

'Me', 'us', and 'others'

Expressing the self in Arawak languages of South America, with a focus on Tariana

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2.1 The Arawak language family: a snapshot


The Amazon basin is an area of high linguistic diversity (rivalled only by the island of New Guinea). It comprises around 350 languages grouped into over fifteen language families, in addition to a number of isolates. The Arawak language family is the largest in South America in terms of its geographical spread, with over forty extant languages spread from the Caribbean to Argentina.¹ The legacy of Arawak languages survives in many common English words, including *hammock*, *hurricane*, *barbecue*, *iguana*, *maize*, *papaya*, *savanna*, *guava*, and possibly *tobacco*.

The internal classification of Arawak languages remains a matter of some debate. Arawak languages are spoken in at least ten locations north of the River Amazon and in at least ten south of it, which accounts for their extreme diversity. A number of grammatical and lexical traits distinguish languages spoken to the north of the River Amazon from those spoken to the south. Well-established subgroups include Kampa in Peru, South Arawak languages in Brazil and Bolivia, and a few small North Arawak groupings in Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela. These include the *Ta*-Arawak subgroup, with Guajiro (or Wayyu-naiki), Añun (or Parauhano) spoken in the region of Peninsula Guajira in Venezuela and Colombia, Garifuna (or Black Carib) in Central America, and Lokono (alternatively known as Dian, or Arawak) in Guyana, French

¹ Other large linguistic families are Carib, Tupí (which subsumes Tupí-Guaraní as one of its branches), Panoan, Jé, and also Tucanoan; smaller families include Arawá, Chapacura, Bora-Witotoan, Guahibo, Jivaroan, Zaparoan, and a few more (see a survey in Aikhenvald 2012a). A detailed discussion of the Arawak family is in Aikhenvald (1999, 2002, and also 2012a: 32–6; a comprehensive bibliography and an up-to-date classification is in Aikhenvald 2016).

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Guyana, and Suriname (and also the long-extinct Taino, the language of the first indigenous group encountered by Columbus). This subgroup got its name from the form of the first-person prefix—we return to this in section 2.2.

Tariana, the Baniwa of Içana-Kurripako dialect continuum, Cabiari, Piapoco, and Guarekena (and possibly Resígaro) in the Upper Rio Negro and adjacent regions of Colombia and Venezuela, form a closely knit Uaupí subgroup (so named after the shared ancestral place of origin, the Uaupí waterfall on the Içana river: Aikhenvald 2013b). A number of other languages within the Upper Rio Negro region and its surrounds show similarities with the Uaupí languages: these include Baré (formerly spoken in Venezuela and adjacent regions of Brazil); the extinct Manao, once spoken in the area of Middle Rio Negro, which gave its name to Manaus, the capital of the state of Amazonas in Brazil; and a closely related group encompassing Baniwa of Guiania, Yavitero, and Warekena of Xié (in Venezuela and the adjacent area of Brazil). The extant languages of the family and their distribution is shown in the map in Fig. 2.1.

We now turn to a brief discussion of the marking and the meanings of first person across the family.

2.2 How person is expressed in Arawak languages

All Arawak languages are highly synthetic and head-marking, with a few prefixes and numerous suffixes. A marked feature of Arawak languages is pronominal marking of subjects and objects (and sometimes other core participants) on verbal forms, and of possessors on nominal forms. This feature (also known as polypersonalism) is a common trait of highly synthetic languages (see Fortescue 1994: 2601; forthcoming).

As in many other Amazonian languages, pronominal affixes in Arawak languages are polyfunctional. A pronominal possessor on nouns is typically expressed with a pronominal prefix, in the same way as the subject of a transitive and of an active intransitive verb. Pronominal prefixes also mark the pronominal argument marked by postpositions and prepositions which are typically related to nouns. Pronominal suffixes and enclitics typically express the direct object, the subject of an intransitive




FIG. 2.1 The distribution of extant Arawak languages, with approximate locations (adapted from Aikhenvald 1999). The map includes six extinct languages: Taino, Island Carib (or Iñeri), Caquetio, and Shebayo in the Caribbean domain, and Manao and Baré in the Rio Negro region. *Key to language abbreviations:* AM: Amuesha (or Yanasha); AP: Apurinã (or Ipurina, Cangiti); BA: Bauré; BG: Baniwa of Guainia (with dialects, Yavitero and Warekena of Xié); BR: Baré; BWC: Baniwa of Içana/Kurripako; CA: Campa languages (Machiguenga, Nanti, Nomat-siguenga, Ashaninca, Asheninca, Pichis, Perené, Pajonal); CAQ: Caquetio; CB: Cabiari (or Kawyari); CHO: Chontaquiuro; CM: Chamicuro; GUA: Guajiro (or Wayyu-naiki); Iñ: Iñapari; KI: Kinikinao; LAR: Locono Arawak; MH: Mehinaku (Xinguan Arawak); MN: Manao; MO: Mojo (Ignaciano, Trinitário); MW: Mawayana; PA: Pareci (or Haliti); PAR: Parauhano (or Añun); PAU: Paiconeca and Paunaca; PI: Piro (or Yine; covering Masco-Piro, Maniteneri, Maxineri); PIA: Piapoco (or Dzase); PR: Palikur; RS: Resígaro; SHE: Shebayo; SL: Salumã (or Enawenê-Nawê); TE: Terêna; TN: Tariana; WA: Waurá (or Waujá) (Xinguan Arawak); WP: Wapishana; YC: Yucuna; Y: Yawalapiti (Xinguan Arawak).

stative verb, and also the subject of a verbless clause. This is the essence of split-ergative marking across the family: the subject of the intransitive verb (S) can acquire different marking depending on the meaning of the verb. The S of verbs which refer to states ('be rich', 'be poor'), qualities ('bad', 'good'), and non-controlled actions ('weep', 'remember', 'forget') is marked in the same way as the O of a transitive verb (and is referred to as S_o). Most verbs which refer to controlled actions including motion ('go', 'remain', 'arrive') mark their S in the same way as the A of a transitive verb (it is referred to as S_a) (see Aikhenvald 1999: 84; and Payne and Payne 2005; and Mihás 2017 on specific developments in the Kampa subgroup).

Warekena of Xié, a North Arawak language, offers a relatively simple example of common Arawak split S-marking.² Similar to many Arawak languages, there is just one prefix position: to mark the transitive subject (A), and the intransitive subject (S_a) of active verbs. An enclitic marks an O (direct object). This is shown in (1) and (2):

- (1) pi-muta-mia=yu Warekena of Xié
 2sgA-call-PERF=3sgfO
 'You called her'
- (2) yu-muta-mia=pi Warekena of Xié
 3sgfA-call-PERF=2sgO
 'She called you'

The subject of intransitive verbs of motion and a few others, including 'die', is also marked with prefixes. Example (3) illustrates the pronominal prefix *yu-* '3sgf S_a ' on the verb ('walk'), a possessed noun ('my wife'), and an adposition ('towards me').

- (3) nu-fumia-wa S_a nu-yuwaba yu-tapapa-mia Warekena of Xié
 1sg-spouse-FEM S_a 1sgPOSS-towards 3sgf S_a -walk-PERF
 'My wife walked towards me'

Verbs of state and natural phenomena mark their S in the same way as the O, with enclitics, e.g. *ura* 'to be dirty', *anuana* 'to be sick', *sese* 'to be dry', as do verbs referring to natural phenomena, like *ariwa* 'to dawn; to get up early', *fibuma* 'to grow dark; to spend the night'. In (4), the enclitic *-yu* refers to the S of a stative verb 'be sick':

- (4) anuana-mia=yu S_o nu-fumia-wa S_o Warekena of Xié
 be.sick-PERF=3sgf S_o 1sg-spouse-FEM S_o
 'My wife was sick'

Pronominal prefixes tend to be uniform across the family. However, suffixes and enclitics have been lost in a number of languages. Affixes for first and second person (singular and plural) are among the most stable forms: see Table 2.1.

The first-person singular prefix has two forms: *ta-* or *t-* in the *Ta*-Arawak languages (spoken in the north of the South American continent and in the Caribbean), and *nu-* or *n-* elsewhere. Incidentally, the division of Arawak languages into

² See an overview in Aikhenvald (2002: 305; 1999: 88–90); data on Warekena of Xié come from Aikhenvald (1998) and my own fieldwork.

TABLE 2.1 A/S_a/possessor prefixes, O/S_o suffixes/enclitics in proto-Arawak

Person	Prefixes		Suffixes	
	sg	pl	sg	pl
1	<i>n(u)-; t(a)-</i>	<i>wa-</i>	<i>-na, -te</i>	<i>-wa</i>
2	<i>(p)i-</i>	<i>(h)i</i>	<i>-pi</i>	<i>-hi</i>

Ta-Arawak and *Nu*-Arawak was the basis of one of the earliest classifications of the family, by von den Steinen (1886), a pioneer of Arawak studies.

Independent personal pronouns usually consist of a cross-referencing prefix plus a one-syllable emphatic particle, e.g. Baré *nu-ni*, Warekena of Xié *nu-ya*, Tariana *nu-ha*, Baniwa of Içana *hnua* (from *nu-ha*), Pareci *na-tyo* 'P. Typically for highly synthetic languages with person expressed on verb and on noun, independent personal pronouns are used sparingly. They tend to be restricted to expressing focused arguments, copula subjects, and copula complements. A large system of four sets of independent personal pronouns has been described for Alto Perené, a Kampa language from Peru. These include continuous topic pronouns, contrastive additive focus pronouns, contrastive exhaustive focus pronouns, and contrastive topic pronouns. Each can be used as subjects and as objects, and can occur together with personal cross-referencing prefixes and suffixes (Mihas 2015: 128–34, 608–11).

In those languages which do not have pronominal suffixes or enclitics on verbs, independent personal pronouns mark objects, as in Baré (Aikhenvald 1995a: 32):

- (5) *nu-sarima tsuma-ka maka nuni* Baré
 1sg-friend call-DECL again me
 'My friend (not anyone else) called me again'

The majority of Arawak languages do not employ cases for core arguments. Tariana is the only exception. The language has no personal suffixes or enclitics on the verb. Instead, the enclitic =*nuku*/=*naku* marks topical nominal objects and recipients of transitive and ditransitive verbs (nontopical objects are formally unmarked). All pronominal objects and recipients are expressed through a combination of a personal prefix plus the suffix *-na* (see the discussion in Aikhenvald 2003: 139–48; and §2.4.1 of this chapter).

First- and second-person pronouns in Arawak languages do not distinguish genders. Two genders—feminine and non-feminine—are limited to third singular pronouns and affixes (see Aikhenvald 1999: 84). Resígaro has developed masculine and feminine genders in first-person inclusive and exclusive pronouns, under the influence of Bora (a Bora-Witoto language: Allin 1975: 116–17; a summary in Aikhenvald 2012b). Tariana has developed feminine forms of all plural independent pronouns under Tucanoan influence (see §2.4.1).

Arawak languages have no dual number (in pronouns or elsewhere). In addition to a plural marker on nouns (reflexes of proto-Arawak **-pe* and **-nai/ne/ni*), some languages have an augmentative plural (e.g. Warekena of Xié *-nawi* 'very many') and collective plural (e.g. Warekena of Xié *-natsi* 'collective'). None of these is used with

first- or second-person pronouns. The lack of honorific pronouns, or pronouns encoding levels of politeness (such as are typical for the languages of Southeast Asia: see Enfield 2007: 102–3), is a feature Arawak languages share with Amazonian languages in general.

In terms of its meanings, first person across the Arawak language family is relatively straightforward. 'I' refers just to a single speaker. A non-singular first-person pronoun 'we' never refers to just the speaker in any Arawak language (in the way 'we' can be used in English). In contrast to languages from other areas—especially the New Guinea region, the Pacific, and some areas in Africa—'I' is not used in the meaning of 'segmentary' person as defined by Rumsey (2000, 2004), i.e. as a cover term for a group of people, a clan, or a subclan, whereby 'I fought with you' can mean 'my ancestors (or segmentary unit) fought with yours'. The conspicuous absence of segmentary first person in Arawak languages (and in Amazonia as a whole) correlates with relatively shallow genealogies (which hardly ever go beyond two or three generations) and weak identification with one's ancestors.

The first-person plural pronoun 'we' is polysemous, covering speaker and one or more addressees or speaker and further person(s), not necessarily an addressee—similarly to 'we' in Indo-European languages such as Italian (Screti 2014: 149; see Dixon 2012: 193 on the polysemy of first-person non-singular in general). In contrast to other Amazonian languages (including Tupí-Guaraní, Urarina, Bora, Tucanoan and Yanomami), most Arawak languages do not make a distinction between two types of first-person pronouns—inclusive (including the addressee) and exclusive (not including the addressee). We now turn to the few languages which have this distinction.

2.3 Inclusive and exclusive first person across Arawak languages

In a few Arawak languages, a distinction between inclusive and exclusive first person was developed either through borrowing a form (§2.3.1) or through language-internal development (§2.3.2).

2.3.1 *Borrowing an exclusive first-person pronoun*

Cross-linguistically speaking, borrowing a pronoun is rather unusual. As a result of intense contact with unrelated languages, two members of the Arawak family acquired inclusive/exclusive forms through direct borrowing. In both cases the exclusive form was borrowed, and the erstwhile first-person plural developed an inclusive meaning.

Mawayana is a highly endangered language spoken by a handful of older people who predominantly use Waiwai and Trio, from the unrelated Carib family. Waiwai and Trio distinguish between first-person inclusive and exclusive. Like other Arawak languages and its closest genetic relative, Wapishana, Mawayana had three exponents of the category of person—first, second, and third. As Carlin (2006: 320) puts it, the remaining speakers of Mawayana 'apparently felt there to be a gap in their pronominal system left by having only one marker (*wa-*) in their own language for the first-person plural without an inclusive/exclusive distinction. The Mawayana filled this

gap by borrowing the Waiwai pronoun *amna* to express the concept of first-person plural exclusive.' The first-person plural prefix *wa-* now marks first-person inclusive, on nouns and on verbs. The distinction between 'our inclusive' and 'our exclusive' possessive markers is shown in (6a,b):

- (6a) *amna saruuka* *Mawayana*
 1+3PERSON fishtrap
 'Our (exc) fishtrap'
- (6b) *wa-saruuka* *Mawayana*
 1pl.POSS-fishtrap
 'Our (inc) fishtrap'

An earlier source (Howard 1986, based on data collected in 1985–6) shows that in more traditional times the prefix *wa-* was used to refer to any first-person non-singular and did not have an inclusive meaning. The introduction of a borrowed first-person exclusive *amna* in Mawayana results from a recent contact-induced change, in all likelihood sped up by the obsolescence of the language and its rapid replacement by the Carib languages Trio and Waiwai (see Aikhenvald 2012b, on the influx of borrowed forms in obsolescent languages).

Resígaro is a North Arawak language (closely related to the Upper Rio Negro languages) spoken in northeastern Peru, surrounded by speakers of Bora and Witotoan groups. Unlike most other Arawak languages but similarly to the Bora-Witotoan group, Resígaro has an inclusive/exclusive opposition in first-person non-singular, and also a dual number (the system is described in a full grammar by Allin 1975: 116–17). The first-person plural exclusive pronoun *muuʔa* was borrowed from Bora, similarly to the way the last speakers of Mawayana introduced a Waiwai form to cover the same meaning. In Resígaro, it was subsequently reanalysed as consisting of a prefix *muu-* and a particle *-ʔa*. In all likelihood, this followed the analogy of other non-singular pronouns in the language itself, such as *na-ʔa* 'third-person plural' and *fa-ʔa* 'first-person plural inclusive' (cognate to the proto-Arawak *wa-* 'first-person plural pronoun').

The Resígaro dual markers feminine *-mupi*, masculine *-musi* (also of a Bora origin) combine with *muu-* as a bound form, in *muu-mupi* 'first dual feminine', *muu-musi* 'first dual masculine'. Unlike other pronouns, the first-person plural exclusive has no corresponding prefix used with nouns and with verbs, which may point towards its later origin.³

Like Mawayana, Resígaro is extremely endangered, and spoken under constant pressure from neighbouring and unrelated languages. The influx of borrowed pronouns (and other grammatical forms) may have been the result of advanced language obsolescence.

³ The first linguistic account of Resígaro was compiled by Rivet and de Wavrin (1951: 204–6) based on a variety of early sources. There is no explicit mention of the 1st-person plural exclusive form; however, the form for 'we' (*nous*) is given as *m(w)ühāfū* (p. 217), which could reflect the exclusive plural *muuʔa*.

2.3.2 Developing an inclusive/exclusive distinction through language-internal resources

In two separate subgroups of Arawak languages spoken to the south of the Amazon, the distinction between 'us including you' and 'us excluding you' has developed via reinterpretation of the existing first-person forms.

The erstwhile first-person plural pronominal affix and pronoun develop inclusive meanings (similar to what we saw in §2.3.1, for Mawayana and Resígaro), and the erstwhile first-person singular undergoes reinterpretation as an exclusive 'we'.

This has been documented in some Kampa languages and in Terêna (South Arawak). The first-person plural pronominal marker *v-* in Terêna has inclusive reference ('us including you'). The first-person singular marker is realized via a nasalization prosody (a reflex of proto-Arawak **nu-*: see Bendor-Samuel 1966; Ekdahl and Butler 1979: 24–5). The form is polysemous: it has an exclusive reference 'us excluding you' and 'I'. A possessive pronoun *vítuque* (1pl+poss) means 'ours: inclusive' and its singular counterpart *induque* (where the prenasalized *d* is the exponent of first person) means 'mine, ours (excluding you)' (Ekdahl and Butler 1979: 67).⁴

The erstwhile first-person plural pronominal markers and independent pronouns in Ashéninca Pichis, from the Kampa subgroup, have inclusive reference, e.g. *aaka* 'we (inclusive)'. The erstwhile first-person singular markers can 'refer to the speaker, or have an exclusive reference', e.g. *naaka* 'first-person exclusive; first-person singular'.⁵ Example (7) (from Reed and Payne 1983: 93) can be understood in three ways, also due to the ambiguity of scope of the plural marker, which can mark either the plural subject (A) or the plural object (O).

- (7) no-kem-ayi-ak-e-ri-ni Ashéninca
 1-hear-PL-PERF-NON.REFLEXIVE-3-PL
 'We (exclusive) heard it', or 'I heard them', or 'We (exclusive) heard them'.

Nomatsiguenga, another Kampa language (Shaver 1996: 34), distinguishes first-person inclusive and exclusive forms in pronominal prefixes and suffixes, and in independent pronouns. The polysemy of first-person exclusive and first-person singular is a feature just of pronominal possessive prefixes on nouns. The inclusive form of pronominal suffixes and independent pronouns is based on the erstwhile first-person plural pronominal prefix *a-*. The exclusive form is based on the first-person singular with a plural marker *-íg* or *-(j)égui*, e.g. prefix *na-/ni-/no-* '1sg A/Sa', circumfix *na/n-/no-... íg* 'we exclusive A/Sa', and independent pronouns *naro* 'I' and *naro-(j)égui* 'we exclusive'.⁶

⁴ Recent sources on Terêna and the closely related Kinikinao (Nascimento 2012; Souza 2008) do not mention any inclusive/exclusive overtones of person in these languages, in all likelihood due to their focus on a more formal than a usage-based analysis, and limited data.

⁵ Independent personal pronouns can occur with the plural marker *-payeení*, as in *naaka-payeení* (1excl-pl) 'we (exclusive)'. See also Payne (1989: 44–5, 219–21).

⁶ Michael (2008: 267, 299, 372; 2013) describes a similar system in Nanti, another Kampa language. Similar principles appear to apply in Caquinte (Swift 1988: 63), Ashéninca Apurucayali (Payne et al. 1982: 42), Axininca Campa (Payne 1981: 33–4), and Machiguenga (Pio Aza 1924: 96, 106, 146). See also Mihás (2017).

The inclusive/exclusive distinction may be restricted to just some pronominal forms. We can recall from section 2.2 that Alto Perené, also from the Kampa subgroup, has four sets of personal pronouns, in addition to pronominal prefixes and suffixes. The inclusive/exclusive distinction is present only in one set of independent pronouns: continuous-topic pronouns have three forms for first person, *naaka* 'I', *naakaite* 'we exclusive', and *aroka* (with variants *arokaite* and *arorite*) 'we inclusive' (Mihas 2015: 129–30). Mihas remarks that younger speakers no longer use *naakaite* 'we exclusive', considering it 'archaic' (p. 130).⁷

A further semantic development, from first-person plural inclusive to generic unidentified human possessor, has been documented for the possessive prefix *a-* in Nanti and Alto Perené, from the Kampa subgroup. This is shown in (8a) and (8b) for Nanti (Michael 2013: 154–5).

- (8a) *a-gito* Nanti
 1pl.incl-head
 '(human) head (lit. our head)'
- (8b) *a-tomi-hegi* Nanti
 1pl.incl-son-PL
 'children (lit. our sons)'

Palikur, an Arawak language spoken in the Brazilian state of Amapá and the adjacent regions of French Guyana, has developed a multi-term system of combinations of first and second persons whereby 'me and you' is placed in the same column as '1sg' and '2sg' (see Dixon 2012: 197 for a typological perspective and a general discussion of minimal-augmented systems). The system contains six terms characterized by inclusion or exclusion of the addressee. Table 2.2 shows independent pronouns (see Green and Green 1972: 62, 86; Green and Green 2016; Launay 2001: 65). Pronominal subject prefixes and object suffixes follow the same principle, with a proviso that the first-person augmented form *usuh* 'first-person augmented: I and others (without you)' does not have a corresponding suffix: the independent pronominal form is used then.

TABLE 2.2 Minimal-augmented person system in Palikur

Speaker	Addressee	Minimal	Augmented
√	—	<i>nah</i> 'I'	<i>usuh</i> 'I+third person without you'
√	√	<i>wis</i> 'I and you singular'	<i>wihwi</i> 'I+you+others'
—	√	<i>pis</i> 'you (singular)'	<i>yis</i> 'you (plural)'

⁷ García Salazar (1997: 25–6) reports the existence of an inclusive 1st-person pronoun *aaka-paini* (we-PL) and the exclusive 1st-person *naaka-paini* (1sg-PL) (based on *naaka* 'I') in Asheninca of the Ucayali River. The inclusive/exclusive distinction is not made in prefixes or suffixes.

Asheninca

spoken to the south of the Amazon, 'us excluding you' has developed via affix and pronoun develop inclusive Mawayana and Resígaro, and the interpretation as an exclusive 'we'.

languages and in Terêna (South marker *v-* in Terêna has inclusive singular marker is realized via a nasal-see Bendor-Samuel 1966; Ekdahl and an exclusive reference 'us excluding (pl+poss) means 'ours: inclusive' and generalised *d* is the exponent of first dahl and Butler 1979: 67).⁴ markers and independent pro-subgroup, have inclusive reference, person singular markers can 'refer to *naaka* 'first-person exclusive; first- Payne 1983: 93) can be understood scope of the plural marker, which can object (O).

'We (exclusive) heard them'. (1996: 34), distinguishes first-person prefixes and suffixes, and in inclusive and first-person singular. The inclusive form of based on the erstwhile first-person singular with the first-person singular with circumfix *na/n-/no-... íg* (1)égui 'we exclusive'.⁶

2012; Souza 2008) do not in kinship due to their focus. in *naaka-payeeni* Kampa language. (Payne et al. 1982: 146). See also Mihas

The origin of the augmented form *usuh* is unclear. The minimal forms *nah* and *wih* and the augmented form *wihwi* (and corresponding personal prefixes and suffixes) go back to the proto-Arawak forms. The minimal-augmented systems are not uncommon cross-linguistically; however, Palikur is the only Arawak language known to have such a system.⁸ The language has been in contact with North Carib languages, especially Carib (also known as Galibi: see Aikhenvald and Green 1998). The structural similarity between the minimal-augmented systems in North Carib languages and Palikur is striking. Table 2.3 shows personal pronouns in Carib (Courtz 2008: 52–3). Similar systems have been described for Trio (Carlin 2004: 144) and for other Carib languages (Derbyshire 1999).

TABLE 2.3 Minimal-augmented person system in Carib

Speaker	Addressee	Minimal	Augmented
√	—	<i>awu</i> 'I'	<i>nàna</i> 'I+third person without you'
√	√	<i>ky~ko</i> 'I and you singular'	<i>kykaron</i> 'I+you+others'
—	√	<i>amoro</i> 'you (singular)'	<i>amyjaron</i> 'you (plural)'

As in Palikur, the augmented '1st+3rd' form in Carib languages stands apart from other forms. In Trio, it behaves in many ways like a noun, and in Carib it occurs with third-person agreement forms on verbs (Carlin 2006; Courtz 2008: 52–3).

The Palikur system differs from what has been described for Carib languages in one way: the 'minimal' form *wis* '1st+2sg', or 'you and me', and corresponding personal prefixes and suffixes are used to refer to 'people in general', echoing the usage described for Nanti and Alto Perené, e.g. *wis* 'people in general' (Green and Green 1972: 62; Green and Green 2016: 268), *u-tew* (1sg+2sg-head) 'our head, head in general' (Green and Green 2016: 23; Diana Green p.c.).

A semantic development from first-person inclusive to a generic form is not uncommon cross-linguistically. In Jarawara and other Madi dialects, from the small Arawá language family in Southern Amazonia, the first-person singular inclusive form can have an impersonal sense. If a Jarawara is shown a picture of an unknown animal, the first question is often *ee kaba-tee awa?* (1INCL eat-HAB seems. masc) 'is it edible?', lit. 'does one (=we inclusive) eat it?' (Dixon 2004: 77). The first-person inclusive form can have generic or indefinite reference in Macushi, a North Carib language (Abbott 1991: 105), Canela-Krahô (Popjes and Popjes 1986: 177), and Kaingáng, both from Jê family (Wiesemann 1986: 377), and also in Limbu (a Tibeto-Burman language: van Driem 1987: 218). This is reminiscent of using a first-person form in a generic sense in many European languages (see also Screti 2014 and Stewart 2014 on Italian and Spanish).

⁸ Marawan and Caripurá (or Karipuere), closely related to Palikur, are extinct; the existing word lists contain little information about non-singular 1st-person pronouns in the language (see Rivet and Reinburg 1921: 110–11; Loukotka 1963: 18).

Tariana, a North Arawak language, followed a different pathway, developing a first-person inclusive form out of a generic person marker, and reinterpreting the erstwhile first-person non-singular as an exclusive form. We turn to this in section 2.4.1.

2.4 The expression of 'self' in Tariana

Tariana is an endangered North Arawak language spoken by about 70 people in two villages (Santa Rosa and Periquitos) within the linguistic area of the Vaupés River Basin in Brazil. The area is known for its institutionalized multilingualism based on the language group exogamy operating between speakers of Tariana and speakers of languages belonging to the East Tucanoan subgroup (including Tucano, Piratapuya, Wanano, and Desano), and on multilateral diffusion. Multilingual patterns in the traditional Vaupés River Basin linguistic area hinge on language-based exogamy: one can only marry someone who belongs to a different language group (inherited through one's father) and who thus has a right to be called a 'speaker' of the language.

A striking feature of the Vaupés area is a cultural inhibition against 'language mixing', viewed in terms of using loan forms (free or bound), especially from Tucano or any other East Tucanoan language. Throughout the history of the Vaupés area in Brazil in the twentieth century, Tucano (the majority East Tucanoan language) has spread at the expense of other East Tucanoan languages and of Tariana. At present, Tariana is spoken less and less on a daily basis.⁹

The pressure from Tucano and other East Tucanoan languages which dominate the linguistic area has resulted in the diffusion of numerous grammatical categories and meanings (rather than forms) into Tariana.

A complex interaction of areal diffusion, genetic inheritance, and independent innovation accounts for a multifaceted realization of person in Tariana, through a plethora of means, including clausal and verbal grammatical categories. A study of Tariana, based on a large corpus (not available for most other languages of the family), allows us to investigate the expression of person in various genres, and also the potential of language contact affecting an Arawak language.

'Self' finds its expression in personal cross-referencing and pronouns (§2.4.1), future forms (§2.4.2), and evidentials (or grammaticalized markers of information source: §2.4.3). First person has a special status in communication and organizing discourse, addressed in section 2.4.4.

2.4.1 Personal pronouns and cross-referencing

Similar to other Arawak languages, person in Tariana is expressed through prefixes on inalienably possessed nouns and on transitive and active intransitive verbs, and

⁹ Further details and references are in Aikhenvald (2002, 2006, 2012a). The current chapter, like all my work, is based on extensive fieldwork with numerous speakers of Tariana. The total corpus consists of 40 hours of transcribed audiorecordings, in addition to fieldnotes collected during participant observation. A comprehensive reference grammar of Tariana is Aikhenvald (2003). The Colombian side of the Vaupés River Basin linguistic area has been made famous by Sorensen (1967); since Tariana has never been spoken on the Colombian side, his work is not relevant here.

independent pronouns, following a common Arawak pattern. These are shown in Table 2.4.

TABLE 2.4 Personal cross-referencing prefixes and pronouns in Tariana

	Prefixes: A/S _a ; on verbs; possessor on nouns	Free pronouns: subject forms
1sg	<i>nu-</i>	<i>nuha, nhua</i>
2sg	<i>pi-</i>	<i>piha, phia</i>
3sgnf	<i>di-</i>	<i>diha</i>
3sgf	<i>du-</i>	<i>duha</i>
1pl	<i>wa-</i>	<i>waha, wha</i>
2pl	<i>i-</i>	<i>iha, ihya</i>
3pl	<i>na-</i>	<i>naha, nha</i>
Impersonal	<i>pa-</i>	<i>paha, pha</i>

Tariana has developed a further set of feminine plural personal pronouns which are optionally used to refer to all-female groups: *waha-ma-pe* (1pl-CL:FEM-PL), *ihya-ma-pe* (2pl-CL:FEM-PL), and *naha-ma-pe* (3pl-CL:FEM-PL). These forms are known to all speakers but used rarely. They are structurally isomorphic to noun phrases in East Tucanoan languages. The term for ‘woman’ in Tucano is used to disambiguate gender reference of first-, second-, or third-person non-singular pronoun, e.g. Tucano *misâ numi-â* (2pl woman-PL) ‘you (pl) women’, *naâ numi-â* (3pl woman-PL) ‘they women’. In rapid speech in Tariana, each of these noun phrases is pronounced as one stress group. As a result, a noun phrase in Tucano corresponds to one phonological (and grammatical) word in Tariana.

Marking the subject on the verb is obligatory. But the first-person singular possessor of a number of kinship terms which refer to very close relatives is not marked on the noun. These terms are *paika* ‘father’, *naka* ‘mother’, *paipheka* ‘father’s older brother’, *namika* ‘father’s younger brother’, and *netenaka* ‘mother’s sister’ (see Aikhenvald 2013a: 10–11 for examples from other parts of the world). Along similar lines, first-person possessive forms of some kin terms in Nanti, a Kampa language, stand apart from the rest: they do not require a possessive prefix, e.g. *ina* ‘my mother’ (compare with *iri-iniro* ‘his mother’, which has to have a prefix).¹⁰

All Tucanoan languages of the area have an exclusive/inclusive distinction in their first-person pronoun. An important difference between the Tariana system—typical of Arawak languages of the area—and East Tucanoan languages used to be the absence of exclusive/inclusive distinctions in first-person plural, and the presence of an impersonal pronoun *pha* (rapid to normal register), *paha* (slow register) ‘one’,

¹⁰ This does not apply to other Kampa languages; e.g. the noun ‘mother’ obligatorily takes all the possessive prefixes in Alto Perené (Mihás 2015: 334).

ak pattern. These are shown in

nd pronouns in Tariana

Free pronouns: subject forms
<i>nuha, nhua</i>
<i>piha, phia</i>
<i>diha</i>
<i>duha</i>
<i>waha, wha</i>
<i>iha, ihya</i>
<i>naha, nha</i>
<i>paha, pha</i>

plural personal pronouns which *waha-ma-pe* (1pl-CL:FEM-PL), *ihya-* (PL). These forms are known to all morphic to noun phrases in East Tucano is used to disambiguate non-singular pronoun, e.g. Tucano *naã numi-ã* (3pl woman-PL) 'they' noun phrases is pronounced as one corresponds to one phonological

ory. But the first-person singular refer to very close relatives is not *naka* 'mother', *paipheka* 'father's' and *netenaka* 'mother's sister' (see parts of the world). Along similar *ina* in Nanti, a Kampa language, inclusive prefix, e.g. *ina* 'my mother' (inclusive prefix).¹⁰ inclusive distinction in their the Tariana system—typical languages used to be the and the presence (low register) 'one',

...takes all the

and the corresponding personal prefix, in traditional Tariana. The language was spoken by the older generation in the 1990s and early 2000s on a daily basis. As most older people have passed away, and the younger generation are using more and more Tucano in their daily interaction, the Tucanoan influence on the language has increased drastically. The lack of the exclusive/inclusive distinction in Tariana now tends to be remedied by reinterpreting the Tariana impersonal pronoun and prefix. It is now frequently used in the meaning of inclusive 'we' (corresponding to Tucano *mari* 'we inclusive'). The erstwhile first-person pronoun *wha* and the prefix *wa-* acquire exclusive meanings (corresponding to Tucano *řsã* 'we exclusive') (see also Aikhenvald 2002: 62–4; 2003: 203).

For instance, the construction *pha nawiki* (we:incl people) 'us (all the) people' typically includes the addressee. In contrast, *wha nawiki* (we:excl people) 'us the people' refers to a group that includes just the speakers, not the addressee. In (9), a speaker recapitulates the time difference between Brazil and Australia: what is today for us (speakers) is tomorrow for you (the other end of the phone line):

- (9) *wha-ne-nuku* *ikasu-naka* Tariana
 we-A/S-TOP.NON.A/S now-PRES.VIS
ihia-ne-nuku *desu-naka*
 you.pl-A/S-TOP.NON.A/S tomorrow-PRES.VIS
 'For us (not you) it is today, for you it is tomorrow'

The development of first-person overtones for generic forms is relatively common cross-linguistically (see also Hung, Srioutai, and Greaux, and Jaszczolt and Witek, this volume). In Brazilian Portuguese, *gente* 'people' is used to refer to 'us' (first-person plural). Along similar lines, the colloquial French impersonal pronoun *on* (from Latin *homo* 'person, man') is used in the meaning of the first-person plural pronoun 'we' (see further examples in Heine and Kuteva 2002: 233; see Beguélin 2014 on the competition between *on* and *nous* in French).¹¹ Developing an inclusive pronoun out of a generic marker is somewhat less common. A first-person inclusive pronoun has evolved out of a generic noun meaning 'person, people' in Kono, a Mande language from Sierra Leone (Heine and Kuteva 2002: 233). Indefinite or impersonal markers developed first-person inclusive meanings in Caddo, a Caddoan language of Oklahoma (Mithun 1999: 71).

Cross-linguistically speaking, inclusive/exclusive distinctions are highly diffusable in language contact (as first pointed out by Jacobsen 1980; see also Mithun 1999: 70–2). The development of inclusive/exclusive meanings in Tariana under the Tucanoan influence, and in Mawayana and Resígaro, offers further support for this statement. The details differ: the erstwhile first-person non-singular gave rise to a first-person inclusive in Mawayana and Resígaro (and also in Kampa languages), and to a first-person exclusive in Tariana.

¹¹ Similar examples are found in Matses, a Panoan language from Peru (Fleck 2006: 558), Koyokon (an Athabaskan language: Thompson 1996: 656), and a number of Tibeto-Burman languages, including rGyalrong (Sun 2005: 14), Kiranti (Ebert 1994: 28–9), and Limbu (Michailovsky 2001).

The impersonal prefix *pa-* is a feature of nine Arawak languages, all cluster in the region of the Upper Rio Negro Basin and its surrounds.¹² The prefix generalises to a generic human being and can be translated as 'one', e.g. Warekena of X *pa-ma* (IMP-do) 'they do, one does', *pa-pana-pitsi* (IMP-plant-PURP) 'what one plants' (Aikhenvald 1998), Baré *ba-witi* (imp-eye) 'one's eyes', *ba-yada* (imp-see) 'one sees'. Cabiari *pa-nàpi* (IMP-arm) 'everyone's arm, one's arm' (Reinoso Galindo n.d.: 9) and Kurripako *pa-kaapi* (IMP-hand) 'hand in general, human hand', *phadoa* (IMP+mother) 'someone's mother'. In just one instance in my corpus of Baré, the impersonal prefix has inclusive reference, 'us (speaker and addressee)', as shown in (10), a final farewell to the author from the last fluent speaker of Baré (who passed away six months later) (see also Aikhenvald 1995a):

- (10) ate ba-yada-ka Baré
 until IMP-see-SEQ
 'Good-bye' (lit. until one sees, i.e. until we (you and I) see each other)

The development of impersonal to inclusive in Baré is strikingly similar to what we find in Tariana. We should however bear in mind that this example appeared as a one-off occurrence in a corpus collected from one obsolescent speaker. The first-person plural prefix *wa-* and the corresponding personal pronoun *wani* 'we' in Baré do not have exclusive overtones. There are no indications of an inclusive meaning of *ba-* in earlier sources on Baré (such as Lopez Sanz 1972 and earlier lists of words and phrases).

The first person in Tariana stands apart from other persons in the expression of imperatives. Tariana has a number of imperative meanings, including a simple imperative with overtones of immediacy, a second-hand imperative ('do on someone else's order'), a proximate imperative meaning ('do here close to the speaker'), a distal imperative meaning ('do there, far from the speaker'), a delayed imperative ('do later'), a conative imperative ('try and do'), a polite imperative, and a malefactive imperative ('do to your own detriment'). Only the simple imperative option is available for a first-person plural addressee, e.g. *wa-hña* (1pl-eat) 'let's eat!'. No imperative can be addressed to first-person singular, or self; such a gap in person values of imperatives is not uncommon across the world's languages (see Aikhenvald 2010: 75–6).

2.4.2 A special status of first person in future forms

Future marking in Tariana offers an additional distinction between first person and other persons (see also Aikhenvald 2003: 320–1). The future can be marked in two ways. The suffix *-de* is used exclusively with first-person subjects (singular and plural), and indicates that the subject is certain of the action they will undertake. In (11), the speaker is certain about what they are going to do:

¹² The languages are the Baniwa of Içana-Kurripako dialect continuum, Tariana, Baré, Warekena of Xié, Baniwa of Guainia, Yavitero, Cabiari, Maipure, and Manao. This prefix also marks co-referential possessor in Yavitero, Cabiari, and Maipure; it is attested, in this function, in Waurá, Mehinaku, and Yawalapiti (the Xinguan subgroup of Arawak languages) and Pareci (Aikhenvald 1999: 84).

- (11) ikasu-nuku pi-na kalisi nu-kalite-de Tariana
 now-TOP.NON.A/S 2sg-OBJECT story 1sg-tell-FUT.CERT
 'I will now tell you a story'

The other marker, *-mhade*, can be used with any person, and has a general future meaning (with non-first person). The form consists of the form *-mha* (homonymous with the non-visual evidential; see §2.4.3.1 and example (17)) and the future *-de*. Its use with the third-person subject is illustrated in (12).

- (12) Wa-we-ri di-kale matsia-mhade Tariana
 1pl-younger.sibling-masc 3sg-heart good-FUT
 pi-na di-ka-ka
 2sg-OBJ 3sgnf-see-SEQ
 'Our younger brother will be happy (lit. our younger brother his heart will be good) when he sees you'

When used with first person, *-mhade* indicates a less certain prediction, something that might happen, especially if accompanied by a parenthetical expression with an epistemic meaning of 'maybe':

- (13) desu nu-nu-mhade pa:pe nu-ni-ka Tariana
 tomorrow 1sg-go-FUT.UNCERT maybe 1sg-do-SEQ
 'I might come tomorrow, maybe'

The two futures in Tariana developed as a consequence of Tucanoan influence. Tucano has two future forms: *-ti* 'certain future' used with first person only, and *-sa-* used with other persons in the meaning of a general future and with first person in the meaning of uncertain future, or future conjecture. The morpheme *-sa-* is homonymous with the non-visual evidential (see Ramirez 1997: 167). The same morpheme marks 'uncertainty' of the second-person future (especially with regard to first person) and non-visual evidentiality. This could be due to epistemic extensions of uncertainty for the non-visual marker in Tucano (Ramirez 1997: 135-6). The structural similarity between Tucano and Tariana uncertain future forms is demonstrated in (14) and (15).

- (14) apê-gi-sa-' Tucano
 play-masc.sg-FUT(=PRES.NONVIS-nonthird.person)
 'I/you/we/you plural will probably play'
- (15) nu-manika-mhade Tariana
 1sg-play-FUT.UNCERT(*mha*:PRES.NONVIS-*de*:FUT.CERT)
 'I will probably play'

The structural equivalence between Tucano and Tariana is far from complete. Tucano has no personal prefixes, and Tariana does not mark gender of the subject with suffixes. Tucano has only one subject marker for all non-third-person values (subject markers for third person distinguish two genders in the singular and a plural form). The Tariana form *-mhade* contains the first-person-only future

rarak languages, all clustered
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 , *ba-yada* (imp-see) 'one sees',
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Baré, Warekena of
 marks co-referential
 Mhinaku, and

form *-de*, while the Tucano form does not. Nevertheless the similarity is suggestive a partial morphological calque.¹³

The Tariana first-person future marker *-de* is not used with the generic pronoun *pha* in its meaning of inclusive first person in the corpus. This is consistent with the Tucano pattern, whereby the first-person-only future is restricted to first-person singular and first-person exclusive.

2.4.3 The expression of 'self' through evidentials

We start with an overview of the Tariana evidential system in section 2.4.3. Correlations between evidential use and person are discussed in section 2.4.3.2.

2.4.3.1 Evidentials and preferred information source in Tariana

Tariana has an elaborate system of marking 'information source', known as evidentials. For each statement, the speaker has to state how they know what they are talking about, using a set of morphological markers. Visual evidentials are used if the speaker has seen the event, and non-visual evidentials refer to something heard, or smelt, or felt by touch. Inferred evidentials refer to something inferred based on visible results: as one infers that it has rained on the basis of puddles, or that someone has eaten chicken because their hands are greasy (in (18)). Assumed evidentials will be used if a statement is based on general knowledge. Reported evidentials are employed if the information comes from a speech report. Evidential markers are partly fused with tense. The inferred and the assumed evidential have no present tense. No evidentiality distinctions are made in the future (this is in line with many languages of the world: see the typological survey in Aikhenvald 2004).

The following examples illustrate kinds of situations when evidentials were used to express different information sources for the speaker (from author's fieldwork in 2012).

- | | | | | |
|------|--|---|------------------|---------|
| (16) | Nu-nami
1sg-father's.younger.brother
'My younger uncle is frying chicken' (I (the speaker) see him) | karaka
chicken
3sgnf-fry-PRESENT.VISUAL | di-merita-naka | Tariana |
| (17) | Nu-nami
1sg-father's.younger.brother
'My younger uncle is frying chicken' (I smell the fried chicken, but cannot see this) | karaka
chicken
3sgnf-fry-PRESENT.NON-VISUAL | di-merita-mha | Tariana |
| (18) | Nu-nami
1sg-father's.younger.brother
'My younger uncle has fried chicken' (I see bits of grease stuck on his hands and he smells of fried chicken) | karaka
chicken
3sgnf-fry-INFERRED-RECENT.PAST | di-merita-nhi-ka | Tariana |

¹³ The origin of the Tariana future marker *-de* is unknown. The form *-mha* as an evidential goes back to grammaticalized root *-hima* 'hear, perceive' (Aikhenvald 2004). First-person vs non-1st-person distinctions are a feature of other East Tucanoan languages, including Wanano (Stenzel 2014: 300–31; Waltz 2007: 459–60) and Desano (Miller 1999: 71–2) (unlike Tucano and Tariana, the markers do not contain a non-visual form).

- (19) Nu-nami karaka di-merita-si-ka Tariana
 1sg-father's.younger.brother chicken 3sgnf-fry-ASSUMED-RECENT.PAST
 'My younger uncle has fried chicken' (I assume so: he gets so much money he can afford it, and he looks like he has had a nice meal)
- (20) Nu-nami karaka di-merita-pida-ka Tariana
 1sg-father's.younger.brother chicken 3sgnf-fry-REPORTED-RECENT.PAST.
 'My younger uncle has fried chicken' (I was told recently)

The speaker will normally have access to more than one information source: what one can see, one can also hear, and there is usually enough information for an inference and an assumption. Visually obtained information, if available, is preferred over any other information source. This means, in Janet Barnes' (1984: 262) words, that 'it does not matter what evidence the speaker later sees or what information he receives; if, at any point, he [they] saw or is seeing the state or event he [they] reports it using a visual evidential.' The next preferred choice will be non-visual evidential, then inferred based on visible results.

The hierarchy of preferred evidentials shown in Fig. 2.2 applies in Tariana and also Tucano (this was first suggested for Tuyuca, an East Tucanoan language from the Vaupés area in Colombia, with a complex system of evidentials: Barnes 1984: 262-4).

Visual < Non-visual < Inferred < Reported < Assumed

FIG. 2.2 Hierarchy of preferred evidentials in Tuyuca and Tariana

The hierarchy reflects the primary importance of visual evidence. One's own non-visual report (which means reporting an event or state that the speaker had heard, smelt, or tasted) is preferred to inferred, reported, or assumed, in this order. The inferred evidential, which implies inference on the basis of direct visual observation, is preferred to reported, and reported is preferred to assumed which is used only when there is no information about the event and the speaker has to base their statement on a general assumption (prior knowledge about the state of affairs or general 'behaviour patterns'). If a speaker has access to direct evidence, or traces, of something happening, he or she would prefer an inferred evidential. This is considered a better choice than reporting what they heard from someone else (further discussion of preferred evidentials is in Aikhenvald 2004: ch. 10).¹⁴

Visually obtained experience is the most valuable and reliable. We will see, in section 2.4.4, how a speaker could use a lexical verb to reinforce the fact that they had seen what they were talking about. Along similar lines, a narrator would often finish a particularly important story (typically, about the adventures and movements of the

¹⁴ Some authors have attempted to reformulate the idea of preferred evidentials as 'best' evidential. We avoid this term because of its inherently evaluative character. Typological parameters for the study of evidentiality are in Aikhenvald (2004, 2018), and a comprehensive bibliography is included in Aikhenvald (2015).

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identical system in section 2.4.3.1.
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 someone has eaten chicken because
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 are partly fused with tense. The
 present tense. No evidentiality distinc-
 many languages of the world: see the

situations when evidentials were used
 by the speaker (from author's fieldwork

di-merita-naka Tariana
 3sgnf-fry-PRESENT.VISUAL
 (the speaker) see him)

di-merita-mha Tariana
 3sgnf-fry-PRESENT.NON-VISUAL
 smelt the fried chicken, but cannot see

di-merita-nhi-ka Tariana
 3sgnf-fry-REPORTED-RECENT.PAST
 told me that grease stuck on his hands

... an evidential goes back to
 ... 1st-person distinc-
 ... 2014: 300-31; Waltz
 ... do not contain a

Tariana ancestors, or one with a moral message) by explicitly stating that they learnt it from 'the horse's mouth'. A story in a reported evidential may finish 'this is what old people told-visual'.

- (21) na na-sape-na pedalia-pe *Tari*
 3pl+say 3pl-tell-REM.P.VIS old-PL
 'Old (people) told-(thus)' (visual information)

The first-person recipient 'to me' does not have to be added; this is clear from visual information source marked on the verb.

A number of further rules account for the use of evidentials. Different types stories always go together with one kind of evidential, as tokens of a genre. In Tariana (as in an overwhelming majority of other languages), ancestral stories and leger are told using reported evidential. A story about what happened to the speaker is c in visual evidential. The non-visual evidential is used to relate the actions of e spirits which are not 'seen', and dreams of ordinary people, while prophetic drea by omniscient shamans are cast in visual evidential. A reduced set of evidentials used in questions, while imperatives have just a reported evidential specificatio (meaning 'do something on someone else's order').

This unusually complex evidentiality system has been largely calqued fro Tucanoan languages. As a consequence, Tariana has a larger system of evidentia than any other Arawak languages. Baniwa of Içana-Kurripako and Piapoco, Tariana closest relatives, have just an evidential marking reported information.

We now turn to the functions of evidentials as implicit person markers.

2.4.3.2 Evidentials and person As in many other languages with evidentials evidentials in Tariana interact with person. This is where the speaker—fir person—stands apart from the rest. The reported evidential is never used with the first person. When talking about one's own actions, the visual evidential is preferred unless the speaker implies that they were not in control, and the action was produce accidentally. If a speaker has cut up the chicken intentionally, they will use visual evidential, as in (22):

- (22) karaka nu-pisa-ka *Tariana*
 chicken 1sg-cut-REC.P.VIS
 'I cut up the chicken'

If a speaker unintentionally cut their finger, they will use the non-visual evidential:

- (23) nu-kapi-da nu-pisa-mahka *Tariana*
 1sg-hand-CL:ROUND 1sg-cut-REC.P.NONVIS
 'I unintentionally cut my finger'

The non-visual evidential cannot be used to refer to unintentional action by a third person. If used with the third person, it would only imply that the speaker could hear what was happening, and could not very well see what the other one was doing. Example (24) contains no information about the third person's control or volitionality:

- (24) di-kapi-da di-pisa-mahka *Tariana*
 3sgnf-hand-CL:ROUND 3sgnf-cut-REC.P.NONVIS
 'He cut his finger (the speaker can hear the action but couldn't see it; no intentionality implied)'

When talking about one's own physical states and feelings, non-visual evidentials are the preferred choice. As a speaker remarked once, 'one cannot see' what one feels (see also Jaszczolt and Witek, this volume, on immunity to error through misidentification (IEM)). In (25), a speaker is talking about his own toothache.

- (25) nu-ie-da kai-mha *Tariana*
 1sg-tooth-CL:ROUND ache-PRES.NONVIS
 'My tooth is hurting (non-visual)'

One's own desires and physical states (such as hunger and thirst) are also expressed using non-visual evidential, as shown in (26):

- (26) mha'isiki nu-ñami-mha nhua *Tariana*
 hunger 1sg-die-PRES.NONVIS I
 karaka nu-na-mha nu-hña
 chicken 1sg-want-PRES.NONVIS 1sg-eat
 'I am dying of hunger, I want to eat chicken'

When a Tariana speaker talks about someone else's feelings, it is not appropriate to use non-visual evidentials, as one cannot feel what the other person feels. A visual evidential would be appropriate, if there is enough visual information to go on. In (27), the speaker could see that José was suffering from toothache, and so they used the visual evidential:

- (27) José di-e-da kai-naka *Tariana*
 José 3sgnf-tooth-CL:ROUND ache-PRES.VIS
 'José's tooth is hurting (visual)'

The evidentials distinguish 'self' from 'other'. They can thus be seen as tantamount to a person-marking strategy, based on the differences in the speaker's access to their own internal states and feelings and to those of another person. This phenomenon, termed 'first-person effect of evidentials', is common in many languages with obligatory marking of information source (see discussion in various chapters in Aikhenvald and Dixon 2014). This also helps distinguish between the two meanings of the impersonal prefix *pa-* and the corresponding impersonal pronoun. When the impersonal is used in the first-person inclusive sense, 'us', the non-visual evidential occurs with verbs of feeling and wanting, as in (28):

- (28) matsi pa-rena-mhana pha *Tariana*
 bad IMP-feel-REM.P.NONVIS IMPERSONAL(1st inclusive)
 'We feel bad (we are in a bad way)'

If the impersonal has a generic non-first-person reference, the non-visual evidential cannot be used to refer to internal states or feelings; another evidential specification

has to be employed instead. Example (29) describes a general fact about how people feel if they do not have enough food while hunting. The visual evidential is appropriate here, since one of its uses is to mark generally known facts:

- (29) hiku-naka pa-rena mhaīsiki Tariana
 thus-PRES.VIS IMP-feel hunger
 ‘One feels thus (because of) hunger’

Depending on their access to experience, speakers use different evidentials. An example comes from how people talk about dreams. Dreams, by common mortals, are often discussed, and even relied upon for warning about what could be dangerous and should be avoided (see Kracke 2010 for a discussion of the role of dreams in Amazonian society, and their predictive powers). A man planning to go hunting is likely to postpone the trip if he has dreamt of a woman (especially a white woman, believed to be a token of an evil spirit) the night before: such a dream is understood as a premonition that things will go wrong. Dreams are normally cast in non-visual evidential since they are not supposed to belong to the ‘real world’: in Kracke’s (2010: 73) words, a dream ‘is a message, a message from an unknown source. Hence it cannot be coded as personal experience.’

An example of such usage of evidentials comes from a description of a dream which did not come true; the evidential used throughout the description of the dream is the remote past non-visual. The speaker dreamt about how he had got a seat in a military plane to go back to Iauaretê (which in real life he did not).

- (30) diha depita numa-ka tapulisa-mhana Tariana
 ART night+ADV 1sg+sleep-SUB dream-REM.P.NONVIS
 diha sargentu apale-mhana wepitana di-wana-mhana
 ART sergeant straight.off-REM.P.NONVIS 1pl+name 3sgnf-call-REM.P.NONVIS
 ‘At night after I’d slept, I dreamt (non-visual), the sergeant called
 our names straight off (for the flight)’

When I asked the speaker why he did not use the visual evidential, his answer was ‘I didn’t really see it, in the dream, don’t you know’ (*ma-ka-kade-mha nhua tapuli-se mēda* NEG-see-NEG-PRES.NONVIS I dream-LOC don’t.you.know). But an account of a dream by a powerful shaman¹⁵ can be—and usually is—cast in visual evidential.

In June 2000, while I was staying in the Tariana-speaking village of Santa Rosa, a powerful Wanano shaman (by the name of Jesús) overnighted there. In the morning he made a speech, saying that he saw in his dream that our work on the Tariana language was good. Jovino translated this as follows, using a direct speech report (in square brackets):

¹⁵ See Aikhenvald (2003: 13–14) on different types of shamans in the Tariana society. Only shamans of the highest caste speak about their dreams as ‘seen’ (these shamans are called *yawi*, lit. ‘jaguar’, since they are believed to be able to transform into jaguars at night and attack people). There are no longer any such shamans among the Tariana.

a general fact about how people
g. The visual evidential is appro-
y known facts:

Tariana

- (31) [ihpani-nipe matsa-naka tapuli-se Tariana
2pl+work-NOM good-PRES.VIS dream-LOC
nu-ka-ka nhua] di-a-ka
1sg-see-REC.P.VIS I 3sgnf-say-REC.P.VIS
“Your work is good, I saw (this) in the dream”, he has said’

To my question why he used the visual evidential (rather than the non-visual one, as people would do when relating their dreams), Jovino replied:

- (32) malieri-pu-naka diha thui di-ka-naka mēda Tariana
shaman-AUG-PRES.VIS he all 3sgnf-see-PRES.VIS don't.you.know
‘He is a real shaman (lit. very much a shaman, or big shaman), he sees
everything’

A close analogy comes from Shipibo-Konibo, a Panoan language spoken in Peru (Valenzuela 2003), where dreams by common mortals are recounted using the reported evidential =ronki. However, if a shaman has a dream or a vision induced by the hallucinogenic ayahuasca he will retell this experience using direct, or first-hand, evidential.

Stories about shamans contain many examples of their prophetic dreams—all cast in visual evidentials. In contrast, stories about shamans which describe their ritual or magic activities are uniformly cast in non-visual evidentials. When I asked why, several speakers answered: ‘He acts with his thinking (or foreboding), don’t you know’ (*Dihmeta-nipe-ne di-ni-mha mēda* 3sgnf+think/feel/forbode-NOM 3sgnf-do/act-PRES.NONVIS don't.you.know). The Tariana believe that shamans’ magic actions cannot be seen by common people (who do not have shamanic powers), which explains this usage.

The use of visual evidential in Tariana can be seen as associated with preferential access to visually obtained knowledge. Overusing the visual evidential by someone other than a shaman would imply assuming a stature one is not entitled to assume—as if one claims to have seen things one cannot really see. Or it can be considered dangerous behaviour—a person who illicitly uses visual evidential may be a hidden sorcerer (also see Gomez-Imbert 1986 on similar examples from Tatuyo, a neighbouring East Tucanoan language). In his discussion of Huallaga Quechua evidentials, Weber (1986: 142) describes a speaker who was using the direct evidential *-mi* too much. To many, this sounded ‘incautious with respect to the information’ conveyed; the man was judged to be ‘not a member of a Quechua speaking community which values his stature’, or downright crazy. Evidentials can thus be closely linked to a person’s status and their access of knowledge and thus to power—especially in the ways they are used with reference to the privileged first-person experience.

2.4.4 Special features of first-person narrators

Speakers’ awareness of the necessity of using the correct evidential and being precise about saying how one knows things manifests itself in a variety of ways (see Aikhenvald 2004: 339). There can be lexical means to refer to someone who does not use their evidentials correctly: for instance, the Tariana verbs *-anihta* ‘think,

ers use different evidentials. An
s. Dreams, by common mortals,
ng about what could be dangerous
discussion of the role of dreams in
A man planning to go hunting is
oman (especially a white woman,
ore: such a dream is understood as
s are normally cast in non-visual
the ‘real world’: in Kracke’s (2010:
in an unknown source. Hence it

es from a description of a dream
ghout the description of the dream
t about how he had got a seat in a
al life he did not).

Tariana

mhana
REM.P.NONVIS
wepitana di-wana-mhana
3pl+name 3sgnf-call-REM.P.NONVIS
the sergeant called

the visual evidential, his answer was
nd-ka-kade-mha nhua tapuli-se
you know). But an account of a
—cast in visual evidential.
speaking village of Santa Rosa, a
ighted there. In the morning
our work on the Tariana
g a direct speech report (in

Only shamans of
‘jaguar’, since they
no longer any such

reason' (negated) and *-mañeta* 'lie, get something wrong' describe someone who draws wrong inferences and does not use the evidentials correctly; another way of referring to someone whose evidential choice is not quite right is *mēdite* (useless+NCL: ANIMATE) 'a useless person'. Speakers of Tariana and Tucano often complain that white people (who speak Portuguese, the national language of Brazil) are 'liars' because they never tell you how they know things (since Portuguese does not have obligatory evidentiality marking).

The first-person speaker (or narrator of a story) has access to an additional way of expressing information source. They can paraphrase their evidential and reinforce it with lexical items corresponding to the information source. A visual evidential can be followed by a lexical comment 'I saw it', and a non-visual by 'I heard it'.

An example of 'lexical reinforcement' of evidentiality is a way of stressing that the information source comes from a story about the good old days when people lived well, no one quarrelled, and no one was hungry, told by Américo, then the oldest living speaker of Tariana. The story was cast in visual evidential, since Américo was recounting what he had seen as a child. At the beginning of the story he inserted a phrase 'I saw it-visual remote past tense', stressing his unique visual experience of this paradise lost. At the very end of the narrative, he used the same sentence, 'I saw it', making sure his visual information source is clear to the audience. The first-person singular pronoun 'I' (underlined in the translation of (33) below) places the perceiver in contrastive focus.

- (33) Ne na-siwa-kaka hñakasi ma:-kade Tariana
 then 3pl-each.other-RECIP food NEG+give-NEG
 ma-ni-kade-na, nhua nu-ka-na.
 NEG-do-NEG.REM.P.VIS I 1sg-see-REM.P.VIS
 Nhua pedale-se nu-ka-na khidite-se nu-ka-na
 I old.times-LOC 1sg-see-REM.P.VIS like.this-LOC 1sg-see-REM.P.VIS
 'Then not giving food to each other they did not do (this), I saw (this). I saw
 (this) in old times, I saw this being small like this'

Américo felt the need to reinforce his visual source of information about the paradise on earth he was describing, since he was aware that for most people his story sounded like a fantasy tale. In another story about a traditional ritual no one but he had actually seen, he also judged it appropriate to insert the phrase 'I saw it' (+remote past visual), strengthening the value of his visually obtained information, to which he had unique access.

A striking feature of Tariana conversations and narratives is a relative paucity of direct speech reports (especially if compared with those Arawak languages which have smaller evidential systems, such as Nanti: Michael 2012). The reported evidential is used if the exact author of the information is not known or is omitted as non-specific (or clear from the context). One speaker heard on the radio that a plane had arrived, and said:

- (34) karakawhya di-uka-pidaka Tariana
 plane 3sgnf-arrive-REC.P.REP
 'A plane has arrived' (I am told)

A direct speech report can be used as an alternative: another speaker chose to quote someone else verbatim, keeping the evidential used by the original speaker:

- (35) karakawhya di-uka-ka di-a-ka Tariana
 plane 3sgnf-arrive-REC.P.VIS 3sgnf-say-REC.P.VIS
 'He said: "The plane has arrived (visual)."'

A direct speech report is preferred when the speaker wishes to preserve the original tense and evidentiality marking used by the one quoted. This is also a way of distancing oneself from the information provided, with an overtone of mistrust as to the veracity of what is being said. A comparable use of direct quotations was described for Arizona Tewa, a Kiowa-Tanoan language from Arizona; there, a direct quote 'lacks the reliability, or the facticity' of its counterpart marked with a reported evidential (Kroskrity 1993: 146). The utterance in (35) was followed by a suggestion that we go and check for ourselves to see if the plane was there. Autobiographical stories by Tariana speakers contain direct quotes from the most hateful and unreliable characters—their white masters. Similar uses of speech reports as a way of conveying speaker's disbelief and attitude to what is being quoted have been described for Wanano, an East Tucanoan language with which Tariana is in close contact (Chernela 2011: 201–5 offers a fascinating in-depth study of the ways in which Wanano women manipulate quotations and evidentials to reflect their stance with regard to the information in addition to dramatic effects).

Self-reports and quotations of one's own speech are used somewhat differently. First, they may have the effect of reinforcing the illocutionary effect of an utterance. As one speaker was suffering from a hangover, his sister scolded him:

- (36) pi-na nu-kalite-tahka mhaïda pira Tariana
 2sg-OBJ 1sg-tell-FRUST+REC.P.VIS PROH 2sg+drink
 yanaka-nuku
 cane.whiskey-TOP.NON.A/S
 'I have told you (in vain), don't drink'

A self-quotation makes a stronger point, not dissimilar to an English 'tell construction', e.g. *I am telling you, don't do that again* (cf. Güldemann 2008: 411–17). In other words, a self-quotation is a way of strengthening a command or a speaker's stance. This is reminiscent of special illocutionary force of self-quotations in many languages, including Weyewa (Kuipers 1992).

Secondly, a self-quotation can be a way of expressing one's emotions and internal speech. In (37), from Américo's autobiography, he was not sure about the future of their work for a white master. This is phrased as a self-quotation.

- (37) tso! kwe-mhade di-a-sõ, nu-a-na Tariana
 Oh! how-FUT 3sg-go-DOUBT 1sg-say-REM.P.VIS
 'Oh, how is it going to be, I said (to myself)'

A self-quotation can be used to replay a past decision (reminiscent of Golato's 2002 analysis of the use of self-quotations in German discourse). In his autobiographical account, Américo quotes his own speech in announcing his plans to accompany a white master on a working trip to Venezuela:

Tariana

Tariana

- (38) Nuhua nu-a-de-khani nu-a nu-sape-na Tairi
 I 1sg-go-FUT.CERT-AWAY 1sg-go 1sg-speak-REM.P.VIS
 paika-mikiri-nuku-pita
 father-NOM.PAST.MASC.SG-TOP.NON.A/S-AGAIN
 '“I will go away”, I kept saying to my late father'

Using a self-quotation here is a way of reinforcing the speaker's stance, and commitment to the decision made. Unlike quotes of what other people said, quotations do not have any overtones of doubt or distancing.

A storyteller may use a special first-person expression to highlight an important point. The special role of a narrator is reflected in the discourse-organizing idiom phrase *nu-a-ka nhua* (1sg-say-SUB I), literally 'I having said'. This expression is extremely common in narratives of any genre and is used exclusively with first person singular. It has the structure of a *-ka* sequential clause and an unusual constituent order: subordinate clauses are overwhelmingly predicate-final, and this is the only instance in the language where the subject follows a verb in a non-main clause.

This discourse-organizing phrase can be used after some important or unusual piece of information, to create a 'suspense' effect. It is underlined in the subsequent examples. The Yanomami are feared by most people of the Upper Rio Negro region. In (39), from a story about how Leonardo Brito and his mates went to visit a Yanomami village, *nu-a-ka nhua* highlights the fear of the Yanomami. The phrase *nu-a-ka nhua* 'I having said' could be translated as 'what I am saying is', or 'look what happens next'. The story is cast in the visual evidential, since this was Leonardo's personal experience.

- (39) wha-miki harame wa-yena wa-mhana Tarian
 we-NOM.PAST:PL scared 1pl-exceed 1pl+go-REM.P.NONVIS
nu-a-ka nhua kay wa-ni tuki di-sape-na
 1sg-say-SUB I thus 1pl-do little 3sgnf-speak-REM.P.VIS
 wa-na di-ra di-matara-na
 1pl-OBJ 3sgnf-order 3sgnf-leave-REM.P.VIS
 'Poor us, we were very scared, I having said, so after we did this, he (the chief) spoke a little and ordered (them) to leave us'

The phrase *nu-a-ka nhua* draws listeners' attention to the speaker, especially in narratives. The phrase can also be used to mark an aside, or an explanation. In (40), Américo describes the trip to Venezuela accompanying a white master. At that time he didn't know much Portuguese (40a). He did know just a few words—this is the explanation in (40b) accompanied by 'I having said', which could be rendered by English 'that is to say':

- (40a) Portugues-nuku yalana yaku-nuku Tariana
 Portuguese-TOP.NON.A/S white.man language-TOP.NON.A/S
 ma-sape-kadite-mhana nu-yeka-niki
 NEG-speak-NEG+NCL.ANIM-REM.P.NONVIS 1sg-know-COMPL
 'I was the one not knowing how to speak Portuguese, the white man's language'

(40b) nu-sape-mhana pa:-da-pe-tupe, nu-a-ka nhua
 1sg-speak-REM.P.NONVIS one-CL:ROUND-PL-DIM:PL 1sg-say-SUB I
 'I spoke a few words (lit. few little round ones), I having said'

The special status of a first-person narrator, and their foregrounding in this way, is very different from the way people talk about themselves in day-to-day communication.

2.4.5 Downplaying the 'self'

In day-to-day conversations, Tariana speakers are reticent and rather self-effacing when talking about themselves. People tend to talk about their wellbeing using the 'attenuative' register characterized by the overuse of diminutives and approximatives. For instance, an appropriate response to a question: 'Do you like this food?' would be *nhesiri-ihya-mha* (like-APPROX-PRES.NONVIS) 'I kind-of like it' or *nhesiri-kade-ihya-mha* (like-NEG-APPROX-PRES.NONVIS) 'I kind-of don't like it'.

A frequently heard answer to the question *matsa-nha phia?* (good/proper-PRES.VIS. INTER you) 'Are you well? Are you all right?' is *matsa-naka, kwam(h)e* (good/proper-PRES.VIS, almost) 'Sort-of fine'. This question is now used as a Tariana equivalent to Portuguese: *tudo bem?* ('all well?') 'How are you?', but its reference to the person's wellbeing is strongly felt by most speakers. A display of personal health (or wealth) is avoided, for fear of envy from malevolent people with hidden powers, and various dangerous spirits who could inflict damage on a person. This is comparable to ways of speaking by other Amazonian peoples. Emilienne Ireland (p.c.) reports that the Wauja, an Arawak-speaking group of the Xingu area in Brazil, do not boast of their health or wealth either, for fear of potential damage which could be inflicted by envious human witches.

In oral communication, it is not considered appropriate to ask directly for something for oneself (though I have frequent first-person-oriented requests in letters written by those Tariana who are literate). A request will be framed as asking on behalf of someone else, or 'us'. When a speaker wanted me to give her some sweets, she explicitly asked for sweets for her mother, saying that her mother is fond of them. This is reminiscent of how the first-person inclusive is used in Terêna, a South Arawak language, as reported by Ekdahl and Butler (1979: 67): 'If a person does not want to appear selfish, they can use first-person plural when the first-person singular is expected.' A further analogy would be the polite use of the inclusive first-person pronoun in Limbu, a Tibeto-Burman language (van Driem 1987: 221).

Sharing and cooperation with relatives and neighbours used to be the main principle of life in the traditional Upper Rio Negro societies with their slash-and-burn agriculture and subsistence farming (see e.g. Jackson 1983; Hugh-Jones 1979). In many Tariana stories a particularly selfish person—who only wishes to have gain for themselves—is punished for putting themselves first, being greedy and refusing to share. This is akin to a social convention in many English-speaking societies of not putting oneself first. As Dixon (forthcoming) puts it, 'if two people want to go through a doorway at the same time, each will urge the other to go first. In many aspects of life, "After you" is the polite way to behave.' Backgrounding oneself, for the

nu-sape-na Tariana
 1sg-speak-REM.P.VIS

father'
 forcing the speaker's stance, and his
 notes of what other people said, self-
 or distancing.

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nu-sape-mhana Tariana
 1pl-go-REM.P.NONVIS
 di-sape-na
 1sgnl-speak-REM.P.VIS

... after we did this, he (the chief)
 ... to the speaker, especially in
 ... or an explanation. In (40),
 ... a white master. At that time
 ... a few words—this is the
 ... which could be rendered by

Tariana
 ... the white man's

Tariana, is likely to be associated with a necessity for protection and reliance on others rather than with mere etiquette.

2.5 Conclusion

The expression of first person in Arawak languages appears relatively simple and straightforward. Yet an in-depth look into one language on which extensive materials are available reveals a complex system, partly accounted for by cultural motivations.

Tariana is an Arawak language which has absorbed numerous influences from its East Tucanoan-speaking neighbours and marriage partners, at the same time maintaining its genetically inherited features. Its manifold expression of first person ranges from personal prefixes and pronouns to the special expression of first person in future, and special, first-person only, effects of using evidentials. One can only be certain of one's own actions in the future—hence the overtone of certainty in future is the prerogative of first-person singular and exclusive statements. Visual evidential is the privileged information source—but one needs the special status of a powerful shaman to be entitled to 'see' things which are not seen by common mortals.

Quoting others may imply disbelief and distancing. But when one quotes what one has said, or thought, the overtones are different—a self-quotation will reinforce the illocutionary source of an utterance, and allow the speaker to reiterate their intentions and past decisions. Within a narrative, a speaker may choose to use a discourse-organizing phrase, 'I having said', to highlight what they consider important. In contrast, downplaying the expression of self—in day-to-day interaction—is ostensibly driven by fear of potentially exposing themselves to malevolent envious entities.

Two opposite forces appear to be at work. Projecting oneself and one's own experience is a feature of a skilled narrator. Yet one's own states and feelings tend to be downplayed and somewhat backgrounded, as a way of protecting self against unknown and evil forces.

The ways in which person and self are expressed in Tariana bring to light a complex interplay between discernible Tucanoan patterns, inheritance from the proto-language, and what look like independent innovations. Tariana preserves many features of expressing first person shared with its Arawak relatives. The distinction between first and non-first person in the future arose under the influence of Tucano. The inclusive/exclusive distinction was developed on the basis of the erstwhile generic marker, as a consequence of intensive contact with Tucano, nowadays the main indigenous language of the area. Convergence between languages in contact can be seen as a means of reducing the cognitive processing load which may have resulted from exposure to several different language structures (see e.g. Karatsareas 2009: 209–10). That the convergence affects the expression of first person—in Tariana as in two other Arawak languages, Mawayana and Resígaro—highlights its communicative salience.

A detailed analysis of the expression of first person in Tariana allows us to place the issues of person and the conceptualization of 'self' and 'other' within the context of verbal art, knowledge, perception and information source, the importance of an individual, and the safety of 'self'.

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de of the (traditionally all words could, in this essentially heavily contextualized environment would be to say that of indexicality vacuous. In section 13.3, there is without much contextual straightforward reference being distinguished in DS standard lexical meaning, but the very fact that such reference common nouns in themselves exemplify or treating indexicality as so difficult after all. This priority of meaning on such for defaultness. Merger reflect ready algorithms none before we get these. All questions will have to

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