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**JULY - SEPTEMBER 1969**

11th Year

# **europaean documentation**

*a survey*

**EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT**

General directorate of parliamentary  
documentation and information

In addition to the official acts published in the Official Gazette of the European Communities, the activities of the European Communities are reported on in publications appearing at regular intervals.

Thus, the Commission of the European Communities publishes a Monthly Bulletin on the activities of the Communities while the European Parliament issues a periodical Information Bulletin on its own activities.

The Council of Ministers issues a press release after all its sessions. Its activities are also reported on in a special section of the Bulletin of the European Communities.

The Economic and Social Committee issues press releases at the close of its plenary sessions, and its overall activities are reported on in a Quarterly Information Bulletin.

The Survey of European Documentation is intended to serve as a supplement to the above publications. It deals with salient features of the process of European integration taking place outside Community bodies.

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**P a r t I**  
**DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION**  
**At the National Level**

## I. GOVERNMENTS AND PARLIAMENTS

### Belgium

#### 1. The direct election of the Belgian members of the European Parliament

On 27 June 1969, Mr. Nothomb and Mr. Chabert (Christian Democrat MPs) introduced a bill for the direct election of the Belgian members of the European Parliament.

They stated : 'Pending real European elections by direct universal suffrage - the democratic basis for a genuine federal State - the authority of Members of the European Parliament ought to be strengthened forthwith by involving the entire electorate in their nomination.' To this end, 'the bill embodies the basic feature of the Italian bill with an eye to the first elections which could be held on the occasion of the local elections in 1970. This date has to be chosen for practical reasons because special elections cannot be organized solely for the purpose of nominating Belgian members of the European Parliament. It is of particular significance because in this month of June 1969, the Belgian Parliament has for the first time reduced the minimum voting age for the 1970 local elections to 18 years.'

The text of the bill is as follows :

#### Article 1

The Belgian Parliament shall hold elections by direct universal suffrage for the purpose of nominating from among its own members, and in accordance with Article 138 of the Treaty setting up the European Economic Community, Belgian representatives to the European Parliament.

#### Article 2

The first elections shall be held on the same day as the local elections, namely, on the second Sunday in October 1970.

#### Article 3

The elections shall be by proportional representation on the basis of a single national constituency.

#### Article 4

Representatives in the European Parliament shall be elected by persons entitled to vote at local elections.

#### Article 5

Members of the Belgian Parliament at the time of the elections shall be eligible as representatives to the European Parliament.

#### Article 6

Candidates shall be drawn in equal numbers from the Senate and from the Chamber of Representatives.

#### Article 7

Each of the Chambers shall declare elected those candidates who, as a result of the elections, have secured on their respective lists the number of votes necessary under the electoral system adopted.

#### Article 8

The Minister of the Interior shall be responsible for giving effect to this Act.

(Chamber of Representatives, Doc. No. 454, 1968-1969-1)

## 2. Ministerial Statement on the devaluation of the French franc

There have been a number of different reactions by members of the Belgian Government to the devaluation of the French franc which was announced on 8 August 1969. The Finance Minister, Mr. Snyers, made the following statement to the Belgian Radio and Television Network on 11 August :

'We must not hide the fact that we are faced with one more of those unfortunate paradoxes which have beset the creation of the Common Market : because a very high level of integration has been achieved in certain areas, especially in agriculture while in another area, namely the monetary sector, integration remains inadequate, there is now a risk that monetary disparities may lead to a reversal of the progress already made towards agricultural integration. While recognizing that there were sound reasons for the measure

taken by the French Government, the crux of the problem is to prevent that measure from resulting in an excessively long setback affecting many of the areas involved in the Common Market for agriculture. '

When asked to state the Belgian position on the Mansholt proposals, the Minister had this to say :

'The Commission has made proposals which consist in allowing France to isolate itself to some extent by enjoying a respite before bringing its agricultural prices into line with the amount of the devaluation. The Commission has suggested a respite of two years. Like the Dutch, I feel that this is too long, because I am most reluctant to accept the idea that the Common Market might suffer a two year setback in the agricultural sector. We are now examining the possibility of arriving at a compromise solution. '

Mr. Snoy et d'Oppuers added : 'If you like, an alternative solution would consist in allowing the exceptional state of affairs, which is an obvious possibility, to prevail for a limited period of time - certainly for much less than two years. This exceptional state of affairs would consist in subsidies for imports and taxes on exports.

It is a fact that prices of agricultural produce in France would no longer be on a par with prices in the other countries of the Community, and this would inevitably lead to the frontier being closed or special regulations introduced at it. '

For his part, the Prime Minister, Mr. Eyskens, stated that he had already taken into account the possibility of devaluation in another country for a long time, but Belgium would take no measure to alter its monetary parity. He regretted that the decision reached by the French Government had not been preceded by contacts or conversations. The Prime Minister also stated that, assuming a revaluation of the Deutsche Mark and continued overheating of the economy, the possibility could not be excluded that some countries with a particularly favourable balance of trade, as was the case with Belgium, might come under heavy pressure and be forced to consider following the German move.

In an interview which he gave to a Belgian daily newspaper, Mr. Tindemans, the Minister for Relations with the European Communities, stated that the devaluation of the currency of a member country might have frustrated the common agricultural price policy within the Community and that the success of the meeting of the Council of Ministers lay precisely in the fact that a solution had been found at Community level. France would be obliged to resume its normal place within the Six after a minimum delay.

The Minister added that all the European partners had felt the need for a common monetary policy and co-ordination of their economic policies. Everyone realized that the agreements on a common agricultural policy reached with considerable difficulty, could be jeopardized at any time, and that it was highly desirable to avoid incidents of this kind in future so that the agricultural accounting unit could be maintained in all the member countries.

The Minister stated that the income of farmers must not be allowed to suffer from the devaluation. In his opinion it was also necessary to maintain the competitive position of processed products, especially those in the food industry, and to avoid the occasional meetings of the Council being exploited as a means of fixing agricultural price policy once and for all.

Finally, there was a noteworthy statement by Mr. André Vlerick, Minister-Secretary of State for Regional Economy, who spoke out in favour of a single currency within the Common Market. Addressing the members of the Belgo-American Chamber of Commerce in New York on 17 September, the Minister expressed the opinion that this was the only means of avoiding periodic monetary crises. The essential cause of these crises lay in the disequilibrium between the nationalistic policies adopted by governments to defend their currencies. In his opinion, these outmoded concepts must disappear and the existing organizations for co-operation, especially the International Monetary Fund, must undergo some adaptation.

(Le Soir, 12 and 16 August 1969; De Standaard, 13 August 1969; L'Echo de la Bourse, 18 September 1969)

## Denmark

### Denmark hopes to negotiate entry into the EEC in the near future

On 18 September 1969, in an interview with the Danish Service of the German Radio, Mr. P. Nyboe Andersen, Danish Minister for Economic Affairs, said that his Government hoped the November summit meeting of the EEC would lead to a decision to open negotiations with the four applicant States, possibly as early as the Spring of 1970. The Danish Government was, however, aware that France's conditions were an obstacle in the way of this objective.

He gave an assurance that Denmark could begin negotiations at any time. He anticipated no difficulties over Denmark's accession because it was ready to accept the Rome Treaties without reservation and was asking for no transitional arrangements. The only condition was that Britain should also be a member. It would run counter to Denmark's interests if only Britain were invited to the preliminary negotiations. On the basis of soundings taken in the European capitals, however, Denmark expected simultaneous negotiations to be conducted with all the applicant States.

He said Denmark would have no difficulty in joining a European political co-operation policy. It was a fundamental principle of its European policy that Denmark would also accept the political side of European integration.

The Danish Government attached great importance to co-operating with the other Scandinavian countries in the planned Nordic Economic Union, said Mr. Andersen; this union should make it easier for the Scandinavian countries to co-operate in Europe on a wider scale.

(VWD-Europa, 19 September 1969)

## France

### 1. Three opinions on Europe - Mr. Chaban-Delmas, Mr. Pinay and Mr. Debré

In the course of an official visit to Bordeaux on 29 and 30 June 1969, the Prime Minister, Mr. Chaban-Delmas, made a speech on Europe to members of the Standing Committee of the European Conference on Local Authorities.

'I now find that after nearly twenty years nothing has changed. Europe is not only still necessary but more so than ever. It must acquire its full economic dimension and, naturally, its political expression. I am certain that your views have not changed, that you are always in favour of Europe and against bureaucratic centralization, self-interest and technocracy. We have been denouncing these dangers for the past twenty years. What we want is a democratic Europe and, by definition, a decentralized and "more human" Europe.

It should be realized that there are at present twenty five different organizations and bodies whose aim is the building of Europe. You can easily imagine the complications, entanglements and the amount of wasted energy that result from this situation. And even the Governments, I am not sure that they have a very clear idea of the degree of concertation and co-ordinated action that is required in each country with regard to representation on these twenty five bodies. You may be certain that this is one of the problems I shall deal with if not forthwith at least very shortly.

What remains to be done is to get the States and the Governments and, above all, public opinion to realize that Europe must be built with patience and tenacity and that account must be taken of certain practical realities for nothing would be more dangerous than pursuing idle dreams. Any premature decision would throw Europe to the bottom of an abyss from which it would never come out again.'

On Thursday, 17 July, Mr. Pinay was received by President Pompidou at the Elysée Palace for half an hour. Mr. Pinay refused to make any statement when he left the President's Palace. However, he handed the following statement to the French Press Agency in the afternoon of the same day :

'The meeting of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe which I attended in Brussels and which was devoted to the problem of

strengthening and enlarging the Common Market was of special significance in the present circumstances.

Our country alone cannot resolve the grave problems with which we are faced, yet it is necessary for France that further progress be made towards the economic and monetary union of Europe. As aptly pointed out by Mr. Pompidou in his press conference, what is needed is a true European Community and a comprehensive economic union.

The need for action is urgent. I am staggered by the disparity between the extent and speed of the changes that are taking place in the world today and the slowness with which Europe is being built.

Astronauts are hurtling towards the moon while we are discussing. We must hasten in making Europe. France and its neighbours no longer form a group that is commensurate with the rest of the world. It is only together, that is with Great Britain, that they will assume the necessary size. France has played a significant part at each stage of European unification. Let France now make proposals. Let it give an example of determination and it will be followed.'

In the meantime, in the July issue of the Echo de Touraine, Mr. Debré, National Defence Minister, published an article on Europe :

'There are, as far as Europe is concerned, two schools of thought: one that would build Europe with France and another that would build Europe without France.

Excluding France is the old dream of politicians and social forces outside our borders. In this respect, the aim of remove French influence and, therefore, French policy, not only on the continent but beyond the continent, is something that belongs to a particular tradition.

On the other hand, making Europe without excluding France is a far greater task. We must make sure that the progress achieved by the Common Market is maintained. It is of capital importance with regard to security matters to have greater co-ordination among governments with a view to common action. But at no time must this progress towards a unified Europe restrict the duty and the right of any nation to affirm in Europe and outside Europe the independence of its diplomacy.

The practical progress that will be made during the coming months will clearly show that the true Europeans are those whose action is guided by the ideas that have inspired the policy of General de Gaulle.



The great problem is to know whether France will remain free to decide its own policy with regard to the United States, the Soviet Union, the Middle East, Africa, etc.

When the new President of the Republic refers to the continuity of French policy, this, I am sure, is what he has in mind. '

(La Nation, 1 July 1969; Le Monde, 19 July 1969; Le Monde 27 July 1969)

2. European affairs discussed at the first two press conferences of Mr. Georges Pompidou

On 10 July 1969 Mr. Pompidou, the newly elected President of the French Republic, gave his first press conference at the Elysée Palace before about one hundred and fifty journalists. The only Ministers in attendance were Mr. Chaban-Delmas, the Prime Minister, and Mr. Léo Hamon, the Government's spokesman.

One of the questions put to Mr. Pompidou was 'may we ask what are your Government's views regarding the building of Europe, with particular reference to Britain's entry into the Community?' The President replied as follows :

'First of all, I should say that the Community does exist. It is a Community of six member States and I should even add that this is not entirely thanks to Britain, to begin with. We feel that the first thing to do is to press on with the building of that Community. Europe is not a convent, entry to which presupposes a series of oaths taken one after the other, nor is it some sort of dream. Europe must be a practical reality. We are, as a matter of fact, reaching the period of realities since the transitional period is due to finish on 31 December and the final period to begin on 1 January 1970. Well, our first resolve, our first endeavour, is to complete that phase and proceed to the final one. We shall give priority to this in our aims.

In the second place, we should like to make it clear because we believe that Europe must be a reality, that the Community should be consolidated, that the European idea, as we now call it, should be carried further in order to turn it into a true Community. At present we only have a customs union and an agricultural Community, the latter being rather difficult to operate. There are a number of fields where significant progress could be made. I refer to the technical, scientific and energy fields. This also applies to transport and company law. There is also the question of financial and mone-

tary policy. In fact I could think of another thousand items where serious progress should be made if we wish to achieve a true Community, that is to say a genuine economic unit. This is our second main concern and we hope that with our partners, that is with the Five, we shall succeed in getting this done.

This is why, moreover, we believe it would be useful, in the not too distant future and preferably at relatively close intervals, for the people chiefly concerned, Heads of State or Government, to meet without any agenda, quite freely, in order to discuss various questions with a view to furthering the completion of the Community as it now exists.

We are now left with the question of the Community's enlargement which means, in fact, Britain's application and that of a number of other candidates. On this particular point, I should like to say that we have, in spite of some recent misunderstandings, no fundamental objection to the accession of Britain or any other country in the Community. We think that the Six should first agree among themselves on the terms of that membership and on its consequences for the future and the very nature of the Community. Up till now, our partners and others have often taken shelter under what has been described as 'the French veto' in order to conceal difficulties and realities. But I am sure that if the Six truly and seriously intend to face the problem as it really is, they will see that Britain's entry which is bound to be followed by that of a number of other countries, raises from the outset a number of difficult questions and will involve deep changes in the Community.

We are not, I repeat, opposed to discussion. We are not against an examination of the problem but we are against starting negotiations without full prior knowledge of the difficulties that will be encountered and without full knowledge of the consequences and what could be the common attitude of the Six. This is, in my opinion, one of the aims of the meeting that could perhaps be held in the next few months among the Heads of State of the Six.

The idea of a summit meeting of the Heads of State or Government was pursued and a meeting was arranged for the month of November 1969.

On 22 September 1969 at his second press conference, the President of the French Republic was asked for his views on the next meeting and replied as follows :

'I am glad that, following the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, a summit meeting has been arranged for the Heads of Government of the six member countries of the EEC. I am glad, first of all, because it is always useful to meet, particularly if it is to discuss freely and frankly. This type of meeting and at that level, without negotiation and without a specific agenda, is a particularly favourable opportunity for free and frank discussion.

I find, furthermore, that the date is suitable because we shall have reached by then an important stage, that of the transition of the Common Market to the final period and that the way in which that stage is reached will be of decisive importance for all the rest, whether we are dealing with the subsequent development of the Community, which is what we have called its strengthening, or whether it concerns the way in which the applications for membership could be considered, which is what we call the enlargement, or whether we are dealing with the future prospects of the European Community.

As for myself I shall go to the meeting with an open mind and without any prejudice. There are various possible solutions. None of these will be brushed aside by France but what I firmly hope is that the transition to the final stage may be the test that will compel everyone inside and outside the Community to come to terms with himself on his conception of the future of Europe. France, for its part, is ready for such a heart-searching examination.'

(Le Monde, 12 July and 24 September 1969)

## Germany

### 1. The European policy of the German Government

#### a) Ambassadors in conference on European unification

The possibilities of giving a new lease of life to the policy of European unification were the focal point of a three-day conference (30 June - 2 July 1969) in Bonn to which Mr. Brandt, Foreign Minister, convened twenty-eight German ambassadors (mainly from the West European capitals but also from Yugoslavia and Turkey), Heads of Missions (NATO, EEC, the Council of Europe, OECD) and representatives from the German Missions to the UNO in New York and Geneva.

'Europe must find its identity and unite its forces so that it can exercise its right to self-determination, measure up to its responsibility on the world's political stage and, above all, make its own decisive contribution to organizing peace' said Mr. Brandt at the opening of the conference. This was the first of the four principles of Germany's policy. The others were :

1. The purposeful completion of the European Communities and their enlargement to encompass those States 'ready and able to work with us on the basis of the Rome Treaties and what has been set up since they were signed.'
2. There was no conflict between unifying Western Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. 'We cannot close our eyes to the fact that Europe's own responsibilities are increasing and will go on doing so.'
3. Similarly there was no conflict between unifying Western Europe and efforts to achieve a peace settlement in Europe. 'In our realistic struggle to remove tension we have already achieved more than many realize.'

Mr. Brandt pointed out that the timing of the conference had not been determined by events in neighbouring States and that it should serve to prevent the elections in Germany from being used as an argument for not pushing ahead with developments.' He warned the diplomats to dispel any impression that Germany was now going to take some major initiative on Europe or that it wanted to take over 'the leadership' in Europe.

Dealing with a whole series of questions, Mr. Brandt repeated his suggestion that a summit conference of the Six should be convened with the United Kingdom. He particularly stressed that Germany was also interested in working together with smaller States such as Norway, Denmark and Ireland.

On Germany's position in the EEC after the transitional period ran out on 31 December he said : 'It is oversimplifying things to say we can not go on with the present agricultural system one day longer . . . . we must be ready to make sacrifices. But the point of these sacrifices must be made clearer.'

Asked if an agreement in principle on accession negotiations could be reached this year, he stressed : 'This agreement must go further than the statement of December 1967 or that of February 1968.' In 1967 the EEC Council had found that all the partners endorsed the principle of enlarging the Community but not all considered the time was ripe.

b) Cabinet statement on European policy

On 2 July 1969, the Cabinet discussed the outcome of the Bonn ambassadorial conference. Following on from the guidelines worked out in the councils of the Foreign Office, the Cabinet decided that Germany's policy on Europe would focus, for the immediate, on the following points :

1. The EEC must be enlarged and this must involve all States willing to join. Closer relations between the EEC and European countries (which wanted this rather than full membership) were also desirable.
2. Every effort must be made to achieve greater solidarity among Europeans in external affairs. Mr. Brandt thought the WEU Council was the appropriate place for improving co-operation between the Seven on foreign policy.
3. The key to progress on European policy lay in the policy pursued by France. The German Government wanted to give the new French Government time to settle down and would not exert any pressure.
4. The German Government was not striving to assume any kind of leadership either for the Federal Republic on its own or in alliance with any other State.
5. On forthcoming talks and decisions, the German Government wished to remain active in the field of European policy, regardless of the elections.

(Die Welt, 1, 3 July 1969; Die Zeit, 4 July 1969)

## 2. Resolution of the Bundestag on majority decisions in the Council of Ministers of the European Communities

On 25 March 1968, sixty-six Members of the Bundestag tabled the following motion : 'The Bundestag moves that the Federal Government be asked to urge the Council of the European Communities to observe the Treaty provisions on qualified majorities.'

On 23 April 1969, the Bundestag's Foreign Affairs Committee submitted a written report on this (Rapporteur : Mr. Furler) : 'The motion was referred to the Foreign Affairs Committee at the 171st session of the German Bundestag; the Committee looked into it at its meetings on 27 June and 6 February 1969.'

Article 148 of the Treaty (of 25 March 1957) setting up the European Economic Community requires that the Council's decisions shall be taken either by a simple or qualified majority of its members, except where otherwise provided for in the Treaty. This principle, the scope of which is already limited by numerous special clauses in the EEC Treaty, has in recent years been the cause of considerable differences of opinion between the Six. France did not call for any revision of Article 148 but wanted a political understanding on this point to the effect that no use would be made of the possibility of majority decisions when a member State made it clear that vital interests were involved. France's wish was dealt with in the Luxembourg Protocol of 1966.

The Committee considered that this was simply a political declaration of intent which did not invalidate the legitimacy of Article 148 of the Treaty; the possibility of majority decisions was still one of the key principles of Community law, of great importance for the existence and for the future of the Community. It would thus be wrong to postpone necessary Council decisions for that reason alone simply because unanimity could not be reached or because individual members of the Council did not want majority decisions. This would lead to an unacceptable paralysis of the Community and would be contrary to the clear wording of the EEC Treaty.

Apart from decisions on budgetary matters, the Council had only taken one decision on a political problem by a majority, to wit the Community's participation in the World Fair at Osaka. The Committee considered that the Government ought, in future, to see to it that the practical application of Treaty Article 148 was not undermined. The decisions that the further development of the Community called for should not be deferred, but taken by a majority if there was no unanimity after all the possibilities of discussion had been exhausted.

The Committee changed the wording of the motion to make it clear that although the Treaty often required the Council to take decisions by a simple majority, it also called for decisions by a qualified majority on specific matters. There must in future be no deviation from this decision-taking process which was clearly laid down in the Treaty.

On 17 June 1969 the Bundestag unanimously passed the following motion :

'The Government is asked to press for the observance, by the Council of the European Communities, of the majority decision provisions laid down in the Treaties.'

(European Parliament, Socialist Group, PE/GS/102/69;  
Bundestag, 171st Session, 8 May 1969)

3. Mr. Strauss, Federal Finance Minister, advocates nuclear weapons for a united Europe and a European code on the trade cycle

In an interview with the Nürnberger Zeitung (published in the week-end edition of 26-27 July 1969), Mr. Strauss said that a genuine European federation would have to have its own nuclear arsenal because this was the 'decisive deterrent'.

He said that the member States of a united Europe could not keep their military sovereignty. The fact that Mr. Wilson, British Prime Minister, brushed aside any public commitment to European unification and was non-committal about the nuclear weapons issue, was purely for domestic and party reasons. Mr. Heath, British leader of the Opposition, had already advocated combining the French and British nuclear weapons as the first stage in a European armaments arrangement.

Regarding Britain's entry into the EEC he said it was wrong 'to demand a wholesale liquidation of her economic and monetary problems before Britain could enter'. Far preferable would be to grant Britain a transitional period. 'Germany, he added, is ready to place its economic power at the service of European unity.'

It had to be made clear to the French President that he had no cause to feel or to express any concern about the possibility of Germany's predominating. The emphasis of German policy was unequivocally 'European and Atlantic'; it was ready to be reconciled with the East. Political flexibility in world affairs, political independence and equality with the USA could only be achieved through a political union of as many European States as possible.

He asked that Germans should undertake not, for a long time, to accept the position of a European prime minister, foreign minister or defence minister in such a federation.

He also called for a common code of conduct on trade-cycle policy in which growth and stability had the same emphasis in the States of Europe, including Britain. Observance of this code should be controlled by a European cyclical affairs council which could foreshadow a European cyclical affairs ministry. The council would revive any fall-off in economic activity in any one State 'by deploying the resources of a European investment fund'.

(Nürnberg Zeitung, 26-27 July 1969;  
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 28 July 1969;  
VWD-Europa, 28 July 1969;  
Bayernkurier, No. 31, 1969, p.4)

#### 4. Mr. Brandt, German Foreign Minister, on European policy

In interviews with the Italian newspapers 'Corriere della Sera' and '24 Ore', Mr. Brandt, German Foreign Minister, discussed European unification. In the interview he gave to 'Corriere della Sera' on 7 August 1969, he said that a European federal state with its own, democratic, constitutional bodies was still a long way off. It was, he thought, erroneous to suppose that the economic integration of Europe, the need for which was disputed by practically no responsible politician, would automatically lead to political integration. This called for an extra thrust and not least for a change in attitudes - still to a large extent inspired by nationalist thoughts and feelings.

With regard to setting up a European nuclear market, he said: 'Our policy for securing peace is aimed at reducing political tension in Europe, at putting an end to the military confrontation and replacing the balance of terror with a lasting state of ordered peace, to guarantee a secure future for all the



peoples of Europe. I cannot see how this aim can be furthered by setting up a West European nuclear power, quite apart from the fact that as things stand at present this would be in conflict with the principle of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which the Federal Republic believes in, even though it has not yet signed the Treaty. It would undermine the prospects for a peaceful settlement between East and West and would give a new impetus to the armaments race.

The question as to whether and to what extent Europe should have its own atomic weapons will in fact first arise if a European federal state comes into being, and no one yet knows what it will be like or whether it will be the result of, or the precondition for a comprehensive state of peace in Europe. I therefore see no cause to speculate about the defence potential of a federation of Europe at the moment.

The military security of Europe will go on being dependent on the alliance with the United States for a long time to come. This does not mean that the European partners in the alliance should not come closer together in the NATO framework, in their own interest. As regards the nuclear defence of the alliance, this guarantees that members who have no atomic weapons of their own co-operate in the nuclear planning. This, as far as I can see, has proved its worth.'

In the interview he gave to '24 Ore', Mr. Brandt said, on relations between East and West, that nothing should occur which might make them more difficult. The growing willingness - whatever the actual motive - to enter into economic, scientific and cultural contacts ought not to be 'held back or absolutely frustrated by obstinacy or lack of foresight'.

East and West Europe were today certainly not such strangers to each other as some feared and as others would like them to be. A conference on European security was a positive idea that could be put to use with a view to a comprehensive peace settlement.

'I am in favour of careful preparations, he said, because I am well aware that the problems of limiting armaments or disarmament in the East or West will need a lot of time if they are to be solved satisfactorily.'

In practical terms, he concluded, 'I see the following as possible, near aims for our policy on European unification :

- negotiations with the countries ready to join;
- the stipulation of association treaties with the neutral countries of Europe and possibly other States interested in this form of co-operation;
- bringing the twelve-year transitional period to a conclusion on schedule on 1 January 1970;
- an agreement on the agricultural policy and the financing arrangements to apply as from 1970 with the introduction of the essential parliamentary control over the very vast sums of Community money ear-marked for agriculture;
- the Community's having its own resources, emanating from customs duties and levies, as provided for in the Community Treaty;
- France's return to the Western European Union and an agreement on regular consultations on foreign policy and defence problems.

In the medium term, we are pursuing five objectives in the framework of our European unification policy :

- 1) enlarging the European Communities to welcome all democratically governed States ready to enter, provided they accept the rights and obligations laid down in the Rome Treaties;
- 2) the further internal consolidation of the Community, taking it from customs union to economic union; the Community's tasks in regional and structural policy, in transport and in the realm of research are still urgently awaiting adequate action;
- 3) closer political co-operation in, and in the interests of Western Europe;
- 4) the democratization of the European Communities;
- 5) lastly, preparatory work on a European peace settlement in the framework of a European security policy. '

(24 Ore, 24 August 1969;

Corriere della Sera, 7 August 1969;

Bulletin of the Press and Information Service of the Federal Government, No. 103, 8 August 1969;

Der Volkswirt, No. 32, 8 August 1969, p.22)

## 5. German views on the EEC agricultural policy

Finding new courses for the common agricultural policy has given food for thought in Germany recently. Criticisms of the regulations that have applied so far have come mainly from the Ministries of Food and Finance.

Concern at the huge cost to Germany of financing the EEC's agricultural market was expressed by the Finance Minister on 10 August 1969. A report to Parliament pointed out that the constantly rising cost of the Agricultural Fund was not only dangerous from the financial standpoint; the growing financial burden was of no benefit to any one because most of it was due to the storage of surpluses; it also narrowed down the scope for implementing an agricultural programme consistent with the national interest. The fact that Germany contributed by far the most to financing the common agricultural policy obviously aggravated the German feeling of unease expressed by the German Finance Minister; conversely and to even greater extent France was the 'greatest beneficiary'.

The Finance Minister's report gives an informative comparison of the contributions that the member States make to, and the amount they draw from the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund. The following figures are the estimates of the Finance Ministry for the financial year 1968-69. Germany, Italy and Belgium contribute more than they draw out whereas France, the Netherlands and Luxembourg draw out more than they contribute. The 'main sleeping partner' in this respect is Germany whose contributions exceed withdrawals by a good DM 1,000m; as the 'main beneficiary', France's withdrawals exceed contributions by DM 1,300m. Overall, Germany's average contribution is 31 per cent.

The Finance Minister deplored the steady rise in the Fund's budget, the volume of which had, in the meantime, risen from DM 151m (1962/3) to DM 9,800m; if the regulations on the organization of markets continued to apply, this figure would exceed DM 14,000m in years to come. The reasons for this were (i) participation of the Fund in expenditure on the agricultural policy to an ultimate 100 per cent, (ii) the rise in production, (iii) the mounting surpluses and (iv) the prices policy.

What added point to Mr. Strauss's criticism was that he could see no sign of this swelling expenditure abating. As a fiscal tool to control production levels - and, hence, the scale of the financial burden - prices had failed; they could not be made to tally with economic and financial requirements for political reasons. As regards products governed by market regulations, rising production, growing surpluses and - consequently - swelling costs had to be ex-

pected to continue. Additional burdens were to be anticipated as a result of the new market regulations (for tobacco, wine and fishery products) about which decisions had already been taken. In addition, the Mansholt Plan provided for structural policy measures that would stretch up to 1980 and cost at least DM 20,000m a year, according to the first estimates of the Brussels Commission.

Looking ahead to the decisions the Council of Ministers of the European Communities will have to take before the end of the year on financing agriculture and on the structure of the market regulations, the view being put forward in the Government recently has been that an effort should be made to modify the system of market regulations. Such reflections have long been current at the Ministry of Food; they have acquired a sharper edge as a result of the devaluation of the French franc on 8 August. A new opening for Germany's desire for change is provided principally by the French monetary cut and the accounting unit which is now, to say the least, shaky.

Interviewed by 'Die Welt' on 16 August 1969, Mr. Neef, Secretary of State at the Ministry of Food, had this to say: 'The European agricultural policy has climbed too high, like a mountain climber who wants, with the ambition of the idealist, to scale a precipitous peak. It would be reasonable for him to hold on calmly, to look around and perhaps call out for help. By making a slight detour he would finally come to the top of the mountain. I think this is the position we are in with the common agricultural policy.'

Mr. Neef went on to say that the market regulations had shown that they could now no longer do what they were supposed to do. They neither guaranteed the farmer an adequate income nor did they serve as a dynamo for taking integration any further. They had to be overhauled. Mr. Neef thought there were three possible alternatives (i) a return to national agricultural policies, (ii) to reshape the present system or (iii) to try and find a new system. He thought there was absolutely nothing to be said for a national system because it was no alternative as far as German policy was concerned; the European Economic Community was not 'negotiable', which ruled out the idea of reverting to the national pattern. There might still be a long time to wait for common monetary and economic policies, with a European dollar and a common issuing bank. It might perhaps be better, therefore, to bring in a system where the common agricultural market would not clash quite so much with the economic and monetary policies; this was not a matter of life and death for Europe but simply a technical and administrative problem. Criticism of the present system was not an attack on the Common Market; one should not bow down to the tyranny of the accounting unit; one had to have the courage to be flexible enough to find a new economic system for the Common Market.

There was also a positive side to the market regulations, he said, for if this policy had not been pursued not one stone of the Community would have been left standing on another. The fact that the EEC was still there was because of the investments the Six had made on the agricultural market. Those who believed that changing the market regulations for agriculture would be calling the Common Market into question overlooked the fact that the problems were no longer the same as they were in 1964. What mattered then was to work for the Common Market and to dispense the medicine of integration; now it is time to try and find new and better methods for agriculture; yet one should not be deluded into thinking that a different agricultural market system could completely preclude surpluses or the abandonment of farms.

The view of the CDU/CSU group in the Bundestag was that the monetary, economic and cyclical policies of the Six had to be approximated; otherwise there was no point in going on with the market regulations in their present form. This point was made by Mr. Struve, acting CDU/CSU group Chairman, at a discussion of the features of CDU/CSU farm policy for the next Bundestag.

On 18 August 1969 Mr. Jahn, Secretary of State at the Foreign Ministry, argued that the Mansholt Plan for the EEC was unworkable in its present form because its prerequisites could not be met in any of the six States. Financially, it was hardly feasible. He suggested setting a ceiling for the EAGGF at DM 10,000m per annum. This amount was already being paid into the Fund every year, Germany alone contributing one third. For every mark paid out, however, Germany got back only about 30 pfennigs.

(Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 14 August, 23 September 1969;

Die Welt, 16 August 1969;

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19, 20 August, 27 September 1969)

## 6. The Franco-German talks in Bonn

On 8 and 9 September 1969 Mr. Georges Pompidou, the French President, was in Bonn for consultations under the Franco-German Treaty. On 9 September, Mr. Diehl, Government Spokesman, summed up the outcome of the talks. The two Governments were agreed that completing the internal development of the Community had to remain the prerequisite for any future political union in Europe.

France, he said, was not yet ready to agree to a specific date for opening negotiations with Britain and the other applicant States. They wanted

to keep this issue for a summit meeting of the Six. They agreed this could take place in The Hague in November. The focal points would be completing and enlarging the Community and political co-operation in Europe.

France was willing to resume its seat on the Western European Union Council whose meetings it had been boycotting for a long time. Mr. Léon Hamon, French Secretary of State and Government Spokesman, told the press that this was conditional on WEU's not being used as a 'court of appeal' over the Community. He stressed that WEU should not be used as a kind of back-door for discussing the problems of the Six.

On the European Communities, he said it was a question of completing, consolidating and enlarging them. He said the Six were under a legal obligation to complete the transitional period by the end of the year. France would not oppose enlarging the EEC, provided it was 'completed'. It was essential for the Six first to clarify their views on the implications and effects of enlarging the Community.

Taking part in the talks were : President Pompidou, Chancellor Kiesinger, Mr. Brandt and Mr. Maurice Schumann, Foreign Ministers, Mr. Francis Xavier Ortoli, Minister for Industrial Development and Scientific Research, and Mr. Gerhard Stoltenberg, Federal Minister for Research. On 8 September, Mr. Jacques Chaban-Delmas was in Bonn for a few hours. European problems took pride of place in the talks. According to official sources, the international situation was analyzed and foreseeable developments in the years ahead were discussed. Both sides agreed that better use could be made of the Franco-German Treaty in regard to political co-operation.

Chancellor Kiesinger and Mr. Brandt opened the talks by saying that the French insistence on first consolidating and then enlarging the EEC could bring no progress in European policy. The Chancellor was emphatic that consolidation had to go hand in hand with enlargement. He said that the summit meeting of the Six (proposed by President Pompidou) had to take a decision as to when accession negotiations with the United Kingdom should officially open. At the same time, the Chancellor said that the meeting should make a decisive start towards achieving West European solidarity on foreign policy.

In view of the international situation, regular consultations on foreign policy were absolutely essential; between the Six initially, these could subsequently be between the Seven.

President Pompidou and Mr. Schumann made it clear that their main concern was to develop Franco-German co-operation on a reciprocal basis; this principally concerned industry and technology.

In practical terms, it was agreed that :

1. A Franco-German working party of government officials would be set up forthwith to look into the question of agricultural policy in the Common Market.
2. Similarly, a governmental working party would be set up for Franco-German industrial co-operation; President Pompidou was dissatisfied with the work done by the existing Franco-German Committee on Industry and Administration. This new working party, discussed by Mr. Stoltenberg and Mr. Ortoli, was to deal with technology, including the building of reactors.

It was further agreed that the possibilities afforded by the Franco-German Treaty should be put to greater use in regard to paving the way for progress in the EEC. There was no intention here of exerting pressure on the other member States to accept any specific ideas.

Mr. Schumann explained that France would be ready to resume its seat on Western European Union from the moment it was made clear that WEU was not going to be used as a 'court of appeal' for Community questions. It was also agreed that the subjects for discussion at the planned summit meeting of the Six in November should be : the development of the EEC, its enlargement and organized political co-operation between Europeans.

Speaking at a dinner at the 'Godesberger Redoute', Mr. Pompidou made it clear that there had been no basic change in Gaullist policy. He stressed that for the Europe of the Six to become a homogeneous economic reality, the final phase of the EEC had first to be initiated in January 1970 and the most urgent aspects of consolidating the EEC dealt with.

This reality was the prerequisite and indeed the firm basis for any political union. The problem of enlarging the EEC was under discussion and France would not avoid this issue once the final phase was reached and once the Six had had the opportunity to talk in complete freedom with each other about the consequences of enlargement.

The consequences of enlargement had to be clearly acknowledged and evaluated. He again stressed : 'France is definitely opposed to the "blocs"

policy and sees in its national independence and one day, I hope, in a European, i. e. an independent Europe, an essential factor in the security of this part of the world.'

Mr. Diehl assured the press that this did not mean that no attempt would be made at this time to bring Europeans to a common line on questions of international policy, on pragmatic lines.

Chancellor Kiesinger agreed that an attempt would be made within the Six to look into the problems involved in Britain's accession. Then negotiations would begin. In the first round of negotiations, all the States that had applied for membership or association would take part; in the second round, the problems of individual applicants would be discussed.

On the occasion of Mr. Pompidou's visit to the residence of the French ambassador, President Heinemann made a speech which attracted considerable attention. The following are extracts : 'We must note with great pleasure and satisfaction that Franco-German friendship and Franco-German reconciliation have today become exemplary realities. It is our conviction that the spirit of the Treaty of 1963 reflects the firm and enduring will of our two peoples to go beyond the strife, the wrongs and the sorrows of the past to build our future together. This will is coming more clearly into the light of day all the time, especially among young people in France and Germany. We should regard this as confirmation that we are on the right road with our policy of close Franco-German co-operation, neighbourliness and friendship. One of the essential features of our work for the future will be to increase our efforts in this direction still further.

We are glad that in our efforts to improve our relations with the East European countries in order to overcome the past, heal wounds, build bridges and close gulfs, we have the full understanding of our French partners. We are aiming at co-operation to create a new climate of confidence and help to pave the way for a lasting peace settlement in Europe. This must be built on the guiding principles of justice, self-determination and European solidarity.

A further line of development is the completion, consolidation and enlargement of our European Communities, in which we work together with our Western European partners. European unification must be pursued with greater speed and energy than in the past : our people expect visible progress in this direction. This is also true of the enlargement of the circle of countries and peoples taking part in this work. I am convinced that Germany and France can, must and will together make a decisive contribution to European unity.



It is our common duty to go on constructing in this spirit and on the basis of the Franco-German Treaty. Now, for the first time, neither of the two great statesmen who concluded the Treaty and gave a new start to relations between our two countries is present . . . . this brings home to us the fact that although the personalities in the history and life of our countries change, our duty remains to serve the cause of understanding between our peoples, the unification of our continent and the preservation of peace.'

Mr. Chaban-Delmas said in connexion with Europa-Union that they did not always agree completely about everything but this was only natural among friends. A whole range of questions faced the two partners, from the completion of the Communities to their consolidation and enlargement. 'But because the situation is so complex, we must go forward carefully in an effort to overcome the obstacles step by step and not succumb to the temptation to give up, which is what the advocates of "all or nothing" do when results do not immediately come up to their expectations.'

(Bulletin of the Press and Information Service of the Federal Government,  
No. 114, 10 September 1969, No. 115, 11 September 1969;  
Die Welt, 9 and 10 September 1969;  
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 9, 10, 11 September 1969;  
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 10, 11 September 1969)

## Great Britain

### 1. Mr. Harold Wilson - 'No commitment to a federal Europe'

Twice in July 1969 Mr. Harold Wilson gave the broad lines of his Government's European policy. In answer to several questions put to him in the Commons on 8 July with regard to Britain's sovereignty and the building of Europe, the Prime Minister replied as follows :

Mr. Jennings (Burton, Conservative).- In any future talks that the Prime Minister might have, will he make it clear that he is not prepared to commit this country to joining a politically federated Europe ?

Mr. Wilson.- I have answered that question many times. My understanding of the Treaty of Rome, and I have had it confirmed by some colleagues yesterday, is that the only political implications of joining the EEC are those set out in the Treaty of Rome which relate specifically to the Treaty.

Ideas that to join means an automatic commitment to some kind of political or defence federation are not justified either by the Treaty or by the Minister responsible for running the Treaty.

The statement made by Mr. Willy Brandt was important in this context. He made clear that political unity in Europe would have to be agreed.

.....

Mr. Thomas Price (Westhoughton, Labour).- There is a growing body of opinion in the House that Britain's entry into the Common Market in the context of contemporary European politics is a non-runner. (Some cheers and cries of "No") Those who persistently back non-runners on race courses are a godsend to the bookmakers whoever they may be in the context of our affairs.

Many of us are disturbed, although by no means Little Englanders, at the prospect of any further erosion of British sovereignty because we would like some evidence that those running the Economic Community are able to solve their own problems before trying to solve ours.

Mr. Wilson.- If Mr. Price is referring to political difficulties in Europe, I would have thought the case for closer political integration between Britain and Europe on many questions going far beyond economics might be the best protection against the dangers he foresees.

Mr. Heath (Bexley, Conservative).- What is the Government's view about further developments in the political field outside the Treaty of Rome, whether they be towards federal, confederal, or non-federal arrangements ?

Mr. Wilson.- There is no automatic obligation to any political federation or any separate kind of political unity by signing or adhering to the Treaty of Rome.

Many feel there is a case for developing institutions towards political unity in Europe. The right answer in the first instance is what the Government are doing to invoke the machinery of the WEU for closer political contacts. (Ministerial cheers) None of this implies any automatic commitment to federal or confederal Europe.

On 22 July the Prime Minister, replying to a parliamentary question, again defined his Government's position with regard to Europe:

Mr. Tuck (Watford, Labour).- How does Mr. Wilson reconcile the assurance he gave on 10 June that federal Europe was just not on for Britain with continued membership by Mr. Stewart of the Monnet Committee for the United States of Europe, which is a federal group ?

Mr. Wilson.- There is nothing inconsistent because there is no immediate proposal by us or any other Government, for any federal get-together or structure, and it does not involve in any way our application to join the Treaty of Rome.

A federal Europe several years from now is hypothetical and does not fit in with the general opinion of the country and the House for the immediate proposition, but it is something which may come in the much more distant future and there is nothing inconsistent with the present situation and the Monnet Commission.'

(Times, 9 and 23 July 1969)

## 2. Mr. Luns, Dutch Foreign Minister, visits London

On 15 July Mr. Luns had talks with Mr. Wilson, Prime Minister, and Mr. Stewart, Foreign Minister, on the 'declaration of intent' concerning British entry into the Communities. The same evening Mr. Luns was guest speaker at a meeting of diplomatic correspondents and the Foreign Press Association.

Mr. Luns said that a really united Europe was inconceivable without Britain. It was not primarily for economic reasons that the Dutch had been the advocates of British entry. He also disagreed with many on the Continent who believed that British public opinion was only lukewarm about the idea of a united Europe. 'If there were really serious grounds for doubting Britain's sincere desire to become a member of the EEC, then the Netherlands would have to make an agonizing reappraisal of its standpoint.'

Mr. Luns was emphatic that consolidation of the Community could go hand in hand with its enlargement. He saw no good reason for postponing British entry.

Mr. Luns thought it would be hazardous if the Six were to confine themselves to improving living standards in the Community. Many young people who had grown up in the present age of affluence were not on the whole impressed by arguments about economic prosperity and they had become 'alarmingly indifferent' about uniting Europe. It was for the young that the parent generation was building up and organizing the new Europe, while the young thoughtlessly denounced the way of life of today's society in unacceptable terms. More emphasis should be laid on the great possibilities that a united Europe would hold out for promoting peace, culture and a range of activities such as help for the developing countries. To give the European idea greater prominence in the European Communities, it should be made clear that they had to remain open to other European States and steps had to be taken to bring this about. Mr. Luns here welcomed the more positive attitude to new memberships adopted by the new French President and his Government. The Community institutions had to be developed in a supra-national way and the European Parliament had to play a greater part. The possibility of its direct election had to be looked into positively. Mr. Luns concluded by repeating that a really united Europe was inconceivable without Britain.

(Handels- & Transport Courant, 16-17 July 1969)

## Ireland

### Mr. Hillary, Irish Foreign Secretary, has talks with Mr. Luns, Dutch Foreign Minister

Mr. Hillary, Irish Foreign Secretary, told Mr. Luns of his concern about rumours that discussions would initially only bear on British entry. He made it clear that his Government hoped that entry negotiations with Britain and the other applicant States would begin and end at the same time.

In reply to a question from a reporter, Mr. Hillary said that in his talks with Mr. Luns, the Dutch Foreign Minister had indicated that he would, as President of the Council of Ministers, bring the Irish standpoint and Ireland's interests to the attention of his colleagues. He was unable to make any prediction as to the decision that would be taken by the European Communities.

Mr. Hillary pointed out that in view of its very close trade relations with Britain, Ireland would be seriously affected if Britain were to become a member of the European Communities before Ireland.

(Handels- & Transport Courant, 16, 17 July 1969)

## Italy

### 1. The Italian Government's European policy programme

Outlining his Government's programme in the Chamber of Deputies on 8 August, Mr. Rumor, President of the Council, said that special attention would be paid to agriculture, particularly in regard to European integration. The proposals put forward in the Mansholt Plan would be carefully studied, even though the actual conditions prevailing in Italian agriculture could not be ignored when it came to re-organizing structures.

The aim of this fundamental re-organization was to make agriculture more efficient and the emphasis had to be on stimulating and re-invigorating the kind of business management which turned work on the land to the best advantage, such as family estates in co-operative link-ups.

He said that Italy trusted there would be a conference on peace and security in Europe and that the USA, the USSR, the members of the two alliances and the other States of Europe would take part in it. The aim of Italy's foreign policy was and remained European unity. The disappointments and delays experienced in the last few years should not cause any deviation from this objective. This was vital because Western Europe could then discharge all its responsibilities and make an effective contribution to the peaceful progress of mankind. It was, however, the Government's duty to work for the complete implementation of the Treaties of Paris and Rome. The Government knew it could also rely here on action by the Italian representatives in the European Parliament.

In the months ahead, the Government's attention would focus on (i) going from the transitional to the final stage of the Common Market (ii) particularly important decisions in the sensitive branches of the European and national economies, including those on the common agricultural policy. The Government trusted that its firm resolve would meet with a similar determination on the part of the other member States. This commitment was, moreover, bound up with that of pursuing action for the entry of the United Kingdom into the Community. Every one was familiar with the obstacles that the requests for membership had frequently run into in recent months. There was hardly any room now for further illusions. Later developments, however, made it reasonable to suggest that, in this respect, the situation had undergone a change for the better. The Government was ready to agree to the planned summit meeting of the Six, to be carefully prepared and attended by

the European Commission. This meeting should be followed by others with the United Kingdom. The Government would press for the election by direct universal suffrage of the members of the European Parliament.

Until the Community could evolve towards political integration, the Government intended to go ahead with the already initiated European political construction and hoped that France would contribute to this end. Lastly, Italy trusted there would be general, complete and controlled disarmament. Italy had made its full contribution to achieving this end, not least by signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Italy intended to continue in this direction.

(Chamber of Deputies, Summary Report, 8 August 1969)

2. Mr. Rumor and Mr. Colombo on the devaluation of the French franc  
(10-11 August 1969)

Speaking in the Chamber of Deputies, Mr. Rumor, President of the Italian Council of Ministers, said that the devaluation of the French franc and the effects it might have on the other States were confirmation of the close inter-dependence of the Western world's economies and of the need for an agreed monetary policy that was co-ordinated internationally: the main end in view was to avoid imbalances in some countries having dangerous repercussions in others. While accepting measures taken by a friendly country with reasonable understanding, the Italian Government trusted that France would take further measures to restore its currency and its economy. The Italian Government's decision not to change the parity of the lira - the other countries in the Group of Ten had taken the same decision on their currencies - was to be seen in this context and followed logically from the decisions agreed on in Bonn since last November on the reasonable measure of devaluation itself.

Mr. Colombo, Minister of Finance, said that Italy supported the French move in so far as its outcome was in the interests of the whole Community. However, monetary provisions alone would not enable France to overcome its present difficulties. The Italian Government was also very interested in the action France would take in the next few weeks to restore its economy. It was in the interest of the Community that there should be no increase in prices because this could prejudice the monetary readjustment and that a price increase did not lead to an increase in surpluses. Hence,

the need to adopt a co-operative attitude in looking into the Commission's proposals, which were, broadly speaking, acceptable.

(Chamber of Deputies, Summary Report, 10 August 1969;  
La Stampa, 12 August 1969)

### 3. Mr. Willy Brandt visits Rome

Mr. Willy Brandt, Foreign Minister and Vice-Chancellor of the Federal Republic, visited Rome on 1 September at the invitation of Mr. Aldo Moro, Italian Foreign Minister.

The following is an extract from a communiqué issued at the close of this visit: 'The talks between the two foreign ministers were held in an atmosphere reflecting the cordiality and sincere friendship characteristic of Italy's relations with Germany. It gave the Ministers a fresh opportunity to bring out the complete identity of views of their two countries on the main problems of common interest at this time. Stress was again laid on the urgent need for practical progress in consolidating and enlarging the Community and in the field of European political co-operation. They recognized the importance of ever-closer co-operation between Italy and Germany on the international bodies to which both countries belonged. They re-affirmed the complete validity of the Atlantic Alliance in its defensive function and as a vital factor in easing tension and consolidating peace. Questions affecting East-West relations were examined during the course of the talks. It was agreed that realistic and tenacious action was called for, despite the difficulties that had arisen in 1968 and which were still there, breeding uneasiness and distress, so as to establish an atmosphere of security and trust, increase co-operation in every field, peacefully resolve controversies and, hence, bring about an equitable solution to the German question.

Against this background, active consideration was given to the question of calling a conference on European problems; properly prepared and with a rational agenda and time-allocation for the problems under discussion, such a conference could be very useful.

The two Ministers discussed a series of problems relating to disarmament, the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the organization of the IAEA and international technological co-operation.'

(Il Popolo, 2 September 1969)



4. Statement by the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Chamber of Deputies (12 September 1969)

Addressing the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber of Deputies the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Signor Moro, stated that the Government considered the adhesion of Italy to the Atlantic Alliance and NATO as a fundamental and lasting interest of the country. The reasons for tightening the links within this alliance remained valid with a view to achieving national security and a relaxation of world tension while at the same time significantly determining the orientation of Italian foreign policy; on the basis of this security it would be possible to open an active political dialogue with Eastern Europe.

The international situation still suggested a need to continue the Atlantic policy even if some sources of tension had been lessened. On the other hand the Atlantic Alliance, while remaining military in nature was tending more and more to become a political fact.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs then expressed the hope that it would be possible to organize a conference on European problems; this conference would be encouraged by any gesture likely to reduce the current tension in Czechoslovakia. As regards Greece, the Government also hoped that the restoration of democratic institutions and individual liberty would be accelerated. In this context he recalled that the time was approaching for the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to debate political and moral sanctions, the adoption of which had been decided by the Consultative Assembly, against the Athens Government: the attitude of Italy would be characterized by its intention to respect the standards set by the Statute of the Council of Europe.

Going on to describe the results of the visit to Rome by Herr Brandt, West German Vice-Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Signor Moro drew attention to the emphasis which had been placed on the urgent need to achieve concrete progress in enlarging the Community through entry of Great Britain and the other countries which had made applications to join, in the internal development of the Community, and finally through political consultation and co-operation extending beyond the Six with a view to the gradual development of a political parallel to the existing achievements of the Community in the economic and social fields.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs then recalled that the idea had been mooted of a summit of the Six to examine European problems, Such a meeting could provide the means to overcome any rigidity in France's European policy.

While not wishing to institutionalize an exceptional procedure which might end up by weakening the authority of the organs of the Community, Italy did not oppose such a proposal, provided that the summit meeting could give positive results - although it was realized that these results were bound to be gradual. He went on to state that devaluation of the franc and the subsequent decision of the Community to isolate the French agricultural market for one year had added an element of uncertainty to the situation; the Minister emphasized the evident difficulty in arriving at final decisions on the agricultural policy of the Community within a year.

Italy therefore felt that negotiations in this sector should take into account the prospect of a geographical enlargement of the Community.

Turning next to problems of disarmament, the Minister confirmed that at the current session of the Geneva Conference the Italian delegation had made its contribution to the discussion of various subjects, including in particular the limitation of armaments on the sea bed in respect of which there was good prospect of an agreement being reached between the Americans and Russians, as well as the subject of prohibition of chemical and biological weapons. Italy had also put forward a suggested programme for general disarmament. On 28 January 1969, the Italian Government appended its signature to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, thereby hoping also to encourage other countries to follow suit. As regards the decisions to be taken on applications of this Treaty, the Minister mentioned the modification of the Statutes of the IAEA (Italian Atomic Energy Authority); in this connexion, Signor Moro concluded, an agreement had been proposed with a view to obtaining for Italy a permanent seat on the Governing Council of the Vienna Agency, having regard to the important rôle which the IAEA would perform in applying the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(Chamber of Deputies, Bollettino delle Giunte delle Commissioni parlamentari, 12 September 1969)

## Netherlands

### 1. Mr. Luns on the rôle of the Benelux countries in the Community

Speaking at a luncheon at the Château de Val-Duchesse on 1 July, Mr. Luns, Dutch Foreign Minister, said: 'The Benelux group is still well worthwhile and it has a useful part to play in the European Community'. He was moderately but resolutely optimistic about the way the Benelux Group could work for unity on the European Communities. It had to concentrate on areas for which the EEC had made no short-term provision. In this way, the course to be followed would be outlined and the Benelux Group would continue to play the part of a pioneer.

Mr. Luns went over what the Group had achieved economically, in foreign policy, as regards development and in the cultural sphere.

The supranational structures had to fit into a larger European framework and, if hopes materialized, embrace an even larger number of countries. Supranational structures, he said, presupposed a new supranational entity and, in view of the predominantly bipolar character of the Benelux Group (BLEU-Netherlands), it was difficult to render this in practical terms. He also asked how a supranational body in the Benelux Group should act in relation to the European institutions. He refuted the theory that the Benelux Group had no choice but to join the European Community. He recalled that the Rome Treaty specifically recognized the Benelux Group.

As for the immediate future, he said, it only remained to execute the decisions taken in The Hague by the Conference of Benelux Governments on the economic union and on working towards a common line on foreign policy. He also stressed the importance of co-ordinating the ports policy of the three countries. He hoped that the progress committee set up recently would give practical advice in every field.

He further stated that the constitution of a qualified majority of the Benelux Group was a stabilizing factor in the great European complex. The fact that the three countries were heavily dependent on their neighbours had predisposed them to adopt and endorse a conciliatory approach in the Communities. He also stressed what the Benelux Group could do: it could, for example, help ease tension between East and West. Although this was not a spectacular rôle, it might be all the more valuable for that very reason. It

looked as though the European Community was going to remain closed to the other European applicants for the time being. The Benelux countries ought therefore to consult with each other on what fresh moves could be made to revive European integration which was temporarily at a standstill.

(L'Echo de la Bourse, 2 July 1969)

## 2. Consultations between Mr. Brandt and Mr. Luns

On 7 and 8 July Mr. Brandt, German Foreign Minister, had talks with Mr. Luns in The Hague. At a press conference Mr. Brandt stated that they were in complete agreement on their European policy objectives, although Mr. Luns added that views might vary as to the material content of this policy.

Both emphasized the connexion between the internal consolidation of the Communities and their enlargement. (Mr. Luns indicated that France and, to a lesser degree Luxembourg and Germany, laid greater stress on consolidation)

Mr. Brandt gave an assurance that the West German elections would not prevent his Government from taking part in discussions on the Communities, except in the case of a summit meeting. The Dutch view on such a meeting was that it should deal solely with political issues and not with matters coming within the terms of reference of the Community institutions. (Mr. Luns hoped that the other four member States, including France, would agree on a joint declaration covering points of 'substance', indicating exactly when and how negotiations with the United Kingdom would be conducted)

Mr. Luns said there were three possible points, which a declaration of intent could cover: (i) all the problems of internal structure, democratization and enlargement could be defined (ii) details regarding negotiations could be set out and (iii) intentions as to what was to be on the agenda in the months ahead could be expressed.

(Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, 8 July 1969;  
l'Aurore, 8 July 1969)

3. The Second Chamber debates the Government's report on the application of the Treaties of Rome in 1968

During the debate on the annual report on the effect and application of the Rome Treaties held on 9 and 10 September, the following were the main points discussed:

- a) enlargement of the European Communities
- b) political co-operation
- c) the devaluation of the French franc
- d) the summit meeting
- e) competition policy
- f) the ultra-centrifugation project
- g) the direct election of the European Parliament and the Community's having its own resources.

The underlying tone of the debate was one of concern at developments in the European Community. Nearly all speakers discussed the position of the European Parliament and the need for direct elections.

a) As regards the enlargement and consolidation of the European Community, Mr. Berkhouwer (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy) stressed that enlarging the Community could only make it stronger. The liberals had no preference for any one of the applicant States, None should be kept in the waiting room while the Community negotiated with only one of them. As the number of members increased, the need for majority decisions would grow more urgent. He said that the Luxembourg Agreement of January 1966 should be rescinded.

Mr. Boersma (Anti-Revolutionary Party) said the devaluation of the French franc and the previous monetary crisis had clearly shown that there was co-operation between the European countries and that this went beyond the borders of the EEC. He regarded this as a good argument for enlarging the Community.

Mr. Schuijt (Catholic People's Party) thought that it would be highly appropriate for consolidation to go hand in hand with enlargement. If the Six built up a rigid, internal structure, it would create difficulties over the entry of new members. He agreed with the Monnet Committee that 'the Six should ..... arrive at a common position, particularly as regards negotiations'.

b) Mr. Van Mierlo (Democracy '66) called for the following compromise on political co-operation:

- (i) obligatory periodic consultations in Brussels between the Six Governments on a free inter-governmental basis;
- (ii) setting up an independent committee to prepare these consultations and having the right to make proposals; the question was whether it should be recommended that some members of this committee should be from the European Commission which could be enlarged for this purpose;
- (iii) widening the scope of the European Parliament's activities to include foreign policy and defence; these political consultations would focus on:
  - relations with the USA, the USSR and the East European countries;
  - the gradual constitution of a European caucus, i. e. a European group which could function as a single partner within NATO;
  - relations with the third world, particularly in regard to development assistance.

Inter-governmental consultations could be conducive to a common political front and lead ultimately to supranational deliberations.

c) As regards the devaluation of the French franc, Mr. Westerterp, (Catholic People's Party) considered that the procedure followed was not legal. The French Government had not complied with either the Council Decision of 1964, under which a definite procedure was laid down, or the Council Decision of 17 July 1969. He thought it was a strange way of legislating for the Council to declare that, because one of its own Decisions had not been complied with, it had been superseded.

Mr. Westerterp strongly disapproved of the fact that a regulation, following from a Commission proposal, had come into effect without the European Parliament's having been consulted. The result had been a change in a regulation which could normally only be made with the concurrence of the European Parliament. The unilateral French decision had been prejudicial to Dutch agricultural and industrial exports.

Mr. Vredeling (Labour Party) saw the French devaluation as a 'black page' in the history of the Community; he particularly deplored the fact that this devaluation had been at all possible. He, too, objected to the procedure adopted by the Commission and Council in this matter. He asked whether economic policy should not be imposed by means of monetary policy, if they

were to break out of the vicious circle. The character of the 'Community-at-law' had been badly shaken by the strange turn this whole affair had taken.

Mr. Lardinois, Minister for Agriculture, pointed out that whatever one's views about the unilateral decision of the French Government might be, it was in the interests of the Community that it should be successful. At a Council meeting he had vainly defended the standpoint that Regulation 653 should be fully applied, including Article 7, which stipulated:

'The member State or States concerned can take provisional measures where these automatically bring temporary relief. In any event these measures must not jeopardize the free movement of agricultural products, ' etc.

The French delegation was the only one that was unwilling to accept the application of Article 226 of the EEC Treaty, under which the European Commission is responsible for determining any necessary measures during the transitional period. In addition, the European Commission did not favour a very broad interpretation of this Article to the effect that these measures should run on after the end of the transitional period. The Dutch delegation thought this was going too far. The French delegation did not wish to make a formal request to the Commission to put this article into effect.

The Commission was finally asked to submit a report to the Council, giving alternatives; the European Parliament would be consulted about this report.

In conclusion Mr. Lardinois stressed that the 'solution' arrived at could not serve as a precedent in the event of the revaluation of any other currency.

d) Mr. Luns, Foreign Minister, reported to the Chamber on what he had told the Governments of the other member States about the organization of a summit meeting:

- if such a meeting were held, it should not be seen as the beginning of a series; every such meeting had to be on an ad hoc basis;
- from this rejection of any institutionalization of summit meetings between the Six, it followed that they could not be prepared by any secretariat or separate preparatory committees;
- a summit meeting to discuss EEC problems should be attended by the European Commission represented by its President, Mr. Rey;

- if the Commission were not represented then the most that could be done would be to have a general political discussion on various subjects, including the political aspects of enlargement or non-enlargement in so far as they concerned the EEC;
- some prior indication should be given by the ministers that the meeting was going to be a success.

Experience of recent summit meetings and, notably, the one in Rome in 1967, which were prepared without any prior diplomatic contacts, had proved disappointing. It would be a good idea if the summit meeting of the Six were followed by a meeting at which Britain could also be present. The Netherlands did not want to make this a sine qua non condition but would make the suggestion to the other member States.

Asked about what the French President had discussed with the German Chancellor regarding a summit meeting, Mr. Luns answered that whatever items may have been under discussion for the agenda, they were not binding on the Dutch Government. This particularly applied to setting up a European secretariat for political affairs.

e) As regards competition policy, Mr. Oele (Labour Party) asked that Article 86 of the EEC Treaty should be put into practical application in respect of positions of market dominance; he asked for sufficient EEC Commission staff to be assigned to the preparatory work on a really workable competition policy. It was necessary to keep an eye on the dominant positions of the large enterprises and he advocated greater freedom for the smaller ones. He suggested that the setting up of a European cartel office be considered. Mr. De Block, Minister for Economic Affairs, shared these views and agreed that there was a backlog in Brussels and that thousands of notifications of agreements were awaiting a decision. He said that the European Commission had assigned a sufficient number of officials for them to be able to pursue a competition policy.

Mr. De Block was not very keen on the idea of a European cartel office. Apart from the fact that setting it up would involve an amendment to the Treaty, an independent body might run counter to the policy of the European Commission.

f) As regards the link between the ultra-centrifugation project and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Mr. Luns said that one difficulty was that Britain could use the know-how it acquired for military purposes. The danger was not so great in the case of Germany, in view of the statements made by Chancellor Kiesinger and Mr. Brandt and Mr. Stulzenberg. Naturally, Mr. Luns would be



very glad if Germany signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty before signing the ultra-centrifugation agreement. Mr. Bakker (Communist Party) was certain that political consultations with such countries as France and Germany would naturally lead to a European nuclear power and he referred to statements made by Mr. Strauss, German Finance Minister, to support this. Mr. Van Mierlo, on the other hand, said that the political link between Germany and the Community was a guarantee against any German bid for a nuclear power. He added that the European Parliament should deal with foreign policy and defence. There were repeated and emphatic demands from the Chamber that Germany should sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. A number of MPs wanted co-operation with Germany on the ultra-centrifugation project to be regarded as a separate issue from the signing of this Treaty.

g) Both Mr. Vredeling and Mr. Van Mierlo considered that political co-operation, particularly on defence, should be dependent on the introduction of democratic control. Mr. Boersma thought it inconceivable that the Community should enter its final phase without having its own resources.

After going into the need for a European party and for the Executive to be appointed by a legally elected Parliament, Mr. Vredeling concluded that the need to democratize the European Community took precedence over consolidation or enlargement.

Giving a rather evasive answer to Mr. Jongeling (Reformed Political Union) about informing the public about Council meetings, Mr. De Koster, Secretary of State, was interrupted by Mr. Westerterp who reminded him of the Government's promise that this question would be dealt with when the Council's final Rules of Procedure were drawn up. Perhaps the reason why the Council had still not done this was because it wanted to avoid tackling such a difficult problem, said Mr. Westerterp. He added that the question as to whether direct elections or increased powers should come first was a 'phoney issue', apart from which, he could not refrain from saying that even though the French Parliament under the Fifth Republic had fewer powers than the European Parliament in some respects, it was still directly elected.

The motion on the European Parliament, introduced by Mr. Westerterp (Catholic People's Party), Mr. Vredeling (Labour Party), Mr. Berkhouwer (People's Party from Freedom and Democracy), Mr. Boersma (Anti-Revolutionary Party), Mr. Bos (Christian Historical Union) and Mr. Van Mierlo (Democracy '66), read as follows:

'The Chamber,

- a) having regard to the deliberations on the Government's report on the European Communities in 1968;
- b) considering that in order to achieve a more democratic decision-taking procedure in the Community the powers of the European Parliament must be extended as soon as possible to cover budgetary rights, legislation and the appointment of members of the European Commission;
- c) expresses the opinion that the final settlement on agricultural financing, endowing the Community with its own resources and increasing the powers of the European Parliament are inseparable issues;
- d) calls on the Government to make its assent to the final settlement on agricultural financing dependent on the replacement of financial contributions from the member States by Community resources and on a satisfactory strengthening of the position of the European Parliament. '

The motion, which had the support of Mr. Luns, was passed without a division. The direct election of the Dutch members of the European Parliament was to be the subject of a proposal by Mr. Westerterp. In this connexion, Mr. Vredeling pointed out that it would be preferable for these direct elections to take place in all member States as other political splinter groups might otherwise spring up.

(Second Chamber, Proceedings, Session of 9 and 10 September, Doc. 10101, 1968-1969)

4. Approval by the Second Chamber of a decision by the representatives of the member countries concerning products with an oil content

On 18 September, the Second Chamber considered the decision taken on 25 July 1967 by the representatives of the governments of the member countries of the European Economic Communities, within the framework of the Council Assembly, setting out special regulations covering products which contain oil and originate from the associated African States and Madagascar, or from overseas countries and territories. Attention was given primarily to legal aspects of the question.

After discussing the content of the decision, Mr. Vredeling (P.v.d.A.) strongly criticized the procedure which consisted in representatives of the

governments of member countries taking a decision within the framework of the Council Assembly on matters which affect the Community. These decisions were sometimes considered to constitute guiding agreements, in the form of 'framework decisions' and in other instances conventions valid under international law. According to the Government, guiding agreements taking the form of 'framework decisions' should not be generally binding and have no legal consequences, while conventions were naturally binding. In practice, however, it was not always apparent to which category a decision belonged. The Government was clearly aware of this problem since it conceded that decisions reached in this vague manner were signed by the Chairman of the Council in the same way as 'agreements noted in the minutes' or recorded notes. Mr. Vredeling wished to know whether political control could be exercised over guiding agreements which were sometimes politically binding conventions. He recalled that his fellow party member, Mr. Burger, referred to all 'decisions taken within the framework of the Council' as international conventions requiring the approval of national parliaments. The Government did not wish to go as far as this, and only considered as international conventions those decisions which it was prepared to submit to parliament for approval.

According to Mr. Vredeling it was not necessary to fall back upon the vague procedure - which was difficult to control - of decisions by representatives of the member countries on matters for which the Treaty made no direct provision but which clearly fell within the framework of the objectives of the Treaty, since the Treaty of Rome made provision for precisely this situation in its Article 235. However this article attributed legislative functions both to the Commission and to the European Parliament.

Mr. Vredeling concluded that financing of the subsidy for products containing oil exported by the associated countries and territories fell within the objectives of the Treaty, having regard to Article 131, and that Article 235 should therefore have been applied. This assumption was supported by the fact that the Community, or more specifically the Council, agreed on 23 December 1963 to grant financial assistance to the associated African States and Madagascar. Although the speaker did not wish to deny the importance of a flexible legislative procedure, he was afraid that the method of 'decisions taken within the framework of the Council' might be used by governments to conceal the absence of real Community spirit.

Mr. Westerterp (K. V. P.) referred in this connexion to the 'framework decision' of 23 April 1963, concerning the tax on margarine and asked what was the value of the guiding agreement which read as follows:

'In this context (with reference to this decision) the Netherlands delegation stated explicitly that the decision could only be implemented if at the same time satisfactory provision were made for

strengthening the budgetary authority of the European Parliament. This is still the position of the Netherlands Government.'

Mr. Boertien (A. R. P.) would find it most disturbing if the conclusion of guiding agreements which must in reality be treated as conventions led to the authority of the Community institutions being weakened.

Secretary of State De Koster argued that the Government favoured a flexible procedure of legislation, while at the same time wishing to involve the Commission closely in the preparation and drafting of 'framework decisions'. The Government was willing to advocate the delegation of authority to the Court of Justice to take cognizance of 'framework conventions' as well. He admitted that when decisions were taken by the governments in the framework of the Council Assembly they did not usually have the intention of entering into a convention. The Secretary of State further defended this type of decision with the argument that in the cases in point the Treaty placed obligations on the member countries but not on the Council. The national policy of the countries could be properly co-ordinated in such cases by a 'framework decision' in accordance with the need which had become apparent in practice to arrive rapidly at a flexible form of legislation on specific matters. This did not alter the fact that the 'governments acting within the framework of the Council Assembly' still interpreted framework decisions at their own discretion and in divergent manners. The Secretary of State would make efforts to ensure that a greater degree of uniformity was reached, covering the question of signature as well.

The draft law was adopted without calling a vote.

(Debates in the Second Chamber, meeting of 18 September, 1969-70 session)

##### 5. The Government's view of the Mansholt Plan

The Dutch Government submitted a Note to the States General setting out its views on the European Commission Memorandum on overhauling agriculture in the EEC. This discussed policy aims (i. e. the enlargement of farms and the moving of farmers to other occupations) and the means for achieving them, such as improving production structures, product sales structures, turning farm land fallow, occupational retraining and the introduction of other necessary social measures. On the financial aspects, the Government declined to comment because it was impossible to evaluate the budget on the basis of the summary given. The Government found this deplorable as the proposed

reform would undoubtedly have a serious effect on the budget. The Government summed up its viewpoint in a general statement. The Memorandum could bridge a major gap when it came to the necessary overhaul of the Community markets and prices policy and as regards the essential consultations on the Community's future structure policy. The Minister for Agriculture pointed out that there had been an undeniable change in the speed with which the various agricultural organizations reacted. One adverse factor had been the change for the worse in the circumstances in the Community, particularly in the common agricultural market, as compared with those obtaining in the initial phase of the EEC's agricultural policy.

The Note broadly agreed with the Memorandum's analysis of the economic and social situation in Community agriculture. The limited demand for a number of farm products (both in the EEC and elsewhere) restricted the scope for further intensification. The rapid growth in the output-per-man in the Community meant that those who remained on the farms must have higher incomes, that the size of farms must be increased and that the number of people engaged in farming must, at the same time, be reduced. A large-scale drift away to non-farming activities would allow a swift rise in agricultural productivity. Against this background, an all-round increase in job opportunities outside agriculture was an absolute prerequisite.

The Minister did not agree with the Commission's views because these concentrated exclusively on a far-reaching tie-up between structural re-organization and restoring the balance of the market. Markets and prices policy, provided it were suitably applied, was still the main feature. As regards dairy product surpluses, the markets and prices policy should help reduce the scale of dairy herds, especially in the 'marginal' dairy regions.

The Government was also critical of the means suggested by the Commission for bringing about the desired structural re-organization. As regards the details given in the Memorandum on the scale of the exodus from the land, the Minister said he would prefer a policy that left room for a spontaneous and differentiated drift, making use of positive moves by the industrial sector. One interesting example was the growing integration of agriculture as the first phase in the industrial production cycle. The Memorandum laid too great a stress on setting up large production units as the norm. The Commission's ideas on setting up organizations of producers met with a similar objection. The idea of a one-sided flow of assistance to the large production units and the producer groups had thus to be rejected.

But on the whole the Note called for a restricted and selective use of subsidies, as one of the tools of social and economic policy designed to bring about a re-organization of farm structures. A careful distinction had to be made between activities where the primary responsibility lay with the

businessman and those for which the Government was primarily responsible. The Commission should have set a limit on the financial responsibilities borne by those in agriculture. One appreciable difficulty was the lack of an appropriate policy for competition in the Community.

Even by reference to the actual facts, there seemed to be reasons for assessing the possibilities and opportunities of a more varied and spontaneous development more favourably than the Commission did. The average age of farm operators was relatively high and the relatively small number of people there to take over from them in many Community regions was relatively small. This was making the problem of the drift-away from the land easier to solve. The Minister attached great importance to educating and informing the younger generation on the farms about the possibilities of working elsewhere at an early stage.

An increase in job opportunities outside agriculture and the need for appropriate co-ordination between the Six on regional policy were still of decisive importance. The Commission's ideas, which were only given in summary form in the Memorandum, would serve in the formulation of the Dutch Government's standpoint in the EEC. This would be the subject of a detailed Government Opinion which would also cover the memorandum promised by the Commission on regional problems.

The preference for letting things take their natural course did not mean that they failed to appreciate the importance of taking appropriate action in the social and economic fields so as to make re-adaptation easier through better winding-up regulations. Taking land out of agricultural use was one idea in the Commission's proposals that deserved to be considered positively. Attention had to be drawn to the policy on the regrouping of farm lands, regional policy and the growing importance of recreational activities.

A final assessment of the financial implications of the measures advocated in the Commission Memorandum had to be kept back for the time being because insufficient details were given. On the other hand, the Association noted that many of the incidental points made in the Note opened up the possibility of reducing costs. A connexion, the Note went on, had to be made between the problems outlined in the Memorandum's and the Community's conduct towards third countries. Under the Treaty, the Community had the responsibility of giving substance to the aim agreed by the Six Governments of making a contribution to the balanced development of world trade. This was particularly important as regards agricultural products, bearing in mind the imbalance obtaining on the world market for several years now in the case of many such products. One could not ignore the great importance attached by a number of developing countries to stabilizing world markets. Overhauling the Community's markets and prices policy to secure a better balance on the

Common Market was bound to create a better atmosphere for trade policy. The Community had to be ready to turn its common markets and prices policy into international regulations, under which other participating States could similarly exercise a measure of discipline over their own agriculture.

The progress of agriculture had resulted mainly from technology and confronted the common agricultural policy with a severe trial of strength. The prosperity of the agricultural community, and, hence, of a large proportion of the populations of the Six member States was at stake. The Government was firmly resolved to make its contribution by taking a realist and constructive view of the future development of the common agriculture policy.

(Doc. 10300, Session of 1969-1970, Government Estimates for Agriculture and Fisheries, Explanatory Statement)

## 6. Parliamentary questions

### a) Direct elections for the European Parliament

Mr. Vredeling (P. v. d. A.) asked the Government (28 May) to inform the Second Chamber of the content of the memoranda which the Secretariat of the Councils of the European Communities had prepared on the subject of direct election of members of the European Parliament.

Mr. Luns, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, replying on behalf of the Minister of Home Affairs, stated on 17 June that the secret nature of the Council documents prevented him from publishing these memoranda, but that he would prepare a memorandum with a similar content for the Netherlands Parliament in order to promote public discussion.

This memorandum reviews the previous history of the question of direct elections; the main problems are summarized in its second section. These problems concern the number of members, the transitional phase, the compatibility of a European and national mandate and the regulations for elections:

1. Number of members

The draft convention provides for the number of members to be tripled while maintaining the present numerical ratios between the national delegations.

- a) Must membership of the Parliament be increased or can the present number of parliamentarians be maintained? (By application of Article 138 of the EEC Treaty, the Parliament has 142 members of which Germany, France and Italy each provide 36, Belgium and the Netherlands 14 each and Luxembourg 6.)
- b) Is there any fundamental reason to accept the tripling proposed in the draft convention?

In this connexion, attention is drawn to a point of order raised in the Second Chamber of the Estates General on 4 October 1957 inviting the Government 'to do its utmost to seize every opportunity of ensuring that steps are taken to double the number of members of the Assembly by a system of substitution or another method.'

- c) France in particular has proposed - most recently during the debates in the European Parliament on 12 March last - inclusion of the principle of 'one man, one vote' in the convention. The present numerical ratios between the nationalities would then be superseded.

2. Transitional phase

Is there still any need for a transitional phase and if so how long should it last? We have already indicated that the draft convention provides for a transitional phase which is to expire in about 1970. During the debates on the draft convention in the European Parliament in May 1960, it was apparent that an overwhelming majority of the members attached great importance to a transitional phase. In this way a process of adaption could be instituted. In this context it is important to note the need to allow European parties to be formed, the connexion with national parliaments which will be retained by at least one third of the members during the transitional period must also be borne in mind.

3. Compatibility of the European mandate with a national parliamentary mandate.

In the draft convention (Article 7), the functions of a European and national deputy are considered compatible during the transitional phase.



Experience shows that in practice difficulties arise from the combination of both offices. Attention was recently drawn to this fact by the Chairman of the European Parliament in his letter of 7 May 1969 to the Chairman of the Council. It should, however, be noted in this connexion that - until such time as the authority of the European Parliament is increased - it may be useful for a European deputy to exercise a controlling function in his capacity as national deputy.

4. Regulations for elections

- a) Articles 9-18 of the draft convention define conditions for the transitional phase, pursuant to which the conduct of elections is left to the member countries, taking into account basic principles defined in the draft convention. The problem now arises, quite apart from the reply to the question as to whether a transitional phase is in fact necessary, of the extent to which it must be considered impossible to elaborate directly regulations for elections.
- b) Whatever may be the reply to the previous question, we are bound to ask what principles are to be applied in establishing the provisional or definitive regulations.
- c) In Article 9 of the draft convention, the European Parliament has stated that it will itself define independently the final regulations for elections. We may well ask whether the European Parliament should have such authority or whether this authority should devolve on the Council and thence on the national parliaments.

(Second Chamber, 1968-1969 Session, Appendix, 1763;  
Memorandum on direct elections to the European Parliament, 1968-69 session, Doc. 10166)

b) A European nuclear power

On 22 May, after Mr. Strauss, German Finance Minister, had rejected the idea of a European nuclear power, Mr. Van der Stoep (Labour Party) asked the Government to make an explicit statement of its own views to the Western European allies and the American Government.

On 16 June Mr. Luns, Foreign Minister, replied: 'The Government rejects the idea of a European nuclear power for the same reasons as were outlined in the explanatory statement given with the question. The Members

of the Alliance are aware of this viewpoint. Then again the Government considers that the wide-ranging discussion which has been going on for years about the idea of a "European nuclear power" will remain rather academic as long as there is no prospect of the degree of political unity in Europe that is necessary for the realization of this idea. The Government feels bound to look on the recent statement by Mr. Strauss, which was his own personal view, in the same light.'

(Second Chamber, Session of 1968-1969, Annex, 1745)

c) Council measures following the devaluation of the French franc

On 5 September, in reply to a question put by Mr. Vredeling (Labour Party) on 15 August on the legal basis for the Council decisions of 11 August concerning agriculture and the cyclical situation, Mr. Luns, Foreign Minister (who was also speaking for the Minister for Agriculture, Finance and Economic Affairs) said: 'Regulation 1586/69 of the Council of the European Communities of 11 August 1969 concerning cyclical policy measures to be taken in respect of agriculture following the devaluation of the French franc is based on Article 103 of the Rome Treaty. The drafting of this Regulation was entrusted to the European Commission in accordance with the so-called management committee procedure.'

In accepting this Regulation, the Government also endorsed the legal grounds given. They did so once it was made clear that there was no possibility of agreement on any other basis. The Dutch delegation on the Council had pressed for the application in regard to, both content and procedure of Council Regulation 653/68 of 30 May 1968 on the conditions for changes in the value of the accounting unit used in the agricultural policy. No proposal was made by the European Commission on the basis of this Regulation. We consider the choice of Article 103 as the legal basis for the measures taken to be acceptable in this case. The fact that these measures clearly serve a cyclical policy purpose and that the Council has a wide measure of discretion under Article 103, 2 prompts us to answer the question in the affirmative. We would also draw attention to the fact that, upon the insistence of the Dutch delegation, the Council finally incorporated a stipulation in Regulation 1586/69 to the effect that the Commission had to submit a report on the application of the measures concerned by 1 December; it had also to submit alternative solutions as well as suitable proposals; the Council would take a decision after consulting the European Parliament on this matter, before 1 January 1970.'

(Second Chamber, Proceedings, session of 1968-1969, Annex 2391)

## Sweden

### European politicians test the ground in Scandinavia

#### a) Mr. Wilson's visit to Sweden

Mr. Wilson, British Prime Minister, went to Sweden on an official visit on 4 July 1969.

This served primarily as an opportunity for detailed discussions about the future integration policy of the two States. The talks turned mainly on Britain's interest in the enlargement of the EEC, the views of both sides on the necessary respect for EFTA in this connexion and interpreting the separate Scandinavian efforts to create Nordek, viz. a Nordic Economic and Customs Union. On the Swedish side alone, eight members of the Government took part in the talks with Mr. Wilson on these subjects. This allowed for a thorough discussion of the foreign, trade and financial policy aspects.

It appeared that Mr. Wilson had come to Sweden with specific proposals which provided the basis for practical discussions. The impression gained from this press conference on 5 July was that Britain was now contemplating suggesting that Sweden should become a full member of a Common Market based primarily on economic relations. Reservations stemming from Sweden's neutralist policy could be shelved until such time as the EEC reached the stage of political integration.

This was the advice of a pragmatist; indirectly it embodied a recommendation to reappraise the possible political repercussions of the Nordek Plan in view of the new pattern that the Common Market debate was assuming. On this point, which was given surprisingly wide coverage in the Swedish press, the warning was of course superfluous. The Danes in particular had so emphatically given the EEC first priority in their future integration policy and their reaction towards Sweden on the Nordek question had been such a broadside of criticisms that Nordek can hardly be expected to come to anything.

Mr. Wilson added that Britain would make no new move to gain entry into the EEC until the Six had discussed the new situation in Europe. He said it would be a long grind and call for a lot of time and a lot of patience.

b) Meeting of Socialist Party leaders in Harpsund

Socialist Party leaders began their conference at the country estate of the Swedish Prime Minister in Harpsund on 6 July 1969. Discussion focussed on the prospects and problems of European politics since General de Gaulle's retirement.

The conference was the poorer for the absence of Mr. Nenni, Italian Socialist leader and former foreign minister and of Mr. Kreisky, the leader of the Austrian Social Democrats. Mr. Nenni was obliged to change his plans at the last minute because of the governmental crisis in Italy and Mr. Kreisky had political commitments at home.

Those taking part included Mr. Brandt, German Foreign Minister, Mr. Wilson, British Prime Minister, Mr. Koivisto, Finnish Prime Minister, Mr. Krag, Danish Social Democrat leader and Mr. Bratelli, leader of the Norwegian Social Democrat Party.

Before coming to Harpsund, Mr. Brandt had told his Danish colleague, Mr. Paul Hartling, and Mr. Torsten Nilsson, Swedish Foreign Minister, about his talks in Paris. He had, he said, found the French much more ready to talk about Europe. But no practical proposals on plans for enlarging the European Communities had been either put forward or discussed.

He further described to them his own Government's position on possible negotiations for their countries' accession to the EEC. He thought that talks could be held with the Scandinavian countries on special accession questions along with negotiations on Britain's entry into the EEC. The German view was that a Nordic Customs Union would not make entry into the EEC more difficult for the Scandinavian countries provided that the door to Europe remained open after such a union was formed.

Integration took pride of place at the Harpsund Conference. On European issues the focal point was a report by Mr. Brandt.

At his press conference he caused some surprise by publicly repudiating the political bases of the EEC Treaty with astounding vehemence. Experience had shown that economic integration did not automatically lead to political union. From what followed it was to be inferred that Mr. Brandt obviously no longer saw the EEC as a means to a self-continuing, dynamic form of integration but as an administrative body superimposed on inter-

governmental co-operation which should allow for joint decisions on economic matters.

Mr. Brandt appears to have gone even further during the conference. On television, Mr. Erlander, Swedish Prime Minister, quoted Mr. Brandt's statement to the effect that Sweden's accession to the Community would be appreciably easier to effect if it were in fact possible to cut the political factor out of the EEC. Considering the care and caution with which Mr. Erlander chose his words, the full implications of Mr. Brandt's statement are even more remarkable.

Mr. Wilson told Mr. Brandt that Britain's most earnest wish was that technological co-operation should be discussed immediately before accession negotiations or else at the same time as the first phase of negotiations between the Six and the others because this field was not fully covered by the Rome Treaties.

The remaining points discussed at Harpsund, including the European security conference, do not really appear to have yielded any new developments.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 and 9 July 1969;  
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 7, 8 and 10 July 1969)

## II. PARTIES AND PROMINENT POLITICIANS

### 1. A motion on foreign policy carried at the Eleventh Christian Democrat Congress

A motion on foreign policy, spoken to by Senator Scelba, was carried unanimously by the delegates at the Italian Christian Democrats' Eleventh Congress on 30 June 1969.

In the motion, the point was made that the dramatic problems of the disequilibrium in the world should be examined and resolved within the same context; that economic expansion should not be divorced from political developments or from the demand for freedom of peoples throughout the world.

At this juncture in European politics, vigorous moves had to be made to re-propose a revival of the supranational and democratic Europe to the Governments and to the political movements; in this connexion, leaders, national parliamentary parties, European parliamentarians, members of the Government and all Christian Democrats working in every area of international and Italian life had to pledge themselves to make every effort to ensure:

- 1) the direct election of the European Parliament and, at the same time, its endowment with powers of deliberation in regard to (a) budgets, on the basis of the Community's having its own resources, (b) the appointment of the European Commission which should have a right of political initiative and (c) in regard to Community legislation;
- 2) adherence to the time-limits laid down in the Treaties for the transitional period;
- 3) carrying common policies into effect for the various sectors, on the basis of well set-out forecasts, to allow for a proper policy of economic planning and a true Community regional policy;
- 4) the application of rules providing for majority-voting on the Community's Council of Ministers;
- 5) the adoption of a common policy on the developing countries;
- 6) the gradual extension of the Community's terms of reference, by means of appropriate and effective instruments, to embrace foreign policy and defence problems.

As regards Italy more specifically, the motion called for the approval of a bill put forward by the people for the (albeit unilateral) election of

representatives to the European Parliament; it asked that the public be kept regularly and fully informed about the problems and the work of the European Parliament and other Community institutions; finally it called for support for any Government initiative conducive to a greater sense of responsibility for and a greater participation in uniting Europe on the part of the younger generation.

(Document of the Christian Democrat Group of the European Parliament, July 1969)

## 2. The Democracy and Progress Centre on European unification

Some of the MPs in the National Assembly's Modern Progress and Democracy Group formed a splinter party under Mr. Jacques Duhamel, the Minister for Agriculture. Its name is 'The Democracy and Progress Centre' and its members include Mr. Joseph Fontanet, Mr. René Pleven, Mr. Claudius-Petit and Mr. Achille-Fould.

The following is an extract from its first policy statement, published on 4 July: 'It has now become a matter of absolute necessity to build the political and economic Europe. This is our guarantee of independence. In the age of the atom, a country of fifty million people can no longer preserve its material power or moral sway if it becomes shut in on itself, for self-sufficiency would lead to regression (.....)

The Democracy and Progress Centre intends to work on these lines and to take effective action. However, the conditions for effective action have undergone a profound change over the last ten years.'

(Le Monde, 5 July 1969)

## 3. European points arising at the CDU's election conference in Essen

The Christian Democrat Union of Germany adopted its programme for the fifth (four-year) parliamentary term of the Bundestag on 8 July 1969; this took place at its election conference in Essen; voting on the various

points lasted one and a half hours; the following were the main points touching on European policy and directly related subjects :

To begin with the programme embraced a series of major challenges, involving the 'unabated demand of Communism for the whole world', the way the world population was growing by leaps and bounds and the conquest of space. It stated 'There is no longer any one people in Europe that measures up to these challenges. Hence all our peoples need a Europe that is economically strong and capable of taking action in the political sphere.'

As regards the EEC programme, it stated 'The European Economic Community must be completed. In the years ahead, we want common policies for economic and monetary affairs for science and research and development aid; and we want to carry through a progressive approximation of social policies. We also want to enlarge the European Economic Community through the entry of States ready to join.

We want to press for the political unification of Europe in a federal State with a directly-elected Parliament. This is still the main task facing the peoples of Europe. Here Franco-German co-operation is very important. We want a state of ordered peace in Europe.' These are a few extracts from the CDU's 1969-1973 programme passed in Essen regarding facets of European policy.

In both the major speeches at the conference, particularly that of Dr. Bruno Heck, Secretary-General, great play was made of the differences of opinion between the CDU and the SPD - and indeed the FDP. Chancellor Kurt-Georg Kiesinger, Party Chairman, also took up this cry as an election issue. But dealing with foreign policy, he laid special emphasis on the needs of Europe. (He did this on other occasions too; this was to further the CDU's action plan regarding European policy which Mr. Rainer Barzel championed in a series of speeches.) He advocated setting up a European political union, maintaining the Atlantic defence alliance and promoting a policy of peace vis-à-vis the East European countries. In another part of his speech he said Germany was ready 'to give its economic potential as a wedding gift to the Europe of the future'.

The sharpness with which the Chancellor and Party Chairman came out against any new nationalism attracted a good deal of attention both at the conference and in the comments on it. On the most decisive point, the Chancellor rejected the criticism that the CDU wanted to 'out-right' or go further to the right than the NPD. He appealed to his friends in the party not simply



to abandon the young people who were trying to find a valid understanding of themselves as a nation to be led astray by demagogues.

There was much applause for Professor Walter Hallstein, former President of the EEC Commission and now President of the European Movement; speaking in his capacity as a candidate for the Bundestag, he made a very moving appeal for support for his ideas furthering European unification.

Over and above the party politics inseparable from any election campaign, European policy was the dominant theme at this conference at which the CDU decided on the strategy of its election campaign.

(Europa-Union No. 8, August 1969)

#### 4. The CDU and the SPD emphasize their common stand on European policy

On 14 July 1969, the day before the Brussels meeting of the Monnet Committee, the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD) emphasized their fundamental agreement on European policy.

Mr. Rainer Barzel, the CDU/CSU Group Chairman, said: 'We thought and we think it basically un-European not to enter into talks with the applicant States.' Because it is always argued that such talks were not yet possible, the Action Committee for the United States of Europe had asked first-class experts to give opinions on the particularly difficult problems contingent on enlarging the EEC. Mr. Barzel thought these opinions showed that although the problems were difficult, they could all be solved if time is taken to discuss them and to make adjustments.

Mr. Barzel was in favour of a conference of the heads of Government of the member States being held this year. The aim should be to reach an understanding on the next steps in completing the Community and to give the 'green light' to talks with the applicant States. Mr. Barzel thought that the heads of Government should (a) agree on a date for a political meeting, with Britain taking part, (b) discuss the special importance of the neutral States in European policy and (c) make an offer to the Warsaw Pact countries to co-operate in the technological, economic and social fields.

In a CDU press release Mr. Barzel said that it was wrong to speak of 'completing or enlarging the EEC'. It had to be both completed and enlarged. As regards political co-operation between Europeans, he said that a new impetus was needed because the EEC would not automatically lead in this direction. The Western European Union Treaty offered a more flexible framework for political talks and co-ordination between the Seven. If this were not turned to advantage, then political co-ordination would have to begin with whoever was willing to embark on it. The basis of European policy still had to be partnership with the USA and the 'openness' of the United Europe to the East.

Both Mr. Barzel and the Social Democrats were in favour of a cautious approach which did not involve the concocting of plans. An SPD press release stated: 'Even now we should be on our guard against undue optimism or a groundless feeling of euphoria about Europe for these could come to nothing.'

As regards the results achieved so far by Mr. Brandt, Foreign Minister, in his exploratory talks, the SPD press release concluded that de Gaulle's argument that enlarging the Community would lead to its becoming a kind of free trade area, belonged to the past. 'No early change in the underlying principles of the Gaullist policy on Europe is to be expected', it added.

The agreement between the CDU and the SPD emerges clearly from the policy statements of both parties. It embraces the following points:

1. The EEC must be further developed through decisions going on from and beyond the customs and economic union. This means that it must be completed and enlarged.
2. An effort was to be made to bring France back to the WEU Council for regular consultations on foreign and defence policy. 'If this proves of no avail, a start must be made on political co-ordination with whoever is willing', suggested Mr. Barzel.
3. The heads of Government of the six member States of the EEC - according to Mr. Barzel - or the heads of Government and Foreign Ministers of the EEC - according to the SPD press release - should meet this year. Political agreement on the next steps in completing the EEC, setting a date for a political meeting, with Britain taking part, discussion of the special importance of the neutral States for European policy and an offer of co-operation to the Warsaw Pact countries in the technological, eco-

conomic and social fields were what Mr. Barzel expected from such a meeting.

(Deutschland-Union-Dienst, 14 July 1969;  
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 July 1969;  
VWD-Europa, 15 July 1969)

5. Reference to Europe in the motion passed by the First Congress of the New Socialist Party (held at Issy-les-Moulineaux, 14-18 July 1969)

France's New Socialist Party, successor to the SFIO and bringing in a certain number of political clubs, passed a two-part motion at the close of its first congress. The first dealt with the policy of the new party and the second outlined a 'plan for socialist action'. The second part was passed unanimously. It referred to the problem of uniting Europe in these terms: 'It is our responsibility as Socialists to put forward a valid policy for our Movement, a policy laying down . . . . the strategy of the Socialist Movement in dealing with the dramatic inequalities and divisions both in the world at large and in the European Community. The NSP must devise a dynamic and impartial foreign policy which will guarantee peace through disarmament, collective security and equality between peoples. To direct a Europe in process of unification towards adopting socialist precepts and practices is a fundamental aim. The NSP will point out that it is the inescapable duty of the industrialized countries to help the "third world" in its efforts to develop. This assistance must be free from any quid pro quo in terms of political, economic or even cultural influence. It must be forward-looking and not geared to maintaining the present trade systems; it should therefore include help towards industrial development and opening up the markets of Europe to "third world" products.'

(Le Monde, 15 July 1969)

6. The SPD holds a conference on Europe in Bad Godesberg

The Social Democrat Party of Germany held a 'discussion on Europe' in Bad Godesberg from 20 to 21 July 1969. Mr. Willy Brandt and Mr. Carlo Schmid and Mr. Dohnanyi were prominent among the speakers present.

Mr. Schmid opened the conference by reviewing European developments in detail and justified the SPD's diffidence on various points concerning which Germany had 'European' decisions to take.

He praised the SPD's early adherence to a 'European' policy: he referred to August Bebel who, as long ago as 1880, had called for a 'European areopagus' to settle the conflicts between France and Germany. He quoted from the SPD's Heidelberg Programme of 1925 in which the objective of the 'United States of Europe' was already being envisaged. After 1945, the SPD had rejected plans and treaties 'which we today know to have created European realities, albeit "little European" realities'; this misunderstanding was due to a lack of conviction about Europe on the part of the SPD.

As for the future, Mr. Schmid favoured setting up European institutions which would depend on the individual Governments as little as possible. In the years ahead there had nevertheless to be co-operation between Governments. European policy could not be anti-American. Although since the war world politics had ceased to be centred on Europe, it was only by being united that Europe could win back respect in the world and avert the danger of the balance between the two world powers being overthrown. In such a Europe, there would be no hegemony. 'Whoever strives after hegemony will destroy Europe' he said.

Speaking for Professor Schiller, Minister for Economic Affairs, Mr. Dohnanyi proposed there should be a close association of European States to carry through industrial projects on a joint basis. He suggested such co-operation with a view to 'welding sectors together' even before political unity could be achieved.

The decisive factor, he said, was pooling resources for research purposes. On the basis of a long-term agreement for a particular branch of industry, for example, a certain percentage could be appropriated for a common fund and only the remainder used for national purposes. He said that the States would have to lay down guidelines and objectives for the use of the common resources but within this context a jointly appointed management would decide quite independently on the use of the funds and place orders in accordance with business principles. Such a system, which he had once proposed for the European 'air bus' was currently being looked into in the European countries that might be concerned in respect of the aircraft industry.

Mr. Dohnanyi took as his subject 'Europe in the competition between the nations - the task of European economic policy in the Seventies'. In the next ten years Europe had to become firmly integrated and interna-

tionally competitive. He saw the difficulties in setting up the large internal market, which was the declared aim of all European Governments, as stemming particularly from differences in the basic structures of the States. In its own interest, Germany would have to help change the agricultural structures in France and Italy in such a way as to bring their economic policy aims closer into line with those of Germany.

Mr. Dohnanyi came out against the 'irresponsible nonsense' of describing this as being soft or as making an advance payment and said that whoever, like Mr. Franz Josef Strauss, flatly rejected Europe's horizontal system of financial equalization on the grounds that even in the West this was stretching the Christian principle of loving one's neighbour too far, 'either does not understand anything about the financial policy problems of integration or else is no upright European'.

Referring to the EEC's relations with the State-trading countries of East Europe, he said - irrespective of the differences in the proportions of industrial ownership - that 'with a view to large-scale East-West leasing arrangements the East European States should lease production facilities out to West European businesses on a long-term basis; these would be modelled on those of the West and earn the necessary capital for investment from exports.

Mr. Brandt, Federal Foreign Minister, told the conference he thought there would be a summit meeting of heads of State and Foreign Ministers this year. He concluded from his recent talks that: 'Present stagnation can be overcome. We can make progress, even though this may be time-consuming and at times really difficult.' He warned against using an EEC summit meeting as 'a pretext for doing nothing for the time being'.

Mr. Brandt listed a series of immediate objectives in their European policy: Concluding association agreements with the neutral States of Europe that were interested in this form of co-operation; completing the twelve-year transitional period on schedule on 1 January 1970; agreement on agricultural policy and the agricultural financing arrangements from 1970 onwards, which must in any event have parliamentary control built into them; France's return to WEU and agreement on regular consultations concerning foreign and defence problems.

In talks within the Community Mr. Brandt felt that an answer had to be found to the question as to how the accession of new members would work out. The most difficult problems arose with the agricultural and monetary policies. On agriculture, he maintained that 'certain adjustments' were

necessary. On monetary policy, the mere weight of an enlarged Community would necessarily counter-balance the dollar. In the years ahead sights should be set on a real European monetary area which included sterling.

He then listed the medium-term aims of their European policy, viz.: (i) enlarging the European Communities to embrace all democratically-governed States willing to join, insofar as they accepted the rights and duties stemming from the Rome Treaties; (ii) completion of the European Communities as a customs and economic union and rounding them off with a monetary union; (iii) the Community's tasks in regional and structure policies; (iv) transport; (v) research, where a radical solution was becoming ever more urgent; (vi) closer political co-operation in and for Western Europe; (vii) democratizing the European Communities and (viii) preparatory work on a European peace settlement.

Mr. Brandt thought nothing should occur that would make practical co-operation between the States of East and West Europe more difficult. The growing willingness to enter into scientific and cultural contacts ought not, whatever construction might be placed on it, to be inhibited through stubbornness or simply allowed to fall by the wayside. With a view to a peace settlement for the whole of Europe, the 'positive idea' of a European security conference might also be helpful. The fact that questions of armaments limitations or disarmament would probably take a long time to solve ought not to deter the Government from making a start and certainly not hold it back from beginning with the possibilities offered by economic co-operation.

Mr. Brandt issued an urgent warning against the 'ghost of nationalism' which was walking abroad in many places in Europe, and not only in Germany. Without mentioning names he said that it was not the most innocent ones who were disguising their nationalism under European colours. He described it as contradictory and illogical to want to play the great European in London or elsewhere, to call for a European federal State and European atomic power and, on the other hand, to oppose the financing of the common agricultural policy, for example, with the argument that this could involve 'concealed reparation payments'. 'It will not do to parade as a European abroad and to display a "true nationalist" bill of health at home.'

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21 July 1969;

VWD-Europa, 21 July 1969;

Bulletin of the Press and Information Service of the Federal Government, No. 97, 23 July 1969)

## 7. Opinions on Britain's membership of the EEC

Following an editorial in The Times on 29 July several leading political figures wrote to the paper to give their views regarding Britain's commitments - federal or otherwise - in joining the EEC. Following are the texts of the letters by Lord Gladwyn and two Conservative MPs, Sir Derek Walter-Smith and Mr. Neil Marten.

From Lord Gladwyn :

'Sir,

The opponents of our entry into the Common Market are once again suggested that, if we do enter it, we shall be irrevocably committed to becoming part of what is always referred to as a Federal State, the assumption being that, before long, the British Parliament will become the equivalent of the State Legislature of Wyoming and that there may even be doubts about the continued existence of our splendid monarchy.

To what exactly we shall ultimately be committed if we sign the Treaty of Rome no one - not even Professor Hallstein - can possibly say. For the political development of the extended Community will depend on the common intention of its members, of which we should then be one. But what is undeniable and what is, I believe, accepted by both the Government and the Tory Opposition, is that, if we do sign the treaty, we should be in honour bound, so far as we are concerned, to abide by all its provisions, and that we could not therefore follow the example of the late Government of France in preventing the full development of the Community in accordance with the treaty by violating its essential provision for weighted majority voting in certain carefully specified spheres.

Here the Government really should brave the wrath of the vociferous Little England patriots by making it quite clear where it stands. Only on such a basis, indeed, can the EEC be expected to function, and consequently only so would there be any real advantage, whether economic or political, in our joining.

But in all the fields not actually covered by the Treaty of Rome, (and these include, among other things, the harmonization of foreign and defence policies and a common monetary policy), it is open to us to try to negotiate any further machinery that may be thought desirable. Many would hold that in such negotiations we should do well also to accept certain limitations on our complete freedom of action and notably weighted voting in a

Council of Ministers, e.g. as regards the standardization of armaments and some new common system of arms procurement, for, if we did so, we would not only materially reinforce the defence of our own country and of Europe, but arrive at a welcome saving of hundreds of millions of pounds.

As the Prime Minister has recently pointed out, this is a separate matter from that of our entry into the EEC, and so far as we are concerned, we have no prior commitments and are free to enter into any new arrangements which we may feel are in the interests both of this country and of her immediate neighbours.'

From Sir Derek Walker-Smith :

'Sir,

In his letter "Entry into Europe"(July 29), Lord Gladwyn says that it is being suggested that, if Britain enters EEC "we shall be irrevocably committed to becoming part of what is always referred to as a Federal State". I do not think that this is correct. Of course, in form the Treaty of Rome does not commit a signatory to federalism, but only to acceptance of a degree of bureaucratic supranationalism in respect of a wide area of economic and social life.

What is, however, very likely is that a country, having accepted membership of the EEC, on the terms of the Treaty of Rome, would in practice have no option except to proceed, along with its fellow members, to participation in a Federal Western Europe, if those others so desired. In this context, Lord Gladwyn's reference to the matter depending on the "common intention of its members" of course begs the question.

Suppose there were no "common intention"? Suppose the majority of the members wanted it and Britain did not? Might not Britain's economic and social arrangements by then be so inextricably intertwined with those of the Community that in practice the theoretical option not to go along with the majority would not be open to us?

Two duties therefore lie on a British Government considering entry on the terms of the Treaty. First, it must define its own position in regard to British participation in a political federation. Secondly, it must make as informed an assessment as it can of the likely nature of the "common intention"; and here it is perhaps significant that powerful voices in Europe declare that entrants should accept that the logic of the Market leads to federation. What neither the electors nor history would forgive would be a Govern-



ment which, either by suggestion falsi or suppressio veri, palters in this great matter.

One other correction must be made, Lord Gladwyn by his reference to Little England tries to fasten the charge of insularity or parochialism on those who are critical of the Treaty of Rome. Perhaps the hot weather has affected Lord Gladwyn's customary urbanity because in his cooler moments he knows this is not true. I for one have certainly never approached the question from an insular standpoint. There is nothing insular in regretting the undemocratic and supranational structure of the Community and wanting a liberalization of the Treaty of Rome.

There is nothing insular in wanting Britain's association with the friendly nations of Western Europe to be close, but to proceed on a basis of retained sovereignty, democratic control and Parliamentary institutions. For myself, I certainly want close association in this form, and I believe that this approach reflects the views of a growing number both in Parliament and the country.....

We therefore, in Britain, while expressing, so far as we properly can, believe that the Treaty should be liberalized, should work now to two associated ends - the formation of a free trade area between EFTA and the Six, and the formation of a wider unit of the type normally referred to as an Atlantic Free Trade Area. Neither of these concepts is insular. On the contrary they are more outward looking than the concept of the Community, and accurately reflect the duality of Britain's position in relation to Europe and the wider world. Both would do good to many and harm to none. And that, in the twentieth century, is much indeed.'

From Mr. Neil Marten :

'Sir,

In your leading article of July 30 you say that the political commitment to Europe is not infrequently misrepresented by the anti-marketeers. You then go on to say that Britain should get into the Common Market and, after that, concern ourselves with future political developments. This is precisely the line of argument which causes anxiety to so many people and which Mr. Heath so clearly recognized in his speech.

Dr. Luns, the Netherlands Foreign Minister, warned Britain on July 16 that its application for membership of the Common Market would receive the full backing of his Government only if there was a firm British commitment to the idea of a Federal Europe. So, presumably, if we do not

give that commitment, we shall not get in. I imagine that is why Mr. Stewart, the British Foreign Secretary, said that Britain had no objection to it when it was discussed at the recent meeting of the Monnet Committee.

Most people want to know what the commitment to a Federal Europe means - and they want to know before and not after we join the Common Market. In the same way they will want to know the cost to Britain of entry.

As you rightly say in your leading article, this is one of the biggest issues facing the nation. Yet the political leaders who spoke at the Guildhall banquet are out of line with public opinion, only 33 per cent of whom (according to the latest National Opinion Poll) want to join the Common Market. It is entirely up to the political leaders to take what line they think right. But it is a fallacy for the Six to think that the British people are behind them.'

(The Times, 29, 31 July, 1 August 1969)

#### 8. The European policy of the Christian Democrats

##### a) The Union of Young Christian Democrats advocates setting up a European university

Speaking in Bonn on 21 August 1969, Mr. Egon A. Klepsch, Chairman of the Union of Young Christian Democrats advocated setting up a European university in Florence. 'This, he said, would be a highly satisfactory and effective way of working towards the mutual recognition of academic qualifications.'

The Union thought this plan should be on the agenda for the summit meeting of the Six heads of Government, scheduled for this year. Mr. Klepsch further suggested that a minister of state should be appointed at the Chancellor's office to co-ordinate the Government's European policy. Similarly, he suggested a European peace corps, to be supported from EEC funds.

##### b) A CDU member calls for a cabinet committee on European questions

In a CDU/CSU press release of 27 August 1969, Mr. Carl-Otto Lenz, a CDU member of the Bundestag, called for a cabinet committee on

European affairs under the chairmanship of the Federal Chancellor. This committee would be required to make co-ordinated proposals to the Government on Germany's approach at the Brussels negotiations and to assist the German delegation there. The committee would also have to deal with all home policy decisions which had a bearing on European integration and co-ordinate them with an eye to the Government's European policy.

Setting up the cabinet committee would have to be coupled with the appointment of a member of the Government to hold a European affairs portfolio. He would have to be empowered to conduct all negotiations in Brussels on the Government's behalf; whether, in either case, he would be assisted by a colleague from one of the Departments in Bonn or by its officials would be for him to decide - subject of course to the constitutional rights of the Chancellor. He would also be responsible for the centralized control of all European unification matters within the Government and act as spokesman both in the Cabinet and the Bundestag.

This, he said, would not only demonstrate the Government's resolve to pursue an active European policy but it would also improve the prospects for a successful conclusion of negotiations in the interests of Germany.

c) Preparing for the European summit meeting

On 13 August Mr. Barzel, Chairman of the CDU/CSU Group in the Bundestag, said in a policy statement on the Brussels decisions of 12 August that it had not been a very proud day for Europe. Without full political, economic and social consultations between all the partners, the EEC was too weak to lead a really active life even though it might still be too strong to die. He called for preparations for the European summit, for which no plans had yet been made. The pressing political talks about completing the European Community should begin as soon as possible. No further delays in European unification could be allowed.

On 24 August Mr. Barzel said that the political scene now seemed more active because talks on completing and enlarging the EEC now appeared possible, because of the forthcoming talks on armaments control between the two world powers and because of the discussion of a European security system. In a Deutschland-Union press release, Mr. Barzel stressed that it was not only Britain but Denmark, Ireland and Norway that wanted to join the EEC. Dr. Hallstein had convincingly demonstrated that enlarging the Community would not automatically make it either stronger or weaker. 'This would be governed solely by the internal arrangements and policy of the Community.'

Suggestions for a more active European policy were made at a conference of CDU/CSU specialists on Europe and members of the Cabinet, held on 24 August under the chairmanship of the Chancellor.

President Pompidou's proposal to hold an EEC summit meeting this year was welcomed. The CDU/CSU would endeavour to ensure the Government proposed a design for Europe for the Seventies. In a resolution it was stated that the summit meeting should give priority to 'how simple but effective arrangements can be worked out to secure a standing agreement among the Six Governments on matters of foreign policy'. 'This co-operation should be set against the background of future common, foreign and defence policies, as a stage towards a European political community and, within the Atlantic Alliance, to a European defence community.'

(Deutschland-Union-Dienst, 13 and 27 August 1969;  
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 14, 23, 25 and 28 August 1969;  
Die Welt, 22 August 1969;  
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 26 August 1969;  
Le Monde, 26 August 1969;  
Politisch-Soziale Korrespondenz, 15 September 1969)

9. Mr. Brandt, German Foreign Minister, and the SPD Executive support the proposal for a European summit meeting

Meeting in Bonn on 22 August 1969, the Social Democrat Party's Executive were quite emphatic that the economic and political unification of Europe should remain one of the main aims of German foreign policy. The European Communities had to be built up into an economic union, remain open to any State willing to enter and be developed in a democratic manner. Following the latest EEC decisions and the devaluation of the French franc, a European summit meeting had become a matter of even greater urgency. Every effort had to be made to ensure that the EEC's transitional period could be brought to a close by the end of 1969.

Speaking in Hamburg on 8 September, Mr. Brandt said that the Government's European policy had to be as realistic as its policy on East-West relations. With reference to the European federal state proposed by Chancellor Kiesinger, he said that instead of projects that could not be achieved in the short-term and which one might be tempted to describe as castles in the air, it would be more worthwhile to complete the EEC first. The European Defence Community had been a case in point. For the next legislative period, NATO could be expected to serve as the basis.

Speaking to the Bundestag conference in Bonn on 16 September, Mr. Brandt summed up the results of the ministerial meeting in Brussels on 15 September as follows :

'We are not yet out of the shallows but a thin channel of clear water is in sight; if we steer carefully, we shall be able to pass through it to the open sea.'

Mr. Brandt said he had come home with the feeling that his various trips to the capital cities of the member States had been worthwhile.

He went back over what had been achieved : they were to hold a summit meeting in The Hague in mid-November; they had agreed that a satisfactory solution had to be found regarding the participation of the Commission and the problems to be dealt with. The meeting would cover both the internal development and the enlargement of the Community. At the same time, the various delegations could raise any subject they considered essential.

The agenda had not been agreed. But it could be relied on that a specific list of points would be dealt with. This would, in any case follow from the subjects under discussion : those concerning the Rome Treaties at which the Commission would take part and other subjects which were to be discussed without the Commission.

Asked whether Germany's desire to overhaul agricultural financing would be included in the subjects discussed at the summit meeting, Mr. Brandt said it was not yet possible to tell. He added, however, that it would not be possible to go into all the details. These were a matter for the responsible departments of the EEC.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 August and 9 September 1969;  
L'Echo de la Bourse, 30-31 August 1969)

#### 10. Europe discussed in a Liberal Party report

On 26 August 1969 an ad hoc Committee of the Liberal Party presided over by Lord Wade, a former Liberal parliamentarian, published a document which the Committee had prepared under the title of 'Liberals look

ahead'. Following are passages of the report dealing with European affairs.

'Britain should be committed to international co-operation and willing to sacrifice "the growing myth of national sovereignty" as viable supra-national bodies appear. The case for Britain's membership of the EEC remains valid, but Liberals should seek to develop political unity in democratic Europe.

The aim of a European political community should be pan-European with the ultimate objective of securing a peaceful and united Continent. This could eventually involve the withdrawal of American and Russian troops from Europe, the disbanding of the present alliance systems, and their replacement with a European territorial integrity treaty guaranteed by the US and Russia.'

Meanwhile, Britain must work for the political and economic integration of Western Europe and must honour British responsibilities in the existing collective security system.

'Any dismantling of the Western Alliance must be preceded by the establishment of an alternative and effective security system. This need not prevent either closer economic and cultural links between West and East Europe, or informal negotiation between ad hoc conciliation bodies paving the way for a European security conference.'

(The Guardian, 27 August 1969)

#### 11. The Liberals wish to found a European party

Meeting in Munich on 1 September 1969, the World Liberal Union (comprising liberal party delegations from all over the world) came out in favour of setting up a strong, European, liberal party. The delegates called for the accession of Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Norway to the EEC and for 'equal treatment for Israel' and for other States outside Europe which wanted to be associated with the EEC.

In another resolution, the Liberal International called for a United Nations enquiry into the international supply of armaments. They

appealed to the States in the Middle East to make 'every conceivable effort' to achieve a lasting peace.

Discussing the Liberal attitude to the unrest prevalent among the younger generation, Professor Werner Maihofer of the University of Saarbrücken, said: 'This younger generation wants a new and more humane society which is at one remove from capitalism and socialism.'

Mr. Walter Scheel, the FDP Chairman, asked that 'mature citizens, who play an active part in shaping the future of their firms should have a full share in the profits and increased prosperity of the whole economy.' The CDU/CSU and SPD concept of co-management was misleading and did not go far enough. He again asked that there should be a Federal Ministry for Education and Cultural Affairs. As regards the policy of the Free Democrats, he said: 'Our Party has made mistakes but in contrast to the CDU and SPD, it has learned from them.'

(Die Welt, 2 September 1969)

## 12. The Dutch political parties on European integration

On 5 September the European Movement organized a conference in The Hague at which the leaders of several political parties gave their views on European integration.

Mr. Toxopeus, Liberal Group Chairman, thought that it was not at present possible to transfer national prerogatives to a supranational European body; such absolute integration presupposed radical changes in the European Treaties, including a much stronger position for the European Parliament. Until this end could be achieved, he said, intermediate objectives had to be set up.

He further explained that for him political co-operation would not be acceptable as long as the Communities were restricted to their present membership. But even if the Community were enlarged, a supranational foreign policy would have to wait and no defence policy could be pursued outside the framework of the Atlantic Alliance.

Mr. Den Uyl, the Socialist Group Chairman, considered that political co-operation outside the framework of the European Commission was undesirable. He was, however, in favour of political consultations in co-operation with the European Commission and the applicant States. Their presence was necessary to ensure that political co-operation did not become a barrier to the entry of new members.

Mr. Den Uyl agreed with Dr. Boertien, spokesman for the Anti-Revolutionary Party, in opposing the idea of a European nuclear power.

Dr. Van Mierlo, of the 'Democracy '66' Party, said that early agreement was necessary on political and defence matters as well as on monetary affairs. What one had to avoid was that these questions remained within the exclusive purview of the Communities. He therefore advocated informal inter-governmental consultations - but in relation to the Community.

As regards British entry, the point discussed was whether Britain should take precedence over the Scandinavian countries. Mr. Mellema, Chairman of the Christian Historical Union, agreed with Mr. Den Uyl that Britain's accession had to come first.

Mr. Toxopeus favoured simultaneous negotiations or, at most, a slight difference in the pace of the discussions. He thought it would be regrettable if Britain were first called in and then a long period elapsed with nothing happening until after a great deal of difficulty it came to the turn of the Scandinavian countries.

Dr. Boertien appeared concerned at the statement of the Monnet Committee for the United States of Europe which advocated giving preference to British entry. He had not heard one valid argument against immediate talks with the Scandinavian countries, he said.

Direct elections to the European Parliament were then discussed. Mr. Mommersteeg, spokesman for the Catholic People's Party, thought that it was more important for the Parliament to have wider powers than for it to be directly elected.

Mr. Toxopeus argued that the links between the European Parliament and the national Parliaments should not be severed as long as the Council of Ministers was not responsible to the European Parliament; at present



members of the European Parliament can call upon individual ministers - in the national Parliaments - to answer for their actions on the Council.

The formation of European political parties was also on the agenda; Mr. Den Uyl put up a strong case for this.

Mr. Mellema said he was against European parties if they remained distinct from the national ones. Dr. Boertien thought that the Christian Democrat Group in Strasbourg was no model of what he would like to see as a European party. Mr. Toxopeus pointed out that in Munich recently the Liberal International had called for a European Liberal Party.

(Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, 6 September 1969)

13. Mr. Maurice Faure: 'Is it too late to revive Europe?'

In Le Monde on 6 September, Mr. Maurice Faure, Radical MP for the Lot Constituency and former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, gave his assessment of the appeals that had been made to revive Europe: 'The main problem is a political one; there cannot be any real "revival" unless majority rule is adopted (because, indirectly, unanimity rule gives a right of veto) and unless the question of the direct election of a European Parliament is looked into again.

I do not wish to under-estimate the results achieved so far. The customs union became a fact on 1 July 1968 and the "Europe of workers" has gone some of the way towards becoming a reality. But the road from the customs union to the economic union and from there to political union is a long and hard one. With few exceptions, what has been achieved is far from obvious to the public at large, whereas the controversy over the agricultural policy and the difficulties of re-organizing industry have been arousing serious concern (.....)

Europe is living on its initial impetus and no new impetus has been forthcoming. To be more precise, the political initiatives suggested by the Commission come up against indifference and even opposition on the part of the Governments. We shall never know how much harm was done to Europe by the sarcastic remarks directed against the "Volapük" international language... It was the European identity which was under attack then.

Have our links of interdependence reached the stage where they are irreversible? Now that it has reached this particular point, European integration can no longer be brought to a halt without the whole design being destroyed. The Treaties built a machine with which to unify the Six countries, the engine of which is the economic policies. To try and stop it would be impossible: it could have only one result; it would mean going back on and undoing all that has been done so far. To reject the idea of the political Europe would only make sense if the intention was to bring the progress of the economic union to a halt, and that would be calling into question both the principle of the Common Market and what it has achieved. The member States are free to destroy the machine but not to stop it.

It is easy to say 'all you have to do is this and this and that,....'. Contemporary observers of the decadence of Rome and Byzantium lucidly analyzed its causes and proposed remedies. The only thing lacking was political will. Today, the causes of the stagnation are well-known. "Revival" has to be seen in terms of "will".'

(Le Monde, 6 September 1969)

#### 14. Mr. George Brown pleads for Britain's entry into the Common Market

In a long article in the Guardian, Mr. George Brown gave his views on Britain's future in the European context. Following are salient passages :

'We are part of Europe now and always have been. Therefore it must follow that the question is not the one that some seek to pose - "whether we join Europe". It is simply a question of whether or not we are to share in the political leadership of Europe, and whether or not we are to share in the economic policies on a European scale that alone can safeguard the jobs of the people of this country.

Those who are arguing about the costs of entry assume that nothing will change with our arrival in the Common Market. This is nonsense. The history of the Common Market shows that all the founder members' interests have been very much taken care of. When we join, we shall take our interests in with us. As far as agriculture and food prices are concerned, this is certainly the right time to join.

Even without the upheaval created by the French devaluation, the common agricultural policy was in a state of uncertainty, with proposals for radical reform coming from the Commission. These problems will not be solved quickly. But at a time when a great deal of new thinking is going on in the Community, Britain's place is to be in there taking part in the thinking and contributing to a solution, not standing on the sidelines wondering what the others will do.

Some people also worry about regional policies, and the need to encourage a proper geographical spread of opportunity in Britain. In their arguments they have failed to observe what member countries of the Six have been doing. I suggest Italy is a good case for them to have a look at. It shows that, far from being a hindrance to effective regional planning, the Community itself has positive regional policies.

But what I really want to talk about is the side of the picture that is so often left out - what it would cost us if we were to stay out of the Common Market. And the obvious cost would be jobs for British workers.

As long as Britain remains outside the EEC, British companies wishing to expand their trade with the Common Market countries will find that they are hampered by trade barriers. Even when the Kennedy Round reductions are fully operative, motor vehicles produced in this country will face a tariff barrier of 17 per cent to 22 per cent, electrical equipment 9 per cent to 15 per cent and man-made textiles 10 per cent to 20 per cent.

More and more British companies will be obliged to set up factories and assembly plants inside the EEC - this is already happening - and as a result, valuable industrial investment which could have been made in this country will be diverted to the Continent. The effect of this in terms of loss of potential jobs in Britain should be obvious to every trade union leader and I am sure will not be lost on their members.

And to put ourselves outside these tariffs would be to aim a totally unnecessary blow at our exports. Much has been made of the "advantages" of Commonwealth Preference. The harsh fact is that Britain has been stuck with an export pattern of trade to Commonwealth countries who, acting in their own interests, have been busy building up their own industries and discriminating against imported manufactures, including ours. Our exports have risen more slowly than our customers' incomes; the exports of our Continental competitors, trading largely with each other, have gone up faster than their customers' incomes.

I therefore conclude that we must swing our exports more towards countries who are fast growing and who want our manufactures. This, increasingly, means Europe. Economist friends tell me that a greater or lesser degree of Europe-orientation could easily make 1 per cent a year difference to the growth of our exports.

If this is so, then over 10 years it would mean £ 700 million a year. We had better be clear what we risk losing if we do not enter the EEC, and find ourselves trying to trade over the Common External Tariff.

Clearly, therefore, the fundamental gain from entry into the Common Market would be a healthier industrial economy. And I am most certainly not talking here in naïve terms of "exposing British industry to the brisk winds of competition". What is at issue are the facts of how British industry, on the shop floor and in offices, can live in the modern economic world.

We need greater productivity. And without doubt one of the prerequisites of this is a larger economic environment. Modern industry needs more elbow room than Britain alone can provide. A growing problem is the sheer amount of research, development and marketing expenditure needed to launch new products. Costs running into scores of millions of pounds, and on occasion far more, must be recouped from sales, and recouped quickly before even newer products come along.

The "entry fee" for new industrial products is, more and more often, higher than the British market alone can justify. So firms based on bigger markets like the United States and the Common Market have an inevitable advantage when taking risky investment decisions. This is a reason why so much of the very good research done in this country fails to emerge as successful industrial products. While the problem is most obvious in the new high-technology "glamour" industries, it is in fact of rising significance in the growth sectors of all industries.

There seems, therefore, little doubt that the cost of not joining the Common Market is that we would increasingly be embedded in an industrial structure full of old products and short of new technologies. The consequences in lower productivity gains would be inexorable. And, therefore, what we could afford to distribute to ourselves to increase our standard of living would inevitably be less.

Even a trivial-sounding  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent a year increase in productivity would, over 10 years, produce an increase in each British wage earner's wage packet of more than £ 1 a week. In fact, as a glance at the table shows,

the difference between the productivity growth of the Common Market countries and what we have achieved has exceeded that  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent by several times and, as a result, we can see how much faster incomes have risen in the Common Market.

Our trade union leaders rightly and properly wish to defend and improve the living standards of their members. It is obvious how much easier this would have been over the past 10 years had we been in the Common Market. I sometimes wonder why our trade union leaders do not take more into account the views and experiences of their opposite numbers on the mainland of Europe. After all, Ernest Bevin urged on the post-war Continental trade union leaders the course they have taken.

The economic costs of joining the Common Market, everybody appears to agree, are finely balanced. Even if those who take the most pessimistic view were to be right, these costs would affect us for no more than a handful of years. Whereas the economic costs of not joining would be a permanent dead hand on what we can do for the British people during the rest of this century.

But the counting is not just in terms of cash in our pockets. The real cost of not joining the Common Market and of not helping to build up an integrated Europe would be, quite apart from the consequences for the rest of Europe, a loss of effective power over our own economy, and therefore of control over our own long-term standard of living. And to see why this is so, we must look at the politics of European unity, which cannot be divorced from its economics - for which I daily give thanks. (.....)

There is, in my view, no question that an integrated Western Europe would play an enormous rôle in world affairs. Not in the flaunting of military strength, although we would make a greater contribution to the strength of the "West", but in what matters much more - the attempt to bridge the economic and political gap between the Western world and the developing countries.

As long as the disunity of Europe persists, the needs of the deprived part of the world get put on one side whilst we in Europe concentrate on our own internal problems. The energies released by European unity could find a magnificent outlet in helping to solve this, the world's greatest problem. And the cost if we do not solve this problem would be grave indeed.

But when I say that politics is the real issue, I am not leaving economics behind. As in Britain, so in Europe, economic policy must be

politically directed. This is a matter of fundamental concern to my fellow members of the Labour movement. And it can be achieved only on a European scale.

Take financial affairs. Europe and the United States now form one financial system, dominated by the economic weight of the United States. American "dear money" policies, in which we have no say, mean that we must pay higher interest rates in our own country whether we like it or not. Yet for Europe to have an equal voice in monetary affairs, it must act as one, otherwise what any particular country does in self-defence can harm its neighbours. It therefore follows that since monetary policy is an arm of economic policy, Europe needs a common economic policy. And that means it needs a political authority to establish such a policy and carry it out.

Where industry is concerned, the American journal "Fortune" puts the matter in a nutshell. "Business everywhere is outgrowing national boundaries and, in so doing, is creating new tensions between the way the world is organised politically and the way it will be increasingly organised economically! We have already entered the era of powerful multi-national companies, able to play one Government off against another and make their own decisions regardless of the consequences to any particular country.

Two issues result. One is the need to build up European-based giant firms able to face their American counterparts in world markets, and nothing short of genuine economic unity in Europe can provide European industry with a power base that matches that of the United States.

The other is control of the political motivations of these firms, whether based in the United States or based in Europe. Clearly, this can only be done by common European policies.

When the important economic, financial and industrial decisions are increasingly taken on a transnational scale, it is surely clear that political control must be exercised at the same level. Unless we build up a political authority able to do this, then it is, in my view, foolish to talk of retaining economic independence. (.....)

Obviously, if we accept the need for European economic unity, the political organisation required to achieve it must have much more power than the present Common Market institutions. And that means much stronger democratic control, with a directly-elected European Parliament as an obvious step. But to work for these changes we have to take our place within the Community.

More and more British trade unionists will find themselves working for transnational companies and therefore having to bargain at that level. Trade unionists within the Common Market have found that they are able to exert considerable influence over the formulation of Community policies. Trade union representatives constitute more than a third of the total membership of the Economic and Social Council, a body which has to be consulted on most major issues of Community policy.

In addition to this, they participate intimately in the work of the Common Market Commission, through the Secretariat of the European Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the various International Trade Secretariats. This includes such specific questions as re-training and re-employment.

What is the cost of moving towards economic and political unity ? It is the transfer of certain specific powers from ourselves alone to a shared basis with our neighbours. What would be the cost of not doing so ? Quite clearly, it would be the growing realisation by the people of this country that in all significant matters, whether political or economic, the major part of our destiny, including the jobs of our people, was being decided in places where we had little influence and no power.

One thing Britain has always been good at - living. Living in changing times. Sharing, yet influencing; changing yet remaining. Is not that what working for an integrated Europe means ? We are in Europe already. We are not at the moment very effective in its decisions. The question is : How then shall we become effective in our own continent, and thereby make our own continent effective in the world ? I have no doubts. We must get together with the other democratic countries of Western Europe to turn the Six into Thirteen. From then on, much is possible.'

(The Guardian, 8 and 9 September 1969)

15. Mr. Victor Larock: a common programme for Belgian and European Socialism

Mr. Victor Larock, Socialist Member of Parliament for Brussels, has published an editorial article in a Belgian daily; this article sets out to define a programme on the European scale which would be essentially socialist in its nature and capable of appealing to the great bulk of the population. He

immediately touches upon a specific, urgent problem: 'Will the Europe of the Six remain at the mercy of the big speculators, as it is today?'

Mr. Larock considers that this particular factor governs in large measure the purchasing and saving power of the workers. And he goes on:

'On this depend the chances of establishing a frontierless European democracy - a democracy in which major private interests will not prevail over the public authority.

Today even the advocates of the most stubborn form of conservatism recognize that a country which is at odds with international speculators is never sure of having the last word.

Dark plots and the Mafia do not come into it. Capital in massive quantities is transferred from bank to bank, from one currency to another, almost in broad daylight. Speculation, we are told, involves enough risks to be practically given the seal of official approval.

When the National Bank of Belgium had to withdraw 4 or 5 thousand million francs from its reserves on 15 August last to support the exchange rate of the franc on the free market, this was not done in answer to an exceptional run on the Belgian franc: such occurrences are common in the present free and easy state of Europe.

We will not be betraying any State secrets if we say that at the time one Minister, who was not a member of our own party, described certain bank transactions as scandalous. His indignation was laudable, but will it result in any positive action? And what is one to say about certain foreign groups whose interests in Belgium are by no means negligible but who nonetheless speculate shamelessly.

But these millions which come and go, these "vast, wandering" fortunes, to adopt the expression which a pope once used, are in large measure - if not entirely - the capitalized product of collective labour and they represent enormous possibilities of employment.

At the whim of its owners, this capital is turned into sterile money in search of a quick profit with no return in human terms, just as it is money without nationality.



As socialists we denounce capitalism. But only too often that sounds like an empty phrase or one of those hackneyed tunes which still move the listener but no longer carry him away. There we have it - capitalism in its concrete reality ! Capitalism on the European scale, of which Belgian high finance is only one level.

The truth is that monied circles have never in the history of our continent achieved such a measure of international power.

If a financial crisis comes, no country is safe and it is not within the bounds of our own narrow frontiers that we must try to guard against such a crisis.

"Exchange control !" is the catch phrase of some. But if the measure is unilateral the damage may be intensified rather than reduced.

"Nationalization of credit !": a still more radical formula. We must make no bones about it. In France two thirds of all deposits are held by nationalized banks, but this has not helped at all. Why ? Because there are links and connections, people who know people, and above all because everything depends on the party or parties which are in power. But when the workers do not enjoy the position which is theirs by right, it is not sufficient for the structures to be on the right track: from the highest level of administration right down to the lowest point of control, everything has a political bias.

In fact, the problem is not French or Belgian: it is European. That is the level on which we must consider it if we are not to indulge in idle words and lead the public astray.

There are tens of millions of workers in Europe whose future fate does not lie with national solutions and still less with regional expedients. If they are aware of all that binds them together, of all that the Belgian workers in particular and their responsible spokesmen are claiming and demanding, then the public powers in Europe will have to reach agreement to hold international high finance at bay.

Otherwise what does this Europe amount to ?

(Le Peuple, 22 September 1969)

### III. ORGANIZATIONS AND GROUPINGS

#### 1. The National Centre of French Employers (CNPFF) : 'France has not drawn all the logical conclusions from the Rome Treaty'

At the CNPFF annual general meeting on 17 June 1969, Mr. Ambroise Roux (submitting the report of the CNPFF's Economics Committee of which he is Chairman) said : 'France has not drawn all the logical conclusions from the Rome Treaty or from the chance it gives to opt for the kind of economy that is based on the laws of the market.'

Considerable progress had been made in terms of respect for the laws of the market and of allowing supply and demand to inter-act freely in regard to capital. This was far from being the case with credit.

The banking sector was severely cramped by the drain of liquid savings, the beneficiaries being institutions vested with excessive privileges under ordinary law. Out of total liquid savings amounting to Fr. 186,000m at the end of 1968, the proportion managed by the banking sector was not more than Fr. 50,000m. This threw the laws of the market out of gear, to satisfy needs whose long-established priority rating was very often questionable . . . .

The only satisfactory answer to this problem was industrial integration at the European level : this was the only way French industries could become competitive with those of the USA and Japan.

There were several conditions that had to be met. France had first to restore the free movement of capital as soon as possible and return to a more liberal policy on foreign investment, especially where this came from other member States.

Pending the finalization of articles of association for a European-type company, which would inevitably take time, there were some measures that should be introduced into the laws of the member States : these were legal and fiscal measures designed to simplify mergers, to limit the cost of mergers and to allow for multinational European groups to be set up on satisfactory lines.

Lastly, care had to be taken that the Brussels administration, which had for a long time paralysed any attempt at collaboration between Common Market enterprises, did not take any further measures that could prejudice industrial integration.

(Le Nouveau Journal, 19 June 1969)

## 2. The Mansholt Plan : views of the Belgian Federation of Young Farmers' Associations

Early in July the Belgian Federation of Young Farmers' Associations published a paper on the Mansholt Plan, from which the following are extracts :

'The idea of bringing pressure to bear on farm product prices in order to introduce structural improvements and adjust supply to demand is one which the Young Farmers' Associations find unacceptable.

They think that the surpluses are the unfortunate effect of having no dynamic, forward-looking trade policy and that the main responsibility for this lies with the political authorities.

Unfortunately, the Mansholt Plan is too much of a political game and much less of a complete, clear-headed analysis of the situation. Thus, many of the figures quoted throw the emphasis on surplus products while no basis for study is given regarding products in short supply; there is nothing to harden the lines of a policy for these productions.

The Young Farmers do not agree that surpluses should be phased out by measures to curtail production, whether these consist in cutting prices, setting quotas, slaughtering cows, leaving land fallow or even conducting an anti-agriculture policy through public opinion, which is what the Mansholt Plan has done.

They feel, furthermore, that surpluses only appear in the Mansholt Plan as a kind of scarecrow, no valid solution being offered at all.

Although they are very much in favour of the Plan's proposal to re-structure production, particularly by giving encouragement to 'modern agricultural businesses', they will never accept that the purpose behind this encouragement should be to cut prices, or that it should allow for prices to be reduced.

To sum up their views on trade policy, they feel that Mr. Mansholt and the European Commission should resolve the surpluses problem by recourse to an acceptable policy on external and internal trade. They are convinced that this, in turn, presupposes a determination on the part of Europe to unite politically. Grounds for this resolve could be found in a consideration of the following factors (i) agriculture is one of the key sectors in a country's economy and in the economy of Europe; (ii) agriculture secures food supplies, without which a country is liable to slide into a very serious state of political dependence; (iii) it is through agriculture that the developing countries first become independent : without it they cannot really develop . . . . .'

As regards the most suitable type of farm, the paper says :

'The Young Farmers want the farm of the future to have several labour units both for farming operations and management.

Yet they would like to put a halt to the trend towards the giant-sized production business because this would bring a new proletariat to the farms.

There should be two criteria for setting up new agricultural businesses and both must be met :

1. The farm must be profitable and one hundred per cent efficient, both technically and economically.
2. The social and human values : working conditions that enable people to make the most of themselves professionally and for all to have a share in the responsibility of running the business.

They feel that setting up the modern farming business referred to in the Mansholt Plan is the answer to their concern on the economic side.

But they have to point out that the Mansholt Plan makes too little allowance for the social and human values by which we should be guided towards co-operative or association farms rather than towards those of the "boss-worker" kind.

They therefore feel that all farmers should attract assistance towards setting up modern farming businesses; this should take the form of practical help in accounting techniques and management and subsidies for traineeships or training, re-training or refresher courses.

They are definitely against financial help in the form of "starting-up" assistance or of subsidies towards investments; these would have the wrong appeal for the farmer who would introduce a false sense of business with his operations; it would also make the farming community mistrust the modern agricultural businesses and prompt them to say "They're run by subsidies".

(La Libre Belgique, 4 July 1969)

### 3. The position of the ACLI on the Mansholt Memorandum

The National Council of the ACLI (Italian Christian Trade Unions) has examined the Mansholt Memorandum on a common agricultural policy and reached the following conclusions :

- 1) We reassert the constant affirmation of the Christian workers that their future lies with Europe - an affirmation which has also been made within the framework of the European Organization of the CMT (Confédération Mondiale du Travail) with which the ACLI are associated;
- 2) On examining a document of such evident importance for the future of Europe and the implementation of a common agricultural policy, we note once again that the "common agricultural policy" implies above all an acceptance of responsibilities by representative social bodies and countries which must pass from the stage of compromises based on national convenience to the stage of European solidarity;
- 3) Before going into the merits of the Mansholt Memorandum, we confirm that the new European solidarity required on the internal plane to achieve the policy of agricultural structures proposed in the Memorandum must also form the basis of an active policy towards the developing countries.

In fact a renewal of the structure of European agriculture is necessary not only to guarantee an increase in the income of farmers but also to eliminate production surpluses so that the quality and quantity of domestic supplies of foodstuffs are such as to favour the development of commercial exchanges with countries which export agricultural produce.

- 4) In emphasizing the urgency and priority placed on the structural policy the Mansholt Memorandum represents a rethinking of the policy hitherto followed within the Community, and therefore expresses an act of courage to which the National Council of the ACLI attaches a special importance.

- 5) We note with pleasure that certain essential choices made in the Mansholt Memorandum coincide with positions adopted by the ACLI in the recent past. In particular we would emphasize that a "structural policy" must be accompanied by an adequate social policy.
- 6) We affirm that to enable such common policies to be achieved individual national policies must be carefully revised and adapted to the objectives of the Mansholt Memorandum.
- 7) Regional policies must also be developed in line with resources which vary in qualitative and quantitative terms so as to bring about an equilibrium in the development of the different sectors of production.
- 8) Above all it is necessary to include social and structural action as a fundamental aspect of the planning mechanisms.
- 9) Another important factor is the realization of the full value of management which can, on the one hand, enable the traditional emphasis on landownership to be eliminated and on the other tend to lay the foundations for a different system of land acquisition and thus to overcome all forms of overvaluation of land; at the same time, a practical way of reducing income from land could be achieved through a welcome new regulation of rentals.
- 10) The Mansholt Memorandum defines certain conditions and time limits for implementing the process of merging farm holdings, thus providing a concrete parameter for evaluating the efficiency of the structural policy.
- 11) The National Council of the ACLI emphasizes its conviction that only a more extensive series of link-ups can enable the objective of an organizational restructuring of our agriculture to be achieved.

In fact it is high time for public investments to cease to be tied to spontaneous requests for assistance and express instead a genuine political desire to achieve predetermined and final objectives established within the framework of a planned policy.

- 12) We emphasize that the Mansholt Memorandum represents for the first time a political document which seeks to promote the exodus from the land by planned solutions including the creation of non-agricultural employment within specific regions, provision for early retirement and the granting of study scholarships to the sons of farmers. We would emphasize, however, that this policy must take in all agricultural workers, i. e. assistants, "metayers", wage-earners and labourers as well as others who are not farm tenants.
- 13) We emphasize that social policy must not be considered as a corollary of a policy of structures, but as an essential obligation of a genuine, influential policy of regional planning capable of encouraging a sense of responsi-

bility in every institution and unifying all efforts in the constant struggle to solve the problem of agricultural and extra-agricultural employment.

- 14) We therefore consider that a solution must also be found to the relationships between farming and the food industry (including the question of the location of new plant), which must, however, be actively governed by a coherent policy for state industry and an effective reinforcement of the contractual power of producers through enhanced co-operation.
- 15) We hope that, having regard to these complex problems and more generally to those which are created by the increasing influence of industrial concentration on the development of agriculture, the EEC Commission will develop appropriate supplementary proposals to add to those already contained in the Mansholt Memorandum.'

(Quaderni di azione sociale 1969/6)

#### 4. The Dutch Agricultural Corporation's views on the Council measures relating to the devaluation of the French Franc and on the Mansholt Plan

Mr. Knottnerus, Chairman of the Agricultural Corporation, stated at a public meeting of its executive, that the Council's measures to contain the consequences of the French Franc's devaluation were the first step on a dangerous road. He said that this sequence of events had a clear lesson for all those in positions of political responsibility. A customs union was not tenable if an economic union did not come into being at the same time and this also meant a stage-by-stage development of a common monetary policy.

Mr. Knottnerus said that Dutch agriculture and horticulture were affected by the French devaluation: 'The French market has always absorbed a substantial proportion of Dutch agricultural exports and these have risen rapidly in recent years. The subsidy and levy system, which has now come into operation for French imports and exports, would appear, at first sight, to offset the effects of the devaluation but, in the case of agricultural products for which there are no Community intervention or purchasing prices, the devaluation takes its full effect. In the case of products for which there are Community prices, the French Government has asked to be free to use its own discretion to set the French price level between 0 and 11.11 per cent lower than the EEC level. France can thus pursue its own price policy and we shall have to wait and see whether these exceptional measures are completely rescinded at the end of the period for which they are scheduled to apply.'

Mr. Knottnerus came to the conclusion that the Council had dealt with the French devaluation in an unfair way. Its decision was not based on the Regulation (+) which sets out how the European accounting unit is to operate and in which it is specifically stated that in the event of any measure affecting exchange rates, the free trade in agricultural products must be maintained. The Council's latest decision could have serious consequences if Germany decided to revalue after the elections. If the Council then enacted an "adjustment" regulation similar to the present one, it would be the end of the free agricultural market of the EEC. The Agricultural Corporation therefore questioned the validity of the Council's decision.

Mr. Knottnerus said that the monetary affairs of the Six had to be settled in the EEC context. It was unfair that the Dutch Government should give preference to discussing monetary policy only within the 'Group of Ten'. From the standpoint of the whole of the agricultural and related sectors there was too much at stake in the progress of affairs for the Common Market to be jeopardized in any way.

When the Council of the European Communities was deliberating on the Mansholt Plan, the Agricultural Association sent a delegation to Mr. Lardinois, Minister for Agriculture, to discuss the European Commission's price proposals.

The Association considered that an average increase in agricultural price levels of three per cent for 1970-1971 was both reasonable and possible. However, from the details given in the European Commission's reports, the Corporation concluded that agricultural costs would tend to rise by about five per cent each year. As against this rise in costs there would be an increase in productivity of the order of three to four per cent. In view of the fact that agriculture had lagged behind in previous years, (as compared with the general level of prosperity) it would be reasonable if agriculture were to share in the increase in productivity.

In talks with Mr. Lardinois, the Corporation expressed its concern about the way in which the European Commission's price proposals had been formulated. There had, for example, been no consultations with the agricultural organizations. The Corporation rejected the European Commission's contention that price increases would only be possible when demand overtook supply in the EEC. Due allowance should be made in the price policy not only for market circumstances but also for cost developments on well-managed farms and for agricultural incomes; the Corporation found fault with the European Commission for basing its proposals on incomplete data.

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(+) Council Regulation No. 653-68



In reply, Mr. Lardinois said that national interest still loomed large in the EEC. In common with the Corporation he trusted that more objective data would be used as the basis for the common agricultural policy. He said that the discussions on market and prices policy for 1970-1971 would probably only start in the Autumn.

(Handels- en Transport Courant, 26, 28 July, 23, 25 August, 4 September 1969, Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, 2 September 1969)

##### 5. The Dutch Consumers' Contact Association on the Mansholt Plan

The Dutch Consumers' Contact Association issued a statement on the Mansholt Plan describing the memorandum on overhauling Community agriculture as a worthwhile starting point. It regarded the shift of emphasis from markets and prices policy to structure policy as the focal point of the Memorandum.

In recent years consumers had repeatedly come out against the efforts of the European Commission to carry through an incomes policy for agriculture by means of the common agricultural policy. Consumer organizations had always considered that this policy's primary function should be to ensure that agriculture made an appropriate contribution towards the general prosperity of the Community. Better incomes for the farming community should follow from this.

The common agricultural policy had been pursued exclusively in terms of market regulations. It was wholly geared to price support.

The consumers' willingness to pledge their support for the Plan was subject to the reservation that there should be a clearly outlined plan showing how the rationalization of agriculture was to go forward in the period from 1970 to 1980.

The Contact Association felt it was wrong to take farm incomes as the starting point. Where the adjustment of agriculture to a constantly changing economic situation brought social problems, social policy was the most appropriate way of providing a solution.

Top priority should be given to improving the basic services and to creating new job opportunities.

The Association considered it essential to overhaul the markets and prices policy as part of a general review of the Community's market policy. The Association thought that the markets and prices policy should initially serve no other purpose than to secure a reasonable measure of price stability in the short term.

Automatic support machinery should be built into the market and price regulations for the various agricultural products to operate whenever prices rose above a certain level.

The Association considered this applied especially to meat prices, a crucial issue at present. Trade policy should also be reappraised when the policy on agriculture was revised because any change in price policy would immediately affect the level of protection obtaining on the external frontiers of the EEC.

(Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, 13 September 1969)

6. Resolution on European policy tabled by the Executive of the Europa-Union in Germany

On 14 July 1969 the Executive of the Europa-Union of Germany published a statement of policy aims for Europe. Since General de Gaulle's departure, many efforts had been made to revive European policy; these had often been incoherent and conflicting; the Europa-Union's statement of aims was designed to express these efforts in more practical terms.

The statement spelt out these aims as follows :

- The completion of the Community

'The customs union and the common agricultural market will only stand firm if common policies materialize for economic, financial and monetary affairs. The six Community countries must agree on the aims of this economic policy (growth, prices, employment) and try to achieve them in their

day-to-day economic policies at the same time. This applies both to the cyclical and the medium-term economic policies.

There should be agreed arrangements for monetary matters to prevent any sudden crisis over balances of payments and this should make it possible to pursue a common policy on economic affairs in the long term. For a common policy on financial and monetary affairs to work, the differences in the economic structures of the member States must be scaled down. This involves co-ordinating policies on structures and on the regions. To give practical shape to this co-ordination, the Community will need to have appropriate prerogatives and suitable machinery.

The common agricultural policy must be brought back within the context of the policy for the economy as a whole. The scope of the policy for markets and prices must be enlarged by means of the common policy for structures. When the final settlement on how agriculture is to be financed is made, care must be taken to rule out any possibility of surplus production; similarly more public resources and a greater proportion of them than in the past must be harnessed to productive objectives.

Nor should one abandon the idea of developing internal market relationships. Technical difficulties must be overcome. The crux of the matter is still approximating turnover and consumer taxes so that border controls may be abolished. This will call for an understanding between the individual member States about the measures they will take as part of their financial planning.

If the Community is to discharge its responsibilities it must have its own resources.'

#### Democratizing the Community

'If the programme for completing the Common Market is to be carried through consistently with the aims of the Rome Treaties, then the institutions of the Community must be fully operative and they must be democratized.

The Council of Ministers should organize its work in such a way that it once again becomes a Community body and a partner of the European Commission and does not go on as an inter-governmental conference. The Council's sessions should have more in common with Cabinet meetings than with international conferences. It would therefore appear appropriate for each Government to empower a particular Cabinet minister to represent it on the Council of Ministers in a regular way.

The provisions of the Treaties on majority decisions should be applied in full. Similarly, the member States should pledge themselves to act in a friendly, Community way (even in cases where unanimity is required) and not make use of any right of veto.

The European Parliament must have the right to share in shaping developments. Institutionally speaking, the European Community should be developed into a bicameral system. Under this system the Commission would continue to have the right of initiative. The Council of Ministers ought, with the majority laid down in the Treaty, to remain as the First or Second Chamber and be a law-issuing body. With regard to drawing up the budget, legislative acts or the appointment of members of the Commission, the European Parliament would either have the right of approval over the Council decisions or - for an interim period - a right of veto (with a majority of two-thirds of its members). Coupled with this consolidation of the rights of the Parliament, there should be an increase in the number of its members (as proposed in the Dehousse Report) and provision should be made for the direct election of half of its members. '

### Enlarging the Community

'Negotiations on enlarging the Community should begin at once. The aim of the negotiations should be :

- the accession of European States to the Treaties of Rome and Paris. Provision should be made for an adequate transitional period;
- the measures needed to adjust the economies of the applicant States should be put through during the transitional period. The Community should look into the possibilities of giving economic support;
- consultations with the applicant States throughout the Treaty negotiations on measures for completing the European Economic Community;
- once the accession negotiations are over, the applicant States should be included in all agreements for completing the Community and democratizing its institutions. '

### Political union

'The points of difficulty will not be resolved unless a series of measures in respect of foreign and defence policies are taken at the same time. These would embrace

- a) foreign policy
- b) defence policy.

The introduction of consultation machinery is an urgent need. These should consist of regular and compulsory consultations between the Governments (Heads of State or Government, foreign and defence ministers). The consultations should be prepared by an independent commission empowered to submit practical proposals. To assist the commission in its work, responsible ambassadors would be available. The members of the commission would not be subject to any national instructions; they would be appointed with the consent of the Governments and confirmed in office by the European Parliament whose terms of reference would be extended to embrace foreign policy and defence.

The aim of co-operation on defence policy would be to develop a European caucus within NATO. This would call for the elaboration of a European defence concept within NATO.

Further measures indicated would include : setting up a European armaments authority whose duty it would be to draw up joint programmes to prevent duplication of effort, to implement programmes agreed upon by the Governments in joint session and put forward proposals for approximating the logistics systems of the member States and create a European defence pool; this would involve employing a greater proportion of the financial resources previously made available by the individual member States for their defence expenditure.

(Europa-Union, No. 8, August 1969, p.9)

#### 7. The National Farmers' Union on Britain's entry into the EEC

The European Economic Community might take the opportunity, when negotiating Britain's entry, to consider changes in its agricultural policy, Mr. Asher Winegarten, chief economist of the National Farmers' Union, said on August 12.

'There may indeed now be a greater disposition among existing members to countenance changes which a few years ago would have evoked stern opposition,' he told the Executive Committee of Cheshire NFU county branch, at Winsford.

If present policies were continued unchanged, he said, the cost of supporting agriculture in the Community could become intolerable.

'It may well be that the opportunity provided by a negotiation with the United Kingdom may be used to reconsider such issues as the framework within which the common agricultural policy is conceived, the structure of some of the commodity regulations, the financial regulations - a big problem for the United Kingdom in particular - the problem of marketing organizations within a wider community, relations with third countries and so on,' he said.

'If events develop in this way then there could be a substantial reduction in what would otherwise be the really formidable burden that our country would be shouldering if we had no alternative but to become members on the basis of the existing common agricultural policy and financing regulations.'

(The Guardian, 13 August 1969)

8. Opinion of the Dutch Economic and Social Council on co-ordinating economic and monetary policies in the Community

The Economic and Social Council's Committee on International Social and Economic Affairs endorsed the European Commission's proposals on co-ordinating policy objectives in the medium-term.

The European Commission considered that the underlying principle of such co-ordination should be a discussion at the Community level of the economic objectives to be achieved in the EEC. The Committee agreed with this, pointing out that what was needed in the Community was for differences in developments in the Six to be kept within certain bounds.

The Committee agreed that it was very important to establish common objectives regarding price developments in the EEC and medium-term economic policy; this should be the framework for co-ordinating cyclical policies.

Under present circumstances, economic policy co-ordination was inevitably restricted to consultations among member States. What was needed, however, in view of the economic union that existed between them, was for the member States to give real substance to these consultations.

The Committee doubted whether the monetary machinery proposed by the European Commission was necessary in view of the arrangements already obtaining at the international level. It asked whether the member States did not constitute too small a circle for them to have their own credit machinery.

Finally the Committee said that the problems dealt with in the memorandum were of great importance for future member States of the Community and should, therefore, be discussed with them.

(Handels- en Transport Courant, 5 August 1969)

9. The Federation of Dutch Metallurgical and Electrical Engineering Industries (FME) and European integration

In its annual report for 1968, the Dutch Federation of Metallurgical and Electrical Engineering Industries put forward its views on developments in the European Communities; its conclusions were brought to the attention of the Government and the national employers' associations.

The FME considered that in some cases European integration within the Communities had brought substantial benefits to the metallurgical and electrical engineering industries. They thought it right for the Netherlands to co-operate in all the activities following on from the Treaties provided that as their implementation continued, the markets of third countries remained open to the EEC. In this connexion, the enlargement of the Communities to embrace other European States would be an effective way of consolidating the open character of these markets.

Although the importance of the Common Market was generally recognized, there had - particularly recently - been a move away from protecting national markets towards a policy of national support measures in favour of home industries.

The political deadlock the EEC was in at the moment and the national approach to industrial policy in the other member States raised the question as to whether the Dutch Government's policy was aimed in the right direction.

The Dutch considered that the way that national support measures interfered with competition was an ill that was getting worse and still had to be cured. The very existence of the different branches of the Dutch metallurgical and electrical engineering industries could be jeopardized. The Dutch Government should therefore tailor its policy to realities, viz. the scale of national support measures in other States. This implied support for industries in building up a position on the Common Market and in holding on to their position on the world market. This support should help to give them a better chance of finding partners to co-operate with in other member States. Co-operation with firms in other member States was one way of countering any unhealthy nationalistic bias and of reducing any adverse effects it might have.

As to the form of this support, the FME considered that in addition to overall assistance, selective support was what was really needed. This could be used to launch projects of interest and promise for the future and for re-organizing those branches of industry in structural decline. These guiding principles could be worked out in consultations between the Minister for Economic Affairs and the Council of the Federation of Dutch Industries to stimulate industrial expansion and in the contacts which the FME had with the Ministry for Economic Affairs.

Given the number of national support measures taken in other member States, the European Commission had to co-ordinate them at the Community level. To carry out its task, the Commission was endeavouring to find out more, by making appropriate surveys, about industrial structures. To ensure that these surveys did not take too little account of (a) the actual market and production structure in the various sectors and (b) the industrial and economic conceptions that stemmed from them, those concerned ought to be actively involved in these surveys. Carefully organized consultations with the Dutch Government were of great importance in this connexion.

(Federation of Metallurgical and Electrical Engineering Industries Annual Report 1968, August 1969)

10. The German Association of Farmers calls for abolition of EEC agricultural prices

The German Association of Farmers is asking for a return to the determination of common agricultural prices within the EEC in national currencies instead of in the dollar-related accounting unit.



In discussions with Federal Chancellor Kiesinger and Federal Minister of Food Höcherl on 22 August 1969, representatives of the Association of Farmers expressed the opinion that the common price system should be suspended until the EEC countries had been able to agree on an integrated economic and currency policy. In addition, if prices were fixed freely, surpluses could be eliminated more easily and the basis for speculation removed, according to a statement to journalists in Bonn by the spokesman of the Association of Farmers, Baron von Fleury, after the discussions. He added, however, that the Chancellor had not agreed to this form of 'renationalization'.

Federal Chancellor Kiesinger gave an assurance to the Council of the Association of Farmers that German agriculture would not face any loss of income as a result of the devaluation of the French franc. In future, too, German agriculture would suffer no loss of competitiveness as a result of decisions taken in Brussels. The Chancellor emphasized that he had instructed the German Delegation to suggest in the Ministerial Council of the EEC, that the effects of the devaluation of the franc should be examined at an early date. Kiesinger agreed with the representatives of the farmers that the estimates in the medium term financial plans for agriculture should be increased considerably to enable the agricultural programme of the Federal Government to be implemented.

The Association of Farmers is assuming that the reduction required under the financial plan of about DM 500m in the estimates for national agricultural policy to meet the increase in the funds needed for the EEC agricultural policy, and as a result of the expiration of the EEC transitional law, will not in fact be implemented. Von Fleury described the increase of the budget by this amount of DM 500m as 'certain'. In addition, however, implementation of the agricultural programme of the Federal Government in 1970 called for a further DM 390m and the promised increase in the old age pension to DM 200 per month, an additional DM 100m. In 1971, DM 490m would be needed for the agricultural programme and DM 770m in 1972. The demands of the Association of Farmers therefore amount to some DM 1,000m for the coming year.

The leaders of the Association of Farmers made far-reaching demands concerning the future agricultural policy of the EEC. They asked for the Federal Government to intervene in Brussels to bring about the abolition of the system of tying EEC agricultural prices to the European accounting unit, the 'green dollar'. This was necessary as long as currency parities in the EEC could be determined independently by the six countries. The common EEC pricing system must be suspended for at least two years, until France had adapted its agricultural prices again. Until such time as a common economic and currency policy could be achieved, prices should be determined in the individual national currencies on the basis of common criteria. Agricultural

prices must reflect true costs. If differences became apparent in prices between the individual countries, these should be balanced out at the frontiers. Article 40 of the EEC treaty provided the legal basis for such action.

Mr. von Fleury made it clear that the Association of Farmers considered the French devaluation to be preferable to a revaluation of the D-mark. With the French devaluation a sick currency had been cured. The absence of a revaluation of the D-mark was defined by the Vice-Chairman of the Association of Farmers as a 'good decision by the Federal Chancellor'. However, the Association of Farmers was well aware of the disadvantages which the devaluation of the franc presented for agriculture. In the next two years it would scarcely be possible to implement the desirable increases in prices. In addition, it was already apparent that the speculation in corn was still continuing against expectations. It was also impossible to check whether France was applying the specified price adaptation system correctly at the frontier. The farmers had little confidence in French promises.

It was also already clear that the French Government did not wish to observe the price ratios between the individual types of agricultural produce determined by the Council of Ministers for the transitional period. This might lead to a distortion of the competitive position.

These considerations played a not insignificant part in the request for 'renationalization' of agricultural markets. The Association of Farmers also hoped that in this way it would be easier to solve the problem of surpluses in the EEC. The idea of national quotas was being considered. At the same time it was assumed that high prices for cattle and fodder corn could be obtained if the Federal Government once again had a free hand in determining agricultural pricing policy.

On 16 September 1969, the German Association of Farmers expressed its grave dissatisfaction with the conversations which had recently taken place with the political parties. The Association drew attention to the fact that an alteration in the current regulations governing the agricultural market was considered inevitable, but the politicians were not prepared to discuss in any detail 'how' this alteration was to be brought about. It was simply common knowledge that any EEC agricultural policy must be accompanied by an appropriate economic and currency policy. The persons with whom the Association of Farmers had held discussions, including the Federal Chancellor, had found it difficult to admit that the only path logically open to us is to cease determining agricultural prices in the European accounting unit as has been done in the past and to determine them instead in the national currency but according to common criteria'. It was self-evident, in the opinion of the Association of Farmers, that national cost trends must always be taken into account.

The Association of Farmers emphatically rejected the opinion of the Federal German Finance Minister that an increase in payments to the EEC agricultural fund should be accompanied by corresponding reductions in the national sector. 'In reality', the two items of expenditure 'were completely separate'. In the opinion of the Association, the new Bundestag and the new Federal Government would have to give increased attention to German agriculture.

(Handelsblatt, 13 August 1969;

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 and 27 August and 17 September 1969;

Frankfurter Rundschau, 23 August 1969;

Die Welt, 23 August and 16 and 17 September 1969;

La Dernière Heure, 23 August 1969)

#### 11. German appeal for a unified integration policy

At a press conference in Bonn on 23 September 1969, the German Chamber of Industry and Commerce released a report jointly drawn up by the German-Swiss Chamber of Commerce in Zürich, the German-Swedish Chamber of Commerce in Stockholm and the German Chamber of Commerce in Vienna.

The report deplored the fact that Western Europe was still split into two integration blocs as far as trade policy was concerned. To focus full attention on this problem, the Chambers of Commerce made a fresh appeal both to the political authorities and the general public. They urged that this 'unfortunate situation' should not be allowed to persist; a unified economic area had to be created in Europe.

Trade relations with the three neutral EFTA States (Austria, Sweden and Switzerland) was regarded as the main victim of this trade policy split. Annual imports of German goods in these three countries were worth around DM 14, 000m; this was more than Germany's exports to the USA and Canada combined and more than Germany's total exports to Asia and Central and South America.

The report stated that to neglect exports to such important customers would be 'economic suicide'. Despite the positive results of the Kennedy Round, the adverse effects of the present customs situation were still making themselves felt and Germany's position on the markets of these countries was grow-

ing steadily worse. Austria, Sweden and Switzerland were neighbouring client countries who ranked, as trading partners, among those with the greatest purchasing power and with whom trade entailed the least risk. Why, the report asked, should relations with such countries be disrupted and even endangered?

The report described the facts in detail but these were not alarming. From 1960 to 1968, the proportion of Switzerland's total imports from Germany had not fallen (29.5 per cent in 1968 compared with 29.4 per cent in 1960). As for Austria, despite the EEC discrimination, the proportion had even risen slightly (from 39.4 per cent to 41.4 per cent); only in the case of Sweden had Germany visibly lost ground (18.7 per cent compared with 21.4 per cent). In terms of the upsurge in German exports, however, these three States no longer absorbed the same proportion of the total; in all three cases the 1968 figures (Austria 4.4 per cent, Switzerland 5.7 per cent, Sweden 3.9 per cent) were lower than those of 1960. As regards EEC/EFTA discrimination, which naturally acted a stimulus to trade within these blocs, Germany's position could still not be described as anything but strong in the EFTA countries.

(Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 25 September 1969)

12. The President of the German Chamber of Industry and Commerce discusses world trade problems and calls on the developing countries to integrate economically on a regional basis

On 25 September, at the Berlin Industrial Conference for 1969, Mr. Otto Wolff von Amerongen, President of the German Chamber of Industry and Commerce, said that the most important job to be done today was to restore the stability of the world monetary system. He advocated a world monetary conference in the near future. The world monetary system was in an unsatisfactory state at the moment.

Speaking of the future of world trade as the common, international task of industry and politicians, he warned against trying to compensate for a failure to expand economically by resorting to 'dirigisme' and protectionism. If 'dirigiste' measures became unavoidable they should only serve as transitional regulations. This presupposed a growing measure of international solidarity and an awareness of the responsibility that the industrialized States have, with regard to their monetary system, towards each other and towards the developing countries. The introduction of special drawing rights, which met the increased need for international liquidities, was to be welcomed.

He was optimistic about the future growth of world trade, which would continue to expand at a faster rate than the rise in world production. Even a slight fallback in world production would not slacken the rate of expansion of world trade. The stimuli of technical progress and economic policy were too strong for that. Compared with the Fifties, the growth of world trade would slacken off slightly but appreciable progress could still be expected, as long as the basic principles of liberal trade policy were put into effect. The great danger to business, he said, was the growth of national protectionism. In view of the present structure of the world's economy, the main fear was protectionism on the part of industrial States.

He called on the developing countries to look more closely than hitherto into the possibilities of economic integration on a regional basis. In this way they could expand their own trade more rapidly. Large internal markets would provide a better basis for the development of their national industries and for enabling them to hold their own in international trade. It was questionable whether the laborious construction of national internal markets was beneficial to the economic development of these countries. Agreements covering raw materials were limited in the effect they could have on stabilizing the market. He warned the developing countries against over-estimating the part that customs duties had played in competition.

More important than customs duties and prices were product quality, market analysis and advertising, setting up sales and distribution organizations and customer service.

(Handelsblatt, 26-27 September 1969)

## At the Community and International Level

### I. COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS

#### Mr. Hans von der Groeben, Member of the European Commission, discusses European problems

Addressing the CDU Land Group in Hamburg on 14 July 1969, Mr. Hans von der Groeben, a member of the European Commission, dealt with certain European problems : (a) achieving co-management on a European scale, (b) an outline political treaty and (c) the scope for action in the East European policy.

On co-management he said that to make the most of the opportunities afforded by the large European market there had to be an ever-growing measure of co-operation between enterprises in different member States. The Commission was there to facilitate such co-operation by introducing a European-type limited company, by making international mergers easier and by issuing directives on fiscal neutrality. But this co-operation would be impossible as a longterm proposition if the various regulations on co-management and the constitution of businesses continued to differ between the Six. 'We must discuss these questions at the European level and come up with answers that seem acceptable to all those involved; this could be decisive for the development of the modern industrial company', he said.

This involved having the workers represented on the Board of Directors, briefing the staff on business committees, collaborating on social policy and, in short, integrating the working man in the modern industrial corporation. A satisfactory arrangement for giving the worker a greater share in capital formation - stemming from fresh investment in the company - would assume tremendous significance, not only for Germany but for the European Community. Differing regulations in European countries would accentuate interference with competition and stand in the way of the development of a large-scale common market.

Without putting a brake on the further development of the Common Market, the Governments of the member States ought to draw up an outline treaty proclaiming their firm resolve to unite Europe politically. This would set out the aims, principles and methods for further economic and political

integration. Such an outline treaty should, he said, lay down the terms of reference of the Community in external relations, defence and economic and cultural affairs.

But because no federal-state dispensation was possible in the next phase of European integration, we should carry on with the well-tried institutions of the Common Market. Next to the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament should function as a 'second chamber'. A treaty on co-operation between the Six on defence and armaments should provide for a European armaments authority and for regular meetings of defence ministers. It is particularly important for the Six once and for all to begin to co-operate closely on external affairs. The most urgent objective here is a common line on relations with the USSR and the East European countries.

With reference to foreign affairs and its 'East' policy, Germany had acted wisely in helping to build the EEC, he said; this was also true from the standpoint of the German Question. A 'go-it-alone' national policy would not lead to a solution of this issue nor would it enable Germany to secure the influence it deserved in world affairs. Incorporated in a European Community, Germany's economic potential and technical inventions would help to give back to Europe the weight it deserved, intellectually, economically and politically. Such a policy would serve the purposes of the only visible chance of a general, prudent, rapprochement between East and West, i.e. making relations more liberal and more humane over a long period. For Germany to act bilaterally without its partners offered little prospect of success.

Relations between Germany and the USSR were strained for reasons that were familiar. Then again, Germany came up against a series of psychological obstacles in the other East European countries; even twenty years after the War, it had not been possible to remove them completely. These reservations with regard to Germany as a trading partner were understandable; but they were not warranted as regards a European Community of which Germany was a member. If Germany acted from within the Community, it would be able to do far more than if it acted on its own, provided that the other member States took Germany's wishes and interests into account. This would apply because, in the long run, a Community would be inconceivable without mutual respect for the vital interests of each member State. In common with all its partners, Germany brought not only its economic potential and what it could do into the EEC; it also brought with it its worries. East Germany was at present a component of the Eastern System. Politically, it was at least as tightly locked in this system as all the other States in the Eastern Bloc. East Germany would only gain greater freedom of action if the Bloc itself loosened its own hold on its components. Only as part of such a general loosening-up, which should be promoted through increased trade and traffic, would East Germany gradually be able to move towards greater self-determination. This process

had to be seen in its broadest context and should not be restricted to the German field. This did not in any way mean that Germany should not act as pace-maker in its efforts to ease tension in this broader context or that solutions would not be found that took Germany's special needs into account.

(Die Welt, 15 July 1969; VWD-Europa, 14 July 1969)



## II. MOVEMENTS, ORGANIZATIONS AND PROMINENT FIGURES

### 1. The European League for Economic Co-operation (ELEC) passes a resolution on consolidating and enlarging the EEC

Meeting in Oslo on 11 July 1969, the ELEC's Executive Council considered the improved prospects opening up for European unity as a result of the new situation in France.

The ELEC pointed out that the approaching deadline of 1 January 1970, when the EEC was due to enter its final phase, increased the urgency of consolidating the European Economic Community: this was a time-limit which could not be re-scheduled. The ELEC asked that to avoid jeopardizing what had been achieved, the Community institutions should endeavour to resolve the most pressing problems by that date and come to an agreement on:

- a) measures to secure co-operation and integration in the monetary sphere, such integration being a more urgent need than ever under present circumstances;
- b) co-ordinating economic policies and the common trade policy;
- c) the financial regulations for the common agricultural policy, which is linked with the problem of the Community's own resources and overhauling agricultural structures;
- d) a policy on technology.

As regards enlarging the EEC, the ELEC stressed the need for this to be kept consistent with the spirit and letter of the Rome Treaties and with regulations passed since they were signed. It asked the Six to take a decision, before the end of the year, to open, resume or accelerate negotiations with the four States that had applied for membership, viz: Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Norway and, at the same time, with all the other European countries that had expressed a desire to play a part in enlarging the Community, whether through entry or association or in any other way.

In order not to aggravate the problems which the enlargement of the EEC raises, there should be standing contacts between the Community institutions and the applicant States so that the Council of Ministers can take the decisions it must take to consolidate the EEC with a full knowledge of the problems these could throw up for the applicant States.

The ELEC trusted that applicant States would take care not to enter into any commitments under regional union treaties that would create difficulties over their entry.

Economic integration was inseparable from political union; hence the resumption of talks on enlarging the EEC could not be divorced from a resumption of talks on political Europe, without which the Rome Treaty aims of peace and progress could not be achieved.

(Luxemburger Wort, 23 July 1969)

2. The Chambers of Commerce of the North Sea Ports discuss the European Commission proposals concerning oils and fats

Acting on behalf of the Chambers of Commerce of the North Sea Ports, the Amsterdam and Antwerp Chambers of Commerce addressed a letter to the European Commission expressing their concern about the proposed Community levy on oils and fats. They pointed out that this regulation would seriously affect a number of developing countries and that the United States would probably take counter-measures. The greater proportion of oils and fats consumed in the EEC was imported from the United States (around 32 per cent and worth \$ 570 m ) and from the developing countries (around 52 per cent and worth \$ 929 m ) out of a total inflow valued at \$ 1, 800 m.

The United States, they wrote, had made it quite clear how little they liked the regulation and in view of the strong protectionist pressure in the USA, the danger inherent in the EEC proposal could not be over-estimated. There was no doubt that the American example of taking counter measures could easily be followed, which would lead to serious upheavals in international trade.

Similarly, the developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America were concerned about the consequences of the proposed levy. They feared that their earnings would be seriously cut.

Finally, the costs borne by EEC industries using oils and fats were expected to rise by nearly 25 per cent. It was not reasonable to make this branch of industry bear the cost of the butter surplus. If too much butter were

produced in the EEC, appropriate measures had to be taken but this should not involve placing burdens on a branch of industry that was in no way responsible.

(Handels- en Transport Courant, 11 June 1969)

3. Statement on the political situation from the Executive Committee of the European Movement

The Executive Committee of the European Movement met in Paris under the chairmanship of Dr. Hallstein on 3 July 1969. It considered that the new factors in France's political situation made it reasonable to hope that progress towards European unity would be resumed and that each Government would be brought face to face with its real responsibilities.

The time had come for action to develop European solidarity, especially since the Community would be entering its final phase in six months' time. Many problems, left pending for years, would have to be resolved rapidly, both as regards consolidating the Community and its enlargement.

In a resolution which it adopted unanimously, the European Movement therefore called for:

1. A policy for overhauling and modernizing industrial and agricultural structures (including the final financial regulations for the agricultural policy), a policy for technology and a regional development plan.
2. A decision to finance the Community's own activities from its own resources, so as to put them on a permanent footing.
3. A common monetary policy and, in particular, a European reserve fund, which were essential for working out a common economic policy.
4. Consolidating and democratizing the institutions set up under the Rome Treaty through (i) the direct election of the Parliament, (ii) increasing the Parliament's powers so that it can take decisions and exercise control, (iii) a return to majority-voting on the Council of Ministers, (iv) enhancing the prestige and independence of the Commission.

The European Movement repeated that European unity could only come about if the Community were enlarged to include all the democratic States who were

able and willing to join. It asked for a decision, before the end of the year, to begin talks with Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Norway, after consultations among the Six, on the basis of the Rome Treaties and regulations passed since they were signed.

It repeated that the economic stage could not be regarded as an end in itself, whatever its own internal dynamics might be; it could only pave the way to a European federation; only this would enable the countries of Europe to play an active part in international affairs and enable them to discharge their individual responsibilities for peace and progress.

(Text released by the European Movement)

4. The European Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ECFTU) passes a resolution on approximating value added taxes in the Community

At its meeting on 5 July 1969, the ECFTU's Executive Committee discussed the Community's fiscal harmonization problems and addressed the following resolution to the Council and the Commission of the European Communities:

'The value added taxation system, which will come into application in all the member States on 1 January 1970, will be a great step forward for the Community, taking it on from the Customs Union to the Economic Union. Under this standardized fiscal system almost all goods and services will be subject to an indirect tax which is in the end paid by the consumer. But in the meantime this will simply be the starting point for further measures to approximate tax burdens, the object of which will be to eliminate formalities at intra-Community frontiers; and the only way this can be done is by approximating value added tax rates which still vary widely from one member State to another. The trade unions are therefore very glad to hear that the Commission will submit a draft directive, before the end of the year, to approximate these rates and remove frontier formalities.'

But this raises many problems, the magnitude of which should not be under-estimated. On this subject, the ECFTU's Executive Committee stated:

'..... the Executive Committee repeats that the Council's decision-taking procedure on the Community's tax rates must be subject to the control of the European Parliament.

Although approximating indirect taxes comes first, it must neither increase the total tax burden nor reduce the purchasing power of workers or consumers in the member States. In those States where increases in the tax burden are the inevitable result of approximating value added taxes, there must be fiscal relief from other taxes to compensate for this and appropriate price and social policy measures must be taken. This must also be done in member States where there is liable to be an all-round rise in indirect taxes when the value added system is introduced there for the first time.

Approximating tax rates and fiscal systems must be more than an arithmetical exercise. Its main purpose should be to strike a fair balance between direct and indirect taxes in all the member States. It remains to be seen, of course, what the figures giving this "fair balance" are to be.

The trade unions realize how tax approximation measures will materially affect their members and workers. They therefore claim the right to have their say - through the processes of information and consultation - from the moment the Commission's proposals go into preparation.'

(Text released by the European Confederation of Free Trade Unions)

##### 5. The Second Conference of European Parliamentarians in Bonn

At the Conference of European Parliamentarians which was convened by the German Council of the European Movement and held in Bonn on 5 and 6 July 1969, under the chairmanship of Mr. Mommer (SPD), Vice-chairman of the Bundestag, discussion of the possible effects of the change of leadership in Paris on the development and extension of the European Community took pride of place.

At the opening of the Conference, Mr. Gerhard Jahn, Parliamentary Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, stated that, in the opinion of the Federal Government, it would be useful if after reaching agreement among the Six, our Heads of State and Government could determine with the British Prime Minister certain guiding principles for future European policy.'

The Secretary of State made the following observations on the basic principles of the European policy followed by the Federal German Government:

1. The economic and political unification of Western Europe remains one of the major objectives of German foreign policy on the road to a just and lasting state of peace in Europe. We enjoy peace in the Western part of the continent. We can help to enhance this state of peace and give an example - not necessarily in terms of the method adopted but certainly in terms of the spirit and motives - which will be understood as such in the Eastern part of our continent as well. This is the basis from which we shall seek to establish peace throughout Europe. We are convinced that if peace is to be guaranteed it is essential to combine the limited forces of the individual European nations; and only a strong Europe, i. e. a united Europe, can make a contribution towards a permanent, just and free state of peace.
2. It is therefore a self-evident fact to us that the work of European unification cannot be limited arbitrarily to a particular circle of countries. Every nation which is seriously willing to make a full contribution towards European unification must be allowed to participate. To prevent the possibility of misunderstanding, I should like to emphasize that we fully understand the attitude of those countries which, for reasons of their status under international law, may be only interested in economic rather than in political co-operation. It will be essential to attempt to offer these countries openings for co-operation which are in line with their own interests and possibilities as well as with our interests.
3. We are convinced that European unification can be lasting only if it is based on democratic principles. Above all this means that all the partners, small or large, must have equal rights. It is a fundamental principle of German policy to oppose all notions of positions of special power or precedence. In view of the many misleading comments which have been voiced, particularly in recent times, regarding the position of Germany on the policy of unification, I should like to state that we do not combine any political ambitions with our self-evident economic strength. We wish to be an equal among equals - no more and certainly no less. We advocate a modern form of co-operation and integration, and therefore reject all traditionalistic concepts of the balance of power in Europe. A policy based on such out-moded principles for maintaining order between countries would stand in direct contradiction with the democratization of the process of unification which we wish to see implemented. We demand the extension of parliamentary controls in the process of integration, and therefore keenly favour direct elections for a European Parliament. Without direct participation by the peoples in the work of unification, the latter is deprived of its most important element.
4. European unification points the way to solving the problems of the future. The Europe for which we are working is not so much our Europe as the Europe of the young generation. Youth must play an active part and its

ideas must be listened to, its hopes and aspirations must be achieved if we are not to build a Europe which will have no meaning for precisely those people for whom it is being created.

5. In its dealings with the outside world, Europe must meet three requirements if it is to contribute towards a permanent state of order in the world. Europe must become a full and equal partner of America. This means that it must develop and maintain its common and individual identity. Europe must, however, also attempt to overcome the present state of division by increasing co-operation with its Eastern neighbours. In our opinion a condition of peace throughout Europe is the best means towards this end. But Europe also has a responsibility to the developing countries. It must attempt to overcome the division of the world into rich and poor countries, because this too is a problem for peace in the world.

Walter Hallstein, Chairman of the International European Movement spoke of a 'notable change of climate' in Paris, but also warned against 'over-zealous initiatives'. As Chairman of the German Council of the European Movement, Mr. Ernst Majonica, CDU Deputy in the Bundestag, emphasized that European questions were not a subject of contention in the election campaign in the Federal Republic.

The French Deputy, Mr. Pierre Abelin (Centre) stated that France would consider a satisfactory solution to the problem of agricultural financing as a 'test case' of the good will of its partners in the EEC. The British Member of Parliament, Mr. Christopher Mayhew (Labour) strongly emphasized that entry into the EEC took priority in British European policy.

In the closing session, Mr. Walter Scheel (FDP), Vice-President of the Bundestag, laid the blame for lost opportunities in European policy squarely at the door of the governments. He stated that the young generation felt the gap between technical and political developments as a danger to its future. That was why youth was so mistrustful. He called upon the parliamentarians to attack their governments more strongly than in the past because of their failures in European policy, and not to accept 'lame decisions'.

At the two day conference in Bonn, parliamentarians from eleven European countries achieved a broad measure of agreement on the question of new initiatives in European policy. The 30 or so parliamentarians from the six EEC countries as well as Great Britain, Denmark, Norway, Ireland and Austria reached four decisions almost unanimously. Only the Austrians abstained from the vote on matters of defence and entry into the EEC. They are seeking a special arrangement because of their neutral status.

The conference resolutions state that a security system covering the whole of Europe as a pre-requisite for a relaxation of military and political tension, is only conceivable if the will of the Europeans to defend themselves is made abundantly clear and the Western European countries are immediately ready to work closely together in the political area.

The governments of the countries which are seeking entry into the European Communities of the Six - Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway - are asked to restate their intentions. On the other hand the governments of the Six are asked to intervene in favour of immediate negotiations on entry, to complete the process of economic union, allow direct elections to the European Parliament, merge the treaties and introduce a system of majority voting in the Council of Ministers. In general, the governments are invited to debate questions of foreign policy, security and defence including armaments, in regular consultations. These consultations should be seen as a first step towards integration.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 July 1969;

Die Welt, 7 July 1969;

Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 8 July 1969:

Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung, No. 91, 9 July 1969;

Das Parlament, No. 28, 12 July 1969;

Informationsdienst des Deutschen Rates der Europäischen Bewegung, No. 7, 30 July 1969, pp. 1-5)

6. Common declaration and resolution passed by the Monnet Committee on pursuing the unification of Europe and Britain's entry into the Common Market

The Action Committee for the United States of Europe held its fifteenth session on 15 and 16 July 1969 in Brussels under the chairmanship of Mr. Jean Monnet. At this particular difficult and delicate period, he was anxious to contribute to a solution of the problems raised by the unification of Europe and Britain's entry into the Common Market.

At the close of the proceedings, the Committee issued the following common declaration and resolution:

'We are today not only confronted with economic problems, however serious these may be, but also with the risk of jeopardizing for a long time and in all areas, the future of our country.



For the countries of Western Europe to be able to turn their vast economic and technological resources to the best account, they must first achieve economic and political union for the sake of social progress and peace in the world.

The creation of a large economic expanse within which products and equipment circulate freely should be combined with the introduction of common policies covering the main aspects of economic life. In this respect, the setting up of a European monetary organization would be of special importance.

Without European unity, the present imbalance between America and Europe will increase and prejudice their subsequent relations. If Europe could develop a common decision-making capacity, such as that of the United States, it could exercise an influence in keeping with its real potential. Harmonized national policies and the unanimity rule give an institutional privilege to the status quo, in spite of the cost and weakness involved.

The prospects for present-day Europe cannot be compared with those of the Soviet Union which is organized on the scale of a continent and under a different system.

The countries of Europe are not large enough to remove, by means of domestic policies, the dangers which now threaten their economic, social and political interests. Jointly, however, they can allay these dangers.

The peoples of Europe cannot fulfil their tasks both in Europe and in the world unless they become united.

The European Community has opened up a way towards a united Europe. This must be strengthened.

In fact, European economic and monetary union is a condition for future life in our countries and for their active and joint part in the direction taken by our civilization. It is essential for a European political organization to have a real influence in the world.

The accession of Britain could and should strengthen the European Communities. As was stressed on 11 March in London by the Action Committee for the United States of Europe 'it is of utmost importance today that the

European integration already begun by the Six be consolidated and pursued by completing economic and political integration with the participation of Britain, enjoying the same rights and having the same obligations as the other member countries.'

To reach this aim it is necessary for the Six and Britain to settle a number of practical problems.

Following the working programme adopted by the Action Committee in London, Mr. Guido Carli, Governor of the Bank of Italy, Professor Triffin, Professor Walter Hallstein, former President of the EEC Commission, Mr. Edgard Pisani, former French Minister of Agriculture, Lord Plowden, Chairman of Tube Investments Ltd. and Professor Karl Winnacker, Director-General of Hoechst, have prepared reports on the main problems raised by Britain's membership of the Common Market, e.g. monetary and agricultural matters, the functioning of the European institutions and technological development.

The Committee has taken an overall view of the problems arising on the basis of reports submitted by the above-mentioned personalities and the exchange of views it had with them.

The Committee is now in a position to indicate the general context in which it envisages the solutions that may be offered.

The Committee is convinced that the Europe of the Six and Britain must look beyond their present situation and relationships, for these conditions may change. Both Europe and Britain are compelled to make the necessary changes to the present context. This is what the Europe of the Six has begun to do and is pursuing with the Common Market. It is within this vast framework that Europe and Britain must seek together the solution to problems which are common to a large extent.

The situation of the Six and the accession of Britain make it incumbent upon the Common Market to fulfil economic and monetary union, i. e. to establish common policies which are essential for the enlarged Common Market to become a vast internal market comparable with that of the United States.

Provided this condition is met, our countries will enjoy the enormous degree of progress which the development of economic integration in-

volves, as well as further possibilities whose extent is only exceeded by that of our requirements.

The Committee analyzed the situation and is fully aware of the interests of the other countries which have applied for membership of the European Community. They feel that talks should start with them as soon as possible.

Resolutions:

'Having heard the reports by Mr. Guido Carli, Professor Robert Triffin, Lord Plowden, Professor Karl Winnacker, Mr. Edgard Pisani and Professor Walter Hallstein, the Committee is convinced that the problems arising from Britain's entry into the Common Market can be resolved. It decided to pursue the survey of monetary, technological, agricultural and institutional questions relating to Britain's entry into the Common Market in order to reach, at its next meeting on 20 and 21 November, a stage where practical solutions can be put forward.

The Committee is glad to record that proposals have been made with a view to the summit conference and decided to put forward to the Governments of the Six and to the British Government the following proposals which would be a preliminary step towards strengthening and enlarging the Common Market.

1) the Six

- a) are taking the necessary measures, whilst completing the transitional period, to achieve the Common Market and ensure the necessary progress for the building of Europe;
- b) have decided, with regard to the Community, initially to start negotiations with Britain and to prepare a common position with a view to these negotiations. The Committee is surprised that the opinion of the Commission has not yet been discussed by the Council; the Council should discuss this without delay.

Negotiations should be restricted to essential points and conducted rapidly.

The other questions should then be dealt with in the institutions of the European Economic Community in accordance with the Rome Treaties,

following Britain's accession when these problems will have become common and no longer separate external problems.

2) at the same time the Six and Britain should intimate their resolve to initiate political union. '

(Documents forwarded by the Action Committee for the United States of Europe)

#### 7. Trade union view on industrial concentration

The 'Monde du travail libre', organ of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, published in July 1969 an article giving the trade union's point of view regarding industrial concentration and multi-national companies:

'As long as the concentration movement is kept within national borders, the national trade union organizations will have to deal with the problem and, if need be, take the necessary protection measures. Until then the International Trade Union Movement should confine itself to advising national unions and exchanging views with them. This situation will change when giant multi-national or international companies are involved. This development started some years ago and is now taking increasingly large proportions. '

..... 'If this trend goes on - which seems to be the case - then the forecasts made by experts that about one hundred world companies will ultimately control two-thirds of the world's means of production, will be proved correct earlier than one imagines today. Under these circumstances, the International Trade Union Movement must assume its responsibilities on this problem. '

'The growth of world concerns is a development that follows logically from general trends. The process has become inevitable in a world where distances play a constantly smaller part. To try to reverse this trend would be quixotic. Undeniably, certain multi-national concerns, in particular those with a highly diversified production, offer a number of advantages from a technical and financial viewpoint. '

'Trade unions have always been in favour of progress and increased production in which they see an essential means of improving the standard of living of workers both in industrialized countries and in developing countries. For this reason, they cannot ignore the positive aspects of multi-national firms. They are, on the other hand, aware of the existence of negative aspects that would emerge if that development was allowed to go on instead of being checked while it is still possible to do so.

In fact, unchecked growth of multi-national firms is a two-sided weapon for national economy. It can reduce the abovementioned advantages by creating serious disadvantages, for example, by disrupting the balance of trade and the structure of supply and demand. It can also create new problems which are not easy to solve and which affect governments (i. e. general and fiscal policy), legislation (i. e. trusts and monopolies) and jurisdiction (i. e. competence of national legislation). But these points can only be mentioned in passing because they do not directly concern the trade union movement. For the trade unions, it is mainly a matter of ensuring that workers derive the benefit of part of this development and retain at least the rights they have acquired. Trade unions are also endeavouring to prevent industrial giants from taking unfair advantage of their enormous power.

While in a national context, the taking over of one firm by a larger one produces a negative effect on existing industrial relations, the effect is even worse in the case of mergers on an international scale. Managers of American branches in Europe may tend to follow the American pattern in their relations with workers. They will try to introduce a wages structure, a premium system and other regulations that would be unpopular with European workers and which they will resist . . . .

More often than not these firms will insist on being "masters in their own homes", and to assert their power they will enforce a rigid staff policy according to directives issued by the parent company. At the same time, they will try to secure the utmost benefit from the difference existing between salaries and social security allowances in different countries. They will also try to take advantage of differences in expenditure according to unit of production in regard to international competition. In pursuing this sort of policy multi-national companies will set workers and unions in a given country or area against workers and unions in another country or area. They do not appear so far to have experienced any social strife because they feel that, if necessary, they could resist any strike by increasing production in another country.

In the past few years the International Trade Union Movement has been faced with this type of situation. A document laying down the position of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions on this problem has

recently been published in the Economic and Social Bulletin. Extracts from that document are given hereunder:

In view of the growing integration of production practised by the large multi-national companies to a degree that goes beyond political and economic barriers, national sovereignty, and in view of the challenge of integration to social structures and the industrial relations machinery, it is logical, natural and necessary that free and democratic organizations of workers should endeavour to achieve a change that will enable them to oppose this trend.

In a growing number of industrial sectors, including those of the motor car industry, the farming implement industry, the electrical and electronic industry, the chemical industry, the entertainment industry and the airlines, the free and democratic organizations of workers have set up an intra-company structure through which they propose to introduce a new form of international trade union co-operation.

Among the aims of these company committees, the following may be mentioned: equal salaries for workers employed in large international concerns; improving at the same time the wages paid in developing countries and protecting those paid in fully developed countries; introducing a holiday premium as a matter of principle on a world basis; protecting income and employment against the effects of technological changes and fluctuations in production; improving advancement prospects up to the higher stages of the parent company; preventing the unfavourable effects of excessive centralization of research and certain restrictions on production decisions; ensuring that the workers enjoy the universal right to organize themselves and negotiate on a joint basis. '

(Monde du travail libre, July-August 1969)

8. A joint paper by the Italian General Labour Confederation (CGIL) and the General Labour Confederation (CGT) on trade union unity in Europe

On 23 July, the Brussels secretary of the CGIL-CGT sent a series of proposals for a Community trade union programme to the secretaries of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the World Labour Confederation (WLC).

The paper goes over the problems thrown up by economic integration and makes a series of programme points. On wages policy, the following aims are put forward: rejection of the incomes policy; wage increases and guaranteed earnings; increased purchasing power for the least-favoured classes; a sliding scale as a means of safeguarding purchasing power against price increases; an end to wage discrepancies; a democratic reform of taxation and an immediate easing of the tax burden borne by the workers.

On employment, the aims set out are: a guarantee of employment and of the right to work; a policy for occupational training, re-training and re-adaptation to enable workers to improve their skills and to keep up with technical developments and the concentration of job duties within the framework of a democratic reform of the educational system; trade union supervision of labour services and employment offices; an economic expansion policy ensuring full employment and adjusting regional imbalances; shorter hours, with a reduction to a five-day, forty-hour working week; four weeks holiday with pay; a change in the retirement age and a review of pensions.

On trade union rights within business organizations, the paper calls for recognition of trade unions within firms and freedom to engage in trade union activities (right of assembly, right to hand out literature, etc.); protection for those engaged in trade union militancy and the right of trade unions to negotiate within business organizations.

Collective contracts and contractual agreements should be made at the industrial, regional, local and business organization levels, to include clauses that really guarantee workers' rights and an improvement in their standard of living. It is hoped that Community trade union organizations will co-ordinate the action they take for this purpose.

In such amalgamated corporations as Citroën-Fiat, the trade union organizations ought to unite their efforts to obtain collective contracts with the general management. Lastly, on problems of social security, the free movement of workers and the social services, the following objectives should be secured: safeguarding and improving the social security systems and their approximation at the level of the most favourable one; real equality and effective guarantees for the rights of migrant workers; a proper housing policy on behalf of workers and their families and a denser network of infant schools, day nurseries, holiday camps for children etc; the construction of collective amenities to promote the pursuit of recreational, cultural and sporting activities.

(L'Unità, 24 September 1969)

9. Mr. Christopher Layton on 'setting a timetable for new European objectives'

In an article in The Times, Mr. Christopher Layton suggested new objectives for Europe. Large extracts are given hereunder:

'Sensing a fresh European breeze from Paris, it is natural for the British to make membership of the Common Market their top priority; and right that the Foreign Office should hope for a negotiation that is narrow, short and sharp. Last time the negotiations got bogged down in interminable complexities. This time the need is recognized for a simple negotiation which will get Britain into the community quickly, enable it to share in the further construction of Europe, and leave difficulties to be settled later on. (.....)

For the first time in Europe for some 10 years, there is today a fluid situation, the possibility of a serious reappraisal of the objectives of the European movement and the hope of a major new advance. This article sets out the case for supplementing negotiations on membership by a parallel high level conference, say in mid-1970. This would lay down longer-range objectives for Europe, and a timetable for achieving them, making the applicants for membership, and the Six together, partners in a strategy for Europe for the next 10 years. (.....)

Common policies in all or any of the crucial fields of monetary policy, technology and defence clearly have major political implications. Like the pressures within the community itself, they force Europeans to chart out a pattern for the development of more effective institutions over the next 10 years.

In the British case, these pressures for a wider strategy are sharpened by a more specific argument. Membership itself may well depend on achieving a wider economic union, because the problem of agriculture and Britain is not soluble in a narrow context. The wild hypothetical figures about agriculture lately planted in the press provide no guide to the real dimensions of the problem. Even without Britain, the existing members may well limit their budgetary contributions across the exchanges to the common fund.

Production quotas may curb surpluses. Higher prices will boost British output, and thus cut back our imports. Eventually it is highly likely that the Community will move towards a system in which prices (at least relative to other prices) come down, so that small uneconomic farms in certain regions get less help from the market and more from direct subsidies.



Even so, it seems likely that agriculture could imply an additional balance of payments deficit for Britain of some £ 200 m to £ 300 m a year in the second half of the 1970s.

Yet it would be childish to rule out British participation in the vast task of constructing a united Europe because of the price of butter. What government, or federation, would devote its entire budget to the special task of shifting resources to the diminishing peasant minority which is trying to move gradually and humanely off the land?

Britain will of course get important industrial compensations from membership. But the imbalance caused by agriculture will only be fully corrected in the next 10 years, if the community develops other common functions, which bring about other major transfers of resources compensating for those of the farm policy: common policies in arms production and technology, subsidies to declining coal fields, regional policies which aid the extremities of the community (Scotland, southern Italy, Spain) might all in some measure provide transfers of resources to, say, Britain.

How should a high level discussion on these great questions be organized and relate to the British negotiations for membership and to progress within the community itself? It is important that neither be jeopardized by a grandiose diversion which will provide new excuses for inaction. Narrow-front negotiations on British membership ought to be started as soon as possible - which means early next year. Inside the community the Barre plan for coordinating economic policies, the search for agricultural solutions, and the important beginnings of a policy for industry, must go forward.

But at the same time parallel discussions on the long term objectives described in this article ought to be initiated creating a climate of confidence and common purpose for the membership negotiations. Perhaps the summit conference of the Six, likely this autumn, could provide the impetus by defining the areas for action, and setting up ad hoc commissions, which the applicant countries would be invited to join. These ad hoc commissions, mixing a few outsiders with representatives of governments and the communities, could draw on the work of Mr. Monnet's Action Committee which met recently in Brussels and prepare the way for a conference or series of conferences to define the objectives for Europe over the next 10 years.

This new equivalent of the Messina conference which launched the Common Market and Euratom on their way should lay down certain general objectives and a timetable for action and agreement on more specific applications.

In technology the conference could agree to add powers to the existing communities, enabling them to elaborate priorities for European science and technology policy, integrate public purchasing and initiate joint development programmes more effectively than hitherto. The elaboration of these principles, sector by sector, would take place over a period of time.

The setting of new objectives for Europe, with new powers to be established under a timetable; automatically implies taking decisions on the political aspects: strengthened powers for the existing commission in industrial strategy and technology, a new Defence Planning Group, a European Currency Board under the Economic Community, majority voting in a large number of matters, powers for the parliament and so on.

It would be logical if a range of new tasks and functions were planned to emerge gradually during Britain's transitional period of, say, five years, so that at the end of this time the community, plus new members, emerged from the chrysalis to become a new and stronger animal. At this point, a crucial device might link Britain's own transitional period with these new developments.

The agreement which makes Britain a member might stipulate that full application of the common agricultural policy to Britain (especially the expensive budgetary provisions) would only come into force, at the end of the five years, if any major adverse effects on the British balance of payments were compensated by transfers of resources in other fields of policy and minimized by funding of sterling liabilities in a common reserve fund. This lever, typical of the original Rome treaty, would make it possible for Britain to join quickly, without solving all problems in advance; at the same time it would put pressure on everyone to solve the problems fairly by a new leap forward to economic union.

What are the chances of getting such a new policy off the ground? The new French Government cannot be expected to repudiate its past. But Mr. Pompidou is a practical man and the realities - the dossiers on the desks of ministers - now dictate new European policies. In Paris, as in Bonn and Brussels, there is also a growing sense that time is short. The deepest aim of the European movement has always been to provide the German people with a spiritual and political home, so that their great energies can be harnessed to common ends.

In Germany the European idea is still regarded as elementary common sense, but it will not survive another five years of battering and disappointment. The British are not wanted by our neighbours as a nineteenth-

century counterweight to reemergent German power. But they are wanted if they come as the new yeast in the community, which speeds the European process, and ensures that the next 10 years are as creative as the last. '

(Times, 5 August 1969)

10. Statement by Mr. Charles Levinson on big world corporations and the Common Market

In an interview given to the Guardian, Mr. Charles Levinson, Secretary-General of the International Federation of Chemical and General Workers' Unions, answered questions on large multinational corporations and their political influence in general and Britain's policy with regard to membership of the Common Market in particular.

Q. Are the big American corporations simply taking over European industry?

A. The notion that this is an American takeover is not entirely correct. Actually what is happening can be called a global takeover. What is involved is the emergence of a new international economic power. It seeks to shed nationality rather than promote it. Already many believe, as I do, that the growth of the multinational corporation will be balanced by the decline of the nation State. Nations are increasingly losing control of their own economies.

One of the best examples of the impact of the multinational corporation on the economy of the nation State is to be found in Switzerland. Swiss assets abroad total nearly \$ 32 billion, of which nearly \$ 6 billion is in direct investments.

Swiss per capita assets and investment abroad is \$ 5,000 compared with US per capita overseas assets of \$ 700. In 1964 the top 20 Swiss companies were reported as employing 94,000 people in Switzerland compared to 264,000 abroad. Factories and sales outlets numbered 114 in Switzerland compared to 921 abroad. The giant Nestlé company conducts 95.5 per cent of its entire business outside Switzerland.

Q. Does the growth of the international corporation reinforce the argument for British membership of the EEC?

A. I may be way out on this, but I think the multinational corporation may have fundamentally modified the nature of the Common Market, particularly in creating an enormous gap between industrial integration and the existing political framework. Industry, through the multinational corporation has already made it an international Common Market rather than only a market of the Six.

American, British, Swiss and Swedish firms are already inside. There are virtually no important British corporations which do not have plants or joint ventures that produce and sell directly in the Common Market.

The same thing is true for most American corporations and banks. In reverse, there is virtually no important corporation of the Six which does not have production facilities and commercial outlets in the EFTA countries and in the United States. In terms of industry, therefore, there has been an integration which has gone much beyond the political and statutory framework of the Common Market.

These firms have begun a process of integration on a global scale which invalidates accepted theories of the importance of regional markets and industry. Because they are both in and out of trade zones and Customs unions, they are able to leap through and around them, to take advantage of different rates of exchange, income and turnover taxes, of inter-company transfer prices between plants.

In other words, of minimizing taxes and costs and maximizing profits in spite of national and regional regulations designed to protect markets internally. And as most of the major companies of the Western world are involved to some degree in such global leap-frogging, the implications may require a serious re-examination of the real economic importance of the Common Market.

The important U. K. firms are already part of the Common Market and are expanding their investments in it, although Britain is not a member.

Take, for example, the case of Lever Brothers, Royal Dutch-Shell, ICI, Reed, Bowater, Dunlop, etc. Even the British Steel Corporation is planning to go multinational. There are fewer industrial barriers than the political picture indicates. It is difficult to see how further integration politically could affect trade significantly under such conditions.

Q.1 Does this mean the U. K. will get the benefits of a large market without joining?

A. The benefits are rather questionable. A recent study in the United States concludes that by 1975, 35 per cent of the total gross national product

of the Western world, exclusive of the United States, projected at one trillion dollars, will be produced by US or US affiliated subsidiaries.

Conversely, about 25 per cent of the US GNP, also projected at one trillion dollars, will be produced by European and Japanese subsidiaries or related firms in the US. By contrast, US exports to the West will only be about \$ 24 billions or about 12 per cent of American overseas sales. Only about 14 per cent of foreign sales in the US will be through exports, 86 per cent will be through direct production.

In terms of Britain, in 1966, for example, British foreign investment overseas was estimated at around \$ 16 billion, including oil, roughly the same as exports. A rule of thumb is that annual overseas sales are about double the amount of direct foreign investment. This would mean that sales generated by British firms overseas were \$ 32 billion, double the value of British manufactured exports. This adds up to a very important factor in the balance of payment problem.

Further, take into account that about 120 firms in Britain account for 50 per cent of the total exports, and that only 15 to 20 firms account for 25 per cent. Yet these are precisely the firms which are expanding their direct overseas investment most rapidly.

Already U.K. exports are primarily geared to engineering, steel, naval construction and vehicles. If you think there is a problem now, wait until these go multinational and Ford and General Motors produce a really international car rather than distinctly national models.

Q. You argue that the international company is already putting many current policies out of date. How much further do you think this internationalism has to go?

A. International production of multinational firms is increasing at a rate of about 12 per cent per year. Most national economies would be very happy indeed to have a growth rate of about 3 per cent to 4 per cent in real terms. The differences are growing and will do so at a rising rate.

By the late 1970s or early 1980s some 200 to 300 multinational corporations will dominate world production and trade, and own 75 per cent of the West's corporate assets of both industry and finance.

The fact that most of these world corporations will have multiple joint ventures with one another, and will be extensively interlocked at various levels of organisation, will make the degree of concentration tremendous, even frightening.

To sum up, I believe that the growth of the multinational corporation is promoting a major structural change in world industry. This growth will in time produce an industrial revolution placing in question most of our existing systems and policies, much of which is already 'yesterday'.

(The Guardian, 3 September 1969)

11. The common agricultural policy discussed by the Committee of Professional Agricultural Organizations (COPA)

Meeting in Brussels on 4 September 1969, the COPA looked into the decisions taken by the Council of Ministers on 11 August, following the devaluation of the French franc. They found it regrettable that the Council should have taken decisions throwing the agricultural market machinery out of gear, instead of dovetailing the conduct of the agricultural policy with the pursuit of the economic and monetary union.

Any expansion in intra-Community trade in agricultural products depended on unifying the markets, eliminating tariff and non-tariff barriers and on having prices that were inter-changeable through a common accounting unit. Altering this state of affairs threw up a great many difficulties regarding the fulfilment of contracts already signed. Businessmen were completely uncertain about the results of their future intra-Community transactions because the regulations were no longer a reliable basis for their estimates.

COPA urged that the exceptional provisions be cancelled at an early date and, in the meantime, that their implementation be simplified so as to minimize the obstacles in the way of intra-Community trade. The common policy for agriculture had to include the organization of markets and the means for improving both the structures of agriculture and the living conditions of the farming community.

(Il Sole, 13 September 1969;  
24 Ore, 13 September 1969)

**12. Mr. Brugmans, Rector of the College of Europe, on present opportunities for a European revival**

In an article published in a French daily, Mr. Henri Brugmans, Rector of the College of Europe at Bruges, discussed three approaches to a European 'revival'. He was not fully convinced of the usefulness of the first two alternatives, that is the enlargement of the Community and direct elections to the European Parliament.

With regard to the question of Britain's entry into the Community, Mr. Brugmans wrote: 'It remains to be seen whether the present moment is propitious. Undeniably, the United Kingdom is going through a period of reflux regarding European affairs. As long as General de Gaulle was keeping the door shut to Britain, no Englishman had any doubt as to his Government's wisdom in continuing to apply for membership of the EEC. But now that the chances appear to be more favourable, public opinion is growing more and more sceptical. In fact, it is wondering whether membership would not cost too much, in particular - and not only - in respect of farming. This was certainly the opinion of the trade unions quite recently. Such questions are understandable, but sterile. The fact is that Britain is faced with a historical choice. Does it or does it not want to remain an island?'

Mr. Brugmans further wrote: 'A greater number of member States will increase the number of points of contention. Hence the need for a more efficient decentralization and hence the need for increasing Community powers.' He concluded: 'It is by no means certain that by giving greater emphasis to the British question - in present circumstances - we are rendering a decisive service to the European cause. In a Community that is still largely in an uncertain position, extending it to more members would increase difficulties even further.'

In Mr. Brugmans' view, direct elections to the European Parliament are not likely to further integration as long as the relevant decision at European level depends upon the Council of Ministers over which a directly elected European Parliament would have no influence. It would be misleading the citizens to ask them to elect members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage. The time has not yet come for such an election.

On the other hand, Mr. Brugmans felt that it was now a good opportunity to resume negotiations on political union in accordance with the basic ideas contained in the Fouchet Plan. At the same time, Mr. Brugmans warned against the dangers that must be avoided. There are four such dangers:

- a) It should not be laid down as a basic principle that the duty of the future European union will be to pursue a particular foreign policy with regard to the East or the West. This subject should be dealt with inside the union;
- b) The political union should not be turned into a super-institution controlling the EEC Commission; on the contrary, the Brussels executive which is responsible for its economic and social fields must take part in framing the policy;
- c) It should be laid down from the outset that the institutional structure, rather flexible at the beginning, should become stronger later on and have as its aim a true federation;
- d) British participation in these negotiations should not be turned into a prerequisite, particularly not today.

(Le Monde, 12 September 1969)

13. The European Journalists' Association passes a resolution on European integration

At its annual general meeting in Bordeaux on 12 September 1969, the European Journalists' Association discussed the problems now facing the Community. Mr. Jean Rey, President of the Commission of the European Communities, and Mr. Jean de Lipkowski, French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, addressed the meeting. A political resolution was then passed, in which the Association stated its position on the decisive problems that the Community would have to tackle in the closing months of 1969.

The Association began by congratulating the Commission for refusing to consider any prolongation of the Common Market's transitional period and for setting in motion the various measures that this refusal implied, particularly concerning agriculture.

The Association noted with satisfaction that the representative of the French Government had made a point of stressing the value of the common agricultural policy as the mainspring of integration; it implied the Community's having its own resources and control over their use by the European Parliament.



The Association was glad that Mr. Rey and Mr. de Lipkowski had come out in favour of rapid progress with the common policies for industry, science and, above all, monetary matters. Both acknowledged that the problem of consolidating the Community could not be divorced, politically, from its enlargement; they were sure that the Commission's supplementary report on the British application would propose the opening of negotiations with the United Kingdom to the Six.

The Association hoped that the forthcoming summit meeting of the Six would give fresh impetus to the Community and lay down the bases for a real European political union; it fully supported the Commission's legitimate request to take part in this meeting; it was particularly glad to note Mr. de Lipkowski's reference to the 'irreplaceable role' of the Commission.

Taking note of the statements made, the Association agreed to spare no effort to mobilize public opinion in support of a decisive revival of the drive towards economic and political unity, within a Community comprising all the democratic States of Europe.

(Notes of an observer)

#### 14. Pope Paul VI receives the European Democratic Union Group

During its conference in Rome the European Democratic Union Group of the European Parliament was received by Pope Paul VI in private audience.

The Pope spoke of the Church's support for the efforts of all parties to bring peoples closer together. He recalled his meeting with General de Gaulle in 1959, when he was still Archbishop of Milan and went on: 'The name of your party, which clearly expresses the importance of your responsibility and your dual allegiance to France and to Europe, seems to us to be an apt synthesis of the dual ideal to which you devote your efforts. Your country is so often in the vanguard in many fields and it was fitting that it should embrace the great idea of building a united Europe; you have been chosen as the privileged servants of this fine cause. You may be sure of our real appreciation for the contribution to the common good of this continent you are making in this way; we extend our sincere good wishes to you and to your activities. We trust that your conference here in Rome, where you will be looking into the problems facing Europe with leading Italian politicians, will be a fruitful one.'

(La Nation, 15 September 1969)

15. A British economist suggests Europe should have a Commission for Industry

Addressing the German Association for World Trade on 20 September 1969, Mr. Charles Villiers, a leading British economist, proposed that a European institution should be set up to promote the formation of European companies; this would come under the auspices of the Brussels Commission or the Council of Ministers.

The purpose of this institution, he said, would be to promote, accelerate and support the re-structuring of European industry to make it internationally competitive, both technologically and in terms of capacity. To be successful, such an institution would have to be independent, have adequate financial resources, be internationally recognized and work on modern lines.

Mr. Villiers pointed out that Europe's per capita gross national product came to half that of the United States. In 1976 Europe would be overtaken by Japan and soon after that, by the USSR. To meet this challenge, European economic integration had to transcend the frontiers. The key fields for such co-operation, he said, were atomic energy, desalinization, automation, aircraft engineering, computer technology and the steel industry.

(Handelsblatt, 22 September 1969)

Zweiter Teil - Deuxième partie - Parte seconda  
Tweede Deel - Part II

METHODISCHE BIBLIOGRAPHIE - BIBLIOGRAPHIE METHODIQUE  
BIBLIOGRAFIA METODICA - BIBLIOGRAFISCH OVERZICHT  
METHODICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

Diese Bibliographie zählt eine Reihe der Bücher auf, welche die Bibliothek des Europäischen Parlaments im Zeitraum, auf den sich dieses Heft bezieht, erworben hat sowie die Zeitschriften, die sie in der gleichen Zeit auswertete.

Cette bibliographie représente une sélection des titres des ouvrages acquis ainsi que des périodiques dépouillés à la Bibliothèque du Parlement européen pendant la période couverte par la présente édition des Cahiers.

In questa bibliografia figura una scelta dei titoli delle opere ricevute e dei periodici selezionati alla Biblioteca del Parlamento Europeo nel periodo coperto dalla presente edizione dei Quaderni.

Deze bibliografie geeft een keuze uit de aanwinsten van de Europese Parlements-bibliotheek en de periodieken waaruit in deze editie van "Europese Documentatie" artikelen zijn opgenomen.

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