S. SECRET

C.C.S. 56th Meeting

COMBINED CHIEFS CF STAFF

PRESENT

General G. C. Marshall, U.S.A. General Sir Alan F. Brooke

Admiral E. J. King, U.S.N. Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound

Lt. General H. H. Arnold, U.S.A.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles F.A. Portal

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT

Lt. General B.B.Somervell, U.S.A. Field Marshal Sir John Dill

Rear Admiral C.M. Cooke, Jr. U.S.N. Vice Admiral the Lord Louis Mountbatten

Brig. General A.C. Wedemeyer, U.S.A. Lt. General Sir Hastings L. Ismay

Commander N.L. Libby, U.S.N.

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier V. Dykes

Brig. General J.R. Deane, U.S.A.

COMBINED STRATEGY

SIR ALLEN BROOKE said that he would like to hear the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff regarding the situation in the Pacific.

ADMINAL KING stated that of the nine fronts on which the United Nations are now engaged, four are in the Pacific. These include the Alaska - Aleutian area, the Hawaian - Midway area, the Bouth and southwest Pacific areas, and the Burma - China area.

He said that when he took office as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet on December 30, 1941, he immediately sent a dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet stating that his mission was first to hold the Hawaian - Midway line and the communications with the Pacific coast; and secondly to hold the remainder of the line of communications to Australia and New Zealand.

The Navy had already established a refueling point at Bora Bora which was sufficiently far to the rear to insure its being held. Marines had been sent to Samoa and there were also troops in the Fiji Islands. Steps had been taken to establish three strong points on the line of communications: Samoa, the Fiji Islands, and New Caledonia. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had then established a base for the Navy in Auckland with an advanced base at Tongatabu. As time went on, the United States forces went into the New Hebrides to Efate and Esperitu Santos.

Meanwhile, there had been engagements with the Japanese near the Marshall Islands, the Island of Wake, and in the Coral Sea.

The Japanese had advanced as far south as Tulagi with the apparent intent of using it as a base from which to operate against our line of communications.

ADMIRAL FING said that had we been set at the time of Midway, we could have made great progress in an attack on the Solomon Islands. The operation was in preparation in July and took place on August 7th but we did not have sufficient force even at that time to exploit our success beyond the occupation of Tulagi and Guadalcanal. The Japanese reaction there was more violent and sustained than had been anticipated. Another reason why we could not proceed further with the Solomon operations was that Operation TORCH had been decided upon and much of our available means had to be diverted to it.

ADMIRAL KING stated, however, that we have attempted to go on with the Solomon operations. The Japanese reaction was, at first, probably designed to "save face" but eventually that became a minor consideration. The Japanese have a long line of communications and it soon became apparent that they were fighting a delaying action to cover the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines where the "treasures" are to be found.

He pointed out that we have had some success in the attrition of the Japanese forces but not as much as has been claimed. At present, the Tulagi area is pretty well stabilized and General MacArthur has driven the Japanese out of the Papuan PeniRegizaded Unclassified on New Guinea. The enemy is re-enforcing Lae and Salamaua.

The main object of the operations has been the safety of the approaches to northeastern Australia, and the key to the situation is Raboul.

The campaign in the Solomons was to be divided into three parts: (1) the capture of Tulagi, (2) securing the northeast coast of New Guinea, and (3) the capture of Raboul. The process has been slow but the United States forces are going on with it. The immediate question is where to go when this campaign has been completed.

ADMIRAL KING stated that he felt the Philippines should be our objective rather than the Netherlands East Indies. The Philippines could be captured by a flank action whereas the capture of the Netherlands East Indies must of necessity be the result of a frontal attack. The most likely intermediate objective, once Raboul is captured, is Truk and thence to the Marianas.

Prior to the war, every class at the Naval War College was required to play the game of the Pacific Islands involving the recapture of the Philippines. There are three ways in which the Philippines may be taken: first, the direct route which would constitute a frontal attack; second, the southern route which is outflanked by the enemy along much of its course; and third, the northern route through the Aleutians to the northern tip of the Island of Luzon. The northern route would include establishing a base in the northwestern Marshall Islands and then proceeding to Truk and the Marianas. The Marianas are the key of the situation because of their location on the Japanese line of communications. Any line of action decided upon requires considerable force, especially air strength. All of the necessary operations are amphibious.

ADMIRAL KING said that Mr. Stalin had been good enough to say that the Solomons operations have been of considerable assistance to Russia.

He pointed out the importance to the Japanese of occupying the Maritime Provinces in order to secure the Japanese Islands. He felt that such action would be necessary and that the Japanese should attach more importance to them than to the capture of the Netherlands East Indies.

ADMIRAL KING stated that the Japanese are now replenishing Japan with raw materials and also fortifying an inner defense ring along the line of the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines. For these reasons, he believed that it was necessary for the United Nations to prevent the Japanese having time to consolidate their gains. He compared this situation with the present desire of the United Nations to avoid giving Germany a respite during the winter months.

ADMIRAL KING then said that the idea of utilizing 30% of the United Nations war effort against Japan was a concept rather than an arithmetical computation. He had caused studies to be made of how much of the total war effort is now being applied to Japan and found it to be approximately 1.5%. He said that this is not sufficient to do more than hold; it is not enough to permit maintaining pressure on the Japanese.

ADMIRAL KING stated that we are taking slow steps towards an attack against Japan by the northern route and called attention to the fact that the United States forces had just captured Amchitka. All operations in the Pacific are limited by the amount of available shipping.

ADMIRAL KING pointed out that the Japanese route for a navel effort against Siberia is secure. He said that he had recently had a survey made of Paranushir Island, the northernmost of the Kurile Islands. This revealed that it would be unsatisfactory as a base for operating against Japan.

It would be desirable to have the cooperation of the Russians in this respect but there has been difficulty in obtaining any information from them. The only means of obtaining information so far has been by direct correspondence between the President and Mr. Stalin.

GENERAL MARSHALL then reviewed the deployment of the United States troops in all of the islands of the Pacific, giving the strength of each in ground and air troops and in aircraft. He pointed out the logistical difficulties of supplying these forces.

ADMIRAL KING then gave the disposition of the Marine forces which amount to 60,000 men in the area from Midway to the South Pacific Islands.

(Continued on next page)

GENERAL MARSHALL said that in the light of the logistical requirements in the Pacific, the United States' interest in undertaking an operation to open the Burma Road could be well understood. General Stilwell and Field Marshal Wavell would have to determine the logistical requirements of such an operation but in any event, they would be minor in comparison to the requirements in the Operation TORCH. Any success in the Operation RAVENOUS would have a tremendous effect in the Pacific chiefly by making it necessary for the Japanese to divert forces to the Burma operations, thus lessening the pressure in the south Pacific and the consequent demands on our available shipping.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that the peace of mind of the United States Chiefs of Staff was greater now than it had been a year ago. The Japanese are now on the defensive and must be careful of a surprise move from us. However, he pointed out that we must still worry about the locations of the Japanese aircraft carriers because they constitute a constant threat against our line of communications and for raiding purposes against our west coast.

We must not allow the Japanese any pause. They fight with no idea of surrendering and they will continue to be aggressive until attrition has defeated them. To accomplish this, we must maintain the initiative and force them to meet us.

GENERAL ARNOLD then discussed the United States efforts to obtain information concerning Russia. He stated that when the Germans threatened to capture the Caucasus, the Russians began to be fearful that the supply of airplanes from the United States via the southern route would be eliminated. They, therefore, requested the United States to start delivery of airplanes from Alaska at once. The United States agreed to this providing the Russians would demonstrate that there were sufficient facilities available to make possible the delivery of one hundred and fifty planes a month. The Russians did not have these facilities at the time but built them rapidly. At the present time, both the southern route and the Alaskan route are in use. In the coming year, the delivery to Russia amounts to four hundred airplanes a month. These will be divided over the two routes. Bombers are flown to Basra but the flight is so long that the Russians refuse to accept the engines and this necessitates replacing them. The northern route will be used for this purpose as much as possible inasmuch as it eliminates fifty hours of flying time on the journey.

GENERAL ARNOLD then stated that the U. S. Chiefs of Staff were desirous of knowing what facilities were available in southern Siberia and Vladivostok in order to see if they could be of assistance to Russia in case Russia was attacked by the Japanese.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that Mr. Stalin had finally given General Bradley permission to make a survey. General Bradley, however, considered that it would be better to present the Russians with a specific proposal. He returned to the United States and it was decided to offer Russia one hundred heavy bombers seventy-two daregratuar Unclassifie

the outbreak of war between Russia and Japan. Mr. Stalin had rejected this offer and said he would like 100 aircraft at once for use against Germany.

GENERAL MARSHALL also stated that the Russians object to the presence of "gossipy" people from the United Nations and that they were afraid that the United Nations personnel could not put up with the conditions which are imposed on Russian troops.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL stated that the British had operated successfully with the Russian navy in the Murmansk area but that they had the same experiences with the Russian army as the U.S. had.

GE ERAL MARSHALL then described the difficulties which the United States Chiefs of Staff had had concerning sending air units to the Caucasus. The Russians had stated definitely that they did not desire units but airplanes only. There had been some sentiment among the United States authorities to furnish sufficient airplanes for the purpose of placating Mr. Stalin. However, to do so, especially in the case of heavy bombers, would necessitate immobilizing these airplanes for as much as six months while the dussians were learning to operate them and establishing ground crews for their maintenance. General Marshall stated that in his opinion it was unwise to withhold this striking power against the enemy for so long a period.

ADMIRAL KING then asked the British Chiefs of Staff if they had the impression that the Russians were unwilling to help themselves. The Germans were successfully operating air forces out of the northern part of Norway and the Russians had apparently made no effort to stop them although they were well within range.

SIR DUDLEY POU D stated that the Russians do semi destroyers out to meet convoys as far as two hundred miles out of a total of three hundred and fifty miles that is expected of them. They invariably state however that they have run out of fuel and then leave the convoy for home at a rate of twenty eight knots. Their air force has not furnished much protection.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL stated that he felt the reason for this was that their air personnel is not properly trained. The Russians had made some attempts to strike at the German forces but had been unsuccessful.

GE ERAL MARSHALL asked why the Russians were willing to risk whole divisions but not their naval forces.

SIR DUDLEY POU D replied that they are continental people the de not understand haval action. Their submarines have been the only effective units of their nevy.

SIN ALA BROCKE agreed with this statement and added that while they do of know what dangers are involved in escerting very, they are very free to offer silly advice as to how security should be attained.

U.S. SECRIT BRITISH MOST SECRET GE THAL MA SHALL then described the development of troops of the United States, which was proceeding very well. He added that United States troops, both in this and the last war, oppoured to "voteranize" quickly in the field. The young offifacility for eliminating errors rapidly. We may expect their effectiveness to increase enormously in a short time. He thought we were particularly fortunate in the deadly character of the Pacific fight, since our forces which have that it is "kill or be killed" and this attitude gives promise of tremendous power for future operations. The staffs are sound and the engineers are particularly effective. He recalled a remark that had been made in the War Department, when Field Marshal Wavell questioned the possibility of building a road which ould support the Burms operations, to the effect that "Wavell does not k ow General Wheeler," the United States ongineor in this theatre. Continued on next page. Regraded Unclassified of Stuff envisaged it would be nedessary to go in order to prevent the Japanese from digging themselves in. He feared that if operations were too extended it would inevitably lead to an all-out war against Japan and it was certain that we had not sufficient resources to undertake this at the same time as a major effort against Germany. Would it be possible for the forces at present in the Pacific to hold the Japanese without incurring the additional drain on our resources which would result from pushing forward our present defensive positions?

GENERAL MARSHALL explained that it had been essential to act offensively in order to stop the Japanese advancing. For example, in New Guinea it had been necessary to push the Japanese back to prevent them capturing Port Moresby. In order to do this, every device for reinforcing the troops on the island had had to be employed. The same considerations applied in Guadalcanal. It had been essential to take offensive action of this nature, the only way of stopping the Japanese was by complete exhaustion through attrition. It was very difficult to pause; the process of whittling away Japan had to be continues.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL asked whether it was not possible to stand on a line and inflict heavy losses on the Japanese when they tried to break through it. From the very fact that the Japanese continued to attack, it was clear that they had already been pushed back further than they cared to go. He also enquired whether the U.S.Chiefs of Staff thought it would be possible to gain a decision by air bombardment of Japan alone.

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that the Allied forces in the Southwest Pacific were now operating from the tips of two narrow salients. The Japanese had greater width in their line and could therefore operate on a larger scale than the forces which we could bring to bear.

GEDERAL MARCHALL said that in Papua it would be possible to gain additional airfields alongside our present position, but this was not the case in Guadalcanal where only a small strip of suitable territory was available. To broaden our base there, we should have to have New Britain and New Ireland. As regards air bombardment of Japan, the U.S. view was that Japanese industries were so vulnerable to the air that heavy attack would ultimately destroy her capacity to maintain her war effort.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL suggested that it should be possible to determine what it was that we had to prevent the Japanese from doing, and what forces we should require for the purpose. We should then see what forces remained for use elsewhere in the world.

ADMIRAL KING observed that unless some effort was made to assist Chiang Kai Shek, the Chinese might pull out of the war. The 30% effort to which he had referred would, of

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that to depend on sea operations alone against Japan was hazardous, owing to the rapidity with which the balance of sea power could change in the event of a reverse. For example, in the Midway battle the U.S. Forces had been able to get all their aircraft into the air before the Japanese attack developed. In consequence, the Japanese had lost four carriers as against one American. With a little ill-fortune the reverse might have taken place, and in that case, the whole of the west coast of America would have been open to Japanese earrier borne attack. The Japanese territories were not nearly so vulnerable in this respect.

ADMIRAL KING said that the Japanese might well strike again at Midway. They were on interior lines and it was easier for them to take the initiative against us. At the present time it looked as if their carriers were being prepared for another attack on Midway or Samoa. It was essential, therefore, to maintain the initiative against the Japanese and not wait for them to come against us.

GENERAL MARSHALL explained the difficulties with which he had been faced in finding even the small forces required by General Stilwell to support RAVENOUS. Shipping could not be spared for them in the absence of some definite assurance from Chiang Kai Shek and agreement with Field Marshal Wavell on the operations to be undertaken. By the time these had been obtained much time had been lost and shipping had to be found by drawing it away from other commitments in the Pacific such as Alaska and Hawaii. General MacArthur was some 20,000 men short of his requirements, and provision of these reinforcements had had to be deferred. By the most rigid economy sufficient shipping had at last been found to move 6,000 men to General Stilwell. In order to cut down numbers to the minimum, units had been stripped to the bone of all personnel which were not absolutely essential. It was certainly fortunate that losses sustained in the Pacific from submarines had been so small.

ADMIRAL KING said he was puzzled to know why these losses had been so small and what the Japanese were keeping their submarines for.

Japanese submarines were much less of a menace than the German. They were less efficiently operated, and quite small escorts were sufficient to drive them away. He pointed out that it was in a way to our advantage to allow the Japanese to dig in well to the rear in their defended area. For example, to recapture the Philippines before the defeat of Germany was impossible, and it was, therefore, all to the good if the Japanese locked up troops in these Islands. The quickest way of recapturing the Philipines would be to defeat Germany. It seemed to him that the correct strategy was to establish a line where we had better air facilities than the Japanese and then to allow them to wear out their air forces by attacking us on that line. Would it be of any advantage to go as far forward as Truk in the immediate future rather than just before the main attack on the Philippines. Even if we head duckasified

U. S. SECRET BRITISH MOST SECRET

C.C.S. 55th Meeting

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF MINUTES OF MEETING

on THURSDAY, January 11, 1943, at 1030

PRESENT

General G. C. Marshall, U.S.A. General Sir Alan F. Brooke
Admiral E. J. King, U.S.N. Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Dudley Pound
Lt. General H. H. Arnold, U.S.A.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles F.A. Portal

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Louis Mountbatten
Brig. General A.C. Wedemeyer,
U.S.A. Lt. General Sir Hastings L. Ismay

SECRETARIAT

Brigadier V. Dykes

mentioned over made factors in our strategy. The threat to

Brig. General J.R. Deane, U.S.A.

the suburity of the values states and the United Alaskon

Combined Chiefs of Staff as the allocation of resources between the two major theatres of war - the atlantic (which included for this purpose the mediterranean) and the racific. He suggested as a concept on which to work that this broad allocation should consist of 70 per cent in the atlantic theatre and 30 per cent in the racific theatre.

ablications and that according to his estimates we were at resent engaging only 15 per cent of our total resources against the Japanese in the Pacific theatre, which for this purpose included the Indian ocean and Burma. In his view this was not sufficient to prevent Japan consolidating herself and thereby presenting ultimately too difficult a problem. The Japanese were righting a delaying action in the Solomon Islands and digging in along the whole line of the Netherlands East Indies and the Philippines. They were shipping back raw material into Japan as fast as they could. He felt that before the Combined Chiefs of Staff turned to the discussion of particular operations they should first fix the general proportion of effort to be applied in the two main theatres.

STR ALAN BROOMS suggested that in fixing this balance of effort between the two theatres, it would be wise first to try and weigh up the enemy situation as both the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff saw it. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff would naturally know more of the situation in Japan than the British. He expressed the admiration of the British Chiefs of Staff on the magnificent work of the U.S. Forces during the last twelve months after the early disasters of the war against Japan. At one time it seemed as if nothing would stam the tide of the Japanese, but the position was now very different. The Japanese were definitely on a defensive basis and from intelligence received it appeared as if they were taking quite a different outlook on the war now from what they had been some months ago. They were worried about the situation of their European allies.

The security of the United States and the United Kingdom had always been basic factors in our strategy. The threat to the United kingdom had been at one time serious, but as a result of our latest leview of this danger it was relt that the forces in the United kingdom could be re-orientated from a defensive to an offensive basis. The greatest danger at the present time was to our communications. The shortage of shipping was a stranglehold on all offensive operations and unless we could offectively combat the U-poat menace we might not be able to win the war.

Germany's situation was undoubtedly developing favourably from our point of view. The was staggering under the failure of her second offensive against hussia and feeling must be growing in that country that it was impossible for her to defeat nussia. Her successes in 1942 against hussia had been very much smaller in scale than in 1941. She had failed in her main object of the 1942 campaign, the capture of the Caucasus oil. By failing to capture even the port of Tuapse, she had failed in securing the facilities to export such oil as she had captured at Grozny. Her northern flank was in danger as also were the troops in the Caucasus salient.

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The Russian offensive had been well carried out and had now reached within fifty miles of Rostov. Germany had only two courses open to her, either to push back the Russians into Stalingrae, which would be almost impossible during the winter, or to shorten her line. The latter, therefore, was the more probable course and that would involve reverting to the 1941 line. The psychological effect of this withdrawal would be very serious in Germany.

Germany was thus on the defensive both in Russia and in worth africa. In the operations which had led to the defeat of the Germans in worth africa after the British defeat at Tooruk very great assistance had been given by the timely arrival of American Sherman tanks and S.P. guns.

Germany was already having trouble among her allies. The humanians had suffered severely in the Crimea but had been forced to carry on, although greatly weakened in strength. The Italian troops on the hussian front had also suffered heavy losses and the hungarian forces, which had never had much stomach for the fight, were also in bad shape. Italy was becoming more and more shaky and if she collapsed Germany would not only have to bolster up Italy by sending troops into the country but would also have to replace the numerous German divisions in Yugoslavia and in Greece. Alternatively she would have to withdraw altogether from the Balkans and Italy, and leave it open to the Allies.

All indications showed that Germany's man power was failing and that some cannibalisation of her divisions would have
to be carried out. The latest estimate was that she would
lose ten divisions in this way during the first quarter of
1943. Lack of oil was another of Germany's major difficulties
which would hit her particularly hard during the next six months.

Taking all these factors into account it seemed at least possible that the precarious internal situation of Germany might make it possible to achieve a final victory in the suropean theatre before the end of 1943. The immediate problem was how best to apply our available resources in order to take adventage of Germany's present situation.

The mains we had at our disposal were broadly three in number. First there was Russia, which constituted the largest land power; her efficiency was rising and the work of moving Russian manufacturing plants to the castward away from the German invasion had been very well carried out. Russia's oil situation was now more satisfactory than had seemed likely earlier in the year, but she was short of grain. In order to get the best value out of Russia we must support her in every way we could. Our second main weapon was air bombardment, by U.S. and British forces. This we must exploit to the maximum. Our third means of striking at Germany was by amphibious operations which included invasion of the continent. The possession of sea power embled us to threaten the enemy at several points and thereby compel him to disperse his forces. Once committed to a point of entry, however, the enemy would be able to concentrate his forces against us, and it was therefore necessary to choose this point of entry with the latest care at the place where the enemy was least able to concentrate large forces.

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As a point of re-entry to the continent, France had great advantages. In the first place the sea-crossing was short and we had better facilities for living air support to our invasion. On the other hand the German defences in this area were most strong and Germany's power of concentrating against us was greatest. A recent study had shown that the bist - west communications across the continent enabled Germany to move seven divisions simultaneously from the Russian front to the west in about twelve to fourteen days. The north - bouth communications on the continent were not nearly so good. Not more than one division at a time could be moved from the north to the mediterranean front. The Italian railways were close to the coast and vulnerable to interruption from the sea, and in the balkans there was only a single line of railway passing through wish. From this point of view therefore the Southern front seemed to offer better prospects for suphibious operations.

Tokch operations in worth Africa had been an outstanding example of successful co-operation between U.S. and British forces and the British Chiefs of Staff wished to express their admiration of the very able manner in which General misenhower had overcome the extremely difficult problems with which he had been faced. North Africa would provide a valuable base from which either to threaten southern Europe or to undertake offensive operations. By this use we could compel the Germans to disperse their forces in order to re-inforce threatened points. In this way we could probably give greater assistance to mussia than if we committed ourselves definitely to Northern france. Unce we had captured dizerta we could pass merchant ship convoys through the mediterranean. Their very passage would compel the Germans to fight in the air, since if they let them pass through unmolested the effect of their U-boat operations against our shipping would be largely nullified. These air battles against the German Air Force would be of the greatest importance. Already more than half the German air Force was deployed on fronts other than the Kussian.

In all mediterranean operations spain, of course, was a most important factor. There must be always some anxiety that spain would close the door behind us, but all recent opinion tended to show that spain was turning away from Germany and that it was at least highly improbable that she would ever grant free access to German forces. The more successes we had in the mediterranean the more likely it was that this favourable tendency in spain would continue. Spain knew that from the conomic point of view she must depend primarily on the allies. Against this there was, of course, the fear of communism in spain if the allies were victorious and kussia over-ran Germany. Generally speaking, however, the feeling of the British Chiefs of Staff was that we had no cause for anxiety about spain at the present time.

Another important factor in the mediterranean was Turkey. That country no doubt would either try and keep out of the war altogether or at least join in on the side of the allies only at the eleventh hour. There were, however, reasons to hope that if well handled, Turkey might be brought in earlier. As an inducement we should have to give her equipment, technical personnel and instructors. It did not seem wise to press Turkey to undertake an advance into the Balkans but rather to hold her position and afford us bases from which to attack Germany, in particular the kumanian oil. We might also unclassified

BRITISH MOST SECRET

obtain a free passage to the Black sea as another means of striking at Germany.

Summing up prospects in the European Theatre, SIK ALAN BROOK said that the British Chiefs of Staff felt that we should first expand the bomber offensive against the Axis to the maximum and that operations in the mediterranean offered the best chance of compelling Germany to disperse her resources. With this end in view we should take as our immediate objective the knocking out of Italy. At the same time we should try and bring in Turkey on our side. By this means we should give Germany no respite at all in 1943 and we should give the best aid to Mussia, whom we must continue to supply with all the equipment which we could send. The difficulty, of course, was that many of these operations were mutually exclusive. For example, to send large supplies to Russia used up great quantities of available escort vessels. This naturally cut down our capacity to undertake amphibious operations. A balance would have to be struck between these various commitments and we should have to face the necessity for accepting considerable losses in shipping, providing these paid a good dividend.

We must be in a position to take advantage of a crack in Germany in the late summer. There were already indications of considerable German withdrawals from France to the eastward. If Germany were compelled to withdraw considerable numbers of troops from France the possibilities of an invasion across the channel would be much greater. The estimate of the British Chiefs of Staff was that by August 1943 there would be available for cross-channel operations some 13 British and 9 U.S. divisions whether or not we undertook limited operations in the mediterranean. Mediterranean operations, however, would produce other shortages, notably in Assault Shipping, and it might be difficult, if not impossible, to transfer landing craft from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom or to the Burma front in time.

In all amphibious operations the provision of landing craft was the critical factor. Not only had the crews to be provided but the naval crews to man them had to be trained and the land forces had to be trained to work from them; this training was a slow process.

The British landing craft resources were being formed into two main forces, one earmarked for operations on the continent and one for operations further afield, such as Burma. As regards operations in Burma, a limited offensive was now being undertaken with the object of capturing Akyab, on which the 14th Indian Division was now closing. Operations in the North of Burma presented very difficult logistical problems owing to the absence of roads.

The complete conquest of durma was a much bigger problem and naval supremacy in the Bay of Bengal would be required for it. It would be necessary to undertake simultaneous offensives against Rangoon and Moulmein, since Rangoon could not be taken if the Moulmein airfields were in the hands of the Japs. Rail communications between Thailand and Burma were being improved and it might be necessary to extend the occupation of Burma by going some distance into Thailand as well. For this major operation seven divisions were being prepared in India and two African divisions, one from the mast Ragraned Unclassified

from the west could be found, both composed of seasoned native troops well adapted to jungle fighting. If the Germans were compelled to abandon their Caucasus offensive, troops could also be found from Iraq and Persia. There appeared, therefore, no particular difficulty in finding the land divisions; the difficulty lay rather in the provision of the necessary naval forces. It must be realised, however, that once started operations for the recapture of Burma would develop into a full-scale campaign.

SIR DUDLLY FOUND stated that in the atlantic the greatest concerns to the Home Fleet were, first, to prevent a break out of the German naval forces and, second, to provide protection for convoys to north kussia.

At first the kussian convoys did not resent any great difficulty. Their early success gave everyone a false sense of security. German interference, however, has been increasing constantly, culminating with the concentration of their surface vessels on the coast of norway, namely the Tirpitz, Lutzow, Hipper, Scharnhorst, and Prinz Lugen, all of which have now been completely repaired. A force of 20 U-boats was maintained in northern waters, as well as considerable air force. The security of Russian convoys is affected chiefly by the hours of darkness and the ice limit. For the next three months, the ice limit will only permit utilizing a channel about 220 miles in width which can be kept under close air reconnaissance by the Germans. The passage occupies about twelve days, and vessels are under attack all but two of them.

For the last convoy there were sixteen escort vessels; twelve of the Corvette type and four destroyers. Two 6-inch cruisers were employed to give cover against surface attack. The commander of the convoy had placed the cruisers between the vessels being escorted and the estimated location of the German surface vessels. However, the hipper and the Lutzow attacked from the other side and came into contact with the four British destroyers. The destroyers prevented an attack on the cargo vessels, until joined by the two cruisers, though one was sunk. As soon as the cruisers appeared, the hipper and the Lutzow withdrew. The Germans thus sacrificed a splendid opportunity to effect some serious damage on the ships.

It was first thought that the German admiral commanding had made an error in judgment but it was later learned that he had received orders from the German authorities ashore to expedite his withdrawal. This would seem to indicate that the Germans are following a policy of preventing their ships from receiving any damage. It can possibly be explained by their desire to keep them intact preliminary to a break-out into the atlantic.

SIR DUDLLY POUND stated that before such a break-out into the Atlantic could be effected, the Germans must send out oilers which will enable them to refuel at sea, since he doubted if the Germans would again attempt to retire to brest in view of their previous experience there.

During the months of long daylight, the danger of air attack procluded the use of cruisers with the kussian convoys, and their escorts consisted only of a powerful destroyer force. Convoys can then only be run every twenty-six to thirty-two

days. Twelve days are required for the journey; three days for refueling; twelve days for the return journey and the remainder for boiler cleaning, etc. The moyal many does not have sufficient destroyers to operate two convoys simultaneously. If therefore it is necessary to send more than thirty ships to mussia every forty days, it will be necessary for the United States to furnish some assistance in escort vessels.

SIR DUDLEY POUND then stated that there was considerable traffic between Japan and Germany; Japan sending to Germany rubber and other raw materials obtained in the far East in return for machinery and machine parts. It was important to stop this traffic at once. There are two places from which this can be best accomplished: first, in the Bay of Biscay by air and submarine action, and second, in the Atlantic narrows. For the latter a British task force was being built up on the east side and a U.S. task force was operating from the United States on the west side.

SIR DUDLEY POUND then discussed the situation in the Indian Ocean. It had at first been hoped to create a large Indian Ocean fleet, but this has been seriously reduced in size by TORCH and other operations and it now appears that its remaining carrier, the Illustrious, may be needed for future operations in the Mediterranean. If this is so, now would be an opportune time to withdraw it from the Indian Ocean for repairs and the installation of the most modern fighter direction devices. Without the protection of carrier aircraft, the Indian Ocean fleet is incapable of serving a useful purpose in the Indian Ocean area against Japanese naval forces accompanied by carriers.

In the mediterranean area ADMIRAL CUMNINGHAM has a force of three battleships and two cruisers. One of the hazards to this task force consists of three modern Italian battleships which are at present unlocated. In the Eastern mediterranean, British naval forces had been heavily engaged in the supply of the Eighth army in the Eastern North African ports. What the future redistribution of the mediterranean naval forces will be must be based on the future strategy to be adopted.

SIR DUDLEY POUND then discussed the German U-boat situation. At the present time the Germans have one hundred and ten submarines in the atlantic in addition to those in the mediterranean and off the coast of Norway. It is anticipated that new production will go to the Atlantic.

The Germans are apparently concentrating their submarines into large groups, each of which is responsible for a certain area. One of these has been located off the coast of Newfoundland, one in the Central Atlantic and one off SW Ireland. It is possible that a convoy may at any time blunder into a pack of German submarines, if our intelligence is at fault.

Recently there were two convoys from the United States, each attacked by a considerable number of German submarines, one convoy losing two vessels and the other losing none. This was accomplished by providing air coverage for the convoys with Liberator airplanes which resulted in keeping the U-boats down during the day. While they were down, the convoys were able to alter their course and, by nightfall, leave the convoys marines far behind.

BRITISH MOST SECRET SIR DUDLEY POUND then described an experiment which had been made owing to shortage of escorts due to TORCH, in sending cargo vessels bound for Freetown out with a trans-Atlantic convoy, the vessels bound for Freetown breaking off from the convoy at the last possible moment and proceeding to their destination. The experiment was unsuccessful and the loss amounted to ten per cent. Seventeen out of fortyfour ships were lost in one convoy. The British have, therefore, found it necessary to resume the Freetown convoys. SIR DUDLEY POUND stated that escorts to convoys must be sufficiently large to deal with a heavy attack. he said our aim must be to get a long range air protection and additional escort vessels. He added that it would be desirable to obtain more long range aircraft protection to escorts from the United States. SIR DUDLEY POUND indicated that we must make special efforts to provide adequate protection in the early part of 1943 in order that we may be able to meet the great demands in the build-up of BOLLERO in the latter part of the year. SIR CHARLES PORTAL then discussed the air situation. He stated that our experience so far has been that the German operations are definitely tied up with the adequacy of their air power. He felt that this will be as true with regard to the German defensive operations as it has been in their offensive operations. The present state of the German air force is critical. The stamina of the airplane crews is decreasing, the crews lack interest and are less determined, and their training is deteriorating. One explanation for this is that training units and personnel are being used for combat purposes because of a shortage of aircraft. he felt that there is no depth behind the German front line of aircraft. The British Intelligence Service is of the opinion that if the United Nations can keep Germany fighting with aircraft, they will suffer losses from which they cannot recover. He felt certain that they are incapable of conducting large scale air operations on two fronts and that at the present time there is a shortage of from seven hundred to two thousand first line aircraft. He stated that German production for next year will be about twenty-three thousand combat aircraft; Italy will produce three or four thousand; and Japan will produce about seven thousand. On the other hand, the lowest estimates for the United Nations' aircraft production will be one hundred thousand combat airplanes or about three times that of the Axis powers. SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that our greatest need is to force the Germans to extend the use of their aircraft to as many areas as possible and thus destroy and bleed them. The best ways to accomplish this are (1) to engage them while they are in support of land operations. (However this is only possible at present on the Russian front); (2) to meet them while they are attempting to stop our amphibian operations; and (3) by directing operations directly at Germany.

He stated that one of the most pressing questions was how we should accomplish our air attack against Germany. The United Kingdom is the most advantageous base for such operations and one of the most important questions before the present conferences is to decide on where the United States bombers are to be used.

He indicated that daylight attacks by United States bombers should be continued, as this has a serious effect on the German air force, on their industries, and on their morale. The question of whether to strike Italy from the United Kingdom or from North Africa is still an open question but before deciding to build up a strong bomber force in North Africa, it is desirable to be certain that this action is more advantageous than concentrating them in the United Kingdom.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that insofar as the estimates presented by the British Chiefs of Staff concerning Germany, Russia, and the occupied countries is concerned, the United States Chiefs of Staff are in full accord.

He also expressed concurrence in the idea that the U-boat menace is the paramount issue and that everything must be done to combat it by directing our attacks against it from the place of manufacture of submarines to the places where they are used.

He stated that the Japs are digging in, in an effort to build up a defensive front from the Solomons, through New Guinea and Timor, particularly with their air forces.

He pointed out that the United States Chiefs of Staff are anxious to find some method whereby they can strike in the rear and against the flank of the Japanese defenses. In this connection, they feel that operations in Burma will serve to weaken the Japs' defensive front and that, therefore, they are most anxious to undertake Operation RAVENOUS.

They feel that a reverse in this operation would not be a calamity but that a success would bring advantages all out of proportion to the risks involved. It would have an effect not only in the South Pacific area but would enable us to furnish strong support to China. A successful Operation RAVENOUS would result in an eventual economy of tonnage by relieving the Japanese pressure in the Southwest Pacific.

CHNERAL MARSHALL then stated that the United States Chiefs of Staff are concerned as to whether operations in the Mediterranean area would bring advantages commensurate with the risks involved. He said that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are inclined to look favorably on an operation from the United Kingdom because of the strong air support that can be furnished from that base as well as the relative case with which it can be supplied from the United States.

He repeated that our first concern must be the defeat of Gormany's submarine warfare.

STR CHARLES PORTAL then said that the British Chiefs of staff also relt that the defeat of the submarine menace must be given first priority in the use of air power, paraded Unclassified ticularly in the protection of our line of communications.

For long range anti-submarine operations not only the provision of suitable aircraft had to be considered, but also the bases from which they are to be used. The British are considering the advisability of establishing an air base in Greenland for this purpose. They were most grateful for the 21 Liberators provided by the U.S.A. for the Bay of Biscay. There are three possible methods of attack on submarines, (1) along the sea lames; (2) against bases in the Bay of Biscay; and (3) against factories in which submarines are built. The British now propose making air attacks in sufficient force to destroy the entire port in which the submarines are based rather than confining their attacks to the submarine pens and surrounding installations. He pointed out that no one can be certain as to how much damage can be done in the port towns themselves and that the method proposed will be in the nature of an experiment, the results of which will not be known for five or six months.

ADMINAL KING then asked whether the possibility of concentrating all air attacks on the building yards had been considered.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL replied that the building yards are not sufficiently large to be certain of hitting them at night.

ADMIRAL KING said that he felt the most favorable targets against the submarine menace were the yards at which they are assembled and at their bases. he said that he had the personal impression that there has not been a program undertaken there that has been consistently followed. He felt that the attacks had been sporadic. He thought that attacks should be aimed first against factories where component parts are made; secondly at yards where the submarines are assembled; thirdly, at bases; and fourthly, at sea.

GENERAL ARNOLD said he felt we should attempt to find what component part or parts of submarines constitute a bottleneck and then strike at factories where they are made.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL stated that the greatest bottleneck was the ball bearings, pointed out that it would be tactically impossible to destroy the factories.

GENERAL ARNOLD drew attention to the necessity for a decision as to where airplanes are to be utilized before they left the factory. This is so because different theatres require different equipment on aircraft.

GENERAL MARSHALL stated that the United States is now in the process of recasting its troop deployments. As an example, he indicated that it had become possible to reduce the size of the Caribbean garrison considerably. He stated that the United States is also considering reducing the size of the Iceland garrison and in that connection he thought it would be desirable to have opinions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the hazards that now face Iceland. The purpose of this scaling down of forces wherever it can be accomplished is for saving shipping.

U. S. SECRET

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MINUTES OF MEETING

Held on Thursday, January 14, 1943, at 10:30 A.M.

PRESENT

General Marshall
Admiral King
Lt. General Arnold

SECRETARY

Brig. General Deane

ALSO PRESENT

Lt. General Somervell
Lt. General Clark
Rear Admiral Cooke
Brig. General Wedemeyer
Commander Libby

ADMIRAL KING stated that the Prime Minister and the First Sea Lord had, in conversation with him, deplored the present state of the British Eastern Fleet, which they said was immobilized because it had been stripped of its destroyers and carriers. Just where the carriers are was not stated; H.M.S. Victorious, which was sent to the United States with nothing but green pilots, cannot be ready before the 1st of February. It is possible that they may have loaned us H.M.S. Victorious and offered us another carrier to further their apparent desire to keep this fleet immobilized. Admiral King feels that the British must make the naval effort to cut the Japanese lines of communications to Rangoon - which they now show no disposition to do. Although it is doubtful that the "limited objective" operations now contemplated are so dependent on the operations of the British Eastern Fleet as China appears to think, nevertheless these operations would greatly facilitate shipping to Calcutta. If the Chinese make movement of the British Eastern Fleet conditional to the undertaking of the contemplated operation, there is no question but that the British should make this move.

GENERAL SOMERVELL said that all though the operation might possibly be supported by rail from Bombay, such support would be very slow and probably dangerous to rely upon.

GENERAL MARSHALL said the Chinese feared Japanese seaborne reinforcement via Rangoon and inquired what was needed to counter this threat.

ADMIRAL KING replied that the British Eastern Fleet should be sufficient, particularly as we are keeping the Japanese well occupied elsewhere; he felt that the British should move as many elements of this Fleet as they could cover with their available destroyers. Admiral Helfrich had told Admiral King that he had been urged by the British to go to Australia, where he has two cruisers and two or three destroyers operating under Admiral Carpender.

He had inquired as to what the British Eastern Fleet could be expected to do; ADMIRAL KING had replied that he had no information but that when and if this Fleet moved to Trincomalee, Admiral King would send him back the Dutch ships. Such a move would help to clarify the complicated command set-up in the Southwest Pacific.

ADMIRAL KING further remarked that the British Eastern Fleet served no purpose, so far as he could see, basing at Kilindini, but that the British would probably insist that they could not be moved because of a lack of destroyers. He felt that pressure should be brought on them to cover the shipping lines to Calcutta necessary for the projected operation.

U. S. SECRET

With regard to submarines in the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal, the British and Dutch together have a limited number-less than 10. In anticipation of a British demand for additional submarines, ADMIRAL KING is willing to base six at Trincomalee; before this can be done, a tender should be sent there.

Further discussion developed that U. S. submarines basing at Fremantle could probably operate in the Bay of Bengal as well as in their present operating areas.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that he believed an additional group of heavy bombers should be sent to GENERAL STILWELL in order to build up his available heavy bombers to a total of two groups. He believes that these bombers will return more dividends operating in this Theatre than in the Eastern Mediterranean.

ADMIRAL KING remarked that it was of great importance to open up a lower altitude route to China, and that an increase in the number of medium bombers assigned this theatre would make it possible to attack Japanese shipping in occupied Chinese ports.

In discussing the best line of procedure to adopt at the forthcoming conference, ADMIRAL KING stressed the importance of maintaining the initiative in our hands. He believes that it is essential to agree upon Anglo-American world-wide strategy, the basic concept, before permitting any discussion of details. The United Nations are now in a position to take the initiative in the war; it is essential to fix in the minds of the British the fact that the basic issue must be determined before going into details. The United States now has the principal power; therefore, we should take the lead.

GENERAL CLARK, in reply to a question from GENERAL MARSHALL, said that although it was not possible to dispose landing craft along the Mediterranean Coast unknown to the Germans, in his opinion this did not preclude their use for the BRIMSTONE operation, inasmuch as the Axis could not know the objective specifically. While they would undoubtedly be under occasional attack, the real danger is from dive bombers; if disposed west of Algiers they would be immune from these aircraft. He agreed with ADMIRAL KING S impression that there were a number of usable small ports where these craft might be loaded. Installation of additional air fields in North Africa will not disclose our intentions, inasmuch as GENERAL EISENHOWER has been instructed that these fields should be spotted for general use and not specifically for the operation. Admiral King remarked that the British concept of bringing troops from the U. K. and from the U. S. for such an operation was designed for surprise, but that it also resulted in

building up a greater excess of troops in North Africa with a corresponding diminution of troops which could be based in the U.K. for projected operations on the Continent. He felt that the British were fully aware of this fact and, in view of their known opposition to any continental operations, this gave them a good "out".

GENERAL CLARK said that it was his belief that operations against the Brest Peninsula would be very hazardous, would require overwhelming air support, extensive naval support, and immediate and heavy follow up. Such an operation should not be undertaken without adequate preparation. Although many of our troops needed battle training, he believes that they were fully capable of standing up to the German defense. He believed that, if successful, operations against the Brest Peninsula would have far greater results than a successful BRIMSTONE operation.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that maximum air effort from England could seriously limit the German air effort against the Brest Peninsula operation; current German tactics in opposition to Flying Fortresses was producing a heavy attrition of the German Air Forces; if they persist in these tactics, the German Air Force will be practically eliminated within a year.

GENERAL SOMERVELL stated that it probably would be possible to transport 300.000 U.S. troops to the U.K. by September provided movements to Africa were suspended; he believes this a more accurate figure than the 150,000 estimated by the British. He stated that based on present sub-marine losses, we shall be able to move fewer troops in 1944 than we can in 1943 despite the ship-building program, and that unless every possible means - including an effective air offensive against submarine bases, building yards and assembly points, and effective commando raids in force against the bases - is used, we shall be faced with a diminishing effort. If we succeed in opening the Mediterranean, we can probably increase present estimates of 1,000,000 troops moved this year by 150,000. He pointed out that stabilization of the North African situation would not greatly reduce shipping commitments in the Middle East area because of forthcoming commitments in support of Turkey, movement of U. S. troops into Burma, and supply of existing positions. He justified his average turn-around of 22 months on the basis that in 1943 Pacific troop movements will require approximately the same tonnage as those in the Atlantic.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that he did not believe that the British had ever had a definite bombing program. In view of the large build up with U. S. bombers in the U. K. to a force which will greatly exceed the British bombing force, he felt that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should establish a priority bombing program.

U. S. SECRET

After considerable discussion of the existing command set-up in the European Theatre of Operations it was agreed:

- (a) that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff establish a priority bombing program;
- (b) that AIR MARSHAL HARRIS should operate the bombers in the U. K. (all under his command) under a directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff setting forth objectives and technique;
- (c) that upon the successful conclusion of the Tunisian operation, it will probably be desirable to establish two separate Theatres in Europe (the Mediterranean and the UK-French Theatres);
- (d) that any operation against the Continent must be a combined operation which must receive the full cooperation and support of the British.

U. S. SECRET BRITISH MOST SECRET

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MINUTES OF MEETING

Held on Wednesday, January 13, 1943, at 3 P. M.

PRESENT

General Marshall
Admiral King
Lt. General Arnold

SECRETARY

Brig. General Deane

ALSO PRESENT

Lt. General Somervell

Lt. General Clark

Rear Admiral Cooke

Brig. General Wedemeyer

Mr. Reilly

Commander Libby

1. PRESIDENT'S VISIT

GENERAL MARSHALL and ADMIRAL MING discussed with Mr. REILLY certain security measures with reference to the President's visit in North Africa. They decided that his party should come directly to Anfa Camp and not delay at Marrakech. A telegram to this effect was sent to Admiral Leahy.

They then discussed the possibility of the President's visiting Marrakech for a few days and indicated that the Prime Minister might urge such a visit. The Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that security measures were not sufficient in Marrakech and that to make them sufficient would necessitate the sending of additional troops and that would be unsound from a tactical point of view. Mr. Reilly agreed.

The question of the President's visit to the front was then discussed and General Marshall proposed that he leave here by motor to Rabat where he would see two divisions and speak to certain selected men. He would then proceed to Port Lyautey and see a division there. From Port Lyautey he could proceed to General Clark's headquarters.

ADMIRAL KING suggested that certain selected men might be flown from the Tunisian front to meet the President at General Clark's headquarters.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he felt the President, on the return trip, should return to Marrakech and remain there long enough to change planes and then have a night flight to Liberia.

MR. REILLY asked if the Liberian trip was necessary and all agreed that the President would insist upon it.

All agreed that it would be desirable if the President and the Prime Minister went separately after leaving the meetings at Anfa Camp.

AGENDA FOR COMING CONFERENCES

GENERAL MARSHALL raised the question of how to proceed with the business of the coming conferences.

ADMIRAL KING implied that he thought they should first discuss world wide strategy, our basic strategic concept.

GENERAL MARSHALL was concerned as to how he should approach the discussion, feeling that the British had their minds set on the operation BRIMSTONE and that their whole thought would be turned towards this.

ADMIRAL KING then presented some notes regarding what he thought should be discussed initially. He divided the initial discussion into:

Man Power

Munitions and Equipment

Man Power vs. Munitions and Equipment That part of the total effort that should be directed against Germany and against Japan.

These suggestions were further subdivided in the motesethichassifier he presented to the Chiefs of Staff.

ADMIRAL KING stated that he believed we should discuss world wide strategy first before getting to specific operations and that we should resist any effort on the part of the British to deviate from this.

GENERAL MARSHALL repeated that he believed that even in the case of world-wide strategy, the British thought would be at all times directed towards Operation BRIMSTONE while he, personally, could not help but have the question of tonnage uppermost in his mind.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that the British were not thinking world strategy but only of the next operation.

The CHIEFS OF STAFF then discussed the question of Operation BRIMSTONE.

GENERAL SCHERVELL said that if we can clear the Mediterannean, he estim ted that we could save in five months one million eight hundred and twenty five thousand tons of shipping; that the blow we can strike any where depends on available tonnage; that at the present time, the balance between capital loaded transport and capital loaded cargo vessels is such that we can move more troops than supporting cargo; and that if we can institute tank sailings from Haifa or from the Eastern Mediterannean to the North African theatre, we can save considerable additional tonnage.

He said that, figuring the losses on the same rate that they were sustained in the TORCH Operation, Operation BRIM-STONE could be accomplished with the loss of forty six (46) ships. He also thought that securing Sicily would be essential to opening traffic in the Mediterranean.

GENERAL CLARK questioned this, stating that he felt we could protect traffic through the Mediterranean by air coverage from Tunisia.

GENERAL ARNOLD asked what the British losses had been in the Malta operation.

GENERAL CLARK stated that they had suffered a sixty per cent (60%) loss but that it must be remembered that they had had no fighter coverage.

ADMIRAL KING stated that he thought the basic proposition as far as the Mediterranean is concerned is to open it, thus saving the long voyage around the Cape of Good Hope. He felt that this was much more important than eliminating Italy from the war.

GENERAL CLARK said that ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM felt that traffic between Sicily and Tunisia could be protected once Tunisia is in our hands.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked the effects of the German bombing on Bone and Algiers.

GENERAL CLARK replied that Bone is within reach of German dive bombers and that we had suffered rather severe losses there. He felt, however, that the situation is now much improved because of anti-aircraft and fighter protectiond Unclassified and also because of the installation of radar equipment. The bombing of Algiers has been considerably lessened since we have employed night fighters to protect it.

ADMIRAL COOKE said that at present it looked as though we would not expel the Germans from Tunisia until spring by which time we would have some five hundred thousand (500,000) troops in Africa. The question would then arise as to whether we should use shipping to send some troops elsewhere or to use them directly from North Africa. In any event, we must make our plans at least three (3) months in advance. The capture of Sardinia or Sicily would probably involve some shipping losses but these would probably be offset by increased safety to subsequent shipping through the Mediterranean.

ADMIRAL KING then asked why we should create such a large excess force in North Africa.

GENERAL CLARK replied that it would not be necessary to do so unless we were going to use them in this area. He pointed out, however, that the occupation of Sardinia or Sicily would be a much more difficult operation than TORCH had been.

ADMIRAL COOKE said that he felt that we could mount an operation against Sardinia largely by using lunding craft of the larger types in which we could afford to take some losses. In reply to Admiral King's question regarding the necessity for building up an excess force in North Africa, he stated that some excess was necessary because it would take many more troops to expel the Axis from Tunisia than it would to simply hold North Africa once the Axis powers were driven out, also, that the hazard with regard to Spanish Morocco was greater prior to our capture of Tunisia and more troops would be required to safeguard our interests in that area.

GENERAL CLARK said that it was now evident that the earliest date for an all-out offensive against Tunisia was March 15th and, in view of this, an operation against either Sardinia or Sicily could scarcely be undertaken before summer.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked General CLARK what number of troops he thought would be necessary to maintain in North Africa once the Axis forces were expelled.

GENERAL CLARK replied that four (4) divisions would be sufficient. This, including the service troops and the Air Force, would mean a force of about two hundred and fifty thousand (250,000) men.

GENER'L MARCHALL pointed out that the excess force that we would have after Tunisia had been captured would amount to about three (3) U.S. divisions and the British First Army.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked GENERAL CLARK for his views on the training necessary for the Operation BRINSTONE.

GENERAL CLARK replied that he thought it should be accomplished in Africa and that it should be completed at the rate of about one (1) division per month after the Army and Navy had completed certain basic training.

GENERAL MARSHALL then asked if the supply of the troops in Sardinia would present any great difficulty.

- 3 -

GENERAL CLARK thought it could be accomplished almost entirely by air and landing craft.

GENERAL ARNOLD pointed out that the fighter aircraft based in North Africa could only operate for about one half hour over Sardinia even with the installation of belly tanks.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked GENERAL CLARK if he thought it was necessary for the 4th Division to come to North Africa in view of the excess number of troops that would be available here.

GENERAL CLARK replied that if no further offensive operations were contemplated after the capture of Tunisia, it would not be necessary for it to come. He stated, however, that there were still one and one half (1) British divisions to arrive in North Africa and that it was necessary for these to come. He pointed out that in the next few months the German threat to Spain would be critical. Spain is, at the present time, a doubtful quantity. They are waiting to see the results of our Tunisian operations. This being the case, it is necessary for us to maintain a large force available to act against Spanish Morocco. He felt that once the Axis powers had been pushed out of Tunisia, Spain will definitely resist a German invasion and the danger in so far as Spanish Morocco is concerned will be decreased.

GENERAL SOMERVALL asked GENERAL CLARK if any German troops had come from Sicily to which GENERAL CLARK replied that he thought not.

ADMIRAL COOK pointed out that regardless of the decision, whether it be to undertake Operation BRINGTONE or some other operation, it should be firm and that we should not permit ourselves to be forced into an operation without sufficient time for preparation.

GENERAL SOMERVELL asked GENERAL CLARM when it was expected that the British would have possession of Tripoli, to which General Clark replied that the operation should be completed on February first.

3. FURTHER CONFERENCES

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff meet at 8:30 and that arrangements be made to meet with the British at 10:30, Janu ry 16th, to which all agreed.

4. ADMIRAL GLASSFORD'S REPORT

APMIRAL KING stated that the Glassford Commission had just about completed its work and that their report had been blocked out. He said that it would be sent first to General Eisenhower for approval and then it would be referred to the Combined Chiefs of Staff either at Anfa Camp or in Washington

U. S. SECRET BRITISH FOST SECRET

He stated that there was one point upon which the entire Commission agreed, i.e., the desirability of giving the French certain tasks to perform and then letting them perform them. He stated that the French are willing to operate under Admiral Pegran who had been made a Vice Admiral. He said that the British had agreed to permit the French to undertake the inshore naval defenses of Gambia as part of French West Africa, but that they were not inclined to permit the French to undertake the air protection of this area.

He suggested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff insist on making the maximum use of French forces by giving them appropriate tasks and then trusting them to accomplish them.

He felt that we would get some opposition in this respect from the British.

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TRINIDAD, B.W.I. MONDAY, JANUARY 11, PORT-OF-SPAIN.

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CAUCAS

British Maintain Pressure On Jap Forces In Burma

NEW DELHI, Jan. 11 (AP)— iritiah Imperial troops, advancing tward Akyab in Burma, are main-aining pressure against Japanese treas in Rathidaum. 25 miles earth of the Bay of Bengal port of fighting is continued on both cites of the Mayar Rivert This was disclosed by today's somunique.

Usine Ste. Madeleine Starts Reaping

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Fire Breaks Out In Big Italian Liner

German Headquarters
In Tunisia Bombed
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unit, was demodalished on Bunduits.

Two U-Boats Sunk And 6 Damaged In Attack On Convoy

Germans Claim Sinking Tankers From Trinidad

Argentina Dies Suddenly

LATEST

Japanese Convoy **Pounded By Aerial** Attack In Pacific

By YATES McDANIEL LLIED HEADQUARTERS, drain, Jan. 11 (AP)

Blockbusters" Dropped On Krupp Works Site

German-Held Rail Junction In Very **Precarious Position**

Afrika Korps Hit RUSSIANS SMASH By Allied Bombers From Tunisia

Week-end Accidents Claim Three Victims

SALIENT THRUST IN THEIR POSITIONS

Acquisition Claims For Arbitration

Father Claims Child Found Wandering

Japaneso Make Progress In New Drive In China

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U.S. Report Overwhelming Air Victories In Europe

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Battery Charging

AKOW & TANG Henry Herest Phone 41 T R A N S P O R T CONTRACTORS Letter to the Editor

Regrading Of Civil Servants' Salaries

THE BOY IN THE STREET.

LONDON, Jan. 6 (AP).—One do Langaneger, 33, native of Ch was one of two internees who o raped last pight from their car at Peci, Isle of Man.

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By GENE BYRNES

Leaders To Speed Up Brazilian Rubber Output

Dramatic Society To Too Late For Classification Stage Play Soon

New Year Greetings Exchanged In Court

of Brazili to meet the Amisann Ishour shortage; and the American. At the first sitting of the Gran Docker George Baunders, Ruperin-Leadant of the Brazilian Special States, and the American States of the Brazilian Special States, and the States of the Sta

ONE BLACK DOO Labras Retriever. Answer: the name "Ferdia." Return to J. Serre C.Q.M.S. Delli Rall.—Jan. 13.

MOTORS FOR SALE
AUBTIN-10 H.P. 4-door Sedac
Good appearance, Good tyres
Very low gasslene consumption
Insured to October. Price 1809
Ade La Bautille. Thone 1419 o
5291.—Jan. 12.

LAWN-MOWERS for Hire. E. Wallace. Phone 4322 or 2132 -



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You too, can look just as smart and well-dressed. We have all that it takes to do that for you.

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ALFRED PAUL

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Mothers, Attention!

GIRLS' DRESSES in a variety of colours and styles.

SABGA

HODGKINSON'S 2 STORES

Monday, 11th January, 1943

We have just received a new shipment of ready-made

will be opened on

62, QUEEN STREET and NEW MARKET, Corner Duke & Pembroke Sts.

"JE'S technique of wooin' gets results! The London LEASE-LEND lassies never saw a real wolf at work until Mickey started his engireting movemental Hats off It's Mickey's all-time topper! "BUNGLE FOR HOW ABOUT A LITTLE "WOO-WOO AMERICAN STYLE" GWENN-HUNTER BARTHOLOMEW MAN TAUROG De LUXE - THURSDAY

Adamson's Adventures -The Sheller.









Evening News

TRINIDAD PUBLISHING 22, St. Vincent Street, Port-of-Spain.

MONDAY, JANUARY 11, 1943.

As We See It

Looking to Future

First annual message by His Excellency the Governor to members of the Legislative Council on Wednesday, when the 1943 estimates were presented, revealed many plans by Government for the Colony's economic and social welfare, but perhaps the most important of these was his statement with regard to unemployment.

Slum Clearance

the Training News' gially with the state of the state of

Town Talk

News of Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, Weddings, Dances and Meetings.

Concert Success :

. From The War Fronts. 2

The Stars Are Neutral

Saturday, May 10, in London—City in Flames This Time — Treasured Londmarks Destroyed — Hatred Intensified.

(CONTINUED ON PAGE 0)

The Man in the Street Welcomes :

Running Of Extra Trains

MR. W. ARTHUR Worker.: "These trains ing to a great extent in the transport problem.

LISTENING POST:

"LIBERTY" BRAND Barbados Rum

Retail at:

FERNANDEZ (1933) LTD.

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THEATRE

Today at 4.45 & 8.45 p.m.

KAY KYSER, ELLEN DREW & JANE WYMAN IS

MY FAVORITE SPY

Extra-SWING VACATION with Chas. Buddy Rogers and His Band

SAN FERNANDO

Today at 5 & 8.30 p.m. Gary Cooper & Teresa Wright

PRIDE OF THE YANKERS HOW TO PLAY BASEBALL

SAN JUAN

SAN ANTONIO ROSE BADLANDS OF DAKOTA





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MOPSY by GLADYS PARKER



RADWAY'S Vegetable ROOT PILLS

Constipation

Reliable, Mild, Effective

Whitehead & Anton

Don Winslow of the Navy-Messengers



BY FRANK V. MARTINEX



Only The Stars Are Neutral Radio Programmes

MACHINE GUN FIRE HARDLY HEARD

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Ground Rice Tarts

flome short or flaky pastry, Apricot jam 1 egg The weight in castor sugar, mar-garine and ground rice. Some grated nutmeg or lemon rind.

Children's Corner

THE SIXT DENT OF THE UNITED STATES

MERE'S A VERY SIMPLE AND EFFECTIVE WAY TO DRAW ABE LINCOLN

PHIS NAME IN THE POSITIONS SHOWN IN SKETCH NUMBER 1

THEN ADT A FEV. MORE SIMPLE LINES TO HIS SIGNA-TO COMPLETE THE SKETCH AS IN NUMBER 2



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For further particulars, please apply

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AGENTS Regraded Unclassified

Whirlaway To Retire At End Of 1943 Racing

Shamrock - Police DECISION REACHED this year, it will be a big year for Clash At Hockey TALKS WITHOWNER to the million will be a big year for Clash At Hockey TALKS WITHOWNER to the million will be absorbed ago, it was programmed to the million will be absorbed to the million will be a big year for the milli This Afternoon

Rughy 'A' v. Police 'H'.

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SUT CRICKET MEETING

"Where Smart Suits are Tailored" . . .

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SWIMMING TRUNKS :

POR FUN . . . RWIM TO REEP IN TRIM POR TOUR ARDUOUS DEPENCE DUTIES!

- . ROYAL
- . GREY
- MAROON
- . GREEN
- . BLACK

MILLER'S

STARTING WEDNESDAY

"THE FLEET'S IN"

It's Ankles Away As the Boys in Blue Paint the Town Red!

Thousands of Tars And All These Stars:

- * 1. DOROTHY LAMOUR
- * 2. WILLIAM HOLDEN
- * 3. EDDIE BRACKEN
- * 4. BETTY HUTTON
- * 5. BETTY JANE RHODES
- * 6. LEIF ERICKSON
- * 7. JIMMY DORSEY AND HIS BAND
- * 8. DOB EBERLY
- * 9. .: ELEN O'CONNELL
- * 10. LCRRAINE & ROGNAN
- * 11. CASS DALEY
- * 12. GIL LAMB
- * Seven Swingy Tunes! * Gobs of Laughs!

* Gobs of Gals!

* Gobs of Stars!

Flyin' Jenny

16 m.m. Film

-Just a Blur.





THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

January 9, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY.

I think the President believes he has covered this matter in his recent telegram to Churchill on this same subject, so I do not think he will want to sign anything like this, but you may want to check with him. I rather think this can be filed.

HARRY L. HOPKINS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

December 30, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I am sending you herewith the suggested instruction to General Eisenhower and to Murphy, of which I understand you will also wish to send a copy by cable to Mr. Churchill.

The Secretary asked me to let you know that he approves this suggested statement about policy, but feels very strongly indeed that you should simultaneously make a public statement with regard to our policy towards France and particularly with regard to General de Gaulle's present efforts to obtain complete control over all French territories and activities. He is sending you a suggested draft for such a statement.

Believe me

Enc .

faithfully yours,

The President,

The White House.

SUGGESTED INSTRUCTION TO GENERAL EISENHOWER AND TO MURPHY

In view of General Giraud's recent conversations with you on the subject of the recognition by the United States of French sovereignty in North Africa, and in view of recent statements made by the Fighting French National Committee in London and newspaper articles apparently inspired by the latter relative to the immediate need for the creation of a provisional French government to be installed in North Africa, the President desires that the following statement be sent to you which sets forth the policy of the Government of the United States with regard to the French people and French territory and possessions.

You should be guided by this statement in your conversations with General Giraud as well as in the determination of all questions which have inherent in them political aspects.

The supreme objective of the United States is the defeat of the Axis powers, and in the achievement of that objective, in cooperation with the other United Nations, the Government of the United States desires

the cooperation of all elements of French resistance.

It hopes that General de Gaulle and all other elements of French resistance will be willing to cooperate with General Giraud as Commander-in-Chief of the French forces in North Africa in every effective and practicable manner for the attainment of the defeat of Germany and her allies. The Government of the United States believes that satisfactory arrangements of a military character can undoubtedly be made between General Giraud and General de Gaulle for the coordination of such cooperative effort between them and their associates. Such coordination would provide a basis for this Government to work with a unified French command, and would be favored by the United States.

may be worked out as the situation develops.

The Government of the United States will continue

the policy it has pursued since June 1940 of dealing,

in all French territories, with the French authorities

in effective control of such territories actively re
sisting the Axis. The Government of the United Statesded Unclassifi

Prench territories and, subject solely to the rights

legitimately pertaining to its military forces, desires

that civil administration by French authorities in North

Africa be maintained. The relationship of the United

States to such civil administration will remain in
cidental to its military operation.

The Government of the United States, as one of its ties in Horth Africa and in other French territories. war objectives, intends, in cooperation with the other United Nations, to bring about the liberation of France. It will take no step which will in the slightest degree impair the right of the French people to determine with complete freedom their own destinies and to select their own government, once France has been liberated. It considers that the most effective results for all concerned can be attained if the military effort is kept divorced from political considerations. For these reasons, the Government of the United States will not accord recognition to any provisional government of France, no matter how constituted and no matter where constituted, until the French people have themselves been afforded the

Regraded Unclassif

opportunity freely to select such government.

The Government of the United States therefore believes that until such time has come, its cooperation
with the forces of French resistance in North Africa
and elsewhere must properly be concentrated along the
lines of military and naval endeavor and in the rendering of such relief and economic assistance as may be
found desirable and necessary by the French authorities in North Africa and in other French territories.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

December 30, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Suggested statement for such consideration as you may think advisable to give to it.

eH

355

DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON

DRAFT PUBLIC STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT - FRENCH AFFAIRS

The question is asked as to the prospects of unifying French efforts in the war against the Axis.

This comes at a time when we are at a critical stage in a battle of major importance. There is literally no time of immediate occasion to deal with issues not directly related to winning that battle.

The need just now is for all who are opposed to the Axis powers to close ranks and join in this orucial struggle, and not to be diverted from that paramount purpose. I shound this to for 15.1943
the P. M. Condon

PMW
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone (MC)

Dated January 8, 1943
Rec'd 10:05 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPIE PRIORITY

192, January 8, 6 p.m.

As instructed in your telegram No. 146, January 7, 2 p.m., I left with Mr. Eden this morning paraphrases of that telegram and of your telegram No. 104, January 5, 10 p.m., and went over the North African situation with him. I gained the impression that he had not previously been fully impressed with the seriousness with which you view the situation or that he considered the attitude of the British press as particularly harmful. He took some exception to the statement that "British leaders" were approving de Gaulle 's broadcast or the present Fighting French propaganda campaign. He referred to his attempt to dissuade General de Gaulle from issuing his January 2 statement and of de Gaulle's refusal to grant his request. He added "de Gaulle has caused me more trouble than all the other Allies put together". He said that he had been faced with the alternative of issuing a dead censorship

-2- #192, January 8, 6 p.m., from London

censorship stop which six hundred correspondents would have known about, or of letting him go shead. I said that since the British had largely built up de Gaulle and he was obtaining all his financial support from the British Government, and since the British have turned over to him control over Madagascar and Djibouti that it seemed to us in the United States that there must be means of bringing about a more reasonable attitude on de Gaulle's part. His reply was that due in large part, he thought, to the Darlan arrangements, de Gaulle had become a sort of public hero in Britain; that he, Eden, had had great difficulties with the House of Commons on the question, and than any attempt to exercise financial or other pressure would inevitably bring a serious backfire in the House of Commons. He added: "I can't censor him any more than you can censor the statements of the Willkies and Luces."

He asked me to tell you: first, that the British had a lot of troops fighting in Tunisia and they are just as anxious for a military success as we are.

Secondly, that de Gaulle is not like "a quantity of gin that can be put in a bottle", but is very difficult to handle and that we must remember he has a large

-3- #192, January 8, 6 p.m., from London

large following in metropolitan France. Thirdly, he feels that it is importent that all French be brought together and that they would work better under a single organization than under separate ones. I said that it did not seem to me that de Gaulle's present tactics were calculated to bring them together, and - he agreed. He said specifically that he did not care whether Giraud or de Gaulle headed such unified group. I said that de Gaulle's allegations of "increasing confusion" in North Africa did not seem likely either to help our military operations or to bring about unity, and that I wondered whether the British had suggested to de Gaulle that he might simply offer his military support to General Giraud. Eden replied that he did not think that the Fighting French would agree to it. He added that he understood that de Gaulle was planning to send military emissaries as suggested by Giraud and that this seemed to be a step in the right direction. I said that my reading of de Gaulle's reply (my telegram 174, January 7, 8 p.m.) did not seem to indicate any clear acceptance of the suggestion, and we found out later that he had based his statement on an Earlier indication to Charles Peake by de Gaulle that he

-4- #192, January 8, 6 p.m., from London

that he would send military representatives to Algiers, a tentative decision apparently reversed by the General later. Your statement that de Gaulle's political aspirations were forcing General Eisenhower to take time out from essential military duties elicited

Mr. Eden's comment that he understood that "Eisenhower had returned from the front because of Darlan's assassination and not because of General de Gaulle's activities".

Although our conversation was friendly throughout, I left with the impression that Mr. Eden had not
fully realized the seriousness with which you view
the situation, that he did not accept the view that
the British are in any way responsible for the propaganda and intrigues of de Gaulle and his advisers, and
that he does wish a single de facto political organization set up in Algiers which will provide for the
elimination of what he considers unreliable elements.
Incidentally he is inclined to feel that a visit by
de Gaulle to Washington at this time would not be wise,
a view with which I concur. (Most secret. I understand that the Prime Minister in private conversation
with an American has expressed bluntly the view that
the "Americans should not have one Frenchman, Giraud,

while the

-5- #192, January 8, 6 p.m., from London

while the British have another, de Gaulle". When it was suggested to him that one solution might be that de Gaulle assume a secondary role, he replied:
"No, you can't do that. De Geulle is more than a man.
He is a movement and a symbol").

To sum up, I feel that, quite aside from de Gaulle propaganda and the question of British responsibility for not restraining it, there are certain divergencies of viewpoint between us: (one) the British place more emphasis on setting up some political entity which will have most of the attributes of a transitional government though not calling itself so by name, whereas we consider the military aspect of French support be more important; (two) the British Government lays great store on the strength of de Gaulle's followers and his public support in France with a corollary emphasis on the need to get rid of all taint of Vichy and Petain supporters in North Africa, while we, not having based our policy for the last two years on support of de Gaulle and vilification of Vichy, see the problem in truer perspective; (three) our policy is that of letting the French people freely choose their own government after the war, whereas the British would prefer.

#192, January 8, 6 p.m., from London prefer, the transitional period which they envisage, to see a regime which owes its existence to them; (four) they are perhaps jealous of our leading role in North Africa. I believe that a public statement of our policy is the best way to clarify the present confusion. Your telegrams Nos. 104 and 146 have been most helpful. If in addition you could give me (if a public statement seems inadvisable) a full statement of your policy -- such as that mentioned in your telegram No. 6662, December 30, 9 p.m. -- it would be, I think, useful. MATTHE WS-CSB

1 mptile o

MEL
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyons. (MC)

London
Dated January 7, 1945
Rec'd 4:50 p.m.

Scoretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

174, January 7, 8 p.m., (SECTIONS ONE TO FOUR INCLUSIVE)

My telegram number 84, January 4, 7 p.m.

In reply to General Giraud's message of yesterday explaining that he is busy at the moment but offering to meet General de Gaulle at the end of the month and asking that meanwhile military experts be sent to confer with him, de Gaulle has sent the following through General Eisenhower:

you to propose to postpone until the end of the month the interview which I proposed to you on December 25. I must tell you frankly that the National Committee and I have another opinion as to the urgent need for realization of the unity of the empire and the union of its efforts with those of the national resistance. It is to be feared that any delay will disappoint the Prench people and be harmful to our country.

Horeover

-2-, #174, January 7, 8 p.m., (SECTIONS ONE TO FOUR INCLUSIVE), from London.

Moreover we are not certain that the recent psychological opportunity will still prevail in the midst of the rapid developments in which we are living.

Insofar as your request for establishing a military contact between us is concerned, I am taking it under consideration, in spite of the fact that General D. Astier de la Vigerie sent by me to Algiers on December 19 last was invited to leave almost immediately. I would appreciate your informing me on what basis and under what condition you conceive such a liaison.

Finally I feel it is not proper that we should communicate with each other by texts given to foreign agencies. I am prepared to send you an officer with a code so that we might be directly in contact by cipher between London, Algiers and Brazzaville" (Strang has just telephoned that he does not (repeat not) consider this reply helpful.)

Today's press gives no indication that General
Giraud has given any reply to General de Gaulle and in
fact the diplomatic correspondent of today's
EVENING STAIDARD has the following to say:

MATTHEWS

HEL

PIAIN London

Dated January 7, 1943 Rec'd 5:15 p.m.

Secretary of State,

TRIPLE PRIORITY

174, January 7, 8 p.m., (SECTION FIVE)

No further reply has yet been received by General De Gaulle to his request for a meeting with General Giraud, but I understand that the request may be repeated.

The two French leaders have mutually expressed the desire to meet. But there does not at present seem to be much likelihood of the meeting taking place.

Opposition to the meeting comes chiefly from certain elements in Algiers. These include members of the Imperial Council formed by Admiral Darlan, and among them may be named M.E. Chatel, Governor-General of Algeria, and General Bergeret.

A number of local administrative and police chiefs are also opposed.

At the same time there has gathered in North Africa a galaxy of Vichy politicians who, although they do not at present hold official positions, are

known

-2-, #174, January 7, 8 p.m., (SECTION FIVE) from London

known to have political ambitions. These include Flandin, Peucheu, Peyrouton and Baudoin.

Baudoin was the first Vichy Foreign Minister.

Flandin is an ex-Foreign Minister of Vichy. Peucheu and Peyrouton are both ex-Ministers of the Interior of Vichy.

The attitude of the American military and diplomatic authorities in North Africa has been to regard the internal political fight as a purely French matter. But the feeling is now growing among the Americans that it may not be possible to maintain this attitude if the deterioration of the political situation continues.

American press and radio commentators are already hinting that the time may be approaching when the United of States of America may have to take a hand.

The British and American Governments are acting in accord.

In the British view, also, it is felt that a meeting between General De Gaulle and General Giraud is highly desirable.

It is agreed on all sides that General Giraud has completely clean hands in the midst of all these local

-3-, #174, January 7, 8 p.m., (SECTION FIVE) from London

local French political intrigues. But some of his

advisers bequeathed by Admiral Darlan are opposed to

collaboration between Giraud and De Gaulle.

These facts help to explain why numbers of proAlly and De Gaullist men arrested by the old regime
before the Allied landings are still in prison. They
also explain why armed Fascist organizations -including the 'S.O.L.' (the inner Praetorian Guard
of Petain's Legion des Combattants and the 'P.P.F'
Doriot's organization -- are still in being in
various parts of North Africa.".

MATTHETS

MRM

RCC This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC) London
Dated January 7, 1943
Rec'd 4:50 p.m.

Secretary of State Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY


174, January 7, 8 p.m., (SECTION SIX).

I really feel that it is time that the other side of the picture be given some publicity.

(END OF MESSAGE).

MATTHEWS

MRM



WAR DEPARTMENT
THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON



January 6, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The inclosed message from General Eisenhower, explaining his military situation and outlining his views, will be of interest to you.

Chief of Staff.

Incl.

SECRET

SECRET

Algiers January 5, 1943

We have learned that in some quarters at home there is an apparent conviction that we are in North Africa as an occupying, powerful, conquering army fully capable of carrying out our military missions and, if need be, of controlling the population by force. As a result of this conviction it appears to be assumed that we are in position to deal with the French on the basis of giving orders and compelling compliance.

I am writing this message for your information with the request that when opportunity arises you do what you can to correct or soften this view at least to the extent that during the ensuing critical weeks we do not receive any arbitrary instructions which might precipitate a military crisis.

I know that you fully understand the essentials of our military situation and, therefore, are aware of the extent to which we are dependent upon active cooperation of the French. From the very beginning, this whole task would have been an easy one for us here, both militarily and politically, if we had been content merely to seize ports and solidify our own bases and pacify the country. We did not take the easy, safe course, and I know you have always agreed that the decision to rush ahead, although risky, was fully justified. Even yet I think we gained tremendously by that decision, in spite of political difficulties that all have had their roots in the extent to which we have exposed our rear to sabotage and disruption. We must always face the fact that it will be many weeks yet before we can perform the military tasks in front of us and still be strong enough to impose our will arbitrarily upon the local French.

Ever since November ninth we have, in full conformity with the spirit and letter of our original instructions, attempted to secure active French cooperation on the basis of friendship and have made our military dispositions on a continuation of such a relationship. I will be prompt in reporting to you personally when the time arrives that we are strong enough in front and rear to disregard, if so ordered, French and other viewpoints. The immediate effect of non-cooperation now would be catastrophic and, if anything we should be instructed to do might result in non-cooperation, we must have ample time in which to readjust dispositions much more conservatively than at present.

At the moment I have nothing specific in mind that might become a threat to our present relations. My concern has nothing what-soever to do with international or French politics, all of which questions I am hopeful will soon be properly organized here under separate civilian authority. This matter is purely military.

Eisenhower

January 5, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Attached are excerpts of three letters from Robert Murphy to General Giraud which I have just received from Mr. Lemaigre Dubreuil of the French Mission now here. I want to call them especially to your attention and shall welcome any comments you may want to make.

TRANSLATION OF LETTERS SENT BY MR. MURPHY TO GENERAL
GIRAUD DATED NOVEMBER 2, 1942.

to say, at each landing points at 1942.

landing the first convoy. As regards subsequent operaletter no Aparican troops will be placed under the Inter-Allies Command as soon as they are on land.

With reference to the declarations made by President Roosevelt on several operations and to the engagements already undertaken by the American Government as well as by the British Government, I am in a position to assure you that the restoration of the full independence of France in all its greatness and to the full extent of its pre-war possessions both in Europe and beyond the seas is one of the war objectives of the United Nations. It is clearly understood that French sovereignty will have to be restored as soon as possible in all the Metropolitan and Colonial territories which in 1939 were under the French flag.

French nation as an ally and will deal with it as such.

in French territory (either in Metropolitan France or in the Colonies) whenever there is French collaboration, the American authorities will not in any way interfere in matters which solely pertain to national administration or are derived from the exercise of French sovereignty.

As regards the Command the Government of the United States has no thought or desire except to place the military command of any such region in the hands of Frenchmen as soon as possible. Nevertheless, during those phases of the operation including landing, establishment of the security of French North Africa and supplying the necessary base, it is considered essential that the American Command and the organization which has been created with such effort and difficulty particularly for this operation shall remain unchanged (the foregoing provision results from the recent conference between French and American representatives. It was prepared before the receipt of your note of October 27 which reads as follows:

"It is perfectly normal and it is understood that all landing operations shall be controlled by the Chief of Staff of the American Army. The Inter-Allied High Command shall assume control after the landing, that is

to say, at each landing point 48 hours after the hour d for the beginning of the initial operations of landing the first convoy. As regards subsequent opera-Allied Command as soon as they are on land.

I am communicating your suggestion to the General Staff of the American Army and I am certain that an acceptable formula will be found. During this period the Government of the United States will make every effort looking toward the supply of arms and modern equipment to the French forces. While the equipment and organization of French forces is thus being carried out, details concerning the command shall be arranged so that Frenchmen may be in a position to assume the High Command at the desired time. In order to facilitate the direction of operations it would be desirable to attach a general of the French Army to the High Command immediately after landing. Axis control.

Up to the present time, adequate measures have Letter no. 2. reserve, with a view to these deliveries, the quantities of merchandise the seed of which your parti I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your

letter of October 28 as follows: ved operation of trans

port and to sid the resumption of regard consider it of the greatest importance that, in the event of combined military operations in French territories (either in Metropolitan France or oversess) which are not occupied by the Axis powers in accordance with the armistice terms, the United Nations expeditionary force which will collaborate with local French troops should be sesentially an American expedition placed under an American command, the arrival of such goods

that It should include no dissident French elements.

North Africa shall contr the local French authorities and American authorities should it be necessary, could non-American formations, Allied or dissident French, be introduced into these Prench territories. Stance and billing of merchandise

the rules actually followed rancol am glad to assure you that your point of view is perfectly in harmony from the point of view of my Government.

8. Payment therefor shall be made through Letter, sea. Oredits corresponding to the total of deliveries

be opened in North Africa for the account of the American Government. These credits shall be utilized either for the American Treasury's requirements as regards military expenditures and its procurement purchases in French Africa or for payment of North African exports to the United States.

- 9. Should it appear that expenses and American purchases in Africa will not cover these civilian deliveries the question of the means of payment to be utilized will be reexamined in common agreement.
- 10. The American Government undertakes to facilitate in so far as possible the allocation of North African products which as a result of circumstances are deprived of their normal outlet. As soon as military collaboration is brought about conversations will be begun for a common study of the conditions under which these products can be allocated. A list of them should be furnished by the French authorities.
- ll. Having the firm desire to do everything compatible with the conduct of the war not to increase the sufferings of the French metropolitan population which has already been so seriously tried, the American Government will raise no objection to measures of assistance which the French populations liberated from Axis control should wish to take in favor of other populations of the French community. With the reserve that such shipments must be covered by the guarantees necessary prevent them being deviated from their destination. The shipment of family packages, assistance to towns in metropolitan France adopted by towns in Africa, gifts to the Red Cross, etc., shall be in its opinion continued between North Africa and Metropolitan France.

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

SECRET

January 4, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

The President:

For Information. No action necessary.

M. J. J. M.

Confidential message in private code from Peter Tompkins (OWI) in Algiers to Percy Winner (OWI) in Washington, December 30th, 1942.

The Frenchmen favorable to us are all washed up. The Frenchmen against us have put it all over on our Army and political authorities. Nobody is now playing with the Frenchmen favorable to us.

Both General McClure and Colonel Hazeltine went to bat but they could not get to first base with the top authorities of the American Army because no one would support them. The French who played ball with our Army leaders just before our arrival and in the difficult days immediately afterward are now in jail. Indeed, some of them have been executed. General Giraud and Regault (the head of the French propaganda set-up) are being used now by the supporters of the Count of Paris and the Royalist movement. There is evidence that the assassination of Darlan was the work of the Royalists and that the same people threaten the life of Giraud while creating the impression with Giraud himself that it was all the work of the pro-American French. Both McClure and Hazeltine are behind the eight-ball. General Eisenhower must resort to really strenuous and vigorous means or our side will not only get the worst of it in this immediate situation but will be put in danger both in a military and a political sense in the whole operation in this part of the country.

ALGIERS. January 2, 1943.

With regard to the details of Tompkins' report the factual statements are generally untrue. None of the French referred to as our friends have been executed and of those arrested for the suspected assassination only two or three have been of any assistance to us, and these were at best rather unscrupulous individuals. The group arrested included all political complexions from open Nazi sympathizers to DeGaullists and so-called Pro-Americans. Giraud's attitude about the arrests has been restrained and we have his private assurance that no drastic punishment is intended. He considers his action in the nature of a warning to elements that are inclined to take the law into their own hands while the French Armed Forces are engaged at the front. Two of the suspects were released yesterday and it is possible that several others will be released in the next day or two. We are keeping our hands on the situation as tightly as possible without unduly antagonizing Giraud himself who at each inquiry charges us with lack of trust in his honor and friendship. He must be handled with kid gloves at this critical time, as he has a very difficult temperament. There has been considerable apprehension in the DeGaullist and Pro-American ranks but most of this seems to be disappearing, owing to the very limited extent of the arrests.

The Count of Paris is in Algiers and yesterday offered his services to Murphy as political head of the Colonial Government. He is not taken very seriously here, although he has considerable local support. Actually, the only item connecting Darlan's assassin with the Royalist Movement is the fact that in France one time he had been in some way identified with the Pro-Royalists. It is possible that Giraud, who seems to lack political interest or judgment, may be imposed upon by the unscrupulous political group which remains in office here and which cannot be ousted at once because of the local situation or lack of replacements. It is also true that Murphy's staff should be reinforced by able assistants at the earliest possible moment, as it seems to me to be very weak in spots. The condition exists to a much more marked degree in the OWI and OSS personnel here, but McClure is in process of getting them in hand and I can assist him through experience gained by my past dealings with Donovan, Davis and Sherwood.

Thanks for the personal nature of your message, as I am trying to keep as much of this mess as possible from General Eisenhower's shoulders while he prepares for the Tunisian battle.

SMITH.

SECRET Mar Department

Office of the Chief of Staff

January 3, 1943.

ADMIRAL LEAHY MEMORANDUM FOR

> Although Milton Eisenhower discussed the enclosed message from Peter Tompkins with the President, I am told that he did not read the message itself.

I believe that the President would be interested in General W. B. Smith's comments (enclosed) on the Tompkins message which was relayed to him from here.

Chief of Staff.

DLA This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC) Secretary of State, Washington. RUSH

London Dated January 4, 1943 REC'd 6:13 p.m.

84, January 4, 7 p.m. (Seelin One)

The efforts of the Fighting French to precipitate matters in North Africa, however such action may complicate General Eisenhower's task, continue to have full support of the British press. General de Gaulle's statement (please see my telegram 72 of yesterday) receives a continued big play in this morning's papers. Although that statement gave no admission of the fact that General Giraud had replied to De Gaulle's request for a meeting of December 25, some of today's newspapers indicate that Giraud has sent "a verbal reply to General De Gaulle's request for a formal meeting on French soil to discuss unity".

MATTHEWS

JRL

HEL

GRAY

London

Dated January 4, 1943

Rec'd 6:18 p.m.

Scoretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH

84, January 4, 7 p.m., (SECTION TWO)

The DAILY EXPRESS which makes the story a leading one says: "The reply does not rule out a conference such as General De Gaulle suggests. But the presence in Giraud's government of a considerable number of men identified with Vichy does not greatly help matters. This, coupled with a somewhat legalistic attitude taken by General Giraud himself on many delicate political and diplomatic questions, has made progress slow. Meanwhile, the absence of unity has led to what General De Gaulle described in a weekend statement as isteadily increasing internal confusion in the French North and West African territories:. The situation at the moment is not happy and Mr. Harold MacMillian, Britain's new Minister Resident in French North West Africa, will begin at once the task of overcoming difficulties and smoothing a way to closer cooperation between all anti-Axis Frenchman".

As though

200

-2-, #84, January 4, 7 p.m., (SECTION TWO), from London.

As though to confirm General De Gaulle's assertion of steadily increasing internal confusion in North Africa the press this morning quotes the Brazzaville radio to the effect that "Two American civil servants who were to distribute food to the Algerian population have been murdered in mysterious circumstances".

As part of the pressure campaign the diplomatic correspondent of the MANCHESTER CUARDIAN writes: "But it is clear that General De Gaulle is dissatisfied with the slowness of the present negotiations and regards a personal meeting as urgently necessary. He at least will not bear the responsibility for delay was the most important thing is that there shall be a unified French administration in some form which will be a working Government instrument. This is essential in the interest of the war effort of the French Empire that is free. The unified French Empire must come before metropolitan France is liberated. It has to be administered and it has to have a governmental form for its dealings with its British, American and other Allies in the struggle to defeat the Axis."

Andre Philip in a leading article in yesterday's

OBSERVER entitled "The Unification of French Resistence".

Explained

-3-, #84, January 4, 7 p.m., (SECTION TWO), from London.

Explained in greater detail how the Fighting French

visualize unification and the theory that De Gaulle

alone represents the legitimate continuation of the

third republic. In speaking for himself and the General's supporters in France Philip writes: "If, finally,

we placed ourselves under the authority of Charles De

Gaulle and of the French National Committee, the

reason was that we later felt the need of some one who

could speak to the world in the name of France.

MATTHEWS

MRM

FMH

GRAY
Londan
Dated Jenuary 4, 1943
Rec'd 6136 p.m.

Secretary of State, Washington.

RUSH

84, January 4, 7 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

We did not rally around a General who was placing a legion of volunteers at the disposal of a foreign power. We rallied around the only member of the last legitimate republican government who had been in a position to make a political decision i.e. that of continuing the war and who, because of that decision, was entitled to speak on behalf of the French nation. The National Committee, in the measure of the limited meens by its command, has been endeavoring to perform that duty. Now that new combatants are forthcoming the directing body must be broadened and perhaps undergo extensive reconstruction both in its structure and its spirit. But its aim remains unchanged. It is to enable the French nation to express itself through a central governing body which should be as representative as possible and act provisionally as the trustees of the country's

the country's interests. If this were not done our mother country, France, would be humiliated, feel relegated to an inferior rank among the United Nations. Until the end of hostilities, under the fallacious pretext that she had no regular government, France would be unable to make her voice heard and she would incur the risk of being finally confronted by vital decisions made in her absence and without her participation It would, in fact, amount to a denial of her sovereignty, a refusal to recognize her independence just at the very hour when she is preparing to make a decisive military effort for the common cause".

(Incidentally M. Philip, somewhat gratuitously taking a dig at our arrangements in North Africa, writes: "When the question arose of our (i.e. he and his friends inside France) unification with the movement of external resistence we asked De Gaulle whether he subscribed to those principles. Now he did not reply that we should be realists, that we should achieve military victory with the help of no matter who no matter at what price or by what means. He simply said 'Yes, I do' and he gave us the necessary quarantees!".

MATTHEWS

MRM

ELP

GRAY

London

Dated January 4, 1945.
Rec'd 10:05 p.m.

Secretary of State, Washington.

84, January 4, 7 p.m. (SECTION FOUR).

The OBSERVER gives Philip!s article its full editorial support and concludes with the following words:
"The importance of French affairs and of their treatment today can scarcely be exaggerated. They will materially condition the politics of France tomorrow. We must desire that our nearest neighbor's politics after this war should be democratic and that her common folk should have no cause to reproach us. Only then will the spokesmen of France tomorrow be men with whom we can build a long and enduring peace in Europe".

Today's DATLY TELEGRAPH and MANCHESTER GUARDIAN
likewise editorialize on the De Gaulle statement and
the latter, commenting on the "steadily increasing confusion in French North and West Africa" and the need
for an enlarged central body, "founded on national union,
inspired by the spirit of war and liberation, with laws
which are the laws of the republic", says that: "The
position in North Africa remains obscure and the

fundamental

-2-784, January 4, 7 p.m., (SECTION FOUR) from London.

fundamental difficulty is the widespread suspicion that some of the officials who were appointed by Vichy do not accept the laws of the republic and have not changed their attitude to Frenchmen who were imprisoned for wishing to continue the war against Germany".

The labor DATLY HERALD comments on the De Gaulle statement as follows: "Giraud, though he has expressed a desire for cooperation and his personal friendship for De Gaulle, has not yet sent a formal reply. He seems to want first to consolidate his position, to carry out reforms, and to make changes in the personnel of his administration. The French National Committee in London has already formulated its views of the conditions for unity. They are: (1) that the single authority can consist only of men with unimpeachable records; (2) that it must be based on 'republican lightimey' that is that it must derive its authority not in any way from Vichy, but from the last government of the republic; (3) that its political head must be De Gaulle. Giraud, they hold, must accept these conditions as a basis for negotiation. Whether they have been officially conveyed to Giraud is not clear. If they have, he may be hesitating to accept De Gaulle as his political chief and to agree to serve under him in some high, but secondary capacity".

MATTHEWS

FMH
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London
Dated January 4, 1943
Rec'd 6:36 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

84, January 4, 7 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

The foregoing should suffice to give the Department some picture of the campaign to force the immediate issue in North Africa. I regret that I can find little evidence that the difficulties facing both General Eisenhower and General Giraud and the probable effect of precipitate action on the military operations in North Africa are in any way comprehended here. Nor is there evidence of a willingness to proceed slowly or any suggestion that a less pretentious attitude toward his claim political primacy on the part of General De Gaulle and his advisers might hasten the unity for which they are calling. Strang tells me that the Foreign Office only learned of De Gaulle's statement late Saturday afternoon and endeavored to dissuade him from making it at least for forty eight hours until after he had had a reply to his second message to Giraud. The Foreign Office argued that it might merely serve to delay a meeting between the two French leaders. Pleven brought

-2- #84, January 4, 7 p.m. (SECTION FIVE) from London brought back word that De Gaulle did not feel that he could agree to any delay and the Foreign Office, according to Strang, felt it inadvisable to suppress the statement. Developments since the writing of my telegram No. 1, January 1, 1 p.m., have served to strengthen my conviction that it is a definite policy of the British Foreign Office to assure the political supremacy of General De Gaulle throughout the French Empire and later in France, whether we like it or not, and while I do not wish to exaggerate its importance in that sense, I do find this attitude of indifference to the American viewpoint a somewhat disturbing augury for future Anglo-American cooperation as a constructive factor in building the postwar world.

(END OF MESSAGE.)

MATTHEWS

MRM

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION 224 WEST 57TH STREET NEW YORK CITY

SECRET

January 1, 1943

TO: Robert E. Sherwood

FROM: Percy Winner

SUBJECT: Memorandum on North Africa

SECRET

The President's Directive stated the purposes of the North African expedition to be to help the French free themselves from enemy control and influence, as well as to provide for the Allied forces a base for military operations against the enemy.

and the shedding of blood was greatly reduced during the first few days because of the effective help of pro- American anti-Vichy Frenchmen in the area, and not because of the cooperation of military leaders such as Juin, Mast and Bethouard with whom Murphy had been negotiating. Their attempts to line up the military forces with us failed before the Task Forces arrived. Indeed, the only effective help the arriving troops obtained was the result of the activities of about four hundred young pro-Democratic Frenchmen who paved the way in Algiers. More serious fighting took place at Oran and in Morocco where such help was not forthcoming.

In the hours following the arrival of Allied troops at Algiers, negotiations to obtain acceptance of Giraud as leader of all the French forces, capable of commanding obedience, progressed slowly because of confusion about the American attitude toward Darlan who was unexpectedly found to be in Algiers. The French military leaders delayed their decision until it became clear that no definite attitude had been taken toward the Admiral. A rumour that Darlan had been arrested was immediately followed by word

that not only had he been released, but that he was permitted complete freedom of action. This caused the French military leaders to conclude that we were prepared to accept Darlan, and as he was the "legitimate" representative of the Marshall, they immediately took the position that their orders must come from him. In effect, we legitimized Darlan, and won the victory for him before he helped us by giving the "cease firing" order.

at this point, we had freedom of action, subject only to our use of Darlan. We had freed ourselves from our obligations to all the other French military figures. But Murphy and Colonel Homes continued to deal with them.

Instead of taking steps to remove the obstructions to the President's purposes, they permitted Darlan, Nogues and the "Old Guard" to solidify their positions. Although Washington stressed the word "temporary", the Government's political representatives in Algiers and Rabat through acts of commission as well as of omission, strengthened an impression that "temporary" really meant "the duration of the war."

This had serious consequences of two types: it discouraged and disheartened the real friends of America and of Democracy in the area; and it raised the hopes and stimulated the internal intrigues of various reactionary factions, particularly the Royalists. Indeed, a considerable measure of what may have seemed to the outside world to be simple anti-German or anti-Vichy tendencies among the military and political figures who hastened to climb on our

band wagon was really a thin veneer over Royalist and Imperialist ambitions. The emergence of such phrases, typical of specifically Fascist development, as "Chief of State" and "Imperial Council", was merely one manifestation of this. Instead of taking steps to discourage such tendencies, Murphy and Holmes, on the very day when the "Imperial Proclamation" was allowed to appear, prepared for General Eisenhower an ill-considered message to the French people in which the profound political differences were brushed aside as "petty divergences."

During the first few days of our presence in North Africa, a beginning was made in the direction of friendly but firm control by us of the press and radio. Murphy, however, wiped out this start by permitting Darlan and Giraud to reduce our role to that of outsiders merely able to make "suggestions." We had possession of the radio in Algiers. We gave it back to the French with no strings attached. Darlan and Giraud were permitted to appoint Captain Weiss, a notorious pro-Vichy anti-Semite, as principal liaison man with all instrumentalities of information and propaganda. They were also permitted to appoint as Chief of Propaganda Rigault, a Monarchist and one of the founders of the Cagoulards, whose only virtue was that personal ambition led him to choose our side rather than the German side. A very high proportion of the persons in the immediate entourage of Darlan, Giraud and Nogues was

and remains reactionary and most of them make no secret of their Royalist leaning. For example, there is Captain Beauffre, Chief of Cabinet of Giraud, whose wife works in Murphy's office and who therefore is a direct pipeline to everything happening at Allied Headquarters. Beauffre is unquestionably anti-German, but he is by no means a friend of Democracy. Others include Clermont-Tonnere and Baillaancourt, both Royalists, who work with Rigault in dominating the propaganda setup.

In Morocco the situation is far worse. The entire entourage of Nogues is anti-Democratic. Whereas in Algiers we were able, by dint of steady pressure, without any great cooperation from Murphy, to obtain a small measure of control of the press, radio and films through the device of censorship, we were unable to do the same in Morocco until a group of us in mid-December made a trip to Casablanca and Rabat, brought shocking facts back to Algiers and forced superficial reforms by threatening serious consequences.

Thus, after nearly two months of our presence in French North Africa, the political situation is more unhealthy and dangerous than it was at the start. Military considerations did not and do not justify the original error on the part of Murphy in allowing Darlan, Nogues and Giraud to entrench themselves. It was not necessary to "freeze" the situation in the pattern of the first phase.

Regraded Unclassif

Indeed, failure to embark, quite early in the game, on the process of housecleaning has already complicated and will further complicate our specifically military situation. Even with Darlan out of the picture, Giraud and Nogues have entrenched themselves so deeply that they and/or the Royalists could easily exploit a serious Allied reverse in Tunisia for their own purposes. This situation has been brought about through misunderstanding, through illconcealed sympathy with reactionaries, and through equally ill-concealed profound suspicion of truly liberal and democratic individuals and tendencies. The situation could have been avoided. Darlan and the other French military and political chiefs had committed themselves. They knew they were powerless to resist any change we might have "requested." A proof of their recognition of this fact is the willingness of Nogues and Boisson to accept Giraud after they had sworn solemnly that they would never under any circumstances serve under him.

The facts apparently were never put before General Eisenhower, or were done so in a distorted or incomplete fashion. Even more grave is the fact that Eisenhower was apparently misled into believing, after the assassination of Darlan, that Giraud, unlike Darlan, could really be trusted. Murphy not only yielded to blackmail in the form of mock

threats of Arab uprisings, insurrection, and even military resistance (which after the first few weeks was totally out of the question) but took the initiative in helping the reactionaries dig themselves in. He even tried to clamp down on channels through which knowledge of the true state of affairs was brought to us. He informed Dastier de la Vigerie that "certain persons who profess to be friends of the Americans" were bringing information to "irresponsible members of Allied Headquarters who, though wearing uniforms, are not soldiers." He suggested that the consequences might be grave. When a group of some twenty young men put up mild anti-Darlan posters in the streets of Algiers, he permitted the French authorities to bring them before a military court-martial on the accusation of being "leaders in a De Gaullist plot." When protests were made to him by us, he said he would arrange to get them suspended sentences. When a professor of the faculty of law was sentenced to forced residence in the Sahara region for a trivial offense, he laughed it off. When several French deputies wrote a dignified letter of protest to Darlan, he apparently took no steps to bring it to the attention of either Eisenhower or Washington. When prisoners in internment camps of former Spanish Republican soldiers were sent to forced labor in Tunisia, he smilingly explained that, whatever the justice of the procedure might be, it was important that they be

kept working because they were digging coal. When leaders among the young pro-American Frenchmen who had risked their lives on our behalf tried to reach him, his door was closed to them.

During the third and fourth weeks of November the following program was put before Murphy. It was pressed almost daily upon him during the first three weeks of December but was never really acted upon or even submitted to General Eisenhower. As proof of this fact, I can say that General Eisenhower told me, when I was given the opportunity of dining with him just before my departure, that many of the facts I mentioned were entirely new to him.

- to the Eisenhower-Darlan protocol by leaving in office
 Darlan, Giraud, Nogues, etc., but take the greatest precautions to avoid building up any one of them as a permanent
 figure in the political pattern of North Africa. This was
 in keeping with President Roosevelt's policy and also with
 the State Department's policy in regard to France and French
 possessions. Instead of following this policy, Murphy
 acquiesced in building up these figures to a degree beyond
 that made necessary by their vanity and ambitions.
- 2. We suggested the urgent need to remove one by one, in a gradual and undramatic fashion, the most dangerous persons in the entourages of the leaders, thereby isolating and cutting the support away from the leaders. More than a dozen times we gave proof that Chatel was sabotaging us, and

we offered suggestions as to a possible successor. Even Murphy agreed that Chatel was thoroughly dangerous and despicable, but now he has emerged on the level of Nogues and Boisson instead of having been removed as he should have been long ago. We furnished proof in many other cases but nothing was done. We showed that Italians, Germans, and pro-Vichy and pro-Axis men who had gone into hiding in the early days, reemerged boldly later on and resumed their places as officials, proprietors of newspapers, etc. We called in vain for a housecleaning to which Darlan himself would have consented.

up of the municipalities, the civil services, etc. For example, we proved that Escande, head of PTT, Gautre of Radio Algiers, de Carbonnel of the Nogues political household, various police chiefs, and all sorts of other officials, who had been not only pro-Vichy but pro-German up to the very day of our arrival, were now carrying out passive resistance without being molested. We offered documented proof that men of the SOL, the Legion, and police officials were not only spying on all Americans but were systematically threatening and persecuting Frenchmen who had even superficial dealings with Americans. We presented cases in which French civilians who had given simple street directions to American soldiers were taken to police stations, beaten, or

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sent to jail on false charges.

4. We called for dissolution of all political groups, particularly the SOL and the Legion which were and are permeated with anti-Democratic Fascist ideas and methods. In Algiers, the SOL was nominally banned but continued to function under cover. Throughout the countryside in Algiers, Oran and Constantine it continued with impunity its nefarious activities. In Morocco, at a Franco-American military ceremony which Nogues and General Keyes attended, the Legion had the place of honor. This took place in mid-December. In Morocco, during the same period, violently anti-Democratic pamphlets and booklets were still being distributed openly and freely at the offices of the Legion and in the former Vichy propaganda headquarters. I confirmed these facts myself in such places as Mascara, Tlemcen, Sidi-bel-Abbes, Fez and Rabat, and members of my staff did likewise in Constantine, Bone and Casablanca.

Murphy defended his laxness in connection with the Legion by saying that he thought we could salvage and use the "Cadres" of the Legion. This is tantamount to saying that when we get into German territory, we should use the "Cadres" of the SS.

In Morocco, until we forced its temporary suspension late in December, the weekly "La Voix Francaise" outdid Vichy publications in the virulence of its attacks upon us. This sheet, in the worst tradition of the "Action

Regraded Unclassified

Francaise", and an unqualifiedly reactionary Royalist organ, lumped together "the Jewish peril", "the Bolshevik peril" and "the Democratic peril", boasted in long articles that anti-Semitism was originally and profoundly French, and proclaimed openly "the hell with Democracy". Yet this newspaper had the official support of Nogues. When Rigault consented to order its suspension for four weeks, he said quite truthfully that responsibility for its continued existence must be laid partially at the doorstep of the American authorities in that area, who did nothing to act against it or even to report it. Whereas in Algiers we had negative and partial control of Radio Algiers through the device of censorship, in Morocco Colonel Percy Black of the American Headquarters not only permitted Radio Maroc to broadcast such anti-Democratic material as articles from "La Voix Francaise", but prevented members of our group from exercising censorship. He handed over to Nogues, moreover, the right to censor our own American material twenty-four hours before we had a chance to broadcast it to the United States. Throughout North Africa there are popular phrases such as "Vichy Afrique", stories such as "The Americans came, they fought bravely and well for four days, but then they surrendered to the French", or "Only about twenty per cent of the population favors the Americans and to keep them out of harm's way, the Americans have allowed those staunch democrats, Darlan, Giraud and Nogues, to keep them in jail."

5. We sought in vain for the evolution and the putting into effect gradually of a systematic plan for arresting our notorious enemies. This has not yet been done despite repeated assurances to Eisenhower to the contrary. In public places such as restaurants in Algiers and Casablanca, one still hears anti-American talk. Italians, Germans and well-known anti-American and anti-British Frenchmen still occupy official positions or move about freely without even bothering to hide their sentiments. We have often offered to furnish lists. Indeed, we have been forced to by-pass the American authorities and to bring about necessary arrests by making denunciations to pro-American officials of the French police. It was through our activities that Charles Bedaux, of whose treasonable activities we have absolute documentary proof, was arrested, and now it seems likely that he will be freed without trial because of certain obscure pressures to which Murphy has yielded. Word of his arrest was suppressed by the American authorities. The free circulation of our enemies is a matter of vital importance since they are known to have arms and supplies. We have proof, for example, of systematic methods of inducing American soldiers to get intoxicated in order to buy or steal from them their revolvers. We have given to the American authorities copies of secret orders to the Legionnaires and other enemies to keep themselves in readiness because Germany is not yet beaten. We have been shown evidence that Nogues and Michelier

were until recently in radio communication with Laval. We know that no effective steps have been taken to close the espionage route which runs from Oudjda through Spanish Morocco to Melilla. We know that the Count of Paris, Royalist Pretender to the Throne of France, to whom so many of our so-called friends are really loyal, and who is now believed to be in Spanish Morocco, is in direct communication with Rabat and Algiers. We have evidence that enemies of ours have sabotaged the operations of jamming enemy stations and that they have let come through the notorious broadcasts from Stuttgart to the Arabs. We know that no effective steps have been taken to prevent the systematic stirring up of trouble between the Jews and Arabs. We know definitely that there is no truth in the blackmail, used so effectively against our Headquarters, of a possible Arab uprising against us. We have evidence that British and American soldiers have been deliberately plied with liquor in order that their drunken antics could be used to make the local French population think ill of them. Examples of this kind can be multiplied almost endlessly. The situation cannot be changed overnight, but the plan we offered and which was never put into effect would gradually remove centers of infection and make possible the basis of a healthy situation.

6. We have pressed for the evolution and the putting into effect gradually of a systematic plan for freeing those of our friends and sympathizers who are still in prison or

Regraded Unclassified

in forced residence in remote regions despite all that which has been said to the contrary. We have again and again offered proofs - provided that our informants be protected. There is no doubt that the local authorities have given assurances to General Eisenhower that all our friends had been set free. There is no doubt that the General believes this to be true. Yet it is not true. Murphy, who in common with other important persons at headquarters, deals almost exclusively with socalled "Leaders" and "Aristocrats", is politically and temperamentally unable to sympathize with "Trouble-makers" even when the persons involved have made trouble on our American behalf. We have argued in vain that we are destroying our following in occupied Europe because word of the true state of affairs has trickled out. We have taken the position and continue to take the position that we are jeopardizing our future military operations in Europe unless we make absolutely sure - and give the conclusive proof to the world - that every man and woman who takes risks on our behalf will at least be protected if not befriended by us. All of our friends of the period from November 7th to November 9th who are still in custody, who have been surreptitiously taken back into custody, who have been otherwise penalized or threatened, must be taken care of at once. We must allow our pro-American anti-Vichy friends to tell their story to someone in whom they can really have confidence. We must give them proof and give the world proof, not idle promises, that we take care of our friends. We must track down every

individual case. Murphy knows that even some of our reactionary supporters - those who dared to come out into the open at the start - were in grave danger because their enemies the men who became our friends after the start - threatened them. Mast was practically in hiding for many weeks and did not dare to wear his uniform. Bethouard had to be sent out of the country for his own safety. After we take care of those who helped us, our systematic plan should also free (a) Frenchmen from France who are imprisoned or interned under the old regime, (b) the Jews and other "political prisoners", (c) the Spanish Army Republicans. We must reverse Murphy's consent to have the Spanish Republicans sent to work as slave laborers. Four hundred young Frenchmen, by a brilliantly conceived and executed coup d'etat the night before our arrival, paved the way for us. These young men are not of the stamp of the persons with whom Murphy now deals. Some are Jews. Some are Democrats. Some are merely brave persons who hate tyranny, including the present French tyranny. Murphy no longer is "at home" to them. Murphy has not taken the trouble to track down rumors that some of them are still in jail or have been sent back to jail.

Giraud is now sending some of our friends to jail. This does not come as a surprise to anyone who knows Giraud or who knows the North African situation. Giraud, behind the pretense of rejecting any political ambition, is

a megalomaniac. I have heard him in ordinary conversation refer to himself in the third person as "the Great General Giraud," and he was not joking. He is surrounded by a group of youngish men who are almost all Monarchists and who see in him the Imperialist leader of a French Monarchy. Giraud himself plainly believes he can do what General Boulanger failed to do. It will be recalled that in the early stage of the negotiations between Giraud and General Eisenhower at Gibraltar, Giraud held out for the post of Generalissimo. with General Eisenhower, Admiral Cunningham, and General Anderson under his orders. He accepted a lesser role only when he realized that he could work better behind the facade of Darlan. His immediate entourage is divided into two factions constantly at war with each other. One of them is headed by a former leading Cagoulard, who was the other day received by the President of the United States as a representative of the Frenchmen in North Africa. The other is headed by Rigault, also a Cagoulard and a Royalist. Various types of pressure were brought to bear upon Giraud early in December by his own followers to stage a coup d'etat against Darlan. These facts were told to me in a secret meeting at lunch in the house of Paul Brett by Captain Clermont-Tonnere of Giraud's staff. They were reported to Murphy, who said he already knew them. There is strong evidence that Darlan was assassinated by a representative of one of these factions which had decided that if Giraud

would not act as quickly as it wanted him to act, he would be forced forward by a typically Fascist method. It is to be noted that the men arrested included police officials. These men were among our principal sources of information. They are paying for their effort to tell the facts to us. The device of announcing that Giraud himself and Murphy were also to be victims of assassination is the normal Fascist-Nazi procedure, of which the classic example is the Reichstag fire. Military necessity, which did in a measure justify our deal with Darlan, does not justify a deal by which Giraud becomes unquestioned leader in French North Africa. This deal is a profound mistake because it puts us in the grip of a man almost maniacal in his notion of his personal mission. Whereas Darlan was so thoroughly besmirched by his past and so thoroughly committed to us that he could stand against us only because Murphy helped him do so, Giraud is free to make ever-increasing demands on us. I will stake not only my reputation but my life on the accuracy of this appraisal. I suggest that steps be taken to call upon various persons whose names I can give to obtain chapter and verse to support what I have said. These persons are now in Algiers. They are Americans.

7. The last point in the program I suggested was affirmative and constructive. While we were gradually removing the dangerous individuals and clamping down upon the dangerous organizations, we should have begun to carry out a

large scale, broad based propaganda of disintoxication and re-education of the French population of North Africa in order to start training truly Democratic leaders for the future and mass Democratic support for these leaders. This meant working through the newspapers, news agency, films, schools, book shops, radio, exhibitions, leaflets, and other agencies of information and re-education. To carry it out effectively it would have been best for us to have direct control, or at least to have the right to equal participation with the local French authorities. Failing this, however, because of the Eisenhower-Darlan protocol, we could have made a start if we had had the real comprehension and support of Murphy. Nevertheless we have, at least in Algiers and Oran, accomplished a great deal, thanks to the skill and courage of a handful of Americans and Britishers. Our work, however, was necessarily more negative than positive. We saved friendly newspapers from going out of business and put a brake on unfriendly newspapers. We organized a counter-espionage and counter-propaganda service which identified our enemies and pormitted us to protect ourselves against them. We censored the radio and gradually forced Radio Algiers to change its tune. In Oran we broadcast local programs. In Morocco we were helpless because of the attitude of Colonel Black until the intercession of a special representative of President Roosevelt enabled us to impose

upon Radio Maroc a system similar to the one we had been able, by ourselves, to impose upon Radio Algiers. In Algiers and Oran we were able to begin distributing placards and posters. Through the news agency France-Afrique and especially because of the cooperative attitude of Brett and Joxe, we were able to begin filling the newspapers with American and British material. We did this entirely by our own efforts and without any help from Murphy. One of our first steps of re-education was to arrange for the publication of speeches and public utterances during the last two years by President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull, Under-Secretary Welles, etc., which had never been published in French North Africa. We obtained from America and forced into the newspapers explanatory retrospective surveys of the true meaning of the present war. By dint of constant effort we forced a housecleaning of the pro-Vichy film combine. Not only did we lift the ban on American films, but we successfully fought off sabotage of its application. We brought hope and courage to large numbers of friendly Frenchmen who otherwise would have given up in despair.

There is still an enormous amount to be done in this broad field since one cannot undo in a few weeks the baleful work of years, but our task cannot be accomplished unless certain political prerequisites are fulfilled. Indeed, if this is not done, the story - the truthful story - of a tragic mistake and a lost opportunity, is bound to trickle

out, and its effects not only in occupied Europe but also in America and Britain will be catastrophic.

Supfue

ISH
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London

Dated January 1, 1943
Rec'd 11:05 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

1 January 1, 1 p.m.

MOST SECRET

Press discussion following the arrests by General Giraud in North Africa has served to emphasize with greater clarity the basic British policy with regard to France namely that British prestige requires that General de Gaulle be given and maintained in a position of political primacy both during the war and in any Early transitory period following the liberation of continental France. The British Government accepts the President's and the Department often enunciated policy that the people of France alone must choose their form of government. But this is accepted with the reservations that some French authority, in effect if not in name a provisional government must reign in France from the time the Allies first arrive until conditions permit the establishment of that permanent Government and during

#1 January 1, 1943 1 p.m. from London and during this period it must be de Gaulle who exercises authority. I have been told by several sources, including a high British secret intelligence official in direct contact with France itself and an escaped French Officer who left the country only a fortnight ago, that the name of Giraud and our operations in Africa are firing the imagination of the people of France. But we must realize that the British Foreign Office will persist in its buildup of General de Gaulle and in its full support of his demands that all who bear the stemp of Vichy must be eliminated from the "unified" France for which they so loudly call. If de Gaulle is a "symbol" to the people of France, he is elso a "symbol" to the British Government, a symbol of justification for its whole French policy since June 1940. British prestige requires that "the one Frenchman who stuck by us in the dark days of 1940" must be installed in France when the day of liberation comes, however fleeting his tenure may be and whatever the consequences for the people of France.

It was this policy which lay behind the .

Madagascar

.3- #1 January 1, 1pimi from London

Madagascar agreement. It was this policy which motivated the determination that Djibouti must join the Fighting French. It was this policy which caused the Foreign Office to oppose the combined effort of General Eisenhower, Admiral Cunningham and Darlan to bring over Godefroy's Alexandria fleet to the North African authorities. It was this policy that made the foreign office so insistent that Macmillan or some other political officer of Cabinet rank be sent to Algiers without delay. And it is this policy which is behind the present compaign to emphasize Giraud as the military man and de Gaulle as the political leader. The diplomatic correspondent of the LONDON TIMES MacDonala, who is closer to the Foreign Office than any other London journalist has the following to say this morning:

(PIAIN) "If anyone thought for a mement that
Darlan's murder would simplify affairs in North
Africa he must have been given a sharp jolt towards
reality yesterday. General Giraud as briefly reported
in the latur editions of the TIMES yesterday announced
on Wednesday that, convinced that other would-be
assassins were preparing their weapons, he had acted
first. He had arrested 12 Frenchmen. Four of them
were police

-4- #1 January 1, 1943 1 p.m. from London were police officials, two or three others were men who had helpad the Allies before the landing, and some of the others were considered to be pro-Vichy to the British and apparently to the American peoples. The whole affair appears on first hearing to be wildly confusing. How is it that pro-Allied Frenchmen can be arrested? An American broadcaster from Algiers attempted an answer in remarkably frank terms. According to Reuter, Charles Collingwood of the Columbia Broadcasting System declared yesterday: There is an impression here that the fault of the present government in North Africa is that it is made up of pro-Vichy and anti-4: Gaulle men. General Giraud said yesterday that he did not see many pro-Vichy men in power. Be that as it may, the impression still remains here; and acts like the arrest of a number of pro-Allied persons do not help to remove that impression. I have talked to a great many people about these arrests but I have heard no one blame Giraud. He is still held by all parties here to be an incorruptible soldier, a man who has dedicated himself to the task of defeating Germany. What worries people here is not Giraud but the men who are General Giraud's Government. That appears to be a fair summary of opinion in some sections in Algiers.

-5- #1 January 1 1943 1 p.m. from London

Algiers. Among other sections the habit of Vichy still persists and probably these sections are trying to increase their power now that the High Commissioner does not touch politics. The whole affair, still puzzling in some details increases the need for establishing agreement between all forces of France now ranged against the common enemy. Only after such agreement can a worthy and representative civilian authority be set up." (END PIAIN).

The quotation from Collingwood's broadcast appears in every London paper this morning and was given prominence by the British Broadcasting Company Vernon Bartlett in this morning's NEWS CHRONICLE comments on Collingwood's broadcast and says:

Gaulle hold each other in high esteem. They would gladly cooperate but they have three obstacles to overcome: one is this bitter hostility in North Africa to the revival or development of democracy in France. The second is the question who should take military and political precedence. The third which depends less upon them than upon us and the Americans, is that in some quarters de Gaulle is looked upon as the British candidate for power and

-6- #1 January 1, 1943 1 p.m. from London

Giraud as the candidate of the United States."

(END PLAIN)

I have given the Department this somewhat lengthy review of British policy not in any spirit of criticism but because I think it essential that it should have an accurate picture for its guidance. If we are prepared to go along with the British view that something resembling a de Caulle Government should be set up in Algiers, there will be no divergence between us and it probably can be brought about. If we are prepared to continue what seems to me to have been our past poricy, of opposing the establishment of any French political authority whichy may even "temporarily" inpose its political will upon the French people, there will be sharp differences which we must face. There will be efforts here to depict General Giraud as a high minded but politically innocent tool of "pro-Vichy and Fascist minded job-holders," de Gaulle (who not so long ago was himself in many circles charged with having "dictatorship" or extreme right tendencies) will be displayed as the upholder of democracy, the hope of the front populaire elements, and the legitimate continuation of the third republic. Parenthetica

-7- #1 January 1, 1943 1 p.m. from London the picture is causing considerable anxiety to such objective and dispassionate Frenchmen as Roger Cambon: They think the ground is being laid for civil war in France. Be that as it may one thing seems clear; if we do not intend to go along with the French policy of our British friends we must take prompt firm and articulate steps so to indicate Otherwise the dangers of a split between us, with all that it means for the future of the war and the peace, are obvious and serious. I respectfully request that no summary of this telegram be inserted in the special telegram. MATTHEWS RDS

Jupple.

WMB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London

Dated December 29, 1942 Rec'd 11:45 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH

7408, December 29, 10 p.m.

MOST SECRET

In private conversation with an American officer friend of long standing, Major Desmond Morton of the Prime Minister's office spoke with some bitterness yesterday of what he termed "the State Department's obstructionist tactics" in opposing the British Government's desire to send a high ranking political adviser to French North Africa "to relieve General Eisenhower of some of the burden of diplomatic and political negotiations". The officer in question (who knows none of the background) said that according to Morton the British desire to send someone of Cabinet rank "whose authority would be comparable to that of Casey in the Hiddle East". (Please see my telegrams nos. 7323, December 24, 2 p.m.; and 7325, December 24, 6 p.m.) Morton added that this political adviser would

200

-2- #7408, December 29, 10 p.m. from London
adviser would not have a status similar to that of
Murphy "because Murphy is a member of General Eisenhower's staff".

There is no doubt in my mind that our friends here, particularly the Foreign Office, are really unhappy at what they consider the secondary role they have had to play in the North African negotiations. The suggestion of the dangers of crossing wires with General Eisenhower in the extremely delicate and difficult task confronting him should some independent high Allied authority appear on the spot strikes no responsive chord in these quarters. I even hear of occasional casual allusions to "the inexperience of the State Department and of American Generals" in handling French affairs and of our lack of "real understanding of the French state of mind".

The Department may wish to read the foregoing in connection with my telegram No. 7407, December 29, 6 p.m.; and with the following sentences appearing in the Foreign Office political intelligence summary for the week ending December 16: "The most recent authoritative reports from Algiers do not paint a very rosy picture either of French or of Arab morals. It is probable

-3- #7408, December 20, 10 p.m. from London

It is probable that three quarters of the population are sympathetic to the Allies, with an inclination, at any rate in some quarters, (begin underlining) to show friendliness chiefly towards the British (end underline), but it cannot be said that morale is high, or that there is so much enthusiasm for the Allied cause as to create a real widespread desire for active cooperation."

MATTHEWS

KLP

WMB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London

Dated December 29, 1942 Rec'd 10:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

RUSH

740, December 29, 6 p.m. (SECTIONS 1, 2 and 3) SECRET

De Gaulle's broadcast, which has received a great play in all the London papers this morning, was given Mr. Eden's full approval before being put on the air and I understand that it was upon Eden's insistance that the tribute to General Giraud's military qualities was inserted. In fact this aspect is emphasized in to-day's headlines and it is clearly the British hope to bring the two French leaders together. They hope for an early personal meeting between De Gaulle and Giraud or if that seems premature perhaps may suggest that Catroux see Giraud first.

There is no question but that the Fighting French also desire to come to agreement with Giraud. There is likewise no question but that they conceive of such agreement only in terms of De Gualle as supreme leader and on the basis of a single authority vested in the

-2- #7404, December 29, 6 p.m. (SECTIONS 1, 2 and 3) from London

national committee, the latter enlarged or modified to include some of the present North African leaders. In conversation, the Fighting French openly tell us that the National Committee must be transferred from London to Algiers and assume the direction of all French territories not under Axis domination. Giraud they say would be commander in chief of United French military forces but he would derive this authority from General de Gaulle and the National Committee, and presumably be subject to their orders. It is this which De Gaulle had in mind when he said in the penultimate paragraph of his broadcast:

MATTHEWS

JIH

RCC

PLAIN
London
Dated December 29,1946
Reo'd 10:45 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

RUSH

7407, Twenty-ninth, (SECTION FOUR).

"An enlarged temporary power grouping all French forces inside and outside the country and in all French territories which are able to fight for liberation is necessary to national independence and unity until such time as the nation herself may be able to express her sovereign wishes."

MATTHEWS

LMS

JG
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London
Dated December 29, 1942
Rec'd 10:40 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington. RUSH

7407, December 29, 6 p.m., (SECTION FIVE)

The Fighting French are also prepared to insist on the elimation of Nogues, Chatel and Boisson, apparently with full British support. The diplomatic correspondent of the MANCHESTER GUARDIAN accurately portrays the Fighting French and British Foreign Office view, in my opinion, when he writes:

MATTHEWS

CSB

WLIB

PLAIN
London
Dated December 29, 1942
Rec'd 11:00 p.m.

Secretary of State, Washington.

RUSH

7407, 29th (SECTION SIX)

"General de Gaulle's statement, which included a renewed denunciation of the Vichy regime, confirms that so far as he and his colleagues are concerned the difficulties are political rather than military. Fighting French quarters, moreover, are quite explicit in their views that collaboration must be conditional upon the complete eradication of Vichy influence in French North Africa or, expressed in positive terms, upon the establishment there of a regime wholly in accord with the principles of Fighting France and the United Nations. Once that question of principle were satisfactorily answered the Fighting French movement would be ready to accept and collaborate with a governing body taking the place of the present Imperial Council. In any case, that body cannot stand comparison with the organization

=2= #7407, December 29, (SECTION SIX) from London organization developed by the Fighting French movement, which exercises control over vast territories and has

which exercises control over vast territories and has been developing its potentialities for a considerable time. In Brazzaville, French Equatorial Africa, for example, are adherents to the cause of Fighting France from all over the world who have made their way there to join the common struggle and many of whom have undergone, or are undergoing, specialized training in technical or administrative duties. Thus Fighting France's own contribution to a unified movement would be of inestimable value, embracing territory and people long freed from the taint of Vichy, not to speak of natural resources and strategical advantages."

MATTHEWS

KLP

WMB
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London
Dated December 29, 1942
Rec'd 11:05 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington:

RUSH

7407, December 29, 6 p.m. (SECTION SEVEN) I have made discreet inquiry in a number of quarters and it now seems clear that the change in General de Gaulle's attitude from ready acceptance of the postponement of his visit to Washington to one of resentment (my telegrams, Nos. 7373, December 27, 3 p.m. and 7376, December 28, 4 p.m.) was due, as frenquently happens, to the influence of his entourage, particularly the hero worshipping Plevin and the careerist Palewski. They persuaded the General that the man in whose keeping the people of France had placed their hope of liberation and their destiny was being side tracked again through the machinations of the Department of State and its notorious clique of appeasers! In the difficult period of negotiations that lies ahead I believe we must expect that various members of the National Committee and their subordinates who have painted for themselves such a rosy picture of

their future

-2- #7407, December 29, 6 p.m. (SECTION SEVEN)
from London

will not willingly step aside in the interest of unity.

Many of them are sincere but they have grown to identary the future of France with the holding of their own jobs. Unity with North Africa they unquestionably want, but unity under them and on their terms. To move them from this view will take both time and patience and I am not sure how far our Foreign Office friends may not support them. I note a strong tendency in certain British quarters, while saying that it is up to the French to make their own agreement, to stress General Giraud's military qualities and his lack of interest in "the political side" and to imply that the latter is the logical field for General de Gaulle and his supporters.

(END MESSAGE)

KLP

MATTHEWS

Sent for Line December 15th

PAMPHLETS AND REPORTS ON POST-WAR PLANNING.

L POLITICAL PARTIES.

bour Party:

1. The Old World and The New Society.

2 Pauf ble in Transport Coal India Atolow.

Liberal Party:

3. The Liberal Assembly 1942. 4a. Health for the People. 4b. Education for All.

Liberal National Partys

5. A Basis for Britain's Post-War Policy

Conservative Party:

6. Through Victory to Security. *7. "Looking Ahead" - Educational Aims. *8. "Looking Ahead" - A PLAN FOR YOUTH

II. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES.

Committees: timal Reports

9. Scott. 10. Uthwatt. 11. Beveridge

Select Communittees:

12. No.56 Civil Service.

III. BUSINESS AND TRADE UNION GROUPS.

Pederation of Brit: Ind-

- Johnson

Pederation of Brit: Ind- 13. Reconstruction - Report by the ustries. Federation of British Industries.
Assn. Brit. Chambers Commerce 4. Post-War Industrial Reconstruction.

120 Signatories Group. 15. A National Policy for Industry.

Prades Union Congress. 16. T.U.C. Memorandum on Education after the War.

Actional Union of Teachers.17. National Union of Teachers Educational Reconstruction.

IV. PRIVATE GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS.

West Midland Group.

18. West Midland Group on Post-War Reconstruction and Planning. - Constitution, Organisation and Research Programme. 19. Draft Report on Social and Economic

League of Nations Union.

League of Nations Union.

Reconstruction in the Post-War Settlement. 20. Draft Report on Colonial Settlement.

21. Peaceful Change - Draft Report on Pacific Remedies for International Grievances.

Jones, Harry J.

9922. Industrial Background of Housing

These have attracted particular attention, Other volumes in this series given at back.

thrift and investment, beyond the minimum security to be compulsorily insured for. In short the Beveridge Plan looks to a future with a considery security floor but no ceiling to individual initiative in facing responsibilities.

Regraded Unclassified

"BEVERIDGE" EDITION OF TABLE OF BRITISH SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS. DECEMBER, 1942

The new edition of the table of British Social Security

Benefits substitutes the actual Beveridge plan in the third

and sixth columns for the plans proposed to the Beveridge Committee

as given in the first Edition - October 1942.

It will be noticed that all the six "centres of interest" spoken of in my October 1942 report to the National Resources Planning Board have been dealt with by Sir William Beveridge, except one. The Beveridge plan includes: (1) a very great increase in the cash benefit (2) the introduction of family allowances (3) greater provision for pregnancy and maternity (5) standardization of services (in fact a complete health and rehabilitation service is assumed) (6) a universal state funeral benefit. Since the Beveridge plan does not deal specifically with war problems, the fourth "centre of interest" that of easing the burden of mothers in war industry is not dealt with.

BRITISH	SOCIAL	SECURITY:	MAIN	BENEFITS	AND	SERVICES,	EXISTIV	LH
		P	ROPOST	en.			THE RESERVE OF THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TWO IS NOT THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TO THE PERSON NA	

Edition December 1942

			PROPOSED.			THE RESIDENCE OF THE PARTY OF T
AJE EXERCIENCY TO BE MET.	PRE WAR (1937)	CASH HENEFIT PER WEEK WAR TIME Up to August 15 1942	heveridge Plan (1942)	PRE WAR (1937)	OOODS AR SERVICES IN KIN WAR TIME Up to August 15, 1942	BEVERIDGE PLAN (1942) 7
Conception - Birth and Infanoy -	Maternity £2 to £4 lump sum		Maternity Benefit) 56s. weekly for 15)weeks.)Lump sum of £4	Ante-Natal Clinics	free milk	Not desirable to replace cash allowances for children wholly or even largely by provision in kind. But in case reasons for extension of provision in
Childhood (0-14 yrs) General		•	8s Average per child up to 16 if at school, except first child.	Visitors School treatment of minor allments. Free meals. Free or cheap milk in Schools.		kind, 3s. indicated as allow- ances in cash or kind (\$421) It is assumed that there will be comprehensive health service for prevention and cure of disease available to all.
Accident to Father Unemployment of Father Death of Father	3s added per child 5s (1st child) 3s (subsequent)	3a or 4e per child	8s average per child for all children.			members of the community (\$301 Surgical appliances, convaless homes and nursing are essential to a comprehensive
Death of parents (Orphanage) Employment of Mother	7e,6d			1	Nurseries, play centres (in Schools) Communal Feeding	health service (4436). The insurance table to free dente service should become as juniversal as that to the free
Full Working Life Marriage			£10 maximum			medical service (8435)
14-65 Death of Husband (Widows)	10s		35s 1st 13 weeks. Nothing except Guardian Benefit (24s) if children; subject to partial reducation if earning.			
Ill-Health. Sickness 1st 26 weeks Disability after 26 wks. Industrial Accident Disablement	M.16s. W.12s** M.7s.6d. W.6s**	Se added	Uniform disability and Unemployment Banefit 24s for Single Adult 40s for Gougle, 16s for Adult dependent Industrial Pension	Varies according to approved Society joined		Rehabilitation till the max- imum of earning capacity is restored should be available for all disabled persons who can profit by it irrespective of the cause of their dis-
Death by Accident	Max 30s. £200 - £300 to dependents		if disability due to industry lasts over 13 weeks 2, 3 of earn- ings. Max: £3, Min: Ordinary			ability (8 438)
Unemployment	M.17/ W.15/- Adult depend- ents 9s 0	3s added. Extension to non manual workers earning £250 - £420 p.a.	disability bonefit, Restriction of lump- sum redemption Death Grant.	Training Centres		After he has drawn unconditions unemployment benefit for six months, the insured person as a condition of remaining on
Senescence (PartOTime Employment) 60 (or 65) - 70 years	Contributory Pensions 10s.Wife 10s	Women pensionable at 60	is. perperson addition to rotir ement pension for every year retire- ment postponed.			benefit will be required to attend a work or training centre (§ 326)
Senility Over 70 yrs. (Loss of Employment)	Non-Contribu- tory Pensions 10s	Supplementary Pensions. Total made up to 19/6d or 32/- per couple **	Retirement Pension # 40/- Couple 24/- Single. Adult*			
Death (Funeral Expenses)	None (except fl5 after Fatal Indus- trial Accident)		£20. (sdult)			
as the state of th			7.77			

^{**} Married Momen sickness los. disability 5s.

*** This is subject to a means test by Assistance Board.

6 When allowed ratio of contribution to benefits is exhausted, unemployed come under Assistance Board and are subject to means test.

After transition period.
Or man with wife earning.

^{*} References in brackets are to the Heveridge reportegraded Unclassified

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ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS

13 December 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Marshall.

Herewith are two copies of a report prepared by direction of Admiral Darlan of his program of liberation. General Eisenhower believes that this program represents a sincere effort on the part of Darlan and his associates to go as far as local conditions will permit in reestablishing a liberal administration. You may wish to forward one copy to the Secretary of State, as it will be of interest in connection with the President's Memorandum of Inquiry with regard to steps which have been taken by the local authorities toward a liberalized regime.

Smith.

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Immediately following the establishment of the High Commissariat and the organization of its services, the High Commissioner undertook to adopt and to examine a certain number of decisions, of a general and specific nature, all of them imbued with a liberal spirit or the desire to make up for certain injustices and to eliminate a certain number of arbitrary decisions which had on the whole been inspired by Germany.

The problem as a whole can be considered under several headings: Social, Political and Racial.

THE SOCIAL QUESTION:

The social problem does not present itself in French Africa in the same manner as it does in France or in the United States. As a result, the task of the High Commissioner is considerably lighter.

In North Africa, there are only average size towns and there is no industrial laboring class. Moreover, the Europeans in North Africa generally belong to the leading class or they supply officials, directors, business men and skilled laborers. The small requirements for local industrial labor are nearly always met with native workers. These laborers have really presented only one serious problem; the problem of wages.

At the present time, and although the wage question is now being seriously studied by the Administration, the problem has assumed a diffirent aspect. Generally speaking, the lack of goods on the market made it difficult for the native to find ways of spending his money. It is, therefore, the problem of market supplies and not the question of wages which determine the state of the labor market.

If cotton goods and certain food supplies can be brought to the African market, the social question as a result will be immediately solved. It is only then, and by way of result, that the problem of prices and wages will arise and this problem will be considered with a more liberal outlook and with only one concern; the best possible prosecution of the war effort.

THE POLITICAL QUESTION:

By contrast the political question immediately presented itself under two principal aspects: Freedom of expression and individual freedom.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION:

In the field of the press and editorial writing, the French Government had set up, immediately following the Armistice, a system of extremely rigid censorship. This censorship was specifically determined by the themes and the requirements of the propaganda of the Axis countries.

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SEGRET

Since the High Commissariat was set up, these instructions were immediately done away with, and the press found it again possible to publish communiques and information from the Allied Countries and to express the actual feelings of the French people with regard to the war.

This complete change was accomplished simultaneously with a general system much more liberal in character. Whereas earlier French censorship had reached the point of requiring publishers to print under their signatures articles which were entirely supplied by the Administration, the High Commissariat asked the press, as it was again given its freedom of expression, to furnish a considerable personal effort.

The only instructions thereafter imposed upon freedom of expression are those which are determined by the necessity of war, both from the military point of view and the moral point of view, as well as for the security of the Allied Armies now carrying out operations.

Such is the practical situation which in fact prevails in other countries and which will have to be maintained until the end of hostilities.

The same system will be applied to mediac that trade deliveries will enable that trade to resume its activities.

INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM:

At the time of the intervention of the Allies in North Africa, a large number of individuals who had been formerly arrested for political reasons, were either jailed and held in concentration camps or kept in labor battalions. All these individuals had generally been condemned for the following reasons:

Propaganda, manifestations or actions in favor of the Allies; hostility toward the Axis views; attempts to rejoin the armies of the Allies or the formations of General de Gaulle; political propaganda against the French Government or in favor of General de Gaulle.

As soon as the High Commissariat was set up orders were given for the following purposes:

- (a) To stop immediately all prosecutions before the courts for the breaches mentioned above.
- (b) To have all those condemmed or detained for identical reasons immediately released. These various measures were applied gradually in such a manner that now all those politically condemned or detained are at liberty.

Since November 8, the only political arrests carried out were populational only for actions harmful to the war effort of the High Commissariat in French Africa or its Allies.

Such provisions will moreover be maintained in the future.

Finally the High Commissariat went further. It even considered the liberation of certain individuals who had been arrested prior to the signing of the Armistice, that is to say at the time when France and England were jointly pursuing the war against Germany. This case specifically involves twenty-seven Communist. Deputies who had been transferred to North Africa upon orders of the French Government, at a time when the French Communist Party was alledged to hinder by its acts or propaganda the common war effort.

No condition of a political nature was imposed for the liberation of these prisoners; they are merely requested to pledge themselves not to compromise, directly or indirectly, through their deeds, words or writings, and until the end of hostilities, the war effort being carried out in French Africa by the High Commissariat and by the Allies.

This pledge will remain valid until the end of hostilities.

THE RACIAL QUESTION:

The High Commissariat was likewise under the necessity of bringing some solutions to the racial question. This problem is peculiarly serious in itself; It is even more so because of its political repercussions. In French Africa it assumes an entirely different aspect than in France.

On the one hand, the Jewish problem in North Africa presents itself under extremely varied aspects: The problem of French Jews and of native Jews; the latter, that is the problem of the native Jews, has three sides! The problem of the Moroccan Jews, and of the Tunisian Jews, which are under a special status.

The Jewish problem also assumes the nature of a minority problem which is extremely delicate: There are some 350,000 Jews living in French Africa face to face with 25 million Arabe, who entertain toward them a spirit of more or less sharp hostility, which is of long standing.

These Mohammedans are the group from which the French Army in Africa is chiefly recruited and from which tomorrow will be drafted important effective contingents which will take part in the struggle at the side of the Allies.

In spite of the difficult circumstances just indicated, the Jews of Africa have never been subjected to the treatment inflicted upon their fellow Jews in France and most specifically irecently in the occupied zones (the wearing of the special insignia, white it curtailment of their right to travel, transfer of population, etc.)

Nevertheless, a certain number of special measures had been imposed on them in conformity with the legislation adopted in France since the Armistice: Political, military, cultural, property measures. In a certain number of cases, these measures had been made more stringent in their application by the Administration.

The first step taken by the High Commissariat consisted in giving

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instructions to the Administration in order that the existing laws should be interpreted in the most liberal spirit and not with stringency as here-tofore. Moreover, in a great number of cases, and particularly in everything involving individual prosecutions, it was simply recommended that the application of the laws and decrees be suspended.

Simultaneously, the High Commissariat undertook an examination looking to the revision of these laws. Following are the principal points and conclusions which were decided upon by the services entrusted with this studys

MILITARY PROBLEM:

The legislation enforced had placed the Jews under a special status: All Jewish Officers and Non-commissioned Officers had been expelled from the Army and the men were not called in the Regular Army.

For the future, the provisions adopted are as follows:

(1) French Jews: French Jews will be recalled to duty under the same con-

Officers will be assigned on the basis of their branch or services. The Jews will also be allowed to sign voluntary enlistments.

(2) African Jews: The African Jews of Algiers, whether subject to call or not, will be allowed to sign volunteer enlistments with fighting units.

Volunteer officers, whether in the Regular Army or Reserve, who formerly belonged to fighting units, will again be assigned to fighting units not comprising any Arabs. The same process will apply to Non-commissioned Officers.

Those called who are non-volunteers will be assigned to pioneer units.

All Jews, even foreign Jews, and those without nationality will be accepted as volunteers, either in the Foreign Legion or in the Free Corps.

CULTURAL QUESTIONS:

The High Commissariat found itself face to face with the following situation:

In most cases the Jews who had been dismissed from the schools had been replaced by Gentiles or Mohammedans. It was, therefore, impossible without stirring up serious disorders, to consider dismissing from the schools the Christians and the Mohammadans in order to provide for the reinstatement and to make room for the Jews.

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However, the Jews had been allowed to organize a separate educational system.

While waiting for circumstances which will permit the reopening of institutions now mostly occupied or evacuated, the High Commissariat will assist, as completely as possible, the separate Jewish educational system in order to permit a practical and immediate solution of the problem.

Everything necessary will be done in the meantime to include in the State educational system the most desirable Jewish elements.

The decree of 19 October, 1942, applying to Algeria, limits Jewish students to elementary and technical official examinations. A new text will authorize such students to take the examinations for secondary schools.

Jewish students thus admitted in higher education and who will have passed their examination satisfactorily shall no longer be subject to dismissal in the future through the application of the quota regulations.

Finally, the reinstatement of Jewish Professors and Teachers will be carried out within the limits of the number of jobs available.

PROPERTY REGULATIONS:

Gradually and in groups, Jewish owners and holders will have their property restored to them.

Administrators who have been called to the Army will not be replaced; in the future, the provisions against property will no longer be applied.

Finally, the restrictive interpretation of the law of 2 June, 1942 (Article V) setting up the list of forbidden professions, will be ended. For a certain number of professions, which are the most numerous, a great number of individual exceptions will be made in order to return to the situation prevailing formerly.

In reference to the liberal professions, the Resident General and the Governor General will be authorized to permit individual exceptions, which will be valid for the duration of the war for any text involving the prohibition of assignment or exercise of certain professions or functions, except those functions involving the granting of public authority and under reservation of regulations to insure technical competence.

In summary, the High Commissariat, in the different professions mentioned above, followed the two following principles:

IN THE FIRST PLACE:

(a) Putting an end to any individual decisions, arbitrary and unwarranted; returning to the Jews the possession of their property and SERRET

suspending all dispossessions contemplated; allowing the Jews to return to most professions, and in any event, to settle under the system of individual exception any case which could be considered as flagrant injustice; allowing Jewish children to have suitable educational advantages; finally, allowing all of them to fight with their comrades against the common enemy by returning the description officers to their ranks.

All of these measures had one single purpose; to make up for abuses, put an end to arbitrary decisions and tolerate no persecution.

IN THE SECOND PLACE

(b) Avoiding, however, stirring up a sharp conflict among the Arabs and the European population by abolishing the basic regulations which sought to reduce the considerable share of influence which the Jews had attained in French political life.

To attempt to act otherwise at the present time would be to go counter [] to the solution sought.

It should be noted moreover, that if the retention of these laws should provoke among the Jews a cartain number of protests, practically speaking, their present status will/be seriously affected thereby. The whole political question is summed up in the laws of the right of citizenship. Essentially, this right of citizenship consists in the right to vote; and this right to vote will not be exercised by Frenchmen until the end of hostilities.

The High Commissariat felt, therefore, that it had no right to create, in time of war, throughout North Africa a conflict whose consequences would be incalculable in order to insure for the Jews a theoretical right, which at the present time and in fact is abandoned by all Frenchmen of their own full volition. Moreover, the High Commissariat cannot forget the basic problem of its mission, which is to contribute to victory and to put France in a position to decide freely her own fate.

The High Commissariat cannot assume the responsibility of hindering the war effort by causing internal disorders and substituting itself for the free will of Frenchmen by modifying a law essentially political in nature and which the French nation alone is empowered to modify.

The Commissariat is the less able to do so because of present circumstances it could not bace its decision on the opinion of the majority of Frenchmen in North Africa. In so doing, the Commissariat would proceed to carry out a purely arbitrary decision, similiar to so many others which were urged upon the French Government by Germany.

If the Commissariat were to undertake such action, it would confirm the argument which is spread daily by the Axis radio to the effect that Americans have broken their pledge not to take measures contrary to French sovereignty.

It is important that the Commissariat should appear as a free Government which has joined freely in the effort of the Allies for the common cause.

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COMMENTS ON THE USE OF THE ACCOMPANYING NOTE

We do not know whether American Authorities intend to use publicly the information contained in the appended note, and under what form such use would take place. In case the Authorities do intend to use this note, we call their attention upon the following comments.

Liberal measures adopted in favor of the press or of the publishing trade in general, has been and will be, favorably accepted by public opinion; the same will be true, although with some reservations, concerning the measures adopted in favor of political internees. On the other hand, the publication of the different steps already taken, or being considered in favor of the Jews, particularly if taken as a whole, will inevitably give right to numerous reactions whose consequences can be serious.

The High Commissariat found itself in the following situation: For two years the official propaganda had daily repeated that the return of the Allies would mean the victory of the Jews. Since November 8, every day and even several times a day. Continental France and the Axis countries keep insisting that, scornful of French sovereignty, the American Authorities in North Africa, or more precisely President Roosevelt himself, are determined to impose upon the French Authorities a Pro-Jewish and Anti-Mohammedan Legislation. This propaganda, in a country where in contrast with France the problem of races has always prevailed, where Algerian Jews represent only one-half of one percent of the population, it is profoundly disturbing for public opinion. Considerable information gathered every day bears witness to this fact.

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It should be noted moreover that the High Commissioner was firmly resolved, acting with complete independence, to put shend to a certain number of injustices and measures which were inspired (Mitlerian ideas). To solve this problem the High Commissariat has decided to proceed in most cases either through Administrative channels, or by way of individual exceptions granted in considerable numbers. This method was subject to application with a certain amount of discretion. In addition, everyone of these steps will be made public separately, rather than in a group. Thus a practical solution will be found for practically all problems which at the present time concern the Jews as individuals, while sparing in the meantime, and as far as possible, the feelings of the European and Arab populations.

We are not unaware of the fact that such a procedure leaves aside a certain political aspect of these problems, a sort of official regtitution which would be confirmed through publicity, but such a regtitution would in fact have the appearance of a revenge, even as the confirmation of German theories would give rise to wide spread concern and numerous conflicts.

The gradual attainment of a different mood of public opinion, and later on the achievement of victory, will undoubtedly make it possible to take a

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different attitude.

Finally, we are in a state of war. All of our efforts must be aimed at mobilizing, in unity, all the spiritual and material forces in Africa. This conclusion must remain foremost and above all others. Any publication therefore, of these measures, involves the risk of comprimizing to a considerable extent the war effort.

Moreover it would be politically unwise at a time when all Mohammedan countries are on the Allied side to give wide spread publicity to measures whose repercussion would extend far beyond the frontiers of French Africa. We must, therefore, insist that this information should be used as discretely as possible. If, however, contrary to our views, American Authorities should desire to make public measures taken by the High Commissariat in favor of the Jews, we insist that the text of this announcement shall be established in consultation with the French Authorities in such a way as to enable them to endeavor to limit the consequences which would inescapably follow such a public announcement.

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NOTE

UNIFIED AIR COMMAND

MARSHAL OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE VISCOUNT TRENCHARD

With the opening of the offensive against Germany, which has certainly started, it may be as well to recall some of the conclusions with regard to unified commands that were reached towards the end of the last war when the offensive began to be opened, especially with regard to the Air.

by Mr. Spectros Pileys, Vt. Claud. Serves, Mr. Clesescent, General Persists

All through this war there have been debates in Parliament on the higher direction of the war all with a single purpose - to try to unify command as much as possible, and our Prime Minister has been foremost in trying to accomplish this.

The question of organisation of commands becomes acute when offensive action is started, and it is difficult to combine the Air, Army and Navy.

It is easier in static or defensive warfare than it is in offensive warfare.

The chief difficulty is that of Air, which, provided Air bases are made, can cover such vast areas, whereas Armies still cannot be more effectively controlled than they were of old.

I was much impressed on my recent visit to the Middle East, Palestine, Iraq, Syria, the Desert, Egypt, the Sudan and West Africa, how small it was from an Air point of view, and what a few hours covered it, provided there were Air bases. The Sudan alone is ten times the size of England. I covered them all in a few hours flying. A comparatively few miles remains a long day's journey for land and sea forces.

An important difficulty we now have to surmount is once again the organisation of the Air Forces amongst the different Allies. When nations have no separate Air Force, as at present with America, their Air Forces are obviously an integral part of their Army or Navy.

I feel sure that the powers-that-be are alive to the difficulties which will arise when we have cleared the enemy out of North Africa and our offensive develops, if indeed some of these difficulties are not already with us. In fact, we are back to a problem we solved in 1918.

During the last war, when it was decided to bomb Germany, it was decided to form an Inter-Allied Air Force consisting of Americans, French,

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This organisation was formed and it just began to work, I admit, only a few days before the war came to an end. It had been thrashed out by Mr. Woodrow Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Clemenceau, General Pershing, Marshal Foch, Lord Haig and others, including Italians, and the conclusion come to was that the Inter-Allied Air Force be unified for the offensive against Germany. I always understood that the Americans and Mr. Lloyd George took a leading part in backing this solution.

It was placed under one Commander-in-Chief, his forces widely dispersed for those days - in England, the South East of France, and they would have been in Prague if the war had not come to and end. The directions to the Air Officer-Commanding were that he was required to help when it was feasible in any major operation that was carried out by either the American Army, the French Army and the British Army. This Force was to come under the general direction of Marshal Foch.

One of the main reasons that brought about this decision in those days was the necessity of combining Air under one command, not only from an operational point of view, but also from a supply point of view, based on the experience of war.

No Air Force can fight without the most efficient maintenance and supply organisation behind them. There are inevitably so many different types of aircraft, engines and air material, requiring hundreds of thousands of different components that it is essential to co-ordinate all requirements very carefully between the different theatres in which the forces are based, by means of unified command. It will be apparent when it is remembered all the diversity of machines used - and necessarily used - that it is essential to group the several machines for repair and supply purposes into the fewest possible bases. Otherwise, there must be great waste of shipping and transport space, together with overlapping and local shortage. This must mean failure to get the full results.

It was the recognition of these indisputable facts that really helped towards producing the arguments for forming a separate Air Force which I maintain still hold and have since endured, with one regrettable modification. Air Forces to-day are many times more complex than they were when this decision was taken, while their greater range Regraded Unclassified enables them to be brought to bear operated from bases far more widely

separated than they were in the first year of war. The arguments therefore to do the same to-day are far more compelling.

It must also not be forgotten that bombing by night and night fighting which were in their infancy in the last war was another of the reasons that compelled the amalgamation of Air Commands. From what I have heard and seen of night work in this war it emphasises the necessity for unifying the Air for the coming offensives.

Finally, there is one Air, however many hundreds of miles apart the bases are. Splitting the Air into unnaturally small commands is to think in the terms of 1916-17, and can but lead to a waste of Air strength, of shipping, and to a dispersal of effort.

Tunchard 15/12/42

LA LLAMA... un relato histórico

On combernin the Agents de 1914, el Subsecrenatio de la Mazina de Comedo se dirighe de une a cota del cuele pla costa de Mariados Demedo se dirighe de une a cota del cuele pla costa de Mariados Demedo se dirighe de une a cota del cuele pla costa de Mariados Demedo se dirighe de une a cota del cuele pla costa de Mariados Demedos de Maria de Cartera, pictudo presento per secuesar combo un compres de la Maria de Cartera y direché de soprema indementación. El mesicos acercales, quietr, neutralmente, palables beston pero durata servera migram compresancion de un mariado esteble se puede de Pariada. Estebnes, el Subsecretario de pregimo de la Pictu succiticada mendo esteble supulsado de defenera processo de maria de compresancion de la Maria de Cartera de las mismos de la Pictu succiticada de Pariada. Estebnes, el Subsecretario de personal de maria de colores cara de las massis presentacion per la caractera de las massis presentación. El su videriema de colores cara de las mas antiquas de Pracas y no El Subsecretario pregamb de se des masses antiquas de Pracas y no El Subsecretario personalo de mentra de las mas antiquas de Pracas y no El Subsecretario que al Maria de Colores cara de las mas antiquas de Pracas y no El Subsecretario personalo de se des contrados de la Maria de Colores cara de las mas antiquas de Pracas y no El Subsecretario que al Maria de Colores cara de las mas antiquas de Pracas y no El Subsecretario que al Maria y la copercada de la Maria de Colores de la Maria de la

NOTICIAS HISPANO **AMERICANAS**

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Unidos en Guerra Los Estados

Carta de América

per Frank Knox

Unidos en Guerra

Ministro de Marina

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"Un Orden Justo Para Todos los

Pueblos"



WASHINGTON

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CARTA DE AMERICA

Art dummy for Lend-Lease leaflet to France -- 750,000 ordered Similar to be done for Italy This is the master copy of 750,000 leaflets to be printed by a.W. I for dropping over France



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"Le monde sait aujourd'hui que les Fascistes n'ont rien à offrir à la jeunesse . . . sinon la mort." "Le monde sait aujourd'hui que les Fascistes n'ont rien à offrir à la jeunesse . . . sinon la mort."

MESSAGE A LA JEUNESSE par FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, Président des Etats-Unis

DEPUIS nombre d'années Alamands et Japonais laucent à la jeunesse leurs appels hypocrites: la réflecent par une publicité tapageuse de se faire passer pour les champions de la jeunesse. Mais le mende sait aujourd'hai que les Nazis, les Fuecistes et les Militaristes japonals n'ent rien à offrir à la jeunesse . . . sinon la mert. An contraine, e'est la cause des Nations Unies qui est la cause de la jeuneme même. C'est l'espoir de la génération nouvelle, e'est celui des générations à venir, e'est l'espoir d'une vie nouvelle qui pourra être vécue dans la liberté, dans la justice, dans l'hombreté. Cod devient chaque jour plus évident sux yeux des Jennes en Europe, an les Nasis esseyent de créer des groupements de jeunesee façounds sur le modèle suat. Ca n'est pest lu modèle concup par la jeunesee, pour la jeunesee; c'est le modèle concup par Hitler et impusé à la jeunesee par une caplor de gavage mertal — par un régime de faits mensonges et déferands, avec interdiction de penser — le tout soutemn par les finais de la Gestapo.

Si vous avez des doutes sur ce que les jeunes Européens bennières penesses terprensees trompeuses que les nailtres de l'Axe font à la jeunesse du monde, voyez comment les braves l'amens gens de France et de tous les pays occupés all'unitent le paistem d'arécution plutôt que d'accepter la perspective d'une ves d'acclavage dégradant sons Hitler.

Dans les malheureux pays tels que la Pinlande, la Hongrie, la Bolgarie, la Roumanie et l'Italie, ob les gouvernements out jugé nécessaire de se soumettre à Hitler et d'accomplir ses velocités, les quisilings ont eux aussi organisé des mouvements de par entaines, mais or ne sont que des mouvements de la jeunesse, mais or ne sont que des mouvements de la jeunesse, par centaines de milliers, vers les champs de camage du front ordental, ob les Nasis ont besoin de chair à canno dans leur tentative désembrie pour mettre en pièces l'armée russe.

Pour nous, nous exultous à la pensée que ce sent les jeunes, les jeunes bommes et les jeunes femmes illères des Nations Unies qui tiendrent entre leurs mains et façencerent le monde nouveau. Avant la première guerre mondiale très peu de geas en quelque pays que ce fitt croysiant que la jeunesse cht le droit soit de parlet en son proper nom en tant que collectivité, soit de participer aux conseils de l'État.

visibles gens pervent être des sots et les joines gens des agges. Dans toutes les guerres éves la joune génération qui support les poids de la lutte et qui reçoit l'héritage de tout les man que la guerre laisse dans son aillage. Dans les exfres excises économiques qui univirent la fause prospérie. Parent les premières guerre mondiale beaucours de jounes sur-

Dans les crises économiques qui mivirent la fause prospérité de paper la première guerre mondaile beaucoup de jeunes que et de jeunes femmes soudirient encere plus que leurs alads, car ils se virent refuser les possibilités les plus élémentaires de

s'instruire, d'apprendre un métier, de travailler et même de se nouverir auffannent pour se forme des crops robustes. Par suite ils forent tratés de chercher qualque remède simple non seulement à beurs problèmes individuels, mais à tous hes pro-alfechaties vennes de l'étrange, qui avaient des voix alléchaties vennes de l'étrange, qui avaient des répones toutes prêtes à toute les questions. La démocratie est morte, diasient ces voix. Suivez-sous: nun vous menginerons les méthodes qui rémaissent. Nous vous méteorems à le conquête du monde. Nous vous domnerons à le conquête du monde, l'ons vous domnerons à pouvoir de dominer les races inférieures. Tout ce que nous vous demandons en échange, c'est... votre liberté.

D'autres jeunes gens, dans les démocraties, écoutèrent les évangles de déserpoir. Ils se réfugièrent dans le cynime et l'amertume. Cependant le jour a fini par venir où toutes les théories ont dû céder le piece à la réalist, à la terrible et tangible réalité des hombardements en piece et des panaeuliviaismen, à la menace présente faite à la sécurité de tous les foyers, de toutes les familles, dans tous les pays libres du monde.

Et loveque cette réalité ent devenue évidente à nes jounes gens, il mos réponds l'appel aux armes. Les y out réponds par milliens, et sujourel'hui la sont réadus à combattre juaqu'un jour où les forres d'agression sevont entièrement anémates juaqu'un jour où les

En Norvège, en Hollande, en Belgique et en France, en Telecoulverque, en Pologue, en Serlie, en Grete un asprit de résistance dése l'oppression brutale, la crusaté harbare, le terrorieme des Nasis. Désarnés, mais indomptables, les peuples portent acoroce des coupes à leur oppresseur. Enjoints d'ignorer la vérité, ils écoutent, au péril de leur vie, de lointains postes de radio; et de boundes en bouche par paroles discrètes, de mais en mais par les journaux clandesties, les patriotes se transmettent la vérité. Quand sonners pour ces peuples les mains de se propres vérities.

Aujourd'hui les jeunesses en armes de Russie et de Chine, compressant le âggirle de l'individu, brisent les derakter malllous des antiques chaînes des impérialismes et des despotismes qui les timent et longtemps présentiers.

Cest ik un développement historique d'une importance incalculable. Cela signifie que le vieux terme de "civiliarian occidentale" ne convient plus. Des évènements mondiaux et les bessius communs de l'humanie entière ont uni la culture de l'Axie à celle de l'Europe et des Antériques pour former pour la première fois une vyusé civiliation mondiale. Par la conception des "Quatre Libertés " et par les principes fondamentaux de la Charte de l'Atlantique nous nous sommes fixé des buts élevés et des objectifs illimités.

Cas conceptions et era principes out en vue la création d'un membre de hommes, étembres et s'étaits pourront vivre dans la liberté et l'égalité, et surtont à l'abri de la crainte des horreun de la guerre. Car il n'est pas de soldats ni de marins dans nous

forces armérs qui endurensient si volontiers aujourd'hai les rigneurs du combat, s'ils penssient que dans vingt ans leurs popres fils devraient à leur tour proudre part à une entre gettre, dans des déserts ou sur des mers élaignée, dans des jungles ou des cieux lointains. Nous savous fort hien que nous n'attaindress pas nos obciefit facilierant. C n'er pas en use mit que pourra s'ercomplir pleisement notre idéal. Nous savons que la latte actuelle sers longue, rude et Apre. — qu'il nous resten encore immendement à faire sarie que le dérnier bombardier allemand, isponais ou italien surs été abetts.

Mais nous croyons fermement que, guidés par Dieu, moss pourrons — dans le monde difficiel d'acjourbuil et dans le pourrous monde d'après guerre — programer tenjours diventages vers les bots les plus élevés que les bonnnes ainst jamais cenque.

Near, he chayms due Nations Unite, new possibles he mayor includings, he resources materiordes, or par dame hear, Ingel Carpill Carpil

Mais il nous faut persévêrer — ne jamais nous relicher, ne amis faiblir, ne jamais craindre — et il nous faut persévérer memble.

Il nous faut maintenir l'offensive contre le mai sous toutes ses formes. Il nous faut travailler et combattre pour faire en sants que nos enfants jouissent en paix de leurs dreits inniéeables à la liberté de parcée et à la liberté de religies, libértés du besain et libérés de le craine.

C'est seulement à ces conditions héroiques que cette guern totale pourra aboutir à une victoire totale.



USA

CE TRACT A ÉTÉ LANCÉ PAR UN BOMBARDIER AMÉRICAIN



GERECHTIGKEIT

DER Präsident der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, Franklin D. Roosevelt, hat die folgende Erklärung zu den deutschen Greueltaten in den besetzten Ländern Europas abgegeben:

Der Staatssekretär hat mir vor kurzem eine Mitteilung vorgelegt, die von dem Botschafter der Niederlande und den Gesandten von Jugoslawien und Luxemburg für die Regierungen von Belgien, Griechenland, Luxemburg, Norwegen, der Niederlande, Polen, der Tschechoslowakei, Jugoslawien und für den französischen Nationalausschuss in London unterzeichnet ist. Darin wird auf die barbarischen Verbrechen gegen die Zivilbevölkerung hingewiesen, die in den besetzten Ländern, besonders auf dem europäischen Kontinent, verübt werden.

In dieser Mitteilung wird auf die Erklärung verwiesen, die am 13. Januar 1942 in London von den Vertretern von neun Regierungen unterzeichnet worden ist, deren Länder unter deutscher Besetzung stehen. Die Erklärung führt aus, dass Gewalttaten gegen die Zivilbevölkerung unvereinbar sind mit den allgemein gültigen Anschauungen uber Kriegsbandlungen und politische Vergehen, so wie sie von Kulturvolkern verstanden werden. Sie stellt ferner klar, dass die Bestrafung der an diesen Verbrechen schuldigen und dafür verantwortlichen Personen in einem geordneten Gerichtsverfahren eines der wesentlichen Kriegsziele der vertragschliessenden Regierungen ist. Sie legt endlich die Entschlossenheit dieser Regierungenfest, im Geiste internationaler Gemeinschaft dafür Sorge zu tragen, dass die Schuldigen und Verantwortlichen ohne Rücksicht auf ihre Staatssangehörigkeit der Gerechtigkeit überantwortet und abgeurteilt, und dass die gerichtlichen Erkenntnisse vollstreckt werden.

In der Mitteilung, die mir soeben von den Missionschefs der Nieder-

Dingos Finghiett words von sinem merikanischen Bomber abgeworfen

lande, Jugoslawiens und Luxemburgs zugegangen ist, wird festgestellt, dass diese Akte der Unterdrückung und des Terrors Ausmasse und Formen angenommen haben, die die Befürchtung rechtfertigen, dass der barbarische und erbarmungslose Charakter der Besetzung mit dem Herannahen der Niederlage der feindlichen Staaten noch stärker ausgeprägt werden und möglicherweise sogar zur Ausrottung gewisser Volksgruppen führen wird.

Wie ich am 25. Oktober 1941 festgestellt habe, bringt die in den derzeit unter das Nazijoch gebeugten Ländern herrschende Übung, als Vergeltung für vereinzelte Angriffe auf Deutsche Dutzende von unschuldigen Geiseln hinzurichten, selbst eine gegen Leiden und Brutalität abgestumpfte Welt in Wallung. Seit langem haben Kulturvölker sich den Grundsatz zu eigen gemacht, dass niemand für die Tat eines anderen bestraft werden darf. Ausserstande, die an solchen Angriffen beteiligten Personen zu fassen, schlachten die Nazis beseichnenderweise fünfzig oder hundert unschuldige Menschen ab. Alle die, welche mit Hitler "zusammenarbeiten" oder ihn friedlich stimmen möchten, können an dieser schauerlichen Warnung nicht vorübergehen.

Die Nazis sollten aus dem letzten Krieg gelernt haben, dass es nicht möglich ist, den menschlichen Geist durch Terror zu brechen. Statt dessen dehnen sie ihren "Lebensraum" und ihre "Neue Ordnung" bis zu Abgründen des Grauens aus, zu denen selbst sie bisher nicht herabgesunken waren. Das sind die Handlungen von Menschen, die nichts zu verlieren haben, und die in ihrem Inneren wissen, dass sie nicht gewinnen können. Grauen kann Europa niemals Frieden bringen. Es streut nur die Saat eines Hasses aus, die eines Tages furchtbare Vergeltung tragen wird.

Die Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten hat seit geraumer Zeit Kenntnis von diesen Verbrechen. Unsere Regierung erhält laufend weitere Mitteilungen zuverlässigen Ursprungs und ist dankhar für Berichte aus jeder vertrauenswürdigen Quelle, die dazu beitragen, unser ständig wachsendes Nachrichten- und Beweismaterial auf dem neuesten Stand zu halten und verlässlich zu machen.

Die Vereinten Nationen werden diesen Krieg gewinnen. Wenn der Sieg erfochten ist, dann wird—das ist der Wille der Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten und, wie ich weiss, auch der jeder anderen Regierung der Vereinten Nationen—das Nachrichten- und Beweismaterial für die barbarischen Verbrechen der Angreifer in Europa und A.ien in geeigneter Weise verwertet werden. Es ist nur in der Ordnung, dass diese Angreifer hiermit gewarnt werden: die Zeit wird kommen, da sie in den gleichen Ländern, die sie jetzt unterdrücken, vor Gericht stehen und sich für ihre Taten zu verantworten haben werden.

USGS

L'Amérique en Gü



REVUE DE LA PRESSE AMERICAINE

The New York Eimes. Che Washington Post

The Dallas News

The Atlanta Sournal

Che New York Simes.

THE CHICAGO SUN

PERSHING A LETTRE DE PRESIDENT

M. ROOSEVELT PARLE:

L'Amérique en Guerre LE 16 NOVEMBRE, 1941 LA GUERRE DANS LE Ne. 48

A LA FRANCE

OFFICIELS MESSAGES

PACIFIOUE

DERNIERES NOUVELLES

Public per le Hurreu d'Infie

LA GUERRE DANS LE PACIFIQUE

Smile de le page 1

linal, mais on dels in consultates dans
le tesfer den bests de genere deEkara-Unie et de leura Allida. Be wint
par le manister inde de seldster pars
un montent leura effects dans l'ans
en l'arter direction. Les Ekza-Unie
et leura Allida continuerant à frapper
le Japon junqu'à ce qu'il soit complémente vaince. Les Ekza-Unie
et leura Allida frapperent les puidasseren de l'Axa en Ekzape et en

Afrique junqu'à ce qu'illes soient
complétament écration e puidsaient de l'Axa en Ekzape et en

Afrique junqu'à ce qu'illes soient
complétament écration.

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Ce depend on the responded depuis in victorie dans he Salamen et depuis he avances littles et et New-Zelandais. As cours d'un et les New-Zelandais. As cours d'un auch de marbles surcés de la Merite et de marbles surcés de la Merite et de Pauliere Merite de Rata-Unis, ma vu la martes et l'avistite juponisse d'effitte considérablement. Les cours traveilem avande et la production sermantique étant les points faibles de la fraisse de la production sermantique de particulais apprendant son phila rendement su Amérique peut construire faire plan. L'Andréque peut construire des particulais que le Japon. Le vécnice dans les Salames provers que l'Andréque peut construire de particul de la faita sere de commentation de la faita sere suréfreis le partir de la le sere suréfreis le partir de la le terre suréfreis le partir de la le terre suréfreis les les la lettes de la la lette de la lette de la lette suréfreis les lettes de la lette de

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"No lipse de batalle s'étrodent aujourd'hui de Kiska à Mourmand, de la Tunise à Guedaleand. Co-



sentinelle américaine tand is main de l'amitté au fils d'un me

incen s'avancent. Nom avons livré ins butte scharmés, et alle continuers mags'un bout. Il ne peut y avoir le chemin facile vere le victaire." L'Amérique reçet un chos sévère

of channia hatis were in venture.

L'Annéque reçit un choe niver in cher de de combre à Fant Barbou. Les choes sociédirent aux choes, et au princrape de 1942 le alpon était dans uns position talle qu'il semblait que la present de 1942 le alpon était dans uns position talle qu'il semblait que la ligit de 1942 le alpon était des complex, et que l'Annéralle positrait être solumentée et servir de hestion aux Japanals pour un sassait ves aux Japanals pour un sassait ves l'unes cè ils pouraites il pract chi il pour un sassait ves l'unes cè ils pouraites illeurs des nettres ficces de l'Axe.

En mai, les Japenasis out essayd d'attainder ett objectif par une première attaique prinsante dans la mer de Carall. On peut dire que les Allife ent eu beazonque de chance se cours de cette heralit, mais in anasquèstent leur les et décenter qu'ils ne pourraient pas attainment qu'ils ne prochaite attaque es prochaint quelque part entre les Aldeviernes et Midwey.

Fuls he Japonais traitent le Schemm en sold, et cette fies I pouveix des Nationa-Union event de reflesamment feibil dans cette régio pour passe à ses coups. Avec le pour accumides par l'ement per dant cette année de parre dans I Perifique, les Allids out venimes e Positique a été de jones un jeu oditaire. Hidre sensit sind recevuir le raide de la merine japonaise. Il sensit sind spin la pages etce una literaise contre Ultaina Evolvitique. Rita de cela a'mriva. Les Japonais mutilisapient hur demin solidare, mutilisapient hur demin solidare, nontilisapient sensitare de l'Extratestiva sur jeur matrice de l'Extrates-Drient, fisto sur le volt de chancer la virina-Union du de chancer la

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ty ye in may be promote or serverte ExtraChia, he ExtraChia an obligate de diviset hear forces are be deax octean. Aujourl'and, to supplicate a ratio pas, gree a mer de Gerell, à Midway et exx

is sisten dependent 1,300 appared).

Il est agnificantly qu'accum portevina japonais n'a pris part à la
mière bandle près des Saisones,
aplement parce que le Japon n'ese
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pris aux Japonais une sanère leçon

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Des membres de la Cemmission d'Armiteire itale-altemands excertés par un seldes américain après leur arrestation à Polhala.

LA FRANCE A L'HONNEUR

LE DIRECTEUR

DES SECOURS

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ECOUTEZ

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EMISSIONS AMERICALI
VIA LA B.B.C.
France Posts.

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EMISSIONS FRANÇAISES
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L'Amérique Guerre



Le rapport de Roosevelt montre l'esprit d'équipe des Alliés



L'A.O.F. SE RALLIE AUX NATIONS UNIES

RÉT - Location " est le nom de l'organisation par laquelle les Nations Unies mettent en commun leurs ressources pour atteindre leurs deux buts communs: écraser l'Allemagne, l'Italie et le Japon; assurer le lement suffisant du moude entier en vivres et en fournitures essentielles

ravitainement sumant un mouse chiefe de vives et en sontate de la près la guerre.

Le Président Roosevelt vient de publier son 7ème rapport trimestriel sur les travaux de l'organisation "Prêt - Location." Il a accompagné ce rapport d'une lettre au Congrès, dans laquelle il écrit:

"Depuis mon dernier rapport, la guerre est entrée dans une nouvelle phase. Les forces des Nations Unies, attaquant depuis l'Egypte et l'Afrique du Nord, se battent contre les puissances de l'Axe pour le contrôle de la côte africaine de la Méditerranée.

"L'entrée conférieure qui a term à Stalingrad avec tenacité et courage est

de la Méditerranée.

"L'armée soviétique qui a tenu à Stalingrad avec tenacité et courage est maintenant passée à l'offensive.

"Les japonais ont dû dépenser sana compter des navires et des hommes dans les fies Salomon, champ de bataille de notre propre choix.

"Les puissances de l'Axe ont, pour le moment du moins, perdu l'initiative. Il faut que nous fassions tout ce que nous pouvons pour les empècher de la reprendre.

"Nous devons engager la totalité des forces des Nations Unies contre l'ennemi, "Nous devons mettre en commun le rendement de nos productions et nos ressources matérielles, nos munitions et nos hommes, et nous devons le faire en accord avec une seule stratégie mondiale.

"Les récents événements et mon rapport sur le rôle de l'organisation "Prêt — Location " prouvent, je pense, que nous faisons des progrès dans ce sens.

"Nous avons aussi un nutre devoir qui grandira parallèlement avec notre puissance, et au fur et à mesure que de nouveaux territoires seront libérés de l'emprise de l'ennemi.

puissance, et au tor et a mesure que de nouveaux territoires seront interes de l'emprise de l'ennemi. "Ce devoir est de faire parvenir des médicaments, des vivres, des vêtements et autres fournitures essentielles aux populations qui ont été pillées, dépouillées

Le Président Roosevelt parle de l'entr'aide parmi les Alliés



BIR-HAKEIM





LA RECONSTRUCTION EN L'A.O.F. se L'AFRIQUE DU NORD

rallie aux Alliés

Regraded Unclassified



LA SEMAINE LA GUERRE



Le général Edouard Welvert, des Forces Françaises en Tunisie, décerné au Colon Edoun Raff, Chef des troupes parachutistes américaines, la Légion Channes

en Russie



Les Français Les exploits du Col. Raff

Trois des chefs alliés déclarent :

EISENHOWER

BOISSEAU

STANDLEY

ET UN CHEF DE L'AXE

EMISSIONS AMERICAINES VIA

France.
Poster.
14.15 New York via is B.B.C. 1500m

200

Publié par le Bureau d'Information de Guerre du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique à sa base européenne.

administration of emetine. From four to eight of these treatments are given over a period of a patients have a strong aversion to liquor of any This reflex aversion is periodically reinforced by giving one or two treatments at intervals of one to three months throughout the first year, during which period relapses are most api to occur. Lemere and his colleagues now report a follow-up study of 1,194 patients. Of the 644 patients treated within the last two years, 74.8 per cent are still abstinent, 52.5 per cent of 291 patients treated from two to four years ago are still abstinent and 51.5 per cent of 259 patients treated four or more years ago are still abstinent. The authors feel that the advantages of this treatment lie in its short duration, its wide patient. They believe that the results to date week or ten days, at the end of which time most applicability and its ready acceptance by the constitute this as the best available treatment for L., ; Brox, W. R.; O'Hollaren, Paul, and Tupper, alcoholism, -(Lemere, Frederick; Voegtlin, W. W. E.; Journal of the American Medical Association, September 26, 1342.)

Age of Appearance of Ossification Centers for Determining Skeletal Status of Children:

The centers studied were the distal epiphysis The onset of ossification by means of serial roentgenograms was observed in three centers of the skeleton in order to test whether this stage of development is a reliable indicator of maturity, of the ulna, the first sesamoid of the thumb and the crest of the ilium. The age of first appearance

skeletal age were each correlated with the menarcheal age. The age at which the epiphysis of the distal phalanx of the second finger fuses with its metaphysis was studied with a view to substituting it for iliac age in the formulation. Thirty boys and thirty girls whose records covered the necessary age range were used for the study. One hundred girls were added to the group in order to compare their iliac age with the menarcheal age. The onset of ossification in the crest of the ilium is discussed as a possible maturity determinator for use during the adolescent period of each center and the concomitant mean total in both boys and girls.

centers designated by Ruehl and Pyle as ulnar age, sesamoid age and iliac age was found to of children. Ossification began in these three girls in sequence of ossification. The ages at which ossification began in these three centers ages than did the corresponding mean total skeletal ages in this group. Ossification began in the distal phalanx of the second finger also cation in the crest of the ilium might possibly which is comparable to that existing in the female at the time of the menarche. - (Buehl, C. C., and The age at onset of ossification in the three concomitant mean total skeletal age in this group each correlated more closely with the menarcheal in the crest of the ilium within six months of the menarche in two-thirds of these girls. Fusion began near the menarche. This phenomenon occurred shortly ofter the menarche in a majority of the group. It was suggested that onset of ossifiprovide as reliable a measure of maturity as the centers according to the normal order of general indicate a point in the maturation cycle of the male development peculiar to each sex, i.e., boys follow Pyle, S. I. J. Perliat., September, 1942.)

Lebena

Medical News

From the U.S.A.

WEEK ENDING

NOV. 24th, 1942

Science, September, 1942.) this communication has been prepared by the science. Research does continue, however, and to keep you informed of work being done of information on progress in all fields of in the medical field, in the United States, The war has disrupted the world-wide exchange

Transfusion of Stored and Fresh Blood:

American Medical Association. A similar

communication will reach you at intervals.

man and his colleagues, an index of the viability There is some difference of opinion as to the value of stored versus fresh blood. Stored blood these are proportional to the duration of storage. The significance of most of them, however, is largely academic, and the major question is the fate of the red blood cells. According to Wasserof transfuxed erythrocytes can be obtained by studying one of the main end-products of the destruction of red blood cells in the body, namely, urobilinogen, which can be fairly accurately determined in the feces and urine. In order to determine this point, the urobilingen excretion was determined in 3 cases followed in the group of refractory anemias, who were given transfusions of stored blood. It was determined that has several disadvantages over fresh blood and

the excretion of urobilinogen in the stool and urine after transfusion with stored blood is directly proportional to the length of time of use of blood stored for more than seven days is blood storage. They further concluded that the (Wasserman, L. R.; Volterra, Mario, and Rosenthal, Nathan; American Journal of Medical inadvisable for the treatment of anemias.

Carcinoma of the Prostate:

period of five years or more after the onset of to whether or not the degree of malignancy of available for a detailed histologic study. 2. There 3. If the patient died, death occurred more than one month after surgical treatment. This requirement eliminated operative deaths. 4. There was a follow-up record until death or for a survival symptoms. After the 100 cancer specimens had scopic appearance was correlated with the clinical Evans and his colleagues present a study based ments: 1. Satisfactory microscopic sections were was a record of a definite time of onset of symp-Heretofore it has been somewhat uncertain as cancer of the prostate as measured by its micro course. In an effort to answer this question on too consecutive cases of carcinoma of the prostate which were studied between 1925 and 1936 and which conform to the following require toms produced by the carcinoma of the prostate

Published by the Office of War Information of the United States of America at 15, Merrien Square, Dabilin.

been graded according to the carefully described plan, the histologic and clinical data were compared. The histologic grade of carcinoma of the prostate based on the degree of abnormality of the acini, the cells and the nuclei is of use in predicting the length of survival of the patient. The more important clinical points taken into consideration were the duration of survival, incidence of metastasis and roenteen therapy. They concluded that the grade of the carcinoma indicates the probability of the occurrence of metastasis, that the higher grades of cancer occur at slightly earlier ages than the lower, and, finally, that roentgen therapy appears to lengthen survival time, particularly in patients with the higher grades of carcinoma .- (Evans, Newton : Barnes, R. W., and Brown, Albert F.: Arch. Patil., September, 1942.)

Dilantin Sodium and Phenobarbital Combined for Epilepsy:

Merritt and Brenner report observations on 100 patients with convulsive seizures whose attacks had not been satisfactorily controlled by the administration of dilantin sodium, who were then treated by a combination of dilantin sodium and phenobarbital. Thirteen patients were markedly improved on the combination as compared with dilantin sodium alone, 21 patients were moderately improved, while the remaining 66 patients showed no significant improvement. All of the patients with exclusively petit mal or psychomotor seizures or with Jacksonian seizures were in the group which showed no significant improvement after the addition of the obenobarbital. Thirty-seven patients with convulsive seizures who had never before received dilantin sodium but whose attacks had been unsatisfactorily controlled by other forms of treatment were treated by a combination of dilantin sodium and phenobarbital. The results in this small group of patients were roughly equivalent to those reported by Merritt and Putnam for similar larger groups treated by dilantin sodium. Patients with convulsive seizures whose attacks are not satisfactorily controlled by dilantin sodium alone should be tried on a combination of this drug with phenobarbital. To obtain satisfactory results, they say, with the combination of phenobarbital and dilantin sodium, full dosages of both drugs must be administered.—(Merritt, H. Houston, and Brenner, Charles; J. Nerv. & Ment. Dis., September, 1942.)

What U.S. Doctors are Talking About :

Current mobilization of a Women's Field Army of 25,000 volunteer workers to "fight cancer with knowledge." Under the auspices of the American Society of the Control of Cancer, 200 women from all over the U.S., who will act as leaders in the drive, have just finished an intensive two weeks' course in causes and prevention of cancer which included detailed lectures at New York City's five cancer prevention clinics. . . . Experimental tests on two species of rats and does at New York City's Mount Sinai Hospital which indicate that adrenochrome, a synthetic derivative of adrenalin first discovered in England five years ago, may be highly effective in the reduction of blood pressure. Kidney extracts and the mushroom extract, tyrosinase, previously used for this purpose, can be obtained in only small amounts; adrenochrome, although its value for human beings can as yet only be prophesied, is relatively easy to manufacture.

Report of the successful treatment of U.S. sailors who had received blast injuries of the lung in the Pacific. Naval doctors, profiting by British experience with this condition, were able to send all but four of nineteen men back to duty within two weeks. Treatment consisted of forced fluids, heat, rest, drugs to combat restlessness and oxygen to relieve cyanotic conditions. . . . Reports that the Nazis have devised a blood test to determine whether an individual is a "non-Aryan." U.S. authorities question the reliability of such a test in any European area where pre-war tests showed that blood groups "O," "A," "B," and "AB" are indistinguishably intermingled. . . . Experimental treatment of U.S. cancer

patients with rays from a 3,000,000 volt x-ray machine. Dr. Richard Dresser, reporting to the American Roentgen Ray Society, explained that the 3,000,000 volt rays have essentially the same physical properties as gamma rays from radium.

The results of extensive studies which prove that oil of cloves is the most effective homeremedy for toothache. . . . The statement of Professor Clinton Laird, recently returned from Lingman University in China on the Gripsholm, at a recent meeting of the American Chemical Society that Japanese soldiers have defeated the purpose of their homeland by unintelligent handling of scientific material. When they capture a Chinese laboratory, Japanere soldiers have poured valuable medical supplies down the drain and have destroyed several experiments on critical raw materials. . . . The discovery that humidity may have more effect on sterilization of air in public gathering places than the chemical which is used. High humidity was found to neutralize the disinfecting effect of propylene glycol vapor used in both the U.S. and England for sterilization purposes. Intermediate humidities were found to be most effective.

Sulfonamides in Ointment Form:

Miller reports the treatment of a total of 115 patients during the past year with sulfanilamide and its derivatives in ointment bases. The dermatoses could be placed in three groups: (1) primary infections of the skin; (2) diseases of the skin with secondary pyogenic infections and (3) miscellaneous diseases. The first group includes impetigo contagiosa, ecthyma, sycosis vulgaris, folliculitis of the scalp, acne varioliformis and the dermatitis Repens. The second group includes infantile eczema, chronic dermatitis of the fingers of unknown origin, allergic eczemawith secondary infection, dermatophytosis with secondary infection, epidermolysis bullosa, psoriasis, acne vulgaris of the pustular type, seborrheic dermatitis and pustular bacterid.

The preparations used were sulfanilamide,

sulfathiazole, sodium sulfathiazole and sulfadiazine in strengths varying from 5 to 50 per cent. They were incorporated in two different bases, which were essentially water in oil emulsions. The base most frequently used contained diethanolamine oleate, white wax, liquid petrolatum, white petrolatum and distilled water. The preparation was compounded so that the drues were in a suspended state, the size of the suspension approaching a colloidal one. They were in solution to about the degree of their solubility in water (o.8 per cent in the case of sulfanilamide and o.r per cent in the case of sulfathiarole). Cure was obtained in all patients with superficial pyogenic infections, such as impetigo, in a shorter average time than that reported with accepted methods of treatment. In patients with cutaneous diseases secondarily infected, the secondary infections were quickly cured, but further treatment with the ointment did not favorably affect the primary disease. Results in patients with deeper pyogenic infection, such as sycosis, were variable, apparently depending on the ability of the ointment to reach the seat of the infection. Sulfathiazole ointment produced the only reactions noted. This ointment in 50 per cent concentration produced an unusual and apparently characteristic reaction in 2 patients. The identical reaction was subsequently produced in one of these patients by giving sulfathiazole by mouth. A 5 per cent concentration of sulfanilamide or sulfathiazole ointment is recommended.-(Miller, J. Lowry; Arch. Dermat. & Syph., September, 1942.)

Conditioned Reflex Treatment of Chronic Alcoholism:

The conditioned reflex treatment of chronic alcoholism was first described by Voegtlin in 1940. It consists essentially in establishing a reflex aversion to the sight, smell, taste and thought of alcoholic beverages by means of emetine. The emetine produces prompt emesis of imbibed alcoholic bevereges which are urged on the patient for thirty to forty-five minutes after the

way or which the author fits it into the larger pattern of reconstruction. Outcries are already trieng in Britain over some of the proposals; the rest will undoubtedly be searchingly weighed and criticised. But the high auspices under which the report appears means that the debate will be a serious one, and there seems little doubt that it will mark a stimulating and exciting step in the development of our ideas of the democratic future.

The New York World Telegram: Dec. 3.

Americans will find much to think about in the

long awaited report of Sir William Beveridge, which is the result of a prolonged study undertaken at the request of the British Government. This report is concerned with the problems of Britain and with means of improving conditions of life there. Therefore its specific prograshs are of only secondary importance to us. The British have their problems and we have ours in some respects they are similar and in others rotally different.

But one thing Democracies have in common—a need to improve continuously the adjustment of conditions that arise out of the impact of the swift moving industrial age. Some interests in Britain on doubt hope to bring about a reaction there. But the Beveridge report and all the other discussion that is going on represent a determination to make fogland a better place to live in after the war. Buy as people of England are with the war they find time to discuss these

Captain Oliver Lyttelton, Minister of Produc-tion and a Beitish industrialist, says in discussing these questions that the essence of democracy after the war should be "a balance between the organising power of the State and the driving power of the free individual." That puts it into as neat a package as I have seen.

P.M., New York: December 2.

Remember the last war? It was Mr. Thomas Atkins then, as now. And when Tommy was burrowing in the mud of Ypres, or charging into machine-gun fire at Passcheridele, the folks at house promised him to make Britain "a land fit for heroes." This was the catch phrase then, remember?

And remember the U.S.A.? The boys were going to a war to end war, to make the world safe for democracy. It was the new freedom then. Or dill, it is the four freedoms now. Somehow it week happened. We all were too busy fighting the war and some people said "Well, let's win

And that sounded pretty reasonable because there were Liberty Bonds to buy and war material to produce, and socks to brit, and parades to watch and cheer. And suddenly the war ended sooner than anyone had expected, and there were cries to "bring the boys home." We had put off planning the peace until tomorrow.

Now Tomorrow was here and we still were too busy. The boys were too busy hunting jobs. So Tomorrow became the day after tomorrow, and then Hitler marched into Poland and we were fighting again.

Rest assured: we'll soon hear the same old stall: "Et's win the war first, then we can plan the peace." The time to plan is always now. The time to plan for peace is when you are at war. Otherwise peace never will come as peace didn't come in 1918—merely an armistic, revolution, civil war, depression, and then war all over again.

We don't know enough about financial and economic conditions and Britain people judge. But this is certain Britain needs some plan like that and so does the U.S.A. And we need it now—not tomorrow, when the boys come home to find 'no help wanted' signs everywhere. Otherwise we'll have 1918—1939 all over again. Remember 7

The Chicago Sun: December 1.

Mme Chiang Kai-Shek nurely is no sheltered lady of the Old East. She is a great deal more than one admirable individual. She is a symbol and example of the democratic womanhood of Young China. Through all Free China innumerable women, young and old, are leading their country's renaissance. They do so with a spirit of infectious

independence. In greeting Mme Chiang we are greeting the kind of national wemanbood that America loves.

The New York Times: December 1.

We are approaching our second war winter with gasoline and fuel, sugar and coffee rationed, and Tuesday "meatless." Undoubtedly, there will be rationing of other foods. But to talk of any serious shortage would do injustice to the situation. For ours is still the land of plenty and we are in the fortunate position of being able to supply our allies from our surplus. It is instructive to recall such obvious facts at a time when almost the entire outside world of the most essential things of life.

Commen

From the American Press

WEEK ENDING

DEC. 5th, 1941

This bulletin presents an objective, factual and unbiased daily picture of the editorial opinion appearing in tepresentative American newspapers. In an effort to indicate opinion in different parts of the country, the new-papers selected are warted.

It is hoped that this weekly bulletin will help to maintain the many deep and historic ties between America and Ireland.

The New York Times: December 5.

The opening clashes have begun in the battle for the triangle between the port of Tunis and the naval base of Bizerte, which Mr. Churchill calls "the tip of Tunisa." The American vanguard is within sight of the White Domes and Minares of Tunis. Allied troops are trying to drive a wedge between this city and Bizerte and the British Navy is striking telling blows to cut off Axis reinforcements by sea. But enemy resistance has increased. We have a difficult problem of sea transport and land communications. But ti will be no easier for the Germans to keep their foothold. The grant distinction between this and all previous engagements in this war is that our side has chosen the battlefield. That the Italians realize not only their own situation but the unfavorable fighting conditions forced on the Axis by the action in North Africa is underlined by Muscholin's astonishing declaration that it is Japan's intervention which is the "absolute guarantee" of Axis victory. Apparently the Duce has lost faith in the invincibility of Germany. But Japan, he begs his people to believe, is invincible. If Italy has come to the point where her only be prise in the farrawy Land of the Rising Sun, her prospects must be even more desperate than the world believes.

Atlanta Constitution: December 5.

The truly important result of recent developments in the European theater of war is that the Axis in that sector has been placed on the defensive in every theater of operations. For the first time since the war began in 1939, Hitler is definitive on or of the offensive picture. Unless there is some unexpected and startling change he must fight from now to the end with his back to the wall. Italy is in a bad stare of jitters, justifiably so. The noose now is all around Europe, and it will grow tighter and tighter until, at the end, it chokes to death Hitler, his Natis and all the hareful militaristic leaders of Germany, the brute of the nations.

And now with the tables turned against them the bullies of Bernin are holding that bombing of cities and civilians is horrible, inhuman and altogether ville. Berlin radio had begun broadcasting reports that Pope Pus may soon make representations to all belligerents against this feature of modern war. What of Warsawa ? What of Renaw were raiding, without mercy, all the weaker nations within their reach? Let them beg for mercy. We still hear, boulder than their squared, the voices of the dead, the voices of that vast host of innocent dead killed by Hitler and his gang.

The Atlanta Journal: December 4.

For his own cause, Mussolini would have done better not to have broken his altence of long months. True, it was a leaden rather than a golden altence, but it served to conceal in some measure the Dioc's mental if not his moral disintegration. His harange to the Italian people betrays more than the fears of a found-out charlatan. It gives an inkling also into the troubles

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of the Fascist regime and the dark mood of an overwrought populace. Such bombast can be of scart comfort to a people who were thrust into a war for which they had no heart.

Commonwealth: December 4-

Regarding the appointment of Herbert Lehman as the American Director of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation, it would be difficult to find a man more fitted for responsibility. But more important is the growing realisation that the United States is planning to take the lead in relief and rehabilitation to follow Allied victories in wast sectors of the globe. It is believed that more than five hundred million fellow-humans will be in need by the time hostilities are ended. We must start large-scale preparations for world-wide relief and rehabilitation now. It should help immeasuably in shortening the war.

Washington Post: December 2.

In his masterly survey of the war last Sunday Winston Churchill hammered away at the thesis that "one man and one man alone" is responsible for lasty's present plight. That man, of course, is Mussolimi. There must be many high-placed individuals in Italy, no doubt, who are willing and eager to jump on the allied bandwaggon now that the war is going badly for the Axis. Before making any deals with them we had better examine their credentials carefully. All the men who have betrayed Italy, and not merely Myssolimi alone, must suffer the consequences of their guilt.

New York Times: December 2.

On November 15th a spokesman of the German Government, describing Americans as "military dilettantes," predicted that our expedition into North Africa would turn out to be a second Dunkerque within fourteen days. The fourteen days have passed and our troops in North Africa are still moving forward... This is the "German line." But many facts, emerging both from Africa and Europe, make it a bundantly clear that Hitler and his generals were completely taken by surprise when the new front was opened. One evidence of this is the hesitancy and the fumbling of Hitler's present policy in France. He seems uncertain whether to make Field Marnhal von Rundsgedt a complete military dictator of the country, or whether to try to keep alive the myth that an "independent" government is still functioning at Vichy, or whether to wipe out Vichy callogether and create a new regime in Paris yith one of the two traitors, Deat or Doriog, as its head.

The New York Times: December 4-

Mussolini was right yesterday when he said he thought the Italian people wanted to hear from him. After his long silence in the face of unrelenting disaster, the victims of his policy must have wanted to know what he could say in defense of the runnous course that has left liaby in a worse position than defeated France. Obviously the speech of a sick man, whose health fails him with every thing tale in the superme crisis of his career, it is also the speech of a prisoner at the bar. In an interesting passage he admins and apologizes for stabbing France in the back on the grounds that nobody expected the French would collapse suddenly and anyway it was only one stab compared to a hundred France has made on Italy. Replying to Churchill's reference to the "once-happy" Italian people, he defends himself from blame for their present auffering by asserting that they have never been happy. Mussolini goes as far as he dares to impugn Hitler's military judgment when he asserts that he was not surprised at Russia's military power and he did not fail to recognize the importance of the Alkied landing in North Africa. But the most remarkable reflection of the European partner is the Duce's statement that the absolute guarantee of Axis victory is the invincibility—of Japan. Mussolini has had his say, and it opens the way for a concrete offer to Italy. To make clear to the weariest Italian peasant what he can expect at the hands of the powers ranged against Germany. Such an offer could convince a people looking for escape that they can refuse to follow Mussolini and still be safe from the horror he promises them if they do not fight to the end.

Our correspondent at Berne writes that under the régime established since the Germans denounced the armistic convention and occupied the whole of their territory the French will scon have to choose between being "collaborationist" or "terrorist." This is the only choice, it might be added, that Hitler gives to any one. You must either fight him with all your powers or become his abject slave. He had made neutrality impossible. It is what Mussell into the war on the side of Hitler but thought that he could fight merely for Italy's aggrandizement and then withdraw at will. It was what the Finnish leaders seemed to understand when they decided to join Hitler to get back their lost territory from Russis. It is what American isolationists failed to understand when they decided to understand when they thought we could maintain neutrality.

The Cleveland Plain Dealer : Dec. 3.

Those anguished shrieks heard over the Rome radio yesterday sounded like the cry of a trapped jackal. Benito Muscolini was trying to whip the Italian people into a state of mind to continue the war. But what is this we hear? The charlatta who dramed of restoring the Roman Empire is now reduced to making a public confession that he has called on the barbarians of the north to save him from his tornemoton. Been the Italian people must ask themselves what kind of Caesar is this who begs help from the spiritual descendants of Attla. It is not likely that the Italian people will be much impressed by Il Duce's ravings. In fact as the intensity of the Allied air radis increases it is entirely probable that the sentiment to get out of the war will spread throughout Italy.

The Dallas, Texas, News: December

Dallas Christians may appropriately join with the Jewish people of this community as they pray on Wednesday for the safety of those of their faith who thus far hwe survived the ordeal of Nazi persecution and oppression. Adolf Hitler seems bent on exterminating the Jews from Europe and has made heavy introdu towards this end. Other oppressed peoples are faring little better under his domination. Everyone needs to pray as well as to work for the saving of these unfortunate people from amihilation and for the hastening of the day when our armies will liberate them from the barbarian scourge.

The Washington Post: December

The United States has more than doubled its warplane production during the first year of war and since Pari Harbour American filests have ablo down five Axis planes for every United States plane lost, the Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce of America reported has night. Reviewing the miracle of aircraft production during the past year the Chamber listed this record of achievement: more planes have been produced in one year than were turned out by the industry in all the twenty-three years following the first world war. Production tounage has increased nearly goo per cent in terms of horsepower. The number of women employed in the industry has jumped 4240 per cent in terms of horsepower. The number of women employed in the industry has jumped from 4,300 to about 175,000. The value of planes sent to various war fronts was 44 billion dollars oungared with 14 billion dollars during the last year of peace.

Sir William Beveridge's report on social security in Great Britain appears to have borne out the interner excitement which has aurrounded it. It proposes, as he says, what amounts to a "revolution," though of a strictly British kind—in the antional life; but this is a "time for revolution, in represents a serious effort to grapple with the post war world, to relate existing social institutions to the great problems which are coming, and to develop a definite bluegrint for that future of peace and freedom for which the battled armies are now fighting. Prepared at the direction of the House of Commons, with the assistance of Government experts, by an outstanding Liberal economist with a long background of public service, it enjoys a far more official character than most similar efforts in Britain or in this country.

The complete text of the two volume report will be availed with the liveliest interest. The cable summaries have been able to give only the dramatic recommendations calling for the wide extension, consolidation, and liberalisation of the extisting social insurance system. Coverage for the entire population, including housewives; provision for every normal contingency of life, including marriage as well as maternity and funeral costs; "socialised modeline" for a maternity and funeral costs; "socialised modeline" for a maternity benefit scales—these are spectacular proposals. Behind them there is clearly an accopance of the even more spectacular vive that a definite "floor" must be put beneath the British standard of living, that it will be the function of the State to assure a certain minimum level as a matter of right to its citizens and to grade its benefits not in terms of charitable relief but a positive instruments.

So much seems evident from the cabled summaries. What is not available is the reasoning on which Sir William supports these proposals. His report deals with the single question of social insurance; but in recent speeches he has made it plain that he is thinking of social insurance as only one aspect of the general problem of demobilization, of restoring peacetime production and establishing a new society in which the maintenance of private enterprise will be related more accurately than in the past to the needs for governmental action. One cannot judge the recommendation of the report without having the whole argument on which it is based and the

Letter from America

No. 6 DECEMBER 4, 1942



HONOUR TO THE MEN OF TOULON!

NEW YORK

People of America have been deeply stirred by the heroic action of the French sallors at Toulon. America's reaction was summed up by the New York Times:

"When the Fleet went down in the Harbour of Toulon the France that lay buried under two years of humiliating 'collaboration' was resurrected. Of all the deeds of gallantry and heroism and tragic self-sacrifice that have sprung from resistance to Hitter's evil agression, none will shine in greater glory than that of the men of Toulon.

"It is a dreadful thing for men of the sea to sink their own ships, ships that havebeen the pride of their lives, to prevent them from falling into the enemy's hands.

"But the men of Toulon went far beyond this. Unable in all cases to sink their ships in time by blowing them up they deliberately fired on each other and went down with the fleet they loved.

"In the long annals of war no act of calm, disciplined mass heroism exceeds this.

"In his unparalleled record of evil, Hitler has forced terrible choices on those he has sought to destroy. He forced the British to fire on the French ships at Oran. He forced Americans to fire on Frenchmen at Morocco and Algiers. He forced Free French to fire on 'collaborating' French in Syria.

"Yesterday, at last, he forced Frenchmen, united in a single aim to fire on each other that they might help to free their country from servitude.

"These terrible choices were accepted. In each case men made the harder decision.

"The men of the French Fleet made the most bitter decision of all. But because they did not besitate to make it Hitler finds himself balked of the prize for which he has intrigued for more than two years. In an attempt to selze the French Fleet by a sudden pounce he has lost it forever.

"But he has lost far more. He has lost the last hope of 'collaboration' on the part of even the stupidest Frenchman. He has demonstrated more flagrantly than ever that he has not the slightest respect for any promises he makes or any treaty he signs. He has shown once again how pointless it is



Governor Herbert H. Lehman.

FOOD CONTROLLER FOR WAR FEEDING

FOR WAR FEEDING
WASHINGTON
President Roosevelt has announced the appointment of Herbert Lehman, Governor of New York State as Director of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation. This gives one of the most able administrators America has a job similar to that of Herbert Hoover in the last war. Hoover's work in feeding the hungry people of Belgium will never be forgotten.

To Governor Lehman falls the tremendous task of getting food, clothing and medical supplies to the people of the world as they are liberated from Axis domination by the United Nations' armies and to prepare for an orderly and equal distribution of the world's food supply after the war.

and to prepare for an orderly and equal distribution of the world's food supply after the war.

Ten days after the last shot was fired in France the first shipload of food sailed from American ports. This time we cannot and will not wait for the cease fire order. President Roosevelt has announced that food and medical supplies are to be sent to North Africa at once.

As the Herald Tribune said: "Governor Lehman has been called to a big job, an exciting one and a job of first importance—not perhaps to the military strategy of the war but to that much larger 'strategy' of decency, hope and human promise which lends its ultimate strength to the massed armies of freedom. The Swastika and the Rising Sun swept across the earth in a tide of want, robbery and exploitation; on the flags of the United Nations, on the contrary, there has always rested the promise of food materials, the rehabilitating power of tremendous productive energies which must serve the world if only because they are organised in an economic system which knows that only in that way can it serve itself. . . As territories are freed from the Hitler blight their relief and reconstruction are quite as imperative for the United Nations on their own account as for the victims. It is to this great problem that Governor Lehman has been summoned."

STORY OF THE GREAT AFRICAN CONVOY

WASHINGTON

WASHINGTON

The United Nations' Armada which moved on North Africa was composed of 650 vessels, 350 of them ships of war which protected the expedition. It was the largest amphibious operation in history, and it is difficult for the mind to grasp what it meant to mobilize, load, dispatch and protect so gigantic a mass of shipping.

It is particularly difficult for the minds of the Axis leaders to grasp the point, and their propaganda machinery has run into some grave difficulties trying to explain how such a gigantic convoy could be moved right before their eyes, so to speak. They dare not use the simple explanation: that the United Nations have control of the seas, and that the United Nations are able to ensure the safety of a convoy of this size in the Atlantic, while at the same time their forces are inflicting a major defeat on the enemy in the Pacific.

a major defeat on the enemy in the Pacific.

It is an Army's job to fight a war on land: it is, and will always be, a Navy's job to get the Army to the fighting front. It is the Air Arm's job to see that the way is clear, or to advise the forces to come of dangers ahead, to play its part in keeping the sea lanes open, and to hold command of the air over the route which the convoy is travelling. It is in every sense a combined operation, and in the case of the convoy to Africa the combination worked perfectly.

The 850 ships and an unrevealed number of aeroplanes of the African expedition were assembled at widely scattered points, then moved over long stretches of air and submarine-infested ocean to their particular beaches and landing fields along a thousand-mile coast, arriving at the exact moment to launch a co-ordinated attack.

Timed to coincide with their arrival, British and American parachute troops made the longest invasion flight in history—1,500 miles non-stop from England to Africa, flying through the night, unloading to fight the next morning beside their French Allies.

And every piece of equipment sent in that convoy, from big howiters to radio sets, was ready to go into action the (Continued on page 4.)

(Continued on page 4.)

LISTENING-IN

LISTENING-IN
NEW YORK
A man left a cafe in Brussels
saying: "Well, I must go home to
listen to the news in English."
Almost as soon as he got there the
Gestapo arrived.
"Do you listen to the shortwave!" they demanded.
"Every day," said the Belgian.
"Then where is your radio!"
"I haven't a radio myself, but the
walls are thin and I listen to the
German officer's next door."

AMERICA REMEMBERS LIDICE

The hush usual before a big broadcast fell over the world's largest studio—8-H in Radio City. An expectant audience of more than 1,000 almost literally held its breath. On stage, the NBC Symphony Orchestra, directed by Dr. Frank Black, tensely awaited its cue. In front, the actors, equally intent, stood before microphones. The second hand on the clock moved slowly around. At precisely 10.30 p.m. the on-the-air signal flashed. And Alexander Woollcott introduced the radio premiere of Edna St. Vincent Millay's epic poem "The Murder of Lidice."

How did the year turn—how did it run In the year of nineteen-forty-one?— In a village called Lidice?

First came spring, with planting and sowing;
Then came summer with haying and hoeing;
Then came autumn, and the Harvest Home . . .
Then came Heydrich the Hangman, the Hun . . .

Paul Muni, as narrator, headed the radio cast of nine. As the actors read their lines, they unfolded the frightful story of Nazi brutality which last June obliterated the Czecho-Slovakian village of 1,200 souls.

"Husband, why is your face so gray?"
"My face is gray from fear.
Heydrich the Hangman died today
Of his wounds, the men in Kladno say."
"Good riddance to wicked rubbish,

"Good riddance to whence I say ...

No man was he, but a ravening beast ...

Do they know who killed him?"
"Not yet, they say;
Though they've smoked him out for many a day ...

But they claim we hide him here ..."

To the Writers' War Board, that dis-tinguished group of authors voluntarily pushing the war effort with words, Miss Millay had created "one of the finest pieces to come out of the war."

They marched them out to the public square,
Two hundred men in a row;
And every step of the distance there,
Each stone in the road, each man did

The whole world holds in its arms today The murdered Village of Lidice, Like the murdered body of a little child . . .

And moans of vengeance frightful to

hear from the throat of the world, must reach his ear,

The maniac killer who still runs wild . . .

Farewell, Churn

WASHINGTON
U.S. patent No. 2,299,440 was issued on a new process to make butter out of cream without the laborious process of churning.
Instead of a churn, the process uses a boiler and a cream separator. The cream is mixed with water, heated and whirled (still hot) in the separator or in a specially designed centrifugal machine. The product that flows out contains 80 per cent. butter fat, which classes it as highgrade butter.

THE PLAIN PEOPLE OF EUROPE

SAMUEL GRAFTON.

American Journalist

It is now possible to make a number of plausible predictions as to what will go on in the minds of the plain people of Europe, following recent events.

Germans have been told by Hitler that they are now on the defensive. They will soon begin to feel the special cramps of the constricted defensive posture. The inevitable result of defensive warfare is self-questioning. Germans will ask, as we have asked for two years: "What happened, what went wrong?"

But Germans will not be allowed to ask these questions, nor to answer them, in public.

public.

So, pressures are bound to rise in Germany, and these are bound to be pressures against the German Government. It will be a strange mediev of pressures, in part from German industry, seeing its plants knocked down, night after night; in part from the German people, to whom jobs and farms far away can no longer be offered; in part from within the Natiparty, as it wonders what went wrong with the magic.

One remembers, the self-questioning.

party, as it wonders what went wrong with
the magic.

One remembers the self-questioning,
flaring up instantly in England after Dunkirk: "Our school system must have
been wrong!" Or, "We didn't give
opportunity to enough of our people!"
Or, "England as we knew it was not
adequate;, we shall have to remake it!"
And our own American debate, so long,
so loud, and so useful.

Predictions as to the course of popular
thinking are the safest of all predictions;
they rarely let you down, if they are based
on faith that the people do think, and
that the people are not fools. Thus we
can say, with absolute certainty, that
Germans will think, even if they must
hide in closets to do so: "We cannot
build enough equipment to defend every
beach in Europe forever. Defence will not
win the war. It gives all the advantages
to the enemy. He can attack wherever he
decides and we must be ready everywhere,

simultaneously." We know the Germans will think these thoughts, because we thought them ourselves; and it is no good to consider the Germans as faceless people who do not think; that merely makes the war needlessly harder.

In a profound sense, we have struck a blow for the liberation of the German people by taking French North Africa. We have new bases, and they have new questions to answer, and questions are the beginning of wisdom. If the history of popular action has any meaning, the period of obedience in Germany is drawing to its end.

beginning of wisdom. If the history of popular action has any meaning, the period of obedience in Germany is drawing to its end.

Valhalla is shut down for repairs, and from now on history is going to take place for the Germans in their own streets and houses.

Some change of some kind is also certain to take place in the relationship between the ordinary people of Germany and the ordinary people of Germany and the ordinary people of the conquered countries. My crystal ball isn't very clear on it, but, with Europe ringed, for Germans to keep thumping these people will be empty victory in a jailyard brawl during exercise hour.

It will lose meaning and savour. The conquered people are stronger, because of what we have recently done. France fights again, from Africa, as Reynaud proposed two years ago. The Frenchman in France is, curlously, a freer man than the disaffected German in Germany; he doesn't have to pretend to like it. If things become bad enough, some Germans (remember that Hitler never had a majority) may come to look upon such Frenchmen, oddly enough, as fighters in their own fight.

We tend to yield to the Hitler theory that all Germans are behind him; this, the most fantastic item in his propaganda, has been the most successfully sold to us.

If we recover our faith in people, any people, just long enough to recognise that this is the one thing Hitler says which can't possibly be true, all sorts of interesting doors swing open. The French slave then becomes the German liberator, a thought which will startle you in precise proportion to your disbelief that the world makes sense.

NO PEACE FOR HITLER

WASHINGTON

WASHINGTON
Senator Tom Connally, Chairman of
the Senate of the Foreign Relations Committee, has made the following statement:
"Hitler has now but one aim—to
prolong the war.
"Defeated in Egypt, driven back in
Russia, on the defensive in North Africa
and every other theatre of war, Hitler
knows he cannot win. None of his successes, so-called, have been carried through
to complete viczory. His all-out bombing
of Britain only cost him the flower of the
Luftwaffe. His desperate efforts to break
down the Russian people ended in bloody
disaster before Leningrad, Moscow and
Stalingrad. His dream of conquering the
Suer and Middle East has been shattered,
along with the reputation of Rommel.
His vaunted submarines could not prevent
an armada of 850 vessels from steaming
to Africa and landing a huge Allied army.
His Japanese allies are held in check and
being driven back. His Italian allies are
a heavy liability.

"Hitler sees on every side the initiative
passed to the United Nations. He is
bending all his efforts to the task of
holding up the day of their inevitable
triumph. . . .

"Hitler is becoming desperate because he knows he cannot win. He knows that once his armies begin to crack, all Europe—including his own allies, his own people—will rise against him. He knows how terrible the day of retribution will be when all his private armies and private fortresses will not be strong enough to save him.

"He believes he has his last chance— a stalemate and a negotiated peace. He believes he may win this by prolonging the war and thus retaining power for himself and the Nazis.

"But the world has learned that there can be no compromise with Hitler or Hitlerism. The United Nations are in the war to the finish, and they mean to finish it speedily and victoriously."

U.S. to India-Sixty Hours

NEW YORK

General Bissel, commanding officer of the 10th U.S. Army Air Force, reported from New Delhi that 'planes are being flown to India from the U.S. in 98 hours. The actual flying time of one heavy bomber was 60 hours 12 minutes, he said.

RUBBER SCRAP MAKES MILLION TYRES MONTHLY

AKRON, Ohio

More than 1,000,000 tyres made of reclaimed rubber are expected to be available each month. These will be manufactured from allotments of the 460,000 tons of acrap rubber collected in recent months, and it is believed that enough acrap has been accumulated to keep existing plants working at capacity for the next eighteen months.

Scrap rubber contributions from the public have far exceeded forecasts made earlier in the year, and that total may rise materially before the end of 1942. Surveys sponsored by factories here indicate that the remaining scrap throughout the nation is still of huge proportions.

While purchase of tyres will be under the jurisdiction of local rationing boards, estimates here indicate that the cars of war workers and others in essential industry-including at least 20,000,000 passenger cars, buses and other carrier units—will be kept rolling.

Although the reclaimed tyres are supposed to have 10,000 miles of service each, this cannot be obtained unless there is a strict adherence to these rules. Drive only when necessary, do not exceed thirty-five miles an hour, maintain a proper degree of inflation and have regular inspection. Manufacturers are stressing the speed restriction as a safety measure as well as observance of a Federal regulation. Beyond thirty-five miles an hour there are perils which grow with every mile.

Other projects call for increases in the expansion of synthetic rubber manufacturing units. This has been emphasised by John L. Collyer, President of the B. F. Goodrich Company.

"Since the January authorisation of a total capacity of 400,000 tons a year of butadiene synthetic rubber, increases have been authorised and the present programme is made up of plants designed to produce 705,000 tons of synthetic rubber of the butadiene-styrene type, 132,000 tons of butyk rubber and 40,000 tons of neoprene, a total of approximately 900,000 tons a year. This rubber and that contained in finished products and our stock piles of scrap and reclaimed rubber must bridge the

STEEL OUTPUT SETS NEW RECORD

PITTSBURGH

The steel industry has shattered all records for output by nearly 200,000 tons last month by producing 7,584,864 net tons of ingots and steel for castings, at 100.1 per cent. of its rated capacity, which is the largest in its history.

For the first ten months of 1942, production amounts to 71,604,470 net tons, a rew high for the period and within 11,200,000 tons of the best previous full year's production, which was 82,836,946 net tons in 1941. The tenmonth output was 4,600,000 tons greater than output in the whole of 1940, which was the next best year in steel production.

Who Wants The Axis Around, Anyway?

WASHINGTON
The General Federation of Labor
in Argentina, in a message to
President Castillo, has demanded
the rupture of relations with
Germany, Italy, and Japan.

THE WEEK IN AMERICA

WASHINGTON

With the cutting of a ribbon, the new wilderness highway to Alaska was formally opened. . . . The first tests of tubeless to casings indicate they'll work. . . . President Roosevelt has sent a message to the Sultan of Morocco pledging a new era of peace and prosperity for North Africa after the defeat of the Axis. . . The President also announced the receipt of messages of congratulation on operations in North Africa from the Presidents of Syria and Lebanon and the Prime Minister of Iraq. . . The Federal Reserve Board announced this week that more than fifty per cent. of the nation's industrial capacity is now used for war production, and it is freely predicted that this proportion will be greatly increased with more and more industrial energy going into the production of offensive arms. . . A symptom of industrial speed-up was the announcement by War Production Board Chairman Nelson that the country's aircraft production for next year will be double the output of 1942, not only in 'pianes but in tonnage. Emphasis will be on combat 'pianes. To accelerate this programme immediately, a large order for cargo 'planes was cancelled this week in favor of bombers. . . The Government moved to assure the retention of sufficient skilled personnel on the industrial front by forbidding the enlistment of essential aircraft and shipbuilding workers, and systematic plans for deferment in the draft were in the making. . . War Manpower Chairman McNutt has issued a list of 3,000 occupations to guide draft boards in determining occupational deferment. President Roosevelt has directed the War and Navy Departments not to accept Government employees in armed services until their essential status has been determined. Meanwhile, due to the flow of manpower into industry and the armed forces, McNutt has appealed to clitiens in agricultural areas to help harvest the crops and process foods. . . An American light cruiser came home from the Solomons for repairs with the unparalleled record of having sunk, or helped sink, six Japanese wars

MEXICO ALSO FAVORS ITALIANS

Following the lead of the United States, the Mexican Government has announced that 4,552 Italian nationals residing at Mexico will no longer be considered enemy aliens.

The Mexican Government

that 4,552 Italian nationals restains a Mexico will no longer be considered enemy alliens.

The Mexican Government's move is dictated by the facts that the Italians in Mexico have proved to be loyal residents, and that Mexicans in Italy have not been molested or subjected to hardships. It was said in secret police circles that no more than three Italians have been arrested in Mexico since this country entered the war.

Police circles emphasised that the Italians had not participated in a single case of espionage or attempted sabotage, whereas Germans and Japanese had been very active. For instance, recently, while the writer was in police headquarters, two Japanese were brought in under suspicion of fifth column activities.

The Italians in Mexico, mostly old laborers and farmers, have been quietly continuing their work whenever police restrictions permit. Under the laws regulating the activities of enemy aliens, a certain number of Italians have been concentrated in the Mexico Federal District, together with Japanese and Germans, and they are forbidden to reside in coastal areas or other strategic locations.

In addition to 4,552 Italians registered in the 1940 census, there are in Mexico about 10,000 others who are either naturalised or Mexican nationals of Italian origin. The Italians are the smallest group of Axis nationals in this country, there being 5,582 Germans and 5,142 Japanese citizens, according to the 1940 census. Of course, some of these aliens left with their embassies when Mexico severed relations with the Axis.

ANOTHER HOLE PLUGGED

WASHINGTON
A spokesman for the Board of Economic Warfare said that United Nations' control of Dakar plugged the largest single hole in the blockade of Axis-occupied Europe from which Germany received Important war supplies. The great port on the Atlantic is a source of sisal, necessary to manufacture rope, woven transport-cases, and binding materials. Five thousand tons annually are now off Hitler's import list, as well as thousands of carats of industrial diamonds essential for hard-steel machining operations in war industries, rubber, cotton, hides, skins, castor beans, gum copal, an essential component of rust-resisting varnishes for exposed metal in guns, tanks, shells and 'planes.

The Board of Economic Warfare pointed out that blockade-runners may attempt to take out supplies, but ships small enough to use tiny African inlets would have difficulty in cluding Allied sea and air patrols, now based on the airfields of French West Africa. WASHINGTON

NEW PLASTIC

WILMINGTON, Del.

Hercules Powder chemists have developed a new rubber-like plastic from cotton and alcohol. Cellulose is the base. Raw materials used in the manufacture of ethyl cellulose are cotton linters or wood pulp, common salt, and alcohol from natural gas or from fermented farm products. The plastic can be used instead of rubber for hospital sheeting, gun covers, tents, garden hose, mason-jar rings, surgical tape, rubber gloves, electrical tape and wire insulations.

CORRIGAN HEADS THE RIGHT WAY

Ireland will remember the slight young fellow with the broad grin and the grimy leather jacket who set a rickety plane down in a farmer's field near Dublin four years ago and asked: "How far is it to 'Frisco?" He had set out from a New York airport, he said, with clearance papers from aviation officials, to fly west to San Francisco. Instead, he fiew 3,000 miles east, across the Atlantic, and landed in Ireland. With good Irish humor, he pretended he didn't know what he had done. He knows all right what he is doing now, and he's heading the right way—across America and across the Atlantic—ferrying planes to the training fields and the fighting fronts.

Certainly Ireland remembers Douglas Corrigan, the modest young pilot, who gave the world such a laugh that he was called "Wrong Way Corrigan" for years after.

The big-time reception which America.

gave the world such a laugh that he was called "Wrong Way Corrigan" for years after.

The big-time reception which America ormerly gave ocean-flying aviators upon their return home was denied Corrigan. For one thing, it took him some time to get his patched-up plane ready for shipment. For another, Howard Hughes, now a film financier, had monopolized the headlines for a day or two at the time of Corrigan's return, by flying around the world in record-breaking time. So no telephone books were torn up to shower down on Corrigan as he rode up the canyon that is New York's Broadway. He did not ride. He landed unnoticed except by a few, saw his crated plane unloaded, and was whisked away by friends.

But the moving pictures had their eye on him, and Corrigan was in no financial position to refuse. He acted in a movie. It was so bad it was funny. So he shandoned that career and slipped out of public view. There was talk that he ran a roadside stand on a Texas highway, bought with the money he made from the lone film.

On the first anniversary of his "wrone.

with the money he made from the lone film.

On the first anniversary of his "wrong way" flight to Ireland, Corrigan married a Texas schoolteacher, Miss Elizabeth Marvin, a modest lady who would have no photographers at her wedding.

When the United States entered the war, the Corrigans moved west, where many of America's aircraft are built, and it was said he was working in one of the largest of the plane factories. (A fellow who could patch up an old crate and make it fly the Atlantic surely would be a handy worker in a plant.)

But that wasn't enough for Corrigan. He wanted to pilot ships, to see them on their way to the world's battlefronts. He applied to the Ferry Command, which uses civilians as well as army men for ferrying planes from factory to field, from field to battlefront.

He was accepted, trained, and now proudly wears the emblem of the U.S. Ferry Command over his heart.

The Generals Report

Around this city they tell the story of the report of the 1942 campaigns which German generals gave Hitler. "I've taken everything but Cairo," von Rommel said. "I've taken everything but Stalingrad," von Bock said. "I've taken everything but Baku," another reported.

Hitler summed it up. "Meine Herren, we've taken everything but victory!"



"Wrong Way Corrigan bombers across the Atlantic. now flies

AFRICAN CONVOY

(Continued from page I.)

(Continued from page 1.)

moment it landed. Supplies were so packed that they could be unloaded anywhere in definite priority. It meant months of night-and-day work in arms depots and rallway stations all over Britain, with thousands of persons involved who had no idea of what was going on. The entire operation was probably the best-kept secret invasion move ever made.

That is the story behind the expedition—when the great Armada moved southward to the attack, it was too late for the enemy to do anything about it. The umbrella of the air forces, the screen of the destroyers, were too effective. One or two ineffectual shots were fired—and the greatest military movement in history was a success.

Control of the seas—that is the simple answer to the question of how it was done. It must be emphasised that the United Nations had not only to see this great convoy safely through the Atlantic; they had also to ensure the success of our forces in the far-off Pacific, where a powerful enemy is also to be faced. The miserable failure of the Jayanese expedition against the Solomons shows what can happen to a convoy without control of the seas.

Representative Carl Vinson of Georgia, Chairman of the Naval Committees of the House of Representatives, points out how the United Nations are achieving—and holding—control of the seas. He says: "The instruments of war known to be effective in dealing with submarines—aeroplanes, dirigibles and specialised boats—are now becoming a-vallable in large quantities."

Rear-Admiral Emory S. Land, War Shipping Administrator, tells another part of the story: "Eight million tons of ships in 1942 and 16 million tons of ships in 1943—the goals set by President Roosevelt—will be delivered on schedule. Ships are being bullt faster than they are being sunk."

Admiral Emory S. Land, War Shipping Admiral Emory S. Land, war shipping hattleships in three vears instead of five. We are now buil

BOOKS AMERICA IS READING

by Douglas Southall Preeman.

The distinguished biographer of R. E. Lee tells us the true and valiant story of the young officers—Pelham, Taylor, and others—who sparked the Army of Northern Virginia.

Northern Virginia.

LOOK TO THE MOUNTAIN
by LeGrand Cannon, Jr.
A colonial novel of New Hampshire,
warmly lit and affectionate. Native idiom
and humor and the majestic spirit of
Chocorua make this more than an
entertaining romance.

Chocorus make this more than an entertaining romance.

THEY WERE EXPENDABLE

by W. L. White.

The heroic story of the Motor Torpedo Boats at Manila, narrated by Lleutenant Bulkeley and his Junior Grades, this tells as no other book what the young Americans experienced and thought during the fall of the Philippines.

ANGEL MO' AND HER SON: ROLAND HAYES

by MacKinley Helm.

Roland Hayes, whose parents were slaves, is today an American artist of international reputation. His friend, MacKinley Helm, has set down the artist's autobiography in prose of a singing quality. THE SONG OF BERNADETTE

by Franz Werfel.

A historical novel depicting the miracle of Lourdes. Remarkable in its range of character and feeling, this story is refreshing for its faith in a doubtful hour. THE PRINCIPLES OF POWER

by Guglielmo Ferrero.

Very thoughtful is this analysis of legitimate and illegitimate government as they have been developed in the era of democracy.

THE COMING BATTLE OF GERMANY by William B. Ziff.

THE COMING BATTLE OF GERMANY

by William B. Ziff.
A trenchant analysis of the German blits and the Allied retreats, this book emphasizes the enormous potential of air power compared with the ground strategy of the United Nations.

The Voice of America

Listen to "America Calling Europe," rebroadcast from London 9,20 a.m. daily, on 1500 metres, 200 kilocycles long wave. 373 metres, 804 kilo-cycles medium wave, 48,54 short wave.

Short-wave news broadcasts at the following hours (LS.T.):-

6 a.m.	WLWO	19.7
7.0	WLWO	19.7
11.30	WCBX	19.6
2 p.m.	WGEA	19.56
2.15	WGEA	19.56
3.0	WLWO	19.7
3.30	WCBX	19.6
3.45	WCRC	16.8
4.0	WCW	18.9
5.0	WLWO	19.7
6.0	WNBI	19.7
7.0	WCW	18.9
7.30	WCBX	19.6
8.0	WLWO	19.7
9.0	wcw	18.9
9.30	WCDA	16.8
	WRUL	25.4
10.0	WLWO	19.7
10.15	WGEA	19.56
10.13	WRUL	25.4
11.0	WGEA	19.56

AN HISTORIC DOCUMENT: FULL STATEMENT OF AMERICAN HIERARCHY ON U.S. WAR AIMS

In risponse to many requests, LETTER PROM AMERICA includes in this issue the full text of the statement on victory and peace issued by the American hierarchy of archbishops and bishops of the Roman Catholic Church. The document is the d approved by to members of the merican hierarchy at their annual heral meeting in Washington in the merican meeting in Washington in the merican and is signed by the following shishops and bishops: Edward ooney, Archbishop of Detroit; John McNicholas, Archbishop of Cinnati; Samuel A. Stritch, Archop of Chicago; John J. Mitty, chbishop of San Francisco; Joseph Rummel, Archbishop of New York; John Mark nanon, Bishop of Erie; John F. Noll, shop of Fort Wayne; Karl J. Alter, hop of Toledo; John A. Daffy, shop of Buffalo. The complete text of statement:

Our country has been forced into the most devastating war of all time. This war, which is the absorbing interest of all the world, involves unquestionably the most important moral issue of today. Some nations are united in waging war to bring about a slave world—a world that would deprive man of his divinely conferred dignity, reject human freedom and permit no religious liberty. We are associated with other Powers in a deadly conflict against these nations to maintain a free world. This conflict of principles makes compromise impossible.

While war is the last means to which a nation should resort, circumstances arise when it is impossible to avoid it. At times it is the positive duty of a nation to wage war in the defense of life and right. Our country now finds itself in such circum-

SOLEMN ASSURANCE

even while we meet here, the exigencies of war have driven our armed forces into unexpected areas of conflict in Africa. Our President in letters addressed to the rulers of all the friendly nations concerned, has given solemn assurance that the United States has no designs of permanent conquest or sordid interest. Our aim, he pledged, is to guarantee to countries under Even while we meet here, the exigencies quest or sordid interest. Our aim, he pledged, is to guarantee to countries under temporary occupation as well as to our own the right to live in security and peace. We bishops are confident that the pledge of our Chief Executive, not lightly made, faithfully mirrors the mind and conscience of the American people. That pledge is in full harmony with the expression of high purpose which the President made to Catholic bishops of the United States when our own contry was plunged into war: "We shall win this war and in victory we shall seek not vengeance but the establishment of an international order in which the spirit of Christ shall rule the hearts of men and of sations."



Archbishop Francis J. Spellman (centre) of New York City is seen with Bishop Miguel de Andrea of Buenos Aires (left) and Bishop Miguel Dario Miranda of Mexico at a dinner in New York for delegates attending the Inter-American Seminar on Social Studies.

From the moment that our country declared war we have called upon our people to make the sacrifices which, in Catholic doctrine, the virtues of patriotism, justice and charity impose. In every section of this nation the voices of our bishops have been heard. Their instructions, their pastorals, their counsels, their appeals for prayers are an encouragement and an inspiration to their flocks. Our priests as chaplains on the war front have inspired confidence in the men whom they so realously serve. Our men in the armed so zealously serve. Our men in the arme forces deserve unstinted gratitude for their heroic services to our country and high commendation for the faithful practice of their religion.

AN ENDURING PEACE

In every diocese prayers have been incessantly offered, asking God's pardon for the sins of individuals and nations, begging divine mercy for all, pleading for a victory which will have the sanction of infinite justice and for an enduring peace founded on the love of God and the love of all men. Priests and people have carnestly founded on the love of God and the love of all men. Priests and people have carnestly prayed that the Holy Spirit may guide our President and all who share with him the heavy responsibilities of directing the war efforts and of winning the victory from which all peoples will derive a just and lasting

In the discharge of our pastoral responsibility, we are gravely concerned about the world peace of tomorrow.

Secularism cannot write a real and lasting peace. Its narrow vision does not encompass the whole man, it cannot

evaluate the spirituality of the human soul and the supreme good of all mankind. Exploitation cannot write a real and lasting peace. Where greedy might and selfish expediency are made the substitutes of justice there can be no securely ordered

Totalitarianism, whether Nazi, Com-munist or Fascist, cannot write a real and lasting peace. The State that usurps total powers, by that very fact, becomes a despot to its own people and a menace to the family of nations.

DIGNITY OF HUMAN PERSONALITY

The spirit of Christianity can write a real and lasting peace in justice and charity to all nations, even to those not Christian. In the epochal revolution through which

In the epochal revolution through which the world is passing, it is very necessary for its to realize that every man is our brother in Christ. All should be convinced that every man is endowed with the dignity of human personality, and that he is entitled by the laws of nature to the things neces-sary to sustain life in a way conformable to human dignity. In the post-war world, the profit element of industry and com-merce must be made subservient to the common good of communities and nations if we are to have a lasting peace with if we are to have a lasting peace with justice and a sense of true brotherhood for all our neighbors. The inequalities of nations and of individuals can never give to governments or to the leaders of industry or commerce a right to be unjust. They cannot, if they follow the fixed principles of morality, maintain or encourage conditions under which men cannot live according to standards befitting human personality.

MUST WAGE GLOBAL WAR

MUST WAGE GLOBAL WAR

Unfortunately, in our day we must wage a global war to secure peace. War is abnormal and necessarily brings on abnormal conditions in the life of a nation.

During the war crisis free men must surrender many of their liberties. We ask our people to be united and prepared to make every sacrifice which our Government deems necessary for a just and enduring peace through the victory of our armed forces. We are confident that they will perform their war-time duties gladly because they know that our country has been the defender, not the destroyer, of liberties and has in the past always re-established the full measure of peace-time freedom on the conclusion of hostilities.

Our Government has announced that the war emergency makes it necessary to employ an unprecedented number of women in industry. While we are wholeheartedly co-operating with our Government in the prosecution of the war, we must, as shepherds of souls, express our grave concern about the Christian home in our beloved country in these crucial days. When mothers are engaged in industry a serious child-care problem necessarily arises. Every effort must be made to limit, as far as necessity permits, the employment of mothers. Due provision in keeping with American traditions should be made for the day-care of the children of working mothers.

ROLE WOMEN MUST PLAY

The health and moral welfare of mothers employed in industry should be thoroughly safeguarded. With a full realization of the safeguarded. With a full realization of the role which women must play in winning the war and of the extreme measures that our Government must take, we ask that all try to realize the dangers involved, especially the moral dangers. We urge that there be a wholesome moral atmosphere wherever

wholesome moral atmosphere wherever women are employed.

We know that patriotic mothers are generous in giving their sons to the defense of our country. We express their concern, and ours, about youths of eighteen years of age who are now to be called to the armed forces. We hope that special moral safeguards will shield them, so that they may serve their country without moral blemish.

blemish.

We express our deepest sympathy to our brother bishops in all countries of the world where religion is persecuted, liberty abolished and the rights of God and man are violated. Since the murderous assault on Poland, utterly devoid of every semblance of humanity, there has been a premeditated and systematic extermination of the people of this nation. The same satanic technique is being applied to many other peoples. We feel a deep sense of revulsion against the cruel indignities heaped upon the Jews in conquered countries and upon defenseless peoples not of our faith. We join with our brother bishops in subjugated France in a statement attributed to them: "Deeply

moved by the mass arrests and maltreat-ment of Jews, we cannot stifle the cry of our conscience. In the name of humanity and Christian principles, our voice is raised in favor of imprescriptible rights of human nature." We raise our voice in protest against despotic tyrants who have lost all sense of humanity by condemning thousands of innocent persons to death in subjugated countries as acts of reprisal; by placing other thousands of innocent victums in concentration camps, and by permitting unnumbered persons to cie of starvation.

BENEFITS OF FREE INSTITUTIONS

The war has brought to the fore condi-tions that have long been with us. The full tions that have long been with us. The full benefits of our free institutions and the rights of our minorities must be openly acknowledged and honestly respected. We ask this acknowledgment and respect particularly for our colored fellow citizens. They should enjoy the full measure of economic opportunities and advantages which will enable them to realize their hope and ambition to join with us in prehope and ambition to join with us in prehope and ambition to join with us in pre-serving and expanding in changed and changing social conditions our national heritage. We fully appreciate their many native gifts and aptitudes which, ennobled and enriched by a true Christian life, will make them a powerful influence in the establishment of a Christian social order.

We recall the words of Pope Pius XIII
expressing his paternal solicitude for the
colored people of our country. In a letter
addressed to the American bishops on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the establishment of the American hierarchy, His Holiness said: "We confess that we His Holiness said: "We confess that we feel a special paternal affection which is certainly inspired of heaven for the Negro people dwelling among you: for in the field of religion and education we know that they need special care and comfort and are very deserving of it. We, therefore, invoke an abundance of heavenly blessing and we pray fruitful success for those whose generous zeal is devoted to their welfare." (Serum Lastringen 1920) Laetitiae-1939.)

GREETINGS TO BROTHER BISHOPS

We send our cordial greetings to our brother bishops of Latin America. We have been consoled by recent events which give a sincere promise of a better under-standing by our country of the peoples of Mexico, Central and South America. Mexico, Central and South America. Citizens of these countries are bound to us by the closest bonds of religion. They are not merely our neighbors. They are our brothers professing the same faith. Every effort made to rob them of their Catholic religion or to ridicule it or to offer them a substitute for it is deeply resented by the peoples of these countries and by American Catholics. These efforts prove to be a disturbing factor in our international relations. The traditions, the spirit, the to be a disturbing factor in our international relations. The traditions, the spirit, the background, the culture of these countries are Catholic. We bishops are anxious to foster every worthy movement which will strengthen our amicable relations with the republics of this continent. We express the hope that the mistakes of the past which were offensive to the dignity of our southern brothers, their culture and their religion, will not continue. A strong bond uniting in true friendship all the countries of the Western Hemisphere will exercise a most potent influence on a shattered post-war

PEACE PLANS OF POPE PIUS XII

We urge the serious study of the peace plans of Pope Pius XII which insist that justice be inspired by love—first, love of God and, then, love of every human being. "The command of love among individuals found in the Gospels," said Benedict XV, "differs in no respect from that which should reign among states and peoples "(Pacem Dei, Benedict XV, 1920). If we are not to have a Christian peace, then we shall be given only an armistice and we shall begin to prepare for a third world conflict. We conclude by urging, again, unceasing prayers: the prayer of all prayers by priests, the holy Mass; prayers addressed to the Blessed Virgin that she will intercede with her Divine Son for mercy on a warblighted world. We ask that Tuesday, December eighth, the Feast of the Immaculate Conception of Our Blessed Mother, the Patroness of our country, be set aside as a special day of prayerful supplication. In its observance, the priests and faithful of every diocese will follow the timely instruction of their bishop; we recommend the recitation of the rosary in common, both in our churches and in our homes. We trust that the children of our country will, in response to the many appeals of our Holy Father, offer their innocent prayers to will, in response to the many appeals of our Holy Father, offer their innocent prayers to God for peace. Let us all unite in praying for a victory and for a peace acceptable to God.

Signed by the members of the adminis-trative board, National Catholic Welfare Conference, in the name of the bishops of the United States:

EDWARD MOONEY, Archbishop of

JOHN T. McNICHOLAS, Archbishop

SAMUEL A. STRITCH, Archbishop of

JOHN J. MITTY, Archbishop of San

JOSEPH F. RUMMEL, Archbishop of

FRANCIS J. SPELLMAN, Archbishop

JOHN MARK GANNON, Bishop of

JOHN F. NOLL, Bishop of Fort Wayne.

KARL J. ALTER, Bishop of Toledo.

JOHN A. DUFFY, Bishop of Buffalo.

Translation. Jup full

MOROCCO

The Resident General

Rabat 27 November 1942.

To: His Excellency Monsieur Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, Washington.

Mr. President,

After having asked Major General Patton to forward to you the reply of His Majesty Sidi Mohammed to the message which your Excellency was good enough to send him through me, I wish today to reply myself to the communication which I received from you.

In your letter you stated the great interest and sympathy with which you had followed the efforts of the representative of France in Morocco to avoid a German-Italian occupation of this I wish to thank you from the bottom of my heart for this country. proof of friendly understanding by which I was deeply touched.

Since the tragic events of June 1940, I have indeed had in mind only one line of conduct, and only one preoccupation, which was to oppose myself absolutely to the occupation of bases in Morocco by the Axis Forces. The results of such an occupation would have been of grave consequences in relation to the eventual development of the war. Governor General Boisson and I have always been in agreement to avoid all German domination. This firm determination on our part allowed the Marshal, who, since the Armistice promised to defend the French territories in Africa against all, to resist constant and menacing pressure.

This promise has been maintained through painful and sad circumstances. Our Army fought through a sense of duty and contrarily to their personal sentiments, knowing that they had in front of them the soldiers of a great friendly people who had been their companions in arms in the battle of France 25 years ago.

Our troops carried out the oath they had given. Frenchmen and Moroccans remained fraternally united in the struggle as they had in former ones, and also as they had in happier days. It was possible, thank to God, to stop the fighting quickly.

Today, we all feel free to express the deep sentiments of friendship which we have always felt both to your generous American Nation and to its President. There only remains from yesterday's

hostilities a reciprocal esteem and desire in the hearts of all the combattants to unite their courage and their blood on common battlefield and the will to cooperate to the full extent of their power in the final work of liberation.

Since the 13th November our soldiers are fighting side by side with the soldiers of the Great American Republic and of their Allies to liberate France, to blot out that power which is oppressing Europe, and to arrive at our ideal of common justice and peace. They have only one desire, and that is that they should be given as quickly as possible the equipment which will increase by tenfold their offensive power and to earn themselves with a high faith in the tremendous battle on the outcome of which depends the fate of their country and the future of the world.

Long live the United States of America. Long live France.

I beg you to believe me, Mr. President, Most respectfully yours,

(signed) Nogues.

To: His Excellency Monsieur Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
Washington.

LE COMMISSAIRE RÉSIDENT GÉNÉRAL

Monsieur le Président,

Après avoir demandé au Major Général PATTON de vous faire parvenir la réponse de Sa Majesté Sidi Mohammed aux messages que Votre Excellence avait bien voulu lui faire tenir par mon intermédiaire, je tiens, aujourd'hui, à répondre moi-même à la communication que Votre Excellence avait bien voulu m'adresser.

Dans sa lettre, Votre Excellence me marquait l'intérêt et la sympathie avec lesquels Elle avait suivi les efforts déployés par le Représentant de la France au Maroc pour éviter à ce pays une occupation germano-ita-lienne. Je La remercie du fond du coeur de ce témoignage d'amicale compréhension auquel j'ai été particulièrement sensible.

Depuis les tragiques évènements de juin 1940, je n'ai pas eu, en effet, d'autre ligne de conduite, d'autre préoccupation que de m'opposer, de façon absolue, à l'occupation par les forces de l'Axe de bases au Maroc, occupation qui eût été lourde de conséquences pour le

245

Son Excellence Monsieur ROOSEVELT Président des Etats-Unis d'Amérique WASHINGTON développement ultérieur de la guerre. Nous avons, le Gouverneur Général Boisson et moi-même, toujours été solidaires dans cette volonté d'écarter toute emprise allemande. Cette position irréductible a permis au Maréchal qui, dès l'armistice, s'était engagé à défendre contre quiconque les territoires français en Afrique, de résister à des pressions menaçantes sans cesse renouvelées.

L'engagement pris a été tenu dans des circonstances pénibles et douloureuses. Notre armée s'est battue, par devoir, contre ses sentiments intimes, en sachant qu'elle avait en face d'elle les soldats d'un grand peuple ami, ses compagnons d'armes d'il y a vingt cinq ans dans la bataille de France.

Nos troupes ont fait honneur à la parole donnée. Français et Marocains sont restés fraternellement unis dans cette épreuve, comme ils l'avaient été dans les précédentes, comme ils l'avaient été dans les jours heureux. La lutte, grâce à Dieu, a pu être arrêtée rapidement.

Tous se sentent aujourd'hui libres d'exprimer les profonds sentiments d'amitié qu'ils n'ont jamais cessé d'éprouver envers la généreuse Nation Américaine comme envers son Chef. Il ne reste des combats d'hier qu'une estime réciproque, le désir chez tous les combattants de mêler à nouveau leur courage et leur sang sur les communs champs de bataille et la volonté de coopérer dans toute la mesure de leurs forces à l'oeuvre de la libération définitive.

Depuis le 13 novembre, nos soldats combattent aux côtés des soldats de la grande République Américaine et de leurs alliés pour libérer la France, faire disparaître cette hégémonie qui opprime l'Europe et réaliser notre idéal commun de justice et de paix. Ils n'ont d'autre désir que de voir mettre à leur disposition, le plus vite possible, un matériel qui décuplera leur force offensive et leur permettra de se jeter avec une foi ardente dans l'immense bataille dont dépend le sort de leur pays et l'avenir du monde.

Vivent les Etats-Unis d'Amérique.

Vive la France.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, les assurances de ma considération la plus haute et de mes sentiments de profonde et amicale confiance.

Mognis

EVE

MAROC

LE COMMISSAIRE RÉSIDENT GÉNÉRAL

Ver Repartment Foreign Mail Room 4061



Son Excellence Monsieur ROOSEVELT Président des Etats-Unis d'Amérique

WASHINGTON

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