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Hadassah

THE WOMEN'S ZIONIST ORGANIZATION OF AMERICA, INC.
FIFTY WEST FIFTY-EIGHTH STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. 10019

11/4/83

Rabbi Marc Tanenbaum
Director, International Affairs
The American Jewish Committee
165 East 56th Street
New York, New York 10022

Dear Rabbi Tanenbaum,

I very much appreciated your having taken the time from what I can imagine is a very busy schedule in order to meet with me.

As I mentioned to you during our conversation, I am planning to move to Israel with my family this coming summer and I would like to pursue the possibility of working for the American Jewish Committee in its Israel Office. Over the past year I have corresponded with Bernie Resnikoff and discussed with Abe Karlikow the possibility in the abstract since I had not made any concrete plans for aliyah at that time.

As you suggested, I am sending you some examples of my work over the past years at Hadassah and the American Jewish Committee and a copy of the introductory and concluding chapters of my recently completed doctoral dissertation.

I would appreciate discussing this matter with you once again when you have returned from Israel and have had a chance to better assess the needs of the International Relations Department and the AJCommittee's Israel operation. Again, many thanks for your time and interest.

Sincerely,



Marc Brandriss

MARC G. BRANDRISS
50 Overlook Terrace, #5E
New York, New York 10033
Tel: (212) 568-9070

PERSONAL

Date of Birth: 29 April 1949
Place of Birth: Wausau, Wisconsin
Family Status: Married, three children
Name of Spouse: Ruth Shane Brandriss

EDUCATION

Columbia University, Department of Political Science -- Ph.D., Jan. 1983
Columbia University, Department of Political Science -- Master of
Philosophy, 1976
Columbia University, School of International Affairs -- Master of
International Affairs, 1973
Columbia University, Middle East Institute -- Certificate of Middle
East Studies, 1973
Yeshiva University -- Bachelor of Arts, cum laude in history, January 1971

EMPLOYMENT

1979- : Director, Public Affairs, Hadassah. Editor, Hadassah UPDATE.
1977-1979 : Assistant to the Director of Israel and Middle East
Affairs, Foreign Affairs Dept., The American Jewish Committee.
Summer 1978 : Research Fellow, Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and
African Studies, Tel Aviv University.
1976-1977 : Research Analyst, Israel and Middle East Affairs, Foreign
Affairs Dept., The American Jewish Committee.
1976-1977 : Visiting Lecturer in Political Science, Yeshiva University.
1973-1975 : Research Assistant, Middle East Institute, Columbia
University.

BACKGROUND

International Affairs:

studied policy-making in defense and foreign affairs with: Roger Hilsman.
studied military strategy, nuclear technology and international affairs
with: Warner Schilling.
studied international law and diplomacy with: Louis Henkin and Oliver
Lissitzyn.
studied political modernization and comparative politics with: Howard
Wriggins.
studied international trade and monetary policy with: Charles Issawi
and Raymond Lubitz.
studied international organization with: Arthur Lall.

Middle East:

studied Middle East diplomatic history and politics with: J.C. Hurewitz
and Abba Eban.
studied Middle East economic history and development with: Charles Issawi.

studied revolution and instability in the Middle East with: Sharif Mardin.
studied Islamic history, political, social and economic institutions,
Ottoman history and Arabic with: Jeanette Wakin and Maan Medina.
studied history of Zionism with: Arthur Hertzberg.

Masters Essay: The Influence of Domestic Politics on Foreign Policy-
Making in Israel: A structural Analysis and Case Study
of the Sale of Arms to West Germany in 1959.

Doctoral Dissertation: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy in Israel:
The Search for Peace, 1967-1973.
(Under sponsorship of Prof. J.C. Hurewitz)


LANGUAGES

Hebrew (excellent), French (good), Arabic (reading).



INTERNAL POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY IN ISRAEL:

THE SEARCH FOR PEACE, 1967-1973



Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

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Chapter 1.

INTERNAL POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY

A state's behavior in the international community is not determined simply by its reaction to external pressures and stimuli; internal pressures and domestic constraints have a decisive impact on its foreign policy. Foreign policy behavior, as Rosenau has stated, is a reaction to both external and internal stimuli.¹

In an early essay dealing with the gap between the two most widely employed levels of analysis in the study of international relations--the foreign policy of states on the one hand, and the study of international politics on the other--J. David Singer argued that the two are not the same and that the differences between them are, in certain respects, unbridgeable.² This does not mean that national-international linkages have been ignored by political scientists. On the contrary, many scholars have been sensitive to the interdependence of national politics and international

¹James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 31.

²J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," World Politics 14 (October 1961): 77-92.

behavior. Yet, the few attempts to organize and analyze the foreign policies of nations with these linkages in view have not been entirely successful.

In earlier approaches to the study of international politics and foreign policy, nation-states were seen as the sole actors in the inter-state system and their external behavior was viewed exclusively as reactions to external stimuli. This "systemic" level of analysis tended to look upon nation-states as essentially monolithic units.¹ In the decision-making approach, which focused on a variety of internal variables in the formulation of a state's foreign policy, the traditional states-as-sole actors approach to international relations was called into question. This approach tended to view governmental decision-making processes as the primary determinants of foreign policy; external events or stimuli were seen merely as "inputs" into the decision-making process. As Wolfers has suggested, the decision-making approach initially represented a shift "from an extreme 'state' emphasis to an equally extreme emphasis on the men who act for states."²

Wolfers argued against a division of the study of international politics into two compartments or levels, one

¹Wolfram F. Hanrieder, ed., Comparative Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1971).

²Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 9.

comprising the realm of the state as the actor, and the other the realm of human actors. Instead, he proposed that all events occurring in the international arena must be understood on the two levels simultaneously: "one calling for concentration on the behavior of states as organized bodies of men, the other calling for concentration on human beings upon whose psychological reactions the behavior credited to states ultimately rests."¹

Waltz added a third level of analysis to his study of international politics, that of the internal structure of states or, more simply, domestic politics.² Extreme formulations of this approach consider that a state's internal system determines its foreign policy, while more moderate versions consider foreign policy as a product of both domestic politics and international circumstances.³

As Robert Jervis has noted, there has not only been a lack of agreement on the substantive dispute in the level-of-analysis problem, but also on the number of levels.⁴

¹Ibid., p. 9.

²Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954).

³Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 22.

⁴Ibid., p. 15.

Rosenau, for example, proposes five levels of analysis.¹ Jervis, himself, proposes four. Rosenau has been one of the strongest advocates of bridging the theoretical and conceptual gap in the study of international politics and foreign policy and national and international systems.

Rosenau first coined the term "linkage politics" to describe a relatively new approach to the study of foreign policy in an attempt to overcome the level of analysis problem. Rosenau defined linkage as "any recurrent sequence of behavior that originates in one system and is reacted to in another."² The original aim of his linkage politics model was an attempt to develop an across-systems-level theory that would specify how, and under what conditions, political behavior at one level of "aggregation" (international) affects political behavior at another level (national).

As developed by Rosenau, the linkage politics model stood in stark contrast to older models which viewed nations as closed systems and international relations as the interactions of governments only. In the linkage view, nations are not encapsulated nor are their domestic actors insulated from influences abroad or at home; rather, there is an

¹Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," p. 43.

²James N. Rosenau, ed., Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems (New York: The Free Press, 1969).

interaction among a variety of political actors, some domestic and some international. Linkage politics treated as permeable the boundary between a nation's political actors and the international political environment. It attempted to combine the insights of the study of international relations with those of domestic politics. It was an effort to explore how the international system shapes and determines the behavior of political systems and how characteristics of political systems, in turn, produce the essential components of the international system.

When Rosenau initially presented his linkage politics model to a group of scholars from both fields in order to discuss the feasibility of bringing the two fields of inquiry closer together, the reaction was less than enthusiastic.¹ Another attempt to identify and deal systematically with linkages between national and international systems was first launched in 1966 and culminated in a book of essays edited by Rosenau in 1969.² The essays, each an attempt to apply Rosenau's original formulation, generally failed. A few of the participants in the initial discussions abandoned it entirely.

¹James N. Rosenau, Of Boundaries and Bridges: A Report on a Conference on the Interdependencies of National and International Political Systems (Princeton, N.J.: Center of International Studies, Research Monograph no. 27, 1967).

²Rosenau, Linkage Politics.

Despite the initial hesitation to adopt a linkage politics framework as a starting point for the formulation of an across-systems-level theory, recent years have seen many more conceptual frameworks dealing with interactions across different levels of analysis. Interdependence, penetration, intervention, integration, adaptation and transnationalism are just a few of the examples of the new preoccupation of students of national and international politics. All of these concepts are characterized by the readiness to abandon long-standing theoretical boundaries and embark on an exploration of the interactions of national and international systems.

The reason for this emerging interest with concepts that enable across-systems-level analysis, aside from the academic interest in bringing the two fields of inquiry closer together, is the technological and communications achievements which have intensified the interdependence of national and international systems. The conceptual boundaries which have previously characterized the analysis of the two types of systems are no longer adequate in today's increasingly interdependent world. As Rosenau had aptly stated, "There is simply too much evidence of overlap between them for analysts to conduct research at one level blissfully ignoring developments at the other."¹ Specialists

¹James N. Rosenau, "Theorizing Across Systems: Lingage Politics Revisited," in Jonathan Wilkenfeld, ed., Conflict Behavior and Linkage Politics (New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1973), p. 31.

in comparative politics can no longer afford to treat domestic political variables as constants in their analyses of the world political arena.¹

Jervis notes that there is no single answer to the question of which level of analysis is most important. The choice among the various levels is often determined by the purpose of the inquiry.²

The traditional or nation-as-sole actor approach has been used most often in works on Israel's foreign policy. With a few notable exceptions, preeminently Michael Brecher's two-volume study of Israel's foreign policy, most of the literature on Israel's foreign relations has viewed Israeli policy as primarily reactive, a function of the constraints imposed by a hostile external environment.³ Too often, the domestic factors in the making of Israeli foreign policy have been ignored and, consequently, the complex nature of Israeli foreign policy has been obscured.

The current study will focus on the domestic factors

¹Ibid., p. 42.

²Jervis, p. 15.

³Michael Brecher, The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972); and Michael Brecher, Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975). Other exceptions include Abraham R. Wagner, Crisis Decision-Making: Israel's Experience in 1967 and 1973 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), and Rael Jean Isaac, Israel Divided: Ideological Politics in the Jewish State (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).

and constraints in Israeli foreign policy. It will view foreign policy as a product of domestic politics and international circumstances. It will examine the ways in which external behavior affects the internal workings of Israeli politics and the impact of the external environment on its domestic political system. Conversely, it will explore the complex dynamics of the Israeli domestic political system and how it affects the making of Israeli foreign policy. The formulation of Israeli foreign policy in the period under study will be treated as an intricate process of governmental decision-makers responding to external pressure, yet restrained in their decisions by domestic concerns.

As noted above, there are those who contend that a state's external behavior is primarily a response to demands and events located abroad which greatly circumscribe the degree to which factors internal to states can be influential. On the other hand, there are those who contend that the external behavior of states is primarily a response to internal needs and demands and, consequently, foreign policy is constrained by, or subordinated to, the objectives of maintaining internal political and social structures. One area of inquiry in this study is the extent to which a coherent foreign policy in Israel during the period under investigation may have been sacrificed to the demands of internal politics. The purpose is to shed further light on the influence and importance of domestic factors on Israeli foreign policy.

Obviously, the approach is prone to controversy and subjective judgments. On the one hand, it would be inaccurate to place primary responsibility on Israeli foreign policy for the failure to achieve a settlement with Israel's Arab neighbors in the years from 1967 to 1973. It might be true that the inability of Israeli leaders to produce more concrete and imaginative proposals for a settlement was partly a result of a lack of domestic consensus and coalition unity; yet, much of what might appear on the surface as the intransigence and rigidity of the Israeli leaders has resulted from a very strong national consensus in the face of the continued hostility of Israel's Arab neighbors and their refusal to recognize the legitimacy of the state of Israel.

Nevertheless, while one cannot reasonably ignore the relevance of external pressures and constraints on Israeli foreign policy nor argue persuasively that domestic constraints are the primary determinants of its external behavior, domestic politics are certainly an important and, perhaps, decisive factor in the making of Israeli foreign policy.

Chapter 11

THE DIMINISHING CONSENSUS ON FOREIGN POLICY

A mood of confidence and sense of security pervaded Israel toward the end of the seven-year interval that separated the June and the October wars. The widespread feelings of self-confidence were reinforced by factors both within and outside the country. The military threat from Israel's Arab neighbors eased because of the internal strife within and among the Arab states. President Nasir of Egypt died in September 1970 and his successor, Anwar al-Sadat, was, for a time, preoccupied with the consolidation of his position in Egypt. Sadat's threats that 1971 would be the "year of decision" in the Arab-Israel conflict were perceived in Israel as merely attempts to bolster his image in Egypt and the Arab world, and the year passed uneventfully.

The major event in the latter part of the interwar period that heightened the mood of self-confidence to the point of complacency in Israel, was Sadat's July 1972 demand for the departure of Soviet military personnel from Egypt which, to Israel, served to further diminish the threat of renewed warfare.

Israeli leaders assured the nation that war should

not be expected in the foreseeable future and, although the prospect for peace was still remote, a tolerable status quo would continue. While Israel's position in the Third World and in Black Africa was eroding, Israeli leaders nevertheless felt secure as relations with the United States lacked the tensions of the earlier postwar years. The flow of American arms was proceeding at a reassuring rate, making the Israel Defense Forces appear so powerful that it seemed to most Israelis as a sufficient deterrent to any potential aggression. It was not, therefore, surprising that when Sadat announced early in 1973 the total mobilization of Egypt for the imminent battle ahead, Israel was decidedly complacent.

The mood in Israel was perhaps best summed up in an October 27, 1972 Jerusalem Post interview with Foreign Minister Abba Eban, a leading exponent of the view that Israel should project a more flexible policy, if only to stem the erosion of Israel's image in the international community.

Israel, he said, was not planning any new initiatives. "I know that initiatives are more popular than letting the other side sweat it out." Nevertheless, Eban was convinced that Israel's best policy at the time was to let Egypt's President Sadat "sweat it out with his range of alternatives narrowing all the time eventually drawing him to discussions with Israel itself."

Eban claimed that the United States was satisfied with the state of affairs and the reasons he cited were: Israel's firm position, the stability of its government and the fact that Israel was making no great demands on Washington. In addition, Eban explained, American satisfaction was further conditioned by the departure of Soviet military advisers from Egypt. "The success of Israel's and America's Middle East policy to date augurs well for the future. Egypt's military option is effectively closed. The Russians will not endanger world detente for Egypt's sake." Sadat could not afford not to seek negotiations with Israel. It was only through negotiations that he could get back the Suez Canal and put "his civilian flag where it has not been until now."

Five and a half years earlier, Israel's objectives in the June 1967 Six Day War were almost purely defensive. Hence the ensuing confusion over political goals in the aftermath of its military victory. Once the enormity of its military success became apparent, public and official attitudes in Israel hardened. Parties and individuals began to advance their own particular postwar objectives.

Many Israelis had been convinced that time would work to Israel's advantage and that the Arabs would eventually be willing to negotiate a political solution to the conflict. But the Arab refusal to recognize, negotiate or make peace with Israel served to deepen Israeli

pessimism over Arab motives and to further intensify Israel's fears and insecurities, hardening the government's resistance toward making concessions.

One should not easily dismiss Israeli suspicions over Arab intentions. The military victory in June 1967 had been complete and it is understandable that most Israelis had assumed that the Arabs would be willing to come to the peace table. Few countries in similar circumstances, following a military triumph of such magnitude, over such enormous odds, would have been prepared to make the unilateral concessions the Arabs demanded from Israel following the war. It is, therefore, not surprising that the Israeli government saw no need to take the diplomatic initiative. The pre-June 5, 1967 borders of Israel were indeed vulnerable and since Arab leaders continued to refuse to recognize or negotiate with Israel, while several persisted to threaten it with extinction, it appears reasonable if not right, for Israel to have insisted that it would not return to the pre-June 1967 borders.

To many Israelis, the problem of borders or the growing demand of the Palestinians to a state of their own was not the basis of the Arab-Israel conflict. The conflict existed before Israel occupied Arab territories in June 1967 and before the demand for a Palestinian state became a paramount concern of the Arab states. The heart of the Arab-Israel dispute was seen by Israelis as the

right of Israel, or more explicitly, the right of Jews, to exercise sovereignty in areas regarded by the Arabs as an exclusive Muslim domain. The inflexible position of Israel's neighbors convinced many Israelis of the intent of the Arabs to destroy the Jewish state and their unwillingness to come to terms with Israel's existence.

The insistence of all the Arab states that Israel withdraw completely to the prewar armistice lines of 1949, the War of Attrition with Egypt, Nasir's immediate violation of the August 1970 cease-fire following Israel's reluctant acceptance of the second Rogers Plan and with it the concept of withdrawal and indirect negotiations, Sadat's demand for prior conditions before negotiating an interim Suez Canal agreement, the increasing verbal hostility of the Third World, and King Husayn's rejection of secret Israeli overtures along the lines of the Allon Plan, discouraged even the most flexible of Israeli leaders and served to reinforce the pervasive pessimism in Israel over Arab intentions.

In the face of relentless Arab hostility, opinion in Israel hardened and the government occupied itself with consolidating its position in the occupied territories. Although a significant segment of the Israeli population would probably have been willing to withdraw to boundaries only marginally different from those of pre-June 5, 1967, both "hawks" and "doves" alike were unwilling to accept the

type of provisional arrangements of the 1949 armistice agreements. To them, the provisionality of those previous agreements reflected the enduring Arab refusal to recognize the permanence of the Jewish state.

The more "hawkish" Israelis saw little hope of conciliating the Arabs and thus saw no reason to relinquish any part of the Israeli occupied territories in a futile attempt to gain Arab recognition. They opposed any withdrawal from the June 1967 ceasefire lines in the absence of a full and contractual peace with the Arabs. The hawks were reinforced in their hardline position by the growing religious, national and historic attachment of many Israelis to particular areas which had once constituted the ancient Jewish homeland.

The "dovish" Israelis, on the other hand, were willing to accept something less than total peace in return for much of the territories occupied in the 1967 war. To them, tangible demonstration of Israeli flexibility was worth the risk if it at least held out the prospect of future Arab reconciliation to Israel's existence and alleviate Israel's isolation abroad. The more moderate "doves" were fearful of the consequences of long-term or permanent control of a hostile Arab population in the occupied territories and what that might mean for the future of Israeli democracy. The more extreme "doves" were prepared to return almost all the territories captured in the 1967 war

and some advocated the recognition of the national rights of Palestinian Arabs to a state of their own on the West Bank and Gaza.

The response to the postwar issues was more complex than the labels "hawks" and "doves" might suggest. The different territories captured in the June 1967 war had different values for different people. Almost no one in Israel considered Sinai to be part of the historic Land of Israel and even the Herut party and the right-of-center Gahal bloc was willing to surrender most of the peninsula in return for peace with Egypt. Virtually no one would agree to divide or relinquish any part of Jerusalem. The National Religious Party was chiefly concerned with Judea and Samaria, insisting that these areas of the West Bank not be surrendered at any cost, while many within the Labor Party insisted on the retention of some of the West Bank territories, and similarly Sharm al-Shaykh, for purely strategic and security related reasons. While Mapam insisted that the West Bank not be annexed by Israel, the leftist-oriented party was almost equally insistent that much of the Golan Heights remain in Israeli hands.

The government itself was divided among those, such as the majority of the National Religious Party and Gahal, who were committed ideologically to retaining the areas which comprised much of the historic Land of Israel for national-religious reasons; and those whose primary concern

was retaining control of strategic areas that would provide the essential minimum for Israel's security. To the pragmatic, strategic oriented leaders of the Labor Party, security was the major criteria, although if part of the territories they thought necessary to retain for strategic reasons coincided with the borders of the historic Land of Israel, it naturally served to reinforce their desire to retain control over the area.

Gahal and the NRP asserted the right of Israel to claim sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip and rejected any settlement that would transfer sovereignty over any part of these areas to any Arab state or entity. The Labor Party appeared willing to relinquish the major portion of the West Bank and Gaza, although not to an independent Palestinian state. Labor was later willing to consider "interim" or "partial" agreements under which territory would be ceded without a formal peace treaty being signed. But the concept of "territories for peace" undermined consensus within Labor since the party was never able to fully define the extent of the territory it was prepared to relinquish.

The debate over foreign policy and the territories played itself out in the government coalition. The internal divisions over postwar objectives between hawks and doves and their several variations, led to deadlock and a policy lacking initiative or innovation.

Confronted with a wide and growing array of conflicting demands, Prime Minister Meir was content for the most part to avoid decisions on postwar aims which might aggravate the divisions within her party or lead to a collapse of her coalition. The result of this attitude contributed to the reactive nature of Israel's foreign policy during the 1967-1973 period, and was typified by the resistance to external pressures rather than the formulation of more positive long-range policy. In short, Israel's post-June 1967 foreign policy was characterized by paralysis and immobilism.

The absence of creative foreign policy initiatives in large part stemmed from the operation of Israel's coalition politics which reflected the dominant influence of the views of the political right. The high value Prime Minister Meir accorded to formal party unity and preserving the balance of views within the coalition, served to perpetuate the policy of indecision, leaving little room for diplomatic initiatives. Other than the policy of standing firm to outside pressures, no coherent long-range concept guided Israel's foreign policy during the period. The very unwillingness to take political risks, the political inability to pursue diplomatic initiatives, left Israel in the position of having to react to the initiatives, often hostile, of its Arab neighbors and those coming from outside the region.

At the outset, it was noted that, with few exceptions, the traditional or nation-as-sole-actor approach has been employed most often in studies of Israeli foreign policy. The reactive nature of Israeli foreign policy has consequently been attributed almost solely to the uniquely hostile regional environment to which Israel must respond in order to insure its survival. In the present study, the analysis has centered on the internal factors that play a part in the shaping of foreign policy. Although domestic factors may not be the primary source of a nation's foreign policy, they do have considerable influence in its formulation. While precise measurement, or ranking, of domestic factors is perhaps impossible, it is important to focus attention on internal variables that might not be readily apparent and are often ignored in a traditional approach.

The major focus of this dissertation has been that the dearth of imaginative, positive initiatives in Israeli foreign policy during the 1967-1973 interwar period can be attributed in large part to the nature of Israeli democracy. In democratic systems generally, conflicting domestic pressures often tend to prevent the implementation of innovative foreign policies. As Henry Kissinger once wrote in a different context, "Nations sometimes find it so difficult

to achieve a domestic consensus that they are reluctant to jeopardize it afterward in international forums."¹

In Israel in particular, where the democratic system is characterized by multipartism, fragmentation and division, the absence of strong leadership in the face of the emerging internal debate over the issues raised by the June 1967 war, led to a reactive foreign policy that reflected short-term interests and lack of decisiveness in government.

Although the current study has focused on domestic factors and constraints in foreign policy, it has also examined the impact of external issues on the domestic political system. Thus, while a major thesis advanced in this study is that the changing nature of the Israeli political system strongly affected the formulation of foreign policy in Israel, the issues raised by the June 1967 war also had a profound effect on the political system, reshaping the domestic base of foreign policy.

The breakdown of domestic consensus in the aftermath of the June 1967 Six Day War and the increasing divergencies of views in Israel over postwar aims were principal reasons for the lack of diplomatic initiatives. Despite the early outward signs of unity among the parties across

¹Henry Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership: A Re-appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 226.

much of the political spectrum in the framework of the National Unity Government, the consequences of Israel's victory in June 1967 divided national opinion. The occupation of Arab territories during the war severely disrupted national consensus on foreign policy issues, creating not only divisions among the parties, but fragmented opinion across party lines.

For three years, Mapai/Labor maintained the fragile support of the parties in the National Unity Government by avoiding decisions on the controversial issues raised by the June 1967 war. Although it was quite able to deflect external pressures for concessions, the government found itself increasingly under pressures from within. The National Religious Party, Labor's traditional coalition partner, was no longer willing to abide by the tacit arrangement of earlier years when it would yield to Labor on questions of foreign policy. Even after Gahal left the government coalition in August 1970, Labor was constrained by an increasingly hawkish NRP which remained its pivotal partner in the coalition, stifling the government's ability to maneuver in the diplomatic arena and closing off the possibilities for serious political foreign policy initiatives. The divergencies of views within Labor itself prevented the governing party from adopting more precise definitions of its postwar aims.

Public opinion seemed to support a hardline foreign

policy, and the Labor Party, faced with its own internal divisions, avoided taking a stand on issues that could upset the status quo. But the status quo policy which reflected the broadest levels of agreement on policy, only thinly masked the inability to arrive at a definition of postwar objectives.

The Six Day War had reopened a whole new set of issues that touched at the heart of Israel's self-identity. Labor was no longer capable of providing the political leadership and direction that the new situation required. The party was also no longer capable of asserting its dominance in the political system. The patterns of political behavior among the parties of the coalition and within Labor itself had changed significantly after 1967 with the formation of the National Unity Government and the establishment of the new United Israel Labor Party in 1968. Politics in Israel ceased to operate according to the rules of a dominant party system. With the emergence of deep ideological divisions both among and within the parties, the consociational features of the system overcame the ability of Labor to dominate the coalition. The consociational patterns of politics enabled the system to preserve superficial unity at the broadest levels of policy, but left Israel with a government unable to act decisively on the major issues it faced as a consequence of the Six Day War.

Note:

One of my responsibilities at Hadassah was to prepared a monthly column for Hadassah Magazine. Since these articles were ghost-written, I have excised their titles and by-lines.

M.B.



WRITE this column on

New Year's Day as we are about to enter a new decade. I would like to share some random thoughts about the turbulent 1970's which have just ended. This is intended not as a comprehensive review of the past ten years, but rather a selective and personalized view of certain events and their effect upon our morale as Americans and as Jews.

The last decade can be characterized as an era of confusion, uncertainty and change. It marked the end of our unquestioning belief in American global dominance. The year 1970 began with the invasion of Cambodia and domestic turmoil over our involvement in the Vietnam War, which culminated with the bloodshed at Kent State University. The decade ended with the rise of militant Islam and the agonizing, still unresolved, crisis in Iran.

The decade saw fitful spurts of relaxation in East-West tensions. Now, with the Soviet thrust into Afghanistan, détente appears headed for suspension and perhaps dissolution. A return to the polarizing politics of the cold war and a growing détente with China may be on the horizon.

The country was witness to the spectacle of Americans being evacuated by helicopter from the American Embassy in Saigon as the United States lost a war for the first time in its history—a war which many Americans did not consider worth fighting. At home, we were witness to the disgrace and resignations of both a President and a Vice President. The debacle in Vietnam led to a loss of confidence and a failure of will to assert our influence in world affairs, to meet the challenges facing our nation and our allies. Watergate led to a loss of faith in our governmental institutions and in our leaders, and it has taken most of the rest of the decade to restore even some of that faith.

Americans began to realize, during the 70's, that their country's natural wealth was not inexhaustible, as the United States lost its self-sufficiency in the vital resource essential to maintain its traditional leadership in the industrial world. The revolution in oil costs, which saw a 1600 percent rise in OPEC oil prices since 1970, began to sap our internal strength. Inflation; recession and world-wide loss of confidence in the dollar led to speculation in gold, raising its price from \$35 an ounce in 1970 to well over \$500 an ounce by the end of 1979.

The decade that began a year after the first man stepped on the moon ended with the breakdown of the nuclear reactor at Three Mile Island—and Americans began to question our technological ability to provide safe nuclear power and develop new sources of energy. Many have begun to ask whether the United States will be able to sustain its moral, industrial and military leadership in a world where revolutionary changes take place overnight. Concern over inflation and energy, distrust of our elected officials, and worry about our future is what President Carter felt the need to diagnose as a "crisis in confidence" and "our national malaise."

THE lowering of national morale was paralleled in Israel. At the beginning of the decade, Israel was still basking in the victory of the 1967 war, and rightly so. The prevailing attitude in the Arab world continued to be the three "noes" of Khartoum: no peace, no recognition, no negotiations. The sudden trauma of the Yom Kippur War changed the mood in Israel overnight from one of optimism and hope to pessimism and uncertainty.

It was during the 1970's that two of Israel's foremost leaders, David Ben Gurion and Golda Meir, died. Both had become legends in their own lifetimes and the loss of their strength and inspiration was sorely felt. The Labor Party, which had ruled since independence, was swept from power and Herut was thrust into the driver's seat. Its leader, Menahem Begin, showed talent in negotiations and, together with Anwar Sadat, earned the Nobel Peace Prize.

The economic nightmare of the 70's hit Israel with a vengeance. If we in the United States, the most prosperous nation in the world, were suffering from inflation, the people of Israel smarted under an even heavier burden. They were not dealing with two-digit inflation, but had to live with daily escalation to the present-day inflation figure of well over 100 percent.

While so-called national liberation movements throughout the world were receiving praise and support, Zionism, the national liberation movement of the Jewish people, was being branded as racism and compared to Nazism. A resurgence of world-wide anti-Semitism was cloaked in the more "acceptable" terminology of "anti-Zionism."

THE 1970's also saw the rise of a new, more insidious form of warfare. Terrorism gained legitimacy as a political instrument. Gangs of murderers were glorified as "freedom fighters" and even governments succumbed to terror tactics. At the beginning of the decade, in September 1970, Palestinian terrorists hijacked and held hostage in the Jordanian desert the innocent passengers and crews of American, British and Swiss airliners.

As the years went by, the terrorist attacks increased in violence and number. The massacres in Munich, Maalot, Lod Airport and on the coastal road are macabre memories etched in our consciousness forever—but not necessarily in the consciences of the peoples of the world. Witness the willingness of much of the world to grant legitimacy to the PLO, thus encouraging it and similar groups to continue to employ terror to achieve their goals.

A recent study listed 6,294 "significant acts" of terrorism between 1970 and 1979, rising from 293 in 1970 to 1,511 in 1978. And this does not even come close to accounting for the millions who faced agonizing death through torture, murder and starvation at the hands of Pol Pot, Idi Amin, Bokassa and other tyrants, while most of the world stood by passively. One of the bright episodes of this era of tacit acceptance of terror was Israel's brilliant rescue of Israeli hostages at Entebbe, Uganda. Israel said "no" to submission to terror!

The UN endorsed the new wave of terrorism when it invited its chief proponent, Yasser Arafat, to address the world forum. For the first time in its history, the organization "dedicated to the preservation of world peace and international security" denounced a peace agreement which, after 30 years of bitter war, led to the signing of the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. The UN assailed the greatest achievement of the period, turned its back on a shining moment of history in which all people of good will take pride.

The record of the past decade, as I have chosen to present it, is indeed a gloomy one. It should not, however, lead us to hopelessness or despair, but rather to renewed effort and commitment as we enter the 1980's. (Continued on page 33)

Soon we will usher in the joyous holiday of Purim, commemorating the defeat of the evil Haman, the courage of Mordecai and Esther and the salvation of our people in the midst of despair. Purim this year assumes heightened significance of particular relevance. Perhaps it is not merely coincidental that the name of Khomeini is strikingly similar to that of Haman. Today, it is not only Israel and the Jewish people that are threatened, but the United States and the entire Free World are being challenged by this modern-day Persian tyrant.

The defeat of Haman serves as a warning to his successors and current counterparts in tyranny. New Hamans have arisen in every generation, but the Jewish people never despaired. Jews the world over celebrate the story of Esther for the message of courage and faith that it conveys in times of trouble. The message of Purim is no less important today when the enlightened world is called upon to stand united against its common enemies of war, fanaticism and bigotry. As Mordecai refused to bow before Haman, we too must stand firm against the blackmail and terrorism of the Hamans of our day.

Perhaps it is also not mere coincidence that Queen Esther, the instrument of her people's salvation in ancient times, was also known by her Hebrew name, Hadassah. Like Esther, far from indulging in despair or feeling burdened by our responsibilities, the women of Hadassah are ready to meet head on, no matter what the sacrifice, the demands of the 80's.

Hadassah Magazine,
February 1980

As May 26, the "target date" for an agreement on West Bank-Gaza autonomy, draws near, certain moves and initiatives are gathering momentum. Most of these maneuvers will, if they succeed, change the rules of the game to Israel's disadvantage.

A hint of what is developing came to the fore when the United States supported an outrageous United Nations resolution which threatened to undermine the very process started at Camp David, which gave birth to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Some of the possible moves are already gathering adherents: recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization, support for the right of the Palestinians to self-determination, a new resolution to replace Resolution 242, renewed attempts (by the Russians, the Indians, and the West Europeans) to subvert the peace process—the list is long and ominous.

Much of Western Europe, motivated in large part by a policy of appeasement geared toward sacrificing Israel's vital security for barrels of oil, is caving in to extremist Arab demands. One country after another in Europe has begun to espouse "the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people." France, Britain, West Germany and most Common Market countries are echoing the call for self-determination.

Chancellor Bruno Kreisky of Austria went further. In a scandalous attempt to outdistance his European colleagues in the race to embrace Yasser Arafat and his terrorist cohorts, he officially accorded diplomatic status to the PLO's representative in Austria—just one short step away from full diplomatic recognition.

The Government of India went even further and granted full diplomatic status to the PLO. India's external affairs minister said this was "a logical step." Incidentally, the Indian Government recognizes Israel but does not have full diplomatic relations. There is no official Indian representation in Israel.

A major effort to put the UN Security Council on record for a Palestinian state on Israel's borders has already begun. Now being circulated in the UN's corridors is the text of a resolution whose key clause affirms the right of Palestinians to establish an independent state in Palestine. As of this writing, the Security Council has deferred a vote on such a resolution until July. Nevertheless, there is still a possibility that the resolution will be brought to an emergency session of the General Assembly at that time. If so, it will probably be overwhelmingly approved. This is not new. What is new is the strong possibility that many European nations will join the Arab, Third World and Soviet blocs in approving such a measure.

In that case, the United States (if it stands behind its only reliable Mideast ally) and Israel will be even more isolated on the question of Palestinian rights than they have ever been before.

THE question of "self-determination of the Palestinians" has become the key issue separating the parties negotiating a solution to the Arab-Israel conflict; it has become a crucial stumbling block in the autonomy talks between Egypt and Israel.

It was not by accident that the subject of Palestinian self-determination was left out of the Camp David agreements. Early on, Prime Minister Menahem Begin said: "The term 'self-determination' means a Palestinian state, and we will not agree to

such a mortal danger to Israel." In contrast, President Anwar Sadat has insisted that the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza be given the right to self-determination including the option of establishing an independent Palestinian state.

The United States position under the Carter Administration has been somewhat ambiguous. President Carter has studiously avoided the use of the term self-determination and has expressed his opposition to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. But he has often talked about the need for the establishment of a Palestinian "homeland" and the recognition of the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people." Until now, the Administration appears to have limited itself to the language adopted in the Camp David accords, which state that the Palestinians should be permitted to "participate in the determination of their own future."

It is true that the concept of a people's right to self-determination has been incorporated into the UN Charter, the Covenants on Human Rights, and a number of other UN resolutions. Yet even today, most international legal scholars consider it a political rather than a legal concept. Until very recently, the classical texts on international law did not even contain references to a right of self-determination.

Despite the incorporation of the concept of self-determination in the UN Charter and other international documents and despite the fact that it has become one of the most widely hailed principles in the world community, it is clear that there is a total lack of agreement on the criteria for its application in particular cases. The actual practice of states has demonstrated that even though the right to self-determination has gained considerable influence in the international community, its application in practice has been selective.

UNFORTUNATELY, as the concept of self-determination has gained widespread influence in world affairs, it has been accepted as an absolute principle of right. When the International Covenants on Human Rights declare that "all peoples have the right to self-determination," they are proclaiming an abstract principle without reference to a specific context.

When applied in a specific political or legal context, self-determination, like all other rights, is subject to limitations. One such limitation is clear: *the implementation of self-determination should not threaten the national unity and territorial integrity and security of a sovereign, independent state.* This would certainly apply if another Palestinian state were established next to Israel. A PLO-controlled state would be a mortal danger to Israel and it should not be permitted to arise.

We are surely all aware of the limitations on certain rights granted under our own Constitution. The right of free speech, as we all know, is curtailed when it would endanger others. So too, the right of a people to self-determination must be limited when it endangers the well-being and security of others.

Let us remember that Hitler invoked the principle of self-determination to justify the forcible detachment of the Sudetenland province from Czechoslovakia. The problem is not with the principle but with its wrongful application. Most international principles are neutral and ambivalent, but "self-determination" was used to tear Europe apart

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during the Nazi period.

Can one imagine the chaos that would result today if, after Tito's death, the different ethnic groups that make up the state of Yugoslavia rose up in revolt under the banner of self-determination? This question should not be confined to Yugoslavia alone. The list of those claiming the right to self-determination would be endless. One might ask about the rights of Kurds, Armenians, Baluchis, Basques, Scots, Welsh, Bretons, Macedonians, Ukrainians, Tartars and countless other people around the world who are living under what some might call alien rule. There are very few countries which would escape the disruption and chaos that would ensue through the unlimited application of the right to self-determination.

IT is the height of irony that many of those countries which support the Palestinian right to self-determination do not even accord basic human rights to their own people. The Arab states that have been in the forefront of the struggle for Palestinian self-determination never once thought to grant them a separate state when the West Bank and Gaza were under their control from 1948 to 1967.

It is interesting that the PLO has often asserted the right of Palestinian self-determination and "liberation" from what they consider to be the "colonial occupation" of their land. Israel is not seen by them as a legitimate state, nor is Zionism accepted as a legitimate expression of the national rights of the Jewish people.

While it demands the right of self-determination for the Palestinians, the PLO's National Covenant would deny it to the Jewish people: "Claims of historical or religious ties of Jews with Palestine are incompatible with the facts of history and the true conception of what constitutes statehood. Judaism, being a religion, is not an independent nationality. Nor do Jews constitute a single nation with an identity of its own." (Emphasis mine.)

At a time when the PLO, or for that matter most of the Arab states, refuse to give any sign that they have recognized the right of the Jewish people to determine its own destiny, it is most inappropriate for European countries to insist that the Palestinians, led by PLO terrorists, be accorded the right of self-determination!

As a matter of fact, Palestinian self-determination has been achieved in the state of Jordan, more than 60 percent of whose cit-

izens are Palestinian. Thus the current demand for the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza is not only a demand for still another Arab state in the Middle East, but also for the establishment of a second Palestinian Arab state.

THE Camp David accords provide the best mechanism for overcoming the security threat posed by an independent Palestine Arab state, while satisfying Palestinian national aspirations. It is indeed unfortunate that the Palestinians refuse to participate in this most promising avenue for achieving a just solution to the Arab-Israel dispute, but it is even sadder to see the countries of Western Europe embarking on a campaign to undermine the Camp David accords in the mistaken belief that giving in to extremist Arab demands will somehow ensure a steady supply of oil.

It seems absurd that so many governments and the international "peace" organization called the United Nations publicly try to downgrade the Camp David accords with their potential for peace, while impatiently waiting to put forth their own initiatives designed to result in a twenty-third Arab state and a weakened Israel. This must not be allowed to happen!

Hadassah Magazine,
May 1980



On a recent visit to Houston, Texas, the oil capital of America, I witnessed the pervasive influence of Arab petrodollars in our country. Arab investment and influence in the United States have been growing at a dramatic rate, due to the mounting increases in the price of Middle Eastern oil. Speaking to my Texas colleagues and reading the newspapers, I discovered several interesting—and alarming—facts about the Arab presence there.

The fourth annual American-Arab Business Conference was recently held in Dallas. The *Arab News* has a Houston office. Arabs hold major interests in many banks and businesses around the state, among them the Western Bank and the Dallas Power and Light Company. Branches of the American-Arab Chamber of Commerce are located in both Dallas and Houston. I was told that Arab students in the Southwest receive stipends on a regular basis from the so-called Saudi Arabian "mission" in Houston. They then return to their respective campuses armed with funds and materials, ready to influence and subvert the minds of young Americans.

Texas, however, is only the tip of the iceberg. In the five-year period 1973-78, OPEC nations had balance-of-payment surpluses totaling about \$200 billion, some \$40 billion of which was invested in the United States, mostly by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. This year, OPEC's current account surplus is expected to reach at least \$45 billion, much of it available for investment in the United States and Western Europe.

No one knows the exact figures for Arab investment in the United States, according to the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs. It was this committee, headed by Democratic Congressman Benjamin Rosenthal of New York, which earlier this year exposed the inadequacy of the Federal Government's methods for collecting data on foreign investment. We do know that these huge petrodollar investments provide the Arab oil-producing states unprecedented potential for power over our economy and foreign policy.

Most of us have long been acquainted with the overt forms of Arab economic warfare against Israel. Unable to achieve their objectives militarily, the Arab states have employed the strategy of boycotting Israel as an extension of their struggle to destroy the Jewish State. In the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War, when the Arabs again failed to achieve victory through force of arms, the economic war against Israel expanded vastly in scope. In the last six years, there has been a growing willingness on the part of the Arab oil-producing states to use the oil weapon as a means to weaken Western and American support for Israel. As in the case of the Arab boycott, the grand strategy failed because of the firm resolve of the United States to resist the embargo.

WHEN it became apparent that threats of embargoes and oil price increases would fail to move the United States to impose a Middle East settlement satisfactory to them, the Arab states devised a more subtle strategy. They realized that the only prospect for achieving a resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict on their terms was to curry favor with Washington by adopting "moderate" positions on oil pricing, in order to induce the United States to exert pressure on Israel to make concessions. While the oil weapon employed during the Yom Kippur War failed to alter American policy toward Israel, it could now be used in a different way to achieve the same desired effect.

Thus, what has unfolded is a transformation of

the tactics and strategy but not the ultimate Arab goal of influencing the United States to change its traditional policy of support for Israel. Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Sheikh Ahmed Zaki el Yamani has made it quite clear on several occasions that he expects the United States to show its "appreciation"—read, put pressure on Israel—in return for Saudi "moderation" in oil price increases and higher production. Yet even this so-called moderation has resulted in a tenfold increase in official OPEC oil prices since 1973 and a 60 percent increase this year alone.

The mounting suspense in the days leading up to OPEC pricing decisions, (along with dire forecasts of economic disaster brought about by still-higher oil prices) indicates only too clearly the need for the United States to accelerate its search for alternative energy resources. Contrary to a Presidential candidate's recent suggestions, even if a solution to the Arab-Israel conflict were achieved, it would not guarantee oil supplies at reasonable costs. Moreover, if the United States were to give in to this type of blackmail, there would be nothing to prevent the Arabs in the future from latching on to other political causes and extracting still more political concessions by threatening higher oil prices and embargoes.

Some countries have already succumbed. In Europe, there is a growing willingness to appease the Arabs and submit to blackmail. European leaders seem to be competing with one another to determine who will be the next openly to embrace Yasser Arafat and the PLO.

TODAY in the United States, we are witnessing the use of ever more insidious techniques in the Arab attempt to influence American attitudes and policies toward the Middle East. As the figures cited above demonstrate, the new weapon is not just oil, but the billions of petrodollars in the coffers of the Arab oil-producing states. Armed with their huge surpluses, Arab governments and financial potentates have invested vast amounts in the United States, contributing to an alarming growth of Arab influence on the shaping of public policy and private business practices in our country.

As one perceptive observer recently noted, "if the oil embargo was the stick, the investments are the carrot—some would say the drug—on which the nation has become increasingly dependent." Already the Arab oil nations have become major lenders to the United States Government through purchases of American treasury bills, notes and bonds. They have acquired substantial real estate holdings and ownership in major banks and industries. Secret agreements arranged by the United States Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Board with certain OPEC Arab nations cloak these investments with a confidentiality and a preferential treatment not extended to the investments of any other nation.

Foreign investment on this scale and the lack of public knowledge of the scope of such investment pose serious dangers to the American economy. Sudden liquidation of Arab holdings in the United States could severely disrupt our financial system.

The political risks are just as frightening. A growing number of politically powerful banking, financial and industrial firms, lured by big money and huge contracts, have used their influence to press for a more pro-Arab foreign policy. Dubbed the "hidden Arab lobby," a large number of well-connected Americans and former Government officials

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representing law firms, public relations agencies, and multinational corporations have become advocates for the Arab cause in return for enormous retainers and consulting fees.

The influence of Arab petrodollars also threatens to jeopardize one of the most cherished of all our freedoms—the pursuit of knowledge and truth. The independence and academic integrity of our universities are in danger of being compromised as administrators, searching for new sources of financial support, have sought funding and research grants from Arab sources, without sufficient regard to the potential inroads on academic freedom.

THIS month we celebrate the joyous holiday of Hanukka, the Feast of Lights, the festival of freedom. Hanukka commemorates the triumphant struggle of the Jews for religious freedom, national independence and spiritual rededication. This year, as we enter into the cold days and long winter nights of December, the story of Hanukka gains special meaning for us. When the Jews entered the Holy Temple, they found one small cruse of oil, sufficient for only one day. But a miracle occurred and it lasted for eight days.

In our own modern-day era of oil shortages, we cannot rely on miracles. It is shocking that, instead of reducing our dependence on imported oil since the 1973 embargo

and the subsequent traumatic price increases, the country has relaxed its conservation programs and has done little to develop alternative energy resources. With the embargo and empty gas pumps only fading memories, there seems to be little public awareness that the United States is more dependent than ever on Middle Eastern oil and therefore more vulnerable to Arab pressure and influence. The situation clearly does not justify our current mood of apathy and complacency. The absence of concerted conservation efforts gives the Arab oil-producing states a power and influence over our nation that constitutes a threat to our political integrity as well as to our economic well-being.

Do we have answers to this threat? Not many, but some. First, we must do our utmost to reduce our consumption of oil and rededicate ourselves to the conservation of our scarce energy resources. Secondly, we must demand immediate examination and development of all our alternate energy resources—and they are many. This may require a careful study of the Government controls now in effect.

Thirdly, we must seek out and publicize the facts and statistics relative to the Arab acquisition of American companies, United States land, ownership of Federal debt obligations and huge deposits in American banks. Fourthly, we must find and present the evidence that some of these investments are being selected more for their political than their financial potential. Perhaps then we can hope to maintain our independence from foreign political influence and retain our freedom from economic intimidation.

Hadassah Magazine,
December 1979



THREE days after returning from my most recent trip to Israel, I was horrified to read a *New York Times* report describing how 17 Vietnamese refugees, including four young children, were murdered at sea by Thai fishermen. Children were thrown overboard; their parents jumped after them and were lost in the turbulent waters of the South China Sea.

The survivors were held prisoner on a deserted island over a period of 22 days, during which time 37 women were raped repeatedly by some 500 fishermen. The youngest rape victim was only 12 years old. At least 57 boats filled with rapacious fishermen stopped at the island to rob and beat the defenseless refugees. The men were assaulted while their wives and daughters were raped.

This is only one shocking case among many that have taken place off the shores of Vietnam, Thailand and Cambodia. The tragedy of the Indochinese refugees is so vast and their suffering so overwhelming that it is difficult to comprehend. Famine and disease threaten the lives of hundreds of thousands of men, women and children in Cambodia. The magnitude and the stark dimensions of the pain and torment are hard to grasp.

Yet we Jews, more than most, understand what it is to suffer and know what it means for the world to ignore human tragedy. Forty-one years ago, diplomats met at Evian to consider the desperate plight of the Jews of Nazi Germany. They deliberated but did not act, and consequently tens of thousands of defenseless human beings perished in a Holocaust that finally engulfed millions more and led to a world-wide conflagration.

Today the world seems to have learned something from the Holocaust that consumed our people. Many nations and individuals are no longer just talking, and some are responding generously and compassionately to the plight of the Cambodian, Vietnamese and other Indochinese refugees.

As you would expect, the people of Israel are not unaffected by this human tragedy. As Jews whose memory of the *Shoa* is ever present, they could not stand idly by while so many of their fellow human beings faced death by starvation and disease. During my visit, I watched with pride as the whole country, in the midst of its own overwhelming economic and political pressures, mobilized its best efforts on behalf of the Indochinese refugees. Children contributed their allowances and donated their lunch money. Kibbutzim, schools and community centers held special fund-raising events. Everyone found a way to contribute. Donations for the Cambodian refugees were being collected everywhere one turned—in restaurants, on the streets, in stores, offices and hotel lobbies.

Now the Israel press reports that a second caravan of trucks loaded with meat, rice, fruit and vegetables has reached the new refugee camp established at Khao I-Dang. Supplies were unloaded by Israeli volunteers while many of the 30,000 refugees in the camp watched silently, applauding the strangers who came to offer friendship and assistance.

The Israeli Scouts have recently adopted a Cambodian refugee camp with some 700 orphans. The Scouts have promised to provide salaries for supervisors, clothes, blankets and toys—all to be paid for from a \$50,000 fund they collected in a house-to-house drive. Yes, in this uncaring world, Israelis remember and teach their children to care!

Soon after my arrival in Israel, a six-man medical team, including three young doctors from Hadassah, embarked on a mission of mercy to the

refugee camps on the Thai-Cambodian border. These doctors intended within their month's stay to establish a medical facility to be manned by Israeli relief teams in rotation. Our doctors, all experts in nutrition, tropical diseases, and infectious diseases, took with them stocks of antibiotics, malarial drugs and rehydration pills.

A few days before they left, Israel had welcomed 197 more Vietnamese refugees to its shores. Forty of these were rescued at sea by an Israeli freighter, whose crew must have been reminded of the Jewish refugees from the Nazi horror who were left adrift and refused a haven by country after country, while the world turned a blind eye.

As the gruesome tragedy of Cambodia was unfolding before our eyes on television and in newspaper headlines, another tragedy—less visible and less well-known—was befalling a long-ignored segment of our own people. The 28,000 Jews of Ethiopia are rapidly facing extinction. Reports indicate that Ethiopian Jews are being killed, raped and sold into slavery as they are caught up in the cross-fire of savage struggles between Government and insurgent forces. Many have been dispossessed from their lands and have been left starving and penniless. Most Falashas would like to go to Israel but are unable to do so because of a general ban on emigration imposed by the Ethiopian Government.

It is gratifying to learn that there is now renewed interest in the plight of the Falashas among Jews in America and in Israel. Prime Minister Menahem Begin has reaffirmed his pledge to support the aliya of Falashas. A Hebrew University poll indicates that the Israeli public overwhelmingly favors immigration of Ethiopian Jews as a national priority, as do the major Jewish organizations representing the American Jewish community.

While I was in Jerusalem, an open campaign strategy was adopted, reversing the former policy of "quiet diplomacy." The Israel Government, the Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Organization announced the launching of a world-wide campaign to publicize the plight of the Falashas and to revitalize efforts for speeding their immigration to Israel and preventing their physical and spiritual annihilation. (For more on the Falashas, see "Life in Israel" in this issue.)

My stay in Israel ended on a happy note. I was privileged to participate in the *brit mila* of Igal Slepak, born in Moscow, who last May, at two weeks of age, arrived in Israel with his young parents. The ceremony was performed in the Chagall Synagogue at the Hadassah-Hebrew University Medical Center in Ein Karem. But the happiness of the moment was tinged with sadness. The child's grandfather, Prisoner of Zion Vladimir Slepak, was unable to attend his first grandson's formal acceptance into the Jewish community. He remains in exile in Siberia, where he and his wife have been confined for several years.

With tears in my eyes, partly out of joy, partly in sadness, I prayed that as this beautiful baby entered a new world of hope among his own people, all children—whether in the remote villages of Ethiopia, in the cramped, disease-ridden quarters of a refugee camp in Cambodia, or in the vast reaches of the Soviet Union—would be able to look to a future free from fear and starvation.

May 1980 see this prayer realized.

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IN 1975, the United Nations proclaimed the first International Women's Year, highlighting the occasion with a world conference in Mexico City. Delegates assembled from all over the globe to call attention to the problems of women and to formulate a world plan of action to eliminate sexual discrimination and enhance the status of women throughout the world. To dramatize the importance of this ten-year plan of action, the UN declared 1976-86 the Decade for Women, and recommended the convening of a mid-decade conference to review progress in carrying out the objectives outlined in 1975. This mid-decade conference is scheduled to take place in Copenhagen, Denmark, July 14-30.

Hadassah has supported the peaceful objectives of the United Nations from its inception. It enjoys the status of a nongovernmental organization affiliated with the public relations division of the United Nations Office of Public Information. Despite the increasing politicization of the UN and its affiliated bodies, and the outrageous General Assembly resolution equating Zionism with racism, Hadassah has continued to support the basic principles upon which the international organization was founded, as well as those social, cultural and humanitarian programs which have not yet been politicized to the detriment of their original goals. Thus, we looked with special interest upon the first International Women's Conference, convened for the purpose of examining and alleviating the problems of women around the world.

I remember with what outrage we learned of the proceedings and declarations of the conference held in Mexico City. One would have supposed that women from all over the globe had come in a spirit of good will and cooperation, yet we noted with growing consternation the subversion of the goals for which the conference had been convened. To our dismay, most of the delegates walked out as Mrs. Leah Rabin, wife of the then Prime Minister of Israel, prepared to address the conference.

To compound our frustration, the conference in Mexico passed a resolution urging women everywhere to struggle against "colonialism, neocolonialism, Zionism, racial discrimination and apartheid." Thus it was in Mexico City, at a conference on women, that the evil and pernicious United Nations declaration equating Zionism with racism was conceived, and was later given birth in November 1975, when the General Assembly officially adopted its equally infamous resolution. Since then, the Zionism-racism equation has steadily infected the work of almost all UN forums.

THE implications of this canard and the fact that it has gained growing currency throughout the world cannot be underestimated. It is not simply an attack upon Israel, but against Jews throughout the world. What has happened is perhaps best described by British critic Goronwy Rees, who was present when the General Assembly's Third Committee adopted the resolution on Zionism in 1975. Rees is quoted by Daniel Moynihan in a *Commentary* magazine article:

There were ghosts haunting the Third Committee that day: the ghosts of Hitler and Goebbels and Julius Streicher, grinning with delight to hear, not only Israel, but Jews as such, denounced in language that would have provoked hysterical applause at any Nuremberg rally. . . . And there were other ghosts also at the debate: the ghosts of the six million dead

camp, listening to the same voices which had cheered and jeered and abused them as they made their way to the gas chambers. For the fundamental thesis advanced by the supporters of the resolution, and approved by the majority of the Third Committee, was that to be a Jew, and to be proud of it, and to be determined to preserve the right to be a Jew is to be an enemy of the human race.

One might have hoped that by now we Jews would have been finished with these evil characterizations. Perhaps the world has become impatient with Prime Minister Menahem Begin's constant refrain that the PLO are the Nazis of our day. But it is the PLO and its cohorts who are again attempting to distort the objectives of the Mid-Decade Conference on Women by bastardizing its agenda.

In violation of procedural rules, the PLO and its supporters have succeeded in having adopted as an official document of the Copenhagen conference a report prepared by the Economic Commission for Western Asia. It is a treatise replete with outrageous lies, distortions and half-truths regarding the history of the Zionist movement and the founding of the State of Israel. Entitled *The Social and Economic Conditions of Palestinian Women Inside and Outside the Occupied Territories*, the document exposes its real aim—to reintroduce the infamous equation of Zionism with racism.

THE Economic Commission for Western Asia (ECWA) is an anti-Israel body that accepted the PLO as a member but refused to accept Israel, a sovereign state. Its report is anti-Jewish, anti-Zionist, anti-Israel and is an attack on Jewish people everywhere. Despite the fact that procedurally the report was ineligible because it was not filed in time, it was accepted. There is no doubt that the PLO is running the show at the UN, despite some half-hearted support for Israel on this issue from several West European countries and full support by the United States.

As in Mexico City in 1975, we are again witnessing the beginnings of an outrageous and insolent scheme to subvert the aims and purposes of the International Women's Conference, transforming it into another forum for the vilification of Israel and the Jewish people—thereby doing a gross disservice to the legitimate aspirations of women throughout the world.

Unless the Western world mounts a meaningful opposition to the politicization of the Copenhagen conference, it will play into the hands of the PLO, dragging the conference into the complexities of the Mideast conflict and hampering the working out of modalities for the improvement of the status of women.

The conference subtheme of "Employment, Health and Education" will be largely submerged by the political overtones of the agenda. There are three main subjects that will dominate the scene and each will provide opportunities for attacking Israel: "Effects of Israeli Occupation on Palestinian Women," "Effects of Apartheid on Women in Africa," and "The Situation of Women Refugees the World Over." Thirteen meetings during ten working days—a disproportionate share of the total—will be allotted for these discussions.

Side by side with this intergovernmental conference, a forum will be convened in Copenhagen to be attended primarily by representatives of nongovernmental organizations and other interested women's groups which are not represented in the official governmental delegations participating in the world conference.

An estimated 10,000 women are expected to take part in this forum; parallel activities and a parallel agenda have been prepared. Three of my colleagues and I will represent Hadassah in the forum. In addition, I will represent the World Jewish Congress at the forum and at the intergovernmental conference, to which the WJC is accredited as an NGO (nongovernmental organization) with consultative status.

You may be assured that my colleagues and I, together with like-minded delegates, will emphasize the women's agenda and try to focus attention on the universality of women's problems. When Israel is attacked, we will endeavor to project a picture of her open, progressive and libertarian society, which acts as a catalyst in promoting improvement in the social, cultural and economic situation of women in neighboring countries. Together with other fair-minded women, we will try to prevent, or at least to bring to public attention, the manipulation of this conference.

We will do all in our power to oppose the introduction of issues extraneous to the central goal of the Decade for Women. We will do this not only to ensure that the legitimate concerns of women are the primary subject matter of the conference, but also to ensure that Israel and the Jewish people are not once again the subject of public vilification and abuse.

Hadassah Magazine,
June/July 1980


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UPDATE, a biweekly newsletter published by Hadassah, is edited and written by Marc Brandriiss. It is sent to Hadassah leadership across the country and to the Directors of all Jewish CRC's. It is also available by paid subscription.





NATIONAL ZIONIST AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF HADASSAH

From: Mrs. Henry Goldman, Chairman, National Zionist Affairs Department
Marc Brandriss, Director, Zionist Affairs Department

To: Presidents, Education Vice-Presidents and Zionist Affairs Chairmen

4 Tammuz 5741

July 6, 1981

DEMOCRACY IN ISRAEL
UNDERSTANDING ISRAELI POLITICS

The Knesset, Israel's parliament, has set national elections for this coming June 30th. A short guide to the Israeli political and electoral system can help in promoting understanding of the only true democratic system of government in the Middle East.

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

Since 1948, when the state of Israel was established, it has been governed under a system of parliamentary democracy. The Israeli political system consists of an executive (the Cabinet under the Prime Minister, sometimes called "the Government"), a legislature (the Knesset) and a judiciary.

THE KNESSET

The Knesset, or parliament, is the supreme sovereign body in Israel. It is a unicameral legislature consisting of 120 members elected for a four-year term through direct secret ballot in a system of "proportional representation." Israel's multi-party system and the shifting coalitions among different parties and factions reflect the special nature of the country's electoral process. Unlike the American electoral system, in which the country is divided into numerous election districts and the citizen votes for a local candidate to represent him in Congress, in Israel the entire country is regarded as one electoral district.

Under the system of "proportional representation," Israelis vote for parties rather than individual candidates. Each party prepares its own nationwide slate of candidates, ranging in number from 1 to 120, depending on the party's degree of optimism as to its success with the voters. The number of persons on the party election list who eventually obtain seats in the Knesset reflects the relative strength of the party in proportion to the total number of votes cast for all the different party lists. Thus, if a party obtains 10 percent of the popular vote, it will receive 12 seats (10% of 120) in the 120

seat Knesset which will be occupied by the first 12 individuals on that party's election list.

While there have been various proposals in the past to change to a single member constituency system, as in the United States, these have never won Knesset approval. In order to improve their chances with the voters, some smaller parties have merged with others to create a new party, while others have made temporary arrangements to run on a single joint electoral list, while retaining their individual party structures. The Israel Labor Party, for example, was formed from a merger of the Mapai, Ahdut Ha'Avodah, and Rafi parties in 1968 and joined in an electoral alignment with the Mapam party. The Likud bloc of Prime Minister Menahem Begin consists of the Herut and Liberal parties, and the two small parties, La'am and Rafi (part of which merged with Labor), each maintaining their own separate identities. These mergers, alignments and splits are normal features of the dynamic Israeli political arena.

THE CABINET

The Cabinet, headed by the prime minister (currently Menahem Begin), is the executive of the Israeli political system. The Cabinet, the main policy-making body of the state of Israel, is responsible to the Knesset which must approve of its composition and policies. The Prime Minister must be a member of the Knesset, but other ministers in the Cabinet need not be. The Cabinet takes office for a four year term after a vote of confidence in the Knesset, but the term may be shortened if the Prime Minister resigns or upon a vote of no-confidence in the Knesset.

Since no party has ever received an absolute majority in an Israeli election, the largest party (the Likud since 1977, and the Labor Party before then), has had to form coalitions with smaller parties in order to guarantee a majority in the Knesset. In exchange for their support the smaller parties receive ministerial posts and often other political concessions.

FIXING THE DATE OF ELECTIONS

Israeli law provides for national elections to be held every four years. The government of Prime Minister Begin which was elected in 1977 could have thus theoretically remained in office until November 16, 1981, so long as it commanded a working majority allowing it to win confidence votes in the Knesset. The resignation of Finance Minister Yigal Hurwitz from the Cabinet on January 11, 1981 and the loss of the three votes held by his party, Rafi, effectively eliminated Prime Minister Begin's working majority in the Knesset.

Israel's parliamentary system is similar to that of certain European democracies in which the Prime Minister services only so long as he enjoys a majority in parliament. Governments, however, can fall at any time and new elections may be called before the normal expiration of a Knesset's four-year term. In this respect, Israel's democracy differs from the American system in which the President is an independent chief executive whose four-year term of office is fixed irrespective of his party's control of Congress.

In Israel, the President occupies more of a ceremonial position, removed from day-to-day politics. In the case of a government crisis, however, the President of Israel is the one who accepts the resignation of a Prime Minister and his government and may designate another Knesset member to attempt to form a new government. It is the Knesset, however, which determines when to dissolve itself and to call for new elections.

In order to stave off a new no-confidence vote following the resignation of Yigal Hurwitz, Mr. Begin proposed that elections be held July 7. After discussions with other parties, a compromise date of June 30th was set for the new elections. This left ample time for the 100-day electoral campaign mandated by Israeli law.

THE POLITICAL PARTIES

Following is a brief survey of some of the major political parties currently competing in the Israeli political arena. (A record 36 political parties, 24 of them new, will compete for seats in the June 30th Knesset elections):

THE GOVERNING LIKUD COALITION, which until Hurwitz's resignation commanded 61 votes (the minimum needed for a majority in the 120-member Knesset), consists of the Likud bloc which includes:

**The Herut party, which Prime Minister Begin heads. As the major component of the Likud bloc, Herut commands the largest number of ministerial portfolios, including Foreign Affairs (currently held by Yitzhak Shamir), Defense (held by Begin), Communications and Finance. Yoram Aridor, who recently joined the Cabinet as Minister of Communications, was unanimously approved by the Cabinet on January 19 to fill the post of Finance Minister.*

Presently Herut can muster about 20 votes in the Knesset, having lost members such as Geula Cohen, who left in 1979 to help found the Tehiya party (see below), and former Defense Minister Ezer Weizman, who was ousted from the Herut after he voted against the government in a no-confidence motion last November.

**The Liberal Party, headed by Deputy Prime Minister Simcha Erlich, holds twelve seats in the Knesset.*

**La'am (For the People), a four-man faction formed out of elements of the Free Center Party, the State List and the Greater Land of Israel Movement.*

**The Rafi faction, once a party of the Labor Party, is headed by Yigal Hurwitz, with three votes. Hurwitz had recently decided to join a new party, Telem, created by Moshe Dayan (see below).*

Likud's coalition partners in the present government are:

**The Democratic Movement, headed by Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Yadin, which currently has three votes in the Knesset. The Democratic Movement is the remnant of the Democratic Movement for Change (DMC), a "new" center party formed in 1976, which managed to win 15 seats in the 1977 elections. In 1978, the DMC split into its two major constituent parts -- the Democratic Movement of Yadin, and Shinui headed by Amnon Rubinstein. The Democratic Movement, left with six seats in the Knesset, was further eroded last year when three members*

broke away and formed Ahva (Brotherhood), an independent party. As a result, the Democratic Movement has been dissolved, while Shinui will submit a slate for the upcoming elections.

*The National Religious Party (NRP), under the leadership of Interior Minister Yosef Burg, has twelve seats in the Knesset. The party has been a coalition member of every Israeli government. However, Religious Affairs Minister, Aharon Abu-Hatzeira, recently broke away from the NRP to announce the formation of a new party, TAMI (Movement for Traditional Israel), to compete in the forthcoming elections.

*Agudat Israel, an ultra-religious party with four seats in the Knesset, had never formally participated in an Israeli government until it agreed to support the Begin government in 1977.

THE OPPOSITION PARTIES

In opposition to the government is a loose collection of parties headed by the Labor Alignment. Labor, which had controlled all Israeli governments for 29 years, now has only 34 seats in the Knesset, 29 of them from the Labor Party and five from the leftist Mapam faction. Despite the recent bitter struggle between Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin for leadership of the party, the December 1980 Labor Party Convention finally confirmed Mr. Peres as party leader, but some of the bitterness over the power struggle remains.

Other parties opposed to the government are:

*The Citizens' Rights Movement (CRM) led by Shulamit Aloni and recently joined by two prominent members of the Peace Now movement.

*The New Communist Party (Rakah), with 5 seats, will compete in the elections as the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality. Its supporters come primarily from the Arab population of Israel. Several of the major Zionist parties also compete for Arab voters. Three other small Arab lists will compete in the elections.

*Shinui (Change) headed by Amnon Rubinstein, which broke away from the now defunct DMC in 1978.

*Sheli, a left-wing party with two seats, which supports a West Bank Palestinian state.

*Tehiya, a right-wing party formed in 1979 to protest what some felt were excessive Israeli concessions in the Camp David Agreements. Tehiya is currently headed by Prof. Yuval Ne'eman and is represented in the Knesset by Geula Cohen and Moshe Shamir.

Joining with the opposition to the Begin government are four independents, including former Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan and former Defense Minister Ezer Weizman. Moshe Dayan left the Begin Cabinet in October 1979 and later set up a new party, Telem (National Renewal Movement), to run in the forthcoming Knesset elections. When the party was first announced last April, polls indicated that it might win up to 19 Knesset seats, but more recent polls give it now more than 4 or 5 seats. Yigal Hurwitz, the former Finance Minister in the Begin Cabinet, has joined Dayan's new party.

We hope that the Administration will lift the suspension of the delivery of the the F-16 planes when it completes its review and realizes that Israel struck at the Iraqi nuclear reactor in an action it deemed necessary to protect its own people and in legitimate self-defense.

WE ARE SURE THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WOULD WELCOME YOUR OPINIONS ON THIS MATTER.

news & analysis FRONTLINE

NATIONAL ZIONIST AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF HADASSAH

From: Mrs. Henry Goldman, Chairman, National Zionist Affairs Department
 Marc Brandriss, Director, Zionist Affairs Department

To: Presidents, Education Vice-Presidents and Zionist Affairs Chairmen

25 Kislev 5742

December 21, 1981


For Soviet Jewry, The Crisis Is Now

Today, we face a crisis of major proportions in the situation of Soviet Jewry.

THE GATES FOR EMIGRATION ARE CLOSING!

After more than a decade, the emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union has virtually ground to a halt. This radical change in Soviet Jewish emigration is underscored by the fact that in October only 368 Jews were able to leave. In November, a devastatingly low number of Soviet Jews -- only 363 -- were permitted to leave the Soviet Union, the lowest number since any effective form of emigration began in 1971. Since emigration from the USSR peaked in 1979 to over 51,000, the numbers for 1981 reflect a 90 percent decline in emigration over the last two years. This sharp downward trend is expected to continue.

Below is a graphic portrayal of the rapidly-decreasing Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union (not counting the months of October and November 1981, which show an even further decline).



TWO-YEAR DECLINE IN EMIGRATION CONTINUES

In the first nine months of 1981 (through September), only 8,047 Jews were permitted to leave the USSR, as compared to 17,734 during the same period in 1980 and 38,678 in the first nine months in 1979.

Potential emigrants are experiencing increasing difficulty in receiving the required letter of invitation from abroad needed to emigrate. In addition, it is estimated that more than 200,000 Soviet Jews already have been sent the necessary invitation from Israel, and some have been waiting as long as ten years to emigrate.

The current rate of exit of less than 400 Jews per month leaving the Soviet Union means there is no longer emigration. There are only some families and individuals who are being granted exit visas. Thus the situation can be likened to that of a decade ago, before efforts throughout the world succeeded in bringing out 250,000 Soviet Jews from behind the Iron Curtain.

SITUATION AMONG REFUSENIKS

The tragic aspects of current Soviet emigration practices is most evident among Soviet Jewish Refuseniks. These are Soviet Jews whose applications for exit visas have been rejected. They face continued harassment and restrictions on their ability to leave. Most of the refuseniks have been fired from their jobs after applying to emigrate. Some of their children have been dismissed from high schools or suffer isolation and humiliations in their classrooms. Often, Jewish students who have managed to be admitted to universities are expelled and then drafted into the Soviet Army, thereby creating an additional pretense ("security") for denying the family exit visas for at least an additional five years.

MAJOR CRACKDOWN ON SOVIET JEWISH ACTIVISTS

Along with the drastic cutback in Jewish emigration, Soviet authorities have begun a major crackdown on Jewish activists. Despite seemingly insurmountable obstacles, many refuseniks continue to fight for their right to emigrate. Deprived of employment and admission to universities, many refuseniks have begun to seek outlets for reaffirming their Judaism. Jews who have had little or no Jewish background are studying Judaism and learning Hebrew.

But over the past year, Soviet authorities have severely cracked down on many of the informal study seminars organized by refuseniks. The educational, cultural and scientific refusenik communities remain under virtual siege. Jews who have tried to study Hebrew, celebrate Jewish holidays and events, or attend classes and seminars have been the target of increasing abuse. Their homes have been invaded; materials on Jewish history and traditions have been seized and threats of arrest and trials. Indeed, over the last several months, arrests of Soviet Jews have intensified dramatically, with several being sentenced to extremely harsh terms.

The courage of Soviet Jewish activists in the face of increasing harassment, frustration and despair was evident in a recent letter sent by 127 Soviet Jewish intellectuals to the 26th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. In it they describe the present situation of Soviet Jews:

"On the one hand, the whole range of factors that have a crippling effect on their national and individual fates and compel them to emigrate continue to exist in full force; on the other hand, it is becoming practically impossible to emigrate."

Summing up the above, we can declare that **THE JEWS OF THE USSR ARE FACING THE THREAT OF A NATIONAL CATASTROPHE.**

SOVIET ANTI-SEMITISM

The Soviet Union remains the largest producer of anti-Semitic materials at home and abroad. Anti-Semitic items appear frequently on radio and television, in newspapers and journals, and even in children's magazines. A recent study of the Soviet Army indicates that anti-Israel and anti-Semitic propaganda are now part of the compulsory indoctrination program for new recruits. Its campaign of anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism in the mass media and press is a serious threat to the security and status of Soviet Jewry.

No wonder that Soviet Jews see themselves as locked into a world where the few remaining personal freedoms dwindle and their security as Jews seems dimmer than it has in many years.

FACTORS IN THE EMIGRATION DECLINE

No one knows for certain why the Soviet authorities have shut down Jewish emigration. A variety of factors are involved, including the current state of American-Soviet relations. Another reason cited by Soviet Jewish activists and others for the decline has been the increasing number of Soviet Jews who left the Soviet Union, all of them with invitations from Israel, and then "dropped out" and went to countries other than Israel. Recently, Soviet officials have also pointed to the high rate of neshira (dropping out) in connection with the current lower rate of emigration, claiming that Soviet Jews who do not go to Israel get their visas under false pretenses.

Several months ago, the Jewish Agency implemented a new plan which it hopes will result in a decline in the high rate of neshira. HIAS (Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society), has agreed to cooperate with the new plan under which it will assist Soviet Jewish emigrants only if they have first degree relatives (parents, spouses, children) in the U.S. or other Western countries. This new policy will begin in January and continue for three months, at which time the results will be evaluated.

AMERICAN EFFORTS

The Reagan Administration has provided verbal support and sympathy for the plight of Soviet Jewry and has made some positive gestures. At a meeting to commemorate the tragedy of the Holocaust, the President declared that the violation of human rights would be at every "negotiating table." At various meetings arranged by the National Conference on Soviet Jewry last Spring, Secretary of State Haig, Vice-President Bush, and President Reagan met with Avital Shcharansky, Iosif Mendelevich and the NCSJ leadership. The President has indicated to the Chairman of the NCSJ, Theodore Mann, that he had personally communicated to Leonid Brezhnev his concern about Soviet Jews. *But many of the promises made by the Administration have not been translated into specific action.*

NOW, MORE THAN EVER, SOVIET JEWS DEPEND ON US. OUR EFFORTS MUST BE REDOUBLED TO BRING THEIR PLIGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE PUBLIC AND TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT THEIR CASE REMAINS A PRIORITY FOR OUR GOVERNMENT.

ACTION ALERT

Hadassah, in cooperation with the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, is engaged in several activities on behalf of Soviet Jewry.

1. Petition Campaign - The National Conference on Soviet Jewry, has launched a major petition campaign for Soviet Jewry with the goal of obtaining one million signatures world wide. The response from Hadassah chapters around the country has been overwhelming and much appreciated. We thank those chapters which have responded so far. (The deadline for petitions has been extended to the middle of January. Petitions have been included in the October 26, 1981 issue of UPDATE).

2. Information Campaign - The National Conference on Soviet Jewry has recommended, in view of the highly disturbing moves in the USSR against emigration and Jewish activists, that Soviet officials be asked to explain their policies. They have urged that the following official Soviet installations be called as often as necessary requesting a response to why Jewish emigration has been cut-back to a virtual halt and why Jews are being harassed and arrested:

Oleg Toyanovsky
Ambassador
Soviet Mission to the United Nations
136 East 67th Street
New York, NY 10021
(212) 861-4900

Aleksandr Chikvaidze
Consul General
Consulate of the USSR
2970 Green Street
San Francisco, CA 94133
(415) 861-4900

Anatoly Dobrynin
Ambassador
Embassy of the USSR
1125 16th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 628-7551

** (Please be brief and polite in your communication. If you are not able to telephone, send letters or mailgrams. Calls or letters can be addressed to the Public Information Officer as well as to the individual Ambassadors.)

3. White House Communications - It is also recommended that individuals send letters to the White House expressing deep concern over the worsening plight of Jews in the Soviet Union, the drastic curtailment of emigration and the continuing harassment and imprisonment of Soviet Jewish refuseniks. The Administration should be urged to put the subject of Soviet Jewry on the agenda of all talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, and that every diplomatic effort on behalf of freedom of Soviet Jews to emigrate will be pursued.

"...fascinating and informative."
—Henry A. Kissinger

ISRAEL'S DEFENSE LINE

Her Friends and Foes
in Washington



I.L. Kenen

The Washington lobby for Israel made a decisive contribution in the struggle to establish Israel, to sustain her, and to help her achieve peace. This book tells how and why this lobby came into existence and the role played by the American people, and the American Jewish community in particular.

"Si Kenen's book describes how U.S. support for the Jewish National Home helped the Jewish people to rise from the ashes of the Holocaust—a triumph for a historically persecuted minority."

—The Hon. Jacob K. Javits

"The story of U.S.-Israel relations during the past 33 years is very much the story of I.L. Kenen and his work. His memoir is required reading for anyone interested in the U.S. role in the Mideast."

—Rep. Jonathan B. Bingham

"This book chronicles how the U.S. Congress came to believe in and support Israel. Its author—I.L. Kenen—was both the architect of the plan and director of its success."

—Robert F. Drinan, S.J.

Israel's Defense Line: Her Friends and Foes in Washington is published by Prometheus Books. It may be ordered from AIPAC, 444 N. Capitol St., N.W., Suite 412, Washington, D.C. 20001. Hard cover - \$18.95; Soft cover - \$9.95.



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THE WOMEN'S
ZIONIST
ORGANIZATION
OF AMERICA,
INC.

December 21, 1981

Dear Colleague,

"Next Year in Jerusalem". We don't want them to have to wait! Each Hadassah member who has ever contemplated "going up" to live in Israel has the opportunity to explore with her family the challenges and satisfactions of Aliyah on site THIS summer.

Enclosed are flyers that supply all the pertinent information for the Hadassah Family Live-In Israel Experience for Potential Olim. (July 1 - July 30, 1982)

PLEASE!!!!


COPY for your bulletin
CIRCULATE with your mailings
PROMOTE the information at meetings
EMPHASIZE the need for early reservations

We have a limited number of houses reserved for us at Neve Ilan, an ideal moshav shitufi in the beautiful Judaeen Hills. The participants are accommodated in the same type 3 bedroom, 1½ bathroom houses in which the permanent residents live. A cooperative mini-market and laundry are available on the premises. A swimming pool is scheduled for completion in April.

Although twelve days of touring in addition to discussions with Aliyah specialists are planned, there will be time for each participant to "live among Israelis" and "do her own thing".

I'm sure you will see to it that whomever of your membership is interested, will take advantage of this unique opportunity. Please do not hesitate to contact me if I can be of further help.

Sincerely,


Sylvia Eisen
National Aliyah Chairman

SE:SNV
encl.

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Henrietta Szold
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Frieda S. Lewis
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\$5,796 per family

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RETURN BEFORE FEB. 1, 1982 TO:

SYLVIA EISEN
National Aliyah Chairman
HADASSAH
50 West 58th St.
New York, N.Y. 10019

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
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Make Check Payable "HADASSAH FAMILY LIVE-IN
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NATIONAL ZIONIST AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF HADASSAH

From: Mrs. Henry Goldman, Chairman, National Zionist Affairs Department
Marc Brandriss, Director, Zionist Affairs Department

To: Presidents, Education Vice-Presidents and Zionist Affairs Chairmen

23 Nisan 5741

April 27, 1981

SEVEN DEADLY FALSEHOODS

On the Sale of Arms to Saudi Arabia

FALSEHOOD # 1

If the United States does not sell Saudi Arabia the weapons it demands, the Saudis will go elsewhere to buy military equipment.

The Saudis have requested, as a "litmus test" of Saudi-American relations, that the United States sell it the most advanced version of the Sidewinder air-to-air missile (the AIM-9L), and conformal fuel and equipment pods (FAST-packs). These "add-ons" will transform the F-15 fighter-bomber, (America's most sophisticated military aircraft) from defensive to offensive planes, significantly increasing their combat range and destructive capabilities. In addition, the United States has proposed to sell Saudi Arabia five AWACS (Airborne Warning and Command Systems) which are intelligence gathering and command and control aircraft.

The Saudis could not obtain these weapons elsewhere. No other country has been capable of producing weapons of the quality and sophistication of the F-15s and the AWACS.

FALSEHOOD # 2

Saudi Arabia will never attack Israel.

Saudi Arabia has participated in every war against Israel by the supply of military hardware to other Arab states and even troops on occasion (For example, a Saudi brigade of approximately 3,000 troops was dispatched to Syria during the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, where it participated in fighting along the approaches to Damascus.) Saudi Arabia has been the major financier of the terrorist PLO which is committed to Israel's destruction, providing it with about \$400 million a year or over \$1 million a day. Saudi Arabia reiterated its call for a Jihad (holy war) against Israel at the recent Islamic Summit at Taif.

FALSEHOOD # 3

The Soviet Union is the major threat to Saudi Arabia and the United States should assist the Saudis in deterring Soviet encroachments in the Middle East.

If the Soviet Union attacked Saudi Arabia, the weapons provided by the United States, including the enhanced F-15s would not be effective in

defending a much more powerful Soviet attack. Only the United States could effectively defend against a massive Soviet offensive. In order to deter the Soviets, the U.S. will have to establish its own military presence in the region. Ironically, the Saudis have refused to permit American bases on its territory which could serve as one of the effective means of deterring Soviet moves in the Middle East and Persian Gulf area. Most important of all, the Saudis do not consider the Soviets to be the major threat in the Middle East. During Secretary of State Alexander Haig's recent trip to the Middle East, the Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, publicly stated that the Saudis believe that Israel was "the main cause of instability" in the region, and not the Soviet Union as claimed by Secretary Haig.

FALSEHOOD # 4

If the United States does not agree to sell Saudi Arabia the sophisticated weapons it demands, the Saudis may cut back on oil production and raise oil prices.

Despite the sale of American weapons to Saudi Arabia, the Saudis have not been "moderate" in their oil pricing and production policy. Since 1978, when the United States first agreed to supply F-15s to Saudi Arabia, its supposed oil "moderation" has resulted in significantly higher oil prices, increasing from \$12 a barrel to \$32 a barrel. There is no reason to believe that the Saudis will be more moderate in their oil policy in the future. The Saudis determine their oil prices and production policies according to their own economic interests. The sale of advanced weaponry would not insure future Saudi moderation in oil pricing or production.

FALSEHOOD # 5

The United States can halt the supply of weapons if Saudi Arabia misuses them.

There is no guarantee that the U.S. would take such action. Many Congressmen approved the sale of the F-15s to Saudi Arabia in 1978 in the hope and expectation that the Saudis would support the Camp David peace effort. Instead, Saudi Arabia has actively opposed the Camp David Accords, worked to strengthen the Arab rejectionists and isolate Egypt within the Arab world and called for a holy war against Israel. Despite its active opposition to U.S. interests in securing peace in the Middle East and past Saudi military participation in wars against Israel, the United States has never threatened to or cut back its supply of arms to Saudi Arabia.

FALSEHOOD # 6

Israel would be able to withstand any military threat from Saudi Arabia, should it occur, despite the supply of these new weapons.

Undoubtedly, Israel would be able to defend itself against an attack from Saudi Arabia alone. But Israel would not have to contend with Saudi Arabia alone, but with the entire bloc of Arab states whose combined military arsenal has begun to exceed even that of NATO.

FALSEHOOD # 7

The AWACS (Airborne Warning and Command System) is an intelligence gathering and surveillance aircraft and does not pose an offensive threat to Israel.

While the AWACS can perform a defensive function, it is an offensive weapon. The AWACS can be used to significantly enhance the offensive


capability of the Saudi airforce, dramatically increasing the military threat to Israel. The AWACS is a modified Boeing 707 jet equipped with a 30-foot rotating radar dome antenna. With the AWACS, Saudi Arabia could monitor all of Israel's military activities, following the movement of troops, aircraft, tanks and artillery pieces, exposing the entire country of Israel to Saudi aerial surveillance. The AWACS in Saudi hands would preclude a pre-emptive strike by Israel against an imminent attack by hostile Arab forces and would provide the Arab states with a pre-emptive strike capability against Israel.

Moreover, the AWACS can be used to coordinate an attack by F-15 fighter-bombers. Tests have shown that the use of the AWACS in this manner is extremely effective, multiplying the "kill-ratio" of the F-15s. A single AWACS could pick up and distinguish among as many as 600 flying targets, providing detailed information on the size, speed and direction of about 240 of them. Thus, enemy planes and anti-aircraft devices, directed by the AWACS can "home-in" immediately on Israeli planes and could instantaneously determine the best route for enemy planes to intercept Israeli aircraft. A major Israeli asset in the balance of military power in the Middle East has been its qualitative superiority, particularly of its airforce. The supply of AWACS to Saudi Arabia would eliminate much of this essential qualitative margin.

RANGE OF THE AWACS

The AWACS can detect any plane in the air as much as 400 miles away. It can monitor movements on land within a 200-300 mile distance.

An example of the distances involved can best be illustrated through the use of a map of the United States. An AWACS over Washington, D.C. could detect high-flying planes as far away as Massachusetts, Michigan, South Carolina and parts of Canada, Tennessee and Ohio. Its radar could also detect any movement on the ground or in the air anywhere in the Virginias, Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Connecticut and large parts of New York and North Carolina.



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Stop Arms For Saudis

By Joseph R. Biden Jr.

David agreements or their support for the Palestine Liberation Organization. Auxiliary fuel tanks would double the range of their F-15's and thus increase the threat to Israel. The AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air missiles would nullify Israel's technological edge in aerial combat. These missiles, on which American fighter aircraft rely, would also be made more vulnerable to loss or compromise. The sale of tanker aircraft would reduce our own inventories, which our commanders already call "insufficient."

Most troubling is the proposed sale of AWACS — Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft — which carry highly sophisticated computers and radar for intelligence collection and aircraft command and control in wartime. In Saudi hands, the planes would, as one Israeli military expert said, "let them strip our most secret defenses totally naked." It would also expose sensitive American technology, vital for the air defense of Europe, to the risks of espionage, defection, war, and overnight change in government.

We should have learned from the fall of the Shah that our sophisticated military equipment should not be entrusted to unstable regimes. The Phoenix missiles sold to the Shah are now considered compromised. If the AWACS offered to him had actually been delivered, how secure would we be today?

It might appear that the presence of hundreds of additional American technical specialists would provide us with some leverage over Saudi use of the offensive equipment involved in this sale. But, again, our Iran experience should teach us that at best any such leverage may prove slight, and that at worst a change in government or the outbreak of another regional war could entrap both our personnel and our policies.

Even with this new equipment, Saudi Arabia by itself can never deter or defeat a determined Soviet attack. But neither can America construct a permanent alliance and coincidence of interests by acquiescing to every Saudi request for added weapons. We cannot and should not expect our security relationship to be any stronger or broader than our range of consensus with the Saudis on other foreign policy issues. Those who worry that the Saudis, if rebuffed, might turn elsewhere for friends and weapons should recognize that they will still be free to do so after the sale.

United States security requires more than promises of friendship and hopes of cooperation. The strategic risks in the arms package for Saudi Arabia justify rejection of it.

Joseph R. Biden Jr., Democrat of Delaware, is a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

PRESIDENTS CONFERENCE URGES INTENSIVE CAMPAIGN AGAINST PROPOSED ARMS SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA

The Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA) reported that the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations has called on its 34 national member agencies to launch an "intensive" campaign directed to the White House, the State Department and Congress against the Reagan Administration's proposed arms package to Saudi Arabia.

The Presidents Conference urged its member agencies to organize a letter writing and mailgram campaign to the Executive and Legislative branches of the U.S. government and to request local chapters to visit their Senators and Representatives during the current Congressional recess "to express deepest concern" over the arms package which would include AWACS, air-to-air missiles and additional fuel tanks for Saudi Arabia's F-15s that would permit them to fly over Israeli air space with offensive weapons.

Howard Squadron, chairman of the Conference, urged members to "stress that America's strategic interests in the Middle East require a commitment from Saudi Arabia to the peace process and to underscore the threat posed by the arms race to the economy and security of our country's friend and ally, Israel."

YOM YERUSHALAYIM

Monday, June 1, 1981 - 28 Iyar 5741

A colorful exhibition of 18 posters, "From 1830 Till Next Year in Jerusalem" has been prepared by the W.Z.O. Department of Information. This exhibition, which traces the modern history of Jerusalem, makes a lovely permanent exhibit for synagogues, community centers, etc., or can be used as decoration for any Jerusalem related event.

It is available, in limited quantity, for \$20 per set from the American Zionist Federation, 515 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022. (The AZF will only accept prepaid orders).

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UPDATE

NATIONAL ZIONIST AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF HADASSAH

From: Mrs. Henry Goldman, Chairman, National Zionist Affairs Department
Marc Brandriss, Director, Zionist Affairs Department

To: Presidents, Education Vice-Presidents and Zionist Affairs Chairmen

11 Sivan 5740

May 26, 1980

MAY 26-DEADLINE OR "LIFELINE"

Six weeks ago, following President Sadat's and Prime Minister Begin's visits to Washington for talks with President Carter, Egypt and Israel agreed to step up the autonomy negotiations with a view towards achieving significant progress by the target date of May 26. Two weeks ago, in a surprise move, President Sadat decided to suspend the autonomy talks. Then, in another reversal, President Sadat decided to resume the suspended negotiations on Palestinian autonomy, in deference to a personal appeal from President Carter. Backtracking once again, Sadat suspended the talks in reaction to a bill proposed in the Knesset to establish Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

The autonomy negotiations were never expected to be easy. It is highly unlikely that an agreement will be reached on May 26. But despite some talk of May 26 as a "deadline" for achieving an agreement on autonomy, it should be recalled that May 26 was never considered more than a target date for reaching an accord. Even though the May 26 target date will not be met, the talks will nevertheless continue in the weeks and even months ahead if necessary. President Sadat, Prime Minister Begin and President Carter all have a strong common interest in success. It should also be remembered that Israel and Egypt continued negotiations for a peace treaty for three months beyond the target date on a peace agreement set at Camp David.

One of the difficulties that has beset the autonomy negotiations is the attempt by Egypt to grant the Administrative Council, legislative and executive powers.

Dry Bones



THIS WOULD CONSTITUTE A BASIS FOR AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN STATE.

What is often forgotten is that the autonomy negotiations were never intended to lead to an agreement on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The autonomy as agreed at Camp David, was meant to serve as an interim five year arrangement during which the Palestinians, Israel, Egypt and Jordan would negotiate for the final status of these territories. Those five years were intended to be a time for testing and mutual accommodation. To insist on a self-governing authority for the West Bank that is more than administrative is to prejudge the final determination of the permanent status of the area.

While significant agreement has been reached, substantial differences between the Egyptian and Israeli positions remain in the following realms:

THE NATURE OF THE AUTONOMY

In conformity with the Camp David accords, Israel's position is that autonomy should extend to the "inhabitants" of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district. Egypt, on the other hand believes that the autonomy should extend to lands as well.

THE NATURE OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY

Israel's position is that an administrative council should be set up. As stipulated in the Camp David Accords, the term "administrative council" defines but also qualifies the powers of this self-governing authority. Egypt, on the other hand, requests full legislative and executive authority, in addition to the administration of justice. An administrative council, by definition, cannot exercise such powers - these are the prerogatives of an independent state.

THE POWERS OF THE SELF-GOVERNING AUTHORITY

According to the Camp David agreement these powers should be negotiated between the parties. Israel, therefore, believes that these powers should be jointly defined. Egypt, on the other hand, requests that all the powers currently exercised by the Military Government should be handed over to the self-governing authority. This position is unacceptable to Israel since there are certain powers, such as security, which for obvious reasons cannot be transferred.

THE SOURCE OF AUTHORITY

Every autonomy arrangement (and examples are numerous) has had a power above it. This is particularly true of one which is to provide for a transitional period of five years. It is Israel's view that the source of authority should be the Military Government. To adopt any other position would be to preordain the ultimate result after the five year period and would vest the self-governing authority with the attributes of an independent state. The Egyptian view is that the self-governing authority should be a self-generating authority, and that no outside source should vest it with authority. To adopt that position would mean, again, an independent state, rather than autonomy.

SECURITY

The role of the self-governing authority described in the Camp David accords is "to assist in providing such security. A strong local police will be constituted and...will maintain continuing liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israel, Jordanian and Egyptian officers." It follows from this that internal (as well as external) security must be in Israel's hands to enable it to counter the twin threat of terrorism and armed invasion, while the role of the self-governing authority should be defined as "assistance" by its police force.

JERUSALEM

The subject of Jerusalem was not included in the Camp David accords, although it was a topic of discussion at Camp David. Jerusalem was considered to be outside the boundaries of the proposed autonomous areas. A return to any form of division within the city would be contrary to all future harmony, coexistence and the spirit of mutual respect and tolerance which has developed since its reunification. Israel does not wish to include any part of Jerusalem in an autonomy agreement precisely because this would imply a redivision of the city.

What is needed then, is an agreement on autonomy that will not foreclose options but one which will mark a new beginning, open and subject to the dynamics of mutual accommodation and peaceful coexistence. As the complex and difficult autonomy talks proceed, as they must, one must recognize Israel's real and legitimate concern with the security of its citizens. Certainly, an autonomy agreement that would lead to the establishment of a PLO-led independent state or a return to the pre-1967 borders would only serve to threaten Israel's vital security and heighten the tensions and instability in the region as a whole.

JERUSALEM: NOW ISRAEL'S LARGEST CITY

Thirteen years after its reunification, Jerusalem has emerged as Israel's largest city with a population of 420,000, surpassing that of Tel Aviv. According to statistics released on the occasion of Yom Yerushalayim, 290,000 of the city's residents are Jews, 100,000 are Moslems and 12,000 are Christians. In the thirteen years since the Six Day War of June 1967, the total population increased by 137,000 or approximately 52 percent. Of the post-1967 increase, 95,000 were Jewish and 42,000 were non-Jewish.

THE HEBRON MURDERS

For the perpetrators of murder in Hebron there is no difference between the residents of Kiryat Arba or the children's house at Misgav Am. Both are occupied by Jews and, therefore, both are fit targets for slaughter.

That the victims in Hebron were engaged in a peaceful Sabbath eve procession and that the victims at Misgav Am were small children within the 1967 borders is entirely irrelevant to PLO calculations. On the contrary, the more helpless the target the more intense the pull on the trigger. This has been the way of the PLO since its inception, It is for this reason that this organization has been put beyond the pale by all Israeli governments.

Even as we mourn the dead in Hebron and nurse the wounded, Israel must look beyond the tragic cycle of violence and repression. For that is precisely the formula of the terrorists whose aim is to ignite the entire area in a blaze of violence engulfing not only Israel and the West Bank but the entire Middle East. (adopted from a Jerusalem Post editorial)

NOSHRIM: ACTIVISTS WANT NEW POLICY

More than thirty of the best-known Soviet Jewish activists, angered by the persistently high level of "drop-outs" (Jews who are given visas to emigrate to Israel, but choose instead to go to the U.S.A., Canada, Australia or other countries in the West) have signed a letter demanding an immediate change in policy which will result in a considerably higher proportion going to, and remaining in, Israel.

It is now known that although the 1979 emigration figures were the highest for more than five years, as many as two out of every three families "dropped out", a percentage which, say the activists is "dangerous, damaging and absolutely intolerable."

They stress the point that the entire movement of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union is a direct result of the many sacrifices and considerable suffering of those who fought for the right to be repatriated to their historic homeland.

They further claim that the present level of drop-outs is directly damaging to all emigration: "We cannot exclude the possibility", the letter states, "that the virtual stoppage of emigration from parts of the Ukraine is due to the fact that from towns like Odessa and Kiev a large number of Jewish families have emigrated to the U.S.A. and places other than Israel."


The fears expressed by the signatories appear to be borne out by reports that OVIR officials are themselves increasingly aware of the drop-out phenomenon and are directly challenging applicants as to where they intend to go.

One women applicant from Leningrad who had asked for permission to join her son in Israel was cross-examined for several hours about her son's job and home conditions before the OVIR official told her that he was well aware that her only son was, in fact, in England.

In their letter, the activists put forward two points for the consideration of Israeli and American bodies set up for the assistance of Soviet Jewish emigration. They are as follows:

- a) "To transfer the transit camp in Rome to Israel and give it ex-territorial rights. We believe, that direct contact with people there and getting to know the country personally will remove the effects of anti-Israeli propoganda, to which the Russian Jews have been subjected for many years. Seeing the country will help them to understand their situation as Olim (immigrants), and they will recognize that they owe the country a duty, which they must fulfill.
- b) Those people who after spending some time in the transit camp still wish to leave for other places should be helped by Jewish organizations in the form of a loan."

Although it is perhaps inevitable that the long-term refuseniks, most of them committed wholeheartedly to the fundamentals of aliyah, should feel some resentment that thousands of non-refusenik families are getting out, and going to the States, the letter in no way suggests that efforts at general emigration should be curtailed. The signatories simply emphasize that the two-thirds ratio is "unacceptable" and potentially damaging.



NATIONAL ZIONIST AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF HADASSAH

From: Mrs. Henry Goldman, Chairman, National Zionist Affairs Department
Marc Brandriss, Director, Zionist Affairs Department

To: Presidents, Education Vice-Presidents and Zionist Affairs Chairmen

29 Tevet 5741

January 5, 1981

JERUSALEM: CHALLENGE TO ISRAEL'S SOVEREIGNTY

THE U.N.

The United Nations is now the staging ground for the Arab campaign to delegitimize Israel, a campaign which is often focused upon Jerusalem. Among the series of anti-Israel resolutions previously adopted by the UN General Assembly and restated in these past weeks, are resolutions :

- *calling for withdrawal of Israel from all "occupied" territories INCLUDING JERUSALEM.
- *denouncing of Israel's recent law declaring Jerusalem the capital of Israel.
- *condemning Israeli actions in Jerusalem.

THE VATICAN

Recently, Pope Paul II was quoted in a Cairo newspaper interview as saying that:

"No one nation can claim exclusive ownership" of Jerusalem.

The Pope was further reported to have said:

"The Vatican categorically rejects the view that it is enough to protect the right to visit the holy places while leaving Jerusalem a united Jewish city under Jewish rule."

A RESPONSE

It is undeniable that Jerusalem is revered by all three major monotheistic faiths. But the universal reverence for the city should not obscure the particular attachment of the Jewish people to Jerusalem.

To Christians and Moslems, Jerusalem is the city which contains many of their holy shrines and sites -- objects of their pilgrimages and the focus of their devotion. TO JEWS, JERUSALEM IS THE LIVING CENTER OF THEIR FAITH AND OF THEIR IDENTITY AS A PEOPLE. ALL OF JERUSALEM IS SACRED TO THE JEWISH PEOPLE.

THE LAW

There is no incompatibility between Israel sovereignty over an undivided Jerusalem and absolute freedom of access and worship by Christians and Moslems. This is an essential principle in Israeli law. In 1967, after the Six Day War when Jerusalem was reunified,

the following law was passed by the Knesset to protect the Holy Places:

1. The Holy Places shall be protected from desecration and any other violation and from anything likely to violate the freedom of access of the members of the different religions to the places sacred to them or their feelings with regard to those places.
2. (a) Whosoever desecrates or otherwise violates a Holy Place shall be liable to imprisonment for a term of seven years.
 (b) Whosoever does anything likely to violate the freedom of access of the members of different religions to the places sacred to them or their feelings with regard to those places shall be liable to imprisonment for a term of five years.

THE PRACTICE

Israeli courts have been vigorous in their protection of the holy places from desecration. Israel has been particularly sensitive regarding the protection of holy sites and places of worship, recalling the many synagogues and institutions destroyed by Arab governments and by Nazi Germany during the Holocaust.

ISRAEL HAS AT NO TIME CLAIMED EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER THE HOLY PLACES SACRED TO OTHER RELIGIONS. Shortly after the reunification of Jerusalem in 1967, Abba Eban, in a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, stated:

The measures taken by my Government to secure the protection of the Holy Places are only a part of Israel's effort to ensure respect for universal interests in Jerusalem...It has forewith ensured that the Holy Places of Judaism, Christianity and Islam be administered under the responsibility of the religions which hold them sacred.

Israel's policy has been recently restated by Ambassador Yehuda Blum in the UN Security Council:

The free and unfettered administration of the Holy Places by each religion and its chosen institutions is and will be guaranteed, and this in cooperation and conjunction with the religious authorities concerned.

JORDAN'S RECORD

The Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan in 1949 called for free access to the holy places and cultural institutions and use of the Cemetery on the Mount of Olives. The Jordanians did not honor these commitments and for the first time in centuries, Jews were completely barred from their holiest of places, the surviving Western Wall of the Temple and were forbidden to live anywhere in the Old City occupied by Jordan from 1949-1967. In addition, the Jordanians violated the sanctity of almost every Jewish place of worship, destroying synagogues and using them as stables and latrines. The Jewish Quarter of the Old City was left in ruins and thousands of Jewish tombstones on the Mount of Olives were uprooted and used to pave roads.

Even Moslem residents of Israel were barred from visiting Islam's holy sites. The Christian community of the city also felt the harsh effects of Jordanian rule. Christian Churches were forbidden to buy land and numerous other privileges long enjoyed by Christian religious institutions were abolished, resulting in substantial decrease in the Christian population.

ISRAEL'S RECORD

The reunification of Jerusalem in 1967 brought to an end the religious repression of the Jordanian government. Since 1967, there has been complete freedom of movement within the united city for members of all faiths including citizens of nations still at war with Israel. In contrast to Jordan, Israel has not engaged in any activity intended to destroy or limit access to Moslem and Christian holy places. On the contrary, Israel has actively worked in cooperation with foreign theological and research institutions to restore these holy sites.

Israel's record of safeguarding the holy places is a record that has not been equalled by any other nation. It is the height of absurdity that it is now condemned by the Arab world, the United Nations, and even the Pope who demand what in effect would be a return to religious discrimination, repression and destruction in the Holy City.

SOVIETS CRACKDOWN ON JEWISH CULTURE

The network of self-education seminars and classes organized by Moscow Jewish refuseniks has been severely curtailed by a wave of KGB raids and arrests. Hebrew self-study groups and seminars have proliferated over the past decade and have been a critical feature of Jewish renaissance in the USSR.

On December 9, eight KGB officers forced their way into a Jewish studies group being conducted by long-term refusenik Ilya Essas. The group was threatened with the accusation of holding an "illegal" religious gathering. They were told that they could be indicted for "violating laws on separation of church and state and of church and school." It was later reported that informal classes taught by veteran refuseniks Yuli Kosharovsky, Vladimir Shakhnovsky and Lev Gorodetsky were recently disrupted, and the participants threatened with prosecution.

In a related act of harassment, on the morning of December 16, the KGB entered a "Gan," or informal nursery school, for refusenik children and ordered all present to leave. The nursery had been in existence for almost three years in a Moscow suburb.

The National Conference on Soviet Jewry and the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council has suggested that:

**statements of community outrage be sent to the local media.

**similar statements be elicited from local prominent educators, NEA groups and teachers' unions.

**Your local representatives may also wish to express their views on this matter.

SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION DROPS MORE THAN 80%

The National Conference on Soviet Jewry reported that only 789 Jews left the Soviet Union in November, a decline of 81.2 percent over the same period for 1979. In the 11 months of 1980, a total of 20,582 Jews left the USSR as compared to 47,175 in the same period in 1979. This constitutes a decline of 56.4%.

Burton Levinson, chairman of the NCSJ, stated: "At a time when East and West European nations are meeting in Madrid to review the Helsinki Accords, including the emigration of Soviet Jews, and others, Moscow continues to test Western resolve. I am certain that our government and others will meet that test and that the American Jewish community and its supporters will do the same."

NEW YORK MAYOR LOVES JERUSALEM; DENOUNCES UN

During his recent visit to Jerusalem, New York Mayor Ed Koch lashed out at the UN, calling it anti-Semitic and urged Israel to resist UN pressure on the issue of Jerusalem.

The Mayor said that with so many conflicts in the world, "I can't understand why so much attention is given at the United Nations to Israel. I really do understand. They are anti-Semitic. And I don't mean anti-Jew and anti-Arab. I mean anti-Jew."

Mayor Koch also stated that Jerusalem should not be redivided and should remain under Israeli rule. He urged Israel to resist UN resolutions calling for the internationalization of the city. "Jerusalem is an international city," he stated, "but it should not be under international control."

A CALL TO CONSCIENCE

More than 100 scholars, scientists and artists--including 30 Nobel laureates--recently joined in a "statement of conscience" to voice their alarm at the growing danger to world peace resulting from the erosion of the United Nations. Their statement is reproduced on page 4 of this issue of UPDATE.

THIS STATEMENT SHOULD BE GIVEN THE WIDEST POSSIBLE EXPOSURE. We suggest you join with other groups in your community to place this statement as an advertisement in your local newspaper. One of the regular advertisers might be asked to sponsor the ad in which your chapter could also be listed as sharing the sentiments expressed by the Committee for U.N. Integrity and the signers of the statements.

news
&
analysis

UPDATE

NATIONAL ZIONIST AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF HADASSAH

From: Mrs. Henry Goldman, Chairman, National Zionist Affairs Department
Marc Brandriss, Director, Zionist Affairs Department

To: Presidents, Education Vice-Presidents and Zionist Affairs Chairmen

1 Tevet 5741

December 8, 1980

THE U.N. EQUATION ANTI-ZIONISM = ANTI-SEMITISM


Five years ago, this past November, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the infamous resolution equating Zionism with racism. Even before, the United Nations has demonstrated time and time again that it has become the principal international forum for attacking Israel and Zionism. The Arabs and their allies in the Soviet block and the Third World, by using the United Nations as a major arena for their political and propaganda warfare against Israel, have succeeded in perverting the ideals and purposes of that international body.

The Arab attack against Israel in the U.N. is part of an overall strategy developed in intimate coordination with the PLO to set in motion a process of delegitimizing Israel in the community of nations. It is both pathetic and obscene that the organization established after the defeat of Nazism now condemns Israel and the Jewish people as racists, transparently hiding behind the code-words of anti-Zionism. Many throughout the world do not fully appreciate the fact that anti-Zionism has now become a "polite" euphemism for anti-Semitism. We, however, are not misled. Anti-Zionism has indeed become the "respectable" substitute for anti-Semitism. Anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism are one and the same.

One cannot divorce Zionism from Judaism. The yearning for the return to Zion has always been a central focus of our Jewish faith. Zionism as a primary component of our Judaism stresses the inseparable bond between the Jewish people, the People of Israel and the Land of Israel. It was no accident that the Jewish national movement was termed Zionism since Zion, or Jerusalem, has always been the focal point of Jewish nationalism since the time of King David. Zionism is indeed the oldest and most long-lived movement for national liberation in the history of the world.

Just as Zionism cannot be separated from Judaism, anti-Zionism cannot be viewed apart from anti-Semitism. Classic anti-Semitism denies the right of Jews as equal members of human society. So

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too, anti-Zionism would deny the right of the Jewish people to national sovereignty and equality in the society of nations. Thus, when the United Nations declares that Zionism is racism, it is not simply an attack on Israel but an attack directed against Jews throughout the world.

Abba Eban once remarked that if the Arabs decided to introduce a resolution at the United Nations declaring that the world was flat, they could count on the support of nearly half that organization's members. Unfortunately and alarmingly, Mr. Eban's prediction is now a fairly accurate description of the political odds and isolation facing Israel in that forum. Only today, their numbers would account for the overwhelming majority of the members of the world organization.

At one time, we might have consoled ourselves that the "tyranny of the majority" in the United Nations was composed of the alliance between totalitarian regimes and dictatorships which included the Arab and Soviet blocs and their Third World allies. Israel could at least, in the past, count on the small and frighteningly decreasing number of democratic countries of the free world to come to its support in the face of the onslaught of anti-Zionist forces. This unfortunately is not the case today.

If any of us had been carried away by the wave of euphoria that accompanied the signing of the Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt less than two years ago, the current proceedings at the United Nations surely has had a sobering effect, reminding us that most of the world, indeed, even that part of the world with which we have shared the values of peace, freedom and democracy, have abandoned not only Israel but the ideals and inspiration that have been the foundation and cornerstone of the free world. Instead of supporting the Camp David peace process which provides the most hopeful avenue for resolving the future status of the West Bank and which invites the Palestinians to participate in the determination of their own future, the United Nations with the acquiescence and even support of Western Europe is actively working to undermine it. Perhaps it is too much to expect that a body founded and dedicated to the pursuit of international peace and security would at least take hopeful note of the first major step towards peace in 30 years of uninterrupted hostility in the Middle East. Instead, the United Nations churns out condemnation after condemnation of Israel, totally ignoring the first serious and hopeful steps toward peace.

CURRENT U.N. ACTIVITIES

This Autumn, for the third consecutive year, the United Nations will be celebrating "Palestine Week" from November 29 through the first week of December. November 29 had been selected by the PLO as "Palestine Day" because it coincides with the date in 1947 when the UN voted to partition Palestine. This year's "celebration" will be subdued, however, because of the continuing war between Iraq and Iran and the heightened tensions between Jordan and Syria. Nevertheless, a PLO exhibition of the Palestinians and the screening of a film, "Palestinians Do Have Rights" will again be presented. (An analysis of the film was included in last year's October 15, 1979 issue of UPDATE).

In addition, the United Nations Postal Administration will issue a set of stamps on the theme of the "Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People." (Jewish organizations have been active in protesting the issuance of the stamp for the last two years. Now that the stamp has actually been issued, it has been advised that to protest after-the-fact may create a "market" for them that would not be desirable, since collectors may be quick to capitalize on the stamps if they believe that they will become controversial).

For several weeks this Fall, there had been fears that the Arab bloc might seek to reject Israel's credentials in the current session of the UN General Assembly. That concern has been eased temporarily and it is considered unlikely that the Arabs will seek to

challenge Israel's credentials in the General Assembly until well into December, if indeed, they adopt such a strategy. Arab disunity as reflected in the Iraqi-Iranian conflict and Jordanian-Syrian tensions seem to indicate that there is no specific and immediate threat to Israel in the UN at this time. This judgment, however, must be qualified by the unpredictability of developments in the United Nations. The Arabs may still decide to challenge Israel's representation later in the year or seek other forms of sanctions.

At present, therefore, the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council (NJCRAC), of which Hadassah is a part, has recommended that the Jewish community refrain from public protest actions that might magnify publicity for the "Palestine Week" celebrations at the UN which, in general, have been little noticed. Ongoing educational and interpretive efforts, however, are encouraged especially if developments in the UN arena appear to warrant more concerted action in the future.

MOYNIHAN MEASURE TO BAN U.S. FUNDS TO PLO

Two weeks ago, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan gained Senate approval of an amendment prohibiting U.S. contributions to UNESCO projects that support the PLO. His amendment, attached to the 1981 Appropriations Bill, provides that the U.S. contribution to UNESCO be reduced by 25 percent of the cost of projects that distribute aid to the PLO or are administered by or in consultation with the terrorist organization. In submitting the amendment, Moynihan stated that "we will not allow the United Nations and its specialized agencies to fund organizations devoted to undermining and destroying the very principles upon which the United Nations is based."

In introducing the measure, Senator Moynihan added to a practice put into effect last year when he and Congressman Lester Wolff offered an amendment to the State Department Authorization Bill which reduced American contributions to the United Nations budget by 25 percent of the amount spent on two UN bodies that have served as a front organization for the PLO — the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, and the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights.

The new Moynihan amendment extends the prohibition on U.S. aid for PLO activities to UNESCO. The UNESCO budget recently adopted at its 21st General Conference in Belgrade contained what Moynihan characterized as "transparent efforts to provide funds to the PLO." The 25 percent cut was selected because the United States furnishes approximately one-quarter of the UN budget.

ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE UN DOUBLE STANDARD

Last month, in a little-noticed but important development, Saudi Arabia announced that it has closed its borders to religious pilgrims and tourists. Saudi Arabia is the site of the two holiest cities of Islam — Mecca and Medina — but as a result of the Saudi action, devout Muslim pilgrim from all over the world, would be barred from visiting their holy places.

In a letter to Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith asks whether the international community will speak out against this blatant violation of religious rights. The Saudi action is contrasted to the reality of Israel's rule over a united Jerusalem. In the thirteen years of Israeli control over the entire city of Jerusalem, while in a state of war with its Arab neighbors, Israel has maintained an unbroken guarantee of access to the holy places for Jews, Christians and Moslems. In the last year alone, more than 80,000 Islamic pilgrims, mostly Arabs, visited their holy places in Jerusalem. Yet, Israel alone is subjected to vilification and hateful propaganda.

CORRECTION: The last issue of UPDATE included a resolution adopted by the American Zionist Federation protesting the National Council of Churches statement on the Middle East. The second paragraph of the AZF resolution should have read: "The N.C.C. call for Peace and Justice in the Middle East is seriously undermined by its advocacy of a PLO state "apart from the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan."

RENEWED DECLINE IN SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION

In what appears to be another cutback in Soviet Jewish emigration, only 524 Jews arrived in Vienna from the Soviet Union during the first three weeks of November. If this rate continues, the total emigration figure for the month of November will be only 800, the lowest since last August. In September, 1300 Jews emigrated and in October the figure was 1400. The decline in the emigration figures for November has renewed fears that the Soviet Union might be intending to close the door to further Jewish emigration.

ACTION ALERT: BRAILOVSKY ARREST

In the last issue of UPDATE (Nov. 24) we reported on the November 13th arrest of Dr. Viktor Brailovsky, a leading figure in the Soviet Jewish emigration movement. Dr. Brailovsky is currently under investigation for "defaming the Soviet state and public order," a charge punishable by up to three years in prison. The charges appear to stem from his role as editor of the underground cultural journal, Jews in the USSR.

Brailovsky and his wife Irina have been involved in the struggle for Jewish emigration for over a decade. He and his family applied to emigrate eight years ago in March 1972 and were refused on the grounds of Irina Brailovsky's alleged "access to secret information" while a computer scientist at Moscow University. They have been repeatedly harassed by Soviet authorities and arrested several times. His home has been searched and material of scientific and Jewish cultural concern confiscated.

Viktor Brailovsky was arrested only two weeks before the Festival of Chanuka. Abraham Bayer, Director of the NJCRAC International Commission recently recalled that a few years ago he had the opportunity to visit the Brailovskys in their Moscow home on the first night of Chanuka. During their visit, it was pointed out that it is traditional to light the Chanuka candles on the window sill so that the miracle of the the festival commemorating the defeat of the oppressors of the Jewish people would be magnified. Dr. Brailovsky then pointed to the street below and urged that the Chanuka candles be lit at his window so that the KGB then watching the Brailovsky apartment would see the candles. This year, at our Chanuka celebrations, it is appropriate that when we light the Chanuka candles, we also leave one Menorah unlit to remind us of Viktor Brailovsky and all Soviet Jews who are not free to be Jews in the Soviet Union.

The National Conference on Soviet Jewry has urged that we act now to prevent Viktor Brailovsky from going to trial. It has suggested that local communities create a "Committee to Free Viktor Brailovsky" and publicize his plight in the local press and media. In addition, communications should be sent to Soviet authorities demanding that Viktor Brailovsky be released and that he and his family be permitted to emigrate to Israel immediately. Cables of protest should be sent to the following Soviet officials:

Roman Rudenko
Procurator General
ul. Pushkinskaya 15-A
Moscow, 103009
RSFSR, USSR

Yuri Andropov
Chairman of the KGB
ul. Dzerzhinskogo 2
Moscow, 10100
RSFSR, USSR

Albert Ivanov
Department of Administrative Organs
of the Central Committee of CPSU
Staraya Ploshchad' 4
Moscow, 103132
RSFSR, USSR

Copies of each cable should be sent to:

Anatoly Dobrynin, Ambassador
Embassy of the USSR
1125 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Aleksandr Chikvaidze, Consul General
Consulate of the USSR
1790 Green Street
San Francisco, California 94133

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NATIONAL ZIONIST AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF HADASSAH

From: Mrs. Henry Goldman, Chairman, National Zionist Affairs Department
Marc Brandriss, Director, Zionist Affairs Department

23 Tammuz 5743

July 4, 1983

SYRIA: A DANGEROUS "SPOILER"

Tensions between Syrian and Israeli forces in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley have eased recently, but there has been no letup in Syrian President Assad's rejection of the Lebanon agreement and Syria's refusal to withdraw its nearly 50,000 troops from Lebanon.

Having failed to block the U.S.-sponsored accord, Syria is devoting its efforts to wreck the agreement and resist Lebanon's decision to terminate the state of war with Israel. The Lebanese Parliament overwhelmingly ratified the Israel-Lebanon Agreement, yet the Syrians have the audacity to claim that the Lebanese government and parliament's action is illegal and not binding.

SPOILER'S STRATEGY

Syrian President Hafez Assad has pursued a "spoiler's" strategy from the very moment the Lebanese-Israeli accord was signed. Syria has:

- * unyieldingly maintained the rejectionist line, not only refusing to withdraw, but increasing its troop strength in Lebanon.
- * pressured Lebanese President Gemayel to renounce the agreement and, failing that, encouraged radical forces inside Lebanon to protest the accord.
- * most importantly, Syria has banked on help from the Soviet Union, which wants to use its close ties to its Syrian client to counter U.S. influence



and reinject itself into the Middle East diplomatic process.

THE REAL INTERVENTIONISTS

The Soviet Union has not only worked to undermine the U.S.-mediated accord, but it has also delivered huge numbers of planes, tanks and its most sophisticated missiles to rebuild Syria's forces, shattered during Israel's operation in Lebanon last June.

Recent events in Lebanon have demonstrated that Syria, with Soviet support, is the interventionist force in Lebanon. It is now perfectly clear that it is Syria and its PLO and Soviet allies, not Israel, which is the obstacle to the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty and independence.

 SYRIAN REJECTIONISM

THE BELLICOSE REACTION OF THE SYRIAN REGIME TO THE SIGNING OF AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON WHICH TERMINATES THE STATE OF WAR AND ESTABLISHES GOOD-NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, WHILE EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING AND STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL PEACE BASED ON FREEDOM, EQUALITY, JUSTICE AND RESPECT FOR FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS, WAS NOT UNEXPECTED. SUCH CONCEPTS ARE NOT PART OF THE SYRIAN POLITICAL LEXICON.

SYRIAN: A REJECTIONIST STATE

Syria's opposition to the Israel-Lebanon Agreement is on par with its rejection of Israel's right to exist and its strategic goal of sabotaging any political initiative that would lead to a negotiated accommodation with Israel and promote stability and peace in the Middle East.

Syrian rejectionism has found unambiguous expression on numerous occasions:

*REJECTION OF ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST

"Syria is still the only Arab state that adheres to the resolutions of the Khartoum Conference of 1967 which decreed: 'no peace, no recognition and no negotiations with Israel.' Syria will always adhere to these resolutions." (Syrian Information Minister Iskander, 12/18/82)

*REJECTION OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242

"The Zionist entity is only a temporary phenomenon.. U.N. Security Council resolution 242 has to be rejected." (Foreign Minister Haddam, 7/7/80)

*REJECTION OF THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS:

"We want a firm stand against the Camp David agreements and their consequences. We want joint Arab action against the agreements... We reject the Camp David Agreements." (Information Minister Iskander, 11/5/78)

*REJECTION OF THE ISRAEL-LEBANON AGREEMENT

"Assad stated that Syria will spare no effort to frustrate the agreement. Syria, the Arab nation, and the forces of progress and peace in the world are strong enough to smash the agreement, and this strength will find expression in the very near future." (Radio Damascus 6/3/83)

*REJECTION OF LEBANON'S REQUEST FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL

"In the wake of such an agreement, Syria cannot ever pull out of Lebanon at any point in the future.. our troops will where they are, regardless of what they think in Washington, and in time certain measures will be taken against Lebanon." (New York Times, 5/15/83, quoting a high Syrian official.)


THE DESIGN FOR A "GREATER SYRIA"

Syrian rejectionism is not confined to the denial of Israel's right to exist. Syrian leaders have repeatedly declared that Lebanon, too, is part of Syria. Thus, shortly after the Syrian invasion of Lebanon in 1976, President Hafez Assad stated:

"Historically, Syria and Lebanon are one country." (Radio Damascus, July 20, 1976)

Ever since Lebanon achieved independence in 1943, the various regimes that ruled in Damascus have made no secret of their wish to annex that country. To this day, there is no Syrian embassy in Beirut.

 THE PERILS OF THE PLO



The rebellion in Lebanon's Bekaa valley of al-Fatah terrorists against Yasir Arafat's leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is being interpreted, as usual, as a fight between moderates and extremists.

The rebels, it is said, want to pursue armed struggle against Israel, while the "moderates" want to try diplomacy.

 THERE ARE NO PLO MODERATES

The truth is that all the factions in the PLO are committed to the same strategic goal--the destruction of the state of Israel. They only differ on the tactics to be employed.

 ARAFAT CONTINUES TO PURSUE THE MILITARY OPTION

When al-Fatah, the largest of the eight terrorist groups in the PLO and allegedly its most "moderate" faction, convened its ruling Revolutionary Council to discuss the growing mutiny in PLO ranks, it announced that it was prepared to meet some of the rebels' demands.

The Revolutionary Council declared that even the so-called "moderate" Arab League's Fez Plan for the resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict on Arab terms should be jettisoned "in favor of the military option" against Israel.

 PLO DOES NOT REPRESENT PALESTINIAN ARAB INTERESTS

The violent rivalries in PLO ranks of the past few weeks demonstrate clearly that the PLO does not represent the interests of the Palestinian Arabs. Yasir Arafat cannot even maintain control over al-Fatah, the terrorist organization he founded.

Moreover, the factional rivalries demonstrate that the PLO, contrary to the wishful thinking of some, could never assume a productive role in Middle East negotiations. Even Arafat's recent pretenses at diplomacy has led to a further radicalization of the PLO.

 SYRIAN DUPLICITY

The PLO rebellion also serves as another example of extremist Arab duplicity. Syria, which often projects itself as the tried and true defender of the radical Palestinian cause, is now engaged in a battle against Yasir Arafat for control of the PLO--to better enable it to continue Syrian domination of Lebanon.

What Saudi Key?

By Jacob Goldberg

ITHACA, N.Y. — It is often argued by American policy makers and journalists that Saudi Arabia holds the key to the success or failure of the Israeli-Lebanese agreement. Such an assertion reflects a widespread but mistaken — and indeed dangerous — perception of Saudi Arabia as a power capable of shaping the course of events in the Middle East.

In reality, Saudi Arabia is a "one-crop" economy, lacking in manpower and dependent on a sizable foreign workforce. New, long-term changes in the world's oil market have already cut annual income by 60 percent in two years. Strategically, the country's long frontiers make it vulnerable to a number of close enemies — while its armed forces are at once weak and small in number. Finally and perhaps most important, Saudi Arabia's leverage over other Arab states is severely limited — as was demonstrated by its failure to dissuade Egypt from pursuing the Camp David peace process.

The two most recent major developments in the Middle East further demonstrate the Saudis' limited power. First, this winter, the Saudis were absolutely unable to influence the Palestine Liberation Organization to join with King Hussein of Jordan in picking up the Reagan peace plan. Nor have the Saudis been able to realize their wish to see the Syrians out of Lebanon. Saudi leverage with Damascus is almost nonexistent, and both Syria and Lebanon manipulatively claim that the Saudis are on their side: Syria insists that Riyadh feels the withdrawal agreement undermines Lebanon's commitments to other Arabs, while Lebanon argues that the Saudis support its decision to ratify the accord.

In fact, whether President Hafez al-Assad of Syria eventually decides to stay in Lebanon or withdraw will not depend on Saudi pressure but rather on his own interpretation of Syria's interests. If he is determined to stay, no amount of Saudi financial assistance will be able to change his mind. And should he decide to withdraw — which is very unlikely — he will probably extract significant financial compensation from Riyadh.

Clearly, then, the Saudis are neither path breakers nor consensus builders. Most often, they are consensus followers. And the misconception that they are key actors in Middle East politics — a view that they themselves help to propagate — places insurmountable

Jacob Goldberg, head of the Saudi Arabian desk at the Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Tel Aviv University, is visiting professor of Middle Eastern studies at Cornell University.

pressure on Riyadh. The Saudis cannot possibly hope to fulfill the high expectations this view creates both in the Arab world and in the West — and these false hopes invariably lead to frustration and bitterness that threaten the security of the ruling House of Saud.

Thus, Syria is angry that the Saudis did not prevent Lebanon from signing the agreement with Israel. The Lebanese are upset that Saudi Arabia does not pressure President Assad to withdraw from Lebanon. Iraq blames Saudi Arabia for not forcing Syria to reopen a pipeline that would enable Iraq to export enough oil to fund its war with Iran. The Reagan Administration is disappointed that Saudi Arabia did not press the P.L.O. to approve King Hussein's entrance into the peace process. Nor can Washington understand why Riyadh does not use its leverage to obtain a Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. Above all, the entire Arab world is frustrated that the Saudis cannot deliver the United States — cannot force it to recognize the P.L.O. and press Israel to withdraw from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Limited leverage

For nearly a decade, as rising oil prices enabled Saudi Arabia to distribute billions of dollars throughout the Arab world, Riyadh failed to recognize that the recipients of this aid were often pursuing their own agendas. Meanwhile, the Saudis themselves were unable to advance any clear policy goals, creating the impression that the money is not intended to buy influence but rather protection — and making the Saudis look susceptible to blackmail. No wonder, then, that almost none of the recipients seem to feel grateful or indebted to Riyadh.

Disillusionment and a new awareness of the limits of their power may eventually lead the Saudis to re-evaluate their strategy. Simple prudence suggests that they should abandon their attempts to play a role they cannot possibly fill — to stop making promises they cannot keep. Such a shift in Saudi foreign policy would draw criticism from Riyadh's Arab "friends," who are accustomed to using Saudi Arabia as a weapon in their rivalries with other Arabs. But in the long run, such a reappraisal would clearly benefit the Saudis themselves. It is high time that Riyadh's friends in the West stop overestimating Saudi power and imposing the burden of an impossible assignment that, in the final analysis, is not in the Saudis' own interests.

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NATIONAL ZIONIST AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF HADASSAH

From Mrs. Henry Goldman, Chairman, National Zionist Affairs Department
8 Av 5743 ^{May} Brandriss Director Zionist Affairs Department

July 18, 1983

SYRIA SLAMS DOOR ON U.S. PEACE EFFORTS

President Hafez Assad's adamant refusal to withdraw Syrian forces from Lebanon has severely diminished the prospects for the implementation of the agreement on withdrawal between Israel and Lebanon that was reached last May.

SERIOUS BLOW TO PEACE

The failure of Secretary of State Shultz to produce any flexibility in the Syrian position is also a serious blow to overall peace prospects in the Middle East because the Israel-Lebanon agreement represented an important step towards the Arab world's acceptance of Israel's right to exist.

Lebanon is the second Arab state that appeared ready to enter into peaceful and normal relations with Israel. Syria is doing all it can to undermine an agreement that removes a second Arab state from the Arab-Israel conflict.

THE SOVIET ROLE

Encouraged by its Soviet patron which has flooded Syria with massive shipments of sophisticated weapons, President Assad stands determined in his desire to retain Syrian control over Lebanon and committed to undermining any movement by another sovereign Arab state toward peace with Israel.

Moscow, as always, is happy to profit from the instability in Lebanon and the Arab hostility toward Israel. The Soviets remain opposed to any peace arrangements achieved through U.S. mediation. A withdrawal of all foreign troops and the restoration of a Western oriented, independent Lebanon is viewed

by Moscow as an unwelcome American diplomatic success.

ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT-?

In order to minimize the number of casualties to its troops, Israel, in consultation with the United States, is considering a limited redeployment of its forces in Lebanon.

If the contemplated redeployment takes place, Israel would expect the Lebanese Army and the multinational peacekeeping force to fill the vacuum.

Ironically, now that Israel is prepared to redeploy its forces further to the south, both the United States and Lebanon are urging Israel not to do so. They appear to finally realize that without an Israeli presence in southern Lebanon, in the absence of a withdrawal of other foreign forces, the area will either revert to anarchy or be quickly infiltrated by PLO and Syrian units.

THE U.S. ROLE

That is precisely why it is important for the U.S. to maintain diplomatic pressure on Syria and to make it clear to the Kremlin that it will not permit Syrian rejectionism backed by Soviet obstructionism to ~~derail~~ the positive results of Israeli peace efforts and American diplomacy.

 THE SAUDI ARABIAN MIRAGE

 LESSONS FROM LEBANON

The Administration still seems to entertain the hope that Saudi Arabia will use its influence to encourage Syria to withdraw from Lebanon. But there is no evidence to indicate that the Saudis are willing, or able, to play such a role.

Indeed, one major lesson of the war in Lebanon is the utter bankruptcy of a Saudi-based American policy. Out of a combination of weakness, cowardice and genuine hostility to the ultimate U.S. aim of peaceful Arab co-existence with Israel, the Saudis have not lifted a finger to advance peace in the region.

While the conservative monarchy in Saudi Arabia may be secretly grateful that the radical Soviet-backed PLO has suffered defeat, it is abundantly clear that the Saudi regime has been unwilling to use its leverage with the PLO or the Syrians.

And while the Saudis might favor the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, King Fahd opposes the terms of the Israel-Lebanon Agreement because it includes provision for Arab recognition of Israel's right to exist with normal relations with its northern Arab neighbor.

 THE NEED FOR A NEW U.S. POLICY

Any reformulation of American Middle East policy in the wake of the war in Lebanon must dispense with past notions that Saudi Arabia is a "moderate" and "pro-Western" Arab regime.

The reality is that Saudi Arabia has waged economic and diplomatic war against the U.S. and other Western industrialized countries and has politically undercut American peace-making efforts in the Middle East.

Periodic Saudi intimations that it is willing to support U.S. peace efforts are merely mirages meant to delude Western audiences into believing that they are moderate. In truth, the Saudis

have not abandoned the hope of Israel's eventual demise as demonstrated by the regime's repudiation of any Arab readiness to make peace with Israel.

 OPPOSED TO U.S. INTERESTS

Saudi Arabia, as demonstrated in a recent ADL research study, is still working against nearly all U.S. interests in the area.

**Although the Administration's peace efforts were based on the assumption that Saudi Arabia would use its economic and political influence to persuade Jordan to enter negotiations with Israel, no such thing happened.

**The Saudis used their influence to try to undermine peacemaking efforts and did nothing to influence Syria to cooperate in U.S. mediation efforts.

**Much of the Saudi funding for both Syria and the PLO has gone for the purchase of arms from the Soviet Union.

**The Saudis continue to cooperate with Arab efforts to undermine the U.S. sponsored Camp David peace process. They broke relations with Egypt after the late President Anwar Sadat signed the peace treaty with Israel in 1979.

**Despite the sale by the U.S. of a wide variety of sophisticated arms including F-15 jets and AWACS, the Saudis refuse to permit the establishment of American military bases for the defense of their own oil fields and the Persian Gulf.

**Saudi Arabia has objected to, and for a time blocked, U.S. oil purchases for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.

 AN UNTRUSTWORTHY ALLY

Today with Saudi influence reduced and waning, the desert kingdom, which has never been a completely trustworthy friend of the United States, is an even weaker reed upon which to base American Middle East policy.

A LEBANESE WHITEWASH

Over four months after the Kahan Commission submitted its report on the massacre of Palestinian Arabs in the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps in Beirut by Christian Lebanese forces, an official Lebanese government report was released recently.

While the Israeli Kahan Commission painfully but courageously acknowledged the indirect responsibility of some Israeli officials, it established conclusively, after meticulous investigation that it was the Phalangist forces that perpetrated the slaughter in the refugee camps. Not one Israeli soldier was implicated in the massacre.

In contrast, the whole intent of the Lebanese "inquiry" was to shift the burden of guilt onto Israel and to absolve the Lebanese from any measure of blame. It exonerated the Christian Phalangists and its military arm, the Lebanese Forces, of any advance knowledge or support for the massacre. It recommended that there should be no prosecution of anyone for anything.

IN SHORT, IT WAS A WHITEWASH!

STILL ANOTHER U.N. TRAVESTY

On August 16-17, the United Nations will convene another of its all too frequent anti-Israel extravaganzas in Geneva. The purpose of this new "International Conference on the Question of Palestine" is to mobilize world opinion on behalf of the terrorist PLO whose fortunes have declined in recent months.

Despite objections by two European countries which had originally been invited to host the conference, preparations are under way at U.N. headquarters in Geneva. One wonders whether the Europeans objected to the conference on principle, or whether they were merely concerned about the attendant security problems.

THE U.N. CAMPAIGN AGAINST ISRAEL

This past year, as usual, Israel dominated the U.N. agenda. Almost weekly, somewhere in the U.N. system, Israel finds itself under attack. Examples abound:

**In July 1982, the U.N. Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (UNESCO) passed a number of anti-Israel resolutions, including one equating Zionism with colonialism and racial discrimination. Incredibly, another called for the rewriting of Biblical history to obliterate the role of the Jewish people.

**In September 1982, Israel's credentials were rejected by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

**In September 1982, a similar expulsion move was narrowly defeated in the International Telecommunications Union (ITU).

**In October 1982, Iran tried (but failed) to challenge Israel's credentials in the U.N. General Assembly.

A CLASSIC SCAPEGOAT

Why has Israel, the lone democracy in the Middle East, become the principal target of U.N. condemnation?

To be sure, matters relating to the Arab-Israel conflict are important. Yet, they surely are not more urgent or critical to world peace as-- the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and the Iran-Iraq war.

Rather, the U.N. has attempted to cast Israel as an international pariah under pressure from the PLO, using Israel and Zionism as a scapegoat for most of the world's ills.

SOVIET JEWS: A PLEA FROM JERUSALEM

We share with you the following letter-to-the-editor in The New York Post, on June 30 written by Igor Tufeld, a former Soviet Jew now living in Jerusalem. We believe it poignantly describes the despair and frustration of Soviet Jewish Refuseniks in the face of increasing harassment and declining emigration.

THE 15 members of a Pentecostal family who finally won permission to leave the USSR this week are lucky. I salute them and wish them well.

But the world should not be deceived by this one humane act of a sadistic Soviet regime. There are tens of thousands of Jews who have been waiting many years to quit the Socialist "paradise." Two of them are my parents.

I was born in Moscow in 1957. Because I wanted to live as a Jew in freedom, I applied in 1976 to emigrate to Israel. Permission was refused because I had "no relatives" there.

That October I joined other refuseniks in a demonstration against the emigration restrictions. The KGB jailed us for 15 days; among my cellmates was Anatoly Shcharansky, who today is wasting away in a Soviet prison.

Six months later, without explanation, I received an exit permit and emigrated to Israel. Then my parents applied to join me. Today, six years later, they are waiting still.

My father, Vladimir, is an invalid; he needs a spinal operation, but the wait is long. He could be operated on quickly in Israel.

My mother, Izolda, had

major surgery two years ago; she too is disabled.

My parents wait in growing despair. They have never met my wife, whom I married in Jerusalem three years ago. They have never met their only grandchild, my son Daniel.

Mine is only one of thousands of families that have been broken by a state policy that has cut Jewish emigration from more than 4000 per month in 1979 to 100 per month this year.

Last week I flew from my home in Jerusalem to testify before a joint hearing of two committees of the House of Representatives in Washington. I told them that the first days of Yuri Andropov may be compared with the final days of Josef Stalin, with his heinous "Doctors' Plot" accusations against the Jews.

The exit gates that were opened for a few years have been slammed shut. Jews who seek to live as Jews, or to study or teach Hebrew, have become the targets of official harassment. Most ominous is the sharp intensification of state-sponsored anti-Semitic propaganda.

The release of a handful of Pentecostals must be seen for what it is: a propaganda device aimed at tricking the West into thinking that the USSR is about to turn over a new leaf. But the Soviets must prove their intentions with much more than a single act of compassion.

Let them give exit permits to the thousands of freedom-seeking Jews who have been trying for 10 years and more to emigrate. Let them end the cruel separation of loved ones.

If they wish, let them begin with my parents. But let them begin.

IGOR TUFELD
Jerusalem

SOVIET ANTI-ZIONIST COMMITTEE - OMINOUS NEW DEVELOPMENTS

The recently established "Anti-Zionist Committee" in the Soviet Union (see June 20 and April 25 issues of UPDATE) will open branches in major cities throughout the U.S.S.R. in addition to Moscow where it is headquartered, according to the Soviet Communist Party newspaper Pravda.

The purpose, says Pravda, is to organize activities "in certain cities to fight the spread of Zionist propaganda."

Commenting on this new development, Pravda sharply attacked Israel and "World Zionism" charging that they "use methods similar to those of the Nazis."

This new propaganda ruse represents a continuing attempt by Soviet authorities to give the impression that there is no persecution of Jews in the Soviet Union. It has been artificially concocted by the Kremlin to counteract and cover up the Soviet program of Jewish spiritual and cultural repression and the almost complete cessation of Soviet Jewish emigration.

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UPDATE

NATIONAL ZIONIST AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF HADASSAH

From Mrs. Henry Goldman, Chairman, National Zionist Affairs Department
Marc Brandriss, Director, Zionist Affairs Department

22 Av 5743

August 1, 1983

ISRAEL REDEPLOYS: SYRIA TOUGHENS ITS STAND

The Israeli Cabinet unanimously approved a redeployment of Israeli troops in Lebanon. The details and timing of the pullback are still to be determined, but Israel will withdraw its forces from the Beirut suburbs and the Shuf mountains and redeploy them on a new line along the Awali River just north of Sidon.

TIGHTER SECURITY MEASURES

Israel has made it clear that it will hold to its positions on the eastern front along the Bekaa Valley until Syria and the PLO terrorists agree to withdraw their forces. Defense Minister Moshe Arens has stated that if the Lebanese Army is successful in taking over the areas evacuated by Israel, there would be further redeployments in the south and along the Lebanese coast. The redeployment will be accompanied by more stringent security measures to further minimize casualties among Israeli forces.

LEBANESE & U.S. MISGIVINGS

Lebanese and American officials have curiously opposed the Israeli redeployment, expressing fears that, in the absence of Syrian and PLO withdrawals, a permanent partition of Lebanon would ensue. Even Secretary of State Shultz has publicly expressed "disappointment with the Israeli decision.

Implicit in their opposition is that Israel should be held responsible for what they believe will result in a de facto partition in Lebanon. What they seem to forget is that Israel, not



Syria, has signed an Agreement and repeatedly declared that it will withdraw all its forces from Lebanon.

SYRIA TO BLAME

The blame for the current state of affairs in Lebanon lies solely with Syria and its PLO clients. Syria has not only declared its refusal to withdraw, but has asserted its right to continue to control and dominate its Lebanese neighbor.

SYRIAN LEBANON

Secretary of State George Shultz returned from his recent trip to Damascus empty-handed. The Syrians are still in Lebanon; they have no intention of going home--because in the Syrian perception they are already home.

The Syrians, and not just the regime of President Hafez Assad, have always viewed a large part of Lebanon as a Syrian province, eventually to be reunited with the Syrian motherland. Syria never recognized the independence of Lebanon and never exchanged ambassadors with Beirut.

THE PLO REBELLION: SYRIA'S GAIN

One obvious explanation for Syria's backing of the PLO rebellion against Yasir Arafat is because President Assad intends to make sure that Syria's stronghold in Lebanon--in which there are still 10-15,000 PLO terrorist forces--will serve only Syrian goals. Syria has been willing to support the fragmentation of the PLO in order to strengthen its own position inside Lebanon.

Moreover, Syria is backing the PLO rebels who espouse an even more extremist ideology which would replace Arafat's pretense at diplomacy and his veneer of "moderation." This is consonant with President Assad's determined refusal to deal with Israel as a legitimate state, and the Syrian desire to oversee Israel's destruction.

IRONY OF THE U.S. POSITION

During this past year's negotiations for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanon, State Department officials were claiming that the Syrians were quite willing to leave Lebanon; all that was necessary was Israel's formal agreement to withdraw. But once again, the Arab desire for peace was grossly

overestimated. Israel signed the agreement with Lebanon to withdraw. Syria will not even negotiate with Lebanon on the matter.

NO UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL

Afterwards, Israel was asked by the United States to consider a timetable for a unilateral Israeli withdrawal as an inducement for the Syrians to do the same. Israel, understandably, refused. Israel had once before unilaterally withdrawn from Lebanon, in 1978 after the Litani operation, only to find that United Nations troops merely served as a cover for the massive PLO buildup in the south, while the Syrians were consolidating their positions in the Bekaa Valley to the east.

Now that Israel has decided on a partial redeployment of its forces to more defensible lines--to minimize Israeli casualties and to avoid Israel's entanglement in the age-old struggles among Lebanon's diverse factions and religious sects--the Lebanese government and the U.S. Administration are resisting. They claim that a partial withdrawal by Israel to more secure lines would result in the de facto partition of Lebanon.

SYRIAN RESPONSIBILITY

The truth is that if Lebanon has been partitioned, it is Syria which did the partitioning when it first sent its army into Lebanon 7 years ago. That army has now been increased to about 50,000 troops and there is no intention of withdrawing them.

The United States, therefore, should make it clear to the Syrians that it is they who will be held responsible for any further violence and conflict in the area -- since their refusal to withdraw prevents the Lebanese Government from restoring its full control over the country.

A STUDY IN CONTRASTS

SYRIA

"There is something important which [the United States] must understand...The matter is that, to the Arab homeland, Syria is one thing and Israel is something else. Syria is the core of the Arab homeland, including Lebanon. But Israel is an alien element in the Arab homeland and it should be removed from this entire homeland one day by force...[note: Syria also considers "Palestine" a part of "Greater Syria".] Therefore, we cannot compare the legitimate presence of friendly forces in Lebanon, namely, the Syrian forces, and the hostile forces... namely the Israeli forces." (Damascus Radio, denying reports that Syria might withdraw from Lebanon even if Israel left.)

ISRAEL

"After the Cabinet decision (on redeployment of its forces from Lebanon), Israeli officials emphasized that they did not view what they called the "redemption" as the beginning of partition, but only as a means of providing additional security for their soldiers and possibly to exert new pressure on the Syrians to pullback.

"'We are very willing to leave Lebanon,' one official said. 'It is almost an obsession. We want to leave Lebanon.'" (The Washington Post, reporting on the Israeli decision to redeploy its troops in Lebanon.)

SOVIET INJUSTICE

It would probably be futile to hope that Soviet Community Party leader Yuri Andropov would respond to letters from his own citizens the way he responded to the now famous letter from an American schoolgirl.

Eleven year-old Samantha Smith from Maine and her parents were given a grand tour of the Soviet Union as a result of the young girl's letter to Andropov voicing her concerns about nuclear war between the superpowers.

Twelve year-old Irina Tarnopolsky of Moscow has received no reply to her letter to the Soviet leader asking that her father, a Jewish Refusenik, be freed from prison. Yuri Tarnopolsky has just been sentenced to three years in a labor camp because he sought to emigrate to Israel.

Andropov has tried to exploit the American schoolgirl's visit for all its worth in an attempt to display Soviet "humanitarianism." Yet, he sentences innocent people to harsh prison terms for the "crime" of seeking to emigrate to the Jewish homeland in Israel.

Zionist Affairs **SELF** **Jewish Education**
ENRICHMENT PROJECT





50 WEST 58th STREET • NEW YORK, N.Y. 10019 • (212) 355-7900 • Telex: HADASS 425191

5 Tishrei, 5744
September 12, 1983

הדסה

THE WOMEN'S
ZIONIST
ORGANIZATION
OF AMERICA,
INC.

Shalom, dear Colleague:

One year ago the National Jewish Education Department created the concept of a "Self-Enrichment Project"--an exciting new way for Hadassah members to explore the joys of Jewish learning.

"Jewish History" was the first unit published and as you probably know it was greeted with great enthusiasm. This Project can provide an answer to the long-felt need of those who thirst for more knowledge and understanding of our Jewish heritage and of the historical and moral precepts that shaped the unique development of the Jewish People.

Using the techniques developed for Unit I, of first evaluating and then increasing knowledge, the Zionist Affairs and Jewish Education Departments have developed the second in this exciting series--on Israel and Zionism. The questions and especially the answer keys have been designed to impart a deeper understanding of the history of the Zionist Movement, which gave birth to the modern state of Israel.

This, then, is your new Self-Enrichment unit on Israel and Zionism. It is an exciting adventure in learning, and we hope you will use it and share it with your colleagues and members of your family. Look upon it as an open door to a continued enriching and exciting experience.

Cordially,

Marc Brandriss, Ph.D.
National Zionist
Affairs Director

Joseph Lowin, Ph.D.
National Jewish
Education Director

Deborah Kaplan
Coordinator
Education Division

Rose Goldman
National Zionist
Affairs Chairman

Barbara Goldstein
National Jewish
Education Chairman

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SELF-ENRICHMENT PROJECT
UNIT II. ISRAEL AND ZIONISM

Part 1: Zionist History and Personalities

1. What is the "Return to Zion" called in Hebrew?
 - a. Yishuv
 - b. Shivat Tzion
 - c. Ahavat Tzion
 - d. Hovevei Tzion
2. The "First Aliyah" (immigration) to Palestine came in the year _____, primarily from _____. (fill in blank)
3. Who said: "If you will it, it is no dream?"
 - a. Louis Brandeis
 - b. Theodor Herzl
 - c. Leo Pinsker
 - d. Stephen S. Wise
4. The event which inspired Theodor Herzl to write The Jewish State was _____. (fill in blank)
5. The first Zionist Congress was held in:
 - a. Basle, Switzerland in 1897
 - b. Paris in 1917
 - c. Jerusalem in 1948
 - d. London in 1917

6. At the First Zionist Congress, the Hatikva was adopted as the National Anthem. It was written by:
- a. Ahad Ha'am
 - b. Theodor Herzl
 - c. Naphtali Herz Imber
 - d. Rabbi Tzvi Hirsch Kalischer
7. Eliezer Ben-Yehuda was:
- a. Founder of the Kibbutz movement
 - b. The father of modern Hebrew
 - c. An 11th century Spanish-Jewish poet and author of the Kuzari
 - d. The founder of the Haganah
8. Who has been called the national poet of the Jewish people?
- a. Shaul Tchernichovsky
 - b. Chaim Nachman Bialik
 - c. Uri Tzvi Greenberg
 - d. Hillel Bavli
9. The first national Zionist organization in the United States was founded in the year _____. (fill in blank).
10. What is the source of the following quotation? The..."government views with favor the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish People."
- a. Israel's Declaration of Independence
 - b. United Nations resolution of November 1947
 - c. The Balfour Declaration of November 1917
 - d. The British White Paper of 1939

11. Britain received a Mandate over Palestine from:

- a. The League of Nations
- b. The United Nations
- c. The Ottoman Empire
- d. The British Commonwealth

12. The Zionist movement was a purely European and American Jewish phenomenon and organized Zionist groups never existed in the Middle East outside of Israel.

TRUE FALSE (circle one)

13. The State of Israel proclaimed its independence on:

- a. June 4, 1967
- b. April 6, 1951
- c. May 14, 1948
- d. November 29, 1947

14. Yom Ha-Atzmaut is:

- a. Holocaust Memorial Day
- b. Memorial Day for Israel's Fallen Heroes
- c. The anniversary of the liberation of Jerusalem
- d. Israel's Independence Day

15. The aims of Zionism as set forth in the "Jerusalem Program" are: (fill in the blanks-- Hint: They are listed on the back of the Hadassah membership card.)

- a. _____
- b. _____
- c. _____
- d. _____
- e. _____

ANSWER KEY

Part 1: Zionist History and Personalities

1. Answer: b. Shivat Tzion

The Yishuv was the organized Jewish community in pre-State Palestine. Ahavat Tzion means the love of Zion. Hovevei Tzion was a Zionist movement founded in 1882 for the purpose of encouraging Jewish settlement in Palestine.

2. Answer: 1882, primarily from Russia.

The pogroms and persecution suffered by the Jews of Russia in 1881-82, set off large-scale Jewish emigration from the Czarist state. Many had been inspired by the "Hovevei Tzion" movement which encouraged agricultural settlement of Jews in Palestine. Members of the First Aliyah pioneered cooperative settlements (today's kibbutzim and moshavim) in areas not previously settled by Jews.

3. Answer: b. Theodor Herzl, the Father of modern political Zionism, author of The Jewish State, and convener of the First Zionist Congress at Basle, Switzerland in 1897.

Louis Brandeis, the first Jew to be appointed an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, assumed a leading position in the American Zionist movement. Brandeis asserted that Zionism, far from being inconsistent with American patriotism, was actually the inevitable consequence of true Americanism. In a famous quote, he stated: "Multiple loyalties are inconsistent...Every American Jew who aids in advancing the Jewish settlement in Palestine...will be a better American for doing so."

Leo Pinsker, a major forerunner of political Zionism, was the author of Auto Emancipation (1882). He did not believe in emancipation and enlightenment as the solution to the Jewish problem in Europe. What the Jewish people needed, Pinsker concluded, was "auto emancipation in a land of their own."

Stephen Wise, Rabbi, Jewish communal leader, and prominent American Zionist, was a founder of the Federation of American Zionists (1897) and the American Jewish Congress (1916). A supporter of Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt, he often interceded on behalf of Zionist and Jewish concerns.

4. Answer: The Dreyfus Affair

Theodor Herzl was a journalist covering the trial of Captain Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish officer on the French General Staff who had been accused of treason. The trial and subsequent conviction of Dreyfus as a German spy in 1895 (he was sentenced to life imprisonment) set off a wave of anti-Semitism in France. A year later, Herzl published his famous treatise, The Jewish State: An Attempt at a Modern Solution of the Jewish Question.

5. Answer: a. Basle, Switzerland in 1897

The 23rd Zionist Congress, the first to meet in Jerusalem was held in August 1951. Previous Congresses, before the establishment of the state, met in Basle, London, the Hague, Hamburg, Vienna, Carlsbad, Zurich, Prague, Lucerne and Geneva.

6. Answer: c. Naphtali Herz Imber

Ahad Ha'am was the Hebrew pseudonym used by Zionist essayist Asher Zvi Ginzberg who was harshly critical of the "practical" Zionists and believed that the Land of Israel should serve as the "spiritual center" of the entire Jewish people.

Theodor Herzl was the founder of political Zionism and the World Zionist Organization.

Rabbi Tzvi Hirsh Kalischer (1795-1874) was a forerunner of political Zionism who advocated the colonization of Palestine.

7. Answer: b. The Father of Modern Hebrew

The 11th century Spanish Jewish poet who authored the Kuzari was Yehuda Halevi. The Haganah was founded by the leaders of the Yishuv in Palestine for defense of Jewish settlements.

8. Answer: Chaim Nachman Bialik

Shaul Tchernichovsky (1875-1943) physician and Hebrew poet born in Russia, was critical of Diaspora Jewish culture, devoted to Hebrew language and Zionism. He settled in Palestine in 1931.

Uri Tzvi Greenberg was a Hebrew and Yiddish poet born in Galicia in 1895. Settling in Palestine in 1924 he became known as the "poet of the Halutzim" (pioneers). His poetry later assumed an extreme nationalistic character, and he joined the Revisionist party under Vladimir Jabotinsky.

Hillel Bavli (1893-1961) Hebrew poet and educator born in Lithuania, immigrated to the United States where he taught Hebrew literature at the Jewish Theological Seminary. He was one of the first Hebrew poets to deal with American themes.

9. Answer: 1898

The Federation of American Zionists was founded in New York in 1898. Professor Richard Gottheil was elected president and Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, secretary. The Federation of American Zionists was a consolidation of 36 small Zionist groups already established in the greater New York area before the First Zionist Congress in 1897. Young Judaea was initially formed by the Federation in 1909. In 1967, Hadassah assumed sole sponsorship of Young Judaea.

10. Answer: c. The Balfour Declaration of November 1917.

Israel's Declaration of Independence was issued on May 14, 1948, establishing Israel as an independent sovereign Jewish state.

The U.N. Resolution of November 1947 recommended the partition of Israel into Jewish and Arab states.

The British White Paper of 1939 declared that it was not British policy that Palestine should become a Jewish state and greatly restricted Jewish emigration to Palestine.

11. Answer: a. The League of Nations

The League of Nations granted the mandate to Britain in 1920. The United Nations was founded in 1945. The British occupied Palestine after defeating the Ottoman Empire.

12. Answer: FALSE

Over the centuries, the religious attachment of Oriental Jewry to the Land of Israel had remained strong and there had been a continuous, though limited, flow of emigrants to Palestine from the countries of North Africa and the Middle East. In the late 19th century, the European Zionist movement attracted followers and sympathizers throughout the Middle East. The first countries in which Zionist organizations were established were Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt. As early as 1898, the communities in these countries sent delegates to the Second

(continued next page)

Zionist Congress in Basle, Switzerland. Later, Zionist groups were formed in Iraq, Shanghai, Turkey, Morocco, Libya, Syria, India and Singapore. Zionist activity came to an end with the mass exodus of Oriental Jewry to Israel in the late 1940s and early 1950s and the banning of Zionist groups in the Arab countries.

13. Answer: c. May 14, 1948, the date corresponding to the 5th of Iyar, 5708

June 4, 1967 marked the start of the Six-Day War. Israel declared its independence on May 14, 1948. On November 29, 1947, the United Nations adopted the Partition Resolution.

14. Answer: d. Israel's Independence Day

Holocaust Memorial Day known in Hebrew as *Yom Hashoah* is observed on the 27th of Nisan, the date marking the start of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising.

Memorial Day of Israel's Fallen Heroes, *Yom Hazikaron*, is observed the day before *Yom Ha-Atzmaut*.

The anniversary of the liberation of Jerusalem, *Yom Yerushalayim*, is celebrated on the 28th day of Iyar.

15. Answer: a. The unity of the Jewish People and the centrality of Israel in Jewish life.
- b. The ingathering of the Jewish People in its historic homeland Eretz Yisrael through Aliyah.
- c. The strengthening of the State of Israel which is based on the prophetic vision of justice and peace.
- d. The preservation of the identity of the Jewish People through the fostering of Jewish and Hebrew education and of Jewish spiritual and cultural values.
- e. The protection of Jewish rights everywhere.

Part 2: Geography



1. Mikveh Israel is:
 - a. The first agricultural school in Israel.
 - b. A ritual bath found on Masada
 - c. A kibbutz near Ramle
 - d. A valley in the lower Galilee

2. The modern Israeli city that was established on sand dunes in 1909 is:
 - a. Netanya
 - b. Arad
 - c. Ashdod
 - d. Tel Aviv

3. The Arava is:
 - a. The coastal plain
 - b. A mountain range in northwestern Israel overlooking the port of Haifa.
 - c. A flat desert plain stretching from the Dead Sea to the Gulf of Eilat
 - d. A river flowing into the Mediterranean in northern Tel Aviv

4. The Hula Lake is:
 - a. another name for the Sea of Galilee
 - b. located in the Negev
 - c. an ancient water-filled crater in the Golan Heights
 - d. formerly a body of water and malaria infested swamp-land north of the Sea of Galilee that was drained by the Jewish National Fund (J.N.F.) and now forms a fertile valley.

5. Identify the following maps by filling in one of the following four descriptions in the blanks under the maps.
- Palestine, 1919
 - Palestine and the Jewish National Home, 1922
 - Israel, Armistice lines, 1949-1967
 - Israel, ceasefire lines, 1967-1979.




Map One _____

Map Two _____



Map Three _____



Map Four _____

6. Identify the location of the following places on the map. (Fill in the blank next to the place-name with the appropriate letter.)

- ___ Sea of Galilee
- ___ Jerusalem
- ___ Tel Aviv
- ___ Haifa
- ___ Eilat
- ___ Ashdod
- ___ Beersheba
- ___ Lebanon
- ___ Saudi Arabia
- ___ Jordan
- ___ Jordan River
- ___ Mediterranean
- ___ Sinai (Egypt)
- ___ Golan Heights
- ___ Gaza Strip
- ___ Judea
- ___ Samaria
- ___ Tiran Straits
- ___ Dead Sea
- ___ Suez Canal
- ___ Ashkelon
- ___ Syria



7. Israel has common borders with:
- a. Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Jordan
 - b. Iraq, Egypt, Jordan
 - c. Syria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Egypt
 - d. Libya, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt
8. The territory of the State of Israel (pre-1967 borders) is approximately the same size as that of:
- a. New Jersey
 - b. California
 - c. Rhode Island
 - d. Texas
9. The population of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District is approximately:
- a. one million
 - b. 1.5 million
 - c. 750,000
 - d. 500,000
10. The lowest point on the face of the earth is:
- a. Death Valley
 - b. The Dead Sea
 - c. Antarctica
 - d. The Red Sea

ANSWER KEY

Part 2: Geography

1. Answer: a. The first agricultural school in Israel, located on the southern outskirts of Tel Aviv.

A ritual bath is known as a *mikva* in Hebrew. Ramle is a city further to the southeast of Tel Aviv. The Jezreel Valley is located in the lower Galilee.

2. Answer: d. Tel Aviv

Netanya, founded in 1929, is on the Mediterranean coast north of Tel Aviv. Arad, founded in 1961, is in the eastern Negev between Beersheva and the Dead Sea. Modern Ashdod, founded in 1955, is on the southern coast and contains Israel's southern-most deepwater port which opened in 1966.

3. Answer: c. A flat desert plain stretching from the Dead Sea to the Gulf of Eilat. Kibbutz Ketura, founded by former Young Judaeans, is located in the Arava.

The coastal plain is known as the Sharon. The mountain range overlooking Haifa is called the Carmel. The river flowing into the Mediterranean in Tel Aviv is the Yarkon.

4. Answer: d. A former body of water north of the Sea of Galilee and which now forms a fertile valley.

The Sea of Galilee is known as Yam Kinneret. The Negev is Israel's southern desert. A water-filled volcanic crater on the Golan Heights is called Birkat Ram (Pool of Ram).

5. Answer: Map One--a. Palestine, 1919

Map Two--c. Israel, Armistice Lines, 1949-1967

Map Three--b. Palestine and the Jewish National Home, 1922.

(The British partitioned Palestine in 1922 creating Transjordan out of more than 3/4 of the original Palestine Mandate.)

Map Four--d. Israel, ceasefire lines 1967-1979.

6. Answers:

B. Sea of Galilee

H. Jerusalem

I. Tel Aviv

C. Haifa

Q. Eilat

J. Ashdod

O. Beersheba

U. Lebanon

T. Saudi Arabia

S. Jordan

E. Jordan River

D. Mediterranean

P. Sinai (Egypt)

A. Golan Heights

L. Gaza Strip

F. Judea

G. Samaria

R. Tiran Straits

M. Dead Sea

N. Suez Canal

K. Ashkelon

V. Syria



7. Answer: a. Lebanon (to the north); Egypt (to the southwest); Syria (to the northeast); Jordan (to the east)


8. Answer: a. New Jersey.

Israel in its pre-1967 borders covers 7,847 square miles of territory; the state of New Jersey, 7,836 square miles. By contrast, Rhode Island (the smallest state) is only 1,214 square miles; California and Texas (the two largest states) are 158,693 square miles and 267,338 square miles respectively.

9. Answer: a. One million.

The Arab population of Judea and Samaria in 1981 was estimated to be about 800,000 while the population in the Gaza Strip numbered approximately 400,000 (or a total of about 1.2 million). The Jewish population in these territories was estimated to be about 25,000.

10. Answer: b. The Dead Sea lies 1,312 feet below sea level.



Part 3: Politics and Foreign Policy

1. Who was the first Prime Minister of Israel?
 - a. Golda Meir
 - b. Chaim Weizman
 - c. David Ben Gurion
 - d. Yitzhak Ben-Tzvi

2. The Israeli Parliament is called the:
 - a. Kinneret
 - b. Knesset
 - c. Keren Kayemet
 - d. Va'ad Leumi

3. How many members are there in the Israeli Parliament?
 - a. 120
 - b. 70
 - c. 100
 - d. 250

4. The current President of Israel is: (fill in the blank)
_____.

5. The current Foreign Minister of Israel is: (fill in the blank)
_____.

6. The current Defense Minister of Israel is: (fill in the blank)
_____.

7. The current Prime Minister of Israel is: (fill in the blank)
_____.

8. The United States Embassy in Israel is located in:
- a. Jerusalem
 - b. Tel Aviv
 - c. Haifa
 - d. Beersheva
9. The Camp David Agreements include a call for:
- a. The establishment of a Palestinian State
 - b. The return of the West Bank to Jordan
 - c. Full autonomy for the residents of the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and Gaza
 - d. Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank
10. According to the terms of the 1979 Peace Treaty, Israel agreed to return:
- a. The Golan Heights to Syria
 - b. The West Bank to Jordan
 - c. The Sinai Peninsula to Egypt
 - d. The Gaza Strip to Egypt
11. What is the source of the following quotation?
- "The claim of historical or religious ties between Jews and Palestine does not tally with historical realities nor with the constituents of statehood in their true sense. Judaism, in its character as a religion, is not a nationality with an independent existence. Likewise, the Jews are not one people with an independent identity."
- a. The Protocols of the Elders of Zion
 - b. The Palestine National Covenant
 - c. Mein Kampf
 - d. Judaism Without Embellishment

12. The primary Jewish self-defense organization that later became the foundation for the Israeli Army is known as:
- a. Irgun Zvai Leumi
 - b. Haganah
 - c. Stern Group
 - d. Palmach

13. The two major political groupings in Israel are the _____ and the _____.

14. In its short history, Israel has fought _____ wars with its Arab neighbors.

TRUE OR FALSE (circle one)

15. United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 calls for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from all the territories occupied in June 1967 and respect for its right to live in peace within secure and recognized borders.

TRUE

FALSE

16. United Nations Security Council Resolution 338, adopted on October 22, 1973 after the Yom Kippur War, calls for the immediate implementation of Resolution 242.

TRUE

FALSE

17. Israel's defense expenditures consume about 15% of its Gross National Product (GNP).

TRUE

FALSE

18. In April 1982, in compliance with its obligations under the Peace Treaty with Egypt, Israel completed its withdrawal from the entire Sinai Peninsula, which comprised nearly 75% of the territories that came under Israel's control as a result of the June 1967 Six-Day War.

TRUE

FALSE

19. Israel has no written Constitution and no Bill of Rights.

TRUE

FALSE

ANSWER KEY

Part 3: Politics and Foreign Policy

1. Answer: c. David Ben-Gurion

Golda Meir was Israel's fourth Prime Minister and assumed the office in 1969 after the death of Levi Eshkol, serving until her resignation in 1974. Chaim Weizmann was Israel's first President. Yitzhak Ben-Tzvi was Israel's second President.

2. Answer: b. The Knesset

The Kinneret is the Sea of Galilee. Keren Kayemet is the Jewish National Fund (JNF). The Va'ad Leumi was the pre-State elected assembly of the Jewish community in Palestine.

3. Answer: a. 120

[N.B. Answers to questions 4.-7. are correct through September 1983.]

4. Answer: Chaim Herzog

Past presidents include: Chaim Weizmann (1949-52); Yitzhak Ben-Zvi (1952-63); Zalman Shazar (1963-73); Ephraim Katzir (1973-78); Yitzhak Navon (1978-83).

5. Answer: Yitzhak Shamir

Past Foreign Ministers include: Moshe Sharett (1948-56); Golda Meir (1956-66); Abba Eban (1966-74); Yigal Allon (1974-77); Moshe Dayan (1977-79).

6. Answer: Moshe Arens

Past Defense Ministers include: *David Ben-Gurion (1948-54, 1955-63); Pinchas Lavon (1954-55); *Levi Eshkol (1963-69); Moshe Dayan (1967-74); Shimon Peres (1974-77); Ezer Weizman (1977-80); Ariel Sharon (1981-83).

*Ben-Gurion and Eshkol held the Defense Ministry portfolio while serving as Prime Minister. For a very brief period in 1980-81, Prime Minister Menachem Begin served also as Defense Minister.

7. Answer: Menachem Begin

Past Prime Ministers include: David Ben-Gurion (1948-54, 1953-63); Levi Eshkol (1963-69); Golda Meir (1969-74); Yitzhak Rabin (1974-77).

8. Answer: b. Tel Aviv

Jerusalem, however, is the capital of Israel, although the United States still does not recognize it as such.

9. Answer: c. Full autonomy for the residents of the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) and Gaza

During the five-year transitional period of autonomy, negotiations among Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the Palestinian inhabitants would be held to determine the issue of sovereignty and final status of Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

10. Answer: c. The Sinai Peninsula to Egypt.

Syria has adamantly refused to negotiate with Israel. In late 1981, Israel's parliament passed legislation applying Israeli law, jurisdiction and administration on the Golan Heights.

The Gaza Strip, although under Egyptian administration until 1967, had never been part of Egypt and was not a subject of the withdrawal provisions of the Peace Treaty.

The final status of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) and Gaza are to be the subject of future negotiations in accordance with the Camp David Accords.

11. Answer: b. The Palestine National Covenant

The 'Protocols of the Elders of Zion' was a slanderous late 19th century anti-Semitic forgery about an imagined Jewish conspiracy to take over the world. Mein Kampf was Adolph Hitler's autobiography and anti-Jewish and racist tract. "Judaism Without Embellishment" is a contemporary Soviet anti-Semitic tract authored by Trofim Kichko in 1963.

12. Answer: b. Haganah

The Irgun Zvai Leumi, whose leader was Menachem Begin, broke away from the Haganah in 1941 in a dispute over tactics; Haganah suspended fighting against the British for the duration of World War II while the Irgun continued it. The Stern Group was an even more extreme group that broke away from the Irgun. The Palmach was the quickly-mobilized "strike force" of the Haganah.

13. Answer: Likud and Ma'arach (Labor Alignment). The Likud is a bloc of small centrist and rightist parties, including the Herut (Freedom) party of Menachem Begin, and the Liberal party. The Labor Alignment includes the Labor party, headed by Shimon Peres, and the leftist Mapam party.

14. Answer: Six. They are: 1--the 1948 War of Independence; 2--the 1956 Sinai Campaign (also known as the Suez campaign); 3--the 1967 Six-Day War; 4--the 1970 War of Attrition (with Egypt along the Suez Canal); 5--the 1973 Yom Kippur War (also known as the October War and the War of Ramadan); and 6--the 1982 Operation Peace for Galilee (war in Lebanon).

15. Answer: FALSE

Resolution 242 calls for "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." The text of the resolution deliberately avoided the use of the words "all" and "the" and does not define the extent of withdrawal.

The resolution, by talking also of the need for "secure and recognized boundaries," contemplates that the parties to the dispute could make territorial adjustments in peace negotiations.

16. Answer: TRUE

It called for the immediate start of direct negotiations among the parties concerned.

17. Answer: FALSE

By the end of 1980, Israel's defense expenditures constituted about 30% of its GNP. By contrast, American defense spending consumes about 6% of the United States' Gross National Product.

18. Answer: FALSE

Israel's withdrawal from Sinai constituted the evacuation of more than 95% of the territories it captured in the June 1967 Six-Day War.

19. Answer: TRUE

In 1950 the Knesset voted to adopt a State Constitution over an unspecified period. A number of so-called "Basic Laws," such as the Law of Return, the Nationality Law, the Education Law, and the Law of Equal Rights for Women (to name just a few), are considered as part of the Constitution, which has not yet been adopted. Universally recognized human and civil rights and liberties, though not recorded in separate forms as in the United States, are embodied in various laws of the State.



Part 4: Society and Culture

TRUE OR FALSE (circle one)

1. Israel's population is made up mostly of Jews of European origin.
TRUE FALSE
2. Arabs make up about 15% of the population of Israel within the pre-June 1967 borders.
TRUE FALSE
3. Any Jew coming to Israel can become a citizen.
TRUE FALSE
4. Israelis work a five-day week, just like Americans.
TRUE FALSE
5. Inflation in Israel is about 50% a year in the early 1980s.
TRUE FALSE
6. Education in Israel is free and compulsory through high school.
TRUE FALSE

MULTIPLE CHOICE

7. The national pastime of Israelis of all ages is: (check one)
___ a. archeology
___ b. horticulture
___ c. history
___ d. geology

8. The Israeli author who won a Nobel Prize for Literature in 1966 is:
- a. Aharon Appelfeld
 - b. Chaim Nachman Bialik
 - c. Amos Oz
 - d. S.Y. Agnon
9. The official language(s) of Israel is (are):
- a. Hebrew
 - b. Hebrew, Arabic, English
 - c. Hebrew, English
 - d. Hebrew, Arabic
10. The largest labor union in Israel is known as:
- a. Egged
 - b. Kupat Cholim
 - c. Histadrut
 - d. Koor
11. How many universities are there in Israel?
- a. Three
 - b. Four
 - c. Seven
 - d. Five
12. The State religion of Israel is:
- a. Judaism
 - b. none
 - c. Islam
 - d. Christianity

13. Each of the 3-item groups listed below has a common feature relating to Israeli culture and society which can be found in the alphabetical listing which follows. Place the letter of the correct answer in the space provided.

- ___ 1) Hi-Tech, Diamonds, Fashion
- ___ 2) Mizrachi, Discount, Leumi
- ___ 3) Kibbutz, Moshav, Kfar
- ___ 4) Ha'aretz, Davar, Ma'ariv
- ___ 5) Miluim, Chen, Nahal
- ___ 6) Kazablan, Kuni Lemel, Sallah
- ___ 7) Ben Yehuda, Even Shoshan, Alcalay
- ___ 8) Masada, Megiddo, Qumran
- ___ 9) Marc Chagall, Jacques Lipchitz, Chaim Gross
- ___ 10) Nahum Goldmann, Helena Rubinstein, Billy Rose
- ___ 11) Naomi Shemer, Chava Alberstein, Yehoram Gaon
- ___ 12) Habimah, Israel Philharmonic, Bezalel
- ___ 13) Kol Israel, Galei Zahal, Rehov Sumsum
- ___ 14) Va'ad Halashon, Ulpan, Omer
- ___ 15) Ben Gurion, Bar Ilan, Weizman
- ___ 16) Nehama Leibowitz, Adin Steinsaltz, Jacob Katz
- ___ 17) Shmuel Katz, Yaacov Agam, Menashe Kadishman
- ___ 18) Yavneh, Mercaz Harav, Hebron

| | | |
|---------------------|--------------------------------|---------------|
| A,rcheological Digs | H,adassah commissioned artists | P,ainters |
| B,anking | I,srael Defense Forces | R,adio/TV |
| C,ountry living | J,ournalism | S,ingers |
| D,ictionaries | L,anguage learning | T,eachers |
| E,xports | M,useums | U,niversities |
| F,ilms | N,ational Arts and Culture | Y,eshivot |

ANSWER KEY

Part 4: Society and Culture

1. Answer: FALSE

Though in 1948 the Jewish community in pre-state Palestine was 85% Ashkenazi (European) in origin, by now only about 45% of Israel's Jewish population is of Ashkenazi origin, and 55% is of Oriental (Asian and African) origin. This shift is partly the result of higher birthrates and the mass aliyah from Arab countries in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

2. Answer: TRUE

This figure includes both Muslim and Christian Arabs. According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, at the end of 1982, the population of Israel (pre-1967 borders plus the Golan Heights) numbered 4,044,000, of which 3,366,300 (83%) were Jews and 688,700 (17%) were non-Jews, primarily Arabs. Sunni Muslims account for about three-quarters of the Arab total; Christians about 15%; and Druzes about 8%.

3. Answer: TRUE

The Law of Return (1950) grants every Jew who so chooses an instant and automatic right to settle in Israel as a citizen. (As amended in 1954, the Law excludes those people who are engaged in an activity directed against the Jewish people, who are likely to endanger the public health or the security of the state, or having a criminal past.) According to the Law, a Jew is someone either born to a Jewish mother, or a convert to Judaism. However, the definition of "who is a Jew?" has been the subject of political and religious controversy in Israel, with Orthodox groups pushing to have the Law amended in order to include as Jews only those people whose conversion has been "according to halacha."

4. Answer: FALSE

Israelis work a six-day week, with Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath, as the day of rest. (Friday is usually a half day.) Were Israel to switch over to a five-day week, it would probably adopt Friday, the Muslim Sabbath, as the other day of rest, rather than Sunday.

5. Answer: FALSE

The inflation rate in Israel in 1982 was about 130%; as of September 1983, inflation has been running at an annual rate of 125%. Israelis are cushioned from the full impact of inflation by the linkage of wages and salaries to the Cost-of-Living index.

6. Answer: FALSE

There is free and compulsory education up to age 13; in 1979-80 free education, but not compulsory, was extended up to and including twelfth grade.

7. Answer: Archeology

The wealth of archeological sites in Israel, dating from earliest times and including Biblical, Greek, Roman, Byzantine, Arab and Ottoman sites, has encouraged the interest of Israelis in uncovering artifacts and remains of the past. Among the important digs have been those at Masada; Hazor; the Jewish quarter of Jerusalem's Old City; and the excavations just south of the Temple Mount.

8. Answer: D. S.Y. Agnon

Aharon Appelfeld is an Israel author who writes on Holocaust themes; his work has only recently become available in English translations. Chaim Nachman Bialik is considered to be the father of modern Hebrew poetry. Amos Oz is an Israeli writer of modern fiction, both novels and short stories.

9. Answer: B. Hebrew, Arabic and English

All three are considered official languages of the State--Hebrew and Arabic for the two major population groups. English is apparently a legacy from the time of the British Mandate.

10. Answer: C. Histadrut (General Federation of Labor, founded in 1920)

Eighty percent of all workers and 90% of all organized workers in Israel belong to the Histadrut, which includes more than forty separate unions. Kupat Cholim is Israel's largest sick fund, an arm of the Histadrut. Egged is the national bus cooperative. Koor is a Fortune 500 company, one of the largest companies in Israel, and a subsidiary of the Histadrut with a large number of enterprises in heavy and medium industry.

11. Answer: C. Seven

They are: The Hebrew University, Jerusalem; Haifa University; Tel Aviv University; Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Beer Sheba; Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan; The Weizmann Institute, Rehovot; and the Technion, Haifa.

12. Answer: B. None

Israel is a Jewish state, but Judaism is not a "state religion." Jewish holidays are recognized as official state holidays, but the law protects the right of non-Jews to freely practice their religion. All creeds are equal before the law, and all holy places are protected. The Ministry of Religion provides for and supervises the religious needs of all groups; matters of personal status of Muslims, Druze and Christians are dealt with by religious courts of these communities. The Supreme Rabbinical Council and the Chief Rabbinate deal with these matters for the Jewish community of Israel.

13. 1) Answer: E.xports

Israel is well known for the export of all these products. High-technology electronics is one of the fastest growing industries in Israel. Among the most well-known is the CAT-scanner. Israel has always been known as a major fashion exporter, and it is a major center of the diamond industry.

2) Answer: B.anking

United Mizrachi Bank, Israel Discount Bank and Bank Leumi Le-Israel are three major banks in Israel with offices world-wide.

3) Answer: C.ountry living

These are three types of rural, primarily agricultural, settlements. The kibbutz is the purest form of communal living. There are several types of moshavim with various degrees of cooperative arrangements among the members. The kfar is a generic term for farming or rural settlement.

4) Answer: J.ournalism

These are three Israeli daily Hebrew language newspapers. Ha'aretz is an independent liberal newspaper and is often referred to as the paper-of-record in Israel. As its name indicates, Ma'ariv is an evening
(continued next page)

newspaper. It is also independent, but traditionally more conservative politically. Davar is the leading party daily affiliated with the Histadrut (General Federation of Labor) and often associated with the Labor Party.

5) Answer: I.srael Defense Forces (I.D.F.)

Miluim is the Hebrew term for army reserve duty. It is a pervasive feature of Israeli life. Israelis are called up for army reserve duty several weeks a year from the age of 18 through their middle 50s. Chen is an acronym from Chel Nashim--the Women's branch of the I.D.F. Nahal is a form of military service combining agricultural and military training.

6) Answer: F.िल्ms

These three films represent an early phase of the Israeli movie industry. They depict and often satirize various aspects of Israeli life.

7) Answer: D.ictionaries

These are the names of the three major lexicographers of the modern Hebrew language. Each published his own dictionary. Eliezer Ben-Yehuda (1858-1922) was the father of modern Hebrew. Avraham Even Shoshan (1906-) compiled a monumental vocalized and illustrated Hebrew dictionary. Reuben Alcalay (1907-) is the author of the most popular complete English-Hebrew, Hebrew-English dictionary.

8) Answer: A.rcheological Digs

Masada, located near the northwest shore of the Dead Sea, was Herod's royal citadel and the last outpost of the Zealots during the Jewish war against Rome (66-70/73 C.E.) Megiddo is an ancient Canaanite and Israelite city on the southern side of the Jezreel Valley. Qumran is the site of the caves where the Dead Sea scrolls were discovered.

9) Answer: H.adassah commissioned artists

Marc Chagall created the stained-glass windows which adorn the Hadassah-Hebrew University Medical Center synagogue at Ein Kerem. Jacques Lipchitz created the "Tree of Life" sculpture in the garden which overlooks Hadassah Hospital on Mount Scopus. Chaim Gross sculpted the piece entitled "Mother Playing" which is located at the Mother and Child Pavilion at Hadassah-Ein Kerem.

10) Answer: M.useums

Beit Hatefutzot, also named the Nahum Goldmann Museum of the Diaspora, is located on the campus of Tel Aviv University. Inspired by and named after the renowned and often controversial former president of the World Jewish Congress and World Zionist Organization, the Nahum Goldmann Museum contains the most extensive exhibitions of Jewish life in the Diaspora. The Helena Rubinstein Pavilion, made possible by the generosity of the renowned patron of the arts, is a major part of the Tel Aviv Museum and is used for special shows and exhibitions. The sculpture garden outside the Israel Museum in Jerusalem is named after the famous songwriter, producer and art-collector, Billy Rose.

11) Answer: S.ingers

Naomi Shemer, one of Israel's most prolific songwriters, is best known for her "Jerusalem of Gold." Chava Alberstein, is a leading interpreter of Israeli popular music. Yehoram Gaon is Israel's leading male contemporary singer and a major actor. He is a major interpreter of Sephardic folk music.

12) Answer: N.ational Arts and Culture

Habima, which literally means "the stage," was the first professional Hebrew theater in the world (founded in Moscow in 1917; moved to Palestine in 1931) and is now Israel's National Theater. The Israel Philharmonic Orchestra has long been considered Israel's national orchestra. In fact, it is a cooperative managed by the musicians themselves. Its international rank has been enhanced by the stature of its conductors, from Arturo Toscanini in 1936 to Zubin Mehta in the 1980s. Bezalel, the national Academy of Arts and Design in Jerusalem, was founded in 1906 by the sculptor Boris Schatz. Its name is derived from the biblical artisan Bezalel ben Uri who supervised the construction and decoration of the Israelite Tabernacle.

13) Answer: R.adio/TV

Kol Israel, the Voice of Israel, was the name of the Haganah (pre-state Jewish defense force) illegal radio broadcasting station. Its first legal broadcast was the Declaration of Independence in 1948 when it continued as the national broadcasting service. Galei Zahal is the radio station operated by the Israel
(continued on next page)

Defense Forces. Rehov Sumsum (Sesame Street), a recently introduced children's TV show in Israel, was developed by the Children's Television Workshop, creators of Sesame Street in the United States, in cooperation with Israel Educational TV.

14) Answer: L.anguage Learning

Va'ad Halashon, the Israel Academy of the Hebrew Language, is the official arbiter of usage and pronunciation of the modern Hebrew language. Ulpan, from the word "elef" meaning 1,000, is the unique Israeli method for teaching conversational Hebrew to new immigrants. Omer is the vocalized Hebrew language daily newspaper for new immigrants in Israel.

15) Answer: U.niversities

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev is a relatively new Israeli university founded in 1965 in Beersheva and now bears the name of Israel's first Prime Minister who always stressed the importance of developing the Negev desert. Bar-Ilan University in Ramat Gan, founded by the Mizrachi Organization of the United States in 1955, places special emphasis on Jewish tradition and Jewish studies. Named for religious Zionist leader Rabbi Meir Berlin (Bar-Ilan), it offers a full program of academic courses in Jewish and secular studies. Chaim Weizmann, the first President of the State of Israel and leader of the World Zionist Organization, was also a noted scientist. The Weizmann Institute in Rehovot is one of the leading scientific research facilities in the world. Other major universities in Israel include the Technion in Haifa, the University of Haifa, Tel Aviv University, and the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.

16) Answer: T.eachers

Nehama Leibowitz is a leading contemporary Biblical commentator. Her classes in Biblical exegesis are popular among a wide variety of Israelis and Jews worldwide. Adin Steinsaltz is a contemporary Talmudic scholar and teacher. His major work in progress is a modern Hebrew translation and commentary of the Talmud. He also writes and lectures extensively on many contemporary Jewish ethical and religious issues. Jacob Katz, a world renowned professor at the Hebrew University, is a noted Jewish historian who has authored many articles and books on the subject of anti-Semitism.

17) Answer: P.ainter

Shmuel Katz, a contemporary Israeli artist, is well known for his depictions of Jerusalem. Yaacov Agam is a noted artist who specializes in kinetic design, including painting, tapestry and sculpture. Menashe Kadishman, another famous Israeli artist whose paintings have been exhibited in major museums and galleries around the world, recently designed a magnificent poster featuring Kiryat Hadassah and the Mount Scopus Hospital as integral parts of the Jerusalem landscape.

18) Answer: Y.eshivot

Yeshivat Kerem B'Yavneh is a religious Zionist yeshiva (Talmudical academy of higher learning) located close to the original site of the Sanhedrin (the Supreme Jewish court) after it was relocated following the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 C.E. A hesder yeshiva, its students combine periods of Torah and Talmudic studies with military service. Mercaz Harav Yeshiva, located in Jerusalem, is also a religious Zionist academy, named for Harav (Rabbi) Avraham Isaac Kook, the first Chief Ashkenazic rabbi of Palestine (1921-1935). Hebron Yeshiva, originally the Yeshiva of Slobodka, Lithuania, was transferred to Palestine in 1924 to the city of Hebron. The yeshiva, which attracted students from all over the world, was destroyed in the 1929 Arab pogrom against the Jews living in Hebron. It was reestablished in Jerusalem but retained the name Hebron Yeshiva and developed into one of the largest Torah centers in Israel.

IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

You may utilize this self-enrichment unit in a number of different ways. These include the following:

A. Individual Study

The individual leader may take this home, study it by herself privately and utilize it as the basis for a self-study home unit. She should, of course, understand that this is a purely private matter and she may undertake as much or as little of it as she desires.

B. Small Group Study

Pre-assign sections of the unit for individuals to prepare and to bring to the next meeting. The unit may then be gone over in groups, with each individual explaining what she has prepared. This method is ideal for couples clubs, study groups, as well as for chapter Board study.

C. Large Group Study

This unit may be the focus for an extended study period (1-2 days), for a general meeting, or retreat. The entire group should study the questionnaire and score themselves. They should then divide according to their areas of need or interest and discuss these steps as a study group, utilizing various resources and textual materials.

D. Region/Big Chapter Boards

This is ideal material for Board study, using the above approaches. The entire Board may undertake it as a Board project; they may wish to divide into groups; or they may use the material as a self-study unit.

E. Family Use

Individual families may wish to undertake this among themselves for Shabbat study or for other occasions when the family wishes to undertake a joint project.

GUIDE TO FURTHER RESOURCES AND
IMPROVING ONE'S BASIC KNOWLEDGE

Congratulations! You have just completed the self-enrichment unit on Israel and Zionism. Try to master the Answer Key; it contains a wealth of information. The next step involves going beyond the unit:

- Consult suggested Jewish Education Department study materials, available from Hadassah Order Department.
- Design programs around the filmstrips we have to offer.
- Consult books listed below; they are available at your local library or from the Hadassah Book Order Service, c/o J. Levine, 58 Eldridge Street, New York, N.Y. 10002.

To remain current with Israeli politics and foreign policy, subscribe to Hadassah's UPDATE (\$7 per year from the Zionist Affairs Department), Near East Report, and the Jerusalem Post International Edition. For cultural issues subscribe to TEXTURES (\$2.00 per year from the Jewish Education Department). Of course, a trip to Israel is one of the most valuable ways of deepening your understanding of Israeli politics, society, and culture. (Contact Hadassah Tourism Department.)

SUGGESTED TITLES

STUDY GUIDES (\$1.25 each):

- The Theme of "The Ingathering of the Exiles" in the Bible.
- Israel Today
- Jerusalem
- Palestine: The Years Between 395-1917
- Zionism, A Short History

FILMSTRIPS (Rental Fee, \$1.00):

- Eliezer Ben Yehuda
- Chaim Nachman Bialik
- A.D. Gordon

BOOKS

- Howard M. Sachar. A History of Israel. (New York: Knopf, 1979), paper. \$12.95
- Arthur Hertzberg. The Zionist Idea. (New York: Atheneum, 1979), paper \$7.95
- Shlomo Avineri. The Making of Modern Zionism. (New York: Basic Books, 1981). \$15.50
Paperback available on 3/84.
- Myths and Facts, 1982. Updated every two years. Available from Near East Report, 444 North Capitol St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001. Paper \$3.50
- The Bazak Guide to Israel. (New York: Harper & Row, distributors, 1983), updated every two years. \$11.95





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jerusalem • itcun • haaganah • enteece •
chaim bar-lev • leninrad trials • the
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Sh'ma

a journal of Jewish responsibility

8/154, MAY 12, 1978



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pooey • mann auditorium • maariv • dead sea scrolls • kibbutz
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"Self-determination" and the west bank

Marc Brandriss

Six months have passed since Egyptian President Anwar Sadat went to Jerusalem. The optimism and euphoria that accompanied Sadat to Israel has given way to renewed pessimism. The warm embraces and expressions of friendship between Israeli and Arab have been replaced by a new propaganda war that seems little different from the situation that prevailed before Sadat's dramatic visit.

One of the key factors contributing to the current stalemate in peace negotiations between Egypt and Israel has been the disagreement over the solution to the Palestinian problem. President Sadat has insisted that the Palestinians be given the right to self-determination including the option of creating an independent Palestinian state.

Prime Minister Begin has ruled out self-determination for the Palestinians stating that "the term self-determination means a Palestinian state and we will not agree to such a mortal danger to Israel." Instead he has proposed an elaborate 26-point plan for Palestinian Arab residents of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district granting them self-rule to govern their domestic affairs, with Israel retaining responsibility for security and public order.

President Carter has carefully avoided using the terms "self-determination" and "Palestinian state." While he has spoken out several times about the need for a Palestinian "homeland," and the recognition of the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people," he has also stated his "preference" for a non-independent Palestinian entity linked to Jordan. After meeting with Sadat at Aswan in early January, in an apparent attempt to bridge the gap between the Israeli and Egyptian positions, President Carter chose to be deliberately ambiguous saying that the Palestinians must be enabled "to participate in the determination of their own future."

International Law is Unclear on Self-Determination
The Palestinian question, which for a long time had been dealt with in the United Nations as a humanitarian and refugee problem, has gradually been transformed into one of "national rights" and self-determination.

Despite its incorporation into the U.N. Charter, the Covenants on Human Rights and countless U.N. resolutions, the right of peoples to self-determination has never had agreed criteria for application in parti-

cular cases in international law. Until recently, standard texts on international law contained no reference to the right of self-determination. Even today, many international legal scholars consider it primarily as a political rather than a legal concept.

The concept of self-determination attained political significance when President Wilson asserted it as a principle in relation to minority rights in Central Europe following the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires in World War I. Despite Wilson's efforts, no mention of self-determination was made in the final text of the League of Nations Covenant.

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Asst. to the Editor Debra Hachen

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The concept of self-determination took on added meaning at the end of World War II when it was written into the Charter of the United Nations and was used primarily to assert the right of independence from colonial rule. But whether or not self-determination is a principle of international law, it has certainly gained considerable influence in the international community and it has become one of the most widely supported principles in the United Nations.

During its relatively recent history, however, the actual practice of states has demonstrated that while the right to self-determination has been acknowledged in principle, the application in practice has been, above all, selective. In the age of decolonization, the implementation of self-determination was never an easy matter, but the basic principle was the simple one that colonial rule should be eliminated in order to give way to rule by the people of the territory concerned.

Separatists' Rights are Limited in Sovereign States
More complicated is the application of self-determination in non-colonial situations. A question that often arises is whether self-determination is applicable when it would undermine the national unity and territorial integrity of a country which has already achieved independence. Asian and African nations which fully supported the right of self-determination in their struggles against colonialism were among the first to oppose the extension of the principle to separatist movements in their own country. An attempt to resolve this problem can be seen in the formulation of the U.N. General Assembly Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (G.A. res. 2625 (XXV)) which declares that "all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development . . ." "Every State has the duty to promote, through joint and separate action, the realization of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, in accordance with the provision of the Charter . . ." Yet the same resolution is careful to state that "nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples . . . and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging

to the territory without distinctions as to race, creed or color."

Some Say There is Only Geographic Self-determination
Thus the principle of self-determination as it emerged in opposition to colonialism should not be confused with the rights of minorities scattered throughout a nation's territory who might be seeking equality of treatment with the majority. It has led some to define the right of self-determination as applicable in a strictly geographical or territorial sense, and not applicable in a cultural or ethnic sense to peoples who are minorities in their own states.

There also arises the question of whether self-determination is an absolute right. The Covenants on Human Rights simply state, "All peoples have the right to self-determination" as an abstract principle. Yet when applied in a specific legal and political context, self-determination may be subject to limitations. One limitation was noted above – when its implementation would threaten the national unity and territorial integrity of a sovereign and independent state. Another limitation alluded to was in situations in which a state possesses a government representing all its inhabitants without discrimination. Another situation in which the principle may be subject to limitation is when its implementation would endanger the rights of others, and when the potential injuries it may cause outweigh the potential benefits it may generate.

Now if Zionism is Accused of Being Colonialism . . .
What does all this mean with respect to the Palestinians? By what right do the Palestinians have a claim to self-determination more so than the Kurds in Iraq, the Ibos in Nigeria, the Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians and Tartars in the Soviet Union and countless other "peoples" around the world living under so-called alien rule? Is it simply because the Palestinians have had the political, military, and economic might of the Soviet Union, Arab oil producing states and the Third World behind them? Whatever moral right various peoples might have to self-determination, it seems evident that in many cases, only raw political and military power, albeit couched in moralistic and legalistic terms, has given force to those claims. It is ironic that most of those supporting a Palestinian right to self-determination do not even accord basic human rights to their own people, much less the right of self-determination. The Arab nations that have been in the forefront of the struggle for Palestinian self-determination never once thought to grant them a separate state when the territory was under their control from 1948 to 1967.

Some Palestinians have often asserted their right to self-determination in opposition to what they consider the colonial occupation of their land. The Palestinian National Covenant brands Zionism as "a political movement organically associated with international imperialism . . ." Even to those Arabs who might reluctantly accept the reality of Israel's existence in the pre-1967 borders, with respect to the West Bank and Gaza, occupation of territory as a result of a war of self-defense has been put on the same level as colonial occupation in an attempt to gain legitimacy for the claim to self-determination from colonial rule.

But Maybe the Palestinians are not a "People" Either . . . Therefore, Israel is not seen as a competing form of nationalism. While demanding the right of self-determination for the Palestinians, the P.L.O. Covenant would deny it to the Jewish people: "Claims of historical or religious ties of Jews with Palestine are incompatible with the facts of history and the true conception of what constitutes statehood. Judaism being a religion, is not an independent nationality. Nor do Jews constitute a single nation with an identity of its own." (Article 20)

On the other hand, some have argued that the Palestinians do not, in fact constitute a people and therefore have no claims to self-determination. Others have said that Palestinian self-determination has been achieved in the state of Jordan whose territory occupies the major part of the original Palestine Mandate and whose citizens are over 60% Palestinian. To them, the demand for a Palestinian state is not only a demand for a 22nd Arab state in the Middle East, but also the creation of a 2nd Palestinian state. Still others believe that Palestinian self-determination can only be satisfied through the creation of an independent state. Many of those, including quite a few Israelis who believe that the Palestinians have the right to a state of their own, would place limits on that right. They point out that satisfaction of Palestinian right to self-determination through the creation of an independent state on their own terms would create a serious danger to Israel's security.

Maybe a Demilitarized West Bank Area Would Work A number of proposals have been suggested to overcome the security threat from granting full self-determination and yet still satisfy Palestinian national aspirations for a homeland. One possibility is the establishment of a Palestinian entity on the West Bank and Gaza that would require demilitarization of the territory, perhaps allowing for a local police force but not for a national army. Other security arrangements, such as monitoring stations and international peace

keeping forces including joint Arab-Israeli patrols could be made. Linking a West Bank state with Jordan in some type of federal or confederal framework could contribute to the economic viability and political stability of the new state.

How does Prime Minister Begin's proposal for self-rule fit in? The Begin proposal does not call for a link with Jordan, although it would allow the residents of the West Bank to choose either Israeli or Jordanian citizenship. Perhaps the reason is simply that King Hussein has so far declined to participate in negotiations. On the other hand, a link with Jordan through some sort of federation might mean the automatic abandonment of any Israeli claims to sovereignty over Judea and Samaria. Begin's proposal, however, insists that "Israel stands by its right and its claim of sovereignty to Judea, Samaria and the Gaza district." Yet explicit in Begin's proposal is the acknowledgement "that other claims exist" and therefore Israel "proposes, for the sake of the agreement and the peace, that the question of sovereignty in these areas be left open." It is not clear whether by acknowledging other claims, Begin was referring to Palestinian Arab claims. Perhaps he meant Jordan, or perhaps he was referring only to the 700,000 Palestinian Arabs already residing on the West Bank.

Begin's Suggestion: "Administrative Autonomy" He does, however, appear to have departed from the attitude of the Labor Government under Golda Meir who seemed to have denied the existence of any claims to Palestinian nationhood. Is Begin saying that the Palestinians do in fact have a claim to a homeland but that it cannot be satisfied because of the threat a Palestinian state would have for Israel's security? Certainly he has clearly stated that "The term self-determination means a Palestinian state, and we will not agree to such a mortal danger to Israel." He thus still refuses to accept Sadat's formulation that the Palestinians have a right to self-determination and even rejects the Carter formulation that Palestinians should participate in the determination of their future (although he seems to accept the latter formulation). To Begin, self-determination for the Palestinians would allow them to establish, free from external interference, any type of state, they would want, including one controlled by the P.L.O. In an attempt to deal with the problem, Begin has proposed administrative autonomy for the residents of the West Bank and Gaza, while insisting on Israeli security control over these territories.

In the Long Run, Begin's Plan is an Open One The Begin plan, however, will probably have to un-

dergo some modification before it is found acceptable to Sadat, Hussein, the Arab residents of the West Bank and Gaza, and even the United States. A major criticism of the plan is that it does not appreciably alter the situation on the West Bank except to relieve Israel of the administrative and bureaucratic burden. Secondly, it does not deal with the Palestinian issue in its entirety, but only with those Palestinians presently living in territory under Israeli administration.


One must, however, view the Begin plan from a longer range perspective. On one hand, Begin really means it when he says that Judea and Samaria are an integral part of Israel, but his readiness to suspend decision over ultimate sovereignty represents a significant departure from his long-held ideological views. His self-rule proposal ends with the statement that "these principles will be subject to review after a five year period." It leaves open the possibility that in a reasonable period of time which allows for at least a limited degree of Palestinian self-expression, during which such a Palestinian "entity" could demonstrate its peaceful intentions, a final formula will be found for satisfying Palestinian national aspirations for their own national identity, while simultaneously providing specific assurances for Israel's security.

"Self-determination" as ideology

Hans J. Morgenthau

The principle of national self-determination can only be understood and rationally applied within a particular political context. Thus Woodrow Wilson justified the liberation of the central and eastern European nationalities from foreign domination by the principle of national self-determination. Theoretically the principle was opposed not only to the status quo of empire, but also to imperialism of any kind, either on the part of the old imperial powers – Germany, Austria, and Russia – or on the part of the liberated small nations. Yet the destruction of the old imperial order at once called forth, still in the name of self-determination, new imperialisms. Those of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia are as outstanding as they were inevitable; for the power vacuum left by the breakdown of the old imperialism had to be filled and the newly liberated nations were there to fill it. As soon as they had installed themselves in power, they invoked the self-same principle of national self-determination in defense of the new status quo. This principle was their most potent ideological weapon from the end of the first to the end of the second world war.

It was by a stroke of propagandistic genius that Hitler hit upon the principle of national self-determination in order to disguise and justify his policies of territorial expansion. The German minorities of Czechoslovakia and Poland, under the banner of national self-determination, were now to play the same role in undermining the national existence of Czechoslovakia and Poland which the Czech, Slovak, and Polish nationalities, under the same ideological banner, had played in undermining the national existence of the



Austrian-Hungarian Empire. With their own ideological weapon turned against them, the benefactors of the status quo of Versailles had no ideology, except the one of law and order, with which to defend that status quo. Thus Austria and Czechoslovakia were surrendered, and Poland was exposed to mortal danger. After the settlement of Munich granted the German demands with regard to Czechoslovakia, the *London Times*, of September 28, 1938, making the German ideology its own, declared: "Self-determination, the professed principle of the Treaty of Versailles, has been invoked by Herr Hitler against its written text, and his appeal has been allowed." Rarely, if ever, has modern history offered a more striking example of the importance of ideologies in international politics and of the confounding effect of an ambiguous ideology aptly employed.

Palestinian "Self-Determination" is Also a Guise

When Germany joined the League of Nations in 1925, it pursued a policy of undermining the status quo of Versailles, mainly using the principle of national self-determination as the dynamite with which to crack the foundations of the territorial status quo. This policy was at odds with the policies of France and its Eastern allies and was aimed, first surreptitiously and later openly, at the termination of their preponderance

on the continent of Europe. In addition to the principle of national self-determination, Germany used the dual fear of Bolshevik revolution and Russian imperialism, which obsessed the Western powers, as a weapon with which to strengthen its own position. While alternately offering itself as a bulwark against Bolshevism and threatening to ally itself with the Soviet Union, Germany was able to wring concessions from the Western powers, to isolate Poland from France, and to paralyze the League.

Similarly, the Arab claims of national self-determination, in order to do them justice, must be put in the political context from which they have risen and within which they are supposed to operate. The Arab claims for Palestinian self-determination, raised in the aftermath of the 1967 war and supported by the confinement of a sector of the Arab population of Palestine in refugee camps, must be seen in the context of the continuous opposition of large masses of Arabs to the existence not only of the state of Israel but of Jewish settlements within the territory of Palestine. In other words, the recognition of the legitimacy of the state of Israel is incompatible with the claim to national self-determination of the Palestinian Arabs. For that claim is territorially based not only upon the so-called West Bank of the Jordan but, as innumerable pronouncements of the P.L.O. claim, upon the territory on which the state of Israel has been erected. Thus the principle of national self-determination on behalf of the Palestinian Arabs reveals itself as the ideological disguise of the unchanging aspiration of large masses of Arabs: the destruction of the state of Israel and the establishment as its substitute of an Arab state.

Israel's security and arab self-rule

Don Peretz

Will Israel be less secure and will it realize less of its historical destiny if it attains peace by returning all or parts of the occupied territories? There is certainly great risk in withdrawal, perhaps as much as there is in remaining in the West Bank and Gaza. But occupation offers the risk of more wars, periodic insurrection by the indigenous Arab population, and subverting many positive values of the Jewish State.

Security is a dynamic and relative concept. As weapons technology becomes more sophisticated the areas required to assure the safety of Jewish settlements constantly expands; as the number of Jewish settlements in Arab or former Arab territories in-

creases, the amount of land under Israel control necessary to defend them must become more extensive or they will cease to be secure. Much less territory was required for security in 1948 than in 1967; it was less in 1967 than in 1973. Today, with Jewish settlements in Sinai, the Golan Heights, Gaza, and the West Bank, even more territory is required for security.

Arab armies of 1948 could inflict less damage on Jewish populations in 1948 than in 1967, and the armies of 1967 were less of a threat than those of today. Arab planes, artillery, rockets, and even small arms a third of a century ago could wreak less damage than today's weapons whose range has increased dangerously since the first war with Israel in 1948. If Arabs acquire even more sophisticated weapons with greater range, and there is no peace settlement, additional Arab lands will be vital to Israel's security. Israel will be forced to continue acquiring Arab lands to keep up with ever escalating security demands until there is a peace settlement. Because of the nature of weapons development and technology, constantly becoming more dangerous for countries crowded into small territories, security demands are irreversible; they can not be deescalated as long as security depends on maintaining superior tactical and strategic advantages, with territorial outposts to balance the enemy's advantages in weaponry. This may require additional wars with the Arab states; it certainly will require not merely continuation of the present high level of military expenditure, but constantly escalating additional expenditures to reenforce the security provided by the territories.

The Historical Reason for Adding Territory

The logic of continued expansion is supported also by claims of those who base their perceptions of Israel on its ancient boundaries. Any historical atlas shows that boundaries of the ancient Jewish states reached far beyond those of Mandatory Palestine whose borders had little relevance to events in the Bible.

Eretz Israel in the Hellenistic period, under the Kingdoms of Alexander Jannaeus, Herod and Agrippa extended far beyond the Jordan River, well into what are now the countries of Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. David's kingdom was even more extensive, from the Gulf of Elat to the banks of the Euphrates River. True, throughout ancient history the Gaza region was seldom if ever included within the borders of *Eretz Israel*, but the presence of a large hostile Philistine population within the region of the Jewish state always presented a serious security risk.

In modern times, Israel's claims to larger territories than those allocated by the United Nations partition

resolution, by the armistice agreements with the Arab states, or claims to lands presently held, were recognized in the original mandate before Great Britain unilaterally declared the first partition between western Palestine and Transjordan in 1921. Neither the 1947 U.N. partition borders, the 1949 armistice frontiers, nor the present territory held by Israel can be claimed as Biblical boundaries. If acquisition of territory is for religious historical or Jewish national reasons, there is no logical reason to stop with the present borders since they constitute only a relatively small part of historical *Eretz Israel*. The only reason for accepting less territory than outlined in the Old Testament is to achieve a compromise between Jewish and Arab claims.

More Territory Means More Arabs

An aspect of the territorial question affecting both its security and historical dimensions is that neither the West Bank nor Gaza are empty or even lightly populated. The hundreds of thousands of non-Jewish indigenous Arab inhabitants complicate any security arrangements for these territories especially since no politically significant number of them desires a continued Jewish presence or is it willing to cooperate in extending Israel's stay. Indications are that significant numbers of the Arab population oppose continued Israel occupation, regardless of what authority replaces Israel.

Since no serious or responsible political leader, not Likud, not Labor, and not the religious parties have proposed forcefully dislocating the indigenous Arab population their continued presence only makes more necessary the large military forces required to secure the territories. Continued occupation, whether for security, historical or other reasons, must be backed by considerably more force than required by Israel within the pre-1967 borders. Both security and historical justifications for retaining the territories must be supported by a commitment to long term, constantly escalating allocation of national human and material resources to military preparedness.


The costs to Israel, of maintaining its hold on the occupied territories, are not small. Security achieved after each victory since 1967 has absorbed monumental increases of the country's resources. In 1966 military expenditures were relatively modest compared to those of other Western countries — 10 percent of G.N.P. and 25 percent of the government's budget; by 1970 they were 24 percent of G.N.P., about twice the ratio for the United States early in the Vietnam War. In 1977 Israel's military expenditures jumped to 30 percent of the G.N.P. and 38 percent of the government budget, placing it among the three or four

countries with the largest percent of national resources devoted to military expenditure.

Israel Cannot Survive Utter Independence

Without a peace settlement, constant escalation has been irreversible, especially since 1974 when a four-fold leap in oil prices gave the Arab states virtually unlimited resources for arms and the possibility of continuously outspending Israel in the decade ahead. The quantum leap in Middle East military expenditures has not eased Israel's security dilemma. The more arms it acquires, the more it requires, to keep up with acquisitions of the surrounding countries.

The more arms it requires, the greater Israel's dependence on the United States, its principal source of weapons and weapons financing. While Israel's close ties with the United States government and American Jewry have been major sources of sustenance since 1948 the dependence is not diminishing.



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A few years ago some Israelis believed that their country could lessen its dependence on foreign arms imports and outside economic assistance. But with the great leap in weapons sophistication and costs and the shift in the balance of Middle East economic power, diminishing dependence has become an illusive goal. Instead, outside supplies and resources have become an ever increasing prerequisite for national security.

The tremendous increase in dependence on the United States government since the 1973 war shows no sign of abatement. Inevitably, a client state, one receiving the largest amount of United States economic and military assistance, totalling between a quarter and a third of all foreign aid, cannot be free from American political influence or pressures. There are no precedents for such large amounts of aid being extended without political reciprocation of some kind. Without

a peace settlement, Israel's dependence on the United States cannot diminish and an independent foreign policy will not be attainable.

Military Commitments and National Character

The quantitative aspects of military requirements prerequisite for maintaining the occupied territories have serious qualitative consequences for Israel's future development. A relatively small based economy in which military requirements devour so much of the nation's manpower and other resources cannot continue to sustain the high level of social development for which Israel became renowned. This was evident, not only in the economic program of Likud, but in alterations of the social and economic system initiated before May 1977 by the Labor governments. Likud has attempted to accelerate the pace at which benefits for laborers, such as subsidies on essential food items or cost-of-living allowances, will be diminished or abandoned altogether. An inevitable consequence of the economies and economic reforms required to finance huge military expenditures, will be to widen the social gap, to increase unemployment for non-Jewish laborers, with the inevitable social tensions resulting from such measures.

Ten years of occupation has tended to polarize the Jewish population and the fifteen percent of Israelis who are not Jewish. Both the Labor and Likud governments' advisors on Arab affairs have pointed out that since 1967 "deeper currents of Palestinian nationalist radicalization . . . have been inundating increasingly large sections of Israel's Arab minority." This was dramatically emphasized during the last three Knesset elections when there was a startling increase of Israeli Arab votes for Rakkah, from 29.6 percent in 1969, to 37 percent in 1973, to over 50 percent in 1977. Dissatisfaction of Arabs in the occupied territories with Israeli military government and their general unease resulting from lack of peace has spilled over into Israel threatening a generation of relatively good relations between the country's two major ethnic groups.

It becomes increasingly difficult for the average Israeli to distinguish between Israeli Arabs, those from the occupied territories, and those who may be P.L.O. sympathizers or active terrorists. The terrible dilemma of the Israeli Arab in facing dual loyalty to nation and state is reversed in the eye of the average Israeli Jew who perceives that alongside him within the Jewish State there are hundreds of thousands of fellow citizens who cannot be trusted. This perception, even if groundless, raises suspicions which undermine the emotional if not the physical security of many Jews.

The Hard Choice Facing the Israelis

The overall effect of continued occupation with actual and perceived security requirements necessary to perpetuate Israel's hold on the territories, is to substantially diminish the relative importance of fundamental values other than security; values for which the Western world and diaspora Jewry have come to admire and respect the Jewish State. These values are imperilled by the security requirements and national mind set resulting from continued occupation of the territories.

While it might be inappropriate for non-Israelis, either U.S. government officials or American Jews to choose between the available alternatives, it should be remembered that opinion in Israel is not unanimous about which way to turn. Voices within the Israel establishment, recent public opinion polls, and public demonstrations by thousands of Israelis including veterans who risked their lives for the state, indicate that those favoring risks for peace are a politically significant force.

In summarizing the choice before Israel, former foreign minister Abba Eban stated recently that prime minister Begin has to give something up: "either part of the Likud platform or his hope of leading our nation towards its cherished peace. One of these renunciations is inexorable. A statesman must build a bridge between ancient fidelities and new hopes, between the echoes of the past and the call of the future. Beyond his own turbulent and confused party ranks there are many, especially in the Labor movement, who would sustain him in a responsible choice. But no national harmony can be constructed around policies or definitions that violate the most ardent hopes of Israel, of the Jewish world and of peace-loving mankind."

Israel's moral and practical case

Howard L. Adelson

The problem of the Palestinian Arabs and the Jewish settlement of the territories liberated in the Six Day War is not in its essence a legal one, for if it were to be judged in purely legal terms, its solution would be simple. The ancient international prerogatives of the conqueror to the fruits of his victory were not questioned until the last half century. Before that time it was an acceptable maxim of international law and practice that *ge dorikteton* (i.e. spear-won territory) belonged as of right to the conqueror. By the very act

of conquest all prior supposedly legitimate rights were extinguished. Thus only rights which could be enforced militarily existed in conquered territory which had not been dealt with in a treaty between the competing powers. Modern practice has, in fact, conformed to the ancient dictum in virtually all cases save those that involve Israel. The Soviet conquest of eastern Europe repealed the results of a thousand years of history in that region.

The Jewish state, however, has never accepted that ancient law of international relations and has never based its conduct upon it. It has instead maintained that the status of lands captured in 1967 and the rights of individual Jews as well as the Jewish people in those lands must be negotiated and settled by treaty. The Israeli government similarly has never accepted the Arab view that Jews can only be temporary occupiers of those lands or any part of the Holy Land and must withdraw in favor of the Arabs whether there is a prior treaty or not. At issue in the question of the settlements is not merely the preservation of Arab rights within the borders of the original mandate of the League of Nations, but the preservation of Jewish rights as confirmed in the original mandate.

If Arab Rights Are Exclusive, Jews Lose their Rights
It is perhaps at this point that the greatest disagreement ensues. If one accepts the proposition that Arab rights are exclusive, and that it is within their right to bar Jews while encouraging Arabs to resettle in the disputed territories, it is a fact that all Jewish rights would be automatically extinguished. Indeed, to carry this line of thinking to its logical conclusion, as do many of the Arab terrorists, the Jewish right to any part of Israel, whether Jerusalem or Tel Aviv, would also be excluded by this insistence upon an exclusive Arab right of resettlement regardless of the facts of history.


For anyone to doubt that acceptance of even what is euphemistically called the moderate Arab position of Anwar el-Sadat necessitates an expulsion of the Jews from the disputed territory and probably finally from Israel is to blind oneself to the realities. Sadat is specifically calling for the immediate departure of the Jews from all of their settlements beyond the "Green Line" which marked the *de facto* borders of Israel as of 1948. He does not make any distinction between private rights and political rights. It is not merely that he rejects any imputation of Israeli sovereignty or extraterritoriality, but the fact that he denies the very right of private Jewish residence that is one of the main stumbling blocks to a negotiated peace.

When Arabs Took Over Territory They Expelled Jews
His position is not difficult to comprehend. It has always been the Arab position. When Transjordan was severed from the mandated territory the few Jews in that four-fifths of the original mandate, who certainly posed no threat to the Arabs there, were removed to the cis-Jordanian region. When Abdullah seized the districts of Samaria and Judea, including a portion of Jerusalem, all known Jews were removed from the region. While Egypt held the Gaza Strip and the Sinai no Jews resided there, and the same is true of the Golan Heights with regard to Syria. The expulsion of the Jews from Egypt itself under Nasser mirrored the Arab view that Jews dwell on sufferance and not by right in any place on this planet.

Obviously Jewry cannot accept that view of its rights. The Zionist movement was designed specifically as an answer to such a view of Jewish rights. The right of private Jewish settlement, whether organized or unorganized, within the regions currently under Israeli control must not be restricted. To accept less than that is to accept a status below that of all of the rest of mankind and to vitiate legal rights that have been recognized by the international community and paid for in blood and treasure.

Arab Nationalism Excludes Palestinian Nationalism
If, as the Arabs are so fond of pointing out, the Palestinian Arabs are simply the Middle Eastern analogue of the Jewry of the Diaspora, then perhaps some of the solutions that were proposed by Jews in the Diaspora may be applicable to the current situation. That might well hold true even if the analogy that the Arabs construct is quite faulty. It is clear that if "Palestinian" nationality for the Arabs exists, it is a very new phenomenon which diverges from the main stream of Arab national thought from the moment of origin of Arab nationalism to the present. One need look no further than the entire body of Arab nationalist literature produced prior to the Sinai Campaign including the works of men like George Antonius and Philip K. Hitti to understand the monolithic character of Arab nationalism. Palestinian nationalism was always denied by Arab spokesmen, and the supposed sudden creation of a Palestinian nation for other purposes must be somewhat suspect. Golda Meir was fond of noting that fact, and the debates at the United Nations in the 1940's and 1950's support her. If there is a Palestinian nation, it is a nation without unique common traditions, history, language, religion, traditions, and, indeed, bereft of any quality that normally marks off a nation.

The drive of Arab nationalism throughout its brief history, and indeed of certain factions of the Arabs of Palestine even today, has always been toward Arab unity and the destruction of the so-called artificial boundaries that separate the Arab *umma* (people) into discrete nation-states. In that sense, of course, the Palestinian Arab is at home wherever he resides throughout the Arab world and only temporary political expediency on the part of the Arab rulers who make the laws in those countries prevents his integration into the masses in each state. The case of Jewry in the Diaspora was obviously quite different because at all times and in virtually all places the separate national character of Jewry has been accepted by the vast masses of non-Jews and Jews alike. The opponents of recognition of Jewish nationality have been infinitely more prominent among so-called assimilated Jews than among gentiles. The world at large has recognized Jewish nationality and enshrined that recognition in laws extending over millenia of history.



JWS

There's Nothing "Holy" About the Boundaries of 1950
 Let us, however, presume for the moment that Palestinian Arab nationality does exist even though that is far from undisputed. Let us equally assume that the *de facto* exchange of populations which has actually occurred in the Middle East because of the flight of Jews from Arab countries and the migration of Arabs from the Holy Land is only a temporary phenomenon caused by circumstances. Does it then follow that these Arabs have the right to eject Jews from their new homes in the Jewish national homeland? Obviously not at all. The right of Jews to live in the Holy Land has been guaranteed many times in international law. It has been a constant Jewish claim over the ages, and finally it can be sustained effectively by the Israeli government. If the character and scope of Jewish settlement was distorted in the past artificially by the illegal White Paper issued by the British man-

datory power on the eve of the Second World War and other immoral British regulations, and if Jews were forcibly and illegally expelled from the portions of the national homeland that fell under Arab domination in 1948 and earlier, that is certainly no reason to conform to the resulting situation as of 1950 and to give it *ex post facto* juridical approval. It is not by chance that only the United Kingdom and Pakistan recognized the forcible annexation of Judea and Samaria by Jordan, a state which was artificially created by wrenching four-fifths of the originally mandated territory from the possibility of Jewish settlement. The principle *ex facto ius oritur* (i.e., that law arises out of the fact) would seem to be more applicable to the current situation which confirms the Jewish right of settlement.

Israel Needs All the Territory West of the Jordan

Circumstances change in the course of human history, and sometimes it is possible to right a grievous wrong. That happened in 1967, and we must not turn the clock back to that date to give *de jure* validity to the illegal acts of the British mandatory power. Of course, in addition to the moral reasons for permitting Jewish settlement, there are practical reasons. Israel, within the 1948 borders, is simply not defensible in 1978 given the weapons presently in the hands of the P.L.O. and Arab regular armies. As an officer who served in the field for the United States and on the General Staff I can point to what is an obvious truism. To hold the Coastal plain one must control the ridge of mountains which runs from Beersheba in the south to Nablus in the north. To hold that ridge one must control the military crest of those mountains which runs to the east of that line. To maintain an adequate defense of that military crest one must control the glaxis which slopes into the Jordan rift. Thus, given the current state of armaments in the region, if Israel is to be capable of effective defense in the face of Arab dreams and actions, it must control all of the territory to the west of the Jordan. That is a minimal demand because it is quite clear that the natural boundary of that region lies far to the east in the desert that extends northward to form the Fertile Crescent. These are truths which simply cannot be disputed and which would require a great deal of space to set forth in detail. The existence of the Kingdom of Jordan, combined with the state of the current arms supplies in the Middle East and the failure of the partition plan in 1947 to create conditions of peace, necessitate the unification of the lands to the west of the Jordan.

Israel Can Give Arabs Autonomy Without Sovereignty
 What then of the Arabs who dwell within the so-called

"Western Palestine" (and it should be noted that this terminology has been widely used by the Arabs and not by the Jews)? The fact is that their national rights, if they exist, are not dependent upon political sovereignty. Professor Simon Dubnow proposed a solution to the problem of Jewry in Eastern Europe in the first part of this century which would have given legitimacy to Jewish national development while guaranteeing the integrity of the states that existed in the region. Prime Minister Begin has followed that proposal with even greater concessions to the Arabs. If we recognize that the chimera of pan-Arabism is at the heart of the Middle Eastern difficulties (for only in that way can we explain the intervention of other Arab states and attempt to justify it), solutions become possible.

It is not a catastrophe if a minority of Jews live under Arab sovereignty, or if a minority of Arabs live under Jewish sovereignty, even though it must be noted that past experience suggests that the Arabs under Jewish sovereignty would be much better treated. What is important is that each minority should control its own cultural autonomy and social development. Israel is fully prepared to concede full autonomy to the Arabs within the regions of Gaza, Judea and Samaria, with the sole exceptions of defense and foreign affairs. That concession is much broader than any asked by Simon Dubnow for the Jews of Europe. The proposal for cultural autonomy, however, must always rest upon the willingness of the majority to incorporate it into the fundamental law of the land. In Europe the successor states refused to do that because they considered it an infringement upon their sovereignty. Sadat refuses to concede any rights to Jews in the Sinai and elsewhere. In the Holy Land Israel is prepared to make that concession. By this device the Arabs will enjoy all of the rights of national cultural development and even political options such as choosing citizenship in Israel or Jordan, i.e. limited self-determination. They will not be bereft of political power, and they would certainly have a number of options available to them to utilize that power.

Israel is Willing to Risk a Future of Bi-Nationalism
Indeed, Israel is undertaking considerable risk in proposing this solution. If all of the Arabs in the area were to opt for Israeli citizenship, approximately one-third of the citizenry of Israel would be non-Jewish. That was the situation of the country at the moment when it was re-established. Fortunately massive Jewish immigration in the early years of the state corrected that imbalance, and Israel is obviously depending upon a sharp increase in Jewish immigration, if peace

comes under this plan. There are good reasons for believing that such an upward trend in Jewish immigration is possible. What is clear, however, is that without such immigration or a sharp increase in the Jewish birth rate, also a likely phenomenon in the event of peace, bi-nationalism would become a fact within half a century. It is therefore a monumental risk in long-term considerations, but Israel is prepared to take that risk in return for security and the chance for development that it would have for fifty years. What is certain is that a solution that barred Jewish residence in Hebron, the second holiest city of Jewry, or Bethlehem, or Samaria, the ancient capital of the northern Jewish kingdom, would necessitate vastly increased defense expenditures for the coming period of time, act as a hindrance to immigration, and, in fact, exacerbate the long-term demographic problems while encouraging irredentism among the Arabs.

The emotional ties of Jewry to Jerusalem, to Hebron, to Bethlehem, to Samaria, and, indeed, to all of the towns and cities of the country (with the exception of Ramallah) are such that it is certain that irredentism would exist within Israel as well as within the re-partitioned Arab successor state. Moral right and practical affairs would have been discarded in any settlement which re-partitioned the country or barred Jewish settlement throughout the length and breadth of the Holy Land. All of the ingredients would have been assembled in the cauldron to ensure the continuation and increase of strife. That is the road to renewed war and not to peace.

(An additional article on this theme, authored by Professor Melvin Urofsky of Commonwealth University of Virginia, will appear in the next issue.)

An invitation to join us

We are still looking for applicants for the *Sh'ma* Fellows program for 1978-1979. The Fellows meet twice a month with the Editor in the late afternoon in New York City. At these meetings Fellows participate in editorial discussions of current and future issues, as well as talk about and plan their own contributions to *Sh'ma*. They receive the modest sum of \$250 for the year. If you are interested, please send us a resume or letter telling about your background and what you are presently doing. The deadline is JUNE 15th, and all candidates will be notified by mid-summer. If you are planning to be away then, please send us your summer address as well. Applications should be sent to *Sh'ma*, Box 567, Port Washington, N.Y. 11050.

Personals from singles

• Attractive intelligent teacher in her early 30's seeks a professional man age 30-49, non-orthodox. Please write: File 154/140, c/o *Sh'ma*, Box 567, Port Washington, N.Y. 10050.

• Personable female, 35 years young, attractive, two wonderful children, desires to meet a non-orthodox male for a serious relationship. Please write: File 154/682, c/o *Sh'ma*, Box 567, Port Washington, N.Y. 11050.

We need your support

Sh'ma's deficit reduction campaign continues, and we continue to need your financial support. To remain alive and independent, to respond to the needs of our readers, we ask you to contribute at this time of year. Any donation, *no matter how small*, goes a long way to ensuring *Sh'ma's* survival. In appreciation, all contributors will receive a personal acknowledgement from the Editor. Also, those who are able to give \$100 or more will receive an autographed copy of Eugene B. Borowitz's new book, *Reform Judaism Today*. All gifts are tax-deductible and should be sent to *Sh'ma*, Box 567, Port Washington, N.Y. 11050.

Ed. Note: Holocaust survivors or their children who wish to get together for discussion are invited to meet at Emanu-El Midtown YM-HA, 344 East 14th St. in New York City on Sunday, May 21, at 2:00 p.m.)

We continue with the identification of our contributing editors:

RICHARD N. LEVY, *Regional Director of Hillel Activities in the Los Angeles area.*

HANS J. MORGENTHAU, *University Professor of Political Science, New School for Social Research.*

DAVID NOVAK, *Rabbi of Congregation Beth El, Norfolk, Va. author of Law and Theology in Judaism, Series I and II.*

HAROLD SCHULWEIS, *Rabbi, Valley Beth Sholom, Los Angeles, and Adjunct Professor at both the University of Judaism and the HUC-JIR.*

HENRY SCHWARZSCHILD, *Director, Project on Capital Punishment, American Civil Liberties Foundation.*

STEVEN SCHWARZSCHILD, *Professor of Philosophy, Washington U., Editor, Judaism, 1960-69.*

SEYMOUR SIEGEL, *Professor of Theology, Jewish Theological Seminary, who has recently edited the collection of papers A Jew Seeks Wisdom, Teachers Guide and When a Jew Prays, Teachers Guide.*

CHARLES SILBERMAN, *Author of Crisis in Black and White.*

ELIE WIESEL, *author and lecturer, whose last book was Messengers of God.*

MARC BRANDRISS is a doctoral candidate in International Relations and Middle East Politics at Columbia University and is a *Sh'ma* Fellow.

DON PERETZ teaches political science at SUNY Binghamton campus.

HOWARD L. ADELSON teaches history at The City College of The City University of New York.

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ISRAELI POLICY TOWARD THE WEST BANK AND JEWISH SETTLEMENTS

A Background Memorandum

By George E. Gruen and Marc Brandriss

The Basic Issues

Recent actions by the Israel Government in the area known as the West Bank of the Jordan River have raised questions in many minds as to its ultimate intentions with respect to the disposition of the territory and the effect on prospects for peace in the Middle East. Is the legitimization of existing Jewish settlements and plans for new settlements simply an expression of the view that Jews have a natural and historic right to live anywhere—and particularly in their historic homeland, without prejudice to the final terms of a negotiated Arab-Israel peace agreement? Or are these actions meant to tell the Arabs and the world that Israel intends to exercise its political sovereignty and not relinquish any of the territory of the West Bank even to an ostensibly moderate Arab ruler, such as King Hussein of Jordan?

Do the Begin Government's actions represent a fundamental change in the Israeli position with regard to the West Bank? All the settlements approved by the previous Labor Governments could be justified in terms of security. They were consistent with the lines of the Allon Plan, which although not formally adopted, had been applied in practice. The plan, first proposed by Yigal Allon shortly after the 1967 war, envisioned an 8 to 12 mile "security belt" of settlements along the Jordan River and settlements in other sparsely populated areas of strategic significance elsewhere on the West Bank. It would leave open for eventual return to Arab control in a peace settlement the densely-populated areas of the West Bank.

However, the legalization by the Begin Government of three civilian settlements in the heart of the West Bank is interpreted by some as signifying a major departure from the previous security rationale of the Labor government. Are these actions intended to implement the public reaffirmation by Prime Minister Begin that he considers historic Judea and Samaria—the Biblical names for the West Bank area—to be "liberated" and not occupied territories; or do they constitute a strong opening bargaining position that may be modified during the course of negotiations?

At present, no clear long term policy for the West Bank and no formal annexation has been announced by the Begin Government. This is in accordance with the self-restraint on this issue incorporated into the new Government's Basic Policy Guidelines in June 1977, reportedly at the insistence of Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan. Paragraph 10 of the Guidelines notes that the Knesset had empowered the Cabinet to apply by administrative order "the law, judiciary and administration of the state to all territory of the Land of Israel" /presumably including the West Bank/, but then adds that the Government will not invoke this authority "so long as negotiations are being conducted on a peace treaty between Israel and its neighbors. The matter will be determined by the choice of proper timing, the political judgment of the Government and the approval of the Knesset after a special debate."

On August 14 the Israeli government announced that it was extending government economic and social services to the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in order to grant them "equal rights, the same as those enjoyed by residents of the State of Israel." A government spokesman denied that the legal status of the territories or citizenship of the inhabitants was in any way affected by the decision and that they would remain under military administration, with Jordanian law continuing to apply to Judea and Samaria. The following day, Mr. Begin explicitly stated that the move was "by no means the beginning of annexation but was motivated solely by a desire to improve the lot of the Arabs under Israeli rule." On August 17, the Israeli government approved the establishment of three new settlements on the West Bank.

The U.S. State Department, on August 18, issued a strongly worded statement, reportedly approved by President Carter, reaffirming the American position that these "unilateral illegal acts in territories presently under Israeli occupation create obstacles to constructive negotiations." A second statement issued at the same time, while noting that Israel had emphasized the "humanitarian aims" of its decision to extend government economic and social services to the Arabs on the West Bank and Gaza, pointed out that "the action creates an impression of permanence of Israeli occupation...that is not helpful."

Israel, on the other hand, claims that the three new settlements were all in close proximity to the 1949 Armistice Demarcation Lines (the so-called "green line") and thus fell within the category of "minor modifications" that the United States had agreed could be made in establishing the final boundaries. The three settlements could be justified by the need for "secure and recognized boundaries" and would thus fit into the "Allon Plan" formula. In fact, they had been approved in principle by the previous Labor Government earlier in the year.

Current Extent of Israeli Settlement

Whatever the ultimate Israeli intentions, the current number of Israeli civilian settlers on the West Bank has been, as President Carter himself has conceded, relatively insignificant "and quite small" when compared to the Arab population of 680,000. While the Israel Government has not provided current official figures on the extent of settlement, Israeli sources have mentioned the existence of 36 settlements on the West Bank with an Israeli civilian population variously estimated at 2,200 to 3,000. They also acknowledge the existence of less than 80 settlements in all the occupied territories with a combined population of approximately 5,000 Israeli settlers.

Other sources, such as Newsweek (August 8, 1977) estimate that 12,000 Israeli settlers are presently living in all the occupied territories, including the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and Sinai, with up to half of the total on the West Bank. Similarly, Bill Moyers in a CBS television report on the West Bank, on August 16, 1977, cited a total of 6,000 Jewish settlers.

However, Time magazine (August 8) alleges a total of 90 Jewish settlements throughout the occupied territories, containing an Israeli population of 60,000. Inquiries to Time as to the basis for their figure, resulted in the response by a Time researcher that their figure includes the Israelis living in nine communities in formerly Jordanian-held Jerusalem and its outskirts, which Israel since 1967 has incorporated within the enlarged Jerusalem municipality.

Development of Israel's Settlement Policy

The political basis for Israeli settlement in the occupied territories is complex. Some have referred to it as "creeping annexation"; others as "establishing facts"; and still others as legitimate security measures adopted by an occupying power concerned for its defense.

In reality, Israeli settlement policy on the West Bank from its initial phase has been somewhat haphazard, partially due to the pressures and counter-pressures of domestic politics. In the early months after the 1967 war, it was assumed that most of the West Bank was to be returned to Jordan in exchange for a peace treaty, with the exception of East Jerusalem, which was to have a distinct status from the rest of the occupied territory. But by September 1967, the government came to the conclusion (after the Arabs had decided on "no peace, no recognition, no negotiations" at their Khartoum summit) that peace was not forthcoming. Many Israelis desired the total annexation of the West Bank. Some considered the West Bank as historically and religiously part of Israel. To them, Hebron or Nablus (Shechem) was just as much rightfully Israel's as was Tel Aviv. Others believed that from a strategic point of view, Israel's possession of the West Bank was vital to its defense.

The Herut Party historically favored Israeli expansion beyond the 1948 lines. This position was not confined to Herut. The Liberal Party, Herut's partner in Gahal (and now its major partner in Likud), had called for the retention of Judea and Samaria, as had the National Religious Party, a member of the governing Labor Party coalition. The Labor Party membership itself was sharply divided. When the Movement for the Whole Land of Israel was founded in 1967, it included some members of the Labor Party.

The Labor Government was initially able to overcome these pressures and on the whole prevented Jewish settlement of the West Bank. Many others in the Labor-led coalition, such as the late Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir were fearful of the demographic problem involved in annexing an area with such a large population of Arabs, known to have the highest birth rate in the region.

But in November 1967, the Whole Land of Israel Movement, enjoying the support of a wide and varied segment of the public, challenged the prevailing policy by supporting both morally and financially the efforts of those who were planning to reestablish the pre-1948 Jewish settlements in the Etzion Bloc between Jerusalem and Hebron, that had been captured and destroyed by the Jordanians during the War of Independence. The government gave in to these pressures and the settlements in the Etzion Bloc were restored.

Another challenge to government policy was successful when, in April 1968, a small group of religious settlers financed by the Whole Land of Israel Movement moved into the city of Hebron. (This too was an area of pre-Israel Jewish settlement, from which the Jews had fled after a pogrom during the 1929 Arab riots.) They were, for a time, confined to an Israeli military post within the city, but eventually the government decided to transfer the new settlement through the construction of a Jewish suburb and industrial complex known as Kiryat Arba (a Biblical name) in September 1971. At the same time that Kfar Etzion was resettled in November 1967, the government also decided to allow the rebuilding of Beit HaArava, a kibbutz located prior to 1948 at the juncture of the Jordan River and the Dead Sea.

However, by May 1968, the government had decided to establish Jewish settlements throughout the entire length of the Jordan Valley, and not only in areas where Jewish settlements had existed in the pre-1948 period. All the Israeli Prime Ministers since the Six-Day War have stated that Israeli policy was to maintain the Jordan River as Israel's security border and the settlements along the Jordan Rift would help establish Israel's control. This approach kept open the option of negotiations between Israel and Jordan. The Nahal (fighting, pioneer youth) settlements established by the Israel Defense Forces in conjunction with the various kibbutz movements combine military training with farm work. Israel has claimed that these settlements are in substance military outposts like those manned by regular units of the Israel Defense Forces.

Those settlements which are essentially civilian in character have been established in areas which the government had hoped would be assigned to its jurisdiction by peace treaties. Various guidelines were adopted with regard to the location of these settlements. They were to be placed on unused land with full compensation paid to the Arab owners. (State-owned land held by the Jordanian Government prior to 1967 is presently under the control of the Israel Lands Authority.) Preference was given to strategically important and underpopulated areas. In the case of civilian settlements consideration was also given to the availability of arable land and water resources.

The policy remained essentially in effect as long as the Labor Party had been in control of the government, although certain modifications in emphasis were introduced in the face of domestic pressures and external events. Prior to the Yom Kippur War, and in anticipation of elections scheduled for October 31, 1973, the Labor Party adopted a program drafted by Minister Without Portfolio Israel Galili which seemed to represent a shift toward a more hardline stance. Under the Galili plan one and a quarter billion Israeli pounds was to be allocated for the development of the West Bank and Gaza and for the integration of Arab agriculture and industry with Israel's own economy. The plan also envisioned new Jewish settlements in

all the occupied territories. It would, for the first time, entitle Jews to purchase Arab lands and property in the West Bank and Gaza.

After the Yom Kippur War, the Galili plan was shelved. In its place, the Labor Party adopted a new platform which contained a policy phrased in general terms stating that "all will be done to continue and strengthen land settlement in accordance with decisions which the Government of Israel will take from time to time, with priority given to considerations of state security." While the Alignment platform undertook to seek "defensible borders that will ensure Israel's ability to protect herself effectively," it expressed a desire for peace based on "territorial compromise," in essence, a reaffirmation of the principles behind the Allon Plan. However, pressures for new settlements, outside the general framework of the Allon Plan have continued.

The Gush Emunim movement, in defiance of Labor Government policy set up a settlement at Kadum near the ruins of ancient Sebastia in December 1975. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin viewed the settlement at Kadum, in the densely Arab populated Samaria, as a challenge to government authority and threatened to remove it by force if necessary. This action, however, was never carried out although the government refused to recognize its legality.

The Begin Government's Policy

After Likud defeated Labor in the Israeli election in May 1977, its leader Menahem Begin set up a narrow coalition with the National Religious Party and General Ariel Sharon's Shlomzion Party, with the support of the Agudat Israel Party in the Knesset. All these parties support wider settlement in the West Bank. Begin had campaigned on a platform calling for the retention of Israeli control over Judea and Samaria, and the continued settlement of Jews on the West Bank. He rejected the concept of any area barred to Jewish settlement (made Judenrein). Shortly after the election Begin visited the settlement at Kadum and announced "we stand on the land of liberated Israel. We believe this is the land of Israel as a right. It belongs to the Jewish people," and called again for the establishment of new settlements.

At the same time Prime Minister Begin reiterated his readiness to meet directly with the leaders of the Arab states at Geneva or elsewhere to conclude peace treaties, emphasizing that there were no preconditions and that each side would be free to present any proposals it wished.

Mr. Begin's visit with President Carter in July did not lead to the open confrontation many had feared as both leaders stressed the personal rapport they had achieved. Yet, the much heralded peace proposal Begin brought along with him to Washington turned out to be "a plan for the framework of the peacemaking process" rather than a specific proposal for the substance of a peace agreement. Begin did not publicly specify the extent to which Israel would be prepared to withdraw from occupied land nor did he commit himself to refrain from establishing new settlements on the West Bank. Israeli press reports suggested that he was prepared for extensive withdrawal from Sinai and the Golan Heights, but would continue to insist on Israeli control of the West Bank.

Underscoring the lack of agreement with Carter on substantive issues, Begin, on his return to Israel, overruled the decision of the previous Israeli government and recognized three formerly unauthorized civilian settlements on the West Bank, including that at Kadum (renamed Elon Moreh), as legal and permanent entities. Legalization of these settlements in the heart of the West Bank appears to signify that the question of security will no longer be claimed as the sole or primary justification for settlement.

The legalization of the three settlements was immediately criticized by Secretary of State Vance who called the action an obstacle to peace. Carter, at a press conference, agreed with this assessment but tended to downplay the significance of the Israeli action. Although Begin did not clearly state whether he would accede to Carter's request that he abstain from further settlement and denied that a freeze on new settlements was in

effect, some observers gave the optimistic interpretation that Begin's action was a move to defuse the demands of his more activist supporters. These observers believe that by legalizing the three settlements and thus reaffirming the principle of support for Jewish settlement, Begin may now refrain in practice from starting any new ones until the Geneva talks are given a chance.

The decision, approved by Begin, to legalize the settlements was actually made by the Ministerial Committee on Settlements, headed by Minister of Agriculture General (ret.) Ariel Sharon, and consisting of other Cabinet members and representatives of the Jewish National Fund and the Jewish Agency, the two voluntary bodies that have historically been involved in the purchase of land and the settlement of Jewish immigrants. The Committee reportedly has before it plans, not yet approved, for at least 16 new settlements in the West Bank.

According to a report in the Washington Post of July 13, 1977, there are four projects in the planning stage for the highly populated Jordan Valley areas. At least seven new settlements are planned by the Gush Emunim movement in the more densely populated areas of the West Bank. (Leaders of the Gush Emunim announced at a press conference in New York on August 7, 1977, that 12 new Jewish settlements by their movement were in the planning stage.) Begin's own Likud Party reportedly has plans for the building of five new Jewish urban areas in the West Bank with a potential total population of 150,000 to be erected over a four-year period.

On September 3, Minister of Agriculture Sharon, an outspoken advocate of Jewish settlement in the occupied territories, stated on Israeli radio that he had a plan to settle two million Jewish settlers in a security belt extending from the Golan Heights in the north to the tip of the Sinai Peninsula in the south. The plan envisaged the establishment of a number of Jewish urban and agricultural settlements in sparsely inhabited areas of the West Bank. Sharon's plan, however, has been greeted with skepticism by the Israeli public. Most Israelis, including some members of the Begin Government, regard it as impractical in view of Israel's lack of financial resources and its present total Jewish population of only three million.

Sharon caused another stir when on September 8 he implied in an interview in the Israeli newspaper Ma'ariv that several new settlements had been secretly established on the West Bank over the last month. The Israel Government immediately notified the U.S. State Department that despite Israeli press reports to the contrary, it had not begun any new Jewish settlements in occupied territory. Sharon himself issued a clarification, claiming that the paper had misconstrued a general comment to the effect that not all steps in the lengthy settlement process are announced in the press.

Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan has defended the settlements as "productive and constructive for peace" because they bring Jews and Arabs together; therefore the West Bank settlements could be seen as assets rather than as obstacles to peace. It was Dayan, who as defense minister in the Labor government had successfully advocated the open bridges policy with Jordan and had also authorized the relatively free movement of Arab workers from the territories into pre-1967 Israel. So far there is not much social contact between the Jewish inhabitants of the settlements and their Arab neighbors, although there is growing economic cooperation.

Dayan has now elaborated a proposal for the West Bank for presentation to President Carter on behalf of the Israel Government during his September visit to the United States to attend the UN General Assembly. The proposal reportedly suggests that the Arab inhabitants of the West Bank be given substantial autonomy, with the option of retaining Jordanian citizenship, while Israel would maintain control over the defense and security of the territory. It calls for "functional" arrangements that would give the Arab population a large degree of self-government and would rely heavily on the cooperation of moderate West Bank leaders while excluding strong supporters of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The plan conceives of the evolution of several West Bank ministries, headed by local Arabs, which would deal with specific areas such as commerce, industry, health, and education, and it would encourage economic links between Israel, the West Bank, and Jordan with an unhindered flow of people and goods. Ac-

According to the plan, Israel would reserve the right to buy and settle vacant lands. Dayan's proposal is in line with his belief that since there is no current prospect for a territorial agreement between the Arabs and Israel with regard to the West Bank, a practical solution should be attempted that would allow both sides to live together.

The Dayan plan reportedly also would offer the 300,000 stateless Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip a choice of Israeli or Jordanian citizenship.

Legal Considerations Under Security Council Resolution 242

The major legal arguments put forward by those who would demand Israel's complete withdrawal from all the territories that came under its control in June 1967 are based on the erroneous interpretation of the provisions of Security Council Resolution 242 which calls for "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" and the second paragraph of the preamble of the resolution which asserts the principle of the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war."

U.S. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg and British delegate Lord Caradon, author of the final text, both have affirmed that the omission of the definite article before the word "territories" in the withdrawal clause was deliberate. The primary territorial objective of the resolution is the establishment of "secure and recognized boundaries." Resolution 242 does not legally require full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories it occupied in June 1967; yet, at the same time, it does not preclude a demand by the Arabs in negotiations for complete withdrawal.

The ambiguity of Resolution 242 leaves room for both opposing demands during the process of negotiations between the parties, but does not require an Israeli commitment for full withdrawal as a condition for those negotiations. Nevertheless, as Goldberg recently indicated, while the resolution's sponsors contemplated "less than total withdrawal," they definitely expected substantial Israeli withdrawal on all fronts, including the West Bank.

A more complex legal question concerns the preamble's clause affirming the principle of the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." The Arabs and their supporters point to this clause of the resolution as the basis for their demand that Israel withdraw from all the territories occupied in June 1967 as a condition for the settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute. The Arab states, until recently, had demanded this even as a precondition for entering negotiations for a settlement.

The contrary Israeli argument as presented by Professor Yehuda Blum, Senior Lecturer in International Law at the Hebrew University in his book, Secure Boundaries and Middle East Peace, (Jerusalem, Hamakor Press, 1971, pp. 80-91), asserts that the pro-Arab view is based on a confusion between the acquisition of territories and their occupation. According to Blum, there is nothing under the UN Charter or general international law that would lead one to suppose that military occupation, especially when it is the result of a war undertaken in self-defense, is illegal. Consequently, the clause of Resolution 242 regarding the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war" cannot mean that a military occupier must withdraw before peace terms are agreed upon.

The real meaning of the clause, noted Professor Blum, is that it considers as inadmissible the attempt to base title to territory on conquest--that military victory itself does not give rights to territory, and that the future disposition of territory can only follow from an international agreement between the parties concerned. Thus if a future peace agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors provides for secure boundaries that depart from the military demarcation lines of the 1948 Armistice Agreements, those future boundaries will be decided not on the basis of the mere physical presence of Israeli forces, but from an international agreement concluded by the parties concerned. (At Arab insistence, the Armistice Agreements explicitly state that the demarcation lines are not permanent political boundaries, and that the determination of the final boundaries between Israel and her neighbors would be left for the "ultimate settlement of the Palestine question.")

Legal Basis for Israel's Claim that the West Bank is Not "Occupied"

While these general legal considerations appear valid with regard to those territories occupied by Israel in June 1967 which lie beyond the boundaries of former Mandatory Palestine (the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights), other considerations are also pertinent with regard to those territories lying within the former Mandate area which had been invaded by Jordan and Egypt in 1948. In fact, the Egyptian occupation of Gaza and the Jordanian annexation of the West Bank, Blum argues, were unlawful in themselves, and in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter which calls on all members to refrain in their international relations "from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any state." Consequently, the use of force by Egypt and Jordan having been illegal, it could not give rise to any valid legal claims or rights of sovereignty over any part of the former Mandatory Palestine--certainly their rights could not exceed those of Israel which assumed control over these territories in 1967.

The annexation of the West Bank by Jordan in 1950 can thus be regarded as invalid under international law. (Egypt never claimed sovereignty over Gaza.) Only two states, the UK and Pakistan, formally recognized the Jordanian annexation. After a lengthy squabble, the Arab League only saw fit to acknowledge the Jordanian annexation as a "trust" and "without prejudice to any final settlement of the Palestine question." Israel in May 1950, denounced the Jordanian action as "a unilateral act which in no way binds Israel" and that "the question of...territories west of the Jordan remains...open."

Prime Minister Begin repeated this argument recently in Jerusalem on July 27, 1977, on his return from the U.S. Responding to the State Department statement criticizing the legalization of three settlements on the West Bank, Mr. Begin said that Israel cannot be considered an occupying power in the West Bank in the legal sense because Jordan which had earlier held the territory had occupied it by aggression in the 1948 war.

In contrast to Jordan's 1948 occupation, Israelis contend that when Israel used force in 1967, it was legitimately used in exercise of its inherent rights of self-defense under the UN Charter. Since the boundary line with Jordan until 1967 was the armistice line of 1949, and not a recognized international border, when the Jordanians attacked across the line into Israel in 1967, the action constituted a violation of the armistice and the armistice agreement then became invalid. This argument, however, leaves open the possibility of the Arabs also claiming the invalidity of the 1949 armistice lines and demanding a return to the 1947 partition lines recommended by the UN General Assembly, the only internationally-approved proposal for dividing former Mandatory Palestine.

The Legal Problems of Settlement on Occupied Territory and the U.S. Position

Other legal questions arise with respect to the establishment of settlements in the occupied territories. In the past, Israel has considered these areas (excluding Jerusalem) as that of territory occupied during war and it has not annexed any part. (In June 1967, East Jerusalem was "re-unified" with West Jerusalem when the Knesset enacted a law extending Israeli administrative jurisdiction to an enlarged Jerusalem municipality.)

The United States currently claims that the establishment of settlements in the occupied territories is a violation of international law under the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 which declared illegal the type of population shifts employed by Nazi Germany during World War II. According to Article 49, paragraph 6 of the Convention, "The occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies." (Emphasis added.) Last year William Scranton, then the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, for the first time explicitly declared that the U.S. regarded Israeli settlements in the occupied territories as "illegal," and that they presented an obstacle to peace.

However, previous to Scranton, U.S. Ambassadors to the UN were not as explicit as he was in terming Israeli settlement policy in the occupied

territories as illegal, and in the main their comments focused on the Jerusalem issue. Ambassador Goldberg, in referring to measures Israel had taken with respect to East Jerusalem, emphasized that the U.S. did not consider these measures other than "interim and provisional" which "cannot affect the present international status nor prejudice the final and permanent status of Jerusalem." Ambassador Charles Yost in July 1969 told the Security Council that the international law governing occupied territories also applied to East Jerusalem. In the U.S. view, he said: "The expropriation or confiscation of land, the construction of housing on such land, the demolition or confiscation of buildings, including those having historic or religious significance, and the application of Israeli law to occupied portions of the city are detrimental to our common interests in the city." (Emphasis added.)

By March 1976, Ambassador Scranton was asserting in the Security Council a new emphasis in U.S. policy with respect to Israeli measures in the occupied territories. On March 31, he quoted from article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and then added: "Clearly, then, substantial re-settlement of the Israeli civilian population in occupied territories, including East Jerusalem, is illegal under the Convention and cannot be considered to have prejudged the outcome of future negotiations between the parties on the location of the borders of States of the Middle East." He went on to say that, "Indeed, the presence of these settlements is seen by my Government as an obstacle to the success of the negotiations for a just and final peace between Israel and its neighbors."

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance recently repeated this contention after Israel's legalization of three settlements on the West Bank in July 1977: "We have consistently stated and reiterated during our discussions here in Washington that we are of the opinion that the placing of these settlements is contrary to international law and presents an obstacle to peace."

But the view that the settlements violate international law is disputed by other legal scholars. As noted above, Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention was drafted to outlaw the "forcible transfers, as well as deportations" of the kind massively undertaken by the Nazis. Consequently, the prohibition in paragraph 6 has been interpreted by leading international law authorities as only "intended to cover cases of the occupant bringing in its nationals for the purpose of displacing the population of the occupied territory." (Lauterpacht's Oppenheim, International Law, 7th ed., Vol. II, p. 452). The new Jewish settlements have not displaced the local Arab population. Moreover, Israel contends that although the Geneva Convention does not legally apply to the West Bank and Gaza, it adheres to its provisions in the treatment of the Arab civilian population.

Political Considerations

Irrespective of the legal merits of the case, there are two issues of practical political consideration. 1. Are the settlements in the West Bank a minor factor in the Arab-Israel conflict, or do they really present a major obstacle to a peace agreement? 2. Will these issues develop into a major crisis in U.S.-Israel relations.

It seems apparent that President Carter is set on bringing about a Middle East peace settlement based on the three major principles of his Middle East policy despite the current Israel Government's opposition to two of them--the withdrawal of Israeli forces from almost all of the territory it occupied in June 1967 with only minor alterations in the pre-1967 borders, and the establishment of some kind of Palestinian homeland on the West Bank, preferably linked with Jordan. Only on the third component of Carter's outline for peace is there agreement with Israel--the acceptance by the Arabs of a real peace with diplomatic and trade relations with Israel.

In his news conference following the Begin visit, Carter indicated his awareness of the pressures within Israel for the establishment of new settlements that Begin has to contend with. However, when asked in a Time magazine interview, published August 8, whether he would use "persuasion or pressure" if Israel's position at Geneva was quite different from his own, Carter responded in general terms, referring to his efforts to convince both Arab and Israeli leaders to support the American approach, but

clearly implied that he would appeal to Begin's domestic and foreign opposition: "I would try to marshal the support of the leader, first of all. Secondly, the opinion of his people back home, the constituencies that might exist in our own country that would have influence around the world, opinion that exists in the European community, and in the Arab nations as well." Thus President Carter appears determined to gain wide support for his own view of a fair territorial settlement. Prime Minister Begin has similarly indicated that he is prepared to appeal directly to American public opinion to oppose objectionable features in the Carter Administration's Middle East policy.


It is still too early to speculate on the final outcome of the current Israeli and Arab foreign ministers' consultations with President Carter. In a September 20 news conference following his talks with President Carter and State Department officials, Foreign Minister Dayan acknowledged that wide gaps still existed between Israel and the United States as well as between Israel and the Arabs, but added that, "We all have to distinguish between the start of negotiations, the bargaining, and the ultimate compromise. I think ultimately an agreed formula will be found."

While noting the differences between Israel and the U.S. over continued plans for Israeli settlements in the territories occupied by Israel during the 1967 war, Dayan said that in a final agreement, "if some settlements were on the other side of the ultimate border" means will be found to "remove them" or adjust to circumstances in some other way. However, Dayan added that, "we can assure the Arab states negotiations will not be decided on settlements."

Dayan thus reflected the Israeli view that the real obstacle to peace in the Middle East is not the restoration of Jewish communities in the historic land of Israel, but the continuing Arab refusal to acknowledge the right of a sovereign Jewish state to exist in the Middle East alongside the 21 sovereign Arab states.

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THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

Summary of the Report of the
Task Force on the Relationship Between
Israel and the American Jewish Community

In the early 1970s an AJC task force, examining the factors shaping the future of the Jewish community through the coming decade, ascribed special significance to the network of associations and patterns of institutional relationships between the American Jewish community and the State of Israel. The report of the task force noted the ways in which concern with the future of Israel has become a major context of Jewish identification and a significant focus of energy and resources for American Jews.

In 1975 a new Task Force on the Relationship between Israel and the American Jewish community was established. Participants in its deliberations included, on the American side, Philip Klutznick, Milton Konvitz, Charles Liebman, Rabbis Wolfe Kelman, David Polish and Joseph Glaser, and a number of AJC Board members including Elmer Winter, Phil Hoffman, Gerry Weinstock, Melvin Merians, and Robert Goldmann. Among the Israelis who participated were: Mordecai Bar-On, an official of the Jewish Agency, on leave, Prof. Haim Ben Shahr, President of Tel Aviv University, Dr. Israel Katz, now the Welfare Minister of Israel and then associated with the Brookdale Institute of Gerontology, Arnulf Pins of the J.D.C. in Israel, Dan Tolkowsky of the Discount Bank Investment Corp., Alexander Rafaeli, a leading Israeli manufacturer, and a number of senior members of the Hebrew University faculty.

The Task Force deliberations were based on papers prepared in advance as well as oral presentations. Two conferences were held in Jerusalem, each of several days duration — one in January 1976 and the other in February 1977. Smaller conferences of special committees were also held in Jerusalem and New York. The report of the Task Force was drafted by Robert Goldmann, who volunteered his services as a member of the Task Force Planning Committee, and Professor David Sidorsky of Columbia, who served as a special consultant. The draft was sent to all the Task Force members whose opinions were solicited and a final version has just been completed, to be published in the very near future. (The Task Force papers will appear in book form later on.)

The following is a concise summary, subdivided into the major areas of discussion:

Ideology and Consensus

A striking feature of these sessions was the persistence of a duality in viewpoints between Israelis and Americans in discussion of ideological issues on the one hand, and the convergence of attitude between them in discussions of policy or pragmatic issues, on the other.

While the Task Force did not define its task in terms of ideological reconciliation, it did take notice of the ideological background against which policies that affect the relationship between Israel and the American Jewish community are developed. It noted that the contemporary Jewish community in Israel conceives of itself as a verification of Zionist ideology, that the elements of Zionist ideology include the assertion that Diaspora is in "exile," that there is need for an "ingathering of exiles" to Israel, and primacy or centrality of a sovereign Israel for Jewish survival must be assumed. One participant observed that in his examination of the differences between competing Zionist ideologies a common element in each was the "negation of the exile."

In contrast, it was noted that the American Jewish community conceives of itself as a demonstration that Judaism and Jewish communal life can survive and even flourish in a democracy.

Taking note of their ideological differences, the Task Force formulated a statement of shared assumptions and principles which are reflected in the joint policies and activities of Israel and the American Jewish community. These were as follows:

1. The future of the American Jewish community and Israel are inextricably interwoven as major constituents of a single Jewish people. Pragmatically, this premise of a single Jewish peoplehood implies a recognition of interdependence and mutual responsibility in the agenda of Jewish and Israeli concerns.

2. The State of Israel has a crucial role in the future of the Jewish people and the existence, security, and development of the State of Israel is a matter of critical concern for Jews everywhere.

3. The American Jewish community is an expression of the historic creativity of the Jewish people in the Diaspora. Both Israel and American Jewry have an equal stake in the continued viability of the American Jewish community.

Although these principles do not directly imply policies, they do provide a background of agreement for the effort to develop specific policies in several major areas of the Israel-American Jewish relationship and suggest direction for improving that relationship.

The Political Dimension

The political aspect of the many overlapping networks of association between the American Jewish community and Israel is the focus of the most concern and generates the most serious debate in communal policy. The political relationship between the American Jewish community and Israel is dominated by concern with Israel's security.

American Jewish political activity in support of Israel has faced two main types of criticism. The first, coming from outside the community, suggests that the Jewish community does not sufficiently respond to American military, strategic or global interests as distinct from a response that is supportive of Israel.

The second criticism is internal, suggesting that the Jewish community's support of Israel tends to be monolithic and uncritical, with insufficient attention to minority opinion.

In response to the first type of criticism, the Task Force noted that the Jewish community has formulated its views in the tradition of American political pluralism, and that the American Jewish-Israeli political relationship is comparable to that of other religious and ethnic groups in the U.S. who identify with their country of origin. Within this framework, Jewish communal policy should be formulated in a manner that demonstrates how it is consistent with—and supportive of—American national interests. The Israeli government in its political relationship with American Jews, must be sensitive to this context within which American Jewish communal activity takes place.

The Task Force devoted much attention to the problems raised by the second type of criticism concerning the issue of political dissent within the American Jewish community. While it did not seek to adjudicate any particular controversy and did not recognize the need to propose structural changes to resolve the issue, it did feel that the problem called for a restatement of the guidelines that have been operative regarding minority, dissenting groups within the Jewish community.

First, it recognized the fact that the American Jewish community is a plural community of voluntary associations and that its coordinating bodies are not constitutionally representative. Consequently, while it is legitimate for the majority to expect that its opinions will be heard and given weight, it recognizes that each group is free to continue the policies determined by its own membership. It also recognized that it is counter-productive for the community to encourage confrontation with small minority groups holding views outside the mainstream of the majority.

Second, while recognizing the importance of permitting expression of dissenting views, this need not limit the assertion of a consensus position and the effort to build support for it within the community.

Third, the Task Force recommended that the structure of such coordinating bodies as the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations and the NJCRAC be re-examined with a view to initiating those changes that would permit them to be more fully representative of American Jewish communal opinion, independent of Israel.

The Task Force sought to identify some of the major issues that require decisions taken jointly by the American Jewish community and Israel that do not impinge on the security interests of Israel. One recent illustration is Soviet Jewish emigration. Here American Jewish interests and Israeli interests may diverge, and it is important that the American Jewish community develop procedures of consultation and collaboration with Israel while not hesitating to undertake independent initiatives. Another issue where a greater degree of collaboration between the American Jewish community and Israel would be desirable is in the anti-Israel actions at the UN. Such collaboration could result in a more effective defense of both Israeli and Jewish interests.

Finally, the Task Force recognized the significance of autonomous and intelligent American Jewish communal policies for many areas of what has been termed the "world Jewish polity." To be most effective in exercising its responsibility, the American Jewish community should improve its procedures for consultation not only with the Government of Israel but with other diaspora Jewish bodies such as the World Jewish Congress. Through such communication and consultation the American Jewish community could improve its capacity for decision-making, delineating those issues on which independence and autonomy should be exercised and those where common action would be desirable.

The Economic Dimension

The scope of the economic involvement and relationships of the American Jewish community with Israel has been significant. According to one estimate, the American Jewish community has been responsible through philanthropy or bonds, for about \$9 billion of the total Israel capital import of \$31 billion since the State was founded.

In examining the framework in which American-Israeli economic relationships have developed, the Task Force noted the historically high rate of growth of the Israeli economy. It also pointed out the vulnerability of the Israeli economy to recession, Israel's high burden of foreign indebtedness, and its continuing adverse balance of payments, making it difficult to realize the goal of economic independence.

The Task Force asserted that it is of major importance that Israel move toward a greater measure of economic independence and that this effort involves sustained collaboration with the American Jewish community. In this connection, an important factor is the ratio between American Jewish philanthropic support of Israel and private American Jewish investment in Israel which runs about 10:1 or higher. The Task Force supported a shift in the direction of greater private investment, while recognizing the need for continued high levels of philanthropic aid. In fact, a recurrent theme in the discussions was the importance of involving American Jews with the Israeli economy in modes other than fund-raising.

It was recognized that a shift in the ratio between investment and philanthropy would involve increased communication, i.e., joint planning and programming between the American Jewish community and the private sector in Israel, and the Task Force made a number of specific recommendations on how this could be accomplished.

The Task Force made specific recommendations as to how American Jews could take the lead in opening up new opportunities for increased investment in Israel. These would include, among other things, an annual assessment of the Israeli economy by a group of independent Israeli economists and an advisory group of American economists, possibly to be reviewed by the Committee for the Economic Growth of Israel (CEGI). It suggested an exploration by Israeli and American economists of more realistic models of Israel's relations with the Diaspora with regard to the flow of people, money, and trade. Joint American-Israeli task forces should be established to review ways of reducing Israel's foreign debt, to develop approaches for the creation of an effective capital market in Israel, to work in conjunction with the CEGI for increased Israeli exports to the United States and the improvement of marketing techniques for these products, and to explore possibilities for significant private foreign investment or participation in government-owned Israeli corporations.

The Task Force also recommended an expansion of current American Jewish volunteer programs including pools of professionals possessing skills that could be put to use in Israel's economic development.

Health and Welfare

A conference composed of leading practitioners and theoreticians of health and welfare institutions in Israel serving as a sub-committee of the Task Force issues a report that formed the basis of Task Force discussion in the area of health and welfare.

There has been a long established and continually developing network of health and welfare institutions in Israel that have direct links with the American Jewish community at a level of collaboration and mutual exchange far beyond that reached in any

other aspect of the American Jewish-Israel relationship. Yet, a recurrent theme in the discussions of the Task Force in this area was the need for a greater degree of American Jewish intervention and participation in ways other than the contribution of funds.

First, it was felt that only if American Jewish leadership exerted a greater influence on the policies of health and welfare institutions to which it contributed, would its commitment grow. Secondly, there exists a need for the development of a procedure for institutional and program evaluation that is currently lacking in Israeli institutions. Thirdly, and most significantly, the Task Force noted that a greater degree of American Jewish intervention was crucial in assisting Israelis to successfully depoliticize their health and welfare institutions. Such politicization stems in part from the fact that they were founded under the sponsorship of the various Zionist parties prior to the establishment of the State. It was believed that greater American Jewish involvement would also contribute to a greater measure of objective and professional standards in health and welfare programs.

In addition, the Task Force noted the sense of concern every Jewish community ought to have regarding the development of Israeli society, particularly the closing of the social gap between the various Israeli ethnic groups.

The Task Force reviewed and accepted several specific recommendations that emerged from the sub-committee. There included (1) encouraging senior Jewish professional personnel from U.S. agencies and Jewish communal services as well as faculty from professional schools to spend a sabbatical year in Israel; (2) helping Jewish communal agencies to develop collaborative projects to help strengthen Israeli health and welfare services without increasing their dependence of the American organizations. It suggested that orientation programs for visiting professionals be proposed to introduce them to living and working conditions in Israel and, conversely, for Israelis coming to the U.S. In addition, the Task Force recommended the establishment of a coordinating body to facilitate personnel recruitment and placement and to identify the specific manpower needs and opportunities in Israeli institutions.

The Education and Cultural Dimension

The Task Force examination of cultural and educational exchange between Israel and the American Jewish community was aided by a study prepared for it, concerning the changing patterns of Israeli and American Jewish self-identification.

The Task Force paper on Jewish identity in Israel and in America pointed out that the development of different forms of Jewish identity in different centers of Jewish life was, to a degree, a novelty in Jewish history. Previously, Halakha (Jewish

religious law) had been the dominant tradition shaping Jewish life. With the eclipse of halakha, it had been assumed by some that the Jews of Israel would develop a new "post halakhic" national Jewish identity and that Diaspora Jewry would develop a form of marginal Jewish identity as a consequence of assimilation into Western society.

The Task Force found it noteworthy, however, that the most secular institutions of Israeli society bear elements of continuity with the Jewish past and that even Israel's most secular concerns such as defense, settlement and immigrant absorption, involve the State in the Jewish experiences with communities outside Israel.

In the United States, the transformation of traditional Jewish patterns of religious identification has not led to the erosion of Jewish identity. In the American Jewish culture there have been many successful efforts toward creative adjustment, revitalization and innovation in the patterns of American Jewish identity.

In addition, the Task Force found that the reality of Israel has become an important element in developing forms of Jewish self-identification for the American Jewish community and that this phenomenon carried with it the potential for important changes in the character of present exchange programs between Israel and American Jewry.

Traditionally, the Zionist movement had taken a leadership position in the development of a network of communal Hebrew schools in the United States and has sent shlichim to direct youth movements of young American Zionists. In the past, though some shlichim were primarily active in efforts to foster aliyah, today most have an educational function.

Similarly, periods of work in Israeli kibbutzim and volunteer programs and study at Israeli educational institutions, yeshivot and various leadership training institutes have all involved American Jewish youth with Israel.

Within the American Jewish community, schools, camps, and youth organizations have developed programs in which Israel is a major resource for Jewish education.

The Task Force found, however, that there has been little communal direction and planning for these activities. Accordingly, the Task Force recommended the establishment, under the leadership of the American Zionist Youth Foundation, of a policy study of the present use of Israel as an educational resource. Such a study should be geared to long-term planning for the development of the Israeli experience as an educational instrumentality. In addition a comprehensive plan should be developed for a new educational track based on an Israeli centered curriculum, alongside the current tracks of Jewish education in America.

The Task Force found that enrollment in formal education exchanges with Israeli institutions, ranging from high school to post graduate level, is far below what it might be, despite the fact that every major Israeli educational institution, at least on the undergraduate level, has developed programs of study for American Jewish students. Accordingly, the Task Force recommended that a study be undertaken by the American Association for Jewish Education to examine the ways in which Israeli educational institutions may serve more effectively as instrumentalities in the formal educational system of the American Jewish community.

The Task Force also proposed the encouragement and support of educational, cultural and professional exchanges with Israeli institutions ranging from symphony orchestras and museums to hospitals and social service institutions, etc.

The Task Force noted that in contrast to the potential use of Israel as an educational resource in America, there appears to be little or no reciprocal need felt by Israelis for involvement with the American Jewish community. It was pointed out that an understanding of the American Jewish experience should form an integral part of the Israeli educational experience and Israelis' interpretation of the Jewish past and present. Accordingly, the Task Force recommended that research and educational activity regarding the history of American Jewry and its role in the context of the world Jewish community be expanded in Israel.

The Issue of Aliyah

In theory, Aliyah and the effort to increase American Jewish immigration to Israel is an issue capable of producing emotional and ideological tension and confrontation between Israel and the American Jewish community. In practice, the Task Force found that almost all the programs and procedures for stimulating and implementing Aliyah could receive broad support from both Israel and the American Jewish community.

Ideologically, Aliyah generates tension within the American Jewish community because it is often linked to the view that the Jewish future in America is threatened by the potential for anti-Semitism and that the Jewish future in America is doomed by the inevitable erosion of Jewish commitment under conditions of freedom.

To American Jewish leaders, threats of anti-Semitism and cultural erosion are viewed as a challenge which stimulates efforts both in safeguarding freedom and developing strategies for preserving and enhancing Jewish continuity.

Furthermore, the Task Force found that the assertion of these ideological premises for Aliyah has been ineffective in persuading

the majority of American Jews to immigrate. Rather, a growth in American Jewish immigration to Israel would seem more related to other kinds of positive appeals, including the stress on the kinds of experiences, values, or qualities that Israeli environment provides.

The Task Force noted that when the focus of aliyah shifts to realistic programs for stimulating immigration to Israel, the ideological polemics often disappear. When American Jews choose to emigrate to Israel because they believe it would provide them with a more complete and intense Jewish life, or because they believe they can make specific contributions to Israeli society, the Task Force found that the American Jewish community has a strong commitment to support these efforts and often considers it as part of its own values to assist them in realizing their goals.

The Task Force therefore found merit in the suggestion that the American Jewish community provide a more supportive role in the absorption of American Jewish immigrants in Israel. It viewed the presence of American Jews living in Israel as providing the natural bonds which most effectively could build bridges between the two communities.

Religious Pluralism in Israel

The Task Force noted that the differences on the major issues which divide Israel and the American Jewish community usually stem from the different historic circumstances of the two communities and suggested that this generalization is most appropriate in the uniquely troublesome area of Jewish religious practice.

The American Jewish community, like all post-Emancipation communities, developed patterns of adjustment to modernity reflected in the neo-Orthodox, Conservative and Reform movements which have become recognized as normative expressions of Jewish religious commitment.

The Israeli community was to a large extent shaped by the secular Zionist tendencies that developed within European Jewry after the Enlightenment, and was relatively untouched by neo-Orthodox, Conservative or Reform attitudes.

The Israeli community also contained an indigenous orthodox community that has its roots in pre-Zionist settlement in the Holy Land. In addition, most of the Sephardic Jews in Israel came from lands that had not experienced Enlightenment or Emancipation, but were rooted in traditional orthodoxy.

Moreover, Israel has inherited the assumption, prevalent in traditional Middle Eastern societies (the so-called millet system), that religious freedom is to be interpreted in terms of freedom for

communal groups, e.g. Moslem, Christian, Jewish, etc., but not of the separation of Religion and State or individual religious choice.

Furthermore, the political system in Israel, from its inception, has had a framework of coalition politics in which the orthodox religious parties have an important bloc of votes.

In this context, it has not been surprising that Israeli governments have found it prudent to postpone efforts to reform Israeli law so as to legitimize Jewish religious pluralism or to achieve separation of Religion and State.

The Task Force did not deliberate on the wisdom of this postponement but it did note some of the small but significant changes in the social realities of religion in Israel. These include the growth of Conservative and Reform movements in Israel, their recent joining of the World Zionist Organization, and the association of the major Israeli non-secular university, Bar-Ilan, with the American Jewish neo-Orthodoxy community. The Task Force suggested that these developments may be setting the stage for continued efforts toward legitimization of religious pluralism in Israel, but warned that the absence of such legitimization and lack of any indigenous Israeli development on the spectrum between secularism and extreme Orthodoxy, sets up impediments to effective communication between Israel and the American Jewish community on their shared religious heritage.

The Task Force recommended continued in-depth discussion of the religious issues. It recognized the need for the Israeli community to appreciate the attitudes of Conservative and Reform Jews who find themselves denied full participation in Israel despite their Zionist commitment. Conversely, it recognized the need for the American Jewish community to appreciate the historic and social circumstances that make it difficult for Israeli society to accommodate religious pluralism in the American tradition.

The Jewish Agency

The major overarching institution in which American Jews and Israelis serve together to shape policies and make decisions affecting the condition of the Diaspora and the development of Israel is the reconstituted Jewish Agency.

As one participant in the Task Force described it, "the main activities and the executive function of the Jewish Agency are divisible (in terms of)...the raising of funds, which is conducted almost entirely in the Diaspora, and...the outlay of the monies in the various spheres in which the Jewish Agency is engaged...(which) is conducted almost entirely in Israel."

Problems for effective involvement of Diaspora representatives arise from this functional division — fundraising and fund dis-

pensing. On the fund-raising side (largely Israeli) there are department heads who work at their salaried jobs every day, who are immersed in Israeli political and administrative life and who have received their positions from the various political parties based on a Party key. On the fundraising side (largely American), the representatives are, for the most part, businessmen with deep commitments and close acquaintances based on frequent trips to Israel--and their efforts are performed on a voluntary basis.

Israeli politics is naturally and inevitably reflected in decision-making in the Agency. In its report, the Task Force cited a statement by Max Fisher, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Jewish Agency in 1976:

Unfortunately, we have not yet reached the point where men are selected for Agency service solely on their qualifications without regard to political or party affiliation...the party key still serves to lock out able people we need in our agency and lock in others who are not up to their responsibilities. We can no longer afford it.

Thus, two kinds of disparities in the personnel composition of the Agency make for an uncomfortable mix: professional versus lay persons; political versus merit criteria.

American representatives have been reluctant to get involved in the politics of the Agency.

Similarly, in the functional areas of Agency work, the Americans are ready and equipped to make recommendations, but seem to shrink from pressing for involvement at the policy level.

Accordingly, the Task Force strongly emphasized the need for more active--and specific--involvement of Diaspora representatives in Agency work.

Beyond the problems outlined above, the Task Force discussed the question of whether American and Israeli members of Agency bodies are truly representative of the different strata within their respective societies. Some participants called for American Jewish representation beyond the fund-raising community. Others noted that the overwhelming majority of Israeli members of the Agency were delegated to their position by the political parties and called for the involvement of the recipients and beneficiaries of Jewish Agency-supported activities.

The Task Force recommended that Diaspora representatives become more deeply and creatively involved in the work of the Agency,

particularly on the policy-making levels. It stressed that particular care should be given to target such efforts at specific program objectives (education, housing, social services, etc.) of the Agency and to involve groups in Israel and in the Diaspora who have a direct interest and the requisite expertise and skill to find such involvement rewarding and productive. It recommended that consideration should be given to broadening the framework of Agency representativeness both from Israel and the Diaspora, in addition to present representation from the Zionist parties and from Diaspora fund-raising organizations.

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ONLY 102 JEWS ALLOWED TO LEAVE USSR IN JUNE

The National Conference on Soviet Jewry reports that only 102 Jews were allowed to leave the Soviet Union for Israel in June. This brings the total for the first six months of 1983 to 639 -- *less than half the emigration figure for the previous year, 1982.*

SINCE THE PEAK YEAR IN 1979, JEWISH EMIGRATION FROM THE SOVIET UNION HAS DECLINED FROM OVER 4,000 A MONTH TO AN AVERAGE OF ONLY 100 A MONTH IN 1983.

The position of the Jews of the Soviet Union is deteriorating rapidly. There is growing harassment and muzzling of cultural and religious expression that is harsh even by Soviet standards. Iosif Begun, the mathematician, has been arrested and faces a third trial because of his attempt to teach the Hebrew language, which has been interpreted as anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. Aleksandr Paritsky, an engineer, was arrested, tried and found guilty for the crime of defaming the Soviet state because he organized Jewish cultural and educational activities in the Ukraine.

Many now believe that this oppression is part of a campaign by the Soviet authorities to blot out the collective memory of the Jewish people. Anti-Semitic statements have also become more prevalent in officially authorized newspapers, magazines, books, military publications and even scientific journals.

Recently, "Invasion Without Arms," an officially sponsored anti-Semitic book, was published and republished in 150,000 copies in Moscow. It characterizes the Old Testament of the Bible as, among other things, "an unsurpassed textbook of hypocrisy, treachery, perfidy and moral degeneracy — all the basest human qualities." Even the young have not been spared. In a recent issue of Pionerskaya Pravda — an official publication for children under the age of 14 — the authorities repeat these anti-Semitic slanders.

As in czarist days, Jews are prevented from entering Soviet universities. Two social scientists, Boris Kanovsky and Valery Sanderov, are in prison for undertaking a study that revealed that Moscow State University

Seymour P. Lachman is University Dean of the City University of New York and chairman of the Greater New York Conference on Soviet Jewry.

Soviet Jews Need Help

By Seymour P. Lachman

practiced anti-Semitism in its admissions policy. Compounding the situation is the fact that Soviet Jewish emigration has practically ceased. Emigration, which had risen to 51,320 in 1979, dropped to 2,688 last year and is down to approximately 100 a month this year. This decline of Soviet Jewish emigration of over 97 percent bears witness to the fact that, more than ever, Russia is still the "prison-house of peoples" and in flagrant violation of international agreements, such as the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. The State Department has branded as "patently false" the statement by the newly formed Soviet Anti-Zionist Committee that most Jews who wanted to leave have already left. Our State Department also criticized the Soviet Union for "enlisting people of Jewish ancestry to participate in their anti-Semitic diatribes."

In fact, Soviet policy is even more restrictive than that of czarist Russia, which practiced anti-Semitism but permitted, and at times even encouraged, large-scale emigration. This safety valve no longer exists, even though more than 300,000 Jews have begun the administrative process they hope will lead to departure from the Soviet Union. Some 10,000 of these Jews are now in limbo because, after completing the process, they discovered that their request to leave had been turned down.

Many of them are professionals — distinguished scientists, scholars, artists and writers — who have been dismissed from their positions because of their desire to leave. We know them as refuseniks, and they are considered pariahs in Soviet society. The more fortunate have found jobs as building custodians or sweepers in movie theaters. Their creative talents have gone to waste since they are denied access to laboratories, libraries, universities, scientific institutes, scholarly journals and recital halls.

And yet they still have a lifeline to the outside world because the American Government has asked members of its diplomatic corps in the Soviet Union to establish regular and sustained contact with these refuseniks. This on-going expression of concern and solidarity has helped give the refuseniks a sense of dignity and an awareness that they are not alone. Recently a letter of protest was submitted to the United States Embassy in Moscow because of weekly visits by an American diplomat to Saturday evening gatherings outside the Moscow synagogue. The protest drew a strong response from Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman, who observed that the diplomat was acting on his instructions to gather information that would broaden the embassy's understanding of Soviet and Jewish affairs.

The refuseniks' isolation could be further broken and spirits raised if diplomats from other nations, such as our NATO allies and other democracies in the world, were to establish similar contacts with them.

Until the Soviet Union agrees to halt the persecution of its Jewish minority, it is imperative that free nations raise the issue in all forums. Furthermore, diplomats of all democratic countries stationed in the Soviet Union should be encouraged to meet with refuseniks, thus focusing on their condition and decreasing their isolation.