

**THE ORGANIZATION OF A UNIQUE EVENT:
THE CASE OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES OF TORINO 2006**

**L'ORGANIZZAZIONE DI UN EVENTO UNICO:
IL CASO DEI GIOCHI OLIMPICI DI TORINO 2006**

**FRANCESCO MARIA BARBINI
UNIVERSITÀ DI BOLOGNA**

Abstract

This contribution describes the decisions and actions taken by the Torino Organizing Committee for the XX Olympic Winter Games. The events presented in the case are analyzed in the light of different theoretical perspectives in order to reflect on the planning process of a unique event, one that could not be postponed or delayed, such as the Olympic Games.

This work is aimed neither at identifying best practices leading to successful events, nor at implementing a checklist for future operators involved in the organization of next Olympic Games; instead, through developing different theoretical interpretations, this paper proposes an organizational discussion about relevant phenomena and fosters a reflection on wider issues related to organizational design and people management in unique events.

Keywords

Mega-event organization, Regulation process, Organizational action, Organizational design, Unique events.

The organization of a unique event: the case of the Olympic Games of Torino 2006 /
L'organizzazione di un evento unico: il caso dei Giochi Olimpici di Torino 2006. Barbini
Francesco Maria. Bologna: TAO Digital Library, 2011.

Proprietà letteraria riservata
© Copyright 2011 degli autori
Tutti i diritti riservati

ISBN: 978-88-906740-5-1

tao Digital Library

The TAO Digital Library is part of the activities of the Research Programs based on the Theory of Organizational Action proposed by Bruno Maggi, a theory of the regulation of social action that conceives organization as a process of actions and decisions. Its research approach proposes: a view on organizational change in enterprises and in work processes; an action on relationships between work and well-being; the analysis and the transformation of the social-action processes, centered on the subject; a focus on learning processes.

TAO Digital Library welcomes disciplinary and multi- or inter-disciplinary contributions related to the theoretical framework and the activities of the TAO Research Programs:

- Innovative papers presenting theoretical or empirical analysis, selected after a double peer review process;
- Contributions of particular relevance in the field which are already published but not easily available to the scientific community.

The submitted contributions may share or not the theoretical perspective proposed by the Theory of Organizational Action, however they should refer to this theory in the discussion.

EDITORIAL STAFF

Editor: Bruno Maggi

Co-editors: Roberto Albano, Francesco M. Barbini, Giovanni Masino, Giovanni Rulli

International Scientific Committee:

Jean-Marie Barbier	CNAM, Paris	Science of the Education
Vittorio Capecchi	Università di Bologna	Methodology of the Social Sciences
Yves Clot	CNAM Paris	Psychology of Work
Renato Di Ruzza	Université de Provence	Economics
Daniel Faïta	Université de Provence	Language Science
Vincenzo Ferrari	Università degli Studi di Milano	Sociology of Law
Armand Hatchuel	Ecole des Mines Paris	Management
Luigi Montuschi	Università di Bologna	Labour Law
Roberto Scazzieri	Università di Bologna	Economics
Laerte Sznalwar	Universidade de São Paulo	Ergonomics, Occupational Medicine
Gilbert de Terssac	CNRS Toulouse	Sociology of Work

www.taoprograms.org
dl@taoprograms.org

Publicato nel mese di Dicembre 2011
da TAO Digital Library – Bologna

The organization of a unique event: the case of the Olympic Games of Torino 2006

Francesco Maria Barbini
Università di Bologna

Introduction

The organizational analysis and discussion of cases not directly connected to business practice is both interesting and not very usual. However, these cases are important since they allow to study decision-making processes and to highlight unusual phenomena that can be used to understand and explain typical managerial issues; they also allow to develop "out of the box" reflections, leaving out traditional assumptions and the study of business models. This contribution presents the decisions and actions taken by the Torino Organizing Committee for the XX Olympic Winter Games¹ (TOROC). The events presented in the case are analyzed in the light of different theoretical perspectives, to reflect on the planning process of a unique event, one that could not be postponed or delayed, such as the Olympic Games.

This work is aimed neither at identifying best practices leading to successful events, nor at implementing a checklist for future operators involved in the organization of next Olympic Games; instead, through developing different theoretical interpretations, this paper intends to foster the understanding of the most relevant phenomena and the reflection on the main issues related to the organization of a unique event.

Another interesting note: when we refer to the "organization of the Olympic Games", the term "organization" is used, from a lexical point of view, according to a meaning which is quite different from the one typically adopted

¹ The most important organizational choices adopted by TOROC in the 2000-2004 period are detailed in Barbini, Melloni, 2005.

by the management literature: in this case, "organization" does not mean "orderly system" but rather "the process of regulation to achieve an objective", as this allows to reflect on the procedural, dynamic and progressive dimension of organization, avoiding the typical reification of the concept.

The Olympic Games

It all began in 776 BC in Olympia. According to the Greek tradition, the first Olympic Games were held that year in honor of Zeus, father of the gods. The Olympiad soon became the most important religious event celebrated in the Panhellenic world. With the Games, the Greeks celebrated the newfound awareness of the national spirit after long centuries of difficulties, following the fall of the Mycenaean kingdom of 1100 BC (Swaddling, 1984; Morgan, 1990; Young, 2004). Continuously played every four years, for a total of 293 editions, the Olympics were suspended at the end of the Third Century AD by Roman Emperor Theodosius. Since then, the Olympic Games remained in oblivion for nearly fifteen centuries, until 1896, when the first modern Olympic Games were held in Athens.

The initiative to revive the Olympic Games is due to Baron Pierre de Coubertin, who deemed them as the best means of bringing the sport "at the service of the harmonious development of the man, to encourage the peaceful coexistence and the preservation of dignity among men". According to the intentions of Pierre de Coubertin, the Olympics should have been aimed at establishing and spreading a "life philosophy" extolling the qualities of body, spirit and mind.

Inspired by historical documents and archaeological findings, and sometimes "inventing" rituals and traditions, Coubertin coagulated around him a group of people animated by the same ideals and, in 1894, formed the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in order to organize the first modern Olympic Games (Young, 1996; 2005).

Within a century, the Olympic Games have become the most important sporting event in the world, in terms of number of competitions, athletes, and

participating nations. The Games are also an unparalleled social and media event, unique in terms of size, atmosphere, universality, and values. Athletes, spectators, sponsors, and media recognize this uniqueness and demonstrate an unmatched interest (DaCosta, 2002; Guala, 2003).

The Olympic Games are held every four years in a city designated by the IOC. The organization of the Games gives honors and responsibilities, and it also generates opportunities for the host city. There are very important honors: for fifteen days (the duration of the event), the host city becomes the seat of the Olympic flame and the ideal core of the dreams and hopes of millions of athletes and supporters. On the other hand, the preparation of such a particular event imposes heavy duties: it is necessary to implement infrastructures, sports facilities, recreational sites and to effectively manage fifteen days filled with competitions and events. Finally, the Olympic Games are a great opportunity that the city can use to gain visibility and prestige worldwide, and to implement a series of investments that can deliver significant and long-lasting improvements in infrastructures and public services (Andranovich et al., 2001; Cashman, Hughes, 1999).

The challenge for the organizers of the Olympics is, therefore, to devise and implement a large set of interventions in order to promote the worldwide image of the city and the nation, to keep costs below acceptable thresholds, and above all, to ensure a broad social return on investments.

The Winter Olympic Games, introduced more recently than the Summer Games, replicate, albeit on a smaller scale, the organization and ceremonies of the latter. Initially, the Winter Olympics were not part of the Olympic movement. In 1924, the organizers of the Paris Olympic Games decided to promote, six months after the summer event, the Winter Games in Chamonix. The success of these Games prompted the IOC, in 1925, to amend its statute to allow the Summer Olympic Games host countries to organize, in the same year, the Winter Games. In 1948 the IOC decided to separate the organization of Summer and Winter Games, so it became possible to assign them to different

countries. Finally, in 1986, the IOC amended its statute to impose a two-year distance between Summer and Winter Games (Deschiens, 1979; Mogor, 1989).

The Summer and Winter Games have significant differences. The latter still have a minor impact on the media and a narrower interest of the public (Essex, Chalkley, 2004). In addition, the Summer Olympics are held in large cities, while Winter Games are assigned to medium-sized cities located in areas well suited to snow sports. In numerical terms, the summer games involve a number of athletes five times higher than the Winter Games and generate a TV audience incomparably higher. However, the same differences is not so evident in terms of infrastructure needs and of investments required (Lesja, 2000); overall, the complexity and the organizational challenges are rather similar.

The next paragraphs will explain the organization of the Olympic Movement, the characteristics and history of the Olympic Games of Torino 2006, the nature and activities of the Organizing Committee and the evolution of its organizational configurations. A theoretical discussion will conclude the paper.

The International Olympic Committee

In its initial configuration, as drafted by Pierre de Coubertin in 1894, the International Olympic Committee was composed of fifteen people (aristocrats and men of culture and sports) from twelve different countries. Currently, the IOC gathers more than one hundred representatives from eighty countries. It works in close collaboration with the International Sports Federations (ISFs) and with National Olympic Committees (NOCs) (Chappelet, Kübler-Mabbott, 2008).

The IOC is the organization in charge of planning and promoting the Olympic Games in accordance with the Olympic Charter. In addition, it pursues the widespread diffusion of the values of peace and nonviolence, and the affirmation of equality among men and between the sexes. It has to promote ethics in sports, to fight any kind of doping, and to protect the environment.

Finally, the IOC should oppose the (ideological and commercial) exploitation of sport activities and athletes and support education to sports.

Today, the IOC is an "international organization, non-governmental and non-profit", based in Lausanne, Switzerland, which acts as the coordinator of the Olympic Movement activities (IOC, 2007). Members are individuals acting as representatives of the IOC in their respective countries, not vice versa, i.e. as delegates of their respective countries at the IOC. The IOC chooses and elects its members from a slate of subjects deemed as qualified by its Executive Board. It is therefore a system of strict cooptation, which has been criticized in recent times and it is suitable for being changed in the medium term (Crowther, 2002). In addition to the assembly of members and the President, a body with broad authority is the Executive Board. This Board includes the IOC President, four Vice-Presidents with specific attributions and ten other members. The Executive Board is in charge of the strategic, administrative, and financial management of the IOC and controls the process for the selection of candidate cities to host the Games.

The International Olympic Committee is the sole owner of the Olympic Games, as well as of their symbols and logos, flag, motto, and anthem. The IOC gathers most of its revenues from the sale of rights related to merchandising, broadcasting and reproduction of the images of the Olympic Games. It is also financed by long-term sponsorship agreements with multinational companies (Tomlinson, 2005).

The honor of hosting the Olympic Games is awarded to a city by the IOC, through a complex process of evaluation and selection (Booth, 2005; Persson, 2000). The selection process begins with a formal request (which must be issued and supported by the National Olympic Committee) from the municipality of the city interested in hosting the Games. The Government of the concerned country must demonstrate its compliance with the Olympic Charter. In addition, the candidate city must exhibit satisfactory financial guarantees. Applications are examined by specific evaluation committees. The IOC autonomously selects the host city seven years before the Games.

Immediately after choosing the host city, the IOC signs with the city and its Government a written contract (Host City Contract) which specifies in detail the duties of the organizers of the Games. Then, the NOC must establish an Organizing Committee (OCOG) which, since its establishment, will interact directly with the IOC and receive appropriate instructions from it. The Organizing Committee must assume the status of legal person and its Executive Committee should include at least one IOC member belonging to the host country, the President and the Secretary General of the National Olympic Committee and at least one representative of the host city. The Executive Committee may also include other prominent figures.

Since its creation and until its dissolution, the OCOG must carry out their activities in accordance with the Olympic Charter, the host city contract, and with the instructions received from the Executive Committee of the IOC. In case of violation of general rules or inefficiencies in the organization process, the IOC keeps the right to withdraw, at any time and with immediate effect, the organization of the Olympic Games from the host city. The NOC, the OCOG and the host city are jointly liable for all obligations established for the organization of the Olympic Games, except for financial obligations, which will be entirely assumed by the host city and the OCOG.

An essential tool recently developed by the IOC in order to support the activities of Organizing Committees is the Olympic Knowledge Transfer Programme (also known as Olympic Games Knowledge Services). This is a recent innovation, aimed at providing organizers with documentation and best practices related to all stages, from the preparation of application documents to the debriefing of the event. The Knowledge Services should enable the collection and management of information, know-hows and experience related to the organization of the Olympics. In addition, they are expected to make the transfer of knowledge from one edition to another smoother and then to reduce the costs, complexity and risks related to the organization of the Games. Two mottos summarize the objectives of this Olympic knowledge management system (Quick, Taylor, 2000): "Stop re-inventing the wheel" and "Adaptation

rather than invention". The first motto expresses the principle that the organization of the Games involves typical choices and solutions that can be bequeathed from one edition to another. Hence OCOGs can avoid the repetition of traditional analysis, trials and errors. Evidently, the proposed solutions can not be fully replicated, because of the intrinsic difference between every edition of the Games. This paves the way to the second motto: the Organizing Committee is not constrained to adopt the choices recommended by the Knowledge management system, instead, it is asked to adapt them to suit its specific needs and context.

By taking advantage of the Olympic Knowledge management system, organizers may (Tzelepi, Quick, 2002):

- Access a set of predefined rules and routines covering the whole preparation process, this may facilitate the work of those who, without specific knowledge (and without experience) have to plan the event;
- Collaborate with IOC members and with the world's leading experts in relation to specific domains;
- Access simulation environments, in order to test the effectiveness and efficiency of the operational solutions adopted;
- Participate in seminars, workshops, training initiatives (e.g. observer programs, debriefing and post-event analysis);
- Connect to a database containing information and case studies related to the various domains of the activities of the Organizing Committee.

The main benefits of this knowledge management system include: higher levels of efficiency in the organization of the event (the reuse of already established practices and techniques allows to avoid common mistakes and redundant costs), the strengthening of the brand of the event (in particular, the uniformity of the organizational solutions adopted by OCOGs makes the editions of Games more similar to each other, enabling the development of a consolidated image and facilitating the cooperation with business partners), and the continuous improvement of the knowledge base available for future organizers.

The genesis of Torino 2006

In the early Nineties, the city of Torino was experiencing a period of stagnation, in particular because of the decline of the automotive industry which, for at least a century, had driven the local economic growth. In this period, local authorities committed themselves to enable the evolution of the city and its hinterland into a new model of regional development, based on the exploitation of cultural heritage and tourism (Bobbio, Guala, 2002).

The application for the organization of the Turin Winter Olympic Games, launched in 1998 by local government (municipality, province and region), is part of that strategy of territorial development. On March 18th 1998 the municipality and the promoting committee officially launched the bid for the Torino Olympic Games. Other candidate cities were Sion (Switzerland), Klagenfurt (Austria), Helsinki (Finland), Zakopane (Poland), and Poprad Tatry (Slovakia). On August 31st 1998, the candidacy dossier was submitted to the IOC. From October 15th to 17th 1998, the IOC evaluation commission was received in Torino to explain the contents of the application. Finally, in Seoul, on June 19th 1999, the General Assembly of the IOC assigned the 2006 Winter Olympic Games to the city of Torino. On the same date, the mayor of Torino and the President of the Italian Olympic Committee (CONI) signed the Host City Contract, i.e. the contract by which the host city and host National Olympic Committee assume the responsibility to respect the rules defined by the IOC for the organization of the Games.

In Torino, the Olympic Games have been scheduled for the period from February 10th to 26th 2006, with athletes from 80 countries belonging to 15 different sports to compete for 84 titles (and 252 medals). Overall, the Organizing Committee estimated the participation of 2,500 athletes, 2,500 coaches and national delegations, 2,300 representatives from the IOC, National Olympic Committees and Sports Federations, 650 judges and referees, in addition to 10,000 journalists and 6,000 people invited by the sponsors.

In order to allow the efficient conduct of competitions, the Organizing Committee deliberated to set up five indoor venues, nine outdoor venues, and

one training venue. Twelve non-competitive venues have also been provided (Olympic Stadium, villages for athletes, Medal Plaza, MPC - Main Press Center, IBC - International Broadcast Centre, OFH - Olympic Family Hotels), together with eight villages to house journalists and eighty service sites (Headquarters of the Organizing Committee, MOC - Main Operation Centre, Main Accreditation Centre, offices, warehouses, parking lots, etc..).

TOROC, The Organizing Committee of Olympic Games

On December 27th 1999, the TOROC (Torino Organizing Committee for the 2006 Olympic Winter Games) was established.

TOROC is configured as a non-profit foundation under private law in charge for carrying out the obligations assumed by the City of Torino and the Italian Olympic Committee when they signed the Host City Contract.

The Committee has been recognized and regulated by the Italian Law 26/03/2003 n.48; the art.2 of this law reads: "The Organizing Committee of Olympic Games is a private foundation incorporated on December 27th 1999 by the City of Torino and the Olympic Committee in fulfillment of the contractual agreements between them and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) with the agreement signed in Seoul on June 19th 1999". The organizing committee acts under private law, but when negotiating contracts with third parties it is required to apply principles of transparency and non-discrimination.

The most important responsibilities undertaken by TOROC are:

- The planning, organization and management of sporting events and ceremonies, the Olympic Village for athletes and coaches, the villages for journalists, the Press Center, International Broadcasting Center and any event included in the Olympic program;
- The design and implementation of temporary structures, the planning and arrangement of accommodations and transports for the various client groups;

- The management of medical and security services, in coordination with public authorities;
- The development and implementation of the marketing plan.

TOROC acts in close coordination with Agenzia Torino 2006, a public body established by Law 9/10/2000 n.285: "The Agenzia Torino 2006 has legal personality under public law and it develops its own organizational, administrative and accounting procedures. The Agency is governed by private law. The Agency carries out the action plan defined by the Organizing Committee of Olympic Games, to enable the coordinated and timely success of the Olympics. [...] It acts taking also into account the needs for post-event reutilization of permanent facilities and infrastructures"(Law 285/2000, Art. 2 and 3).

Ultimately, the Agenzia Torino 2006 has assumed the responsibility for all the investments in infrastructures and permanent installations which are intended to serve the community well beyond the Olympic Games. TOROC is in charge of all activities connected with the organization of the Games and all the investments in temporary structures, which are intended to be used only for the duration of the event.

TOROC developed an action plan (detailing locations, priorities, costs, technical and functional requirements) approved by the Italian government, while the Agenzia Torino 2006 had the task of managing the procurement processes.

Overall, more than 65 sporting facilities, infrastructure, roads, villages for athletes and journalists were planned. The total expenditure was estimated at 1,700 million Euro, partially covered by private and public investors.

TOROC activities have been funded by partner companies (divided into four categories: top sponsors, major sponsors, official suppliers and sponsors), television rights, revenues from the sale of tickets, licensing rights on logos and sales of services and products during and after the Games.

About 40% of TOROC's revenues came from television rights, 40% from sponsorship contracts, 10% from ticket sales and the remaining 10% from merchandising. The costs were mainly related to staff and management, information systems, and to the implementation of temporary structures.

The "crafts" of the TOROC

The complexity of the organization of the Olympic Games is well expressed by its own peculiarities. First of all, the Olympic Games are a one-shot event (single, without any possibility of repetition), with non-extendable deadlines. This requires a rigorous pre-ordination of the available means in order to achieve the predefined goal. The uniqueness of the event does not allow hypothesizing paths of improvement over the time.

Secondly, the organization of the Games is created from scratch: the Organizing Committee has to design and to build the sites, to select and recruit the staff and to develop skills and competencies. The Games require relevant investments both in facilities where sporting events will take place (the so-called competitive venues) and in non-competitive sites (i.e. non-competitive venues, Olympic Villages, shops, medal plaza, etc.). In addition, the organizers of every edition of the Games do not have, with few exceptions, skills and experience directly related to such domain. People involved in the organization of the Games usually have important managerial background, however they need to learn the so-called "Olympic knowledge", i.e. specific knowledge about the planning and management of Olympic events.

Thirdly, the organization of the Games evolves gradually (ramp-up by phases) and dissolves very quickly (sudden ramp-down). After a very slow phase of growth, the dissolution of the organization takes place very quickly, immediately after the conclusion of the Games. The full availability of resources and staff takes places just a few months before the event. On the other side, all commitments must be fulfilled almost instantaneously at the end of the event. This obviously creates problems of coordination as well as the need for the simultaneous management of many events concentrated in a limited timeframe.

The greater part of the activities of the Organizing Committee is related to the planning and preparation of the Games: the operational phase itself (the management of the Games) lasts no more than twenty days, compared to about seven years of preparation. The days of actual operation, however, are occupied by many simultaneous events (competitions, awards, ceremonies, etc.) carried out in many different locations.

Finally, the organization of the Olympic Games is particularly vulnerable to the impact of external events, just to cite the most relevant: risk of terrorist attacks, possible effects of war or political events, the variability of weather conditions. These sources of uncertainty are clearly unavoidable and require organizational solutions in order to prevent them and to limit their consequences, in full respect of the calendar of events.

For the preparation and the organization of the Olympic Games, the Organizing Committee must bear numerous contractual obligations (as detailed by the Host City Contract) which require the provision of specific services to the different classes of "clients": spectators, athletes and delegations of the National Olympic Committees, Sport Federations, sponsors and journalists. These different "clients" have to be placed in positions where they are able to play their role and to take part in the spectacle.

In particular, for the Torino Winter Olympic Games, the Organizing Committee carried specific responsibilities in terms of:

- Installations: TOROC manages all venues, is responsible for their preparation, for the preparation of temporary structures (stands, hospitality areas, parking lots, services, radio and TV infrastructures), for the organization of health services and for catering and waste disposal. Overall, TOROC manages thirteen competitive sites (Palasport Olimpico and Torino Esposizioni, Palavela, Oval Lingotto, Pinerolo, Prigelato, Prigelato Plan, Bardonecchia, Sauze d'Oulx, Cesana Pariol, Cesana San Sicario, San Sicario Fraiteve, Sestriere), three non-competitive sites (Medal Plaza, Stadium and Ceremonies of the Torino-Caselle International Airport), three Olympic villages and seven villages for journalists;

- Communications and media: TOROC, through its division TOBO (Torino Olympic Broadcasting Organization), is in charge of the production and diffusion of the TV signal to all broadcasters (about eighty) who have acquired the rights to broadcast the Olympic Games. This commitment is related to the preparation and management of the International Broadcasting Centre (IBC, International Broadcasting Center), the Main Press Centre (MPC Main Press Center), fourteen Venue Media Centres (VMC Press decentralized centers);
- Sport: TOROC, in addition to managing competition and training facilities, must manage the three Olympic villages to allow all the national teams to compete in the best ways. To ensure equal opportunities to all countries participating in the Olympic Games, Organizing Committees are used to cover the travel expenses of the sport teams;
- Information technology: IT-related spending accounts for about a quarter of the budget of the TOROC. Investments are headed to five main areas: telecommunications, internet, timing and results, information technology, planning. In terms of equipment, during the Time Games, TOROC provides 500 network servers linking 4,500 desktops and 600 laptops (the network system must be able to manage up to 11,000 e-mails messages per working day), 12,000 wired telephones, 5,000 TV sets and 6,000 digital radios for internal communications;
- Transport: TOROC, in collaboration with local transport companies, should provide transport services to more than 20,000 people.

In addition to these activities, TOROC is in charge of the organization of the ceremonies, the management of accreditations, the provision of accommodation services, the organization of the Olympic Torch Relay and the management of the artistic and cultural programs.

Overall, the Organizing Committee should play more than forty “crafts”, from logistics planning to public relations, (for a synthetic list of TOROC’s jobs, see Figure 1).

Institutional activities
Communication External relations and lobbying Media relations
Planning activities
Development and implementation of projects for permanent structures Development and implementation of projects for temporary structures Planning of operational activities and client services Sponsorship Ticketing Licensing/Merchandising Allocation Accreditation Planning of the transportation system Planning of security system
Operations
Operational management of the sites Event management Media services Broadcasting Medical services Security / Surveillance Spectator services Facility management Transports and logistics Client services Services to the IOC
Support activities
Program management Accounting, finance, auditing, risk management, legal services, contracts Recruitment, selection, management and training of human resources Organizational development, Organization, Procedures IT applications, infrastructures, IT services Procurement of goods and services

Figure 1. The "crafts" of TOROC, our adaptation from Barbini, Melloni, 2005.

Obviously, the Organizing Committee can not directly carry out all these activities. Hence, TOROC has defined a strategy to select the (core) activities to be managed directly and those suitable for being outsourced to external partners. In general, TOROC has decided to directly manage all activities deemed to be "Olympic" (for example, the design and development of venues and of temporary installations, the planning and management of events and

competitions, the anti-doping activities), the process of analysis and definition of clients' requirements, and the management of TV productions. Furthermore, TOROC has decided to claim for itself the management of other critical activities, such as, for instance, the management of the relations with National Olympic Committees and Sport Federations, the management of accreditations and the management of front-end services to clients. All other activities have been outsourced to external service providers.

The outsourcing of these activities required a choice about the method for managing supply-chain relationships. TOROC took into consideration three options:

- Shattered outsourcing, i.e. the development of a large network of contracts with many suppliers;
- Outsourcing to service providers, i.e. the outsourcer is in charge of the strategic management and control of activities, while the service provider has to arrange the operations, by coordinating a large number of suppliers;
- Outsourcing to general contractors/integrators: identification of few partners who take the overall responsibility for the management of entire processes (then, every partner can outsource its activities to other subjects).

TOROC decided to avoid pursuing extreme cost efficiency by means of shattered outsourcing since such solution would have created relevant problems in terms of coordination and control. Instead, it outsourced the activities related to the implementation and management of venues to service providers. Finally, it outsourced to general contractors all the activities related to the logistics, the organization of car rental services and the implementation of villages for journalists.

The formal configuration of TOROC

TOROC began its operations in late 2001, adopting a traditional functional configuration: functions became the basis for aggregating the various categories of operators and for enabling the development of specific knowledge and expertise.

The rationale of this choice was twofold. On the one hand, the Executive Committee of TOROC deemed this configuration very effective in enabling the emergence and evolution of specialist Olympic knowledge, namely a set of knowledge and critical skills which are hard (if not impossible) to find on the market. On the other hand, this choice was strongly influenced by the fact that the IOC had been adopting the same configuration: it was not an imposition, rather it has been a solution driven by the need to intensively interact with specific functions of IOC and by the opportunity to take full advantage of the documentation, in particular best practices and know-hows prepared according to functional criteria.

TOROC has therefore set up an organization headed by a General Director who directly coordinates some Functional Units shaped around the main "crafts" assigned to the Committee (Figure 2). Internal auditing and control activities were carried out in a functional perspective, mainly based on the budget of the Function.

In the intentions of TOROC, finally, the functional configuration appeared very suitable for supporting the progressive growth of the staff, from 200 units at the end of 2001, to about 800 of the end of 2004, to more than 1500 units at the end of 2005.

In 2003, TOROC implemented a self-assessment of its organizational performance to evaluate its efficiency and to identify evolutionary paths. The results of the assessment were not encouraging: first of all, the Functions rapidly succeeded in developing skills and specialist know-hows and were able to interface effectively with the IOC, but then they started to focus on their particular problems, neglecting more general issues. In particular, this emphasis on the objectives of the Function was generating significant problems of coordination and conflict resolution.




Figure 2. The formal configuration of TOROC in 2004. Adapted from Barbini, Melloni, 2005.

The assessment showed the need for a catalyzation of commitments and special efforts toward common goals. The fragmentation of planning and control processes, carried out almost exclusively in terms of Functions, hindered the development of shared goals and prevented the full recognition of the global processes. The recognition of these problems forced TOROC to act, at the end of 2003, by developing a strategic roadmap and revising its formal configuration to allow higher levels of collaboration between different functions. The interventions on the organizational chart were, in essence, those typically implemented to make a functional configuration more focused on results and customers, in particular:

- Identification and formalization of critical cross-functional processes;
- Creation of transversal groups (clusters), called "coordination", consistent with operational areas, to coordinate subjects performing homologous activities in different functions;
- Establishment of committees to ensure points of contact and exchange of information for the top management of the Functions to allow the definition and development of shared strategic directions;
- Development of cross-functional projects aimed at specific interfunctional targets.

In addition to these interventions, the management of TOROC imposed the formalization of the channels of authority and responsibility and adopted techniques of internal marketing (by means of formal and informal communications) in order to generate consensus and unity of action within the Organizing Committee.

The roadmap

The assessment conducted in 2003 showed, in addition to coordination problems, the lack of any common vision able to direct the efforts of the subjects towards common and consistent goals. This may seem counterintuitive for an organization created with a very clear instrumental orientation (i.e. organizing and managing the Olympic Games); however, it is understandable if we consider the differences in terms of crafts, experience, training and specialization of the actors involved.




Figure 3. The roadmap.

Therefore, TOROC has implemented a roadmap, i.e. a master plan to coalesce internal efforts and consensus. The roadmap is not a single document, but a sum of plans with different levels of detail connected with each other (Figure 3).

Hitherto, each Function operated in accordance with guidelines developed by its own management team. In 2003, new guidelines (concepts) were developed for each Function to define qualitative indications (in terms of

mission of the Function, categories of clients, contractual obligations, activities, service levels, formal configuration, operative requirements, risks involved) about the way it was intended to operate during the Games time. In 2004, these concepts have been translated into Functional Operation Manuals, i.e. an aggregation of detailed and quantitative descriptions of the operations planned for the period of the Games. These manuals were expected to become the source of specific rules and procedures to guide the action of each operator during the Games. Then, individual training initiatives have been based on the activities specified by the manual.

In parallel to these interventions focused on the Functions, TOROC has initiated a process of definition and planning of the activities within each venue. Such planning process started with the definition of the venue concept, that is, a translation of Functional Concepts at the level of each venue. In 2004, pilot plans were drawn for two Operating Venues, thus allowing the development of a Generic Venue Operation Plan, i.e. a set of references common to all competitive venues (i.e. those designed to accommodate sporting events).

Finally, thirty-five Venue Operation Plans (one for each venue, competitive and non-competitive) were elaborated to define the operational activities of each venue. These plans identified the management processes of each venue, such as the cross-functional breakdown of the Functional Operational Manuals, and the interfaces between the various operational functions within the venue.

TOROC developed the roadmap as a shared platform for enabling the organizational evolution and as a forum for internal discussion.




Figure 2. The formal configuration of TOROC in 2006. Adapted from TOROC, 2006.

The Venuization Process

This hybrid functional configuration has been designed to operate for a short period of time: in fact, in mid-2005, TOROC started the process of venuization, which implemented a massive decentralization of people, authorities and responsibilities to the venues. Therefore, TOROC ceased to be monolithic and centralized and it was replaced by a TOROC with many headquarters, where authority and responsibility were separated and allocated to the venues.

Hence, the formal configuration underwent a very important change, from functional and centralized to output-based and decentralized.

Consequently, venues became the main basis of aggregation of people and resources.

The participants in the organization (now more than 1,500) were progressively assigned to their specific venue and, in addition to changing workplace, they changed their role, responsibilities and reporting lines (the functional reporting lines were partly replaced by venue-based reporting lines). At the corporate level, the Main Operations Centre (MOC) and the heads of Functional departments remained.

The MOC and the Functional Departments worked as the main interfaces toward the external environments, were in charge of the coordination between the venues and the global management of knowledge and competencies. On the other hand, venues received a complete operational responsibility, they were asked to set up their own processes for the efficient management of their events (competitive and non-competitive).

The relationship between the center and the venues implied that operational decisions were delegated almost entirely to the venue, with the Center only invoked in case of decisions involving more venues or concerning general problems. The activities of the venue were configured according to a sort of matrix where each operator was submitted to a dual reporting system: toward the venue managers for the operational activities and toward central

functional managers with respect to the activities related to procedures and know-hows.

It should be noted that the venuization process is not a peculiar strategy defined by TOROC, on the contrary, it has been suggested by the IOC that, also by means of success stories and best practices, in fact imposed it. The venues became a sort of quasi-enterprises acting according to their needs, within a framework managed by MOC and Functional departments. They were led by a "venue team", which was designed to bring together all the skills necessary for the operation of each venue and was responsible for the activities performed during the test events and the Games time. It was a permanent team composed by people allocated by the Functions according to the specific activities to be carried out. The venue team actually consisted of three entities, which can be represented as three concentric circles gradually expanding over time, as the Games Time approached:

- Lead team, i.e. the managers of the venue, the designer of the temporary works (overlay) and the sport managers;
- Core team, which gathered the heads of key functions to be carried out by the venue (transport, logistics and services to viewers, technology, human resource management, security, etc.); the core team also included a contact person from TOBO in charge of the coordination between its central unit and the venue management;
- External team, which included all the people responsible for the operations of the venue (medical services, tickets, protocol, ceremonies and events, public relations, communications, catering services...).

Each venue manager had a specific budget to cover the special needs arising during the Games time. Figure 5 describes the formal configuration of a competitive venue during the Games.




Figure 5. The formal configuration of a competitive venue. Adapted from TOROC, 2006.

The Games time

The venue-based configuration has been designed to operate in decentralized ways during the Games time. Therefore, every venue had attributions and authorities to handle its workload (including competitions and all side events). At the central level, MOC had to collect relevant data about the conduct of every event, to monitor the key indicators of organizational performance, and to manage all the critical issues which could not be faced by the single venue.

The MOC was also involved in meetings with the highest representatives of the IOC who were in charge of overseeing the correct management of the event. Alongside the work of the MOC, a Command Center had to deal with functional issues related to specialist areas (e.g. transportation problems) and worked in coordination with the functional task force of the IOC.

Therefore, the most part of Games has been managed directly by the venues. The coordination and resolution of general problems was left to central authorities (MOC and Functional Directions) operating in conjunction with the Public Authorities (Prefecture, etc..) and with the IOC (Figure 6).




Figure 6. The global configuration during the Games. Adapted from Barbini, Melloni, 2005 and TOROC, 2006.

The management of human resources

Usually, people do not participate in the organization of the Olympic Games more than once in a lifetime. While there are few Olympic professionals, the majority of the staff composing the OCOGs is people without any kind of expertise on the Olympic domain. The IOC offers to OCOG members many training programs aimed at generating and disseminating Olympic knowledge. In addition, Organizing Committees usually pay great attention to internal training (Van der Wagen, 2007).

The HRM process starts with the selection of the staff.

TOROC has adopted ad-hoc strategies for selecting its staff; in particular, TOROC decided to look for people with expertise on the functional activities to be carried out, without caring about Olympic knowledge. Hence, TOROC tried to attract people with relevant and certified specialist knowledge and, at the same time, it developed specific training initiatives for the development of the Olympic knowledge.

Two training streams were identified: specialist training and Olympic training. Specialist training took place immediately after the recruitment and was very focused on the assigned job. The process of Olympic training, which was oriented to the development of in-depth expertise concerning the organization of the Olympic Games, has been more complex; it required many efforts and ad hoc training. In particular, TOROC has outlined three training strategies. The first strategy concerned the development of basic skills, i.e. the understanding of basic problems and possible solutions associated with the organization of the events. This training allowed people to access the on-line knowledge base made available by IOC (including the theoretical frameworks and case studies). In addition, TOROC offered training on the job programs performed by Olympic experts, and monographic training activities carried out by consultants of the IOC. Finally, TOROC managers had the opportunity to participate in meetings and discussions with the organizers of the previous Games, in particular with the members of the 2002 Salt Lake City's OCOG.

The second strategy has been aimed to the development of the Olympic know-how, which concerns specific activities to be undertaken during the Olympics. This training has been delivered through two programs provided by IOC: the Observer Program, which allowed 150 people from TOROC to “witness” the Salt Lake City Games, participating in meetings of the Local Organizing Committee, and the Secondment Program, which has allowed some "second level" managers (i.e. managers in charge of the coordination of operational activities) to participate in the Athens Games with supporting roles to the local Organizing Committee.

The third strategy relied on learning by doing. As noted above, the fact that TOROC was established to organize a single event (one-shot) prevented any possibility of improvement in operational performances over time. This problem has been overcome by means of simulations which allowed both the assessment of the overall operational capabilities and the development of expertise. TOROC pursued this strategy along three lines of action. First of all, the first and simplest form of simulation was implemented to identify possible problems which required appropriate reaction activities. This simulation has been performed in a “protected environment”, without time pressure, and was aimed at stimulating the learning of operational procedures. A second line of intervention was based on simulations in which subjects were put in front of realistic situations, with a multiplicity of problems to solve and strong time pressure. The goal of these simulations was to assess the effectiveness of procedures and people’s effectiveness in reacting to situations of high stress. Finally, TOROC promoted some rehearsals in which the whole Organizing Committee simulated real-time operational situations.

Besides the training sessions described above, the IOC recommends the organization of some Test Events to evaluate the overall effectiveness of the OCOG. Since mid-2004, TOROC had been organizing a series of international sporting events, with the aim of testing the functionality of venues and their operational procedures, the playing fields and every other aspect connected with the sports competition, the technical systems (timing, scoring systems,

ranking systems etc.), and the organization of human resources (staff, volunteers, contractors). In case of Test Event of great complexity (in terms of time concentration of events, number of services to be provided and activities to be performed), the operating environment was in fact very similar to that of the Games time, thus allowing also to assess the support institutions (MOC, Accreditation Center, Transport, Logistics, etc..).

The development of skills is essential to make the organization of the Games possible, but it is not sufficient. The motivation of people is also fundamental. It is not easy to achieve an adequate involvement by a person who is aware that her employment will expire immediately after the Games; in addition, no career opportunities or salary upgrades are possible. The "Olympic spirit" can boost enthusiasm and involvement, but OCOGs can not rely solely on it. TOROC worked to enhance the image and importance of the Games. It also adopted compensation systems which delayed the payment of the largest part of wages toward the Games time. Finally, TOROC negotiated agreements with several private companies for facilitating the reallocation of workers after the Games.

In general, TOROC tended to emphasize that the participation in the organization of the Olympic Games could be considered a way for increasing the reputation of high-level managers, while it could be as a sort of "gym" for lower levels.

The management of volunteers presented completely different challenges. Olympic Games would not be possible without the cooperation of thousands of people who, inspired by the "Olympic spirit", voluntarily and freely lend their work to the Organizing Committee. They are an essential workforce that, in the forefront or behind the scenes, carry out simple but fundamental tasks: from the transport of spectators, to the preparation of race tracks, to assistance to guests, press, sponsors and athletes. TOROC assigned more than 350 tasks to volunteers; these tasks are tightly regulated by detailed procedures. The training of volunteers, therefore, was primarily focused on such procedures (Kemp, 2002).

TOROC planned the need, in Games Time, for about 20,000 volunteers. These had to be drawn, selected, motivated, trained and then coordinated. To contact and attract volunteers, TOROC launched a dedicated website (www.noi2006.it) which, mainly by leveraging the Olympic spirit, ideals and values, could stimulate the people's availability and desire for active membership. Furthermore, TOROC has activated agreements with volunteer organizations able to convey a large number of "professional volunteers".

Volunteers were selected by means of direct interviews and submitted to a specific training process. At the beginning of 2005, TOROC began to organize short meetings to check the availability and motivation of the volunteers who joined through the website. During the Games, the Organizing Committee provided volunteers with accident and liability insurances, free transportations from parking areas to the venues, and meals. They also received the official uniform and the "Noi2006" Olympic certificate attesting their involvement in the Games.

Discussion

The events concerning the organization of the Olympic Games can be explained from different theoretical perspectives. We are not looking for the best interpretation, or the interpretation best suited to explain this case. Instead, we will only propose a comparison of different theories for the analysis of organizational choices in case of unique events.

Initially, we will focus on the theories typically adopted to explain the organization of the Olympic Games (Project Management, Contingency Theory, Neo-institutionalism), then we will propose interpretations based on the perspective of Organizational Action (Maggi, Thompson, Simon, Emerson).

The Theory of Project Management allows an initial and necessary series of reflections on the organization of the Games: "[...] within the Olympic Movement, the OCOG is the project-based organizational unit that is formed with the specific task of coordinating activities related to the organization of the Olympic Games "(Ferrara, 2001: 409, our translation). In particular, Ferrara

(2001) explains the organization of the Olympic Games as a temporary organization (Lundin, 1995) consisting of a network of independent actors, and managed according to the rules of project management.

According to this theoretical perspective (Bartezzaghi et al., 1999), the organization of the Games is a project characterized by fixed duration and deadlines, clear objectives, and predefined resources. The whole project is governed by peculiar governance systems aimed at managing the preparation of the event and anticipating contingencies and constraints.

The duration of the project is evident: the organization is established with the foundation of the Organizing Committee and is expiring in the immediate aftermath of the Games' end. The whole life of the project is marked by precise temporal constraints and deadlines.

The objective of TOROC is clear: to ensure that the Games take place as smoothly as possible, ensuring that the clients' requirements defined by the Host City Contract are met. These requirements are set out in detail and their satisfaction can be measured by precise quantitative analysis (e.g. by linking the average waiting time in queue of spectators with the target values provided). If all the parameters associated with service levels defined for each client group is respected, the Games will be considered well organized.

Obviously, this monitoring and evaluation strategy requires a significant preliminary planning process aimed at identifying client groups, their expectations and the levels of service to be provided. TOROC has in fact proactively identified the major stakeholders of the Games, profiling them into four categories: clients, partners, territory, generic stakeholders.

"Clients" are athletes and representatives of the Olympic Family, media, broadcast operators, sponsors and spectators. Among the "Partners" there are the sponsors, including suppliers of goods or services, service providers, the Agenzia Torino 2006, operators of public services, local government, the prefecture, etc. The "Territory" is composed of volunteers, general public, future (post-Games) users of the Olympic structures, economic actors. Finally, the category of "Stakeholders" includes the Government, the Municipality of

Torino, the Province and the Region, the Board of Directors of TOROC, CONI and IOC.

The focus of TOROC is oriented toward the most important subjects belonging to each profile; peculiar value-added services have been developed and supplied to each of them. Other stakeholders are taken into account only residually by TOROC, mainly in order to avoid situations of tension and, where possible, to provide them with tangible benefits.

In the framework of these strategic guidelines, TOROC develops its planning and control system, which is aimed at translating strategic objectives into intermediate milestones to monitor and evaluate the actual behavior of workers. The ability to anticipate contingencies and constraints then becomes essential to the success of the Olympic Organizing Committee.

The theory of Project Management proposes different techniques for establishing an effective planning and control system.

First of all, it proposes to adopt a feedforward control system, i.e. to proactively seek for possible future problems before they can attack the essential variables of the system (Heylighen, Joslyn, 2001). This control strategy requires high capabilities in collecting information on environmental states, in developing forecasts about the possible evolution of the objectives of the project, and to act to defend the organizational system. The anticipation of the constraints should be based on the use, re-use and diffusion of knowledge among the subjects, on the extensive use of teamwork, and on the continuous experimentation, even through simulations. TOROC has implemented such control systems by widely adopting the Olympic knowledge management system provided by the IOC. In this way, TOROC profited from the experiences of its predecessors, to anticipate and avoid common, traditional problems.

Beside feedforward, the theory of project management suggests the definition of a complete hierarchy of milestones as a fundamental method of control. Milestones, with different relevance and priority, allow the continuous assessment of the performances and, in case of deviation from the expected

path, the possibility for an efficient reaction. Ultimately, they serve to correct errors and inaccuracies.

TOROC continuously monitored its performance with reference to formal indicators provided by the IOC (also comparing the results with those of previous editions of the Games) and, above all, by testing its operations with simulation and test events.

Finally, Project Management Theory suggests the adoption of policies of delegation of authority and control-by-alarm. The decentralization of authority to local units would allow decision-making process to be performed closer to place where problems arise; moreover, the "center" should be no longer overloaded by local problems and would focus on broader issues for which it is invoked by the periphery (through so-called "alarms"). TOROC has adopted a broad process of delegation (the venueization) thus making the venues largely autonomous, leaving the center (MOC) in charge of the overall control.

The tool commonly deemed essential to effectively govern a project is the "project plan", a document containing clear and detailed descriptions of the management policies. It can be divided into the following sections:

- The work breakdown structure, i.e. the breakup of the project into tasks and subtasks. This scheme is essential for planning, especially in order to plan schedules and resources requirements. In Torino, the roadmap played that role, identifying and planning the tasks and resources allocated to both venues and Functions.
- The organization, i.e. the formal division of responsibilities on the activities to be carried out. TOROC showed great attention to its formal configuration and updated it continuously.
- The control systems, i.e. the tools and techniques that should guide the activities of assessment, control and management. TOROC adopted the service levels defined by the Host City Contract together with indicators provided by the IOC through its Olympic knowledge base.

A problem peculiar to the organization of the Games is related to the asymmetry of power in favor of the IOC over the OCOG. Some authors found similarities between this situation and the neo-Taylorist separation between conception and direction of the organization of the Games (under the responsibility of the IOC) and the execution of the activities (carried out mainly by volunteers, under the control of the OCOG): "Aspects of Taylorism can be observed in the ways in which the Olympic Games have been managed. The use of monopoly over Olympic knowledge in particular, give evidence to the fact that the event organization process is provided top down to OCOGs from the IOC and the conception of games management is done by managers whilst delivery takes place predominantly by volunteers"(Theodoraki, 2007). The condition of monopoly, which seems to characterize the IOC, has also provided inspiration to several attempts to explain the OCOG-CIO relationship in the light of the franchising theory (Theodoraki, 2007).

The problems of organizational design experienced by TOROC can be also interpreted by means of the Contingency Theory: the classic contribution from P.R. Lawrence and J.W. Lorsch (1967) could be very useful to this purpose. According to this perspective, the organizational structure is not immutable, yet it is a complex set of variables which allow a wide range of choices based on the characteristics of the organizational environment. The organization is not intended as a monolithic system, it is multifaceted and multiform, and composed of several units acting together but exposed to different environmental sectors. Each sub-unit is in contact with a particular environment and is structured in accordance with such an environment.

According to Lawrence and Lorsch, the level of "differentiation" between the units composing the organization (i.e. "the difference in cognitive and emotional orientation among managers in different functional departments") should reflect the environmental diversity. High differentiation can cause high centrifugal forces, potentially threatening the performance and, ultimately, the life of the organization. The designer of the organization must pursue also the

integration (i.e. a “state of collaboration that exists among departments that are required to achieve unity of effort by the demands of the environment”) of the behavior among the different units .

Lawrence and Lorsch state that the efficient (and then successful) enterprise is the one that is able to differentiate its units according to the needs of the environment and, at the same time, to find the appropriate integration methods.

The organizational evolution of TOROC can be interpreted from this point of view: it explains the continuous changes in the organizational configuration as an adaptation to changing environmental conditions and the tension in the relationship between differentiation and integration of organizational units. TOROC is initially configured by functions; the differentiation between the units is then very high. The environment is very heterogeneous and dynamic, TOROC has tight relationships with a large number of different subjects, and therefore the differentiation of its units is consistent with such situation.

The integration is initially left in the shade, under the assumption that the hierarchical reporting lines can ensure unity of action and conflict resolution. The adoption of a hybrid functional configuration was aimed at introducing new techniques of integration between the units, to achieve greater cohesion and synergy.

Finally, the venueization can be interpreted as an answer to the rising complexity of the environment during the Games time. This environmental complexity should be matched by internal differentiation; the growing differentiation would make integration almost impossible to achieve. Hence, TOROC decides to make venues almost independent, thus allowing them to operate like quasi-enterprises; a central point of integration and coordination (the MOC) is then established.

The architectural choices implemented by TOROC can also be interpreted according to a perspective which focuses on the organizational

design process. To this end, we can adopt the theory of H. Mintzberg (1979): in fact, Mintzberg states that the organizational design is a deliberate and rational process which, starting from the objectives of the organization, produces an effective formal configuration. The organization of the Olympic Games is then explained as the consequence of a rational system of decisions aimed at planning in advance tasks, activities and responsibilities. The organizational design process is marked by precise steps. It starts with the identification of the organizational objectives (i.e. the recognition of the organization's function with reference to the environmental system in which it is placed); then, the designer determines all the atomic activities to be carried out to efficiently achieve the objectives. After that, she aggregates the activities into jobs, depending on the degree of specialization required. Next, the designer determines the needs for formalization of each job, and the consequent requirements in terms of training and indoctrination. Finally, she designs the "macrostructure", determining which and how many jobs should be combined into first-level units, then grouping these units into second-level units until she achieves a complete hierarchy, which is expressed by the organization chart.

This theory postulates the fundamental role of the designer, who must be able to identify organizational goals and technologies and to rationally predetermine activities, processes and jobs. By reason of the complexity of the design process, the designer might be tempted to solicit external professionals (usually consultancy firms) in order to acquire expertise, know-how and best practices.

This perspective is very useful to explain the process of design of the formal configuration of TOROC:

- The "designer" of the TOROC has identified the objective (consisting in the organization of successful Games) and has defined the activities to be performed and the "crafts" she deemed necessary;
- The designer has collected activities and crafts into jobs, clarifying also the requirements in terms of experience and competences.
- She has implemented training plans tailored to the individual jobs.

- She has grouped the jobs into homogeneous units and assigned authorities and responsibilities, thus finalizing the organization chart.

This design process has been deemed too complex for being managed by people without any experience in the organization of the Olympic Games, hence the IOC tried to control it by means of the Olympic knowledge management system and by proposing best practices and procedures. The Olympic knowledge management system is therefore not only a tool for training and learning, but also (and above all) an essential tool to support and address the activities related to organizational design.

The organizational choices implemented by TOROC appear fully consistent with the action plan proposed by the IOC: TOROC is initially configured by Functions, in order to benefit from high specialization and, as the Games approaches, it starts a relevant process of decentralization of decision-making attributions.

From this theoretical perspective, TOROC seems to have designed consistently its organizational configuration in order to efficiently achieve its final goal: the organization of successful Olympic Games.

Neo-institutional Theory (DiMaggio, Powell, 1983) is often used (e.g. Ferrara, 2001; Theodoraki, 2007) to explain the homogeneity and the persistence of a number of organizational choices between the various editions of the Games. This theoretical perspective, in fact, explains the homogeneity of organizational solutions by asserting that enterprises behave and compete to acquire institutional legitimacy, rather than mere economic and technical efficiency. According to DiMaggio and Powell, "organizations compete not just for resources and customers, but for political power and institutional legitimacy, for social as well economic fitness" (DiMaggio, Powell, 1983: 150). After the spontaneous emergence of a legitimate organizational field, enterprises acting within such field are exposed to a set of uncontrollable forces which drive them to become more and more homogeneous: "by organizational field, we mean those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a

recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products" (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 148).

The process forcing enterprises operating in the organizational field to become similar to each other is called institutional isomorphism. DiMaggio and Powell identifies three types of institutional isomorphism: coercive, mimetic and normative. The coercive isomorphism "results from both formal and informal pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent and by cultural expectations in the society within which organizations function" (DiMaggio, Powell 1983: 150). The mimetic isomorphism influences the organizations which have a poor understanding of relevant technologies and cannot identify detailed goals for inspiring their behavior. These organizations try to govern the high uncertainty to which they are exposed by replicating configurations and strategies adopted by the most successful organizations operating in the organizational field. Finally, normative isomorphism stems from professionalization, i.e. the "collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods of their work, to control "the production of producers", and to establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their occupational autonomy "(DiMaggio, Powell, 1983: 152).

In the case of the Olympics, the purpose of the organizers cannot be strictly related to economic efficiency, instead they seem to pursue global visibility and social legitimacy (both nationally and internationally). As part of the Olympic organizational field, the organizational choices of OCOG can be interpreted as resulting from isomorphic pressures. In particular, the Olympic organizational field can be shaped around the subjects belonging to, and cooperating with, the Olympic Movement. Initially, the relationships upon which the organizational field has emerged have been structured and legitimized through the efforts of Coubertin and then through political processes; in recent decades, the Olympic organizational field has extended to

private companies (the “partners” of the Games) and to various subjects involved in the organization of the Olympics.

In this context, the behavior of the IOC is critical, in fact it seems to be actively trying to make the different editions of the Games as similar and homogeneous as possible. The most important subjects acting on the organizational field, namely Sport Federations, Sponsors, and the media, take advantage of such homogeneity and stimulate it. These subjects actually generate isomorphic pressures on OCOGs.

At the analytical level, in the case of Torino 2006, the three types of isomorphism identified by DiMaggio and Powell appear to have been acting on TOROC. First, the choices of TOROC are derived from "impositions" by other organizations on which it depends. The IOC directly or indirectly imposes organizational configurations, strategies, and management techniques. The Olympic knowledge management system, ultimately, is a method for forcing TOROC to implement specific (and standardized) organizational solutions. Even the Olympic traditions and ceremonies that have been institutionalized over time eventually become sources of coercive isomorphism. In the same way, other subjects such as sport teams, TV networks, governments and regulatory bodies are pushing for the homogenization of the competitions, calendars and schedules of events.

With regard to mimetic isomorphism, it should be noted how the organization of the Olympics is exposed to environmental contingencies and high uncertainty with reference to technologies and objectives; to face such challenges OCOGs typically refer to the choices adopted by their predecessors. This imitation strategy is also induced by IOC, which provides OCOGs with the Olympic knowledge management system, with best practices and with training initiatives.

Finally, with reference to normative isomorphism, it is possible to highlight the fact that those involved in organizing the Olympic Games often have similar curricula and professional experiences. They are not already skilled with reference to Games organization, but usually they are managers

who have worked in public or private companies and have important managerial competences and reputation. In addition, the training programs proposed by IOC stimulate the indoctrination of values and behaviors consistent with the "Olympic spirit".

The neo-institutionalist theory explains in detail many of the organizational and strategic choices made by TOROC. However, certain critical issues still emerge. In particular, it is difficult to explain the reasons for the relevant differences in operational decisions implemented by the Organizing Committees of the various editions of the Games; often, in fact, under a common and traditional denomination, we can witness very different policies and strategies.

Obviously, the reason for this heterogeneity can be attributed to the difference in the organizational field in which every OCOG operates. This explanation, however, would undermine the foundation of the neo-institutionalist analysis, i.e. the homogeneity in organizational choices.

To remain within the path of the neo-institutionalist perspective, we can refer to the dual nature of the organizational field in which the Organizing Committees operates: a persistent organizational field (based on IOC, Sports Federations, Sponsors, etc.) that is complemented by an organizational field which is peculiar to each edition (thus implying a concept of institutional legitimacy differently qualified each time).

Hence, the Organizing Committees would behave to achieve legitimacy with respect to both the persistent organizational field (hence the homogeneity of the editions), and the peculiar organization field (thus fostering heterogeneity with respect to previous editions): the actual behavior of OCOGs stems from the "reconciliation" of these two sources of legitimacy; this would also explain the non-perfect homogeneity of the solutions implemented over the time. Finally, it is important to underline that Organizing Committees are neither able to choose the organizational field in which they have to operate (the organizational field emerges from a spontaneous process of

institutionalization) nor to decide about the conditions of legitimacy (which depend on social values and conditions not governable by OCOGs).

In the next paragraphs, the main facts related to the organization of the Olympic Games will be interpreted in the light of the Theory of Organizational Action (TAO), proposed by Bruno Maggi (1984/1990; 2003) as part of an "innovative tradition" he has drawn from the classics contributions by Max Weber, Chester Barnard, Herbert Simon and James Thompson. TAO defines the organization as a process of actions and decisions; it is not a reified system, objective or objectified, but a social action, a continuous process of adjustment of the action to achieve a desired objective in conditions of bounded and intentional rationality.

According to the theory of J.D. Thompson (1967), the organizational action defines its "domain", i.e. the range of products (and, therefore, the main technologies it is willing to control), the target population and the additional services it is going to supply. The decision about what and how to do something implies the identification of the relevant technologies (as well as the identification of the technologies the organization is willing to control and the technologies it is going to "buy" outside its boundaries). Given the bounded rationality of human decision-making processes, organizational action is never able to preside over the entire matrix of technologies related to its domain. Therefore, definition of the domain necessarily involves the development of dependencies from other subjects (i.e. the subjects who preside over the technologies which are relevant for the organization but not managed by it). Then, Thompson introduces the concept of task environment as the set of entities with which the organizational action finds itself in conditions of interdependence (e.g. customers, suppliers, competitors for markets and resources, regulatory groups). The choice of domain is therefore an intentional act, and the task environment stems from that decision.

This conception of the environment as determined by organizational choices marks the difference between the Thompson's Theory and the theories

mentioned above, which considers the environment as an exogenous and pre-existing factor imposing the organizational adaptation (Maggi, 2003).

In any case, the task environment still have a fundamental importance because, on the one hand, it has to express a consensus (even implicitly) about the domain claimed by the organization and, on the other hand, because it is in conditions of interdependence with such organization.

The consensus on the domain is essential for the actual development of the organizational action. It expresses a set of expectations about what the organization will or will not do and is reflected in the agreement expressed by the subjects to enter into relationships with the organization. However, when an element of the task environment expresses the consensus on the domain claimed by the focal organization, this implies a change in its own domain (in analytical terms, the element of the task environment changes its domain to embrace the actions requested by the focal organization); so the element of the task environment, right through its consensus, develops dependence on the focal organization. A situation of mutual dependence (interdependence) is then established, with the organization and the elements of the task environment trying to use their power to impose constraints and contingencies to each other and simultaneously trying to reduce their exposure to the contingencies posed by the other.

This situation depicts a complex relationship in which the subjects continuously try to increase their power and reduce their dependence. In this theoretical perspective (Emerson, 1962) power is conceived in relational terms, not as an attribute: each subject, at any time, exercises power and undergoes dependence on the other. The management of interdependencies therefore requires special attention.

TOROC has stated its domain as soon as it was established. This choice is not definitive, but exposed to constant change during organizational action. Initially, TOROC decides what will be its reference population and what products and services to supply. In fact, the first decision on the domain takes place at the time of submission of the application of the candidature of Torino

2006: the dossier submitted to IOC contains the fundamental elements of the domain of the possible organization of the Games. First, the application defines in analytical terms the places and the calendar of the competitions, the organizational choices and their schedule, the investment that will be carried out, the estimated levels of service. This affirmation of domain obviously needs the consensus of the IOC, but this is not sufficient for the domain to become operative: it is also necessary the consensus of other elements of the task environment, in particular of local collectivities, national institutions, athletes and Olympic professionals. Since then, the domain is continuously fine-tuned by TOROC by detailing and amending both the objectives and the organization of means to achieve them.

With respect to organizational goals, it is important to understand that both the members of the Organizing Committee and the elements that compose the task environment have their own expectations regarding the objectives of the organization. In other words, every subject (internal and external to the organizational action) has interests and goals for the organization. The athletes want sport infrastructures which can facilitate the achievement of superior performances, local and national institutions pursue visibility, residents of host city ask for low impact on the environment and for the maximization of the value of the Olympic legacy. The Nation Olympic Committee of the county hosting the Games tries to gain prestige within the international Olympic Movement, while the IOC is concerned in preserving the uniqueness of the Olympic Games and in enhancing their appeal and their economic turnover.

However, at any time, only a small number of subjects will be able to actually address the organizational choices in directions consistent with their objectives: since power lays on social relationships, it evolves and changes over time, constantly changing the ability of the various subjects to influence the organization's goals.

TOROC is therefore at the center of a dense network of interdependencies with the task environment; a network governed by complex political processes. The objectives inspiring the organizational action are not

defined as a consequence of a simple mediation between the many different objectives coalescing around the organization. On the contrary, TOROC develops processes of decisions and actions which are intended to create proactive goals. By overcoming the deterministic interpretation of power as an attribute of a subject, this theoretical perspective views the goals as the result of power/dependence relations between TOROC and the subjects of the task environment.

It is also interesting to notice that the dynamics of power to which TOROC is exposed change over time: at the time of the application of the candidature, the Organizing Committee is in strongly dependent on the IOC, which has the power to choose the host of the Games, on the local institutions, which must support the candidature, and on the local communities which must agree to bear the burdens of the Games.

Once the Host City Contract is signed, there is a balance of power: after choosing the host city, the IOC loses the possibility to find alternative locations and, therefore, is bounded in strong relationships with TOROC. The IOC then increases its dependence on TOROC, since the Olympic venue becomes non-fungible and the OCOG becomes essential to allow the efficient achievement of the Olympics. The IOC still has, however, very strong power premises since it is able to influence the behavior of the Organizing Committee. With respect to the power-dependence relationships, it is important to recall the problems faced by the IOC and the Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games of Athens 2004: in that case, delays and inefficiencies in the organization of the event and in the development of infrastructures put the IOC and the Organizing Committee into serious difficulties, the former claimed extraordinary interventions and eventually imposed the removal of the President of the latter, threatening the withdrawal of the Games.

The relative dependence on the IOC does not exhaust the power-dependence relations of TOROC: strong interdependencies are present also in relation to other subjects of the task environment. First, TOROC has no spending power, because the Government put the Agenzia Torino 2006 in

charge of the budget of the investments; so TOROC has to negotiate and schedule infrastructure investments with that agency. In addition, any infrastructure intervention, as well as the choices related to the Olympic calendar and ceremonies, must be "negotiated" with local institutions and the public opinion.

On the other hand, TOROC has the ability to utilize the Olympic name and logo and thus it acquires great prestige, which can be used to influence the behavior of other subjects and, ultimately, to increase criticality and decrease fungibility within power-dependence relationships (Emerson, 1962; Thompson; 1967).

The decisions concerning the domain also involve choices about the boundaries in which TOROC can exercise its control (Masino, Maggi, 2001, Maggi, 2003; Masino, 2005).

The domain and the choices related to the management of the boundaries are phenomena peculiar and distinctive of any organizational action. In the case of the Torino Games, it is evident that the choices made by TOROC are quite different from those implemented by the Organizing Committees of previous editions.

As already noted, the IOC acts in order to standardize and homogenize as much as possible the organizational choices adopted by Organizing Committee of each Olympics; in addition, the Olympic Knowledge Transfer Programme can be interpreted as an attempt by IOC to impose common solutions and techniques (best practices and know-how are decision premises the IOC "conveys" to TOROC). Nevertheless, the OCOG of every edition revises and interprets differently these rules. In Torino, TOROC has decided to undertake a very particular strategy, implementing tight relationships with external partners without giving up control on strategic decisions and interventions; TOROC also assigned relevant control and coordination attributions to its central Functional directions.

Through the choices related to the definition and redefinition of its domain, TOROC defines and arranges the behavior of its main components,

which become interdependent. Thompson identifies three typical forms of interdependence: pooled, sequential, and reciprocal, which are connected to three typical forms of coordination: by standardization, by plan, and by mutual adjustment.

The three forms of coordination are characterized by different complexity and, ultimately, by the cost involved.

According to Thompson, the interdependent components of the organization are structured (grouped) within units to lower the total cost of coordination.

The units, and thus the organizational hierarchy, are then the result of an aggregation process aimed at coordinating the cooperative behaviors of the subjects. To this end, priority is given to the grouping of mutually interdependent positions in units of first level. If it is not possible to group all mutually interdependent positions within the same unit, it is possible to create sub-units which can then be coordinated within a super-unit. Once grouped the positions characterized by mutual interdependence, it becomes relevant to facilitate the coordination of sequential interdependent behavior, with the grouping of sequentially interdependent units within higher-level units.

Finally, once solved the problems related to the coordination of mutual and sequential interdependent behavior, the organization tries grouping together the homogeneous units to facilitate coordination through standardization.

In Thompson's perspective, the result of this structuration process is never permanent since the organizational action constantly changes its domain and the technologies it presides, thus imposing a continuous structuration process.

It is also important to underline how the process of structuring allows a wide variety of choices: actually, the subjects involved in the organization operate within complex and multidimensional networks of interdependencies, hence the identification of the grouping priorities is the result of intentional decision-making processes.

At first, TOROC pursues the coordination of behaviors which are mutually and sequentially interdependent within groups operating with the same technology (the "occupation"); this is achieved by means of Functions. The coordination of the interdependent behavior of subjects operating within different technologies is not deemed important at this time and therefore cross-functions coordination is implemented at a higher level: the Top Management is in charge of this kind of coordination. These choices should stimulate the learning of Olympic knowledge, thanks to the tight interactions between subjects dealing with the same problems and technologies. TOROC can also implement a large body of specialized rules that will, in future, provide guidelines for operational activities.

When the relationships within the Functions become consolidated and specialized knowledge is developed, for TOROC it becomes critical to enable subject from different technologies to cooperate. TOROC then establishes cross-functional groups, mainly in the form of committees and task forces, in order to coordinate the cooperative behavior of the different groups of occupations.

As the Games time approaches, it becomes essential to facilitate the coordinated behavior of the subjects working in the same venue. TOROC acts by replacing the previous units based of functional groups and by focusing on interdependences among people acting within the same venue. Venuization can then be interpreted as a strategy to promote the coordination of interdependent behavior of subjects acting within a venue during the Games Time.

The organization of the Olympic Games could also be interpreted as a synthetic organization (Thompson, 1967). However, this interpretation cannot be considered correct since the synthetic organization is an organization which arises (usually as a consequence of unpredictable catastrophic events) without the benefit of preliminary rules and with a very strong teleological orientation (the subjects are committed in pursuing common, immediate and tangible goals). The most important feature of the synthetic organization lies on the fact that, at the same time, it has to operate and to regulate its behavior, without

being able to take advantage of preliminary rules, thus preventing organizational action from being efficient.

With reference to the regulation process, Maggi (2003) distinguishes between preliminary regulation and contextual regulation. According to the TAO, both preliminary and contextual rules contribute to the regulation of the behavior. In the different processes of action, however, these two forms of regulation acquire different size and importance.

From an analytical point of view, most organizational actions in the seven years preceding the Olympics are aimed at defining preliminary rules to facilitate the coordination of decisions and actions during the Games Time. It is a seven-year period in which TOROC undergoes a massive process of preliminary regulation of the behavior that will take place in Games Time. This stems from a typical constraint associated with the Olympics: the uniqueness and non-repeatability of the event. This situation precludes any heuristic learning and any possibility of performance improvement over time (as the case, for example, of a business start-up which, by its nature, is oriented to stay and evolve over time). Therefore, the Organizing Committee acts to pre-arrange its behavior in the Olympic period. All the various organizational choices made in the preparatory period have the (direct or indirect) objective to arrange as precisely as possible the collective behavior during the Olympics. However, the bounded rationality characterizing the decision-making processes inhibits the absolute predetermination of the actions to be carried out during the Games. The Organizing Committee is therefore forced to develop preliminary rules (i.e. rules that pre-ordering a general and indicative) and (being the predetermination impossible) to delegate responsibility and decision-making attributions. The venuization strategies try to meet this kind of needs.

Unlike synthetic organization, then, the organization of the Olympic Games can be interpreted as a seven-year process aimed at establishing rules to give a preliminary order to the action which will take place in Games Time. As shown by Maggi, however, even such a massive regulation process can not be able to exclude the need for contextual regulation.

Moreover, according to the theoretical perspective proposed by Simon (1947), to effectively control the behavior of subjects during the Games Time, the Organizing Committee must be able to influence the premises upon which they base their decision-making processes. Thompson's detailed analysis of the control process contends that these premises consist primarily in preferences about the expected results (i.e. the objectives) and assumptions about the cause-effect relationships to be mobilized in order to achieve the expected result (i.e. technology). In order to actually influence the behavior of the subjects on the field, then, the Organizing Committee should be able to "transmit" to each of them both unambiguous objectives and relevant technologies to achieve them. The definition of unambiguous objectives is difficult because, given the complex power-dependence relationships which characterize the organization of the Games, these objectives are numerous and sometimes inconsistent (for instance, in case of weather conditions that make the ski slopes not perfectly viable, the venue manager is exposed at least to two conflicting goals: to delay the event to ensure that competition takes place in perfect conditions, or to go on with the races, in order to preserve the Olympic calendar and then the TV coverage and the needs of the sponsors). With respect to the definition of the technology to be deployed, it is very difficult for the Organizing Committee to identify the one-best-way to achieve the objectives, since contingencies may significantly alter the conditions in which the behavior is to be performed. The uncertainties characterizing both the goals and technologies of the OCOG allow to explain the high degree of discretion left and imposed to subjects during the Games time. Such an extensive discretion assigned to venues could be interpreted as a form of autonomy. In fact, during the Games time, the venue is required to make important decisions without preliminary permissions or instructions from the headquarter, which is alerted just in case of very critical events. From this point of view, the venuization process transforms TOROC into a network of "quasi-autonomous" venues, coordinated and supported by a light headquarter.

Maggi (1984/1990; 2003) proposes an interesting point of view clarifying meanings and logical relations existing between the concepts of autonomy and discretion. According to Maggi, autonomy means independence, self-regulation, self-governing and it is opposed to the concept of heteronomy, i.e. the regulation process coming from other subjects. Maggi then distinguishes, from an analytical point of view, the regulation process from the actual decision and action process. Autonomy and heteronomy are related to the regulation process, while the discretion is related to the possibility for a subject to choose, basing on preliminary rules, among a set of alternatives. Hence, the rule assumed by a subject as a premise for her decision-making process can be autonomous (i.e. created by the subject herself) or heteronomous (i.e. imposed by other subjects). A rule, autonomously or heteronomously defined, may allow the subject to choose between different paths of actions (thus assigning discretion to the subject), or may impose the adoption of a predetermined path of action.

From this point of views, is it possible to state that venues are truly autonomous during the Games time? The answer is definitely negative: the headquarter, before delegating responsibilities to the venues, defines (through the roadmap and the various operational plans) detailed rules and specific procedures in order to tightly regulate the operations of each venue during the Games time. Therefore, each venue receives a large corpus of heteronomous rules, to which it must necessarily conform. These rules usually assign high discretion to the venues in order to facilitate the efficient management of contingencies. Hence, venues, far from being autonomous, are largely governed by external rules that allow and force them to exercise their discretion.

In fact, it is possible to view the organizational action carried out by TOROC in the seven years before the Olympics as a massive effort to exclude, limit, and prevent venues from exercising autonomy. This interpretation is also consistent with respect to the peculiarities of the organization of the Games: since it is a one-shot event, not repeatable, with predetermined deadlines and schedule, the Organizing Committee requires an absolute respect of rules and

procedures. If every venue was really independent, it would create a situation of quasi-anarchy, which would endanger timing and unity of purpose, and, ultimately, the Olympics itself.

Hence, the exercise of autonomy during the Games Time can be regarded as one of the most critical contingencies to which the organization of the Olympics is exposed. This is true at different decision levels: the IOC tries to prevent TOROC from being autonomous, as well as TOROC acts to limit autonomous behaviors from the venues.

Conclusion

The Olympics are the biggest and most complex sports and media event of our times. Their organization imposes an unparalleled organizational commitment and requires a complex process of decisions and actions.

The analysis of this process, at its various levels, is of great interest for Organization Theory: it allows to analyze the entire life of the organization and to explain the choices implemented by participants in the various situations.

In this paper we presented the most important organizational choices adopted by the TOROC in the planning of the Torino Olympic Games. Then, these decisions have been explained through different theoretical perspectives.

The interpretation developed on the basis of the Project Management Theory emphasizes the importance of governance and control systems set up by TOROC. Consistent with this point of view are the contributions of Lawrence and Lorsch, about the influence of environment on organizational decisions, and the contribution of Mintzberg, which emphasizes the role of the designer in organizational design. These theories are consistent with each other and can offer a unifying point of view about the organization of the Games. They share the vision of the organization as a system predetermined or predictable, in which the subjects operate in conditions of absolute rationality in order to efficiently achieve a shared goal.

In the perspective of the Organizational Action, the organization (intended as a process of decisions and actions) operates heuristically under

conditions of bounded and intentional rationality. Therefore, the participants are not able to have a perfect knowledge of the aims of the organization and of the means available. According to this theoretical perspective, however, bounded rationality does not determine a complete organizational ambiguity, because the subjects are intentionally rational, that is, they try to identify the purpose to be satisfied and to arrange the available means to achieve it.

References

- ANDRANOVICH G., BURBANK M.J., HEYING C.H.
2001 Olympic Cities: Lessons Learned from Mega-Event Politics, *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 23, 2: 113-131.
- BARBINI F.M., MELLONI A.
2005 *L'organizzazione dei Giochi Olimpici di Torino 2006*, Working Paper of the Research Program "L'Officina di Organizzazione".
- BARNARD C.J.
1938 *The functions of the executive*, Boston: Harvard University Press.
- BARTEZZAGHI G., SPINA G.L., VERGANTI R.
1999 *Organizzazione le PMI per la crescita*, Milano: Il Sole 24 Ore.
- BOOTH D.
2005 Lobbying orgies: Olympic city bids in the post-Los Angeles era, in Young K., Wamsley K.B. (Eds.), *Global Olympics historical and sociological studies of the modern Games*: 201-226, Oxford: Elsevier.
- CASHMAN R., HUGHES A.
1999 *Staging the Olympics: The event and its impact*, Sydney: University of New South Wales Press.

- CHAPPELET J.L., KÜBLER-MABBOTT B.
2008 *International Olympic Committee and the Olympic system: The governance of world sport*, Milton Park: Routledge.
- CROWTHER N.
2002 The Salt Lake City scandals and the ancient Olympic Games, *International Journal of the History of Sport*, 19, 4: 169-178.
- DACOSTA L.P.
2002 *Olympic studies - Current intellectual crossroads*, Rio de Janeiro: Editora Gama Filho.
- DESCHIENS G.
1979 *L'histoire des Jeux olympiques d'hiver*, Morzine: Editions Vuarnet.
- DiMAGGIO P.J., POWELL W.W.
1983 The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields, *American Sociological Review*, 48, 2: 147-160.
- EMERSON R.M.
1962 Power-dependence relations, *American Sociological Review*, 27: 31-40.
- ESSEX S., CHALKLEY B.
2004 Mega-sporting events in urban and regional policy: a history of the Winter Olympics, *Planning Perspectives*, 19: 201-232.
- FERRARA M.
2001 *L'organizzazione dello sport*, Torino: Giappichelli.
- GUALA A.
2003 Grandi eventi, immagine, comunicazione: Torino e le Olimpiadi invernali del 2006, in *Proc. of the IV Convegno nazionale dei sociologi dell'ambiente*, 19-20 September 2003, Torino.
- GUALA C., BOBBIO L.
2002 *Olimpiadi e grandi eventi*, Roma: Carocci.
- HEYLIGHEN F., JOSLYN C.
2001 Cybernetics and Second Order Cybernetics, in Meyers R.A. (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Physical Science & Technology*, vol. 4: 155-170, New York: Academic Press.
- KEMP S.
2002 The hidden workforce: volunteers' learning in the Olympics, *Journal of European Industrial Training*, 26, 2-4: 109-116.

KYLE D.G.

1993 *Athletics in ancient Athens*, Leiden: E.J. Brill.

IOC - INTERNATIONAL OLYMPIC COMMITTEE

2007 *Olympic Charter*, Lausanne: International Olympic Committee.

LAWRENCE P.R., LORSCH J.W.

1967 *Organization and environment: managing differentiation and integration*, Boston: Harvard University Press.

LESJO J.H.

2000 Lillehammer 1994: planning, figuration and the "green" Winter Games, *International Review for the Sociology of Sport*, 35, 3: 282-293.

LUNDIN R.A.

1995 Temporary organizations and project management, *Scandinavian Journal of Management*, 11, 4.

MAGGI B.

1984/1990 *Razionalità e benessere. Studio interdisciplinare dell'organizzazione*, Milano: Etas Libri.

2003 *De l'agir organisationnel. Un point de vue sur le travail, le bien-être, l'apprentissage*, Toulouse : Octarès Editions.

MAGGI B., COTNOIR P.

2003 Coordination et contrôle du travail de conception aux frontières organisationnelles: le cas de l'industrie aéronautique, in *Proc. of the IX Journées de Sociologie du Travail*: 469-476.

MAGGI B., MASINO G.

1999 Niveaux de décision et modes de régulation. Autonomie et discrétion dans le processus de travail, in *Proc. of Condor GDR-CNRS-FROG Seminar*, Paris. An updated version is in: Maggi, 2003.

MASINO G., MAGGI B.

2001 Verso una ridefinizione del concetto di confine organizzativo: interpretazione di alcuni casi aziendali, in *Proc. of the XXIII Convegno Aidea, Processi di terziarizzazione dell'economia e nuove sfide al governo delle aziende*: 298-313, Milano: McGraw-Hill.

MINTZBERG H.

1979 *The structuring of organizations*, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

MOGORE C.

1989 *La grande histoire des Jeux olympiques d'hiver*, Chambéry: AGRAF.

MORGAN C.

1990 *Athletes and oracles: the transformation of Olympia and Delphi in the eighth Century B.C.*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

NONAKA I., TAKEUCHI H.

1995 *The knowledge-creating company*, New York: Oxford University Press.

PERSSON C.

2000 The international Olympic committee and site decisions: the case of the 2002 Winter Olympics, *Event Management*, 6, 3: 135-153.

QUICK S.P., TAYLOR T.

2000 Transferring knowledge from one big event to the next: the Greek Olympic educational experience, in Allen J., Harris R., Jago L., Veal A.J. (Eds.), *Events beyond 2000: setting the agenda*, Proc. of Conference on event evaluation, research, education, Sydney.

SIMON H.A.

1947 *Administrative behavior*, New York: Macmillan.

SWADDLING J.

1984 *The Ancient Olympic Games*, Austin: University of Texas Press.

THEODORAKI E.

2007 *Olympic Event Organization*, Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.

THOMPSON J.D.

1967 *Organizations in action*, New York: McGraw-Hill.

TOMLINSON A.

2005 The commercialisation of the Olympics: Cities, corporations, and the Olympic commodity, in Young K., Wamsley K.B. (Eds.), *Global Olympics historical and sociological studies of the modern Games: 179-220*, Oxford: Elsevier.

TOROC

2006 *Sustainability report_2006*, Torino: Report of the Organizing Committee.

TZELEPI M., QUICK S.P.

2002 The Sydney Organising Committee for The Olympic Games "Event Leadership" Training Course—An Effectiveness Evaluation, *Event Management*, 7, 4: 245-257.

VAN DER WAGEN L.

2007 *Human Resource Management for Events. Managing the event workforce*, Oxford: Elsevier.

YOUNG D.C.

1996 *The modern Olympics: a struggle for revival*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

2004 *A brief history of the Olympic Games*, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

2005 *From Olympia 776 BC to Athens 2004: The origin and authenticity of the modern Olympic Games*, in Young K., Wamsley K.B. (Eds.), *Global Olympics historical and sociological studies of the modern Games*: 3-18, Oxford: Elsevier.