# Politicians, Bureaucrats and Leadership in Organizations

Lessons from Regional Planning in France

June Burnham

French Politics, Society and Culture Series

General Editor: **Robert Elgie**, Paddy Moriarty Professor of Government and International Studies, Dublin City University

France has always fascinated outside observers. Now, the country is undergoing a period of profound transformation. France is faced with a rapidly changing international and European environment and it is having to rethink some of its most basic social, political and economic orthodoxies. As elsewhere, there is pressure to conform. And yet, while France is responding in ways that are no doubt familiar to people in other European countries, it is also managing to maintain elements of its long-standing distinctiveness. Overall, it remains a place that is not exactly *comme les autres*.

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Politicians, Bureaucrats and Leadership in Organizations

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June Burnham

Researcher, June Burnham & Associates
Formerly Senior Lecturer in European Government
Middlesex University, UK

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List of Abbreviations

AdT	Aménagement du territoire
AFII	French Agency for International Investment
CGP	Commissariat général au Plan
CIACT	Comité interministériel d'aménagement et de competitivité des territoires
CIADT	Comité interministériel d'aménagement et de développement du territoire
CIAT	Comité interministériel d'aménagement du territoire
CID	Conférence interdépartementale
CNADT	Conseil national d'aménagement et de développement du territoire
CNAT	Conseil national d'aménagement du territoire
CNER	Conseil national des économies régionales
CODER	Commission de développement économique régional
CR	Conseil régional
CRIDEL	Centre de rencontres et d'initiatives pour le développement local
DAFU	Direction de l'aménagement foncier et de l'urbanisme
DAT	Direction de l'aménagement du territoire
DATAR	Délégation à l'aménagement du territoire et à l'action régionale
DGEN	Délégation général à l'équipement national
DIACT	Délégation interministérielle à la competitivité des territoires
ENA	Ecole nationale d'administration
EPR	Etablissement public régional
FAD	Fonds d'aide à la décentralisation
FDES	Fonds de développement économique et social
FGER	Fonds de gestion de l'espace rural
FIAM	Fonds interministériel pour l'auto-développement en montagne
FIAT	Fonds d'intervention pour l'aménagement du territoire

FIDAR	Fonds interministériel de développement et d'aménagement rural
FNADT	Fonds national d'aménagement et de développement du territoire
FNAT	Fonds national d'aménagement du territoire
FNDE	Fonds national de développement des entreprises
FRILE	Fonds régionalisé d'aide aux initiatives locales
FRR	Fonds de rénovation rurale
GIRZOM	Groupe interministériel pour la restructuration des zones minières
IEP	Institut d'études politiques (Paris)
IGAME	Inspecteur- général de l'administration en mission extraordinaire
IGEN	Inspecteur- général de l'économie nationale
LOADT	Loi d'orientation pour l'aménagement et le développement du territoire
LOLF	Loi organique relative aux lois de finances
MRU	Ministry for Reconstruction and Urban Planning
OREAM	Organisation d'études d'aménagement des aires métropolitaines
PAR	Programme d'action régional
PAT	Prime à l'aménagement du territoire
SEM	Société d'économie mixte
SGAR	Secrétaire-général aux affaires régionales
TGV	Train à grande vitesse

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Political Leaders and Bureaucratic Organizations

The aim of this book is to demonstrate that politicians in government make more of an impact on the bureaucratic organizations in their charge than political scientists usually acknowledge. Although the evidence for that assertion will derive from an examination of French regional planning, each chapter shows the potential for interesting findings in other policies and political systems by those stimulated to adopt equivalent research techniques; and some pointers to that effect are offered in the concluding chapter.

Political leadership in government

Journalists frequently ascribe political events to the influence of particular ministers, and political biographers emphasize their subject's contribution to affairs, but most academics remain sceptical about the extent to which individual politicians can alter institutions. Studies of the relationship between the political executive and the public administration either do not pay detailed attention to the institutional resources available to political post-holders or are uninterested in leadership. Recent research has tended to attribute greater weight to the constraints of institutions on individuals than to the impact of individuals on institutions.

The classic institutional approach to leadership

British studies on public administration were traditionally conducted within a formal institutional framework that gave little consideration to political leadership. Essentially, they were confined to the history, structure, functions, powers and relationships of government organizations (Rhodes 1997: 166). The underlying hypothesis gave primacy

to the institutions, meaning 'the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy' (Hall 1986: 19). Institutions were delineated narrowly: until the 1980s they were unlikely to include the networks of relationships between political leaders, the public bureaucracy and the other policy actors. Especially, there was a reluctance to engage with the idea that individuals might exercise effective power. At one level, the concept smacked of the 'Great Man' genre of political history, which fell particularly out of favour from the 1960s, at a time of student rebellions, the strengthening of feminism, and Marxist histories of the working class. At another level, political leadership, because it is a manifestation of power, was often treated as 'a Leviathan, a frightening beast, which it is perhaps more urgent to tame than to dissect' (Blondel 1987: 3). Leadership, notably as a psychological phenomenon entailing 'followership', is said to be linked to times when there was a culture of deference and respect: it is 'pre-democratic' (Heywood 2000: 136).

This view prevailed in Europe and Latin America, where liberal thinkers tended to fear leadership, and political elites saw leadership as intrinsically bad, given the excesses of past rulers (Blondel 1995: 301). In 1958, at the moment when 'everybody was talking of the return to power of General de Gaulle … the Left was doing it more discreetly, its traditions and principles being against the theory of the Providential Man' (Duverger 1958). In Britain there is a reluctance to talk of political leadership, partly because of the association with Fascism and the cult of personality (Gaffney 1991: 11), but also because of the norm of Cabinet government. Many authorities on the British premiership have been unwilling to accept that its impact might vary substantially, depending on the person in the post. When Margaret Thatcher broke this convention she was 'elevated into a personal phenomenon unrepresentative of anything other than herself and her government' (Foley 1993: 19). Such politicians are described as exceptional – statistical 'far outliers' (Dunleavy *et al.* 1990: 133).

Most Cabinet governments in Western Europe operate on a consensual basis (Blondel and Müller-Rommel 1993; Jones 1991b; King 1994) and are keen to show that they do, to the extent that in some countries (such as the Netherlands and Norway) the post of prime minister provides few official resources. At the same time, some prime ministers are more strongly supported by formal and informal institutions, such as the power to hire and fire, or a parliamentary majority. The Irish *Taoiseach*, for example, is 'potentially more powerful than any other European prime minister, with the exception of his British counterpart'

(O'Leary 1991: 159), while Germany, Greece, Portugal and Spain have been categorized as political systems in which prime ministers have a higher than usual capacity to influence events (King 1994: 153). Putting it in general terms, political executives of different countries vary in their impact because of the disparity in institutional resources made available to them. Variations in impact could be expected to exist in any one country between the political executives in post at different times, depending on whether they have the skills, desire and energy to exploit these resources fully. In a country that provides its leaders with more substantial resources the disparity between those who make the most of them and those who do not may be very wide. Yet studies of political leaders usually conclude that the difference between any country's post holders in the impact they make on organizations or policy is negligible; and certainly so by comparison with the differences between countries: 'Differences between national political institutions create more variation in the office of prime minister than do differences of personality and circumstances in a country' (Rose 1991: 9).

Behavioural analyses of political leadership

The presidential nature of the US Constitution made it easier there to discuss individual leadership but, until the 1950s, texts on the political executive also made much of the formal institutions. Then the development of positivist science approaches, that placed stress on the political environment, emphasized behavioural explanations (the inputs of voters, interest groups and other actors) and took attention away from bureaucratic organizations (Peters 1989: 4–6). *Presidential Power* (Neustadt 1960) was innovative because it highlighted the gap between the formal and the real resources available to US presidents. It demonstrated their powerlessness in comparison with the popular image of a president. Official resources could not be relied upon, since bureaucrats had their own departmental duties and constituencies of interest, and they might see their duty as following the president or they might not (Neustadt 1960: 7). Subsequent editions stressed the constraints: 'Presidential weakness was the underlying theme of *Presidential Power*' (Neustadt 1976: i; 1990: ix).

That pithy statement was misleading. *Presidential Power* was normative as well as empirical. It wanted elected presidents to be able to implement their agenda and described them as weak because they could not be sure of success through giving orders (as the ex-military President Eisenhower found to his surprise), but needed to rely on the personal power of persuasion. Yet the presidents that Neustadt examined in 1960

were not absolutely weak nor uniformly weak. Neustadt found significant differences in the levels of 'influence on government action' between Presidents Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower, even when they acted through their impersonal 'power to command' the bureaucracies rather than using personalized powers of persuasion. Presidents Johnson and Nixon were even regarded by most Americans as having 'altogether too much influence on far too many acts of government' (Neustadt 1976: i).

Other behavioural studies of presidential leadership found that style and performance make a substantial difference to what happens. Tucker (1981: 50–3, 60–2) showed that US presidents were more likely to be successful if they were able to

- manage the concerns of interest groups;
- define and publicize policy dilemmas;
- gain the support of the public and Congress for the presidential solution;
- create political support for their agenda;
- and choose a good moment.

Whereas Neustadt thought that a test of a president was whether his or her purposes ran with the 'grain of history' (1976: 147–8), and thereby emphasized the exogenous constraints, Tucker saw as the essence of leadership that of educating others about the historical situation, turning the context into a resource: individual leaders 'often make a significant difference in historical outcomes by virtue of the ways in which they act or fail to act at critical junctures in the development of events' (1981: 15–30).

Tucker rejected the dichotomous distinction that is often made between 'event-making' leaders, who imposed their personalities upon history, and leaders who just 'help it follow the course it was going to take anyhow'. Leaders 'matter in degree, a little more, a little less'. In Tucker's analysis, the degree to which leaders matter is a product of their political intellectual and interpersonal skills (1995: 27–30); he says little about their administrative skills in using formal powers to reorient the institutions towards politicians' aims. Tucker's empirical evidence also derives mainly from the 'exceptional' end of the spectrum (Kennedy, Gorbachev and Mandela). The role of leaders is perhaps easier to identify in crisis situations than in more settled times, when politicians are mostly bargaining over incremental changes. Yet, where most liberal democracies are concerned, it is the nature of everyday leadership that is more useful to clarify.

Research by Kellerman on American political leadership 'in normal times' showed that the influence of the president appeared to determine political outcomes some of the time. Her analyses focused on the efforts of six presidents to promote their most important personal priority. Kellerman (1984: 28–31, 256) distinguished 'the best politicians, and the most effective directive leaders' (Johnson and Reagan), from the rest (Kennedy, Nixon, Ford and Carter), as far as these particular policies were concerned. The more successful presidents paid attention to the views of other people ('other-directed'), but were guided by a personal sense of what to do ('inner-directed'). Kellerman researched political leadership within a behavioural framework and found behavioural factors related to leaders' success. Neither the presidents' use of institutional resources nor institutional constraints figured much in the analysis, but her studies showed that the differential behaviour of presidents led to different outcomes.

Much of the literature on leadership in the 1980s used either the trait approach (searching for personality types) or a situational and interactional approach which sets personality into the context of other factors (social and physical environment, the personality characteristics of other group members), and that again focused mainly on behavioural aspects (Janda 1972: 48). Unusually, Hargrove and Nelson (1984) used a mixed behavioural and institutional framework and concluded that the style and performance of US presidents made a big difference to legislation, policy and programmes. They argued that the president's power derived mainly from three elements: the Constitution, culture and politics, and the leadership skills of the individual president, of which the Constitution was deemed least important, since it said little about the organization of the presidency and gave the president few formal powers (1984: 175). Hargrove and Nelson's investigations stressed the behavioural and personal aspects: leaders' strategies in relation to institutional resources varied according to the leadership's goals and skills. However, their conclusions as to whether they were 'presidents of preparation', 'presidents of achievement' or 'presidents of consolidation' relied very much on evidence of the use presidents made of the institutions.

Revisiting the institutions

The 'new institutionalism' expounded by March and Olsen (1984, 1989) offered a stronger theoretical foundation to the 'interactional' relationship between leaders and institutions. March and Olsen contended that

political institutions had a more autonomous role than behavioural approaches accorded them: 'The state is not only affected by society but also affects it' (1984: 738). Government agencies could take on lives of their own, going beyond their envisaged remit and becoming political forces in themselves (1984: 739). In the new institutionalism, institutions do not simply reflect the social forces that created them: they actively shape perceptions, and therefore behaviour, by embodying norms of what should be done, and by providing rules to structure and guide behaviour. The idea that an actor's political preferences were stable, at the heart of behavioural theories of decision making, was being replaced by the idea that preferences could be modified.

Whereas the behavioural perspective saw political leadership as brokering a compromise between a given set of competing preferences (identifying coalitions of interests, log-rolling and so on), new institutionalists viewed leadership as reshaping or transforming preferences (of the leader as well as 'followers') through interaction. 'The leadership role is that of an educator, stimulating and accepting changing worldviews, redefining meanings, stimulating commitments' (March and Olsen 1984: 739). While the behavioural assumption was that political resources were distributed between actors by broad social processes, the new institutionalist view was that institutions affected the distribution of resources, and thus the power of political actors, and thence the political institutions. Holding an office gave additional rights that altered the distribution of power, but the leader's policy options would be shaped in part by the existing bureaucratic agencies. The policy outcome would affect the leader's reputational power, which in turn would modify political outcomes.

Overarching these issues were contrasting views of how to analyze the political system. Neither facilitates a study of autonomous leadership. Because systems of modern states are complex, simplifying theories are adopted. For behaviouralists, theories of collective behaviour typically rely on statistical aggregation or on a hypothesis of evolutionary efficiency (the group of actors can be predicted to act rationally such that the outcome is jointly optimal), and thus can say little about individuals. The institutionalist simplification is to assume a political structure (March and Olsen 1984: 741). Within this perspective, leaders are socialized into seeing certain actions as appropriate to the political and social situation; they take on the duties that are implied by their place in the institutions rather than exercising choices based on their individual values. By arguing that institutions and their relationships strongly shape and constrain political actions, new institutionalists infer that

individual political leaders will not find it easy to redirect the paths of institutions such as bureaucratic organizations, and that the leaders themselves will be guided along paths shaped for them by the institutions.

Analyzing the institutional constraints on political leaders

These arguments in favour of 'institutionalist thought' were addressed to a behaviourist academy. However, 'new institutionalism' (see Hall 1986; Hall and Taylor 1996; Peters 1999; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Steinmo *et al.* 1992; Weaver and Rockman 1993) reinforced the explanatory role already given to institutions by institutionalists. Their analyses explained the persistence and incrementalism often observed in organizations and policies; and in doing so further circumscribed the influence individuals would have on events. Exceptional leaders, the ideas they conveyed or crisis circumstances that gave them additional power, were sometimes posited as the explanation for institutional change, but further confined the effective exercise of leadership to unusual people or occasions.

Four examples from various fields illustrate this point. First, Rose's extensive research led him to conclude that the actions of the British prime minister, despite being among the most powerful in Western Europe, were strongly determined by institutional constraints:

> The first priority of a Prime Minister is to do what is expected of him or her. How a Prime Minister meets these role expectations reflects not only his or her basic personality, whatever that may be, but even more what the incumbent has learned in a quarter century of socialisation in Westminster and Whitehall.
>
> (Rose 1980: 44)

As Rose says, it is not enough to look at 'personality stories'; an attempt should be made to measure and assess the 'impersonal record': 'Even a prime minister as radical in rhetoric and as long in office as Margaret Thatcher left in place two-thirds of Acts of Parliament inherited from predecessors, and more than seven-eighths of spending commitments' (Rose 2000: 60). Second, Elgie's (1995) comparative project on political leadership drew lessons on the interaction between chief political executives and the formal political environment from an institutional analysis of six liberal democracies. Discussing the process of leadership within a three-fold structure – leadership ambition and styles, institutional context, and social context – Elgie found that 'institutional

structures had the greatest impact on the leadership process' (1995: 195). Institutions defined the resources available to a leader and the constraints which set the limits on their action; and they shaped leaders' behaviour by creating institutional roles they felt obliged to play. The institutional structures provided the strategic context to the leaders' actions, restricting their options to those recognized by the rules of the game (1995: 205–6). Yet Elgie cites substantial evidence that political leaders are partly independent of the institutions. Many German chancellors, having won the status of national leader through a personalized election process, secured 'a certain autonomy' from their parties, and found themselves in 'a dominant and advantageous position' (1995: 88). Konrad Adenauer and Helmut Kohl were able to profit from 'exceptional circumstances' to overcome the conventions that dispersed power and 'impose a coherent leadership strategy upon the system as a whole' (1995: 105). Some leaders, because of their personal ambitions or style (Adenauer, de Gaulle, Roosevelt and Thatcher), and because of their use of the 'degree of free will' available to all leaders, could even 'act as catalysts of change' (1995: 208). However, Elgie concludes that 'what these leaders can and cannot do is primarily determined by the institutional structures of their country' (1995: 210).

Third, a detailed analysis undertaken by Cole (1994a) of the French President Mitterrand revealed the substantial impact he made on politics, while also emphasizing the constraints on his action. Cole found much evidence that French presidents made a distinctive contribution to events. 'Presidential practice has in fact varied with each incumbent, as well as at different stages of each presidency.' 'The president has almost a complete freedom of manoeuvre in relation to the "reserved" sector of foreign policy, European affairs and defence'; and moreover the president could 'intervene in any policy area should the need arise' (1994a: 86, 91). Cole found that French prime ministers, though generally subordinate to the president, had some freedom to promote their own policy preferences. Jacques Chirac, as a prime minister with a parliamentary majority that supported him rather than the president, had the strongest position, but even prime ministers in less favourable positions with regard to the president had resources of their own, notably in their control of the bureaucracy, that meant their role was 'far from minimal' (1994a: 93).

Cole used 'interpretative skills' (1994a: 170) to evaluate systematically the personal, positional and environmental factors that seemed to help or hinder Mitterrand's leadership, and identified the significance of the institutional resources available to a French president. 'His margins of

manoeuvre were shaped in a large measure by the possibilities opened by this office.' 'The strength of this location reflected the strength of the French presidency, far more than it did Mitterrand's personal qualities, however impressive or otherwise.' Yet external constraints limited the 'capacity for genuinely independent choice' (1994a: 170, 173). In the policy domain in which a French president has greatest freedom – foreign policy – political choices are circumscribed by the international environment. Cole's conclusions are similar to those of Rose and Elgie. 'The institution of the presidency is more important than the personality of the incumbent in understanding the French political system, though each individual President has left his own unmistakable mark on the institution' (1994a: 175). It is a balanced assessment that recognizes the contribution of the individual but in the end gives primacy to the institutions (see also Cole 1994b).

Finally, Sheffer's edited volume on *Innovative Leadership in International Politics* (1993) might have been expected to tilt the balance the other way by emphasizing individual initiative. Edinger's introduction starts with the familiar two-way appreciation of the relationship. 'From one point of view…the leadership of a particular individual…is…the last, if not the least important remaining factor that could conceivably account for events that cannot be entirely explained by other variables.' On the other hand, 'a contrasting point of view…starts with the premise that one person's leadership has a great deal to do with the course of past or future political developments'. Sheffer's team were nevertheless very sceptical about politicians' capacity for autonomous action. Even if leaders might sometimes be 'at least the proximate cause', it was 'extremely rare' to find them introduce new patterns of relationships, since it required the leaders to have not only the power to introduce a change but also the continued legitimacy to maintain it (Edinger 1993: 15).

Assessing the impact of political leaders

Researchers on political leadership recognize the problems involved in demonstrating a case, which is one reason for the equivocal nature of their conclusions. The result has been that political leaders tend to be given a dichotomous and asymmetrical character divided between a 'few charismatic leaders' whose impact is obvious and 'a mass of grey and indistinct office-holders' (Blondel 1995: 303). Blondel (1987) was unusual in proposing a methodological framework for a 'general analysis' of leadership that would assess the varied impact of all leaders

against the background of their equally varied environments. However, given the ambitious nature of this programme, Blondel did not carry out an empirical analysis, but conducted a hypothetico-deductive argument with illustrations from different parts of the leadership spectrum.

The limited nature of political leadership studies two decades ago was noted by Sheffer: few authors 'attempted to go from the particular to the general, whether utilising institutional, rational behaviour, or psychological approaches; instead studies have tended to be too narrowly tailored to the authors' theoretical biases and to rely too much on episodic material' (1993: xiv). Some researchers have risen to the challenge and gone beyond the episodic – or at least systematized the episodes into longitudinal comparisons in deliberately limited domains. Thus Theakston's application of the biographic method to *Leadership in Whitehall* (1999) proved a 'valuable tool for studying administrative leadership...and providing an essential complement to institutional analysis and the conditions of effective administrative leadership' (Rhodes 1999: xi). It stimulated a set of inquiries into leadership in British public administration (Theakston 2000) whose common method was a longitudinal comparison within a relatively confined institutional setting. For example, Fry's (2000) examination of 'three giants of the British inter-war British higher civil service'; Isaac-Henry's (2000) study of five 'chief executives and leadership in a local authority' (Birmingham); and Burnham and Jones's (2000) identification of the 'innovators at 10 Downing Street' illuminated the interactions between political and administrative leaders in transforming one bureaucratic organization.

Dudley and Richardson's (2000) findings on the impact of individuals similarly show the benefits of taking a longitudinal, comparative and focused approach. Setting out to explain radical change in transport policy when most policy literature emphasizes inertia and incrementalism (2000: ix), they found that ideas, interests, institutions and individuals were all relevant but that individuals played the key role. 'In facilitating and executing the introduction of new ideas, it appears to be key individuals, acting in a variety of roles, who are primarily responsible for this task' (Dudley and Richardson 2000: 229). To the concept of the individual as policy entrepreneur (Kingdon 1995: 20), and as policy broker organizing an acceptable compromise (Sabatier 1993: 16), Dudley and Richardson added the role of shaper and transmitter of ideas (2000: 237). These individuals included interest group leaders or experts, but the most numerous and the most effective were ministers, because they could provide the policy advocacy coalitions with decisive leadership,

widening and strengthening them, and facilitating the conditions for policy change (2000: 239).

These studies were important clues, not only to the potential influence of individual leaders but also on how more generalized conclusions on the impact of leadership might be obtained within the limited space of one book. By conducting a systematic and detailed examination of leadership action in the context of environmental constraints and opportunities, but limiting the scope of the institutional and societal framework, it becomes possible to provide the finer-scaled evidence required to demonstrate the differentiated ways in which all political leaders, not just the charismatic ones, make an impact on bureaucratic organizations.

The analytical strategy

The broad strategy of the book is to use Blondel's general analysis of leadership as a guiding thread in the evaluation of leadership action, in much the same way as, for example, Page (1992) applies Max Weber's ideal-type bureaucracy when comparing bureaucratic systems, and Page and Jenkins (2005) structure the responses from their interviews with 'policy bureaucrats' around Weber (1947) and Gouldner (1954). Like the Weberian model, the Blondel analysis is a logically reasoned argument with enough supporting evidence to give it a certain validity and make it a classic in its own sphere. It provides a template that is sufficiently rigid to reduce 'episodic' subjectivity yet can be argued against explicitly where it seems to fail when confronted with evidence. That is, the arguments, evidence and conclusions in this book will stand or fall in their own right.

The political leaders considered in this analysis are those who have executive authority over the country's bureaucratic organizations, that is, presidents, prime ministers and ministers. Though the chapters that follow will encompass both former bureaucrats who became ministers, and politicians in parliament, local government and indeed in the bureaucracy, the emphasis is on the impact of the national political leadership.

Blondel argues that the impact of leaders on their environment derives from personal and positional resources. The personal resources include elements of personality (such as energy and intellect) and sociological attributes (such as social status and experience); the positional resources are institutional instruments, such as parliament, parties and the bureaucracy, which link leaders to government and nation. In the

end, Blondel puts more emphasis on the positional factors. However, he first analyzes the contribution of the personal factors. In an exposition derived mainly from Weber, Blondel reasons that the strength of the relationship between the leadership and the population would depend mainly on the personal sources of leadership power and societal conditions. An evaluation of this relationship would enable leaders to be characterized according to the extent to which the leadership was charismatic, and according to the type of relationship between the leader and society, whether the loyalty of traditional communities or the legalistic contracts of associational societies, or something else (1987: 51–7).

This personality/societal typology which relates to the use of personal resources is of little interest in distinguishing between the vast majority of leaders in liberal democracies, who would cluster together at one end of each scale. This book will therefore be concerned with those elements of leadership power that derive from position rather than from personality, though the effects of personality are still present, being implicit in attaining and maintaining a leadership position, and explicitly revealed in the policy orientation of leaders and their strategies for managing institutions and events.

Blondel too develops more fully the positional strand of his analytical framework. In his earlier work on *World Leaders* (1980), the theoretical and methodological difficulties of measuring leadership led him to deal with chief executives. He operationalized leadership there by adopting a 'positional standpoint', on the basis that someone is likely to be a leader if it is believed by others that he or she has the right to be a leader (1980: 9–14). This point is often debated. For example, Bass (2004: 13) cites observations from the 1960s that supervisors at the same level in an organization had identical powers, but did not use them with equal effectiveness to influence individuals and the organization. On the other hand, Janda (1972: 61) quotes several studies that show that formal group status is a source of power. An elected supervisor has more influence than a non-elected supervisor, but even a non-elected supervisor has influence. 'It thus seems likely that the very occupation of a key position in a structure lends legitimacy to the occupant' (Janda 1972: 61). Savoie (1999: 104) quotes a Canadian Cabinet minister: 'When your colleague becomes prime minister, overnight he assumes a different persona, or perhaps it is us who see him differently.'

The debate is crucial to those discussing what it means to be a leader. For example, Rose (1991: 19) distinguishes prime ministers who are leaders from those who are jugglers, bargainers or symbols. Some theorists see leadership as that part of the leader's influence which is not

mandated by the position. 'Thus, managers are leaders only when they take the opportunity to exert influence over activities beyond what has been prescribed as their role requirements' (Bass 2004: 14). This book is not about the psychological trait of leadership, but about demonstrating the outcome of leadership action, and the question is therefore whether it is enough to analyze the impact of leaders primarily in terms of their use of positional resources. In practice, the empirical evidence presented in the following chapters goes some way to validating the assertion that positional resources are fundamental to influencing bureaucratic organizations in liberal democracies, even if personal resources can be a powerful determinant of how influence is exerted. Leaders' personal characteristics are also involved even in their use of positional resources and it is worth exploring Blondel's exposition of this point.

Blondel reasons that position provides the institutional instruments which sustain leaders' actions and structures the environment of their political behaviour. The scope of leaders' activities depends on their personal ambitions but is also conditioned by their institutional and non-institutional environment. On the one hand, the definition of which matters are in a leader's province, or are 'felt' to be so, will be determined by the institutional environment: that is, by constitutional and legal arrangements, and customs and conventions inherited from previous leaders, or acknowledged *de facto* by the bureaucracy and citizens as being part of the leader's role. On the other hand, the non-institutional environment (economic problems or social demands, internal or external crises) may constrain or give greater opportunities, and here such personal resources as a leader's individual perspective and capacity to respond will come into play. A comparison of leaders would need to evaluate both their activity and the extent to which each was helped or hindered by the environment.

The two principal conceptual components of Blondel's proposed assessment are therefore the leaders' actions and the countervailing influence of the institutional and non-institutional environment. How are the leaders' activities to be assessed? Ideally, as Blondel argues, the goals that any particular leader or set of leaders pursued in every field and sub-field of activity ought to be examined, with a list of their actions. Given the practical and theoretical difficulties, Blondel suggests the development of a rather broad-brush typology of leaders, classifying them by the 'set of intentions which leaders effectively attempt to put into practice' (1987: 81–2). Their 'general orientation towards action' (1987: 97) would be categorized along two dimensions: the extent to which they are concerned with maintenance or change (small or large

changes to a policy) and the scope of their intervention (from changing policy to changing the system). Thus Blondel's scheme does not evaluate actual results from the leaders' actions, but classifies leaders by their 'potential leadership impact', according to the scope and radical nature of their intentions. In contrast, in this text the field of research is deliberately restricted in order to produce comparative evaluations based on detailed evidence, assessing the actual outcome of the leader's actions in qualitative and quantitative terms.

The second component of Blondel's assessment is the policy-making environment, whether in institutional or non-institutional form. The fundamental institution for leaders is their position as office-holder, from which a number of other institutional resources might flow: the appointment of ministers, top bureaucrats or personal expert advisers, the ability to give instructions to the bureaucracy or the control of a political party that can mobilize the population in favour of their policies. Blondel debates whether leaders are more helped or hindered by constitutions and other products of 'institutional engineering', such as bureaucratic organizations. He concludes they are more likely to constrain leaders' power than add to it, since the formal structures are often set up specifically to limit the discretionary power of leaders (1987: 151).

Leadership impact seems to depend especially strongly on the public bureaucracies. 'Bureaucracies are the tools, the instruments *par excellence*, which leaders have to use and on which they have to rely' (Blondel 1987: 167). Yet the system that leaders encounter as they take office is often poorly designed. 'From the point of view of leaders, the "system" is often inefficient, badly-structured and badly-organized. This is not only because of deliberate opposition, but often – perhaps mostly – because the system is simply unresponsive or only partly responsive' (1987: 150). Blondel suggests that the following characteristics of a public bureaucracy condition the impact of leaders:

- the design of the administrative organization;
- the links between the bureaucracy and the leader;
- the competence of officials; and
- the links between the bureaucracy and the population.

Blondel concludes that leaders will want to increase the effectiveness of the bureaucracy, but he is not optimistic about their chances.

> Leaders of all countries are thus faced with structural problems with respect to bureaucracies . . . Of course, leaders – and in particular leaders who wish to achieve goals that are appreciably more 'activist' than

those of their predecessors – often wish to do more; to an extent at least, they can try and bend the 'muscles' of the bureaucracy; but their expectations will remain largely unfulfilled.

(Blondel 1987: 170)

New leaders, Blondel argues, can attempt to improve the bureaucracy by using their personal powers (their prestige, their following in the nation and in the bureaucracy itself), and contingent environmental circumstances (such as a post-appointment 'state of grace'), to obtain greater responsiveness to their goals. The reforms that seem most effective are those that will enhance the four characteristics identified as important: the organization, its linkage with the government, staff recruitment and training, and their linkage with the population. Reforms intended to improve one of these characteristics may worsen one of the others (recruitment methods that favour loyalty may lead to a decline in competence); therefore leaders will need to consider the trade-offs. Improvements are in any case likely to be slow, difficult and expensive. 'Bureaucracies are an important element in the process by which leaders can see their goals realized; but the constraints and hurdles are numerous and cannot be overcome easily, let alone rapidly' (1987: 172).

Blondel similarly highlights the constraints on leaders posed by other parts of the institutional environment, including local government, political parties and interest groups. Their institutionalized procedures and linkages structure relations between the leader and the population. Though parties can help national leaders by reducing particularist loyalties, they also oblige them to pay attention to regional and local leaders. Leaders can create 'personalized' parties to provide backing for their own aims, or try to modify the existing territorial organizational structure, but new institutions need time as well as the sharing of power with subordinates before they can reach into the community, and are thus of limited use to current leaders. Thus leaders need to rely on the bureaucracy formally under their command. Blondel frequently reminds researchers both of the wide range of impacts that leaders can make on institutions and of the fact that institutions can facilitate as well as limit leadership action; but on the whole he seems to agree with the arguments of those who assert that institutions are the main determinants of a leader's actions, and that their role is a constraining and limiting one.

In contrast, non-institutional environmental structures are more likely to assist leaders (1987: 29–30, 99–113). The wider environment provides a more or less exogenous framework to their actions that is not always restricting. Crises, or 'the honeymoon period' sometimes given

to new political leaders, can offer opportunities as well as constraints. Blondel analyzes the interaction between political leaders and the non-institutional environment as a complex two-way behavioural process. In one direction, some leaders make better use than others of the opportunities given by the environment, such as using the success of a foreign policy initiative to bring domestic rewards. In the other direction, a particular societal environment may give support to a progressive reformer. Blondel's summary of his conceptual assessment of the impact of political leaders brings together this reciprocal influence of leaders and their environmental context into an assertion that matches the aim of this book too:

> Leaders seem prima facie to be able to make an impact on the complex network of the environment. Clearly, there is an interplay between the will of the leaders, their aims and ambitions, and the reality around them. It is by gradually analysing the conditions of this interplay that we shall be better able to assess the precise impact of leadership under various types of circumstances.
>
> (1987: 113)

Blondel's analytic framework serves as a departure point for a more practicable project in which the validity is enhanced by a greater reliance on evidence. The chief modification is that, whereas Blondel compared political leaders across widely differing political systems, this project makes a longitudinal comparison of the impact of different leaders in one liberal democratic country. Polities evolve over time (and indeed choosing a country for the case study that changes its political system in a distinctive manner adds empirical and theoretical interest), but the task of comparing the impact of different leaderships is simplified.

Similarly, the interplay between leadership resources and the institutional and non-institutional environment can be examined in more detail with respect to just one domain, providing that domain covers a variety of bureaucratic and other institutions. Within that domain, the leadership's actions will be considered with respect to creating, changing or maintaining bureaucratic organizations and bureaucratic instruments. Few elements covered by Blondel's general analysis of leadership are entirely omitted as a result of this limitation. The bureaucracy is always implicated, whether as one of the leadership's positional resources, or as part of the environment structuring the leadership's action. The leadership's use of positional resources is addressed when considering constitutional–legal powers and powers of appointment, or

examining the party system configuration and conventions on 'who does what' within the leadership, or linking implementation issues to the duration of a leader in post. Though the analysis of the influence of the institutional environment will deal chiefly with the interplay between leaders and bureaucratic institutions, it will also show how it is often mediated by parliament and local government. Finally, the influence of the non-institutional environment is treated under the same headings found in Blondel: the state of the economy, political crises and the 'honeymoon period' that may provide opportunities as well as constraints for leaders.

However, the book does not claim to examine the entirety of the relationship between the political leadership and the institutional environment but to evaluate the capacity of political leaders to make an impact on bureaucratic institutions in one broad policy arena and in the context of the wider institutional and non-institutional environment.

Politicians, bureaucrats and regional planning in France

A single case study has only limited generalizability or lessons for other issues and settings (Marshall and Rossman 1995: 143–4), though it is possible for even a single case to be powerful if it disproves a widely held assumption, such as that only exceptional leaders can make significant changes to bureaucratic institutions. Nevertheless, if the data collection and analysis is guided by a specified framework, other researchers and policy makers may be able to transfer the conclusions from this case to the settings in which they are interested. If this case study shows that the use of certain positional resources helps leaders direct the bureaucracy, judgements can be made about how the possession or absence of equivalent resources in other polities will affect leaders. Though only experts in those other areas can make the judgements, it will be part of the task of the concluding chapter to suggest whether lessons from this case apply more widely.

The capacity for this research to offer lessons for other situations can be enhanced by a cross-case analysis within an overall study (Miles and Huberman 1994: 173–4; Yin 1994: 120). It is also a substantial advantage if the case study can demonstrate a consistent pattern of findings across a variety, not only of political leaders and organizations, but also of constitutional contexts, intra-executive power relationships, party system configurations and non-institutional environmental conditions. Such considerations drove the choice of the subject for this book.

Choice of case study

French constitutional arrangements and party systems have changed frequently in the last 60 years, inadvertently providing researchers with a variety of institutional and non-institutional contexts. In particular, the political executive's positional resources have experienced step changes since 1940. Four years of authoritarian rule by the Vichy State, headed by President Pétain, were followed by the two-year Liberation government under Prime Minister de Gaulle. The political leaders of the new Fourth Republic were given few constitutional powers over parliament in 1946, and were further handicapped by a fragmented and conflict-ridden party system which brought unstable government. The Fifth Republic Constitution of 1958 gave strong formal powers to the national political executive to control (or bypass) the legislature and thereby reduce parliament's veto over organizational change. Political executives, especially the president, were able to remain in post for longer periods to oversee implementation. The radical change from Right to Left in 1981, and especially the decentralization that followed, represents for the researcher another fruitful testing ground.

The strengthening of the political executive in the Fifth Republic means that a demonstration that it is able to reorient bureaucratic institutions might not convince readers that leaders of other countries could do likewise. Political conditions in many contemporary European systems are more like those of the Fourth Republic. Yet the Fifth Republic provides a particularly useful context because it not only offers a period of continuity for the core study (allowing the effect of other variables to be examined), but also contrasts with the three previous regimes; and it includes some crisis moments that enable that potential leadership opportunity to be explored. Furthermore, closer examination of policy making in the Fifth Republic shows that the strength of its leadership is often rather relative, especially where there are conflicts between president, prime minister and the minister-in-charge of a policy.

Considering the other side of the executive–bureaucracy relationship, political leaders face a difficult challenge. 'Long before she had democratic institutions, France possessed an exceptionally capable, self-confident, powerful and centralised bureaucracy' (Williams 1972: 336). The details will emerge in later chapters, but the French State bureaucracy can be summarized as a hierarchically and rationally organized, technically competent institution led by an elite group recruited on formally meritocratic and fiercely competitive grounds.

It is self-regarding and highly autonomous, having been constructed before the development of popular democracy and trained to believe it incarnates the public interest better than do elected politicians. It is highly esteemed and defended by the population as a whole and by other institutions such as local government and the Senate. It exhibits strongly the distinguishing features of an administrative organization that Weber described as the ideal rational model and feared would take control in the absence of strong political leadership.

In the 1960s, Crozier's classic analysis emphasized the French administration's 'bureaucratic rigidity' that reduced its effectiveness and made reforms hard for leaders to achieve. Those at the top had power in name only, because of divisions between hierarchical and vertical strata, deepened by poor interpersonal communication (1966: 225–32). It is hard to orient French bureaucratic institutions towards common goals, despite a number of horizontal linking mechanisms, including the top interministerial corps and specialized interministerial organizations. Top officials 'were paralysed when it came to reforms that might change some equilibrium' that had been carefully worked out between rival groups. It seemed that only heroic leadership or social crises could change the bureaucracy (1964: 232–40).

There is no single assessment of French administration. Wright's (1989) chapter titled 'The administrative state: foundations, myth and reality' summed up admirably the 'on the one hand . . . on the other . . .' evaluation that he and other experts on France have made about its 'administrative power'. The outwardly strong and autonomous bureaucracy is internally divided by the vertical 'silos' of ministries and the multiplicity of corps. From the 1970s the swings in party–political majority added political divisions within the senior echelons, or at least made them more evident. The French bureaucracy was likely to provide more of an obstacle than a valuable resource for leaders, and for that very reason is a critical test case of the thesis that leaders can make an impact on bureaucratic institutions.

The policy domain with which this book is concerned, regional planning, covers a wide span of technical policy sectors and a large number of interested parties. In France, the term used for regional planning – *aménagement du territoire* (AdT) – also means at different times what in English (at any rate in Britain) would be called regional development, regional policy or – more recently – spatial planning. The term is generally agreed to be untranslatable into English (possibly unable to be

understood by 'Anglo-Saxons'), and is usually left in French. The most succinct definition in English seems to be the following:

> It can best be described as a flexible and generic notion referring to that state activity which aims to promote the balanced territorial development of France as a whole without neglecting the specific needs and character of individual regions and their constituent parts.
> (Biarez 1982: 270)

The administrative organization in charge for most of the period covered by this book was the Délégation à l'aménagement du territoire et à l'action régionale (DATAR), an interministerial agency set up in 1963. It was preceded during the early evolution of the policy by a division of a technical ministry (Direction de l'aménagement du territoire [DAT]) and was succeeded in 2006 by the Délégation interministérielle à l'aménagement et à la compétitivité des territoires (DIACT), whose name translated Minister Sarkozy's desire to emphasize a more liberal approach (Ministère de l'Intérieur 2006). A small interministerial body, the agency is legally part of the Prime Minister's Office, though day-to-day responsibility is often delegated to another minister (an evolving structure that enables a number of issues about the interactions between ministries to be explored).

Regional planning provides a good subject for a case study of the impact of political leaders on the bureaucracy. The responsible bureaucracy is in direct contact with political leaders: its staff appointed by them, financed by them and instructed by them. The connections between ministers and the agency's top officials are therefore not complicated by intervening actors in the real world, and are relatively easy to identify. As the prime instrument for orienting the rest of the public service towards the leaders' goals on AdT, it is 'doubly bureaucratic', because of its status as a bureaucracy and its task of coordinating other bureaucratic institutions. It is the political leadership's tool for coordinating the initiation and implementation of policy programmes that help stimulate regional development, a wide-ranging policy domain that encompasses a large number of ministries, their field offices and local councils, enabling the leaders' relationships with these institutions to be explored. Its functional role allows an assessment of the more distant relationships between leaders and bureaucratic institutions, often mediated by parliamentarians and other interests, since its role is to persuade officials at central and field levels, local councils and others to adopt measures decided by the government of the day.

The analysis centres on the agency DATAR because of its existence under different leaders for over 40 years, enabling longitudinal comparisons to be made. While DIACT is too recent to provide much more than a further instance of leadership impact on administrative structure, it is useful to extend the boundaries of the study outside DATAR in two other ways. First, the period 'pre-DATAR' (when political leaders tried in different constitutional contexts to promote the same policy through conventional ministerial units) permits an assessment of leaders' power to alter bureaucratic organizations and of any contrast in the outcomes when two different types of bureaucratic instrument are placed at ministers' disposal. There is a second contrast with actions that might be termed 'non-DATAR', when political leaders, deliberately or otherwise, have not made use of DATAR in circumstances in which other political leaders did so. DATAR's reputation has varied widely over the years, for which some blame variations in its closeness to political leaders, others blame its movement within the machinery of government or changes in the non-institutional environment: it is thereby an appropriate research object in methodological terms.

Outline of the book

The first part of the book examines the evolution of the organization for delivering regional planning to demonstrate that political leaders can change such structures; and then it analyzes leaders' use of positional and personal resources to show how they influence the structures and steer them in their preferred directions. The second part of the book looks at two contrasting policy areas, strongly implicated in AdT but which are arenas for different networks of bureaucratic corps and other policy actors. This part evaluates the success (or otherwise) of political leaders in achieving their policy objectives and explores the diversity of ways in which leaders use the institutional and the non-institutional environment to negotiate with or confront the incumbent interests.

Chapter 2 analyzes the organizational reform process that starts with the initiation of the policy of AdT in the 1940s. Dissatisfied with the structures, leaders with the most interest in the policy aims made successive amendments to the ministerial divisions responsible for the policy before setting up DATAR as a different form of agency. This chapter tests the capacity of both bureaucratic and political leaders with 'activist' ambitions to make changes to the machinery of central government to improve its effectiveness, as Blondel (1987: 170) suggested they might.

It compares the actions of different leaders, identifies the distinctive roles of bureaucrats and political leaders and comes to some initial conclusions on the impact that leaders can make on organizations.

The next three chapters tackle questions about the characteristics of a bureaucratic organization that political leaders may choose to change to ensure it implements leadership goals loyally and competently. Chapter 3 surveys the changes since 1963 in DATAR's organizational links to the political leadership and also in its personal links to leaders, as indicated by their commitment to AdT; it then evaluates the relationship between the strength of these links and DATAR's reputation as a powerful and effective agency, as well as the validity of alternative explanations for DATAR's varying image. Chapter 4 assesses the leaders' efforts to make DATAR responsive to their aims. Through a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the leaders' use of personal and positional powers to make top appointments and to decide staffing levels, Chapter 4 shows how leaders can improve DATAR's responsiveness by adapting its organization and activities, and the trade-off between loyalty and competence. Chapter 5 addresses Blondel's observation that the bureaucracy has to provide effective links to the population if the leader's aims are to be implemented effectively. The regional planning agency's role is not to provide services directly but to steer other organizations towards the national leadership's goals. Its relevant 'population' consists mainly of the institutions it coordinates; and the instruments it has been given are the conventional bureaucratic coordinating instruments: committees and budgets. Chapter 5 scrutinizes the way the leadership uses these administrative and financial tools to implement its aims for AdT.

In the second part of the book, Chapters 6 and 7 undertake studies of two sub-fields that have different levels of 'scope' and different dominant policy actors. The concern is to demonstrate in empirical terms that political leaders can make an impact on and through the bureaucratic institutions, and to reach a better understanding of the institutional and non-institutional conditions that enable them to do so.

Chapter 6 concerns the planning and funding of the major road network. Three bureaucratic organizations have been key actors in determining this highly technical policy, while political leaders try to inflect the officials' preferences towards their own aims. The goal is to assess how much impact the leadership is able to make in this bureaucratic arena, and to see what difference the creation of DATAR as a personalized leadership tool made to the success and operating procedures of the

political leadership. The aims and input of the political leaders and the bureaucratic groups with respect to three dozen roads planning projects are compared in a quantitative analysis with their outcomes, and the results used to guide a qualitative analysis within the Blondel framework of resources, constraints and opportunities. Chapter 7 considers regionalization, led by DAT and DATAR in the 1950s and 1960s; DATAR and DIACT have continued to contribute to the process. The aim is to demonstrate the capacity of the national political leadership to modify territorial institutions against a background of opposition from other bureaucratic and political interests. As in Chapter 6, the relative significance of the input from political leaders and different institutional groups is analyzed first quantitatively and then qualitatively within the Blondel framework.

The validity of the analysis and its conclusions is enhanced by using a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods that are explained in each chapter, but all using a variety of indicators and different sources and types of data. Different aspects of the same phenomenon are thus examined from multiple perspectives, each with its different strengths. A consistent picture builds up to provide a persuasive case in the concluding chapter. Though the methodology may lose something by being less generalizable than Blondel's classic work, it gains by not having to adopt the simplifying assumptions Blondel had to make to cover a global arena of people, issues and political systems. This book is specifically concerned to demonstrate in empirical terms that political leaders can make an impact on and through bureaucratic organizations, and to reach a better understanding of the institutional and non-institutional conditions that enable them to do so.

2
Restructuring Bureaucratic Organizations

The assessment of the impact of the political leadership on the organization of French regional planning starts with the conception of the policy and the administrative arrangements to deliver it. Blondel thinks political leaders are likely to have to improve the organizational structure if they are to achieve the outcomes they desire, but he is sceptical about their chances of doing so. 'Leaders are not powerless to move the machinery and the structures, but the extent of their power is . . . often overestimated' (Blondel 1987: 172–3). Blondel's analysis suggests that setting up a bureaucracy for an innovative or ambitious policy – and French regional planning was both – would meet special difficulty. 'Leaders who wish to achieve goals that are appreciably more "activist" than those of their predecessors often wish to do more; . . . they can try and bend the "muscles" of the bureaucracy; but their expectations will remain largely unfulfilled' (Blondel 1987: 170).

This chapter examines the evolution of the bureaucratic organization responsible for *aménagement du territoire* (AdT) and the principal actors in that evolution (see Table 2.1). How well did leaders succeed in 'bending the muscles' of the bureaucracy, and what were the criteria for success? A first answer to these questions is given at the end of the chapter.

The Service de l'aménagement du territoire

Not until 2003 (Alvergne and Musso 2003: 104) did an official publication mention the Vichy origins of AdT. During the wartime Occupation, the Vichy State invented the policy and created its first administrative structure, the Service de l'aménagement du territoire. While a near equivalent ('town and country planning') had started in Britain before the war, 'the term *aménagement du territoire* did not exist in France in

Table 2.1 'Political leaders' in the stages to DATAR

Prime minister and status		Other main actors and status	
• 1941–43 Vichy: creation of the Service de l'aménagement du territoire			
Deputy Head of State		*Head of the DGEN*	
Darlan	Naval officer and former technical minister	Lehideux	Manager
		Giraud	Bureaucrat
		Surleau	Bureaucrat
• 1944 Liberation: transfer to the Minister of Reconstruction			
Head of Government		*Minister of Reconstruction*	
De Gaulle	Army officer and former technical minister	Dautry	Former manager, bureaucrat and technical minister
• 1946 Abolition of Reconstruction's regional tier			
Head of Government		*Minister of Reconstruction*	
Gouin	Elected politician	Billoux	Elected politician
• 1948 Fourth Republic: creation of the Direction de l'aménagement du territoire			
Prime Minister		*Minister of Reconstruction*	
Queuille	Elected politician	Claudius-Petit	Elected politician
• 1954 Interministerial committees and regional reforms			
Prime Minister		*Minister of Economy*	
Mendès-France	Elected politician	Faure	Elected politician
• 1958 Reform of interministerial committees			
Prime Minister		*Minister of Construction*	
De Gaulle	Former army officer and technical minister	Sudreau	Bureaucrat
• 1959 Fifth Republic: CIAT, Prime Minister's interministerial committee			
Prime Minister		*Minister of Construction*	
Debré	Elected politician	Sudreau	Bureaucrat
• 1962 A ministry for aménagement du territoire			
Prime Minister		*Minister-délégué*	
Pompidou	Banker and political aide	Schumann	Elected politician
• 1963 The creation of DATAR			
Prime Minister		*Delegué*	
Pompidou	Banker and political aide	Guichard	Political aide and prefect

1939: it was born in 1944 under Vichy', according to Jean-François Gravier (1970: 57), an academic who worked for Vichy and the post-war government, and introduced regional planning to the public.

The full powers given to Marshal Pétain by the constitutional law of 10 July 1940 enabled his government to start reorganizing an administration his supporters said had been corrupted by parliamentary influence. Some ministries were split into single-purpose units, creating new types of administrative bodies (*délégations*, commissariats, secretariats, etc.). This movement accelerated after Pétain made Admiral Darlan his deputy in 1941. Darlan brought into government a younger generation: '*polytechniciens, inspecteurs des finances*, company directors: that is, the "technocrats" with a new vision of society and the socio-economic future of France' (Dreyfus 1990: 395–7). Many had trained at the Ecole polytechnique or the Ecole libre des sciences politiques before becoming State officials or directors of industrial firms or banks. They were the more Right-wing members of the clubs of the 1930s that promoted Keynesian economics, the orderly planning of infrastructure and urban development, and a technical rationality in decision making (Dreyfus 1990: 21–2, 34, 223; Massardier 1996: 15–32; Paxton 1972: 356). They rejected both the pre-war Popular Front and liberal economics. Some were enthused with the Vichy project for a National Revolution; others just wanted to modernize a State administration they thought out of date (Baruch 1997: 222).

Among Darlan's new organizations was the Délégation général à l'équipement national (DGEN), which reported directly to Pétain. Its function was to draw up investment plans for the post-war economy, including a ten-year State infrastructure plan. Two organizations were attached to DGEN: the Commissariat à la reconstruction immobilière, created in 1940 from a section of the former Ministry of Public Works to oversee reconstruction; and the Service d'aménagement et d'urbanisme de la région parisienne, which brought together urban planners from Paris and its suburbs. The first *délégué général* of DGEN was François Lehideux, former second-in-command at Renault, who was more clearly a politician than later *délégués*. From 1941 Lehideux also held a ministerial post, unlike his successors, Henri Giraud and Frédéric Surleau, both technical bureaucrats, who were responsible to ministers. All three had experience on the boundaries of politics and administration in the *cabinet* of Raoul Dautry, 'technocratic' minister of munitions in the last government of the Third Republic (Baudouï 1992); and all wanted reform: Lehideux was 'genuinely interested in rationalising the outmoded French industrial system', and producing a State investment plan

(Paxton 1972: 219) while Surleau wrote in July 1940 that 'France has an overriding need for a new, keen administration that deliberately breaks with the errors of past ways' (Baruch 1997: 173).

The Service de l'aménagement du territoire was created within DGEN's urban planning division. According to Pierre Randet, who was the first head of the *service*, Giraud put together Dautry's pre-war policy of moving factories away from vulnerable areas with the need to reduce Parisian transport and housing problems (Randet 1955: 140–1). A report for Giraud by the engineer Gabriel Dessus recommended encouraging firms to move from Paris to smaller towns to 'balance' their agricultural activities (Mazet 2000: 7) and it seems likely that the Service de l'aménagement du territoire was set up to develop this policy. One critic (Audouin 1977: 18) asserted that the government, remembering the Popular Front, wanted to reduce concentrations of urban workers, but he gives no evidence. Certainly it responded to the provincial ideology of the Pétain entourage (Mioche 1987: 23).

DGEN met the 'hurdles' Blondel predicted would confront new administrative structures. Vichy had made the changes in pursuit of efficient coordination: DGEN was cited by Darlan's secretariat in May 1941 as an institution that fulfilled the government's goal of 'concentrating in the hands of one person responsibility for problems of a specific nature that in themselves belonged to several ministries' (Baruch 1997: Annex 16). Yet Lehideux found that officials from 'classic' ministries refused to regard it as 'a real ministry' – and he possessed the title of minister, unlike his successors (Dreyfus 1990: 534). The prefects complained to the Interior Ministry about the independence of the *délégué*; and finance officials criticized the cost of the new agency and its ten-year plan: DGEN was later put under the Finance Minister's control (Baruch 1997: 202–3).

Restructuring by the Provisional Government

General de Gaulle's 'government of national unanimity' in September 1944 had no formal or legal title of authority (Williams 1972: 20); its structure had to be negotiated between de Gaulle's representatives and the Resistance organization, the Conseil national de la Résistance. De Gaulle had little room for manoeuvre in allocating ministers and portfolios because the appropriate weight had to be given to the main Resistance groups and political parties, old and new generations, 'technicians' and parliamentarians (Rioux 2002: 69–73). However, it was de Gaulle's personal decision to sweep under the carpet the 'malefactors'

and the existence of the Vichy State rather than risk disturbances that might bring in the Communists or an American military government (Bloch-Lainé and Gruson 1996: 119, 135; Guichard 1999: 12–3). Thus the bureaucracy survived almost intact (Paxton 1972: 333–5).

DGEN officials were transferred to a new Ministry for Public Works and Transport, apart from Surleau and the officials working on the ten-year investment plan, who were assigned to the Minister for the National Economy, Pierre Mendès-France. In November 1944 the Minister for Public Works and Transport asked to be relieved of the reconstruction portfolio. De Gaulle invited Dautry to take it on: his 'apolitical' stance would not upset the political balance and, 'while almost unknown to English-speakers, he was an almost heroic figure in his own country' (Pacey 2002: 67). As a rail company engineer in the First World War, he built supply lines in record time; later he unified French rail firms into the SNCF. He did not agree to the armistice in 1940 and took no part in Vichy but his 'managerial efficiency' inspired many who did. He was president of the journal *Urbanisme*, and kept in touch with DGEN planners until 1943 (Baudouï 1992: 264–88; Avril 1993: 230; Massardier 1996: 104). Dautry persuaded de Gaulle to add urban planning to the reconstruction portfolio, arguing that France should be modernized, not restored (Avril 1993: 246); and de Gaulle transferred the urban planners to Dautry as Ministry for Reconstruction and Urban Planning (MRU).

Dautry set up two directorates in MRU: the Directorate for urban planning and housing included the Service de l'aménagement du territoire. However, after he left, the Service worked mainly on 'urban development plans . . . for war-damaged communes' (Randet 1994: 16–8). Dautry also appointed regional commissioners he personally selected from other organizations, and an Industrial Decentralization Unit, to which he recruited Gravier. Dautry asked Gravier to 'set out the principles of *aménagement du territoire* in a way that would be widely intelligible and useful' (Avril 1993: 246). Dautry was 'definitely the father of industrial decentralization, which was the first visible form of regional planning, but one circumscribed by economic problems . . . that pushed the spatial dimension into the background' (Charles and Cristini 1992: 468–9).

De Gaulle and Dautry changed the ministerial structures, yet only after de Gaulle had taken up his post in Paris, free of constraints imposed by the Conseil national de la Résistance (which had also refused Dautry a role in urban planning). De Gaulle moved the DGEN infrastructure planners again – from the Ministry of National Economy

to MRU, after the Economic Council he chaired decided that MRU should draw up a reconstruction plan to fit the Ministry of National Economy's investment Plan (Mioche 1987: 62). However, there were disputes between ministers about responsibility for the Plan, to which de Gaulle's response was as much political as organizational: he assigned investment planning to a new Commissariat Général au Plan (CGP or Plan Commissariat), responsible to the prime minister, 'to counterbalance the appointment of a Communist [François Billoux] as Minister for the National Economy' (Mioche 1987: 89).

The regional structure is abolished

Dautry resigned with de Gaulle in 1946 and Billoux became Minister for Reconstruction. He was the first person with responsibility for regional planning to fulfil Page's definition (1992: 148) of 'political leadership', by using his position, 'gained as a result of a career in politics, a career in the struggle for power through competition involving election within a system of representative government, to assert the choices of the politician' (though Billoux's career had developed through Resistance activity). Billoux immediately removed the ministry's regional tier, dismissing all Dautry's regional commissioners and all but one of the regional construction inspectors appointed under Vichy. 'Regionalism and regionalization were equated with collaboration and Fascism' (Mény 1987a: 53). Billoux kept the Service de l'aménagement du territoire and was interested in its work, but, as a Communist, he was 'short-circuited' by prime ministers, and his activities increasingly circumscribed by the finance ministry (Yvert 1990: 668–9). 'The influence of the Service de l'aménagement du territoire, which had no financial instruments, was rather weak; the first Monnet Plan, drawn up from 1946 to 1947, showed no interest in this domain' (Gravier 1970: 57). Gravier had been posted to the Plan Commissariat's regional section in 1947 but with no tangible result.

Other Reconstruction ministers between 1946 and 1948 were 'completely indifferent to *aménagement du territoire*' (Gravier 1970: 57); their housing portfolio took greater priority during their short terms in office. Staff in the ministry followed the lead of their ministers. 'The Ministry of Reconstruction did not at first feel the need to coordinate their efforts with the Plan Commissariat . . . The Plan had objectives for basic industries . . . that were not easily adapted to *géographie volontaire* [changing the map of France] . . . and the Ministry of Reconstruction was driven by the need to house people' (Randet 1994: 18–9, 24).

The Direction de l'aménagement du territoire

Regional planning was brought to public attention with the publication of a book by Gravier (1947) whose title – *Paris et le désert français* – is widely used as a symbol for rural depopulation and the over-concentration of economic, cultural and intellectual activity in capital cities. This book was the report Dautry had commissioned, prefaced by Dautry and published 'to attack the Plan' (Alvergne and Musso 2003: 110). The author feared that the Plan Commissariat's investment programme would reinforce regional imbalances. But there were also elements of 'turf-guarding', as Randet (1955: 140) later admitted: The 'classic conflict of powers' between the Plan Commissariat and DAT led them into 'rivalry'.

The book was publicized in the National Assembly by Eugène Claudius-Petit, who became MRU a year later. Claudius-Petit's explanation of AdT in MRU's 'green paper' on the subject remains the standard definition in France:

> *Aménagement du territoir*e is the search for a more balanced distribution of the population within the territory of France in relation to the distribution of natural resources and economic activity. Its constant concern is to provide people with better living and working conditions, and improved facilities for leisure and cultural activities. It is therefore being carried out not just from economic motives, but much more for people's well-being and fulfilment.
>
> (MRU 1950a: 3)

Claudius-Petit, the representative of the largest Resistance movement (Franc-Tireur) on the Conseil national de la Résistance, and now a leader of the centrist Resistance party, was in post for a relatively long period, from 1948 to 1953. He was supported until 1952 by three prime ministers: Queuille, Bidault and Pleven. Claudius-Petit raised the organizational status of regional planning by renaming the urban planning directorate the Direction de l'aménagement du territoire (DAT); and creating a new Service de l'aménagement national, which he set to producing options for a national plan of AdT. Randet's version, *Pour un plan national d'aménagement du territoire* (MRU 1950a), outlining objectives and actions, was approved at a Cabinet meeting of the Bidault government. An advisory Central Commission was set up by decree in 1950. Composed of nine top public officials (including François Bloch-Lainé of the State investment bank, the Caisse des Dépôts; Gabriel

Dessus, by then a director of Electricité de France; and Alfred Sauvy, director of government statistics), it met in Claudius-Petit's office to hear expert witnesses (Bloch-Lainé 1977: 141). On their advice, and with the support of the Breton prime minister, René Pleven, a special fund, the Fonds national d'aménagement du territoire (FNAT), was created in 1950, which DAT could use to offer industrialists incentives to relocate. Another Act in 1951 enabled public corporations or mixed-economy companies to be set up for regional development projects and apply for Caisse des Dépôts loans, but the implementing regulations were not issued (Pisani 1956a: 322), and the Central Commission stopped meeting in June 1952 (Randet 1994: 65–7). The prime minister in 1952, Antoine Pinay, was firmly against planning (Cohen 1977: 56) and Claudius-Petit lowered his own ambitions rather than endanger the Plan Commissariat's investment Plan, itself rather fragile. Claudius-Petit had 'noticed that through this notion [of *aménagement du territoire*] he risked calling planning as a whole into question. He therefore confined his actions mainly to urban policy' (Bloch-Lainé 1962: 869).

Claudius-Petit's immediate successors prioritized their housing portfolio: Courant (minister in 1953) is remembered for his housing action plan, and Lemaire (minister 1953–54) for his levy on wages to fund house-building. The prime minister, Laniel, had 'urban planning' removed from the ministry's masthead, instructing Courant: 'Tell the urban planners to go to hell' (Randet 1994: 27). During this hiatus at ministerial level, others became active. In March 1953 over 400 Breton political representatives, chaired by Pleven, agreed to prepare a Breton plan for regional development, modernization and infrastructure. The Plan Commissioner, Etienne Hirsch, was present, but 'disinclined to accept the idea of regional planning' (Bougeard 1994: 189). DAT made itself 'especially responsible for encouraging Breton regional development' (*Le Monde* 7–8 February 1954), but 'DAT had to encourage initiatives from others because it was unable to provide them itself' (Pouyet 1968: 23). The Caisse des Dépôts under Bloch-Lainé supported regional development projects outside the ministerial investment programmes; and at the Ministry of Industry, the official Pierre Dreyfus, 'working closely with Bloch-Lainé', was the source of an Industrial Decentralization and Expansion Unit attached to the minister's *cabinet* (Rousso 1986a: 32). DAT continued to carry out its official role but met opposition from other parts of the bureaucracy and other ministers. Randet was even shouted at in a corridor of the Matignon [the prime minister's office] by an Industry Minister who

accused Randet of trespassing on his patch (Randet in *Administration* 1994: 22). While there were differences between bureaucracies that constituted hurdles to coordinated regional planning, the determination or reluctance of ministers to control this policy area was also an important factor.

The Mendès-France–Faure regional economic reforms

When Mendès-France became prime minister in June 1954 he transferred the Plan Commissariat to the Minister of Finance and Economy, Edgar Faure, creating the structure he had argued for unsuccessfully in 1944. Mendès-France and Faure, who followed him as prime minister, 'emphasised their determination to modernize economic structures, were interested in economic productivity, and conscious of the need for regional development' (Berstein 1985: 222). Mendès-France was voted special powers to make decrees in the economic, social and fiscal domain. He was fully occupied with foreign affairs for most of his premiership; the practical steps were therefore taken by Faure in liaison with the prime minister's *cabinet*. Further instruments were decided by Mendès-France in February 1955 with Robert Buron as Finance Minister. Then Prime Minister Faure with Pierre Pflimlin at Finance completed a set of 120 decrees under special powers in the economic domain.

Among these decrees were some that would require ministries to adopt common regional boundaries, so that 'regional action programmes' of Plan investment could be planned and implemented. They asked the Plan Commissariat to draw up the programmes, and to head an interministerial committee (the *groupe de synthèse*) that would propose suitable regional boundaries. The Inspecteurs généraux de l'économie nationale (IGENs, a corps of the Ministry of National Economy) were asked to oversee the implementation of the programmes. A substantial development fund, the Fonds de développement économique et social (FDES), was established; its committee was chaired by Bloch-Lainé. DAT was assigned tasks related to its ministerial remit: it ran an interministerial 'decentralization committee' drawing up lists of State enterprises that could move out of Paris (chaired by Surleau, the former director of DGEN); it was vice-chair of the Plan Commissariat's *groupe de synthèse* deciding the regional boundaries, and it was the technical adviser to the FDES industrial decentralization sub-committee. It kept its own development fund, FNAT, much smaller than the FDES. 'The Ministry of Finance became strong [in *aménagement du territoire*] because it controlled the tools for decentralized expansion: the legal

measures put in place between 1954 and 1957 gave it the dominant role' (Pouyet 1968: 38).

Finance officials were unlikely to obstruct this increase in their powers and indeed this 'experiment … received the full agreement of the Rue de Rivoli' [then home to the Ministry of Finance]; and moreover, 'the big names of the civil service … Gabriel Ardant, Claude Gruson, François Bloch-Lainé, Paul Delouvrier, Louis Armand, Alfred Sauvy, gave their unswerving support' to Mendès-France (Rioux 2001: 51, 631). However, the reforms met substantial resistance from other bureaucrats and politicians (discussed further in Chapter 7). The decree specifying the boundaries for the regional action programmes was not published for 18 months, such were the disputes between ministries and the protests from national politicians with local mandates (hence Normandy was divided into two regions: 'Lower', around Caen, and 'Upper', around Rouen [Clout 1972: 31–5; Monier 1965: 35]). Only two ministries designated a regional-level official. The IGENs were 'unable to overcome psychological and administrative resistance' from ministries to implement the programmes (Pouyet 1968: 39). Prefects took no notice of the IGENs, according to Monier (1965: 67), one of the IGENs involved.

Following this experience, officials and politicians interested in administrative modernization and/or regional policy promoted ideas for change, notably in the 1956 edition of the *Revue française de science politique*, with contributions from serving and former officials, including Michel Debré, regional commissioner during the Liberation, *conseiller d'Etat* and *député*; Jean-François Gravier, still at the Plan Commissariat; and Edgard Pisani, senator and former prefect. They said that 'the extensions' made by Mendès-France and Faure to the policy of AdT 'posed delicate problems of administrative coordination' which the Ministry of Reconstruction was incapable of resolving. Gravier wanted to reorganize the administration on the basis of the needs of AdT, while Debré identified political and constitutional problems as the cause of the administrative problems. Pisani concluded that 'a real regional development policy would require reforms not only to the administration but to the State, to [local] taxation and to habits' (Pisani 1956b: 262). His article, '*Administration de gestion, administration de mission*' (Pisani 1956a), proposing a new institutional formula for development projects, contrasted traditional ministerial bureaucracies (*administrations de gestion*): formalist, reactive, permanent, hierarchically organized and suited to managing activities that did not change much, with *administrations de mission*, set up to conceive and carry out a 'mission': lightweight, realist, forward-looking, project-focused, informal in working methods

and interministerial in recruitment and function. There was a clear parallel with DAT and the Plan Commissariat. The new Socialist Prime Minister Mollet and Finance Minister Ramadier asked Bloch-Lainé to prepare a reform of the economic administration, including the Plan Commissariat (published in Bloch-Lainé 1962). They then dropped the subject – from which Bloch-Lainé concluded that 'the Socialist position was more verbal than operational' (Bloch-Lainé and Bouvier 1986: 100).

DAT pursued regional development objectives but was unable to achieve them. Its top official (not its minister) had asked Pflimlin in 1955 if the Plan Commissariat's regional action programmes could take account of DAT's regional development plans. These mapped the urban and rural centres where investment could usefully be concentrated for long-term development gains. Pflimlin refused, preferring actions that would produce jobs more quickly (Randet 1994: 81). The Reconstruction ministers, Duchet and Chochoy, were more concerned with their housing responsibilities: Duchet in 1955 organized a massive low-cost housing programme; and Chochoy was a housing specialist specifically appointed by Mollet to prepare the 1957 Housing Act (Yvert 1990: 773, 783). Ignoring their ministers' disinterest, DAT, 'puffed up with its pioneering role in this domain', inserted a clause in the Housing Act, to make regional development plans a legal requirement. Questions were immediately raised: would DAT and the Plan Commissariat use the same procedures and consult the same organizations? Or would conflicting plans emerge, given that there were no formal arrangements for coordination and little prospect of DAT and the Plan Commissariat working together voluntarily? (Lajugie 1964: 307; Pouyet 1968: 36).

The government's official adviser on administrative efficiency, the Comité central d'enquêtes sur le coût et le rendement des services publics (a standing body of civil servants and parliamentarians advising government on administrative efficiency), issued immediately a report that was 'a long indictment of the inability of the Ministry of Reconstruction to ensure the coordination of regional development activities' (Pouyet 1968: 36). It recommended the prime minister set up and chair an interministerial committee on AdT. 'Implementation of *aménagement du territoire* cannot belong to a single ministry; all ministries are involved. A body at the highest level . . . seems indispensable' (Report of September 1957, quoted in Pouyet 1968: 47).

Reform of interministerial committees

In May 1958 de Gaulle was made prime minister of the Fourth Republic to resolve the Algerian crisis, and was voted powers to make law

by Orders until a new Constitution was agreed. De Gaulle appointed Pierre Sudreau as Minister for Construction. A prefect deported for his Resistance activities, Sudreau had been deputy director of the Faure *cabinet* that prepared the 1954–55 regional reforms, and then headed the Commissariat pour l'urbanisme de la région parisienne, developing Parisian infrastructure. Sudreau was interested in regional planning and 'had seen on the ground how poor the administration could be at achieving the public good' (Debré 1988: 91). Sudreau was one of the half-dozen ministers or administrators (including Pisani, Bloch-Lainé, Delouvrier and Massé) whom de Gaulle held in high esteem and whose reform ideas he was willing to consider if they would improve coherence and coordination (Chevallier 1992: 563). Sudreau persuaded de Gaulle to let him retain responsibility for AdT, but with enhanced interministerial provisions to improve coordination.

The DAT decentralization committee, listing State firms that could move out of Paris, was asked to select ministry divisions too, but the committee would now be run from the Plan Commissariat. Additional interministerial committees, chaired by DAT, would decide which industrial or scientific buildings would be given planning permits in Paris, or would offer grants to firms locating in disadvantaged regions. The Plan Commissariat's regional action programmes would after all be integrated into DAT's regional development plans by a regional plans committee, which the Commissariat would chair, with DAT as vice-chair. Finally, a body to advise the Construction minister on regional planning, the Conseil supérieur de la Construction, was created, chaired by the regional developer, Philippe Lamour, who had in 1945 been a member of de Gaulle's Economic Council at the same time as Mendès-France and Dautry. Bloch-Lainé (1962: 869) must have been referring to Sudreau and his ambitions when he warned,

> [Claudius-Petit's] successors experienced, as he did, the temptation to overextend the boundaries. However discreet their staff, they could not avoid conflict with the Plan Commissariat when the latter, somewhat belatedly, started to take an interest in regionalising its programmes.

CIAT, the Prime Minister's interministerial committee

Construction Minister Sudreau met similar 'turf-guarding' problems with finance and industry ministers to those DAT had met with officials. At Sudreau's request, Debré started to hold an informal monthly meeting, soon formalized by decree as the Comité interministeriel permanent pour les problèmes d'action régionale et d'aménagement du territoire

(CIAT, later called CIADT, and now called CIACT, see Chapter 5 for details of its work). Sudreau prepared reports for the committee, while the meetings were organized by Jérôme Monod, Debré's *cabinet* adviser for administrative affairs and regional planning, who later became head of DATAR (Debré 1988: 22, 166–7, 177). Monod was also preparing regional administrative reforms (discussed further in Chapter 7). Debré took other steps to support Sudreau, appointing *Commissaires à l'aménagement du territoire* in three regions, to work with DAT and local officials under Sudreau's direction. Despite these actions DAT remained unable to coordinate the regional development plans. The *Commissaires à l'aménagement du territoire* 'clashed with the field officials, especially the prefects' (Pouyet 1968: 37). Pisani as Agriculture Minister and the Plan Commissariat introduced their own redevelopment projects. The Plan Commissariat did not want regionalized planning, as one of its then regional planners regretfully admitted (Roche 1986: 69–70).

> Its tables of figures … were already so complicated to draw up that an additional dimension was resented as at best a new constraint and at worst an unwarranted interference. Adding regional needs, even smoothed out by us … made it too obvious that some trends were erroneous, or did not fit Plan assumptions … It risked exposing the inconsistencies, even contradictions, that were more easily masked in total national figures … What remained, therefore, was to go through the motions [*faire 'comme si'*]. The Plan … could not and did not want to integrate the regional dimension.

By 1962 the survival of the Ministry of Construction itself was under review: its former responsibility for Paris plans had been transferred to a new Paris District authority, making some suspect that the ministry was searching for a new role. The ministry then published a National *Plan d'aménagement du territoire* that Sudreau had asked the Conseil supérieur de la Construction to draw up (Sudreau 1994: 5). It was issued just before the Plan Commissariat's Fourth Plan of investment was presented to parliament. The government was embarrassed when parliamentarians used the debate on the Fourth Plan to demand regional investment plans too, first conceded by Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, then countermanded by President de Gaulle (Rodwin 1970: 338–9). The embarrassment became the stimulus for a more fundamental structural reform by the incoming prime minister, Pompidou.

An ephemeral ministry

Unlike Debré, Pompidou was not a parliamentarian. He served in de Gaulle's *cabinet* from 1944 to 1946, became director-general of Rothschild's bank and returned to serve de Gaulle as his *directeur de cabinet* in 1958, helping him set up the new government.

> He thought that France was not up to date, that it must industrialise, build up its infrastructure, and launch an ambitious policy of *aménagement du territoire* . . . In fact, a proper executive body for *aménagement du territoire* was still to be created, and it was this gap to which Georges Pompidou applied himself urgently.
>
> (Roussel 1994: 150–3)

The day he became prime minister, Pompidou brought national investment planning and regional planning together under his direct authority, and created a new post of '*Ministre-délégué auprès du premier ministre*, responsible for the Plan and *aménagement du territoire*'. The title signalled that the minister had the delegated and close authority of the prime minister. The post was offered to Maurice Schumann, a Centre-party leader. The Plan Commissioner, Pierre Massé, was not consulted and learned of his forthcoming transfer to the Prime Minister's Office from Schumann (Massé 1986: 199, 210). Schumann appointed as his *directeur de cabinet* the Plan Commissariat's top finance official, who chose as his deputy Debré's *cabinet* adviser on AdT, Monod. Schumann 'made no secret of his desire to construct a great super-coordinating ministry', to include a Délégation à l'aménagement du territoire, supported by technical divisions (Lanversin 1970: 62). Critical comments quickly appeared in the press (Pouyet 1968: 45). When Schumann resigned a month later with other centrist ministers (because of de Gaulle's anti-Europe speech), his ministry had still not been set up: no ministry would transfer staff or areas of competence (Pouyet 1968: 45). As a member of Schumann's *cabinet* told Catherine Grémion (1979: 143),

> The decree appointing M. Schumann was never issued, he resigned before it could happen, because we had not managed to settle it properly. Why? Because the opposition from other ministries was formidable. In consequence, a minister of State existed but there was no decree setting out his responsibilities, no staff . . . And secondly, no provision had been made for him to have powers, especially financial powers.

The creation of DATAR

For academics (such as Grémion 1979: 143; Pouyet 1968: 46), the Schumann ministry was a valuable theoretical experiment, which demonstrated two 'fundamental principles': first, that 'an agency for *aménagement du territoire* located at the heart of State administrative and financial action should be responsible for coordinating its implementation'; and second, 'that the responsibility for regional planning must be located at the highest level in the government hierarchy'. For the top financial official Bloch-Lainé (1962: 884–5), the lesson was that AdT needed an executive 'horizontal administration' like the Plan Commissariat, which would work closely with the Plan Commissariat, but preferably not be the Plan Commissariat (which had other important tasks). Yet the experiment also demonstrated the difficulty of establishing such an organization if it deprived others of their roles. The first head of DATAR, Pompidou's closest aide, Olivier Guichard (1975: 89–90), put it pragmatically:

> [Pompidou] relaunched the idea of *aménagement du territoire* by asking a minister, Maurice Schumann, to invent the role. It was not the best method. It was much better for the role to be held by someone located outside the classic governmental structures but directly attached to the prime minister, sufficiently discreet not to raise alarm, sufficiently well-supported to secure decisions, and with real power, that is to say, money. A month later, the departure of the MRP ministers . . . gave him the chance to arrive at this formula.

Like Pompidou, Guichard was highly political but not an elected politician, and had the status of an official without having been a bureaucrat. His father, a naval officer, had been Darlan's *directeur du cabinet* at Vichy, though de Gaulle 'had the good manners never to mention him', and Guichard himself was de Gaulle's *chef de cabinet* throughout 'the desert years' after 1946, working at times with Pompidou (Guichard 1999: 161). After de Gaulle became president, Guichard was made a prefect by special decree (see Chapter 4), and ran the Organization for Saharan Development looking for water and possibly oil and a nuclear testing site until France left Algeria. From 1962 to 1967 (while at DATAR) he occupied the office next to Pompidou's in Matignon, a *chargé de mission* but above the *cabinet* hierarchy. Guichard (1975: 89) said the idea of DATAR came mainly from Pompidou, but they often talked it over. Monod and many others say Guichard was the 'inventor' of DATAR.

Learning from the problems met by Schumann, the organizational arrangements and legal texts were prepared in detail for several months before DATAR was announced. Guichard, Monod and Xavier Ortoli (Pompidou's *directeur du cabinet*) 'surveyed the principal decision-making nodes in the administrative and financial apparatus and organized the necessary regulatory provisions' (Grémion 1976: 124). The *délégué* of DATAR was made a member of any committee or secretariat that dealt with issues important for AdT, of which the most significant was CIAT, whose meetings the prime minister chaired and DATAR would prepare. A Pompidou *cabinet* member said that 'right from the beginning, the *délégué* had all the legal powers required and seats in all the arenas where these problems were discussed' (Grémion 1979: 144).

The *délégué* was given the financial powers Schumann had lacked. One of the first acts of Schumann's *cabinet* had been to ask for a regional aid fund. In preparing DATAR, Pompidou asked the Minister of Finance, Giscard, for a 'ring-fenced' section to be added to the prime minister's budget, so that he 'could dispose of a sum to be used at the discretion of the Matignon without the sometimes stifling supervision of the Ministry of Finance' (Roussel 1994: 153). The Fonds d'intervention pour l'aménagement du territoire (FIAT) was created by decree at the same time as DATAR. It was agreed that the *délégué* would participate in the settling of each ministry's budget and report on the outcome at the end of each financial year. (The reality of these powers is examined in Chapter 5.) The agency would thereby have a comprehensive oversight of all pertinent committees, agencies and funding bodies.

There were arguments with ministries over the text of the decrees, 'the technical administrations having reservations on everything'; but the most difficult sticking point – the phrase 'regional action' at the end of DATAR's title – came from the political leadership. 'There was pressure to create a Délégation à l'aménagement du territoire full stop. An economic problem had to be resolved, a certain number of technical problems were to be resolved, and that was it'… 'Every time the text came back from those countless meetings "l'action régionale" had to be put back' (Perrilliat 1992: 9). In his last public speech, celebrating DATAR's fortieth anniversary, Guichard revealed that Gaulle and Pompidou were reluctant to admit the regional dimension.

> Since the regions were supposed to be the preferred framework for regional planning, and the Délégation would be in charge of the coordination and promotion, it was essential that it was concerned in regional action. So I positively insisted, in the end successfully, that

the 'Délégation 'à l'aménagement du territoire' should also be called 'à l'action régionale'. Even though the President of the Republic had thought about these issues less than had his Prime Minister, he agreed that DATAR should adopt the whole of the acronym.

(Guichard 2003)

In relation to DATAR itself the founding decree (63–112, of 14 February 1963) said only that 'it will be created, under the authority of the prime minister', and that 'it will be directed by a *délégué* appointed by decree'. Other Articles give the *délégué* powers to attend, chair or prepare the meetings of certain committees, to 'make use' of a few named divisions of sectoral ministries (such as the Industry Ministry's Industrial Decentralization Unit, which was in fact quickly integrated into DATAR); or they assign responsibilities to the *délégué* for monitoring grants or ministerial budgets to see they meet 'the objectives of *aménagement du territoire*'. The memorandum accompanying the decree said that the new institution was designed to 'improve coherence'. On planning, there was to be an end to 'the dual structure' of the Plan Commissariat's four-year investment plans, and the Construction Ministry's longer-term plan for *aménagement du territoire*'. On implementation, whereas ministries remained 'fundamentally responsible for execution, there was a need for more efficient coordination . . . monitoring . . . and promotion', which would be the role of DATAR (Lanversin 1970: 70–2). Other decrees reconstituted DAT as the Direction de l'aménagement foncier et de l'urbanisme (DAFU) reducing its functions to urban planning. It retained control of its FNAT fund (renamed FNAFU), but the permitted uses were restricted and the *délégué* was on its funding committee.

The decree on DATAR reassured ministers that there would be no further attempt at a ministry of AdT (Pouyet 1968: 57–8): the *délégué* had little direct executive power, relying on interministerial committees, a few ministerial divisions and budgetary oversight to coordinate the implementation by the traditional ministries of the Plan Commissariat's schemes. Yet 'it benefited, more than any of the usual organizational schemes ever could, from a real interministerial power' (Ortoli 1990: 131). Guichard claimed afterwards that 'he had been placed in an exceptional position: simultaneously outside the administrative circuit and yet able to intervene everywhere, on almost all development problems', and that he had enjoyed more real power at DATAR than in his next post as Minister for Industry (1975: 87).

DATAR was set up immediately at Guichard's former Office for Saharan Development, retaining some of his former colleagues, and

recruiting others by word of mouth from those who had heard 'something promising was going on' (Essig 1979: 19; Roche 1986: 70). DATAR was made more powerful by Guichard combining his role as *délégué* with that of the *chargé de mission* at Matignon closest to Pompidou. One of the original DATAR members said, 'The dual post gave us sufficient influence to carry out activities that inevitably involved having to counteract all the bureaucratic inertia (*pesanteurs*) of the time' (*Administration* 1994: 35–6). According to Pompidou's *directeur de cabinet*, 'the power was guaranteed by choosing a person, Olivier Guichard, who was very close to Pompidou, and by the permanent, pressing intervention of the prime minister' (Ortoli 1990: 131). By the same token, DATAR would be weakened if its *délégué* did not enjoy the same relationship with another prime minister who was equally committed.

Conclusions

The capacity of the French authorities to create a new policy and several different structures to deliver it in a 20-year period seems to refute Blondel's worst assumptions about the difficulties political leaders would face in trying to reorganize a bureaucracy. The institutional persistence of DATAR from 1963 to 2005 may seem to negate this conclusion, and it is true that strong local political defenders kept it in being at times when it did not fit national government aims. The continual updating of its internal structures, discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, should dispel the illusion of four decades of continuity. Meanwhile, in a chapter examining the changes leading up to the creation of DATAR, we need to note only that in June 2005 the new Prime Minister Villepin and Interior Minister Sarkozy announced that the government would counteract the effects of globalization by enhancing the competitiveness of French regions, in October 2005 renamed the CIAT/CIADT committee CIACT (replacing D for development with C for competitiveness) and in December 2005 reconstructed DATAR as DIACT (delegation for the planning and competitiveness of territories), incorporating within it the 'interministerial mission for economic changes', MIME, whose task had been to predict and manage site closures as companies relocated abroad.

Nevertheless, though the power of leaders to change structures has been demonstrated, so has the problem of persuading bureaucrats to accept the changes and coordinate their activities. Blondel (1987: 172) was right to say that political leaders would meet 'constraints and hurdles'. DAT proved unable, from its vertical silo, to influence the Plan

Commissariat and other ministries, even when supported by enthusiastic ministers. Fourth Republic prime ministers gave powers in related fields to other bureaucracies; these too failed to work together. The leaders of the Fifth Republic first strengthened the existing structures by adding interministerial committees, but conflict continued. A more thorough attempt at reform, retaining vertical divisions but within a horizontal ministry for AdT, was abandoned after it failed to overcome objections from ministers and ministries. Learning from this failure, and from the analyses of reform-minded officials and politicians, the prime minister's aides prepared a different form of bureaucratic institution. A new agency, 'lighter but stronger', was introduced; its formally prescribed powers were few in number but critical for effective coordination and intervention.

How easily was the political leadership able to 'bend the "muscles" of the bureaucracy'? A comparison of nine specific attempts by the political leadership to change bureaucratic structures, based on the brief information supplied at this early stage in the book, is necessarily rather tentative, but yields some preliminary findings. The relationship between political leaders and bureaucrats in these organizational changes was complex: their contributions intertwined and the distinction between 'politicians' and 'bureaucrats' was frequently unclear. As Table 2.1 shows, only during the Fourth Republic did key actors conform to 'ideal types', which suggests a further question about whether experienced officials given ministerial posts are more likely to be successful when they instigate administrative reforms.

Former military or civil officials were the source of three changes. The first administrative unit for AdT was set up by an official at the top of the Vichy DGEN, itself created by a head of government who was a naval officer and former 'technical' minister. When de Gaulle moved DGEN's staff between ministries to support Dautry, both leaders had technical, administrative and ministerial backgrounds more like those of some Vichy ministers than of their party–political colleagues. This pattern was virtually repeated in 1958 with de Gaulle and Sudreau, an official with an interest in administrative efficiency who had run a planning agency. The administrative impact of the changes introduced by these technical ministers was temporary and on the whole unproductive. The DGEN, like other new agencies created by Vichy, was resented by officials in traditional ministries, and the DGEN's autonomy, which the reformers hoped would add efficiency in the manner of Britain's executive agencies half-a-century later, was soon removed by the finance minister. Dautry's regional administrators were removed

by his more political successor, and the Service de l'aménagement du territoire Dautry re-created had no impact on the Plan Commissariat. Despite the additional administrative instruments added by Sudreau with prime ministerial support, he and his staff were opposed by other ministers and their officials, and the Plan he initiated clashed with that of the Plan Commissariat, and caused political embarrassment for the government. It was also clear that reform-minded top officials could promote their own agenda in the absence of ministerial support, but had no power to create the appropriate tools, beyond a small unit within the Industry Minister's *cabinet.*

Four changes initiated by elected politicians had more success but could still meet ideological or 'turf-guarding' obstacles – from other political leaders as often as bureaucrats. First, Billoux illustrated his ability to alter bureaucratic structures by promptly removing Dautry's regional posts. Second, the Reconstruction Minister, Claudius-Petit, was able, with supportive prime ministers, to raise the status of the Service to a Directorate, and secure it increased resources. However, its activities, opposed by other agencies, were curtailed by later prime ministers opposed to planning. Third, political leaders – Mendès-France, Faure, Buron and Pflimlin – could, with special decree-making power, introduce substantial reforms. However, these reforms not only involved field services who risked losing local power but, more significantly, threatened the local fiefdoms of national politicians: both groups delayed the implementation and affected the outcome. Fourth, Debré added the CIAT committee and regional Commissioners to help Sudreau improve ministerial coordination. Neither instrument was immediately successful though both later became effective coordinating tools in the hands of DATAR.

Finally, the two changes inaugurated by an unelected party–political prime minister (Pompidou) were innovative in design and of contrasting outcomes. He brought the chief planning bureaucracy (Plan Commissariat) under his own control, and then tried first an 'interministerial' ministry to which ministries and ministers mounted an effective opposition; and second, learning from that lesson, created an *administration de mission*, DATAR, whose strong positional advantages but apparently unthreatening profile were carefully prepared in advance by his closest political and official aides.

Overall, leaders failed outright to bring about a new structure on only one of the nine occasions, though of course they may have had other reform ambitions they dared not even attempt. On other occasions changes were delayed, or took place but without the benefits

expected. Yet opposition that was sufficiently constraining to limit or reverse the choices made by political leaders came from other political leaders more often than from bureaucratic groups (who had to seek political support for their position). When top officials developed ideas for organizational reform, they were able to be implemented only when ministers took them up with enthusiasm. Politicians seem to have more power both to change and to resist change to organizational structures than have bureaucrats. There is some evidence of a tendency for the most radical and lasting changes to be introduced by leaders with strong political authority, and those decisions made by 'technical' ministers to be those least likely to be accepted by their colleagues. Nevertheless, the ministerial post conferred *de facto* as well as *de jure* authority to make organizational changes. Blondel's operationalization of the concept of political leadership by the holding of an executive position in government, with the argument that it is position that both confers and acknowledges political authority, seems to be justified in this case.

3
Links to the Leadership:
Positional or Personal?

The creators of DATAR later suggested that its power was guaranteed by the *délégué*'s close personal links to the prime minister and the latter's 'permanent, pressing intervention' (Ortoli 1990: 131). Blondel puts this requirement in general terms when he insists (1987: 168) that 'the links between the bureaucracy and the leader must be close and effective'. Bureaucratic institutions may hinder more than help political leaders, he argues, because they are not 'reliable'. Leaders may be able 'to press a button' to the bureaucracy, but they cannot expect decisions to be implemented just because they have pressed the button: 'All they can hope for is that some of these decisions will be partly implemented in the fairly near future' (1987: 150).

The political leaders who created DATAR in 1963 were of the same view. They aimed to bring the coordination of regional planning and development under the political leadership's control by placing it in the hands of the prime minister, though – given the prime minister's other commitments – the day-to-day responsibility was delegated to the head of DATAR. Using Blondel's imagery, the political leadership's button to regional planning connected directly to DATAR which in turn assured links to the bureaucracy. Such matters fitted into the traditional public administration concern with efficient organizational structures, typified by the writings of Gulick in the 1930s (see Peters 1989: 124–37); by the British government's White Paper, *The Reorganization of Central Government* (Cmnd 4506, 1970), which proposed delegation to accountable units; or by the French Conseil d'Etat's (1984) examination of 'governmental structures and administrative organization'.

There was therefore consternation among French politicians and administrative scientists when DATAR was attached in turn to various ministers, even though remaining legally part of the prime minister's

office. The prevailing opinion was that this arrangement harmed DATAR's capacity to coordinate bureaucracies: 'While each solution may have a good explanation, in reality it favours one aspect of *aménagement du territoire* and weakens others. In particular it makes coordination more difficult' (Montricher 1995: 38). There has been no empirical evaluation of this claim and, though there are 'machinery of government' arguments to justify attaching DATAR to the prime minister, there are also good arguments for attaching it to other ministers.

This chapter examines the nature of the link between the political leadership and DATAR, and its relationship to DATAR's capacity to make an impact on regional planning. What 'administrative science' arguments are there for and against different ministerial locations? How important is organizational proximity to the prime minister to DATAR's effectiveness? What countervailing factors were proposed by those who noticed that DATAR's sharp decline in reputation occurred in the mid-1970s and not when it was first detached from the prime minister in 1967? The most frequent explanation was the 'contingent factor' of the 1970s oil crisis; and the validity of this alternative thesis is explored.

If the position of DATAR within the ministerial structure is not of supreme importance and economic crisis is not an adequate explanation, is the 'close link' between leadership and DATAR really less significant than Blondel and DATAR's creators asserted? The last chapter showed that those committed to the policy were, naturally, more likely to concern themselves with its organizational arrangements. Is DATAR's effectiveness related less to its organizational closeness to leaders than to its ideological closeness to leadership concerns? The crucial characteristic of the link between leadership and bureaucracy may not be positional but personal. While the leadership's position gives it the authority to press the button, the leadership's interest in the outcome may also need to be evident for action to follow. The final part of the chapter explores that possibility.

The importance of location

The belief that DATAR's direct attachment to the prime minister was the essence of its power was held by a wide spectrum of people from political scientists (Biarez 1982: 271), law academics (Lanversin 1970: 73; Madiot 1996: 21) and public administration specialists (Bodiguel and Quermonne 1983: 181; Rigaud and Delcros 1984: 195), to a commission of enquiry (Guichard Commission 1986) and three former *délégués* (Essig 1979: 286; Monod and de Castelbajac 1980: 33; Guichard in *Le Monde*

13 February 2003). This conviction was held on the Left as well as the Right. The Socialist leader François Mitterrand told the National Assembly in 1963 that the new Gaullist arrangement 'was a very good decision' (speech reprinted in DATAR 1964: 70); he made a parallel arrangement in his first 'shadow government' in 1966 (Pouyet 1968: 70).

There is general (though probably erroneous) agreement that the greater impact DATAR made in its first decade was related to its governmental location. According to *Le Monde* (23 March 1986), 'The 1960s and 1970s were the golden age of *aménagement du territoire* when a direct line joined DATAR to the Matignon.' The memorandum to the decree of 1963 creating DATAR argued that it would be authoritative precisely because of its link to the prime minister. It said that DATAR's role 'required it to have the permanent possibility of appeal to the arbitration and the authority of the prime minister' (reprinted in Alvergne and Musso 2003: 124). Three decades later, it was still said that 'returning to the 1967 situation and attaching *aménagement du territoire* directly to the prime minister, without a minister or junior minister in-between, would give DATAR its maximum authority and effectiveness' (Madiot 1996: 21).

The array of locations to which various prime ministers have assigned DATAR, as listed in Table 3.1, can be grouped under functional headings:

- directly attached to the prime minister, or to a junior minister in the prime minister's office;
- attached to a minister for planning, alongside the Plan Commissariat;
- attached to the interior minister, sometimes through a junior minister;
- attached to a technical minister: most often the minister of infrastructure, but also the minister for the environment or for industry, the latter through a junior minister;
- attached to a minister responsible for other cross-cutting areas, such as urban affairs or 'State reform and public service'.

The usual view on options other than a direct link to the prime minister is that none of these groupings is illogical, but that the disadvantages outweigh the advantages (Madiot 1979: 49).

Direct attachment to the Prime Minister

The closest possible formal link between the prime minister and DATAR was regarded by most analysts as the best arrangement. 'This solution is unquestionably the simplest. It also confers the highest prestige on

Table 3.1 Organizational location of ministerial responsibility

	Prime Minister	Ministerial location	Minister/Junior
● *President de Gaulle*			
1963	Pompidou 1	Prime Minister	–
1967	Pompidou 2	Plan	Marcellin
1968	Couve	Plan	Guichard
● *President Pompidou*			
1969	Chaban	Plan	Bettencourt
1972	Messmer	Infrastructure, Transport, Tourism	Guichard
● *President Giscard d'Estaing*			
1974	Chirac	Interior	Poniatowski
1976	Barre 1	Plan	Lecanuet
1977	Barre 2	Infrastructure	Fourcade, Icart
1978	Barre 3	Prime Minister	–
● *President Mitterrand*			
1981	Mauroy 1	Plan	Rocard
1983	Mauroy 2	Prime Minister's Junior Minister	Le Garrec
1984	Fabius	Plan	Defferre
1986	Chirac	Infrastructure, Housing and Transport	Méhaignerie
1988	Rocard	Industry	Fauroux/Chérèque
1991	Cresson	Urban Affairs	Delebarre
1992	Bérégovoy 1	Prime Minister's Junior Minister	Laignel
1992	Bérégovoy 2	Industry and Trade	Strauss-Kahn/Laignel
1993	Balladur	Interior	Pasqua/Hoeffel
● *President Chirac*			
1995	Juppé 1	Infrastructure and Transport	Pons
1995	Juppé 2	Urban Affairs	Gaudin
1997	Jospin	Environment	Voynet, Cochet
2002	Raffarin 1	Public Service	Delevoye/Briand
2004	Raffarin 2	Infrastructure, Transport and Sea	de Robien/St Sernin
2005	Villepin	Interior	Sarkozy/Estrosi
● *President Sarkozy*			
2007	Fillon 1	Sustainable Ecology, Development and Planning	Borloo
2008	Fillon 2	Ecology, Energy and Sustainable Development	Borloo/Falco

aménagement du territoire and the greatest authority on DATAR' (Madiot 1979: 50). As well as the initial period under the Gaullists, from 1963 to 1967, DATAR was also directly attached to Prime Minister Barre from 1978 to 1981, during the Giscard presidency, when Barre vaunted DATAR's 'exemplary character' to the press (*Le Monde* 3 May 1979; *La Croix* 24 April 1980). During Mitterrand's presidency Prime Minister Mauroy brought DATAR within his own orbit from 1983 to 1984, though his junior minister could 'call on DATAR's services'. Finally, Prime Minister Bérégovoy in 1992 briefly assigned *aménagement du territoire* (AdT) to his junior minister, before transferring both the minister and DATAR to the minister for industry.

For two DATAR members, Jérôme Monod and Philippe de Castelbajac (1971: 38–9), the agency's close link to the prime minister was its most desirable attribute for making maximum impact; it was one of the three vital characteristics of AdT in France: 'the authority of the prime minister as the direct source of power . . .'; 'the regular holding of the Cabinet committee CIAT'; and 'the existence of an unallocated budgetary fund [FIAT]'. The last two characteristics also tied DATAR closely to the prime minister's aims since CIAT was chaired by the prime minister, even when DATAR was attached to another minister, and the fund FIAT came from the prime minister's budget. The prime minister and DATAR were closely linked wherever the latter was formally located.

Contradicting the argument he put forward in 1963, Pompidou in 1967 appointed Marcellin as *ministre-délégué*, directly responsible to himself for the Plan Commissariat and DATAR. Guichard was now industry minister and some argued that other DATAR staff, as conventional officials, had not been able to persuade other officials to adapt their programmes, and that a minister was therefore required. 'It was observed that DATAR by itself was incapable of ensuring coordination. The *délégué* could not manage to prevail over officials in the relevant ministries such as Industry, Construction, etc.' (Teneur and di Qual 1972: 14). Ministers too had made difficulties, with the Industry Minister Charbonnel in 1966 demanding that regional development grants should be his responsibility. The decision on location probably owed something to political expediency because Pompidou suddenly had to find ministerial posts for Independent Republicans, such as Marcellin, after his Gaullist majority was unexpectedly cut in the 1967 parliamentary elections.

The principle of direct attachment continued to be promoted. In the 'great parliamentary debate on *aménagement du territoire*' of 1990, *deputés* queued up to tell the Minister for Regional Development and Industrial

Conversion that he should be attached directly to the prime minister (speeches reprinted in DATAR 1990: 14, 31–3). Guichard told *Le Monde* (13 February 2003) that he had insisted for 40 years that DATAR 'must be attached directly to the prime minister to be able to exercise an authority over all other ministers'.

Joint attachment with the Plan Commissariat

Grouping the two planning bodies, DATAR and the Plan Commissariat, under a planning minister is often seen as 'the least worse solution' by those who think DATAR should really be linked directly to the prime minister (Madiot 1993: 37). It joins the agency responsible for developing infrastructure and spatial planning objectives with the agency responsible for delivering them. This option was tried in 1967 by Prime Minister Pompidou and was terminated in 1972 by President Pompidou. According to a member of the Plan Commissariat at the time (Ullmo 1975: 35), the collaboration of the two agencies was 'characterized by a mixture of cooperation and competition, a relationship facilitated when the two bodies were united under the control of the minister responsible for planning and spatial development [but] the allocation of responsibilities ... was not really operational'.

In the early years their respective top officials (Guichard at DATAR, Massé at the Plan) were able to keep the conflict between the two agencies within bounds, using the same avoidance tactic as Minister Claudius-Petit had in the 1950s (see Chapter 2); that is, by DATAR 'reducing *aménagement du territoire* to mere regional planning' ... and 'restricting its coordinating activities' (Pouyet 1968: 96–7), while the Plan Commissariat concentrated 'on problems everyone agreed about (medium-term growth) and refused to let itself be dragged into political fights over short-term decisions ... or ideological disputes about the longer-term future' (Crozier 1965: 154). Under its second *délégué*, Monod, DATAR challenged the Plan by itself planning 20-year developments and looking at 30-year scenarios. The agencies had opposite operating strategies: the Plan Commissariat's style was to depoliticize decision-making, relying on consensus-building (Hayward 1975: 9); DATAR was 'imperious', 'sure of itself', 'domineering' and 'authoritarian' (Madiot 1979: 51–4). The overlap between the Plan Commissariat's role of conception and DATAR's role of execution was made 'more complex by personal conflict ... There was, it seems, some fear at the Plan Commissariat of a certain expansionist tendency at DATAR' (Madiot 1979: 55). Despite the problems, this double ministerial post was still

coveted in 1976 when it was given to the Centre-party leader Lecanuet by President Giscard d'Estaing as he constructed his Centre-Right 'triumvirate' coalition (Chevallier *et al.* 2002: 249). However, the Left was more in favour of a Jacobin unity than regions, despite a stream within the Socialist party, led by Rocard, that had reconciled regional planning and decentralization (see Chapter 7 and more generally Loughlin 2007; Nakano 2000; Phlipponneau 1981; Rocard 2001). Even in 2008, the star presenter of the '*13.00*' news programme on TF1, Jean-Pierre Pernaut, was considered 'a man of the Right' for including a 10-minute regional slot, 'because to talk about regions is being Right-wing' (interview in *Courrier Picard*, 26 April 2008). When President Mitterrand appointed 'Michel Rocard, the rival, Minister for the Plan and *aménagement du territoire*, it was a way of marginalising him' (Brachet 1995: 81). Rocard told interviewers, 'It was my time in purgatory' (Favier and Martin-Roland 1990: 70). The joint post was clearly not coveted, since the ageing Socialist leader Defferre '*had to be content with* the Plan and *aménagement du territoire*' when he insisted in 1984 in remaining in government (Favier and Martin-Roland 1991: 166, our emphasis).

A subsequent official inquiry warned against combining the two agencies, since they were carrying out tasks 'difficult to reconcile: forward planning and the operational execution of regional planning' (J. de Gaulle 1994: 72). This somewhat surprising comment was followed by the explanation that 'Joint working by DATAR and the Plan Commissariat . . . is indispensable; but certain aspects of our administrative sociology sometimes make this collaboration difficult. Collaboration is however essential and requires the capacity for dialogue between the two institutions to be strengthened.' (*Ibid.*) The rivalry between the Plan Commissariat and DATAR had become too entrenched for them to work together effectively. (When DATAR and Plan officials responsible for the same policy area in their respective agencies danced together at a local government event, the *Entretiens Territoriaux de Strasbourg*, it was the highlight of the evening, 'the only time the two organisations have ever cooperated'.) Prime Minister Rocard in 1988 initially intended to fuse the two agencies but then decided to transfer DATAR to his political colleague the Industry Minister Fauroux (Drevet 1991: 216). With State economic planning increasingly an unrealistic aim and out of favour under all governments, Prime Minister Villepin announced in October 2005 the replacement of the Plan Commissariat by a smaller Centre for Strategic Analysis, and the transfer of other Plan tasks, such as monitoring the progress of State-Region Plan Contracts, to DATAR. The task of forecasting future economic developments and reporting them

to the interministerial committee CIAT or CIACT, hitherto serviced by DATAR and then DIACT, was given to the Ministry of Finance, laying the grounds for continuing one historic rivalry with another.

Attachment to the Interior Minister

A link to the Interior minister is another 'second-best' option sometimes recommended. 'If the prime minister did not think it advisable to return DATAR to its original position, would it not be better to attach it to the Minister of Interior?', asked the Conseil d'Etat (1986: 24). However, when Giscard put his closest political colleague, Michel Poniatowski, Interior Minister, in charge of DATAR in 1974, it 'weakened DATAR's image because the Interior Minister is in charge of elections' (Audouin 1977: 201). 'The award of the first *contrats de pays* (schemes for improving rural areas) showed that "favours" were given to *deputés* or mayors from the political majority' (Madiot 1979: 50). Though this assertion has been refuted empirically, it confirms the point that this position confers disadvantages. François Essig (1979: 34), deputy to the *délégué* at the time, advised against this particular link because 'the minister was more interested in public security problems [mass strikes and Corsican terrorists] and party politics than in DATAR.' A similar assertion was made when Nicolas Sarkozy was Minister for the Interior and *aménagement du territoire* during his presidential campaign, because party politics and urban riots took up much of his time – although in this case he made a close political supporter, Christian Estrosi, junior minister for *aménagement du territoire*.

Le Monde's specialist on AdT (F. Grosrichard, 20 January 1990; 17 March 1991) argued that DATAR would be strengthened by a link to the interior minister, who in France is responsible for local government, since decentralization had increased the role of local authorities. The prefectoral corps, which staffs the managerial posts in the ministry, also represents the State in the localities and has become increasingly important in coordinating programmes as more functions are decentralized. It has a permanent presence in DATAR for that reason, with half the *délégués* since 1963 from the corps (see Chapter 4). Charles Pasqua became Minister for the Interior and *aménagement du territoire* in 1993, after campaigning on a 'regional development' theme, and used the prefects to raise the profile of the policy (as well as himself). Likewise, Sarkozy, as Minister for the Interior and *aménagement du territoire* in 2005, used the prefects to survey citizens' opinions on the state of local public services, with DATAR acting as coordinator (DIACT 2006: 46).

Such experiences suggest that the two organizations can fit well together but that DATAR also benefits from retaining its separate identity.

Attachment to a Technical Minister

Despite Guichard's exhortations for DATAR to be directly attached to the prime minister, he became Minister for *Aménagement du territoire*, Infrastructure, Housing and Tourism in 1972 and described this experience as 'a notable effort of administrative coordination' (Madiot 1979: 50). The minister told *Le Monde* (10 October 1972), 'I have not achieved absolute administrative and political rationality from combining the powers provided by the new ministry. But I think it is at least progress.' While apparently an agglomeration of disparate sectors, the main regional planning programmes at this time emphasized infrastructure-intensive urban development and tourist schemes for which the combination was relevant. The arrangement was copied by other Right-wing prime ministers: Barre in 1977, Chirac in 1986, Juppé in 1995 and Raffarin in 2002.

The Socialist prime ministers Rocard and Bérégovoy reflected their party's priorities in assigning DATAR to a junior minister under the Industry Minister. Rocard appointed Chérèque, who had 'made a good job' of industrial restructuring in Lorraine (Drevet 1991: 216), as junior minister for *aménagement du territoire*. Regional development was coupled with the environment in Jospin's government from 1997, as a matter of political expediency. Jospin had offered the Green Party a ministry for environment and transport in return for electoral support. In the event the Communists took transport, and DATAR was added to the environment instead (*Le Monde* 6 June 1997; Manesse 1998: 45).

Attaching DATAR to a technical ministry 'presents the major disadvantage of making *aménagement du territoire* subservient to a sectoral concern' (Manesse 1998: 45). As the parliamentarian Georges Chavannes said of Chérèque, 'the minister is slightly too much the minister for industrial restructuring and not enough the minister for *aménagement du territoire*' (*Le Monde* 11 November 1989). Yet a sectoral minister can at least use DATAR to implement policies in that sector. Under two ministers for infrastructure and *aménagement du territoire*, Fourcade in 1977 and Méhaignerie from 1986 to 1988, there was good implementation of transport projects that linked peripheral or isolated regions (see Chapter 6). Furthermore, delegation does not stop the prime minister maintaining links with DATAR. Prime Minister Rocard had put DATAR 'under the authority' of a minister for industrial restructuring, himself

junior to the Industry Minister. But DATAR still worked directly for Rocard in areas unrelated to industrial restructuring, such as negotiating State-Region Plan Contracts, preparing an interministerial meeting on Corsica, and taking on the national coordination of European structural funds (*Le Monde* 25 January 1990).

Joint attachment with other horizontal agencies

Linking regional development with urban affairs appeared to be a policy response to 'inner-city' crisis, but there were other rationales. Michel Delebarre, who had been a professional regional developer, was made minister '*à la ville et à l'aménagement du territoire*' in Cresson's government in 1991. Because urban programmes had already been announced, he 'wondered what else he could do to make his mark'. He encouraged Cresson to reinvigorate the policy of moving public bodies out of Paris (see Chapter 5), and thereby revived AdT (Bezes 1994: 76–7; Favier and Martin-Roland 1999: 102). Jean-Paul Delevoye was made minister for 'public service and *aménagement du territoire*' in 2002, but only because he asked President Chirac to add the latter role 'so that he was not a minister who just says no' [to civil service demands], as his wife helpfully explained to reporters (*Le Monde* 24 July 2003). The rationality of appointments does not always have much to do with arguments about the advantages and disadvantages of certain locations.

The consequences of a changing location

There are two distinct problems about locating DATAR other than directly under the prime minister. The first is that any ministerial position may emphasize one part of DATAR's role to the detriment of other activities – but that may reflect the leader's priorities, too, and it does not hinder DATAR working directly for the prime minister on other issues. The second is that DATAR's 'nomadic behaviour' may in itself damage its reputation. Biarez (1982: 271) claimed that little changed when DATAR was relocated since it was still in law part of the prime minister's office: 'Its capacity for arbitration does not seem to have been prejudiced by the successive attachments of DATAR to different ministries, since the *Délégation* has remained in the prime minister's service.' Former *délégués* thought differently. 'Even though we were placed under the authority of influential members of the government, these frequent changes made people forget DATAR was still part of the prime minister's office' (Essig 1979: 33). The Guichard Commission (1986: 58) thought that the instability led to a loss in effectiveness, and also that DATAR

had lost the 'interministerial' status conferred by the direct link to the prime minister.

The Conseil d'Etat's analysis (1986: 19) of the ways in which prime ministers could delegate 'coordinating roles' to others found that political authority transferred fully only if 'it was not just in principle but also in fact that they were acting in the prime minister's name'. Delegation can be effective, but only providing prime ministers take care to show policy actors that the agency has his or her full backing. Essig (1979: 32) had experienced this relationship as deputy *délégué* in 1972, when DATAR was first attached to a technical minister: 'This change could have had damaging consequences . . . Our fears rapidly dissipated: first the minister received the same powers delegated from the prime minister; second, our minister was none other than Guichard . . . who held a privileged place in the government.' Yet by 1986 Guichard himself no longer thought any ministerial position for DATAR was an effective option: '*Aménagement du territoire* can manage without a minister but not without a prime minister' (Guichard Commission 1986: 59).

An empirical assessment of the effects of location

Despite these strong recommendations for DATAR's direct attachment to the prime minister, doubt must remain, partly because so many prime ministers have not followed them, but mainly because there has been no empirical evaluation of the relationship between DATAR's location and its impact. Such an exercise is not easy since there are no overall appraisals of DATAR's work, or data on which they might be based. DATAR's official 'history' (Laborie *et al.* 1985), its intermittent 'annual' Reports (see DATAR 2005: 29–31) and seasonal 'Letters' (such as *Lettre de la DATAR* 175, 2002) record rather than evaluate its wide range of activities. The official performance data on its chief development grant (PAT) consist of basic statistics (number of grant-aided projects, number of jobs involved, grant per job, number of grants to foreign firms, etc.) whose value cannot be judged because they have not been not examined in context (such as economic trends or inward investment in competitor countries), or over time (the durability of the jobs created). Not until DATAR's final months of existence did it commission and publish the results of a more extensive evaluation of PAT, which showed that the award of PAT was likely to lead to the granting of other public funds; that half the new jobs would not have been created without the PAT award; and that one in five of the projects aided had been attracted to France by the award of PAT and other public funds (DIACT 2006: 7–12).

The Guichard Commission (1986: 10) acknowledged these weaknesses in evaluation: 'The "1960s policy", created and supported by a strong political will, achieved its objectives despite a few failures, but without it being possible to distinguish precisely what should be attributed to the policy itself and what to the spontaneous evolution that would have affected the territory in any case.' Successive decisions of Prime Minister Balladur in 1995 and Prime Minister Juppé in 1997 to create 'Observatoires de l'aménagement du territoire' to monitor policy implementation were not put into effect. A decree of 2004 finally created an 'Observatoire des territoires', but the decree referred only to 'collecting and publishing data useful to DATAR', even if, by 2006, DIACT saw the role as collecting and sharing regional data relating to development (DIACT 2007: 79).

The Cour des Comptes (Court of Accounts) examines particular aspects of DATAR's work from time to time (for example, its budgetary management), but is interested chiefly in whether the correct administrative and financial procedures have been followed (see for example Cour des Comptes 2001). Some excellent academic studies have analyzed AdT but their assessments of this wide-ranging policy have, like this book, had to be restricted to a particular issue, such as Massardier (1996) on the sociology of a technocratic elite, Andrault (1990) on industrial strategy and Bezes (1994) on moving a government agency out of Paris. The most comprehensive evaluation of DATAR and AdT was by Biarez (1983a) who set her study within the context of local–central relations. It made the most of the limited statistics available by comparing regional wealth with DATAR's allocation by grants by region to test the hypothesis that DATAR's goal is to subsidize private investment and reduce social unrest. Biarez (1989: 213) later complained of DATAR's 'lack of interest in any approach that would enable the results of its policies to be known. DATAR uses few indicators to determine the success or failure of an activity…Observation is not continuous, and the validity of criteria and the usefulness of those chosen are not discussed.' Andrault (1990: 250–7) concurred. However, DATAR is not alone in this regard in France, where 'despite the introduction of several autonomous structures attached to the Plan Commissariat, and recently to parliament, evaluation remains marginal' (Chagnollaud 2000: 270).

The effectiveness of DATAR in different locations cannot therefore be evaluated in terms of directly measurable policy outputs. The approach taken here is to use observers' judgement of DATAR's capacity, as required by the preamble to the 1963 decree, to ensure that 'ministries

modify their actions…to make them converge on the government's overall objectives' (quoted in Alvergne and Musso 2003: 124). The variable to be measured has affinities with concepts of 'power, influence, control and domination' that are 'notoriously difficult both to interpret and to employ rigorously in empirical work' (Dahl 1989: 272). Dahl developed a 'reputational survey' method to meet this empirical problem and it has remained a useful tool (see for example, Fischer *et al.* 2004). The theoretical justification for using 'reputational power' to estimate influence rests on the assumption that those reputed by others to have power are more likely to be able to persuade the latter to accept their views. In their 'rehabilitation' of reputational power, Dowding *et al.* (1995: 272) note that 'reputations…are a key power resource for actors' in interactions with other players and in bargaining over decisions. That is, DATAR's effectiveness at persuading policy actors to modify their policy programmes can be evaluated indirectly by the level of 'strength', 'weakness' and similar characteristics that witnesses ascribe to DATAR.

The survey described below uses a similar strategy to the reputational power analysis conducted by Dowding *et al.* These researchers searched a large database of newspaper articles to estimate the influence of actors in terms of the number of times they were cited, using the 'fact of being reported' as a quantifiable measure of the actor's power resource. In the present case, the data comes from two sources: press cuttings and academic texts. The former comprises the folder (*Dossier 506/01*) compiled by the Institut d'études politiques in Paris of articles that refer to DATAR and a few other public actors responsible for AdT. This method enables DATAR's reputation to be given a rating according to the opinions expressed rather than the number of citations. First, for each year or time period, three items were selected that referred to DATAR's power and status in the government. The three included both an academic and a press opinion. For some years fewer than three comments occur; where there are more, items were selected for their clarity or to reflect any spread of views. DATAR's 'reputational power' was then given a rating according to the three comments. The survey covered a 30-year period, 1963–92, which included all the different types of ministerial locations and presidents from the Right, Centre Right and Left.

Table 3.2 lists the statements used as comparators for assigning DATAR's 'reputation indicator' for each year, from the 'very strong' reputation in the 'golden age', when the *délégué* Guichard could 'impose DATAR's preferences' (but only if the prime minister and president agreed with him), and its 'powerlessness' in 1981 or 1986 when

Table 3.2   Comparator statements on reputational power

Reputation indicator	Comparator statements
Very strong 8	• The golden age of AdT (*Le Monde* 23 March 1986) • DATAR's preferences could be imposed (Grémion 1992a: 498)
Capable 4	• DATAR is seen as capable of conquering new fields (Madiot 1993: 39) • Rocard gave DATAR the role of selecting zones (Bezes 1994: 118)
Credible 3	• Plan–Contract negotiations gave DATAR new credibility (*La Croix* 28 June 1984)
Weak 2	• DATAR prepared its 15th anniversary at a time, when after a little eclipse, it was rising in public opinion (Essig 1979: 277)
Very weak 1	• Minister Méhaignerie has just managed to preserve DATAR (*Le Monde* 7 April 1984)
Powerless 0	• The Belin–Gisserot report has recommended that DATAR should go (*Les Echos* 8 July 1986)

DATAR was 'in disarray' or likely to be abolished. These indicators were expressed numerically, from '8 out of 10' for 'very strong' to '0' for 'powerless'. Though the numbers are necessarily subjective, they enable a preliminary statistical assessment to be made (in practice the statistical outcomes did not prove sensitive to small changes in coding). To save space, Tables 3.3 and 3.4 for the years before the Right to Left change to 1981, and for those after, show just one comment for each year (a fuller list of comments is given in Burnham 2005).

The results are plotted on a chart in Figure 3.1, which gives some idea of the significance of the ministerial location of a bureaucratic agency such as DATAR. The first decade, which is universally seen as DATAR's 'strong' period, included times when it was attached to the minister for the Plan or for Infrastructure. While DATAR was strong when it was attached to the prime minister in the 1960s, periods of relative weakness in the late 1970s include years attached to the prime minister, and it could hardly have been weaker than in 1992 under Prime Minister Bérégovoy, who had as Finance Minister demanded the abolition of the *agrément* – DATAR's most effective policy tool (planning permission for Parisian office-building [*La Tribune* 4 September 1986]). More generally, attachments to the prime minister, to the minister for the Plan and to

Table 3.3   DATAR's reputational power 1963–80

	Selected statements	Reputation indicator
1963–64	• DATAR, run by Guichard, played a big role in interministerial decisions, especially on the budget (Quermonne 1967: 21)	8
1965–66	• DATAR is strong because of the PM's support and interest … It can use the threat of his arbitration to constrain ministries (Pouyet 1968: 73)	8
1967–68	• *Délégué*'s role and knowledge gave him such weight that he sometimes overshadowed ministers and top officials (Coulbois and Jung 1994: 15)	8
1969–71	• 1960s and 1970s the golden age of AdT, with a direct line from DATAR to Matignon (*Le Monde* 23 March 1986)	8
1972	• DATAR's flamboyant period goes up to 1973 (*Le Monde* 21 January 1980)	8
1973	• The golden age of AdT lasted 10 years, before it was harmed by the slowdown in growth, and technical change (*Libération* 10 October 1986)	8
1974	• DATAR came up against economic crisis; AdT was a luxury (*Quotidien de Paris* 4 April 1990)	1
1975	• The pillars supporting DATAR's action have been foundering since the economic crisis of the 1970s (*Le Monde* 29 March 1987)	1
1976	• DATAR became a nurse from 1975 to 1976 (Audouin 1977: 31)	1
1977	• DATAR prepared its 15th anniversary at a time, when after a little eclipse, it was rising in public opinion (Essig 1979: 277)	2
1978	• Giscard speech at Vichy (6 December 1978) supports DATAR and asks it for a national conference. He says he wants to give AdT a second wind	3
1979	• Josselin, Socialist shadow minister, said DATAR is trying to create jobs anywhere on anything; said it is just a rural nurse (*Le Monde* 3 February 1979)	2
1980	• Barre visits DATAR; says it is 'an exemplary organisation'; tells it 'to reconquer the territory' (*La Croix* 24 April 1980)	2

Note: The 'reputational power indicator' (out of 10) was estimated with reference to three quotations for the year (see Burnham 2005) and against the comparators in Table 3.2.

Table 3.4 DATAR's reputational power 1981–92

	Typical statements	Reputation indicator
1981	• Rocard takes 6 months to appoint a *délégué*. DATAR breaks down and has an identity crisis (*Le Monde* 18 September 1981)	0
1982	• Rocard gives DATAR the coordinating role for Plan Contracts; keeps *délégué*: chance of a second wind (Bodiguel and Quermonne 1983: 181)	1
1983	• Plan Contract negotiations gave DATAR new credibility with ministries and regional politicians (*La Croix* 28 June 1984)	3
1984	• Government removes DATAR's control over Paris office-building. Dirigiste AdT fails (*Libération* 15 December 1984)	1
1985	• DATAR drifting, image tarnished … Many in government majority ask whether to keep it (*Le Monde* 20 May 1986)	0
1986	• The Belin–Gisserot report recommends that DATAR should go (*Les Echos* 8 July 1986)	0
1987	• Minister Méhaignerie just managed to preserve DATAR (*Le Monde* 7 April 1987)	1
1988	• Budget for AdT so low that senators abolished it in derision (*Le Monde* 16 December 1988)	1
1989	• Government takes months to appoint a *délégué* (*Le Monde* 6 October 1989)	0
1990	• Assembly doubles DATAR's budget. Rocard says, 'A new phase is beginning' (*Le Monde* 31 January 1990)	2
1991	• DATAR is seen as capable of conquering new fields (Madiot 1993: 39); it rose in status during the early 1990s (Stevens 1992: 101)	4
1992	• DATAR staff go on strike against their proposed move to Paris suburbs (*Le Monde* 13 December 1992)	0

Note: The 'reputational power indicator' (out of 10) was estimated with reference to three quotations for the year (see Burnham 2005) and against the comparators in Table 3.2.

the minister for Infrastructure were all associated at different times with both a stronger and a weaker DATAR. Each location can be associated with better or worse outcomes, which must therefore depend on other or additional factors.

Figure 3.1   DATAR's power and organizational location
Source of data: Tables 3.1, 3.3 and 3.4.

The effects of economic contingencies

The most frequent alternative explanation given for DATAR's dramatic loss of reputation in the mid-1970s is the oil crisis of the period. '*Aménagement du territoire* was born in the years of strong economic expansion, the 1960s, and was then confronted from 1973 with the crisis and a series of economic changes that were poorly understood' (*Quotidien de Paris* 24 April 1990). It was never the only explanation: Audouin (1977: 29) attributed the 'down-grading' of DATAR's reputation to the appointment of President Giscard's friend Poniatowski as minister, which had made DATAR seem even more of a party–political vehicle than it had been under the Gaullists. Elie Cohen's (1989: 270) description of the 'Monod doctrine' (to 'rescue' vulnerable firms with regional development funding while they were still viable) even portrays DATAR as more active and influential because of the economic crisis – but diverted from its official goals.

Figure 3.2 tests the 'economic explanation' by correlating the conventional measure of economic growth (the percentage change in 'real GDP' each year) with DATAR's reputational power over the same 30-year period. It is clear that there is a common strong performance by DATAR and the economy until the mid-1970s, followed for both by a crisis in the mid-1970s and a joint recovery. After 1983 the two seem to be unrelated. In statistical terms, the correlation for the whole period is high

DATAR's reputational power   GDP change %

Figure 3.2   DATAR's power and economic growth
Source of data: Tables 3.3, 3.4 and INSEE, *Comptes Nationaux*: 'Evolution du PIB en France'.

($r^2 = 0.518$) and highly significant (less than 1 in 1000 chance of finding such a correlation if none existed). Yet for the later period it is virtually non-existent ($r^2 = 0.077$).

Although this simple methodology cannot settle the question, it bolsters the claims of those who say that DATAR was not weakened simply by the change in economic conditions. Langumier (1986) and Wachter (1989) argue that the agency continued its efforts but adapted its development strategies to the new conditions. 'The decline of [DATAR's] institutional power is, in many respects, independent of changes in the economic environment. Certainly, the crisis restricted the redistributive power of *aménagement du territoire*. But the appropriate responses were worked out and applied' (Wachter 1989: 56). High levels of growth in the 1960s had encouraged political leaders and DATAR to conceive redistributive policies based on developing 'metropolitan counter-magnets' to Paris. Yet DATAR was also able to invent other programmes, such as the contracts to improve small towns and retain their population that it introduced in 1975 (Langumier 1986: 115). Declining levels of growth in the late 1980s and early 1990s did not stop ministers such as Chérèque and Delebarre, who had been professional regional developers, promoting the policy energetically with projects for industrial restructuring or administrative relocation to provincial cities. Indeed Chérèque argued that long-term regional development programmes were most needed at times of economic crisis (Marcou *et al.* 1994: 79).

Thus there is no necessary connection between economic growth and DATAR's reputation or impact. As Blondel (1987: 7–8) suggests, the political leaders' own perspective and capacity to respond come into play when they are confronted with events in the non-institutional environment. However, the coincidence of the oil crisis and the change of political leaders in 1974 made the two factors hard to disentangle. Favourable economic conditions and DATAR's links to the leadership were generally seen as twin necessary conditions for its success. 'The end of the period of economic growth brought a halt to industrial decentralisation, principal beneficiary of the regional development policy invented by Olivier Guichard with the support of Georges Pompidou and imposed thanks to the political authority of General de Gaulle' (*Le Monde* 13 July 1993). Yet there is an implication in that comment that, alongside economic conditions, it was political support and authority that mattered, not where DATAR was placed organizationally in the ministerial structures.

Leadership interest: an empirical analysis

In the last section, as in the last chapter, there were signs that the activities of members of the political leadership could have an impact on DATAR (positive or negative), as they had on the DAT. The concluding part of this chapter is guided by a statistical test of the relationship between political leaders' interest in AdT and DATAR's reputational power. It checks whether DATAR's likely influence over other parts of the bureaucracy is related to the leadership's own commitment to the policy, and hence, conversely, whether leaders with varying amounts of interest in the policy area have a different impact on bureaucracies.

This evaluation of leaders' interest in AdT is based on their words and deeds where possible, backed up by secondary sources. For each president and prime minister over the same 30-year period, statements were collected that referred to the leader's attitude to AdT. Ten statements were selected for presidents, and five for prime ministers – who were mostly not in place long enough for ten relevant statements to be published. In Chirac's case, statements are given for both premierships because his views changed after 1981, when the Gaullist party he led adopted a liberal economic policy in opposition to the interventionism of the new Left government (Derville 1990: 23). Based on these statements, an 'interest indicator' was estimated for each leader. Table 3.5 lists the statements used as comparators, from the 'strong'

Table 3.5   Comparator statements on leadership interest

Interest indicator	Comparator statements
Strong 4	Made AdT a national priority ... Gave it much attention, supported by forecasting studies, directives and incentives (Esambert 1994: 37, 140)
Fairly strong 3	Decided to put AdT under Industry with Chérèque who had succeeded in Lorraine; gave Chérèque a new development fund (Drevet 1991: 216)
Equivocal 2	25 November 1975: Giscard declared, 'At a time of crisis, AdT must be an economic policy for overall development' (Alvergne and Musso 2003: 198) Argues for a non-bureaucratic State that intervenes only temporarily to help individuals face up to their responsibilities (Giscard 1977: 127)
Slight 1	Chaired the AdT committee, CIAT, but left an out-of-favour minister or *délégué* to hold the press conference (*Le Monde* 19 April 1984)
None 0	Decided to exempt speculative office-building from DATAR's chief negotiating tool, the *agrément* permit to build in Paris (Bezes 1994: 25)

interest expressed by Pompidou to the 'no interest' shown by Messmer, a defence and overseas specialist.

Table 3.6 shows two of the statements used for each president in estimating their 'interest indicator' and Tables 3.7 and 3.8 show two for each prime minister. A quantified indicator was assigned based on the full set of statements (listed in Burnham 2005). These indicators were plotted against those for DATAR's reputational power. Although the assessments are subjective and individual indicators are vulnerable to error, the exercise is sufficiently transparent for readers to judge the likely validity of the results.

Figure 3.3 reveals a very close statistical link between the president's reported interest in AdT and DATAR's reputed power. The correlation ($r^2 = 0.889$) is 'highly significant', such that there is 1 in 1000 chance of finding such a close link if there were no correlation; and changes in the president's interest 'explain' statistically a very large part of the change in DATAR's reputational power. DATAR was strongest under the early Gaullists, who were committed to a national modernization policy to which all regions must contribute (see de Gaulle 1970: speeches

Table 3.6 Presidential interest in *aménagement du territoire*

Interest indicator	Statements of interest
De Gaulle 1958–69 4	• 12 July 1961, speech on TV: Activity is concentrated in certain regions, held back in others … We must, as one says, '*aménager le territoire*', that is, remodel the structure and face of France (de Gaulle 1970, III: 255) • 2 February 1969, speech at Quimper: Our Plan must *aménager* … State action over the whole territory, so that each region … has the will and receives the means to take its part in the overall national effort (*ibid*. V: 378)
Pompidou 1969–74 4	• October 1970, speech at opening of Lille–Marseille motorway: I want to emphasize that it is … a factor in promoting economic activity and thus the goal of *aménagement du territoire* (AdT) (Esambert 1994: 109) • 6 November 1973, held a *Conseil restreint* (selective committee meeting) to agree to restrict new office space in Paris to encourage services sector to move out to regions (Audouin 1997: 62)
Giscard 1974–81 2	• 25 September 1974, set up and chaired a Central Planning Council. At its meeting of 25 November 1975 declared that in a time of crisis, AdT must be an economic policy for the country's overall development (Alvergne and Musso 2003: 198) • In 1982 as president of Auvergne, ideological opposition to a regional plan as a basis for the State-Region Plan Contract (Madiot 1993: 75)
Mitterrand 1981–95 1	• In *Ici et Maintenant* (1980) writes, 'France needed a strong centralized power to be made … now needs decentralized powers not to be un-made.' Against 'domination from Paris by colonial administrators' [such as DATAR] • In 1981, the *délégué* was 16th on list of 22, in order of priority, of posts to be appointed within 6 months, not counting prefects or banks (Attali 1993a: 38)

Note: The 'interest indicator' (out of 5) was estimated with reference to ten quotations for each president (see Burnham 2005) and against the comparators in Table 3.5.

on 14 April and 8 May 1961, 14 January 1963, 27 April 1969; and Pompidou's speech of October 1970 in Esambert 1994: 109). DATAR was weaker under the liberal Giscard, who saw little value in planning either for the whole nation or for the Auvergne region he presided but was willing to agree to a limited number of measures focused on specific policy initiatives or rural areas (Giscard d'Estaing 1977; Madiot

Table 3.7   Prime Ministerial interest in *aménagement du territoire* 1963–81

Interest indicator	Statements of interest
Pompidou 1962–68	• In 1962 made AdT a national priority … Gave it much attention, supported by forecasting studies, directives and incentives (Esambert 1994: 37, 140)
4	• Speech to National Assembly 26 November 1963: 'Putting AdT into operation is the most important business of the whole nation' (Lanversin 1970: 32)
Couve 1968–69	• In 1939 Couve gave Delouvrier low marks at Sciences Po for writing in favour of a type of planned economy (Delouvrier in Chenu 1994: 49)
0	• Was uncomfortable outside Paris (Essig 1979: 134)
Chaban-Delmas 1969–72	• 'I emphasised the importance of AdT, with a concern to locate new industries in new regions, develop the regional metropolises and reduce the power of the Paris region' (Chaban-Delmas 1997: 442)
4	• Plan of 1971–75 needed Chaban-Delmas's personal commitment to the Plan and DATAR … to keep AdT, against the preference of top officials for the market (Lajugie *et al.* 1979: 393)
Messmer 1972–74	• No interest expressed. 'Particularly respectful of Presidential authority: the President's views were a sure guide to his decisions' (Essig 1979: 87)
0	• 'Colourless, uninspiring, unimaginative' (Hayward 1993a: 28)
Chirac 1974–76	• Instruction of 1 July 1974 to SNCF: Must fight the running-down of market towns and country areas: no new closures of local passenger lines.
3	• Knew DATAR and regional development well because of passion for Corrèze and Limousin; a precious arbiter for DATAR (Essig 1979: 87)
Barre 1976–81	• In 1962 on Normandy regional development committee; drafted its regional plan; then on the National Council for AdT (Lanversin 1970: 157)
3	• Speech 23 April 1980: 'In early 1978 I decided that in the circumstances a second wind had to be given to AdT' (Andrault 1990: 222)

Note: The 'interest indicator' (out of 5) was estimated with reference to up to five quotations for each Prime Minister (see Burnham 2005) and against the comparators in Table 3.5.

1979: 73, 1993: 75). DATAR came near to abolition under Mitterrand, for whom DATAR was the very symbol of 'the obsessive domination from Paris of a colonial administration' (Favier and Martin-Roland 1990: 144). He was most likely to support regional planning initiatives if

Table 3.8 Prime Ministerial interest in *aménagement du territoire* 1981–92

Interest indicator	Statements of interest
Mauroy 1981–84	• 6 May 1982 decided in CIAT to create a regional development grant, to be controlled by regions, not by DATAR (Rémond 1999: 97)
1	• 6 May 1983 and 13 April 1984 chaired the CIAT but left Rocard or *délegué* to hold the press conference later (*Le Monde* 19 April 1984)
Fabius 1984–86	• Decided in committee 14 January 1985 to exempt offices from DATAR's chief negotiating tool, the permit (*agrément*) to build in Paris (Bezes 1994: 25)
0	• Opposed to regional tier and 'regional grand dukes', proposed that regional councillors be elected by *département* (Rémond 1999: 37)
Chirac 1986–88	• Wants DATAR's efficiency improved, and the prefects to deliver new AdT aims (*Le Monde* 10 April 1987)
1	• Launches more roads for backward France and more TGV (train à grande vitesse) for 'winning France' with privatization proceeds (*Le Monde* 12 February 1988)
Rocard 1988–91	• Decided to put AdT under Industry with Chérèque who had succeeded in Lorraine; gave Chérèque a new development fund (Drevet 1991: 216)
3	• Increased licence paid for building in western Paris 'to help a rebalancing within the Paris region' (i.e. not France) (*Libération* 2 August 1989)
Cresson 1991–92	• Said, 'I saw AdT needed a new wind. DATAR got very good results for first 15 years, but role no longer appropriate' (to Bezes 1994: 72)
3	• Had decided to use the Right's AdT theme; and a commuter accident led her to agree to relocate offices from Paris (to Favier and Martin-Roland 1999: 100–3)
Bérégovoy 1992–93	• From 1985 Finance Minister Bérégovoy talked like the liberals he used to attack (Bauchard 1994: 40)
0	• In a context that was bound to be disastrous, he decided to keep to a rigorous economic and monetary policy (Chevallier *et al.* 2002: 398)

Note: The 'interest indicator' (out of 5) was estimated with reference to up to five quotations for each Prime Minister (see Burnham 2005) and against the comparators in Table 3.5.

they promoted another objective of interest to him (a transport fund that would create new jobs, the relocation to the provinces of Parisian bureaucrats). DATAR's reputation within the administration seems to follow the presidency's interests closely. Presidents seem to have made

Figure 3.3   DATAR's power and presidential interest
Source of data: Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.6.

an impact on DATAR's reputation in a way that related to their own level of commitment to the policy it implemented.

   Despite the stronger legal link between the prime minister and DATAR (the president's single formal power over DATAR is his counter-signature to the *délégué*'s appointment), Figure 3.4 shows only a weak correlation statistically between the prime minister's reported interest in AdT and DATAR's reputational power. Not only do variations in the prime minister's interest 'explain' statistically a tiny proportion of the variation in DATAR's reputational power ($r^2 = 0.128$), but also the finding is not statistically significant (this level of correlation could be found about 1 in 10 times by chance). The weak relationship between the prime minister's aims for AdT and his or her impact on DATAR's efforts, combined


Figure 3.4   DATAR's power and prime ministerial interest
Source of data: Tables 3.3, 3.4, 3.7 and 3.8.

with the strong relationship found for the presidency, suggests that the president's wishes dominated the outcome. On the one hand, DATAR's reputation could remain high under Couve de Murville and Messmer, despite their opposition to or disinterest in planning, because they were disposed to follow their president's wishes. Under de Gaulle, Couve de Murville was 'evasively and unswervingly reliable' (Hayward 1993b: 59). The *délégué* Essig wrote that 'the President's views were a sure guide to Messmer's decisions' (1979: 87).

Premiers keen to promote initiatives could go ahead if the president were also keen or at least in accord with them, as Pompidou did in creating DATAR during de Gaulle's presidency, and Cresson did when transferring administrative bodies out of central Paris during Mitterrand's presidency (see Chapter 5). On the other hand, DATAR's reputation was not high under Prime Minister Barre, despite his long-term interest in regional economic planning, and his decision to bring DATAR under his direct authority in 1978 because, he said, 'I was convinced by then that in the circumstances in which we found ourselves, a second wind had to be given to *aménagement du territoire*' (*La Croix* 24 April 1980). However, after 1978 Giscard was more suspicious of Barre's independence (Servent 1989: 51), and it is likely that his efforts were restricted by the president.

Prime ministers are not as free as presidents to make an impact on DATAR in accordance with their own preferences, if the two leaders have different views on policy. The 'joint' commitment of the top leadership (as measured by adding together the interest indicators of president and prime minister) correlates well with DATAR's standing but less well than does the president's commitment alone. This finding confirms that the president has a greater impact on DATAR's activities than has the prime minister, and that a prime minister's commitment to the policy cannot substitute for the absence of presidential interest. It is another piece of evidence that the legal tie and direct attachment of DATAR to the prime minister is unimportant compared with the goals that political leaders, but especially the president, have for the policy it coordinates.

Conclusions

Blondel's criterion for ensuring an effective transmission of policy between executive decision and implementation was that 'the links between the bureaucracy and the leader must be close and effective' (1987: 168). This chapter examined two contrasting interpretations of

the nature of those links. It is usually argued that DATAR's direct attachment to the prime minister was crucial to persuading ministries to adopt leadership goals. The implication is that the prime minister's influence depends on the formal institutions above all else, and that positional resources, which derive from the institutional environment, are more important than personal resources, such as a commitment to a cause or a capacity to respond to the non-institutional environment.

An assessment of the arguments and examples cited in favour of one location or another showed that there was no 'single best solution'. In any case, the 'positional' resources could still be used wherever the agency was located in the ministerial structures: prime ministers dealt directly with the agency on issues of interest even after they had attached it to other ministries; and they could still chair the interministerial committees. A quantitative evaluation of the variations in DATAR's 'reputational power' confirmed this analysis, showing that it bore no discernible relationship to its location in the ministerial structures. The presumed link between economic growth and DATAR's reputation, used by many observers to explain DATAR's loss of status in the mid-1970s, is called into question by the weakness of the statistical relationship in the second half of the period. There was evidence that, if some leaders saw economic problems as a constraint, others considered them to be a reason for countervailing action, and implemented changes not only to DATAR but to other parts of the administrative apparatus (such as by relocating them outside Paris).

The alternative thesis – that variations in the commitment of political leaders to a policy could have an impact on the responsible bureaucracy's capacity to act effectively – was then tested empirically and systematically. A very strong link was found between the president's interest in AdT and DATAR's reputed capacity to act. No link of significance was observed between the prime minister's interest and DATAR's reputational power, despite the conventional emphasis on the formal link. The subjectivity of the survey methodology limits claims to validity (until reinforced by findings from other chapters), but these results are supported by the concrete examples given and are consistent with well-understood patterns of power within the Fifth Republic executive (see Wright 1989: 86–98, 1993: 101–19). On the whole, the 'close and effective links' that Blondel thought necessary between leader and bureaucracy refer in the French case to the president, not the prime minister. Just as significantly, the vital links seem to be those of personal support of the agency delivering a policy rather than legal–positional ties of formal responsibility. Positional resources are important – but for

determining which member of the leadership will decide on the level of support. These findings show that DATAR constitutes, in Blondel's terms, a 'reliable button', in that its level of power to influence bureaucratic action bears a strong relationship to the level of activity that the political leadership wants to see in this domain. In other words, the political leadership has the capacity to make an impact on this bureaucratic agency's activities in proportion to its willingness to do so.

4
Ensuring Responsiveness, Competence and Loyalty

The last chapter showed that DATAR's effectiveness as a coordinating bureaucracy was related to the interest taken by political leaders in its affairs and therefore that leaders had an impact on DATAR that was linked to their interest in its work. This chapter and the next strengthen the claim by showing how that 'highly significant' relationship at the statistical level of principle is affected at the level of political–administrative practice. Blondel (1987: 150) thought 'the system' linking political leaders to the bureaucracy was 'often – perhaps mostly . . . simply unresponsive or only partly responsive' to their needs. He assumed that four factors made a difference to how well bureaucrats implemented leadership aims (1987: 168). One, links from the central bureaucracy to other organizations and the general population constitute a special case where DATAR is concerned and will be examined in the following chapter. The remaining factors could apply to all bureaucratic organizations:

- 'competence'
- 'administrative organisation – not too light nor too heavy'
- 'civil servants must . . . be expected to be reliable . . . the fostering of loyalty of civil servants by a variety of means – but not at the expense of initiative taking – is a manifest requirement if bureaucracies are to provide a significant help to leaders in achieving their goals'.

Leaders have 'two types of instruments' in connection with these factors (Blondel 1987: 171–2): personal mechanisms, such as their prestige and following within the bureaucracy, to obtain greater loyalty and zeal; and institutional mechanisms, such as in the 'recruitment and training

of the personnel' and 'the organization of the service'. However, there would be 'inevitable trade-offs' between the various elements.

In setting up DATAR in 1963, political leaders employed 'personal' and 'institutional' mechanisms to combine reliable orientation towards their interests with operational effectiveness. Its *délégué*, Guichard, was personally close and loyal to the leadership, technically competent in the domain and able to recruit an enthusiastic team. Early on, he described DATAR as an *administration de mission* (Guichard 1965: 6), and DATAR and DIACT continued to be so defined: 'DATAR [DIACT] is an *administration de mission* of interministerial character' (www.datar.fr; www.diact.fr). This bureaucratic model (Pisani 1956a: 323–6) is lightweight, project-focused, informal in working methods and interministerial in recruitment and function. The agency was thus potentially capable of a speedy refocusing on a new leader's aims but by the same token DATAR had relative freedom to pursue its own projects. What resources did political leaders have to ensure this agency evolved in the ways each intended? Did the agency's personnel and activities respond to their policy priorities? These issues are explored first through an analysis of the leaders' efforts to choose as *délégué* someone competent and loyal to their aims. The second part of the chapter judges the ability of political leaders to make an impact on the staffing, budget and work programmes of this organization.

Choosing the top official

The French political leadership's powers to appoint a top official of its choice can be judged from the rules for such appointments, and from evidence about the *délégués* appointed since 1963 (Table 4.1 lists them, together with some variables explored in this section).

The political leadership's powers to appoint

With their decree of 14 February 1963, political leaders gave themselves the positional resources to choose the *délégué*. The head of DATAR became one of about 500 'discretionary appointments' they made in the regular Cabinet meeting, the Council of Ministers. The president is responsible under the 1958 Constitution for making such appointments, but the decree must be countersigned by the prime minister, the sectoral minister and junior minister to whom the agency is attached, if any. All four signed the decree appointing Pierre Mirabaud as the last DATAR (and first DIACT) *délégué* in 2004, and that appointing his successor, Pierre Dartout, in 2008. The political leadership has a wide choice

Table 4.1 Top officials at DATAR and DIACT

Délégué, date appointed (and age)	Prime Minister, date of government formation*	Training and corps	Cabinet and AdT experience	Next and top posts
• *Guichard* 14 February 1963 (43)	Pompidou 14 April 1962	Sciences-Po Prefect	*Cabinets* 5 years Saharan office	Industry minister Gaullist 'baron'
• *Monod* 24 October 1968 (37)	Couve 10 July 1968	ENA Cour des Comptes	*Cabinets* 4 years DATAR 5 years	Director PM's *cabinet* Head of Suez
• *Essig* 12 September 1975 (41)	Chirac 25 May 1974	ENA Conseil d'Etat	DATAR 12 years	Director marine policy Paris Ch. of Commerce
• *Chadeau* 27 April 1978 (51)	Barre (3) 3 April 1978	Sciences-Po Regional Prefect	*Cabinets* 4 years AdT as prefect	PM's *cabinet* Head SNCF
• *Attali* 14 October 1981 (38)	Mauroy 21 May 1981	ENA Cour des Comptes	*Cabinet* Plan DATAR 6 years	Head GAN insurance Head Air France
• *Sallois* 6 September 1984 (43)	Fabius 17 July 1984	ENA Cour des Comptes	*Cabinet* 3 years	Caisse des Dépôts Director, Musées de F.
• *Carrez* 6 May 1987 (47)	Chirac 20 March 1986	ENA Cour des Comptes	*Cabinets* 7 years	Director Nat. Geog. Director of Forests
• *Duport* 4 October 1989 (47)	Rocard 9 May 1988	ENA Admin. civil	*Cabinet* Plan Paris planning	Prefect, North Paris Regional Prefect, Paris

•	*Paillet* 2 September 1993 (39)	Balladur 29 March 1993	Ecole des Ponts	*Cabinet* 2 years Paris planning	Director Min's *cabinet* Head, building firm
•	*Aubert* 15 November 1995 (48)	Juppé (2) 7 November 1995	ENA Admin. civil	*Cabinet* 2 years Junior Minister	Inspector-general Head of a State charity
•	*Guigou* 23 July 1997 (57)	Jospin 2 June 1997	ENSA Professor	*Cabinet* 1 year DATAR 12 years	Inspector-general Head of research group
•	*Jacquet* 24 July 2002 (50)	Raffarin 6 May 2002	ENST, ENA Prefect	*Cabinet* 3 months AdT as Prefect	Paris Chamber of Commerce
•	*Mirabeau* 20 Nov 2004 (56)	Raffarin (2) 31 March 2004	ENA Regional Prefect	*Cabinets* 4 years DATAR 2 years	
•	*Dartout* 28 April 2008 (54)	Fillon (2) 17 July 2008	ENA Prefect	*Cabinet* 1 year AdT as Prefect	

Note: * The number in parentheses after the prime minister's name indicates in which of their governments they made the appointment (for example, Chadeau was appointed by Barre only after Barre formed his third government).
Sources: Data from *Who's Who in France, Lettre de la DATAR*, French government press statements.

of recruits: the person chosen does not even need to be a civil servant (Bodiguel 1994: 72). Ministers can ease the departure of a *délégué*. If they are civil servants, they can be transferred to a 'discretionary post' in a ministry: *délégué* Essig became head of the maritime transport directorate (the minister for regional planning was also the transport minister); and *délégué* Duport was promoted prefect (the new minister of *aménagement du territoire* was also the Interior minister in charge of prefects). They can be appointed to a public body: Prime Minister Mauroy in 1981 arranged for *délégué* Chadeau to head the SNCF rail enterprise. The president can offer a sinecure post in a corps through the '*tour extérieur*' procedure for 'outsider' appointments. Two departing *délégués*, Aubert in 1995 and Guigou in 2002, were made inspectors-general by this means.

Ministers can appoint staff to their *cabinets* by a simple *arrêté* (which does not need presidential approval) and they used this provision to facilitate a transition to and from the post of *délégué*. A *cabinet* post can be used for an outgoing *délégué* until a replacement post is organized: Prime Minister Chirac in 1975 made his friend Monod his *directeur de cabinet* when the *délégué* left DATAR following conflict with his minister (Massot 1979: 216), and Chadeau was in Mauroy's *cabinet* until the appointment to the SNCF could be made. (The transition from Right to Left in 1981 initiated so many transfers that the 'musical chairs' lasted many months.) Conversely, a candidate for *délégué* can work from the minister's *cabinet* until the incumbent moves out. Carrez was appointed *délégué* in May 1987, but he 'had been preparing to take over', using his *cabinet* position, since March 1986 (*Le Monde* 7 May 1987). Political leaders can expand these powers quite subtly. President Pompidou reduced the length of discretionary appointments so that more frequent nominations could be made 'without drama' (Massot 1987: 292); and Mitterrand in 1984 extended the range of appointments that could be made through the *tour extérieur*.

That leaders use such procedures is in one sense not evidence of direct power but of the power to subvert the constraints imposed by a tenured civil service protected by statute. The political leadership of 1959 originally adapted the discretionary procedure to add flexibility and incentives to a bureaucracy whose top posts were 'monopolized by certain corps', not for purposes of politicization (Bodiguel 1994: 72). The use of these procedures by the Left in 1981 and the Right in 1986 stimulated complaints about 'witch hunts', demonstrating the 'trade-off' between ensuring loyalty from some officials and alienating others. The Centre-Right parliamentary majority passed legislation in 1986 to limit *tour extérieur* appointments.

The top post at DATAR is used by Lochak (1992: 51) to exemplify 'structural politicization', because Attali, Sallois and Carrez were in turn displaced by appointees 'close to' the political leaders who appointed them. 'These changes were made without haste, the government trying in general to offer fair compensation to the departing official', yet DATAR became thereby a 'lame duck' by the expectation of the *délégué*'s dismissal. Sallois 'knew his days were numbered from March 1986', when the Right won, and for 9 months had to 'work in double harness' with his successor, Carrez (*Le Monde* 7 May 1987). 'The departure [of Carrez] was programmed in advance' (*Libération* 2 August 1989) and 'he more or less disappeared from the scene 6 months beforehand' (*Le Monde* 19 September 1989). In 1997 Aubert simply 'put his post at the disposal of the minister', and 'in compensation would be appointed an inspector-general for the Infrastructure ministry' (*Le Monde* 10 August 1997).

'Many of these [discretionary] posts are not particularly prominent or sensitive, and ministers will usually fill them with competent people from within the career service, with little attention to their political orientation' (Stevens 1992: 129). Four or five early *délégués* had this 'non-politicized' character in which competence prevailed. Only when Left and Right alternated in power from 1981 did it became clear that political leaders had strong powers to select the *délégué* on political grounds if they so chose.

The constraints within a multiple political leadership

Notwithstanding the power of 'the political leadership' to select a *délégué*, the need for two or more politicians (president, prime minister and minister) to agree on a name imposes constraints. The chief players are the president and the prime minister. According to Guichard, when asked 'why he was nominated' as first *délégué*, the two were in accord. 'Neither of them told me precisely and it's too late to ask them. But I think it's not too difficult to understand. The General liked me and I was very close to Pompidou, and they were passionate about this issue' (Guichard 1975: 90). De Gaulle's sole concern, according to Guichard, was this *délégué*'s 'second job' as chief adviser to Pompidou (Charles and Cristini 1992: 470), very probably because it risked giving a political coloration to an official's post. Essig's appointment was 'mutually arranged' between the departing *délégué* Monod, the Gaullist Prime Minister Chirac and the Giscardian Minister of Interior and *aménagement du territoire*, Poniatowski (Audouin 1977: 30; Essig 1979: 33). In 1978 Prime

Minister Barre, deciding to take direct control of DATAR, persuaded Essig this was 'an opportune moment to move on' and himself chose Chadeau (Essig 1979: 15).

Within 6 months of becoming president in 1981 Mitterrand had centralized the process for making discretionary appointments. A group of presidential and prime ministerial advisers debated the names to put to Mitterrand (Attali 1993a: 134). If Mitterrand did not approve a name before the Cabinet met, the name was withdrawn from the agenda. Disputes within the leadership were frequent. It took the Left 5 months in 1981 to fill the post after Chadeau left, with no convincing explanation (F. Grosrichard, *Le Monde* 18 September 1981). It seems that Minister Rocard, a rival of Mitterrand, had been unable to get a name approved. Bernard Attali was eventually appointed at the same Council of Ministers to which Rocard presented an Interim Plan whose forecasts he did not believe, because he 'had had enough' of being kept outside decision making (Favier and Martin-Roland 1990: 119).

At times of 'cohabitation' between president and prime minister of opposing parties, the President could not impose a name, but Mitterrand required of Prime Minister Chirac that departing officials were offered a post of similar grade (Mény 1992: 110). Chirac in 1986 relied for his majority on the centrist Minister Méhaignerie, who was therefore able to choose Carrez, who had long worked in his *cabinets* at local and national level. Méhaignerie had declared he would not practise 'witch hunts', so Carrez could not be appointed until the incumbent was found an appropriate post. In 1988 Prime Minister Rocard too asked ministers to end witch hunts, and moreover relied on Méhaignerie's support in parliament: Carrez left 'only when he could be appointed to a reasonable post' (Lochak 1992: 42, 48). With relationships still poor between Mitterrand and Rocard, the next *délégué*, Duport, was named 'after months of shilly-shallying' by the Elysée. The minister had to 'defend his candidate tooth and claw' (*Le Monde* 29 September, 6 October 1989).

Presidents and sometimes prime ministers have often pushed their choice of *délégué* on the minister for *aménagement du territoire* but rarely with good outcomes. Sallois was 'imposed on Gaston Defferre, a few weeks after the latter was made Minister of the Plan and *aménagement du territoire*. He irritated the Mayor of Marseille, who progressively marginalised him' (*Le Monde* 7 May 1987). President Chirac 'personally asked Juppé to find an important post for Raymond-Max Aubert, forcing the hand of both the head of government and the new minister for *aménagement du territoire*' (*Le Monde* 16 November 1995). Relations between *délégué* Aubert and the Minister Gaudin were 'glacial' (*Le Monde*

5 June 1996). In Jospin's government, the appointment of Guigou in 1997 was unwelcome to Minister Voynet. Her *cabinet* had numerous clashes with the *délégué*. The minister 'frequently asked Jospin to replace him. In 2001 she went and he stayed' (*Le Monde* 8 July 2001).

Table 4.1 shows that nearly all governments appoint a new *délégué*: the exceptions were Chaban-Delmas and Messmer (but President Pompidou had already approved Monod as deputy *délégué* in his premiership), Cresson and Bérégovoy; significantly, Cresson's similar 'failure' to place her network in top administrative posts was identified as a major cause of her weakness as a prime minister (Favier and Martin-Roland 1999: 17–18). Yet, only Chadeau was subject to what Lochak calls 'revenge politicization' – evicted precipitously when the new leadership has no strategic interest in the post. Recent appointments of *délégué* are of a 'clientelist' type driven by a 'desire to satisfy the ambitions of friends, or, in some cases, to reward services rendered ...; although, in most cases, appointing friends is not only to reward them but also to be able to work with people one knows and can rely on' (Lochak 1992: 55). In 2004 Minister de Robien, political boss of Amiens, appointed as *délégué* the regional prefect of Picardie, based in Amiens. In 2008 the new junior minister for *aménagement du territoire* Hubert Falco, mayor of Toulon, appointed as *délégué* the prefect of the Var, based in Toulon. Most *délégués* are now selected on a personalized basis. There were 'inevitable trade-offs' in the loss in DATAR's authority, from the uncertainty when governments changed, from the political rivalry that led to delays in appointments, and by the loss of competence from restricting the recruitment pool.

Professional competence and personal loyalty

'Competence' is the first of four characteristics of the civil service that affect the impact of political leaders, according to Blondel (1987: 168). The assessment below of a *délégué*'s technical competence for the post has mostly to be based on their known professional qualifications. Since the *délégué*'s role is to see that ministerial decisions are prepared and coordinated, the typical *directeur de cabinet* seems an appropriate benchmark. *Directeurs* are virtually always mid-career civil servants, about 35 to 45 years old (Hayward and Wright 2002: 46). They are likely to have trained at the Ecole nationale d'administration, ENA (Schrameck 1995: 34). For much of the time since 1963 about half the *directeurs* belonged to the administrative *grands corps* recruited from those achieving top marks at ENA (Inspection des Finances, Conseil d'Etat and Cour des

Comptes); a few to the top technical *grands corps*, recruited from the highest-placed graduates of the Ecole polytechnique (Corps des Mines, Ponts et Chaussées); and the rest to the corps of prefects, diplomats or generalist *administrateurs civils* (Thuillier 1982: 33). Even in the 1990s, when a lower proportion of *cabinet* members were from the *grands corps* than in the 1970s, the majority of ministers still filled the *directeur* post from the *grand corps* (Rouban 1998: 27) because of their 'vast network of relationships across society' and 'irreplaceable general competence' (Suleiman 1979: 107).

About 40 per cent of *directeurs* make explicit their political commitment but, while *cabinets* should include some members who are there because of their links with the minister, the criterion for choosing the *directeur* must be administrative expertise (Schrameck 1995: 34). There were 'disastrous consequences' for Prime Minister Balladur when he chose as *directeur* a young, inexperienced official: 'It is an example of the "court politics" danger of choosing someone with whom one is comfortable rather than who is competent' (Hayward and Wright 2002: 48). The main requirements are therefore 'political skill and administrative authority, although in some ministries ... specialist skills are also necessary' (Hayward and Wright 2002: 46).

Have political leaders been able to attract to their service a *délégué* with these attributes? Table 4.2 summarizes the evidence on 14 *délégués*: their age at appointment, the training institutions they attended and their corps, and their experience in a *cabinet* and in DATAR's specialist domain. The post offered on leaving DATAR and a later 'top job' are listed as some indication of the calibre of person appointed.

All *délégués* were civil servants, which brings advantages for interministerial coordination, though Guichard had only become a prefect four years earlier by the *tour extérieur* (Guichard 1975: 79). Aubert had only a few years as a junior official before becoming a party politician, serving Chirac in the Paris town hall. He was then a junior minister, and while at DATAR remained mayor of Tulle (chief town of Chirac's Corrèze). He also entered ENA through the less daunting entry process for internal civil service candidates as did Jacquet; indeed Aubert, Jacquet and Dartout were in the same year at ENA and it is likely that Jacquet, who had no other strong qualifications, was recommended to Chirac by Aubert. A large majority of *délégués* took the generalist high achievers' route through the Institut d'études politiques (IEP) and ENA (or, for Guichard and Chadeau the predecessor Ecole libre des sciences politiques). Paillet trained at the Ecole polytechnique and then won entry to the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées; and Guigou did not go to ENA

Table 4.2 Interdisciplinary appointments at DATAR's Paris office (schematic)

Approximate year	1986	1988	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000
Prime Minister	Chirac	Rocard	Cresson	Bérégovoy	Balladur	Juppé	Jospin	
Délégué	Cour des Comptes- - - - -		Admin. civil h.c.- - - - -		Ponts	Admin. civil	Professor- - - - - - - - -	
Deputy-délégué	Professor	C. Comptes	Professor- - - - - - - - -		Prefect	Admin. civil h.c.- - - - - - -		Prefect
Conseiller technique	Sub-prefect	Sub-prefect- - - - - - - - -		Sub-prefect	Admin. civil	Sub-prefect	Admin. civil	non-corps
Finance, Secretariat	C. Comptes	Admin. civil- - - - - - - - -		Admin. civil	Sub-prefect- - - - -		Admin. civil	INSEE
Directeur			INSEE- - - - - - -		Professor- - - - - - -		non-corps- - - - - - - - -	
Conseiller au délégué					Prefect	Admin. civil	Prefect	non-corps
Conseiller au délégué						Armaments	Armaments	[none]
Relocation of firms	non-corps	Telecoms- - - - - - - - -		Mines	Ponts	non-corps	non-corps	Armaments
Rural development	IGREF	Agronomist	[vacant]	non-corps	IGREF- - - - - - - -		[vacant]	non-corps
Infrastructure/plans	Ponts- - - - - - - - - - - - -		Ponts- - - - - - - - - - - -		Territorial administrator		[vacant]	non-corps
Europe/international	Agronomist	Admin. civil h.c.- - - - - - - - - - - -			Admin. civil- - - - - - -		Admin. civil	non-corps
Location factors	Mines- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -			[vacant]	Contracted post			
Studies, forecasts	[vacant]	non-corps- - - - - - - -			INSEE- - - - - - -		Lecturer	non-corps
State action, services					Admin. civil- - - - - - - - - -		Admin. civil	Lecturer
Economic action					Admin. civil			
'LOADT' Act					TPG finance			
Institutions					Prefect			
Universities, research					Lecturer			

Notes: The posts are all those listed in *Bottin administratif* held at some time 1986–2000 by a member of a senior corps. *Administrateur civil h.c* is a top grade; IGREF and INSEE are rural engineering and statistical corps.
Source of data: *Bottin administratif* (various years), supplemented by *Lettres de la DATAR*.

but studied agricultural economics and became an academic. Unlike the first seven *délégués*, the second seven did not by and large have the classic educational career that gives authority to a French civil servant and the best access to coordinating networks.

The contrast in educational background is necessarily reinforced by a consideration of corps status, since that depends on academic prowess. Leaving aside Guichard, five of the next six *délégués* came from one of the top three corps, and the sixth, Chadeau, was at the highest level of the prefects' corps. However, Carrez was the last of the *délégués* from the top three corps. *Le Monde*'s correspondents presented Duport, '*administrateur civil hors classe*' (almost on a par with the *grand corps*) as one of 'the Jacobin technostructure and administrative intelligentsia', but Aubert as 'an ephemeral junior minister in the Juppé government, mayor of Tulle, close to Chirac, and who had lost his seat in Corrèze', and Guigou as 'the spouse of the justice minister and a professor of agricultural economics' (6 October 1989; 24 July, 10 August 1997), which was unfair to Guigou whose ideas on local government structures and regional economic strategies have been adopted by ministers from all parties.

The decline in the level of formal qualifications was accompanied by a similar if uneven decline in relevant experience. It is unsurprising that two early *délégués* appointed by Left governments (starting their careers under Right-wing governments) had been *directeurs de cabinet* only to the Plan Commissioner (an official); and their predecessor Essig had never served in a *cabinet*. Even so, the *délégués* appointed before 1993 had substantially more experience of *cabinet* work than those appointed later, and in more significant positions. Paillet's and Jacquet's short service was as *chef du cabinet* (organizing the minister's personal agenda whereas the *directeur* coordinates policy affairs); and Aubert's *cabinet* was that of the ministry for overseas *départements*, not a central ministry. In contrast, among the first seven *délégués*, Guichard and Monod had been members of a president's or prime minister's *cabinet*; Chadeau was *directeur de cabinet* to Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas, and Sallois and Carrez *directeurs de cabinets* of senior ministers.

Although competence in a bureaucracy's technical area of business is not seen as essential to a *directeur de cabinet* (generalist skills being prized), nearly all *délégués* had relevant experience. Some had already worked for DATAR (Monod, Essig, Attali, Guigou and Mirabaud), or in the Paris region planning offices (Duport and Paillet), or developing the Sahara (Guichard) or Paris new towns (Chadeau) or in a regional prefect's office as secretary-general for regional affairs, SGAR (Jacquet). The

level of expertise has since declined overall. In 1965 Monod had prepared a regional administrative reform and helped Guichard design and then run DATAR: in 1995 Aubert had been a rural affairs minister for 5 months. In 1976 Chadeau had been 'an activist regional prefect' in the Nord-Pas de Calais region (Hayward 1986: 119): in 2002 Jacquet had been the SGAR in Nord-Pas de Calais and in Paris. In 1981 Attali as No. 3 at DATAR had organized the prime minister's Comité interministériel d'aménagement du territoire, CIAT, for 6 years: in 1997 Guigou had worked as No. 3 at DATAR for 12 years, but as a technical expert.

A last indicator of the relative competence of the different *délégués* is their subsequent career. Guichard, Monod, Attali and Duport seem to have reached the highest points in their diverse spheres: Guichard in politics, Monod in business, Attali in public corporations and Duport in the prefectoral corps; Chadeau, Sallois and Carrez were appointed to discretionary posts that others covet. Those appointed after 1990 seem unlikely to reach equivalent positions.

The evidence on affiliations between *délégu*é and political leaders that might aid 'reliability' is unavoidably subjective and incomplete. Guichard had been de Gaulle's aide-de-camp for 13 years and then Pompidou's *chargé de mission*, a post above the *cabinet* hierarchy. Monod had a close comradeship with Chirac at Sciences Po, ENA and the Cour des Comptes, but then pursued a non-political career and was already *délégué* when Chirac became prime minister. Though Chirac made Monod his *directeur de cabinet* and the following year recruited Monod as secretary-general of his new Gaullist party, Monod's lack of political sense soon brought about his departure, and he is better described as Chirac's *éminence grise* (Collovald 1999: 103–4). Essig too knew Chirac from IEP and ENA but they were not close. Essig's brother was a Socialist career rail official who was later given appointments by Left governments, but there is no evidence on Essig's own political leanings. Chadeau had been *directeur de cabinet* to Right-wing ministers of different strands, but had also worked closely with the Socialist Mauroy in Nord-Pas de Calais before being made *délégué* by the Centrist Barre.

Politicized appointments appeared therefore to start and finish with Guichard and did not at first seemed to restart with Attali in 1981. It was assumed that his appointment was due to his brother's influence with President Mitterrand and that DATAR's work would benefit from the family, not political, link (Hayward 1983: 200–1). However, the brothers had different careers and personalities and, moreover, relations were poor between Jacques Attali and Bérégovoy, then head of the Presidential Secretariat, which liaises with the rest of the political leadership

(Favier and Martin-Roland 1990: 434; Stevens 1992: 74). Nonetheless, DATAR's dealings with ministries improved during Attali's tenure (*La Croix* 28 June 1984); the perception of close links was beneficial to DATAR. Eight of the nine *délégués* who followed Attali were close politically or well-known personally to members of the political leadership. Carrez, Paillet, Mirabaud and Dartout had already worked closely with their new ministers. For two *délégués*, the personalized links were taken to extremes: Paillet admitted and was charged with collecting £500,000 from Alsthom in 1994 on behalf of Pasqua, in return for awarding a permit to build in Paris (*Le Monde* 18 May and 25 June 2003); Aubert was charged with benefiting from a 'false job' in Chirac's Paris town hall (*Le Monde* 31 March 2003).

Le Monde (29 September 1988) once judged the position of *délégué* at DATAR to be 'one of the highest civil service posts'. Some recent nominations give a different impression. Whichever criterion is examined, there is a trend to a reduction in the qualities thought to give officials the strongest reputation for effectiveness. For political leaders not particularly interested in AdT (Presidents Mitterrand and Chirac) it could be appropriate to use the post to reward loyalty. However, Prime Minister Balladur and his minister Pasqua promoted vigorously the old 'Gaullist' version of AdT (for example in Pasqua and Séguin 1993) and yet appointed less well-qualified candidates. Yet if an unusual appointment such as Aubert's or Jacquet's was unlikely to add credibility to regional planning, it is witness to the capacity of the French leadership to impose the candidate of its choice. Political leaders seem to be choosing the person they want but, in Hayward and Wright's phrase, 'in danger of choosing someone with whom one is comfortable rather than who is competent' (2002: 48).

Steering the agency's recruitment and activities

Political leaders exert some influence over the agency's activities through their choice of *délégué*, and that control is reinforced by formal powers on staffing limits and programme budgets, but the way staff operate is not so susceptible to formal command. The second part of this chapter therefore examines a new leadership's capacity for steering recruitment, and ensuring staff respond to its priorities. DATAR was intended by its authors to have the characteristics of an *administration de mission*, which constitutes a useful template for judging its evolution. As outlined by Pouyet (1968: 60–7) soon after DATAR's launch, the three

main characteristics of an *administration de mission*, and the questions they invite are as follows:

- a 'lightweight' organization – how well can leaders control staffing levels? Do staff numbers match the level of importance given by the leadership to regional planning?
- interdisciplinarity – can leaders attract the top generalist and specialist administrators able to persuade a range of ministries to adopt the leaders' programmes?
- team working – a 'team spirit' was deemed essential in 1963 to overcome 'silo' mentalities: have the teams been restructured to meet the policy priorities of new political leaders?

A lightweight and flexible administration

Some political scientists assert that public bureaucracies tend to 'oversupply' services and grow (Niskanen 1971) and some of DATAR's opponents agreed: the President of the Paris Region Michel Giraud described DATAR (in *Le Monde* of 29 March 1987) as a 'young lightweight structure that had become a fat old lady succumbing to Parkinson's law'. Yet French political leaders have considerable power to control the number of officials in any section of the French national administration.

The number of in-house staff a French ministry or interministerial organization can pay is fixed in the annual Finance Act, and therefore subject to political control. DATAR/DIACT is part of the prime minister's office; the prime minister, in negotiation with the minister(s) for *aménagement du territoire*, the *délégué* and, especially, the Finance Ministry, determine the maximum number of posts the agency will fund, which is written into the Act. The Act on Finance Acts 2001, Loi organique relative aux lois de finances (LOLF), implemented in 2006, gave the official in charge of a programme, in this case the *délégué* in charge of '*Aménagement du Territoire*', more flexibility to move resources between budgetary sections in order to achieve policy objectives. However, both the number of personnel and the personnel budget remain capped: flexibility does not extend to paying staff from another section of the agency's budget or employing more but 'cheaper' staff.

To show the level of detail and staff changes that the political leadership could impose through the budget, Table 4.3 compares the number of posts proposed in the Left-wing Jospin's last full financial year (2001) with the Right-wing Raffarin's first full financial year (2003). The budget

Table 4.3   Budgetary posts under different leaders

		Number of posts in budgets for 2001 (Jospin) and 2003 (Raffarin)				Actual number on 31 December
		At 1 January	Posts abolished	Posts created	At 31 December	
Total	Jospin	113	0	3	116	113
number of posts	Raffarin	123	38	38	123	123
• Tenured	Jospin	58	0	3	61	60
posts	Raffarin	68	4	6	70	70
• Contracted	Jospin	55	0	0	55	53
posts	Raffarin	55	34	32	53	53

Sources: Loi de Finances initiale: Services du premier ministre, 2001, 2003; and DATAR, Rapport d'activités 2003.

specified the number of tenured officials and non-tenured (contract) staff to be carried on DATAR's budget, and the number of posts in both categories to be abolished or created during the coming year. The LOLF format does not distinguish between tenured and non-tenured, but requires numbers – and the planned changes in numbers – by hierarchical level (top officials, other administrators and other technicians) which is a different but equally strong constraint on the *délégué*.

Table 4.3 shows that an incoming government is able to adapt staffing through the use of contracts. An additional ten tenured officials had been recruited after the presidential election in 2002, and a high turnover of contracts was planned for 2003, making it possible to respond to the priorities of the new government. In contrast, as the previous government came to the end of a five-year term, no great change was expected, and DATAR failed to recruit the three additional staff planned, a warning that the political leadership may specify the numbers required but must still persuade people to join.

French civil service provisions on staff mobility give additional flexibility that can be exploited either by ministers or by the official head of an administration (see Burnham 2000: 98–114). As Table 4.4 shows for some recent years, only 33 to 40 of the budgetary posts at DATAR/DIACT were occupied by tenured officials based permanently at the agency, difficult to move or dismiss. Another 27 to 33 were filled by tenured officials on temporary transfer to DATAR/DIACT, '*détaché*' from their

Table 4.4   Permanent, contracted and seconded officials

	DATAR/DIACT's budget			Seconded from another budget		TOTAL on 31 December
	Tenured officials		Contracted			
	Permanent	Transferred		Tenured	Contracted	
2001	33	27	53	51	5	169
2004	40	27	52	35	10	164
2006	39	33	41	49	11	173

Sources: DATAR/DIACT, *Rapport d'activités* for each year.

ministry or corps. About 40 to 55 of the budgetary posts were filled by staff recruited on short-term or 'indefinite' contracts, of which the latter can be terminated at any time. Even within the budgeted posts, the numbers or qualifications of staff can be varied to meet new demands, or to fill gaps when suitable seconded staff are unavailable. Yet the most noteworthy characteristic of DATAR, which continues in DIACT, has been the presence of a sizeable group of officials (56 to 60 recently), additional to the budgetary posts, seconded to the agency (*mis à disposition*) by their corps or ministry and remunerated from their home budgets. These officials stay on average 3 years, and are mostly tenured 'policy bureaucrats' as Page and Jenkins (2005) call them, though they include a few manual and administrative staff. In the past the budget for these officials was not accounted for directly by the ministers in charge of *aménagement du territoir*e (but via their sponsor organization): in the LOLF system the number of officials '*mis à disposition*' and the associated resource needs and policy objectives to be met have to be noted in DIACT's budget.

The significance of secondment is clear from Table 4.4, and increased further by consideration of the numbers of 'A grade' officials (who make up the top 20 per cent of the French State civil service, excluding teachers). Very few of the permanent tenured officials at the agency are in this grade: nearly all are carrying out secretarial, technical or manual tasks. In recent years 55 to 60 per cent of DATAR/DIACT staff have been 'A grade' but virtually all of these personnel (98 per cent in 2006) have been transferred or seconded there or are contracted employees. That is, the political leaders in charge of this agency are able to determine exactly the maximum number of posts they will remunerate, and allocate permanent support staff, but the actual size of the agency and the

number of 'policy bureaucrats' recruited will depend on its attractiveness to potential 'secondees'; which means the posting has to be of value in terms of the goals of the individual or corps concerned (Bodiguel and Quermonne 1983: 188; Suleiman 1979: 182).

Before examining the long-term evidence for this statement, it is worth considering the lessons from the smaller-scale changes in Table 4.4. The additional permanent budgetary posts in 2002 and 2003 noted earlier did not counterbalance substantial falls in grade A officials seconded from elsewhere (50 in 2001, 39 in 2003). There was no increase in the better-qualified 'secondees' until Minister de Robien replaced *délégué* Jacquet with Mirabaud, and Sarkozy became the minister for *aménagement du territoire* (41 in 2004, 50 in 2005 and 53 in 2006). This increase in staff '*mis à disposition*' was not just quantitative: the ministries of agriculture, infrastructure and interior all expanded their contributions in 2005 with staff at higher grades on average than those they sent in 2003–04. Yet even with Mirabaud as *délégué*, DATAR and then DIACT did not recruit the full complement of budgetary posts, symptomatic of the agency's long-term decline in authority.

Staff numbers for the whole period since 1963 can be collated and correlated with changes of prime minister and *délégué* to make inferences about their relative impact on appointments. The data (set out in Burnham 2005: 100) derive mainly from Souchon-Zahn (in Bodiguel and Quermonne 1983: 186–8) and Massardier (1996). Figures on the 'A grade' staff, going up to 1988, show a sharp increase of DATAR's numbers during de Gaulle's presidency and Pompidou's premiership; slow growth in the Pompidou and Giscard presidencies; rapid expansion with the arrival of the Left government; and a sharp decrease during Chirac's first premiership. Within this broad picture, the biggest net increases occurred in 1967, 1976 and 1978, years when prime ministers or ministers showed interest in the topic; the strongest decreases were in 1986 and 1988 when presidents or prime ministers signalled their disinterest. In contrast, an expansion in 1971, when the 'technocratic' Monod started forecasting studies, had no obvious link to political leaders and seems to be an exercise of bureaucratic autonomy.

Data on budgetary posts exclude many seconded staff but are available for a longer period. These figures too show strong recruitment in 1982 by the Left-wing government, whose leaders gave experience to groups new to power, put sympathizers in posts close to decision makers and rewarded campaigners. This expansion was followed by cutbacks under the Fabius and Chirac governments of the mid-1980s which showed their opposition to regional planning in other ways too. There was some

recovery in 1990 after Rocard's government appointed Duport as *délégué*, and the minister Chérèque revived the forecasting studies. A smaller surge in 1993 was initiated by Pasqua, as minister responsible for AdT. 'Pasqua wanted "shock troops" put in place [to] re-conquer the territory', and Paillet recruited more staff (*Les Echos* 29 October 1993). Prime Minister Balladur later prioritized budgetary savings, requiring DATAR to reduce its staff by 20 per cent: DATAR complied (*Le Moniteur* 1 July 1994). Finally, there was an increase in budgetary posts after the change of government in 2002, with the new numbers being maintained by Raffarin and further increased by the Villepin government, although, as we have seen, fewer seconded officials were recruited for a time.

Souchon-Zahn's early work on DATAR staff suggested that recruitment was influenced by the *délégué* since turnover 'tended to increase' when the *délégué* changed (Bodiguel and Quermonne 1983: 186). Massardier's figures to 1988 show this conclusion does not hold in 1975, 1984 or 1987. Rather, step changes are associated with changes in political leadership or commitment, and the change of *délégué* that is often associated with a high turnover is another consequence of the same cause, the change of political leadership. The political leadership not only has the powers to control DATAR's budgetary size but seems on the whole to have controlled its overall size too, the increase under Monod in 1971 being an exception.

External collaborators have always been part of the arrangements for developing and implementing AdT. These additional human resources take two forms. First, under the terms of the 14 February 1963 decree the *délégué* can call on experts. 'Personalities', such as Philippe Lamour, Paul Delouvrier, Pierre Racine, Roger Grégoire and Marcel Long, were brought in as presidents of development projects and chairs of committees or to write special reports. Massardier (1996: 155) reckoned that DATAR's use of prestigious collaborators had declined, an evolution that he attributed to a decline in DATAR's own prestige. This activity does nevertheless continue, but in bursts, with 'working groups' and 'circles' being created and then fading away as political interest in the policy waxes and wanes. DIACT has renewed the series of '*Travaux*' reports associated with the 'Monod' period. The first, *Logistique et territoires* (Savy 2006), was commissioned from the foremost French authority on the subject, and the second, on 'Greater Paris' (a Sarkozy enthusiasm), from a prize-winning architect and an academic (Chemetov and Gilli 2006).

Second, the agency contributes staff to inter-institutional organizations that coordinate development projects that cut across functional and territorial boundaries. Some critics see them as strengthening the

political leadership by extending its reach; for example, regional development commissioners can implement centrally decided regional strategies and transmit to central decision makers the views of important 'private groups that bring together the various regional economic interests' (Biarez 1982: 272–3, 277, 1989: 185–6). Others, such as the Cour des Comptes and the Guichard Commission (1986: 56), see them as DATAR 'paying for people not at its disposal', listing 'rural development commissioners, development project coordinators, industrial commissioners, tourist development missions, economic action missions, conversion poles, general secretariats for regional affairs (SGARs . . .), as well as 21 offices abroad'.

Certainly, these bodies are more complicated to monitor than are 'in-house' staff (Cour des Comptes 1998, 2002). However, all seven structures mentioned above were appointed, created, funded and sustained by the will of the political leadership: the commissioners and heads of missions are appointed in a Council of Ministers; grants to associations were approved in a CIAT/CIADT/CIACT, chaired by the prime minister; 'conversion poles' were approved in the Council of Ministers or a CIAT, and the SGARs are the 'economic divisions' of regional prefectures, run by sub-prefects. The offices abroad (prospecting for inward investment) have long been criticized by ministries that think 'investment' or 'abroad' is their monopoly. In 2001 these offices became a separate establishment, the French Agency for International Investment (AFII), with budgetary and management responsibilities shared jointly by DATAR and the Ministry of Finance; its staffing, resources and performance objectives as an 'operator' now laid out clearly in LOLF documents. As the minister for *aménagement du territoire* Yves Cochet reminded the Cour des Comptes (2002: para. 6745), 'The allocation of each of the main headings of DATAR's budget is decided by the prime minister or the minister responsible for *aménagement du territoire*.'

In summary, wherever DATAR/DIACT staff are employed, the political leadership can adapt the number and location of posts through the formal controls of budgetary law and ministerial decision-making; but its recruitment of higher-level officials and experts is more closely related to the priority being given by the government to the policy domain. The leadership has instruments such as the Cour des Comptes that can draw its attention to imperfect practices, shown by DATAR's recruitment of its first human resources specialist in 2001, responding to Cour warnings that DATAR was no longer a small team around a *délégué*, even if it was not the 'fat old lady' described by the leader of the Paris regional council.

An interdisciplinary organization

Just as the *délégué* seems likely to be most effective if he or she has similar characteristics to those of a *directeur de cabinet*, DATAR is like a *cabinet* in needing mobile *grands corps* members from ENA or Ecole polytechnique if it is to use their networks to facilitate coordination (Hayward and Wright 2002: 45). In DATAR's early years half the *chargés de mission* (policy bureaucrats) had attended ENA or Polytechnique. A third were from the top five administrative corps and another third from the top technical corps. Every relevant bureaucratic institution was 'covered' by a *chargé* competent in its domain (Pouyet 1968: 62–4). Guichard built this organization from his previous collaborators in the Office for Saharan Development (Massardier 1996: 130), and from those in the Conseil d'Etat and elsewhere who heard that 'something promising was going on' (Roche 1986: 70; Essig 1979: 19). Yet even this 'promising' new organization was unable to attract a member of the topmost corps, the Finance Inspectorate. 'The Finance Ministry refused to allow an *inspecteur des finances* to work for a *conseiller référendaire* from the Cour des Comptes' [Monod] (Essig 1979: 21). How therefore could subsequent leaders ensure that the agency had the staff to match their needs?

Table 4.5 compares the educational background of DATAR policy staff recruited in the Gaullist presidency, the Pompidou and Giscard presidencies and the first Mitterrand presidency. Massardier (1996) observed that the *proportion* of staff that had been at ENA was approximately the same in the 1970s as in the 1960s, but that in the 1980s it declined

Table 4.5 Training of policy staff at DATAR

Training establishment	1963–70		1971–81		1982–88	
ENA	14	29%	25	32%	15	21%
Ecole polytechnique	8	17%	21	27%	13	18%
Other *grandes écoles*	3	6%	5	6%	4	6%
Other public service *écoles*	4	8%	8	10%	11	15%
IEP only	13	27%	10	13%	10	14%
University	13	27%	10	13%	10	14%
Others	5	10%	8	10%	15	21%
Total number of staff (N=100%)	48		70		72	

Notes: The totals given are less than the sum of the columns because most staff have been to more than one establishment. IEP is the Institut d'études politiques, and includes the former 'Sciences Po'. Following Massardier, the middle period is longer than the others.
Source: Recalculated from figures and tables in Massardier (1996: 159–63).

markedly. The *proportion* trained at Polytechnique increased substantially in the 1970s, because regional development was given a strong technical bias in this period; it then declined significantly in the 1980s. Massardier interprets these trends as another sign of a loss in DATAR's prestige, but a more subtle interpretation can be made. The *absolute number* of ENA graduates recruited per year was the same in Mitterrand's first term as it was under the Gaullists. The *number* of *polytechniciens* recruited per year remained as high as in the 1970s. However, DATAR expanded hugely following the arrival of the Left; and a large proportion of them had been educated elsewhere. This recruitment strategy, retaining the same capacity in terms of ENA and Polytechnique networks, yet offering additional posts to those with different training, matched the new leadership's desire to open recruitment to its own people without cutting back on traditional, proven arrangements (Pfister 1988: 92). Nevertheless, Massardier may be right to conclude that the new recruitment damaged the image of the organization in the eyes of those trained at the top *écoles*.

A similar picture is seen in the recruitment from the *grands corps*. Table 4.6 gives figures for director-level posts, the *chargés de mission* (policy staff) in Paris and those in commissariats outside Paris. Recruitment for director-level posts is fairly similar across the three periods; the *délégué* (until 1987) and the deputy *délégué* (until 1982) came from the *grands corps*. The number of *chargés* from these corps also remains

Table 4.6   Grands corps membership of senior officials

	1963–70	1971–81	1982–88
Administrative *grands corps*	12	12	8
• Director posts	3	4	4
• Policy staff in Paris	4	7	4
• Policy staff outside Paris	5	1	0
Technical *grands corps*	10	21	11
• Director posts	1	5	2
• Policy staff in Paris	6	12	8
• Policy staff outside Paris	3	4	5
Total	22	43	23

Note: The administrative *grands corps* here are the Inspection des Finances, Conseil d'Etat and Cour des Comptes; the technical corps are the Corps des Mines and the Corps des Ponts et Chaussées. The middle period is longer.
Source: Recalculated from figures and tables in Massardier (1996: 152, 170–1).

steady, though recruitment from the administrative *grands corps* to missions outside Paris ceases. In total, the same number is recruited to DATAR in the 1980s as in the 1960s, though not at the level of the early 1970s, when Essig (1979: 57) had 'to keep numbers down by pleading the smallness of the building to stem demand'. The stability of *grands corps* recruitment in the early 1980s is especially significant because it contrasts with the decline in such recruitment later in the Mitterrand presidency, following the politicization of appointments.

Table 4.2 analyzes the interdisciplinary character of recent DATAR and current DIACT personnel in a different way to highlight other factors without identifying individuals. It shows the evolution in corps memberships of senior posts in DATAR's Paris office between 1986 and 2000. Corps appointments declined in number and variety and general prestige between 1988 and 1993, with a brief revival during the Balladur government, and then a further decline to 2000. The Cour des Comptes had always assigned one or two members to DATAR, but after Rocard's government in 1989 appointed a top *administrateur civil* as *délégué*, the Cour did not send another member until 2004 (and then it was a former DATAR agronomist nominated to the Cour by the *tour extérieur*). Equally, 1989 was the last year that senior members of the three top technical corps (Mines, Ponts and Télécomms) were present at the same time. However, though the corps can choose (or not) to sponsor a posting, Table 4.2 shows they do not control the individual posts: only about 10 per cent of postings consisted of a corps member (or member of no corps) replacing a member of the same corps (or none). Other traditional bureaucratic norms were transgressed too when a second 'No. 2' was appointed by the Left government in 1990, demoted to 'No. 3' by the Right government in 1995 and created *délégué* by the next Left government in 1997. Flexibility remains; 11 new posts were created in this period; and posts were discontinued when a role ceased to be a priority.

Yet the eruption of appointments under the Balladur government 1993–95 reveals the most significant point. Political leaders promoting a more dynamic AdT were able to attract corps members, including those less politically identified. A deputy *délégué* arrived from the Interior ministry, where he had prepared new laws on local authorities for the Socialists Defferre and Joxe; he would now oversee the Gaullist Pasqua's bill on AdT (*Le Monde* 16 February 1994, 3 February 1995; *La Tribune* 17 February 1994). There were also small increases in recruitment from the technical *grands corps* in 2001 and 2002 as a new presidency approached (DATAR 2001, 2002). The opposite tendency is also seen in

Table 4.7   Corps membership of seconded officials

On 31 December:	2000	2001	2003	2004	2005	2006
• high grades	4	3	1	3	6	5
• middle grades	6	10	9	7	9	13
• junior grades	22	21	17	14	14	17
Total	32	34	27	24	29	35

Note: The figures refer to officials '*mis à disposition*' (paid by home organization).
Source: Figures taken from DATAR or DIACT's *Rapport d'activités* for the years cited.

a drop in the number of high-level seconded officials after the political leadership's appointment of a relatively inexperienced *délégu*é in 2002 (see Table 4.7). No ministry 'put at DATAR's disposal' during Jacquet's term a high-level member, as they did after the regional prefect Mirabaud was appointed (DATAR and DIACT annual reports). To that extent the bureaucracy constrains the leadership's capacity to choose the best technically qualified staff for the purpose; it also demonstrates Blondel's point that leaders will have to balance faithful reliability, willingness to serve and competence.

The responsiveness of teams to leadership priorities

Guichard's period as head of the Office for Saharan Development impressed on him the merits of a team-based system that transcended sectoral boundaries (Charles and Cristini 1992: 470; Essig 1979: 24). The founding ideas still translate into DIACT's working practices. The high proportion of secondments itself means there can be no career structure; the diversity of backgrounds blurs status; and there is an informal relationship within teams. Yet how well do these teams reflect the leadership's priorities?

Figure 4.1 sets out the evolution of the team structure. Some changes would have taken place under any political leadership in response to changes in the environment (the addition of the service sector in the 1970s, a 'European' team in the run-up to the Single Market 1992). But there is considerable evidence of response to leadership aims in the substantial structural changes following alternations of political leadership (1978–82, 1992–93, 2002–03 and 2007). Individual changes seem to relate well to the political leadership's orientation on AdT. By 1978 a 'rural team, focusing on country areas and small towns', had been added to meet the goals Giscard defined in November 1975. The Paris Basin team was set up in 1990 in response to Prime Minister Rocard's alarm

Year									
1967	Regional action		Industrial decentralisation, foreign investment and aid to companies		Public infrastructure		Studies		
1978	Industrial team		Urban team		Rural team		Studies, forecasting		
1982	Regional development		Relocation of economics activities	Urban policy and infrastructure	Sensitive zones		Forecasting	Finance	
1992	European affairs	Region contracts international cooperation	Economic re-location, inward investment	Location factors	Towns and infrastructure	Paris basin	Rural development	Local development	Studies, forecasting	Administration, finance, interministerial affairs
1993	Europe and inter-national cooperation	Regional, inter-regional action, forecasting	Economic activity, inward investment	Emergency action	Spatial and territorial action, matching urban decongestion to rural depopulation				General secretariat, fund management
2001	European action cross-border cooperation	Regional and inter-regional plans	Economic activity, inward investment	Organisation of territories	Interministerial territorial action	Environment, rural action, sustainable development	Local development, jobs, local productive systems, public services, state reform, relocation	Studies, forecasting	General secretariat
2002	Europe and international cooperation	Region plan contracts, major projects	Economy, jobs, inward investment	Territorial strategic planning	Sustainable urban development	Public services, state reform, admin. relocation	Local development	Studies, forecasting	General secretariat
2003	Europe and international	Regional action and metropolitan areas	Economic development and attractiveness		State territorial policies and sustainable development		Rural and local development		General secretariat
2007	International cooperation	Regional development, EU policies	Development and economic change	Innovation and competitiveness	Sustainable development and transport	Territorial dynamics	Observatory	Studies, forecasting	General secretariat

Figure 4.1   The evolution of teams at DATAR and DIACT

at census results for the region. Its report was published in 1992; a Paris Region scheme agreed by ministers in 1993 and a Paris Basin plan signed by regional presidents in 1994 (Lacaze 1994: 344). *Les Echos* (29 October 1993) reported that 'DATAR is adapting its structures to its new tasks', as the *délégué* reorganized the teams around Pasqua's priorities. In 1997 DATAR did not just adopt the vocabulary of 'sustainable development' for a team when the Green Minister Voynet became Minister for Environment and *Aménagement du territoire*, but organized the production of sustainable development plans for several public services.

Yet if the teams are linked to leaders' priorities, not all the leaders' priorities are covered by the teams. Journalists questioned why Bernard Attali's DATAR did not have an industrial team to come up with ideas for industrial restructuring, though it was among the top presidential concerns (*La Croix* 28 June 1984). In 2003 DATAR set up four teams that corresponded closely to most of the goals proclaimed by the premier in December 2002 ('promote wealth creation'; 'make metropolitan areas and regions attractive internationally'; 'enable all territories to participate in regional development'; 'give them the means of self-development'). But the policies most dear to Raffarin – decentralization, and the transnational associations he called *petites Europes* – 'were to be given to [unnamed] members of staff to follow up' (*Le Monde* 13 February 2003). Professional notions of AdT also intrude: in 2001 the creation of the 'local productive systems' team and the expansion of the *délégué*'s forecasting programme were surely facilitated by the departure of the Green minister, Voynet. On the whole, however, DATAR seemed to adapt its ways of working to the demands of a new leadership, even when these changed frequently.

Conclusions

This chapter set out to show how the political leadership was able to adapt and steer a bureaucratic organization towards its requirements. The analysis focused on the two structural elements that combine to give leaders the assurance of reliability, competence and a flexible responsiveness: the post of *délégué*, in which political leaders would need to marry loyalty with competent direction; and the constitution of the agency as a body with varied and high-quality recruitment and informal working methods that would facilitate interministerial coordination while adapting to new political demands.

The French political leadership has considerable power to appoint a loyal *délégué* from a wide recruitment pool. Despite the strong career

protection rights of the French civil service, there are many ways a new leadership can replace a *délégué* without undermining the loyalty of the bureaucracy as a whole or the willingness of able candidates to be recruited; this system seemed to operate satisfactorily for 20 years. The greatest constraint on the political leadership came from internal conflict within its multiple components (president, prime minister and minister(s) for *aménagement du territoire*), mediated by the party system. The most efficient nomination processes took place when there were fewer active participants – a valid argument for attaching an agency directly to the prime minister. There was dysfunctional conflict between the *délégué* and ministers for *aménagement du territoire* whose preferences had not been respected by prime minister or (more usually) president. 'Structured politicization' after 1981 soon led to a loss in DATAR's effectiveness during every political transition. In choosing a *délégué*, political leaders make a 'trade-off' between competence and loyalty. Political leaders gave increasingly greater weight to personal links than to professional criteria; their strategy fitted Lochak's category of 'clientelist politicization', at best appointing people who could be relied upon, at worst satisfying the ambitions of friends or rewarding services rendered.

This conclusion was reinforced by the examination of the political leaders' powers to staff the agency. Political leaders have direct and effective control of the number of staff paid from the budget assigned to AdT and whether they will be permanent additions to the bureaucracy or can be dismissed at will. Staff in the field, by virtue of the type of policy domain, are more difficult to control in formal ways; nevertheless, each field office was consciously created by political leaders, and it is within their power to abolish them or curtail irregular practices. A more important apparent constraint is that the recruitment of senior staff is largely at the choice of seconding institutions and the officials themselves, based on the value to them of the secondment; but their response is related to the signals the leadership sends out about the future of the policy, and control is again in the leadership's hands. This correlation between leadership interest and the availability of qualified staff could be seen in quantitative terms, with staff numbers and turnover rising and falling with the arrival of new political leaders with a greater or less commitment to AdT.

The point was underlined by analyses of the characteristics of the recruits most able to network: those trained at ENA or Ecole polytechnique, and especially members of the higher corps. Up to the start of Mitterrand's second term of office, the numbers of ENA and *grands corps* staff at DATAR did not change greatly in absolute terms, while

the numbers from Polytechnique and the technical *grands corps* varied mainly in response to policy changes decided by political leaders. Officials were keen to work at DATAR and there was a rapid expansion after 1981 when Left-wing leaders opened up recruitment to staff with different qualifications. From the late 1980s there were fewer staff from the higher *corp*s, partly because some leaders were clearly uninterested in the policy, partly because this very lack of interest led them to make politicized top appointments that were dissuasive to potential recruits. The same phenomenon could be observed after 2002. Nevertheless, the greater presence of senior officials during the mid-1990s when Balladur and Pasqua revived the policy showed that recruitment could be stimulated quickly in response to interest shown by the political leadership. A similar if rather lower-key revival was seen in 2005. Finally, an examination of the agency's evolving team structure showed that the agency adapted quickly to new demands by the political leadership, even if some effort went into rather technical work, and some themes of interest to ministers failed to be addressed.

Overall, political leaders can use personal and institutional mechanisms in the manner asserted by Blondel to reorient a bureaucratic agency to their own needs. The *grands corps* had a considerable capacity to resist appointment to DATAR, which they brought into operation when the political leadership showed their lack of interest in the organization, as conveyed by its own attitude to appointments. The major constraints on an effective response to policy demands are the conflicts within the leadership itself and the consequences of politicization. First, politicization gained ground at the expense of technocracy; as it did more widely in the ministerial *cabinets* (Hayward and Wright 2002: 43). Then from the mid-1990s political loyalty, friendships and reward took over from competence and authority as the major criteria in appointments. Yet the brief return of the *grands corps* in the mid-1990s, when political leaders were enthusiastic about regional planning, showed that political interest and will could make an impact on DATAR itself and on its capacity to influence the bureaucratic environment on behalf of the political leadership.

5
Steering Policy through Administrative and Financial Tools

Blondel argued that there are four characteristics of a public bureaucracy that govern its implementation of the leader's goals – competence, organization, reliability and linkage to the population. In the case of French regional planning, the political leaders who created DATAR did not intend it to link them directly to the population in the manner of a field service with local offices, but instead to help them steer the population of actors who would deliver implementation. When setting up DATAR in 1963, Pompidou's aides 'surveyed the principal decision-making nodes in the administrative and financial apparatus and organized the necessary regulatory provisions' (Grémion 1976: 124). The chief administrative instrument was the committee chaired by the prime minister, the Comité interministériel d'aménagement du territoire (CIAT), whose decisions DATAR would prepare. The *délégué* was given a seat on other ministerial and bureaucratic committees relevant to regional development. The main financial instruments were a fund, the Fonds d'intervention pour l'aménagement du territoire (FIAT), and procedures to give DATAR oversight of ministries' capital budgets.

Nearly half a century later what evidence is there that CIAT and other committees met the needs of each leadership? Could new leaders create and abolish committees to fit their own objectives, or have committees taken on an institutionalized existence? How easy was it for the political leadership to control the size and use of funding allocated to AdT? Were new leaders able to create, abolish and modify development funds in tune with their own priorities? Overall, has each political leadership been able to adapt administrative and financial resources to its own goals, using them to steer its policy agenda?

The administrative tools

The first part of this chapter assesses the capacity of French political leaders to make use of that conventional administrative device, the committee. It examines the organization of the principal committee in this domain, CIAT and its successors, to judge whether it was a tool that political leaders have been able to use as they intended. To a qualitative analysis it adds a quantitative exercise for further evidence that it is leaders who drive CIAT not bureaucrats. The last part of this section shows how other interministerial committees relating to regional planning have responded to the variations in leadership concerns.

The committees CIAT, CIADT and CIACT

Until the 1980s – that is, until the arrival of the Left with different policy priorities – CIAT was 'the most important of all the committees created by decree' (Massot 1979: 151–2). For Massot, the importance of CIAT stemmed from the funding that it disbursed, DATAR's method for organizing it, which was so effective it was adopted for interministerial committees run by the government secretary-general, and the direct legal force of its decisions over administrative bodies: it does not prepare decisions, it enacts them, as the Conseil d'Etat decided on 4 June 1993 when the ENA 'old boys' association vainly challenged CIAT's power to move ENA to Strasbourg.

Prime Minister Debré initiated CIAT in 1959 as an informal session to discuss conflicts between ministers (see Chapter 2), found it useful and formally established it by decree (19 November 1960). He held ten CIATs from 1959 to 1962, organized by Monod, his *cabinet* official for *aménagement du territoire* (Debré 1988: 177). Pompidou's decree of 14 February 1963 made DATAR responsible for preparing and organizing CIAT meetings and for seeing decisions were followed through. In 1963 CIAT had a core membership of the prime minister, the ministers of Interior, Finance, Industry and Agriculture, and the *délégué*; other ministers were invited for particular topics. In 1974, the new president, Giscard, created his own planning body, the Conseil central de la planification, which he chaired, that issued occasional strategic directions for AdT. CIAT continued to meet, chaired by the prime minister, but its 'core membership' was enlarged by a decree of 17 June 1975 to ten ministers, which some thought less efficient, though it also reflected the broadening scope of the policy under a new presidency and changed economic conditions. CIAT meetings became more infrequent from 1978, and there were no meetings at all in 1980 and 1986 (see Table 5.1).

Table 5.1 Meetings and decisions of CIAT and CIADT

No. of meetings		Examples of decisions
1963	4	All new aerospace activity to be located in SW France
1964	5	Agreed to fund new aerospace centre in Toulouse
1965	5?	[*Met every 2 to 3 months*: Guichard 1965: 132]
1966	6	Agreed to create OREAMs (Metropolitan area planning bodies)
1967	5	FIAT grant for the development of a magnetic levitation train
1968	6	Breton expressway plan and 3 rural renovation zones
1969	4	Road to Bordeaux to be widened; official body to move to Toulouse
1970	6	Reorganization of water supply system approved
1971	4	Agreed to study the long-term future of coastline
1972	5	Invited the Finance Minister to develop Lyon as a financial centre
1973	3	Agreed development contracts for some 'middle-sized' towns
1974	5	Funding for Massif Central within a general 'mountain' policy
1975	5	Agreed development charters for Massif Central and Corsica
1976	3	Approved access channel to small fishing port of Le Crotoy
1977	3	Rural 'one-stop shops' for public services to be created
1978	2	State contracts with rural communities (*contrats de pays*)
1979	1	Aid to mining zones
No meeting in 1980		
1981	1	Regional development grants to be awarded locally
1982	2	State-Region Plan Contracts to be negotiated
1983	3	Technological development zone in the Auvergne to be funded
1984	1	Transport network plan agreed
1985	1	Industrial conversion zones agreed
No meeting in 1986		
1987	1	Roads policy and funding approved
1988	3	Agreed terms of second round of State-Region Plan Contracts
1989	3	State-Region Plan Contracts authorized
1990	3	Approved grant regime to help private firms relocate
1991	4	Relocation of administrative bodies, including ENA and DATAR
1992	2	More relocation of officials, and assistance package
1993	2	Agreed to have New Act on AdT
1994	2	Rural 'one-stop shops' for public services to be created

Table 5.1 (Continued)

No. of meetings		Examples of decisions
		No meeting in 1995 or 1996
1997	2	Agreed to revise Act on AdT
1998	1	New set of State-Region Plan Contracts to be organized
1999	1	Draft budgets for Plan Contracts approved
2000	2	Aid to coastline areas after storm damage and oil spills
2001	1	High-speed Internet cable network to be funded
2002	1	'*Pôles de compétitivité*' policy launched
2003	3	Restructuring of military sites; rural policies; Plan Contracts
2004	1	Competition for '*Pôles de compétitivité*' announced
2005	3	67 winners of funds for '*Pôles de compétitivité*' announced
2006	1	Launched State-Region Plan Contracts 2007–13

Sources: DATAR/DIACT Documentation Service; and see Burnham 2005: 115–16.

The revival of a 'Gaullist' policy of AdT in the Balladur premiership of 1993–95 led to a review of the arrangements. The 'Pasqua Act' 1995 had combined the fund FIAT and other specific development funds into a larger all-purpose fund, the Fonds national d'aménagement et de développement du territoire (FNADT). In the final days of the Balladur administration a decree of 21 April 1995 replaced CIAT with the Comité interministériel d'aménagement et de développement du territoire (CIADT), to be responsible for FNADT decisions. It extended the ministerial membership to 14 and made the government secretary-general, rather than DATAR, responsible for recording decisions and sending out the follow-up instructions to ministers. Balladur's successor, Juppé, keen not to commit expenditure on a rural support plan being promoted by the minister for regional development (*Le Monde* 28 July 1996, quoting the minister, Gaudin), chose not to hold the first meeting of CIADT until 2 months before the 1997 parliamentary elections, when he announced seven spending programmes for after the elections (which he lost).

The change of title to CIACT emerged from the industrial development policy championed by the Raffarin government 2002–05, that of '*pôles de compétitivité*' (local partnerships of companies, universities and others to attract investment). It fell to the next prime minister, Villepin, and Minister of Interior and *Aménagement du territoire* Sarkozy to announce at the CIADT of July 2005 the '*pôles de compétitivité*' that had won a DATAR competition. The competition's unexpected popularity

(over a hundred entries, with more entering in later years) seems to have led Villepin to announce that his government would counteract globalization by enhancing local competitiveness, and in October 2005, two days before the next CIADT announcing the second round winners, to issue a decree replacing CIADT with a Comité interministériel d'aménagement et de compétitivité du territoire (CIACT).

Table 5.1 gives examples of CIAT decisions to demonstrate their wide scope. They fall into three categories:

1. administrative decisions, such as to create interministerial organizations for planning metropolitan areas (OREAMs), approve a development plan or relocate administrative bodies
2. financial decisions, whether about a FIAT/FNADT award, a subsidy regime or a Plan Contract
3. 'the prime minister settles any dispute that has arisen between DATAR and ministers' (Madiot 1979: 48).

Political control of CIATs

Until the early 1970s CIATs were an administratively efficient tool. The decisions were presented as a list of actions (*rélévé de décisions*) that were directions to ministers from the prime minister. In practice they ratified agreements DATAR had already organized between the participants with the backing of the prime minister (Massot 1979: 152). These decisions had far-reaching consequences (for example, the development of the aerospace industry around Toulouse) but they were dry and technocratic. They produced a *rélévé de décisions* of two pages (Essig 1979: 91).

> The first two *délégués*, Olivier Guichard and Jérôme Monod, developed a particularly effective working method. DATAR prepared CIAT's agenda and dossiers carefully, with…ministries…and the prime minister. The prime minister met the *délégué* a few days before CIAT…In effect he made his decision at that time. The *délégué* gave the prime minister an element of flexibility within the draft agreement [with ministries]. On some dossiers DATAR could accept strategic withdrawals to save the face of the minister concerned…The often sterile game of interministerial conflict was in most cases replaced by agreements that enabled action to take place with the power of a government decision behind them.
>
> (Rigaud and Delcros 1984: 197)

With such attention paid by DATAR to efficient organization it might seem that CIAT was in the control of bureaucrats. When Pompidou's chief political aide, Guichard, was *délégué*, there was no question that political will prevailed. But the vignettes of other prime ministers offered by the *délégué* Essig (1979: 86–8) show they too put their political stamp on CIAT decisions. Couve de Murville, 1968–69, 'was really exacting', and sent back for further study several dossiers that DATAR thought well-prepared. Chaban-Delmas, 1969–72, was more interested in 'the big picture', and left details to his *cabinet*, who had settled 'practically everything' before CIAT met. With Messmer, 1972–74, there was more debate around the table, and then the decision was made with 'particular respect to presidential authority: for Messmer the President of the Republic's goals were a sure guide to decisions'. Chirac in 1974 demonstrated an 'aggressive political will'. As an experienced minister who knew the dossiers he was able to assert himself as *patron*. He worked closely with his strong *cabinet* but did not always take their advice. Barre from 1976 was intellectually interested in the dossiers, explaining them to the committee 'in his professorial style', but once he made the decision, 'everyone knew they had no choice but to execute it'.

By the time Essig left DATAR in 1978 the CIAT agenda was longer, the briefs thicker and the *rélévé de décisions* sometimes 70 pages long. The length resulted mainly from changes in the policies: instead of a few grand projects there were many contracts with rural communities (see Table 5.1). However, for the same reason, CIAT became involved even where it was unnecessary, because field officials pressed for 'a decision in CIAT', which had a 'quite different effect among local people: it was a sign of the attention the whole government was giving their area' (Essig 1979: 89). CIAT thereby improved the leadership's 'links with the population' but it wasted ministers' time. The load was then reduced by devolving most decisions to meetings of ministers' *cabinet* officials, reserving only major or disputed decisions for CIAT. Such pre-meetings of *cabinet* members can lead to the committee itself becoming a formality with ministers and prime minister reluctant to attend in person (Schrameck 1995: 63). Barre stopped holding CIATs after that of February 1979, at which no big new decisions were made, judging by the press statement (DATAR Documentation services). Barre had been actively involved in regional economic development since the 1950s and continued to urge on DATAR publicly (*La Croix* 24 April 1980), but regional planning decisions were now taken by decree in Councils of Ministers, perhaps because the President could be present – Giscard was less trusting of Barré's economic strategy after 1978 (Servent 1989: 51), but perhaps also because DATAR and CIAT were less productive.

In the Mitterrand presidencies there were other signs that CIAT was no longer politically significant. The minister for *aménagement du territoire* was given authority to chair CIATs, when they were held at all, which was mostly to take decisions on Plan Contracts, which Rocard's Planning Act 1982 stipulated should be approved in CIAT. When Prime Minister Mauroy chaired CIATs he left the press conferences to Minister Rocard or the *délégué* (*Le Monde* 19 April 1984). During Fabius's premiership only one CIAT was held in two years, most regional development decisions being made in Councils of Ministers (*Le Monde* 15 December 1984, 29 November 1985). Yet even the few decisions made in CIAT by Fabius and his Right-wing successor Chirac demonstrated that politicians controlled its decision making: although a Chirac-chaired CIAT retained the new Instituts Universitaires de Technologie approved in a Fabius-chaired CIAT, it transferred them to different towns (DATAR 1990: 126).

Prime Minister Rocard's reinvigoration of AdT in 1988 was signalled by a return to three CIATs a year, in which he returned to administrative decentralization, the very symbol of bureaucratic resistance in this policy area.

> Administrative inertia, conflict with the *grands corps* and civil service trade unions, family and financial constraints on officials, and the old Jacobin power reflex – in a word, conservatism – has prevented this policy of re-siting public bodies from really taking off.
>
> (F. Grosrichard, *Le Monde* 17 November 1991)

The 'decentralization CIATs' of the 1990s illustrate well the political nature of its decision making and the complex interactions of politicians and bureaucrats, especially when the decisions affect the bureaucrats themselves – and local politicians. At the CIAT of November 1990, Rocard asked ministers to provide by July 1991 a plan for relocating 5 per cent of their staff outside Paris, and suspended all authorization for expansion within Paris until the plans were approved (Bezes 1994: 62). Ministers did not produce the plans, just as they had not produced them following similar CIAT decisions in 1973 and 1981.

Rocard's successor, Cresson, was reluctant to hold a CIAT unless plans could be announced, but Delebarre, minister for *aménagement du territoire*, wanted to make his political mark with a high-profile CIAT (Favier and Martin-Roland 1999: 103). These two agreed to announce ministries' relocation plans for them (Bezes 1994: 81). Their *cabinets* quietly selected candidates, aided by DATAR's existing briefs and anonymous suggestions from DATAR officials. At Cresson's first CIAT in October 1991 a few moves to provincial cites were announced, stimulating

local politicians to demand more (*Le Monde* 17 November 1991). Ministries were given the chance to substitute their own candidates before a November CIAT named 20 public bodies as the first stage of 30,000 posts to leave Paris by 2000. In the light of past failures, the achievement of the target number only four years late was a success. They included some symbolically important institutions, such as ENA, the Plan Commissariat and DATAR. ENA half-moved (its staff and students mostly commute from Paris). The Plan did not move (it was abolished in 2006 but the successor Centre d'analyse stratégique was still in the Commissariat's office in 2008). DATAR resisted a move to northern Paris, but in 2007 moved to a less prestigious building. Ministers did not oppose the prime minister in CIAT. 'No provincial minister could be against: all had asked for something for their town', a prime ministerial adviser told Bezes (1994: 127). The political self-interest of ministers and local politicians overcame the resistance of the bureaucratic organizations.

DATAR did not officially organize Cresson's CIATs, and the final choice of organizations was made by political actors: Cresson, Delebarre and their *directeurs de cabinet*. DATAR was not prepared to be seen as an authoritarian institution nor risk conflict with ministries with whom it would have later to negotiate. Delebarre's *directeur de cabinet* said DATAR did what it could but it needed the 'acceleration from the political level [which] came from the *cabinets* and political will'. Once the prime minister had ruled in CIAT, minister's *cabinets* and even 'Budget officials totally hostile to the policy' felt unable to dissent, saying in classic public administration style: 'An administration in the end is there to execute a government's decisions' (Bezes 1994: 90, 130, 139).

Subsequent changes to the relocation programme confirmed the political ownership of CIAT decisions. A Bérégovoy CIAT approved transfers but added grants to help families move. The Balladur government 'altered the programme significantly', according to the Public Service Minister Rossinot (in *Courrier Picard* 15 April 1993), while nevertheless increasing the number of officials transferred. Juppé's CIADT added new candidates, but decided to ask the private sector to help spouses find work. Jospin's first CIADT in 1997 agreed to 'maintain promised figures on posts' but make negotiations more transparent and add measures to help spouses integrate. Raffarin's first CIADT in 2002 confirmed the numbers but changed the locations to 'a more strategic focus on regional metropolitan areas' (a return to a Gaullist interpretation of AdT).

CIAT had been an efficiently organized operation in the 1960s and early 1970s, that prime ministers used in their own way, then later

became less efficient in administrative terms, while making the leadership's actions better known at local level. Yet the institution could be revived when an enthusiastic or politically astute leadership had something to announce, as the flurry of meetings in 1991, 2002 and 2005 showed.

A tool of presidents and Prime Ministers

Madiot (1993: 36) observed that 'the frequency of meetings is variable and depends on the place of *aménagement du territoire* in governmental policy'. Figure 5.1 confirms that assertion by relating the number of CIATs held per year during each premiership with the 'interest indicator' for each prime minister as assessed in Chapter 3. Figure 5.2 repeats the exercise for the president. The statistical relationship between the prime minister's interest and the holding of CIATs, while significant, is only moderately so ($r^2 = 0.243$; with a 1 in 100 chance of this level of correlation occurring if there were no relationship), even though the CIAT is a tool that is legally in the hands of the prime minister. In contrast, there is a very strong statistical link between the president's interest in the policy and the number of times that CIAT meets ($r^2 = 0.468$; a 1 in 1000 chance). The correlation is so strong that several errors in assigning quantitative values would not call it into question.

Figure 5.1 The frequency of CIATs and the prime minister's interest
Note: The number of CIATs given is the average number per year of their premiership rather than the actual number in any calendar year.
Source of data: Tables 3.7, 3.8 and 5.1.

Figure 5.2   The frequency of CIATs and the president's interest
Source of data: Tables 3.6 and 5.1.

This conundrum has two contributory explanations. First, most straightforwardly, the holding of CIATs depends more on the president's level of intervention than that of the prime minister's. Couve de Murville (1968) and Messmer (1972–73) held more CIATs than might have been expected from them, given their low level of interest in regional planning, because Couve was 'a passive and impassive tool of the presidential will' (Hayward 1983: 108) while 'the President of the Republic's goals were a sure guide to Messmer's decisions' (Essig 1979: 87). Second, even prime ministers with no interest in the policy must hold CIATs if they want to agree Plan Contracts or to spend FIAT/FNADT by the year-end or before an election.

President Mitterrand did not intervene in AdT, except where job creation schemes could make use of its policy instruments. The frequency of CIATs was therefore closer to the wishes of his prime ministers, as Figure 5.1 indicates. However, Rocard and Cresson knew they had his support when they promoted in CIAT the relocation of Parisian officials (Attali 1993b: 761; Bezes 1994: 88; Favier and Martin-Roland 1999: 100, 103). Essig's observation (1979: 81), that de Gaulle's 'successors presidentialized *aménagement du territoire*', because Pompidou decided the major aims in presidential *Conseils restreint*s and Giscard in the Central Planning Council, applies equally to Mitterrand, even though he showed little interest. But whether the president or the prime minister rules on CIAT, it is the political leadership, not DATAR, which decides if it will be called. CIAT is no different from other interministerial committees

chaired by the prime minister: 'Some are held at regular intervals and have a quasi-institutional form. They often reflect the government's policy priorities and therefore meet rarely or not at all when those change' (Schrameck 1995: 63).

Other committees, councils and groups

The *délégué* and his or her senior colleagues are chair, secretary or member of many committees, councils, groups and boards, including those of public enterprises such as the SNCF and the Post Office. It is often said that committees become 'institutionalized', existing whether or not they serve the current leadership's purpose. Table 5.2 lists those relating to DATAR created up to the end of the Left-wing administration in 2002 in order to evaluate their position by the end of the following Right-wing administration. Of the 39 committees listed, only five remained in their original format in 2007. Political leaders showed they were not limited by the institutions when nine committees were expressly abolished or wound up (as their work was completed), 13 were reconstructed in another format and six were transferred to bodies outside central government. However, two committees just stopped meeting, having been active for some years, apparently without being officially wound up, and four show no signs of having met and probably encountered opposition. Nevertheless the committee landscape shows that considerable change takes place over the years.

The evolution of two contrasting organizations, the decentralization committee and the council for AdT, illuminates the considerable leeway political leaders have to modify committees and councils.

In the decree creating DATAR, Prime Minister Pompidou appointed it to the two decentralization committees (one for public bodies, one for industrial firms) that encouraged relocation out of Paris and awarded the *agrément* (approval) to expand premises in Paris. The first had been set up by ministers in 1955 and run by DAT. The second was added by de Gaulle in 1958 and run by DAT but from the Plan Commissariat (see Chapter 2). Pompidou made DATAR secretary of both committees; then in 1967 he combined them into one, which he moved to DATAR. The *agrément* was DATAR's most powerful bargaining tool (agreeing to a small extension in Paris provided the applicant built a second larger establishment in Toulouse...), but was always under challenge from Parisian Gaullists, Communists and business (Madiot 1996: 691). The first Left government weakened the *agrément* constraints by decree in 1982 and 1985, and in 1986 gave the Paris regional prefect more say

Table 5.2 Interministerial committees and councils

Committee or council	Purpose	DATAR's role and other information	Creation	Changes
• *PM Pompidou*				
Comité de décentralisation (pre-DATAR)	To plan decentralization of State bodies and award *agrément*	*Délégué* on committee; advises on *agrément* (Paris permit); Secretariat at Plan. See below	D. 30 June 1955; D. 14 February 1963	1967 reformed
Comité interministériel des parcs nationaux (pre-DATAR)	To organize bodies to run national parks	DATAR to organize management bodies. Stopped meeting when role transferred to National Council	Act 1960; D. 31 October 1961	1985 devolved
Comité des investissements étrangers (pre-DATAR)	To authorize foreign investments in France	DATAR a member of interministerial committee and 'associated with its work'	n.d.	2001 to AFII
Comité national pour les problèmes de l'eau	Ministry of Interior, then DATAR to organize water boards	Staff attached to *délégué* 1965. Supervision of boards transferred to new Environment Ministry	D. 6 July 1961	1971 devolved
CNAT Commission national de l'aménagement du territoire	Consultative body on national regional planning.	Attached to Commissariat général au Plan (CGP); *délégué* the Vice-President. Stopped meeting after 1970	PM *arrêté* 14 February 1963	1975 to CNAT-CV
GCPU Groupe Central de Planification Urbaine	To define policy on conurbations; approve their plans	Attached to DATAR and secretariat at DATAR. Officials also from Finance Ministry and Plan	CIAT 2 June 1964	1977 wound up
GIF Groupe Interministériel Foncier	To decide funds for urban development zones	Chaired by *délégué* on industrial zones; by Infrastructure Minister on urban zones	CIAT 24 February 1966	1984 abolished
Groupe interministériel d'aménagement du bassin parisien	To promote overall policy for Paris Basin to disperse growth	DATAR a member; produced development plans for zones around Paris 1967–71	CIAT 22 July 1966	n.d.

Commission interministérielle des parcs naturels régionaux	Consultation on parks to promote tourism, protect environment	Policy initiated by DATAR; attached to *délégué*. Transferred to Environment in 1975	D. 1 March 1967	1975 wound up
Comité central de rénovation rurale	To advise Rural Renovation Commissioners	Committee and rural commissioners at DATAR. Took over from Ministry of Agriculture	D. 24 October 1967	1979 to CIDAR
Groupe central de conversion	To advise Industrial Conversion Commissioners	Committee, commissioners at DATAR; attached to Minister of AdT	D. 24 October 1967	n.d.
Comité de décentralisation	To encourage relocation and award *agrément* to all sectors	Secretariat at DATAR; reports on dossier to CIAT, but Infrastructure Minister decides	D. 24 October 1967	1986 reformed
• *PM Chaban-Delmas*				
GCVN Groupe central de Villes Nouvelles	To manage resources for urban housing schemes	Managed by Sec. Gen. of Villes Nouvelles at DATAR, then at Infrastructure	PM *arrêté* 29 December 1970	1984 reformed
Groupe interministériel pour l'aménagement du plateau de Valbonne	To plan development of a 'Silicon Valley' (Sophia-Antipolis)	Run by DATAR. CIAT 1974 devolved to local Mission Valbonne – 1 DATAR member 2008	CIAT 20 April 1972	1974 devolved
• *PM Messmer*				
GIVM Groupe interministériel des villes moyennes	To prepare development grant decisions for medium-sized towns	Committee of officials from relevant ministries set up and chaired by *délégué*	1973	1982 abolished

Table 5.2 (Continued)

Committee or council	Purpose	DATAR's role and other information	Creation	Changes
• *PM Chirac*				
CIASI Comité interministériel...des structures industrielles	To award grants to firms in trouble, or about to be	Chaired first by *délégué*, then Industry official. Secretariat at Ministry of Finance	PM *arrêté* 28 November 1974	1982 to CIRI
Commission de l'aménagement du territoire et du cadre du vie	To report on draft aims of 7th Plan	Chaired by Plan official; deputy-*délégué* the vice-chair; 33 officials, banks, unions, firms	1975	1975 last met
Conseil d'administration du Conservatoire de l'espace littoral	To improve, protect and manage the coastline	Attached to DATAR till 1986; then DATAR a member. 2005 Act creates a National Council	D. 11 December 1975 Act 1986	2005 devolved
Conseil interministériel pour le promotion de l'emploi	To resolve administrative problems for firms taking on staff	To be chaired by *délégué*	PM *arrêté* 3 March 1976	n.d.
• *PM Barre*				
Groupe interministériel des services publics en milieu rural	To propose measures for reducing closures of rural services	DATAR set it up; proposed devolved to local committees – created by decree 16 October 1979	Cabinet 8 February 1978	1979 devolved
Comité de l'aménagement du territoire (of the Plan)	To consult and prepare AdT aspects of 8th Plan	A Plan commission; DATAR official was rapporteur; produced 1980 report	n.d.	1981 abolished
CIDAR Comité interministériel de développe-ment...rural	To develop policy on rural diversification, spend FIDAR	DATAR was secretary to PM's committee; chaired official committee [funding ended 1995]	D. 3 July 1979; D. 17 September 1984	June 1994 last met

CODIS Comité … des actions de développement industriel	To determine future economic sectors for priority action	*Délégué* a member; did not meet after 1980; then incorporated into Fund FIM.	*Arrêté* 16 October 1979	1983 to FIM
Groupe interministériel permanent pour l'aménagement des banlieues	To help ministries take inner suburbs into account in policies	*Délégué* a member; Secretariat at the Urban Development Fund; abolished 7 December 1984	*Arrêté* 22 April 1980	1984 abolished
• *PM Mauroy*				
CIRI Comité interministériel de restructuration industrielle	To gives grants to industrial firms in difficulty and to help adapt	*Délégué* is a member; Secretariat at Ministry of Finance	*Arrêté* 6 July 1982	extant in 2008
CIALA Comité … d'aides à la localisation des activités	To awards grants for relocation of non-tertiary sector activity	Chaired by *délégué*; Secretariat at DATAR	PM *arrêté* 10 July 1982	extant in 2008
GCVN Groupe central de villes nouvelles	To prepares CIAT decisions on each New Town	Managed by New Towns Secretariat; located at DATAR 1984–93, then at Infrastructure	*Arrêté* 16 May 1984	1999 abolished
CIV Comité interministériel pour les villes	To coordinate policy for urban solidarity, Urban Social Fund	*Délégué* on the committee with ministers; Urban policy minister and DATAR organize it	D. 16 June 1984; D. 19 September 1984	1988 reformed

Table 5.2 (Continued)

Committee or council	Purpose	DATAR's role and other information	Creation	Changes
● *PM Fabius*				
Conseil national de la montagne	To debate mountain issues and advise on grant allocation	Secretariat at DATAR. Initiated by minister Rocard in 1983; PM chairs; last met 2006	Decree 20 September 1985	extant in 2008
Comité de décentralisation	To decide on applications to locate in Paris or move out.	Chaired by Ministers of Urban and regional planning; DATAR and Regional Prefect advise	*Arrêté* 28 February 1986	2001 to CITEP
● *PM Rocard*				
CIV Comité interministériel des villes	To coordinate policy for urban solidarity and urban contracts	Délégué on committee; Secretariat at Delegation à la Ville; did not meet 2002–06, met in 2008	D. 20 October 1988	extant in 2008
GIDEL Groupe interministériel sur le développement local	To guide CRIDEL network on local development	Délégué chairs GIDEL (officials) and organizes CRIDEL (officials, councils, firms and banks)	Decided by PM 1989	1996 to ETD[a]
CNAT Commission national d'aménagement du territoire	To advise on sectoral and EU policies on regional planning	PM or Minister for AdT chairs. Mixed membership. Rarely met	CIAT November 1990; D. 23 September 1991	1995 to CNADT
● *PM Balladur*				
Observatoire interministériel des restructurations d'activités	To monitor and prepare firms' restructuring and relocation	DATAR to organize under PM's authority	CIAT 20 September 1994	n.d.

Groupe d'orientation stratégique	To increase attractiveness of France to foreign investors	DATAR to organize and provide secretariat under PM's authority; set up 1996	CIAT 20 September 1994	2001 to AFII[b]
• *PM Juppé*				
CNADT Commission nationale de l'aménagement ... territoire	To advise on implementation by State, local authorities and EU	PM chairs. Chair of standing committee a regional politician. Secretariat at DATAR	Act 4 February 1995; D. 29 September 1995	1999 to CNADT
Observatoire de l'aménagement du territoire (public interest body)	To evaluate policies, with a committee on local finances	Act 1995 says DATAR to organize and fund a body of politicians, officials and associations	CIADT 10 April 1997	n.d.[c]
• *PM Jospin*				
CNADT Commission nationale de l'aménagement ... territoire	To advise on implementation by State, local authorities and EU	PM chairs. Chair of standing committee a regional politician. Secretariat at DATAR	Act 25 June 1999; D. 19 September 2000	extant in 2008
CITEP Comité pour l'implantation territoriale des emplois publics	To prepare and execute relocation policy for public bodies	DATAR a member of the committee; abolished 12 November 2007; residual role absorbed into DIACT	CIADT July 2001; D. 14 January 2002	2007 abolished

[a]ETD – Entreprises, Territoires et Développement – an association created and funded by DATAR from 1989.
[b]AFII – Agence française pour les investissements internationaux – a public body combining DATAR staff abroad with Ministry of Economy staff.
[c]The Conseil de l'observatoire des territoires is an advisory body to DATAR's Observatoire des territoires, set up in 2003 as a result of a CIADT decision of 13 December 2002, an important tool for identifying, collecting and sharing local data on indicators of sustainable development, but neither of these is the body envisaged in the 1995 Act.
Sources: Compiled from many documents: please see Burnham 2005: 127.

in the committee. The resulting office-building and population boom led Prime Minister Rocard to revive the *agrément* in 1990. In 2000 the Jospin government transferred the *agrément* process for companies to the regional prefect. The decentralization committee now dealt only with public organizations and was merged into the agency set up by Delebarre in 1992 to implement his administrative relocation projects. The new body, the Comité pour l'implantation territoriale des emplois publics (CITEP), included an official from DATAR's public services team. In November 2007 the Fillon government, to simplify planning procedures, abolished by decree of the Conseil d'Etat both the *agrément* and CITEP and transferred the residual powers directly to DIACT. Any large public body that wants to set up in substantial offices in Paris must ask DIACT's permission, but if DIACT does not reply within a month permission is assumed to be granted. With 11 changes to bodies and procedures in 50 years, political leaders seem to have been able to make changes to this committee that reflected their policy orientations and found adequate legal and administrative instruments to do so.

The Conseil national d'aménagement du territoire (CNAT) is among the few bodies listed in Table 5.2 that include 'civil society' as well as officials. CNAT was created in 1963 to replace the Ministry of Construction's advisory body that had clashed with the Plan Commissariat (see Chapter 2). It was set up at the Commissariat with the same well-known regional developer (Philippe Lamour) as chair and the *délégué* as vice-chair, to advise on the regional aspects of the national investment plan. It was reconvened briefly under Giscard, wrote a report on the Seventh Plan and stopped meeting: Giscard was 'a convinced anti-planner' (Green 1980: 103). Rocard in 1990 approved its re-establishment, and Cresson issued its decree of application in 1991. Members had scarcely been appointed when the Balladur government decided in 1993 that it should be replaced with a Conseil national d'aménagement et de développement du territoire (CNADT), but the requisite Act was not passed until 1995. The decree of application was issued by Juppé and members appointed, but the Act and therefore CNADT was rescinded by the Jospin government in 1997. A new CNADT, with a different membership, finally started work in 2001 under the Limousin regional president, the Socialist Robert Savy, an expert on and enthusiast for AdT, but the governmental change in 2002 was inevitably followed by a renewal of members, chaired by the only Right-wing regional president, Adrien Zeller. Whereas changes to the decentralization committee responded to policy changes and local pressures, changes to CNAT/CNADT were driven by what Lochak called 'revenge politicization' (see Chapter 4).

However, they demonstrate the point equally well that political leaders can control the committees, though sometimes to little purpose.

The financial tools: budgets, funds and contracts

The political leaders who created DATAR expected its financial powers to be the vital weapon in AdT: 'In the end, the *délégué*'s effectiveness will depend on the financial means at his disposal and the role he plays within the funding bodies involved in regional expansion' (*Rapport au Président de la République*, 15 February 1963, quoted in Pouyet 1968: 73). The financial means consisted of the budget for AdT, whose main element was the fund FIAT/FNADT, and other funds that encouraged the types of development leaders sought. However, DATAR's main role was expected to be its manipulation of ministries' spending by region.

The budget for regional development

Until 2006 the annual budget voted by parliament for AdT came from the prime minister's budget. The minister to whom this policy domain was delegated negotiated the sum involved 'and proposed it to the prime minister' (Besse Report 2003: 29). Under the 'LOLF' procedures (see Chapter 4), which aims to link budgetary responsibility to accountability for programmes and outputs, the budget for '*la politique des territoires*' is divided between 'one-off' projects for which the prime minister is directly accountable and the main programme for AdT, for which the minister is politically responsible, while the *délégué* as its top official is accountable for its use. Under both the old and new systems, the political post holders and their advisers have led the negotiations – but have they managed to impose their own priorities?

Table 5.3 sets out the budgetary headings within which the *délégué* worked until 2005. The budget for staff (numbers capped) and other administrative costs set one limit on DATAR's activity. Its programme budget consisted of the fund FIAT or FNADT, the capital grant PAT (Prime d'aménagement du territoire) that helps firms set up in assisted areas, and support for the AFII agencies encouraging inward investment. FNADT was sub-divided between the amount that the government agreed to contribute to State-Region Plan Contracts, and the rest that would be approved as individual measures in CIADT. As Table 5.3 shows, the government (technically, parliament), changed the budget each year both in total and between its elements. The government could also amend each figure during the year. This power is more likely to be exercised when there is a change of political leadership or economic

Table 5.3   The budget for *aménagement du territoire* 1995–2005 (€million)

	1995	1997	2000	2003	2005
President	Mitterrand	Chirac	Chirac	Chirac	Chirac
Prime Minister	Balladur	Juppé	Jospin	Raffarin	Raffarin
Minister for AdT	Pasqua	Gaudin	Voynet	Sarkozy	de Robien
Agency running costs	14.7	14.0	15.4	13.5	12.7
Staff costs	8.9	8.7	8.9	6.2	6.2
Equipment, research	5.8	5.3	6.5	7.3	6.5
Intervention budget	62.7	44.8	75.7	60.0	74.8
Agencies abroad	(funded from elsewhere)		6.4	7.7	7.5
FNADT current	62.7	44.8	69.3	52.3	67.4
-State-Region contracts			(36.5)	(20.0)	(42.2)
-inter-regional					(3.7)
-non-contractualized			(32.8)	(32.3)	(21.5)
State investment aid	269.5	199.6	206.6	195.0	177.6
FNADT capital	217.2	176.0	142.6	150.0	138.7
-State-Region contracts			(54.2)	(69.0)	(71.9)
-inter-regional					(3.0)
-non-contractualized			(88.4)	(81.0)	(63.9)
PAT grants to firms	52.3	23.6	64.0	45.0	38.9
Total credits	347.0	258.5	298.0	268.5	265.2

Notes: FNADT Fonds national d'aménagement et de développement du territoire; PAT Prime d'aménagement du territoire (grants to firms).
Sources: *Loi de finances initiale* (LFI) 'Services du Premier ministre, V. Aménagement du territore': *crédits de paiements* (the sum that can be spent in that financial year).

conditions (Baslé 2000: 15), but its use in AdT was demonstrated in May 2001 when an *arrêté* simply removed €15 million from the FNADT contribution to Plan Contracts on the grounds that implementation had slowed down, and a further reduction of €38 million was made later that year, and of €45 million during the following year (Besse Report 2003: 31, 33).

It is tempting to argue that, given these controls, the case has been made that political leaders' budgetary allocations reflect their policy

intentions. 'Since the beginning of the 1980s there have been significant variations which are explained by the relative interest or disinterest in *aménagement du territoire*: 1981, 1983 and 1986 are black years for the policy in this respect' (Mazet 2000: 84). 'The increase in 1991 is significant and reflects the political will to relaunch *aménagement du territoire*' (Madiot 1993: 52).

However, the budgetary figures are to some extent a mirage: '*mystificateur et trompe l'oeil*', argued Jean-Pierre Kucheida, the National Assembly rapporteur of the 1990 AdT budget (*Le Monde* 24 October 1993). The reasons are best explained with reference to Tables 5.4 and 5.5 on the evolution in DATAR's funding and its chief grants FIAT and FNADT. The budget is presented to parliament as two sets of figures: *autorisations de programme* (budget authorizations) specify the maximum sum the organization can that year commit itself to pay in that year or in the future (for example, a contract for a multi-year project). *Crédits de paiements* are the maximum sums the organization may pay out in that year – though delays in expenditure may mean that these credits are actually spent in future years. The difficulty of tracking DATAR's actual spending in any year from a particular year's credits was such that only rarely did regulators, such as the Assembly's Kucheida (Madiot 1996: 113), the Cour des Comptes (2002) or Senator Besse (2003), establish the details. Confirming the political leadership's influence, the Senate Finance Committee 'deplored the fact that "budgetary authorization" in the case of FNADT does not mean very much. Not only is the division of its budget [between Contracts and the rest] mainly decided by the prime minister, but also a sizeable proportion is habitually postponed into subsequent years' (Besse 2003: 28).

The Besse Report showed that annual variations in the credits voted for FNADT between 1997 and 2002 made little difference to DATAR's annual spending. Its backlog of unspent authorizations and credits enabled it to spend consistently about €230 million each year. However, the political leaders helped drive this behaviour. They made political capital by providing funds but not agreeing to spend them, or by holding back spending in order to make politically timed announcements. Most expenditure for AdT has legally to be agreed in CIAT and its successors. Leaders have called CIADTs late in the financial year (1998, 1999, 2001 and 2002) or not at all (1995, 1996). The first meeting of CIADT in 2001 was so late that 'grants were not paid until 12 December 2001 (current) and 8 January 2002 (capital); that is, the 2001 credits could not in fact be spent in 2001' (Besse 2003: 35). There is not even a reliable connection between the budget as presented and the leadership's intention

Table 5.4   DATAR's budget and FIAT (million francs)

	FIAT authorizations[a]	Budget authorizations current prices[b]	Budget authorizations 1980 prices[b]
1963	110		
1964	150		
1965	175		
1966	175		
1967	200		
1968	219		
1969	218		
1970	218		
1971	270		
1972	270		
1973	279		
1974	281		
1975	287		
1976	282		
1977	269		
1978	259		
1979	276		
1980	273	1863	1863
1981	246	1658	1462
1982	576	2200	1740
1983	348	1681	1211
1984	856	2235	1499
1985	907	2338	1480
1986		1914	1212
1987		1959	1172
1988		1850	1079
1989		1883	1061
1990		1855	1010
1991			1104
1992			1150
1993			1381

[a] *Autorisations de programme* (permission to commit spending) as agreed at the beginning of each year.
[b] *Autorisations de programme*, as amended by additional or cancelled credits
Sources: *Loi de finances initiale*, 1971, 1972; Biarez 1989; Madiot 1986, 1993: 52, 1996, citing *Rapport Kucheida*, A.N. 1353 (1990).

to spend it, as the *délégué* confirmed in 2003 when he explained that DATAR's (smaller) budget 'matches commitments clearly identified for 2003; it is not a "flag-waving" budget whose sole concern is to make it appear there are more credits than in the previous year' (*Lettre de la DATAR*, 176, 2003).

Table 5.5   DATAR's budget and FNADT (million francs)

	FNADT credits[a]	Budget credits[a]	Budget authorizations[b]
1995	1837	2277	3146
1996	1842	2268	2565
1997	1450	1696	1944
1998	1397	1806	1999
1999	1377	1803	2008
2000	1404	1942	2122
2001	1161	1752	2409
2002	1327	1870	1765
2003	1325	1755	1771

[a]*Crédits de paiements* (permission to spend that year) as agreed at the beginning of each year.
[b]*Autorisations de programme* (permission to commit spending) as agreed at the beginning of each year; *Loi de finances initiale*.
Sources: *Loi de finances initiale*.

There is little value therefore in assessing 'quantitatively' the link between a political leadership's commitment for AdT and its impact on budgets. However, expert qualitative studies of the budgetary process suggest it is indeed determined by political leaders, even if their *directeurs de cabinet* and financial advisers, using information supplied by Ministry of Finance officials, conduct the negotiations. The specific outcomes on AdT are consistent with the general processes reported by Elgie (1993) and Hayward and Wright (2002). AdT was affected like other domains by the sharp decrease in 1983 imposed by President Mitterrand's announcement that the budget deficit would not exceed 3 per cent. The 1985 budget was similarly 'budgeting by Presidential *fait accompli* fiat'. As in other sectors, Chirac's 'cohabitation' budget of 1987 was not influenced by Mitterrand and included cuts for AdT following Finance Minister Balladur's negotiations with its minister. In 1990, Industry and *Aménagement du territoire* was just one of a group of ministries that Prime Minister Rocard, 'in coordination with the Finance Ministry and the presidency', decided would experience reduced expenditure. President Chirac's announcement in 1997 that he was committed to a 3 per cent maximum budget deficit had the same impact on ministers' budgets as had Mitterrand's announcement in 1983. The negotiations were conducted by Prime Minister Juppé, and the budget proposed for AdT was reduced drastically (Hayward and Wright 2002: 171–5).

Parliamentarians do not constrain the political leaders seriously on the budget. 'Provided it is willing to set aside about 0.05 per cent of the

budget to make a number of minor but politically popular concessions to its own parliamentary supporters, the government can secure the legitimation of its budget by parliament' (Hayward 1983: 194). The biggest challenge to this assertion, as far as AdT is concerned, came with the Finance Acts for 1989 and 1990 during Rocard's minority government. Rocard tried to work with the National Assembly rather than use the French executive's powerful controls over voting procedures. In the debate on the 1989 budget, the government had to withdraw the vote on 'industry, tourism, trade and *aménagement du territoire*', because the Assembly objected strenuously to the provisions for AdT, despite the minister offering an additional €33 million, and accepting a Centrist amendment proposing another €8 million. The Assembly approved the whole government budget only after a further increase of €11 million for AdT. However, Senators were still dissatisfied with the AdT provision, and it approved the government's budget only after reducing the AdT chapter to zero, 'in derision' (*Le Monde* 11 November, 20 November, 13 December and 16 December 1988). On the budget for 1990, the government had to resubmit in January a package for AdT that was twice that originally proposed (*Le Monde* 31 January 1990). Yet, in both years, the government made mid-year amendments that reduced the budget as it had intended. Thus, even in the difficult conditions of a minority government, political leaders were able to determine DATAR's income, and its distribution between categories, and to delay expenditure – though not to control the year in which the money was spent.

How have these conclusions been altered by LOLF? It was implemented only in 2006 (coincidentally with the mutation of DATAR into DIACT, though it was DATAR which prepared DIACT's first LOLF budget), and will need time before being evaluated. Some preliminary observations can be made. As Table 5.6 shows, the budgetary format focuses on the allocation of resources between policy objectives (such as increasing the attraction of an area to inward investment), rather between institutions (funds, contracts, regions and current and capital expenditure). There is more clarity about the political objectives and how they vary between governments: the change to 'economic attraction and competitiveness of territories' from 'economic attraction and development', is not just a change of name: the Raffarin government's grants to a few '*pôles de compétitivité*' became a big theme under Villepin and Sarkozy (who made them the subject of an early presidential speech, 15 June 2007), and dominated DIACT's funding 'offer' in 2008.

Table 5.6 The budget for *aménagement du territoire* programmes 2005–08 (€million)

	2005	2006	2007	2008
President Prime Minister Minister for AdT	Chirac Raffarin de Robien	Chirac Villepin Sarkozy	Chirac Villepin Sarkozy	Sarkozy Fillon Borloo
Economic attraction and development (2006)	77.0	71.4	–	–
Economic attraction and competitiveness of territories (2007, 2008)	–	–	95.0	137.3
Territorial development and solidarity (2006, 2007)	151.6	173.8	263.6	–
Solidarity and balanced development of territories (2008)	–	–	–	212.3
Identification of AdT issues and interministerial projects (2006)	27.6	37.7	–	–
Interministerial projects (2007)	(24.2)	(34.1)	24.8	–
Research	(3.4)	(3.6)	–	–
Steering and research instruments (2007, 2008)	–	–	16.9	23.9
Support (2006)	9.9	12.8	–	–
DATAR/DIACT staff costs	(6.0)	(8.9)	(9.3)	(9.5)
Other costs (and research 2007/08)	(3.9)	(3.9)	(7.6)	(8.6)
Other interventions	–	–	–	(5.8)
Total programme	266.0	295.7	400.4	373.5

Notes: *Crédits de paiements* as agreed at the beginning of each year.
The increased budget in 2007 is partly the result of combining a small 'mission', MIME, with DATAR in the new DIACT.
Items in italics are the policy objectives for the years given in brackets.
Source: Budgetary documents: www.performance–publique.gouv.fr/

Moreover, the LOLF budgetary presentation is part of a wider reform to improve the performance of the bureaucracy. The *délégué* must cite a number of performance objectives in the budgetary documents. As these evolved between 2006 and 2008 they became more sophisticated but not easier to achieve. For example, 2006 indicators included 'the proportion of the PAT budget awarded to *pôles de compétitivité*': the 2008 set substituted the 'number of *pôles de compétitivité* projects that pass the first stage in accessing the Industry Ministry's fund', a better test of the quality of DIACT's advice to projects for '*pôles*'. Finally, the LOLF budgetary documents require a diagram that shows when each year's credits are spent. Though it is too soon to make a definitive judgement,

the new system enhances rather than reduces the political control of bureaucratic spending.

FIAT, FNADT and other funds for regional development

FIAT was for 30 years the chief financial instrument of AdT. Early DATAR staff emphasized that FIAT was its 'war chest' (*trésor de guerre*). FIAT could persuade a ministry to make a different decision; for example, it was crucial in 1964 to the establishment of the School of Aeronautical Engineering in Toulouse that helped the city become the centre of a modern industry (Perrin *et al.* 1968: 57). FIAT was a 'stock of funds not already earmarked' with which DATAR persuaded ministries to start a project: 'If you agree to build this port, we will pay part of the first tranche' (Monod and de Castelbajac 1980: 33). However, FIAT increasingly substituted for ministries' programmes, such that by 1981 about 80 per cent of its annual credits were already committed before the start of the budgetary year (Madiot 1986: 198).

The stability of the FIAT budget between 1970 and 1981, and thus its decline through inflation (see Table 5.4), exemplifies the 'withering on the vine' of a budget that ministers find difficult to tell recipients they have abolished. Table 5.5 shows that ministers are treating the newer FNADT in the same way. However, leaders have not lost thereby power to fund regional development, since they have created other funds to target their favoured sectors. Table 5.7 lists two dozen funds created since Claudius-Petit introduced FNAT in 1950 (see Chapter 2), and summarizes their purpose, source of funding and significant actors. They comprise those created up to the end of the Left government in 2002, in order to evaluate their joint status at the end of the Right government of 2002–07. The political system's capacity to change funding patterns can be judged from the reform of 12 of the 24 funds and abolition of another nine, with only two operating in substantially the same form by 2008. Only one (the Fonds national de développement des entreprises, FNDE) was successfully opposed by the Ministry of Finance across changes of government. The Left eventually set it up outside central government. Reforms to the funding regimes are sometimes related to changes in the external environment (such as EU rules on State aids) but at least nine are the direct result of action by political leaders with different ideas on what should be funded and how.

Two sectors, rural development and urban renovation, illustrate the problems of interministerial coordination that political leaders resolved with their use of these funds. Pompidou as prime minister

Table 5.7 Special funds for regional development

Fund	Purpose	Source and control	Creation	Changes
• *PM Pompidou*				
FDES Fonds de développement économique et social	Loans to firms, local authorities for restructuring, relocation	Special Treasury account, *délégué* on board. In decline from 1970s; Treasury loan from 1993.	D. 30 June 1955 D. 14 February 1963	1993 role to CIRI (Table 5.3)
FAD Fonds d'aide à la décentralisation	Grants to firms to locate outside Paris (paid from FIAT 1977–80)	Funded from PM's budget and Paris licence; run by DAT/DATAR; decided in CIAT	Act 2 August 1960; Act 7 July 1971	1991 to new FAD
FNAFU (ex-FNAT) Fonds national pour l'aménagement foncier et urbain	Funds to buy land for industrial renovation	Special Treasury account run by Infrastructure; *délégué*, Finance, Interior on board	D. 14 February 1963	1999 wound up
SCDC Société Centrale d'aide au Développement des Collectivités	To aid capital development projects of local authorities	Caisse des Dépôts with banks, DATAR. From 2003 Caisse and Agency for Urban Renovation	1967 Act 1 August 2003	2003 role to ANRU
FAR Fonds d'action rurale	For rural development initiatives	Ministry of Agriculture; DATAR's rural commissioners advised on how spent	D. 30 December 1967	1979 to FIDAR
• *PM Chaban-Delmas*				
FRR Fonds de rénovation rurale	Funds various projects by DATAR's rural Commissioners	PM's budget and Ministry of Agriculture; run by DATAR; decided in CIAT	CIAT 1972	1979 to FIDAR
• *PM Messmer*				
FDA Fonds de décentralisation administrative	Grants to encourage Paris administrations to move	Ministry of Finance to 1979, then AdT; funds at the disposal of DATAR	CIAT 1973	1987 wound up

Table 5.7 (Continued)

Fund	Purpose	Source and control	Creation	Changes
• *PM Chirac*				
GIRZOM Groupe interministériel… restructuration des zones minières	Coordinated infrastructure improvement in 3 mining areas	Funded by PM and 5 ministries to 1975; then PM; then AdT; then Industry	CIAT 1972	1995 to FNADT
• *PM Barre*				
FSAI Fonds spécial d'adaptation industrielle	For steel, shipbuilding or textile zones	Total sum of 3 billion francs. DATAR chaired management committee.	8 September 1978	1981 wound up
FIDAR Fonds interministériel de développement et aménagement rural	Grouped funds for rural areas; later added to Plan Contracts	PM's budget, run by DATAR and Prefects to 1986, then Ministry of Agriculture and Prefects	D. 3 July 1979	1995 to FNADT
• *PM Mauroy*				
FIM Fonds industriel de modernisation	Finances research and innovation in conversion poles	Run by ANVAR (Industrial research agency); *délégué* on FIM and ANVAR board	PM *arrêté* 28 July 1983	1986 wound up
FSGT Fonds spécial de grands travaux	Funds for TGV, roads and energy conservation	Act puts under Finance Ministry; DATAR on board; but Transport ran it	D. 13 August 1982	1987 wound up
FIBM Fonds d'industrialisation du bassin minier	Aids reconversion of mining zones	Managed by Ministry of Industry (created by Minister Fabius); DATAR not involved	1984	Extant in 2008

• *PM Fabius*				
FIAM Fonds interministériel pour l'auto-développement en montagne	Funds projects on a variety of themes in mountainous areas	Budget of Min AdT (Min of Ag. 1986-88) Conseil de la Montagne advised; DATAR ran	Act 10 January 1985	1995 to FNADT
• *PM Rocard*				
FRILE Fonds régionalisé d'aide aux initiatives locales …	Subsidizes local job creation ideas by groups of communes	Budgets of PM, Min. AdT, Employment, Agriculture; DATAR and Prefects ran it	PM circular 28 October 1988	1995 to FNADT
• *PM Cresson*				
FAD Fonds d'aide à la décentralisation	Grants to firms and their staff locating outside Paris	PM's budget and Paris licence. Run by DATAR's CIALA, Entreprises et Territoire	Re-funded in 1992	1995 to FNADT
• *PM Balladur*				
FDPMI Fonds de développement des petites et moyennes industries	Gives aid to modernise in DATAR/DIACT's 'PAT' areas	Budget of Ministry of Industry; DATAR/DIACT negotiates use in Plan-Contracts	CIAT 12 July 1993	Extant in 2008
FGER Fonds de gestion de l'espace rural	Grants to communes for farmers' conservation projects	Budget of Minister of Agriculture, run by Min of Ag., prefects; DATAR had no official role	Act 4 February 1995; D. 5 April 1995	1999 wound up
FPTA Fonds de péréquation des transports aériens	Supports regional air services in the interest of AdT	Treasury account, funded by airport tax; run by Transport, advised by MPs, *délégué*, etc.	Act 4 February 1995; D. 9 May 1995	1999 to FIATA
FITTVN Fonds d'investissement des transports terrestres …	Fund roads, TGV, canals, to serve hard-to-reach places	Treasury account, funded by road tolls; run by Transport, advised by *délégué*, officials	Act 4 February 1995 D. 13 October 1995	2001 wound up

Table 5.7 (Continued)

Fund	Purpose	Source and control	Creation	Changes
FNDE (1) Fonds national de développement des entreprises	Guarantee loans, risk capital to small firms in priority zones	Successive Ministers for AdT wanted it but never became operational: Finance opposed it	Act 4 February 1995	Never funded
● *PM Jospin*				
FNDE (2) Fonds national de développement des entreprises	Guarantee loans, risk capital to small firms in priority zones	Funded by BDPME bank, CDC; run by DATAR, then OSEO (BDPME and ANVAR)[a]	CIADT 15 December 1997	2003 role to OSEO
FIATA Fonds d'intervention pour les aéroports et le transport aérien	Inter-regional airlines and airports for AdT and safety	Treasury account run by Ministry of Transport, Implements decisions of CIADT	Finance Act 1999	2005 not funded
FGMN Fonds de gestion des milieux naturels	To fund rehabilitation of natural habitats and quality of life	Budget of PM/Ministry of Environment and AdT. Discontinued by new ecology minister.	Act 25 June 1999	2003 wound up

[a] BDPME Banque de développement de petites et moyennes entreprises; CDC Caisse des Dépôts et des Consignations; OSEO is the name of the public body combining the former BDPME and ANVAR Agence nationale de valorisation de la recherche.
Sources: Compiled from many sources (see Burnham 2005: 139; updated using Web sites of Budget ministry and Caisse des Dépôts).

had appointed by decree rural renovation commissioners to coordinate development in certain zones 'under his authority'. With Debré's support as Finance Minister, a Fonds d'action rurale (FAR) was created for the Ministry of Agriculture to distribute according to the commissioners' advice. In 1971 President Pompidou was told by his *cabinet* and the commissioners that 'certain technical ministries were holding back rural renovation funds' (Michardère in 'Georges Pompidou' 1990: 260). Through CIAT he created another fund, the Fonds de rénovation rurale (FRR), resourced partly from the prime minister's budget, partly from the minister of agriculture's, but now DATAR would arrange the expenditure through CIAT. When Prime Minister Barre took personal responsibility for AdT in 1978, he combined this and other rural funds into a Fonds interministériel de développement et d'aménagement rural (FIDAR). Wholly funded from the prime minister's budget, it was allocated by an interministerial committee, CIDAR (see Table 5.2), and managed by DATAR and regional prefects. In 1986 Prime Minister Chirac transferred control of FIDAR to Agriculture, though only 'after a trial of strength between Balladur [Finance] and Méhaignerie [*Aménagement du territoire*]' (*Le Monde* 19 December 1986). Agriculture was one of only two budgets that Chirac dealt with personally that year, 'out of personal interest and because they were politically sensitive' (Hayward and Wright 2002: 174). Méhaignerie too was interested (an *ingénieur en chef du génie rural*, and son and brother of a farmer), but he was also being pressed to accept serious cuts elsewhere. In 1988 Prime Minister Rocard introduced the Fonds régionalisé d'aide aux initiatives locales (FRILE) to encourage small communes to group together to promote economic development. Most of its funding came from *Aménagement du territoire* and Employment, with only 10 per cent from Agriculture, but Agriculture did not forward its contribution to regional prefects, and there were calls to allow DATAR to run the programme (Madiot 1993: 53, 60). Eventually Balladur and Pasqua's more radical reform of AdT in 1995 incorporated FIDAR, FRILE and others into a general FNADT fund within the prime minister's budget.

While rural development suffered from a confusion of specific funds, renovation of former mining areas suffered from poor coordination between ministries responsible for different aspects. The programme was funded from FIAT and five ministerial budgets and 'if one did not give its contribution the whole project seized up' (GIRZOM 1981: 14). When Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas visited a mining area in 1972 he agreed to provide a single budget. CIAT soon confirmed that DATAR should host a coordinating Groupe interministériel pour la

restructuration des zones minières (GIRZOM). From 1972 to 1975 CIAT agreed an annual joint budget with contributions from each ministry, but 'they always competed with other ministry demands'. Chirac in 1975 'renewed the promise' and created a special chapter in the prime minister's general budget. It was allocated to ministries in CIAT, but there were long delays between CIAT authorization and the field offices receiving the funding (GIRZOM 1981: 73). Worse, there was no CIAT meeting in 1980, and in 1981 GIRZOM renewed its pleas with the new government. In 1983 Pierre Mauroy, Prime Minister and Minister for *Aménagement du territoire*, and mayor of Lille, agreed that a GIRZOM fund should be distributed by DATAR through the State-Region Plan Contracts.

By 1994 FIAT represented less than half the funding from the prime minister's budget for AdT (FIAT was 864 million francs, while FIDAR, FRILE, GIRZOM, FAD and FIAM – see Table 5.7 – came to over 1000 million francs). Each fund had enabled political leaders to target their particular concerns, but they simultaneously reduced DATAR's capacity to respond to changing priorities and baffled those the funding aimed to encourage. The fund FNADT created by the Pasqua Act combined FIAT with the five other funds. However, parliamentarians still wanted to know how much was spent on their particular concerns and constituencies. Pasqua was able to incorporate into FNADT the mountain fund FIAM and the rural fund FIDAR only after agreeing to consult mountain representatives on FNADT expenditure (Manesse 1998: 112). Until 2002 DATAR had to publish a tally of 'notional FIAM' spending. Moreover, Pasqua was pressurized during the passage of his bill to add new funds, such as the FGER 'for rural management', though his successors were able to nullify it by funding it poorly and making the qualifying conditions highly restrictive (Manesse 1998: 115).

Political leaders continue to create in a variety of statutory ways (law, decree, *arrêté*, circular and CIAT) the funds that attract media attention, sometimes using 'off-budget' resources such as airport taxes and motorway tolls (see Table 5.7). While it appears difficult to abolish the main AdT fund for reasons that are both political and institutional (much of its funding is committed to future years), it seems that leaders can fund policies in which they are interested, can reduce the budgets of those created by their predecessors and can abolish smaller funds they see no need to retain. Yet they need persistence and imagination to bypass 'certain technical ministries' (an issue examined more closely in following chapters).

Control of ministerial budgets

The government's justification in 1963 for putting only weak levels of funding in DATAR's hands was that general public capital spending (schools, hospitals, roads…) would be reoriented towards regional development needs. Prime Minister Pompidou arranged for the *délégué* to monitor ministries' draft budgets and to report to CIAT 'on whether the proposed investment programmes fitted with the aims of *aménagement du territoire*'. DATAR and regional prefects would monitor implementation.

In the early years DATAR liaised between ministries and the Plan Commissariat while budgets were prepared, and DATAR had an informal right, 'secured by Guichard', to attend the budget talks with sectoral ministers: it was 'the first time officials from outside [the Ministry of Finance] had attended such talks' (Essig 1979: 26–9; Pouyet 1968: 87). The *délégué* advised the prime minister, who settled 'any conflict between DATAR's geographic considerations and the ministries' sectoral concerns' (Lanversin 1970: 200; Monod and de Castelbajac 1971: 38). By 1968 officials were more likely to 'think geographically', rather than considering only their own sector (Essig 1979: 26; Pouyet 1968: 88). The Ministry of Construction was dividing its housing budget between the eight priority regional cities, and had allocated 90 per cent of its total budget by region; the Ministry of Education divided 62 per cent of its budget in 1966 compared with 54 per cent in 1965. However, the Ministry of Public Works had managed to regionalize only 'new spending'; existing programmes continued as before (Pouyet 1968: 89).

From 1969, under a different government, DATAR no longer had such close contact with ministries. DATAR still attended the Finance Ministry's budget settlements, but ministries regionalized their credits without DATAR's oversight (Essig 1979: 27; Lanversin 1970: 200). Monod and de Castelbajac (1980: 32) acknowledged that 'administrative practice did not entirely live up to the ambitions of the decree-makers'. Ministry divisions avoided DATAR's intervention (Lanversin 1970: 200), and parliamentarians were happy to see ministry officials resist in this period of territorial reform. President Pompidou saw the political challenge of further regionalization and drew back (Machin 1977: 59–60, see also Chapter 7). 'Rational' responses to regional imbalances had other political implications. Where politicians wanted equal provision, as in education, DATAR would check 'whether the administration was catching up in lagging areas or accentuating the advantages of those already favoured' (Essig 1979: 26). Yet the Plan Commissariat had found in 1962

that 'to remedy the accumulation of under-investment in north-eastern France, no new schools should be built in Paris, Aix, Montpellier or Toulouse' (Roche 1986: 68), a proposition that would scarcely be popular among the political elite. Moreover, Giscard as Finance Minister from 1969 had rejected the idea of 'Rationalization of Budgetary Decisions' because it jeopardized the Ministry's position as arbiter between ministries' budgets (Ashford 1982). DATAR's close supervision of ministry spending met political as well as bureaucratic constraints.

Only 30 per cent of civil capital expenditure was ever allocated by region (Madiot 1979: 67). 'Confronted with strong administrative forces, DATAR . . . had difficulty making ordinary capital expenditure match the priorities it had decided with the regions' (Monod and de Castelbajac 1980: 32–3; see also Biarez 1989: 183). On specific major projects, DATAR with leader support could implement regional spending priorities. Institutions that Pompidou introduced in 1966–68 with Debré as Finance Minister, such as the OREAMs that developed regional cities; the Group interministériel foncier that decided which urban projects would obtain public funding; the Languedoc–Roussillon and Fos projects that were provided with block budgets (Racine 1980: 57); and the rural and mining area commissioners were all arrangements that directed expenditure where political leaders intended.

However, these innovative projects gave DATAR a centralist image, and the new political leaders of the early 1980s did not see a useful role for DATAR, apart from negotiating the State-Region Contracts that were the most productive part of the Left's attempt to bring back investment planning. Regionalized budgets disappeared in 1984, and the Chirac government in 1986 refused DATAR any role in budgetary preparation (Guichard Commission 1986: 57).

State-region plan contracts

Paradoxically, the Plan Contracts that introduced a decentralized form of allocating ministry spending have provided the central political leadership with an effective tool for orienting investment patterns. DATAR initiated the model of State contracts with local authorities in 1973 (see Table 5.1). In 1975, with President Giscard then supporting decentralization, a DATAR official, Charlet (1976: 211–16) suggested that 'reciprocal contracts' would be appropriate instruments for a decentralized state. The former *délégué* Monod and six DATAR officials were important members of the Goux Commission (1982) that designed

the Left's Plan procedures. DATAR's minister, Rocard, and the *délégué*, Attali, were credited with having invented and put the Plan Contracts in place (*Le Monde* 29 September 1988). DATAR coordinates the Plan Contracts at central level, but the political leadership, especially the prime minister, plays a leading role by defining in 'CIATs' the negotiating procedures and national priorities, and agreeing draft and final versions of the Contracts. For the first round (1984–88), Mauroy appointed a personal friend, Le Garrec, to check that Contracts matched the government's industrial priorities (Favier and Martin-Roland 1991: 60–8, 119; Madiot 1996: 66). DATAR and the prefects advised regional councils, with DATAR explaining the proposals made by central ministries. Prime Minister Chirac, in the 'cohabitation' government of 1986–88, used CIAT to introduce different procedures for a second round of Contracts (1989–93). Regional prefects were to be the main negotiators, with DATAR confined to central level, organizing CIATs and putting draft proposals to ministries (using FIAT to push State priorities for regional development). DATAR would continue to monitor expenditure (Chain 1997: 147–8, 151). Though the incoming prime minister, Rocard, kept the four priority sectors Chirac had specified, he was able to add another two that reflected the Left's priorities (DATAR 1990: 146).

Three short-lived prime ministers oversaw the preparation of the third generation of Contracts (1994–99). They all held CIATs to specify or re-specify objectives and give negotiating instructions. Balladur and Pasqua made the 'third generation of Plan contracts a more energetic instrument of *aménagement du territoire*' (Madiot 1996: 67), by raising the State's contribution in areas of low GDP and high unemployment. They tried to focus expenditure on a 'hard core' of projects defined in CIAT. But this 'unilateral' decision annoyed some regions, which had to be given additional grants before they would sign contracts (Balme and Bonnet 1995: 69), reducing the re-distributive effect. The Juppé government then 'unilaterally' decided to spread the State's five-year funding over six years, arguing it would bring the timetable in line with the EU's six-year grant programme.

State-Region Plan Contracts have enabled the political leadership to claw back some of the financial power decentralized to territorial authorities. Central government provided only 44 per cent of the 1989–93 Contracts, once annexes and VAT paid by regions to the State were taken into account (Madiot 1996: 66). Further, the promise of 'matching funding' and FNADT tempts regions to 'adapt' to the government's objectives. The latter prevailed for 75 per cent of the 1994–99 Contract

budget, according to the *délégué* Aubert (quoted in Billet 1997: 7). The last completed round of Contracts (2000–06) combined 15 to 20 per cent of the State civil (capital and current) budget with 25 to 30 per cent of the regions' (capital and current) budget (DATAR Web site, 'CPER', 16 December 2003). If these sums are 75 per cent targeted on the political leadership's aims, they achieve a control over the regional destination of expenditure similar to the 30 per cent of the State civil capital budget (current spending was never covered), that DATAR was able to 'regionalize' in practice. In summary, although the political leadership no longer tries to control the territorial distribution of ministerial budgets 'at source', the Plan Contracts have become an equally effective alternative.

Conclusions

This chapter focused on the way leaders can use administrative and financial tools to adjust the policy orientation of bureaucratic organizations. The interministerial committee CIAT was for at least a decade a helpful instrument for a leadership that wanted to take a small number of 'heroic' decisions at national level. In the early 1970s, CIAT became less procedurally efficient, though it strengthened the links between the political leaders and local populations that Blondel thought essential. The absence of a CIAT in 1980 at least demonstrated that meetings had not become an institutionalized forum to ratify bureaucrats' projects; the revival by Cresson and Delebarre in 1991 did likewise. They showed that CIAT could still be an effective forum for highly political interministerial decision making, and especially for those decisions most likely to be resisted by bureaucrats. In general, whether 'CIATs' are held or not depends on two factors: the political leadership's interest in AdT; and its desire to take the types of decisions (including on spending) that have legally to be taken in this forum.

   While most political and media attention emphasizes 'CIAT', mainly because of its substantial funding decisions, presidents, prime ministers and ministers can use other forums, such as the Council of Ministers, or create other administrative institutions to promote their aims. They invented 'agencies', 'commissioners' and 'groups' to fill gaps in implementation by the traditional ministries. Yet the more conventional committees and councils mostly responded to the changing demands of the political executive, even if a few show encountered resistance, while those with a membership from civil society were frequently

reconstituted to match the central leadership's desire for politically sympathetic support, advice and control.

Political leaders have strong and effective powers to specify the resources that will be devoted to AdT. First, like the staffing budget examined in the previous chapter, the financial budget that the prime minister and the minister for *aménagement du territoire* negotiate is not only finely detailed but also amendable during the year. Budgets have been shown to be determined by prime ministers and budget ministers within constraints set by the president (apart from during 'cohabitation'). But if DATAR's annual income was strongly constrained by the political leadership, with a subsidiary political intervention by parliament, control over its expenditure was less sure. However, the chief cause was leaders' failure to agree to spend the budget it had earlier requested parliament to approve, tempting bureaucrats with a backlog of unspent funds to adopt a coping strategy.

The decline in the main fund for AdT was accompanied, and indeed caused, by the tendency of leaders to create funds for their own political priorities. Examples of the funds for rural development and the rehabilitation of mining areas showed that there were indeed recurrent administrative problems, but also that leaders had the capacity to devise solutions when their interest was engaged. The efforts of political leaders to use DATAR to reorient ministries' annual budgets were soon abandoned for forms of expenditure planning that could take better account of political criteria. If the State-Region Plan Contracts developed in the 1980s give national political leaders only partial control of public spending in each region, they are equivalent in outcome to the best that more ambitious reforms achieved in practice, and they are better-coordinated across ministries and more closely linked to local populations than is conventional ministerial spending.

In Blondel's analysis of the relationship between the bureaucracy and the political leadership, he was fairly pessimistic about a political decision being followed by good implementation, because 'the "system" is often inefficient, badly structured and badly organized. This is … often, perhaps mostly – because the system is simply unresponsive or only partly responsive' (Blondel 1987: 150). However, this chapter has shown that political leaders can use very effectively the well-understood traditional formulae of interministerial committees and targeted funding, supplemented by a diverse range of area-based or programme-specific solutions, such as commissioners, block budgets and contracts with local and regional authorities. Although the Left did not initially imagine that

DATAR, with its history as the central State's organizer of AdT, would be a useful partner in their decentralized system, its political leaders were able to adapt DATAR and the administrative and financial tools it deployed so it continued to steer public policy in the direction they intended.

6
Roads Planning and Funding

The concern of this book is with the argument that political leaders find it difficult to make their mark, such are the constraints posed by bureaucratic organizations. Previous chapters have dealt with that concern in relation to the leadership's capacity to alter the organizational design and operation of the bureaucracy itself. However, any assessment of the political leadership's ability to affect the workings of the bureaucracy needs to be carried through to the eventual outcome, and in particular to the role of the bureaucracy in assisting or hampering the leadership's efforts in the policy domain. As Blondel (1980: 15) observed, 'whether political leaders appear to "make a difference" to the type of policies which are followed . . . is in many ways the central question of political activity'.

Despite the ordinariness of roads policy, this technical domain posed a strong challenge to a political leadership that wanted to use roads to develop provincial cities and isolated regions. Indeed ordinariness and technicality often signify a policy domain that professional bureaucracies have managed to define as theirs, and therefore one in which political intervention is likely to be most resisted (Baumgartner 1996: 86). The national road network is an area in which the significant decisions are made at the top and on identifiable occasions, making it feasible to explore the contributions of significant players to each decision, and within the wider context.

The chief bureaucratic players

Given the specialized nature of the domain, the bureaucratic actors chiefly responsible for the policy and some of their interactions with politicians should be introduced before embarking on a more systematic analysis of political leadership on this issue.

The Ponts et Chaussées

The '*Ponts*' have had administrative responsibility for 'roads and bridges' for three centuries. Members of the *grand corps*, the Ponts et Chaussées, trained at Ecole Polytechnique and further selected for the Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées, staff senior posts in the infrastructure ministry, *cabinets* and public bodies such as DIACT. Many 'retire early' to management posts in private firms. Work at local level is organized by the next highest corps, the Travaux Publics (public works), whose members design and manage roads infrastructure for the State and *départements*. They are close to mayors, for whom they carry out improvements for a fee distributed within the corps. Well-integrated into civil society, the Travaux Publics can call up support from local politicians, road lobbies and trade unions.

The *Ponts* hold a monopoly over road planning and funding at central level. Their position on an issue such as a national road network or road tolling was changed by political leaders only with difficulty and after repeated attempts. The corps found numerous technical objections; and if its career goals were affected, its opposition strengthened. The example of the motorways illustrates the pattern. The corps opposed the Tolled Motorways Bill presented in 1952 and 1954 by Transport Ministers Antoine Pinay and Jacques Chaban-Delmas, arguing that motorways were expensive, would not be used, would pose surfacing problems and favoured rich men's transport; and that tolls were undemocratic – it also feared that such major investments would be decided by national political leaders, taking decisional and fee-earning power from the corps at local level (Thoenig 1973: 60–1). Though short lengths of untolled motorway were built, tolls remained a 'taboo of the Roads Directorate', according to the head of DAT (Randet 1994: 87). When the first tolled motorway was eventually agreed, Ponts et Chaussées engineers soon held top posts in its private constructor, Cofiroute, and its parent company, CGE.

In the 1960s the *Ponts* were losing their posts in public and private industry to the administrative *grands corps*. A younger generation of corps leaders therefore guided a takeover of urban infrastructure planning of regional cities being run by DAT in the Construction Ministry. They encouraged the fusion of Construction into Public Works as a Superministry of Infrastructure (Chevallier 1992: 563; Pisani 1974: 142; Suleiman 1974: 174, 177). They took over from DATAR and the Plan Commissariat the coordination of the development of regional cities (Thoenig 1973: 71–3, 101, 129), where they overemphasized

physical infrastructure. The Roads Directorate was the only central division to disobey Prime Minister Cresson's instruction to leave negotiations on the 1994–99 Plan Contracts to DATAR, the prefects and the regions (Cour des Comptes 1998: 140, 161). 'The Roads Director always went to war against anything that threatened his sector's autonomy' (Thoenig 1973: 76). According to Guichard, *délégué* and later Minister for *Aménagement du territoire* and Infrastructure,

> The *ingénieurs des Ponts* do admirably what they know how to do, tarmac. But . . . it didn't occur to them to ask themselves why they were doing it . . . Yet once it has been decided that a bridge should be built here and not there . . . who can oppose it when the decision has been made by technical people?
>
> (1975: 97)

The Plan Commissariat

A special feature of French infrastructure funding was its incorporation within medium-term national and regional investment planning, for which the Commissariat Général au Plan (CGP) was primarily responsible. Created by de Gaulle in 1946, the Commissariat was an *administration de mission* like DATAR, but a more persistent attempt than with DATAR was made to keep the Commissariat politically independent.

The first three Modernization and Infrastructure Plans (1947–61) gave no place to roads. The Plan Commissariat 'found it difficult to break into the closed world of transport' (Thoenig and Despicht 1975: 395) and was persuaded by the SNCF (State rail corporation) and the EDF (State electricity corporation) that priority should be given to rail electrification (Cohen 1977: 99–100, 110). The Fourth Plan (1962–65), 'the high-water mark of French planning' (Green 1980: 121), was the first to make provision for roads and regions. Yet 'the project to regionalize funding in the Plan failed' – as noted in Chapters 4 and 5, dividing investment by region would have exposed statistical problems, and the disparities between the North–East and Paris would raise political problems (Roche 1986: 23, 65–70). De Gaulle had ambitions for the capital and supported Paul Delouvrier, *délégué-général* of the Paris District, in persuading the Commissariat to increase the funding for Paris (Delouvrier in Chenu 1994: 271–3; Massé 1986: 206).

Simultaneously with the Fourth Plan, DAT published a *Plan national d'aménagement du territoire* in which tolled motorways linked regional

cities. The immediate effect (see Chapter 2) was the replacement of DAT by DATAR and the transfer of the CGP to the prime minister. The Fifth Plan (1966–70) included a more polished version of the DAT scheme. The Plan Commissioner now argued that motorways should link the regional cities and join them to the European Community (EC) (Massé 1964: 19–25). The Plan Commissariat was 'on better terms' with DATAR during the preparation of the Sixth Plan (Essig 1979: 70). DATAR also worked with *Ponts* transport economists using their 'rationalized decision-making' techniques and together decided that more roads into Paris would attract more jobs and create more congestion (Lojkine 1972: 121–3). Despite this analysis, the Sixth Plan (1971–74, extended to 1975) prioritized radial roads into Paris, and Paris received a third of the Sixth Plan motorway budget (Jardin and Fleury 1973: 102, 229), by decision of President Pompidou in a *Conseil restreint* of October 1970: 'Pompidou distrusted the planning apparatus and economic advice' (Ozenda and Strauss-Kahn 1985: 105).

President Giscard set up his Central Planning Council 'to control the Plan Commissariat' (Bodiguel and Quermonne: 1983: 178). He did not favour motorways for Paris and reduced the budget for Paris roads in 1974–75 (Marchand 1993: 328). The Seventh Plan (1976–80) consisted of a few dozen specific actions. The one Priority Action Programme that concerned 'roads to open up disadvantaged regions', which both Giscard and DATAR wanted, was the one 'that suffered most from budgetary problems' (Quinet and Touzery 1986: 60, 81). By the Eighth Plan (1981–85), the Commissariat had given up quantifying investment planning. In any case the Left replaced it with an Interim Plan and Interim State-Region Contracts, individually negotiated between regions and ministries. Roads investment was the largest element in these contracts, as it was in all rounds of State-Region Contracts until those covering 2007–13, in which transport remained the biggest item but with local rail services (for which regions have become responsible) expected to take the largest share. For the Ninth Plan (1984–89), the '*Ponts*' impressive-sounding Mini-Multisectoral Dynamic-Transport econometric model, enabling the effect of transport on other sectors to be taken into account, favoured the TGV(*Planifier Aujourd'hui* 1989: 85), which therefore prevailed over motorways in the Plan despite scepticism within the CGP.

The Commissariat, like DATAR, was nearly abolished by Chirac in 1986 but 'caution triumphed' (Machin 1989: 136). While the authority of National Plans and therefore of the Commissariat was in decline, regions pressed for State-Region Plan Contracts, for which DATAR was

chief negotiator at central level. The Plan Commissariat and National Plans were in effect superseded by DATAR and State-Region Contracts. 'The Commissariat remains in existence for reasons that have more to do with symbols than with practical State action' (Madiot 1996: 27). In October 2005 the prime minister announced its demise: it was reconstituted as the Centre d'analyse stratégique, to give public policy advice, in March 2006.

The Finance Ministry

The power of the French financial bureaucracy is well documented (see Stevens 1980 and Green 1980), but a particular conflict of interests between the Ministry of Finance and the Plan Commissariat on transport needs to be noted. Until the 1980s much infrastructure spending was 'provisionally planned', to use Green's term (1980: 103), by the CGP. However, while its macro-economists tended to favour growth led by investment (in rail), Budget officials tried to curtail spending to limit inflation (Green 1980: 104). Political leaders who wanted to spend on roads were therefore likely to meet resistance from both the Finance Ministry and the Plan (Cohen 1977: 99–100). Finance Ministry officials were present in *cabinets*, on committees drawing up road programmes, in the motorway funding agency, and on the working group on the 'rationalization of transport decisions'. Finance ministers argued about budgets for the road plans that had already been approved, and amended them according to budgetary and economic contingencies. 'In France the Finance Ministry has always intervened positively to the point of practically dispossessing the spending ministries of many of their powers' (Hayward 1975: 8).

Road planning decisions compared

These issues can be examined more systematically within a framework, developed from Blondel's conceptual scheme (1987: 4–8), that compares in turn

- the ways in which political leaders use the positional resources offered by the Constitution and institutional conventions, as modified by the configuration of the party system;
- the influence of bureaucratic organizations in helping or constraining leaders in this domain;

- the leadership's use of financial and contingent opportunities, such as crises or honeymoon periods; and other less tangible resources, such as 'prevailing ideas';
- the opportunities and constraints during implementation, especially the leadership's ability to control execution and funding.

Between the launching of the policy of AdT in 1943–44 and the end of the Left government in 2002 (sufficiently far away for outcomes to have emerged), 36 decisions on instruments for road investment can be identified with a potential impact on regional development (see Table 6.1).

Table 6.1   Roads planning instruments relevant for *aménagement du territoire*

	Prime Minister	**Instrument**	**Year**
•	*President Auriol 1946–53*		
T1	Pleven to Pinay	FSIR Road Fund and 1st Road Plan	1951
•	*President Coty 1954–58*		
T2	Mendès to Faure	Act on tolled motorways	1954
T3	Mendès to Faure	Second CGP Plan – DAT initiative	1954
T4	De Gaulle	Roads in Third CGP Plan	1958
•	*President De Gaulle 1959–69*		
T5	Debré	1st National Roads Programme	1959
T6	Debré	Roads in Fourth CGP Plan	1962
T7	Debré	DAT's 2nd Plan of AdT	1962
T8	Pompidou	Caisse nationale des autoroutes	1962
T9	Pompidou	Roads in Languedoc–Roussillon and Fos mission	1966
T10	Pompidou	Creation of Superministry of Infrastructure	1966
T11	Pompidou	Fifth CGP Plan: inter-metropole road network	1966
T12	Pompidou	OREAM bodies to develop regional metropolises	1966
T13	Pompidou	Breton expressway scheme (Plan Breton)	1968
•	*President Pompidou 1969–74*		
T14	Chaban	Act on tolled motorways by concessions	1969
T15	Chaban	2nd National Road Network 1971	1969
T16	Chaban	Sixth CGP Plan: competition and solidarity	1971
T17	Chaban	Paris–Strasbourg motorway	1972

- *President Giscard d'Estaing 1974–81*

T18	Chirac	Conseil central de planification	1974
T19	Chirac	Revised Seventh CGP Plan: reduce territorial imbalance	1976
T20	Barre	National motorway programme 1978–83	1977
T21	Barre	Rationalization of Transport Decisions Group	1978

- *President Mitterrand 1981–95*

T22	Mauroy	Interim State–Regions Plan Contracts	1981
T23	Mauroy	Transport Act 1982 (LOTI)	1982
T24	Mauroy	FSGT Fund for transport and energy projects	1982
T25	Mauroy	1st State–Region Plan Contracts 1984–88	1983
T26	Mauroy	Motorway and national road plan	1983
T27	Mauroy	Massif Central and Breton expressways	1984
T28	Chirac	National Road Plan	1987
T29	Rocard	2nd State–Region Plan Contracts 1989–93	1987
T30	Cresson	National Road and Motorway Plan	1992
T31	Balladur	3rd State–Region Plan Contracts 1994–99	1993
T32	Balladur	Acceleration of motorway programme	1993
T33	Balladur	Paris Basin Charter and Contract	1994
T34	Balladur	National Plan of AdT and road plan	1995

- *President Chirac 1995–2007*

| T35 | Jospin | 4th State–Region Plan Contracts 2000–06 | 1998 |
| T36 | Jospin | Sustainable transport service plans | 1999 |

Some were 'one-off' events, such as legislation to allow motorways to be built. Yet even the road network, with its appearance of steady evolution, is a product of discrete actions by political leaders, when they redefine the map of strategic roads in a Council of Ministers or an interministerial committee.

Using a methodological strategy suggested by Miles and Huberman for qualitative comparisons (1994: 173–94), a database was constructed for each instrument, collating evidence relating to each of Blondel's analytical themes. Table 6.2 gives an example. The information from each database appears in a condensed form in Table 6.3 to enable data to be compared more easily and also to show as concisely as possible the

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Table 6.2 Example of roads planning instrument database

T11	Fifth CGP Plan road network to link major cities	1966
Political leaders	President: De Gaulle Prime Minister: Pompidou	
Instrument and context	A major objective of Fifth Plan: transport investment to enable a locality to be developed, to strengthen regional action and AdT; roads to develop the 'regional cities' agreed in CIAT 1964.	Thoenig and Despicht 1975: 396
Role of DATAR	Formal role to ensure coherence of Plan investments with AdT objectives, coordinate annual infrastructure spending. Vice-chair of CNAT, regional Plan and funding committees. In 1968, 2 staff at DATAR liaised with Infrastructure Ministry. CGP accepted DATAR's more elaborate version of DAT's 1961 scheme, supported by CNAT study on transport and location: 'technical criteria'. 'Monod presented precise numbers' and 'quantified needs'.	*decree 63–112; Pouyet 1968: 66; *Randet 1994: 82–5; *Delouvrier 1994: 273
Role of President	Wanted grandeur of France served through grandeur of Paris: favoured quality in technical performance: motorways, périphérique, new towns. Asked Delouvrier: 'What do you need to achieve all that?' 'Very strongly supported the périphérique'.	Hoddé 1992: 531, 535
Role of PM [and AdT minister in this case]	Put Plan and AdT under himself as PM to control Plan (CGP). Gave Guichard FIAT, free of Finance Ministry approval, to finance sections of motorway. Approved roads to develop regional cities in CIAT 1964. End of 1964 Delouvrier showed Pompidou Paris motorway plan. PM did not want to spend money on them but accepted he had to.	*Guichard in Roussel 1994: 152; *Delouvrier in Chenu, 1994: 272
Role of Roads Minister	Report to de Gaulle 27 April 1966: harms AdT to give Paris public transport infrastructure subsidies. Some large projects underway not based on cost-benefit research. Dismissed by PM (for other reasons).	*Pisani 1974: 150–1
Ponts role and view	Ponts 'saw red' when regions created by decree March 1964, and had to answer to prefect. Roads Director against anything harming the autonomy of his sector. But regional prefect relied on Ponts to decide road investments. Motorway projects decided centrally, but on advice of central and regional roads officials.	Dupuy and Thoenig 1983: 77; Thoenig 1973: 76; Hansen 1968: 240

CGP (Plan) role and view	Massé was pro-regional cities, said must define motorway network to match, join them and link into EC. Said CGP had agreed to tolls because (a) it was the only solution the then Finance Minister [Pinay] likely to accept and (b) regions in Plan survey wanted motorways more than phones.	*Massé 1968 [1964]: 79–85; *Massé in Rousso 1986: 202, 217
Funding	DATAR's FIAT by 1970 had given one-third aid to roads. January 1966 Debré, Finance Minister made 'solemn visit' to DATAR – said would help industrial conversion, reduce burden of unproductive areas	Allen and Maclennan 1970: 188; *Essig 1979: 28, 42, 45
Other issues	DATAR's annex to budget now to show credits allocated to each programme region.	Perrin *et al*. 1968: 53
Output from instrument	Fifth Plan concentrated investments on 'nationally-important motorways' around 6 of 8 regional cities, plus Nice, but not the 2 poorest (Toulouse, Nantes). CGP pressurized to add more cities including Nice. Delouvrier persuaded CGP to increase roads funding for Paris.	*in Chenu 1994: 273; Thoenig and Despicht 1975: 396; Prud'homme 1974: 40

Note: * Primary source.

material that supports the analysis (the full list of sources is given in Burnham 2005: 156). Each instrument is also evaluated succinctly in terms of achievement of policy goals:

- how well did the output match leaders' announced intentions for the instrument?
- how well did the road tool fulfil the leaders' aims for AdT?

The general pattern of interactions between leaders and bureaucrats and the effect of outcomes can be assessed first in a 'quantivised' way as suggested by Ragin (1987: Chapter 8). In Table 6.4 a 'tick' ($\sqrt{}$) means the action (or expressed preference, or funding or technical paradigm) favoured the introduction of the instrument, '0' that there was no documented input or action and a 'cross' (X) that the action or other factor was unfavourable. The 'star rating' in the final columns relates first to the match between the leaders' expressed aims for the instrument and

Table 6.3 Roads planning data meta-matrix: tools T1 to T36

Instruments	Leaders' input				Bureaucratic input		Policy process			Output	
DAT/ DATAR	President	PM	Minister for AdT	Minister for roads	Ponts	CGP	Technical paradigm	Funding	Other issues	Match to leaders' aim	Impact on AdT
T1 1951 *FSIR Road Fund and First Road Plan*										**0**	**0**
Relations with CGP not organized, harmed execution	No interest, and no powers in this field	Pro-AdT PM agreed FSIR, ex-transport minister PM agreed plan	Keen on AdT but chose not to take actions in conflict with CGP	Agreed FSIR as Min, then signed decree as PM	TP did not want to lose local power; Ponts preferred rail	Preferred rail spending; could not enter Corps world.	Ponts plan based on Paris traffic and growth forecasts	Special funds organized but absorbed into general budget	Strong roads lobby entering parliament	Leaders introduced tool but no output	Little or no output, on roads or AdT aspect
T2 1954 *Act on tolled motorways*										**0**	**0**
No formal role on roads	Pro-AdT when at Construction, but no powers	2 PMs had special voting powers – but still had to give in to MPs	Keen Tsp and AdT minister promoted Bill, especially for local development; next Roads minister asked Ponts for Plan		Said not democratic – also loss of local control by Corps	Against – diverts funds from CGP priorities	Motorways – a Ponts taboo	Would use private funds, but that posed 'public service' problems	MPs reduced Act – exceptions; and not local use	Bill reduced – no longer what leaders wanted	No use for local development at the time
T3 1954 *Second CGP Plan – DAT initiative*										*******	**0**
DAT initiative in 1955 to persuade Minister of Plan	Pro-DAT when at Construction, but no powers	Promoted industrial relocation and transport coordination	Minister not involved in persuading Minister of Finance.	2 active roads ministers, one keen on AdT	Said 'roads are rich men's transport'; conflict with AdT officials	'A period of amenagement-infrastructure classic conflict of powers'	CGP thought regional plans could divert Plan spending from its goals	Roads had largest reduction from Second plan aims	Faure de-emphasized Plan	Leaders able to choose a different option	'Plan road funds not divided in line with industrial relocation'
T4 1958 *Roads in Third CGP Plan*										**0**	**0**
Vice-chair CGP regional cttee; on Finance cttee	Created the CGP cttee; restarts Plan, as President left it to PM	Supported AdT Min, asked CGP to regionalize Plan in 1961	Active Min, keen on AdT; former close aide of Pres, friend of PM	Keen on roads and local development, asked PM for funds	Ran CGP cttee; wanted to strengthen existing network	Coordinated regional plans. Could not enter roads world	Need to respond to traffic growth, catch up Germany, Italy	Gaullist expansion policy but Finance cutbacks	Planners worried congestion hinders growth	Leaders did not achieve institutional change in CGP	'Maps did not find place'. Roads not in CGP Plans till Fourth

T5 1959 *First National Roads programme*

On Roads Commission with Finance and CGP to oversee Ponts	Approved roads but especially in Paris	Agreed plans, but lifted toll restriction to fund telecomms	Must have agreed Commission and appointed DAT. Pro AdT	Wanted funds and free roads. Finance Ministry said use tolls	'Tolls a taboo of the roads division'; delayed motorways	CGP on Roads Commission. Saw tolls as compromise	'AdT not taken into account because of the roads backlog'	Roads divn controlled funds; Finance refused more	Political desire not to stop Paris expansion and roads two-way	* Mixed output reflected different goals of political leaders	0 'New network. based on existing traffic, not voluntary geography'

T6 1962 *Roads in Fourth CGP Plan*

Vice-Pres of regional Plans committee	First wanted roads for economic growth, then for Paris	Supported CGP Regional division with Finance and Cour staff.	An active promoter, trusted by Debré and de Gaulle	Support to Delouvrier's infrastructure spending in Paris	Ponts tried to meet traffic demands; TP prioritized local roads	CGP ran regional process, met problems, no road options	CGP said could not allow regional differences; nor slow Paris	First time Finance Ministry adapted policy to help CGP	Delouvrier had quantified Paris needs in Fourth and Fifth Plans	* Mixed output. PM wanted change: Pres and Roads Min pro-Paris	0 More roads investment but not allocated on AdT grounds

T7 1962 *DAT's Second Plan of AdT*

Wrote Plan, met CGP, criticized short-termism of Roads divn	No known intervention	Did not know? Pompidou's reaction was to invent DATAR	Had it drawn up under friend Lamour, asked for its publication	Not officially involved. But same minister who did not want toll roads	Starts economic divn to draw 'roads' part of CGP Plan	CGP reluctant to add regions; would show statistics problems	Ponts 'wanted better current network – a new argument'	DAT met CGP weekly to discuss urban investment	Bloch-Lainé wanted rail and road in one ministry to help AdT	0 DAT out of top leader's control though Minister for AdT in favour	* No impact but called effective attention to problem

T8 1962 *Caisse nationale des autoroutes*

No input. DAT in disgrace after published 2nd Plan of AdT	None known. But in favour of Paris motorways	Used Caisse to avoid confrontation with Ponts on tolls	Trying without success to construct a Ministry of AdT and Plan	As Paris District President supported Paris roads	Took over motorways and chaired CNA	Massé proposed tolls to Debré – as roads without funding needs	Ponts prioritizing response to traffic demand	Funding by CDC (Bloch-Lainé) and CNA chaired by Ponts	Paris had high proportion of State budget at this time	* PM able to set up new tool, but use partly diverted from his aims	* CNA funds first used for Paris–Lille, to help Lille car plant

Table 6.3 (Continued)

Instruments	Leaders' input				Bureaucratic input		Policy process			Output	
DAT/ DATAR	President	PM	Minister for AdT	Minister for roads	Ponts	CGP	Technical paradigm	Funding	Other issues	Match to leaders' aim	Impact on AdT
T9 1966 *Roads in Languedoc mission*										**	**
Head of mission used contacts to bypass Ponts and Finance	Approved efficient structure, finance, and the project	Debré appointed friend as mission head, then Pompidou as PM and Minister of AdT signed decree		Promoted Paris investment. He was bypassed	Ponts built roads where mission decided from mission funds	A rival project to CGP's local project; CGP kept outside this one	A 'mission' or special purpose vehicle then in vogue	Block budget, not sectorally – divided an administrative innovation	Debré not Giscard the Minister of Finance	Scheme fully in tune with leadership's wishes	'A complete network of roads built – would do same again'
T10 1966 *Creation of Superministry of Infrastructure*										*	*
No input	His initiative to create – a real 'overseer' of large national infrastructure	Hostile to creation of Super-ministries. Separated public transport off when Pisani left		Wanted long-term planning of transport, land and finance	Ponts wanted new roles; Roads Divn against merger	Not known	President thought proximity increases efficiency	DATAR lost urban funding power to Infrastructure ministry	Local politicians did not like loss of posts, local advice	Mixed output. Pres wanted change: PM not – made temporary	Remove urban planning from DATAR but a good outcome
T11 1966 *Fifth Plan road network to link regional cities*										**	*
Formal role to see Plan met AdT goals: checked budget plans	Kept CGP in being. 'But very strongly supported the peripherique'	Approved scheme. Took over Plan and AdT to check CGP/Finance. Gave DATAR FIAT, 'free of Finance Ministry', to fund motorway sections		Successive ministers approved inter-urban roads	Coordination by Regional Prefect – who relied on Ponts advice	Supported metropoles, but also Paris infrastructure	Regional 'capitals' now scientific 'metropoles d'equilibre'	FIAT gave 1/3 aid to roads; Finance Minister supported AdT	Delouvrier got CGP and Roads Minister to fund Paris	Leaders achieved what wanted: i.e. mixed aims on Paris	Action in some AdT metropoles but also Nice, Paris
T12 1966 *OREAM bodies to develop regional cities*										**	**
Central coordinator. Funded the OREAMs	No known intervention	Agreed OREAMs in CIAT. Reluctant to spend on Paris. Arbitrated State-region and Ministry–DATAR disputes in CIAT. Set up central GCPU	Pisani's link of Roads and Construction helped OREAM		Ponts and DAT used OREAMs to reduce DATAR power	CGP eclipsed by DATAR in OREAMs who had funds, realistic	DATAR a norm-setter on economic, modern-ization	DATAR worked with ministries to see where money spent	Mayors of metropoles freed of departments	Leaders achieved what wanted: i.e. mixed aims on Paris	Limited funding but short lengths around most metropoles

T13 1968 *Breton expressway scheme (Plan Breton)*

										**	**
Guichard persuaded PM in 1968 riots to give political launch	Announced again in speech in Brittany 1969	Agreed 1965 – no outcome. A 'measure for Brittany' in June 1968	Breton, said transport important for AdT; worked with PM	Four ministers 1965–69, some pro-AdT, some pro-Paris.	Roads division said 'it was folly'	Marcellin and Guichard Ministers Plan and AdT 1967–69 pushed it.	Cost-benefit of motorway poor; Brittany 'had right to modern rail'	Some funding from FIAT, FSIR decided by Roads minister	Built under pressure from Bretons, Chirac-Giscard	Scheme fully in tune with leadership's wishes after hesitation	AdT policy agreed and implemented after hesitates

T14 1969 *Act on tolled motorways by concessions*

										**	**
Worked with President's adviser, to get road links to metropoles	Wanted car-driven, industrial economy	Had introduced 1954 tolled roads bill for development	Bettencourt, helpful to DATAR but not driving force here	For property development, 'lifted obstacle of Roads Division'	Ponts were paid to inspect motorways, later ran road companies	Massé had proposed tolls to Debré – as roads without funding needs	Pres: No more counting cars; Ponts: 'Got M-ways we wanted'	Minister had to promise MPs roads would help west	Accelerated roads to west and regional cities – but others more	Political leadership achieved their congruent purposes	Matched AdTs goals though still favoured growth regions

T15 1969 *Second national road plan*

										**	**
Close liaison with Ponts' on which provincial roads to fund	Wanted roads 'to help AdT and industry'. Took decision in Conseil	Wanted transport to help AdT. Decided to list funded roads.	Formally his and PM's priorities were now in command	Upset DDE traditional ways. Cut Paris motorways	Drew up as asked, but later critical: 'no figures to justify'	No role but fitted Plan spirit. 'A signal to investors'	RCB promoted by Ponts working with CGP and DATAR	50% FIAT went to roads DATAR wanted, but not enough	Giscard at Finance opposed completion date for Plan	Political leadership achieved their congruent purposes	'Translated better than predecessor a desire for AdT'.

T16 1971 *Sixth Plan: competition and social solidarity*

										*	*
On better terms with CGP. With Ponts on CGP working party	Distrusted Planning. Wanted roads, including Paris radials	Pro-Plan, centralized funds Min. of AdT had devolved	Guichard, Bettencourt persuaded MPs to accept Plan	'Central fiefdoms' took back decisions from prefects	Ran CGP roads cttee. RCB officials against Paris radials	CGP and regional unit in opposition. Had to add more cities	Roads cost-benefit appraisal now to include AdT	Priority investments in 6th Plan served Paris most and Nice	DATAR 'had problems making its concerns prevail'	Mixed output reflected different goals of political leaders	Regional plans had little AdT impact; politicians added towns

Table 6.3 (Continued)

Instruments	Leaders' input				Bureaucratic input		Policy process			Output	
DAT/ DATAR	President	PM	Minister for AdT	Minister for roads	Ponts	CGP	Technical paradigm	Funding	Other issues	Match to leaders' aim	Impact on AdT
T17 1972 *Paris–Strasbourg motorway* Used Presidential visit to accelerate an AdT decision	Announced on visit: 'Motorways appreciated by local élus'	No known intervention. Unlikely: Bordeaux his priority	Guichard Minister of Roads and AdT during execution	'This political route went through towns of 2 transport ministers'	'A political decision. an operation typical of AdT'	No known role. Additional to planned investment	Decision political 'but also based on transport and AdT studies'	President examined progress, found new funds	Thought useful at time of EC growth to link region to France	** 'President's will prevailed. Motorway built two years sooner'	** DATAR got a one-off policy decision it really wanted
T18 1974 *Central planning council* Advised on AdT. CIAT decided 22 mF for Massif Central	Set up and chaired it. Decided 'rural' AdT policy in it	Held CIAT to agree funds for Massif C; announced Brittany roads	Changed AdT from urban network to rural support	Promised Breton roads; Ministers stop defending Ponts/rail	Still trying to meet traffic demand	Plan on CCP. But Giscard anti-Plan, used CCP to control CGP	Gave attention post-73 to 'life-quality' – 'vivre au pays'	More funds to rural areas, small towns, and 'pays'	Giscard led 1975 budget arbitration not PM and DATAR	** A tool for making President's will prevail and did	** Effective AdT output but DATAR officially not much involved
T19 1976 *Revised Seventh Plan* Not 'chef de file' for transport PAP5. CNAT played no role	His goals for AdT: 'spread economic activities over territory'	Chirac – no input. Barre wanted a Plan for Nation, not State	Fourcade, technician, restored DATAR's 'active, daring image'- let DATAR decide roads. Fourcade and Icart stronger against Ponts		Said PAP5 (access to dis-advantaged regions) unimportant	Main plan not regionalized. Giscard marginalized CGP	Ponts wanted roads to meet traffic demand not isolated regions.	PAP5 spending in Massif Central but not Brittany	Spending down by 50% but Massif Central funded	** Political leadership's will prevailed	* Some output useful to AdT though DATAR not much involved
T20 1977 *National motorway programme* Negotiated a CIAT with Ponts to decide road programme	Giscard anti-car and capitals; but left to Barre	'Behind liberal rhetoric, a powerful practice of dirigisme'.	Fourcade, a technician, keen to rebalance Paris and regions. Supports DATAR on roads, versus PM and ministers on roads		Ponts official at DATAR unable to return to Ponts	No known input	'[DATAR] tried to integrate regional devt into Roads' calculations.'	Depends on Finance, CNA and CdC. Road spend halved from 1978	Some leading Ponts wanted to conquer wider world of AdT	* Political will prevailed but then limited by finance	* Road plans now decided in CIAT. Funds limited AdT output

T21 1978 *Rationalization of Transport Decisions Group*

										**	**
3 DATAR officials with 5 Finance/Plan and 19 Transport	No role. Did not like RCB when Finance Minister	Set up as PM and Economy minister, published as PM and AdT	Icart a liberal Minister of Infrastructure – AdT. Set up to introduce fair competition, accepted recommendations and published report		Roads director: 'No impact from roads, limited redistribution'	CGP had small representation in Group	'Had to consider AdT though no evidence of any impact'	Roads appraisal changed 1980 to include AdT	Issue raised by Guillaumat Commission on road–rail competition	Political leadership achieved their congruent purposes	AdT now officially (sceptically), considered in road schemes

T22 1981 *Interim State–Region Plan Contracts*

										*	0
No part in organizing contracts. Lost budget role	Put Rocard in 'a cupboard' Wants Plan and AdT attached to PM	Chaired CIATs on Contracts; put friend in charge	No ministry contacts. Gave DATAR coordinating role but late	Each region negotiated independently with the ministry	Ponts officials had most input on negotiating roads content	No role in Intermim tsp contracts. At its weakest	'TP want decisions on legal technical bases, want results'	DATAR lost role of budgetary oversight	Motorways a paradigm for local leaders.	Deliberately poor coordination within political leadership	No AdT input to 1981–82 investment decisions

T23 1982 *Transport Act (LOTI)*

										**	**
On National Transport Council and advisory role on projects	Opinion on all bills from March 1982; wants urban transport	Chaired CIAT May 1982 with AdT contribution to transport as 1st item	Act gives minister the approval role for road schemes	AdT one of his 4 objectives in promoting the Bill	Ponts economist wrote the Bill, including AdT criteria.	No known position or locus for intervention	Ponts praise DATAR 1971 map balanced access to all regions	AdT to be a part of the costs-benefits appraisal	Imposes wide consultation, CNT, regions, not just Parisian elite	Political leadership achieved their congruent purposes	AdT ministers must now agree to all large transport decisions

T24 1982 *FSGT – Fund for transport and energy projects*

										**	**
Delegue a member of FSGT, and disburses the funds	Asked for projects: Transport and DATAR to execute	Wanted for electoral reasons but keen on urban renewal	PM's friend set it up. Implemented well by Defferre	Asked by President to carry out some things like TGV	Unlikely to object to funds for road and rail schemes	No known position or locus for intervention	Seen as a job creation scheme, but roads were needed	About 1.3 bn F a year: 400 mF to main roads, 50 m to estate roads	Delors opposed: Sum reduced after arrival of Chirac	Political leadership achieved their congruent purposes	Funded TGV Atlantique and roads thought good for AdT at the time.

Table 6.3 (Continued)

Instruments	Leaders' input				Bureaucratic input		Policy process			Output	
DAT/ DATAR	President	PM	Minister for AdT	Minister for roads	Ponts	CGP	Technical paradigm	Funding	Other issues	Match to leaders' aim	Impact on AdT
T25 1983 *First State-Region Plan Contracts 1984–88*										**	*
Pivot of negotiations, checked ministry budgets	No known role but keen to help Lorraine (partly for votes)	No known role in most contracts, but keen to help Lorraine. Chaired CIATs, wanted decentralization, appointed friend to check		No known input	Said DATAR matched regional with national strategy	Head of CGP saw limited role for intervention in economy	Ponts derided 'regions' demand for roads, airports and canals'	DATAR used FIAT to push aims, but Lorraine got largest sums	Poorer regions now funding State roads others had free	Unbalanced funding reflected goals of political leadership	Helped AdT aims in some regions more than others
T26 1983 *Motorway and national road plan*										*	*
Drew up jointly with Ponts. Plans now decided in CIATs.	Asked for projects: Transport and DATAR to execute	PM is Minister for AdT with friend, his junior minister. Discussed road plan in CIATs, approved it just before resigned in 1984		Said financial rigour meant he could not make his dossiers move	Drew map with DATAR. Issued as guidance in 1986.	No known position or locus for intervention	Ponts say DATAR 1971 map 'balanced access to all regions…'	Cutbacks in budget from 1984 when Bérégovoy at Finance	Decree agreed but map not published till 1986 (No funds?)	Tool that leaders wanted but not published/ well-funded	Focuses on inter-urban roads; but not 'unprofitable' roads
T27 1984 *Massif Central and Breton expressways*										**	**
Developed old plan, organized CIAT which agreed it	No known input: but likely to have agreed	Mauroy agreed at CIAT to fund Massif Central expressway. Implemented by Defferre as Minister for AdT		PCF minister then replaced by Quilès (friend of Mitterrand)	No known input	No known input	Paradigm is TGV but roads to Massif Central, Brittany	State financed though transport budget reduced	2.2 mF in Brittany, MC, Midi-Pyrenees in 2 years 1984–85	Scheme fully in tune with leadership's wishes	More spent on roads for AdT even though other budgets cut back
T28 1987 *National road plan – increase competitiveness*										**	**
Published 1984 map in 1985. Organized CIAT.	Cohabitation – No known input and seems very unlikely.	Funded from privatization, tolls. Roads to help France in EC	Minister of Infrastructure and AdT. Ordered Guichard Report which recommended road programme. Minister promoted motorways, TGV		Road division adopted evaluation including AdT benefits	Very weak. Chirac nearly abolished, but 'caution triumphed'	AdT policy differentiating less between regions; more about growth	Balladur only agreed reluctantly if regions co-funded	Limousin, others, said had 'right to a motorway' – not roads	Tool that PM wanted, overruled Finance minister	What DATAR wanted for AdT
T29 1987 *Second State–Region Contracts 1988–93*										**	*
Organized 4 CIATs. Liaised with prefects, with CGP on evaluation	No input. Sarcastic about Rocard's planning	For Chirac roads 1st priority: Rocard added regl devt	Regional industrial development his main interest	Delebarre wants roads but Finance against	Some Roads Ponts want; others query link to development	CGP fading, CIAT main decision site, CGP set up evaluation	'Xth Plan logic' of 'One Europe' governed road contracts	Contracts fund 80% State roads. Main roads budget cut.	Prefects play stronger role than DATAR at Regional level	New political leaders able to inflect tool towards their own priorities	Helped AdT aims mainly in Massif C and Brittany

T30 1992 *National road and motorway plan*

										**	**
Published Ponts reports of AdT problem from fast TGVs	Wanted all citizens at '30 minutes from fast road'	Cresson's initiative for jobs and AdT, signed on last day as PM	Delebarre (ex- roads minister), keen to make his mark	Quilès, X-Shell, wanted long-term transport policy-making	Ponts agree fast-transit systems produce 2-tier localities	Report showed impact of roads on AdT modest	Comptes report: link of roads to development link unclear	Bérégovoy not keen to fund, but allowed it as job support	Road budgets restored to appease strikers etc Nov 1991	Scheme in tune with leadership's wishes	Plan in line with old AdT aims, just as paradigm changing

T31 1993 *3rd State-region Plan Contracts 1994–99*

										**	**
Central coordinator. Checked budgets spent	Cohabitation – No known input and seems very unlikely	2 PMs held CIATs. Balladur CIAT fixed totals for prefects.	Pasqua the driving force, but followed up previous minister	The ministry that delegated the least budget to regions	Roads disobeyed PM's rule to leave talks to DATAR	CGP had to work with DATAR on evaluating expenditure	The State-imposed aims included development and AdT	Provided 80% road funds. Poorer regions were given more	Finance ministry does not give DATAR statistics	Contracts 75% in tune with leadership's wishes	Variable State funding to regional roads on an AdT basis

T32 1993 *Acceleration of motorway programme*

										**	*
No known input – turned away from road emphasis	Cohabitation – No known input and seems very unlikely	Decided to complete network in 10 years not 15	Pasqua keen to complete scheme; improve access	Pons gave go-ahead to an (ex?) AdT road scheme under Juppé	Builds tolled motorways instead of links that help AdT more	No input; still not evaluating roads according to AdT criteria	Groups suggest poor returns for AdT of new roads	Use of Caisse and 'private' motorway companies hid true cost	'A response to powerful road and public works lobby'	Scheme in tune with leadership's wishes	AdT policy DATAR once wanted. Now asks if best value

T33 1994 *Paris Basin Charter and Contract*

										**	**
Asked 1965 colleague for Report, used chance given to implement it	Cohabitation – No known input and seems very unlikely	Balladur then Juppé agreed at CIATs in 1994, 1997	Pursued by PS then Pasqua, RPR Paris leader	No interest shown. Not at ceremony to sign the contract	Délégué and Report author were both Paris Ponts planners	No input. [Prefects more important]	An engineers' network to decongest Paris, link regions to EU	DATAR used reserve Plan Contract funds for Paris Basin contract	Coordination easier: led by political allies, and Ponts-AdT officials	Scheme in tune with leadership's wishes	Effective introduction of long-wanted and planned scheme

Table 6.3 (Continued)

Instruments	Leaders' input				Bureaucratic input		Policy process			Output	
DAT/ DATAR	President	PM	Minister for AdT	Minister for roads	Ponts	CGP	Technical paradigm	Funding	Other issues	Match to leaders' aim	Impact on AdT
T34 1995 ***National Plan of AdT and Road Plan***										**0**	**0**
Coordinated debate on Act and wrote the material	Cohabitation – No known input and seems very unlikely	Balladur supported it, then he and Juppé slowed it down.	Pasqua promoted 45 min. access but then Pons delayed	Delayed Plan – only 'best value' projects	Approved Report to incorporate non-market values	Asked for Report on rational transport decisions	Scepticism on structuring role of transport	LOADT would introduce funds from tolls to pay for AdT roads	MPs added funds till government reluctant to pay	Programme some Right wanted, but Greens rejected	A planned 'systematic' AdT network never put into force
T35 1998 ***Fourth State-Region Plan Contracts 2000–06***										*	*
Central negotiator but conflict with AdT minister's cabinet	No known input but not likely	No interest. Adjudicated at rare CIAT meetings	Minister wanted negotiations run by regions and rail	Wanted to keep up spending on road, as well as rail.	Roads division said 'mayors want tarmac'. Other Ponts differed	CGP secretariat for advisory CNADT and evaluation	Too much emphasis on roads – impact on AdT unproven	Roads still as large an element in Regional Contracts	Right-wing Presidents of regions object to paying for State services	National political leaders unen-thusiastic and divided	Policy DATAR wanted for some regions; now moving to other policies
T36 1999 ***Sustainable transport service plans***										**0**	**0**
Little role compared with ministry and the regions	No known input but not likely	In CIAT chose service schemes and rail not National Plan	Wanted green decentralized plans and no road growth	Wanted to keep up spending on road, as well as rail.	Some drew up plans and approved; Roads still want roads	Commissioned 2nd Boiteux Report on transport decisions	Too much emphasis on roads – impact on AdT unproven	Government mainly relying on regions to pay for roads	Local élus delay, want roads. New minister scraps	National leaders divided. Plans scrapped	Responds to traffic demand in 1999, does not modify demand

Table 6.4 Roads planning instruments in order of impact

Roads instrument		DAT/DATAR	Leaders' input				Bureaucrats		Policy process			Output	
			President	PM	AdT	Roads	Ponts	CGP	Paradigm	Funds	Other	Leaders aim	AdT
T1	1951	0	0	√	0	√	X	X	X	0	√	0	0
T2	1954	0	0	√	√	√	X	X	X	√?	X	0	0
T4	1958	√	0	√	√	√	X	X	X	0	X	0	0
T34	1995	√	0	X	√	X	√	√	√	0?	X	0	0
T36	1999	0	0	0	√	0	√?	?	X	0	X	0	0
T7	1962	√	0	0	√	0	0	X	X	0	√	0	*
T3	1954	√	0	√	0	√	X	X	X	X	0	*	0
T5	1959	√	0	√?	√	√	X	√	X	X	X	*	0
T6	1962	√	X?	√	√	X	X	√	X	√	X	*	0
T22	1981	0	0	√	√	√	√	0	√	√	√	*	0
T8	1962	0	0	√	0	0	X	√	X	X	X	*	*
T10	1966	0	√	X	X	√	√	0?	√	0	X	*	*
T16	1971	√	X	0	√	0	√	X	√	X	X	*	*
T20	1977	√	0	√	√	√	X	0	√	0	√	*	*
T26	1983	√	√	√	√	√	√	0	√	X	X	*	*
T35	1998	√	0	0	X?	√	√	√	X	√	X	*	*
T11	1966	√	0	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	**	*
T19	1976	0	√	0	√	√	X	0	X	√	√	**	*
T25	1983	√	0	√	√	0	√	0	X	√	X	**	*

Table 6.4   (Continued)

Roads instrument		DAT/DATAR	Leaders' input				Bureaucrats		Policy process			Output	
			President	PM	AdT	Roads	Ponts	CGP	Paradigm	Funds	Other	Leaders aim	AdT
T29	1987	√	0	√	√	√	√	0	√	√	X	**	*
T32	1993	0	0	√	√	√	√	0	X	√	√	**	*
T9	1966	√	√	√	√	0	0	0	√	√	√	**	**
T12	1966	√	0	√	√	√	√	0	√	√	X	**	**
T13	1968	√	√	√	√	√	X	√	X	√	√	**	**
T14	1969	√	√	√	0	√	√	√	√	√	0	**	**
T15	1969	√	√	√	√	√	0	0	0	√	X	**	**
T17	1972	√	√	0	√	√	X	0	√	√	√	**	**
T18	1974	√	√	0	√	√	X	X	√	√	√	**	**
T21	1978	√	0	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	**	**
T23	1982	0	√	√	√	√	√	0	√	√	√	**	**
T24	1982	√	√	√	√	√	√	0	√	√	X	**	**
T27	1984	√	0?	√	√	0	0	0	√	√	√	**	**
T28	1987	√	0	√	√	√	√	0	√	√	X	**	**
T30	1992	√	√	√	√	X	X	X	X	√	√	**	**
T31	1993	√	0	√	√	0	X?	√	√	√	X	**	**
T33	1994	√	0	√	√	0	√	0	√	√	√	**	**

Notes: √ = input favouring the instrument, X = opposition to it; 0 = no input, ? = less certain or varying. Star rating on the match to leaders' aims, or the impact on AdT: 0 to ** in order of increasing impact.

its outcome, and, second, to the practical impact of the instrument on AdT. Though this reduction of material is severe, it enables a tentative identification of common factors among 36 instruments to be made, to guide a deeper exploration.

An overview of Table 6.4 suggests that just over half the roads instruments produced strong outcomes (20 of 36 with **). About a quarter made some impact (10 of 36 with *), while only a sixth seemed to have no direct impact (6 of 36 with '0'). In four of the ten cases where a partial impact was made, the outcome simply partially fulfilled leaders' aims; for example, the 1977 National Motorway Programme started well but then slowed down. In the other six cases the mixed outcome accurately reflected leaders' mixed views; for example, Prime Ministers Debré and Pompidou had wanted Fourth Plan roads investment to improve access to provincial cities, but the roads minister, Jacquet, was also President of the Paris District and mayor of a Paris new town. He helped Delouvrier, top official of the Paris District, who, as noted above, was encouraged by de Gaulle to help make Paris a fine city (Delouvrier in Chenu 1994: 271). Overall, the political leadership saw outcomes that matched well its joint or mixed aims in about two-thirds of cases.

Critics could argue that leaders were not the primary causal agents. Further examination of Table 6.4 suggests the contrary. First, there was a strong relationship between the success of the instrument and leadership support. All 20 instruments whose outputs best matched leadership intentions (**) were favoured by the president or prime minister, mostly both. Of the six with poor outcomes ('0') only half were favoured by either the president or the prime minister, and one was opposed. In the group of 10 instruments that partly met the leaders' aims, leadership support fell half-way between. If the outcome of the instruments were mainly related to factors other than leadership action, a more random relationship would be expected. Second, in at least seven cases (T4, T5, T9, T10, T12, T14 and T30) there is primary 'triangulated' evidence that the instrument was personally chosen by ministers. For example, Plan Commissioner Massé (1986: 203) and Debré (1988: 64) both say that in 1960 the Roads Minister, Buron, invited Massé and Finance Minister Pinay to dinner, where they agreed on inter-urban tolls as the only mutually acceptable funding; and that this proposal was put to Prime Minister Debré. Sources on six further tools (T11, T15, T17, T18, T19 and T24) insist on the personal nature of a politician's initiative. The Fonds spécial des grands travaux is an example: Mitterrand wrote to Prime Minister Mauroy in 1982 asking for a list of measures, including a transport fund that DATAR and the transport minister should run;

according to Attali (1993a: 387–8) the President had worked on the letter for a week.

In contrast, the inputs of bureaucratic actors were not well related to the outcomes. A third of the instruments that matched the leaders' goals very well (**) did so despite opposition by a bureaucratic group. Five tools (T13, T19, T25, T32 and T30) that were implemented well or quite well offended the technocrats' contemporary view on worthwhile projects (Quinet and Touzery 1986: 68). Four tools (T15, T24, T28 and T29) had strong outcomes despite opposition by the finance ministry (Attali 1993a: 721; Favier and Martin-Roland 1990: 438). Nonetheless, bureaucratic groups played a significant role in determining outcomes. While a third of leadership projects succeeded despite bureaucratic opposition, two-thirds of those with partial or poor outcomes had been opposed by one or more bureaucratic groups; and financial problems figured in all instruments with very weak outcomes.

However, in terms of regional planning less than half the instruments were helpful, and a quarter seemed counterproductive. This failure derived partly from the greater difficulty leaders found in coordinating their roads spending with their official policy on AdT, partly because of the conflict within the leadership over whether poorer regions or Paris most needed new roads. DATAR, as the government's regional promoter, made a difference to outcomes nevertheless. No road instruments before its creation helped AdT, even those with that specific intention. The first really successful instrument was a block budget for DATAR's Languedoc–Roussillon 'mission' so roads could be built as it decided (Racine 1980: 57).

The influence of bureaucratic actors is not negligible but the columns of Table 6.4 show political support had a greater effect on outcomes. Given the wealth of evidence on leaders' personal intervention in these decisions, it would be perverse to claim that political leaders were not mainly responsible for the impact of the instruments they announced.

Exercising political leadership

Using Blondel's scheme for comparing political leaders, the pointers from the quantitative analysis help to identify the conditions under which the leadership exercised its preferences, and in particular the role of bureaucratic actors.

The positional resources of political leaders

The change of Constitution in 1958 made a difference to the powers of leaders to enact formal instruments but it made little practical difference to the outcomes. In the Fourth Republic parliamentarians, pressurized by roads officials, rejected the Tolled Motorways Bill in 1952, and in 1954 restricted its use to 'exceptional circumstances' (Dunn 1995: 281–2; Jardin and Fleury 1973: xxii; Thoenig 1973: 60). Debré used the stronger legislative decree powers of the Fifth Republic to lift this restriction, but the *Ponts* still did not build tolled motorways. Pompidou in 1962 tried to avoid open confrontation by creating the Caisse nationale des autoroutes to assist local authority or mixed-economy development, but this 'provoked new quarrels' (Jardin and Fleury 1973: 83; Thoenig 1973: 61–90). The Roads Director was appointed to chair the Caisse, and there are no other examples in the roads domain of Fifth Republic leaders using different legal powers from their Fourth Republic predecessors.

In both Republics road programmes were approved by decree; and road funds were created by parliamentary Act (such as the Fonds spécial d'investissement routier in December 1951 and Mitterrand's Fonds spécial des grands travaux in August 1982). Though the Fifth Republic executive had stronger control over parliament from new rules on voting procedures, ministers must have felt these powers were inadequate, because Infrastructure Minister Chalandon, in the 1969 Motorway Concessions Act, gave the Ponts et Chaussées the kind of 'compensation' that Mény (1992: 221–2) saw as a sad example of *La Corruption de la République*: 'using a procedure of unimpeachable legality, Chalandon required the companies awarded the concession to pay 0.5 per cent to the State engineers for their supervision and monitoring work'. (Communes also receive a percentage of tolls collected on their territory, increasing the attraction of motorways to them.)

However, the change of Constitution, and more especially the 1962 amendment on direct election of the President, helped bring about changes in the party system and intra-executive relationships, which in turn determined which leader's views on roads policy were likely to prevail. These balances of power also affected whether DATAR's advice or that of a bureaucratic actor supported by a political rival was more influential. Presidents made no documented input to roads policy in the Fourth Republic, or in periods of cohabitation in the Fifth. In the Fifth Republic, not only DATAR, but all instruments decided in CIAT/CIADT/CIACT or supported by the prime minister's budget or FIAT/FNADT (national roads plans, regional city development plans and

State-Region Contracts) fell within the prime minister's legal domain. However, presidents made their own interpretation of 'who does what' in road planning, depending on their interest in a topic and their inclination to trust the prime minister. This analysis fits that for other domains (see Elgie 1993; Hayward 1993b; Massot 1979, 1987, 1988).

President de Gaulle (1971: 133) wanted a 'massive development of transport networks for economic modernization', but especially 'favoured the [Parisian] *périphérique* and motorways for the quality of their technical performance that served France through the grandeur of Paris', and had asked Delouvrier: 'What will you need to complete all that?' (Hoddé and Toussaint 1992: 531, 535). Delouvrier showed Prime Minister Pompidou the map of Paris roads that de Gaulle had approved, and 'although the prime minister did not want to spend money on them, he accepted he had to' (Delouvrier in Chenu 1994: 272; Roussel 1994: 152–3).

Similar examples exist for other presidents. As seen above, President Mitterrand decided there should be a transport fund even though the finance minister opposed it, and the prime minister did not at first implement it (Attali 1993a: 721; Favier and Martin-Roland 1990: 438). President Pompidou decided on the motorway programme down to the detail on contracts in presidential *Conseils restreints* (29 November and 11 December 1969, 25 November 1971), using technical information obtained by his *cabinet* from DATAR and the Infrastructure Ministry (Archives Nationales 1996; Esambert 1994: 108–9; Essig 1979: 100). President Giscard used his own small Central Planning Council (prime minister, two ministers and the Plan Commissioner) to supervise the Plan Commissariat on these affairs (Bodiguel and Quermonne 1983: 178), calling in advisers such as DATAR's *délégué* Essig, as he chose. 'It was the place *par excellence* at which decisions were taken' (Hayward 1982: 123).

Prime ministers in turn took decisions that might legally have been made by a sectoral minister. Roads ministers were not necessarily taken into the prime minister's confidence: Cresson's television announcement of a massive road project that would 'generate 80,000 to 100,000 jobs' was received with surprise by the minister (*Tribune de l'Economie* 2 May 1996). In the CIAT that decided the Breton expressway (during the May 1968 'events' in which Bretons participated vigorously), Prime Minister Pompidou is reported as saying to the roads minister: 'I am sure you are going to repeat what your officials say … too expensive, not economically sound, etc. but I will decide anyway and you will do it' (Essig 1979: 85).

Essig thought that if the prime minister had not adopted that tone the Breton Plan would have been 'sanitized by the frequent administrative trench warfare'. President Mitterrand too worried that the inexperienced Left ministers would let their officials take control. He ruled that ministers were not to read out notes in Councils of Ministers; and in 1982 he complained that in large *Conseils restreints* everyone except Defferre (a Fourth Republic minister like himself) repeated the opinions of their *cabinet* (Attali 1993a: 34, 246).

Yet, within the parameters set by the president and prime minister, some ministers made their own contribution to policy. Those who were responsible for both infrastructure and AdT were particularly influential, though the effect on the latter could work in either direction. Five road instruments with very successful outcomes for AdT were introduced and implemented by ministers for Infrastructure and *Aménagement du territoire* committed to regional development (Guichard, Fourcade and Méhaignerie). In contrast, their market-orientated successor, Bernard Pons, slowed down the drafting of the national road plan required by the 1995 Act on AdT. He instructed the Roads Directorate to retain only those few schemes with the best cost-benefit ratio – unlikely to help provincial development (*Le Monde* 5 December 1996). The more successful early road instruments were those that bypassed both roads and finance ministers, such as the block budget for the Languedoc project.

Thus, although sectoral ministers were more constrained in their actions by the constitutional conventions and the party system than was the prime minister, whose input and impact were in turn constrained by the president, each member of the political leadership had some capacity to amend policy to his or her particular goals.

The influence of bureaucratic organizations

The urban planners in the DAT section of the Reconstruction Ministry, at the urging of their minister, Claudius-Petit, invented the idea of developing regional cities as counterweights to Paris, and that of road networks to link them together (MRU 1950b: 21); this approach later became central to French regional planning. However, DAT had no authority in relation to national roads, and it had no influence on roads decisions, even when it participated in interministerial committees on roads planning set up by Debré that were instructed to take AdT into account (Jardin and Fleury 1973: xxiv; Monod and de Castelbajac 1971: 100). Furthermore, 'its relations with the Plan Commissariat were not organized' (Lanversin 1970: 61). DAT's approach to the minister

for Economy, Finance and the Plan in 1955 failed to persuade him to include their networks in new regional programmes (Randet 1994: 81). In 1958 Prime Minister de Gaulle put DAT on the Commissariat's regional plans committee, where its transport maps again made no impact (Randet 1994: 81). It was in this context that the construction ministry in 1962 published its own Plan for AdT, including motorways connecting regional cities, but with no legal or practical means to bring them about.

In contrast, DATAR made some input into three-quarters of the instruments introduced after 1963 and most had good outcomes in terms of AdT. Its interventions were generally in support of a political leader's aims. Where this was not the case, the outcome was less successful, but DATAR was not pursuing its own bureaucratic route: rather, the political leaders had contradictory ambitions (De Gaulle and Debré's interest in regional development collided with their interest in Paris) or had changed (the 1995 Road Plan developed for Balladur's government was not supported by Balladur's successor). In later years DATAR was less certain than politicians that more road infrastructure would help rural development. But these exceptions demonstrate, if that were needed, that political leaders were not constrained by DATAR's advice.

DATAR's interventions could take a variety of forms. In the 1960s and early 1970s its action was rather hierarchical or peremptory, helping political leaders defeat bureaucratic habits. President Pompidou's announcement on a visit to Metz that the Paris–Strasbourg motorway would go through Metz was one of several instances when DATAR 'took the opportunity of an official visit to snatch a definitive ruling' in favour of a project it preferred. Although 'generally' these announcements were prepared beforehand with ministries, Essig (1979: 100–1) 'admitted that, in certain cases, the dynamism of DATAR . . . could lead to these stages being skipped'. The block budget for the Languedoc mission was organized at the top, while Debré was Finance Minister, by the mission's president, Pierre Racine, Debré's closest colleague at the Conseil d'Etat for 20 years. This budgetary sum, not already divided into sectoral chapters, was an administrative innovation: Racine 'was given exorbitant decision-making and financial powers' (Mény 1974: 243). He would simply ring up ministers about what was needed (Essig 1979: 65).

During the premiership of Chaban-Delmas, who was personally committed to regional planning and development (Lajugie *et al.* 1979: 393; Chaban-Delmas 1997: 442), DATAR worked 'in close liaison' with some *Ponts* officials, for instance in composing the 1971 National Road Network Scheme (DATAR 1972; Jardin and Fleury 1973: 115, 117); but one

such official was unable to return to the ministry after serving at DATAR, 'because he had fought the *Ponts*' roads policy' (Essig 1979: 60). The Road Director was dismissive about this scheme, because it was not based on cost-benefit figures (Quinet 1980: 27–8). When DATAR and the Roads Directorate jointly negotiated the National Motorway Programme of 1978–83 one organization tried to integrate into the calculations the presumed effects on development: the other evaluated cost-benefit in terms of traffic (Essig 1979: 75).

The Ponts et Chaussées was a formidable opponent to roads instruments with AdT objectives in the1950s. Over the whole period studied; those that failed fully or partly to meet leaders' aims were twice as likely to have been opposed by the Ponts as those that were successful. But the ambiguous outcome of some instruments is a signal that the Ponts' common professional norms do not preclude internal divergence. While the Roads Directorate and local *Ponts* saw the new policies as a threat to their monopoly or at least a distraction from their traditional work (Thoenig (1973: 67–8), many in the cohorts of the 1960s saw the motorways or DATAR's urban infrastructure schemes as new and interesting career opportunities. Georges Pébereau, the young leader of the *Ponts* association in 1964, became director of DAFU (formerly DAT) in 1966, and was director-general of CGE, building the new motorways, by 1972. At the same time as Guichard was expressing his exasperation with Infrastructure officials keen to tarmac, *Ponts* economists were lobbying for a different cost-benefit approach that included AdT criteria (Ashford 1982: 75; Jardin and Fleury 1973: 64). Guichard (1975: 98) did not worry about 'being excommunicated by the administration [for his criticism] ... In all the *grands corps* there are people who think the same'.

The *Ponts* hampered the political leadership most in the 1950s and 1960s when they were reluctant to abandon their local spheres of influence. In a second phase, some realized that joining in was advantageous. In a third phase, most agreed that AdT could justify more tarmac – and the TGV. Then some *Ponts* economists showed that fast transport did not affect economic development; it seemed that, at most the absence of fast roads might be a handicap, but it was difficult to prove (Merlin 1994; Savy 1996). But the change of technical paradigm was ignored by national and local leaders. In short, despite the dominance of this specialized bureaucracy within its sector, it could be persuaded, bypassed or ignored by political leaders as easily as the 'sustainable transport service plans' that Infrastructure officials drafted with great difficulty and skill for one minister for *Aménagement du territoire* in 2001 were completely set aside by another in 2002.

The Plan Commissariat was also associated with many of the early instruments that failed to match leaders' aims well or address AdT objectives. Its statistical weaknesses made it reluctant to give the Plan a regional dimension (Ullmo 1975: 37). Its worry that road congestion would slow economic expansion encouraged it to increase investment for Paris (Jardin and Fleury 1973: xxvi). From 1966 those instruments that succeeded were those in which the Plan Commissariat was not involved, first because DATAR and political leaders found other solutions, and then because economic planning itself was no longer of interest to the leadership. For Pompidou and Giscard, unlike for General de Gaulle, planning was not 'an ardent obligation'. 'Mitterrand's decision to stigmatize Rocard by appointing him Minister for the Plan' signalled the future for national planning in his presidency (*Le Monde* 11 December 1981).

Financial, technical and contingent constraints and opportunities

Inadequate funding was the most common reason for poor or delayed outcomes to roads instruments. Typical of Fourth Republic problems was the absorption into the general budget of the 1951 road fund that came from fuel duties (Dunn 1995: 280; Thoenig 1973: 60–2; Jardin and Fleury 1973: xxi). In the Fifth Republic the weakest source of funding was ministerial budgets, which can be revised at any time (see Chapter 5). During the second Mitterrand presidency, the national roads budget was cut in June 1990 after a conflict in CIAT between the Transport Minister Delebarre and Finance Minister Bérégovoy (Dunn 1995: 281), who was worried about the Gulf War, the rising cost-of-living index and a weak capital market. It was then partly restored in November 1991 to appease demonstrating road hauliers and construction companies (*Le Monde* 11 December 1991), and further supported by a jobs programme in March 1992. It is for this reason that councils such as the Region of Limousin have fought for 'their right to a motorway' (funded through concessions and tolls) rather than the dual carriageways which are so vulnerable to annual ministerial budgets.

Political leaders often sought to persuade the finance minister to 'find' additional resources for programmes they were intent on implementing; some were more ingenious or persuasive than others. Prime Minister Pompidou asked Finance Minister Giscard for the fund FIAT (see Chapter 5), in order that DATAR could subsidize motorway sections independent of the Finance Ministry (Guichard in Roussel 1994: 152).

A third of FIAT in the Pompidou years went to road projects, and FNADT is still used to steer roads spending in State-Region Contracts. When DATAR in 1972 arranged for President Pompidou to announce an early completion of the Paris–Strasbourg motorway, the advance funding was raised by borrowing against future toll income; in 1984 Prime Minister Chirac announced in CIAT a motorway programme funded from privatization proceeds despite protests from Finance Minister Balladur (*Le Monde* 12 February 1988); and in 1993 Prime Minister Balladur (in 1972 Pompidou's Secretary-General) again used toll income to fund his 'accelerated motorway programme'. Mitterrand's transport fund came from supplementary fuel tax, and was announced as funding road schemes but much went to the TGV which Mitterrand, the *Ponts* and DATAR all wanted at that time. Regional councils contributed substantially to roads in successive rounds of the State-Region Contracts (*Le Monde*, 18 November 1988), despite having no legal responsibility for them. 'Regions make strong financial contributions, highly appreciated by the State, which does not hesitate to solicit them' (Pontier 1998: 46–7).

Until the 1990s it was generally considered that 'opening-up' of regions through fast transport connections would aid development, but then the same groups of technocrats started to express doubts (Bonnafous *et al.* 1993; Carrère 1992; Cour des Comptes 1992). When Balladur announced his 1993 programme the technical paradigm had already changed. Yet national leaders continued to fund roads in the State-Region Contracts, because of the pressure from local interests. Overall, political initiatives that matched the dominant technical paradigm were more likely to be adopted: three-quarters of the instruments that fitted the contemporary professional view led to successful outcomes for leaders. But 'technicality' worked in unpredictable ways. DATAR's version of the DAT scheme for road networks to link regional cities with networks succeeded with the Plan Commissariat because DATAR defined the cities using plausible technical criteria and precise numbers (Delouvrier in Chenu 1994: 273). Yet DATAR's careful work with *Ponts* urban planners, using 'rationalized decision-making' techniques developed by *Ponts* economists, showing that new roads in Paris would lead to more jobs and more congestion, made no difference to politicians who had political or personal reasons for wanting Paris to grow (Essig 1979: 70; Lojkine 1972: 121–2).

Crises and honeymoon periods had only a weak and inconsistent effect on roads policy. During the inter-Republic transition, de Gaulle was able to insert DAT into the roads investment committee, but it made no noticeable impact. The agricultural riots in Brittany during the crisis

of May 1968 helped Prime Minister Pompidou and DATAR ignore the *Ponts*' opposition to the Breton road plan, but President de Gaulle had to relaunch the project during a visit to Brittany a year later, and its implementation relied on later leaders. Responses to economic crises varied with the leadership, and could either stimulate a project or call its viability into question, but the effect was always small-scale or short-term. While some leaders, such as Mitterrand and Cresson, responded to economic problems by promoting new projects, others, such as Rocard and Bérégovoy, chose to cut budgets. In the roads policy domain, contingent events are less significant than the reaction to them of individual political leaders.

Implementation and persistence

Although the French President can enjoy a relatively long term (14 years in the case of Mitterrand, though 10 years is now the maximum), prime ministers and ministers are unlikely to be in place to ensure the completion of their road projects. A quarter of the roads instruments with potentially good outcomes for both road and regional planning objectives were compromised by poor implementation. On the other hand, some instruments that were successfully opposed when first introduced were revived in a more powerful form later, as leaders persisted, learned from experience and profited from changes in the party system. The Fourth Republic's Tolled Motorways Bill that failed to pass in 1952, and was virtually neutered by parliamentarians when Chaban-Delmas reintroduced it in 1954, was eventually re-enacted in 1969 during the Chaban premiership, following some concessions to the *Ponts* and local politicians. Implementation of roads-and-regional planning was relatively consistent in the Gaullist period because Pompidou was committed to it as Prime Minister, and as President appointed ministers of like mind. Yet much depended on the individual minister: the *délégué* Essig (1979: 35, 120) found that even Fourcade, a highly competent minister with 'an extraordinary knowledge of his dossiers', monitored only those Seventh Plan programmes which he had personally negotiated, not all those for which he was legally responsible.

Implementation and persistence link back to funding, especially in this policy domain because those investments affecting isolated regions are those with the smallest economic return. The last Mauroy government of 1984 was still making a special effort to fund the Massif Central and Brittany expressways that DAT recommended in 1959 and Pompidou started to build in 1968. More recently, implementation has

suffered most from changes in political leadership that result in abrupt reversals in direction (Balladur to Juppé in 1995, Juppé to Jospin in 1997 and Jospin to Raffarin in 2002). The outcome is highly inefficient technically and economically and challenges the commitment of officials, but in political science terms confirms the ease with which new leaders can replace or annul instruments that their predecessors have just enacted.

Conclusions

The aim of the chapter was to show that political leaders can 'make a difference' even in such as a technical domain as roads planning and to identify the opportunities and constraints they meet in the policy process, especially with regard to bureaucratic institutions. A preliminary examination of the specialized bureaucratic organizations in road planning and investment, and some of their interactions with political leaders over particular instruments, suggested that the Ponts et Chaussées (especially the Road Directorate), the Plan Commissariat and the Ministry of Finance would be typical of bureaucracies that 'are an important element in the process by which leaders can see their goals realized; but the constraints and hurdles are numerous and cannot be overcome easily, let alone rapidly' (Blondel 1987: 172).

The quantitative analysis of 36 instruments that involved the work of these groups showed that just over half the instruments enacted matched well leaders' published intentions for the instrument, though slightly fewer had good outcomes for AdT. While far from the constitutional ideal, this outcome contradicts the more pessimistic assumptions of what leaders can achieve in practice within the constraints of bureaucratic systems. Another group of instruments had mixed outcomes independent of bureaucratic behaviour because political leaders themselves were not united in their aspirations. Overall, outcomes depended much more on the input of the president and/or the prime minister than whether bureaucratic groups opposed or supported the aims.

The qualitative assessment assessed the political leadership's actions in the context of their institutional and non-institutional environment: their positional resources given by the constitution and the configuration of the party system, the actions of bureaucratic institutions; the 'fit' of their instrument to the prevailing technical paradigm, available financial resources and other contingencies and opportunities; and the constraints on implementation.

It seems that, although political leaders were more likely in the Fifth than the Fourth Republic to bring their policy action to a successful conclusion, the difference did not relate to differences in the executive's formal powers to enact roads instruments; the stronger formal powers of the executive were less important than the change to a majority party system for most of the time after 1962, and the longevity of governments, allowing alternative options to be proposed and pursued. The change in the Constitution and its conventions made more difference in determining who took decisions. Apart from periods of cohabitation, the goals of a president who chose to intervene took precedence over those of the prime minister. De Gaulle, Pompidou and Giscard in turn 'presidentialized' this domain by imposing their preferences on the most significant decisions, by specifying road instruments in meetings they controlled, and by calling in technical advice as they chose. Mitterrand intervened in this technical policy only when it contributed to his other policy goals.

Among the bureaucratic institutions that could both help and hinder political leaders, DATAR, which had been created with much forethought by political leaders to help them coordinate an ambitious policy, was strongly associated with successful leadership projects, unlike its Fourth Republic predecessor, DAT, which was just one bureaucratic division trying to persuade others of greater historic, technical and legal authority in this domain. The incumbent bureaucracy, the *Ponts*, was able to be particularly obstructive because it was supported by local interests with a parliamentary veto. In the early Fifth Republic political leaders achieved results only by bypassing, outmanoeuvring or paying the corps. Officials then diverged over their corporate career response and their professional understanding of the value of roads; new programmes were more likely to be negotiated and agreed by leaders in interministerial meetings. Though roads officials continue to press their case with local councils, the place of the corps has declined with that of the need for more roads, and political leaders regularly ignore the technical paradigms the corps develops. The Plan proved a strong opponent to the leadership's aims for integrating AdT into national investment planning, partly because of the technical difficulties but mainly because of political, not bureaucratic problems: the implications for regional spending would have been unwelcome to the incumbent political elite. In any case, no president after de Gaulle believed in national planning.

The finance ministry and implementation were strongly interlinked in this roads case study. The most productive leadership tactic was to

introduce instruments that would be relatively independent of the frequent budgetary changes and ministry intervention. Political leaders sometimes had to press the finance ministry before even agreed schemes were launched. For this and other reasons, crises in the economic and political environment rarely contributed to successful instruments; they could provide an initial impetus, but that had to be followed up by the persistent exercise of leadership.

Considering the successive stages in the policy process that can be traced for the different instruments examined above and in Table 6.3, there seem to be four patterns to the leadership's interactions with the bureaucratic institutions and their results.

First, most negatively, for some instruments the input from the political leadership was weakly coordinated, if at all. In such circumstances bureaucratic groups, with or without the complicity of local politicians, dominated the outcome. In the early years of AdT it was unsurprising that DAT, lacking technical expertise and financial resources, was unable to overcome the combined opposition of the roads engineers and their clients in local government, even when it was backed by such an energetic minister as Chaban-Delmas. However, DATAR, despite its additional financial and administrative advantages, was no more successful at steering instruments towards regional policy goals than DAT had been, unless it was given the overt support of leaders, and an official locus in the bargaining process. This pattern demonstrated once again the importance of the leadership demonstrating a personal commitment to a project if it is to succeed.

A second pattern occurred where political leaders supported DATAR's negotiations with other bureaucratic organizations before a proposal was enacted in an interministerial forum. These instruments fitted the ruling paradigm or were of an incremental nature, and DATAR would use FIAT or one of the other funds assigned to it by ministers to reorient preferences marginally, or to advance a project more quickly. Decisions were approved in CIAT or a Council of Ministers for legal reasons or to gain political publicity, but in effect the prime minister ratified an agreement DATAR had prepared for the leadership, perhaps working closely with the minister for *aménagement du territoire*, and the relevant bureaucratic organizations (the *Ponts*, the prefects and the finance officials). Examples were the road programmes which basically fitted the planning ideas of the day, and which gave the *Ponts* more roads to tarmac even if not in the places they would have chosen. State-Region Contracts from 1984 also followed this pattern. The quietness of the conventional policy-making process did not mean that political leaders did not 'make

a difference'. Their intervention was low-key but the outcome reflected their goals.

As a third pattern, political leaders could adopt a more active approach, asking DATAR to prepare projects that would shift roads provision more rapidly towards regional policy objectives. Decisions were taken in a peremptory fashion, perhaps without consulting the technical bureaucracies or even their ministers. Instruments might deliberately avoid using ministry officials in implementation, or 'bounce' them into conforming; for example, using local expectations raised by a Presidential announcement during a visit to 'the provinces', or the implied threat of rival service providers. This tactic was frequently used by the early Gaullist leaders, keen to promote AdT through innovative ways rather than repeating actions that had not worked well in the past. This way of proceeding was to some extent copied by the Gaullist partnership of Balladur and Pasqua in the 1990s. The main problem of 'top-down' decisions used to be in ensuring they were implemented by bureaucratic groups that leaders had not persuaded of an instrument's value. The issue now is that frequent reversal of a predecessor's project by an incoming political leadership may increase disaffection among bureaucrats and a loss of professional commitment.

Finally, political leaders sometimes played a very personal role in initiating instruments that brought together roads and regional planning. Thus President de Gaulle, partly inspired by Edgard Pisani, and knowing the young *Ponts* would support it, introduced a Superministry of Infrastructure that fitted his preference for efficient administrative coordination; Giscard set up his select Central Planning Council and used it to develop and announce his particular, focused aims for AdT; and Mitterrand proposed a public works programme for DATAR and the transport minister to implement, and then insisted it was done. Prime Minister Chirac's choice of privatization receipts to fund transport infrastructure, in face of opposition from his finance minister, also exemplifies this personal style of decision making. The thesis deliberately does not treat the psychological aspects of leadership, because it is more concerned to show that even 'grey and indistinct office-holders' (Blondel 1995: 303) have more power to change the institutions than is often thought. Nevertheless, the evidence and the analysis make clear that some political leaders were more likely than others to spot and seize opportunities in pursuit of their aims. They showed that there are many ways to overcome the constraints posed by bureaucracies and other institutions.

7
Regionalization

This chapter examines leaders' efforts in a policy domain of a very different kind and scope from that of roads planning. Regionalization was for 25 years 'above all a reform of the State, which was organized at regional level', according to Giuily (1992: 116), one of the two aides to Gaston Defferre who prepared and piloted his decentralization Act of 1982 through parliament. The reform sought to change not only the formal territorial structures, but also the customary relationships between the political and bureaucratic actors who operated them.

A second contrast to roads planning is the seemingly radical nature of the 'step changes' in the regionalization process. The 1982 Act was one such, and studies of decentralization agree that another had occurred in 1964, when a 'Prefect of the Region' (*préfet de région*) became responsible for regional economic development and coordinating the work of ministry field offices, and a consultative body was created in 22 regions, the Commission de développement économique régional (CODER). Yet historians identify dozens of other moves, adding to (or subtracting from) the institutional presence of regions (see among others: Aubert 1977; Bodineau and Verpeaux 1997; Bourjol 1969; Dayries and Dayries 1982; Grémion 1979, 1992b; Huguenin and Martinat 1998; Monier 1965; Rémond 1999; Schmidt 1990). The analysis in this chapter therefore does not analyze a small number of outstanding events but a larger number of mostly less dramatic reforms, which are listed in Table 7.1.

A third contrast with roads planning, in a book about lessons from regional planning, is the variable impact of DAT and of DATAR. DAT successfully promoted the idea of the region but its failure to coordinate regional development stimulated the government's adviser on administration to insist that reform should take place, and within a regional framework (Machin 1977: 50, 63; Monier 1965: 38–9). There

was a similar disparity between the primary role given to DATAR and its *délégué*, Guichard, in the 1964 reforms (Grémion 1979: 321); and the absence of DATAR and its minister, Rocard, from work on the 1982 Decentralization Act.

A final contrast is in the identity of the groups that were important throughout the regionalization process. While many public bureaucracies were implicated, the prefectoral corps was always the crucial institution with which leaders had to deal, because of its role as the government's territorial representative and for its links to local political leaders. The other important group was not a bureaucracy but the local politicians, the *élus*, and especially those who were the leading players in the *département* (county council). The *élus* have a considerable conservative influence in France, partly because parliamentarians in both chambers tend to hold a local mandate (mayor, president of either the *département* or a large urban authority), and partly because the Senate is elected by local representatives in a procedure which over-represents the rural cantons of *départements*.

The approaches to the process of regionalization of these groups should therefore be outlined before the general analysis that follows. Unlike the previous chapter there has to be a single narrative, so enmeshed are the prefects and the *élus*.

The chief bureaucratic players and the *élus*

The corps of prefects has a continuous institutional history back to Napoleon. The 1789 Revolution had replaced the provinces and their royal *intendants* with a more uniform set of departments and Commissioners in the aim of creating national unity and equality. In 1800 Napoleon replaced the Commissioners with a system of prefects to organize local affairs in the interest of the State. Radical political leaders tried at intervals to introduce regions to implement new State roles, especially economic development, but were always opposed by the prefects (Chapman 1955: 14–17, 32; Le Clère and Wright 1973: 107). Whether in the 1850s or the 1940s prefects objected to regional bodies on the grounds that 'they put a screen between them and the government in Paris' (Bodineau and Verpeaux 1997: 83; Leclère and Wright 1973: 107). They were 'attached to the *département* structure and the traditional equality of prefects' (Grémion 1979: 135). In 1940 the only regional bodies were the 17 chambers of commerce, deriving from emergency committees set up by Clémentel, a liberal Minister of Commerce, in 1917.

The first regional prefects were introduced in 1941 under the full powers of Marshal Pétain. Pétain wanted to resurrect the historic provinces, and his head of government and Minister of Interior, Admiral Darlan, pre-empted him by introducing 18 administrative regions, headed by regional prefects, with assistant *intendants* for civil order and economic development (Paxton 1972: 199). DGEN, the infrastructure directorate which housed the regional planning division (see Chapter 2), appointed officials to this new tier, but the *intendants* were too burdened with wartime problems to consider economic development (Damette and Scheibling 1998: 214). The prefects thought Vichy regionalization 'seriously threatened the corps . . . The Regional Prefect . . . aroused the hostility of ordinary prefects . . . [as] a brash political upstart' (Chapman 1955: 57).

At Liberation General de Gaulle replaced the Vichy regional prefects with his regional commissioners (none was a career prefect) to prevent the disorder that might provoke the Allies to impose military rule. *Département* councillors were hostile to the commissioners, saying there was no elected assembly at that level to control them (Bodineau and Verpeaux 1997: 83). Their supporters in parliament voted down the commissioners' budget; and the posts were abolished after de Gaulle went in 1946. Some ministers, including the Reconstruction minister responsible for AdT, had also appointed regional officials but these too were removed. The prefect remained the executive head of a *département*, even though the Fourth Republic Constitution (Articles 87, 89) provided for a transfer to the elected council *président* (chair). 'Neither the politicians, the chairmen, nor the Government want the reform but none considers it tactful to say so in public' (Chapman 1955: 175). They feared the possibility of a Communist *président*; a burdensome role for a *président* with a political or business career in Paris; or that a strong local figure might challenge them for their parliamentary seat.

During the 1947–48 strikes parliament was persuaded by the Interior Minister, Jules Moch, to let him appoint 'inspectors-general of the administration on special mission' (IGAMEs), to the large military regions (Chapman 1955: 17). Moch's successor made the IGAME prefect of the *département* in which the regional main town was located, but with strictly no authority over other prefects. In 1952–53, decrees from the Interior Ministry (to which prefects 'belong') confirmed that IGAMEs would not lead groups of *départements* nor coordinate a regional conference of field officials. The prefectoral corps 'condemned the regions and regionalism to defend the *départements'*, it

being assumed that if regions were introduced, *départements* would be abolished (Lemasurier 1954: 380; Mény 1974: 347–54).

In 1954, Prime Minister Mendès-France reoriented AdT with a vigorous regional economic planning that required regional administrative structures. Prefects were asked to 'approve' regional committees to be consulted on the Plan Commissariat's regional action programmes, PARs (lists of capital projects). In a process Hayward (1986) called 'incorporating the periphery', the government hoped to harness the energies and ideas of local economic expansion committees but ensure that only one organization would claim to speak for each region (Monier 1965: 57). A group led by the Plan Commissariat and the Reconstruction Ministry's DAT was asked to delineate the PAR regional boundaries. Undecided between nine 'European-size' IGAME regions (the preference of experts on AdT) or 47 'large *départements*' (the preference of Jacobins who thought 'regions would pose political problems for Paris' [Debré 1956: 308]), the CGP–DAT group proposed 19 regions, based on the Clémentel economic regions. However, 'to pacify some cities and bureaucracies' (Clout 1972: 31–5), the government in 1956 announced a total of 22 regions (two in Normandy to satisfy Caen and Rouen; Nord-Pas de Calais and Picardy to divide Socialist Arras and Lille from Communist Amiens; Besançon separated from Dijon). Ministries were asked to modify field office areas to fit PAR boundaries, but few obeyed this instruction. Prefects would not work with the IGAMEs responsible for drawing up the PARs (Monier 1965: 30, 62). The *élus* complained that the IGAMEs were selecting as partners the voluntary expansion committees and not the *départements*' committees; numerous *département* committees were then 'approved' (Mény 1974: 319–20).

Independently, DAT drew up regional development plans to indicate where PAR 'actions' should be concentrated for best effect but was unable to persuade the Plan Commissariat or ministries to use them (Pouyet 1968: 36). The government's adviser on administrative efficiency, the Comité central d'enquêtes sur le coût et le rendement des services publics, criticized in September 1957 the 'Ministry of Reconstruction's incapacity to coordinate *aménagement du territoire*' (Pouyet 1968: 36). Its report of July 1958 said that AdT needed, and provided the opportunity for, reforming administrative action at regional level: the Prefect in the central city of a region should exercise the IGAME's coordinating powers, and all ministries should adopt the PAR region boundaries (Monier 1965: 38–9). In the last days of the Fourth Republic, Prime Minister de Gaulle used his special decree powers to require ministries to harmonize their regional boundaries; a prefect in each region to

coordinate an inter-*département* Conference (CID) of prefects and other officials; and the PARs and DAT plans to be integrated – as DAT had proposed – but under the control of a committee chaired by the Plan Commissariat, with DAT as vice-chair.

The Senate immediately set up a committee to fight the reforms (Roig 1964: 15–16), while 'the majority of prefects were strongly opposed to any kind of regional reform' (Machin 1977: 53). Prime Minister Debré made the CIDs responsible for implementing the regional plans, but the prefects boycotted the CIDs. Debré suggested the Interior Minister write individually to the prefect in the principal town of each region, designating them the 'coordinating prefect' of a CID (Grémion 1979: 135–7). These prefects were still unable to coordinate the technical field services, who continued to report to their Paris office (Bauchet 1964: 57; Roig 1964: 32).

Regional reform was pursued more vigorously by President de Gaulle once the Algerian crisis was over. He appointed a minister for administrative reform who studied proposals from the Interior Ministry, DATAR and the Plan Commissariat. De Gaulle wanted a strong role for economic and social regional committees, and Guichard seems to have tried but failed to persuade the likely members to agree. DATAR then proposed the CODERs, which combined members of the expansion committees with local *élus* in one consultative body. Prime Minister Pompidou approved DATAR's scheme, but President de Gaulle later accepted the Interior Ministry's suggestions to make the CODERs smaller, and put the prefects in a stronger position when dealing with them (Grémion 1992b: 36–7). On the other hand, de Gaulle took the final step in agreeing in a Council of Ministers to create the 'Prefect of the Region', though well aware of the prefects' opposition: 'It was not without some apprehension that [they] envisaged the changes to be introduced in the long-established balance of local appointments and practices, as well as in the ranks of their own hierarchy' (De Gaulle 1971: II, 369). These reforms did not bring the renewal of elites or the 'rational' regional spending that DATAR wanted, but transferred to regions the *départemental* networks of solidarity – and rivalry – and traditional patterns of 'sharing out' funding (Grémion and Worms 1968: 51). Pierre Grémion (1976: 129) thought the 'winner of the [1964] administrative reforms was the Interior Ministry', because it controlled the implementation, yet the prefects were also constrained by established ties when they nominated to the CODERS 'their' *élus* rather than business people and academics.

The idea of greater socio-economic representation of regions was pursued by de Gaulle after 'May 1968' with its calls for 'participation'. The

president asked Guichard (Minister for *Aménagement du territoire* and Regionalization) and Jean-Marcel Jeanneney (Minister for Regional and Senate Reform) for referendum proposals. The latter's were chosen by de Gaulle but rejected by the electorate after senators campaigned strongly against the proposals (Jeanneney 1992: 83). In 1972 President Pompidou introduced instead the two-tier *établissements publics régionaux* (EPRs), made up of a regional council mainly of *élus* (some chosen by the prefect), and an economic and social committee. They were restricted to an advisory role, Pompidou being caught between the conservatism of many parliamentarians and the aspirations raised in the CODERs and revealed in electoral campaigns by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber (Essig 1979: 113; Machin 1977: 61; Phlipponneau 1981: 69). In the Giscard presidency, DATAR was asked by Prime Minister Barre to draft a list of additional regional powers, which was adopted by the Blois 'Common Programme of the Right' for the 1978 parliamentary elections, but then dropped.

Left-wing opposition leaders (Defferre, Le Pensec, Mauroy and Mitterrand) proposed bills to strengthen the EPRs or elect them directly, and though the Barre government rejected the bills it extended regions' legal powers, and some regions extended their practical power, a new generation of reform-minded prefects accepting the changes (Philip 1976: 25–7). Within a year of President Mitterrand's election, Defferre's Act of 2 March 1982 had transferred political responsibility to the EPRs. DATAR's minister, 'the rival' Rocard, was *persona non grata* in Mitterrand circles and had little to do with the Act (Grémion 1987: 245). Many parliamentarians, as local *élus*, resisted the transfer of power, seeing prefectoral supervision as their guarantee against risk and local pressures, but Defferre was adamant (Favier and Martin-Roland 1990: 146; Grémion 1987: 244). In the Interior Ministry, 'though the reform was not adopted cheerfully, it was accepted without argument, and the prefectoral corps in particular . . . "played the reform game" once parliament had decided, as normal in a Republic' (Giuily 1992: 124).

Elections to regional councils were repeatedly postponed because of the Left's poor showing in polls (Douence 1995: 12–13). The delays enabled the *président* of the *département* to become installed as the 'new strong man', taking the prefect's executive role – while appointing former prefects as chief advisers (Favier and Martin-Roland 1990: 148). President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Fabius made a 'bizarre choice' of an electoral system for regions using the *département* as constituency, 'to satisfy the president's concern to ensure the *départements* survived'. It meant regional councillors would pay more attention to the demands of

their *département* than of the region, but the regions were now political bodies (Chevallier *et al*. 2002: 322–5).

Regionalization decisions compared

A four-stage analytical framework similar to that used in Chapter 6 can be applied to regionalization:

- the positional resources and constraints of the Constitution and its conventions, and the configuration of the party system;
- the actions of the bureaucratic organizations and other actors in response to policy changes on regional institutions;
- the leadership's use of institutional and contingent constraints and opportunities in deciding the instrument; and
- the constraints during implementation by such factors as the duration of the leadership's mandate.

For each reform project in Table 7.1, evidence on these themes was compiled into a database, of which Table 7.2 is an example. The database was organized around Blondel's main analytical themes, with the addition of a summary of the outcome in terms of the institutional development of regions. The information from each database is summarized in Table 7.3 to compare data more easily and to show the material that backs up the claims in the brief analysis below. At the end of each row, the instrument is evaluated succinctly in terms of the estimated impact of the instrument on the extent of change towards political regions, and a 'star rating' assigned. Projects were rated '0' to *** depending on the amount of change that occurred (bearing in mind Blondel's distinction between managing, adjusting and innovating), or X if it reversed the regionalization process. Since many authors stress the potential significance of 'events' as a 'critical resource' for leaders, this data is categorized too, as 'system' changes (such as the first 'alternation' of political power in the Fifth Republic in 1981), 'major' crises (decolonization problems in 1954–55) or the merely 'electoral' threat to the ruling executive.

To guide the qualitative analysis a 'quantivised' version of other information in Table 7.3 was drawn up, as for the previous chapter. In Table 7.4 each cell has a 'tick' ($\sqrt{}$), zero ('0') or a 'cross' (X), depending on whether the action or view of the actor favoured stronger regions ($\sqrt{}$), there was no input ('0') or there was opposition to regionalization (X). Where there was a clear bifurcation of views within a group of officials or *élus* (such as between rural and big-city mayors), or the actors

Table 7.1 Regionalization instruments 1944–86

	Prime Minister	**Instrument**	**Year**
•	*Vichy State*		
R1	Darlan	Vichy regional administration	1941
•	*Liberation Government*		
R2	De Gaulle	Regional commissioners	1944
R3	Gouin	Abolition of regional administration	1946
•	*President Auriol 1946–53*		
R4	Schuman	Creation of regional IGAMEs	1947
R5	Marie to Queuille	Regional reform under IGAMEs	1948
R6	Queuille to Faure	Economic regionalization reforms	1948
R7	Pinay to Laniel	Rejection of regional administration	1952
•	*President Coty 1954–58*		
R8	Mendès	Official expansion committees	1954
R9	Faure	Regional action programmes	1955
R10	Faure	Economic programme regions	1955
R11	Faure	Preparation of regional action programmes	1955
R12	Mollet	Relaunch of regional administrative reforms	1956
R13	Mollet	DAT regional plans	1957
R14	De Gaulle	Relaunch of regional administrative reforms	1958
•	*President De Gaulle 1959–69*		
R15	Debré	Interdepartmental conference	1959
R16	Debré	Regional administrative boundaries	1960
R17	Debré	Regional coordinating prefect	1961
R18	Debré	Official regional expansion committees	1961
R19	Pompidou	Regional administrative reform	1962
R20	Pompidou	Reform of regional committees	1963
R21	Pompidou	Introduction of CODERs	1964
R22	Pompidou	Prefect of the Region	1964
R23	Pompidou	Implementation of 1964 reforms	1964
R24	Pompidou	De Gaulle's socio-economic regions	1966
R25	Couve	Regional referendum	1968
•	*President Pompidou 1969–74*		
R26	Chaban	Regional deconcentration	1970
R27	Chaban	Act on EPR regional bodies	1972
•	*President Giscard d'Estaing 1974–81*		
R28	Chirac	Promise then halt to regionalization	1974
R29	Barre	Blois programme	1978
R30	Barre	Bonnet Bill, Barre decrees	1980
•	*President Mitterrand 1981–95*		
R31	Mauroy	Defferre Act 1982	1982
R32	Mauroy	Planning Reform Act 1982–83	1982
R33	Mauroy	Implementation of Defferre's reform	1982
R34	Fabius	Election of regional councils	1986

Table 7.2 Example of regionalization instrument database

R25	Regional referendum of 27 April 1969	1968
Political leaders	President: De Gaulle Prime Minister: Couve de Murville; Interior: Marcellin; Reform and Regions: Jeanneney; AdT and regionalization: Guichard	
Instrument and context	De Gaulle wanted referendum on socio-economic representation, in regions and Senate; referendum proposals prepared by Jeanneney and Guichard; J's option chosen, and fails.	
DATAR	Drew up suggestions for Minister Guichard.	*Essig 1979: 110
Role of President	After parl. elections July 1968, asked Tricot to brief him. In July 1968 wrote to PM: 'Jeanneney is to prepare referendum'; chose J's project because detailed, would not need an Act. 'De Gaulle absolutely insisted: regions to have full power over decisions, but regional prefect to prepare dossiers and execute decisions as guarantee against partisanship and fiefdoms'.	*Tricot 1977: 111; Jeanneney 1992: 73, 93; *J. in Huguenin 1998: 18
Role of PM	Told National Assembly that only a State-selected prefect, not elected regional assembly could be effective, ensure general interest. Advised President not to hold the referendum. PM not very keen, delayed holding it.	Hayward 1983: 51; Tricot 1990: 143; *Jeanneney 1992: 83
Role of AdT minister	Prepared brief questions; wanted two separate referendums; later said President right to have one. Held a large survey of regions. With de Gaulle at Quimper 2 February 1969 when President promoted regions. Guichard ('but not certain colleagues') wanted élus and group representation on equal terms (except on budget), 'to inspire innovation and mobilise all regional actors in economic market'.	*Guichard 1975: 103; *Aubry 1988: 134, 130–2
Interior Minister	Couve and Marcellin wanted to resist public disorder, and therefore gave a key role to Prefects.	Machin 1977: 59
Minister of Reform	In National Assembly 11 December 1968 referred to Clemenceau's regional project to remove old structures. Transform society by decentralization and participation by socio-professional groups.	Rémond 1999:13–14

Table 7.2   (Continued)

R25	Regional referendum of 27 April 1969	1968
Prefects role and view	'Prefectoral corps apprehensive … of changes to be introduced in the long-established balance of local appointments and practices, as well as in the ranks of their own hierarchy'.	*De Gaulle Memoirs, II 1971: 369
Elus role and view	Local notables opposed to regional reform and also anti-region. 80% of notables wanted prefect to exercise regional powers; PS notables said would reduce role of departments, groups would take over from élus.	Hayward 1983: 51; *Phlipponneau 1981: 35, 48)
Regional actors	Regionalists said proposals inadequate, undemocratic: these were reasons for voting 'No'.	*Phlipponneau 1981: 35
Critical resources	Referendum delayed while Guichard organized his regional survey, which gave Senators extra time to campaign against it.	*Jeanneney 1992: 83
Other issues	Regionalization proposed on 27 April 1969 was really wanted by voters, but they did not understand why it was also damaging Senate.	Grémion 1992a: 39
Outcomes for regions	Guichard thought CODERs 'indispensable counterweight to implementation by State regional administration' as a transitional phase – but could not persuade regional people; 1969 the end of CODERs and regions.	*Camous 1973: 223

Note: * Primary source.

changed their minds (President Giscard in the face of divergent electoral pressures), the 'division' symbol (÷) was assigned.

A preliminary statistical interpretation is that the political leadership made an impact on regionalization in proportion to its collective ambition. Nearly all instruments that achieved most change (6 of the 7** or ***), such as the appointment of regional prefects in 1964, were supported by a majority of the leaders. Of those that did not succeed (such as the regional referendum of 1969), less than half were supported by a majority of leaders (3 of 8 with '0'). Those that made modest changes, such as the creation of the CID, fell in between: two-thirds

Table 7.3 Regionalization data meta-matrix: projects R1 to R34

Projects	Leaders' input				Bureaucratic input		Other actors		Policy process	
DAT/Minister AdT	President	PM	Minister of Interior	Minister of Economy	Prefects	Other officials	Elus	Regional actors	Critical resources	Outcome for regions
R1 1941–44 *Vichy regional administration*									**System**	*
Appoints staff to regions; provincial elites to advise administration	Wants provinces, governors and councils in Constitution	Creates Regional Prefects, for order and economy	Asked ministries to align boundaries on provinces	Wants non-bureaucratic region to help implement State policies	Regional Prefects are political upstarts – a threat to Corps	Many ministries, e.g. Beaux-Arts adapt to new framework	Councils would displace 3rd Rep 'pals' of MPs/ Senators	Expansion committees start; Brittany given official status	Wartime regime imposed structure for order, food	Vichy survived most in admin, economic modernization, planning
R2 1944 *Regional Commissioners*									**System**	*
Appoints regional staff; Gravier reports on industrial relocation, AdT	De Gaulle wanted Regional Commissioners to restore order, did not have 90 prefects; wants order and an efficient territorial scale		Wants prefects to restore unitary state		Prefects are 25% from corps. Commissioners not prefects but top resisters	Most ministries reconcentrate powers 1944; Prefects just go-betweens	Department élus hostile to Commissioner; not accountable locally	Suspicion of regional cttees. Breton regionalists suppressed	Liberation tactic to keep down PCF and keep out US-led admin	Vichy broke ice for regional reorganization for order in automobile age
R3 1946 *Abolition of regional administration*									**0**	**X**
PCF minister sacks regional staff. DAT focuses on urban planning			Budget provision for Regl Commrs but parl refused; posts abolished in May 1946		50% prefects from old corps. Against Regl Commnrs– screen prefects from ministers	Many retain regional structures but with variety of boundaries	Praised dept; reduced Commissioner budget in December 1945, then to zero in March 1946	Moselle sets up modernization committee	De Gaulle paralyzed by parties in 1945 when peace restored	Region smelt of sulphur; Debré – dangerous for national unity

Table 7.3 (Continued)

Projects	Leaders' input				Bureaucratic input		Other actors		Policy process	
DAT/Minister AdT	President	PM	Minister of Interior	Minister of Economy	Prefects	Other officials	Elus	Regional actors	Critical resources	Outcome for regions
R4 1947 *Creation of regional IGAME*									**Major**	*
Gravier's book: deconcentrate for economic balance and civic virtues	Auriol advised ministers: strengthen department prefect	Interior Minister against deconcentration to prefect; but in strikes persuades parl to fund 8 IGAMEs to coordinate prefects – then agrees would be city prefect		Gets INSEE in IGAME regions agreed by Parl	Condemned regions to save dept. IGAMEs were 'regions in disguise'	Closon, head of Census, wants region like CODER of 1964	MPs will fund IGAMEs if no admin reform nor attack on prefects	Region too large to be controlled by elus' trad processes	Severe strikes used by Moch to persuade parliament	Crisis used to restore regional officials but limited by prefects, MPs
R5 1948–51 Regional reform under IGAME									**0**	*
Pro-AdT Minister. Planners want and adopt IGAME regions	PM Queuille makes dep-IGAME prefects, Bidault give IGAMEs regional role, Queuille (PM and Interior Minister) says ministries can delegate to IGAMEs		Asks IGAMEs to consult prefects in regional meeting	IGEN officials adopt IGAME regions; Bloch-Lainé wants links to groups	Consecrates …adminis-trative regionalism of sad [Vichy] memory	40 pluri-dept field services by 1950; helps resistance to change		Gravier book stimulates 'regional Poujadism' in social groups	Department inadequate but protected by Constitu-tion	Government starts regional administrative reform under IGAME
R6 1948–53 Economic regionalization reforms									**0**	*
Gravier encourages Minister to aid regional economic groups; organize informal associations; set up regional missions		Queuille PM and Min Fin, then Pleven encourages AdT Minister. Then Queuille PM and Min Interior, makes law on SEM regional development companies		Economic officials work with Min AdT; on SEMs for regional devt	Given no control over SEM development missions	Caisse, Industry help regional develop-ment in SEMs	Politicians are important in committees but not their initiative	Initiative from local groups; form CNER, pressurize government		Committees sensitize public and ministers on relocation, AdT and regions

R7 1952–53 *Rejection of regional administration*

							0	X
Some links with Brittany but otherwise no role. PM anti-planning	Pinay (PM and Min Fin) concentrates on budget	Gives power to prefects, not IGAME, to coordinate devt funds.	Most prefects complain about IGAMEs; but prefect Pisani starts department committee to mobilize local economic development	CGP sends Gravier to CELIB, says match local to CGP goals	Vichy settlement – Vichy MPs amnestied March 1953	Brittany makes Plan, pushes regional plans with CGP and DAT		Regional administration was rejected

R8 1954 *Official expansion committees*

							Major	*
'AdT -industrial conversion posed admin coordination problems'	PM wants economic progress by modern State. Moved Plan to Min Econ. Set up group of economic advisers. Decrees to approve one representative committees, keep goodwill of local actors, set up regional devt SEMs	Strong role on economic AdT; Decree on regl SEMs; IGEN given a role	Prefects and IGEN to select cttees, attend meetings with field heads	Hierarchical officials do not like reform, know the tricks (Chaban)	Tolerated MF while he took responsibility for colonies	'Bretons as influential in decrees as Gravier'	'Regional action of MF, Faure, Mollet, result of crisis, but pragmatic'	Offers regional committees role to avoid excesses, keep goodwill

R9 1955 *Regional Action Programmes* (PARs)

							Major	**
Wants 10 Parises; but lacks resources and powers on AdT	PM says must develop underused regions, and Plan. 'Did practical reform; enabled State devt aid to be given to regional devt not just industrial conversion'	Decrees on PARs and funds – do not state for what territory, who draws up; creates SDR banks; National Council of committees, 'first try at coherent apparatus'	Pisani says AdT needs reform of State, admin, taxes, habits and boundaries	Min Fin starts PAR; IGAME and IGEN argue; CGP left to do it.	Think about 'querelles de clocher' on funds, not the future	Expansion cttees chaired by Pflimlin, Faure, Pleven Chaban	Faure voted special econ, social powers: used to make the decrees	Mendes F, Faure strongly promote economic regionalism

Table 7.3 (Continued)

Projects	Leaders' input				Bureaucratic input		Other actors		Policy process	
DAT/Minister AdT	President	PM	Minister of Interior	Minister of Economy	Prefects	Other officials	Elus	Regional actors	Critical resources	Outcome for regions
R10 1955 *Economic programme regions*									**Major**	**
CGP-DAT group define 19 [Clementel] regions. 'No time for study'.		Radicals implement economic regionalism like Clementel		Creates SDR banks in large regions, do not help weakest regions.	IGAME: IGEN conflict on plans, prefects reluctant, job goes to CGP	Top CS wanted 7–12 regions, like technical paradigm	19 regions changed to 22 to pacify rival towns and adminis-tration		Faure voted special econ, social powers: used to make the decrees	Regions delineated; Ag, Public Works, designate regional official
R11 1955 *Preparation of regional progs* (*PARs*)									**0**	**0**
'Unsuited to AdT'. No role in CGP PARs. DAT starts own plans		Arrêté: Regional expansion committees to be consulted on SDRs	Econ minister asks IGAMEs to help organize LA consultation	IGENs asked to consult cttees. Pflimlin rejects DAT's plans	Say difficult to consult cttees because role defined re a department.	CGP control from Paris; new ministerial collabora-tion slow	CGP make little contact with elus for fear of regional demands	PARs depend on élus or group taking initiative, and resources		Appeals for coordination between CGP and DAT never succeeded
R12 1956–57 *Relaunch of regional administrative reforms*									**0**	**0**
Close relations with national CNER organized by Pflimlin		Fixed borders for 22 PAR regions around depts. Did not want regions	PAR and IGAME zones aligned. IGAMEs made top prefects	Prefects, IGEN to encourage regional committees	Prefects ignore IGAME. Corps warns prefects of risks from regions.	Regional boundaries decreed, but field services did not comply	Department presidents complain that regional expansion committees approved. Leads to approval of many committees created by departments.		Regional reform outside rev-olutionary period, and pragmatic	'IGAME resisted by prefects, officials, PARs left to CGP'

R13 1957 *DAT regional plans*									**0**	*
Efficiency committee report says DAT unable to coordinate multi-admin action on AdT. DAT asks for regional development plans in August 1957 housing law			EEC Treaty assumes 'European-size regions'		Prefects, IGENs and service chiefs learn habit of meeting to draw up joint position on PAR; but department and central admins keep power on execution	'Structural reforms need resolute political will' (Debre's Racine, May 1957)	Breton MOB demands financial autonomy and elected council	Economic regionalism not administrative regionalism'	**0**	CCECRSP report: AdT is a rationale to reform field services
R14 1958 *Relaunch of regional administrative reforms*									**System**	*
CGP DAT plans fused; Min, PM appoint 3 Regional commissioners	Region to aid F influence as well as own development; asked Boulloche and Mollet (and B-Lainé) to propose efficient administrative regrouping		Interior Minister appoints Reform Group which produces – after changes – decree on regional harmonization, prefect to run coordinating CID		Some IGAME/ Prefects want regions; strong Prefect role in AdT. Most not	CCERSP '58: AdT needs coord. Prefect; all Ministers to use 22 regions	Petits notables subordinated to State AdT/'made allies in restructuring'	Regional cttees consulted. CGP drew up plans	**System** De Gaulle voted full powers June 1958 to solve Algeria	PAR plans agreed by Plan, DAT, FDES, Ministries, in committee
R15 1959 *Interdepartmental Conference – CID*									**Major**	*
No input	As PM, made decree to create CID; but said 'Vive la Creuse'	Wants large depts, run by officials, but not to rival prefects	Chatenet: improve depts not make regions; Frey replaces	Min Fin's cut-backs and Gaullist expansion are in conflict	Prefects resisted CID; will accept it only if chair and site rotated	CS obstacles led PM to shelve department reform	Senate (of rural grands notables) set up group to veto reforms	Urban, industry forces gain access to govt through regional cttees	**Major** Algerian crisis led PM to restrict reform to 'inter-dept' coordination	Inter-department coordination under prefect starts

Table 7.3 (Continued)

Projects	Leaders' input				Bureaucratic input		Other actors		Policy process	
DAT/Minister AdT	President	PM	Minister of Interior	Minister of Economy	Prefects	Other officials	Elus	Regional actors	Critical resources	Outcome for regions
R16 1960 *Regional administrative boundaries*									**Major**	*
DAT on Mairey boundary Commission	'Tempted by provinces' when Debré writing 1958 Constitution	Wanted economic regions, not 'federalism'	Mairey boundary commission wanted large depts or Euro-regions. Minister said one too old and other too young. So 22 regions remained		Upset by CID, attached to depts and to equality of prefects	Debré's staff acted from own ideas more than Debré's will	Depts assured that trad offices not harmed by 'convenient units for AdT'	PM needed decree for conference of regional committees	PM signs letters despite Algeria riots 'Business must go on'	Harmonization on 21 'regl action areas' but no capitals
R17 1961 *Regional coordinating prefect*									**0**	*
Plan for 8 Euro-regions. Minister did not appoint regional chiefs	Says Regional Prefect to be head of economic and social region	Insists Interior Minister names Chairs of CID when prefects resist	One prefect to have regional economic role: dept prefects to keep powers	IGENs lose role to Prefects once Prefects decide have to accept reform	Some prefects favourable to regions, but others boycott CIDs	Only Ponts, Construc-tion, Agriculture name regional heads.	After 1959 changes made by orders/circulars, not parliament		Debré and Vth could accept IV's regions because not ideological	'CID collegiality a good first move, since other admin reform opposed'
R18 1961 *Official regional expansion committees*									**Electoral**	*
Economic devt needs plans developed with community, till autonomous	PM told CNER would recognize cttees in CID areas, so CNER would press admin for CID; wanted committees to be more legitimate, representative of TUs		Bloch-Lainé wants regional groups for democratic planning	Prefects, IGEN asked to get regional cttees set up quickly	CGP said committee to give views on regional, but not State Plan	Rivalries meant many/no cttees in some regions	Brittany refused decree rules. Kept own cttee and élus' cttee	Bretons started direct action; their MPs pressed admin.	Revival of decree to approve regional committees

Projects	Leaders' input				Bureaucratic input		Other actors		Policy process	
DATAR	President	PM and Min. AdT	Minister of Interior	Min. of Admin. Reform	Prefects	Other officials	Elus	Regional actors	Critical resources	Outcome for regions
R19 1962 *Regional administrative project*									0	*
Pushes for large met-regions. Main planning link with regions	Appts Min Ad Reform: prefect to be regl chef; groups to be represented	Regionalizes budget; takes on DATAR and CGP; staff monitor reform	Appts directeur de cabinet favourable to regional reform	Saw project as improving coherence of policy	A few coordinating prefects wanted CID/CAR strengthened	CGP found regional plans difficult: used only West, East and Paris	Political class more hostile to de Gaulle after 1962 referendum	Regional unity rare; depart-ment a solid admin reality		DATAR and Minister start to prepare coordinated regional action
R20 1963 *Reform of regional committees*									0	0
Wants controlled consultative regional institutions	Wants better socio-econ representa-tion at regional level	Appts friend Guichard to DATAR, main reformer of region bodies	Wants repre-sentative cttee, not new body – or elus would object	Wants cttees with planning role, more representa-tive, not new body	Some coordinating prefects wanted rep-resentative committees	CGP asserts that cttees a way to create new Gaullist local elites	Cttees were 'philately societies', or political opposition	CNER liked DATAR plans, then saw would lead to political control		President's and DATAR option for regions is not accepted
R21 1964 *Introduction of CODERs*									0	**
Designed CODER; put under prefect; let expansion cttees die	Agreed CODER but amended: keep cttees; CODER to be much smaller	PM agreed Guichard plan: not plan of Min Int, Admin Reform, CGP	Against regional institution; would bring political problems	Liked DATAR proposal; added CODER powers, cttees to remain	Wanted weak regional body of local élus; to inform not consult	CGP said CODER will endanger Plan; upset region	Grand élus on cttees feared link to CODER would lead to cttee capture	Guichard visiting chief towns – idea of CODERs born then		First official regional body – with exclusive consulta-tion rights

Table 7.3 (Continued)

Projects	Leaders' input				Bureaucratic input		Other actors		Policy process	
DATAR/Min AdT	President	PM	Minister of Interior	Min. of Admin. Reform	Prefects	Other officials	Elus	Regional actors	Critical resources	Outcome for regions
R22 1947 *Prefect of the Region*									**0**	**
Not much interest in prefectoral reform	Agreed provisions in Conseil: Prefect to be regional patron	Agrees regional prefect to stay as department prefect	Favoured regional reform; but regl prefect to stay as dept prefect.	Wanted reform: strong powers to regional prefect	Told by PM to tell élus, groups that AdT to be through regional action	Min Int and CGP sorted out planning articles without conflict	Were told: 'not a new admin tier', 'keeps character of local councils'	Regionali-zing Plan a serious challenge to Prefect and his notables		'Region' used as noun for first time (not as adjective)
R23 1964 *Implementation of 1964 reforms*									**0**	**0**
Did not get political aim, but experience let it insert itself in provinces	Determined to deconcentrate, not decentralize. Told Prefects to confine committees to studies, and CODER to consultation	'Winner of reform' by 1968, because controlled execution	Created interminis-terial mission to monitor execution	Circumscri-bed by existing relations: put dept élus on CODERs	Set up regional offices; but dept office refused to 'delegate' to it	Committee regionalist spirit replaced by 'village mentality'	Treason of notables: Left fought for dept when Gaullist helped regions		Trad department networks re-established at region level
R24 1966–68 *De Gaulle's socio-economic regions*									**Major**	**0**
Minister wants budget, AdT decentral-ized. Consults regions widely	Wants socio-econ regional assembly and referendum – abandoned	De Gaulle's project will fail. Agreement to elections instead	[Jeanneney against; a rushed text – would fail]	Only 2 of 22 regional prefects want a separate deptl prefect	Rocard, Jean Moulin, DATAR and Pisani vaunting regionalism	'Admin cannot ignore Chirac and Chadernagor in Limousin'	Functional regionalism brought more regional demands	'Conseil des ministres held in middle of Paris insur-rection'	De Gaulle withdraws it on Pompidou's advice

R25 1968–69 *Regional referendum*

									0	0
Minister to propose referendum Q; DATAR makes suggestions	Wants élus-socio-econ assemblies; and prefect to execute.	'Not against' but not for; prefect to execute, non-elected council	Feared public disorder, so gave key role to Prefects	Regional project to remove out of date admin divisions	Want to keep old balance of appts, methods; and own ranks.		PS wants to keep want role of dept. Grands notables want prefect to run	Regionalists said reform inadequate; undemocratic; should vote no	Referendum delayed; gave Senators time to campaign	Guichard thought CODER should balance admin but could not impose idea

R26 1970 *Regional deconcentration*

									Electoral	0
Back to admin deconcentration; assumes will have economic regions	Learns lesson. Overrules PM. Functional de-concentration – Union of Depts	Wants regions: gave admin and finance powers to Regl Prefects	Rural Commissioners use regional funds as DATAR not prefect decides	Junior minister: region must not become a State – break up France	Not able to control field officials	Paris admin resist transfer of responsibility to R. Prefects.	Senate able to persuade the local élus that should not have regions	16 regions want to try Chaban's regionalization experiment	Servan-Schreiber relaunches regional idea in by-elections	No de-centralization, more powers to Regional Prefect

R27 1972 *Act on EPR regional bodies*

									Electoral	**
No role in Act. Implements it. 11 regional missions.	Draws up with his advisers: wants trad élus to take stock of modernization	PM and regional demands push Act on reluctant President	No role.	Cautious reformer Frey asked to write a narrow law.	New ex-ENA Regl Prefects appointed, interested in regl econ devt	INSEE helps DATAR set up regional economic observatories	Reform had to please both centrist Senate notables and Gaullists	CODER did not satisfy, but maintained aspirations.	JJ Servan-Schreiber's candidacy forces reform, but has to go through Parl	Regions now economic quangos: centre-left promise political regions

Table 7.3 (Continued)

Projects	Leaders' input				Bureaucratic input		Other actors		Policy process	
DATAR	President	PM	Min. Plan and AdT	Minister of Interior	Prefects	Other officials	Elus	Regional actors	Critical resources	Outcome for regions
R28 1974–75 *Promise then halt to regionalization*									**Electoral**	**0**
Wants regions to steer decentralization; proposes Plan Contracts	March 1975 says wants regions. November 1975 says cannot replace other councils	March 1975 says will decentralize; March 1976 says regions will not be real authorities	Regional Prefect given prefects' powers on dept funds	JJ Servan-Schreiber appointed but PM soon asked Pres to sack him	Must work with local elus. Elected regions should decide but not execute		PS introduce regional Bills; Faure, Gaullists want bigger role for regions	Elus on EPR represent Depts. Many hostile to socio-economic cttees	Corsican riots; regionalists lose in 1973 elections	Councils the representative of departments, more than regions
R29 1978 *Blois programme*									**Electoral**	*
Proposes new regional powers; issues regional Scenario	Talks of decentralization – then1972 Act to be tried for 10 years first	Negotiates Blois Program: wants region's role to grow	Lecanuet asks DATAR: reflect on regional inferences of Guichard report		Some prefects annul Regional Council acts. Others let them overstep law	Bloch-Lainé still wants metropoles policy. Paris too large	Pressurize to increase funds. Senate bill on region's own economic plan	Hostility between depts or main towns in some regions	Economic problems and Servan-Schreiber pressure	EPR economic development role grows, some develop political identity

R30 1980 *Bonnet Bill, Barre decrees*

									0	*
'DATAR and Regl Commrs short-circuit Prefects, EPR but good work'	'Use 1972 Act fully'. Gives Regl Council new powers to fund econ devt	PM drops Blois proposals after elections. 1980 starts intermin review of Act; 1981 decrees extend CR powers but keep EPR status	Bonnet Bill on local freedom – but not region. Senate agree then silence	Some prefects the regional coordinator of economic action	Report on EPRs – to do both more and less than 1972 law	Senate Bill for regions. PS introduce Bill in Nat Assembly	Giraud (Ile-de-France): decentralize to regions, to responsi-bilize			Economic need pulling EPRs further than 1972 law intended

R31 1982 *Defferre Act of 2 March 1982*

									System	***
No input	Wanted elected regions, decentraliza-tion; pro-department and prefects	Wants decentraliza-tion to regions, though a big-city actor	Rocard pro-region; wanted to participate but had little to do with it.	For big cities; wants responsible, free, elected regions	Defferre would abolish but Constitution, President, élus protect them	Gaullists: elected CR threat to national unity; Mitterrandistes for departments: Rocardians regions; Mauroy large regions: but Nord and Picardy against		No regional contribu-tions from grassroots in 1981	Priority to rapid institutional reform and transfer of power to élus	Transfer of power; political regions created

R32 1982–83 *Planning Reform Act and Contracts*

									System	**
Had Contracts idea. Coordinated; but pressed from top and below.	Pushed Rocard to more reformist texts than wanted, in Conseil	Agreed in CIATs. Asked friend to oversee negotiation.	Gave DATAR coordination role. Weak. No Plan contacts in Ministries	Had history of arguments with a Parisian DATAR	Negotiate with regions, and propose State priorities	Ministries go direct to regions. Promote own sectoral plans	Some notables able to modify Contract after CIAT by direct access	Mostly unused to planning. Want powers but often over-whelmed	Technical debate by administra-tion, a few grand notables	State-Region Plan Contracts a concrete role that defined regions

Table 7.3 (Continued)

Projects	Leaders' input				Bureaucratic input		Other actors		Policy process	
DATAR	President	PM	Min. Plan and AdT	Minister of Interior	Prefects	Other officials	Elus	Regional actors	Critical resources	Outcome for regions
R33 1983–86 *Implementation of Defferre's reform*									**Electoral**	**0**
Missions go to regions; new regional commissioners created.	Told Defferre to keep prefect and let ministers keep powers	Devolved regional aids to regions.	Delors, Fabius, Rocard and Lang want to keep grip on their budgets	Says will give as many new powers to Prefects as give to regions	'Directs' field admin. Regain power because electorally useful to Government	First against decentral-ization; then senior officials use for career	While wait for CR elections, Pres of dept becomes 'new strong man'	Until election, Council represented by MPs and local councillors	Right won Depts 1982: 'naive to give the powers to others'	Ministers fight loss of power: 'classic French politico-admin reform'
R34 1986 *Election of Regional Councils*									**Electoral**	*
No role	Promotes PR by depts to save depts and give best effect for PS	Opposed to regions. Wants PR by dept to stop regional 'dukes'	(Defferre) No input known	Presents Bill: 'Depart-ment deeply rooted in ancient history'			Most PS want departmental election; a few PR by dept; Right against PR	Big cities became de jure as well as de facto powerful	Government doing badly in polls, want to minimize losses	Electoral system reinforces department strategies of councillors

Notes: change of column headings. Star rating: 0 to *** in order of level of institutional change towards regions; X means a move away.

Table 7.4 Regionalization instruments in order of impact

		DAT/DATAR	Political leaders					Bureaucrats		Other actors		Policy process	
			President	PM	Interior	Economy	AdT	Prefects	Others	Elus	Regional	Crisis	Outcome
R3	1946	0		0	√	0	X	X	X	X	√	0	X
R7	1953	0	X	0	X	0	0	÷	÷	X	√	0	X
R12	1956	√	0	X	√	√	0	X	X	X	0	0	0
R11	1955	0	0	√	√	√	0	X	X	0	√	0	0
R20	1963	√	√	0	X	0	0	÷	X	X	÷	0	0
R23	1964	√	0	÷	√	0	÷	÷	X	X	√	0	0
R24	1968	√	√	X	0	0	√	X	√	√	√	Major	0
R25	1969	√	√	0	X	0	√	X	0	X	X	0	0
R28	1974	√	÷	÷	√	0y	√	÷	0	√	÷	Electoral	0
R33	1982	0	X	√	X	0	0	0	0	X	√	Electoral	0
R1	1941	√	√	√	√	√	√	X	√	0	√	System	*
R2	1944	√		√	X	0	√	0	X	X	X	System	*
R4	1947	√	X	0	√	√	0	X	√	√	0y	Major	*
R5	1948	√	0	√	√	√	√	X	X	0	√	0	*
R6	1948	√	0	√	0	√	√	0	√	÷	√	0	*
R13	1957	√	0	0	0	0	÷	0	0	0	√	0	*
R14	1958	√	0	√	√	0	√	÷	√	√	√	System	*
R16	1960	√	√	√	√	0	√	0	√	÷	√	Major	*
R18	1961	√	0	√	0	0	√	÷	√	X	√	Electoral	*
R19	1962	√	√	√	√	√	√	÷	X	X	X	0	*

Table 7.4 (Continued)

		DAT/DATAR	Political leaders					Bureaucrats		Other actors		Policy process	
			President	PM	Interior	Economy	AdT	Prefects	Others	Elus	Regional	Crisis	Outcome
R8	1954	0	0	√	0	√	√	0	X	X	√	Major	*
R15	1960	0	√	√	÷	0	√	X	X	X	√	Major	*
R17	1961	0	√	√	÷	0	√	÷	÷	0	√	0	*
R26	1970	√	√	√	0	0	√	÷	X	X	√	Electoral	*
R29	1978	√	÷	√	0	√	√	÷	√	√	÷	Electoral	*
R30	1980	0	÷	÷	0	0	÷	√	√	√	√	0	*
R34	1986	0	X	X	X	0	0	0	0	X	√	Electoral	*
R9	1955	√	0	√	0	√	0	÷	√	X	√	Major	**
R10	1955	√	0	√	0	√	√	X	√	X	0	Major	**
R21	1964	√	√	√	X	0	√	X	X	÷	÷	0	**
R32	1982	√	√	√	√	X	1	√	X	÷	÷	0	**
R22	1964	0	√	0	√	0	0	÷	√	X	0	0	**
R27	1972	0	√	√	0	0	√	√	√	√	√	Electoral	**
R31	1982	0	√	√	√	0	√	X	0	÷	0	System	***

Notes: √ = input favouring regionaliszation; X = opposition. 0 = no view/input; ÷ = divided/varying views. Star rating: 0 to *** of level of change towards regions; X = move away.

had been supported by the majority (11 of 17*), though there were anomalous cases, in particular the regional council elections of 1986 further legitimized the region, despite the president, prime minister and interior minister choosing an electoral system that sustained the *département*. Of the 34 leadership initiatives, only two explicitly reversed or halted regionalization (abolition of the Commissioners in 1946, and the assurances in 1952–53 that the prefects would not lose powers to the IGAMEs). Of the 32 initiatives intended to strengthen the regional level, three-quarters (24) succeeded, but less than a quarter of all reforms (7 of 34) introduced substantial change.

The link between leadership aims and output is not just statistical but is supported by evidence of their active involvement in many decisions. For example, 'it was a personal idea of Michel Debré in April 1960' to use an announcement to the national council of regional economic committees (CNER) to 'bounce' the prefects into activating the CID (Grémion 1979: 135, quoting Debré's *cabinet* aide). President de Gaulle asked two *cabinet* members to monitor progress on two specific outcomes he wanted from the 1964 reforms (Aubert 1977: 287; Grémion 1979: 147). De Gaulle also sent the new Prime Minister Couve and Minister Jeanneney 'a letter [published in *Le Figaro*] fixing a programme of reforms, in which he assigned the creation of regions and the reform of the Senate to [Jeanneney]' (Jeanneney 1992: 73). Minister Defferre himself decided and insisted that his decentralization bill should be presented soon after the 1981 election, even if that meant it was not finely prepared (Giuily 1992: 118). These were not decisions taken in the name of a leader by other actors.

Opposition to reforms by other actors (prefects, other officials, *élus* and other regional actors) was certainly linked to poor outcomes. More than half the eight instruments producing no significant change had been opposed by two or more of these groups (R11, R12, R20, R22 and R25), in contrast to only a third of the 24 that succeeded (R2, R5, R8, R10, R15, R19, R21 and R26). Nonetheless, though the prefectoral corps had opposed half the regionalization reforms that failed (R11, R12, R24 and R25), its opposition to nearly half of those that made largest changes (R10, R21 and R31) self-evidently did not stop the political leadership achieving them. The *élus* successfully opposed or reduced in scope a dozen reforms, especially the empowerment of the regional expansion committees (Grémion 1979: 166). Nevertheless, most successful reforms were introduced despite their objections, though often after some concessions, such as by increasing the number of regions. Events such as elections or system change were more likely to be associated with

success. But the tendency is slight (15 of the 24), and with no obvious relationship between the 'radicalness' of the reform embarked upon or accomplished and the level of 'crisis'. There is a noteworthy contrast between the Defferre Act, introduced quickly because the authors thought there was an advantage from the 'honeymoon period', and the similarly significant 1964 reforms, to which de Gaulle was able to give attention because the crises were settled.

Table 7.4 can also be used to contrast the instruments in which DAT and DATAR intervened. Each was involved in about two-thirds of projects before or after 1963. The reforms engaging DATAR, despite its greater authority, were more likely to end in failure, partly because they were more ambitious attempts by President de Gaulle to introduce a different type of socio-economic representation, which the incumbent elites and party politicians were bound to oppose.

Exercising political leadership

Qualitative analysis within Blondel's scheme helps to specify the conditions in which leaders implemented regionalization decisions; while the quantitative findings ensure that the examples cited are not exceptions.

The positional resources of political leaders

The Constitutional change in 1958 did not help leaders in this domain. Projects were initiated at the same frequency in both Republics; the incidence of major reforms was similar; and about three-quarters achieved some success in both Republics. The most significant reforms of the Fourth Republic (by Mendès-France and Faure) were made using special powers granted by parliament. Debré used the equivalent *ordonnance* procedure of the 1958 Constitution in 1959 to require Parisian councils and ministries to set up a regional body, but they ignored it and Debré eventually sought parliamentary authority in a 1961 Act (Debré 1988: 168). Defferre contemplated using an *ordonnance* instead of a decentralization bill to save time, but rejected the idea as politically untenable after the Left gained a huge majority (Giuily 1992: 119). The Constitution's Article 72 (referring to the 'government delegate in the *département*') constrained Defferre's desire to abolish the prefect, but so did his president, who argued that the State needed prefects to deal with the *élus* (Favier 1990: 146).

The configuration of the party system in the Fourth Republic favoured some centrist politicians and the regionalization they promoted, provided they persisted (Radicals: Marie, Queuille, Mendès-France, Faure

and Chaban; UDSR: Pleven and Claudius-Petit; MRP: Bidault, Pflimlin and Buron). Queuille as Interior Minister made the IGAME the prefect of the chief town of an 'IGAME region' (decree 19 May 1950), and as prime minister and interior minister gave ministers authority to delegate powers to the IGAMEs (decree 24 May 1951), while his colleagues at Reconstruction (Claudius-Petit) and Economy (Petsche and Faure) adopted the IGAME boundaries for the DAT planners and the IGENs (economic inspectors-general). However, the frequent changes of government could bring policy reversals, as when Pinay's Conservative coalition announced that the IGAMEs would not be given new powers and asked *département* prefects to coordinate development funds (Circular 21 May 1952; Decree 26 September 1953). The Socialist President, Vincent Auriol, had intervened, 'as a guarantor of State authority', telling the finance minister that the prefectoral corps had ready a draft bill to deconcentrate functions to departmental prefects (Auriol 1970: 544).

The Fifth Republic's Constitution and party system configuration together influenced which leader's views prevailed on regionalization, decisions being ultimately in the president's hands, except during periods of cohabitation, as others have demonstrated (Elgie 1993, 1995; Hayward 1993b; Massot 1979, 1987, 1988; and also see previous chapter). The projects with the strongest outcomes for regions were all supported by presidents, though this support did not guarantee success, as de Gaulle's projects on socio-economic representation showed. Although Prime Minister Debré had long argued for restructuring into 40 to 50 super-*départements* (Debré 1956: 311; 1988: 176), he implemented Prime Minister de Gaulle's decrees, inaugurating reform within *départements* and PAR-region boundaries. Although de Gaulle accepted Prime Minister Pompidou's advice not to hold a referendum on representation in May 1968, but to call a parliamentary election, he then exercised his right to appoint a different prime minister, who was immediately asked to prepare a referendum on the same subject (Alexandre 1972: 171; Jeanneney 1992: 73).

President Pompidou publicly overruled Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas, who had said in September 1970 that he had 'not abandoned regionalization' (Chaban-Delmas 1997: 435, 441; Ashford 1982: 37). Chaban was contradicted in October by Pompidou who said 'the region must be . . . a union of *départements*' (Essig 1979: 111–12), and that he himself would decide the outcome of regional reform (Machin 1977: 60), which he did with his *cabinet* (Archives Nationales 1996: 5AG2/2). After Prime Minister Barre had negotiated the 'Blois

common programme' that included increasing the EPRs' powers, President Giscard used a speech celebrating DATAR's 15 years to proclaim that 'the issue is not to increase their powers but for them to exercise them fully' (Rémond 1999: 26; Phlipponneau 1981: 17). While Mitterrand generally left Defferre to organize decentralization legislation as the minister wanted, he set limits where Defferre's ideas clashed with those of other ministers on budgets or with his own on prefects.

In the Fourth Republic, the initiatives most significant for strengthening regionalization were taken by economic and finance ministers. In the Fifth Republic, finance ministers did not promote regional reforms even when the prime concern of the reforms was efficient coordination of State investment. Exceptionally, Barre used his twin position as Prime Minister and Economic Minister in 1977 to issue a decree extending the economic powers of the EPRs. Finance Minister Delors was just one of many ministers to oppose the transfer of expenditure in 1981: 'Delors, Fabius, Rocard and Lang still oppose decentralization. They intend to keep their grip on the whole of their budget' (Attali 1993a: 99). The president told Defferre 'to be realistic' and to 'adjust the balance between ministers and territorial authorities' (Grémion 1987: 246).

The role of the interior minister and ministry was crucial: initiatives in the Fourth and even the Fifth Republic were more likely to succeed if the reform did not concern them. When the prefects in 1960 boycotted the CIDs decreed by de Gaulle, Debré had to 'issue a sharp reminder to the interior minister, Frey [a former head of the prefectoral corps], that the government had agreed this reform' (Grémion 1976: 122). At the same time, those instruments strongly promoted by an interior minister such as Defferre were a little more likely to succeed.

A minister for *aménagement du territoire*, Claudius-Petit, had in the Fourth Republic provided the stimulus to regionalization, promoting expansion committees and regional development (Randet 1994: 60; Bloch-Lainé 1977: 141); yet he had little success until his policy was taken up by others. In the Fifth Republic, regionalization projects by ministers for *aménagement du territoire* succeeded mainly when they were also the prime minister (whether Pompidou or Barre). Minister Rocard's Planning Reform Act would lead to an enhanced role for regions as negotiator of State-Region Contracts (on behalf of *départements* and communes too from 2006), but its significance was probably not recognized at the time. In 1969 the text Guichard drew up for the regional referendum was rejected by the President for its brevity (Jeanneney 1992: 75, 93). In this domain too, ministers worked within parameters set by presidents and prime ministers.

The influence of bureaucratic organizations

The key question in considering bureaucratic organizations is whether these vital instruments 'help' or 'hinder' (Blondel 1987: 149). It would be posed more acutely for DAT, a ministerial bureaucracy, than for DATAR, which could be adapted to each political leadership's needs, as previous chapters have shown. DAT was a frequent but ineffective participant in regionalization. It 'encouraged regional initiatives by expansion committees – because it was unable to carry them out itself' (Pouyet 1968: 23). Though DAT was vice-chair of the group selecting regional boundaries in 1955, it did not manage to impose the larger 'planning' region over the 'political' configuration chosen. 'The regional programmes promoted an administrative structure that was not based on any serious criterion and has paralysed the establishment of a healthy urban structure' (Labasse 1966: 568).

DATAR played the lead role in preparing the representation elements of the 1964 reforms and gave de Gaulle substantial help with his referendum proposals (Camous 1973: 233; Essig 1979: 110; Grémion 1979, 1992; Aubry 1988: 131; Jeanneney 1992: 82). However, the 1964 reforms did not enfranchise the 'modernizing' elites as DATAR and political leaders intended (Grémion 1979: 148, 167–9), leading DATAR, with the prime minister's authority, to appoint its own regional commissioners (Grémion 1976: 37). The decentralizing views DATAR promoted after 1968 did not match the 'Jacobin centralizing concepts' that underpinned the 1972 Act on EPRs, and DATAR played no part in its drafting (Lacour 1983: 57), though 'it was very active in putting the new arrangements in place' (Essig 1979: 114). 'The rival' Rocard and therefore DATAR had no role in the Defferre Act of 1982, and the Act contradicted regional planning principles (unlike in Germany, the region's plans could not command the *département*'s or commune's). However, DATAR's technique of negotiating contracts with local authorities fed into Rocard's Planning Reform Act (Balme and Bonnet 1995: 53; Charlet 1976: 216). Leaders were certainly free to exclude DATAR when the type of AdT it represented clashed with their own ideas.

The prefectoral corps was usually against regionalization initiatives, and the corp's tactics were a strong constraint on political leaders. It had to accept the creation of the IGAMEs approved by parliament in 1948, but its 'fear that the IGAMEs were regional prefects in disguise' (Mény 1974: 352) kept these officials based in Paris until 1950 (Lemasurier 1954: 378). Though an *arrêté* made the IGAMEs responsible for drawing up the regional action programmes, IGAMEs met strong resistance

from the prefects and the field services and 'the text of 13 July 1956 was not actually implemented' (Monier 1965: 30, 62). De Gaulle's decrees of 1958 had required the CIDs to be coordinated by a prefect, but when Debré's aides prepared the implementing texts they 'did not dare' designate a regional coordinator (Lanversin 1970: 55) and the prefects did not choose one of their own volition. Debré had to insist that the interior minister appointed them. Prefects then objected to the CODERs proposed by DATAR in 1964, preferring a weak regional conference of local *élus* (Grémion 1979: 180, 185); inevitably, they selected CODER members from among this group.

The 1972 reform creating the EPRs gave new economic tasks to regional prefects, which were welcomed by many of the younger prefects promoted by the Chaban-Delmas government (Machin 1977: 101). The corps had long included a few reformers like Pisani, arguing that changes to budgets, taxation and administrative habits were as important as regional boundaries (Pisani 1956a: 262). Philip (1976: 25–7) as regional prefect of Limousin could not ignore the policy priorities negotiated between the Socialist Chadernagor and the Gaullist Chirac even if they were 'not what the administration wanted'. He foresaw elected councils making decisions, even if the power to execute them was likely to remain in the hands of prefects, as a condition of State funding. Interior Minister Defferre prepared the decentralization laws using officials from other *grands corps* (Conseil d'Etat, Cour des Comptes and Ponts et Chaussées [Nakano 2000: 108–11]). However, when the Left lost heavily in the *département* elections of 1982, the government 'needed the prefects for preparing the municipal elections'. Prefects would be 'compensated' for decentralization by deconcentrating more functions from Paris ministries for them to supervise (Attali 1993: 388).

Many other ministries obstructed political leaders' efforts to create coordinating structures (Phlipponneau 1981: 28). They had kept Vichy's useful regional divisions but varied the boundaries, 'enabling them to resist change' (Monod and Castelbajac 1971: 47–8). Thirty field services did not adopt the boundaries decreed in 1956 until after Debré renewed the decree in 1960. Only three ministries (Agriculture, Construction and Public Works) had appointed regional officials to the CID by 1963 (Monier 1965: 66). Field services refused to 'delegate up' to regional officials (Gremion and Worms 1968: 53), while technical ministries handicapped DATAR by avoiding the deconcentration down to regions that Chaban decreed in 1970 (Essig 1979: 112). However, no other bureaucratic group was as able as the prefects to constrain the political leadership on regionalization, because none was so crucial to

monitoring implementation or so close to local politicians across the spectrum of public policy.

The constraints posed by other policy actors

Pierre Grémion and Jean-Pierre Worms demonstrated the significance of the historic networks that linked the prefects and the *élus*, in which each promoted their joint goals (Grémion 1966; Worms 1966). In their common interest, these two groups were more often against regionalization moves than for them. As seen earlier, following the Liberation, parliamentarians had successfully objected to State officials at a territorial level that was not controlled by elected people; and though they agreed to Moch's IGAMEs, he had to insist that their powers would not expand (Lemasurier 1954: 378). They 'reluctantly tolerated' Mendès-France and regional economic modernization in 1954 while he took on decolonization (Williams 1972: 440; Guichard 1975: 20, 64). The fragile political majorities of the Fourth Republic meant that the map of regions prepared by the Plan Commissariat and DAT in 1955 could not 'transgress' *département* borders, and political compromises had to be made (Monier 1965: 35).

In the Fifth Republic too, the Senate group opposing Debré's regional reform forced the government to 'take oratorical precautions', assuring departments that ministerial field divisions would not be affected (Monier 1965: 44). Although AdT strategy was to focus development around regional cities, the prime minister's staff did not risk naming regional 'capitals' in the 1960 texts on the CID (Lanversin 1970: 55). Many parliamentarians were scornful of the regional committees – 'unelected stamp clubs' (Grémion 1979: 166). At the same time, the '*grands élus*' (such as Chaban, Pflimlin and Pleven), who were interested in regional development, chaired the committees and wanted a larger role, rejected DATAR's plans for the CODERs, fearing participation would lead to capture (Grémion 1979: 166, 190). But 80 per cent of *notables* at this time still wanted the prefect to exercise the regional powers (Hayward 1983: 51). The EPRs, because of their status as public bodies with financial powers, had to be created by Act of Parliament where 'the Senate, the bastion and guardian of traditional local *notables* was especially critical, and successfully diluted the content of the bill by a number of amendments' (Machin 1977: 61). During the passage of the 1982 decentralization bill, 'the debates in the Senate were particularly long and difficult' (Giuily 1992: 120). Later, when announcing the electoral procedures for the regions, the new Interior Minister, Joxe, was

still reassuring senators that 'the *département*, deeply rooted in ancient cultural and economic history, cannot be ignored' (Douence 1995: 16).

Institutional and contingent constraints and opportunities

No specific institutional forum emerged that political leaders could use to decide or ratify decisions on territorial structures, analogous to DATAR's CIAT on roads policy. In the Fourth Republic, political leaders could discuss projects in Councils of Ministers, but they enacted regionalization instruments as individual ministers. In the Fifth Republic, the president's *conseils restreints* with the prime minister and a small number of ministers, followed by a Council of Ministers to adopt decrees, as used for the three decrees of 1964, was the typical arrangement (Burin des Roziers 1990: 84). Whatever the procedure, presidents exercised their prerogative to decide the outcome. Although the 1972 Act on EPRs was considered by at least one *comité restreint* – chaired by the prime minister, and three *conseils restreints* – chaired by the president, the basic decision had already been announced by President Pompidou in his 1970 speech on 'the union of *départements*'.

Blondel suggested that honeymoon periods and crises might create special opportunities for leaders to assert their will. Large steps towards regions were taken following regime change in 1940, 1944 and 1958. Other considerable reforms were contemporaneous with major events in 1947–48 (strikes and riots), 1954–55 (Indochina) and 1960–61 (Algeria). Yet while Moch in 1948, and Mendès and Faure in 1954–55 used parliamentary support deriving from a crisis to launch reform, Debré signed the January 1960 texts despite the crisis. Signing the ministerial instructions Monod presented on the night of Algerian demonstrations, he said: 'You're right, we must ensure that things go on' (Grémion 1979: 133). De Gaulle turned his own attention to administrative reform and the substantial 1964 project only 'after Algeria was settled' (Aubert 1977: 287). In 1981 'Defferre's approach was based on . . . the need to work quickly to benefit from what was then called "the state of grace", and impose a radical reform before conservative forces, in the broadest sense, took over again. Gaston Defferre was much influenced by Pierre Mendès-France's theory about "the hundred days" and the need to undertake any fundamental reform during the short period after the elections' (Giuily 1992: 118–19). While regarding some elements, such as the abolition of the prefect's supervision, as central, Defferre did not let other desirable aspects such as deciding boundaries delay the passage of the bill. Prime Minister Mauroy discussed adopting larger regions but soon

found that public opinion in his Nord-Pas de Calais and neighbouring Picardy was against it (Defferre, *Le Monde* 10 June 1981).

In the Fifth Republic, a third of instruments seemed to have been affected by short-term electoral concerns. Giscard as presidential candidate and as president put forward decentralization proposals when needing electoral support from centrist parties promoting regionalism, and dropped them when the need evaporated. Defferre's reforms were affected by the Left's willingness to give more power to prefects to ensure their support before local elections, and an electoral system for regions that might 'reduce the defeat' in simultaneous national elections (Chevallier 2002: 323). In this domain at least, forthcoming elections constituted environmental constraints whereas post-election euphoria, and economic and political crises, provided opportunities that could take a number of directions depending on the response of the leadership to the occasion.

Implementation and persistence

The significance of the duration of a political leadership is evident in the short-lived regional structures of the Vichy State and the Liberation government compared with the capacity of later political leaders to consolidate the direction of their reforms. The Gaullists exemplified most clearly the use that French political leaders could make of a decade in office. Yet, the achievements by some political leaders of the Fourth Republic in picking up their own or their colleagues' projects on returning to government demonstrate the capacity of political leaders to make an impact even in a difficult political context.

In the Fifth Republic, individual political leaders could make a difference by the paths they took. Debré did not accept the tardiness of the prefects in setting up the CIDs but exercised hierarchical authority over the interior minister and used local interests to put pressure on officials. Pompidou oversaw the implementation of the 1972 arrangements in detail, down to the individual candidates for the regional prefecture's economic posts (Archives Nationales 1996: 5AG2/2/325–6). In contrast, Giscard had seven years to implement his promise to make his term 'that of a France of the regions' (Déloye 1997: 39), but abandoned both his proposals to do so. President Mitterrand reined Defferre back on their joint aspirations, when they met objections, while nevertheless retaining the essence of their goals. Thus the ability of political leaders to make an impact on regionalization goals in conformity with their aspirations seems to rest in the end more with the leader than with the conditions

that constrain them, though a good deal depended on the position of the leader in the government and party hierarchy.

Conclusions

The aim of this chapter was to show that political leaders can make an impact on the regional institutions that condition the policy of AdT, and identify the characteristics of that engagement. The prefects and national politicians whose power base was the *département* were likely to make the construction of a regional tier difficult. The prefects valued the formal parity of their posts and relationships, and their direct links to Paris. The *élus* were quick to reject any regional institution and to defend the prefects, in part for similar reasons of parity, in part because they relied on the prefect. Nevertheless, initiatives on regional institutions were undertaken in most premierships after the Second World War. Three-quarters of them made some impact, nearly all in the direction of strengthening the institutions; and nearly a quarter introduced radical change. The link between political leadership and regionalization project was not just statistical; there was much evidence of leaders keeping themselves informed, putting forward their own solutions to a problem and taking the final decisions. The objections of bureaucratic groups and other political actors made a difference, weakening and delaying projects, but some considerable reforms were made despite their opposition.

Legal–constitutional provisions made little difference to the number of leadership initiatives or their outcomes, but, together with the configuration of the party system, made more difference to which political leader prevailed. Overall, it seems that individual ministers in the multi-party parliamentary system of the Fourth Republic were able to take incremental actions within their own portfolio, but actions across the government depended on voluntary cooperation between like-minded colleagues. In the Fifth Republic, presidential wishes on regional reform mostly constrained the choices made by prime ministers; in turn prime ministers might take on a sectoral role, or they could put pressure on a minister to implement agreed actions. Regionalization projects were better coordinated in the Fifth Republic, with the corollary that individual political leaders were less free to pursue their own aims.

The ministerial division DAT was energized by its minister into encouraging regional committees, but its organizational weaknesses mirrored that of the government as a whole, bringing the issue of coordinated administration onto the political agenda. DATAR played a central

and effective role on behalf of leaders in some substantial regionalization projects, but others failed. However, the chief bureaucratic actors were the prefects. They delayed implementation or reduced the import of the change. By 1958 there were already a few prefects who wanted regional reform, and when in the 1970s political leaders promoted a new generation of prefects there were more prefects who saw the regional economic role as worthwhile and political decentralization as inevitable.

Local *élus* were crucial in constraining the political leadership, probably more so than the bureaucrats, since not only did they depend on the prefects, but their own status was at stake and their representatives had a veto in parliament. They rejected the Liberation Regional Commissioners, restricted the role of the IGAMEs, forced a redrawing of the regional map of regions, delayed the concept of a regional town and opposed the 'unelected' regional development committees. In the Fifth Republic, they dominated the new CODERs and ensured that regions did not diminish *départements*. From the 1970s some mayors of larger urban areas, often with significant national roles, changed their position and a series of political leaders gradually constituted regions. Party considerations then delayed the first elections, hampering the establishment of the new councils.

Implementation was a problem for Liberation and Fourth Republic leaders, with reforms occasionally put into reverse by successors; yet some leaders pursued the same goals through different coalitions, and administrative regions gradually took shape. Despite the greater longevity of governments in the early Fifth Republic, presidents and prime ministers still had to persist, insist and monitor to see that decrees were implemented as agreed. Though there is something incongruous about President Pompidou supervising the appointment of the regional prefect's economic adviser, the outcome of Defferre's radical reforms was substantially altered by the implementing texts, produced under a prime minister and interior minister who did not share the same goals.

Successful regionalization projects often took place at times of crisis or early in a new government. However, the motivation was partly pragmatic, making use of special powers given by parliament at these times, or an empty parliamentary timetable; and partly from an assumption of 'honeymoon' benefits. Moreover, important regionalization instruments were enacted either despite crisis or because there was no crisis. Electoral considerations were always important, whether the political leadership needed tactical alliances with parties, support from the prefects (who were their conciliators at local level), or an electoral system that would also reduce electoral losses at national level.

In contrast to roads policy, no new central decision-making institutions such as CIAT were created that might give leaders an advantage their predecessors did not have. DATAR provided a negotiating tool for leaders when they chose to involve it, especially in 1964, but it was not essential to later instruments; and – with the approval of the political leadership – it adopted 'alternative regions' after 1964, better-related to specific regional development problems, and that could cross administrative boundaries. The constituted regions evolved in their composition and functions (programme-regions, CODER, EPR and regional councils) but the territorial institutions and boundaries established by the Revolution were no easier for political leaders to change in 1981 than they were in 1955.

This apart, political leaders found considerable opportunity to pursue their aims effectively in their own manner. Four different patterns can be identified. First, there were the 'heroic decisions' as defined by Jack Hayward: for example, the decrees issued by Mendès-France and Faure in 1954–55 or by Prime Minister de Gaulle in 1958 were 'heroic in the dual sense . . . [of being] both an ambitious political exercise in rational decision-making and an ambitious assertion of political will by government leaders' (Hayward 1982: 112). The decrees issued by Mendès-France and Faure were developed by a small circle of people (Mendès, Faure and Buron and their *cabinets*), and comprised an unusually coherent set of measures: regional committees, regional action programmes, harmonized regional boundaries, as well as a large number of practical measures for promoting regional economic development. That was not to say they were fully implemented by the technical bureaucracies; and General de Gaulle had to restate the demand on boundaries when adding the CIDs that prefects had opposed for a century. Debré's implementing decrees were also 'heroic', in being prepared by *cabinet* members as 'a technocratic reform, not political nor dogmatic' (Antoine 1960: 358), and executed despite the reluctance of the Interior minister, who was reminded of the government's decision in an authoritative fashion. 'Men as different as Pierre Mendès-France and Michel Debré feared that without a modernized state and a real political will in Paris, economic progress would be hampered and social reform blocked' (Williams 1972: 435).

Political leaders could also introduce policy changes of wide scope through a process of 'negotiating with' rather than 'imposing on' other actors, in another distinction made by Hayward (1982: 113). The 1964 innovations were highly ambitious, but the decision-making was widely shared among ministers and different bureaucratic groups,

and substantial consultation of socio-economic and regional actors was undertaken by DATAR – and the outcome was 'a compromise' (Grémion 1976: 37). The 1982 Defferre Act combined significant institutional change with intensive negotiation in parliament, notwithstanding the minister's determined exercise of political will on aspects that he considered non-negotiable, such as the transfer of executive power.

In contrast, other initiatives more clearly matched Mény's (1987: 250) categorization of the decentralization laws as 'part of a progressive, incremental process in the politico-administrative system'. They could be low-key but effective even if the amount of change was limited. Most Fourth Republic proposals were of this nature: narrow in scope (within the remit of a single minister), taking small steps, with premiers having to take on a ministerial role to act in the sector, rather than expect to lead an interministerial project. There were also instruments of this nature in the Fifth Republic: measures that implemented and supplemented the 1964 reforms; the setting-up of the EPRs; the Barre decrees that gave additional economic powers to EPRs; and the State-Region Plan Contracts, initiated and negotiated by DATAR, fit into this un-heroic but progressive model.

Finally, some initiatives were neither heroic nor 'progressive' in Mény's sense, but weak, negative or vacillating, such as the 1952 circular that confirmed 'there could be no question of transforming the IGAME into the administrative head of a group of departments' (quoted by Mény 1974: 354); or the short-lived 'Blois' programme on regional decentralization that DATAR was asked to develop to shore up electoral alliances with regionalists; or the 'bizarre' electoral system that would departmentalize the region that some of the same leaders had so recently created, in order to lose less badly a national election that was already lost.

These four different modes of operating the policy-making institutions could be corralled into a rather approximate double dichotomy based not on Blondel's two dimensions of the 'scope' and the 'amount' of leadership ambitions, but on the nature of the ambitions and the nature of the policy process: heroically ambitious change versus limited modifications; leadership-imposed initiative versus a negotiated compromise settlement. Like all dichotomies it would misrepresent the diversity and complexity of approaches taken by political leaders.

8
Lessons from Regional Planning in France

The objective of this book was to demonstrate that political leaders have considerable control over bureaucratic institutions, with a substantial ability to modify organizational structures and reorient bureaucratic activities towards their own political goals. The predominant interpretation of the relationship between leaders and institutions in the political science literature has been that political leaders have little autonomy relative to the constraints exerted by formal and informal institutions. Exceptions to this general rule of leadership weakness are widely accepted: exceptional leaders, or leaders profiting from exceptional situations, can change institutions (Edinger 1993: 67; Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 15–16). Such instances are often used to support a classification of political executives as, on the one hand, charismatic or anomalous leaders who overcome the constraints to make a profound impact on the polity, and the rest, mere 'managers' or 'jugglers' of the obstacles in their path.

However, not all writers on political leaders adopt a dichotomous typology. Blondel proposed a general methodology for appraising the comparative impact of 'a mass of grey and indistinct office-holders' within their institutional and non-institutional context (1995: 303). This book has used that methodology as a point of departure for exploring the relationship between the political leadership and bureaucratic organizations within one policy domain – regional planning in France – and with reference to one bureaucratic actor within that domain, DATAR, now called DIACT. The result is less a case study of an organization (especially since it does not evaluate its work as a whole), than the use of the organization as a test bed for assessing the ways in which leaders interact with bureaucracies. That said, DATAR was an organization which was admired, envied and favourably compared by commentators

in other countries for its apparent power within France (e.g., Budge 1988; Hall 1975, 1989; McNamara 1977; Yuill 1982), and for its continuing success at promoting its ideas on spatial planning within the European Union (Faludi 2004). Considering too that the self-confident and compartmentalized French bureaucracy could be expected to provide this agency with a difficult coordinating task, it is right that DATAR/DIACT has an important place in the 'lessons from French regional planning', among the broader issues about the conditions under which political leaders make an impact on bureaucracies.

A study of one politico–administrative system cannot make strong claims to validity or 'generalizability', even in a book in which findings converge, chapter after chapter, on one conclusion. It therefore seems valuable, in recalling the evidence from each chapter, to identify the principal factors which seemed to condition the outcomes, and to consider whether these factors pertain to other political systems too; if so, the findings may hold more widely. As Yin (1994: 36) and Marshall and Rossman (1995: 143) have noted, the burden of making the judgements on transferability must fall on other researchers, possessing deeper knowledge of those systems. This chapter aims merely to indicate the empirical conditions that may be crucial. The examples from other liberal democracies are chosen to demonstrate just two specific points: first, that the particular phenomena discussed do not apply only to France – there exist other political systems, sharing certain patterns of resources or constraints, where the same conclusions are likely to apply; second, that there are other political systems where these conclusions are less likely to apply, or might apply but in another way, because of different constitutional or party structures or different political or bureaucratic cultures that result in different ways of organizing policy making.

Political leadership and bureaucratic organizations

The evidence presented in the first chapters of the book showed that Blondel (1987: 168, 170) was too pessimistic when he asserted that activist leaders who expected to adapt a bureaucratic organization to match their needs would find their expectations remained 'largely unfulfilled'.

Reshaping organizational structures

Chapter 2 examined the changes made in France to the central administrative structures responsible for regional planning, as a succession of governments created, enhanced, reduced, revived, ignored, reinstated

and eventually replaced the ministerial division DAT with the prime minister's agency DATAR. Nine reforms of the central machinery in 20 years, of which only one failed completely (see Table 2.1), are testimony to the leadership's capacity to alter bureaucratic institutions (whether or not other changes might have been envisaged but found too difficult to introduce).

The earliest arrangements were conceived by people in ministerial positions who were not typical party politicians: they had been 'technical' ministers in 1939, or served in their *cabinets*. A similar pattern was repeated in 1958 and the final changes in 1963 were carried out under a political prime minister who had never held elective office. Some worthwhile preliminary observations on the impact of 'a political leadership' could be made nonetheless. The status of the minister as politician or former official, elected or not, was immaterial to whether bureaucrats implemented the changes demanded: it was the post or position that counted. The argument of Blondel and others (see Chapter 1) that political leaders can be defined by their executive post seemed to be justified by the evidence in Chapter 2. Even the most authoritative permanent officials who suggested changes were not themselves able to reform the ministerial machinery; and their regional development activities were dependent on powers agreed by ministers. There was a slight tendency for the more radical changes to be introduced by political figures (not necessarily elected); and for the changes they introduced to be better respected by other politicians than those introduced by the 'technical' ministers; thus political status or party leadership role may well constitute a substantial addition to the resources conferred by the formal post.

What lessons could be useful for those studying the political–administrative relationship in other jurisdictions? Leaving aside the wider context for the moment, the basic elements required for political leaders to implement these changes seem to be that

- the prime minister could redistribute responsibilities between ministries;
- ministers or the prime minister (perhaps by taking on the ministerial post) could alter structures within a ministry;
- the prime minister could set up a coordinating agency within his or her office; and
- ministers could rely on technical advice from expert and trusted aides in setting up the agency (this last element is discussed in a later section).

Prime ministers in many liberal democracies can exercise powers to reallocate functions between ministries and other government organizations with the help of officials: Britain, Australia and Canada have 'machinery of government' divisions specifically to give the prime minister advice on such matters. In Canada, the prime minister can organize the machinery of government as he or she thinks fit, announcing changes to Cabinet without prior submission (Savoie 1999: 140). Nor is this power confined to 'Westminster' systems. In Spain, where the post-Franco Constitution reinforced the autonomy of the prime minister, early incumbents were particularly active in rearranging ministries and reorganizing divisions (Baena del Alcázar 2002: 328–9). The Socialist González, having failed with the 1984 Act to abolish directly the powerful specialized corps, created after his re-election in 1986 a Ministry for Public Administration, including the prime minister's office, to control human resources across the ministries, and staffed it with a new generalist corps of state civil administrators supported by the political leadership (Alvarez de Cienfuelgos 1999: 37, 48).

German chancellors can and do redefine the number and scope of ministries (Schmidt 2003: 28). They also have at their disposal a chancellor's office of about 500 people, whose main task is to coordinate and supervise the implementation by federal ministries of government policies. Its policy groups, including some cross-cutting units, prepare government guidelines and monitor particular ministries. Providing it can persuade party and state leaders, the German political leadership can even increase its legislative scope by amending the Constitution. Indeed, regional planning provides an example. Until 2006 it was a 'framework' competence, meaning that planning ministers from the states and the federal government negotiated federal 'spatial planning guidelines' which the states adapted to their own requirements. It produced a rather narrow form of regulatory land-use planning (the criticism often made of DATAR's precursor, DAT), which the states' planners were reluctant to renegotiate (Faludi 2003: 123). The 'grand coalition' with the Social Democrats led by Christian Democrat Merkel from 2005 was able to negotiate agreement to a federal reform package in 2006 that included the transfer of spatial planning to the domain of 'concurrent competence', in which the federal government can propose legislation. By 2008, the Social Democrat minister responsible for spatial planning (and also notably for urban development and the eastern states) had been able to put to parliament a bill that would integrate into spatial planning social, economic and environmental concerns (see federal transport ministry, www.bmvbs.de/).

In contrast, Norwegian prime ministers have been categorized as weak because they have no formal powers to establish or abolish ministries or reshuffle their responsibilities or issue instructions to do so to ministerial colleagues (King 1994: 153). In such conditions, which have also occurred in the Netherlands, Finland and Austria (Andeweg 1993: 27), the findings from this chapter will not necessarily apply, though given Norway's collegiate government and its relationships of trust with a heterogeneous administrative culture (Christensen 2000: 102–5), similar results may be achieved in other ways. Certainly, the Norwegian ministerial structures have undergone considerable reform, including big waves of change in the 1950s (when it was 'the political leadership' that created a new administrative doctrine), the 1970s (new ministries for new political issues), the 1980s (rationalization and mergers) and in 1996, when a new Cabinet reversed the previous mergers (Christensen 2000: 97–8).

Ministers often have considerable autonomy on whether they promote reforms of their own or resist the prime minister's. Thiébault (1993: 89) cites Austria, Finland and Germany as the West European countries in which ministers are most independent: 'Within the sphere of responsibility of each department, a minister cannot be given orders, in theory at least, even by the [German] chancellor.' However, this doctrine is not always followed by the premier: Andeweg (1993: 33) contrasted Chancellors Erhard and Kohl, who followed it, with Adenauer, who did not. The power relationship between chancellor and ministers depends not only on the particular incumbents but also on the party system. In general, leaders of single-party governments have greater influence on ministerial departments than those in charge of coalition governments (Frognier 1993: 62). In the French Fourth Republic, prime ministers often had to take on the portfolio of a ministry to reform its administration. Nowadays, the independent action of ministers is more constrained in France, as is the case in Britain, Ireland and Denmark.

The experience of Canadian premiers in trying to improve coordination of regional development programmes through successive re-organizations parallels the French experience. Trudeau set up a Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE) on becoming prime minister in 1968, and gave it a mandate to coordinate or at least influence other federal departments; but DREE was never able to achieve collective federal action (Savoie 1999: 59). A decade later, DREE was still unable to persuade the industry ministry to give preference to development zones when it awarded subsidies to manufacturers.

In 1982 Trudeau merged the regional development and industry ministries into a new Department for Regional Industrial Expansion (DRIE), to force them to settle their arguments internally instead of bringing them to Cabinet. Its provincial network was overhauled by Premier Mulroney a few years later, but the regional agencies he established were within months of their inauguration already judged to be failing (*ibid*.: 59). Savoie sees the decline in prime ministerial interest, by Trudeau, then Mulroney and then Chrétien, as the major impediment to organizing regional development effectively (*ibid*.: 59, 141–2). That conclusion, alongside similar indications for France, was followed up in Chapter 3.

The relative importance of positional links and political commitment

The evidence in this book confirmed Blondel's assumption (1987: 168) that the 'links between the bureaucracy and the leaders must be close and effective' for the leadership to have a strong impact on policy implementation. However, the essential link, in DATAR's case, was not its legal attachment to the prime minister, as is frequently asserted, but the 'affective' relationships between political leaders and the agency. Political, academic and bureaucratic authorities on AdT have tended to overestimate the importance of the prime minister's positional status in comparison with the prime minister's positional resources and personal attributes, especially a commitment to the policy. In Chapter 3, DATAR's reputation as an effective promoter of regional development was shown to be closely related to the level of interest taken by the president and prime minister in this policy domain, but not to the organization's governmental location.

Summing up the lessons from Chapter 3, it seems that

- an interministerial agency does not need to be attached to the prime minister's office (or the core executive generally) to be effective; other locations can be equally advantageous;
- it is important for a bureaucratic agency's success that the political leadership demonstrates its commitment to the policy the agency is promoting;
- whose commitment within the political leadership matters most, depends not just on the constitution but on the party system. In France, the president's level of interest usually matters more than the prime minister's, though both are important.

Most descriptions of DATAR emphasized its location at the centre of government as being the key to its success as a coordinating agency on behalf of the government; similar assumptions have often been made elsewhere. Hargrove and Nelson (1984: 175) suggest that when the United States Congress created the 'institutional Presidency' by moving the then Bureau of the Budget from the Treasury to President Roosevelt's office in 1939, they made the Bureau 'a direct instrument of presidential authority over the departments'. In Britain, Blair set up various units in the Prime Minister's Office and the Cabinet Office to promote his themes (anti-drugs, social inclusion, public services, policy delivery, etc.) Yet the lesson from French regional planning is that where an interministerial administrative unit is located is not crucial to its effectiveness. The lack of powers to reorganize the 'machinery of government' may therefore not constitute a handicap for leaders, providing that an organization's 'centrality' in the political leadership's concerns is evident.

The contribution to outcomes that can be made by a leader's obvious commitment to a policy has been observed in other countries. Kellerman (1984) found that those US presidents who promoted their personal policy priority successfully had demonstrated their interest by taking care to debate the issues with the affected groups; and they had a 'rather fierce determination to see a very particular policy become law' (1984: 28–31, 256). The new Canadian Department of Regional Economic Expansion was able to target its funding on a few effective programmes after Prime Minister Trudeau declared that regional development was important, gave the DREE a close political friend as minister, appointed a powerful figure as its top official and awarded it a large budget. Once Trudeau turned his attention to other issues the department was no longer able to resist provincial pressures and dispersed its funds in all directions. A similar sequence of events happened under Mulroney once he too 'lost interest' (Savoie 1999: 334–5). In Britain, Blair was in 1999 still taking a close interest in the Social Exclusion Unit, giving it credibility with other departments and Parliament (*Economist* 21 August 1999: 19–20). In 2001 it was moved to the ministry for local government, and officials later commented 'on the loss of status on its transfer from the Cabinet Office'. Page and Jenkins (2005: 89) thought it was probably proximity to the prime minister rather than the organizational location that conferred the special status. The conclusion from Chapter 3 is that the proximity in question is not about geography but about the closeness of the prime minister's attention to its affairs.

In the US, Canada and Britain, it is clear which member of the government can do most to secure an interministerial agency's reputational power. In a coalition, even an undisputed head of government may not be in a position to promote too obviously a policy bureaucracy he or she favours. In Germany, the 'more effective a chancellor is in determinedly pushing his [or her] policy options, the less pleased the coalition partner may be' (Smith 1992: 49). However, even in highly multi-party systems where the prime minister has few constitutional resources the outcome can vary with the individual concerned. For example, Keman (2002: 229–30) contrasts the Belgian premier, a 'coordinator/mediator' of independent ministers, with the 'well-organized' Netherlands Cabinet in which the prime minister has been since the 1970s 'a supreme referee', influential in a decision-making process that binds the Cabinet. Writing a decade earlier, Andeweg (1991: 130) was not so sure that Dutch prime ministers were consistently influential but thought that their position varied with the individual's personality, suggesting that prime ministerial initiative can make a difference even where there are strong constraints and few opportunities.

Responsiveness, loyalty and competence

Chapter 4 showed that French political leaders have considerable positional resources with which to alter DATAR/DIACT's staffing, size, structure and activities so that it responds to their particular policy aims. The Constitution and civil service statutes between them give the president, prime minister and the minister for *aménagement du territoire* extensive joint formal powers to select a *délégué*. The greatest constraint came from conflict within this multiple leadership, with the president and then prime minister having greater influence, to the extent that some ministers had difficult relationships with 'their' *délégués*. The credibility of *délégués* suffered serious decline as criteria on personal and political loyalty superseded those on competence and experience. On the whole, the agency's work has remained focused on the leaders' priorities, as the evolution in its 'policy teams' showed – the reshaping was especially clear at times of strong ideological change – though there was a tendency to develop a technical research programme which, while relevant to the domain, could also signify technocratic deviation.

The French political leadership has powerful budgetary procedures to control the recruitment of personnel, which continues under the 'LOLF' regime introduced in 2006. Furthermore, the policy staff on which

DATAR/DIACT depends can be drafted in at short notice on contracts or with the agreement of their corps or ministry. Staff numbers were shown to respond mainly to leadership demands, whether for rapid expansion, or subsequent contraction. However, the recruitment of senior and *grands corps* officials was shown to depend greatly on a demonstration that the policy domain was important to the leadership, including by the appointment of a stronger *délégué*. It seems that for political leaders to be supported by a responsive and competent agency, they need the power to

- appoint a top official who is well-qualified according to national norms and will direct the agency's work in accordance with the current leadership's aims;
- control the size of the agency;
- attract appropriately qualified staff, which in the case of an interministerial agency means a diverse group able to work with each other and across ministries.

In almost all civil service systems, political leaders may make preferential choices of staff on political or policy grounds. Even where they do not have formal powers of appointment or dismissal the equivalent effect may be achieved in less overt ways (Peters and Pierre 2004: 2, 6). After a change of government in Lithuania, ministers exploit a loophole in civil service legislation by redesignating some 'B' posts appointed by the civil service machinery as politically appointed 'A' posts (Jasaitis 1999: 318). More typically, the long-established German system of making the 'state secretary' post at the top of a ministry subject to political appointment (and to 'temporary retirement') has been supplemented over the last 20 years with appointments to political support units attached to the chancellor and other ministers. For these positions, the use of public employee contracts 'neatly circumvents the restrictions imposed by civil service law' (Goetz 1999: 147–9, 160). The chief of the chancellor's office can be an official ('state secretary') or a cabinet minister without portfolio, as the chancellor chooses.

Among the common comparator countries, the Netherlands and Denmark seem to place the strongest constraints on the political leadership's freedom to appoint. In Denmark, ministers have powers under civil service legislation and collective agreements to appoint policy advisers as contracted employees, but these are rarely used. The core leadership (prime minister and finance minister) has centralized

the appointment of top officials since the 1970s, but there is only circumstantial evidence of politicization. The countervailing pressures come not only from trade unions but also from wider society, as reflected in the media and parliament which treat political appointments as controversial (Christensen 2004: 17–28). In the Netherlands, ministers deny that party criteria determine who is appointed to a top civil service post: 'the concept of the loyal and party political neutral civil servant is a treasured part of [the Dutch] tradition'. Nevertheless, the procedures give room for political leaders to include informal criteria, which appear to be used to ensure compatibility of policy views and not party congruence (van der Meer 2004: 219).

In coalition governments the questions would arise about who appoints to key positions. The Dutch government poses (and avoids) the question most clearly by systematically having senior and junior ministers in a department from different parties. In Germany, Kohl was unable in 1992 to appoint to his chancellery a senior official from the Economics Ministry, vetoed by the Free Democrats in charge of the ministry, who feared its role would be undercut. When the FDP was weakened in the 1994 elections, Kohl was able to place this same official as the political–administrative head of the ministry, against the minister's opposition. Peters (1997: 240) suggests that, as presidential systems and coalitions give civil servants alternative leaders to whom they can be responsive, they make the bureaucracy more autonomous of the executive. This proposition may hold for the senior civil service as a group (or its party-based sub-groups), but in the case of DATAR, quarrels between leaders over politicized appointments weakened the officials concerned and the agency as a whole. More generally, French academics see the politicization of appointments as a waste of talent, with only half the cohort of senior officials in active work in government while the other half waits for the political majority to change (Mény 1992: 110). In these conditions the Danish and Dutch systems of restricting personalized appointments to the rare, discreet and ambiguous constitute a leadership strength rather than a weakness.

Peters and Pierre (2004: 2) signalled the problem with leader intervention in appointments when they defined 'politicization' as 'the substitution of political criteria for merit-based criteria in the selection, retention, promotion, rewards, and disciplining of members of the public service' (see also Page and Wright 1999). Most US presidents 'do not use their powers to maximum effectiveness, which would mean getting people who are both competent to run their agencies and loyal

to the president so that they will run them in pursuit of their policies'
(Hargrove and Nelson 1984: 211). The trend was for a new American
president to appoint competent people, who took on the bureaucratic
perspective of their agency, to which the president in mid-term reacted
by appointing loyal people who were not sufficiently talented or expe-
rienced to advance the president's interest (*ibid.*). Political selection
is more likely to be effective if it consists of top appointments only,
chosen from personnel who have been promoted for most of their
career on merit grounds (Peters and Pierre 2004: 3). The lesson from
French regional planning could be a move towards Danish norms,
even if in some countries politicization might have a positive impact
by making a hidebound or self-serving bureaucracy more energetic in
promoting the elected leadership's policy priorities (Peters and Pierre
2004: 10).

In addition to appointing the *délégué*, the French political leadership
is able to limit the number of personnel, and adjust staffing to chang-
ing priorities using contracted and seconded officials. Yet, for the latter
to serve, their ministries, agencies or *grands corps* have to be willing
to transfer them. In Spain, a similarly elaborate system of corps to that in
France dominated into the 1980s the appointments to policy posts, and
indeed political posts, since the two elites were virtually one (Baena del
Alcázar 2002). The Spanish political leadership, through the Ministry for
Public Administration and the Ministry of Economy and Treasury, now
has greater power than in the 1980s to control the size of the bureau-
cracy and interdepartmental mobility (Parrado Díez 2000a: 163–5). It
has been able to reduce the numbers of new civil servants (though min-
istries responded by increasing temporary contracts, which were in turn
outlawed), but there has been little change in the understaffing of some
ministries and the overstaffing of others because top officials obstruct
the transfer of personnel. Some similar corps have been merged, and the
generalist civil administrator corps created. However, both entry into
the civil service and transfers to policy posts are still controlled by polit-
ically appointed officials, who favour fellow corps members (Parrado
Díez 2000b: 264). The process is both more politicized, yet more in the
hands of bureaucratic groups than in the case of DIACT, without the bal-
ancing advantage that exists in France of strong interministerial corps
that assist effective coordination across ministries, though the Spanish
leadership has taken action to improve its position with the creation of
the generalist state civil administrative corps.

The German political leadership is supported by a budgetary pro-
cess which stipulates in even finer detail than in France the number of

posts for federal civil servants by ministry. The number of contracted employees in policy posts, which is small but concerns particularly policy and political support units, is similarly recorded. The federal government has been able to limit the total number of officials of all grades, cutting it back across all ministries from the mid-1990s after the post-unification expansion (with bigger cuts in those that had expanded most), and merging several ministries (Goetz 1999: 154). Political leaders can overcome inflexible German civil service regulations by appointing staff as contracted employees, and by making appointments to senior posts beyond the budgetary limits from civil servants in a lower grade. Though there is less mobility of civil servants in Germany than there is in France, Sweden, Britain, Belgium or the Netherlands (Horton and Farnham 2000: 317), the type of energetic official that leaders might like for a small coordinating unit are just those who are actively pursuing their own career by seeking generalist posts in proximity to political leaders (Goetz 1999: 164). German political leaders are thus in the same position as French leaders – having to persuade potential recruits of the personal value to them of a post.

German civil servants likely to be appointed to a policy support unit are highly qualified: technically competent, politically socialized and experienced at the general bargaining skills that can help interministerial as well as intergovernmental coordination (Schröter 2004: 75). As in the Netherlands and Austria, and in contrast to France and Spain, there are no corps networks to hamper coordination on policies that involve rival networks (Wright and Hayward 2000: 36). On the other hand, neither are there the unifying forces from common educational backgrounds and frequent interministerial transfers evident in Britain and even in France, where the corps may divide but also link people in the same ENA or Ecole polytechnique cohort: the singularity of the five highest French corps is that they cut across ministries, technical sectors and public and private domains. In Germany, 'recruitment to the career civil service seems almost deliberately designed to minimize the chances for the selection of a tightly knit administrative elite' (Goetz 1999: 160). Hence the development of policy support units, which bring in officials and others who have worked in parliament, state bureaucracies, research institutes and political parties at federal and state levels, has been an important aid to better coordination. The inherent fragmentation by ministries and technical sectors gives a special burden but also unique opportunity for central control to the chancellery, which 'has decisively increased its hold over the ministries; departmental autonomy has been curtailed' (Goetz 1999: 149).

Steering policy with administrative and financial tools

In French regional planning, the 'institutions, arrangements and organizations' which Blondel (1987: 150) thought leaders would use to steer government policy are the interministerial committees and financial mechanisms in which DATAR participated, under the more or less direct control of the prime minister or other senior politicians.

The interministerial committee CIAT/CIADT/CIACT transmitted the leaders' policy intentions whether it issued strategic directions in a top-down manner (1960s), confirmed contracts already negotiated with local councils (1970s), or met erratically (1980s and late 1990s), and even when it made changes to its meeting place (from 1993) or name (1995, 2005). Chapter 5 demonstrated, however, that because the CIAT was a prime ministerial resource, the 'presidentialization' of regional planning was expressed in forums they dominated: the president's *Conseils restreints* or Central Planning Council, and Cabinet meetings. President Sarkozy was no different, using an early speech to announce that privatization receipts would finance ten 'exceptional' collaborative university projects of 'innovative territorial restructuring character' (*Le Monde* 30 May 2008). Political leaders also had considerable power to direct policy initiatives through other interministerial committees and advisory councils, creating, modifying and abolishing them to match their particular goals.

Funding French regional planning has mostly been through budgetary allocations, whether from the prime minister's budget or from that of a minister responsible for one of the sectors involved. Chapter 5 showed how these sums could be varied by the political leadership, and how the new 'LOLF' budgetary presentation closed for DIACT a loophole that DATAR exploited to even out budgetary variations. The propensity of leaders to create new funds for their favoured policies rather than modify old ones is an indication of constraint, though in part it also owes much to the political kudos from announcing 'new funds'. The ambitious aim of DATAR's creators to allocate state capital expenditure according to regional development priorities was never very well implemented, and leaders chose innovative ways to fund specific regional projects rather than tackle the obstacles, both bureaucratic and political, to regionalized budgets. Co-funded contracts between State and territorial authorities became the means of adapting the Right's centrally organized regional redistribution to the Left's politically decentralized system, and have been as effective as the earlier strategy. That is, French political leaders were mostly able, if they chose, to use administrative

and financial tools to steer public and private bodies towards a substantial part of their regional development goals, even if the original ideals were never achieved. In the French case at least, the 'institutions, arrangements and organizations' on which the political leadership relied for steering their aims for AdT were primarily

- interministerial committees and councils of ministers and/or officials;
- government budgets, targeted funding and co-funding contracts.

In assessing whether these findings might extend to other political systems and other domains, there is a danger of expecting similar purposes to be achieved by similar means, and thereby missing other ways through which political leaderships – especially in their more collective or diffuse forms – steer, manage or govern public policies (Kickert 1997; Toonen 2000). In the type of Cabinet system in which the British heritage still lingers (Australia, Canada and Britain itself), prime ministers use Cabinet and its various sub-groupings in a range of ways depending on their policy interests (focused or wide-ranging), circumstances (their political standing in the majority party and public opinion) and personality (Weller 2003: 712–17). They may debate, announce, argue or set the tone of the meetings; they may take decisions in segmented groups of ministers, or with a mix of ministers, officials and personal advisers in committees and groups, or in bilateral meetings, especially with finance ministers on budgets. Though interpretations of the functions of Cabinet government in all its institutional manifestations vary with observer and over time, according to Weller (*ibid.*), it is an arrangement to ensure decisions are made in the general rather than the individual ministerial interest (Canada), the process by which the government as a whole determines its policy and ensures the political will to implement it (Britain), and provides policy coherence and political support (Australia). Many other countries use similar mechanisms: even the Dutch prime minister, who until the 1970s did not really have a leadership role, now draws up Cabinet agendas and chairs both the Cabinet and Cabinet committees (Keman 2002: 229).

Britain's committee system is much like that of France in representing and mediating between the interests of sectoral ministers and ministries, whereas in other liberal democracies with parliamentary systems the Cabinet, and its committees where they exist, represents members of the coalition (rather than party factions) and/or regions (Australia, Canada,

Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands). In Germany, the Cabinet is more of 'a clearing-house for pre-determined policies' and functions without committees (Smith 1991: 50), but the practice has developed of leaders of the coalition parties in government and parliament meeting just before Cabinet, as do policy groups bringing together the relevant minister or top officials with the parliamentary party policy specialists (Goetz 1997: 757–7). Different chancellors use this apparatus differently: Helmut Schmidt gave the Cabinet itself high status while Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schröder favoured coalition committees and other informal coordination and steering institutions, such as the Alliance for Jobs chaired by Schröder, with a membership of federal ministers, trade union and business representatives (Schmidt 2003: 33).

Germany's federal system has spawned several hundred sectoral committees linking federation and states. They symbolize a bargaining form of federalism (necessarily supported by an administrative federalism) that differs from the conventional American model (Smith 1992: 42). Where regional development is concerned, federal planning has until now been less important than planning by the states; and German planning officials are wary of French AdT with its tradition of central state intervention (Faludi 2004: 1355). Despite being impressed by the proactive style of French planning, they wanted to keep their 'bottom-up' spatial planning (Faludi 2003: 131). The risk is of policy segmentation unless the chancellor, with the aid of the chancellery and fellow ministers, performs this function.

Similarly, the budgetary and fund-creating powers of the political leadership are more restricted in Germany than in France, because states are responsible for the larger proportion of public expenditure and because they can defend their interests as territorial entities in the Bundesrat far more powerfully than can territorial entities in France (though French localities make their presence felt though dual-mandate politicians, especially in the Senate). Moreover, the prevailing concept in German budgetary transfers has been to make compensatory payments to equalize income per head, rather than to steer development strategies. Having brought spatial planning closer within the federal government's legislative arena, the political leadership is nearer to fulfilling its goal to implement 'a shift away from primarily compensation-oriented distribution to targeted support for specific regional potentials and strengths' (Federal Ministry of Transport, Building and Urban Affairs: www.bmvbs.de, 22 July 2008).

Many observers have described central arrangements in the Netherlands and Germany as 'badly coordinated' compared with the

tight control exercised in Britain by the Treasury and Cabinet. The Dutch administration jealously guards its tradition of ministerial autonomy, with the main palliatives the increasingly binding nature of the initial coalition programme and the pragmatic search for compromise (Heywood and Wright 1997: 85). Yet, academics in 'consensus democracies', such as the Netherlands and Switzerland, are likely to be puzzled by the focus on formal coordinating powers. In the regional planning field, Faludi says simply that, unlike German planning officials, who think in terms of sovereignty, division of responsibility and their monopoly role in making statutory plans, for Dutch planners, sharing the role between several levels is standard practice (Faludi 2003: 132). More generally, Kickert (1997) thinks 'Anglo-American' studies of 'new public management' should pay more attention to the 'public governance' tradition of the Netherlands. It consists of the 'directed influencing' of complex networks in societal policy sectors, which bring together actors from 'national, provincial and local government, political and societal groups, pressure, action and interest groups, societal institutions, private and business organizations' (Kickert 1997: 735). Although, as an empirical observation, governments are not equivalent in status to the other actors, governance is not about a central state using its power monopoly and legislative authority (Kickert 1997: 738). Klöti (2001: 21), while observing an increase in the 'steering capacities' of the Swiss federal government, notes that its role was still more of a 'central partner in a complex network of intergovernmental relations', and that leadership was about mediating not issuing orders. However, such systems may not work so well in larger nations, or incorporate the interests of social groups not (yet) part of the established networks, and a more purposeful political leadership may be needed to handle responses to large events such as the incorporation of new regions.

Politicians, bureaucrats and leadership

Chapters 6 and 7 extended the enquiry on political leaders to their impact on the wider bureaucratic environment, as Blondel suggested in *World Leaders* (1980: 15), by examining 'whether, on a comparative basis, political leaders appear to "make a difference" to the policies followed'. Two case studies contrasted the actions of political leaders in the light of the institutional and non-institutional context, particularly the resources and constraints deriving from constitutional provisions and the party system; the role of bureaucratic organizations;

and the constraints and opportunities offered by such factors as crises or honeymoon periods.

The impact of leaders: the statistical evidence

The input of political leaders into road network planning – a technical domain generally agreed to be dominated by technical corps and other interests – was examined in Chapter 6. Outputs from about half the road planning instruments matched well the leadership's official intentions for them, and an even higher proportion (about two-thirds) corresponded well to the joint or conflicting intentions of a multiple leadership. Slightly fewer instruments fulfilled the goals of AdT, confirming the extra challenge of coordinating multiple policy sectors and aspirations. The support (or mixed feelings) of the political leadership made far more impact on the results than the breadth of support (or opposition) across bureaucratic organizations.

The capacity of leaders to make a difference was also tested in a sharply contrasting domain: the reform of the administrative and political regional institutions. It was bound to be resisted by the prefectoral corps and the veto groups of local–national politicians in parliament. Chapter 7 showed that, despite objections from these groups, three-quarters of the proposals made by political leaders made some impact, and nearly a quarter brought about substantial institutional change. Those instruments achieving most change were more likely to be supported by a majority of political leaders. While opposition to reforms made a difference to outcomes, most were introduced nevertheless, though often modified by concessions from the leaders.

Underpinning the statistical data in both sets of case studies was considerable primary evidence that individual presidents and prime ministers were personally engaged in the projects: initiating, developing, negotiating, monitoring, suggesting solutions to difficulties and making strategic decisions on timing or on what concessions could be made and what was non-negotiable.

Exercising political leadership

Although the French Constitution of 1958 strengthened the French executive, it made no practical difference to the impact of the political leadership in either roads or regionalization policy, mainly because of the attitude of other actors to the legal provisions. Fourth Republic parliamentarians, conscious of the leadership's weakness, gave it temporary law-making powers that it used to make changes in regional economic

administration: on the other hand, in the Fifth Republic, bureaucrats and local politicians were willing to ignore instructions issued under similar powers, and other solutions had to be found. Leaders made proposals just as frequently and as vigorously before and after 1958, and their level of impact was much the same, more especially on regionalization than on roads, since constitutional reform had not changed the rural composition of the Senate or the dual mandate of parliamentarians. The terms of a constitution are important – and indeed reform of the Senate and to multiple post-holding are constant themes in French politics – but in these studies it was hard to see evidence of constitutional support or constraint on leaders, particularly as elements such as powers to appoint officials could be amended so easily. These conclusions may not be unusual given the capacity of the German executive too to amend a Constitution expressly designed to constrain – though stabilize – the chancellor. Merkel's Grand Coalition government was able to change the Basic Law to move domains into its sole jurisdiction in order to reduce the proportion of legislation that could be obstructed by the states in the Bundesrat from 60 per cent to 40 per cent, as Merkel intended (speech to Bundestag, 29 March 2006).

The change of Constitution in France, together with the change in the party system it helped engender, had much more effect on the power relationships within the leadership, and on whose policy preferences would dominate (Elgie 2003: 95–103). This study confirms that of Elgie and others. In the Fourth Republic the president rarely intervened, whereas in the Fifth, except during periods of cohabitation, presidents determined what role they and the prime minister played, and in which forum an instrument would be decided. Departmental ministers had some room for their projects within the leeway permitted by the president and prime minister, and they were more likely to be successful if both were favourable, though leaders of coalition partners sometimes had an advantage. Ministers could also affect outcomes by delaying projects, but overall the positional hierarchy mirrored the party hierarchy in determining whether a project went forward. This conclusion fits that of Jones (1991a) for the countries of Western Europe surveyed in his edited volume (Germany, France, the Netherlands, Ireland and Italy). Political resources were the most important resources (or constraints) for a prime minister [or French president], in these countries, and their most important political resource was party, including in their relationship with other coalition leaders.

The bureaucratic environment was a serious threat to many leadership initiatives in both fields examined. The corps and the more independent

administrative bodies, like the Plan Commissariat, posed significant obstacles to political leaders who wanted to change the established rules of the game. In both Republics political leaders could find their proposals obstructed or delayed and had to find a compromise, an alternative instrument and even a financial motivation or penalty. Yet bureaucratic obstruction was often successful only because it was supported by local and national politicians (including in the government parties). What appeared to be bureaucratic resistance was sometimes revealed as opposition within the political leadership itself.

At the same time, French policy officials can provide highly competent support to a political leadership, with the exception of a small number of people appointed on grounds of political reward rather than talent. None of the bureaucratic institutions examined in these chapters was monolithic: there were always groups within groups who saw the interest or the inevitability of the reforms being proposed, or who held a different professional view from those at the very top. Rouban (1996) showed in convincing empirical detail that the technical corps embraced change more readily than the administrative *grands corps* but that those at the very top were the most resistant to change because it offered them no further reward.

Heywood and Wright (1997: 82–6), in a comparison of West European administrative systems, note that France, like Spain, is distinctive in having such a powerful and elaborate system of self-governed corps, although in France the administrative and technical *grands corps* also provide an efficient coordinating device. In contrast, the British senior civil service is not only one entity but managed from the top by political leaders, though it lacks competence on technical issues (Burnham and Pyper 2008: 191–24). Many central administrations differ from the French in being (similarly) fragmented between ministries but without the same level of organized self-interest (Italy, Germany and the Netherlands). Some have alternative coordinating devices (in Germany the chancellor's office and party affiliation; in the Netherlands pragmatic compromise and the recent development of a senior civil service). Others such as in Greece are simply too weak to provide leadership support (Page and Wright 2007: 11). Top officials in France, as in Germany and Belgium, are more subject to politicized appointments than in Britain, Denmark or the Netherlands but currently follow Peter and Pierre's (2004: 2) dictum that politicized appointments work best if they come only after a career selected on merit. The challenge for French political leaders is to profit from the strong capacity of its bureaucratic environment without alienating officials through careless politicization.

Political institutions were a significant constraint. Politicians of all parties were a substantial component of the opposition to leaders' projects if these appeared to threaten their own status as local notables or that of the prefects and technical corps whom they relied upon to promote their interests at higher levels and provide legal and practical advice. The dual mandate makes both parliamentary chambers a potential veto point. In the Fourth Republic, with its weak parties and shifting coalitions, parliamentarians risked few penalties by opposing the political leadership; most measures on roads or regions proceeded, if at all, only after substantial modifications that satisfied a notable's interest, some to lasting deleterious effect. The Fifth Republic, whose executive had more power over the legislature (through procedural rules and a two-bloc-plus party system), revealed the extent to which members of the political leadership, including presidents and financial and technical ministers, could amend and subvert an agreed programme. Some leaders achieved their successes by ensuring that their projects bypassed particular ministers as well as the corps, or by taking advantage of ministers' personal interests by offering to decentralize administrative units to their provincial seats.

France is a Southern European country in its 'political opportunity structure' built from multiple-office holding, patron–client relations and informal channels for exercising influence (Mény and Rhodes 1997: 103–5). Even if this structure is not as well developed as in Italy, Spain or Greece, and there are questions in France about whether the State controls business or business the State (see Naughton 1999 on the former oil company, Elf), 'conflicts of interest' within policy-making networks are more strongly present than in the Nordic countries, the Netherlands or Britain, and decisions are less 'rational' than the technical corps claim.

The non-institutional policy environment was manifested in the contemporary technical or professional paradigms, which might be taken up by political leaders – but they were unlikely to prevail over a need to cut budgets or, alternatively, to create jobs, or the local interests of leading politicians and their backers. Some political leaders simply distrusted planning experts and bureaucrats in general, and preferred to decide the details themselves. Contingent opportunities, such as crises in the political or economic environment, occasionally helped a prime minister enthuse ministers who might otherwise have been persuaded by technicians' arguments, or changed a prime minister's attitude to whether a project should be funded or not. However, the use of crises and 'honeymoon periods' depended greatly on a leader's individual response to problems and opportunities, with some successful projects

taking place at these times; other leaders deliberately postponed serious reform to quieter periods. In any case, an impulse for change provoked or supported by a reference to current events was inadequate to sustain implementation of large-scale infrastructure projects or the long-term process of regional reform.

Persistence in overcoming obstacles revealed differences in leadership style. Some presidents and prime ministers chased up ministers when actions they had requested had not been implemented; some prime ministers and ministers found different and innovative ways to implement projects that had met resistance when promoted through the traditional legislative, budgetary or administrative processes. Though the evidence on the variations in a politician's capacity for innovation and persistence inevitably favours those who were in post long enough or frequently enough for it to be demonstrated, there is a difference between certain leaders who 'were more verbal than operational', when they asked officials for a report on administrative reforms to economic and regional planning, and dropped it (Bloch-Lainé and Bouvier 1986: 100), and others, who implemented one of its recommended options, found it did not work and prepared carefully with their aides the agency solution that was DATAR.

How 'leaders made a difference', and whether the outcome was dominated by bureaucratic groups, varied greatly. Though roads planning and regionalization cannot represent the whole field of regional planning, their intrinsic differences and organizational contrasts mean that weight must be given to features found to be common to both. Putting together the findings from the two case studies, the processes can be generalized as four schematic models of the approaches taken by leaders to policy making, varying in their interactions with bureaucratic organizations, and in their outcomes.

First, there were initiatives dominated by the institutional and non-institutional environment, from which there was no significant output because of the constraints exerted by bureaucratic institutions or local political actors, often in concert; or because national political leaders themselves were divided; or because of electoral constraints on the leaders. DATAR (or DAT before it) was not asked to contribute on these issues or its advice was rejected. In both policy domains examined, these failed initiatives represented a quarter to a third of instruments.

Second, there were incremental achievements by political leaders, often against strong constraints from bureaucratic groups or more powerful political leaders. These were instruments in which DATAR was typically used as a leadership resource to negotiate with State

bureaucrats and other groups at national or local level, to move the technical paradigm along, or to modify ministries' or regions' projects using FIAT/FNADT and other funds, before politicians settled the last details. These projects involved low-key but sustained intervention by the political leaders supporting them, who initiated, announced or ratified the agreements. They were modest instruments representing what was possible given the opposition to more substantial change. This model applied to nearly half the instruments across both policy sectors, more in the regionalization process in which local actors were directly affected, less on road instruments, whose incremental outcomes were more frequently the result of internal compromise within the political leadership. Though it cannot be described as the 'normal' method of interaction – because processes varied greatly – it was the most usual method.

Third, some highly committed political leaders achieved ambitious goals, using resources from outside the traditional policy community to prepare or implement the instruments, challenging the incumbent power-holders. These leaders were willing to give concessions to hostile groups of bureaucrats or local political actors, providing their core goals were retained. The outsiders could be advisers from a different corps or no corps, the private sector, from DATAR or expressly excluding DATAR as just another potential bureaucratic opponent. A few of these instruments were enacted by leaders using 'special powers' or under 'honeymoon' conditions, but it was difficult to demonstrate that the 'honeymoon' was essential to the output, rather than that the initiators had gone ahead, believing that it was. They were prepared in what looked to be a top-down manner that bypassed the usual networks and they could be announced in a top-down manner too, declared by president, prime minister or minister of finance. This form of interaction represented nearly a quarter of the instruments in the two policy domains.

Fourth and last, some actions were assertions of personal political will by a president or prime minister over other political leaders and bureaucratic groups, with little or no discussion with them. Although the idea might come from a close adviser or be elaborated with close advisers, essentially they were projects that others were expected to accept and implement as they stood. They constituted only about a tenth of the processes examined and were not necessarily 'heroic' projects in the dual sense defined by Hayward, as being 'both an ambitious political exercise in rational decision-making and an ambitious assertion of political will by government leaders' (Hayward 1982: 112); those that were, happened perhaps once in a presidency.

A more or less absolute exercise of political will and judgement by a leader, defying the institutional constraints, was thus a very rare event. Whether on roads policy or on regionalization, the political leadership mostly achieved incremental change, either because that was what it sought, or because its ambitions were curtailed by internal conflict and local politicians as much as by bureaucratic opposition. Sometimes leaders failed to make headway, and occasionally they asserted their political will in a dramatic fashion. Overall, the variety and strength of outcomes demonstrate that political leaders have a capacity to make an impact on bureaucratic organizations and to reorient bureaucratic activities towards their particular political goals that is far greater than even Blondel anticipated.

Appendix I: Political leaders 1944–2008

Prime Minister		Interior	Economy + Finance		Construction	Public works
Provisional Government 1944–46						
De Gaulle	10 September 1944	Tixier	Mendes, Pleven		Dautry	R.Mayer
De Gaulle	21 November 1945	Tixier	Pleven		Dautry	Moch
Gouin (Soc)	26 January 1946	Le Troquer	Philip		Billoux	Moch
Bidault (MRP)	24 June 1946	Depreux	Schuman	s/s Pflimlin	Billoux	Moch
Blum (Soc)	16 December 1946	Depreux	Philip	s/s Guyon	Schmitt	Moch
Fourth Republic						
President Auriol (Soc) 1946–53						
Ramadier (Soc)	22 January 1947	Depreux	Schuman	s/s Philip	Tillon	Moch
Ramadier (Soc)	22 October 1947	Depreux	Moch		Letourneau	Moch
Schuman (MRP)	24 November 1947	Moch	R.Mayer		Coty	Pineau
Marie (Rad)	26 July 1978	Moch	Reynaud		Coty	Pineau
Schuman (MRP)	5 September 1948	Moch	Pineau		Coty	Queuille
Queuille (Rad)	11 September 1948	Moch	Queuille, Petsch		C-Petit	Pineau

					Budget		
Bidault (MRP)	28 October 1949	Moch, Queuille	Petsche	s/s Buron		C-Petit	Pineau, Chastellain
Queuille (Rad)	2 July 1950	Queuille (PM)	Petsche	E.Faure		C-Petit	Bourgès-M
Pleven (UDSR)	12 July 1950	Queuille	Petsche	E.Faure		C-Petit	Pinay
Queuille (Rad)	10 March 1951	Queuille (PM)	Petsche	E.Faure		C-Petit	Pinay
Pleven (UDSR)	11 August 1951	Brune	R.Mayer	Courant		C-Petit	Pinay
E.Faure (Rad)	20 January 1952	Brune	Buron	Courant		C-Petit	Pinay
Pinay (RI)	8 March 1952	Brune	Pinay and s/s Gaillard	Moreau		C-Petit	Morice
R.Mayer (Rad)	8 January 1953	Brune	Bourges-M	Moreau		Courant	Morice
Laniel (RI)	28 June 1953	Martinaud-D	E.Faure			Lemaire	Chastellain
President Coty (Cons) January 1954–May 1958							
Laniel (RI)	20 January 1954	Martinaud-D	Buron			Lemaire	Chastellain
Mendes-F (Rad)	19 June 1954	Mitterrand	E.Faure			Lemaire	Chaban-Delmas
Mendes-F (Rad)	14 August 1954	Mitterrand	E.Faure			C-Petit	Chaban-Delmas
Mendes-F (Rad)	3 September 1954	Mitterrand	Buron			Chaban-D	
E.Faure (Rad)	23 February 1955	Bourges-M	Pflimlin			Duchet	
E.Faure (Rad)	2 December 1955	E.Faure	Lecoste			Duchet	
Mollet (Soc)	1 February 1956	Gilbert-Jules	Ramadier			Felice	Pinton

Prime Minister		Interior	Economy + Finance	Construction				Public works
Bourges-M (Rad)	13 June 1957	Gilbert-Jules	Gaillard	Chochoy	Bonnafous			
Gaillard (Rad)	6 November 1957	Bourges-M	Pflimlin (with Plan)	Bonnafous				
Pflimlin (MRP)	14 May 1958	M.Faure, Moch	E.Faure (with Plan)	Bonnafous				
De Gaulle	1 June 1958	Pelletier	Pinay	Sudreau	Buron			

Fifth Republic
President de Gaulle January 1959–April 1969

Prime Minister		Interior	Economy + Finance	Construction		Admin. reform	Minister – délégué	Délégué
Debré (UNR)	8 January 1959	Berthouin	Pinay	Sudreau	Buron			
Debré (UNR)	28 May 1959	Chatenet, Frey	Pinay, Baumgart-ner	Sudreau	Buron			
Debré (UNR)	6 May 1961	Frey	Baumgartner, Giscard	Sudreau	Buron	**Admin. reform**	**Minister – délégué**	
Pompidou (UNR) + **AdT**	14 April 1962	Frey	Giscard	Maziol	Buron, Jacquet	L.Joxe	Schumann	**Délégué**
				Super-Infrastructure				14 February 1963 Guichard
Pompidou (UNR)	8 January 1966	Frey	Debré	Pisani	s/s Bettencourt		**Plan + AdT**	
Pompidou (UNR)	1 April 1967	Fouchet	Debré	Ortoli	s/s Chamant		Marcellin	[6 April 1967]
Pompidou (UDR)	31 May 1968	Marcellin	Couve	Galley	s/s Chamant		Guichard	Monod
Couve (UDR)	10 July 1968	Marcellin	Ortoli	Chalandon	s/s Chamant		Guichard	

President Pompidou (UDR) June 1969–April 1974

Chaban-D (UDR)	20 June 1969	Marcellin	Giscard s/s Chirac	Chalandon	Mondon, Chamant	Frey s/s Malaud	Bettencourt	Monod
				AdT + Infrastructure				
Messmer (UDR)	5 July 1972	Marcellin	Giscard	Guichard and s/s Bonnet	Galley			
Messmer (UDR)	2 April 1973	Marcellin	Giscard	Guichard and s/s Bonnet	Guéna	Peyrefitte		
				AdT + Super-infrastructure				
Messmer (UDR)	27 February 1974	Chirac	Giscard	Guichard and s/s Bonnet		Peyrefitte		

President Giscard (UDF) May 1974–May 1981

		Interior + AdT		**Infrastructure**	**Transport**			12 September 1975
Chirac (UDR)	27 May 1974	Poniatowski	Fourcade	Galley	Cavaillé		**Plan + AdT**	Essig
Barre	25 August 1976	Poniatowski	Barre	Fourcade	Cavaillé		Lecanuet	
				AdT + Super-infrastructure				
Barre	29 March 1977	Bonnet	Barre	Fourcade and s/s Cavaillé Icart and s/s Dijoud				
				Environment	**Transport**			27 April 1978
Barre + **AdT**	3 April 1978	Bonnet	Monory	D'Ornano	Le Theule			Chadeau

Prime Minister		Interior	Economy + Finance	Urban + Infrastructure	Transport		Plan + AdT	Délégué
President Mitterrand (PS) May 1981–May 1988								
Mauroy (PS)	21 May 1981	Defferre	Delors	Quilliot	Fiterman	**Plan**	Rocard	27 October 1981
Mauroy (PS) + **AdT**	4 October 1983	Defferre	Delors	Quilès	Fiterman	Le Garrec PM's s/s		Attali
				Super-infrastructure			**Plan + AdT**	
Fabius (PS)	18 July 1984	Joxe	Bérégovoy	Quilès	s/s Auroux		Defferre	6 September 1984
Fabius (PS)	20 September 1985	Joxe	Bérégovoy	Auroux	Josselin			Sallois
				AdT + Super-infrastructure				6 May 1987
Chirac (RPR)	20 March 1986	Pasqua	Balladur	Méhaignerie, s/s Douffiagues				Carrez
President Mitterrand (PS) May 1988–May 1995								
Rocard (PS)	9 May 1988	Joxe	Bérégovoy	M.Faure	Mermaz	Stoléru	Fauroux s/s Chérèque	4 October 1989
Rocard (PS)	23 June 1988	Joxe	Bérégovoy	M.Faure	Delebarre			Duport
				Urban + AdT	**Super-infrastructure**			
Cresson (PS)	15 May 1991	Marchand	Bérégovoy	Delebarre	Quilès	**Industry + AdT**		
Bérégovoy (PS)	2 April 1992				Bianco	Strauss-Kahn s/s Laignel		
		Interior + AdT						2 September 1993
Balladur (RPR)	29 March 1993	Pasqua s/s Hoeffel			Pons			Paillet

President Chirac (UMP) May 1995–May 2007

		Interior		**AdT + Super-infrastructure**		
Juppé (UMP)	17 May 1995	J.L.Debré	Madelin	Pons s/s Aubert (rural) Idrac (transport)		
				Urban + AdT	**Super-infrastructure**	15 November 1995
Juppé (UMP)	7 November 1995	J.L.Debré	Arthuis	Gaudin	Pons	Aubert
						AdT + Environment
Jospin (PS)	2 June 1997 1 September 2000	Chevenement Vaillant	Strauss-Kahn Fabius		Gayssot Gayssot	Voynet Voynet, then Cochet	23 July 1997 Guigou
						Public Service + AdT	24 July 2002
Raffarin (UMP)	7 May 2002	Sarkozy	Mer		De Robien	Delevoye s/s Briand	Jacquet
				AdT + Super-infrastructure		20 November 2004
Raffarin (UMP)	31 March 2004	Villepin	Sarkozy	De Robien s/s St Sernin		Mirabaud
		Interior + AdT	Breton	**Super-infrastructure**		
Villepin (UMP)	31 May 2005	Sarkozy s/s Estrosi		Perben		
President Sarkozy (UMP) May 2007–						
				Environment, Infrastructure, AdT		28 April 2008
Fillon (UMP)	19 May 2007	Alliot-Marie	Lagarde	Borloo s/s Falco (AdT) Blanc (Paris)		Dartout

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