HERMENEIA

Journal of Hermeneutics, Art Theory and Criticism

Topic:
Interdisciplinarity – An Umbrella Term ?

Topic Editors:
Andreea MIRONESCU, Anca-Diana BIBIRI,
Camelia GRĂDINARU, Emanuel GROSU

Summary

VARIA

BOOK REVIEWS

Argument of the Editors

There is no unitary theory of interdisciplinarity, but we are most certainly crossing a postdisciplinary era, one in which inter-, multi-, trans-disciplinarity have already merged into a meta-discipline, a new idiom where all these prefixes are partially interchangeable. But what does the conceptual vocabulary of interdisciplinarity consist of today? Which are its applicative methodologies? How do we acknowledge the potential meeting points of two distinct disciplines? How can these meetings be encouraged? And how does the imperative of being interdisciplinary shape the policies of research and the academic culture?

In order to answer these questions, the 6th edition of the conference *Perspectives in Humanities and Social Sciences* (PHSS), held between the 16th and the 17th of May, 2019 at the Institute of Interdisciplinary Research, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iaşi, focused on the multifaceted topic of inter- and transdisciplinary concepts, epistemologies, methodologies and forms of academic collaboration. The present section gathers a selection of papers presented at the PHSS conference. The authors critically analyze the need for interdisciplinary perspectives in order to better comprehend several important topics of the contemporary world. At the same time, emerging fields of study prove to be interdisciplinary or even transdiciplinary (such as electronic governance), while others still negotiate their scientific status, trying to balance the tensions between interdisciplinarity and disciplinarity (such as political theology, sociolinguistics and digital media). In the same vein, traditional disciplines, such as literary studies, turn against their own centuries-old tradition and call for trans-aesthetic, trans-national and trans-disciplinary approaches.

We are grateful to the academic institutions that supported the organization of this event ("A. Philippide" Institute of Romanian Philology, Romanian Academy – Iaşi Branch; Faculty of Computer Science, Faculty of

Letters, Faculty of Philosophy and Social-Political Sciences, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, and the Museum of the "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iaşi), and to our media partners. Special thanks go to *Hermeneia. Journal of Hermeneutics, Art Theory and Criticism* and its excellent editing board for their openness toward the interdisciplinary research topics selected for publication.

The 2019 edition of the PHSS conference was organized as part of the research grant "Interdisciplinarity in Literary Studies: A Qualitative and Quantitative Approach" (GI-UAIC-2017-01), currently implemented at the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research – Social Sciences and Humanities Research Department.

Andreea MIRONESCU
Anca-Diana BIBIRI
Camelia GRĂDINARU
Emanuel GROSU

Cristina BLEORȚU *

El proyecto RoSe Blent:
un ejemplo de la era digital

The RoSe Blent Project: An Example of the Digital Era

Abstract: What we propose in this article is to show, based on an example, how new teaching methods are adopted in the field of philology in an age where we move from an analog world to a digital one. Thus, we will present, first, some positive and negative opinions about the digital era in which we move. Secondly, we will focus on the methodology used in the Department of Romance Philology from the University of Zurich for the creation of an online course of linguistics and another of Romance literature for students of the first course. Thirdly, it will be mentioned the advantages and disavantages of such a project. And, finally, we will take some conclusions.

Keywords: RoSe Blent, digital era, interdisciplinarity, collaboration, Romance philology.

1. Introducción

La interdisciplinariedad, cada vez más importante y más presente en el ámbito académico, brilla en el campo de las Humanidades digitales. Así pues, los medios digitales y la incorporación de las herramientas digitales a nuestra vida diaria ya no supone ninguna novedad en el mundo que vivimos. Asimismo, estudiar filología hoy día es muy distinto de la década de los años ochenta y noventa; ahora tenemos mucho más fácil acceso a los diccionarios, corpus de lengua, atlas, las transcripciones de los manuscritos medievales, libros, podemos reconocer el mérito que tiene la implementación de los buscadores, bases de datos, bibliotecas, archivos virtuales, etc., lo que puede presentar ventajas y desventajas a la vez.

Por un lado, existen especialistas que consideran que el progreso y las innovaciones siempre son bienvenidas, puesto que nos facilita el trabajo diario. Por otro lado, investigadores como Spitzer (2015) muestran que la dependencia de internet no contribuye al éxito académico y niegan el valor que la tecnología digital añade a las Humanidades Digitales. Asimismo, la "Declaración de la Stavanger", partiendo de un número importante de participantes, llama la atención que la introducción de la tecnología digital en los colegios puede afectar el desarrollo cognitivo de los niños:

* PhD, Postdoctoral Researcher, Romanisches Seminar, University of Zürich, Switzerland; email: cbleortu@hotmail.com

when introducing digital technologies to education and urges for further research on pressing issues regarding screen technologies and cognition. Teachers and other educators must be made aware that rapid and indiscriminate swaps of print, paper, and pencils for digital technologies in primary education are not neutral. Unless accompanied by carefully developed digital learning tools and strategies, they may cause a setback in the development of children's reading comprehension and emerging critical thinking skills.[1]

y recomienda la lectura sobre papel, no en las pantallas, para un mejor almacenamiento de información durante un período más largo de tiempo.

Es más: otros estudios como el de Turkle (2015) se centran en la falta de la empatia en los llamados nativos digitales, que se debe a la ausencia cada vez mayor de la interacción cara a cara:

> The idea that we are living moments of more and lives of less is supported by a recent study in which pairs of college-aged friends were asked to communicate in four different ways: face-to-face communication, video chat, audio chat, and online instant messaging. Then, the degree of emotional bonding in these friendships was assessed both by asking how people felt and watching how they behaved toward each other. The results were clear: in-person conversation led to the most emotional connection and online messaging led to the most emotional connection and online messaging led to the least. The students had tried to "warm up" their digital messages by using emoticons, typingout the sounds of laughter ("Hahaha"), and using the forced urgency of TYPING IN ALL CAPS. But these techniques had not done the job. It is when we see each other's faces and hear each other's voices that we become most human to each other. (Tuckle 2015, 26)

También el mismo autor hace referencia a las desventajas de una conversación en línea y a las ventajas de una conversación cara a cara:

> The anxiety about spontaneity and the desire to manage our time means that certain conversations tend to fall away. Most endangered: the kind in which you listen intently to another person and expect he or she is listening to you; where a discussion can go off on a tangentand circle back; where sometthing unexpected can be discovered about a person or an idea. And there are other losses: in person, we have access to the messages carried in the face, the voice, and the body. Online, we settle for simple fare: we get our efficiency and our chance to edit, but we can learn to ask questions that a return email can answer. (Tuckle 2015, 26)

No obstante, la tecnología nos facilita también mucho el trabajo de búsqueda. Si antes teníamos que pasar horas en unas salas oscuras, donde las temperaturas eran bastante bajas para que los libros, los manuscritos, etc. no fueran afectados por el calor, hoy día es mucho más fácil consultar ciertas obras a través del ordenador puesto que la mayoría de ellos empieza a digitalizarse[2]. Es más: las herramientas digitales nos ayudan a rastrear el contenido que deseamos encontrar, obtener referencias concretas sobre un tema, filtrar la información, etc.

2. El proyecto RoSe Blent

En la llamada "era digital" se enmarca también el Proyecto RoSe Blent de la Universidad de Zúrich, que se desarrolla en el departamento de filología románica a partir del curso 2018-2019. Este proyecto quiso aprovechar las nuevas technologías para crear dos cursos en línea "Introducción a la lingüística" e "Introducción a la literatura", siguiendo el modelo de otras universidades.

Para llevar a cabo tal tarea distintos profesores fueron grabados durante unos diez minutos sobre la materia que enseñan. Las grabaciones se llevaron a cabo durante el curso 2017-2018, en varias sesiones, por un equipo de profesionales que se ocupó después de la edición de las imágenes tomadas. Una vez editados los vídeos, los profesores tuvieron la posibilidad de ver cada vídeo y decir si había que hacer más cambios. Los temas de los dos cursos son los siguientes:

Tabla 1: Las unidades de lingüística y los profesores responsables

Unidades de lingüística
El estudio de la romanística en la era digital: una reflexión crítica sobre los medios (M. Loporcaro)
El signo lingüístico: fonética y fonología (J. Kabatek)
Morfología (C. de Benito Moreno)
Morfosintaxis (M. Loporcaro)
Sintaxis (E. Stark)
Semántica (P. Obrist)
Lexicología (M. Glessgen)
Pragmática (P. Obrist)
Historia lingüística I: del latín a las lenguas románicas (H. Carles)
Historia lingüística II: siglos XI – XXI (M. Glessgen)
Dialectología, sociolingüística y contacto lingüístico (C. de Benito Moreno y J. Kabatek)

Tabla 2: Las unidades de literatura y los profesores responsables

Unidades de literatura
Texto y contexto (R. Väler)
Historia literaria y canon (T. Crivelli)
Géneros literarios (E. de Oliveira)
Interpretar el texto literario (U. Bähler)
Estilística e intertextualidad (J. Bartuschat)
Filología (R. Trachsler)
El texto narrativo (T. Klinkert)
El texto poético (I. López Guil)
Retórica (S. Zanetti)
Teatro (T. Klinkert)

Aparte de estos temas, en lingüística se grabaron unos retratos lingüísticos de las lenguas románicas, donde se menciona el número de hablantes de cada lengua, los rasgos más característicos de cada idioma (los fonéticos, fonológicos, morfosintácticos, lexicales, semánticos), la evolución histórica, la situación sociolingüística, los dialectos, etc.; incluso se hace referencia a algún poeta famoso. Las lenguas y los profesores responsables de cada retrato son los siguientes:

Tabla 3: Los retratos lingüísticos y los profesores responsables

Catalán (G. Álvarez)
Español (C. de Benito Moreno)
Francés (V. Rodríguez)
Gallego (J. Bartuschat)
Italiano (M. Loporcaro)
Occitano (C. Dubois Huber)
Portugués de Europa (M. A. Ramos)
Portugués de Brasil (E. de Oliveira)
Retorromance (R. Väler)
Rumano (M. Chihai)
Sardo (M. Loporcaro)

Después de grabar estos temas en distintas lenguas románicas, cada vídeo se ha traducido en distintos idiomas por estudiantes de grado y posdoctorandos (en el caso del rumano): francés, italiano, español, portúges, retorromance y rumano. Su traducción se ha llevado a cabo con el programa gratuito Aegisub (http://www.aegisub.org/), versión 3.2:

Figura 1: Aegisub en un proyecto de la Universidad de Zúrich

No obstante, el programa Aegisub ha impuesto determinadas pautas para los subtítulos. (i) Así pues, los traductores del vídeo no pudieron utilizar

más de cuarenta caracteres para cada fragmento segmentado. (ii) Si tenían más de cuarenta caracteres lo que podían hacer era dividir la frase en dos utilizando el símbolo "/N". (iii) Por lo tanto, no siempre los subtítulos emplean las mismas palabras que las de los vídeos; muchas veces se han buscado sinonimos e incluso se han reformulado algunas oraciones para poder respetar las pautas impuestas por el programa. (iv) También muchas veces ha resultado bastante difícil sustituir los ejemplos de cada lengua que aparecían en cada vídeo, así que muchas veces se han conservado los ejemplos originales y se ha presentado la traducción de cada uno de ellos. A modo de ejemplo: *Pruncul meu beseduieşte să nu-mi muştruluiesc mintenaş neamul pentru marha noastră,* una frase del retrato rumano, que hace referencia a la presencia de los elementos húngaros en el vocabulario rumano, se ha conservado en rumano.

El contenido de cada traducción fue revisado por los profesores responsables de cada unidad y corregido de nuevo por cada traductor. Mientras que la última corrección consistió en una revisión lingüística de cada lengua por un grupo de profesores de la Universidad de Zúrich del Departamento de filología románica. Los profesores responsables fueron los siguientes:

Tabla 4: Los profesores responsables de la corrección lingüística

Español (C. de Benito Moreno)
Francés (H. Carles, M. Glessgen, E. Stark)
Italiano (M. Loporcaro)
Portugués (J. Kabatek)
Retorromance (R. Väler)
Rumano (C. Bleorțu)

Aparte de la información de los vídeos, los estudiantes disponen de una introducción para cada unidad, donde aparecen también los objetivos de la unidad, y unas actividades que tienen que llevar a cabo. Una vez realizadas, recibirán feedback sobre ellas. Es más: en el curso existen varios tutores que ofrecen explicaciones sobre el contenido de las unidades.

3. Las ventajas y las desventajas de un tal proyecto

Tal como hemos señalado antes, lo nuevo y la tecnología no siempre se miran desde una perspectiva positiva; no obstante, creemos que un tal proyecto puede presentar una serie de ventajas. (i) Por un lado, un estudiante que trabaja tiene acceso a los materiales en línea y puede conciliar muy bien el trabajo con el estudio. (ii) Por otro lado, estos materiales pueden representar una fuente importante para los estudiantes de lingüística románica comparada que pueden practicar las distintas lenguas románicas que aprenden. (iii) Asimismo, las grabaciones pueden desempeñar un papel relevante

para la preparación de los exámenes y para el desarrollo de la universidad misma puesto que hoy día casi todas las universidades organizan cursos en línea (véase, por ejemplo, el curso de *Digital Humanities* de la Universidad de Harvard).

Otras posibles ventajas que puede presentar un astfel de proyecto son: (iv) la creación de un modelo de trabajo basado en la interdisciplinariedad; (v) la formación de equipos colaborativos; (vi) una contribución significativa para los estudiantes que realizaron las traducciones, lo que los puede llevar a seguir en este campo; (vii) la generación de nuevas relaciones en el eje horizontal mediante las prácticas interdisciplinares; (viii) la posibilidad de elegir cuándo estudiar de acuerdo con el tiempo de que dispone cada alumno; (ix) la posibilidad de ahorrar tiempo y quizás dinero (así no se debbe gastar dinero en el transporte), etc.

De cualquier manera, tampoco tenemos que ser demasiado entusiasmados, sino que debemos mirar todo desde una perspectiva crítica, tal como señala Kabatek cuando hace referencia a las nuevas tecnologías y al lenguaje:

> Sin embargo, no aprendemos absolutamente nada acerca de la esencia del lenguaje humano ni acerca de las estructuras ni acerca de la relación entre lenguaje y mundo. Esto no quiere decir que haya que rechazar las nuevas metodologías, todo lo contrario: solo habrá que valorar sus alcances y límites sin dejarse llevar por las ilusiones. (Kabatek 2012, 99)

Participar a un curso en línea impide a los estudiantes entrar en contacto directo con sus profesores, con sus compañeros, lo que parece estar alterando las relaciones en la dirección vertical. Asimismo, las ideas que pueden surgir durante una clase presencial no nacen durante un curso en línea. Es más: la cantidad de información que se suele dar durante una clase no puede aparecer en un vídeo cuya duración es de diez minutos. Asimismo, no es lo mismo recibir feedback sobre tus deberes en una clase que en un mail.

4. Conclusiones

En este trabajo se han presentado los efectos de la era digital y se ha descrito el proyecto RoSe Blent, de la Universidad de Zúrich, del departamento de filología románica, que ha sido desarrollado por un grupo de investigadores de literatura y lingüística románicas, con el objetivo de ofrecer el soporte necesario para la generación de dos cursos en línea: "Introducción a la lingüística" e "Introducción a la literatura" para los estudiantes del primer curso.

A lo largo de este trabajo, de una manera más o menos explícita, hemos presentado las ventajas y las desventajas de este proyecto. (i) Así pues, hemos podido comprobado que este proyecto promueve una comunidad

dinámica como sucede, por ejemplo, con META-NET, un proyecto promovido por la Alianza Tecnológica para una Europa Multilingüe. (ii) Es más: RoSe Blent facilita la comunicación y la cooperación entre profesores que enseñan lenguas distintas, lo que lleva a la formación de equipos colaborativos y a la creación de un modelo basado en la interdisciplinariedad. Otras ventajas que presenta son las siguientes:

- (iii) proporciona a los estudiantes el mismo acceso al conocimiento en cualquiera de las lenguas románicas mencionadas anteriormente;
- (iv) los estudiantes que realizaron las traducciones pudieron participar con una contribución significativa;
- (v) se puede acceder a los recursos en línea;
- (vi) genera nuevas relaciones en el eje horizontal mediante las prácticas interdisciplinares;
- (vii) los cursos en línea permiten a los estudiantes ahorrar tiempo y quizás el dinero del transporte;
- (vii) un estudiante podrá elegir cuándo estudiar según el tiempo del que disponga;
- (ix) los estudiantes podrán conciliar mejor el trabajo y los estudios universitarios;
- (x) construye puentes entre las lenguas románicas que se enseñan en la Universidad de Zúrich, etc.

Es evidente que el nuevo entorno tecnológico que, actualmente, se abre no solamente ante los investigadores, sino también ante los estudiantes ofrece extraordinarias oportunidades para la docencia. Las nuevas oportunidades exigen, desde luego, una cierta precaución puesto que aunque queda mucho camino por recorrer. Por lo tanto, este proyecto presenta también desventajas. (i) Por ejemplo, a los estudiantes les faltará el contacto con el profesor del curso, lo que puede conducir a la falta de empatía en los llamados estudiantes nativos digitales y a la alteración de las relaciones en la dirección vertical, debido a la falta de interacción cara a cara, como señala Tuckle (2015). (ii) Además, la cantidad de información que se transmite durante una clase es distinta de la de un vídeo. Por lo tanto, podemos concluir que no debemos ser demasiado reacios pero tampoco muy entusiasmados con las nuevas tecnologías.

Notes

[1]   http://ereadcost.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/StavangerDeclarationPressRelease.pdf, p. 2.
[2] Si solo pensamos en la biblioteca de St. Gallen (Suiza), una de las más antiguas de Europa, vemos que existen más de 4000 de manuscriptos digitalizados: https://www.e-codices.unifr.ch/de/list/csg.

References

Baraibar, Álvaro (ed.). 2014. *Visibilidad y divulgación de la investigación desde las Humanidades digitales. Experiencias y proyectos*. Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra: Pamplona.

Berry, David M. "Introduction: Understanding the Digital Humanities." In *Understanding Digital Humanities*. edited by David M. Berry, 1-21. London: Palgrave.

Bleorţu, Cristina. 2019a. "Los subtítulos y el uso del programa Aegisub". In *Romania Contexta II*, International Colloquium, Universitatea "Babeş-Bolyai" Cluj-Napoca, 11-12 october.

Bleorţu, Cristina. 2019b. "Importanţa proiectului RoSe Blent de la Universitatea din Zürich şi aplicarea lui la Universitatea 'Ştefan cel Mare' din Suceava". In *AmbasaDOR de Bucovina*, Universitatea "Ştefan cel Mare" din Suceava, 22-26 July.

Bleorţu, Cristina and Anca Bibiri. 2019. "Proiectul RoSe Blent: un exemplu al revoluţiei digitale". In *Perspectives in Humanities and social sciences*, Universitatea "Alexandru Ioan Cuza", Iaşi, 17-19 May.

Bolter, Jay David and Remediation R. Grusin. 1999. *Understanding New Media*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

Burdick, Anne, Johanna Drucker, Peter Lunenfeld, Todd Presner and Jeffrey Schnapp (eds.). 2012. *Digital Humanities*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press: https://mitpress.mit.edu/sites/default/files/titles/content/9780262018470_Open_Access_E dition.pdf [Consultado 7.10.2019]

Cameron, Fiona and Sarah Kenderdene. 2007. *Theorizing digital cultural heritage. A critical discourse*. MIT Press: Cambridge, Massachussets.

Diodato, Roberto. 2005. *Estetica del virtuale*. Milano: Bruno Mondadori.

Discroll, Mattew James and Elena Pierazzo. 2016. *Digital Scholarly Editing: Theories and Practices*. Cambridge: Open Book Publishers.

Kabatek, Johannes. 2012. "Intuición y empirismo". *Anejos de Analecta Malacitana*, 86-99.

Kabatek, Johannes (2015): "Este posibilă o lingvistică istorică bazată pe un corpus reprezentativ?". In *Tradiţii discursive. Studii*. edited by Cristina Bleorţu, Adrian Turculeţ, Carlota de Benito Moreno and Miguel Cuevas Alonso, 121-136. Bucureşti: Editura Academiei Române.

Loporcaro, Michele. 2019. *El estudio de la romanística en la era digital: una reflexión crítica sobre los medios*, curso en línea. Universidad de Zúrich.

Spitzer, Manfred. 2015. *Demenza digitale. Come la nuova tecnologia ci rende stupidi*. Milano: Corbaccio.

Turkle, Sherry. 2015. *Reclaiming Conversation: The Power of Talk in a Digital Age*. New York: Penguin Press.

Carina Ionela BRÂNZILĂ *

The Interdisciplinarity of Online Courses in Academia

Abstract: Nowadays, when the fast pace of life presses everyone to do more things in a shorter time, there is little time left for self-improvement and for learning. Paradoxically, now there are more opportunities than ever before to discover new things. The plethora of information available is overwhelming. The advent of internet brought with it increased prospects of learning and acquiring new skills. Practically speaking, the internet can teach us almost everything. In this context, famous universities and institutes have developed their own online courses, offering unparalleled chances to learners all around the globe: valuable information presented by reputed professors and specialists, for modest fees or even for free. Never before has this happened in the history of human knowledge. This article aims at discussing the large offer of such online courses and their impact on the academic world.

Keywords: online courses, MOOC, university, internet, learning.

Academia is going through important modifications as times change and one of the main changes that can be witnessed is an openness toward technology, innovation and the world wide web. We are witnessing the advent and impressive growth of online, open courses available to all learners at low cost or no cost at all. Educational opportunities are wider than ever and good quality is now available for everyone on the internet. Regarding this, old and prestigious universities are now offering online courses or include such courses in their bachelors' or master' s programs. The potential for online learning is immense and higher institutions have already acknowledged it. There are obvious benefits associated to online learning and some downsides, as well. This article will aim at underlining several of these and to raise open questions regarding the future of education in the technological age.

Online courses emerged as early as 2008, when the first MOOCs were created – MOOC standing for "Massive open online course". A MOOC is an online course with the option of free and open registration, a publicly-shared curriculum, and open-ended outcomes. MOOCs integrate social networking, accessible online resources, and are facilitated by leading practitioners in the field of study. Most significantly, MOOCs build on the

---

* PhD, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iaşi, Romania; e-mail: carinabranzila@gmail.com

engagement of learners who self-organize their participation according to learning goals, prior knowledge and skills, and common interests (Comier 2010, 5).

Historically speaking, it all started in 2008, when a course entitled "Connectivism and Connective Knowledge" was made available by Siemens and Downes from the University of Manitoba. It aimed at allowing as many learners as possible to enjoy the benefits of an online course. It was the first course to include open learning with distributed content, meaning it was located on the world wide web. Participants in the course could add to the network and an aggregation tool was employed to gather all content together. Although there were people attending the courses on campus in Canada, where it originated, there were also thousands of students taking part online. David Comier coined the term MOOC, in response to the above mentioned course. The initial MOOCs had a clear social component which was lost later on, as more and more courses appeared. However, the Canadian experiment was, in fact, not the first large scale, successful experience with such courses. Stanford University had previously offered three online free courses seven years earlier, in 2001, when Norbig and Thrun provided hundreds of thousands of students with an insight into artificial intelligence. The same year, 2001, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) created OpenCourseWare (OCW) – university courses made available for free on the internet, which later developed into MITx and edX. The latter are online platforms that provide online university courses on various topics at low costs or no costs at all, some even offering academic credentials after certain exams.

The idea of such courses is to publish all course materials online and make them widely available to everyone (Yue n.d.). McGill University from Canada mentions on its official web-page the existence of online consortiums with over 30 partner universities, all prestigious ones, making available an open source platform to be used by everyone. (McGill n.d.) Widely popular platforms offering online courses on almost any type of subject are edX, MITx, Coursera, MiriadaX, Udacity, Udemy, FutureLearn, but there are tens of other platforms to choose from. Class Central, a learners' supported initiative of keeping watch on MOOCs around the world, claimed in 2019 that by the end of 2018, 100 million people had signed up for at least an online course; furthermore, apart from large global platforms, national sites around the world are launching such online courses in their own language, such as India, Israel, Italy or even Thailand. Class Central catalogued over 12.000 such platforms offering courses worldwide (Shah and Pickard 2019).

A short overview of courses available on such a platform reveals an overwhelming interdisciplinary offer: from architecture, arts and culture to computer science or data analysis, not forgetting economics and finance,

education, philosophy or even earth science. edX, for example, which comprises virtually any type of course imaginable, is also offering certifications, from professional certificates to online masters' degrees at affordable prices. Another example is the British platform FutureLearn, providing not less than 13 categories of courses, ranging from Creative Arts and Media to Law or Science, Engineering and Math. Each of these categories comprise tens of courses to choose from. The programs offered by FutureLearn range from short courses that teach new skills to in-depth programs that provide professional or academic accreditation to flexible online degrees. Coursera, on the other hand, offers 100% online Masters's Degree, Msc, Bachelor's Degree from universities as prestigious as the University of London or Penn University, USA. There are also certificates available for online learning – for example, in 2019, only John Hopkins university is offering 10 specialization courses in Data Science with 14 available subtitles in various languages including complex ones like Vietnamese or Japanese, but the proposals are many more. In fact, it seems this education breakthrough presents the major disadvantage of being so varied, that choosing becomes very difficult indeed.

Berkley's renowned historian DeLong argues in his revolutionary posting of 2010 that there are four online learning revolutions (DeLong 2010). The first one took place as early as 390 BC, when the books replaced the teacher, allowing the access to knowledge of many more learners than those who could hear the teacher in person. Plato thought this was a second-rate experience: reading a book of the teachings of a first-rate intellectual. The second revolution had to do with the advent of universities in the western world. Books being extremely expensive back in those times, the university experience of learners being able to absorb the content of more books as read and explained to them by a scholar was a superior experience, considering how few books could be owned by one. The third online learning revolution was the invention of the Gutenberg press, which brought about the explosion of print and made books available, in time, to virtually everyone. The fourth revolution is obviously the advent of online courses we are witnessing today and DeLong expresses his concern regarding the future of this online learning and of universities as providers of education in an era of technological progress (DeLong 2010).

Dr. Barbara Oakley, on the other hand, extensively discusses in her book entitled "Mindshift" how learning online can be beneficial for the brain, as it offers a non-formal learning style. The incredible offer of online courses makes specializing in one area only obsolete. Oakley discusses the broadening of passions and drawing on recent neuroscientific research, she mentions the notions of aptitude and ability versus change. Barbara Oakley challenges the carefree set careers by proving that learning is a continuous process, that professional expansion in several directions is required, and

the brain needs daily training. Furthermore, people who change careers or interests later in life due to such online courses are "fertile cross-pollinators", bringing significant insights from one discipline to another, challenging preconceptions and tapping into the hidden potential of human beings (Oakley 2017).

As Sanchez-Gordon and Lujan-Mora mention, the MOOC inventors promised in the beginning the democratization of high quality education by making it available to people worldwide, especially those who would have not been able to access it otherwise (Sanchez-Gordon and Lujan-Mora 2019). The founders of Coursera are quoted stating that their platform aims at offering 'the best courses from the best instructors at the best universities and provide it to everyone around the world for free' for people with great potential and little exposure to high-quality education (Koller 2012). The Icef Monitor noted in 2013 that MOOCs promised in 2011:

> to open up education to millions across the world who, for either geographical or financial reasons, would never have been able to access it otherwise; to be incredibly disruptive – for professors, bricks-and-mortar campuses, and revenue streams; to be very limited in scope, with no clear business or monetisation plan behind them, no credits attached to courses or degrees, and no sense of how a free, non-credited achievement would stack up in the real world of work. (Monitor Icef 2013)

William Leonard makes an inventory of early promises from learning platforms:

> A few elite institutions would offer the best of their courses, taught by top instructors at little or no charge. […] MOOCs would employ a low-cost business plan, allowing broad student access to free or low-cost high-quality education, countering the impact of ever-increasing tuition fees. On-demand delivery would accommodate conflicting family and work responsibilities. Traditional student age and returning adult students would have equal access. […] Institutions would benefit from online offerings requiring little, if any, new brick and mortar projects to accommodate the flood of additional students. The technology would promote more efficient use of existing faculty resources. (Leonard 2019)

Indeed, there are many advantages of online courses. Some are obvious: the choice is extremely wide and everyone can now learn anything – education is openly accessible to everyone, of all ages and backgrounds. The only requirement is the desire for knowledge. Never in the history of human kind has such a privilege been so widely available. As the OCW platform advertises, there is no registration, no enrolment, no start or end dates, just information freely available for everyone (OCW n.d.). With online learning, there is the obvious advantage of time: such courses are extremely flexible and students can organize their own learning according to their needs and

time available. Also, learners study at their own pace, as fast or slow as they can – this is a very important asset of online courses. The costs are also a major advantage, as online courses are obviously more affordable – a person can obtain a master's degree from a prestigious university, a degree which would otherwise be off-reach. The quality of courses and the teaching input of renowned professors and instructors is also worth mentioning. The broadening educational opportunities are also seen as a remedy for the rising inequality in the world (Thoma 2013). Also, there is a certain amount of experimentation with learning platforms, such as blended courses, including both face-to-face teaching and online activities, or online courses as complementing traditional teaching methods in the form of conferences or films to be watched on youtube, material to be read available on google drive, listening of online podcasts, or courses 100% available on the platform but with more teaching input in real life.

However, there are also certain disadvantages associated to online learning. First of all, it may seem a bit impersonal, often implying no human contact. In the case of courses that also offer support forums, this aspect is eased but still present. Also, too much flexibility may mean less commitment from the learner. Next, not all learners interested in the courses offered online have the time or the means to actually do them. Mark Thoma lists several negative aspects related to online learning: students cannot ask questions to their teachers and the contact with instructors and peers is minimum, if not absent altogether – no pair work, no group work, no common projects, no office hours to discuss with the teachers. Also, evaluations may be deficient and lacking in substance since they must often be machine assisted. Last but not least, the development of online courses might bring the disappearance of traditional universities as such (Thoma 2015). Furthermore, statistics show that drop-out rates are extremely high. Inside Higher Ed shows that by 2017-2018, the course completion rate was extremely low: only 3.13% actually completed the course. MOOCs' low completion rate has barely budged despite 6 years of investment in course development and learning research, argues a *Science* report (Reich and Valiente 2019). And last but not least, the MOOCs seem to fail their early promises, as the vast majority of learners starting a course were educated people from economically advantaged countries – so the initial purpose of reaching developing countries was not fulfilled (Leonard 2019). The *Science* magazine notes that MOOC participation is concentrated almost entirely in the wealthiest countries of the world:

> The vast majority of MOOC learners never return after their first year, the growth in MOOC participation has been concentrated almost entirely in the world's most affluent countries, and the bane of MOOCs – low completion rates has not improved over 6 years […] It was clear from the first few years of

MOOC research that MOOCs disproportionately drew their learners from affluent countries and neighborhoods, and markers of socioeconomic status were correlated with greater persistence and certification. (Reich and Valiente 2019)

The evolution of learning platforms was rapid, two main types of MOOCs emerging in a short period of time: C-MOOCs, designed to connect learners more, X-MOOCs, related to the OpenCourseWare from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and being offered in partnership with a profit organization. However, these days there are other branches growing from the original stem of MOOC. To mention just a few: SMOC stands for Synchronous Massive Online Course and it provides live lectures to students who need to register and participate in a more personal and interactive manner, including through chat-rooms for asking questions or posting comments; SPOC, on the other hand, stands for Self-Paced Online Course are it represents a course open to enrollment all the time which means higher independence and an extremely flexible pace, but virtually no interaction to the other participants in the course or to the teacher; SPOC may also stand for Small Private Online Courses which restrict the participation of students to some hundreds only, ensuring a better teaching quality and a more personalized learning experience.

Authors like Veletsianos and Sheperdson have looked into the interdisciplinarity of MOOCs and published their findings which used bibliometric data as a result of descriptive and inferential statistics. Their conclusions were that Education and Computer Sciences were the most two frequent researchers of the MOOC phenomenon, with over half of affiliations, the rest being rather diverse, as well. Furthermore, they found that MOOC is becoming more and more interdisciplinary in time "suggesting that the scientific complexity of the field is being tackled by a greater diversity of researchers […] empirical research on xMOOCs may be more interdisciplinary than research on cMOOCs" (Veletsianos and Sheperdson 2015, 11).

The interdisciplinary character of online platform will obviously change in the future, as xMOOCs represent a more familiar model for academia and the MOOCs in general are growing in popularity. However, the change might be for the best, as more fields might become interested considering the probable growth in popularity of online learning. Adam states that MOOCs, if designed inclusively, have the potential and ability to create reciprocal channels between truly diverse global participants, where a plurality of voices can be heard and true diversity of global knowledge can be achieved. This would require taking into account the context of the marginalized virtual participant (Adam 2018). Also, with an increased focus on revenue and profit from the organizing institutions, the situation itself of

online courses will most likely experience significant modifications, as well. For example, online education may improve the incomes of learners by offering them more opportunities to earn money based on what they have learned. Also, the learners' quality of life might be improved due to their participation in the courses. This could increase their popularity as well, a fact which may lead to other changes, like less free courses and more paid ones.

The MOOC courses will gradually come to reflect the technological realities of nowadays. The MOOC's future will depend on improved instructor preparation and pre-registration screening, coupled with a business plan designed to at least break even (Leonard 2019).

Online platform providers will most likely search for and even find solutions to the problems they are facing, such as the high drop-out rate. This will lead to changes in the format of MOOCs and the external aspects regarding their availability, price, offer of certification and so on. Also, online courses will continue to adapt to the realities of today and perhaps include more topics that reflect what is currently happening in the world. Regarding the controversial relationship between online courses and degrees and universities, Thoma express his worries that

> the development of online courses will lead to a two-tiered education system, but that's just another way of saying I think traditional "brick and mortar" education is better. Traditional higher education institutions can do everything online courses do […] and provide things such as hands on labs in the sciences, highly valuable internship opportunities, and the chance to participate in cutting edge research. (Thoma 2015)

So, in conclusion, traditional universities will probably continue to exist and so will online courses – the main concern of research will be to harmoniously blend the two for the best possible outcome.

References

DeLong, J. Bradford. 2010. *The 4ᵗʰ online learning revolution.*
        https://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2010/11/the-fourth-online-learning-
        revolution.html. Accessed 14ᵗʰ September 2019.
Desarrolloweb. n.d.d. *What is a MOOC?*
        http://desarrolloweb.dlsi.ua.es/moocs/what-is-a-mooc Accessed 10ᵗʰ September
        2019.
ICEF Monitor. 2013. *Are we already entering a post-MOOC era?* November 13, 2013. Accessed
        10ᵗʰ September 2019.
Koller, Daphne. 2012. *What we're learning from online education.* TEDGlobal 2012, June
        http://www.ted.com/talks/daphne_koller_what_we_re_learning_from_online_e
        ducation.html. Accessed 10ᵗʰ September 2019.

Leonard, William, Patrick. "So why did MOOCs fail to live up to the hype?". *University World News*. February 8, 2019.
https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20190207110446568.
Accessed 10th September 2019.

McAuley, Alexander; Stewart, Bonnie; Siemens, George; Cormier, Dave. 2010. *The Mooc Model for Digital Practice.*
http://davecormier.com/edblog/wp-content/uploads/MOOC_Final.pdf.
Accessed 14th September 2019.

McGill University. n.d. *A Brief History of MOOCs.*
https://www.mcgill.ca/maut/current-issues/moocs/history accessed 10th October 2019.

MIT Open Course Ware. n.d. *Get Started with OCW.*
https://ocw.mit.edu/help/get-started-with-ocw/ accessed 10th September 2019.

Oackley, Barbara. 2017. *Mindshift.* New York: TarcherPerigee.

Reich, Justin and Valiente-Ruiperez, Jose. 2019. "What happened to disruptive transformation of education?". *Science*, January 8.
https://www.sciencemagazinedigital.org/sciencemagazine/11_january_2019/MobilePagedArticle.action?articleId=1455537&app=false#articleId1455537.
Accessed 10th September 2019.

Sanchez-Gordon, Sandra and Luján-Mora, Sergio. 2013. "Accessibility considerations of massive online open courses as creditable courses in engineering programs". *International Conference of Education, Research and Innovation ICERI 2013*. IATED Digital Library: 853-5862.

Shah, Dhawal and Pickard, Laurie. 2019. "Massive List of MOOC Providers Around The World".
https://www.classcentral.com/report/mooc-providers-list/. 30 July 2019, accessed 10th September 2019.

Taskeen, Adam. 2018. *The Future of MOOCs Must Be Decolonized.*
https://www.edsurge.com/news/2019-01-03-the-future-of-moocs-must-be-decolonized. Accessed 10th September 2019.

Thoma, Mark. 2013. "Will online higher ed widen the income gap?". *The Fiscal Times*. January 16.

Veletsianos, George and Sheperdson, Peter. 2015. "Who studies MOOCs? Interdisciplinarity in MOOC research and its changes over time". *International Review of Research in Open and Distributed Learning* 16(3): 11-13.

Florin CRÎŞMĂREANU [*]

Philosophie et *théologie* chez Saint Maxime le Confesseur. Sur l'impossibilité d'une approche interdisciplinaire

Philosophy and *Theology* in St. Maximus the Confessor. About the Impossibility of an Interdisciplinary Approach

Abstract: In this study I set out to analyze the relationship between two founding disciplines – *theology* and *philosophy*, as we find it outlined in the writings of one of the most important Greek Fathers of the Church, Saint Maximus the Confessor. There have been countless studies that follow only one of the paradigms exclusively to the other, an aspect that has divided a good part of the exegetes into two categories: the theologians (I refer here in particular to Jean Claude Larchet) that consider philosophy as playing no role in the writings of the Confessor and, on the other hand, the philologists (Bram Roosen, Peter Van Deun et al.), and the philosophers (in particular the M.-J. Le Guillou School, as it has been called) who consider that the conceptual apparatus adopted by Maximus from the philosophical texts of Plato, Aristotle and especially the Stoics is of a significant importance. However, there are many exegetes, such as S.L. Epiphanovich, who takes a conciliatory stance when he states that "we cannot rightly call the world view of Saint Maximus neither purely theological nor purely philosophical".

Keywords: Maximus the Confessor, Philosophy, Theology, Interdisciplinary.

Pour mieux comprendre l'interdisciplinarité, si souvent invoquée de nos jour, il convient, à mon avis, de retourner aux racines de celle-ci, plus précisément à l'analyse du rapport entre deux disciplines fondatrices – la *théologie* et la *philosophie* –, tel qu'il est illustré dans les écrits de l'un des plus importants Pères grecs de l'Église, Saint Maxime le Confesseur (580-662). On a écrit des livres et des articles célèbres valorisant tantôt l'une, tantôt l'autre, aspect qui a divisé les exégètes en deux catégories : d'une part, les théologiens (et je pense ici surtout à Jean Claude Larchet) qui considèrent que la philosophie ne joue aucun rôle dans les œuvres du Confesseur, de l'autre, les philologues (Bram Roosen, P. Van Deun *et al*), les philosophes (l'École de M.-J. Le Guillou, comme on l'a nommée) qui considèrent que

[*] PhD, Research Department, Faculty of Philosophy and Socio-Political Sciences, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iaşi, Romania; email: fcrismareanu@gmail.com

l'appareil conceptuel emprunté par Maxime des textes des philosophes (Platon, Aristote surtout, les stoïciens) a une importance significative. Le savant russe S.L. Epifanovitch semble réconcilier les deux positions lorsqu'il affirme que « on ne peut pas appeler la conception sur le monde de Saint Maxime ni purement théologique, ni purement philosophique » (Epifanovitch 2009, 71). Ce qui est certain est que tant le terme de philosophie (y compris un appareil conceptuel de souche philosophique) que celui de théologie (il y a même un ouvrage de Maxime intitulé *Capita theologica et oeconomica*, mais il est possible que le titre ait été donné par un copiste) sont utilisés par le Confesseur, parfois avec des sens différents voire surprenants, comme on va le voir. Contrairement au titre, ma recherche visera les éléments historiques, philosophiques, théologiques et philologiques impliqués dans l'investigation annoncée.

Maximum monachum, divinum philosophum. Ce sont les mots d'Érigène qui, dans son œuvre monumental, *Periphyseon*, I, les utilise lorsqu'il parle de Maxime le Confesseur. Malgré les grands efforts faits par l'Irlandais pour traduire en latin les principales œuvres du Confesseur (*Ambigua ad Iohannem* [*CPG* 7705] et *Quaestiones ad Thalassium* [*CPG* 7688] ou *Scoliae*, le titre donné par l'Érigène), leur réception dans l'Occident a été modeste. Même au début de siècle XX, en 1915 plus précisément, le savant russe S.L. Epifanovitch affirmait que « le temps n'est pas encore venu de prouver l'importance littéraire de Saint Maxime » (Epifanovitch 2009, 190). Soixante-dix ans plus tard, un autre éminent exégète de l'œuvre maximien, Marcel Doucet, estimait que « l'„heure" de Maxime viendra » (Doucet 1985, 155). En effet, on voit dernièrement croître, dans plusieurs perspectives, l'intérêt pour la vie et l'œuvre du Confesseur: on a publié des éditions critiques de ses écrits, on a traduit son œuvre dans les langues vernaculaires; on rédige des monographies au sujet des thèmes fondamentaux de sa doctrine; on organise, du moins annuellement, un congrès international consacré à Maxime – on parle déjà de maximologues –, on bâtit des églises ayant comme patron Maxime le Confesseur, etc. Bref, le temps de Maxime est venu.

Partons, scolastiquement, de la question suivante : peut-on considérer Maxime comme étant un philosophe ou un théologien ? Pour que cette question reçoive une réponse satisfaisante, je crois qu'il faut clarifier les sens qu'avaient à l'époque les deux termes. Dans les écrits des Pères de l'Église, la distinction entre philosophie et théologie fonctionnait certainement dans un autre paradigme, à présent étranger à la plupart d'entre nous. Par humilité, probablement, la majorité des Pères se seraient appelés eux-mêmes des philosophes plutôt que des théologiens. Quand je dis cela je pense aux deux paliers qui pourraient soutenir cette idée : d'une part, la distinction entre *notre philosophie* (des chrétiens) et *la philosophie des autres, d'en dehors* et, d'autre part, au fonctionnement d'une distinction fondamentale pour cette époque-là, celle entre *la théologie* et *l'oikonomia,* c'est-à-dire « la différence qui existe entre

croire sans voir et croire en voyant » (Mondzain 1996, 40). Donc, dans les premiers siècles chrétiens, s'appeler *théologien* aurait été perçu comme une grande audace (à ce je sais, de tous les Pères grecs, seul Saint Grégoire de Nazianze réclame pour lui-même le nom de *theologos* – *Oratio* 20, 12; *PG* 35, 1080 A).

Pour tout penseur chrétien, la philosophie, considérée au sens élargi, est une recherche de la vérité et du bonheur conformément à un mode de vie propre à ceux qui aiment la sagesse (parce que c'est ce que φιλόσοφος signifie, étymologiquement). Maxime connaissait, sans doute, les sens et l'emploi du terme φιλοσοφία des écrits de ses prédécesseur, comme par exemple Paul, Origène, Grégoire de Nazianze, Denys l'Aréopagite *et al*. On rencontre déjà une première délimitation par rapport à une certaine philosophie chez l'Apôtre Paul qui nous avertit : « Veillez à ce que nul ne vous prenne au piège de la philosophie » (*Col.* 2, 8). Tertullien semble respecter la consigne de Paul avec acharnement, en étant parfois même plus intransigeant que celui-ci (*Hic acris et vehementis ingenii*, selon Jérôme, *De viris illustribus*, LIII). D'où la conclusion de commentateurs tels É. Gilson, de cataloguer Tertullien pour un adversaire de la philosophie (étiquette qu'on utilisera parfois pour des Pères de l'Église également). Il est vrai que dans le christianisme premier la philosophie n'a pas joué un rôle aussi important qu'on croyait, bien au contraire. Par exemple, Justin Martyr et Philosophe appelait *la philosophie comme étant à plusieurs têtes* et *les philosophes amateurs de vaine gloire* (*Apologia*, II, 3, 1); malgré cela, la tradition lui a attribué aussi le nom de *philosophe*. D'autre part, pour Tertullien, les philosophes sont « des patriarches des hérétiques » (*Adversus Hermogenem*, VIII, 3). Parmi ceux-ci, le Stagirite semble occuper une place privilégiée : *Miserum Aristotelen! Qui illis dialecticam instituit* (*De praescriptione haereticorum*, VII, 6), et dans *De anima*, I, 2, il parodie le fameux *homo animal sociale* par *philosophus, gloriae animal*.

Pour Clément d'Alexandrie, la gnose est une connaissance supérieure sur les choses divines, qu'il oppose non seulement aux « philosophes grecs et barbares » (Clément d'Alexandrie 1954, 73), mais aussi à la « croyance commune » des chrétiens. L'Alexandrin considère que la gnose implique la croyance, mais qu'elle la dépasse aussi. Dans le IIIe chapitre du livre VII des *Stromates*, il parle d'une contemplation parfaite, imprimée dans l'âme du gnostique par Jésus Lui-même.

Origène est à son tour une autre source importante pour les sens de la philosophie dans le christianisme. Comme le souligne H. Crouzel, pour ce qui est du sens de la philosophie chez Origène,

> Deux exégèses surtout sont fameuses. D'abord celle de la « belle captive » qui a eu toute une postérité médiévale (de Lubac 1959, 203-304): *Deuteronom* 21, 10-13 ordonne au guerrier qui veut épouser sa prisonnière de lui raser la tête et de lui couper les ongles, c'est-à-dire, explique Origène, avant d'utiliser ce qu'il a

pris aux philosophes, le chrétien doit en détacher ce qui est mort et inutile (*Homiliae in Leviticum* VI, 6). La seconde est celle des « dépouilles des Egyptiens », développée dans *la Lettre a Grégoire* (§§ 2-3). Origène a exhorté son élève à utiliser la philosophie et les disciplines encycliques comme auxiliaires de la science chrétienne et il s'explique ainsi: avant de quitter l'Egypte les Hébreux avaient pris à leurs voisins toute sorte d'objets pour construire le Tabernacle de Iahvé (*Ex.* 11, 2; 12, 35): ainsi le chrétien se servira de tout ce que la philosophie a d'utilisable pour bâtir la « divine philosophie » du Christianisme. (Crouzel 1985, 211)

A côté des écrits d'Origène, une autre source importante pour Maxime, sur le sens de la philosophie, c'est Grégoire de Nazianze. Pour ce Père de l'Église, la philosophie peut avoir, même à l'intérieur du même ouvrage, des sens différents. Grégoire affirme que : « tout le monde n'a pas la capacité de philosopher sur Dieu, et, un peu plus loin, il dit : "Philosophe-moi au sujet du monde, ou des mondes, de la matière, de l'âme, des natures raisonnées meilleures ou pires, de la ressuscitation des morts, du jugement dernier, des récompenses et des punitions d'alors, des passions du Christ" » (*Oratio* 20, 12). En réalité, si l'on lit ces affirmations dans leur contexte, on observe qu'elles ne sont pas contradictoires, mais complémentaires. Comme nous l'avons dit ci-dessus, Grégoire de Nazianze s'arroge le titre de *theologos*. Un exégète attentif comme Tomáš Špidlík considère que, « tandis que *la philosophie* est un mode de vie, *la théologie* est plutôt une fonction [...] pour Grégoire, la théologie est synonyme de prédication, explication des vérités divines (Špidlík 1971, 137). C'est dans ce sens que Grégoire attribue à lui-même le titre de *theologos*. Dans les écrits de Grégoire, ainsi que dans les textes d'autres Pères, « les termes de théorie, philosophie et théologie sont très proches et on peut les considérer comme identiques » (Špidlík 197, 135), et l'expression « la philosophie comme juste manière de vivre » apparaît dans les ouvrages de Grégoire de Nazianze, *Oratio* 22 (*PG* 35, 1237 A).

L'œuvre qui nous est parvenu sous le nom de Denys l'Aréopagite, qui a influencé en quelque mesure Maxime aussi, nomme « philosophie » aussi bien la vie monastique que la vertu de Job [...]. La « philosophie » dont Denys parle est la « philosophie selon nous » (καθ' ἡμᾶς φιλοσοφίας – *Corpus Dionysiacum* I, 1990, 125; Schmidinger 1989, 886-898; Carabă 2013, 19), c'est-à-dire la philosophie des chrétiennes [...]. Les « vrais philosophes » (αὐτοῦ φιλοσοφία – *Corpus Dionysiacum* II, 1991, 166) sont ceux qui reconnaissent que Dieu peut être connu à travers ses œuvres (*Rm.* 1, 20). Les deux hommes par rapport auxquels Denys définit la philosophie chrétienne sont Hiérothée et Apollophane, « le sophiste » (de Andia 2006, 55). Qui plus est, au premier paragraphe de la *Lettre IX* (Ep. 9, 197, 11-12), Denys parle de la double modalité de la tradition des théologiens, symbolique et télestique (σιμβολικὴν καὶ τελεστικήν) d'une parte, philosophique et démonstratif d'autre part (φιλόσοφον καὶ ἀποδεικτικήν). Selon l'avis de Pantéléimon

Kalaitzidis, « il est facile de constater, suivant la perspective dionysienne, que l'origine, la provenance même de deux traditions, symbolique et philosophique, se trouve dans les Λόγια, dans ce que Dieu a manifesté et révélé sur Lui-même » (Kalaitzidis 1997, 460). Dans ce contexte, Denys affirme que « l'essentiel de notre hiérarchie humaine est constitué par Λόγια (les Écritures) reçues de Dieu » (*Corpus Dionysiacum* II 1991, 67).

En héritier de la tradition que représentent les auteurs mentionnés ci-dessus, Maxime le Confesseur préfère à son tour d'utiliser parfois pour sa doctrine le terme de φιλοσοφία (*Capita de Charitate* IV, 47; *Capita theologica et oeconomica* I, 36; II, 96). Le savant russe, S.L. Epifanovitch considérait que « dans les temps anciens le terme de φιλοσοφία avait un sens bien plus large qu'à présent, et il dénommait, en général, tout acte de l'esprit; par philosophie on désignait, en particulier, la vie monastique (Eusèbe de Césarée, *Histoire ecclésiastique*, II, 17, 5; Denys l'Aréopagite, *Eccl. Hier.* VI, III, 2; dans PG 3, 533 D) » (Epifanovitch 2009, 71). En second lieu, on ne retrouve pas dans les textes de Maxime une distinction entre philosophie et théologie, seulement entre « notre philosophie », « la philosophie des moines », « la philosophie des chrétiens » (*Mystagogia*, V) et « la philosophie de ceux d'en dehors ». Dans *Quaestiones et dubia* (q. 100)*,* en lui étant demandé d'expliquer l'affirmation de Grégoire de Nazianze « je n'admets pas qu'une source soit bouchée ni un torrent m'emporter » (*Oratio* XVI), Maxime dit que:

> la source c'est l'enseignement évangélique, toujours bouillonnant de foi ; le torrent c'est la philosophie du dehors n'ayant d'obéissance qu'en paroles. Et autrement : la source c'est celui dont la vie concorde avec ses paroles ; le torrent la parole non agissante, feignant l'obéissance uniquement en paroles. Ou encore la source c'est celui qui transmet a ceux qui apprennent la tradition dans l'esprit de ce qui est à l'intérieur ; le torrent, celui qui enseigne la lettre. (Maxime 1999, 101)

L'accent de la « philosophie d'en dehors sur la raison seulement » n'est autre que la parole sans acte qui ne charme l'oreille que par son retentissement ». Séparée du reste des procès mentionnés ci-dessus, la raison humaine peut être considérée avec suspicion, car ce type de démarche, strictement rationnel, peut conduire dans une autre direction que le but final de l'homme : le salut. « La connaissance sans actes de ceux qui se remplissent à cause d'elle de l'amour de la gloire est une théologie des démons » (δαιμόνων θεολογία – *Ep.* 20). On peut observer ici l'étrange association entre théologie et démons. Il ne faut pas oublier que le diable est un théologien habile (dans un certain sens du terme). S'il arrive ce que Maxime dit, alors « la théologie devient une supra-structure idéologique » (Yannaras 2008, 8), dans le genre d'un « académisme théologique fondé sur la rupture entre la théologie et la vie de l'expérience de l'Église [...] La vérité théologique est séparée de la vie, elle perd son caractère dynamique de connaissance que lui

garantissait la participation à l'acte existentiel de l'Église » (Yannaras 2008, 50-51).

D'autre part, la théologie représente, selon l'interprétation maximienne, « les os de Jésus-Christ », qui tient tout ensemble (*Quaestiones ad Thalassium*, 35; Thunberg 2005, 387-388). Ayant comme point de départ la doctrine évagrienne, qu'il modifie radicalement, Maxime considère que le corps de Jésus consiste dans les raisons (λόγοι) des choses sensibles ; le sang du Sauveur représente les raisons (λόγοι) des choses intelligibles, et les os de Jésus-Christ sont les raisons (λόγοι) au-dessus de la compréhension de la Divinité (Thunberg 2005, 387-388). En réalité, Maxime est beaucoup plus explicite à propos de ce qu'il comprend par théologie lorsqu'il affirme que « le Verbe de Dieu incarné nous enseigne la *théologie*, des lors qu'il nous montre en lui-même le Père es l'Esprit Saint » (θεολογίαν μὲν γὰρ διδάσκει σαρκούμενος ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγος, ὡς ἐν ἑαυτῷ δεικνὺς τὸν Πατέρα καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον – Maxime 2004, 550). En plus, les Évangiles témoignent le fait que le Logos s'interprète lui-même, comme il résulte de l'épisode du chemin vers Emmaüs (*Lc.* 24, 13-25; *Mc.* 16, 12-13). L'effort humain, qu'il fût de nature théologique même, de traduction du Verbe est, au mieux, un acte synergique (συνεργεία), de travail commun de Dieu et de l'homme, aucunement un acte qui soit totalement au pouvoir de l'homme. La Sainte Écriture nous dit de manière explicite que : « Personne n'a jamais vu Dieu; le Fils unique, qui est dans le sein du Père, est celui qui l'a fait connaître (ἐξηγήσατο) » (*Jean* 1, 18). Si l'on embrasse cette clé christologique de lecture de l'Écriture, on peut dire que « jusqu'à ce que Christ soit formé (μορφωθῇ) en vous » (*Gal.* 4, 19), on n'accédera pas au vrai sens de l'Écriture, mais seulement à des *ombres* de celui-ci. L'idée que Jésus est l'interprète des Écritures pourrait être prise par Maxime d'Origène (*Commentarii in Evangelium Ioannis* I, 33-36), qui dit

> qu'avant la venue du Christ la loi et les prophètes ne contenaient pas l'annonce qu'implique la définition du mot « évangile », puisque celui qui devait éclairer les mystères qu'ils renferment n'était pas encore venu. Parce qu'il est venu et parce qu'il a réalisé l'incarnation de l'Evangile, le Sauveur a, par l'Evangile, fait de tout comme un évangile […] avant l'évangile qui a pris naissance par la venue de Jésus-Christ, aucun des écrits des anciens n'était un évangile. Mais l'Évangile, qui est une alliance nouvelle, nous ayant dégagés de la vétusté de la lettre, a fait luire dans la lumière de la connaissance la nouveauté jamais vieillie de l'Esprit, nouveauté propre à l'alliance nouvelle et qui était déposée dans toutes les Écritures. (Origène 1966, 77-79)

L'ontologie du texte sacré devient plus prononcée dans les textes maximiens, où l'on affirme que « pour notre intelligence épaisse, de s'incarner pour nous et d'être exprime par des lettres, syllabes et mots » (Maxime 1994, 280). En plus, en s'inspirant, au plus probable, des textes d'Origène

(*Commentarium in Joannem*, 13, 42; Origène 1975, 179-185), Maxime parle d'une *triple incarnation* du Logos divin: dans les raisons (λόγοι) de la création, dans les paroles (λόγοι) des Écritures et dans la nature humaine par Jésus Christ (de Lubac 1950, 336-346). Maxime soutient que

> tant que nous voyons dans le texte de l'Écriture sainte, de diverses manières, par les énigmes (τῶν αἰνιγμάτων), le Verbe de Dieu incarné, nous ne contemplons pas encore en esprit le Père incorporel, simple, unique et seul, tel qu'il est dans le Fils incorporel, simple, unique et seul, comme le dit l'Évangile: « Celui qui m'a vu a vu le Père » (*Jean* 14, 9), et: « Je suis dans le Père et le Père est en moi » (*Jean* 14, 10). Il faut donc beaucoup de science pour, échappant tout d'abord aux voiles qui entourent la trame des mots, contempler par l'*intelligence* nue le Verbe pur, tel qu'en lui-même, montrant en lui le Père aussi clairement qu'il est possible aux hommes de le comprendre. C'est pourquoi il est nécessaire que celui qui cherche Dieu pieusement ne soit dominé par aucun mot, afin de ne pas, à son insu, prendre pour Dieu les choses qui l'entourent, c'est-à-dire en affectionnant dangereusement les mots de l'Écriture à la place du Verbe. (Maxime 2004, 452)

Dans les textes maximiens, aussi bien que dans ceux dionysiens, on peut affirmer, sans se tromper, que la théologie n'est pas « une connaissance suréminente », comme l'affirment certains interprètes, en revêtant d'une nuance scholastique la doctrine maximienne, mais elle est une manière de vivre. Celui qui a daigné d'arriver à cet état, de théologiser au sujet de Dieu, ne formule pas des jugements de valeur à propos de Dieu, mais il vit effectivement dans cet état, le plus souvent inexprimable de manière discursive. Raison pour laquelle, pour Denys tout comme pour Maxime, *la théologie n'est rien d'autre qu'une doxologie*: « Que tout ce qui respire loue l'Éternel! » (*Ps.* 150, 6); ou, pour autrement dire: « si tu es théologien [si tu t'occupes avec la contemplation de Dieu], tu prieras vraiment; et si tu pries vraiment, tu es théologien » (Évagre le Pontique).

En guise de conclusion aux affirmations antérieures, tant pour Denys que pour Maxime, *la prière* s'avère être l'autre nom de la *théologie*, comprise en tant que *doxologie*. Pour les Pères de l'Église, prier signifie s'abandonner aux mains de Dieu, se souvenir de Lui, L'évoquer et invoquer Son nom, se faire un avec Lui. La prière et la théologie se joignent par un lien indissoluble. Il n'y a pas de théologie sans prière et en dehors de la prière, l'acte même de la prière se présente et s'offre comme acte théologique, et la théologie s'avère être, pour reprendre la belle expression de Nikos Nissiotis, « une pensée priante » (Nissiotis 1960, 294).

La théologie maximienne a un profond caractère *anagogique*, dimension inséparable de la divinisation (θέωσις). Pour les chrétiens orientaux il ne peut pas s'agir d'une théologie scientifique, mais d'une participation personnelle de nous tous, chacun d'après son pouvoir, à la grâce divine. Comme on le voit de ses écrits et surtout des histoires sur sa vie, Maxime n'a pas fait de la

théologie pour l'amour de la théologie. Pour Maxime, la théologie ne signifie pas un débat autour des questions « théologiques », mais une manière de vivre pour Jésus-Christ.

Sans doute, *de plus en plus accablée de textes issus, souvent, de* « l'extrême plaisir d'écrire » (Jean-Luc Marion)*, la théologie s'est atrophiée. La théologie comme science*, comme discipline académique, a peu à peu remplacé la *théologie comme manière de vivre*, où la rencontre avec l'autre, avec une personne, provoque une *joie* immense. Pour les Pères grecs de l'Église, le *théo*logien (Marion 1989, 17-25) ne mérite ce nom que « s'il imite le théologien qui est au-dessus de lui, à savoir notre Sauveur » et qu'il réussisse à transgresser le texte pour arriver à la Parole Suprême (Grégoire de Nazianze, *Oratio* XXXI, 8). Par conséquent, *le vrai théologien c'est Jésus Christ. La théologie a un caractère anagogique, inséparable de la divinisation* (θέωσις – *Centuries sur la charité* I, 12; *Quaestiones et dubia* 29; 46).

J'ai essayé de tracer ci-dessus seulement quelques repères sur la manière de comprendre le rapport institué entre la philosophie et la théologie dans l'espace du christianisme oriental. La distinction entre « notre philosophie » et « la philosophie de ceux d'en dehors » joue un rôle fondamental dans la compréhension de la manière des auteurs de l'âge patristique de se rapporter à la philosophie classique et la construction d'une « nouvelle philosophie », « la philosophie d'après Jésus-Christ », qui ne peut être que selon le modèle du Sauveur, un mode de vie, et l'existence philosophique n'est pour les Pères que la vie chrétienne. Modèle pour tout chrétien, Jésus Christ ne s'est pas Incarné pour ainsi vérifier les idées des philosophes. Il est le Médiateur entre Dieu et les hommes (1 *Tm.* 2, 5). Cette doctrine se réfère évidemment au problème fondamental du salut qui, dans son essence, n'est pas une question spéculative, mais pratique par excellence, un mode de vie. On *vit* d'abord, puis on *philosophe* (*primum vivere, deinde philosophari*). Donc, « la philosophie byzantine, dans la mesure dans laquelle elle se prétend être une philosophie chrétienne (χριστιανικὴ φιλοσοφία) ou elle valorise la révélation plus que la raison, n'est pas de la philosophie » (Carabă 2013, 17).

References

de Andia, Ysabel. 2006. *Denys l'Aréopagite. Tradition et métamorphoses*, préface par Maurice de Gandillac. Paris: J. Vrin.

Carabă, Vasile Adrian. 2013. "Se poate vorbi astăzi despre o filosofie bizantină? Interpretări noi la o temă veche". *Studii Teologice* 4: 15-27.

Clément d'Alexandrie. 1954. *Stromate* II. Traduction par C. Mondésert. Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf (*SC* 38).

Corpus Dionysiacum / Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita. 1990. *De divinis nominibus*, vol. I. Ed. Beate Regina Suchla. Berlin/New York: W. de Gruyter.

Corpus Dionysiacum / Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita. 1991. *De coelesti hierarchia; De ecclesiastica hierarchia; De mystica theologia; Epistulae*. Vol. II. Ed. Günter Heil. Berlin/New York: W. de Gruyter.

Crouzel, Henri. 1985. *Origène*. "Culture et Vérité" (coll. *Le Sycomore. Chrétiens d'aujourd'hui*, 15). Paris: Lethielleux-Namur.

Doucet, Marcel. 1985. "La volonté humaine du Christ, spécialement en son agonie. Maxime la Confesseur, interprète de l'Écriture". *Science et Esprit* 37(2): 123-159.

Epifanovitch, Serghei Leontievici. 2009. *Sfântul Maxim Mărturisitorul şi teologia bizantină*. Traduction du russe et préface par Marcel Coja. Bucureşti: Evanghelismos.

Kalaitzidis, Pantéléimon. 1997. "Theologia. Discours sur Dieu et science théologique chez Denys l'Aréopagite et Thomas d'Aquin". In *Denys l'Aréopagite et sa postérité en Orient et en Occident. Actes du colloque international*, edited by Ysabel de Andia, 457-487. Paris: Institut d'Études Augustiniennes.

de Lubac, Henri. 1950. *Histoire et Esprit. L'intelligence de l'Écriture d'après Origène*. Paris: Aubier.

de Lubac, Henri. 1959. *Exégèse médiévale* I/1. Paris: Aubier.

Marion, Jean-Luc. 1989. "Théo-logique". In *Encyclopédie philosophique universelle. I. L'Univers philosophique*, edited by A. Jacob and J. F. Mattei, 17-25. Paris: PUF.

Mondzain, Marie-José. 1996. *Image, icône, économie. Les sources byzantines de l'imaginaire contemporain*. Paris: Seuil.

Nissiotis, Nikos. 1960. "La théologie en tant que science et en tant que doxologie". *Irénikon* 33: 291-310.

Origène. 1966. *Commentaire sur saint Jean*, tome I. Ed. et trad. Cécile Blanc. Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf.

Origène. 1975. *Commentaire sur saint Jean*, tome III. Ed. et trad. Cécile Blanc. Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf.

Saint Maxime le Confesseur. 1994. *Ambigua*. Traduction par Em. Ponsoye. Paris–Suresnes: Les Éditions de l'Ancre.

Saint Maxime le Confesseur. 1999. *Questions et difficultés* (*Quaestiones et dubia*). Traduction par Emmanuel Ponsoye. Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf.

Saint Maxime le Confesseur. 2004. "Capita theologica et oeconomica". In *Philocalie des Pères neptiques*, Tome A, Volume 3: *de Maxime le Confesseur à Théophane le Climaque*. Traduction par Jacques Touraille. Bégrolles-en-Mauges: Abbaye de Bellefontaine.

Saint Maxime le Confesseur. 2004. "Orationes Dominicae brevis expositio". In *Philocalie des Pères neptiques*, Tome A, Volume 3: *de Maxime le Confesseur à Théophane le Climaque*. Traduction par Jacques Touraille. Bégrolles-en-Mauges: Abbaye de Bellefontaine.

Schmidinger, Heinrich. 1989. "Philosophie, christliche". In *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, Band 7, edited by J. Ritter, K. Gründer, 886-898. Basel-Stuttgart: Schwabe.

Špidlík, Tomáš. 1971. *Grégoire de Nazianze: Introduction à l'étude de sa doctrine spirituelle*. Rome: Pontifical Institute of Oriental Studies.

Thunberg, Lars. 2005. *Antropologia teologică a Sfântului Maxim Mărturisitorul. Microcosmos şi Mediator*. Traduit de l'anglais par Anca Popescu. Bucureşti: Sofia.

Yannaras, Christos. 2008. *Adevărul şi unitatea Bisericii*. Traduit du français par D. Cojocariu. Iaşi: Trinitas.

Bogdan Alexandru DUCA [*]

Between Political Science, Theology, and Sociology: Political Theology and Its Evolution

Abstract: After having been relaunched by Carl Schmitt in modern times, political theology became a "fashionable" discipline among the academic mediums of the second half of the 20th century, given that it is, at the same time, an exotic subject and an epistemic field for ideological currents to thrive in. But by leaving its turbulent adolescence characterized by close relationships with ideology and by losing its exotic charm, political theology becomes a mature and (quite likely) durable discipline. The purpose of this presentation is to follow essential data on the birth and avatars of a new discipline, forced to function interdisciplinarily. Interdisciplinarity offers not just an objective openness towards the truth and preciseness, but it can also bring forth ideological temptation, which can be noticed in modernity. The story of the birth and adolescence of a new discipline can be relevant to explaining this openness, as well as its ideological temptations.

Keywords: theology, political, political theology, interdisciplinarity.

1. Introduction

The 20th century was the century of theological and political reflection, and the 21st century begins with a major event, the 2001 September 11 terror attacks, which can't be interpreted otherwise but by using a theological and political key.

Nevertheless, when one asks oneself, "What is political theology?", the answers and implicit definitions vary from one author to another.

Is or does political theology deserve to be considered a discipline pertaining to social sciences? Is it or does it deserve to be considered a theological discipline? Is it a frontier field? Does it meet epistemic requirements so that it can be considered a science? Is political theology a domain that's limited only to the cultural frontiers of Christianity? These questions are for now left unanswered clearly. But what is acknowledged in different fields, from social science specialists to theology specialists, is the fact that political theology is a scene of reflection that is becoming more and more necessary.

[*] Issachar Center for Religious Freedom, București, Romania; email: albogdanduca@gmail.com

2. The evolutions of a concept

Political theology was discussed even in classical, unchristian antiquity. Varro defined political theology as everything that pertains to the necessary worship of the protective gods of the polis and the state (Scattola 2007, 13).

Besides, ancient Rome had institutionalized the practice of divinization, and it had also given a religious cult to an emperor; as such, the imperial cult had become a religious criterion "sine qua non" for showing one's political and patriotic attachment to Caesar and to the nation: The Roman Empire.

Christian reality is added to the Roman and imperial one. A small sect originating from a marginal province of the Roman Empire rapidly conquers (compared to the whole scale of history) the entire Empire, converting it in less than 400 years. Naturally, both contemporary theologists and historians ask themselves to which measure Christianism conquered the Empire, or the Empire conquered the Christians.

Christianism didn't initially have a clear vision regarding its relationship with the state. As an eschatological religion, it had a kind of disinterest in finding a recipe for theological and political survival. A simple reading of the New Testament offers us various collaboration models between the young Christian Church and the state and society, from the widely known evangelical principle "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's; and to God the things that are God's" to the famous 13th chapter of Paul's Epistle to the Romans, in which the authority of divine origin is emphasized, including that of pagan leadership, and to the eschatological reflections on the Antichrist and regarding the growing tension between the Christians and secular power, which trace John the Apostle's alleged texts like a red thread[1].

The times of the Roman persecutions force Christianism to resort to various working hypotheses in its relationship with the imperial power. One of the authors of those times, Bishop Meliton de Sardes (Benga 2004, 41-51), is an example of theological and political reaction, but interpreting his apologetic effort as what modernity will understand through political theology is difficult.

The times of Christianism being turned into an imperial religion (also known as "Constantinian") will underline the necessity of an absolute harmony between the Empire and the Church, which should ideally reach its organic dimension. In actuality, the two social realities – an ecclesiastical one (the Church) and a political one (the Empire) – found themselves in and competed for Catholic and universal aspiration. Christianism used the image of the Kingdom of Heaven even from the times of the New Testament, and although that image is not a part of this world (yet), it is the model that all Christians should ambitiously seek.

The two concepts around which the medieval perspective of the relationship between the Church and the political power are organized are caesaropapism and papocaesarism. Caesaropapism (better known as the principle of symphony) involves the supremacy of the secular power in matters of the Church, and it is based on the model created by Constantine the Great in his alleged opening speech of the First Council of Nicaea in 325 AD, as it was recounted by Eusebius of Caesarea: "You are indeed bishops in all which is internal to the Church. But I have been appointed Bishop by God for all outside the Church." (Eslin 2001, 101-102).

Papocaesarism (theocracy), affirmed the pre-eminence of the religious power over the secular one, and it even involved the absolute power of the Church and its pontifical sovereign, the Pope, over secular matters. The tension created by papocaesarism between the Pope's Rome and the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation will lead to the birth of what Pierre Manent called the "theologico-political vector" (Manent 2003), which eventually created modern politics. The winner of the conflict between the Empire and the Church was unexpected: the emerging political world of state cities in the Italian peninsula, with their economy dynamics, compensated for the political and military fragility. They rediscovered and then reinvented the use of the modern world, democracy, and the republic.

Another winner consisted of the national states as they were born because the Empire's and the Church's universalist ideals became fragile. That's why the modern world, the age when the nations were born, wasn't the most favorable one for Christianism, in terms of its relationship to secular power.

3. Political theology as a project of the modern age

In the 17th century, a mutation that is essential to what we now call the European civilization occurred, after Seewald's famous book, "inventing autonomy" – the philosophy and sciences focused on the human being became autonomous to the theological reflection controlled by the Church.

As for political literature, this moment is marked by two editorial releases: *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* by Baruch Spinoza and *Leviathan* by Thomas Hobbes. Although both books are essentially theological, their novelty compared to the universe of the theological works of the times forced the ulterior exegesis to catalog them as being works of political philosophy, avoiding the term (assumed by Spinoza even in the title) of "political theology". But now, we can certainly consider them mandatory titles of any political theology bibliography.

The 18th and 19th centuries witnessed the predominance of religion critique and were a period where confidence in the progress of science and humanity (both were looked at as a whole) shadowed, or even tried to

annihilate religious hope. During the 19th century, theology itself is affected by the triumph of liberalism, demythologization, and alienation to the traditional religious conventions.

Otherwise said, political theology had nothing to do in this scenery. Any theologico-religious plan had no purpose and place in this speech other than by serving as a negative or ironic example, such as Karl Marx's famous book "The Holy Family", entirely written in an ecclesiastical style, so as to underline the failure of the "Young Hegelians" critiqued by Marx by association with the alleged failure of Christianism.

In its modern form, the type of political theology that we now know is born along with the failure of progressive optimism. World War I is the beginning of the end for all the illusions according to which humanity would have "Science" (in its singular form) as the engine of ensuring a bright future for itself. From the trenches and field hospitals of this world conflict, theology experiences a radical change, which puts a stop to progressive illusions. Karl Barth or Paul Tillich are the exponents of a new theology, freed from liberal illusions, but which refuses, at the same time, to return to a type of scholastic theology, strongly impregnated by metaphysics, as had been the case of medieval Christian theology.

However, the term "political theology" makes its entrance along with the release of a small book about sovereignty by a German philosopher, specializing in constitutional law – Carl Schmitt. Even though it's secular, with a specialization that's foreign to theology and it lacks the rigors of ecclesiastical subordination, Schmitt's approach is a form of affirmation of the autonomy of political theology to the Church. Thanks to Schmitt, political theology is an autonomous epistemic measure to the ecclesiastical magisterium.

In its 1922 book, *Political Theology*, Schmitt proposes a reading of modern politics and its fundamental concepts, after which he concludes that modern politics is nothing but secularized theology (Schmitt 1996, 56). Besides, the whole modern reality seems to pay tribute to a paradigm of theological thinking[2].

The book leads to historian and former protestant (converted to Catholicism) theologian Eric Peterson's critical reaction and he denies the possibility and conditions of existence for political theology. Peterson's reaction comes from a conservative position, loyal to the post-Tridentine Catholic Church's specific vision on the relationship between the state and society.

But the Catholic Church itself went through a time of major changes (which led to the Second Vatican Council), and they involved a social and political reevaluation of the relationship with the state and society.

The initiator of this change was Pope Leo XIII, who, along with the encyclical *Rerum Novarum* of 1891, opens the perspectives of a new social Catholic doctrine, aware and open to having a dialogue with the modern

world. The initiative was continued by the succeeding Popes, to the point where the Catholic Church now has an articulated social doctrine. Based on the Catholic model, all Christian Churches have initiatives and articulation efforts not just of one social way of thinking, but of social doctrine, as well.

4. Political theology after Auschwitz

However, after Schmitt's approach, theologico-political reflection doesn't return to resuming the magisterial documents regarding the social doctrine. Furthermore, it will not wait for the official confirmations or condemnations of the Church to adopt one position or another.

Like many disciplines that emerged in the 20th century (such as psychology, sociology, anthropology, cultural studies, etc.), the engine of political theology will be fueled and significantly influenced by the competing ideologies of modern times.

World War II and its consequences (the discovery of the Holocaust, the extension of the communist influence) were the final blow given to progressive optimism in the first period of modernity. This led to a new type of relationship between Christianism and society.

The moment where a rupture between Divinity and modernity occurred in its cultural and intellectual expression can relatively easily be associated to the 1755 earthquake. Then, on All Saints' Day, at 9 am, when the faithful people of Lisbon were at mass, an earthquake, followed by a tsunami wave, destroyed the city and its neighboring fields, leaving behind over one hundred thousand deaths. The event, which coincided with the birth of the European press and at the same time, with better and faster information transmission, created a seismic wave among illuminist intellectuals. God, the only one at fault for this natural occurrence, is taken out of the equations of modern thinking. The man must learn to be alone, since providence if it exists, isn't too efficient.

One hundred ninety years later, WWII, the Holocaust, and the atomic bomb completely destroy the individual's faith in humanity. Modernity fails and in its place, appears what we now call postmodernity. Postmodernity is defined as a failure of metanarratives, of the great ideological, but also religious stories. The defeat of ideologies doesn't cause a comeback of religious primacy, which we encountered in premodernity.

Political theology will experience a unique development during this time span. Two different types of political theology can be discussed depending on their relation to modernity. One part of political theology theoreticians refuse modernity and are integrated into postmodernity, creating a socio-political response of a Christian nuance within the postmodern frames. A good example in this sense is English theologist John Milbank, from assumed Christian positions, or philosopher Simon Critchley.

Additionally, this type of political theology experiences various evolutions in a fertile and consistent dialogue with various typical postmodern ideological forms. Political theologies generate diverse forms of theological discourse, as well as theologies preoccupied with gender politics, multiculturalism, ecology, etc.

Another part of theoreticians seems to ally – from a conservative instinct – with modernity while being confronted with the challenges of postmodernity. The authors of modernity that are most referred to are, of course, Hegel and Marx. Both Hegel and Marx are ideal philosophical references of political theology, on account of their historicism tributary to Christian eschatology (Borghesi 2018, 241).

Gaston Fessard, a Catholic theologian deeply influenced by the Hegelian thinking, Johann Baptist Metz, and Jurgen Moltmann, are just several referential names of this current. Moltmann develops a theology with a strong dialectic impression of Hegelian origin. It is precisely the Hegelian dialectics that determines Moltmann to transfer the nucleus of his political theology from Christology to triadology, the latter being understood dialectically (Bergmann 2010, 332).

5. Marx's fascination

Karl Marx despised Christianism. Despite the general opinion, Marx never had a particular interest in the religious issue. Being most likely tributary to the specific vision of that phase of modernity, Marx didn't see in religion anything other than an achieved phenomenon, that the progress of science and humanity will leave behind. As previously discussed, religion's style was useful for ironizing rather than for argumentation.

However, Christians took Marx seriously. First, they condemned him, and then they began to reevaluate him. Marx's reevaluation (Duca 2015, 143) is specific to the period after WWII, when Marxism, which had failed politically in Eastern Europe and Asia, became referenced to in a cultural manner in the West. His conclusions, the concepts of his thinking, his categories of society's way of thinking, are not just familiar to us, but personal to the contemporary understanding of reality.

That's why it is no wonder that Marx was more and more thought of, in Christian theological mediums, as being Aristotle's equivalent in medieval theology: the referential philosopher to which the new theology critically related to.

But Marx offers something else – a type of Oriental thinking involving the categories that are fragile from an economical and social standpoint, and a political solution for social justice, which coincides with the evangelical aspirations. In the Western world, this connection was developed along with the clergy becoming aware of the lack of a pastoral strategy to the

proletariat tempted by Communist ideas. The appearance of working priests in France was a result of change, on the one hand, but on the other, it was also an anti-Communist pastoral experiment that put the Catholic clergy in direct contact with the Marxist social vision.

In third world countries, the Marxist solution was gradually identified with the Christian solution, thereby generating a liberation theology, one that has a strong social praxis, attached to the idea of revolution. Although it was initially condemned and then reevaluated[3] by the Catholic Church, liberation theology became a real chapter of the South-American history of Catholicism, influencing first the Catholic Church in Latin America, and then the entire Catholic Church. The latter eventually assumed a preferential option for the poor in its own social doctrine.

6. Does unchristian political theology exist?

There is a tendency to talk about political theology as being something exclusively Christian. This tendency can, of course, be explained by a somewhat self-sufficiency of Judeo-Christian culture. On the other hand, political theology couldn't have developed in a frame other than that represented by the synthesis of Judeo-Christian culture and the Greco-Roman civilization.

The theologico-political reflection is bound to a double dimension – the eschatological dimension of Judeo-Christianism and the historicist dimension of liberal democracy. Through its eschatological dimension, Judeo-Christianism has an instilled historical dimension. To believe in the God of the Bible is to believe in a God of Abraham, of his son, Isaac, and his nephew, Jacob, and in a God of a people. Through Jacob, He becomes the God of a nation – Israel –, and through Jesus Christ, He becomes a universal God. Naturally, we can't ignore the other religions that are established by Judeo-Christian continuity – Islam, and more recently, Mormonism.

The Bible contains a succession of agreements between God and people, agreements that evolve from family contracts to a social contract and then to a political regulation. These agreements have an eschatological finality – the setup of Kingdom of God.

Unlike classical Greek democracy, liberal democracy is a political project that doesn't resume to searching and applying the correct governing system. Liberal democracy also wants to conquer history and the future. Modernity brought forth a series of metanarratives that play in the field of democracy, thereby influencing it – ideologies, with their aspiration of offering a rational understanding of the past and present, on the basis of which the future can be built. These ideologies are inspired by what they have at their disposal – the Christian belief.

That is how we return to Carl Schmitt's thesis, mentioned at the beginning of this text: the fundamental concepts of politics are secularized theological concepts. As such, theology can be found in modernity, just like political philosophy was found in metaphysics in the Middle Ages.

Modern politics, born in the Western World as a result of faith being secularized, is practically universal. Democracy, as it was designed in Christian modernity, can be found across the world (with the exception of several states which assume a theocratic vision or that of an absolute monarchy). It seems that only the references to Judeo-Christianism and the Islam generate a theologico-political reflection and reaction.

Notes

[1] The Gospel of John (chapters 14-17), The First Epistle of John (2, 14-22), and The Book of Revelation (chapters 4-19), all underline the intense antagonism between the Christian community and the world, especially in terms of its social and political aspects.

[2] In a letter exchange with Jacob Taubes, Carl Schmitt used this witticism that humorously synthesizes his vision: "What is there today that is not 'theology' (apart from theological claptrap)?" (Taubes 2011, 134).

[3] In 1983, the then cardinal Joseph Ratzinger condemned, from his position of prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, any use of marxist categories in theological reflection and the social praxis of the Church. In 2007, as the Roman Pontiff, he pointed out the relevance of Marx's thinking for understanding social problems in encyclical Spe Salvi.

References

Agamben, Giorgio. 2009. *Il Regno e la Gloria. Per una genealogia teologica dell' economia e dell governo*. Torino: Universale Bollati Boringheri.

Barbu, Daniel. 2016. *Au cetăţenii suflet? O teologie politică a societăţilor post-seculare*. Bucureşti: Vremea.

Benga, Daniel, "Creştinism şi Imperiu. Teologia politică de la Meliton de Sardes la Augustin". In *Teologie şi politică. De la Sfinţii Părinţi la Europa Unită*, edited by Miruna Tătaru-Cazaban. Bucureşti: Anastasia.

Bergmann, Sigurd. 2010. "În Duhul, prin Fiul, către Tatăl... Patru aprecieri asupra spaţiului dinamismului treimic într-o creaţie care aşteaptă cu dor mântuirea". In *Dumnezeu Tatăl şi viaţa Preasfintei Treimi*, edited by Buchiu Ştefan, Şelaru Sorin. Bucureşti: Editura Trinitas.

Borghesi, Massimo. 2018. *Critica della teologia politica. Da Agostino a Peterson: la fine dell' era constantiniana*. Bologna: Marietti.

Duca, Bogdan-Alexandru. 2016. "Proprietatea în doctrina socială a Bisericii Catolice. Magisteriu şi praxis". *Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review*, 1.

Eslin, Jean Claude. 2001. *Dumnezeu şi puterea. Teologie şi politică în Occident*, trad by Tatiana Petrache and Irina Floare. Bucureşti: Anastasia.

Manent, Pierre. 2003, *O filosofie politică pentru cetăţean*, trad. by Mona Antohi. Bucureşti: Humanitas.

Metz, Johann Baptist. 1998. *Sul concetto della nuova teologia politica. 1967-1997*, trad. by Francesca Caracciolo Pieri. Brescia: Queriniana.

Millbank, John. 1993. *Theology and Social Theory. Beyond Secular Reason*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Pontificio Consiglio della Giustizia e della Pace. 2005. *Compendio della Dottrina Sociale della Chiesa*. Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana.

Scattola, Merio. 2007. *Teologia politică*. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Schmitt, Carl. 1996. *Teologia politică*, trad. by Lavinia Stan and Lucian Turcescu. Bucureşti: Universal Dalsi.

Stauffer, Ethelbert. 1956. *Le Christ et les Cesars*, trad. by G. Duchet-Suchaux. Paris: Editions Alsatia.

Taubes, Jacob. 2011. *Teologia politică a lui Pavel*, trad. by Maria Magdalena Anghelescu. Cluj-Napoca: Tact.

Camelia GRĂDINARU *

Digital Media – between Disciplinarity and Interdisciplinarity

Abstract: In the context of the proliferation of new media studies, seen in increasing number of courses, academic departments, journal or projects, this article analyses the status of this field. Is this an already crystallized domain, a well-established discipline, with all the benefits and limits of this label? Or, rather, it is an interdisciplinary field, with little reasons for disciplinizing? The paper deals with the tension between interdisciplinarity and discipline, explaining the "status" of digital media in the academic canon.

Keywords: new media, digital media, discipline, interdisciplinary, communication sciences.

1. Introduction

In the past half of the century, communication and media studies have expanded in an impressive manner: numerous sub-domains had emerged and different aspects of communication (visual communication, interpersonal communication, electronic communication) have developed in independent branches of research. The technological progress has accelerated even more this phenomenon and the need to explain the significant relationships among media, economy, politics or everyday life was obvious. The Internet had moved things foreward and faster: new university programs, curricula and research projects emerged and gained a lot of attention and support. Also, the way of living and the daily routines of the contemporary people were deeply affected by the means of digital communication, changing behaviours, styles of communication or identitary representations. Even if we see the present media in a long history of communication and technology, their implications seem revolutionary (Manovich 2001). Their complexity and their embedment in almost every aspect of our life require knowledge from other domains (computing, psychology, politics, arts) in order to satisfactorily grasp the field of communication today. It is notorious that research teams in this area are composed of specialists in multifarious disciplines, many subjects being caught across many disciplines. Thus, it

* PhD, Researcher, Institute for Interdisciplinary Research, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Department, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iasi, Iasi, Romania; email: camelia.gradinaru@uaic.ro

is not surprising that the theorists began to wonder in very pragmatic and also meta-discursive ways what the future for communication research would look like. In this vein, I will select some relevant ideas of this debate, especially those that refer to the tension between the interdisciplinary and disciplinary character of this domain.

2. A slight detour: interdisciplinarity at work

Being almost a buzzword of our contemporary academic discourses, the interdisciplinarity represents more than an umbrella term. Its potential is still open, and taking a squint at biosciences for instance could give us a hint about the power of interdisciplinary thinking. Integrating the separate or canonical knowledge, creating boundaries among disciplines and providing complex explanations for sophisticated problems are just a few advantages of interdisciplinary approach. Moreover, it requires collaborative teams, critical exchange of views and creativity. Producing an interdisciplinary culture has never been easy only if we think that the interdisciplinary researchers were educated in disciplinary methods and paradigms. The tensions between originality and tradition, cooperation and competition, sharing and secrecy, distinctiveness and belonging are just some examples of multiple issues that occur in producing a functional interdisciplinary structure (Derrick et al. 2011, 8). In the same time when the interdisciplinary research seemed to resolve many limitations of some traditional topics, many other problems such as legitimization or authority occurred.

In terms of vocabulary, a plethora of terms used in discourses shows some difficulties in properly defining the interdisciplinarity. The contrast with the notion of academic disciplines is often involved, but even their homogeneity has been questioned. A discipline is seen as a strong structure of knowledge, with serious tradition, characteristic language, methods and a community. Beside these, "its distinctiveness is recognised institutionally by the existence of distinct departments, chairs, courses and so on" (Squires 1992, 202).

Disciplines have their own lens in order to see and interpret the world. As Thomas Kuhn (1962) put it, they create paradigms of thought that constitute frameworks of thought, mental models that orientate research. Every discipline has its cognitive and methodological "maps" that assure the activity of a "normal science". Thus, the community of scientists has a clear toolbox to approach certain problems of their field. Even if a new paradigm could explain better the phenomena, the paradigm shift is always a dramatic change, people struggling in preserving their concepts, procedures and vocabularies. Also, the paradigms tend to be incommensurable, a trait that raises many epistemological, but also practical challenges for the researchers. The importance of the scientific communities that form around a

ground set of values, concepts and methods is overstated by Apostel (1972, 147), who considers that "a discipline does not exist. A science does not exist. There are persons and groups practising the same science or the same discipline".

In the same time, the revolutionary work that many times happens in the margins of disciplines, in hybrid zones, seems possible after a deep specialisation in the foundational core of a discipline. There is a dimension of power in the presentation of disciplines as knowledge keepers and guardians of truth. As Foucault discussed the concept of discipline in general, they can also be constraining and restrictive, sometimes barriers to free thinking: "the disciplines characterize, classify, specialize; they distribute along a scale, around a norm, hierarchize individuals in relation to one another and, if necessary, disqualify and invalidate" (Foucault 1991, 223). In the same vein, Parker (2002, 374) emphasizes that a discipline represents "a complex structure: to be engaged in a discipline is to shape, and be shaped by, the subject, to be part of a scholarly community, to engage with fellow students – to become 'disciplined'". Disciplines preserve knowledge and are defined by rigour, normativity and a sense of certainty. In the same time, they can lead to an "imperialistic" view, leaving unexplained "interstitial gaps" (Chettiparamb 2007, 9).

Thus, the concept of "discipline" was considered "artificial" and a new "postdisciplinary world" (Turner 2006) was declared. The democratisation of knowledge and the need of a more complex view were stated as necessary steps in widening the disciplinarity ways. E. Pharo and K. Bridle (2012) analyzed the possibility of interdisciplinarity behind the facade of disciplines, pointing out that the discipline-based structure represents a major "obstacle" to collaboration and interdisciplinary opportunities. Also, they provide a synthetic understanding of the key terms that predominantly appear in discussions. Thus, "informed disciplinarity" refers to the use of other information from other disciplines in order to illuminate a specific content, while "cross-disciplinarity" is when the aspects of a discipline are explained in terms of another discipline ("the physics of music" or "the politics of the literature"). The multidisciplinarity supposes the "coexistence of more than one discipline side by side in a way that adds knowledge together without integration" (Pharo and Bridle 2012, 67). It recognizes the validity of disciplines and the fact that many ideas occurred in various disciplines in relative the same period of time. The interdisciplinarity represents the next complex step, because it integrates two or more disciplines that "may range from simple communication of ideas to the mutual integration of organizing concepts and practices in a fairly large field" (Pharo and Bridle 2012, 67). In education sciences, following the works of Lattuca, the researchers differentiate between "synthetic interdisciplinarity" and "conceptual interdisciplinarity". In her literature review, Angelique Chettiparamb

(2007, 19-20) mentions Heckhausen's typology of interdisciplinarity, in order to indicate the complexity of the concept: "indiscriminate interdisciplinarity" (encyclopaedic knowledge), "pseudo-interdisciplinarity", "auxiliary interdisciplinarity", "composite interdisciplinarity", "supplementary interdisciplinarity" and "unifying interdisciplinarity".

The interdisciplinary perspectives can occur within disciplines also, as a profound characteristic that already exists in every discipline, because "the space of interdisciplinarity is not just *out* there – interdisciplinarity activity these days may be *in* the heart of disciplinary practice" (Klein 2000, 8). Thus, the interdisciplinarity is not seen as producing itself in the exteriority of blamed disciplines, in a new, aseptic frame, but it becomes to grow inside the disciplinary contexts. The problem remains the modalities in which we can measure the interdisciplinarity and its possible levels (Patraș 2017).

Nevertheless, transdisciplinarity seems to be the highest form of integration, dissolving the disciplinary boundaries and imposing a new way of thinking, and most of the time, creating a new research field. Basarab Nicolescu acknowledged the work done by Jean Piaget, who developed the concept of transdisciplinarity as the lack of "stable boundaries between the disciplines", but he observed the risk of transforming this notion into a "super- or hyperdiscipline, a kind of 'science of sciences'" (Nicolescu 2010, 20) wanted to surpass this issue in order to keep transdisciplinarity open, "beyond disciplines". Thus, transdisciplinarity "concerns that which is at once between the disciplines, across the different disciplines, and beyond all disciplines. Its goal is the understanding of the present world, of which one of the imperatives is the unity of knowledge" (Nicolescu 2010, 22). In sum, multidisciplinarity enriches a discipline by introducing different perspectives from other areas for a certain subject, while interdisciplinarity concerns mainly the transfer of methods at three levels: applicative, epistemological and in order to generate new disciplines, such as chaos theory or quantum cosmology.

3. Digital media's tensions

The interdisciplinary nature of new media[1] research is fundamental for understanding of this domain. From the beginning, new media have been situated at the crossroads among computing, communication and content. They depend on the binary language of computers and on the capabilities of the micro-processor, becoming "a mix between existing cultural conventions and the conventions of the software" (Manovich 2003, 18). This emerging field grew in amplitude by 1990, becoming a major focus of theory and research, one reason being exactly its multistratified constitution. A symptomatic point is represented by the inner difficulty of its definition, the

multifarious perspectives, domains and theories involved making its depiction a hard task. Thus, new media are

> information and communication technologies and their associated social contexts, incorporating: the artifacts or devices that enable and extend our abilities to communicate; the communication activities or practices we engage in to develop and use these devices; and the social arrangements or organizations that form around the devices and practices. (Lievrouw and Livingstone 2002, 7)

From this perspective we can easily observe the embedment of technology, artefacts, practices, devices, social configurations and organisations in the very essence of domain. Also, new media cannot be significantly grasped if we exclude the theories and frameworks that come from philosophy, economy, sciences, arts or popular culture. Beside media studies, these research areas are mandatory if we want "to begin to make sense of the cultural changes that new media are held to make" (Lister et al. 2009, 2). Thus, one challenge derives from the interdisciplinarity that imbues the specificity of new media:

> Our task is further complicated by complexities that almost always require approaches drawn from the methodologies and theoretical frameworks of many disciplines – a multidisciplinarity or interdisciplinarity that is itself constantly in flux. (Ess and Consalvo 2011, 2)

New media are highly interdisciplinary and that evidence asks for a new culture among media researchers, a culture that promotes critical reflexivity and epistemological pluralism.

4. The state of the matter: discipline or interdisciplinary field?

The interdisciplinary core of new media studies advances the issue of institutionalisation or education policy. Also, the entire field of communication studies deals with the tension between their inner interdisciplinary characteristics and the bias toward disciplinarisation. Actually, in searching for legitimacy, a new interdisciplinary field may become a discipline, "with its own perpetuating bureaucratic machinery" Chettiparamb (2007, 16) or not? Many theories about interdisciplinarity promoted the dissolution of disciplines, rejecting their imperialistic claim of holding the universal truth and their subsequent ideas of canon, objectivity and jargon. In the same time, the need for budget, education programmes, staff, scholarly societies, university faculties, journals, and all other benefits that come with institutionalisation are an important trigger for transforming a field into a specific discipline. The debate around the status of communication and media studies started at least since the 1980s, and the special issue of the *Journal of*

Communication in 1983 represents a nodal point in this inquiry. Whether or not we can talk about a discipline was the key interrogation but, as Robert T. Craig observed, no emerging consensus could arrive from this volume:

> Many writers referred casually to "the discipline" as if there were no longer any question of disciplinary status or identity. Many others claimed, some quite emphatically, that the field of communication was *not* a discipline, but they differed greatly in their attitudes toward this fact and their prescriptions for what, if anything, to do about it. Some were optimistic that the field was emerging toward disciplinary status; others seemed equally certain that no such thing was happening. Some saw the continuing fragmentation of the field as a problem; others celebrated fragmentation as an invaluable source of adaptive strength. Some called urgently for efforts to define the intellectual focus of the discipline; others just as urgently insisted that any such effort to define a theoretical core would be not only useless but counter-productive. (Craig 2008, 686)

This overview reflects quite accurate the state of affairs for the majority of domains and sub-domains of communication sciences. John Durham Peters affirmed the failure of definition for this field since 1986 and also criticized the institutionalization of communication, while other authors sustained the imperative of disciplinary framework. The process of digitization created a form of convergence that seemed to unite different media into the umbrella of digital media but this apparent movement does not resolve the ambiguity of its shared scientific status. The diversity of the communication field and its rapid expansion may also raise many unresolved issues. For Nordenstreng, "such proliferation is not only normal but problematic", because the field can lose its scholarly roots and become "more and more dependent on the empirical and practical dimensions of reality. This means that applied research is increasingly being used to service existing institutions in the field, and we are back in the old division between administrative and critical research" (2012, 1). For Nordenstreng, the popularity of the field is not a reason for celebration, but a symptom for a possible poor development that "runs the risk of becoming professionally self-centered and scientifically shallow" (2012, 3). Thus, the specialisation can represent a solution that can undo "media hubris" (Nordenstreng 2012, 3), alongside the understanding of communication in relation to the system of sciences. Also, the study of history of communication in universities may represent a modality of continuous examination of the very nature of the area, together with the social turn of technologies (Gradinaru 2016).

For Craig, the indisciplinarity of communication science is inseparable from its essence:

> No matter how intellectually or institutionally well established the discipline of communication may become, many areas of the field will continue to be highly

interdisciplinary. Contextually focused areas like health communication and political communication inherently straddle disciplinary boundaries. Study of the media as social institutions is unavoidably a multidisciplinary endeavor involving psychology, sociology, economics, legal and policy studies, technology studies, etc. The question is not whether communication will continue to be an interdisciplinary field, as it certainly will do. The open question is whether communication may also have a theoretical core that enables communication scholars to approach interdisciplinary topics from a distinct disciplinary viewpoint that adds real value to the interdisciplinary enterprise. (Craig 2008, 687, author's emphasis)

In this vein, the interdisciplinary status of this field is not questionable; rather, the disciplinary perspective is that which can be problematic, mostly because it supposes a coherent or even unitary dimension.

With regard to digital media, Jonathan Sterne (2005) discussed if the movement toward disciplinarity should really be a desirable one, in the context done by its statement: "regardless of whether one thinks digital media studies is or should be a discipline, there is no question that digital media are a concern across the disciplines" (Sterne 2005, 250). In spite of many theories, disciplines are not, in fact, so fundamentally different from interdisciplinary fields (except the institutional consecration) and, conversely, many disciplines have developed out of interdisciplinary areas. Nevertheless, becoming a discipline is many times a strategy hard to complete and many new domains emerged in the last century have not been established as disciplines. Also, it is a fact that we are living a research and academic frame that recognizes or even encourages interdisciplinary work, teams or projects.

From an intellectual point of view, Sterne rejects the disciplinary movement: "if we consider digital media studies as an intellectual enterprise, then I believe it entirely fair to say that the field is *not* moving toward disciplinarity" (Sterne 2005, 251, author's emphasis). The relations of digital media with humanities and social sciences are not very well established, in order to delineate a right "place" in this network. Another important problem is the canon of this domain that constitutes a pillar of a discipline. While a canon is formed in a very long time, digital media do not have such a long history but the speed of changes activate the rapid configuration of research traditions. Many texts have already been canonized and several journal, for instance, are milestones for this area. Also, many researchers are acknowledged as creating the main reference for the new media literature.

In terms of methodology, Sterne criticised the use of traditional methods and theories (some of them belonging to other fields) to new media objects. In the meantime, specific methods have been developed even if we cannot talk about a genuine new ensemble of objects. As a comment, the best methods come after the setting up of the object of study, needing a longer time. Also, as Cosgrave showed in his study (2019), digital methods rehash

the integrated perspective, inter and transdiciplinary. Disciplinary methods are perceived as key parts of their inner essence and they appear in many critics as a main barrier to interdisciplinarity – if methods are totally specific to a field, is hard to manage an interdisciplinary research. For Cosgrave,

> there is a limited palette of methods, but an endless range of epistemological terroir. However, understanding the tools and methods which disciplines have in common can provide a practical basis for interdisciplinary collaboration. Gathering all this together would permit a more organic, evolutionary way of seeing the development of scholarly fields, rather than a confrontation between discipline and interdiscipline. (Cosgrave 2019, 9)

In the same time, it is important to notice that soft and digital tools especially created to enhance methods of various disciplines bring with them some similarities that are often treated as unique to their domains.

One of the goals of disciplines is the ability of reproducing themselves, but the existing and increasing number of courses, modules, publications demonstrates that digital media have accomplished this requirement. However, we cannot minimize the struggle for academic security and for adequate policies, even if the aims for digital media can be set differently:

> the greatest hope for our field – whatever you want to call it – lies in our ability to address, reframe, or re-ask really big questions that cut across all the human sciences. In the end, disciplinarity is nothing more than an institutional promise to our field. Our work has much more important and much more pressing intellectual and political promises. Our challenge is to fulfill them. (Sterne 2005, 254)

Digital media are now the established media and the digital convergence served as a catalyst also for the academic strengthen of the field. Moreover, digital literacy becomes a necessity at the general level, being in a great social demand (courses, conferences, information). Nevertheless, its great development as form of communication does not automatically imply the same level of standardisation and clarifications in terms required by a discipline. Sometimes, the expansion of the object of study exceeds its theoretical and meta-theoretical cadence, challenging the researchers and academics in order to fill this gap.

5. Conclusions

The aim of this paper was to emphasise some of the tensions that are hidden in the tissue of a very actual domain of study. The whole field of communication sciences is characterised by a massive development and a great level of interdisciplinarity. In this respect, our investigation formed around the relationships discipline – interdisciplinary field, in order to analyse the evolution of a domain that is interdisciplinary from the very

beginning and its trends toward disciplinarity and institutionalisation. Thus, we can observe that there is not only a movement from disciplines toward interdisciplinary thinking, but also the opposite, from an interdisciplinary field toward disciplinarisation. Moreover, we can tackle this issue at the grass-roots: it is always will a linkage between a meta-level of comprehension and a specialised analysis, just as between scientific cooperation regardless of the boundaries and an institutional community. Also, the inquiry about the scientific status of a domain has to take into consideration its history, tradition, and, of course, its age. Based on the stage of its development, the same domain may be in different positions of affirming its status. From a wider point of view, this tension gives us a clue about the inner negotiations of the legitimacy or the subsequent structures of power that interfere with the condition of a field.

Notes

[1] In this article I will pass over the huge debate about the terminology of the fields and subfields, its limitations or benefits (digital media, new media, Internet studies and so on), choosing to refer to them as a whole marked by the same set of issues concerning their scientific status.

References

Apostel, Leo. 1972. "Conceptual Tools for Interdisciplinarity: An Operational Approach". In *Interdisciplinarity: Problems of Teaching and Research in Universities*, edited by Leo Apostel et al., 141-180. Paris: OECD.

Chettiparamb, Angelique. 2007. *Interdisciplinarity: a literature review*. Southampton: Interdisciplinary Teaching and Learning Group, University of Southampton.

Cosgrave, Mike. 2019. "Digital humanities methods as a gateway to inter and trans-disciplinarity". *Global Intellectual History*, 1-10, https://doi.org/10.1080/23801883.2019.1657639

Craig, Robert T. 2008. "Communication as a field and discipline". In *The international encyclopedia of communication*, edited by Wolfgang Donsbach, 675-688. First Edition. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Davies, Martin, and Devlin, Marcia. 2007. *Interdisciplinary higher education: Implications for teaching and learning*. Melbourne: Centre for the Study of Higher Education, https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/f36f/bdc8cd7238a1107303817edde1afd225d428.pdf

Derrick, E.G.; Falk-Krzesinski, H.J.; Roberts, M.R.; and Olson, S. 2011. "Facilitating interdisciplinary research and education: A practical guide". *Boulder, CO: American Association for the Advancement of Science*, http://researchdevelopment.byu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Full_Report_Creating_Interdisciplinary_Science.pdf

Ess, Charles and Consalvo, Mia. 2011. "What is "Internet Studies?". In *The Handbook of Internet* Studies, edited by Mia Consalvo and Charles Ess, 1-8. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Foucault, Michel. 1991. *Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison*. Translated from French by Alan Sheridan. New York: Vinatege Books.

Grădinaru, Camelia. 2016. "Memory, Interpretation and Connectedness: The Imagined Part of Virtual Communities". *Hermeneia: Journal of Hermeneutics, Art Theory & Criticism* 17: 233-242.

Klein, J. T. 2000. A Conceptual Vocabulary of Interdisciplinary Science. In *Practising Interdisciplinarity,* edited by P. Weingart and N. Stehr, 3-24. London: University of Toronto Press.

Kuhn, Thomas. 1962. *The structure of scientific revolutions.* Chicago: University of Chicago.

Lievrouw, Leah and Livingstone, Sonia. 2002. "The Social Shaping and Consequences of ICTs". In *Handbook of New Media*, edited by Leah A. Lievrouw and Sonia Livingstone, 1-15. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage.

Lister, Martin; Dovey, Jon; Giddings, Seth; Grant, Ian; Kelly, Kieran. 2009. *New Media. A Critical Introduction.* Second edition. London, New York: Routledge.

Manovich, Lev. 2001. *The language of new media.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Manovich, Lev. 2003. "New Media from Borges to HTML". Introduction to *The New Media Reader,* edited by Noah Wardrip-Fruin and Nick Montfort, 13-25. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

Nicolescu, Basarab. 2010. "Methodology of Transdisciplinarity – Levels of Reality, Logic of the Included Middle and Complexity". *Transdisciplinary Journal of Engineering & Science* 1(1): 19-38.

Nordenstreng, Kaarle. 2012. "Communication research has expanded phenomenally since the 1950s, but where has it taken us?". *Euricom Colloquium.* Piran, http://www.uta.fi/cmt/en/contact/staff/kaarlenordenstreng/publications/Kaarl eNordenstreng_for_Piran.pdf

Parker, Janet. 2002. "A New Disciplinarity: Communities of Knowledge, Learning and Practice". *Teaching in Higher Education* 7(4): 373-386.

Patraş, Roxana; Mironescu, A.; Grădinaru, C.; and Grosu, E. 2017. "Poate fi măsurată interdisciplinaritatea? O analiză cantitativă şi calitativă a cuvintelor-cheie". *Revista Transilvania* 10: 17-31.

Peters, John Durham. 1986. "Institutional sources of intellectual poverty in communication research". *Communication Research* 13(4): 527-559.

Pharo, Emma J. and Bridle, Kerry. 2012. "Does interdisciplinarity exist behind the façade of traditional disciplines? A study of natural resource management teaching". *Journal of Geography in Higher Education* 36(1): 65-80.

Squires, Geoffrey. 1992. "Interdisciplinarity in Higher Education in the United Kingdom". *European Journal of Education* 27(3): 201-210.

Sterne, Jonathan. 2005. "Digital Media and Disciplinarity". *The Information Society* 21: 249-256.

Turner, Bryan S. 2006. "Discipline". *Theory, Culture and Society* 23(2-3): 183-186.

Emanuel GROSU [*]

The Heliocentrism of the Ancient: between Geometry and Physics

Abstract: Geocentrism remained a fundamental characteristic of ancient astronomy, though there were moments in the history of this discipline when they argued for the orbital movement of the Earth around the Sun and even its rotation around its own axis. Practically, at the crossroads between physics and geometry, astronomy rejected a correct thesis in geometric terms, based on seemingly arguable physical theories. In this paper, my goal is to present from a synthetic and diachronic perspective several elements of the cosmologic model developed by the Greeks until the time of Aristarchus of Samos, thus highlighting several aspects of physics that made it impossible to accept heliocentrism, explainable in mathematical terms, which he promoted.

Keywords: astronomy, geometry, physics, geocentrism, failed interdisciplinarity.

1. Introduction

It suffices to mention here the anecdote recounted by Diogenes Laertius about Thales of Miletus (the first author appraised in his monumental *Vit. phil.*, I, 34) to understand that the movement of divine bodies and the anticipation of astronomical events was one of the major concerns of ancient philosophy, from its inception. Astronomy ("the law of the asters") tries to provide answers to several issues, thus speculating at the same time notions from physics and mathematics (more precisely, geometry). Such matters were: the matter making up the planets, the Sun and the Moon included; the laws governing movement, the shape of planets and their place in the Universe; the place of the Earth within this system; how eclipses occur and how they may be "predicted".

The infinity of the Universe seems incontestable nowadays, like a postulate. But, however striking that may be, a brilliant mind such as Aristotle, for instance, sought arguments to demonstrate the contrary: the fact that the sky makes a complete rotation around the Earth proves that it is finite (*De caelo*, II, 4). Hence, the finite character of the Universe, at least in this excerpt, is related to the centrality and immovability of the Earth. Moreover,

[*] PhD, Researcher, Department of Interdisciplinary Research in Social-Human Sciences, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iasi, Romania; email: emagrosu@yahoo.com

in an infinite space, the idea of a centre is illogical, just like the idea of ascribing a certain shape to this space.

2. The theory of spheres

The school of Miletus and the Elatic school had focused on the idea of the constitutive elements of the universe: earth, water, air, fire, aether. Despite the observations, simply insufficient (Dreyer 1977, 31), on which they based their suppositions, these schools hold the merit of having imagined the universe as a sphere. This practically led to the idea of the geometric pattern described by the concentric spheres based on which one may describe and approximate the path of the divine bodies and may predict astronomic phenomena. Philolaus (and the school of Pythagoras in general) believed that in the centre of the universe there was the central fire (not the Sun) around which, on their own orbits, the planets gravitated (the Earth included) in a circular motion, opposite to the sphere of fixed stars. The central fire was not visible due to the interposition of the Anti-Earth[1] – a supposed planet that the Pythagoreans had introduced in the system because of the belief that 10 was the perfect number –, and to the fact that it was situated on the opposite side of the discovered world. According to Philolaus, the Earth did not revolve around its own axis.

Whereas Plato was not highly interested in physics in general and in cosmography in particular, the great philosopher did utter a well-articulated opinion in his work concerning the shape and composition of the universe. Spherical, "ensouled, rational living being" (*Tim.*, 30c), copy of a rational model, agent and patient of all its actions (*Tim.*, 28b; 33d), the universe is based on four constitutive elements – earth, water, air, fire (*Tim.*, 53b; aether was considered "the brightest part": *Tim.*, 58d) – and it divides into a Hyperuranion ("place beyond heaven") and Infrauranion (*Phaidr.*, 246d-248e). T The divine bodies (that measure time: *Tim.*, 38d) have fraction-like patterns (in geometrical progression: 1, 2, 4, 8 and 1, 3, 9, 27 – the importance provided to the number has a Pythagorean origin), and among the movements, the rotation one being specific. It has different speeds according to the "spindle of Necessity" by eight distinct orbits "wheels": the sphere of fixed stars, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Mercury, Venus, the Sun and the Moon. For Plato, *Aplanes* ("the identical" whose dominant motion is manifested at the level of all the divine bodies) – the sphere of fixed stars – revolves in a motion opposite to the one of the other divine bodies, and their revolution is accompanied by the song of the Sirens (another Pythagorean idea reprised by Plato) and continued by Moire (*Republica*, 614b-621c). The difference between the movements "of the planets" is that – being situated at various distances from the Earth (immobile, spherical and huge, situated in the centre of the universe) around which they revolved – they fulfilled

their revolutions in various periods: Saturn, in 30 "solar years", the Sun, in one year, the Moon, in almost 30 days, etc.

The rotation of the divine bodies around the Earth seems to be the fundamental element of the universe described by Plato (Dreyer 1977, 63), but a well-grounded geometrical model had to account not only for the apparent movements of the divine bodies as they may be seen from a certain point of our planet, but also it had to provide the framework for more pragmatic purposes. I refer here to an explanation for the irregularities of the paths based on which one may predict the astronomic events.

Eudoxus of Cnidus believed that the movement of the "wandering stars" may be explained through concentric spheres[2] (the Earth being situated in the centre). Namely, all divine bodies are located on the equator of a sphere that revolves evenly around its own axis. The poles of this sphere are on the internal surface of another sphere revolving reversely around its own axis, inclined in relation to the axis of the first sphere, etc, reason for which the movement of any body is the result of combining the three (or four) rotation movements. Eudoxus imagined 27 such spheres: three for the Moon and Sun, four for each planet (Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn) and one for the sphere of fixed stars. From among them, the outer one reproduced the movement of the sphere of fixed stars, from the East to the West (the diurnal movement of divine bodies). The second one had a 20° and 30' inclination (its equator being in the plane of the ecliptic) and it provided the "annual" movement of all the "planets" (respecting "the year" specific for each "planet", namely the period of its complete revolution around the Earth), from the West to the East, in opposition to the movement of the sphere of fixed stars. The others were meant to describe the particularities (accelerations, decelerations, precession, retrocession) of the motion specific to each "planet". Thus, all the divine bodies revolve around the Earth, situated in the centre of the universe, independently from one another and from the sphere of fixed stars.

Callippus of Cyzicus – a student of Eudoxus – attempted to eliminate the inaccuracies related to the longitudinal and latitudinal movements inherent to the system, thus imagining a larger number of concentric spheres, with the help of which he managed, for the movement of the Sun, to determine the duration of seasons, with an approximation of less than a day[3].

Whereas the universe according to Callippus had 33 spheres (among which, for instance, five for the Sun and five for the Moon), the one imagined by Aristotle comprised 55 (for instance, nine for the Sun, five for the Moon) by adding 22 additional spheres that revolve in a motion contrary to the spheres of Eudoxus and Callipus (*Metaphysics*, XII, 8). Eternal and divine, spherical (specific configuration because "clearly they

have no movement of their own […] nature has bestowed upon them no organ appropriate to such movement" – *De caelo*, II, 11), the stars comprise a matter (for which the movement of rotation is natural) that is not earth, nor water, nor air, nor fire. Moreover, the friction set up in the air by their motion (De caelo, II, 7) causes warmth and light that proceed from them. According to Aristotle, the most ample and rapid sphere – the sphere of fixed stars – is directly influenced by the higher divine cause and it has a circular and uniform motion: the sky is moved evenly (*De caelo*, II, 6), in a circular pattern (a noble movement, without contrary, specific to the aether – *De caelo*, II, 4-5) from the right (local determination more noble than the left) to the left (noble direction – *De caelo*, II, 5). Hence, the visible pole is actually "the lower side" of the sky, and the visible pole is the "upper side" of it (*De caelo*, II, 2). "The planets", on the other hand, fixed on their own spheres, also have a circular motion, but contrary to the rotation direction of the sphere of fixed stars. In case of these trajectories, it is necessary to reverse the poles to the "upper side" and "the lower side" of the sphere of fixed stars (*De caelo*, II, 2). Their compound movement – of their own spheres on which they are at rest (*De caelo*, II, 8), as the Earth is at rest (*De caelo*, II, 3), situated in the centre of the universe (*De caelo*, II, 14) – becomes simpler ("have fewer movements" – *De caelo*, II, 12) as it gets closer to the centre. Thus, the concentric spheres of Eudoxus and Callippus are no longer a mathematical model, but a physical representation of the cosmos (Dreyer 1977, 110), material and finite (for "outside the farthest circumference there is neither void nor place": *De caelo*, II, 4), for it could not make a full rotation in a finite period otherwise. As for the shape of the Earth, the depiction of the eclipse in *De caelo*, II, 14 suggests that, because the shadow of the Earth described an arc on the Moon disc, its shape is necessarily spherical.

This model, which made the sphere (the assertion "The shape of the heaven is of necessity spherical; for that is the shape most appropriate to its substance and also by nature primary" in *De caelo*, II, 4, is followed by four arguments) the fundamental element of the cosmic structure, of its elements and of the description of their motions – though it had become ever more complicated – managed to remain rather easy to use. It also managed to approximate in a satisfactory manner the observable phenomena. However, as long as it was based on the uniform rotation of concentric spheres, it failed to account for the luminosity variations of the "planets" (Dreyer 1977, 129; Kuhn 2000, 76) – as they were closer or farther away from the Earth. It also failed to account for their movement (orbital or "annual") seemingly retrograde in certain instances, or for the uneven character of the angular motion speeds.

3. The centrality and immobility of the Earth

The assertion of the spherical model of the universe also imposed the thesis that the Earth is immobile; because in a sphere that revolves only the centre[4] stays still and because if something moves permanently, something else must always stay still (Aristotle, *De caelo*, II, 3)[5].

Within the universe whose outer limit was the sphere of fixed stars, the order of the mobile divine bodies was also a controversial topic. Macrobius talks about a *Chaldean order* and an *Egyptian order.*

In the myth of Er within the *Republic*, Plato – of whom Macrobius (*In Somn. Scip.*, I, 19, 5) says that he follows the *ordo Ægiptiorum* – proposes the following structure: the sphere of fixed stars, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Mercury, Venus, the Sun, the Moon. *Ordo Chaldeorum*, on the other hand, as Macrobius calls it, adopted by Archimedes and Cicero and accepted by several others, was the following: Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Sun, Mercury, Venus, the Moon, with the Sun in median position. Hence, the difference would consist only in the position of the Sun, Venus and Mercury, of which Plato said, "overtake and are overtaken by one another" (*Tim.*, 38d). Through this statement, he tried to explain the very close trajectories (the duration of their own "years", implicitly) and the irregularities noticeable in the movement of the three bodies, and not so much the fact that sometimes Venus and Mercury seemed to be visible on one side or the other of the Sun. The last idea led Heraclides Ponticus to the ingenious solution of the semi-heliocentric system: the Sun, just as the other divine bodies revolve around the Earth situated in the centre of the universe, but around the Sun, as its satellites, revolve Venus and Mercury. Practically, for Heraclides, both the Chaldean order, and the Platonic order (*Egyptian*) were correct, but alternatively – according to the position, as seen from the Earth, of Mercury and Venus on their orbital path on one side or the other of the Sun. Aristotle may not have known of this solution, given that he fails to mention it in *De caelo*. There (II, 10), he states that – while the mobile stars move contrary to the sphere of fixed stars – the latter makes the movement of the first slow down as they are farther away from the Earth. Therefore, the calculation "of the years" for each "planet" also determines their order: Moon, Mercury, Venus, Sun, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, the sphere of fixed stars practically, a version of *ordo Chaldeorum*, found in Hipparchus, Ptolemy or in the Latin authors Pliny, *Nat. hist.*, II, 6, 32-36, or Bed the Venerable, *De rer. nat.*, XIII.

The semi-heliocentric model of Heraclides Ponticus was not a denial of centrality of the Earth in the system. Nonetheless, there was only a step to the heliocentric theory by Aristarchus of Samos[6]. Before him, the Pythagorean School had proposed a model where the divine bodies, the Earth included (and the Anti-Earth), rotated around the central fire that –

like the Anti-Earth – could only be seen from the inhabited side of the world. This model contrasted with some previous opinions (of the Miletus or Eleatic school) that saw the centrality of the Earth not only in terms of Spatiality but also – down to its last consequences – placed it at the origin of certain cosmic phenomena. For Heraclitus of Ephesus, the Sun and the Moon were like two bowls that, the concave side facing our direction, captured the moist exhalations of the Earth, and this "fuel" lit up at sunrise and set down at sunset (Aristotle, *Meteor.*, II, 2, 355a; *Plac. phil.*, II, 28). For Anaxagoras of Clazomenae, the stars were fragments set off the Earth that remained in space only due to the rotation of aether (*Plac. phil.*, II, 13).

For Aristarchus however, in the centre of the universe there was the Sun, a visible point of reference and a subject of the most common astronomic events, the eclipses. Compared to the theory of the central fire specific to the Pythagorean School, the one uttered by Aristarchus could be confronted with the direct observation of the phenomena. Unfortunately, no accurate presentation of Aristarchus' theory was preserved, which may have allowed us to understand his cosmological ideas correctly. The very brief presentation made by Archimedes in *Arenarius* (I, 4-5) shows that the Earth makes an orbital movement around the Sun, immobile in the centre of the universe, around which revolves the sphere of fixed stars. We find out nothing about the movements of the other bodies. However, given that the Moon rotated, as per Aristarchus, too, around the Earth, this would have generated similar difficulties with the ones of the semi-heliocentric theory by Heraclides – two divine bodies (the Sun and the Earth) around which revolve other divine bodies –, but at least it could have allowed the correct explanation of the eclipses. Or, for Aristarchus, the solar eclipse was due to the inclination of the Earth – at least this may be deduced from the brief enumeration of opinions concerning the solar eclipse, in *Plac. phil.*, II, 24.

The hypothesis that the Earth, though in the centre of the universe, would revolve around its own axis from the West to the East (as an explanation for the diurnal movement of the sphere of fixed stars), does not have – according to the sources – a definite author and is not given much credit, being rejected by Ptolemy. Diogenes Laertius (*Vit. phil.*, VIII, 85) ascribes to Philolaus the opinion that the Earth revolves in a circle (κατὰ κύκλον), a vague expression, but which – corroborated with the idea of the central fire being invisible and with the mention that it revolves in a circle (κύκλῳ περιφέρεσθαι) around the fire, as per an oblique orbit (κατὰ κύκλον λοξὸν), the same as the Sun and the Moon, stated in *Plac. phil.*, III, 13 – only allows one interpretation. Namely, the solely orbital movement (around its own axis) of the Earth made the central fire remain invisible (and the Anti-Earth of the Pythagoreans). Diogenes Laertius (*Vit. phil.*, IX, 30) ascribes to Leucippus the idea that the Earth, shaped like a tambour, revolves around

the centre, but it is unclear whether he refers to the orbital movement or to the one around its own axis. Concerning the latter, Cicero (*Acad. Priora*, II, 39, 123) is far more explicit: supporting Theophrastus, he believed that Icetus of Syracuse would have launched the opinion that the diurnal movement of the sphere of fixed stars is only apparent, as a consequence of the rotation of the Earth around its own axis[7]. On the other hand, *Plac. phil.* (III, 13) credits Heraclides Ponticus and Ecphantus with this belief. Naturally, the rotation direction of the Earth was from the West to the East, if the constellations were considered motionless. Upon invoking the scarcity of sources, but also the deductions made by H. Martin (Martin 1881), Schiaparelli believes that Heraclides Ponticus had in common with the Pythagorean School the idea of the movement of the observation point around the centre of the universe. Along with Icetus and Ecphantus, he agreed with the thesis according to which the sky would not revolve around the Earth, but the Earth around its own axis, the only original hypothesis being the one of the orbital movements of Venus and Mercury around the Sun (Schiaparelli 1926, vol. II, 121-122). If – as stated by Schiaparelli – with the system of Tycho Brahe (the Earth revolves around its own axis; the Moon is a satellite of the Earth; the other planets – Venus, Mercury, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn – have as centre of their orbits the Sun, along with which they revolve around the Earth) they agreed even during the times of Heraclides Ponticus[8] and if Aristarchus only assumed that the Earth revolves around the Sun just like the other planets, then the statement (rather late, of the 1st-2nd century AD) made in *Plac. phil.*, II, 24 is at least confusing.

The idea of the centrality and immobility of the Earth survived the theses by Aristarchus [9] and the symbolical thought of the first Christian centuries, thus crossing the entire Middle Ages. Thus, it may be found in Cassiodorus, Isidore of Seville, Bede (reprised through Pliny the Elder) or Dungal (reprised from Macrobius). Th. Kuhn – based on an ample passage (which he cites) from Aristotle, *De caelo* (II, 14) – considers that such opinions as those uttered by the Pythagoreans or by Heraclides or by Aristarchus, "though astronomically persuasive", could not be accepted. The reason is that they were in opposition with a series of beliefs subjected to physics, as it was not a distinct field from astronomy (Kuhn 2000, 108-111). Th. Kuhn also cites the answer (Kuhn 2000, 111), equally relevant for this statement, by Ptolemy of *Almagesta* to the theory uttered by Heraclides, according to which the sphere of fixed stars is immobile, and the Earth would revolve around its own axis from the West to the East. Earlier in the book, in the conclusions to the volume *Scritti sulla storia della astronomia antica* (1926, vol. II, 173), Schiaparelli believed that rejecting the hypotheses of Heraclides and Aristarchus also came after the success of "mathematical astrology", arrived to Greece from Asia Minor through Berosus the Chaldean.

To support Schiaparelli's statement, Ptolemy himself was known for both *Almagesta* (an astronomy treatise) and *Tetrabiblos* (an astrology treatise).

4. Conclusions

Upon commenting the paragraph in *Arenarios* featuring the heliocentric of Aristarchus of Samos, Schiaparelli (1926, vol. II, 168) states that Archimedes uses the term γραφάς cthat may refer to a graphic presentation or demonstration. Hence, whereas, geometrically one could prove that the heliocentric system was capable of accounting for observable astronomical events that had not been solved previously within the geocentric system, Aristarchus' ideas must have been rejected using other arguments than mathematical. The new theory involved, on one hand, that the Earth was a satellite of the Sun, which contradicted the traditional order of the elements (starting from the lowest point of the sphere, the centre: earth, water, air, fire, aether) in the universe. The new theory stated, on the other hand, that not the sky of fixed stars revolved around the Earth, but that the planet revolved around its own axis. This questioned the idea of finite Universe and, had we admitted the thesis of Universe infinity, the idea of a centre and of (spherical) forms hereof would have become unsustainable. Therefore, heliocentrism was unacceptable pursuant to fundamental theses of physics in that period. To it, we add astrology, a rather new pseudoscience for the Greeks, but which had conquered the Greco-Roman world, who claimed to foretell destinies based on the astral configurations at the moment the individuals were born or conceived. There were also the meteorological phenomena, (invoked by Ptolemy in *Almagesta*): if the Earth revolved around its own axis from the West to the East, should not we see how the clouds remained behind, thus "making" a seeming movement in the other direction, towards the West?

Aristarchus' ideas were rejected, which led to an intensification of the efforts to explain the irregularities observable in the movement of "planets" through increasingly complex mathematical calculations and models: epicycles, deferents, mobile eccentric circles, "equants" (< lat. *aequans*)[10]. Subsequently featured by Ptolemy in *Almagesta*, they represented the articulations of the geocentric model used throughout the Middle Ages.

Notes

[1] The interposition of the Earth and the Anti-Earth also explained the higher frequency of Moon eclipses compared to Sun eclipses.

[2] *Plac. phil.*, II, 16, attributes to Anaximander the idea that stars move along with the spheres or circles where they are situated. Given that the uniform circular motion failed to depict the real motion of the mobile stars, Eudoxus proposed to combine several rotations as a solution.

[3] In *Metaphysics*, XII, 8, Aristotle provides a description of the system imagined by Eudoxus and Callipus.

[4] Diogenes Laertious (*Vit. phil.*, IX, 21) ascribed to Parmenides the idea of the Earth's centrality.

[5] Anaxagoras, Democritus or Cleanthes, according to whom the stars move from the East to the West (*Plac. phil.*, II, 16), also feature versions of the same idea according to which they would all revolve around the Earth. The same may be found in "Alcmaeon and mathematicians", who pinpointed that they moved from the west to the East in relation to the sphere of fixed stars (*Plac. phil.*, II, 16).

[6] Schiaparelli, upon analysing a fragment of Simplicius (Διὸ καὶ παρελθών τις φησὶν Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικὸς ὅτι καὶ κινουμένης πως τῆς γῆς, τοῦ δ΄ ἡλίου μένοντός πως, δύναται ἡ περὶ τὸν ἥλιον φαινομένη ἀνωμαλία σώζεσθαι – Simplicius 1882, 292) who in his turn reprises a fragment from Geminus of Rhodes, *Meteorologica*, deduces that Heraclides Ponticus had launched (or at least he could have) even the idea of the Earth revolving around the Sun. See also Schiaparelli 1873, 31, 55.

[7] This makes Dreyer (1977, 46) assume that Icetus, a Pythagorean, did not share the idea of the central fire, which – in case of the Earth's rotation around its own axis – would be visible. *Cf.* also Diogenes Laertius, *Vit. phil.*, VIII, 85.

[8] The author may have been even Heraclides Ponticus or a contemporary: see Schiaparelli (1926), vol. II, 126.

[9] As Pliny synthesised in *Nat. hist.*, II, 4, 11: *...ita solam inmobilem circa eam volubili universitate.*

[10] The epicycles and mobile eccentric circles were the expression of another level of abstraction: their centres no longer coincided with the position of divine bodies, as with the model of concentric spheres. Schiaparelli demonstrates that both the epicycles and the mobile eccentric circles were "diverse forms of the same construction, and the calculation of the planet's position remains essentially the same" (Schiaparelli 1926, vol. II, 132-133). However, the epicycles had the advantage "of being applied to inferior planets, too" (Venus and Mars), reason for which the Greek geometry experts preferred them to mobile eccentric circles.

References

Archimede. 2017. *Arenarius*, a cura di Heinrich F. Fleck. Quaderni di Scienze Umane e Filosofia Naturale - 2, 1, Gennaio. Pubblicazione elettronica aperiodica: www.heinrichfleck.net.

Aristotle. 2005. *Despre cer*, introductory study, bibliography, translation from Old Greek, analytical summary, notes and indices by Şerban Nicolau. Bucureşti: Paideia.

Aristotle. 2007. *Metafizica*, translation, commentary and notes by Andrei Cornea, second edition revised and annotated. Bucureşti: Humanitas.

Cassiodor. 2015. *Instituţiile*, bilingual edition, translation, introductory study and notes by Vichi Eugenia Ciocani. Iaşi: Polirom.

Diogenes Laertius. 2005. *Vite e dottrine dei più celebri filosofi*, testo greco a fronte, a cura di Giovanni Reale, con la collaborazione di Giuseppe Girgenti e Ilaria Ramelli. Milano: Bompiani.

Dreyer, J.L.E. 1977. *Storia dell'astronomia da Talete a Keplero*. Milan: Feltrinelli (1906. *History of the Planetary Systems from Thales to Kepler*. Cambridge: University Press).

Kuhn, Thomas S. 2000. *La rivoluzione copernicana. L'astronomia planetaria nello sviluppo del pensiero occidentale*. Torino: Einaudi (1957. *The Copernican Revolution. Planetary Astronomy in the Development of Western Thought*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press).

Macrobius. 2001. *Commento al Sogno di Scipione*, testo latino a fronte, saggio introduttivo di Ilaria Ramelli, traduzione, bibliografia, note e apparati di Moreno Neri. Milano: Bompiani.

Martin, Th.-H. 1881. "Mémoires sur l'histoire des hypothèses astronomiques chez les Grecs et les Romains". *Mémoires de l'Académie des inscriptions et belles lettres*, XXX, 2° partie.

Plato. 1986. *Republica*, translation, interpretation, preliminary clarifications, notes and annex by Andrei Cornea. In Platon, *Opere*, vol. V. Bucureşti: Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică.

Plato. 1993. *Timaios*, translated by C. Partenie. In Platon, *Opere*, vol. VII. Bucureşti: Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică.

Pliny the Elder. 2011. *Naturalis historia*, vol. I, translated by Ioana Costa and Tudor Dinu, edition, preface and notes by Ioana Costa, index and linguistic notes by Tudor Dinu. Iaşi: Polirom (1906. *Naturalis historiae libri XXXVII*, edidit Carolus Mayhoff, vol. I, libri I-IV. Leipzig: Teubner).

Plutarch. 2017. *Placita philosophorum*, in *Tutti i Moralia*, prima traduzione italiana completa, testo greco a fronte, coordinamento di Emanuele Lelli e Giuliano Pisani. Milano: Bompiani.

Schiaparelli, Giovanni V. 1873. *I precursori di Copernico nell'antichità*. Milan-Naples: Ulrico Hoepli.

Schiaparelli, Giovanni V. 1926. *Scritti sulla storia della astronomia antica*, parte prima: scritti editi, tomo secondo. Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli Editore.

Venerable Bede. 1862. *De natura rerum, De ratione temporum,* in *Opera omnia*, accurante J.P. Migne, *Patrologiae Latinae Cursus Completus*, vol. 90, coll. 187-278, 293-578. Paris, apud Gaume fratres.

Ioana JÎJÎIE MOROȘANU [*]

Affectivity – at the Border between Psychology and Rhetoric

Abstract: What moves masses of people? Are we rather emotional or rational beings? What emotional impact do the words we transmit to our interlocutors have? These are just a few of the myriad questions that researchers in various fields have wanted to answer. From a psychological perspective, emotions influence our attitude towards others and how we react in certain situations. Over time, the question of quantifying the extent to which they are the result of social learning or genetic inheritance has been raised. On the other hand, rhetoric speaks to us about passions as emotions in action produced at the level of an audience through discourse. What is interesting is that the modalities of manifesting emotional experiences have evolved to guide us to cope with the crucial events in our lives, as well as how the speaker manages to determine them at the auditory level has changed. It is fascinating how the two domains manage to analyze the affectivity from different perspectives, but how neither would make sense without the other. Therefore, in the following article, I will cover, under the umbrella of interdisciplinarity, the common aspects that can be extracted from the psychological and rhetorical theories.

Keywords: rhetoric, psychology, emotions, affectivity, passions, mechanisms, speech.

1. From ideas to emotions

Each of us is composed of two infinitely important parts of our existence as human beings. Each of us is made of body and soul. With this analogy in mind, the article delineates the general lines of the term affectivity. Why did I start with this specific analogy in mind? Because even the concept of affectivity would not have existed scientifically if two fundamental perspectives of understanding the term – psychological and rhetorical – had not been outlined. And, in my opinion, the psychological perspective is like a soul because it analyzes affectivity from any person's intrinsic characteristics point of view and the psychological mechanisms underlying the interpersonal relationships dominated by affectivity, while

---
[*] PhD Student, School of Communication Sciences, Faculty of Philosophy and Socio-Political Sciences, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iaşi, Romania; email: ioanamorosanu93@gmail.com

the rhetorical perspective focuses more on how affectivity is manifested externally through language, nonverbal behaviors or paraverbal items; thus, through the rhetorical aspects, affectivity is exposed in front of a public like a body.

When we talk about affectivity, we will automatically think of human emotions. When considering the nature of emotions, we must take into account subjective experiences, verbal descriptions, emotional responses and influences, behavioral expressions, but also subsequent consequences. The relation of these behaviors can be characterized by consistency or there may be discrepancies between them. Depending on the origin, some researchers consider emotions to be biological or physical (Panksepp 1988, 37-73), or psychological (Lazarus 1991, 819-834), but we can also look at emotions from the perspective of cognitive processes where those are subordinate to informational processes in the human brain.

Common to all these approaches are ten basic emotions (Eckman 2003, 10-17): interest, happiness, surprise, anxiety, anger, disgust, dissatisfaction, fear, shame, and guilt. How people express their emotions can be changed by family, society and cultural influences. Learning their various forms plays an important role in determining what is considered socially or culturally right as an emotional expression in a given situation. From a rhetorical point of view, the affectivity and the emotions take the form of the pathos that reprints the emotional states of the audience in front of which a speaker supports his speech. Regardless of the domain or discipline, one of the aims of oratorical art is to persuade the public, and this could not be achieved without the induction of a specific emotional state to the audience. The question is how can we generate emotions at the level of an audience only through our speech?

The stimulating sources of the pathos are represented by the systems of values and beliefs to which the speaker must align the speech. There are also several techniques by which it can induce desired passions – and they come from what we call logos. Specifically, I think that how a speaker selects his ideas that will form the discourse is responsible for generating specific emotions at the level of the audience.

1.1. *A cognitive point of view on how emotions work*

Although the idea that a good discourse is the one that has strong arguments is rooted in the collective mind, we must mention that these arguments do not address strictly to the public intellect. The arguments used by the speaker, those confessions of facts, data or results of an expert's report, even those are mere statistics that modify the audience's affect. A successful speech is one where the raw arguments manage to generate emotions at the public level. But how can we do this? First of all, we build

our arguments by combining two types of judgments: those of fact and those of value. If the factual judgments will give credence to the speaker and thus gain public confidence, the valuable ones will address to his affective side. The speaker has a set of knowledge, valuable experiences, just like his audience. Through discourse, they finally collide and those common experiences and values that resonate both ways will cause emotions.

When a speaker gives a speech with a persuasive intent, the question that arises is which part of the soul should be assessed: the affective or the rational? The intuitive answer would be that affection should be his main focus, but in this case what would be the purpose of grounding a discourse on logical arguments or factual judgments? If the speaker generates pathos at the level of his audience and by the call to reason, how exactly does this process work? Recently researchers in cognitive science have proposed the hypothesis of the existence of two distinct cognitive systems (Kahneman 2011, 39). These two systems are sometimes called implicit and explicit, although some theorists prefer to emphasize the functional differences between the two and not their connection with the idea of consciousness. To avoid any kind of confusion, they were called System 1 and System 2. System 1 is generally described to be a universal form of cognition shared by both humans and animals. It represents systems combinations that run in terms of autonomy. System 1 includes the instinctive behaviors that are innately planned, and its processes are most often described to be formed by the learning produced by the creation of neural networks. The processes are fast, parallel and automatic through their nature, only their final product is held by the conscience. On the other hand, system 2 was developed more recently than the previous one and is considered to be purely human. The processes of this system are much slower and sequential and appeal to the person's working memory, being closely linked to memory. Despite its limited capacity and low-speed, system 2 allows for the development of an abstract and hypothetical type of thinking that S1 could not trigger. For example, when it comes to the decision-making process, most of the time we tend to act from the perspective of past experiences, using solutions that have worked before. Such intuitive decisions need minimal reflection from one person. But we can also make decisions by building mental models or simulations of future possibilities. In the general sense, mental models (Rickheit 1999, 6) represent an area of dynamic symbolic representations of objects or external events presented within a natural or artificial cognitive system. They have a series of properties that differentiate them from the rest of the symbolic representations, among which are the ability to generate descriptions about the purpose and architecture of a system, explanations related to the condition and functionality of a system, as well as predictions.

Through his speech, an individual will address first to his audience's S2 system, the conscious one, through which the information is analyzed.

Through certain discursive techniques such as humor or irony, the speaker manages to diminish the rational barriers of the public, thus communicating the message to the S1 system, hence generating emotions.

At a rational level, we can notice that people sometimes prefer certain ideas and disregard others. Not only do they like those ideas, but they adhere to it. This cohesion between a person and an idea is also rooted in the idea of beautifulness. Beauty attracts humans because it is associated with pleasure. We love certain ideas because they resonate with our values, which, of course, we consider beautiful since we have acquired them and they represent ourselves. In this case, the speaker has the opportunity to juggle with those speech elements that determine the beautiful or the ugly and are proper to arouse the passion that he wants to. It is in the interest of the speaker to find the right means to illustrate within his discourse those instances of the beautiful with which the audience resonates, to fulfill their ultimate purpose, namely to generate a certain attitude or behavior. And this is where the emotion comes into play.

1.2. *A rhetorical – linguistic point of view on how passions work*

From a linguistic perspective, discursive aesthetics is closely linked to establishing the beauty of a discourse. By the aesthetic act (Nasta and Alexandrescu 1972, 449) we understand that way of perceiving the objects of the outer world that acts as a mediator between the hybrid multitude of disparate impressions and the analytical proximity of the phenomena, which we call scientific. In the aesthetic act, whether he or she conceives an oratorical discourse, we dissociate from the world of sound and light impressions the inner images of objects, their shapes, colors, types, sounds, as distinct from us and reflecting the object world. This typical feature gives the object certain integrity or a kind of personality.

Thus, the beauty of the discourse is also embodied by the concept of style. The style with the highest chances of generating passions at the level of the audience is, of course, the sublime style. If temperance was the characteristic considered essential to the simple style, the boldness to the limit seems to be the dominant note of the sublime style. This style raises the hearts and minds of the listeners and can cause the most unstoppable passions both in one person and especially in the masses. The basic principle of the sublime style according to Cicero (1942, 45) consists in the fact that: there is no limit in the choice of arguments, in their organization and ordering, in speech decoration, in the use of metaphors if in this way we can "shake" the public with regard to his beliefs, feelings, attitudes or actions, and this in a way that produces delight, which amazes.

We cannot speak about style or elocution without detailing the idea of figurative language through which the process is possible. The figurative

language can convey emotions not only through the musicality, the visual or auditory image it generates or through the beauty of the chosen words but also through the logical inferences that link the arguments that are finally included in a rhetorical figure. Perelman considers that the rhetorical figures are not merely simple accessories, effective tools in elocution construction, but each of them represents an argument in itself in the context in which they are integrated into a discourse. Among the rhetorical figures with the highest cognitive, argumentative, but also emotionally load are irony, metaphor and the call to humor. All of these have in common the relation between reality and appearances. If in the case of irony, the rhetorical figure expresses the opposite of the expectation determined by reality, the metaphor is a complex comparison between two different realities that we would not have thought to bring in the same context. This relation to reality and expectations, especially to the expectations of the auditor, leads to an analysis of emotions that are generated with their confirmation or rejection.

Also, along the rhetorical figures, the story (Sachs 2016, 25) as a discursive technique can induce emotions. People who listen to a speech will react emotionally to stories and will internalize them much more easily, facilitating persuasion. Stories are a special type of human communication designed to convince the audience of the storyteller's vision of the world. Each character has a purpose, according to their values, faces difficulties along the way and succeeds or fails, depending on the story's vision about how the world works. And, the stories that will matter in the discursive "ocean" and that will succeed in winning the "war" of narratives will not only be the ones that amuse but those that matter emotionally, those that will awake strong emotions in the listener and will be memorable enough to determine people to act in a certain direction. Why? Because stories are the rearrangement and retelling of our experiences with the world in a way that will make others want to hear and learn from them. They allow us to make order in the chaotic, otherwise insignificant, experience of our senses by editing the irrelevant details, defining the cause of each effect and giving meaning to the string of things we have seen, felt or simply imagined.

2. Charisma's passional force

Up to this point, going through the main perspectives through which emotions were understood – psychological and rhetorical – and also the sources through which they are generated, we can see that passions, as they were first understood by Aristotle (2004, 186), represent the common point of the two perspectives. Next, it is very important to analyze how a person can put all this information into practice to generate public-level passions to

turn them into their followers. Such an individual in the rhetorical sphere is considered to be a charismatic speaker. We can see the answer given by Daniel Goleman (2017, 23), who pointed out that charismatic leaders, who are usually charismatic orators, have always played a crucial emotional role. The first leaders of humanity – from the chief of the tribe to the priestesses – largely disbanded because their way of imposing themselves was convincing on an emotional level.

Charismatic leaders, in constructing their prescriptive mental models, emphasize the goals – normally positive, future-oriented ones. These prescriptive mental models tend to emphasize goals and not causes in their discursive and feasible manifestations. The causes that apply in the available descriptive mental models will be those that are retained by charismatic leaders in building their prescriptive mental model. But charismatic leaders, in shaping the model, tend to keep causes under control as a result of people's actions. In consequence, these leaders define future goals that direct others towards actions that ultimately lead to these goals. In other words, charismatic leaders see people as creators of their destiny through the actions they take on a set of known, relatively unambiguous causes. Charismatic leaders should encourage people to act on the causes relevant to achieving their goals. How leaders can motivate this type of action is role modeling and self-sacrifice, but also through communication. Not only does charismatic leadership require communication (Fiol, Harris, and House 1999, 449-482), but it also involves a mass appeal designed to build engagement and encourage followers' actions on the causes relevant to achieving their goals. Thus, charismatic leaders exert influence and maintain control through goals, while allowing followers the freedom to act on the causes that will lead to the goal.

From the rhetorical perspective, the charismatic leader represents an embodiment of the ethos, and one of the qualities of this element of the oratorical triad to which the speaker can appeal in support of the speech to generate certain passions at the audience level is represented by the non-verbal part of the speech. By gesture we want to convey something more than saying the word directly, we want to emphasize the message transmitted. And, since what we can finally convey through a discourse are emotions, then it is fair to say that gesture is an efficient mechanism for generating passions. Today's leaders should resort to influence and not control, and influence is based both on the ability to understand the other's perspective – the active listening of the interlocutor and non-verbal behavior – and the ability to communicate congruent, to align words in body language. And the gestures, posture, gaze and all other signals that go with the message, encode the mental and emotional state of a person to correctly interp-

ret or misread these behavioral cues as reflecting the respective states. Moreover, what underlies emotions generating through gesture is called mirroring (Feyereusen 2018, 22). In other words, mirror neurons are activated by a particular action, but also by observing the same actions. According to some authors (Iacoboni 2009, 14), this system emphasizes the automatic resonance mechanisms that allowed people to imitate and empathize.

Starting from the idea that political leaders can provoke emotions (Lanzettta et al. 1985, 85-116) and convey impressions through their non-verbal communication style that includes both voice qualities and facial expressions, we can say that charismatic leaders can have the same effects at an audience level. Effective political leaders often show charisma in convincing voters that they are the best option. Thus, charisma can generate emotions in people through nonverbal aspects of communication.

In a series of experiments conducted from 1982 to 1989, Roger Masters and Denis Sullivan (1990, 35-47) explored how the facial expressions of leaders perceived in the television environment affect the viewers' emotions, emotions, and political attitudes. Their theoretical approach joined the ethological (van Hoff 1969, 9-81) and social psychology perspectives with their work on the role of impressions and emotions in shaping political attitudes. Ethological theories emphasize the importance of facial expressions in signaling the attack, escape or submission within the power relations established at the primate level.

The authors developed the hypothesis that such facial expressions are among the significant stimuli that can be determining for attributing the characteristics of the leaders, but also the emotional reactions towards them. But the facial expressions of leaders, if repeatedly observed, can change the attitudes of the viewers by directly generating emotions (Zajonc 1982, 117-123) or attributing traits (Albeson et al. 1982, 619-630) that affect attitudes toward the leader. Rather than directly affecting attitudes, facial expressions can generate attributions of traits that, in turn, provoke emotions that in turn affect attitudes. On the other hand, the observer's emotional responses to the leader's display may generate attributions of traits that, through a rather cognitive process, shape attitudes toward the leader.

Alongside nonverbal, the paraverbal represents a means of transmitting charisma to an audience. Starting from Aristotelian theory, the voice has been considered to be a means of hypocrisy and certain vocal tones are normally associated with certain emotions. I also think that certain inflections of the voice arouse at the level of the audience certain reactions that can materialize in emotions if they are kept long enough. Thus, a low-pitched voice, with lower speed, can induce calm and goodwill in the au-

dience, while an alert, high-pitched voice can stir the audience. When it comes to voice inflections, emphasizing a meaningful idea for speech through a higher pitch and slower cadence, as well as alternating it with a series of arguments presented more smoothly, can create a favorable framework for public persuasion.

3. Conclusion

We can see the importance of interdisciplinarity in outlining and explaining a vast concept as affectivity. Without the psychological perspective, we could not understand why a group of people would follow a certain leader who from a rational point of view does not have a well-founded substrate, while without the rhetorical perspective we could not see the realization of truthful experiences at the level of a group of people and we could not understand what mechanisms caused certain emotions in people after the verbal or nonverbal communication took note. Especially since interdisciplinarity and affectivity have at least one thing in common – they connect so different intellectual and spiritual baggage to harmonize the society in which we live.

References

Albeson, Robert; Donald Kinder; Mark Peters; and Susan Fiske. 1982. "Affective and semantic components in political person perception". *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 42(4): 619-630. https://psycnet.apa.org/buy/1982-32629-001.

Aristotel. 2004. *Retorica*. Translated by Maria-Cristina Andrei. Bucureşti: Editura IRI.

Cicero. 1942. *De oratore*. London: William Heinemann LTD. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Eckman, Paul. 2003. *Unmasking the face*. Cambridge: Malor Books.

Feyereisen, Pierre. 2018. *The cognitive psychology of speech related gesture*. London, New York: Taylor & Francis Group.

Fiol, C.M.; D. Harris; and R.J. House. 1999. "Charismatic leadership: Strategies for effecting social change". *The Leadership Quarterly* 10: 449-482.

Goleman, Daniel; Richard Boyatzis; and Annie Mckee. 2017. *Inteligenţa emoţională în lidership*. Translated by Sabina Dorneanu. Bucureşti: Editura Curtea Veche.

Van Hoff, J.A.R.A.M. 1969. "The facial displays of catarrhine monkeys and apes". In *Primate Ethology*, edited by Desmond *Morris*, 7-68. New York: Doubleday Anchor.

Iacoboni, Marco. 2009. *Mirroring People: The science of empathy and how we connect with others*. New York: Picador.

Kahneman, Daniel. 2015. *Gândire rapidă, gândire lentă*. Translated by Dan Crăciun. Bucureşti: Publica.

Lanzettta, Denis; G. Sullivan; Roger D. Masters; and Gregory J. Mettigo. 1985. "Emotional cognitive responses to televised images of political leaders". In *Mass Media and Political Though*, edited by Sidney Kraus and Richard E. Perloff, 113-129. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Lazarus, R.S. 1991. "Progress on a cognitive-motivational-relational theory of emotion". *American Psychologist* 46(8): 819-834. https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1991-32296-001.

Masters, R.D., and D. Sullivan. 1990. *Nonverbal behaviour and leadership: emotion and cognition in political information processing.* Bekerly: UC Bekerly Work Papers.

Nasta, Mihail, and Sorin Alexandrescu. 1972. *Poetică și stilistică. Orientări moderne. Prolegomene și antologie.* București: Editura Univers.

Panksepp, J. 1988. "Brain emotional circuits and psychopathologies". In *Emotions* and *psychopathology*, edited by M. Clynes and J. Panksepp, 37-76. New York: Plenum Press. https://psycnet.apa.org/record/1988-98531-003.

Rickheit, Gert and Christopher Habel. 1999. *Mental models in discourse processing and reasoning.* Elsevier: Academic Press.

Sachs, Jonah. 2016. *Războiul poveștilor. Cum cei care spun (și trăiesc) cele mai bune povești vor domina viitorul.* Translated by Elena Marcu. București: Editura Black Button Books.

Zajonc, Robert. 1982. "On the primacy of Affect". *American Psychologist* 39(2): 117-123.

Andreea MIRONESCU *
Doris MIRONESCU **

Premises for a History of Romanian Literature from a Trans-disciplinary Perspective

Abstract: This article sets out to critically discuss the promise and challenges of adopting interdisciplinarity in the humanistic disciplines and especially in the postcommunist countries of East-Central Europe. The adoption of methods and concepts from other disciplines is not always an easy task and does not automatically ensure an effective internationalization of results or acceptance inside the discipline. The first part of the article comments on the hardships of inter- and trans-disciplinary research in the humanities and particularly in the parcel of literary studies. In its second part, the paper offers a brief survey of trans-disciplinary ways of engaging the challenges of today's world from within the field of Romanian literary studies.

Keywords: interdisciplinarity, trans-disciplinarity, literary studies, memory studies, history of Romanian literature, quantitative research.

1. Why interdisciplinarity "**is so very hard to do"**

Literary studies in Romania have, for a long time, taken as their model of scientific work the national literary history, following several great achievements in this area. But the premises for this centrality of literary history have changed, and at the same time changes took place in methodology, concepts and patterns of work in the discipline, prompting the need to discuss a new reformist wave in the history of this often contested, although

very prestigious field of study. Many of these changes were effected against the background of a consistent interdisciplinary integration, but this is not a simple or unitary process, and its differences in East-Central Europe and the West need to be accounted for. At the same time, the type of reactions to the interdisciplinary model in literary studies are not similar to what happens in other humanistic fields. In this article, we set out to give a brief survey of the difficulties confronted by literary studies in their approach to interdisciplinarity in the last few decades, trying to explain why, in Stanley Fish's jocular phrase, "being interdisciplinary is so very hard to do" (Fish 1989, 15). Then we will proceed to discuss the changes in Romanian literary studies since the advent of interdisciplinarity and identify two main models of trans-disciplinary integration of literary studies, each with its merits and its limitations.

A critical discussion of interdisciplinarity in the humanities in general and especially in the parcel of literary studies must take into account two elements of difficulty, one methodological in nature, the other applicative. In what regards the *methodological* difficulty, we are referring to the vast and volatile semantics of the composite concepts that describe some form of transgression of disciplinary limits, such as inter-, multi-, trans-disciplinarity. Most studies on the topic work with a hierarchical definition of these notions, by arranging them on a scale that shows multidisciplinarity as a softer version of interdisciplinary collaboration, while transdisciplinarity is seen as the final goal of cross-disciplinary cooperation (Nicolescu 2007; Wagner et al. 2011, 16). With all these distinctions, interdisciplinarity still functions as an umbrella term for all types of research that goes beyond the limits of an established discipline. The second difficulty confronted by interdisciplinarity in the humanities is *applicative* in nature and refers to the lack of specific indicators that might measure the degree of interdisciplinarity in these disciplines. Ever since the 1960s, when the Institute for Science Information (ISI) of the United States elaborated and launched the three indexes that describe and provide hierarchies for the editorial materials of academic journals worldwide – Science Citation Index (SCI), Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) and Arts and Humanities Citation Index (AHCI) –, a number of studies remarked the differences in the specificity and in the output of research in natural sciences (NS) and in social and humanistic studies (HS). These differences regard mainly (1) *the differences in the structure of the disciplines*: a mostly applicative structure in NS; a structure centered on text and source analysis in HS (Fish 1989; Ochsner 2014); (2) *the potential for internationalization*: almost total in NS, but considerably limited in HS, since the latter are conditioned by a national language and by a local cultural patrimony and are inscribed within the local and national traditions of research of these domains (Patraş et al. 2017); (3) *the habitual type of academic*

collaboration: team work in NS vs. individual work in HS, co-authoring academic articles vs. writing single-author articles etc. (Holm, Jarrick and Scott 2015; Wagner et al. 2011); (4) *funding granted for research*: HS are taken into consideration in only 10% of the domains of the H2020 project (Pedersen 2016). All these factors influence negatively the public and academic perception of the social and humanistic studies, and reduce their capacity to attract further funding for research.

These difficulties notwithstanding, interdisciplinarity remains an indicator with a growing importance in the humanities. According to *Humanities World Report 2015* elaborated by three independent researchers, in HS interdisciplinarity is associated with *internationalization, the import of recent methodologies* from neighboring disciplines, with *developing collaborative projects* and *publishing co-authored articles* (Holm, Jarrick and Scott 2015, 122-135). However, these characteristics of interdisciplinary work go against some of the patterns and practices of humanistic disciplines. Conversely, there are aspects of humanistic research that function as actual limits of interdisciplinarity and should be perceived as such. Thus, (1) the *relatively long tradition* of many of the branches of humanistic studies led them to become self-sufficient and intra-referential, instead of trans-referential and open toward other fields of research. (2) This venerable tradition has led to the *naturalization of its founding principles*, but also to the naturalization of several practices and methods, of a certain research design and of disciplinary protocols that, as a consequence, are hard to change. However, we must note that the trans-disciplinary impulses from within the discipline have come, so far, from those who sought to contest this apparently immutable tradition. (3) There is a centripetal dynamic of humanistic studies that comes from their national circumscription or, as cultural critics have called it, their *"methodological nationalism"* (Beck 2000, Bender 2001). Given that they developed inside a national linguistic framework (the study of language and literature) or that they studied national groups (history or sociology), they transferred the characteristics of their object of study at the level of the field of research. Although the social and technological aspects of today's world – migration, mass-media and electronic communication, for instance – challenged and continue to challenge this model, in several disciplines it still remains very stable. (4) Humanistic disciplines profit from a *legitimating function* in relation to the state, since the establishment of some of these socio-humanistic disciplines at an academic level coincided with the formation or the consolidation of national states (Beck 2000). There is little incentive to abandoning a culturally prominent position that, sometimes, ensures funding from the state, albeit for political and identity related reasons. (5) To some within these disciplines, interdisciplinarity looks like an intrinsic condition of existence in this area, and this leads to the current lack in its problematization and even in its conceptualization. For instance, the *encyclopedic aspect* of early modern literary

history or of comparative literature appears to the practitioners within the field as an efficient version of interdisciplinarity. There are, indeed, specific types of traditional philological work, for instance manuscript editing, that involve forms of cross-disciplinary cooperation since long before the emergence of the concept of transdisciplinarity. But this type of work covers only a small part of the domain and does not account for the greater impact that can be achieved through a more integrated humanistic research in the face of socio-economic and cultural challenges presented by the contemporary world.

From among the humanistic sciences, literary studies represent one of the most important domains of research at a global level. An analysis of the domains in the AHCI index developed by ISI shows that 51% of the research areas imply the study of literature, whereas 33% of the total are dedicated exclusively to the study of literature (English literature, British, Germanic, Romance, Scandinavian literatures; national literatures; the study of individual authors or genres[1]). This is precisely why a discussion of the way in which interdisciplinarity is assimilated by literary studies is relevant both for the culture of the discipline, and for the various national cultures. In East-Central Europe – but also in other areas of the globe – literature functioned as a motor for the formation of national cultures and was essential in the creation of a national identity and language. In his well-known article "Why Did Modern Literary Theory Originate in Central and Eastern Europe?", Galin Tihanov notes "the early institutionalization" of literary studies in this region: "at the university level, the first chair of Russian literature in Russia was established in 1835", while "the first chair of literature in England was not established until 1852" (Tihanov 2004, 77). This early institutionalization, however, determined a development of literary studies inside a national framework which, one the one hand, gave it prominence over other academic disciplines but, on the other hand, linked it with the authority of the state and limited its field of choices. Because of this traditional association, the pressure of becoming interdisciplinary in East-Central Europe began to be felt only in the second decade of postcommunism, much later than in Western Europe and the United States, where interdisciplinarity was being discussed ever since the 1980s in a tone both playful and radical by critics such as Stanley Fish (Fish 1989).

Given all these difficulties, we preferred to use in this article the term *trans-disciplinarity* instead of *interdisciplinarity*. However, our use of the term does not imply a hierarchy of types of cross-disciplinary integration, as it is postulated in the literature on this topic (Nicolescu 2007, 54), and must be understood as stressing the linguistic root *discipline*, and not the prefix *trans-*, which Nicolescu accentuates. In order to bring out this difference, we use the hyphenated form of the word. We do not consider that the goal

of trans-disciplinarity should be an integrative humanistic science of all sciences. We consider a defining trait of trans-disciplinarity the tendency to surpass the limits of a discipline, to polemically transcend it, and we stress this distance by using the hyphenated form of the word. In this sense, trans-disciplinarity integrates the meaning of post-disciplinarity. Since we are already living in an age brimming with socio-political and cultural "post-"s, among which postcommunism, (post-)postmodernism, posthumanism, posttheory, we prefer to describe the situation of contemporary Romanian literary studies as that of a "posthistory of literature". In our account, literary history, understood as both a discipline and a practice, is less and less perceived as a "natural" model for researchers, despite its long tradition and prestige (Mironescu 2018). In what follows, we will turn to contemporary Romanian literary studies and discuss the conditions that led to a critique of the long-standing principles of the discipline in the last two decades.

2. Romanian literary studies in postcommunism and the challenge of trans-disciplinarity

Even though we are fast approaching the end of the third decade since the fall of Nicolae Ceauşescu's communist dictatorship in December 1989, the situation of contemporary literary studies in Romania still needs to be defined, at least for its initial phase, as postcommunist. This happens because the whole dynamics of the field depends on the initial condition of the discipline after the regime change. Literary studies contemplated the loss of their high status, but this was not due to a severe political indoctrination or to an exceeding nationalist instrumentalization in the communist years; on the contrary, the elevation of literature and its associated "science" during communism was indebted to the particular type of political value acquired by an openly apolitical literature. Reading literature and the practice of literary criticism had come to be seen as having a liberating effect in a time of oppression, part of what was called in the early 1990s, either derisively or apologetically, "resistance through culture". By "cultural resistance", the seemingly atemporal and ahistorical status of fiction permitted literature and the hermeneutic exercise associated with it to acquire a political value, as they effectively could "shut out" the politically manipulated quotidian reality and allow the literature connoisseur an inner space of virtual independence, for a republic of one's own. But if literary hermeneutics and close reading were thus celebrated, literary contextualization and meta-critical research were seen as derivative, inessential practices, as they engaged segments of literary history very remote from the present day (sociology of 19th century literature, for instance, in Paul Cornea (1980) and seemed to lack the kind of oblique, subversive referentiality that was

required. In time, after 1989, this generated a dissatisfaction with decontextualized literary hermeneutics and with its refusal of history stemming from a political program that no longer applied to the social realities at hand.

Another important factor that stimulated discussions of change in literary studies was the intervention of a relatively new type of work in humanistic sciences in the conditions of a market economy. While literary studies had been done with the goal of finding ever new arguments for the validity of the literary canon and, as such, had gravitated towards the consolidation of their tradition, neighboring humanistic disciplines were gaining a new-found relevance by reinventing themselves in order to comment on economic, social and political phenomena of the immediate present. Since economy, sociology or political studies could aspire to acquire influence and possibly even effect changes in society through an intelligent marriage of theory and practice, literary studies saw their old propensity toward evasion as a hindrance and sought ways in which investigating literature could become more socially engaged. Academic communities throughout East-Central Europe grappled with a new imperative, that of remaining relevant after communism (Wachtel 2006), or, in economic terms, of achieving sustainability. When trans-disciplinary methodologies and strategies began to be imported by Romanian scholars in literary studies, these were seen as a way to bring the discipline out of its perceived insularity.

At the same time, literature went ahead and did what literary studies did not appear to be interested in doing. A new generation of writers started in the 2000s to tackle socio-political problems of present Romania, including generational conflict, economical migration and identity displacement, poverty, ruin and ecological distress. Critics had to follow suit, and soon literary historians were forced to observe that a new cohort of postcommunist writers had emerged on the literary stage and had to be discussed in relation to the existing canon (Cordoş 2012). This phenomenon coincided in time with a "retreat" of a generation of critics who had been active throughout the 2000s from cultural journalism and a reorientation toward academic research (Matei 2011). While writers became socially involved and tried to reach to a socially conscious audience, the critics' turn toward academic publishing in the academia was not a form of boycotting contemporary literature – on the contrary, thanks to some of them, postcommunist Romanian literature has become a hot topic of academic study. In researching contemporary literature, power games in modern literary history and ways in which blindness to ideology provided literature with surprising insights, these authors felt compelled to open up their field to trans-disciplinary methods and borrow instruments and concepts from neighboring disciplines. The result was a new development in Romanian literary studies,

a change that brought the discipline in closer contact with other humanistic sciences and helped it metabolize its own tradition.

There are several ways in which trans-disciplinarity is processed in contemporary literary studies in Romania: (1) as a thorough critique of the fundaments of the discipline, thus going at least one step beyond its ecosystem; (2) as an integration of methodologies from other disciplines to the study of literature; (3) as a migration of literary researchers toward emergent multidisciplinary fields. It is clear that the drive to make the research more trans-disciplinary is not only a methodological imperative, but also a political one. It is not only meant to address the "technical" limitations of the field, but also to analyze the direction of the flow of concepts and theories on the international stage, to expose the power games that lead to canonical equilibrium and the ideological presuppositions that underscore the strong concepts of the discipline, and to try to find means of communication within a world-wide system of reference, thus going around the national systems of validation.

In the last decade, several interventions de-naturalized the critical language of traditional literary history through contextual analyses that exposed its formation and the reasons for its authority. Probably no other humanistic discipline in Romania went through such a deep process of self-analysis and contestation. Not always the contestations came from a polemical drive against tradition; what was crucial was the metacritical dimension of these studies, which sought to find a way to describe the premises of more traditional studies of literary history in a metalanguage that does not start from the same presuppositions. For instance, Teodora Dumitru studied the connection between the political and the literary ideology of interwar critic E. Lovinescu in her book *Modernitatea politică şi literară în gândirea lui E. Lovinescu* [*The Political and Literary Modernity in E. Lovinescu's Thought*] (2016) and in the process identified several contradictions of Romanian modernism that helped produced its unique pattern of political idealism and aesthetic autonomism. Andrei Terian proceeded to decompose the system of thought of Romania's foremost canonical critic in his monograph *G. Călinescu. A cincea esenţă* [*G. Călinescu. The Fifth Essence*] (2009) by analyzing his thesis on the aesthetic, biographism, national character etc. and also studied his many-faced legacy in Romanian criticism. In his book *Critica în tranşee. De la realismul socialist la autonomia esteticului* [*Criticism in the Trenches. From Socialist Realism to Aesthetic Autonomy*] (2011), Alex Goldiş discusses the political causes and methodological effects of the aesthetic turn in Romanian criticism in the second half of the 20th century. On the other hand, Ioana Macrea-Toma in her book *Privilighenţia: instituţii literare în comunismul românesc* [*Priviligentsia: Literary Institutions in Romanian Communism*] (2009) stressed the importance of the economics of publishing in communism and analyses the

patron-client dependence established between writers and the state. Adriana Stan gives in her book *Bastionul lingvistic. O istorie comparată a structuralismului în România* [*The Fortress of Linguistics. A Comparative History of Structuralism in Romania*] (2017) an account of Romanian structuralists and structuralism-inspired criticism in the 1960s and 1970s by taking into account the political protection that a neutral, ahistorical form of criticism inspired by the apolitical science of linguistics could provide in times of political pressure. In *Ideologiile literaturii române în postcomunism* [*The Ideologies of Romanian Literature in Postcommunism*] (2017), Mihai Iovănel turns to contemporary literature, to the writers' political allegiances, institutional power and economical interests, and analyses the social turn as it is reflected not only by writers with canonical aspirations, but also by popular fiction authors from "minor" genres. Finally, bringing together all the insights provided by these authors and many more, a collective work edited by Mircea Martin, Christian Moraru and Andrei Terian, *Romanian Literature as World Literature* (2017), set out to deconstruct Romanian literary history by setting it against the world scene and identifying the "quilting points" of its transnational tapestry. In all these critical works we are talking about a virtual type of trans-disciplinarity, which actually has an epistemological function, rather than a methodological one. They tend to distance themselves from key moments of the history of the discipline in order to better describe them critically, but in the process they de-naturalize the canonical position of the authors discussed and relate their theories and concepts to the contexts which influenced their formation. By examining how concepts came to be elaborated, they restore the historicity of often actualized and multiply refunctionalized concepts and reveal literary history as an activity heavily marked by its own historicity, that often comes to be obscured by the discipline's tendency to perpetuate itself and to consolidate its tradition.

But aside from these critical works and their implicit trans-disciplinarity, there are studies which indeed practice trans-disciplinarity in an explicit manner. Their appearance is suggestive of the drive in the discipline toward a more integrative methodology, that borrows more from other humanistic studies and conceives of literature as occupying a much more volatile space, that overlaps with that of many other disciplines, among which geography, statistics, economy, environmentalism, trauma studies and cultural studies. We are interested in the ways these forms of explicitly trans-disciplinary work transform the domain of literary studies, and to this end we stop at two directions that are fairly well represented today, quantitative literary studies and memory studies.

Entering the Romanian stage in the context of a powerful drive toward internationalization, quantitative studies profited from the manifestation of two principal theories that came to dominate literary research at the beginning of the 21st century: *world literature studies* and the so-called "space turn"

in the humanities. While the first encouraged big-scale investigations of large numbers of texts, following literary phenomena across literatures and ages, and research on translations, the space turn favored a heightened awareness of the predicament of globalization. Quantitative studies in the United States and Western Europe are usually the product of large interdisciplinary teams working on institutionally supported research projects, but in Romania they have been done, so far, by individual researchers in small working groups, especially at the universities in Cluj and Sibiu. The problems raised by their studies concern the corpora and databases available for quantitative research, as well as the difficulties of working with them (Terian 2019a). This is why one of their most important achievements so far is that of transforming several instruments produced by classical philology (mainly dictionaries of the Romanian novel or of works translated into Romanian) from sources of information into resources for quantitative research, thereby refunctionalizing existing corpora of metadata as primary sources for a new way of investigating literature. The topics researched are usually classical topics of Romanian literary history, such as the predominance of specific genres in literature (Terian 2019b) or the international circulation of Romanian literature in translations (Sass, Baghiu, Pojoga 2018). The avowed intention of many studies that use the quantitative method is to go beyond the results of traditional criticism and to overturn classical perceptions and interpretations through the authority of numbers.

Another type of disciplinary behavior in postcommunist Romanian literary studies is migration to emerging trans-disciplinary fields, among which a prominent place is held by memory studies. Stemming from Holocaust studies and group sociology, memory studies gained considerable terrain recently in East-Central Europe, mainly because the local memory battles that had waited to be fought for decades needed a wider space in which to be played out and, hopefully, come to an ending. Although memory has been obsessively present in the public arena in Romania for the last three decades, only in recent years a critical theory of memory started to materialize, with a consistent help from literary scholars. It is also true that literary scholars are more prone to doing theory on the topic of memory than historians or sociologists because of their formation in a theoretically-inclined discipline. The fact that postcommunist literature turned to the topics of social angst, troubled identity and generational conflict was reflected by the turn to memory in academic research, given that the most prominent topic in memory studies in Romania is remembering communism and the various forms of memorialization that emerged in postcommunism, be they fiction or memoirs, public monuments and other forms of art, film, Facebook groups, museums and virtual archives. The novelty of the matter under study is a defining trait of most of the studies in memory produced, although some work on Romantic literature and ruinology does

exist (Mironescu 2016). But the bulk of the work being done refers to the memory of communism, a topic that has helped in the internationalization as research, as multinational teams investigate the East-Central European memory of communism (Todorova 2014) or the state of cultural memory in contemporary Romanian literature and art (Mattusch 2018). The field also favors comparative and intermedial studies, such as Claudiu Turcuş's *Împotriva memoriei. De la estetismul socialist la noul cinema românesc* [*Against Memory. From Socialist Aestheticism to the New Romanian Cinema*] (2017). The aim of such studies is to offer analyses on literary and literature-adjacent topics that might be used by researchers in neighboring domains. This is why the engagement with canonical issues of Romanian literary history is less important for these scholars, as they tend to neglect them in order to achieve a better interaction with colleagues from other fields of research.

3. Conclusions

In Romania, literary studies are still developed in the academia under the guise of national literary history, as most university study programs will attest. In Romanian universities, literary studies are not subject to pressure in favor of interdisciplinarity, as it happens for more than three decades in the U.S. and Western Europe. At the same time, there are no research policies that push traditional humanistic disciplines to become "sustainable" through social-oriented cross-disciplinary research. This is why at the center of the canon of the discipline are still single-authored national literary histories, starting with G. Călinescu's influential *Istoria literaturii române de la origini până în prezent* [*History of Romanian Literature from Its Origins to the Present Day*] (1941) and ending with N. Manolescu's *Istoria critică a literaturii române* [*Critical History of Romanian Literature*] (2008). In this article, our goal was to identify the premises for a systemic change of the discipline following the advent of trans-disciplinary methodologies and research patterns and behaviors in Romania. The first thing we noticed was the strong impetus of a generation of critics emerging in the years 2000 that work to de-naturalize the language and the premises of traditional literary history. In the wake of this metacritical drive, critics turned to methods and instruments that originated from other disciplines in order to achieve more positive results to long-debated topics of literary history. In their early stages, quantitative studies relied on major literary dictionaries initially meant as monuments of and to the discipline they served, turning them into databases. In this way, traditional literary history was estranged from its own purposes and used as a basis for new types of research, less concerned with borrowing the authority of tradition. On the other hand, beyond the methodological import,

emerging transnational and trans-disciplinary fields such as memory studies attracted Romanian literary researchers. By working essentially on the topic of postcommunism, memory studies in Romania achieved the objective of internationalization, but strayed from their original disciplinary allegiance, a fact which might not let them contribute to the reformation of the field. Literary studies constantly reform themselves and are habitually oblivious to exterior factors thanks to their tradition and prestige. But in the last three decades, the growing imperative of trans-disciplinarity encouraged them to open up to other humanistic sciences and profit from their metacritical drive to question the premises of literary history as a model of the discipline. Still, this trans-disciplinary turn functions, for now, from the bottom-up, from individual researchers to, presumably, the institutions in which they function.

Notes

[1] Cf.: http://mjl.clarivate.com/scope/scope_ahci/

References

Beck, Ulrich. 2000. "The Cosmopolitan Perspective: Sociology of the Second Age of Modernity". *British Journal of Sociology* 51: 79-105.

Bender, Thomas. 2001. "Writing National History in a Global Age". *Correspondence: An International Review of Culture and Society* 7: 13-14.

Călinescu, G. 2003. *Istoria literaturii române de la origini până în prezent*. București: Semne.

Cordoş, Sada. 2012. *Lumi din cuvinte. Reprezentări și identități în literature română postbelică. București: Cartea Românească.*

Cornea, Paul. 1980. *Regula jocului. Versantul colectiv al literaturii*. București: Eminescu.

Fish, Stanley. 1989. "Being Interdisciplinary Is So Very Hard to Do". *Profession*: 15-22.

Goldiş, Alex. 2011. *Critica în tranşee. De la realismul socialist la autonomia esteticului*. București: Cartea Românească.

Holm, P.; A. Jarrick; and D. Scott. 2015. *Humanities World Report 2015*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Iovănel, Mihai. 2017. *Ideologiile literaturii române în postcomunism*. București: Editura Muzeului Literaturii Române

Macrea-Toma, Ioana. 2009. *Privilighenția: instituții literare în comunismul românesc*. Cluj-Napoca: Casa Cărții de Știință.

Manolescu, Nicolae. 2008. *Istoria critică a literaturii române*. Pitești: Paralela 45.

Martin, Mircea; Christian Moraru; and Andrei Terian (eds). 2017. *Romanian Literature as World Literature*. New York: Bloomsbury.

Matei, Alexandru. 2011. "Critica literară la ora culturii de masă – diviziunea mitotică a criticii contemporane". *Dilemateca* VI, 59: 14.

Mattusch, Michèle (ed.). 2018. *Kulturelles Gedächtnis, Ästhetisches Erinnern. Literatur, Film und Kunst in Rumänien*. Berlin: Frank und Timme.

Mironescu, Andreea. 2018. "Extinderea domeniului literaturii. Integrarea formelor hibride în istoria literară românească". *Philologica Jassyensia* 2(28): 71-82.

Mironescu, Doris. 2016. *Un secol al memoriei. Literatură și conștiință comunitară în epoca romantică*. Iași: Editura Universității " Alexandru Ioan Cuza".

Moraru, Christian and Andrei Terian. 2017. *Introduction: The Worlds of Romanian Literature and the Geopolitics of Reading*. In *Romanian Literature as World Literature*, edited by Mircea Martin, Christian Moraru, Andrei Terian, 1-31. New York: Bloomsbury.

Nicolescu, Basarab. 2007. *Transdisciplinaritatea. Manifest*. Iași: Junimea.

Patraș, Roxana; Andreea Mironescu; Camelia Grădinaru; and Emanuel Grosu. 2017. "Poate fi măsurată interdisciplinaritatea? O analiză calitativă și cantitativă a cuvintelor cheie". *Transilvania* 10: 17-31.

Ochsner, M.; Hug, S.; and Daniel, H.D. 2014. *Zeitschrift für Erziehungswiss*, 17(Supl 6): 111-132.

Pedersen, David Butz. 2016. "Integrating Social Sciences and Humanities in Interdisciplinary Research". *Palgrave Communications* 2: article number 16036.

Sass, Maria; Ștefan Baghiu; and Vlad Pojoga (eds). 2018. *The Culture of Translation in Romania/ Übersetzungskultur und Literaturübersetzen in Rümanien*. Bern: Peter Lang.

Stan, Adriana. 2017. *Bastionul lingvistic. O istorie comparată a structuralismului în România*. București: Editura Muzeului Literaturii Române.

Terian, Andrei. 2009. *G. Călinescu. A cincea esență*. București: Cartea Românească.

Terian, Andrei. 2019a. "Big Numbers. A Quantitative Analysis of the Development of the Novel in Romania". *Transylvanian Review* XXVIII(Supl 1): 55-71.

Terian, Andrei. 2019b. "Istoria literară și analiza cantitativă: un studiu al pieței de carte actuale din România". In *Exploring the Digital turn,* edited by Anca-Diana Bibiri, Camelia Grădinaru, Emanuel Grosu, Andreea Mironescu, Roxana Patraș, 33-43. Iași: Editura Universității "Alexandru Ioan Cuza".

Tihanov, Galin. 2004. "Why Did Modern Literary Theory Originate in Central and Eastern Europe? (And Why It is Now Dead)". *Common Knowledge* 10(1): 61-81.

Todorova, Maria, Augusta Dimou, Stefan Troebst. 2014. *Remembering Communism. Genres of Representation*. Budapest: CEU Press.

Turcuș, Claudiu. 2017. *Împotriva memoriei. De la estetismul socialist la noul cinema românesc*. Cluj-Napoca: Eikon.

Wachtel, Andrew. 2006. *Remaining Relevant after Communism. The Role of the Writer in Eastern Europe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Wagner, C.S. et al. 2011. "Approaches to understanding and measuring interdisciplinary scientific research (IDR): A review of the literature". *Journal of Informetrics* 165: 14-26.

Mihaela MOCANU *
Anca-Diana BIBIRI **

Beyond "Tribes and Territories" in Humanities

Abstract: Largely used in the early 1990's for the cultures of academic disciplines and their roots in different knowledge characteristics, the "tribes and territories" metaphor refers to the borders between traditional disciplines and the researchers' and academics' tendency to isolate themselves within the limits of their own discipline. Starting from the belief that a fragmentary approach can only provide a limited perspective upon the object of knowledge, the interdisciplinary approach has gradually gained solid ground starting from the second decade of the 20th century, leading thus to the development of interdisciplinary research fields. In this context, both sociolinguistics, developed at the confluence of linguistics with sociology, starting in the mid-20th century, and computational linguistics, emerging at the end of the same century, at the borderline between classical linguistics and computer science, propose interdisciplinary approaches to language facts, by exploring the conceptual and methodological apparatus of linguistics, sociology and the automatic processing of language. This study presents the methodological particularities of the two disciplines, highlighting the arguments they bring to support the interdisciplinary research of linguistic phenomena.

Keywords: interdisciplinarity, humanities, sociolinguistics, computational linguistics.

1. The "tribes and territories" metaphor

The "tribes and territories" metaphor was coined by Tony Becher in his work entitled *Academic Tribes and Territories: Intellectual enquiry and the culture of disciplines*, first published in 1989. The book provides an account of researches, data and theories indicating that "the knowledge structures of disciplines (the academic territories) strongly condition or even determine the behaviour and values of academics. In this account academics live in disciplinary tribes with common sets of practices, at least as far as research practices are concerned" (Trowler 2014, 17). The empirical research Becher's thesis is based upon was conducted in the mid 1980's in several top

* PhD, Senior Researcher, Institute for Interdisciplinary Research, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Department, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iaşi, Romania; email: mihaelamocanuiasi.@yahoo.com
** PhD, Researcher, Institute for Interdisciplinary Research, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Department, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iaşi, Romania; email: anca.bibiri@gmail.com

universities in Great Britain (Birmingham**;** Brighton Polytechnic; Bristol; Cambridge; Chelsea College London; Essex; Exeter; Imperial College London; Kent; London School of Economics; Reading; Southampton; University College London) and USA (University of California: Berkeley, Los Angeles, San Francisco; Santa Barbara; Stanford). Becher gathered a total of 221 interviews with respected scholars and researchers from over 12 academic fields, interrogating their approach to research and the influence of the structure of knowledge on research practices in those different disciplines.

The knowledge structures that constitute the epistemological nucleus of the disciplines present: (i) a cognitive dimension (Biglan 1973; Kolb 1981), in relation to which one can distinguish between *hard* and *soft*, *pure* and *applicative* disciplines, and (ii) a social dimension (Becher 1989), in relation to which one can differentiate between four other types of disciplines: *convergent* and *divergent*, *urban* and *rural*. Based on these classifications, it is possible to state that physics for example is hard, pure, convergent and urban, while sociology is soft, pure, divergent and rural. The disciplinary knowledge characteristics generate practice differences between the academic "tribes", mirrored by their approach of the research issues, by their collaboration with researchers working in different fields, and even by their methods of disseminating the outcomes of their research.

The importance of Tony Becher's book lies in the construction of a new framework for conceptualizing the influences exerted on academic practices, through the reflections he proposes on major questions regarding the status of academic disciplines and the relationships between them: Have disciplines been displaced by inter-disciplinarity, having outlived their usefulness? and How significant are disciplinary differences in teaching and research practices? (Becher 1994).

While some researchers regard it as outdated (Manathunga and Brew 2012, 44). when it comes to reflecting the new realities of the academic and research world, the "tribes and territories" metaphor could be related to the atomization and fragmentation tendency characterizing the classical inter-disciplinary approach to knowledge phenomena Starting from the mid-20th century, the disciplinary perspective has been perceived as insufficient in meeting the challenges of a society that is constantly changing, due to the continuous development of the information and communication fields. Consequently, "the atmosphere of indifference, and even adversity and hostility that used to dominate (and still dominates) the relations between the 'exact' sciences and humanities appears increasingly anachronistic" (Marcus 2011, 10). The natural response to this was not necessarily aimed at giving up the disciplinary approach perspectives, but rather at stimulating interdisciplinary interaction, the conceptual and methodological dialogue

between various fields of study, due to the firm belief that such an approach could provide a more complex knowledge of the investigated phenomena.

2. Inter-, pluri-, multi- and trans-disciplinarity

The 20th century is marked by a complex process of reconfiguration of the field of knowledge, resulted from the need of a holistic, unifying perspective that could trespass the rigid borderlines between traditional disciplines, a tendency that had already been anticipated by the birth of hybrid research field as well as by the unprecedented development of the comparative studies. The profound epistemological crisis generated the restructuring of "the way we think about the way we think" was reflected by an increased permeability of the borderlines between various knowledge and research fields, a hybridization of genres and the post-modern return to the great theories and cosmologies. According to Julie Thomson Klein, "all interdisciplinary activities are rooted in the ideas of unity and synthesis, evoking a common epistemology of convergence" (Klein 1990, 11).

A series of new terms that had been coined in the 19th century, such as *inter-*, *multi-*, *pluri-* and *transdisciplinarity*, designate the interference between traditional disciplines, a certain blurring of the separating lines between research fields and a conceptual and methodological transfer between disciplines. Despite their success, the above-mentioned terms lack rigour as far as their definitions are concerned, being often used as umbrella-terms carrying a variety of meanings and significations. Generally speaking, interdisciplinarity involves the combining of two or more academic disciplines into one activity. General dictionaries define *interdisciplinarity* as the transfer of concepts and methodology from one discipline to another with the aim of approaching research issues from a more adequate perspective. Thus, according to *The Oxford English Dictionary* interdisciplinarity means "of or pertaining to two or more disciplines or branches of learning; contributing to or benefiting from two or more disciplines". *The Collins Dictionary* defines interdisciplinarity as "the quality or state of involving more than one discipline", while *The Cambridge Dictionary* provides the following definition: "the fact of involving two or more different subjects or areas of knowledge".

One can note that most dictionary definitions relate the term *interdisciplinarity* with *disciplinarity*, with a delimitation of the specific difference between the two concepts. Emphasizing the close connection between the two terms, Louis Menand states that "interdisciplinarity is not only completely consistent with disciplinarity, it actually depends on the concept" (Menand 2001, 52). Consequently, "understanding the role of disciplines in interdisciplinary studies should be central to a full understanding of interdisciplinarity" (Newell 1998, 541).

Interdisciplinary research represents an individual or team research method aimed at capitalizing "data, information, techniques, tools, perspectives, concepts, and/or theories from two or more disciplines or bodies of specialized knowledge to advance fundamental understanding or to solve problems whose solutions are beyond the scope of a discipline or field of research practice" (Keestra et al. 2016, 31). Interdisciplinary research approach requires "not pasting two disciplines together to create one product but rather an integration and a synthesis of ideas and methods" (Newell 1998, 541). The purpose of interdisciplinary research is actually a pragmatic one: to solve a problem, to resolve an issue, to raise a new question, to explain a phenomenon, to create a new product, or to address a topic, all these being too complex for the methodological inventory of a single discipline and requiring thus an interdisciplinary approach. The aim of interdisciplinary approaches is finally "to produce a more comprehensive understanding or cognitive advancement" (Repko 2008, 12).

Starting from the dictionary definition of the adjective *interdisciplinary*: "involving two or more different subjects or areas of knowledge" (*Cambridge Dictionary*), we define the interdisciplinary approach as the connection between two or more academic disciplines in some way or ways. We must mention that dictionary definitions "remain rather vague regarding what exactly is being used or combined within the involved disciplines or how that combination is actually accomplished" (Augsburg 2016, 13). The semantic dilution of the term is the result of both its use at a large scale and the lack of unitary criteria used in the evaluation of interdisciplinarity. Thus, in the academic context, *interdisciplinarity* has become an over-used term: there is hardly any scientific event nowadays that does not declare its interdisciplinary character, while scientific publications massively encourage, by means of their editorial policies, scientific papers proposing interdisciplinary approaches. Lately, the assessment of research projects has been entirely based on the interdisciplinary nature of their scientific approach. Taking into account this terminological inflation one might rightfully ask whether interdisciplinarity is a trend or a reality of contemporary scientific reality.

In the academic discourse, interdisciplinarity typically applies to four realms: knowledge, research, education, and theory (Nissani 1995, 121). *Interdisciplinarity* is in competition with the other terms mentioned above: *trans-*, *pluri-* and *multidisciplinarity*, although the semantic delimitations between these terms are not always clear. In these conditions, *interdisciplinarity* is often used in a relation of synonymy with the concepts of *pluridisciplinarity* and *transdisciplinarity*, despite the differences in meaning displayed by these terms. To sum up, while *pluridisciplinarity* represents the study of an object by means of multiple disciplinary contributions, and while *transdisciplinarity* aims at studying *among*, *through* and *beyond* disciplines, in order to reach a better

understanding of the world, from the perspective of knowledge, *interdisciplinarity* designates the transfer of concepts and methods from one discipline to the other. Transdisciplinarity is regarded "as the further development of inter-disciplinarity" (Mittelstrass 2011, 329)

The term *interdisciplinarity* gained ground in the field of education sciences, where it defines the process of cooperation, unification and unitary codification of various scientific disciplines, involving a certain degree of integration between the different fields of knowledge and between different approaches, as well as the use of a common language allowing for conceptual and methodological changes. The interdisciplinary approach in the field of education sciences is based on the belief that no educational discipline is a closed field, the interdisciplinary correlation of information from different fields being beneficial for the development of both the critical and reflective thinking of an individual.

Transgressing certain epistemological and methodological barriers between various disciplines has resulted in a re-assessment of the research object, which is no longer regarded from the unique perspective of a single discipline, but rather placed under the magnifying glass of the interdisciplinary approach. The research object is studied from all angles, while the analysis is performed with methodological and epistemological tools belonging to several disciplines, aimed at rendering the research deeper and more extended. The exploitation of the connections between disciplines requires, nevertheless, superior skills and abilities from the researcher, since interdisciplinarity means more than the mere agglutination of concepts and methods belonging to different disciplines, it actually implies the systemic and integrative usage of these methods and concepts.

3. Arguments for an interdisciplinary approach of language facts

Analysing the arguments in favour of interdisciplinarity, Bengt Hansson highlights two aspects that are essential to the phenomenon of knowledge: (i) the nature of problems and (ii) the nature of breakthroughs (Hansson 1999, 339). The former refers to the complexity of the issues that should be solved by science and that require the joint effort of several disciplines to identify solutions. The latter aspect, highlighted by the history of science, indicates that the major discoveries were the outcome of the exploitation of the knowledge and methods of several disciplines and rather than of disciplinary approaches.

Without aiming at providing an exhaustive presentation of the meaning of language, we feel it is necessary to introduce a series of conceptual clarifications that refer to the framework of our study. The identity of verbal language, among other "languages" used by people (the language of

colours, the language of clothes, the language of architecture, the language of music and the like), is defined by the relationship with the other, each act of language being the product of an individual who can only define himself/herself in relation to another individual, according to the principle of otherness (without another human being there is no self-consciousness). Language is not just any faculty, or merely one of the many activities performed by an individual; on the contrary, it is one of the fundamental dimensions of the existence of a human being: "Whereas by means of their work people build a world which is appropriate for their physical existence, by means of language they build an existence that is appropriate for their spiritual life" (Coşeriu 2009, 39).

Awareness with regard to the primordial nature of verbal language among all communication systems has turned it into a central topic of reflection and research since ancient times (from this viewpoint, rhetoric, philosophy and logic are areas systematically concerned with the nature and manifestations of verbal language). The 20th century brought along a reflective return towards the nature of language, inaugurating new disciplines, such as linguistics, semiotics or pragmatics which assume it as a research object. This ever-increasing interest is fuelled by the linguistic turn, initiated by the *Course in General Linguistics* (1916), authored by the Geneva linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, who emphasizes the necessity of a theory of language. The proper understanding of the importance of language in the communication process and the immense potential of discursiveness turns discursive acts into a favourite research object of the humanities. Moreover, the emergence of computer languages, with the immense potential they open for human knowledge and communication, has stimulated the emergence of new fields of analysis, proving once again the constantly changing nature of verbal language. The interdisciplinary approach to language facts is supported by the premise that the development of a fully comprehensive explanatory model of the language phenomenon should definitely take into account both the implicit linguistic factors (linguistic units, linguistic relations and structures) and the extra-linguistic factors (ontological, gnoseological and social in the first place).

3.1. *Sociolinguistics*

One of the modern frontier disciplines developed during the second half of the 20th century, namely sociolinguistics (SL), emerged at the crossroad between linguistics and sociology. Although it represents an independent interdisciplinary field, SL is still regarded by certain researchers as a mere branch of linguistics. Aiming at the systematic study of the functioning of language in its micro- and macro-social context, the new discipline has its roots in the USA. The term *socio-linguistics* was used for the first time in 1952

by H.C. Currie. In 1963 sociolinguistic research became official and the Sociolinguistic Commission was founded, followed in 1964 by the first symposium of ethno- and sociolinguistics, held in Bloomington. The emergence of sociolinguistics was anticipated by a series of disciplines belonging to traditional linguistics which dealt with relating linguistic phenomena to extra-linguistic factors: dialectology and linguistic geography, historical linguistics, the study of bi- and multilingualism. An important part in the development of SL was played by language sociology studies, initiated in Europe around the mid-20th century. Among the sources of SL we should also mention the studies conducted by the American anthropologists and ethnologists who, while studying the indigenous linguistic communities, aimed at explaining, among other aspects, the verbal interaction occurring within and outside these groups. The American linguist William Labov is known as the founder of quantitative sociolinguistics, as he proposes a social approach to the language by means of the sociolinguistic model through the variability concept. The importance of using language in the social context in which it is materialized is also advocated for by Labov, who emphasizes linguistic productions rather than theorized linguistic abstractions, stressing the importance of the study of the social context in which language is manifested.

Whereas in the foreign literature on the field the two concepts, namely sociolinguistics and language sociology designate the same reality, the Romanian literature manifests a tendency towards semantic specialization, as the term "sociolinguistics" is used to designate the new discipline, whereas "language sociology" is claimed by sociologists as one of the branches of their science. In the case of language sociology, language facts are only mentioned for the characterization of certain sociological categories.

After the emergence of SL, the discipline follows an upward trend, as indicated by the large number of studies and works in the field, the more and more numerous departments of sociolinguistics in universities as well as the multitude of scientific events organized around this topic. While SL researchers were at first interested in highlighting the dependence of the language facts variation on the variation of social factors in a given socio-cultural community, towards the end of the 20th century SL became obviously close to pragmatics, for the benefit of both disciplines.

As far as the object of study of SL is concerned, at the beginnings of this discipline researchers were rather suspicious with regard to a specific object of study, perceiving SL rather as a particular way of approaching linguistic facts, as an extra-linguistic, sociocultural perspective upon the linguistic code. The rigorous designation of a specific research object proved to be a lengthy and difficult process. According to the existing definitions SL is limited to: the study of the relationship between language and social factors such as class, age, gender and ethnicity (Hudson 1996, 3); or as the study

of the effect of any and all aspects of society, including cultural norms, expectations, and context on the way language is used (Trudgill 2000, 20); the study of stylistic and social variation of language (Wardhaugh 2010, 10) or to "the study of language variety and variation in relation with the structure of the linguistic communities of speakers" (Coşeriu 1994, 133). We could sum up by saying that the object of SL is linguistic diversity influenced by social factors. The literature in the field distinguishes between four main types of linguistic variation which act at a macro-social level with repercussions at the individual communicative behaviour level: (i) *diastratic variation* (i.e. social); (ii) *diaphasic variation* (i.e. stylistic); (iii) *diatopic variation* (territorial or dialectal) and (iv) *diachronic variation* (or historical).

With regard to the process of delimiting the research object of SL, Coşeriu refers to a system displaying three levels of language achievement defined as activity, knowledge and product (individual / historical / universal), which would have the following correspondents: discourse sociolinguistics, the sociolinguistics of languages and the sociolinguistics of speech in general (Coşeriu 1981, 8). Each of these three dimensions of manifestation is associated its own tasks. Thus: 1. the purpose of speech SL in general would be to investigate the degree of knowledge and use of general norms of speech (...) in relation to the social (or sociocultural) structure of linguistic communities; 2. the object of a SL of languages would be the study of the diastatic variation (of sociolects respectively) of an idiom in their reciprocal relations, as well as the study of the inter-diastatic knowledge (respectively of the extent to which the different sociolects are shared and known in a given community); 3. the sociolinguistic of discourse would consider traditional discourses and types of discourse as attributes of social categories, specifying their status and prestige in a given social context.

As far as its methodology is concerned, SL does not consist in a juxtaposition of the issues and work methods linguistics and sociology normally deal with, but it represents a new qualitative field which has its own objectives and research tools. As an interdisciplinary study, SL reflects the mutual implication relationship between linguistics and sociology. The existence of such a relationship is closely connected with the twofold aspect of the linguistic act: an interaction fact between individuals and, at the same time, a coordinated manifestation of certain linguistic elements. Sociolinguistics targets, on the one hand, the correlations between social structures and linguistic structures and, on the other hand, the changes that occur in this relationship, trying to find out the interaction between social and linguistic structures.

The main method used for the collection of material SL coincides with the one used in dialectology: the investigation. Both the direct investigation (where answers to a pre-established questionnaire are written down on the

spot) and the indirect investigation (where the entire interview/investigation is recorded and subsequently transcribed) are used. Exact data regarding the characteristics of verbal interaction within different communities can be provided by the recording of various conversations between the members of a community rather than by a questionnaire investigation. A slight guidance of the conversation by the investigator might help obtain data regarding the attitude of the members of the community towards people outside that community (the insider-outside relationship). The dialectal investigation differs from the sociolinguistic investigation in terms of the informers and the questionnaire. While in dialectology the aim is to identify the typical informer for a certain community, for a certain age group or social category, the SL investigation requires the simultaneous use of several informers, of different ages and professions who were either born in the respective community of have recently settled there (Haugen, 1971, defines it as "the intensive study of a population"). This difference results from the fact that dialectology deals with determining the local invariant features of language whose confrontation can provide the image of the characteristics of linguistic variation on a large territory, that is horizontally, whereas SL aims at establishing the "social invariants" of language, whose confrontation provides information about the vertical differentiations within language; for each locality, the juxtaposition of social invariants provides a mosaic-like image of the structure of the language.

The sociolinguistic investigation is not limited to rural or conservative communities; it actually targets the most diverse types of communities, including the large urban settlements. A special type of research, described and used by W. Labov is the one he labels as "rapid anonymous investigations" which consist in systematic observations based on brief conversations during which the investigator does not introduce himself/herself as such to the subjects. Such investigations were carried out in several department stores in New York. Moreover, non-systematic observations can also be carried out (where the specialist has no intervention whatsoever in orienting/guiding the discussions) by recording conversations between various individuals in places where verbal interaction is spontaneous and sufficient from a quantitative viewpoint (restaurants, means of transportation, stores, etc.). In such situations, the investigator has no information about the subjects, except for the information they communicate accidentally and obviously except for the information revealed by their manner of speech. The questionnaire used in SL investigations is significantly shorter than the one used in dialectal investigations, as the researcher aims at investigating as many people as possible. The researchers are interested in only a limited number of linguistic phenomena, the so-called linguistic variables, which are attributed the status of relevant indicators for the distinctions applied to a certain community.

The issues related to SL have been approached in different manners, depending on the existing traditions related to linguistic research. In USA, for instance, in the anthropological research tradition, the accent fell on the study of the relationships between standard language and culture and Indian languages and cultures, bilingualism and urban dialectology. In France, where linguistic geography first appeared, SL exploited the outcomes of dialectology, while an equally vivid interest was manifested for discourse studies (with a focus on political discourse) and school SL. In Germany, the focus fell on the theory and practice of communication, whereas in the former Soviet Union the main interest was centred upon planning and linguistic policies, determined by multilingualism and the enforcement of Russian as the official language. Sociolinguistics has been underrepresented in Romania, where the few sporadic approaches in the field belong mainly to dialectologists, challenged by the relationship between dialects and the literary language. Moreover, we should mention the contributions in psycholinguistics signed by Tatiana Slama-Cazacu, as well as the language sociology studies published by Traian Herseni along with the school sociolinguistic studies conducted by Marina Ciolac. The central issues regarding the relationship between the literary language and the other levels and styles of the language have been frequently approached by both linguists and dialectologists almost exclusively from the perspective of normative linguistics and stylistics and very rarely from a sociolinguistic viewpoint.

3.2. *Computational linguistics*

A relatively young discipline, computational linguistics (CL) is situated, as suggested by its name, at the borderline between classical linguistic and computer sciences. Along with The Technology of Human Language (THL), CL approaches the study of human language from a double perspective:

a) a theoretical one, as it adds the theoretical and experimental apparatus of computer sciences to the language investigation methods specific to classical linguistics;

b) an experimental one, as its ultimate aim is to help people communicate with the machine in the most natural way possible, namely by using natural language.

CL is basically a discipline that uses computerized techniques of linguistic analysis that involve algorithms, data structures and formal models of representation as well as artificial intelligence techniques. Based on various formalisms, with the aim of creating various algorithms and programs for intelligent processing (analysis, understanding, interpretation, translation) of texts, computational linguistics aims at "understanding" and processing

natural language using the computer. Beyond the specific methodological inventory, CL shares similar objectives with the other scientific fields, aiming at capturing the dynamics of discourse and its defining features.

The history of the field is about half a century long, as its beginnings can be traced around the mid-20th century, being associated with the attempts of automated processing related to mathematical linguistics research and the computational linguistics of the 1960's. At the beginning the main interests of the researchers in the field focused on automatic translation programmes; the area of research subsequently extended comprising various other issues such as: computer-assisted lexicographic research, "direct translation" models, syntactic analysis, statistical analysis of natural languages, dependence grammars, mathematical linguistics, etc.

The research efforts undertaken in this field were initially of a theoretical nature: they mainly sought to prove some of the theories developed on natural language by quantitative methods. The advent of the internet brought along a commercial interest, the creation and exploitation of applications that use human language, computer applications being nowadays largely used in telephone services and tourism. However, at present, most applications in the THL field seem to be centred upon the efficient use of the information space offered by the *web*. Studies indicate that nowadays people waste at least as much time in searching for information as they do for the productive use of such information, even if most of the information known today is available, one way or another, as text on the *web*.

A tendency to preserve the identity of national languages has become obvious in our modern society. In a world where politics, the economy and information have been globalized and somehow standardized, the languages of smaller and medium nations are in the danger of being diminished or even disappear as they are taken over by those languages spoken at a larger scale. The electronic presence of a language within the web has become an indicator of its use: the more present a language is in the electronic media, the more important that language is. Consequently, the priority of each linguistic community is to create electronic linguistic resources of large dimensions and to develop the necessary technology for the processing of their specific language.

A research direction belonging to the field of computational linguistics, automated discourse analysis is an interdisciplinary approach whose aim is to perform the discourse analysis using computer specific tools. It relies on the conceptual and theoretical apparatus used in rhetoric, linguistics, communication sciences, psychology, sociology, to which the experimental potential of information media is added. Specialists in the field of computational linguistics believe that since a text is spoken and triggers a certain linguistic behaviour, it becomes discourse. In CL, discourse has been at the centre of several computational theories. Computational linguistics starts

from the premise that beyond any diverse and seemingly disordered string of words there is a structure and this structure is revealed by the theories of syntax. In turn, semantics is concerned with the way in which the elementary meanings of words, which become so fragile when separated from context, are combined and form the meanings of utterances. How are these meanings of separate sentences interconnected in the story communicated by an entire text and which are the laws that discourse is based upon? These are questions for which computational theories of discourse seek answers.

Regarded from the larger perspective of CL, the theories of discourse enter the stage only after morphology, syntax and computational semantics already brought their contribution to the field. These approaches must actually be regarded as complementary, as they all aim at understanding the laws that govern a discursive manifestation. The basic constitutive element of a discourse is called discourse unit. Most authors accept the clause as the discourse unit. A clause generally communicates a situation, an event, a state. Most theories approaching the issue of discourse representation and processing accept the hypothesis that the discourse structure has a tree-like representation. Discourse units are attached to the tree-like structure gradually, as they occur.

Which is the message that the author intends to send with a text and how does the author persuade the reader about his/her intention? Considering that any concept can be expressed in several ways, why do we choose a specific form over the other? What are the elements that contribute to the cohesion of a text, what makes it coherent? Can one use a pronoun (a referential expression, generally) anywhere in a text? What is the connection between discourse structure and referentiality? These are the questions discourse theories attempt to provide answers to. Four of these theories certainly dominate the field of computational linguistics: *the rhetoric structures theory*, *the attentional state theory*, *the centres theory* and *the veins theory* (Cristea 2002, 271-304, Cristea et al. 1998).

Each of the above-mentioned classical discourse theories provides the framework for subsequent analytical development meant to overcome the limits of one model or another, to deepen and confer more significance to the research. Of the main research directions belonging to automated discourse analysis we mention: morphological analysis, lexical analysis, syntactic analysis, semantic analysis, cognitive-discursive analysis. In this respect, a series of analysis programmes has been designed to follow up a single level of discourse, along with programmes aimed at performing a more complex analysis, on multiple levels (Grosz et al. 1995). The main advantages of automated discourse analysis refer to: the possibility of processing large corpora; the capacity to express linguistic theories in a formal manner; the assessment of the validity of certain natural language theories; establishing

certain patterns at a semantic and syntactic level as well as defining the relationships between the two levels of a text; establishing the right premises for the objectification of discourse interpretations (Grosz and Sidner 1986). Nevertheless, computer-aided discourse analysis is challenged by a series of limitations, as well. First of all, only texts in electronic format can be processed. Secondly, there are aspects of language that computer technology is still unable to formalize. Such an example would be issues related to semantic ambiguity that can only be solved in relation to their discursive context. Last but not least, computer-assisted analysis remains mainly a quantitative type of analysis.

Despite all the above-mentioned limitations, the computer-assisted processing and analysis of language facts has seen an unprecedented development.

> In analysing human language, by means of extremely rigorous methods inherited from its mathematical origin, informatics is far from destroying its mysterious nature, its ambiguity or poetic dimension. It aims at identifying the sources of this ambiguity without imposing artificial clarity when language is inherently ambiguous and it can discover structure and regularity in those areas of language where a poet can merely perceive a debauchery of imagination transposed into words. (Cristea 2005, 1)

4. Conclusions

Based on the general theory of systems and on the systemic approach methodology, interdisciplinarity proposes a complex and holistic approach to the knowledge phenomena by establishing connections and interactions between various fields. The interdisciplinary approach aims at trespassing the artificial borderlines between disciplines, representing a strict requirement in a world prone to constant change and cognitive accumulation in various fields of knowledge. The researcher's capacity to hold an integrative perspective enable him/her acquire a deeper understanding of the topic and adapt his/her research methods, concepts and specific skills to a more complex and extended issues. From this perspective, interdisciplinarity has two main advantages: (i) complementarity: starting from the premise that a single discipline cannot explain a phenomenon by itself, we can rightfully state that the contribution of several disciplines shall lead to a better understanding of the object of study and (ii) creativity: the interaction between disciplines contributes to the production of original explanations and to new methodological solutions.

Interdisciplinarity is based on our understanding of the fact that we live in a world of complexity, where the hermetic borders between disciplines are no longer valid, a world in which we must identify the connections between various fields of knowledge. Hyper-specialization and atomism

lead to a limited perspective upon the object of study, preventing the researcher from gaining a unitary perspective upon it. The ability to re-trace a common language, the awareness with regard to the multiform nature of research objects and consequently the awareness with regard to the superiority of an interdisciplinary approach have become the main focus of scientific research, with the aim of identifying solutions that could increase the quality of the research outcomes.

References

Augsburg, Tanya. 2016. *Becoming Interdisciplinary: An Introduction to Interdisciplinary Studies*, third edition. Dubuque: Kendall Hunt Publishing.

Becher, T. 1989. *Academic Tribes and Territories: Intellectual enquiry and the culture of disciplines*. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Becher, T. 1994. "The Significance of Disciplinary Differences". *Studies in Higher Education* 19(2): 151-161.

Becher, T. and P. Trowler. 2001. *Academic Tribes and Territories: Intellectual enquiry and the culture of disciplines*, 2nd edition. Buckingham: Open University Press/SRHE.

Biglan, A. 1973. "The Characteristics of Subject Matter in Different Academic Areas". *Journal of Applied Psychology* 57(3): 195-203.

Coşeriu, Eugen. 1981. "La socio- e la etnolingüística. Sus fundamentos e sus tareas". *Annuario de Latras,* México, XIX: 5-30.

Coşeriu, Eugen. 1994. *Lingvistică din perspectivă spaţială şi antropologică. Trei studii*. Chişinău: Editura Ştiinţa.

Coşeriu, Eugen. 2009. *Omul şi limbajul său. Studii de filosofia limbajului, teorie a limbii şi lingvistică generală*. Iaşi: Editura Universităţii "Al. I. Cuza" din Iaşi.

Cristea, Dan, Nancy Ide, Laurent Romary. 1998. *Veins Theory: A Model of Global Discourse Cohesion and Coherence*. Montréal: Coling-ACL Conference.

Cristea, Dan. 2002. "Referenţialitate şi cursivitate în relaţie cu structura de discurs". In *Limba Română în Societatea Informaţională – Societatea Cunoaşterii*. edited by Dan Tufiş and Florin Gh. Filip. Bucureşti: Editura Expert.

Cristea, Dan. 2005. "Resurse lingvistice şi tehnologii ale limbajului natural. Cazul limbii române". *Prelegeri Academice* III(3).

Grosz, B.J. and C. Sidner. 1986. "Attention, intentions and the structure of discourse". *Computational Linguistics* 12(3): 175-204.

Grosz B.J.; S. Weinstein; and A.K. Joshi. 1995. "Centering: a framework for modeling the local coherence of discourse". *Computational Linguistics* 21(2): 203-225.

Hansson, Bengt. 1999. "Interdisciplinarity: For what purpose?". *Policy Sciences* 32: 339-343.

Haugen, E. 1971. "The Ecology of language". *The Linguistic Reporter*. Supplement 25, 19-26: 324-329.

Hudson, R.A. 1996. *Sociolinguistics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Keestra, Machiel; Lucas Rutting; Ger Post; Mieke De Roo; Sylvia Blad; and Linda De Greef. 2016. *An Introduction to Interdisciplinary Research: Theory and Practice*. edited by Menken Steph and Keestra Machiel. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.

Klein, Julie Thomson. 1990. *Interdisciplinarity: History, Theory, and Practice*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.

Kolb, D.A. 1981. "Learning styles and disciplinary differences". In *The Modern American College*. edited by A. Chickering. San Francisco: Jossey Bass.

Manathunga, C. and A. Brew. 2012. "Beyond tribes and territories: new metaphors for new times". In *Tribes and territories in the 21st-century: rethinking the significance of disciplines in*

higher education, edited by P. Trowler, M. Saunders and V. Bamber, 44-56. London: Taylor & Francis.

Marcus, Solomon. 2011. *Paradigme universale*. Piteşti: Editura Paralela 45.

Menand, Louis. 2001. "Undisciplined". *The Wilson Quarterly* 25(4): 51-59.

Mittelstrass, J. 2011. "On Transdisciplinarity". *Trames* 15(65/60): 329- 338.

Newell, William H. (ed.). 1998. *Interdisciplinarity: Essays from the Literature*. New York: The College Entrance Examination Board.

Nissani, Moti. 1995. "Fruits, Salads, and Smoothies: A Working Definition of Interdisciplinarity". *The Journal of Educational Thought (JET) / Revue de la Pensée Éducative* 29(2): 121-128.

Repko, A.F. 2008. *Interdisciplinary research: process and theory*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Trowler, Paul; Murray Saunders; and Veronica Bamber (eds.). 2012. *Tribes and Territories in the 21st Century. Rethinking the significance of disciplines in higher education*, 1st Edition. New York: Routledge.

Trowler, Paul. 2014. "Academic Tribes and Territories: the theoretical trajectory". *Osterreichische Zeitschrift fur Geschichtswissenschaften* 25(3): 17-26.

Trudgill, Peter. 2000. *Sociolinguistics: An Introduction to Language and Society*. England: Penguin Books.

Wardhaugh, R. 2010. *An Introduction to Sociolinguistics*. New York: Basil Blackwell Inc.

Andrei-Constantin SĂLĂVĂSTRU [*]

Interdisciplinarity in Early Modern Political Thought: History, Theology and Law in the Huguenot Literature during the 1570ˢ

Abstract: Interdisciplinarity played an important role in the development of many early modern political doctrines. One of the most significant examples occurred during the French Wars of Religion (1562-1598): this period witnessed the emergence of the first fully developed theories of popular sovereignty in European political thought, when discontent with the Valois monarchy determined both parties in conflict, first the Huguenots, then the radical Catholics coalesced in the Catholic League, to advocate for active resistance against a monarchy which they perceived as tyrannical. Opposition to tyranny was something which medieval political thought had contemplated as well, but the theories developed during the second half of the sixteenth century were much more radical than these precedents, because they embraced an almost modern concept of the state, where the ultimate "sovereignty" was vested in representative assemblies such as the Estates General. The Huguenots had been the first to take such a bold step and they constructed their doctrine by resorting to arguments and methods from law, theology and history: such an interdisciplinary approach was a reflection of the intellectual background of the Huguenots authors, well-versed in these three fields, but also a political necessity, as it allowed them to avoid a too sectarian perspective. By basing their ideas on sources from Roman, feudal and even canon law, from the Scriptures and French and European history, the Huguenots were making the case that they were merely resurrecting an old constitutional tradition, which had fallen into disuse, but still remained imprescriptible.

Keywords: Huguenots, France, Sixteenth-Century, Resistance, Tyranny.

1. Introduction

Interdisciplinarity is not a monopoly of the modern times - nor of the academic environment. On the contrary, it can be encountered in much more different contexts – both temporal and social. One of the most re-markable and original cases of interdisciplinarity occurred in the Huguenot political literature from the second half of the sixteenth century. Taking

---

[*] PhD, Researcher, Institute for Interdisciplinary Research, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Department, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iași, Romania; email: andreisalavastru@yahoo.com

their cue from some cautious remarks of Jean Calvin and driven by the political necessity to find a way to deal with what they considered to be the hostility, more or less overt, of the Valois dynasty, that generation of French Protestants developed a theory of popular sovereignty from which they derived a popular right of resistance against the oppressive behaviour of tyrannical princes. It was a theory far more radical than any of its medieval and Renaissance predecessors who also admitted the evils of tyranny, warned against it and, in some cases, even tried to provide some solutions: the made difference lies, first and foremost, in the depth and the thoroughness of the argument, as the French Protestants of the 1570^s provided an well-defined constitutional mechanism for remonstrating with, resisting and, when all else failed, even removing an incorrigible tyrant from his throne. The French Huguenots were not the first amongst the sixteenth-century reformers to take such a step: previously, the so-called Marian exiles, a group of English Protestants forced to take refuge on the continent in order to escape the persecutions unleashed under Mary Tudor, joined by the Scot pastor John Knox, have stated in categorical terms that rebellion against a prince who transgressed against God was lawful, even up to the point of deposing him. But, while they insist upon this point, based on Biblical and Roman law arguments, they do not actually specify a clear constitutional mechanism by which the censoring or the removal of a tyrant could come to pass: thus, their political thought had some clear anarchical implications, which made it vulnerable to the charges of sedition usually laid against the Protestants and which the Huguenots so vehemently rejected. It fell upon the latter to correct the shortcomings of this first generation of resistance theorists and develop a more adequate model.

Originally, the Huguenots hesitated to engage in a direct attack against the king itself, but preferred the safer solution (and one with a long tradition) of blaming the alleged "evil advisors", who were misleading the monarch into oppressing what were otherwise loyal subjects: this was easier to do since both Francis II (1559-1560) and Charles IX (1560-1574) were extremely young (and, in the case of the latter, even under a formal regency until 1563) and clearly under the influence of their entourages, which did not include many friends of the Huguenots. Two of the most famous examples of how this argument was employed were François Hotman's pamphlet "Le Tigre de France" from 1560 and the manifesto issued by the prince of Condé at the beginning of the first religious war, in 1562: the former was a bitter attack on the Cardinal of Lorraine, the uncle of Francis II and the person to whom the Huguenots ascribed the responsibility for the bloody reprisals which occurred in the aftermath of the so-called "conspiracy from Amboise", while the second contained a categorical declaration that the Protestants have taken up arms not against the king, but only to defend the laws of the kingdom. More direct attacks against the monarchy

were not entirely lacking, but they appeared rather from the fringes of the Huguenot movement and they were condemned by the Huguenots themselves, as they conflicted with their professions of loyalty towards the Crown and provided a basis for the charges of sedition directed against them: such was the case of *La Défense civile et militaire des innocents et de l'Eglise de Christ*, a tract printed at Lyon in 1563 who argued for resistance against the "tyrant king" based on scriptural foundations and, due to its radical content, was condemned by the consistory of the city and all copies burned (Gaganakis 2006, 138). There were other tracts promoting similar ideas, issued especially from the Huguenot citadel of La Rochelle, such as *Question politique: s'il est licite aux subjects de capituler avec leur prince* or *Discours par dialogues de l'Edict de revocation de la paix,* both printed around 1568-1569 (Jouanna 2007, 332), but, until the events of Saint-Bartholomew, the notion of fighting against the king itself (let alone overthrowing him!) was not one of the key tenets of the Huguenot movement.

The most important Huguenot tracts arguing in favour of resistance were published after 1572, in the midst of a wave of anti-royalist Protestant propaganda, triggered by the slaughter of much of the Huguenot leadership during the night of Saint Bartholomew. The Huguenots attributed the responsibility for this event to the king Charles IX and his mother, Catherine de Medicis*,* and it seemed that open rebellion directed against the monarch itself became inevitable in this context. Consequently, they no longer hesitated to launch a direct challenge to the monarchy and a model of lawful resistance, enshrined in an alleged sovereignty of the people, was subsequently constructed in François Hotman's *Francogallia*, Theodore Beza's *Right of Magistrates* and the anonymous *Vindiciae contra tyrannos*. The first two of these works were published almost at the same time, immediately in the aftermath of the massacre of Saint-Bartholomew, in 1573 and 1574, respectively, while *Vindiciae* appeared several years later, in 1579. What characterizes all three them is their lack of a Calvinist focus: what they try out to do, instead, is to construct an argument as universal as possible, and they succeeded to such an extent that many of their points were to be borrowed later by their own Catholic enemies, coalesced after 1584 in the Catholic League. A major reason for their success was the interdisciplinary character of their methodology, an approach was eased by the intellectual background of the Huguenots authors, well-versed in Roman, feudal and canon law, theology and history.

2. The Historical Argument

History represented one of the main sources from which the three Huguenot authors derived their arguments, by pointing out constitutional precedents by which they could make the case that resistance against tyrants

was both lawful and sound. This was so because the past had always been surrounded by a powerful mystique for both the medieval theorists and their early modern successors, especially since many of the examples came from two ancient political traditions held in reverence by sixteenth-century humanists and lawyers, namely Rome and Greece. A successful political model bore the mark of legitimacy and, in the eyes of the political theorists (not just the Huguenots), was something to be emulated: being ancient was a positive attribute, not an indication that it had become outdated. From one perspective, though, this presented major difficulties for the Monarchomach triumvirs, because there was not really much in French history on which they could base their ideas of popular sovereignty and lawful resistance by the magistrates. The concept of an "ancient constitution" of France, depicted as an arrangement between the monarch and the people assembled in the Estates, was extremely appealing, but completely ahistorical: yet, despite the dangers which such an undertaking posed, François Hotman went straight down this path in his *Francogallia*, the first of three Huguenot monarchomach tracts. Ralph Giesey claimed that a powerful factor in Hotman's choice of using French (alleged) historical precedents was his nationalism, stronger than in the case of his fellow Huguenot writers, basing his argument on the patriotic rhetoric which abounds in *Francogallia* and his insistence on France's unique constitution (Giesey 1967, 54-55). Yet, as I have argued in a previous study,

> the deciding factor was the fact that – as *Francogallia* was basically a constitutional treatise –, historical precedent had a massive significance for its argument, because "since the law was regarded as unchanging, to establish with certainty a given usage enjoying long acceptance in the past meant to give it validity in the present system" (Church 1969, 203). In the medieval and early modern period, accepted custom quickly gained force of law and a jurist like François Hotman could not have failed to make use of this principle in developing his theories. Nannerl Keohane asserted that Hotman "had provided the example for those who wanted to search the distant past for the true constitution of France", arguing for «popular sovereignty, which few later jurists did» (Keohane 1980, 316). In Julian Franklin's words, "the characteristics of the ancient constitution are thus presented as a standard against which subsequent changes must be measured and evaluated". (Franklin 1969, 20). (Sălăvăstru 2017, 32)

For Hotman, the origins of his supposed French constitution stretched back to the period before the Roman conquest: the Gallic tradition which he invoked was characterized by the consultative nature of the exercise of power, as each Gallic polity possessed a "public council" where the affairs of the state were discussed, and the limited nature of the royal authority (in the case of those Gallic polities ruled by kings), bridled by "the reverence and the authority of good and honorable men, representing the person of

the people, which has given them this power" (Hotman 1574, 12). Yet, the ancientness of this constitution would not have meant much if it could have been argued that it no longer applied in Hotman's times: and, therefore, one of his major concerns was to point out its imprescriptible character. For Hotman, even the Roman conquest did not alter the manner in which the legitimacy of power was obtained: the Romans ruled Gaul by strength of arms, but when the Franks invaded the country (which, in Hotman's assessment, welcomed them as liberators), their rulers could not be considered kings of the new polity of "Francogallia" unless they were elected "by both people" (Franks and Gauls) gathered in a public assembly (Hotman 1574, 57-58). Basically, "Hotman argued that the French kingship had been anciently elective and the public council of the realm, the ancient *Parlamentum*, was coeval with the state itself" (Franklin 1973, 44). Hotman establishes a clear constitutional continuity between the Gallic polities and the new monarchy of "Francogallia", especially since there was a clear congruency between the manner in which both Gallic and Frankish kings assumed the throne, namely by election: in his opinion, two separate historical traditions were merged to form an original elective "Francogaul" monarchy, where a public assembly, ancestor of the contemporary Estates General, chose the king and, equally important, retained the right to control or even depose him. As John Salmon remarked, Hotman's stress upon Frankish election was meant to demonstrate the former sovereignty of the Estates, and when he referred to the need to return to the pristine constitution, it was this what he had in mind (Salmon 1987, 135). These Estates gathered on a yearly basis and exerted their powers over the kings throughout the entire Merovingian and Carolingian period, and even during the Capetians (although Hotman blames Hugo Capet for a certain diminution of their authority), showing its strength even during the reign of Louis XI, when, in Hotman's assessment, it took a stand against this king's abusive policies. But the fundamental problem of Hotman's argument was the fact that it was historically inaccurate and nothing better illustrated this than his description of the events surrounding the League of the Public Weal during Louis XI, where Hotman depicted what was a classic aristocratic rebellion as a constitutional struggle. In Quentin Skinner's analysis, Hotman's basic assumption was that the ancient French constitution was normative for the present and the outcome of Hotman's historical analysis was thus a theory of popular sovereignty in which "the highest administrative authority in the kingdom" was said to be vested at all times in "the assembly of the Three Estates" (Skinner 2004, 310-313).

Hotman's fellow Monarchomachs, Theodore Beza and the author of *Vindiciae contra tyrannos*, likely realized that the evidence from French history for the kind of constitutional model which they were trying to advocate was weak and could not have sufficed to construct a convincing argument: there

is less resort to historical precedent in *Right of Magistrates* and *Vindiciae* (compared to *Francogallia*) and even less focus on French examples. Beza, for instance, makes the same point about the elective character of Merovingian and Carolingian monarchies and insists it was the Estates' right to elect and depose a king, otherwise "Pepin [in 751] and Hugo Capet [in 987] would have had no right [to the throne], because the lines of Merovech and Charlemangne had not been extinguished" at those times (Béze 1970, 39-44). Yet, the French example is integrated by Beza in a larger European constitutional tradition, tracing its descent to ancient Greece (especially to Athens and Sparta) and Rome and continuing up to Beza's time in a part of the European kingdoms, although in France it had already fallen into disuse. The right of resistance against a tyrant by the inferior magistrates is the key to Beza's constitutional scheme: the historical support for their rights is drawn from Rome's and, to a lesser extent, Sparta's example (Béze 1970, 18-21, 28). *Vindiciae*, in turn, goes back to the old dispute between Philip IV and Boniface VIII: if resistance against the latter by the king of France was permissible, according to the doctors of Sorbonne of that time, because it was an action directed exclusively against the person of Boniface and not against the Church or the office of the pope, then the same principle should apply to the inferior magistrates with respect to a tyrannical monarch (Brutus 2003, 57-59). The constitutional basis for the argument in favour of the resistance is the elective character of kingship: for the author of *Vindiciae*, this was the best type of monarchy and, while relies mostly on Biblical examples and natural law to prove his point, he also resorts to several historical examples, first from the history of Medes and Romans, then from those of contemporary kingdoms, including France, which, according to the author, had practiced this form of succession in the early stages of its monarchy (Brutus 2003, 71-74). The same examples of Sparta and Rome appear again with respect to the existence of magistrates who could even judge the monarchs – the ephors in case of Sparta and "the senate, the consuls, and the praetors, as well as praetorian prefects and governors of provinces" in case of Rome (Brutus 2003, 80-81). In the opinion of *Vindiciae*'s author, traces of this constitutional model can still be seen in France, although the magistrates no longer fulfill their duty accordingly, and remain very much alive in states like the Holy Empire, Poland or the Spanish kingdoms.

3. The Monarchomach Resistance Theory in Light of the Scripture and the Law

François Hotman's antiquarian approach displayed a significant flaw, which was soon exploited by the opponents of the Huguenots thesis of popular sovereignty: Hotman's French constitutionalist precedents were

inaccurate, to say the least, and was even suspected of having deliberately falsified his evidence. This determined the other two monarchomachs to give history a less important place in their arguments and turn more towards law and the Bible in order to prove their point. Even without taking into account the obvious weaknesses of Hotman's methodology, for Beza and the author of *Vindiciae* (unlike for François Hotman), historical precedent, no matter how ancient and prestigious, did not suffice: because, when the monarchy claimed to be divinely ordained, when an entire set of rituals had been designed to surround the person of the king with a sacral aura, an attack against the king (even a tyrannical one) could be regarded as an attack against the God's anointed and, therefore, blasphemous. That was more so when the Pauline assertion, that all power came from God, was taken into consideration. In order to parry this criticism, both Beza and the author of *Vindiciae* understood very well that it was essential to prove there was a right of resistance rooted in the Biblical tradition and the superiority of the people over their kings was just as divinely instituted as the kingship itself. For them, the foundation of popular sovereignty was rooted, first and foremost, not in the ancient constitution of the Francogallia, but in Biblical tradition. Both describe the Biblical monarchy of Israel as the most perfect one, being instituted by God himself, and refer to an original Biblical compact, between God, kings and people, which established a mutual set of obligations between the last two: the breaking of the compact would also dissolve the bonds of loyalty between king and people and would permit one to act against the other, since both were responsible to God for the good faith of the other party. Speaking about the author of *Vindiciae*, George Garnett correctly points out that "Old Testament Israel provides him with an incontestable model in the analysis of a covenant between God, king, and people" (Garnett 2006, 881-882), which has two parts, sacred and secular – and the same thing could be said about Beza and his *Right of Magistrates*. When they do refer to presumed French constitutional precedents, they do so by pointing out that they were merely emulating a divinely ordained political model established by biblical tradition. For this purpose, Beza and *Vindiciae* abandoned Hotman's special emphasis on the uniqueness of the so-called "ancient French constitution" and they paid equal attention to the constitutions of the other Christian monarchies, because it was more convenient for them to argue for a Biblical origin of the popular sovereignty they were trying to develop in their texts if they could prove that France was not an exception to the rule.

If the Bible was key to the argument of Beza and *Vindiciae*'s, it did not stood alone and law (in particular natural and Roman law) played an equally important role. Basically, Bible and law intermingled in the *Of the Right of Magistrates* and *Vindiciae* to provide the legal foundation for the people's corporative right of resistance. Kathleen Parrow suggests that "Catholics,

threatened with charges of treason, and Huguenots, threatened with charges of treason or heresy, based their justification for use of violence on the Roman law of Justinian's Code and Digest, the canon law of Gratian's Decretum and the papal decretals, and the French royal and customary laws" and were motivated in part by the need to avoid forfeiture of life and property which such charges undoubtedly brought with them (Parrow 1991, 705). But it can be convincingly argued that the main reason for the deployment of principles of law in the resistance tracts has much more to do with the ideological framework the authors were trying to develop, rather than with such prosaic interests. In the preface to his modern edition of *Vindiciae*, George Garnett claims that the mutual obligation between rulers and subjects "is framed in terms of the categories and principles of law, as interpreted by the commentators of the high and late middle ages and beyond; and to a much lesser extent those of canon law. Indeed, the juristic analysis of the sacred part of the covenant, first established in Old Testament Israel, provides the juristic model for analysis of the secular part" (Garnett 2006, 881-882). The original covenant between God, kings and subjects is described in terms of feudal law, by identifying the relationship between God and kings with that between lord and vassals, and of Roman law, by using several Roman legal concepts, such as tutorship, dominion or *vindicatio*, in order to define the relationship between kings and subjects. The king's rights over his subjects (which include not only the subjects' material assets, but even their lives) are analogous to the rights a tutor has, in Roman law, over his ward's property: they consist only of a right of administrating it with the purpose of preserving the respective property or enriching it and any possibility of alienation of the ward's property is categorically excluded. Full ownership, *dominium,* belongs exclusively to the people – but since the people, according to medieval and early modern political thought, cannot govern itself, then it is in a permanent state of minority. The use of proprietary language in this manner in order to describe the covenant between God, kings and people provided a very useful analogy to model the structure of power and to activate the development of a populist political theory. But one final, and crucial, element of the law of property provided the mechanism for the radical core that made the monarchomach doctrine a fully revolutionary ideology, and not simply abstract political or legal speculation, namely the ancient action of recovery, *vindicatio* (Lee 2008, 394): in Roman law, this meant that the possessor of a *dominium* which had been conceded to someone else could reclaim his property in some extraordinary circumstances. In the scheme developed by the monarchomachs, especially in *Vindiciae*, that meant that the people could reclaim the political power which had been entrusted to its king if the latter misused it. This connection between the Biblical pact and the appropriate principles from Roman law was possible because, according to George Garnett, Roman law, like the

canon law with which it was closely interrelated, could not contradict God's – and that was something which future critics of the monarchomach theories like the Scot William Barclay and the monarchomachs themselves could agree on. For the sixteenth-century men, Roman law, as the pre-eminent expression of human rationality, was founded in God's providential ordering of creation, which was also, by definition, rational (Garnett 2006, 882).

Quentin Skinner correctly points out that, by resorting to "scholastic and Roman law traditions of radical constitutionalism", the monarchomachs were able to reject "the characteristically Protestant tendency to suppose that God places all men in a condition of political subjection as a remedy for their sins. Instead they began to argue that the original and fundamental condition of the people must be one of natural liberty", but he goes too far when commenting that this "enabled them to abandon the orthodox Pauline contention that all the powers that be must be seen as directly ordained by God. Instead they inferred that any legitimate political society must originate in an act of free consent on the part of the whole populace" (Skinner 2004, 320). What is actually rejected is the absolute character of the Pauline injunction, regardless of circumstances: political authority was, indeed, instituted by God, but its creation was dependent on specific conditions to which the people's consent was tied to. This can be noticed from the same description of the covenant described before: the pact between God, king and people is accompanied by a second agreement, by which the people acclaims God's choice for king and the latter assumes specific obligations with respect to the people's rights. In other words, there is actually a double agreement which set up the original monarchies: a "*foedus*" which established the duty of both the magistrate and the people to uphold the laws of God, and a "*pactum*", which is a purely political contract, whose existence is predicated upon the natural law principle that, wherever equity and justice prevailed, no people had accepted a king except upon some specific conditions, and this pact takes the form of "a mutual oath between the king and the people" (Skinner 2004, 331). The resort to arguments derived from law allows for a secularization of the Biblical model of popular sovereignty: the Biblical pact described in both works is mostly religious in its purpose, aimed at preserving God's law, and the examples provided by the Old Testament of rebellions against tyrants were of a similar character – the people rising up against rulers who had violated the divine law. According to Quentin Skinner, the Huguenot writers treat the people's welfare as the final cause of the commonwealth, and proceed to equate this with their right to enjoy their properties – and what they mostly had in mind by this is the duty of the ruler to uphold the inalienable and natural rights of the people to their lives and liberties, which were the fundamental and natural properties which everyone may be said to possess

in a pre-political state (Skinner 2004, 328). Natural law, in particular, allowed them to argue that the right to rebellion against a tyrant did not necessitate an explicit divine sanction. Natural law also originated with God, but it did not necessarily have to be the outcome of a revelation: rather, it was enshrined by God in all human hearts and could be discovered through reason, therefore it represents the foundation of both Christian and heathen polities. Of course, there could be a distinction, as established by Beza, between "the natural law common to all nations and the public law of particular places". While these two need not be identical, however, natural law contained such "general fairness and equity" that any polity forsaking them ought to be "utterly condemned and cast off" (VanDrunen 2005/2006, 157). In the words of David VanDrunen, "given that kings often do not follow their natural law responsibilities, these writers also turn to natural law for remedies against tyranny. They discover in it both ordinary checks on the power of rulers and extraordinary remedies in extreme circumstances" (VanDrunen 2005/2006, 158) – checks which, like they did in the case of the notion of a covenant establishing the monarchy and defining the king's powers, are, once again, combined with scriptural arguments. This combination of scriptural tradition and natural law was possible because, in the opinion of the same David VanDrunen, "these resistance writers speak in general terms of the content of natural law by recognizing the basic principles of justice revealed in it" (VanDrunen 2005/2006, 157). Natural law is therefore another way in which the relationship between king and subjects is determined: both authors claim that the people preceded kings and that the latter were originally established by the former. *Vindiciae* arrives at this conclusion by reasoning that no one is born a king or is a king by nature "in himself" and that a king cannot rule without a people, while Beza argues that rulers are instituted for the good of the people and not vice versa, "as indeed Nature herself seems to proclaim with a loud voice". Even if the Biblical tradition of the covenant between God, kings and people which set up the Israelite monarchy, interpreted as it was with the help of feudal and Roman law, indicated that the people possessed a right to act against their king if the pact was broken, one of the biggest obstacles in front of the Huguenot theory of resistance was the famous passage from Romans 13, which urged obedience towards rulers. In order to find a solution from this dilemma, *Vindiciae* appeals to natural law-type thinking: according to David VanDrunen,

> when interpreting these verses, the author analogizes to the relationship of masters and servants generally to show that God must be obeyed above kings. At a later point, he elaborates his assertion of right "implanted by nature" by noting that Romans 13 speaks of kings as ministers of God for the good, in order to support the idea that a king using taxes to enrich himself is unworthy of his title. (VanDrunen 2005/2006, 154-155)

While Beza and the author of *Vindiciae* accept that resistance against a tyrant was lawful and even commendable, they both place some limitations on it, of a moral and legal nature. Just as their monarchy was not absolute, neither the right of resistance was. A king displaying some common vices was not necessarily a tyrant and neither some occasional unjust act represented proof of tyranny: for resistance to be morally acceptable, it had to represent an answer to manifest and incorrigible injustice, which threatened the entire realm or at least significant parts of it, and it must always be a last resort, after all remonstrances had failed. But, even in such a case, there were clear conditions as to who could actually resist a tyrant. Beza and *Vindiciae* make certain to distinguish between lawful resistance and unlawful sedition: the people did possess the right to oppose and even overthrow a king who had broken the original contract, but it did not exercise it directly. In particular, both authors are adamant that mere individuals could not resist a lawful ruler and their only recourse in face of injustice was flight. The basis for this position lies in the nature of the original contract: it was one in which the people entered as a corporation and, therefore, it could be annulled only by the people acting also as a corporation – more specifically, by certain political actors which have been delegated such powers enabling them to represent the corporative people.

There were two possible agents which could have resisted a tyrannical king: first, the magistrates of the kingdom (by which it was understood both the so-called officers of the Crown such as the chancellor, the constable, the marshals and the local governments of the various urban communities), second, the representative assemblies (whose role was more prominent in Beza's *Right of Magistrates*). This was necessary because, even though the latter were possessing of full and ultimate sovereignty, such representative assemblies might sometimes prove inadequate for the purpose of opposing a tyrannical king, first and foremost because they did not have a permanent existence. A fundamental role was thus entrusted to the magistrates of the kingdom, who possessed the right to resist flagrant oppression within their legal and territorial jurisdiction. Both Beza and *Vindiciae* trace their existence up to the foundation of the Israelite monarchy of the Old Testament: in *Right of Magistrates*, they were "the leaders of the twelve tribes, the captains of the thounsands, hundreds and fifties and the elders of the people" (Béze 1970, 18) and in *Vindiciae* "the seventy elders of the kingdom of Israel", "the leaders or princes of tribes", "the judges and prefects of individual cities – that is, the captains of thousands, of hundreds, and others – who presided over as many families as there were" and, finally, "military commanders [fortes], dignitaries, and others, from whom the public council was assembled" (Brutus 2003, 46). Quentin Skinner refers to this theory of inferior magistrates as "providentialist" (Skinner 2004, 324-325), because it is through them that the people enforces the divine covenant upon their

kings: they take a direct part in the swearing of oaths which occurs both at the inception of the monarchy and at the beginning of each specific reign and, therefore, they are the ones responsible, on behalf of the people, to make sure that the law of God was upheld. Yet, even if such mechanism existed in the Jewish monarchy of Old Testament Israel, as argued with the examples provided, it remained the question whether those rights of the people were still in force, since it was plainly obvious (and even Hotman did not argued otherwise) that those principles have fallen into disuse. According to David Lee, the author of *Vindiciae*

> argued that, even if long possession could transfer rights of ownership in the civil law, such an extraordinary transfer could never be interpreted to prejudice the rights of the people. In part, the argument relied on the medieval juristic theory of corporation as an immortal body which never dies. Prescription can operate only when there is a finite space of time in which long possession can be established. But since the people are immortal in this way, perpetual like the water of a flowing river, time and temporality are irrelevant considerations. The people's collective rights are, like them, immortal, imprescribable, and inalienable. (Lee 2008, 389)

Beza could not really find in the Old Testament an equivalent to the French Estates General – which was, according to the monarchomachs' theory, the only institution validated not just to resist a tyrant, but also to remove him from office, thus fulfilling the only task which the inferior magistrates were not mandated to carry out –, while *Vindiciae* refers briefly to a kind of extraordinary assembly which was supposed to represent the whole people of Israel, was comprised mostly of the previously mentioned magistrates and which convened when "the gravest matters had to deliberated upon" (Brutus 2003, 78-79). They refer to the existence of such representative assemblies at the beginning of the French monarchy and in other European kingdoms, but they are faced with an even greater difficulty than when they were arguing for the rights of the inferior magistrates: because, even though they were not exactly what Beza and *Vindiciae* purported them to be, those "officers of the Crown" existed on a regular basis and enjoyed numerous rights and privileges with respect to the king, the Estates General bore no actual resemblance to the version described in the treatises of the monarchomachs: the most significant power one could claim they possessed was the necessity to give their consent to taxation. Otherwise, their role was purely consultative and there could have been no discussion of a right to censor the actions of the king, let alone depose him. Beza, for instance, admitted that the Estates General no longer possessed any power to control the king, ascribing the responsibility for this situation to Louis XI, who, allegedly, had turned the French monarchy into a tyranny. Such constitutional transformation had no validity, though, because, first and

foremost, represented a breaking by the king of his coronation oath, which demanded him to respect existing rights and privileges, and, also, it contravened the fundamental laws of the kingdom. Beza could make such claims because, in this situation, they benefitted from the support of another principle of Roman law, that no prescription could harm the Empire: according to Ernst Kantorowicz,

> by the thirteenth century, the concept had gained general acceptance that the fisc represented within empire or kingdom some sphere of supra-personal continuity and perpetuality which depended on the life of the individual ruler as little as Church property depended on the life of an individual bishop or pope. (Kantorowicz 1957, 177)

The principle had been employed by different monarchies, including that of France, during the preceding centuries, to defend the inalienability of the royal domain and rights: but, in the monarchomachs' political template, where ultimate sovereignty was transferred from the king to the people, the same principle was used to demonstrate that the extensive powers which the French monarchy had acquired and the diminution of the prerogatives of the Estates were unlawful. *Vindiciae* simply sidesteps the issue: it acknowledges the importance of the Estates in the past and in other contemporary kingdoms, but it does not make an explicit statement about whether they retained the right to depose an unfit monarch. Instead, it uses different examples from the actual history of the Estates since the fourteenth century to prove that they could override the will of the monarch (ignoring that, in the examples provided, the Estates were actually used by the kings of France to get rid of unfavourable treaties): based on the same principle of Roman law mentioned before, the past actions of the Estates are used as evidence that the people was still above the king, despite the presumed constitutional decline of the former in the Capetian era, and the monarch remained merely an administrator of his realm, just as he was in the Merovingian and Carolingian periods, when the Estates, according to *Vindiciae*, still enjoyed their right of deposition.

4. Conclusions

Despite the erudition they displayed in developing thes theories, the political model proposed by the Huguenots could not take a concrete form: even if it answered the main theoretical issues which they had to solve, it quickly hit some massive hurdles. The main problem was the Estates General itself, which had been described in the Huguenot tracts as the embodiment of popular sovereignty and the only able to provide the most radical solution against tyranny, the deposition of the tyrant. The Estates General had indeed been summoned in 1576 and 1588, each time at Blois,

with the openly stated purpose of finding a solution to the crisis France was going through since 1562: on these occasions, there were attempts to carry out some reforms along the lines recommended by the Huguenot authors, in order to strengthen the authority of the Estates General and limit the power of the king. If the delegates taking part in the Blois assemblies would have shown more determination and political ability, a partnership between the king and the Estates could have emerged, which could have become a first step towards a constitutional monarchy. Despite this, the Estates General from 1576 and 1588 did not manage to act as an united body, each of the three estates having its own agenda and, most importantly for the Huguenots, they had been dominated by a Catholic majority, whose goal was not to stop the king's abusive actions against the Protestants, but to force Henry III to correct what the radical Catholics considered to be his main flaw: insufficient zeal in suppressing heresy. The alternative for the Huguenots was the individual resistance of the magistrates, which had been successfully carried out for a period by protestant princes such as Henry of Navarre or Henri of Condé or by the Huguenot cities from southern France, which had become de facto independent after 1572. Even so, the main weakness of this constitutional model was the fact it did not come from a deep ideological attachment, but was dictated by extreme circumstance: after 1584, when a real possibility that Henry of Navarre would become the king of France emerged, Huguenot authors such as Hotman or Mornay reconsidered their position. In these new circumstances, the arguments against unlimited royal power from the 1570s became, due to their universality, quite embarrassing for the Huguenots, because they were appropriated and used against them by their own enemies. A constitutional model based on scriptural, historical and law arguments could just as well be deployed against the Huguenots: this versatility and ideological ambiguity had for purpose to appeal to those moderate Catholics for whom internal peace was preferable to continued attempts to suppress the Huguenots, but the outcome was far from what was intended.

References

Bèze, Theodore de. 1970. *Du Droit des magistrats*, edited by Robert Kingdon. Genéve: Librairie Droz.

Brutus, Stephanus Junius (pseud.). 2003. *Vindiciae contra Tyrannos: or, concerning the legitimate power of a prince over the people, and of the people over a prince*, edited and translated by George Garnett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Church, William F. 1969. *Constitutional Thought in Sixteenth-Century France. A Study in the Evolution of Ideas*. New York: Octagon Books.

Franklin, Julian H. 1973. *Jean Bodin and the Rise of Absolutist Theory*. Cambridge and London: Cambridge University Press.

Franklin, Julian H. (ed.). 1969. *Constitutionalism and Resistance in the Sixteenth Century: Three Treatises by Hotman, Beza & Mornay*. New York: Pegasus.

Gaganakis, Costas. 2006. "Religious Zeal and Political Expediency on the Eve of the Wars of Religion". *Historein* 6: 134-143.

Garnett, George. 2006. "Law in the *Vindiciae, contra tyrannos*: A Vindication". *The Historical Journal* 49(3): 877-891.

Giesey, Ralph. 1967. "When and Why Hotman Wrote the Francogallia". *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance* 29(3): 581-611.

Hotman, François. 1574. *La Gaule Françoise*. Köln.

Jouanna, Arlette. 2007. *La Saint-Barthélemy. Les mystères d'un crime d'État*. Paris: Gallimard.

Kantorowicz, Ernst. 1957. *The King's Two Bodies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Keohane, Nannerl. 1980. *Philosophy and the State in France. The Renaissance to the Enlightenment*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lee, David. 2008. "Private Law Models for Public Law Concepts: The Roman Law Theory of Dominium in the Monarchomach Doctrine of Popular Sovereignty". *The Review of Politics* 70(3): 370-399.

Parrow, Kathleen. 1991. "Neither Treason, nor Heresy: Use of Defense Arguments to Avoid Forfeiture during the French Wars of Religion". *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 22(4): 705-716.

Salmon, John Hearsay McMillan. 1987. *Renaissance and Revolt. Essays in the Intellectual and Social History of Early Modern France*. Cambridge and London: Cambridge University Press.

Sălăvăstru, Andrei. 2017. "Historical Imaginary in the Political Literature of the French Wars of Religion: The Case of François Hotman's *Francogallia*". *Hermeneia* 19: 27-42.

Skinner, Quentin. 2004. *Foundations of Modern Political Thought: The Age of Reformation*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

VanDrunen, David. 2005/2006. "The Use of Natural Law in Early Calvinist Resistance Theory". *Journal of Law and Religion* 21(1): 143-167.

Virgil STOICA *

Electronic Governance:
Interdisciplinary or Multidisciplinary Field?

Abstract: In recent years, electronic governance has become an obvious and increasingly intense phenomenon. The concept of e-governance becomes useful when e-governance is viewed from a broad, comprehensive perspective, which refers not only to the authority and intervention of the state, but also to the joint action of the other actors involved in the development of public services, whether it is by citizens, civil society organizations, companies or institutions of public interest. Electronic governance thus manifests itself as part of an overall vision of the relationship between the state and society. Therefore, e-governance can today be considered an indispensable element of democratic practice, being one of the most important concerns of international organizations that promote democratic principles and respect for human rights. Research in the field of electronic governance is proving to be interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary, only thus being able to address the complexity of problems and phenomena without oversimplifying them.

Keywords: electronic government, electronic governance, interdisciplinary, transdisciplinary.

In recent decades, states around the world have faced increasing challenges in terms of transparency, efficiency and effectiveness of governance. The implementation of information and communication technologies (ICT) promises greater accessibility to public information and services, reduction of corruption, as well as more intense participation of citizens in decision-making. Neither the functioning of public institutions in general nor the improvement of democratic mechanisms can be conceived independently of the huge social and technological ecosystem of the global digital network. In this context, e-government and e-governance have become important topics on the political agendas of contemporary states.

Governance has always been dependent on technology, understood as a set of knowledge, skills, techniques, knowledge strategies, and tools. The emergence of new technological models has influenced, at the same time, the structuring of the principles of political authority and social relations. Industrial societies have become more and more complex, more conflictive

* PhD, Professor, Political Sciences, International Relations and European Studies Department, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iasi, Romania; e-mail: virgilstoica@gmail.com

and dynamic, and political institutions have gained more and more attributions to deal with new social problems. The more the government became involved in social life, the more it had to rely on new, more complex techniques for collecting, storing and disseminating information. Technologies not only have supported certain existing courses of action. They opened the way to new areas of action. The invention of the printing press, then of the telegraph, and later of the Internet, offered individuals the opportunity to inform or participate in public life, but also offered the governments the ability to carry out, under new conditions, public policies.

Governments have been using information and communication technology (ICT) for several decades in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of their actions. The first applications focused on building information management systems, which could be used for planning and monitoring the implementation of public policies. Despite failures in the use of information and communication technology, the emergence of the Internet and its use in distance education, increasing citizen participation and providing information and services to them have led to the idea that ICT can provide the public sector with fundamental benefits.

Technology and new perspectives on this field are producing radical changes in economic and social relations, which makes to increase citizens' expectations of government. Although governments try to cope with change, they often encounter impediments such as improper circulation of information within administrative hierarchies, public policies that do not respond to population requirements, lack of effective assessment tools, cumbersome tax and tax collection systems, public services that can be accessed only in "traditional" forms (West 2005, 5). The implementation of technological innovations within the systems of government is essential to meet the needs of a globalized economy, a growing population, and with increasing demands. However, change often encounters opposition even within government structures, either because the lack of knowledge or resources, or because the consequences of change (Schwester 2009, 119). Understanding the phenomenon of computerized globalization and the details of the relationship between the evolution of ICT and the action of political institutions is therefore of the utmost importance for the success of public policies and economic development programs.

When the Internet was invented in the 1960s, no one could predict how society would be transformed a few decades later. According to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU 2018), the proportion of the population using the Internet has increased worldwide from 15.8% in 2005 (approximately one billion inhabitants), to 43.8% in 2015 (approximately 3.5 billion inhabitants), and 51.2% in 2018. In Romania, the proportion of individuals with internet access increased, according to the same source,

from 3.61% in 2000, to 28.30% in 2007 and reached 55.76% in 2015, and 72.4% in 2018, but still far from the average of developed countries (91%).

Such an explosive growth in the use of the Internet and the rapid development of e-commerce in the private sector have created the desire of citizens to receive public services (at least some of them) in a digital way. But the Internet is not just another manner of providing public services. It stimulates the transformation of the philosophy of governance and the organization of the administration. Thus, the traditional administrative-bureaucratic paradigm is tested by the new paradigm of electronic governance.

Usually, the public administration is regarded as a hierarchical bureaucracy. This model, known as the Weberian model of organization, focuses on internal and managerial problems, emphasizing the importance of creating departments, standardization, specialization and routine in the administrative process. Civil servants performing similar functions are grouped and organized in the same administrative unit or department. Each unit is responsible for understanding the clients, assessing the demand for the services they offer, implementing these services and evaluating them. One of the advantages of this "classic" bureaucracy is that it reduces the transaction costs of communication and coordination, through the establishment of specialized departments and routines. This perspective encourages professional specialization and maximizes efficiency, as well as potential economies of scale. Moreover, through rules, regulations and hierarchical supervision, the bureaucratic model reduces the chances of unintended errors, frauds and negligence of civil servants and ensures the fair treatment of all clients. However, the Weberian bureaucracy is often criticized for its rigidity, excessive emphasis on procedures, inefficiency, and inability to serve people differently, depending on their preferences (Dunleavy et al. 2006, 78).

Following these criticisms, in the early 1980s, emerged a movement for the "reinvention of government", which represents an effort to reorient government operations from an inward-facing perspective to an outward-facing perspective, and toward user needs. According to this model, the citizens are seen mainly as clients, becoming the central point in designing the way of providing public services. Public officials are therefore forced to find ways to mandate citizens on community issues. This perspective requires public officials to partner with citizen groups and non-governmental organizations to identify solutions and effectively deliver public services. The major obstacle to reforming governance from such a perspective is the transactional costs of communication between public officials and citizens. Citizens' consultation can be considered chronophagic and financially costly by the rulers. Citizens may be reluctant to participate in the decision-making process of governance, due to the time and energy consumption required for it (West 2005, 127).

Faced with these challenges, information technology has begun to play an increasingly important role in the functioning of public administration. The emergence of the Internet marked a turning point in the use of information technology, by placing the emphasis of the government on the relations with citizens. Gradually, the Internet has become more and more cost-effective and easier to use, so officials can communicate much easy with citizens and provide more information. The development of e-commerce has reinforced these trends in the government sector. The Internet allows not only companies, but also citizens to exchange information and conduct transactions efficiently. As a result of technological advancement and economic changes, policy makers have been stimulated to shift the focus of using information technology from internal managerial needs to external links with the public.

This new paradigm leads to a change in the organizational principles of governance. While the bureaucratic model emphasizes top-down leadership and hierarchical communication, the new model emphasizes teamwork, multidirectional networks, direct communication between stakeholders, and rapid feedback (Dunleavy et al. 2006, 93). It is no longer necessary for citizens to know which department they should contact to get a particular service. The departmental structure behind a "single office" consequently becomes invisible to consumers.

The term "e-government" is a recent one and, yet,it hasn't got a unanimously accepted definition. Electronic government is one of the most interesting concepts introduced in the field of public administration in the late 1990s, although it was not very clearly defined and understood by public policy analysts and bureaucrats (Moon 2002, 274). As with other concepts in public administration (strategic management, participatory management, etc.), the idea of electronic government followed the adoption in the private sector of what was called electronic business (e-businesses) and electronic commerce (e-commerce). Broadly, electronic government includes the use of all information and communication technologies, from fax to mobile, to facilitate the day-to-day management of government issues. However, as with e-commerce, the usual interpretation of e-government refers exclusively to Internet-based activities, which improve citizens' access to government information, services and expertise, in order to ensure citizens' participation in the governance process and their satisfactionabout it (UN & ASPA 2003, 16).

Electronic government can be defined, in a narrow sense, as the production and provision of public services through information technology. More broadly, it can be defined as any use of information technology to simplify and improve the relationships between governors and other actors, such as voters, private companies and other government agencies (Sprecher 2000, 21). Another definition says that electronic government can be understood

as using information and communication technology to promote efficient and effective governance, to facilitate access to government services, to allow greater access to public information and to increase the responsibility of the government towards the citizens (Bhatnagar 2004, 19).

Analogous to the concept of e-commerce, which brings customers closer to companies (business to clients, B2C) and facilitates business relations (B2B), the goals of e-governance are to improve the links between government and citizens (G2C), on those between government and firms (G2B), as well as leading to easier, more transparent and cheaper connections within government (G2G).

Figure 1. The links between government, citizens and business

Traditionally, interactions between citizens and government bodies or between firms and government bodies take place in their office. With the advent of new information technologies, it is possible to move the place of interaction closer to customers, to information centers in public institutions or other spaces, or even in the client's office or home, by using the personal computer and the internet.

Information technology has become one of the central elements of managerial reform, and electronic governance is an essential dimension of governance in a society open to the future and responsive to the challenges of globalization. Information technology has opened up numerous possibilities to increase managerial efficiency and the quality of public services offered to citizens, has contributed to dramatic changes in policy (Nye 1999, 5; Norris 1999, 77), within government institutions (Fountain 2001), regarding performance management (Brown 1999, 121) and reducing bureaucracy (Moon and Bretschneider 2002, 278).

E-commerce has evolved into four stages: information presentation, interaction, transaction execution and delivery. In a similar way, the stages of the maturation of electronic governance were defined. Recent studies show that there are five stages in the development of electronic governance, stages that reflect the degree of technical sophistication and interaction with users (**Figure 2**).

Figure 2. Stages in the development of electronic governance
(Bhatnagar 2004, 20)

Four stages are similar to those in e-commerce, to which is added the stage of electronic democracy: dissemination of information (one-way communication), two-way communication, financial services and economic transactions, transforming (through horizontal and vertical integration) and political participation (Moon 2002, 282).

The first step is the simplest form of electronic governance and consists only of posting information on the web page for viewing by citizens. The second stage is characterized by an interactive communication between governors and citizens, incorporating e-mail and information transfer systems. In the third stage, the sites allow online services and financial transactions (Hiller and Belanger 2001, 13). This type of e-governance can be partially achieved by providing databases and online links with them, as well as by providing permits and licenses (Layene and Lee 2001, 129). In the fourth stage, there is an intention to integrate the various government services, both vertically (inter-governmental integration) and horizontally (intra-governmental integration). This stage requires special efforts, as it requires time and resources to integrate the online system with the services behind it (Hiller and Bellanger 2001, 131). The final stage involves promoting political participation based on Internet access, where government websites include online voting, online discussion forums, and online opinion polls, all for the most direct interaction with the public. If the first four stages are related to public services provided through the Internet, the fifth stage emphasizes the political activities that citizens can participate through. The

conceptual framework we refer to is merely an exploratory tool that helps to understand the evolution of electronic governance, but in practice linear evolution may not be confirmed.

Such an approach, which describes progressively how good governance, supported by the evolution of technology, can lead to an increase in the quality of democratic representation, is important for understanding the political interactions that occur outside the administrative environment. The concept of electronic governance becomes useful when electronic governance is viewed from a broad, comprehensive perspective, which refers not only to the authority and intervention of the state, but also to the joint action of the other actors involved in the development of public services, citizens, civil society organizations, companies or institutions of public interest.

Electronic governance thus manifests itself as part of an overall vision of the relationship between the state and society. Some authors believe that e-governance involves the promotion of more intense civic engagement and political participation by government institutions or civil society (Palvia& Sharma 2007, 5), using new mass communication technologies. Therefore, e-governance can today be considered an indispensable element of democratic practice, being one of the most important concerns of international organizations that promote democratic principles and respect for human rights (Council of Europe 2005, 8).

	"Hard" sciences ⟶		"Weak" sciences
Pure sciences	Computer science		Ethics of electronic governance
	Informatics		Information management
	Formal modeling	Management of eGovernment organizations	E-justice
	E-GIS (electronic geographical information system)	Infrastructure and interoperability of electronic governance	E-administration E-health
Applied sciences	Urban planning	Electronic public services	E-inclusion

Figure 3. The field of electronic governance

The relatively new field of electronic governance is at the intersection of already established fields of other sciences: political science, public administration, management, informatics, computer science, sociology, law, ethics, etc. (Scholl 2008, 30). The field of e-government research is therefore dominated by a strong multidisciplinary perspective (Irani and Dwivendi 2008, 223).

In fact, the precise domain of electronic governance cannot be defined: it overlaps the areas traditionally occupied by other disciplines, studying a

group of problems that tend to be outside the interest of a single "traditional" science. The domain of electronic governance seems to belong to the interdisciplinary sciences. If Biglan's classification of academic disciplines (hard sciences, weak sciences, pure sciences and applied sciences) is used, it can be observed that the field of electronic governance research extends across this spectrum (Delcambre& Giuliano 2005, 37).

Electronic governance is both interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary (Heeks 2006, 4). At its center is the information (raw data, but also processed data). This information is used through technology, which can be digital but also non-digital.

Figure 4. Model of electronic governance systems (Heeks 2006, 5)

In order for electronic governance to be considered a system, information and technology must be added to people and their work for a purpose, a process in which information is processed with the help of technology (**Figure 4**). Electronic governance systems are not independent, but are covered by public organizations, which provide them with the administrative and cultural environment in which they operate. Public organizations,

in turn, evolve into a much broader societal framework, which includes besides the technical and economic, political, legal, socio-cultural or legal dimension.

In conclusion, electronic governance is a new field of study, having no clear boundaries, no settled theories and no dominant research methodologies. Some authors consider that it is a field of interdisciplinary studies. Computer science, informatics, urban planning, management, ethics, public services, public administration and other social sciences can be brought together under the "umbrella" of digitalization. At the same time, an e-government system is not just information and technology, but it is included in the public sector (which means resources, structures, management and organizational culture), all these being embedded in a broader context of political thoughts, laws, values, technologies, and economic system, all of them being gathered together in a transdisciplinary field.

References

Bhatnagar, S. 2004. *E-Government. From Vision to Implementation*. London: Sage Publications Ltd.

Brown, D. 1999. "Information Systems for Improved Performance Management: Development Approaches in U.S. Public Agencies". In *Reinventing Government in the Information Age*, edited by Richard Heeks, 113-134. New York: Routledge.

Council of Europe. 2005. *Electronic governance ("e-governance"): recommendation adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 15 December 2004 and explanatory memorandum*. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Pub.

Delcambre, L. Giuliano, G. 2005. "Digital government research in academia". *Computer* 38(12): 33-39.

Dunleavy, P.; Margetts, H.; Bastow, S.; and Tinker, J. 2006. *Digital Era Governance: IT Corporations, the State, and E-Government*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Fountain, J.E. 2001. *Building the Virtual State. Information Technology and Institutional Change*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Heeks, R. 2006. *Implementuing and Managing eGovernment*. London: Sage Publications.

Hiller, J. and Belanger, F. 2001. *Privacy Strategies for Electronic Government. E-Government Series*. Pricewaterhouse Coopers Endowment for the Business of Government, Arlington VA.

International Telecommunication Union. 2018. *Measuring the Information Society Report*. https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/publications/misr2018/MISR-2018-Vol-1-E.pdf. (Accessed 4 November 2018)

Irani, Z. and Dwivendi, Y.K. 2008. "Editorial". *Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy* 2(4): 221-224.

Jain Palvia, S., and Sharma, S.S. 2007. "E-Government and E-Governance: Definitions/Domain Framework and Status around the World". In *Foundations of e-Government*, edited by A. Agarwal and V. V. Ramana. http://www.iceg.net/2007/books/1/1_369.pdf

Layne, K., and Lee, J. 2001. "Developing fully functional E-government: A four stage model". *Government Information Quarterly* 18(2): 122-136.

Moon, M.J.; Welch E.W.; and Wong W. 2005. "What Drives Global E-governance? An Exploratory Study at a Macro Level". *Proceedings of the 38th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences*, DOI: 10.1109/HICSS.2005.688

Moon, M.J., and Bretschneider, S. 2002. "Does the Perception of Red Tape Constrain IT Innovativeness in Organizations? Unexpected Results from Simultaneous Equation Model and Implications". *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 12(2): 273-291.

Norris, P. 1999. "Who Surfs? New Technology, Old Voters, and Virtual Democracy". In *Democracy.com? Governance in Networked World*, edited by Elaine Ciulla Kamarck and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 71-94. Hollis NH: Hollis Publishing Company.

Nye, J. 1999. "Information Technology and Democratic Governance". In *Democracy.com? Governance in Networked World*, edited by Elaine Ciulla Kamarck şi Joseph S. Nye, Jr., 1-18. Hollis, NH: Hollis Publishing Company.

Scholl, H. 2008. "Discipline or Interdisciplinary Study Domain? Challenges and Promises in Electronic Government Research". In *Digital Government. E-Government Research, Case Studies, and Implementation*, edited by H. Chen, L. Brandt, V. Gregg, R. Traunmuller, S. Dawes, E. Hovy, A. Macintosh, C. Larson, 21-41. New York: Springer Science-Business Media.

Schwester, R. 2009. "Examining the Barriers to e-Government Adoption". *Electronic Journal of e-Government* 7(1): 113-122.

Sprecher, M. 2000. "Racing to E-government: Using the Internet for Citizen Service Delivery". *Government Finance Review* 16(5): 21-22.

United Nations and American Society for Public Administration. 2003. *Global Survey of E-government*. https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/portals/egovkb/Documents/un/2003 -Survey/unpan016066.pdf.

West, D.M. 2005. *Digital Government: Technology and Public Sector Performance*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Simon CUFF *

Affected History: The Truth of Gadamer and Methods in New Testament Hermeneutics

Abstract: Gadamer is cited as an hermeneutical resource for New Testament Scholarship with increasing frequency. There is a tendency within New Testament scholarship to interpret Gadamer as advocating a method of interpretation which looks to reception of the text as a means to interpret that text. In this trajectory, Gadamer is seen as a stepping stone toward the hermeneutics of reception of Hans Robert Jauss. This article seeks to revisit Gadamer's own reflection on his philosophical hermeneutics, his resistance to method, and the possibility of incorporating Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics within interpretation of text. Ultimately, it sees Gadamer'sinsight not as providing an improved method, but a intellectual humility with respect of our own and others' interpretations of various texts. Understood in this way, Gadamer prompts reflection on the influences which shape us as interpreters and a greater awareness of own standing in relation to the text.

Keywords: Gadamer, *wirkungsgeschichte*, New Testament, method, Scripture.

1. The Gadamer of New Testament Scholarship

The hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002) was developed in a number of essays and most famously in his magnum opus *Truth and Method* (1960). Since its publication, the question of how best to integrate the insights of Gadamer's hermeneutics within the task of interpretation of any text remains unsettled. This is especially the case within the study of the New Testament.

Gadamer's hermeneutics, and certain features abstracted from it, are now regularly utilised within New Testament scholarship in a manner which is at odds with (and at times *explicitly* at odds with) the express hermeneutics put forward by Gadamer himself. In the most extreme cases, terms taken from his theory have been utilised with little or no reference to their Gadamerean forebear.

This present essay does not seek to settle disputes concerning the interpretation of Gadamer or the dominance of historical-criticism within the interpretation of the New Testament. Instead we seek to make some observations which should be taken into account as Gadamer and his hermeneutics continues to play an increasing role in the evolution of New Testament studies.

---

* PhD, Tutor and Lecturer in Theology at St. Mellitus College, London, UK; email: Simon.Cuff@stmellitus.ac.uk

As late as 2001, during Gadamer's lifetime, Bruce Pearson was able to write: "Gadamer has not been utilized in any extensive way by New Testament scholarship" (Pearson 2001, 35). In the intervening years, anglophone scholars in particular have been turning to Gadamer with increasing regularity[1]. Where Gadamer is invoked he is often cited as proposing a hermeneutic of reception focussed on the "*wirkungsgeschichte*" or "effective-history" of the text. We shall consider this concept in more detail below. At this stage, it is sufficient to note how this insight of Gadamer is normally understood. It is not enough, according to this dominant interpretation of Gadamer, to consider the meaning of the "original" text in isolation. We must also look at subsequent interpretations of the "original" to better understand the "original" meaning of the text. In some instances, this process of interpretation is historicised, with chronological proximity given preference to judge between competing interpretations[2].

As appeals to Gadamer have become more frequent, the importance of considering how best to utilise his hermeneutics within New Testament study has correspondingly increased. Robert Evans' recent monograph is a significant contribution towards this on-going task. Evans makes a strong case for an understanding of Gadamer's hermeneutics which allows considerable space for the practice of historical-criticism that has risen to dominance within the interpretation of the New Testament over the last two centuries (Evans 2014, 26-52). He views it as an important phase within the wider task of understanding.

David Parris includes Gadamer within an important account of the rise of reception-critical study (Parris 2009). Parris explores the recent history of reception-critical study of the New Testament and identifies Gerhard Ebeling as the source of the current resurgence in interest the reception of a text[3]. In doing so, he plays down the important role Ulrich Luz has had in popularising the current focus on the reception of the text within Biblical studies. Parris argues that "hermeneutically, Luz's model is based on Hans-Georg Gadamer's work and stands within the trajectory of thought launched by Ebeling" (Parris 2009, ix-x, xv).

For our purposes, it is significant that Parris recognises Luz's work is "based on" Gadamer's. Our interest is in the distance between Gadamer's theory and Luz's application of the same. This distance has important implications for the manner in which *wirkungsgeschichte* is understood within New Testament studies.

Within Parris' study, *wirkungsgeschichte*, the history of a text's effects is treated as practically synonymous with terms such as "reception history" or "interpretation history". This highlights an important terminological haze in this area more generally. The difficult to translate German word "*wirkungsgeschichte*" is translated variously as "effective-history", "history of effects", "history of influence" and, more broadly, "reception".

Precision is needed here. To elide these distinct aspects of a text into a broader study of "reception" risks obscuring Gadamer's insight into the nature of interpretation which, as we see below, is his focus. To include both the hermeneutics of Gadamer and the reception-focussed hermeneutics of Hans Robert Jauss together under the label of "reception theory", as Parris does, further risks obscuring the distinctiveness of Gadamer's theory of interpretation. Including Gadamer within approaches to the text that emphasise "reception" places focus on the many instances of reception between the text and the one seeking to interpret the text. Gadamer, as we shall see, proffers a philosophical hermeneutics focussed primarily on the one seeking to interpret the text.

Luz's understanding of *Wirkungsgeschichte* demonstrates his distance from Gadamer in this respect. Luz is concerned, like Jauss, with those instances of reception and readings of the text which have occurred before the one seeking to interpret the text. Luz's understanding of *Wirkungsgeschichte* is often assumed to be taken directly from Gadamer, and indicative of the term within Gadamer's thought. Luz is clear that this is not the case: "Effective history enables me to connect with Gadamer, though my perspective is different from his" (Luz 2005, 351).

Luz is indebted to Gadamer. He shares with Gadamer a concern for "the effective power of the texts themselves" (Luz 2007, 61). However, Luz expresses this concern through a focus on the readings those texts have engendered as an interpretative aid, rather than a focus on the phenomenon of interpretation on the part of the one who seeks to understand the Biblical text herself.

2. The Method of Gadamer

Gadamer's perspective, meanwhile, is one firmly rooted in the phenomenological tradition indebted to Heidegger. He sees his hermeneutics as a continuation of Heidegger's approach. He describes his project as part of "the necessity to prolong the critique of hermeneutics which Heidegger had begun" (Gadamer 1976, 12)[4].

Dale Stover suggests that because of this Heideggerean legacy, the term "*wirkungsgeschichte*" might be better translated "radical historicity" (Stover 1976, 34-44). He notes that although "effectual historicality" would be a more literal rendering, the phrase is more obscure in English. "Radical" is used here in the sense of root principle, fundamental ground, or pervasive condition. "Radical historicality," then means something like "unconditionally historical" (Stover 1976, 43n3). He spells out the consequences of *wirkungsgeschichte* as "radical historicity": "radical historicality means that meanings are forever bound to a tradition-in-process, and the grasp for an absolute understanding is futile, meaningless" (Stover 1976, 36-37).

Interpreters are inseparably part of an historical process which includes both them and the text from which they are unable to escape. Considering other interpretations of a text does not clarify or get the interpreter closer to an absolute understanding of a text. Tracing the "history of interpretation" does not liberate the interpreter from an historical situation from which it is impossible to escape.

This understanding of *wirkungsgeschichte* as "radical historicity" helps to explain a persistent criticism of Gadamer's hermeneutics, which is otherwise difficult to understand given the predominant understanding of *wirkungsgeschichte* as reception-history as an interpretative aid which remains dominant within New Testament studies. Gadamer has been repeatedly criticised for *describing* the interpreter locked in an historical condition from which she cannot escape. Critics have persistently critiqued the lack of methodology for overcoming this situation which Gadamer refuses to give.

E. D. Hirsch is an early, and vocal, opponent of Gadamer's hermeneutics along these lines. For Hirsch, Gadamer's positing that each interpreter is locked into this historicity, unable to overcome it, producing interpretations governed by that subjective historicity is hopelessly relative. He even goes so far as to suggest this puts Gadamer outside of the hermeneutical tradition starting with Schleiermacher: "The relativism of Heidegger and Gadamer runs counter to... objectivist views (that) can be considered a throwback to the 'genuine' or 'authentic' tradition of Schleiermacher" (Hirsch 1976, 17). He rejects the role the historicity or historical situation of the interpreter plays in interpretation, rejecting "how the historicity of understanding affects the conduct of interpretation" (Hirsch 1967, 153).

For Hirsch, Gadamer's positing the impossibility of overcoming the interpreter's historical situation leads to relativism: "whatever that language says to us is its meaning. It means what ever we take it to mean. Reduced to its intelligible significance the doctrine of the autonomy of a written text is the doctrine of the indeterminacy of textual meaning" (Hirsch 1965, 492). Anthony Thiselton likewise notes the consequence of focussing on the reader's historically-situated application of a text on interpretation: "The distinction between meaning and application disappears... (leaving) no room for hermeneutical norms which would help us decide what might constitute responsible interpretation in any given case" (Thiselton 1985, 110).

To overcome the dangers of relativism, Hirsch wants Gadamer to provide the method promised by the title *Truth and Method*. Gadamer's lack of methodmeans that he finds this title "somewhat ironic" and bemoans "the deliberate irony of Professor Gadamer's title" (Hirsch 1967, 245). Hirsch is not alone in his frustration that Gadamer's hermeneutics does not live up to its title, and fails to offer a method of interpretation. Emilio Betti, who had developed a hermeneutics of his own which sought just such a method, is another early critic along these lines (Betti 1961; 1980).

Before we see how Gadamer responds to this charge, it is worth noting that Hirsch is correct in finding the title "deliberately ironic". In his biography of Gadamer, Jean Grondin notes that *Truth and Method* was originally to be entitled *Foundations of a Philosophical Hermeneutics*, then *Understanding and Event* before the final title was adopted (Grondin 2003, 281-282).

Pearson notes the importance of the term "philosophical" here: "Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics are not about facilitating the formulation of methods of interpretation. This is specifically why he has chosen the title 'philosophical' hermeneutics, in contradistinction to the 'science of hermeneutics'" (Pearson 2001, 9). Gadamer's focus is on the phenomenon of understanding as an event, not a method for more accurate or "objective" interpretation (Gadamer, 2008).

That this is so becomes clear in Gadamer's response to Betti. Gadamer insists:

> Fundamentally I am not proposing a method; I am describing what is the case. That it is as I described it cannot, I think, be seriously questioned... I am trying to go beyond the concept of method held by modern science (which retains its limited justification) and to envisage in a fundamentally universal way what always happens. (Gadamer 1965, 512-513)

He reaffirms the position he articulated in *Truth and Method*, that hermeneutics must not be obsessed by method:

> Understanding is to be thought of less as a subjective act than as participating in an event of tradition, a process of transmission in which past and present are constantly mediated. This is what must be validated by hermeneutical theory, which is far too dominated by the idea of a procedure, of a method. (Gadamer 2004, 291)

Gadamer is not against method as such, but he recognises that the buck does not stop with, and "objectivity" is not secured by, the application of method[5]. He notes the trivial ends to which method can be utilised[6]. He recognises both that there are limits to the usefulness of method and that method only goes so far in explains the phenomenon of understanding: "Method is not everything" (Gadamer, 1976, 12)[7]. Method, he insists, is useful only in so far as it serves as an instrument to understanding (Gadamer 1976, 12).

James Crouch describes the reasons for Gadamer's pessimism about method, since "a hermeneutic that limits itself to scientific methodology – that accepts method as the sole criterion of truth – ultimately limits understanding, excludes much that is truth" (Crouch 2007, 7).

Gadamer is suspicious of too hasty a turn to method in order to achieve "objective" interpretation. This is suspicious is partly based on Gadamer's

rehabilitation of the concepts of "prejudice" and "tradition" against post-Enlightment "prejudices" against them: "There is one prejudice of the Enlightenment that defines its essence: the fundamental prejudice of the Enlightenment is the prejudice against prejudice itself, which denies tradition its power" (Gadamer 2004, 272-273). Roger Lundin notes in contrast that "many modern theories of interpretation ... (and) denigrate the role of tradition in interpretation and seek indubitable methods" (Lundin 1985, 24).

Stanley Rosen has noted that this fear of relativism leads to a state of desperation on the part of the historian, who seeks security in methodology as a result:

> [The historian] is correct in his assertion that a lack of sound methodology leads to the obliteration of the distinction between subtlety and madness... since there are no canons for the exercise of subtlety, ... [the historian] is in practice all too often driven to the desperate expedient of equating subtlety with the exercise of sound methodology. (Rosen 2003, 165-166)

He goes on to note that: "the usual result is to define subtlety in terms of historical consensus, that is to say, in terms of the doctrines that characterise the school to which the philologist belongs" (Rosen 2003, 166). All too often, legitimate interpretation is restricted to consensually determined canons of the school to which the interpreter belongs.

Parris exhibits exactly the behaviour described by Rosen. In doing so he continues a line of interpretation which sees Gadamer as a stepping stone to reception studies as suggested by Jauss: "We must understand Gadamer as a prelude to Jauss" (Parris 2009, 2). Whilst recognising Gadamer's reluctance to advocate method, Parris refuses to allow it to stand: "More than this is needed if we are going to successfully apply Gadamer's hermeneutic to biblical interpretation. We really need some form of methodological framework to incorporate all the different approaches to the Bible that have developed" (Parris 2009, 114). This is just one example of the process highlighted by Yvonne Sherwood and Stephen Moore: "Biblical studies is *obsessed* with method and is *possessed by* method. Biblical scholarship seems to turn everything it touches into method" (Moore and Sherwood 2011, 33).

Mark Knight likewise notes how the historical-critical method trains biblical scholars not to engage with Truth and Method as a work of philosophical hermeneutics: "To take just one example, we might note the way in which the historical-critical method trains biblical scholars to look for the history in Truth and Method and avoid a philosophical hermeneutics that is too abstract" (Knight 2010, 144).

The central point of the present article is to underline the fact that any interpretive approach which seeks to derive a method from, or a base a method on, the hermeneutics of Gadamer immediately parts company with Gadamer himself.

At the end of his debate with Betti, Gadamer bemoans: "Obviously I have not succeeded in convincing Betti that a philosophical theory of hermeneutics is not a methodology" (Gadamer 1965, 513). Instead, Gadamer seeks a hermeneutics which goes beyond method: "Hermeneutics surpasses methods, because it reminds us of our practical life experience and only through this awareness might the innate power of dogmatism be overcome" (Gadamer 1976, 12-13)[8]. Ironically, Gadamer insists, to maintain a focus on method, shows only that one "is profoundly involved in the subjectivism which we are endeavouring to overcome" (Gadamer 1965, 513).

3. A New Horizon ?

Gadamer's hermeneutics does not enable us to produce or fine-tune a methodology of interpretation to help us overcome the shackles of tradition, or to prevent the historical situation within which we interpret the text from clouding our interpretation. If anything, the reverse is the case. Terry Eagleton suggests this in his summary of Gadamer's hermeneutical theory: "The point of the tradition, then, is to get us back to where we were, only more radically so" (Eagleton 1981, 54).

We do not, and cannot, completely overcome the prejudices which make up our historical standing as interpreters. As Knight notes, "Gadamer's contested hermeneutical conversation is unashamedly historical and attuned to a tradition that we can revise but not leave behind" (Knight 2010, 144). At best, we can become aware of them. This inability to escape the traditionary forces which govern us is the ground of the debate between Gadamer and Jürgen Habermas[9]. Habermas insists on a possibility to escape traditions which Gadamer insists we have no choice but to inhabit.

Realising the traditions which we inhabit helps us to see the limitations of our understanding. It does not help us beyond them. This is one way to understand Gadamer's *wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewußtsein*. Our awareness of the traditions in which we stand helps us to be aware of the limitations of all interpretation, which is at best provisional.

Instead of prompting the search for a methodology which improves our method of understanding, Gadamer's insight might better be utilised by generating an awareness in us of the reasons we interpret the New Testament text in the way we do. It may help us to realise our preference for this or that interpretation, arising out of the traditions which we have no choice but to inhabit. It also prompts us toward a greater humility with regards to other methods and interpretations of the Biblical text.

If we give due consideration not to the impossible desire for a methodology but to the philosophical commitments of a Gadamerean hermeneutic then we can note with Thomas Guarino that: "reconstructive hermeneutics necessarily yields to an interpretive theory which allows for a plurality of

new and differing interpretations of a text's meaning. Such plurality is demanded by the historicity of understanding" (Guarino 1990, 227).

This plurality of meanings is neither arbitrary nor a relativistic fudge but a "radical plurality" (Guarino 1990, 227). As such, *Wirkungsgeschichte* should be allowed the full weight of Stover's translation as "radical historicality". The historicality to which Gadamer alerts us does not limit the canons of meaning or provide a new refined methodology sensitive to successive interpretations of a text and their impact upon us as interpreters. Instead, it expands the task of interpretation to encourage understanding and celebrating the tradition in which any interpreter approaches the text.

A final thought on what this means for those of us who regard the New Testament to be Scripture, and offer the possibility of encounter with the divine. It's quite understandable how the importance of sound interpretation as a means to discern God's will within that encounter drives Christians to be very concerned what constitutes right reading of a text. An early criticism of Gadameris that his hermeneutic treats *every* text as if it were the text of Scripture: "For Gadamer, all texts are like the Constitution and the Bible" (Hirsch 1967, 123). What are the implications for reading Scripture if what Gadamer says is true of *every* text and interpreter is no less true for those who approach the text of Scripture as such.

If Gadamer's philosophical theory of hermeneutics is allowed to stand on its own terms, rather than securing right reading of the Scriptural text through the history of early or successive interpretations, it encourages us to recognise the possibility of readings and interpretations of the text which are equally moments of encounter, even if very different from our own. We might not be able to step outside of our tradition, or remove others from the tradition in which they stand, at least not this in life. We can however come to recognise the force of our own tradition on our own interpretation of the text, and come to terms with the impact of another's tradition on theirs. Such an insight prompts not relativism, but humility, until such a time that we are offered the ability to interpret the word face-to-face.

Notes

[1] For example, Räisänen (1992); Bockmuehl (1996; 2007); Childs (2008, 29-63); Nicholls (2005; 2007). Signficantly, commentary series have emerged which emphasise the reception and *wirksgungeschichte* of the text, including Intervarsity Press' Ancient Christian Commentary series, Blackwell's Bible Commentaries and the *Evangelisch-Katholischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament.*

[2] For example, Bockmuehl (2007, 36): "My modest suggestion here is to harness the historical implications of a *Wirkungsgeschichte* on the human scale – the scale of personal living memory. That is to say, I propose to privilege the earlier over the more remote effects for a historical understanding of texts, persons and events".

[3] Parris points especially to Ebeling (1964).

[4] "La nécessité d'un prolongement de la critique de l'herméneutique que Heidegger avait commencée" (Gadamer 1976, 12). Gadamer's paper was originally delivered to the University of Montreal as an address on the March 11, 1974.

[5] "Il est totalement absurde de dire que j'ai des objections contre les méthodes" (Gadamer 1976, 12). Stover also makes this point (Stover 1976, 36).

[6] "Je m'objecte seulement contre une application sansintelligence et sans intérêt motivé des méthodes, car je sais trop que les méthodes aussi peuvent être excellemment mises au service de trivialités" (Gadamer 1976, 12).

[7] "Cela veut dire que *la méthode n'est pas tout*" (Gadamer 1976, 12).

[8] "L'herméneutique rappelle aux sciences comme à notre expériencepratique de la vie, qu'il faut vaincre les aliénations de notre culture et de notrecivilisation en surmontant la barrière des préoccupations dogmatisantes qui nous sont innées" (Gadamer 1976, 12).

[9] On the debate between Gadamer and Habermas, see Habermas (1986) and How (1995).

References

Betti, Emilio. 1961. "L'Ermeneutica storica e la storicita dell intendere". *Annali della Faculta di Giurisprudenza* 16. Bari.

Betti, Emilio. 1980. "Hermeneutics as the General Methodology of the Geisteswissen-schaften". In *Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy and Critique*, edited by Josef Bleicher. London: Routledge.

Bockmuehl, Markus. 1996. "A Commentator's Approach to the 'Effective History' of Philippians". *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* 18, 57-88.

Bockmuehl, Markus. 2007. "New Testament *Wirkungsgeschichte* and the Early Christian Appeal to Living Memory". In *Memory in the Bible and Antiquity,* edited by Loren Stuckenbruck, Stephen Barton and Benjamin Wold, 341-361. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

Childs, Brevard. 2008. "Alternative Proposals for the Problem of Interpretation". In *The Church's Guide for Reading Paul*, 29-63. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans.

Crouch, James E. 2007. "Augustine and Gadamer: An Essay on *Wirkungsgeschichte*". *Encounter* 68.4

Eagleton, Terence. 1981. *Walter Benjamin: or Towards a Revolutionary Criticism.* London: Verso.

Ebeling, Gerhard. 1964. *Wort Gottes und Tradition.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Evans, Robert. 2014. *Reception History, Tradition and Biblical Interpretation.* London: Bloomsbury.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1976."L'herméneutique philosophique". *Studies in Religion* 5(1): 3-13.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1965. "Hermeneutics and Historicism". In Gadamer Hans-Georg. *Truth and Method*, 507-537. London: Continuum.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 2004. *Truth and Method.* London: Continuum.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 2008. "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutic Reflection (1967)". In *Philosophical Hermeneutics,* translated by David E. Linge, 18-43. London: University of California Press.

Grondin, Jean. 2003. *Hans-Georg Gadamer: A Biography.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Guarino, Thomas. 1990. "Revelation and Foundationalism: Toward Hermeneutical and Ontological Appropriateness". *Modern Theology* 6(3) (April): 221-235.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1986. "On Hermeneutics' Claim to Universality". In *The Hermeneutics Reader: Texts of the German Tradition from The Enlightenment to the Present,* edited by Kurt Mueller-Vollmer, 294-319. Oxford: Blackwell.

Hirsch, Eric D. 1965. "Truth and Method in Interpretation". *The Review of Metaphysics* 18(3): 488-507.

Hirsch, Eric D. 1967. *Validity in Interpretation.* London: Yale University Press.

Hirsch, Eric D. 1976. *The Aims of Interpretation.* London: University of Chicago Press.

How, Alan. 1995. *The Habermas-Gadamer Debate and the Nature of the Social.* London: Avebury.

Knight, Mark. 2010. "*Wirkungsgeschichte*, Reception History, Reception Theory". *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* 33(2): 137-146.

Lundin, Roger. 1985. "Our Hermeneutical Inheritance". In *The Responsibility of Hermeneutics* by Roger Lundin, Anthony Thiselton, Clarence Walhout, 1-30. Exeter: Paternoster.

Luz, Ulrich. 2005. "Hermeneutics of 'Effective History' and the Church". In *Studies in Matthew*, translated by Rosemary Selle, 349-369. Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans.

Luz, Ulrich. 2007. *Matthew 1-7: A Commentary.* Minneapolis: Fortress Press.

Moore, Stephen D., and Sherwood, Y. 2011. *The Invention of the Biblical Scholar: A Critical Manifesto.* Minneapolis: Fortress Press.

Nicholls, Rachel. 2005. "Is *Wirkungsgeschichte* (or Reception History) a kind of intellectual *Parkour* (or Free Running?)". Accessed September 28, 2019. https://issuu.com/revrach/docs/wirkungsgeschichte.

Nicholls, Rachel. 2007. *Walking on the Water: Reading Mt 14.22-33 in Light of Its Wirkungsgeschichte.* Brill: Leiden.

Parris, David P. 2009. *Reception Theory and Biblical Hermeneutics.* Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications.

Pearson, Brook. 2001. *Corresponding Sense: Paul, Dialectic and Gadamer.* Leiden: Brill.

Räisänen, Heikki. 1992. "The Effective "History'of the Bible: A Challenge to Biblical Scholarship". *Scottish Journal of Theology* 45: 303-324.

Rosen, Stanley. 2003. *Hermeneutics as Politics.* London: Yale University Press.

Stover, Dale. 1976. "Linguisticality and Theology: Applying the Hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer". *Studies in Religion* 5(1): 34-44.

Thiselton, Anthony. 1985. "Reader-Response Hermeneutics, Action Models and the Parables of Jesus". In *The Responsibility of Hermeneutics* by Roger Lundin, Anthony Thiselton, Clarence Walhout, 79-114. Exeter: Paternoster.

Lavinia-Alexandra GRIJAC [*]

Lac, non escam. Interpretations of I Cor. 3:2 in patristic and medieval philosophy

Abstract: The aim of this article is to analyze a number of selected patristic and medieval interpretations of I Corinthians 3:2 ("*Lac vobis potum dedi, non escam: nondum enim poteratis: sed nec nunc quidem potestis: adhuc enim carnales estis.*") There is a strong connection between biblical exegesis and the understanding of fundamental philosophical ideas. The numerous patristic and medieval commentaries to the Pauline epistles play an important role in the creation of major philosophical systems, research methodologies, types of human behaviour and social practices. A philosophical investigation of the interpretations of a particular Bible verse through history reveals a great diversity of mentalities, philosophical views, literary styles and historical circumstances. I find I Cor. 3:2 to be of particular interest because its interpretations touch upon many different domains (theology, philosophy, psychology, hermeneutics, epistemology etc.) and show a remarkable historical transmission, as this article shall present by analyzing the interpretations of Origen, Augustine, Petrus Lombardus, Henry of Ghent, Thomas de Argentina and Alphonsus Vargas Toletanus.

Keywords: biblical exegesis, patristic and medieval philosophy, I Cor. 3:2, Origen, Augustine, Petrus Lombardus, Henry of Ghent, Thomas de Argentina, Alphonsus Vargas Toletanus.

1. On I Corinthians 3:2

In order to analyze different patristic and medieval interpretations of I Cor. 3:2, one must firstly become familiar with the verse's main ideas. Therefore, I will provide a short overview of this specific verse and keywords like "carnal" and "spiritual", based on different works of biblical exegesis.

As there are many possible divisions of the epistle, I Cor. 3:2 can be placed within different segments such as I Cor. 3:1-9, as found in (Collins 1999), 2:6-3:4 (Horsley 1998), 2:14-3:4 (Fitzmyer 2008) or strictly 3:1-3. Each division suggests a distinct interpretation and understanding of the keywords "milk", "solid food", "carnal", "spiritual". The image of infants and milk can be considered a metaphorical representation of Paul's relationship with the Corinthians, suggesting the motherly care and "nourishing"

[*] MA student, Master for Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Faculty of History and Philosophy, "Babeş-Bolyai" University Cluj-Napoca, Romania; email: lavinia.grijac@gmail.com

guidance he offered to those he converted (Collins 1999, 140-141). Simultaneously, by comparing the Corinthians (who considered themselves physically, mentally and spiritually mature) to infants, Paul's discourse takes a sarcastic turn after he made an exposition using the themes and vocabulary familiar to the Corinthians (Horsley 1998, 56-57), only to later remind them of their actual present situation: after their conversion, they continued to conduct their lives accordingly to earthly values, limiting themselves to an interpersonal level, establishing new religious groups and choosing their own new spiritual leaders (Collins 1999, 143-145). To Paul, the conflicts between these groups' members are a sign of their general immaturity, as well as a sign of the fact that his message was not assimilated correctly by them, as they remained "carnal" and corruptible (Fitzmyer 2008, 187-188). The types of food can represent either different types of doctrine (an introductory, easy-to-understand doctrine that Paul gave the Corinthians and a more abstract and profound doctrine that he withheld from them) or the same doctrine, but adapted in two different ways to the Corinthians' understanding capacity and circumstances so that the message of the cross infallibly reaches them (Pagels 1975, 55; 57-58). The verse's interpretations multiply if we consider the keywords' original Greek form, their conceptual history and their usage in other Pauline epistles or Books of the Bible.

While some interpretations can be particularly problematic (for example, a Gnostic interpretation implying a strict hierarchy among believers, essentially divided into carnal people and spiritual people), the fight against heretical views resulted in the fortification of Christian doctrine in the first two centuries CE, simultaneously (re)affirming the plurality of interpretations, their importance and circulation. Such effort can be seen in Origen's and Augustine's works, which had a long-lasting influence on the culture of future centuries.

2. The interpretation of Augustine. A possible link to Origen

I will now analyze Augustine's interpretation of I Cor. 3:2 following the verse's appearances in *De Trinitate,* I, 3, *Confessiones,* XIII, 23 and *De Trinitate,* III, 1, in this selected order.

At the beginning of *De Trinitate*'s Book One, Augustine describes three ways which lead those who study doctrinal problems on the divinity into error, thus arriving at conclusions either false or inadequate to be considered real knowledge. The first one refers to those who approach spiritual problems from an empirical standpoint; the second refers to those whose debates bear an exaggerated exaltation and are dominated by a superfluous emotional and subjective mark; the third one refers to pagans, characterized by competitiveness and stubbornness, both factors that suppress the

person's receptiveness. Each category's specific faults are hindrances to someone who aspires to understand transcendence, and if that someone falls into one of these categories, they will be unable to attain anything beyond mere opinions. Thus, we observe one holds a methodological problem, the second an affective problem and the third a receptiveness problem, all of which are answered to in a Christian manner: the person's approach must be based on faith, they must practice the Christian way of life in order to gain control over the influence of passions or other emotions over their reasoning and, respectively, bearing in mind that the intended "object of knowledge" in this case is God, they must admit and accept his unknowable nature. However, the study of Scripture can bring the person closer to an understanding of spiritual things, for the Scripture conveys them either directly or allegorically. It is the homo viator's responsibility to do a hermeneutical reading of the Bible, acknowledging the principle of plurality of its interpretations, each initially equally valid, but only the interpretations based on faith can be ultimately considered true. Augustine justifies this principle's existence examining the difference between the Trinity's persons and their distinct actions, a difference that, despite existing, does not renounce the Trinity's internal unity and equality. It is here that Augustine uses I Cor. 3:2, especially early in *De Trinitate*'s course.

It is important to note that, in this case, Augustine uses I Cor. 3:2 as an argument following I Cor. 2:3, thus the two verses together may suggest a specific reading of the text:

> Deinde secutus ait: *et ego in infirmitate et in timore et tremore multo fui apud vos.* Et paulo post eis dicit: *et ego, fratres, non potui loqui vobis quasi spiritalibus sed quasi carnalibus. Quasi parvulis in Christo lac vobis potum dedi, non escam; nondum enim poteratis, sed nec adhuc potestis.* Hoc cum dicitur quibusdam irascuntur et sibi contumeliose dici putant, et plerumque malunt credere eos potius, a quibus haec audiunt non habere quod dicant quam se capere non posse quod dixerint. Et aliquando afferimus eis rationem, non quam petunt cum de Deo quaerunt, quia nec ipsi eam valent sumere nec nos fortasse vel apprehendere vel proferre, sed qua demonstretur eis quam sint inhabiles minimeque idonei percipiendo quod exigunt. (*De Trinitate, I, 3*)

While I Cor. 3:2 allows for a reading of the message that the responsibility of understanding is both the speaker's and the listeners', the presence of I Cor. 2:3 directs the reading towards observing the listeners' situation and role. The verse focuses on Paul, yet it exposes his weaknesses and criticizes his oratory skills (Fitzmyer 2008, 171-173). This way, once the limits of the one holding the discourse have been established, the public's contribution can be observed. Before the use of these verses, a critique of the unreceptive public was made; after invoking the two verses as support, this critique is resumed and its focus shifts back to the public. Simultaneously, the idea

of plurality of biblical interpretation continues to be sustained. Different approaches and opinions are a normal consequence of the diversity of communities, methods, circumstances and historical legacies, but also a consequence of the individual differences regarding one's own understanding capacity. This latter individual *quantum potest* is emphasized in *Confessiones,* XIII, 23, where Augustine uses I Cor. 3:2 as well:

> Quoniam quidem *alii datur per spiritum sermo sapientiae* tamquam *luminare maius* propter eos, qui perspicuae veritatis luce delectantur tamquam in principio diei, *alii autem sermo scientiae secundum eumdem spiritum* tamquam *luminare minus, alii fides, alii donatio curationum, alii operationes virtutum, alii prophetia, alii diiudicatio spirituum, alteri genera linguarum*, et haec omnia tamquam stellae. *Omnia* enim *haec operatur unus atque idem spiritus, dividens propria unicuique prout vult* et faciens apparere sidera in manifestatione *ad utilitatem. Sermo* autem *scientiae*, qua continentur omnia sacramenta, quae variantur temporibus tamquam luna, et ceterae notitiae donorum, quae deinceps tamquam stellae commemorata sunt, quantum differunt ab illo candore sapientiae, quo gaudet praedictus dies, tantum in principio noctis sunt. His enim sunt necessaria, quibus ille prudentissimus servus tuus *non* potuit *loqui quasi spiritalibus, sed quasi carnalibus*, ille, qui *sapientiam* loquitur *inter perfectos. Animalis autem homo* tamquam parvulus in Christo lactisque potator, donec roboretur ad solidum cibum et aciem firmet ad solis aspectum, non habeat desertam noctem suam, sed luce lunae stellarumque contentus sit. (*Confessionum Libri XIII,* XIII, 23)

The transmission of ideas is also a transmission of interpretations – it is probable that Augustine follows Origen's understanding of I Cor. 3:2 here. Augustine's perception of Origen varied strongly as it went through different phases (Ramelli 2013, 289) related to his critique of Manichaeism and, later, Pelagianism. After an initially positive perception of Origen's ideas, Augustine comes to condemn him, deeming him a heretic. The complexity of the Origen-Augustine relation increases even more considering part of the Augustinian reaction and arguments against Origen results from the linguistic barrier between the two authors, as well as the questionable quality of the transmission of Origen's ideas, reaching Augustine indirectly through Ambrose, Jerome, Horosius and available translations (Ramelli 2013, 282; 285-286). Augustine is familiar with Origen's biblical exegesis and his method (Ramelli 2013, 303) and I Cor. 3:2's use in *Confessiones,* XIII, 23 shows that Augustine understands the terms *carnales* and *spirituales* in the same sense present in Origen's interpretation of the verse in his *Commentary* on the Song of Songs:

> Evidens utique est nec ab ullo omnino arbitror dubitari quod "pueros" hic Iohannes vel "adulescentes" aut "iuvenes" vel etiam "patres" secundum animae, non secundum corporis appellet aetatem. Sed et Paulus dicit in quodam loco: "non potui vobis loqui quasi spiritalibus, sed quasi carnalibus, tamquam parvulis in Christo; lac vobis potum dedi, non escam". In "Christo" autem "parvulus"

procul dubio secundum animae, non secundum carnis nominatur aetatem. (*Commentarium in Canticum Canticorum,* Prologus)

With this interpretation, Origen suggests a "psychological" understanding of the terms "carnal" and "spiritual". They are psychological states or attributes of the individual just as traits derived from age-related metaphorical expressions ("infants in Christ") are, which means that the soul and its traits are addressed, not the material body. In other words, when we address the carnal people or the spiritual people, we refer to a spiritual reality in which both groups are situated and thus we move away from the Gnostic dualism which implies the material reality serving as a manifestation of primordial differences. Each state (carnal or spiritual) has its specific way of understanding and interpreting, therefore, as in Augustine's interpretation, the focus falls on accepting the individual differences of a public, as well as accepting the limits of a discourse, rather than imposing essential differences that separate one inferior human category from another superior one, in a hierarchy that does not allow the carnal to ever advance because they lack certain innate qualities. If that was the case, then Augustine would not distance himself from a Gnostic conception in which only one category (the spiritual people, the pneumatics) is by nature destined for salvation. With these ideas in mind, returning to the verse's appearance in *Confessiones,* a key-question can now be asked: is surpassing one's personal condition possible, so that even those who can only bear "the light of the moon and the stars" are able to develop the capacity to bear "the sun's light", an allegory that matches that of milk and solid food ? Augustine's answer is affirmative: it becomes possible through studying, inasmuch as it is an activity necessarily based on faith, though until the person *on the path* achieves this goal, they need to accept and acknowledge their own condition. The path to knowledge requires active involvement of the *homo viator* in Augustine's vision, which justifies the shift of attention from the speaker to the audience in *De Trinitate,* where the public, understood as a sum of unique individual human beings, holds the greater responsibility. The speaker too must not forget their limits, since they too are advancing on the same ascetic path, which implies continuous effort.

The terminology of I Cor. 3:2 is also used at the beginning of *De Trinitate*'s Book Three:

Credant qui volunt malle me legendo quam legenda dictando laborare. Qui autem hoc nolunt credere, experiri vero et possunt et volunt, dent quae legendo vel meis inquisitionibus respondeatur vel interrogationibus aliorum quas pro mea persona quam in servitio Christi gero et pro studio quo fidem nostram adversus errorem carnalium et animalium hominum muniri inardesco necesse est me pati, et videant quam facile ab isto labore me temperem et quanto etiam gaudio stilum possim habere feriatum. (*De Trinitate,* III, 1)

Reading the fragment brings up the question: *what is the error of the carnal and animal people?* An answer can be found in *De Trin.,* III, 1-2, as the problem addressed in *De Trin.,* III, 1-2 is distinct from the one reintroduced afterwards, starting with *De Trin.,* III, 3, where Book Two's discussion resumes. Before proceeding, I shall provide a brief summary of this portion's main ideas.

De Trin., III, 1 begins with what at first glance seems to be a personal position of Augustine regarding his own investigation methods, contrasting with two other ways of advancing in a research: reading about something and talking about something (while indicating textual sources). Although an intellectual effort (the *work* that the fragment talks about) is present in both activities, a third type of activity remains superior to them: the personal hermeneutical exercise by written interpretation ("*Egoque ipse multa quae nesciebam* scribendo *me didicisse confitear*", *De Trin.,* III, 1). The importance of the written transmission of knowledge is recognized, writing is considered a constructive activity and is encouraged, for it is useful to both author and readers – those contemporary to the author or those of future generations. The topic of written transmission naturally touches upon the topic of translations. Later on, in the end of *De Trin.,* III, 2, the topic of error resurfaces: Augustine discusses faulty approaches to a debate's theme and for each he suggests ways to correct them. Firstly, the person engaging in this type of intellectual task must be devoted to the subject of discussion and not to their personal interest: both those who bring arguments and those who offer corrections must act serving the truth, not their ego[1]. Secondly, reading the Bible can "provide" the reader with faith, while reading Augustine's writings may provide additional understanding, and the one who intends to make a correction must do so *ex divina lectione vel inconcussa ratione (De Trin.,* III, 2). If, in the end, one arrives (even partially) to a truth, they must acknowledge it as universal (it does not belong to a single person, but to anyone who finds and assimilates it), and if one arrives to an error, this error pertains to the individual, not to the truth itself. Thus, at the end of *De Trin.,* III, 2, having followed a circular rhetorical path, we can grasp an idea as to what the error mentioned at the start of *De Trin.,* III, 1 refers to: the error resides in the individual approach to a theme and so it raises the problem of a correct approach – in this case, the adequate approach to truth regarding the divine. Just as there are different ways of biblical interpretation, there are different motivations and approaches to a theme in general.

One might wonder if Augustine considers himself a pneumatic here, because the error is associated only with the carnal and animal categories, Augustine avoids falling into this error, and this necessarily implies a spiritual approach of the discussed subject. In fact, the error cannot be assigned to the spiritual people to begin with, as they are mature on a cognitive, moral and spiritual level, hence they are "complete". Although a certain

distancing from the other two categories is noticeable, it does not occur in a manner of explicitly addressing groups of people placed on different stages of initiation into a certain type of knowledge, but in a manner that highlights the possibility of different approaches and interpretations. The "right" way to knowledge can be found by anyone, even the uninitiated, because the possibility of faith's "awakening" by contact with the Scripture lies in every human – such idea belongs to a conception which does not subscribe to the Gnostic division of humanity in strictly-delimited categories, depending on the reception of *gnosis* through its oral transmission. Before claiming that the quoted paragraph presents a Gnostic vestige in Augustine's work, the aforesaid observations are to be considered and, based on them, I would argue that it is rather the case of Augustine making a distinction between how he investigates the Trinity problem and how other people, investigating the same problem, fall into various errors because of their understanding capacity (*De Trin.,* I, 3) or lack of exercise (*De Trin.,* III, 1-2).

3. Peter Lombard, Glossa ordinaria and the transmission of Augustine's interpretation

To further visualize the transmission of the Augustinian interpretation we can turn to an important research tool, widely-used from the 12th century until as late as the 18th century (Rosemann 2004, 26): *Glossa ordinaria.* In its full title *Biblia cum glossa ordinaria* is an edition of the *Biblia vulgata,* including the Old and New Testaments, together with two types of commentaries of their texts: the interlinear commentary, between the rows on which the verses are written, and the marginal commentary, in side columns around the central text frame containing the verses, this being the final page layout chosen after many variants. These commentaries reunite fragments of exegetical works of authority, such as the Church Fathers' works. As the *Glossa ordinaria* was the most used Bible edition in universities from its making and up until modern times, it is essential to examine the commentary on I Cor. 3:2 included in this biblical studies instrument in order to continue our investigation.

After an analysis of the page including the commentary on I Cor. 3:2, the original author and source text of the commentary can be identified: it is part of Peter Lombard's *Collectanea in omnes Pauli apostoli Epistulas.* The *Collectanea* are a collection of bibliographical resources and commentaries regarding the Pauline epistles. Peter Lombard worked on and revised the *Collectanea* numerous times before starting his *Sentences.* The work also represents the author's search of a most efficient method of presenting, teaching and investigating fundamental Christian ideas, a search which inevitably has to do with the narrative biblical commentary tradition and the doctrinal expositions already established in theology until that time. The

result is a synthesis work in which the epistles are analysed verse by verse while in pursuit of two main goals: a concise summary of the content and a commentary on said content's main ideas, providing quotations and identifying their exact source. The resulting commentary is therefore more of an array of relevant references for each particular subject, alongside the questions raised by Peter Lombard himself, inviting the reader to reflect upon the content's conceptual basis and to a structured debate meant to provide solutions to the seeming contradictions between different ideas or texts of authority (Rosemann 2004, 47-48).

Below is the *Collectanea* fragment containing the interpretation of I Cor. 3:2, which is based on Augustine's *Evangelium Ioannis tractatus centum viginti quatuor*, Tractatus 98, 1-3. I made the following edits to highlight the places where the *Glossa*'s text is identical to *Collectanea*'s: the **bold** text marks the interlinear commentary, the underlined text marks the marginal commentary, and, lastly, the *italic* text marks the citations or paraphrases of Augustine's text:

> Et ego fratres. Quasi dicat: Dico quod **sensum Christi habemus**, et **tamen**, o fratres, ego, **qui possem**, non potui, id est **non debui**, loqui vobis quasi spiritualibus, id est **sicut soleo spiritualibus loqui**, sed quasi carnalibus. **Et hoc tam diligenter feci**, quia dedi vobis potum lac, id est **facilem doctrinam** et **dulcem et nutrientem**, tanquam parvulus in Christo, id est in **cognitione** Christi, non escam dedi vobis, id est **non altiora praedicavi** vobis; **quare**? quia nondum poteratis capere. Ecce secundum hoc ostenditur quod Apostolus illis tanquam incapacibus minora, non altiora praedicavit. Vel ita, non potui vobis loqui quasi spiritualibus, etc.
>
> [Augustinus] *Est quaestio utrum spirituales homines habeant aliquid in doctrina quod carnalibus taceant, et spiritualibus dicant.* Quod utique videtur ex his verbis Apostoli. Dominus etiam ait: Multa habeo vobis dicere, sed non potestis portare modo. Secundum quam intelligentiam haec verba Apostoli supra exposuimus, sed est alius intellectus in his non negligendus.
>
> *Scire enim debet charitas vestra* quod *nulla videtur necessitas, ut aliqua secreta doctrinae taceantur fidelibus parvulis, seorsum dicenda majoribus, id est intelligentioribus*, cum eadem praedicaret. Apostolus spiritualibus et carnalibus, quique pro modo suo capiebant *illi, ut parvuli, isti ut majores, illi ut lactis alimentum, isti ut cibi solidamentum, quia etsi non audivit amplius, tamen intelligitur amplius. Non enim aequaliter mente percipitur, etiam quod in fide pariter ab utrisque recipitur.* Ideo Apostolus ait: Non potui vobis loqui quasi spiritualibus, sed quasi carnalibus, id est non potestis accipere quod dicebam, quasi spirituales, sed quasi carnales.
>
> Et tanquam parvulis in Christo lac dedi vobis potum, non escam, id est quod praedicavi vobis, fuit vobis quasi lactis potus, non solidus cibus. Sicut enim crux Christi, aliis stultitia, aliis scandalum, vocatis autem sanctis est virtus Dei et sapientia, ita idem *aliis est lac, aliis est cibus, secundum quod capacitas eorum plus vel minus capit*, ut hi qui dicunt, ego sum illius, vel illius, aliter acceperunt de

crucifixo, quam ille qui dixit: Mihi absit gloriari nisi in cruce Domini nostri Jesu Christi. Eadem simul *audiunt spirituales et carnales, et quique pro suo modo capiunt; nec necesse est ut aliqua secreta taceantur parvulis,* dicenda perfectis. Ideo que dicit Apostolus, non potui vobis loqui, quasi spiritualibus, etc.; quod est dicere, non potuistis quod dicebam intelligere, ut spirituales, sed ut carnales. *Si enim spirituales essent, non dicerent: Ego sum Pauli.*

Nondum enim. Quasi dicat: Bene dixi tanquam parvulis, quia nondum, quandiu vobis cum eram, poteratis capere escam, ut spirituales, nondum quidem potestis escam recipere, etsi ab illis edocti sitis, scilicet a pseudo. (*Collectanea in omnes Pauli apostoli Epistulas,* I ad Corinthios, cap. 3, versus: 1+)

Besides the actual commentary, the fragment selection from Augustine's text, the place they are given and the logic behind the arrangement are the elements directing the reading towards a specific understanding of the verse. Peter Lombard's view emerges through these methodological and positioning-related choices the same way such choices reveal his authorial stand on the themes and texts later present in the *Sentences* (Rosemann 2004, 7). Almost always does Peter Lombard use the same terms as Augustine. He also gives exact citations and paraphrases that adapt Augustine's ideas and rhetoric to the type of fluent and succinct read sought by the Lombard. For this purpose, the paraphrases do not strictly follow the source-text ideas' order, but instead prioritize the overall coherence of the text including the paraphrases. This way, the commentary can serve as a working instrument for the ones engaged in a hermeneutical or recapitulative exercise, in the context of an already existing public studying biblical and patristic texts in institutions meant for this type of occupation. *Collectanea* became a reference work for students and theologians; a significant amount of its texts was later included in the final version of the *Glossa,* which means that a large number of people had access to Peter Lombard's commentary and, through it, to Augustine's interpretation. From a hermeneutical point of view, the message remained unchanged: the responsibility of interpreting and understanding a discourse is mainly that of each individual and the quality and depth of the content one arrives to depend on their personal capacity. Behind this message is a mindset that encourages multiplicity of interpretation, individual studying and commentaries of the source-texts. This simultaneously emphasizes the need of guidelines or hermeneutical principles which can decide the validity, correctness and quality of an interpretation. We can also take into consideration the historical context and "spirit" of the *Collectanea* interpretation discussed here, largely-transmitted especially after the *Glossa's* use became more frequent: we can think of it as one of the many elements which contributed to the establishment and evolution of European universities in general.

4. The Interpretations of Henry of Ghent, Thomas de Argentina and Alphonsus Vargas Toletanus

One of the medieval authors who explicitly references the *Glossa ordinaria* is Henry of Ghent, master theologian at the University of Paris in the 13th century. His profession already tells us that he was engaged in activites such as holding university courses and conducting a specific type of debate on various themes proposed by students: the *disputationes quodlibetales*. These debates were also recorded in written form. As a result, there are a total of 15 *Quodlibet* which were published by the university annually of biannually during Henry's lifetime (Porro 2006, 175). A reference to I Cor. 3:2 is found in *Quodlibet XII,* q. 2:

> Taliter autem Augustinus in principio super Ioannem intelligentiam huius luminis discutit exponendo illud Ioannis I-o: "Vita erat lux hominum". Dicit enim sic: "Ex ista vita homines illuminantur", et exponit diffuse et expresse quod illa vita, quae lux est increata, illuminat homines duplici lumine: parvulos quidem lumine fidei quo nutriantur ut lacte, maiores vero lumine sapientiae quo solido cibo vescantur. De qua sapientia dicit Apostolus I-a "ad" Corinthios "cap.-o" II-o: "Sapientiam loquimur inter perfectos". Glossa: "Perfectos dicit non cognitores et doctores, sed auditores iam capaces". Quos et spirituales vocat, non capaces autem carnales, quando subdit: "Non potui vobis loqui quasi spiritualibus, sed quasi carnalibus". Carnalibus autem iam fidelibus loquebatur ut eos in fide nutriret, spiritualibus autem ut eos circa intellectum eorum quae fide tenentur, instrueret, qualiter defendi et roborari possent. Ut enim ibi | dicit Glossa: "Cum eadem Apostolus praedicaret spiritualibus et carnalibus, quique pro modulo suo capiebant, illi ut parvuli, isti ut maiores, illi ut lactis alimentum, isti ut cibi solidamentum, quia etsi non audiunt amplius, tamen intelligunt amplius. Non enim aequaliter mente percipitur etiam quod in fide pariter ab utrisque recipitur". Quod autem aliud sit lumen fidei quod accipiunt parvuli, aliud vero lumen sapientiae quod accipiunt maiores, expresse declarat AUGUSTINUS, super illud Ioannis I-o: "Vita erat lux hominum" sic inquiens: "Multi sunt animales, nondum que se possunt ad spiritualem intellectum erigere". (*Quodlibet XII,* q. 2, "ad argumenta")

As previously said, it is evident that Henry cites the *Glossa* as he refers to I Cor. 3:2. However, Henry's hermeneutical route differs from the one indicated in the *Glossa*. The fragment focuses on the character who did not occupy the central place in the previous interpretations: the speaker, preacher, lecturer, professor or, in this case, the theologian. It is important to note that the quodlibetal disputations carry a specific degree of freedom regarding both their themes (the 15 *Quodlibet* have a wide thematic spectre, discussing matters of theology, philosophy, metaphysics, ecclesiology, anthropology, ethics, politics etc.) and the author's own freedom of expression. With this in mind, *quaestio* 2 is a text in which the author reflects upon his

own profession. Henry also criticizes those theologians who inadequately prioritize philosophy, understating or even denying theology's scientific status, which in turn confirms the unknowableness of the "objects" of faith and renders the theologian an invalid profession. Henry notes how absurd it is for these conclusions to come from theologians themselves. In his vision, the theologian not only certainly represents a valid profession, but also a distinct human type among other types, just as theology is considered a distinct science, superior to all other sciences. The problem of the status and role of the theologian is discussed throughout the debate, alongside the main problem announced in the *quaestio*'s title *(Utrum in via de Deo possit quod quid est, vel quod sit trinus, clarius sciri quam per lumen fidei).* This main problem is an epistemological one, to which Henry's response is delivered within the framework of an illumination theory based on – but not identical to – the Augustinian model. A brief presentation of this theory's main ideas is necessary for a subsequent understanding of Henry's use of I Cor. 3:2 in *Quodlibet XII,* q. 2, which refers both to the divine illumination theory and to the theologian's special status.

As the name of the theory of knowledge suggests, the illumination theory uses terms belonging to the semantic field of "light" – vision, visible/ invisible, clarity/obscurity, radiance, sun, moon etc. The true, uncreated light is God's divine light, which exists in the minds of all created beings, albeit in different ways. The different manifestations of the light illuminating the human intellect are conditions of knowledge, each with a specific nature through which truth of things in their essence can be uncovered. The access to this ontological truth is given to every person through illumination (Führer 1998, 83), although only who acknowledge the fact that it is *received* qualify for its proper use. This acknowledgement is like a conversion (where the light of faith/*lumen fidei* is the condition for the conversion to truth); consequently, the light will function as an *instrument* structuring and organizing the intellect and as transparent *medium* which allows the profundity of reality's objects to become visible. In the end, natural knowledge will be surpassed and the human subject will come closer to all things' essential truth. The person's will, disposition and natural knowledge are contributing factors in this dynamic process; however, the light of faith as a given is present in the person regardless of their attributes (for example, their age and its associated cognitive capacity). As the person gains more knowledge, even only natural knowledge, they become capable of receiving a superior type of light – "*Ecce quod fides primo est in parvulis sine intelligentia, sed in fide nutritur ut validus fiat. Factus autem validus ad intellectum suscipiendum lumine superiore illuminatur (…)*", *Quodlibet XII,* q. 2. Moreover, Henry distinguishes between three ways of knowing the truth: to believe, to understand and to see. He illustrates the differences between them through an analogy presenting different approaches a person witnessing a solar eclipse can have. *To believe*

is to recognize the astronomical event, yet to be unable to demonstrate or verify it: the person's "faith" lies in the astronomy master's words. *To understand* implies the ability to demonstrate the event by means of reason and logical demonstration methods. *To see* means to be able to look at the eclipse directly and to perceive, with the corporeal eye, that the moon stands between the viewer and the sun at that moment. In analogy to the corporeal eye capable of identifying, understanding and contemplating the eclipse (all these activities being implied by the act of vision, in the sense of the verb *videre*) is the mind's eye (*oculus mentis*): it can contemplate God directly, in His "actual" presence. In contrast to *lumen fidei,* which is the first condition of knowledge and first manifestation of the divine light in the human subject, the possibility to "see" divinity in itself is not given to humans during their lifetime – it becomes possible after being illuminated with the light of glory (*lumen gloriae*), which occurs only in the afterlife. *Lumen fidei* and *lumen gloriae* manifest on different levels – with this idea in mind, Henry ends the paragraph that contains the analogy by referring to these distinct levels: "to believe" happens *in the present*, while "to see"/the act of vision means to see *in patria,* alongside which *"to understand"* also certainly exists as a way of knowledge ("*Consimiliter large et credere in praesenti et videre in patria intelligere quaedam dici possunt.*", *Quodlibet XII,* q. 2). "Understanding" is superior to mere "believing" and it is therefore linked to a type of light superior to the light of faith – in the demonstration of such light's existence lies Henry's central thesis in *quaestio* 2.

We can now anticipate Henry's search for the concept or idea of this type of light in the works of the authorities he mainly references. Throughout this *quaestio,* Henry repeatedly cites Augustine and, in the fragment containing I Cor. 3:2, his reference to Augustine's *In Evangelium Ioannis tractatus centum viginti quatuor,* Tractatus 1, 17-18 is about the two types of divine light which illuminate humans: initially, the light of faith (*lumen fidei*), together with the analogy to feeding children with milk, and, later, the light of wisdom (*lumen sapientiae*), together with the analogy to adults able to eat solid food. In Henry's view, there must be an intermediary between the two groups of people, so that the ones who have deeper knowledge guide those who walk the path[2], while they also defend their faith against the arguments of the unfaithful and the heretics by all means they possess (thus it is proper to use both knowledge of spiritual things and methods of reason and natural sciences). This necessary existence of an intermediary, whose pedagogic role is especially important, is justified by the existence of a third type of light, *lumen medium,* given through divine illumination exclusively to the theologian. As this supernatural *lumen medium* is present in the theologian, he represents the most qualified person to nurture, educate and guide the believers, as well as mediate communication and find solutions to the disagreements or tensions between the aforementioned two groups.

In relation to the *lumen fidei/lumen gloriae* distinction, *lumen medium* too holds an intermediary position between the light of faith, through which baptized believers can know God during their earthly life, and the light of glory, received only in the afterlife. This means that the theologian enjoys both earthly and divine beatitude during his earthly lifetime, as he is able to enjoy human activities and an active social life, as well as the beatitude of the life beyond (Leone 2011, 312). Thus, the theologians form an elite to which Henry considers he belongs, while the theologian's figure simultaneously becomes an ideal or model, alongside the philosopher's figure (Plato, Aristotle) or the ideal of the stoic engaged in both the active and the contemplative life, who also has a clear understanding of the types of knowledge and questions pertaining to both.

Later, in the 14th century, Thomas de Argentina (Thomas of Strasbourg) refers to Henry's work within a different literary genre, where Thomas makes a brief presentation of the quoted *Quodlibet XII,* q. 2 fragment and keeps the reference to I Cor. 3:2. The presentation is strategically placed in the Prologue to his Commentary on the First Book of *Sentences:*

> Praeterea theologia est notitia nobilissima regulans omnes alias scientias, ergo erit scientifica. Sed quia tantam evidentiam, quantam requirit scientia, habere non possumus de his, de quibus tractat theologia in lumine naturali, nec in solo lumine fidei, ideo ponunt praedicti lumen quoddam supernaturale clarius lumine fidei, obscurius tamen lumine gloriae. Quod lumen a Deo communicatur sacrae theologiae doctoribus, tanquam perfectis et communem statum fidelium excedentibus et ceteris praeexistentibus fidem sanctam confirmando et iugiter defendendo. Et addunt, quod lumen meridiei non compatitur secum aliquam noctis obscuritatem, lumini tamen aurorae hoc non repugnat. Sic licet clare videre in lumine gloriae fidem excludat et omnem obscuritatem evacuet, intelligere tamen scientifice in isto medio lumini fidei non repugnat. Propter hoc ait Augustinus super Iohannem quod lux increata duplici lumine fideles illuminat, parvulos quidem lumine fidei, ut lacte nutriantur; maiores vero lumine sapientiae, quo vescantur solido cibo. (*Scriptum in primum Sententiarum,* Quaestio II Prologi, p. 4, 4)

To understand the strategic aspect of the reference's use in the Prologue one must firstly consider the aim of the commented text, Peter Lombard's *Sentences,* as well as the purpose of writing a commentary on it. While *Collectanea* and *Glossa ordinaria* provide commentaries and bibliographical resources for well-defined practical and pedagogical reasons, the *Sentences*'s mission revolves around bringing a Christian theological system to light through an organized presentation and explanation of it or, in other words, an exposition according to the methods of systematic theology, a goal also sought by other authors contemporary to Peter Lombard (Peter Abelard, Hugh of Saint Victor). Peter Lombard's project proved successful, the *Sentences* became the official theology manual used in universities and this

led to the apparition of a new literary genre, the Commentaries to the *Sentences*. Writing a *Sentences* commentary was a necessary step for graduation as it gave students the title of doctor of theology. The Prologue to a *Sentences* commentary serves as an introductory part and place where arguments to justify theology as science are provided and the work's aim is stated. Moreover, the Prologue became the frame in which the young authors could offer expositions of their own ideas, analogies, citations etc. (see, for example, the Prologues to the *Sentences* commentaries of William of Ockham, Gregory of Rimini, Godescalc de Nepomuk). The content of a Prologue thus follows certain practical objectives, but also carries a personal nuance.

Thomas' reference to *Quodlibet XII,* q. 2 in his Prologue is meant to support the theologian as a profession. Thomas shares Henry's ideas regarding the theologian's unique qualities and his intermediary position. Although the cited paragraph starts with the claim of theology's superiority over other sciences, the focus falls on the necessity of the existence of a person capable of understanding and explaining theology not just from an exclusively rational standpoint, nor one exclusively based on faith, but from a "middle" standpoint which allows an acceptance and adequate use of elements involved in both. Thomas adds the allegorical image of types of light differing by the amount of darkness they contain: noon's light is opposite of night's darkness, yet dawn's light stays between the two and, although it "knows" and "participates" in both, it remains a type of light, not a type of darkness, and stays compatible with noon's light. These relations matchingly support theology's status as a science: it knows and uses the methods of philosophy and other sciences, yet stays compatible with faith and religion. It is important to note that this analogy is not present in *Quodlibet XII,* q. 2 specifically. Nonetheless, Thomas' Prologue places him in the lines of a recurrent Christian exegetical tradition which makes use of light and vision-centered allegories.

Another 14th century author, Alphonsus Vargas Toletanus, makes the same reference to Henry's text, followed by a discussion on Thomas de Argentina's Prologue, q. 3, art. 1. The use of I Cor. 3:2 stays the same as in Henry's case:

> Secundum punctus est quod licet illud lumen non infundatur omnibus fidelibus de lege communi, infunditur tamen doctoribus et maioribus ut fidem valeant defendere et declarare. Et ista videtur intentio beati Augustini ubi supra dicens quod lux increata illuminat hominem dupliciter parvulos quidem lumine fidei quo nutriuntur ut lacte. Maiores vero lumine sapientie quo ut solido cibo vescantur quod lumen habebat Apostulus qui dicebat: sapientiam loquimur inter perfectos. Hec Augustinus. Et videtur auctoritas valde clara. (*In Primum Sententiarum*, Liber I, Prologus, Quaestio 2)

This is, of course, only a part of a larger scholastic exposition meant to reject Henry's proposed concept and Thomas' commentary. The subtitles given throughout the Prologue's course clearly indicate the exposition's steps: *Opinio Henrici XII Quolibet, questione 2 → Conclusio prima → Conclusio secunda → Tertia conclusio → Thomas de Argentina in Prologo I, questione 3, articulo 1 → Contra Thomam de Argentina → Respondeo ad rationes Henrici.*

Alphonsus observes the problematic nature of the concept of *lumen medium* and the consequences of the analogy meant to illustrate it. If *lumen medium* corresponds to dawn's light, and *lumen gloriae* corresponds to noon's light, then the analogy implies that *lumen fidei* and night's darkness also correspond. Besides the risk of associating the light of faith with an image of darkness (thus giving it a pejorative nuance), the antithetical pair of terms "night's darkness and noon's light" are in a relation of contrariety, therefore they cannot be simultaneously true or coexist under the same circumstance. Analogically, the light of faith and the light of glory cannot coexist within the same person, not even within the theologian, as Alphonsus argues. The concept of *lumen medium* in itself is nonsensical from a logical perspective: if it mediates the knowledge pertaining to the levels of the two other types of light, then *lumen medium* contains their corresponding traits which are, however, contrary, and the human intellect cannot "think" a thing of such nature. In addition, as reason's natural light makes phantasms intelligible to the human mind, and the theologian's *lumen medium* allows him to be the intermediary between objects of this world and objects of faith, then so too *lumen medium* makes articles of faith knowable through reason as objects of the intellect, which is absurd given the fact that the content of an article of faith is essentially distinct and incompatible with reason and its ways. Consequently, revealed theology is nothing more than a science in general (it operates with objects of the intellect) and in this regard is no different than geometry – once again a problematic consequence, as sciences collect information through experience, while theology by definition does not share this nature. Alphonsus argues that the ideas proposed by Henry obviously oppose common knowledge – "*Ista opinio multa ponit que communiter non tenent.*" Presented here is only a part of the analyzed premises and conclusions to which Alphonsus arrives after numerous inferences and applications of *modus ponens*.

In the end, while Henry's discourse revolves around the theologian's distinct human type and social role, Alphonsus focuses more on *lumen medium*'s logical validity as a concept, its supernatural origin and the conditions under which it could coexist with the light of faith within the same circumstance (this circumstance is the person or, more precisely, the believer who received the light of faith through baptism and who is now the theologian given *lumen medium*). One could argue that Henry's more anthropological conception is examined or tested according to Alphonsus' logical

and philosophical approach. Although both authors refer to types of under-standing and types of people when they use I Cor. 3:2 in their texts, the verse plays the role of a supporting argument in Henry's case and that of a hypothetical element in Alphonsus' case.

5. Conclusions

The difference between the speaker and the public represents the central theme of the patristic and medieval exegesis on I Cor. 3:2. The criteria by which this difference can be established vary greatly: the understanding and interpretation capacity, types of individual approaches to a theme, lifestyle, the presence of certain *a priori* conditions of knowledge, social role etc. The relationship between the speaker and the public includes many factors which affect the form that the message adopts when it is verbalized or written. Among these factors, the speaker's perception of the aforemen-tioned difference shapes the discourse predominantly. This difference, alongside its implied consequences (which can be of pedagogical, exegetical, philosophical, ethical, sociological or religious nature, to name only a few), produced many distinct human "portraits" through history: the portraits of the orator, the commentator and the university teacher, as well as the por-traits of the beginner, the disciple and the larger public or the masses. Every interpretation of this verse conveys a mentality and a way in which the indi-vidual is perceived in one of the enumerated roles. Every commentary on I Cor. 3:2 records a specific vision on the person who either shares or rece-ives a message. The exegesis formed around this verse shows the remarka-ble diversity of ideas which defines the cultural environment which we are part of.

Notes

[1] „*Verumtamen sicut lectorem meum nolo esse mihi deditum, ita correctorem nolo sibi. Ille me non amet amplius quam catholicam fidem, ille se non amet amplius quam catholicam veritatem.*" – Here, the discussion is in terms of an emotion (love or devotement to an author and love of self vs love of truth and love of knowledge). This emotion is a motivational element based on which the individuals on both sides of the argument choose to engage in investigating a problem. The search for truth is superior to defending one's ego, for example. The fact that Augustine talks about "correctores", not just simple opponents, can be a consequence of the distinction made in *De Trin.,* I, regarding the different wrong ways of discussing a theme. This distinction does not deny the possibility of one person having a different stand on a subject than another person; however, certain conditions are applied, such as the desired truth being the same and the approach being adecquate, as discussed in *De Trin.,* II. This way, the eventual counterarguments are based on an intention to constructively correct a different opinion and can thus produce or add knowledge.

[2] „*Piis autem opitulatur per hanc scientiam clariorem, quando per doctrinam maiorum, qui hanc habent scientiam clariorem, fides suadetur minoribus, ut in ipsis generetur et nutriatur.*" – What is notable here

are the terms used by Henry to describe the guidance of the *maiores*, namely *generetur et nutriantur:* generating faith and knowledge and, respectively, nourishing so that the *minores* properly assimilate what knowledge is given to them.

References

Alphonsus Vargas Toletanus. 2019. *In Primum Sententiarum,* Edited by Cioca, Luciana. Accessed July 2019 at http://thesis-project.ro/alphonsusvargas/texts.html.

Augustine. 1996. *Confessionum Libri XIII.* Edited by Lucas Verheijen. Turnhout: Brepols.

Augustine. 1968. *De Trinitate Libri XV (Libri I-XII).* Edited by W. J. Mountain. Turnhout: Brepols.

Augustine. 1968. *In Iohannis Evangelium Tractatus CXXIV.* Edited by Willems Radbodus. Turnhout: Brepols.

Collins, Raymond F. 1999. *First Corinthians.* Edited by Daniel J. Harrington. Vol. 7. Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press.

Fitzmyer, Joseph A. 2008. *First Corinthians.* Vol. 32. New Haven, London: Yale University Press.

Froelich, Karlfried, and Margaret T. Gibson. 1992. *Biblia Latina cum glossa ordinaria. Facsimile reprint of the editio princeps (Adolph Rusch of Strassburg 1480/81).* Vol. IV. Turnhout: Brepols.

Führer, Markus L. 1998. "Henry of Ghent on Divine Illumination." *Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch Für Antike Und Mittelalter* 3: 69-85.

Henry of Ghent. 1987. *Quodlibet XII.* Edited by J. Decorte. Leuven: Leuven University Press.

Horsley, Richard A. 1998. *1 Corinthians.* Nashville: Abingdon Press.

Leone, Marialucrezia. 2011. "Moral Philosophy in Henry of Ghent." In *A Companion to Henry of Ghent*, edited by Gordon A. Wilson, 275-314. Leiden/ Boston: Brill.

Pagels, Elaine Hiesey. 1975. *The Gnostic Paul.* Philadelphia: Fortress Press.

Petrus Lombardus. 1855. *Collectanea in Omnes Divi Pauli Apostoli Epistulas.* Edited by J. P. Migne. *Patrologia Latina*, vol. 191.

Porro, Pasquale. 2006. "Doing theology (and philosophy) in the first person: Henry of Ghent's Quodlibeta." In *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Thirteenth Century*, edited by Cristopher Schabel, 172-231. Leiden; Boston: Brill.

Ramelli, Ilaria L. E. 2013. "Origen in Augustine: A Paradoxical Reception." *Numen* 60(2-3): 280-307.

Rosemann, Philipp W. 2004. *Peter Lombard.* Oxford/ New York: Oxford University Press.

Thomas de Argentina. 2019. *Scriptum in primum Sententiarum.* Baumgarten, Critian. Accessed July 2019 at http://thesis-project.ro/thomasdeargentina/texts.html.

Andrei-Tudor MAN [*]

The Role of Divination in the Stoic System[**]

Abstract: The article explores the Stoic treatment of divination and the epistemological role assumed by the divinatory arts within the Stoic philosophical system. The following pages speak of divination as a genre of knowledge and as an exercise (ἄσκησις) for the investigation of nature. Aligned by Chrysippus to theology, the final part of the philosophical exercise, divination would appear as having the role to fulfill the study of physics. Equally, we will argue that the ancient Stoics praised divination not as an art of foreseeing the future, but as a science that discovers the universal chain of causes that determines everything in the world, *i.e.* fate. After a short presentation of the Stoic classification of knowledge, the article discusses stoic cosmology with an emphasis on the idea of order. The last section of the article explores the vast relationship between divination and fate and argues that, for the Stoics, divination is a genre of science that has the role to unveil the non-evident causal structure of the universe.

Keywords: divination, cosmology, Stoicism, fate, order.

1. Introduction

Divination was a common religious practice in the ancient world, individuals and societies seeking to anticipate the future through the interpretation of natural signs and through ritualic examinations of the divine will[1]. The vast research on the rituality of divination undertook in the field of religious studies attests to the fact that, whatever ancient society considered, the ancients attempted to anticipate the future through a wide range of divinatory practices[2]. However, in ancient views, future was unrevealing itself not only through ritual, but nature itself was wearing a cloth woven with signs that charmed equally the gaze of diviners and of philosophers. Whether they observed the flight of birds or the entrails of sacrificed animals or whether they consulted the words of individuals under divine possession, the diviners were acting as assuming an already established order of nature. Amazed by the success of divination, the Stoa tackled the questions

of divination and of its condition of possibility, the natural order, resulting a fine interrogation on the constitution of the universe and a cosmology that rivaled the dominant Platonic cosmology.

Since its beginnings, Greek philosophy proved a great interest in divination, aiming to place it under a rational explanation. In the prologue of *De divinatione,* Cicero exhibits a catalogue of the philosophical interests in divination, dividing the small number of philosophers that reject the validity of divination, such as Xenophanes of Colophon, Epicure and the Epicureans or the Stoic Panaetius, from the large number of those asserting its validity. According to Cicero, Democritus and Pythagoras accepted divination and were followed by the Academy and the Peripatetics. However, the Stoa assumed an unconditioned acceptance of divination, the Stoic philosophers becoming the main apologists of its validity (Cicero *De div.*, I, 5)[3]. The main philosophical endeavor of ancient Stoicism was to include the entire universe with its entire diversity of objects and phenomena within a philosophical system and to represent it as following a rational and understandable order. The Stoic universe is established on a unique substance, the material body (σῶμα), and its phenomena are reduced to a unique model of causation. The human mind is able to produce representations of natural phenomena as a relationship between a cause and its effect using the strict implication (p → q). Thus, science is described as an effort to represent the ensemble of causal relationships constituting the universe. Letting aside the question of rite and divinatory practice, the following pages will be focused on the Stoic interpretation of divination as a mean to uncover the constitution of the universe. Moreover, we will attempt to determine the status of divination within the Stoic system and to determine its epistemological role. The paper focuses on the ancient Stoic doctrine of divination, and more particularly on the doctrine established by Chrysippus, the third leader of the Stoa.

Cicero's catalogue of philosophers describes Chrysippus as the author of a treatise on divination, probably entitled *Περί μαντικῆς*, consisting of two books, *On dreams* and *On oracles*. Although Zeno of Kition and Cleanthes discussed on divination in their writings, Chrysippus is the first Stoic philosopher to dedicate an entire treatise to this problem (*De Div.* I, 6)[4]. Cicero's *De divinatione* also distinguishes between natural divination and technical divination. The first genre includes all the species of divination that are produced under divine inspiration and can be included under the religious category of ἐνθουσιασμός, *i.e.* dreams, prophecies or oracles etc., while the second genre includes those species of divination that require a theoretical knowledge for the interpretation of natural phenomena, *i.e.* auspices, haruspices, or astrology. This classification of divination was employed by the Stoics, but it does not have a Stoic origin. From a Stoic point of view,

the distinction would be made between a type of technical divination (τεχνική) and a type of non-technical divination (ἄτεχνος), since the Stoics assert that nature (φύσις) encompasses everything, including the technical objects. Therefore, although Chrysippus' treatise discusses two topics that pertain to the genre of non-technical divination (natural), *i.e.* dreams and oracles, the following pages will describe how the philosopher's writings reveal his interest in both genres of divination.

2. The order of philosophy

Two distinct fragments preserve Chrysippus' definition of philosophy. While the first fragment was transmitted by Aetius' *De placita philosophorum* (SVF II, 35)[5], the second fragment comes from Plutarch's *De Stoicorum repugnantiis* (SVF II, 42)[6]. The first definition asserts the unity of philosophy and its practical purpose. Philosophy is described as a homogenous exercise aiming to gain wisdom to the philosopher and its division in various domains is founded only on didactical purposes. Wisdom (σοφία), the science of divine and human matters, is the goal the philosopher is aiming for in the exercise (ἄσκησις) of philosophy. The exercise is structured with reference to the type of objects that the philosopher experiments: logic is the exercise of the conceptual inner objects, ethics is the exercise of the limits of human free action and physics is the exercise of the exterior objects of the world, including the divine ones.

The second definition describes a hierarchy of philosophical disciplines. According to Chrysippus, philosophy follows both a didactic order and a "real" one. The didactic order of philosophy proceeds from logic, passes through ethics and ends with the research of nature, *i.e.* physics. The didactic order of philosophy implies an advancement from the most intimate circle of objects, the inner one, towards the widest one, the circle of natural objects. Chrysippus also describes an ordered hierarchy of physics, according to which the philosophical exercise comes to an end in the study of theology. The philosopher takes a different way in the description of the theological exercise: theology transcends the model of the rational study of nature and the appropriation of the theological doctrines is described as an initiation, mystery or rite (τελετή)[7]. The didactic order is followed by a "real" one, *i.e.* logics, physics and ethics, since every ethical research has to be established on the knowledge of the theological principles of physics, *i.e.* Zeus, fate, providence etc. (Gourinat 2000, 24-30; Muller 2006, 51-55).

Therefore, according to Chrysippus, philosophy is an exercise that aims to gain wisdom to the philosopher and the distinction between its domains has only a didactic purpose. Both models of hierarchical order of philosophy affirm theology as the highest level of knowledge. Although it is not

mentioned by Plutarch, divination is part of Stoic theology. In consequence, in order to understand the statute of divination in the Stoic system, we will shortly present the main topics of Stoic theology.

3. The order of the universe

3.1. *The fundaments of Stoic cosmology*

The fact that philosophy is viewed by the Stoics as a unitary exercise is founded on their monistic cosmology. While philosophy is divided into its three parts as a didactic distinction between its objects of study, the universe is divided into its parts according to the interaction between its two founding principles. Thus, since its beginnings, Stoicism asserted that the universe is a unique living being (ζῷον), made of a singular corporal substance (σῶμα) and shaped by the interaction of two principles, a passive one and an active one[8]. While God is the active principle, matter without form is the passive one. Through their interaction, the active principle informs matter and thus generates all the particular objects of the universe (SVF I, 97-98). If Platonism and Aristotelianism postulate an immaterial substance as formal principle, Stoicism asserts the materiality of both of them (SVF II, 299-300)[9]. The corporal matter of the active principle is a specie of subtle fire (πνεῦμα), generated by the mixture of air and fire, that mixes, according to Zeno of Kition, with the informal matter and remains in all the generated objects. Besides God, the active principle is designated through a series of other names: reason (λόγος), intelligent being (νοερὸν), artisan fire (πῦρ τεχνικὸν), spirit (πνεῦμα) or intellect producing everything (νοῦς) (SVF II, 1027). Moreover, Chrysippus describes Zeus, the chief god of the Greek pantheon, through the attribute of *active principle* of the world (SVF II, 528). The Stoics preserve the traditional Greek link between religion and cosmology and grant Zeus the statute of artisan principle of the universe. Zeus, or the active principle, takes the role of demiurge, his will being the rational force that rationally orders matter. Cleanthes' *Hymn to Zeus* exhibits the will of Zeus as the rational law governing the entire universe and argues for an antithesis between the divine will, governing the universe in accordance to reason, and the human will, trespassing the laws of the universe in the search of individual goods (SVF I, 537). Therefore, Stoic philosophy assumes the task to deliver a rational theology and its cosmology attempts to include God in the rational description of the universe.

While the theological aspects and the rationality of the universal order are broadly asserted in Greek philosophy[10], the corporality of the active principle is an innovation of the Stoa and it determined the rise of a series of contradictions. The corporeal active principle is described as piercing all

matter and remaining within the generated objects to assure the cohesion of matter and to determinine the set of possibilities that objects can act or suffer (SVF II, 310). Carneades'[11] skepticism rejected the possibility of interaction between two corporeal principles and the creation of objects from their mixture. More particularly, the question needed to be answered by the Stoa was that of how the two corporeal principles mix and equally preserve their identity in the resulted object (SVF II, 465a). Chrysippus answered the problem through the theory of the four types of mixture (SVF II, 471). According to the philosopher, the mixing (μίξις) constitutes the model of interaction between the two principles, enhancing them to preserve their identity. The most illustrative example for this type of mixture is the soul's mixing with the body, both corporeal entities preserving their identity in the resulted ensouled creature.

The Stoic universe is generated by the interaction of the active and passive principles. The active principle has the purpose to order the universe, to assure the cohesion of matter and to determine the ontological set of possibilities. The plurality of names taken by the active principle is given in accordance with the type of matter that it interacts with and its function in the generated object (SVF II, 1027). For example, when described as ruler of the universe the active principle is named God or Zeus, as the rational principle of the world order it bears the name reason (λόγος), while presented as principle of life and movement in the human body it is called soul (ψυχή). The rationally ordered universe is the condition of possibility of science. Consequently, the following paragraphs will discuss the Stoic theory of universal order.

3.2. *Fate*

Stoic philosophy considers the universe a predetermined concatenation of causes. Causality is a universal phenomenon; thus, each reality is placed at the intersection of multiple causal interactions with other realities. The set of causal relations is limited and determined by the active principle through the fact that it inhabits each of the particular things in the universe. The active principle determines not only the causal relationships of particular objects, but also the entire causal structure of the universe. Through the fact that the active principle assumes different names with reference to the type of matter that it inhabits and the function that it takes, in the role of determining the causal structure of the universe, the active principle is called εἱμαρμένη, fate.

Cicero's *De divinatione* preserves the stoic definition of fate: "Fatum autem id appello quod Graeci εἱμαρμένην id est ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causae causa nexa rem ex se gignat" (De Div. I, 55)[12]. Cicero presents

fate (lat. *fatum*) as the entanglement of causes that determines the existence of all things and their possible interactions, and differentiates the stoic definition from superstitious belief: fate is the eternal cause of things. Another definition of fate pertaining to Chrysippus can be found in Ioannes Stobaeus' *Anthologicum* (SVF II, 913)[13]. Stobaeus' fragment preserves three versions of the definition, each corresponding to a different work of the Stoic philosopher: fate is (1) the rational principle of the world, (2) the rational principle of the things in the world that are governed by providence and (3) the rational principle through which all the passed things have passed, the present things are and the future will come into being. Much more, Chrysippus presents the substance of fate as a pneumatic potency.

The synonymy between "active principle" and "fate" is revealed by the two definitions above. Accordingly, fate represents the active principle as the establisher of the rational order of the universe. All things in universe are subjects of the imposed rational order and their generation and corruption are determined in accordance to fate. Chrysippus defines fate as well through its relationship to providence. Therefore, fate has a double area of applicability: the entanglement of causes that determines the order of the universe and the principle determining the existence and destiny of particular objects. Moreover, the fact that it institutes a rational order makes the universe knowable and enables the human mind to represent its causal order.

The strong link between the nature of human soul and the order of the universe provides the possibility of knowledge. In Chrysippus' opinion, the first Stoic to discuss the soul in a treatise entirely dedicated to this topic (Gourinat 2005, 557-578), the human soul is one of the many hypostases of the active principle. The material substance of the soul (ψυχή) is πνεῦμα, also the matter of the active principle. Chrysippus distinguishes between three types of πνεῦμα: one that offers cohesion to matter in stones and bones, one that offers growth to plants and animals and the psychical πνεῦμα that produces representations and coordinates movement (SVF II, 786). Thus, the human soul is defined with reference to intellection and the coordination of the body. We will argue, therefore, a communion of nature between universe and human soul, that determines knowledge as the ability of the soul to reproduce the order of the universe.

Stoic knowledge is described as the exercise to reproduce within the human mind the causal order instituted by fate. Chrysippus argues for a semiological model capable to formalize the causal relationships, *i.e.* the strict implication, where the function of sign is ascribed to the first element of the implication (Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, II, 97, 104; *Adversus mathematicos*, VIII, 316). Because the causal structure covers the entire universe, Stoicism imposed semiology as a universal scientific method.

Considering all, the exercise of philosophy and the didactical proceeding from logics to theology appears to be an endeavor to reconstruct in an abstract form the causal structure of the universe. Moreover, the fulfillment of philosophy in wisdom (σοφία) would be understood as the achievement of a complete image of the predetermined entanglement of causes. Philosophy is described as the ensemble of all possible knowledge and its classification in the three domains indicates its practical stages and also classifies the knowable objects in three categories[14]. In addition, the three domains indicate a triple relationship between human and universe: the relationship between man and himself exercised by logic, the relationship with other humans exercised by the ethical inquiry and the relationship with the gods as the ultimate task of the physical inquiry (Gourinat 2000, 29). We need to assume that, for the Stoics, an object of knowledge consists at all times of a causal relationship. In consequence, logic consists of an exercise on the inner objects of the human mind[15], ethics is an exercise on the causal relationships particular to human life and physics is the exercise concerning the causal relationships in nature. A distinctive element is the Stoic inclusion of theological objects in the natural realm, hence the research of theology requests the same method, *i.e.* semiology, as the research of more common natural objects. Practicing philosophy, the philosopher advances from the inner objects, passes through the exterior ones and fulfills its knowledge through an exercise regarding the understanding of the divine elements in nature. We will argue that divination is part of the theological section of the philosophical exercise.

The stoic theory of divination, as presented for instance in Cicero's *De divinatione,* argues for two genres of divination: natural divination, comprising prophecy, oracles and oneiromancy, and technical divination, comprising haruspices, auspices and astrology.

The Greek world placed at the center of its religious practices especially the natural genre and, in consequence, the Greek philosophers mostly considered the natural forms of divination. For example, Plato describes in the Timaeus the physiology of divinatory knowledge (*Timaeus* 71a-72c) and in other dialogues, like the Apology, he makes Socrates to publicly acknowledge his demon. Furthermore, Aristotle took part to his master's interest to divination, although by holding a more critical view, in his *De divinatione per somnum* describing oneiric divination as caused by different physiological dispositions of the human body. Departing from the classical opinions on divination, the Stoa argued for a scientific understanding of the divinatory practices, discussing them mostly with reference to the validity and verifiability of the knowledge they deliver. Accordingly, the Stoics applied to divination their universal method for the research of nature, *i.e.* semiology, offering however an outstanding attention to the genre that

implies the observation of natural phenomena and the identification of patterns in nature, *i.e.* technical divination.

3.3. **The relationship between divination and fate**

The stoic description of the world rejects the existence of chance, τύχη being classified as an illusion of the mind in its incapacity to identify the causes of natural phenomena (SVF II, 965-967, 970-971). The chain of causes that establishes the order of the universe encompasses a number of non-evident causes (αἴτιαι ἄδηλοι) (White 2003, 140). The philosopher clashes with the problem of hidden causes also in ethics, when, while evident that it does not originate in our will, the cause of an impulse may not be directly accessible to the human mind. As it follows, when one's mind asserts that an event happens by chance, it is only due its incapacity to determine the natural cause of the event and not because nature contains events with a non-causal genesis. As shown above, the didactical order of philosophy (SVF II, 42) sets the final phase of the philosophical exercise, *i.e.* theology, not under the common scholastic practices, which characterize other philosophical disciplines, but describes it as initiation, τελετή.

The knowledge of the divine aspects of nature, those establishing and sustaining the cohesion and the order of the world, is not teachable through the common didactic ways of philosophy. While the parts of philosophy that research evident causal relationships are taught through regular didactical methods, founded on logic and engaging the basic rational abilities of the human mind, theology requests a different kind of transmission, based on the fact that its causal objects of study are fully non-evident to the human mind[16]. Therefore, the existence of chance would be asserted only by a mind unable to understand the universal entanglement of causes. Moreover, while direct empirical knowledge enables the particular disciplines of philosophy to grasp particular causal relationships, the universal causal chain would remain unreachable to common empirical knowledge and thus, based on Stoic empirical epistemology, completely unknowable. In consequence, although the human mind may determine the causes of particular events, the rational order predetermining all causality would remain completely imperceptible. We propose to call the theological fundaments of the universe first degree non-evident causes.

Furthermore, there are also second degree non-evident causes. The uninitiated to the observation of nature would reject divination as an art that interprets arbitrary phenomena and ascribes them with signification rooted into the will of the diviner. However, Chrysippus submits divination to the same scientific criteria that determine regular natural knowledge. In consequence, divination is described to study the same causality that determines

the phenomena studied by the other semiological sciences and the diviner, like other researchers of nature, to apply the logical methods of verifiability. Furthermore, divination confronts not only natural recurrence, as in the case of auspices, but it also deals with phenomena deviating from the normal course of nature due to the intervention of the divine will. For instance, Cicero describes how Caesar's grim outcome was announced by the absence of the heart of a sacrificed ox (*De Div.* I, 1190. It follows that divination explores two different kinds of non-evident causes and, in consequence, implies two different types of interpretation and requires to the seers two different kinds of skills (*De Div.* I, 118). The first type consists in those causes unveiled by the rigorous observance of nature. Considering common people, the flight of birds would not produce any signification, but only an initiated augur would be capable to link the flight to the future event that it announces. On the other hand, omens, the non-evident causes determined by the divine intervention in the course of nature, would be linked to the events that they announce not on the base of observing recurrences in nature, thus the seers needing a capacity to read irregularities in the course of nature[17]. In consequence, the common mind would not grasp the causes of certain particular events and would interpret them as happening by chance. Divination, in Stoic opinion, has the purpose to research this class of particular non-evident causes.

If we accept this classification of non-evident causes, we are entitled to wonder on the relationship between the two classes, *i.e.* between the order of the universe and the causes of particular events that are revealed by divination. A fragment of Chrysippus' Περὶ εἱμαρμένης seems to provide an answer to our inquiry (SVF II, 939)[18]. Eusebius' *Praeparatio evangelica* preserves a passage of Diogenianus, a critic of Stoicism, that comments and quotes a fragment of Chrysippus' treatise on fate. Diogenianus describes Chrysippus' uses of a circular argument to demonstrate the existence of fate and divination: "For he wants to prove that 'everything happens in accordance with fate' from 'divination exists', and he cannot prove that 'divination exists' in any other way than by presupposing that 'everything occurs in accordance with fate'"[19]. Jonathan Barnes analyses the argument and described it as *reciprocity*, a form of circular argument with only two elements (Barnes 1990, 61). Moreover, Barnes argues that, even though Aristotle qualifies in the Prior Analytics (25a 14-17) the circular argument as fallacious, other Hellenistic and Late Antique thinkers approved it and used it as a valid form of philosophical reasoning (Barnes 1990, 66 *sq.*).

Susanne Bobzien discusses the relationship between fate and divination in Chrysippus' thought by analyzing the fragment of Diogenianus (Bobzien 2001, 87-93). The fragment describes each element of the relationship to act as proof for the other. If the dependency of the validity of divination to the

existence of an all-encompassing predetermined order may be understandable, the function of divination as proof for the existence of order seems hardly reachable and this is why Bobzien introduces a new premise that she argues to be implicitly connoted by the argument. According to Bobzien, the fact that Chrysippus describes valid divination to be delivered only by diviners possessing a certain expertise needs to be taken into consideration as a necessary condition for the truth of predictions. The divinatory truth that follows from divination practiced by skilled diviners provides the knowledge of fate. As the scholar shows, a prediction of a future event requires to be classified as true or false not only after the occurrence of the predicted event, but it has to be already true when the seer provides the prediction. Consequently, it's determined the necessity of *a causal nexus that extends from the present (i.e. the time when the prediction is made) to the time when the predicted event happens* (Bobzien 2001, 94). The truth of a prediction reveals the existence of a predetermined structure that includes the causal relationship that divination asserts to be linking a two realities. Therefore, although fate remains beyond empirical knowledge, divination indicates its existence. Bobzien wisely synthetizes the relation between the two genres of non-evident causes, saying that fate is a *ratio essendi* of divination, whereas divination is the *ratio cognoscendi* of fate (Bobzien 2001, 92).

Although Bobzien and Barnes offer impressive analyses of the dialectical relation between fate and divination, describing their statutes of reciprocal proofs and the validity of the circular argument, we propose to push the inquiry furthermore by bringing into discussion the two types of non-evident causes presented above. We will argue that, beyond its logic function, the reciprocity argument exhibits the epistemological relation between universal determinism and divination.

The theory of non-evident causes is developed with a clear reference to the Stoic distinction between manifest and non-manifest facts, the latter reenacting the Epicurean doctrine of evident (ἐναργῆ) and non-evident (ἄδηλα) objects (Gourinat 2000, 231-232). While manifest facts (or evident objects) are directly accessible to the mind, non-manifest facts (or non-evident objects) are hidden to our perception and require indicative signs to reveal them. Nonetheless, not all non-evident objects can be semiologically revealed. For example, the number of stars in the sky remains completely incomprehensible to our mind. In consequence, the sign is able to reveal only partially non-evident objects, hidden either due to a context or to their nature. The smoke seen from afar announces the existence of a fire that cannot be seen due to distance. However, in this case the sign does not have an indicative function, but a commemorative one, because it appeals to previous direct interactions with fire. Other objects are naturally hidden to our knowledge, being yet reachable due to indicative signs: sweat indicates

the existence of skin pores and the movements of the body indicate the soul (Sextus Empiricus, *O.P.* II, 97, 104; *A.M.*, VIII, 316.). In consequence, we would question in which category of non-evident facts the two kinds of non-evident causes find their place ?

The diviner practicing technical divination would predict a future consequence by proceeding from a current event. The temporal distance that makes the predicted event inaccessible to direct perception suggests that divination deals with contextually non-evident events and that its semiological reasoning is established on commemorative signs. However, at a further consideration, it is indisputable that Stoicism considers divination particularly for its capacity to reveal causes of events that are commonly described to happen by chance. In this line, the main object of divination is not the future event, but the cause to which the diviner links it. Just like sweat is a self-evident object that indicates the existence of skin pores, the events considered by diviners as causes of future events are equally evident. Consequently, divination deals with indicative signs.

Moreover, a slight difference needs to be taken into consideration. While the movements of the body or the sweat of the skin indicate a causal simultaneity, the causal relationships revealed by divination are considered in a temporal distance and the validity of the predicting syllogism would be verified only posterior to the occurring of the predicted event. Thus, while common indicative signs are established on hypothetical syllogisms[20], which are sufficient to describe and verify the causal link between two events, we are forced to assume a supplementary experiential criterion for the validation of divinatory indicative signs. For example, in the case of a common indicative sign, the affirmation of the causal relationship is simultaneous to its verification. One can describe an object as ensouled proceeding from the movements of its body. While in this case the effect is ontologically dependent on the simultaneous existence of its cause, in the case of divinatory causality the effect does not rely on the simultaneity of the cause and would occur even at long periods of time after the prediction was made. Because the consequence of an indictive sign is revealed as simultaneous to its cause, to confirm the existence of the effect would be sufficient as validation of the cause. Moreover, while a hypothetical syllogism asserts the cause of an event by proceeding from the self-evidence of the effect, divinatory reasoning would proceed in the other way around, by asserting from the self-evidence of a cause the relationship linking it to its effect. Thus, not the consequence is self-evident in divinatory reasoning, but its cause and, because a temporal distance divides them, a supplementary experiential mean of verification would be advanced. For example, the flight of a bird coming from the right side may be a favorable sign for a future event. However, in this case it would not be sufficient to confirm the flight of the bird in order

to judge the validity of the prediction, but the divinatory reasoning would be validated only if the predicted event would occur.

One would remark how at the center of the Stoic interest in divination is not the success of predictions, but the capacity to reveal the causal relationships that link two events that common knowledge would qualify as contingent. Thus, while the traditional view on divination mostly regarded the capacity to reveal future events, the Stoic point of view considers divination not so much for its prophetic function, as for its function of revelatory for what we have called second degree non-evident causes. While common knowledge would describe both the effect and the cause of a divinatory relationship as happening by chance and as absolutely distinct phenomena, divination reveals the link between the two elements and asserts their causal relationship. Although divinatory reasoning proceeds from the self-evidence of a cause, that cause would still be considered non-evident because its effect would be described as happening by chance if divination would not reveal their relationship. Therefore, although the divinatory cause is self-evident to the senses, its statute of cause for a future event remains non-evident until it is disclosed by divination. While this type of divinatory reasoning works as a revealer of the second-degree non-evident causes, we still need to question whether a similar reasoning would reveal the first-degree non-evident causes.

Stoic cosmology asserts world's utility and beauty as signs of the fact that the universe is not the product of chance but of divine providence, the ordering principle of the universe (Dragona-Monachou 1994, 4428). However, in order to assert providence from natural order, one needs to explain the events that may impede the discovery of universal necessity, *i.e.* the second-degree non-evident causes. Thus, divination becomes a *sine qua non* exercise to the discovery of the principles that determine the universal order, due to its capacity to reveal those areas of the causal chain that the common mind would not comprehend and would describe as happening by chance. We propose to interpret Chrysippus' fragment in Diogenianus by following this line of thought, suggesting that fate has to be viewed as the revealed non-evident cause of a successful act of divination.

If put into the form of a hypothetical syllogism, the first reasoning of Chrysippus would look as it follows: (1) "If divination is successful, fate orders everything/ But divination is successful, / Therefore, fate orders everything." The argument takes the form of a hypothetical syllogism that proceeds from a common indicative sign, the self-evidence of the cause being a sign of the consequence. Thus, not only that successful divination reveals a future event from the self-evidence of its cause, but it essentially indicates that the particular causal relationship takes part to a wider causal web encompassing the entire universe. Between the success of divination

and the determined order of fate the temporal distance inherent to the divinatory reasoning is absent. However, in order to assert the causal relationship between fate and divination, what Bobzien remarks to be the implicit premise of the success of divination has to be considered, the cases of unsuccessful divination being naturally irrelevant to the task to reveal the universal order. Diogenianus' fragment says that Chrysippus is able to deduce the existence of fate from divination only by implicitly assuming the existence of fate as a condition of successful divination: (2) "If fate orders everything, divination is successful, / But fate orders everything, / Therefore, divination is successful."

We propose to interpret both (1) and (2) as asserting divination as the revelatory sign of the universal order. Firstly, we have determined that the first-degree non-evident causes have a more general domain than the particular second-degree causes. Secondly, we have described the indicative sign as a self-evident object or event able to reveal a naturally non-evident object or event. Thirdly, a sign is the antecedent element of a valid implication. Fate is a more general cause than the particular ones, assuming that it encompasses everything. The success of divination is a self-evident event, as the validation a prediction after the occurrence of the predicted event, while fate is by nature occulted to direct sensorial knowledge. The third aspect is unclear in this situation, each of the arguments assuming a different antecedent element and this particular aspect determines the difficulty in the interpretation of the fragment of Diogenianus.

The fact that Chrysippus disposes (2) after (1) is not accidental and needs to be taken into consideration. Thus, just as the soul is known through the movements of the body, but remains completely imperceptible, fate would be known through successful divination, but remain completely imperceptible. Following the example of element (2) of Chrysippus' reciprocity argument, we may assert the bodily movements from the existence of the soul: "If I am ensouled, I can move my body, / But I am ensouled, / Therefore I can move my body." We can see how both arguments proceed from the imperceptible element of the reasoning in order to assert the existence of the self-evident element. Moreover, because the soul and fate are by their nature non-evident causes, the above reasoning needs to be preceded by another argument revealing their existence. Therefore, it is clear why Chrysippus asserts the validity of divination from the existence of fate only after the reasoning that reveals the existence of fate from the success of divination. In order to assume its role in an argument, fate had to be previously revealed by another hypothetical argument.

However, what is Chrysippus' motif to introduce a supplementary argument ? While (1) asserts divination as revealing its ontological dependency on the all-encompassing fate, the second element seems to drive the inquiry

further and to reveal other aspects of the relationship between fate and divination. Susan Sauvé Meyer (2009, 71-90) distinguishes two types of causal relationships within Chrysippus philosophy. The first type of causality regards the active principle as the efficient cause of all objects in the universe. The second type of causality comprises all the relationships between particular objects that imply a change in one of the elements of the causal relationship. Sauvé Meyer argues that, while all objects are corporal effects of the active principle, within the causal relationships of particular objects the quality of effect is ascribed to none of the objects, but to the incorporeal consequence that an object causes on the other. In other words, while the active principle is the cause of the existence of all objects, a particular object would not be cause of the existence of another object, but of the incorporeal effect that the other object suffers. For instance, the scalpel is not the cause of flesh, but of the incorporeal predicate 'being cut' that is ascribed to the flesh. While the active principle and informal matter are simultaneous present within the generated object, the cause being simultaneous to the effect, the existence of the particular cause and the object suffering the particular incorporeal effect are not dependent one on the other, independently existing before and after the causal interaction (Sauvé Meyer 2009, 75). Thus, while a particular object is the effect of fate only as long as the active principle remains within its matter, the particular objects exist indifferent to the effect they cause on other objects. We have described how the active principle is an artisan fire piercing all informal matter and shaping it in objects within which it remains and sustains cohesion. The human soul is part of the universal πνεῦμα and thus it follows the causal simultaneity of the active principle. Moreover, the active principle acts as cause not only of the existence of particular objects, but also of the order of universe, ordering all objects in a string of causes. All particular objects obtain thus the statute of cause, producing incorporeal effects one on another, and are ordered in a structure that predetermins their causal interactions.

In consequence, new aspects illuminate the type of causality implied by divination. If applied to the fragment of Diogenianus, the causal models presented earlier suggest that the argument engages fate as cause of divination under two aspects: (1) describes fate as the string of causes that encompasses all particular causal relationships and (2) describes fate as efficient cause of the entire universe. From the fact that divination reveals causal relationships between particular objects, *i.e.* happening under the type of non-efficient causality specific to the particular objects, fate is revealed under its aspect of causal structure comprised of all the particular causalities. As we have described, fate is necessary to divinatory causality due to the fact that a causal nexus has to unite the two elements of the relationship through the long temporal interval which may divide them. The prediction

has to be true from its assertion and the causal nexus, *i.e.* fate, would be the condition of its truth, because it predetermines the causal relationship with the future predicted event. Therefore, (1) describes rather the particular causal relationships capable to reveal fate, than fate as a *sine qua non* condition of divination. After the existence of fate and its predetermining role are revealed, the philosopher further asserts the role of fate as the efficient cause of all objects and as the ontological condition of all particular causality. As we have described, the action of fate as efficient cause of the universe is simultaneous in its existence to the existence of the effect. As long as the active principle remains within matter and provides its cohesion and order, the universe and all its objects would exist. The periodic destruction of the universe asserted by Chrysippus happens due to the separation between the active principle and matter. Therefore, (2) describes fate under its aspect of efficient cause of the universe. As long as it orders matter and predetermines the causal interactions of the resulted particular objects, fate would be the efficient cause of the divinatory causal relationships and the success of divination would be simultaneous to the acting of fate as efficient cause. Divination works as a revelatory sign of the first-degree non-evident cause, *i.e.* fate. While the first part of the argument asserts the existence of fate as a consequence of successful divination, the second part would drive further the semiological reasoning by proclaiming fate as the non-evident cause that determines the validity of divinatory reasoning.

4. Conclusion

The pages above were written in the search of those doctrinal elements able to reveal the role of divination for the Stoic philosophers. We consequently argued for a series of certain doctrinal elements that would serve our task, which we will shortly resume. The symmetry between the order of the universe and the organization of the Stoic system reveals the ethical principle that equally governs the life of the philosopher and his scientific efforts, *i.e.* οἰκείωσις. Not only that the philosophical system assumes the look of the universe, but the philosopher himself conducts his own actions striving to achieve a life in accordance to nature. We have described Stoic philosophy as an exercise meant to obtain wisdom to the philosopher, concluding from here that the philosopher's search for accordance to nature is identical to his scientific practice. Therefore, wisdom as a fulfilment of the philosophical exercise would coincide to the ethical and scientific goals of the Stoic philosopher: to become wisdom implies to coherently represent the universe and to consequently assume a life in accordance to its constitution. The philosopher focuses on the necessity governing nature and strives to achieve a representation of the multiple laws determining the life of the

universe. However, a complete image of the universe would include even those areas of the universe that escape the capacity of our mind to submit them under the governance of necessity. This is the first aspect of the Stoic questioning of divination. The philosopher needs furthermore to achieve the knowledge of those areas of the universe which escape our empirical faculties, this being the second aspect of the Stoic interest in divination. Brief, the question on divination is double, it equally concerns the natural phenomena that have a non-evident cause and the regions of the world that escape our direct perception. The pages above argue for the integration of divination within the theological part of physics, as the discipline that, proceeding from the non-evident causal relationships in nature, is capable to determine the existence of the rational order of the universe. The Stoic interest in divination detoured from the views of traditional religion, *i.e.* the prediction of future events, valuing it as a semiological reasoning that allows to derive the conclusion of the existence of a predetermined web of causes, *i.e.* fate.

Notes

[1] The development of the divinatory institutions within the western Mediterranean basin was marked by the dichotomy between public and private divination. Thus, while Greek divinatory institutions, like the oracles of Delphi, Delos and Dodona, were open to the individuals, offering responses equally to personal questions and to those concerning the entire society, divination developed in Rome mostly into an institution open to questions concerning the ensemble of society. For the legalistic development of the Roman divinatory institutions see Linderski (1986, 2146-2312). The dichotomy was even deeper at the end of the Republic and in the imperial age, once astrology became more popular in the popular and intellectual circles. In this matter are eloquent the edict condemning astrology in 33 BC, thus before the battle of Actium, in order to prevent the use of astrology in the interests of the particulars that endanger the republican order, and the edict of Augustus in 11 BC, condemning the forms of divination concerning individual interests (Volk 2009, 127-172).

[2] For a list of divinatory practices see: Porphyre (2012, fr.43). Even though it was written at the end of the 19th century, the work of A. Bouché-Leclercq (1879-1882) continues to be relevant; See also the abridged version with a foreword questioning the importance of the work nowadays by S. Georgoudi (2003) at Jérôme Millon, Grenoble. The problem of divination reappeared in the attention of the religious research through the innovative questioning offered by the book of J.-P. Vernant *et al* (1974). From the vast recent research on divination its worth mentioning the works of S. Iles Johnston and P.T. Struck (2005), A. Busine (2005), S. Georgoudi, R. Koch Piettre and F. Schmidt (2012), K. Beerden (2013) and G.H. Renberg (2017).

[3] "Atque haec, ut ego arbitror, veteres rerum magis eventis moniti quam ratione docti probaverunt. Philosophorum vero exquisita quaedam argumenta cur esset vera divinatio collecta sunt; e quibus, ut de antiquissumis loquar, Colophonius Xenophanes unus qui deos esse diceret divinationem funditus sustulit, reliqui vero omnes praeter Epicurum balbutientem de natura deorum divinationem probaverunt, sed non uno modo. Nam cum Socrates omnesque Socratici Zenoque et ii qui ab eo essent profecti manerent in antiquorum philosophorum sententia vetere Academia et Peripateticis consentientibus, cumque huic rei

magnam auctoritatem Pythagoras iam ante tribuisset, qui etiam ipse augur vellet esse, plurimisque locis gravis auctor Democritus praesensionem rerum futurarum conprobaret, Dicaearchus Peripateticus cetera divinationis genera sustulit, somniorum et furoris reliquit, Cratippusque familiaris noster, quem ego parem summis Peripateticis iudico, isdem rebus fidem tribuit, reliqua divinationis genera reiecit." (Cicero De div., I, 5.).

[4] "Sed quom Stoici omnia fere ilia defenderent, quod et Zeno in suis commentariis quasi semina quaedam sparsisset et ea Cleanthes paulo uberiora fecisset, accessit acerrumo vir ingenio Chrysippus, qui totam de divinatione duobus libris explicavit sententiam, uno praeterea de oraculis, uno de somniis; quem subsequens unum librum Babylonius Diogenes edidit eius auditor, duo Antipater, quinque noster Posidonius. Sed a Stoicis vel princeps eius disciplinae, Posidoni doctor, discipulus Antipatri degeneravit Panaetius nec tamen ausus estnegare vim esse divinandi, sed dubitare se dixit. Quod illi in aliqua re invitissumis Stoicis Stoico facere licuit,id nos ut in reliquis rebus faciamus a Stoicis non concedetur? Praesertim cum id, de quo Panaetio non liquet, reliquis eiusdem disciplinae solis luce videatur clarius. Sed haec quidem laus Academiae praestantissumi philosophi iudicio et testimonio conprobata est." (*De div.* I, 6).

[5] "Οἱ μὲν οὖν Στωικοὶ ἔφασαν τὴν μὲν σοφίαν εἶναι θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων ἐπιστήμην, τὴν δὲ φιλοσοφίαν ἄσκησιν ἐπιτηδείου τέχνης, ἐπιτήδειον δ' εἶναι μίαν καὶ ἀνωτάτω τὴν ἀρετήν, ἀρετὰς δὲ τὰς γενικωτάτας τρεῖς, φυσικὴν ἠθικὴν λογικήν· δι' ἣν αἰτίαν καὶ τριμερής ἐστιν ἡ φιλοσοφία, ἧς τὸ μὲν φυσικὸν τὸ δ' ἠθικὸν τὸ δὲ λογικόν· καὶ φυσικὸν μὲν ὅταν περὶ κόσμου ζητῶμεν καὶ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ, ἠθικὸν δὲ τὸ κατησχολημένον περὶ τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον, λογικὸν δὲ τὸ περὶ τὸν λόγον, ὃ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλοῦσιν." (SVF II, 35 = Aetius I, *Prooem*, 2 = Pseudo-Plutarh, 874e1-f1).

[6] "Ὁ Χρύσιππος οἴεται δεῖν τῶν λογικῶν πρῶτον ἀκροᾶσθαι τοὺς νέους δεύτερον δὲ τῶν ἠθικῶν μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῶν φυσικῶν, ὡς ἂν τέλος δὲ τούτοις τὸν περὶ θεῶν λόγον ἔσχατον παραλαμβάνειν. πολλαχοῦ δὲ τούτων ὑπ' αὐτοῦ λεγομένων ἀρκέσει παραθέσθαι τὰ ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ περὶ Βίων ἔχοντα κατὰ λέξιν οὕτως· 'πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ μοι κατὰ τὰ ὀρθῶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων εἰρημένα τρία γένη τῶν τοῦ φιλοσόφου θεωρημάτων εἶναι, τὰ μὲν λογικὰ τὰ δ' ἠθικὰ τὰ δὲ φυσικά· εἶτα τούτων δεῖν τάττεσθαι πρῶτα μὲν τὰ λογικὰ δεύτερα δὲ τὰ ἠθικὰ τρίτα δὲ τὰ φυσικά· τῶν δὲ φυσικῶν ἔσχατος εἶναι ὁ περὶ τῶν θεῶν λόγος· διὸ καὶ τελετὰς <προς> ηγόρευσαν τὰς τούτου παραδόσεις.' ἀλλὰ τοῦτόν γε τὸν λόγον, ὃν ἔσχατόν φησι δεῖν τάττεσθαι, <τὸν> περὶ θεῶν, ἔθει προτάττει καὶ προεκτίθησι παντὸς ἠθικοῦ ζητήματος· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τελῶν οὔτε περὶ δικαιοσύνης οὔτε περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν οὔτε περὶ γάμου καὶ παιδοτροφίας οὔτε περὶ νόμου καὶ πολιτείας φαίνεται τὸ παράπαν φθεγγόμενος, εἰ μή, καθάπερ οἱ τὰ ψηφίσματα ταῖς πόλεσιν εἰσφέροντες προγράφουσιν Ἀγαθὴν Τύχην, οὕτως καὶ αὐτὸς προγράψειε τὸν Δία, τὴν Εἱμαρμένην, τὴν Πρόνοιαν, τὸ συνέχεσθαι μιᾷ δυνάμει τὸν κόσμον ἕνα ὄντα καὶ πεπερασμένον" (SVF II, 42 = Plutarch, *De stoicorum repugnantiis,* 9, 1035a1-b11).

[7] The Brill's New Pauly describes Chrysippus' use of τελετή as metaphorical, departing from its fundamental religious sense established within the milieu of ancient Greek religion (Scherf, '*Telete*'). The form τελετή is part of the semantic field of τέλος (*completion, realization*, but also *decision, authority* or *rite*) and commonly signifies the initiation in the mystery cults and even the celebration of mysteries. As we observe, Chrysippus uses the word beyond its institutionalized religious usage, but maintains the area of use to the theological context (Chantraine, 1977, 1101-1103).

[8] For the link between Stoic cosmology and Plato's *Timaeus* description of the universe as a living animal Cf. Gretchen Reydams-Schils 1999, 41-115.

[9] While a great part of the manuscripts of Diogenes Laertius describe the principles as corporeal (σώματα), some others, including the Suda, correctly describe them as incorporeal (ἀσωμάτους). Arnim's fragment 299 followed the form ἀσωμάτους (D.L. VII, 134), this

generating a controversy with regard to the nature of the Stoic principles, through the fact that many other of Arnim's fragments attest the corporeal nature of the principles (SVF II 305, 310, 313 *et. al.*). Tiziano Dorandi's new edition of D.L. (2013, 522) attests to the correctitude of the σώματα version.

[10] For example, Plato's *Timaeus*.

[11] For example, many of the arguments against divination used by M. Cicero in the second book of *De divinatione* would come from Carneades' critique of the Stoic theory of divination (Schofield 1986, 54).

[12] "Fatum autem id appello quod Graeci εἱμαρμένην id est ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causae causa nexa rem ex se gignat. Ea est ex omni aeternitate fluens Veritas sempiterna. Quod cum ita sit, nihil est factum quod non futurum fuerit, eodemque modo nihil est futurum cuius non causas id ipsum efficientes natura contineat. Ex quo intellegitur, ut fatum sit non id quod superstitiose sed id quod physice dicitur, causa aeterna rerum, cur et ea quae praeterierunt facta sint et quae instant fiant et quae secuntur futura sint" (Cicero *De div.,* I, 55).

[13] "'Χρύσιππος' δύναμιν πνευματικὴν τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς εἱμαρμένης, τάξει τοῦ παντὸς διοικητικήν. Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ Περὶ κόσμου, ἐν δὲ τῷ δευτέρῳ Περὶ ὅρων καὶ ἐν τοῖς Περὶ τῆς εἱμαρμένης καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις σποράδην πολυτρόπως ἀποφαίνεται λέγων· Εἱμαρμένη ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ κόσμου λόγος, ἢ λόγος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοίᾳ διοικουμένων· ἢ λόγος, καθ' ὃν τὰ μὲν γεγονότα γέγονε, τὰ δὲ γινόμενα γίνεται, τὰ δὲ γενησόμενα γενήσεται. Μεταλαμβάνει δ' ἀντὶ τοῦ λόγου τὴν ἀλήθειαν, τὴν αἰτίαν, τὴν φύσιν, τὴν ἀνάγκην, προστιθεὶς καὶ ἑτέρας ὀνομασίας, ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας τασσομένας καθ' ἑτέρας καὶ ἑτέρας ἐπιβολάς. Μοίρας δὲ καλεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὰς διαμερισμοῦ, Κλωθὼ καὶ Λάχεσιν καὶ Ἄτροπον. Λάχεσιν μέν, ὅτι ὃν κλῆρον λελόγχασιν ἕκαστοι κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἀπονέμεται" (SVF II, 913).

[14] We may relate our interpretation with the famous passage of Hierocles the Stoic, describing the universe as disposed in concentric circles, the first one, closest to the subject, being the one traced around one's mind, and the final one encompassing the entire universe in a community of humans and gods (Ramelli 2009, 91-93).

[15] The objects of logics are the inner representations of things. Stoic epistemology proposes knowledge as the sensorial representation of exterior things. The Stoics distinguish the rational representations (φαντασίαι λογικαί) of the human soul from concepts. The process of knowledge happens in two steps. Firstly, through distinctive sensorial interactions, the subjects develop unconscious notions (ἔννοιαι) of exterior things, these being a form of memorized representations that serve to the recognition of individual objects and as a form of descriptive definition (ὑπογραφή). Pre-notions (ἔννοιαι) are equivalated by Chrysippus with Epicure's πρόληψις, natural concepts of the human mind based on successive sensorial perceptions. The pre-notion is a criterion of truth. Thus, by comparing the sensorial representation of the exterior object with its afferent pre-notion, the ruling part of the soul (ἡγεμονικόν) offers its approval, qualifying the representation as true, or rejects its approval, qualifying it as false. Secondly, concepts, as universal definitions, are formed through logical operations on the pre-notions. For further readings see: Gourinat (1996, 46-62), Dyson (2009) and Tieleman (1996, 219-232).

[16] We are acquainted with Pierre Hadot's thesis that ancient philosophy, and particularly Stoicism, is founded on the practice of philosophy, the philosopher discovering on its own the constitution of nature and the ethical precepts, and not on the scholastic transmission of knowledge. According to Hadot, philosophical education focused on the transmission of the doctrinal core of each school and not on the transmission of a full corpus of knowledge (Hadot 1995). Chrysippus' fragment (SVF II, 42) seems to sustain Hadot's interpretation, by asserting the theological initiation as the introduction to the *sine qua non* core of Stoicism.

[17] We observe that causality has a broader sense than material causality, the later implying that an event is produced due to the material interaction between two objects.

[18] "[ἐξαρκεῖν ἔμοιγε μαρτυρίας χάριν τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος ἡγοῦμαι καὶ μίαν ἑνὸς τούτων παράθεσιν ἀπαντῶσαν πρὸς τὰ Χρυσίππῳ περὶ εἱμαρμένης ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν μαντείων προρρήσεως κατασκευασθέντα. γράφει δ' οὖν ὁ συγγραφεὺς πρὸς αὐτόν, ἀπελέγχων ὅτι κακῶς ἐκ τῶν μαντείων σημειοῦται τὴν εἱμαρμένην etc.]'Φέρει δὲ καὶ ἄλλην ἀπόδειξιν ἐν τῷ προειρημένῳ βιβλίῳ τοιαύτην τινά. μὴ γὰρ ἂν τὰς τῶν μάντεων προρρήσεις ἀληθεῖς εἶναί φησιν, εἰ μὴ πάντα ὑπὸ τῆς εἱμαρμένης περιείχοντο.' - ὡς γὰρ ἐναργοῦς ὄντος τοῦ πάσας ἀποβαίνειν τὰς τῶν καλουμένων μάντεωνπρορρήσεις ἢ ὡς μᾶλλον ἂν ὑπὸ τινος τούτου συγχωρηθέντος, τοῦ πάντα γίνεσθαι καθ' εἱμαρμένην, καὶ οὐχὶ ὁμοίως ἂν ψευδοῦς ῥηθέντος καὶ αὐτοῦ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον, λέγω δὲ τὸ μὴ πάντα ἀποβαίνειν τὰ προαγορευθέντα, μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα αὐτῶν, ἡ ἐνάργεια δείκνυσιν. οὕτω τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἡμῖν Χρύσιππος κεκόμικεν, δι' ἀλλήλων κατασκευάζων ἑκάτερα. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πάντα γίγνεσθαι καθ' εἱμαρμένην ἐκ τοῦ μαντικὴν εἶναι δεικνύναι βούλεται, τὸ δὲ εἶναι μαντικὴν οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἀποδεῖξαι δύναιτο, εἰ μὴ προλάβοι τὸ πάντα συμβαίνειν καθ' εἱμαρμένην" (SVF II, 939).

[19] We use Susanne Bobzien's (2001, 89) translation.

[20] These are the forms of reasoning commonly known as modus ponendo ponens, modus tollendo tollens, modus ponendo tollens and modus tollendo ponens. For further readings see Bobzien (2002, 359-394).

References

Barnes, Jonathan. 1990. *The Toils of Scepticism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Beerden, Kim. 2013. *Worlds Full of Signs. Ancient Greek Divination in context*. Leiden–Boston: Brill.

Bobzien, Susanne. 2001. *Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Bobzien, Susanne. 2002. "The Development of Modus Ponens in Antiquity: From Aristotle to the 2nd Century AD". *Phronesis*: 4: 359-394.

Bouché-Leclercq, Auguste. 1879-1882. *Histoire de la Divination dans* l'Antiquité. Paris: Leroux.

Busine, Aude. 2005. *Paroles d'Apollon, Pratiques et traditions oraculaires dans l'Antiquité tardive (IIe-VIe siècles)*. Leiden–Boston: Brill.

Chantraine, Pierre. 1977. *Dictionnaire Étymologique de la Langue Grecque. Histoire des mots*. Paris: Éditions Klincksieck.

Diogenes Laertius. 2013. *Lives of Eminent Philosophers*. Edited with introduction by Tiziano Dorandi, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dragona-Monachou, Myrto. 1994. "Divine Providence in the Philosophy of the Empire". In *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, II, 36.7, 4417-4490. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter.

Dyson, Henry. 2009. *Prolepsis and Ennoia in the Early Stoa*. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter.

Georgoudi, Stella; Koch Piettre, Renée; Schmidt, Francis. 2012. *La Raison des Signes. Présages, rites, destin dans les sociétés de la Méditerranée ancienne*. Leiden–Boston: Brill.

Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste. 1996. *Les stoïciens et l'âme*. Paris: P.U.F.

Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste. 2000. *La dialectique des stoïciens*. Paris: Vrin.

Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste. 2005. "Le traité de Chrysippe Sur l'âme", *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* 4 (*Les stoïciens et le monde*): 557-578.

Hadot, Pierre. 1995. *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie antique?* Paris: Gallimard.

Iles Johnston, Sarah; Struck, Peter T. 2005. *Mantikê, Studies in Ancient Divination*. Leiden–Boston: Brill.

Linderski, Jerzy. 1986. "The Augural Law". In *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt,* II, 16.3, 2146-2312. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter.

Muller, Robert. 2006. *Les stoïciens.* Paris: Vrin.

Porphyre. 2012. *Lettre à Anebon*, text established, translated and commented by H. D. Saffrey and A-P. Segonds. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

Ramelli, Ilaria. 2009. *Hierocles the Stoic: Elements of Ethics, Fragments, and Excerpts,* translated by David Konstan. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature.

Renberg, Gil H. 2017. *Where Dreams May Come. Incubation sanctuaries in the Greco-Roman World,* 2 vols. Leiden–Boston: Brill.

Reydams-Schils, Gretchen. 1999. *Demiurge and Providence. Stoic and Platonist Readings of Plato's* Timaeus. Turnhout: Brepols.

Sauvé Meyer, Susan. 2009. "Chain of Causes. What is Stoic Fate?". In *God and Cosmos in Stoicism,* Ricardo Salles (ed.), 71-90. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Scherf, Johannes. "Telete". In *Brill's New Pauly*, H. Cancik and H. Schneider (eds.), English edition by Ch. F. Salazar, *Classical Tradition* volumes edited by M. Landfester and English edition by F. G. Gentry. Accessed May 20, 2019. Doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1574-9347_bnp_e1203080.

Schofield, Malcolm. "Cicero for and against Divination". *The Journal of Roman Studies* 76: 47-65.

Tieleman, Teun. 1996. *Galen & Chrysippus on the Soul. Argument and Refutation in the* De Placitis *Books II-III.* Leiden, New York, Köln: Brill.

Vernant Jean-Pierre *et al.* 1974. *Divination et Rationalité.* Paris: Éditions du Seuil.

Volk, Katharina. 2009. *Manilius and his Intellectual Background.* Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

White, Michael J. 2003. "Stoic Natural Philosophy (Physics and Cosmology)". In *The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics*, Brad Inwood (ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Emanuel COPILAŞ [*]

Coping with the Unconscious.
Hegel and Psychoanalysis

Abstract: Psychoanalysis, which disavowed psychology on the ground that the unconscious is too deep to have a science of its own and can only be analyzed to the extent that it reveals itself through symptoms – posed a major challenge for modern philosophy as well. Since Hegel is one of the most important modern philosophers, I argue here that the encounter between psychoanalysis (through its major exponents, Freud and Lacan) and Hegelian speculative dialectic, far from posing a threat to the latter, it actually enriches it, while placing the former into a proper ontology.

Keywords: desire, symbol, mediation, dialectic, reason.

1. Introduction

Parallels between Hegel's philosophy and psychoanalysis were rather scarce until half a century ago. Since then, more and more studies and books that outline important similarities, but also differences between the two parts have appeared. Nevertheless, as I try to argue in this article, there is still ground to be covered in this respect. Hegel's logic, along with some of his early writings, will prove especially helpful to outline how psychoanalysis's drive for the unconscious, the non-rational dimension of individuals, can be integrated into the Hegelian dialectic between the particular and the universal. Also, Sigmund Freud's typology of the psyche (id, ego, superego) can be interpreted, although not in this order, as an internal form of dialectic that prepares the way and also parallels the authentic, social dialectic that occurs between man and his many environments.

Jacques Lacan's original brand of Freudianism and its relation to Hegel's philosophical system represents the second pillar of the paper. Lacan's insistence on desires, language and symbols that mediate our identities to the point the subject itself becomes irrelevant brought forward the bases of meta-psychoanalysis, an endeavor in which Hegel is quoted many times. Even so, Lacan generally uses some of Hegel's concept for his own philosophical purposes and specifically against Hegel's overall ontology, a position that he explicitly recognizes (Lacan 2006, 683). However, authors like Slavoj

---
[*] PhD, Lecturer, Political Science Department, West University of Timisoara, Romania; email: copilasemanuel@yahoo.com

Žižek are convinced that, in the end, Lacan was a real Hegelian, even if he was not aware of this, due to the fact that he encountered Hegel especially through Alexander Kojève's seminar on the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and was not directly familiarized with the German philosopher's major works (Žižek 2014).

Using the works of these two major representatives of psychoanalysis, Freud and Lacan, I intend to bring forward the hypothesis that although they share important convergence points with Hegel's philosophical system, which they challenge to a major extent – they are, on the whole, incompatible with speculative dialectic. Their insistence on particularities, even as absences, in the case of Lacan, to the disadvantage of the universal, of self-creating spirit, renders their differences more important as their tangential similarities. Still, dialectic is able to incorporate psychoanalysis and resist the splits it induces between the individual and his world(s), revealing their temporary, not permanent nature.

The first section of the article deals with what Freud and Hegel have in common and disagree as well when it comes to individuality, society, religion and history. Both thinkers were rationalists formed under the auspices of Enlightenment, even if Freud showed a kind of circumspection towards rational teleology that would have certainly perplexed Hegel. With this in mind, the most important tenet of this section is that Hegel picks up where Freud has left off: psychoanalysis ends where dialectic begins (see Johnston 1927, 554). Or, better said, for dialectic to begin at all.

The second section is centered around Lacan's presumed Hegelianism. I analyze here Lacan's use of Hegelian notions like the "beautiful soul' which follows exclusively the "law of the heart" and develops an "unhappy conscience", the "cunning of reason" and, finally, the master-servant dialectical reciprocity. Despite Lacan's powerful structuralism and his convincing arguments against the autonomy of subjects, arguments that owe not little to Hegel's philosophy, I consider that a Hegelian subject is nevertheless possible, even if as a simple fragment of the whole possessing consciousness; substance alienating itself as subject in order to plenary return to itself as ontological dynamics aware of itself, the Hegelian subject is simultaneously a projection and a prerequisite of its own object. Furthermore, by trying to transform Lacan into a Hegelian, Žižek seems to end up with transforming Hegel himself from an emancipatory and even subversive philosopher into a passive follower of a certain historical status-quo, something which Hegel never was (Žižek 2014).

In conclusion, the unconscious is offered a place into dialectic, but not a central one, although it certainly represents the point from which dialectic takes off. As the constitutive other of reason, the unconscious is negated and superseded by consciousness, by the rational ego, in the sense that it is recognized as a powerful and potentially disruptive force, but one that has

to be limited and maintained under a certain control in order for anything else to exist and develop. And since societies, laws and politics exist, no matter how fragile, unjust or polarized they may be, the unconscious traversing and inscribing them with its own negativity is also compelled by them to keep its distance, or crumble along with them and along with what makes it possible in the first place, its itself other, conscience.

2. The limits of reason. Freud and Hegel on human nature, society, religion and history

It appears that Freud, the founding father of "abyssal psychology", as he used to call psychoanalysis, has never read Hegel. At least, not seriously (Mills 2002, 188-189; Butler 1976, 506). Indeed, Freud's scarce and transient remarks with reference to Hegel and the "obscurity" of his philosophy are striking (Freud 2017a, 709).

However, this is a small matter, since even if he had read Hegel, Freud would have not been able to confer psychoanalysis an ontological dimension. He did not intend it in the first place: psychoanalysis is and remains a field of investigation centered around the individual and its non-rational thoughts and behaviors. Moreover, he explicitly stated that psychoanalysis must not adopt a certain philosophical vision upon the world, because psychanalyst would try to impose that particular vision upon their patients, and that would amount to an intolerable form of "violence" (Freud 2017b, 202). This is why human nature occupies a considerable symbolical weight in Freud's writings.

However, for someone who developed such a subversive approach with reference to the reified Enlightenment oriented European status-quo at the end of the 19th century, Freud's concept of human nature is a highly conservative one. For example, he considers aggression a salient characteristic of humanity, and all attempts to reduce it, not necessarily eradicate it, futile (Freud 2017c, 330-331). This aggression is fueled mostly by the "pleasure principle", which aims to subdue the external reality to its erratic wishes. But the "pleasure principle" in itself is dangerous and potentially harmful, due to its lack of reasonability. However, it is contained by the "reality principle" that compels the individual to take into account social needs that are above itself and ultimately make possible his own existence.

This is how "culture" occurs, a term Freud designates for social organization in general – constraining the pleasure principle to retreat into the unconscious and generate different phantasms and thus making its repressed presence felt in various sublimated ways (Freud 2017d, 17, 218-220). External reality induces major divisions into the "psychical apparatus", as Freud calls it, as the individual must learn to obey norms and customs in order to

live in an organized community. The id, where the pleasure principle reigns, consisting mostly on libido, an energy ultimately based on sexual desires – develops the ego, an interface that allows it to socially integrate and pursue its existence according to the specific laws of a given society. As the individual internalizes these laws and norms, especially in his childhood, under the guidance of his parents, the superego comes into the scene. The superego, the ideal of the ego, is linked in an intimate way to the id: if the first represents a relentless drive for unchained sexuality (including incest) and aggression, the last is also a frantic dimension of internalized conformity that induces all sorts of peculiar behaviors, especially melancholia and anxiety. It is the task of the ego to maintain the fragile equilibrium between the id and the superego, and to expand itself to the detriment of the id. In other words, people should become more and more rational, but this is not the tantamount of superseding human nature. After all, the id, consisting in instincts and repressed memories of all sorts (Jung 1994, 45), represents the biggest part of the psychic apparatus and its constant repression under the auspices of civilization entails many forms of neurosis and guilty consciousness, a result which propels Freud to argue that neurosis is the unavoidable price we pay for the advancement of civilization, the "discontent in civilization" (Freud 2017d, 304-306, 314-320, 330-331, 334, 336-343, 356, 370; Freud 2017c, 292-293, 310-312; Freud 2017b, 244-246, 275-276, 443-444; Freud 2017e, 262-263; Freud 2017a, 580-589, 594-602, 615-616; Freud 2017f, 264-265, 270-272, 314-315).

But the advancement of civilization is not the equivalent of progress, an idea Freud decisively rejected (Freud 2017c, 195, 222-236, 313-314). The id is insurmountable regardless of the social context, because "the ego is never master in his own house" (Freud 1999, 80). Society, the reified image of the archaic father, the arbitrary ruler of the primitive hoard that was killed by his own sons only to be reinstated latter as rules and interdictions in order to prevent chaos and anarchy (Freud 2017c, 150-151, 266, 300-301, 512-517) – can never amount to something more than a thin lair of reason temporarily covering huge amounts of libidinal energies waiting to burst at every occasion they get.

In this social process, religion plays a key role. Based on a collective superego that underlines every human community, on an essence, to use Hegel's terminology, religion has nevertheless a negative impact both upon individuals and societies. Its rigid morality triggers coping mechanisms that result in hypocrisy, a feature that every religion and every society as well possesses. But, equally important, religion suppresses critical thinking beginning with childhood and thus produces neurotic individuals with guilty consciousnesses. Even if religion has played an important role in fostering social coherence and imposing the reality principle upon the unconscious,

the id and its never-ending pleasure principle, Freud renders it as a transient phase of historical development. From animism, humanity arrived at religion. But now it is time to go beyond religion and constitute itself on solid, scientific principles (Freud 2017a, 698-699, 702-703, 706; Freud 2017c, 195-222, 446-449; Freud 2017g, 194-204). As we will observe, Hegel's philosophy of religion shares numerous similarities with what Freud had to say about it.

Finally, considering Freud's accounts of individuality, society and religion, we can understand why he perceives history as a permanent trail of crimes, wars and libidinal manifestations (Freud 2017c, 61-62). In close connection with his dismissal of progress, the idea of history as nothing more than chaos and crimes committed by individuals and/or peoples completes the picture of a profoundly skeptical thinker with a peculiar taste for reason and civilized behavior, even if only at an individual level (see also Burston 1996, 73). This, for Hegel, is nothing more than a betrayal of reason. One more remark: Freud often quotes approvingly Arthur Schopenhauer (Freud 2017g, 46-47; Freud 2017c, 445-446), the philosopher of arbitrary will as the driving force of everything that exists, and also one of the most anti-Hegelian thinkers of the 19th century.

Turning our attention to Hegel, his position regarding human nature is highly different than that of Freud. But Hegel was not at all naïve. He did not endorse cosmopolitan Kantianism, for example, but he did argue in favor of progress, both moral and political. However, the path of this progress is a long and sinuous one, marked by numerous setbacks. Consequently, human nature is gradually paving the way for the affirmation of human spirit:

> While the first paradise was that of human nature, this is the second, the higher paradise of the human spirit, the paradise where the human spirit emerges like a bride from her chamber, endowed with a fairer naturalness, with freedom, depth, and serenity. The first wild glory of its dawn in the cast is restrained by the grandeur of form and tamed into beauty. The human spirit manifests its profundity here no longer in confusion, gloom, or arrogance, but in perfect clarity. Its serenity is not like the play of children; it is rather a veil spread over the melancholy which is familiar with the cruelty of fate but is not thereby driven to lose its freedom and moderation. (Hegel 1961, 325)

While Freud's concept of human nature is stuck into the unconscious and therefore permanent, Hegel's concept of human nature is subjectable to change, and it changes according to the historical context the individual lives in. There is no permanently determined human nature: every man is the product of its environment, as well as every environment is the product of its inhabitants. The unconscious that produces specific human natures is just the first stage of spirit, its unmediated immediacy (Berthold-Bond 1991,

195; Mills 2002, 4); as the layers of spirit gather, human nature is compelled to supersede itself into human spirit. This does not mean it will disappear altogether, because feelings, its main component, will not disappear with the advancement of reason. On the contrary, it will still be recognized as one of the main forces shaping human existence, but it won't be allowed to orient it in a constitutive way.

Berthold-Bond argues that, for Hegel, "the unconscious which is a mere surface, and consciousness or rationality which is the genuine text of the psyche" (Berthold-Bond 1991, 195). If we take a closer look into Hegel's logic, Berthold-Bond's argument is not sustainable. The *Science of Logic* follows the process of quantity being converted into quality and the reverse. Unaware of itself and the multitudes it contains, quantity gives birth out of itself to quality. Arising as a differentiation within quantity, both as limit and as conscience, quality is not the beyond of quantity, not its metaphysics, but quantity negated and thus propelled to a superior stage of existence (Hegel 1986; Hegel 2010). If we replace quantity with the unconscious and quality with the ego, it follows that the ego is not the opposite of the id, but a split within the id that allows it to return to itself in a more mature and dynamic way. Rationality is not the "genuine text of the psyche" because Hegelian rationality is always related to the universal, to political societies. Individual intellects are capable of reason only to a limited extent; after all, they are mere "accidents", as Hegel argues in his *Science of Logic*, while the rational Idea alone is true, at a historical scale. In Hegel's words,

> The human being is this Night, this empty nothing which contains everything in its simplicity – a wealth of infinitely many representations, images, none of which occur to it directly, and none of which are not present. This [is] the Night, the interior of [human] nature, existing here – pure Self – [and] in phantasmagoric representations it is night everywhere: here a bloody head suddenly shoots up and there another white shape, only to disappear as suddenly. We see this Night when we look a human being in the eye, looking into a Night which turns terrifying. [For from his eyes] the night of the world hangs out toward us. Into this Night the being has returned. Yet the movement of this power is posited likewise. (Hegel 1983, 87)

However, reason depends on intellects to impose itself, and this is why it is always fragile, due to the particularities that convey it. In the same time, reason gathers its strength from the unintended consequences produced by the activities of individuals, which are unaware that in every selfish act the seeds of the universal are planted, in the sense that its beneficial effects will be sought by more and more different and diverse people and, eventually, institutionalized.

Furthermore, using Hegel's triadic dialectical method, we can consider the id as nature, the superego as the abstract, rational Idea, the concept of

reality, and the ego as their synthesis, actually existing spirit. After all, Freud himself characterized the ego as a unifying and synthetic force within the psychic apparatus (Freud 2017f, 273, 288, 336). As stated in the introduction section, this internal, psychological dialectic between id, ego and superego paves the way for the Hegelian social and historical dialectic, allowing individuals to become as rational as possible, both from inside and from outside themselves.

Due to the fact that reason can only accomplish itself in the relations between individuals, and not inside their intellects, their arbitrary psychologies, societies represent for Hegel the true cradle of individuality, and not the other way around, as Freud considers. But in order for societies to be truly rational, they must institutionalize themselves as states and bring forward their own, specific forms of right. However, particularity is not to be oppressed in the name of the general will; after all, what Hegel calls the "subjective spirit" represents the cornerstone of modernity (Hegel 2003). For spirit to advance, both particular and the universal must reciprocate themselves as fair as possible; after all, they exist and prosper only in their speculative, dialectical unity; outside it, they are nothing but empty, abstract projections of arbitrary and thus non-rational wills (Hegel 1977).

Next, Hegel's theological reflections are rather congruent to those of Freud, although Hegel does not contest religion as fiercely as Freud does. Religion is just a phase of spirit, of humanity's self-consciousness. With all its excesses, religion is indispensable for a proper morality, but when it transforms this morality into a political instrument and substitute itself for the state, we are no longer on the realm of spirit. Due to its moral impetus and the fear and punitive approach that goes along with it, religion remains on the realm of finitude and cannot access real infinity, the universal; consequently, it is suited only for individual purposes and should center itself to the private sphere. Be that as it is, Hegel does not believe that religion represses knowledge, as Freud does. The original sin is nothing but the distance between the knowledge of man and the knowledge of God, both reconciling themselves in the process of historical becoming. God is therefore man, spirit, and it is a true part of human communities as long as it helps them become more open, more tolerant, more aware of their internal and external mediacies. Redemption is mundane, not metaphysical, and it is available for everyone (Hegel 1988; Hegel 1995).

As for history, although it is bloody, violent and apparently chaotic, it represents way more than a series of various massacres, as Freud interprets it. History is, to quote Hegel's famous syntagma, "the court of the world" (Hegel 2003). History is the depositary of spirit, from its infancy and to its future maturity, and philosophy is nothing more than an expression of its historical epoch. Hegel's account of history is groundbreaking and radically different in respect to the previous philosophies that approached the topic:

far from being a metaphysical wisdom with universal validity regardless of time and place, philosophy is nothing more than a product of its time, a way among many others through which a period and a context understands and puts itself into perspective (Hegel 2011).

To sum up, Freud and Hegel disagree on important matters, like the ones presented above, but they also share a common affinity towards the ideals of the Enlightenment, even the first works his way in this direction with an empirical method and the second prefers a speculative dialectical approach (Mills 2002, 188-189, 191). But maybe their most striking difference can be found in the way they comprehend mental derangement, or simply madness. For Freud, madness, under its most common form, neurosis, is the product of the unconscious, more specifically it occurs as a conflict between the id and the ego, a conflict in which the id eventually takes control of the psyche. For Hegel, madness is also the product of the unconscious, a relapse into emotionality and feelings on the expense of reason (Mills 2002, 60; Berthold 2009, 301). But if madness remains for Freud essentially an individual condition, for Hegel it represents first of all a social one. Not many scholars that compared the two authors stressed this point enough. Louis Sass did it, although in a transient way (Sass 2009, 321). However, in Hegel's early writings, madness is very clearly defined as a social issue:

> Once the social character of human beings has been disturbed and forced to throw itself into idiosyncrasies (…), it becomes so profoundly distorted that it expands its strength on this separation from others and proceeds to assert its isolation to the point of madness; for madness is simply the complete isolation of the individual from his kind. (Hegel 2004, 101)

3. Desire, symbol, sign. Is Lacan truly a Hegelian ?

Although he always stated that he was a Freudian, Lacan actually managed to push Freudian psychoanalysis a step further, circumscribing it to a cultural and ultimately philosophical debate. Far from being the domain of nude instincts and repressed/forgotten memories, Lacan's unconscious departs from that of Freud by being the product of language and of "symbolic overdetermination" (Lacan 2006, 88). Lacan distinguishes between language, symbols and signs, arguing that language is much more than simple speech: through speech, language expresses itself in the subject, and not the other way around. The subject is therefore reduced to a medium that allows the interplay between desires and symbols that always signify to other desires and symbols, phenomenologically embodied in accidental subjects (Lacan 1998, 68; Lacan 2008, 88-89).

According to Lacan, the real subject is the Other, the unconscious. The place of desires, many of which the subject is not even aware of, the

unconscious consists also in signifiers that float chaotically and imprint their meanings in the signified, usually the individual, but also different objects as well. Signifiers are desires wrapped around symbols that propel the individual to think and behave in certain ways, recognizable to other signifiers. Through symbols and "chains of signification", the language of desires is inscribed in the subject, which expresses them as sounds (speech) or signs (writing). Desires are more than simple demands the subject must fulfill in order to carry on with its daily existence; in fact, desire is what persists after a particular demand was satisfied (Lacan 2006; Lacan 1998, 149, 198-199; Lacan 2013, 11-18; Lacan 1990, 8). Here lies a first major departure from Hegel, who considers language a tool of reason, not of desires (Hegel 1979, 114).

Among the most important signifiers is the symbol of the phallus, money, "the signifier that most thoroughly annihilates every signification" (Lacan 2006, 27), and everyday objects that are immersed into multiple chains of signification that produce a variety of effects of which the protagonists of certain situations in which that particular signifier is present are unaware of. This is the case of the famous "purloined letter" that Lacan comments in a rich and eloquent way (Lacan 2006, 6-48).

Not only the signifiers signify, but also the spaces between them (Lacan 2006, 327). Those spaces, those "cuts" between the signifying chains are extremely important: the fate of the subject itself depends on them, on the constant rearrangement of words and the "symbolic lesions" they suffer while leaping from one signifying chain to another (Lacan 2006, 21). In Lacan's words, "It is the world of words that creates the world of things. (…) Man thus speaks, but it is because the symbol has made him man" (Lacan 2006, 229).

Using Freud's metaphor of the father of the primitive hoard, Lacan advances the concept of "name-of-the-father" which directly links culture and social organizations with the unconscious. The mythical figure of the father reinstated as law functions as a set of interdictions that generate all sorts of frustrations; through, the arbitrariness of personal power was not overcome. It was institutionalized. The name of the father occupies the pace of the unconscious and generates its effects as laws, but those laws are only expressions of the desires and the jouissance of the father, of power, in the end, not of universal reason, as Hegel concludes (Lacan 2006, 230, 479-485). These laws are not strictly confined to the political domain: they are also to be found in every other field of human interaction. Since the name of the father follows us in everything we think and experience, both as law and as interdiction, knowledge cannot be anything but "paranoiac" (Lacan 2006, 77, 91-93).

As every society undergoes alienation and cannot fully comprehend itself, so does every individual; starting with the "mirror-stage", when the infant is

about six months old and can recognize his image in the mirror, he begins thinking and referring to himself as a body. His perception of himself becomes mediated through external objects, and the child is compelled to negate himself, to think of himself from outside, in order to be allowed to return to himself as himself. This individual alienation is further fathomed by the use of language through speech and between or as symbols: one cannot speak himself entirely, thus one cannot comprehend himself entirely. We can understand now why for Lacan the unconscious is a product of language and it amounts to the personal history of the subject, to which the subject does not and will never have full access to (Lacan 2006, 76-88, 214-217; Lacan 2009, 27; Lacan 1990, 6).

This is why thinking can only amplify alienation. "I am thinking where I am not, therefore I am where I am not thinking" (Lacan 2006, 430). Or, in a broader train of thoughts,

> In analytic experience, intention (…) turns out to be unconscious insofar as it is expressed and conscious insofar as it is repressed (…). And language, being approached via its function of social expression, reveals both its significant unity in intention and its constitutive ambiguity as subjective expression, admitting something that contradicts thought or using thought to lie. (Lacan 2006, 67)

One can either express itself as a channel of the signifier, either conceptualize what it expresses and thus repress it. Thinking does not help us evade the power of the signifiers; it only allows them to sublimate themselves in other form and to further tighten the grip they already have on us. A distinct anti-Hegelian position, which scholars like Žižek fail to take into account when trying to convert Lacan into a Hegelian. But we will get to that soon enough.

Still, Lacan insists that while the subject is nothing more than an empty place, crossed randomly by desires and signifiers that speak him more than he will be ever able to speak them – he nevertheless exists and resists as much as possible to the symbolic power of the signifiers and also to his desires, to his phantasms that induce specific symptoms.

> This is not to say, however, that our culture pursues its course in the shadows outside of creative subjectivity. On the contrary, creative subjectivity has not ceased in its struggle to renew here the never-exhausted power of symbols in the human exchange that brings them to light.
> To emphasize the small number of subjects who prop up this creation would be to give in to a romantic perspective by comparing things that are not equivalent. The fact is that this subjectivity, regardless of the domain in which it appears – mathematics, politics, religion, or even advertising – continues to animate the movement of humanity as a whole. (Lacan 2006, 234)

I propose a twofold interpretation of this defense of subjectivity. First, resistance, through conceptualization, for example, is the equivalent of the signifier's cunningness, a maneuver that allows apparently repressed symbols to reappear with vengeance by sublimating themselves outside the subject's direct knowledge, like prince charming that cuts off the head of the hydra and immediately has to face two heads instead, and so on. Second, resistance allows the subject to slide through different chains of signification and, while never being able to elude them completely, offers some consistency to the lack that he ultimately is. Perhaps this second interpretation is the most accurate one, and in its light we can decipher one of Lacan's most ambiguous and cryptic phrases: "no roll of the dice in the signifier will ever abolish chance. This is so because chance exists only within a linguistic determination, no matter how we consider it, whether in combination with automatism or encounter" (Lacan 2006, 758). The subject is usually a physical device used by symbols and affects to communicate with each other, but it can also be a true encounter with something else, something new; his chance is to resist signification within the distances, the cuts between signifying chains and to displace them in more meaningful and rewarding ways. "Resistance, equal in its denial effect despite Hegel and Freud, unhappy consciousness and discontent in civilization" (Lacan 2006, 709; see also Comay 2015, 237-266).

After this short and unavoidable schematic presentation of Lacanian psychoanalysis, we can turn our attention to Lacan's use of some Hegelian concepts like the beautiful soul, unhappy conscience, the law of the heart, the cunning of reason and the master-servant dialectic.

Basically, the main finding of psychology, one that was further nurtured by psychoanalysis, as Žižek observes, is that individuals are not fully transparent with reference to themselves (Žižek 1993). In philosophical terms, as I have argued in the first section of the paper, this is a fundamental tenet of Hegel's understanding of intellect in its insurmountable contradiction with reason. Furthermore, spirit itself is, up to a certain point, a form of self-alienation: societies cannot fully reconcile themselves in political terms, but only in philosophical, religious and artistic terms (Hegel 1983, 176-177; Pinkard 2000, 494, 603-604).

This opacity of the subject with reference to itself allows the subject to think that he is better, above the world around, with all its corruption, intrigues, treachery and violence.

> The me (…) of modern man (…) (which Lacan distinguishes from the I, the Freudian ego, the ontological identity of the subject, in contrast with the phenomenological one, the "me", m.n.), has taken on its form in the dialectical impasse of the beautiful soul who does not recognize his very reason for being in the disorder he denounces in the world. (Lacan 2006, 232-233)

Following the law of the heart, the beautiful soul is just a stubborn intellect that refuses a dialectical encounter with the very world that produced and continues to sustain him. For Hegel, stoics, skeptics and romantics were all examples of beautiful souls that tried to reject the world with means they have necessarily extracted from the world itself (Hegel 1977).

But the cunning of reason, Lacan argues further, is the way reason as universal totality of mediations projects its signifying lack into the beautiful souls, poignantly and slowly making them understand themselves as parts of the world and, more importantly, as reasons for the disorder that they fear and condemn in the first place (Lacan 2006, 710; see also Macdonald 2014, 7-9). While Lacan uses the cunning of reason for psychoanalytic, individual purposes, Hegel advanced it as an ontological problem: reason makes its presence felt in history under the form of less and less alienated societies, aware of both their internal and their external mediations, but also as an absence, bringing forward its (partial or complete) negation: wars, conflicts, racism, colonialism, capitalism etc. In this manner, by hiding and giving way to reprehensible events, reason presents itself as indispensable to individual consciousnesses, to intellects, and thus dialectically moves forward (Hegel 2011).

But the most important proof of Lacan's non-Hegelianism resides in his understanding of the master-servant dialectic. The relation between the two parts stops being a social one and becomes an intrapersonal one: the master is for Lacan the Other, the name of the father, the sum of signifiers, while the servant is the signified, the subject forever reduced to the symbolic power of the Other.

> The Other, as preliminary site of the pure subject of the signifier, occupies the key (…) position here, even before coming into existence here as absolute Master – to use Hegel's term with and against him. For what is omitted in the platitude of modern information theory is the fact that one cannot even speak of a code without it already being the Other's code; something quite different is at stake in the message, since the subject constitutes himself on the basis of the message, such that he receives from the Other even the message he himself sends. (Lacan 2006, 683; Lacan 1991, 29-142)

Even if the struggle in which the infant acquires his identity against and according to the rules imposed by the father resembles the historical master-servant dialectic, the advancement of liberty through necessity (Casey, Woody *apud* O'Neill 1996, 229-230), to convert the master into the unconscious means to make use of this concept in a very different way than Hegel intended it: for him, both master and slave possess a certain form of incomplete consciousness, but their struggle is a phenomenological, social, economic and political one, not a psychological one (Hegel 1977; Hegel

1979, 125-126). Lacan is pretty aware of that and he undoubtedly recognizes that he uses "Hegel's term with and against him".

Still, more important than this psychological reduction of the master servant dialectic is the fact that Lacan links this struggles for recognition between master of servant to a desire for recognition and, dialectically enough, to a recognition of desire:

> Man's very desire is constituted (…), under the sign of mediation: it is the desire to have one's desire recognized. Its object is a desire, that of other people, in the sense that man has no object that is constituted for his desire without some mediation (Lacan 2006, 148). Reason and desire thus become inextricably mixed, a fact that Hegel himself acknowledged. (Whitebook 2008, 384; see also Kojève *apud* O'Neill 1996, 50)

When trying to present Lacan as a Hegelian, Žižek generally argues that the split that occurs between the intellect and its social environment, or between liberty and necessity, is not resolved by passing into another, superior stage of freedom, but by reconciling the individual, the beautiful soul, in the last instance, with the exterior reality. Through a supposed simple mental operation, the subject miraculously understands its place within actually existing necessity and thus realizes the freedom he craved for, even if only at a mental level, only through thinking (Žižek 2014, Žižek 1993). Richard Chessick is more direct: "Hegel insists that social action and revolution will not overcome alienation; it has to be done by changes in attitudes purely within one's consciousness. This implies an acceptance of the status quo" (Chessick 2008, 702). Žižek's Hegel and Žižek's Lacan are fully endorsing the absence of the subject; moreover, if in the case of Lacan things are debatable to a certain extent, when it comes to Hegel, Žižek is certain that the philosopher understands the sublation of necessity by embracing it until it no longer represents a negation of the signified subject.

Is this truly Hegel's political philosophy, opportunism disguised as dialectical maturity? Let's take a closer look. In Hegel's youth, for example, absolutist monarchies were crumbling, and the French Revolution marked the end of history as the beginning of a more free and meaningful history in which the old metaphysic of the divine right was replaced by republics or constitutional monarchies. "The beginning of the French Revolution must be considered as the struggle of the rational right of the state against the mass of positive rights and privileges which had oppressed it" (Hegel 2009, 65; see also Hegel 1984, 122-123). Had Hegel until then passively accepted the status-quo of absolutist monarchies ?

> "Old right" and "old constitution" are such grand and beautiful words that it sounds like a sacrilege to rob a people of its rights. However, whether that which goes by the name of the old right and constitution is right or wrong cannot depend on its age. The abolition of human sacrifice, of slavery, of

feudal despotism and of countless infamies was also always a cancelling of something which was an old right. (Hegel 2009, 65)

Are this the words of someone who embraced the pre-revolutionary way of doing politics and confined freedom strictly at the level of his abstract consciousness ?

Furthermore, Hegel insists in his logic that man is the result of his own reason, and that reason cannot be reduced to thoughts and/or words alone. As concept of reality, reason does not exist only in the minds of men, as an inconsistent abstraction, but also in their actions and the type of societies they build for themselves. In fact, thoughts are deeds as deeds are thoughts; they only exist in their speculative mutuality, not in themselves (Hegel 2010). Moreover, philosophy is possible only in states where political freedom exists, to a certain extent (Hegel 1995). If philosophy, the contextual and historical method of acceding to reason, is impossible in the absence of political freedom, it follows that reason itself is impossible or at least incomplete in the absence of political freedom. And even if reason construe itself slowly and with the help of unconscious intellects, it most certainly does not exclude the benefits derived from the work of superior consciousnesses in this process. Finally, although Hegel is constantly worried of the dangers revolutions and civil wars can entail, inducing a split between particularities and the universal, the state, he also recognizes the right of the citizens to revolt if authoritarianism becomes unbearable, putting the development of reason in danger (Hegel 2011).

We can conclude by now that the Hegelian subject, although restricted by dialectical reason and also acting as a vehicle for its advancement, more or less conscious, is more articulated than the Lacanian subject. And so, despite Žižek's (and Lacan's) efforts to turn Hegel into an optimist conservative, or into a vigorous structuralist of Spinozist extraction, Hegel's philosophical system – which this article never intended to present in detail – withstands the Other, the name of the father, the chains of signification, the unconscious and, overall, psychoanalysis. It does so not by expelling the unconscious, but be recognizing it as the *nec plus ultra* of reason: its limit, its negation, its dialectical driving force.

4. Conclusion: desire with dialectic, Freud and Lacan with Hegel

With the help of Hegel's logic, and also using his political philosophy, the present article intended to offer several new insights to the relation between the speculative philosophy of this highly influential thinker and the works of Freud, on one hand, and Lacan, on the other hand. First of all, it stressed out that the unconscious, far from being an obstacle for Hegel's

system, is actually substance, quantity unaware of itself, that gives birth out of itself to quality, to consciousness, and thus manage to go beyond itself, as liberty goes beyond necessity and it also arises form necessity. Simply put, the unconscious cannot be eliminated, because alienation itself, individual and political as well, is permanent. However, it can be superseded. The ego is not master in his own house, as Freud wrote, but he is nevertheless at home, even if being at home is tantamount for Freud with discontent in civilization (neurosis), for Lacan with the Other expressing itself through the empty vessel of subjectivity (symptom) and for Hegel with an unavoidable contextualization of spirit in the historical dynamic of its self-achievement (reason).

Psychoanalysis vacillated the rushed certitudes of modern philosophy and secured an important place for non-rationality, desire, jouissance. After Freud, civilization becomes incomprehensible in the absence of the unconscious, just like after Lacan, Kant cannot be understood without Sade: law cannot abolish desire, because law itself is a form of desire (Lacan 2006, 645-668; Lacan 2013, 50; Lacan 2009, 275-276). After Hegel, however, nothing can be understood in the absence of dialectic, especially the unconscious and its language of desires, of pulsating jouissance. Civilization is not necessarily the death instinct, the suppression of life instinct, of sexuality, as Freud considered; after all, Freud himself recognized that creativity and human development in general are impossible without circumscribing the id, without maintaining it under some form of control (Freud 2017a, 348-357). Civilization is the respect and acceptance of jouissance without allowing it to become dominant. This is why Hegel insisted that states should not preoccupy themselves too much with the morality of their citizens as long as it does not affect their ethical (political) behavior.

> Not as a state, but only as a moral entity, can the state demand morality of its citizens. It is the state's duty not to make any arrangements which contravene or secretly undermine morality, because it is in its own greatest interest, even for the sake of legality (its proper aim), to ensure that its citizens shall also be morally good. But if it sets up institutions with a view to bringing about this result directly, then it might issue laws enacting that its citizens ought to be moral, but they would be improper, contradictory, and laughable. The state could only bring its citizens to submit to these institutions through their trust in them, and this trust it must first arouse. (Hegel 1961, 97-98)

What is this but a blunt recognition of Sade's principle that lies at the core of psychoanalysis and according to which jouissance is indispensable for a proper political society ?

References

Berthold, Daniel. 2009. "Talking Cures: A Lacanian Reading on Hegel and Kierkegaard on Language and Madness". *Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology* 16(4): 299-311.

Berthold-Bond, Daniel. 1991. "Hegel, Nietzsche, and Freud on Madness and the Unconscious". *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* (5)3: 193-213.

Burston, Daniel. 1996. "Conflict and Sociability in Hegel, Freud and their Followers: Tzvetan Todorov's 'Living Alone Together'". *New Literary History* 27(1): 73-82.

Butler, Clark. 1976. "Hegel and Freud. A Comparison". *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 36(4): 506-522.

Casey, Edward; Woody, Melvin. 1996. "Hegel and Lacan. The Dialectic of Desire". In *Hegel's Dialectic of Desire and Recognition. Texts and Commentary*, ed. O'Neill, John, 223-232. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Chessick, Richard. 2008. "The relevance of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* to the Process of Contemporary Psychoanalysis". *Journal of The American Academy of Psychoanalysis and Dynamic Psychiatry* 36(4): 677–706.

Comay, Rebecca. 2015. "Resistance and Repetition. Freud and Hegel". *Research in Phenomenology* 45(2): 237-266.

Freud, Sigmund. 1999. *Compendiu de psihanaliză (An Outline of Psycho-Analysis)*. Translated by Daniela Ştefănescu. Bucureşti: Trei.

Freud, Sigmund. 2017a. *Introducere în pihanaliză (Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis)*. Translated by Ondine Dăscăliţa, Roxana Melnicu, Reiner Wilhelm. Bucureşti: Trei.

Freud, Sigmund. 2017b. *Tehnica psihanalizei (The technique of Psycho-Analysis)*. Translated by Roxana Melnicu. Bucureşti: Trei.

Freud, Sigmund. 2017c. *Studii despre societate şi religie (Studies on society and religion)*. Translated by Raluca Hurduc, Roxana Melnicu, George Purdea, Daniela Ştefănescu, Vasile Dem. Zamfirescu. Bucureşti: Trei.

Freud, Sigmund. 2017d. *Psihologia inconştientului (The psychology of the unconscious)*. Translated by Gilbert Lepădatu, George Purdea, Vasile Dem. Zamfirescu. Bucureşti: Trei.

Freud, Sigmund. 2017e. *Nevroza la copil (Neurosis in child)*. Translated by Rodica Matei, Ruxandra Hosu. Bucureşti: Trei.

Freud, Sigmund. 2017f. *Inhibiţie, simptom, angoasă (Inhibition, simptom, anxiety)*. Translated by Roxana Melnicu, Georgeta Mitrea. Bucureşti: Trei.

Hegel, G.W.F. 1961. *On Christianity. Early Theological Writings by Friedrich Hegel.* Translation by T.M. Knox. New York: Harper Torchbooks.

Hegel, G.W.F. 1977. *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hegel, G.W.F. 1979. *System of Ethical Life (1802/3) and First Philosophy of Spirit (Part III of the System of Speculative Philosophy 1803/4).* Translated and edited by H.S. Harris and T.M. Knox. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Hegel, G.W.F. 1983. *Hegel and the Human Spirit. A Translation of the Jena lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit (1805-1806) with commentary.* Translation by Leo Rauch. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.

Hegel, G.W.F. 1984. *Hegel: The Letters.* Translated by Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Hegel, G.W.F. 1986. *The Jena System, 1804-1805: Logic and Metaphysics*. Translated by John Burbidge and George di Giovanni. Kingston, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Hegel, G.W.F. 1988. *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. One volume edition. The Lectures of 1827.* Oakland: University of California Press.

Hegel, G.W.F. 1995. *Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Vol. I., Greek Philosophy to Plato*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Hegel, G.W.F. 2003. *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. Translated by H.B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hegel, G.W.F. 2004. *Political Writings*. Edited by Laurence Dickey and H.B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hegel, G.W.F. 2009. *Heidelberg Writings. Journal Publications*. Edited and translated by Brady Bowman and Allen Speight. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hegel, G.W.F. 2010. *The Science of Logic*. Translated by George di Giovanni. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hegel, G.W.F. 2011. *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*. Translated by Ruben Alvarado. Aalten: WordBridge Publishing.

Johnston, W.H. "Hegel and Freud'. *The Monist* 37(4): 553-577.

Jung, Carl-Gustav. 1994. *Puterea sufletului. Antologie. A patra parte. Reflecţii teoretice privind natura psihismului*. Translated by Suzana Holan. Bucureşti: Anima.

Kojève, Alexandre. 1996. "Desire and Work in the Master and Slave". In *Hegel's Dialectic of Desire and Recognition. Texts and Commentary*, ed. O'Neill, John. Albany: State University of New York Press: 49-66.

Lacan, Jacques. 1990. *Television. A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment*. New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company.

Lacan, Jacques. 1991. *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*. New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company.

Lacan, Jacques. 1998. *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis*. New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company.

Lacan, Jacques. 2006. *Ècrits. The First Complete Edition in English*. Translation by Bruce Fink. New York, London: W. W. Norton & Company.

Lacan, Jacques. 2008. *My teaching*. London, New York: Verso.

Lacan, Jacques. 2013. *The Triumph of Religion, preceded by Discourse to Catholics*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Macdonald, Molly. 2014. *Hegel and Psychoanalysis. A New Interpretation of Phenomenology of Spirit*. New York, London: Routledge.

Mills, Jon. 2002. *The Unconscious Abyss. Hegel's Anticipation of Psychoanalysis*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Pinkard, Terry. 2000. *Hegel. A Biography*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sass, Louis A. 2009. "Madness and the Ineffable: Hegel, Kierkegaard and Lacan". *Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology* 16(4): 319-324.

Whitebook, Joel. 2008. "First Nature and Second Nature in Hegel and Psychoanalysis". *Constellations* 15(3): 382-389.

Žižek Slavoj. 1993. *Tarrying with the Negative. Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Žižek, Slavoj. 2014. *The Most Sublime Hysteric. Hegel with Lacan*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Gerard STAN [*]

Réseaux sans échelle dans l'architecture de la connaissance. Une lecture interdisciplinaire

Free scale networks in the architecture of knowledge. An interdisciplinary lecture

Abstract: The problem of justification of opinions has generated in the area of epistemology attempts to identify a essentialist mechanism, through which an opinion could reach the status of knowledge. Such mechanisms have been proposed by foundationalism and coherentism as the main philosophical theories of epistemic justification. If an epistemic subject organizes his beliefs in free scale networks, it would result that his beliefs are justified on the basis of countless different mechanisms of justification. This conclusion derives from the structure of a free scale network: a free scale network has nodes with different values of centrality and connectivity. If opinions with different values of centrality and connectivity are justificated beliefs, it follows that the epistemic paths followed in the justification process are different. Therefore, in a real network of opinions the idea of a characteristic node would not make sense. If the idea of a characteristic node does not make sense in a real network of beliefs, it means that the philosophical effort to identify a unique mechanism of epistemic justification does not have much legitimacy. Starting from the idea of a *free scale network* (A.L. Barabási), this study is a criticism of the attempt of traditional theories of knowledge to propose essentialists mechanisms for justification of knowledge. In addition, I will try to argue that understanding the form and the complexity of the opinions network articulated by an epistemic subject can convey to us something essential about how the process of knowledge in general proceeds.

Keywords: epistemology, epistemic subject, foundationalism, coherentism, free scale networks, essentialism, opinion networks, hubs, node, characteristic node, centrality, connectivity.

1. Introduction

La possibilité d'acquérir des connaissances par un sujet épistémique, comme l'ont théorisé les épistémologues avant et après Edmund Gettier, dépend de la réalisation de plusieurs conditions essentielles: *opinion*, *justification*, *vérité*, *acceptation*, *absence de jugements disqualifiants*, etc. Même si les discussions sur le caractère nécessaire et suffisant de ces conditions semblent sans fin, il

[*] PhD, Associate Professor, Department of Communication Sciences and Public Relations, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University, Iași, Romania; e-mail: gstan@uaic.ro.

est certain que peu de philosophes sont disposés à contester le caractère nécessaire de la condition de *justification*. À l'exception de Popper et des philosophes convaincus que certains processus cognitifs nous fournissent des informations fiables (Fred Dretske, par exemple), la condition de la justification est acceptée comme une condition essentielle de la connaissance: si un sujet épistémique élimine le processus de justification de ses opinions, il éliminera les raisons suffisantes pour admettre une opinion en tant que connaissance. S'il existe un consensus – presque complet – entre les philosophies de la connaissance concernant la nécessité de satisfaire à la condition de la justification, il n'existe pas le même consensus concernant les stratégies optimales de justification des opinions. Sans doute, les stratégies les plus importantes pour justifier des opinions sont les fondationnalistes et les cohérentistes. La première stratégie consiste à indiquer un ensemble de jugements privilégiées, évidentes en elles-mêmes, qui servent de base aux processus de justification de toutes les autres jugements; la deuxième stratégie consiste à regrouper des jugements épistémiquement liées dans des ensembles capables de supporter une nouvelle opinion, la simple cohérence avec cet ensemble étant considérée comme suffisante pour justifier la nouvelle opinion.

L'idée de base de cette étude est la suivante: la tentative d'identifier une stratégie optimale et universelle pour justifier la connaissance est une forme d'essentialisme épistémique, qui ne peut expliquer la manière concrète dont les sujets épistémiques construisent leurs réseaux de croyances. Nous pouvons mieux comprendre les stratégies réelles de justification utilisées par un sujet épistémique, si l'on part d'un principe minimal provisoire, selon lequel un sujet, dans presque toutes les situations, aura un comportement épistémique qui ne mettra pas en danger la structure globale de son réseau de convictions. On pourrait appeler cela *le principe de la conservation épistémique*. En d'autres termes, j'ai tendance à croire que l'identification des propriétés des réseaux complexes d'opinions de sujets épistémiques est plus rentable sur le plan philosophique que l'identification d'une stratégie universelle pour justifier la connaissance. En comprenant les propriétés réelles des réseaux de croyances dans l'esprit des sujets épistémiques, je pense que nous pouvons comprendre plus clairement le comportement épistémique, mais aussi les attitudes des sujets à l'égard des différentes stratégies de justification épistémique.

La première partie de la recherche sera consacrée à l'évaluation des deux catégories de théories de la justification épistémique: *le fondationnalisme* et *le cohérentisme*. Je montrerai que les deux catégories de stratégies de justification sont discutables en raison d'inadéquations intrinsèques (les stratégies fondationnalistes favorisent d'une manière difficile à justifier un type de jugement, les stratégies cohérentistes sont basées sur l'idée discutable de la suffisance du soutien mutuel entre propositions de même statut, au même niveau),

soulignés par les critiques de chacun d'eux; de mon point de vue, ces straté-
gies sont discutables car, prises isolément et constamment appliquées
au processus de justification épistémique, elles génèrent des réseaux de
croyances non robustes, dans un équilibre précaire, avec des propriétés infé-
rieures que celles de la plupart des réseaux naturels. Ainsi, si un sujet épis-
témique applique systématiquement les stratégies fondationnalistes, il cons-
truira un réseau de croyances sous forme de hiérarchie: d'une part, nous
aurions le niveau des propositions de base et des principes évidents par eux-
mêmes, d'autre part, le niveau des propositions basées sur celles de la pre-
mière catégorie. De même, si un sujet épistémique applique systématique-
ment des stratégies cohérentistes pour justifier ses opinions, il construirait
tacitement un réseau de croyances, dans lequel chaque nœud aurait le même
degré de connectivité et de centralité[1] (un type de réseau dans lequel l'idée
de nœud caractéristique aurait du sens). Les hiérarchies et les réseaux ho-
mogènes ont des propriétés formelles trop simples pour expliquer la com-
plexité des processus réels de justification épistémique et la robustesse des
réseaux de croyances des sujets épistémiques.

Dans la deuxième partie de l'étude, je soutiendrai que le centrage de
l'épistémologie sur l'identification de la stratégie de justification optimale il
pourrait être remplacé par un souci d'identifier la structure optimale du
réseau de croyances auquel un sujet épistémique tend naturellement. Ces
propriétés ne sont pas soumises au choix du sujet épistémique, mais sont
dictées par certaines contraintes formelles qui tendent à augmenter
l'équilibre, la complexité et la robustesse de tout réseau. L'idée d'un réseau
démocratique et homogène (chaque nœud a le même degré de connectivité
et de centralité), ainsi que celle de hiérarchie, sont des structures trop simples
pour saisir la multidimensionnalité du processus réel d'interconnexion des
croyances d'un sujet épistémique et, implicitement, du processus de justifi-
cation épistémique; de plus, il n'a pas les propriétés pour les transformer en
réseaux équilibrés, avec un degré élevé d'interconnexion et de robustesse. Je
soutiendrai que la structure de réseau sans échelle (Albert-Laszlo Barabasi)
convient à la modélisation des réseaux de croyances dans l'esprit d'un sujet
épistémique; dans tout réseau épistémique réel, il existe des concentrateurs
(hubs), des nœuds, des jugements, qui jouissent d'un statut privilégié, mais
le passage aux jugements avec une faible connectivité se fait progressive-
ment. En d'autres termes, je soutiendrai que la structure du réseau sans
échelle est appropriée pour rendre compte de l'organisation des croyances
constituant le corpus de connaissances d'un sujet épistémique. En outre, si
nous acceptons que le réseau de croyances d'un sujet épistémique soit un
réseau sans échelle, nous comprenons que des croyances différentes dans le
réseau, ayant différents degrés de centralité et de connectivité, seront justi-
fiées de différentes manières. Par conséquent, si un sujet épistémique cons-
truit un réseau de croyances solide et stable utilisant plusieurs stratégies de

justification, il s'avère que la tentative philosophique d'identifier une essence du processus de justification, une seule stratégie correcte et authentique pour justifier les opinions, est superflue.

2. Le fondationnalisme et les hiérarchies naturelles entre les propositions

Toute opinion d'un sujet épistémique prétendant atteindre le statut de connaissance doit être justifiée par des raisons épistémiquement suffisants; mais aussi ces raisons, en tant que propositions avec statut de connaissance, doivent être vrais et justifiés, etc. En d'autres termes, l'exigence de justifier une opinion nous conduit à une chaîne de justification qui s'étend à l'infini. Afin d'éviter une régression à l'infini, différents philosophes ont indiqué des types de propositions privilégiées, des propositions pouvant être considérées comme une limite et un fondement de l'ensemble du connaissance: les philosophes empiristes ont indiqué les propositions de base, les philosophes rationalistes ont indiqué des propositions d'intuition rationnelle, les philosophies théistes ont indiqué les propositions garanti par un sujet épistémique suprême. A leur tour, dans différents cadres philosophiques, les trois types de propositions jouaient le rôle d'entités privilégiées, étant admises en tant que connaissances sans être liées à d'autres propositions. Comme si, dans une sorte de hiérarchie naturelle du savoir, les propositions de ce type auraient bénéficié d'un rang plus élevé, d'un degré de preuve découlant de leur essence. En nous limitant à la connaissance des faits, j'examinerai dans quelle mesure les propositions de base peuvent jouer un rôle privilégié dans la justification des propositions relatives aux faits.

Les propositions de base, postulées principalement dans les philosophes empiristes, ont été conçues comme une sorte de fondement de tout l'édifice de la connaissance, la dernière couche de pensée matérialisée dans un langage à la frontière de l'expérience. Selon Roderick Chisholm, l'expression « *a* is *F* » est considérée comme une proposition de base si le simple fait que *a* est *F* me justifie d'accepter cette proposition (Chisholm 1982, 80). Le défi fondamental de toute théorie empiriste de la justification épistémique est de démontrer que toute connaissance de faits ou toute connaissance en général peut être basée sur des propositions de base. Les philosophes empiristes ont dû résoudre un problème épineux: la source de légitimité de ces propositions de base. En d'autres termes, pour quelle raison les propositions de base pourraient-elles être considérées comme sûres et pourraient donc être utilisées comme des briques dans le processus de justification d'autres propositions ? Bertrand Russell répond que de telles propositions, appelées par lui des *jugements sur les perceptions*, peuvent être considérées comme absolument sûres car elles peuvent être déduites des données des sens, qui sont douteuses. Les objets de la perception sont vus par Russell, dans *The Problems of Philosophy* (1912), comme des *sense data*, des "informations senso-

rielles"; dans ce cas, ils pourraient être considérés comme des fondements de la connaissance. Mais les objets de perception ne peuvent pas être connus, selon Russell, dans leur nature intrinsèque, mais seulement par leurs modalités d'arrangement dans certaines configurations spatiales. Dans *The Analysis of Matter* (1927), il reprendra cette thèse: un sujet épistémique ne peut connaître perceptuellement la nature intrinsèque des objets perçus, mais ne peut connaître que la nature, le caractère intrinsèque et la qualité des perceptions. Le seul moyen d'obtenir des informations sur le monde extérieur est de faire des déductions basées sur nos perceptions. Selon Russell, ces déductions doivent être faites en tenant compte de deux principes: (1) des perceptions différentes ont des stimuli différents (c'est-à-dire que des perceptions différentes impliquent des causes différentes) et (2) les relations supposées du point de vue physique ne sont pas identiques à celles perçues, mais leur correspondent en grande partie, car leurs propriétés logico-mathématiques sont préservées (c'est-à-dire que les relations entre les perceptions ont les mêmes propriétés logico-mathématiques que les relations entre leurs causes non perceptuelles). En d'autres termes, la structure logique des relations entre les perceptions est isomorphe aux relations logiques entre les objets de la perception. Dans ces conditions, pour Russell, la possibilité et le caractère légitime des propositions de base résultent de l'isomorphisme entre la perception et l'état de choses perçu. Malheureusement, l'isomorphisme de certaines structures logiques ne peut rien dire sur les relations physiques réelles qui structurent un fait. Mais l'existence réelle de cet isomorphisme est plutôt une hypothèse qu'une thèse rigoureusement démontrée dans la philosophie de Russell.

Dans une revue de *The Analysis of Matter*, le mathématicien M.H.A. Newman soulève un certain nombre d'objections à l'isomorphisme entre les perceptions et les états de choses perçus, comme le pensait Russell. *Premièrement*, selon Newman, si un sujet épistémique humain ne peut connaître que la structure abstraite et logique du monde extérieur, toutes les connaissances scientifiques seraient alors triviales; *deuxièmement*, Newman souligne que la structure épistémique construite sur la base de la perception A est l'une des nombreuses structures que nous pouvons construire en respectant le nombre d'entités de A. En d'autres termes, en choisissant le nombre correct d'objets qui causent les perceptions, nous pouvons construire plusieurs structures compatibles avec la structure de l'état réel qui était la cause de la perception. *Troisièmement*, selon Newman, les accusations de trivialité auraient pu être évitées si Russell avait abandonné l'affirmation selon laquelle nous ne pouvons connaître que la structure logique du monde extérieur. Selon Newman, l'isomorphisme perception-état des choses aurait une valeur épistémique si la structure en question incluait des relations définies, c'est-à-dire des relations physiques entre les choses. Spécifier les relations particulières qui génèrent la structure entre les données sensibles donnerait une

valeur épistémique aux données sensibles. Mais Russell n'indique pas comment les relations physiques entre les choses pourraient être reconstruites à partir de l'analyse de la structure de données sensibles.

Dans ces conditions, la structure physique des états de choses, objets de perception, reste étrangère aux actes de perception d'un sujet épistémique. La conséquence est sombre pour le destin épistémique des propositions de base: si les perceptions ne peuvent capturer les relations physiques entre les choses, les propositions de base, légitimées par la perception, ne peuvent pas fonctionner comme base de la connaissance empirique. Par conséquent, le statut privilégié de ce type de propositions est illusoire.

Une tentative de réhabilitation du statut de propositions de base appartient à A.J. Ayer, qui considère que la relation entre les propositions de base et les états de choses est de nature sémantique. Plus clairement, dans *Basic Proposition*, Ayer distingue les propositions relatives aux données sensorielles des propositions relatives aux objets physiques; les propositions sur les données sensorielles sont des descriptions linguistiques de certains états de conscience ou expériences subjectives. (Ayer 1950, 60-74) Dans la mesure où il existe des descriptions correctes de nos expériences subjectives, les propositions sur les données sensorielles sont épistémiquement sûres, estime Ayer. Les propositions relatives aux données sensorielles sont correctes si le sujet épistémique qui les formule utilise correctement les notions qui décrivant les impressions subjectives dans le langage. Ayer appelle ces types de propositions des *propositions de base*, c'est-à-dire des propositions dont la vérité ou la fausseté dans une situation donnée est définitivement fixée par une règle de signification. (Ayer 1950, 60-74) Les propositions de base sont infaillibles tant que nous ne commettons pas d'erreur dans l'utilisation des mots. Ces propositions sont, pour Ayer, le fondement d'une hiérarchie épistémique, le fondement légitime sur lequel la connaissance des faits peut être fondée. Cependant, la qualité des propositions de base d'être des propositions sur des impressions subjectives, une qualité qui aurait dû les protéger de l'erreur et du mensonge, les rend inaptes à jouer le rôle de base épistémique objective de la connaissance des faits. Une proposition sur ce que ressent un sujet épistémique ne peut justifier une proposition sur ce qui existe dans le monde. En outre, comme le soutient Keith Lehrer, les opinions sur les impressions subjectives peuvent être fausses et finalement faillibles. Ainsi, le statut privilégié des propositions de base dans le processus de justification de la connaissance est compromis.

L'argument le plus sérieux concernant le manque de légitimité épistémique des propositions de base est celui invoqué par Popper, d'une part, et Neurath et Carnap, de l'autre: les propositions de base ne peuvent être justifiées sur des non-propositions, sur l'expérience perceptive. La justification, étant une relation logique, doit être une relation entre propositions. La solution: selon Popper, il existe des propositions de base, mais elles sont adoptées par convention par la communauté épistémique; les propositions de

base, privées de la légitimité d'un contact privilégié avec le monde extérieur, ne possède pas de pouvoir de confirmation dans la logique de la connaissance poppérienne. D'autre part, Neurath et Carnap acceptent l'existence de propositions de base (sous forme de propositions de protocole), mais elles n'ont plus un statut privilégié, elles ne sont pas le fondement d'une hiérarchie de connaissances, mais des nœuds sans importance dans le réseau de connaissances humaines.

3. Les réseaux propositionnels et la cohérence de connaissance

Le fondationnalisme épistémologique échoue à cause de l'impossibilité de séparer une catégorie de propositions qui, ayant une supériorité conférée par le rang hiérarchique, devrait fonctionner comme une fondation à la connaissance des faits. Dans la suite, nous étudions la suggestion de Neurath et Carnap selon laquelle une simple cohérence entre des propositions de même rang est suffit pour justifier la connaissance des faits. L'une des tentatives les plus célèbres de construction d'une théorie cohérentiste de la justification épistémique appartient au philosophe Keith Lehrer. De son point de vue, le souci de la vérité et de rien d'autre que la vérité met en branle le mécanisme de la justification. (Lehrer 1990, 112) Dans ce contexte, la justification d'une proposition réside dans la cohérence avec un système de propositions précédent. Ainsi, Keith Lehrer pose la question de savoir comment un sujet épistémique décide de la valeur cognitive des propositions d'observation:

> Cependant, comment allons-nous décider si ce que les sens nous suggèrent est plus vrai et correct que faux et illusoire? Nous devons tenir compte des informations disponibles. Quelle est cette information? C'est ce que j'ai déjà accepté lorsque je me suis mis à la recherche de la vérité. C'est notre système d'information préalablement accepté. L'évaluation de toutes les affirmations de vérité, tant celles fondées sur nos sens, notre raisonnement et notre mémoire, que celles représentées par les témoignages d'autrui, doivent reposer sur le système d'acceptation qui contient notre conception du monde et garantit notre accès au monde extérieur. Il n'y a aucun moyen de sortir du cercle de ce que nous acceptons. L'acceptation est le carburant nécessaire au mécanisme de justification. (Lehrer 1990, 112-113)

Par conséquent, basé sur l'acceptation, un sujet épistémique construit un système de propositions sur la base duquel il déclarera que d'autres propositions sont cohérentes avec le système accepté, donc justifiées. Lehrer est convaincu qu'un système d'acceptation produit une justification s'il nous informe qu'il est plus raisonnable d'accepter certaines choses que d'autres.

On remarque que, contrairement au fondationnalisme, qui admettait l'existence d'une catégorie de propositions privilégiées (propositions de base, mais aussi de propositions basées sur l'intuition rationnelle ou celles

garanties par un sujet épistémique absolu) et, implicitement, une organisation hiérarchique du savoir, le cohérentisme se construit autour de l'idée que la vérité d'une proposition ne peut être soutenue que par la simple cohérence explicative avec un ensemble de propositions donné, en s'organisant en un réseau homogène de propositions. Cependant, ni la structuration cohérentiste des étapes de justification épistémique ne semble être ni épistémologiquement raisonnable ni viable au regard des propriétés du réseau de croyances générées au niveau d'un sujet épistémique. Dans *Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology* (1993), Susan Haack identifie trois arguments contre une théorie cohérentiste de la justification épistémique.

A. *L'objection de l'exigence trop élevé*

Le cohérentisme semble impliquer qu'un sujet épistémique possédant un ensemble de croyances incompatibles, donc incohérentes, ne possède pas de motifs suffisants sur le plan épistémique pour justifier l'une quelconque de ses croyances. Susan Haack reconnaît que cette objection est difficile à accepter et indique également le chemin par lequel le cohérentisme peut y échapper:

> l'ensemble des croyances dont la justification sera justifiée ne représente pas l'ensemble des croyances du sujet, mais un certain sous-ensemble de l'ensemble respectif (...) Sans doute, toutes les croyances d'une personne ne sont pas relevantes pour justifier chacune de ses croyances. (Haack 1993, 25)

B. *L'objection de l'histoire cohérente*

Comme Susan Haack a dit,

> le cohérentisme ne peut pas être correct (...) parce que la consistance d'un ensemble de croyances est manifestement insuffisante pour garantir ou être un indicateur de leur vérité (...) Le fait qu'un ensemble de croyances soit consistante et large ne représente pas une garantie plus grande ni un indice plus pertinent de sa vérité que s'il était juste consistant. (Haack 1993, 26)

Après tout, l'inconvénient essentiel du cohérentisme est qu'il tente de justifier l'idée que la justification épistémique serait exclusivement lié aux relations entre les croyances. Ceci est rendu plus évident par la troisième objection soulevée par Susan Haack.

C. *L'objection des marins tourmentés*

Cette objection a été soulevée par C.I. Lewis. Le philosophe estime que

> la prétention de cohérence selon laquelle des croyances empiriques ne peuvent être justifiées que par des relations se renforçant mutuellement est aussi absurde que de suggérer que deux marins tourmentés pouvaient s'appuyer l'un sur l'autre, l'un derrière l'autre, sans que l'un d'eux ne soit assis sur quelque chose. (Haack 1993, 27)

Selon Susan Haack, le cohérentisme ne peut être satisfaisante car il ne confère au monde extérieur aucun rôle dans la justification des connaissances. En excluant toute contribution informationnelle extérieure pour justifier des croyances empiriques, un processus cohérentiste de justification d'une croyance empirique ne saurait être un indicateur de sa vérité, de sa représentation correcte de la réalité du monde. Haack pense que cet argument est fatal au corentisme. Une théorie qui repose uniquement sur les relations internes entre les croyances d'un sujet épistémique a de grandes difficultés à fournir les conditions d'une possibilité raisonnable à l'appui d'une théorie de la justification épistémique et d'une théorie de la vérité. Si nous prenons ces objections au sérieux, nous comprenons que le mécanisme de justification des connaissances proposé dans une perspective cohérentiste ne peut rendre compte de la connaissance des faits.

4. La structure de la connaissance et les réseaux sans échelle

En abordant de manière topologique l'organisation de la connaissance dans l'esprit d'un sujet épistémique, nous constatons que le fondationnalisme considère l'organisation de la connaissance de manière hiérarchique, sous la forme d'un réseau peu complexe, organisé à deux niveaux: un niveau de nœuds privilégiés (les propositions de base) et un niveau des nœuds habituels (les propositions qui constituent le corpus actuel de connaissances du sujet épistémique). Toute proposition du corpus de la connaissance doit être directement ou indirectement liée à une ou plusieurs propositions de base. En principe, si nous prenons en compte la loi des grands nombres, chaque proposition de base sera connectée (logiquement et épistémiquement) avec à peu près le même nombre de propositions du corpus de connaissances, et les propositions du corpus de connaissances auront en moyenne le même nombre de connexions avec des propositions de base ou avec d'autres propositions dans le corpus de propositions. De toute évidence, le statut hiérarchique plus élevé des propositions de base entraînera un plus grand nombre de connexions avec les autres propositions que les propositions ordinaires.

D'autre part, le cohérentisme voit l'organisation de toutes les opinions justifiées dans l'esprit d'un sujet épistémique sous la forme d'un réseau aléatoire, un réseau dans lequel il n'y a pas de nœuds privilégiés, c'est-à-dire des propositions ayant un statut spécial. Dans ce type d'organisation, le nombre de liens d'un nœud est le même, quel que soit le nœud choisi. En langage topologique, un réseau aléatoire a une échelle caractéristique dans la connectivité de ses nœuds (Barabási 2002, 70) et, par conséquent, nous pouvons parler dans le cas de ce type de réseau de l'idée d'un nœud caractéristique (tous les nœuds ont, en moyenne, le même nombre de connexions). Malgré les différences soulignées entre les deux types de réseaux

d'organisation des connaissances assumés par les stratégies de justification fondationnalistes et cohérentistes, les caractéristiques formelles des systèmes de croyances obtenus semblent assez similaires. Même si, dans le cas de la hiérarchie assumée par le fondationnalisme, il existe une différence entre la connectivité (nombre de liens) d'une proposition de base et la connectivité d'une proposition du corpus de opinions justifiées, le réseau qui en résulte peut être traité globalement comme un réseau à l'échelle, grâce à la similitude majeure existant entre les nœuds représentant les propositions de base et les nœuds représentant les propositions justifiées. Le réseau épistémique d'un sujet dont les connaissances sont justifiées d'une manière fondationnaliste possède un degré élevé d'homogénéité et une structure assez proche des réseaux aléatoires. Tant qu'on peut parler d'un noeud caractéristique des propositions de base et d'un noeud caractéristique des propositions justifiées, la diversité est assurée par les différences de connectivité des deux types de noeuds. Dans ce cas, l'hétérogénéité du réseau est minimale. Les grandes régions de ce réseau ressemblent à l'identification à des réseaux aléatoires supposée par l'organisation cohérentiste des connaissances. En d'autres termes, les deux théories de la justification épistémique cherchent, identifient et postulent un type de mécanisme essentiel de la justification épistémique. Pour les fondationnalistes, le mécanisme essentiel est le lien logique entre une opinion et une proposition de base; pour les cohérentistes, le mécanisme essentiel consiste à établir des relations de cohérence (relations de soutien mutuel entre propositions de même niveau). Le processus de justification épistémique n'est pas unidirectionnel, il est beaucoup plus complexe qu'un seul type de mécanisme épistémique pourrait surprendre. Le fondationnalisme et la cohérentisme ne parviennent pas à comprendre la complexité et l'unicité de la configuration épistémique dont un sujet peut être utilisé pour construire une justification épistémique.

Si nous considérons la complexité inhérente au processus de justification épistémique, la complexité inhérente d'un système de croyances, le fait qu'une proposition justifiée puisse être connectée dans le système de connaissances avec un nombre variable de propositions mais également avec des entités non propositionnelles, je pense que le modèle le plus approprié la représentation de la connaissance dans l'esprit d'un sujet épistémique est celle du *réseau sans échelle* (Albert-László Barabási). Comme le soutient Barabasi, les réseaux sont au cœur de systèmes complexes (Barabási 2016, 5-6) et les croyances dans l'esprit d'un sujet épistémique forment un système complexe, parce que chaque croyance a sa propre formule de justification. Un modèle de connaissance structurée dans l'esprit d'un sujet épistémique sous la forme d'un réseau n'est pas compatible avec l'idée d'un nœud caractéristique. Les réseaux de croyances dans l'esprit des sujets ne sont ni des réseaux homogènes, ni des hiérarchies absolues.

Comme le souligne Barabasi, les réseaux de grande complexité – la cellule animale, l'Internet, le réseau de neurones du cerveau, les réseaux de collaborations académiques ou artistiques – sont des réseaux sans échelle, c'est-à-dire des réseaux respectant une loi polynomiale de la distribution de noeuds. Un tel modèle de réseau implique une hiérarchie continue de nœuds, allant de concentrateurs (hubs) rares à de nombreux petits nœuds. Le plus grand hub est suivi de près par deux ou trois plus petits, etc. Finalement, atteignez les nombreux petits nœuds. La distribution polynomiale, nous dit Barabasi, nous oblige à abandonner l'idée d'une échelle ou d'un nœud caractéristique. Dans une hiérarchie continue, il n'y a pas de nœud spécifique que nous puissions choisir et qui soit caractéristique de tous les nœuds. (Barabási 2002, 71-72)

Je crois que le système de croyance d'un sujet épistémique, qui est un réseau essentiellement complexe, peut être modélisé avec le plus grand réalisme possible au moyen d'un réseau sans échelle. Si nous options pour un réseau aléatoire (réseau résultant de l'application continue de l'option cohérentiste de justification des opinions), serait nier la preuve que, dans l'espace de la justification épistémique, certaines propositions sont beaucoup plus importantes que d'autres; si nous options pour un système purement hiérarchique de justification de la connaissance (qui sont spécifiques aux stratégies fondationnalistes), le réseau de connaissances résultant serait extrêmement vulnérable (avec le rejet de la proposition jouant le rôle de hub suprême, tout le système de connaissances d'un sujet épistémique serait ruiné; toute topologie centralisée est vulnérable aux infirmations et attaques externes). D'autre part, si nous modélisons le système de croyances d'un sujet épistémique en fonction de la topologie d'un réseau sans échelle (réseau à plusieurs concentrateurs, situés dans l'ordre décroissant), nous pouvons expliquer une série de caractéristiques de tels systèmes:

A. *Le caractère dynamique du système de croyance*

À tout moment, les nœuds du réseau de croyance peuvent apparaître et disparaître sans qu'il y ait de dysfonctionnement du système cognitif; parce qu'il n'existe aucun modèle permettant de connecter un nœud à un autre, un nœud déjà pris dans un ensemble de relations peut à tout moment développer d'autres relations avec des nœuds nouvellement apparus. C'est le mécanisme par lequel une justification épistémique peut être améliorée, renforcée. Par conséquent, un modèle de type réseau sans échelle peut mettre en évidence non seulement la structure actuelle d'un système de croyance, mais également sa croissance, sa dynamique.

B. *Le caractère conservateur du système des croyances*

Malgré l'émergence et la disparition de nœuds dans le réseau épistémique (les croyances), la possibilité qu'un hub réellement important (une conviction

avec un degré élevé de centralité et de connectivité) soit annulé et éliminé est négligeable (mais toujours existant). La modification de la topologie globale d'un réseau ne peut être obtenue qu'en désactivant et en éliminant simultanément les convictions de type concentrateur (hub) de haut niveau, une situation très, très improbable; la plupart du temps, les changements sont locaux, affectant les croyances avec un faible degré de connectivité et de centralité, laissant la topologie globale du réseau de croyances inchangée. Par conséquent, le modèle de type réseau sans échelle peut expliquer la préservation globale de la structure d'un système de croyances, malgré les changements qu'il subit au fil du temps.

C. *Tolérance à l'erreur*

Malgré l'absence de justification d'une croyance ou malgré le fait qu'un sujet épistémique croit de manière injustifiée qu'une conviction est vraie, car dans le modèle de réseau sans échelle la plupart des croyances d'un sujet épistémique possèdent faible connectivité, la possibilité de transmettre l'erreur, la contamination, à tous les nœuds du système des croyances est réduite. Quelque chose de différent se produit dans une réseau de croyances pure-ment hiérarchique: plus l'erreur est proche du nœud central, plus grande est la partie du réseau affectée. Si l'erreur apparaît juste au centre du réseau (le nœud de croyance suprême est faux, s'il existe une telle chose dans l'esprit d'un sujet épistémique réel), alors tout le réseau sera contaminé par sa faus-seté.

D. *Le caractère complexe de la justification épistémique*

L'absence d'un schéma exact des connexions entre les nœuds d'un réseau épistémique sans échelle ouvre le chemin de la compréhension du processus de justification des croyances en dehors de toute formule unique, en dehors de tout mécanisme essentialiste ou type. Une proposition peut être considé-rée comme justifiée sans respecter un modèle de justification unique ou sans se conformer à un mécanisme - essence de la justification. En fait, la for-mule permettant de justifier chacune des croyances d'un sujet épistémique pourrait ne pas être répétable. La justification d'une proposition devient un processus rationnel par lequel des entités propositionnelles de types diffé-rents (intuitions rationnelles, structures mathématiques, propositions de base, etc.) peuvent être connectées avec des entités non propositionnelles, mais pouvant être représentées au niveau du système épistémique sous une forme propositionnelle.

E. *Le caractère local des critères de justification épistémique*

Dans ces conditions, le problème de la justification épistémique devient local, spécifique à certains domaines d'investigation. Chaque domaine de re-cherche établit des critères spécifiques pour la justification épistémique, en

fonction de sa spécificité, de ses méthodes, de ses traditions et de son histoire; il est raisonnable de croire que les opinions, les croyances et les hypothèses du domaine de recherche de la pédagogie auront d'autres normes et critères de justification que ceux du domaine de l'analyse mathématique, de l'archéologie ou de la météorologie. Tout comme il est raisonnable de croire qu'un sujet épistémique peut avoir des convictions dans tous ces domaines de recherche, mais quand il vérifie leur degré de justification, il ne les étudiera pas à travers l'optique d'un mécanisme de justification unique, mais suivra exigences et critères spécifiques à chaque domaine de recherche. Dans ces conditions, le problème de la justification des convictions devient un impénétrable et insoluble dans le domaine de la philosophie. Dans ce contexte, l'épistémologie resterait à discuter plus fortement de l'obligation, élevée au rang de vertu épistémique, pour chaque sujet rationnel – dans n'importe quel domaine de la connaissance il serait situé – d'établir et de fournir des croyances avec un degré élevé de justification épistémique.

F. *Le caractère explicatif de la justification*

Si la possibilité de justifier de connaissance dépendait d'un mécanisme unique, ce mécanisme prédéterminerait le type de connexions épistémiques d'une croyance, l'obligeant à entrer dans certaines connexions épistémiques plutôt que d'autres. Libéré de la contrainte du mécanisme unique de la justification de la connaissance, le sujet épistémique acquiert un degré de liberté supplémentaire lui permettant de construire des micro-réseaux de justification locaux, des modèles explicatives complexes, en utilisant des mécanismes appropriés et des connaissances spécifiques. Dans ces circonstances, le degré, la qualité et le caractère local de la justification peuvent devenir des indicateurs plus fiables de la vérité.

5. Conclusions

Le problème de la justification des opinions a généré dans le domaine de la philosophie des tentatives pour identifier un mécanisme unique et essentiel par lequel une opinion pourrait atteindre le statut de connaissance. Si un sujet épistémique organise spontanément ses croyances dans un réseau sans échelle, il s'ensuit que ses convictions sont justifiées sur la base de multiples mécanismes de justification. Cette conclusion découle de la structure d'un réseau sans échelle: un réseau sans échelle comporte des nœuds avec différentes valeurs de centralité et de connectivité. Si les croyances avec des valeurs différentes de centralité et de connectivité sont des croyances bien justifiées, il en découle que leurs trajectoires épistémiques dans le processus de justification sont différentes. De toute évidence, il est difficile de prouver, sans recherches empiriques adéquates, que le réseau de croyances d'un sujet épistémique est un réseau sans échelle. Mais si nous partons du principe que

la plupart des grands réseaux sont des réseaux sans échelle (villes, réseaux professionnels, Internet, épidémies, tissus vivants, etc.), il ne serait pas injustifiable d'indiquer que les réseaux de croyances sont des réseaux sans échelle. Dans ces conditions, la postulation d'un mécanisme unique de justification épistémique serait exclue, car le réseau de croyances ainsi obtenu serait homogène, réseau dans lequel la notion de nœud caractéristique aurait un sens. Mais si l'idée d'un nœud caractéristique n'a pas de sens dans le réseau de croyances réel, cela signifie que l'effort philosophique pour identifier un mécanisme unique de justification épistémique n'a pas beaucoup de sens. Si les réseaux de croyances sont des réseaux sans échelle, le problème de la manière dont les sujets épistémiques fixent et justifient leur croyances n'est plus un problème philosophique, normatif, mais un problème spécifique à chaque domaine de connaissance, un problème qui peut être résolu dans chaque domaine de connaissance. Enfin, comprendre les réseaux de croyances en tant que réseaux sans échelle ouvre la voie à une compréhension naturalisée de la façon dont les sujets épistémiques fixent et justifient leurs croyances, suivre des chemins uniques avec divers degrés de complexité.

Notes

[1] Le degré de connectivité d'un nœud dans un réseau exprime le nombre de connexions de ce nœud avec d'autres nœuds du réseau. Le degré de centralité d'un nœud dans un réseau exprime le nombre d'étapes nécessaires pour se connecter séparément à chaque nœud: plus le degré de centralité d'un nœud est élevé, plus le nombre d'étapes nécessaires pour se connecter à chaque nœud est petit. Les concentrateurs (les hubs) d'un réseau sont les nœuds présentant les niveaux de connectivité et de centralité les plus élevés.

References

Ayer, A.J. 1950. "Basic propositions". *Philosophical analysis, A collection of essays*, edited by Max Black, 60-74. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
Barabási, Albert-László. 2002. *Linked. The New Science of Networks*. Cambridge, Massachustess: Perseus Publisihing.
Barabási, Albert-László. 2016. *Network Science*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chisholm, R.M.1982. *The Foundations of Knowing*, Brighton: The Harvester Press.
Dretske, Fred.1981. *Knowledge and the Flow of Information*. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Haack, Susan. 1993. *Evidence and Inquiry. Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology*. Cambridge, Massachustess: Blackwell.
Lehrer, Keith. 1990. *Theory Of Knowledge*. London: Routledge.
Newman, M.H.A. 1928. "Mr. Russell's Causal Theory of Perception". *Mind*, vol. 37.
Popper, Karl R. 2002. *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, London: Routledge.
Russell, Bertrand. 1927. *The Analysis of Matter*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co.
Russell, Bertrand. 1912. *The Problems of Philosophy*. London: Williams and Norgate.

Roxana PATRAŞ [*], Ioana GALLERON [**]
Camelia GRĂDINARU [***], Ioana LIONTE [****]
Lucreţia PASCARU [*****]

The Splendors and Mist(eries)
of Romanian Digital Literary Studies:
a State-of-the-Art just before
Horizons 2020 closes off [******]

Abstract: The present article is a snapshot of Digital Literary Studies (DLS) in the present-day Romanian academia, higher education curricula, and research evaluation. In the first part, the emphasis falls on the term "digital turn" and on its specific uses and extensions in humanities, as DH (digital humanities), on the one hand, and as digital literary studies/ computer literary studies (DLS/ CLS)/ computational linguistics (CL), on the other. In the second part, we zoom in the field of DLS/ CLS and analyze the way in which it has been localized, operationalized, institutionalized and understood in the Romanian academic environment and publications (DH-targeted journals, humanities journals, and cultural magazines), in higher education curricula (master/ bachelor programs of study), and in designing evaluation standards for DH/ DLS/ CLS research projects (methodologies for funding national research). In the third part, we provide a down-to-earth approach to Romanian DLS by bringing out the experience with digitization, format conversion, manual cleaning, encoding, annotation, and with various editing, quantitative analysis, and data management tools (AntConc, TXM, StyloR, Nooj, Heurist, Transkribus, Oxygen etc.), acquired throughout the implementation of Hai-Ro Project (*Hajduk Novels in Romania during the Long Nineteenth Century: digital edition and corpus analysis assisted by computational tools*).

Keywords: Digital Literary Studies, Digital Turn, digitization, data management, annotation.

[*] Senior Researcher (CS II), Institute for Interdisciplinary Research, Sciences and Humanities Research Department, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iaşi, Romania; email: roxana.patras@uaic.ro

[**] Professor, Sorbonne Nouvelle University, LATTICE research team (UMR 8094), France; email: ioana.galleron@sorbonne-nouvelle.fr

[***] Senior Researcher (CS III), Institute for Interdisciplinary Research, Social Sciences and Humanities Research Department, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iasi, Romania; email: camelia.gradinaru@uaic.ro

[****] Assistant Professor, PhD student, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iaşi, "Gr. T. Popa" University of Medicine and Pharmacy, Romania; email: ilionte@yahoo.com

[*****] Assistant Researcher, PhD student, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iaşi, Romania; email: lucrelucre9@gmail.com

1. Introduction

Digital humanities (DH) are at the crossroads between two cultures: humanities and computation. This field became widespread since 1990s, but its complexity makes it hard to define even today (Schnapp and Presner 2009). It supposes the use of analogue and digital sources, a hybrid methodology, an interdisciplinary framework and a various range of technologies (databases, data analytics, linguistic analysis software, geographical and social mapping tools and so on). Moreover, DH does not mean the simple application of digital tools to already existent data, but it implies a profound level of speculative thinking, creativity and adaptation. Thus, the spirit of DH is "of experimentation along the entire work chain: theorizing and conceptualization, research, data collection, content curation, data processing, data analytics, and often open publishing (of digital corpora and collections, of virtualized experiences, of publications, and of multimedial presentations)" (Hai-Jew 2017, ix). The digital tools and software are not used only in order to extend humanities research, but also to deeply reflect on how methodologies could shape our interpretation of data. In this vein, "digital humanities projects are not simply mechanistic applications of technical knowledge, but occasions for critical self-consciousness" (Drucker and Nowviskie 2004, 432). The ground on which humanists work is fundamentally changed and an "algorithmic criticism" (Ramsey 2011) could be found at work.

The digital turn – expression seen by Mills (2010) as a "pun" on Gee's "social turn" in literacy studies (2000) – is bringing new genres, ways of editing and modelling and, in sum, new modes of knowledge. In humanities, the digital turn expanded not only the research material, but also the research questions. Thus, "data, once captured, cleaned and encoded, could be easily interrogated using simple methods but from a variety of perspectives, allowing researchers to escape disciplinary silos so their work better reflected the complexity which humanities seek to make sense of" (Cosgrave 2019, 9).

If in architecture Carpo (2017) talked about "the second digital turn", in humanities the power of changes is considered seminal. The "generative humanities" represent "a mode of practice that depends on rapid cycles of prototyping and testing, a willingness to embrace productive failure, and the realisation that any 'solutions' generated within the Digital Humanities will spawn new 'problems'" (Burdick et al. 2012, 5). The DH' effects can be perceived also in the deconstruction of the artificial divide between humanities and sciences, showing that humanists, together with scientists, are still needed to solve contemporary problems (Liu 2012; Fiormonte et al. 2015).

During the last decades, DH centers or teams have started to flourish in various higher education and research institutions around the globe, and this new discipline – or maybe an interdisciplinary field, or a set of research methods, as some may say[1] – became rapidly in fashion, as proven amongst others by the rapid renaming of other endeavors on the same model: researchers can nowadays engage into "medical humanities", "spatial humanities", "climate change humanities" and so on (Schreibmann, Siemens and Unsworth, 2016). Borne by the cultural and political accent fallen on the complexity of present-day life challenges, the metaphor of the "crossing"[2] has proven thus to be a fertile one, inviting humanities researchers to open up to other approaches, epistemic frameworks and tools, so as to produce new ideas and insights.

2. Digital Humanities in Romania

Without any pretense on rendering an exhaustive overview, we could spot 2014 as a moment of emergence for Romanian DH studies, more notably, in the field of literary studies. Initially, DH occurred in articles authored by Romanian scholars as a hazy concept that called for either polemic action or theoretical conjectures. Over the last 5 years, DH has legitimized itself as a theoretical paradigm by appealing to field-related *glossae* rather than data-driven research; however, curriculum initiatives and evaluation standards (for funding national projects) caught the new buzz in the air, launching Master's Programs (University of Bucharest) and designing a special domain for DH-related projects in the last UEFISCDI calls (https://uefiscdi.gov.ro/p1-dezvoltarea-sistemului-national-de-cd).

In what follows, we are sketching a timeline for the development of DH research in Romania and propose a categorization based on the publication types we could identify. This reveals not only the way in which DH is theoretically negotiated and conceptually managed locally, but also the fact that this umbrella term is usually associated with research on metadata which does not ground on results yielded by actual digital tools. Accordingly, we have identified the following types of DH articles:

a. DH articles that showcase the premises and/or results of research by emphasizing the general lines and the work-in-progress particularities;

b. DH articles that take inventory and discuss in a general note the advancements of the field itself (software tools, computational adjustments, etc.) but without trying them on Romanian texts;

c. DH articles that use the term "digital humanities" either as a conceptual counterpart or as a taxonomical correspondent in order to advent an emerging field and thereafter to jumpstart a more extensive debate/analysis/ research that makes use of related concepts such as "distant reading",

"quantitative studies", "big data", "macroanalysis", "digital literature", "intermediality" etc.

d. DH articles that try to provide conceptual/theoretical/paradigmatic insight into the perils and benefits in using the dichotomy between "digital" and ("traditional" or "national") humanities; more often than not, these have polemical aspect, for the stakes regard a paradigmatic shift in a field of study known for its proverbial resistance to change; optionally, the academic and institutional validation is also aimed at.

e. DH articles that review volumes/ pieces of research undertaken in the field of (global) Digital Humanities.

Before we proceed with detailing some of the articles' content, it is worthwhile noting that "digital humanities" is secondary (as frequency of usage) to Moretti's concept of "distant reading". Comments on Moretti's research as well as on the gracious trinity "distant reading"-"quantitative analysis"-"world literature" are, subsequently, a sort of Trojan horse that may also encapsulate some hints on DH.

The categories provided hereafter do not cover the entire spectrum but may organize a critical view on the field's recent developments. Similarly, there are articles that easily fit into more than one category as well as articles (reviews, for instance) that overlap the type.

2.1. *DH articles*

There are some publications, other than those adjacent or directly related to literary or language studies, that have endeavored to disseminate the results of DH research. These articles are written by computing specialists, computer science scholars, programmers and IT engineers who take a direct interest in the field but for whom data is always data, thus nothing more than binary computing. Their articles deal with the technical intricacies of computational work, which is actually the basis of DH studies. However, it falls within our area of interest also to take into account those "midway" publications and articles that reflect the synergy between the previously exclusive subject fields of CS and language/ literature studies, therefore between the (innovating) Digital and the (traditionalist) Humanities. Such articles can be found in *Studia UBB Digitalia*, a journal affiliated with the Transylvania Digital Humanities Centre that, since its creation in 2017, has issued four thematic volumes mentioned next in a chronological order: *Digitising the Humanities* (Moldovan and Schuster 2017), *Computing History. Eastern European Scholars* (Moldovan and Schuster 2017), *Digital Economy and Humanities* (Stanca 2018), and *Digital Classics and Ancient History* (Varga 2018).

Given the publication's transdisiplinary ambitions, one should expect a fair degree of thematic variability which *Studia UBB Digitalia* does not fail to deliver: challenges of TEI encoding and manuscript transcription (Bleier

2017, 9-25), software development and CS altogether such as eXist DB or Saxon/C in PHP (Schwaderer 2017, 100-111), articles that deal with the digital dissemination of scientific and editorial practice in terms of publishing platforms and specific software such as HTML5, CSS3, JavaScript, LaTeX (Constantinescu 2017, 42-56), metadata of photographic objects (Das Gupta 2017, 57-74). Nevertheless, few are the articles that inquire into Romanian-language corpora and databases.

2.2. *Digital Humanities and its greedy siblings: distant reading, computational analysis, quantitative studies*

Most of the articles pertaining to this section are very recent undertakings of (chiefly) literary scholars, doctoral students or graduates who conducted their researches in the wake of the new paradigms of quantitative analysis and distant reading, researches making use of a network of conceptual tools that their authors unequivocally relate to the field of DH. Analysis mainly consists of a conceptual inquiry of the subject matter: the theoretical framework of distant reading, state-of-the-art considerations concerning quantitative analysis, macroanalysis, big data, world literature, all of them envisaged under the umbrella-term "Digital Humanities". Listing research difficulties (the faults and oversights of the existing corpora, the lack of appropriate technological means for digitising texts, the lack of expertise in conducting DH studies and in establishing DH institutionally) also has a "flanerie" aspect as long as the applied part of this research misses from the argument.

Several such articles can be found in the 2019 thematic supplement of the *Transylvanian Review* titled "Romanian Literature in the Digital Age" as well as in the collective work *New Paradigms in Contemporary Romanian Literary Studies (I)* initiated by the same publication and set out, as deduced from the coordinators' introductory statement, to "get a better picture on contemporary literary research" (Baghiu and Modoc 2019, 13-16). Usually graphs are appended in order to show – and not just tell – that research on metadata is done seriously, that categories are clear-cut, and that all possible in-between items have been properly put in the right boxes. Ştefan Baghiu's *The French Novel in Translation. A Distant Reading for Romania during Communism (1944-1989)* is a nice attempt at connecting world literature studies, quantitative analysis, and polysystem studies with a research on metadata provided by the *Dictionary of the Translated Romanian Novel* (DRRT 2005). Try as we might, we could not find an indication of the tools that have been used in creating the database behind the graphs illustrating "The General Timeline for the Translation of Novels in Communist Romania", "Translations of Novels from Western Countries (1944-1989)", and "Scattered Approach to Renditions of French Novels in Romania (1944-1989)" (Baghiu 2019, 88-89),

which support the periodization of translations from French (novels) during Communism.

Relying on a type of inquisitorial attitude (one has to torture one's metadata till it tells the truth), Andrei Terian talks about *Big Numbers. A Quantitative Analysis of the Development of the Novel in Romania* and arrives to conclusions by counting original and translated novels. The survey applies various types of instruments – ILO ("index of literary originality") and ILA ("index of literary autonomy") – in order to define four major periods of the Romanian novel (Terian 2019, 59). There are, however, some points that do not result clearly, for instance, the error rate in establishing the ILO/ ILA, what is the acceptable error margin for this survey, as well as the scholar's acceptation of the term "big data/ numbers". As we all probably know, the BNF, the Gutenberg, the Google books databases make big data, whereas around 2000 Romanian novels and translations do not.

Claire Clivaz makes an extremely interesting analysis of the occurrence and institutionalization of two concurrent French equivalents for the term digital humanities in her article titled "Lost in translation?": "Whilst the collective *laudatio* of the corporeal aspect of "humanités digitales" is well founded, it is nevertheless surprising that only a few scholars have noticed the return of the outmoded French word *humanités*" (Clivaz 2017, 31). Clivaz's remark should also open a discussion about the proper translation of DH in Romanian.

2.3. *Digital Humanities as a think tank*

The articles that advent DH as a paradigmatic shift in the field of Romanian literary studies may have a secondary discursive component related to the implementation aspects. They usually discuss the emergence of DH field in terms of conflict with regard to the already established *humaniores* and to more classical forms of hermeneutics. Obviously, this is boosted by the dichotomy "close reading" versus "distant reading" and by prophecies on its implications in the future on a larger scale of local/ regional/ global literary history and theory. Here and there, challenges in terms of research facilities are mentioned too.

One of the earliest articles about this topic is Alex Goldiş's "Digital Humanities – o nouă paradigmă teoretică?", which proposes "a survey on a pilot discipline" (Goldiş 2014, 1). It inevitably departs from the theoretical apparatus of Franco Moretti and Matthew L. Jockers, all the while discussing about the new way of looking at literature through the telescope of distant reading, macroanalysis and quantitative studies. Commenting on seminal texts such as *Macroanalysis. Digital Methods and Literary History*, *Distant Reading*, *Mimesis* or *The Rise of the Novel*, Goldiş discusses the fundamental

shifts that classical hermeneutics will probably undergo once confronted with the revolutionary DH methods.

Skimming over some aspects of computational analysis, *Analiza computaţională în cadrul studiilor literare româneşti* provides the general readership with a very brief overview of the CA 16204, *Distant Reading for European Literary History*. The article fashions itself in terms of an alarm signal on the current obstacles of "computing" Romanian literature. Among such obstacles, the authors list the lack of collaboration among Romanian researchers (language/ literature and, respectively, computer sciences) and the resistance of Romanian literary critics to new approaches. Even if the authors fail to indicate the correct link to the project's documentation on *github* and to the project's site (https://www.distant-reading.net/) and even if they do not seem to have an idea of the design or status of the Romanian collection, the European network of literary scholars, the multilingual literary corpus ELTeC and some basic tools (oXygen, TXM, Stylo, Gephi, Palladio) — not necessarily the most appropriate for lesser resourced languages such as Romanian — are fairly mentioned (Ciorogar and Modoc 2019).

Organizational, financial and technological issues are discussed in studies such as "Teaching Digital Humanities in Romania" (Nicolaescu and Mihai 2014), "Is Romanian Culture ready for the digital turn?" (Ursa 2015), "Challenges in setting up a digital humanities center in Romania" (Moldovan and Puşcariu 2017) or "What is Digital Humanities and What's it doing in Romanian Departments?" (Olaru 2019). Mădălina Nicolaescu and Adriana Mihai present a digital initiative of University of Bucharest, which consists in creating a collection of digitized translations of Shakespeare's works. The authors suggest including digital literature "as the last chapter in courses of literary history" (Nicolaescu and Mihai 2014, 3), but they are not clear whether this new type of literature should be addressed with methods specific to traditional "literary history" or should they also be studied with digital methods.

The difficulties in setting up a DH center in Romania (2017) are brought about by Corina Moldovan and Voica Puşcariu. Mihaela Ursa's article instead launches a Mephistophelian question: *Is Romanian Culture ready for the digital turn?*. Giving a very exact diagnosis, Ursa remarks that DH advent occurred in a moment when the Romanian culture and implicitly Romanian studies have not done with old feuds. For the last century, the aesthetic principle has dominated Romanian studies and the verdicts of excellence bestowed on literary works. The conflict between research practices based on "individual authority" and those based on "collective authority," that is, the scholars' preference for individual research rather than for team-based approaches, is another drawback for the future of DH (Ursa 2015, 86). In other words, Romanian researchers tend to prefer to be lone wolves because they are always after a quick hit and a clear prestige.

"What is Digital Humanities and What's it doing in Romanian Departments?" outlines two possible scenarios in which the researcher is the main character: 1. The researcher does not have access to a digitized corpus; 2. The researcher has full access to the metadata by using various programs or browsers such as Python, Jupyter Notebook, Zotero, Palladio (Olaru 2019). To have or not to have, this is thus the question... And beyond the somehow trivial manner of putting things, the article suggests that Romanian DLS researchers do not have other than metadata.

2.4. *DH read by literary reviewers*

Book reviews constitute another way of approaching the topic of Digital Humanities in the Romanian academic environment. We could trace two of such endeavors, the first one authored by Alex Ciorogar (2015), and the second, by Alex Goldiș (2017). Referring to *Digital Humanities and the Study of Intermediality in Comparative Cultural Studies* and to *Bestseller Code*, reviewers speak about "the new theoretical trends and their shifting away from textuality, focusing instead on the vast opportunities opened up by the new materiality of digital production, distribution, and consumption" (Ciorogar 2015, 226).

In a nutshell, DH's emergence in the Romanian academic discourse is streamlined mainly via literary studies and fashions itself from a discursive-polemical-theoretical angle rather than as an actual field of study. Truth is that recent developments of DH come with a high cost for those who decide to undertake research projects that involve data analysis. Most certainly, engaging in DH is not a profitable career choice, considering the amount of unrewarded preparatory work it asks for. To put it in a simple way, much effort and patience appears to be needed before being able to start producing interesting results, to such an extent that some may wonder if the entire endeavor is worthwhile, and if we are not finally moving mountains to give birth just to a small mouse. In this respect, Nan Z Da's article "The Computational Case against Computational Literary Studies" (Nan Z Da 2019) has raised some issues that, since its publication at the beginning of 2019, have been intensely debated upon.

3. Difficulties in practice: the *Hai-Ro* project

In what follows we will list some of the difficulties a DH researcher is confronted with, taking as a case study the French-Romanian project *Hai-Ro*. We will start with a short presentation of Hai-Ro[3], whose idea came about when two enthusiastic members of the COST action *Distant Reading for European Literary History*[4] started an experimental collaboration on TEI encoding and validating a small set of hajduk novels selected for inclusion

in the Romanian collection of the ELTeC[5]. The project addresses the scarcity of DLS resources designed for Romanian language and literature by creating a literary corpus of hajduk novels (1850-1950) TEI-XML conformant and including semantic annotations. One of our dearest principles is to promote a fair use of data, thus to make our corpus available as an Open access resource for approaching the Romanian literary tradition (genres, periods, canonization mechanisms, etc.) with quantitative tools and methods.

We had a vista of our misery, only when we found out that suboptimal OCR output on non-standardized Romanian and on cheap-paper 19th century prints made us spend an average of 40 hours on cleaning manually only 100 pages. This toilsome preparation of files, the workarounds related to digitization, as well as an "on-the-go" style of learning about and experimenting with new tools brought us to several hot-button issues that might be summarized as follows:

a. the prominence of NLP approaches in Romanian research environment lead to a quasi-grammarian manner of dealing with texts; according to Chomsky-Schützenberger hierarchy (Silberztein 2013, 1-13), a grammar can turn interesting results only if it proves to be "context-sensitive";

b. the libraries' politics of digitization, chiefly oriented toward Romanian press and toward historical archives and sources, lead to a narrow range of literary resources, thus to a random or trivial (read "canonically-driven") literary sampling in the already compiled Romanian corpora (Tufiş 2018; Barbu Mititelu et al. 2017): CoRoLa[6], ROMBAC, ROCO[7], SWARA, BABEL[8];

c. building balanced *literary corpora* has always come last in the line of priorities because the national literary tradition – leaving aside the murky aisles of this term, by "national" we simply mean "language-based" – has some old and new battles to fight;

d. blame it on typically Romanian imitation/ adaptation/ "forms-without-content"/ cultural emergence or not, the Romanian academia has always been prone to put the cart before the horse, especially if the cart is a rattling palanquin such as Franco Moretti's theory on "distant reading." As a matter of fact, it was only when we jumped out of the splendid palanquin that we bitterly discovered we had no (literary) data to experiment on. At this point of discussion, we attest that we are thoroughly aware of the danger in using "literary" before binary-computed data. In any case, we prefer to take this risk rather than meshing endless *glossae* on metadata provided by lexicons, national bibliographies, library catalogues, and literature dictionaries.

Surely, some digitization projects – ex-*dacoromanica*, currently called Biblioteca Digitală a Bucureştilor[9], or the digital library of UBB[10], for instance – have yielded useful resources. Nevertheless, in the case of project-oriented research questions such as ours, we could avail of neither

scans nor interoperable formats. Realizing that we are under the ground-level of any serious quantitative pursuit (that is, clean files, preferably XML), we had no other option but to draw a side-project agenda, partly composed of militant must-do-s, and partly, of naïve wishful thinking.

First things first, let us have a glimpse on mundane matters, such as *software costs* and Eastern-European *research practices related to investment in software products*. Many of us have probably noticed that for the XML format, *Oxygen 21.1* excels other open-source software, albeit a good mark should be given to *jEdit* (except for its option on *toggle line wrap*, which is quite difficult to track). While with Xpath 2.0 functions and operators there is always enough room to experience and learn, we might readily add that spellcheck in *Oxygen* looks as miserable as in any other editor as long as we keep on using the Classic Romanian Dictionary Pack[11], which relies on comma below characters and not cedilla, thus does not support diachronic and non-standardized varieties of spelling.

Similarly, whoever has tried the new version *Abby 15 Corporate* would consider that it performs better on Romanian than other free options or than OCRs provided by scanner installation kits[12]. In any case, on Romanian 19th-century non-standardized language and on cheap popular prints, which are always delivering mind-blowing UTF-8Y code and curly cedilla for glyphs such as "ş" and "ţ", *Abby* produces not entirely messy editables (see **Figure 1**) but does a sort of default normalization in the sense that "é", "ê", "ë" are read as "e", ǐ is read as "i" or "l", "ó" is read as "o", while "ḑ" is read as "d" or simply not available for choice in UTF-8. By the way, if one browses through the "character map" in *Oxygen*, "ḑ" and "Ḑ" must be searched in Latin Extended Additional as in Office Word. We have not tried yet OCR4all[13], designed by the researchers of University of Würzburg (Reuil et al 2019), but it promises interesting results.

Figure 1: OCR of the novel *Vestitul Bandit Dragoş sau Demonul din pădurea Nicoresci*
(Craiova: Filip Lazăr & Comp, 1893)

Anyhow, with a price over 600 $ per user license − and we have not added here the bank transfers, VAT and top-up costs related to the distribution chain − these tools are practically inaccessible to larger Romanian research teams because the entire budget of a medium research project (say, up to 100, 000 EUR) would be spent on purchasing software. There is always the Eastern European approach to research practices, which usually leads to devising genuine solutions and workarounds that are paid dearly for in terms of work-life (un)balance. Luckily enough, Hai-Ro is a bilateral French-Romanian project that could tap in resources and tools for French DH research, so all project members received a key for using Oxygen during implementation.

It was only after a *manu propria* scanning and OCR processing that we could take a closer look at texts, contents and at their particularities. Obviously, our list of 40 candidates, our theoretical assumptions on Romanian popular fiction and on novel genres, our idea of annotating spatial entities in hajduk novels had been crystallized long before the project kicked off. The only problem was that fine-grained theoretical insights would not help much when some of our novels − *Aldo şi Aminta*, Costache Boerescu's novel, for instance − stubbornly refused digitization. Illustrating those wonderful convolutions of the Romanian transition alphabet (Cazimir 2006), which obviously resulted in unacceptable OCR (see **Figure 2**), they needed a special treatment. As everything else in our corpus! The solution to this issue was Transkribus[14], a platform which enables users to train handwriting recognition models and, in problematic cases, to treat prints as manuscripts and letter fonts as handwriting. After a careful cleaning of pages, stretching of baselines, checking of text regions, line-by-line Layout analysis, and finally transliteration, we were able to train a HTR which performed pretty well on transition prints (see **Figure 3**).

The next step was an experimental use of several tools designed for quantitative analysis and data management (StyloR, AntConc, TXM, HumaNum, Heurist, and just recently Nooj), some of them working marvels on resourced languages such as English and French. While they could not be turned into palatable scientific prose (see **Figures 4, 5, 6** for several experiments with Stylo, TXM), the results of these experiments formed a pattern of prerequisites for Romanian DLS: if texts are not properly cleaned, then tokenization is not relevant; and when you manage to have a good-enough tokenization on 19th century texts, this is not enough because a highly inflected and non-standardized language such as modern Romanian will probably need a good lemmatizer. And all this is necessary just to be able to count properly; to be sure that lemmas are on the right ranks, and bring forth what some critics already deem as "a bag of words".

Then you would probably like to have some morphological and syntactic information added to strings of words resulted from queries, thus POS would be a nice feature, especially for diachronic varieties of spelling. But this will only be possible if training unsupervised tagging will work properly on our texts. However, consistent POS tagging needs normalization to a certain extent (that is, consistent principles of editing), so we return to the old feud between (original) form preservers and content divers.


Figure 2: OCR of the novel *Aldo și Aminta*
(București: Tip. Bisericească din Sf. Mitropolie, 1855)

Figure 3: *Aldo si Aminta*, page 15,
automated transliteration with HTR trained by Transkribus

**Figure 4**: Experiments with immitators of N.D. Popescu (StyloR)

Figure 5: Experiments on authorship attribution
(Radu Ionescu's *Catastuhul amorului*)

Figure 6: Experiments with TXM (suboptimal tokenization due to lack
of lemmatizers and commabelow characters and cedilla characters,
e.g. the conjunction "și")

The detailed process of creating a literary corpus in a lesser resourced language such as Romanian resembles any story of raise and fall, of enthusiasm and demotivation, of splendors and miseries. Yet, while still counting on words and not only counting words, the only thing we are left with is to read Balzac's inspiring title in a playful way. If only the misery of being always late was outstretched, then the intriguing mysteries and mist(eries) of pioneer research might just yield the real meaning of splendor.

Notes

[1] For this discussion, see Schreibmann, Siemens and Unsworth, 2016. Significantly, ADHO, the international umbrella association for digital humanities, does not provide a definition for DH either on its "About" page or on other pages.

[2] "Digital Humanities is the discipline born from the intersection between humanities scholarship and computational technologies. It aims at investigating how digital methodologies can be used to enhance research in disciplines such a History, Literature, Languages, Art History, Music, Cultural Studies and many others. Digital Humanities holds a very strong practical component as it includes the concrete creation of digital resources for the study of specific disciplines." (see Pierazzo 2011).

[3] https://proiectulbrancusihairo.wordpress.com/

[4] https://www.distant-reading.net/

[5] https://www.distant-reading.net/eltec/

[6] Inappropriate for complex queries http://corola.racai.ro/

[7] Available only on ELRA http://catalogue.elra.info/en-us/repository/browse, and only under license for non-ELRA members

[8] Both of them speech corpora https://speech.utcluj.ro/swarasc/, with the important detail that BABEL is also an ELRA product, thus under license

[9] https://www.bibmet.ro/biblioteca-digitala-bucurestilor/
[10] http://dspace.bcucluj.ro/
[11] https://extensions.openoffice.org/
[12] We experienced Canon's Iris Scan Desk 5 Pro https://www.irislink.com/EN-RO/c1956/IRIScan-Desk--5-Pro---Desktop-camera-scanner.aspx
[13] https://github.com/OCR4all/OCR4all
[14] https://transkribus.eu/Transkribus/

References

Baghiu, Ştefan and Emanuel Modoc. 2019. "New Paradigms in Contemporary Romanian Literary Studies (I)". *Transilvania* (5-6): 13-16.

Baghiu, Ştefan. 2019. "The French Novel in Translation: A Distant Reading for Romania during Communism (1944–1989)". *Transylvanian Review* 28, Supplement 1: 83-100.

Barbu Mititelu, V. et al. 2017. *Corpus of Contemporary Romanian. Architecture, Annotation Levels and Analysis Tools*. In *Lingvistică românească, lingvistică Romanică*, edited by Helga Bogdan Oprea et al, 13-20. Bucureşti: Universităţii din Bucureşti.

Bleier, Roman. 2017. "Digital documentary editing of St Patrick's epistles. Linking the manuscript witnesses to the canonical text". *Studia UBB Digitalia* 62(1): 9-25.

Burdick, Anne, Drucker, Johanna, Lunenfeld, Peter, Presner, Todd and Schnapp, Jeffrey (eds.). 2012. *Digital humanities*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Carpo, M. 2017. *The second digital turn: design beyond intelligence*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Cazimir, Ştefan. 2006. *Alfabetul de tranziţie*. Ediţia a 2-a. Bucureşti: Humanitas.

Ciorogar, Alex, and Emanuel Modoc. 2019. "Analiza computaţională în cadrul studiilor literare româneşti". *Observator Cultural* 981 (August).

Ciorogar, Alex. 2015. "Review of *Digital Humanities and the Study of Intermediality in Comparative Cultural Studies* by Steven Tötösy de Zepetnek (ed.)". *Metacritic Journal for Comparative Studies and Theory* 1(1) (October): 266-275.

Clivaz, Claire. 2017. "Lost in translation? The odyssey of 'digital humanities' in French". *Studia UBB Digitalia* 62(1): 26-41.

Constantinescu, Nicolaie. 2017. "Stretching the boundaries of publishing: The Open Web Platform and the alternatives". *Studia UBB Digitalia* 62(1): 42-56.

Cosgrave, Mike. 2019. "Digital humanities methods as a gateway to inter and transdisciplinarity". *Global Intellectual History*, 1-10, https://doi.org/10.1080/23801883.2019.1657639

Da, Nan Z. 2019. "The Computational Case against Computational Literary Studies". *Critical Inquiry* 45 (Spring): 601-639.

Das Gupta, Vinayak. 2017. "Albums in the attic. An investigation of photographic metadata". *Studia UBB Digitalia* 62(1): 57-74.

Dicţionarul cronologic al romanului românesc. 2003. Vol. 1. Bucharest: Editura Academiei Române.

Dicţionarul romanului românesc tradus. 2005. Vol. 1. Bucharest: Editura Academiei Române.

Dindelegan, Mariana. 2018. "Digital and Coding Literacy for School Students". *Studia UBB Digitalia* 63(1): 55-68.

Drucker, J., and Nowviskie, B. 2004. "Speculative computing: Aesthetic provocations in humanities computing", in *A Companion to Digital Humanities*, edited by Susan Schreibman, Ray Siemens and John Unsworth, 431-447. Oxford: Blackwell.

Fiormonte, D., Numerico, T., Tomasi, F., Schmidt, D., Ferguson, C., and Rockwell, G. 2015. *The digital humanist: A critical inquiry*. New York: Punctum books.

Gee, J. (Ed.). 2000. *The New Literacy Studies: From "socially situated" to the work of the social*. London: Routledge.

Goldiş, Alex. 2014. "Digital Humanities – o nouă paradigmă teoretică?". *Transilvania* 12: 1-4.

Goldiş, Alex. 2017. "Ce romane mai citesc computerele. Review of *The Bestseller Code* by Jodie Archer and Matthew L. Jockers". *Vatra* no. 5-6.

Mills, K. A. 2010. "A review of the 'digital turn' in the new literacy studies". *Review of educational research* 80(2): 246-271.

Moldovan, Corina, and Viorica Puşcariu. 2017. "Challenges in setting up a digital humanities center in Romania". *Studia Philologia* LXII(1): 247-256.

Nicolaescu, Mădălina, and Adriana Mihai. 2014. "Teaching Digital Humanities in Romania". *CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture* 16(5): 1-2.

Olaru, Ovio. 2019. "What is Digital Humanities and What's It Doing in Romanian Departments?". *Transilvania* 5-6: 30-37.

Pierazzo, Elena. 2011. *Digital Humanities: a definition*, https://epierazzo.blogspot.com/2011/01/digital-humanities-definition.html.

Ramsay, Stephen. 2011. *Reading Machines: Toward and Algorithmic Criticism*. Urbana, Chicago, and Springfield: University of Illinois Press.

Reul, Christian et al. 2019. "OCR4all-An Open-Source Tool Providing a (Semi)Automatic OCR Workflow for Historical Printings". Submitted to *Applied Sciences*: 1-54, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335737763_OCR4all_-_An_Open-Source_Tool_Providing_a_Semi-Automatic_OCR_Workflow_for_Historical_Printings

Schnapp, J. and Presner, P. 2009. *Digital Humanities Manifesto 2.0*, http://www.humanitiesblast.com/manifesto/Manifesto_V2.pdf

Schreibman, Susan, Siemens, Ray, Unsworth, John (eds). 2016. *A New Companion to Digital Humanities*. 2nd Edition. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Schwaderer, Christian . 2017. "eXist DB or Saxon/C in PHP. A comparison between two approaches for XSLT 2.0 based websites". *Studia UBB Digitalia* 62(1): 100-111.

Silberztein, Max. 2013. "NooJ Computational Devices". In *Formalising Natural Languages with NooJ,* edited by Svetla Koeva, Slim Mesfar and Max Silberztein, 1-13. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars.

Terian, Andrei. 2019. "Big Numbers: A Quantitative Analysis of the Development of the Novel in Romania". *Transylvanian Review* XXVIII, *Supplement* 1: 55-71.

Tufiş, D. 2018. *CoRoLa Primul corpus computaţional de referinţă pentru limba română contemporană. Market Watch* 205: 28-29.

Ursa, Mihaela. 2015. "Is Romanian Culture ready for the digital turn?". *Metacritic Journal for Comparative Studies and Theory* 1(1): 85-97.

Web:

https://epierazzo.blogspot.com/2011/01/digital-humanities-definition.html
https://transkribus.eu/Transkribus/
https://github.com/OCR4all/OCR4all
https://www.irislink.com/EN-RO/c1956/IRIScan-Desk--5-Pro---Desktop-camera-scanner.aspx
https://extensions.openoffice.org/
http://dspace.bcucluj.ro/
https://www.bibmet.ro/biblioteca-digitala-bucurestilor/
http://catalogue.elra.info/en-us/repository/browse
https://speech.utcluj.ro/swarasc/
https://proiectulbrancusihairo.wordpress.com/
https://www.distant-reading.net/https://www.distant-reading.net/eltec/
https://uefiscdi.gov.ro/p1-dezvoltarea-sistemului-national-de-cd

George BONDOR [*]

Benjamin Fondane et la philosophie de la crise[**]

Benjamin Fondane and the Philosophy of the Crisis

Abstract: The main aims of this paper are: 1) to analyse the philosophical texts of the Romanian-French poet and thinker Benjamin Fondane in order to highlight the tragic and paradoxical manner in which the personal identity is formed under the auspices of the crisis of the self; 2) to connect his philosophy of the crisis with the Avant-Garde movement; 3) to identify Fondane's place within the movement of Existential philosophy from the first half of the 20th century, but also his criticism on the Rationalism and the Husserlian phenomenology.

Keywords: Benjamin Fondane, crisis of the self, Avant-Garde, Existentialism, phenomenology, identity.

La métaphore de l'avant-garde n'est que rarement présente de manière explicite dans le discours philosophique. Le radicalisme et la sensibilité de la crise, propres aux avant-gardes[1], reçoivent dans la philosophie des étiquettes tout à fait différentes. Il en va de même de l'instinct de la fin, doublé par la passion pour un nouveau début. Néanmoins, la pensée philosophique n'est pas du tout étrangère d'une sensibilité pareille. On la retrouve avec chaque geste et expérience radicale de la pensée – qui sont présents chez tous les grands philosophes. C'en est le cas de l'un des philosophes de l'avant-garde roumaine qui a également été un penseur remarquable, Benjamin Fondane. Attiré dans un premier temps par le symbolisme, il adhère plus tard au dadaïsme et au surréalisme et arrive à la philosophie notamment pour attaquer la raison depuis la place qui lui est propre (Carassou 1990).

« Osons être des hommes tragiques ! »

Fondane se déclare être un adepte de la pensée existentielle, concrète, une réaction contre la philosophie rationaliste, qui cherchait l'universel plutôt que l'individuel, en appréciant davantage les vertus de la nécessité que les délices de la contingence et ayant comme but d'identifier les règles stables

plutôt que les exceptions notables. Tout en s'opposant à ce type de philosophie logico-discursive, la pensée existentielle préfère le chemin du paradoxe. Elle commence par la compréhension de la condition de l'homme, celle d'exilé dans ce monde, en identifiant les maladies existentielles, pour en découvrir le traitement adéquat. « La pensée existentielle prétend que tout se passe *comme si* notre conscience était déchue » (Fondane 1979, 11). De manière explicite ou bien de manière implicite, la pensée de Fondane se sert d'un métalangage médical, sur lequel pariera par la suite également Constantin Noica, pour qui la philosophie est censée être une *medicina entis*. On voit de la sorte chez Fondane une version purement philosophique des sensibilités propres aux avant-gardes, plus radicale même que celles-ci, visant plutôt le fait de se sauver soi-même qu'un militantisme culturel ou politique. La philosophie ne peut se faire qu'à la première personne, croit Fondane, comme expérience interne, telle qu'on la voit chez Pascal, Jean de la Croix, Dostoïevski, Rimbaud ou Chestov. Parler de soi-même signifie comprendre que dans son propre soi se cachent des maladies graves de la culture, de la civilisation, de l'esprit, masques que l'on emporte parfois à notre insu. Plonger dans son propre soi nous dévoile la condition tragique de l'homme, qui est celle de la dissension intime, du déchirement profond, suite à la présence dans l'homme d'une tension entre les deux pensées, rationnelle et existentielle (Fondane 1979, 23-24). Dans son « essence » improbable, l'homme est un être paradoxal. C'est pourquoi la philosophie doit cultiver, elle aussi, une pensée de type paradoxal. Ce n'est pas la conciliation dialectique des deux opposés, comme chez Hegel, mais leur conflit qui constitue le propre de l'homme.

La dispute de Fondane avec la philosophie rationaliste est une dispute nuancée. La raison est inévitable, s'avérant être utile dans plusieurs contextes. En plus, l'homme est en quelque sorte condamné à s'orienter sur la voie de la raison, à la seule précision près que la raison veut la mort de l'homme. Fondane la compare à un mur inévitable. C'est le pire des maux, qui nous éloigne de la liberté, de la quête du soi. La raison nous met en possession d'une morale de l'univers, montre le poète-philosophe (ou, peut-être, de l'universel), qui n'est toutefois qu'une morale des autres. La raison est un juge froid, cruel, malveillant, à en croire Fondane. Elle nous accompagne comme un démon. On ne doit pas y succomber, mais on ne peut pas non plus s'y opposer, car *penser contre, c'est penser comme*. C'est pourquoi la voie choisie par Dostoïevski est considérée par Fondane comme la meilleure : « on ne pouvait la [raison] briser de son front », mais pour y échapper l'homme « avait le droit de lui tirer la langue et, même, au besoin, devenir fou » (Fondane 1979, 265). Ce ne sont pas seulement des figures de style, mais des gestes de révolte supérieure, ironique. La moquerie est élevée, dans un style avant-gardiste, au rang d'attitude devant la raison, de tout ce qui est donné, déjà fixé, objectivé.

L'anti-cartésianisme de Fondane est total : la raison est un malin génie. Tout en poursuivant le chemin de la raison, l'homme œuvre en fait contre lui-même. La raison est l'élément démoniaque de l'homme, une idée qui le rend proche d'une pléiade de penseurs, à partir de Kierkegaard et de Nietzsche et jusqu'à Heidegger et Berdiaeff. Il partage avec eux la conviction que l'existence humaine est tragique. De cette perspective, la distinction qu'il opère entre l'homme tragique et l'homme théorique est extrêmement importante : « Osons donc être des hommes tragiques ! », écrit Fondane en citant Nietzsche (Fondane 1979, 45).

« Job le pauvre »

Tout comme la raison, le terme de connaissance est, à son tour, atteint d'une nuance péjorative. Lorsque la connaissance est le but ultime de l'homme, on a affaire à une existence inauthentique. La découverte de la connaissance est la suprême cruauté, pour Fondane, tout comme pour Nietzsche, avec la chute du Paradis. « La liberté ne commence que là où la connaissance finit. » (Fondane 1979, XXIV) Les termes opposés à la connaissance sont l'existence et la vie, la croyance, la liberté et l'espoir. Par la suite, l'homme vit à moitié conformément au principe de la réalité, mais il est en même temps à moitié plein d'espoir. La conclusion n'en est pas tout à fait pessimiste, même si Fondane se demande si toute philosophie n'est pas, après tout, un appel à la résignation. Mais l'homme n'a pas seulement « le devoir de se résigner, mais aussi le droit de désespérer » (Fondane 1979, 280).

L'homme théorique est l'homme de la séparation. Cette séparation doit être dépassée, mais sans être intégrée dans une totalité de type hégélien. Comme Kierkegaard, Fondane ne croit pas que Hegel ait raison lorsqu'il affirme que l'espoir et la liberté pourraient être découverts par la totalisation. Celle-ci lui apparaît comme une maladie, une simple inclusion de l'individu dans une collectivité. Par contre, comme le montre Fondane, Hegel a voulu nous faire croire que la maladie consistait dans le fait que certaines exceptions refusaient de se laisser totaliser, en déclenchant chez le philosophe et chez le savant une profonde angoisse. Pour Hegel, dans l'interprétation de Fondane, le malade est celui qui est assoiffé du possible, le remède philosophique en étant l'intelligible. Or, il s'agit d'une fausse solution pour le penseur existentiel.

C'est toujours à cause du primat de la connaissance théorique que Fondane s'écarte de Husserl, qui avait accompagné jusqu'à un certain point son parcours philosophique et dont il a écrit des pages admirables (Fondane 1990, 93-118). La voie husserlienne est une bonne voie dans la mesure où elle cherche les évidences ultimes. A la seule précision près que Husserl est

pénétré par la tentation de l'universel, en essayant une description phéno-
ménologique des structures universelles de la conscience, mais en tombant,
par la présupposition théorique de sa philosophie même, dans une attitude
objectualisante. D'ailleurs, Fondane est plutôt l'adepte de Chestov, qui sus-
pecte les soi-disant évidences ultimes sous prétexte qu'il s'agirait de simples
constructions rationnelles, uniformisantes et neutres. Pour Fondane, la
philosophie se fait uniquement à la première personne. Au premier abord, le
point de départ de la phénoménologie semble satisfaire à cette exigence, car
la réduction phénoménologique, l'analyse, la description, la réflexion sur son
propre vécu sont des actes du son propre ego. Husserl même était conscient
de la position solipsiste de sa philosophie. Il avait tout simplement la pré-
tention que dans le particulier de sa propre expérience on pouvait découvrir
l'universel. C'est pourquoi Husserl représente, dans l'histoire de la philoso-
phie, la forme ultime de l'*homo theoreticus*, l'accomplissement d'une manière
de faire de la philosophie une simple théorie de la connaissance. La ré-
flexion sur le vécu est un acte ultérieur, qui transforme le vécu dans une
série d'objets. A cet égard, la critique de Fondane est similaire à celle que
Heidegger fait de son professeur Husserl. Pour parler d'un point de vue
phénoménologique, on peut dire que Fondane opère un autre type de
réduction, la réduction à l'individualité, la seule qui puisse conduire à la
découverte de soi à ses propres dépens.

La description phénoménologique, telle que la proposait Husserl, n'est
pas adéquate à la découverte de l'individualité. Fondane décrit, en fait,
quelque chose qui ne se laisse pas décrire par le langage habituel. C'est une
description par le biais de la suggestion des choses importantes pour
l'individu. Cette forme de la description renvoie vers ce que l'on pourrait
nommer une pensée typologique, la seule qui puisse satisfaire à la compré-
hension. Avec les typologies fondamentales, entrent en scène les grands pa-
radoxes de l'homme : raison et espoir, connaissance et vie, logique et exis-
tence. La manière dont Fondane fait travailler la pensée typologique n'est
pas proche de Nietzsche, mais de Kierkegaard. La typologie qui contient
toutes les autres est située entre Job le puissant, exagérément rationnel, et
Job le pauvre, celui qui assume le choc existentiel et le droit au désespoir
que nous avons tous, une véritable « aristocratie de malheur » (Fondane
1979, 271 et 288). Selon Fondane, vivre le malheur est la seule voie de
l'esprit de rompre le cercle de la connaissance (de la raison). Au lieu de « je
suis celui qui est », marque de la philosophie, l'esprit découvre que « je suis
celui qui suis », marque de la pensée théologique. Au lieu des évidences de la
raison, on doit découvrir les évidences de la tragédie (Fondane 1979, 282).
Une telle évidence est l'espoir : « une force, un appel, une évidence, un
"argument" aussi philosophique que les autres » (Fondane 1979, 284). Au
lieu de la paix, de la nécessité, de la Loi universelle, des instances supra-
ordonnées de l'individu, comme c'est le cas, pour Hegel, de l'Etat, du

Peuple, de l'Histoire, de la Raison, de l'Esprit ou même Dieu, que préfère l'orientation principale de la philosophie, y compris les phénoménologies de Husserl, de Heidegger et de Sartre –, Fondane renvoie aux auteurs chez lesquels Jaspers appréciait « l'inquiétude sans fin », l'exception, l'éclaircissement, l'élément conditionnel et non-universel : Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Berdiaeff, Chestov (Fondane 1990).

« La seconde paire d'yeux »

La vérité n'est donc pas une vérité théorique, totalisante et objectivante. Fondane parie sur les petites vérités, sur les révélations personnelles. L'idée des petites révélations vient de Léon Chestov, que le penseur roumain a beaucoup admiré. Les références à l'œuvre de celui-ci, *Les révélations de la mort*, sont nombreuses. Pour Chestov, mais aussi pour Fondane, l'individu doit prendre conscience de la nécessité du saut, de la nécessité du choc existentiel, du moment privilégié où l'on rompt le cercle de la connaissance, pour découvrir, dans un vécu authentique, ce qui est au-delà, le transcendent. On rencontre un scénario similaire chez Heidegger, pour qui la marche-d'avance (le devancement) vers la mort éveille en nous les révélations les plus profondes. Elle nous met face à face avec nous-mêmes, avec notre possible le plus pur. Ou, dans le scénario préféré de Chestov et Fondane, la révélation de la mort nous met face à face avec Dieu. C'est pourquoi « la mort est peut-être la vie », comme le dit Euripide. L'homme est captif à tout moment à l'oubli de soi, étant accaparé par la tentation du pouvoir dirigé vers les choses et les autres personnes. La conscience de la mort représente justement un excellent moyen de comprendre sa propre finitude, le manque de pouvoir, nos limites et faiblesses, ce n'est qu'ainsi que nos rapports avec le monde, avec le soi et les autres deviennent authentiques.

La philosophie, la poésie, l'expérience esthétique nous approchent de la vérité vécue. De tout cela, la philosophie nous procure, peut-être, la plus grande infusion de lucidité, mais la poésie et l'art disent de manière plus directe ce que la philosophie peut tout simplement oser suggérer (Fondane 1999, 8-17). Le chemin immanent pour découvrir la finitude est nécessaire, mais insuffisant. On a besoin de beaucoup plus : un appel de l'au-delà, une promesse d'un « grand Lundi », comme dirait Kafka (Fondane 1990).

Fondane répond à cette voix de l'au-delà aussi bien de manière poétique, que philosophique, morale et religieuse. L'homme irrésigné est, de la sorte, un homme révolté par rapport à la condition de l'exil dans ce monde. C'est l'homme qui découvre « la seconde paire d'yeux », pour reprendre la belle expression de Chestov. C'est « l'homme seul, à qui non seulement il est tout refusé, mais encore à qui on demande tout » (Fondane 1979, 288), l'exception, l' « élu » à qui on ouvre la route dite privilégiée du malheur,

quand la terre se dérobe sous nos pieds (Fondane 1990). Ce privilège est une simple manière de parler, car, comme le montre Fondane, il n'y a aucune route privilégiée, mais « il y a autant de routes que d'hommes seuls et qui cherchent » (Fondane 1979, 288).

Notes

[1] Tout comme le montre Matei Calinescu dans un chapitre de son livre, *Five Faces of Modernity*, l'avant-garde se caractérise par la radicalisation des traits principaux de la modernité, en empruntant et menant tout à la fois aux conséquences ultimes les paradoxes inhérents à celle-ci. Si la modernité est « une tradition contre la tradition », l'avant-garde s'élève elle-même contre le passé, en aspirant toutefois, avec une certaine urgence, à la mise en place d'une nouvelle direction. Son esprit critique n'est pas seulement doublé par le désir irrépressible de constituer sa propre identité, mais aussi par un esprit stratégique, « militaire », la preuve en étant la suite de manifestes artistiques et littéraires, de véritables déclarations politiques. La radicalité dogmatique de l'avant-garde se manifeste, selon Calinescu, aussi bien au niveau de l'affirmation de soi qu'au niveau de la destruction de soi, le meilleur exemple en ce sens étant le dadaïsme, avec le manifeste de « l'anti-art pour l'anti-art ». Comme on le sait déjà, il n'y a pas une seule avant-garde. Celle-ci ne correspond pas à une période de l'histoire bien déterminée, mais l'esprit avant-gardiste se retrouve dans plusieurs moments de passage d'une période à l'autre, d'une sensibilité à l'autre. En ce sens, Matei Calinescu l'identifie aussi bien dans la Renaissance que dans l'utopisme politique et dans l'esthétisme révolutionnaire du XIXe siècle, dans les manifestes de la première moitié du XXe siècle (par exemple, le surréalisme de Breton), mais aussi dans le cadre du postmodernisme. En fait, l'avant-garde marque une sensibilité de la crise, cultivée pour elle-même, pas seulement en vue de la dépasser (Calinescu 1987, 95-148).

References

Calinescu, Matei. 1987. *Five Faces of Modernity. Modernism, Avant-Garde, Decadence, Kitsch, Post-modernism*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Carassou, Michel. 1990. « Préface ». In Benjamin Fondane, *Le lundi existentiel et le dimanche de l'histoire, suivi de La philosophie vivante*. Paris: Éditions du Rocher.

Fondane, Benjamin. 1979. *La Conscience malheureuse*. Paris: Editions Plasma.

Fondane, Benjamin. 1990. *Le lundi existentiel et le dimanche de l'histoire, suivi de La philosophie vivante*. Paris: Éditions du Rocher.

Fondane, Benjamin. 1999. « Mots sauvages ». In Benjamin Fondane, *Paysages (Poèmes. 1917-1923) / Priveliști (Poeme. 1917-1923)*, traduit par Odile Serre. Pitesti: Editura Paralela 45, 8-17.

Florina Rodica HARIGA [*]

Concepts, Senses and Interpretations in the Works of Joachim of Fiore Regarding the Lombardian Critique of the Doctrine of the Trinity [**]

Abstract: The aim of this article is to examine the way in which Joachim of Fiore approaches the doctrine of the Trinity present in the first book of the *Sentences* of Peter the Lombard by means of his works such as *Psalterium decem cordarum*, *Tractatus in expositionem vite et regule beati Benedicti* and to correlate them to the possible arguments presented in the decree of the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 that condemned a certain work of Joachim of Fiore now lost. The article compares the two methods of interpretation, the dialectical one of Peter the Lombard influenced by Abelard and Anselm, and the symbolical-analogical one of Joachim of Fiore very similar to the approach of Roscelin of Compiègne. The critique, the debates, the condemnations and rehabilitations remain a mark of the way in which the history and philosophy of ideas have shaped the Western way of thinking until the modern times.

Keywords: Joachim of Fiore; Roscelin of Compiègne; *res*; Peter the Lombard; doctrine of the Trinity; Fourth Lateran Council; medieval philosophy.

The controversy of Joachim of Fiore's critique to the interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity exposed by Peter the Lombard in the first book of the *Sentences* may be better understood if one deepens the research of the primary sources that may shed light over this issue. The passage that may have led to the critical observation done by Joachim of Fiore regarding the fact that Peter the Lombard has transformed the Trinity into a *quaternity* is the following one that contains the concept *res*: *ita tres res dicimus, ut easdem esse unam quandam summam rem confiteamur* (*Sententiae*, I dist., 25, c. 2, §5, p. 194) and *cum enim una et summa quaedam res sit divina essentia* […] (*Ibidem*, I dist., 5, c. 1, §6, p. 82). The word *res* as to express the essence makes Joachim think of a *quaternitas* as he cannot conceive that the ontological condition of the divine essence can be understood as a *res,* that is as a

singular aspect and it would compromise in this sense the internal relationships of the Trinity. The essence of the Trinity is not understood as being a real and proper unity, but more like a collective one by means of similitude. The word *res* cannot express a collective noun because it refers to a singular and particular aspect as an individual, for example a singular human being and not the community where he lives. In the first book of the *Psalterium decem cordarum* (Florensis 2009, 34), Joachim defines the unity of divine essence of the three Persons as a synthesis of a plurality, it has to be understood in a relational and symbolical manner, and not as a "prisoner" of the logical concept of singularity and individuality:

> *Ad aliquid ergo dicta est* trinitas, *ad aliquid* unitas: *trinitas ad vitandam singularitatem persone, unitas ad cavendam unius divisionem substantie. Aliud enim portat* unitas, *aliud* singularitas, *aliud* pluralitas. *Unitas ut iam dixi, de communione plurium dicta est, non de una tantam persona, quia ubi singularitas est, unitas esse non potest.*

As a resume, the passage expresses the following ideas: Trinity is to be understood in order to avoid the singularity of persons, unity to escape the division of one's substance. Unity is about a communion of many, not of one person alone, as a singularity it cannot represent a unity.

If Peter the Lombard, follows a dialectical key of interpretation of the doctrine of the Trinity proposed earlier in another dispute between Abelard and Roscelin (Mews 1997, 347-364), Joachim uses in his texts analogies and symbolical understandings of the concepts he chooses to define. Same words are used and understood in different manners and the critique evolves around the meaning of one word; a conflict of interpretations between two different ways of approaching an idea that led to a different understanding of a doctrine. Can one speak about a limit of interpretation as well? One should be aware that a limit of interpretation easily may hide a manipulation of an interpretation that directs the sense of a word towards the desired approach of a subject.

In the paper *L'ordine dell'aldilà nel pensiero di Gioacchino da Fiore* presented at the 9° Congresso Internazionale di Studi Gioachimiti, 19-21 settembre 2019 in San Giovanni in Fiore, professor Alessandro Ghisalberti from the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano has discussed exactly the resemblance between the two terminological disputes: Roscelin-Abelard, Joachim of Fiore-Peter the Lombard. The dispute from the first half of the 12th century between the dialectics and anti-dialectics as it was later called by different scholars follows the distinction between three types of order and hierarchies: *ordo idearum*, *ordo verborum*, *ordo rerum*. The ideas in this case are considered to be the archetypes of the divine mind mediated by the Logos that reflect in the words, especially in the words of the revelation. In this sense, as Professor Ghisalberti notices, one may assert a plenary correspondence between the order of the ideas (*ordo idearum*) and the order of the

words (*ordo verborum*) that is strictly connected to the order of things (*ordo rerum*). The order of things expresses a stable order as long as it is linked to experience and senses, logics and ontology are disconnected and the language of sciences does not ensure that one understands in an objective manner the real nature of things. These are the main ideas exposed by Roscelin in fragments of his writings gathered from different authors that have criticized him and from his remaining epistle to Abelard. The point where the tendency of interpretation seems to be similar between Joachim and Roscelin is to find the correct words to define the Trinity, one God in three Persons, without the fact that the individuality of persons may destroy the unity of essence. One essence and three individual persons is a difficult idea to accept according to a dialectical vocabulary and only revelation through means of symbolism and analogies may step in to shed some light into the matter.

In the article about Roscelin of Compiègne from the *Enciclopedia Filosofica*, Giulio d'Onofrio (2006, 9836-9839) observes that Roscelin considers scientific language merely as a convention invented by men in order to describe and understand in a practical manner the unpredictable aspects from the created universe as marks of absolute divine freedom. The problem in this case is the fact that Roscelin rejects the instruments of the liberal arts as being able to create adequately intellectual objects that correspond to the theological reality of the Trinitarian mystery. The gap between the world and order of things and the world and order of ideas remains for Roscelin insurmountable, especially when it comes to discussions referring to the Trinity and the Incarnation. He does not want to introduce a conceptual distinction to define the way in which there are three Persons of the Trinity and, in the same sense, the substances as the doctrine understands it, because speaking of a substantial unity in the case of God in the same way as different finite sciences speak about created things, would lead to two different situations for the human intellect: to consider the divine Persons as distinctive *res* or to admit that if they are a unique one *res* would mean, for example, to acknowledge that the Father and the Holy Spirit also took part in the Incarnation of the Son. Different Persons do not have to imply the existence of different identities is the assertion of Roscelin and if faith does not establish the truth, because the truth transcends it, at least it should not assert what is false when interpreting the revelation.

Peter the Lombard follows the hermeneutical line of Anselm and Abelard opposed to the ideas expressed by Roscelin in his *Epistola ad Abaelardum* (Roscelin 1845-55, vol. CLXXVIII; col. 357C-372A) in understanding the unity of the divine essence and using the word *res* in the above mentioned passage from the *Sentences*. The use of the expression *quaedam summa res* and the word *res* to define the essence recalls the *quaternitas* as *res* is understood here as a singular, individual aspect. Joachim understands to interpret the

word *res* differently, more close to the sense given by Roscelin to the word as one may observe by reading the passage of the article discussing the condemnation of Joachim, and this is what brought him in fact the condemnation of the Lateran Council from 1215 (Alberigo *et al* 1991, 231-233):

Damnamus ergo et reprobamus libellum seu tractatum, quem Abbas Joachim edidit contra Magistrum Petrum Lombardum, de unitate seu essentia Trinitatis, appellans ipsum haereticum et insanum pro eo, quod in suis dixit Sententiis: *"Quoniam quaedam summa res est Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus, et illa non est generans, neque genita, neque procedens". Unde asserit, quod ille non tam Trinitatem, quam quaternitatem astruebat in Deo, videlicet tres personas, et illam communem essentiam quasi quartam; manifeste protestans, quod nulla res est, quae sit Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus; nec est essentia, nec substantia nec natura: quamvis concedat, quod Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt una essentia, una substantia unaque natura. Verum unitatem huiusmodi non veram et propriam, sed quasi collectivam et similitudinariam esse fatetur, quemadmodum dicuntur multi homines unus populus, et multi fideles una Ecclesia [...]. Non enim (ut ait) fideles Christi sunt unum, i e. quaedam una res, quae communis sit onmibus, sed hoc modo sunt unum, id est una Ecclesia, propter catholicae fidei unitatem, et tandem unum regnum, propter unionem indissolubilis caritatis quemadmodum in canonica Joannis Apostoli epistola legitur Quia "tres sunt, qui testimonium dant in caelo, Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus: et hi tres unum sunt" (1 Jo 5, 7), statimque subiungitur: "Et tres sunt, qui testimonium dant in terra: Spiritus, aqua et sanguis et hi tres unum sunt" (1 Jo 5, 8), sicut in quibusdam codicibus invenitur.*

Nos autem, sacro approbante Concilio, credimus et confitemur cum Petro Lombardo, quod una quaedam summa res est, incomprehensibilis quidem et ineffabilis, quae veraciter est Pater, et Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus; tres simul personae, ac singillatim quaelibet earundem: et ideo in Deo solummodo Trinitas est, non quaternitas quia quaelibet trium personarum est illa res, videlicet substantia, essentia seu natura divina: quae sola est universorum principium, praeter quod aliud inveniri non potest: et illa res non est generans, neque genita, nec procedens, sed est Pater, qui generat, et Filius, qui gignitur, et Spiritus Sanctus, qui procedit: ut distinctiones sint in personis, et unitas in natura.

Licet igitur "alius sit Pater, alius Filius, alius Spiritus Sanctus, non tamen aliud": sed id quod est Pater, est Filius et Spiritus Sanctus idem omnino ut secundum orthodoxam et catholicam fidem consubstantiales esse credantur. Pater enim ab aeterno Filium generando, suam substantiam ei dedit [...]. Ac dici non potest, quod partem substantiae suae illi dederit, et partem ipse sibi retinuerit, cum substantia Patris indivisibilis sit, utpote simplex omnino sed nec dici potest, quod Pater in Filium transtulerit suam substantiam generando, quasi sic dederit eam Filio, quod non retinuerit ipsam sibi alioquin desiisset esse substantia. Patet ergo, quod sine ulla diminutione Filius nascendo substantiam Patris accepit, et ita Pater et Filius habent eandem substantiam: et sic eadem res est Pater et Filius. nec non et Spiritus Sanctus ab utroque procedens.[...]

Si quis igitur sententiam vel doctrinam praefati Ioachim in hac parte defendere vel approbare praesumpserit, tamquam haereticus ab omnibus confutetur.

This passage is highlighting the fact that Joachim does not accept an ontological status similar to the one of *res* for the divine essence, because this would attempt to the nature of the relationships of the Trinitarian

persons. *Ordo idearum* cannot coincide with the *ordo verborum* and the *ordo rerum* in the way that one understands the created world and its order. If *res*, according to the logical interpretation, can be applied only to singular aspects, the divine essence becomes a singular aspect apart from the three Persons of the Trinity thus transforming itself into a *quaternitas*. This is the hermeneutical critique that Joachim of Fiore sustains to the arguments and definitions of the Trinity proposed by Peter the Lombard following the line of Anselm and Abelard. The unity proposed as definition by Joachim is to be understood as a collective unity by means of similitude as the analogy of the believers in Christ who represent a unity for the catholic faith. The unity exposed by the Fourth Lateran Council along with Peter the Lombard asserts that each of the three divine Persons represents a substance or essence or nature that does neither generate nor proceed and isn't generated, only the Father generates, only the Son is generated, and only the Holy Ghost proceeds. The actions distinguish the Persons; the unity is given by the nature or the substance of the Persons (Potestà 2017, 203). Although the Council of 1215 condemns this particular treaty and the interpretation against Peter the Lombard, the memory of Joachim of Fiore, his other works and the Abbey he has founded remain very highly esteemed and appreciated also due to the fact that by means of a letter, the Abbot himself has offered his works to be analyzed and corrected by the Church. Joachim is not considered a heretic, only this idea has been condemned as such, the article of the second canon ends by saying that only if a person intends to maintain and spread the condemned doctrine he should be considered a heretic and therefore rejected as such by the Catholic Church.

In 1220 pope Honorius III announces through a bulla that the Abbot Joachim is a catholic man and not a heretic as it could have been understood by the fact that the treaty published by Joachim against Peter the Lombard has been condemned at the Lateran Council in 1215. The bulla wants to clarify the many public rumors that have been spread on this occasion exaggerating the fact that neither the treaty nor the exposed doctrine has been considered as heretic, but the Abbot himself. The falsity of the rumors has caused much distress among clerics and laics who followed the Abbot making them renounce the tranquility of contemplation and rebel against the rules of the Order founded by Joachim of Fiore. The bulla continues by expressing the will of Joachim exposed in the letter he personally wrote through which he gave all his works to be corrected and analyzed by the Church and declared himself a true member of the Roman-Catholic Church. The purpose of the bulla is clearly once more stated at the ending of the document, Joachim is a catholic man and the religious institution (the abbey and the order) that he has founded in Calabria is valid, any other person considering the facts differently and spreading more false aspects on the matter will be punished.

After an insight meant to shed more light on the matter of the critique made by Joachim of Fiore to Peter the Lombard and the consequences that the Abbot had to suffer from this critique I would like to refer to a passage present in one of his works, namely *Tractatus in expositionem vite et regule beati Benedicti* from the folio 145ra, cod. 322 present at the Biblioteca Antoniana in Padova. The fragment is the only remaining explicit proof that Joachim had personally criticized and attacked Peter the Lombard:

> [...] *abolita primo impietate Sabellii, qui personas negavit, secundo pravitate Arrii, qui unitatem scidit, tertio blasphemia Petri, qui unitatem a Trinitate dividens quaternitatem inducit.*

What is even more interesting in this passage is the marginal note of the folio to the word *Petri* and the above added corrections on a few words of the phrase. Peter's name is marked in a square with the above added word *illorum*, *dividens* is transformed into *dividentes* and *inducit* into *inducunt* by correcting only the endings of the words. The corrections are explained by the marginal note where one may read: *hoc iuxta Later(anense) concilium corrigendum*. In this sense, the correction renders the attacked person anonymous, but the attack or the critique remains present. The reader is not facing a correction but an alternative reading version (Patschovsky 2012, 13).

In fact, the event of the critique made by Joachim of Fiore to Peter the Lombard, the condemnation of his lost treaty and the rehabilitation of his memory done by Pope Honorius III, the debate between Roscelin and Abelard around the understanding of the word *res* are all proofs that the history of ideas is a vivid mechanism of interpretations and senses. The way, in which one understands to interpret a concept, the method that one uses in ones interpretations opens multiple perspectives of approval and admiration or of critique and rejection. These perspectives are in a continuous evolution, the ideas in philosophy and history are not isolated aspects that cannot evolve or change is the thing made clear by the abovementioned authors. Men, scientists, writers of an era prefer a certain method; an interpretation of a certain concept that is valid for that era and that can be proved insufficient for the following ones to come because they cannot be universally applied in all the fields of human understanding. Joachim of Fiore understood this flexibility (that is not equal to relativity) of history, ideas and eras in all the interpretations present in his works. A further proof in this sense is even more his testament letter that allowed the Church to correct his ideas in order for them to be adapted to the proper conditions of that present time. His rehabilitation five years after the condemnation of the treaty made at the Fourth Lateran Council marks once again the vivid mechanism of interpretations and ideas. A debate is reshaped by a critique, a

condemnation by rehabilitation. The history of mankind may be understood, by means of analogy and similitude, in observing the evolution of one person and the multiple events that happen to that person along his/hers lifetime. The inheritance of Joachim of Fiore remains a lesson of the normality represented by the fluidity of history and ideas that are not given once and for all. The fact of understanding and accepting this lesson represents the key of salvation and perfection offered by Joachim of Fiore. And through this key, through this way his words are still vivid to us as they were for the people who followed him or disapproved with him in the 12th century.

References

Alberigo, J.; Dossetti, J. *et al* (eds.). 1991. "Concilium lateranense IV-1215. Constitutiones, 2. De errore abbatis Joachim". In *Conciliorum oecumenicorum decreta*. Bologna.

Florensis, Joachim. 2009. *Psalterium decem cordarum*, hg. v. Kurt-Victor Selge (MGH.QG 20). Hannover.

Florensis, Ioachim. 2008. *Opera omnia*, curantibus R. E. Lerner, A. Patschovsky, G. L. Potestà, R. Rusconi, K.-V. Selge (Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo). Roma.

Ghisalberti, Alessandro. 2019. *L'ordine dell'aldilà nel pensiero di Gioacchino da Fiore*. 9º Congresso Internazionale di Studi Gioachimiti, 19-21 settembre 2019. (unpublished paper). San Giovanni in Fiore.

Mews, C.J. 1997. "The Trinitarian Doctrine of Roscelin of Compiègne and Its Influence: Twelfth-century Nominalism and Theology Reconsidered". In *Languages et philosophie. Hommage à Jean Jolivet*. A. de Libera; A. Elamrani-Jamal; A. Galonnier; G. Dahan (eds.). Paris.

d'Onofrio, Giulio. 2006. "Roscellino di Compiègne". In *Enciclopedia Filosofica*. (Bompiani Giunti Editori). Firenze.

Patschovsky, Alexander. 2012. "Introduzione". Gioacchino da Fiore. *Sulla Vita e sulla Regola di san Benedetto*. Roberto Rusconi (ed.) (Viella). Roma.

Potestà, Gian Luca. 2017. "La condanna del *libellus* trinitario di Gioacchino da Fiore: oggetto, ragioni, esiti". In *The Fourth Lateran Council. Institutional Reform and Spiritual Renewal*. Gert Melville; Johannes Helmrath (eds.) (Didymos Verlag). Affalterbach.

Roscelin, 1845-55. "Epistola ad Abaelardum". In *Patrologiae cursus completes*. Series II: Patres Ecclesiae Latinae. Migne, J.-P. (ed.). Paris.

Diana MARGARIT [*]

Narratives of *Southern Constellations.* Cultural diplomacy and artistic exchanges within the Non-Aligned Movement [**]

Abstract: The purpose of my paper consists in understanding the transnational artistic exchange within the Non-Aligned Movement as a cultural tool for strengthening the cohesion between its member-states and aggregating alternative discourses to the two (Soviet and American) dominant ones during the Cold War era. Thus, I use the framing theoretical perspective specific to social movements studies, in order to highlight the connections between art and political solidarity through the analysis of the exhibition "Southern Constellations. The Poetics of the Non-Aligned" that took place in 2019 in Ljubljana. From a methodological point of view, my analysis of cultural exchanges between non-aligned countries is set up within a frame narrative – a narrative within a narrative. What I am particularly interested in is not so much the description of the cultural diplomacy in the context of the Non-Aligned Movement *per se*, but rather how the story of those events is told almost thirty years after the formal breakup of Yugoslavia. In the end, I try to argue that the international artistic exchanges contributed decisively to the creation and use of new meanings and narratives that eventually generated frame resonance in terms of geo-political strategies.

Keywords: Artistic exchanges, cultural diplomacy, frame resonance, frame narrative, the Non-Aligned Movement, Yugoslavia.

1. Introduction

The Cold War era is particularly known for the geo-political and ideological dichotomy between the Soviet and the American blocks. The tensions between them had implications on a large part of the globe, and generated a relatively complex system of alliances and partnerships. However, not all states were happy with this world order. Those that decided to stay neutral formed their own system of alliances and partnerships called the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

[*] PhD, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza University" of Iasi/ "George Enescu" National University of Arts, Romania; email: margaritdiana@yahoo.fr.

Born in 1961, at the highest pick of the animosities between East and West which culminated one year later with the Cuban Missile Crisis, the NAM struggled to represent the common interests of those states from South-East Asia, Africa, Latin America (and even Europe), the Southern hemisphere, on their path to decolonization. In 1961, at the Belgrade Summit, the five initiators of the movement (the Yugoslav president Josip Tito, the Egyptian president Gamal Nasser, the Indian prime-minister Jawaharlal Nehru, the Ghanaian president Kwame Nkrumah and the Indonesian president Sukarno) met for the first time within the formal political context of the Non-Aligned Movement in order to set up the agenda of their cooperation. Nevertheless, the origins of the movement can be traced back ten years prior to the first NAM summit. In 1951, African and Asian states met at the Bandung Conference, in Indonesia, to discuss the necessity to cooperate and support each other against colonialism and imperialism, by declaring their neutrality towards the two main power blocks.

After the first NAM conference organized in 1961, the participants left with mixed feelings and almost unsatisfied with the discussions. Soon after, they agreed that a second conference was imperative and that more Southern countries should join the movement. The Soviet Union expressed its support both for the movement and for the idea of a second, more encompassing conference (History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive 1964). Step by step, NAM increased the number of its members from all continents and became the second largest organization in terms of membership after the United Nations.

The non-aligned foreign policy of the member states had not only a geopolitical dimension, but it was also a "state of mind", as Gopal puts it. "It was the natural expression of peoples who were again raising their voice after many years of suppression" (Gopal 1976, 4), who were genuinely convinced that they would be able to find their own path without interfering with their former colonists. The creation of NAM had two main reasons: a) a reactive one in respect especially to the European powers who had controlled for centuries largest parts of the world – this explains why Soviet Union sympathized with the idea of a third geo-political configuration that would diminish the number of future possible allies of the Western world; b) a proactive one – the NAM countries decided to cooperate because by being together they were hoping to support each other during the long and sometimes violent processes of achieving their autonomy and independence. At the same time, they were all in search of an identity, symbols and rituals that could express their true inner self as nations. All these newly formed nations were convinced that by sharing a common past of oppression and colonialism they would easily achieve consensus within the movement. This explains why this movement did not get a formal institutional

expression, permanent structures and voting procedures other than the consensus until the '90s. In the end, their reluctance to create permanent institutions was an understandable reaction caused by the fear of new forms of domination and oppression. Unfortunately, the conference system - based on summits organized every three years – failed to strengthen their ties. After the Havana Summit in 1979, J. Graham noticed: "[…] the NAM has remained an essentially amorphous group, struggling to surmount its own internal differences and quarrels in order to promote consensual concerns" (Graham 1980, 153).

Nevertheless, during the Cold War era, NAM behaved rather as a social movement and less as an international organization like, for instance, the United Nations. It encompassed states, political leaders and diplomats that manifested their shared disapproval toward the antagonistic political order – between East and West –, stood up together and took a collective stance on political matters such as anti-colonialism, self-determination of peoples, respect for sovereignty and mutual support. All these elements became part of the movement *per se* and shaped its distinct identity, despite the geographical and sometimes political heterogeneity of its members (Dinkel 2018, 13-14).

From the very beginning, Yugoslavia played a major part in the organization of the movement. The fact that the first conference was hosted by Tito in Belgrade reflects the openness of the political regime towards the developing countries in the Southern Hemisphere and its willingness to stand aside from the political rivalries between the European super-powers, as well as to find new partners with similar views on domestic governance and foreign policy. Even though it did not have a colonial past, nor was it confronted with an imminent threat like other leading countries of the movement, Yugoslavia joined it because it was afraid that the European rivalries might jeopardize its independence. Moreover, its socialist regime – distinct from the Soviet one – did find some echoes in the socialist regimes of the Southern developing countries (Stojanovic 1981, 445-446). Thus, by playing an active role within the movement, it became one of its leading voices in the '60s and '70s, something it could have never dreamt of after the End of the Second World War. In just twenty years, from the isolated state it once was, Yugoslavia became a central power within the NAM. Its socio-economic policy based on workers' self-management, as well as its initiatives at the United Nations on sanctioning the acts of aggression, defining the diplomatic laws and creating the premises for the doctrine of peaceful coexistence increased its visibility and influence.

The Yugoslav efforts to strengthen the relations between the NAM countries covered many areas from strategic partnerships, political and economic alliances to cultural diplomacy. More precisely, cultural diplomacy through art transformed the heterogeneity of the NAM members into an

asset for promoting cohesion and self-awareness among them. After its expulsion from Cominform, that took place in June 1948, Tito needed to present himself as the leader of a country whose economy, industry and culture were flourishing far away from the Soviet influence. The Yugoslav propaganda was portraying the country as the land of the "multinational and multicultural community" (Ugresic 1994, 26), a "*terra vergine*" where socialism and consumerism were making a perfect couple (Zimmermann 2016). This idyllic picture of Yugoslavia was immediately transferred into a foreign policy vision that a future possible program for NAM that would transform it into in an international peaceful community where aggression, neocolonialism and imperialism no longer existed. Art decisively contributed to the dissemination of these ideas through cultural exchanges with the Western world (Unterkofler 2018), as well as with the communist or non-aligned ones.

This paper seeks to understand the nature and the means of cultural exchanges between Yugoslavia and the other non-aligned countries through the lens of an exhibition that took place in 2019 (7 March - 31 August) in Ljubljana, "Southern Constellations. The Poetics of the Non-Aligned" that focused precisely on this topic. By placing it in a new context, in which Yugoslavia no longer exists, the exhibition seeks to explore the possible contemporaneity of the NAM. Thus, from a methodological point of view, my interpretation of the cultural and artistic exchanges between Yugoslavia and other non-aligned countries will be filtered through the frame narrative perspective – a story within a story. At the same time, by using the conceptual tools provided by framing theory– as a social movement's theory – I try to argue that artistic exchanges between Yugoslavia and the rest of the non-aligned countries generated narrative frames that consolidated their political cohesion.

2. Theoretical framework

Frames are structures that help individuals and groups to detect and understand occurrences from their private and collective experience both individually and as members of collectivities. They have the role of encoding and decoding experience. Simply put, they are packages of meaning (Jasper 2007, 76) and thus, collective action frames express the specificities of the group, its values, norms and environment, based on collective identity (Gamson 2015). In this respect, the framing perspective (Gamson and Meyer 1996) within the discipline concerned with the study of social movements offers a complex insight into how a member of community (an individual or even a state) perceives, presents him/herself to the rest of the society and how they determine the coagulation and the

spread of these frames within society. According to Benford and Snow, frames are

> action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement organization. […] [They] are constructed in part as movement adherents negotiate a shared understanding of some problematic condition or situation they define as in need of change, make attributions regarding who or what is to blame, articulate an alternative set of arrangements, and urge other to act in concert to affect change. (Benford and Snow 2000, 614-615)

Framing processes may comprise simultaneously or separately three dimensions: one which provides the evaluation of reality as diagnostic, another which provides solutions and a third one which motivates and mobilize the actor based on the previous two assumptions. Differently put, diagnostic framing refers to the way the movement depicts its issues and detects the responsible agents for the situation they intend to change, whilst prognostic framing, which usually follows the diagnostic one, proposes an action plan to solve the encountered problem. Motivational framing addresses the construction of narratives that help members to bond and bystanders to join the movement. It is a mandatory task for the engaging and mobilizing processes (Benford and Snow 2000, 615-618).

Frames are symbolically constructed in order to produce frame resonance, that is a set of meanings that coincide with others' meanings and understandings (Snow and Benford 1988). Movements must define their boundaries and frames within an ideological and social structure framework (Oliver and Johnston, 2000; Veigh et al. 2004) for its members to act together. Each narrative can become a framing narrative for another narrative by simply containing it. "Framing narratives can, and often do, play a vital role in the narratives they frame" (Porter Abbott 2008, 29). In the case of my paper, the exhibition organized in Ljubljana becomes a framing narrative for the narrative of the artistic exchanges between Yugoslavia and the other non-aligned fellow states during the Cold War era.

3. *Southern Constellations*. A "Russian doll"-type narrative

The exhibition "Southern Constellations: The Poetics of the Non-Aligned" was one of the many activities within a two-years collaborative project New Mappings of Europe, under the coordination of several cultural and artistic institutions from Serbia, Slovenia, United Kingdom and Austria. The project program comprised several exhibitions, a conference on the contemporaneity of the NAM, artistic residences and several other educational and community lunches (New Mappings of Europe 2019a). The exhibition hosted by the Museum of Contemporary Art Metelkova,

Ljubljana, was curated by Bojana Piškur, a curator at the Museum of Modern Art in Ljubljana whose research was focused on the NAM, the artistic Yugoslav post-avantgarde and the artistic exchanges between Yugoslavia and Latin America. More than twenty artists and artistic associations from all over the world were invited to exhibit their work. The heterogeneity of the artists who exhibited their creations and their diverse geographical provenance reflect the heterogeneity of the non-aligned states.

The title of the exhibition is a metaphor for the past struggles and misfortunes of many southern states of the globe who stood up against their oppressors and created their own independent forums of cooperation. At least from this point of view, they are like the astronomical constellations which are celestial configurations grouped around bright stars, especially noticeable during the night. In a world dominated by two bright stars, the Soviet Union and the United States, who would have hoped to reach a similar status? And, consequently, which were the bright stars of the southern constellations? The answer lies in a mixture of geo-political influence and national self-awareness and conscience. From the point of view of the curator, Bojana Piškur, Yugoslavia was one of those bright stars that consolidated its influence within the movement by using, among others, ideological and symbolic instruments through cultural exchanges.

Even though the texts of the catalogue barely suggest the propagandistic display of the Yugoslav greatness at that time, it is obvious that the cultural and artistic exchanges initiated by Tito were intended to exert what Joseph Nye calls "soft power". According to Nye, soft power is "the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideas, and policies" (Nye 2005, X). Tito understood that by creating (and being part of) a movement whose members would share the same vision of a world that protects the sovereignty of the states, his international influence would increase.

Art was one of those fields in which Tito invested many national resources – artists, money, domestic and diplomatic political structures. Teja Merhar's text on the relationship between Yugoslavia and the member states of NAM (Merhar 2019, 43-72) reveals an impressive number of cultural conventions signed with representatives from all continents. The golden age of these conventions was the '60s and the '70s. They continued during the eighth decade of the last century, but not with the same intensity as during the previous ones. Even though the author does not offer an explanation for the artistic rush from the '60s and '70s, in my opinion it is related to Tito himself and his foreign policy. Tito died in May 1980, and as in the case of most dictatorships, the spark of the political regime, at least in the way the deceased leader envisaged it, started fading. Another revealing

aspect of these cultural cooperation is, from my perspective, the coincidence between the Yugoslav artistic exhibitions and the NAM conferences or Tito's visits. Even though the author refers to coincidences, this seems rather a deliberative action. From the large list of cultural conventions and exchanges that Merhar could find in the archives, four of them bear the sign of this strange "coincidence": a) in Brazil, in 1963, the Yugoslav exhibition coincides with Tito's visit; b) in United Arab Republic (Egypt), in 1964, the Yugoslav exhibition coincides with the 2nd NAM conference; c) in Sri Lanka, in 1976, the Yugoslav exhibition coincides with the 5th NAM conference; d) in Cuba, in 1979, the Yugoslav exhibition is planned to coincide with the 6th NAM conference, but the archives fail to confirm that it really happened.

Why was art so important for the cohesion of NAM members and implicitly, for Tito? First, even though NAM was born as a political movement, it soon covered many different areas of cooperation, from economic and financial reciprocal support to cultural exchanges. Moreover, the narratives of NAM state leaders often invoked cultural emancipation as a tool against cultural, ideological and economic imperialism. "The affirmation of cultural identity, in fact, underlies the will to establish a new international economic order in which the appreciation of the values of different civilizations could contribute towards defining original models of endogenous development" (UN General Assembly 1979, 141). Thus, culture became both the *ethos* and the *logos* for affirming their state sovereignty. This was one of those areas of cooperation that celebrated and praised diversity, national specificities, ethnic and linguistic historical heterogeneity. Moreover, many states from Latin America, Africa and Asia were claiming their emancipation through cultural revolution. The harsh critique of Western imperialism and its permanent interest in meddling with their internal affairs were shaping what we have previously called the diagnostic framing. Based on that, they created new narratives, prognostic frames in which art and culture played a decisive role. Artists would no longer see Western art as an artistic reference point. On the contrary, they would search inspiration and resources in their own countries, and they would get affiliated to the foreign policy of the political regime. They would put themselves in the service of national interests and would use their art as weapons against neocolonialism, capitalism and cultural imperialism.

Secondly, the regime was encouraging artists to participate to international exhibitions, as agreed in the terms of the cultural conventions. The political leaders considered art as an incentive for motivational frames. From their perspective, artistic exchanges would strengthen the cooperation between the non-aligned states by offering each other the opportunity to express their inner self as a nation and, at the same time, to better know

their fellow members. In other words, art became the medium for frame resonance. During the '60s and '70s, the non-aligned countries were willing to taste their freedom, make political experiments, encourage cooperation, find more political allies and cultivate their friendship. The vibe of NAM was so contagious that after achieving its independence, each territory would join the movement.

Art and politics were so connected that invitations for international artists were intermediated by embassies that, in some cases, were even responsible for the selection of the artists according to the official political exigencies. The recruitment policy for the 1975 international exhibition at the Art Pavilion Slovenj Gradec, in Yugoslavia, confirms it:

> as for artists from non-aligned countries, the documents reveal that the collaboration with such countries was highly encouraged on the political level. […] gallery representatives traveled to Belgrade on two occasions to visit various embassies and try to establish political contacts to get artists interested in participating. (Hribernik and Hergold Germ 2019, 85)

In addition, the institution appointed to deal with international artistic exchanges, the Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, had to prepare cultural conventions with strategic states and create programs that would promote Yugoslav artists and would present the country as an innovative and creative space for art production.

Despite the formal opposition of Yugoslavia to the Western world, the political decisions with respect to different artistic events were showing a different reality.

> The Ljubljana Biennial laureates tended to be artists from Western countries […], while artists from the Third World countries were often 'only' awarded purchase awards […]. […] as mentioned above, the biennial was oriented toward the West and followed the Western art canons. […] While Yugoslav political manifestos of the time espoused the grand ideas of anti-colonialism, de-colonialism, and the struggle against cultural imperialism, the practice tended to be different. (Piškur and Merhar 2019, 173-174)

This proves that the Yugoslav regime was playing a double game and its opportunistic decisions were meant to take advantage from all possible associations, both with the Western countries and with the non-aligned world.

Southern Constellations does not only seek to provide a documentation on the artistic manifestations within the broader framework of cultural exchanges between Yugoslavia and other member state of NAM. In my opinion, it is also an expression of Yugo-nostalgia, even though on the website of the project it is stated: "The topics covered in the exhibition are not to be considered some kind of exoticism of the past, nor do they harbor nostalgia for the movement itself" (New Mappings of Europe 2019b).

There are some excerpts from the exhibition catalogue ["NAM-inspired Internationalism nevertheless had a significant force, which probably represented one of the movement's greatest potentials, one that is largely forgotten today (page 21), "putting forward a model for a peaceful coexistence of the first, second and third worlds-if only in art and culture" (page 174)] that suggest, in my opinion, a peculiar Yugo-nostalgic feeling not necessarily related to the history of Yugoslavia as a non-aligned member, but rather to the fantasy of its potentiality.

After the dismantlement of Yugoslavia in 1991, the cultural experience of Yugo-nostalgia, "nostalgia for the fantasies associated with a country, the SFRY" (Lindstrom 2005, 233) appeared as a psycho-social remedy against the separatist movements that shredded the country. The Yugoslav state disappeared in 1991 along with its membership of NAM. Thirty years prior, in Tito's view, the principles of brotherhood and closeness embodied in the federative configuration of the Yugoslav state were to be translated at the international level, as a regulatory principle for the NAM. *Mutatis mutandis*, NAM had a similar faith to Yugoslavia. It did not vanish, but the noble ideals of peaceful brotherhood collapsed as soon as its members started giving up their engagements and invading their fellow members. Their former comradeship became nothing more than an empty word. For this reason, the exhibition in Ljubljana can be interpreted as the expression of nostalgia for new beginnings, for the enthusiasm and richness of ideals and hopes that accompany new beginnings.

In the context of the dominant ideologies that nowadays undeniably proclaim the supremacy of the neoliberal and capitalist order, "Southern Constellations" recontextualizes the relevance of a governmental movement based on principles such as formal equality, reciprocal recognition, mutual support and solidarity in achieving independence and autonomy. Almost fifty years later after the first NAM conference, the violent interactions between some of the member states (see, e.g. the former/actual military conflicts between Iran and Iraq, India and Pakistan, the Gulf War, the Yemeni Civil War, Saudi Arabia's military offensives against Yemen, Bahrain, Iran during the past twenty years and so on) have casted black shades over the organization. Its high hopes against neocolonialism and imperialism seem to have been replaced by civil wars and conflicts with neighboring states over ethnic, religious and territorial claims. Even though it represents the largest political organization in terms of membership after the United Nations, it's efficiency in respect to its former goals is debatable. What the NAM seems to be missing, among others, is a trustworthy and resonant voice that could express the core common goals of the movement and seek actions based on them. Undeniably, Yugoslavia next to other states like India, Egypt, Ghana or Cuba, was one of them. The future of NAM

remains uncertain and so does the possibility of an efficient and promising leadership.

The artistic exchanges that took place between the NAM states as a result of their cultural conventions expressed their willingness to strengthen their ties within the movement, as well as their need to find new ways of expressing their identities. "Southern Constellations" attempted to recreate the peculiar enthusiasm which characterized the first decades of the movement, but at the same time it emphasized new struggles that many of its members states are still dealing with nowadays. Their peripheric geo-political and economic position in respect to the unipolar neoliberal and capitalist world maintains them in the same vulnerable situations as in the `60s. Refugee crises, hunger, extreme poverty, exploitation, religious, ethnic and gender discrimination, terrorism continue to threaten the life of billions of people. At least from this perspective, alternative narratives as those provided by artistic events such as this exhibition which may emphasize their struggles and needs could be the beginning of a new and truly decolonizing era.

4. Conclusions

Ever since its beginnings, NAM has provided vital support for its members, mostly newly born countries that achieved their independence after centuries of exploitation and domination. One of the states that initiated the movement was Yugoslavia, whose recent history was different from that of Latin-American or African countries. However, Tito's actions after the end of the World War II marginalized the country and weakened its geo-political position. For Yugoslavia, as well as for most of the countries located in the southern part of the globe, NAM embodied the common struggle against imperialism, colonialism, interference of Western countries in their internal affairs. It chose a third way distinct from the political and ideological antagonism between the United States – and the Western world – and the Soviet Union – and its communist satellites.

One of the elements which undeniably contributed to the cohesion of the member states was culture and, more precisely, art. Through cultural conventions, the non-aligned countries made fruitful artistic exchanges that helped them raise their self-awareness as nations and create forums of cooperation that enforced their political commitments. The main purpose of this paper was to determine the nature and the basis of the artistic exchanges initiated by Yugoslavia with other NAM members, based on the exhibition "Southern Constellations. The Poetics of the Non-Aligned" that took place in Ljubljana in 2019. Thus, I was rather interested in the story of the cultural exchanges in the way it was narrated by this exhibition. From

this perspective, my analysis uses the literary technique of the frame narrative – a story within a story or a "Russian doll"-type story.

Nevertheless, I have read the catalogue of the exhibition from a political perspective and not an artistic one. I tried to point out that artistic exchanges initiated both by Yugoslavia and other non-aligned states had many political implications – they were commissioned by the state for political purposes. For this reason, they were relevant instruments in exerting soft power within a broader international context. Moreover, by using framing theory – as applied in social movements studies –, I highlighted the fact that cooperation between NAM states through artistic means shaped their frame resonance - core values and norms that defined both the movement and its members.

References

Abbott, H. P. 2014. *The Cambridge Introduction to Narrative*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Benford, R. D. and D. A. Snow. 2000. "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment". *Annual Review of Sociology* 26: 611-639.

Dinkel, J. 2018. *The Non-Aligned Movement: Genesis, Organization and Politics (1927-1992)*. Leiden: Brill.

Gamson, J. 2015. "The Dilemmas of Identity Politics". In: J. Goodwin and J. M. Jasper (eds.), *The Social Movements Reader: Cases and Concepts*, 354-362. Chichester: Wiley.

Gamson, W. A. and D. S. Meyer. 1996. "Framing Political Opportunity". In: D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy and M. D. Zald (eds.), *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, 275-290. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gopal, S. 1976. "What Is Non-Alignment?" *India International Quarterly* 3(3): 3-7.

Graham, J. 1980. "The Non-Aligned Movement after the Havana Summit". *Journal of International Affairs* 34(1): 153-160.

History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. 1964. "Report on the 1st and 2nd Conference of Non-Aligned Countries", June 26, AMPJSh V. 1961 D 422: 46-51. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110537.

Hribernik, A. and K. Hergold Germ. 2019. "Art Pavilion Slovenj Gradec". In *Southern Constellations. The Poetics of the Non-Aligned* [Exhibition Catalogue], 83-88. Exhibited at Museum of Contemporary Art Metelkova 7 March-31 August 2019.

Jaspers, J. 2007. "Cultural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements". In: B. Klandermans and C. Roggeband (eds.), *Handbook of Social Movements Across Disciplines*, 59-110. New York: Springer.

Lindstrom, N. 2005. "Yugonostalgia: Restorative and Reflective Nostalgia in Former Yugoslavia". *East Central Europe* 32(1-2): 227-237.

Merhar, T. 2019. "International Collaboration in Culture between Yugoslavia and the Countries of the Non-Aligned Movement". In *Southern Constellations. The Poetics of the Non-Aligned* [Exhibition Catalogue], 43-72. Exhibited at Museum of Contemporary Art Metelkova 7 March-31 August 2019.

Moderna galerija. 2019. *Southern Constellations. The Poetics of the Non-Aligned* [Exhibition Catalogue]. Exhibited at Museum of Contemporary Art Metelkova 7 March-31 August 2019.

New Mappings of Europe. 2019a. *Programme*.
    http://www.newmappingsofeurope.si/en/pro gramme.
New Mappings of Europe. 2019b. *Southern Constellations: The Poetics of the Non-Aligned*.
    http://www.newmappingsofeurope.si/en/programme/exhibitions?active=MG-MSUM.
Nye, J. 2005. *Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs.
Oliver, P. E. and H. Johnston. 2000. "What a Good Idea! Frames and Ideologies in Social
    Movement Research". *Mobilization. An International Quarterly* 4(1): 37-54.
Piškur, B. and T. Merhar. 2019. "Third World: Prints from the Non-Aligned Countries at
    the International Biennial Exhibitions of Graphic Arts in Ljubljana between 1961-
    1991". *Southern Constellations. The Poetics of the Non-Aligned* [Exhibition Catalogue],
    171-174. Exhibited at Museum of Contemporary Art Metelkova 7 March-31
    August 2019.
Snow, D. A. and R. D. Benford. 1988. "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant
    Mobilization". In: B. Klandermans, H. Kriesi and S. G. Tarrow (eds.), *From
    Structure to Action: Social Movement Participation Across Cultures*, 197-217. Greenwich:
    JAI Press.
Stojanovic, R. 1981. "The Emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement: A View from
    Belgrade". *Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law* 13(3): 443-450.
Ugresic, D. 1994. "The Culture of Lies". *Index of Censorship* 23(1-2): 23-43.
UN General Assembly. 1979. *6th Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-
    Aligned Movement*.
    http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official_Document/6[th]_Summit
    _FD_Havana_Declaration_1979_Whole.pdf.
Unterkofler, D. 2018. "Connection with the World: Internationalism and New Art Practice
    in Yugoslavia". In: K. Cseh-Varga and A. Czirak (eds.), *Performance Art in the Second
    Public Sphere. Event-Based Art in Late Socialist Europe*, 45-59. Oxon: Routledge.
Veigh, R., Myers, D. J. and D. Sikkink. 2004. "Corn, Klansmen, and Coolidge: Structure
    and Framing in Social Movements". *Social Forces* 83(2): 653-690.
Zimmermann, T. 2016. "The Visualization of the Third Way in Tito's Yugoslavia". In: J.
    Bazin, P. Dubourg Glatigny and P. Piotrowski (eds.), *Art beyond Borders: Artistic
    Exchange in Communist Europe (1945-1989)*, 473-484. Budapest: CEU Press.

Pierre-Antoine PONTOIZEAU [*]

Note de lecture

(*La philosophie de la limite chez Jean Ladrière*, ouvrage collectif sous la direction
de Louis Perron et Pierre-Antoine Pontoizeau,
Presses universitaires de Louvain, 2019, 252 p.)

Jean Ladrière a abordé tous les secteurs de la philosophie et de l'expérience humaine. L'un des vecteurs fondamentaux de cette réflexion est la problématique des limites de la rationalité tant sur le plan théorique que pratique. Sa contribution à la compréhension des limites a éclairé plusieurs générations et ses contributions sur l'éthique, la société, la nature sont d'une grande actualité. Mathématicien et philosophe, il est l'auteur d'une magistrale synthèse en 1957 : *Les limitations internes des formalismes,* qui récapitule toutes les recherches des mathématiciens concourant à éclairer le principe d'incomplétude de Gödel. Ladrière exprime une limite, celle d'un système logique qui ne peut jamais se clore sur lui-même jusqu'à parfaire son autonomie : l'inaccessible réflexivité

Cet ouvrage collectif explore la pensée des limites en lien avec son expérience dans les recherches actuelles et dans les questions contemporaines. Se confronter à la limite et à ce qui la déborde, c'est aussi l'exercice proposé au lecteur. En effet, réunissant des mathématiciens, physiciens, philosophes et théologiens permet d'éprouver l'existence de nos limites, voire l'incommensurabilité des savoirs. Il s'y joue l'expérience de ces limites au regard de l'immensité des champs des connaissances, avec cette curiosité qui permet d'articuler des sens et de relier des champs de connaissance à ceux qui le sont moins ; mais qui furent familiers pour Ladrière.

Mathilde Bataille (Louvain) fait un portrait précis qui resitue l'œuvre de Jean Ladrière dans l'histoire de la philosophie, montrant toute la valeur d'un auteur qui a su récapituler dès les années cinquante la somme des savoirs les plus récents en mathématique tout en investissant des champs tels l'éthique, l'articulation du sens, les relations entre la raison et les croyances ou la foi.

Le lecteur trouvera des textes émanant de mathématiciens, physiciens, logiciens et épistémologues.

Celui de Jean-Paul Delahaye (*Lille*) s'intéresse à la force axiomatique du hasard. Il reprend les conclusions de Gödel concernant l'incomplétude et interroge les méthodes de complétion. Comment compléter et satisfaire l'exigence de consistance qui voudrait que le système soit plein ? Il souligne

---

[*] Président de Institut de Recherches de Philosophie Contemporaine, Paris, France; email: papontoizeau@gmail.com

que les travaux de Chaitin ou Kolmogorov sur la complexité aboutissent aussi à des indécidables de Gödel. Il fait état des résultats de Bienvenu confirmant encore la limitation de Gödel. J.P. Delahaye en conclut que le phénomène d'incomplétude est entre mathématique et philosophie des mathématiques et que « toute philosophie des mathématiques se doit d'en rendre compte et d'en fournir la compréhension » (p.53). Il est alors question de complexité et de hasard, soit d'information à ajouter sans pour autant éviter l'incomplétude.

Bertrand Hespel (*Namur*), élève de Ladrière, fait un remarquable exposé des inégalités de Bell en mécanique quantique. Il rappelle que les expériences violent systématiquement ces relations que les mesures devraient respecter dans l'hypothèse d'une théorie déterministe locale. B. Hespel en tire quelques enseignements. Cette situation entrouvre la porte à une autre compréhension de ce qui apparaît de prime abord comme l'échec de l'hypothèse initiale. Ceci constitue « un signe difficilement contestable de ce que cette théorie parvient bel et bien à capturer certaines des caractéristiques essentielles de cette réalité non phénoménale que dévoilent ces expériences » (244). La science réintroduit la métaphysique, comme le fait de limitation de Gödel se prolonge de sa théorie des concepts ou chez Ladrière se conclut par ses suggestions de concernant l'articulation du sens.

François Lepage (*Montréal*) s'intéresse aux limites du positivisme logique, travaillant en logicien sur les liens entre la logique et les probabilités. Dans un exposé très formel de logicien, il met progressivement en évidence la part d'intuitionnisme irréductible à tout formalisme. Il insiste sur l'arrière-plan épistémologique et sur les incertitudes inhérentes aux égalités probabilistes, celles-ci conduisant à des décisions contradictoires mais pleinement cohérentes. En rappelant la part de subjectivité inhérente à un jugement des alternatives probabilistes, F. Lepage fait sienne la conclusion de Savage : « Cela n'est pas une critique attentatoire à la logique mais simplement une partie du truisme à l'effet que la logique à elle seule n'est pas un guide exhaustif dans la vie » (193).

Jean-Claude Simard (*Rimouski*) rappelle, à l'instar de M. Guillermin que le positivisme logique a échoué et que la *mathesis universalis* qu'il nomme « réduction interthéorique » est inatteignable depuis les enseignements de Quine et Kuhn en particulier du fait « de l'indétermination de la traduction et de l'inscrutabilité de la référence » (154) et de l'incommensurabilité des paradigmes. Mais il tente de trouver une logique au processus macrohistorique d'industrialisation qui rétroagit sur les sciences. En faisant un remarquable travail de synthèse très documenté, il illustre les propos de Ladrière concernant le caractère opératoire de la science, son projet d'ensemble limité parce qu'il n'englobe pas toute la vie, limitée parce qu'il est ouvert et créatif ; sans capacité de programmer son développement.

Denis Mieville (*Neuchâtel*) s'intéresse à une autre sorte de limite, celle des concepts eux-mêmes qui président à une logique de pensée. Son questionnement revient aux origines de l'incomplétude qui traduit certes les limites d'un système lors de son déploiement en vue de sa complétude, mais qui révèle dans son incomplétude les limites intrinsèques des premiers concepts et figures de pensée. D. Mieville en fait l'objet de son propos en signalant que Ladrière : « permet en effet de penser à une deuxième catégorie de limités à dépasser, celles des formes du langage logique accepté alors, des formes qui expriment un champ d'expressions plutôt restreint, des formes qui s'ouvrent aux dépassements » (59). Il interroge la distinction syntaxico-sémantique et rappelle l'inventivité et la créativité des logiciens dont celui qui lui est familier : Stanislas Lesniewski. Il indique alors que la logique ne cherche pas à enfermer et contraindre mais au contraire à « offrir une langue logique d'une richesse incomparable » (63).

Mathieu Guillermin (*Lyon*) fait un détour par les épistémologues dont Feyerabend, Kuhn et Putnam auquel il a consacré sa thèse. En exposant les principaux traits de la pensée de Putnam, il décrit des formes de limitations théoriques et pratiques. D'abord celle de l'incommensurabilité qui manifeste tout à la fois une limite effective et une seconde qui tient aux problématiques inhérentes à une théorie générale unifiée des savoirs. Immédiatement, l'incommensurabilité introduit la sensibilité au contexte qui rappelle la limite historique de Ladrière. La limite est présente chez Kuhn qu'il cite : « la démarche scientifique ne dispose d'aucun autre point d'appui archimédien que celui historiquement situé et déjà en place » (115) et Putnam « nous partons d'où nous sommes. Nous ne pouvons que partir d'où nous sommes » (115). Et sa conclusion fait échos à la notion d'articulation du sens cher à Ladrière : « les limites des discours descriptifs pourraient se comprendre comme des seuils ouvrant à un ou des univers de sens » (136).

D'autres textes sont plus philosophiques et mettent l'œuvre de Ladrière en perspective d'une pensée de la limite éclairée par quelques auteurs de référence.

Jean-Michel Counet (*Louvain*) ose un rapprochement à travers les siècles avec Nicolas de Cues et Immanuel Kant parce qu'ils ont en commun de « réfléchir d'une façon féconde aux limites de la rationalité et tous trois vont attribuer à la relation entre philosophie et mathématique un rôle paradigmatique majeur » (139). Il montre que leur conception des mathématiques induit toujours une limite. Et reprenant le constat de Ladrière quant à l'impossible actualisation de la pensée, J.M. Counet évoque l'impossible coïncidence de la pensée dans une pleine réflexivité. La limite est le fait de la condition humaine, concluant que « existence et formalisme n'ont rien d'antinomique, mais constituent deux pôles d'une unique expérience humaine que la philosophie doit s'efforcer d'articuler au mieux » (149).

Constantin Salavastru (*Iasi*) approfondit le sens des limites dans une brillante synthèse de l'histoire de la logique. Il rappelle les paradoxes antiques et contemporains de la théorie des ensembles de Russell. Il souligne la limite de l'autoréférentialité introduisant la crise de la théorie axiomatique et l'infondation formelle des prémisses faisant le lien avec l'intuitionnisme initial étudié par Lepage : « Il s'agit d'un nouveau « regressus ad infinitum » qui oblige à l'arrêt de cet acte de fondation et au fait d'assumer les premisses ultimes par l'intuition » (32). C. Salavastru poursuit l'inventaire des limites par l'incomplétude de Gödel qui introduit celle de la métalangue et ses complexités de nature et d'articulation avec le formalisme. Il en conclut à la nécessité d'une réflexion critique : « toute la pensée travaille par l'intermédiaire des actes de limitation et ces actes de la limitation s'équilibrent réciproquement » (43).

Louis Perron (*Ottawa*) a consacré une œuvre de référence à Ladrière et à la notion d'*Eschaton*. D'emblée, il choisit une approche existentielle parce que : « cette approche existentielle apparaît de plus en plus présente chez le Ladrière de la maturité. Elle met en valeur l'expérience profonde des contemporains, l'éprouvé, le ressenti sous-jacent à la conscience historique » (11). La limite dit quelque chose de la « finitude humaine ». Elle brise l'élan des Lumières et « nous faisons l'expérience des limites de nos pouvoirs » (13). L. Perron rappelle la crise des fondements et l'acuité des conclusions de Ladrière concernant les « limitations internes, épistémologiques de la raison » (15). Il analyse le contexte des science sociales où Ladrière décrit : « une raison enracinée dans l'expérience du monde vécu, incapable de réflexion totale, absolue, parce que portée par une subjectivité finie » (15). Il introduit alors les thèmes de la relation au futur, de l'espérance et de l'historicité témoignant que la limitation ouvre à la « vision de l'aube ».

Mathilde Bataille (*Louvain*) est une spécialiste de l'œuvre de Ladrière auquel elle consacre sa thèse. Elle met en lumière l'inspiration de Wittgenstein et des limites du langage qui ne peut pas tout dire et de sa relation au monde qu'il pourrait prétendre englober. Elle montre comment à la suite de Wittgenstein, Ladrière réfute « la logique absolue », rappelant que : « la logique absolue présuppose ce qu'elle a pour fonction de réaliser, elle cherche ce qu'elle postule, à savoir ce qui du point de vue de l'absolu, se donne comme l'identité du réel et de la pensée. » (89). Plus qu'une confrontation entre le formalisme et ce qu'il représente, M. Bataille insiste sur la raison créatrice de Ladrière, raison pratique à l'œuvre où « se nouent l'univers propre de la raison comme principe d'organisation et l'altérité du monde. » (96).

Hubert Faes (*Paris*) explore l'implicite de la négation de la limite où l'on s'abstrait de toutes les finitudes. Il montre comment Ladrière ne s'arrête pas au constat des limites formelles et que son œuvre développe une philosophie de toutes les limites : celle de l'existence et des ressources naturelles. Cette finitude du monde rend l'illimité inaccessible et invite à une pratique

raisonnable de la raison : « être raisonnable pour elle, c'est se soucier moins du développement infini de son pouvoir que du fini, non seulement de ce qu'ont de limité ses réalisations, mais des limites à mettre à ces réalisations en fonction de leur sens et de leur portée dans l'existence actuelle » (108). Sans le nommer, H. Faes développe une éthique de la raison raisonnée en concluant à propos de la finitude existentielle : « cette condition ouvre le monde à l'action humaine responsable, à travers laquelle la raison découvre ce qu'elle peut espérer en étant raisonnable » (109).

Pierre-Antoine Pontoizeau (*Paris*) interroge les limites internes des formalismes en reprenant les constats posés déjà par Nicolas de Cues sur l'inadéquation des symboles finies évoquant des objets excédant la finitude. Mais, surtout, il resitue Ladrière par rapport à Tillich qui dès 1951 distingue la raison sémantique produisant indéfiniment du sens et la raison instrumentale fantasmant un formalisme panmathématique. Il fait ensuite un parallèle avec la pensée du mathématicien Grothendieck pour entrouvrir la voix aux théories de concepts. Celles-ci montrent qu'existe une science qui précèdent les calculs, la limite étant alors ce seuil qui atteste de ces langages et des mondes dans les intuitions initiales et dans des langages en dehors du formalisme incomplet.

Enfin, un texte fait le lien entre foi et raison, thème cher à Jean Ladrière où la théologienne Thérèse Nadeau-Lacour (*Québec*) fait le lien entre l'*excédence* et la limite dans un bel exercice d'herméneutique. Elle explique le parcours de Ladrière développant son projet d'une « articulation des différentes rationalités » dont celle de la théologie. Elle s'appuie sur la préface que Ladrière fit à sa thèse. L'élucidation des textes révèle l'excédence, ce que le texte évoque indirectement. T. Nadeau-Lacour l'applique à la Lettre VII aux Romains d'Ignace d'Antioche. Elle tire de cet exercice deux voies de dépassement, celle du renversement de la conscience au-delà d'un langage voué à la représentation passant de l'intention à l'attention, celle d'un dépassement existentiel où le texte devient locution, parole animée manifestant la présence. « Il s'agit là d'une heureuse limite » (216) de l'expérience chrétienne « habitée à la fois par des limites et par une excédence » (215). Son exercice est remarquable d'érudition.

Ouvrage rare mais dense qui peut manquer parfois de pédagogie mais qui témoigne de la complexité de la transition épistémologique occidentale en cours, par sa richesse interdisciplinaire, éprouvant la limite des pratiques des différentes sciences. Ces chercheurs ont montré toute la fécondité de la pensée de Ladrière. Quelques idées maîtresses traversent leurs approches à la façon d'une articulation souterraine du sens : la limite du logos et de la connaissance, la manifestation d'autres dimensions : l'intuition, l'inscription historique, la création indéterminée sans oublier des complétudes par le hasard, l'excédence du sens ou la théorie des concepts et la manifestation de la finitude.

Bogdan GUGUIANU [*]

Classical Style as Achievement
of the Living Philosophy

(Constantin-Ionuţ Mihai *Retorică și convertire în filosofia antică. Un studiu asupra literaturii protreptice,* Iași: Editura Universităţii "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" din Iași, 2018, 310 p.)

Among the books published by "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University Press in 2018, Constantin-Ionuţ Mihai's *Rhetoric and Conversion in Ancient Philosophy* cannot go unnoticed. The study is basically an in-depth analysis of the concept of "protreptic" (προτρεπτικός), which has been sparsely explored in the field until now. Conceived initially as a PhD thesis, the research is now highly regarded among the volumes whose purpose is to lay emphasis on the particularities of ancient philosophy. The author is hardly a novice when it comes to tackling this subject: it represents the core element of his philosophical approach in his numerous articles and presentations for various scientific events.

What strikes you first is his simple, concise, incisive style which maintains its undiluted consistency throughout the whole work. The text is not stylistically heavy and the narrative is fluid – qualities of a classical style rarely encountered in our authors' repertoires nowadays. The footnotes emerge at the right moment and straighten out any dilemma the reader may be confronted with, offering an instrumentation which is not too tiresome, abundant or intrusive. The author's understanding of classical philology is also relevant, without which a scientific text of such a broad reach would be impossible to elaborate.

Regarding the target audience of this kind of text, we can identify, *grosso modo*, at least two categories of readers: the neophytes in the matter of Ancient classical philosophy and the connoisseurs of it. For the former, the book offers valuable information about Ancient culture and its protagonists through an accessible and digestible content. For the latter though, the present study fits into that category of mandatory works for anyone interested in the field. The subtle and complex perspective on what philosophy meant in the Ancient times, sustained by quotes and excerpts from the classics' works, can offer the expert in the matter a more-than-welcomed support for the identification of the authorial intention and the argumentation's framework.

[*] "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iași, Romania; e-mail: bogdan.guguianu@yahoo.com

The book is made up of five carefully elaborated chapters, structured as an algorithm of analysis. The intentions of the research, clearly specified in the introduction, are painstakingly followed throughout the study, which shows the author's respect for the reader. But what are these intentions? First of all, the work's purpose matches the author's desire to offer those interested in the subject a journey into the history and signification of exhortative philosophical discourse. Other intentions add up to this one, such as: defining the literary species which boosts the interest in philosophy, interpreting texts of the authors who were preoccupied with these kinds of enterprises and from whom these types of texts were preserved and, last but not least, outlining the "protreptic" as a cultural phenomenon in Greek and Latin antiquity. Obviously, the whole process of theorizing about these issues takes into account the historical and cultural context.

Leafing through: the first chapter (19-76) offers a bird's eye view of this literary species; the second one (77-116) aims to present the particularities of Plato's protreptic (the dialogues *Euthydemos, Gorghias, Phaidon*); the third one (117-174) analyzes Aristotle's *Protrepticus*; the fourth one (175-240) takes into consideration Marcus Tulius Cicero's dialogue *Hortensius*, and the last one (241-280) highlights the major importance of the study of philosophy for Ancient personalities as reflected in the protreptic works in which the acquisition of virtue was always at stake.

About the book, in greater detail. The introduction and the first chapter of the book theorize about different aspects related to the meanings and the history of Ancient rhetorical and philosophical traditions. These fragments contain highly relevant issues such as elements related to the genesis of this type of literary species, more precisely the warfare context in which it was born (most probably caused by the feuds between rhetoric, sophistic, philosophy and medicine schools who were in search of disciples). Then the focus is on the characteristics and particularities of this kind of discourse, and on referencing the authors who embraced it. The rant between researchers about the special status of literary species ascribed to the protreptic is discussed in the first chapter too. It is not neglected the utilitarian character of the protreptic discourse which is permanently regarded as a matter of ideological dispute between doctrines, and implicitly schools of philosophy. This chapter also provides an analysis of terms specific to the exhortative discourse (προτροπή, συμβουλή, παράκλησις, παραίνεσις), focusing mostly on the context in which they are employed in relation to the core concept of the study.

The second chapter mostly concentrates on the analysis of Plato's discourse which is tributary to the exhortative style. It is also discussed the most important feature of the protreptic's bipartite structure: *disproof* (ἔλεγχος), which consists of criticizing the ideology embraced by the actor or rival

school's doctrine, and *demonstration* (ἔνδειξις), which illustrates the role of supporting the ideas promoted by the emitter of a protreptic discourse. The author's analysis reflects his in-depth knowledge of both Plato's texts and their recurrent motifs (body-spirit relation, the myth, the true knowledge) and of the contextual particularities of the concept of "protreptic". The most seductive moral can be this: the ordinary man's life is opposed to the philosopher's, considering that philosophy is the necessary condition of acquiring happiness.

As I previously mentioned, the third chapter showcases the Stagirite's *Protrepticus*, and it is rather unfortunate that only a few fragments of it have been preserved. Here we find out that various researchers really strove to remain as faithful to that kind of exoteric discourse and as objective as they could in their attempt to restore it, considering that, as in the case of other similar Aristotelian works, they only had bits and pieces to work with. The objectivity can be noticed in the author's interpretation too, especially when he presents the polemics between exegetes regarding the restoration of *Protrepticus*. As he consistently does throughout the entire study, Constantin Ionuț Mihai never seeks to take sides when it comes to the ideas involved in the disputes. The conclusions are formed only after a subtle pondering and analysis of the arguments, thus conferring an honest and logical justification on the general ideas of the text. Following this path, the text will offer important information not only about the Stagirite's body of work, but also about his life, personality, and his intentions in different situations.

The fourth chapter, which is the last one focused on "the author and his work", deals with Marcus Tullius Cicero's dialogue *Hortensius*. Most probably written in a period when the thinker from Arpinum, retired from political life of Rome, needed philosophy more than ever (it's about 46-45 B.C. when Cesar was in his prime), the dialogue has been preserved only partially. It was a "tribute" from Cicero to his own rival rhetorician Hortensius, a celebrated personality of Roman political life who was the supporter of the futility of philosophy. The remained fragments put at our disposal faithfully evoke the tendencies of the exhortative discourse. The author of the study also mentions the essential versions which offer those who are interested salient data about the Ciceronian work's structure and content. It is also analyzed the quality of *medicina animi* attributed to philosophy by Cicero. We cannot neglect the stylistic and literary value of *Hortensius*, considering that it had a huge influence on classics' literature such as Virgil, Seneca, or Quintilian. Still, as a general idea of the exegesis we can identify the fact that the dialogue *Hortensius* contains strong references to works of Plato, Aristotle or Posidonius. It appears that this is rather a conservatory take on the protreptic discourse, grateful and tributary to its inspirational sources.

Finally, I have to lay emphasis on the importance of the last chapter: not only does it represent a well-executed synthesis of information from the previous chapters, but it also explains to the reader what philosophy stood for *in concreto* in Antiquity. He talks about that complex phenomenon defined as *way of life*. Unlike the approaches of contemporary philosophy, it is good to remember that, at least in ancient times, philosophy had also to be lived, not only read or elaborated and preserved in treatises and compendiums. So, back in the day, the attachment to a doctrine meant in the first place that you should turn it into a *modus vivendi*, while presenting it as a theory and a set of ideas was rather a subsidiary objective. The book also deserves the credit for explaining this huge issue the contemporary exegesis has been confronting with for a long time: the split between the philosopher's life and the doctrine according to which he was raised and educated. Thus, philosophical models shouldn't only be sought in the thinker's theses, but also equally in his deeds.

I can definitely state that *Rhetoric and Conversion in Ancient Philosophy* is a remarkable guide for those who want to form a coherent and articulate opinion on the world, philosophy, and classical culture. But the readers can easily be compelled to regard this book as something we may rightfully call a "metadiscourse": it starts by providing a stimulus for studying philosophy, but it also ends up being a call for meditation on the urge of living philosophy.

Cristian MOISUC[*]

Philosophie et théologie – une synthèse patristique[**]

(Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Liturghia cosmică. Lumea în gândirea Sfântului Maxim Mărturisitorul*, Iași: Editura Doxologia, 2018, traducere din limba germană de Pr. Alexandru I. Roșu, 474 p.)

La maison d'édition Doxologia ne se dément pas lorsqu'il s'agit de faire connaître au public roumain des œuvres fondamentales de l'exégèse patristique dédiée aux Pères Grecs.

Dans sa collection *Patristica,* la série *Etudes* (car il y a aussi une série *Traductions*, très active), elle a fait paraître la traduction d'un chef d'œuvre dédié à saint Maxime le Confesseur, à savoir la deuxième édition (celle de 1961) de *Kosmische Liturgie* de Hans Urs von Balthasar. Cette traduction faite par le prêtre Alexandru I. Roșu (né à Iași, en 1981), fin connaisseur de l'allemand, de saint Maxime et de Heidegger (ce qui est, il faut le dire, une performance!), rend accessible aux lecteurs roumains cette grande œuvre d'exégèse dédiée à saint Maxime le Confesseur. D'ailleurs, la maison d'édition Doxologia a consacré beaucoup d'effort à faire traduire en roumain des ouvrages fondamentaux ayant rapport à l'œuvre ou à la personne de saint Maxime le Confesseur. Faisons mention uniquement de deux ouvrages plus récents comme *Saint Maxime le Confesseur, Médiateur entre l'Orient et l'Occident* (1998) et *Saint Maxime le Confesseur* (2003), de Jean-Claude Larchet.

Cette fois-ci, la traduction du monumental volume de von Balthasar est triplement importante:

- tout d'abord, parce qu'il s'agit de l'édition de 1961, révisée et augmentée par l'auteur lui-même. Ainsi, à l'ancienne édition de 1941, Hans Urs von Balthasar avait ajouté deux traductions (*La Mystagogie* et les *Centuries sur l'amour* et des *Centuries gnostiques*) et une étude dédiée aux *Scholies* faites aux œuvres de saint Denys l'Aréopagite. Même si le traducteur roumain n'a pas (re)traduit en roumain, pour des raisons bien détaillées dans sa note (p.19-21) ces traductions en allemand, le volume en roumain n'en pâtit pas, parce que le public roumain dispose déjà des traductions classiques de la *Mystagogie* et des *Centuries* de saint Maxime faites par le Père Dumitru Stăniloae. En

même temps, le traducteur a décidé, vu le haut degré de complexité philologique (en allemande, grec et latin à la fois) de ne traduire ni l'étude qui ouvre, dans l'édition allemande, les *Centuries gnostiques*. Ce bijou d'acribie philologique, comme affirme le traducteur, le fait surtout un instrument de travail pour les patrologues et les philologues classiques, et son importance pour le public large serait quasi-nule. Par contre, le Père Roşu a bien choisi de traduire l'étude sur les *Scholies* faites aux œuvres de saint Denys l'Aréopagite (que von Balthasar avait publiée comme article séparé en 1940), qui se présentent actuellement comme un mélange (sans aucune possibilité actuelle de distinction) entre scholies de saint Maxime lui-même et les scholies de Jean de Scythopolis :

- ensuite, parce que l'œuvre de von Balthasar est la première à parler ouvertement de l'esprit *synthétique* de saint Maxime le Confesseur. Aujourd'hui, les lecteur de saint Maxime sont habitué avec l'idée de *médiation* (Jean-Claude Larchet)*,* qui régirait l'œuvre de cet auteur patristique, mais ce fut von Balthasar, le premier, qui parla d'une réelle synthèse chez Maxime le Confesseur, à tous les niveaux de sa pensée.

- en fin de compte, parce que le Père Dumitru Stăniloae, au cours de son travail de traducteur aux œuvres de saint Maxime, a eu sous les yeux le livre de von Balthasar, dans les deux éditions: la première, dans les années 1940, lors de la traduction des *Centuries* et des *Réponses à Thalassios* et la seconde, dans les années 1980, lors de la traduction de l'*Ambigua* et des *Epîtres*. Ainsi, un fil rouge philologique, théologique et philosophique relie les trois auteurs (saint Maxime, von Balthasar – son commentateur et le Père Stăniloae – son traducteur): bon nombre de termes maximiens ont été traduits en roumain et surtout interprétés par le Père Stăniloae à la lumière de la lecture qu'il faisait de la *Kosmische Liturgie*. Certes, le vocabulaire de la théologie roumaine moderne doit tout aux traductions du père Stăniloae et, une fois que le public roumain a accès à l'œuvre de von Balthasar, on possède un paysage conceptuel complet qui favorise au maximum la bonne compréhension de l'œuvre de saint Maxime. Il est indéniable que d'énormes difficultés surgissent lorsque le traducteur se voit obligé de prendre des décisions terminologiques non sans risques (par exemple: est-il possible de traduire un concept de von Balthasar de 1961 à l'aide d'un terme utilisé par le Père Stăniloae dans les années 1940? faut-il re-traduire, par la filière von Balthasar de 1961, un terme que le Père Stăniloae avait déjà forgé dans les années 1980? comment éviter le poids trop « heideggérien » ou même « hégelien » de certains termes que von Balthasar emploie lors de son commentaire a saint Maxime?), mais le mérite du traducteur est d'autant plus grand qu'il s'est décidé de ne pas imposer une *seule* solution, laissant le texte évoluer dans *deux* registres (celui du commentateur allemand et celui du théologien roumain). En plus, connaisseur solide (même s'il décline modestement cette qualité)

du vocabulaire heideggérien, le Père Roşu a su faire les bons choix pour rendre dans un roumain accessible la technicité des termes allemands que von Balthasar reprend à Heidegger (surtout dans le registre de l'*être*). Pour un lecteur allemand, le perpétuel balancement entre *das Sein, das Seiendes, das dasein, die Existenz, das Wesen, die Wesenheit* peut sembler normal et sans problèmes, mais pour un lecteur roumain, cela frise l'incompréhension. Redisons-le, le savoir-faire du traducteur apporte une clarté (une fois n'est pas coutume!) quasi-*cartésienne* dans la foret où foisonnent les sonorités heideggériennes des concepts grâce auxquels von Balthasar commente les subtilités abyssales de la théologie de saint Maxime.

L'œuvre de von Balthasar a le mérite de souligner à quel point le travail de saint Maxime a été non seulement un effort de *synthèse christologique* (c'est le motif central de l'œuvre), mais aussi de *re-sémantisation* des concepts qu'il reprend à la tradition théologique d'avant lui.

La traduction roumaine de la *Kosmische Liturgie* se présente structurée sur 7 chapitres (dont une *Introduction*) et une *Annexe*. Dans l'*Introduction*, le sous-chapitre intitulé *La synthèse* présente l'idée-maitresse de von Balthasar: saint Maxime n'est pas un auteur qui aurait « ramassé » différentes « sources » patristiques, mais un génie théologique et philosophique en même temps qui a su « ouvrir l'un envers l'autre » cinq ou six mondes spirituels (p.68) qui, de son vivant, semblaient déjà réciproquement cloisonnés. En théologien contemplatif et philosophe de formation aristotélique (mais non pas aristotélicien!) à la fois, en mystique de tradition aréopagitique et moine de sensibilité évagrienne en meme temps, saint Maxime a su dépasser les dangers conceptuels et spirituels de l'origénisme et de lutter contre le monophysisme et du monothélisme, afin de defendre jusqu'au martyre la doctrine chalcédonienne des deux natures et des deux volontés dans le Christ.

C'est avec acuité que von Balthasar remarque chez saint Maxime « la stéréotypie géométrique des concepts », due à « la précision presqu'exagérée » (p.73) qui le fait bien distinguer entre le sens orthodoxe, chalcédonien, et le sens dangereux (hérétique) des formules théologiques utilisées en son temps qui décrivent non seulement la personne et l'œuvre du Christ, mais aussi le legs patristique antérieur (Evagre, Origène, saint Grégoire de Nysse, saint Denys, saint Cyrille et autres). L'interprétation maximienne, toutefois, n'est jamais un pur jeu intellectuel, car le saint reste toujours guidé par sa formation mystique et ascétique. La parfaite connaissance des Ecritures vient renforcer un *mode de vie*, non seulement une *manière de penser*, et c'est lors de la grande dispute avec Pyrrhus que des surprenants extraits de l'Ecriture viennent soutenir les fines interprétations de saint Maxime.

La *synthese*, qui opère au niveau cosmologique (chapitre IV), humain (chapitre V), christologique (chapitre VI) et spirituel (chapitre VII) n'est pas une structure intellectuelle qui imposerait, de force, une réconciliation des

contraires, mais une *matrice christologique* qui se réplique à tous les niveaux de la création, de l'Univers en tant que tel à la créature la plus humble.

Ainsi, *L'Incarnation du Christ* (qui se déploie à trois niveaux: dans la lettre de Ecriture, dans les *logoi* ou *raisons* des choses et dans la chair humaine) devient, dans la pensée de saint Maxime, une norme d'interprétation et de compréhension de toute l'Ecriture en tant que parole de Dieu, y compris des lieux les plus obscurs et les plus difficiles, comme on lit dans les *Centuries gnostiques,* I, 66. L'*en-soi* des choses créés est donc vu comme *l'être-dans-et-par-le-Christ,* un nouveau mode d'existence où *la* synthèse hypostatique Dieu-Homme, exprimée dans la formule *tantum-quantum* (*autant* Dieu s'est fait home, *autant* l'homme a été divinise) permet de dépasser les dualités d'inspiration origéniennes qui avaient secrètement soutenu le monophysisme.

Au niveau philosophique, *la synthèse* maximienne a du affronter un triple problème (p.57): la tentation implicite de l'origénisme à penser la création comme le résultat d'une déchéance originaire dans la matérialité et la fin du monde comme une restauration intégrale de l'élément spirituel (l'apocatastase); la dangereuse propension évagrienne à penser la contemplation « sans formes et images » comme une préparation a la contemplation de Dieu; l'apparent accent monophysite de la christologie alexandrine qui, par la formule de saint Cyrille *mia physin,* semblait soutenir l'option hérétique pour une seule nature du Christ (p.76).

Prenant appui sur les adverbes que le Concile de Chalcedoine affirmait sous la forme du dogme christologique *(sans confusion* et *sans changement* des natures; *sans division* et *sans séparation* des personnes), saint Maxime a su dépasser toute tentation d'unilatéralisme de la pensée qui, sous prétexte du silence respectueux, viderait la profondeur théologique et dogmatique du Concile (c'était le cas du *Typos* de l'empereur Constance II, en 647, contre lequel saint Maxime reste le seul à s'insurger, après l'exile du Pape Martin Ier et la capitulation du Pape Eugène Ier).

Hans Urs von Balthasar souligne, dans le chapitre sur Dieu, qu'aucune connaissance rationnelle de la Trinite n'est possible chez Maxime. Aucune « trace ontologique » de la Trinite n'est décelable chez saint Maxime (p.120), ce qui fait que sa théologie ne comporte aucune « explication systématique des processus intra-trinitaires, comme dans la théologie scolastique » (p.120). Des lors, aucun « schéma trinitaire » n'est applicable, à partir de la structure ontologique de la créature (donc, aucune *analogia entis* dans le sens latin) et aucune « science divine » du mystère n'est envisageable. A bon droit souligne von Balthasar qu'il n'existe, chez saint Maxime, aucun concept « neutre » et « commun » de l'existence ou de l'être qui puisse décrire proprement et en même temps Dieu et la créature (p.107). Le mouvement de la pensée doit se contenter des expressions antinomiques sur Dieu qui, en tout cas, ne font que décrire le rapport de Dieu *au monde créé* et non pas Dieu en tant que

Dieu. Cette dialectique de la pensée ne fait que rendre manifeste la limite inhérente de la créature, qui se trouve toujours dans un perpétuel mouvement entre la ressemblance et la dissemblance par rapport à son Créateur dont la nature reste enveloppée dans l'inconnaissance la plus totale (p.108).

Saint Maxime apparait donc comme un défenseur sans faille de la transcendance divine (p.113) et c'est pour cette raison qu'il s'en tient aux conceptions de saint Denys l'Aréopagite sur la transcendance absolue de Dieu. Le thème du progrès spirituel chez l'Aréopagite est scrupuleusement gardé, mais l'union mystique à Dieu n'abolit pas la différence entre l'homme et Dieu.

Mais s'en tenir à ce moment de la pensée maximienne, quoi souligne, comme toute la patristique grecque d'ailleurs, le caractère inconnaissable de Dieu, s'est faire injustice au moment christologique de sa pensée, et à la dimension *économique* de sa théologie. Hans Urs von Balthasar souligne que chez saint Maxime, comme dans toute la tradition d'avant lui, la révélation de Dieu se fait non sous la forme d'une connaissance spéculative, mais sous le mode de l'Incarnation du Christ, manière paradoxale par laquelle *Dieu se fait homme entier, tout en restant Dieu absolument transcendant.*

Le Christ, la véritable synthèse (le nom du chapitre VI) peut donc être vu comme la quintessence du livre (puisqu'elle constitue le cœur de l'œuvre même de saint Maxime). On a du mal, en tant que chrétien orthodoxe, à accepter l'approche très risquée de von Balthasar, entre saint Maxime et Hegel (p.247) et encore moins d'acquiescer à la thèse (peut être trop simpliste) que la christologie du Confesseur n'est pas innovante (p.248). Si « la grande contribution de saint Maxime consiste dans le choix de la formule christologique comme point crucial pour l'articulation de la vision sur le monde » (p.249), cela n'est pas le signe d'une moindre contribution à la christologie! Balthasar lui-seul reconnait qu'il y a eu des cas dans l'histoire du christianisme où une formule dogmatique a devancé le moment de pleine maturité (ou même de maturation) d'un concept (p.252). Ce fut le cas du Concile d'Ephèse et de celui de Chalcédoine. L'œuvre de saint Maxime, parue à ce moment de « crépuscule des concepts » (p.252) est, comme celle conciliaire, pleine d'intuitions géniales (von Balthasar emploie le mot), mais elle ont longtemps été couvertes par l'apparence de quelques concepts théologiques abstraits. Une de ces intuitions, magistralement révélée par von Balthasar, est que les énormes difficultés rencontrées au cours des controverses théologiques avec les monophysites sont dépassées par saint Maxime par recours à la doctrine trinitaire (p.254). La dispute avec Pyrrhus montre à quel point chez saint Maxime la doctrine trinitaire et l'enseignement sur l'agir historique et salvifique (donc, *économique*) du Christ se complètent et se soutiennent réciproquement. La théologie et l'économie ne sont pas deux versants opposés, mais deux face d'un même mystère divin, le mystère de Dieu trinitaire et le mystère du Dieu fait homme.

Le lecteur appréciera encore les précisions terminologiques et historiques de von Balthasar (p. 258-288) qui permettent de comprendre le véritable caractère innovant (sur le plan terminologique) de la christologie de saint Maxime.

La *synthèse*, qui opère à tous les niveaux (dans l'homme, dans le cosmos, dans l'Eglise, dans le temps) est traitée par von Balthasar sur presque la moitié du livre (p.247-422), son attention se portant sur la manière dont le verbe fondamental du Concile de Chalcedoine (*sozein,* sauver ou garder) a été le cadre dont la pensée de saint Maxime s'est développée: les cinq grandes synthèses dont parle saint Maxime (entre l'homme et la femme; entre le paradis et la terre habitée; entre la terre et le ciel; entre le sensible et l'intelligible; entre la créature et le Créateur) se font tout en préservant le propre de chaque élément, selon le modèle christologique.

Si on devait résumer ce livre capital pour la compréhension de cette profondeur théologique inégalée qui fut celle de saint Maxime, il suffirait de laisser la parole à l'auteur allemand, qui dit que le Confesseur a reçu et intégré dans son œuvre l'enseignement de l'école d'Alexandrie sur la divinité, tout en lui ôtant les épines spirituelles du néoplatonisme (p.328). Ici et toujours comme chez les Pères de l'Eglise, c'est un concile (celui de Chalcedoine, en l'occurrence) qui a montré au Confesseur le chemin paradoxal de la théologie qui, tout en étant au plus haut point spéculative (pour repousser les hérésies), n'a pas perdu son caractère humble et mystique devant le mystère de la transcendance divine.