

● PSF: France: Bullitt Jan. - June 1939

little  
personal.

PSF; France  
Bullitt

Dear Mr President -

Happy birthday,  
and as many more of them  
as you may want.

I could try to tell  
you what it means to me  
to have you in the world;  
but I think you know  
without being told.

There is nobody like  
you, and I love you.

Bill

---

20 January 1939  
Washington.

Pink 31  
U. S. S. HOUSTON

PSF: Bullitt

Confidential

[Feb, 1939?]

FROM: MR EARLY.  
TO: THE PRESIDENT

0023 FROM HULL:- BULLITT TELEGRAPHS HAD CONVERSATIONS DURING PAST TWENTY FOUR HOURS WITH DELADIER, CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF, SEVERAL CABINET MEMBERS, AND BLUM. ALL CONSIDER PRESENT SITUATION AT LEAST AS SERIOUS AS LAST AUGUST ON BASIS OF FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

REINFORCEMENTS GOING TO ITALIAN ARMY IN LIBYA DAILY,  
GERMANS SENDING AIRPLANES IN CRATES TO LIBYA EVERY DAY.

THOSE MENTIONED ABOVE BELIEVE UNACCEPTABLE DEMANDS WILL BE MADE BY MUSSOLINI BETWEEN TENTH AND END OF MARCH AND ALSO THEIR BELIEF THAT FRANCE MAY EXPECT MUSSOLINI TO MAKE WAR UPON IT ANY TIME AFTER THE MIDDLE OF MARCH, PROBABLY ATTACKING DJIBOUTI FIRST. THEY STATE ITALY HAS NOW ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND TROOPS IN LIBYA AND ABOUT TO ADD THIRTY THOUSAND. DELADIER AND GAMELIN BELIEVE THAT FRENCH CAN DEFEND TUNISIA, BUT THAT ITALY MAY ATTACK EGYPT, WHICH, ACCORDING TO FRENCH INFORMATION, IS NOT IN AS STRONG DEFENSIVE POSITION. ALL MEN ABOVE MENTIONED BELIEVE THAT ALTHOUGH GERMANY DOES NOT WISH TO GO TO WAR WITH FRANCE, IT WILL GO TO WAR IN SUPPORT OF ITALY ~~FRANCE~~ IN CASE LATTER ATTACKS FRANCE. FRENCH GOVERNMENT BELIEVE POSSIBLE AND ADVISABLE TO MAKE BROAD, COMPREHENSIVE COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT WITH GERMANY IN ORDER TO OFFER POSSIBILITY OF GOOD FRANCO GERMAN RELATIONS, IN ORDER THAT GERMANY MIGHT HESITATE TO GO TO WAR AND THUS LOSE SUCH BENEFITS. DELADIER PERSONALLY BELIEVES FRENCH NEGOTIATIONS WITH SPAIN ARE MEETING WITH SUCCESS. DELADIER AND GAMELIN ACTUALLY DISCUSSED WITH BULLITT



MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN PARIS IN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS IN THE  
EVENT OF AN ATTACK BY GERMANY AND ITALY. THOSE TWO OFFICIALS  
CONSIDER BRITISH POSITION IN THE FAR EAST EXTREMELY GRAVE, AS  
GREAT BRITAIN HELPLESS TO DEFEND AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, SINGAPORE,  
HONGKONG, OR THE DUTCH EAST INDIES AGAINST JAPANESE ATTACK.  
THEY SEE SOME CONNECTION BETWEEN POSSIBLE ATTACK BY ITALIANS  
IN LIBYA AGAINST EGYPT AND MOVEMENT AGAINST BRITISH NOT ONLY  
IN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, BUT IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND FAREAST.  
BLUM CONSIDERS SITUATION SO SERIOUS HAS DECIDED NOT TO UNDER-  
TAKE PLANNED TRIP TO AMERICA AT THIS TIME 1900.

Dist: President  
Hawaii  
Adm Leahy  
Col Walker

Pink 31  
Page 2.

2

PSP: France 0  
Rullitt

Paris, February 1, 1939.

Personal and ~~Confidential~~

Dear Mr. President:

Here are the latest figures on plane production of the French Secret Service. The French managed to produce in the month of December ninety-four planes. The British produced between two hundred and fifty and three hundred. In addition, the British produced about one hundred training planes. La Chambre states that the French production is now rising steadily and that it will reach two hundred per month in June, and two hundred and fifty next July. By the end of the year, he expects it to be about four hundred per month.

La Chambre said that the latest information brought in by the French Secret Service indicates that although the Germans produced about one thousand planes a month in September and October last, they were unable to keep  
up

The Honorable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

Washington, D. C.

up this tempo, and in November and December produced only between six and seven hundred planes per month.

Your personal connection with the Deity continues to manifest itself in an astonishing manner. I told you that it probably would be impossible for me to bring to pass your wish that Saint-Quentin might be translated to a happier sphere. Today Guy La Chambre told me that he wants to quit as Minister for Air and wants to go to Washington as French Ambassador. He asked me if I would tell Daladier to send him to Washington as Ambassador. I replied that I would not be so impertinent and, of course, would not make any comments on my vis-à-vis in Washington, but if Daladier himself should ask my opinion, I should feel obliged to give it to him. As a result, I expect Daladier to ask me whether or not I think La Chambre would do in Washington. I think he would be bully. He is very much of a gentleman; very gay and alive; with a charming wife who used to be one of the leading actresses of France. I am sure you would like him and inasmuch as he is Daladier's most intimate friend, you would have a real Ambassador.

Incidentally, he told me that that dope-taking, half-American, Patenôtre, former owner of the Philadelphia Inquirer and now Minister of National Economy,

is

is also anxious to be an Ambassador, and that Daladier expects to send him to Brazil.

If La Chambre leaves the Ministry of Air to go to Washington, he will be replaced by M. Dautry, who was Director of the French State Railways and, for the past year or so, has been Chief Director of the Hispano-Suiza Company. He has the reputation of being the greatest industrialist in France and would be a bigger shirt-front at least than Guy La Chambre, who is just a nice, honest, sincere fellow.

Incidentally, La Chambre told me a few things about your friend de La Grange, which will amuse you. He said that he had come to the conclusion that La Grange's chief interest in representing France in aviation deals was to make money privately on the side. He showed me an astounding letter which La Grange had written to him yesterday, as a Senator, urging him to buy a complicated press for making aviation bodies from the Baldwin Locomotive Works at double the price to be paid for a similar press in England. De La Grange asked this huge extra payment - for the amount was enormous - as a personal favor to him. And on the side, let La Chambre know that he was thinking of attacking him in the Senate! That used to be called blackmail!

La Chambre

La Chambre told me also that La Grange had been furious when he had learned that an aviation mission had been sent to America to buy planes and that he had not headed it. La Grange had finally said to La Chambre that he assumed he had been eliminated because I was jealous of him since I realized that you talked to him more frankly than you did to me.

As I have been here only for half a minute, I haven't been able to pick up yet all the dirt, but I can tell you one more interesting thing. Daladier is seriously thinking of running for the Presidency of the Republic this spring when Lebrun gets out. La Chambre says that Daladier feels certain he will have the votes of three-fourths of the Senate and at least one-half the Chamber of Deputies. He wants to be President of the Republic in the sense that you are President of the United States, taking a much more active role than has been assumed by the President for many years. I suspect that as soon as the other leading politicians learn that this is what Daladier has in mind, a coalition will be formed against him for there would not be much fun in being Président du Conseil during the next seven years if Daladier were to be a really vigorous Président de la République.

Jules Henry

Jules Henry came up from Spain last night and told me that he personally had gone out to find the lines defending Barcelona - where he was until the very day Franco's troops entered. He asserted that the lines defending Barcelona were there but that there was not one single defender in them. He said that Barcelona just blew up and he looks for the total collapse of resistance in Catalonia within ten days and the total collapse of the Valencia and Madrid areas inside three weeks. He believes that Mussolini will follow Franco's triumphs by immediate demands on France which will have to be refused and that we shall be close to war by the end of February.

I am not so sure - because the speech made last night by that neurotic Austrian house-painter has me puzzled. I listened to it on the radio. It was unquestionably the dullest and most disorderly speech he has made and it showed, I thought, a definite hesitation about provoking war due to fear of the hostility of the United States. On the other hand, I think it showed what all the information from Germany indicates; to wit: if Mussolini goes to war for any reason whatever, Germany will have to support Italy because Germany can not afford to see Italy defeated.

Italy

Italy has the ball and I hope that you have invented some act to impress Benito if he begins to start the rumpus. It is unquestionable that your acts have had a cooling effect on Hitler and I think they might have a similar effect on Benito, who is the bad boy of the moment. Don't forget that your last communication to him was the letter telling him that he was the white-haired boy. At the moment, he thinks that you think he is grand.

There is another possible line of evolution about which I spoke to the British Ambassador today. I think there are signs that Chamberlain is preparing to act vis-à-vis France precisely the way he acted toward Czechoslovakia. I suspect that you may have Chamberlain getting together with Hitler and telling France that after all, there is much virtue in the Italian claims and that France had better give up at least half what Mussolini will demand. The British Ambassador quite violently denied that Chamberlain would take this course but I suspect that the violence of his denial meant that it is the course that will be taken. A few minutes later he said that since war would mean the triumph of the forces of Bolshevism on the Continent, any sacrifice necessary to avoid war must be made. The British have always found it easy to sacrifice the interests of other people and you may find yourself,



yourself, before another couple of months have passed, wishing to request Mr. Chamberlain quietly not to behave like a S.C.B.

Léon Blum is walking into the house at this moment so that I must stop dictating.

Love to you all.

Yours affectionately,

Bill

P.S. - Blum is extremely gloomy. He believes that Mussolini will make absolutely unacceptable demands just as soon as resistance to Franco collapses completely. He believes that Hitler can not avoid supporting Mussolini if Mussolini goes to war and he believes that Chamberlain at the last minute will try to sell out France in the manner that I suggest would be British policy to the British Ambassador. Blum doesn't think that there will be war before April at the earliest and may come to the United States for a brief visit the end of February. He is in fine form personally and seems to have recovered entirely from the death of his wife. W.C.B.

S.P.B.



**TELEGRAM RECEIVED**

*Bullitt  
File  
Private  
+ confidential*

JR  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (D)

Paris  
**FROM** Dated February 3, 1939

Rec'd 11:10 a.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

193, February 3, 11 a.m.

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Guy Lachambre, Minister for Air, called on me  
this morning and said that today the French Government  
would place definite orders for 115 Martin bombers  
and 100 Douglas bombers and 200 North American training  
planes; and would ask for options on an additional  
120 Martin bombers and 100 Douglas bombers.

Lachambre said that Daladier last night had  
asked him to say to me he hoped it would not be  
necessary for either the Secretary of the Treasury  
or any other American Government official to give out  
the exact figures and details of these orders. The  
impression produced in Germany and Italy by the idea  
that France could obtain an unlimited number of planes  
in the United States had been so valuable a deterrent  
to attack by Germany and Italy that it should not  
be disturbed by actual figures of moderate dimensions.

I have not yet been able to see Daladier as I

went

851.248/136

NB

Confidential File

-2- #193, February 3, 11 a.m., from Paris!

went to bed with a severe attack of grippe the day I saw Bonnet (January 30) and I am still flat on my back. I expect to be up tomorrow, however, and believe that the options which will be asked for today by the French will be taken up shortly after I have talked with Daladier.

It is difficult to exaggerate the salutary effect which the leakage of your remarks to the Congressman has had in Europe, no matter how much trouble it may have made for you in the United States. Both the Germans and Italians are going to think hard now before attacking France and England.

BULLITT

HPD

C O P I E

*file  
confidential*

PSF: France  
Bullitt

Paris, February 9, 1939.

~~PERSONAL AND STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Sumner:

At the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Air, I have just received Mr. Maurice Dollfus, Managing Director of the Matford Company, Paris, which manufactures Ford cars in France. In addition, the Minister for Air had spoken to me about the matter which Dollfus wished to discuss.

It appears that at the present time the French are turning out a great many planes but comparatively few first rate motors. As a result the French have purchased the rights to manufacture the British Rolls-Royce Merlin motor in France and have asked the French Matford people to manufacture most of the parts for this motor. The French Matford organization, as a patriotic

The Honorable

Sumner Welles,

Under Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

patriotic duty, desires to carry out this work and finds the conditions proposed by the Ministry for Air satisfactory.

One large stumbling block is, however, foreseen-- Mr. Henry Ford. Dollfus fears that while Mr. Edsel Ford will be entirely in favor of permitting the Matford plant to manufacture these parts for the British Rolls-Royce Merlin engine, Mr. Henry Ford may consider that to have a plant in which he is a majority stockholder manufacture parts for an engine that is going into a war plane would be contrary to his principles. Mr. Dollfus said to me that he believed that if someone could say to Edsel Ford that I knew all about this piece of business and that I considered that it was not contrary to the interests of the United States and that I hoped it would go through, that would be sufficient. He did not know that even this would be necessary, but before leaving for America he wished to be sure that in case he should run into difficulties in Detroit, there would be someone with whom he could get in touch in Washington.

I do not know that he will call on you for help,

but

but if he should ask to see you, please see him. The order is an extremely important one involving at the outset one thousand motors to be completed before the end of this year.

Good luck and every good wish.

Yours very sincerely,

(Signed): WILLIAM C. BULLITT.

William C. Bullitt.

WCB/jgh

MEMO FOR THE P. S.

Why don't you have a cocktail  
with him and look him over?

F. D. R.



PSF: Liance  
(Bullitt)

Paris, February 13, 1939.

Dear Missy:

This is a letter that "God" received from a very old friend of his. He didn't take it up with the President, not because he did not think well of the gentleman in question but because there were too many other important things to discuss. He does think well of him and has been a close friend of his for many years.


Now that the Senate has taken to refusing to confirm the President's appointments, it has occurred to "God" that residents of the District of Columbia are in nobody's senatorial district and Burkinshaw, although he comes from Connecticut, has lived almost all his life in the District of Columbia.

It

Miss Marguerite Le Hand,  
Private Secretary to the President,  
The White House,  
Washington, D. C.

It may be worth while looking him up even though there is no chance of appointment at the present time. In any case, I have been told to tell you that the Ambassador has known him ever since he was on the Ford Peace Party and since he worked as his assistant at the Peace Conference in 1919.

Very sincerely yours,



Carmel Offie.

Enclosure.

I feel impelled to advise you that since December 1919 we have not been together working for twenty years. Marvin Medlar and Steve Early are friends from our newspaper days. I also am in contact with Senator Frank Delaney of Connecticut. However, he is not strong enough to bring his appointment himself, although I assure you he certainly will go in for me in every way. Frank R. Smith, with whom I have been associated



C O P Y

Law Offices  
NEIL BURKINSHAW  
Shoreham Building  
Washington, D. C.

December 16, 1938.

My dear Bill:

In the course of our conversation yesterday on your suggestion that I become active in politics I was on the verge several times of asking you to aid me in the fulfillment of a long cherished ambition -- that is, of going on the bench. However, I refrained only because of the thought that you might be embarrassed by being compelled to tell me you could not interfere in the matter of appointments. Hence, I am writing you this letter so that you may act as you see fit without any necessity of explanation.

There are three vacancies at this time in the Federal Courts of the District of Columbia, one in the Court of Appeals, which is the position I want, and two in the United States District Court. Also there is the likelihood of a second vacancy on the Court of Appeals if there be true the newspaper predictions that Justice Harold Stevens is to be elevated from that Court to the Supreme Court of the United States.

It is believed that all of these vacancies will be filled immediately upon the convening of Congress next month. The nominations will be sent in within two or three weeks.

I feel impelled to move at this time because there may not be another vacancy for twenty years. Marvin MacIntire and Steve Early are friends from old newspaper days. I grew up in Meriden with Senator Frank Maloney of Connecticut. However, he is not strong enough to swing this appointment himself, although I assure you he certainly will go to bat for me in every way. Frank P. Walsh, with whom I have been associated

more . . .

more or less over the past nineteen years would also aid in every respect. Incidentally, he appointed me some three years ago as Washington counsel for the Power Authority for the State of New York, a pet project of the President while Governor of New York.

Without conceit, I feel that none would question my professional proficiency or integrity. I have been a participant in most of the outstanding trials in this jurisdiction for fifteen years. I was an Assistant United States Attorney for five years and Special Assistant to the Attorney General for three years. In addition to my work in the oil trials which included the conviction of Harry Sinclair, I participated in a series of outstanding security frauds prosecutions. Only two years ago I was called in as a technician on federal procedure to make the last ditch fight for Bruno Richard Hauptman in the Federal courts in New Jersey and in the United States Supreme Court.

There is a growing desire, expressed both by the bar and the press, for the appointment of a local man to the Court of Appeals, as it happens that the present five members have been selected from the outside and hence lack intimate familiarity with the very difficult local procedure. It is widely believed that the next appointment may come from the District.

As you know, I enjoy a very lucrative practice, but I gladly would suffer a diminution in earnings in order to have that position.

In a way, I hate to trespass on old friendship in making this request of you. But, I probably never again shall be situated as I am now in the matter of possessing friends in high station who might aid me. I feel that Helen and I should not neglect an opportunity such as this.

If you can see your way clear to assist me I shall be forever grateful. And, if you cannot, then I shall understand.

Cordially,

(Signed): NEIL.

PSF: Bullitt

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

One original copy only.

[Feb. 1939.]

For the President

From the Under Secretary.

I am telegraphing you a secret message just received from Bullitt. The Secretary, who is still laid up in bed, has asked me to let you know that neither he nor I know anything about the "measures" mentioned in the last paragraph of Bullitt's telegram. The message reads as follows:

"At luncheon today a member of the Superior War Council, General Requin, was accompanied by the general of whom Daladier has spoken to be made head of the Army, General Staff, General Georges. The latter said information on the following lines had been received from persons considered entirely reliable by the Staff and connected with the Secret Service.

"First: That the Italian Chief of State, after hesitating for some time, has made up his mind to go ahead with his demands against the French and to make war if what he wants should be rejected by France.

"Second: On February 14 he had been promised by Hitler that the full support of Germany would be behind him against the French and that Italy would have Germany as an ally in war in case of necessity.

"Third: A mobilization had been started by Mussolini in a quiet way. He has now between 350,000 and 400,000 reservists in arms, not counting the regular classes in military training service. By the first of March the mobilized strength of the Army of Italy would be brought to 1,000,000 men as a result of orders Mussolini had issued.

"Fourth: The number of troops in Libya has now been brought up to 100,000 by further concentrations there. The greater part of the aviation forces of Italy was being assembled in Libya and in Sicily.

"Fifth: Not only high German officers, technicians and aviators but also a great number of German soldiers had been sent to Libya in addition to the Italian troops.

"There was no question about the authenticity of this information in the minds of both the generals above mentioned. They themselves believe that the campaign of intimidation would be begun by Mussolini about the 1st of March and that about the end of March it was likely that Italy and Germany would strike.

"I know both Requin and Georges so well that I do not believe they would color their statements to me in any way. In my opinion this information must be taken most seriously with regard to the intentions of Mussolini.

"It was stated by General Georges that so seriously had this information been taken by the General Staff that Tunisia had been ordered this morning to be placed

immediately upon a war footing. Already troops from Algiers were being moved Tunisia. As a sidelight, Georges added that excellent anti-aircraft guns of Swiss make, to the number of ninety, which had been brought from Spain by Negrin's soldiers, were already en route to Tunis.

It seems appropriate to suggest that certain measures which I believe was considered might have a cooling effect upon Italy and which were discussed when I was in the United States should be considered and prepared for putting into immediate effect during the next four or five weeks."

HULL

PSF: France  
Bullitt

Personal and  
Secret.

Paris, February 21, 1939.

Dear Mr. President:

This letter is for you alone and I hope you will answer it by cable immediately.

About the 5th of February, Guy La Chambre said to me that Lindbergh had informed him that on a recent trip to Germany, he had ascertained that the German Government would be glad to sell Benz motors of about 1050 horsepower to France. La Chambre said that he was thinking of purchasing three of these motors to try. He asked me if I thought there would be any hostile reaction in the United States, if it should become known that the French Government had purchased three German Benz motors in Germany. I replied that I did not think there would be any hostile reaction; in fact, people would consider it rather clever of the French to have got examples of the best German airplane motors for thorough inspection.

Last

The Honorable

Franklin Delano Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

The White House.

Last evening Guy La Chambre called on me and said that he had just had a most important conversation with Daladier and that Daladier had asked him to speak to me, and that no one else in the French Government had or would have any knowledge of the matter that he was about to bring up. Daladier especially did not wish Bonnet and the other members of the Quai d'Orsay to know about it as they were thoroughly unreliable.

Guy La Chambre then said that the French Air Attaché in Berlin had just returned to Paris and had reported as follows: General Udet had sent for him and had stated that Lindbergh had said to General Milch that the French might like to purchase some German airplane motors for which they would be prepared to pay cash in free exchange, quite aside from any compensation agreements. Udet then said that General Milch had spoken to Goering; that Goering had spoken to Hitler who had approved the transaction; and that Goering had directed him (Udet) to inform the French Air Attaché in Berlin that the German Government would be glad to sell to the French Government three hundred Benz motors for delivery about December 1939

or

or January 1940.

Guy La Chambre said that the French Air Attaché was now in Paris waiting for a message to carry back to the German Government. The first observation that he, La Chambre, had made was that delay in delivery of these motors made any such proposal of doubtful value; second, that if any such proposal went through, the French must have ten of these motors for immediate inspection; third, that the entire matter would have to be considered most carefully before a decision should be made. He had, therefore, ordered the French Air Attaché to remain in Paris for the moment and he and Daladier had consulted.

Their decision was that it would be desirable to order these three hundred motors not because of the addition that they would make to France's air strength-- there would be too few of them to make much difference and in case of war it would be impossible to get parts to repair any of them -- but because of the improvement that might be produced by such an order in the diplomatic relations between France and Germany, and because news of such a deal would tend to make the Italians less sure of German support.

The



The question that Daladier wished to put up to me was whether or not the news of the purchase of three hundred airplane motors by France from Germany would produce an unfortunate effect on public opinion in the United States.

I replied that I could not answer such a question.

La Chambre said that he and Daladier had expected me to make just this reply and what Daladier wanted was for me to communicate with you personally and ask your personal opinion of the deal.

I said that I considered the question filled with high explosive and did not believe it should be handled by telegraph; that you were at the moment on a cruiser in the Caribbean and would not return until the fourth of March; and that I believed that if Daladier wished to get your reaction to this proposal, he could not obtain it until after March fourth at the earliest.

La Chambre said that he would delay replying to the Germans until after your return.

I don't know whether or not you will care to express any opinion whatsoever; but even if you want to refuse to reply, please send me immediately a telegram

to

to that effect. Guy La Chambre said that a mere indication from you that the reaction in America would be unfortunate, would be sufficient to kill the deal.

Personally, I don't like the smell of it. I do not believe that there is any real approach by Germany toward friendship with France. It seems to me that the test should be: Will Germany agree to deliver three hundred motors next month to France? They have plenty in stock to spare.

You know all about the possible reaction in America and I know little, so I wish you would let me know exactly what you think. I do believe that whatever indication you tell me to give to Daladier will be decisive. I shall, of course, merely mention the matter verbally. Please telegraph at once.

Guy La Chambre also said to me that during the same conversation in which he had talked over this matter with Daladier, he had had two shocks. He had understood, as I had from our last conversation with Daladier and Paul Reynaud, that it had been decided to exercise the options for the additional one hundred

twenty

twenty Martins and an additional one hundred Douglasses. Daladier now appeared to be doubtful because of the size of the expenditures in foreign aircraft -- the decision having been made to buy a large quantity of Rolls-Royce Merlin motors and this German order being in prospect.

The French options on these additional American planes do not expire until March 12th and Guy La Chambre said that he believed Daladier would take up the options before that time.

The second shock was that although he thought it was all fixed for him to go as Ambassador to Washington, Daladier had said to him that Georges Bonnet had just about persuaded him that Jules Henry should be sent as French Ambassador to Washington and asked him if he wanted another diplomatic post. He had said that he did not want any other diplomatic post and if Daladier should decide to send Henry instead of himself to Washington, he would prefer to remain as Minister for Air.

Please cable me as cryptically as you like. I shall understand.

Love and a lot of it.

Bill

*file-private*

Personal and  
Secret.

Paris, February 22, 1939.

Dear Mr. President:

This is another letter for your most private eye. And as you read it, you will chortle, remembering the day when we cooked up the Johnson Act and predicted that we would make those chickens come home to roost.

Paul Reynaud, Minister of Finance, telephoned yesterday and said that he had a matter of the utmost importance about which he wished to speak to me at once. He came in today. He said that he had become convinced that France must make immediately a settlement of her debt to the United States. No such obstacle to perfect relations between France and the United States could be permitted to exist any longer. (You will recall my telegram No. 276 of February 13, 10 P. M.).

Reynaud went on to say that France at the present  
time

The Honorable

Franklin Delano Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

The White House.

time had eighty-seven billion francs in gold. He would be prepared to hand over to the United States ten billion francs in gold at once with the statement that whereas France, during a period of great economic and financial stress had been unable to make payments on her debt to the United States, now that the financial situation had improved, France desired to resume payments. He added that he did not propose that this should be a final settlement of the debt, but only that such payment in a lump sum should be accepted by the Government of the United States as sufficient evidence of good faith to relieve France from the restrictions of the Johnson Act.

He went on to say that he knew that ten billion francs, which was an enormous sum for France, representing as it did about fifteen percent of the French war chest, was a small sum for the United States, representing as it did only about three hundred million dollars. The sacrifice from the French point of view, however, when France was threatened by war, was enormous. He hoped that this would be appreciated in the United States and that such a payment might be considered sufficient

to

to lift the restrictions of the Johnson Act.

I replied that I thanked him most heartily for what he had said; that I was certain that you would be most happy to hear of this honorable proposal; but I added that Congress controlled completely any debt settlements and that Congress was most loath to deal with the matter. I pointed out that the Hungarians had made an offer which had been buried in committee, and that a French offer of three hundred million dollars in gold to settle a debt of many billions would probably not be regarded as good business by the Congress.

Reynaud said that he understood this, but he felt that you might be able to put the question on the basis of fairness to an honorable, democratic and friendly nation which desired to do what it could and could not do more.

I then suggested that although the ten billion francs in gold alone probably would not be acceptable to the American Congress; ten billion francs plus X might possibly be acceptable; X to represent French possessions

which

which we might desire for strategic reasons.

Reynaud replied that in addition to the ten billion francs, he felt it would be possible for France to throw in Clipperton Island; the French interests in the New Hebrides which they hold under a condominium with the British, and any other French possessions we might fancy in either the Caribbean or the Pacific -- provided that such possessions did not have either a large population or a great sentimental value to France. As an example of islands to be excluded because of their sentimental value, he cited St. Pierre and Miquelon.

Since you collect stamps, you don't need to look at the map: and you can count in your mind any islands or other territories that France possesses anywhere. I happen to recall a discussion we had in the White House not long ago about the need for an American base somewhere in the region of Venezuela and it occurs to me that you might fancy French Guiana.

In any event, will you please get your imagination to work furiously on this subject. I wish to God

that

B.H.  
WILLIAM F. MILLER.

that I could be with you in the White House for one evening. Our inventions would be terrific! As it is, I can only say that if you want any French territory, plus ten billion francs in gold, in return for releasing France from the operations of the Johnson Act, it looks as if you might be able to get it.

Let me have a letter about this just as soon as you possibly can. I do not believe that you should telegraph with regard to it. Reynaud is extremely skeptical with regard to the discretion of the French Foreign Office and our Department of State, to say nothing of the privacy of our telegraphic communications. He asked me especially to refer this to you alone and to avoid absolutely official communications at this stage.

Speed is of the essence. If war should begin, the French couldn't make a payment.

Don't you feel rather proud of the achievements of our offspring? The carrot and the club is, after all, not a bad formula in international dealings.

A large embrace and good luck.

Bill  
William C. Bullitt.



Bullitt

Personal and  
Secret

Paris, February 23, 1939.

Dear Mr. President:

A few days ago while talking with Mandel about the situation in French Indo-China and the possibility of a Japanese attack on the French railroad to stop the transit of supplies to China, a curious thought struck me.

There is an Emperor of Annam. The Emperor of Annam is not in default on any debt to the Government of the United States. The Emperor of Annam needs airplanes to defend his kingdom. Suppose the Emperor of Annam should wish to buy three or four or five hundred airplanes in the United States. Suppose either the Export-Import Bank or private bankers should wish to give credits of five years to the manufacturers of the planes in order that the business might be obtained. Would either the Export-Import Bank or any private  
banker

The Honorable

Franklin Delano Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

The White House.

- 2 -

banker or group of bankers be forbidden to offer such a credit to the manufacturer by the Johnson Act? I think not.

Would you like to have the Emperor of Annam buy a few hundred planes in the United States? And would this sort of financing be possible?

Please let me know the answer as soon as you can. If the answer should be yes, you may count on seeing a representative of the Emperor of Annam arrive incognito in the United States for the purchase of planes.

Blessings.

Bill.

*file  
personal*

Paris, March 18, 1939.

Personal and ~~Confidential~~

Dear Mr. President:

I thank you profoundly for having had Welles make that statement about Czechoslovakia. My feeling that we had to say a word for human decency increased in intensity every hour that the word remained unsaid. It was splendidly done and, coupled with your brief indication with regard to the need for a change in the Neutrality Act, will have some effect at least in Europe.

I like also your action in continuing to recognize the Minister of Czechoslovakia as the representative of his country. I remember telling you some years ago one of the few facts that I have ever been able to tell you that you did not know already, to wit: that, during all the years when  
Poland

The Honorable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

Washington, D. C.

Poland had ceased to exist as a sovereign state, the Turkish Sultans invariably invited the Polish Ambassador, who did not exist, to every Court function, and at the beginning of each Court function, in the presence of the Ambassadors of Germany, Austria, and Russia, the Court Chamberlain announced to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan: "The Polish Ambassador begs to be excused as he is slightly indisposed."


That always seemed to me one of the really gentlemanly gestures in human history, and I am glad that, at least for the moment, we are following this example of the Osmanlis.

Henceforth in Europe diplomatic action will be almost impossible. A minimum of good faith is necessary for civilized intercourse, and Hitler has proved sevenfold that he is an unscrupulous liar.

My guess is that by this time next year you will wish that you had an American Army of two million men ready for action. I hope that does not prove to be true; but I fear it will. The War Department today is perhaps even more important than the Navy Department because in the Navy what needs to be done has been done, and in the War Department nearly everything remains to be done.

Blessings and good luck.

Yours affectionately,

  
William C. Bullitt.

*file  
journal*

Paris, March 23, 1939.

Dear Mr. President:

Following our cryptic telephone conversation, the French Minister for Air decided to let the negotiations for the purchase of three hundred Daimler-Benz airplane motors from Germany die an immediate and natural death.

Yrs.

B. H.

The Honorable  
Franklin D. Roosevelt,  
President of the United States of America,  
Washington, D. C.

*file*  
→  
Private and  
Confidential.

Paris, March 23, 1939.

Dear Mr. President:

Tonight Hitler is on his way to Memel. He will soon be making plans to visit other spots in Europe. Some day someone will have enough guts to pull a trigger and the affair will begin. The British seem to be awake at last and the French definitely are awake.

I wish you could have been here during the past few days to see how a nation should react to a tragic situation.

As you know, in the past three days the French have mobilized two classes and an extra hundred thousand specialists - including one of my kitchen boys. Everyone believes that war is inevitable and that it will come quickly. Every soldier has gone with a quiet resolution that is beyond praise and the wives and mothers and children have been just as calm.

Hitler's invasion of Bohemia and Moravia produced

a

The Honorable

Franklin Delano Roosevelt,

The White House,

Washington.

a curious result. It convinced every Frenchman and every French woman that no promise of the dictators was to be relied on; that words were useless; and that Hitler could be stopped by nothing but force. As a result, there is a curious serenity from one end of France to the other. There is no vacillation or mourning. The spirit of the people is incomparably better than in 1914 and far better even than the spirit last September. The quiet courage and serenity in France today is the only manifestation in a long time that has made me proud to be a member of the human race.

The German game is obvious and is based on the elementary principle of military strategy that it is wise to strike where your opponents are weakest and defeat them in detail before their forces can be concentrated. Czechoslovakia has gone. Memel has gone, and an effort will be made to establish a virtual protectorate over Lithuania. The Poles then will have three German fronts to defend. They may not be the next on the list because Hungary, Rumania and Yugoslavia may

may be disintegrated by the pressure and threats which were used in the case of Czechoslovakia and Memel. The important thing is that the Poles

If those countries go, the pressure on Poland will be terrific, since the Poles will be able to look forward only to the horror of being once again the battleground for Germans and Russians.

If the Poles should cave in without fighting, the next turn would doubtless be that of France. If there were no friends or allies to the eastward, there would be a terrible temptation to France to make huge concessions to buy off Italy. That obviously would only delay the day of attack on France -- and who can say that under those circumstances, Great Britain would not prefer to make her peace with Germany at the expense of France rather than risk an almost certain defeat.

The above is, I believe, the German reasoning. The moral for us is that unless some nation in Europe stands up to Germany quickly, France and England may face defeat and such defeat would mean the French and British fleets in the hands of the Germans and the Italians. We should then have the Japs in the Pacific

and



and an overwhelming fleet against us in the Atlantic.

You know this already and I apologize for repeating it. The important thing is that the people of the United States don't yet know it.

If European war should begin, I believe the American people unanimously would say, "Send supplies to the allies but never, never, never an American soldier." I believe that even though the countries of Europe should fall under German domination, one by one, and even though it should seem that France and England were going to be defeated, the American people would not desire to declare war on Germany unless Germany had committed direct acts of aggression against the United States or American citizens.

I believe, however, that such acts of aggression would be committed and that after not more than a year of European war, the American people would desire to declare war on Germany.

At this point, it seems to me worthwhile to enter the realm of pure imagination. Here are my imaginings.

The only great army on the side of decency is the  
French

French Army; the British have even less of an army than we have and it is even worse in all respects than our own. If the French Army should be licked because it simply did not have enough men to put in line against three times the number of Italians and Germans, that would be the end of England also -- in spite of the British fleet. The vital point, therefore, if war starts, will become the maintenance of the strength of the French Army.

Americans will begin to realize that fact and will begin to wish to strengthen the French Army -- when it will be too late to create an American Army to intervene in time.

We ought to create that army now.

I know from our conversations of last October that you are working on the question of industrial preparation for war all the way from the production of powder down. I think we should start to produce soldiers as well.

If you bring the present regular army and the National Guard to full strength immediately, you will  
have

have a considerable number of men trained in the rudiments of war. But I would like to stick this thought in your mind. If we should try to send an American Army to Europe as an American Army with all services, the preparation would take much too long and the net result would be the same as the result when Pershing attacked in the region of Montfaucon. Half-trained artillery officers would fire at night into their own troops and everything that we should accomplish would cost us five times as much as the cost to the Germans.

I believe, therefore, that if we are drawn into war, while our eventual objective should be the creation of an American Army in France, we should train the half million men that you may be able to get ready fairly quickly in the regular Army and the National Guard, and send them over to France to be brigaded with the French Army, one regiment to a Division. Thus they would be well led and well trained.

Pershing's mistake was the creation of an independent American Army too quickly. The troops should remain brigaded with the French until they really become veterans.

veterans. This seems to me elementary common sense and under war conditions the people of the United States, in spite of the wish to have an independent American Army, would see the point and support you.

I doubt if you could get any General now high in the War Department or the field to support such a program. They would naturally want a fully independent American Army to be created at the earliest possible moment. It would be their great chance to command and they would not wish to be brigaded with the French.

You may have some General at the present time in the Army that I know nothing about, but it occurs to me that unless you should have someone who could see this point, it might be worthwhile to bring back Douglas MacArthur, who would have to accept any conditions in advance that you might care to impose on him, and send him to direct our activities in France.

A letter of this sort may make you think that I am already marching into Berlin. I am not, and I hope to God that the whole train of events listed above as a possibility -- by no means a certainty -- which I

have

have predicted, may never come to pass. I do feel sure, however, that it is essential that we should begin instantly to train a great army. It is equally essential that we should know that if we should be drawn in, we would want to send as many men as possible to be brigaded with the French.

I wish I could talk this over with you because in order to avoid making this letter endless, I am obliged to state everything baldly and crudely. You will make your own rectifications and you will know anyhow that I am not quite so dumb as I may sound.

Love and good luck.

Yours affectionately,

Bill

William C. Bullitt.

March 24, 1939.

P. S. The pouch has not yet left so that I can add this comment.

If Poland should reject the British offer of an alliance, as seems possible, all resistance to Germany would cease to the eastward of the French boundaries. The strength which Hitler and Mussolini could bring against the French Army after a few weeks or months of organization of Central and Eastern Europe would be such that the temptation to France and England to submit to Germany would be colossal.

If they should fight, they would fight under conditions which probably would mean rapid defeat. If they should submit, South America would be next on the Hitler program.

I know how hard the political task will be for you, but I am certain that the best time for us to create a real army is today.

W.C.B.

PSF: France  
Bullitt

file  
preserved

Paris, March 23, 1939.

Dear Mr. President:

You asked me to write you about my conversations with Roy Howard. Life is moving too fast for me to be able to find time to give you the comedy which no doubt is what you want.

The only important thing from a political point of view is that Roy, after visiting most of the countries of Europe, seems to have developed a sincere and violent admiration for your foreign policy. He says he has the greatest desire to cooperate closely with you after his return to the United States. He adds that he has a feeling that someone must have been poisoning your mind against him because he can not understand otherwise how it happens that although he agrees with all your objectives and almost all your measures,

The Honorable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

Washington, D. C.

measures, you seem to remain so aloof from him (I can hear you groan!).

Nevertheless, I think it would be good politics to invite him to have lunch with you at the White House as soon as he gets back from Europe. He has made some interesting observations and you won't be bored.

Good luck.

Yrs.

Bill



REB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS

Dated March 23, 1939

Rec'd 4:30 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

552, March 23, 5 p. m.

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Daladier spoke to me today with regard to the matter discussed in my letter of February 22. He said that he himself had initiated the proposal and that he was determined to push it through. Since ~~he~~<sup>he</sup> has the power to govern by decree at the present time this means something.

He was not at all horrified by the idea of ~~(X)~~<sup>X</sup>. He said that he considered it entirely reasonable and added that there were approximately fifty points where it might apply. He believed that no one was so well qualified as Jean Monnet to handle this matter and he would send Monnet a personal telegram today asking him to return to Paris from New York for a few days to discuss the matter and to return immediately to America.

Daladier added that on Monnet's arrival in Paris he would wish to have a discussion with Monnet and myself.

If you have any ideas that you think I ought to have

in

REB

2-#552, From Paris, Mar. 23, 5p.m.

in mind during such a discussion, you might transmit them to me by letter in the ~~diplomatic~~ <sup>diplomatic</sup> pouch immediately. Don't send me your views unless you think I need them. If you could give me some personal indication for my information but not repetition as to the direction in which my geography is wrong I should be obliged. To be of use, this would have to reach me by the first pouch.

BULLITT

HPL

✓  
2

*file private*

REB

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated FROM to anyone. (D)

PARIS

Dated March 23, 1939

Rec'd 4:30 p. m.

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
MAR 24 1939  
MR. WELLES

SECRETARY OF STATE  
MAR 24 1939

*copy to President via Mr. Hand at 10:15 a.m. off*

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

552, March 23, 5 p. m.

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Daladier spoke to me today with regard to the matter discussed in my letter of February 22. He said that he himself had initiated the proposal and that he was determined to push it through. Since ~~he~~ has the power to govern by decree at the present time this means something.

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123 BULLITT, WM.C/504

Confidential File

REB

2-#552, From Paris, Mar. 23, 5p.m.

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could give me some personal indication for my information  
but not repetition as to the direction in which my  
geography is wrong I should be obliged. To be of use,  
this would have to reach me by the first pouch.

BULLITT

NPL

*Top -  
Private*

JR  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (D)

Paris

Dated March 25, 1939

Rec'd 12:20 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

565, March 25, 1 p.m.

~~SECRET~~ AND PERSONAL FOR THE SECRETARY.

I had a long talk with Otto of Hapsburg last night.  
He is surprisingly intelligent and has extraordinary  
sources of information in Austria and Germany which it  
would be indiscreet for me to describe.

He stated to me with accompanying details which  
carried complete conviction as to the accuracy of the  
report the following: On either the ninth or tenth of  
March, he had forgotten which, Hitler at Berchtesgaden  
stated to three leaders of the National Socialist movement  
in Austria that he would seize Czechoslovakia on the  
fourteenth of March; that he would take control of all the  
rest Central and Eastern Europe this summer; that in 1940  
he would wipe France and the French race from the map and  
would reduce Great Britain to serfdom. In the year 1941,  
using all the resources of Europe, he would conquer the  
United States by a joint attack with Japan on North and  
South America.

As

-2- #565, March 25, 1 p.m., from Paris.

As I have indicated above I believe Hitler said this.

In view of the speed with which resistance to Hitler is collapsing in Central and Eastern Europe I am not sure that he will have to wait until next year to make his attempt to wipe out France, and reduce England to vassalage.

His recent attempt to acquire air bases in Iceland is considered by the French to have been a step on his way toward the United States.

BULLITT

HPD

PSF: France  
Bullitt

Personal and  
Delivered

Paris, April 3, 1939.

Dear Mr. President:

If you saw the April 8, 1939, issue of the SATURDAY EVENING POST and read the article entitled, "The Great World Money Play"; sub-titled "The Story of Henny Penny at the Treasury", by Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner, you doubtless were as shocked as I am.

The facts in this article are absolutely accurate, although presented in the form of a farce melodrama.

These

The Honorable

Franklin Delano Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

The White House.

These facts could be known only to the Secretary of the Treasury, and the internal evidence is sufficient proof that they were supplied to Alsop and Kintner either by Henry or one of his subordinates acting under his orders.

Incidentally, before I left Washington last January, Henry told me that he intended to supply facts to Alsop and Kintner for an article on himself to appear in the SATURDAY EVENING POST, and added that they had agreed to let him correct and approve the article before publication.

The article contains accurate reports of discussions and highly confidential communications between the Government of the United States and the Governments of Great Britain and France. It contains figures drawn from confidential telegrams in confidential codes of the Department of State. It contains statements by and about Englishmen, Frenchmen, Germans and Dutchmen of the sort that the Department of State is careful to eliminate from any publications made by the Department even after fifteen years, and even after the consent of the Government concerned has been obtained for the publication of records.



One of the most shocking of these statements is to be found on page 82, under the title of AUGUST 19: "Cariguel disclosed that by eleven A. M., two million dollars in gold had been lost to New York alone." As you know, and as the Secretary of the Treasury knows, Cariguel has no right whatever to make such statements to Cochran. But Cariguel has trusted Cochran for years and tells him the truth. If the SATURDAY EVENING POST containing this statement comes to the attention of the French Government, Cariguel unquestionably will be dismissed from his post at the Banque de France.

Among the facts contained in the article is the statement, "Morgenthau wired Cochran: 'Please inform Finance Minister Auriol that you have been instructed by your Government to inform him that we would prefer that draft document be presented simultaneously.'"

This order to Cochran, published in the SATURDAY EVENING POST on page 86 of the April 8, 1939 issue, is taken verbatim from telegram No. 337, September 4, 7 P.M., 1936, to this Mission in B-1 confidential code which is used for the confidential communications of our missions all over the world.

and the careers of a large number of honors. On

were

On the 10th of June, 1933, you signed H.R. 4220, "AN ACT For The Protection Of Government Records", which reads as follows:

"That whoever, by virtue of his employment by the United States, shall obtain from another or shall have custody of or access to, or shall have had custody of or access to, any official diplomatic code or any matter prepared in any such code, or which purports to have been prepared in any such code, and shall willfully, without authorization or competent authority, publish or furnish to another any such code or matter,..... shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both."

The publication of the telegram quoted above alone entitles the Secretary of the Treasury to be fined not more than ten thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

Without question any British Chancellor of the Exchequer or any French Minister of Finance who had acted in this manner would be dismissed from his post at once and prosecuted criminally under official secrets acts.

Cochran said to me today that he feels his usefulness not only in Paris but in every country in Europe has been destroyed by the publication of this article.

The American Government has been made contemptible, and the careers of a large number of honorable men who  
were


were so reckless as to have confidence in the American Secretary of the Treasury have been placed in jeopardy.

I hope that the Republicans will be dumb enough not to demand a Congressional investigation of this matter which would compel you to order Henry's prosecution by the Attorney General.

I feel that in the interest of discipline in the Government service, you will have to take action.

Apologies.

Yours affectionately,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "William C. Bullitt". The signature is written in dark ink and is centered on the page.

William C. Bullitt.

file  
Confidential

Bullitt

April 4, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

In telegram No. 630, dated April 4th, 5 p.m., and received by the Department of State marked "Personal and Secret for the President", Ambassador Bullitt stated that he had lunched on April fourth with Messrs. Monnet, Reynaud and Daladier and that they talked over the matter of X. Ambassador Bullitt stated that the conversation was serious and satisfactory and that it was decided to let the complete question rest with the President's imagination. He concluded by adding that the President would have a visitor knocking at the door after his return to Washington.

PSF: France  
Bullitt

File  
Confidential  
Private

Personal and  
Private

Paris, April 4, 1939.

Dear Mr. President:

I lunched today with Daladier, Paul Reynaud and Jean Monnet. Daladier and Reynaud related what they had said to me about the French debt, and all four of us then discussed every aspect of the question.

Daladier said that, since he had the power to govern by decree, he could do anything he pleased about the debt, and stated that he did not care how many islands it might be necessary to turn over to the United States if only the question could be settled.

Reynaud, on the other hand, pointed out that, at a moment when Daladier had reiterated his determination not to give up one inch of French soil to Italy or any other country, it would be a bit inconsistent to hand over French territory to the United States and suggested that if we wanted some islands they might be  
given

The Honorable

Franklin Delano Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

The White House.

given to us on the basis of a 99-year concession without transfer of sovereignty or a perpetual lease of bases or some other legal formula. Daladier seemed untroubled by this argument.

The upshot of the discussion was this: Two proposals were approved:

The first, that the French Government should pay at once to the Government of the United States either ten or fifteen percent of the gold reserve of the Banque de France -- (the figure of ten billion francs was suggested by Reynaud) -- as a gesture of good will, with the explanation that France, now that there was some improvement in the French financial position, desired to recognize in this concrete form the obligation of France to pay its debt to the Government of the United States.

It was clearly understood that this proposal could not relieve France from the operation of the Johnson Act. It was believed, however, that such a payment might remove soreness in America caused by the default.

The second proposal was that an attempt should be made through a payment of ten billion francs plus X, representing an unspecified number of unspecified islands, which might be useful to the United States as naval or airplane bases, to settle the entire question of the debt.

Monnet

Monnet expressed the opinion that even if the Johnson Act and the Neutrality Act should be repealed, it would be impossible for either the French or British Governments at the present time to float large loans in the open market in the United States. Reynaud replied that he believed it would be possible for the French Government to obtain very considerable long-term credits from the large banks in New York. He stated that Winthrop Aldrich had told him a few days ago that the Chase National Bank would be prepared to extend credits in very large amounts, if not forbidden by the Johnson Act.

Monnet and I pointed out that decision as to the advisability or inadvisability of either proposal must rest with you, because you alone could know what effect either proposal would have on American public opinion and on the Congress.

Finally, it was decided that you and you alone could decide which proposal, if either, might or might not be desirable.

I said and repeated that, even though you might consider one of these proposals desirable, you would wish to be extremely careful about the timing of any such proposal.

Public

Public opinion in the United States at the moment was so aroused, emotional, and at once sympathetic and suspicious, that a proposal which might not be acceptable one week might be acceptable the next week.

It was finally agreed that Monnet should return to the United States in the near future, carrying a personal letter from Daladier to you empowering him to negotiate. It was understood that if you and he should work out a proposal that seemed satisfactory, the French Government would agree to make such a proposal at such moment as you might indicate.

Both Daladier and Paul Reynaud are convinced that Germany will precipitate general war in Europe before the 15th of May. (I think this is possible but by no means certain.) They are, therefore, most anxious to act quickly. They both said that they wished I would return to the United States with Monnet to try to work out the matter. I replied that I did not see how I could leave Paris at the present time. Both Daladier and Reynaud insisted, saying that I understood the French point of view completely and that it would be worthwhile for me to go home for a short time to work out this question.

The most confidential communications - Monnet's will be published by him.

Reynaud,



Monnet's father has just had a stroke of apoplexy and Monnet left Paris this afternoon to spend two or three days in Cognac. He promised Daladier to see him the moment he returned to Paris.

I anticipate, therefore, the following development. Monnet will arrive in Washington soon after your return from Warm Springs armed with a letter from Daladier. I hope that you will have him come over to the White House some evening alone. It makes no difference whether you invite him to come for dinner or after dinner, because he is one person who has no false pride.

You will find him, as usual, utterly honest-minded and utterly discreet. I think you ought to see him alone and explore all the possibilities, knowing that you can talk with him as indiscreetly as you like, and that there will be no indiscretions. If you can work out something with him, he ought to write Daladier exactly what you think should be done, and if Daladier agrees, the formal proposal should be made to me here. Then you should pick your moment. Don't have Henry the Morgue in on your first conversation. The SATURDAY EVENING POST article of April 8, 1939, has made everyone believe that even the most confidential communications with Henry will be published by him.

Reynaud,

Reynaud, toward the close of our conversation, brought up the point that the French Government had agreed to make a settlement with the British Government on all fours with any settlement of its debt to the Government of the United States. He added that he was confident that the British Government would waive this right, if the French Government should ask to have it waived. It was agreed that nothing should be said to the British Government about the proposed negotiation with you unless and until you and Monnet should have reached agreement as to the desirable procedure.

Both Daladier and Paul Reynaud are genuinely enthusiastic about the idea. Just to test them out, I threw a bit of cold water, and Monnet poured a lot more. They were unquenched.


Congress might be willing to accept a debt settlement on the "plus X" basis, if you could present it personally to the chief leaders as a great piece of business: i. e. before the cataclysm, you had been able to hornswaggle something of real value to the United States out of France in exchange for debts about to become worthless.

Monnet

Monnet understands so well both American and French opinion that I feel I could not be of much use during your discussions with him. However, I have no objections to hopping the YANKEE CLIPPER if you want me.

Love and good luck.

Yours affectionately,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "William C. Bullitt". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the typed name.

William C. Bullitt.

PSF: France  
Bullitt

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Warm Springs, Ga.,  
April 4, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR

AMBASSADOR BULLITT

Will you look into this  
and let me know?

F. D. R.

( UNDER SECRETARY'S PAPER)

MAR 27 1939

Dear Mr. President:

Before replying to the letter from Countess Giausanti, which I return herewith, I venture to suggest that it might be prudent to ask Bill Bullitt to check up on her identity and affiliations. I have, therefore, made a copy of her letter to you and if and when a satisfactory answer is forthcoming from Bill Bullitt I shall submit for your approval a draft answer.

Faithfully yours,

Sumner Welles

Enclosure:  
Letter from  
Countess Giausanti.

The President,  
The White House.

Bullitt

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 10, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
AMBASSADOR BULLITT

Anything in this?

F. D. R.

Newspaper clipping headed HITLER  
EMBASSY IN FRANCE LEADS ATTACKS  
ON U. S.

REB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS

Dated April 10, 1939

Rec'd 7 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

693, April 10, 7 p. m. (SECTION ONE)

PERSONAL AND STRICTLY ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY.

At this moment words no matter how wise have small effect on Hitler and Mussolini. They are still sensitive to acts. I realize fully that public opinion in the United States is not yet acutely aware of the ultimate menace to the American continents involved in the present activities of Germany, Italy and Japan. I venture to suggest for your consideration nevertheless the following unless this -- with the full realization that at this distance I cannot judge whether or not they are within the realm of political possibility:

One. I trust that you will put into effect immediately the measure designed to prevent all payments to Italy which we discussed in draft form when last I was in Washington.

Two.

Bullitt  
J. L.  
Personal

REB

2-#693, From Paris, Apr. 10, 7p.m.  
(Sec. One)

Two! I believe that in considering the question of the defense of the United States and the Americas it would be extremely unwise to eliminate from consideration the possibility that Germany, Italy, and Japan may win a comparatively speedy victory over France and England. Under those circumstances the British and French fleets might fall into the hands of our enemies. If in view of this possibility you are thinking of asking Congress to increase either the army or the navy, or both, I believe that such a request at this moment would have an immediate chilling effect on Hitler and Mussolini.

(END SECTION ONE)

BULLITT

NPL

EMB



REB

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (D)

PARIS

Dated April 10, 1939

Rec'd 6:35 p. m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

693, April 10, 7 p. m. (SECTION TWO)

Three. I am entirely uninformed as to your strategic plans for our fleet but I venture to suggest that if the fleet should be sent now either to Honolulu or the Philippines the Japanese would not dare to send an expedition against Singapore.

Four. The influence of the United States in Bulgaria is I believe still strong. I believe it might be most important if you should instruct Atherton to say to the Bulgarian Government, and keep on saying, that we, as friends of the Bulgarian people, hope that the Bulgarian Government will not again choose the side of early victories and ultimate defeat in a great international conflict.

Five. I believe the British are digging their own grave by refusing to introduce conscription and by continuing to count on the good faith of Mussolini. If you

agree

REB

2-#693, From Paris, April 10, 7p.m.  
(Sec. Two)

agree with this opinion I think it might be most helpful if you should ask the British Ambassador in Washington why the British Government has not introduced conscription and why it has not sent ships to Corfu.

(END OF MESSAGE)

BULLITT

EMB

NPL

PSF; France; Bullitt

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

April 10, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
AMBASSADOR BULLITT

In great confidence, run  
your eye over these proposed  
promotions and give me your  
slant as fast as you can.

F. D. R.

*Files of Confidential  
Personal & Confidential*

cc

Personal and  
~~Confidential~~

Paris, April 23, 1939.

Dear Mr. President:

Your memorandum of April 10th asking me to give you my opinion on the proposed promotions in the Foreign Service reached me only yesterday. I shall get this letter into our NORMANDIE pouch day after tomorrow so that you should have it before the first of May.

The list of officers nominated for promotion is curiously uneven. There are a few excellent men on it; a few who are definitely bad, and many who represent entrenched mediocrity.

Personally, I hate to see feeble incompetents promoted to the higher ranks of the Service. In the long run the upper classes of the Service become cluttered up with men who can not fill important posts with distinction. When the Department of State has money for promotions,

The Honorable

Franklin Delano Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

The White House.

promotions, I believe the promotions should go to men who may be expected to become intensely valuable government servants.

The only persons that I am certain should be promoted are the following:

Class 4 to Class 3.

Donald R. Heath

Class 5 to Class 4.

James E. McKenna  
John J. Muccio

Class 6 to Class 5.

S. Walter Washington

Class 7 to Class 6.

Joseph L. Brent  
Landreth Harrison  
Miss Frances E. Willis

Class 8 to Class 7.

Ware Adams  
Robert D. Coe  
Everett Drumright  
Elbridge Durbrow  
Hugh Corby Fox  
Nathaniel Lancaster, Jr.  
Arthur R. Ringwalt  
Eric C. Wendelin

Unclassified A to Class 8.

Stephen E. Aguirre  
Douglas Flood  
Frank Schuler, Jr.  
William C. Trimble

I do not want to burden you with my opinions about everyone on the list; but there are some that I believe positively should not be promoted.

J. Webb Benton is a sissy whose life is occupied by his relationship with his aged mother from whom he is inseparable. He is a perfect example of the "tea-hound, cake-eater" type that happily is becoming less frequent in the Service.

Ralph C. Busser is a dodo Baptist veterinarian who will be sixty-five years of age and ripe for retirement on the third of next January. His promotion is suggested to you obviously merely in order to give him a higher pension. I consider this sort of graft entirely improper.

J. Rives Childs is a weakling with some money who is totally dominated by his White Russian wife, whose entire family he carts about with him.

William de Courcy is another Baptist veterinarian who will never be of any use except as a minor consular officer.

A. Dana Hodgdon was very nearly dismissed from the Service some years ago because of his peculiar habit of getting drunk regularly and attacking any female within reach. I have seen him in drunken action on several occasions. I refused to have him in Moscow when the Department attempted to assign him to the Mission there. Everyone with whom he has worked has been inspired by a rapid desire to get rid

of

of him. He is really awful.

On the subject of Gerald A. Drew, you can derive ample information from any one of your friends who is a daily habitu  of the Mayflower and Shoreham bars.

Willard Galbraith is a gentleman who hit the bottle so successfully when he was assigned to Honduras, and behaved in such an insulting manner to the Hondurans that he was hopped out of the country by plane one jump ahead of assassination.

Frederick P. Latimer, Jr., was assigned to Helsingfors when you recognized the Soviet Union and did a great deal of talking on the subject of two Communists -- F.D.R. and W.C.B.

Among the other men on the list, there are few that I know well. There may be geniuses among them, but most of the ones I know slightly, -- like Hiram Bingham, Jr., and Homer Byington, Jr.,-- are merely rather feeble sons of distinguished fathers.

I wish I could be of more use, but at any rate I am certain that the men I have classified as deserving promotions should be promoted, and the ones that I have classified as not deserving promotions should not be.

Incidentally,

Incidentally, you may wish to take this opportunity to rectify a few injustices that are rather shocking.

You will remember Robert F. Kelley, former Chief of the Eastern European Division of the Department of State, who prepared all the documents for our negotiations with Litvinov. When his Division was abolished, he was appointed a Foreign Service Officer of Class III, and sent as First Secretary of Embassy at Istanbul. He told me confidentially at that time that Sumner had promised to send him out in Class II, with an early promotion to Class I. This was two years ago, and he is still Class III. He really ought to be a Chief of Mission. Unquestionably, he deserves to be in Class II.

W. Perry George, Consul at Bordeaux, has not been promoted for almost ten years. He is a very good officer and is doing excellent work in Bordeaux. In fact he is doing better work than any consul in France. The Department has not promoted him because he incurred the wrath of Mr. Wilbur J. Carr some years ago when he helped expose a visa scandal in Buenos Aires.

Paul C. Squire, now at Venice, was Consul at Nice until a few weeks ago. He has not been promoted since 1930. He is an intelligent, cultured, able officer and should be promoted.



promoted.

If you should eliminate the names I have suggested or others from the list of promotions, you might care to tell the Department that some of the money thus saved should be used for the promotion of deserving clerks who, as usual, are being neglected shamefully.

Blessings.

Yours affectionately,

Bill

William C. Bullitt.

Enclosures:

Secretary's letter with documents attached.

PSF: Franca  
Cullitt folder

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 11, 1939.

Memorandum For the President.

The Navy and War Departments have been furnished with a copy of the attached confidential information regarding the French and Italian Navies.

The original is returned herewith for your files.

Respectfully,

*D. J. Callaghan*  
D. J. Callaghan.

*File*  
*Private & Confidential*

Paris, March 23, 1939.

Dear Mr. President:

You asked me for some dope on the relative strengths of the French and Italian Navies. I have had our naval boys in the office do some work on this subject. I had hoped that I could get something that would be more valuable and therefore have held up sending you this report, but nothing else seems to be forthcoming.

Good luck and every good wish.

Bill

Enclosure

Report.

The Honorable .

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

Washington, D. C.

**AMERICAN EMBASSY**  
OFFICE OF THE NAVAL ATTACHÉ  
2. AVENUE GABRIEL  
PARIS

COMPARISON OF FORCES

In battleships, the French have an advantage of 8 to 6 in numbers with 3 new and 5 old ships, as against the Italian 2 new and 4 old. However, because of the recent complete modernization of the old Italian ships, the 4 old ships are more than a match for the 5 old French ships. In comparative strength as of say March 1939, the Italians, in battleship power, have an advantage of 7 to 6. Because of the faster speed of construction, the Italian advantage will increase until 1942 when it will swing to the side of the French.

In heavy cruisers, and light cruisers, the Fleets are practically equal in numbers but here again the Italians, slightly inferior in heavy cruisers, are slightly superior, because of newness of ships, in light cruisers. The combined comparison proportion, however, is just about equal.

The French have thirty-two leaders and thirty-four destroyers, a total in the two classes of 66, against which the Italians possess 63 large destroyers. The ratio here also is practically equal as the superior numbers and tonnage of the French are offset by the younger age of the Italian vessels.

In submarines the Italians are definitely superior, both in numbers - 90 to 78 - and in tonnage, adequate for work in and around the Mediterranean.

In torpedo vessels, the French oppose 12 torpedo boats and 22 new escorteurs against 32 new Italian torpedo craft, and here, too, the Italians, in spite of fewer numbers, in tonnage and speed are slightly superior.

Both forces have one aircraft tender, and in addition the French have one carrier. As a counterpoise, the Italians have 35 coastal motor boats against the French 15.

Auxiliary vessels are about equal in number, practically of equal military value and consequently are not included on either side.

As a summary, if the two fleets met, vessel to vessel, with no other considerations being taken into account, the Italians as a whole can be considered superior to the extent of about 19 to 15. This is because of the superior condition of Italian battleships and because of numbers and condition of her submarines, with other forces about equal. However, Fleets and wars are not won with just those considerations, but other points - communications, economics, bases, aviation, military strength and will to fight - must also be evaluated, as well as the material condition of the ships. Italian artillery has always been considered poor as compared with the French. It was inferior to the French in the World War, and in the comment concerning the war in Spain, it has always been declared that Italian guns were excellent, but their control very poor, and that same condition is believed to be true as regards the Navy. From personal observation, corroborated by the British Naval Attaché, the French Fleet is in better condition now than it was even in the World War. In that conflict, both British and American naval personnel regarded the French as good enough, when they did go to sea, but as having a strong dislike against being rolled around by the waves, dodging any going to sea unless it was absolutely required.

The strength of a Fleet is not measured in ships alone, but in the combination of ships and bases. The French bases at Toulon, Oran, Alger and Bizerte are admirably situated to support the French Fleet in the

Western Mediterranean. They are faced by the Italian bases at Spezia, Naples, Messina, Pantelliria and Maddalena. The possession of these points effectually closes the eastern Mediterranean to the French in case of war. However, the eastern Mediterranean, while desirable, is not vital to France.

Industry Italian power in the air is about forty percent greater than that of the French, and by operating from bases in the Italian Peninsula and Sardinia, air threats and attacks can be made against French communications to Africa, as well as on southern French cities and ports. However, this would be no Spanish war and quick reprisals against Italian cities in the Po Valley, and even Rome, would be readily envisaged.

In a war between the two powers, France by her mastery of the Western Mediterranean can effectively blockade Italy from any access to the Atlantic, and deprive her of many supplies needed to wage a conflict. To cite but one example, in such a case where could Italy get the necessary amounts of oil and gasoline. Not from Syria, nor from Russia; some perhaps from Roumania, but also, Germany is not going to impoverish herself and reduce her own supplies even to help an ally. In other words, France can strangle Italy, with equal forces, whereas complete Italian mastery of the eastern Mediterranean would, although an annoyance, by no means be vital for France with her Atlantic routes to Africa and the possibilities of being supplied through the Atlantic.

Italy's deficiency in raw materials is well known. The domestic production of iron only amounts to 25% of her total consumption of iron and steel. (The consumption of iron and steel would, of course, be much greater in war time). They are trying to raise the percentage to about 35% by a

Central Board that control of 13 deposits will become a problem in time of war.

greater use of pyrite ash, by the utilization of low grade iron carbonate deposits, through the roasting process, and by the treatment of ancient iron slag deposits.

The coal produced in Italy is only about 8% of the country's total requirements, and all coking coal which is indispensable for the steel industry must be imported. Domestic coal has a high sulphur and ash content and electric power, where plants may be vulnerable in war time, is being substituted wherever possible.

Domestic crude oil production in Italy, including some from Albania, amounted to only 4% of the country's requirements in 1938. As for copper, Italy produces less than 4% of her total needs. One third of her lead comes from foreign sources.

It is doubted that the above deficiencies could come from Germany as Germany is now deficient in iron, oil and copper. Germany met about 38% of her oil requirements in 1938 from domestic sources, and they hope to bring it up to 50%. The final production cost of gasoline is roughly four times the world market price.

Germany produces 14% of her copper, mainly from the Mansfield copper district; she hopes to raise this to 25% by 1940. The cost is far above the world price. Aluminium, magnesium and other light metal alloys are substituted wherever possible.

Before the war, when Lorraine was part of Germany, 92% of German requirements for iron ore were obtained from domestic sources. By intensive development of low grade deposits, she now produces about one-third of her requirements; she hopes to bring this up to 50% in 1940.

So vital is Germany's dependence on the ores from Northern and Central Sweden that control of these deposits will become a problem in time of war.

The above does not take into account about 12 other acute deficiencies in important minerals, or in foodstuffs, etc.

Italy would therefore have to obtain iron ore and other deficiencies from Spain or the Eastern Mediterranean countries, to augment the small amount Germany could spare her.

However, were Italy to establish herself in bases in Spain, then the French position would become much more serious, as the Atlantic trade routes of France could be threatened and attacked by plane and submarine. Italian bases in Spain would render France's African communications totally insecure, and would be even a grave threat to French Atlantic lines. Such a situation would be absolutely untenable for the French, and such bases would have to be cleaned up before any other operations could be undertaken.

The worst thing that could happen from the Italian viewpoint would be for the French Fleet to withdraw to the Western Mediterranean, when immediately the process of strangulation would start. As the Italians themselves say, they must break out into the Atlantic, and so they would be forced to seek out the French Fleet and give battle at a relatively long distance from Italian bases while at a correspondingly shorter number of miles from the French bases of Oran and Bizerte.

An Italian attack in Africa against Tunisia or Algeria can be discounted, as it would have no effect on the ultimate outcome of the war. The decisive theater of operations will be, undoubtedly, as it has so often before, the plains of the Po Valley and Northern Italy. The victor there can



rearrange his African status as he may desire.

Although the numbers of submarines that may be employed are considerable, improved methods of submarine detection (listening gear) as well as increased airplane surveillance, will hamper underseas craft. Mining, except closely off ports, for defensive purposes, cannot be resorted to because of the relative great depths of the Mediterranean.

In conclusion, with no Italian bases in Spain, the French Fleet by virtue of position can fight the potentially stronger Italian Fleet in the Western Mediterranean, with the advantage in favor of the French. With Italian bases in Spain, the French position becomes increasingly dangerous and may result in the temporary withdrawal of the French Fleet from the Mediterranean until Spain is cleared up.

NAVY  
(FRANCE)

<u>Battleships</u>	<u>Completed</u>	<u>Armament</u>	<u>Speed</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>
4 RICHELIEU	1939 1940 2-1941	8 - 15"	30 4	35,000
2 DUNKERQUE	1938 1939	8 - 13"	31.5	26,500
3 BRETAGNE	1913	10 - 13.4"	20	22,000
2 COURBET	1911-12	12 - 12"	20	22,000
Total 1939 - 3 new + 5 old + 3 building.				

Carriers

1 BEARN	1927	40 planes	21.5	22,000
Total	- 1 + 1 building (will not be completed until 1941).			

Heavy Cruisers

1 ALGERIE	1934	8 - 8"	33	10,000
7 TOURVILLE	1928-1932	8 - 8"	33-36	10,000

Total - 8 none building.

Light Cruisers

6 La Galissonniere	1936-37	9 - 6"	35-36	7600
1 Emile Bertin	1934	9 - 6" 200 mines	37	5900
1 Jeanne d'Arc	1931	8 - 6.1"	27	6500
3 Primouguet	1926	8 - 6.1"	33	7800
1 Pluton (mines)	1931	4 - 5.5" 290 mines	30	4800

Total - 12 - none building.

NAVY  
(FRANCE)

<u>Destroyer-Leaders</u>	<u>Completed</u>	<u>Armament</u>	<u>Speed</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>
2 Mogador	1938	8 - 5.5"	38	2884
6 Fantasque	1933-34	5 - 5.5"	37	2569
6 Cassard	1933-34	5 - 5.5"	39-42	2441
6 Aigle	1932-33	5 - 5.5"	38-40	2400
6 Guépard	1930-33	5 - 5.5"	38-40	2436
6 Jaguar	1926-27	5 - 5.1"	34-35	2126
Total - 32 - None building				
<u>Destroyers</u>				
8 Le Hardi	1939-40	6 - 5.1"	37-38	1772
26 Adroit	1926-29	4 - 5.1"	34	1378
Total - 26, plus 8 building (will be finished 1939-40)				
<u>Torpedo Boats</u>				
12 Pomone	1936-38	2 - 3.9"	35	610
<u>Submarines</u>				
5 Moillot	1938-39	9 - 21.7" Torps	23/10	1605/2100
1 Surcouf	1934	2 - 8" guns 22 - 21.7" Torps	17/10	2900/4300
30 Redoutable	1928-37	11 - 21.7" Torps	17/10	1300/2000
9 Requin	1926-27	16 - 21.7" Torps	16/10	1000/1400
22 Dione	1930-38	8 - 21.7" Torps	14/9	571/809
11 Sirée	1925-27	7 - 21.7" Torps	14/7	540/760
Total - 78.				
<u>Submarines - Mine-Laying</u>				
6 Saphir	1928-35	6 Torpedoes 32 Mines	12/9	670/925

NAVY  
(FRANCE)

<u>Seaplane Carrier</u>	<u>Completed</u>	<u>Armament</u>	<u>Speed</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>
1 Comdt. Teste	1931	12 - 3.9"	20	10,000
<u>Escorteurs</u>				
22 Elan	1932	2 - 3.9"	20	630
11 Arros	1918	2 - 5.5"	20	644

Total 22 new, plus 11 old.

Auxiliary vessels are not included.

NAVY  
(ITALY)

<u>Battleships</u>	<u>Completed</u>	<u>Armament</u>	<u>Speed</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>
2 ROMA	1940-41	9 - 15"	32	35,000
2 LITTORIO	1939	9 - 15"	32	35,000
4 CAVOUR	1911-1913 1937-1939 refitted	10 - 12.6"	27	23,000

Total - 2 new plus 4 old, refitted plus 2 building.

Heavy Cruisers

3 TRENTO	1929-33	8 - 8"	35	10,000
4 ZARA	1931-32	8 - 8"	32	10,000

Total - 7.

Cruisers, light

2 GARABALDI	1937	10 - 6"	36	7874
2 FILIBERTO	1935-36	8 - 6"	36.5	7283
2 MONTECUECOLI	1935	8 - 6"	37	6941
2 DIAZ	1933	8 - 6"	37	5008
4 BANDE NERE	1931-32	8 - 6"	38-40	5069

Total - 12 new plus 3 pre-war plus 12 to be completed 1942.

Destroyers

12 AVIERE	1938-39	4 - 4.7"	39	1620
4 ORIANI	1938	4 - 4.7"	39	1729
4 GRECOLE	1935	4 - 4.7"	38	1449
8 DAINO	1932	4 - 4.7"	38	1220
12 NAVIGATORI	1931	6 - 4.7"	38-42	1628
8 TURBINE	1929	4 - 4.7"	38	1090
4 SCURO	1927	4 - 4.7"	37	1058

NAVY  
(ITALY)

<u>Destroyers</u> (Cont'd)	<u>Completed</u>	<u>Armament</u>	<u>Speed</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>
4 SELIA	1926	4 - 4.7"	36	935
3 LECNE	1924	8 - 4.7" 60 mines	33	1526
4 CURTATONE	1923	4 - 4" 10 mines	33	966

Total - 63 plus 9 pre-war.

Torpedo Boats

16 PARTENOPE	1938-39	3 - 3.9" plus mines	34	679
16 SPICA	1936-37	3 - 3.9" " "	34	638
6 GENERALI	1923	3 - 4" plus mines	30	635

Total - 32 new plus 6 old plus 19 pre-war.

Submarines

4 GALVI	1935	8 - 21" torpedoes	18/9	1340/1900
4 BULLIA	1928	6 - 21" "	17/9	1368/1874
9 MARCELLO	1937-38	8 - 21" "	17/9	940/1400
3 GALVAIN	1938	8 - 21" "	17/9	896/1350
6 ARCHIMEDE	1934-35	8 - 21" "	17/8	880/1200
6 SQUALO	1930-31	8 - 21" "	17/9	800/1100
4 SANTA ROSA	1930	8 - 21" "	17/9	815/1078
8 PISANI	1928	6 - 21" "	17/9	790/1000
29 PERLA	1937-38	6 - 21" "	14/8	620/853
12 SIREVA	1933-34	6 - 21" "	14/8	590/787
5 ARGONAUTUS	1931-32	6 - 21" "	14/8	600/778

Total - 90 plus 5 pre-war plus 20 building and completed in 1941.

NAVY  
(ITALY)

<u>Submarines, Mine-Laying</u>	<u>Completed</u>	<u>Armament</u>	<u>Speed</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>
4 FOCA	1937-38	6 - 21" Torpedoes 45 mines	16/8	1109/1533
2 CARRICONI	1929	4 - 21" " 24 mines	14/8	803/1051

Total 6 plus 2 pre-war.

Seaplane Carrier

1 MIRAGLIA	1927	20 planes	21	4880
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Auxiliary vessels are not included.

AMERICAN EMBASSY  
OFFICE OF THE NAVAL ATTACHE  
2. AVENUE GABRIEL  
PARIS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

9 February, 1939.

Memorandum for the Ambassador:

The following data on speed of firing of French naval guns, as contrasted with American, is submitted:

The maximum speed of firing of guns, limited by the speed of the hoist as well as by regulations is, for various guns, as follows:

<u>Type of Gun</u>	<u>Shots per Minute</u>	
	<u>French</u>	<u>American</u>
(Guns in Turrets or Casemates) -		
12-inch and above	2	3 to 4
8-inch	3	6
6-inch	6	12
5.5-inch	8	18-20
(Unprotected guns)		
6-inch	6	12
5.5, 5.1, 3.9 inch	8	18-20
3-inch	10	25
2.5 and 1.8 inch	15	50

If ready boxes are available at top and bottom of hoist, the above speeds of firing for non-protected guns can be maintained as follows:

6, 5.5, 5.1, 3.9 inch	4 minutes	30 minutes
3, 2.5, and 1.8 inch	6 "	75 "

After that time has elapsed, the rate of firing decreases as follows:

6-inch	3 shots per minute	10 shots per minute
5.5, 5.1, 3.9 inch	5 " " "	No change
3, 2.5, and 1.8 inch	6 " " "	No change



Bullitt

file  
personal


Paris, April 18, 1939.

Dear Mr. President:

I was really delighted to receive those volumes of your Public Papers and Addresses, and I thank you most heartily for the inscription.

I don't see how you find time to remember always to be nice to the obscure in the sticks. Anyhow, you do, and I am grateful.

Yours affectionately,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, consisting of the letters 'W', 'C', and 'B' in a stylized, cursive-like font, followed by a period.

William C. Bullitt.

The Honorable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

Washington, D. C.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

g

April 19, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE P. S.

Will you reply to Bill  
Bullitt and say as long as Mrs.  
Forbes has asked for it, it  
should be done?

F. D. R.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to  
PR 811.607 New York, 1939/1351

April 17, 1939.

My dear Miss LeHand:

I am sending you herewith a paraphrase of a code message which Ambassador Bullitt sent to the Secretary of State today for delivery to you.

Sincerely yours,

*G. T. Jamieson*  
Chief of Protocol.

Enclosure:  
Telegram.

Miss Marguerite A. LeHand,  
Private Secretary to the President,  
The White House.

Paris

April 17, 1939.

FOR MISS LEHAND.

Please let me know whether the President wishes me to comply with the following request:

I received a call this morning from the Marquis de Pelleport, 23, rue de Invalids, Paris. He brought with him a letter from Mrs. Dora D. Forbes, the President's aunt, requesting that he arrange immediately to send the bronze bust of the President done by his wife, the Marquise de Pelleport, to the New York World's Fair. I have seen the bust and, in my opinion, it is a better likeness of Herbert Bayard Swope than of the President. In order that the bust may be placed in the French Pavilion at the World's Fair, the Marquis has asked that I arrange for its transportation to New York.

BULLITT

Bullitt

April 24, 1939

Dear Bill:

All your letters have been grand and I hope you will keep on writing to me.

We all love the list of orders for the Royal guests and only wish you were going to be here to help us out. We are also amused at the thought of the sider-down comforter in Washington on June eighth, to say nothing of the hot water bottles for the ladies in waiting!

I like the picture you sent and I do hope you are taking my conversation seriously!

My affectionate good wishes,

As always,

F. D. R.

Honorable William C. Bullitt  
Ambassador Extraordinary and  
Plenipotentiary  
Paris, France

Paris, March 23, 1939.

Dear Mr. President:

I send you the enclosed just to prove to you  
that you are present in my office in Paris, even  
though you may think you aren't.

Love and good luck.

B:11

Enclosure  
Photograph.

The Honorable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

Washington, D. C.

1  
Please note  
that this must  
not be told to  
the Dept. as yet -  
M. G. H.

Bullitt

file  
Confidential

Personal and

Paris, April 28, 1939.

Dear Mr. President:

I wish I could telegraph this piece of news to you today; but Leger gave it to me on condition that it positively should not be sent by telegraph.

Gafenc<sup>o</sup>, while passing through Poland, came to an understanding with Beck that, in case of an attack on Poland by Germany, Rumania would declare war at once on the side of Poland; and in case of an attack on Rumania by Germany, Poland would declare war at once on Germany.

This secret agreement was communicated orally to Chamberlain and Daladier by Gafenc<sup>o</sup>. It has been concealed with extreme care from Berlin, and for obvious reasons must continue to be concealed.

Daladier stated to Gafenco today that it was  
absolutely

The Honorable

Franklin Delano Roosevelt,  
The White House,  
Washington.




absolutely essential, however, that the Rumanian Government should inform the Turkish Government that this agreement had been reached, so that the Anglo-Turkish and Franco-Turkish agreements might enter into effect at once.

Gafenco implored Daladier not to say a word about the agreement to the Turks; but promised that he would send a personal emissary to communicate the fact of the existence of this agreement to Ismet Inonu in Ankara.

Please hold this piece of information for your most secret ear. Just as soon as it ceases to be so utterly secret, I will send a telegram to the Department on the subject.

Yours affectionately,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Bill", with a horizontal line underneath.

William C. Bullitt.

FOR THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL  
FILES.

BPVCE

PLACE  
STAMP  
HERE

PSF: France (Bullitt)

Personal.

Paris, May 4, 1939.

Dear Mr. President:

I know that you intervened effectively in London through Joe Kennedy once in this matter. I think you will be interested, therefore, in this letter from Weizmann.

Good luck.

Yours always,

Bill.

William C. Bullitt.

Enclosure:

1 Letter.

The Honorable

Franklin Delano Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

The White House.

*Personal*



מכון למחקר של דניאל סייף  
THE DANIEL SIEFF  
RESEARCH INSTITUTE  
מכון אبحاث דניאל סייף

REHOVOTH  
PALESTINE

P.O. B. 26 ת.ד.  
TELEPHONE 259 טלפון

רחובות  
ארץ-ישראל

PLEASE REPLY TO  
THE SECRETARY

נא לענות  
למזכירות

April 24, 1939.

*My dear Mr Bullitt,*

I arrived here just three weeks ago after an absence of nearly a year and I feel very much impelled to write you of some first impressions insofar as they bear on the subject of our recent talks in Paris.

I have come to Palestine on many occasions during the past 20 years, in times of growth and stagnation, of trouble and of prosperity. Never before, however, have I been made so intensely aware of the extraordinary transformation that has been wrought here in the character and outlook of the Jews. This is no longer a colony or a settlement. It is a real people in the most integral sense of the term. These three years of disturbances have produced an awareness of realities, a sense of national cohesion and a doughty determination such as I had never before felt on coming out here. I have seen these first few weeks a great many people from practically every stratum of this complex society, and the impression that is left in one's mind from every talk is that of an iron determination to hold out, whatever the sacrifice demanded, and to oppose to the utmost the imposition of any policy aiming at the liquidation of the National Home. Last week the Jewish Labour Party, which represents the largest force in the Jewish community and, incidentally, one of its most constructive elements, had a memorable conference in which it was decided that no sacrifice would be too heavy if thereby the paralysis of Jewish immigration, the closing of any part of the country to Jewish settlement, and the subjection of the National Home to Arab domination could be prevented. In a resolution which had the austere moral ring of the great historical declarations of the



2.

16th and 17 centuries, it was affirmed that by abandoning its obligation to promote the development of the Jewish National Home, for which essentially the Mandate was entrusted to the British Government, the latter would divest itself of the moral and legal title by which it governs this country and reduce itself to a mere agency of coercion. You know well what the aftermath of such a declaration has been in the past. In the present case it would be fraught with supreme tragedy.

I have conveyed all this in a telegram to the Prime Minister and warned him, in as restrained language as I could use in such circumstances, of what was here at stake. I made it clear to him that the Jews were determined to make the supreme sacrifice rather than submit to such a regime. Their position is so desperate that they have little to lose. I do not know what result this last minute appeal will have. The air is full of reports that conversations with the Arab leaders are being continued in Cairo and other places and that even further concessions are about to be made to them. I can only say this that if the Government really adopts the policy outlined to us in London and endeavours to carry it into effect, it will bite granite. At a time when millions of Jews are undergoing a sadistic persecution such as the world has not known since the darkest ages, the Jews of Palestine will not put up with the land in which a National Home was solemnly promised to them by the civilised world being closed to their harassed brethren. Immigration will continue with or without Government permission as it is continuing in these days despite the Procrustean restrictions imposed upon it. Tragedies of which the world hears very little are being enacted every day along the coast of Palestine. Boats, overloaded with refugees from German concentration camps, are floating about for weeks on end in the Mediterranean, their passengers starved and afflicted with the diseases of hunger and exhaustion, among them women and children of tender age. Some of these boats have been caught by British patrol vessels and dragged to the coast then to be pushed out again into the open sea with their human cargo. Can you visualize the feelings of the Jews of this country in witnessing these ghastly spectacles, when they know all the time that these unfortunate people could be productively



3.

absorbed in Palestine without any harm being done to the Arabs?

What makes the policy of the Government so utterly amazing is the complete ignorance which it betrays of the realities of the situation in this part of the world. Every day the Arab press of the neighbouring countries reveals the fear of war that is shaking the Arab world. Their only hope is that the Western democratic powers may protect them against the onslaught of the totalitarian regimes. Never before has the British army been so popular in Egypt as it is these days. In Syria the French meet with a sympathy from the nationalist extremists such as would have been inconceivable a year ago. And at this moment when the Arabs are so evidently dependent on British help and are so conscious of it, the British Government embarks on a policy which can<sup>only</sup> be explained, if at all, by their fear that the Arabs would turn against them in case of war. For this policy the Government is prepared to sacrifice the Jews who could be of real help to them in an international conflict and whose loyalty is beyond any shadow of doubt. As the ancient Latin has it, it is sometimes "difficult not to write a satire".

I am sorry to trouble you with all this, but as I know how interested you are in the problem I trust you will forgive me for expatiating on it at such length. Perhaps you may find it possible to convey some of this to your Government. It is the only one which may conceivably still be able to prevail upon the British Government to desist from a course which, I am convinced, can only end in disaster. But it would have to be done most speedily and with more than ordinary emphasis.

*With cordial regards  
Yours very sincerely  
Ch. Weizmann*

Mr. W.Ch. Bullitt,  
Ambassador of the United States  
to France,  
Embassy of the United States of America,  
Paris,  
France.

*file  
Confidential*

*PSF: France  
Bullitt*

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 8, 1939.

MEMORANDUM for General Watson:

Herewith is a memorandum from the President enclosing a personal and confidential report. I have naturally carried out the instructions. No one has seen this paper, and I have read it and studied it carefully.

I know General Requin personally and there is little doubt that his remarks and report were very nearly correct about eighteen months ago. Since then matters have improved materially and within another year with funds now available I believe the deficiencies will be well on the way to being wiped out.

Respectfully,

*Malin Gray*  
Chief of Staff.

encl.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

May 3, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL CRAIG  
GENERAL MARSHALL

The enclosed is for your  
own eyes only. Please read and  
return.

F. D. R.



Personal and  
Confidential.

Paris, April 18, 1939.

Dear Mr. President:

A few weeks ago I asked your old friend and mine, General Réquin, who is now a member of the Supreme War Council, to give me his views on the American Army. Réquin replied that he would prefer to give me his views in writing. He expressed the opinion that in view of world conditions, it might be desirable to bring up the American Army to the figure of five hundred thousand men.

I have now received a memorandum from him which discusses both the weak points of the American Army and methods of increasing its peace-time strength.

You will remember that it was Réquin who was sent to the United States in 1917 to organize the cooperation  
between

The Honorable


Franklin Delano Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

The White House.

between the military forces of the United States and France. If the opinions of anyone in France on our Army are worth anything, his are. Needless to say, no reference should be made to the source from which this memorandum emanates.

Yours affectionately,

Handwritten signature of William C. Bullitt in cursive script.

William C. Bullitt.

April 13, 1939.

NOTE

ON THE UNITED STATES ARMY

I will describe hereinafter:

The weak points of the United States Army.

The measures which would permit increasing its peace time strength to 500,000 men and at the same time eliminating these weak points.

The measures which would permit hastening its development in case of war.

I. WEAKNESSES.

1. Insufficiency of the effectives.

Regular Army:

total effectives: 178,000 men. From this total must be deducted that portion stationed overseas, as well as that of the Air Corps, that is, approximately 60,000 men. The remaining 118,000 men would permit the United States to have on the continent, only 3 Infantry Divisions and 1 Cavalry Division, certain elements of which, besides, are incomplete (Infantry Regiments of 2 Battalions, Artillery Regiments reduced to 1 Group, and even to 1 Battery).

National Guard:

is composed of 18 Infantry Divisions and 4 Cavalry Divisions, plus a certain number of units not forming part of any division. But all these large units are incomplete; certain elements are defective; and those existing have generally weak effectives.

2. Almost complete lack of reserve troops.

Regular Army:

up to the present time, the Regular Army has had no  
reserves

reserves whatsoever. These reserves (75,000 men) have been in the process of formation since 1938; but the recruiting of these men will be completed only in 1942.

National Guard:

possesses no organized reserves. In case of conflict, the National Guard would have to call for volunteers, or begin recruiting in order to bring its units up to war time strength.

3. Insufficiency of armament and of equipment put at disposition of units.

Regular Army:

the armament of the Infantry is being replaced and completed; but this transformation is still far from complete. Anti-tank armament is almost totally lacking.

The modern equipment required to complete the American Artillery: howitzers of 105, cannons of 155, are available as prototypes only.

The D.C.A. (Anti-Aircraft Service) has available only a small amount of equipment.

The tanks are small in number, 300 or 400 in all. They are fast; but weakly armor-plated.

National Guard:

The armament, in large part, dates from the war.

The equipment is incomplete.

A few tanks only: 36 in all.

4. Unwieldiness of the American divisional organization.

The present American division comprises:

4 Infantry Regiments,

3 Artillery Regiments,

or 22,000 officers and men in all.

This is a large unit hard to maneuver.

A new type of division which would comprise:

National Guard: 3 Infantry

Total: 118,000 men.

3 Infantry Regiments, 2 Artillery Regiments, 11 to 12,000 officers and men in all, is being tried out. However, nothing has as yet been agreed upon. New trials are foreseen for 1939. The experiment of a 3-Regiment Division, however, was tried out successfully in war in all large armies a long time ago.

5. Summary instruction and insufficient number of reserve officers.

The training of reserve officers is often superficial and generally more theoretical than practical.

Their number should be increased by 30,000 in order to meet the needs of the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the extra Divisions (27 Infantry Divisions, 6 Cavalry Divisions).

6. Absence of a corps of non-commissioned reserve officers.

There exist possibilities in subordinate staffs; but they are not exactly enumerated. The military training of these eventual staffs is probably summary, and their number undoubtedly insufficient.

7. Insufficiency of equipment reserves and munitions stocks.

The armament reserves, as well as those of modern equipment, are small. The same applies to munitions stocks.

II. MEASURES WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE INCREASE TO 500,000 MEN OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN PEACE TIME.

1. From the standpoint of effectives:

The United States Army in peace time numbers at the present moment:

Regular Army:	118,000 men	(after deducting the portion stationed overseas and the "Air Corps")
National Guard:	<u>200,000 men</u>	
Total:	318,000 men.	

In order to increase this army to 500,000 men, it would thus be necessary to enlist approximately 200,000 men.

The entry into the only Regular Army of these 200,000 men would present great difficulties due to the Americans' lack of enthusiasm for military obligations and due to the necessity to create numerous new installations. It would undoubtedly be more practical for the Americans to be content with a slight increase of the Regular Army's effectives. For example, increasing the effectives by approximately 50 to 60,000 men, would permit doubling the number of regular Divisions, and applying to the National Guard the major part of the increase in such a manner as to bring up to war strength existing Divisions, and if necessary, to create new ones.\*

2. From the standpoint of staffs.

The question of staffs would be easy to solve, in so far as it concerns the National Guard, in view of the reserve staff which the Corps of Reserve Officers constitutes.

It would be much more ticklish in so far as it concerns the Regular Army. The increase in staffs corresponding to the increase in effectives which is envisaged would be approximately 3,000 officers. In order to gain time, the greatest portion of these should be obtained by transferring officers from the reserve to the active list, or by authorizing a certain number of them to serve in active duty, as we do in France.

3. From the standpoint of equipment.

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\*This increase of effectives of the National Guard would be facilitated by the fact that the law of 1920, which serves as a basis for the organization of the National Guard, provides for the National Guard a maximum effective of 425,000 men.

The envisaged increase of 200,000 men would demand a tremendous effort from the standpoint of equipment. In fact, it would be necessary:

first, to furnish to units already in existence all the equipment they need and which they now have only in part;

then to distribute the necessary equipment to the newly formed units.

This effort is certainly not beyond the possibilities of American industry. In spite of everything, this industry would doubtless require a certain amount of delay before production could reach its peak.

III. MEASURES WHICH WOULD PERMIT HASTENING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN WAR TIME.

The United States Army in time of war comprises:

1. The Regular Army units.
2. The National Guard units.
3. The units placed in the field after the declaration of war.

1. Regular Army units.

In peace time, the Regular Army units have available only a portion of the personnel and equipment required for war time.

In case of conflict, the rapidity with which they are placed in the field depends on the reserves of men and equipment, which must be organized in time of peace.

These reserves are, for the moment, insufficient and should be completed as rapidly as possible.

2. National Guard units.

The National Guard units as they now exist are incomplete from the double standpoint of personnel and equipment.

equipment.

Having no organized reserves available, the National Guard, in order to be able to bring its units up to war strength, must enlist volunteers or incorporate recruits in case conscription is decreed.

The same situation holds in so far as equipment (armament included) is concerned. Due to the lack of reserves of equipment, this equipment must be ordered or placed in production upon mobilization.

Also, several months must be allowed in which to bring the National Guard up to war strength.

These delays could be considerably lessened if the National Guard:

1. included units constantly maintained at war strength, or failing this, had available organized reserves,
2. had in reserve the equipment necessary to complete its peace time equipment.
3. Units placed in the field upon the declaration of war.

Considerable time would be gained:

if the United States fixed in peace time the method of conscription in time of war,

if, using this method as a basis, they proceeded in peace time to take the census in each State of all citizens subject to call to the colors, particularly all those having had military training and capable of serving as monitors and instructors\*,

if, also in time of peace, there were decided upon the measures to be taken for putting in the field, immediately upon mobilization, a first echelon of units of formation: instruction centers, recruits and teaching personnel for these centers, stocking of clothing, teaching equipment, etc....

In addition, the putting into the field of formation units being the function of:

unattached

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\*Non-commissioned officers and men discharged from the Regular Army and citizens having received training at C.M.T.C.'s., a para-military organization created in order to furnish Americans with rudimentary military training and discipline.



unattached staffs,  
unassigned equipment,

it would be necessary for the United States:

a) to possess a greater number of reserve officers (approximately 30,000 additional reserve officers) and effectives of non-commissioned reserve officers exactly enumerated, and probably increased;

b) to prepare industrial mobilization in such complete fashion that the manufacture of equipment can begin in a minimum of time.

PSF: France  
Ballitt

Paris, May 9, 1939.

PERSONAL

Dear Mr. President:

In spite of Daladier's insistence that your French is impeccable, you didn't seem particularly quick on the uptake when he asked you if he could appoint me French Minister for Foreign Affairs!

Nevertheless, he was bowled over by the sound of your voice.

On account of that or for some other reason, he asked me at once to draft for him a law to increase the French birth rate which he would promulgate by decree! I do not know quite what to suggest unless it is to have Joe Kennedy transferred to Paris!

The little Queen is now on her way to you  
together

The Honorable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

Washington, D. C.

together with the little King. She is a nice girl - either down or no either down - and you will like her, in spite of the fact that her sister-in-law, the Princess Royal, goes around England talking about "her cheap public smile". She is a bit gracious; but resembles so much the female caddies who used to carry my clubs at Pitlochry in Scotland many years ago that I find her pleasant. And she has an active curiosity.

When she touched the subject of royal presents, I suggested that you would be touched close to the heart, at least as close as the stomach, by a Stilton cheese. If she brings it, you can blame and excuse me.

The little King is beginning to feel his oats, but still remains a rather frightened boy. Joe Kennedy gave the Queen Virginia Ham and Pickled Peaches. She ate vast quantities, and expressed a royal desire to become more closely acquainted with the dish when in America.

I have no other tips to give you except the obvious one that it is well not to mention the Duke and Duchess of Windsor unless the King brings up the subject. He probably won't. About a month ago the Duke of Windsor wrote to Queen Mary that Bertie had behaved

behaved toward him in such an ungentlemanly manner because of "the influence of that common little woman" the Queen, that he could have no further relations with Bertie. Brotherly love is, therefore, not at fever heat.

The only low news from Paris this week concerns Flandin, six feet five, Germanophile, and ex-Prime Minister. He has faded quickly from the political picture due to the event which occurred about two weeks ago. Daladier is my authority for this. He said that Flandin called on a young lady who lives near me and was in bed with her when her amant de coeur broke into the apartment; beat up Flandin and drove him into the street half-clothed, minus his watch, wallet, and trousers! Daladier does not expect any serious opposition from Flandin in the near future.

Good luck and may you have a good time as sovereign to sovereign over my Pommery.

Yours affectionately,

B.H.

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2 A  
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GREATEST  
MUSIC"**  
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Brandenburg Concertos  
Nos. 2 and 3

TURN TO PAGE 8 FOR  
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Classified Section

**New York Post**

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The Works of  
**FENIMORE COOPER**

**HITLER EMBASSY  
IN FRANCE LEADS  
ATTACKS ON U. S.**

Anti-American Periodical  
Submits Editions to  
German Diplomats

By EDWARD HUNTER

Special Correspondent N. Y. Post  
Copyright, 1939, by N. Y. Post, Inc.

PARIS, March 31.—"The Imbecility of Democracy" . . . "Will Harpo Marx Succeed President Roosevelt?" . . . "The Philosemite Roosevelt . . ."

Of course these quotations had to come from a German or Italian newspaper. Only they didn't. They were published in Paris in a single issue of Je Suis Partout (I Am Everywhere).

In what country did a weekly newspaper with a circulation of more than half a million publish two "cultural articles" about the United States, one about "Vice and Gangs," and the other just about gangs? In Germany or Italy of course. Wrong again. In Paris, in the Gringoire.

These are only samples of a new vicious anti-American campaign that has begun in French newspapers and magazines that usually are identified with German influence or money. The outspoken enemies of democracy in France, and they are many and powerful, are pouring forth venom against the United States as if that were the one country that stood in their path.

**Gets German Approval**

I traced the source of some of these attacks. Each week when the first copy of Je Suis Partout drops from the press, the machines stop and every one waits until it is sent to the German Embassy in Paris for an O. K. This was a dying publication only a few months ago. The staff was laid off. But overnight it blossomed forth with twice as many pages and renewed financing.

The discharged staff was called back and given increases, but warned not to talk outside the office. There was no advertising to explain this sudden prosperity. There's hardly half a page of legitimate advertising in its twelve pages. Its circulation didn't warrant any increased expenditure, although it appeared in heaps on all stands.

**Diplomat Investigates**

This aroused the curiosity of a European diplomat who made an investigation. He found that the trail led to Germany. It was part of the campaign to bore from within that followed the pledging of support to this country by other democracies in case of unprovoked aggression. If an uprising could be staged from within, outside assistance would be interference in the affairs of a friendly nation—as in Spain. The diplomat's inquiry showed

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3. N. W. T. SUBWAY—Take local train to Rector St., walk three blocks west.
4. 9TH AVE. "L"—Get off at Rector St., walk two blocks west.
5. FROM NEW JERSEY—Take Hudson Tubes—get off at Cortlandt St., walk south to Rector St. and west to West St.

Public Service Department, West Street Lobby, open 9 A. M. to 6 P. M. each day except Sundays.

## Diplomat Investigates

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The diplomat's inquiry showed that the subsidy was paid by a clever artifice. The money comes from one of France's munitions kings who has plants both in Germany and his own country. Berlin's Propaganda Ministry works only through his executives in that country, though, and it's their job to deal directly with their colleagues in France.

Gringoire often looks like a French edition of the Angriff of Berlin. Identical articles can be found in both. A mistake was made recently that gave observers a laugh. The Angriff came out with an article that it announced had been published in the preceding issue of the Gringoire.

It wasn't, though—it was only published in the following issue, after it had been supposedly reprinted by the official German organ!

## Canadian Interest Sought

Discredited anti-American and anti-Semitic propaganda is constantly being unearthed in this new drive. For instance, the false quotation from Benjamin Franklin made its appearance again last week in a Paris publication.

One of the significant aspects of Je Suis Partout is its specific appeal to Canadians and South Americans. It advertises that it is the only French journal to publish a Canadian page. Although violently against the United States, it runs flattering material on Canada, with a subscription blank alongside. A drive for readers is being made among both French Canadians and South Americans.

If French publications could be used in this way, Germany would escape, at least technically, the accusation of spreading this propaganda in the Americas. It would be a sister democracy of the United States, France! No opportunity is lost in these organs to warn the Canadians and South Americans that they cannot trust the United States, which is "seeking only imperialistic advantages."

## Here's an Example

Here is the sort of information about the United States that the French public is being fed:

"Don't imagine these examples of cities entirely handed over to gangsters are unusual. They are, to the contrary, legion, and not merely second-rate towns. They're capitals of States, such as Kansas City, Des Moines, Toledo, Chicago, not to speak of New York, which is entirely under the power of Tammany Hall.

## BALL LOTS TO OPEN IN BROOKLYN PARKS

"Batter up!" will be the cry throughout Brooklyn after 1 P. M. tomorrow afternoon when the Park Department opens its baseball fields in the borough.

The fields scheduled to be thrown open to the sandlotters are thirteen at the Prospect Park Parade Grounds, four at Columbia and Halleck Streets, six at Dyker Beach Park, one at Remsen and Clarkson Streets, two at Shore Road and Ninety-sixth Street and Third Avenue, two at Avenue U and East Fifty-eighth Street, one at McCarren Park and one at Thirty-seventh Street and Second Avenue. A heavy demand for permits was reported by the Park Department.

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Att. 5-9-39  
P.S. I.F. R. 1472

Paris, May 9, 1939.

Dear Mr. President:

I believe that the enclosed article from the New York Post, which you sent to me recently, is not to be taken too seriously.

The headlines of the article, about the German Embassy in Paris leading "attacks on U.S.", seem to be based upon the statement in the body of the article that the French publication, Je Suis Partout, sends its first copy hot off the press to the German Embassy and waits before continuing with the publication of the issue until it gets an O.K., from the Embassy. This is absurd.

Je Suis Partout is generally believed to have been on the German payroll for the past two or three years. It has no influence whatsoever.

Yours always,

Bill

Enclosure.

The Honorable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

Washington, D. C.

Paris, May 9, 1939.

PERSONAL

Dear Mr. President:

Three small matters:

(1) I have just had a letter from Huberta Earle saying that George is finding it very hard to be among the unemployed, and that he is violently eager to get into some sort of government work. She did not specify what or where.

(2) Henry Grady of the Tariff Commission, formerly of the Department of State, has just finished a flying trip through Central and Eastern Europe and has some worth while ideas. You or somebody else ought to talk with him.

(3) If you haven't done so already, please write me briefly what you said to Monnet.

Yours always,

Bill

The Honorable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

Washington, D. C.



PSF: France: Bullitt

May 16, 1939.

Dear Bill:-

Thank you for the several documents this morning. I have not forgotten George but, as you know, it will be a bit easier to fit him in somewhere in a month or two than just at this minute. I will try to see Henry Grady.

I had a nice talk with M. and since then he has seen Morgenthau twice. The gist of it is that we are all agreed that a somewhat elastic formula holds out some hope in the future but that the present time is inopportune. I told him frankly that I thought it would be a mistake for his government to deplete a bettering cash condition for a little while.

As to X, I explained to him that one or two of the larger localities would be a headache to us if we had to run them and that the money value of two or three smaller places would amount to a sum so small that even if they were of some military use to us the amount worth paying would be a drop in the bucket compared with the total owed or compared with the total of a settlement. I think he is entirely satisfied with the friendly and practical approach and also with the thought that this is not a good time to push it to any publicity stage.

It is grand of you to send the Champagne and I do wish you could be here at the time of the visit.

By the way, in regard to Reed, apparently Bill Phillips and the people here feel he has been going a good job in Rome. And in regard to Huck, I fear he has been a complete fish out of water in Buenos Aires. I think we will have to move him from there but it is difficult to have people who can only fit in in fancy European Capitals.

My best to you,

As ever yours,

Honorable William C. Bullitt,  
American Embassy,  
Paris,  
France.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 16, 1939

My dear Mr. President:

I have received your memorandum of May 15, with which you enclose a letter which Bill Bullitt has sent you under date of April 25 suggesting that Pinkney Tuck, now Counselor of Embassy in Buenos Aires, be transferred to Rome and that Edward L. Reed, now Counselor of Embassy in Rome, replace him as Counselor of Embassy in Buenos Aires.

Bill refers to Ed Reed as a "bone-head", "who still ought to be selling collars in his father's haberdashery in Philadelphia". Of course, I do not know upon what personal knowledge of Ed Reed Bill Bullitt bases his characterization in his letter to you. I am very confident, however, that he has not had the opportunity of knowing Reed as well as I do. Ed Reed was my Counselor of Embassy throughout the time that I was Ambassador to Cuba. I have never known a more loyal, hard working,

The President,

The White House.


conscientious, and efficient Foreign Service officer than he proved to be at that time. I cannot speak too highly of the help he gave me. After that he was for three years Chief of the Division of Mexican Affairs in the Department before that Division was consolidated in the Division of the American Republics. He worked immediately under my supervision, and I can speak of him in that capacity in the highest possible terms. Bill Phillips asked for him to be sent to Rome, and I have every reason to believe that he has been doing an admirable job under very difficult circumstances in Rome during the two years that he has been stationed there. So far as the fact that his father had a haberdashery is concerned, I cannot see that that has anything to do with the case. Certainly Ed Reed is a gentleman in the best sense of the word, and in my judgment one of the hardest working, most presentable, and most efficient Foreign Service officers that we have.

I think that Tuck should certainly be transferred from Buenos Aires, and I have already spoken with the Division of Foreign Service Personnel with regard to this matter. He has proved himself totally unqualified to be in Buenos Aires, and the report that Ed Flynn gave you with regard to Tuck confirms me in this belief. He was only moved from Brussels because of Joe Davies' refusal to have him on

his staff.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "D. Kelly". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "D" and a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

Personal and  
Confidential.

Paris, April 25, 1939.

Dear Mr. President:

I have just received a note from Basil O'Connor, giving me the details of the dedication of the new school at Warm Springs given by Mrs. S. Pinkney Tuck. Basil also enclosed for my information a copy of Mrs. Tuck's very nice letter which was read at the dedication ceremony.

Tuck is, as you know, a Foreign Service Officer of Class II. He was first secretary of this Embassy when I arrived here as Ambassador. When it became known that the Embassy in Brussels would need a new Counselor, he asked me if I would recommend him for this vacancy. I did so and he was assigned as Counselor of Embassy at Brussels.

Less than six months later Tuck was transferred to Buenos Aires. Mrs. Tuck had just finished furnishing a  
home

The Honorable

Franklin Delano Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

The White House.

home in Brussels at great expense since she looked forward to being there for two or three years. The Tucks did not complain in any way and went immediately without protest to Buenos Aires. It was especially hard because Tuck's aged mother lives in Brussels with his brother, who is the leading American business man in Belgium. Both Tuck and his wife have an intimate knowledge of Europe with contacts in every country. Both speak perfect French and German, but no Spanish. I happen to know that they went intensely to go to Rome. Neither you nor the Department is getting much information from Rome at the moment. This is due, in part, to the fact that we have as Counselor of Embassy there a bone-head named Edward L. Reed, who still ought to be selling collars in his father's haberdashery in Philadelphia. Why not switch Tuck and Reed? The Tucks would be excellent in Rome and I happen to know that Bill Phillips likes him very much.

As a matter of fact, I wish I could have both of them in Paris, but I think Bob Murphy deserves to succeed Wilson as my Counselor of Embassy and Tuck has too high a rank in the Service to be anything but Counselor. I do not suggest this change as an urgent necessity, but if you want to strengthen the Embassy in Rome, just remember that

Tuck

- 3 -

Tuck is a first-rate officer and that Mrs. Tuck is an  
angel, and that there are few such pairs in the Foreign  
Service.

Yours affectionately,

*Bill.*

William C. Bullitt.



PSF: France  
(Bullitt)

May 16, 1939

Dear Bill:

I am told that the pouch leaves today and I want to get this letter off to you to thank you for all that champagne. I really do not see why you should do this, but I know we are all going to enjoy it very much although I assure you I am not using all of it even on the Royal visitors.

I only wish you could be here with us the time of the Royal visit. At any rate I will quietly drink to your good health at the dinner.

Your letter of the ninth has just arrived and is a joy. I know you will do a good job on the French Birth Rate Law!

The little Queen has acquired a great reputation over here. It may be a difficult one to live up to. Needless to say, there is great excitement here. However, I think we will all heave a great sigh of relief once they cross the Canadian border safely on their way home.

I loved the story of Flandin. It is a joy.

Do write me again very soon.

As ever,

F. D. R.

Honorable William C. Bullitt  
Ambassador Extraordinary and  
Plenipotentiary  
Paris  
France

MAL:G

PSF: France  
Bullitt folder  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 24, 1939.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
AMBASSADOR BULLITT  
TO READ AND RETURN

F. D. R.

Enclosure - Memorandum from Secretary  
Welles covering Mr.  
McDaniel's suggestions.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

May 22, 1939.

My dear Mr. President:

With reference to your memorandum of May 3 with which you were good enough to enclose for my information Bill Bullitt's letter to you of April 18 together with attached memoranda written by Charles B. McDaniel, Jr., I have had prepared a memorandum in the Department which I believe may be of interest to you. This memorandum deals fully with the suggestions contained in Mr. McDaniel's memoranda.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosures:  
From Ambassador  
Bullitt, with  
enclosures;  
Memorandum.

The President,  
The White House.



EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Paris, April 18, 1939.

Dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing herewith memoranda to me from Charles B. McDaniel, Jr. He is one American business man who has the noble virtue of brevity. I have given him a letter of introduction to Sumner Welles, but I think you ought to read these memoranda.

Incidentally, if you should happen to see McDaniel, you would not be bored.

Yours always,

*Bill*

William C. Bullitt.

Enclosures:  
Two memoranda.

The Honorable

Franklin Delano Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

The White House.

Private & Confidential Memorandum

If an occasion could be found for you or your great American friend to issue unofficially some statement regarding Portugal and the work of Dr Salazar (very conservative and above all non political), it would be received with interest and might be of far reaching influence on the present situation.

During a recent confidential conversation with Dr Salazar, I received the impression that he is aware of the danger of German and Italian trade methods and that he is interested in obtaining trade independence from these countries in favour of the United States. This policy is also evidenced by the purchase being made at this moment of American Railway equipment at prices of from

20 to 40 percent above the subsidized German and Italian competition. These purchases constitute a generalization of American standards on the entire railway system and the successive replacement of the existing German equipment. Acting on instructions from Berlin, the German Ambassador, has energetically intervened both with the Ministry of Communications and with Dr Salazar to prevent such operation, and was informed that American offers were more favourable.

Barter relations with Germany have not proved altogether satisfactory, and Italy at the present moment is heavily indebted to the Bank of Portugal on her compensation agreements.

During the Spanish conflict, Portugal has been the closest disinterested friend of General Franco, and Dr Salazar today is

the one sure and direct allied influence we have with Spain. The possible far-reaching importance of the recent non-aggression pact concluded with General Franco can only be appreciated by a careful observer of European affairs.

A most effective strategical trade effort which we could make would be to offer Portugal, a full, and Spain at least partial, economic independence of Germany and Italy. These, the mother countries, have been heretofore powerful influences in Italian and German economic penetration in Latin America.

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I have been unofficially informed and believe that proposals of a non-political aspect from the United States to Spain, through the proper channels, would be generously considered. The same proposals, however, emanating

from either France or England would not be entertained through fear of political complications.

Portuguese and Spanish products of every nature i.e. cork, olives, sardines, tin, mercury, potash etc. are non competitive products which could be imported advantageously and would partially offset their unfavorable trade balance with the United States.



Private & ~~Confidential~~ Memorandum

A few days ago, General Franco's closest adviser informed me that during a banquet given him recently by the German Industries and Economic Ministry, a proposal was made to purchase 90 percent of Spain's exports on a compensation basis. He was aware of the purpose of the offer and the disadvantages to Spanish economy. His reply to my reactions regarding the matter was "but what can we do ? We don't trust the French because we know they have been our enemies in the last war. England has offered us 40 million pounds, but we would not consider this at such a moment. We do not feel that most of the Americans have been friendly to us during the last war, but we attribute this to misunderstanding of our cause, and we would accept a transaction

with America, which we would not entertain with either France or England."

He then suggested the possibility of a business with Spain similar to the transaction which we have just negotiated in Portugal as a beginning and as a gesture of confidence in Spain. We might for example, he said, offer an immediate credit of say 25 million dollars for five years maximum to be utilized for the purchase of approximately five million dollars of tobacco and 20 million dollars of cotton. He said that he would recommend such a transaction, but that it could only be presented confidentially and unofficially, and negotiated personally with General Franco. He insisted that it is only through private and proper channels that such transaction could be realized, and he believes that such proposal could open the way for shaping Spain's economic and trade policies in the direction,

which he, as an economist, desires and would recommend. He advised that a credit of that importance could be met by the Spanish treasury, but that he would not at the present moment consider heavier commitments.

He stated that Germany is now endeavouring to obtain control of Spanish mercury and potash deposits. He believes that by acting quickly and discreetly this move might be counteracted. He informed me that one of the richest known potash deposits has just been discovered near Barcelona, containing some seventy five million tons of the highest grade product. If the above loan could be arranged, he believes it might enable him to break the German potash cartel and sell to America, which would definitely orientate Spain's future trade interest with our own.

PSF: France  
(Bullitt)

May 24, 1939

Dear Bill:

On receipt of your letter of May 9 in regard to the Rosenblatt project, I took the matter up with the War Department and the Department of State. The question has been fully reconsidered. I agree, however, with the two Departments that it would be very inadvisable from our point of view for Rosenblatt to go ahead with his project at this time. If he wishes to take it up again two or three months from now, the Departments will be glad to review the question in the light of the circumstances then existing, and it is possible that the situation might by that time have changed sufficiently so that we would be prepared to reverse our present position.

Affectionately yours,

The Honorable  
William C. Bullitt,  
American Ambassador,  
Paris.

COPY  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 17, 1939

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF WAR

What can I say on this?

F. D. R.

Paris, May 9, 1939.

PERSONAL AND SECRET

Dear Mr. President:

I enclose herewith a secret report of the French General Staff which has been compiled from information gathered by the French Secret Service and is the basis on which the French General Staff has prepared its plans for coping with the German Air Force. I thought you would rather have it in extenso rather than in summary. Please note that it is absolutely secret.

A few days ago, La Chambre, Minister for Air, said to me that owing to the failure of the Bloch prototype which the French had expected to be as good or better than the Amiot, he had become sincerely interested in the possibility of manufacturing the Amiot plane in the United States. At the same time I received a memorandum prepared by Joseph C. Green of the Department of State which had been seen and  
approved

The Honorable

Franklin D. Roosevelt,

President of the United States of America,

Washington, D. C.