

SUPPORTING THE MONUC MANDATE WITH PRIVATE SERVICES IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

IPOA Operational Concept Paper

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As the United Nations has bitterly and repeatedly discovered over the last decade, no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force if complex peacekeeping, in particular, is to succeed.

-Brahimi Report, Executive Summary, p. viii

Summary

The United Nations is slowly moving into Phase III of their MONUC peacekeeping deployment in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), but even if additional UN troops materialize, the mission will lack crucial capabilities necessary for success. Phase III includes an increase in troop numbers and envisions a modest forward deployment in the chaotic eastern DRC. Deployment has been sluggish, and without certain critical capabilities combined with a key willingness to engage in desperately needed peace enforcement activities, MONUC will be unable to effectively fulfill their mandate. This inadequacy risks the current, tentative steps towards peace. So far, few UN member states are volunteering troops for this difficult and dangerous mission. In his most recent report on MONUC, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan suggests that if enough troops were not proffered by member nations, "specialized civilian contracts would have to be sought . . ."

The International Peace Operations Association (IPOA) has formed a consortium of private firms prepared to work under the UN commander to provide the necessary services to fully support the UN mandate. The costs of this operation would be a fraction of what the UN would pay for a similar mission using state forces, and the operation would be better able to adapt to the evolving situation. More significantly, these firms are able to rapidly deploy on short notice and provide professional services and specializations not normally available from the state militaries deploying for this UN operation, including **high-tech aerial surveillance, rapid police reaction and humanitarian rescue capabilities.**

MONUC cannot be expected to successfully fulfill its mission of peacekeeping, stabilization and humanitarian protection without these services. (See Appendix 1)

In the meantime, **humanitarian organizations report more than 2,000 people per day are dying prematurely** in DRC, rape is being used as a weapon of war, ethnic cleansing is occurring in several regions, and crimes against the most vulnerable civilians are occurring with

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shocking impunity. The ability and will to respond quickly, something the UN has been unable to provide through conventional means, is essential in addressing this horrendous conflict.

The modest support of the IPOA consortium will ensure that MONUC can fulfill its mandate and bring much needed peace to the region. While world attention may be drawn to Iraq and Afghanistan, MONUC can be empowered to become a UN success story, moving beyond conflict observation to become a proactive factor in fostering stability and peace in this war-shattered region of Africa.

Current Situation

Eastern DRC is closer to peace than in any period since the conflict began. There have been a number of encouraging agreements between the key players, and with the withdrawal of Ugandan and Rwandan forces there are new opportunities - and dangers. Maintaining a peace largely depends on an effective and flexible UN and multinational on-ground capacity that does not exist. Despite plans for modest expansion of the MONUC mission, it is unlikely to gain the requisite multinational support - in terms of manpower and critical skills - in the foreseeable future.

The UN intends to expand MONUC from the 4,302 troops and observers currently deployed to 8,700 troops - but this is still a miniscule number considering the size of the territory covered. Approximately 5,000 additional troops are being requested to implement "Phase III" of the peacekeeping operation, which is supposed to oversee an ambitious DDRRR program (Disarming, Demobilizing, Repatriating, Reintegrating and Resettling of all armed groups). Whether that many troops will be proffered by member states, or more to the point, whether they will bring the requisite skills critical for successful implementation of the formidable mandate is a key unanswered question.

South Africa has done much to negotiate the peace and facilitate the withdrawal of foreign troops from DRC by hosting discussions and summits, and by committing to send 2,000 troops and specialized military support personnel to MONUC. The ultimate capability of South Africa to actually field that many troops in DRC has been questioned and it has also been reported that the South African National Defence Force has obtained a waiver that allows them to deploy troops that are HIV positive for this peacekeeping mission. The South African military is currently stretched to maintain a significant deployment in Burundi as well. South Africa has spearheaded the political process, but it is unlikely to be able to bolster the military aspect as much as desired.

In the meantime, the eastern DRC suffers from armed groups battling each other and preying on the most vulnerable communities. With no effective armed force to ensure order, these groups commit atrocious humanitarian crimes with impunity. Populations are being terrorized and forced off their farms, creating starvation in one of the most fertile countries on earth, and increasing rates of disease and child mortality. Attempts to return internally displaced populations (IDPs) and refugees have met with little success. Studies have shown that security is the number one concern for returning populations, but there is little security available.

Realistically, the UN will not be able to muster the capabilities they require for effective Phase III deployment. The majority of states contributing troops to MONUC do not have the capacity for this difficult high-risk mission. There is also the question of expense. Currently MONUC costs \$608 million per year, a quarter of which is paid by the United States. **If full deployment**

strength is reached, the cost could well exceed \$1 billion, a third of the UN's entire peacekeeping budget.

Thus the UN finds itself in a position of trying to do too much with too little. Unlike East Timor (UNTEAT) and Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), there are no Western powers taking the lead role with MONUC. An inadequate number of UN member states have shown interest in participating in this complex, dangerous mission. Without the additional troops and the skills necessary to police the painstakingly negotiated agreements, the mission will not succeed. (See Appendix 2)

Proposal

The war in the DRC can be brought to an end promptly - given effective international peacekeeping and capacity building. Unfortunately, the current plans for the expansion of MONUC are optimistic in both scale and effectiveness. By utilizing a consortium of specialized firms that will enhance MONUC's capabilities, however, MONUC can become a proactive factor for peace.

IPOA's consortium of specialized firms is uniquely capable of overcoming the DRC's appalling lack of infrastructure, difficult terrain, vast distances, and communication limitations. The companies prepared to commit to this operation include:

PAE - an international logistics company, which has supported a number of critical peacekeeping operations in Africa and around the world while earning high-praise from international organizations, governments and NGOs for capability, efficiency, and cost effectiveness.

ICI of Oregon – an aviation and security firm renowned for its willingness to go anywhere, anytime. The company has extensive experience in peacekeeping operations in Africa and Haiti, and won the 1998 State Department Contractor of the Year Award for its work in Liberia.

MPRI – a specialized service company that draws on the talent of experienced U.S. police and military personnel to offer critical skills to develop leadership and enhance professionalism, humanitarianism and accountability to civilian authority. MPRI brings an enormous wealth of African experience where it has worked to hone the skills of African forces for international peace operations and to develop appropriate and democratic civil-military relations in African states.

AirScan International – a professional aviation surveillance company capable of locating and counting displaced populations, tracking armed groups and verifying agreements. The company operates worldwide and has extensive experience in Africa and with Department of Defense contracts.

TASK International – a specialized security firm that utilizes the services of Gurkha veterans of the British army. These highly skilled Nepalese Gurkhas have extensive dedicated training and experience in peacekeeping operations and humanitarian emergencies in developing countries.

These firms can provide **high-tech aerial surveillance, effective rapid deployment units, disarmament services and local gendarme capacity building**. They can act as “force multipliers” to make current MONUC deployment levels substantially more effective, saving the UN the millions of dollars required for expansion, and they can prepare an all-Congolese

gendarme contingent to ultimately assume the security role. **The cost of the IPOA consortium could be provided by the United States as a part of its normal 27% contribution for the peacekeeping operation.**

MONUC has not had the resources to effectively fulfill its mandate, and it is highly doubtful that these resources will be forthcoming *without* the use of private companies. While it has managed to establish important bases of operation, provide observation services, establish liaison with the various factions, and generate important intelligence, most of its Chapter VII mandate is underutilized and under enforced. It has not been proactive in monitoring transfers of ammunition and weaponry, nor has it been capable of protecting civilians and vulnerable groups such as women and children from persistent violence. Even with the additional troops requested by the Secretary General, the operation will lack the critical skills and equipment necessary to fully carry out the mandate.

Unprecedented Transparency and Accountability

The IPOA consortium is prepared to offer a greater degree of transparency and accountability than any UN peacekeeping operation has EVER provided. The consortium members fully expect to be held to a higher standard than typical UN operations and are committed to earning the confidence of all concerned parties with professionalism and responsiveness. These companies all have a great deal of experience in these conflict situations and recognize the critical importance of working closely with NGOs and local authorities to ensure the highest level of service and responsiveness. IPOA previously developed a code of conduct that **enshrines transparency and accountability**. This code can be used as a foundation for a more situation-specific document to further engender the confidence of the international community. This code can be supported by written contractual obligations and restrictions, financial penalties and the utilization of trained military observers from the humanitarian community. Further, fair and impartial legal procedures should be pre-established to ensure fair and proper legal processes protecting the rights of Congolese and company employees.

While the UN has shown a reluctance to endorse the “**Security Curtain**” suggested in the South Africa talks, perhaps due to a lack of capacity to enforce it, the IPOA consortium would possess the capability to protect such a zone. MONUC could in fact ensure the integrity of a 50km-wide - or even substantially larger - demilitarized Security Curtain at the same time as it supports the original mandate. The aerial surveillance firm, using high-tech sensors, combined with other firms providing a quick-reaction police capability, helicopter services, disarmament specialization, and logistical support could render MONUC robust enough to establish and maintain a demilitarized zone in eastern DRC. The IPOA consortium could help MONUC create a peaceful haven for vulnerable groups and displaced persons, and even implement the orderly disarmament and subsequent protection of the resident Interahamwe/ex-FAR forces. (See Appendix 3)

An effectively patrolled demilitarized zone and well-monitored disarmament program should provide the confidence required for the ultimate demobilization of all forces in eastern DRC. Rwanda has stated that it wants a secure border free from attacks by the Interahamwe/ex-FAR, a requirement that can be assured with this concept. We believe this proposal will also be acceptable to the DRC and Ugandan governments.

There is now an extraordinary opportunity to finally end this horrendous conflict in central Africa. Providing thus far absent humanitarian protections and demilitarizing eastern Congo are technically plausible concepts given appropriate resources. IPOA's consortium can quickly assemble those resources at a low cost and ensure that MONUC has the support it needs. With the security situation under control, other organizations and NGOs can spread throughout the formerly inaccessible regions of the DRC to provide humanitarian relief and begin reconciliation and reconstruction. Finally, with the local gendarme capacity-building program, a new generation of civilian security can ensure long-term peace and stability.

Details of Operation

The IPOA consortium would bring specialized capabilities and assets to ensure effective support for the MONUC mandate. While the primary goal is to improve security, these capabilities and assets could be used for a wide variety of functions that will enhance peacekeeping and long-term stability:

- 1) **Security and Stabilization Services** – the IPOA consortium could provide high-tech surveillance and air-mobile rapid-reaction police services to vastly enhance security and substantially contribute to long-term stabilization. The consortium could:
 - a) Protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.
 - b) Locate, monitor and warn of armed or hostile groups.
 - c) Monitor the withdrawal and redeployment of forces and cessation of hostilities.
 - d) Deter, or if necessary, interdict armed factions undermining the UN mandate.
 - e) Protect UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment.
 - f) Ensure and assist the freedom of movement of MONUC personnel engaged in their official duties.
 - g) Prepare local Congolese to assume responsible and effective security and border protection functions in preparation for UN departure.
 - h) Contribute to micro-disarmament operations as a part of the DDR program, by assisting with:
 - i) Disarming irregular forces, specifically the Interahamwe and ex-FAR, in a peaceful and orderly fashion.
 - ii) Disarming of civilians and non-military personnel in protected areas of weapons more lethal than shotguns or hunting rifles.
 - iii) Cataloguing, removing and immediately destroying all weapons retrieved during disarmament operations.
 - iv) Ensure that disarmed soldiers are protected from retribution.

- 2) **Humanitarian Services** – the IPOA consortium could significantly improve the dire humanitarian situation. The consortium could:
 - a) Locate and monitor IDP movements and vulnerable population groups for more efficient relief and/or rescue operations.
 - b) Provide mission security for international humanitarian operations.
 - c) Undertake demining and ordnance disposal operations.
 - d) Provide logistics services for NGOs and humanitarian organizations.
- 3) **NGO and Humanitarian Support Services** – In order to enhance the relief and reconstruction of Eastern Congo, the IPOA consortium could utilize its in-house resources to:
 - a) Establish improved communications networks.
 - b) Provide a 24-hour rapid rescue service for MONUC and NGOs.
 - c) Provide 24-hour emergency medical facilities.
 - d) Provide emergency evacuation capability for key personnel in crisis situations - medical or security – making it more feasible for NGOs to operate in the field.

Deployment Time and Costs

Once financing is arranged, initial IPOA consortium deployment could begin within 30 days and be completed within 90.

As mentioned, if the MONUC mission grows to its current authorized strength of 8,700 personnel, the estimated cost would be \$1 billion annually. The IPOA consortium could be provided as a portion of the United States' normal 27% contribution to the MONUC budget.

The estimated annual cost for this consortium to providing these critical peacekeeping services in support of MONUC would be between 100 and 200 million dollars depending on the scale of deployment requested – 10 to 20% of the total cost of the current mission.

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Appendixes

I. Quotations from NGOs and Human Rights Organizations

II. UNSC Latest Report on MONUC

III. Overview of MONUC

IV. Maps

V. Company Descriptions
