MONITORING REPORT

The violent extremism propaganda circulating

on online platforms in Albania

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1. INTRODUCTION

Violent extremism and the forces that promote radicalisation comprise some of the most difficult challenges nowadays. Albania is committed to fulfilling the goals of national security, to uphold stability, as well as to prevent and combat violent extremism. To this end, the legal and institutional framework (Acquis) has been developed and consolidated in line with international anti-terrorism developments, strengthening internal institutional mechanisms and investing in regional and international partnerships, as well as in initiatives in the fight against terrorism.

With the defeat of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which acted openly, with regular forces and staged attacks by a "state government", extremist groups that have evaded arrest and prosecution, by law enforcement, now can continue to maintain communication and propagate to their followers through online communication. ISIS has already proven that it has expertise in electronic communication and technology due to the use of online recruitment methods of foreign fighters from many European countries. This experience in social media and video propaganda can be used again to keep in touch with radicalized people, but also to recruit new members who can organize violent acts and armed attacks in various western countries.

Albanians were one of the target groups of ISIS online propaganda in 2015-2017, which proved effective in radicalizing and recruiting about 500 fighters and their families from their countries in Western Balkans and Europe. A study supported by the Academy of Political Studies in 2015[1] discovered a sophisticated online public communication strategy of ISIS in Albanian language, aiming at recruiting them as fighters in conflict areas. Furthermore, the Albanian language is also one of the five languages used for communication in what is considered the official online site of ISIS (https://hilafeti.wordpress.com), proving once again the danger that the propaganda of this terrorist group might pose for the radicalization of Albanians.

Albania has benefited from the digital agenda that the European Commission implements in the Balkans to establish national broadband networks, as the basic infrastructure for all internet service providers. Large-scale use of Internet and modern communication technologies by Albanian citizens is considered a necessity for the country's economic and social development and its gradual rapprochement with the levels of the European Union countries.

Current policies in Albania promote the expansion of internet service to cover many areas of the country as well as the liberalization of the telecommunications market by promoting competitiveness of different service providers. The latter comprise one of the reasons for the growth in internet users thanks to the adoption of technology, the establishment of wireless service, aggressive promotional packages with integrated services (telephone, internet, TV) and the stimulation of interest through network content such as videos, direct broadcast, etc.

Growth of internet users in our country is related not only to the global trend of technology use, but also to the liberalization of the market and the positive pressure exerted by the

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[1] Public relation online strategies of ISIS in Albania - 2015
http://www.asp.al/pdf/Strategjia_e_komunikimit_te_IS_-_Koncept_paper_13_Nentor.pdf

governmental instances for the use of internet particularly for businesses. Electronic procurement, online services of the E-Albania platform, as well as other facilities to avoid queues and corruption, have had positive pressure to increase demand for Internet service in the country.

According to INSTAT statistics[2], 82.2 percent of Albanian households had internet access in 2019, marking a higher internet penetration rate than the world average (estimated at 58.8 percent). Having a young population, our country uses smartphones excessively, which offer low cost internet service on the basis of solid 4G infrastructure anywhere.

INSTAT data also reveals that "daily/almost daily" internet usage has recorded the highest percentages over the years for all age groups, the main users belonging to age group of 16-24 years at about 93.1% and age group of 25-34 years at 92.4%. Usage rate by gender shows that males are more frequent users, comprising 71.2% of users compared to 66% of female users. On the other hand, the main activities carried out online are information search (for 50.2% of internet users), information sharing, e-mail (32.5%) Youtube, online movies (live or saved online, 38.2%).

Along with this positive development of the spread of internet, the possibility of exposing society and particularly young people, as they are the main users, to various risks in the online environment has increased. In this new virtual reality of the "world wide web", radical and extremist groups have found an efficient way to spread their ideologies as well as collaborate and persuade followers without any geographical or time constraints. The Internet is a great facilitator of interpersonal interaction. A radical movement can exist in a virtual group that may include people who have never met in real life but who are connected through shared attitudes and ideologies.

According to European Commission 2019 Report on Albania[3]: "*Online radicalisation content in Albanian is on the rise. The authorities need to enhance their online monitoring and response capacities, and enhance their efforts to empower civil society to develop positive and alternative narratives online. The government also needs to step up efforts to counter external influences, including financial flows that could lead to further radicalisation*".

One of the most vulnerable groups to violent extremism and other negative phenomena associated with online communication are children and young people who are still searching for their identity. A study[4] conducted by UNICEF Albania showed that more than 20% of children surveyed accept all social requests in social networks, 25% of them interacted online with someone they did not know in real life, 16% of them have met in person someone they found online and parents know only about 9% of children's online experiences.

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[2] Survey on Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) usage in Households and by Individuals in 2018 – 20192018-2019
http://www.instat.gov.al/media/6436/survey-on-information-and-communication-technologies-ict-usage-in-households-and-by-individuals-in-2018-2019.pdf
[3] https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-albania-report.pdf
[4] A study on 'Children's Experiences of Internet Use in Albania'
https://www.unicef.org/albania/viral-summit-better-Internet-children-and-adolescents-albania

In the face of these developments, law enforcement institutions need to strengthen monitoring and collaboration mechanisms with the technology and telecommunications industry to provide a safer online environment.

The National Authority for Electronic Certification and Cyber Security (AKCESK) is the public institution that ensures a secure electronic environment in Albania. The mission of AKCESK is to ensure the security of electronic transactions between citizens, businesses and public authorities, and to establish minimum technical standards for data security and networks/computer systems of information society in line with international standards in this area, aiming at creating a secure electronic environment.

This report aims at monitoring cases of online radicalisation and violent extremism in Albania, tackling this phenomenon, assessing the available legal, institutional and human resources, identifying gaps to take the necessary measures to prevent such phenomena, as well as to providing a secure electronic environment.

More specifically, the monitoring process objectives are to:

1. Search for extremist content on online platforms in Albania (websites, blogs, social networks, etc.);
2. Specify and analyze individuals and organizations with extremist tendencies;
3. Specify online platforms, social networks, websites used to distribute extremist content;
4. Provide reliable statistics for relevant policy making.

2. METHODOLOGY OF THE MONITORING PROCESS

The monitoring process relied on research methodologies and publications, as well as on the analyzes on similar projects initiated and lead by the European Commission[5]. The content analysis methodology, through keyword research, was used in this process to understand the narrative, target group in Albania and the electronic platforms used. Also, based on Mc Farlane's (2010) definition, it was determined what can be defined as violent extremism online.

According to the scholar violent extremism online is: "the use of online communication systems as a means to facilitate, and/or influence individuals or groups, in developing, adopting, and/or advancing belief systems which lay outside the relative norms of mainstream

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[5] https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers_en

society resulting in the advocating of threats, and/or physical acts, of violence, to further that belief system" [6].

The methodology used consisted of drafting a list of keywords that could lead users to extremist content as they used the search engine. These keywords were categorised based on their ideological type and the potential risk associated with them. The search elements were also based on the keywords used in the State Intelligence Service (SHISH) reports regarding spread of propaganda and calls for violent extremism and radicalisation in Albania.

For each of these keywords was found the average number of people propagating their extremist ideologies, including ethnic, political extremism etc. Persons interested, genders included in percentages, average age, level of education, etc., were also identified.

Data collection and analysis was carried out by a group of six experienced researchers in issues of violent extremism monitoring and online communication during two months **November - December 2019.**

The researchers compiled a list of popular websites suspected of having extremist content, and analyzed them along with linked data that could lead to other sites with malicious content.

Keywords categorization[7]

To identify the level of risk associated with each word in the content they are included, the keywords were divided into these categories:

- 1st Category: Extreme, violent words

- 2nd Category: General keywords

The categorization of keywords such as 'beheading' or 'killing apostates' are inherently violent, whereas others, such as 'crusades' or 'caliphate' are more general in their nature and, as such their content had to be carefully analyzed, so as not to interfere with the exercise of freedom of speech and opinion.[8]

High-Risk Extreme Words	General Keywords
Suicide Vest	Martyr
Killing Apostates	Jihad

Table no.1: Keywords categorization

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[6] McFarlane, B., Online Violent Radicalisation (OVeR): Challenges Facing Law Enforcement Agencies and Policy Stakeholders, Monash University, 2010
[7] Appendix 6, key words to monitor
[8] EU Human Rights Guidelines on Freedom of Expression Online and Offline
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/142549.pdf

It is inevitable that there is some degree of overlap between the categories, however the designation reflects the nature of the keyword itself, rather than its connotations with any particular group. This means that while the concept of 'khilafah' (caliphate) is most associated with ISIS, but the word itself does not have any violent or extreme connotations. As a result it was categorised in the political Islamist keyword list.

Keyword Search Frequencies

Data on keywords use was obtained through the search engines[9], where from Google's historical data specific results, containing radicalised and violent extremist content, were gathered.

As the study did not have access to Google's comprehensive data, these average frequencies can be used as a useful guide to keyword popularity and geographic trends, but do not give exact or conclusive figures.

Regional frequencies were collected for both Albanian and Arabic keywords. The data on Arabic keyword frequencies does not correspond exclusively to the geographical Arab world, but keywords in Arabic were chosen due to the fact that it is the language used by different extremist groups.

Persons who were active on websites, social media, youtube, where keywords were found, were then identified and statistics on their gender, age, and location were extracted.

Content Categorisation

Content categorisation was created to have a more detailed summary of content types where the keywords were found. Designations of the content found on a website did not reflect the judgment of an entire website, but only of the content where the keyword was found.

Categories	Extreme	Neutral	Informative	Anti-Islamic
1	Violent			
2	Non-Violent			
3	Political Islamist			
4		News, Analysis, Religious Ideologies		
5			Civil Society	
6			Government	
7			Religious Groups	
8				Anti-Islamic

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[9] Appendix 1, Search engines

Table no.2: Content categorisation of keywords

Grouping on extreme content was split into three categories; violent, non-violent, and radical political content of terrorist groups. Contents were categorised as violent if they contained either images of graphic violence or calls for violence.

Websites considered to be extreme but non-violent were those expressing anti-Semitic, homophobic, racist, or sectarian views but without incitement to violence. The radical political category included content that expressed a specific affinity towards a particular Islamist group. This category clearly refers to well-known political groups that are actively seeking to gain political power.

Grouping on neutral content includes mainstream media websites, websites that propagate religious ideologies.

Grouping on informative (counter-narrative) content is split into three subcategories: civil society groups, government groups, and religious groups. For religious groups, this includes well-known religious organizations, as well as individuals with Islamist tendencies, who propagate ideologies about their faith.

Grouping on anti-Islamic content includes some keywords wherein there is a continued presence of anti-Muslim extremist content.

Initially monitoring was attempted through some open source tools/applications, but the generated data was not grouped and oriented according to the specific search. For this reason, manual searches by various search engines (see **appendix 1**) were used to retrieve information that had radical and violent extremist content from Google database.

3. MONITORING ANALYSIS

Empirical research has focused on monitoring the most widely used online platforms in Albania, such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram, Websites, Online Games, to monitor cases of propaganda spread or influence of certain views, which may lead to radicalisation or violent extremism. At the stage where someone has followed a hashtag or joined a group, they have likely already shown openness to an ideology. The research found that there are numerous websites and social media accounts in Albania that can be used to spread extremist ideologies.

3.1 SOCIAL MEDIA

Social media plays a key role in spreading propaganda about radicalism and violent extremism, including social media such as:

3.1.1 FACEBOOK[10]

Statistics show that in Albania the Facebook penetration rate in January 2019[11] reached about 47.6% of the population and the number of Facebook users reached about 1.4 million, being the most widely used social media in the country.

Search for keywords revealed that the social network Facebook is mostly used by people who spread extremist propaganda in the Albanian language. Although some users with fake accounts and some organizations with suspicious religious profiles were identified, a detailed analysis of users and the content they share with others was provided.

A total of 42 accounts were monitored on Facebook, out of which:

- 28 accounts spread religious propaganda;

- 4 accounts spread extremist political ideologies;

- 4 accounts share ideologies about ethnic conflict;

- 2 accounts share ideologies about the terrorist implications in Albania;

- 4 accounts spread their ideologies on religious discrimination.

Fig.1: No. of Facebook accounts that spread propaganda according to the above categories

The following was found for each content category:

- ***Religious Propaganda***
    Likes-318,945; Comment -1068

- ***Political extremism and violence***
    Likes-826; Comment -191

- ***Ethnic conflict***
    Likes-721; Comments -105

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[10] According to Appendix 3, references found in Facebook.
[11] https://www.internetworldstats.com/europa2.htm

- ***Religious discrimination***
  Likes-3157; Comments -553

- ***Posts implying terrorist affinities***
  Likes-184; Comments -228

3.1.2 YOUTUBE[12]

24 accounts were found on YouTube, with the majority disseminating religious propaganda. Users spreading religious propaganda are 16 in total and their publications are liked about 4282 times and commented about 173 times. There are 73,284 subscribers of these accounts.

Other accounts are divided into:

• 16 accounts of extremist content about religious propaganda;

• 2 accounts providing ideology about political extremism;

• 2 on ethnic conflict;

• 2 on terrorist implications;

• 2 on religious discrimination.

Likes implying terrorist affinities and ethnic conflict amounted to 182.

Likes about religious propaganda amount to 4282 and comments so far 124.

Fig 2: No. of YouTube accounts that disseminate propaganda by category in the graphic.

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[12] **According to Appendix 4, references found on YouTube**

3.1.3 TWITTER, TELEGRAM AND INSTAGRAM[13]

There were found 12 accounts on Twitter, Telegram and Instagram, which spread mainly religious propaganda.

Respectively:

• 6 accounts were found on Twitter, which were liked 50 times and had 59 subscribers.

• 4 users were found on Telegram, which had 990 subscribers.

• 2 accounts were found on Instagram, which had 128 followers and 54 posts.

Fig. 3: No. of Twitter, Telegram and Instagram accounts that spread propaganda by category in the graphic

The table in Figure 4 is created based on this social network monitoring, while it provides information on the number of links found that spread radicalism and violent extremism. Most prevalent are links that spread extremism with religious content, but there are also references with political extremism / political violence, links that contain extremist information and views about ethnic conflicts, terrorist implications in Albania, extremism and religious discrimination.

[13] According to appendix 5, links found on Twitter, Instagram, Telegram

Fig 4: Number of links found spreading radicalism and violent extremism

3.2 WEB PAGES [14]

The two-month monitoring of websites confirms the use of the Internet and online communication to spread ideologies of radicalism and violent extremism, mostly in a descriptive nature. By searching with keywords, 94 extremist content links were identified. These addresses serve as a link to social networks like Facebook, YouTube and Twitter. The links found in the websites are grouped as below:

- 56 links containing religious propaganda;

- 4 links containing religious discrimination;

- 8 links containing terrorist implication;

- 6 links containing extremism with ethnic conflict in its core;

- 12 links containing political extremism and violence.

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[14] According to appendix 2, References found on web pages

Propaganda in Websites

| Category	No. of links monitored
Political Extremism/Political Violence	12
Religious Propaganda	56
Ethnic Conflict	6
Terrorist implication in Albania	8
Religious Discrimination	4

Fig. 5: No. of links in web pages that spread propaganda by category in the graphic

3.3 ONLINE GAMES

Following the advancement of technology, online games now integrate the ability for their users to talk to each other with voice or video while playing, or to share personal information. Most games like **Grand Theft Auto: Vice City, San Andreas, Grand Theft Auto V** and other violent video games including killing or scenes of violence can spread violent extremism to children and young people. Users of these games are also involved in situations that affect their psychology, such as. "Kill in exchange for money and missions," which creates aggressive behaviour at an early age. In addition to the content of violence, online games can contain ethnic and religious hatred, behaviours that are demonstrated by them to other children in school premises.

In terms of social risks, gaming websites have the potential to integrate video messaging and verbal communication capabilities, which can be used by malicious individuals to obtain personal information. These individuals may establish social relationships with children, pretending to be their peers or an adult they can trust, and later try to persuade them to meet directly.

References found on keywords

52 references were found during the control for general keywords in the search engines, 30 out of which were references on high-risk keywords [15]

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[15] Related references in Appendix 2,3,4,5

Search of all keywords in percentage

37%

63%

General keywords (52 links found)

Fig 6: Number of links in % found on keywords

Division by age group and gender

Female

Male

0%   20%   40%   60%   80%

■ Age group (51-80 year old) ■ Age group (26-50 year old) ■ Age group (15-25 year old)

Fig 7: Age groups and gender of persons involved in extremist online communication

During the monitoring of age groups and gender of users it was found that:

- age groups comprised of 15-25 year old males, whom make up about 70% of the cases reviewed, are the individuals most likely to spread violent extremism online;

- age groups comprised of 26-50 year old males make up about 35% of cases,

- while age groups comprised of 51-80 year old make up about 15% of cases. These are mainly involved in political extremism and political violence.

- women appear to be less involved in the propagation of violent extremist ideologies, with the age groups of 15-25 and 26-50 constituting about 15% of cases.

Information and communication technologies provide numerous opportunities for the exchange of knowledge and intercultural dialogue. The Internet, in particular, serves as a catalyst for innovation in all spheres through various actors. This factor is more obvious and relevant to young people, as key users in the digital age. At the same time, the Internet has brought on worrisome challenges, such as the creation of virtual communities, which can lead to isolation and marginalization, and in their most extreme form may pose a threat to national security issues.

In this regard, the Internet has been embraced by violent extremist groups who are increasingly using technology to promote violence and hate speech on ethnic, religious, gender and cultural grounds, to recruit young people and create global outreach online communities, among which violent views and behaviours is encouraged, thereby contributing to the processes of radicalization.

The monitoring of the use of Internet for the purpose of spreading propaganda on violent extremism and radicalization, over a two-month period (November-December 2019), showed that ideological content is present on Albanian-language websites and social networks. The analysis of the monitoring findings showed that most of the material generated through these search engines and social networks was not explicitly violent, but mainly ideologically oriented towards radicalism and violent extremism.

Some key conclusions from the monitoring are:

➢ Web pages and social media in Albanian language continue to play a major role in spreading ideologies and propaganda on violent extremism. The most prevalent are links that spread extremism with religious content, but there are also references of political extremism / political violence inclination, as well as links that contain information and extremist viewpoint on ethnic conflicts, terrorist implications in Albania, gender and religious discrimination.

➢ Extremist messages and hate speech promoting radicalization have not been removed or blocked by Internet service providers or social media platforms in Albanian language, even though they were published many years ago.

➢ The social network, Facebook is mostly used by those spreading extremist propaganda in the Albanian language. Extremist content also exists on personal and organizations' accounts on YouTube, Twitter, Telegram and Instagram. Attention should also be paid to online games, which create the opportunity for communication between players, apart from promoting examples of violence.

➢ The most vulnerable age group to online extremism messages is that of 15-25 years old, mostly male. This segment of society, also based on European Commission studies, has this tendency due to high unemployment, lack of necessary education, skills and perspectives in the context of family structure, urbanization and increased

perceptions of marginalization. These young people are even more at risk of being recruited as fighters in conflict zones or committing terrorist acts in their societies.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS

The risk of spreading extremist propaganda and online radicalization through the Internet and social networks in the Albanian language continues to be high. In this way, it is necessary to further develop legal regulations to provide a safer online space in connection to the risk of online extremism. Other countries' approaches in this regard are different, with some of them applying strict regulatory measures for Internet service providers (ISPs), including the use of technology to block access to certain websites. Meanwhile, other countries have decided to develop a regulatory approach to the sector, but mainly relying on self-regulation by sector operators. Most ISPs, web platforms and social networks have been forced to set terms in service contracts that prohibit access to content related to terrorism and violent extremism.

It is up to policymakers and other important stakeholders to determine the appropriate mechanism that can provide effective and timely response and prevention efforts. This study aims to serve as a further incentive for proper decision-making, which is also based on interest of different stakeholders.

Based on the findings of this monitoring as well as contemporary best practices, some recommendations may be offered to policymakers and other actors facing the challenges of violent online extremism:

- It is recommended that Albanian legislation in the field of cyber security be approximated as soon as possible with that of European Union legislation, creating a complete and clearly codified mechanism to correctly address issues related to violent extremism online. It is necessary to establish legal acts to regulate relations and to clearly define the duties and rights between Internet service providers and social platforms in order to block or delete material with violent extremist content.

- It is recommended to review the National Strategy and Action Plan "Against Violent Extremism", in order to improve the component of Strategic Communication and create effective measures for online security.

- Establishment and capacity building of institutional structures for continuous monitoring of the propaganda of violent extremism circulating on online platforms in the Albanian language. Law enforcement agencies need to create protocols and information sharing systems, to collect, organize, and share data from a wide range of sources, to provide an effective and timely preventive response in a space that has already become the "main front" of war" of terrorist groups.

- The internet and digital communications have become an important part of citizens' everyday life, that's why any restriction or surveillance on suspected persons should

not be misused to violate the privacy of citizens in general. Any attempt to prevent radicalization and violent extremism on the Internet (such as regulating, filtering, or blocking online content deemed illegal by international jurisprudence) must be made in accordance with international human rights standards and in accordance with the rule of law checklist, in order not to illegally affect the freedom of speech and free movement of information.

- Despite the potential offered by the Internet and online communication to spread extremist propaganda, must be clear that it is only one of the possible sources of radicalization. Studies to date prove that online extremist propaganda has had an impact on people who were previously affected by social problems, marginalization or extremist ideology. For this reason, it is important that the approach to the dangers of extremism should be as holistic as possible and should involve all stakeholders and actors.

Based on **European Commission Recommendation COM (2017) 555[16]** and **Terrorism Directive (EU) 2017/541[17]**, some concrete measures may also be offered by the Albanian authorities to respond to extremist messages and other illegal content on the online platforms:

- Legal regulations for online platforms providers (websites, blogs, social networks, etc.) to provide contact points or technical interfaces, which may allow effective and prompt signaling of violent extremist materials by official or even individuals, for the purpose of deleting / blocking these materials or profiles. For this purpose, the legal regulation and procedures recently established and implemented by the Internet Reference Unit, part of EUROPOL[18], may be used.

- Regulations and procedures for providers of internet service in public places such as schools, shopping centres, bars or even public squares, by installing filters, special software or other innovative measures to prevent access to harmful content on the Internet.

- Online platform providers (websites, blogs, social networks, etc.) should clearly define in their terms of service that they will not store material with extremist content. This provides a more acceptable approach to complaints or legal measures that persons affected by deletion of controversial material may take.

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[16] Tackling Illegal Content Online – European Commision, 28.9.2017
https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/EN/COM-2017-555-F1-EN-MAIN-PART-1.PDF
[17] Directive (EU) 2017/541 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 on combating terrorism
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32017L0541
[18] The EU Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU)
https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/eu-internet-referal-unit-eu-iru

The first search engine used in monitoring served to generate keyword information on the twitter social network. Most of the links found through this search engine were informative.

Search engine URL: https://developer.twitter.com/docs/api/1.1/overview

*Fig: Search engine for keywords on twitter social network*

Fig: Search results for keywords on twitter social network

Social-searcher is the second search engine, from which we generate analytics and statistics about the keyword we are looking for. Specifically, it generates the content, how often the keyword was used, in which specific web page was used and the redirect link to that page.

Search engine URL: https://www.social-searcher.com/social-buzz/?wblngë&ntwë&psttypë&searchidë0&periodë&valueë&fbpageë&q5ëabdullah+azzam+albania

Fig: Search engine to generate analytics and statistics about keywords

Serpstat is another search engine, which shows a view of the states where the keyword we are looking for exists, as well as the generated links around it. The study found that most keywords did not exist in Albania.

Search engine URL: https://serpstat.com/

Fig: Search engine to generate states where the keyword is published

APPENDIX 2, SOME REFERENCES FOUND IN WEBSITES

47 links found - This appendix is confidential due to sensitive information.

APPENDIX 3, REFERENCES FOUND IN FACEBOOK

33 links found - This appendix is confidential due to sensitive information.

APPENDIX 4, SOME LINKS FOUND BY YOUTUBE.

20 links found - This appendix is confidential due to sensitive information.

APPENDIX 5, SOME LINKS FOUND IN TWITTER, INSTAGRAM, TELEGRAM

7 links found - This appendix is confidential due to sensitive information.

APPENDIX 6, KEY WORDS FOR MONITORING

KEY WORDS FOR MONITORING

Apostasy

Apostate

Apostates

Ayman al-Zawahiri

Caliphate

Crusader

Crusaders

Dabiq

Dabiq Magazine

Ibn Taymiyyah

Islamic State

Jihad

Jihad Meaning

Kafir

Khalifa Meaning

Khilafah

Kuffar

Martyr

Martyrdom in Islam

Martyrs

Mujahideen

Shahada

Suicide Vest

HIGH RISK KEY WORDS FOR MONITORING

Abdullah Azzam

Amaq Agency

Apostate Islam

Apostates in Islam

Beheadings

Crusader Army

Crusaders Against Islam

Dabiq PDF

How to do Jihad

Ibn Taymiyyah Jihad

Inspire Magazine

Jewish Coalition

Jihad for Ummah

Jihad in the Quran

Khalifah

Khilafah Syria

Killing Apostates

Killing Infidels

Killing Kuffar

Mujahid

Preparing for Jihad

Rafidah

Soldiers of the Caliphate

Taghut

Amelije Istishadije

Al-Qaeda

Bidatci

Dawla Islamiyyah

Eksploziv

Emir

Ekstremizëm

Haku

Haëala

Hixhara

Ikhuan

Khalifat

LHT

Muxhahid

Muvahid

Murtedat

Munafik

Murxhi

Rafidijtë

Shehid

Sherihat

ISIL

ISIS

Shtet Islamik (Khalifat)

Shirk

Targut

Tekfir