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

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
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
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
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PREFACE

The full significance of events in the Vietnam conflict during 1970, as in prior years, will be apparent only after many years of study. The historians at MACV have composed the 1970 history with this in mind, recording events in a manner which will provide a rich source of information for future evaluation and interpretation. At the same time, by providing an overview of major programs and activities in 1970, the historians have compiled a valuable reference document for current use.

The diverse activities of MACV and the tremendous amount of historically pertinent documents, precluded making the history all-inclusive. Emphasis has been on MACV's unique activities and relationships. Where appropriate, background has been provided on continuing programs, or the reader has been referred to the applicable volume of previous MACV Command Histories. Additional information on subjects discussed in the current history can be found in the source documents referenced in the footnotes. These sources have been recorded on microfilm in the MACV Military History Branch files.

The 1970 MACV Command History was developed under the leadership of COL Albert M. Avery (USA), Chief, Military History Branch during 1970, and completed under COL Elizabeth H. Branch (USA), who replaced COL Avery as the MACV Command Historian on 10 Feb 71. Historians who made significant contributions were: LTCs George J. Hamilton, Jr (USMC), Clarence L. Moore (USAF), Kenneth J. McKee (USA), Ruth J. O'Holleran (USMC), and Frederick A. Dodd (USA); CDR Ted J. Bush (USN); MAJs Martha N. Stanton (USAF), Leland M. Martin (USAF), and Charles W. Glover (USA); LCDRs Michael L. McMillen (USN) and Bradley Johnson (USN); CPTs Joel R. Blatt (USA), Justin M. Reese, III (USA), Richard A. Hunt (USA), and James I. Gabbe (USA). Under the expert supervision of MSgt Zebedee Worsham, Jr (USAF), valuable assistance in administration, typing, filing, and graphics design and layout was provided by: MSgt Bernitt E. Powers (USAF); SFC Richard A. Smith (USA); TSgt Harold L. Jimerson (USAF); SSGT Ermelinda Salazar (USMC); SSGs Thomas L. Crossland (USA) and Randolph S. Hunt (USA); SSgt Maurice A. Goode, III (USAF); SP9s Ronald Fawcett (USA), Kent L. Holbrook (USA), Fred A. Mazur (USA), and Thomas C. Laysor (USA); YN2 Leroy R. Lum Ho (USN); SP9s Hobby V. Howard (US), Charles E. Knudsen (USA), Larry A. Spaid (USA), Kenneth R. Wenzel (USA), and Roy M. Wickum (USA); PFC Robert L. Muir, Jr (USA); and Miss Christine Cabell, the Military History Branch Librarian.

The historians acknowledge their indebtedness to the original authors of source material and staff papers, and to the MACV staff who assisted in providing information and guidance.

Although each contribution may not have been recorded, this history stands as a record of accomplishment of all those who have led, who have served, and who have supported the MACV effort.


E. H. BRANCH
Colonel, USA
Command Historian

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CHAPTER I

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INTRODUCTION

(U) The most dramatic event of the war in 1970 was the combined US/RVNAF* cross-border operation. Yet the less dramatic programs of Vietnamization and pacification and development were and still are the keystones of the GVN's political and military operations, crucial to the country's long range stability and security. The Cambodian operation was a catalyst allowing the US to meet more readily its 1970 goals, i. e., to continue to Vietnamize the war, lower the number of US casualties, withdraw US Forces on schedule, and stimulate a negotiated settlement of the war. All four goals were interrelated. As the US redeployed units and turned over areas of operation, the RVNAF found it had the ability to assume a greater operational role. And as the US Forces became less active due to Vietnamization, the casualty rate also dropped, continuing a trend that was evident even before the Cambodian campaign.

(U) Most important, the success of Vietnamization allowed the US to adhere to the Nixon Doctrine, which envisions a lower US profile in international affairs and emphasizes providing economic aid as well as military advice and equipment to other countries to enable them to resolve their own internal problems. It became evident in 1970 that the US was pursuing a successful strategy which provided the GVN both security and additional time for the various pacification programs to operate and take root. Moreover, the government itself gave indications that it was developing democratic institutions. The success of military operations had given the nascent political structure the proper climate in which to develop.

(U) The coming year will be the time of testing, of determining whether the roots of government have taken hold. The loyalty and active support of the people will have to be cultivated to assure the continued growth and health of the RVN's political system. The challenges of 1971 -- the need to stabilize the economy, the need to continue progress in restoring security and tranquility to the countryside -- are crucial to the existence of the GVN. In this sense the definitive measurement of MACV's progress in 1970, in military operations, Vietnamization, and pacification, will be in 1971.

(C) Military operations in 1970 were geared to exploiting the progress in Vietnamization and pacification and development. In addition to the Cambodian sanctuary operations, there were operations against VC/NVA in-country "sanctuary" base areas such as portions of Kien Hoa, Quang Ngai, and Quang Nam Provinces, and the U Minh Forest. With these operations, and with literally hundreds of small unit actions extending security from consolidation zones, the GVN control was spread. "Here the effective and proven (pacification) technique was applied, entering in force with Regular Forces to push away large enemy units, following up with territorial forces to provide local security, resettling the population, opening roads, establishing markets" (1)

(C) Because of the success of allied tactics and the pressure on his sanctuaries, the enemy changed strategy, reverting to guerrilla warfare and the economy-of-force operations which he had previously outlined in COSVN Resolutions 9 and 14. The targets of VC/NVA efforts were the successful pacification and Vietnamization programs with more attacks against territorial forces (RF/PF) and increasing reliance on terrorism.

*All abbreviations and acronyms can be found in the Glossary.


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(C) The most telling blow against the enemy of the year, if not the war, was the cross-border Cambodian campaign. The true significance of the damage done to the enemy was greater than the vast amounts of weaponry and tonnage of rice destroyed and captured, or the personnel losses, all of which can be portrayed in impressive columns of statistics. It must be measured in terms of the pause in enemy activity as he attempted to reconstruct his logistics foundation. The impact must also be measured in terms of the psychological impact on both the enemy and on the RVN. The large numbers of Hoi Chanh and political cadre who rallied, as well as the lack of aggressiveness by some VC/NVA tactical units, were indications of the psychological turmoil created within the enemy's infrastructure. The psychological effects on the GVN, the RVNAF, the territorial forces, and the population were even more significant. The increased confidence of the RVNAF in its capability to wage a successful campaign against the enemy, the ability of the RF/PF to assume responsibility for security of the people, and the increased confidence of the people in their government and armed forces provided a set of conditions which could assure the success of the Vietnamization program and the orderly withdrawal of US forces.

(S) The combined operations in Cambodia had also affected subsequent air operations. The enemy's logistic system had been upset by the cross-border campaign. With the closing of the port of Kompong Som and the disruption of his Cambodia base and supply areas, the enemy was forced to rely increasingly on the Ho Chi Minh Trail through southern Laos and northern Cambodia. It was his only logistic lifeline. As the enemy perforce shifted to economy-of-force operations, air interdiction of the enemy's LOC was made even more important. In October 1970, with the approach of the dry season, an intensified interdiction campaign was launched against selected areas in Laos. By the end of the month heavy rainfall and the interdiction program had brought the throughput to a virtual standstill.

(C) Seaborne infiltration was prevented by MARKET TIME, the naval barrier patrol of RVN territorial waters. Naval activity during 1970 also continued to focus on preventing VC/NVA infiltration into MRs 3 and 4 through sensors, waterborne guardposts, and active boat patrols.

(C) Thus allied operations in Southeast Asia advanced the security of Vietnam and made it possible for pacification and development programs to progress.

(C) While combat operations were designed to attack the enemy in his base areas, the pacification campaign sought to restrict VC access to the population. In this manner it would help prevent the symbiosis of guerrilla and populace essential to the success of enemy insurgency. This made internal security paramount. The 1970 Pacification and Development Plan, an improved version of the 1969 plan, took this into consideration. It was anticipated that a serious challenge would appear in the field of internal security; this challenge would be met through strengthened PHUNG HOANG (elimination of VC infrastructure) and National Police programs.

(C) Improvements in security were measured in several ways. The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) ABC ratings (those hamlets in a relatively secure status) showed improvement. In January 1970, the ABC rating was 87.9 percent; at the end of December it stood at 95.1 percent. More significantly, AB hamlets moved from 69.5 percent to 84.6 percent over the same period. As Ambassador Colby said, "Pacification, like golf, becomes more difficult to improve the better it gets, and consequently the rate of progress was less than that of 1969. By end-December, however, HES estimates conceded VC control of only 103 hamlets and a total of 37,800 population, or 0.2 percent of the national total." (2)

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(C) The strength increases in territorial forces (RF/PF) and in the PSDF were other indications of growing security. By the end of December the RF totalled 283,106 and the PF 250,889. The total organized strength of the PSDF was 3,378,498, of whom 2,894,881 were trained; by end of December 444,537 weapons had been furnished to the PSDF.

(C) The PHUNG HOANG program actually exceeded its original goal of 18,000 VC infrastructure (VCI) neutralizations. By the end of the year a total of 21,700 VCI had been sentenced, rallied or killed.

(C) Problems in security persisted, despite the success of programs such as PHUNG HOANG. The enemy relied more heavily on terrorism as the year progressed, especially in MR 2. There, in contrast with MRs 3 and 4, the enemy was not directly affected by the Cambodian incursion and was better able to apply his intended tactic of guerrilla warfare. The entire year showed an actual 10 percent increase in incidents countrywide notwithstanding the GVN goal of reducing the total number of incidents by 50 percent during the year. The internal security struggle was not yet resolved.

(C) In spite of its progress in promoting internal security and thus aiding the community, the GVN often did not seem to have developed the deep-rooted commitment and support of the people. As one analyst put it, "Most of the civilians are indifferent to the GVN and have no real sense of identification with or loyalty to the government." (3) The GVN did move in many areas in 1970 to ameliorate social and economic problems and generate popular support for itself and its programs. Twice during the year the GVN organized and carried out effective relief efforts. Vietnamese refugees from Cambodia and victims of the October/November floods in northern RVN were cared for effectively by the GVN.

(C) The GVN moved in the political sphere to develop support and loyalty. Its political program for 1970 proved to be highly successful in the provincial council elections, the Senate elections, a massive program of training and motivating local officials, the introduction of the provincial councils into decision making and influence, the increase of elected village and hamlet leadership to 95 percent of those in the country, and the Special Self-Development Campaign by which each village in the land was consulted on its desires for development projects in 1971. (4) These programs should be seen not merely as indices of growing GVN political control and influence, but also as vehicles for developing "rice-roots" political support, of identifying the people with the GVN.

(C) New developmental programs were started. A major land reform bill, the Land-to-the Tiller Law of March 1970, was promulgated as well as a Veteran's Benefit Law. Both measures, if properly implemented, should stimulate further loyalty. There was improvement in the agricultural sector as well. Closely related to increased rural security were improved LOCs and greater commercial interchange between producer and market. Under the rice program, 95 percent of the crop goal for 1970 was planted and 882,197 metric tons harvested by the end of the year. Of this total, a significant amount (306,000 hectares) was IR5 and IR8 rice, the "miracle rice." Miracle rice offered the farmer who planted it a crop yield up to five times greater than conventional rice. The advantages of this to the farmer and the GVN economy were evident.

(C) Economic reform measures were undertaken. Tax and banking laws were changed to stem the serious outflow of piasters resulting from foreign trade imbalances. Import duties for luxury items were increased and deposits required for imported goods and commodities. Tax collection procedures were revised to increase revenues. The GVN also encouraged banks to make funds available for land ownership and business enterprises. Perhaps most significant

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was the October devaluation of the personal accommodation rate of the piaster from \$VN 118 to \$VN 275 per \$US 1 MPC. The immediate effect was to curtail severely speculation in MPC, thus aiding the stabilization of the piaster.

(C) Even with all the genuine progress, serious social and economic problems remain, and these problem areas will loom large in the critical 1971 election year. Foremost will be the state of the Vietnamese economy. Inflation during 1970 was 32 percent, in itself a serious threat to the stability of the government. No lasting economic progress can be achieved until inflation is brought under control. The huge trade deficit will have to be reduced. The RVN imported goods whose value was 54 times greater than the value of goods exported (\$US 650 million vs \$US 12 million). These figures underscore the GVN reliance on outside aid and the fact that the Vietnamese economy is based on consumption, and not production, of goods and services. These major economic problems are compounded by the influx of unskilled people from war-torn rural to secure urban areas, further straining the housing, economic, and sanitation capacities of the crowded cities to absorb them. During 1970 the GVN also had to deal with anti-government demonstrations on the part of discontented students and veterans.

(U) Just as the GVN is assuming responsibility for solution of its political and economic problems, it is assuming the burden of combat. Vietnamization is indeed one of the biggest successes of 1970. The ultimate goal is RVNAF self-sufficiency; during the year RVNAF took many significant steps toward that goal.

(U) The Cambodian operation, beginning with RVNAF incursions in April, offered the most convincing evidence since TET 1968 of the vast improvement of Vietnamese forces. All tactical planning, logistics support, and actual leadership of the Vietnamese side of the campaign were Vietnamese. From ARVN to VNMC and VNAF, all elements were successful. The myth of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong superiority, first cracked during TET 1968, was completely broken. The campaign was a tremendous confidence and morale booster. It convinced American advisors that the RVNAF was well on its way toward prosecuting the war on its own.

(U) During the summer Cambodian operations, RF/PF units assumed responsibility for protection of sectors of MRs 3 and 4 which formerly depended for security on ARVN divisions operating in Cambodia. This signified achievement of a primary goal of the Improvement and Modernization (I&M) program: the territorial forces would take responsibility for countryside security, leaving the regular forces free to undertake large-scale operations into remaining enemy enclaves. In most areas the RF/PF performed satisfactorily, and sometimes outstandingly, in their enlarged role.

(S) Under the I&M program, the RVNAF force structure reached its 1970 authorized strength of 986,360. By 1973, the force level is expected to level off at 1.1 million. The size of the RVNAF is best illustrated by comparison with the US. A comparable US military force structure in proportion to total population would total over 18 million people.

(U) A key element to both the assumption of the combat burden and the force structure increases was an improved RVNAF training base. During 1970 the RVNAF training centers provided over a half million men and women for the tactical units, while the service schools graduated over 87,000 students. This training capability assured a flow of qualified soldiers, sailors and airmen to fill newly activated units of the increased force structure and to provide qualified replacements for existing units.

(C) To support the increased combat participation of RVNAF, equipment turnover continued to proceed rapidly, especially to naval forces. Under the accelerated turnover plan, begun in 1968,

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all small coastal and river combat craft had been turned over to the VNN by the end of 1970. With this action the USN reverted to an advisory role, except for its air assets and Seal; henceforth the primary USN task was to provide advice and logistics support to the VNN. All that remained for completion of the USN's Vietnamization program was to complete transferral of support craft and continue phasing out its advisory program. By year's end, the VNN assumed responsibility for almost all barrier interdiction in MRs 3 and 4 and for the inner MARKET TIME barrier.

(S) Turnover of responsibility to the VNAF proceeded less rapidly due to shortfalls in technical training. English language proficiency, a necessity for studying the mechanics and operation of aircraft, was a serious problem. Still, Vietnamization of the air war progressed ahead of schedule. At the end of the year, the VNAF flew roughly 50 percent of the TACAIR sorties in RVN; the 1969 rate was 18 percent.

(U) Vietnamization of the ground conflict was another significant accomplishment of the year. Major US units redeployed in three increments in 1970. By 15 Apr 70 the 1st Inf Div, 26th Regt Landing Team (USMC), the 3d Bde of the 4th Inf Div, and the 12th Tactical Fighter Group (USAF) had redeployed. As of 15 Oct 70 the 3d Bde of the 9th Inf Div, the 199th Inf Bde, the 7th Regt Landing Team (USMC) and three mobile construction battalions (7, 10, 121) (USN) had left Vietnam. Finally, by the end of December the 4th Inf Div and the 25th Inf Div (minus the 2nd Bde) had returned to CONUS.

(C) RVNAF was assuming increased responsibilities for areas of operation throughout RVN. In MR 1, ARVN assumed major responsibility for areas of operation in western Quang Tri Province (formerly the responsibility of the US Marines). They also took over several fire support bases south of the DMZ and in southwestern Quang Tri and western Thua Thien Provinces. With the standdown of the 4th Inf Div in October-November, ARVN areas of responsibility increased to include most of MR 2, with the exception of some areas of the five coastal provinces. In MR 3, RVNAF forces became responsible for the majority of operations in the border areas and over 50 percent of the entire region, after the 25th Inf Div redeployed in November. The defense of the Saigon area had already been turned over to the RVNAF in October 1969. ARVN had assumed responsibility in 1969 for all ground operations in MR 4 when the 9th Inf Div (US) redeployed.

(C) Along with the turnover of areas of operation went the turnover of bases and real property. During the year, the policies and procedures for disposal of excess real and related property were finalized. By 31 Dec 70, a total of 77 transfers ranging from fire support bases to large bases were completed, with 38 still in process. Redeployments of US Forces resulted in the transfer of over \$14 million worth of individual major items to RVNAF.

(C) Improvement and modernization of all communication-electronics (C-E) facilities, equipment and training continued throughout the year. Vietnamization of US communications support began in the spring of the year with the successful turnover of communications/support responsibilities to several ARVN units. Major steps were also taken to replace US military personnel operating the Integrated Communication System-SEA with civilians. Some civilians were US and third-country nationals, but most were Vietnamese. The significance of the integrated communication system in Vietnam cannot be overestimated. In a country where communications had been slow and backward, the integrated system now provided the RVN with a modern sophisticated communications network linking the entire country from the DMZ to the Delta.

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(S) Construction of LOCs remained a major effort during the year with 40 percent of US engineer troop effort, 25 percent of contractor effort, and 25 percent of RVNAF engineer troop effort devoted to the construction of roads. Accordingly, 2,355 km of roads were completed of the total program of 4,418 km. A deferral of 492 km of roads was necessary during the year because of a reduction in funds.

(C) Even with all the progress there were still problems to be resolved. Such problems as leadership deficiencies and desertion, endemic to RVNAF and evident since the beginning of I&M, continued. Promotions were still too slow and often regulated by political convention. There was a continuing shortage of officers (LT through LTC) and NCOs, especially serious in the RF/PF. Officers and NCO instructors and cadre at training schools and training centers were in short supply. Desertion, perhaps the major dilemma plaguing the RVNAF, continued at rates slightly higher than in 1968 and 1969. The 1970 gross desertion rate per thousand for all RVNAF was 11.8; it was 11.1 in 1969.

(U) One of the problems facing MACV paradoxically resulted from the success of Vietnamization. As the US Forces turned over the burden of active fighting to the RVNAF and accelerated redeployment, US morale problems increased. There were instances of racial clashes and incidents of successful and attempted "fragging" (discharge of fragmentation grenades) of officers and NCOs by disgruntled GIs. Apprehensions for drug abuse increased sharply over 1969 with the bulk of the 1970 arrests occurring in the last 3 months of 1970. Heroin was used by 5 to 10 percent of those apprehended. To combat the growing drug problem, a Drug-Abuse Task Force was formed in late August 1970 to examine all aspects of drug abuse in RVN and to formulate new procedures to combat the problem. (5)

(U) To combat these morale problems associated with the reduced US combat role, MACV changed its leave policy. Formerly one 7-day leave was authorized during the normal tour. During 1970 the policy was changed to allow each serviceman to take one 14-day leave and return to the US. The granting of more leave time to personnel stationed in RVN attests both to the reduced US role in the war and to success in reducing the scope and intensity of the conflict. The morale-boosting R&R program continued successfully.

(U) The Paris peace talks continued in an unfruitful fashion. In spite of President Nixon's October offer of a cease-fire in place, the talks remained deadlocked. The US delegation repeatedly attempted to induce NVN to agree to prisoner exchanges. At the end of the year Hanoi still had not made any concessions on the PW issue.

(U) At the end of 1970, MACV could see evidence of real progress over the past year. The Cambodian operation was a significant military success. Progress in pacification and Vietnamization was steady and continuous. Perhaps the clearest indication of success in 1970 was the lowering of the US profile as the RVNAF more and more assumed the burden of fighting and the GVN continued its progress in pacification. While the increased ability of RVNAF under Vietnamization led to steadily increasing security, the US redeployed 139,025 troops. On 1 Jan 70 US strength was 474,819; at the end of the year it was down to 335,794, while other FWMAF strength remained relatively constant. If progress in Vietnamization and pacification was the keynote of 1970, the theme of 1971 would be testing the viability of our progress.

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CHAPTER II

MILITARY STRATEGY AND PLANS

US OBJECTIVES IN VIETNAM

(C) In 1970 the ultimate US objective in Vietnam continued to be:

A free, independent and viable nation of South Vietnam functioning in a secure environment both internally and regionally. (1)

Immediate and intermediate US objectives were identified and established as a basis for the issuance of strategic guidance, the development of strategic plans, and the management of the resources -- necessary steps towards the achievement of the ultimate objective. By mid-1970, the immediate objective had been attained, i. e., an environment of reasonable security had been created within key areas of South Vietnam; a realistic basis for the Government of South Vietnam (GVN) and the people to proceed with building a free and independent nation. Emphasis shifted to Vietnamization and a decreasing role for US forces. At the close of 1970, the intermediate objective, as defined below, was considered attainable by mid-1971.

Expanded areas of secure environment within which the GVN carries out national development programs which will give a solidified basis for the GVN and its people to continue developing meaningful institutions and an environment for beneficial economic growth and social change. (2)

US STRATEGY FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

(C) To further US objectives, the US military mission in South Vietnam was to assist the Vietnamese Government in reestablishing and expanding its authority and control and in improving its security forces -- Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), paramilitary, and police organization -- to the point where GVN could maintain security for its own people. (3) In 1970 the GVN achieved a significant degree of stability and a substantial expansion of its armed forces. Results were becoming more apparent as the GVN assumed more responsibility for the development of a free, independent and viable Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

(C) GVN/US/FWF (Free World Forces) were committed to the "one war" concept in their efforts to defeat the enemy. Promulgated by COMUSMACV in early 1969, the "one war" or "area security" concept continued to emphasize:

... that the conflict was not three separate wars; that is, a war of big battalions, a war of pacification, and a war of territorial security. It is one war. In this "one war", the coordinated employment of all resources must be applied to specific critical priority areas. Priority of effort must be aimed toward the isolation of the enemy from the people. (4)

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Use of Forces

(C) All forces had as their primary concern the provision of effective security for the people of the RVN. To that end:

--RVNAF units assisted and supported by Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) (including US) would concentrate their primary efforts on the destruction of enemy main forces, and secondarily, in conjunction with the territorial forces, assist the National Police (NP) in the neutralization of subversive elements. Additionally, the regular forces were assigned the mission of border surveillance to interdict and preempt external reinforcements-- personnel and materiel-- into the RVN. Finally they were charged with support of the total pacification and development effort.

--The territorial forces would assume an ever-increasing degree of responsibility for local security of the people, as well as for government installations and lines of communications (LOCs), thus allowing the regular forces to concentrate on destruction of the enemy main forces. Ground and aerial interdiction in the RVN, Cambodia, and Laos would hamper ground infiltration, and naval forces would continue to deny sea infiltration.

--As the RVNAF increased their capability to effectively conduct both offensive and defense operations, COMUSMACV progressively would redeploy troops and allocate an increasing portion of resources to national development.

(C) Disposition of forces:

--RVN regular forces were to be deployed to the less populated areas for mobile combat with enemy main force units, assisted by FWMAF.

--Territorial forces would be deployed primarily in the secure bases and consolidation zones to provide local security, to protect LOCs, and to assist the civil elements in neutralizing the VC infrastructure (VCI) or other subversive elements.

--The civil elements would be deployed in the local populated areas to secure the people, protect facilities, neutralize subversive elements, and prevent crime.

(C) Priority of effort during the hostilities phase was to be given to the heavily populated, politically and economically significant, fertile lowlands -- particularly the Mekong Delta area. Enemy base areas would be isolated and the capability of enemy forces to mass for attack was to be precluded through the judicious use of mobility and fire power. It was also necessary, concurrently, to control the highland regions and to bring the highland tribes people into the nation's mainstream; the enemy had to be denied permanently the opportunity of exploiting either the terrain or the population resources of the highland region. (5)

Strategy for Southeast Asia

(S) The war in Southeast Asia (SEA) took a new turn when President Nixon on 30 Apr 70 announced that US combat troops were being sent into Cambodia along with South Vietnamese forces ... "to clean out major enemy sanctuaries. (6)

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(S) Following the Cambodian cross-border operations, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) provided guidance for further development of SEA strategy to include an FY71 Cambodian strategy. The guidance continued the emphasis on development of RVNAF and support of pacification, but in addition, provided guidance on GVN operations in Cambodia and US support thereto. (For further discussion, see TOP SECRET Supplement.) (/)

PLANS

GVN and Combined Plans

(C) The strategy for the conduct of the war as outlined in the Combined Strategic Objectives Plan was implemented by GVN plans coordinated with MACV. Two documents, the GVN 1970 Pacification and Development (P&D) Plan and the Combined Campaign Plan 1970, AB 145, directed 1970 operations.

GVN 1970 Pacification and Development Plan

(C) The GVN 1970 P&D Plan, the second annual P&D plan, included the basic guidelines published by the RVN's Central Pacification and Development Council (CPDC), a cabinet committee formed in 1969 which had developed and approved the 1969 P&D plan as a continuation of the 1968 Accelerated Pacification Campaign. The 1970 P&D Plan contained inputs from the ministries chiefly responsible for the program involved and was approved by the President, the Prime Minister, and the entire cabinet. It became the authoritative document on pacification policies. As in 1969, provision was made for each province chief and the province senior advisor to sign the province plan jointly. The joint signing of the province plans illustrated the importance of the GVN plan and of the coordinated US/GVN effort called for in its execution.

(C) The GVN 1970 P&D Plan had the following objectives:

1. Territorial Security. Provide a B level of security to 90 percent of the population and at least a C level to 100 percent. (See Chapter VIII for a description of these security ratings.) Reduce enemy ground attacks or attacks-by-fire at least 50 percent in comparison with 1969 in areas undergoing pacification, and 75 percent in those areas which are completely secure.
2. Protection of the People against Terrorism. Neutralize the VCI and expand law and order. Fulfill the goals established by the 1969 P&D Plan. Reduce terrorist, sabotage, and propaganda activities by 50 percent, in comparison with the 1969 rate, in those areas undergoing pacification and by 75 percent in secure areas. The NP was to expand and increase the quality of its assistance in the cities and in every village in secure areas.
3. People's Self Defense Force (PSDF). Complete the organization, training, and equipping of the PSDF and increase its participation in the pacification effort and community affairs.

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4. Local Administration. Complete the elections and staffing of all village, hamlet, municipal, and provincial councils; give the village more tax and budget responsibility; and encourage the formation and expression of community organizations for all goals in the society.

5. Greater National Unity. Rally 40,000 Hoi Chanhs. Place greater emphasis on the Chieu Hoi program and the quality of the ralliers, e. g., high and middle-ranking cadre.

6. Brighter Life for War Victims. Improve and normalize the lives of the refugees, veterans, and widows.

7. People's Information. Strengthen and integrate the information system and identify and motivate leadership at all levels.

8. Prosperity for All. Establish economic prosperity for all by increasing the means of production. Eliminate useless restrictions; expedite land reforms; organize producer associations; provide credit; and provide development capital down to the villages for projects the people desire. (8)

(C) The GVN 1970 P&D Plan is discussed in more detail in Chapter VIII, Pacification and Development. That chapter also discusses the GVN Special P&D Plan initiated on 1 Jul 70, which provided the impetus to complete all the goals established for 1970 and to prepare for the 1971 Community Defense and Local Development Plan. In order to implement the latter plan on 1 Mar 71, the GVN conducted a special transition campaign covering the period 1 Nov 70-28 Feb 71.

The Combined Campaign Plan

(S) The Combined Campaign Plan 1970, AB 145, dated 31 Oct 69, was prepared jointly by representatives of the RVNAF Joint General Staff (JGS) and the FWMAF. The single, bilingual document was the basic plan for the conduct of all military operation in RVN during 1970. The GVN P&D Plan and the Combined Campaign Plan complemented one another.

(S) The 1970 plan, AB 145, was based on two assumptions regarding Vietnamization: first, that FWMAF (which included US) would be reduced to a level consistent with progress of RVNAF improvement and modernization, pacification and development, and the level of enemy activity; and second, that the accelerated program of expansion, improvement, and modernization of RVNAF would proceed as planned. The Combined Campaign Plan 1970 provided for the transition from the 1969 security system, i. e., emphasis on critical priority areas, to a security system that ultimately would require less participation by combat forces of FWMAF. The territorial forces, consisting of Regional Forces and Popular Forces (RF/PF), supported by NP and PSDF, assumed an increasingly important role. While supporting the government P&D program, these forces would conduct operations to prevent enemy infiltration, attacks, and harassment of populated areas from villages to province capitals, military bases, and vital LOCs.

(S) One of the major objectives of the campaign plan was participation in the GVN 1970 P&D Plan. That in itself was significant. Whereas the 1969 Combined Campaign Plan called for support of pacification and development, the 1970 plan called for participation. That objective was equally as important as the other objective, defeat of the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army (VC/NVA) forces. Supporting the two basic objectives were related tasks:

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1. Defeat VC/NVA Forces. The related tasks were to conduct sustained, coordinated, and combined mobile operations against VC/NVA forces, base areas (BAs), and logistic systems; conduct a continuous air offensive to neutralize enemy forces, BAs, and logistic systems in RVN and in authorized contiguous areas; execute ground, sea, and air operations to interdict enemy land and water LOCs; deny the enemy rice and other supplies; maintain air supremacy and naval superiority within and adjacent to RVN; conduct border and coastal surveillance, cross-border operations as authorized, and counter-infiltration operations; conduct psychological operations against enemy personnel; and conduct intelligence and counter-intelligence operations.

2. Participate in the P&D Plan throughout RVN. The related tasks were to secure population areas, economic and political centers, and military installations; conduct operations to prevent enemy infiltration into areas adjacent to population centers; assist in the identification and neutralization of the VCI; conduct military operations to secure areas for pacification; maintain and improve security of both secure areas and consolidation zones; assist in the development of the PSDF; secure and improve LOCs supporting military, political, and economic efforts; participate in population and resources control programs; support the Chieu Hoi program with strong psychological operations; assist in resettling refugees; conduct military civic action; and integrate US and RVNAF forces in providing for a common integrated telecommunications system supporting RVN.

(S) The Combined Campaign Plan had nine major goals used to measure progress in achieving the major objectives:

1. Participate in the GVN 1970 P&D Plan, with its eight programs:
 - a. Territorial security
 - b. Protection of the people against terrorism
 - c. People's Self Defense Forces
 - d. Local administration
 - e. Greater national unity
 - f. Brighter life for war victims
 - g. People's information
 - h. Prosperity for all
2. Organize, train, equip, and modernize RVNAF to achieve a maximum state of combat effectiveness.
3. Employ RVNAF in accordance with their assigned missions and capabilities.
4. Replace, on a selective basis, regular-force units assigned to pacification and static territorial security missions with RF.

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5. Inflict more casualties on the enemy than he could replace.
6. Deny the maximum number of BA sanctuaries and logistical systems in RVN to the enemy.
7. Restore and secure to the greatest extent possible the road, railroad, and waterway LOCs.
8. Protect all national resources in secure areas and consolidation zones. In other areas deprive the enemy of the use of natural resources to the maximum extent possible.
9. Increase intelligence and counterintelligence activities.

(S) Significantly, the concept of operations was based on JGS recognition of the concept of Vietnamization. The concept envisaged four aspects of the relationship between RVNAF and FWMAF:

1. A transition from the existing security system to a security system that ultimately would not require the current level of participation by combat forces of the RVN.
2. RVNAF and FWMAF would continue to conduct combined or unilateral operations to meet enemy formations and reduce selected BAs.
3. As major enemy formations were withdrawn or forced to withdraw to North Vietnam (NVN), pacification and development goals would be met, and the combat effectiveness of RVNAF improved to such an extent that the requirement for FWMAF would be reduced.
4. Where necessary, combat support and service support would continue to be provided to RVNAF by FWMAF.

(S) Operating within the concept, RVNAF and FWMAF were employed in critical priority areas, while economy-of-force was practiced elsewhere and mobile operations emphasized. Two interdependent roles were established. First, the FWMAF and RVNAF regular forces conducted operations primarily to locate and neutralize enemy main forces, BAs, and logistical systems in RVN; deter enemy incursions into RVN along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), Laotian and Cambodian borders, and in coastal waters; and prevent enemy main-force incursions into consolidation zones and secure areas. Secondly, the territorial forces, consisting of RF/PF, supported by the NP, PSDF, and regular forces when the situation required, conducted operations primarily to participate in CVN pacification and development and prevent enemy infiltration, attacks, and harassment in secure areas and pacification areas.

(S) Naval forces were responsible for continuing coastal surveillance operations to deny the enemy use of the sea for infiltration. Inland waterway interdiction was to be continued in the Delta, the river approaches to Saigon, and in other inland waterway systems to deny enemy use of vital LOCs and to protect them for friendly use. Naval gunfire was to be employed for interdiction fires, support of friendly coastal operations and neutralization of enemy facilities and forces. Riverine operations would be continued in I, III, and IV CTZ.

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(S) Air forces were responsible for conducting close air support, interdiction operations, and logistics air lift in support of FWMAF and RVNAF. Tactical air forces were to be reinforced by heavy strike forces with continued emphasis on quick reaction capabilities. Aerial reconnaissance was to provide complete coverage of operational areas and principal routes of infiltration and provide early identification of enemy troop concentrations.

(S) The efforts of all elements of RVNAF and the FWMAF were to be closely coordinated with emphasis on cooperation. This was particularly critical to the success of the GVN P&D plan. In that regard, psychological operations and civic action were coordinated with military operations to gain support of the people; cause them to participate in national programs including Chieu Hoi and PHUNG HOANG; show them GVN was fighting for their welfare; and destroy enemy morale and persuade them to rally to GVN.

(S) Special emphasis was placed on sector planning to insure close coordination of military and paramilitary efforts; continuous military participation in pacification and development programs; combined and coordinated operations to assure security of the populace; and improvement and modernization of all elements of the RVNAF, particularly RF and PF.

1. CTZ commanders were responsible that sectors prepared and implemented sector territorial plans based on the guidance contained in AB 145 and the GVN 1970 P&D Plan. The sector plans aimed primarily at assuring security for the Vietnamese people with particular attention to neutralizing the VCI and the prevention of terrorist and sapper activity. Sector plans also supported the establishment of efficient rural administration which met the peoples' expectations and motivated them to participate in government; protect and control resources; assist refugees; and assist in the organization, training, equipping and employment of the PSDF.

2. Military participation in pacification and development was to be continuous, with efforts focused on consolidation zones. In secure areas and consolidated zones the PF, in conjunction with the NP and PSDF, had the responsibility for village and hamlet security, and they were to cooperate fully with the police in neutralizing the VCI. The PF were also assigned the task of maintaining law and order and eliminating criminal elements in the villages and hamlets where NP were not available. Military and civilian efforts to identify the VCI were to be intensified and followed up by rapid and incisive reaction to exploit intelligence. The importance of the people as the greatest asset to the GVN was stressed. Every effort was to be made to liberate people under enemy control and to provide maximum security. Efforts were to be made to deny the essential assets of food, money, manpower, concealment, and intelligence which the enemy needed to continue the war. The majority of the population and the major food producing areas were within secure areas and consolidation zones. The enemy was to be driven from those areas into the sparsely populated, food-scarce areas. Special emphasis was directed toward the protection of provincial and district capitals and cities. In that regard the plan stressed operations which required regular forces to concentrate on operations outside population centers leaving internal security to police and territorial forces.

3. Combined operations were another matter of emphasis. Those operations would include reciprocal general and direct support, coordinated artillery and air support, and combined intelligence collection and dissemination. Neutralization of enemy BAs was to continue with priority to those which directly affected high population areas, vital LOCs, strategic government centers, and areas of economic importance. Border and coastal defense activities were continued in order to discover and deter entry of enemy personnel and equipment into RVN. The number and duration of those operations were to be increased with emphasis on day and night patrols, ambushes, and night operations.

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4. All elements of RVNAF, particularly the RF and PF, were to be improved through force structure revisions, personnel and logistics management improvements, special training, and the provision of essential modern weapons and equipment. Combined training to improve the combat effectiveness of the RVNAF was also emphasized.

(S) Thus, the principles of area security were incorporated and the protection of the Vietnamese people stressed. The plan definitely recognized the assumption of a greater share of the war effort by the RVNAF as objectives were achieved and provided for intensified military participation in pacification and development under the "one war" concept.

(S) In execution, CTZ operations were focused as follows:

I CTZ. Regular forces would be committed primarily to mobile operations against enemy forces, BAs, LOCs, and logistic systems in I CTZ and other enemy forces which might invade across the DMZ or Laotian border. Emphasis was to be placed by territorial forces on maintaining security in secure areas and improving security in consolidation zones. Military participation in the government P&D plan was to be intensified. Opening and protecting vital road, rail, and water LOCs, particularly Routes 1 and 9, were to be given high priority.

II CTZ. Regular forces would be committed primarily to mobile operations against enemy forces, BAs, LOCs, and logistical systems in II CTZ, and other enemy forces which might invade across the Laotian or Cambodian borders. Emphasis was to be placed by territorial forces on maintaining security in secure areas and improving security in consolidation zones. Military participation in the government P&D plan was to be intensified. Opening and protecting vital road, rail, and water LOCs, particularly Routes 1, 11, 14, 19, 20, and 21, were to be given high priority.

III CTZ. Regular forces would be committed primarily to mobile operations against enemy forces, BAs, LOCs, and logistical systems in III CTZ, and other enemy forces which might invade across the Cambodian border. Emphasis was placed by territorial forces on maintaining security in secure areas and on improving security in consolidation zones. Military participation in the government P&D plan was to be intensified. Opening and protecting vital roads, rail, and water LOCs, particularly Routes 1, 4, 13, 15, 20, 22, the Saigon-Bien Hoa highway, and the Saigon shipping channel, were to be given high priority.

IV CTZ. Regular forces would be committed primarily to mobile operations against enemy forces, BAs, LOCs, and logistical systems in IV CTZ, and other enemy forces which might invade across the Cambodian border. Emphasis was placed by territorial forces on maintaining security in secure areas and on improving security in consolidation zones. Military participation in the government P&D plan was to be intensified. Opening and protecting vital road and water LOCs, particularly Routes 4 and the Bac Lieu-Saigon and Rach Gia-Saigon waterways, were to be given high priority. The outpost defensive system was to be strengthened and improved to effectively counter all enemy ground and fire attacks. (9)

Planning for 1971

(S) On 31 Oct 70 the Combined Campaign Plan, 1971, / B 146 (U) was distributed and became effective for planning with an implementation date of 1 Jan 71. The major thrusts of AB 146 were assuring the protection of the Vietnamese people; participation in pacification and

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development; and improving the combat effectiveness of the RVNAF. The plan recognized the Vietnamese were assuming a greater share of the war effort as the FWMAF redeployed.

(S) AB 146 continued the two objectives of the 1970 AB 145 Plan; the defeat of the VC/NVA, and participation in the GVN 1971 Community Defense and Local Development Plan. A most significant departure from the previous plan was the responsibility of the RVNAF to conduct cross-border operations in authorized contiguous areas on order and to support the PHUNG HOANG Plan to neutralize the VCI. In reality, AB 146 recognized the progress achieved by the RVNAF during 1970.

Special Campaign Plans

(S) The Combined Campaign Plan 1970, AB 145, provided planning guidance and direction to RVNAF and FWMAF commanders for operations in 1970. These included specifically directing military participation in the GVN 1970 P&D Plan. As conditions changed, revised guidance which amplified the annual campaign plan was dispatched by message to the field. Thus by message of 10 Jun 70 COMUSMACV promulgated the Summer Campaign Plan, providing guidance for on-going operations through 30 Jun, prescribing authorities and limitations for US support of RVNAF cross-border operations in Cambodia after 30 Jun, and outlining priority of tasks to be accomplished. (10) Information in that plan, and the later Fall Campaign Plan, was also provided as a basis for planning discussions among US, RVNAF, and other FWMAF commanders.

(S) Operations in Cambodia had previously not been incorporated in campaign plans. Special planning for possible cross-border operations had been initiated by the MACV staff in Jan 70. Detailed combined planning began on 27 Mar following receipt of JCS authority. Two general areas (Angel's Wing-Parrot's Beak and the Fishhook) were initially selected as the proposed operational objective areas. As planning progressed, additional enemy BAs were added as operational objectives. The overall objective of the US attack into Cambodia would be the capture or destruction of enemy materiel and facilities. US operations would be limited in extent and duration; units were not authorized to operate beyond 30 km from the RVN border, and all US ground operations would be completed by 30 Jun. For a detailed discussion, see Annex C.

Summer Campaign Plan

(S) The Summer Campaign Plan was based on the concept that enemy capabilities in III and IV CTZ had been appreciably reduced by the operations in Cambodia. (CTZs were redesignated Military Regions (MRs) on 1 Jul 70.) Allied operations would be conducted to maintain maximum pressure on the enemy forces and logistical bases.

1. Until 30 Jun 70 the focus was to be on aggressive conduct of operations against the Cambodia BAs; forces not in Cambodia were to continue combat operations designed to assist Vietnamization.

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2. After 30 Jun, an intensified campaign was to be waged against in-country enemy forces, with the RVNAF continuing forays into Cambodia to prevent a reestablished threat from that area. Although a major military threat confronted I CTZ, significant enemy forces remained throughout RVN. Operations were to be conducted which would reduce those threats, with consideration given to the allocation of additional resources to I CTZ. Support of pacification was to be intensified, particularly with emphasis on expansion of population security, on neutralization of the VCI, and on assistance in improving the effectiveness of the RF/PF. The increased confidence and skill of the RVNAF which resulted from the Cambodian operation was to be exploited. The spirit of offense was to be maintained.

(S) Under the Summer Campaign Plan, the objective of US operations was to improve the security of the people of RVN by: supporting RVNAF in preventing the enemy from reestablishing a military capability in Cambodia; intensifying efforts supporting pacification; and conducting combat operations to eliminate enemy main forces and BAs and reduce the flow of materiel and manpower support for the enemy in and adjacent to RVN.

(S) Reflecting their increased ability, RVNAF was to:

1. Continue cross-border operations designed to disrupt and prevent reestablishment of the VC/NVA system in Cambodia where such operations were clearly and directly related to the security of RVN;
2. Increase communication and liaison with Forces Armees Nationale Khmer (FANK) in order to enhance FANK capabilities and provide channels for materiel assistance and for operational coordination and support;
3. Conduct combat operations within RVN, including intensified combat operations in the border areas;
4. Continue progressive turnover of responsibility from Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) to territorial forces for population security;
5. Support the Special P&D Plan to enhance identification of the populace with the GVN;
and
6. Intensify attacks against VCI with particular emphasis on traditional strongholds.

(S) The US and other FWMAF were to conduct mobile operations in expanded areas of operation (AO) to locate and neutralize VC/NVA BAs and resources, as well as supporting GVN pacification and development efforts in assigned areas.

(S) In executing the plan, RVNAF, US, and other FWMAF would maintain maximum pressure on the enemy; maintain air interdiction efforts (including B-52s) against the enemy BAs and LOCs in Cambodia and Laos; accomplish standdown of JS combat units designated for redeployment as late as practicable but to complete redeployment by 15 Oct 70; encourage conduct of cross-border operations by RVNAF, when hard intelligence identified worthwhile targets; give first priority of combat support and combat service support to CG, XXIV Corps and second priority to CG, I FFORCEV; and conduct surveillance and denial operations to frustrate enemy efforts to reestablish LOCs and BAs.

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(S) Explicit guidance was provided on operations in Cambodia after 30 Jun. There would be no forces, no advisors, no US close-air support, no US helicopters, and no US ships or craft in Cambodia. US Forces would support and complement RVNAF cross-border operations to the limit of the authorities cited below:

1. Combat, advisory, and logistical support, including medical evacuation, were to be furnished to RVNAF up to the RVN/Cambodian border and to the limits of Cambodian territorial waters.
2. Artillery fire support was permitted across the border into Cambodia to the limit of range from gun positions in RVN.
3. Air interdiction operations against enemy BAs and LOCs were to be conducted in the authorized area of northeast Cambodia. (11)

(C) Special rules of engagement (ROE) past 30 Jun 70 were issued and placed in effect. See TOP SECRET Supplement.

Fall Campaign Plan

(S) In September 1970, COMUSMACV issued a Fall Campaign Plan providing guidance for the conduct of operations for the period 1 Oct thru 31 Dec 70. The Fall Campaign Plan considered:

1. Improvements in RVNAF quality as well as possible increase in RVNAF force levels.
2. Continued redeployment of US Forces from RVN and reduction in the resources available from FWMAF, resulting in the continual progressive assumption by RVNAF of responsibility for expanded AOs.
3. An increase in counter-pacification activities by the enemy. Enemy military action in MR 1 was expected to increase, with military action elsewhere in RVN remaining at a relatively low level.
4. Selective US support of Government of Cambodia's efforts in defense of its neutrality and independence.
5. The restrictive effort of the northeast monsoon on operations in MR 1 and the northern coastal region of MR 2.
6. The improvement of trafficability for surface operations and weather for air operations, as a result of the dry season in the remainder of RVN.

(S) Allied assets were to be utilized in the light of the mission, the enemy situation, and the most pressing needs at that time. Operations would vary not only from one MR to another, but also in a single MR. Along the border and in contested areas, the focus was to be on the enemy; in pacified areas the judicious utilization of combat power was to be exercised and efforts directed at the creation of a secure, peaceful environment and the promotion of orderly growth.

(S) The prudent utilization of artillery, tactical air (TACAIR), B-52 strikes, helicopters, and gunships, particularly in pacified areas, was to be emphasized at all levels of command.

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(S) Special emphasis was placed on achieving the goals listed in the AB 145 and the Special 1970 P&D Plan, prior to the end of CY 70. A concerted effort, in cooperation with and in support of local civilian authorities and agencies, was to be placed on achieving the following unattained goals in all MRs:

1. RF/PF and PSDF training programs
2. Reduction of terrorists incidents
3. Territorial security goals with respect to percentages of population in AB and ABC categories.
4. VCI neutralization goals
5. Improved security of LOCs
6. Effective Chieu Hoi program
7. Refugee resettlement goals.

(S) Priority undertakings were also established. Maximum pressure was to be maintained on the enemy. The pattern of military operations was designed to keep the enemy off-balance and allow for economy-of-force. As US and other FWMAF presence decreased, imagination became more vital to effective operations.

1. Unless hard intelligence warranted large-scale operations, emphasis was to be placed on the conduct of small-unit actions throughout RVN in order to provide security to consolidation zones and secure areas. Available forces were to react quickly should enemy contact develop.
2. All forces were to conduct a coordinated intelligence-gathering effort, employing all military and civil intelligence agencies within the area of responsibility, to identify vulnerable enemy sub-systems.
3. In the clearing zone, emphasis was placed on military participation in resource denial in order to preclude enemy access to foodstuffs, munitions, and other items essential to the VC war effort.
4. Psychological operations were to be characterized by time-phased communications with specific target audiences to achieve the desired behavior, such as providing information, in support of military operations.
5. Naval forces were to provide coastal surveillance to interdict enemy infiltration into RVN; riverine patrols to deny the enemy's use of inland waterways; and naval gunfire support of friendly ground operations.
6. Air forces were to provide TACAIR support to the ground forces; interdiction of enemy infiltration and logistical routes into RVN; aerial reconnaissance, particularly in the border and coastal areas; airlift support; and search and recovery support. Air interdiction

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efforts were to be maintained in Laos, RVN, and in Cambodia (contingent upon the extension of Cambodian air interdiction authority).

7. US Forces were to complement RVNAF operating in the clearing zone, by providing route and area security and reconnaissance over broad areas.

8. RVNAF mobile field forces were to conduct mobile operations against enemy main-force units in the border area and clearing zones.

9. RVNAF Cambodian cross-border operations were to continue, where such operations were clearly and directly related to the security of RVN, so as to preclude the establishment of a viable logistics system by the enemy. US support of those operations was governed by the authorities related to Cambodian operations.

10. The RF/PF were to conduct mobile operations to increase the security of villages and hamlets in accordance with GVN 1970 P&D Plan and Supplemental 1970 P&D Plan. Secure areas were to be the responsibility of the NP in coordination with PSDF and the PF. Priority tasks in all MRs would be to upgrade the performance of those forces.

(S) Concerning pacification, emphasis was to be placed on supporting and assisting the GVN in achieving the goals and objectives called for in the GVN Supplemental P&D Plan with priority to territorial security, the reduction of incidents of terrorism, and increasing the effectiveness of the territorial forces.

(S) Psychological operations were to place primary emphasis on the neutralization of the VCI. Priority was to be given to the exercise of influence by all commanders and senior advisors to insure effective implementation of the People's Information Program.

(S) Improvement of the RVNAF during the fall campaign was to be achieved by providing an environment in which improvement and modernization of the RVN armed forces could be accelerated. The goal was for the RVNAF to become self-sufficient in order to replace US and other FWMAF in assuming responsibility for the conduct of the war.

(S) In devising the fall campaign, the probable courses of enemy action were appraised to be increased military activity in MR 1 for the balance of the year in the hope of inflicting maximum allied casualties, impeding the pacification program, and relieving allied pressure on enemy forces in the other regions; concurrently, the enemy would continue attempts to maintain a strong presence in the populated areas relying heavily on the local forces and the guerrillas. Politically motivated terrorists acts were expected to continue, and periodic upsurges could be expected to occur in the Delta and in the coastal areas of enemy MR 5 (roughly Danang to Cam Ranh). The enemy was expected to consolidate his gains in Laos while continuing his efforts to secure a logistics corridor through Cambodia. His ultimate goal in SEA remained complete domination of RVN.

(S) To meet the enemy threat, the RVNAF were to :

1. Continue cross-border operations when such operations were clearly and directly related to security of RVN;

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2. Continue communications and liaison with FANK;
3. Conduct combat operations within RVN against enemy main-force units in the border area and clearing zones;
4. Continue progressive assumption of responsibility for border areas;
5. Continue progressive turnover of responsibility from RVNAF mobile field forces to territorial forces for population security;
6. Support the 1970 Supplemental P&D Plan to enhance identification of the RVNAF and the GVN with the people;
7. Maintain LOCs and open roads and waterways, as directed;
8. Increase use of surface LOCs;
9. Intensify attacks against VCI;
10. Assist in the control of resources and people;
11. Continue political warfare (POLWAR) activities to gain and maintain the loyalty of RVNAF, gain the support of the population for GVN, and destroy enemy morale and loyalty;
12. Continue coastal surveillance and riverine patrols;
13. Provide maximum TACAIR support to ground and naval forces.

(S) The RF were to: continue unilateral and coordinated mobile offensive operations, night patrols, and ambushes against enemy provincial organic mobile forces, or local force companies, guerrillas, and VCI; deny infiltration into secure areas; and assist the rural development (RD) cadre and PF in organization and training of PSDF.

(S) The FWMAF were to continue mobile operations as defined in the Summer Campaign Plan, to free the RVNAF for operations in less secure areas requiring reinforcement. Specifically, the tasks of FWMAF other than US were:

1. Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam (ROKFV), in coordination and cooperation with RVNAF and other FWMAF: conduct continuous small unit operations to search out and destroy the enemy; in addition, support the GVN 1970 P&D Plan in assigned tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) with emphasis on Phu Yen, Binh Dinh, and Quang Nam Provinces.

2. Royal Thai Forces, Vietnam (RTFV): continue to conduct mobile operations in their AO to free RVNAF for combat operations in clearing zones, border surveillance zones, and other areas requiring reinforcement; support the GVN 1970 P&D Plan in assigned areas of operations.

3. The Australians and New Zealanders: continue to conduct mobile operations in areas of operations to free RVNAF for combat operations in the clearing zones, border surveillance zones, and other areas requiring reinforcement; support the GVN 1970 P&D Plan in their assigned areas of operations.

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(S) Of special interest in the tasking directive were two policies:

1. Standdown of US combat units designated for redeployment was to be staggered throughout the period, consistent with operational requirements. Standdown time could be extended to 60 days, if required.

2. Priority of combat support and combat service support was to be the CG, XXIV Corps/Senior Advisor, MR 1.

(S) The Fall Campaign Plan/assigned specific tasks as follows:

1. CG, XXIV Corps/Senior Advisor MR 1:

a. In conjunction with RVNAF and FWMAF, conduct combat operations to eliminate VC/NVA forces; neutralize BAs 112 and 127 in Central Quang Nam Province; maintain secure LOCs; and operate as far west as weather permits.

b. Support GVN pacification and development efforts with emphasis on Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai Provinces.

(1) Support RF and PF training programs.

(2) Coordinate closely with Provincial Intelligence and Operations Coordination Centers (PIOCC/DIOCC) through senior US advisors. Maximum mutual exchange of intelligence was desired.

c. Within the limits of available resources and in coordination with VNAF, increase air interdiction of Khe Sanh Plain, Da Krong Basin, and A Shau Valley to prevent enemy infiltration of consolidation zones and secure areas.

d. Intensify reconnaissance efforts along the border in coordination with RVNAF.

2. CG, IFFORCEV/Senior Advisor MR 2:

a. In conjunction with RVNAF and FWMAF, conduct combat operations to eliminate VC/NVA forces; neutralize BAs 202, 226, 229, 236, 238, and 252; maintain secure LOCs and operate in the northern areas as weather permits.

b. Support GVN pacification and development efforts with emphasis on Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, and Tuyen Duc Provinces.

(1) Support RF and PF training programs.

(2) Coordinate closely with PIOCC/DIOCC through senior US advisors. Maximum mutual exchange of intelligence was desired.

c. Within the limits of available US resources and in coordination with VNAF, increase air interdiction in the MR 2 highlands to prevent enemy infiltration of consolidated zones and secure areas.

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d. Intensify reconnaissance efforts along the border in coordination with RVNAF.

3. CG, IIFORCEV/Senior Advisor MR 3:

a. In conjunction with RVNAF and FWMAF, conduct combat operations to eliminate VC/NVA forces, neutralize BAs, and maintain secure LOCs. Place emphasis on War Zones C and D and the border area.

b. Support GVN pacification and development efforts with emphasis on Bien Hoa, Hau Nghia, and Phuoc Tuy Provinces.

(1) Support RF and PF training programs.

(2) Coordinate closely with PIOC/DIOCC through senior US advisors. Maximum mutual exchange of intelligence was desired.

c. Intensify reconnaissance efforts along the border in coordination with RVNAF.

4. CG, DMAC/Senior Advisor MR 4:

a. Support RVNAF combat operations to eliminate in-country VC/NVA forces, neutralize BAs, and maintain LOCs. Place emphasis on the Cambodian border area, Seven Mountains area, U Minh Forest, and BAs 470, 487, and 490.

b. Support GVN Supplemental 1970 P&D Plan with emphasis on Chong Thien, Vinh Binh, Kien Hoa, Kien Giang, and Phong Dinh Provinces.

c. Intensify reconnaissance efforts along the border in coordination with RVNAF.

d. By use of mobile advisory teams (MATs) provide increased support to territorial forces.

e. Coordinate efforts between PIOC/DIOCC and RVNAF to insure maximum mutual exchanges of intelligence information.

5. CDR, Seventh Air Force (7AF)/Senior Advisor Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF);

a. Continue to provide air support as required, including TACAIR support to ground forces, aerial reconnaissance, airlift support, psychological operations (PSYOPS) support, and support of the resources denial program.

b. Provide priority of TACAIR effort to COMMANDO HUNT V and approved interdiction campaign in Cambodia.

c. Provide priority of immediate TACAIR support in RVN to US, RVNAF, and FWMAF combat units in MR 1.

d. Continue to advise and assist VNAF in its progressive assumption of responsibility for air operations.

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6. COMNAVFORV and Chief, Naval Advisory Group, MACV:

- a. Continue limited coastal surveillance and in-country riverine interdiction and pacification operations as limited assets permit.
- b. Continue to advise and support the Vietnamese Navy (VNN) in its conduct of coastal surveillance and riverine interdiction operations.
- c. Be prepared to advise and assist the VNN in the conduct of authorized blockade and other contingency operations in the Gulf of Thailand.
- d. Continue to provide helicopter gunships and OV-10 missions in support of US and VNN forces.

7. CG, USARV, was directed to give priority of combat support and combat service support to the CG, XXIV Corps.

(S) Limitations of authorities for US support of cross-border operations were similar to those in the Summer Campaign Plan. See ROE section in TOP SECRET Supplement.

(S) The fall campaign directive clearly reflected the progress of Vietnamization. With the significant reductions in US and FWMAF manpower and logistic support, qualitative and quantitative improvements were being made in the RVNAF so that they could assume greater responsibility for operations, particularly along the border and in the clearing zones. Missions which formerly had been given US Forces were becoming RVNAF responsibility. In the fall campaign directive, the US Forces were given a supporting-role responsibility for providing route security, plus area security and reconnaissance over broad areas. The desired effect was an accelerated assumption of AOs by the RVNAF. (12)

Status of Plans

(U) As directed by COMUSMACV or higher headquarters, operations plans (OPLANS) were developed or updated during 1970 to direct operations or provide for various contingencies. For titles and a resumé of these plans, see TOP SECRET Supplement.

(S) The status of MACV OPLANS as of 31 Dec 70:

<u>Short Title</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Changes</u>
COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 5F01	28 Jan 69	C2/13 May 70
COMUSMACV OPLAN 5J20F	3 Feb 70	C1/8 Jul 70
COMUSMACV OPLAN 5J22	25 May 70	C1/8 Jul 70
COMUSMACV OPLAN 5J27	5 Jul 69	C2/16 Aug 70

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<u>Short Title</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Changes</u>
COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 32-64	15 May 64	C7/10 Nov 67
COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 39-65	15 Jun 65	C7/23 Jan 67
COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 5F41	12 Jun 68	C2/5 Jun 70
COMUSMACV OPLAN 5J41	22 May 68	C2/5 Jun 70
COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 5F42	8 Jul 68	C4/2 Jun 70
COMUSSEASIA OPLAN 5F43	2 Jul 69	C1/26 Sep 69
COMUSMACV OPLAN 5J60A	1 Sep 68	C5/14 May 70
COMUSMACV OPLAN 5J60B	1 Dec 70	C1/18 Dec 70
COMUSMACV OPLAN 5J65	1 Jun 69	C3/23 Mar 70
COMUSMACV OPLAN 5J72	22 Jun 68	
COMUSMACV OPLAN J103	16 Aug 69	
COMUSMACV OPLAN J183	10 Aug 69	C8/18 Aug 70
COMUSMACV OPLAN J186	1 Nov 69	C1/13 Jun 70
COMUSMACV OPLAN J190	13 Jan 70	C3/12 Dec 70
COMUSMACV Restoral Plan J193	26 Apr 70	
COMUSMACV Logistics Plan J194	5 Feb 70	C3/23 Jun 70
COMUSMACV OPLAN J195	20 Mar 70	
COMUSMACV OPLAN J201	22 Oct 70	
Central Region SFATO Field Forces OPPLAN 4/69	11 Jan 70	C2/11 Jun 70
SEATO Field Forces OPLAN 6/70	11 Nov 70	
AB 145 (Combined Campaign Plan)	31 Oct 69	
AB 146 (Combined Campaign Plan)	31 Oct 70	
Summer Campaign Plan	10 Jun 70	

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<u>Short Title</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Changes</u>
Fall Campaign Plan	21 Sep 70	C1/24 Sep 70
CLIP	31 Jul 69	
IV CTZ Transportation Plan	18 Apr 68	
GVN 1970 Pacification and Development Plan	No Date	

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Military Strategy and Plans - Chapter II

1. Rpt (S), MACJ53, 29 Jul 70, Subj: Promulgation of the Revised MACV Strategic Objectives Plan (U), Gp - 3.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Pamphlet (U), Commanders Digest, Vol 8, No. 6, 9 May 70.
7. Msg (TS), JCS to CINCPAC, 211941Z Aug 70, Subj: Military Strategy in SEASIA (U), Gp-1.
8. GVN 1970 Pacification & Development Plan, Undated, Gp - Not Stated.
9. Plan (S), Combined Campaign Plan, 1970, (AB 145) (U), 31 Oct 69, Gp - 4.
10. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to Cdr,7AF, et al., 100148Z Jun 70, Subj: Summer Campaign Plans (U), Gp - 4.
11. Ibid.
12. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to Cdr,7AF, et al., 211125Z Sep 70, Subj: Fall Campaign Plan (U), Gp - 3.

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CHAPTER III

THE ENEMY

INTRODUCTION


(S) In his lifetime Ho Chi Minh drafted a general plan for the conquest of Vietnam which included: consolidation of the north, liberation of the south, and unification of the country. Although these objectives seemed to delineate three deliberate stages, they were, in reality, all interrelated. The fact that these stages were dependent rather than independent explained many of the reasons for Hanoi's expansionist activities in Indochina.

(S) Consolidation of the north was dependent upon liberation of the south and unification of the country. This consolidation was not solely a political process. It was also an economic problem. Hanoi's objective in the north was to build a firm economic foundation for its political revolution. This foundation was to be based on heavy industry rather than light manufacturing and agriculture. The bulk of the foreign exchange needed to finance this industrial development had to be squeezed from the country's agricultural sector. Hanoi's problem was that the division of Vietnam in 1954 left North Vietnam (NVN) as a deficit agricultural producer. Consequently, even with substantial foreign aid, its possibilities of achieving its desired economic objectives were limited.

(S) Conversely, the partition of Vietnam under the Geneva Agreements gave the south the rich agricultural areas of Vietnam. Using and instigating political dissidence aimed at the Diem regime, the north launched a rural-based revolution in the south committed to achieving its ends of economic and political domination of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN).

(S) Hanoi chose, though, to cloak her support of the war in the RVN as anti-imperialistic and nationalistic rather than in the harsh realities of political and economic power seeking. This deception also served to cover the fundamental political question in the conflict: what institutional system shall prevail in South Vietnam (SVN)? The turmoil within the Vietnamese society after the 1950s was, to a great degree, the result of the replacement of the Confucian/Mandarin system of social organization and government administration with new institutional structures. The ideological struggle waged in SVN added the dimension of social revolution to the war. The conflict over institutions stood at the vortex of the war between the north and south.

(S) Hanoi's strategy in the south was promotion of a people's war or a war of national liberation. As conceptualized in the writings of the leaders of the north, it was a war of the weak against the strong, which struck at the weakness of a central government with a minimum of resource expenditure by the instigating nation. The capacity of an economically weak force to carry on this type of war depended on the external support it received, its capability to build a shadow

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political structure to organize the resource base of its adversary for its own benefit, and the capability of its military units to use this shadow political structure for supplies, men, communications, and intelligence.

(S) This strategy was very successful in the south until the scenario was significantly altered in 1965 by the heavy commitment of American forces. About this time, Hanoi made two significant decisions. Both decisions broke with theoretical conceptions of a war of liberation. First, Hanoi dispatched large numbers of NVN troops to RVN. This constituted a major resource commitment out of the NVN economy. The resources of the weak were being committed against those of the strong.

(S) Secondly, with the commitment of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) troops, Hanoi adopted a strategy of general offensives based on main-force units from the north. Not only did the main-force units fail in their military objectives, but their formation committed Hanoi to the support of units that were not internally self-sufficient. This fact coupled with the arming of troops in the south with the Communist family of infantry weapons, tied Hanoi to using its economic assets to support an external logistics system. As the traditional sea supply routes and then Sihanoukville/Kompong Som were closed, Hanoi had to commit more troops to man and secure an overland logistics system.

(S) One other event, exogenous to Hanoi's own decision making, took place in 1968 and had a significant effect on Hanoi's strategy. This was the initiation in RVN of the Accelerated Pacification Program (APP). The program succeeded in halting the erosion of the central government's resource base in rural areas while reasserting government control over what once were insurgent domains and resources. The program took the strategic initiative away from the Viet Cong (VC)/NVA in the rural areas.

(S) The failure of the general offensives, the manpower drain from the north, the effectiveness of the Government of Vietnam (GVN) pacification program in cutting the resource base in the south, and the need to rebuild the economy of the north to at least its prewar level, were all factors in influencing Hanoi to change its national priorities. The first public announcement of this change was made in Le Duan's 2 Feb 70 speech to the party cadre on the occasion of the party's 40th anniversary celebration. Le Duan called for a "two track" policy of building socialism in the north while simultaneously continuing the war in the south. This policy was reaffirmed by Troung Chinh in May and by Premier Pham Van Dong on 2 Sep. The change in priorities connoted a reallocation of economic resources, specifically the apportionment of Hanoi's most abundant resource, human labor. In terms of the objectives of liberation of the south and unification of the country, it meant a lengthening of the original time frame to achieve these goals. In terms of Hanoi's perception of the war it meant that the enemy was counting on what he felt were the internal contradictions in the Saigon government and US domestic politics to weaken the position of the allies.

(S) The shift in NVN's national priorities was reflected in Hanoi's strategy throughout Indochina. Enemy activity was being geared to a protracted conflict stressing conservation of forces, attempts to rebuild base areas (BAs), and efforts to strengthen the guerrilla and political structures. To see how Hanoi was implementing this protracted war strategy in Indochina, it was best to analyze the area as seven interrelated conflicts: the war in northern Laos; the logistics war of southern Laos and northeastern Cambodia; the Cambodian conflict; the Central Office for South

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Vietnam (COSVN) area of the RVN; the VC Military Region (MR) 5 conflict; the B-5 Front and Military Region Tri-Thien-Hue (MRTTH); and finally the B-3 Front. (See Figure III-1.)

(S) The war in northern Laos was a strategic adjunct to the main event in the RVN. Peace efforts were promoted in 1970 by NVN, whose military position on the Plain of Jars allowed it to apply political leverage on the Laotian government. It was hypothesized that they desired to minimize their resources input to northern Laos while attempting to get the bombing halted in the south. To achieve these objectives, they could offer to neutralize the Plain of Jars for a quid pro quo from Vientiane that would involve stopping or restricting the air interdiction in the panhandle. Since only a statement from a Laotian government recognized by the United States could place the US in an embarrassing position vis a vis the bombing in the panhandle, direct military moves by NVN to overthrow the government seemed unlikely. In any event, NVN troops would remain in northern Laos as long as a power vacuum existed on Hanoi's western flank.

(S) The logistics war of southern Laos and northeastern Cambodia stood as the critical conflict for the VC/NVA. Operation MARKET TIME prevented him from using coastal waters. The port of Sihanoukville/Kompong Som was denied him. Allied operations during 1970 captured large quantities of stockpiled supplies. The GVN pacification program was undermining his ability to obtain supplies in the RVN. The enemy had to establish an extension of the existing trail through southern Laos and northeastern Cambodia if he was to be militarily effective in southern Indochina.

(S) The magnitude of the enemy's preparations during 1970 surpassed previous logistical campaigns, and a much greater effort was planned.

(S) In the logistics war, indications of the enemy's effort included the construction of new road by-passes and storage facilities, and military operations aimed at eliminating attempts by friendly forces to interdict lines of communication (LOCs) and harass supply installations. The enemy's ability to develop and secure existing LOCs in the panhandle was enhanced by the seizure of Attopou and Saravane, and sufficient NVA forces were available for further expansion of the system.

(S) The establishment of a large logistical system in the rice-deficit area of southern Laos and northeastern Cambodia demanded significant quantities of imported food. The most effective system would be to bring rice and dried fish north from Cambodia for units in this area. Therefore, some northern bound supplies could be expected in the Tonle Kong/Mekong corridor, and the food-rich Tonle Sap basin would become an important objective of the NVA. A rice supply in this corridor also made it a more attractive infiltration route to COSVN than the old border trails.

(S) The fact that the NVA had to establish an extensive overland supply route to southern Indochina was of strategic importance to the allied forces. For the first time in the war, North Vietnam had to commit troops to hold and secure its major supply route to the COSVN area, thus making a large manpower commitment without significantly increasing its fighting strength. This, of course, was dependent upon the continued effectiveness of MARKET TIME, which successfully prevented adequate logistical support from arriving by sea.


(S) In the Cambodian conflict, the aims of the NVA were varied but all tied to the ultimate intention of dominating the RVN. The long-term objective was to have a government in Phnom Penh that would accept VC/NVA use of Cambodia. It was doubtful whether the NVN wanted to

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FIGURE III-1

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directly overthrow the existing government. Such an act would raise significant concern in Thailand and could reverse the steady withdrawal of American troops from Indochina. In the short term the NVA would concentrate on disruption of Cambodia to limit Forces Armees Nationales Khmer's (FANK) ability to move against the Mekong corridor.

(S) The NVA was moving to gain and hold control in three ways. First, organize a Khmer infrastructure in the rural areas. This infrastructure would be used to siphon off Cambodian economic resources, including manpower, to supplement the depleted base of the VC/NVA. Its major purpose, though, was to serve the political objective of organizing a shadow government to aid the Khmer Rouge in their insurgent effort. The Khmer Rouge in November were estimated to have a total strength between 8,000 and 10,000. The majority was located south of the line formed by Routes 6, 21, and 7. Roughly, 4,000 Khmer Rouge were reported to be northwest of Route 4 and south of Route 6. It was believed that only about one-third of these troops were adequately armed. Khmer units located near VC/NVA main-force units were rather well-equipped, but in the border area they were dominated by the Vietnamese. Some friction developed between them due to the superior attitude held by the VC/NVA, as well as some difference in objectives. Since estimates of Khmer Rouge strength increased four to five fold after March, it could be assumed that they were not highly trained and that their numbers, even if accurate, were not to be equated with main-force units.

(S) Secondly, the NVA could be expected to spread the war to western Cambodia. They would attempt to keep the expanding FANK out of the strategic Mekong corridor by attacking towns and major LOCs in the west, thereby hoping to tie FANK's forces into static positions. As operations in Cambodia continued, the enemy would increasingly require an in-country logistical base to support his forces both in Cambodia and in Vietnam. The Tonle Sap basin and Battambang Province, which produced large quantities of fish and rice, could provide him such a base.

(S) Finally, the NVA could be expected to try to weaken and disrupt the central government by undermining its economic base and political influence. They would try to cripple the economic base by inhibiting the marketing of crops both on the domestic and international market. The political influence of the government would be attacked by propaganda issued under Sihanouk's name, by isolating rural areas from government communications, and by the use of selective terrorism against government officials and installations.

(S) In the COSVN area of the RVN, Resolutions 9 and 14 still stood as the guiding strategy. These documents placed strong emphasis on rebuilding the guerrilla base of the insurgency. Small unit actions and sapper activity were stressed over main-force units. Pacification and Vietnamization were directly targeted.

(S) The predominant theme throughout COSVN was small-unit operations. Main-force units were following this pattern of being subordinated to local force commands. This was done for a number of reasons: lack of external supply and the incapability of the infrastructure to support large units, a conscious policy of strengthening guerrilla units, and conservation-of-force tactics. In terms of allied strategy this meant the major burden of security would rest on the Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF) and internal security forces.

(S) A similar trend of main-force units being fragmented or subordinated to local forces was seen in MR 5. One of the early examples in the RVN was the breakdown of the 10th NVA

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Regiment in July 1969. Two of its battalions were subordinated to Phu Yen Province and the third to Khanh Hoa. COSVN Resolutions 9 and 14 were published during this same time period.

(S) It was reasonable to assume that the policies of COSVN and MR 5 were coordinated and therefore similar tactics were expected by those units that were broken down or resubordinated in the two areas. In Phu Yen these tactics were assassination and abduction on a very effective scale. The tactics used in Phu Yen were not positive in nature. What they proved was access to the population but not control over the population. What was accomplished was that the enemy inhibited a peasant's commitment to the Saigon government. Whether these tactics actually increased VC/NVA support or strength was difficult to determine. The tactics were seen, though, as an integral part of a protracted war focusing on continuing the conflict over a long time period. The MR 5 and COSVN areas of operation included approximately 80 percent of the RVN population. The tactics of the VC/NVA were therefore geared to control this population and the economic resources in the area via guerrilla concepts.

(S) The B-5 Front and MRTTH as well as the B-3 Front were different situations and the VC/NVA treated them so in their strategy. The B-5 Front and MRTTH were fought with more conventional tactics: traditional command structures, combat service support, and troop rotation on and off the battlefield. Neither the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) nor local force troops were strong. In this area it was rather easy to produce a threat because of the short supply routes from the north. This threat tied considerable allied firepower into an area of nominal population, but whose protection needed to be guaranteed so that the NVA did not reap a psychological advantage. This enemy main-force commitment would be continued.

(S) The B-3 Front was also a strategic front. After 1965 the area evolved mainly into a strategic logistical base. The fact that the NVA had 6 percent of their combat maneuver strength in B-3 and 14 percent of their support and administration strength tended to support this conclusion. Enemy combat activity was characterized by main-force attacks on isolated posts to gain psychological and propaganda objectives. (1)

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THE VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE

Leadership

Organization

(C) The enemy was vitally dependent upon the support of a relatively small number of people in RVN. The task of organizing the support, as well as providing overall military and political leadership for the Communist effort in RVN fell to the intricate network of control organizations referred to as the Viet Cong Infrastructure, or VCI.

(C) The VCI included the leadership and cadre of the party and the associated front organizations at all levels. The top echelon was the Central Office for South Vietnam, or COSVN, led by Pham Hung, also a deputy premier in the NVN Government. COSVN controlled the overall Communist effort in RVN. The term VCI was applied to both the organizational structures and the personnel filling the positions. The aims of the VCI combined both political and military aspects, and according to one captured document: "... must make people participate in the political struggle at the same time they become effective guerrilla fighters."

(C) According to the Communist doctrine two of the primary fundamentals for a successful struggle were a cause and an organization. The VC cause in RVN was the establishment of Communist control and a Communist society throughout the country; the organizational means of that control was the VCI. The Communist organizational complex consisted of three parts: military, party/government, and front, all of which were controlled by the party (see Figure III-2). The organizational pattern was followed at all echelons, from COSVN down to the individual hamlet. All of the cadre in the party were considered members of the infrastructure, whereas only a few of the military and front organization cadre could be considered VCI members. That was because the term VCI was applied only to the core leaders at all levels. Both the military and the front organizations were controlled by the party. In the military, for instance, the party committee at the appropriate echelon had to approve all military operations. For that purpose, an intermediate coordinating committee called the Military Affairs Party Committee (MAPC) at COSVN level and the Coordination and Operations Committee at village level existed at each echelon between the party executive committee and the corresponding unit headquarters. Its mission was to advise the party on the tactical feasibility and political desirability of planned operations. It was a joint committee of military members chosen from the unit headquarters and civilians chosen from the party executive committee.

(C) Only top military leaders who sat on the intermediate committee or on the party executive committee itself were considered part of the infrastructure because they were involved in planning military operations for political purposes. There was a popular tendency to confuse guerrillas with VCI because guerrillas did not wear uniforms. The guerrillas were, however, soldiers who performed primarily military missions.

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
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VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION FOR SOUTH VIETNAM



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FIGURE III-2

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(C) The front was the vehicle through which the party cultivated popular support and involved the population in the war. The front existed, for all functional purposes, at two levels only, the national level and the village and hamlet level. At the national level, it existed to present the appearance of a broad-based popular movement. At the village and hamlet levels, it served to organize existing groups of people into party-controlled organizations and to exploit those organizations for the support of the war. The front performed the vital function of representing the Communist movement as an alliance of associations, groups, and parties with the following five goals:

1. End corruption.
2. Reunify the country.
3. Institute progressive programs.
4. Replace the GVN.
5. Expel the foreign invaders.

In that way it effectively disguised Communist control of the so-called liberation movement and provided the flexibility of doctrine outside the party line to attract people who would not support an open Communist line.

(C) The VCI had two missions. The first was to provide military units with the money, food, recruits, intelligence, refuge, and guides without which they could not survive. Secondly, it set the stage for Communist assumption of power through an organization which could step in to fill a political vacuum at any time and place where GVN effectiveness faltered.

(C) Before either of the missions could be carried out, however, there had to be a source of personnel. That was the task of the Civilian Proselyting Committee. There was a subsection for every exploitable group of people and the party attempted to form an association for every group. The groups were then controlled or influenced by the party through the front committees. Except for the few military leaders discussed previously, the VCI personnel in any echelon were civilians. The individuals ranged from overtly appointed members of so-called liberation governments operating in VC-controlled areas, to members of functional cells operating covertly in every precinct of Saigon. As with the military, the party controlled the functional organizations through a matrix of chapters and cells.

(C) There were other specific functional organizations which contributed to the VCI's missions (see Figure III-3). The Finance and Economy, Military Proselyting, Security, Forward Supply Sections and Front Associations of the organization contributed primarily to the first of the VCI's two missions. The Finance and Economy Section collected food and money and supervised the allocation of food and war materiel. Well over one-half the food for VC/NVA units was procured in-country and the civilian Finance and Economy Section planned and managed that effort (See VC/NVA Logistics and Tax Collection section of this chapter.) The Military Proselyting Section ran operations to subvert allied and ARVN personnel. Before an offensive, the section increased its activities. The Security Section ran intelligence and reconnaissance operations and an anti-Chieu Hoi program. Security cadre also increased reconnaissance and intelligence collection efforts prior to offensive activity. The Forward Supply Council coordinated activities between the Finance and Economy Sections and Military Rear Service Elements for the purpose of passing supplies to the units. The Forward Supply Council also was responsible for managing all civilian laborers drawn from front associations to act as porters and litter bearers.

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


FIGURE III-3

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Again, immediately before and during an offensive, that section's activities reached a peak. (See VC/NVA Logistics and Tax Collection section of this chapter.)

(C) Front associations provided the manpower base for recruitment into military, paramilitary, and VCI organizations. They were also a manpower pool for civilian laborers who were drafted to support military units just before an attack.

(C) The second mission, that of setting the stage for the assumption of power by a Communist-controlled government, was carried out by the Civilian Proselyting, Propaganda Training, Civil Health, and Organization Sections, and People's Revolutionary Committees.

(C) As has been stated, the Civilian Proselyting Section attempted to organize the population into front associations which were subsequently exploited for party purposes. The Propaganda Training Section performed the obvious task of emphasizing the righteousness of the front and the wickedness of the GVN and US. The Civil Health Section attempted to meet the medical needs of the population by providing dispensaries and medical and civic action program (MEDCAP) service, although in practice they spent much of their time treating military casualties. The Organization Section supervised the manning of the VCI structure and monitored its quality. (2)

(C) One other organizational entity entered the picture: the People's Revolutionary Committees (RCs), also known as Liberation Committees; PRG Committees; Autonomous Administrative Committees; and Rural Area Administrative Committee. A basic principle of Communist government was interlocking administration, at every level, by party and by civil hierarchy. Those structures operated with the party as the final authority, as all functions of the civil administration had to be subordinated to party policy. The principle was implemented at the village level in Vietnam by the Communist Party and its organ, the RC, representing the civil hierarchy. Action during the TET-68 offensive included the formation of RCs. It received emphasis at the village level in order to secure the support of the people and subvert GVN civil administration. In practice, it resulted in village government which was ready to assume or contest control should the GVN weaken or a similar opportunity present itself. In most cases, the opportunity had not occurred and the RCs in a given area were usually publicized but otherwise had no existence separate from the VCI. Documents indicated that an RC was to be selected by caucus of "representative (hamlet) citizens," called a "revolutionary council." That was a technique of the party which involved the populace, securing their support. In most instances in GVN or contested areas, however, the party simply appointed the committee. The RC membership, usually no more than nine persons, administered the civil government by means of staff sections. In most instances the party staff sections assumed that responsibility and performed the necessary services and functions. In theory, the interlocking principle was in effect. However, due to recruitment, training, organizational, or security problems, the party might be forced to assume both roles, rather than to control the civil hierarchy indirectly. Regardless, the party maintained authority. An RC in practice could have the following positions/sections:

- (1) Chairman/General and Military Affairs Section.
- (2) Vice Chairman/Production, Economy, and Finance Section.
- (3) Vice Chairman/Security Section.

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- (4) Secretary/Administrative Section.
- (5) Member/Information and Culture Section.
- (6) Member/Education Section.
- (7) Member/Public Health and Welfare Section. (3)

The appearance of an RC theoretically was the final stage in the VCI take-over of a village, but it was no longer the critical one as far as indicating actual VC control. The VCI appointed RCs in contested areas so they could claim control, even though they could not exercise it. If RCs were established throughout RVN, the VC/NVA could, for instance, lay claim to de jure control of much territory in the event of a cease-fire or other political accommodation. Out of some 2,500 villages in RVN, the Communists managed to appoint RCs in about one-half. However, as shown below, less than one-half of those were able to exert any appreciable influence in village affairs:

Villages in South Vietnam	2,500
Villages with Committees:	
Influential	555
Ineffective	695
Total	1,250

(C) Allied and GVN campaigns and the extension of government control restricted the VCI's freedom of action in many areas. Large rallies during daylight hours, common before 1967, were rare in 1970.

(C) In summary, the VCI could be defined as the elaborate VC control structure in RVN, an interlocking organizational complex with party control encompassing party, military, and front leadership at all levels and pursuing two missions. First, it gathered, organized, and applied the popular and logistical support required for the continuation of the war effort in the south; and secondly, it attempted to form and maintain the shadow government which, according to Communist plans, could assume power were the complete take-over of RVN to be effected. (4)

VCI City Committees

(U) Urban VCI activities were shaped chiefly by the need for cadre to operate undetected in an environment wholly controlled by the GVN. Requirements for maintaining security at all costs led to lack of timely support and coordination, operational errors, and organizational awkwardness. Inconclusive results of the second offensive on the cities in May 1968 convinced the VC that a change was necessary, and they reorganized in June and July.

(U) The new organizational concepts permitted increased capabilities and the use of larger numbers of people. While the simple, efficient three-man party cell was still relied upon as the basic building block, two or three cells could be formed into operating sections similar to those

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found at district level. A difference between city and district sections lay in the greater variety of activities normally required of city sections.

(U) Excluding Saigon, Hue (two committees), and Danang (three committees), there was only one party committee for each city. The city committee (except Saigon) reported to the headquarters of the province in which it was located, except for Bien Hoa Committee which reported directly to the COSVN Current Affairs Committee.

(U) Saigon had a separate party committee in each precinct that reported to a COSVN subregion (SR). Precincts 2, 4, 7, and 8 reported to SR-2, Precinct 9 reported to SR-4, and it appeared Precinct 1 reported to SR-5. Subsections of the various subregion sections were structured to control and conduct special activities in Saigon, such as tax collecting, coordinating general offensive military operations, and infiltrating personnel and weapons. Day-to-day operations, were managed by the Precinct Current Affairs Committees, with the Precinct Party Secretary reporting precinct activities directly to the Subregion Current Affairs Committee concerned, at least on a monthly basis, often on the 25th.

(U) City party committees were supplemented by specialized subsections and ad hoc committees from the next higher echelon as required. For example, coordination and operating committees were set up for general offensives and other large military operations involving city units. Inspection teams were available for troubleshooting problems, and cells could enter the cities for work in any area requiring augmentation of the city sections' efforts.

(U) The various standard operating sections in the cities that were structurally similar to those found at district level had many functional similarities as well. Often, however, because of personnel restrictions and security requirements, a city section could have additional missions, such as civilian proselyting, inciting struggle movements, or providing penetration agents, that probably were not performed by a similar section at district. Again because of security requirements, city section chiefs or deputies personally performed duties that would be accomplished by less important cadre at district level.

(U) Saigon VCI operations were the most complex and clandestine of any in Vietnam. The operations included tax collection, proselyting, propagandizing, political indoctrination, popular education, combined information and reconnaissance, political struggle, and coordination and operating cells that moved in and out of Saigon from subregion subsections. There were some party committee cells, such as civil affairs units, secret youth groups, and different types of penetration groups, that were permanently located in Saigon and moved from precinct to precinct as progress was made or ground lost. They reported directly to the subregion through their own com-mo-liaison channels and appeared not to have a lateral relationship, not even for logistical support, with the precinct committees.

(U) In Saigon there were also the specialized cells subordinate to the precinct committees themselves. Secret organization cells abounded in Saigon precinct committees and they performed almost any activity from recruitment to assassination not assumed by a specific section. They could penetrate GVN and private organizations, extort money from precinct citizens, incite riots, and distribute leaflets and other propaganda. They were assigned to a geographical area of the precinct and formed the nucleus for almost any required activity in their specific zone. Finally, there were special temporary cells, subordinate to the precincts, formed on a task basis. One person from each of the sections could form a temporary unit with one of the secret organization

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cells to concentrate on a particular function in a specific zone. Other functions, such as civilian proselyting, inciting political struggles, propagandizing, and reconnaissance, were the responsibility of each person in the precinct organization as he made his daily contact with the people, if there was no section to take care of such activities.

(U) Because the cities were controlled by the GVN and VC cadre had to live there legally, the individual cadre was permitted to know only his own immediate cell members and organization. City cadre were instructed never to hold large group meetings in their areas of operation except during general offensives, when extraordinary coordination was required. Even in secret zone areas during training, city cadre had to protect their identity and wore cardboard or towel masks to hide their faces.

(U) Normally, month-end city party committee meetings were held outside the city in the safe hamlet or rear area wherever the committee secretary was located. Meeting places of cells and sections located within city boundaries, however, were pre arranged and appeared to be of a rather permanent nature. Use of the main place or any of the five or six alternates always depended on the current local situation. Meetings would often be held in a snack bar, soup shop, physician's office, or other crowded public places at 0700 hours in the morning or 1800 hours in the evening since, to avoid arousing suspicion, the cadre generally moved during the rush hours used by normal city workers in the cadre's operating area.

(U) In restaurants and other public places persons who seemed to have nothing to do were met and engaged in short conversations by a series of people one after another. The person who was met was likely a cell or section leader or other important person.

(U) Though proselyting and "enemy" organization penetration had long been VCI strengths, more emphasis was placed in the fields in anticipation of an imminent peace and political resolution of the war. Each important city labor branch was to have its own "party committee." Professional groups, social organizations, trade unions, friendship associations, and student groups were targeted for penetration. Party members with legal status were to attempt to obtain membership in the executive committees of such organizations. A typical penetration effort might include the VC agent's joining or obtaining employment with an organization, followed by a 90-day period of pre-indoctrination study of those persons likely to be sympathetic to the cause. Activation of a secret organization consisting of the agent and the sympathizers and a full-scale inducement of the organization to protest against the "enemy" would then follow.

(U) Individuals targeted for neutralization by the VC within the cities were police, inter-family chiefs, inter-block chiefs, and civil self-defense members.

(U) Secret youth groups were set up in market areas, GVN strongpoint perimeters, or along strategic roads. One of their missions was proselyting, another was propaganda dissemination. Propagandizing in those areas was sometimes done by youths who felt their age protected them.

(U) The VC often had problems in coordinating the operational efforts of working cadre located inside the cities with leadership and other cadre located outside the cities. Thus, secure com-mo-liaison routes and methods were very important to successful city operations. (5)

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Terrorism

Doctrine

(U) The goal of Communists in Vietnam was the unification of North and South Vietnam under the Communist banner. Through the years this struggle had a dual character; in effect two wars. One, the "armed struggle," pitted army against army in military conflict. The second and more central war, the "political struggle," had as its objective stealing the people away from the GVN. The enemy's concern was the control of the population. He sought to achieve that through programs designed to control the people. (6)

Population Control

(U) Control of the people was sought through a number of specific methods. One enmeshed the villager into a network of social movements and organizations which developed social pressures to keep the dissenter in line. Another was through intensive communication efforts: education; "thought reform"; agitation; and propaganda. A third method was coercion, force, and terror. All those and others were essential to the system. Each program of the party organizations included terror. However, that did not mean a system in which terror was dominant, all pervasive, and always at the forefront.

(U) Too often Communist terror was portrayed in simplistic terms: viciousness for its own sake; terror simply to terrorize. The Communists were presented as sub-human sadists indifferent to the blood on their hands. The average Communist in Vietnam thought of his system not in moral but in utilitarian terms. He found terror to be the single greatest advantage he had over the government; one he credited for making possible most of his successes. It became an axiom of the Communists that their successes were in direct relation to the degree of people's sense of insecurity: the greater the insecurity, the better their prospects. That was well known and understood at all Communist levels. Thus, the tool of the Communist in establishing control consisted of those programs which terrorized. (7)

Objectives

(U) To achieve the desired results of terrorist doctrine, the Communist had three major objectives.

1. Terror to diminish the opposing force. That included both the elimination of key officials and the totality of power. The resulting weakness was the single most important gain. The removal of an individual not only reduced manpower but also eliminated a service, a resource, and an asset that no longer functioned for the government.
2. Terror to sustain Communist morale. The guerrilla leader knew the morale of his followers was short lived and subject to fluctuation. The guerrilla saw himself as alone, belea-

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guered, surrounded, and out-numbered. A well-planned and executed strike against a well-armed, superior enemy sent morale soaring. The effect on the victim was inconsequential because the guerrilla's prowess was demonstrated and his invulnerability again proven. Of course, any failure was worse than had the act never been attempted.

3. Terror to disorient and psychologically isolate the individual. That objective related directly with the degree of insecurity. An assassination not only frightened the individual but also destroyed part of the structure which previously was a source of security. The loss of safety and order in society disoriented the individual. He became isolated. He could no longer draw strength from customary social support. He could rely on only himself. Each individual searched desperately to assure his own safety. Thus, the third objective was served through the terrorist act itself. (8)

Targets

(U) There were 15 categories of personnel identified as targets of Communist terror. They were:

1. Enemy personnel in fields of espionage, police, public security, special forces psychological warfare, (PSYWAR), including covert organizations.
2. Members of reactionary political parties and organizations and parties working behind a religious front (e. g. , Dai Viets, VNQDD, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao).
3. Members of enemy military and paramilitary organizations.
4. Puppet government officials, from interfamily level upwards.
5. Leading and key popular organization leaders (e. g. , village organizations such as farm cooperatives, women's and youth organizations, and trade unions).
6. Members of the enemy's cultural, art, propaganda, and press establishment.
7. Leading and key members of religious organizations still deeply superstitious (e. g. , Catholics).
8. Thieves, assassins, gangsters, prostitutes, speculators, and fortune tellers.
9. Defectors who gave information to the enemy, took with them automatic weapons or important documents or who were suspected of having done same; and those who were cadre or officers.
10. Members of the exploiter class and their spouses who had not specifically sided with the workers. (The Communists in Vietnam as elsewhere divided society into exploiter and exploited.)

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11. Individuals with backward political tendencies including those who did dishonest and corrupt deeds yet tried to justify them.

12. Relatives of persons engaged in enemy espionage, security, special forces or PSYWAR organizations; relatives of important members or leaders of reactionary political parties or religious groups still deeply superstitious; families of military above the rank of private; members of families of government officials from village level upwards.

13. Relatives of persons who were punished by the revolution in earlier years and who subsequently grumbled about the revolution; relatives of those jailed by the revolution for spying.

14. Deserters or AWOLs who returned to the revolution but without clear explanation (i. e., who may be government penetration agents.)

15. Individuals with suspicious background or record of past activity.

(U) It was estimated that the above list, if strictly applied to all of South Vietnam, would total at least 3 million people. That probably was what Col Tran Van Dac, the highest ranking Hoi Chanh, meant when he said, "There are 3 million South Vietnamese on the (Communist) blood debt list." (9)

Methods

(C) The term terrorism referred to overt acts involving the use or threat of violence designed to intimidate, demonstrate presence, and influence political behavior. The main characteristic of terrorism was the use of violence against non-military persons or installations, generally in a way to avoid losses to the terrorist group causing the violence. Terrorism specifically included: harassing fires against inhabited areas and certain classes of individuals; detonation of mines in the path of persons or vehicles; deliberate assassinations; and kidnapping of government officials and other groups of civilians.

(C) Harassing fire was one of the methods most frequently used and was defined as sporadic fire at a target with one or more weapons with no intent to maneuver, assault, or overpower. It could be directed at any kind of target and casualties might or might not result. Harassment was used to describe the destruction of property or crops, or similar contact with the population designed to force contributions of labor, supplies, and taxes.

(C) Kidnapping was the forcible capture of one or more individuals and included both government officials and ordinary civilians. Assassination was the physical elimination of one or more civilians or government officials. The term assassination was applied to the killing of non-military personnel through random causes such as mining of roads, detonation of explosive devices in market places, and harassing fires. Selective assassination was used to describe the deliberate killing of a specific individual or small group of individuals and was a small percentage of the total killed by terrorism.

(C) Terrorist activities were not necessarily conducted by sections of VC organizations specifically assigned to such activities. In a large part, such operations fell within the purview

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of local force, guerrilla, and VCI elements. Under control of the Party Chapter Committee, local-force elements, after evaluating current political and military situations in their areas, planned and executed their actions. Directives from higher authorities designated targets against which certain quotas were to be achieved. (10)

Propaganda Value

(C) The individual act of terrorism was inseparable from the propaganda value of the act. Targets for terrorist attacks were chosen to achieve maximum psychological effect. Terrorism was used to demonstrate several specific points to the RVN populace. It showed the VC's ability to circumvent GVN security forces; it graphically illustrated the danger of cooperating with, or serving the GVN; and it pointed out the vulnerability of the GVN's budding social and economic institutions.

(C) The ability to operate in those areas ostensibly under GVN control was of paramount importance to the VC. If the RVN civilians became confident in GVN's ability to protect them, the VC would lose the concealment and local logistical support necessary for guerrilla warfare. The terrorist act need not be consummated for the VC to demonstrate the fragility of security. A short-term abduction or a strategically placed warning note was often sufficient evidence of the VC potential.

(C) The VC won few converts through acts of terrorism, but they hoped the acts would cause the people to choose a course of prudent neutrality. The populace would then be more apt to respond to coercive demands to render aid. A priority mission of the VC terrorist was to disrupt any activity which was showing that the GVN could provide democratic institutions or a higher standard of living. Schools, health clinics, market places, and polls were often the target of terrorist activities.

(C) However, when VC terrorism ceased to be selective, it became counterproductive for propaganda purposes. Brutal massacres of innocent civilians did irreparable damage to the image of the local VC forces. Even more significant were the detrimental effects of the incident on the VC's international image. (11)

Propaganda

(C) The VC/NVA considered propaganda one of the key factors in their ultimate victory. Propaganda was always an integral part of the enemy's tactics and assumed greater importance as the scale of military fighting continued to decrease. The enemy used propaganda to raise their own forces' morale while attempting to reduce allied morale and to assist their proselyting efforts. Gaining international support and discrediting the GVN were their long range political objectives.

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Propaganda Techniques

(U) VC propaganda instruments were divided into two broad categories, the face-to-face instruments and mass media. Face-to-face propaganda included entertainment teams, armed propaganda teams, and propaganda cadre. Mass media included Liberation Radio, Liberation Press, printed propaganda, and films. Propaganda efforts were channeled for the most part through face-to-face facilities.

(C) The face-to-face methods were preferred based on the cultural heritage of the Vietnamese people. They had no conception of themselves as a "mass" of people; therefore, the mass media approach may have offended the average citizen. Thus, mass media was relegated mainly to reinforcing themes expressed by the face-to-face method.

(C) Entertainment teams incorporated propaganda messages into traditional Vietnamese performing arts. Short plays, folk songs, dances, and poetry readings were used in an attempt to make Communist dogma palatable to the Vietnamese peasant. The teams functioned much like a minstrel show. The average team consisted of about 20 members and most teams had female and teenage members. Occasionally, the team was equipped with a generator and microphone. Some teams traveled with an armed platoon which was carefully concealed from the audience during the performance. Teams operated on either the district or village level. Training was conducted by the province propaganda and training section. Training emphasized the necessity of rapport with the communities served. The teams were taught to encourage the populace to submit material to be performed. Material was also received from the province or region propaganda and training section.

(C) Armed propaganda teams were used in the areas under GVN control or bordering areas. The teams were armed for self-defense, but fought only if attacked and placed primary emphasis on lecturing methods. The very presence of the team had a great psychological impact, demonstrating to the people the relative ease with which they could move within GVN controlled areas. The lectures could be easily adjusted to meet the needs of the particular situation. The team cadre were urged to conduct the lectures with tact and reasonability. Individuals who adamantly opposed listening to the lectures would be allowed to continue about their business. However, if indifference was spread country-wide, it was necessary to demand mandatory attendance. The indicated purpose of the lectures was "to create public opinion." The ideal result was enthusiastic and unqualified support of the PRG. Most teams geared their appeal toward a more realistic goal: fomenting a hostile attitude toward the GVN. Grievances were exaggerated and distorted in hopes the lecture would further inflame the conflict between the people and the government.

(U) Mass media techniques were a means of disseminating propaganda that was familiar to the western observer. Mass media propaganda organs were the primary propaganda tools only in those areas which had been pacified to the extent the locale was inaccessible to the face-to-face propaganda organizations.

(C) Liberation Radio began transmitting on 1 Feb 62 as the "Voice of the NFLSVN." The air time could be broken down into seven themes: VC/NVA victories, praise and emulation, GVN internal problems, international support, agriculture and production, allied aggression, and war crimes. The first three themes received the predominate emphasis. Many of the important announcements and speeches were duplicated from previous broadcasts of the NVN organ, Radio Hanoi. The effectiveness of Liberation Radio as a propaganda vehicle was diminished by the

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dogmatism and redundancy inherent in Communist mass media productions. Interrogation reports of VC/NVA prisoners and deserters indicated they found Liberation Radio dull and uninformative.

(U) Liberation Press Agency (LPA) was founded as the "official organ and information agency of the NFLSVN." The LPA was under the supervision of the Propaganda and Training Section of COSVN. The Communists asserted Liberation Press was a news agency of international scope with correspondents in several foreign countries, including some non-Communist nations. Coverage within SVN reportedly included the placement of LPA correspondents in the majority of the 41 VC provinces.

(C) The mission of the LPA was to procure information and news items, and then distill the data into an integrated propaganda program. The finished propaganda was then distributed to radio stations, newspapers, and propaganda agencies for further dissemination. The distribution was accomplished by means of a radio communication network. LPA issued five daily news reports: to various local areas in SVN; to individual VC agencies and units; a consolidated report for all VC agencies and units; one sent to NVN; and a final report in English distributed to foreign countries. The majority of LPA articles were spurious claims of VC victories over GVN and US Forces. They also exploited all instances of social, economic, and political difficulties with the GVN.

(C) A variety of printed propaganda had continuously appeared in SVN since the days of the Viet Minh. The VC had demonstrated the capability to print and distribute many forms of printed propaganda including newspapers, leaflets, magazines, and books. The COSVN Propaganda and Training Section, military regions, provinces, and sometimes districts had printing capabilities of varying degrees of sophistication. Equipment ranged from small printing plants to make-shift printing shops. Bamboo was even used where standard newsprint was not available. The VC also made a mimeograph machine from wood and cloth which used ink derived from kerosene extract.

(C) There were two VC newspapers, Giai Phong and Nhanh Dan, which claimed to be centrally produced for nationwide distribution. Those publications were augmented by numerous papers produced at the local level. They rarely exceeded six pages and were published and distributed at region and province level.

(U) Another common form of printed propaganda was the leaflet. Leaflets appeared in Vietnamese, English, Korean, and Chinese. Most leaflets were directed at allied forces in hopes of lowering morale, inducing desertions, or causing them to press for an end to the war. An expanded form of the leaflet was the booklet. The booklet was commonly an extended statement attributed to an important VC or NVN official. Another, was the slogan slip, i. e., a small piece of paper 2 X 4 inches containing a short propaganda phrase on each side.

(U) VC use of film as a propaganda instrument was not widespread. Film was both produced and imported by the VC. The Liberation Films Studio was the production organ of the NFLSVN. Imported films included products of the NVA Motion Picture Department, the Peking Film Company, and the Russian Film Producers. Films were generally either documentaries or newsreels. Typical newsreels included scenes of captured American prisoners, downed American aircraft, the peaceful life in the "liberated" areas of the south, and evidence of support from abroad. A frequent theme of newsreels was the purported negative influence US presence had on the traditional Vietnamese society. Scenes depicting Vietnamese participating in narcotics traffic and prostitution were attributed to American presence. The documentary, sometimes called a

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"pictorial dramatization," usually revolved around a central theme or story, usually based on a hero. Films had the advantage of easily holding the viewers' attention and made a lasting impression. However, since they could not be adjusted to meet special local needs, they lacked the flexibility to become an important propaganda tool. (12)

Target Groups

(U) Enemy propagandists tailored specific appeals for every significant vocational, religious, ethnic, and political special interest group in SVN. They generally sought to influence groups displaying hostility toward the existing GVN. Propaganda appeals to special interest groups was greatly increased. The primary targets of the campaign were the An Quang Buddhists, disabled ARVN veterans, and RVN students. Those groups had a history of violent confrontation with the Thieu administration.

(U) Propaganda appeals to high school and college students were typical attempts aimed at special interest groups. Student dissatisfaction with mandatory military training culminated in a series of protest demonstrations in Saigon. The arrest of student leaders led to student strikes and more violent demonstrations. Communist propaganda called for unqualified public support of the militant student leaders. The Communists portrayed every GVN gesture of reconciliation toward the students as evidence of the political power of the student movement. Students were urged to form a coalition with other non-Communist, anti-GVN groups. The VC believed it to be more effective to alienate special interest groups from the GVN than to recruit groups' members into the Communist movement. (13)

International Propaganda

(U) The VC had also exerted considerable time and effort in building and maintaining a favorable international opinion. The goal of their international efforts was to create an illusion of support from the majority of the world's populace. Their hope was that the facade of international support would pressure the US into making major concessions to the PRG.

(U) Naturally, they could rely on vocal support of the Chinese and Russian Communist blocs. In addition, the PRG had received support from those African and Arab governments that identified with the PRG struggle as similar to their own anti-colonial efforts. International pressure groups whose activities generated publicity favorable to the VC existed in most western and neutral countries. Those groups included Communist front organizations, socialist, and pacifist groups. In many instances the VC realized more than just moral support when large monetary contributions were donated as the result of mass protests. They also relied on statements by American dissident elements and anti-war congressmen to boost the sagging morale of their war-weary people. They cited such statements as evidence the US could not continue its involvement in SEA for any prolonged period.

(U) The Paris Peace Talks became a major vehicle for disseminating their propaganda to the international audience. One of their featured themes was the purported American war crimes. Claims of barbarities had previously been accepted as valid by the international audience normally receptive to all Communist propaganda. The publicity given the alleged massacre at Son My provided them with a credibility with segments of the international audience normally

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skeptical of VC/NVA claims. Additional themes included claims the US waged chemical warfare in RVN. Their claims were distorted descriptions of defoliation activities. (14)

Propaganda Aimed at US Soldiers

(U) The Communists reserved a moderate portion of their propaganda program for appeals to US servicemen. Propaganda appeared in the form of printed slogans and leaflets and English language programs of Liberation Radio and Radio Hanoi. Propaganda themes included attempts to exploit the individual soldier's homesickness and separation from loved ones, political controversies, and social problems.

(U) Public statements of prominent American politicians were quoted extensively in Communist broadcasts and leaflets. Those statements often appeared altered or with qualifiers removed so they seemed to be harsher in criticism than originally intended. Actions of the anti-war groups coupled with the statements were an attempt to convince the American soldier he lacked the support of the American public.

(U) Propaganda also focused on events related to the anti-war movements such as the trial of the "Chicago Seven," the Kent State incident, and the flight of American draft dodgers to Canada. Attempts were made to convince the individual soldier he was putting his life in jeopardy to serve the special interests of a small clique of politicians.

(U) The struggle of the Negro for equal rights served as another propaganda theme. Fifty percent of the appeals were targeted at minority groups, with an emphasis on the black serviceman. The Communists preferred to print and broadcast statements of moderate Negro leaders, such as Ralph Abernathy and Whitney Young, over those of black revolutionaries, such as Eldridge Cleaver and H. Rap Brown. They felt it would enhance their appeal to demonstrate even conservative Negro leaders were against US involvement. They also tried to stir dissatisfaction among black servicemen by alleging Negroes were discriminated against even on the battlefield.

(U) The quality of propaganda depended on the type media used. News broadcasts were often direct quotes from AP or UPI presented without interpretation or comment. The more personal appeals were frequently couched in the contemporary jargon of American youth, with additional slogans derived from US anti-war groups. However, the VC/NVN use of the US slang was either imprecise or archaic, and slogans often were in stilted English.

(C) Leaflets, on the other hand, were characterized by clear print and precise English. The typical leaflet had a photograph of demonstrations on one side and a short quotation on the other. Other leaflets were safe conduct passes and urged the US soldier to desert his unit and seek the protection of the Communists. The Communists rarely, if ever, demeaned the fighting ability or courage of the individual serviceman; great pains were taken not to offend him. Instead, the serviceman was exhorted to view insubordination as a legitimate expression of a political opinion.

(U) The VC/NVN propaganda campaign had little, if any, success in demoralizing the American serviceman. Anti-war sentiment and alienation toward the military or society as a whole were attributed to attitudes and opinions formed prior to military service. There was no evidence the infrequent cases of anti-war behavior or of racial hostility among US troops was influenced by VC/NVN propaganda. (15)

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Proselyting

(U) The VC put increased emphasis on recruiting persons from all levels of the GVN's military and civilian bureaucracies to the side of the revolution. As the "third prong" of the Communists' fundamental strategy of the "three-pronged attack," proselyting was placed on an equal status with the other military and political activities constituting the first two prongs of their strategic triad. Considerable human resources were committed to the effort, and proselyting received major organizational recognition in the Military and Civilian Proselyting Section of COSVN, provincial, district, and village structure.

(U) Proselyting campaigns employed a variety of media, including formal entertainment groups that traveled from village to village, clandestine newspapers and radio transmitters, and numerous posters, leaflets, and other printed matter. A good deal of effort was concentrated on "face-to-face" indoctrination by propaganda cadre at the village market, by secret propagandists who had been planted within government ranks, and by local cadres making house-to-house visits at the hamlet level. The VC considered the relatives of persons serving in the GVN their most effective vehicles, and GVN-connected families living in VC controlled or contested areas were constantly pressured to write or visit their sons, brothers, or husbands to persuade them to defect and join forces with the revolution.

(U) Campaigns were differentiated according to the individual target groups, i. e., officers were approached differently from enlisted men, intellectuals from urban workers, and they often were tailored to the specific local grievances they sought to exploit. They all placed heavy emphasis on appeals to "nationalism," "anticolonialism," and "anti-Americanism." The central theme was the NLF was fighting a "just war" against the American imperialists and their Vietnamese lackeys; the forces of the revolution were gaining strength day by day and would prove victorious in the end; and to assist in the great patriotic struggle was the sacred duty of all Vietnamese, including the misguided who had thoughtlessly sided with, or had been "duped" into joining the GVN. (16)

Recruitment


1970 Estimates

(S) The VC/NVA continued to have a difficult time recruiting in RVN. The ability to recruit depended largely on population control. The monthly estimates of VC/NVA recruiting in RVN in 1970 were: (17)

JAN	3,100	JUL	2,700
FEB	3,200	AUG	2,400
MAR	3,100	SEP	2,400

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RECRUITMENT



SOURCE: MACJ2

FIGURE III-4

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APR	3,000	OCT	2,300
MAY	2,900	NOV	2,800
JUN	2,800	DEC	2,900

(U) Figure III-4 displays the in-country recruitment for the period January 1968 through December 1970.

The Movement of Children from South to North Vietnam

(C) The movement of children from South to North Vietnam dated back to the partition of Vietnam at Geneva in 1954. After completion of a course of study, the youths were returned to South Vietnam to assume positions of responsibility in the Communist organizational hierarchy.

(C) There appeared to be two distinct selection and training programs aimed at different age groups. The first group included youths between the ages of 10 and 17 who underwent normal secondary schooling along with technical and political training. The second group included those between the ages of 17 and 30 who underwent a more technically-slanted course of study aimed at raising their skill level in a specific field.

(C) The selection process began at COSVN level where quotas were assigned to the military regions and provinces. The quotas were passed to the districts where the ultimate recruitment responsibility rested. The village party cadre prepared dossiers on the eligible children and young adults. The dossiers were passed to the district party headquarters where the selections were made.

(C) Eligibility generally was determined by loyalty to the revolution. The most eligible were children of party cadre who had made valuable contributions or sacrifices to the insurgency. Eligibility for the older group was determined by the candidates' merit, with at least 2 to 3 years of outstanding service required.

(C) Very little forceful persuasion or outright kidnapping was reported. Considerations of the parents by the party precluded the use of force. Children were mostly chosen from families or areas which were ideologically committed to the Communists. Parents also wanted their children educated by the Communists and felt honored at their selection. Another consideration was, schools in insecure areas did not exist or were not adequate. Sending the children north presented educational opportunities not found in the south. The VC were unable to provide educational services due to the presence of large numbers of US troops.

(C) Once in North Vietnam, the children were reported as either staying in a group of buildings or being boarded with families. Reports stressed the children were accorded special treatment, but without friction or hostility.

(C) The course of study for the children was generally the same as for North Vietnamese children. The brightest children were chosen for advanced military, technical, and political training after completing the basic secondary course. Reports stated some children were sent abroad to places such as China, Russia, East Germany, and Cuba for the advanced training.

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
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INTELLIGENCE NETWORK



— DIRECT CONTROL
- - - DIRECT COMMUNICATION / COORDINATION

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FIGURE III-5

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(C) Little was known concerning the specific jobs given to children educated in North Vietnam. Some remained in the north while others were returned to the south. The program provided the VC with a continuous new generation of leaders for the VCI. The program was considered an integral part of the protracted war policy. Further, the program provided educational service to loyal supporters, insuring future cooperation. (18)

Intelligence, Security, and Counterintelligence

(S) There were four major activities directing intelligence and counterintelligence operations against the RVN. They were: the North Vietnamese Ministry of Public Security (MPS); the North Vietnamese Central Research Agency (Cuc Nghien Cuu) (CNC); the VCI; and VC/NVA main force military intelligence organizations. The MPS and CNC were controlled directly from Hanoi, although their operations were conducted in SVN. The VCI was the backbone of the COSVN military intelligence and counterintelligence services. VC/NVA main-force units utilized the intelligence organization and capabilities of the VCI together with their own tactical intelligence units. (see Figure III-5.)

(S) The NVN MPS was the executive organ for maintaining internal security, public order, and party discipline throughout North and South Vietnam. In SVN, the COSVN Security Section was the highest MPS echelon. The functional elements in SVN were called security sections and they existed in every party committee from the national to village level. They were controlled through a multiple command channel. The MPS communicated directly with security sections at province level and above. The higher level echelons above province were believed to be headed by MPS staff officers from NVN. (19)

(S) The COSVN Security Section was subordinate to the Political Directorate of the Central Executive Committee. Its functions were: giving general direction and guidance to lower operating echelons from region to hamlet level; informing the Central Executive Committee, COSVN, on intelligence and security matters; providing internal security for COSVN and its allied agencies; training security cadre at district level and above; and conducting counterintelligence and espionage operations in VC and GVN controlled areas.

(S) The COSVN Security Section was headed by a leadership committee having a chief, at least one deputy chief, and representatives from the various subsections. The section handled the major policy decisions, supervised the more important aspects of administration, and handled the financial and personnel actions of the subordinate subsections. The following functional subsections were reported:

1. Administrative. Responsible for management, finance, logistics, and routine administrative support.
2. Internal Security. Performed counterintelligence functions. Consisted of a reconnaissance element responsible for countering allied "raids" into VC controlled areas by developing and disseminating intelligence about allied forces, and a judicial element which administered permanent courts in VC controlled areas.
3. Research. Maintained files on counter-revolutionary personnel and produced papers and studies on captured documents.

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4. Guard Unit. Provided protection for visiting foreign dignitaries and insured their safety while in the area.
5. Production. Provided food for the security section.
6. Commo-Liaison. Provided the security section with its own transportation, message transmission, and interpersonnel contact capability.
7. Logistical. Maintained armories, food storage facilities, and means of transportation and distribution.
8. Interrogation and Detention. Exploited prisoners and administered jails and PW camps.
9. Internal Security and Intelligence School. Provided training for the security sections down to district level.
10. Organic Mobile Unit. Appeared to be the military component of security sections and provided border surveillance.
11. Technical Intercept. Possibly provided early warning of allied air strikes and ground operations through the intercept of allied radio communications. (20)

(S) The CNC was the NVN strategic military espionage apparatus subordinate to the NVN Ministry of Defense. Its mission was the collection of positive intelligence on hostile military and political activities. It had the responsibility for keeping the general staff of the NVA informed on the capabilities and intentions of US and allied forces in RVN. CNC activities were controlled directly from NVN. Although CNC activities were separate from other VC intelligence matters in SVN, the increase in CNC control was proportionate to the increased numbers of NVA troops. CNC agents communicated directly with headquarters by courier or radio; high level liaison was conducted with the VC/NVA military elements. The CNC placed emphasis on the collection of intelligence on US and SVN forces by using domestic and unskilled employees as low-level informants. CNC was also involved in the collection of intelligence through the intercept of US and SVN radio traffic. CNC-trained cryptographic specialists were known to be present in SVN. CNC also established a contact system in SVN to service and direct agent nets.

(S) In addition to the intelligence organizations controlled directly from Hanoi, the following were part of COSVN: Military Intelligence Service, Strategic Intelligence Service, Military Security Service, and Military Proselyting Sections.

(S) The Military Intelligence Service was staffed in part by CNC personnel. It was subordinate to the Military Staff of the Military Affairs Sections of COSVN. Its activities were dispersed throughout SVN at every level of the party apparatus. Its functions were: development of clandestine information collections assets and operational support structure; collection of tactical intelligence and military order of battle information in direct support of VC/NVA military operations; execution of specialized armed operations; production of intelligence; providing guidance and training of VC reconnaissance elements; and providing covert agents with documentation.

(S) The Strategic Intelligence Service collected strategic intelligence for COSVN. It was a miniature CNC headquarters which coordinated CNC operations in SVN. The service was

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established to intensify the collection of strategic intelligence. It operated closely with the Military Intelligence Service.

(S) The Military Security Service was subordinate to the Political Staff of the Military Affairs Section of COSVN. Although similar to the MPS apparatus, it differed in that its targets and the elements it protected were primarily military. Its activities were closely coordinated with MPS. Counterespionage operations, indoctrination of civilian and military personnel on maintenance of security and preservation of party discipline were its announced activities.

(S) The Military Proselyting Section was subordinate to the Current Affairs Committee of COSVN. It controlled military proselyting activity at every level of the Communist apparatus, from national to village level. Its function was to undermine the will of and affect desertions among allied forces in the south. Information collected as a by-product was forwarded through party channels to the military intelligence units. Activities included the recruitment-in-place and the insertion of agents as penetrants within the GVN and military agencies. It was probable this activity was coordinated with and supervised by the Military Security Service at the same echelon. (21)

(S) COSVN's Technical Reconnaissance Bureau conducted a large, well-equipped and well-organized VC communications intelligence (COMINT) effort in RVN. The operating units, known as Technical Reconnaissance Units, had a substantial English language capability and were targeted against US and South Vietnamese communications networks. The units usually were deployed immediately prior to and during combat to maximize intelligence on allied strength, disposition, and intentions. They were set up to react immediately to COMINT derived from US and ARVN tactical voice communications. At the beginning of 1970, there were an estimated 4,000 Communist troops assigned to integral COMINT units in direct support of field units. Their inventory included several thousand US tactical and commercial radios and CHICOM tactical radios. They also had battery-operated tape recorders for exploiting US voice communications.

(S) The effectiveness and thoroughness of the VC/NVA COMINT effort was clearly demonstrated when a US 1st Div Co overran and captured in December 1969 a complete VC radio intercept station in Ben Suc in Binh Duong Province (see p III-113, Vol I, 1969 MACV Command History).

(S) Another form of intelligence collection was direct reconnaissance of objectives by members and agents of VC and NVA tactical units. Captured documents showed reconnaissance elements made skillful use of mobile and fixed observation posts near friendly positions and on LOCs.

(S) The use of women, children, and old men as collectors was favored for low-level observation missions. Young men rarely were used because they might be questioned about their draft status. Innocent-appearing children had a chance of gaining access to troop areas since those under 15 were not required to have identification cards and therefore, were not subject to document controls as were adults. Where installations bordered built-up civilian communities and where there was a large number of civilians employed at the installation, successful reconnaissance was difficult to prevent.

(S) The enemy's large and impressive intelligence effort had the advantage of operating in its native environment. However, there were several weaknesses in its operation. The enemy

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practice of repeated reconnaissance of tactical targets made agents more vulnerable to detection and apprehension. That, in turn, provided warning of possible attacks. The VC ranks included inexperienced and relatively untrained intelligence, proselyting, and special action personnel. The leaders were generally well-trained and experienced, but there was often a shortage of capable cadre in certain areas. The enemy's intelligence nets were often poorly organized. The failure to compartmentalize within tended to compromise the entire net with the apprehension of one member. The great number of documents captured indicated that weak document security practices were also a stumbling block to the enemy. Finally, the enemy practice of using terror and violence was sometimes counterproductive, creating foes who could and did expose Communist agents.

(S) The VC/NVA had an extensive espionage and intelligence apparatus capable of continuous coverage of the government and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF). There were weaknesses within the enemy's intelligence organization, but they were partially offset by numerous types of collection assets which could be rapidly exploited on a tactical level by the effective interlocking political-military organization at all echelons. (22)

VCI Activities

January

(C) Preparation for the February offensive, the VC anti-pacification campaign and planning for the post-conflict political struggle highlighted VCI activity. Preparation for the February offensive was prevalent throughout the RYN but was most intense in I and IV CTZs. In both those CTZs, numerous province and district party committee meetings were held to implement COSVN directives and to issue orders for the Winter-Spring Campaign. The VCI's most urgent requirement was to meet the increased support needs of NVA units that had been redeployed to IV CTZ. Throughout the country there was an increased emphasis on the gathering of food. The VC anti-pacification campaign hoped to achieve the goal of returning civilians to VC controlled areas by "shattering" the GVN pacification program. Urban areas posed the most difficult problem for the VC and it appeared they were preparing efforts directed at the suburban or "stepping stone" belts around the cities. Tactics used in the preparation were the enemy's false rallier program and military proselyting to induce RF/PF and People's Self Defense Force (PSDF) to act as "fifth columnist." Strengthening of the lower-level party apparatus remained at the base of any post-conflict preparation. Steps taken to counter potential problems included district "leadership" and "indoctrination" courses for village level cadre. New cadre were appointed to responsible party positions. Further preparation involved the infiltration of cadre into legitimate political and religious groups opposed to the GVN and into the RF/PF and PSDF to proselyte "fifth columnist." Secret party chapters designed to mobilize public opinion were also created. They were tasked to mobilize a peace movement and to encourage the people to protest against GVN economic policies. The issue of peace was increasingly appearing in propaganda and captured documents. The VC may have been using talk of a cease-fire to boost lagging morale; however, the reported establishment of a "National Front for Peace" in III CTZ was significant. The "front" was designed to appeal to those elements of the country who wanted a cease-fire and peace. This development may have indicated that the frequent references to a cease-fire served purposes other than morale building.

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(C) The VC continued to stress their standard propaganda themes, including demands for a complete US withdrawal and for a coalition government in the RVN. In IV CTZ, vivid details of the alleged massacre at Son My were released, and claims of many similar atrocities throughout the RVN by US soldiers were made. Additional propaganda capitalized on the upcoming TET holidays, citing the Communists' self-imposed 3-day truces as examples of their "unchanged humanitarian policy" based upon "respect for the customs and habits of our people and peoples of other countries." In II CTZ, enemy propaganda warned of threatening attacks and called on the villagers to build bunkers and store a month's supply of food. A series of year-end summaries highlighting alleged Communist military, political, and diplomatic successes achieved during 1969 were released during the month. Claims that 645,000 casualties were inflicted on the Allies represented their military success. Political successes included the founding of the PRG and the spread of revolutionary administrations to "41 provinces and cities, and 1,300 out of 1,600 villages in SVN." On the diplomatic front, the Communists claimed wide-spread acceptance and international support for the PRG and its 10-Point Peace Plan. They also hailed the development of the antiwar movement both in the US and among the "progressive" peoples of the world. Having cited those past achievements, they presented an optimistic forecast for 1970: "The US/Puppet defeat is obvious" and "our people's victory is drawing nearer than ever before."

(C) Military proselyting received the greatest emphasis, especially with the PSDF and RF/PF. That was due to the threat the VC felt the Vietnamization program presented. In IV CTZ, the friction between the GVN and the ethnic Cambodian population over the loss of minority recognition and special rights presented an exploitable situation. In GVN Phu Yen Province a course in military proselyting techniques was established for cadre assigned to district and village proselyting sections.

(C) Finance and economy activity was characterized by continued efforts to alleviate a serious rice shortage in I CTZ and parts of III CTZ. In IV CTZ, there was an intensification of revenue collection efforts due to the movement of NVA units into the area. In Vung Tau and Dalat, the VC attempted to extort "protection money" from persons regularly operating vehicles on the main routes to Saigon. Efforts were increased to approach operators in their homes or businesses to collect safe passage money to Saigon rather than establishing road "tax points" as in the past. In I CTZ, NVN currency was introduced into areas of strong VC influence. The residents were told that it would become the only legal tender and many exchanged their \$VN for NVN currency. In IV CTZ, reports indicated that attempts were made to introduce a new "PRG currency" into areas of strong VC influence. The attempts presented a danger to the economic and pacification efforts of the GVN. The exchange of \$VN for NVN or PRG currency would provide the VC with a fund of \$VN to spend on the open market, a visible sign of VC influence, and confine commercial transactions to VC controlled areas.

(C) The Communists continued to target terrorism against rural development and pacification cadre, members of the National Police and PSDF, and lower-level GVN officials. The increased terrorist activity may have been a prelude to a period of intensive sapper activity in cities throughout the RVN during the TET holidays. (23)

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February

(C) The country-wide VCI political thrust decreased moderately compared with the high tempo of activity that preceded the TET holidays. VC political efforts continued to be targeted at the GVN pacification program. Extensive preparation for the post-conflict struggle remained in evidence. In spite of the offensive indicators that had abounded in January and early February, the threatened military offensive was not mounted. COSVN Directive 136, a captured supplement to COSVN Resolution 9, outlined five missions for the Spring Offensive: destroy the enemy's (FWMAF/RVNAF) war potential and inflict heavier casualties on US troops; thwart the enemy's Accelerated Pacification Program; consolidate administration in "liberated" areas and construct combat villages; launch military proselyting efforts; and improve morale of all personnel. In the B-3 Front, indications of an offensive persisted. Enemy propaganda warned of attacks on Kontum and Ban Me Thuot. Enemy anti-pacification efforts were manifested by sharp increases in terrorist activities and assassinations of GVN low-level administrative officers throughout the highlands. The movement of children to the north for training continued. The majority of the children were cadre's sons and daughters between the ages of 10 and 14. The reindoctrination programs in I CTZ continued through the month. In addition to the lower-level party cadre, female cadre and members of farmer's associations were focused on. In VC Phu Yen Province, an 18 Feb PRP report ordered Action Arrow agents to abduct farmers, women, teenagers between the ages of 13 and 16, and relatives of persons serving the GVN. The abductees were to be indoctrinated on topics such as: demands that the GVN return husbands and sons to their homes and end the draft; appeals to the people not to serve the GVN; campaigns to motivate the people to supply rice and money to the VC and to assist military operations; and appeals to the people to hide VC cadre during stay-behind operations.

(C) Communist propaganda stressed the themes of anti-pacification, protracted warfare, and post-conflict planning. A Liberation Radio broadcast, reporting the results of a mid-January meeting of the PRG Council of Ministers, stated that the established 1970 goals were strengthening the revolutionary administration and military forces at all echelons and "frustrating" the pacification and Vietnamization programs. In VC Binh Dinh Province, Communist propaganda asserted that General Duong Van "Big" Minh and Senator Tran Van Don were covertly plotting to overthrow the Thieu-Ky Government. In VC Tuyen Duc Province, the Communist called for the reestablishment of normal relations between North and South Vietnam pending a peace settlement. In another theme, the enemy intensified the often repeated allegations that the US was making massive use of chemical warfare in the RVN. A propaganda article dated 18 Feb claimed that the US had continuously and systematically conducted chemical warfare since 1961 on an unprecedented scale turning Vietnam into "a testing ground and the Vietnamese into guinea pigs for the experimentation of mass destruction weapons." VC propaganda also claimed that numerous country-wide TET truce violations were committed by allied forces.

(C) COSVN Directive 136 manifested the enemy's perception of the threat posed by the GVN pacification and Vietnamization programs. The directive called for greatly increased military proselyting to thwart those programs. The directive also called for tighter control of the population and the disruption of the GVN efforts to strengthen their control. Proselyting of ethnic Cambodians in IV CTZ continued during the month. A report from IV CTZ stated that VC cadre disguised as Buddhist monks were to penetrate the pagodas and lead anti-government demonstrations. That was to create as much confusion as possible in the continuing struggle between the GVN and the Cambodians over the issue of minority rights.

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(C) In finance and economy activity, the VC rumor that the GVN was withdrawing \$VN500 notes from circulation and introducing \$VN1,000 notes was revived. The concern was manifested in directives to the local finance and economy sections in VC Quang Nam and VC Binh Dinh Provinces to spend their \$VN500 notes. In IV CTZ, the appearance of a "PRG currency" in a fourth province showed an intensified attempt to establish areas of increased VC financial control.

(C) Even though the targets of terrorism remained the same as last month, innocent GVN civilians constituted the majority of the victims of random violence. An increase in abductions in II CTZ's VC Phu Yen Province was noted during the month. There was insufficient information to explain the disproportionate increase; however, it was possible that the abductions were intended to form a labor force to collect food and transport munitions.

(C) A 27 Feb report from VC MR 2 gave an insight into the VCI's own security and the repeated absence of VC units from the area during allied ground and air strikes. The basic means employed to establish an early warning system was the intercept of allied radio communications. The advanced warning varied from 5 to 6 hours for ground operations and 15 to 30 minutes for air strikes. Given such advance warning, the VCI could easily absent themselves and reassert their influence when the operation was over. (24)

March

(C) The ouster of Prince Sihanouk in Cambodia was potentially more significant for the military-political future in South Vietnam than any event since the issuance of COSVN Resolution 9 in July 1969, or the TET Offensive of February 1968. Significant VCI initiated activities in SVN, including a marked increase in abduction and plans for extensive interference in March and April local elections, remained consistent with the emphasis in COSVN Resolution 9 on neutralizing the pacification program. The VCI were especially active in attacking both pacification and the broad context of political stability within which pacification proceeded. The VCI attacked pacification progress directly through a massive terrorism campaign and took initial steps to avert future GVN pacification gains from the land reform bill. The enemy also attempted to undermine political stability by exploiting the discontent of a number of special interest groups in Saigon and by aggravating the inflationary trends which were an important cause of many problems which plagued the GVN.

(C) Enemy propaganda increasingly claimed that the US was using chemical warfare and nausea gas in the RVN. They alleged these weapons destroyed both residents and the ecological balance of the areas where they were used. Internationally, this theme might be used to continue the war crime motif, and to discredit President Nixon's 25 Nov 69 disavowal of the use of biological warfare. NVN Vice President, Nguyen Duy Trinh in a Paris interview, depicted the US as intensifying the war and as responsible for the failure of the Paris Peace Talks.

(C) A document from VC Quang Tri Province stated that a new proselyting campaign was being aimed at ARVN draftees stationed near the DMZ. The conscripts were promised that if they rallied to the VC cause, they would be allowed to return to their homes. If they rallied, the conscripts were to be indoctrinated and sent home as local guerrillas or secret VC supporters. Proselyting of Montagnards in the B-3 Front and Cambodian monks in VC MR 3 was reported though there was

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no new significant proselyting of the Korean forces.

(C) In finance and economy activity there were numerous reports of continued problems in tax and rice collection. Population resettlement programs were contributing significantly to the difficulties by reducing the population's proximity to the VCI. Reports from several areas supported the expectation of an increase in armed collection activities. In other areas, the outright extortion of goods had alienated the population to such an extent that they would not sell their goods to the VCI. Two solutions possibly under consideration to prevent that were to use a middleman to purchase goods or to induce youth group members to persuade their elders to sell to the VC/NVA. In the delta, where rice had been plentiful enough to supply local units as well as other areas in short supply, the VCI found themselves unable to supply even the local units due to the pacification programs. The events in Cambodia were also expected to aggravate the supply problems in IV Corps. To deal with some of their supply and economy problems the VCI introduced agricultural experts into VC Binh Dinh Province not only as an anti-pacification program but as a method of increasing agricultural production.

(C) Terrorism increased during the month, especially the number of abductions in VC Phu Yen Province. The VCI may have been using Phu Yen as a trial province for a relatively inexpensive program of anti-pacification based on terrorism. The abductions were followed by intense reorientation and reeducation. The abduction-indoctrination sequence was an effective counter-pacification weapon. It demonstrated to the people that the GVN was incapable of protecting them and created the impression that the VC could do whatever they wanted whenever they pleased.

(C) Several captured documents placed significant emphasis on tightening security practices. A directive from the security section of MR 6 instructed subordinate sections to tighten the controls on the handling of secret documents to keep them out of GVN hands. Lax security had caused casualties and limited the success of the revolution. A COSVN circular suggested procedures to prevent the loss of secret documents.

(C) Other VCI activity in SVN continued to be directed toward the disruption of pacification. The VCI planned to interfere with the March-April village and hamlet-level elections. The plan called for the seizing of identification papers required to vote, planting explosives in voting areas, and kidnapping or assassinating candidates. They sought covert participation in the elections by supporting VC sympathizers or by promoting VC agents. Either disruptions, covert participation, or a combination of these could be used in different locations. (25)

April

(C) VCI activity during the month continued to emphasize the disruption of the GVN pacification program. The first signs of the VCI efforts to thwart possible benefits to Allies from the GVN land reform bill appeared in SR3. VCI propaganda teams tried to discourage land owners from selling land to the GVN and villages from accepting land distributed by the GVN. The inequities of land distribution were a basic grievance which the enemy had exploited for years. In accordance with COSVN Directive 129, issued in November 1969, there was an increase in political struggles in the urban areas. The directive called for "stepping up our political struggle movement in cities" and "increasing our troop proselyting task." Another document captured in April

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stated:

The student struggles in Saigon, Hue, and My Tho have reached an unprecedented high point. Coupled with the (RVNAF) war invalids' (protest demonstrations), these movements have forced the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique into a quagmire. This is an excellent opportunity for us to intensify our political and proselyting activities among students and the war invalids." (26)

In Saigon, the VCI intended to infiltrate student groups and to stage anti-GVN demonstrations. In Danang, the VCI intended to infiltrate and agitate groups of students, workers, and Buddhists. In light of the student strikes against the arrest of student leaders and the persecution of Vietnamese in Cambodia, the closing of all schools and universities in Saigon, and the demonstrations of veterans and Buddhists in Saigon, the opportunity for enemy political subversion was enhanced.

(C) Enemy propaganda was used in an attempt to counter possible GVN pacification gains resulting from the land reform bill. Liberation Radio commentaries labeled the land reform bill a farce. The commentaries quoted William Corson's book The Betrayal, stating that the land reform bill would turn the RVN peasants into tenant farmers for a group of landowners, government officials, and army officers. Propaganda was also directed at other special interest groups in an attempt to exploit existing social disquiet, thereby disrupting the context of political stability within which pacification proceeded. Enemy broadcasts strongly supported the student strikes against the GVN in Saigon and Hue. A Hanoi broadcast in response to the grievances of veterans in Saigon argued that in Saigon "there are two completely opposite social classes---one rich because it supports the aggressive war, the other living miserably in slums, a victim of the dirty and cruel war of aggression." (27) On 21 Apr, Truong Chinh, Chairman of the National Assembly of the DRV, announced over Radio Hanoi the formation of the Indochinese Peoples' United Front. The front had the purpose of winning back and maintaining the "independence, sovereignty, unified spirit, and territorial integrity" of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. On 24-25 Apr, a Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples was held. In another propaganda theme, the enemy linked the GVN with the persecution of Vietnamese inside Cambodia. President Nixon's 20 Apr announcement that 150,000 American troops would be withdrawn from RVN drew enemy propaganda reaction. Liberation Radio and Radio Hanoi stressed that Nixon was both prolonging the war through Vietnamization, using Vietnamese to fight Vietnamese, and expanding the war to Laos and Cambodia, using Indochinese to fight Indochinese. President Nixon's 30 Apr decision to commit US ground forces in Cambodia drew an even heavier propaganda reaction than his announcement on troop withdrawals. The PRG accused President Nixon of openly invading Cambodia and of intensifying and expanding the war throughout Indochina.

(C) The events in Cambodia caused emphasis to again be placed on the proselyting of ethnic Khmers living in SVN. The goal was to show the Khmers that their true enemies were the Americans and their allies, the Cambodian landlords, and the Khmer soldiers. A document captured in MR 7 stated that civilian proselyting cadre should implement a policy of reminding Catholics of their family members in the north and to help them write letters to their relatives. The cadre were further directed to deepen the hatred of those people for the Americans and GVN personnel. Another captured document called for the stepping up of military proselyting activities to frustrate the pacification program and reduce the morale of the GVN troops. Another objective mentioned was to foil Vietnamization by promoting local guerrilla warfare. Another COSVN document placed emphasis on the recruiting of additional fifth columnists from the families of GVN military

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personnel to support local political struggles in an attempt to defeat Vietnamization. Refugees were another important target for proselyting activities. The campaign basically was to induce people to remain in or move into VC controlled areas.

(C) The VCI, through finance and economy measures, attempted to aggravate the inflation within RVN whenever possible. Finance and economy sections subordinate to VC MR 3 were directed to tell the population that it was better to increase spending than to hoard money, and that it was better to keep rice and food at home than to sell it to the GVN for money that would soon be devalued. Increased spending would drive up local prices, and the hoarding of rice would drive up food prices in urban areas. The introduction of counterfeit money would also contribute to local price increases. The political grievances which would result from further increases in the cost of rice could easily be exploited by the VCI. Unrest of the veterans and other groups would compound, and the VCI could organize anti-GVN demonstrations in the cities and towns. Deterioration of the RVN economy through inflation would create a more favorable climate for the introduction of a PRG currency. Receptivity to a PRG currency would be increased to the degree that their confidence in GVN currency was weakened. Successful introduction of a PRG currency, even in isolated areas, would bolster the PRG's claim to legitimacy, compounding further the political difficulties of the GVN. In other finance and economy activity, the VCI was instituting a program to increase VC food production in an effort to alleviate recurring food shortages. A captured document gave three reasons for the shortages: reduction in the area of cultivated land; intensive allied pacification and military activities; and allied use of defoliants. A captured document from MR 5 directed that a large quantity of food should be stored to carry out the projected campaign of pacification disruption. The mission was to solve supply problems by practicing thrift, increasing farm production, and using legal cadres to collect taxes. Subordinate units were directed to produce or collect 50 percent of their food and 40 percent of their cash requirements. A COSVN directive, issued by the Finance and Economy Section, set new guidelines for the collection of industrial and commercial taxes. Collections were to be made in all industrial complexes, cities, suburban areas, and along communication routes, with support from armed escorts.

(C) Terrorist activity continued to be highlighted by abductions and there was a general country-wide increase in terrorists incidents associated with the first phase of "Campaign X." The abduction campaign experienced in VC Phu Yen Province in early February, spread into GVN Pleiku, GVN Phu Bon, GVN Binh Dinh, VC Binh Thuan, and VC Tuyen Duc Provinces. Several captured documents, including COSVN Resolution 14, called for the dispersion of all troop units into small elements and stressed the importance of building up the guerrilla force. These documents provided a context within which the increased enemy reliance on terrorism and sapper activity could be understood.

(C) The VCI continued to emphasize the tightening of security practices. In MR 5, a mobile team was to be established to check on persons entering and leaving VC "liberated" areas. A document from the SVNLA called for the institution of a Party Inspection Committee at all echelons to tighten security and eliminate violations of party regulations. Security sections were also utilized in support of terrorist activity. Sections were to compile lists of pacification personnel for neutralization. (28)

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May

(C) After one month of US operations in Cambodia, certain aspects of the future course of the conflict in Vietnam could be assessed. Allied capture of enemy caches in the Cambodian sanctuaries and the disruption of the supply lines around the sanctuaries would impair enemy logistics operations in the areas south of VC Quang Ngai and VC Kontum Provinces. The enemy would have to compensate for those losses by supplying its forces locally. They would attempt to facilitate local support of forces through intensified tax collection both in money and in kind. The proselyting of ethnic Cambodians along the RVN/Cambodia border and in the delta was expected to increase. The establishment of an infrastructure would be of imminent priority. That organization was expected to be largely for logistical purposes, charged with extracting supplies from Cambodia. Political cadre from the RVN would be sent to Cambodia to organize the ethnic Vietnamese and Cambodian population. Communist propaganda was expected to argue that President Nixon's Vietnamization program was the US policy of spreading the war throughout SEA, and prolonging it by using Indochinese to fight Indochinese.

(C) Communist propaganda efforts during May were centered around student unrest and the disabled veterans' campaign to obtain increased government compensation. Liberation Radio and Hanoi broadcasts reported that the Cambodian cross-border operations were expanding the war and were acts of aggression opposing the independence and sovereignty of another country. The enemy ridiculed President Nixon for expanding the war after promising in the 1968 election campaign to end it. Enemy propaganda in the B-3 Front centered around a planned military campaign. Propaganda cadre and propaganda leaflets warned the villagers of the attacks and told them to prepare to aid the VC in their attempts to liberate the area from US and GVN forces. In the MR 10 area, propaganda was aimed at the farmers and Farmers Associations urging them to supply rice and money to the Liberation Front soldiers.

(C) The student and veteran unrest also presented an opportunity to intensify proselyting activities. Demonstrations by those groups were reported in Saigon, Qui Nhon City, VC Quang Ngai Province, and the VC Quang Da Special Zone. Ethnic Cambodians in VC MR 3 were being encouraged to volunteer for duty with the VC in Cambodia. Volunteers were told they would be part of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.

(C) The Cambodian cross-border operations made the work of the finance and economy section difficult. In VC Binh Dinh Province, NVA and province main forces were divided into platoons to remedy the shortage of supplies. The platoons were to coordinate with the local VC forces to urge the populace to contribute agricultural taxes. In the B-3 Front, reports indicated that the enemy was suffering from severe food shortages. Combat units were directed to produce one-half of their rice requirement and support elements were to increase rice production by 100 percent. SR 2 suffered more from the Cambodian cross-border operations than any other region or sub-region. As a result, local VCI organization would be forced to assume increased responsibility for logistical support.

(C) Although terrorism declined during the month, large numbers of civilians were abducted, continuing the trend in terrorism. High rates of abduction were noted in GVN Phu Yen, Binh Thuan, Quang Nam, Pleiku, Ba Xuyen, Quang Tri, and Binh Dinh Provinces. (29)

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June

(C) The overall effects of the allied operations in Cambodia were largely as assessed in May. Despite the difficulties, there was a remarkable normality in the type and level of VCI activities. During the month, the VCI planned to disrupt the provincial and municipal council elections and continued to sustain high levels of terrorism.

(C) Enemy propaganda attacks on allied operations in Cambodia were broadcast by Liberation Radio in reaction to President Nixon's 3 Jun review of the first month of operations. The broadcast argued that prior to allied operations, Cambodia had been a "peaceful oasis." The broadcast also chided President Nixon because in his speech he "did not mention the so-called Communist headquarters in Cambodia, the main target of the aggression," and further for trying to support Lon Nol who was "no more than the mayor of Phnom Penh City." (30)

(C) Finance and economy activity was highlighted by a number of reports concerning the actual or planned introduction of a NLF or PRG currency in SVN. Reports identified GVN Quang Nam and VC Ben Tre Provinces as the areas where the actual introduction had taken place.

(C) Terrorist activity continued to be highlighted by a large number of abductions in GVN Phu Yen, Kontum, Pleiku, Binh Thuan, Binh Duong, Quang Tri, Binh Dinh, Ninh Thuan, Phong Dinh, and Kien Hoa Provinces. In addition to revealing inadequacies in local security, the abduction campaign had three purposes. First, some abducted youth were sent to Laos for military and political training. Second, the VCI reportedly abducted persons for ransom in VC Binh Thuan and GVN Pleiku Provinces. Finally, the VCI appeared to be abducting their own false ralliers and legal agents for intelligence gathering purposes, while simultaneously removing suspicion that these personnel were working with the VCI.

(C) The tightening of security practices and organizations at all echelons was a continuing theme during the month. In VC Binh Dinh Province, subordinate security sections were instructed to increase security activities during 1970. Hamlet and village security forces were to be consolidated and they were to motivate the population to participate in a program to eliminate and reform the enemy. One of the reasons for the tightening of security organizations was due to poor leadership and supervision at the district level and above. Poor leadership was attributed to the new personnel assigned to these positions and to a lack of knowledge of their job. Political re-orientation programs were used to acquaint newly assigned cadre with the areas in which, and the people with whom, they work.

(C) Enemy plans to disrupt the provincial elections included the same techniques they had planned to use in the March-April elections. However, they did not plan to run a covert agent, recognizing the difficulty of running a covert agent for a provincial council. One new tactic not used during the previous election was for local forces to tell the villagers that, if they voted, their lives and property would be endangered. (31)

July

(C) VCI activity decreased from previous months and was attributed to four factors. First, the allied cross-border operations created logistical problems for the VCI. Second, the operations

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brought a redirection of VCI/VC activity from the RVN to Cambodia. Political cadre from RVN remained active in Cambodia, while VC/NVA military activity conducted limited attacks on 80 percent of the major population centers in Cambodia. Third, in some areas of RVN, July was traditionally a relatively inactive month for the VCI. Finally, the cross-border operations were conducted at a time when the VCI was in the midst of reorganizing its finance and economy, civil health, postal, communications, and transportation apparatus in preparation for a more intense political struggle as the level of military activity scaled down in the RVN. The transitional difficulties involved in such reorganization may have hampered the ability of the VCI to respond to difficulties created by allied military activity in Cambodia.

(C) Communist propaganda, through Liberation Radio, exploited the controversy surrounding the alleged "tiger cells" at Con Son Island prison, by quoting a US congressman on the subject of prison conditions in RVN. An SVNLA directive instructed subordinate echelons to collect US and GVN toxic chemical devices for transmittal to the Chemical Office, Military Staff Department, SVNLA. The devices were to be forwarded to foreign countries for use as evidence when denouncing the "crimes" of US "imperialist." Enemy propaganda broadcasts focused on US use of chemical warfare and nausea gas in the RVN, arguing that during "Nixon's first year in the White House, the number of victims of US chemicals in South Vietnam rapidly increased, equaling one-third of the number for all previous seven years." (32)

(C) Evidence accumulated before the cross-border operations confirmed that the VCI felt rural to urban population shifts in RVN had contributed to GVN pacification gains and it was in the interests of the VCI to promote the return of refugees to the country-side. Population movement from less to more secure areas lessened the population base to which the VCI had access for the purpose of "tax" collection, recruitment, proselyting, and propagandizing. The VCI in the B-3 Front, therefore, encouraged people to leave resettlement centers for their former more isolated hamlets. In VC Binh Long Province the VCI also directed propaganda against resettlement centers, arguing that since the centers were characterized by hunger and disease, the inhabitants should demand freedom to return to their old homes.

(C) In finance and economy activity, evidence was received of the introduction of enemy currency into three provinces. That brought the total number of provinces to eight into which enemy currency had been introduced since 1 Jan 70. Reports indicated that NVN currency was introduced in VC Quang Da, PRG currency in VC Ben Tre, VC My Tho, and VC Can Tho, NLF currency in VC Ben Tre, and a "VC currency" in VC Ba Bien, VC Vinh Long, and Ca Mau. Introduction of enemy currencies offered the VCI a number of potential advantages. First, an exchange rate of 10 units of GVN currency for one unit of enemy currency was usually reported. Villagers agreeing to exchange \$VN provided the VCI with negotiable currency with which to purchase food and supplies. Second, a self-contained enemy currency system insulated to some extent the enemy-controlled areas from the inflation prevalent in GVN-controlled areas. Third, the currency would force villagers who had exchanged their GVN currency to make all commercial transactions in VC areas. Fourth, the introduction of VC currency in one area could force villagers in nearby GVN areas to accept the money rather than discontinue trade with the VC village. In that way, areas of VCI influence could be expanded. Fifth, strictly economic considerations aside, introductions of an enemy currency could have a significant psychological impact on the area and near the area involved by serving as a continuing reminder of the VC/VCI presence. Finally, circulation of a PRG currency could bolster the PRG's claim to legitimacy, since a primary governmental function was the issuance and control of a money supply. In other developments, the enemy issued

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savings bonds in VC My Tho Province and postage stamps in Thuan Phong District of VC Binh Thuan Province.

(C) Enemy terrorist activity declined in comparison to the previous months. The slackening in terrorism was reflected in several areas. The high abduction rate noted in the previous 2 months lessened significantly. The expected increase in terrorism during the provincial elections in late June did not materialize. Finally, terrorism did not peak at anytime during July as it had in either the first or second week during the preceding 3 months.

(C) The PRG responded coolly to President Nixon's appointment of Ambassador David Bruce as Chief US Delegate at the Paris Peace Talks. In a Paris press briefing, a PRG spokesman stated:

I would like to say that since Mr. Nixon narrowed the scope of the Paris Conference on Viet-Nam by withdrawing Mr. Cabot Lodge from his position as Chief of the US delegation at the Paris conference, this is merely something he had to do. Public opinion around the world and in the US, rather than we, has criticized Mr. Nixon for having downgraded the conference. (33)

August

(C) VCI activity did not increase appreciably from the relatively low level of activity noted in July. The VCI were apparently well occupied with logistics problems, "tax" collection in kind, and recruitment.

(C) Communist propaganda, through Liberation Radio, continued to exploit publicity concerning the prison at Con Son Island. In a 20 Jul broadcast, Thich Don Hau, member of the Central Committee of the Alliance of National, Democratic, and Peace Forces, and of the Advisory Council to the PRG, was quoted:

Recently, public opinion strongly condemned the US-Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique's extremely harsh and outrageous penal system in Con Son as a hell on earth. US and western public opinion also said that the Americans have spent 440,000 dollars yearly to develop tiger cages and prisons. US advisors have directly supervised the fortune of the detainees, regardless of age and sex. The presence of US advisors at Con Son prison and US funds for fortifying this prison are convincing proof of the US criminal implication in the US-Thieu-Ky clique's penitentiary system. (34)

(C) A captured enemy assessment of the proselyting of Cambodians in VC MR 3 pointed out the number of those people residing in "liberated" areas had risen. To take advantage of that situation and to improve upon proselyting methods, the VC planned to appoint a "sizeable number" of Cambodians to key positions in both the Government and the Regional Front Committees. That action was viewed as having a favorable effect upon the Cambodians, thus inducing them to cooperate with the VC more readily.

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(C) Terrorist activity reached the lowest level since January, declining further from the lull noted in July. According to a 23 Aug report, COSVN directed VC forces throughout SVN to disrupt the GVN senatorial elections on 30 Aug. The tactics, similar to previous elections, were to include depriving the population access to voting centers either by use of explosives and violence, or by seizing identification cards.

(C) The VCI were increasing their capability of relying on "legal" cadre to perform such activities as military proselyting, gathering intelligence, and engaging in political struggles. A "legal" cadre was defined as a highly indoctrinated individual who possessed a GVN identification card, but worked for the enemy. The three basic ways the cadre could be created were: infiltrating the Chieu Hoi program; altering or forging GVN identification cards; and recruiting people already possessing legal status. According to a high level rallier, emphasis placed on the "legal" cadre would be increased as the "political phase" of the war intensified. He further stated that the main means used to "legalize" cadre would be by infiltrating the Chieu Hoi program. A captured document called for various agencies subordinate to the political staff of MR 5 to forward GVN ID cards to higher headquarters for falsification. The forged ID cards possible would be reissued to selected cadre in order to establish their "legal" status. The VC had always actively recruited people to serve the purposes of the insurgency. Increased emphasis was directed toward the recruitment of people having legal status who already either worked in certain professions, worked in GVN or allied installations, were members of special interest groups, or lived in cities. The activities the people, once recruited as "legal" cadre, were to participate in were summarized in a captured document from MR 5. The document stated that they would be used to increase those political struggles against the GVN which could be legally carried out in the cities and towns. Further, they were to aid in motivating arrivals in the urban areas to move back to their former villages. Another captured document from VC Tay Ninh Province called for the recruitment of elderly people of "prestigious" families to aid in convincing others to support the VCI. Many of the "legal" cadre created through false ralliers were instructed to join RVNAF units to conduct military proselyting activities, to undermine morale by propagandizing, and to incite revolts and encourage mass desertions. PSDF and pacification units were mentioned for special attention. Legal status was also a useful tool for the gathering of intelligence information in the villages. The agents were to closely follow the activities of local GVN administrators and agents to aid in their "suppression" by the armed security elements. In short, they were to gather intelligence on the activities of potential targets for terrorism. (35)

September

(C) The most significant VCI political activity occurred at the Paris peace negotiations, where the chief PRG delegate, Mme Binh, put forward an eight-point elaboration of the NLF's 10-point peace proposal from May 1969. In the RVN, VCI activity focused on "taxation" in kind in connection with the fall harvest and continued to emphasize both military and civilian proselyting, the exploitation of urban grievances, and attempts to create legal cadre through the false rallier program.

(C) Finance and economy activity was at a nationwide high level during the month to coincide with the main harvest. The success or failure of the enemy's harvest "tax" collection was a barometer for assessing enemy strengths and weaknesses for the following year. The percentage

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of the total harvest the VC were able to collect had several ramifications for the immediate future. First, even modest success had a direct bearing on the VC's ability to mount any sort of serious military operation. A bad harvest or poor "tax" receipts could severely hamper military activity and have a profound effect on long-range planning. Second, low quantities of essential foodstuffs in the various local areas could create increased strain on the already severely damaged central supply system. A shortage of any magnitude would result in acute problems for the VC and perhaps lead to an increase in the number of Hoi Chanhs. Third, the lesser the percentage of the total crop the VC were able to divert for their own use, the greater the percentage finding its way to legitimate markets. A larger supply of rice in the Saigon market place would tend to bring the price of rice down to a more reasonable level. That would ease somewhat the inflationary pressure on the GVN economy and perhaps help to make the Thieu government's economic policy more viable, thereby in turn reducing urban unrest. The "tax" collection drive could also be used to assess present strengths and weaknesses of the VCI. The drive was characterized by a marked increase in the use of military and armed special action units to do the actual "tax" collection. The increase in the use of armed units reflected the decline in VCI access to the population. Further, it could be seen as an indicator of a growing attitude of non-cooperation on the part of the people in many areas. If the high level of finance and economy activity continued beyond the harvest period, several conclusions could be drawn concerning the enemy situation. First, the enemy's central supply system suffered greater damage than was immediately supposed after the cross-border operations. Second, a decline in VCI access to the population due to pacification gains would be suggested. Third, an indication that the self-sufficiency campaign was a failure. Finally, it could signal the beginning of increased terrorism aimed at convincing uncooperative persons to pay the same "taxes" as before.

(C) Terrorist activity peaked during the first days of the month, then declined gradually. Terrorism during the last half of the month compared with the levels noted during August. The general increase during the first days appeared to have been concentrated during the last days in August as part of the VCI efforts to disrupt the GVN senatorial elections.

(C) The PRG was not successful in gaining full delegate status at the Lusaka Conference of non-Aligned Nations, held in Lusaka, Zambia, on 6-10 Sep. However, there was sufficient support for the PRG to gain observer status at the Conference. The PRG was represented by Mme Binh, the PRG's Minister of Foreign Affairs and chief delegate of the PRG at the Paris peace negotiations.

(C) After a 3-month absence from the Paris peace negotiations, Mme Binh returned to Paris on 14 Sep, 4 days after the close of the Lusaka Conference. On 17 Sep, at the 84th session of the talks, Mme Binh proposed an "eight point peace initiative," which she described as an elaboration of the 10-point proposal put forward by the NLF on 8 May 1969. The three principal elements of the eight-point proposal were: first, that the US withdraw all forces from the RVN by 30 Jun 71. If the US agreed to such a withdrawal, the enemy would agree to refrain from attacking the withdrawing US Forces, and would discuss the question of releasing prisoners of war. Second, that a provisional coalition government be formed in South Vietnam. Such a coalition would include three components; members of the PRG, members of the various political and religious groups and forces which stood for peace-independence-neutrality, and members of the present GVN other than President Thieu, Vice-President Ky, and Prime Minister Khiem. Third, that after agreement on the above and related issues, a cease-fire will be implemented in South Vietnam. (36)

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October

(C) VCI activity during the month was highlighted by increased emphasis on a "diplomatic offensive" and renewed finance and economy activity.

(C) Communist propaganda, through Liberation Radio, responded to President Nixon's five-point peace proposal of 7 Oct with a predictable negative reaction. There were two major themes in the broadcast: first, that the proposal was put forward prior to the US congressional elections for domestic political purposes; and that substantively the proposed cease-fire prior to agreement on other issues was aimed at legalizing American "aggression" in and "occupation" of Vietnam. In other broadcasts, Liberation Radio denounced the GVN's "For the People" campaign, claiming that token arrest of a number of hooligans and prostitutes was only "for form's sake," and an attempt to conceal the GVN's own "repression" of the people. A large number of broadcasts were devoted to the partial devaluation of the \$VN in early October. The broadcasts claimed that the devaluation was forced upon the "puppet" regime by the US, that it would profit American soldiers alone, and that it would result in a considerable rise in the cost of living for the SVN.

(C) The use of US green dollars by the VCI highlighted finance and economy activity. There was a marked increase in the use of US green dollars since the beginning of the cross-border operation on 1 May. The increase was primarily due to two overriding situations in the countryside. First, the cross-border operation itself, which disrupted the old enemy central supply routes and staging areas along the Cambodian border, put a greater strain on local supply activities by forcing VC political and military agencies to find alternate sources for essential commodities. Second, pacification gains decreased the enemy's access to the people over the same period, thus making the extractions of foodstuffs and GVN currency from the populace more difficult. Those conditions contributed significantly toward critical shortages of both food and medicine for the enemy. As a result, the VCI began to place increased reliance upon changing US green dollars for \$VN on the urban black market to secure several benefits. First, US currency was a readily acceptable medium of exchange for procuring needed \$VN, which in turn bought the food and medicine necessary to alleviate the local shortages. Second, large denominations of US dollars were easily stored and transported in small containers, which did not arouse much notice or suspicion. Third, the profits attached to changing US dollars to \$VN offered the VC a convenient means for making inroads into legitimate business. Those large profits could be used to induce businessmen to accommodate the VC by providing them with either access to the urban markets or transport for the illegal goods. Finally, holdings of US currency provided the VC with a hedge against inflation, devaluation, and currency change rumors plaguing the \$VN. Due to its stability, the VC opted for US currency as a long-term investment.

(C) Captured documents indicated that COSVN issued a directive which outlined the provisions of the eight-point PRG peace initiative announced by Mme Binh in Paris on 17 Sep, and explained the purpose of the initiative. COSVN attributed five purposes to the initiative. First, to promote favorable world opinion concerning PRG/DRV goodwill and intentions. Second, to increase anti-war sentiment in the US prior to the 3 Nov congressional elections. Third, to isolate the Thieu-Ky-Khiem Government. Fourth, to increase the political struggles within urban areas of SVN. Finally, to gain support of the Vietnamese middle class. In sum, the eight-point proposal, as explained by COSVN, was more a "diplomatic offensive" than a "peace initiative." Further, "this phase is aimed at creating favorable conditions for the consolidation of our forces and attacks on the enemy in all fields. It is not designed to end the war and bring about peace in Vietnam. The conflict between the enemy and ourselves is to be solved mainly on the battlefield when the forces

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of both sides are balanced." (37)

November

(C) During the month there were numerous reports of discussions among enemy political and military cadre concerning the possibility of, and preparations for, a cease-fire and formation of a coalition government. Despite the number and variety of such reports, it was probably not in the enemy's interest to agree to an extended cease-fire, at least for the near future. It was doubtful that such an agreement was in fact being contemplated. A number of considerations lead to that conclusion. First, the eight point proposal put forward in Paris on 17 Sep by Mme Binh called for a cease-fire only subsequent to agreement on the formation of a coalition government. In contrast, President Nixon's October proposal called for an immediate cease-fire in place, to be followed by negotiated agreements on the rate of US withdrawals, the political future of the RVN, etc. The PRG position, that a cease-fire would come only after prior agreement on those issues, was not arbitrary. The enemy recognized the effects of US public sentiment on US foreign policy. A cease-fire would considerably reduce that pressure and permit the President to negotiate with more strength. Secondly, much as diminution in American casualties decreased political pressure on President Nixon, lowering the level of violence within the RVN would decrease political pressures of dissident groups directed at the GVN. With the presidential election upcoming in the RVN in the fall of 1971, the enemy would want to maintain high levels of ARVN casualties in order to provide potential "third force" candidates such as General Minh and Tran Van Don with a "restoration of peace" issue. Thirdly, it was unlikely that the enemy would accept a cease-fire from a position of relative military weakness within the RVN. Acceptance of a cease-fire under such conditions would leave the enemy with virtually no bargaining leverage during the subsequent negotiations (except for their holding of American PWs). As Sir Robert Thompson argued in No Exit From Vietnam, the enemy was willing to negotiate in order to open an international, psychological war or front, and would also be willing to negotiate to secure "recognition" of an enemy victory. The enemy was not likely to negotiate, however, from a position of weakness; that would admit failure, and it would be preferable for the VC/NVA merely to fade away. For that reason, the enemy was not likely to agree to a cease-fire and substantive negotiations unless he was able first to initiate a significant military offensive. Finally, VC/NVA military potential within the RVN was significantly dependent upon events in Cambodia. Even the short-term future of Cambodia could not be certain until the rice harvest was completed in January or February 1971. Until the enemy had determined his own ability to prevent rice from flowing to Phnom Penh and to divert the crop for his use, it was most unlikely that any cease-fire agreement could be reached. The enemy needed more time to evaluate his recovery from the effects of the allied cross-border operations.

(C) If the considerations outlined were weighing heavily with policy makers in the NVN Lao Dong Party, in COSVN, and in the PRG, the question arose why low and mid-level cadre were reportedly discussing the possibility of and preparations for a cease-fire. Those cadre were discussing a cease-fire in earnest because they saw the PRG and US delegations in Paris putting forward proposals for a cease-fire. COSVN directives explained to cadre that the eight-point PRG proposal was designed more as a diplomatic and political offensive than as a peace initiative. Specifically, the proposal was designed to promote favorable world opinion, increase anti-war sentiment in the US, and isolate the Thieu-Ky-Khiem government. Although official PRG guidance instructed cadre to eliminate a "wait-and-see attitude towards peace," some cadre nevertheless took to serious speculation concerning a cease-fire. In light of the proposals in Paris, that was a human

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reaction even for a highly indoctrinated Communist. The reaction was understandable in light of the fact that COSVN was demanding some doublethinking on the part of its cadre. On the one hand they were told that the eight-point proposal constituted a diplomatic offensive and did not increase the prospects for peace. On the other hand, they were told to exploit the eight-point proposal within the RVN through propaganda which explained to the population that the proposal reflected the seriousness of the PRG's interest in securing peace.

(C) In an environment in which speculation concerning a cease-fire was prevalent, many normal VCI activities were likely to be interpreted by both political cadre and allied analysts as special preparation for a cease-fire. For example, COSVN ordered a political census or determination of popular sentiments in Tra Vinh. Low-level political cadre were likely to perceive this as part of preparations for the elections in the RVN which the PRG stated would follow a cease-fire and formation of a coalition government. While a political census might have been useful to the VCI in the event of a cease-fire, it was not in itself an indication that a cease-fire was imminent. The political census had long been a device used by the VCI to intimidate the population and consequently win population control.

(C) Speculation concerning a possible cease-fire was bolstered by a number of reports that the VCI instructed cadre to produce NLF flags, which would be flown during a cease-fire to deceive international inspection teams with respect to the extent of enemy control with the RVN. Reports that the VCI initiated an effort to make NLF flags originated in VC Quang Nam, VC Quang Ngai, VC Binh Dinh, VC Binh Long, GVN Binh Hoa, VC Tay Ninh, SR1, SR6, GVN Long An, VC My Tho, and VC Vinh Long Provinces. Most of the reports suggested, however, that the VCI effort to make and display flags served several other purposes. While the flags would eventually be useful in a cease-fire situation, it was also possible that flag production was encouraged as a response to the GVN-encouraged display of RVN flags on National Day on 1 Nov, and in preparation for a concerted effort to display NLF flags on 20 Dec in celebration of the 10th anniversary of the official formation of the NLF. It could be questioned how likely the alternate uses of the flag were, given the likelihood of GVN retaliation against families openly displaying NLF flags before a cease-fire. Nevertheless it was possible that the VC could realistically expect sympathizers to display NLF flags in thoroughly VC-controlled areas, on special occasions, to build morale, and demonstrate solidarity. It would probably be a mistake to conclude that a cease-fire was imminent simply because NLF flags were being produced and openly shown.

(C) In other activity, a document captured in early November and labeled "Directive 23," probably a COSVN directive, provided instructions for a campaign to motivate the population to leave resettlement centers and return to their native lands in order to increase farm production and form local combat groups. For a long time the VCI had perceived that population shifts to resettlement centers and urban areas contributed significantly to GVN pacification gains, both by increasing security for the population and by denying to the VCI the population base required for sufficient recruitment, "tax" collection in money and kind, etc. Numerous attempts to encourage the population to leave resettlement centers and to return to their native lands were reported prior to the issuance of Directive 23. Directive 23 did not, therefore, represent any new COSVN policy. It was, rather, a formalization of policies implemented locally for some time. The document was, however, the first known COSVN directive or resolution principally devoted to the theme of motivating refugees to return to their native lands, and as such, reflected acute COSVN concern over the impact of population shifts within the RVN.

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(U) Terrorism fell slightly from the levels of September and October. There were no significant peaks in terrorism during the month. (38)

December

(C) VCI activity during the month was highlighted by enemy planning to disrupt the GVN presidential elections and plans to initiate a winter/spring campaign. Enemy plans to disrupt the 1971 GVN presidential elections were reported in VC Binh Dinh, SR1, and VC Kien Phong Provinces. In VC Binh Dinh the VC intended to confiscate GVN identification cards and other official documents, making travel difficult and hence disrupting election activity. As of 7 Dec the VC had confiscated 7,817 cards in Tan Quan District. In some cases the enemy disguised themselves as RF/PF members to make it easier to confiscate the cards. The VC also planned to seize the family registration documents, with photos of each family, used by the GVN to facilitate control over the local inhabitants. In SR1, COSVN planned to dispatch rallying cadre to infiltrate organizations of political dissidents such as the students, Buddhists, and war invalids in urban areas. The purpose of the infiltration was to exploit the grievances of those groups. Once the cadre attained legal status by rallying, they were to work to influence the organizations in favor of candidates who would form the opposition party to the GVN during the 1971 presidential elections. In VC Kien Phong Province, a COSVN directive reportedly sent to district committees called for the districts to plan for disruption of the 1971 GVN presidential elections. The disruptions were to include assassinations of GVN election officials, harassment of members of the presidential campaign team, bombing of election offices, and prevention of persons from rural areas from participating in the elections. Plans calling for the initiation of a "winter campaign" were received from SR1, Long An SR, SR5, and VC My Tho Province. In SR1, the VC were to initiate a "winter campaign" throughout the SR in late December. The purposes of the campaign in Long An SR were to improve deteriorating VC morale, reduce GVN control over the population, and raise the prestige of the VC in order to pressure the negotiators at the Paris Peace Talks. The offensive was to take the form of the usual three-pronged attacks, consisting of military, political, and military proselyting activity. The SR5 Current Affairs Committee directed subordinate units to initiate a three-stage offensive from December through February 1971, with the objective of expanding the VCI. The first stage was to intensify civilian propaganda and proselyting. During the second stage, subordinated districts were to conduct three-pronged attacks, consisting of military, political, and military proselyting activity aimed at hampering the GVN pacification program. The third stage was to be an amplification of the already existing anti-pacification program. Plans for the winter/spring offensive in MR 2 were outlined at a meeting of the VC My Tho Province party committee. The offensive was to be divided into two phases, a military phase running from 20 Dec to 20 Jan and a political action phase running from 20 Jan to 20 Feb. The military phase would not be country-wide, but would concentrate on selected GVN cities and provinces. The attacks, by main-force and NVA units, were to induce the GVN to use their regular units in a static defense of the populated areas, leaving rural areas relatively undefended and vulnerable to VC local-force units. In the political phase, the local-force units were to transfer their control to the political cadre, who would intensively propagandize for a coalition government. In other activity, a captured directive from a district party committee in Binh Dinh Province called for the build-up of guerrilla forces and the intensification of partisan warfare into the spring of 1971. VC efforts to legalize their cadre and to penetrate GVN organizations continued. In VC MR 3 several reports were received of enemy directives to obtain ID cards and GVN paperwork by changing their name, moving to different districts, and if necessary, bribing national policemen.

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(C) In propaganda activity, the fatal shooting of a VN student by a US soldier provided the Communist with an opportunity to exploit anti-US sentiment among student groups. Cadre were directed to mingle with the crowds and throw grenades and provoke student-police confrontation.

(C) In finance and economy activity, reports of region-wide food shortages were received from MR 10. The most significant indication of the enemy's logistical problems in MR 10 was the continued flow of ralliers from VC controlled labor villages in VC Phuoc Long Province. Most of the ralliers cited food shortages as the primary reason for rallying. The villages not only had to farm under adverse conditions, but the VC exerted increased pressure on them to produce more and more food. The loss of significant numbers of the population represented a severe blow to the enemy's self-sufficiency program. In VC Tay Ninh Province, reports that two companies of the 82d Rear Service Group (RSG) were observed in Phuoc Binh and Phuoc Tay Hamlets represented a significant development in Tay Ninh, as RSGs had been relatively inactive since the allied cross-border operations. In VC Can Tho Province, MR 3, a "defense tax" was levied during the harvest season. Families of ARVN soldiers were further required to provide 200 rounds of ammunition, one grenade, and \$VN5,000 per month. In VC Tra Vinh Province the VC were collecting an "Anti-American National Salvation Tax" of \$VN100 per family, or an equivalent amount of ammunition.

(C) In security activity, captured documents revealed that "Inspection Committees" as outlined in COSVN Directive 13 were being set up in MR 5. The "committees" were to have auditing, counterintelligence, and other "watchdog" functions. Significantly, they were to be outside the party chain of command at all echelons, but were to report directly to party committee at each echelon. (39)

The VCI during 1970 and Prospects for 1971

(C) During 1969 the VC altered what had been the pattern of the war for nearly 4 years. This was the result of two factors: one, lack of favorable results on the battlefield, and two, the limitation of available resources. There was a growing realization that large VC/NVA units could not operate in SVN because of growing ARVN strength and continued US tactical support. The awareness of that fact was manifested in COSVN Resolution 9, a sweeping reappraisal of the war embodying the reestablishment of small-unit insurgency as the mode of achieving what appeared to be a diminishing prospect for success. The tactics enumerated in COSVN Resolution 9 and subsequently supplemented in COSVN Resolution 14 were the result of an evaluation of VC assets and a decision that large military action was not in keeping with either the VC logistical capabilities or the environment in which he found himself operating. The political aspects of the situation were not ignored either. In fact, there was a call for a general awareness of the growing importance of the political side of the struggle.

(C) The military form of the new policy consisted of the downgrading of enemy units. Some regiments and battalions were broken up into their subordinate parts and dispersed, others continued as large units but conducted the major part of their activity in specialized, cell-size units. The primary target of the military was the Vietnamization program. The new small units, operating in three to five-man cells and as sapper units, were to initiate a nationwide program of harassment of RF/PF and PSDF units. Main-force units that were not redeployed were subject to one of three types of activity: first, retaining their integrity but remaining inoperative or using

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only small units; second, dispersing personnel as either fillers or advisors; and third, utilization as sappers.

(C) The political target was pacification. This did not mean the functional elements of pacification such as RD cadre who might be attacked by the military, but rather the people themselves. The thrust of the program was two-pronged: first, the military proselyting activity aimed at penetration of the entire GVN structure; and second, the civilian proselyting activity aimed at destroying GVN gains in the people. A large portion of the program depended on the acquisition of legal documentation for VC/VCI cadre. In some cases it was achieved by allowing "false rallying" through the Chieu Hoi program. That avenue was open for only lower or relatively unimportant cadre, who were not known by the police or wanted for a long list of civil or military offenses. They might pass through the Chieu Hoi screening and processing and within 120 days became legally documented. They would, of course, be under the surveillance of the police for awhile, but could eventually be of great political use to the VC. In the case of cadre known by the National Police, who would be subject to long prison sentences even if they took advantage of the Chieu Hoi program, legal documentation could be obtained through either theft or forgery.

(C) In early 1970, the enemy initiated portions of that new military and political program, while continuing to develop others. COSVN was searching for the means by which to counter GVN pacification and Vietnamization gains. Units were being broken down in various parts of the country, particularly VC MR 5 and the COSVN area with the exception of the delta. In the latter area, the terrain and scattered population centers had long necessitated a strong reliance on small-unit, guerrilla tactics. Many of the new units were created with the express purpose of supporting political objectives. Activities which were underway in specific areas were undoubtedly intended for use throughout SVN. In VC Phu Yen Province, which was looked upon as something of a VCI laboratory for new programs, an extensive abduction campaign began in January. Elements of the 10th NVA Regiment were disbanded, and its dispersed battalions re-subordinated to provincial control in VC Khanh Hoa and VC Phu Yen provinces. Elements assigned to Phu Yen were in turn incorporated into the 96th LF Battalion. During the period, 1 Feb to 30 Jun there were 1,400 reported abductions in VC Phu Yen, 50 percent of them taking place in the area of operations (AO) of the 96th. The abductions were conducted by personnel of the 96th, divided into five-man squads operating in conjunction with the local VCI. Another experimental program was also underway, initiated by COSVN, with the intent of developing and testing anti-pacification techniques. The success or failure of the program was to determine in some measure whether similar tactics were to be used by COSVN throughout its administrative areas. Phase one of the program, conducted during late 1969 and early 1970, was to measure the capability of the VC to counter the GVN pacification program in selected areas where neither had significant control. Resources at region, province, and district level were to augment those of the villages. Theoretically, the best VC personnel in an area would combine their efforts to significantly reduce the effectiveness of GVN pacification activity.

(C) Both of these efforts, the abduction campaign in Phu Yen and the experimental village program in the COSVN areas, appeared as new efforts for 1970; they may have been intended for wider implementation during the remainder of 1970. Thus, while COSVN was calling for the dispersion and downgrading of military units, it was also developing plans for the concentration of political resources. Indeed, the two strategies were closely related, thinly dispersed military units holding back further territorial expansion by the GVN, and concentrated political assets eroding GVN political control.

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(C) The Cambodian cross-border operation reinforced the emphasis upon insurgency techniques. The downgrading that began as a military necessity became even more important to the VC in maintaining a logistical base in Cambodia. Because he had already begun the downgrading of his units and because of his increased emphasis on local procurement of supplies, the enemy was not hurt by the Cambodian operations to the extent that he would have been in 1969. The measured reduction in the size of tactical units was already underway; the smaller independent units found it much easier to survive in the face of diminishing supply pools than their larger counterparts would have. One favorable allied result was the disruption of LOCs. While the relatively unsophisticated lower echelons survived, they suffered greatly from lack of direction. As a result, there was a corresponding lull in activity of the VCI after the Cambodian cross-border operation. The withdrawal of major headquarters, the subsequent loss of control, and the movement of military units and political cadre to Cambodia, all resulted in a significant loss of momentum which allowed the GVN to make gains in pacification.

(C) Enemy activity, which was very low following the cross-border operation, was in the last few months of 1970 characterized by efforts to regain lost momentum and to reexert effective control over all military and political echelons. The form of these efforts was the attempt to revitalize programs left incomplete as a result of the Cambodian disruption. COSVN produced a steady stream of directives and resolutions, none of which changed the emphasis of Resolution 9, but all of which aimed at bringing the apparatus together again. Directives 25 and 26 pointed out again COSVN's displeasure with the "weak" response at the local level, and traced local difficulties to failure to properly implement COSVN Resolution 9. Directive 26 stressed many of the points of Resolution 9 in calling for continued efforts against GVN pacification and RF/PF forces, but placed added emphasis on the expansion of "revolutionary movement" to the urban areas. After the issuing of Directive 26 (probably in August 1970), Communist documents repeatedly indicated a desire to increase the number of cadre with legal GVN identification. The role of those cadre was the infiltration and manipulation of urban-based organizations, especially in the Saigon area.

(C) At COSVN's direction all echelons under its command again started operations to increase their self-sufficiency, made necessary as a result of damage done to the southern part of the Cambodian base camp area. Even in areas such as VC MRs 5 and 6, self-sufficiency was being pushed. That action on COSVN's part resulted in significant changes in taxation and rear service activities. There was a growing trend for RSGs to depend more and more on the purchase of supplies with currency, and less on the accumulation of large caches. The smaller political and military groups could be sustained more easily by the regular distribution of funds, and taxation was favoring the collection of money or hard-to-get items such as ammunition. That use of currency increased the reliance of the VC/VCI on legal RVN business firms, and resulted in expansion both in physical size and in importance of the shadow supply system.

(C) Manpower infiltration to the south in the period following the cross-border operation appeared to fall off, or at least flowed in a different direction. Many of the units in the south fell below strength as a result. In the effort to establish an infrastructure in Cambodia, cadre were lost to Cambodia as advisors. Thus, many military and political units needed replacements, but were not able to recruit sufficient numbers locally. GVN MRs 3 and 4 were hurt most. While infiltration increased in the last month or so of 1970, the benefits were felt only marginally in SVN, and then mostly in the areas north of GVN MR 3. Some units, finding themselves greatly understrength, merely changed their unit designation from battalion to company; all units, political and military, faced the future unsure of the manpower situation.

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(C) Coupled with the efforts to put its house in order was COSVN's concern for reestablishing effective control over its administrative units in SVN. Directives called for an expanded commitment to development of revolutionary organizations at the village level. Other directives called for local initiative in solving control problems. The largest reorganization took place in GVN MRs 3 and 4, where efforts to tighten control consisted principally of establishing new echelons. Some new echelons were military in nature, others were political, and there were some new echelons which combined both. The new political echelons effectively reduced the number of subordinate elements to be dealt with by one headquarters. That enabled leadership cadre to observe more closely the cadre they commanded; it also reduced, in most cases, the necessity for important cadre to risk travel over long distances. An example was combining several provinces into a special zone, with a new echelon operating between military region and province headquarters.

(C) The new military echelons were also formed by inserting staffs between existing headquarters, but rather than acting as an additional administrative level, they took all the next lower echelon's military forces and relieved that echelon of direct responsibility. Thus, several villages, rather than having their own guerrilla force, depended on the same local commander. The result was that the new political echelons reduced the administrative load of any one echelon, and the new military echelons decreased the number of military commanders while increasing the size of individual AOs. The third approach yielded a similar result, but eliminated the restructuring of either the political or military chains of command, since those administrative units maintained both political and military control. They were inserted between existing echelons to serve as an additional political element, but they also immediately consolidated the next lower echelon's military assets. The ultimate result was a tightening of political control and a more economical use of military forces.

(C) The majority of COSVN's efforts in the latter part of 1970 were directed at regaining the position it had prior to the cross-border operation. There was no evidence that preparation for 1971 had gone beyond the planning stages, and there were no new resolutions or directives captured indicating a new direction for 1971. The Cambodian operation and the closing of Kompong Som effectively severed much of the infiltration of supplies and men into and out of central and southern SVN, particularly in the delta. The downgrading of units further reduced the possibilities of major military activity emanating from within SVN. Mounting any serious activity in SVN in 1971 would necessitate a shift of resources into SVN from a new logistical base in the tri-border area. With the logistical base in Cambodia moved farther to the north and the supply lines in the delta cut, it would be difficult for the enemy to sustain actions in GVN MRs 3 and 4.

(C) Alternatives were somewhat more flexible when one considered the remainder of RVN. While the enemy gave up much of his offensive military capability in GVN MRs 3 and 4, he retained several options in the central and northern parts of the country. Military activity was possible in the central and western highlands, especially in B-3 Front and MR 10. These areas were also hurt by the cross-border operation, but the new logistical base in the tri-border area provided the proximity necessary to support a large campaign. The terrain was also favorable, and the lack of significant population, from VC Binh Long Province in the south to VC Kontum Province in the north, made it easy for the enemy to hide larger units or move them toward the coastal plains and the urban areas.

(C) The urban areas of central and northern South Vietnam were always the base of relatively strong VC support. VC Phu Yen Province was chosen for the abduction campaign in early 1970

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because of the support readily available there. Similar support existed, though to a lesser extent, in most of the populated coastal plains; the enemy would like very much to separate that area from the rest of RVN. In the past such strategy had even been proposed and followed; that is, there were attempts to sever the country between GVN MRs 2 and 3. It was feasible that such an attempt could be made again.

(C) While difficulties were raised by supply and manpower disruption, the damage was temporary in the north; none of those obstacles was as insurmountable as in the south, where distance was a compounding factor. Manpower shortages were slowly being made up in the north, and there was a drive (as in the south) to procure legal documentation for as many cadre as possible. If COSVN considered military action in RVN in 1971, it would most likely be in the north.

(C) That could consist of large-scale military action in the western highlands against the border outposts and fire bases, with a coordinated wave of terrorism in the urban coastal plains; or it might consist of a series of high points throughout the spring and summer. There was little doubt that COSVN and Hanoi would like to influence the RVN presidential elections, and a show of force by the VC (if they had not lost such a capability) could be effective. Allied cross-border operations reduced the enemy military activity in SVN to the point that many of the VC's own cadre rallied, because they thought the war was lost. There was even talk of a cease-fire, but until the GVN elections of 1971, a decision in Cambodia, and the final decisions on US troop withdrawal, a cease-fire was not to the enemy's advantage. The enemy would like, therefore, to reassert his military presence in RVN prior to the 1971 elections. The object of such a move would be to raise the spectre of VC military power and perhaps strengthen the argument of the neutral elements in RVN. To increase military activity could be beneficial, but there remained the danger that too much force might produce disadvantages with regard to the elections, Cambodia, or the US withdrawals. It was necessary, therefore, to achieve an optimum combination of psychological and physical pressure, so as to derive only beneficial effects. Until the elections in October 1971, any one of the above considerations might dictate the policy to be adopted, but for the time being, the use of military resources remained a critical (and apparently as yet an undecided) question.

(C) If the enemy was in doubt as to what his course of action would be prior to the elections, his course following the elections was probably somewhat clearer. If a neutralist or peace candidate defeated President Thieu, the way would undoubtedly be opened to the possibility of a negotiated coalition government. If President Thieu was reelected, however, the enemy might attempt one last military effort to conclude the struggle. There still remained problems associated with the role of the US, of course, and perhaps of Cambodia.

(C) In many ways, 1971 would be a critical year because of the elections and their possible result. (40)


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FIGURE III-6

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ENEMY SUPPORT OPERATIONS

VC/NVA Base Areas

General

(C) A BA was a section of terrain which contained VC/NVA installations, defensive fortifications, or other physical structures having several purposes. BAs were used for basic or advanced training of personnel and units; as a permanent or temporary location for political, military, or logistical headquarters; for storage and distribution of medicine, ordnance, food, petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL), and other war materiel; and as a site used by combat units to rest, regroup, retrain, evade friendly operations, and/or initiate preparatory phase of offensive operations. (41)

(S) There were three major functions that could be performed by a BA: transshipment and infiltration, logistical resupply, and staging for political and military operations. While all BAs performed each of those functions to a limited extent, areas with the major function of staging tended to be in RVN and some in Cambodia. Logistical resupply areas were found both within and outside RVN, and infiltration areas were located out of country. An exception to that pattern occurred in MR 2 where a band of transshipment BAs ran through the center of the MR. Those areas served as transshipment points for the movement of men and supplies toward the coastal staging areas. (42) (See Figure III-6.)

MR 1 and Adjacent Areas

(C) BA 112. (See Figure III-7.) The presence of Front 4 HQs and its supporting units made BA 112 the center of command and control activity for all of the VC Quang Da Special Zone. The BA functioned as a terminus for logistics traffic from the west. Routes used by elements of the 220th Transportation Regt lead from the Laotian border into the valley of the Song Cai, where supplies were distributed for storage or were transferred to other transportation elements for shipment to units operating east and north of the BA.

(C) BA 128. BA 128 was used by units operating in southern Quang Ngai Province. Elements of the 240th Transportation Regt had facilities there, including a dispensary. BA 128 was utilized as a command and control center, as a training and storage area, and as a staging area for military operations. The headquarters of the 21st NVA Regt regularly used the northern section of the base.


(C) BA 129. BA 129 was activated during the 3d Qtr to reflect the buildup of enemy forces in the mountains south of the Ba Long Valley. Routes 616 and 9222 lead into the BA where numerous storage areas were reported. The BA provided logistical and command and control support for

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FIGURE III-7

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operations east and north of the area. Combat and support elements of the 304th and 324B NVA Divs operated from this BA.

(C) BA 604. BA 604 functioned as a major logistical staging area for supplies moving south through Laos. Supplies were transshipped to BA 611 and beyond after arriving from NVN. Elements of the 559th Transportation Group traditionally used this BA.

(C) BA 607. This BA was used as a logistical and personnel staging area for enemy forces operating in Thua Thien and Quang Nam Provinces. Elements of the 4th and 5th NVA Regts were periodically reported in the vicinity of this BA.

(C) BA 611. This BA served as a major logistical and command and control area for personnel and supplies entering RVN. The western portion was utilized as a transshipment point for personnel and supplies moving to BA 612, while the eastern portion provided support for units in western Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. This BA was historically used as an AO for major rear-service units and by the headquarters element of MRTTH.

(C) BA 612. This BA served as a major transshipment point and storage area along a major logistics and troop infiltration route into SVN. Supplies were transported from here into BA 614 and the tri-border area.

(C) BA 614. This BA served as a logistics staging area for enemy forces operating in Quang Tin, Quang Nam, and Kontum Provinces. It has also served as an AO for major rear service units, including elements of the 230th Transportation Regt. (43)

MR 2 and Adjacent Areas

(C) BA 201. (See Figure III-8.) BA 201 was re-established during the 3d Qtr. The BA sat astride an infiltration and logistics route extending from BA 614 in Laos. The area was thought to contain intermediate storage and bivouac areas for infiltration groups and supplies being moved along the route. It was also identified as a possible alternate location of MR 5 HQ.

(C) BA 202. This BA was used as a storage area, training site, and transshipment point for elements of the 95B NVA Regt and H15 LF Bn. The K1 Inf Bn of the 95B Regt had the mission of transporting supplies from BA 701 to the regiment's base camp.

(C) BA 236. This BA was the most active enemy area in MR 2. The major combat and support elements of the 3d NVA Div were located in the vicinity of the BA. Most enemy activity in central and northern Binh Dinh Province was attributed to elements of the 3d Div. The Binh Dinh Province Committee and several main force (MF) and local force (LF) battalions were also located in this BA.

(C) BA 236. This BA was used as a storage and resupply area and training site by the K13 NVA LF Inf Bn and the 96th LF Inf Bn. The mission of these units was to disrupt the GVN pacification program in Phu Yen Province.


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FIGURE III-8

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(C) BA 238. This BA was a storage, resupply, and transshipment point for the 401st LF Sapper Bn which operated in and around Ban Me Thuot.

(C) BA 251. This BA was a transshipment and resupply point for enemy units operating in southern Binh Thuan Province and northeastern Binh Tuy Province in MR 3. This BA was also a possible location of MR 6 HQ. Units operated from BA 251 against western Binh Thuan Province, especially around Phan Thiet City.

(C) BA 252. This BA was an important support base for enemy units operating in Khanh Hoa Province. Supplies were brought into the BA by elements of the 250th NVA Trans Regt along logistical routes originating in the vicinity of BA 740. The 95th NVA Arty Bn and the 407th VC MF Sapper Bn operated from this area against installations at Nha Trang, Cam Ranh Bay and the Dong Ba Thin Airfield.

(C) BA 609. This BA, located in the tri-border region, was a major storage, resupply, and transshipment area and entry point for enemy personnel infiltrating into RVN and Cambodia. This BA was also the B-3 Front HQ and supplied many of its major subordinate units.

(C) BA 613. This BA was used as a logistical support area and transshipment point.

(C) BA 702. This BA was a major support base for enemy units operating in Kentun and Pleiku Provinces. Elements of the 24th NVA Regt and the 5th and 6th NVA Trans Bn were reported in this BA.

(C) BA 701. This BA was a major enemy storage and resupply area, transshipment point, and entry point for personnel infiltrating into RVN from Cambodia.

(C) BA 740. This BA was used by the 250th NVA Trans Regt and the 7th NVA Trans Bn as a transshipment point for supplies being brought into SVN from Cambodia. (44)

MR 3 and Adjacent Areas

(C) BA 300. (See Figure III-9.) This BA was reactivated during the 3d Qtr when elements of the 84th RSG were forced to withdraw from BA 302 into the vicinity of BA 300. This BA had been the location of HQ 5th VC Div.

(C) BA 303. This BA was used as a staging area for operations into Dien Hoa, Long Khanh, and Phuoc Tuy Provinces. Elements of the 274th VC Regt, 74th Arty Regt, and units of SR4 and VC U-1 operated from this base.

(C) BA 205. This BA was established during the 3d Qtr when elements of the 84th RSG and the Staff Section, MR 7, were identified in the area along with the discovery of enemy caches and installations.

(C) BA 351. This BA contained excellent LOCs and was the southern end of a logistical/personnel corridor paralleling SVN's MR 2 border south from Laos. The 90th Recovery and Replacement Regt also operated in the area. The Jolley and Adams Roads ran from BA 351 to War Zone "D". The 86th RSG operated from this BA.


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FIGURE III-9

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(C) BA 353. This BA was used as a staging area for attacks on ARVN units operating along QL22 and Highway 7 in Cambodia. This BA had also served as the location of COSVN HQ.

(C) BA 354. This BA was used as a training area, logistical base, and staging area for operations against ARVN forces in northwestern War Zone "C" and Cambodia. The 82d RSG operated from this BA. The 95C NVA Regt, 271st VC Regt, and 9th VC Div were identified in this area.

(C) BA 355. This BA served as a staging area for enemy operations in the Michelin Plantation region and southeastern Tay Ninh Province. Its location along the Saigon River logistical corridor afforded ease of supply to units utilizing the area. The 82d RSG operated from this BA.

(C) BA 359. This BA, along with War Zone "D," was the terminus of the Jolley and Adams Roads. The area was a logistical base for enemy units operating in SR4, SR5, MR7, and Binh Tuy Province. The 81st RSG operated from this BA.

(C) BA 708. This BA was important to the enemy as the source of the Saigon River personnel/logistical infiltration corridor and as a staging area for tactical activity in Binh Long and eastern War Zone "C". This BA was reconfigured and redesignated from BA 353 during the 3d Qtr. The 7th NVA Div had made extensive use of this BA.

(C) BA 711. This BA was activated during the 3d Qtr according to intelligence which indicated that the enemy was using the Chhlong River area, referred to as the "Funnel," as a major headquarters and logistics base. There were several sections from COSVN and SVNLA and the 94th Recovery and Replacement Regt located in the BA.

(C) BA 712. This BA afforded excellent cover and concealment and Highway 131 provided LOCs to other BAs. Trails leading south from the area formed the beginning of the logistical/personnel corridor known as the Serge's Jungle Highway. The 70th RSG and the 92d Recovery and Replacement Regt operated from this BA. Units of the 5th VC Div were reported operating from this BA.

(C) BA 713. This BA was used for political and military training, rest, and resupply for units operating in Hau Nghia, Long An, and Tay Ninh Provinces. The 100th RSG operated from this BA. (45)

MR 4 and Adjacent Areas


(C) BA 400. (See Figure III-10.) BA 400 was used as a transshipment center and a depot for logistics infiltration from Cambodia, and as a refitting area for units operating in western VC MR 2. The headquarters of the 18B NVA Regt maintained its base here.

(C) BA 470. BA 470 was an enemy stronghold and center of activity. Supplies and personnel were infiltrated from Cambodia into the area for further distribution to units in eastern VC MR 2. Supplies and personnel were moved freely between BAs 470 and 490. The headquarters and elements of the 98th NVA Regt, DT1 VC Regt, and LF units were reported in this BA.

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FIGURE III-10

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(C) BA 482. This BA was a logistical base containing munitions factories, a hospital, and an aid station. Several NVA, VC I.F, and VC LF units were reported in this BA.

(C) BA 483. This BA was an enemy stronghold with the U Minh Forest providing a secure storage and staging area. This BA was the center of enemy activity in VC MR 3. HQ VC MR 3, D2 VC Regt, 95A NVA Regt, and the D1 VC Regt were located in or around this BA.

(C) BA 487. BA 487 was used by LF units operating in the Vinh Long/Vinh Binh Province boundary.

(C) BA 490. BA 490 was used by LF units operating in Kien Hoa Province. The VCI was particularly active and influential within and near the BA.

(C) BA 704. This BA served as a logistical and personnel transshipment center and as a sanctuary for enemy forces operating in western VC MR 2. The 295th VC MF Bn was reported operating in this BA. (46)

The Infiltration System

Introduction

(C) Infiltration of personnel included the preparation of the troops in NVN; movement through NVN and into RVN across the DMZ, through Laos, or Cambodia; and movement to the destination in RVN. The route from NVN through Laos and Cambodia was a complex system. Convoys of trucks, wagons, carts, porters, ships, barges, boats, and trains transported personnel through NVN. The corridor was an interwoven net of BAs, Binh Trams (BTs) (military stations), commo-liaison (CL) stations, and transportation units responsible for storage of supplies and delivering infiltration groups or units into RVN. (47)

Movement from NVN

(C) Prior to US bombing of NVN, infiltrators often travelled through NVN by vehicle. The bombing destroyed many bridges, slowing but not stopping southbound traffic. The monthly infiltration figures after ROLLING THUNDER (US bombing program of NVN) indicated an upward rate. In early 1970, trains were often used for transport from training areas to Vinh City, the door to infiltration corridors. Trucks were also used. From Vinh City, ferries were frequently used to cross rivers where bridges were not rebuilt. Troops travelled southwest from Vinh City on Route 8 through the Nape Pass into Laos or south-southwest along Route 15 to the Mu Gia Pass. (See Figure III-11.) Another route ran from Vinh City through Ha Tinh, southwest along Route 151 through the Mu Gia Pass on Route 15 and south on Routes 91, 92, and 96. The above routes merged after their juncture with Route 110 in southern Laos and were normally terminated in the


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FIGURE III-11

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vicinity of BA 604. The route south from Dong Nai followed secondary routes through the piedmont parallel to the Annamite Mountains. It then followed Routes 102A/B and 103A/B to an area near the DMZ. However, specific corridors discussed were not always the actual routes used. They were supplemented by a heavy network of trails paralleling the major roads and waterways. (48)

Movement from the DMZ

(C) From the DMZ, personnel travelled directly into northern MR 1 or west along the Ben Hai River into Laos and BAs, BTs, and CL stations. There were approximately 20 BAs located along the Laos, Cambodia, and RVN borders (see the Base Area section of this chapter for further discussion and maps of BAs). (49)

Movement through the Laos Panhandle-The 559th Transportation Group

(C) The 559th Trans Grp, established in 1959, was subordinate to the NVA High Command's GDRS. It was responsible for the movement of men and supplies into RVN via Laos. Personnel and supplies were probably distributed to forward supply depots in accordance with priorities established by MRTTH and the B-3 Front (see Figure III-19 for the geographical location of the MFs). From there, the various regiments and divisions furnished transportation and guides for the personnel and supplies assigned to their units. The 559th Trans Grp had the following missions:

1. Movement and storage of supplies from NVN to depots along the Laotian/RVN border and to several points within RVN.
2. Improvement, maintenance, and protection of the roads and major trails within the area.
3. Logistical support and route guides for infiltration personnel along the CL routes, as well as evacuation of casualties.
4. Maintenance of hospital, dispensary, and aid station facilities.


Even though the movement of personnel and supplies from the DMZ followed the same general routes south, there was little relationship between the two. Personnel and supplies might parallel each other along the trails; however, very seldom were they moved together. Supplies were shipped to storage areas to be picked up by support unit elements. Personnel were led from BT to BT and from CL station to CL station until they reached their assigned units. Reports indicated infiltrators sometimes stopped along the route to help move supplies. However, once finished, the group continued on its journey.

(C) In order to accomplish its mission, the 559th Trans Gp was organized into a series of subordinate BTs, each responsible for a geographic area. Each BT had subordinate transportation, engineer, infantry, medical, and air defense elements for prompt movement and protection of personnel and supplies in its area. The group primarily used motorized equipment (Russian-built

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VC/NVA LOCS INTO (MR I)



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FIGURE III-12

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Gaz and Zil trucks). In early 1970, the 559th maintained nine known BTs in Laos and RVN. The estimated strength of the group was between 16,000 and 30,000. Parenthetically, one of the reasons for differing estimates of enemy strength in Laos was the inclusion of the 559th in some estimates and its exclusion in others. It was believed a typical BT included engineer battalions, transportation (truck) battalions, AA battalions, infantry battalions, a troop movement unit (infiltration guides), and a medical unit. Each BT was also responsible for depot maintenance, road construction, and establishment of LOCs.

(C) To facilitate the movements, the VC/NVA developed a net of CL stations in Laos, Cambodia, and RVN. The stations were to:

1. Supply food and provide bivouac sites for the infiltration groups.
2. Provide a guide to lead the groups from one station to the next.
3. Provide the medical supplies and facilities for the group. If an infiltrator required time to recuperate from an illness or wound, he would stay at the station for attachment to a subsequent infiltration group passing through.

CL stations were usually separated by 1 day's march time. The location of a CL station, as well as its use, was subject to change. In addition, deserters, sick, and lost soldiers were gathered at the stations. (50)

Movement into MR 1

(C) Probably the most used infiltration corridor into MR 1 was the A Shau Valley. A CICV study of access routes to the valley and Route 548, the main infiltration corridor within the valley, showed interdiction at any point of Route 548 could be easily by-passed due to the open nature of the surrounding terrain which allowed nearly unimpeded travel within the valley. Personnel exiting the A Shau Valley moved east from BA 607 along Route 614 or paralleling trails. From BA 607, it continued south via trail networks along the Laos/RVN border and Route 966 to BA 614 (see Figure III-12 and the "Base Area" section of this chapter for a map of BAs). BA 614 was the last major BA through which the infiltrators passed before reaching the Laos/Cambodia/RVN tri-border area. (51)

Infiltration Through the A Shau Valley

(C) The A Shau Valley was a region which ran for about 25 miles along the Laotian border in Thua Thien Province. The valley was a natural avenue of movement through a region sparsely settled and physically remote from the government controlled area of MR 1.

(C) In the early and mid-1960s, three special forces camps were maintained in the valley at A Luoi, Ta Bat, and A Shau. In 1966, when friendly units abandoned the outposts to concentrate on the defense of the coastal areas, the valley and the surrounding areas were left largely to the enemy.

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(C) He quickly took advantage of allied absence and established supply and infiltration routes leading to areas of military operations in the east and south. He built a complex of interlocking roads, trails, supply depots, and command posts (CP) to support forays into the populated eastern lowlands. For several years, he was relatively free from allied intervention.

(C) The operations in the A Shau were an integral part of the Ho Chi Minh Trail system. A separate BT was established there.

(C) In its heyday of early 1968, the enemy logistic network in the valley was a high-volume operation supplying his troops attacking Hue and Danang during the 1968 TET Offensive. At one time Communists directed that 8 tons be delivered daily through the A Shau pipeline to BA 112.

(C) After TET 1968, the Allies mounted an effort to deny the valley to the enemy. In Operation DELAWARE in April and May 1968 the US 1st Cav Div occupied the valley floor. When troops left, air power began to suppress enemy activities in the area striking interdiction points repetitively.

(C) Operations DEWEY CANYON and MASSACHUSETTS STRIKER in early 1969 virtually expelled enemy forces from the valley and captured nearly 800 tons of food, arms, and ammunition.

(C) Denied the avenue afforded by Routes 922 and 548, the enemy faced two alternatives. First, he could carry supplies overland from Laos into Thua Thien and Quang Nam Provinces. However, due to the extremely rugged terrain in the area, considerably more time and effort would be required. His second alternative was trucking supplies farther down the Ho Chi Minh Trail to Chavane, east via Routes 165 and 966 to the tri-border area, and then northeast toward BAs 112 and 127.

(C) During the allied occupation of the valley in early 1969, he was forced to do just that. According to prisoner reports and captured documents, it more than doubled the time necessary to move supplies to BA 112. As a result, he persisted in attempts to use the valley. During the air interdiction of 1968 and 1969, he built by-passes around the more vulnerable road sections. He tried to avoid losing that important logistic avenue.

(C) Allied sweep operations terminated with the advent of the 1969 rainy season. After that, weather and the continued air interdiction kept his logistic activity at a minimum.

(C) With the onset of the 1969/1970 dry season, the enemy again returned to the valley and set up a base of operations in the surrounding hills. The BA 611, A Shau Valley, and central mountains formed a complex which was a base of operations and cache network supporting VC/NVA efforts through the rainy season. The 7th NVA Trans Regt, consisting of several thousand men, was estimated to be operating in the valley. Elements of the 5th, 6th, and 29th NVA Inf Regts provided security for the logistic effort.

(C) For geographic, topographic, and military reasons, the A Shau Valley, with Route 548, in 1969 was to be an important part of the enemy's support system. The significance of the A Shau Valley to the enemy was clearer after study of the geography of the conflict in MR 1 and topography of the border area between MR 1 and Laos. The conflict in MR 1 was a struggle to control the populated coastal plains where most of the population lived in villages and hamlets or

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in the cities of Quang Tri, Hue, Danang, and Quang Ngai. Population distribution forced concentration of allied military and GVN pacification personnel in the lowlands. That left the sparsely settled and often densely forested foothills and highlands to the enemy. There he operated with considerable freedom establishing arms and supply caches for his forays into the lowlands. From October 1969 through March 1970, estimates said he moved nearly 7,000 tons of supplies into BA 611 for dispersal throughout Thua Thien and Quang Nam Provinces.

(C) Topographical considerations emphasized the value of the A Shau to the enemy. It cut through the highest mountains in MR 1 and eastern Laos. Peaks reached above 6,000 feet to the west, and lesser mountains continued south along the MR 1/Laos border. Because the border terrain restricted movement of supplies from Laos, it was to the enemy's advantage to utilize the existing routes approaching or entering RVN.

(C) Routes 9, 926, and 921 in northern MR 1 provided access to Quang Tri Province. To the south, Routes 966 and 165 offered access to Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces. The shortest and easiest access to Thua Thien and Quang Nam Provinces were Routes 922 or 923. Of the last two, 922's advantage was clearly evident, if Route 548 through the A Shau was open. Once inside RVN, supplies could be shuttled by truck, bicycle, or portering to caches in the mountains and foothills west of Hue or farther south into BAs 112 and 127. (52)

Movement into the B-3 Front

(C) In early 1970, truck convoys were the primary material transport mode but personnel walked. Troops arriving in the northern tri-border area near BA 609 moved east through Kontum and Pleiku Provinces, along the inter-provincial routes. The B-3 Front controlled troop movement down the trail and along the western border of MR 2 into four primary BAs; 609, 701, 702, and 740. The 240th Trans Regt was responsible for moving infiltrators and supplies from BA 609 to areas of northern MR 2. BAs 701 and 702 along the western border of MR 2 handled the personnel destined for central MR 2. They moved southeast through Pleiku Province and on to Phu Bon and Phu Yen Provinces. BA 740 handled personnel movement into southern MR 2. The 250th Trans Regt paralleled the 240th and moved personnel out of BA 740, across Quang Duc and Darlac Provinces, ultimately into Khanh Hoa Province and the Phu Yen Plain. (53)

Movement into MR 3

(C) MR 3 had the most complex infiltration system within RVN. In early 1970, there were four major BAs which serviced MR 3. BA 351, located in the northwest part of MR 3 in Phuoc Long Province, infiltrated men and supplies into MR 3 via the Jolley and Adams Road. Personnel moved along those two routes with CL guides possibly from the 86th RSG. The Jolley Road ran southeast out of BA 351 through Phuoc Long Province and turned southwest and continued into Long Khanh Province. The Adams Road ran south out of BA 351 through central Phuoc Long Province into Long Khanh Province. From that area, where the two roads seemed to merge, the 81st RSG continued to move personnel and supplies through Long Khanh Province south into Phuoc Tuy, Bien Hoa, and Binh Tuy Provinces. (See the Logistics section of this chapter.)

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(C) BA 712, located north of Binh Long Province, provided personnel transport south along Serges Jungle Highway. That route ran south out of BA 712 along the Phuoc Long-Binh Long Province border into northern Binh Duong Province. The responsibility of moving personnel out of BA 712 possibly fell upon CL personnel from the 70th RSG. BA 708 was along the northern border of MR 3 in the Fishhook area of Cambodia. Troops were moved out of BA 708, possibly by CL personnel from the 50th RSG, through eastern Tay Ninh province and then along the Tay Ninh - Binh Duong Province border.

(C) Base Area 354 was located along the Tay Ninh/Cambodian border northwest of Tay Ninh City. From BA 354 supplies were moved to BA 355 and other areas by elements of the 82d RSG. Also, the 100th RSG moved supplies southeast out of BA 354 to BA 713.

(C) Finally, BA 713, located in Cambodia's Parrot's Beak area, was serviced by the 100th RSG. The 100th RSG CL moved personnel from the Ba Thu (Cambodia) area southeast through Hau Nghia Province into Long An Province for further distribution and assignment in the southwest portion of MR 3. The 100th also moved personnel northeast out of BA 713 into Binh Duong Province where the 83d Gp assumed the responsibility of moving them into central MR 3. Other BAs located within MR 3 were 300, 303, 305, 355, and 359. Those BAs served as MR 3 supply depots and storage areas for infiltrators.

(C) There were four additional transportation units operating in MR 3. The units were the 48th VC, 49th, H50, and D5 Trans Bns. Available information concerning the units was limited, and their actual AOs and responsibility were not known. (54)

The Rear Service Groups in MR 3.

(C) There were a number of rear service groups operating in MR 3 whose procurement activities extended into Cambodia. Five groups operated on both sides of the RVN/Cambodian border. They were the 50th, 70th, 82d, 86th, and 100th. The 86th RSG operated out of BA 351. In the border area, Cambodian merchants bought the VC's medical supplies, rice, and, clothing and arranged the infiltration of weapons and ammunition. Supplies were usually transported to the border by Cambodians and turned over to the VC for further transport into RVN. The 70th RSG operated in a similar manner out of BA 712. Supplies were purchased locally and moved to that BA, where the VC picked them up for infiltration. The 50th RSG maintained procurement elements in the Fishhook area of Cambodia. Personnel and supplies were moved south along the Saigon River corridor into central MR 3. The 100th RSG operated more extensively within Cambodia than the others. Its headquarters was located in Cambodia's Kompong Trach area near WT 8761. Its strength was estimated at 500 troops, divided into 10 sections. The sections included finance, procurement, administration, political, and transportation elements. The 100th was also responsible for maintaining three hospitals, a number of storage areas and training facilities, and for supporting maneuver elements in the Long An SR, Hau Nghia, and the Tay Ninh area. Unlike the transportation elements in other parts of RVN, the RSGs in MR 3 were also responsible for movement of personnel and supplies within MR 3 and for the procurement, production, and maintenance of hospital facilities within MR 3. (For a further discussion of the movement of supplies and munitions, see the Logistic section of this chapter.) (55)

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Movement in Cambodia

(C) Infiltration of personnel through Cambodia normally paralleled the border areas of Cambodia and RVN. The infiltrators entered RVN through the various BAs previously mentioned. Route 7 was the major corridor for infiltration and provided ready access to BAs along the border. Infiltrators were guided through Cambodia by guides from the rear services units under COSVN. The transportation network in Cambodia differed from that in Laos, in that the NVN did not have a transportation unit such as the 559th in Cambodia. [redacted] much of the VC/NVA materiel came into Cambodia via Sihanoukville (Kompong Som) and was transported by civilian contractors and the Cambodian Army (FARK) to the VC/NVA BAs. Troops infiltrated along the Cambodian/RVN border. Supplies were transported from Cambodian seaports in western and southern Cambodia. (For a fuller discussion, see p III-154, Vol I, 1969 MACV Command History.) US and ARVN cross-border operations and overall developments in Cambodia altered the picture. (See Logistics Sections of the chapter.)

(C) Prior to the cross-border operation, the existence of an infiltration corridor was known; however, more specific information was provided by documents and PWs captured during the cross-border operation. The development and coordination of the system was the responsibility of the SVNLA through specific units organized for the exact mission. In July 1969, HQ SVNLA activated the 92d and 94th Straggler Recovery and Replacement (SRR) Regts. These two regiments supplemented the 90th SRR Regt, which had been active for an unknown period of time. The AO of the SRR regiments began where the Tonle Srepok crossed the RVN border. The SRR regiments were responsible for movement of infiltrators and logistics to and through Cambodia into GVN MRs 3 and 4. The AO of the 90th SRR Regts was from the Tonle Srepok south to the vicinity of BA 712. The 92d SRR Regt operated from BA 712 south to BA 353. The 94th SRR Regt was responsible for the area south of BA 353, to include GVN MR 4. (56)

Movement into MR 4


(C) Infiltration into MR 4 in 1969 and early 1970 was by unit rather than by individual replacements. The movements were considered to be unit deployments rather than infiltration. However, groups of replacements for MR 4 units were guided along the Cambodian border to points near BAs 713 and 354. There the infiltration groups were disbanded and regrouped into smaller or larger replacement units. Normally they received additional training to acquaint them with the delta's weather, terrain, and tactics before moving on with guides from the unit to which they were assigned. BAs 704 and 400 were located along Cambodia's southern border with RVN. Although basically logistical areas, transportation units supporting them maintained CLS stations for the two infiltration corridors into MR 4. Those followed the Plain of Reeds and the border trails leading to the Seven Mountains area and the U Minh Corridor. (57)

Attrition Rate during Infiltration

(C) The infiltration journey from NVN was difficult because of rugged terrain, heat, fatigue, disease and harassment from bombing and artillery strikes. The three greatest problems were malaria (by far the greatest), air and artillery strikes, and desertion. Approximately 3 percent

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INFILTRATION



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FIGURE III-13

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of an infiltration group cadre returned to NVN after the trip to RVN. PW reports and captured documents reporting infiltration losses indicated possibly a 15 to 17 percent attrition rate. (58)

Personnel Infiltration Trends

(C) The NVA had the ability to train 70,000 to 80,000 yearly. They infiltrated most into the RVN between October and May in groups ranging from 10 to 25 and up to 600 to 800. The groups were identified by unit designation and infiltration group number which were usually in sequence. The first digit of the infiltration number normally indicated the destination. Most infiltrators appeared destined for MRs 1 and 3 where the enemy activity was relatively high. Infiltration appeared to follow two policies. First, the enemy seemed to have a planned estimated number of infiltrators to enter the RVN. That was seen in the groups infiltrated under the numerical system explained earlier. The numbers were in sequence with departure and arrival dates planned. Second, the enemy, previously proved he could infiltrate complete units or large groups of replacements, prior to or during large operations. That was the case during the TET 1968, Khe Sanh, Hue City, and Saigon campaigns. Those areas were still to be considered high-activity centers as was indicated by the percentage of infiltrators assigned to the areas. After TET 1968, NVA strength in RVN steadily decreased. In early 1970, the average, country-wide strength of the NVA battalions was approximately one-half Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) strength. Infiltration after 1968 also declined. Attempts were made to correlate NVA strengths with NVA losses to get an indication of the quantity of infiltration replacements. However, due to an inadequate knowledge of the actual NVA strengths and losses, an estimate of infiltration based on that theory could not be justified. (59)

Personnel Infiltration Rates

(C) NVA infiltration into RVN generally paralleled and remained proportionate to the total NVA strength in RVN. There were seasonal high points, generally occurring from March to June. These high points occurred because a larger number of infiltrators were sent south during the dry weather; and a larger number of infiltrators were usually needed to satisfy requirements of the enemy offensives which usually occurred during those dry-weather months. Infiltration remained relatively constant throughout 1967. The monthly rate tripled in January 1968, rose to over 32,000 in March, and remained in excess of 25,000 through August. This reflected requirements for support of the TET and post-TET offensives. By October 1968, the monthly rate was again between 5,000 and 10,000. There was a large increase in February 1969 through June 1969, apparently to satisfy the requirements of the Spring-Summer Offensive. Thereafter the monthly rate dropped sharply to an unusually low level, remaining well below 5,000 through December. Since NVA strength in RVN was relatively constant after September 1968, the reduced rate appeared adequate to sustain the 1970 strength and combat level as the enemy continued to avoid massive ground contacts and assaults and concentrated instead on economy-of-force operations such as attacks-by-fire (ABF) and sapper attacks. The monthly rate during the last half of 1970 was unusually low, possibly due to diversion of infiltrators to southern Laos and Cambodia. (60)

(U) Figure III-13 displays the fluctuations of NVA infiltration from January 1964 through December 1970.

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Infiltration Rates of Supplies and Materiel to RVN

(S) The major development in the movement of supplies and materiel into RVN from January to June 1970 was the crash logistics program initiated in late 1969, attempting to keep supplies moving down the trail during the rainy season. One possible explanation for the enemy's logistics push in early 1970 was his concern about LOCs in Cambodia. [redacted] periodically closed the logistics tap in 1969, attempting to gain concessions from the VC/NVA. Thus the increased flow down the trail could have been designed to meet any contingency that developed in Cambodia. After [redacted] the allied cross-border operations, it was not surprising that NVN failed to pull back to NVN during the rainy season as they usually did with the personnel manning the logistics trail.

(S) From January through March the principal avenues of infiltration for supplies into MR 1 and northern MR 2 were LOCs in the Lao Panhandle. Evidence indicated Cambodian ports and inland waterways provided supplies to MRs 3 and 4 and southern MR 2.

(S) In late March and in April, with the change of government in Cambodia, it was believed that no supplies were moved through Cambodia. Requirements for MRs 3, 4, and southern MR 2 were probably met from stockpiles. Units operating away from the border areas in MR 1 and northern MR 2 experienced difficulty in obtaining supplies.

(S) In May allied operations in Cambodia disrupted the supply system supporting MRs 3, 4, and southern MR 2. However, it was felt the enemy anticipated the probability of cross-border operations and displaced some of his stockpiles from the border area. Since VC/NVA supply requirements were normally determined by operational intentions, it was felt the losses in Cambodia would probably force him to scale his near-future operations to a level commensurate with supplies available. It was concluded he would be temporarily forced to choose between a lower level of tactical activity or accept the risks inherent in further reducing his operating stocks by sustaining a normal level of tactical activity.

(S) In June and July supply requirements for MRs 3, 4, and southern MR 2 were probably met from existing stockpiles. The rainy season limited activity and movement on the LOCs in the Lao Panhandle. Enemy forces were forced to utilize reserve stockpiles in the border areas as was normal during the rainy season.

(S) Through October, the rainy season seriously limited logistical activity and the movement of materiel through the Lao Panhandle toward the RVN in support of enemy forces in MR 1 and northern MR 2. In November, when the rainy season ended, increased logistical activity and movement of materiel through the Lao Panhandle was noted. Even so, enemy forces in MR 1 and northern MR 2 were forced to draw upon accumulated resources stockpiled in the border areas.

(S) After the change of government in Cambodia, no war related supplies were believed to have been imported into Cambodia through Kompong Som in support of enemy forces in southern MR 2 and MRs 3 and 4. However, enemy control over large portions of northeastern Cambodia probably permitted him to continue collection of food and supplies in support of his forces in southern RVN. Requirements for weapons and munitions were probably met from stocks previously stored in Cambodia or RVN. (S) See Table III-1 for a monthly estimate of Troops supported, force requirement, and percent procured in RVN.

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Infiltration of Supplies and Materiel*

1970	Troops Supported			Total	Force Requirement (STPD)	Percent Procured in RVN
	Maneuver & Combat Support	Guerrilla	Administrative Service			
Jan	135,525	45,300	55,105	235,930	284	67
Feb	134,700	43,800	54,960	233,460	309	64
Mar	134,275	42,000	54,860	231,135	305	69
Apr	133,480	40,500	55,660	229,640	253	64
May	133,390	40,400	56,960	230,750	476	35
Jun	135,830	39,600	60,415	235,845	304	55
Jul	134,630	38,100	62,300	235,030	246	61
Aug	135,415	37,600	64,750	239,765	230	63
Sep	135,935	36,800	66,960	239,695	229	64
Oct	135,555	35,200	66,960	237,715	321	66
Nov	135,910	34,100	65,710	235,720	218	67
Dec	134,510	30,900	64,650	230,060	215	67

*Figures used in this chart were current as of the cut-off of the reference reports. Since strength figures were continually updated, those used above were the ones used in force requirement computations.

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
TABLE III-1

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LOGISTICS ORGANIZATION



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FIGURE III-14

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VC/NVA Logistics and Tax Collection

Organization of the VC/NVA Logistics System

(C) The enemy's in-country logistic transportation system differed from that of out-country in two significant respects. First, the enemy did not control the ground inside RVN as he did in eastern Laos. Hence he could not maintain a road and truck-park network. Secondly, while in Laos and Cambodia the enemy moved supplies over what could be termed "truck" or "main-line" high-volume routes. Inside RVN the supplies had to be dispersed to the small units located throughout the countryside. In those circumstances, it was not surprising to see that in-country the VC/NVA utilized methods and techniques different from those used outside RVN.

(C) MACV estimated, that at the end of the 1st quarter of 1970 the enemy imported over 90 percent of his arms and ammunition, about one-third of his food, and 25 percent of his other clothing and equipment requirements. The rest was procured inside RVN. Some munitions, predominantly booby traps and other anti-personnel ordnance, were produced locally by the VC. Materials were often obtained from captured or dud allied munitions; other goods and food were purchased either on the open markets or taxed and extorted from the population in VC-controlled areas.

(C) The enemy supply system in-country provided support to both VC/NVA units. Most of the work was organized and carried out by the VC under the control and direction of the integrated VC/NVA party network headed by COSVN. There were, however, NVA transportation units in MRs 1 and 2.

(C) The VC supply organization was composed of three major parts, the rear service organizations, the finance and economy sections, and in some areas, the forward supply councils (see Figure III-14). All of the organization was under the over-all command of the party committees at the various levels. Although in practice the one military and two political organizations sometimes performed overlapping or duplicate tasks, the division of responsibility among the military and civilian organizations was clear. The task of distributing supplies to the troops fell on the military; that of obtaining supplies and money from the populace and of organizing civilian labor for transportation and evacuation fell on the civilian/political agencies. (63)

(C) The finance and economy section supervised tax collection in the village. In addition to collecting money and food, the finance and economy section supervised the allocation of food and war material. Bond programs, fund drives, and borrowing and lending schemes were managed by the section. It might have also managed local VC business establishments and operated small war material manufacturing centers and food production units. The frontline supply council, commonly called the forward supply council, was charged with mobilizing all material resources (food, weapons, ammunitions) and manpower in its area. The council coordinated activities of finance and economy and military rear service sections which dealt with the supplying of military units. It managed civilian laborers, frequently obtained through the efforts of front associations, to serve as porters and litter bearers. It managed entry and exit points where supplies were purchased on the open market and then cached for further distribution. The council was staffed jointly by civilian personnel from the finance and economy section and the security section. (64)

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(C) Thus, movement of supplies and ammunition was carried out by military transportation support units, assisted by rear service sections from the combat units themselves, and during periods of heightened activity, by civilian labor recruited or impressed by the political party organizations. The party sections levied taxes and oversaw the collection of foodstuffs from the resources available in VC-controlled areas.

(C) Supplies reached RVN via a complicated out-country infiltration system, and at or near the border, underwent transfer to the in-country system. The supplies were off-loaded and stored in the several BAs the enemy maintained and occupied. From those areas, the supplies were ready for further movement into and through RVN (see Infiltration into RVN and Base Areas sections of this chapter).

(C) Prior to early 1969, the enemy made some use of trucks inside the country, primarily in the A Shau Valley and in northern RVN MR 3. During the dry season he was able to move trucks down the A Shau and eastward toward Hue. He also was able to use trucks in War Zone "C" in northern Tay Ninh Province of RVN MR 3, a traditional Communist stronghold. Ground operations and concerted air interdiction campaigns during the first part of 1969 denied the A Shau Valley for truck use. Allied operations and extension of government control all but eliminated the use of military vehicles elsewhere in-country. The enemy did attempt, in early 1970, to move trucks into the A Shau Valley.

(C) He relied primarily on the slow, primitive, but less vulnerable modes such as portage, bicycles, carts, and sampans or pirogues. Portage was the most prevalent form. Throughout RVN some 25,000 personnel, both VC and NVA, were assigned to transportation units. They were augmented during periods of high activity by civilians recruited from VC-controlled territory. Bicycles were well suited for use over unimproved roads or even well-used trails. Special reinforced bicycles, carrying up to 500 pounds, were pushed by one or two men. Carts were used when they could be obtained. Reports indicated the VC sometimes gave peasants carts or draft animals if they agreed to make the carts available for hauling military supplies at specified times. In the delta and in southwestern RVN MR 3, canals and waterways facilitated the use of sampans and the small pirogues.

(C) Unimproved roads or simple jungle trails sufficed. Where jungle canopy provided cover from detection, the enemy improved his trails. He used bamboo rods to create crude, but effective all-weather surface. Bamboo was also used to bridge small streams.

(C) Numerous avenues and areas were used by the enemy in getting his supplies into the country and to his troops. In RVN MR 1 several routes were used consistently through the years. One, through the eastern section of the DMZ, stretched southwest to safe areas, although allied operations reduced the importance of the route before 1970. During late 1970, use of the western DMZ area increased, with alternate routes being constructed and a general upgrading of the system in the area taking place. Other routes led into the A Shau, south of Khe Sanh, and to BAs farther south. Supplies were picked up at border BAs by members of the transportation units or rear service elements of the maneuver units, and moved to caches or to troops.

(C) The main transportation units operating in southern MR 1 were the 220th, 230th, 240th, and 260th Trans Regt. The 220th Regt moved supplies from the Quang Nam/Laotian border in the

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vicinity of Routes 9662 and 9668 to eastern Quang Nam Province, where the 260th Regt took over responsibility for distributing the supplies to units operating in the area. The 230th Regt was responsible for transporting supplies from the MR 5 supply points at the Lactian border to Quang Tin Province and also to the 240th Regt in Quang Ngai Province. Supplies were disseminated throughout Quang Ngai and into northern MR 2 by the 240th Regt. In northern MR 1, subordinate battalions of Front 4 and MRTTH transported supplies from the Laotian border down to line units and also to the Ruong Ruong Valley area. In addition to those transportation units, entire combat units were sometimes tasked to porter supplies.

(C) RVN MR 2 was supplied from a network of transportation routes emanating from a series of BAs adjacent to the Cambodian/RVN border. Moving in areas where they were least hindered by allied operations, elements of the 240th Trans Regt moved supplies south from the MR 1/MR 2 border into Binh Dinh Province. The D2, D5, D6, and D7 Trans Bns of the B-3 Front moved supplies into northern, central, and southern MR 2, as well as down the Ho Chi Minh trail on the Cambodian/RVN border. The 250th Trans Regt, with its subordinate battalions, moved supplies across southern MR 2 to the coast. Provincial supply elements further distributed the supplies to district and lower levels.

(C) There were four major north-south supply corridors in RVN MR3. The Jolley Road and Adams Road were trail complexes in Phuoc Long Province. The Serpes Jungle Highway ran along the Binh Long/Phuoc Long border. The Mustang Road ran south from the Fishhook area. Although called "road" or "highway", the routes were actually complexes of trails, stream segments, and occasional stretches of road. The only major west-to-east supply route ran from the Ba Thu and Parrot's Beak areas of Cambodia into Long An Province. Other shorter shuttle routes were in west-central MR 3, and some ran between Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces (see Figure III-15).


(C) Supplies were moved in RVN MR 3 by regimental-size organizations known as rear service groups. There were seven of the groups ranging in size from 300 to 4,000 men, with total strength of over 12,000. They were unique to RVN MR 3 and were not only responsible for transporting supplies, but also were charged with procurement, production, maintenance of hospital facilities, and evacuation of sick and wounded personnel.

(C) A trail system discovered in War Zone "C" of northwestern RVN MR 3 in 1968 provided a good example of the enemy's use of a CL station to facilitate movement of supplies by porters. Those stations or transshipment points separated by approximately a 1-day walk, were simply regions in jungle terrain considered relatively safe from allied operations. CLs also served a valuable security function in that porters were employed to transport material between only two such stations, each succeeding segment being service by other porters. This compartmentation reduced the chances of the entire system being compromised by personnel captured at any particular location.

(C) In RVN MR 4, the Bassac and Mekong Rivers provided the main approach to the delta, although US and VNN operations forced the enemy to use numerous smaller waterways and canals. The major transportation units were the 195th, 196th, and D-16 Trans Bns and some elements of the 410th Trans Bn. The 195th was tasked with movement of supplies from Cambodia to the Three Sisters Mountain area, with the 196th responsible for moving supplies to the Rach Gia area and from there elements of the U Minh 10 Inf Bn moved supplies into the U Minh Forest base area; the D-16 Bn operated in northern RVN MR 4. After the supplies were delivered to storage areas,

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requesting units organized small transportation elements from their rear service sections to pick up their requirements.

(C) To distribute his supplies and ammunition throughout the country, the enemy utilized an intricate system of depots and caches. In that manner he was able to stockpile arms, ammunition, and supplies in relative proximity to his forces. The system was necessary for two reasons. First, the logistic system, relying as it did on slow means of movement, could not support large-scale action in progress; therefore, the supplies had to precede the operation. Secondly, supplies were stored during the dry months in preparation for the rainy season, during which movement of materiel was more difficult.

(C) The caches ranged from a few mortar rounds to the 450 tons of arms, munitions, and food found in the Khe Sanh Valley in February 1969. The average cache consisted of 70 percent food, 25 percent ammunition, and 5 percent weapons, although caches consisting of only one category were also found. The 173 tons found near Rang Rang in February were primarily arms and ammunition. For a discussion of material found in Cambodia, see Annex C.

(C) As allied operations uncovered and destroyed the enemy's large depots and interdiction efforts reduced the flow through the main corridors, the number and size of caches dropped. As the enemy was forced to disperse his caches more and more, the average size dropped from 5 or 6 tons to 1 or 2 tons. In RVN, the enemy apparently continued to utilize some large central depots, such as that at Rang Rang, but placed more reliance on smaller, more widely dispersed caches.

(C) Caches were discovered in nearly every province of the country. The greatest number were uncovered in Tay Ninh, Quang Tri, Long An, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Hau Nghia, Gia Dinh, Binh Long, Long Khanh, Binh Dinh, and Phuoc Long Provinces. The heavier concentrations were found in areas which were both traditional infiltration avenues and which contained heavier troop concentrations, and also were subject to more allied sweep operations.

(C) A detailed look at the Jolley Road complex in eastern Phuoc Long Province of RVN MR 3 provided an excellent illustration of enemy techniques for moving quantities of materiel by primitive means. In 1970, there were numerous indications that infiltration and supply activities in RVN MR 3 were disrupted by allied operations against the Adams Road, the Serges Jungle Highway, and the Ba Thu Corridor. To compensate for the interdiction, a new route, known as the Jolley Road, was developed along the eastern border of Phuoc Long Province (see Figure III-16). In most areas the trail network was hidden by double and triple jungle canopy. However, US and ARVN elements explored enough segments of the system to piece together the general trace of the corridor.

(C) The road seemed to be a wide complex of parallel routes, allowing lateral shifts to avoid allied interdiction. That was illustrated by the maze of known jungle trails in the vicinity of Route 14 in northern Phuoc Long Province, an area through which the Jolley Road ran. The "road" contained miles of interlocking trails allowing considerable freedom of movement in evading detection. The northern-most road point located by mid-1970 was at YU5001. From there trails generally followed the Dong Nai River to a junction with the river at YT5198. The Dong Nai River was itself an integral part of the system. Numerous sampans and docking points indicated materiel moving south was carried by water approximately 9 km downstream. There it apparently was off-loaded and again carried overland, following trails toward the general Rang Rang area (see Figure III-16).


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PHUOC LONG PROVINCE

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FIGURE III-16

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(C) Some of the trails were 4 to 8 feet wide, with a hard packed earth or bamboo mat surface. Other segments of corduroy surface were discovered east of Rang Rang, and more than 30 bridges of various sizes and materials were found. The materiel discovered in the cache near Rang Rang probably came down the Jolley Road. Available evidence indicated the materiel discovered there was transported by portage, bicycles, sampans, and possibly carts. II Field Force, Vietnam (IIFORCEV) estimated the strength of the 81st and 86th RSGs, approximately 5,000 men, was sufficient to transport the entire cache by manpower alone within 80 to 120 days.

(C) The enemy's in-country logistic system was adapted to a situation in which he was denied the use of sophisticated transportation. Reliance on portage, bicycles, carts, and small watercraft eliminated the need to maintain and protect roadways and vehicles. The primary strength of the system was the simplicity and adaptability of the transportation phase. The Jolley Road typified the capability to move materiel overland and flexibility in developing new routes to avoid allied operations. There were weaknesses inherent in the system. First, it took a long time to move supplies any appreciable distance. Secondly, the necessity of prepositioning arms and ammunition in caches made plans vulnerable to disruption through discovery of the caches. (65)

A New VC/NVA Southern Laos - Northern Cambodia LOC

(C) As a result of Cambodian developments, it was thought the VC/NVA would develop a new LOC or LOCs through southern Laos and northeastern Cambodia. The LOC systems available to the enemy had four geographical divisions: the Lao Panhandle; crossing the Lao/Cambodian border; east of the Mekong River; and west of the Mekong River in Cambodia. (See Figure III-17.)

(C) There were three possible north-south routes in the Lao panhandle. Each began near where east-west Route 9 crossed the RVN/Laos border. The primary LOC ran west along Route 9, then south on Routes 92 and 96. Supplies could be off-loaded at Ban Bak into the Se Kong River. However, two waterfalls just south of Ban Bak required portage. Supplies could also continue south from Ban Bak on Routes 92 and 96 and then be transported to the Se Kong at a point below the second waterfall, thus eliminating the required portage. Supplies could also continue south on Route 96, then west on Route 110 to Route 97. The second LOC ran west on Route 9, then south on Routes 23 and 16 to Attapeu. From Attapeu, supplies could enter the Se Kong or continue west on Route 18 and then south on Route 13. The third possible LOC ran west on Route 9, then south on Routes 23 and 13. Two factors however, made it the least desirable. The portions of the route around Pakse were not under VC/NVA control and traversed open terrain susceptible to air interdiction.

(C) There were also thought to be three LOCs crossing the Laos/Cambodia border: the Mekong River/Route 13; the Se Kong (Tonle Kong in Cambodia)/Route 97; and the Route 110 systems. Route 110 was marginal due to the extensive porter system required to meet needs in southern RVN.

(C) Several possible LOCs existed for movement in Cambodia. The Tonle Kong River/Route 97 provided the greatest flexibility. Supplies arriving on the Tonle Kong could off-load at Route 194, then move southeast to Route 19. Route 19 provided direct entry into central RVN MR 2 or easy access to Route 141 south to the COSVN area of operation along the RVN/Cambodia border. Supplies on the Tonle Kong could continue to the junction with the Tonle San then into central RVN

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
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VC/NVA LOCs - SOUTHERN LAOS & NORTHEASTERN CAMBODIA



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FIGURE III-17

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MR 2 or along the Srepok into southern RVN MR 2. Supplies on the Tonle Kong could also continue down the Mekong River to the vicinity of Kratie, where they were trucked to the border regions. The Mekong River/Route 13 also provided for rapid movement of supplies. Route 13 provided direct entry to RVN MR 3. However, that route was open and susceptible to friendly interdiction. The Mekong was not easily navigated due to rapids and waterfalls in Laos. However, once below those obstacles, easy entry to the Tonle San and Srepok or southern shipment to Kratie was possible.

(C) The area west of the Mekong in Cambodia also contained LOCs once used by the Viet Minh. There was no substantial evidence that these LOCs were used by the enemy, but reports presented the possibility.

(C) Complete analysis of the transportation system, logistical requirements in RVN MRs 2, 3, and 4, and available LOCs indicated Route 92 south to the Se Kong River would be the principal short-term LOC. Long-term major LOCs, it was believed, would be Routes 92, 96, 110, and 97 into Cambodia. Within Cambodia, the major routes were less clear. It was thought that, with the advent of the dry season, Routes 194 and 141 would be upgraded and used. (66)

The Shadow Supply System

(S) The "shadow supply system" was defined as the enemy's method of supporting military units and political organizations throughout the RVN with funds and supplies. The VCI were coping with increased problems in financing and supporting military and political activities. Although most enemy war materiel came from Communist Bloc countries, the VC/NVA were primarily dependent upon the people and land of the south for other assistance. To acquire this vital support, the enemy was forced to rely more heavily on his covert apparatus to obtain funds and supplies.

(S) Specific agencies at each level of the enemy's command and control structure formed the internal organization of the "shadow supply system." The Lao Dong and its subordinate, the Armed Forces High Command, Hanoi, exercised political and military control through the major headquarters in the Republic. Senior political cadre of current affairs committees provided overall policy guidance and planning. Finance and economy sections had the mission of acquiring and distributing funds for activities within their respective area, to include supporting VC/NVA activities with \$VN from converted US dollars. Rear service staffs supervised logistics functions of subordinate rear service units. These three elements also were found at province, district, and some village levels throughout the RVN.

(S) The core of the "shadow supply system" included lower echelon rear service groups and VCI-staffed finance and economy sections and forward supply councils. Rear service groups functioned under enemy military regions and fronts and had specific areas of operations. The mission of a rear service group was to receive, store, and transport materiel, collect taxes, and purchase supplies. Finance and economy sections at region and subregion levels planned and managed manufacturing of materiel and food production. They also were primary collection and allocation agencies of money and provisions. At district levels, these sections determined when and where to tax the population in order to meet financial objectives. Forward supply councils

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were subordinate to current affairs committees at all echelons and coordinated activities between finance and economy sections and rear service groups. Councils at each echelon obtained porters, litter bearers, and other logistical support personnel mainly by exploiting the population. Forward supply councils also managed entry and exit points where supplies were purchased on the open market and cached nearby for future distribution. Councils were staffed jointly by VCI civilians from finance and economy sections and military personnel from rear service staffs. Military supply procurement ranged from armed extortion and terrorist tactics to tax collection and actual farming.

(S) To operate an effective system, necessary funds had to be available. There were two principal money sources which sustained the operation of the system: external financing and in-country taxation. External financing was provided by the Foreign Trade Bank which was subordinate to the National Bank of NVN. It obtained US dollars through foreign exchange accounts maintained in Hong Kong, Singapore, Djakarta, France, Japan, and Egypt. Numerous captured documents indicated that dollars were acquired in 1,000, 500, 100, and 50 dollar denominations. US banknotes were usually distributed by bursar cells of each finance and economy section to VC region and subregion levels for exchange to \$VN on illegal money markets located in major cities such as Danang, Saigon, and Bien Hoa. Some \$VN thus obtained were used to finance enemy commercial and VCI activities, while the bulk was forwarded to higher echelons, probably for use in funding military activities. The use of American banknotes increased during 1970. Two examples of this were the capture of an enemy cache containing \$5,000 in US currency in Quang Nam Province in June and another \$22,300 in Binh Tuy Province in mid-August. The enemy also exploited the black market for exchanging currency and generally conducted such transactions in urban areas where converted funds were then used to purchase supplies.

(S) A second major source of VC funds was in-country taxation. The most important were agriculture, transportation, and business taxes. Since RVN had an agricultural economy, the VC agriculture tax was probably the most lucrative. Rates varied up to 40 percent and were computed so that the taxpayer was assessed a percentage of what the VC calculated his land ought to produce, rather than actual production. Agricultural taxes were more often collected in produce than in cash. With the country-wide erosion of the VC tax base as the result of allied operations and the pacification program, portions of the population still subject to taxation had to share an increased burden. Tax activities increased significantly in late 1970, partially the result of unmet quotas and enemy attempts to take advantage of the rice harvest.

(S) Another important source of income was derived from transportation taxes. This tax was collected from all types of conveyances, as well as pedestrian traffic. Commercial vehicles, particularly buses and lumber trucks operating in isolated areas of the country, were the most frequent targets. Transportation taxes were normally collected at edges of VC-occupied areas, near province boundaries, and along major highways.

(S) Exploitation of legitimate commercial businesses was another source of funds for the VC. Companies subject to this form of extortion ran the gamut from commercial carriers to movie theaters, bars, restaurants, and other businesses which depended upon public good will. Plantations and construction, oil, and lumber companies formed another group which was open to exploitation. Captured documents indicated that lumber truck owners in Tuyen Duc Province were "taxed" up to \$VN 150,000 as an alternative to the destruction of their trucks. The threat of force or even minor harassment was usually enough to convince owners to make accommodations with the enemy. This took two forms. First, and most widespread, was payment of taxes to the VC

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in products or cash. The second form was allowing the VC the use of company assets to transport supplies or personnel into areas where they normally were denied access.

(S) The most complex and sensitive aspect of the "shadow supply system" was procurement of food and supplies. First was the receipt of goods rather than cash as tax payments. Second was the use of intermediary purchasing agents with legal RVN status who obtained the necessary licenses and permits to acquire and transport supplies. Purchasing agents employed by the VC also worked under the jurisdiction of trade shops which sent agents to cities to purchase food and supplies for resale to the VC/NVA. The well-publicized discovery in July of American wheat flour in VC caches in Binh Tuy Province, as well as discoveries of locally manufactured and imported cloth in August, attested to the effectiveness of this system, particularly around Saigon. Third, and most widespread, was purchase by proxy in local markets by individuals at the request or insistence of VC finance and economy cadre. In GVN MR 3, the VC reportedly paid 10 to 35 percent over market price to obtain goods. Direct purchases by military units and VCI cadre was a fourth method. This activity was commonplace in isolated hamlets and villages. Whether for reasons of ideology, coercion, or profit, the enemy acquired supplies from the open market. While it was impossible to quantify amounts obtained, they appeared to be substantial. The final manner of securing supplies was outright confiscation. Methods of confiscation differed as did those for collecting taxes. Throughout the Republic, confiscation was occasionally perpetrated under the guise of taxation, even though the people might have already paid their taxes. Receipts for confiscated material promising reimbursement in the future were sometimes given, but payment probably never followed. Frequently, the enemy entered an area during the harvest period and forced farmers to give whatever was demanded.

(S) While there was often little distinction between taxation and confiscation as conducted by the VC, the important point was that the enemy was becoming increasingly reliant upon the local population as a source of supply. As an example, enemy directives captured on 6 Sep revealed that SR 4 had revised its supply system and would no longer issue food and supplies to subordinate elements. According to the documents, the SR headquarters would henceforth allocate only funds, and units would assume responsibility for purchasing their own supplies. While reliance on local procurement reduced the centralized rear service requirement, it placed a greater logistical burden on the "shadow supply system" and reduced the combat capability of tactical forces which had to devote resources and time to supply activities.

(S) Transportation, storage, and distribution of goods completed the supply cycle. Forward supply councils at various echelons were natural bridges between VCI finance and economy sections and military rear service groups. Their basic responsibilities included the management of an intricate system of pick up, intermediate storage, and delivery of supplies to political and military elements. Captured documents confirmed that many deliveries were made by individuals with legal status. The effectiveness of the system varied country-wide and was dependent on the degree of cooperation from the populace and limits imposed by allied military presence. The magnitude of the system was revealed by the ability of the enemy to procure imported US supplies from urban sources. The GVN Ministry of Economy sold such products to privately owned and approved jobbers for a profit. Jobbers resold these items into the retail market without any GVN restrictions or checks made as to final destination of goods. To transport these goods out of Saigon, the jobber merely had to apply for a permit from the Ministry of Economy, which often granted approval without questions. As an example, US Forces operating in Binh Tuy Province in July captured

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66 tons of wheat flour which was stored in eight different VC cache sites. All flour sacks were inscribed with the same purchase authorization number and had been imported into RVN by US-AID. The flour was apparently being shipped from Saigon to Phan Thiet in Binh Thuan Province when it was diverted for enemy use. When the GVN Judicial Police attempted to review records concerning some of the deliveries with the Ministry of Economy, they were told the records had been destroyed by fire. It appeared that these commodities reached VC hands through corruption or collusion between jobbers, retailers, truckers, and possibly some government and local officials.

(S) A review of the "shadow supply system", its organization, and methods of operation showed that it had several vulnerabilities. Access to the population which permitted taxation of the populace and ubiquitous small-scale purchases of required items remained the key to the effectiveness of this type supply system. Allied operations and pacification efforts eroded enemy capabilities in this respect and continued progress would further restrict the enemy's freedom and ability to purchase or confiscate supplies. The VC procurement of supplies in large quantities from urban centers offered the greatest potential for allied exploitation. The neutralization of illegal money markets, pseudo-legitimate VC commercial enterprises, and sources of supply would deal a severe blow to the entire system. Effective action against these activities was greatly dependent upon increased GVN efforts. A more vigorous application of GVN laws prohibiting currency manipulation and black marketeering would also assist in neutralizing the system. Public knowledge that the GVN would take effective and quick action to punish all offenders as well as those public officials who condoned or protected the system would demonstrate the long-range disadvantages of cooperation with the VC and put greater pressure on the supply apparatus. The "shadow supply system" was also vulnerable from within. The organization was heavily dependent on VCI cadre manning finance and economy sections and forward supply councils as well as individuals who were bribed or coerced into cooperating with the enemy. Timely exploitation of information furnished by Hoi Chanhs, ralliers, and VCI defectors would make the system susceptible to allied countermeasures. The system remained vulnerable to allied military operations. The effectiveness of the forward supply councils was dependent upon the ability to use CI routes and stations and to maintain secure storage sites. Route interdiction and destruction of enemy caches contributed to localized supply shortages. Continued emphasis on such operations would further limit the effectiveness of this vital link in the enemy's supply system. (67)

VC Methods of Taxation

(C) Throughout the period of conflict in RVN, the VCI had to cope with the problems of supporting and financing the activities of several hundred thousand military and political personnel. Although most of the war materiel came from the Communist Bloc countries, the VC depended on the people and the land in the south for their own needs. The support, for the most part, came from a comprehensive and complex "taxation" system which essentially amounted to extortion. There were extensive annual budgets, complex "tax rates," exemptions, penalties, and tax collectors involved in the system which resembled that of a legitimate government. Nearly every form of commercial activity was the object of attempted VC taxation. The system was so extensive that one product might be taxed at several points from the time it left the producer until it reached the consumer.

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(C) Since RVN had a predominantly agrarian economy, the VC placed strong emphasis on the taxation of the production, processing, transportation, and marketing of agricultural products. In the VC controlled areas, taxation was systematic and assumed a legalistic facade. Acting in the name of the NLF/SVN or the PRG, gradual payment scales, tables of deduction, and other fiscal measures common to a tax agency were employed. Budgets were carefully prepared and passed through several echelons for review and consolidation. Revenue collection quotas were based on periodic surveys of the production areas and on the extent of VC control or influence in the area. In GVN controlled areas, reliance on outright extortion was more pronounced, increasing in direct proportion to the degree of GVN control.

(C) One of two methods of taxation was generally employed; per capita or a percentage of the total production. Under the per capita system, the basis of the tax was the individual. Under the total production system a levy was made on the farmer's total crop harvest. For example, taxes might be assessed based on the productivity of the land; a fixed tax for the first ton and an additional fixed rate for each additional ton harvested. Another method levied a productivity index whereby each area of paddy had to produce a specified weight of rice. Additionally, a tax on the amount actually produced was levied. If the farmer failed to produce enough he was charged a tax based on the amount he failed to produce.

(C) Industrial and commercial extortion in GVN controlled areas proved lucrative. The payments took the form of protection insurance. Businessmen who did not pay were liable to find their shops or trucks blown up, their workers on strike, or themselves and families in danger. After payments were made, merchants were often threatened with the disclosure of their collaboration with the VC. Taxes were usually based on a percentage of income or a lump sum annual payment. In some instances, the machinery used to produce goods was taxed. In other cases, a tax-in-kind was levied whereby products were demanded rather than money. Not all taxes levied against businessmen were direct. For instance, rich businessmen and factory owners were motivated to contribute money to worthy funds. In another instance loans were solicited from the people with repayment promised within one year.

(C) Taxation of transportation throughout RVN was particularly adaptable to the VC methods and capabilities. Tax stations and checkpoints were easily established along LOCs where favorable terrain and concealment were afforded. The tax stations served two primary purposes, production of revenue and restriction of movement of goods in and out of the VC territory. Buses, trucks, Hondas, sampans, and cargo and navigational craft were taxed. In some instances, the taxation of buses and their passengers was used as a covert method of voluntary contributions to the VC. Those payments were called "taxes" to allay the suspicions of passengers.

(C) Import-export taxes were intended to restrict the flow of goods to and from VC controlled areas. Items in short supply were not permitted to leave the VC-controlled area, while luxury, unnecessary items were not permitted into those areas to restrict the outflow of money.

(C) There were also instances of tax levies on plantation owners and real property. At one time, plantation taxes were a major source of income, but due to the wartime disruption of the economy and transportation routes, that source of income decreased. The houses and production land were also taxed in some areas.

(C) VC taxation of individual income yielded little in comparison to other methods, but demonstrated the complexity of the tax system. Exemptions were granted to people who had served

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
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TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION



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FIGURE III-18

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or had relatives serving the VC. People who had relatives serving the GVN were the prime targets for taxation. The most common determinant of a family's income tax was the socio-economic class they were placed in. Taxes were paid in money or rice or a combination of money and rice. Often threats of violence accompanied the tax levy. (68)

VC/NVA MILITARY OPERATIONS

Organization

(C) Enemy territorial organization of SVN encompassed a flexible hierarchy of fronts, military regions, subregions, provinces, and districts extending Hanoi's military and political control to village and hamlet level. The structure was frequently changed to meet new military or political needs. No territory or central headquarters was so sacrosanct it could not be restructured, renamed, resubordinated, or eliminated.

(C) There were five headquarters controlling activities in SVN: the DMZ (or B-5) Front; MRTTH, MR 5, the B-3 Front, and the largest and most important organization---the COSVN (see figure III-18). COSVN was both a regional committee of the NVN Lao Dong Party and the Central Committee of its SVN branch, the People's Revolutionary Party. COSVN received orders directly from the NVN Politburo and High Command and, in turn, directly controlled five military regions, five subregions, Tay Ninh Province, and main forces. The South Vietnam Liberation Army acted as the COSVN military staff and exercised direct command of rear service and base area units. Although the other four major headquarters took their direction from Hanoi, COSVN played a key coordinating role in policy matters outside its area.

(C) Fronts were equivalent to US corps command in some respects. They varied greatly in strength, with some containing only independent regiments and battalions, while others contained divisions as well. The B-5 Front, also known as the DMZ Front, and the B-3 Front in the western highlands were subordinate directly to NVN. The other fronts coordinated their battle plans with COSVN or the local military region. The mission of the fronts was to engage allied maneuver elements with VC main-force and NVA units in order to lessen allied pressure and, thereby, allow the local-force VC units to concentrate on fighting GVN PF and RF units.

(C) Military regions controlled military operations and political matters in several provinces. MRTTH and MR 5 were directly subordinate to NVN. All of the other MRs were subordinate to COSVN. Military regions supplemented the food supply of the NVA units in their area as well as performed their primary mission of training, organizing, equipping, and supplying the VC main and local force units in their area.

(C) The only defined sub-regions were found in the provinces surrounding Saigon. They were directly subordinate to COSVN and boundaries were primarily military tactical boundaries.


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COMMUNIST ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS & MILITARY REGIONS IN RVN



SOURCE: MACJ2

FIGURE III-19

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Sub-regions assumed all the missions of military regions, to include supplementing the personnel and logistical support provided by COSVN.

(C) Provincial boundaries and names were not always the same as those of the GVN provinces. For example, Quang Da was the VC name for GVN Quang Nam Province, while VC Quang Nam Province was the GVN Quang Tin Province. The importance of the fact the boundaries rarely coincided was that enemy units maneuvered within the VC designated boundaries rather than the GVN designated boundaries. (69) (See Figure III-19.)

(C) Districts, like the provinces, did not correspond to the GVN structure and were frequently altered to facilitate local control and administration. Districts controlled local force companies and separate platoons.

(C) Villages and hamlets were like US townships. A village was composed of one or more hamlets. A VC controlled village normally had a guerrilla platoon and a VC hamlet had a guerrilla squad. GVN controlled villages and hamlets had only smaller covert or secret guerrilla elements. (70)

Strengths

(C) Table III-2 shows the enemy strength in SVN and contiguous areas of Cambodia, Laos, and NVN that represented an immediate threat to SVN. A slight decrease in countrywide strength was noted during April and May, probably due to the redeployment of several enemy units from SVN to Cambodia in the wake of the allied cross-border operation. The build-up of NVA personnel in the delta (MR 4), which commenced in mid-1969, was also noticeable. There was also a noticeable increase in NVA personnel in comparison to VC, probably as a result of recruitment problems in RVN. Table III-3 shows the countrywide VC/NVA battalions, composed of combat or maneuver, combat support, and administrative services units. Table III-4 shows only the maneuver battalions, composed of infantry, sapper, reconnaissance, and security units. Also, see the sections on the enemy situation by MR for a further listing of enemy strengths and dispositions.

VC/NVA COUNTRYWIDE
PERSONNEL STRENGTH - 1970

Month	Category	MR 1	MR 2	MR 3	MR 4	TOTAL
Jan	VC/NVA	76,115	40,215	73,135	46,465	235,930
	NVA	48,795	13,845	19,085	2,645	84,370
Feb	VC/NVA	72,410	42,240	71,405	47,405	233,460
	NVA	46,125	16,465	17,825	3,810	84,265
Mar	VC/NVA	71,605	42,640	70,065	46,825	231,135
	NVA	45,610	17,190	17,500	4,110	84,410

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<u>Month</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>MR 1</u>	<u>MR 2</u>	<u>MR 3</u>	<u>MR 4</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Apr	VC/NVA	71,690	41,680	69,740	46,530	229,640
	NVA	45,520	17,000	17,195	4,660	84,375
May	VC/NVA	71,145	43,250	68,660	47,695	230,750
	NVA	45,675	17,990	16,075	5,825	85,565
Jun	VC/NVA	74,630	43,100	71,330	46,785	235,845
	NVA	48,975	17,990	16,235	5,825	89,025
Jul	VC/NVA	74,190	43,940	71,340	45,560	235,030
	NVA	48,925	18,710	15,080	5,825	88,540
Aug	VC/NVA	76,210	44,675	73,755	45,125	239,765
	NVA	48,295	19,645	15,475	5,825	89,240
Sep	VC/NVA	77,150	44,525	73,185	44,835	239,695
	NVA	49,250	19,645	15,785	5,825	90,505
Oct	VC/NVA	76,700	44,425	72,755	43,835	237,715
	NVA	49,200	19,645	15,510	5,825	90,180
Nov	VC/NVA	76,055	44,415	71,915	43,335	235,720
	NVA	49,200	19,735	15,485	5,825	90,245
Dec	VC/NVA	74,815	43,200	70,425	41,620	230,060
	NVA	48,300	19,380	15,220	5,825	88,725

Source: MACJ231

TABLE III-2

COUNTRYWIDE VC/NVA BATTALIONS - 1970

<u>Month</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>MR 1</u>	<u>MR 2</u>	<u>MR 3</u>	<u>MR 4</u>	<u>SUB-TOTAL</u>	<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>
Jan	VC	26	21	62	43	152	352
	NVA	99	32	62	7	200	
Feb	VC	26	21	62	43	152	353
	NVA	91	41	59	10	201	
Mar	VC	26	20	61	44	151	352
	NVA	91	41	58	11	201	

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<u>Month</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>MR 1</u>	<u>MR 2</u>	<u>MR 3</u>	<u>MR 4</u>	<u>SUB-TOTAL</u>	<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>
Apr	VC	26	20	61	44	151	355
	NVA	91	41	61	11	204	
May	VC	26	21	60	43	150	357
	NVA	91	43	59	14	207	
Jun	VC	25	21	60	43	149	360
	NVA	94	43	60	14	211	
Jul	VC	25	22	60	44	151	363
	NVA	94	44	60	14	212	
Aug	VC	26	22	59	44	151	366
	NVA	92	47	62	14	215	
Sep	VC	26	22	56	44	148	366
	NVA	94	47	63	14	218	
Oct	VC	26	22	56	44	148	365
	NVA	94	47	62	14	217	
Nov	VC	26	22	57	44	149	367
	NVA	94	47	63	14	218	
Dec	VC	27	22	57	44	150	364
	NVA	91	47	62	14	214	

Source: MACJ231

TABLE III-3

COUNTRYWIDE VC/NVA MANEUVER BATTALIONS - 1970

<u>Month</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>MR 1</u>	<u>MR 2</u>	<u>MR 3</u>	<u>MR 4</u>	<u>SUB-TOTAL</u>	<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>
Jan	VC	24	21	51	39	135	281
	NVA	72	27	40	7	146	
Feb	VC	24	21	51	39	135	282
	NVA	70	30	37	10	147	
Mar	VC	24	20	50	40	134	281
	NVA	70	30	36	11	147	

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<u>Month</u>	<u>Category</u>	<u>MR 1</u>	<u>MR 2</u>	<u>MR 3</u>	<u>MR 4</u>	<u>SUB-TOTAL</u>	<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>
Apr	VC	24	20	50	40	134	283
	NVA	70	30	38	11	149	
May	VC	24	21	49	39	133	282
	NVA	70	29	36	14	149	
Jun	VC	23	21	50	39	133	286
	NVA	73	29	37	14	153	
Jul	VC	23	22	50	40	135	289
	NVA	73	30	37	14	154	
Aug	VC	24	22	49	40	135	291
	NVA	71	33	38	14	156	
Sep	VC	24	22	46	40	132	289
	NVA	72	33	38	14	157	
Oct	VC	24	22	46	40	132	288
	NVA	72	33	37	14	156	
Nov	VC	24	22	47	40	133	290
	NVA	72	33	38	14	157	
Dec	VC	22	22	47	40	131	284
	NVA	69	33	37	14	153	

Source: MACJ231

TABLE III-4

Strategy

Enemy Activity Trends

(S) The year 1970 saw the enemy in the RVN move steadily away from classic military operations while placing increased reliance on guerrilla warfare. The world press repeatedly emphasized the lull in enemy activity and speculated as to cause and effect. An examination of several factors influencing these trends led to a better understanding of the 1970 situation in RVN.

(S) Comparison of monthly averages of enemy-initiated incidents for 1968-1970, showed the changes in enemy strategy and tactics. Large-scale attacks (battalion size) reflected a significant decrease over the 3 year period, while small-scale attacks reflected a similar but less significant decrease. In contrast, the occurrence of harassment/terrorism incidents showed a significant increase. The enemy was badly hurt in 1968 and early 1969 as a result of allied air and ground

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operations. Therefore, in July 1969, COSVN disseminated Resolution 9, calling for a scaling down of operations to conserve manpower and materiel resources while continuing the revolution. In September 1969, the SVNLA published a pamphlet directing the breaking up of large units, forming of guerrilla cells, and the use of guerrilla tactics. Two months later, COSVN Resolution 14 was published, reemphasizing the necessity for intensifying guerrilla warfare and setting forth organizational principles and tactics. Three months following, in February, COSVN Directive 136 was issued, further expanding upon the over-all strategy and tactics to be followed by the enemy. As a result of these documents, the VC strategy could be summarized: rebuild VC strength through economy-of-force tactics; neutralize the GVN pacification program; control the land and people; and work toward the replacement of the Thieu/Ky government with a "progressive" administration favorably disposed to inclusion of the VC in a provisional coalition government. Military tactics directed by COSVN and SVNLA could also be summarized: break-up large units; organize and operate primarily in cells of three to five men; make cells as self-sufficient as possible; arm personnel with weapons consistent with the guerrilla mission; prepare to support large unit operations which could be conducted when and where expedient; and attack all manifestations of the pacification and Vietnamization programs.

(S) After July 1969, the number of attacks directed against pacification targets equalled the attacks against ARVN units, US units, and population centers combined. Assassination was a key tactic in the enemy's anti-pacification program. The 1970 monthly averages of enemy assassination of government officials at the provincial and village levels reflected a significant increase over 1969 monthly averages. These trends followed from the instructions contained in Directive 136 to "kill any hamlet chief, deputy hamlet chief, or village council member possible. They are the target of our attack on the government pacification program." Both allied and enemy KIA showed a general downward trend. (See Table V-3 Chap V.) However, the enemy KIA decreased at a greater rate. The downward trends were the result of several factors. First was the enemy's shift to small-unit operations which exposed fewer numbers of his personnel to allied firepower. In addition, US forces were withdrawing their firepower with its greater kill capacity. Lastly, allied search and destroy operations were reduced. The economy-of-force strategy pursued by enemy forces was not only reflected in their KIA but also by the fact that their ordnance expenditures during 1970 were down substantially over previous years.

(S) In late 1969 and 1970, the Communists were hurt by the US air interdiction effort, the emergence of a hostile Cambodian government, the closing of Kampong Som port, and the highly successful allied cross-border operations. The pacification program was also viewed as a growing success. However, there was no changing of enemy goals or a lessening of his determination to achieve them. (71)

COSVN Resolution 14

(U) COSVN Resolution 14, issued on 30 Oct 69 by the Current Affairs Committee of COSVN, dealt throughout with the importance of intensifying guerrilla warfare in the RVN. The relevance of Resolution 14, however, could only be understood in the perspective of prior COSVN documents. Resolution 14 suggested three reasons why "guerrilla warfare holds a strategic position of vital importance." Each of the reasons had previously been discussed by COSVN in Resolution 9, issued in July 1969.

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(U) First, Resolution 14 stressed that guerrilla warfare was the single possible means of coping with an enemy who was overwhelmingly stronger both in terms of men and materiel: "... the only way to cope with an enemy who has a large number of troops and war facilities, is to wage guerrilla warfare through (the) three strategic areas ..." Resolution 9 alluded to much the same point: "...we could not annihilate the enemy's large-size units, and our attacks against fortifications were not successful."

(U) Second, Resolution 14 argued that a strong guerrilla base was a necessary condition for success in main-force operations. "Only by generating a guerrilla warfare movement... will we have a fundamental basis to win success in our large-scale operations." Again, this argument was anticipated in Resolution 9, which argued that successful main-force operations required coordination with small attacks. Allied forces which dispersed to deal with guerrilla activity became easier targets for enemy main-forces.

(U) Finally, Resolution 14 argued that intensified guerrilla warfare was required to defeat the allied pacification program. Once again, Resolution 9 foreshadowed this argument in placing special emphasis on efforts to frustrate the pacification program. This was to be accomplished "by eliminating the administrative personnel of the puppet government and disrupting the oppressive control system at the lowest levels." Eliminating the allied "control system" meant eliminating RF/PF and PSDF forces, RD cadre, and local GVN officials. This was not a job for large-size units. Resolution 9, therefore, stated that in order to attack pacification successfully guerrilla and militia forces "should be doubled or tripled," and the associated sapper, light mortar, engineer, and combat reconnaissance units should also be improved.

(U) COSVN Resolution 9 paid a certain degree of lip service to main force units: "We should strengthen our main force and make it a strong striking force." This nominal exhortation to "strengthen" the main force, however, looked pale compared to the assertion that the guerrilla and militia forces should, specifically, be "doubled or tripled." This emphasis on small unit tactics and guerrilla warfare was not simply a defensive response to the inability of the VC/NVA to win a main-force war. It was also a positive response, a strategy, for defeating a pacification program which itself hinged on the work of relatively small "units" in the form of RF/PF and PSDF forces, RD cadre, and GVN officials spread over a large geographic area.

(C) This general strategy of reliance on guerrilla and small-unit tactics to defeat pacification emerged in Resolution 9 and was developed in more detail in two subsequent COSVN documents, of which Resolution 14 was the second. The first was a "pamphlet" issued on 20 Sep 69 by the Propaganda and Training Section (PTS), Political Staff, HQ SVNLA. According to the PTS pamphlet, "One of the new initiatives taken recently by Headquarters of the People's Revolutionary Armed Forces called for the dispersion of all troop units into small elements." The purpose of the pamphlet was "to insure success of the change of the tactic" by encouraging efforts to convince cadre and combatants "that the dispersion of troop units is a very clear-sighted and correct policy." It was clear from the pamphlet that the SVNLA was directing some breakdown of main forces into smaller units, consistent with the emphasis of Resolution 9 on small-unit tactics.

(C) COSVN Resolution 14 addressed the small-unit strategy not from the point of view of breaking down main forces, but rather of building up the guerrilla forces. Specifically, Resolution 14 set the following guidelines for the organization and mission of guerrilla forces.

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(U) First, a guerrilla unit should consist of three to five-man cells; second, the cells should be able to live legally among the population, they should be secret; third, guerrillas should be armed with grenades, mines, explosives, and rudimentary weapons, though rifles should be used where conditions permit; fourth, guerrillas should be self-sufficient with respect to obtaining ammunition, either capturing ammunition from allied forces, or producing it in the cities; and finally, the primary mission of guerrillas was to attack PSDF and PF forces, local police, GVN village officials, and pacification cadre; in short, they should attack those personnel who were instruments of the GVN pacification program.

(C) Resolution 14 was not, then, a major COSVN policy statement comparable in scope to Resolution 9. Resolution 14 in no way supplanted Resolution 9 as an overall policy statement. To the contrary, Resolution 14 was consistent with and supplemental to those sections of Resolution 9 which played down the possibility of a main-force victory for the VC/NVA and stressed increased small-unit, sapper, and guerrilla activity as a positive strategy for defeating pacification. Resolution 14 was one in a succession of documents, following Resolution 9 which developed this strategy.

(C) The dispersion of main forces and reliance on small-unit, guerrilla tactics constituted a positive response to the allied pacification program, a strategy which attempted to defeat pacification militarily and politically. The small-unit, guerrilla tactics supported an economy-of-force strategy designed to enable the enemy to conduct a continued, prolonged struggle in the years to come. Alternatively, should the future bring a cease-fire and serious negotiations in Paris, dispersion of NVA units and their resubordination to local forces could considerably complicate attempts to reach agreement on the withdrawal of NVA forces from the RVN. It may have enabled Hanoi to "withdraw" NVA units only after all or a significant percentage of their strength had been dispersed and reassigned to VC local and guerrilla forces.

(C) The prospects were that the trend toward increased guerrilla warfare would continue. In the short term, allied cross-border operations caused enemy logistics problems which, except in MR 1 and northern MR 2, would reinforce the enemy's independent motivations for lower-level, small-unit activity. As the PTS pamphlet pointed out:

... dispersion is designed... to adequately meet the equipment, weapons, ammunition, food, and medicine supply requirements of the People's Revolutionary Armed Forces. In reality, it seems much easier for a local area to provide enough supplies for a couple of small units of approximately 20 members each than for a large unit of hundreds of men or more. (72)

(U) On the long term, Hanoi was increasingly emphasizing the importance of economic development in the DRV. Prosecution of this goal would probably require the scaling down of the main force conflict which had been developing in the RVN. It was surprising, therefore, that a Hanoi Radio broadcast on 10 Jul argued in language familiar from COSVN Resolution 14: "never before had guerrilla warfare held such an important position as it does now... primarily, guerrilla warfare is decisive in frustrating the US-puppet's pacification scheme... the struggle to oppose the enemy's pacification program has become a long-range, resolute struggle." This suggested a lower-level struggle in the present, but portends a longer, protracted struggle in the future.

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COSVN Directive 136

(S) COSVN Directive 136, issued in February 1970, was a 10-page supplement to COSVN Resolution 9. It was similar in content and nature, but shed additional light on the methods by which COSVN intended to accomplish the objectives of Resolution 9. The directive was divided into three major sections, including an assessment of the Communist and allied positions, the development of the revolution in SVN, and future guidelines and missions.

(S) Part one, an assessment of position, was propagandistic in nature and couched in usual COSVN phrases. The analysis concluded that the GVN was on the brink of collapse, the internal situation in the US and US policy on Vietnam had isolated President Nixon from the people, and that victory for VC forces was nearer than ever before. COSVN stated that the US policy was failing, the Vietnamization was the last attempt by the US to save its position, and that its attempts to avoid casualties had likewise been unsuccessful. US withdrawals had a demoralizing effect on ARVN forces and even on the remaining US Forces. The ARVN was developing so rapidly that it had become undisciplined, inefficient, and liable to penetration. As for future allied operations, they had the capability to prolong the war but not to escalate it. Therefore, they would continue the Vietnamization plan, with the Accelerated Pacification Campaign as its backbone.

(S) The Communist forces, on the other hand, were enjoying successes attributed to the Communist superior leadership, combat techniques, heroic soldiers, and popular support. References to their own shortcomings, as revealed in previous COSVN documents, were due primarily to a lack of aggressiveness and confidence. Therefore, the effort to remotivate the troops and populace must continue with renewed vigor.

(S) The direction of the struggle, as seen by COSVN, was to intensify attacks in hopes that the US would sign an agreement to withdraw all of its troops from RVN. There had to be a cease-fire agreement before the US pulled out completely, but even before that, VC forces had to crush the GVN pacification program and control the land and the people. The Thieu-Ky administration had to be overthrown so that there could be a progressive administration in Saigon to negotiate with the VC on a Provisional Coalition Government. COSVN judged the situation would lead to the overthrow of the Thieu-Ky government and that a third force would emerge.

(S) The sections of the directive covering guidelines, missions, and attack principles were very similar to those of previous COSVN documents and exhibited a continued adherence to Resolution 9. Central themes were defeat of the pacification program and a rebuilding of VC strength through the familiar economy-of-force tactics. The directive went on to elaborate on the targets which would prove most productive in carrying out the objectives for defeat of the pacification program and withdrawal of US Forces. Specifically listed were hamlet chiefs, deputy chiefs, and assistant chiefs for security, the chiefs of zones, subwards, and wards in the cities. "They are the target of our attack on the Government Pacification Program." In the countryside, the Communists were to pay particular attention to eliminating rural development cadre and support troops, as well as police, PHOENIX, Chieu Hoi, armed propaganda officials, and ralliers. In killing large numbers of US personnel, the enemy should aim at commissioned officers and high-ranking specialists. COSVN reasoned that attacks on American Negroes and enlisted men had little political effect. American commissioned officers' lives were valuable, however, because they came from rich, politically powerful families who could not afford to let President Nixon escalate the war again.

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(S) The last category mentioned in the directive illustrated the close attention paid to the integration of military and political targets. The party, said the directive, deliberately did not make public the names of US prisoners. This tactic held the attention of the anti-war movement in the US. If they were told their sons and brothers were dead, they would lose interest in the anti-war struggle.

(S) Generally, COSVN Directive 136 was supplementary to COSVN Resolution 9, spelling out in detail some of the specific actions intended to carry out the guidance of Resolution 9. It did, however, further clarify the specific actions and targets in the enemy's implementation of COSVN Resolution 9. (73)

COSVN Directive 27

(S) COSVN Directive 27, dated 28 Aug 70, revealed that the Lao Dong Party Central Committee instructed the PRG delegation in Paris to launch a diplomatic offensive. The diplomatic offensive was apparently initiated by Madame Binh in Paris on 17 Sep with an eight-point peace plan. The purposes of the diplomatic offensive were divided into four categories: expose the "fake" US position on peace issues; motivate the RVN masses to demand an end to the war (including withdrawal of US Forces, overthrow of the Thieu-Ky government, and establishment of a Provisional Coalition Government); weaken the US/GVN position to pave the way for the formation of a third force in SVN politics; and intensify the anti-war movement in the US. The diplomatic offensive was intended to force the US/GVN to enter into serious negotiations. Cadre were reminded that victory in RVN would be determined on the battlefield, not at the conference table. However, they were cautioned not to "underestimate the power of diplomatic attack."

(S) To fulfill the tasks of the diplomatic offensive, Directive 27 outlined political, military, and troop proselyting activities, or the familiar three-pronged strategy. The political tasks involved the entire infrastructure in a propaganda campaign to give the widest possible dissemination of Madame Binh's eight-point peace plan. Each religious, bourgeois, and intellectual leader was to be given a copy of the proposal, everyone was encouraged to listen to Liberation Radio for news of the peace proposal, and demonstrations were to be organized calling for the overthrow of Thieu-Ky-Khiern.

(S) These political tasks were to be supplemented by military efforts which included coordinated attacks on US/GVN forces in an effort to inflict heavy casualties. COSVN believed this would strengthen the anti-war movement in the US and build anti-war sentiment among US troops in RVN. This effort was expected to force the US to withdraw its troops by 30 Jun 71 or if some US troops remained, that they would be restricted to defined areas. In addition to attacks on US/GVN forces, the VC/NVA were to accelerate hostilities in Laos and Cambodia.

(S) The troop proselyting tasks included urging desertion among ARVN troops under attack, encouraging families to call their male members home to join the people in their demand for peace, and the overthrow of the government in the south. The three-pronged offensive was not to be completed in a definite period of time, but "in steps coordinated with changes in the balance of forces between the enemy and ourselves, which will turn the situation in our favor."

(S) The large volume of background material on the PRG proposal passed to Communist troops in the field suggested that other steps would be taken in support of the diplomatic offensive.

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Directive 27 and implementing documents suggested that the Communists were not rigidly attached to the language of the eight-point proposal. The directive also gave the indication of enemy intentions for the near future. It was apparently intended to be only a short-term program. It did not suggest any departure from the strategy set down in COSVN Resolutions 9 and 14. The directive clearly stated that it in no way contradicted the alleged COSVN Directive 20 which called for a highpoint or a series of highpoints during the fall. Directive 27 was not a major policy statement. It was probably designed for internal party use to explain the peace proposal, while attempting to maintain a fighting morale among VC/NVA troops. Even if Hanoi decided to negotiate seriously, it did not want its troops to relax their aggressive posture. The primary target of the diplomatic offensive was public opinion in the US and RVN. (74)

Strategy for 1971

(S) An analysis of VC/NVA activity suggested that NVN would continue the war in the south while simultaneously trying to rebuild the economy of the north. To do this they opted for a protracted war. Operation MARKET TIME and the closing of Kompong Som necessitated the expansion of an overland supply route to COSVN. The consolidation and use of this route would receive the highest priority during the northeast monsoon. In support of this effort, NVN might seek to apply both military and political pressure on the Laotian government to stop the bombing in the panhandle.

(S) In Cambodia, the VC/NVA would concentrate on keeping FANK and ARVN out of the strategic Mekong corridor, while trying to develop a national liberation movement to disrupt Cambodia internally. Eventually NVN would prefer to have a government in Phnom Penh more amenable to the NVA presence in Cambodia.

(S) In the COSVN area of the RVN and in MR 5, the enemy would continue to emphasize the counter-pacification efforts and the development of guerrilla and local-force units as a foundation creating an option for a return to main-force warfare some time in the future. The existing main-force threat would continue in northern MR 5, MRTTH, and the B-5 Front.

(S) The validity of this estimate would be reflected in how Hanoi chose to employ its labor force internally, how many men it dispatched from NVN during the northeast monsoon, and how these men were distributed throughout Indochina. In NVN approximately 209,000 men became of draft age each year, of which 110,000 were physically fit under existing standards. North Vietnam was probably capable of sustaining an infiltration rate of 100,000 to 120,000 per year for a long period, or of dispatching over 235,000 in a single year, as it did in 1968. Expenditure of manpower in this manner had a detrimental effect on economic development in the north. A country-wide draft and recruitment drive under way in NVN might have been designed to meet increased manpower requirements in the south. However, it appeared more probable that this mobilization was aimed at expanding the militia and reserve units to create a trained military pool for a long-term commitment, while still allowing the majority of productivity of the pool to be focused on economic output in the north. The mobilization may have also had a secondary purpose as a part of a psychological operations (PSYOPS) effort to stimulate a continued commitment by the populace to the war effort.

(S) Because of the high priority placed by Hanoi on the opening of the LOC south out of Laos in Cambodia, it was expected that COSVN would receive a significant portion of the 1971 infiltrators.

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It was anticipated that 1971 infiltration figures would be as great as or larger than in 1970. COSVN had a significant force located in Cambodia and at the same time was attempting to maintain its presence in the RVN.

(S) This existing commitment attested to the importance that Hanoi placed on COSVN's area of responsibility. What this commitment meant in terms of strategy, however, was not completely clear. The problem was that COSVN's AO touched on three of the seven conflicts in Indochina: the logistics war, the Cambodian conflict, and the conflict in RVN COSVN. The determining criteria was where COSVN would commit its 1971 replacements.

(S) The logistics war was COSVN's first option. This would mean that substantial portions of the infiltrators would probably be integrated into COSVN combat units located in Cambodia. These units could be used primarily as a screening force protecting the southern terminus of the Tonle Kong/Mekong corridor and securing the towns of Kompong Cham and Kompong Thom. Given the heavy emphasis of Resolutions 9 and 14 on building and securing of rear BAs and the importance of external aid to the enemy, the logistics war provided a very real short-term option that could absorb a significant portion of COSVN's new manpower. COSVN's second option was to apply its new manpower to support of the Cambodian conflict. This would result in a direct effort to remove the Lon Nol government by the commitment of main-force units against FANK and Phnom Penh. COSVN had very little to gain by attempting to exercise this option. The replacement of the Lon Nol government by one more amenable to the NVN cause would not assure a military sanctuary nor allow unrestricted use of waterways and ports. Even if successful, it would cost heavily in supplies, men, and world opinion. A commitment of new forces to a major offensive against Cambodia did not fit the pattern of enemy activity and was beyond his existing capability to sustain.

(S) The third option was the commitment of small units into the RVN to strengthen existing main-force and local force units. COSVN's force densities in the RVN MRs 3 and 4 significantly declined during 1970 due to losses, troop commitments to Cambodia, and a substantial drop during 1970 in local recruitment. This option in some combination with the logistics option would probably be the strategy accepted by COSVN.

(S) Evidence of 1970's patterns of infiltration was still too fragmentary to verify the strategic estimate made earlier. What could be said was that no contradictory evidence existed to challenge the estimate. All indications suggested that the enemy would continue to follow a strategy of protracted warfare during the American troop withdrawal. Hanoi's long-range objectives still included the liberation of the south, unification of the country, and extension of its sphere of influence over all of Indochina. (75)

Tactics

Use of Sappers

(S) Sapper tactics received great emphasis by the VC/NVA in 1969 and 1970 as an aggressive economy-of-force tactic. Sappers, by definition, were specially trained, highly motivated assault

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troops used in small groups to attack enemy installations. These forces received specialized training in the penetration and destruction of enemy fortifications and equipment and were trained to operate in small groups. At times, the sapper did conduct suicide attacks and was not supposed to fear death or capture by the enemy. His morale usually was high and he was politically motivated to carry out, without question, all instructions and requirements imposed on him by cadre personnel. The mission of a sapper was to penetrate enemy (allied) installations/positions and destroy main targets such as aircraft, heavy weapons, and troop concentrations (barracks, messing facilities, and clubs). Water sappers were targeted against waterborne craft and installations. They were instructed to destroy the target and withdraw as soon as possible. The mission was to be completed at all costs, but could be terminated at any time upon the orders of the leader of the sapper unit for the particular mission. The leader of the sapper unit was usually a company cadre and the size of the unit varied according to the size and number of targets on any particular mission. The actual attack, once the target complex was penetrated, usually did not last more than one-half hour, although the penetration of the target perimeter could take up to 4 hours, depending on prevailing conditions such as cover and detection by enemy personnel. Special-action teams should not be confused with sappers. These teams were groups of covert agents who conducted clandestine operations in the RVN or acted as counter-intelligence operatives in NVN. These covert agents were recruited from sapper units, however, and usually received approximately 3 years of training before being assigned to a special-action team. (76)

Reconnaissance

(S) Normally, 10 days before a sapper attack was to be launched, a three-man reconnaissance team would reconnoiter the target area with binoculars from approximately 1 km away, or closer if the terrain permitted, for 2 days. They determined how many guard posts there were, the number of guards, the amount of barbed wire, number and placement of lights, and the location of ditches, canals, ravines, and other avenues of approach. After reconnaissance was completed, the collected information was taken back to the unit, a sand model constructed, and several practice sessions held before the actual attack. Preliminary information might also be obtained through spies and informants working within the installation. (77)

Recruitment and Training of Sappers

(S) The men selected for sapper training had to be in excellent physical condition, preferably have at least a fourth grade education, and believe in the Communist cause. The men had to follow instructions without argument. Men between the ages of 18 and 25 were preferred. The leaders were older, usually between the ages of 25 and 30. Most men selected were single; however, no special criterion existed for the selection of single over married men. Officers could volunteer for the training, but enlisted men had to be selected. According to one source, women were undergoing sapper training in Pleiku Province. Many sources indicated women were participants in terrorist activities, either directly or indirectly. On any allied installation, Vietnamese women provided the overwhelming bulk of food service and maintenance labor force. The areas in which they came in contact daily allowed them to reconnoiter any target of their choice. They could give sapper units inside intelligence and assistance needed to execute a successful attack and also had terrorist capabilities themselves.

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(S) During training, the sapper received political indoctrination lectures approximately 3 to 4 hours per week. The political officer related the struggle of the Viet Minh against the French domination, and he correlated these events with the American presence in RVN. The lectures told of the French coming to dominate and exploit the people, stressing the point of how the Viet Minh won the war against the French and the subsequent freedom the people gained after the French were driven out of the country. The men were taught that the American objective was to dominate and exploit the people just as the French did. Lectures on Communist doctrine included such topics as:

1. Why the Communist regime is best for the people of Vietnam.
2. How the Communist regime has helped the people of Vietnam.
3. How the Communist regime never hurt the people of Vietnam.
4. How the Communist regime divided the rich land owners' property and distributed it among the poor people of NVN.
5. The present existence of middle class families in NVN. The men were told that the present-day rich people were just a little richer than the poor people. They were not as rich as they were while the French were dominating the country. The men were convinced that there were no very poor or extremely rich people in NVN at present. They believed that under the Communist regime all people were equal in status and wealth.

(S) All reports concerning sapper training indicated that most instructors who trained VC sappers were NVA or experienced VC personnel. The major difference between VC and NVA sapper training was the time element. Whereas NVA received anywhere from 4 to 18 months training in NVN, VC sappers only received anywhere from 1 to 3 months training, due mainly to the exigencies of the war effort, the VC could not spare the personnel for a longer period. The instructors, in all cases, seemed to remain aloof from the trainees and did not mix socially.

(S) Sapper training areas were located throughout NVN, Cambodia, and the RVN. The training camps seemed to have been located in remote areas away from population centers. In NVN, water sapper training areas seemed to have been located strictly in the Haiphong City area. Although VC water sapper training camps in the RVN had been reported, there were no details on them. (78)

Enemy Situation in I CTZ/MR I

Introduction

(S) While the allied cross-border operations into Cambodia resulted in a reduction in enemy capabilities in the COSVN area, the enemy threat to the northern half of RVN increased. This increase was most significant in MR I, designated I CTZ until 1 Jul 70, where the enemy retained the capability of launching large-scale attacks in three areas. In the DMZ area of the B-5 Front,

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the enemy had approximately 20 battalions deployed, and retained the capability of reinforcing these units with elements of two or more NVA divisions. In MRTTH the enemy threat continued to increase. The deployment of elements of the 304th and 324 B NVA Divs, the 7th Front, and MRTTH presented a significantly increased threat to key population centers and the populated coastal areas between Quang Tri City and Phu Loc. The eastward movement of regimental entities across the piedmont to the eastern slopes of the Annamite Mountains posed an increased threat to Quang Tri City. In southern MRTTH, the eastward movement of regimental units from BA 611 across the A Chau Valley into the jungle area west of Hue significantly increased the threat to that area. The third area of major concern was in Front 4, where an estimated 20 enemy battalions were deployed. While the southern two provinces of MR I were not considered high-threat areas, the enemy maintained the capability of conducting up to regimental-size operations in Quang Tin Province. Enemy operations consisted of ABFs against both military and civilian targets, occasional ground attacks, and counterpacification operations. The enemy made his presence felt in the area south of the central DMZ with ABFs against nearby FSBs.

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Strength

(U) Table III-5 shows the enemy personnel strength in I CTZ/MR 1 for 1970. Table III-6 shows the number and type of VC/NVA battalions in CTZ/MR 1 for 1970.

I CTZ/MR 1

PERSONNEL STRENGTH - 1970

<u>Month</u>	<u>Maneuver</u>	<u>Combat Support</u>	<u>Total Combat Strength</u>	<u>Admin Services</u>	<u>Guerrilla</u>	<u>Total</u>
Jan	41,190 (33,045)*	9,290 (8,565)	50,480 (41,610)	13,635 (7,185)	12,000	76,115 (48,795)
Feb	40,230 (32,360)	7,220 (6,495)	47,450 (38,855)	13,760 (7,310)	11,200	72,410 (46,165)
Mar	40,025 (31,805)	7,220 (6,495)	47,245 (38,300)	13,660 (7,310)	10,700	71,605 (45,610)
Apr	40,110 (31,715)	7,220 (6,495)	47,330 (38,210)	13,660 (7,310)	10,700	71,690 (45,520)
May	39,965 (31,870)	7,220 (6,495)	47,185 (38,365)	13,660 (7,310)	10,300	71,145 (45,675)
Jun	41,750 (33,570)	7,220 (6,495)	48,970 (40,065)	15,260 (8,910)	10,400	74,630 (48,975)
Jul	41,610 (33,520)	7,220 (6,495)	48,830 (40,015)	15,260 (8,910)	10,100	74,190 (48,925)
Aug	41,230 (32,890)	7,220 (6,495)	48,450 (39,385)	17,660 (8,910)	10,100	76,210 (48,295)
Sep	42,315 (33,845)	7,300 (6,620)	49,615 (40,465)	17,535 (8,785)	10,000	77,150 (49,250)
Oct	42,265 (33,795)	7,300 (6,620)	49,565 (40,415)	17,535 (8,785)	9,600	76,700 (49,200)
Nov	42,120 (33,795)	7,300 (6,620)	49,420 (40,415)	17,535 (8,785)	9,100	76,055 (49,200)
Dec	40,815 (32,895)	8,300 (6,620)	49,115 (39,515)	17,600 (8,785)	8,100	74,815 (48,300)

*NVA Shown in Parentheses.

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TABLE III-5

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I CTZ/MR I

VC/NVA BATTALIONS - 1970

VC	MF+	MF+	LF+	LF+	Recont+	Scty+	Arty	Sig	Trans	VC Total	Total VC/NVA	Total
	INF	Sapper	INF	Sapper								VC/NVA
Jan	7	8	7	1	1	0	2	0	0	26	125	96
Feb	7	8	7	1	1	0	2	0	0	26	117	94
Mar	7	8	7	1	1	0	2	0	0	26	117	94
Apr	7	8	7	1	1	0	2	0	0	26	117	94
May	7	8	7	1	1	0	2	0	0	26	117	94
Jun	7	7	7	1	1	0	2	0	0	25	119	96
Jul	7	7	7	1	1	0	2	0	0	25	119	96
Aug	7	8	7	1	1	0	2	0	0	26	118	95
Sep	7	8	7	1	1	0	2	0	0	26	120	96
Oct	7	8	7	1	1	0	2	0	0	26	120	96
Nov	7	8	7	1	1	0	2	0	0	26	120	96
Dec	7	6	7	1	1	0	2	0	3	27	118	91

NVA	INF+	Sapt+	Recont+	Scty+	Arty	Sig	Trans	Med	Engr	Trng	Log	NVA Total
Jan	61	11	0	0	19	2	2	2	2	0	0	99
Feb	60	10	0	0	17	1	1	1	1	0	0	91
Mar	60	9	1	0	17	1	1	1	1	0	0	91
Apr	60	9	1	0	17	1	1	1	1	0	0	91
May	60	9	1	0	17	1	1	1	1	0	0	91
Jun	63	9	1	0	17	1	1	1	1	0	0	94
Jul	63	9	1	0	17	1	1	1	1	0	0	94
Aug	61	9	1	0	17	1	1	1	1	0	0	92
Sep	61	10	1	0	17	1	1	1	1	1	0	94
Oct	61	10	1	0	17	1	1	1	1	1	0	94
Nov	61	10	1	0	17	1	1	1	1	1	0	94
Dec	58	10	1	0	17	1	1	1	1	1	0	91

+Maneuver Battalion

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TABLE III-6

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Enemy Activity

January

(C) Enemy-initiated activity was characterized by scattered ABFs, harassing fires, and limited ground contacts, and increased logistical activity. Analysis of enemy activity indicated Phase II of the three-phase Winter-Spring Campaign was probably initiated on 3 Jan. Increased enemy harassing fires south of the central and eastern DMZ possibly represented an attempt to screen the infiltration or positioning of forces in the area. In MRTTH, visual and photographic reconnaissance revealed increased usage of BA 611 in the A Shau Valley area. Sightings in the A Shau Valley revealed the presence of trucks, personnel, bunkers, base camps, and well-used high-speed tracks. Several contacts with possible elements of the 29th and 803d NVA Regts, prisoner statements, captured documents, the relative lack of activity east of the A Shau Valley, and the logistical activity in the area indicated Quang Tri City could be the primary target of the coming offensive. This could also have indicated enemy tactical activity south of the central DMZ and west of Hue was diversionary in nature. In Front 4, prisoner and rallier statements and captured documents indicated the GVN pacification program and the Danang, Hoi An, and An Hoa areas as primary targets in the next phase of the Winter-Spring Campaign. In southern I CTZ, prisoner and rallier statements, captured documents, and reconnaissance activity around Quang Ngai City indicated it could be a primary target in early 1970. There were indications Phase III of the Winter-Spring Campaign would be in two stages. Stage one would be prior to TET and Stage two after TET.

February

(C) Enemy-initiated activity continued at a low level characterized by scattered ABFs, harassing fires, limited ground contacts, reconnaissance efforts, and logistical activities. Analysis of enemy activity indicated Phase III of the Winter-Spring Campaign was probably initiated on 31 Jan, prior to the proclaimed TET offensive. In the B-5 Front on 31 Jan, contact with the 1st Bn, 27th NVA Regt, north of Camp Carroll, confirmed the continued presence of regimental elements south of the central DMZ. This activity possibly represented enemy attempts to preposition units in the area in preparation for future activity. In MRTTH the continued use of BA 611 was revealed. Aerial photography revealed recent construction efforts on Route 548 and in the general northwest area of the A Shau Valley. In the 7th Front, reports indicated a significant number of replacement personnel had been received, possibly in preparation for tactical activity in the Quang Tri lowlands. In MR 5, on the night of 31 Jan, a series of coordinated ABFs and harassing fires were launched against allied maneuver elements and GVN pacification elements. Despite the relative absence of enemy-initiated ground attacks, it was probable these attacks represented the initiation of Phase III of the Winter-Spring Campaign. The T89 Sapper Bn, V-25 VC Bn, and the 70th VC Bn were identified in contact with allied forces in Quang Nam Province. Heavy losses inflicted on these units and the continued discovery of significant food caches, defensive bunker complexes, and hospital complexes probably added to the morale and disciplinary problems existing in many MR 5 units.

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March

(C) Enemy-initiated activity continued at a low level. In the B-5 Front reports indicated all three battalions of the 27th NVA Regt were south of the DMZ and would attack allied forces, possibly in early April. In MRTTH, reconnaissance and interrogation reports disclosed the continued use of BA 611 and the movement of forces toward the piedmont. Elements of the 812th NVA Regt were identified in contact with ARVN on 17 Mar. This was the first confirmed contact with the 812th NVA Regt since its infiltration into RVN in October 1969. In MR 5 activity was generally light and directed against the GVN pacification program. Reports revealed the enemy's concern with the success of the pacification program and indicated disruption of the program would continue to be the primary objective. Reports also indicated a possible phase of increased activity would commence in early April.

April

(C) After a period of moderate activity from 31 Mar to 2 Apr, enemy-initiated activity increased to a slightly higher level than noted in March. In the B-5 Front allied forces operating in the general area of Fire Support Base (FSB) Fuller maintained steady contact with major elements of the 27th NVA Regt and received ABFs from probable elements of the 84th NVA Artillery Regt. Reports indicated the 27th NVA Regt probably received a significant number of replacements from the 138th NVA Regt. The use of 120mm mortars against FSB Fuller on 6 Apr possibly indicated the redeployment of elements of the 164th NVA Artillery Regt to the central DMZ. A Hoi Chanh stated the entire 246th NVA Regt had deployed south of the DMZ and was preparing for a future large-scale offensive. An analysis of prisoners' statements and enemy activity indicated the equivalent of eight maneuver battalions were deployed south of the central and eastern DMZ. In MRTTH, captured documents revealed a possible increased tactical posture by the 304th NVA Div support elements and a captured prisoner revealed a possible eastward movement of elements of the 66th NVA Regt, 304th NVA Div. Scattered contacts with probable elements of the 803d and 29th NVA Regts indicated the continued presence of 324B Div elements east of the A Shau Valley. Elements of the Chi Thua II Sapper Bn, 5th NVA Regt, identified in contacts with ARVN elements on 7 Apr, revealed a possible easterly shift in the battalions AO. In MR 5, interrogation reports and the disposition of enemy forces indicated a possible second phase of intensified activity to begin in early May, with the pacification program and allied installations as the primary targets.

May

(C) Enemy-initiated activity was at a slightly higher level than noted during April. Contact with major elements of the 27th NVA Regt and elements of the 84th and 164th NVA Artillery Regts continued in the B-5 Front. Elements of the 126th NVA Naval Sapper and 270th NVA Regts were identified in two contacts south of the DMZ, representing the first identified contact with the elements of the 270th in more than 6 months. In MRTTH, aerial photography on 14 May revealed Routes 616, 9222, and 548 were open and in use, while a new undesignated road was being developed to connect Route 616 with Routes 9222 and 548. Identification of elements of the 5th NVA Bn, 812th NVA Regt, 324B NVA Div, in an attack on FSB O'Reilly on 28 May, indicated a possible change in the tactical posture of the regiment. Contacts with elements of the 808th NVA Bn, 7th Front, southeast of Quang Tri City, possibly indicated renewed interest in the lowland areas. In MR 5 on

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8 May, enemy forces initiated Phase II of the Winter-Spring Campaign by launching relatively light ABFs and ground attacks directed against ARVN forces, pacification elements, and hamlets. An attempted second increase in activity on the night of 20 May was pre-empted due to an accumulation of internal problems and allied operations. In the vicinity of Thuong Duc, elements of the 38th and 141st NVA Regts maintained pressure on allied forces in the area. In Quang Tin Province relatively constant contact was maintained with elements of the 1st VC and 3d NVA Regts and the 10th NVA Sapper Bn, 2d NVA Div, with over 900 enemy personnel killed. In MR 5, prisoner statements, agent reports, and the disposition of enemy forces indicated MR 5 elements might attempt to initiate a third phase of intensified tactical activity possibly to begin in early June with the pacification program as the primary target.

June

(C) Enemy-initiated activity decreased slightly from the level noted in May. In the B-5 Front, a decrease in the level and intensity of ABFs in the area south of the central and eastern DMZ suggested a tactical step-down by some elements of the 84th and 164th NVA Regts. A noticeable decrease in contacts may have indicated major maneuver elements were refitting or repositioning their forces. In MRTTH on 2 Jun, elements of the 9th Bn, 66th NVA Regt, 304th NVA Div, were identified in an attack against ARVN forces at FSB Tun Tavern. Between 21 and 24 Jun, ARVN forces operating southeast of Khe Sanh captured over 60 tons of food and munitions, probably belonging to elements of the 66th NVA Regt, 304th NVA Div. During the same time period other ARVN forces operating southeast of FSB Tun Tavern discovered additional caches plus four base camps probably belonging to elements of the 7th Front and the 812th NVA Regt, 324B NVA Div. On 10 Jun, elements of the K-4C Bn, 4th NVA Regt, were identified in an attack against US Forces at FSB Tomahawk in Phu Loc District, Thua Thien Province. In MR 5 between 3 and 5 Jun, Phase III of the K-700 Campaign was initiated by launching relatively light ABFs and ground attacks directed primarily against pacification forces and allied maneuver elements and installations. On 11 Jun, two companies of the T-89 VC Sapper Bn attacked Thanh My Hamlet destroying 85 percent of the hamlet, killing 74 civilians, and wounding 68 civilians. To the south, elements of the 409th VC Sapper Bn attacked the Thang Binh District Headquarters, while in Quang Ngai Province on 7 Jun, probable elements of the Binh Son VC District Unit launched an attack against the Binh Son District Headquarters.

July

(C) Enemy-initiated activity decreased from the level noted in June. In the B-5 Front on 27 Jul, possible elements of the 4th Bn, 270th NVA Regt initiated an attack against the Gia Linh District Headquarters. In the central DMZ aerial photography of 4 and 21 Jul revealed continued expansion of LOCs. In the area south of the central DMZ, probable elements of the 84th NVA Arty Regt resumed tactical operations against allied units and installations. In MRTTH on 8 Jul, elements of the 1st and 2d Bns, 9th NVA Regt, 304th NVA Div, suffered 139 KIA when engaged by US troops in the Khe Sanh area. Subsequent sweep operations in the area discovered an additional 101 enemy bodies. East of the A Shau Valley probable elements of the 803d NVA Regt, 324B Div, maintained intense pressure on allied units operating in and near the abandoned FSB Ripcord. On 22 Jul, allied forces near FSB Ripcord contacted possible elements of the 803d NVA Regt resulting

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in 61 enemy KIA. To the east on 1 Jul, elements of the 808th NVA Bn, 7th Front and 6th Bn, 812th NVA Regt, launched a series of coordinated small-scale attacks in the lowlands of Hai Lang District, Quang Tri Province. The attempted penetration resulted in 139 enemy KIA and 17 detained. In MR 5 a decreased level and intensity of ground attacks and ABFs indicated enemy units were refitting, repositioning forces, and conducting reconnaissance in preparation for a future phase of increased tactical activity. A captured document revealed the enemy's next campaign would be primarily directed against the allied pacification program.

August

(C) Enemy-initiated activity increased from the level noted during July. In the B-5 Front, enemy activity was characterized by scattered ABFs and limited ground probes. On 4 Aug, elements of the 8th Bn, 66th NVA Regt, were identified in a ground contact 2 km east of Mai Loc CIDG Camp. On 16 Aug, FSB Fuller received 70 rounds of 120mm mortar fire and Camp Carroll received 32 rounds of 122mm rocket fire. On 29 Aug, ARVN elements operating in the vicinity of FSB Fuller received 105 rounds of 120mm mortar fire. The attacks were probably conducted by elements of the 84th NVA Arty Regt. In MRTTH, a series of contacts in the lowlands of Hai Lang District, east and southeast of Quang Tri City between 12 and 14 Aug, resulted in cumulative enemy casualties of over 300 KIA, 31 PWs, and five Hoi Chanhs. Elements of the 3d Bn, 9th NVA Regt, 304th NVA Div and the 808th Bn, MRTTH were identified as the enemy units involved. To the south, in the highlands east of the Da Krong River Valley, the enemy increased pressure on allied FSBs in the area, particularly FSBs O'Reilly and Barnett. Documents, prisoners, and a Hoi Chanh from the area identified elements of the 2d Bn, 9th NVA Regt, 304th NVA Div; the 801st and 802d Bns, 6th NVA Regt, MRTTH; and elements of the 9th Bn, 29th NVA Regt, 324B NVA Div. In MR 5, enemy-initiated activity was at a low level as enemy units attempted to evade allied sweep operations and prepared for increased activity. Prisoners and captured documents revealed enemy intentions to step up tactical activity in the lowlands of Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai Provinces, particularly against the Accelerated Pacification Program. Commencing on 30 Aug, the enemy appeared to have attempted to implement his plans, although the limited scope and intensity of the upsurge indicated much of his planning was frustrated by allied preemptive operations.

September

(C) Enemy-initiated activity remained at the increased level noted during August for the first half of the month. After 15 Sep, activity began to decrease and continued until the end of the month. In the DMZ Front, enemy maneuver and artillery units operating south of the central DMZ maintained a low but constant level of activity, characterized by limited ground attacks and scattered ABFs, while probably preparing for future increased tactical activity. On 2 Sep, A-1 Combat Base received six time-fuse detonated rockets. This was the first report of enemy delay fuzes being employed with rockets and offered the enemy a new harassment capability. In MRTTH, a combination of continued contacts, prisoner statements, and a Hoi Chanh indicated that FSB O'Reilly would be targeted by major units operating in the area. After 6 Aug, the enemy had lost more than 690 KIA in the O'Reilly area. In related activity, information from a Hoi Chanh who rallied on 12 Aug near FSB O'Reilly, disclosed that he was a lieutenant in the 801st Bn, 6th NVA Regt. He stated that the enemy forces planned a three-phase attack on FSB O'Reilly to overrun it.

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In MR 5 enemy-initiated activity continued at a low level as the enemy increased his emphasis on guerrilla and VCI activities. A letter captured on 12 Aug, near Thuong Duc CIDG Camp, dated 27 Feb, from the Chief of Headquarters, MR 5, Military Staff Department, outlined a plan to strengthen enemy guerrilla forces during the summer and autumn of 1970. The document directed that by the end of 1970, MR 5 was to have 80,000 guerrillas of all types. In related activity, an enemy document captured on 5 Aug near Danang, dated 13 Jul, from the Coordination and Operations Committee, VC Quang Da Province, to the Current Affairs Committee, MR 5, concerned future activities during 1970 and 1971. The document disclosed that enemy military efforts would be focused in the lowlands where the bulk of enemy LF units and one-fifth of the guerrilla units were to operate. The document further disclosed that particular attention was to be paid to training hamlet guerrillas and that by early 1971, 70 percent of the hamlet guerrillas and all of the village guerrillas were to be capable of fighting allied units. Additionally, guerrilla combat effectiveness was to be rapidly improved and LF units were to be developed in both quantity and quality.

October

(C) Enemy-initiated activity reflected an overall decrease from the level noted during September. In the B-5 Front, enemy activity remained at a low level, characterized by scattered ABFs and limited ground attacks. On 8 Oct, in western Quang Tri Province near Khe Sanh, US elements observed an unknown-size enemy force and engaged them with helicopter gunships, resulting in 26 KBA. The enemy unit involved may have been an element of the 246th NVA Regt which had elements engaged in trail construction and improvement in the area. Anticipation of the monsoon rains probably caused the enemy to reposition some maneuver elements northward and may have provided a partial explanation for the low level of enemy activity in the area. In MRTTH, enemy-initiated activity dropped significantly and shifted eastward toward the lowlands. On 2 Oct near FSB O'Reilly, ARVN elements on a search operation received fifty 60mm mortar rounds followed by a ground attack from an estimated two platoons. The enemy unit involved was possibly an element of the 6th NVA Regt, MRTTH. On 6 and 8 Oct near Hue, ARVN elements engaged an estimated two enemy platoons. In related activity, a prisoner captured on 1 Oct in the vicinity of the contacts, identified his unit as the 4th Co, 810th Bn, 5th NVA Regt and stated that his battalion's mission was to transport rice. This may have represented enemy logistical preparations for an anticipated increase in tactical activity in the lowlands. On 17 Oct, enemy forces ambushed allied elements 15 km south-southeast of Quang Tri City. On 22 Oct, enemy fire support elements initiated a series of ABFs against allied positions in and adjacent to the lowlands of Thua Thien Province. Also on 22 Oct, 13 km south-southwest of Hue, US gunships engaged an unknown-size enemy force, resulting in 20 KBA. In MR 5 enemy-initiated activity was highlighted by a widespread, low intensity increase in tactical activity throughout the southern three provinces. On 4 Oct, enemy forces in Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai Provinces initiated their planned increased activities with a modest surge throughout the region. In most cases, these activities were confined to ABFs of low intensity. The only area where enemy activity was sustained was in Quang Nam Province, in the An Hoa/Thuong Duc/Hill 52 area, where enemy pressure continued through the first 2 weeks of the month, decreasing toward the end of the month. Elements of the 38th NVA Regt were identified as the enemy units in contact. On 12 and 17 Oct, Danang air base received light rocket attacks. In Quang Tin Province, a week-long sector operation concluded on 25 Oct with cumulative results of 360 enemy KIA, 59 detained, 84 Hoi Chanhs, and 102 individual weapons captured. This operation may have preempted the enemy's

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tactical plans in the area. In Quang Ngai Province, over 100 tons of rice were captured during the month, compounding enemy logistical problems in the area. The weather deteriorated during the latter part of the month, culminating with Typhoon Kate, which struck southern MR 1 on 25 Sep. Subsequent heavy rains caused widespread flooding in the lowlands and contributed in large part to the lull in tactical activity at the end of the month.

November

(C) Enemy-initiated activity was at a decreased level from that noted during October. In the B-5 Front, enemy-initiated activity was at a low level with some enemy artillery elements conducting harassing ABFs against allied operations and FSBs south of the DMZ. On 13 Nov in eastern Quang Tri Province, MRTTH, allied elements on a search operation contacted an estimated enemy battalion, possibly an element of the 912th NVA Regt, 324B NVA Div or an element of the 7th Front, MRTTH. The Hue-Danang railroad in Phu Loc District, Thua Thien Province, was interdicted four times during the month. On 26 Nov, in Phu Loc District, the Hoi Dua Bridge was destroyed by an estimated enemy battalion. The enemy unit involved was possibly an element of the 4th NVA Regt, MRTTH. These incidents probably indicated an increased emphasis by enemy units in the area in the interdiction of LOCs. In MR 5, enemy-initiated activity remained at a low level as enemy forces attempted to recover from floods and logistical problems while making plans for tactical activity, possibly to occur in early December. Captured documents revealed that the enemy believed as a result of US troop withdrawals, there would be a 40 to 60-percent reduction in allied war potential and that enemy prestige was expected to rise. Other captured documents indicated an increased emphasis by the enemy on recruitment in order to implement planned guerrilla and proselyting activities and to rectify difficulties encountered in collecting taxes. On 3 Nov in southeastern Quang Nam Province, allied elements engaged an unknown-size enemy force. Interrogation of detainees identified five battalions, subordinate to Front 4, which the detainees claimed were involved in disaster relief operations. On 13 Nov in northeastern Quang Tin, allied elements contacted an unknown-size enemy force, possibly an element of the 70th VC Bn, Quang Nam Provincial Unit. On 15 and 16 Nov in eastern Quang Tin Province, allied elements conducting search-and-ambush operations made four separate contacts with unknown-size enemy forces, probably elements of the Quang Nam Provincial Unit.

December

(C) Enemy-initiated activity remained at a level comparable to that noted during November. In the B-5 Front enemy-initiated activity was at a low-level, with friendly units encountering occasional small contacts. The Hue/Danang railroad in Phu Loc District, Thua Thien Province, was interdicted twice during the month. On 19 Dec a 39th Transportation Bn convoy en route to Phu Bai, received mortar and small-arms fire 20 km east-southeast of Phu Loc, Thua Thien Province. This was the only reported ambush of a convoy on Route 1 during the quarter. MR 5 showed a substantial increase in enemy small-unit contacts and logistical activity, possibly, for planned tactical actions in late January. On 2 Dec, 1km southwest of Ha Thanh, the Thong Song Hamlet PSDF, while occupying an observation post (OP), received a ground attack by 120 sappers. The OP was overrun but was later reoccupied by PSDF personnel. The enemy unit involved was

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possibly an element of the 406th Sapper Bn, MR 5. At 0515 on 9 Dec, 8 km northeast of Que Son, allied elements in a night defensive position received a coordinated mortar and ground attack from an estimated 40 to 50-man force. The enemy force penetrated the night defensive position but was repelled 1 hour after the contact was initiated. The enemy unit responsible for this attack possibly was an element of the 70th VC LF Bn, Quang Nam Provincial Unit. The 70th VC LF Bn was reportedly planning sapper-type attacks, probably in the Que Son/Thang Binh area. On 23 Dec 35 km northwest of Quang Ngai City, Quang Ngai Province, the 61st Ranger Border Defense Bn engaged an estimated enemy battalion. Gunships from the US 23d Inf Div supported the contact. A notebook captured on 4 Dec, 12 km southwest of Phu Bai, contained an entry dated 24 Nov regarding a directive originated by the Lao Dong Party Politburo, NVN. The notebook directed that the population be urged to demand better living standards, pay raises, new jobs, and more freedom. Other demands to be made were an unconditional withdrawal of US troops from the RVN, an end to the pacification program and the Vietnamization plan, and additional democratic rights for the people, as proposed by the NLF's eight point statement in Paris and President Nixon's five point peace initiative. This party directive may have indicated that the enemy was implementing a propaganda campaign for the purpose of winning popular support for a provisional government. (79)

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(U) Table III-7 shows enemy-initiated incidents, losses, and weapons captured in I CTZ/MR 1 during 1970.

Enemy-Initiated Incidents, Losses, and Weapons Captured I CTZ/MR 1 - 1970

	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>
Attacks-by-Fire	27	23	20	41	91	63
Assaults	31	27	24	61	90	30
Ambushes	1	4	2	2	2	4
Harassments*	581 (341)	678 (404)	647 (390)	838 (556)	904 (671)	555 (377)
Terrorism	16	13	22	12	21	9
Sabotage	1	2	2	5	3	4
Propaganda	3	1	0	0	1	0
AA Fire	647	566	264	291	473	316
TOTAL	1,307	1,314	1,008	1,250	1,585	981
Enemy KIA	3,063	2,908	3,235	3,313	4,794	5,239
Weapons Captured	1,089	968	1,259	1,497	1,497	1,463
CSW	123	93	99	214	223	214
IW	966	875	1,160	1,283	1,274	1,249

	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>
Attacks-by-Fire	36	47	36	19	3	11
Assaults	27	80	31	13	5	18
Ambushes	0	6	0	3	3	2
Harassments*	528 (317)	629 (386)	461 (306)	245 (163)	173 (88)	276 (133)
Terrorism	19	10	11	7	4	25
Sabotage	2	2	3	3	2	0
Propaganda	0	2	0	0	0	1
AA Fire	447	520	547	361	248	328
TOTAL	1,059	1,296	1,089	651	438	661
Enemy KIA	2,973	3,444	2,799	1,921	1,718	2,313
Weapons Captured	1,329	1,379	980	764	732	964
CSW	128	180	89	50	74	132
IW	1,201	1,199	881	714	688	832

*Fire of Less Than 20 Rounds in Parentheses

SOURCE: MACJ2

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TABLE III-7.

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Organization and Dispositions

(U) Tables III-8 III- 9, and III-10 show the MACV enemy order of battle holdings as of 31 Jan, 30 Jun, and 31 Dec 1970 respectively. Figures III-20A and B, III-21A and B, and III-22A, B, and C show enemy unit locations as of 31 Jan, 30 Jun, and 31 Dec 1970 respectively.

I CTZ/MR 1
MACV ENEMY OB HOLDINGS
31 JAN 70

HANOI HIGH COMMAND

DMZ FRONT

49 NVA INF BN QUANG BINH PROV	270 NVA INF REGT
9 NVA INF REGT 304 NVA INF DIV	84 NVA RKT REGT
20 NVA SAP BN 304 NVA INF DIV	164 NVA ARTY REGT
27 NVA INF REGT	246 NVA INF REGT
33 INDEP NVA SAP BN	126 NAVAL SAP REGT NVN SAP CMBT GP
31 NVA INF REGT	20TH NVA TRANS BN 325TH NVA INF DIV
36TH NVA INF REGT 308th NVA INF DIV	24B NVA INF REGT 304 NVA INF DIV

MILITARY REGION 5

107 NVA HVY WPNS SPT BN	406 VC SAP BN
120 VC MONT INF BN	

FRONT 4

31 NVA INF REGT (INDEP)	3RD NVA SAP BN
36 NVA INF REGT	D3 NVA INF BN

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90 NVA INF REGT

141 NVA INF REGT

577 NVA RL BN

R20 VC INF BN

T-89 VC SAP BN

42 VC RECON BN

V25 VC INF BN

T-87 VC SAP BN

490 NVA SAP BN

HAI VAN VC MF SAP BN

573 NVA RKT BN

575 NVA RKT BN

QUANG DA PROVINCE

Q80 VC LF INF BN
HIEU NHON DIST

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

38 VC LF INF BN

48 VC LF INF BN

81 VC LF INF BN

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

V16 VC LF SAP BN

70 VC LF INF BN

72 VC LF INF BN

74 VC LF CLT SPT BN
MORT

78 VC LF RL BN

NONG TRUONG 2 NVA INF DIV

1 VC INF REGT

21 NVA INF REGT

31 NVA INF REGT

10 NVA SAP BN

17 NVA SIG BN

14 NVA AD BN

12 NVA ARTY BN

18 NVA MED BN

GK 40 NVA ENGR BN

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NONG TRUONG 3 NVA INF DIV

22 NVA INF REGT
30 NVA ENGR BN
40 NVA SAP BN
200 NVA AD BN
300 NVA ARTY BN COMP
500 NVA TRANS BN

551 NVA SIG BN
600 NVA MED BN
9TH NVA SAP BN
95 VC SAP BN
409 VC SAP BN

TRI THIEN HUE MR

4 NVA INF REGT
5 NVA INF REGT
6 NVA INF REGT

9 NVA INF REGT
29 NVA INF REGT
803 NVA INF REGT

7 NVA FRONT

812 NVA INF REGT
K11 NVA SAP BN
808 NVA INF BN
K34 NVA RKT BN

814 NVA INF BN
1/84 NVA RL BN
10 NVA SAP BN

THUA THIEN PROVINCE

PHU LOC VC LF INF BN

SOURCE: MACJ2

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TABLE III-8

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III-117


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UNLOCATED UNITS

- XXX DMZ FRONT
- 803(-)
- 84(-)
- 270
- 164
- 27(-)
- 31
- 9
- 304
- 33
- 812(+)
- 36
- 325
- 24B
- 304
- 6(+)
- 126
- 20
- 304

MACV ORDER OF BATTLE
MR I
NORTHERN HALF
31 JAN 70



ABBREVIATIONS - VC PROVINCE
TT THUA THIEN

- NVA
- MF
- LF

SOURCE: MACJ2

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FIGURE III-20A




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MACV ORDER OF BATTLE MR I SOUTHERN HALF 31 JAN 70

UNLOCATED UNITS



ABBREVIATIONS-VC PROVINCE
QN QUANG NAM
QNG QUANG NGAI



FIGURE III-20B

SOURCE: MACJ2

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I CTZ/MR 1
MACV ENEMY OB HOLDINGS
30 JUNE 70

HANOI HIGH COMMAND

DMZ FRONT

49 NVA INF BN
QUANG BINH PROV

9 NVA INF REGT
304 NVA INF DIV

66B NVA INF REGT
304 NVA INF DIV

27 NVA INF REGT

33 INDEP NVA SAP BN

31 NVA INF REGT

36 NVA INF REGT

270 NVA INF REGT

84 NVA RKT REGT

164 NVA ARTY REGT

246 NVA INF REGT

126 NAVAL SAPPER REGT
NVN SAPPER CMBT GP

20 NVA TRANS BN
325 NVA INF DIV

24B NVA INF REGT
304 NVA INF DIV

MILITARY REGION 5

22 NVA INF REGT
NT3 NVA INF DIV

509 NVA TNG BN
NT3 NVA INF DIV

107 NVA HVY WPNS SPT BN

403 NVA SAPPER BN

406 VC SAPPER BN

409 VC SAPPER BN

120 VC MONT INF BN

FRONT 4

31 NVA INF REGT (INDEP)

36 NVA INF REGT

38 NVA INF REGT

141 NVA INF REGT

577 NVA RL BN

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8 1 13 3 4

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R20 VC INF BN

42 VC RECON BN

D3 NVA INF BN

T87 VC SAPPER BN

573 NVA RKT BN

T89 VC SAP BN

3 NVA SAPPER BN

V25 VC INF BN

HAI VAN VC SAPPER BN

QUANG DA PROVINCE

Q80 VC LF INF BN
HIEU NHON DIST

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

38 VC LF INF BN

48 VC LF INF BN

81 VC LF INF BN

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

V16 VC LF SAPPER BN

72 VC LF INF BN

78 VC LF RL BN

70 VC LF INF BN

74 VC LF CBT SPT BN
(MORT)

NONG TRONG 2 NVA INF DIV

1 VC INF REGT

31 NVA INF REGT

17 NVA SIG BN

12 NVA ARTY BN

GK40 NVA ENGR BN

21 NVA INF REGT

10 NVA SAPPER BN

14 NVA AD BN

18 NVA MED BN

TRI THIEN HUE MR

11A NVA RECON BN

4 NVA INF REGT

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5 NVA INF REGT

6 NVA INF REGT

9 NVA INF REGT

29 NVA INF REGT

803 NVA INF REGT

7 NVA FRONT

812 NVA INF REGT

814 NVA INF BN

808 NVA INF BN

1/84 NVA RL BN

K11 NVA SAP BN

10 NVA SAPPER BN

K34 NVA RKT BN

THUA THIEN PROVINCE

PHU LOC VC LF INF BN

SOURCE: MACJ2

TABLE III-9

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
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III-122

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UNLOCATED UNITS

DMZ FR HANOI	31 DMZ FR	64(-) DMZ FR	126 DMZ FR	164 DMZ FR
270 DMZ FR	248 304	36 325	9 304	802 8
TTH MR HANOI	29 TTH MR	803 TTH MR	11A TTH MR	



ABBREVIATIONS

TTH MR	TRI THIEN HUE MILITARY REGION
DMZ	DEMILITARIZED ZONE
FR	FRONT
TT	THUA THIEN
MR	MILITARY REGION

MACV ORDER OF BATTLE
MR I
NORTHERN HALF
30 JUNE 70

SOURCE: MACJ2

FIGURE III-21A


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MACV ORDER OF BATTLE
MR I
SOUTHERN HALF
30 JUNE 70



SOURCE: MACJ2

FIGURE III-21B

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I CTZ/MR 1
MACV ENEMY OB HOLDINGS
31 DEC 70

HANOI HIGH COMMAND

DMZ FRONT

27 NVA INF REGT
31 NVA INF REGT
84 NVA RKT REGT
246 NVA INF REGT
20 NVA TRANS BN
325 NVA INF DIV

33 INDEP NVA SAP BN
270 NVA INF REGT
164 NVA ARTY REGT
126 NAVAL SAP REGT
NVN SAP COMBT GP

304B NVA INF DIV

9 NVA INF REGT
66B NVA INF REGT

24B NVA INF REGT
20 NVA SAP BN

MILITARY REGION 5

509 NVA TNG BN
NT3 NVA INF DIV
403 NVA SAP BN
409 VC SAP BN
402 VC SAP BN

107 NVA HVY WPNS SPT BN
406 VC SAP BN
120 VC MONT INF BN

FRONT 4

31 NVA INF REGT (INDEP)
141 NVA INF REGT
577 NVA RL BN

38 NVA INF REGT
36 NVA INF REGT
325 NVA INF DIV
R20 VC INF BN

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T89 VC SAP BN

91 NVA SAP BN

V25 VC INF BN

575 NVA RKT BN

42 VC RECON BN

D3 NVA INF BN

573 NVA RKT BN

QUANG NGAI PROVINCE

38 VC LF INF BN

B1 VC LF INF BN

48 VC LF INF BN

QUANG NAM PROVINCE

V16 VC LF SAP BN

72 VC LF INF BN

78 VC LF RL BN

70 VC LF INF BN

74 VC LF CBT SPT BN
MORT

NONG TRUONG 2 NVA INF DIV

1 VC INF REGT

31 NVA INF REGT

17 NVA SIG BN

12 NVA ARTY BN

GK40 NVA ENGR BN

21 NVA INF REGT

10 NVA SAP BN

14 NVA AD BN

18 NVA MED BN

TRI THIEN HUE MRTTH

11A NVA RECON BN

4 NVA INF REGT

6 NVA INF REGT

29 NVA INF REGT

5 NVA INF REGT

9 NVA INF REGT

803 NVA INF REGT

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7 NVA FRONT

812 NVA INF REGT

808 NVA INF BN

K11 NVA SAP BN

K34 NVA RKT BN

814 NVA INF BN

1/84 NVA RL BN

10 NVA SAP BN

THUA THIEN PROVINCE

PHU LOC VC LF INF BN

SOURCE: MACJ2

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TABLE III-19

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
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UNLOCATED UNITS

DMZ FR XXX
 31 B-5 FR 84 B-5 FR
 126 S 164 B-5 FR 270 B-5 FR
 304 B5 FR 9 304 248 304
 668 304 20 304

MACV ORDER OF BATTLE
 MR I
 QUANG TRI
 31 DEC 70



ABBREVIATIONS
 DMZ DEMILITARIZED ZONE
 FR FRONT
 MR MILITARY REGION

SOURCE: MACJ2

FIGURE III-22A

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8 1 13 3 4


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UNLOCATED UNITS

29 MRT TH 803 MRTTH 9 MRTTH
6 MRTTH IIA MRTTH

MACV ORDER OF BATTLE
MR I
THUA THIEN
31 DEC 70

NVA
 VC MF
 VC LF



ABBREVIATIONS
MR MILITARY REGION
MRTTH MR TRI THIEN HUE
TT THUA THIEN PROVINCIAL UNIT

SOURCE: MACJ2

FIGURE III-22B


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MACV ORDER OF BATTLE MR I SOUTHERN HALF 31 DEC 70

UNLOCATED UNITS
31 NT2 141 FR4
1 NT2 36 FR4



ABBREVIATIONS
QN QUANG NAM
QT QUANG TIN
QNG QUANG NGAI
MR MILITARY REGION
FR FRONT

NVA
 VC MF
 VC LF

SOURCE: MACJ2

FIGURE III-22C

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III-130

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Enemy Situation in II CTZ/MR 2

Introduction

(S) The bulk of the enemy forces in MR 2 (designated II CTZ until 1 Jul 70) were located in two areas: the tri-border area and central Binh Dinh Province. B-3 Front units were deployed primarily around BA 609, where three plus regiments were probably engaged in logistical and training activities. Several of the B-3 Front entities were in Cambodia where the front expanded to secure key points critical to its logistical system. B-3 Front elements retained the capability of main-force attacks on isolated posts to gain psychological and propaganda objectives. In Binh Dinh Province, two regiments of the 3d NVA Div were targeted against the populated coastal region and the pacification program. In the remainder of MR 2, the widely dispersed, understrength units did not present a serious threat to that area. However, the forces did have a capability to conduct sporadic ABFs, sapper attacks, and limited ground attacks against allied positions and the pacification program.

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Strength

(U) Table III-11 shows the enemy personnel strength in II CTZ/MR 2 for 1970. Table III-12 shows the number and type of VC/NVA battalions in II CTZ/MR 2 for 1970.

II CTZ/MR 2
PERSONNEL STRENGTH-1970

<u>Month</u>	<u>Maneuver</u>	<u>Combat Support</u>	<u>Total Combat Strength</u>	<u>Admin Services</u>	<u>Guerrilla</u>	<u>Total</u>
Jan	22,890 (10,385)*	1,780 (1,720)	24,670 (12,105)	5,245 (1,740)	10,300	40,215 (13,845)
Feb	23,415 (11,055)	3,880 (3,770)	27,245 (14,825)	4,995 (1,640)	10,000	42,240 (16,465)
Mar	23,745 (11,710)	3,900 (3,840)	27,645 (15,550)	4,995 (1,640)	10,000	42,640 (17,190)
Apr	23,255 (11,490)	3,730 (3,670)	26,985 (15,160)	5,195 (1,840)	9,500	41,680 (17,000)
May	23,235 (11,390)	4,370 (4,310)	27,605 (15,700)	5,945 (2,230)	9,700	43,250 (17,990)
Jun	23,085 (11,390)	4,370 (4,310)	27,455 (15,700)	5,945 (2,290)	9,700	43,100 (17,990)
Jul	23,555 (11,640)	4,370 (4,310)	27,925 (15,950)	6,415 (2,760)	9,600	43,490 (18,710)
Aug	24,190 (12,275)	4,370 (4,310)	28,560 (16,585)	6,715 (3,060)	9,400	44,675 (19,645)
Sep	24,140 (12,275)	4,370 (4,310)	28,510 (16,585)	6,715 (3,060)	9,300	44,525 (19,645)
Oct	24,140 (12,275)	4,370 (4,310)	28,510 (16,585)	6,715 (3,060)	9,200	44,425 (19,645)
Nov	24,230 (12,365)	4,370 (4,310)	28,600 (16,675)	6,715 (3,060)	9,100	44,415 (19,735)
Dec	23,815 (12,010)	4,370 (4,310)	28,185 (16,320)	6,715 (3,060)	8,300	43,200 (19,380)

*NVA shown in parentheses

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TABLE III-11

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II CTZ/MR 2
VC/NVA BATTALIONS - 1970

<u>VC</u>	<u>MF</u> <u>Inf+</u>	<u>MF</u> <u>Sap+</u>	<u>LF</u> <u>Inf+</u>	<u>LF</u> <u>Sap+</u>	<u>Recont+</u>	<u>Scty+</u>	<u>Arty</u>	<u>Sig</u>	<u>Trans</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>VC/NVA</u>	<u>Total</u> <u>VC/NVA</u> <u>Maneuver</u>
Jan	4	1	12	4	0	0	0	0	0	21	53	48
Feb	4	1	12	4	0	0	0	0	0	21	62	51
Mar	4	1	11	4	0	0	0	0	0	20	61	50
Apr	3	1	12	4	0	0	0	0	0	20	61	50
May	3	1	12	5	0	0	0	0	0	21	64	50
Jun	3	1	12	5	0	0	0	0	0	21	64	50
Jul	3	1	12	6	0	0	0	0	0	22	66	52
Aug	3	1	12	6	0	0	0	0	0	22	69	55
Sep	3	1	12	6	0	0	0	0	0	22	69	55
Oct	3	1	12	6	0	0	0	0	0	22	69	55
Nov	3	1	12	6	0	0	0	0	0	22	69	55
Dec	3	1	12	6	0	0	0	0	0	22	69	55
<u>NVA</u>	<u>Inf+</u>	<u>Sap+</u>	<u>Recont+</u>	<u>Scty+</u>	<u>Arty</u>	<u>Sig</u>	<u>Trans</u>	<u>Med</u>	<u>Engr</u>	<u>Trng</u>	<u>Log</u>	<u>Total</u>
Jan	23	4	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	32
Feb	24	6	0	0	7	1	1	1	1	0	0	41
Mar	24	5	1	0	7	1	1	1	1	0	0	41
Apr	24	5	1	0	7	1	1	1	1	0	0	41
May	24	4	1	0	10	1	1	1	1	0	0	43
Jun	24	4	1	0	10	1	1	1	1	0	0	43
Jul	24	5	1	0	10	1	1	1	1	0	0	44
Aug	26	5	1	1	10	1	1	1	1	0	0	47
Sep	26	5	1	1	10	1	1	1	1	0	0	47
Oct	26	5	1	1	10	1	1	1	1	0	0	47
Nov	26	5	1	1	10	1	1	1	1	0	0	47
Dec	26	5	1	1	10	1	1	1	1	0	0	47

+Maneuver Battalion

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TABLE III-12

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Enemy Activity

January

(C) Enemy-initiated activity was limited in scope and intensity except on the night of 6 Jan when there was an increase in harassing fire and ground probes. In the B-3 Front, major enemy forces located in the border base areas remained out of contact. Elements of the 24th NVA Regt remained located in the vicinity of the Plei Mrong Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) camp and were possibly preparing to conduct attacks along Route 14 between Kontum and Pleiku. The 95B NVA Regt continued limited activity along Route 19, west of An Khe. Documents captured in Pleiku Province indicated increased sapper training was conducted during the latter half of 1969, and all local force battalions were to form a sapper company. In Binh Dinh Province, MR 5, there were numerous indications that elements of the 3d NVA Div were preparing to conduct widespread attacks against allied forces and installations, with the main objective being disruption of the GVN pacification programs. The attacks were expected to consist of heavy ABFs and ground probes by company-size and smaller units, while local force units were to conduct proselyting activities, selective terrorism, assassinations, and kidnapping to prove the GVN was not capable of providing security for the populace.

February

(C) Enemy-initiated activity continued at a low level except on the night of 31 Jan, when there was a sharp increase in harassing fires and ground probes in the B-3 Front and MR 5. In the B-3 Front, major enemy forces located in the border areas remained out of contact. PW statements confirmed the 6th Bn, 24th NVA Regt was located in the vicinity of Plei Mrong CIDG camp. The 95B NVA Regt continued limited activity along Route 19, west of An Khe. On 10 Feb, a 10-ton rice cache, probably intended for the 95B NVA Regt, was discovered along an infiltration and supply route in Pleiku Province. The loss of this cache further compounded the regiment's existing rice shortage. In Binh Dinh Province, MR 5, aggressive allied operations against the 3d NVA Div discovered approximately 66 tons of rice and 7 tons of munitions in a probable division rear supply area. To the south, Republic of Korea (ROK) Armed Forces operating in BA 226 after 12 Feb killed 195 enemy and took 136 individual weapons, 22 crew-served weapons, and an assortment of ammunition. These allied operations probably forced a major re-evaluation of the 3d NVA Div's plans. In Phu Yen Province, MR 5, after 1 Feb, there were approximately 35 abduction incidents, resulting in some 293 civilians missing. Returnees indicated they were taken to the nearby mountains for propaganda lectures. An agent report indicated the enemy considered the pre-TET phase of activity to be unsuccessful and in the second Phase, reorientation and re-education efforts were to be intensified with Tuy Hoa District as the primary target. In Tuyen Duc Province, MR 6, the first significant enemy-initiated activity in Dalat City since early December 1969 occurred on 18 Feb, when 2 explosive charges were set off in a hotel theater, killing eight civilians and wounding 37.

March

(C) Enemy-initiated activity was limited in scope and intensity as enemy forces generally avoided contact with friendly forces. In the B-3 Front, documents and prisoners from the 24th

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NVA Regt indicated Cambodian military pressure had an adverse effect on logistic activities and, as a result, the B-3 Front ordered subordinate units to produce from 50 to 100 percent of their rice and other food. A prisoner from the 1st Bn, 95B NVA Regt stated the unit had the mission of transporting rice in preparation for future tactical activity in the Plei Me area. In Binh Dinh Province, MR 5, elements of the 3d NVA Div continued to avoid contact with allied forces. Allied operations in the vicinity of BA 226 resulted in the capture of approximately 70 tons of rice and 10 tons of munitions. Captured prisoners and documents continued to indicate the GVN pacification program had seriously affected the enemy's ability to recruit replacements in Binh Dinh Province. A prisoner from the 22d NVA Regt stated several members of his unit were transferred to local-force units to increase their capability to counter the pacification effort. In Phu Yen Province the enemy continued civilian abductions. An agent report indicated VC cadre were to infiltrate the population to conduct proselyting activities based on the themes of corruption in the GVN, excessive taxation, and prolongation of the war against the people.

April

(C) On the night of 31 Mar, the enemy launched a series of coordinated attacks, initiating the spring campaign. This widespread offensive activity consisted of ABFs against RF and PF units, US installations, and selected district headquarters. From 1800 hours, 31 Mar to 0600 hours 2 Apr, there were 14 ABFs, 72 attacks of harassing fire, and 10 ground probes. On 1 Apr the enemy initiated an offensive in northern Kontum Province in the vicinity of the Dak Seang Special Forces Camp. After 1 Apr there was almost daily fighting in or near the camp. The enemy units involved were probably elements of the 28th NVA Regt, the 40th NVA Artillery Regt, and the D-120 Sapper Bn. Additionally from 12 to 15 Apr, the Dak Pek Special Forces Camp received heavy ABFs and ground attacks from probable elements of the 80th NVA Bn. Information provided by prisoners [redacted] indicated the enemy intended to continue offensive activity in Kontum Province and possibly shift activity to the Ben Het area. In Binh Dinh Province elements of the 3d NVA Div increased tactical activity from 1 to 15 Apr in the Plei Me/Phu Cat area. On 6 Apr, sappers penetrated the defensive perimeter of Camp Radcliff at An Khe and destroyed 12 helicopters. Numerous prisoners and documents indicated HQ, 22d NVA Regt, had been deactivated and its subordinate battalions reassigned to provincial units in MR 5. In Phu Yen Province [redacted] the Province Current Affairs Committee directed that all military activities be used to support political and military proselyting missions in Tuy An and Tuy Hoa Districts. This was a further indication that military forces in Phu Yen Province were primarily engaged in supporting political activities. In Binh Thuan Province prisoners from the 186th MF Bn, the 240th NVA Bn, and the 840th LF Bn revealed that the combat efficiency of their units had diminished considerably since 1966. The low intensity of enemy-initiated activity in Binh Thuan Province during the past 6 months tended to substantiate this information.

A5
A5

May

(C) In the B-3 Front the enemy continued to conduct sporadic ABFs and ground attacks against friendly units operating in and around the Dak Seang Special Forces Camp. The enemy units involved were probably elements of the 28th NVA Regt, 40th NVA Arty Regt, D120 Sapper Bn, and

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possibly elements of the 66th NVA Regt. A prisoner captured in the Ben Het area from the 16th Bn, 40th NVA Arty Regt revealed that the regiment consisted of six battalions: 11th, 16th, 30th, 32d, 33d, and 44th. A prisoner captured west of BA 701 from the 6th Bn, 24th NVA Regt and a document captured east of BA 702 revealed a new 7th Bn had probably been activated under control of the 24th NVA Regt. On 5 May, ARVN and US Forces initiated cross-border operations into Cambodian BAs against light enemy resistance. In Binh Dinh Province, MR 5, major elements of the 3d NVA Div avoided contact with allied forces during the month. Indications continued to show a shortage of food and supplies was seriously affecting the combat efficiency of the 3d NVA Div. A prisoner stated the 2d Regt, 3d NVA Div was unable to accept 200 replacements last fall because of these shortages. Also possibly related to these food and supply shortages was the confirmed deactivation of the Headquarters, 22d NVA Regt and the probable assignment of its subordinate units to provincial and LF control. In Phu Yen Province there was a significant increase in the number of civilian abductions starting on 21 May in Tuy Hoa District. There were brief surges of enemy activity in MR 6 on 3 May and again on 30 May when elements of the 145th Mr Bn, 200C NVA Sapper Bn, and 810th LF Bn attacked several positions in Dalat City.

June

(C) On the night of 3 Jun, the enemy launched Phase 3 of the Summer Campaign in the B-3 Front and MR 5. The offensive activity was widespread and consisted primarily of ABFs against RF/PF, US installations, and selected district headquarters. From 1800 hours, 3 Jun, until 1800 hours, 4 Jun, there were 3 ABFs, 28 attacks of harassing fire, and 7 ground probes. In the B-3 Front, the enemy activity in the Dak Seang/Ben Het area decreased sharply, and it appeared the enemy had completed his campaign. A prisoner captured in BA 702 confirmed that reported supply shortages in the B-3 Front had existed since the end of 1968. The shortages, plus the recent loss of significant supply and rice caches because of allied cross-border operations forced the B-3 Front to divert major forces into Cambodia to secure LOCs and areas for resupply. Prisoners from the K20 NVA Sapper Bn and the 349th NVA Bn captured in the vicinity of Labansiek, Cambodia, confirmed this intention. In Binh Dinh Province, MR 5, major elements of the 3d NVA Div continued to avoid major contact with allied forces. A prisoner and a Hoi Chanh revealed the battalions of the 2d NVA Regt moved eastward out of BA 226 into central Phu My District. Captured documents confirmed Phase 3 of the enemy's Summer Campaign began on the night of 3 Jun, and revealed the final stage of Phase 3 would take place during the last 10 days of June. In Khanh Hoa Province prisoners and captured documents revealed a new sapper battalion had been formed. In MR 6, prisoners captured during the 30-31 May attack on Dalat City revealed the 200C NVA Sapper Bn was redesignated A16 and moved in January from Binh Thuan Province to an area northwest of Dalat, Tuyen Duc Province.

July

(C) Enemy-initiated activity was at a reduced level, consisting primarily of scattered, harassing ABFs against RF, PF, and US installations. In the B-3 Front, major enemy forces remained out of contact and were probably engaged in resupply and production activities, re-establishing caches in BAs, and securing new logistical areas and LOCs in Cambodia. Aerial

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observation in the vicinity of Lomphat, Cambodia, revealed the probable use of the Tonle Srepok River for resupply of B-3 Front units. Prisoners captured in July revealed that between April and June the B-3 Front received two COSVN destined infiltration groups numbering between 400 and 500 personnel each. Three prisoners captured on 12 Jul, in the vicinity of Plei Me, confirmed B-3 Front supply activity along the Ia Drang River south of BA 701. Two other prisoners from the 1st Bn, 95B NVA Regt, also captured in the vicinity of Plei Me, revealed their unit's resupply mission in the vicinity of Ba Kev, Cambodia, and the establishment of storage sites in that area. The prisoners also stated elements of the 1st Bn, 95B NVA Regt and of the 631st NVA Bn participated in a 22 Jul attack on RF units. The mission of the 95B NVA Regt near Ba Kev was substantiated by a Hoi Chanh from the K-28 Recon Bn who further stated a forward element of the B-3 Front was located in Kontum Province and another in Cambodia. Additionally, the Hoi Chanh revealed B-52 strikes and allied cross-border operations destroyed numerous caches and impeded the movement of supplies, requiring new logistical corridors to be established in Cambodia. In Binh Dinh Province, MR 5, major elements of the 3d NVA Div continued to avoid contact with allied forces. A captured document revealed low morale within the 18th NVA Regt. The relatively low level of activity initiated by the 18th NVA Regt during the previous 6 months tended to substantiate the information. A prisoner from the 2d Bn, 2d NVA Regt stated elements of the battalion were located east of Phu My during June and moved west on or about 22 Jul for further training. The probable disposition of the battalions of the former 22d NVA Regt was revealed in a captured document which stated the 8th and 9th Bns were assigned to the provincial level, and the 7th Bn was assigned to the 18th NVA Regt. In MR 6, a captured document revealed the main enemy objectives in the region during 1970 would be US Forces in Binh Thuan Province and ARVN forces in Tuyen Duc Province. Further interrogation of a prisoner captured on 12 Jun in the vicinity of Cam Ranh Bay revealed elements of the 407th Sapper Bn were targeted against the Cam Ranh Bay and Dong Ba Thin area. Two prisoners, captured during the 5 Jul attack on US elements in the vicinity of Song Mao, revealed the enemy forces involved were elements of the 186th MF Bn, reinforced with the 440th LF Co.

August

(C) Enemy-initiated activity was at a low level until the night of 29 Aug when the enemy launched a series of coordinated attacks in the B-3 Front and MR 5. The increased activity probably represented the initiation of the enemy's Fall Campaign, in conjunction with the GVN-Senate election and VC/NVA anniversaries. The activity was widespread and consisted primarily of ABFs against RF/PF units, US installations, and civilian population centers. In the B-3 Front, a prisoner from the 80th NVA Bn, captured on 18 Aug in the vicinity of Kham Duc, Quang Tin Province, revealed that the battalion's mission was to attack Kham Duc. A rallier from the K28th NVA Recon Bn stated that combat troops were involved in transporting supplies and that attacks against the Plei Me, Duc Co, and Plei Djereng Special Forces camps, planned by B-3 Front elements, probably would not occur until the end of the rainy season because of supply shortages. Another prisoner from the 394th NVA Bn confirmed the supply shortages and revealed that the battalion occupied Lomphat, Cambodia, in May and moved to southern BA 701 in July after leaving personnel in Lomphat to organize the local guerrillas. In Binh Dinh Province, MR 5 elements of the 3d NVA Div continued to avoid major contact with allied units. A prisoner from the 4th Bn, 12th NVA Regt confirmed that the 7th Bn, formerly of the 22d NVA Regt, was resubordinated to the 12th Regt. Prisoners from the 90th NVA Engr Bn, 3d NVA Div, revealed that the battalion was targeted against Route 19 southwest of Phu Cat. In Khanh Hoa Province the POL tank farm

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at Cam Ranh Bay received a sapper attack from probable elements of the 407th MF Sapper Bn on 30 Aug, resulting in the loss of 460,000 gallons of aviation fuel. In MR 6, an agent report revealed that unidentified units of MR 6 were planning attacks against district headquarters and allied installations in the Phan Thiet area on 2 and 3 Sep. A document captured in Binh Thuan Province revealed that the 840th MF Bn was planning attacks east of Luong Son, also on 2 and 3 Sep. On 31 Aug, elements of the 840th MF Bn were identified in a battalion-size contact in the Luong Son area, resulting in 56 enemy killed.

September

(C) Enemy-initiated activity was at a reduced level, consisting primarily of scattered harassing ABFs against RF/PF units and US installations. In the B-3 Front, there was no significant enemy activity as major enemy units remained out of contact in the northern highlands and probably continued to engage in logistical and refitting activities. A prisoner from the X-67 LF Bn, captured on 10 Sep, revealed that elements of the battalion joined forces with elements of the 408th LF Sapper Bn and would conduct operations in the Plei Me area. Documents captured in Darlac Province on 23 Sep, revealed plans for attacks to be conducted by LF elements from 25 Sep until 8 Oct and from 11 to 24 Oct. The document also revealed that a highpoint would occur from 20 to 24 Oct. In MR 5, elements of the 3d NVA Div avoided contact with allied units operating in BA 226. [redacted] reports indicated that the 3d NVA Div elements might have been attempting to secure food during the rice harvest in Binh Dinh Province in conjunction with harassing attacks against RF/PF units. A prisoner from the 300th NVA Arty Bn, 3d NVA Div, captured on 2 Sep, revealed that the battalion would increase tactical activity in the Phu My/LZ Crystal area on 30 Sep and continue until 15 Oct. A Hoi Chanh and a prisoner from the 400th NVA Sapper Bn, 3d NVA Div, revealed that the battalion would conduct attacks against allied installations in the Phu My area. The rallier stated the attacks would begin in the near future in conjunction with the 300th NVA Artillery Bn. In Phu Yen Province, an RMK (contractor) Construction Camp received an ABF followed by a sapper attack on 8 Sep, resulting in \$100,000 of equipment damage. In Khanh Hoa Province, on 23 Sep, a cargo ship in Cam Ranh Bay was moderately damaged by an unknown type explosive device, probably set by LF swimmer/sapper elements. In MR 6, [redacted] the 481st and 482d LF Bns would combine with LF companies for attacks on district headquarters and allied installations in the Phan Thiet area in late September. [redacted] food and ammunition shortages in MR 6 might have been curtailing tactical operations in the LF units.

AS

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October

(C) The enemy probably initiated Phase II of his Fall (H-26) Campaign in the B-3 Front and MR 5. From 031830 to 051830 Oct, there were 25 ABFs and 12 ground probes reported throughout the region. This increase occurred primarily in Kontum Province in the B-3 Front and Binh Dinh in MR 5. Targets for the attacks were primarily RF/PF units and US installations. In the B-3 Front on 23 Oct, ARVN elements in the vicinity of the Plei Me CIDG Camp received an estimated battalion-size ground attack from probable elements of the 39th NVA Bn. On 30 Oct, US and ARVN elements at FSB Oasis received 80 rounds of mixed 82mm mortar and B-40 rocket

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fire followed by a sapper attack from an unidentified enemy force. On 1 Oct in Binh Dinh Province, MR 5, US elements at FSB Washington engaged elements of the 400th NVA Sapper Bn. A captured document revealed morale and leadership problems in the 2d NVA Regt, 3d NVA Div. The document also revealed that the regiment failed to accomplish its assigned mission during Phase 1, probably the enemy's fall campaign. A prisoner from the 6th Bn, 12th NVA Regt, stated that two companies of the 90th Engr Bn, 3d NVA Div, had augmented the 6th Bn for the past 2 months. On 20 Oct, an allied convoy on Route 19 was ambushed by probable elements of the C-2 Co, 90th Engr Bn, indicating that at least three companies of the battalion were supporting the 6th Bn, 12th NVA Regt. In Phu Yen Province on 4 Oct, ARVN forces received an ABF and ground attack from probable LF elements. In MR 6, a Hoi Chanh and a prisoner revealed that the effectiveness of ARVN operations and crop-destruction missions conducted in Ninh Thuan Province resulted in a shortage of supplies and low morale in the provincial units, and that many members of the units wanted to stop the fighting and return to civilian life. In Binh Thuan Province on 28 Oct, ARVN elements engaged an unknown-size probable LF unit, capturing assorted small-arm and crew-served weapons ammunition.

November

(C) Enemy-initiated activity was at a reduced level, except for increased harassment of LOCs in the B-3 Front and a 1-day coordinated increase in tactical activity in MR 6. In the B-3 Front, major enemy forces remained out of contact as they probably continued to engage in logistical activity. During the period 16 to 22 Nov, ARVN elements conducted Operation NGUYEN HUE II/I in BAs 701 and 740. Contact with the enemy was light and scattered; however, several significant caches were discovered. On 17 and 19 Nov, caches containing 245 tons of 85mm ammunition, 11,150 gallons of gasoline, and 10 tons of 105mm ammunition were discovered in northern BA 701. Additionally, several caches totaling 39 tons of rice were discovered in BAs 701 and 740. On 19 Nov, a hamlet northwest of Pleiku City was attacked by an estimated enemy battalion, probably elements of the 631st NVA Bn. On 21 Nov, probable elements of the 95B NVA Regt ambushed an allied convoy on Route 19 in the vicinity of the Mang Giang Pass. In Binh Dinh Province, MR 5, major elements of the 3d NVA Div remained out of contact as severe weather probably preempted any planned tactical activity. A document captured in Binh Dinh Province provided information on the enemy's diplomatic offensive based on the PRG eight-point proposal made in Paris. Other documents captured in the province revealed the enemy's plans, based on MR 5 Resolution 10, for a protracted war by increasing guerrilla warfare. Targets for LF units were to be the GVN pacification program and allied forces, specifically LOCs and allied installations. The documents provided an indication of the enemy's knowledge, since mid-August, of US troop withdrawals in MR 2. In Khanh Hoa Province on 26 Nov, probable swimmer-sapper elements of the 407th MF Sapper Bn detonated an explosive charge in the vicinity of a US cargo ship, wounding two civilian crewmen and slightly damaging the ship. In MR 6 on the morning of 29 Nov, the enemy launched a coordinated series of attacks against RF/PF elements and allied installations. In Lam Dong Province on 29 Nov, RF elements received an attack from an unknown-size enemy force which penetrated the compound perimeter. In Binh Thuan Province, a prisoner revealed emphasis on low-level propaganda activities to counter the GVN pacification program and a captured document indicated the enemy's concern in controlling desertions in district units. On 29 Nov, RF elements in the Luong Son area engaged an estimated enemy battalion, possibly the 186th MF Bn. Later on 29 Nov, ARVN elements in the same area engaged an estimated two enemy companies in two contacts, possibly elements of the 186th MF Bn in combination with LF units.

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December

(C) Enemy-initiated activity was at a reduced level; however, there was a slight increase in harassment attacks and ABFs over the previous month. In the B-3 Front major enemy forces remained out of contact, and probably continued logistical activity. Enemy-initiated activity in this area was characterized by scattered ABFs against allied units and installations and was primarily centered in Pleiku Province. On 6 Dec National Police Field Force elements ambushed probable elements of the Gia Lai Provincial Unit west of An Khe, Binh Dinh Province. From 11 to 12 Dec, 11 tons of rice were captured in the vicinity of BA 202. The caches were probably maintained by elements of the 95B NVA Regt, and such a loss would further compound the enemy's logistical problems in BA 202. A PW stated that because of numerous casualties from Dak Seang, Cambodia, and winter campaigns, the B-3 Front was forced to regroup and reorganize its units into smaller, more-easily manageable units. The 2d Bn, 95B NVA Regt, was placed under command of the Gia Lai Provincial Unit, while the Headquarters and the 1st Bn, 95B Regt, remained under control of the B-3 Front. This was the first report of the reorganization, and additional information was required to substantiate the PW's statements. In Binh Dinh, MR 5, major units of the 3d NVA Div continued to give primary attention to logistical and training activities. An enemy force, probably elements of the 13th NVA Bn, Phu Yen Provincial Unit, entered Phu Lon hamlet and abducted 30 civilians. This was a further indication of the enemy's continued use of terrorism to counter the GVN pacification program and regain control of the population in Phu Yen Province. On 2 Dec an enemy unit, probably the 9th NVA Bn, attacked ARVN elements 20 km south of Song Cau. A document captured on 12 Nov substantiated previous information on guerrilla shortages and the emphasis the enemy was placing on guerrilla warfare. The continued reference to these subjects in documents captured in Binh Dinh Province indicated that the GVN pacification program made serious inroads into the strength of the enemy's guerrilla forces. Other captured documents indicated that serious morale and ideological problems were being experienced by the 2d NVA Regt and also suggested that these problems were common throughout the 3d NVA Div. Two ambushes of US convoys in Binh Dinh and Khanh Hoa Provinces may have indicated that the plans of the Binh Dinh Provincial Unit, which prescribed attacks against LOCs may have pertained to all of southern MR 5. (80)

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(U) Table III-13 shows enemy-initiated incidents, losses, and weapons captured in II CTZ/MR 2 during 1970.

Enemy-Initiated Incidents, Losses, and Weapons Captured in II CTZ/MR 2 - 1970

	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>
Attacks-by-fire	20	18	8	95	65	21
Assaults	51	60	37	84	99	55
Ambushes	6	3	8	9	19	9
Harassments*	206 (169)	201 (158)	184 (131)	423 (357)	376 (340)	199 (170)
Terrorism	37	65	101	92	72	69
Sabotage	1	1	0	3	2	3
Propaganda	1	0	3	2	0	2
AA Fire	129	163	111	325	136	86
TOTAL	451	511	452	1,003	769	444
Enemy KIA	1,082	938	1,163	3,905	3,384	893
Weapons Captured	610	968	692	797	758	499
CSW	88	93	115	124	76	48
IW	522	875	577	673	682	451

	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>
Attacks-by-fire	16	41	23	18	7	16
Assaults	31	15	45	35	20	36
Ambushes	12	12	12	11	10	15
Harassments*	165 (118)	199 (150)	204 (150)	111 (95)	75 (56)	142 (119)
Terrorism	36	18	24	21	20	33
Sabotage	1	7	3	6	0	1
Propaganda	0	2	0	0	0	6
AA Fire	86	120	158	193	120	92
TOTAL	347	414	469	395	252	341
Enemy KIA	820	853	835	1,043	766	1,059
Weapons Captured	420	807	461	542	395	418
CSW	28	67	42	62	38	26
IW	392	740	419	480	357	392

*Fire of Less Than 20 Rounds in Parenthesis

SOURCE: MACJ2

TABLE III-13

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Organization and Dispositions

(U) Tables III-14, III-15, and III-16 show the MACV enemy order of battle holdings as of 31 Jan, 30 Jun, and 31 Dec 1970 respectively. Figures III-23A and B, III-24A and B, and III-25A and B show enemy unit locations as of 31 Jan, 30 Jun, 31 Dec 1970 respectively.

II CTZ/MR 2
MACV ENEMY OB HOLDINGS
31 JAN 70

HANOI HIGH COMMAND

B-3 NVA FRONT

24 NVA INF REGT	K25B NVA ENG BN
40 NVA ARTY REGT	K37 NVA SAP BN
66 NVA INF REGT	K20 NVA SAP BN
28 NVA INF REGT	K394 NVA INF BN
K25A NVA ENG BN	631 NVA INF BN

MILITARY REGION 5

95 NVA ARTY BN (COMP)	30 VC INF BN
18 NVA INF REGT NT 3 NVA DIV	300 NVA SAP BN
2 NVA INF REGT NT 3 NVA DIV	407 VC SAP BN

BINH DINH PROV

36 VC LF SAP BN	E 210 VC LF INF BN
50 VC LF INF BN	VC-11 VC LF INF BN

DAKLAK PROV

X45 VC LF INF BN H4 DIST	E 301 VC LF INF BN
	401 VC LF SAP BN

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KHANH HOA PROV

K12 NVA LF INF BN

KONTUM PROV

406 VC LF SAP BN

PHU YEN PROV

96 VC INF BN

GIA LJA PROV

408 VC LF SAP BN

COSVN

MILITARY REGION 6

200 C NVA SAP BN

145 VC INF BN

186 VC INF BN

NINH THUAN PROV

610 NVA INF BN

BINH THUAN PROV

481 VC LF INF BN

TUYEN DUC PROV

810 VC LF INF BN

MILITARY REGION 10

QUANG DUC PROV

D251 VC LF INF BN

SOURCE: MACJ2

304 VC LF INF BN

K13 NVA LF BN

H15 VC LF INF BN

130 NVA ARTY BN

240 NVA INF BN

840 VC INF BN

482 VC LF INF BN

TABLE III-14


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
FIGURE III-23A

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UNLOCATED UNITS

- K32 [DL] 40
- K33 [DL] 40
- K37 [S] 83
- K3 [DL] 28
- 9 [DL] 66
- 28 [DL] 83
- K1 [DL] 28
- K2 [DL] 28
- 66 [DL] 83
- 7 [DL] 66
- 8 [DL] 66

MACV ORDER OF BATTLE
MR 2
SOUTHERN HALF
31 JAN 70



SOURCE: MACJ2

FIGURE III-23B

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II CTZ/MR 2
MACV ENEMY OB HOLDINGS
30 JUNE 70

HANOI HIGH COMMAND

E-3 NVA FRONT

24 NVA INF REGT

25B NVA INF REGT

K07 NVA SAP BN

K394 NVA INF BN

K28 NVA RECON BN

40 NVA ARTY REGT

66 NVA INF REGT

28 NVA INF REGT

K20 NVA SAP BN

631 NVA INF BN

MILITARY REGION 5

95 NVA ARTY BN (COMP)

407 VC SAP BN

BINH DINH PROV

36 VC LF SAP BN

50 VC LF SAP BN

E210 VC LF INF BN

300 VC LF SAP BN

DAKLAK PROV

X45 VC INF BN
H4 DIST

E301 VC LF INF BN

401 VC LF SAP BN

KHANH HOA PROV

K12 NVA LF INF BN

KONTUM PROV

304 VC LF INF BN

406 VC LF SAP BN

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PHU YEN PROV

96 VC LF INF BN
K14 VC LF INF BN

K13 NVA LF INF BN

GIA LIA PROV

H15 VC LF INF BN

NONG TRUONG 3 NVA INF DIV

18 NVA INF REGT
7 NVA INF REGT
8 NVA INF BN
22 NVA INF REGT
90 NVA ENGR BN
300 NVA ARTY BN (COMP)

500 NVA TRANS BN
551 NVA SIG BN
40 NVA SAP BN
NT3 NVA INF DIV
200 NVA AD BN
600 NVA MED BN

COSVN

MILITARY REGION 6

130 NVA ARTY BN
145 VC INF BN
240 NVA INF BN

200C NVA SAP BN
186 VC INF BN
840 VC INF BN

NINH THUAN PROV

610 NVA INF BN

BINH THUAN PROV

481 VC LF INF BN

482 VC LF INF BN

TUYEN DUC PROV

810 VC LF INF BN

MILITARY REGION 10

QUANG DUC PROV

D251 VC LF BN

SOURCE: MACJ2

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TABLE III-15

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
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MACV ORDER OF BATTLE MR 2 NORTHERN HALF 30 JUNE 70

UNLOCATED UNITS

40 III K2 II 28 II K31 I B3 III 42 III GL 4 III 24 III 40 B3 III
 K30 III 40 III 8 III 66 III 24 III B3 III 6 III 24 III 44 III 40 III
 K32 III 40 III 66 III B3 III 9 III 66 III 240 III K20 III B3 III B3 III
 D23 K26



BD BINH DINH PROV
 PY PHU YEN PROV
 GL GIA LIA PROV
 K KONTUM PROV

SOURCE: MACJ2

FIGURE III-24A


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MACV ORDER OF BATTLE MR 2 SOUTHERN HALF 30 JUNE 70



SOURCE: MACJ2

FIGURE III-24B

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II CTZ/MR 2
MACV ENEMY OB HOLDINGS
31 DEC 70

HANOI HIGH COMMAND

B-3 NVA FRONT

24 NVA INF REGT
40 NVA ARTY REGT
66 NVA INF REGT
95B NVA INF REGT
28 NVA INF REGT
K37 NVA SAP BN

K20 NVA SAP BN
K394 NVA INF BN
631 NVA INF BN
K28 NVA RECON BN
K27 NVA GUARD BN
K80 NVA SAP BN

MILITARY REGION 5

95 NVA ARTY BN (COMP)

407 VC SAP BN

BINH DINH PROV

36 VC LF SAP BN
50 VC LF INF BN
F210 VC LF INF BN

300 VC LF SAP BN
8 NVA LF INF BN

DAKLAK PROV

X45 VC INF BN
H4 DIST

E 301 VC LF INF BN
401 VC LF SAP BN

KHANH HOA PROV

K12 NVA LF INF BN

KHANH HOA VC SAP BN

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III-150

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KONTUM PROV

304 VC LF INF BN

406 VC LF SAP BN

PHU YEN PROV

96 VC LF INF BN

K14 VC LF INF BN

K13 NVA LF INF BN

9 NVA LF INF BN

GIA LAI PROV

408 VC LF SAP BN

H15 VC LF INF BN

NONG TRUONG 3 NVA INF DIV

12 NVA INF REGT

200 NVA AD BN

2 NVA INF REGT

300 NVA ARTY BN COMP

7 NVA INF BN

500 NVA TRANS BN

40 NVA SAP BN

551 NVA SIG BN

90 NVA ENGR BN

600 NVA MED BN

COSVN

MILITARY REGION 6

130 NVA ARTY BN

186 VC INF BN

A16 NVA SAP BN

240 NVA INF BN

145 VC INF BN

840 VC INF BN

NINH THUAN PROV

610 NVA INF BN

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BINH THUAN PROV

481 VC LF INF BN

482 VC LF INF BN

TUYEN DUC PROV

810 VC LF INF BN

MILITARY REGION 10

QUANG DUC PROV

D251 VC LF INF BN

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TABLE III-16


III-152

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UNLOCATED UNITS

B3	XXX	9	68	K32	40	6	24	K1	28	K20	B3	K27	B3
66	B3	40	B3	K44	40	5	B3	K2	28	K26	B3	(GUARD)	
7	66	K11	40	24	B3	6	B3	K37	B3	K80	B3	7	NT3
8	66	K30	40	4	24	K3	28						

MACV ORDER OF BATTLE
MR 2
NORTHERN HALF
31 DEC 70



SOURCE: MACJ2

FIGURE III-25A

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
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**MACV ORDER OF BATTLE
MR 2
SOUTHERN HALF
31 DEC 70**



SOURCE: MACJ2

FIGURE III-25D

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Enemy Situation in III CTZ/MR 3

Introduction

(S) The allied cross-border operations in Cambodia significantly reduced the threat to MR 3 (designated III CTZ until 1 Jul 70). However, areas of potential enemy activity existed along the RVN/Cambodia border in northern Phuoc Long and Tay Ninh Provinces. HQ, 5th VC Div and its 174th NVA Regt were located generally north of BA 350. The 7th NVA Div and its three regiments were deployed generally north of BA 353. Elements of the 9th VC Div were located in Cambodia, west of Tay Ninh Province. Enemy activity throughout MR 3 centered on logistical efforts to restore supply lines, BAs, and command and control systems disrupted by the cross-border operations. Activity was characterized by small-unit counter-pacification operations, low intensity ABFs, and increased reliance on sapper attacks against isolated RF/PF and PSDF outposts.

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Strength

(U) Table III-17 shows the enemy personnel strength in III CTZ/MR 3 for 1970. Table III-18 shows the number and type of VC/NVA battalions in III CTZ/MR 3 for 1970.

III CTZ/MR 3
PERSONNEL STRENGTH - 1970

<u>Month</u>	<u>Maneuver</u>	<u>Combat Strength</u>	<u>Total Combat Strength</u>	<u>Admin Services</u>	<u>Guerrilla</u>	<u>Total</u>
Jan	31,185 (13,925)*	8,775 (5,160)	39,960 (19,085)	28,675	4,500	73,135 (19,085)
Feb	29,855 (12,665)	8,695 (5,160)	38,550 (17,825)	28,655	4,200	71,405 (17,825)
Mar	29,040 (12,370)	8,470 (5,130)	37,510 (17,500)	28,655	3,900	70,065 (17,500)
Apr	28,130 (11,880)	8,655 (5,315)	36,785 (17,195)	29,255	3,700	69,740 (17,195)
May	26,600 (10,760)	8,655 (5,315)	35,255 (16,075)	29,805	3,600	68,660 (16,075)
Jun	27,645 (10,920)	8,525 (5,315)	36,170 (16,235)	31,660	3,500	71,330 (16,235)
Jul	26,490 (9,915)	8,375 (5,165)	34,865 (15,080)	33,075	3,400	71,340 (15,080)
Aug	27,055 (10,210)	8,475 (5,265)	35,530 (15,475)	34,825	3,400	73,755 (15,475)
Sep	26,450 (10,210)	8,675 (5,465)	35,125 (15,675)	35,160 (110)	2,900	73,185 (15,785)
Oct	26,120 (9,935)	8,675 (5,465)	34,795 (15,400)	35,160 (110)	2,800	72,755 (15,510)
Nov	26,815 (10,225)	8,390 (5,150)	35,205 (15,375)	33,910 (110)	2,800	71,915 (15,485)
Dec	26,550 (9,960)	8,390 (5,150)	34,940 (15,110)	32,785 (110)	2,700	70,425 (15,220)

*NVA shown in parentheses

SOURCE: MACJ231

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TABLE III-17

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III CTZ/MR 3
VC/NVA BATTALIONS - 1970

VC	MF	MF	LF	LF	Recont+	Scyty+	Arty	Sig	Trans	Total	Total	Total
	Inf+	Sap+	Inf+	Sap+							VC/NVA	Maneuver
Jan	35	8	6	0	2	0	10	1	0	62	124	91
Feb	35	8	6	0	2	0	10	1	0	62	121	88
Mar	35	7	6	0	2	0	10	1	0	61	119	86
Apr	35	7	6	0	2	0	10	1	0	61	122	88
May	35	7	5	0	2	0	10	1	0	60	119	85
Jun	33	7	5	0	3	2	9	1	0	60	120	87
Jul	33	7	5	0	3	2	9	1	0	60	120	87
Aug	32	7	5	0	3	2	9	1	0	59	121	87
Sep	31	5	5	0	3	2	9	1	0	56	119	84
Oct	31	5	5	0	3	2	9	1	0	56	118	83
Nov	31	6	5	0	3	2	9	1	0	57	120	85
Dec	31	6	5	0	3	2	9	1	0	57	119	84

NVA	Inf+	Sap+	Recont+	Scyty+	Arty	Sig	Trans	Med	Engr	Trng	Log	Total
Jan	34	6	0	0	14	2	2	2	2	0	0	62
Feb	31	6	0	0	14	2	2	2	2	0	0	59
Mar	31	5	0	0	14	2	2	2	2	0	0	58
Apr	31	7	0	0	14	2	2	2	2	0	1	61
May	29	7	0	0	14	2	2	2	2	0	1	59
Jun	29	8	0	0	14	2	2	2	2	0	1	60
Jul	29	8	0	0	14	2	2	2	2	0	1	60
Aug	29	8	0	1	14	2	2	2	2	0	2	62
Sep	29	8	0	1	14	2	2	2	2	3	0	63
Oct	28	8	0	1	14	2	2	2	2	3	0	62
Nov	28	9	0	1	14	2	2	2	2	3	0	63
Dec	27	9	0	1	14	2	2	2	2	3	0	62

+Maneuver Battalion

SOURCE: MACJ231

TABLE III-18

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Winter Campaign in III CTZ

(C) The enemy's Winter Campaign, November 1969, extended through 6 Feb 70. An analysis of the campaign in III CTZ afforded a good indication of the enemy's intentions and efforts because of the geographic and political importance of III CTZ.

(C) COSVN Resolution 9 revealed the campaign objectives. To determine the extent to which the enemy attained the goals set forth in the resolution, it was necessary to compare his actions and the results with his stated objectives. Resolution 9 stated the overall COSVN goal was to end the war in a stronger position than the GVN and to control a major part of the countryside before a settlement was reached. In order to achieve this goal, four military objectives were set:

1. Force the withdrawal of US Forces.
2. Prevent the improvement of the ARVN.
3. Disrupt the GVN's pacification program.
4. Strengthen enemy base and supply areas.

(C) Strong attacks on US Forces with anticipated heavy casualties, were aimed at accelerating US withdrawals by increasing anti-war pressures. Heavy attacks on ARVN units at the same time were to prevent the replacement and training of personnel and result in the eventual disintegration of the ARVN. The elimination of pacification cadre and RF/PF personnel was called for to discredit the pacification program and secure control of the rural areas around Saigon. The strategic plan also called for improving BAs and supply corridors, encircling other municipalities and allied bases, and developing an in-place force inside Saigon and the Capital Military District (CMD).

(C) Clear evidence of compliance with the guidance contained in COSVN Resolution 9 was observed as the Winter Campaign developed. The enemy's divisional forces remained near their strategic northern bases attempting to dislodge the smaller allied installations threatening supply and infiltration corridors. His tactics also reflected COSVN guidance in that he placed heavy suppressive fire on allied FSBs while attempting to ambush allied patrols. In the SRs around Saigon, emphasis on sapper tactics against ARVN and RF/PF posts was evident. SR 1 MF battalions were converted to sapper units, and the 1st NVA Regt sapper company was expanded to a battalion. Attempts to expand the Communist force structure were indicated by the appearance of the newly formed 6-B Bn of SR 2 and by the probable reconstitution of the Quyet Thang Regt disbanded earlier. Numerous captured documents and statements by enemy personnel revealed plans to support local forces with main-force units in the anti-pacification effort. Also, evidence of an attempt to disrupt pacification and extend the enemy's logistical effort was seen in movement of elements of the 33d Regt into Binh Thuy Province. The emphasis on improving logistical capabilities in MRs 10, 7, and 6 could also be interpreted from the large stockpiles of arms, munitions, and equipment found in southwestern War Zone "D" near Rang Rang. The reduction of SR 6 action elements and the statements of PWs revealed the enemy changed from overt attempts to infiltrate the CMD to using agents and terrorists operating under legal cover in the capital.

(C) The results of the enemy's redirected efforts were reflected in various statistics during the Winter Campaign in III CTZ. Enemy-initiated incidents gradually rose during November and

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remained at the higher level throughout December and January, although activity in general was light. The high point of 21 Jan fell short of those recorded in previous campaigns. There was a clear increase in the percentage of incidents involving ARVN units and the proportion of incidents, by the end of January, indicated US, ARVN, and RF/PF units were about equally targeted. Two terrorist incidents in the Thu Duc Officers' Candidate School also reflected direct attempts to target ARVN training facilities.

(C) Enemy losses generally decreased in each succeeding month and reflected a continued effort to conserve manpower by using ABFs and stand-off actions while attempting to avoid large-scale contacts. Enemy losses continued at a significant rate in spite of a downward trend, indicating he still operated at a disadvantage vis-a-vis friendly forces and the VC/NVA wanted to maintain military pressure.

(C) A study of the trends during the Winter Campaign confirmed the effect of COSVN guidance on the enemy's tactical operations in III CTZ. A comparison of enemy accomplishments with his military objectives, on the other hand, revealed that the Winter Campaign failed to show significant enemy progress in III CTZ. While ARVN forces were increasingly targeted, incidents against them tripled, ARVN losses reflected only a moderate rise, and the number of ARVN killed per incident dropped. Meanwhile, the number of attacks directed at US Forces and the US KIA rate declined steadily contrary to COSVN emphasis on heavy US casualties. Attacks on RF/PF also decreased during January, and no reversals in pacification progress were noted. Finally, the territory and population under Communist control continued to decline; enemy BAs and infiltration corridors were continuously threatened by allied operations; and enemy logistics efforts were hampered by the discovery of forward supply caches.

(C) From this analysis, it could be concluded the enemy was not successful in attaining the objectives of COSVN Resolution 9 in III CTZ during the Winter Campaign. He failed to inflict heavy US casualties and increase pressures for a withdrawal. He failed to cause an ARVN defeat or prevent the improvement of the RVNAF. And, he failed to reverse the continued progress in the pacification program. However, there were indications the VC/NVA used the period of the Winter Campaign to build logistically and to reindoctrinate political cadre and military forces (as ordered by Resolution 9), prior to launching greater efforts to implement tactics consistent with Resolution 9 later in the spring. (81)

Enemy Activity

January

(C) Enemy-initiated activity increased during the month and was characterized by ABFs, harassing fire, and limited ground probes. During the period 201800 to 220600 Jan, there were 14 ABFs and 48 harassing fire attacks. The major emphasis was in the northern provinces, where 40 attacks were conducted. The other attacks were scattered throughout the CTZ and appeared to be well coordinated. The 9th VC Div was deployed in War Zone "C," with the 272d VC Regt in the western area, the 95C NVA Regt in the central portion, and the 271st VC Regt in the eastern sector. The 7th NVA Div was deployed in northern Binh Long and northwestern Phuoc Long Provinces along the border. The 141st NVA Regt and the 209th NVA Regt were also identified

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in the area. The 5th VC Div probably remained deployed in an area from northwest of Bu Dop on the Cambodian border to central Phuoc Long Province. Artillery elements of the division were probably responsible for heavy ABFs on 20 and 21 Jan against the MACV compound near Song Be. Documents captured northwest of FSB Judie on 7 Jan identified elements of the 2d Bn, 275th VC Regt, and possible elements of the 24th AA Bn, 5th VC Div. The enemy unit involved in two 20 Jan contacts north of Duc Phong Special Forces Camp was probably an element of the 174th NVA Regt. In MR 7, enemy-initiated activity was light except on the night of 20 Jan, when there was an increase in ABFs and harassing fire. The battalions of the 33d NVA Regt were believed to be operating in central Long Khanh Province, primarily targeted against the pacification program and engaged in logistical activities. The 274th VC Regt probably remained deployed in the vicinity of BA 303. Enemy activity in the SRs was characterized by light, scattered ABFs, harassing fires, and reconnaissance and supply activity. In SR 1, documents captured at a possible supply transfer point identified elements of the 101st NVA Regt. The continued identification of SR 1 units in the upper Saigon River corridor indicated they were still required to transport their own supplies. Documents and cache discoveries indicated a continued logistics problem for the SR. In SR 2, a prisoner captured 3 Jan and identified as the Commanding Officer, 2d Co, 6th Bn, indicated an element of his company was conducting reconnaissance in Long An Province for a planned attack by SR units. The SR's lack of activity during the period of increased enemy activity on 20 and 21 Jan may have been due to the loss of a munitions cache captured south of Go Dau Ha on 19 Jan. In SR 3, the Assistant Chief of Staff, 3d Bn, 1st NVA Regt, captured on 8 Jan, stated the battalion's mission was to operate in Binh Phouc District and to harass ARVN OPs. He also stated the unit normally planned one attack each month, but since October 1969 no attacks were conducted because of a shortage of ammunition and allied preemptive activity. The source also stated the battalion had plans for a new offensive in late January. A prisoner captured 7 Jan, north of Can Duoc, identified the Military Intelligence Group, SR 3, and stated its mission was to intercept radio transmissions from Long An Province and the 3d Bn, 50th ARVN Regt, to determine the location and future plans of these units. In SR 4, an undated document captured on 20 Jan, suggested future tactical and political activity would continue to focus on disrupting the pacification program. In SR 5, documents captured southwest of Phuoc Vinh identified the 2d Bn, Dong Nai VC Regt. Terrorist activity in Saigon decreased with four minor incidents reported. At month's end, major units were preparing for future tactical activity and were engaged in logistical activity.

February

(C) Enemy-initiated activity was characterized by ABFs, limited ground probes, and logistical activity. Phase III of the Winter/Spring Campaign was initiated the night of 26 Feb with a marked increase in harassing fires. The 9th VC Div, 272d VC Regt, and the 271st VC Regt remained deployed as in January. The 7th NVA Div was deployed from the Fishhook to the northwestern Phuoc Long Province border area. The 5th VC Div probably remained deployed in northern Phuoc Long Province. The 275th VC Regt was believed to have shifted its AO to the Bu Dop/Bo Duc area. Evidence of infiltration and logistical activity in northeastern Phuoc Long Province was provided by the confirmation of a trail network running generally from BA 351 southeast to the Jolley Road. After 17 Feb, ARVN forces captured a total of 70 tons of rice along the suspected trace of the network. On 17 Feb, in the general area, US helicopters killed 45 enemy, probably a group of infiltrators or rear service personnel. In MR 7, in the vicinity of Rang Rang, Mobile Strike Force elements discovered a series of caches containing a total of 169 tons of munitions. The area was believed to be a BA for RSG 81. The loss of these munitions compounded the

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logistical shortages in MR 7. Elements of the 33d NVA Regt were relocated to Binh Tuy Province where they were believed to be targeted against the pacification effort. Additionally, prisoners captured east of Vo Dot stated the regiment had been reubordinated to the 5th VC Div. The 274th VC Regt probably remained deployed in the vicinity of BA 303. Enemy activity in the SRs was characterized by light, scattered ABFs, harassing fires, and reconnaissance and logistical activity. In SR 1, the former Chief of Staff of the 268th Regt stated if allied units maintained the same level of activity and success for the next 2 to 3 months as they had in the last 6 months, both the 268th Regt and SR1 itself would be rendered ineffective. Documents captured east of Dau Tieng gave further evidence that the Spring Campaign would be localized and the intensity of tactical activity would depend on individual unit capability. In SR 2, interrogations of a Hoi Chanh ^{AS} revealed a new regiment was formed by SR 2 in November 1969. The regiment, consisting of the 267th and 16B Bns, was formed to attack observation posts, conduct countersweep operations, and harass the pacification and rural development programs. The Hoi Chanh stated the 16B Bn was originally the N-16 Bn of SR 6, but was reassigned to SR 2 in November 1969 and subsequently redesignated the 16B Bn. A prisoner captured northeast of the sugar plantation on 17 Feb, stated he had heard that the 267th and 269th Bn would move into northern Duc Hoa District to conduct tactical activity. The timing given agreed with other tenuous information indicating a major offensive may have been planned for late March. In SR 3, an NVA prisoner from the Tan An Special Action Unit revealed he and 19 other NVA personnel were assigned to the unit in April 1969. The integration of NVA with LFs was a direct result of the decline of recruitment in the provinces and heavy losses incurred by the LF units. In SR 4 on 3 Feb, there were two attacks against shipping in the Long Tau Shipping Channel, with minor damages and no casualties reported. The last attack against shipping in the Long Tau Shipping Channel occurred on 10 Oct 69. In SR 5 on 3 Feb, elements of the Dong Nai Regt were probably involved in a contact west of Tan Uyen, which resulted in 23 reported enemy-initiated incidents.

March

(C) During the month, enemy-initiated activity continued to be characterized by ABFs, limited ground probes, and logistical activity. Major divisional elements continued training, political indoctrination, and logistical activity. The change in government in Cambodia caused VC/NVA units great concern over the status of their border BAs. At the end of the month, open conflict between Cambodian and VC/NVA forces was occurring, and the situation along the III CTZ/Cambodian border was tense. The 9th VC Div was deployed in northern Tay Ninh Province with the 272d VC Regt and the 95C NVA Regt in north central Tay Ninh Province. The 271st Regt was probably located in the border sanctuary. Elements of the 66th Security Regt were identified following an 18 Mar contact northwest of Thien Ngou Special Forces Camp. The 7th NVA Div was deployed from the Fishhook area to west of BA 350. The 165th NVA Regt was probably located in the Fishhook area corridor to safeguard logistical routes along the upper Saigon River. The 141st NVA Regt was located in northern Binh Long Province. Elements of the 209th NVA Regt were identified west of Loc Ninh in contacts on 2, 10, and possibly 22 Mar. The 5th VC Div, except the 33d NVA Regt, probably remained deployed in northern Phuoc Long Province. The 33d NVA Regt remained in eastern Binh Tuy Province and was primarily engaged in logistical activity. Elements of the 275th VC Regt and divisional sapper elements were identified west of Song Be. After 19 Mar, friendly forces captured a total of 37.3 tons of rice south-southwest of Bu Dop in a possible supply area for the 275th Regt. Documents captured in the same area identified elements of the 70th RSG and revealed the enemy was attempting to reopen the upper portion of the Sergeas Jungle.

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Highway with a new road nearing completion. This was probably designed to expedite infiltration of supplies prior to the beginning of the rainy season. Elements of the 174th NVA Regt were believed to be engaged in logistical security missions. Documents captured southeast of BA 351 identified elements of the 174th Regt along the trail network running from BA 351 southeast to the Jolley Road. On 16 Mar, US Forces discovered a 30-ton rice cache in eastern Binh Tuy Province which probably belonged to elements of MR 6. In MR 7, a document captured in northern Long Khanh gave further evidence of the continuing food and rear service problems of MR 7 units. The 274th VC Regt probably remained deployed in the vicinity of BA 303. Enemy-initiated activity in the SRs was characterized by light, scattered ABFs, harassing fires, and reconnaissance and supply activity. In SR 1, documents captured on 6 Mar and a prisoner captured on 11 Mar, southwest of Minh Thanh, identified elements of the 101st NVA Regt. Documents captured on 7 Mar northeast of Hoc Mon indicated the Quy Thang Regt would redeploy elements into the Hoc Mon area in preparation for offensive activity. A document captured west of Phu Cuong outlined the missions of SR 1 forces in 1970. The document stated the immediate mission was not to liberate new areas but to retain areas now under enemy control and to stay close to the population. Further, the document stressed the vital importance of the efforts to disband the PSDF, if possible turning PSDF personnel into secret enemy guerrillas. A 20 Mar contact in the Boi Loi Woods, as well as information from a Hoi Chanh, indicated that the 268th VC Regt relocated from its Cambodia sanctuary to its normal AO in BA 356. On 22 Mar, a woman terrorist threw an explosive device into a group of Vietnamese civilians in the vicinity of the Hoc Mon District Headquarters compound, killing 17 civilians and injuring 41. In SR 2, a prisoner captured northeast of Ben Luc identified the 6th VC Bn. A document captured on 11 Mar in southwestern Hau Nghia Province gave guidance for missions to be carried out in 1970. The documents revealed a large-scale operation by enemy units was no longer possible; therefore, SR 2 battalions would be placed at the disposal of district units. Units would be targeted against pacification teams and isolated RF companies; however, engagements with company-sized or larger units were to be restricted to minimize casualties. Lending credence to this document was a letter captured at the same location on 1 Mar which revealed the 2642d NVA Bn was assigned to the Duc Hoa District Unit in accordance with the new mission of 1970. In SR 3, there was no significant enemy activity. In SR 4, elements of the 10th Sapper Bn were probably involved in contacts on 10 and 18 Mar on the northern edge of the Rung Sat Special Zone. On 4 Mar, there was one attack against a vessel in the Long Tau Shipping Channel with minor damage and no casualties reported. In SR 5, a rallier from the Dong Nai NVA Regt stated the regiment had a severe rice shortage and poor morale. In Saigon terrorist activity increased, with 17 enemy-initiated incidents reported.

April

(C) Enemy-initiated activity increased during the first 2 days of the month and was characterized by ABFs and limited ground probes as divisional units adjusted to new AOs and conducted logistic missions in preparation for possible future activity. Throughout the month, however, the enemy was hard pressed to protect his BAs and LOCs along the Cambodian border because of the coordinated Vietnamese and Cambodian military operations. The 9th VC Div completed its move to an AO in western Tay Ninh Province, with the 271st VC Regt in the vicinity of BA 706, the 95C NVA Regt in the vicinity of BA 354, and the 272d VC Regt probably along the Cambodian border and in northwestern Tay Ninh Province. Captured documents indicated the redeployment of the division was planned prior to the change of government in Cambodia. All three regiments received replacements prior to or concurrent with the redeployments. The 7th NVA Div was probably

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deployed from northern Tay Ninh to BA 350. It appeared the 7th Div was adjusting its AO to fill the gap made as the 9th Div shifted its AO. The 209th and 165th NVA Regts were identified in northern Tay Ninh Province and the upper Saigon River corridor, respectively. The 141st NVA Regt was not identified or contacted after 11 Mar when it was located in BA 350. The 5th VC Div, except for the 33d NVA Regt, probably remained deployed in northern and central Phuoc Long Province. Documents captured on 11 Apr northwest of Song Be indicated the 22d Arty Bn, 5th VC Div, and an unidentified regiment, would attack the Bu Dop Special Forces Camp and the Song Be/FSB Buttons area during phases A and B of Campaign X. The 33d NVA Regt remained deployed in eastern Binh Tuy Province. Documents captured on 14 Apr identified the 74th NVA Rocket Regt, MR 7, and contained firing data for specific targets to include objectives in Saigon, Bien Hoa/Long Binh, Bearcat, Blackhorse, Nui Dat, and Vung Tau. Enemy activity in the SRs was characterized by light, scattered ABFs, harassing fires, and reconnaissance and supply activity. Information from Tan Tru District, SR 3, infrastructure members indicated a company of the 2d Bn, 1st NVA Regt was placed under the operational control of SR 3 and assigned to work directly for Tan Tru District to counter pacification activities. The necessity for NVA support of VCI activities in SR 3, along with the previously reported conversion of MF units in SR 2, was a reflection of the enemy's continued emphasis on small-unit guerrilla tactics to counter the pacification program. Saigon was hit by four 122mm rockets on 13 Apr and three 122mm rockets on 16 Apr. Terrorist incidents in Saigon totaled 15 during the month. Documents captured in the Angel's Wing indicated the N 10 Sapper Bn, SR 6, conducted extensive reconnaissance within Saigon and further terrorist activity was planned.

May

(C) Enemy-initiated activity increased during the periods 2 to 3 May and 20 to 21 May and was characterized by ABFs and limited ground probes as the enemy attempted to defend his BAs against allied cross-border operations. Allied operations uncovered large supply, munitions, and food caches. Throughout the month, the enemy made limited attempts to protect its supply depots; however, the attempts were not coordinated as major enemy units moved deeper into Cambodia to avoid contact. The 9th VC Div remained deployed in Cambodia west of BA 354, with the 271st VC Regt southwest of BA 354, the 95C NVA Regt in the vicinity of BA 354, and the 272d VC Regt northwest of Dog's Face. Prisoner statements indicated both the 271st and 272d Regts had missions in Cambodia, while it appeared the 95 C Regt continued to operate in the vicinity of BA 354. The 7th NVA Div was probably deployed in the Fishhook area of Cambodia. The 209th and 165th NVA Regts, were identified in the vicinity of eastern BA 353, while the 141st NVA Regt was last identified 5 km north-northwest of Mimot. The 5th VC Div, except for the 33d NVA Regt, probably remained deployed in an area northwest of BA 351 where the 174th NVA Regt and elements of the 275th VC Regt were identified in contacts. Documents captured during the cross-border operation revealed that COSVN had anticipated allied cross-border operations into the Fishhook and Parrot's Beak areas, but the lack of stiff resistance indicated the units deployed in the border areas were not prepared to counter the operations. The 33d NVA Regt remained deployed in eastern Binh Tuy Province. Enemy activity in the SRs was characterized by light, scattered ABFs. Interrogation of a rallier, identified as the deputy commander of SR 2, revealed that SR 2 elements had been unable to remove the caches on the Ba Thu Area, which were destroyed in the allied operations. He also stated SR 2 elements incurred serious casualties during the cross-border operations in the Parrot's Beak area. There were 12 terrorist incidents in Saigon during the

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month. Major enemy units withdrew into Cambodia as allied forces penetrated the major logistics area in Cambodia. Enemy resistance increased during the latter part of the month as he continued to reorganize his forces. Any planned tactical activity in the near future would probably be directed at relieving allied pressure on his major logistical depots.

June

(C) Enemy activity consisted primarily of ABFs, limited ground probes, and continued reaction to the allied cross-border operation. Allied operations in Cambodia continued to result in the discovery of large supply, munitions, and food caches. The enemy made only limited attempts to defend logistical depots in Cambodia except in the Fishhook area. Enemy resistance was intense at times in the Fishhook area; however, he generally avoided major ground contacts. The 5th VC Div, except for the 33d NVA Regt, probably remained deployed in Cambodia. The 33d Regt was contacted and identified in Binh Tuy Province. The 7th NVA Div was probably deployed in the Fishhook area and along the northern Tay Ninh Province/Cambodia border. The 209th and 165th NVA Regts were identified in the vicinity of eastern BA 353 and southern BA 352. The 141st NVA Regt probably remained along and northwest of Route 7 from Mimot toward Snoul to provide security for rear BAs and headquarters elements. The 9th VC Div, including all of its regiments, was identified and contacted in MR I of Cambodia. Enemy activity in the SRs was characterized by light, scattered ABFs and limited small-unit actions. In SR 1 prisoners and documents indicated the 101st NVA Regt returned to its traditional AO in the vicinity of the Trapezoid. In SR 5, the K1 and K4 Bns, Dong Nai Regt were identified in a 9 Jun attack on FSB Normandy. There were seven ABFs on Military Sea Transport Service ships in the Long Tau Shipping Channel on 15 and 20 Jun. In Saigon there were two terrorist incidents.

July

(C) Enemy-initiated activity consisted primarily of scattered ABFs and limited ground probes. The 5th VC Div, except for the 33d NVA Regt, probably remained deployed in Cambodia and northern Phouc Long Province. The 174th NVA Regt was identified by documents captured following an 18 Jul ambush of a US engineer convoy 9 km south-southwest of Bu Dop. This was the first identification of the regiment within MR 3 after early May and may have indicated elements of the 5th Div were returning to their normal AO. The 7th NVA Div apparently was deployed westward out of the Fishhook area to the vicinity of Krek. The 209th NVA Regt was identified in contacts in northwestern Tay Ninh Province. The 7th Div probably had the mission of attacking ARVN forces operating in the Krek area and along Routes 7 and 22. The 9th VC Div probably remained deployed in MR I of Cambodia and was identified in the vicinity of Route 7 and the Chup Rubber Plantation. Enemy activity in the SRs was characterized by light, scattered ABFs, and limited small-unit actions. In SR 2, enemy forces were probably involved in tactical activity against ARVN forces operating along Route 1 in Cambodia. Captured documents revealed SR 5 had issued a directive to conserve food and ammunition. This directive was similar to those issued by the HQ, VC Ba Long Province; 274th VC Regt, MR 7; and MR 10. During the latter part of the month, US Forces captured 12.3 tons of weapons and ammunition in War Zone "D", probably further complicating the logistical problems of MR 7 and SR 5. A rallier from the 1st Bn, 274th VC Regt, MR 7, revealed the regiment was planning to increase its tactical activity against allied forces along Route 15. There

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were five terrorist incidents in Saigon during the month. Also on 20 Jul, two 122mm rockets impacted in the downtown area of Saigon.

August

(C) Enemy-initiated activity consisted primarily of scattered ABFs and limited ground probes. The 5th VC Div, except for the 33d NVA Regt, probably remained deployed in Cambodia and northern Phuoc Long Province. The 33d Regt probably remained in eastern Binh Tuy Province. Elements of the 5th Div generally avoided contact during the month. Elements of the 7th NVA Div probably were involved in tactical activity in northern Tay Ninh Province and in the vicinity of Krek, Cambodia. The 7th Div probably remained deployed in Cambodia, north of Tay Ninh Province. The 9th VC Div, except for possible elements of the 271st VC Reg, probably remained deployed in Cambodia. The 271st Regt was identified by two prisoners as being responsible for tactical activity in northwestern Tay Ninh Province during the early part of the month. Elements of the 271st Regt may have remained in the area and retained the mission of interdicting Route 22. Enemy activity in the SRs was characterized by light, scattered ABFs and limited ground actions. Captured documents and interrogations continued to reflect severe logistical and recruiting difficulties among the enemy units in the SRs. In MR 7 on 15 Aug, US Forces captured a cache containing \$22,300 in genuine US currency of \$100 and \$500 denominations. Captured documents and statements by a Hoi Chanh substantiated the extensive use of US currency by enemy units in MR 7 and elsewhere throughout the country to finance their war effort. US Forces operating in War Zone "D", captured a total of 10.5 tons of weapons, food, and supplies during the month. In Saigon, during the month, there were five terrorist incidents.

September

(C) Enemy-initiated activity consisted primarily of light, scattered ABFs and limited ground probes. The 5th VC Div, except for the 33d NVA Regt, probably remained deployed in Cambodia and northern Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces. The 33d Regt probably remained in eastern Binh Tuy Province where it was believed it retained the mission of countering the GVN APP. Elements of the 5th Div generally avoided contact however, divisional units might have been involved in a series of contacts northeast of Loc Ninh from 11 to 18 Sep. The 7th NVA Div was believed deployed in Cambodia north of Tay Ninh Province. The 9th VC Div, except for possible elements of the 95C NVA Regt, probably remained in Cambodia. The 95C Regt was identified by prisoners as responsible for tactical activity in northwestern Tay Ninh Province during the early part of the month. In the SRs, various sources of intelligence indicated that the Bach Dang VC Sapper Bn, SR 1; the headquarters of the Dong Nai Regt, SR 5; and the K-3 VC Bn, Dong Nai Regt, were deactivated. The deactivation of the Dong Nai Regt headquarters left its three remaining battalions operating in district AOs, but subordinate to SR 5. Captured documents and ralliers also revealed the SR 2 and SR 3 possibly were merged into a single military command, however, there were no available indications that the political arms of the SRs were affected. These developments were further indications of the enemy's deteriorating conventional military position and its downgrading of MF units to LF status in implementation of COSVN Resolutions.

_____ indicate that the enemy was encountering serious logistical and morale problems. In Saigon, there were three terrorist incidents reported.

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October

(C) Enemy-initiated activity consisted of light, scattered ABFs, and limited ground probes. The 5th VC Div, except for the 33d NVA Regt, probably remained deployed in Cambodia and northern Binh Long and Phuoc Long Provinces. The 33d Regt probably remained in eastern and central Binh Tuy Province where it probably retained the mission of countering the GVN pacification program. Elements of 33d Regt were identified by prisoners as being responsible for a series of contacts east-northeast of Vo Dat during the early part of the month. Regimental elements would probably remain in the vicinity of the rice bowl for the November rice harvest. The 7th NVA Div probably remained deployed in Cambodia, north of Tay Ninh Province. Its subordinate elements were not identified in contact during the month; however, 7th Div elements and possible elements of the 5th VC Div may have been involved in a series of late October contacts with ARVN forces in the vicinity of Mimot and Snuol, Cambodia, respectively. The 9th VC Div probably remained deployed in Cambodia. Various sources indicated that the enemy's control over the populace in Phuoc Long Province, MR 10, was decreasing. Extreme food shortages and mistreatment by the VC resulted in more than 400 ralliers from the province after 1 Jul. In the SRs, various sources indicated that the K-1 and K-4 VC and K-2 NVA Bns, SR 5, were dispersed and were directly supporting LFs. In SR 2, various sources revealed that the 269th VC Bn, D16 NVA Bn, and probably one other battalion were consolidated to form the 1696th VC Bn. The discovery of a 1.9 ton munitions cache in the vicinity of Ben Luc indicated at least some success in enemy infiltration of supplies into SR 2. Several sources indicated that the companies of the D440 NVA Bn were split among the VC Ba Long Province, a district headquarters, and the D445 VC Bn. After 10 Oct, US Forces discovered 11 caches containing a total of 19.3 tons of munitions in War Zone "D", northeast of Rang Rang. There were two terrorist incidents and one attempted incident in Saigon.

November

(C) Enemy-initiated activity consisted of scattered ABFs and limited ground contacts which increased in number toward the end of the month. In BA 351, US Forces captured an estimated 48.1 tons of rice during the month. Various sources of intelligence indicated that SRs 2 and 3 were consolidated into the Long An SR. The enemy's continuing emphasis on sapper type operations was indicated by the discovery of 720 pounds of TNT near Ben Luc in SR 2. On 17 Nov, Bien Hoa air base and adjacent facilities received thirty 107mm rockets, representing the second largest rocket attack in MR 3 during 1970. Documents captured in SR 5 revealed the possible formation of three "Suicide Anti-Pacification Groups," which had the mission of conducting limited sapper, propaganda and proselyting activities within the SR. [redacted] continued to indicate the enemy's increased reliance upon the use of legal cadre to purchase food and supplies on the local market, particularly in MR 7. A village activity plan captured in MR 7 revealed a continuing emphasis on strengthening local guerrilla units, increased taxation quotas, and greater reliance upon the local populace for logistical and financial support. In Saigon, there were four terrorist incidents during the month. Additionally, on 2 Nov, four 122mm rockets impacted in Saigon. AS

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December

(C) Enemy-initiated activity was at a low-level consisting of anti-pacification operations, limited ground attacks, and light ABFs. There was a slight increase in ABFs at mid-month. On 16 Dec, Bien Hoa air base received five 122mm rockets. On 18 Dec, 2d Bde, 25th US Inf Div, received an estimated 8 to 12 rounds of 82mm mortar fire. In SR 5, further interrogation of a PW, captured on 10 Oct in Phu Giao District, Binh Duong Province, along with a Hoi Chanh who rallied on 10 Oct, revealed that the resupply of SR 5 units was accomplished through local purchases made by legal cadre using GVN documentation. In MR 10 on 15 Dec, US Forces on ground reconnaissance in northern Phuoc Long Province discovered an estimated 6-ton munitions cache 7 km northeast of Bu Gia Map. The cache, which was in good condition, contained nine individual weapons, 622 rounds of 82mm mortar, 599 B-40 rounds, 86,800 small-arms rounds, 750 pounds of explosives (similar to C-4), and other miscellaneous munitions. |

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indicate that the enemy's control over the populace in Phuoc Long Province was decreasing. This was accomplished through the presence of allied forces and effective psychological operations. In Tay Ninh Province on 13, 14, and 15 Dec, ARVN forces on search operations along the Cambodian border south of BA 708 received three ABFs consisting of a total of 130 rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortar fire. These ABFs were the most intense in MR 3 after 11 Oct and were probably initiated by elements of K-5 NVA Arty Bn, 96th NVA Arty Regt, in support of RSGs 50 or 82. Various sources and tactical activity in Tay Ninh Province indicated an increased enemy emphasis on sapper tactics and the interdiction of LOCs. On 4 Dec an RF position, providing security to the Khiem Hanh District HQ, received an unknown number of 82mm mortar rounds followed by a ground probed from an unknown-size enemy force. Two PWs, captured in the contact identified the 48th and 47th Cos, 5th NVA Sapper Bn, Sapper Command. The 5th NVA Sapper Bn operated in MR 2 and MR 3, Cambodia, after moving from GVN MR 4; so it was more likely that the two PWs were reassigned to the 10th NVA Sapper Bn, which was last identified by Tay Ninh. Concerning the Long An SR, interrogation of a PW captured on 8 Dec provided information on the organization of artillery units within the Long An SR. Source stated that when SR 2 and SR 3 merged to form the Long An SR, the 128th VC Arty Bn and two other artillery elements of SR 2 and SR 3 were combined to form the Artillery Section, Long An SR. In SR 4, documents captured on 26 Nov by RF elements, provided information concerning the 2 Nov rocket attack against Saigon and the 1 Nov attack against the SS President Coolidge in the Long Tau shipping channel. The unit identified was the D-10 VC Sapper Bn, MR 7. In the Saigon area during December, there were five terrorist incidents including exploding charges on two US BOQs, a charge in front of the Tin Sang newspaper office, and several fire bombings of US vehicles. In addition, on 19 Dec, two 122mm rockets impacted in Saigon. (82)

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(U) Table III-19 shows enemy-initiated incidents, losses, and weapons captured in III CTZ/ MR 3 during 1970.

Enemy-Initiated Incidents, Losses, and Weapons Captured III CTZ/MR 3 - 1970

	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>
Attacks-by-Fire	47	23	29	49	26	25
Assaults	28	14	20	56	15	14
Ambushes	4	1	1	5	8	0
Harassments*	293 (151)	213 (94)	376 (141)	458 (222)	426 (193)	4 (51)
Terrorism	22	21	49	58	48	41
Sabotage	4	4	1	6	3	0
Propaganda	0	3	2	8	1	1
AA Fire	139	82	59	107	93	44
Total	537	361	537	747	619	439
Enemy KIA	3,296	2,629	3,676	3,535	1,124	734
Weapons Captured	1,015	1,970	1,915	1,486	1,061	633
CSW	182	198	206	215	169	47
IW	1,433	1,722	1,709	1,271	892	586

	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>
Attacks-by-Fire	14	17	18	8	6	10
Assaults	18	23	13	11	7	12
Ambushes	6	10	2	1	3	1
Harassments*	318 (143)	374 (149)	292 (107)	175 (89)	176 (95)	175 (402)
Terrorism	35	32	33	46	36	71
Sabotage	1	0	2	1	2	6
Propaganda	0	1	0	0	0	1
AA Fire	65	78	136	143	96	102
Total	455	537	496	385	326	378
Enemy KIA	612	896	801	762	857	603
Weapons Captured	1,240	912	559	922	565	474
CSW	103	71	66	180	44	63
IW	1,137	841	493	742	521	411

*Fire of Less Than 20 Rounds in Parentheses

SOURCE: MACJ2

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TABLE III-19

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Organization and Dispositions

(U) Tables III-20, III-21, and III-22 show the MACV enemy order of battle holdings as of 31 Jan, 30 Jun, and 31 Dec 1970 respectively. Figures III-26 III-27 and III-28 show enemy unit locations as of 31 Jan, 30 Jun, and 31 Dec 1970 respectively.

III CTZ/MR 3
MACV ENEMY OB HOLDINGS
31 JAN 70

COSVN

45 VC RECON BN

5th VC SAP BN
(J16 ARMOR OFFICE)

4th NVA SAP BN
(J16 ARMOR OFFICE)

3 VC SAP BN
(J16 ARMOR OFFICE)

7th NVA SAP BN
(J16 ARMOR OFFICE)

66 VC BASE SECURITY
REGT

TAY NINH PROV

D1 VC LF INF BN

D 14 VC LF INF BN

MILITARY REGION 7

33 NVA INF REGT

74 NVA RKT REGT

DOAN 10 VC SAP GP

274 VC INF REGT

8 VC SWIMMER SAP BN

67 VC SAP BN

SUB REGION U-1

6 NVA SAP BN

D2 VC INF BN

D1 VC SAP BN

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SUB REGION 4

D6 VC HVY WPNS BN

D4 VC INF BN

D2 VC INF BN

BA BIEN PROV

D440 VC LF INF BN

D445 VC LF INF BN

SUB REGION 1

10 VC ARTY BN

101 NVA INF REGT

QUYET THANG 1 VC INF BN

268 VC INF REGT

QUYET THANG 11 VC LF BN

D9 NVA ARTY BN

GIA DINH 4 NVA SAP BN

8 VC ARTY BN

SUB REGION 2

6 VC INF BN

2642 VC INF BN

12 VC SAP/RECON BN

269 VC INF BN

D16 NVA INF BN

308 VC INF BN

128 VC ARTY BN

G21 VC MF RECON/
INTEL CO

267 VC INF BN

SUB REGION 3

1 NVA INF REGT

265 VC INF BN

508 VC INF BN

506 VC INF BN

3 VC ARTY BN

520 VC INF BN

211 NVA SAP BN

DONG PHU NVA INF BN

SUB REGION 5

DONG NAI VC INF REGT

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SUB REGION 6

SR 6 VC SPCL ACTION GROUP

MILITARY REGION 10

G45 NVA INF BN

BINH LONG PROV

368 VC LF INF BN

PHUOC LONG PROV

D168 VC LF INF BN

69 ARTY DIV/CMD GP

96 NVA ARTY REGT

56 VC AD BN

208B NVA RKT REGT

58 VC ARTY BN (MORT)

CONG TRUONG 5 VC INF DIV

95A NVA INF REGT

22 NVA ARTY BN

275 VC INF REGT

24 NVA AD BN

174 NVA INF REGT

26 VC SIG BN

121 VC SAP/RECON BN

CONG TRUONG 7 NVA INF DIV

95 NVA RECON SAP BN

17 NVA TRANS BN

24 NVA AD BN

K103 NVA TRNG BN

26 NVA SIG BN

141 NVA INF REGT

K22 NVA ARTY BN

165 NVA INF REGT

28 NVA ENGR BN

209 NVA INF REGT

K101 NVA CONV BN

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CONG TRUONG 9 VC INF DIV

271 VC INF REGT

272 VC INF REGT

88 NVA INF REGT

95 C NVA INF REGT

22 VC ARTY BN

24 VC AD BN

T28 VC RECON BN

B-3 NVA FRONT

NONG TRUONG 1 NVA INF DIV

25 NVA ENGR BN

26 NVA SIG BN

18 NVA MED BN

24 NVA AA BN

27 NVA TRANS BN

22 NVA ARTY BN

101D NVA INF REGT

SOURCE: MACJ2

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TABLE III-20

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III CTZ /MR 3
MACV ENEMY OB HOLDINGS
30 JUNE 70

COSVN

46 VC RECON BN

180 VC SECURITY REGT

TAY NINH PROV

D1 VC LF INF BN

D14 VC LF INF BN

LIBERATION ARMY

SAPPER COMMAND

7 NVA SAP BN

8 NVA SAP BN

9 NVA SAP BN

MILITARY REGION 7

74 NVA RKT REGT

274 VC INF REGT

67 VC SAP BN

SUB REGION U-1

6 NVA SAP BN

D1 VC SAP BN

D2 VC INF BN

SUB REGION 4

D2 VC INF BN

D4 VC INF BN

D6 VC HVY WPNS BN

8 VC SWIMMER SAPPER BN

DOAN 10 VC SAPPER GROUP

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[REDACTED]

BA BIEN PROV

D440 VC LF INF BN

D 445 VC LF INF BN

SUB REGION 1

101 NVA INF REGT

QUYET THANG VC INF REGT

D9 NVA ARTY BN

268 VC INF REGT

BAC DANG VC SAP BN

8 VC ARTY BN

SUB REGION 2

6 VC INF BN

D16 NVA INF BN

267 VC INF BN

269 VC INF BN

12 VC SAPPER/RECON BN

128 VC ARTY BN

2642 VC INF BN

308 VC INT BN

SUB REGION 3

1 NVA INF REGT

3 VC ARTY BN

265 VC INF BN

520 VC INF BN

508 VC INF BN

211 NVA SAP BN

506 VC INF BN

DONG PHU NVA INF BN

SUB REGION 5

DONG NAI VC INF REGT

K3 VC INF BN

SUB REGION 6

SR 6 VC SPCL ACTION GROUP

MILITARY REGION 10

G45 NVA INF BN

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BINH LONG PROV

368 VC LF INF BN

PHUOC LONG PROV

D168 VC LF INF BN

69 VC ARTY DIV/CMD GP

96 NVA ARTY REGT

56 VC AD BN

208B NVA ARTY REGT

58 VC ARTY BN (MOPT)

CONG TRUONG 5 VC INF DIV

275 VC INF REGT

33 NVA INF REGT

22 NVA ARTY BN

26 VC SIG BN

174 NVA INF REGT

121 VC SAP/RECON BN

24 NVA AD BN

27 VC RECON BN

CONG TRUONG 7 NVA INF DIV

95 NVA RECON SAP BN

26 NVA SIG BN

28 NVA ENGR BN

17 NVA TRANS BN

141 NVA INF REGT

209 NVA INF REGT

24 NVA AD BN

22 NVA ARTY BN

K101 NVA CONV BN

K103 NVA TRNG BN

165 NVA INF REGT

CONG TRUONG 9 VC INF DIV

271 VC INF REGT

95C NVA INF REGT

24 VC AD BN

272 VC INF REGT

22 VC ARTY BN

T28 VC RECON BN

B-3 NVA FRONT

NONG TRUONG 1 NVA INF DIV

25 NVA ENGR BN

18 NVA MED BN

27 NVA TRANS BN

26 NVA SIG BN

24 NVA AA BN

22 NVA ARTY BN

SOURCE: MACJ2


TABLE III-21

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SOURCE: MACJ2

FIGURE III-27

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III CTZ/MR 3
MACV ENEMY OB HOLDINGS
31 DEC 70

COSVN

46 VC RECON BN

180 VC SEC REGT

190 NVA SEC GUARD BN

TAY NINH PROV

D1 VC LF INF BN

D14 VC LF INF BN

LIBERATION ARMY

SAPPER COMMAND

7 NVA SAP BN

H11 NVA SAP TNG BN

8 NVA SAP BN

10 NVA SAP BN

9 NVA SAP BN

MILITARY REGION 7

274 VC INF REGT

6 NVA SAP BN

D65 VC SAP ENGR BN

74 NVA RKT REGT

SUB REGION U-1

D1 VC SAP BN

D2 VC INF BN

SUB REGION 4

D2 VC INF BN

DOAN 10 VC SAP BN

D4 VC INF BN

8 VC SWIMMER SAP BN

D6 VC HVY WPNS BN

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BA BIEN PROV

D445 VC LF INF BN

SUB REGION 1

101 NVA INF REGT

268 VC INF REGT

QUYET THANG VC INF REGT

D9 NVA ARTY BN

8 VC ARTY BN

LONG AN SUB REGION

1 NVA INF REGT

6 VC INF BN

12 VC SAP/RECON BN

128 VC ARTY BN

267 VC INF BN

308 VC INF BN

1696 VC INF BN

508 VC INF BN

3 VC ARTY BN

211 NVA SAP BN

506 VC INF BN

502 VC INF BN

DONG PHU NVA INF BN

SUB REGION 5

K1 VC INF BN

K2 NVA INF BN

K4 VC INF BN

SUB REGION 6

SR 6 VC SPCL ACTION GP

MILITARY REGION 10

BINH LONG PROV

368 VC LF INF BN

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PHUOC LONG PROV

D168 VC LF INF BN

G45 NVA INF BN

69 VC ARTY DIV/CMD GP

96 NVA ARTY REGT

56 VC AD BN

208B NVA RKT REGT

58 VC ARTY BN (MORT)

CONG TRUONG 5 VC INF DIV

275 VC INF REGT

24 NVA AD BN

174 NVA INF REGT

26 VC SIG BN

33 NVA INF REGT

27 VC RECON BN

122 NVA ARTY BN

28 VC SAP BN

CONG TRUONG 7 NVA INF DIV

95 NVA RECON SAP BN

17 NVA TRANS BN

24 NVA AD BN

K103 NVA TRNG BN

26 NVA SIG BN

141 NVA INF REGT

K22 NVA ARTY BN

165 NVA INF REGT

28 NVA ENGR BN

209 NVA INF REGT

K101 NVA CONV BN

CONG TRUONG 9 VC INF DIV

271 VC INF REGT

22 VC ARTY BN

272 VC INF REGT

24 VC AD BN

95 C NVA INF REGT

T28 VC RECON BN

B-1 NVA FRONT

NONG TRUONG 1 NVA INF DIV

25 NVA ENGR BN

26 NVA SIG BN

18 NVA MED BN

24 NVA AA BN

27 NVA TRANS BN

SOURCE: MACJ2


TABLE III-22

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**MACV ORDER OF BATTLE
MR 3
31 DEC 70**



SOURCE: MACJ2

FIGURE III-28

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Enemy Situation in IV CTZ/MR 4

Introduction

(S) Prior to the allied cross-border operations, the threat to MR 4 was greatly increased during 1969 and early 1970 by the deployment of five regiments and a division headquarters from MR 3. At that time the primary threat was in northwestern Chau Doc Province where elements of the 1st NVA Div HQ and three regimental equivalents were deployed. The cross-border operations caused the relocation of some of these forces, reducing the immediate threat to the population centers of Chau Doc Province. There were two additional areas of enemy concentration. In the area of Dinh Tuong Province there were two regimental headquarters and about 12 weakened battalions deployed. In the vicinity of BA 483, there were three regimental headquarters and about 8 undermanned battalions. The dispersion of one NVA regiment in the Seven Mountains and western Kien Giang Province and the movement of another NVA regiment and two sapper battalions into Cambodia reduced the enemy's capability to conduct large-scale attacks in the Seven Mountains. The reliance on small-unit operations to counter the pacification program was expected to continue.

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Strength

(U) Table III-23 shows the enemy personnel strength in IV CTZ/MR 4 for 1970. Table III-24 shows the number and type of VC/NVA battalions in IV CTZ/MR 4 for 1970.

IV CTZ/MR 4
PERSONNEL STRENGTH - 1970

<u>Month</u>	<u>Maneuver</u>	<u>Combat Support</u>	<u>Total Combat Strength</u>	<u>Admin Services</u>	<u>Guerrilla</u>	<u>Total</u>
Jan	19,165 (2,645)*	1,250	20,415 (2,645)	7,550	18,500	46,465 (2,645)
Feb	20,205 (3,810)	1,250	21,455 (3,810)	7,550	18,400	47,405 (3,810)
Mar	20,625 (4,110)	1,250	21,875 (4,110)	7,550	17,400	46,825 (4,110)
Apr	21,130 (4,660)	1,250	22,380 (4,660)	7,550	16,600	46,530 (4,660)
May	22,095 (5,825)	1,250	23,345 (5,825)	7,550	16,800	47,695 (5,825)
Jun	21,985 (5,825)	1,250	23,235 (5,825)	7,550	16,000	46,785 (5,825)
Jul	21,760 (5,825)	1,250	23,010 (5,825)	7,550	15,000	45,560 (5,825)
Aug	21,635 (5,825)	1,240	22,875 (5,825)	7,550	14,700	45,125 (5,825)
Sep	21,445 (5,825)	1,240	22,685 (5,825)	7,550	14,600	44,835 (5,825)
Oct	21,445 (5,825)	1,240	22,685 (5,825)	7,550	13,600	43,835 (5,825)
Nov	21,445 (5,825)	1,240	22,685 (5,825)	7,550	13,100	43,335 (5,825)
Dec	21,030 (5,825)	1,240	22,270 (5,825)	7,550	11,800	41,620 (5,825)

*NVA shown in parentheses

SOURCE: MACJ231

TABLE III-23

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IV CTZ/MR 4
VC/NVA BATTALIONS - 1970

VC	MF+	MF+	LF+	LF+	Recont+	Scty+	Arty	Sig	Trans	Total	Total	Total
	Inf	Sap	Inf	Sap							VC/NVA	Maneuver
Jan	18	4	16	1	0	0	4	0	0	43	50	46
Feb	17	4	17	1	0	0	4	0	0	43	53	49
Mar	15	7	17	1	0	0	4	0	0	44	55	51
Apr	15	7	17	1	0	0	4	0	0	44	55	51
May	15	7	16	1	0	0	4	0	0	43	57	53
Jun	15	7	16	1	0	0	4	0	0	43	57	53
Jul	15	8	16	1	0	0	4	0	0	44	58	54
Aug	15	8	16	1	0	0	4	0	0	44	58	54
Sep	15	8	16	1	0	0	4	0	0	44	58	54
Oct	15	8	16	1	0	0	4	0	0	44	58	54
Nov	15	8	16	1	0	0	4	0	0	44	58	54
Dec	15	8	16	1	0	0	4	0	0	44	58	54

NVA	Inf+	Sap+	Recont+	Scty+	Arty	Sig	Trans	Med	Engr	Trng	Log	Total
Jan	6	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
Feb	9	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
Mar	9	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11
Apr	9	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11
May	12	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14
Jun	12	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14
Jul	12	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14
Aug	12	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14
Sep	12	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14
Oct	12	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14
Nov	12	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14
Dec	12	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14

+Maneuver Battalion

SOURCE: MACJ231

TABLE III-24

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The NVA in the Delta

(S) One of the prominent developments in the enemy's military situation during 1969 was the introduction of large numbers of NVA personnel into IV CTZ, an area where, until then, the war had been waged entirely by VC forces. Approximately 6,200 NVA personnel moved into IV Corps after May of 1969, and another 1,200 were attempting to infiltrate the area in early 1970. Of the 6,200 troops in the CTZ, about two-thirds were members of five regiments introduced into the CTZ as units, and the remainder were individual filler personnel for weakened VC units.

(S) In the wake of the NVA build-up came recurring low-level reports of friction between the northerners and the indigenous VC troops. Hoi Chanhs and PWs reported that the NVA troops considered themselves superior, had better equipment and arms, and received reserve foodstuffs that had been stockpiled by the VC for their own forces. NVA possessions such as insect repellent and cigarette lighters were mentioned as items of envy. By February the problem had grown to the extent that the Communist leadership felt it necessary to take action to remedy the situation. COSVN, therefore, issued directives to HQs, MR 2 and MR 3 in the delta explaining in some detail the decision to send NVA troops to IV CTZ and giving specific guidance for their utilization.

(S) According to COSVN's explanation, there were several factors leading to the condition which required the dispatch of NVA troops. In essence, the explanation given by COSVN constituted a frank admission of a seriously deteriorating Communist situation in IV CTZ during 1969 and cited two factors contributing to that situation: personnel and tactical difficulties and GVN pacification progress. ARVN troops had continued to play what COSVN called a "decisive role" in the Delta after the withdrawal of US Forces. In addition, successful government expansion of the RF was mentioned as a significant threat to Communist plans. VC recruitment difficulties had mounted as GVN control of the territory and population expanded. As a result, said COSVN, it was necessary to admit that the GVN pacification program had been at least partially successful and had "...temporarily created a difficult situation for friendly (VC/NVA) forces." Therefore, COSVN asserted, there was no way to avoid sending main-force NVA units, as well as filler personnel, to the delta to overcome the deficiencies in the Communists' tactical situation.

(S) COSVN's directive was prompted not only by the reports of friction between the northerners and the local VC troops, but also because resentment apparently was manifesting itself at MR 2 and MR 3 HQ in careless employment of the NVA units. This undesirable effect on the war effort made it imperative for COSVN to issue clear guidance on both the mission to be pursued in the delta and the correct employment of the NVA units. The primary purpose of Communist military and guerrilla forces in the delta was plainly stated by COSVN as being the destruction of the GVN pacification program. The enemy's preoccupation with this theme was evident in the directive and instructions sent to the military headquarters there; that goal was to be the main mission of all forces in MR 4. As for the NVA units sent in, their objective was to provide support to the local VC in pursuit of the main goal. Specifically, said COSVN, they had been sent to the area to overcome the personnel shortages suffered by the local force and guerrilla units, to provide support for the local guerrilla warfare movement, and to help prepare for Communist control of the population in the event a political solution to the war was found.

(S) COSVN's guidance on the employment of the NVA units was equally clear and apparently was intended to counter an MR 2 and MR 3 HQs tendency to rely more and more on the new NVA units and to use them in large-scale combat roles. The guidance reemphasized that the main-force units were in the delta for a support mission only. For this reason, COSVN cautioned, local

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force personnel should not over rely on the main-force units. The employment of the NVA personnel was outlined in terms of COSVN's emphasis on small-scale attacks and guerrilla warfare. Since the primary mission in the delta battlefield was to counter allied pacification efforts, the principal combat targets were to be pacification teams, government leaders, [redacted] and smaller military elements. Maximum efforts should be made to avoid casualties, and the concept of operations was to attack only when success was assured and to attack only elements involved in sweep operations or occupying small outposts. All commanders were specifically directed to avoid the tendency toward large-scale operations for big victories which might end up with heavy losses. (83)

Enemy Activity

January

(C) The enemy sharply increased his offensive activity on 18 and 19 Jan, predominantly in MR 2. Documents captured in Kien Tuong Province, coupled with increased enemy contact in the area, indicated elements of the 88th NVA Regt may have been redeploying to BA 470. On 14 Jan, probable elements of the 18B NVA Regt attacked the Ba Xoai Special Forces Camp in BA 400, with approximately 400 rounds of mixed mortar, recoilless rifle, and rocket fire causing the destruction or damage of all camp buildings and sensor monitoring equipment. [redacted] indicated elements of the 95th NVA Regt may have deployed to western MR 2. The 101D NVA Regt remained deployed along the Chau Doc Province/Cambodia border and indications were that elements of the regiment may have been deploying to BA 400. In MR 3, enemy activity continued at a reduced level, except on 22 Jan, when an estimated two battalions, probably of the 273d VC Regt, attacked a Vietnamese Marine unit in BA 483. The attack was preceded by 100 rounds of mortar and recoilless rifle fire. Friendly operations against the 273d VC Regt and elements of the D-1 VC Regt had probably preempted significant enemy offensive activity in MR 3. AS

February

(C) The enemy initiated his monthly highpoint of activity during the night of 25 Feb. Recent information confirmed COSVN's activation of the 10th Sapper Bn, subordinate to the 88th NVA Regt in early November 1969. Elements of the 88th NVA Regt apparently suffered heavy casualties as their attempted infiltration into BA 470 was thwarted by friendly operations in the Plain of Reeds area. The 101D and 18B NVA Regts probably remained in BA 400. [redacted] indicate the presence of the 95th NVA Regt in Cambodia opposite Chau Doc Province; however, no contact had yet confirmed the regiment's relocation from III CTZ. Possible elements of the D-1, D-2, and the 273d VC Regts in or near BA 483 were reported in contacts during the month, indicating that these regiments remained in their normal AOs. The D-3 Regt remained in the border areas of Vinh Long and Vinh Binh Provinces. Conclusive information was received during February that the 308th Inf Bn, D-3 Regt was deactivated and its remaining men and equipment transferred to the regiment's 306th and 312th Inf Bns. A 5-ton munitions cache captured in Vinh Long Province on 22 Feb yielded ten 107mm rockets. It was the first confirmation of that weapon in Vinh Long Province, suggesting the D-3 Regt had recently been issued the weapon. AS

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March

(C) The enemy launched his monthly highpoint during the night of 14 Mar. The DT-1 Regt, with its 261B MF Bn, remained in Dinh Tuong while the subordinate 261A MF Bn was training, refitting, and accepting fillers in northern Kien Tuong Province. The 261A Bn returned to Dinh Tuong in the latter part of March. The DT-2 Regt had subordinate battalions deployed in Go Cong and Kien Hoa Provinces probably with the mission of coordinating attacks with LF units against GVN out-posts and installations. During its continued attempts to infiltrate into Dinh Tuong Province, the 88th NVA Regt sustained 158 KIA as a result of allied sweeps in the northern Plain of Reeds. Information was received confirming that the 3d, 4th, and 5th Sapper Bns, 16th Armor Office, COSVN, deployed to IV CTZ in late December 1969 and early January, 1970, and were probably in the Seven Mountains area. Elements of both the 18B and 101D NVA Regts were identified in contacts in the Seven Mountains area of Chau Doc Province. AS indicate elements of the 95th NVA Regt were attempting to infiltrate MR 3. A significant change in the composition of major VC units was revealed when the 273d Inf Regt was redesignated as the D-2 VC Regt. ARVN sweeps in BA 483 captured or destroyed approximately 180 tons of rice believed intended for use by units of the D-1 and D-2 Regt. The D-3 Regt remained out of contact during the month. On the night of 29 Mar, the enemy launched the initial phase of his new campaign with coordinated attacks against the Chi Lang Training Center, B43 and Ba Xoai Special Forces Camps, and Tri Ton Military District in the Seven Mountains area.

April

(C) The enemy continued the increased activity begun on 29 Mar which peaked on 1 Apr with the highest level of activity after February 1969. By the third week, activity had decreased to its normal level. During this phase of the enemy's campaign, ABFs and ground attacks were utilized to disrupt the GVN pacification program. Although attacks were scattered throughout the CTZ, the heaviest concentrations occurred in Dinh Tuong, Chau Doc, Vinh Long, and Vinh Binh Provinces. The DT-2 VC Regt remained deployed along the Dinh Tuong/Go Cong Province borders and in Kien Hoa Province. The DT-1 VC Regt operated in western Dinh Tuong Province where friendly units sustained heavy casualties in contacts with the regiment's 261A MF Bn. Major elements of the 88th NVA Regt infiltrated the Dinh Tuong Province area with the mission of reinforcing the DT-1 and DT-2 Regts. Other regimental elements remained in Cambodia in the vicinity of BA 709. Captured prisoners disclosed the formation of the 269B MF Sapper Bn in the vicinity of BA 709 and its subsequent deployment to Dinh Tuong Province. The 101D NVA Regt suffered heavy losses from friendly operations near Nui Khet in the northern Seven Mountains area. The 18B NVA Regt was deployed in southern BA 400 where it concentrated ABFs primarily against observation posts. The attacks by the 18B Regt probably were designed as a diversionary tactic to permit infiltration of the 95th NVA Regt from southern Kampot Province, Cambodia to BA 483. The D-1 and D-2 VC Regts remained in northern BA 483, while the D-3 VC Regt deployed in the Vinh Binh/Vinh Long Province area.

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May

(C) Enemy-initiated activity continued at an increased level of intensity, culminating on 3 May, then gradually decreased to a moderate level of activity during the remainder of the month. The enemy employed ABFs and limited ground attacks to harass the pacification program, concentrating the attacks in MR 2 until 20 May, when emphasis shifted to MR 3. The DT-2 VC Regt remained deployed along the Go Cong/Dinh Tuong Province border and in eastern Kien Hoa Province. Major elements of the 88th NVA Regt remained in southwest BA 470 where they were probably responsible for increased attacks in southwestern Kien Phong Province. The cross-border operation caused the redeployment of several enemy units formerly immune to friendly actions in their BA in Cambodia. The effect was a deeper penetration of these units into Cambodia. Included were some elements of the 88th NVA Regt, the 295th MF Bn, and probable elements of HQ, MR 2. Elements of the 101D NVA Regt probably remained in the northern Seven Mountains area while the majority of the regiment may have deployed to Cambodia. HQ 1st NVA Div remained in BA 400. The D-1 VC Regt redeployed to central MR 3, and may have detached its 307th MF Bn to join the D-3 Regt in the Vinh Long/Vinh Binh Province border area. The D-2 VC Regt operated in north-eastern BA 483. A battalion of the 95th NVA Regt was identified in central An Xuyen Province providing the first indication of successful infiltration of regimental elements to southern BA 483.

June

(C) Enemy-initiated activity increased sharply on 3 and 4 Jun when it reached its highest level after 3 May. During the remainder of the month, activity gradually decreased to light to moderate level characterized by ABFs and limited ground attacks against the pacification program. The majority of enemy activity occurred in MR 2. The DT-2 VC Regt remained in eastern Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa Provinces. The DT-1 VC Regt was not identified during the month, but probably remained in western Dinh Tuong Province. Elements of the 88th NVA Regt were identified in the vicinity of BA 470. Other elements of the 88th Regt operated in Cambodia. HQ 1st NVA Div remained in BA 400, while its subordinate, 101D NVA Regt, redeployed to Kompong Speu Province, Cambodia. The 18B NVA Regt was deployed in the Seven Mountains area of Chau Doc Province and in western Kien Giang Province. The D-1, D-2, and D-3 Regts AOs remained central, western, and eastern MR 3, respectively. Allied forces continued to engage possible elements of the 95th NVA Regt in An Xuyen Province.

July

(C) Enemy-initiated activity was moderate early in the month, decreased at mid-month, and increased slightly at month-end. The increase was possibly related to the commemoration of the 16th anniversary of the Geneva accords. Activity was characterized by ABFs and limited ground probes against the pacification program. The DT-2 VC Regt remained in western Go Cong, eastern Dinh Tuong, and Kien Hoa Provinces. A Hoi Chanh from the 269B MF Sapper Bn confirmed reports of the subordination of his unit to the DT-1 VC Regt. A prisoner from the message section of HQ 88th NVA Regt stated several of the regiment's elements were located in western BA 470. HQ 88th Regt and its subordinate, 9th Inf Bn, probably remained in Cambodia. Prisoners and a rallier confirmed formation of the 271st Inf Bn, probably deployed in the vicinity of BA 709 with the security mission for elements of HQ MR 2. The 18B NVA Regt operated in the Seven Mountains and western Kien Giang Province. The D-1 and D-2 VC Regts were in central and western MR 3,

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respectively. A document, captured on 3 Jul, indicated the strength of the D-2 VC Regt exceeded 1,500 men, suggesting the regiment received new personnel after heavy losses from friendly forces in November 1969. The D-3 VC Regt remained along the Vinh Long/Vinh Binh Province border. A Hoi Chanh, who rallied on 6 Jul, confirmed reports the 307th MF Bn was reassigned from the D-1 VC Regt to the D-3 VC Regt. The 95th NVA Regt was not identified in contact during the month and probably remained in the vicinity of southern BA 483.

August

(C) Enemy-initiated activity at the beginning of the month was substantially increased, with the heaviest concentration occurring in the central Kien Giang/western Chuong Thien Province area. Activity was characterized by a significant increase in the number and intensity of ABFs, continuing through the second week of August when the activity began to decline. The end of August was marked by an upturn in the number of ABFs which coincided with the GVN elections held on 30 Aug and the enemy's planned increase for the beginning of September. In eastern MR 4, Ben Tre Provincial elements 516A and 516B LF Bns suffered substantial losses in contacts with friendly forces on 11 and 13 Aug in Kien Hoa Province. The DT-2 VC Regt remained dispersed in western Go Cong and eastern Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa Province, while the DT-1 VC Regt operated in central Dinh Tuong Province. Neither the DT-1 nor the DT-2 Regt was noted in significant activity during the month. A Hoi Chanh confirmed reports that elements of the 7th and 8th Inf Bns and the 10th Sapper Bn of the 88th NVA Regt remained in central BA 470. He further confirmed that the forward CP of MR 2 was located in BA 470 and maintained an extensive staff and support structure, to include the D-16 Trans Bn. This indicated that the regional headquarters had relinquished most of its authority to the forward CP, possibly freeing the headquarters for a mission in Cambodia. Elements of the 88th NVA Regt may have been involved in minor contacts with friendly forces in the vicinity of BA 470. The 18B NVA Regt remained dispersed throughout the Seven Mountains region in the vicinity of BA 400 and in the Three Sisters area of northwestern Kien Giang Province. Elements of the regiment were probably responsible for the continued ABFs in the Seven Mountains region, a ground attack against Ba Chuc Village in northwestern BA 400 on 25 Aug, and for the continual shelling of FSB Nui Hon Soc in the Three Sisters area. In MR 3, elements of the D-2 VC Regt and the 95th NVA Regt remained deployed in the U Minh Forrest area of BA 483. They were probably responsible for the substantial increase in ABFs in the VC Rach Gia Province during the first part of the month. Documents captured during engagements on 24 and 25 Aug in central Chuong Thien Province indicated that elements of the D-1 VC Regt may have deployed to western Chuong Thien Province in the vicinity of BA 483. Two Hoi Chanhs, from eastern MR 2 and MR 3, alleged that shortages of supplies and munitions had developed as a result of the allied cross-border operations necessitating the postponement of planned enemy offensive activity in that area of MR 4. The D-3 Regt remained deployed along the Vinh Long/Vinh Binh Province border and was not identified in any significant activity during the month.

September

(C) During the first week of the month, enemy-initiated activity was characterized by significantly increased daily ABFs which might have been the initial phase of the enemy's Autumn-Winter offensive. Activity then scaled down to a reduced level, characterized by scattered ABFs through-

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out the region. In eastern MR 4 during the period 19 to 22 Sep, Ben Tre provincial forces had substantial losses in contacts with friendly forces in Kien Hoa Province. In addition, about 1 ton of assorted individual and crew-served weapons, plus small-arms and crew-served ammunition, was captured following two of the contacts. The interrogation of a rallier from Kien Hoa Province provided information on a possible enemy offensive, attempts to form a new battalion, and financial aid from Red China. The Hoi Chanh stated that on 25 May 70. COSVN issued Directive 20, which dealt with a general VC/NVA offensive for all of the RVN with the purpose of destroying the GVN APP and increasing VC-controlled area. The source also stated that Red China was sending aid in the form of US green dollars to help finance the war in the RVN. Another Hoi Chanh, from Kien Phong Province, discussed a general offensive. The DT-1 and DT-2 VC Regt operated in their normal AOs, central Dinh Tuong Province and the Dinh Tuong/ Go Cong Province border/ eastern Kien Hoa area, respectively. Elements of the DT-1 Regt were identified in two contacts during the month, on 1 and 13 Sep. A document captured in Cho Gao District, Dinh Tuong Province, provided evidence of the shortage of weapons, ammunition, and food in VC MR 2. The document ordered all subordinate units to conserve weapons, ammunition, and food beginning on 1 Jun. The document also directed subordinate units to attack GVN storage areas and utilize troop proselyting to obtain weapons and ammunition. Major elements of the 88th NVA Regt remained deployed in the vicinity of BA 470, where elements of the regiment's 10th Sapper Bn were identified in a contact on 6 Sep. Captured documents indicated that the 9th Inf Bn, 88th Regt, was deployed in the Crow's Nest area of Cambodia, and might possibly attempt to infiltrate into BA 470. The 18B NVA Regt remained dispersed throughout the Seven Mountains region and in the Three Sisters area of Kien Giang Province. Elements of the regiment were probably responsible for the ABFs conducted in the vicinity of the Seven Mountains, and for a ground attack against PSDF in a hamlet in Tri Ton District, Chau Doc. In VC MR 3, the D-1 and D-2 VC Regts remained dispersed in the vicinity of northern BA 483. Elements of the D-2 Regt might have been the enemy unit involved in a contact resulting in major enemy losses on 7 Sep. The 95th NVA Regt remained located in southern BA 483, where elements of the regiment might have been involved in a contact on 15 Sep, resulting in two helicopters destroyed and eight damaged. In An Xuyen Province on 23 Sep, friendly forces guided by a Hoi Chanh discovered an estimated 7-ton munitions cache and possible rocket assembly point in BA 482. The cache included 350 disassembled SKS rifles and assorted weapons and ammunition. The facility was probably operated by a rear service element of VC MR 3. Information provided by a Hoi Chanh indicated the probable successful infiltration of an NVA supply trawler into northwestern An Xuyen Province in late August. The D-3 VC Regt operated along the Vinh Long/Vinh Binh Province border, where elements of the regiment might have been responsible for the significant ABFs in northeast Vinh Binh Province and two ground attacks conducted against outposts during the first part of the month.

October

(C) Enemy-initiated activity was characterized by light, scattered ABFs throughout the region and ground attacks against isolated outposts. Enemy activity in VC Ben Tre Province during the latter part of the month reflected the possible beginning of a moderate offensive in VC MR 2, and highlighted enemy activity for the month. The interrogation of a PW from the 502d LF Bn provided information concerning the composition of his unit. The source claimed that the 502d Bn was broken down into platoon and squad-size units to operate on a village and hamlet level, while NVA cadre were assigned to work with village guerrillas. The DT-1 and DT-2 VC Regts operated in their normal AOs, central Dinh Tuong Province and the Dinh Tuong/Go Cong Province border area, respectively. Neither regiment was identified in contact during the month. Interro-

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gation of a Hoi Chanh from the 341st VC Sapper Bn, VC MR 2, provided information of the enemy's increased emphasis on naval sapper activities. HQ 88th NVA Regt and its subordinate 9th Inf Bn remained located in Prey Veng Province, Cambodia, while its 7th and 8th Inf Bns and 10th Sapper Bn remained deployed in the vicinity of BA 470. Regimental elements were possibly involved in a contact on 1 Oct. The 18B NVA Regt remained in the vicinity of the Seven Mountains and Mo So Mountains and was probably involved in the sporadic enemy activity in the Mo So Mountains area. The D-1 and D-2 VC Regts were dispersed throughout BA 483 and were not noted in significant activity during the month. The 95th NVA Regt remained dispersed in central An Xuyen Province. While not confirmed, elements of the regiment may have been involved in the attack on the Advanced Tactical Support Base at Song Ong Doc on 20 Oct, which resulted in major damage to the base and significant friendly casualties. The interrogation of a Hoi Chanh provided information concerning the possible infiltration of filler personnel from Cambodia to the U Minh Forrest. The D-3 VC Regt remained deployed along the Vinh Long/Vinh Binh Province border and was not noted in significant activity during the month.

November

(C) Enemy-initiated activity was characterized by ABFs directed against RF/PF outposts as well as province and district towns. Three RF/PF outposts were overrun by ground attacks during the month, raising the year's total to 64. Infiltration activity was highlighted by the sinking of a NVN SL-3 infiltration trawler on 22 Nov off the coast of Kien Hoa Province. Interrogation of two captured crew members of the trawler indicated that the ship was loaded in Haiphong, NVN. Inspection of samples of the cargo recovered revealed that it consisted of AK-47 ammunition manufactured in North Korea, 82mm mortar rounds made in Communist China, and B-41 rockets. The DT-1 and DT-2 Regts operated in their normal AOs, central Dinh Tuong Province and the Dinh Tuong/Go Cong Province border area, respectively. Neither regiment was identified in contact during the month. The 88th NVA Regt HQ and its subordinate 9th Inf Bn remained located in Prey Veng Province, Cambodia, while its 7th and 8th Inf Bns and 10th Sapper Bn remained deployed in the vicinity of BA 470. The 18B NVA Regt remained in the vicinity of the Seven Mountains and Mo So Mountains and was probably involved in contacts on 7, 8, 13, 14, and 17 Nov. The D-1 and D-2 Regts remained dispersed throughout BA 483. The D-1 VC Regt may have been responsible for the 26 Nov attack on Ta Soul Hamlet and the adjacent Bien Dan PF outpost in Chuong Thien Province. The outpost was overrun during the attack. The 95th NVA Regt continued to be dispersed in central An Xuyen Province, where on 22 Nov, a combined force of PF soldiers and US Navy Seals raided a VC prison camp and liberated 19 Vietnamese nationals. The D-3 Regt remained deployed along the Vinh Long/Vinh Binh Province border and was not involved in significant activity during the month.

December

(C) Enemy-initiated activity was light, with scattered ground fire and attacks against isolated outposts. Kien Hoa Province had the largest number of enemy-initiated incidents, followed by Kien Giang Province. A PW from the K-23d Med Co, 88th NVA Regt, gave information concerning the strengths of units subordinate to the 88th NVA Regt, and also stated that the 88th NVA Regt had not received replacements after infiltrating into BA 470. Contradicting this was a PW from the Z-7

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MF Inf Bn, who stated that he was one of 70 replacements to join the Z-7 MF Inf Bn, 88th NVA Regt. The DT-1 and DT-2 VC Regts operated in their normal AOs in central Dinh Tuong Province and east to the Go Cong border area. Neither regiment was identified in contact during December. HQ 88th NVA Regt and its subordinate 9th Inf remained located in Prey Veng Province, Cambodia, while the 7th and 8th Inf Bns and the 10th Sapper Bn, 88th NVA Regt, remained deployed within BA 470. The 18B NVA Regt remained deployed in the vicinity of the Seven Mountains and Mo So Mountain area. The D-1 VC Regt was located approximately 15 km east of BA 483. HQ D-2 VC Regt and its subordinate units, the Z-10 Arty and Z-8 Inf Bns, were in the eastern part of BA 483, while the Z-9 Inf Bn, D-2 Inf Regt, was in the northern part of BA 483. The 95A NVA Inf Regt HQ was located approximately 14 km south of BA 483 in An Xuyen Province, while its subordinate battalions, the Z-7 and Z-8, were located in extreme southern BA 483. The D-3 Inf Regt was located in the border area of Vinh Long and Vinh Binh Provinces. (84)

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(U) Table III-25 shows enemy-initiated incidents, losses, and weapons captured in IV CTZ/ MR 4 during 1970.

Enemy - Initiated Incidents, Losses, and Weapons Captured IV CTZ/MR 4 - 1970

	<u>Jan</u>	<u>Feb</u>	<u>Mar</u>	<u>Apr</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>Jun</u>
Attacks-by-Fire	40	32	34	44	61	72
Assaults	43	19	21	59	48	34
Ambushes	6	4	1	3	4	2
Harassments*	431 (379)	368 (317)	282 (252)	669 (633)	770 (696)	603 (579)
Terrorism	36	31	27	70	57	67
Sabotage	11	1	4	7	9	6
Propaganda	0	0	1	2	2	6
AA Fire	69	117	69	43	86	44
TOTAL	636	572	439	897	1,037	834
Enemy KIA	2,549	2,750	3,375	4,054	2,048	2,188
Weapons Captured	993	1,141	1,214	2,693	900	903
CSW	115	126	190	184	68	79
IW	878	1,015	1,024	2,509	832	824

	<u>Jul</u>	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Dec</u>
Attacks-by-Fire	58	43	37	48	40	47
Assaults	24	74	44	24	31	33
Ambushes	7	6	17	12	11	15
Harassments*	514 (476)	640 (593)	658 (621)	662 (628)	517 (455)	516 (467)
Terrorism	51	33	47	52	56	79
Sabotage	6	7	10	17	13	1
Propaganda	2	3	2	0	1	3
AA Fire	35	90	136	158	189	150
TOTAL	697	896	961	973	858	844
Enemy KIA	1,980	1,704	1,658	1,461	2,041	2,610
Weapons Captured	539	639	894	591	764	1,217
CSW	47	61	56	54	57	186
IW	492	578	838	537	707	1,031

*Fire of Less Than 20 Rounds in Parentheses

SOURCE: MACJ2

TABLE III-25

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Organization and Dispositions

(U) Tables III-26, III-27, and III-28 show the MACV enemy order of battle holdings as of 31 Jan, 30 Jun, and 31 Dec 1970 respectively. Figures III-29, III-30, and III-31 show enemy unit locations as of 31 Jan, 30 Jun, and 31 Dec 1970 respectively.

IV CTZ /MR 4
MACV ENEMY OB HOLDINGS
31 JAN 70

COSVN

MILITARY REGION 2

269B VC SAP BN	18B NVA INF REGT
BINH DUC VC ARTY BN	DT1 VC INF REGT
DT2 VC INF REGT	D295X VC INF BN
267B VC SAP BN	

AN GIANG PROV

511 VC LF INF BN	512 VC LF INF BN
------------------	------------------

BEN TRE PROV

516A VC LF INF BN	516B VC LF INF BN
X580 VC INF BN	570 VC LF INF BN

GO CONG PROV

514B VC LF INF BN

KIEN PHONG PROV

502 VC LF INF BN

MY THO PROV

514C VC LF INF BN	207 VC LF SAP BN
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KIEN TUONG PROV

504 VC LF INF BN

MILITARY REGION 3

273 VC INF REGT

CA MAU PROV

U MINH 2 VC LF INF BN

CAN THO PROV

TAY DO I VC LF INF BN

TAY DO II VC LF INF BN

RACH GIA PROV

U MINH 10 VC LF INF BN

SOC TRANG PROV

D764 VC LF INF BN

TRA VINH PROV

501 VC LF INF BN

VINH LONG PROV

D857 VC LF INF BN

CUU LONG VC INF REGT

D1 VC INF REGT

D2 VC INF REGT

198 VC ARTY BN

TN 3173 VC INF BN

301 VC SAP/ENGR BN

2315 VC ARTY BN

TABLE III-26

SOURCE: MACJ2


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MACV ORDER OF BATTLE MR 4 31 JAN 70



SOURCE: MACJ2

FIGURE III-29

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IV CTZ/MR 4
MACV ENEMY OB HOLDINGS
30 JUNE 70

COSVN

D4 NVA SAP BN
SAPPER COMMAND

D5 VC SAP BN
SAPPER COMMAND

95A NVA INF REGT
CT5 VC INF DIV

MILITARY REGION 2

88 NVA INF REGT

BINH DUC VC ARTY BN

DT1 VC INF REGT

DT2 VC INF REGT

295 VC INF BN

341 VC SAP BN

267B VC SAP BN

269B VC SAP BN

AN GIANG PROV

511 VC LF INF BN

512 VC LF INF BN

BEN TRE PROV

516A VC LF INF BN

X580 VC LF INF BN

516B VC LF INF BN

GO CONG PROV

514B VC LF INF BN

KIEN PHONG PROV

502 VC LF INF BN

KIEN TUONG PROV

504 VC LF INF BN

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MY THO PROV

514 VC LF INF BN

207 VC LF SAP BN

MILITARY REGION 3

D1 VC INF REGT

D2 VC INF REGT

D3 VC INF REGT

2311 VC ARTY BN

TN3173 VC INF BN

301 VC SAP/ENGR BN

2315 VC ARTY BN

962 VC INF BN

VINH LONG PROV

D857 VC LF INF BN

CA MAU PROV

U MINH 2 VC LF INF BN

CAN THO PROV

TAY DO I VC LF INF BN

TAY DO II VC LF INF BN

RACH GIA PROV

U MINH 10 VC LF INF BN

SOC TRANG PROV

D764 VC LF INF BN

TRA VINH PROV

501 VC LF INF BN

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B-3 NVA FRONT

HANOI

NONG TRUONG I NVA INF DIV

18B NVA INF REGT

101D NVA INF REGT

SOURCE: MACJ2


TABLE III-27

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SOURCE: MACJ2

FIGURE III-30

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IV CTZ/MR 4
MACV ENEMY OB HOLDINGS
31 DEC 70

COSVN

D4 NVA SAP BN
SAPPER COMMAND

K12 VC SAP BN
SAPPER COMMAND

D5 VC SAP BN
SAPPER COMMAND

MILITARY REGION 2

88 NVA INF REGT

DT2 VC INF REGT

295 VC INF BN

BINH DUC VC ARTY BN

DT1 VC INF REGT

341 VC SAP BN

AN GIANG PROV

511 VC LF INF BN

512 VC LF INF BN

BEN TRE PROV

516A VC LF INF BN

516B VC LF INF BN

X580 VC LF INF BN

GO CONG PROV

514B VC LF INF BN

KIEN PHONG PROV

502 VC LF INF BN

KIEN TUONG PROV

504 VC LF INF BN

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MY THO PROV

514C VC LF INF BN

207 VC LF SAP BN

MILITARY REGION 3

D1 VC INF REGT

D3 VC INF REGT

TN3173 VC INF BN

2315 VC ARTY BN

95A NVA INF REGT
CT 5 VC INF DIV

D2 VC INF REGT

2311 VC ARTY BN

301 VC SAP/ENGR BN

962 VC INF BN

B-3 NVA Front

NONG TRUONG 1 NVA INF DIV

18B NVA INF REGT

101D NVA INF REGT

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
SOURCE: MACJ2

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TABLE III-28

**MACV ORDER OF BATTLE
MR 4**

28 DEC 70



SOURCE: MACJ2


FIGURE III-31

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CHINESE ROAD CONSTRUCTION



SOURCE: 7AF

FIGURE III-32

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OUT-COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS

Laos

Introduction

(S) Laos was significant as a theater of the Indochina War and as an infiltration corridor into RVN. (For a discussion of infiltration through Laos, see The Infiltration System section of this chapter.) At the close of 1969, PL and NVA troops were building up for the 1969-1970 dry season offensive in Laos. Earlier in 1969, the pattern of the war which had existed for several years was broken. At the beginning of the 1969 rainy season, instead of ending their dry season offensive the PL/NVA captured Moung Soui. During the 1969 rainy season, RLG troops, spearheaded by Meo irregular guerrilla forces led by General Vang Pao, launched an offensive which recaptured the Plain of Jars for the first time since 1964.

(S) In February 1970, after a long logistical and troop buildup, NVN and PL troops launched an offensive which recaptured the Plain of Jars and carried the war into the Meo heartland south of the plain. The guerrilla mountain strongholds of Sam Thong and Long Tieng were threatened. In late April and in May, the focus of PL/NVA activity shifted from northern Laos to southern Laos and was related to attempts by the NVA to build a new LOC into Cambodia. In southern Laos, with the capture of Attopeu and Saravane, Communist troops came to control areas which they had not controlled at the period of the cease fire in 1962. However, in other areas of Laos, the Communist forces had not yet controlled as much territory as they controlled at the cease-fire of 1962. At year end however, Communist forces increased their attacks in northwestern Laos and stepped up their logistical activity in southern Laos.

(S) The Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) offered a five-point peace proposal in March, which called for an end to the conflict based on the Geneva Accords of 1962 and the "realities of the present situation," a phrase that seemed to indicate PL confidence in their stronger military position.

(S) In July, hopes for negotiations between the NLHS and the RLG brightened when the NLHS suggested preliminary talks in Khang Khay. Although the NLHS had previously insisted on an end to all US bombing before holding talks, they appeared willing to hold the preliminary discussions without that condition.

Chinese Road Construction

(S) Chinese road construction continued during 1970 in northwest Laos and evidence indicated it would begin to move southward (See Figure III-32).

(S) January interpretations of late December 1969 aerial photography revealed a rough, motorable section of road from Moung Sai to within 5 miles of Moung Houn. There were no indications construction would continue south of Moung Houn before completion of the Moung Sai-Moung Houn section. Work near Moung La continued but at a slower pace, possibly due to the construction of a major bridge. The Chinese continued to deny any knowledge of current construction. (85)

(C) Souvanna Phouma, the Laotian Premier, commented in February that he believed the People's Republic of China (PRC) would use the road to promote insurgency in Thailand. In that respect the road's future would be similar in function to the Ho Chi Minh Trail in central and southern Laos. (86)

(S) Extensive aerial photography on 11 May revealed construction continuing along the entire net except south of Moung Houn. The bridge at Moung La was completed and open to traffic. Clearing and construction continued on the link between Moung La and Moung Khoua. A seasonal roadway would probably be complete before the onset of the monsoon season, but an all-weather road would not be complete before the next season. (87)

(C) As of late July, the main headquarters and logistical base for Chinese road construction activity was Ban Kenoy located northwest of Muong Sai just off Route 4. There were an estimated 5,000 Chinese involved in the road construction and related activities. The Ban Kenoy area contained a major rice storage area, fuel dump, and equipment storage area. Regularly scheduled runs were made twice monthly to China to support the logistical requirements. (88)

(S) In late December, aerial photography revealed that clearing activity on Route 45 had reached Muong Khoua and that the motorable limit had reached to within 0.5 km west of Muong Khoua. (89)

Communist Organization in Laos

(S) The main NVN-allied political organization in Laos was the Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) or Lao Patriotic Front, led by Prince Souphanouvong, the half-brother of Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos. The NLHS was a legal organization. A5

It had been accorded official political representation in the Vientiane Coalition Government after the 1962 Geneva Accords.

(S) As a result of the agreement, the NLHS also functioned as a de facto government in itself, administering and controlling the Communist-dominated areas of Laos. In the Laotian provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua, the NLHS was the sole government and, at one time, was recognized as the legal government by the RLG in Vientiane.

(S) The NLHS organization was similar in structure to the organization of parties in all other Communist countries. The NLHS Central Committee, under the leadership of Prince Souphanouvong, was the principal decision-making body. Central Committee decisions were passed to provincial governors; from that level, the decisions were then routed down through district and village chiefs. In most of the PL/NVA occupied areas, these officials exercised firm control over the inhabitants.

(S) Behind the NLHS was another organization seldom observed. Of the 11 known members of the NLHS Central Committee, nine belonged to another organization known as the Phak Pasason Lao, or Lao People's Party (LPP). Information on that party was very sketchy, but it appeared that it was formed in the early 1950s as a clandestine organization with the central task of guiding

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and directing the overt NLHS and the PL. Membership seemed to be exclusive and several top ranking NLHS members reportedly had never been admitted to its ranks. [redacted] reportedly was not admitted as a member until several years ago, and was therefore

AS

(S) The LPP exerted control over the NLHS organization through two channels. Members of the LPP Central Committee who were also members of the NLHS Central Committee provided the first channel. The second was via the LPP's own intelligence agency, variously referred to as the "Society Research Unit", or "C-5" or "D-7." The purpose of the organization was to provide the Central Committee of the LPP with intelligence on all areas of Laos, not only the RLG, but also on the NLHS and the PL structure itself. With members of that intelligence organization placed in key villages and towns, the "Society Research Unit" served as a watchdog for the whole Communist structure in Laos.

(S) But that did not fully complete the picture of Communist organization in Laos. There was reportedly an even more exclusive Communist group within Laos which consisted of an estimated 17 Lao who held membership in both the LPP and the Lao Dong Party in NVN. [redacted]

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[redacted] The members had been selected by the Lao Dong Party because of their outstanding leadership ability, their thorough dedication to Communism, and their willingness to subordinate Lao nationalist aspirations to those of the Lao Dong Party organization.

(S) [redacted] members of that very exclusive group were General Kaysone Phomvihan and Nouhak Phoumsavan, both of whom were also high ranking members of the Central Committee of the NLHS and the LPP. Nouhak was reported to be First Secretary and highest ranking member of the LPP, but Kaysone was reported to have been a close personal friend of Ho Chi Minh and outranked Nouhak in the Lao Dong Party. In addition to Kaysone being one of the top commanders of the PL forces, he also reportedly served as the principal channel for liaison with Hanoi and controlled secret funds received from there.

AS

(S) The Communist organization in Laos was a classic example of front organizations and shadow governments. The public, overt organization was the NLHS or Lao Patriotic Front. Behind and controlling that organization was the covert LPP. However, that organization was further controlled from Hanoi through a very small nucleus of Lao who were members of the Lao Dong Party. The real power behind the Communist movement in Laos, therefore, ultimately resided with the politburo of the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi. (90)

The Pathet Lao Army


(S) RLG forces were opposed by two separate and distinct armies, the NVA regular units and the indigenous PL Army. While most of the fighting in years just before 1970 was against the NVA, the PL Army--its background, organization, training, logistics, and effectiveness-- is worthy of consideration.

(S) The term "Pathet Lao" translates and means "Land of the Lao" and was the name by which the Laotian Communists called their armed forces beginning in the late 1940s. The term continued to be applied to those forces by the Western World, although in late 1965 the NLHS, the Communist political front in Laos, began to use the term "Lao People's Liberation Army." From a force of

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**PATHET LAO AREAS
OF INFLUENCE**



PL LOGISTICAL ROUTES -----
NVA INFILTRATION ROUTES _____
1962 DIVIDING LINE - - - - -
PL TRAINING SITES ○

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FIGURE III-33

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only several hundred troops which assisted the Viet Minh in defeating the French in the Indochina War in 1954, the PL increased its strength to many thousands by the early 1960s.

(S) By the time of the 1962 Geneva Accords, which brought a temporary end to the civil war which had been raging since the end of the Indochina War, the PL forces controlled those portions of Laos shown in Figure III-33. Expressed in another manner, the PL controlled most of the area of Laos east of a line which traditionally divided the tribal minority uplanders from the ethnic Lao majority who inhabited the lowland areas.

(S) Within the PL-controlled portion of Laos there was a region which, from all reports, had been virtually given up by the PL. It was the area of the Ho Chi Minh Trail running through the easternmost section of the Laotian Panhandle. It appeared the NVA controlled nearly all of that area, and the PL were relegated to protecting the infiltration routes from RLG intrusion from the west.

(S) The PL strength was estimated at more than 50,000, including more than 3,000 NVN personnel. Only 20 of the infantry battalions, or less than one-fourth, were listed as purely indigenous PL. The units functioned very much as local forces or a militia.

(S) According to all reports, the NVA advisors to PL units did not act as commanders but played an active role in the planning phase before a military operation and provided any special training required by the unit to which they were assigned. NVA advisors dressed in PL uniforms, shared the Laotians' food and quarters, and apparently were generally respected by the more easy-going Lao for their self-discipline and dedication. Reports obtained from captured NVA officers, however, indicated the role of the NVA advisor was difficult. His recommendations might be completely ignored, and the lack of discipline, basic military training, and poor motivation of PL troops often was a source of friction between the advisor and the PL commander.

(S) The majority of PL training apparently was carried out in "on-the-job" fashion within the individual units. There were 30 locations in Laos which provided more formal training and certain special skills for PL officers, but the number of troops trained at those centers constituted a small minority. From all reports most of the formal training was carried out by NVA advisors.

(S) Communist indoctrination was given to PL troops, but only to a limited degree. Reportedly, that type of training was not common and PL units were rather lax as far as ideological training was concerned.

(S) In the area of logistics, NVN was the principal provider to the PL via a system that was merely an extension of the NVA logistic network for its own forces. Supplies received from NVN by the PL consisted primarily of arms and ammunition. Other categories of provisions, such as clothing and foodstuffs, were procured by the PL units themselves through foraging and local requisition. An exception to NVN being the principal logistic source was found in northwestern Laos. The Chinese Communists were assumed to be furnishing much of the supplies to the PL in that area. As was the case with NVN, those supplies consisted primarily of arms and ammunition.

(S) To measure the effectiveness of the PL army was a difficult task, but from most indications it was, on the whole, a poorly led force. PL units lacked enthusiasm and were generally unwilling to fight, a description which contrasted sharply with the NVA cadre and units. From all accounts of NVA ralliers and prisoners, the typical PL was a poor soldier; any PL army

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effectiveness was attributable to the presence of NVA advisors or a core of NVA soldiers in PL units. But even with that presence to lend backbone to PL units, reports indicated most PL attacks against RLG positions were, in actuality, carried out by 100 percent NVA units. Only after a position was taken, did the PL troops occupy and defend.

(S) As of 15 Apr 70 there were 44 PL battalions which were believed to include about 20 NVA advisors per battalion. An additional 27 PL battalions were believed to be composed of approximately 30 percent NVA personnel. The strength and structure of the PL army as of 15 April 1970 was as follows:

20 Pathet Lao Inf Bns	4,170
44 PL/NVN Inf Bns	11,495 (880 NVA)
27 PL/NVA Inf Bns	5,850 (2,700 NVA)
13 Engr Bns	4,500
9 Arty Bns	1,440
8 AAA Bns	1,530
2 Amr Bns	205
7 Khammouane Inf Bns	1,325
7 Deuanist Inf Bns	750
1 Deuanist Engr Bn	250
Command and Support	<u>16,400</u>
	47,915

(S) The PL command structure was relatively simple. Reportedly, the NLHS Minister of Defense was General Kaysone Phomvihane, and the PL Supreme Commander was General Khamtay Siphandone. The PL organization command structure was part of the Communist organizational structure in Laos.

(S) From the PL supreme headquarters near Sam Neua those officers commanded individual PL battalions in northern Laos through individual province governments. In southern Laos, command of PL units was administered through Southern Laos Tactical HQ located in the Tchepone area.

(S) The PL command structure was directly related to the NVA. At the PL supreme headquarters NVA advisors were responsible to HQ Military Region Northwest, located at Son La in NVN, and from there, back to Hanoi. Similarly, at the Southern Laos Tactical Headquarters a group of NVA advisors were responsible to HQ MR 4 at Vinh, and as in northern Laos, from there to Hanoi. Farther down the chain of command in the field, most of the better PL units in those

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two regions had attached NVA advisors. They were responsible to the NVA advisor at province level who reported to the MR HQ and, eventually to Hanoi.

(S) The PL Army, approximately 50,000 strong and in its principal units strengthened by NVA advisors and hard core NVA troops, was an adjunct of the NVA. Most of its training, logistics, and command and control were an extension of Hanoi's control over its own army. Nevertheless, despite its weaknesses, the PL was able to hold and defend the Communist-controlled hinterlands and mountainous regions. The opposing RLG army (excluding Vang Pao's guerrillas) was of generally low quality, and the PL Army was an effective counterforce. (91)

Lao Peace Proposals

(S) On 6 Mar the Central Committee of the Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) proposed a five-point plan for a political settlement of the Lao conflict in a broadcast from Radio Hanoi. The plan called for: an end to the conflict based on the Geneva Accords of 1962 and the "realities of the present situation"; the holding of general elections after peace was achieved; a provisional government to be set up in the interim; party-controlled areas which would not be entered by the other party and the complete withdrawal of US advisors and equipment and the cessation of bombing in Laos as a precondition for settlement. (92)

(C) On 22 Mar, an LPF messenger delivered a letter from Prince Souphanouvong to Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. The letter restated the LPF five-points and added a personal appeal to the prime minister to stop all bombing. (93)

(C) A 12 Mar meeting in Champassak Province stated PL/NVA military leaders had entered into the political phase of the struggle in Laos. There were two reasons for negotiations between Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong. First, to halt the bombing of enemy forces and second, to encourage the US to pull out of South Vietnam. Further military actions by the PL/NVA would defeat their purposes by causing Souvanna to request increased bombing and the help of US ground forces. (94)

(C) The 8 Apr RLG response to the LPF letter asserted their readiness to discuss the five-points in what was hoped to be "fruitful conversation." At the same time, they asked that the five-points not be construed as rigid conditions imposed before discussion. The letter went on to protest the presence of North Vietnamese soldiers and spoke of the long struggle of the Laotian people against them.

So, to create a favorable atmosphere and to be able to discuss seriously or strictly national interests, the Royal Government would be favorable to: One: A ceasefire throughout Lao territory between the combatant forces and an immediate withdrawal of foreign forces. Two: Simultaneous supervision in all zones without exception by the ICC of the ceasefire and of the withdrawal of foreign troops which have been illegally introduced into Laos. Three: A meeting of the interested parties in a place to be determined to discuss thoroughly all points of difference and to seek an equitable and definitive solution taking into account national interests only, without interference in the internal affairs of neighboring countries which is the very condition of neutrality. (95)

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In closing, the letter contained a personal appeal to Souphanouvong to solve the Lao conflict; in so doing, to perhaps preserve peace in Indochina.

(U) A 24 Jul editorial published in the Lao Presse analyzed the two current Communist offensives in Laos, one political and one military. The political offensive was manifest by the arrival of a high ranking PL official, who was to bring another message from Prince Souphanouvong to Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and was charged to conduct preparatory negotiations on arrangements for a possible meeting between plenipotentiaries of all Lao political parties. The military offensive not only served the PL to make their negotiating position strong in talks with the RLG, but also served Hanoi's interests in pursuing their policy of military conquests in RVN and Cambodia. (96)

(S) The PL envoy, Souk Vongsak, arrived in Vientiane on 31 Jul. Souk, who had been a Communist member of Souvanna Phouma's coalition government set up after the 1962 Geneva Agreement, was a member of the royal family from Luang Prabang and a nephew of Souvanna. Soth Phetrasy said Souk was selected as the NLHS envoy to show the NLHS recognition of the king and the royal family. Soth further stated Souk was not a Communist but a patriot and nationalist and as a neutralist could sympathize with Souvanna. (97)

(S) On 3 Aug Souk delivered the expected message to Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. The letter did not make a bombing halt a precondition for preliminary talks, but did indicate it would be the most important topic of discussion. Any settlement, it stated, must be made in accordance with the five-point proposal. The letter also proposed an elaborate procedure for carrying on the talks: first, talks between Souvanna and Souk; second, meetings between plenipotentiaries representing Souvanna and Souphanouvong; and lastly, formal negotiations between interested Lao parties.

(S) There were probably several reasons why the NLHS and Hanoi leaders wanted to engage the RLG in talks. In addition to the call for cessation of US bombing, they hoped to deter anticipated allied cross-border operations in the Lao Panhandle supply routes. They may have hoped to prevent the annual rainy-season advance of air-supported government forces, thus gaining advantages for their next dry-season offensive. Politically, the Communists may have hoped to bring about strains in the US/RLG relationship by inducing Souvanna to ask for a bombing halt or reduction of other US activities. They also may have hoped to intensify political strains in Vientiane, recently exacerbated by government military defeats, and playing on rightist suspicions of Souvanna and regional rivalries and resentments. Finally, with an eye on Paris, Hanoi may have wanted to demonstrate that when given the opportunity, it had a reasonable approach to peace negotiations.

(S) Souvanna also saw advantages to the talks. Because government forces succeeded in holding the line in northern Laos and recent events on Cambodia had complicated the Communist situation, he believed he had a position of strength from which to bargain. (98)

(U) On 12 Aug the town of Khang Khay, on the Plain of Jars, was accepted by the PL as the meeting place between plenipotentiaries. (99)

(U) On 4 Sep, it was publicly announced that Pheng Phongsavan, Minister of the Interior of the RLG, had been appointed by Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma as his plenipotentiary representative for discussions between the RLG and the PL. In a 29 Aug letter to Souk Vongsak, the prime minister stated that Minister Pheng was granted full powers to act as his representative.

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In the same letter, the prime minister announced that he would be absent from Vientiane on affairs of state until the end of October. Prime Minister Souvanna left Vientiane on 2 Sep proceeding to Lusaka, Zambia, for the conference of non-Aligned Nations. He also planned to attend the General Assembly of the United Nations. (100)

(C) In an 18 Sep press communique Soth Pethrasy, upon returning from a meeting with Prince Souphanouvong in Sam Neua, announced that General Phoune Siphaseuth had been appointed as Souphanouvong's plenipotentiary representative in a letter to Prime Minister Souvanna on 30 Aug. (101)

(S) On 16 Nov, at a meeting between Souk and Souvanna, several arrangements for the talks between the NLHS and the RLG were made. First, the meeting place would be Khang Khay. Second, 10 representatives would be appointed by each side with Pheng Phongsavan leading the RLG delegation and General Phoune Siphaseuth leading the NLHS delegation. Third, the British and Soviet Ambassadors in Vientiane, as representatives of the co-signers of the 1962 Geneva Accords, would be requested to nominate observers to the meetings, with both the British and Soviet military attaches and the International Control Commission (ICC) members attending every meeting. Fourth, Souvanna would request that the ICC provide daily helicopter transportation to Khang Khay from Vong Vieng for the RLG delegation and from Sam Neua for the NLHS delegation. Neither delegation would remain in Khang Khay over night. Fifth, there would be no need for a military security unit for the discussions, since the ICC members would accompany the delegations. Finally, daily meetings would be held until the completion of the discussions. (102)

(U) In another meeting between Souk and Souvanna on 1 Dec, Souk requested that air bombardment over Xieng Khouang and Houa Phan Provinces be stopped 10 days before, during, and 7 days after proposed talks in Khang Khay. Souvanna further proposed that a 15 km neutral zone be created on the Plain of Jars around Khang Kay and that the conference be held under the aegis of the two co-chairmen of the 1962 Geneva Accords (Britain and the Soviet Union) as well as the members of the ICC (India, Canada and Poland). (103)

(C) As the year ended, there was little prospect that genuine negotiations between the two sides would replace the shadow-boxing. Nevertheless, during 1970, new trends were set in motion by two developments. First, the enunciation of a peace program by the Communist in early spring, and secondly, the initiation of contacts between the two sides in mid-summer. While demonstrations of flexibility from both sides indicated that they saw some potential benefits from continued exploratory talks, strong restraints on both sides made a major breakthrough unlikely for the near future. At the year's end, while the issues of titles for the Khang Khay representatives remained unresolved, it seemed to be a less central dispute, with the nature of the military stand-down perhaps replacing it. (104)

Military Situation

(26 Dec 69 - 2 Jan 70)


(S) In MR II, in the Plain of Jars area, major enemy initiated ground actions were near the eastern Route 7/71 junction. (See Figure III-34.) To the northeast, government positions at Phou Nok Kok were probed but enemy forces were driven off with the aid of Royal Lao Air Force (RLAF)

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FIGURE III-35

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gunships. Attacks on government positions around Xieng Khouangville and along the trail system to the east continued. The number of small-scale probes in that area could be the prelude to large-scale attacks. In MR III, light and sporadic activity was noted in the area southwest of Moung Phalane. (See Figure III-35.)

(3-9 Jan)

(S) In MR II a large enemy force, possibly as large as three battalions, assaulted the strategic Phou Nok Kok summit. A nearby government outpost was also attacked. Both positions were lost. Phou Nok Kok was a vital point near Route 7, the key NVN infiltration route. Phou Nok Kok was a critical terrain feature for the NVN and a position they had to control prior to launching an offensive on the Plain of Jars. In MR IV, Attopeu, Saravane, and Pakse came under rocket and mortar attack on 8-9 Jan. Reports indicated the attacks were intended to harass and terrorize the civilian population.

(10-23 Jan)

(S) In MR II, a three-pronged enemy attack was slowly developing to drive into the Plain of Jars. The enemy had pushed government forces south in Lat Bouak sector, built up their forces in the Phu Nok Kok area, and pushed paramilitary forces off several positions east of Xieng Khouangville. In MR III, government forces secured the Moung Phalane airfield, an important site in support of government operations in MR III.

(24 Jan - 13 Feb)

(S) In MR I, enemy forces continued attacks in Pak Beng, the last remaining government outpost. Seizure of the position would give the enemy uncontested control of the Nam Beng Valley, the area of Chinese Communist road building. In MR II, the anticipated enemy offensive in the Plain of Jars began on 12 Feb. Attacks were launched against MG Vang Pao's headquarters on 12 and 13 Feb and against government positions near the Route 7/71 junction. In MR IV, Attopeu, came under mortar and recoilless rifle attack on the nights of 10 and 11 Feb.

(14-20 Feb)

(S) In MR I, PL forces forced the withdrawal of government troops in the Pak Beng. In MR II, Lima Site (LS) 22 (a Lima Site was a Laotian airfield, a relatively permanent aircraft landing site in more or less continuous use) had been under constant attack since the night of 11-12 Feb. Enemy troops supported by tanks, mortar, and recoilless rifle fire overran the site during early morning 21 Feb. By the afternoon of 21 Feb all government forces had withdrawn leaving the Plain of Jars in enemy control. In MR IV, Pakse and Saravane were attacked during the week. In MR V, enemy forces were contacted east of Paksane on 16 and 17 Feb.

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(21-27 Feb)

(S) In MR I, enemy forces launched a heavy probing attack against the government base at Xieng Lom. Xieng Lom was an important staging base for guerrilla operations directed against enemy activity in the Thai/Laos border area. In MR II, government forces withdrawing from LS 22 proceeded to LS 275, were joined by LS 275 defenders, and proceeded further to the west. On 24 Feb, MG Vang Pao directed both Moung Soui and Xieng Khouangville be evacuated. Enemy forces captured Phou Pha Sai on 27 Feb. Phou Pha Sai was located 15 km northeast of Long Tieng, LS 20A where MG Vang Pao established his new headquarters.

(28 Feb - 6 Mar)

(S) In MR I, near Luang Prabang, a series of light contacts took place during the week. In MR II, MG Vang Pao utilized a lull in activity to strengthen his defensive position. He was establishing defensive line and reinforcing strong points on key terrain. The defensive line included LSs 238, 38, 15, 72, 5, and 204. In MR IV the airfield at Attopeu was mortared on 2 Mar. Additionally, there were a small number of enemy harassing attacks on government outposts through MRs III and IV.

(7-13 Mar)

(S) In MR I, on 6 Mar, the enemy launched an attack on the government outpost at Muong Ngeun capturing the position. On 12 Mar, government forces counterattacked and recaptured the position. In MR II, two government outposts north of the PDJ were captured and other key positions were seriously threatened. In the vicinity of LS 238 and LS 15, NVN forces occupied former friendly positions.

(14-20 Mar)

(S) In MR I, on the night of 19 Mar, several villages, located in the Mekong River Valley approximately 50 km west of Luang Prabang, were attacked. Aerial observation on 20 Mar disclosed two villages had been burned and looted. In MR V on 16 Mar, two bridges, 30 km east of Paksane, were destroyed. In MR II, LSs 238, 204, and 5 were still under friendly control. LSs 38, 15, 72, and 20 had been abandoned.

(21-27 Mar)

(S) In MR II LS 32, located north of the Plain of Jars, and nearby government positions were probed by light ground attacks. Government forces conducting operations to reoccupy Sam Thong retook the position. Another friendly unit, sweeping west toward Sam Thong, contacted an enemy force on 22 Mar. The contact occurred 8 km east of Sam Thong and prevented friendly forces from

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advancing. On 27 Mar, friendly forces recaptured Phou Pha Sai, the prominent hilltop 15 km northeast of Long Tieng.

(28 Mar - 3 Apr)

(S) In MR I, LS 259 was overrun by an unknown size enemy force on 30 Mar. LS 259 was the last government controlled position between the Mekong and Nam Tha Rivers. In MR II, Sam Thong, LS 20, was reoccupied by friendly troops on 30 Mar. On 1 Apr, friendly forces captured the eastern point of the high ridgeline south of LS 72. On the following morning enemy units attacked the newly established position, but the assault was repulsed.

(4-10 Apr)

(S) In MR II, government troops established blocking positions on enemy infiltration routes north of LS 72 and occupied the eastern end of the LS 72 airstrip. North of the Plain of Jars, enemy units launched several ground attacks on government positions near LS 32. All attacks were repulsed. In MR IV on 8 Apr, a government position located 26 km east of Paksane was attacked several times.

(11-15 Apr)

(S) In MR II, the Sam Thong/Long Tieng area received enemy rocket, mortar, and artillery fire as well as ground probes. LS 32 continued to receive nightly ground probes and artillery shelling.

(16-23 Apr)

(S) In MR I, the enemy attempted to dislodge government forces operating north of the Mekong River between Muong Houn and Luang Prabang. On 16 Apr, an attack on a government position located 40 km northwest of Luang Prabang was repulsed. On 18 Apr, a hilltop strongpoint, located 30 km east of Muong Houn, was attacked and friendly forces withdrew. In MR II, LS 206 was abandoned by friendly forces. LS 231 was the last friendly-controlled outpost northeast of the Ban Ban area.

(24 Apr - 1 May)

(S) In MR II, LS 231 was evacuated on 27 Apr. In MR IV, several outposts south of Attapeu were captured on 28 Apr. During the night of 29-30 Apr, a large enemy force moved up the

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opposite banks of the Se Kong River and surrounded Attopeu. Early on the morning of 30 Apr, the town was ordered evacuated.

(2-10 May)

(S) In MR II LS 33, located north of the Plain of Jars was attacked and overrun by enemy forces. In MR IV, Attopeu was in enemy control after the city was abandoned on 30 Apr. Enemy forces launched small attacks against government positions on the eastern rim of the Bolovens Plateau. In Saravane, the commander of MR IV requested and received permission to evacuate the city. The civilian population began the evacuation by airlift to Pakse on 10 May. The military defenders planned to remain behind.

(11-23 May)

(S) In MR II five government outposts, located in an area 4 km north of Sam Thong, were attacked and abandoned. The loss of these outposts placed Long Tieng within range of enemy rockets. In MR IV, government outposts on the eastern edge of the Bolovens Plateau received rocket and mortar fire as well as ground attacks. Large enemy forces were reported within 5 km north of Saravane.

(24-30 May)

(S) In MR II, government operations to retake LS 15 were begun on 27 May. Progress was prevented by enemy resistance.

(31 May - 5 Jun)

(S) In MR I, government forces reoccupied Nuang Pak Tha, an outpost on the Mekong River approximately 65 km northwest of Pak Beng on 31 May. In MR II, heavy casualties were inflicted on government troops engaged in operations to retake LS 15.

(6-12 Jun)

(S) In MR II, the government offensive to retake LS 15 continued. On 6 Jun, friendly forces attacked a hilltop position 4 km north of LS 72. On 7 Jun, government forces recaptured an outpost overrun 3 days before. In MR IV, Saravane was overrun on the morning of 9 Jun. The civilian population had previously been evacuated and government defenders withdrew to a nearby Lima Site.

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(13-26 Jun)

(S) In MR IV on 16 Jun, an enemy force overran LS 171, located 5 km northeast of Saravane. Defending forces withdrew to PS-39. On 18 Jun, enemy forces captured PS-19, located 25 km north of Saravane. The site was reoccupied unopposed on 25 Jun, by government troops. On 23 Jun, LS 134, located 15 km east of Saravane was lost.

(27 Jun - 3 Jul)

(S) In MR II, enemy activity was characterized by small-scale probes of government positions north and west of Sam Thong.

(4-10 Jul)

(S) In MR II on 7 Jul, enemy troops attacked the refugee village of Phu Cum near LS 50. There were 27 refugees killed and 24 wounded.

(11-23 Jul)

(S) In MR I, the major guerrilla base at Vien Phu Kha, located approximately 70 km northwest of Muong Houn was seriously threatened by enemy forces. Attacks north and east of Vien Phu Kha on 16, 17, and 18 Jul suggested enemy intentions to eliminate the base. Enemy success would seriously impair guerrilla operations in the Nam Tha Valley and would eliminate the only major friendly base in Hona Khong Province east of Nam Yu. In MR II, a 200-man Special Guerrilla Unit (SGU), operating north and west of Sam Thong, captured enemy positions on 8 and 10 Jul. Enemy sappers attacked the refugee camp at Phu Cum (LS 50) on 8 and 11 Jul. Thirty-seven casualties, mostly women and children, were reported. In MR II, friendly operations in the Muong Phine area met stiff enemy resistance. These operations, involving three SGU battalions, were considered successful because of penetration into areas previously regarded as secure by the enemy. In MR IV, on the nights of 13 and 14 Jul, enemy forces attacked friendly positions at Phou Nong Tao. On 17 Jul enemy attacks forced government troops defending Phou Nong Tao to withdraw. In Sithadone Province, Khong Island was under increased enemy pressure and the 60-man government garrison was reinforced with over 1,000 troops from Pakse and MRs III and V. Reports indicated the enemy intended to increase their use of Sithadone Province as a staging area for activities in Cambodia.

(24-30 Jul)

(S) In MR III, government harassment and interdiction efforts directed against Route 23 south of Muong Phine met heavy enemy resistance on the night of 23-24 Jul. In MR IV, during the night of 27-28 Jul, enemy forces regained control of PS-21. This position had changed hands on several occasions during previous weeks.

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(31 Jul - 7 Aug)

(S) In MR I on 4 Aug, three government battalions began an airlift operation into the Nam Ou Valley, approximately 45 km north northwest of Luang Prabang. Their mission was to interdict water traffic on the Nam Ou and provide protection to Luang Prabang. In MR II, enemy activity in the LS-72 area increased. Beginning on 30 Jul, enemy attacks were launched against government positions along the Phu Long Mat Ridgeline, approximately 5 km north of LS-72. On 31 Jul enemy forces overran three positions but were reoccupied by government forces on 3 Aug. Prior knowledge of a planned government offensive to push enemy forces back to the Plain of Jars caused the indefinite cancellation of the offensive. In MR III, government forces operating approximately 7 km north of Bon Tang Vai received enemy mortar fire beginning on the night of 1 Aug and continuing into the morning hours of 2 Aug. By 0600 approximately 110 government troops had laid down their weapons and equipment and deserted. In MR IV, on 31 Jul, government forces launched an operation to retake positions at Bun Saphang, across from Khong Island, lost on 13 Jul. Heavy enemy resistance forced the government troops to withdraw and relocate on Khong Island.

(8-14 Aug)

(S) In MR IV on 13 Aug, PS-39, the last government controlled outpost in Saravane Province was overrun.

(15-21 Aug)

(S) In MR II, near the Plain of Jars, Operation LEAPFROG began on 18 Aug. Five hundred government troops were inserted into an area approximately 5 km northwest of LS-15, an objective of the operation. On 20 Aug, enemy forces forced friendly elements to withdraw from one of their forward positions.

(22 Aug - 4 Sep)

(S) In MR II, heavy rains and enemy resistance continued to hinder friendly progress in Operation LEAPFROG in the Plain of Jars. Government forces were advancing slowly toward LS-15 and occupied positions approximately 4 to 6 km to the south and southeast of the objective. Government patrols entered Muong Soui on the night of 31 Aug - 1 Sep, reaching the air field without encountering enemy opposition. In MR III, a NVA rallier revealed that the 9th NVA Regt arrived in Savannakhet Province in May. The regiment had been subordinate to MRTTH in the RVN. The regiment's mission was to secure the Muong Phine area and the Route 9-23 complex. In MR IV, on the Bolovens Plateau, government positions around LS 166 were attacked by an estimated enemy battalion on 29 Aug. Friendly forces withdrew on 30 Aug, but counterattacked, finding the enemy had withdrawn.

(5-11 Sep)

(S) In MR I, Operation 870 continued in the Nam Ou Valley with only minor contacts reported. Plans were reportedly being made to withdraw most of the troops from the operation. In MR II,

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the paramilitary forces of MG Vang Pao continued their efforts to capture Muong Soui. On 10 Sep, government forces were forced to withdraw from their positions north of the city after a 5-hour contact with an estimated two enemy battalions. In MR III, five government battalions operating in the central panhandle continued to conduct patrols and small-unit search operations with only limited contacts reported. Documents captured after a 5 Sep contact approximately 25 km west of Muong Phine indicated the enemy unit involved was from the 5th NVA Bn, 968th NVA Gp. The 968th Gp (AKA 968th Front) apparently controlled all NVA tactical units in southern Laos. In MR IV, government irregular forces continued to operate with moderate success on the eastern edge of the Bolovens Plateau. These elements were part of the government's Operation GAUNTLET, designed to interdict enemy LOCs in the southeastern panhandle. In MR V on 10 Sep, a government battalion-sized operation began 65 km north of Vientiane. Objectives of the operation were to clear enemy forces from the Nam Sane and Nam Leuk Valleys and to destroy enemy rice fields in the area.

(12-18 Sep)

(S) In MR I, a 200-man government force operating in northwestern Laos, captured a former friendly outpost approximately 4 km from the Lao/Burma border. Operation 870 forces continued to move southwest along the Nam Ou Valley, northwest of Pak Ou. In MR II, Operation LEAP-FROG continued without discernible progress. In MR IV, a document captured 25 km east of Chavane, revealed the primary missions of BT 44 were to protect storage facilities and LOCs, to protect troop movements, and to evacuate wounded personnel. The document also revealed that due to enemy activity, rains, and gasoline and tire shortages, the 56th Truck Trans Bn was able to attain only 50 percent of its transportation goal. In MR V, operations in the Nam Sane and Nam Leuk Valleys continued without significant contact.

(19-25 Sep)

(S) In MR I, Operation 870 ended on 24 Sep when government forces returned to the Luang Prabang area. In MR II, enemy attacks on government positions south and southwest of the Plain of Jars on 21, 23, and 24 Sep indicated NVA intentions to prevent any significant gains by MG Vang Pao's Operation COUNTERPUNCH, the new name for Operation LEAPFROG. Major tactical emphasis of government forces on this operation would probably be toward Muong Soui during the remainder of the rainy season. In MR III, the 5th Bn, 968th NVA Front, continued tactical activity in the area west of Muong Phine. In MR IV, a government guerrilla battalion occupied Ban Tourn-lane on Route 23 in the south-central panhandle. The airstrip adjacent to the town was also secured after only minor enemy contact. On the Bolovens Plateau, evidence continued to accumulate indicating an enemy threat to Paksong, a vital government supply point serving friendly irregular forces on the eastern rim of the plateau. East of Paksong, elements of two government irregular battalions assaulted heavily fortified NVA positions at PS-26, 13 km northwest of Attopeu, and captured the position on 25 Sep.

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(26 Sep - 2 Oct)

(S) In MR II, irregular troops were inserted into an area south of Route 4 and east of the Plain of Jars to cut enemy supply lines and to divert enemy forces from the Ban Na area. No contact with enemy forces was made since 26 Sep when the insertion was made. In MR III, friendly forces operating along Route 9 west of Muong Phine engaged an unknown-sized enemy unit. In MR IV, two government irregular battalions conducting an interdiction operation along Route 23, engaged an enemy force approximately 37 km north of Saravane. Activity in the southern Lao Panhandle centered around the eastern rim of the Bolovens Plateau. On 27 Sep, PS-20, located in the Se Kong Valley approximately 28 km north of Attopeu, was captured by an estimated NVA battalion.

(3-9 Oct)

(S) In MR II, the government forces operation to clear Route 4 was terminated on 7 Oct. To the northwest, elements of four irregular battalions were located north and west of Muong Soui. On 5 Oct, friendly forces repulsed an enemy attack attempting to overrun government positions 1 km west of Muong Soui. In the Ban Na area south of the Plain of Jars, Operation COUNTER-PUNCH Part II was in progress. The objective of reoccupying LS-15 remained unchanged. Enemy resistance throughout MR II was expected to increase as a result of the renewed operations to take Muong Soui and Ban Na.

(10-16 Oct)

(S) In MR II, friendly forces occupied Muong Soui on 10 Oct and uncovered a number of small enemy arms caches south of Muong Soui. Friendly forces were setting up blocking positions around the city. Friendly forces advancing on Ban Na met little enemy resistance. Lead elements of the government forces were located within 1 km of the airstrip on 16 Oct. In MR IV on 11 Oct, an estimated two enemy companies attacked and occupied PS-2, 50 km north of Attopeu.

(17-23 Oct)

(S) In MR II, government forces continued to consolidate their positions north and east of Muong Soui. On 18 Oct, two government positions were attacked by small-sized enemy units. The enemy dead at both positions were wearing new uniforms and appeared considerably younger than those killed in other attacks in the area. This suggested that the enemy was possibly committing reinforcements or new units into the area. Government forces occupied Ban Na and the former enemy strong points to the east at Nuong Pot. On 19 Oct, a small friendly unit captured Phou Seu Mountain after contacting only slight enemy resistance. In MR III, a six-battalion government force was in the final phase of preparation for a clearing operation east along Route 9 toward Muong Phine. Enemy resistance to the operation was expected to be heavy. In MR IV, PS-2 was reoccupied by irregular units on 17 Oct, encountering no enemy resistance.

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(24-30 Oct)

(S) In MR II, government forces continued consolidating positions and patrolling in the Muong Soui area. Enemy activity consisted primarily of small-scale ambushes and ABFs. On 27 Oct, an estimated enemy company attacked two government outposts 3 km north of Ban Na. The friendly units held both positions. On 29 Oct, government forces repulsed an attack by an estimated 200-man NVA force on Phou Seu Mountain, 14 km east of Ban Na. On 30 Oct, Phou Seu was again attacked by an estimated 200-man NVA force. Government forces repulsed the attacks and held the position. In MR III, a five-battalion government force was advancing along Route 9 toward Muong Phine. On 27 Oct, a government battalion engaged a platoon-sized NVA unit, 25 km west of Muong Phine. Documents, found on a NVA soldier killed in the contact, identified the unit as the 2d Co, 5th NVA Bn, 968th Front. On 29 Oct, three government battalions attacked and occupied an enemy position believed to have been the headquarters of the PL Savannakhet Province Chief, 23 km north of Muong Phine. The enemy set fire to the headquarters complex as they retreated, burning 25 shelters, one dispensary, and five storehouses.

(31 Oct - 6 Nov)

(S) In MR II on 30 Oct, government forces occupying the highpoint positions of Phou Seu and Phon Kok, on the western edge of the Plain of Jars came under attack by an estimated 250-man NVA force. Again on 1 Nov, an estimated six NVA companies attacked and occupied the hill top positions on Phou Seu and Phou Kok. In the Ban Na area government forces continued to consolidate and expand their perimeter areas. In MR III on 2 Nov, an estimated two NVA battalions launched a series of ABFs and ground assaults against a SGU located 20 km north of Muong Phine. On 3 Nov, enemy units conducted another series of small scale-attacks against other SGU positions located 4 km west of Muong Phine. On 4 Nov, a SGU attacked an unknown-sized enemy force at a suspected enemy bivouac area, 20 km northeast of Muong Phine. Also on 4 Nov, a SGU located 4 km west of Muong Phine was attacked by an estimated two NVA battalions. On 6 Nov, the SGU commander reported that every major road, trail, road junction, and by-pass in the areas west of Tchepone and Muong Phine was successfully mined with anti-personnel and anti-vehicular mines. In MR V on 2 Nov, government forces began a sweep operation north of Pakxane and established a base at Sun Ben on 4 Nov. The base was to be used for small-unit operations throughout the area. On 2 Nov, a RLG Bureau of Public Roads truck was ambushed by an unknown-size enemy force on Highway 13, 18 km south of Muong Kassi.

(7-13 Nov)

(S) In MR II, government forces on the western edge of the Plain of Jars continued to expand and consolidate their positions. A six-battalion government force was conducting small-scale operations in the area around Ban Na. In MR III, the three SGUs operating in the Tchepone area and the three SGUs operating in the Muong Phine area, completed their mission and withdrew westward toward Muong Phalane.

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(14-20 Nov)

(S) In MR II, activity was centered in the Plain of Jars area and was characterized by small artillery-supported ground attacks by both friendly and enemy units against the high-ground positions in the vicinity of Ban Na. In MR IV on 16 Nov, two government irregular companies, supported by T-28 air strikes, assaulted enemy high-ground positions 14 km west of Attopeu. The attack was later discontinued.

(21-27 Nov)

(S) In MR I on 26 Nov, a government-charter C-47, flying a regular commercial run between Luang Prabang and Ban Houei Sai, was hit in the wing by two 37mm anti-aircraft shells, 15 km southwest of Muong Houn. The aircraft landed safely at Luang Prabang. In MR II on 26 Nov, a 250-man NVA force launched a coordinated ground attack on government artillery positions in the vicinity of Ban Na, west of the Plain of Jars. Friendly forces were able to hold all positions except one forward outpost. On 24 Nov in the Muong Moc area, northeast of Paksane, an estimated 200-man NVA force attacked and occupied five government irregular outposts. Although the strongest outpost in the vicinity of the Muong Moc airstrip was not attacked, NVA elements occupied the high ground overlooking both Muong Moc and the key outposts protecting the western approach to the Muong Moc valley. In MR IV in the Bolovens Plateau area, approximately 50 km northwest of Attopeu, PS-2 and PS-27 were attacked by an unknown-sized NVA unit on 22 Nov. PS-27 was captured but PS-2 repulsed the attack. On the same day, PS-26 and PS-38, approximately 16 km west of Attopeu, were simultaneously attacked and occupied by an estimated three NVA companies each. On 23 Nov, three NVA companies attacked LS-165, 26 km northwest of Attopeu, and government irregulars withdrew. On the same day, government irregulars reoccupied PS-38 with enemy resistance. On 27 Nov, PS-38 again fell to the enemy and PS-165 was reoccupied by government units.

(28 Nov - 3 Dec)

(S) In MR I on 30 Nov, government units in the Mok Hau Valley area northeast of Luang Prabang were attacked by a well-coordinated enemy force estimated to be three NVA battalions. By 2 Dec, government units had pulled back and formed new defenses 20 km northeast of Luang Prabang. In MR II, government irregulars were airlifted from Long Tieng and Khang Kho to LS-2, 17 km south of Ban Ban, to move towards enemy storage and transshipment facilities in the Ban Ban area. On 2 Dec, an estimated 100-sappers attacked a friendly position 8 km south of Ban Na. On the same day, an estimated 100-man NVA force attacked and occupied a government irregular position 7 km west of Muong Moc. NVA units held three high-ground positions overlooking the approach to the Muong Moc Valley. In MR IV, on 2 and 3 Dec, two government irregular battalions were moved to LS-172 to undertake operations against LS-38, west of Attopeu. On 30 Nov, two platoons of the irregulars probed enemy positions at LS-166 and on 2 Dec patrols in the vicinity of the site reported sighting no enemy. Also on 2 Dec, three SGUs secured the high ground along Route 23, 4 km south of Thateng. On 3 Dec, one of the SGUs engaged an estimated three-NVA companies, 3 km southwest of Thateng.

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(4-10 Dec)

(S) In MR I, NVA units that conducted attacks against government positions northeast of Luang Prabang on 30 Nov were identified as elements of the 335th NVA Regiment. The regimental headquarters was located in Dien Bien Phu, NVN, and elements of the regiment were operating in Laos as early as 1955. In MR II on 4 Dec, LS-46 was captured by NVA units. Tactical activity in the Ban Ban area was primarily small-scale enemy ambushes and ABFs. Government units reported no important progress in their advance on Ban Ban. In MR IV, PS-40, southwest of Attopeu, was re-entered on 4 Dec by government units which encountered no enemy resistance. On 5 Dec, PS-22 was attacked by an estimated three NVA battalions. Later that same day, the site was attacked a second time by two NVA companies. Enemy units briefly occupied positions on the northwest edge of the airstrip but were driven off. Further south, LS-165 and 172 came under attack by small enemy units also on 5 Dec. Lima Site 165 was again attacked on 9 Dec. Also on 5 Dec, an estimated two enemy companies attacked two government teams in a village 29 km northeast of Khong Sedone. Forward air controllers (FAC) reported approximately 200 villagers evacuated the area and were moving towards Khong Sedone. The SGUs moving towards Thateng on Route 23 were located 4 km from their objective. Their advance was halted by an estimated two enemy companies in well fortified caves near Thateng.

(11-18 Dec)

(S) In MR II, on 11 Dec an estimated 100-man NVA force attacked and occupied a government position 15 km northwest of Ban Ban. On 12 Dec, government irregulars operating in the vicinity of LS-2 launched a drive towards Ban Ban, 17 km to the north. On 16 Dec, a forward outpost near LS-2, which irregular units occupied on 13 Dec, was attacked by an estimated 100-man NVA force. Government units withdrew from the position, but returned without resistance on 14 Dec. On 19 Dec, the forward elements of the government force were located approximately 13 km southwest of Ban Ban. In MR III, on the night of 12-13 Dec, an estimated two enemy companies attacked a government position 86 km north of Thakhek. Government units held the position against the attack. In MR IV on the night of 11 Dec, four 140mm rockets were fired at Paksong.

(19-25 Dec)

(S) In MR I on 21 Dec, friendly units operating northeast of Luang Prabang encountered an estimated two PL/NVA platoons. In MR II, government irregular units operating from LS-2 moved to within 6 km of Ban Ban. On 19 Dec, an enemy company attacked two government positions in the vicinity of LS-2. On the same day, elements of a government battalion contacted an estimated 50-man NVA force 16 km southeast of LS-2. On 22-23 Dec, an estimated 100-man enemy force attacked a government battalion 11 km southeast of Ban Ban and an unknown size enemy force attacked another government battalion 10 km south of Ban Ban. On 26 Dec, government units captured several large NVA supply caches 7 km southeast of Ban Ban. An estimated 100 tons of rice and an unreported amount of artillery and mortar ammunition was destroyed. In MR III on 25 Dec, a government battalion contacted an estimated five NVA companies 10 km north of Muong Phalane. The government unit withdrew towards Muong Phalane. In MR IV, friendly

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units were consolidating their positions north of Paksong. On 25 Dec, an estimated two NVA battalions attacked LS-172 causing the 30-man government security force to withdraw from the site.

(26-31 Dec)

(S) In MR III on 29 Dec, government forces repulsed a two-company enemy attack against Muong Phalane. Also on 29 Dec, an NVA battalion attacked government positions at the Route 13 bridge over the Se Bang Hiang, 80 km southeast of Savaynakhet. The bridge was only slightly damaged but the government post was destroyed. In MR IV on 27 Dec, government units repulsed a company-size enemy attack on an outpost 4 km north of PS 22. (105)

Estimated Enemy Order of Battle

(C) The overall PL/NVN strength in Laos was 96,160 personnel in 218 battalions as of 15 Dec 70. Estimated enemy strength remained approximately 95,000, ranging from a high of 98,055 in May to the November low of 92,735.

(C) The estimated enemy force as of 15 December 1970 was:

Total North Vietnamese Forces	51,830	
Infantry in 52 NVA Bns		20,050
Infantry in 28 combined PL/NVA Bns		2,800
NVA advisors in 48 PL/NVN Bns		960
AAA in 15 NVA Bns		5,250
Command and Support		8,200
Advisors in 16 PL/NVA AAA Bns		120
Commo-liaison in 1 Bn		350
Transportation in 1 Bn		300
Engineers in 29 NVA Bns (includes civilian coolies)		13,800
 Total Lao Forces	44,330	
Pathet Lao	42,405	
Infantry in 16 PL Bns		3,120
Infantry in 48 PL/NVN Bns		10,940
Infantry in 28 PL/NVA Bns		6,025
Field Artillery in 5 Bns		940
AAA in 6 PL/NVN Bns		1,130
Engineers in 10 Bns		3,550
Command and Support		16,700
 Khammouane/PL		1,000
Deuanist/PL	925	
Infantry in 6 Bns		675
Engineers in 1 Bn		250
 Chinese Communists	5,200 - 6,800	

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(C) A force estimated at between 4,000 and 5,000 Chinese Communist personnel in five to seven battalions associated with engineering activity was located in northwestern Laos. In addition, an estimated 1,200 to 1,800 Chinese personnel were associated with AAA activity in the same region.

(C) The following figures were a breakdown of enemy combat strength by military region as of 15 Dec 70. Forces included were infantry, field artillery, and AAA. (106)

<u>Military Region</u>	<u>PL*</u>	<u>NVA</u>	<u>PL/NVA**</u>	<u>Neutralist</u>	<u>Total</u>
MR-I	6,190	2,200	2,575	1,000	11,965
MR-II	4,855	7,950	2,600	675	16,080
MR-III	3,290	7,500	625	0	11,415
MR-IV	2,300	7,650	2,675	0	12,625
MR-V	575	0	350	0	925
TOTAL	17,210	25,300	8,825	1,675	53,010

*Total includes 1,080 NVA advisors.

**Total includes 2,800 NVA personnel.

CAMBODIA

Introduction

(S) Cambodia became a major logistics corridor for the VC/NVA after 1965. In addition, as the war in RVN increased in intensity, the VC/NVA built up BAs along the Cambodian-RVN border. Tension between the Cambodian Government of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and the VC/NVA and between Sihanouk and his political opponents increased in 1969. But the gravity of the threat to Sihanouk's power was not apparent. In 1969, the Cambodians held up the flow of supplies to the VC/NVA at times and attempted to extract concessions for the continuation of the arms and supply traffic. Evidence indicated the bulk of the supplies in Cambodian army storage depots were released to the VC/NVA in late 1969. The problems the VC/NVA experienced in their Cambodian logistics arrangements may have partially explained the crash logistics effort down the Ho Chi Minh trail in early 1970.

(S) The two major figures in the Cambodian government overthrew Sihanouk in a coup on 18 Mar. That touched off a chain of events which altered the military situation from one of skirmishes and border incidents on the eastern border of Cambodia to war throughout the country. The differences between Sihanouk and Lon Nol and Sirik Matak, the two primary leaders who replaced

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him, were partly over the continued presence of VC/NVA troops in BAs in Cambodia. Other issues, such as the state of economy were also significant. After the coup, NVN and China broke diplomatic relations with Cambodia and heeded Sihanouk's appeals for help in restoring him to power.

(S) NVN turned to building an insurgency and an infrastructure in Cambodia. Since the Cambodian Communist movement was weak, VC/NVA troops and political cadre fought the military and political battles NVN hoped would force the new government's demise; allow the return of Sihanouk and restoration of the BAs and the logistic networks; and put Communists in control of Cambodia. VC/NVA troops acted in the name of Sihanouk whose principal popular support was among the peasantry. NVA troops improved and constructed new LOCs from the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos into the logistical corridors in northeast Cambodia. The weakness of the Cambodian armed forces in the face of the experienced VC/NVA troops led to victories for the Communist troops and a military situation where Phnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia, was largely surrounded at the end of June. It was not anticipated VC/NVA troops would attempt to capture Phnom Penh militarily, but that they would attempt to place sufficient pressure on the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak government for it to topple. (Also see Annex C for a background discussion.)

Cambodian Political Situation

(C) An evaluation of the situation after the withdrawal of US troops indicated conditions were better than expected. Expressed reasons were: advent of the rainy season had greatly restricted enemy activities to un-flooded and mountaineous areas; cross-border operations had an impact on supply bases and disorganization of forces; and the shortage of ammunition and food caused malnutrition, disease, and death among enemy units. Enemy forces had overestimated the confidence of the population in Sihanouk. Recruiting activities met with little success due to national sentiment of Cambodian people. (107)

(S) The Cambodian National Assembly supported Lon Nol as the only man capable of pursuing the war against the Communists and recognized the military situation called for a military regime. Appointment of new government officials on 1 Jul was seen as an astute political move. The appointments seemed to quiet assembly discontent. (108)

(C) In a speech to the nation on 15 Aug, Lon Nol announced that a committee was actively working on a republican constitution. The proclamation was not announced until October. (109)

(C) The Cambodian National Assembly and Senate in a joint session on 5 Oct unanimously voted to proclaim Cambodia a Republic on 9 Oct. The proclamation modified the existing constitution until an agreement could be reached on a new draft constitution. Two basic modifications to be made concerned the abolishment of articles referring to the monarchy and a general statement to the effect that any articles which impinged on individual rights would be null and void. Specific articles to take affect on proclamation were: first, Cambodia was a "Republic, one and indivisible"; second, that the existing constitution would continue to be applicable except for those articles contrary to the spirit of a Republican regime; third, that all laws and regulations bestowing or recognizing privileges by birth contrary to the principle of equality of all citizens before the law, would be considered null, and finally, that Cheng Heng, in his capacity of Chief of State, would continue to exercise those functions until the election of a president. (110)

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Cambodian Insurgent Threat

(S) Historically, Cambodia had not been beset with internal unrest. One of the major reasons was the ethnic composition. An estimated 87 percent of the nearly 6.5 million were ethnic Khmer or Cambodian, presenting no serious ethnic, regional, or ideological differences. The largest minority groups were the Vietnamese and Chinese, each accounting for about 5 per cent of the total population. The Buddhist system of values emphasizing gentleness, serenity, and acceptance of one's fate without complaint further enhanced social stability.

(S) However in 1967, the government indicated an increasing alarm over an insurgency problem. The Khmer Serei ("Free Cambodians") was the earliest insurgent group of any consequence. That non-Communist dissident group, led by Son Ngoc Thanh, began in the late 1950s. The group's only ideology was the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk, the Chief of State. The small group, numbering approximately 200 to 300, was primarily located in Thailand and carried out raids in the north-west section of Cambodia. For all intents and purposes, the Khmer Serei movement had lost its steam and died out by early 1970. (111)

(C) Two groups were involved in active rebellion: the Khmer Loeu (Hill Khmer), consisting of tribal groups in the northeast; and the Khmer Rouge (Khmer Reds) in the south and west. Both groups shared a common hostility toward the Cambodian Government. The most disconcerting factor was the approximately 40,000 VC/NVA troops who were aiding and encouraging the insurgent groups along the eastern border.

(S) The Khmer Rouge became active in 1967 when a peasant rebellion erupted in Battambang Province. There had been considerable corruption and malpractice by government officials, and the inhabitants were particularly dissatisfied with government rice-control measures. In 1968 areas of Khmer Rouge activity had expanded to Koh Kong, Kompong Speu, and Kampot Provinces. The degree of Communist influence was seen in the organization and equipment and through the use of pro-Communist propaganda leaflets. In 1969 the rebels expanded their area of operations to the eastern border area opposite Tay Ninh Province, RVN. There were also indications of Khmer Rouge complicity with Khmer Loeu in the northwestern provinces of Ratanakiri, Mondolkiri, and Stung Treng.

(S) Khmer Loeu insurgents, hill tribesmen of the northeastern provinces, were in open revolt after May 1968. The rebellion stemmed from grievances against the extension of government reforms and controls offensive to their cultural traditions and beliefs. Communist influence in the Khmer Loeu was uncertain; however, they received weapons, training and, perhaps, leadership from the VC operating in the northeastern border area.

(S) Estimated strength of Khmer Rouge and Khmer Loeu were 2,000 to 3,000 and 1,200 respectively. (112)

The Cambodian Army

(S) The Cambodian Army (Forces Armees Nationales Khmer (FANK) known as FARK prior to April) was trying to preserve enclaves of freedom in a land swept by Communist aggression. The difficulties it faced became apparent when hostilities began in the spring. They were aggravated

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by the stresses of the situation at that time. The armed forces were subordinate to the Chief of State, Cheng Heng. General Lon Nol, Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense, was the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Chief of the army. The army was the dominant service, over the air force and navy, with Lon Nol firmly in charge. In April when overt Communist aggression commenced, the army had a strength of 37,000. The force was poorly equipped and trained. By mid-August the force had over 120,000 men. The army had been deliberately neglected during the reign of Prince Sihanouk and had been used to build roads and in other civic actions programs. Tacit approval of the officers to engage in smuggling for the VC/NVA undermined both discipline and morale. The army was incapable of organizing an effective defense against external aggression because most officers and men were inexperienced. The French Military Mission in charge of training was not an aggressive element. They were continually plagued with a shortage of officers, especially field grade officers. The Soviet Union and Communist China had been the major suppliers of arms and equipment. Other weapons included those from France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the United States. With only a limited number of each type of weapon, the lack of standardization caused problems in training and maintenance. Communication between units was limited or nonexistent. The principal method of communication was by runner or ground couriers. Transportation consisted of commandeered civilian buses, soft drink trucks, and trucks of owners who had catered formerly to the VC.

(S) FANK was beset with problems. In mid-August only 25 battalions of over 220 could be considered reasonably ready for combat. The shortage of experienced fighting men plagued it. Small-arms ammunition was in such short supply that recruits sometimes fired only five practice rounds before being sent into battle. One commander summed up his problem, "We recruit, train, and fight at the same time." FANK's tactics, or lack of them, enabled the enemy to keep the initiative and choose the time and place for battles. FANK's propensity to maintain its conventional warfare plan in fighting an enemy who used hit-and-run tactics was another tactical problem. FANK was tied to strategic defense of major cities and LOCs. The enemy operated in remote areas and away from LOCs. From such positions, the enemy was capable of moving against a variety of targets.

(S) FANK suffered from a lack of administrative and organizational ability, combat experience, training, and equipment. Until FANK was trained and equipped, it was unable to withstand intensive enemy offensives.

(S) On the favorable side, national sentiment and unity was strong. FANK soldiers had shown an increased willingness to stand and fight. They were gaining fighting spirit and courage, but substantial training was needed. Foreign assistance extended FANK's ability to cope with the enemy. US-made and captured enemy equipment delivered to Cambodia included communications equipment, vehicles, small arms, and ammunition. Some 3,000 Khmer Krom troops, Cambodian mercenaries trained and equipped by US Special Forces in Vietnam, were sent to Cambodia. ARVN units trained Cambodian troops in RVN.

(113) (See the Top Secret Supplement for further discussion of the US Military assistance program.)

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Assessment of Enemy Intentions

(S) Communist short-term intentions appeared focused on offensive operations to keep FANK disorganized, weak, and on the defensive. Attacks and LOC interdictions were designed to limit FANK's surface-movement ability, restrict offensive capability, and weaken the country politically and economically. The enemy's offensive tactics gave him freedom of movement and the ability to exert military pressure where he chose. The immediate objective of the Communists was establishment of a logistical corridor from Laos along the Mekong River into central Cambodia.

(S) Long-term Communist intentions appeared oriented toward development of a Cambodian infrastructure and local insurgent force, controlled by the Vietnamese. Prosecuting the Vietnam conflict with main-force units would be emphasized. A minimum of regular units and local elements would be used to engage the FANK. The overall Communist objective was to force an accommodation of the GOC through military, economic, and political erosion. (114)

Establishment of a Cambodian Infrastructure

(S) Establishment of an infrastructure in Cambodia was not a simple task for the VC/NVA. The Khmer people possessed a degree of ethnic, religious, and political homogeneity. Associations between Khmers, who comprised the majority of the Cambodian population, and the Vietnamese had been painful for centuries. The resultant, deep-seated animosity limited the direct role which the VC/NVA could play at the village level. For that reason, creation of a large Communist covert apparatus among the Khmers, similar to the VCI, was more difficult than it first appeared.

(S) The covert organizations within RVN had been created over a long period of time. It grew in an environment replete with secret societies and in which the traditional interplay of informal social groups was endemic. The process took place in an atmosphere of dynamic change occurring while Vietnam was still in a colonial status. It permitted the focus of Vietnamese resentment against the French and drew heavy sustenance from latent Vietnamese nationalism.

(S) However, the situation was far different in Cambodia. Cambodian social organization was more informal and rudimentary. Buddhist influence was much more pervasive. Social life was basically village-oriented and influence at the local level was jointly exercised by Bonzes, village school teachers, Chinese shopkeepers, and rice and lumbermill operators. Thus the VC/NVA appeared as aliens in all areas of Cambodia except the provinces along the RVN border where the Vietnamese minority resided. Without the traditional secret societies and the issue of colonialism, it seemed unlikely the VC/NVA could erect a very extensive or cohesive infrastructure in Cambodia during the span of 6 months to a year. (115)

Sihanouk's Government-in-Exile

(S) On 5 May in Peking Sihanouk announced the formation of the "Royal Government of National Union" (RGNU). Sihanouk retained his position as Chief of State and additionally was named as

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chairman of the "National United Front of Kampuchea" (FUNK). He described his government as "the only legal government of all the Khmer people" and called for the overthrow of the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak "racists, fascist reactionary regime." His cabinet was composed of two different types of people: those older members who had long been loyal to Sihanouk, and a younger group of intellectuals and leftists. The leftists probably played a dominant role in steering Sihanouk along the course charted out by Peking. Sihanouk's announcement that the RGNU would be under the leadership of FUNK indicated the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would be the behind-the-scenes controlling authority for Communist efforts in Cambodia. Thus, it appeared Sihanouk would occupy a figurehead position in the new government with the Chinese actually controlling future events for a Communist movement in Cambodia. (116)

(S) In an effort to lend political substance to efforts to overthrow the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak government, Sihanouk announced details concerning the policy and leadership of FUNK and the establishment of a government-in-exile.

The aim of their "present political program" was:

...to realize the broadest national union for fighting against all the maneuvers and aggression of the American imperialists, overthrowing the dictatorships of their flunkies... and for building a free and democratic regime of the people progressing towards the construction of a prosperous Cambodia conforming to the profound aspirations of our people.

(S) The political program called on FUNK to "unite and mobilize all social classes and strata" in its struggle. It also called for the creation and strengthening of a "National Liberation Army" made up of guerrilla units, partisans, and those who rebelled against the government. The army's mission was to "destroy to the maximum the enemy armed forces and to defend and expand the liberated areas, the solid rear for our struggle."

(S) The program went on to set out the political, economic, social, and cultural aspects of the front's strategy. The "democratization" of Cambodian society was being carried out in the "liberated areas" and would later be carried out in the whole country. Full democratic freedoms were promised except, significantly, to the "traitors known to the country." The economic policy sought, among other things, to maintain the nationalization of the banks and foreign trade, to encourage the "national bourgeoisie" to set up enterprises that were "beneficial to the people in conformity with the laws concerning wage-earners," and to encourage "the growth of trade unions." In the social cultural field, it promised to "develop the good traditions of the Angkor civilization."

(S) In concluding, the program gave guidelines for foreign policy, which was to be one of "national independence, peace, neutrality, nonalignment, solidarity, and friendship with all peace-loving and justice-loving peoples and governments." Foreign nations would not be allowed to establish military bases or station troops in Cambodia. They would pursue a policy of "friendship, militant solidarity, and cooperation with Laos and Vietnam" in the struggle against "United States imperialism." The front was ready to make "concerted efforts with Laos and Vietnam to make Indochina genuinely a zone of independence, peace, and progress."

(S) An analysis of the political program of FUNK proved it was little more than a strategy for the installation of a pro-Communist regime in Phnom Penh. The program bore marked

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similarities to that of the NFLSVN.

(S) The formation of FUNK and a government-in-exile added a new dimension to the fighting in Cambodia. It gave notice that Sihanouk and his Communist supporters were prepared to wage their struggle for power on both the political and military fronts. It also indicated the increased reliance and indebtedness into which Sihanouk entered with his Communist patrons, particularly Peking and Hanoi. The formation of another Communist-front organization in Indochina, in addition to the Pathet Lao and Viet Cong, escalated the war and further jeopardized the chances of a peaceful solution to the conflict. (117)

(C) A military aid grant agreement was signed on 17 Aug between the People's Republic of China and Sihanouk. The agreement appeared to be of more political than military significance. It followed the normal policy of avoiding direct involvement of Chinese combat forces in Indo-Chinese conflicts. The grant did not indicate anything new since it was believed Sihanouk was receiving military assistance prior to his overthrow and in the interim period. Announcement also mentioned a loan agreement signed in May. No details of either grant or loan were given. The Chinese apparently hoped purely Cambodian forces could be organized and thus limit Hanoi's role in Cambodia. (118)

(U) A joint statement issued by Sihanouk, FUNK and the RGNU strongly denounced and exposed the "republic" fraud of the reactionary Long Nol-Sirik Matak clique. The statement emphatically pointed out that the bogus "republic" of the Lonolites was illegal, anti-popular, anti-democratic, and anti-national and absolutely could not represent the Khmer people but was against the Khmer people. It appealed to all the countries and governments which loved justice, freedom, and democracy and peace to refuse resolutely to recognize de facto or de jure the bogus "republic" of the Lonolites. (119)

Cambodia and the Lusaka Conference

(C) With the approaching Non-Aligned Conference (NAC) to be held at Lusaka, Zambia, in early September the US Government shared the view of the east Asian participants that Sihanouk no longer had a legitimate claim or popular support and his seating would be harmful to the cause of peace in SEA. (120)

(C) Likewise, the US was concerned over the seating of PRG. As an arm of the Vietnamese Communist movement, the US considered the PRG anything but a "non-aligned" neutral. The "government" was a fabrication as it had no capital, controlled virtually no territory or population, was formed on an order from Hanoi without election or other claim to legitimacy, and terrorized the population it claimed to represent. The PRG was noted as totally unqualified for admission to the NAC. (121)

(C) The conference opened on 7 Sep with Zambia's President emphasizing the expected themes. Included were: need to develop a non-aligned strategy; economic and social development needs of Third World in the 1970s; denunciation of colonial and minority regimes in southern Africa and alleged western support for them; Middle east crisis; withdrawal of foreign troops from SEA; and need to have UN General Assembly resolutions enforced. The foreign ministers meeting was dominated by long debate over credentials of Government of Cambodia and Sihanouk delegations and the


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FIGURE III-36

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PRG. The decision was to seat neither Cambodian delegation and a compromise granted the PRG observer status. (122)

Military Situation

(8-14 May)

(S) Following the overthrow of Sihanouk in March, NVA forces moved into the northeastern provinces of Cambodia to bolster the VC/Khmer Rouge. On 6 May they captured the strategic city of Kratie, the capital of Mondolkiri Province, on the Mekong and Senmonorom Rivers and Route 141. Reports indicated most of Mondolkiri Province was Communist-controlled before the capital fell. The Neak Luong Ferry crossing was recaptured by government forces on 9 May. Concern over the situation in the southwest heightened with Communist attacks on the town of Kampot during that week. (See figure III-36.)

(15-21 May)

(S) Attacks on Stung Treng City began on 14 May and by 18 May the city fell. With the earlier fall of Kratie, the loss of Stung Treng gave VC/NVA control of most of northeastern Cambodia, the important Route 13 to southern Laos, and the waterways to the east of Stung Treng. Kompong Cham City was attacked on 16 May and occupied 1 day until government troops retook it. Continued enemy pressure twice drove Cambodian troops from Tonle Bet, a small city across the Mekong from Kompong Cham City. The cities of Lomphat, Labansiek, and Bo Kheo were the last known remaining Cambodian centers of resistance in northeastern Cambodia. Pressure on the towns of Kampot, Kep, and the provincial capitals of Takeo and Prey Veng was relieved by allied and Cambodian sweep operations during the week.

(22-28 May)

(S) Communists twice attacked Labansiek during the week of 30 May. An attack on 24 May was repulsed and an attack on 26 May was reported. The town of Lomphat was reported to be isolated. A bridge north of the town was destroyed on 23 May and on 25 May the airfield was lost. In Kompong Cham Province, ARVN and Cambodian forces relieved pressure on Kompong Cham City through action at Tonle Bet and Chup on 24 May. In Kompong Thom Province activity increased as enemy forces were reported moving toward Kompong Thom City from the north and east. Fighting centered around the town of Tang Krasang, south of Kompong Thom City on Route 6. During the night of 25 May the town was attacked and overrun. The bridge south of the town was destroyed.

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(29 May - 4 Jun)

(S) The city of Lomphat was evacuated of all military and most civilians on 21 May. Personnel were taken to Labansiek. Attacks on Labansiek during the week were repulsed by government troops and allied air strikes. In Kompong Thom Province, enemy forces captured the towns of Tang Krasang and Kompong Thom by 29 May, giving them control of another segment of Route 6. By 31 May their control extended 30 km south to Baray. Pressure around Kompong Thom City continued to build when a FANK outpost north of the city was attacked on 29 May. Several villages to the northeast, east, and southeast of the city were seized exerting even more pressure. In the southwest, enemy forces launched a strong attack against Prey Veng City on 28 May. FANK defenders held the city until an ARVN relief force arrived on 29 May. Fighting continued until FANK reported the city was firmly in allied hands on 31 May.

(5-11 Jun)

(S) Enemy attacks on Kompong Thom began on the morning of 4 Jun. Fighting continued for several days and the northern part of the town was invaded. Enemy forces were finally repulsed. A battalion-size relief force arrived but prospects for maintaining control of the city appeared dim. To the northwest, attacks on the Siem Reap air field were launched on 6 Jun. Enemy forces held the airfield for 2 days before FANK forces counterattacked and secured the airfield. Enemy concentrations were noted north of Siem Reap near Angkor Wat. Scattered attacks occurred through Kompong Speu Province during the week. On 10 Jun, enemy forces attacked a FANK outpost along Route 4 northeast of Kompong Som, effectively cutting the important route from the port city to Phnom Penh.

(12-18 Jun)

(S) During the week of 18 June, enemy activities were directed against provincial capitals throughout the country. Kompong Thom City received nightly shelling suggesting enemy policy was to tie down FANK forces and slowly wear them down. There were claims enemy forces occupied the historic ruins of Angkor Wat north of Siem Reap. Kompong Chhnang City, located on Route 5, came under heavy attack on the night of 15 Jun. Reports were incomplete and conflicting, but it appeared the enemy would overrun the city. Kompong Speu was attacked on the morning of 12 Jun. After almost a week of fighting during which most of the town was occupied, ARVN troops and artillery forced the enemy to withdraw. On 17 Jun, FANK forces reported the town completely free of enemy forces. Every major highway leading to Phnom Penh, with the exception of Route 1, was interdicted. Rail lines to the coast and northwest to Thailand were also cut. Large troop concentrations were reported north, northeast, east, and south of Phnom Penh.

(19-25 Jun)

(S) In the northeast, steady enemy pressure forced the evacuation of Labansiek and Bo Kheo. The evacuation began on 23 Jun as an ARVN column penetrated Cambodia along Route 19 to protect

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the ground evacuation of Bo Kheo. Labansiek was air evacuated. In the north, Thbeng Mean Chey, the capital of Preah Vihear Province, was abandoned under pressure from enemy forces. Increased enemy pressure along the northern shore of the Tonle Sap prompted FANK MR III HQ to evacuate outposts in the area. Over 300 mortar rounds and heavy ground assaults were launched against FANK positions in Kompong Thom. Until the arrival of allied air support and reinforcements, FANK units had held only the southwest portion of the downtown area. A FANK relief force of five battalions slowly moved up Route 6. To the south FANK forces opened Route 4 from Kompong Som to Phnom Penh but the route remained vulnerable to enemy interdiction. Enemy probes and troop movements were reported in the area around Phnom Penh. An enemy force occupied a village on the east bank of the Mekong River only 19 km north of the city.

(26 Jun - 2 Jul)

(S) The evacuation of Labansiek and Bo Kheo was completed on the evening of 26 Jun. Over 8,000 refugees were placed in camps near Pleiku, RVN. In the northwest, enemy action against FANK positions along Route 6 was reported. Large enemy concentrations were reported northwest, east, and south of Siem Reap and heavy enemy attacks were expected. The FANK relief force arrived on 28 Jun within 1/2 mile of Kompong Thom, but was halted by a destroyed bridge. After 2 days of unsuccessful effort to repair the bridge, the column turned back toward Phnom Penh. A village 10 nautical miles (nm) north-northeast of Phnom Penh was overrun during the week and held for 3 days before FANK operations retook the town. West of the Mekong River, enemy attacks were launched against Lovek, site of a government arms and ammunition depot, but were repulsed. Route 4 remained open between Phnom Penh and Kompong Speu allowing badly needed stocks of petroleum to be transported to the capital city. Southeast of Phnom Penh along Route 1, the enemy continued attempts to interdict that important route. Enemy forces were reported concentrating along the east bank of the Mekong in the area west of Prey Veng. Attacks were launched against FANK positions southeast of Prey Veng and at Kompong Trabek. Svay Rieng received a mortar attack on 29 Jun and FANK patrols were ambushed the next day less than 3 nm from the city.

(3-9 Jul)

(S) Enemy activity throughout the country was marked by a lull during the period. In the northwest, FANK reported enemy forces evacuated the ruins of Angkor Wat but large concentrations were reported to the west of Angkor Wat and south of Siem Reap. In the southwest, the enemy continued his efforts to interdict Route 4. South of Phnom Penh, a large enemy force estimated at 1,000 attacked Saang on 5 Jul. Enemy forces withdrew before a FANK relief force dispatched from Phnom Penh arrived. Southeast of Phnom Penh, enemy attacks were launched against several villages along the Mekong. Enemy activity also increased in Prey Veng and Svay Rieng Provinces. A FANK position southeast of Prey Veng was attacked and another position at Kompong Trabek was overrun but retaken a short time later.

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(31 Jul - 6 Aug)

(S) On the night of 31 Jul, the enemy launched a heavy mortar attack against Kompong Thom and then followed up with strong ground assaults. Fighting lasted 3 days when activity lessened to light probes and harassing fire. To the south, FANK units guarding the village of Skoun at the Route 6/7 junction were heavily attacked on the night of 31 Jul. Khmer Krom reinforcements were dispatched to aid the FANK. In the southwest the FANK battalion at Thmar Keo, harassed by the enemy for several weeks, left by convoy for Kompong Speu. The convoy, containing both military and civilians, was ambushed along Route 42 on 2 Aug. At Kirirom, the FANK counterattack had not materialized, primarily due to enemy interdiction along Route 4. FANK units at the cement plant northeast of Kampot City continued to be harassed with mortar attacks on 29 Jul and 4 Aug.

(7-13 Aug)

(S) In the northwest, Samrong, the capital of Oddar Meanchey Province, was ordered evacuated. Two villages, northwest of Siem Reap along Route 6, came under heavy attack on the morning of 8 Aug. FANK reinforcements and heavy air strikes prevented the fall of the villages. The enemy also destroyed a bridge on Route 6 about 10 km southeast of the villages, cutting the route between Siem Reap and Battambang. The village of Skoun at the junction of Routes 6/7 was retaken by FANK forces on 7 Aug. On 6 Aug the village of Svay Don Kid, located between Route 5 and the railroad, was occupied after a brief firefight with FANK units. On 8 Aug, a FANK patrol was ambushed about 15 km southwest of Pursat. The next day, a FANK unit launched a surprise attack on an enemy-held village about 35 km west of Pursat. The FANK operation to retake the Kirirom Plateau proceeded slowly. Six battalions of FANK troops arrived in Phnom Penh on 11 and 12 Aug from SVN. The units, evacuated from Labansiek during June, were returned to Cambodia after being retrained and re-equipped by the ARVN.

(14-20 Aug)

(S) Later information on Samrong, the capital of Oddar Meanchey Province, indicated only civilians were evacuated. Approximately 450 poorly armed FANK troops continued to garrison the town. Enemy efforts to isolate the provincial capital intensified. Route 68 was interdicted south of the city with three bridges destroyed and trees piled across the road. Enemy pressure at Kompong Thom continued with attacks by fire against FANK positions occurring nearly every day. A visit by Prime Minister Lon Nol on 17 Aug contributed appreciably to FANK morale. At Kompong Cham, FANK units at the airfield were harassed by enemy fire on the night of 17 Aug. On 19 Aug a naval convoy of 33 river craft and four ferries carrying supplies to Kompong Cham received heavy small-arms and mortar fire on its trip up the Mekong. To the west, Kompong Chhnang received small-arms and mortar fire on 13 and 18 Aug. A ground assault on the night of 18 Aug was successfully repulsed. Attacks on FANK units along Route 5 south of Kompong Chhnang were launched on the morning of 17 Aug. Fresh troops from Phnom Penh eased the situation in southwest Cambodia at Kirirom. The former unit was reported to have taken heavy casualties and suffered from illness and exhaustion. In Koh Kong Province, the subdistrict capital of Trapeang Rong fell to a Khmer Rouge force on 14 Aug.

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(21-27 Aug)

(S) Enemy attempts to isolate Samrong continued during the week of 21 Aug. The enemy occupied a key bridge 30 km south of the city on Route 68 and harassed FANK units in the villages of Thkov and Kralanh at the Route 6/68 junction. At Siem Reap enemy attacks by fire and minor skirmishes occurred as a result of FANK clearing operations. At Kompong Thom, FANK positions received enemy attacks-by-fire every day during the week. In Pursat Province, FANK units abandoned their outposts along Route 56 and enemy troops occupied them. Enemy activity in Kompong Chhnang was centered primarily on Route 5. FANK forces recaptured the damaged bridge at O Sandon on 20 Aug and completed repairs on 23 Aug. On 23 and 26 Aug enemy units ambushed convoys attempting to resupply Kompong Chhnang. The heaviest fighting during the week occurred at Prek Tameak. Enemy forces struck two FANK battalions stationed there on 20 Aug. A third FANK battalion was rushed to the scene from Phnom Penh and FANK T-28's and artillery helped to force an enemy withdrawal. On the night of 24 Aug the enemy resumed the attack and sporadic fighting continued.

(28 Aug - 3 Sep)

(S) In northwestern Cambodia, FANK units launched a sweep operation on 30 Aug in an attempt to clear enemy units from the vicinity of Kralanh and Thkov. In Pursat Province FANK sweep operations produced sharp clashes on 28 Aug, 1, and 2 Sep. The Infantry Training School at Romeas was attacked on the nights of 30 Aug and 1 Sep. Enemy forces attacked FANK units at Srang twice during the week. The attack on 28 Aug was successfully repulsed, but on 30 Aug FANK units were forced from the town. A FANK counterattack on 31 Aug was halted by sharp enemy resistance.

(4-10 Sep)

(S) On 3 Sep, FANK forces re-entered Srang against virtually no enemy resistance. Srang fell on 30 Aug and FANK tried unsuccessfully to retake it for 5 days. On 5 Sep, FANK forces continued to pursue enemy forces withdrawing to the northwest. A FANK element from Kompong Speu was moved into position to block the enemy retreat, and artillery and air strikes were called in on the surrounded enemy force. On the night of 3 Sep, Tram Khnar, located about 5 miles east of Srang, was attacked. On 5 Sep, three FANK battalions launched a sweep south along Route 3. In northwestern Cambodia, FANK positions near Siem Reap were attacked by an estimated 300-man enemy force on the morning of 8 Sep. A prisoner, capture near Kralanh, indicated the 275th Regt, 5th VC Div was operating near Siem Reap. On 7 Sep, FANK completed the first phase of an operation to reinforce and resupply the garrison at Kompong Thom. A river convoy, consisting of 35 river craft, was to transport supplies and three infantry battalions from Phnom Penh, via the Mekong, Tonle Sap, and Stung Sen to Kompong Thom. A truck convoy, consisting of six battalions, was to depart Skoun north up Route 6 clearing and repairing the road as they progressed. On 9 Sep, the river convoy arrived at Kompong Thom, bringing to 12 the number of FANK battalions defending the city.

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(11-17 Sep)

(S) In northwest Cambodia, FANK sweep operations around Siem Reap on 10 Sep resulted in a contact lasting over 5 hours. The forward air guide continued to report a build-up of enemy forces in the area. The road convoy from Skoun was forced to withdraw on 13 Sep by enemy troops in the village of Tang Kauk. The convoy was halted near the junction of Routes 6 and 71. Elsewhere, enemy interdiction efforts against LOCs increased as Route 1, Route 4, and the rail line between Phnom Penh and Battambang was interdicted.

(18-24 Sep)

(S) Activity continued to focus on the FANK operation to relieve Kompong Thom. The convoy reached a total of 11 battalions and sweep operations were launched to deny the enemy ambush positions. The convoy remained halted near the Route 6/71 junction. On 23 Sep, six FANK battalions, deployed on a front extending 2 miles on either side of Route 6, launched a drive northward with the objective of surrounding the enemy held village of Tang Kauk. Another river convoy to Kompong Thom was launched on 17 Sep with 21 tons of food and 5,000 cases of ammunition. The convoy arrived that night with little enemy resistance encountered. The convoy returned to Kompong Chhnang on 21 Sep, evacuating 1,200 Vietnamese refugees and 200 other personnel.

(25 Sep - 1 Oct)

(S) The FANK operation to capture Tang Kauk was halted within 1 mile of the city by heavy enemy resistance. The attack was renewed on 25 Sep, after a 1-day halt to allow resupply and evacuation of casualties. The city was entered later that same day against little enemy resistance. Another river convoy departed Kompong Chhnang on 27 Sep with four 105mm howitzers to aid the FANK defensive potential in Kompong Thom. The convoy arrived that same day encountering only minor harassing fire. Enemy pressure along Route 5 continued with ambushes of FANK convoys on 24 and 29 Sep. In southwestern Cambodia, FANK attempts to re-enter the Kirirom Plateau were quickly repulsed. Enemy ambushes along Route 4 succeeded in destroying two tank trucks carrying POL from Kompong Som to Phnom Penh.

(2-8 Oct)

(S) On 30 Sep, Battambang City was harassed for the first time probably by Cambodian insurgents. Battambang was one of four provincial capitals not previously subjected to enemy action. The activity suggested the enemy might attempt to gain control over the province prior to the rice harvest in December. Battambang Province grew enough rice to support the entire Cambodian population and still leave some for export. The FANK river convoy returned to Kompong Chhnang with a load of refugees on 1 Oct, and FANK announced that it was the last amphibious operation to Kompong Thom. On Route 6, the FANK road convoy remained at Tang Kauk. On 7 Oct, FANK positions near the Route 6/71 junction, Skoun, and Prey Totung received enemy fire. To the west, enemy forces harassed Kompong Chhnang on 5 and 6 Oct, and continued to interrupt rice shipments on Route 5. In southwest Cambodia, enemy forces continued to harass FANK units near Sre Khlong and ambushed convoys on Route 4.

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(9-15 Oct)

(S) Major attention focused on the FANK operation on Route 6, where the FANK convoy remained in Tang Kauk carrying out security and civic action programs. Light probes were directed against the convoy and FANK positions on Route 7 at Pray Totung and Traeung. On 11 Oct, a battalion of FANK reinforcements arrived at the convoy, bringing the total number of troops in the operation to about 11,000. Although enemy activity was light, reports of troop movements suggested a large enemy unit, possibly of regimental size, had moved south from the Chamcar Andong plantation into the Chamcar Leu plantation. Also, enemy troops and supply movements into the vicinity of the Prek Kak and Chup plantation were noted, indicating increased pressure on the FANK convoy or possible attacks on Kompong Cham might be imminent. On Route 6, the enemy damaged or destroyed four bridges between Siem Reap and Kralanh.

(16-22 Oct)

(S) On 18 Oct, in southern Battambang Province, a FANK sweep operation provoked a sharp clash with enemy units. Further fighting was reported in the same area on 20 and 21 Oct. On 14 Oct, 13 FANK battalions launched a sweep operation south of Phnom Penh. The purpose of the operation was to clear Routes 2 and 3 and the area in between. By 15 Oct, FANK troops had occupied Tram Khnar and Samrong Yong. The operation was terminated on 19 Oct. The success of the operation was expected to disrupt the enemy logistics corridor through the area toward the Kirirom Plateau. Further, the size and timing of the operation demonstrated FANK's increasing confidence in its offensive capability. In Kampot Province the enemy reportedly established several check points on Route 16 and had interdicted the road in several places. On 13 Oct, they launched an unsuccessful attack against a village along Route 16. Although the reasons behind the increased activity were unknown, it was possibly to insure security of the enemy BAs in the hill country north of Kep. Eastern Kampot Province was a traditional rear services area for enemy forces operating in SVN MR 4.

(23-29 Oct)

(S) At Siem Reap on 23 Oct, a FAC sighted 16 sampans on the river 4 miles south of the city. This was the second incident of sampan activity south of Siem Reap and suggested the enemy was still using waterways from the Tonle Sap to supply his forces in the Siem Reap area. In the Kompong Thom area, activity remained light with an ABF reported on 25 Oct and a FANK sweep to the southeast on 27 Oct. In the Tang Kauk area on Route 6, FANK units continued to prepare for a renewed offensive to the north. Information indicated there were 24 FANK battalions plus armor and artillery and civilian pacification personnel in the area. In eastern Kampot Province, the enemy blew 12 bridges on Route 16 northeast of Tuk Meas on the night of 25 Oct, and Kirivong was attacked for 3 consecutive days. In eastern Cambodia, an ARVN task force launched a drive toward Snuol on 25 Oct.

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(30 Oct - 5 Nov)

(S) In southwest Cambodia, the enemy attacked FANK forces at Siem Reap and the adjacent airfield throughout the afternoon of 3 Nov. In central Cambodia, FANK elements operating about 6 miles west of Kompong Thom received an enemy assault that was repulsed on 1 Nov. On 29 Oct, the enemy ambushed a river convoy on the Mekong about 6 miles east of Phnom Penh. The following day, FANK launched a two-battalion sweep operation in the area to clear the east bank of the river. The operation was terminated on 1 Nov. In eastern Kompong Cham Province, a FANK armored battalion, operating with ARVN units, in the vicinity of Mimot was to conduct PSYWAR while attempting to recruit local personnel for FANK. This was the first time FANK elements were noted in the area since April.

(6-12 Nov)

(S) During the early morning hours on 9 Nov, the enemy launched coordinated attacks against Kompong Cham and its adjacent airfield, Traeung, Prey Totung, Skoun, Tang Kauk, and several small, isolated FANK positions. The heaviest fighting occurred at Kompong Cham airfield, Traeung, and Skoun. On 10 Nov, FANK forces withdrew from Traeung, and the enemy heavily damaged a major bridge on Route 6, about 14 miles southwest of Skoun, cutting the area off from Phnom Penh. On the night of 10 Nov, the enemy again launched an ABF and ground probe against Kompong Cham. Prisoners taken at Skoun, identified their units as the 23d Bn, 174th NVA Regt, 5th VC Div. On 8 Nov, a joint FANK/ARVN force launched an operation in the area northwest of Samrong Yong. Farther to the south, attacks on Kirivong and Kompong Trach were reported. On 5 Nov, the Pursat-Battambang train was fired on and later the same night, the enemy damaged a bridge on the rail line northwest of Muong. In Phnom Penh on 7 Nov, two explosions in a theater killed 23 and wounded 46. On 9 Nov, a grenade apparently thrown at a security patrol missed its target, wounding six bystanders.

(13-19 Nov)

(S) Kompong Cham and the nearby airfield were subjected to ABFs and light attacks throughout the week. On Route 7, two FANK convoys were harassed on 11-12 Nov. On 16 Nov, FANK elements conducting operations north of Tang Kauk met heavy enemy resistance. A joint FANK/ARVN operation along the Mekong, 12 km west-southwest of Prey Veng, reported a clash with an unknown-size enemy unit on 14 Nov. On 16 Nov, a pontoon bridge was installed some 15 miles southwest of Skoun on Route 6, bypassing the bridge damaged by the enemy on 9 Nov. On 10 Nov, an Army-Navy operation was begun to re-establish government control in the area between the east bank of the Tonle Sap Lake and the Stung Sen River. On 16 Nov, an ARVN sweep operation began in BAs 701 and 740 in northeastern Cambodia. On the first day, an ARVN element discovered over 254 tons of 85mm ammunition, 11,150 gallons of gasoline, and 10 tons of rice, representing one of the largest caches found after allied operations began in April. On 17 Nov, troop contacts were reported at Kompong Tuol and Trapeang Totung, and one ABF at Kompong Pring, all within 13 miles of Phnom Penh. On the same day in Phnom Penh, a grenade was thrown at a column of military police recruits, killing one and wounding six.

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(20-26 Nov)

(S) During the week, Kompong Cham, Prey Totung, and Skoun were subjected to ABFs. Limited enemy attacks were apparently aimed at disrupting and delaying FANK efforts to secure Route 7. A FANK task force was moving to retake Traeung. A Cambodian Navy convoy which left Phnom Penh on 21 Nov for Kompong Cham was attacked three times by enemy forces; however, the convoy arrived at Kompong Cham on 23 Nov. In southwest Cambodia, activity increased along Route 4 as enemy elements attacked Srang and the FANK armored brigade camp near Sre Khlong. At the Pich Nil Mountain Pass and Stung Chral, FANK positions were overrun, and the cartridge factory and Kirirom hydroelectric plant near Stung Chral were occupied. In northwest Cambodia, a village 10 miles northwest of Siem Reap, was attacked on 23 Nov and occupied the following day. In Phnom Penh on 18 Nov, a locomotive at the railroad station was damaged by an explosion. On 20 Nov 5 miles west of Phnom Penh, a large explosion destroyed an ammunition storage warehouse.

(27 Nov - 3 Dec)

(S) Enemy ground probes and ABFs continued to be directed against FANK positions along Routes 6 and 7 west of Kompong Cham. A FANK operation to retake Batheay and reopen Route 6 was progressing slowly with FANK elements 3 miles from their objective. On 1 Dec, FANK forces reoccupied the eastern terminus of the Route 6 ferry across the Tonle Sap, which was taken by the enemy the preceding day. In the southwest, enemy forces continued to hold the Pich Nil Pass, Stung Chral cartridge factory, and the Kirirom hydroelectric plant. In the Siem Reap area, the enemy continued to direct sporadic ABFs against the city and the nearby airfield. FANK sweeps had successfully cleared the road between Siem Reap and the airfield. To the northwest, the enemy continued to hold a village on Route 6 about 9 miles from Siem Reap. On 1 Dec, a plastic explosive device caused extensive damage to the second floor of the US Embassy in Phnom Penh.

(4-10 Dec)

(S) On 8 Dec, two FANK battalions operating about 6 miles northwest of Svay Rieng were attacked by a large enemy force. The attack was repulsed with the aid of ARVN artillery. During the week, FANK launched several unsuccessful sweeps along Routes 6 and 7, meeting stiff enemy resistance. The enemy controlled a section of Route 6 at Batheay and a portion of Route 7 east from Traeung. Isolation of Kompong Cham was increased by a successful enemy assault on the Mekong River town of Peam Chikang. In the vicinity of the Pich Nil Pass on Route 4, the enemy expanded his effort to the east along the strategic LOC and increased his pressure on FANK units in Sre Khlong. In northwestern Cambodia, assaults against two villages and a bridge security element on Route 5 about 20 miles northwest of Pursat were launched. In addition, the enemy controlled a section of Route 5 between Muong Russei and Battambang, and rail service west of Pursat was disrupted. On 9 Dec, FANK forces entered and secured the village of Puok on Route 6 near Siem Reap. Also on 9 Dec, the enemy launched an ABF against Siem Reap, and a heavy contact was reported in the vicinity of the Angkor Thom temple ruins.

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(11-17 Dec)

(S) On the morning of 12 Dec, the enemy launched simultaneous, heavy assaults on several FANK positions in western Kompong Cham Province. Heaviest fighting occurred at Prey Totung, Khvet, and O Da. A large enemy force occupied most of Prey Totung, but was forced to withdraw on 14 Dec. On 13 Dec, FANK units succeeded in reoccupying the town of Batheay. On 15 Dec, the enemy launched an unsuccessful ground assault on FANK units around Phaav on Route 6. On 14 Dec, an ARVN task force was airlifted into Kompong Cham and began a sweep to the west along Route 7 as far as O Da. In southwestern Cambodia, the enemy continued to hold the strategic Pich Nil Pass on Route 4. On Route 6 about 20 miles northwest of Siem Reap, the enemy destroyed a bridge again interdicting the route.

(18-24 Dec)

(S) During the week, FANK and ARVN units in western Kompong Cham Province consolidated their positions along Route 7 and succeeded in opening the route from Skoun to Kompong Cham City. On 19 Dec, three ARVN battalions launched a sweep operation north of Route 7 into the Chamkar Lue Plantation with only light resistance reported. Kompong Cham City continued to receive sporadic ABFs and a plastic explosive charge was detonated along the riverfront in the first terrorist act reported. In the southwest activity remained focused on Route 4 in the vicinity of the Pich Nil Pass. The enemy continued to control the pass, thereby blocking the strategic LOC. West of the Pich Nil, the enemy captured a bridge on Route 4 northeast of Sre Khlong on 20 Dec, but FANK reoccupied the site later that same day. To the west, FANK sweep operations in eastern Battambang Province prompted several clashes with enemy units believed to be infiltrating the area from the vicinity of Siem Reap. The FANK operations were launched to provide security to the rich rice-growing region. On the morning of 23 Dec, a second POL tanker arrived in Phnom Penh via the Mekong River from SVN after the conclusion of a special agreement with SVN.

(25-31 Dec)

(S) On 23 Dec, FANK and ARVN forces launched a joint operation south of Route 7 into the vicinity of Pearn Chikang. On 23 and 28 Dec, Kompong Cham airfield received rocket fire. On the night of 27 Dec, the enemy launched a ground assault on FANK units at Rokakong, but the attack was repulsed. The ARVN terminated its operation in western Kompong Cham Province on 28 Dec and withdrew its forces to SVN the following day. In the southwest along Route 4 west of the Pich Nil Pass, a FANK battalion at Sre Ambel was overrun on 26 Dec. On 29 Dec, FANK repulsed an enemy attack near Sre Khlong with the aid of VNAF gunships. A FANK operation to clear Route 4 and reopen the Pich Nil Pass was scheduled to begin on 31 Dec. To the west, a FANK naval convoy delivered supplies and troops to eastern Battambang Province in an attempt to augment the units providing the security during the rice harvest. On 30 Dec, FANK launched a six-battalion sweep operation south of Siem Reap in an attempt to secure the area. (123)

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CHAPTER IV
US AND OTHER FREE WORLD FORCES

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Mission

(U) The mission of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) was to assist the Government of the Republic of Vietnam (GVN) to defeat externally directed and supported Communist subversion and aggression in order to attain an environment which would allow the people of RVN to determine their future without outside interference.

Command Relationships

(S) Commande., United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), was the commander of a subordinate unified command under the operational command of Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC). COMUSMACV was the Commander Designate of the Central Region SEATO Field Force (CCRSFF), Commander Designate of the SEATO Field Force (CSFF), and Commander Designate of the United States Forces Southeast Asia (COMUSSEASIA). In those designated capacities he developed and was prepared to execute plans responsive to those of SEATO and CINCPAC.

(S) COMUSMACV served as the military member of the US Mission Council for purposes of coordination with the Chief of Mission on all matters relating to US military activities in RVN. COMUSMACV additionally was the representative of the US CDEF and CINCPAC with respect to the US Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) Program in RVN.


(S) COMUSMACV was designated Single Senior Military Representative in the RVN. (See Figure IV-1.) In that capacity he was responsible directly to CINCPAC for coordination of matters of joint concern connected with the relationships among all personnel in the country area of concern who were under jurisdiction of or accountable to the DOD on one hand, and the local people, local government officials, and US Ambassadors on the other. The authority of COMUSMACV in such matters extended to all personnel, military or civilian, under the jurisdiction of or accountable to the DOD, regardless of whether or not they were assigned to the Pacific Command (PACOM).

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PACIFIC COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS-1970



- OPERATIONAL COMMAND
- OPERATIONAL CONTROL
- COMMAND LESS OPERATIONAL COMMAND

NOTE: (1) UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF XXIV CORPS
AFTER 9 MARCH 1970

FIGURE IV-1

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Responsibilities and Functions of COMUSMACV

(S) COMUSMACV, as commander of a subordinate unified command was to: (1)

1. Exercise operational command of all US Forces and military agencies assigned for the accomplishment of his missions.
2. Consult with the Ambassador on US political and basic policy matters. Divergent views were to be reported to CINCPAC by COMUSMACV.
3. Keep the Ambassador fully informed, especially concerning all high level contacts with officials of the RVN, and on major RVNAF military plans and pending operations.
4. Plan for and be prepared to conduct military operations as directed by CINCPAC.
5. Assist the GVN and RVNAF in planning for military operations.
6. To the extent agreed upon by the US and the countries concerned, control and coordinate operations of third country military contingents and provide military and MASF support therefor.

United States Mission Council

(C) The US Mission, consisting of the US Embassy, USMACV, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), [REDACTED] had been established to implement programs to achieve US objectives in RVN. While those agencies responded to the direction of US agencies at the national level, local guidance was provided by a mission council established to insure an integrated US effort in the RVN. The council was composed of the US Ambassador (Chief); the Deputy Ambassador; COMUSMACV; Deputy Commander, MACV, for Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (DEPCORDS); Director, USAID; Director, JUSPAO; [REDACTED]. The relationship between USMACV and the other elements of the mission team was one of coordination and cooperation. In case of differences of view between the Chief, US Mission and COMUSMACV, each was free to communicate such differences to national authorities. COMUSMACV communications were to be forwarded through CINCPAC.

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Service Component Commanders

General

(C) The commanders of the US Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps forces in the RVN are as follows: (For tactical ground forces under their command, see Figure IV-2.)

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1. Army component commander: Commanding General, US Army, Vietnam (CG, USARV).
2. Naval component commander: Commander, US Naval Forces, Vietnam (COMNAVFORV).
3. Air Force component commander: Commander, 7th US Air Force (CDR, 7AF).
4. III Marine Amphibious Force commander: Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (CG, III MAF).

Responsibilities and Command Relationships for Component Commands (2)

CG USARV

(C) USARV, with assigned and attached units, was assigned to HQ, US Army, Pacific (USARPAC), with station in RVN. CINCUSARPAC exercised command less operational control of USARV. COMUSMACV exercised operational command of USARV. Deputy CG, USARV, was to discharge Army component command functions for uniservice Army matters in RVN. He also provided advice and forces to COMUSMACV for the conduct of combat and combat support operations in RVN. Other areas of responsibility charged to Deputy CG, USARV, were: base development and logistics (see Chapter IX); intelligence and counterintelligence support to COMUSMACV; performance of research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) and combat development (CD) functions; operation of DOD property disposal functions; graves registration office operation; and Army engineer construction support.

COMNAVFORV

(C) NAVFORV, with its assigned units, was assigned to Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT). CINCPACFLT exercised command less operational control of NAVFORV. COMUSMACV exercised operational command of NAVFORV. Logistic support in Military Region (MR) 2, 3, and 4 was provided by USARV except for service-peculiar items which were provided from own-service resources. Additionally COMNAVFORV was responsible for serving as the Navy component commander for appropriate uniservice Navy matters in RVN, less planning and coordination concerning Seventh Fleet (7th Flt) air, naval gunfire, and amphibious operations. The conduct of naval component planning in support of MACV operations plans and exercise of operational control of all Navy component functions assigned to COMUSMACV, except those specifically assigned elsewhere, were also functions of NAVFORV. The support of pacification and provision of mobile construction support to III MAF and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) and RDT&E were other important areas of concern and responsibility of NAVFORV.

(C) COMNAVFORV was specifically charged with the responsibility to perform the following functions:

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1. Conduct air and surface surveillance, including visit and search.
2. Conduct harbor clearance and salvage operations as required.
3. Advise on port security and explosive loading.
4. Provide naval gunfire support (NGFS) with assigned units, as feasible on a not-to-interfere basis with surface surveillance.
5. Conduct river patrol operations, including visit and search, interdiction, and resource control operations.
6. Conduct mine countermeasures operations.

CDR 7AF

(C) Seventh United States Air Force (7AF), with assigned and attached units, was assigned to HQ, Pacific Air Forces (PACAF). CINCPACAF exercised command less operational control of 7AF. Logistic support was provided by USARV except for service-peculiar items which were provided from own-service resources. CDR, 7AF was directed to exercise command direction of all tactical, tactical support, base support, and training units assigned or attached to 7AF. The commander was to serve as Air Force (AF) component commander for COMUSMACV and discharge AF component command functions for uniservice AF matters in RVN. CDR 7AF also served as DEPCOMUSMACV for Air Ops.

(C) Further duties of CDR, 7AF were to:

1. Serve as senior air advisor to the VNAF and exercise operational control of the USAF Advisory Group (AFGP).
2. Conduct and coordinate offensive and defensive air operations, tactical airlift, air traffic control, search and rescue operations, and reconnaissance operations.
3. Coordinate all air operations in the USMACV area of responsibility, including those of US, FWMAF, and VNAF units which were not assigned or attached to 7AF.
4. Function as air defense commander and exercise overall air defense responsibility within RVN.
5. Provide weather and aerial port service for COMUSMACV through attached units.
6. Provide intelligence and counterintelligence support as directed by COMUSMACV for purposes of target development/assessment in support of air/ground operations or campaign planning.

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CG, III MAF

(C) United States III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF) with assigned and attached units, a separate uniservice command subordinate to and under control of CG, XXIV Corps (after 9 Mar), was assigned in the service chain of command, less operational control, to CG, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (CG, FMFPAC). Logistic common item and common service support were provided by COMNAVFORV (until relieved of that function by USARV on 1 Jul) except for service-peculiar items. CG, III MAF was to exercise operational control of USMC units assigned or attached by CG, FMFPAC, to Vietnam. He was to provide security for designated critical US and GVN installations in his assigned area of responsibility and conduct US unilateral, combined US and FWMAF, and combined US/FWMAF/RVNAF combat operations. The exercise of operational control of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1st MAW), making available to DEPCOMUSMACV for Air Ops, strike and reconnaissance air assets, and tactical air control systems as required, was a further function of CG, III MAF. Other significant duties were: (2)

1. Exercise operational control of other US and FWMAF units designated by CG, XXIV Corps.
2. Provide intelligence and counterintelligence in III MAF Tactical Area of Responsibility (TAOR) as directed by CG, XXIV Corps.
3. Conduct operations within assigned area of responsibility to support pacification and development activities in established TAOR and in other areas in accordance with current instructions.
4. Prepare to execute contingency plans as directed.

US FORCES

General

(C) US military forces which stood at 474,819 personnel on 1 Jan 70 decreased by nearly one-third during the year. Strengths by service at the beginning and end of the year were as follows: (3)

	<u>1 January</u>	<u>31 December</u>
Air Force	58,463	43,137
Army	330,648	250,653
Coast Guard	433	108
Marine Corps	55,039	25,394
Navy	<u>30,236</u>	<u>16,502</u>
TOTAL	474,819	335,794

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US STRENGTH
1964-1970




FIGURE IV-3

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(S) The number of US maneuver battalions in-country decreased correspondingly during the year. At the beginning of 1970 there were 93 maneuver battalions in-country--81 Army and 12 Marine. The term "maneuver battalion" did not include the divisional organic cavalry squadron. At the end of the year the number of battalions had decreased to 54--48 Army and 6 USMC. Effective in October, two divisional Armored Cavalry Squadrons were included in the total of maneuver battalions. (See Figure IV-3)

Strength Changes in Headquarters MACV

(C) The authorized strength for each MAOV joint table of distribution (JTD) as of 1 Jan and 31 Dec was as shown below. Year-end figures are in parentheses. (See glossary for abbreviation meanings).

JTD	Officers	Enlisted	Civilian	Total
HQ MACV Staff	984 (777)	1,013 (845)	15 (14)	2,012 (1636)
ARPA (OSD) Unit	7 (7)	4 (4)	3 (3)	14 (14)
AFVN	13 (17)	162 (158)	1 (1)	176 (176)
JUSPAO	50 (50)	57 (57)	2 (2)	109 (109)
(a)(4)				
FAC	1,886 (1318)	3,100 (1995)	1 (0)	4,987 (3313)
AFGP	206 (337)	288 (810)	- (11)	494 (1158)
NAG	360 (658)	603 (2071)	1 (0)	964 (2729)
CORDS	2,324 (2694)	3,830 (3967)	65 (55)	6,219 (6716)

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Redeployment of US Troops from RVN

Background

(S) Redeployment of US troops from RVN began with the 10 Jun 69 US/RVN conference at Midway Island. Upon completion of the meetings President Nixon announced that 25,000 US personnel would be withdrawn from the RVN starting within 30 days of that date. The first facet of the KEYSTONE operations began with that increment of troop withdrawal. KEYSTONE EAGLE brought the first 25,000 personnel out of RVN by the target date of 31 Aug; KEYSTONE CARDINAL was the second increment of the program and accomplished a further reduction in US forces from RVN of 40,500 bringing the 1969 total of troop spaces redeployed from RVN to 65,500, and the space ceiling lowered to 484,000 from a high of 549,500. Details on KEYSTONE EAGLE and KEYSTONE CARDINAL, as well as particulars on the lessons learned in the 9th Inf Div redeployment, can be found in USMACV 1969 Command History, Chapter IV and Annex D.

KEYSTONE BLUEJAY (Increment III)

(C) Upon successful completion of the second increment of the redeployment on 15 Dec 69, President Nixon announced the third increment. Known as Operation KEYSTONE BLUEJAY, it called for a reduction of 50,000 manpower spaces prior to 15 Apr 70. In order to maintain the largest possible troop strength during the TET period it was announced that the first movement of personnel in connection with the "Phase III redeployment will not occur until early February. It is not anticipated that there will be any standdown of combat units prior to Mid-February". The third-increment redeployment called for a space level of 434,000 by reducing as follows. (5)

US Army	29,500
US Navy	2,000
USMC	12,900
USAF	<u>5,600</u>
	50,000

(S) The major units to be withdrawn during the KEYSTONE BLUEJAY redeployment were: the 1st Inf Div, the USMC 26th Regimental Landing Team (RLT), the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div, and the USAF 12th Tactical Fighter Group (TFG). The 1st Inf Div was reduced to 2 percent of its authorized strength and returned to Fort Riley, Kansas. The 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div was similarly reduced and inactivated at Fort Lewis, Washington. The 26th RLT was reduced to cadre strength and inactivated at Camp Pendleton, California. The 12th TFG was returned to CONUS. Navy elements were strength reductions not involving inactivation or transfer of any units. (6) All redeployments were completed by 15 Apr 70.

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Events Leading to Further Reductions

(U) In June 1969, when President Nixon first outlined the national program to bring a just peace to RVN, he stated that there were three criteria upon which the rate of US troop withdrawal would depend:

1. Progress in the training of the South Vietnamese.
2. Progress in the Paris negotiations.
3. The level of enemy activity.

In announcing the intention to proceed with further reductions of US troops from RVN, the President noted that the first three withdrawals were done on a "cut and try" basis with no certainty that the program would be successful. After completion of three such drawdowns it was obvious that the US could move from "cut and try" to a longer range program for the replacement of US troops with RVNAF. The President noted in his "Vietnamization Progress Report" of 20 Apr: (7)

... progress in training and equipping South Vietnamese forces has substantially exceeded our original expectations last June. Very significant advances have also been made in pacification...

However, I must report with regret that no progress has taken place on the negotiating front. The enemy still demands that we unilaterally and unconditionally withdraw all American forces...

* * * * *

Let me now turn to the third criteria for troop withdrawals -- the level of enemy activity. In several areas since December, that level has substantially increased.

(U) Despite the increased enemy activity, however, there had been an overall decline in enemy force levels in RVN since December 1969, the RVNAF had assumed more of the burden of their own defense, and American casualties had been reduced to the lowest level in 5 years. On 20 Apr, therefore, the President announced a drawdown of 150,000 men would take place to be completed during the spring of 1971. The total number of troops withdrawn from RVN would then reach nearly half the greatest number in-country at the 1969 peak. No specific mention was made at that time of redeployment increments. (8)

US Phasedown in RVN

Planning for FY71 Redeployments

(U) Redeployment schedules assumed greater significance after the 30 Apr announcement of Cambodian operations. For a discussion of FY 71 redeployment planning, see TOP SECRET Supplement.

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Further Combat Unit Withdrawals

(S) A fourth increment withdrawal was announced by the President on 3 Jun for completion by 15 Oct. The major combat units withdrawn during Increment IV (KEYSTONE ROBIN ALFA) were the 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div; 199th Inf Bde, and the USMC 7th RLT. In addition, a number of smaller Army, Navy and Airforce units were included. The required space reduction of 50,000 was accomplished by 15 Oct. (9)

(S) KEYSTONE ROBIN BRAVO, Increment V, commenced on 16 Oct and represented an additional 40,000 reduction in forces. Combat elements of the 25th Inf Div from MR 3 and the 4th Inf Div from MR 2 represented the major portion of this withdrawal. Upon completion of the reduction on 30 Dec 70, the authorized ceiling was 344,000. (10)

US Army Redeployments

In-Country Strength - January 1970

(S) At the beginning of 1970, the US Army had 333,348 personnel in-country. Major combat units and their maneuver battalions were as follows:

<u>Army Divisions</u>		<u>Bdes, Regts, Others</u>	
1st Cav Div (Ambl)	9	1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech)	3
101st Abn Div (Ambl)	10	3d Bde, 9th Inf Div	4
1st Inf Div	9	11th Armd Cav Regt	3
4th Inf Div	10	173d Abn Bde	4
23d Inf (Americal) Div	11	199th Inf Bde	4
25th Inf Div	<u>10</u>	1st Bn (Mech), 50th Inf	1
Sub Total	59	1st Sqdn, 1st Cav	1
		2d Sqdn, 1st Cav	1
		3d Sqdn, 5th Cav	<u>1</u>
		Sub Total	22

Grand Total: 81 Maneuver Battalions

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Supporting units were: twenty-eight 105mm battalions, ten 155mm battalions, four 8"/155 battalions, eight 8"/175 battalions, three air defense battalions, 16 engineer combat and 14 engineer construction battalions. In addition there were 142 aviation companies and 84 other battalions.

DA Instructions for Redeployment

(C) The DA Letter of Instruction for the redeployment of the third increment of USA forces from RVN was published 22 Jan. It provided the policy and procedures to be followed in reducing the Army force level in RVN by 29,443 personnel spaces prior to 15 Apr. It was to be done by redeploying certain units to CONUS and Europe during the period 28 Feb-15 Apr. In addition to the 29,443 Army spaces to be reduced in RVN, individual accounts and general support forces elsewhere were reduced by approximately 19,200 spaces.

KEYSTONE BLUEJAY

(C) Units redeployed were reduced in RVN to color guard detachments not larger than 2 percent of authorized strength. Those detachments redeployed for appropriate inactivation or reassignment ceremonies. Major units affected by KEYSTONE BLUEJAY were: the 1st Inf Div which was reduced to a color guard detachment and redeployed to Fort Riley, Kansas, except that its 3d Bde detachment was redeployed to CINCUSAREUR; the 24th Inf Div (Mech) which was inactivated with its assets turned over to the 1st Inf Div; and the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div which was reduced to a color guard detachment and redeployed to Fort Lewis, Washington for inactivation.(11)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>REDUCTION DATE</u>
1 AG Co	545	7 Apr
1 Avn Bn	423	2 Apr
242 CM Det	5	18 Feb
266 CM Plt	41	19 Feb
1 CS HHC	103	6 Apr
1 CS Bn S&T	485	31 Mar
701 CS Bn	854	4 Apr
1/4 Cav Sqdn (-D Co)	856	5 Apr
1 Engr Bn	972	4 Apr
1 FA HHC	213	21 Mar
1/5 FA Bn	526	3 Mar
8/6 FA Bn	616	22 Mar
1/7 FA Bn	526	19 Mar
2/33 FA Bn	526	2 Apr
1 Inf HHC Div	175	22 Mar
1/1 Inf HHC Bde	128	22 Mar
2/1 Inf HHC Bde	128	7 Mar
3/1 Inf HHC Bde	128	23 Mar
1/2 Inf Bn	920	30 Mar
2/2 Inf Bn (Mech)	908	1 Apr
1/16 Inf Bn (Mech)	908	20 Mar

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>REDUCTION DATE</u>
2/16 Inf Bn	920	14 Mar
1/18 Inf Bn	920	3 Mar
2/18 Inf Bn	920	15 Mar
1/26 Inf Bn	920	29 Mar
1/28 Inf Bn	920	1 Mar
2/28 Inf Bn	920	28 Feb
35 Inf Plt-Sct Dog	28	18 Feb
41 Inf Plt-Sct Dog	28	11 Mar
61 Inf Plt Cmbt Tracker	23	25 Feb
1/75 Inf Co (Rgr)	118	10 Mar
1 Med Bn	366	2 Apr
1 MI Det	80	16 Mar
1 MP Co	189	1 Apr
43 PI Tm	5	3 Apr
44 PI Tm	5	3 Apr
121 Sig Bn	641	3 Apr
337 AS Co	148	7 Apr
509 AS HHC RR Grp	28*	14 Apr
1 MI Bn ARS	42*	14 Apr
45 MI Co	20*	14 Apr
4 PSYOP Gp	10*	14 Apr
6 PSYOP Bn	30*	14 Apr
7 PSYOP Bn	30*	14 Apr
8 PSYOP Bn	30*	14 Apr
10 PSYOP Bn	80*	14 Apr
5 SF Gp - Co A	84*	14 Apr
5 SF Gp - Co B	56*	14 Apr
5 SF Gp - Co C	148*	14 Apr
5 SF Gp - Co D	112*	14 Apr
507 TC Gp	10*	14 Apr
HQ IFFV	43*	14 Apr
4i Civil Affairs Co	140	28 Feb
1 FA HHC IFFV Arty	19*	14 Apr
3/6 FA Bn	505	10 Apr
297 TC Co	10*	14 Apr
CMD Tac Area	16	25 Mar
CMD DMAC	111*	14 Apr
HHC IFFV	39*	14 Apr
2 FA HHC IFFV Arty	19*	14 Apr
7/9 FA Bn	528	1 Apr
9 TC Co	10*	14 Apr
2/13 FA Bn	528	15 Mar
HHC XXIV Corps	37*	14 Apr
HHC XXIV Corps Arty	18*	14 Apr
6/33 FA Bn	415	28 Feb
238 FA Det Radar	8	22 Feb
108 TC Co	10*	14 Apr

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>REDUCTION DATE</u>
Army Element AAFES	17*	14 Apr
HQ USARV	60*	14 Apr
MI Det USASSG/1st Div	9	6 Apr
USARV Patient Acct	100*	14 Apr
101 AS Co RR	6*	14 Apr
313 AS HHC Bn RR	4*	14 Apr
11 Avn Co	58*	14 Apr
303 AS HHC Bn	2*	14 Apr
USA Engr Const Agency	40*	14 Apr
168 Engr Bn	812	10 Apr
501 Engr Co	119	8 Apr
569 Engr Co	130	14 Apr
HQ Spt Comd Sgn	31*	14 Apr
1st Log Comd	43*	14 Apr
Log Depot Long Binh	815*	14 Apr
303 TC Co Acft Maint	241	1 Feb
HQ Spt Comd Qui Nhon	25*	14 Apr
HQ Spt Comd CRB	25*	14 Apr
Log Depot Qui Nhon	245*	14 Apr
243 CS Co	186*	14 Apr
287 CS Det	10	16 Feb
288 CS Det	10	17 Feb
511 CS Det	12	18 Feb
126 Finance Co	40*	14 Apr
292 Finance Det	49*	14 Apr
205 Ord Plt	90	12 Mar
64 QM HHD	65	8 Apr
109 QM Co	72*	14 Apr
4 TC HHC	128*	14 Apr
11 TC HHD	45	12 Feb
125 TC HHC	138	14 Feb
440 TC Co	156*	14 Apr
556 TC Co	171	8 Apr
1 Med Det	12	6 Feb
1 Med Co	72	4 Feb
2 Med Hoasp	120	10 Mar
43 Med HHD Gp	41	7 Feb
44 Med HHD Bde	9*	14 Apr
67 Med Det	7	16 Feb
74 Med Det	12	18 Feb
210 Med Det	31	28 Feb
219 Med Det	19	16 Feb
241 Med Det	21	18 Feb
257 Med Det	36	20 Feb
359 Med Det	8	6 Feb
463 Med Det	3	14 Feb
551 Med Det	3	16 Feb

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>REDUCTION DATE</u>
760 Med Det	19	9 Feb
764 Med Det	8	18 Feb
945 Med Det	7	20 Feb
18 MP HHD Bde	12*	14 Feb
92 MP Det Bn H&HQ	26	5 Feb
44 Sig Bn HHD	120*	14 Apr
53 Sig Det	15	6 Apr
267 Sig Co	231	24 Feb
587 Sig Co	41*	14 Apr
261 Sig Co	25*	14 Apr
4 AG Co	132*	14 Apr
1st Bn, 69th Armor	615	30 Mar
4 CS Bn S&T	80*	14 Apr
704 CS Bn	103*	14 Apr
4 Engr Bn	202*	14 Apr
3/4 Inf HHC Bde	128	10 Apr
1/8 Inf	920	3 Apr
1/35 Inf	920	20 Mar
2/9 FA Bn	526	10 Apr
4 Med Bn	80*	14 Apr
4 MP Co	30*	14 Apr
124 Sig Bn	36*	14 Apr
3 CS Co	180	10 Apr
Btry F, 16 FA	125	1 Apr
76 FA Det CMR	9	1 Mar
260 FA Det CMR	9	1 Mar
75 Inf Co (Rgr)	52*	14 Apr
Color Det, 1st Inf Div	340	7 Apr
Color Det, 3/4 Inf Div	75	10 Apr
Color Det, 3/6 FA Bn	10	10 Apr

* Indicates drawdown on unit remaining in country

KEYSTONE ROBIN (ALFA)

(FOUO) On 3 Jun 70 the President announced that 50,000 spaces of the previously announced 150,000 space reduction in RVN would be redeployed by 15 Oct 70. The US Army portion of the reduction was met through reductions, unit inactivations, and unit redeployments.

(FOUO) On 14 Oct 70 the redeployments of increment four were completed. The major army units involved were the 199th Light Inf Bde and the 3d Bde, 9th Inf Div. The units were reduced to color guard detachments prior to redeployment. The total US Army reduction of 16,779 spaces included 1,471 from reductions in strength of units remaining in RVN and a net withdrawal of 148 spaces from the debit/credit account. The following units were redeployed or inactivated as part of increment four redeployments: (12)

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>REDUCTION DATE</u>
	784*	12 Oct
2/1 Cav Sqdn	812	15 Sep
35 Engr Bn	4	14 Oct
251 SC TM	4	14 Oct
487 SC TM	4	14 Oct
522 SC TM	4	14 Oct
540 SC TM	1	14 Oct
585 MI TM	8	14 Oct
629 MI TM	8	14 Oct
630 MI TM	4	14 Oct
631 MI TM	6*	14 Oct
588 MI TM	25*	14 Oct
613 MI TM	4*	14 Oct
633 MI TM	6*	14 Oct
634 MI TM	2*	14 Oct
641 MI TM	4*	14 Oct
HHC 5 SW Gp	81*	14 Oct
Co A 5 SW Gp	53*	14 Oct
Co B 5 SW Gp	81*	14 Oct
Co C 5 SW Gp	81*	14 Oct
Co D 5 SW Gp	38*	14 Oct
Co E 5 SW Gp	13*	14 Oct
31 Engr Det	135*	31 Jul
71 Med Hosp Evac	84	31 Jul
51 Med Co	84	31 Jul
561 Med Co	6	31 Jul
75 Med Det	40	1 Aug
174 OD Det	109	12 Oct
459 SC Bn (Co B)	102	1 Aug
313 SC Co	170	15 Aug
278 SC Co	69	1 Oct
13 QM Plt	135	12 Oct
647 QM Co	219	12 Oct
3/9 Inf HHC Bde	908	12 Oct
2/47 Inf Bn	920	12 Oct
2/60 Inf Bn	920	12 Oct
5/60 Inf Bn	641	14 Oct
2/4 FA Bn	156*	12 Oct
854 TC Co	2	14 Oct
19 MH Det	123	14 Oct
199 AV Co	81*	15 Jul
203 AV Co	331	1 Jul
245 AV Co	180	15 Sep
590 CS Co	123	12 Oct
185 AV Co	31	12 Oct
45 Inf Plt	210	12 Oct
17 Arm Trp (Troop D)	165	
87 Engr Co		

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>REDUCTION DATE</u>
520 AG Co	64*	14 Oct
199 Inf HHC Bde	203	12 Oct
7 CS Bn	544	12 Oct
90 CS Co	136	1 Aug
4/12 Inf Bn	920	12 Oct
188 OD Co	100*	14 Oct
58 AG Unit	13	31 Jul
518 AG Co	24*	14 Oct
504 Med Det	6	15 Aug
551 TC Co	182*	14 Oct
19 PI Det	5	12 Oct
49 Inf Plt	28	12 Oct
360 AV Det	21	14 Oct
3/7 Inf Bn	920	12 Oct
39 CM Det	5	12 Oct
503 CM Det	5	12 Oct
179 MI Det	38	12 Oct
40 PI Det	5	12 Oct
152 MP Plt	40	12 Oct
44 MH Det	2	12 Oct
338 AV Det	21	14 Oct
6/31 Inf Bn	920	12 Oct
5/12 Inf Bn	920	12 Oct
314 AV Det	17	14 Oct
65 Inf Plt	10	12 Oct
76 Inf Plt	10	12 Oct
75 Inf Co E	61	12 Oct
75 Inf Co M	61	12 Oct
46 OD Co	65*	14 Oct
361 SC Bn (Co C)	17*	14 Oct
369 SC Bn (Co B)	16*	14 Oct
3 TC HHD	5*	14 Oct
99 CS Bn	544	12 Oct
56 SC Co	102	12 Oct
571 En Co	165	12 Oct
493 MI Det	32	12 Oct
483 MP Plt	40	12 Oct
276 FA Det	9	12 Oct
39 Inf Plt	35	12 Oct
Log Comd USA Spt CRB	137*	14 Oct
BI Mortuary	14*	14 Oct
4 TC HHC	63*	14 Oct
2/40 FA Bn	641	12 Oct
40 Inf Plt	28	1 Oct
BI HQS	5*	14 Oct
2/3 Inf Bn	920	12 Oct
7/13 FA Bn	528	12 Oct
520 AG	13*	14 Oct
Debit/Credit Acct	149	14 Oct

* Indicates drawdown on unit remaining in country

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KEYSTONE ROBIN (BRAVO)

(S) On 14 Oct the DA forwarded instructions detailing the dispositions of units to be redeployed and/or deactivated as part of the fifth increment redeployments. The US Army's share of KEYSTONE ROBIN BRAVO was 38,100 spaces. Major units involved were the remainder of the 4th Inf Div and the 25th Inf Div, minus the 2d Bde. The two divisions were reduced to small color guard detachment and redeployed to Ft. Carson, Colorado, and Hawaii respectively. All other units were reduced in strength or inactivated in country. (13)

(FOUO) The units involved in the redeployment were: (14)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>REDUCTION DATE</u>
4 AG Co	413	8 Dec
4 AV Bn	374	2 Dec
14 PI Det	5	5 Dec
21 PI Det	5	5 Dec
43 CM Det	5	1 Nov
4 CS HHC	103	8 Dec
4 CS Bn	405	8 Dec
704 CS Bn	751	8 Dec
4 EN Bn CBT	770	8 Dec
4 FA HHC Arty	213	8 Dec
6/29 FA Bn	526	8 Dec
4/42 FA Bn	526	8 Dec
4 Inf Div HHC	175	8 Dec
4 Inf Div 1 HHC Bde	128	8 Dec
4 Inf Div 2 HHC Bde	128	8 Dec
2/8 Inf Bn Mech	908	8 Dec
3/8 Inf Bn	920	8 Dec
1/12 Inf Bn	920	8 Dec
3/12 Inf Bn	920	8 Dec
1/14 Inf Bn	920	7 Dec
33 Inf Plt	28	24 Oct
2/35 Inf Bn	920	8 Dec
50 Inf Plt	28	24 Oct
64 Inf Plt	23	24 Oct
75 Inf Co K	118	1 Dec
4 MD Bn	286	8 Dec
29 MH Det	2	15 Dec
4 MI Co	80	8 Dec
4 MP Co	159	8 Dec
124 SC Bn	605	8 Dec
25 AG Co	353*	8 Dec
3/4 Cav Sqdn	784*	8 Dec
2/34 Arm	615	8 Dec
25 AV Bn	374	8 Dec
15 PI Det	5	20 Nov
25 CS HHC	103	8 Dec
25 CS Bn	389*	8 Dec

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>REDUCTION DATE</u>
725 CS Bn	687*	8 Dec
65 Eng Bn	807*	8 Dec
7/11 FA Bn	526	8 Dec
3/13 FA Bn	612	8 Dec
25 FA Div HHE	213	8 Dec
2/77 FA Bn	411*	8 Dec
4/9 Inf Bn	920	8 Dec
2/14 Inf Bn	920	8 Dec
2/22 Mech Inf Bn	908	8 Dec
4/23 Mech Inf Bn	908	8 Dec
25 Inf HHC	84*	8 Dec
25 Inf Div 1 HHC Bde	128	8 Dec
25 Inf Div 3 HHC Bde	128	8 Dec
2/27 Inf Bn	920	8 Dec
44 Inf Plt	31	14 Nov
46 Inf Plt	31	11 Dec
66 Inf Plt	13*	30 Dec
75 Inf F Co	57*	20 Nov
25 Med Bn	277*	8 Dec
MI Det USASSG 25 Div	3	15 Dec
MI Det USASSG 25 Div	6	15 Dec
25 MI Co	48*	8 Dec
125 SC Bn	539*	8 Dec
25 MP Co	149*	8 Dec
588 MI Det	6*	30 Dec
613 MI Det	1*	30 Dec
633 MI Det	4	15 Dec
634 MI Det	5*	30 Dec
703 MI Det	2*	30 Dec
641 MI Det	1*	30 Dec
5 SW Gp Aug	141*	30 Dec
5 SW Gp Abn Co C	171*	30 Dec
5 SW Gp Abn Co D	207*	30 Dec
5 SW Gp SC Abn Co E	12*	30 Dec
1 MI Bn Air Rcn Sp	138*	30 Dec
4 SW PSYOPS Gp HHC	9*	30 Dec
6 SW PSYOPS Bn	10*	30 Dec
7 SW PSYOPS Bn	12*	30 Dec
8 SW PSYOPS Bn	15*	30 Dec
10 SW PSYOPS Bn	24*	30 Dec
303 AS Bn HHC	19*	30 Dec
8 AS RR FS	24*	30 Dec
313 AS Bn HHC	19*	30 Dec
374 AS Co	158*	15 Dec
403 AS Det	44	15 Dec
BI HQ USARV	86*	30 Dec
BI Army Concept Team	10*	30 Dec

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>REDUCTION DATE</u>
552 TC Co	65*	30 Dec
17 Cav Trp K	266	15 Dec
BI HQ I FFV	80*	30 Dec
5 PI Det	3*	30 Dec
11 PI Det	18	8 Dec
6/14 FA Bn	565	2 Dec
5/22 FA Bn	565	2 Dec
52 FA Gp HHB	30*	30 Dec
1/50 Mech Inf Bn	908	14 Dec
54 Inf Det	19	10 Dec
54 SC Bn Corps	481*	30 Dec
167 SC Co	302	21 Nov
297 TC Co	57*	30 Dec
71 AD Btry D	20*	30 Dec
1/27 FA Bn	537	2 Dec
29 FA Btry 1 SLT	114	30 Dec
121 Avn Co	288*	30 Dec
119 Avn Co	288	15 Dec
190 Avn Co	288	15 Dec
195 Avn Co	288	15 Dec
196 Avn Co	268	15 Dec
273 Avn Co	27*	23 Dec
281 Avn Co	288	30 Dec
355 Avn Co	187	15 Dec
19 Engr Bn	812	29 Dec
41 Engr Co	225	14 Dec
79 Engr Gp HHC	111	15 Dec
362 Engr Co	186	14 Dec
246 FA Det	9	16 Nov
257 FA Det	9	9 Nov
53 SC Bn	69*	9 Nov
517 Engr Co	186	30 Dec
588 Engr Bn	812	15 Dec
595 Engr Co	186	15 Nov
687 Engr Co	132	15 Dec
8 Med Hsp	39*	16 Nov
12 Med Hsp	305	30 Dec
45 Med Hsp	123	14 Dec
71 Med Hsp	170	24 Oct
254 Med Det	48	14 Dec
SC Bn COMSEC	21*	16 Nov
SC Fac	64*	30 Dec
586 SC Co	172	30 Dec
587 SC Co	145	15 Dec
69 CS Bn	3*	16 Nov
Lg CRB Depot	305*	30 Dec
33 OD Co	191	30 Dec
52 TC Plt	8*	2 Dec
		30 Dec

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>REDUCTION DATE</u>
110 TC Plt	20*	30 Dec
362 TC Det	9	2 Dec
377 TC Det	9	2 Dec
512 TC Det	11	2 Dec
670 TC Co	44*	30 Dec
6 AG Det	10*	30 Dec
527 AG Co	53*	30 Dec
566 AG Det	16*	30 Dec
5 CS HHC	277	15 Nov
45 CS Gp HHC	87	14 Dec
132 CS Det	13	2 Nov
243 CS Co	61	15 Dec
560 CS Co	183	15 Dec
561 CS Co	154	2 Dec
579 CS Det	16	10 Dec
126 FI Sec	53*	30 Dec
Lg Qui Nhon Depot	565*	30 Dec
30 MH Det	2	2 Dec
188 OD Co	120	15 Dec
3 QM Det	8	2 Dec
79 QM Plt	49*	30 Dec
134 QM Plt	150*	30 Dec
291 QM Det	2	2 Oct
385 QM Det	12	11 Dec
525 QM Co	13*	30 Dec
240 QM HHD	23*	30 Dec
820 OD Co	218	16 Nov
853 SC Det	4	2 Dec
573 CS Co	105*	15 Dec
585 TC Det	8	6 Dec
854 TC Co	117*	30 Dec
BI HQS Spt	7*	30 Dec
48 AG Det	11	11 Dec
758 CS Co	168	10 Dec
Lg Long Binh Depot	7*	30 Dec
81 QM Plt	40*	30 Dec
252 QM Det	8	21 Nov
368 TC Co	100*	30 Dec
372 TC Co	100*	30 Dec
543 TC Co	178	2 Dec
551 TC Co	82*	30 Dec
9 FA Det	9	18 Nov
248 FA Det	9	18 Nov
258 FA Det	9	27 Nov
259 FA Det	9	27 Nov
Debit/Credit	245	30 Dec

* Indicates drawdown on unit remaining in country.

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US Marine Corps Redeployment

KEYSTONE BLUEJAY

(S) With the arrival of USS Durham (LAK-114) at Long Beach, California, on 7 April, the Marine surface movement of KEYSTONE BLUEJAY, carried entirely on fleet shipping, was completed. In addition to redeploying RLT-26 and associated aviation units, the move trimmed the III MAF logistic support organization by a motor transport battalion, major elements of a shore party battalion, a military police company, detachments from an engineer battalion, and a hospital company. (15)

(C) The USMC began 1970 with an authorized space ceiling of 55,508. KEYSTONE BLUEJAY redeployed the following 12,904 of those spaces: (16)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>REDUCTION DATE</u>
3d AMTRAC Bn (-)	502	28 Jan
CMR Plt	43	29 Jan
HMH-361	233	31 Jan
Det HMS-16	36	31 Jan
Det VFMA-542	328	31 Jan
Det HMS-11	58	31 Jan
Det VMA-223	218	28 Jan
1st AT Bn (Cadre)	19	31 Jan
Det FLC	651	31 Jan
Det 9th Comm Bn	6	31 Jan
Det 5th Comm Bn	215	31 Jan
Co A, 5th Engr Bn	129	31 Jan
Det H&S Co, 5th Engr Bn	4	31 Jan
LSU 5th Serv Bn	186	31 Jan
Det Trans Fac	50	31 Jan
Mil Asst Tm	5	31 Jan
Co A, 5th AT Bn	69	31 Jan
Det H&S Co, 5th AT Bn	6	31 Jan
Co A, 5th AMTRAC Bn	146	31 Jan
Det H&S Co, 5th AMTRAC Bn	26	31 Jan
Det Svc Co Hq Bn 5th Mar Div	16	31 Jan
Det 7th MT Bn	100	11 Feb
Det 1st SP Bn	100	11 Feb
1st Hosp Co (-)	24	27 Feb
Det H&HS-18	50	26 Feb
HMS-12	403	25 Feb
MABS-12	365	2 Mar
Det MWHG-1	25	25 Feb
MATCU-62	68	25 Feb
VMA-211	218	25 Feb
Plt 1st Bridge Co	48	19 Feb
7th MT Bn (-)	307	19 Feb

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>REDUCTION DATE</u>
Det 3d AMTRAC Bn	32	20 Feb
Co A (-) 9th Engr Bn	130	2 Mar
Det 3d AMTRAC Bn	173	2 Mar
Det 1st Radio Bn	50	2 Mar
3d ITT	6	2 Mar
1st Tank Bn (-)	438	15 Mar
5th 175 Gun Btry	158	11 Mar
1st Plt 8" How	54	11 Mar
Plt 3d Bridge Co	60	11 Mar
Hq Co 26th Mar	218	19 Mar
1st Bn 26th Mar	1190	19 Mar
2d Bn 26th Mar	1190	12 Mar
3d Bn 26th Mar	1190	12 Mar
1st Bn 13th Mar	669	19 Mar
K Btry, 4/13 Mar	110	22 Mar
Det Hq Btry, 4/13	21	22 Mar
Co A, 5th Recon Bn	72	12 Mar
Det H&S Co, 5th Recon Bn	16	12 Mar
C&C, 5th Med Bn	25	12 Mar
Co A, 5th Med Bn	95	12 Mar
Det H&S Co, 5th MT Bn	3	11 Mar
Co A, 5th SP Bn	60	11 Mar
Det H&S Co, 5th SP Bn	37	12 Mar
Det MP Co Hq 5th Mar Div	20	12 Mar
Co A, 5th Tank Bn	24	11 Mar
Det H&S Co, 5th Tank Bn	73	12 Mar
Co C, 3d MP Bn	200	22 Mar
Det FLC	600	11 Mar
Det 9th Engr Bn	70	12 Mar
1st SP Bn (-)	279	11 Mar
Det 1st Hosp Co	11	12 Mar
Det HMS-16	164	12 Mar
Prov Hq III MAF (SCAMP)	50	12 Mar
OOCNE	762	22 Mar

KEYSTONE ROBIN ALFA

(S) The sailing of the USS Saint Louis, LKA 116, from Danang harbor on 13 Oct brought to a close the fourth increment redeployment of the USMC from the RVN to destinations in the US, Okinawa, and Japan. Major units involved were the 7th Mar Regt, Marine Composite Recon Sqdn-1, Marine Medium Helicopter Sqdn-161, Marine Attack Sqdn-122, and the command and support elements of Marine Aircraft Group-13. (17)

(FOUO) KEYSTONE ROBIN ALFA redeployed the following 17,021 spaces: (18)

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>REDUCTION DATE</u>
VMFA-314	324	20 Sep
Det H and MS-13	5d*	20 Sep
HQ Maint Sqdn 17	382*	19 Aug
Wing Equip Repair Sqdn 17	233	19 Aug
HQ and Maint Sqdn 13	373*	5 Oct
Mar Air Base Sqdn 13	502	12 Oct
Det HQ and Maint Sqdn 16	21	15 Aug
1st 175mm Gun Btry	158	12 Oct
Mar Comp Recon Sqdn 1	463	20 Jul
HQ and Maint Sqdn 11	127*	20 Sep
Mar Fighter Atk Sqdn 122	317	20 Sep
Mar Med Helo Sqdn 161	249	19 Aug
Mar Air Traf Cont Unit 67	68	8 Oct
All Weather Atk Sqdn 242	304	20 Sep
HQ Bn 1 Div	494*	20 Sep
1st Med Bn Co C	30*	8 Oct
1st Bn 7th Mar	1157	20 Sep
2d Bn 7th Mar	1157	12 Oct
3d Bn 7th Mar	1157	12 Oct
3d Bn 11th Mar	659	12 Oct
4th Bn 11th Mar	272*	3 Oct
Co C 1st Tnk Bn	129	6 Sep
1st Motor Transport Bn	66*	12 Oct
1st Recon Bn	245*	1 Oct
1st Dental Co	2*	8 Oct
H-S Co 3d MAF	307*	20 Jul
3d 175mm Gun Btry	158	6 Sep
1st 8" HOW Btry	222	6 Sep
7th Eng Bn	781*	23 Aug
1st Bridge Co	135	23 Aug
9th Eng Bn	877	23 Aug
5th Communication Bn	366*	6 Sep
3d MP Bn	478	23 Aug
1st Force Recon Co	124*	23 Aug
3d Force Recon Co	154	9 Jul
1st Counterintelligence Tm	16	30 Sep
7th Counterintelligence Tm	16	8 Oct
9th Interrogation Trans Tm	11	30 Sep
15th Interrogation Trans Tm	11	19 Aug
FLC	1197	1 Oct
HQ Co 7th Mar	220	8 Oct
CAPS	1111*	1 Oct
Comb Act Co HQ	66*	1 Oct
Comb Act Gp HQ	104*	12 Oct
ROK Aug	8	1 Oct
CAF HQ	45	12 Oct
Trans FAC	157	

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>REDUCTION DATE</u>
Auto Serv Cntr	186	12 Oct
Brig Flc Aug	67	12 Oct
OCCNE	1257*	6 Oct

* Indicates drawdown on unit remaining in country.

(U) In the fifth increment KEYSTONE ROBIN BRAVO, no USMC units were redeployed or reduced.

US Navy Redeployment

KEYSTONE BLUEJAY

(C) In-country naval forces at the beginning of 1970 were 30,820 spaces. KEYSTONE BLUEJAY reduced USN strength 2,050 spaces. The majority of the drawdown was from the NSA Danang. It was in preparation for the disestablishment of the NSA Danang on 1 Jul, leaving only a support facility there, and the establishment of the NSA Saigon headed by a flag officer. The new command was headquartered in Saigon and was responsible for the Navy support mission of the former NSA Saigon in MRs 2, 3, and 4, as well as that portion of Navy-unique support to USN units in MR 1. In addition the CDR NSA Saigon had the additional duty of Senior Advisor, VNN Logistics Support Command.

(FOUO) The spaces redeployed by the USN in the third increment were as follows: (19)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>REDUCTION DATE</u>
NSA Danang	1628*	14 Apr
Navy w/RLT-26	252	19 Mar
Navy w/1st MAW	32*	14 Apr
Navy w/FLC	8*	14 Apr
Navy w/1st Mar Div	130*	14 Apr

* Indicates drawdown on unit in country.

KEYSTONE ROBIN ALFA

(FOUO) KEYSTONE ROBIN ALFA reduced USN strength by 8,800 spaces. The principal units were the USS Iredell County, LST 839, and Navy Mobile Construction Bns 7, 10, and 121. The units redeployed or reduced in the fourth increment are shown in the following table: (20)

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>REDUCTION DATE</u>
Cos Surv Ctr	29*	15 Oct
OINC Const RVN	3*	15 Oct
Coastal Div 11	112	1 Oct
Coastal Div 13	80*	15 Oct
River Div 513	49	24 Jul
River Div 573	49	24 Jul
River Div 593	41*	24 Jul
River Aslt Sqdn 15	69*	15 Jul
River Div 515	49	24 Jul
River Div 553	49	24 Jul
River Div 554	49	24 Jul
Inshore UWG-1 Det 1	85*	1 Oct
Inshore UWG-1 Det 3	77*	1 Oct
Inshore UWG-1 Det 4	70*	1 Oct
Fld Tech Auth Elm	1	21 Aug
CTF 76 Rep RVN	1	10 Jul
LST 839 Iredell Cty	97	10 Jul
Mobile Const Bn 7	729	10 Jul
Mobile Const Bn 10	729	1 Oct
Naval Forces VN	64*	15 Oct
3d Naval Const Redg	74*	1 Oct
Mobile Const Bn 121	729	24 Jul
Const Bn Mant Unit 301	317*	1 Oct
River Assault Sqdn 13	272	24 Jul
Mine Div 112	28*	1 Oct
Mine Div 113	41*	24 Jul
NSA Danang	4281*	8 Oct
NAMRU 2 Det	10	30 Jul
MSTS Office Saigon	2*	15 Oct
USN with USMC	614*	15 Oct

* Indicates drawdown on unit remaining in country.

KEYSTONE ROBIN BRAVO

(FOUO) In the fifth increment of redeployment, KEYSTONE ROBIN BRAVO, 1,300 USN spaces were reduced. The major units involved were USS Benewah, River Assault Sqdn 15, and Coastal Div 13. The units redeployed or reduced are listed in the following table: (21)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>REDUCTION DATE</u>
Inshore UWG-1 WESTPAC Det	7*	30 Dec
Coastal Div 13	183	1 Dec
River Div 571	49	10 Dec
River Sqdn 55	4	10 Dec
River Aslt 15	255	30 Dec

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>REDUCTION DATE</u>
River Div 594	49	10 Dec
Inshore UWG-1 Det Unit 2	139	30 Dec
USS Benewah APB 35	194	26 Nov
STABS-LSSC	115	15 Nov
RPF 5 PBR Crews	55	1 Dec
COMSEVENTHFLT Det C	10*	30 Dec
Mine Div 112	69	30 Dec
NSF Danang Hqs	171*	30 Dec

* Indicates drawdown on unit remaining in country.

US Air Force Redeployment

KEYSTONE BLUEJAY

(C) The USAF space ceiling in RVN was 59,080 at the beginning of 1970. KEYSTONE BLUEJAY redeployed 5,607 of those spaces. The major units affected were the 819 and 820th Civil Engineer Sqdns, the 16th Tactical Recon Sqdn, which redeployed out of country, and the 557, 558, and 559th Tactical Fighter Wings which were inactivated in-country.

(FOUO) Specific units redeployed or in which spaces were reduced are shown in the following table: (22)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>REDUCTION DATE</u>
14 APO Sqdn	35*	14 Apr
38 AER Sqdn 0006	9*	14 Apr
38 AER SQDN 0011	8*	14 Apr
819 Civil Engr Sqdn	400	10 Apr
820 Civil Engr Sqdn	400	15 Feb
6004 Spt Sqdn	2*	14 Apr
16 TAC Recon Sqdn	277	17 Mar
460th Avionics Sqdn	142*	14 Apr
460 Field Mant Sqdn	162*	14 Apr
460 TAC Recon Wing	42*	14 Apr
377 Combat Spt Gp	12*	14 Apr
377 Supply Sqdn	28*	14 Apr
377 Trans Sqdn	13*	14 Apr
377 Civil Engr Sqdn	17*	14 Apr
377 Sec Sqdn	15*	14 Apr
377 Dispensary	4*	14 Apr
12 SOS Sqdn	23*	14 Apr
3d Field Maint Sqdn	8*	14 Apr
3 Avionics Sqdn	3*	14 Apr

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>REDUCTION DATE</u>
3 TAC Fighter Wg	1*	14 Apr
3 Supply Sqdn	1*	14 Apr
3 Civil Engr Sqdn	3*	14 Apr
3 Sec Police Sqdn	1*	14 Apr
834 Air Div	23*	14 Apr
12 TAC Fighter Wg	145*	14 Apr
557 TAC Fighter Sqdn	213	31 Mar
558 TAC Fighter Sqdn	213	31 Mar
559 TAC Fighter Sqdn	213	31 Mar
12 Avionics Maint Sqdn	205*	14 Apr
12 Field Maint Sqdn	411*	14 Apr
412 Munitions Maint Sqdn	333*	14 Apr
12 Cmbt Spt Gp	38*	14 Apr
12 Civil Engr Sqdn	41*	14 Apr
12 Sep Sqdn	10*	14 Apr
12 Ser Sqdn	39*	14 Apr
12 Supply Sqdn	73*	14 Apr
12 Hospital	12*	14 Apr
12 TAC Recon Sqdn	34*	14 Apr
366 Civil Engr Sqdn	2*	14 Apr
366 Sec Police Sqdn	2*	14 Apr
366 Supply Sqdn	2*	14 Apr
366 Trans Sqdn	1*	14 Apr
38 Aero Sqdn	22*	14 Apr
633 CLM Sqdn	1*	14 Apr
633 Civil Engr Sqdn	3*	14 Apr
460 Recon Tech Sqdn	153	31 Mar
7AF Debit/Credit Acct	1812	14 Apr

* Indicates drawdown in country.

KEYSTONE ROBIN ALFA

(FOUO) With the fourth increment of redeployment, known as KEYSTONE ROBIN ALFA, 7,400 AF spaces were reduced. The major units involved were the 3d and 31st Tactical Fighter Wings. The following table shows the specific units which were involved in the space reductions or redeployments: (23)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>REDUCTION DATE</u>
8 Atk Sqdn	95	1 Oct
90 Atk Sqdn	95	1 Oct
12 SOP Sqdn	98	24 Jul
3 TFG Wing	165	15 Oct
531 TFG Sqdn	118	24 Jul
8 APO Sqdn	35*	15 Oct
3 AVN Sqdn	91	15 Oct

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>REDUCTION DATE</u>
3 FDM Sqdn	111*	15 Oct
303 MUM Sqdn	243*	15 Oct
600 PHO Sqdn	17*	15 Oct
3 COS Gp	44*	15 Oct
3 CEG Sqdn	52*	15 Oct
3 SEP Sqdn	135*	15 Oct
3 SER Sqdn	22*	15 Oct
3 SUP Sqdn	98*	15 Oct
3 TRS Sqdn	32*	15 Oct
PPCRGR 1505	10*	15 Oct
1877 CMN Sqdn	35*	15 Oct
3 DIS DS	26*	15 Oct
315 TAL Sqdn	5*	15 Oct
6250 SUT	4	31 Aug
31 TFG Wg	180	1 Oct
416 TFG Sqdn	118	18 Sep
355 TFG Sqdn	118	20 Sep
306 TFG Sqdn	118	22 Sep
308 TFG Sqdn	118	24 Sep
309 TFG Sqdn	118	1 Oct
14 APO Sqdn 3	4*	15 Oct
31 AVN Sqdn	140*	8 Oct
31 FDM Sqdn	457*	8 Oct
431 MUN Sqdn	453*	15 Oct
38 AER Sqdn 11	21	15 Oct
600 PHO Sqdn 8	36	15 Oct
30 WEA Sqdn 56	6*	15 Oct
31 COS Gp	103*	1 Oct
31 CEG Sqdn	67*	1 Oct
31 SEP Sqdn	253*	1 Oct
31 SER Sqdn	42*	1 Oct
31 SUP Sqdn	138*	1 Oct
31 TRS Sqdn	15*	1 Oct
1884 CMN Sqdn	60*	15 Oct
31 DIS DS	49*	1 Oct
6254 AB Sqdn	218*	15 Oct
6255 AB Sqdn	36*	15 Oct
21 AOS FT	9*	15 Oct
PPCRGR 1504	16*	15 Oct
309 TAL Sqdn	158	24 Jul
315 CLM Sqdn	81*	15 Oct
35 FDM Sqdn	4*	31 Jul
35 COS Gp	4*	31 Jul
35 CEG Sqdn	3*	31 Jul
35 SEP Sqdn	6*	31 Jul
35 SER Sqdn	9*	31 Jul
35 SUP Sqdn	4*	31 Jul
35 TRS Sqdn	4*	31 Jul
7AF Debit/Credit Acct	2703	

* Indicates drawdown on unit remaining in country.

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KEYSTONE ROBIN BRAVO

(FOUO) KEYSTONE ROBIN BRAVO, reduced the AF units by 600 spaces. Only one unit, the 45th Tactical Recon Sqdn, was redeployed. All other Increment V units reduced strength in country. The specific units are shown in the following table: (24)

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>REDUCTION DATE</u>
45 TAC Recon Sqdn	227	16 Nov
460 Avionics Maint Sqdn	66*	30 Dec
460 Field Maint Sqdn	96*	30 Dec
460 TAC Recon Wg	26*	30 Dec
35 Field Maint Sqdn	16*	30 Dec
377 Combat Spt Gp	11*	30 Dec
377 Civil Engr Sqdn	10*	30 Dec
377 Scty Police Sqdn	2*	30 Dec
377 Services Sqdn	5*	30 Dec
377 Supply Sqdn	19*	30 Dec
377 Transportation Sqdn	8*	30 Dec
7AF Debit/Credit Acct	100	
377 USAF Disp	4*	30 Dec

* Indicates drawdown on unit remaining in country

OTHER FREE WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE FORCES

General

(U) In addition to the US, seven nations were providing military assistance to the RVN. As the number of national forces grew from the Australian contribution which began with 30 advisors in 1962, it became necessary to provide a central organization through which the efforts of those forces could be coordinated. Such an organization, known as the Free World Military Assistance Organization (FWMAO), was established in December 1964. The groups within the organization in 1970 were:

- Headquarters, Australian Force, Vietnam
- Republic of China Military Assistance Group, Vietnam
- Headquarters, Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam
- Headquarters, New Zealand Vietnam Force
- National Headquarters, Philippine Contingent, Vietnam
- Headquarters, Royal Thai Forces, Vietnam
- Spanish Medical Mission

(C) In contrast to the previous years, the strength of the Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) remained nearly constant through the first 6 months of 1970. There were

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FREE WORLD STRENGTH (LESS U.S. FORCES)
(1966-1970)




FIGURE IV-4

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indications the Thai and Australian Governments were giving some consideration to a reduction of their forces in Vietnam. The following table and Figure IV-4 reflect the trends in assigned strengths of the forces;(25)

<u>Country</u>	<u>End</u> <u>1965</u>	<u>End</u> <u>1966</u>	<u>End</u> <u>1967</u>	<u>End</u> <u>1968</u>	<u>End</u> <u>1969</u>	<u>End</u> <u>1970</u>
Australia	1, 557	4, 525	6, 818	7, 661	7, 672	6, 768
Republic of China	20	23	31	29	29	31
Republic of Korea	20, 620	45, 566	47, 829	50, 003	48, 869	48, 537
New Zealand	119	155	534	516	552	441
Republic of the Philippines	72	2, 061	2, 020	1, 576	189	74
Spain	0	13	13	12	10	7
Thailand	16	224	2, 205	6, 005	11, 568	11, 586
TOTAL	22, 404	52, 566	59, 450	65, 802	68, 889	67, 444

Note: Organizational tables of FWMAF can be found in USMACV Command History 1969, Chapter IV.

Australia/New Zealand

Australian Forces

(U) In the Australian force of about 8, 000 personnel were army, navy, and air force units. The army operated in a direct combat role through the 1st Australian Task Force (ATF) based in Phuoc Tuy Province. The task force had three infantry battalions, plus artillery, armor, cavalry, aviation, signal, and logistic support elements. Its main logistic support came from the 1st Australian Logistic Support Group located at Vung Tau. In addition, the Australian Army provided a training team of about 100 officers and warrant officer which was integrated into advisory and special force efforts throughout RVN.

(U) The Royal Australian Navy contingent comprised a destroyer on station with the US 7th Flt, a clearance diving team, and a helicopter flight which was integrated with the 135th Assault Helicopter Company. The Royal Australian Air Force provided three squadrons: Number 2 Squadron (Canberra bombers) which operated out of Phang Rang AB to provide air support; Number 35 Squadron which operated a passenger and cargo service to destinations throughout RVN; and Number 9 Squadron (Iroquois helicopters) which provided direct air support to the ATF.

New Zealand Forces

(U) New Zealand's contribution was two infantry companies, integrated with one of the Australian battalions to form an ANZAC Battalion, an artillery battery which also operated with the ATF, a Special Air Service (SAS) troop integrated with an Australian SAS Squadron, and a tri-service medical team engaged in civic action. In addition, New Zealand provided officers and other ranks in some Australian units, two nursing sisters at the 1st Australian Field Hospital, and some helicopter pilots who served with Number 9 Squadron, RAAF.

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Withdrawals

(S) During the latter months of 1969, there was some agitation in Australia to withdraw her troops from RVN, especially in the light of US redeployments. (See USMACV Command History, 1969, Chapter IV). Prime Minister Gorton indicated Australia would announce a troop withdrawal at the time the US made their next redeployment announcement. On 28 Jan the CofS, Australian Forces, Vietnam (AFV) met with the ACofS, J3 in discussions of Australian intentions toward troop withdrawal. At that time there were rumors that Australia would be withdrawing her troops in April or May 1970. At that time the CofS, AFV indicated he had no knowledge other than the December 1969 announcement of the Prime Minister. He said he felt that only one battalion would be withdrawn initially and the pace of future withdrawals would be keyed to moves by the US. (26)

(S) On 29 Mar, COMAFV met with DEPCOMUSMACV to discuss topics of conversation expected in a forthcoming visit of the Australian Minister of Defence and the Australian Chiefs of Staff Committee Chairman. The topics were: (27)

1. Government of Australia (GOA) intention to withdraw elements of its task force in RVN.
2. Possible expansion of Australian military training effort in RVN as an offset to withdrawal of troops.

It was stressed that Australia was considering only a partial withdrawal within the context of Prime Minister Gorton's public statement linking an Australian troop reduction to President Nixon's next redeployment announcement. It was the DEPCOMUSMACV position that from a military point of view the stakes in RVN warranted a maximum Australian contribution and their long-term security interests in SEA justified that effort. At that time DEPCOMUSMACV also suggested that the Australian government might consider expanding its advisory role. That was already under consideration though GOA policy called for phase-out of Australian advisors from CIDG efforts by normal attrition. (28)

(C) On 2 Apr, MACT and the Central Training Command chaired a conference to hear and discuss a proposal from the AFV concerning an increase in Australian support of RVNAF training. The AFV proposal was still in the preliminary state and the extent had not yet been determined, but it would be directed toward the RF/PF in Phuoc Tuy Province. That increased training effort on the part of the GOA was to be linked to future withdrawals of AFV troops, but by mid-year no definite dates or numbers of personnel had been promulgated. (29)

(C) On 20 Aug the governments of both Australia and New Zealand made announcements of troop withdrawals from RVN. The GOA Defence Minister announced the pending redeployment of the 8th Royal Australian Regiment comprising 900 men. It was to be completed by 12 Nov and would leave an Australian force level of 6,062 personnel. It was the first drawdown of the Australian forces; it was to be a phase out of troops in much the same manner as US redeployments. On the same date the New Zealand Prime Minister announced his government's intention to reduce its force in RVN by one infantry company of 144 men, leaving a second company of similar size and an artillery battery of 150 men. (30)

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(S) COMUSMACV felt the impact of the withdrawals on combat operations would be minimal for the following reason: (31)

1. The 5th ARVN Div was assuming operational responsibility for a larger portion of its TAOR. That was freeing FWMAF which were sharing the 5th TAOR to conduct operations in the southeastern portion of MR 3 where the redeploying forces were operating.
2. Pacification efforts within the Australian area of operations (AO) had been relatively successful and the enemy had been forced to move into less populated areas which separated them more and more from the people.
3. The loss of the units had been anticipated and AO realignments planned.
4. A decision by the Australians to add seven mobile advisory and training teams and the establishment of a Jungle Warfare Training Center prior to the redeployment had been made.

(C) In November New Zealand announced plans to send a 25-man army training team to the RVN in early 1971. The announcement to provide training assistance followed closely the 12 Nov withdrawal of W Company from VN.

(C) It was planned that the team would be New Zealand's contribution to a joint GVN/GNZ training wing at the Chi Lang National Training Center in Chau Doc Province. The main body of the team was scheduled to arrive in RVN in January 1971, to provide leadership training for members of the RF and PF. The goal was to train 1,200 students annually. The team also planned to provide civil aid to local villages. (32)

Republic of China

(U) There was no significant change in mission or forces of the Republic of China Military Assistance Group, Vietnam, during 1970.

Republic of Korea

Force Level

(C) The Republic of Korea Forces in Vietnam, (ROKFV) had been overstrength in 1968 and 1969, but the overstrength was almost eliminated during 1970 with an agreement between HQ ROKFV and HQ MACV which permitted a 1 percent overstrength to allow for normal troop rotation. The authorized force level in Vietnam for ROK units was:

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<u>Major Unit</u>	<u>Authorized Strength</u>
HQ ROKFV	1,708*
Capital Division	14,312
9th Division	14,162
2d Marine Brigade	6,170
Logistic Support Command	8,840
Construction Support Group	2,112
Navy Transport Unit	<u>568</u>
Total	47,872
10 Oct 70 Agreement 1 percent (1 percent minus 11 people)	<u>467</u>
Total	48,339

* Includes 60 ROK civilians and 82 ROK Air Force personnel

Withdrawal Possibilities

(S) At the end of 1970, with a US troop cut in Korea underway and a Korean presidential election due in May 1971, there was some concern in Korea over retention of their troops in RVN while the US was withdrawing from both RVN and Korea. The most likely ROK unit for redeployment back to Korea appeared to be the 2d ROK Marine Brigade since ROK Marine officers were serving their third tour in RVN. With the pullout of the US Marine units, the ROK Marines were faced with the prospect of coming under the operational control of the US XXIV Corps, moving south into the ROK Field Force Command area in ARVN II Corps, or redeployment back to Korea. (33)

Republic of the Philippines

(FOUO) With the departure of the Philippine Civic Action Group, Vietnam (PHILCAGV) main body in December 1969, a 44 man equipment retrograde team (ERT) remained behind to turn in US and RVN equipment formerly in the custody of PHILCAGV. On 21 Jan, the ERT returned to the Republic of the Philippines (ROP) leaving 14 personnel in RVN to complete the turn in documentation. The last of the group departed 15 Feb. The residual Filipino force was redesignated Philippine Contingent, Vietnam (PHILCONV) and consisted of a headquarters element, four MAPEX (Military Assistance Program Excess Material Teams) teams, and four medical/dental teams. The authorized strength of the PHILCONV was 131 personnel. (34)

(C) The PHILCONV, composed of medical, dental, and surgical teams, arrived in RVN in 1964. When the PHILCAGV arrived in 1966, PHILCONV was integrated as a unit into the PHILCAGV organization. PHILCONV at the beginning of 1970 was the ROP designation of the rear party of PHILCAGV. Essentially it was the former PHILCON element of PHILCAGV with no change in mission. (See 1969 MACV Command History for further details on mission of these units.) All personnel assigned to PHILCONV were members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. There were 66 qualified medical, dental, and surgical doctors and technicians assigned to teams based in the cities of Tay Ninh, My Tho, Phu Cuong, and Bao Trai. The

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MAPEX element consisted of 36 logistics specialists, four teams of nine personnel each. The teams were located in Long Binh, Danang, Qui Nhon, and Cam Ranh Bay. The remaining 29 personnel were assigned to command and administrative duties in the national headquarters in Saigon.

(C) On 1 Jul 70, PHILCONV was further reduced to a total of 71 personnel. The Saigon National Headquarters element was decreased to 10 personnel. The medical, dental, and surgical personnel were modified to 61 doctors and technicians. The MAPEX element was no longer associated with PHILCONV but was on temporary additional duty from the ROP.

(C) COMUSMACV, in coordination with Chief, JGS, RVNAF, provided security for PHILCONV. Security measures were restricted to assignment of headquarters personnel to US billets in the Saigon area and locating operational elements in ARVN or US installations. PHILCONV personnel bore arms only for the purpose of self defense in the event of enemy attack and did not engage in offensive military operations. (35)

Thailand

Semi-Annual Rotation

(S) The semi-annual rotation of Thai forces had become routine by 1970. The first of two such rotations of the year took place in January and February with the movement of the second and fourth increments of the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force between Long Thanh North, RVN, and Don Muong, Thailand. Theater Common Service Airlift System (CSAS) airlift was used as it was the most suitable mode for rotation of personnel. In making the decision for airlift tactical/operational requirements, unit integrity, personnel security, and necessity for speed were considered. Sealift was found most suitable for movement of CONEX containers between Newport, RVN, and Sattahip, Thailand. (36)

(U) A round-robin airlift for the Thai forces was used. The aircraft would fly from RVN to Thailand with a load of troops and return the same day with a similar load from Thailand. The 5,500 troops were moved in three echelons plus an advance party in each direction and a rear party from Thailand to RVN. (37)

(U) During the period 1 Jul-21 Aug the second rotation of the RTAVF occurred. Approximately one-half of the "Black Leopard" Div rotated, and along with that move the annual headquarters rotation took place. It was accomplished in the same manner as the earlier rotation. (38)

Withdrawal of Forces

(C) In late 1969 there were internal pressures to withdraw some of the Thai forces from Vietnam. It was due in part to the fact that the US and Philippines had already reduced troop strength in RVN, and the Australians had announced intentions to cut back some of their strength. Because of reports the Royal Thai Government (RTG) was considering a cutback, despite a public statement to the contrary by the Deputy Prime Minister of Thailand, the GVN made a request to the RTG to "witho'd any decision regarding withdrawal of Thai forces from Vietnam." Thus

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the Thai Prime Minister stated in mid-January his government would "not consider a pullout until a more suitable time, and the decision comes following talks between the two nations." (39)

(S) During March in a meeting with the US Ambassador, the Thai Prime Minister indicated there was considerable pressure from parliament to withdraw Thai forces from RVN in the face of continued US and allied reductions. He did not directly say there would be a Thai withdrawal but stated, "When the people feel very strongly about a situation, the government must do something to ease that situation." The US position was hopeful the RTG intended to maintain the Thai forces in RVN as long as the GVN needed them or until Thailand itself required them. The USG hoped the RTG would retain all of the Thai forces or at least a substantial part of them during the Vietnamization process. The psychological and political importance of having not only US forces but Thai and other FW forces supporting the GVN was noted. (40)

(S) In November the RTG announced it was planning to withdraw its forces from VN by 1972. The decision was based on the growth of internal insurgency in Thailand and the deterioration of security in Laos and Cambodia. It was felt that the Thai troop withdrawal would not adversely affect the security of the RVN. (41)

(S) The withdrawal plans were based on a rotational phase-out. The fifth increment would not be replaced after its return to Thailand in August 1971. The sixth increment would deploy as planned in January 1971 and withdraw one year later to complete the redeployment. The RTAF and RTN units would be withdrawn sometime before January 1972. The composition of a residual force to remain in the RVN was to be the subject of further RTG/GVN discussion. However, the RTG was considering a token force of a non-combat nature. (42)

Spanish State

(C) The Spanish Medical Mission Vietnam (SMMV) was integrated into the Vietnamese Provincial Hospital at Go Cong City. The mission, established in 1966, fluctuated between eight and 12 personnel with the strength authorized at 12. In June the Spanish Army Central General Staff made a decision to reduce the personnel in the SMMV to no more than seven. That was due to the reevaluation of requirements. (43)

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
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CHAPTER V

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN RVN

THE OPERATING AREA

Areas of Responsibility

(U) The Republic of Vietnam (RVN) was divided into four military regions (MR), which prior to 1 Jul 70 were designated Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ). See Figure V-1. These regions were political as well as military jurisdictions, since in RVN both political and military activities were conducted through the same governmental structure. The four military regions were each commanded by a Corps commander who was also the regional commander. (1) Under the Corps/ MR commander was the province chief, who was in charge of both military and civil administration. The 44 provinces were further divided into 275 districts, which in turn were divided into villages, and the villages into hamlets. There were also several autonomous cities, such as Hue, Danaang, Cam Ranh, and Saigon, each administered by a mayor who reported directly to the Government of Vietnam (GVN). (2)

(U) US responsibility for military operations paralleled the GVN structure. The senior US military commander in each region/Corps area also had an advisory role for the region. (3)

(U) GVN/US jurisdictions:

<u>Region</u>	<u>GVN</u>	<u>US</u>	<u>Headquarters</u>
MR 1	Cmdr I Corps/MR 1	CG, XXIV Corps/Senior Advisor (Sr Adv) MR 1*	Danang
MR 2	Cmdr II Corps/MR 2	CG, I Field Force Vietnam (IFFV)/Sr Adv MR 2	Nha Trang
MR 3	Cmdr III Corps/MR 3	CG, IFFV/Sr Adv MR 3	Bien Hoa
MR 4	Cmdr IV Corps/MR 4	CG, Delta Military Assistance Command (DMAC)/Sr Adv MR 4	Can Tho

* CG III MAF was Sr Adv I CTZ until 9 Mar 70.

Terrain


(U) The Republic of Vietnam is divided into three major geographic regions: the narrow coastal plain below the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ); the Central Highlands to the west, part of the

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


FIGURE V-1

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Annamite Mountain Chain; and the Mekong Delta, occupying the southern two-fifths of the country. The Delta, with its fertile alluvial plains favored by heavy rainfall, is one of the great rice growing areas of the world. The RVN's population is heavily concentrated in the Delta region. In the north, the people are primarily in the fertile narrow coastal strip along the eastern slopes of the Annamite Mountain Chain. The northern portion of this chain extends into Laos and North Vietnam and forms a formidable natural barrier to infiltration. The southern portion of the Annamite Chain forms a plateau area, known as the Highlands Plateau. (4)

(U) Figure V-2 shows key terrain features and infiltration routes.

Climate

(U) South Vietnam is both hot and humid. The climate, and consequently the pattern of operations, is controlled by two monsoons, the northeast and the southwest. Starting in October and November, the northeast (winter) monsoon brings rains over northern Vietnam and the narrow coastal plains of southern Vietnam above Nha Trang. At the same time, little rain falls over the remaining portion of RVN, i. e., over the MR 2 highlands and MRs 3 and 4. Precipitation increases in southern and inland RVN during April and May, the transition months. The winter pattern then is reversed. From about June, the southwest (summer) monsoon brings heavy rains to most parts of the country, while the coastal area from Nha Trang north to Haiphong is comparatively dry. (5)

(U) For a detailed discussion of climate, see Volume III, 1969 MACV Command History.

OVERVIEW OF SURFACE OPERATIONS

(C) Allied operations during 1970 were characterized by:

- significant cross-border operations in Cambodia
- decreased and smaller scale contacts with the enemy
- increased Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) operations
- intensified support to pacification and development efforts.

Ground Operations

Allied Objectives

(S) As prescribed by their mission, RVNAF, US and other Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) continued efforts in 1970 to assure the security of the Vietnamese people throughout RVN by defeating the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army (VC/NVA) and participating

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KEY FEATURES OF SEA AREA OF OPERATIONS




FIGURE V-2

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in the GVN Pacification and Development Program. Allied operations were geared to exploiting the progress in Vietnamization, pacification and development; locating and destroying enemy units, base camps, and cache sites; and supporting GVN forces in providing security for the population and destroying the VC infrastructure (VCI).

(C) As progress continued in the pacification and development effort and the RVNAF improved in effectiveness, FWMAF units were withdrawn. US operations were designed to minimize the effect of US redeployments and to assist GVN forces in assuming full responsibility for the conduct of the war. (6)

Enemy Activity

(C) The enemy placed increased emphasis during 1970 on guerrilla warfare. Economy-of-force tactics were evident in the majority of incidents. In line with the enemy's chief objective of discrediting the pacification program, his main targets were Regional and Popular Force (RF/PF) outposts or troop positions. He usually operated near his base areas, where the support of the populace was essential.

Significance of Cambodian Operations

(C) The most significant event of the year, if not the war, was the commitment of major US and RVNAF forces to cross-border operations in Cambodia. These operations were primarily directed against the enemy base areas along the western border areas in III and IV Corps (subsequently redesignated MRs 3 and 4). The first of these operations was a 3-day Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) armor and infantry sweep of the Angel's Wing area (see Figure V-2) from 14 to 17 Apr. This operation caught the enemy unprepared; 415 enemy were killed, and 118 weapons, large quantities of ammunition, and 99 tons of rice were captured. Surprise was lost after this first operation. Ensuing Cambodian operations had to be planned and executed rapidly to prevent the enemy from preparing defense of his bases or removing war materials.

(C) Eleven major cross-border operations were executed by combined US/RVNAF forces in May and June. Like the initial April operation, the primary mission was to destroy or neutralize enemy supply and troop concentrations and disrupt enemy activity along the RVN border. In some cases the mission included combat and material support and assistance to the Cambodian Army, refugee evacuation, and opening and securing roads and waterways.

(C) The total number of enemy killed in May and June was significant, over 10,000. However, since most main-force enemy units avoided contact, a large portion of these losses were suffered by rear-service elements. Enemy logistic losses were more significant, with some cache finds so extensive that they were more depots than cache sites.

(C) By July, the impact of the allied Cambodian sanctuary counter-offensive had become apparent. The true significance of the damage done to the enemy was greater than the personnel losses and the vast amounts of weapons and tonnage of rice and ammunition destroyed and captured. The impact had to be measured also in terms of the amount of resources, personnel, and energy required to replace the material and equipment lost. A further measure was the pause in enemy activity as he attempted to reconstruct his logistic foundation.

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(C) Above all, the impact of operations against the Cambodian sanctuaries had to be measured in terms of its psychological effect on both the enemy and on the GVN. The increased number of Hoi Chanhs and political cadre who rallied was one indication of the psychological turmoil created in the enemy's organizational structure. Even more significant were the psychological effects on the Vietnamese government, the RVNAF, the territorial forces, and the people. The increased confidence of the RVNAF in their capability to wage a successful campaign against the enemy, the ability of the RF and PF to assume crucial responsibility for the security of the people, and the increased confidence of the people in their government and armed forces provided a set of conditions which could assure the success of the Vietnamization program and the orderly withdrawal of US Forces.

(C) The level and direction of enemy activity also changed after the Cambodian operations. Earlier in the year there had been high points of RVN-wide activity, with over 200 attacks-by-fire and 39 ground attacks during the 31 Mar-1 Apr high point. Increased activity was planned throughout the year, but the enemy did not have the resources to implement his plans fully. With supplies depleted in Cambodia, he had to rely increasingly on support from the people. To get this support, he had to resort to increased use of terrorism. He partially offset logistical problems by capturing friendly equipment. He sought alternate infiltration routes. He terrorized the populace in an effort to maintain his presence and defeat the pacification program. Thus through economy-of-force tactics, he continued operations. But he failed in many of his objectives, due both to his lack of supplies and the increased effectiveness of allied counter-offensive operations. (7)

Allied Operations

(S) The ultimate objective of allied combat operations in Vietnam was security for the populace, so that pacification and development could progress. Allied operations were characterized as search-and-clear, interdiction of lines of communication (LOC), screening, and reconnaissance. Extensive use of reconnaissance permitted the allied forces to detect the enemy before he had an opportunity to operate near populated areas. Once detected, friendly forces preempted him by engaging his forces promptly and by seizing or destroying his caches. In all engagements, the flexibility and concentrated firepower of artillery, TACAIR, and B-52s was used to maximum advantage.

(S) On 1 Jul, following the Cambodian operations, allied forces launched a country-wide Summer Campaign. The objective was to intensify pacification and development efforts, with emphasis on elimination of the VCI and guerrilla forces. This first quarterly combined campaign terminated on 30 Sep with 21,123 enemy KIA and 8,407 Hoi Chanhs; friendly losses were 3,403 killed and 13,923 wounded. (8)

(S) On 1 Oct the Fall Campaign began. The operational concept focused attention on using allied resources against contested border areas. In the more pacified areas, emphasis was directed at the creation of a secure peaceful environment. Military operations were designed to keep the enemy off-balance while applying the principle of economy-of-force with emphasis on small-unit actions. All levels of command stressed the prudent use of artillery and air assets. Resource denial was also emphasized, with operations to prevent enemy access to food, medical supplies, munitions and other items essential to his war effort. RVNAF mobile field forces operated against enemy main-force units in border areas and clearing zones. The RF/PF conducted mobile operations to increase the security of villages and hamlets. (9)

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Resume' of Operations

(U) Following is a chronological summary by CTZ/MR of military operations that affected security and Vietnamization. A resume' of significant individual actions, by province, is contained in Annex E.

Activities in MR 1

(S) The I CTZ/MR 1 had the highest enemy threat and the largest number of US combat forces during the year, although ARVN forces increasingly assumed greater areas of responsibility. In turn, the RF/PF assumed greater responsibility for security of the populated coast line, thereby freeing regular forces to operate against enemy forces in the western portion. This formed a shield between the enemy forces and the people.

(C) In the early part of the year the enemy established large bases along the Vietnamese/Laotian border in northwestern Quang Tri Province and the adjacent Laotian region, as well as the A Shau Valley area. NVA units increased their tactical posture in the mountain region of northern I CTZ and along the central DMZ. Of lesser significance was the rehabilitation of old base areas and the construction of new ones in the western parts of Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai Provinces. Throughout the year, the enemy continued to defend cache sites, consolidate bases in the western areas, and attempt to expand to the east. The enemy harassed allied installations and operations south of the DMZ and conducted sporadic attacks in the lowlands against population centers and installations.

(C) US and ARVN forces in MR 1 conducted both combined and unilateral operations to maintain pressure on the enemy and deny access to the populated areas. MR 1 had the largest scale of military activity in RVN. In the western portion of the area, particularly the A Shau Valley, ARVN and US efforts were aimed at destroying the enemy and his logistic facilities and interdicting his LOCs. Along the DMZ, allied operations consisted primarily of reconnaissance-in-force and saturation ambushes to prevent enemy infiltration into the populated lowlands. Operations in the remainder of the area were primarily search-and-clear operations to locate and destroy the enemy forces, staging areas and forward cache sites. Operations were also conducted in support of the pacification program, with the goal of eliminating the VCI and political apparatus and restoring GVN control and protecting vital LOCs. Generally, company-size or smaller forces engaged in daily contacts with the enemy from Danang to the boundary of II CTZ/MR 2.

(C) In November and December, operations were restricted in the eastern portion of MR 1 and northern MR 2 due to the heavy rains of the northeast monsoons and the after-effects of tropical storms Kate and Louise. Although operations were limited nearer the coast, ARVN forces continued major operations in the rugged areas of the western portion.

(C) At the end of the year the success of allied efforts was indicated by increased security in the populated lowlands and a general decrease in enemy initiated activity: the enemy withheld his main force units from battle, relying on the local forces to conduct sporadic attacks-by-fire and limited ground attacks. (10)

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Activities in MR 2

(C) II CTZ/MR 2 had the greatest threat next to MR 1. During the early part of the year, enemy activity was relatively light and characterized by economy-of-force with sporadic attacks-by-fire, light ground probes, sapper attacks, interdiction of LOCs, and terrorism, particularly abductions. The problem of abductions continued throughout the year, with II CTZ/MR 2 having the highest incident rate in the Republic. Enemy activity increased during April and May. On the night of 31 Mar-1 Apr the enemy conducted 53 attacks-by-fire and eight ground attacks. Activity then declined to a moderate level throughout the corps, except the area in the Dak Seang-Ben Het-Dak To triangle of northwestern Kontum Province. This area was subjected to intense attacks-by-fire, ground assaults, and sniper fire throughout April and May. The latter part of the year, enemy activity was at a low level except for brief upsurges of activity at the end of August and again at the end of November. The targets of most attacks were primarily RF/PF and ARVN installations.

(C) Allied military activities in MR 2 were characterized by intensive community defense and local development efforts along the coastal plains; maintenance of security along vital arteries of the region, particularly Route 19 between Pleiku and Qui Nhon; and maintenance of government control of the sparsely populated central highlands. With operations designed to seize the initiative and keep the enemy off balance, US, ARVN, and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces continued to search and destroy main force units, eliminate VCI and guerrilla forces, and protect the population. In the early part of the year ARVN forces were committed to pacification missions using short term operations on the edges of populated areas. By April, ARVN forces significantly increased their number of security operations.

(C) In mid-March, the 47th Regt, 22d ARVN Div, deployed to Pleiku Province to replace the 3d Bde, 4th Inf Div and the remaining elements of the 4th Div that had relocated earlier to Binh Dinh Province. The 22d ARVN Div assumed responsibility for the entire highlands on 15 Apr. This step in Vietnamization culminated in the redeployment of the entire 4th Inf Div to the US by 15 Dec.

(C) US Forces conducted operations in the central highlands in late April to relieve ARVN forces for deployment to the Dak Seang battle area, but thereafter most US operations were conducted in the coastal province of Binh Dinh. In the coastal area to the south, ROK forces conducted many short duration operations in support of the pacification program. (11)

Activities in MR 3

(C) In III CTZ/MR 3, the level of enemy activity during the first 6 months ranged from light to moderate, falling to a low level after the Cambodian operations and remaining light for the last 6 months of the year. A corps-wide high point was initiated by both main force and subregion forces during the latter part of January, consisting primarily of attacks-by-fire focused on allied bases and defensive positions as well as on RF/PF units. During the first week of February a large cache of signal equipment, arms, and munitions was discovered by elements of the CIDG 3d Mobile Strike Force near Rang Rang in Long Khanh Province. In retaliation, the enemy struck the area surrounding the cache with particularly intense fire. Action remained relatively scattered until the night of 31 Mar-1 Apr when a high level of activity commenced. By the morning of 2 Apr, 59 attacks-by-fire and 16 ground assaults had been reported. Although attacks-by-fire rose during the first week of May, activity dropped off considerably during the rest of May and

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June as allied operations in Cambodia diverted the enemy's attention and preempted proposed plans for offensive activity. The remainder of the year enemy activity was generally light with only two attacks by company-size units in July and two in November. Attacks-by-fire were scattered and the enemy forces avoided decisive contact.

(C) Allied operations were centered on the corps-wide Phase IV of Campaign TOAN THANG. This campaign, which had begun on 1 Nov 69, had the mission of locating and destroying enemy forces, interdicting infiltration routes, and denying base camp areas. Other activity concentrated on upgrading ARVN/RF/PF through improvement and modernization, supporting pacification by keeping enemy local and main force units from populated areas, and conducting military operations to locate and engage the enemy. Small unit operations were designed to search out enemy forces, emphasizing quick reaction to intelligence. The Australian Task Force continued to operate in Phuoc Tuy Province, maintaining increasing pressure on the enemy, while the Royal Thai Army Volunteers continued to operate against the enemy elements in central Bien Hoa Province.

(C) US operations in Cambodia began on 1 May when elements of the 1st Cav Div, 11th Armd Cav Regt, and the ARVN Abn Div made a combined mechanized-air mobile assault into the Fish-hook region of Cambodia. Within a few days, two brigades of the 25th Inf Div and the 9th ARVN Regt had joined the cross-border operations. ARVN and US Forces conducted systematic pursuit of known enemy units within the targeted base areas and concentrated on destroying enemy arms, munitions, and food cache sites in those areas. US Forces were withdrawn from Cambodia by 1800 hours on 29 Jun.

(C) Movement of US and ARVN forces into the Cambodian area of operations during May and June necessitated economy-of-force measures in RVN, with heavy reliance placed upon territorial forces for security. Operations for the remainder of the year were of battalion and smaller size and directed toward strengthening government control over the countryside. Allied objectives were to sever traditional supply routes, keep the enemy units off-balance, destroy the VCI, and interdict the shadow supply system. Greater emphasis was placed on RVNAF assuming responsibility for larger areas of independent operation. Additionally, emphasis was placed on increasing the effectiveness of territorial forces. RF and PF units actively participated in community defense and local development, neutralization of the VCI, and intensive patrolling and ambush operations, particularly at night.

(C) Within MR 3, 1970 saw steady progress in pacification and a diminished VC/NVA combat capability. The enemy's main-force capability was fragmented, his supply lines interdicted, his Cambodian sanctuaries attacked, his caches destroyed, and his local forces eroded. (12)

Activities in MR 4

(C) The enemy maintained a constant presence in IV CTZ/MR 4, where the bulk of the population lives and which is the richest agricultural area in Southeast Asia. There have been no US or Free World ground combat forces in MR 4 since the departure of the US 9th Div in August 1969. However, the US advisor effort remained strong. US naval personnel as well as US helicopter assets and some combat support elements provided support to RVN forces, who assumed responsibility for the entire area.

(C) Enemy activity in the area was light and scattered until the latter part of March. Friendly installations in the Seven Mountains area of Chau Doc Province were hard hit by a series of Com-

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munist attacks during the period 29-30 Mar. This upsurge of activity continued briefly throughout the CTZ from 31 Mar to 2 Apr, when 55 attacks-by-fire and three ground assaults were recorded. Enemy activity remained at a relatively high level until early May. On 3 May there occurred a total of 79 attacks-by-fire and seven ground attacks, with the Seven Mountains area again being hit hard. Activity fell to a light to moderate level for the remainder of the year, although the Seven Mountains area continued to be a focal point of activity through August. During the latter half of the year the enemy used hit-and-run tactics against selected targets, particularly isolated military compounds and RF/PF outposts. Communist forces continued their efforts to undermine and discredit the GVN's pacification program, conducting small-scale indirect fire attacks and limited ground actions.

(C) Three ARVN divisions operated in IV CTZ/MR 4: the 7th Inf Div in the northern corps area; the 9th Inf Div, which normally operated in the four central provinces; and the 21st ARVN Div in the southern provinces. The "B" Marine Bde was attached to the 7th ARVN Div from 4 Jan to 6 May and conducted reconnaissance-in-force operations in portions of Kien Hoa and Dinh Tuong Provinces. During those operations, the Vietnamese Marines conducted company-size patrols and had sporadic contact with the enemy. The enemy used evasive tactics and inflicted the majority of casualties on friendly troops by extensive mining of the area.

(C) Later in the year, the 7th ARVN Div conducted a highly successful operation in Kien Hoa Province, a traditional stronghold of the VC which was used for rest, logistic support, and as a staging area for attacks on outposts and villages in the area. The 9th Inf Div conducted operations in the central province, with Chau Doc Province being a focal point of action. Operations were conducted to locate and destroy enemy base areas, supply caches, and installations. Another traditional enemy stronghold, the U Minh Forest, was the focus of 21st ARVN Div operations at the end of the year. These areas of enemy concentration were entered in strength by regular forces to destroy the enemy main force units. This action would be followed up by territorial security forces to provide local security.

(C) The RF/PF in IV CTZ/MR 4 provided more than 80 percent of the combat power and had the largest number of casualties, but at the same time they exacted a greater toll from enemy forces. With approximately 4,200 outposts throughout the MR, RF/PF units provided security to the heavily populated area by conducting patrols and ambush operations as well as working with the National Police, provincial reconnaissance units, and National Police Field Forces to destroy the VCI. In November, a MR-wide campaign of saturation operations targeted against both VC military and the VCI achieved noteworthy results. This operation, which stressed utilization of all available intelligence from all sources, coordination and cooperation of all forces in the MR, and the use of all available forces, was continued into 1971.

(C) With approximately 3,400 km of rivers, canals, and waterways in this river delta region, naval and marine forces played a prominent role in providing security as well as combat action forces. Coordinated naval and ground operations interdicted the enemy's commo-liaison routes, destroyed base areas along the waterways, and thus opened waterways to friendly commerce. During the Cambodian operation, naval and marine forces teamed up to establish security of the Mekong River from the Cambodian border to the capital city of Phnom Penh. (13)

Summary

(S) Combat operations by allied forces during 1970 were successful in reducing the enemy's capability to launch major attacks. The change in government in Cambodia and allied sanctuary

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counter-offensive operations seriously disrupted the VC/NVA logistics effort. The enemy's lack of a ready resupply capability coupled with the continued success of the GVN pacification and development programs brought a change in the character of the war; the enemy shifted from major combat operations to protracted guerrilla warfare. This, in turn, shifted allied strategy. In keeping with the "one war" concept, emphasis was placed on elimination of in-country enemy main forces, support of the pacification program, and continued progress in the improvement and modernization of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. There was a steady improvement in RVNAF combat operations throughout the year. The cross-border operations especially increased the pride and confidence of all services. While there were shortcomings, the Vietnamese were demonstrating daily their ability to shoulder greater responsibilities in the conduct of the war.

Naval Operations

(C) Naval operations in 1970 were notable for the effective infiltration barriers and for the USN program of accelerated turnover of craft and operations to the Vietnamese Navy (VNN). MARKET TIME operations continued along the almost 1,000 miles of South Vietnam coast, preventing seaborne infiltration from North Vietnam and inhibiting the movement of enemy personnel and supplies between points on the RVN coast. Equally effective barrier operations were conducted along inland waterways and canals in the Delta.

Digest of Operations

(U) A digest of 1970 naval activity is contained in Annex F, with complete description of the various operations.

Chronological Summary

(C) During the early part of 1970, naval activity centered on countering the increased enemy buildup in the Delta. Although the water level was decreasing due to the dry season, enemy forces regularly attempted to infiltrate combat units and supplies. USN and VNN units made repeated heavy contacts, forcing the enemy to attempt to infiltrate elsewhere. The integrated naval command promptly reacted by strengthening naval forces in the new area.

(C) Special coastal surveillance was started during March to preclude large-scale enemy infiltration by sea from Cambodia to the west coast of South Vietnam. MARKET TIME patrols were augmented and assigned special areas of operations (AOs) in the Gulf of Thailand. During May and June, the Navy effort in Vietnam was concentrated on Cambodian operations. Naval units provided waterborne blocking forces for ARVN and US Army sweeps into the Parrot's Beak and Fishhook regions of Cambodia (see Figure V-2). One of the major missions of the VNN during the Cambodian operation was the evacuation of over 82,000 ethnic Vietnamese refugees from Cambodia to South Vietnam. The VNN and VN Marines conducted many operations in Cambodia. Their performance was outstanding and resulted in the Mekong River being under effective GVN control from the South China Sea to Phnom Penh.

(C) A major milestone in the accelerated turnover (ACTOV) program took place in June, when the GVN accepted title to 273 combatant craft. Another major ACTOV milestone occurred in July

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when the VNN assumed operational control of significant portions of the SEA LORDS campaign (coordinated naval operations in the Delta to clear waterways and control LOCs; see Figure F-3, Annex F). At the same time in MR 1, the VNN took over from the USN the Operation CLEAR-WATER mission of minesweeping the Hue River water LOC.

(C) On 1 Sep, the USN turned over operational command of the entire MARKET TIME inner barrier to the VNN. The MARKET TIME outer barrier and air barriers remained under USN command. During 1970 MARKET TIME forces detected 12 enemy trawlers in international waters. All but one eventually aborted their mission after detection and returned to Chinese territorial waters. One was destroyed on 22 Nov in the territorial waters of Vietnam off the east coast of MR 4, after it was challenged and it attempted to evade capture. An estimated 60 tons of weapons and ammunition were salvaged from the sunken trawler by USN and VNN divers.

(C) During the latter part of 1970, the VNN assumed responsibility for SEARCH TURN and BREEZY COVE (inland waterway operations in MR 4). On 1 Sep, the Advanced Tactical Support Base at Old Nam Can City moved ashore from its headquarters located on moored barges on Cua Lun River. This marked the termination of Operation SEAFLOAT and the beginning of Operation SOLID ANCHOR. The only operation remaining under USN command was Operation SOLID ANCHOR, which supported the pacification campaign in An Xuyen Province, southern MR 4. On 1 Dec the USN turned over the last of the "swift boats" used for MARKET TIME inner barrier patrols. The VNN received the last of the USN small coastal and river combat craft on 30 Dec. This turnover completed a 25-month program designed to withdraw US sailors from coastal and river combat operations.

(C) Throughout the year there was an almost unbroken inland waterborne barrier along the MR 3 and 4 border with Cambodia, from the Gulf of Thailand up to Tay Ninh City. One small gap along the MR 4 border canal which could not be covered by boat operations was denied the enemy by increased troop concentrations, use of sensors, and naval air forces. Interdiction operations continued throughout the Delta, patrolling waterways to keep open the LOCs, thereby supporting pacification as well as security. Units continued to have almost daily contact with the enemy and precluded many enemy attempts to mine the water traffic.

(C) At year's end the VNN continued their coastal surveillance patrols along the Cambodian coast on the Gulf of Thailand, as well as their operations to interdict VC/NVA infiltration in MR 3 and 4 from the outskirts of Saigon to the southern tip of the Delta and around to the Cambodian border. The only USN combat forces remaining in Vietnam were nine Seal platoons. Two USN air squadrons, specifically commissioned to support the VNN "brown water" naval operations, provided combat air support to allied forces in the Delta. The USN had essentially reverted to its former noncombatant role of providing advice and logistics support for the VNN. (14)

CASUALTY DATA

(C) US deaths in RVN from hostile causes exceeded 4,100 in 1970, or about 45 percent of the comparable 1969 figure. There were 1,829 nonbattle deaths in RVN in 1970, which represented 30 percent of the year's total of 6,005 from all causes. (15)

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(U) Figure V-3 provides comparative casualty data for Southeast Asia from the beginning of the US presence through 1970.

HOLIDAY STANDDOWNS

(U) Brief truces during selected Vietnamese holidays continued throughout 1970. The lessons learned from previous Communist violations caused the US, FWMAF, and RVNAF to limit the truces to 24 hours rather than the longer periods announced by VC/NVA. COMUSMACV's determination that the enemy would not gain an advantage during a recognized lull to launch attacks or resupply his forces continued to guide the field force actions and activities.

TET ce

(S) During the 1970 TET truce COMUSMACV directed a temporary cessation of offensive operations in the RVN during the period 051800H to 061800H Feb 70. Normal operations were to be resumed at the expiration of the time limit, or earlier if so ordered. The general cease-fire rules directed:

1. Decisive reaction against enemy truce violations which struck friendly forces.
2. US Forces were not to initiate any air, ground, or naval offensive operations. However, each commander was authorized and directed to take all actions necessary to carry out the inherent right and responsibility of a commander for self-defense of his forces. The actions included but were not limited to the following:
 - a. Illumination.
 - b. Defensive ambushes on routes-of-approach to friendly positions.
 - c. Intensified aerial reconnaissance and ground patrolling in areas containing potential enemy concentrations along enemy LOCs.
 - d. Helicopter gunship cover of convoy and other movements.
 - e. Counter-battery fire.
3. Friendly forces-in-contact as a result of any VC/NVA attack were not to break contact or decrease the intensity of actions until the VC/NVA forces withdrew.
4. Psychological operations could be continued at the discretion of tactical commanders, to include use of electronic media and/or aerial delivery techniques and all PSYOPS programs involving direct face-to-face communications.

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COMPARATIVE CASUALTIES - SOUTHEAST ASIA

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	Cum 1960 to Date
U.S. Military Deaths, Bostik												
Vietnam# (RVN)	-	1	31	77	146	1,365	4,989	9,358	14,561	9,367	4,183	44,441
(NVN)	-	(1)	(31)	(77)	(145)	(1,331)	(4,946)	(9,314)	(14,537)	(9,361)	(4,176)	
	-	(-)	(-)	(-)	(1)	(34)	(43)	(44)	(24)	(6)	(7)	
Laos	-	10	-	1	1	4	19	20	31	47	38	190
Sub-Total	-	11	31	78	147	1,369	5,008	9,378	14,592	9,414	4,221	44,631
Thailand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	4	5
Total SEASIA	-	11	31	78	147	1,369	5,008	9,378	14,593	9,414	4,225	44,636
Deaths from other causes:												
Vietnam# (RVN)	-	2	10	36	48	354	1,043	1,679	1,917	2,110	1,841	9,291
(NVN)	-	(2)	(10)	(36)	(48)	(359)	(1,043)	(1,537)	(1,899)	(2,076)	(1,829)	
	-	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(142)	(18)	(34)	(12)	
Laos	-	2	3	-	-	-	2	1	2	3	3	22
Sub-Total	-	2	21	36	48	359	1,045	1,680	1,919	2,113	1,844	9,313
Thailand	-	2	8	11	8	24	56	57	102	91	65	439
Total SEASIA	-	4	29	47	56	383	1,101	1,737	2,021	2,204	1,909	9,752
Wounded, nonfatal:												
Hospital care required:												
Vietnam#	-	1	39	218	521	3,307	16,520	32,359	46,783	32,898	15,177	149,208
Laos	-	1	2	-	1	1	6	12	16	42	34	141
Sub-Total	-	2	41	218	522	3,308	16,526	32,371	46,799	32,940	15,211	149,349
Thailand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	1	4
Total SEASIA	-	2	41	218	522	3,308	16,526	32,371	46,801	32,941	15,212	149,353
Hospital care not required:												
Vietnam#	-	-	35	193	517	2,803	13,540	29,629	45,991	37,210	15,361	146,291
Laos	-	1	2	-	-	3	27	25	30	66	71	238
Sub-Total	-	1	37	193	517	2,806	13,567	29,654	46,021	37,276	15,432	146,529
Thailand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
Total SEASIA	-	1	37	193	517	2,806	13,567	29,654	46,022	37,276	15,432	146,530

Table V. 1.

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COMPARATIVE CASUALTIES - SOUTHEAST ASIA

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	Cum. 1960 to Date
RVN Military*												
Deaths from hostile action:	2,223	4,004	4,457	5,665	7,457	11,243	11,953	12,716	24,323	18,938	21,258	127,104
RVNAF									3,592	2,895	1,961	
Paramilitary									27,915	21,833	23,219	
Total												
Wounded, nonfatal:												
RVNAF	2,788	5,449	7,195	11,488	17,017	23,118	20,975	29,448	61,084	56,281	65,485	311,527
Paramilitary									9,612	8,995	5,901	
Total									70,696	65,276	71,386	
Missing:												
RVNAF	2,515	3,233	1,270	3,137	6,036	7,848	3,283	2,340	1,996	655	716	33,501
Paramilitary									464	259	230	
Total									2,460	914	946	
VC/NVA Military*												
Deaths from hostile action	5,669	12,133	21,158	20,575	16,785	35,436	55,524	88,104	181,149	156,954	103,638	
Prisoners of War (Cumulative)												
Other Nation Military												
Deaths from hostile action:												
Australia - New Zealand	-	-	-	-	1	14	60	76	104	99	70	431
Korea	-	-	-	-	-	17	506	1,005	824	635	529	3,602
Philippines	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	8
Thailand	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	51	132	105	319
RVN Civilian												
Deaths from hostile action:					1,795	1,900	1,723	3,706	5,389*	6,202		

* Excludes February for which data are not available

Includes data for operations in connection with Cambodia and in waters adjacent to Vietnam which are within the limits of the designated combat zone.

† Includes data for operations in connection with Cambodia and Laos where applicable.

Note: RVN Paramilitary casualty data are not available prior to 1968.

SOURCE: Directorate for Information Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Comptroller: 10 Mar 71.

Table V-1 (Continued)

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5. Commanders at all levels were to insure US Forces were maintained in a high state of readiness before, during, and after the cessation period.

6. Interdiction fires were not to be conducted during the cease-fire period.

7. All normal operations were to be resumed at the conclusion of the cessation period. (15)

(C) For special instructions regarding DMZ and ARC LIGHT strikes during the TET truce see TOP SECRET Supplement.

(C) The above cease-fire rules for TET 70 were similar to those of 1969. However, commanders were given specific authority to employ counter-battery fire. SEA LORDS, MARKET TIME, and GAME WARDEN operations were unaffected by the truce.

(U) During the 24-hour TET suspension, 118 enemy-initiated incidents were recorded by US, RVN, and FWMAF. Only 78 of those were considered significant actions in which casualties occurred. During the period US Forces suffered three killed and 32 wounded. Enemy losses were 142 killed and 20 detained. (17)

Buddha's Birthday

(S) The 17th recognized truce was in observance of Buddha's birthday between 180400Z to 190400Z May 70. (18) Intelligence indicated an enemy capability to launch attacks against allied forces or installations. During the 24-hour cessation allied forces in RVN remained on the alert. The general rules for operations within the RVN during the truce period were the same as for TET. With the Cambodian operation in full swing, no cease-fire was extended outside RVN. (19) It was clearly ordered "US Forces are not, repeat not, to initiate any air, ground, or naval offensive operations directed at enemy forces located in the Republic of South Vietnam." (20) However, MARKET TIME, GAME WARDEN, SEA LORDS, and search-and-rescue operations continued uninterrupted as in the past, while commanders were directed to keep offensive operations underway in enemy base areas along the Cambodian border.

(C) For special instructions regarding the DMZ and ARC LIGHT strikes, see TOP SECRET Supplement.

(U) As in previous cease-fires, enemy-initiated actions continued; 205 were recorded of which 90 were considered significant. In these significant actions US casualties were one killed and 25 wounded. The enemy deaths were 196, and nine were detained. (21)

PW Repatriation

(S) In support of the prisoner-of-war-repatriation operation of 11 Jul 70 (see Chapter X), a temporary cease-fire was declared by COMUSMACV in the DMZ from 110600 to 112100 Jul. No reported incidents marred the repatriation operation. (22)

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ENEMY CEASE-FIRE ACTIVITY

CHRISTMAS: 1800 HOURS 24 DEC 70 - 1800 HOURS 25 DEC 70

MR	INCIDENTS		ENEMY LOSSES		*FRIENDLY CASUALTIES		
	MAJOR	MINOR	KIA	DET	KIA	WIA	MIA
1	13	15	11	5	0	21(2)	0
2	10	7	1	0	2	12(1)	0
3	9	15	5	1	0	5(1)	1 VN CIV
4	15	4	15	1	15	18	2
CHRISTMAS 1970	47	41	32	7	17	56(4)	3
1969	61	54	101	13	21	72(3)	5

NEW YEARS: 1800 HOURS 31 DEC 70 - 1800 HOURS 1 JAN 71

1	16	6	19	2	2(1)	14(10)	0
2	8	5	16	0	1	3	0
3	9	7	16	1	3	2	0
4	14	17	12	0	7	43(1)	0
NEW YEAR 1971	47	35	63	3	13(1)	62(11)	0
1970	61	54	167	3	26(6)	55(14)	12

* NUMBER IN () DENOTES US CASUALTIES

TRUCE VIOLATIONS

- AN INCIDENT INVOLVING AN ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN ENEMY AND FRIENDLY GROUND, AIR, OR NAVAL FORCES WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL LIMITS OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, DURING A STAND-DOWN PERIOD.
- AN INCIDENT OF ENEMY HARASSING FIRE AGAINST FRIENDLY CIVILIAN OR MILITARY PERSONNEL, INSTALLATION, SHIP OR AIRCRAFT.
- AN INCIDENT OF ENEMY SABOTAGE, TERROR, OR PROPAGANDA ACTIVITY.
- AN INCIDENT OF ENEMY USE OF COMMAND DETONATED LAND OR WATER MINES. SELF-DETONATING MINES WILL NOT BE CONSIDERED A TRUCE VIOLATION DUE TO THE INABILITY TO DETERMINE THE TIME OF PLACEMENT.
- A MAJOR MOVEMENT OF ENEMY TROOPS OR SUPPLIES.

MAJOR INCIDENTS

- A TRUCE VIOLATION IN WHICH CASUALTIES OCCUR TO EITHER SIDE, INCLUDING ENEMY DETAINEES AND FRIENDLY MISSING PERSONNEL OR ABDUCTED CIVILIANS.
- A FRIENDLY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED BY FIRE.
- A GROUND ATTACK OR A SIGNIFICANT STANDOFF FIRE ATTACK ON A POPULATION CENTER.
- A TRUCE VIOLATION OF SUCH MAGNITUDE OR UNUSUAL SIGNIFICANCE AS TO REQUIRE SPECIAL REPORTING.

MINOR INCIDENTS

- A TRUCE VIOLATION WHICH CANNOT BE CATEGORIZED ACCORDING TO ANY OF THE CONDITIONS ABOVE.

FIGURE V-4

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Christmas and New Year Truces

(S) COMUSMACV recommended to CINCPAC 30 Nov 70 that the pattern for the holiday truces parallel the 1969 practice. He proposed the truce dates be 241800H-251800H Dec and 311800H Dec-011800H Jan 71. The following factors were considered in the recommendation:

1. The proposed truce would not be related to other cease-fire initiatives. Publicity was to use the term truce and avoid the word cease-fire so as to differentiate between concepts and minimize public misunderstanding.

2. Extended truce, i.e., beyond 24 hours, afforded the enemy an opportunity to maneuver and build up/rest his forces and multiplied the likelihood of violation. In addition, pacification progress and security of allied forces required the FWMAF be able to engage the enemy whenever they could detect and identify him. Therefore the truce was to be for a short duration.

CINCPAC forwarded COMUSMACV's recommendation to CJCS for approval and implementation. (23)

(S) JCS authorized COMUSMACV to observe a Christmas truce period 241800H to 251800H Dec 70, and a New Year's truce period 311800H Dec 70 to 011800H Jan 71. On 23 Dec 70 CINCPAC cautioned all commands to maintain an undiminished vigilance during the holiday season. (24) (See Figure V-4 for cease-fire violations and casualties.)

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

(C) Specific rules of engagement (ROE) were published to control operations in specific areas. See TOP SECRET Supplement for a discussion in-country ROE as well as for the DMZ, border operations, Cambodian operations, and Laos.

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MILITARY OPERATIONS - Chapter V

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CHAPTER VI

AIR OPERATIONS IN SEA

... While air is powerful, it is also flexible. From this level, power can be moved with ease. For example, our arena includes BARREL ROLL, STEEL TIGER (operating areas in Laos), and South Vietnam. Where the enemy puts the heat on, whether it's the Plain of Jars or Duc Lap, it's only a matter of hours until tremendous shifts of power can be made. We realize it's not all that effortless on the part of the Air Force ... But the whole system is geared to do precisely that. With no long warning to the enemy. It's done right away ...

Basically, what we are doing is trying to run enemy casualties up with our firepower, and the biggest weight of firepower comes from TACAIR. And we also want to keep our losses down, again by TACAIR. This also includes the B-52s which have been tremendous (1)

GEN Creighton W. Abrams

OVERVIEW

(U) In 1970, as in years before, airpower went where the enemy was. As the enemy moved, generally in rhythm with monsoon seasons, the whole spectrum of air operations -- airlift, close air support, interdiction, reconnaissance, and search and rescue -- moved with him. Figures VI-1 and 2 provide a map and a glossary of major air operations.

(S) The airpower available to COMUSMACV, while always capable of providing necessary support, was greatly reduced during the year. At mid-year MACV had at its disposal 3,243 helicopters and 522 fixed-wing aircraft of the US Army; approximately 49 helicopters and 191 fixed-wing US Navy (USN) aircraft based in RVN and Thailand and staging from Yankee Station in the South China Sea; 201 helicopters and 145 fixed-wing aircraft of the US Marines (USMC); 64 helicopters and 1,444 fixed-wing aircraft of the US Air Force (USAF); 22 helicopters and 18 fixed-wing aircraft of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF); and 164 helicopters and 363 fixed-wing aircraft of the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF). In addition, MACV had support of Strategic Air Command (SAC) tankers and B-52s staging from Guam, Okinawa, and Thailand, as well as access to data gathered from highly-classified reconnaissance programs. The following figures show the large reduction of Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF) airframes and the dramatic increase in VNAF power in 1970. (3)

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VI-1

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


FIGURE VI-1

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Glossary of Air Operations in Southeast Asia (2)

- (S) ARC LIGHT-B-52 conventional bombing operations SEA
- (S) BARREL ROLL-Strikes in northern Laos against personnel and equipment from North Vietnam
- (S) BLUE TREE-Reconnaissance in North Vietnam
- (S) FACE VALUE-Reconnaissance in Cambodia
- (S) FREEDOM DEAL-Strikes in Cambodia against personnel and equipment
- (S) IRON HAND-Strikes against SAM and radar-controlled AAA sites by specially equipped F-105s
- (C) OAK TRAIL-Reconnaissance in South Vietnam
- (S) ROLLING THUNDER-Air operations conducted over North Vietnam
- (S) ROUTE PACKAGES-Areas designated by CINCPAC to facilitate assignment of interdiction and for other operational purposes
- (S) STEEL TIGER -Strikes in southern Laos against personnel and equipment from North Vietnam
- (S) YANKEE STATION-US Navy forces in the Gulf of Tonkin (1830N 10730E)
- (S) YANKEE TEAM-Reconnaissance in Laos

FIGURE VI-2

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<u>Airframes in SEA</u>	<u>31 Dec 69</u>	<u>31 Dec 70</u>	<u>Percent Change</u>
USA	3,872	3,436	-11%
USN*	240	240	0%
USMC	441	219	-50%
USAF	1,776	1,192	-33%
RAAF	40	40	0%
VNAF	<u>451</u>	<u>746</u>	<u>+65%</u>
Total	6,820	5,873	-14%

* Estimated and includes aircraft staging from Yankee Station.

(S) During 1970, the year of Vietnamization, as in previous years of the conflict, the skies belonged to the Allies. Only enemy ground fire and surface-to-air missiles (SAM) seriously disputed allied air superiority. Air-to-air combat virtually ceased following the November 1968 bombing halt in North Vietnam (NVN). From then through 1970, airpower in SEA was dedicated almost exclusively to ground support and interdiction since the Allies dominated the skies.

(S) The discussion in this chapter concerns air operations in South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam. The Cambodian Sanctuary Counter-Offensive (29 Apr - 30 Jun 70) is treated separately in Annex C.

(U) No attempt has been made to give a comprehensive evaluation of the role or contribution of airpower in SEA. The magnitude of the effort was such that statistics, with all their inherent weaknesses, are used to describe it. In many instances even statistics are not included because they are the concern of the component commanders. Except for a brief introduction, US Army aviation is not discussed because it is almost exclusively a concern of lower echelon commanders. Although Army aviators flew the majority of the combat and combat support sorties, most of the ordnance was delivered by the other services.

Forces

(U) A brief description of the US, other FWMAF, and VNAF contributions to air operations follows. This has been done to provide an overview as well as a source document for further research.

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U S Army Aviation

(C) Army aviation was introduced to RVN 11 Dec 61 with the deployment of 21 CH-21 helicopters to provide transportation for Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) troops. From 1961 to 1965 Army aviation basically provided transportation and medical evacuation of wounded for the ARVN.

(C) In the spring of 1965 when it became apparent that ARVN was incapable of containing the Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army (VC/NVA), US combat troops were deployed, starting with the USMC. In September 1965 the Army 1st Cav Div (Ambl) came equipped with 430 helicopters. Their area of operation in the central highlands was 100 by 125 miles, the largest assumed by any division, and they immediately joined battle with the VC/NVA. Other US ground units deployed to Republic of Vietnam (RVN) possessed air resources in varying degrees. Basically there were three types of aviation involved: airmobile divisions such as the 1st Cav Div; units in other than airmobile configuration which possessed organic air resources; and non-organic aviation assets to provide various types of support at the military region (MR) level.

(C) Aviation tremendously increased the combat potential of Army ground units. Allied ground troops could come from every direction, over any terrain, and were not dependent on established lines of communications (LOC). They arrived near objectives, fresh and in large numbers. They arrived quickly and denied the enemy an opportunity to exploit a local tactical advantage. If they made no contact, they moved on. They were not limited by ground resupply; their food, ammunition and other materials were brought to them; and finally, the injured were evacuated rapidly.

(C) Aviation assets, in effect, multiplied troop numbers. Some commanders estimated that their aviation multiplied their effectiveness by as much as a factor of 15. Others believed a more realistic figure to be six to eight. All agreed helicopters made their operations much more effective and without that advantage, a much larger force was necessary. (4)

(C) Further discussion of Army aviation will be found in tactical histories. Its contributions were well summarized in the following statement by the G-3 Air, II FFV.

... It is another asset the ground commander can use to influence the battle. The key element here is that aviation is under the direct control of the ground commander -- it's his. In other kinds of support, the tactical commander requests and some higher headquarters approves or disapproves. Once the ground unit gets the Army aviation, by TOE or by dedication, that's it. Anything the ground commander has like that is most responsive (5)

U S Navy Aviation


(S) Naval air assets supporting COMUSMACV consisted of approximately 240 aircraft which were aboard aircraft carriers (TF-77) at Yankee Station or land-based in RVN and Thailand (see Figure VI-3). The carriers had a wide variety of aircraft (see Figure VI-4). Land-based aircraft of major naval units consisted of: P-3s supporting MARKET TIME, an operation to prevent infiltration from the sea; UH-1s and OV-10s used primarily for close air support in the Mekong Delta; and a few support aircraft for TF-77. Also stationed ashore were

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OV-10 "Black Ponies" provide aerial reconnaissance and firepower for ground and waterborne units operating in the Mekong Delta.



A UH-1 "Seawolf" at work with the "brown-water" Navy in the Mekong Delta.

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
two C-1As, five C-117s, six CH-46s, and one UH-34 which supported COMNAVFORV and 7th Fleet requirements. (6)

(U) Two squadrons provided the in-country naval firepower; they were: the Light Helicopter Attack Squadron 3 (HAL-3) flying UH-1s which were nicknamed Seawolves; and Light Attack Squadron 4 (VAL-4) flying OV-10 Broncos which were dubbed Black Ponies by the Navy airmen. In addition to providing support for friendly ground and waterborne units, the squadrons rescued downed airmen, performed medical evacuation missions, and responded to various types of distress calls. (7)

(S) Navy carrier pilots flew the first attack missions over North Vietnam in August 1964 after President Johnson ordered air strikes against selected military targets. They flew over 100,000 sorties over North Vietnam before the November 1968 bombing halt. During 1970 aircraft from Yankee Station carriers flew most of their missions in Laos, in RVN MR 1, and in support of ROLLING THUNDER operations. (8)

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR NAVAL AIR UNITS

AS OF 1 AUG 70



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Source: CINCPAC Command Digest

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
FIGURE VI-3

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VI-8

1970 ATTACK AIRCRAFT CARRIER (CVA) OPERATIONS AT YANKEE STATION

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
CVA												
CORAL SEA (L)	1-18	18-6	6-20	20-10	7-1							
RANGER (L)	1-5	30-17	1-20	17-7							22-17	28
CONSTELLATION (L)	5-31	12-1	1-26	17-1								21-7
HANCOCK (S)	19-11		8-26									30
SHANGRI-LA (S)				11-1	13-28	25-3	29-17	8-29				
BON HOMME RICHARD (L)					2-26	2-29	3-28	17-9	28-20			
AMERICA (L)					26-26	24-13	25-19	8-7				
ORISKANY (S)						12-30	13-21	3-26	18-13	7-21		
KITTY HAWK (L)												8-28

Large Deck

F-4J 13
F-4E 13
A-7E 13
A-7F 13
A-1A/C 16
EKA-1B 3
KA-3B 2
E-2B 4
SH-3A 6
C-1A 1
KA-5C 5
89

Small Deck

F-8T 13
F-8E 13
A-4F 13
A-1F 13
FKA-1B 3
F-11B 3
RF-4C 3
UH-1C 3
C-1A 1
81

Typical aircraft complements of the CVAs are

CVAs with large decks are indicated by (L.)
small decks are indicated by (S)

Sources: MACJ3072, Fact Book
7th Flt Liaison

FIGURE VI-4

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USAF AIRCRAFT ORDER OF BATTLE, SEA, 30 JUN 70

RVN TOTAL 1,073

Ban Me Thout (6)		Bien Hoa (264)		Cam Ranh Bay (183)		Da Nang (206)		Nha Trang (7)		Phan Rang (102)		Phu Cat (72)	
UH-1	6	A-1	2	C-7	46	A-1	9	C-123	4	AC-119	9	AC-119	6
		A-37	65	C-130	38	AC-119	9	C-130	3	C-123	21	C-7	17
		C-47	2	RC-130	6	C-47	1			F-100	65	EC-47	15
		F-100	19	HH-43	2	C-123	9			HC-47	1	F-4	30
		HH-3	2	0-1	17	EC-47	10			HH-43	1	HH-43	4
		HH-43	2	0-2	74	F-4	48			UC-123	5		
		0-1	55			HH-3	2						
		0-2	78			HH-43	2						
		OV-10	32			HH-53	3						
		UC-123	7			0-2	72						
						OV-10	41						

Tan Son Nhut (103)			Total Aircraft in SEA	
AC-119	5		A-1	60
C-123	17	A-37	65	
C-130	28	AC-119	32	
EC-47	15	AC-130	3	
HH-43	2	B-52	39	
RB-57	3	C-7	79	
RF-4	15	C-47	6	
RF-101	18	C-123	56	
		C-130	81	
		CH-3	9	
		EB-66	19	
		EC-121	16	
		EC-47	45	
		F-4	211	
		F-100	170	
		F-105	65	
		HC-47	1	
		HC-130	8	
		HH-3	4	
		HH-43	27	
		HH-53	12	
		KC-135	32	
		0-1	72	
		0-2	247	
		OV-10	102	
		RB-57	3	
		RC-130	6	
		RF-4	56	
		RF-101	18	
		UC-123	18	
		UH-1	12	
		QU-22B	5	
		TOTAL	1,584	

SOUTHEAST ASIA TOTAL 1,584

Source: PACAF and TIA

FIGURE VI-5

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US Air Force

(U) USAF personnel have been in Vietnam since 8 Nov 50. The exact number of the initial group is unknown, but in 1954 there were 55. Initially they were part of a joint American-French training team; that relationship continued until 1957 when all French forces withdrew from Vietnam. (9) After the French left, USAF advisors continued to assist the VNAF in a modest program of expansion and equipment update. The gradual expansion continued until about 1962 when a more accelerated program started.

(U) In February 1965 a jet flew the first USAF strike mission in the Vietnam war. From then to 1968 there was a great escalation of the USAF effort. USAF personnel carried a wide variety of activities including: aerial observation, aeromedical evacuation, air traffic control, close air support, interdiction, medical support, psychological warfare operations, and operated a series of communications and radar stations throughout SEA.



(U) Nearly every aircraft in the USAF was adapted to operations in SEA. (10) See Figure VI-5 for the type, number, and location of aircraft in SEA as of 30 Jun 70.



USAF F-4 Phantom jets of the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing take on fuel from a SAC KC-135 Stratotanker as they head for a mission against enemy locations in SEA.

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1ST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING AIRCRAFT LOCATION JULY 1970



1ST WING	MAG-16	MAG-13
H&MS-17	H&MS-16	H&MS-13
C-117D 1	CH-46D 0	C-117D 1
US-2A/B 3	HML-167	VMFA-115
MAG-11	UH-1E 38	F-4B 22
H&MS-11	HML-367	VMFA-122
C-117D 2	AH-1G 25	F-4B 18
TA-4F 11	HMM-161	VMFA-314
VMA-311	CH-46D 27	F-4B 17
A-4E 25	HMM-262	
VMA(AW)-225	CH-46D 29	
A-6A 14	HMM-263	
VMA(AW)-242	CH-46D 30	
A-6A 12	HMM-364	
VMO-2	CH-46D 32	
OV-10A 19	HMH-463	
	CH-53D 20	

Source: FMFPAC

FIGURE VI-6

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
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US Marine Aviation

(S) The USMC has been involved in SEA air operations since 1962 when a helicopter squadron was tasked to support ARVN forces in the Mekong Delta. Since then Marine aviation, developed specifically for participation with USMC maneuver units and fire-support agencies, expanded significantly in size and mission in SEA. That expansion resulted from: availability of an inventory of diversified aircraft; capability of operating from shipboard or relatively austere shore facilities; and a "... control apparatus to focus helicopter, fixed wing, and anti-aircraft assets on supported unit requirements." (11) See Figure VI-6 for status of forces.

(S) In 1970 the mission of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (1 MAW) was to conduct "...fixed-wing attack, reconnaissance and air defense missions plus helicopter attack and helicopter transport of counterinsurgency operations." The wing's area of operation was primarily MR 1, but they flew a significant number of air defense missions in support of the 7th Fleet in the Gulf of Tonkin and a large number of sorties over Laos. Occasionally they flew attack sorties in MR 2 and Cambodia. (12)

(S) Many units redeployed during 1970 and by the end of the year the 1 MAW conducted predominantly in-country operations. (13)



Two A6A Intruders from Marine All Weather Attack Squadron 225 await clearance for take-off at the Danang AB. The Viking on the left is the squadron's symbol.

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New Zealand

(U) New Zealand's primary contribution to the Vietnam war was ground forces which served with Australian units. Her contribution to air operations consisted of helicopter pilots who served with Number 9 Squadron, RAAF.

Republic of Korea Air Force

(C) The Republic of Korea (ROK), in response to President Johnson's 1964 appeal for "more flags" in Vietnam, sent a mobile hospital and a small group of karate instructors. ROK troops came in force in 1965 and by 1970 they numbered 50,000 men, the second largest expeditionary force in RVN. The force consisted of army, navy, air force, and marine personnel, but most were ground troops assigned to MR 2.

(C) The Koreans had few aircraft in RVN and most of them belong to the army. Tactical Air (TACAIR) support, including forward air controllers (FAC), in the ROK area of operations was supplied by the US, RVN, and Australia. In mid-1970, the ROK Air Force had three C-54s in RVN which were used entirely for administrative flights and three other C-54s which shuttled back and forth between RVN and South Korea. The primary mission was transporting sick and wounded personnel.

(C) The ROK Army had the following 1970 aircraft inventory in RVN: twenty O-1s, one U-21, two U-6s and nine UH-1 helicopters. They, too, were used almost entirely for liaison and administrative flights, and only occasionally performed missions like artillery spotting. (14)

Royal Australian Air Force

(S) Australia, the first Free World nation after the US to join the RVN in its struggle against Communist forces, sent 30 officers and warrant officers to advise the ARVN in July 1962. By 1967 she had committed personnel from her army, navy, and air force to active conflict. During 1970 the personnel in the RVN numbered more than 8,000, of which about 700 were airmen. This was the third largest foreign troop contribution after the US and ROK. Australia, like New Zealand, payed her way and was not subsidized or recompensed as were other FWMAF nations.

(S) In 1964 President Johnson publicly urged other non-Communist nations to join in ridding RVN of the Communist insurgency. By 1966 seven had done so: Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Republic of Korea, the Republic of the Phillipines, the Republic of China and Spain. Of those, only Australia played a significant role in the air war.

(S) Her contribution of bomber, fighter, helicopter, and transport units and support elements in SEA consisted of:

1. A C-7 squadron deployed to RVN in mid-1964. The six aircraft of Number 35 Squadron were integrated into the USAF airlift system and were, in fact, the first C-7s used by the 7AF; they antedated the transfer of the US Army C-7s to the USAF by 2 1/2 years.

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2. from 1962 to mid-1968. AS
The unit, assigned at the request of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, provided air defense for Thailand.

3. An RAAF helicopter squadron assigned to Vung Tau in 1965 to support the Australian Task Force. The Number 9 Squadron flew its 16 UH-1 helicopters in classic army support missions.

4. The Australian Army Aviation Corps' 161st Reconnaissance Flight consisting of six UH-13 helicopters and four light planes based with the headquarters at Vung Tau. Its mission was to service liaison activities, perform visual reconnaissance, and carry out psychological warfare in the Australian area of responsibility.

5. Eight B-57 Canberra bombers of Number 2 Squadron which functioned as a working squadron of the USAF's 35th Tactical Fighter Wing at Phan Rang AB. Assigned on 19 Apr 67, the squadron's crews hit a wide range of targets in RVN 4 days later to become the first RAAF crews to drop bombs in the Vietnam war. RAAF crews in their uniquely-equipped B-57s delivered ordnance with a precision no other aircraft in the theater could match under the same conditions. As a result they were given targets that otherwise would have required expensive guided bombs.

6. Royal Australian Navy UH-1 crews and ground-support personnel deployed in October 1967. They served with the US Army's 135th Assault Helicopter Company at Bear Cat, MR 3 RVN.

7. A small number of FACs, F-4 pilots, ground-control-intercept specialists, and photo interpreters attached to US units throughout RVN. They were operationally integrated into the units.

8. RAAF C-130s and QANTAS Airline contract aircraft providing airlift. They provided medical evacuation, rotation of personnel, and resupply of items not bought from the US military.

(S) In July 1970 the 700 RAAF personnel were divided among the B-57 squadron at Phan Rang AB, the C-7 and UH-1 helicopter assault squadrons at Vung Tau, and supporting detachments on allied bases.

(S) There were injuries and their aircraft took their share of hits from ground fire, but in 6 years of flying in RVN the RAAF had neither a fatality nor a loss. They played a significant role and performed with a level of competence which was greatly admired by USAF personnel in Vietnam. (15)

Royal Thai Air Force

(C) Thailand's principal contribution to the Vietnam war was on the ground. Of the more than 11,000 Thai in Vietnam, only a handful were Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF).

(C) In September 1964 the RTAF sent 16 officers and men to augment VNAF C-47 crews. Shortages of transport crews were chronic and the situation was expected to continue through

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1972. In 1964 it was particularly acute because at that time the VNAF had more transport aircraft than it had crews to man them.

(C) By 1970 the Victory Flight, as the RTAF contingent in RVN was called, consisted of 45 personnel who were assigned as follows: three pilots and five flight engineers who flew with the VNAF in C-47s; nine pilots, seven flight engineers, and three loadmasters flying with the USAF in C-123Ks; and the remainder who had jobs in intelligence, communications, flight engineering, loading, and operations, though many of them performed flight duties as an additional duty. Other Thai personnel performed as FACs.

(C) Thailand had no airframes in RVN, but three C-123s of the 19th Tactical Airlift Squadron carried the RTAF insignia. There were two prime reasons for that situation: one was visual evidence that the RTAF was in RVN; the other was prestige of the Thai airmen. When half of the Victory Flight rotated from RVN every 6 months, the Thai airmen flew in an aircraft bearing the RTAF insignia. The RTAF Chief of Staff personally met the aircraft and the prestige of the crews and the glory of the occasion would have suffered had they flown home in a foreign aircraft. (16)

Vietnamese Air Force

(U) The VNAF was established as a separate and independent aerial component 1 Jul 55 when it was officially separated from the French Air Force. (17) At that time it was organized into five squadrons, a training center, and a supply depot. The inventory consisted of 32 C-47 transports and a number of obsolete and combat-worn French aircraft. The headquarters was in Saigon until it moved to Tan Son Nhut AB in 1956. (18)

(U) USAF advisors have assisted the VNAF since 8 Nov 50. They started as a small group with exact numbers not known, but in 1954 there were 55 USAF personnel in Vietnam as part of a joint American-French training team. After French forces withdrew from Vietnam in 1957, USAF advisors continued to assist in a modest program of expansion during which aircraft such as A-1s, H-19s, H-34s, L-19s, T-6s, T-28s, and U-17s replaced most of the older aircraft acquired from the French.

(U) Gradual expansion changed to a more accelerated program during the 1962 to 1965 period when the VNAF grew from 4,000 to over 10,000 personnel and the aircraft increased from about 180 to more than 380. The force was reorganized into four wings and each controlled air operations in its respective MR.

(U) In 1966 the USAF Advisory Group introduced plans for the self-sufficiency of the VNAF and the emphasis was placed on helping strengthen its internal organization and modernize the equipment. (19)

(C) Since then the VNAF has grown in size and firepower. In 1970 there were nine tactical wings, an expanded training center, a Tactical Air Control Center, an aircraft warning and control group, and an Air Medical Center. The manpower increased from about 10,000 in 1965 to over 40,000 in 1970. (20)

(S) As the VNAF grew in strength it grew in sophistication. For example, the 522d Fighter Squadron at Bien Hoa AB started operating the supersonic F-5, Freedom Fighter, in combat in mid-1967. Other attack fighters were the A-1 and the A-1J. In addition they had

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AC-47 gunships and RF-5 reconnaissance aircraft. In 1970 they increased their capability by fully processing their own RF-5 reconnaissance film, training in night ordnance delivery, and qualifying A-1 and A-37 squadrons in all-weather bombing. The most impressive statistic was the VNAF strike record: they flew about half of all TACAIR sorties in RVN by the end of 1970 in addition to flying about 1,000 sorties per month in Cambodia. (21)

(U) C-119 transports were integrated into the transport force in 1968. Along with the C-47s these flew throughout RVN providing airlift of cargo, equipment, and personnel for the ARVN. Helicopters assigned included the H-34, CH-47, and the jet-powered UH-1. They lifted supplies, provided medical evacuation, and supported airmobile operations.

(U) Other aircraft consisted of O-1s and U-17s which were used for FACs and psychological warfare. T-41s were used at the training center. (22)

(U) See Figure VI-7 for 31 Dec 70 aircraft authorizations and their unit and location.



A flight of VNAF A-37s from Nha Trang heads for a target near Qui Nhon on the central coast. Vietnamese pilots were flying about half of the TACAIR sorties in RVN by the end of 1970.


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Source: AFGP

FIGURE VI-7

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Command and Control

(S) Air operations in SEA, the responsibility of COMUSMACV, were conducted by DEPCOMUSMACV for Air who was also Commander, Seventh Air Force (7AF). In that capacity, he was the single manager for air operations in RVN, Cambodia, Laos, and specified areas of NVN. He coordinated air operations with the VNAF, Navy carrier force (CTF-77), I MAF, and SAC forces supporting MACV operations. He acted as the single point of contact for coordination with external agencies involving air operations. Figure VI-8 provides a graphic portrayal of the command relationships. (23)

OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF AIR OPS IN SEA




FIGURE VI-8

(S) COMUSMACV provided broad general guidance and DEPCOMUSMACV for Air planned, coordinated, and directed air operations. The success of the relationship was summed up by COMUSMACV who said, "... The air is really a powerful weapon, but to use this power effectively, you need both integrated all-source intelligence and an integrated all-source reaction. Fortunately, we've had centralized management of the air effort and this has been important to me personally..." (24)

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Rules of Engagement

(C) Rules of engagement (ROE) for air operations were contained in MACV Directive 525-13, dated 12 Oct 68. It was quoted in detail in the 1969 MACV Command History. Basically, it directed that all practical means be employed to limit the risk to lives and property of friendly forces and civilians and to respect operational and national boundaries. Modification by subordinate commanders was prohibited.

(C) During September 1970 ROE for air operations came under command scrutiny. COMUSMACV sent the following message to his subordinate commanders on 17 Sep 70:

I am becoming increasingly concerned over the significant increase in the number of incidents in which friendly Vietnamese civilians have been killed or injured by US aircraft. Since 2 September 1970, seven incidents have been reported. Six involved US Army aircraft and one involved a USAF aircraft. Such incidents are counterproductive to US goals in SEA.

The alarming number of incidents occurring since 2 September 1970 indicates a need for more thorough target evaluation and clearance prior to engagement.

ROE applicable to the operation of US aircraft are clearly defined in MACV Directive 525-13. To impose further restriction on the tactical employment of US aircraft could have an adverse effect on combat operations and jeopardize the safety of air crewmembers and passengers. (25)

(U) For further discussion of this subject see TOP SECRET Supplement.

Sortie Reductions

(U) For discussion of this subject see TOP SECRET Supplement.

TACAIR

TACAIR Sortie Allocation

(S) At the beginning of 1970 USAF attack/strike aircraft in SEA were limited to an average of 14,000 sorties per month. That limitation was JCS imposed in October 1969 as part of the SECDEF Project 703. (26)

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(S) Use of the limited sorties was a matter of concern throughout the year. On 30 Mar 70 DEPCOMUSMACV for Air said:

General Abrams and I agree that requirements for air in the RVN must get first priority because we have US troops fighting here. Second, and first at this time due to reduced enemy activity in RVN, is the STEEL TIGER effort which has a direct impact on the fighting in-country. Third is BARREL ROLL, but we can up the sorties there when required. Of course, operations in all areas tend to ebb and flow with the monsoons. (27)

(S) Early in the year distribution of preplanned TACAIR sorties was 45% in-country and 55 percent out-country. (28) Actual sorties flown were close to that ratio until April when only 44 percent were flown in Laos. With the Cambodian campaign kickoff in May the figures were drastically changed. Cambodia received about 25 percent of TACAIR sorties in May and June with Laos receiving 36 percent in May and 27 percent in June. During July, August, and September about 13 percent supported operations in Cambodia, 34 percent were flown in Laos, and the other 53 percent were flown in-country. During October, November, and December increasing percentages of sorties went to Cambodia and Laos while percentages decreased in RVN. During December 73 percent of TACAIR sorties were flown in Cambodia and Laos.

(S) In October MACV abolished the concept of weekly preplanned sortie allocation except to MR 1. The message said:

The changing nature of the war in SVN, the increasing demands of the MACV air interdiction campaign, and constraints on resource availability do not support continuance of the practice of allocating a specific and relatively constant number of weekly pre-planned TACAIR sorties to major commands.

The doctrinal concept of the Joint Air Ground Operations System (JAGOS) meets the needs of field commanders in providing, on request, the necessary tactical air support to influence an action. Additionally, it insures the maximum effective utilization of available air resources within the parameters of this war at this time. Accordingly, the sortie allocation system currently in effect is modified effective 20 October 1970. The relatively low levels of activity in MRs 2, 3, and 4, coupled with increased VNAF capability justify the termination of weekly sortie allocations to these MRs. For the present MR 1 will continue to receive an allocation of weekly pre-planned sorties because of the tactical situation in that region (29)

(S) In mid-December the critical nature of the ground situation in Cambodia caused COMUSMACV to further revise TACAIR sortie allocation procedures. Starting 16 Dec all RVN preplanned sorties were allocated on a daily basis. Overall allocation of the 471 daily sorties was: RVN 12 percent, Cambodia 15 percent, and Laos 73 percent. Within Laos 9 percent were planned for BARREL ROLL and 91 percent went to STEEL TIGER. The RVN breakout was 56 percent preplanned, 35 percent immediate, and 9 percent special. Commander, 7AF, was tasked to maintain the flexibility of generating additional sorties or temporarily drawing from Cambodia or STEEL TIGER for emergency situations in RVN. (30)

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TACAIR Reaction Study

(U) The Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) completed a study in July 1970 which was designed to "...document actual fire support reaction time for the engagement of enemy targets during stability operations in RVN and to recommend methods whereby these reaction times may be reduced." The evaluation was conducted between November 1969 and February 1970 in MRs 1, 2, and 3 and included field artillery, armed helicopters, aerial field artillery, tactical aircraft, and naval gunfire.

(U) Reaction time for TACAIR was divided into fire mission processing, scramble time, en route time, time over target, and clearance time. Definitions used were:

1. Fire Mission Processing: time required from detection of a target until the initiation of fire support actions.
2. Scramble Time: time required to alert crews, man aircraft, start engines, arm weapons, taxi and become airborne.
3. En Route Time: time required from end of scramble to arrival over the target area.
4. Time over Target: time from arrival over the target area until the ordnance had been delivered on the target. It included time for pilot briefing, orientation of aircraft, control of the ground situation, and any delays which prevented the aircraft from delivering fire.
5. Clearance Time: time required to obtain the tactical and/or political clearances.... (This was usually done before aircraft arrived and was no real factor.) (31)

(C) A total of 1,357 TACAIR sorties were evaluated during the 4-month period. All were flown in support of troops in contact (TIC). Scheduled and preplanned missions were not considered in the evaluation.

(C) Elapsed times from request to ordnance delivery were as shown below:

1. Total Mission Time (Average) for Scrambled Mission:

<u>Event</u>	<u>Average Time in Minutes</u>	<u>Range in Minutes</u>
Call for fire	0.0	0.5 5.0
Army processing time	19.8	0.0 26.0
USAF processing time	5.0	(77% of missions)
Scramble time	15.7	7.0 46.0
En route time	<u>20.6</u>	1.0 51.0
Total	61.1	

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2. Total Mission Time (Average) for Diverted Mission:

<u>Event</u>	<u>Average Time in Minutes</u>	<u>Range in Minutes</u>
Call for fire	0.0	--
Army processing time	19.8	0.0 26.0
USAF processing time	5.0	(77% of missions)
En route time	15.0 or less	0.0 15.0
Total	39.8	

Figure VI-9 shows 15-minute TACAIR coverage of South Vietnam.

(C) Recommendations concerning TACAIR were:

1. Command emphasis at all levels be placed on airstrike request procedures.
2. Commanders be aware of the time delays inherent in scrambled missions and plan accordingly.
3. Maneuver commanders stress the importance of prestrike planning and maintain close coordination with the FAC in all aspects of an airstrike. (32)


(U) See Table VI-1 for TACAIR strike aircraft armament capabilities and Table VI-2 for gunship armament capabilities.

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FIFTEEN MINUTE TACTICAL AIR COVERAGE OF SOUTH VIETNAM

FIGURE VI-9

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TACAIR AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT CAPABILITIES

AIRCRAFT	COMBAT RADIUS STD LOADS	DEGRADATION FOR MAX LOAD/STORES	STD LOADS	MAX LOADS	FUEL
F-100	250 NM	20% ML	6 Stores 6x750#(Mk-117)	9 Stores* 9x500#(Mk-82)	:30
F-4D&E	265 NM	10% CRU 10% ML	10 Stores 10x750(Mk-117)	12 Stores 12x750x(Mk-117)	:30
F-57G	375 NM	NONE	8 Stores** 4x500#(Mk-82) LGB 4x750# (500#)	8 Stores 5,000# (Variables of Hard & Retard Ordnance)	:30
A-37	100 NM	10% ML	4 Stores 2x500#(Mk-82) 2x250#(Mk-81) 4x500#(Mk-82) 2x750#(Mk-117) 2xBLU-32(500# Nap)	6 Stores 6 CRU-25 (random delay) 2xBLU-23 (500# Nap) 2xBLU-27 (750# Nap) 2xBLU-32 (500# Nap)	:30
A-1H	285 NM	20% ML	7 Stores 7x750#(Mk-117)	8 Stores 8x750x(Mk-117)	:30
A-4F	210 NM	NONE	6 Stores 6x500#(Mk-82) 4xMk-20(Hookeye) 2x1000#(Mk-83)	NONE	:25
A-6	260 NM	NONE	12 Stores 12x500#(Mk-2) 4x1000#(Mk-83) 4x2000#(Mk-84)	NONE	:15
A-7	260 NM	NONE	8 Stores 4x500#(Mk-82) 4xMk-20(Hookeye) 4x1000#(Mk-83)	NONE	:25
F-4E***	270 NM	NONE	4 Ext Stores 4xATM-9 (Sidewinder) 20mm Cannons	4 Ext Stores 8,000#(20 Bombs)	:30
F-47F (Canberra)	375 NM	NONE	2 Ext Stores 6x750x(Mk-117)	4 Back Bay Stores 8000#(20 Bombs)	:30

* Requires triple ejection racks.

** Mk-82 (500 lb) Laser guided bomb (LGB) expected to be employed against enemy targets on or about 1 Jan 71.

*** Primary Function: Air Interceptors (air-to-air fighters). Armed with 20mm cannons and air-to-air missiles(ATM 9 - Sidewinder).

These facts were based on standard planning factors and will vary as the mission profile varied.

Source: MACJ5

Table VI-1

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
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GUNSHIP ARMAMENT CAPABILITIES

<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>MAX TIME AIRBORNE</u>	<u>ARMAMENT</u>	<u>ILLUMINATION</u>	<u>NON VISUAL GUN CONTACT</u>	<u>GUNS COUPLED TO FIRE CONTROL</u>
AC-47	7+30	3x7.62 16,000 rds or 9,000 rds	Mk-24 32 Flares or 45 Flares	NO	NO
AC-119G	4+40	4x7.62 32,000 rds	Mk-24 24 Flares 1x20 KW Visual or IR Light	YES	YES
AC-119K	4+40	2x20mm 3,000 rds 4x7.62 32,000 rds	Mk-24 24 Flares 1x20 KW or IR Light	YES	YES
AC-130	4+30	2x40mm 336 rds 2x20mm 3,000 rds 2x7.62 4,000 rds	Mk-24 24 Flares 2x20 KW Visual or IR Light	YES	YES

SOURCE: MACJ5

TABLE VI-2



Guns of the AC-130

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ARC LIGHT

(S) ARC LIGHT sortie activity for 1970 was reduced significantly from the previous year. The total number of sorties flown in support of the allied effort in SEA during 1970 was 15,105. That was 4,414 fewer than were flown in 1969.

(S) In August the monthly sortie rate was reduced from 1,400 to 1,000 sorties per month. Effective 20 Sep all B-52s striking targets in RVN, Cambodia, and Laos were launched from AS

(S) The 1970 activity saw a greater emphasis on interdiction bombing. Approximately 65% of all sorties flown during the year were against targets along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos and staging areas in Cambodia. The previous year only 28% of the sorties were flown against targets outside RVN. The intensified interdiction campaign against the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex in Laos started 10 Oct and involved repeated ARC LIGHT saturation raids against key interdiction boxes in the Laotian Panhandle. ARC LIGHT sorties were used against enemy supply and staging areas and troop concentrations and were particularly effective in undermining the morale of the enemy troops. (33)

ARC LIGHT Sortie Distribution

(S) The shift in targeting of ARC LIGHT sorties during 1970 as well as the continuing decline are shown in the following table. (34)

	<u>Cambodia</u>	<u>Laos</u>	<u>DMZ</u>	<u>MR 1</u>	<u>MR 2</u>	<u>MR 3</u>	<u>MR 4</u>	<u>Total</u>
Jan		681	6	118	131	420	89	1,445
Feb		786	4	49	303	137	27	1,306
Mar		917	5	78	143	228	66	1,437
Apr		579	12	61	271	395	79	1,397
May	406	366	27	141	345	138	37	1,460
Jun	353	551	52	312	45	15	67	1,395
Jul	185	677	39	354	37	76	73	1,441
Aug	291	606	21	313	9	38	21	1,239
Sep	122	556	0	235	11	48	11	983
Oct	23	922	0	56	0	6	6	1,013
Nov	29	942	0	8	0	0	0	979
Dec	33	912	56	0	0	0	9	1,010
Total	1,382	8,495	222	1,725	1,295	1,501	485	15,105

B-52 Move to U-Tapao

TABLE VI-3

(S) With the reduction in sorties there also was an evolution in employment of B-52s. In 1969 a typical daily ARC LIGHT operation was missions of six B-52s per mission with two cells of three aircraft each. AS
three missions (18 aircraft) from Anderson AFB, Guam, and two missions (12 aircraft) from Kadena AB, Okinawa. (35) The aircraft had various bombloads. AS

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B-52s drop bombs over SEA. Standard bombload for ARC LIGHT mission is 43,500 lbs.

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Data on ARC LIGHT Missions

(S) Following are facts concerning B-52 operations as of late 1970:

Descriptions of ARC LIGHT targets and results are provided later in sections dealing with areas of operation.

2. Bomb Loads:

a.		(A) Mk-117 (750 lbs)	(B) Mk-82 (500 lbs)	TOTAL ORDNANCE
<u>INTERNAL</u>	<u>EXTERNAL</u>			
A	B (STD Load)	42 Internal	24 (External)	43,500 lbs
A	A	42 Internal 24 External		49,500 lbs
B	A	24 External	84 (Internal)	60,000 lbs
B	B		84 (Internal) 24 (External)	54,000 lbs

b. CBU-24: 66 cannisters/670 bomblets = 44,220 bomblets.

3. Weapons fuses available for general purpose bombs were:

- a. Instantaneous
- b. .01 second delay
- c. .025 second delay
- d. .1 second delay

4. Defense of ARC LIGHT (TINY TIM missions):

Mig CAP: Flights of two F-4 aircraft protected against Mig threat except four F-4s were employed at interdiction target box "Alpha" if Migs were at Vinh. The Mig CAP was not required when B-52s were:

- (1) East of 10-00E.
- (2) West of Laos/Thailand border.
- (3) South of 17-30N, if Migs were not south of Hanoi.
- (4) South of 17-00N, if Migs were not south of Bai Thuong.
- (5) South of 16-30N, if Migs were at Vinh.

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b. IRON HAND: Two F-105s (WILD WEASELS) would protect against SAM and radar-directed AAA threats when route of B-52 was:

- (1) Within 25 NM of the NVN border
- (2) Within 25 NM of a SAM site
- (3) Within 10 NM of 100mm AAA battery.

(If another SAM or AAA simultaneously threatened the B-52, a second pair of IRON HAND aircraft was provided.)

c. ECM/ESM: One or more EB-66s (which protected against enemy acquisition and control radar system, radar directed weapon systems, and command and control communications systems) were provided on missions north of 16-30N. In addition, the B-52 had a variety of self-defense equipment and tactics.

d. Package breakout (figures are minimum):

- (1) Mig threat only
 - (a) 1 EB-66
 - (b) 2 F-4s
- (2) Mig/SAM/AAA threat:
 - (a) 2 EB-66s
 - (b) 2 F-4s (F-4s were used in a dual role for ARC LIGHT missions against interdiction box "Bravo". They flew at 8,000 feet to provide FLAK suppression, but if a Mig threat developed, they jettisoned bombs and provided Mig CAP.)
 - (c) 2 F-105s (36)

Standardization of Bombloads

(5) Standardization of the bombloads was proposed by SAC in late December 1969. SAC contended a standard load would produce considerable savings in bomb costs without a loss in weapons effectiveness. CINCPACAF concurred, but COMUSMACV strongly opposed the SAC proposal on the grounds the "... reduction in delivered ordnance ... (was) the equivalent of another substantial sortie rate reduction." CINCPAC supported COMUSMACV and recommended no change "... until it ... (could) be established to the satisfaction of COMUSMACV and CINCPAC that there would be no degradation in overall sortie and firepower effectiveness...." (37)

(5) In early January 1970 SAC replied:

... Since the initial proposal was made another consideration has developed. The NVN have recently moved heavy AAA into Laos, comprising a threat to the B-52. Going higher was determined to be the best

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answer if B-52s are to continue relatively safe operation in these target areas. Since we are presently operating at optimum altitudes a reduction in operating weights is necessary (particularly for U-Tapao). The proposed bomb load for U-Tapao results in reducing operating weights by 17,000 pounds, with no loss in effectiveness. The following rationale was used in arriving at this proposal.

1. Anderson/Kadena forces have been using the proposed bomb loads on targets throughout Laos and Vietnam since February 1968. We have found nothing to indicate that these bomb loads are less effective than the ones presently being used by U-Tapao.

2. A weaponeering study indicated that against either the two by one or three by one (kilometer) target boxes, either load provides an overlap of munitions effect ... Target coverage is essentially the same for both loads

In summary the message said, "... SAC believes there is much to gain by going to the revised bomb load at U-Tapao and that there will be no reduction in effectiveness" (38)

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(39)

ARC LIGHT Operations Security

(S) B-52 strikes in many instances came as no surprise to the enemy. Field reports and PW interrogation reports indicated the enemy received warning in time to evacuate the target area or take refuge in natural cover or prepared bunkers. In those instances the effectiveness of B-52 strikes was significantly reduced. (40)

(C) On 11 Jun 70 MACV Chief of Staff Action Memorandum 70-79 tasked MACJ3 to form an ad hoc group to consider operational aspects of ARC LIGHT operations in SEA and eliminate sources of pre-mission compromise. The 11-member group was directed to evaluate target nomination procedures, physical security, dissemination of mission information, mission procedures, and the Heavy Artillery Warning System. The initial meeting was held 19 Jun 70. The group included MACV staff officers, 7 AF operations and communications staff officers, a member from SAC ADVON (advanced echelon), and an observer from the Air Force Office of Special Investigation. Members visited all CTZ headquarters. (41)

(S) The Chief of Staff, MACV, wrote the Chief of Staff, Joint General Staff (JGS), on 24 Jul explaining the historical efforts to improve the security of B-52 operations dating back to June 1965, and asking for his ideas to improve the situation. (42)

(S) Chief of Staff, JGS, in his reply of 21 Aug explained RVNAF security measures and concluded that there were four influencing factors when information on B-52 strikes were disclosed. There were:

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1. ... Air reconnaissance to confirm information at the objectives before the B-52 air strike.

2. Employing too much radio or telephone facilities to exchange information regarding the activities of B-52s.

3. The rules of engagement are inflexible. After a time, the enemy can discover the pattern and in time take appropriate action.

4. In addition, the fire power of the B-52 has a high priority to the NVA. The B-52 bases are placed far from RVN's territory so NVA and other communist countries have probably organized a rapid reaction alarm system from outside RVN territory. This is a factor that needs closer scrutiny. (43)

(S) The collection phase of the security study was completed and the group concluded that the enemy obtained forewarning from almost every phase of the ARC LIGHT operations from conception to time-over-target. Enemy prior knowledge coupled with the cyclic pattern of ARC LIGHT operations allowed the enemy to predict substantially in advance and with varying degrees of accuracy when and where he would be hit. The initial report was transmitted to the field for comment. (44)

(S) Guidance which modified ARC LIGHT procedures was transmitted to the field in a 21 Sep 70 message:

1. Physical Security and Handling of ARC LIGHT Information.

a. Conduct ARC LIGHT target planning in a US exclusion area unless target is to be a joint US/RVNA F planned target.

b. Use of ARC LIGHT nickname clearly identifies B-52 operations and will not be used in unsecure communications.

c. ARC LIGHT prestrike information will be disseminated only to those individuals required to take actions related to command and control or safety of forces.

d. ARC LIGHT information will be stored, displayed and released on a need-to-know basis.

e. US advisors will stress to their RVNA F counterparts the necessity for the strict need-to-know principle for ... ARC LIGHT ... information.

2. Target Development. Insure intelligence efforts to develop and improve targeting are appropriately conducted to prevent compromise of pending ARC LIGHT strikes.

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3. Target Recommendation/Clearance.

a. Obtain GVN political and military clearance suitably expanded in time and space, as feasible, to inhibit possibility of pinpointing target areas and strike times.

b. Reconfirm previously cleared targets only when tactical or other considerations dictate. If necessary to reconfirm, combine with several targets in the Military Region for which earlier clearance had been granted.

c. Clearance procedures will be accomplished by personal contact between the advisor and his counterpart. US secure voice or secure teletype equipment will be used to transmit clearance information.

d. When possible ARC LIGHT strike target clearances will be requested by using the same terminology and procedures used in requesting tactical air and artillery strikes.

4. Target Nomination and Selection.

a. Specific ARC LIGHT strike information on approved targets will be transmitted only to those recipients who have established a need-to-know

b. ARC LIGHT strike approval information will be relayed to subordinate commands at latest practical time. Earlier release time is acceptable if follow-up surface operations are to be conducted.

5. Heavy Artillery Warning (HAW) Radio Broadcast/7AF ARC LIGHT Teletype Message.

a. Discontinue ARC LIGHT Heavy Artillery Warning teletype message and include HAW broadcast data as additional item in 7AF readdressal of 8AF Frag order. Insure that activities concerned with radio broadcast of HAW ... are recipients of 8AF Frag order. Develop HAW broadcast data by establishing coordinates of the center of a circle with radius of 5 NM. Target will lie completely within circle but not at center. Instruct control agencies to advise aircraft to avoid coordinate by 10 NM, which will provide minimum of 5 NM lateral clearance

b. Direct Artillery Warning Centers and Air Traffic Control activities responsible for flight following to discontinue issuing B-52 strike advisories to transient aircraft. These activities will provide routing instructions based on artillery warning data available, with no reference to type, and will advise pilots to "monitor guard channel for subsequent advisories."

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The message closed with a reminder that security of ARC LIGHT operations continued to be an area of prime concern and asked all agencies to review their procedures to increase security. (45)

Airlift

(U) Airlift in Vietnam could be grouped into four categories: organic airlift of the Army and USMC, "Scatback" operations from Tan Son Nhut AB, strategic airlift provided by the Military Airlift Command (MAC), and tactical airlift. The organic airlift of the Army and USMC was used for air assaults, medical evacuation, resupply, and administrative purposes. The "Scatback" operations, headquartered at Tan Son Nhut AB, used their T-39s and C-118s to transport personnel and limited quantities of high priority cargo. Strategic airlift was provided by MAC contract carriers and C-5, C-124s, C-133, and C-141s.

(U) By far the largest segment of airlift was the tactical airlift which comprised a logistics operation unparalleled in military history. The men and materiel airlifted (over 5 million tons since the airlift began) surpassed the combined totals airlifted during the tactical airlift of the Korean War, Berlin airlift, and "Hump" airlift over the Himalayas during World War II. Approximately 200 aircraft consisting of C-7s of the RAAF and C-7s, C-123s, and C-130s of the USAF were under the operational control of the 834th Air Div, single manager of tactical airlift in Vietnam.

(U) There were no fronts, battle lines were not drawn, and ground routes were often impassable and always in danger of enemy fire. Such conditions coupled with a fluid ground situation and troops continually on the move, made airlift vitally important. (46) For details on aeromedical evacuation and personnel and cargo moved by airlift see Chapter IX.

Reconnaissance

(S) Aerial reconnaissance, strategic and tactical, was monitored by MACJ211, whose mission was to plan and supervise all airborne reconnaissance activities in the MACV area of responsibility. In the areas of airborne radio direction finding (ARDF) and airborne communications intercept (ACI), MACJ211 exercised operational control of all tactical support resources in SEA.

(S) Strategic reconnaissance platforms which supported MACV requirements were: the SR-71 (GIANT SCALE); U-2 (GIANT NAIL); and BUFFALO HUNTER drones. All were operated by SAC and were oriented to national requirements.

(S) GIANT SCALE SR-71 platforms operated from Okinawa and were used primarily to maintain surveillance of SAM deployments in North Vietnam, but occasionally conducted

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electronic intelligence activities [redacted] GIANT SCALE was targeted almost exclusively against national requirements and was generally scheduled to cover the Hanoi-Haiphong area on each mission. The SR-71 had photo, side-looking airborne radar (SLAR), infrared (IR), and electromagnetic reconnaissance capability.

AS

(S) GIANT NAIL U-2 operations, like the BUFFALO HUNTER drone program, were based at Bien Hoa AB, RVN [redacted] GIANT NAIL operated one U-2 and was almost exclusively responsive to CINCPAC requirements. It was a photo and electronic intelligence mission and covered Cambodia, permissive areas of Laos, and occasionally RVN. SAM and Mig threats precluded coverage of NVN.

AS

(S) BUFFALO HUNTER drones supported DIA, CINCPAC, and MACV photo requirements in SEA, but were used primarily for coverage of high-threat areas of NVN. The program utilized a DC-130 mother ship which carried two SPA-147 Ryan Firebee drones, one of which was a spare. [redacted] recoveries were programmed offshore from Danang AB, RVN. Danang-based CH-3 helicopters were used for recovery after the drone engine was stopped and the craft came to the surface by parachute.

AS

(S) [redacted]

AS

(S) Tactical reconnaissance involved many more people and aircraft and consisted of photo, SLAR, IR, visual ARDF, and AGL. Reconnaissance functions were performed by all US branches, RAAF, and VNAF.

(S) In addition to organic reconnaissance platforms the Army provided OV-1 Mohawks which were controlled by MACV. Three models were in use. OV-1As performed visual and photo surveillance. OV-1Bs had all OV-1A capabilities as well as SLAR. The system had a range of 90 km on either or both sides of the aircraft and could detect "... targets travelling as slow as 3 mph and has detected everything from bicycles to tanks." OV-1Cs carried cameras and IR detection system.

(S) After the RF-101Cs departed in November 1970, 7AF tactical reconnaissance systems tasked by MACJ211 consisted of RF-4Cs and RB-57s. Both had photo and IR capability, but the RB-57 was restricted to daytime targets due to the lack of adequate navigational equipment. Coupled to the reconnaissance capability was a responsive system of using T-39s and U-6s to get the results to the user. Essentially T-39s were used for long hauls to MRs 1 and 2 and U-6s were used for further delivery within MRs 1 and 2 and all deliveries in MRs 3 and 4.

(S) Each MR was provided a USAF tactical air surveillance squadron. The O-1s, O-2s, and OV-10s they flew had limited photo capabilities, but the key reconnaissance element was the forward air controller (FAC). (47)


(S) FACs were used throughout SEA. COMUSMACV praised their contribution:

The FACs deserve a special word. In the Republic of Vietnam, STEEL TIGER, and BARREL ROLL there are FACs flying all types of aircraft to match the environment and these are very important. For sensitive areas


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The newest reconnaissance aircraft in SEA is the OV-10 Bronco which was designed to provide good visibility.



The oldest reconnaissance aircraft in service in SEA is the ARDF-equipped EC-47, commonly called the "Gooney Bird." This one was made in 1943.

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such as the borders of Cambodia and Laos, you're not in the ball game unless a FAC is there. He makes sure you're doing what is authorized and not guessing. He takes the guesswork out of the operation. They've made a real professional contribution, because they are seasoned professionals. FACs don't get lost. (48)

(S) ARDF missions were flown by Army RU-1s, RU-6s, RU-8s, and RU-21s and USAF EC-47s. The equipment located "... enemy radio transmitters, often within a radius of 250 meters." (49) At year's end there were 119 aircraft with ARDF capability in SEA. Army aircraft, due to a null requirement, were limited to bearings from directly in front of or directly behind. The EC-47 had the capability of obtaining bearings on several targets simultaneously and proved extremely valuable in high density communications environments. (50)

Search and Rescue

Background

(S) When US Forces became involved in hostilities in SEA, the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service (ARRS) was not fully prepared to enter into armed conflict. The assumption that wartime search and rescue (SAR) was an extension of peacetime SAR was in error and that was quickly recognized during the early days of the Vietnam conflict. In 1964, the only rotary wing aircraft available to be deployed to SEA was the HH-43B assigned to the local base rescue units. The amphibious HU-16 and the HC-54 were the only fixed-wing aircraft available. Both had a limited rescue and recovery capability. HC-54s, made available as command and control aircraft, were also limited in mission capability. ARRS was forced to take helicopter aircraft from other USAF missions to provide a partially adequate SAR capability in SEA. Even then it took 3 years to fully develop and position the required forces.

(S) In October 1965, six CH-3C helicopters modified for combat rescue service were deployed to SEA. After deployment and additional modifications, they were redesignated the HH-3E "Jolly Green Giant", and became increasingly responsible for the out-country aircrew recovery mission in Laos, North Vietnam, and the Gulf of Tonkin. Twelve HH-43F "Pedros" were also configured for combat recoveries to augment the HH-43B, which had been performing the out-country aircrew recovery mission since deployment in October 1964. By January 1967, HH-43 out-country missions had ended. The HC-54s were replaced by HC-130H/Ps, a far more suitable aircraft for command and control.

(S) Quick access to a downed aircrew member was a crucial element in a successful recovery, but development of significantly faster helicopters was years away. Therefore, longer endurance was vitally necessary to enable the rescue craft to loiter on orbit nearer the areas in which aircraft were likely to be lost.

(S) Air-to-air refueling of helicopters proved technically feasible and became a routine operation for the SAR "Jolly Green Giants" in September 1967; thereby greatly increasing the range and responsiveness of the SAR forces. Eight improved HH-53B helicopters, with the

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**COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE
TASK FORCE COMMUNICATIONS**





FIGURE VI-10

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
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The HH-43 "Pedro" arrives just as the distressed aircraft comes to a stop.

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1970	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
Combat Saves	14	11	26	51	10	21	5	2	2	5	18	9
Non-Combat Saves	3	3	29	14	5	4	7	8	3	17	22	14
Monthly Total	17	14	55	65	15	25	12	10	5	22	40	23
In-Country	1	8	39	41	12	19	10	6	5	19	19	14
Out-Country	16	6	16	24	3	6	2	4	0	3	4	9
Cumulative	17	31	86	151	166	191	203	213	218	240	280	303

Source: ARRG

FIGURE VI-11



HH-53 takes on Fuel from the HC-130

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(S) The following tables show the combat saves by country and service and total aircraft losses in SEA from 1 Dec 64 through 31 Dec 70. (55)

TOTAL COMBAT SAVES BY COUNTRY

(1 Dec 64 through 31 Dec 70)

<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>NVN</u>	<u>SVN</u>	<u>LAOS</u>	<u>THAILAND</u>	<u>GULF OF TONKIN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
USAF	79	257	218	44	62	660
USN	11	283	50	1	37	382
USA	0	576	17	0	5	598
F/MIL	0	115	366	0	5	486
CIV	0	22	6	0	0	28
OTHER	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>
	90	1255	657	45	109	2,156

TOTAL ARRS ACFT LOSSES TO DATE

CH-3C	-----	1
HC-54	-----	1
HC-130P	-----	2
HH-3E	-----	18
HH-43B	-----	8
HH-43F	-----	4
HH-53B	-----	3
HU-16B	-----	<u>2</u>
		39

SOURCE: PACAF

TABLE VI-4

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
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Aircraft Combat Losses in SEA

(S) Aircraft lost in combat continued to decline in number during 1970. Figure VI-12 shows aircraft losses by month for a 3-year period. (57)

AIRCRAFT COMBAT LOSSES IN SEA



Source: PACAF

FIGURE VI-12

(S) The following tables list losses by service, type of aircraft, and country through 31 Dec 70. Losses in Cambodia were computed since 1 May 70 and computation for South Vietnam began 1 Jan 65. Figures in parentheses show aircraft lost on the ground. (58)

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Aircraft Combat Losses in SEA Through 31 Dec 70

	<u>NVN</u>	<u>LAOS</u>	<u>CAMB</u>	<u>SVN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>USA</u>					
Fixed-Wing	0	0	0	118 (24)	118 (24)
Rotary-Wing	0	7	23	1,712 (201)	1,742 (201)
TOTAL	0	7	23	1,811 (223)	1,841 (224)
<u>USN</u>					
A-1	36	5	0	4	45
A/KA-3	2	0	0	0	2
A-4	168	14	0	4	186
A-6	30	9	0	0	39
A-7	7	10	0	0	17
EA-1	1	0	0	0	1
F-4	50	5	0	2	57
F-8	52	2	0	2	56
OP-2	0	3	0	0	3
OV-10	0	0	0	3	3
P-3B	0	0	0	2	2
RA-3B	4	0	0	0	4
RA-5C	14	1	0	1	16
RF-8	16	2	0	0	18
S-2D	1	0	0	0	1
SH-3A	4	0	0	0	4
UH-1	0	0	0	1	1
UH-2	1	0	0	0	1
TOTAL	386	51	0	19	456
<u>USAF</u>					
A-1	18	81	0	32 (2)	131 (2)
A-26	0	10	0	0	10
A-37	0	0	1	7 (1)	8 (1)
AC-47	0	4	0	13 (2)	17 (2)
AC-130	0	2	0	0	2
B-57	5	12	0	15	32
C-7	0	0	0	9 (1)	9 (1)
C-47	1	3	0	2 (1)	6 (1)
C-123	0	3	0	15 (4)	18 (4)
C-130	2	2	0	24 (12)	28 (12)
CH/HH-3	4	15	0	4	23
CH/HH-43	1	0	0	8 (1)	9 (1)
CH/HH-53	0	3	0	0	3
EB-66	4	0	0	1	5
F-4	138	78	4	59 (9)	279 (9)
F-5	0	0	0	7	7
F-100	16	28	3	143 (7)	190 (7)
F-102	1	0	0	6 (4)	7 (4)

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Aircraft Combat Losses in SEA Through 31 Dec 70 (Cont.)

	<u>NVN</u>	<u>LAOS</u>	<u>CAMB</u>	<u>SVN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>USAF (Cont.)</u>					
F-104	4	2	0	2	8
F-105	275	50	0	1	326
F-111	0	2	0	0	2
HU-16B	1	0	0	1	2
O-1	2	9	1	106 (25)	118 (25)
O-2	3	14	2	43 (8)	63 (8)
OV-10	0	9	3	10	22
RB-57	0	0	0	2	2
RF-4	33	22	0	12 (4)	67 (4)
RF-101	27	3	0	3 (1)	33 (1)
T-28	1	3	0	0	4
U-3	0	0	0	1 (1)	1 (1)
U-10	0	1 (1)	0	2 (1)	3 (2)
UH-1	0	1	0	12	13
TOTAL	536	357 (1)	14	540 (84)	1,447 (85)
<u>USMC</u>					
A/TA-4	8	5	0	53 (8)	66 (8)
A-6	8	1	0	5 (2)	14 (2)
C-117	0	0	0	0	0
EF-10B	1	0	0	3	4
F-4	7	9	0	47 (6)	63 (6)
F-8	2	1	0	11 (2)	14 (2)
F-9	0	0	0	1	1
KC-130	1	0	0	1	2
O-1	0	0	0	2	2
OV-10	0	0	0	6	6
RF-4	1	0	0	1	2
*Rotary-Wing	1	5	0	239 (34)	245 (34)
TOTAL	29	21	0	365 (52)	414 (52)
<u>VNAP</u>					
A-1	10	0	0	74 (8)	84 (8)
A-37	0	0	0	2	2
C-47	0	0	0	4 (3)	4 (3)
C-119	0	0	1	1 (1)	2 (1)
H/CH-34	0	0	0	39 (8)	39 (8)
F-5	0	0	0	2	2
O-1	0	0	0	12 (3)	12 (3)
U-6	0	0	0	1	1
U-17	0	0	0	8 (3)	8 (3)
UH-1	0	0	1	10	11
TOTAL	10	0	2	153 (26)	165 (26)

Source: PACAF

Table VI- 5

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USA, USN, USAF, and USMC Aircraft Combat Losses in Laos and NVN

(S) Aircraft combat losses in Laos and NVN from 1 Jan 65 through 31 Dec 70 are shown in the following table. Losses are shown by aircraft type, altitude, maneuver, and the weapon causing the loss.

1. AIRCRAFT TYPE		2. ALTITUDE		
<u>TYPE</u>		<u>ALTITUDE (FT)</u>	<u>USAF/USA</u>	<u>USN/USMC</u>
F-105	322	1-500	54	26
F-4C/D/E	206	501-1000	27	11
F-104	6	1001-1500	38	22
RF-4C	54	1501-2000	35	20
RF-101	30	2001-3000	56	35
A-1E/H/J	96	3001-4000	65	39
O-1/2	28	4001-5000	104	28
EB-66	3	5001-6000	48	11
A/EC-47	7	6001-7000	31	8
A-26	9	7001	132	59
B-57	17	Unknown	<u>316</u>	<u>208</u>
F-111	3			
Other	125	TOTAL	906	467
Navy/USMC	<u>467</u>			
TOTAL	1,373			

3. MANEUVER		
<u>MANEUVER</u>	<u>USAF/USA</u>	<u>USN/USMC</u>
Dive Bomb	134	44
Strafe	37	10
Rocket Pass	20	15
Pull-Up	97	40
Jink Turn	75	57
Level	123	39
Unknown	<u>420</u>	<u>262</u>
TOTAL	906	467

4. WEAPON TYPE		
<u>WEAPON</u>	<u>USAF/USA</u>	<u>USN/USMC</u>
MIG	36	11
SAM	56	57
AW/SA	229	99
37/57mm	306	166
85/100mm	33	18
Unknown	<u>246</u>	<u>116</u>
TOTAL	906	467

Source: 7AF

Table VI-6

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Aircraft operating in SEA are constantly monitored by radar. Men on the ground advise pilots on weather and other pertinent information.

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


FIGURE VI-13

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AIR OPERATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

Air Operations in I CTZ /MR I and the DMZ

(C) During the month of January the allocation of preplanned TACAIR sorties remained fairly constant throughout the RVN. However, I Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) did receive limited additional preplanned and special TACAIR to counter increased enemy activity in known base areas (BA). (59)

(S) The overall TACAIR sortie rate in I CTZ was reduced by 35 USMC TACAIR sorties per day on 15 Jan as 20 A-4 aircraft of USMC VMA (attack squadron) 211 and 14 F-4 aircraft of VMFA (fighter/attack squadron) 542 stood down in I CTZ as part of Phase III redeployment. (60)

(S) There was an increase in ARC LIGHT in I CTZ during January over the 1969 year-end level as 36 targets were struck by 118 sorties. Seventeen strikes near the eastern edge of BA 611 (see Figure VI-13) were targeted against suspected enemy supplies, equipment, and troop concentrations and resulted in seven trucks, numerous bunkers, trails, and base camps destroyed. Eight targets northwest of A Luoi were struck during the month, but extensive cloud cover prevented bomb-damage assessment (BDA) and aircrew reporting of secondary explosions. Nine strikes, in the Khe Sanh area, resulted in 17 secondary explosions reported on four of the missions; however, cloud cover obscured the target area on the remaining five strikes. Additionally, two secondary targets were struck during the month. (61)

(S) The TACAIR sortie allocations for I CTZ remained at a constant level for the month of February; however, the stand down of USMC VMA 211 a part of Phase III Redeployment, with 20 A-4 aircraft on 12 Feb, resulted in the loss of 20 USMC TACAIR sorties daily. (62)

(S) There was a decrease in ARC LIGHT strikes in I CTZ during the month of February with 18 targets being struck by 49 sorties. Two were flown in central Quang Nam Province against enemy base camps and staging areas; however, extensive cloud cover prevented aircrew BDA. One target struck in the DMZ contained numerous bunkers, fighting positions, structures, and an active trail network, and resulted in an aircrew reported secondary explosion (see Figure VI-14). Two were against secondary targets, but again extensive cloud cover prevented BDA. The remaining strikes, targeted against enemy resupply routes, storage areas, and active trail networks leading from the area, were west of the A Luoi area in eastern BA 611. Six of those resulted in 43 observed secondary explosions while weather prevented BDA on the remaining eight. (63)

(S) ARC LIGHT activity in I CTZ increased during the month of March as 25 targets were struck by 78 aircraft (see Figure VI-15). Twenty-one targets in the area of the A Shau Valley, which contained base camps, bunkers, fighting positions, AA/AW positions, trench networks, structures and storage facilities located along spur roads leading into RVN from BA 611, were struck. Weather precluded BDA on 16 of the strikes while 40 secondary explosions were reported on the five remaining targets. On 12 Mar, three sorties were flown against a target near A Luoi and resulted in 30 secondary explosions. In Quang Nam Province, near BA 112, four strikes were flown against active base camps and resulted in 11 secondary explosions being reported on one of the strikes. (64)

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(S) During the month of April 25 targets were struck in I CTZ by 61 B-52 aircraft with four of the strikes against targets located in the DMZ. Weather prevented BDA on 13 of the strikes, while aircrews observed a total of 88 secondary explosions on the other 12 strikes. As sensor activity, visual reconnaissance (VR), and ground contacts confirmed enemy presence in the area, 17 targets near the A Shau Valley and four in central Quang Nam Province, in the vicinity of BA 127, were struck. (65)

(S) During the month of May, 57 targets were struck in I CTZ and the DMZ by 168 ARC LIGHT aircraft. Targets included nine in the central DMZ, 21 north of Cam Lo and just south of the central DMZ, four east of Khe Sanh, 15 in the A Shau Valley area, and eight in the vicinity of BA 112 and Hiep Duc. A total of 167 secondary explosions were reported on 38 of the strikes; however, weather prevented aircrew observed BDA on the remaining 19 strikes. (66)

(S) TACAIR sorties continued in May and June at a nearly-constant level of over 4,500 sorties. Lucrative targets in the northern provinces and DMZ saw 364 ARC LIGHT sorties flown in 125 strikes in June. More than double the May total, the strikes were flown against troop concentrations, major infiltration routes, staging complexes, caches, and defensive positions. Aircrews reported 308 secondary explosions. Many of the sorties were in support of friendly forces on northern FSBs. (67) TACAIR sorties were up 10 percent.

(S) More than two of every three in-country ARC LIGHT sorties in July were flown in MR 1 (CTZs were changed to MRs in July) and the DMZ. A total of 133 strikes and 393 sorties were targeted as in June with additional requirements generated by summer campaigns of the 101st Abn Div (Ambl), 1st ARVN Div, the 23d Inf (Americal) Div, and 2d ARVN Div. Eight strikes were flown in support of defensive positions near FSB Ripcord. (68)

Support of FSB Ripcord

(C) Between 17-23 Jul 70 a total of 322 TACAIR sorties, 198 preplanned and 124 immediates, were flown in support of FSB Ripcord. Established by elements of the 2d Bn, 506th Inf, 101st Abn Div (Ambl) on 1 Apr 70 the base came under heavy fire and ground attacks. During the period 17-23 Jul 70 the enemy intensified his attack and on 23 Jul 70 both the battalion commander and S-3 were killed during an attack. By noon 23 Jul 70 the base was evacuated. Four CH-47 Chinooks were destroyed during the period and two UH-1 helicopters were shot down but were later recovered. TACAIR was flown to support troops in contact, provide interdiction, assist the evacuation, and deny the enemy use of the FSB. (69)

(S) In August, for the third month in a row, MR 1 and the DMZ received a lion's share of the ARC LIGHT sorties: 83 percent of the in-country effort. A total of 44 strikes were flown against enemy concentrations near FSB O'Reilly in central Quang Tri Province. In-flight and ground diversions were numerous in response to the fluid tactical situation. (70)

(S) Enemy units attempted to build up main-force elements in the A Shau Valley near FSB O'Reilly in September. Over 4,000 TACAIR sorties and 77 percent of the in-country ARC LIGHT sorties were used in conjunction with XXIV Corps ground operations to disrupt the enemy effort. (71)

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Effects of Tropical Storms in October and November

(S) The major factor influencing operations in the northern portion of RVN during October was the weather. A strong northeasterly flow typical of the northeast monsoon was well established by the beginning of the month and that, coupled with several tropical disturbances, caused northern RVN to have predominantly cloudy skies and at times heavy rain. Rain occurred almost daily during the last half of the month, and during the last week of the month daily rainfall frequently exceeded 3 inches due to tropical storm Kate and the polar front. As a result of the heavy rain and flooding, over 229,700 people were evacuated from their homes in MR I. The flood caused 184 Vietnamese deaths, 11 Korean deaths, and eight US deaths. Over half (55 percent) of the MR I rice crop was destroyed, constituting 10 percent of the total rice crop in South Vietnam. No large bridges were destroyed; however, there was extensive damage to the roads which required repair to restore tactical mobility for ground forces. Enemy-initiated incidents declined substantially, with weekly average incidents dropping almost 30 percent. (72) A combination of weather, reduced enemy activity, and the start of the COMMANDO HUNT V interdiction campaign in Laos reduced the sorties flown in RVN. Only 56 ARC LIGHT, seven gunship (see Figure VI-16) and 460 TACAIR sorties were flown in MR I during October. The ARC LIGHT sorties were flown against targets located in the extreme western corner of the DMZ. The strikes were targeted against interdiction points on Waterway 7 and Route 1032B. (73)

(S) The influence of the heavy October rains and flooding disrupted logistical activity and kept enemy action below expected levels. (74) Only eight ARC LIGHT and no gunship sorties were flown in November while TACAIR continued at about the same rate with 1,529 sorties (see Figure VI-17). In December 1,598 TACAIR sorties were flown while there were no ARC LIGHT and no gunship sorties flown.




Vietnamese civilians in Thua Thien Province await helicopters to airlift them to safety of higher ground.

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ARC LIGHT SORTIES IN THE DMZ




Source: MACJ3

* Data not available

FIGURE VI-14

ARC LIGHT SORTIES IN MR 1



Source: MACJ3

* Data not available


FIGURE VI-15

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
FIXED-WING GUNSHIP SORTIES IN MR 1, PERCENTAGE OF SEA TOTAL



Source: MACJ3 and SEADAB

FIGURE VI-16

TACAIR SORTIES IN MR 1, PERCENTAGE OF SEA TOTAL



Source: MACJ3

FIGURE VI-17

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


FIGURE VI-18

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Air Operations in II CTZ/MR 2

(S) ARC LIGHT activities in II CTZ decreased in January over the 1969 year-end level as 29 targets were struck. Fourteen strikes in the vicinity of Ben Het were targeted against enemy staging areas and were used to deny the enemy a safe area from which to operate. Aircrew members reported 80 secondary explosions resulting from nine of the strikes; however, weather obscured the results of the remaining five strikes. North of Dak To, four targets were struck resulting in 16 aircrew reported secondary explosions, while six strikes were made in Binh Dinh Province to disrupt or destroy troop concentrations and thwart a main force enemy build-up. (75)

(S) An increase in enemy activity along the Cambodian border in II CTZ resulted in an increase of ARC LIGHT activity during the month of February. Forty-four targets located under heavy jungle canopy, containing base camps, bivouac areas, storage sites, foxholes and defensive positions, were struck in eastern BA 609 (see Figure VI-18) and resulted in 562 secondary explosions. Six strikes, targeted against traditional base areas and rear service elements of the 3d NVA Division and local force units, resulted in 25 observed secondary explosions. Additionally, four targets in BA 226 were struck and resulted in 13 secondary explosions on one target while the remaining targets were obscured by weather. (76)

(S) Twenty-eight ARC LIGHT strikes were conducted in II CTZ during March by 143 B-52 aircraft (see Figure VI-19). The primary effort was against targets in the tri-border area located in and around BA 609 and resulted in 281 secondary explosions. Eight additional targets, southwest of Ben Het, were struck, resulting in 164 secondary explosions. Of the remaining strikes, two were against secondary targets in Pleiku and Kontum Provinces and resulted in 11 secondary explosions on one of the strikes. (77)

(C) During the night of 30 Mar - 1 Apr the battle of Dak Seang - Dak Pek, in Kontum Province, began. Dak Seang was initially attacked on 30 Mar - 1 Apr and Dak Pek on the night of 11 - 12 Apr. During the period 1 - 11 Apr, 951 TACAIR sorties were flown in support of the operation at Dak Seang, and during the period 12 - 31 Apr, 1,043 TACAIR sorties were flown in support of the Dak Seang - Dak Pek battle. (78)

(S) ARC LIGHT strikes flown in II CTZ during April increased significantly from the previous month as 64 targets were struck by 271 sorties. Nearly all of the strikes were flown in the northwestern region of Kontum Province near the tri-border area, with three secondary targets in Quang Duc Province. The two major target areas were at Dak Seang, which received 33 strikes, and BA 609 which received 28 strikes. The objective of the strikes near the Dak Seang CIDG Camp was to inflict maximum casualties and disrupt enemy forces surrounding the camp. A total of 54 secondary explosions were reported on 23 of the strikes; however, weather and the tactical situation precluded aircrew and ground follow up BDA on the remaining strikes. A total of 27 strikes, directed at known VC/NVA staging areas and resupply facilities south and east of the tri-border area, resulted in 228 secondary explosions. (79)

(S) A total of 70 targets were struck in II Corps by 345 B-52 sorties during the month of May. Nearly all of the targets were located in BAs along the RVN-Cambodian border and targeted against known enemy staging and resupply base camps containing supply-personnel

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bunkers, storage areas, AA/AW positions, transshipment points, and trench networks. BDA totaling 516 secondary explosions was observed by aircrews on 51 strikes while 19 strikes were unobserved because of weather. On 5 May, a strike in BA 609 reported 23 secondary explosions, and another strike in an adjacent area the next day produced 38 secondaries. Two strikes flown against tactical-logistical elements and facilities southeast of Thang Dui resulted in 100 secondary explosions, and the following day four strikes in the same area produced 69 more. (80)

(S) June, July, August, and September were quiet months. MR 2 received about 2 percent of ARC LIGHT sorties and about 8 percent of TACAIR sorties. (81)

(S) The 355th Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS) with 18 F-100 aircraft located at Tuy Hoa Air Base stood down on 13 Aug 70 for redeployment to the USA and the 31st Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), located at Tuy Hoa, stood down on 10 Sep 70. Three squadrons phased down during the month: the 416 TFS with 18 F-100s stood down on 5 Sep 70; the 306th TFS with 18 F-100s stood down on 10 Sep 70; and the 309th TFS with 18 F-100s completed the standdown for the wing on 10 Sep. (82)

(S) Ground action continued to be light and scattered in MR 2 during October. As in MR 1 the activity was influenced by the heavy rains and flooding. (83) There were 26 gunship (see Figure VI-20), and 651 TACAIR sorties flown, but no ARC LIGHT.

(S) In November attacks-by-fire, limited ground probes, and terrorist incidents directed against the pacification program characterized enemy activity. (84) The air operations were light; there were nine gunship and 591 TACAIR sorties flown (see Figure VI-21), but again no ARC LIGHT.

(S) December brought a further decrease in sorties flown. There were no ARC LIGHT, 11 gunship, and 534 TACAIR sorties were flown.



F-100s of the 31st Tactical Fighter Wing head for home.

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
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
ARC LIGHT SORTIES IN MR 2



1970	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
Strikes	29	60	28	64	70	15	13	8	5	0	0	0
Sorties	131	303	143	271	385	45	37	9	11	0	0	0
Sorties Obs'd by Aircrew	*	*	*	*	*	29	13	1	4	0	0	0
Aircrew Rept'd Secondaries	99	677	299	283	516	15	9	1	1	0	0	0
Percentage of SEA ARC LIGHT	9	27	10	19	21	3	7	1	1	0	0	0
Percentage of RVN ARC LIGHT	17	58	27	33	50	9	6	2	9	0	0	0

Source: MACJ3 * Data not available FIGURE VI.19

FIXED-WING GUNSHIP SORTIES IN MR 2, PERCENTAGE OF SEA TOTAL



Source: MACJ3 and SEADAN FIGURE VI.20

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
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TACAIR SORTIES IN MR 2, PERCENTAGE OF SEA TOTAL



1970	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
RAAF	0	0	0	0	3	11	14	12	7	18	39	15
USAF	1578	1324	1408	2920	1371	1369	1345	1157	704	313	317	237
USMC	0	0	0	111	51	59	12	7	2	0	0	0
USN	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	7	0	0	0	0
VNAP	552	488	526	606	48	215	338	269	369	320	235	271
TOTAL	2130	1812	1934	3637	1473	1654	1714	1452	1082	651	591	534

Source: NACJ3

FIGURE VI-21


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(C) The heavy canopy of the jungle was blasted by a BLU-82, Helicopter Landing Zone clearing device, and provided a usable landing zone.

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Air Operations in III CTZ/MR 3

(C) During the month of January the allocation of preplanned TACAIR sorties remained fairly constant throughout the RVN. However, the Rung Sat Special Zone of III CTZ received limited additional preplanned and special TACAIR to counter increased enemy activity. (85)

(S) ARC LIGHT activity in III CTZ decreased during January with 84 targets struck by 420 sorties, or 29 percent of the total ARC LIGHT effort in SEA. Infiltration routes and staging areas along the northern borders of Tay Ninh, Binh Long, and Phuoc Long Provinces, (see Figure VI-22) were the targets of 42 strikes which resulted in 632 secondary explosions being reported by aircrews. Also, targets in the vicinity of Katum were struck 29 times resulting in 143 secondary explosions, while the remaining strikes in III CTZ were flown against traditional base camps, infiltration routes, and rest areas. (86)

(S) Although TACAIR sorties remained at a constant level the significant decrease in ARC LIGHT activity in III CTZ during February was attributed to the increased effort against lucrative targets in Laos and associated supply and infiltration routes. Thirty-four targets were struck by 137 aircraft with 26 of the targets located along the Cambodian border. The strikes resulted in an exceptional strike/secondary explosion rate as aircrews observed 530 secondary explosions in the area. Also, one strike was flown in Phuoc Tuy Province in support of Australian Forces which resulted in 18 secondary explosions being reported. (87)

(C) The BLU-82, Helicopter Landing Zone (HLZ) clearing device was dropped by a C-130 on 24 Mar in support of II Field Forces. It was the initial tactical employment of the BLU-82, a 15,000 pound slurry filled weapon, designed to provide a somewhat larger and improved operable landing zone than the 10,000 pound low-fragmentation M-121 bomb. (88)

(S) ARC LIGHT activity in III CTZ increased (see Figure VI-23) in March as 52 targets were struck by 228 aircraft. Nearly all of the strikes were in northwestern III CTZ near the Cambodian border, as sensor activity, contacts, and ground fire incidents confirmed a high level of enemy activity. Aircrews reported 573 secondary explosions on 45 of the struck targets and seven were not observed because of weather. Two strikes in eastern BA 353, west of An Loc, resulted in 127 secondary explosions being reported. (89)

(S) Nearly 30 percent of all ARC LIGHT activity during the month of April was against targets in III CTZ as 94 targets were struck by 395 aircraft. The major areas struck were WAR ZONE C, northwest of Tay Ninh City, which received 29 strikes, and the Fishhook area, which received 46 strikes. Other strikes were flown against targets in BAs bordering Cambodia and targets in Bien Hoa, Long Khanh and Binh Duong Provinces. The strikes in III CTZ resulted in 529 secondary explosions reported on 68 targets, while weather precluded aircrew BDA on the remaining 26 strikes. On 29 and 30 Apr, five strikes were flown against targets west of An Loc which resulted in a reported 116 secondary explosions. Also, two strikes were flown against a base camp used by battalion-size enemy forces in the coastal province of Binh Tuy which resulted in so many secondary explosions on one strike that the aircrew was unable to count them. In addition to a PW report that his entire base camp was destroyed and two NVA companies were KBA by the strikes, ground follow-up reported 38 bunkers and numerous other facilities destroyed. (90)

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(S) During May, 146 B-52 sorties were flown in III CTZ against 31 targets, nearly all of which were along the Cambodian-RVN border in support of Cambodian operations in the Fish-hook area. Aircrews reported 59 secondary explosions resulting from four strikes flown against targets in BA 352. Twenty-seven other strikes were completed against enemy staging and infiltration areas causing 105 reported secondary explosions. (91)

(S) The operations in Cambodia accounted for most of the action of III CTZ units during June. Only five ARC LIGHT strikes of 15 sorties were flown in III CTZ. (92)

(S) July saw a significant increase in ARC LIGHT sorties in the region. Nearly all of the 76 sorties were enemy BAs in northern Tay Ninh and Phuoc Long Provinces. TACAIR continued at about the same rate with roughly 10 percent of the total effort expended in MR 3. Contacts and ground incidents confirmed enemy presence.

(S) August was relatively quiet with MR 3 receiving only 13 ARC LIGHT strikes and 10 percent of total TACAIR. (93)

(S) On 1 Sep 70 the 3d TFW at Bien Hoa began redeployment preparations with the stand-down of the 8th Attack Fighter Squadron (AFS). On 1 Oct 70 the 90th AFS stood down and the A-37 aircraft turned over to VNAF. The 604th TFS remained at Bien Hoa. (94)

(S) September ARC LIGHT and TACAIR sorties remained light and were flown in support of surface forces.



(S) Enemy-initiated activity remained light and scattered in October, November, and December. During the 3-month period there were only six ARC LIGHT sorties flown. The gunship sorties (see Figure VI-24) went from 94 sorties in October to 12 in December. TACAIR sorties (see Figure VI-25) were almost steady at an average of slightly over 1,000 per month. (95)

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


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TACAIR SORTIES IN MR 3, PERCENTAGE OF SEA TOTAL



1970	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
RAAF	92	143	123	133	97	66	79	106	88	68	30	20
USAF	2836	2105	2174	1966	1308	2200	1340	1242	1391	658	724	593
USMC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
VNAF	1335	1183	1274	1459	477	629	486	529	425	474	324	377
TOTAL	4263	3431	3571	3558	1882	2895	1905	1877	1904	1200	1078	990

Source: NACJ3

FIGURE VI-25

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Air Operations in IV CTZ/MR 4

(C) In January the allocation of preplanned TACAIR sorties remained fairly constant throughout RVN. However, limited additional preplanned and special TACAIR was furnished in support of special ground operations in IV CTZ, the Seven Mountains area (BA 400) (see Figure VI-26) in Chau Doc Province, to counter increased enemy activity in known base camp areas. (96)

(S) ARC LIGHT activity in IV CTZ reflected a sizable increase in January as 32 targets were struck by 89 sorties (see Figure VI-27). The greater part of the effort was directed against the Seven Mountains area in Chau Doc Province, northwest of Tri Ton, where 22 strikes using tandem tactics were employed. On 19 of the strikes, aircrews reported 279 secondary explosions which destroyed or damaged 132 caves, 89 foxholes, 91 bunkers, 22 structures, 1,675 meters of trench, and caused 44 sustained fires. Another traditional assembly, rest, and resupply area in the U-Minh Forest (BA 483) was struck six times resulting in 48 reported secondary explosions with 185 structures, 37 sampans, 2 dispensaries, and 15 bunkers destroyed or damaged. Two independent sources reported the VC removed 100 bodies from the area immediately following four strikes on 11 Jan. (97)

(S) ARC LIGHT activity in IV CTZ decreased during the month of February when 10 strikes hit enemy forces in BA 400 in the Seven Mountains area. VR, photography, and Hoi Chanh reports confirmed a high level of enemy activity in that area and aircrews reported 118 secondary explosions. (98)

(S) During March, 23 B-52 strikes were flown against 66 targets located in Kien Giang, An Xuyen, Chau Doc, and Kien Hoa Provinces of IV CTZ. The Seven Mountains area continued to be active and received strikes on 12 primary targets. Two strikes in Kien Giang Province against sampan docking and troop support staging areas resulted in 37 crew observed secondary explosions and ground reports of 10 sampans destroyed. (99)

(S) At approximately 260300Z Mar 70, an ARC LIGHT strike was conducted on a target in Chau Doc Province. The strike force consisted of three aircraft; however, one aircraft aborted resulting in a strike force of two aircraft carrying 84 Mk-82s and 24 Mk-117s each. Because of an apparent ranging error in the MSQ equipment, all bombs impacted outside the target box with a normal bomb train of approximately 2,500 meters. Preliminary information indicated that at least 12 persons were injured, three seriously. (100)

(S) A total of 79 B-52 sorties were flown against 28 targets located in Chau Doc, Dinh Tuong, Kien Hoa, and Vinh Binh Provinces during April. BA 400, in the Seven Mountains area, continued to be the most active area as 16 primary and seven secondary targets were struck. A total of 125 secondary explosions were reported by aircrews on 20 of those strikes. Also, two strikes near BA 490 in Dinh Tuong Province resulted in five reported secondary explosions and numerous bunkers, fighting positions, structures and trenches destroyed. (101)

(S) During May, 37 B-52 sorties were flown against 15 targets in Chau Doc, Kien Giang, and Vinh Binh Provinces. Again BA 400 received the majority of the strikes as six primary and three secondary strikes produced a total of 18 secondary explosions on six of them while the

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


FIGURE VI-26

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remaining three were obscured by weather. Two strikes flown against targets in the Three Sisters Mountain area northwest of Rach Gia, an area containing base camps and resupply points used by enemy infiltrating into the U Minh Forest, resulted in 17 reported secondary explosions. (102)

(S) During June 25 strikes by 67 ARC LIGHT aircraft hit troop concentrations and staging complexes in the U Minh Forest, near Truc Giang in Kien Hoa Province, and targets near Tri Ton in the Seven Mountains area. About 5 percent of the ARC LIGHT sorties and 8 percent of TACAIR were used in IV CTZ. (103)

(S) MR 4 received 5 percent of ARC LIGHT and 7 percent of TACAIR sorties in July. Most of the 24 strikes of 73 B-52s were in support of intensified ARVN clearing operations in the Delta. They were targeted against troop concentrations and base camps in the U Minh Forest north of Sa Dec in Kien Phong Province and in central Kien Hoa Province. A single three-ship strike flown on 30 Jul against an enemy base camp and headquarters area in the U Minh Forest reported 20 secondary explosions. (104)

(S) In August and September there were few targets in MR 4 considered suitable for ARC LIGHT operations. As a result, 21 sorties were flown in August and 11 in September. TACAIR in MR 4 accounted for 6 percent of the sorties in August and 7 percent in September. (105)

(S) In October enemy-initiated activity was light and scattered in MR 4, but in November it had the highest level of activity in RVN. Attacks-by-fire and ground attacks were directed against Regional Force (RF) and Popular Force (PF) outposts and military compounds. Again, the attacks were in connection with the enemy anti-pacification program. (106) The air operations in November consisted of 28 gunship (see Figure VI-28) and 932 TACAIR sorties. In December there were nine ARC LIGHT, 41 gunships, and 1,271 TACAIR sorties flown. (See Figure VI-29)



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
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TACAIR SORTIES IN MR 4, PERCENTAGE OF SEA TOTAL



1970	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
RAAF	140	59	105	113	98	120	153	124	129	85	36	84
USAF	449	556	753	584	733	920	602	396	318	169	212	270
USMC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
VNAP	1066	943	990	1103	389	499	536	442	523	635	684	917
TOTAL	1655	1558	1848	1800	1220	1539	1291	962	970	889	932	1271

Source: MACJ3

FIGURE VI-29

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


FIGURE VI-30

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AIR OPERATIONS IN CAMBODIA

(S) In March 1970 COMUSMACV commented on the enemy supply system. He said:

The enemy has two logistic systems, one in Laos and one in Cambodia. The one in Laos is direct... With Cambodia materials from China, Russia, and Eastern Europe go to Sihanoukville for offloading and retransit... In Cambodia, we can't do anything until the material enters SVN. (107)

(U) On 30 Apr 70 President Nixon announced his decision to enter Cambodia. Details of US operations during May and June were covered in Annex C. Actions from 1 Jul to 31 Dec 70 are included in this section.

(C) The role of air operations in Cambodia was basically interdiction. On 5 Aug SECSTATE stated US policy:

The President's policy on air operations in Cambodia is that we will conduct operations to interdict enemy supplies, communications, and personnel when in the judgment of US commanders such operations will enhance the safety and security of US and allied personnel in SVN, or will have an ancillary effect that directly benefits the present government in Cambodia. Although the purpose of our interdiction is to protect Americans and allied personnel in South Vietnam, these operations, obviously, may have a dual benefit that may serve our purposes and at the same time serve the Cambodian government. It is not prudent as far as military planning is concerned to give direct answers on operating orders; but the reason for conducting air activities in Cambodia is the interdiction of supplies, materiel, and personnel in order to protect Americans in Vietnam and the Vietnamization program; to enhance continuing American withdrawals; and to reduce American casualties. (108)

Rules of Engagement

(S) During the Cambodian Sanctuary Counter-Offensive (1 May - 30 Jun 70) the rules of engagement (ROE) were the same as those used in RVN: They were prescribed in MACV Directive 523-13. Air operations were authorized to a uniform depth of 30 km inside Cambodia. At the completion of the campaign, 302400H Jun 70, a new set of ROE was promulgated.

(S) The ROE governing air interdiction operations within Cambodia were set forth in a 29 May memorandum of agreement, entered into by representatives of the Forces Armées

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National Khmer (FANK), JGS/RVNAF, and MACV. The established ROE were to be complied with by all forces, units, and individuals participating in air interdiction operations in Cambodia. The initial boundaries were established as the area encompassed by the Cambodia-RVN border on the east, the Cambodian-Laotian border on the north, and a line 200 meters south and west of Route 13 from Kratie to the border of RVN on the south (see Figure VI-30).

(S) The general guidelines were basically the same as those employed in the Laotian STEEL TIGER area to include:

1. FAC control of all strikes by tactical fighters, except for properly validated and cleared radar-controlled attacks.
2. FANK validation to return ground fire directed at aircraft from an urban area, town, village, or hamlet.
3. CS authorized to be used by SAR forces.
4. Unless requested and validated by FANK, areas of cultural value to the Cambodian people would not be struck.
5. FANK development of special operating areas in which aircraft could strike without prior coordination.
6. FANK validations of Category A and B LOCs.
7. FANK validation of B-52 strikes, unless the strike was along a Category A LOC or in a FANK developed special operating area. (109)

Protection of Angkor Wat Cultural Monuments

(U) For discussion of this subject see TOP SECRET Supplement.

Monthly Summaries

(U) US activities in Cambodia prior to 1 Jul 70 are included in Annex C. The following sections summarize the activities for each month starting in July.

July

(S) All US ground troops were withdrawn from Cambodia by 30 Jun; consequently, air activity there was significantly reduced in July. US TACAIR sorties in July decreased about

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70 percent over the previous month, while VNAF sorties dropped about 20 percent. The variance in the extent of decrease in air support between the USAF and the VNAF was attributed to the fact that ARVN forces did not withdraw from Cambodia as did the US Army. Reconnaissance sorties declined 46 percent due to reduction in requests for target coverage and an increase of 84 percent in the success rate.

(S) Most USAF attack sorties, i.e., 86 percent, were flown in the 8-hour period between 1200 and 2000 hours. Most of the strikes were conducted in the northeast FREEDOM DEAL and FREEDOM DEAL Extension areas. Ninety-one percent of the 185 ARC LIGHT sorties over Cambodia dropped their bombs in the Fishhook area on the border of South Vietnam with the remaining 9 percent bombing along the border farther north, in the area of Cambodia immediately west of Pleiku. (See Figure VI-31 for ARC LIGHT activity, Figure VI-32 for fixed wing gunship sorties, and Figure VI-33 for TACAIR sorties.)

(S) During July analysis of intelligence revealed limited enemy supply movement in northeast Cambodia. A small amount of supplies was probably moved into Cambodia at night by the Mekong and Sekong Rivers; however, almost all watercraft sighted by FACs were beached and empty. Roadwatch teams reported a slight increase in troop movement on Route 110 but no pattern of enemy resupply was noted. Logistics movement in Cambodia for the month was local and light. Ground action consisted principally of scattered small-scale attacks on government positions. Large enemy concentrations were reported east of the Mekong and northeast of Phnom Penh. Additional enemy concentrations were reported in northwest Cambodia near Siem Reap, and Kompong Thom in central Cambodia was attacked several times. The FANK retained their hold on the town, however. The areas of Cambodia north and northeast of Route 7 in the east and Route 6 in the west were controlled by the enemy. Enemy intentions appeared to be to consolidate their positions and to establish a strong base north of Phnom Penh to attempt to increase their hold on the central part of the country. Route 4 to Kompong Som (formerly Sihanoukville) remained open most of the month with some threat posed by enemy forces in the areas of Kirirom, Kompong Speu, and Sre Khlong.

(S) The mission of air in Cambodia was to maintain surveillance of enemy activity within Cambodia and to attack those activities that threatened friendly forces within the specified limits imposed by the JCS. In support of that mission Direct Air Support Center V (DASC) was established in Phnom Penh, a joint VNAF/Cambodian organization that controlled aircraft of both nations. Additional support of the mission was provided by extensive reconnaissance over Cambodia with approximately 38 slow-mover FAC missions, plus four Stormy F-4 FAC missions and four RF-4 VR missions, flown every day. Strikes were authorized in the FREEDOM DEAL and FREEDOM DEAL Extension areas as limited by the ROE. Search and rescue was authorized throughout the entire country to recover downed aircrews. Command and control was exercised by 7AF Tactical Air Control Center through II and III DASCs. (110)

August

(S) During August enemy activity levels varied among areas of Cambodia; however, the general level of activity was higher than in RVN. Attack sorties flown by the USAF increased greatly; VNAF attack sorties decreased slightly. About 67 percent of the attack effort was flown between the hours of 1200 and 2000. USAF tactical reconnaissance continued to be flown from Tan Son Nhut utilizing RF-4C, RF-101, and RB-57 aircraft. There were 313 sorties flown

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(46 at night). Effective sorties decreased from 322 to 301. Tan Son Nhut RF-4Cs continued to fly four VR missions per day, spending 2 1/2 hours on VR. Total reconnaissance sorties decreased slightly; however, support sorties increased 75 percent. USAF TACAIR strikes were concentrated on the enemy logistic system both east and west of the Mekong River, while ARC LIGHT effort, 231 sorties, was targeted near the RVN border.

(S) Civilian and non-tactical military air traffic routes were established over Cambodia in August 1970 for the first time since rules governing international civil aviation were enacted at an international convention held in Chicago in 1944. The new and shorter route over Cambodia to Thailand was expected to be used by some 600 MAC, MAC-contract, and command support aircraft each month.

(S) No extensive enemy supply movement was detected in Cambodia. Some supply activity was observed in the northern part of the country both east and west of the Mekong River, with a limited number of watercraft and carts sighted by FACs. Bamboo rafts, pirogues, and river craft of up to 12-ton size were observed carrying supplies. FAC observations also confirmed the use of bicycles for logistic movement in northeastern Cambodia. No large scale, organized logistic system was detected in Cambodia, however.

(S) The ground situation throughout August was characterized by a number of enemy attacks and ambushes, but areas controlled by government and Communist troops did not change significantly. In northwestern Cambodia enemy pressure increased on Samrong, the Capital of Oddar Meanchey Province, which was isolated by the enemy. Pressure eased somewhat at Siem Reap, but Kompong Thom was surrounded and attacked frequently. FANK forces repelled the enemy attacks and consolidated their hold on the city. At the end of the month, however, Kompong Thom was still surrounded. The village of Skoun, south of Kompong Thom, was lost and retaken by FANK forces. Farther southeast at Kompong Cham there were numerous attacks-by-fire, as was the case at Kompong Chhnang.

(S) In the central part of Cambodia some of the heaviest fighting took place near the village of Prek Tameak, located about 20 km north-northeast of Phnom Penh. Enemy forces made an extensive effort to take the town, but were repelled by three FANK battalions supported by FANK T-28s and artillery. In southwestern Cambodia government forces succeeded in regaining ground and improving the situation at Kirirom. To the west, in Pursat Province, an infiltration and supply route was confirmed through the Cardamom Mountains between the center of the province and northwestern Kompong Speu Province. By the end of the month FANK forces had launched operations to ease the pressure on Kompong Thom, Pursat Province, and the towns of Kralanh and Thkov in northwest Cambodia.

(S) The successful defense of Kompong Thom and Prek Tameak appeared to have increased the confidence of Cambodian government forces. Routes 1 and 4, toward Saigon and Kompong Som respectively, remained open most of the month, providing supply and communications links to the capital, Phnom Penh. (111)

September

(S) During September enemy activity levels continued generally higher than those experienced in RVN. Total TACAIR sorties flown by the USAF/VNAF decreased slightly as VNAF sorties increased and USAF sorties decreased. Tactical reconnaissance sorties flown over

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Cambodia decreased from 333 to 246. Thirty-two night sorties were flown, 31 by RF-4Cs and one by an RE-57. Two VR sorties per day were flown using an RF-4C operating with an F-4 FAC.

(S) Enemy logistics activity observed in Cambodia was again limited, with some movement of supplies in the northern area east and west of the Mekong River. Rafts and pirogues carrying supplies were observed and struck. The ground situation remained relatively static in terms of areas controlled by friendly and enemy troops. Srang, which had been captured by the enemy on 30 Aug, was retaken by FANK troops early in the month. An operation to reinforce and resupply the garrison at Kompong Thom was initiated on 7 Sep. A river convoy was sent from Kompong Chhnang by the Mekong and Ton Le Sap rivers and a six-battalion convoy moved north up Route 6 from Skoun. The river convoy reached Kompong Thom, but the ground convoy was not as successful. Enemy troops in the village of Tang Kauk forced the convoy to halt near the junction of Routes 6 and 71. Although the village was taken by FANK troops, the convoy remained stalled there for the remainder of the month due to enemy resistance and downed bridges to the north. Communication and supply were maintained with Kompong Thom by river forces, and pacification, civic action, and propaganda programs were initiated in the area controlled by the road convoy.

(S) Enemy attacks-by-fire continued at Siem Reap, Kompong Chhnang, Srang, and Battambang. Enemy interdiction efforts against LOCs increased, hampering the transport of food from agricultural and fishing areas to Phnom Penh. Enemy pressures along Route 4 from the port of Kompong Som to the capital caused the closure of that strategic road between 1500 hours and dawn every day. That was considered highly significant since it was a vital LOC to the Cambodians. (112)

October

(S) Enemy activity levels in Cambodia were generally light in October and consisted principally of harassing activities. Total TACAIR flown decreased by about half as emphasis shifted to strikes of an immediate nature against perishable targets located in the FREEDOM DEAL areas and extensions. Tactical reconnaissance sorties decreased markedly, from 246 to 72. Of the 72, 50 were day and 22 were night sorties, 85 percent being successful. ARC LIGHT sorties decreased to 25 from last month's 122.

(S) Two notable items occurred in Cambodian political affairs. First Cambodia was declared a republic in ceremonies which took place on 19 Oct; the constitution remained basically unchanged, with the exception that all references to the monarchy were removed. Second, on 20 Oct, eight VC and Cambodian Communists rallied with their weapons to government forces at Kompong Speu. They were the first reported ralliers to the government side since the split with the North Vietnamese.

(S) In ground combat, Battambang in the northwest was attacked on 2 Oct for the first time. Previously Battambang had been one of only four provincial capitals which had not been harassed. (113)

(S) The DIA reported the following information which related to future Communist actions in Cambodia:

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A meeting of Communist military and political chiefs was to have been held at COSVN Headquarters in late August, according to a rallier formerly assigned to a COSVN support element. The agenda included NVA - VC plans in the Republic of Vietnam and Cambodia, the formation of three new Military Regions (MRs) in Cambodia, and the reestablishment of communications-liaison routes and base areas there. COSVN Directive 20, which was to be taken up at the meeting, stressed the difficulties of a political solution. Even with a coalition government excluding present South Vietnamese leaders and the withdrawal of US forces, no decisive shift in favor of the Communists was foreseen. Communist activities in Cambodia were again described as ancillary to the liberation of South Vietnam. Operations against RVN units in Cambodia were to be stepped up, and a full-scale effort to create a viable infrastructure in Cambodia was to be pressed. The main problem was not military, but the development of a political organization strong enough to govern. The temporary emphasis on Cambodia would shift much of the burden of the war in South Vietnam to local military commanders. The focus of Communist military efforts in SVN would be in MR I, as supply lines there were still intact. (114)

November

(S) During November enemy activity in Cambodia increased with attacks on towns and key road junctions and growing incidence of terrorism in Phnom Penh. Attack sorties flown by the USAF decreased, but VNAF attack sorties increased significantly. USAF reconnaissance sorties decreased but support sorties increased, resulting in a 20 percent increase in total sorties flown by both services in Cambodia.

(S) Early in the month ground action was light and scattered. However, on 9 Nov the enemy launched coordinated attacks against Kompong Cham and its airfield, Traeung, Prey Totung, Skoun, Tang Kauk, and several small isolated FANK outposts. Traeung was lost to the enemy and the attacks were probably designed to prevent the resumption of the FANK drive up Route 6. Traeung was subsequently retaken, but friendly casualties in the area were heavier than usual.

(S) On 16 Nov an ARVN cross-border sweep was initiated in BAs 701 and 740 in northeastern Cambodia (see Figure VI-18). The operation was highly successful. End-of-month reports stated the following results: 88 enemy KIA, 264 tons of munitions, 11,150 gallons of gasoline, 29 tons of rice, and some communications equipment captured, at a cost of two ARVN KIA and eight WIA. The munitions consisted of 254 tons of 85mm and 10 tons of 105mm artillery ammunition, one of the largest caches uncovered since allied operations were initiated in Cambodia.

(S) Late in the month enemy forces attacked and occupied the Pich Nil Pass on Route 4, the main highway to the port of Kompong Som. FANK positions at the pass and at Stung Chral were overrun, as were a cartridge factory and the Kirirom hydroelectric plant near there. A six-battalion FANK relief force was heavily attacked on the 26th, and at month's end the pass remained closed and in enemy hands with Route 4 still interdicted. The isolation of Phnom Penh from Kompong Som was considered serious; however, supplies were available to the capital via the Mekong River. (115)

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December

(S) During December, enemy activity in Cambodia increased with the beginning of their expected dry season offensive and attempts to cut lines of communication to isolate Phnom Penh. TACAIR sorties flown by the USAF almost tripled, and VNAF sorties increased 55 percent. Total sorties flown by USAF and VNAF aircraft in Cambodia increased 47 percent. A total of 33 ARC LIGHT sorties were flown as compared to 29 in November.


(S) During the month enemy activity was concentrated in the area of Kompong Cham and Route 7; the area near Siem Reap; in the area along Route 5 near Battambang City; and, most critically, the area of the Pich Nil Pass. Enemy forces held the pass the entire month, which interdicted Route 4 between the port of Kompong Som and Phnom Penh. On 31 Dec a FANK operation was scheduled to be launched in an attempt to clear the area and reopen the road. Twelve battalions were to be involved, with six operating east of the pass and six to the west.

(S) Elsewhere in the country, on 1 Dec, an explosive device caused extensive damage to the second floor of the US Embassy in Phnom Penh. The explosion marked the first act of terrorism directed against Americans in Cambodia. Kompong Cham remained isolated for most of the month, with Route 7 interdicted west of the city. On 12 Dec there was heavy fighting in the area with high casualties incurred by both sides. The following week ARVN units were helilifted to Kompong Cham and succeeded in opening Route 7, thereby permitting resupply of the town by convoy.

(S) In western Cambodia in MR III the enemy was active in the area around Battambang City and succeeded in interdicting both Route 5 and the rail line to Phnom Penh. The area produced 22 percent of the total rice crop in Cambodia, and December was the rice harvesting season. Enough rice was produced in provinces other than Battambang to feed the entire country; however, loss of the crop from the area was a severe blow to the Cambodian economy. (116)

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ARC LIGHT SORTIES IN CAMBODIA, PERCENTAGE OF SEA TOTAL




Source: MACJ3

* Data not available

FIGURE VI-31

FIXED-WING GUNSHIP SORTIES IN CAMBODIA, PERCENTAGE OF SEA TOTAL



Source: MACJ3 and SEADAB

FIGURE VI-32

* For Cambodian Air Operations during May and June see Annex C.
** July data not available.

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
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TACAIR SORTIES IN CAMBODIA, PERCENTAGE OF SEA TOTAL



1970	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
USAF					4661	3465	857	1370	1107	302	524	1203
USMC					16	4	0	0	0	0	0	0
USN					0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
VNAP					1712	1292	976	816	915	1016	1404	1358
TOTAL					6389	4761	1833	2186	2022	1318	1928	2561
PERCENTAGE					26	24	12	14	12	12	14	16

Source: MACJ3

FIGURE VI-33

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


FIGURE VI-34

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AIR OPERATIONS IN LAOS

Air power has played a critical part in our whole effort in SEA. The enemy has two logistics systems, one in Laos and one in Cambodia. The one in Laos is direct

The air effort in Laos during the dry season was to interdict. In 1968, the program was successful. We know this, because when the dry season was over he didn't have enough supplies in SVN to meet his purposes during the wet season. He, of course, planned for a certain amount of losses, but I think his losses exceeded what he had planned for his operations in upper II Corps and I Corps.

In 1969, the effort was also successful because of a good combination of pressure on the ground...and the air interdiction in Laos(117)

General Creighton W. Abrams
3 Mar 70

General

(S) Basically there were two distinct air operations in Laos. In northern Laos air was used to support US-backed Meo guerrilla forces led by Maj Gen Vang Pao. Those operations were in the BARREL ROLL area (see Figure VI-34). To the south was the STEEL TIGER area where most of the interdiction operations took place. More than a third of the total ARC LIGHT gunship, and TACAIR sorties in 1970 were utilized in Laos. (For further discussion of this subject see TOP SECRET Supplement.)

Command and Control

(S) The US Ambassador to Laos was charged with the overall direction of the war effort. US Forces operating in Laos consisted of aircraft from Navy carriers (CTF-77), 1 MAF, USAF bases in RVN and Thailand, and SAC forces supporting MACV. DEPCOMUSMACV for Air, acting for COMUSMACV, controlled the forces as shown in Figure VI-35. The air-control structure, including the Raven FACs, was under the direction of the US Air Attache in Vientiane, Laos.

(S) In STEEL TIGER the air effort was controlled by tight and experience-tested procedures. Such was not the case in BARREL ROLL. The concern of DEPCOMUSMACV for Air about the command and control arrangements in BARREL ROLL in early 1970 was reflected in the following statement.

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AIR OPERATIONS IN LAOS




FIGURE VI-35

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...Command and control in ... BARREL ROLL is weak. The Ravens are our best FACs but they don't give a damn about paperwork and reporting, and we don't always know what's happening with our strikes. Sometimes they're using them on targets remote from the main action where they are needed. The nuts and bolts of command and control are the same in BARREL ROLL as in the rest of the theater. But it's not as tight there. In STEEL TIGER, we know what's there and what is being done, and operations are coordinated and carefully watched. That's not the case in BARREL ROLL.... (119)

(S) The problem of assessing results in BARREL ROLL was further amplified in the following comments of DEPCOMUSMACV for Air.

We think we're providing enough sorties but Vang Pao doesn't always think so. When I talked with Vang Pao ... he said "Americans like KBA. Buddhists no like. American pilots like KBA and we like American pilots." It's a great comfort for them to have radio contact with a pilot overhead and they think the way to get more air is by inflating KBA.... (120)

Rules of Engagement

(U) For discussion of this subject see TOP SECRET Supplement.

Interdiction and Close Air Support in BARREL ROLL

(S) The role of airpower in BARREL ROLL was documented in a series of CHECO reports which covered activities back to the initial involvement in May 1964 when enemy occupation of the Plain of Jars triggered a US air effort. Part of the overview of the latest report follows:

During the 1969-1970 dry season in Northern Laos, airpower played a critical role in supporting friendly guerrilla forces fighting defensively against two North Vietnamese divisions using tanks and artillery. Prior to November 1969, US-backed Meo guerrilla forces led by Maj Gen Vang Pao and supported by a record 200 USAF sorties a day had pushed across the Plain of Jars, captured 8,000 tons of enemy equipment, killed several thousand enemy soldiers, and reached advanced positions only a few miles from the border of North Vietnam. Considered the greatest Lao victory of the war, this success was clearly attributed to airpower used to advantage to support outnumbered and outgunned friendly guerrillas. It was recognized at the time that the guerrillas could not hold their gains against an inevitable dry season enemy offensive, but it was hoped that this enemy reaction could be delayed. The enemy had been caught off balance, losing his pre-stocked caches in the Plain of

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Aerial View of Long Tieng (LS 20A) General Vang Pao's Headquarters

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Jars area, as well as a population base which could hide him, carry his supplies, dig his trenches and bunkers, and provide him with food.

A high sortie rate, averaging 150 a day in November and December 1969, and January 1970, supported Vang Pao's advanced troops and struck interdiction points primarily on Route 7, leading from North Vietnam to the heartland of Laos. In all, the combination of USAF airpower and Vang Pao's ground troops managed to hold the enemy back for a critical three and one-half months after the start of the dry season.

As the roads dried out, as Vang Pao's troops began to tire from five months on the front line, and as one of the worst ground hazes in memory restricted visibility over all of northern Laos, the enemy attempted to move. His first attacks in December 1969 and early January 1970 were beaten back.

On 12 January, after four days of bad weather, the enemy took Phou Nok Kok, a key northeast entry point to the Plain of Jars (PDJ) on Route 7, where more than 250 of Vang Pao's guerrillas straddled the road. Phou Nok Kok was called "the cork in the bottle" of the plain. More than a month later, on 21 February, Xieng Khouang, the main airfield of the PDJ with a supply base and some 1,300 troops, was finally taken as its troops deserted without a fight. Muong Soul, west of the Plain, with its airstrip serving 11 Royal Lao Air Force T-28s, was lost on the night of 24 February 1970, when its 120 defenders also fled without fighting. There followed three weeks of relative quiet, during which the USAF sortie rate dropped from 200 daily to less than 100 daily due to lack of targets. Then, on 17 March the enemy hit the "Vang Pao Line" south of the PDJ, consisting of five strong points manned by 3,000 friendly guerrillas, appearing in in strength all around Sam Thong and Vang Pao's headquarters base of Long Tieng.

Sam Thong was evacuated, and on 17 March 1970, it looked as if Long Tieng would also be lost, but in a critical four-day period, with airstrikes during extremely poor visibility, reinforcement were brought into Long Tieng, and the key head-quarters site held. By the end of March, the enemy appeared to have reached his high water mark, and Vang Pao, aided by improved weather conditions for air support, was able to mount a limited offensive.

While the loss of the PDJ was expected and air plans made accordingly, the final rapid enemy advance, the crumbling of friendly defenses, and the fact that the North Vietnamese had moved deep into Laos created a dangerous situation: "It made a serious loss, psychologically, politically, and militarily," said US Ambassador to Laos, G. McMurtrie Godley.

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Four major elements which influenced the role of airpower during the enemy advances in the 1969-1970 dry season are emphasized in this report. First is the relationship of highly sophisticated tactical airpower to irregular ground troops fighting against regular forces. Second is the extremely complex control mechanism by which US airpower was directed. Third are intelligence and targeting problems in an environment very favorable to enemy forces. Finally, there are the adverse weather conditions in Northern Laos during the 1969-1970 dry season, when a haze created by smoke and dust completely covered the combat area for long and critical periods. (121)

A5

(S) Commander, 7AF, assessed the 1969-1970 dry season campaign in the preface of the report. He said:

This ... (is) a unique use of tactical air power in support of guerrilla forces in northern Laos. The problems of targeting, command and control, operations during poor weather, and force allocation, and the lessons learned, have relevance for future operations.

This report covers a period during which air power was able to sustain a small group of Meo guerrillas within the shadow of the North Vietnam border, under mounting pressure from regular enemy forces. Although the air operations were constantly restricted by poor weather that limited reconnaissance and attacks to six hours or less per day, the net result of the combined tactical air and friendly guerrilla operations was a three and a half month delay of the enemy's dry season offensive.

The enemy had lost the Plain of Jars at high cost, and he reoccupied it at high cost. The cost would have been even higher had the guerrilla forces stood and fought in a delaying action thus forcing the enemy to mass and present targets for air attack. The enemy recovered a depopulated PDJ devoid of crops and supply caches and he owned it only at night and during bad weather. His situation in April 1970 was markedly different and worse than in June 1969 when he last held the same territory. (122)

(U) Air support of Gen Vang Pao's forces and the interdiction program in BARREL ROLL are covered in the monthly reports which follow.

January

(S) The enemy's transportation efforts in BARREL ROLL were concentrated on resupplying his troops in the Plain of Jars. Routes 6, 61, and 68 were used to move supplies into Ban Ban Valley. There were 910 sensor detections and 175 visual observations in BARREL ROLL for the month. On 24 Jan 70 reporting of BARREL ROLL sensor activations was discontinued.

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(S) In BARREL ROLL operations, strikes were allocated to Raven FACs (FACs in Laos under direct control of Air Attache, Laos; they usually flew with Lao observer aboard) to deter the enemy's ground offensive in the Plain of Jars. Toward the end of the month, two special targeting areas were established. One was located 5 km south of the junction of Routes 7 and 11 and the other on the eastern slopes of Phou Nok Kok. Beginning 23 Jan 70, a concentrated effort was directed against those boxes utilizing LORAN/COMMANDO NAIL systems. Package emplacements (mixture of munitions consisting of road-cutting ordnance, mines, and anti-vehicle, and anti-personnel ordnance dropped in that order) terminated on Route 7K on 18 Jan 70, as sorties were devoted to perishable area targets. Truck-kill missions continued to operate at night. At the end of the month, additional target boxes also were established in the Ban Ban Valley and south of Route 7.

(S) Friendly ground forces in the area of the target box south of the junction of Routes 7 and 71 reported heavy damage with numerous KIA and WIA. BDA reported was 68 secondary fires and one secondary explosion which was 10 times normal size. Total TACAIR BDA in BARREL ROLL for January was 725 secondary fires and 651 secondary explosions. There were 118 trucks destroyed and 45 damaged. (123)

February

(S) The TET holiday stand-down in BARREL ROLL was followed by the expected enemy offensive against the Plain of Jars. Route 7 was the predominant LOC for resupplying the offensive, the NVA continued the munitions buildup by infiltrating tanks and artillery into the area northeast of the Plain of Jars. There were 552 visually observed trucks for the month.

(S) During the enemy's offensive against the Plain of Jars, sorties in BARREL ROLL were increased to about 200 a day and provided strike and flare support. All of the strikes in the Plain of Jars continued to be directed by Raven FACs. Special operating areas consisting of troop concentrations and bivouac areas were struck by 16 sorties a day. An average of 20 sorties per day was scheduled in an interdiction program along Routes 7 and 61 to hinder the enemy's resupply efforts. Munitions packages were implanted daily on two segments of Route 7 one on either side of Ban Ban. On 28 Feb aircraft seeding the eastern point were fired at by SAMs launched from NVN. No aircraft were hit. AC-119s began operating in an armed reconnaissance role against both road traffic and troop concentrations in BARREL ROLL.

(S) TACAIR BDA for the month included 1,863 secondary fires and 10,308 secondary explosions. There were 111 trucks destroyed and 85 damaged. An ammunition storage area near Ban Ban was struck, yielding over 10,000 small secondary fires and explosions. (124)

March

(S) During March, Royal Laotian Government (RLG) Forces in MR II were concerned primarily with stopping the NVA advance towards Long Tieng. After friendly troops completely withdrew from the Plain of Jars during the latter part of February, a defense line was established as an outer perimeter defense for the Sam Thong/Long Tieng complex. NVA units continued to pressure the line, and on 17 Mar the major thrust developed. By 18 Mar Sam Thong was evacuated and it appeared that Long Tieng would soon be under severe pressure. The anticipated NVA attack did not develop, however, and Long Tieng was reinforced. Conditions for General Vang Pao's forces subsequently improved rapidly. Sam Thong was recaptured on 30 Mar. Resupply of NVA forces on and around the Plain of Jars continued via Route 7.

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(S) Daily strikes were scheduled to interdict Route 7. Raven FACs placed strikes on enemy troops and supplies in the vicinity of the Plain of Jars while other sorties continued to destroy enemy stockpiles along Route 7. The primary objective of the night campaign was the support of friendly base camps under attack. Support to the night effort was provided by scheduling three AC-130s and four AC-119s to BARREL ROLL.

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(S) TACAIR BDA for the month totalled 124 trucks destroyed and 81 damaged, plus 917 secondary fires and 690 secondary explosions. [REDACTED] the enemy's transportation along Route 7 was hindered by package emplacements. Visual truck observations numbered 574, the great majority being on Route 7. (125)

April

(S) During April actions stabilized southwest of the Plain of Jars where the RLG Forces made some progress in expanding their defenses. To the northeast of Ban Ban the last government presence was removed. NVN units attacked and occupied the last three Royal Laotian Army positions in northeastern Xieng Khouang Province. North of the Plain of Jars, government troops at Lima Site (LS) 32 (Laotian airfield, a relatively permanent aircraft landing site, in frequent use), continued to resist intense pressure from enemy forces and the position remained under RLG control. Communist forces attacked Sam Thong on 4 and 12 Apr and received heavy casualties in each engagement. It appeared that some of the attacking forces withdrew to the northeast to refit and resupply. The Long Tieng area was relatively quiet except for periodic rocket attacks. Considerable activity occurred in the vicinity of LS-72 which was recaptured by guerrilla forces on 8 Apr. Since that time government forces applied pressure north of the site but encountered stiff resistance from well entrenched NVA forces. Helicopter operations to extract regional defense forces and refugees continued. Between 14 and 27 Apr LSs 82, 201, and 231 were evacuated.

(S) Early in April an intensive interdiction campaign, averaging 40 sorties a day, was launched against Route 7 west of Ban Ban to hinder the enemy in resupplying his forces on and near the Plain of Jars. Later in the month, strikes were again divided between those interdiction points and perishable targets. Strikes were targeted against supply stockpiles which had accumulated in the Ban Ban area as a result of the interdiction program. Raven FACs continued to direct air strikes in support of troops in contact, while gunships operated at night to locate and kill trucks.

(S) Close air support of General Vang Pao's forces aided in halting several enemy drives against LSs and other friendly positions. A series of enemy attacks on Sam Thong and LS 32 were repulsed with the aid of air strikes. Of the 742 visually-observed trucks, 140 were destroyed and 128 damaged. There were also 383 secondary fires and 628 secondary explosions. (126)

May

(S) Heavy rains associated with the beginning of the southwest monsoon season reduced the activity of the RLG and North Vietnamese/Pathet Lao (NVA/PL) Armies. Southwest of the Plain of Jars General Vang Pao consolidated the positions he won the previous month and accomplished some further gains north of Sam Thong and LS 72. By the end of the month, RLG Forces in both areas were bogged down by weather and stiff enemy resistance. Enemy pressure against Bouam Long (LS 32) declined, and government troops ventured out from the main site and region to retake outlying strong points.

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(S) Throughout the month, strikes were concentrated against the Route 7 interdiction point which was 11 km west of Ban Ban. Lucrative storage areas in the Ban Ban Valley were struck. On 27 May a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) was established to strike FAC-developed targets in BARREL ROLL. Strikes against the interdiction point on Route 7 succeeded in keeping it closed to truck traffic 29 days in May. Of the 615 visually-observed trucks in BARREL ROLL, 167 were destroyed and damaged. There were 288 secondary fires and 562 secondary explosions. (127) A5

June

(S) The effects of the southwest monsoon were evident throughout Northern Laos during June as both friendly and enemy operations were reduced considerably.

(S) The only significant territorial gain came early in the month when RLG Forces occupied a strategic hilltop position between LS 72 and LS 15 after six unsuccessful attempts. During the remainder of the month the military activity was highlighted by periodic enemy surges. Those actions probably were designed to keep government forces off balance and to preclude General Vang Pao's troops from carrying out planned operations against LS 15.

(S) Northeast of the Plain of Jars, government operations showed the most success. During the first part of the month, Bouam Long (LS 32) was still being subjected to mortar attacks; however, friendly forces began to move out and reoccupy some of the nearby HLZs. On 8 Jun the initial attempt to recapture Phou Then failed and government operations were delayed until weather conditions ensured air support would be available. Phou Then was successfully occupied on 18 June. For a few days the enemy harassed the position with ineffectual mortar attacks. Enemy pressure then subsided in the area and government patrols operated a minimum of 2 miles, and as much as 4 miles from the main site, against no enemy opposition.

(S) Indications of increased enemy pressure against LS 50/50A and LS 6 persisted throughout the month, but a serious threat did not develop at either location.

(S) A balanced strike program was maintained in BARREL ROLL against interdiction points and perishable area targets during June. Since the interdiction point 11 km west of Ban Ban remained cut with no attempt made by the enemy to repair it, strikes were made against four interdiction points east of Ban Ban. Perishable area targets were struck in the Plain of Jars, Ban Ban Valley, and around the interdiction points. Anti-personnel mines were seeded in the Sam Thong (LS 20) area as a result of a buildup of enemy activity and along trails near the interdiction point of Route 7 west of Ban Ban to hamper enemy repair and portering activity. The Nam Ou (Waterway 34) was also seeded with Mk-36s to limit enemy shipping on this river.

(S) The interdiction point west of Ban Ban was kept closed the entire month of June. Mining of the Nam Ou resulted in a reported total of 125 casualties. Of the 274 visually-observed trucks in BARREL ROLL, 54 were destroyed and 38 damaged. There were 91 secondary fires and 287 secondary explosions. (128)

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July

(S) During July the disposition of opposing forces in northeastern Laos remained relatively static. Most of the activity during the month consisted of small-scale ground probes and attacks-by-fire. Although the attacks caused only minor damage and casualties, they were sufficient to keep General Vang Pao's forces in a defensive posture throughout most of July.

(S) North of the Plain of Jars, a pattern of Communist terrorism seemed to be developing. Three attacks against civilians occurred during the month, two at the refugee camp near the LS 50/50A complex and one at the village of Ban Sop/Man. The attacks resulted in 34 civilians killed and 27 wounded.

(S) The interdiction program in BARREL ROLL continued against selected points on Route 7 east of Ban Ban. "Skyline Drive," a new road under construction south of eastern Route 7, was also struck to disrupt its use as an alternate supply route. Perishable area targets were again struck in the Ban Ban area and the Plain of Jars. In addition, strikes were conducted against perishable area targets along Routes 4 and 68. Paveway weapons (laser - guided bombs) were used throughout the month in a gun-killing role to reduce the high AAA threat.

(S) Strikes against AAA resulted in 14 guns destroyed and 5 damaged. Of the 205 visually-observed trucks in BARREL ROLL, 39 were destroyed and 41 damaged. There were 29 secondary explosions and 63 secondary fires. (129)

August

(S) Military activity in BARREL ROLL was highlighted by friendly initiated activity. Premier Souvanna Phouma ordered General Vang Pao to begin his limited wet-season offensive. The operation, designated LEAPFROG, was scheduled to commence on 3 Aug. However, only hours before the starting time, evidence was received that the NVA had foreknowledge of the plan and the operation was temporarily halted. Subsequently, a combination of bad weather and concentrated enemy pressure continued to delay the offensive. On 18 Aug, with conditions finally favorable, LEAPFROG II was launched. As the month ended, the outcome of the operation was undetermined.

(S) Enemy resupply movement in BARREL ROLL decreased. A combination of rain and bomb damage caused muddy conditions and slides on the major resupply routes.

(S) With most interdiction points along Route 7 closed or in poor condition, LOC strikes in BARREL ROLL focused on periodic seeding of the trail networks around the cutting points east and west of Ban Ban. The trail networks, along with the bypasses and motorable segments of routes leading to the interdiction points, were seeded to harass enemy portering and repair activity. Predominant strike activity during the middle of the month was directed against storage area targets because the routes remained closed. Area targets were struck around Route 7 near Ban Ban, on the eastern segment of Route 7 near the Buffer Zone, and in the Plain of Jars. A-1s augmented by F-4s and F-105s worked with the Raven FACs in close air support of friendly ground forces. As of 25 Aug, two QRF F-4s were allocated daily for support of Operation LEAPFROG.

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(S) Of the 107 visually-observed trucks in the BARREL ROLL, 18 were destroyed and 30 damaged. There were 173 secondary explosions and 50 secondary fires. (130)

September

(S) In Northern Laos during early September, friendly military activity centered in regrouping the forces of General Vang Pao, and during the later part of the period, on a continuation of Operation COUNTER PUNCH (previously designated Operation LEAPFROG). A two-pronged attack launched toward Muong Soui by General Vang Pao was unable to achieve significant gains against well-entrenched enemy forces. The timely utilization of daily TACAIR in support of the attack against Muong Soui was hampered by recurring periods of poor weather. Those friendly forces not involved in the attack on Muong Soui occupied positions in the south-west corner of the Plain of Jars.

(S) Enemy resupply activity in BARREL ROLL reflected a slight upward trend during September. Persistently heavy rainfall and TACAIR interdiction during breaks in the weather combined to keep the activity at a low level.

(S) Route 7 was maintained in an interdicted status through most of September, with periodic seeding operations conducted to harass repair and portering activity. Route 6 was interdicted, but the enemy restored it to operational status for a short time before it was again closed by TACAIR strikes. Air strikes were also conducted against storage areas and bivouac sites and in support of Operation COUNTER PUNCH when weather permitted.

(S) Of a total of 115 trucks visually observed in BARREL ROLL during the reporting period, air strikes destroyed 13 and damaged 15. There were 133 secondary explosions and 59 secondary fires reported. (131)

October

(S) Operation COUNTER PUNCH continued in Northern Laos as friendly ground units under the command of General Vang Pao successfully recaptured Muong Soui on 10 Oct and LS 15 on 17 Oct. TACAIR support provided significant assistance to friendly units involved in this activity, despite periods of recurring poor weather.

(S) Enemy resupply activity in Northern Laos continued at a low level, with TACAIR interdiction and rainfall inhibiting enemy logistic movement.

(S) TACAIR interdiction during October was directed against key points on Routes 67 and 7. Both routes were closed to vehicular throughput for most of the month. Cluster bomb units (CBUs) and time-delay ordnance were employed to hamper and harass enemy road repair and portering activity. Air strikes against enemy troop concentrations, particularly on the western edge of the Plain of Jars, provided support for friendly troops engaged in ground operations.

(S) Visual-truck observations in BARREL ROLL for October totaled 112, with 38 destroyed and 28 damaged by airstrikes. Totals for secondary fires and explosions were reported as 13 and 29, respectively. (132)

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November

(S) Support for General Vang Pao's ground operations continued to be the primary mission of TACAIR in BARREL ROLL during November. With indications of military preparations to resist Vang Pao's initiatives, enemy resupply activity increased to a moderate level and ground action intensified.

(S) In spite of sortie limitations and persistent poor flying weather, TACAIR successfully supported General Vang Pao's ground operations in the Plain of Jars area. Increasing NVA pressures against LS 15 were withstood and the enemy added an additional regiment to his positions in the Ban Ban area. On 1 Nov, the high ground at Phou Seu (southwestern Plain of Jars) was abandoned to attacking enemy forces. Phou Kok Mountain, approximately 1 mile northwest of the Phou Seu Twin Peaks, was also abandoned under enemy pressure. At month's end, a large-scale government operation against key Communist positions, including the enemy logistics center at Ban Ban, was still in progress and being supported by TACAIR. (133)

December

(S) In the ground war, the TACAIR primary mission for December was to support General Vang Pao's forces engaged in Phase III of Operation COUNTER PUNCH and the forces defending against enemy pressure on the eastern rim of the Bolovens Plateau. Enemy military and resupply operations continued at a light level during the month.

(S) TACAIR support of General Vang Pao's ground forces continued under Raven FAC control. Night sorties of AC-119 gunships provided additional support for troops in contact. Enemy initiated activity west of the Plain of Jars was light throughout the month, consisting chiefly of occasional attacks-by-fire and small unit probes. Phase III of Operation COUNTER PUNCH drew most of the enemy's attention.

(S) Friendly units northwest of Ban Ban moved into the Ban Ban Valley along Route 6 toward the end of the month, encountering only very light enemy contact. The southern task force of Operation COUNTER PUNCH moved north toward Ban Ban from the government-controlled LS 2. Irregular troops were 3 1/2 miles southeast of Ban Ban on Route 7 by the end of December, destroying a large enemy cache of four vehicles and over 100 tons of supplies enroute. One battle occurred 2 1/2 miles north of LS 2 and lasted 2 1/2 hours. The enemy showed only token resistance thereafter. (134)

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


FIGURE VI-36


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A ZIL 157 about 5 miles southeast of Sepone on Route 9. Note flat tire and spare equipment.



Truck in foreground was carrying about fifty 10-gallon cans of gasoline when it was destroyed.

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Interdiction in the STEEL TIGER Area

(S) Air interdiction in STEEL TIGER was a major threat to enemy logistics activity in Laos. The importance of air was stressed in the remarks by President Nixon on 6 Mar 70.

Our air strikes have destroyed weapons and supplies over the past four years which would have taken thousands of American lives . . . Our first priority for such operations is to interdict the continued flow of troops and supplies across Laotian territory on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. As Commander-in-Chief of our armed forces, I consider it my responsibility to use our air power to interdict this flow of supplies and men into South Vietnam and thereby avoid a heavy toll of American and allied lives. (135)

(S) During the dry season (northeast monsoons, Nov 69 - Apr 70) the enemy worked hard to rebuild roads and push supplies through the Ho Chi Minh Trail. He placed increased emphasis on transport by petroleum, oil, and lubricant POL pipelines and waterways, but the heart of his logistics system was use of trucks. One of the principal trucks used was the ZIL 157, a sophisticated six-wheel drive vehicle capable of carrying nearly 5 tons at more than 40 miles per hour over the Lao roads. The tires could be inflated or deflated by the driver while the vehicle was in motion. It allowed the driver to adjust to road or trail conditions from mud to hard surface.

(S) Truck inventory in STEEL TIGER reached 2,400 of which about 72 percent were in commission at all times. Almost exclusively a night operation, about 98 percent of the truck traffic detected by sensors was between 1700 and 0700. An average of 450 trucks operated each night, and most traffic was before midnight.

(S) The movement under cover of darkness was a complicated process of short hauls and numerous transfers. Almost all movements were by a series of short shuttles. Drivers drove their trucks over the same segment night after night and became thoroughly familiar with their assigned route.

COMMANDO HUNT III

(S) The US effort to counter enemy supply movement during the 69-70 dry season was COMMANDO HUNT III. That campaign was thoroughly documented in a 7AF report on COMMANDO HUNT III published in May 70. The study included an analysis of individual aircraft effectiveness against trucks which concluded:

1. A majority of the aircraft showed significant increase in effectiveness in attacks against trucks.
2. Jet fighter and attack aircraft destroyed or damaged 3,900 trucks, 39 percent of the campaign total.

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3. Gunships were the most effective truck killer, obtaining 48 percent of the trucks destroyed or damaged while flying only 8 percent of the sorties.

4. Gunships required two to three escort sorties for each attack sortie they flew, reflecting a team effort.

5. The AC-130 Surprise Package was the most effective individual aircraft in destroying or damaging trucks. (136)

(S) The following chart shows the effectiveness of each aircraft used in STEEL TIGER during COMMANDO HUNT III.

Effectiveness of COMMANDO HUNT III Aircraft

<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>Trucks Destroyed Or Damaged</u>	<u>Sorties Attacking Trucks</u>	<u>Trucks Struck</u>	<u>Trucks Destroyed Or Damaged Per Sortie</u>	<u>Trucks Destroyed Or Damaged Per Truck Struck</u>
Surprise Package	822	112	1104	7.34	.74
Other AC-130	2562	591	4742	4.34	.54
AC-123	440	141	854	3.12	.52
AC-119	987	435	2005	2.27	.49
A-6	977	1486	2708	.66	.36
A-1	1271	2332	4602	.55	.28
A-7	959	3147	3866	.30	.25
F-4	1576	6310	11178	.25	.14
A-4	245	1223	1446	.20	.17
Total	9839	15777	32505	.62	.30

January

(S) Shortly after the first of the year the enemy launched his January logistics offensive. The activity was reflected in 41,483 sensor detections, the highest ever recorded for one month. Visual observations were limited by weather conditions and numbered 10,695. Predominant shuttle activity and traffic flow reverted to the western routes (23, 237, 917, and 918) for movement of supplies to BA 611. (See Figure VI-36 for routes, Figure VI-11 for a map,

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and Chapter III for a discussion of BAs.) However, toward the end of the month, increased activity also was noted on the main routes (911F, 911G, 91, and 9G). Rising levels of activity were noted at the three passes of Nape, Mu Gia, and Ban Karai. Southbound trucks from Nape Pass utilized Route 81 for westward movement. Traffic through Mu Gia Pass which was light earlier in the month increased later as the pass showed increasing enemy use in his crash program for moving supplies into the panhandle. There was a considerable amount of vehicle movement immediately below the Mu Gia Pass/Ban Phe Nop entry complex that could not be supported by the level of activity noted in the Mu Gia Pass. It may have been associated with the movement of supplies which were stored in that area prior to the northeast monsoon season. Ban Karai Pass also continued to sustain rising levels of traffic in support of the January push. Heavy shuttle activity into BA 611 resulted in large stockpiles which were subsequently moved on to Route 922 for throughput in SVN, and on Route 92D/E bypass and Route 92E/96 for input into BAs 612, 614, 613, and 609. Routes 926, 921B, 922, 966, and 110 were utilized for movement of supplies to SVN with Route 922 receiving the majority of the traffic.

(S) High numbers of visually-observed and sensor-detected trucks resulted in an extensive truck-kill effort throughout the month. Gunships patrolled Routes 922, 96, 110, 92, 914, 917, 23A, 23B, and 911 nightly, and truck parks and storage areas were struck during the day. During January, Army Mohawks with SLAR accompanied the AC-119s to provide an increased capability for target acquisition. During the first weeks of the month, packages were emplaced in the areas of Mu Gia Pass, Ban Pha Nop, Routes 911, 912, 9116, 9115, and 9112 junction, Routes 92D, 92E, and 922 junction, and Route 96B. However, by the end of the month package emplacements were temporarily halted, and the sorties used for that purpose were utilized instead against truck parks and storage areas.

(S) Increased strike effort against trucks in STEEL TIGER resulted in a record number of 1,445 destroyed and 766 damaged. TACAIR BDA for the month totalled 4,385 secondary explosions and 2,767 secondary fires. (137)

(S) ARC LIGHT efforts in January were directed against truck park and storage areas, enemy personnel, bivouac areas, POL storage, and concentrations of supplies. The 681 sorties produced 1,205 secondary explosions and 640 secondary fires. (138) Increased emphasis was placed in BA 611 along Routes 92D and 922 which were being used as primary arteries for movement of enemy supplies into SVN. One strike against that complex produced 60 secondary explosions, 39 of which were two to four times normal size. (139)

(S) The average estimated daily input of enemy supplies in STEEL TIGER increased from 42 truckloads in December to 79 truckloads in January. Input areas and percentages were: Ban Karai Pass 52 percent, Mu Gia Pass 36 percent, and Routes 92A and 1039 12 percent. Throughput to the RVN border was estimated by 7AF as 33 truckloads a day compared to 12 per day for December. (140)

February

(S) Traffic flow decreased early in February as the enemy regrouped and prepared for a renewed logistics offensive. After a sharp reduction to 247 sensor detections during the TET holiday (6 Feb), traffic rose as the new logistics push was launched. Sensor detection and visual observation for the month numbered 47,562 and 8,317, respectively. South of Mu Gia Pass, although increased enemy presence occurred on the main route structure (Route 911),

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the western routes (23, 237 and 125) were the most heavily traveled. The majority of the activity in the February push involved shuttling materials via main (911, 91, 9G, and 92C) and western (23, 917, and 914) routes toward BA 611. The enemy also increased his utilization of entry corridors west of the DMZ (Routes 1039 and 92A) for input into Southern Laos. With resumption of Purple Orbit (sensor relay) providing more accurate monitoring capability, increased movement was detected in the southern panhandle as supplies were shuttled to SVN. By the end of the month, the activity was reflected in the tri-border area. Considerable enemy attention was given to expanding the road net, with over 200 km of new roads constructed since the first of the year.

(S) In STEEL TIGER, night-truck attacks continued using gunships over Routes 23, 237, 125, 122, 917, 914, 911, 92, 922, 96, 165, 966, and 110. COMMANDO BCLT (Task Force Alpha-Controlled airstrikes on moving trucks utilizing sensor activations) continued in the Ban Karai Pass area with all-weather strikes being made by A-6s and F-4s. Visual strikes were conducted by the A-1/OV-10 Panther Teams. Strikes were also directed against POL shuttling and input on Route 1039 and Waterway 7. Late in the month, a special interdiction effort was launched against Routes 926 and eastern 922, 966, and 110 to hamper enemy throughput efforts to SVN.

(S) Strikes against trucks resulted in 1,430 destroyed and 695 damaged. TACAIR BDA for the month totaled 3,121 secondary explosions and 4,287 secondary fires. The interdiction against the principal west-to-east throughput routes appeared to be successful as reduced flow was apparent at the end of the month. (141)

(S) ARC LIGHT strikes were against truck park and storage areas, supply concentrations, enemy personnel, bivouac areas, and POL pipeline and storage in areas west of the DMZ, BA 611, Tchepone, and the junction of Routes 911, 922, 9112, and 9115. A record BDA was achieved with 786 sorties resulting in 2,533 secondary explosions and 35 secondary fires. (142)

March

(S) The enemy's March logistics push did not reflect the high activity levels of January and February. As emphasis shifted from new input to shuttle movement within the panhandle, the decline was evident in both sensor detections and visual observations which decreased to 29,834 and 7,043 respectively. Large amounts of supplies previously noted entering the Laotian Panhandle were transferred to BA 611 for continued movement to SVN. The enemy appeared to have completed the season's effort through Mu Gia Pass. Input and traffic flow in the area were sharply reduced. Accompanying the reduction at Mu Gia was increased input activity on the LOCs (1039, 92A, Waterway 7J and 913) west of the DMZ. Ban Karai Pass continued to serve as a major entry corridor. As the western routes (23, 912 and 914) ceased receiving heavy traffic from Mu Gia, Ban Karai traffic shifted from the main route structure (911F, 911G, 91A, and 91B) to these western routes. Inputs from LOCs west of the DMZ utilized main routes (9G, and 92C) enroute to BA 611. Routes 972, 92E and 96 were used to move materials from BA 611 toward SVN and BA 612. Later in the month, increased traffic was noted on Route 966 toward BA 614 and on Route 110 toward BA 609. Movement along roads in the southern panhandle was supplemented by the floating of POL and supplies down Waterway 4.

(S) The intensified road cutting by TACAIR which began late in February along Routes 96, 966, and 110 continued throughout March with increased shuttling of supplies through BA 611 :

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additional interdiction points on Routes 92D and 929 were struck. Day strikes were also made against truck park and storage areas from Ban Karai Pass south, especially in the areas of Routes 92A and Waterway 7J, 92D-922 junction, and 966. Night truck hunter/killer coverage was maintained by the gunships operating throughout the panhandle.

(S) Sensor detections and other reliable intelligence revealed that the interdiction packages on Routes 92D and T929 adversely affected enemy traffic. Sensor detected traffic and FAC VR along Route 96 also indicated package emplacements hampered the enemy's throughput. Strikes against trucks in STEEL TIGER resulted in 1,119 destroyed and 636 damaged. In addition, 4,392 secondary fires and 4,513 secondary explosions were reported. (143)

(S) From the junction of Routes 911, 912, 9112 and 9115 south to BA 611, ARC LIGHT strikes were again directed against truck park and storage areas, supply concentrations, enemy personnel, bivouac areas, and POL pipeline and storage areas. For the second month in a row, a high BDA was achieved. A total of 917 sorties resulted in 3,174 secondary explosions and 14 secondary fires. (144)

April

(S) In April, sensor detections and visual observations further decreased to 20,253 and 6,353 respectively. The enemy's transportation activity during the month was concentrated on the movement of supplies from storage areas in the central panhandle to areas near SVN. The effort reached its highest point near the middle of the month. The light traffic detected south of Mu Gia Pass was apparently related to local resupply. Input through Ban Karai Pass decreased, and by the end of the month it was no longer used as a primary entry corridor. Early in the month, movement of goods from stockpiles along Route 912 proceeded toward BA 604 via western Routes (23G, and 917), but later reverted to main routes (91, 918 and 911). LOCs west of the DMZ (1039, T1035, 92A and Waterway 7J) supported the majority of enemy input into Laos during April. Traffic continued toward BA 611 utilizing Routes 9G and 92C, while Routes 914B and 914C supported traffic from Ban Karai. Throughout the period, Routes 922, 966 and 110 were again used for movement toward SVN. By the end of the month, rainfall began to affect LOCs and hamper some enemy traffic.

(S) With increased enemy activity west of the DMZ, interdiction points along Routes 1039 and 92A were targeted by TACAIR to impede enemy input. Strikes were also conducted against interdiction points along Routes T929, 96, 966 and 110, and the junction area of Routes 92D and 922 to deter truck movement. With a decline in activity at Ban Karai and a corresponding increase developing west of the DMZ, a COMMANDO BOLT operation was established along Routes 92A and T1038 at the end of the month. Three new sensor strings were emplaced along Routes T1038 and 92A over a 30 km segment to provide a monitoring capability to direct strikes against movers at 10 impact points on Routes 913, 92A, and T1038. Day strikes were conducted against perishable area targets, especially along Routes T929, 966, 922, and in the Tchepone area. Gunships continued to operate at night in a truck-hunter/killer role.

(S) Truck strikes resulted in 1,060 destroyed and 679 damaged. Secondary fires and explosions for the month totaled 2,803 and 3,707 respectively. (145)

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(S) ARC LIGHT strikes during April were conducted against truck park and storage areas, supply concentrations, and enemy personnel and bivouac areas along Routes 92A and 966 and in BA 611. There were 579 sorties resulting in 499 secondary explosions and 3 secondary fires. Poor weather conditions restricted reporting of BDA. (146)

May

(S) There was a gradual decline in the enemy's logistics movement during May. Sensor detections decreased from 20,253 to 17,788 and visual observations from 6,353 to 4,077. Traffic was light south of Mu Gia and Ban Karai Passes and was probably engaged in local resupply activity. The Ban Raving area, west of the DMZ, supported the majority of the input to the Laotian Panhandle. As stockpiles along routes south of Ban Karai were depleted, shuttling of materials to BA 604 decreased. Movement into and out of BA 611 continued, but at a reduced rate. By the end of the month, traffic was predominantly northbound with some trucks returning to NVN. Corduroying and graveling were noted on most major routes throughout the panhandle as the enemy attempted to maintain the roads into the rainy season. Construction work was reported on Routes 1032B and 92B from the junction of 92A south to 90. Development of those routes would provide the enemy with more direct access to the southern panhandle.

(S) TACAIR emphasis was placed on striking road segments to intensify deterioration from increasing rainfall. Interdiction continued along Routes 1038, 1039, and 92A to curb input traffic and to hinder throughput movement. Interdiction points along Routes 110D, 96, 92D, 922, 926, and 929 were struck. QRF of six to 12 F-4s was established [redacted] on 23 May for use in STEEL TIGER. The aircraft and crews were placed on 30-minute reaction status to launch only when needed against lucrative targets developed by FACs. Night surveillance of Waterway 4 was initiated and gunships patrolled it. After the enemy takeover of Attopeu on 30 Apr, the US augmented the Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF) in the defense of the Bolovens Plateau. A5

(S) The interdiction program combined with rainfall along Routes 110, 922, and 966 caused some slides and muddy conditions which restricted enemy movement and resulted in a decrease of the throughput. There were 503 trucks destroyed and 495 damaged with 1,418 secondary fires and 1,706 secondary explosions. Poor flying weather caused many sortie cancellations. (147)

(S) ARC LIGHT strikes were concentrated along Routes 92A and 1039. The targets consisted of truck parks and storage areas, POL storage, bivouac sites, and enemy personnel. The 186 sorties resulted in 346 aircrew-observed secondaries. Weather restricted BDA efforts. (148)

June

(S) Increasing rainfall and selective interdiction resulted in deteriorating route conditions throughout the Laotian Panhandle. That caused a decrease in sensor detections (17,788 to 8,340) and visual observations (4,077 to 2,044) during June. In the areas of Mu Gia and Ban Karai Passes and the route network to the south of those passes, the enemy was engaged in local resupply movement and maintaining the routes. The Ban Raving area continued to be the main input route into Laos; however, activity there was also at a reduced level. Traffic was monitored on Route 1032A proceeding south with supplies to be transported on Waterway 7.

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Supplies from the Ban Raving area were shuttled farther south to BA 611 via Route 914B/C and to Route 926 via Route 92C. A reduction in shuttle activity was noted into BA 611 and from BA 611 south to BAs 612, 614 and 613 where weather damage to routes was light. Activity on Waterway 4 also was light with river teams reporting an average of seven craft a day along segments between Ban Bak and the Cambodian border. Although the roads in extreme Southern Laos remained in motorable condition, very little traffic was monitored on Routes 110A/B and 1101 and in the tri-border area.

(S) The primary TACAIR strike emphasis during June was against interdiction points and seeding segments along Routes 1039, 92A, 929, 914B/C, 922, 926, and 110 to hamper the enemy's transportation efforts. With continued heavy use of Waterway 7, strikes were conducted against POL drums being shipped down that LOC. Paveway strikes were conducted periodically against the Ban La Boy fords south of Ban Karai Pass. With continued activity at Ban Karai and Ban Raving and increasingly poor flying weather, the number of aircraft scheduled nightly to COMMANDO BOLT was increased. By the end of the month, the gunship strength was reduced to three AC-130s and 8 AC-119s as some AC-130s left for inspection and repair. The AC-123s flew their last combat mission on 28 Jun prior to their rotation to the United States.

(S) Strikes against interdiction points along Routes 926, 922, 966, and 110, combined with rainfall, resulted in numerous road cuts and slides and caused a corresponding drop in throughput during June. A total of 227 trucks were destroyed and 222 damaged with 589 secondary fires and 1,584 secondary explosions. There were 1,461 drums destroyed on Waterway 7. Many sortie cancellations were caused by poor flying weather. (149)

(S) During the month ARC LIGHT strikes were concentrated west of the DMZ along Routes 92A and 1032B, in BA 611, and along the routes leading into SVN. Poor weather was a key factor affecting visual BDA with over half of the total sorties unable to observe results because of the weather. There were 298 secondary fires and explosions reported from 551 sorties. (150)

July

(S) Rainfall throughout July was intermittent, resulting in periods of wet road conditions. That, coupled with continuing interdiction and reduced enemy activity, caused a further reduction in sensor detections (8,340 to 3,098) and visual observations (2,044 to 1,115). The Ban Raving area continued to support the majority of input into the Laotian Panhandle. A surge in traffic flow shuttling supplies to Waterway 7 was noted on Route 1032A. The enemy appeared to take increased advantage of the waterways as routes in the area became difficult to traverse. A significant amount of activity was monitored on Route 913, as supplies from Waterway 7, Route 92A, and the pipeline complex west of the DMZ were transported to BA 611. At the end of the month, a sharp increase in southbound movers through Ban Karai was detected. That could have resulted from the increasingly poor condition of LOCs in the Ban Raving area, with the enemy reverting to Ban Karai for input, or it could have been a local resupply effort. Light shuttle traffic which was proceeding to BA 611 was monitored on Routes 914B/C and 92C/D. Predominant throughput movement in July occurred on Route 922, although at a reduced level.



(S) Movement in the southern panhandle, towards BA 612, Chavane, and the tri-border area was extremely light. Since the route network in that area remained in relatively good condition, the enemy was probably encountering difficulties other than weather-damaged roads. Reliable reports indicated that POL shortages, at least in some areas, were hampering enemy transportation efforts. There were also indications the enemy planned to use Waterway 4.

(S) During July TACAIR strikes were continued against interdiction points on Routes 922, 110, 926 and in the area of Routes 924 and 96. The heaviest effort was directed against the Route 922 network where the enemy was concentrating his throughput movement. A plan was implemented which involved cutting two interdiction points on Route 922 during the day, keeping NIGHT OWL (delivering of ordnance by light of flares) FACs overhead to interfere with road repairs, and thus channeling truck traffic farther south on Route 922 into gunship coverage. Perishable area targets were struck along Routes 92A, 9G, 914 and 922 and Waterway 7. Rock channeling jetties on Waterway 7, used to control floating POL drums and supply sacks, were struck to impede supply shipment on the river. On and after 10 Jul, all-weather sorties were directed against selected perishable areas targets. Also, two special target boxes were established for FAC-controlled strikes, one in the Ban Bak area and one northeast of Tchepone. To exploit breaks in the weather, a surging operation was originated based on short-term forecasts. Available and unscheduled aircraft were placed on standby alert prior to the predicted breaks and with minimum warning were launched for FAC-controlled strikes. Segments of Waterway 4D, E, and G were seeded with Mk-36s early in the month.

(S) Concentration on Route 922 resulted in a corresponding drop in throughput. Strikes against jetties on Waterway 7 enhanced flooding and hindered shipment of supplies on that LOC. The QRF plus surging operations permitted exploitation of short breaks in the weather. A total of 123 trucks were destroyed and 105 damaged, with 178 secondary fires and 269 secondary explosions reported. (151)

(S) ARC LIGHT strikes during July were primarily against truck park and storage areas, concentration of supplies, the POL pipeline, and enemy personnel. The majority of targets struck were located along the southern segment of Route 92A, along the newly constructed Route 1032B, and in BA 611 south of Route 922. A total of 677 sorties were flown over the Laotian Panhandle and aircrews report 1 459 secondary explosions and fires. There were 318 sorties which could not report results because of poor weather. (152)

(S) The estimated average daily input of enemy supplies into STEEL TIGER by truck decreased from 21 truckloads in June to 6 truckloads in July. Waterway 7J input, which increased from an estimated 19 to 40 tons input per day as of 1 Jul, and the pipelines (an estimated 15 tons per day) accounted for 55 tons daily or the equivalent of an additional 18 truckloads per day. Ban Karai handled 55 percent of the total truck input, compared to 33 percent for June. The remaining 45 percent was attributed to Ban Raving, compared with 67 percent in June. No input was detected through Mu Gia during July.

(S) It is estimated that an average of three truckloads of throughput reached the SVN border area per day, compared with 6 truckloads in June. Route 922 accounted for 82 percent of the total throughput. Route 110D was second with 8 percent. (153)

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August

(S) Activity continued at a moderate level for the first half of August with only isolated segments of the main road network being unusable. The majority of the truck input came through Ban Karai Pass, while Waterway 7J and the pipeline were the primary LOCs used for input in the Ban Raving area. The input through Ban Karai could have been high priority cargo needed in preparation for launching the dry season campaign. Input through Ban Raving probably consisted of food and POL products.

(S) Supplies that entered Laos through Ban Karai may have been in the trucks detected on Routes 239 and 917 after they moved farther south. A light shuttle was also maintained towards BA 611 on Routes 914B/C and 92C/D. In the central panhandle, increased traffic on Routes X929 and X928 to BA 612 and on Route 96D to the tri-border area indicated enemy effort to resupply those areas.

(C) By mid-month, heavy rainfall created severe flooding conditions and slides on many of the routes and high water at the fords. Flooding on Waterway 7J scattered and destroyed supplies, and the enemy temporarily ceased use of that LOC. Daily traffic levels declined markedly to the lowest number of detections during the 1970 wet season. It was reflected in an overall monthly decrease of sensor detections (3,098 to 1,639) and visual observations (1,115 to 635). Though total activity was light, a significant rise in eastbound movement on Route 966D towards BA 614 was detected late in August. Since interdiction points along Route 966 were closed and FACs had noted bicycle tracks, it appeared the enemy was portering supplies around unmotorable route segments for movement toward border storage areas.

(S) The interdiction program was focused on motorable input and throughput routes and on critical road segments in the central route structure from Ban Karai Pass south to the Routes 92D and 922 junction area. The Ban Laboy and Routes 911 and 912 junction areas were struck to hamper the southward movement of the supplies noted entering through Ban Karai. Interdiction points along Route 92D were attacked to reduce shuttle movement towards BA 611. Strikes were continued against interdiction points on Route 9221 to channel truck traffic south into orbiting gunship areas. Near the end of the month, sorties against those interdiction points were reduced because most remained closed due to bomb damage and weather. Area targets containing stockpiles of supplies were bombed along the networks of Routes 912 and 913. In addition, transshipment points and barrels along Waterway 7 were hit. Fighters attacked channeling jetties on Waterway 7 to complement the effects of high water and counteract input. Gunship coverage was maintained over LOCs in the central route structure and over active throughput routes. With the increase in activity on Route 966D, A-6s and gunships provided night coverage along the network. Throughput on the Route 922 network remained low as the result of the interdiction and gunship program on this LOC. Due to increased utilization and excellent results, the QRF was increased from 12 to 16 F-4s a day.

(S) A reduction of enemy activity in STEEL TIGER was reflected in the month's BDA of 70 trucks destroyed and 38 damaged. A total of 308 secondary fires and 642 secondary explosions was also reported. (154)

(S) ARC LIGHT strikes during August were directed against truck park/storage areas, concentrations of supplies, and the POL pipeline in the Ban Raving area. Aircrews who flew the 606 sorties reported 251 secondary fires and explosions and 311 sorties unobserved due to weather. (155)

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September

(S) Enemy activity during the first 3 weeks of September continued at a low level. An upward trend in logistic activity noted during the latter part of the month was quickly reversed by the return of inclement weather. Mark 36 mines were seeded along key route segments during the last 9 days of the month. No movement was recorded on Waterway 7J the first 21 days, but it increased substantially near the end of the month. As a result of that increase, Ban Raving became the primary entry gate, with Ban Karai ranking second in total input tonnage.

(S) Bad weather and air strikes against interdiction points continued to restrict the logistic flow in STEEL TIGER. Priority attention was given by the enemy to road repair and construction at the expense of logistical movement. Heavy rainfall during the latter part of the reporting period created widespread flood conditions, compounding the problem faced by the enemy in attempting to reopen and extend his LOCs.

(S) Sensor detections and visual-truck observations declined throughout the month and eventually reached the lowest recorded points for the 70-71 wet season. Sensor detections decreased from 1,693 in August to 423 for September, while visual observations declined from 635 to 336.

(S) September interdiction was concentrated on the two major input areas, Ban Karai and Ban Raving Passes and on Route 922, the principal throughput route leading into the A Shau Valley. A continuous strike effort was maintained by cutting interdiction points and seeding vulnerable route segments by day and employing gunships, night FACs with QRF, and COMMANDO BOLT attacks against the LOCs at night. Enemy repair and construction activities were hampered by the combined pressures of TACAIR operations and bad weather. TACAIR BDA for the period of this report included 37 trucks destroyed, 27 trucks damaged, 338 secondary explosions, and 149 secondary fires.

(S) Day and night air support was also provided for the RLG ground operations, Operation GAUNTLET, conducted in the Bolovens Plateau and adjacent areas. (156)

(S) ARC LIGHT strikes, directed against target boxes containing truck parks, storage areas, POL facilities, and bivouac sites, recorded 241 secondary explosions during September. Of the total of 556 sorties, the results of 317 were not observed due to weather. (157)

(S) The estimated daily input of supplies by truck into STEEL TIGER decreased from an average input of 6 truckloads per day in August to 2 truckloads per day in September. Although no input was detected on Waterway 7J during the first week in September, 150 tons were credited to the system for the period 23-30 September. POL pipeline input through Ban Raving was estimated at 35 tons for the period 16-22 September, with zero input estimated for the rest of the month. Collectively, Waterway 7J and the associated POL pipeline introduced an average of 6 tons per day into the enemy's logistical system, equating to 55 percent of the total input into STEEL TIGER for September. The remaining 45 percent came through Ban Karai Pass.

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(S) Throughput to the Laos/SVN border area for September was estimated to have averaged 4 truckloads per day for August, representing a substantial reduction. A 7AF mathematical analysis determined that 60 tons per day were consumed by the enemy in the maintenance of his southern Laos logistical system. BDA for September was estimated at 13 tons per day based on further calculations. In September the patterns and intent of enemy logistical activity from Laos to Cambodia were insufficiently clear to permit quantification with any degree of accuracy. The level of such activity, however, was still believed to be insignificant. (158)

October and COMMANDO HUNT V

(S) The COMMANDO HUNT V Dry Season Interdiction Campaign was initiated on 10 Oct 70. It opened with an intensive concentration of sorties against four specially selected interdiction boxes across the major entry routes from North Vietnam into the Laotian Panhandle. The northernmost box, Alpha, was located astride Routes 1202 and 23A, 11 NM south of Mu Gia Pass. Box Bravo provided coverage of Routes 912B and 9125, 9 NM southwest of Ban Karai Pass. Box Charlie, 11 NM west of the DMZ, covered Waterway 7J, Routes 92A and 1035, and the POL pipeline. Box Delta, at the western end of the DMZ, covered Waterway 7J and Routes 92A and 1032B. (See Figure VI-36.) A general increase in enemy logistics activity, detected early in the month, was quickly reversed and by the end of October enemy input and throughput was at a virtual standstill. An estimated 51 southbound trucks had traversed the entry interdiction points since the campaign began on 10 Oct. No trucks transited any box during the last week of October.

(S) Ban Karai was the primary source of input during October, with Mu Gia following in second place. In the Ban Raving area, input was limited, and most activity was on repair and construction projects. By the end of October, air strikes and heavy rainfall obliterated all traces of previously used routes in the four entry interdiction boxes, making them impassable for vehicular traffic.

(S) No throughput traffic was detected for the entire month of October. Tactical interdiction using instantaneous and delayed-fuzed ordnance, together with heavy rainfall, reduced selected interdiction points in the core route structure to an impassable state. The resultant zero throughput for October marked the longest continuous blockage of enemy logistic movement recorded thus far. The only other reporting period with zero throughput was the week of 1-7 October 1969.

(S) In the central Laotian Panhandle, enemy supply shuttle activity was considerably below the level anticipated, but accounted for the 923 detections during October, substantially above the 423 recorded for September. Trucks sighted in STEEL TIGER totalled 431 for October as compared with 336 observations for the previous month.

(S) ARC LIGHT and TACAIR sorties were employed in a well-coordinated day and night effort directed at four strategically placed interdiction boxes on the three major input routes from North Vietnam. That concentrated interdiction program, utilizing the combined assets of TACAIR and ARC LIGHT, initially limited enemy vehicular movement through the special target boxes and combined with the rains from tropical storm Kate, completely obliterated the routes which previously traversed the boxes. For the final 6 days of October, no input was detected entering the Laotian logistic structure from North Vietnam.

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173037N 1054352E
WZ 7603600
VI 11358 23OCT70 059LP

101A 217713
CONFIDENTIAL GP-4


(C) Route 1202 in Interdiction Box Alpha on 23 Oct 70.

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(C) Route 912 B in Interdiction Box Bravo as it appeared on 11 Oct 70.



(C) The same area (indicated by lines) as it appeared on 24 Nov 70.

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(S) Interdiction pressure was maintained on throughput routes, Routes 922, 966 and 110, into RVN and Cambodia during October, with interdiction points closed by airstrikes and heavy rains. Utilization of the QRF F-4 aircraft continued through October with little change from the sortie level recorded for the previous month. The arrival on 17 Oct of the new B-57Gs provided a significant augmentation to the AC-119 and AC-130 gunship program. Recorded BDA by TACAIR strikes for October included 33 trucks destroyed, 23 trucks damaged, 87 secondary fires, and 101 secondary explosions. (159) ARC LIGHT BDA for the period was 833 secondary explosions and two secondary fires. Of 922 ARC LIGHT sorties, results on only 423 could be observed due to weather. (160)

(S) It was estimated that an average of nine truckloads of supplies per day entered STEEL TIGER during October versus an average of two per day for the previous month. No October input was detected through the POL pipeline or on Waterway 7J. Input through Ban Karai accounted for 63 percent of the October total (previous month - 45 percent), with 31 percent being credited to Mu Gia (zero percent for September) and the remaining 6 percent through Ban Raving (55 percent for September).

(S) No throughput was detected to the Laos/South Vietnam border area during October. The average for September was an estimated four truckloads per day. It was estimated that the enemy consumed 65 tons of supplies per day in the maintenance of his Southern Laotian logistic system. For October, the daily average BDA was calculated to be 13 tons per day. Enemy throughput from Southern Laos into Cambodia was believed to be insignificant. (161)

November

(S) During November, the major emphasis of the COMMANDO HUNT V Northeast Monsoon Campaign was against the four entry interdiction boxes across the major input routes from North Vietnam into Laos, against trucks in the central route structure, and interdiction points on the exit routes.

(S) Ban Karai remained the primary input corridor, with Mu Gia second, although input increased through the Ban Raving area during the last half of the month. At the month's close, unusually wet weather slowed truck traffic in Northern STEEL TIGER.

(S) Throughput into Cambodia was detected for the first time, although the volume was insignificant. The flow toward RVN was small, going from zero for the first ten days to only token levels. Strikes against selected interdiction points kept major throughput routes closed for most of the period, while TACAIR and gunship strikes gradually increased their toll against trucks moving through the road network. Poor weather was a limiting factor throughout the month on air operations as well as on enemy logistic movements.

(S) Coordinated ARC LIGHT and TACAIR strikes on interdiction points Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, and Delta restricted logistics flow into the central route structure. The enemy stockpiled goods north of the target boxes, portering, bypassing, and surging supplies through or around the interdicted areas between strikes. As indicated by total sensor detections, November traffic levels in STEEL TIGER were eight times greater than in October. The amount of detected supply traffic through or around the entry interdiction areas showed moderate increases for all three input corridors, Mu Gia, Ban Karai, and Ban Raving. Traffic was extremely light for the first 10 days of the month, then increased to its peak during the third week. Air strikes combined with heavy rain to slow enemy logistics traffic to a low level by the month's end.

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(S) Input to storage areas north of the entry interdiction boxes more than quadrupled over October levels. However, day and night saturation bombing hampered large-scale southward supply movement. There was evidence of shortages in enemy supplies in MR IV in the southern panhandle.

(S) Estimated throughput, which was zero during October and for the first 10 days of November, increased to token levels for the remainder of the month. For throughput toward SVN, Route 966 was the primary LOC carrying 19 truckloads during the month. Route 926 ranked second, with six truckloads of throughput. For the first time, throughput moving toward Cambodia was detected, consisting of watercraft on Waterway 4D and truck movements on Route 110A. Although approximately the same number of trucks were inputted during November 1970 compared to 1969, the interdiction campaign, complemented by bad weather, reduced throughput to a level far below that of the previous year.

(S) It was estimated that an average of 42 truckloads of supplies per day entered STEEL TIGER during November versus an average of nine per day in October. No measurable November input was detected on Waterway 7J. The POL pipeline was estimated to average 15 tons (nearly 4 equivalent truckloads) input per day during the period 25-30 November. No pipeline input was detected for the remainder of the month. Input through Ban Karai accounted for 46 percent of the November total (63 percent in October), with 30 percent through Mu Gia (October, 31 percent) and 24 percent through Ban Raving (October, 6 percent).

(S) Estimated throughput averaged less than one truckload per day toward RVN during November and less than two equivalent truckloads weekly toward Cambodia. Route 966 accounted for 65 percent of throughput toward RVN, while Routes 926 and 922 carried 21 percent and 14 percent, respectively. Waterway 4D carried 59 percent of the throughput toward Cambodia and Route 110A had 41 percent. Consumption of 76 tons per day was calculated to be required to maintain the southern Laotian logistics system. BDA for November was estimated to be 41 tons per day. (162)

December

(S) The major emphasis of the COMMANDO HUNT V Northeast Monsoon Campaign during December was on the four entry interdiction boxes across the major input routes from North Vietnam into Laos and on attacks against trucks in STEEL TIGER. Strikes against perishable-area targets in the central route structure increased with the rise in logistical activity. Interdiction points struck were mainly those south of the heaviest truck traffic and along the exit routes. Ban Karai remained the primary input corridor, while input through Ban Raving surpassed that entering the Mu Gia corridor. Overall input exceeded the November level. Throughput into RVN was also greater than the preceding month, although it remained relatively light. Only token throughput was estimated to have entered Cambodia.

(S) Coordinated ARC LIGHT and TACAIR strikes on interdiction boxes Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, and Delta continued to restrict enemy logistics flow into the central route structure. Between strikes, the enemy portered, bypassed, or surged through or around the boxes with supplies stored north of the target boxes. Traffic levels for December throughout STEEL TIGER were almost three times greater than those of November, as indicated by sensor detections. However, detected traffic through or around the interdiction boxes increased to a level only 50 percent more than during November. A greater number of nighttime sorties and

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additional AC-130 gunships in operation enhanced the effectiveness of TACAIR operations against trucks in southern Laos. Increased strikes against perishable area targets in December resulted in heavy enemy losses. An all time high for BDA on a single target complex was recorded. On Route 924 near Ban Bac a truck park and storage area was struck by TACAIR beginning on 18 Dec. The final BDA was 450 secondary fires and 10,149 secondary explosions. Photography confirmed 61 trucks destroyed (see Figure VI-37).




FIGURE VI-37

(S) Input to storage areas north of the entry interdiction boxes increased by 36 percent over November levels. During December, southbound traffic was detected for the first time on Route 910, which was included in the input totals for Ban Raving.

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(S) Estimated throughput was 31 percent over November's figure, but remained at low levels. Strikes against interdiction points and trucks on key exit routes held traffic below anticipated levels, totaling only one-eighth of the throughput detected in December 1969. For throughput toward SVN, Route 922 was the primary LOC, carrying 36 truckloads during the month. Route 926 ranked second, with 3 truckloads. Throughput toward Cambodia remained at the token level recorded during November.

(S) It was estimated that an average of 60 truckloads of supplies per day entered STEEL TIGER during December, versus an average of 42 per day in November. Input on Waterway 7J was estimated to have averaged approximately 20 tons or 5 equivalent truckloads per month during November and December. The POL pipelines were estimated to have carried 15 tons or nearly 4 equivalent truckloads per day during December. Input through Ban Karai accounted for 40 percent of the December total compared to 46 percent in November. Thirty-eight percent of the input came through Ban Raving compared to 24 percent in November. Input through Mu Gia entry gate was 22 percent, down from the 30 percent recorded in November.

(S) Consumption of 82 tons per day was calculated to be required to maintain the Southern Laotian logistics system. BDA for December was estimated to be 127 tons per day. A total of 1,015 trucks were destroyed and 444 were damaged by air strikes during the month. Daily input and throughput were estimated as 238 and 6 tons, respectively.

(S) Estimated throughput toward SVN during December averaged only slightly over one truckload per day. Throughput toward Cambodia averaged two equivalent truckloads per week. Route 922 accounted for 90 percent of throughput toward SVN, while Routes 926 and 110D/E carried 8 percent and 2 percent respectively. Waterway 4D carried 78 percent of the throughput toward Cambodia, and Route 110A had the remaining 22 percent. (163)

(S) Results of the interdiction campaign in Laos are shown by the following charts:

- | | |
|-----------------------------------------|--------------|
| 1. ARC LIGHT Sorties | Figure VI-38 |
| 2. Gunship Sorties | Figure VI-39 |
| 3. TACAIR Sorties | Figure VI-40 |
| 4. Truck Sightings | Figure VI-41 |
| 5. Trucks Damaged and Destroyed | Figure VI-42 |
| 6. Percentage of Support by Target Type | Figure VI-43 |
| 7. Input and Throughput Tonnage | Figure VI-44 |

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
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ARC LIGHT SORTIES IN LAOS, PERCENTAGE OF SEA TOTAL




1970	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
Strikes	179	182	190	120	87	162	192	206	191	319	349	317
Sorties	681	786	917	579	366	551	677	606	556	922	942	912
Sorties Obsd by Aircrew	*	*	*	*	*	*	359	295	239	423	472	512
Aircrew Septd Secondaries	1205	2533	2174	499	346	298	459	251	241	833	1029	917
Percentage of SEA ARC LIGHT	47	60	64	42	25	39	47	49	57	91	96	90

Source: MACJ3

* Data not available

FIGURE VI-35

FIXED-WING GUNSHIP SORTIES IN LAOS, PERCENTAGE OF SEA TOTAL



1970	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
USAF								95	109	27	135	189
VNAP								0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL								95	109	27	135	189
PERCENTAGE								15	16	17	21	50

Source: MACJ3 and SEADAS

FIGURE VI-36

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
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TACAIR SORTIES IN LAOS, PERCENTAGE OF SEA TOTAL



1970	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
RAAF	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USAF	2653	8980	8798	7693	5783	3990	4203	3322	3973	3809	5069	6102
USMC	620	240	155	295	288	267	70	68	73	0	307	665
USN	3108	2801	2982	2977	3457	1588	1969	1557	1783	1163	1792	2301
VNAP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	11391	12021	11895	10966	10888	5845	6242	4943	5829	5172	7129	9068

Source: MACJ3

* Only 2 CVAs on line

PHOTO VI-49



A night launch of an F-4 from the deck of the USS America.


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
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Source: USAP TIA

FIGURE VI-41



Source: USAP TIA

FIGURE VI-42

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
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PERCENTAGE OF EFFORT IN STEEL TIGER BY TARGET TYPE




1970	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
TCA/Trk Pk/Stor	45	42	48	40	53	52	71	68	59	80	73	70
TRUCKS	34	35	31	35	28	21	10	8	6	6	9	17
Defenses/Other	21	23	21	21	19	27	19	24	35	1	18	13

SOURCE: USAP TIA

FIGURE VI-43

ARMY LOGISTICS ACTIVITY IN LAGS (THOUS TONS)



1970	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
INPUT	2257	4173	3189	5787	5669	1682	2765	1066	153	418	418	418
PDA	5787	5512	4407	5112	2767	1682	1156	430	404	277	1076	1637
CONSUMPTION	2813	3212	2466	2607	2258	1767	1833	1633	1638	2074	2275	2448
THROUGHPUT	12137	10737	8189	4407	4407	2767	1682	1156	430	2074	2275	7485

Source: USAP TIA

FIGURE VI-44

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


FIGURE VI-45

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
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AIR OPERATIONS IN NORTH VIETNAM

Route Packages

(S) North Vietnam is divided into seven geographical areas called route packages (RP). (See Figure VI-45.) The segments of the ROLLING THUNDER area were designated by CINCPAC to facilitate assignment of interdiction areas to CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, AND COMUSMACV and for the other operational purposes. (164)



(C) A BUFFALO HUNTER drone picture shows 43 trucks heading south from Vinh in RP 2.


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ROLLING THUNDER Combat Sorties

(S) ROLLING THUNDER combat sorties are shown in Figure VI-46. Although flown in support of ROLLING THUNDER operations, not all sorties indicated actually flew over NVN territory. Sorties flown by helicopters and B-52s were not included. (165)



1970		JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
ATTACK	USAF	10	18	128	48	381	0	2	0	1	0	6	2
	USN	0	2	0	6	8	22	4	11	7	0	6	0
	USMC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CAP/ESCORT	USAF	83	87	208	175	322	219	220	236	233	345	373	299
	USN	903	1231	1346	1358	1667	1216	1298	1023	862	666	318	135
	USMC	50	53	48	48	53	46	48	48	50	41	99	42
RECCE	USAF	259	269	293	288	336	272	275	298	240	261	261	260
	USN	61	101	91	97	158	130	106	90	82	47	46	68
	USMC	0	6	68	80	111	90	0	0	0	0	0	0
OTHER	USAF	450	470	556	426	433	451	313	355	310	304	305	347
	USN	727	758	1172	959	1490	1054	1175	1020	856	740	443	137
	USMC	0	96	70	80	80	66	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL		2543	3091	3980	3565	5039	3566	3441	3081	2641	2404	1857	1290

SOURCE: USAF TIA

FIGURE VI-46

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ROLLING THUNDER Target List

(S) Although air strikes have not been authorized against NVN targets since 1 Nov 68, the ROLLING THUNDER Target List (RTTL) was continually evaluated, adjusted, and updated to reflect the current status of NVN targets systems. It was necessary to maintain the capability to resume effective air strikes against NVN should they again be authorized. Maintaining the RTTL also gave an indication of the NVN target regeneration efforts. The table below shows the number of targets on the RTTL and those priority targets considered worthy of strike as of 30 Jun 70. (166)

<u>Category</u>	<u>Total Targets</u>	<u>Targets Worthy Of Strike</u>
Air Defense	36	25
Electrical Power	20	13
Military Complexes	152	73
POL Storage	33	20
Transportation Facilities	148	92
War Supporting Facilities	<u>18</u>	<u>17</u>
Total	407	240

Reconnaissance and Intelligence

(S) Reconnaissance revealed a steady, though not dramatic, increase in NVN's available aircraft. Considerably more jet aircraft were in NVN in 1970 than in 1969, although there was an increase of only 11 percent in overall aircraft available. The increase in NVN was caused by their relocating 26 aircraft from safe havens in South China and adding 27 others. See Table VI-6 for a detailed comparison of December 1969 and December 1970 force levels.

(S) Following are discussions on the background, capabilities, and outlook for NVN's airfields, aircraft, SAM's, and general air defense posture.

Airfields

(S) With only five airfields capable of supporting jet fighter or light bomber operations in 1964, the North Vietnamese Air Force (NVAF) found itself ill-prepared to meet the US air threat, and a program was initiated to develop a more extensive airfield system to accommodate

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its newly acquired jet fighter force. By mid-1965, an extensive airfield improvement program was well underway. Construction of aircraft revetments, runway extensions, alert aprons, and other related buildings was observed at several different airfields. Between 1965 and 1968, the North Vietnamese began construction on three more airfields (Hoa Lac, Bai Thuong and Yen Bai) and continually maintained reconstruction and repair activities required by the US airstrikes. By 1 Apr 68, the beginning of the partial bombing halt, only four jet-capable airfields were serviceable (Phuc Yen, Kien An, and Hanoi/Gia Lam) despite NVN's repair and construction efforts. See Figure VI-47 for end of 1970 status of NVN airfields.

(S) Since that time, North Vietnam has made a concerted effort to accelerate airfield construction and repair in order to expand the number of serviceable airfields available for their operational jet and transport inventory.

(S) Three new airfields have been completed since 1 Apr 68. Construction on the runway at Yen Bai was completed in May 1968 and the airfield eventually became operational in July 1969 when jet aircraft were first photographed there. Two other new airfields were started and completed during that time frame; one at Dong Suong, begun in October 1968 and considered usable by the end of February 1969; and the other at Quan Lang, started in August 1969 and considered usable by the end of October 1969. Of the three, Yen Bai was the only active airfield. Dong Suong and Quan Lang could support temporary, limited deployments of Mig aircraft, but lacked adequate facilities necessary for sustained operations. There was some evidence that Dong Suong was used late in 1970 by NVAF Migs, but not for sustained flying operations. It was estimated that it would remain a secondary dispersal/deployment field.

(S) In addition to the newly constructed airfields, the NVAF reactivated seven others after the bombing halt, including four jet-capable facilities (Hoa Lac, Bai Thuong, Cat Bi, and Vinh). Hoa Lac was reactivated in May 1968, shortly after the beginning of the bombing restriction. The runway at Bai Thuong was resurfaced with pierced-steel planking and became operational in August 1969. Repairs at Bac Mai were completed by June 1968, and reconstruction activities at Cat Bi were finished by December 1968. In April 1969 the 4,000 foot natural surface runway at Na San was considered serviceable to light aircraft only. Vinh repairs got underway in May 1969, and by July the graded-earth runway was considered serviceable to jet aircraft. Dien Bien Phu was the most recently reactivated airfield. Reconstruction activity was completed in January 1970, on approximately 4,000 feet of the runway, and it was considered serviceable to light transports.

(S) Other repairs and improvements which were conducted on runways and facilities in North Vietnam since the bombing halt included: widening of the runway at Gia Lam; resurfacing of the main runway and taxiway at Hoa Lac; continued improvement of the main dispersal area and support facilities at Yen Bai; runway and runway over-run repairs/improvements at Kep; taxiway improvements at Phuc Yen; and the addition of POL facilities at Vinh.

(S) Activity seen since the halt of US bombing in the north provided evidence of a North Vietnamese intent to establish a wide infrastructure to support their aircraft. Although some of the fields are still limited in facilities, they nevertheless were capable of supporting short-term operations and could be improved when the North Vietnamese consider the time appropriate. The latter point was considered significant in that the time was fast approaching when the Hanoi planners were likely to decide that they could move their aircraft anywhere within their airspace without fear of US intervention or "protective reaction." It was a key point. Within minimal time after

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the withdrawal of US airpower, the NVAF could deploy their aircraft into a posture capable of defending their airspace as well as providing staging bases for potential offensive operations against neighboring countries.

Aircraft

(S) At the beginning of the bombing halt, the in-country NVAF inventory consisted of only seven Mig-21s and six Mig-15/17s. The safe havens at Yunnani and Nanning in China held an additional 14 Mig -21s and 99 Mig-15/17s. Through the transfer of NVAF aircraft from China, and the assembly of newly-arrived Mig-21 aircraft at Phuc Yen, the inventory in NVN at the beginning of the complete bombing halt on 1 Nov 68 had increased to 31 Mig-21s (many of them the newer Fishbed-F) and 22 Mig-15/17s. In China, the NVAF had maintained seven Mig-21s and 89 Mig-15/17s. In addition to the fighter aircraft, there were four IL-28 light bombers at Yunnani and three at Phuc Yen.

(S) The trend continued and by 1 May 69 the inventory within North Vietnam had increased to 33 Mig-21s, 10 Mig-19s, and 31 Mig-15/17s based on five airfields, Phuc Yen, Hoa Lac, Kep, Kien An, and Bai Thuong. During the ensuing year to May 1970, the inventory nearly doubled to 67 Mig-21s, 9 Mig-19s, and 57 Mig-15/17s. The arrival in April 1969 of the CHICOM-produced Mig-19 added a new dimension to the NVAF, being the first twin-engined fighter in the inventory. As with any new weapons system, the Mig-19s were plagued by a shortage of spare parts, inexperienced pilots, and aircraft accidents. Originally introduced at Kep, the Mig-19s were later transferred to Yen Bai, probably because of rough runway conditions at Kep.

(S) After May 1970, the inventory continued to increase, caused primarily by the return of NVAF aircraft from China.

(S) The year end AOB had 90 Mig-21s, 34 Mig-19s, 54 Mig-15/17s, and four IL-28 light bombers in NVN. In China, 4 Mig-21s were left along with 82 Mig-15/17s and four IL-28s. (See Table VI-8.) It was doubtful that many more of those aircraft would be transferred to NVN with the exception of the IL-28s. It was quite possible that the remaining Mig-21s were in a non-flyable status as a result of their storage in the open as well as possible cannibalization for parts. A portion of the Mig-15/17s were probably being used for some CHICOM training of NVN pilots, although evidence of intensive training activity was lacking.

(S) The in-country NVAF inventory was based primarily on four airfields, Phuc Yen, Yen Bai, Kep, and Kien An, although temporary deployment to other bases had occurred. Base loading is shown in the comparison between December 1969 and December 1970 NVN AOB, Table VI-8.

(S) The Mig-21s at Yen Bai arrived during the early summer of 1970, but in December 1970 they were not believed to be engaged in flight activity. The establishment of a ground-controlled intercept site at Yen Bai indicated that the Mig-19 unit based there was probably responsible for air defense of that area, and the influx of additional Mig-19 aircraft from China indicated that pilots were available to fly them. This may not have been the case with the Mig-21s because, as previously mentioned, the 14 Mig-21s at Yen Bai apparently had not been flown.

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
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NORTH VIETNAM AIRFIELDS



SOURCE: 7AF

FIGURE VI-47

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NORTH VIETNAM AIR ORDER OF BATTLE

Jet-End 1969/1970

AIRFIELD	Mig-15/17		Mig-19		Mig-21		IL-28		TOTAL	
	69	70	69	70	69	70	69	70	69	70
NVN										
Bai Thuong	3	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	10	0
Hoa Lac	16	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	4
Kep	10	36	1	1	1	0	0	0	12	37
Kien An	16	6	0	0	2	0	0	0	18	6
Phuc Yen	5	5	0	0	49	64	2	4	56	73
Yen Bai	8	3	9	33	0	14	0	0	17	50
Dong Suong	0	0	0	0	0	12	0	0	0	12
Sub-Total	58	54	10	34	59	90	2	4	129	182
South China										
Peitun/ Yunnani	82	82	0	0	30	4	0	4	*116	90
TOTAL	140	136	10	34	89	94	2	8	245	272

*Sic

Transport-End 1970
(1969 figures not available)

AIRFIELD	AN-2	AN-24	IL-14	IL-18	IL-2	MI-4	MI-6	Total
NVN								
Gia Lam	14	3	9	1	11	17	6	61
Phuc Yen	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2
Sub-Total	14	3	9	1	11	17	8	63
South China								
Peitun/ Yunnani	12	0	4	0	13	0	0	29
TOTAL	26	3	13	1	24	17	8	92

Source: MACJ031 and 7AF

Table VI-8

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(S) Although the NVAF had established a presence in the NVN Panhandle as far back as January 1968, the airfield at Bai Thuong was not occupied on a full time basis until the spring of 1969. A further move down the panhandle began in January 1970, when two Mig-21s occupied Vinh for the first time. It was initially believed that it was a step toward a reassertion of North Vietnamese control of their airspace, which had virtually been open to US airpower.

(S) Apparently, the North Vietnamese were not completely confident of their air defense system, for after the Vinh Mig-21 participation in the shootdown of a USAF SAR helicopter on 28 Jan the aircraft returned north, probably to Bai Thuong. Following that move, US "protective reaction" strikes to cross-border SAM/AAA firings in North Vietnam met no determined resistance by the Bai Thuong Mig force, even though one Mig was lost to US Navy fighters. Shortly after that incident, the NVAF pulled the Mig force further back into the heartland to its year-end disposition. Undoubtedly, NVN still harbored fears of a resumption of the bombing. That fear was probably reinforced by US willingness to retaliate for cross-border firings at US aircraft operating in adjacent Laos.

(S) In the clutch, then, the NVAF failed its first combat test since the bombing halt. It probably caused a great deal of consternation within the NVN high command and was probably the impetus for the return of the stored Mig-19s and 21s from China and the launching of a concerted training program to improve effectiveness. (167)

(S) Intelligence analysts of the 7AF concluded:

Any estimate of Hanoi's plans is tenuous, but probably its first priority will be to reassert a permanent presence in the Panhandle, most likely at Bai Thuong, and as the level of USAF involvement in SEA decreases, this may include deployment of a detachment to Vinh. In either case, the NVAF will concentrate much of its effort in improving effective coordination and employment of the force, and conveying "lessons learned" by NVAF pilots who flew against US forces during the "airwar" to the newer and younger pilots. Also, by the time the US withdrawal is complete, some of the NVAF combat veterans should have risen to positions of leadership within the operational force, providing a strong element of air-to-air combat experience at strategy-making levels.

Other developments include the possible establishment of an NVAF basic flying program for pilots. Photography of Phuc Yen in August 1970 revealed four L-29 MAYA jet trainers there. (The L-29 is the basic jet trainer of the Warsaw Pact and is manufactured in Czechoslovakia.) Also in August and September, five YAK-18 MAX light training aircraft, were noted at Hoa Lac. Approximately 12 of this type of aircraft are estimated to be in the inventory but have been unlocated since the bombing halt. A Hungarian Air Force officer defector has revealed information that Soviet training of North Vietnamese pilots through 1968 had been at a rate of about 30 to 40 per year. With this number, the USSR could have trained about 280 pilots since 1964. A comparison of this number with North Vietnam's present inventory of 272 jet fighters, plus the 122 Migs downed by US

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forces, suggests that a large number of pilots have been trained in China. China's training assistance would be necessary to offset pilot attrition and allow minimally adequate manning levels for aircraft possessed. The 82 NVAF Mig-15/17s in China may serve as training aircraft, but recent evidence of this is lacking.

A desire on the part of the NVAF to compensate for this reduced out-country training, as well as to take advantage of its own combat experience in North Vietnam, may partially account for the arrival of the L-29s and the re-appearance of YAK-18s at Hoa Lac. (168)

(S) Capabilities of the North Vietnamese AAA was assessed as follows: (169)

Maximum Range

<u>Type</u>	<u>Horizontal</u>	<u>Vertical</u>	<u>Tactical AA Range</u>
100mm	23,000 yd	48,000 ft	39,000 ft
85mm	17,000 yd	34,000 ft	27,500 ft
57mm	13,000 yd	31,999 ft	19,700 ft
			(13,000 ft w/on carriage (fire cont.))
37mm	8,700 yd	20,000 ft	8,200 ft
30mm	11,000 yd	23,000 ft	6,600 ft
23mm	7,600 yd	16,700 ft	6,600 ft
14.5mm	7,600 yd	14,700 ft	4,600 ft
12.7mm	7,100 yd	18,360 ft	3,300 ft

SAM

(S) The SA-2 SAM system was introduced into NVN early in 1965 and provided an element never before encountered by an attacking air force. In the Korean action, for example, attacking aircraft had to contend with enemy fighters and antiaircraft guns; SAMs were not a part of enemy defenses.

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(S) The first SAM site in NVN was detected on 5 Apr 65 about 24 km southeast of Hanoi. By 24 Jul 65, at least seven sites were built or were under construction. The magnitude of the ensuing SAM buildup was reflected in reported SAM-kill figures. For example, through 31 Mar 68, USAF, Navy, and Marine Corps pilots reported destroying 125 SAM sites and damaging 142.

(S) Precise analysis of the effectiveness of US air strikes against SAM facilities was difficult. Frequent movements of firing batteries between prepared sites, and an apparent practice of immediately repositioning a battery which had exposed itself by a launch, complicated photographic confirmation of strike results. However, in the period since 1965, the US lost one aircraft for each 50 known SAM firings.

(S) It was estimated at the time of the bombing halt on 1 Nov 68 that the NVN SAM order of battle consisted of 35 occupied sites. SAM activity from that time to October 1969 was confined to minor relocations of SAM firing battalions in the Vinh, Thanh Hoa, and Hanoi/Haiphong complexes. However, during October and November 1969, evidence of a change in SAM employment tactics in southern NVN began to surface. The number of SAM battalions detected around Vinh decreased to two, from a previous average of four, and all of the battalions were withdrawn from the Thanh Hoa area.

(S) On 12 Dec 69, a Fansong radar intercept north of Ban Karai Pass provided the first firm evidence that Hanoi had altered its SAM deployments to threaten US air operations in Laos near the NVN border. On 19 Dec 69 the crews of three B-52s engaged in an ARC LIGHT strike south of Ban Karai reported that multiple SAMs were fired at their aircraft. Ten other crews (four F-4 MigCAP, two F-105 IRON HAND, two EB-66 jamming aircraft, and two other electronic-intelligence aircraft) also observed the firings. However, evasive action and maneuvering to keep the missiles in sight and lack of a horizon or other references caused variation in the sighting reports. The result was that the launch point of the SAM could not be plotted precisely.

(S) Low ceilings for 8 days prior to the 19 Dec firing were ideal for movement of a firing battalion (which probably used two launchers) into position on NVN's Route 137 without being detected by US reconnaissance aircraft. The tactic was apparently to use transportable SAM packages containing less than a full firing battalion to threaten B-52s and their support aircraft, as well as tactical strike aircraft engaged in operations along highly important LOCs in Laos. Although the tactic did not result in the downing of any US aircraft, B-52s were withdrawn from operating areas immediately adjacent to NVN after the firing of 19 Dec.

(S) During the period December 1969 to April 1970, identification of 19 additional prepared firing positions in RPs I and IV in the Barthelmy Pass area suggested that the enemy intended to keep his SAM equipment on the move. After the 19 Dec incident, the North Vietnamese fired SAMs on four other occasions from three, possibly four, of those sites. Three of the four firings were directed against USAF aircraft flying over NVN; the fourth was a cross-border firing at an aircraft operating in Laos. Descriptions of the firings follows:

North of Mu Gia Pass, on 27 Jan 70, an RF-4C photo reconnaissance aircraft and two F-4D escorts were fired at by three missiles and, based on crew reports, VN-748 may have been the launch site. The missiles came through the top of the cloud deck, passed through the flight, and detonated approximately 20,000 feet above the aircraft. When the RF-4C saw the missiles approaching,

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he activated his self-protection pods (QRC-335 and ALQ-87), dropped chaff, and began jinking. He jointed with one of the F-4D escorts in pod formation and dived. The other F-4D escort immediately dove for the deck on seeing the missiles. At the same time, three EB-66E and two EB-66C aircraft were conducting ECM jamming (electronic countermeasures) from an orbit over the Gulf of Tonkin. A combination of the ECM and the tactics employed by the RF-4C and escort evidently accounted for the failure of the SAMs to hit their targets.

On 28 Jan 70, two IRON HAND escorts for RF-4 reconnaissance aircraft were fired at by SA-2 missiles from VN-748 and possibly VN-747 (north of Mu Gia Pass). One F-105 was lost to AAA fire while bombing and strafing in the vicinity of VN-380. Two and possibly as many as five SAMs were fired in this incident.

On 2 Feb 70, one SAM from VN-374 (north of Mu Gia Pass) was fired at two RF-4 photo reconnaissance aircraft and their escorts. The missile was observed to rise approximately 1,500 feet into the air and then fall back to the ground, impacting near the site. The escorting F-105Gs struck the site with bombs and expended one SHRIKE, and BDA photography showed the area to be heavily cratered, with two damaged launchers and a burning electronics van. Photography of 3 Feb showed the area to be completely unoccupied, with no trace of any SAMs and SAM-associated equipment, amply demonstrating the North Vietnamese ability to move this equipment quickly.

In the Bartholemy Pass area, a cross border firing occurred on 28 Feb 70 against a force of 15 F-105Ds. The aircraft were flying over Laos in the vicinity of the pass when RHAW (radar homing and warning) indications were received from the pass area. Approximately one minute later, four SAMs were fired within a one minute period. The missiles passed through the lead flight and detonated above it. (170)

(S) In April 1970, the first signs appeared of North Vietnamese withdrawal of SAMs from RP-1. By early May, RP-1 was devoid of SAMs. US protection reactions against those firings and the beginning of the rainy season in Laos undoubtedly were factors in NVN's decision to remove them.

(S) Thus was concluded the first NVN effort to use SAMs for the protection of LOCs outside of North Vietnam. Although the effort was not entirely successful, Hanoi probably credited the tactic with causing the suspension of B-52 strikes near the NVN border. The North Vietnamese probably concluded also that frequent redeployment of SAMs complicated the US detection problem, especially if they were moved under the cover of adverse weather. It was made obvious to Hanoi that US was likely to react to cross-border SAM firings.

(S) Since the withdrawal of SAMs from the southern panhandle in May 1970, the status of the firing battalions in NVN had remained similar to that noted in 1969. From 35 to 38 firing battalions remained at operational locations, with occasional shifts of some battalions between sites in a SAM complex. With the advent of the 70/71 dry season in Laos, SAMs again were deployed to RP-1. During 3-14 Nov, SAM equipment was photographed at several locations in RP-1.

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(S) The first firing of the 70/71 dry season occurred on 12-13 Dec against two F-105G IRON HAND aircraft flying in support of an approaching B-52 cell. On that same date, a cross-border firing occurred against a Navy A-6 flying over Laos near the Ban Karai Pass. Those firings coupled with other indicators pointedly reflected increasing air defense activity in the panhandle. That included the apparent establishment of command and control procedures for interface of weapons systems south of 20 degrees. Also, Migs were temporarily deployed to Vinh in late November, and a ground controlled intercept (GCI) site established near Ha Tinh/Cam Xuyen was capable of controlling Mig intercepts as far south as the DMZ.

(S) The impetus for the SAM deployments and other air defense improvements may have been provided by the COMMANDO HUNT V interdiction strikes against the Mu Gia, Ban Karai, and DMZ input corridors, and the importance to the enemy of his 70/71 logistics effort in Laos.

(S) It was expected that the North Vietnamese would almost certainly continue to improve their air defenses, especially in the panhandle. (171)

Assessment of NVAF Capability

(S) The capability of the NVAF was assessed by 7AF intelligence analysts as follows:

Since the bombing halt in November 1968, the NVAF has rebuilt its shattered airfield system and increased its aircraft inventory, affording many options for the deployment of its force. In terms of kill probabilities, the Migs will remain the most serious threat to US aircraft. While the number of firing battalions have remained about the same, SAMs have been deployed to geographic areas from which US air operations over Laos can be threatened with cross border firings.

AAA positions located throughout North Vietnam have remained relatively stable in numbers since the bombing halt. North Vietnamese AAA sites are manned by the world's most experienced gun crews, and their contribution to the defense of NVN will be considerable.

The electronic environment in NVN is dense in fire control, GCI and early warning radars. Early warning coverage extends far beyond the NVN borders, and the GCI coverage includes most of NVN and adjacent Laos and the sea approaches to North Vietnam.

The NVAF has a limited capability for close air support and for ground attack in areas outside North Vietnam. In addition to the Mig force, the NVAF has some offensive potential in its IL-28 jet light bomber force. Currently, four IL-28s are kept in-country,

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although crews maintain only a minimum degree of proficiency. This capability could be expanded if the NVAF chose to bring the remaining four IL-28s back from China. Also, the Mig-21 inventory is large enough to allow the utilization of most of the Mig-17 fleet in a ground attack role, even though it would be limited by poor range payload (90 nautical miles with two 550 pound bombs). Such use would require deployment of the Mig-17 force to forward areas for optimum performance in a ground attack role.

Since the 21 Nov 70 US protective reaction strikes announced by President Nixon, there have been indications that the NVN is readjusting its southern defenses. The North Vietnamese will probably continue to threaten US air operations in areas adjacent to the North Vietnam border, and to improve markedly their air defenses in the southern panhandle. (172)

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