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ESSAYS

ON

THE (NATURE AND PRINCIPLES

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TASTE./

BY ARCHIBALD ALISON, LL. B. F. R. S. ''' PREBENDARY OF SARUM, &C.

WITH CORRECTIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS BY ABRAHAM MILLS,

TEACHER OF RHETORIC AND BELLES LETTRES.

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
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PREFACE.

In offering to the public, a new edition of Dr. Alison's "Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste," it affords me peculiar pleasure to acknowledge the gratification that the flattering reception of my editions of Burke's "Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful," and Blair's "Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres," afforded; and while, in the present case, I may have criticised with a bolder hand, and attempted to improve to a greater extent than in either of the former, it is to be hoped, that the responsibility assumed in editing works of so much importance, and so deservedly popular, will be regarded as a sufficient apology for what has been done.

Previous editions of this work, notwithstanding the interest that the subject excites, contain many inaccuracies which greatly interrupt the pleasure that the subject itself is so well calculated to afford; but as the inaccuracies are of a nature to be observed by those only, who have, in some degree, kept pace with the rapid improvement of our language during the last thirty years, they have, hitherto, been overlooked. It is by no means, however, pretended, that the present edition is free from errors : all that is claimed is to have improved it;

PREFACE.

but of the nature, extent and value, of the improvements, it is for an impartial public to judge, and not myself.

The necessity of translations to the passages introduced from the ancient classics, must appear evident to all who are familiar with the business of instruction; for though the scholar may have learned those languages, obstacles are perpetually thrown in his way, if while reading, he is subjected to the necessity of rendering into his native tongue, thoughts and beauties presented to him, in a foreign dress: and why the disposition to introduce Latin and Greek poetry, for the purpose of illustrating arguments and principles, in English composition, should still prevail, even among writers of genius; It certainly cannot be that there it is difficult to determine. is difficulty in selecting suitable examples from our own poets; for every man of cultivated taste must acknowledge, that in the English language poetry is in its native element; and that for variety and appropriateness of examples both of the sublime and the beautiful, no other language at all compares with it.

I would by no means, however, be understood to undervalue the ancient classics, for with them are closely identified many of our earliest and most endeared associations; and, perhaps it is to the familiarity acquired during scholastic studies, that the preference which they so generally receive, is to be attributed.

In the translations introduced, I have in every instance where appropriate ones were to be found, selected them from poets whose authority, as translators, is acknowledged; and in each case the name of the translator is appended: It will

PREFACE.

also, doubtless, readily be perceived, that in the original translations, accuracy rather than elegance has been studied.

The questions are constructed on the same principle on which those are that accompany my other works, and literally embrace the whole body of the author: scholars should, therefore, when they commence the book, be distinctly informed, that, in it, nothing is to be left unlearned; but that, throughout the work, the answer to each succeeding question, commences at the word, at which the answer to the preceding one terminates; thus embracing the whole.

It may then, perhaps, with some degree of propriety, be asked, what advantages are proposed by the introduction of questions to a work of such magnitude, if the whole is still to be learned ? To which I would reply, that, in the first place, as the questions are, throughout, closely connected, and the answers frequently depending upon each other, the most devoted attention of the scholar is required, not only in preparing the lesson, but during the recitation also; which every teacher will acknowlekge is the attainment of one of the most important points in teaching successfully: and in the second place, the questions being at the base of the page on which the answers are respectively found, they must necessarily facilitate the teacher's labor.

With these remarks the work is presented to the same indulgent public, by whom judgment was passed upon its predecessors; and that it may meet with as little severity as they did, is as much as can be hoped.

A. MILLS.

New York, Sept. 1830.

TASTE is, in general, considered to be that faculty of the human mind, by which we perceive and enjoy whatever is BEAUTIFUL or SUBLIME in the works of nature or art.

The perception of these qualities is attended with an emotion of pleasure, very distinguishable from every other pleasure of our nature, and which is accordingly distinguished by the name of the EMOTION OF TASTE. The distinctions of the objects of taste, into the sublime and beautiful, has produced a similar division of this emotion, into the EMOTION OF SUBLIMITY and the EMOTION OF BEAUTY.

The qualities that produce these emotions, are to be found in almost every class of the objects of human knowledge, and the emotions themselves afford one of the most extensive sources of human delight. They occur to us, amid every variety of EXTEENAL scenery, and among many diversities of disposition and affection in the MIND of man. The most pleasing arts of human invention are altogether directed to their pursuit; and even the necessary arts are exalted into dignity, by the genius that can unite beauty with use. From the earliest period of society, to its last stage of improvement, they afford an innocent and elegant amusement to private life, at the same time that they increase the splendor of national character; and in the progress of nations, as well as of individuals, while they attract attention from the pleasures they bestow, they serve to exalt the human mind, from corporeal to intellectual pursuits.

These qualities, however, though so important to human happiness, are not the objects of immediate observation; and in the attempt to investigate them, various circumstances unite to perplex

our research. They are often obscured under the number of qualities with which they are accidentally combined: they result often from peculiar combinations of the qualities of objects, or the relation of certain parts of objects to each other: they are still oftener, perhaps, dependent upon the state of our own minds, and vary in their effects with the dispositions in which they happen to be observed. In all cases, while we feel the emotions they excite, we are ignorant of the causes by which they are produced; and when we seek to discover them, we have no other method of discovery, than that varied and patient EXPERIMENT, by which, amid these complicated circumstances, we may gradually ascertain the peculiar qualities which, by the constitution of our NATURE, are permanently connected with the emotions we feel.

In the employment of this mode of investigation, there are two great objects of attention and inquiry, which seem to include all that is either necessary, or perhaps possible, for us to discover on the subject of taste.

These objects are,

I. To investigate the NATURE of those QUALITIES that produce the emotions of TASTE; and,

II. To investigate the NATURE of that FACULTY, by which these emotions are received.

These investigations, however, are not to be considered as objects of philosophical curiosity only: they have an immediate relation to all the arts that are directed to the production either of the BEAUTE-FUL or the SUBLIME; and they afford the only means by which the principles of these various arts can be ascertained. Without a just and accurate conception of the nature of these qualities, the ABTIST must be unable to determine, whether the beauty he creates is temporary or permanent, whether adapted to the accidental prejudices of his age, or to the uniform constitution of the human mind; and whatever the science of CRITICISM can afford for the improvement or correction of taste, must altogether depend upon the previous knowledge of the nature and laws of this faculty.

To both these inquiries, however, there is a preliminary investigation, which seems absolutely necessary, and without which every conclusion we form must be either imperfect or vague. In the investigation of CAUSES, the first and most important step, is the accurate examination of the EFFECT to be explained. In the science of mind, however, as well as in that of body, there are few effects altogether simple, or in which accidental circumstances are not combined with the proper effect. Unless, therefore, by means of repeated experiments, such accidental circumstances are accurately distinguished from the phenomena that permanently characterize the effect, we are under the necessity of including in the cause, the causes also of all the accidental circumstances with which the effect is accompanied.

With the emotions of TASTE, in almost every instance, many other accidental emotions of pleasure are united-the various simple pleasures that arise from other qualities of the object; the pleasure of agreeable sensation, in the case of material objects; and in all, that pleasure which by the constitution of our nature is annexed to the exercise of our faculties. Unless, therefore, we have previously acquired a distinct and accurate conception of that peculiar effect which is produced on our minds, when the emotions of taste are felt, and can precisely distinguish it from the effects that are produced by these accidental qualities, we must necessarily include, in the causes of such emotions, those qualities also, which are the causes of the accidental pleasures with which this emotion is accompanied. The variety of systems that philosophers have adopted upon this subject, and the various emotions into which they have resolved the emotion of taste, while they afford a sufficient evidence of the numerous accidental pleasures that accompany these emotions, afford, also, a strong illustration of the necessity of previously ascertaining the nature of this effect, before we attempt to investigate its cause. With regard, therefore, to both these inquiries, the first and most important step is accurately to examine the nature of this EMOTION itself, and its distinction from every other emotion of pleasure; and our capacity of discovering either the nature of the qualities that produce the emotions of taste, or the nature of the faculty by which they are received, will be exactly proportioned to our accuracy in ascertaining the nature of the emotion itself.

When we look back to the history of these investigations, and to the theories which have been so liberally formed upon the subject,

there is one fact that must necessarily strike us, *viz*. That all these theories have uniformly taken for granted the *simplicity* of this emotion—that they have considered it as an emotion too plain, and too commonly felt, to admit of any analysis—that they have as uniformly, therefore, referred it to some *one* principle or law of the human mind; and that they have consequently concluded, that the discovery of that *one* principle was the essential key into which all the pleasures of taste were to be resolved.

While they have assumed this fundamental principle, the various theories of philosophers may, and indeed must, be included in the two following classes of supposition.

I. The first class is that which resolves the emotion of taste directly into an original law of our nature, which supposes a sense, or senses, by which the qualities of beauty and sublimity are perceived and felt, as their appropriate objects; and concludes, therefore, that the genuine object of the arts of taste, is to discover, and to imitate those qualities in every subject which the prescription of nature has thus made essentially, either beautiful or sublime.

To this first class of hypotheses belong almost all the theories of music, of architecture, and of sculpture; the theory of Mr. Hogarth, of the Abbe Winkelman, and perhaps in its last result, also the theory of Sir Joshua Reynolds. It is the species of hypothesis which is naturally resorted to by all artists and amateurs—by those, whose habits of thought lead them to attend more to the causes of their emotions, than to the nature of the emotions themselves.

II. The second class of hypotheses arises from the opposite view of the subject. It is that which resists the idea of any new or peculiar sense, distinct from the common principles of our nature; which supposes some one known and acknowledged principle or affection of mind, to be the foundation of all the emotions we receive from the objects of taste, and which resolves, therefore, all the various phenomena into some more general law of our intellectual or moral constitution. Of this kind are the hypotheses of M. Diderot, who attributes all our emotions of this kind to the perception of relation; of Mr. Hume, who resolves them into our sense of utility; and of the venerable St. Austin, who, with nobler views, a thousand years ago, resolved them into the pleasure which belongs to the perception of order and design. It is the species of hypotheses most natural to retired and philosophic minds—to those, whose habits have led them to attend more to the nature of the emotions they felt, than to the causes which produced them.

If the success of these long and varied inquiries has not corresponded to the genius of the industry of the philosophers who have pursued them, a suspicion may arise that there has been something faulty in the principle of their investigation; and that some fundamental assumption has been made, which ought first to have been patiently and securely ascertained. It was this suspicion that first led to the following inquiries-it seemed to me that the simplicity OF THE ENOTION OF TASTE, was a principle much too hastily adopted ; and that the consequences which followed from it, under both these classes of hypotheses, were very little reconcileable with the most common experience of human feeling; and from the examination of this preliminary question, I was led gradually to conclusions which seemed not only to me, but to others, whose opinion I value far more than my own, of an importance not unworthy of being presented to the public. In doing this, I am conscious that I have entered upon a new and untrodden path; and I feel all my own weakness in pursuing it; yet I trust my readers will believe, that I should not have pursued it so long, if I were not convinced that it would finally terminate in views not only important to the arts of taste, but important also to the philosophy of the human mind.

The inquiries which follow, naturally divide themselves into the following parts; and are to be prosecuted in the following order—

I. I shall begin with an ANALYSIS of the EFFECT which is produced apon the mind, when the emotions of beauty or sublimity are felt. I shall endeavor to show, that this effect is very different from the determination of a SENSE; that it is not, in fact, a simple, but a complex emotion; that it involves in all cases, 1st, the production of some simple emotion, or the exercise of some moral affection; and, 2dly, the consequent excitement of a peculiar exercise of the imagination—that these concomitant effects are distinguishable, and very often distinguished in our experience; and that the peculiar pleasure of the BEAUTIFUL or the SUBLIME is only felt when these two effects are conjoined, and the complex emotion produced.

The prosecution of the subject will lead to another inquiry of some difficulty and extent, viz. into the origin of the beauty and sublimity of the qualities of MATTER. To this subordinate inquiry I shall devote a separate Essay. I shall endeavor to show that all the phenomena are reducible to the same general principle, and that the qualities of matter are not beautiful or sublime in themselves, but as they are, by various means, the signs or expressions of qualities capable of producing emotion.

II. From this examination of the EFFECT I shall proceed, in the SECOND PART, to investigate the CAUSES which are productive of it ; or, in other words, the sources of the beautiful and the sublime in nature and art.

In the course of this investigation I shall endeavor to show, 1st, that there is no single emotion into which these varied effects can be resolved; that on the contrary, every simple emotion, and therefore every object which is capable of producing any simple emotion, may be the foundation of the complex emotion of beauty or sublimity. But, in the second place, that this complex emotion of beauty or sublimity is never produced, unless, beside the excitement of some simple emotion, the imagination is also excited, and the exercise of the two faculties combined in the general effect. The prosecution of the subject will lead me to the principal object of the inquiry, to show what is that LAW OF MIND, according to which, in actual life, this exercise or employment of imagination is excited; and what are the means by which, in the different fine arts, the artist is able to awaken this important exercise of imagination, and to exalt objects of simple and common pleasure, into objects of beauty or sublimity.

In this part of the subject, there are two subordinate inquiries which will necessarily demand attention-

1. The qualities of sublimity and beauty, are discovered, not only in pleasing or agreeable subjects, but frequently also in objects that are in themselves productive of PAIN; and some of the noblest productions of the fine arts are founded upon subjects of TERROR and DISTRESS. It will form, therefore, an obvious and important inquiry to ascertain by what means this singular effect is produced in REAL NATURE, and by what means it may be produced in the compositions of ART.

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191 ⁽⁺⁾

2. There is a distinction in the effects produced upon our minds by objects of taste, and this distinction, both in the EMOTIONS and their CAUSES, has been expressed by the terms of SUBLIMITY and BEAUTY. It will form, therefore, a second object of inquiry to ascertain THE NATURE OF THIS DISTINCTION, both with regard to these emotions and to the qualities that produce them.

III. From the preceding inquiries I shall proceed, in the LAST PART, to investigate the NATURE of that faculty by which these emotions are perceived and felt. I shall endeavor to show, that it has no resemblance to a sense; that as, whenever it is employed, two distinct and independent powers of mindere employed, it is not to be considered as a separate and peculiar faculty, and that it is finally to be resolved into more general principles of our constitution. These speculations will probably lead to the important inquiry, whether there is any STANDARD by which the perfection or imperfection of our sentiments upon these subjects may be determined; to some explanation of the means by which taste may be corrected or improved; and to some illustration of the PURPOSES, which this peculiar constitution of our nature serves, in the increase of human HAPPINESS, and the exaltation of human CHARACTER.

I feel it incumbent on me, however, to inform my readers, that I am to employ, in these inquiries, a different kind of evidence from what has usually been employed by writers upon these subjects, and that my illustrations will be derived, much less from the compositions of the fine arts, than from the appearances of common nature, and the experience of common men. If the fine arts are, in reality, arts of imitation, their principles are to be sought for in the subject which they imitate; and it is ever to be remembered, "That music, archi-"tecture, and painting, as well as poetry and oratory are to deduce "their laws and rules from the general sense and taste of mankind. "and not from the principles of these arts themselves: in other "words, that the taste is not to conform to the art, but the art to the "taste."* In following this mode of illustration, while I am sensible that I render my book less amusing, I trust I may render it more The most effectual method to check the empiricism, either useful.

* Mr. Addison.

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of art or of science, is to multiply, as far as possible, the number of those who can observe, and judge; and, whatever may be the conclusions of my readers with regard to my own particular opinions, I shall not have occupied their attention in vain, if I can lead them to think and to feel for themselves—to employ the powers which are given them to the ends for which they were given; and, upon subjects where all men are entitled to judge, to disregard alike the abstract refinements of the philosopher who speculates in the closet, and the technical doctrines of the artist who dictates in the school.

۲

xiv

CONTENTS.

							PAGE:
Preface,		•	•	•	4		3
INTRODUCTIO	DN	•	•	•	•	•	7

ESSAY I.

Of the nature of the emotions of sublimity and be	auty.							
CHAP. ISECT. I. Of the effect produced upon the								
imagination, by objects of sublimity	and							
beauty,	•	17						
SECT. II. The same subject continued,	•	19						
SECT. III. The same subject continued,	•	27						
CHAP. IISECT. I. Analysis of this exercise of ima-								
gination,	•	52						
SECT. II. The same subject continued,		57						
SECT. III. The same subject continued,	•	76						
Conclusion,	•	96						

ESSAY II.

Of the sublimity and beauty of the material world.		
CHAP. I. Introductory,	•	105
CHAP. II. Of the sublimity and beauty of sound,	-	113
SECT. I. Of simple sounds,	•	ibid
Part I. Of miscellaneous sounds, .	e e	ibid
Part II. Of the notes of animals, .	•	127
Part III. Of the tones of the human voice,	•	134
SECT. II. Of composed sounds, or music,	•	142
CHAP. III. Of the sublimity and beauty of the obje	cts	
of sight,	•	161
SECT. I. Of colors,	•	163
CHAP. IV. Of forms,	•	173

.

CONTENTS.

SECT. I. Of the natural sublimity and beauty of				
forms.				
Part I. Of the sublimity of forms, .	176			
Part II. Of the beauty of forms,	180			
Part III. Of the composition of forms, .	203			
SECT. II. Of the relative beauty of forms, .	228			
Part I. Of the influence of design upon the				
beauty of forms,	229			
Part II. Of the influence of fitness upon the				
beauty of forms,	258			
Part III. Of the influence of utility upon the				
beauty of forms, .	293			
SECT. III. Of the accidental beauty of forms, .	294			
CHAP. V. Of the sublimity and beauty of motion,	301			
CHAP. VI. Of the beauty of the human countenance				
and form.				
SECT. I. Introductory,	306			
SECT. II. Of the human countenance, .	308			
Part I. Of the colors of the countenance,	ibid			
Part II. Of the features of the human coun-	IDia			
tenance,	319			
Part III. Of the composition of the colors and	010			
features in the human countenance.	328			
· · · · · · · ·	0.60			
SECT. III. Of the beauty and sublimity of the	045			
human form,	345			
SECT. IV. Of the sublimity and beauty of attitude				
and gesture,	372			
SECT. V. Of grace,	384			
SECT. VI. Conclusion.—Of the final cause of this				
constitution of our nature	402			

ł

xvi

ESSAY I.

ON THE NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE EFFECT PRODUCED UPON THE IMAGINATION BY OBJECTS OF SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY.

SECTION I.

THE emotions of sublimity and beauty are uniformly ascribed, both in popular and philosophical language, to the imagination. The fine arts are considered as the arts which are addressed to the imagination, and the pleasures which they afford are described, by way of distinction, as the pleasures of the imagination. The nature of any person's taste, is, in common life, generally determined from the nature or character of his imagination, and the expression of any deficiency in this power of mind, is considered as synonymous with the expression of a similar deficiency in point of taste.

Although, however, this connexion is so generally acknowledged, it is not, perhaps, as generally understood in what it

To what are the emotions of sublimity and beauty uniformly ascribed? To what are the fine arts addressed, and how are the pleasures which they afford described? From what is the nature of any person's taste, in common life, generally determined; and how is the expression of any deficiency in this power of mind considered? Although this connexion is so generally acknow-

consists, or what is the nature of that effect which is produced upon the imagination and by objects of sublimity and beauty. I shall endeavor, therefore, in the first place, to state what seems to me the nature of this effect, or, in what that exercise of imagination consists, which is so generally supposed to take place, when these emotions are felt.

When any object, either of sublimity or beauty is presented to the mind, I believe every man is conscious of a train of thought being immediately awakened in his imagination, analogous to the character or expression of the original object. The simple perception of the object, we frequently find, is insufficient to excite these emotions, unless it is accompanied with this operation of mind, unless, according to common expression, our imagination is seized, and our fancy busied in the pursuit of all those trains of thought, which are allied to this character of expression.

Thus, when we feel either the beauty or sublimity of natural scenery—the gay lustre of a morning in spring, or the mild radiance of a summer evening, the savage majesty of a wintrystorm, or the wild magnificence of a tempestuous ocean—we are conscious of a variety of images in our minds, very different from those which the objects themselves can present to the eye. Trains of pleasing or of solemn thought arise spontaneously within our minds; our hearts swell with emotions, of which the objects before us seem to afford no adequate cause; and we are never so much satiated with delight, as when, in recalling our attention, we are unable to trace either the progress or the connexion of those thoughts which have passed with so much rapidity through our imagination.

The effect of the different arts of taste is similar. The landscapes of Claude Lorrain, the music of Handel, the poetry of Milton, excite feeble emotions in our minds, when our attention is confined to the qualities they present to our senses, or

ledged, yet what is not perhaps, as generally understood? What does our author, therefore, in the first place, propose to do? When any object, either of sublimity or beauty, is presented to the mind, of what is every man conscious? Under what circumstances do we frequently find the simple perception of the object, insufficient to excite these emotions? How is this remark illustrated? From what does it appear that the effect of the different arts of taste is simi-

when it is to such qualities of their composition that we turn our regard. It is then only, that we feel the sublimity or beauty of their productions, when our imaginations are kindled by their power, when we lose ourselves amid the number of images that pass before our minds, and when we waken, at last, from this play of fancy, as from the charm of a romantic dream. The beautiful apostrophe of the Abbé de Lille, upon the subject of gardening

> N'avez-vous pas souvent, au lieux infrequentés, Rencontré tout-à-coup, ces aspects enchantés, Qui suspendent vos pas, dont l'image chérie Vous jette en une douce et longue réverie ?

is equally applicable to every other composition of taste; and in the production of such trains of thought, seems to consist the effect which objects of sublimity and beauty have upon the imagination.

For the truth of this observation itself, I must finally appeal to the consciousness of the reader; but there are some very familiar considerations, which it may be useful to suggest, that seem very strongly to shew the connexion between this exercise of imagination, and the existence of the emotions of sublimity or beauty.

SECTION II.

That the emotions of beauty or sublimity are unfelt, unless this exercise of imagination is excited, seems capable of illustration, from many instances of a very familiar kind.

I. If the mind is in such a state as to prevent this freedom of imagination, the emotion, whether of sublimity or beauty, is unperceived. As far as the beauties of art or nature affect the external senses, their effect is the same upon every man who

19

lar? When only, do we feel the sublimity or beauty of their productions? Of the following beautiful apostrophe upon gardening, what is observed? Repeat it. For the truth of this observation, to what must we finally appeal; and what follows?

What seems capable of familiar illustration, and why? When is their effect the same upon every man who is in possession of these senses? But to a man

is in possession of these senses. But to a man in pain, or in grief, whose mind, by these means, is attentive only to one object or consideration, the same scene, or the same form, will produce no feeling of admiration, which at other times, when his imagination was at liberty, would have produced it in its fullest perfection. Whatever is great or beautiful in the scenery of external nature, is almost constantly before us; and not a day passes without presenting us with appearances, fitted both to charm and to elevate our minds; yet it is in general with a heedless eye that we regard them, and only in particular moments that we are sensible of their power. There is no man, for instance, who has not felt the beauties of sunset; vet every one can remember many instances, when this most striking scene had no effect at all upon his imagination; and when he has beheld all the magnificence with which nature generally distinguishes the close of day, without one sentiment of admiration or delight. There are times, in the same manner, when we can read the Georgics, or the Seasons, with perfect indifference, and with no more emotion, than what we feel from the most uninteresting composition in prose; while in other moments, the first lines we meet with take possession of our imagination, and awaken in it such innumerable trains of imagery, as almost leave behind the fancy of the poet. In these, and of similar cases of difference in our feelings, from the same objects, it will always be found, that the difference arises from the state of our imaginations : from our disposition to follow out the train of thought which such objects naturally produce, or our incapacity to do it, from some other idea, which has at that time taken possession of our minds, and renders us unable to attend to any thing else. That state of mind, every man must have felt, is most favorable to the emotions of taste, in which the imagination is free and unembarrassed, or in which the attention is so little occupied by any private or particular

in pain, or in grief, what is their effect? What remark follows? How is this illustrated? From reading the Georgics or the Seasons, how is this remark farther illustrated? In these, and similar cases of difference in our feelings, from what will it always be found that the difference arises? What state of mind, must every man have felt is the most favourable to the emotions of taste? Upon whom, accordingly, do objects of taste make the strongest im-

object of thought, as to leave us open to all the impressions which the objects that are before us can create. It is upon the vacant and the unemployed, accordingly, that objects of taste make the strongest impression. It is in such hours alone, that we turn to the compositions of music, or of poetry, for amusement. The seasons of care, of grief, or of business, have other occupations, and destroy for the time, at least, our sensibility to the beautiful or the sublime, in the same proportion that they produce a state of mind unfavorable to the indulgence of imagination.

II. The same thing is observable in criticism. When we sit down to appreciate the value of a poem, or of a painting, and attend minutely to the language or composition of the one, or to the coloring or design of the other, we feel no longer the delight which they at first produce. Our imagination in this employment is restrained, and instead of yielding to its sugges. tions, we studiously endeavor to resist them, by fixing our attention upon minute and partial circumstances of the composition. How much this operation of mind tends to diminish our sense of its beauty, every one will feel, who attends to his own thoughts on such an occasion, or who will recollect how different was his state of mind, when he first felt the beauty, either of the painting or of the poem. It is this, chiefly, which makes it so difficult for young people, possessed of imagination, to judge of the merits of any poem or fable, and which induces them so often to give their approbation to compositions of little value. It is not, that they are incapable of learning in what the merits of such compositions consist, for these principles of judgment are neither numerous nor abstruse. It is not, that greater experience produces greater sensibility, for this every thing contradicts; but it is, because every thing, in that period of life, is able to excite their imaginations, and to move their hearts, because they judge of the composition, not by its merits

pression; and why? How is this illustrated? How does it appear that the same thing is observable in criticism? Of our imagination in this employment, what is observed? How may every one feel the extent to which this operation of mind tends to diminish our sense of its beauty? On young people, what effect does this produce? Why is this the case? Of their own imagi-

when compared with other works, or by its approach to any abstract or ideal standard, but by its effect in agitating their imaginations, and leading them into that fairy land, in which the fancy of youth has so much delight to wander. It is their own imagination that has the charm which they attribute to the work that excites it; and the simplest tale, or the poorest novel, is, at that time, as capable of awakening it, as the eloquence of Virgil or of Rousseau, would, at a future period, be. All this, however, all this flow of imagination, in which youth and men of sensibility are so apt to indulge, and which so often brings them pleasure at the expense of their taste, the labor of criticism destroys. The mind, in such an employment, instead of being at liberty to follow whatever trains of imagery the composition before it can excite, is either fettered to the consideration of some of its minute and solitary parts; or pauses, amid the rapidity of its conceptions, to make them the objects of its attention and review. In these operations, accordingly, the emotion, whether of beauty or of sublimity, is lost; and if it is wished to be recalled, it can only be done by relaxing this vigor of atten. tion, and resigning ourselves again to the natural stream of our thoughts. The mathematician who investigates the demon. strations of the Newtonian philosophy, the painter who studies the design of Raphael, the poet who reasons upon the measure of Milton-all, in such occupations, lose the delight which these several productions can give ; and when they are willing to recover their emotion, must withdraw their attention from those minute considerations, and leave their fancy to expatiate at will, amid all the great or pleasing conceptions, which such productions of genius can raise.

III. The effect which is thus produced upon the mind, by temporary exertions of attention, is also more permanently produced by the difference of original character; and the de-

nation, what is observed ? But of all this flow, what is remarked ? What is the state of the mind in such an employment ? In these operations, what is observed of the emotion, whether it be of beauty or of sublimity, and how only can it be recalled ? How is this illustrated from the mathematician, &c. ? How is the effect thus produced upon the mind by temporary exertions of attention, more permanently produced; and to what is the degree in which the

gree in which the emotions of sublimity or beauty are felt, is, in general proportioned to the prevalence of those relations of thought in the mind, upon which this exercise of imagination depends. The principal relation which seems to take place in those trains of thought, that are produced by objects of taste, is that of resemblance; the relation of all others, the most loose and general, and which affords the greatest range of thought for our imagination to pursue. Wherever, accordingly, these emotions are felt, it will be found, not only that this is the relation which principally prevails among our ideas, but that the emotion itself is proportioned to the degree in which it prevails.

In the effect which is produced upon our minds, by the different appearances of natural scenery, it is easy to trace this progress of resembling thought, and to observe how faithfully the conceptions which arise in our imaginations, correspond with the impressions which the character of these seasons produce. What, for instance, is the impression which we feel from spring? The soft and gentle green with which the earth is spread, the feeble texture of the plants and flowers, the young of animals just entering into life, and the remains of winter yet lingering among the woods and hills-all conspire to infuse into our minds somewhat of that fearful tenderness with which infancy is usually beheld. With such a sentiment, how innumerable are the ideas which present themselves to our imagination ! ideas, it is apparent, by no means confined to the scene before our eyes, or to the possible desolation which may yet await its infant beauty, but which almost involuntarily extend themselves to analogies with the life of man, and bring before us all those images of hope or fear, which, according to our peculiar situations, have the dominion of our hearts !---The beauty of autumn is accompanied with a similar exercise

emotions of sublimity or beauty are felt, in general, proportioned? What is the principal relation which seems to take place in those trains of thought; and of it, what is observed? What, accordingly, follows? In the effect which is produced upon our minds, by the different appearances of natural scenery, to trace what, is an easy task? What is the impression which we feel from the scenery of spring? With such a sentiment, what is observed of the ideas that present themselves to our imagination? With what is the beauty of au-

of thought: The leaves begin then to drop from the trees; the flowers and shrubs, with which the fields were adorned in the summer months decay: the woods and groves are silent; the sun himself seems gradually to withdraw his light, or to become enfeebled in his power. Who is there, who, at this season, does not feel his mind impressed with a sentiment of melancholy? or who is able to resist that current of thought, which, from such appearances of decay, so naturally leads him to the solemn imagination of that inevitable fate, which is to bring on, alike, the decay of life, of empire, and of nature itself? In such cases of emotion, every man must have felt, that the character of the scene is no sooner impressed upon his mind, than various trains of correspondent imagery, rise before his imagination; that whatever may be the nature of the impression, the general tone of his thoughts partakes of this nature or character, and that his delight is proportioned to the degree in which this uniformity of character prevails.

The same effect, however, is not produced upon all men. There are many, whom the prospect of such appearances in nature excites to no exercise of fancy whatever; who, by their original constitution, are more disposed to the employment of attention, than of imagination, and who, in the objects that are presented to them, are more apt to observe their individual and distinguishing qualities, than those by which they are related to other objects of their knowledge. Upon the minds of such men, the relation of resemblance has little power; the efforts of their imagination, accordingly, are either feeble or slow, and the general character of their understandings is that of steady and precise, rather than that of enlarged and extensive thought. It is, I believe, consistent with general experience, that men of this description are little sensible to the emotions of sublimity or beauty; and they who have attended to the language of such men, when objects of this kind have been presented to them, must have perceived, that the emotion which they felt,

tumn accompanied? How is this illustrated? With what sentiment is the mind, at this season impressed; and what cannot be resisted? In such cases of emotion, what must every man have felt? Why is not the same effect produced upon all men? What is remarked of the relation of resemblance upon the minds of such men; and of the efforts of their imagination; and of the gene-

was no greater than what they themselves have experienced in those cases, where they have exerted a similar degree of attention, or when any other cause has restrained the usual exercise of their imagination. To the qualities which are productive of simple emotion, to the useful, the agreeable, the fitting, or the convenient in objects, they have the same sensibility that other men have; but of the superior and more complex emotion of beauty, they seem to be, either, altogether unconscious, or to share in it only in the proportion to the degree in which they can relax this severity of attention, and yield to the relation of resembling thought.

It is in the same manner, that the progress of life generally takes from men their sensibility to the objects of taste. The season in which these are felt in their fullest degree, is youth ; when, according to common expression, the imagination is warm, or, in other words, when it is easily excited to that exertion upon which so much of the emotion of beauty depends. The business of life, in the greatest part of mankind, and the habits of more accurate thought, which are acquired by the few who reason and reflect, tend equally to produce, in both, a stricter relation in the train of their thoughts, and greater attention to the objects of their consideration, than can either be expected, or can happen in youth. They become, by these means, not only less easily led to any exercise of imagination, but their associations become, at the same time, less consistent with the employment of it. The man of business, who has passed his life in studying the means of accumulating wealth, and the philosopher, whose years have been employed in the investigation of causes, have both, not only acquired a constitution of mind very little fitted for the indulgence of imagination, but have acquired also associations of a very different kind from those which take place when imagination is employed. In the

ral character of their understandings, what is observed? Of what emotions are men of this description little sensible; and what must they have perceived, who have attended to their language, when objects of this kind have been presented to them? To what qualities have they the same sensibility that other men have; but of what do they seem to be, either altogether unconscious, or to share, in proportion to what? What, in the same manner, is the effect of the progress of life? How is this illustrated? What do the business of life

first of these characters, the prospect of any beautiful scene in nature would induce no other idea than that of its value. In the other it would lead only to speculations upon the causes of the beauty that was ascribed to it. In both, it would thus excite ideas which could be the foundation of no exercise of imagination, because they required thought and attention. То a young mind, on the contrary, possessed of any sensibility, how many pleasing ideas would such a prospect afford? Ideas of peace and innocence, and rural joy, and all the unblemished delights of solitude and contemplation. In such trains of imagery, no labor of thought, or habits of attention, are required; they rise spontaneously in the mind, upon the prospect of any object to which they bear the slightest resemblance, and they lead it almost insensibly along, in a kind of bewitching reverie, through all its store of pleasing or interesting conceptions. To the philosopher, or the man of business, the emotion of beauty, from such a scene, would be but feebly known ; but by the young mind, which had such sensibility, it would be felt in all its warmth, and would produce an emotion of delight, which not only would be little comprehended by men of a severer or more thoughtful character, but which seems also to be very little dependent upon the object which excites it, and to be derived, in a great measure, from this exercise of mind itself.

In these familiar instances, it is obvious how much the emotions of taste are connected with this state or character of imagination, and how much those habits or employments of mind, which demand attention, or which limit it to the consideration of single objects, tend to diminish the sensibility of mankind to the emotions of sublimity or beauty.

and the habits of accurate thought, equally tend to produce; and why? How is this illustrated from the man of business, and the philosopher? In the first of these characters, what ideas only, would the prospect of any beautiful scene in nature induce; and in the other, to what speculations would it lead? In both, what would it thus excite; and why? To a young mind, on the contrary, what ideas would it excite; and of such trains of imagery, what is observed? What is observed of the emotion of beauty, to the mind of a philosopher, from such a scene? By the young mind, how would it be felt; and what effect would it produce? In these familiar instances, what is obvious ?

SECTION III.

There are many other instances, equally familiar, which are sufficient to shew that whatever increases this exercise or employment of imagination, increases also the emotion of beauty or sublimity.

I. This is very obviously the effect of all associations. There is no man who has not some interesting associations with particular scenes, or airs, or books, and who does not feel their beauty or sublimity enhanced to him by such connexions. The view of the house where one was born, of the school where one was educated, and where the gay years of infancy were passed, is indifferent to no man. They recall so many images of past happiness and past affections, they are connected with so many strong or valued emotions, and lead altogether to so long a train of feelings and recollections, that there is hardly any scene which one ever beholds with so much rapture. There are songs also, that we have heard in our infancy, which, when brought to our remembrance in after years, raise emotions for which we cannot well account; and which, though perhaps very indifferent in themselves, still continue, from this association, and from the variety of conceptions which they kindle in our minds, to be our favorites through life. The scenes which have been distinguished by the residence of any person, whose memory we admire, produce a similar effect. "Movemur enim, nescio quo pacto, locis ipsis, in quibus eorum, " quos diligimus, aut admiramur adsunt vestigia."* The scenes

There are many other instances, equally familiar, sufficient to show what? How does it appear that this is obviously the effect of all associations? How is this illustrated? What do they recall, with what are they connected, and to what do they lead? How is this also illustrated, from songs which we may have heard in our infancy? What is observed of the scenes which have been distinguished by the residence of any person whose memory we admire; and what illustration is given? Though the scenes themselves may not be parti-

* For we are somehow affected by those very places in which we behold the footsteps of those whom we love and admire.

themselves may not be particularly beautiful; but the delight with which we recollect the traces of their lives, blends itself insensibly with the emotions which the scenery excites ; and the admiration which these recollections afford, seems to give a kind of sanctity to the place where they dwelt, and converts every thing into beauty which appears to have been connected with them. There are scenes, undoubtedly, more beautiful than Runnymede, yet, to those who recollect the great event which passed there, there is no scene, perhaps, which so strongly seizes upon the imagination; and although the emotions this recollection produces, are of a very different kind from those which the mere natural scenery can excite, yet they unite themselves so well with these inferior emotions, and spread so venerable a charm over the whole, that one can hardly persuade himself, that the scene itself is not entitled to this admiration. The valley of Vaucluse is celebrated for its beauty, yet how much of it has been owing to its being the residence of Pe. trarch !

> Mias ces eaux, ce beau ciel, ce vallon enchanteur, Moins que Pétrarque et Laure interessoient mon cœur. La voila donc disois-je, oui, voila cette rive Que Pétrarque charmoit de sa lyre plaintive ; Ici Pétrarque à Laure exprimant son amour, Voyoit naître trop tard, mourir trop tot, le jour. Retrouverai-je encore, sur ces rocs solitaires, De leurs chiffres unis les tendres caractères ? Une grotte écartée avoit frappé mes yeux, Grotte sombre, dis-moi si tu les vis heureux, M'écriois-je! un vieux tronc bordoit-il le rivage? Laure avoit reposé sous son antique ombrage ; Je redemandois Laure à l'echo du vallon, Et l'echo n'avoit point oublié ce doux nom, Partout mes yeux cherchoient, voyoient, Pétrarque et Laure, Et par eux, ces beaux lieux s'émbellissoient encore.

Les Jardins, Chant 3me.

The sublime is increased, in the same manner, by whatever tends to increase this exercise of imagination. The field of any celebrated battle becomes sublime from this association.

cularly beautiful, yet what follows? How is this remark illustrated from Runnymede? What is observed of the valley of Vaucluse? Repeat the passage introduced, illustrative of this remark. How is the sublime, also, increased? No man, acquainted with English history, can behold the field of Agincourt, without some emotion of this kind. The additional conceptions which this association produces, and which fill the mind of the spectator on the prospect of that memorable field, diffuse themselves, in some measure, over the scene, and give it a sublimity which does not naturally belong to it. The majesty of the Alps, themselves, is increased by the remembrance of Hannibal's march over them; and who is there that could stand on the banks of the Rubicon, without feeling his imagination kindle, and his heart beat high ?

"Middleton Dale," says Mr. Whately, "is a cleft between "rocks, ascending gradually from a romantic village, till it "emerges, at about two miles distance, on the vast more-"lands of the Peak. It is a dismal entrance to a desert; the "hills above it are bare, the rocks are of a grey color, their "surfaces are rugged, and their shapes sayage, frequently ter-"minating in craggy points, sometimes resembling vast un-"wieldy bulwarks, or rising in heavy buttresses one above "another, and here and there a misshapen mass bulging out. "hangs lowering over its base. No traces of men are to be "seen, except in a road, which has no effect on such a scene " of desolation, and in the lime-kilns constantly smoking on the The soil is disfigured with all the tinges of brown and "side. "red, which denote barrenness; in some places it has crum-"bled away, and strata of loose dark stones only appear: and " in others, long lines of dross, shovelled out of the mines, have "fallen down the steeps. In these mines, the veins of lead on "one side of the Dale, are observed always to have corres. "ponding veins, in the same direction, on the other; and the " rocks, though differing widely in different places, yet always "continue in one style for some way together, and seem to "have a relation to each other. Both these appearances make "it probable that Middleton Dale is a chasm rent in the moun-"tains by some convulsion of nature beyond the memory of "man, or perhaps before the island was peopled. The scene,

How is this remark illustrated, from the field of Agincourt, the passage of the Alps by Hannibal, and of the Rubicon by Cæsar? Repeat Mr. Whately's description of Middleton Dale. By what is the sublimity of this scene much in-

"though it does not prove the fact, yet justifies the supposition, "and it gives credit to the tales of the country people, who, to "aggravate its horrors, always point to a precipice, down which "they say a young woman of the village threw herself head-"long, in despair at the neglect of a man whom she loved; "and shew a cavern, where a skeleton once was discovered, "but of what wretch is unknown; his bones were the only "memorial left of him."—Observations upon modern gardeniug, p. 93.

It is surely unnecessary to remark, how much the sublimity of this extraordinary scene is increased, by the circumstances of horror which are so finely connected with it.

One of the sublimest objects in natural scenery, is an old and deep wood, covering the side of a mountain, when seen from below; yet how much greater sublimity is given to it by Dr. Akenside, by the addition of the solemn images which, in the following lines are associated with it !

> ------Mark the sable woods That shade sublime yon mountain's nodding brow. With what religious awe the solemn scene Commands your steps! as if the reverend form Of Minos or of Numa, should forsake Th' Elysian seats, and down the embowering glade Move to your pausing eyc.----

Pleas. Imag. b. iii.

There is a passage in one of the Odes of the same poet, in which a scene, which is in general only beautiful, is rendered strikingly sublime, from the imagery with which it is associated.

> 'Tis thus to work her baneful power, Suspicion waits the sullen hour Of fretfulness and strife, When care the infirmer bosom wrings, Or Eurus waves his murky wings, To damp the seats of life. But come, forsake the scene unbless'd Which first beheld your faithful breast To groundless fears a prey;

creased? What is one of the sublimest objects in natural scenery; and by whom is its sublimity greatly increased? Repeat the passage. What is remarked of a passage in one of the Odes of the same poet? Repeat it. In

OF SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY.

Come, where with my prevailing lyre The skies, the streams, the groves conspire

To charm your doubts away. Thron'd in the sun's descending car What power unseen diffuseth far

This tenderness of mind? What Genius smiles on yonder flood ! What God in whispers from the wood Bids every thought be kind?

Ode to Suspicion.

I know not, however, any instance, where the effect of any association is so remarkable in bestowing sublimity on objects, to which it does not naturally belong, as in the following inimitable poem of Buchanan's on the month of May. This season is, in general, fitted to excite emotions very different from sublimity, and the numerous poems which have been written in celebration of it, dwell uniformly on its circumstances of "vernal joy." In this ode, however, the circumstances which the poet has selected, are of a kind, which, to me, appear inexpressibly sublime, and distinguish the poem itself by a degree and character of grandeur, which I have seldom found equalled in any other composition. The idea of it was probably taken from these fine lines of Virgil in the second Georgic, in describing the effects of spring:

> Non alios, prima crescentis origine mundi Illuxisse dies, aliumve habuisse tenorem Crediderim: ver illud erat, ver magnus agebat Orbis, et hybernis parcebant flatibus Euri: Cum primum lucem pecudes hausere, virûmque, Ferrea progenies duris caput extulit arvis, Immissæque feræ sylvis, et cidera cœlo.

Then did the new creation first appear, , Nor other was the tenor of the year; When laughing heaven did the great birth attend, And eastern winds their wintry breath suspend---

what poem is the effect of association most remarkably exemplified? This season is, in general, fitted to excite emotions of what kind, and on what do the poems that have been written in celebration of it, uniformly dwell? In this ode, however, of what kind are the circumstances which the poet has selected; and how do they distinguish the poem? Whence was the idea of it probably taken? Repeat the passage. Repeat the ode also. What effect have Then sheep first saw the sun in open fields, And savage beasts were sent to stock the wilds— And golden stars flew up to light the skies, And man's relentless race from stony quarries rise. Druden.

I believe, however, that no man will doubt how much Buchanan has improved upon this beautiful idea.

CALENDÆ MALÆ.

Salvete sacris deliciis sacræ Maiæ calendæ, lætitiæ et mero Ludisque dicatæ jocisque Et teneris charitum choreís. Salve voluptas et nitidum decus Anni recurrens perpetua vice, Et flos renascentis juventæ

In senium properantis Ævi. Cum blanda veris temperies novo Illuxit orbi, primaque secula

Fulsere flaventi metallo, Sponte sua, sine lege, justa, Talis per omnes continuus tenor Annos tepenti rura Favonio

Mulcebat, et nullis feraces Seminibus recreabat agros. Talis beatis incubat insulis Felicis auræ perpetuus tepor,

Et nesciis campis senectæ Difficilis, querulique morbi. Talis silentum per tacitum nemus Levi susurrat murmure spiritus,

Lethenque juxta obliviosam Funereas agitat cupressos.

Forsan supremis cum Deus ignibus Piabit orbem, lætaque secula

Mundo reducet, talis aura Æthereos animos fovebit. Salve fugacis gloria feculi, Salve secunda digna dies nota, Salve vetustæ vitæ imago, Et specimen venientis Ævi.

THE FIRST OF MAY:

Hail to thee, delicious day, Fair and sacred first of May---Sacred unto wine and mirth Where the game and feast have birth---Sacred to the gentle dance Where the Graces' dark eyes glance--- Hail! delight, and shining grace! Ever following the pace Of the aye revolving year, Time's unwearied traveller ! When Spring's life-inspiring ravs Lit the world in other days, Those delicious days of old In the blessed age of gold, Such unceasing mildness charmed Fields which soft Favonius warmed : Earth's unsown fertility Gave forth fruits spontaneously. Such a warmth of æther smiles Ever on the Blessed Isles, And the Fields where sad decay And old age held never sway ! Such a gentle murmur blows Through the silent grove where flows Lethe's quiet water on, Fraught with sweet oblivion ! When God sends his judgment fires, Purging Earth till sin expires, Perchance an air like this will cherish ! Ethereal souls that cannot perish. Hail! glory of the fleeting age-Praiseworthy in man's pilgrimage-Image of Earth's early bloom, And type of life beyond the tomb !

National associations have a similar effect, in increasing the emotions of sublimity and beauty, as they, very obviously, increase the number of images presented to the mind. The fine lines which Virgil has dedicated in his Georgics, to the praises of his native country, however beautiful to us, were, undoubtedly, read with a far superior emotion by an ancient Roman. The prodigies which the same poet has described, as preceding the death of Cæsar, and the still more minute description which Lucan, in the first book of his Pharsalia, has given of such events, on the approach of the civil war, must, probably, have given to a Roman, who was under the dominion of such national superstitions, the strongest emotions of sublimity and

national associations; and why? How is this illustrated, from the fine lines which Virgil has dedicated to the praises of his native country, from the description of the prodigies that preceded the death of Cæsar, and from the description that Lucan has given of similar events? With what emotion only, terror. But we read them now without any other emotion, than that which arises from the beauty of the composition.

The influence of such associations, in increasing either the beauty or the sublimity of musical composition, can hardly have escaped any person's observation. The tune called Belleisle March is said, by a very eminent writer, to have owed its popularity among the people of England to the supposition, that it was the tune which was played, when the English army marched into Belleisle, and to its consequent association with images of fame, and conquest, and military glory. There are other tunes of the same character, which, without any peculiar merit, always serve to please the people, whenever they are performed. The natives of any country, that possesses a national or characteristic music, need not be reminded how strongly the performance of such airs brings back to them the imagery of their native land; and must often have had occasion to remark how inferior an emotion they excite in those who are strangers to such associations. The effect of the celebrated national song, which is said to have overpowered the Swiss soldier in a foreign land, with melancholy and despair, and which it is therefore found necessary to forbid in the armies in which they serve, cannot surely be attributed to its composition alone, but to the recollections that it brings, and to those images that it kindles in his mind, of peace, and freedom, and domestic pleasure, from which he is torn, and to which he may never return. Whatever may be the sublimity of Handel's music, the singular effect of it on some late occasions is, doubtless, not to be ascribed to that sublimity alone, but in a peculiar manner to the place where it was performed; not only from the sacredness of that place, which is, of itself, so well fitted to excite many awful emotions; but in a considerable degree, also, from its being the repository of so many "illustrious dead,"

do we now read them? What is remarked of the influence of such associations, in increasing the beauty or the sublimity of musical composition? How isth is illustrated from Belleisle March; and from other tunes also of the same character? Of what need not the natives of any country, that possesses a national music, be reminded; and what must they often have had occasion to remark? How is this illustrated, from the effect of the celebrated national song upon the Swiss soldier? Of the sublimity and effect of Handel's music

and the scene, perhaps of all others, most sacred to those who have any sensibility to the glories of their country.

There are associations, also, which arise from particular professions, or habits of thought, which serve very well to illustrate the same observation. No man, in general, is sensible to beauty, in those subjects with regard to which he has not previous ideas. The beauty of a theory, or of a relic of antiquity, is unintelligible to a peasant. The charms of the country are altogether lost upon a citizen who has passed his life in town. In the same manner, the more our ideas are increased, or our conceptions extended upon any subject, the greater is the number of associations we connect with it, and the stronger is the emotion of sublimity or beauty we receive from it.

The pleasure, for instance, which the generality of mankind receive from any celebrated painting, is trifling when compared to that which a painter feels, if he is a man of any common degree of candor. What is to them, only an accurate representation of nature, is, to him, a beautiful exertion of genius, and a perfect display of art. The difficulties which occur to his mind in the design and execution of such a performance, and the testimonies of skill, of taste, and of invention, which the accomplishment of it exhibits, excite a variety of emotions in his breast, of which the common spectator is altogether unsusceptible; and the admiration with which he thus contemplates the genius and art of the painter, blends itself with the peculiar emotions which the picture itself can produce, and enhances to him every beauty that it may possess.

The beauty of any scene in nature is seldom so striking to others, as it is to a landscape painter, or to those who profess the beautiful art of laying out grounds. The difficulties, both of invention and execution, which from their professions are familiar to them, render the profusion with which nature often

on some late occasions, what is observed? What other associations also, serve to illustrate the same observation? In what subjects is no man sensible of beauty; and to whom is the beauty of a theory, or relict of antiquity, unintelligible? Upon whom are the charms of the country altogether lost? In the same manner, what is observed, when our ideas become increased upon any subject? How is this remark illustrated, from the comparative pleasure which a painter, and the generality of markind receive, from a celebrated painting? To whom is the heavily of any scene in nature more striking than scatters the most picturesque beauties, little less than miraculous. Every little circumstance of form and perspective, and light and shade, which are unnoticed by a common eye, are important in theirs; and mingling in their minds the ideas of difficulty, and facility in overcoming it, produce altogether an emotion of delight; incomparably more animated than any that the generality of mankind usually derive from it.

The delight which most men of education receive from the consideration of antiquity, and the beauty that they discover in every object which is connected with ancient times, is in a great measure to be ascribed to the same cause. The antiquarian in his cabinet, surrounded by the relics of former ages, seems to himself to be removed to periods that are long since past, and indulges in the imagination of living in a world, which, by a very natural kind of prejudice, we are always willing to believe was both wiser and better than the present. All that is venerable or laudable in the history of these times, present themselves to his memory. The gallantry, the heroism, the patriotism of antiquity, rise again before his view, softened by the obscurity in which they are involved, and rendered more seducing to the imagination by that obscurity itself, which, while it mingles a sentiment of regret amid his pursuits, serves, at the same time, to stimulate his fancy to fill up, by its own creation, those long intervals of time of which history has pre-The relics he contemplates seem to draw served no record. him still nearer to the ages of his regard. The dress, the furniture, the arms of the times, are so many assistances to his imagination, in guiding or directing its exercise, and, offering him a thousand sources of imagery, provide him with an honest, inexhaustible field, in which his memory and his fancy may expatiate. There are few men who have not felt somewhat, at least, of the delight of such an employment. There is no man in the least acquainted with the history of antiquity, who does not love to let his imagination loose on the prospect of its re-

to others; and why? What remark follows? Of the delight which most men of education receive from the consideration of antiquity, what is observed? How is this fully illustrated, in the case of the antiquarian? In what do all men, acquainted with the history of antiquity, love to indulge their imagina-

mains, and to whom they are not in some measure sacred, from the innumerable images which they bring. Even the peasant, whose knowledge of former times extends but to a few generations, has yet in his village some monument of the deeds or virtues of his forefathers; and cherishes with a fond veneration the memorial of those good old times to which his imagination returns with delight, and of which he loves to recount the simple tales that tradition has brought him.

And what is it that constitutes that emotion of sublime delight, which every man of common sensibility feels upon the first prospect of Rome? It is not the scene of destruction which is before him. It is not the Tiber, diminished in his imagination to a paltry stream, flowing amid the ruins of that magnificence which it once adorned. It is not the triumph of superstition over the wreck of human greatness, and its monuments erected upon the very spot where the first honors of humanity have been gained. It is ancient Rome which fills his imagination. It is the country of Cæsar, and Cicero, and Virgil, which is before him. It is the mistress of the world which he sees, and who seems to him to rise again from her tomb, to give laws to the universe. All that the labors of his youth, or the studies of his maturer age have acquired, with regard to the history of this great people, open at once before his imagination, and present him with a field of high and solemn imagery, which can never be exhausted. Take from him these associations, conceal from him that it is Rome that he sees, and how different would be his emotion !

II. The effect which is thus produced, by associations, in increasing the emotions of sublimity or beauty, is produced also, either in nature, or in description, by what are generally termed picturesque objects. Instances of such objects are familiar to every one's observation. An old tower in the middle of

tion? Of the peasant, whose knowledge of former times extends but to a few generations, what is observed? What is it not, and what is it, that constitutes that emotion of sublime delight, which every man of common sensibility feels upon the first prospect of Rome? What, open at once, before his imagination? Take from him these associations, and what will be the cousequence? By what also, is the effect which is thus produced by associations,

a deep wood, a bridge flung across a chasm between rocks, a cottage on a precipice, are common examples. If I am not mistaken, the effect which such objects have on every one's mind, is to suggest an additional train of conceptions, beside what the scene or description itself would have suggested; for it is very obvious, that no objects are remarked as picturesque, which do not strike the imagination by themselves. They are, in general, such circumstances, as coincide, but are not necessarily connected with the character of the scene or description, and which, at first, affecting the mind with an emotion of surprise, produce afterwards an increased, or additional train of imagery. The effect of such objects, in increasing the emotions either of beauty or sublimity, will probably be obvious from the following instances:

The beauty of sunset, in a fine autumnal evening, seems almost incapable of addition from any circumstance. The various and radiant coloring of the clouds, the soft light of the sun, that gives so rich a glow to every object on which it falls, the dark shades with which it is contrasted, and the calm and deep repose that seems to steal over universal nature, form altogether a scene, which serves, perhaps, better than any other in the world, to satiate the imagination with delight : Yet there is no man who does not know how great an addition this fine scene is capable of receiving from the circumstance of the evening bell. In what, however, does the effect of this most picturesque circumstance consist? Is it not in the additional images which are thus suggested to the imagination? images indeed of melancholy and sadness, but which still are pleasing, and which serve most wonderfully to accord with that solemn and pensive state of mind, which is almost irresistibly produced by this charming scene.

Nothing can be more beautiful than Dr. Goldsmith's description of evening, in the Deserted Village :

produced? What are instances of such objects? What is the effect which such objects have on one's mind; and why? Of these circumstances, what is observed? Why does the beauty of sunset, on a fine autumnal evening, seem almost incapable of addition from any circumstance? Yet, from what may it receive a great addition? In what does the effect of this most picturesque circumstance consist; and of these what is observed? What is

OF SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY.

Sweet was the sound, when oft at evening's close Up yonder hill the village murmur rose. There, as I pass'd with careless steps and slow, The mingling notes came softened from below : The swain responsive as the milkmaid sung, The sober herd that low'd to meet their young. The noisy geese that gabbled o'er the pool, The playful children just let loose from school, The watch-dog's voice that bay'd the whisp'ring wind, And the loud laugh, that spoke the vacant mind.

Yet how much is the beauty of this description increased, by the fine circumstance with which it is closed !

> These all in soft confusion sought the shade, And fill'd each pause the nightingale had made.

There is a beauty of the same kind produced in the "Seasons," by the addition of one of the most picturesque circumstances that was ever imagined by a poet:

> ——Lead me to the mountain brow, Where sits the shepherd on the grassy turf, Inhaling, healthful, the descending sun. Around him feeds his many bleating flock, Of various cadence, and his sportive lambs Their frolics play; and now the sprightly race Invites them forth, when swift, the signal given, They start away, and sweep the mossy mound That runs around the hill, the rampart once Of iron war, in ancient barbarous times.

> > Spring.

The scene is undoubtedly beautiful of itself, without the addition of the last circumstance; yet how much more beautiful does it become by the new order of thought which this circumstance awakens in the mind, and which, contrasting the remembrance of ancient warfare and turbulent times, with the serenity and repose of the modern scene, agitate the imagination with a variety of indistinct conceptions, which otherwise could never have arisen in it !

The physical arguments of Buchanan, in his poem "de

observed of Dr. Goldsmith's description of evening? Repeat it. By what is the beauty of this description much increased? Repeat them. Where is there a beauty of the same kind? Repeat the passage that contains it. Of the scene, of itself, what is observed; yet by what is the beauty much inSphæra," against the doctrine of the motion of the earth, are probably read with little emotion; but it is impossible to read the following lines of it without delight, from the very picturesque imagery which they contain:

> Ergo tam celeri tellus si concita motu Iret in Occasum, rursusque rediret in Ortum, Cuncta simul quateret secum, vastoque fragore, Templa, ædes, miserisque etiam cum civibus, urbes Opprimerit subitæ strages inopina ruinæ. Ipsæ etiam volucres tranantes aera leni Remigio alarum, celeri vertigine terræ Abreptas gemerent sylvas, nidosque tenella Cum sobole et chara forsan cum conjuge : nec se Auderet zephyro solus committere turtur, Ne procul ablatos, terra fugiente, Hymenæos Et viduum longo luctu defleret amorem.

> > Lib. 1.

For were the globe thus rapidly to make Its flight from west to east, it needs must shake Its temples, houses, cities to the ground, And with wild noise spread desolation round. The very bird that wings his course through air Would mourn the vanished woods that held his care. The nest where slept his nestlings and his mate, Torn from him by earth's swift-revolving weight ! Nor would the gentle turtle dare expand His wing to zephyr, lest the flying land Far from his sight his partner should remove, And leave him mourning for his widowed love !

There is a very striking beauty of the same kind in a little poem of Dr. Beattie's, entitled "Retirement:"

Thy shades, thy silence now be mine, Thy charms my only theme; My haunt, the hollow cliff, whose pine Waves o'er the gloomy stream; Where the scar'd owl on pinions grey Breaks from the rustling boughs, And down the lone vale sails away To more profound repose.

creased? What is observed of the physical arguments of Buchanan, against the doctrine of the motion of the earth? But of the following lines, what is remarked? Repeat them. Repeat the passage from Dr. Beattie's "Retirement," containing a beauty of the same kind. What says Mr. Whately, in "All," says Mr. Whately, in describing the Tinian Lawn at Hagley, "all here is of an even temper, all mild, placid, and "serene; in the gayest season of the day, not more than "cheerful, in the stillest watch of night, not gloomy. The "scene is indeed peculiarly adapted to the tranquillity of the "latter, when the moon seems to repose her light on the thick "foliage of the grove, and steadily marks the shade of every "bough. It is delightful then to saunter here, and see the "grass and the gossamer which entwines it glistening with "dew, to listen, and hear nothing stir, except perhaps a wither-"ed leaf, dropping gently through a tree, and sheltered from "the chill, to catch the freshness of the evening air." It is difficult to conceive any thing more beautiful than this description ; yet how much is its beauty increased by the concluding circumstance? "A solitary urn, chosen by Mr. Pope for the "spot. and now inscribed to his memory, when seen by a "gleam of moonlight through the trees, fixes that thoughtful-"ness and composure, to which the mind is insensibly led by "the rest of this elegant scene."-Observations on gardening. p. 201.

I shall conclude these instances of the effect of picturesque objects, in increasing the emotion of beauty, with a passage from the Iliad, which contains one of the most striking images that I know of in poetry, and which I am the more willing to quote, as it has not been taken so much notice of as it deserves. It is the appearance of Achilles, when Phœnix and Ulysses are sent from the Grecian camp to appease his wrath:

> Τω δε βατην παξα Σινα πολυφλοισθοιο Δαλασσης, Πολλα μαλ' ευχομενω γαιηχώ Ευνοσιγαιώ, Ρηϊδιως πεπιθειν μεγαλας φεενας Αιαχιδαο· Μυζμιδονων δ' επι τε χλισιας χαι νηας Ιχεσθην. Τον δ' εδέου φεενα τερπομενον φοζμιγγι λιγειη Καλη, δαιδαλεη, επι δ' αργυζεος ζύγος ηεν Την αξετ' εξ εναζων, πτολιν Ηετιωνος ολεσσας Τη όγε Συμον ετερπεν, αειδε δ' αξα χλεα ανδζον. Πiad, lib. ix. v. 182.

describing the Tinian Lawn at Hagley? Of this description, what is observed; yet by what circumstance is its beauty much increased? With what passage does our author conclude these instances of the effect of pic-

6

NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS

Through the still night they march, and hear the roar Of murmuring billows, on the sounding shore : And now arriv'd, where on the sandy bay, The Myrmidonian tents and vessels lay, Amus'd, at ease, the godlike man they found Pleas'd with the solemn harp's harmonious sound. With this he sooths his angry soul, and sings Th' immortal deeds of herces and of kings. B. ix. v. 236.

It was impossible for the poet to have imagined any other occupation so well fitted to the mighty mind of Achilles, or so effectual in interesting the reader in the fate of him, whom Dr. Beattie calls, with truth, the most terrific human personage that poetical imagination has feigned.

The sublime is increased in the same manner, by the addition of picturesque objects. The striking image with which Virgil concludes the description of the prodigies which attended the death of Cæsar, is well known:

> Scilicet et tempus veniet cum finibus illis Agricola, incurvo terram molitus aratro, Exesa inveniet scabrâ rubigine pila : Aut gravibus rastris, galeas pulsabit inanes, Grandiaque effosis mirabitur ossa sepulchris.

And in the course of time the day will come When, as the farmer ploughs the heavy loam, The rusted darts upturned shall meet his eye, And empty helmets 'neath his harrow lie— Then shall he marvel at the skeletons, Th' unsepulchred remains of mighty ones !

There are few passages more sublime in the Pharsalia of Lucan, than the description, in the third book, of one of Pompey's armies, blocked up by Cæsar in a part of the country where there was no water, and where the soldiers were perishing with thirst. After describing, very minutely, the fruitless attempts of the army to obtain relief, and the miserable expedients with which they endeavored to supply their wants, he

turesque objects; and what is observed of it? Repeat it. On this passage what remark follows? Of the effects of picturesque objects on the sublime, what is observed? In support of this remark, what passage is introduced? Repeat it. What description in the Pharsalia is considered one of the most sublime the work contains? With what remark is it introduced? Repeat proceeds in the following nervous and beautiful lines, of which, I am persuaded, the last circumstance is too striking to require any comment:

> O fortunati, fugiens quos barbarus hostis, Fontibus immistos stravit per rura heneno. \sim Hos licet in fluvios saniem, tabemque ferarum Pallida, Dictaria, Casar, nascentia saxis Infundas aconita palam, Romana juventus Non decepta bibet-torrentur viscera flamma Oraque sicca rigent squamosis aspera linguis; Jam marcent venæ, nulloque humore rigatus Aëris alternos angustat Pulmo meatus. Rescissoque nocent suspiria dura palato. Pandant ora siti, nocturnumque aëra captant. Expectant imbres, quorum modo cuncta natabant Impulsu, et siccis vultus in nubibus hærent. Quoque magis miseros undæ jejunia solvant Non, super arentum Mercen, Cancrique sub axe Qua nudi Garamantes arant, sedere, sed inter Stagnantem Sicorim et rapidum, deprensus Iberum Spectat vicinos, sitiens exercitus, amnes.

> > Lib. iii, ad med.

Oh happy they for whom the barbarous foe When flying made the founts with poison flow-Cæsar! though in these rivers thou should'st pour Corrupted blood and wild beasts' thickened gore, And the Dictman rock's pale aconite, The Roman youth would drink with death in sight ! Though scorching flames their entrails flashed along, And to the dry mouth stuck the scaly tongue. Now shrink the veins; with moisture unbedewed The gasping lungs seek for their airy food-With pain the palate lets the sigh go through; Thirsty they ope their mouths to catch the dew ! They pray for showers which late did freely move, And fix their eyes on the dry heaven above ! Nor were they camped on Meroë's hot isle, Nor where the naked Garamantes toil-But where the lazy Sycoris doth flow, And swift Iberus' waves all freshly go-The coldiers perishing with thirst extreme, Gazed hopelessly upon each neighboring stream !

The fine description in the Jerusalem Delivered, of a similar distress in the army of Godfrey, before the walls of Jerusalem.

it. Whence was the fine description in the Jerusalem Delivered, of a similar distress in the army of Godfrey, probably borrowed; and in it, what is it

has probably been borrowed from this passage of Lucan; and it is pleasing to observe, with what address Tasso has imitated, though not copied, the picturesque circumstance with which the description of the Roman poet is closed. Instead of aggravating the distress of the soldier, by the prospect of waters, which he could not approach, he recalls to his remembrance the cool shades and still fountains of his native land—a circumstance, not only singularly pathetic, but more fertile also of imagery, than, perhaps, any other that the poet could have imagined :

> S'alcun giammai tra frondeggiante rive Puro vide stagnar liquido argento, O giù precipitose ir acque vive. Per Alpe o'n piaggia érbosa à passo lento; Quelle al vago desio forma, e descrive, E ministra materia al suo tormento: Che l'immagine lor gelida e molle L'asciuga e scalda, e nel pensier ribolle.

Can. xiii. St. Lx.

He that the gliding rivers earst had seene, Adowne their verdant chanels gently rold, Or falling streames which to the vallies greene Distill'd from tops of Alpine mountaines cold, Those he desir'd in vaine, new torments beene, Augmented thus, with wish of comforts old, Those waters coole he dranke in vaine conceit Which more oncreast his thirst, encreast his heat. FARFAX.

In Thomson's description of Winter in the northern regions, though the description itself is sublime, yet one additional circumstance adds powerfully to its sublimity :

> Thence winding eastward to the Tartar coast, She sweeps the howling margin of the main, Where, undissolving from the first of time, Snows swell on snows, amazing, to the sky, And icy mountains, high on mountains pil'd, Seem to the shivering sailor, from afar, Shapeless and white, an atmosphere of clouds. Ocean itself no longer can resist The binding fury: but in all its rage Of tempest, taken by the boundless frost, Is many a fathom to the bottom chain'd, And bid to roat no more—a bleak expanse

pleasing to observe? How is this illustrated? Repeat the passage. By what is the sublimity in Thomson's description of Winter in the northern regions, increased? Repeat the whole passage. Of the following masterly Shagg'd o'er with wavy-rocks, cheerless, and void, Of every life, that from the dreary months Flies, conscious, southward. Miserable they! Who, here entangled in the gathering ice, Take their las look of the descending sun, While full of death, and fierce with tenfold frost, The long long night, incumbent o'er their heads Falls horrible.—

In the following masterly description of a very sublime scene in nature, by Mr. Whately, I doubt not but that it will be acknowledged, how much the sublimity of it is increased, by the very picturesque imagery which the occupations of the inhabitants afford. "A scene at the New Weir, on the river "Wye, which in itself is truly great and awful, so far form be-"ing disturbed, becomes more interesting and important, by the "business to which it is destined. It is a chasm between two "ranges of hills, which rise almost perpendicularly from the "water; the rocks on the sides are mostly heavy masses, and "their color is generally brown; but here and there a pale " craggy cliff starts up to a vast height above the rest, uncon-"nected, broken, and bare : large trees frequently force out "their way amongst them, and many of them stand far back " in the covert, where their natural dusky hue is deepened by "the shadow which overhangs them. The river, too, as it " retires, loses itself amid the woods, which close immediately " above, then rise thick and high, and darken the water. In "the midst of all this gloom is an iron forge, covered with a " black cloud of smoke, and surrounded with half burned ore, " with coal, and with cinders. The fuel for it is brought down "a path, worn into steps, narrow, and steep, and winding " among the precipices; and near it is an open space of barren "moor, about which are scattered the huts of the workmen. "It stands close to the cascade of the Weir, where the agita-"tion of the current is increased by large fragments of rocks " which have been swept down by floods from the banks, or " shivered by tempests from the brow; and at stated intervals. "the sullen sound, from the strokes of the great hammers in "the forge, deadens the roar of the waterfall."-Page 109.

description from Mr. Whately, what is observed? Repeat it. Where is there a similar beauty found; and what is it? With what passage are these

There is a similar beauty, if I am not mistaken, in the conclusion of the following passage from Mons. Diderot.

"Qu'est ce qu'il faut au poëte ? Est-ce une nature brute ou "cultivée ? paisible ou troublée ? Préféra-t-il la beauté d'un " jour pur et serein, à l'horreur d'une nuit obscure, où le sifie-"ment interrompu des vents se mêle par intervalles au mur-"mure sourd et continu d'un tonnere éloigné, et où il voit "l'éclair allumer le ciel sur sa tête ? Préféra-t-il le spectacle " d'une mer tranquille, à celui des flots agitées ? le muet et "froid aspect d'un palais, à la proménade parmi des ruines? " un édifice construit, un éspece planté de la main des hommes, "au touffu d'une antique forêt, au creux ignoré d'une roche "deserte? des nappes d'eau, des bassins, des cascades, à la " vûe d'une cataracte qui se brise en tombant à travers des " rochers, et dont le bruit se fait entendre au loin du berger. "qui a conduit son troupeau dans la montagne, et qui l'écoute " avec éffroi ?"-Epitre à Mons. Grimm. sur la Poësie Drama. " tioue.

I shall conclude these illustrations with a very sublime one from the Paradise Regained of Milton, in which I believe the force of the concluding stroke will not be denied.

> -----Either tropic now 'Gan thunder, and both ends of heaven; the clouds From many a horrid rift abortive, pour'd Fierce rain, with lightning mix'd; nor slept the winds Within their stony caves, but rush'd abroad From the four hinges of the world, and fell On the vex'd wilderness, whose tallest pines, Though rooted deep as high, and sturdiest oaks Bow'd their stiff neck., loaden with stormy blasts Or torn up sheer-----Ill wast thou shrouded then, O patient Son of God ! Book iv.

In these, and a thousand other instances that might be produced, I believe every man of sensibility will be conscious of a variety of great or pleasing images passing with rapidity in his imagination, beyond what the scene or description immediately before him can, of themselves, excite. They seem often

illustrations concluded ? Repeat it. In these, and a thousand other instances that might be produced, of what must every man of sensibility be conscious ?

indeed, to have but a very distant relation to the object that at first excited them; and the object itself appears only to serve as a hint, to awaken the imagination, and to lead it through every analogous idea that has place in the memory. It is then, indeed, in this powerless state of reverie, when we are carried on by our conceptions, not guiding them, that the deepest emotions of beauty or sublimity are felt; that our hearts swell with feelings which language is too weak to express; and that, in the depth of silence and astonishment, we pay to the charm that enthrals us, the most flattering mark of our applause.

"The power of such characters in nature," says Mr. Whately, from whom I am happy to borrow the following observations, not only from the beauty of their expression, but from their singular coincidence in the illustration of the fact I have been endeavoring to establish; "the power of such characters is " not confined to the ideas which the objects themselves imme-"diately suggest; for these are connected with others, which " insensibly lead to subjects far distant perhaps from the origi-"nal thought, and related to it only by similitude in the sensa-"tions they excite. In a prospect enriched and enlivened with "inhabitants and cultivation, the attention is caught first by "the circumstances which are gavest in the season, the bloom " of an orchard, the festivity of a hay-field, and the carols of " a harvest home ; but the cheerfulness which these infuse into "the mind, expands afterwards to other objects than those " immediately presented to the eye, and we are thereby dis-" posed to receive, and delighted to pursue, a variety of pleas-"ing ideas, and every benevolent feeling. At the sight of a " ruin, reflections on the change, the decay, and the desolation " before us naturally occur; and they introduce a long succes-" sion of others, all tinctured with that melancholy which these "have inspired : or if the monument revive the memory of " former times, we do not stop at the simple fact which it re-" cords, but recollect many more coeval circumstances, which "we see, not perhaps as they were, but as they are come down

How do they often seem? When is it that the deepest emotions of beauty or sublimity are felt; and that we pay, to the charm that enthrals us, the most flattering mark of our applause? On this subject, what says Mr. Whately? "to us, venerable with age, and magnified by fame. Even "without the assistance of buildings, or other adventitious cir-" cumstances, nature alone furnishes materials for scenes which "may be adapted to almost every kind of expression. Their "operation is general, and their consequences infinite : the "mind is elevated, depressed, or composed, as gaiety, bloom, " or tranquillity prevail in the scene, and we soon lose sight of "the means by which the character is formed. We forget the " particular objects it presents, and, giving way to their effects " without recurring to the cause, we follow the track they have " begun, to any extent, which the dispositions they accord with "will allow. It suffices that the scenes of nature have power "to affect our imagination and our sensibility : for such is the " constitution of the human mind, that if once it is agitated, the " emotion often spreads beyond the occasion : when the passions " are roused, their course is unrestrained ; when the fancy is on "the wing, its flight is unbounded, and quitting the inanimate " objects which first gave them their spring, we may be led by "thought above thought, widely differing in degree, but still " corresponding in character, till we rise from familiar subjects "to the sublimest conceptions, and are rapt in the contempla-" tion of whatever is great or beautiful, which we see in nature, "feel in man, or attribute to the Divinity." p. 154.

III. The influence of such additional trains of imagery, in increasing the emotions of sublimity or beauty, might be illustrated from many other circumstances equally familiar. I am induced to mention only the following, because it is one of the most striking that I know, and because it is probable that most men of education have at least in some degree been conscious of it :--the influence, I mean, of an acquaintance with poetry in our earlier years, in increasing our sensibility to the beauties of nature.

The generality of mankind live in the world, without receiving any kind of delight from the various scenes of beauty which

From what might the influence of such additional trains of imagery, be farther illustrated? What only does our author mention; and why? How do the generality of mankind live in the world? How is this remark illus-

its order displays. The rising and setting of the sun, the varying aspect of the moon, the vicissitude of seasons, the revolution of the planets, and all the stupendous scenery that they produce, are to them only common occurrences, like the ordinary events of every day. They have been so long familiar, that they cease to strike them with any appearance either of magnificence or beauty, and are regarded by them with no other sentiments, than as being useful for the purposes of human life. We may all remember a period in our lives, when this was the state of our own minds; and it is probable most men will recollect, that the time when nature began to appear to them in another view, was, when they were engaged in the study of classical literature. In most men, at least, the first appearance of poetical imagination is at school, when their imaginations begin to be warmed by the descriptions of ancient poetry, and when they have acquired a new sense, as it were, with which they can behold the face of nature.

How different, from this period, become the sentiments with which the scenery of nature is contemplated, by those who have any imagination! The beautiful forms of ancient mythology, with which the fancy of poets peopled every element, are now ready to appear to their minds, upon the prospect of every scene. The descriptions of ancient authors, so long admired, and so deserving of admiration, occur to them at every moment, and with them, all those enthusiastic ideas of ancient genius and glory, which the study of so many years of youth so naturally leads them to form. Or, if the study of modern poetry has succeeded to that of the ancient, a thousand other beautiful associations are acquired, which, instead of destroying, serve easily to unite with the former, and to afford a new source of delight. The awful forms of Gothic superstition, the wild and romantic imagery, which the turbulence of the middle ages, the Crusades, and the institution of chivalry,

trated? Why is this the case? What period in our lives may we all remember; and what, is it probable, most men will recollect? What, to most men, is the first appearance of poetical imagination? By whom do the sentiments with which nature is contemplated, from this period, become very different? How is this illustrated? Or, if the study of modern poetry has succeeded to that of the ancient, what follows? Of this remark what illustration is given?

have spread over every country of Europe, arise to the imagination in every scene; accompanied with all those pleasing recollections of prowess, and adventure, and courteous manners, which distinguished those memorable times. With such images in their minds, it is not common nature that appears to surround them. It is nature embellished and made sacred by the memory of Theocritus and Virgil, and Milton and Tasso; their genius seems still to linger among the scenes which inspired it, and to irradiate every object where it dwells; and the creations of their fancy seem the fit inhabitants of that nature, which their descriptions have clothed with beauty.

Nor is it only in providing so many scenes of association, that the influence of an acquaintance with poetry consists. It is yet still more powerful in giving character to the different appearances of nature, in connecting them with various emotions and affections of our hearts, and in thus providing an almost inexhaustible source, either of solemn or of cheerful meditation. What to ordinary men is but a common occurrence, or common scenery, to those who have such associations, is full of beauty. The seasons of the year, which are marked only by the generality of mankind by the different occupations or amusements they bring, have each of them, to such men, peculiar expressions, and awaken them to an exercise either of pleasing or of awful thought. The seasons of the day, which are regarded only by the common spectator as the call to labor, or to rest, are to them characteristic, either of cheerfulness or solemnity, and connected with all the various emotions which these characters excite. Even the familiar circumstances of general nature, which pass unheeded by a common eve, the cottage, the sheep-fold, the curfew,-all have expressions to them, because, in the compositions to which they have been accustomed, these all are associated with peculiar characters, or rendered expressive of them, and leading them to the remembrance of such associations, enable them to

With such images in their minds, what is it that surrounds them; and why? In what is poetry still more powerful? What, to ordinary men, is but a common occurrence, is to those who have such associations full of what? How is this illustrated from the seasons of the year, and the seasons of the day? Why have even the familiar circumstances of general nature expressions to

behold, with corresponding dispositions, the scenes which are before them, and to feel from their prospect the same powerful influence, which the eloquence of poetry has ascribed to them.

Associations of this kind, when acquired in early life, are seldom altogether lost; and whatever inconveniences they may sometimes have with regard to the general character, or however much they may be ridiculed by those who do not experience them, they are yet productive, to those who possess them, of a perpetual and innocent delight. Nature herself is their friend; in her most dreadful, as well as her most lovely scenes, they can discover something, either to elevate their imaginations, or to move their hearts; and amid every change of scenery, or of climate, can still find themselves among the early objects of their admiration, or their love.

them? Of associations of this kind, when acquired in early life, what is observed; and why?

CHAPTER II.

ANALYSIS OF THIS EXERCISE OF IMAGINATION.

SECTION I.

THE illustrations in the preceding chapter seem to shew, that whenever the emotions of sublimity or beauty are felt, that exercise of imagination is produced, which consists in the indulgence of a train of thought; that when this exercise is prevented, these emotions are unfelt or unperceived; and that whatever tends to increase this exercise of mind, tends in the same proportion to increase these emotions. If these illustrations are just, it seems reasonable to conclude, that the effect produced upon the mind by objects of sublimity and beauty, consists in the production of this exercise of imagination.

Although, however, this conclusion seems to me both just and consonant to experience, yet it is in itself too general, to be considered as a sufficient account of the nature of that operation of mind which takes place in the case of such emotions. There are many trains of ideas of which we are conscious, which are unattended with any kind of pleasure. There are other operations of mind, in which such trains of thought are necessarily produced, without exciting any similar emotion. Even in the common hours of life, every man is conscious of a continued succession of thoughts passing through his mind, suggested either by the presence of external objects, or arising from the established laws of association; such trains of thought, however, are seldom attended with pleasure, and still seldomer with an emotion, corresponding, in any degree, to the emotions of sublimity or beauty.

There are, in like manner, many cases where objects excite a train of thought in the mind, without exciting any emotion of

What do the illustrations in the preceding chapter seem to shew? If these illustrations are just, what does it seem reasonable to conclude? Of this

pleasure or delight. The prospect of the house, for instance, where one has formerly lived, excites very naturally a train of conceptions in the mind; yet it is by no means true that such an exercise of imagination is necessarily accompanied with pleasure, for these conceptions not only may be, but very often are, of a kind extremely indifferent, and sometimes also simply painful. The mention of an event in history, or of a fact in science, naturally leads us to the conception of a number of related events, or similar facts; yet it is obvious, that in such a case the exercise of mind which is produced, if it is accompanied with any pleasure at all, is in most cases accompanied with a pleasure very different from that which attends the emotions of sublimity or beauty

If therefore some train of thought, or some exercise of imagination is necessary for the production of the emotions of taste, it is obvious, that this is not every train of thought of which we are capable. To ascertain, therefore, with any precision, either the nature or the causes of these emotions, it is previously necessary to investigate the nature of those trains of thought that are produced by objects of sublimity and beauty, and their difference from those ordinary trains, which are unaccompanied with such pleasure.

As far as I am able to judge, this difference consists in two things. 1st. In the nature of the ideas or conceptions which compose such trains: and 2dly. In the nature of the law of their succession.

I. In our ordinary trains of thought, we must all be conscious that the ideas which compose them, are very frequently of a kind which excite no emotions, either of pleasure or pain. There is an infinite variety of our ideas, as well as of our sensations, that may be termed indifferent, which are perceived

conclusion what is observed; and why? Even in the common hours of life, of what is every man conscious? There are, in like manner, many cases of what? What instances are mentioned to illustrate this remark? What conclusion, therefore, follows? To ascertain, with any precision, either the nature or the causes of these emotions, what investigation is previously necessary? In what two things does this difference consist? In our ordinary trains of thought, of what must we all be conscious? How, is this remark.

without any sentiment either of pain or pleasure, and which pass, as it were, before the mind, without making any farther impression than simply exciting the consciousness of their existence. That such ideas compose a great part, and perhaps the greatest part, of our ordinary trains of thought, is apparent from the single consideration, that such trains are seldom attended with emotion of any kind.

The trains of thought which are suggested by external objects, are very frequently of a similar kind. The greater part of such objects are simply indifferent, or, at least, are regarded as indifferent in our common hours, either of occupation or amusement: the conceptions which they produce, by the laws of association, partake of the nature or character of the object which originally excited them, and the whole train passes through our mind without leaving any further emotion, then perhaps the general emotion of pleasure which accompanies the exercise of our faculties. It is scarcely possible for us to pass an hour of our lives without experiencing some train of thought of this kind, suggested by some of the external objects which happen to surround us. The indifference with which such trains are either pursued or deserted, is a sufficient evidence that the ideas of which they are composed, are, in general, of a kind unfitted to produce any emotion, either of pleasure or pain.

In the case of those trains of thought, on the contrary, which are suggested by objects either of sublimity or beauty, I apprehend it will be found, that they are, in all cases, composed of ideas capable of exciting some affection or emotion; and that not only the whole succession is accompanied with that peculiar emotion, which we call the emotion of beauty or sublimity, but that every individual idea of such a succession is, in itself, productive of some simple emotion or other. Thus the

54

illustrated? From what consideration is it evident that such ideas compose a great part of our ordinary trains of thought? How does it appear that the trains of thought which are suggested by external objects, are very frequently of a similar kind? How is this illustrated? Of what is the indifference with which such trains are either pursued or deserted, a sufficient proof? In the case of those trains of thought, on the contrary, which are suggested by objects, either of sublimity or beauty, of what is it apprehended they will, in all casee, be found to be composed; and of them what is observed? How is this

ideas suggested by the scenery of spring, are productive of emotions of cheerfulness, of gladness, and of tenderness. The images suggested by the prospect of ruins, are images belonging to pity, to melancholy, and to admiration. The ideas, in the same manner, awakened by the view of the ocean in a storm, are ideas of power, of majesty, and of terror. In every case, where the emotions of taste are felt, I conceive it will be found, that the train of thought which is excited, is distinguished by some character of emotion, and that it is by this means distinguished from our common or ordinary successions of thought. To prevent a very tedious and unnecessary circumlocution, such ideas may perhaps, without any impropriety, be termed ideas of emotion; and I shall beg leave, therefore, to use the expression in this sense.

The first circumstance, then, which seems to distinguish those strains of thought which are produced by objects, either of sublimity or beauty, is, that the ideas or conceptions of which they are composed, are ideas of emotion.

II. In our ordinary trains of thought, there seldom appears any general principle of connexion among the ideas which compose them. Each idea, indeed, is related, by an established law of our nature, to that which immediately preceded and that which immediately follows it, but in the whole series there is no predominant relation or bond of connexion. This want of general connexion is so strong, that even that most general of all relations, the relation either of pleasure or pain, is frequently violated. Images both of the one kind and the other, succeed each other in the course of the train; and when we put an end to it, we are often at a loss to say, whether the whole series was pleasant or painful. Of this irregularity, I think every man will be convinced, who chooses to attend to it.

In those trains, on the contrary, which are suggested by objects of sublimity or beauty, however slight the connexion

illustrated ? In every case where the emotions of taste are felt, what is remarked of the train of thought ? To prevent a very tedious circumlocution, what may such ideas be termed ? What, then, is the first circumstance that seems to distinguish them ? In our ordinary trains of thought, what seldom appears among the ideas which compose them ? To what is each idea related; and of this want of general connexion what is observed ? How is this

NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS

a electron . between individual thoughts may be, I believe it will be found. that there is always some general principle of connexion which pervades the whole, and gives them some certain and definite character. They are either gay, or pathetic, or melancholy, or solemn, or awful, or elevating, &c. according to the nature of the emotion which is first excited. Thus the prospect of a serene evening in summer, produces first an emotion of peacefulness and tranquillity, and then suggests a variety of images corresponding to this primary impression. The sight of a torrent, or a storm, in the same manner, impresses us first with sentiments of awe, or solemnity, or terror, and then awakens in our minds a series of conceptions allied to this peculiar emotion. Whatever may be the character of the original emotion. the images which succeed seem all to have a relation to this character; and if we trace them back, we shall discover not only a connexion between the individual thoughts of the train, but also a general relation among the whole, and a conformity to that peculiar emotion which first excited them.

> The train of thought, therefore, which takes place in the mind, upon the prospect of objects of sublimity and beauty, may be considered as consisting in a regular, or consistent train of ideas of emotion, and as distinguished from our ordinary trains of thought. 1st. In respect of the nature of the ideas of which it is composed, by their being ideas productive of emotion : and 2dly. In respect of their succession, by their being distinguished by some general principle of connexion, which subsists through the whole extent of the train.

The truth of the account which I have now given of the nature of that train of thought which attends the emotions of sublimity and beauty, must undoubtedly at last be determined by its conformity to general experience and observation. There are some considerations, however, of a very obvious and

illustrated? In those trains, on the contrary, which are suggested by objects of sublimity or beauty, what will be found; and of them what is remarked? How is this illustrated ? Whatever may be the character of the original emotion, of the images that succeed it, what is observed? In what may the train of thought which takes place in the mind, upon the prospect of objects of sublimity and beauty, be considered as consisting? In respect of the nature of the ideas, and in respect of their succession, what is observed? How must the truth of the account which has now been given, be determined? Why

familiar kind, which it may be useful to suggest to the reader, for the purpose of affording him a method of investigating with accuracy the truth of this account.

If it is true that the ideas that compose the train of thought, which attends the emotions of taste, are uniformly ideas of emotion, then it ought, in fact, to be found that no objects or qualities are experienced to be beautiful or sublime, but such as are productive of some simple emotion.

If it is true that such trains of thought are uniformly distinguished by some general principle of connexion, then it ought also to be found, that no composition of objects or qualities produces such emotions, in which this unity of character or of emotion is not preserved.

I shall endeavor, at some length, to illustrate the truth of both these propositions.

SECTION II.

That no objects, or qualities in objects, are, in fact, felt either as beautiful or sublime, but such as are productive of some simple emotion, seems evident from the following familiar considerations.

I. Wherever the emotions of sublimity or beauty are felt, 1 believe it will be found, that, by the presence of the object, some affection is uniformly excited, before the more complex emotion of beauty is felt; and that if no such affection is excited, no emotion of beauty or sublimity is produced. The truth of this observation may be illustrated, both from common language, and common experience.

1. If any man were to assert that some object, though positively indifferent or uninteresting, is yet beautiful or sublime, every one would consider the assertion an absurdity. If, on the other hand, he should assert, that the object has neither beauty nor sublimity to him, because there is no quality in it

8

may it be useful to suggest the following considerations to the reader? What is the first? What is the second? With what remark does this section open? Wherever the emotions of sublimity or beauty are felt, what will be found to be their effect? From what sources may the truth of this observation be illustrated? Repeat the first illustration. Between what emotions is there a

which can give him any emotion, I apprehend we shall not only clearly understand his meaning, but very readily allow his reason; and if the object is such as appears to us in the light, either of sublimity or beauty, and we wish to make him sensible of it, the course that we shall naturally take is to point out to him some affecting or interesting quality, which he imagines he has overlooked, and which we feel to be the foundation of our own emotion.

There is, undoubtedly, a very great difference between the emotion of taste, and any simple emotion, as of cheerfulness, tenderness, melancholy, solemnity, elevation, terror, &c. as such emotions are frequently felt without any sentiment of beauty or sublimity; but there is no case I believe, where the emotions of taste are felt, without the previous production of some such simple emotion. It is often, indeed, difficult to say, what is the quality of the object which produces the emotion of beauty; and it is sometimes difficult, in the case of complex objects, when different qualities unite in the production of emotion, to define the exact nature of that emotion which we feel; but whether the general impression we receive is that of gaiety, or tenderness, or melancholy, or solemnity, or elevation, or terror, &c. we have never any difficulty of determining : and so strong is our conviction of the dependence of the emotions of taste upon some such previous simple emotion, that whenever we endeavor to explain the beauty or sublimity of any object, we uniformly proceed by pointing out the interesting or affecting quality in it, which is fitted to produce this previous emotion. It is not only impossible for us to imagine an object of taste that is not an object of emotion; but it is impossible to describe any such object without resting the description upon that quality, or those qualities in it, which are productive of simple emotion.

2. Every man has had reason to observe a difference in his sentiments, with regard to the beauty of particular objects, from those of other people, either in his considering certain objects

58

great difference; and why? But there is no case where the emotion of taste is felt without what? What do we often find a difficult task? But about what have we never any difficulty in determining? What is the effect of our conviction of the dependence of the emotions of taste upon some such previous simple emotion; and why? What difference in his sentiments has every man

as beautiful, which did not appear so to them, or in their considering certain objects as beautiful, which did not appear so to There is no instance of this more common than in the him. case of airs in music. In the first case of such a difference of opinion, we generally endeavor to recollect, whether there is not some accidental association of pleasure which we have with such objects, and which affords us that delight which other people do not share; and it not unfrequently happens, that we assign such associations as the cause of our pleasure, and as our apology for differing from their opinion. In the other case, we generally take it for granted, that they who feel a beauty where we do not, have some pleasing association with the object in question, of which we are unconscious, and which is accordingly productive to them of that delight in which we are unable to share. In both cases, though we may not discover what the particular association is, yet we do not fail to suppose that some such association exists, which is the foundation of the sentiment of beauty, and to consider this difference of opinion as sufficiently accounted for on such a supposition. This very natural kind of reasoning could not, I think, take place, if we did not find from experience, that those objects only are productive of the sentiment of beauty, which are capable of exciting emotion.

3. The different habits and occupations of life produce a similar effect on the sentiments of mankind with regard to the objects of taste, by their tendency to confine their sensibility to a certain class of objects, and to render all others indifferent to them. In our progress from infancy to manhood, how much do our sentiments of beauty change with our years! how often, in the course of this progress, do we look back with contempt, or at least with wonder, upon the tastes of our carlier days, and the objects that gratified them! and how uniformly in all this progress do our opinions of beauty coincide with

had reason to observe? In what instance is this most common? In the first case of such a difference, what do we endeavor to recollect? In the other case, what do we generally take for granted? In both cases, though we may not discover what the particular association is, yet what do we not fail to suppose? Under what circumstances could not this very natural kind of reassoning take place? How do the different habits and occupations of life produce a similar effect on the sentiments of mankind, with regard to objects of taste? How is this remark illustrated in our progress from infancy to man-

the prevalent emotions of our hearts, and with that change of sensibility which the progress of life occasions! As soon as any class of objects loses its importance in our esteem, as soon as their presence ceases to bring us pleasure, or their absence to give us pain, the beauty in which our infant imagination arrayed them disappears, and begins to irradiate another class of objects, which we are willing to flatter ourselves are more deserving of such sentiments, but which have often no other value, than in their coincidence with those new emotions that begin to swell in our breasts. The little circle of infant beauty contains no other objects than those that can excite the affections of the child. The wider range which youth discovers, is still limited by the same boundaries which nature has prescribed to the affections of youth. It is only when we arrive at manhood, and still more, when either the liberality of our education, or the original capacity of our minds, has led us to experience, or to participate in all the affections of our nature, that we acquire that comprehensive taste, which enables us to discover, and to relish, every species of sublimity and beauty.

It is easily observable, also, that besides the natural progress of life, the habits of thought, which men acquire from the diversity of their occupations, tend, in the same proportion, to limit their sense of beauty or sublimity, as they limit their emotions to a particular character or kind. The lover reads or hears with indifference, of all that is most sublime in the history of ambition, and wonders only at the folly of mankind, who can sacrifice their ease, their comforts, and all the best pleasures of life, to the unsubstantial pursuit of power. The man, whose life has been passed in the pursuits of commerce, and who has learned to estimate every thing by its value in money, laughs at the labors of the philosopher or the poet, and beholds, with indifference, the most splendid pursuits of life, if they are not repaid by wealth. The anecdote of a late celebrated ma-

hood? What objects only does the little circle of infant beauty contain; and by what is the wide range which youth discovers, still limited? When only do we acquire that comprehensive taste which enables us to discover and to relish every species of sublimity and beauty? What is observed of the influence of particular habits of thought? In the case of the lover, how is this illustrated? How, in the case of the man who has passed his life in the pursuits of commerce? What anecdote is here introduced of a late celebrated

thematician is well known, who read the Paradise Lost, without being able to discover in it any thing that was sublime, but who said he could never read the queries at the end of Newton's Optics, without feeling his hair stand on end, and his blood run cold. There are thousands who have read the old ballad of Chevy Chase, without having their imaginations inflamed with the ideas of military glory. It is the brave only, who in the perusal of it, like the gallant Sir Philip Sidney, feel "their hearts moved, as by the sound of a trumpet."

The effect of such habits of mind upon the sense of beauty. may, in some degree, be observed in all the different classes of mankind; and there are probably few men, who have not had occasion to remark how much the diversity of taste corresponds to the diversity of occupations, and, even in the most trifling things, how strongly the sentiments of beauty, in different men, are expressive of their prevailing habits, or turn of mind. It is only in the higher stations, accordingly, or in the liberal professions of life, that we expect to find men of either a delicate, or a comprehensive taste. The inferior situations of life, by contracting the knowledge and the affections of men, within very narrow limits, produce, insensibly, a similar contraction in their notions of the beautiful or the sublime. The finest natural taste is seldom found able to withstand that narrowness and insensibility of mind, which is, perhaps, necessarily acquired by the minute and uninteresting details of the mechanical arts; and they who have been doomed, by their professions to pass their earlier years in populous and commercial cities, and in the narrow and selfish pursuits which prevail there, soon lose that sensibility which is the most natural of all-the sensibility to the beauties of the country : because they lose all those sentiments of tenderness and innocence, which are the foundation of much the greater part of the associations we connect with the scenery of nature.

mathematician? Of the old ballad of Chevy Chase, what is observed? How extensively may the effect of such habits of mind be observed? What have most men had occasion to remark? Where only, then, can we expect to find men of either a delicate or comprehensive taste? Of the inferior stations of life, what is observed? What is the finest natural taste seldom found able to withstand? What is observed of those who have been doomed, by their pro-

4. The difference of original character, or the natural tendency of our minds to particular kinds of emotion, produces a similar difference in our sentiments of beauty, and serves, in a very obvious manner, to limit our taste to a certain class or character of objects. There are men, for instance, who, in all the varieties of external nature, find nothing beautiful but as it tends to awaken in them a sentiment of sadness-who meet the return of spring with minds only prophetic of its decay, and who follow the decline of autumn with no other remembrance than that the beauties of the year are gone. There are men, on the contrary, to whom every appearance of nature is beautiful, as awakening a sentiment of gaiety :---to whom spring and autum are equally welcome, because they bring to them only different images of joy; and who, even in the most desolate and wintry scenes, are yet able to discover something in which their hearts may rejoice. It is not surely, that nature herself is different, that so different effects are produced upon the imaginations of these men; but it is because the original constitution of their minds has led them to different habits of emotion-because their imaginations seize only those expres. sions in nature which are allied to their prevailing dispositions. and because every other appearance is indifferent to them, but those which fall in with the peculiar sensibility of their hearts. The gaiety of nature is beautiful only to the cheerful man; it is melancholy to the man of sadness; because these alone are the qualities which accord with the emotions they are accustomed to cherish, and in which their imaginations delight to indulge.

The same observation is equally applicable to the different tastes of men in poetry, and the rest of the fine arts; and the productions that all men peculiarly admire, are those which suit that peculiar train of emotion, to which, from their origi-

fessions, to pass their earlier years in populous and commercial cities; and why? What produces a similar difference in our sentiments of beauty; and what does it serve to limit? How is this remark fully illustrated? To what are we to attribute the different effects upon the imaginations of these men? What effect does the gaiety of nature produce upon the cheerful man, what upon the man of sadness; and why? To what is the same observation equally applicable; and what are the productions which all men peculiarly admire? How is this remark illustrated from the ardent and gallant mind? How from

nal constitution, they are most strongly disposed. The ardent and gallant mind sickens at the insipidity of pastoral, and the languor of the elegetic poetry, and delights only in the great interests of the tragic and the epic muse. The tender and romantic peruse, with indifference, the Iliad and the Paradise Lost, and return with gladness to those favorite compositions, which are descriptive of the joys or sorrows of love. The gay and the frivolous, on the contrary, alike insensible to the sentiments, either of tenderness or magnanimity, find their delight in that cold, but lively style of poetry, which has been produced by the gallantry of modern times, and which, in its principal features, is so strongly characteristic of the passion itself. In general, those kinds of poetry only are delightful, or excite, in us, any very sensible emotions of sublimity or beauty, which fall in with our peculiar habits of sentiment or feeling; and if it rarely happens, that one species of poetry is relished to the exclusion of every other, it arises only from this, that it is equally rare, that one species of emotion should have so completely the dominion of the heart, as to exclude all emotions of any other kind. In proportion, however, as our sensibility is weak, with regard to any other class of objects, it is observable, that our sense of sublimity or beauty in such objects, is weak in the same proportion; and wherever it happens, for it sometimes does happen, that men, from their original constitution, are incapable of any one species of emotion, I believe it will also be found, that they are equally insensible to all the sublimity or beauty which the rest of the world find in the objects of such emotion.

5. Besides the influence of permanent habits of thought, or of the diversities of original disposition upon our sentiments or beauty, every man must have had opportunity to observe, that the perception of beauty depends also on the temporary sensibility of his mind; and that even objects of the most experi-

the tender and romantic? In what do the gay and the frivolous find their delight? In general, what kinds of poetry only are delightful? If it rarely happens that one species of poetry is relished to the exclusion of others, from what does it arise? In proportion as our sensibility is weak, with regard to any class of objects, what is observable; and what remark follows? Besides the influence of permanent habits of thought, &c., what must every man

NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS

enced beauty, fail in exciting their usual delight, when they occur to him in moments, when he is under the dominion of different emotions from those with which he usually regards In our seasons of gaiety, we behold, with indifference, them. the same objects, which delight our imaginations when we are under the impressions of tenderness or melancholy. In our seasons of despondence, we turn, with some kind of aversion, from the objects or the reflections that enchant us in our hours of gaiety. In the common hours of life, in the same manner, when we are either busy, or unoccupied, and when our minds are free from every kind of sensibility, the objects of taste make but a feeble impression upon us; and are either altogether neglected, or tacitly reserved till another time, when we may be more in the temper to enjoy them. The husbandman who goes out to observe the state of his grounds, the man of business who walks forth to ruminate about his affairs, or the philosopher, to reason or reflect, whatever their natural sensibilities may be, are at such times insensible to every beauty that the scenery of nature may exhibit; nor do they begin to feel them, until they withdraw their attention from the particular objects of their thought, and abandon themselves to the emotions which such scenes may happen to inspire.

There are even moments of listlessness and languor, in which no objects of taste whatever can excite their usual delight, in which our favorite landscapes, our favorite airs, cease altogether to affect us; and when sometimes we almost wonder what is the secret spell that hangs over our minds and prevents us from enjoying the pleasures that are within our reach. It is not that the objects of such pleasures are changed; it is not even that we have not the wish to enjoy them, for this we frequently attempt, and attempt in vain; but it is because we come to them either with minds fatigued, and with spirits below their usual tone, or under the influence of other feelings than are necessary for their enjoyment. Whenever we return to

have had opportunity to observe? From our seasons of gaiety, and our seasons of despondency, how is this remark illustrated? Of the impression of objects of taste in the common hours of life, what is observed? How is this illustrated? They do not begin to feel them, until they do what? In moments of listlessness and languor, what is the state of the mind? What is not,

65

that state of mind which is favorable to such emotions, our delight returns with it, and the objects of such pleasures become as favorite as they were before.

II. It is farther observable, that our sense of the beauty or sublimity of every object depends upon that quality, or those qualities of it which we consider ; and that objects of the most acknowledged beauty, cease to affect us with such emotions, when we make any of their indifferent or uninteresting qualities the object of our consideration. There is no production of taste whatever, which has not many qualities of a very indifferent kind; and there can be no doubt, both that we have it in our power to make any of these qualities the object of our attention, and that we very often do so, without regarding any of those qualities of emotion, upon which its beauty or its sublimity is founded. In such cases, I believe every one has felt, that the effect upon his mind corresponds to the quality he considers.

1. It is difficult, for instance, to enumerate the various qualities which may produce the emotion of beauty, in the statues of the Venus de Medicis, or the Apollo Belvidere; yet it is undoubtedly possible for any man to see these masterpieces of statuary, and yet feel no emotion of beauty. The delicacy, the modesty, the timidity of the one, the grace, the dignity, the majesty of the other, and in both, the inimitable art with which these characters are expressed, are, in general, the qualities which first impress themselves upon the imagination of the spectator; yet the man of the best taste may afterwards see them, without thinking of any such expressions. He may observe their dimensions, he may study their proportions, he may attend to the particular state of their preservation, the history

and what is the cause of this? When do the objects of such pleasures become as favorite as they were before? Upon what is it farther observable that one sense of the beauty or sublimity of any object depends? As there is no production of taste which has not many qualities of a very different kind, of what can there be no doubt? In such cases, what has every one felt? How is this illustrated from the statues of the Venus de Medicis, or the Apollo Belvidere? In both, what are the qualities which first impress themselves upon the imagination of the spectator? Yet, without what may the man of the best taste afterwards see them? How is this illustrated? Of all these qualities, what

of their discovery, or even the nature of the marble of which they are made. All these are as truly qualities of these statues, as their majesty or their grace, and may certainly, at particular times, happen to engage the attention of the man of the most refined taste. That in such cases, no emotion of beauty would be felt, and that before it could be felt, it would be necessary for the spectator to withdraw his mind from the consideration of such unaffecting qualities, is too obvious to require any illustration.

The same observation is applicable to every other production of taste. There is no poem, no painting, no musical composition, however beautiful or sublime, that has not many qualities or attributes, that are altogether uninteresting, and which may not be made the object of attention at particular times, although in general they are left out of consideration. The inversions of Milton, the compound epithets of Thomson, are as really qualities of their compositions, as the sublimity of the one, or the tenderness of the other. The person who should make such qualities alone the object of his attention, in the perusal of the Seasons, or the Paradise Lost, though he might certainly receive some instruction, would doubtless receive little delight ; and if he were really capable of feeling the sublimity or beauty which distinguishes these compositions, it must be to other and more affecting qualities of them that he must turn his regard. While these minute and unaffecting circumstances were the objects of his attention, he could be conscious of no greater emotion than what he might receive from the perusal of the most unanimated prose. It is in consequence of this, that the exercise of criticism never fails to destroy, for the time, our sensibility to the beauty of every composition, and that habits of this kind so generally end in destroying the sensibility of taste. ; They accustom us to consider every composition in relation only to rules; they turn our attention from those quali-

is observed? In such cases, what is too obvious to require illustration? From what does it appear that the same observation is applicable to every other work of taste? How is this illustrated from Milton and from Thomson? Of the person who should make such qualities alone the object of his attention, in the perusal of these works, what is remarked? While these circumstances were the objects of his attention, of what would he not be con-

ties upon which their effect is founded as objects of taste, to the consideration of the principles by which this effect is attained; and instead of that deep and enthusiastic delight which the perception of beauty or sublimity bestows, they afford us at last no higher enjoyment, than what arises from the observation of the dexterity of art.

2. The effect of familiarity, which has so often been observed, in diminishing our sensibility to the objects of taste, may serve also as an illustration of the same principle. This effect indeed is generally resolved into the influence of habit, which in this, as in every other case, is supposed to diminish the strength of our emotions; yet that it is not solely to be ascribed to habit, seems evident from the following consideration—that such indifference is never permanent, and that there are times when the most familiar objects awaken us to the fullest sense of their beauty. The necessity which we are under of considering all such objects when familiar, in very different aspects from those in which they appear to us as objects of beauty, and of attending only to their unaffecting qualities, may, perhaps, better account, both for this gradual decay of our sensibility, and for its temporary returns.

When a man of any taste, for instance, first settles in a romantic country, he is willing to flatter himself that he can never be satiated with its beauties, and that in their contemplation he shall continue to receive the same exquisite delight. The aspect in which he now sees them, is solely that in which they are calculated to produce emotion. The streams are known to him only by their gentleness or their majesty—the woods by their solemnity—the rocks by their awfulness or terror. In a very short time, however, he is forced to consider them in very different lights. They are useful to him for some purposes, either of occupation or amusement. They serve as distinc-

scious? What, in consequence of this, is the effect of the exercise of criticism? How is this remark illustrated? The effect of what may also serve to illustrate the same principle? Into what is this effect generally resolved; and of it what is observed? Yet that it is not solely to be ascribed to habit, seems evident from what consideration? What may, perhaps, better account, both for this gradual decay of our sensibility, and for its temporary returns? From the settling of a man of taste in a romantic country, how is this illustrated? In a very short time, how is he forced to consider them; and why?

tions of different properties, or of different divisions of the country. They become boundaries or landmarks, by which his knowledge of the neighbourhood is ascertained. It is with these qualities that he hears them usually spoken of by all who surround him. It is in this light that he must often speak and think of them himself. It is with these qualities accordingly, that he comes at last insensibly to consider them, in the common hours of his life. Even a circumstance so trifling as the assignation of particular names, contributes in a great degree. to produce this effect; because the use of such names, in marking the particular situation or place of such objects, naturally leads him to consider the objects themselves in no other light than that of their place or situation. It is with very different feelings that he must now regard the objects that were once so full of beauty. They now occur to his mind only as topographical distinctions, and are beheld with the indifference which such qualities produce. Their majesty, their solemnity, their terror, &c., are gradually obscured, under the mass of unaffecting qualities with which he is obliged to consider them ; and excepting at those times when either their appearances or their expressions are new, or when some other incident has awakened that tone or temper of thought with which their expressions agree, and when of consequence he is disposed to consider them in the light of this expression alone, he must be content, at last, to pass his life without any perception of their beauty.

It is on the same account that the great and the opulent become gradually so indifferent to those articles of elegance or magnificence with which they are surrounded, and which are so effectual in exciting the admiration of other men. The man of inferior rank, whose situation prevents him from all familiarity with such objects, sees them in the light of their magnificence and elegance alone; he sees them, too, as signs of that

What remarks follow? What is the influence of a circumstance so trifling as the assignation of particular names; and why? With what feelings does he now regard objects that were once so full of beauty? How is this illustrated? And excepting at what times must he be content to pass his life without any perception of their beauty? Of the great and the opulent, for the same reason, what is observed? How does the man of inferior rank see such

happiness and refined pleasure, which men in his condition so usually, and so falsely attribute to those of elevated rank; and he feels, accordingly, all that unmingled emotion of admiration which such expressions are fitted to produce. But the possessor must often see them in different lights. Whatever may be their elegance or their beauty, they still serve some end, or answer some purpose of his establishment. They are destined to some particular use, or are ornaments of some particular place: they are articles in the furniture, of such a room, or ingredients in the composition of such a scene : they were designed by such an artist, executed after such a model, or cost such a sum of money. In such, or in some other equally uninteresting light, he must frequently be obliged, both to speak and to think of them. In proportion as the habit of consider. ing them in such a light increases, his disposition, or his opportunity to consider them as objects of taste diminishes. Their elegance or their magnificence gradually disappears, until, at last, he comes to regard them, except at particular times, with no farther emotion, than what he receives from the common furniture of his house. The application of the same observation to many more important sources of our happiness, is too obvious to require any illustration.

There is no man, in like manner, acquainted with the history or the literature of antiquity, who has not felt-his imagination inflamed by the most trifling circumstances connected with such periods. The names of the Ilyssus, the Tiber, the Forum, the Capitol, &c. have a kind of established grandeur in our apprehensions, because the only light in which we regard them, is that of their relation to those past scenes of greatness. No man, however, is weak enough to believe, that to the citizen of Athens, or of Rome, such names were productive of similar emotions. To him they undoubtedly conveyed no other ideas, than those of the particular divisions of the city

objects; and what emotion does he feel? How does it appear that the possessor must often see them in different lights? The habit of considering them in such a light, produces what effect? Of the application of the same observation to many more important sources of our happines, what is observed? No man is acquainted with the history or the literature of antiquity, who has not felt what? What examples are mentioned, what is said of them; and why? Yet what is no man weak enough to believe; and to him what

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in which he dwelt, and were heard, of consequence, with the same indifference that the citizen of London now hears of the Strand, or the Tower.

3. The influence of fashion in producing so frequent revolutions in the sentiments of men, with regard to the beauty of those objects to which it extends, and in disposing us to neglect or to despise at one time, the objects which we considered as beautiful, may, at another, perhaps, be explained upon the same principle. Fashion may be considered, in general, as the custom of the great. It is the dress, the furniture, the language, the manners of the great world, which constitute what is called the fashion in each of these articles, and which the rest of mankind are in such haste to adopt, after their example. Whatever the real beauty or propriety of these articles may be, it is not in this light that we consider them. They are the signs of that elegance, and taste, and splendor, which is so liberally attributed to elevated rank; they are associated with the consequence which such situations bestow; and they establish a kind of external distinction between this envied station, and those humble and mortifying conditions of life, to which no man is willing to belong. It is in the light, therefore, of this connexion only, that we are disposed to consider them; and they accordingly affect us with the same emotion of delight which we receive from the consideration of taste or elegance. in more permanent instances. As soon, however, as this association is destroyed—as soon as the caprice or the inconstancy of the great have introduced other usages in their place, our opinion of their beauty is immediately destroyed. The quality which was formerly so pleasing or so interesting in them-the quality which alone we considered, is now appropriated to other objects, and our admiration readily transfers itself to those newer forms, which have risen into distinction from the same csuse. The forsaken fashion, whatever may be its real

idea only did they convey? The influence of what, in producing what effects, may perhaps be explained upon the same principle? What may fashion, in general, be considered; and why? Whatever the real beauty or propriety of these articles may be, how do we consider them? As it is in the light of this connexion only that we are disposed to consider them, how do they affect us? When is our opinion of their beauty immediately destroyed; and why?

or intrinsic beauty, falls, for the present at least, into neglect or contempt; because, either our admiration of it was founded only upon that quality which it has lost, or because it has now descended to the inferior ranks, and is of consequence associated with ideas of meanness and vulgarity. A few years bring round again the same fashion. The same association attends it, and our admiration is renewed as before. It is on the same account, that they who are most liable to the seduction of fashion, are people on whose minds the slighter associations have a strong effect. A plain man is incapable of such associations : a man of sense is above them; but the young and the frivolous, whose principles of taste are either unformed, or whose minds are unable to maintain any settled opinions, are apt to lose sight of every other quality in such objects, but their relation to the practice of the great, and of course to suffer their sentiments of beauty to vary with the caprice of this practice. It is. the same cause which attaches the old to the fashions of their youth. They are associated with the memory of their better days, with a thousand recollections of happiness, and gaiety, and heartfelt pleasures, which they now no longer feel. The fashions of modern times have no such pleasing associations to They are connected to them, only with ideas of thoughtthem. less gaiety, or childish caprice. It is the fashions of their youth alone, therefore, that they consider as beautiful.

III. It may farther be observed, that the dependence of taste upon sensibility, or the necessity of some simple emotion being excited, before the beauty or sublimity of any object is perceived, is so far from being remote from general observation, that it is the foundation of some of the most common judgments we form with regard to the characters of men.

1. When we are but slightly acquainted with any person, and have had no opportunities of knowing the particular nature of

Into what does the forsaken fashion fall, and for what reason? What effect does the lapse of a few years produce? Who are most liable to the seductions of fashion; and for what reason? Why are the old attached to the fashions of their youth? Why have not the fashions of modern times such pleasing associations to them? What may farther be observed? Under what circumstances do we not venture to pronounce, with regard to a person's taste? If

his sentiments or turn of mind, we never venture to pronounce, or even to guess with regard to his taste; and if, in such a stage of our acquaintance, we find that his opinions of beauty are very different from our own, we are so far from being sur. prised at it, that we set ourselves very deliberately to account for it, either by recalling to mind those habits or occupations of his life which may have led him to different kinds of emotion, or by supposing that his natural sensbility is very different from our own. On the other hand, when we are well acquainted with any person, and know intimately the particular turn or sensibility of his mind, although we should never have happened to know his sentiments of sublimity or beauty, we yet venture very boldly to pronounce, whether any particular class of objects will affect him with such sentiments or not. The foundation of our judgment, in such cases, is the agreement or disagreement of such objects, with the particular turn or character of his affections; and if we are well acquainted with the person, our judgment is seldom wrong. In the same manner, although we are altogether unacquainted with any person, yet if we are inform d of his particular taste, or of his favorite objects of beauty or sublimity, we not only feel ourselves disposed to conclude from thence, with regard to his particular turn or character of mind, but if the instances are sufficiently numerous, we, in general, conclude right. It is scarcely possible for any man to read the works of a poet, without forming some judgment of his character and affections as a man, or without concluding, that the magnanimity, the tenderness, the gaiety, or the melancholy, distinguished him in private life, which characterize the scenes or descriptions of his works. I am far from contending, that such judgments, in general, are just; not only from the rashness with which they so commonly are formed, but still more, in those cases where we reason from any person's taste, from the impossibility of knowing whether

in such a stage of our acquaintance, we find that his opinions of beauty are very different from our own, what do we do? On the other hand, of a person whom we intimately know, what is observed? What is, in such cases, the foundation of our judgment; and if we are well acquainted with the person, what will follow? What remark follows, of a person with whose *taste* only we are acquainted? Without what, is it scarcely possible for any man to read the works of a poet? For what is our author far from contending; and for

this taste is genuine, or whether it is founded upon some accidental associations. All that I mean to conclude is, that such judgments are a proof of the connexion between taste and sensibility; and that they could not be formed, unless we found from experience, that no qualities affect us with the pleasures of taste, but such as are productive of some simple emotion.

2. It is farther to be observed, that the sense of the dependence of the emotions of sublimity or beauty, upon the accidental, or temporary disposition of the mind, is also very strongly expressed, both in common conduct and in common To a man under some present impression of joy, conversation. we should not venture to appeal with regard to the beauty of any melancholy or pathetic composition-to a man under the dominion of sorrow, we should much less presume to present, even the most beautiful composition, which contained only images of joy. In both cases we should feel that the compositions in question demanded different emotions from those that the persons had in their power to bestow-that while their present dispositions continued, there was no chance of the composition's being interesting to them; and if we really wished to know their opinions, we would naturally wait till we should find them in such a disposition as was favorable to the emotions to which either of the compositions was addressed.

When any poem, or painting, or scene in nature peculiarly affects us, we are generally in haste to shew it to some friend, whose taste we know is similar to our own; and our minds are not fully satiated with its beauties, until we are able to unite with our own peculiar emotion, that pleasing surprise which we participate with one to whom it was new, and that sentiment of gladness, which it is so natural to feel, when we find that we have been able to communicate delight. It sometimes happens, however, that the person to whom we shew it does not feel the pleasure we expected. In such a case, though we are a little

what reason? What is all that he means to conclude? What is farther to be observed? How is this remark illustrated? In both cases what should we feel? And if we really wished to know their opinions, for what should we naturally wait? When any poem, or painting, or scene in nature, particularly affects us, to do what are we generally in haste? Until when are not our minds fully satisfied of its beauties? What, however, sometimes hap-

surprised, we are not much disappointed. We tell him, that he happens not to be in the humor to be pleased-that at another time we are sure he will feel its beauty; and though we should not happen to know what is the peculiar cause of his indifference, we yet satisfy ourselves that there is some cause which prevents him from the indulgence of the particular emotion which the scene of the composition demands, and which we know he is, in general, disposed to indulge. It happens, accordingly, if we are really well acquainted with the person, and if this beauty is not founded upon some particular association of our own, that our expectation is gratified, and that, when he returns to his ordinary temper of mind, he becomes sensible to all the beauty or sublimity which we had found in it. Many other instances of the same kind might be produced. In all eases, I think, where we discover in other people a weaker sense with regard to the beauty of particular objects than in ourselves, and when we can recollect no accidental association which may account for the superiority of our own emotion, we are naturally inclined to attribute it, either to some temporary occupation or embarrassment of their minds when such objects were presented to them; or, if we find that this was not the case, to some original deficiency in the sensibility of their hearts. To say that a man has no feelings of tenderness or magnanimity, accounts to us at once for his want of sensibility to the beauty of any actions or species of composition, which are founded on such emotions. In the same manner, to say that, at any particular time, he was under the dominion of opposite feelings, as fully accounts to us for his insensibility at such a time to the heauty of such actions or compositions. I apprehend, that these very natural and very common judgments could not be formed, unless we found from experience, that those

pens? In such a case, how are we affected? What do we tell him? Though we should not happen to know what is the peculiar cause of his indifference, yet of what do we satisfy ourselves? If we are well acquainted with the person, what, accordingly, happens? In all cases, when we discover in other people a weaker sense with regard to the beauty of particular objects than in ourselves, to what are we naturally inclined to attribute it? To say that a man has no feelings of tenderness or magnanimity, accounts to us for what? In the same manner to say what, accounts for what? Under what circumstances could not these judgments be formed? From what, particularly,

qualities only are felt as beautiful or sublime, which are found to produce emotion.

IV. The proposition which I have now endeavored to illustrate, might be illustrated from a variety of other considerations, and particularly from the nature of the fine arts. The object of these arts is to produce the emotions of taste; and it might easily be shown—

1. That the only subjects that are, in themselves, proper for the imitation of these arts, are such as are productive of some species of simple emotion-

2. That when these subjects are of a contrary kind, the method by which alone they can be rendered either beautiful or sublime, is by the addition of some interesting or affecting quality—

3. That the extent, as well as the power of the different fine arts, in producing such emotions, is in proportion to the capacity which they afford the artist of making such additions; and that, in this respect, poetry, by employing the instrument of language, by means of which it can express every quality of mind as well as of body, has a decided superiority over the rest of these arts, which are limited to the expression of the qualities of body alone.

These considerations, however, besides their being familiar to those who have reflected upon these subjects, would necessarily lead to discussions far beyond the limits of these Essays. The reader, who would wish to see some of these principles illustrated, will find it very fully and very beautifully done in Dr. Beattie's Essays upon poetry and music.

If the preceding illustrations are just—if it is found, that no qualities are felt, either as beautiful or sublime, but such as accord with the habitual or temporary sensibility of our minds that objects of the most acknowledged beauty fail to excite their usual emotions, when we regard them in the light of any of their uninteresting or unaffecting qualities; and that our . 0

might the proposition which our author has endeavored to illustrate, be illustrated? What is the object of these arts; and what, in the first place, might casily be shown? What, in the second? What, in the third? Of these considerations, what is observed? Where are these principles illustrated? Under

common judgments of the characters of men are founded upon this experience, it seems that there can be no doubt of the truth of the proposition itself.

SECTION III.

If it is true, that those trains of thought which attend the emotions of taste, are uniformly distinguished by some general principle of connexion, it ought to be found, that no composition of objects or qualities in fact produces such emotions, in which this unity of character or of emotion is not preserved. This proposition also may be illustrated from the most superficial review of the principles of composition, in the different arts of taste.

I. There is no man of common taste, who has not often lamented that confusion of expression which so frequently takes place, even in the most beautiful scenes of real nature, and which prevents him from indulging to the full, the peculiar emotion which the scene itself is fitted to inspire. The cheerfulness of the morning is often disturbed by circumstances of minute or laborious occupation, the solemnity of noon by noise and bustling industry, the tranquillity and melancholy of evening by vivacity and vulgar gaiety. It is seldom even that any unity of character is preserved among the inanimate objects of such scenery. The sublimest situations are often disfigured by objects that we feel unworthy of them-by the traces of culti. vation, or attempts towards improvement-by the poverty of their woods, or of their streams, or some other of their great constituent features-by appearances of uniformity or regula. rity, that almost induce the idea of art. The loveliest scenes, in the same manner, are frequently disturbed by unaccording circumstances-by the signs of cultivation, the regularity of

what circumstances can there be no doubt of the truth of the proposition which our author has endeavored to illustrate?

With what remark, does this section open? Whence may this proposition also be illustrated? What has every man of common taste often lamented? How is this remark illustrated? How does it appear that unity of character is seldom preserved among the inanimate objects of such scenery? How are the loveliest scenes, in the same manner, frequently disturbed? What is the

inclosures, the traces of manufactures, and, what is worse than all, by the presumptuous embellishments of fantastic taste. Amid this confusion of incidents, the general character of the scene is altogether lost: we scarcely know to what class of objects to give our attention; and having yiewed it with astonishment, rather than with delight, we, at last, busy ourselves with imaginary improvements, and in conceiving what its beauty might be, if every feature were removed which now serves to interrupt its expression, and to diminish its effect.

What we thus attempt in imagination, it is the business of the art of gardening to execute; and the great source of the superiority of its productions to the original scenes in nature, consists in the purity and harmony of its composition, in the power which the artist enjoys, to remove from his landscape whatever is hostile to its effect, or unsuited to its character, and, by selecting only such circumstances as accord with the general expression of the scene, to awaken an emotion more full, more simple, and more harmonious, than any we can receive from the scenes of nature itself.

It is by this rule, accordingly, that the excellence of all such compositions is determined. In real nature, we often forgive, or are willing to forget slight inaccuracies or trifling inconsistencies; but in such productions of design, we expect and require more perfect correspondence. Every object that is not suited to the character of the scene, or that has not an effect in strengthening the expression by which it is distinguished, we condemn as an intrusion, and consider as a reproach upon the taste of the artist. When this expectation, on the contrary, is fully gratified—when the circumstances of the scenery are all such as accord with the peculiar emotion which the scene is fitted to inspire—when the hand of the artist disappears, and the embellishments of his fancy press themselves upon our belief, as the voluntary profusion of nature, we

effect of this confusion of incidents; and what is the consequence? It is the business of what art, to execute what we thus attempt in imagination? In what does the great source of the superiority of its productions, to the original scenes in nature, consist? In real nature, what do we often forgive; but in such productions of design, what do we expect? How is this illustrated? When do we pronounce that the composition is perfect, and acknowledge that the artist has attained the end of his art? How do we afford him the most

immediately pronounce that the composition is perfect-we acknowledge that he has attained the end of his art; and, in yielding ourselves up to the emotion which his composition demands, we afford him the most convincing mark of our applause. In the power which the art of gardening thus possesses, in common with the other fine arts, of withdrawing from its imitations, whatever is inconsistent with their expression, and of adding whatever may contribute to strengthen, or to extend their effect, consists the great superiority which it possesses over the originals from which they are copied.

II. The art of landscape painting is yet superior in its effect, from the capacity which the artist enjoys, of giving both greater extent and greater unity to his composition. In the art of gardening, the great materials of the scene are provided by nature, and the artist must satisfy himself with that degree of expression which she has bestowed. In a landscape, on the contrary, the painter has the choice of the circumstances he is to represent, and can give whatever force or extent he pleases to the expression he wishes to convey. In gardening, the materials of the scene are few, and those few unwieldy; and the artist often contents himself with the reflection, that he has given the best disposition in his power to the scanty and intractable materials of nature. In a landscape, on the contrary, the whole range of scenery is before the eye of the painter. He may select the circumstances which are to characterize a single composition from a thousand scenes, and may unite into one expression, the scattered features with which nature has feebly marked a thousand situations. The momentary effects of light or shade-the fortunate incidents which chance sometimes throws in, to improve the expression of real scenery. and which can never again be recalled, he has it in his power to perpetuate upon his canvass; above all, the occupations of men, so important in determining, or in heightening the cha-

convincing mark of our applause? Of the power which the art of gardening thus possesses, what is observed? Why is the art of landscape painting still superior, in its effects? How is this remark tully illustrated? What has he it in his power to perpetuate upon his canvass? What fall easily within the reach of his imitation; and of them, what is observed? Whilst it is by the racters of nature, and which are seldom compatible with the scenes of gardening, fall easily within the reach of his imitation, and afford him the means of producing both greater strength, and greater unity of expression, than is to be found, either in the rude, or in the embellished state of real scenery.

While it is by the invention of such circumstances that we estimate the genius of the artist, it is by their composition that his taste is uniformly determined. The mere assemblage of picturesque incidents, the most unimproved taste will condemn. Some general principle is universally demanded, some decided expression, to which the meaning of the several parts may be referred, and which, by affording us, as it were, the key of the scene, may lead us to feel, from the whole of the composition, that full and undisturbed emotion which we are prepared to indulge. It is this purity and simplicity of composition, accordingly, which has uniformly distinguished the great masters of the art from the mere copiers of nature. It is by their adherence to it, that their fame has been attained; and the names of Salvator and Claude Lorrain, can scarcely be mentioned without bringing to mind the peculiar character of their com. positions, and the different emotions which their representations of nature are destined to produce.

It is not, however, on our first acquaintance with this art, that we either discover its capacity, or feel its effects; and perhaps the progress of taste, in this respect, may afford a farther illustration of the great and fundamental principle of composition. What we first understand of painting is, that it is a simple art of imitation, and what we expect to find in it, is the representation of the common scenes of nature that surround us. It is with some degree of surprise, accordingly, that we first observe the different scenery with which the painter presents us, and with an emotion rather of wonder than of delight, that we gaze

inversion of such circumstances that we estimate the genius of the artist, by what is his taste determined? How is this illustrated? This purity and simplicity of composition, consequently, distinguishes whom? What has been the consequence of their adherence to it; and without what, can the names of Salvator and Claude Lorrain scarcely be mentioned? Of our first acquaintance with this art, what is observed? What do we first understand of painting; and what do we expect to find in it? What remark follows? How do

at a style of landscape, which has so little resemblance to the ordinary views to which we are accustomed. In the copy of a real scene, we can discover and admire the skill of the artist; but in the representation of a desert or of desolate prospects, in appearances of solitude or tempest, we perceive no traces of imitation, and wonder only at the perversity of taste, which could have led to the choice of so disagreeable subjects.

As soon, however, as from the progress of our, own sensibility, or from our acquaintance with poetical composition, we begin to connect expression with such views of nature, we begin also to understand and to feel the beauties of landscape. painting. It is with a different view that we now consider it. It is not for imitation we look, but for character. It is not the art but the genius of the painter, which now gives value to his compositions; and the language he employs is found, not only to speak to the eye, but to affect the imagination and the heart. It is not now a simple copy which we see, nor is our emotion limited to the cold pleasure which arises from the perception of accurate imitation. It is a creation of fancy which the artist presents us, in which only the greatest expressions of nature are retained, and where more interesting emotions are awakened, than those which we experience, from the usual tameness of common scenery. In the same proportion in which we thus discover the expression of landscape, we begin to collect the principles of its composition. The crowd of incidents which used to dazzle our earlier taste, as expressive both of the skill and of the invention of the artist, begin to appear to us as inconsistence or confusion. When our hearts are affected, we seek only for objects congenial to our emotion : and the simplicity which we used to call the poverty of landscape, begins now to be welcome to us, as permitting us to indulge, without interruption, those interesting trains of thought

the copy of the real scene, and the representation of a desert, &c. respectively affect us? When do we begin to understand and to feel the beauties of landscape painting? With what view do we now consider it; and for what do we look? What now gives value to his composition; and of the language he employs, what is observed? What is it not, that we now see? What is it that the artist presents us; and of it, what is remarked? In what proportion do we collect the principles of its composition in a landscape? How is this illustrated? When our hearts are affected, what is the consequence? What is the effect of an

which the character of the scene is fitted to inspire. As our knowledge of the expressions of nature increases, our sensibility to the beauty or to the defects of composition becomes more keen, until at last our admiration attaches itself only to those greater productions of the art, in which one pure and unmingled character is preserved, and in which no feature is admitted, which may prevent it from falling upon the heart with one full and harmonious effect.

In this manner, the object of painting is no sooner discovered than the unity of expression is felt to be the great secret of its power; the superiority which it at last assumes over the scenery of nature, is found to arise, in one important respect, from the greater purity and simplicity which its composition can attain, and perhaps this simple rule comprehends all that criticism can prescribe for the regulation of this delightful art.

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III. But whatever may be the superiority of painting to the originals from which it is copied, it is still limited, in comparison of that which poetry enjoys. The painter addresses himself to the eye. The poet speaks to the imagination. The painter can represent no other qualities of nature, but those which we discern by the sense of sight. The poet can blend with those, all the qualities which we perceive by means of our other senses. The painter can seize only one moment of existence, and can represent no other qualities of objects than what this single moment affords. The whole history of nature is within the reach of the poet, the varying appearances which its different productions assume in the progress of their growth and decay, and the powerful effects which are produced by the contrast of these different aspects or expressions. The painter can give to the objects of his scenery only the visible and material qualities which are discerned by the eye, and must leave the interpretation of their expression to the imagination of the spectator; but the poet can give animation to whatever he de-

increase of knowledge of the expressions of nature? In this manner, what is observed? From what is the superiority which it assumes found to arise; and of this simple rule what is observed? In comparison of what, is the superiority of painting very limited? How is this remark fully illustrated? What are at his disposal; and how can he, at once, produce an impression which

scribes. All the sublimity and beauty of the moral and inteflectual world are at his disposal; and, by bestowing on the inanimate objects of his scenery the characters and affections of mind, he can produce at once, an expression which every capacity may understand, and every heart may feel. Whatever may be the advantage which painting enjoys from the greater clearness and precision of its images, it is much more than balanced by the unbounded powers which the instrument of language affords to the poet, both in the selection of the objects of his description, and in the decision of their expression.

It is, accordingly, by the preservation of unity of character or expression, that the excellence of poetical description is determined; and perhaps the superior advantages which the poet enjoys, in the choice of his materials, renders our demand for its observance more rigid, than in any of the other arts of taste. In real nature we willingly accommodate ourselves to the ordinary defects of scenery, and accept with gratitude those singular aspects in which some predominant character is tolerably preserved. In the compositions of gardening, we make allowance for the narrow limits within which the invention of the artist is confined, and are dissatisfied only when great inconsistencies are retained. Even in painting, we are still mindful that it is the objects only of one sense that the artist can represent ; and rather lament his restraints, than condemn his taste, if our minds are not fully impressed with the emotions he studies to raise, or if the different incidents of his composition do not fully accord in the degree, as well as in the nature of their expression. But the descriptions of the poet can claim no such indulgence. With the capacity of blending in his composition, the objects of every sense-with the past and the future, as well as the present, in his power-above all,

every capacity may understand, and every heart may feel? By what are the advantages of painting much more than balanced? By what is the excellence of poetical description determined; and what remark follows? In real nature, to what do we willingly accommodate ourselves; and what do we accept with gratitude? In the composition of gardening, for what do we make allowance; and when only are we dissatisfied? Even in painting, of what are we still mindful; and what do we lament? Why cannot the descriptions of the poet claim any such indulgence; and when do we feel that he is un-

with the mighty spell of mind at his command, with which he can raise every object that he touches into life and sentiment, we feel that he is unworthy of his art, if our imaginations are not satiated with his composition, and if in the chastity, as well as the power of his expression, he has not gratified the demand of our hearts.

It would be an unpleasing, and indeed an unnecessary task, to illustrate this observation by the defects or absurdities of poets of inferior genius, or imperfect taste. It will pehaps be more useful, to produce a few instances of description from some of the greatest poets, in which very trifling circumstances serve to destroy, or at least to diminish their effect, when they do not fully coincide with the nature of the emotion which the descriptions are intended to raise.

In that fine passage in the second book of the Georgics, in which Virgil celebrates the praises of his native country, after these fine lines,

> Hic ver assiduum atque alienis mensibus æstas, Bis gravidæ pecudes, bis pomis utilis arbos : At rabidæ tigres absunt, et sæva leonum Semina, nec miseros fallunt aconita legentes, Nec rapit immensos orbes per humum, neque tanto Squameus in spiram tractu se colligit anguis—

Perpetual spring our happy climate sees, Twice breed the cattle and twice bear the trees— And summer suns recede by slow degrees. Our land is from the rage of tigers freed, Nor nourishes the lion's angry seed— Nor poisonous aconite is here produced, Or grows unknown, or is, when known, refused. Nor in so vast a length our serpents glide, Or raised on such a spiry volume ride.

Dryden.

There is no reader whose enthusiasm is not checked by the cold and prosaic line which follows:

Adde tot egregias urbes, operumque laborem.

Next add our cities of illustrious name, Their costly labour and stupendous frame.

Dryden.

worthy of his art? What would be an unpleasing and an unnecessary task? What will, perhaps, be more useful? Repeat the first passage introduced. What is the effect of the line that follows? Repeat it. What is observed of it? The tameness and vulgarity of the transition dissipates, at once, the emotion we had shared with the poet, and reduces him, in our opinion, to the level of a mere describer.

The effect of the following nervous and beautiful lines in the conclusion of the same book, is nearly destroyed by a similar defect. After these lines,

Hanc olim veteres vitam coluere Sabini Hanc Remus et frater; sic fortis Etruria crevit, Scilicet et rerum facta est pulcherrima Roma—

Such was the life the frugal Sabines led, So Remus and his brother god were bred— From whom the austere Etrurian virtue rose And this rude life our homely fathers chose— Old Rome from such a race derived her birth, The seat of empire, and the conquered earth.

Dryden.

We little expect the following spiritless conclusion :

Septemque una sibi muro circumdedit arces.

Which now on seven high hills triumphant reigns.

Dryden.

There is a still more surprising instance of this fault in one of the most pathetic passages of the whole poem—in the description of the disease among the cattle, which concludes the third Georgic. The passage is as follows:

> Ecce autem duro fumans sub vomere taurus Concidit : et mixtum spumis vomit ore cruorem. Extremosque ciet genitus : it tristis arator Mærentem abjungens fraternå morte juvencum, Atque opere in medio defixa relinquit aratra.

The steer, who to the yoke was bred to bow, (Studious of tillage and the crooked plough,) Falls down and dies—and dying speus a flood Of foamy madness mixed with clotted blood ! The clown, who, cursing Providence, repines, His mournful fellow from the team disjoins; With many a groan forsakes his fruitful care, And in th' unfinish'd furrow leaves the share.

Dryden.

What is the next passage introduced; and how is its effect destroyed? Where is there a still more surprising instance of this fault? Repeat the passage.

The unhappy image in the second line is less calculated to excite compassion than disgust, and is singularly ill suited to that tone of tenderness and delicacy which the poet has every where else so successfully maintained, in describing the progress of this loathsome disease.

In the speech of Agamemnon to Idomeneus in the fourth book of the Iliad, a circumstance is introduced altogether inconsistent both with the dignity of the speech, and the majesty of epic poetry :

> Divine Idomeneus ! what thanks we owe To worth like thine ! what praise shall we bestow ! To thee the foremost honors are decreed, First in the fight, and every graceful deed. For this, in banquets, when the generous bowls Restore our blood, and raise the warriors' souls, Though all the rest with stated rules be bound, Unmixed, unmeasured are thy goblets crown'd.

Instances of the same defect may be found in the comparison of the sudden cure of Mars' wound to the coagulation of curds —in that of Ajax retreating before the Trojans to an ass driven by boys from a field of corn—in the comparison of an obstinate combat between the Greeks and the Trojans, to the stubborn struggle between two peasants, about the limits of their respective grounds—in that of Ajax flying from ship to ship, to encounter the Trojans, to a horseman riding several horses at once, and showing his dexterity, by vaulting from one to another.

There is a similar fault in the two following passages from Milton, where the introduction of trifling and ludicrous circumstances diminishes the beauty of the one, and the sublimity of the other.

> Now morn her rosy steps in the eastern clime Advancing, sow'd the earth with orient pearl, When Adam wak'd : so custom'd, for his sleep Was airy light, from pure digestion bred, And temp'rate vapors bland, which th' only sound

What is observed of the unhappy image in the second line? What is observed of a circumstance introduced in the speech of Agamemnon to Idomeneus? Repeat the passage. Where may instances of the same defect be found? Of the two following passages from Milton, what is observed? Repeat them.

NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS

Of leaves and fuming rills, Aurora's fan Lightly dispers'd, and the shrill matin song Of birds on every bough.

Book v.

They ended parle, and both address'd for fight Unspeakable; for who, though with the tongue Of angels, can relate, or to what things Liken on earth conspicuous, that may lift Human imagination to such height Of godlike power? for likest gods they seem'd; Stood they or mov'd, in stature, motion, arms, Fit to decide the empire of great heav'n. Now wav'd their fiery swords, and in the air Made horrid circles; two broad suns their shields Blaz'd opposite, while expectation stood In horror; from each hand with speed retir'd Where erst was thickest fight, th' angelic throng, And left large field, unsafe within the wind Of such commution.

Book vi.-

In the following passage from the sixth book of Lucan's Pharsalia, where he describes the incantations of the witch Eryctho, and of whose voice he had before said with great sublimity,

> Omne nefas superi, prima jam voce precantis Concedunt, carmenque timent audire secundum----

She speaks—the gods above at once comply, And tremble lest again her voice she try :

In laboring to increase the terror of the reader, he has randered his description almost ludicrous, by accumulating images which serve only to confuse, and which, in themselves, have scarcely any other relation than that of mere noise.

> Tum vox Lethæos cunctis pollentior herbis Excantare Deos, confundit murmura primum Dissona, et humanæ multum discordia linguæ. Latratus habet illa canum, gemitusque luporum Quod trepidus bubo, quod strix nocturna queruntur, Quod strident, ululantque feræ, quod sibilat anguis, Exprimit, et planctus illisæ cautibus undæ Silvarumque sonum, fractæque tonitrua nubis; Tot rerum vox una fuit.——

What is the subject of the following passage from Lucan's Pharsalia ? Repeat the lines. In laboring to increase the terror of the reader, what has he done; and how? Repeat the passage. Such a collection of unaccording images is And then a voice more powerful than herbs The gods of Lethe's solitude disturbs— At first discordant murmurs float along, And mixed confusions of the human tongue— The dog's fierce bark, the wolf's rapacious howl, The night bird's cry—the hooting of the owl, The wild beast's roar—the hissing of the snake, The dashing wave which on the rock doth break— The crash of woods—the thunder of the cloud, All these combined in her sole voice do crowd.

Such a collection of unaccording images is scarcely less absurd than the following description of the nightingale, by Marini:

> Una voce pennuta un suon' volante E vestito di penne, un vivo flato, Una piuma canora, un canto alato, Un spirituel che d' harmonia composto Vive in anguste viscere nascosto.

A feathered voice, a flying sound and dressed with wings—a living breath, a singing plumage—a winged song—a little spirit, which, made up of harmony, lives hidden in a narrow bosom.*

Even less obvious inconsistencies are sufficient to diminish the effect of poetical description, when they do not perfectly coincide with the general emotion.

There is a circumstance introduced in the following passage from Horace, which is liable to this censure :

Solvitur acris Hyems, grata vice veris et Favoni, Trahuntque siccas machinæ carinas, Ac neque jam stabulis gaudet pecus, aut arator igni,

Nec prata canis albicant pruinis.

Jam Cytherea choros ducit Venus, imminente Luna,

Junctæque Nymphis Gratiæ decentes

Alterno terram quatiunt pede.----

Winter yields unto the sway Of the west wind and of May,

scarcely less absurd than what? Repeat it. When are less obvious inconsistencies sufficient to diminish the effect of poetical description? Repeat the passage introduced from Horace, illustrative of this remark. Why is the

* It was the Editor's original intention to introduce into his work poetic translations only; but from the peculiarity of Marini's description of the Nightingale, he thinks it will be better understood in a simply literal dress. And the dry ships now are seen Drawn from stocks by the machine ;* Flocks no more the stall desire, And the ploughman shuns the fire-And the fresh and fruitful mead From the hoary frost is freed-Now doth Venus lead the dance 'Neath the moon's benignant glance, And the Graces trip along With the nymphs, mid mirth and song.

The image contained in the second line is obviously improper. It suggests ideas of labor, and difficulty, and art, and has no correspondence with that emotion of gladness with which we behold the return of the spring, and which is so successfully maintained by the gay and pleasing imagery in the rest of the passage.

In a description of the morning, in the charming poem of the Minstrel, there is a circumstance to which the severity of criticism might object upon the same principle :

> The cottage curs at early pilgrim bark, Crown'd with her pail, the tripping milkmaid sings, The whistling ploughman stalks afield, and hark ! Down the rough slope the ponderous wagon rings.

The image in the last line, though undoubtedly a striking one in itself, and very beautifully described, is yet improper, as it is inconsistent both with the period of society, and the scenery of the country to which the Minstrel refers.

There is a similar error in the following fine description from Shakspeare :

> The current, that with gentle murmur glides, Thou knowest, being stopp'd, impatiently doth rage, But when his fair course is not hindered, He makes sweet music with the enamell'd stones,

> > .

image contained in the second line improper? What is observed of the description of morning, in the Minstrel? Repeat the passage. Of the image in the last line, what is observed? In what description is there a similar error?

* The Editor may, perhaps, be charged with want of poetry in the translaion of "Trahuntque siccas machinæ carinas," found in the third and fourth lines of the translation; but when it is recollected that the criticism rests altogether upon that line, the necessity of rendering it as literal as rhyme will admit, must appear obvious to every reader. Giving a gentle kiss to every sedge He overtaketh in his pilgrimage : And so by many winding nooks he strays With willing sport to the wild ocean.

The pleasing personification which we attribute to a brook, is founded upon the faint belief of voluntary motion, and is immediately checked, when the poet descends to any minute or particular resemblance.

Even in that inimitable description which Virgil has given of a storm, in the first book of the Georgics, a very accurate taste may perhaps discover some light deficiencies :

> Szpe etiam immensum czelo venit agmon aquarum, Et fodam glomerant tempestatem imbribus atris Collectz ex alto nubes. Ruit arduus zther Et pluvia ingenti sata læta, boumque, labores, Diluit. Implentur fossæ, et cava flumina crescunt Cum sonitu, fervetque fretis spirantibus æquor. Ipse pater, mediå nimborum in nocte, coruscâ Fulmina molitur dextrâ, quo maxuma motu Terra tremit: fugêre feræ, et mortalia corda Per gentes humiles stravit pavor. Ille flagranti Aut atho, aut Rhodopen, aut alta Ceraunia telo Dejicit: ingeminant Austri, et densissimus imber.

And oft whole sheets descend of sluicy rain, Sucked by the spongy clouds from off the main-The lofty skies at once came pouring down, The promised crop and golden labors drown. The dikes are filled; and with a roaring sound; The rising rivers float the nether ground-And rocks the bellowing voice of boiling seas rebound. The father of the gods his glory shrouds, Involved in tempests and a night of clouds; And from the middle darkness flashing out, By fits he deals his fiery bolts about-Earth feels the motion of her angry god, Her entrails tremble, and her mountains nod---And flying beasts in forests seek abode. Deep horror seizes every human breast, Their pride is humbled, and their fear confess'd, While he from high his rolling thunder throws, And fires the mountains with repeated blows-

Upon what is the pleasing personification which we attribute to a brook founded? What is observed of the inimitable description which Virgil has given of a storm? Repeat it. To what passages, in these lines, does our auThe rocks are from their old foundations rent, The wind redoubled and the rains augment.

Dryden.

If there are any passages to which I object in these wonderful lines, they are those that are marked in Italics. I acknowledge, indeed, that the "pluvia ingenti sata læta boumque labores diluit," is defensible from the connexion of the imagery with the subject of the poem; but the "implentur fossæ" is both an unnecessary and a degrading circumstance, when compared with the magnificent effects that are described in the rest of the passage.

I shall conclude these illustrations, with two passages, descriptive of the same scene, from different poets, in which the effects of imperfect and of harmonious composition are strikingly exemplified.

In the "Argonautica" of Apollonius Rhodius, when Medea is described in a state of deep agitation between her unwillingness to betray her father, and her desire to save her lover Jason, the anxiety of her mind is expressed by the following contrast, of which I give a literal translation :

"The night now covered the earth with her shade; and in "the open sea the pilots, upon their decks, observed the star "of Orion. The travellers and the watchmen slumbered. "Even the grief of mothers who had lost their children, was "suspended by sleep. In the cities there was neither heard "the cry of dogs, nor the noise nor murmur of men. Silence "reigned in the midst of darkness. Medea alone knew not the "charms of this peaceful night, so deeply was her soul impressed "with fears for Jason."

Virgil describes a similar situation as follows :

Nox erat, et placidum carpebant fessa soporem Corpora per terras, sylvæque et sæva quierant Æquora: quum medio volvunter sidera lapsu Quum tacet omnis ager: pecudes, pictaæque volucres, Quæque lacus late liquidos, quæque aspera dumis Rura tenent, somno positæ sub nocte silenti

thor object; and what does he observe of them? With what passages does he conclude these illustrations? What are the circumstances of the first? Repeat it. How does Virgil describe a similar situation? What says Lenibant curas, et corda oblita laborum : At non infelix animi Phænissa.

"Twas dead of night, when weary bodies close Their eyes in balmy sleep and soft repose— The winds no longer whisper through the woods, Now murmuring tides disturb the gentle floods— The stars in silent order moved around, And Peace, with downy wings, was brooding on the ground. The flocks and herds, and parti-color'd fowl Which haunt the woods, or skim the weedy pool, Stretch'd on the quiet earth securely lay, Forgetting the past labors of the day. All else of nature's common gifts partake, Unhappy Dido was alone awake.

Dryden.

"On voit ici," says M. Marmontel, with his usual taste and discernment, "non seulement la superiorité du talent, la vie, " et l'ame repandues dans une pöesie harmonieuse, et du coloris " le plus pur, mais singulièrement encore la superiorité du goût. "Dans la peinture du poëte Grec, il y a des details inutiles, il "y en a des contraires à l'effet du tableau. Les observations " des pilotes, dans de silence de la nuit, portent eux-mêmes le " caractère de la vigilance et de l'inquietude, et ne contrastent " point avec le trouble de Medée. L'image d'une mere qui a " perdu ses enfants est faite pour distraire de celle d'une amante ; "elle en affoiblit l'interêt, et le poëte en la lui opposant, est " allé contre son dessein ; a lieu que, dans le tableau de Virgile, "tout est réduit à l'unité. C'est la nature entiére, dans le " calme et dans le sommeil, tandis que la malheureuse Didon "veille seule, et se livré en proie à tous les tourments de "l'amour. Enfin, dans le poëte Grec, le cri des chiens, le " sommeil des portiers, sont des details minutieux et indignes de "l'epopée, au lieu que dans Virgile tout est noble et peint à "grands traits: huit vers embrassant la nature."-Encyclopedie, voc. IMITATION.

In these illustrations of the necessity of unity of expression, for the production of the emotions of sublimity and beauty, I have chiefly confined myself to such instances in poetry, as are descriptive of natural scenery, because they are most within

Marmontel, with his usual taste and discernment? In these illustrations, to what has our author chiefly confined himself; and why? To what does the

the observation of that class of readers, to whom any illustrations of this point are necessary. The same principle extends, with equal force, to every other branch of poetical imitationto the description of the characters, the sentiments, and the passions of men : and one great source of the superiority which such imitations have over the originals from which they are copied, consists in these cases, as well as the former, in the power which the artist enjoys of giving an unity of character to his descriptions, which is not to be found in real nature. The illustration of this point, however, as well as of the general fact, that all such descriptions are defective, in which this unity is not preserved. I must leave to the reader's own observation. In the same view, I leave the consideration of the effect of contrast-a principle which may at first seem adverse to these conclusions, but which, in fact, is one of the strongest The reader who is accustomed to such confirmations of them. speculations, need not be reminded, that the real end of contrast is to strengthen the effect of the general emotion-that its propriety is determined by the nature of that emotion-that it is justly applied only in those cases, where the emotion is violent and demands relief, or faint and requires support, or long-continued and needs repose; and that in all cases where it exceeds these limits, or where it does not serve to invigorate the character of the composition, it serves only to obstruct or to diminish its effect; and the reader to whom these principles are new, may find amusement in verifying them.

, IV. The unity of character which is thus demanded in poetical description, for the production of the emotions of taste, is demanded also in every species of poetical composition, whatever may be its extent.

In describing the events of life, it is the business of the historian to represent them as they really happened; to investi-

same principle, with equal force, extend? In what does one great source of their superiority consist? To what is the illustration of this point left? In the same view the consideration of what is left; and what is said of it? Of what need not the reader who is accustomed to such speculations, be reminded? In what may the reader to whom these principles are new, find amusement? In what is the unity of character, which is thus demanded in poetical description. also demanded? In describing the events of life, in what manner

gate their causes, however minute; and to report the motives of the actors, however base or mean. In a poetical representation of such events, no such confusion is permitted to appear. A representation destined by its nature to affect, must not only be founded upon some great or interesting subject, but, in the management of this subject, such means only must be employed as are fitted to preserve, and to promote the interest and the sympathy of the reader. The historian who should relate the voyage of Æneas, and the foundation of Rome, must of necessity relate many triffing and uninteresting events, which could be valuable only from their being true. The poet who should attempt this subject, must introduce only pathetic or sublime events-must unfold their connexion with greater clearnessmust point out their consequences as of greater momentand must spread over all that tone and character of dignity which we both expect and demand in a composition, destined to excite the sensibility, and to awaken the admiration of mankind. Even that species of poem which has been called by the critics the historical epic, and which is only a poetical narration of real events, is, in some measure, subjected to the same rule; and though we do not expect from it the sublime machinery, or the artful conduct of the real epic, we yet demand a more uniform tone of elevation, and a purer and more dignified selection of incidents, than from the strict narrative of real history. In both, the poet assumes the character of a person deeply impressed with the magnitude or the interest of the story he relates. To impress his reader with similar sentiments, is the end and object of his work; and he can do this in no other way, but by presenting to his mind such incidents only as accord with these great emotions, leaving out whatever, in the real history of the event, may be mean or uniteresting; and by the invention of every circumstance that, while it is consistent with probability, may raise the subject of his work

should the historian represent them? What is the case in poetry? Of a representation destined by its nature to affect, what is observed? In relating the voyage of Æneas, what would the historian be compelled to do? What course would the poet pursue? Of that species of poem even, which has been called the historical epic, what is observed? In both, what character does the poet assume? What is the end and object of his work; and in what

into greater importance in his esteem. That it is by this rule accordingly the conduct of the epic poem is determined, is too obvious to require any illustration.

The same unity of emotion is demanded in dramatic poetry, at least, in the highest and noblest species of it-tragedy; and in the conduct of the drama, this unity of character is fully as essential as any of those three unities, of which every book of criticism is so full. If it is painful to us, when we are deeply engaged in some great interest, to turn our minds to the consideration of some other event; it is fully as painful to us, in the midst of our admiration or our sympathy, and while our hearts are swelling with tender or with elevated emotions, to descend to the consideration of minute, or mean, or unimportant incidents, however naturally they may be connected with the story, or however much we may be convinced that they actually took place. The envy which Elizabeth entertained of the beauty of Mary of Scotland, was certainly one cause, and probably a great cause of the distresses of that most unfortunate Queen; but if a poet, in a tragedy founded upon her pathetic story, should introduce the scene which Melville describes in his memoirs, and in which the weakness of Elizabeth is so apparent, we should consider it both as degrading to the dignity of tragedy, and unsuited to the nature of the emotion which the story is fitted to raise. It is hence that tragi-comedy is utterly indefensible, after all that has been said in its defence. If it is painful to us in such cases to descend to the consideration of indifferent incidents, it is a thousand times more painful to be forced to attend to those that are ludicrous; and there is no man of the most common sensibility, who does not feel his mind revolt, and his indignation kindle at the absurdity of the poet, who can thus break in upon the sacred retirement of his sorrow, with the intolerable noise of valgar mirth. Had the

way only can he do this? In what other kind of poetry is the same unity of emotion demanded? This unity of character is as essential as what? How is this remark illustrated? The envy which Elizabeth entertained of the beauty of Mary of Scotland was one cause of what; but what, in poetry, would be unsuited to the nature of the emotion which the story is fitted to raise? Hence, what is indefensible; and why? How is this illustrated in the case of Shakspeare? Who is the first tragedian of modern Europe who

taste of Shakspeare been equal to his genius, or had his knowledge of the laws of the drama corresponded to his knowledge of the human heart, the effect of his compositions would not only have been greater than it now is, but greater perhaps, than we can well imagine; and had he attempted to produce, through a whole composition, that powerful and uniform interest which he can raise in a single scene, nothing of that perfection would have been wanting, of which we may conceive this sublime art to be capable.

Of the necessity of this unity of emotion, Corneille is the first tragedian of modern Europe who seems to have been sensible ; and I know not whether the faults of this poet have not been exaggerated by English critics, from their inattention to the end which he seems to have prescribed to himself in his works. To present a faithful picture of human life, or of human passions, seems not to have been his conception of the intention of tragedy. His object, on the contrary, seems to have been, to exalt and to elevate the imagination-to awaken only the greatest and noblest passions of the human mind; and, by presenting such scenes and such events alone, as could most powerfully promote this end, to render the theatre a school of sublime instruction, rather than an imitation of common life. To effect this purpose, he was early led to see the necessity, or disposed by the greatness of his own mind, to the observation of an uniform character of dignity; to disregard whatever, of common, of trivial, or even of pathetic in the originals from which he copied, might serve to interrupt this peculiar flow of emotion; and instead of giving a simple copy of nature, to adorn the events he represented, with all that eloquence and poetry could afford. He maintains, accordingly, in all his best plays, amid much exaggeration, and much of the false eloquence of his time, a tone of commanding, and even of facinating dignity, which disposes us almost to believe, that we are conversing with Beings of an higher order than our own; and which blinds us, at least for a time, to all the

seems to have been sensible of the necessity of this unity of emotion; and by whom, and why have his faults been exaggerated? What seems not, and what seems to have been his object? To effect this purpose, to what was he early led? In all his best plays, what does he, accordingly, main-

faults and all the imperfections of his composition. I am far from being supposed to defend his opinions of tragedy, and still less to excuse his extravagance and bombast; but I conceive that no person can feel his beauties, or do justice to his merits, who does not regard his tragedies in this view; and I think that some allowance ought to be made for the faults of a poet, who first shewed to his country the example of regular tragedy, and whose works the great Prince of Condé called "The Breviary of kings."

In the former section I endeavored to show, that no objects are, in themselves, fitted to produce the emotions of sublimity or beauty, which are not productive of some simple emotion.

In this, I have attempted to show, that no composition of objects or qualities is in fact productive of such emotions, in which an unity of character is not preserved. The slight illustrations which I have now offered, are probably sufficient to point out the truth of the general principle; but the application of it to the different arts of taste and the explanation of the great rules of composition from this constitution of our nature, are objects far beyond the limits of these Essays. I must satisfy myself, therefore, with observing in general, that, in all the fine arts, that composition is most excellent, in which the different parts most fully unite in the production of one unmingled emotion, and that the taste the most perfect, where the perception of this relation of objects, in point of expression, is most delicate and precise.

CONCLUSION.

I. The illustrations of the first chapter of this Essay are intended to show, that whenever the emotions of beauty or sub-

tain; and what is its effect? To defend what, is our author far from being disposed? But how only can his plays be rightly estimated; and for what should some allowance be made? In the former section, what did our author endeavor to show? What has he attempted to show in this? For what are the slight illustrations now offered, probably sufficient; but what are objects far beyond the limits of these Easays? With what general observation, therefore, must our author satisfy himself?

limity are felt, that exercise of imagination is produced which consists in the prosecution of a train of thought.

The illustrations in the second chapter are intended to point out the distinction between such trains, and our ordinary trains of thought, and to show that this difference consists, 1st, In the ideas which compose them, being in all cases ideas of emotion; and 2dly, In their possessing an uniform principle of connexion through the whole of the train. The effect, therefore, which is produced upon the mind, by objects of taste, may be considered as consisting in the production of a regular or consistent train of ideas of emotion.

II. The account which I have now given of this effect, may, perhaps, serve to point out an important distinction between the emotions of taste, and all our different emotions of simple pleasure. In the case of these last emotions, no additional train of thought is necessary. The pleasurable feeling follows immediately the presence of the object or quality, and has no dependence upon any thing for its perfection, but the sound state of the sense by which it is received. The emotions of joy, pity, benevolence, gratitude, utility, propriety, novelty, &c. might undoubtedly be felt, although we had no such power of mind as that by which we follow out a train of ideas, and certainly are felt in a thousand cases when this faculty is unemployed.

In the case of the emotions of taste, on the other hand, it seems evident, that this exercise of mind is necessary, and that unless this train of thought is produced, these emotions are unfelt. Whatever may be the nature of that simple emotion which any object is fitted to excite—whether that of gaiety, tranquillity, melancholy, &c.—if it produce not a train of thought in our minds, we are conscious only of that simple emotion.

What are the illustrations, in the first chapter of this Essay, intended to show? For what are the illustrations, in the second, intended? In what, therefore, may the effect which is produced upon the mind be considered as consisting? The account now given, may serve to point out what distinction? In the case of these last emotions, what is not necessary; and why? How is this illustrated? In the case of the emotions of taste, on the other hand, what seems evident? What two remarks follow? If the author of our na-

Whenever, on the contrary, this train of thought, or this exercise of imagination is produced, we are conscious of an emotion of a higher and more pleasing kind; and which, though it is impossible to describe in language, we yet distinguish by the name of the emotion of taste. If, accordingly, the author of our nature had denied us this faculty of imagination, it should seem that these emotions could not have been felt, and that all our emotions would have been limited to those of simple pleasure.

The emotions of taste may, therefore, be considered as distinguished from the emotions of simple pleasure, by being dependent upon the exercise of our imagination; and though founded, in all cases, upon some simple emotion, still requiring the employment of this faculty for their existence.

III. As in every operation of taste there are, thus, two different faculties employed, viz. some affection or emotion raised, and the imagination excited to a train of thought corresponding to this emotion, the peculiar pleasure which attends, and which constitutes the emotions of taste, may naturally be considered as composed of the pleasures which separately attend the exercise of these faculties; or, in other words, as produced by the union of pleasing emotion, with the pleasure which, by the constitution of our nature, is annexed to the exercise of imagination. That both these pleasures are felt in every operation of taste, seems to me very agreeable to common experience and observation.

1. That in every case of the emotions of sublimity or beauty, that simple emotion of pleasure is felt, which arises from the peculiar nature of the object perceived, every man, I conceive, may very easily satisfy himself. In any beautiful object, the character of which is cheerfulness, we are conscious of a feel-

ture had denied us this faculty of imagination, what would have been the consequence? From what may the emotions of taste therefore be considered as distinguished; and how? In every object of taste, what two different faculties are employed? Of what may the peculiar pleasure which attends, and which constitutes the emotions of taste, be considered as composed? That both these pleasures are felt in every operation of taste seems agreeable to what? Of what may every man very easily satisfy himself? How is this

ing of cheerfulness-in objects of melancholy, of a feeling of sadness-in objects of utility, of a feeling of satisfaction and complacence, similar to what we feel from objects of the same kind when the emotion of beauty is not excited. In sublime objects, in the same manner, whatever their character may be, whether that of greatness, terror, power, &c. we are conscious of the feelings of admiration, of awe, of humility, &c. and of the same pleasures from the exercise of them, which we feel in those cases where the emotion of sublimity is not produced. In the trains of thought which are not excited by objects, either of sublimity or beauty, every man knows that the character of those trains is determined by the peculiar nature of the object; and instead of the emotions of taste being attended with one uniform species of pleasure, every man must have felt, that the sum of his pleasure is in a great degree composed of the peculiar pleasure which the exercise of different affections bring.

2. That there is a pleasure, also annexed, by the constitution of our nature, to the exercise of imagination, is a proposition which seems to require very little illustration. In common opinion, the employment of imagination is always supposed to communicate delight; when we yield to its power, we are considered as indulging in a secret pleasure; and every superiority, in the strength or sensibility of this faculty, is believed to be attended with a similar increase in the happiness of human life. Nor is this persuasion of the connexion of pleasure with the exercise of imagination, confined to those cases where the mind is employed in contemplating images of joy only; for even in those men whose constitution disposes them to gloomy or melancholy thought, we have still a belief that there is some secret and fascinating charm in the disposition which they indulge, and that, in this operation of mind itself, they find a pleasure

illustrated from objects of beauty, of melancholy, of utility, and of sublimity? In the trains of thought which are excited by objects, either of sublimity or beauty, what does every man know; and what must every one have felt? What other proposition seems to require very little illustration? In common opinion, what is the employment of imagination always supposed to communicate; and what follows? Of this persuasion of the connexion of pleasure with the exercise of imagination, what is observed; and why? What state

which more than compensates for all the pain which the character of their thoughts may bring. There is a state of mind, also, which every man must have felt, when, without any particular object of meditation, the imagination seems to retire from the realities of life, and to wander amid a creation of its own—when the most varied and discordant scenes rise as by enchantment before the mind; and when all the other faculties of our nature seem gradually to be obscured, to give, to this creation of fancy, a more radiant glow. With what delight such employments of imagination are attended, the young and the romantic can tell, to whom they are often more dear than all the real enjoyments of life; and who, from the noise and tumult of vulgar joy, often hasten to retire to solitude and silence, where they may yield, with security, to these illusions of imagination, and indulge again their visionary bliss.

On a subject of this kind, however, when illustration is, perhaps, less important than description, I am happy to be able to transcribe a passage, which will render unnecessary every illustration that I can give. It is a passage from a posthumous work of M. Rousseau, in which he describes his mode of life, during a summer which he passed in the island of St. Pierre, in the middle of the little lake of Bienne.

"Quand le beau tems m'invitoit, j'allois me jetter seul dans "un bateau que je conduisois au milieu du lac, quand l'eau "étoit calme, et là, m'étendant tout de mon long dans le bateau, "les yeux tournés vers le ciel, je me laissois aller et dériver "lentement au gré de l'eau, quelquefois pendant plusieurs "heures, plongé dans mille rêveries confuses, mais délicieuses, "et qui sans avoir aucun objet bien déterminé ni constant, ne "laissoient pas d'etre à mon gré cent fois préférables à tout ce "que j'avois trouvé de plus doux dans ce qu'on appelle les "plaisirs de la vie.-----

"-----Quand le soir approchoit, je descendois, des cimes de " le l'isle, et j'allois volontiers m'asseoir au bord du lac, sur la " grève dans quelque asyle caché; là le bruit des vagues, et

of mind also, must every man have felt? Who can tell with what delight such employments of imagination are attended; and what is observed of the estimation in which they are held by them? On this subject what is our author happy to be able to do; and where is it found? Repeat the passage. " l'agitation de l'eau fixant mes sens, et chassant de mon ame "toute autre agitation, la plongeoient dans une rêverie déli-"cieuse, où la nuit me surprenoit souvent sans que je m'en "fusse appercu. Le flux et reflux de cette eau, son bruit "continu, mais renflé par intervalles, frappant sans relâche mon "oreille et mes yeux, suppléoient aux mouvemens internes que "la rêverie éteignoit en moi, et suffisoient pour me faire sentir "avec plaisir mon éxistence, sans prendre la peine de pen-"ser.-----

"------Tel est l'état où je me suis trouvé souvent à l'isle "de St. Pierre dans mes rêveries solitaires, soit couché dans "mon bateau que je laissois dériver au gré de l'eau, soit assis "sur les rives du lac agité, soit ailleurs au bord d'une belle "riviere, où d'un ruisseau murmurant sur le gravier. Telle "est la manière dont j'ai passé mon tems, durant le séjour que j'y ai fait. Qu'on me dise à present ce qu'il y a là d'assez "attrayant pour exciter dans mon cœur des regrêts si vifs, si "tendres, et si durables, qu'au bout de quinze ans il m'est im-"possible de songer à cette habitation cherie, sans m'y sentir "à chaque fois transporter encore par les élans du desir.------

"----J'ai pensé quelquefois assez profondement, mais "rarement avec plaisir, presque toujours contre mon gré, et "comme par force; la rêverie me délasse et m'amuse, la reflex. "ion me fatigue et m'attriste. Quelquefois mes rêveries "finissent par meditation, mais plus souvent mes meditations "finissent par la rêverie; et durant ces égaremens mon ame "erre et plâne dans l'univers sur les aîles de l'imagination, "dans des éxtases qui passent toute autre jouissance.

"Tant que je goutai celle-la dans toute sa pureté, toute autre occupation me fut toujours insipide. Mais quand une fois, jetté dans la carrière littéraire, par des impulsions étrangers, je sentis la fatigue du travail d'esprit, et l'importunité d'une célebrité malheureuse, je sentis en même tems languir et s'attiédir mes douces rêveries, et bientôt forcé de m'occuper malgrè moi de ma triste situation, je ne pus plus retrouver, que bien rarement, ces cheres éxtases, qui durant cinquante ans m'avoient tenu lieu de fortune et de gloire; et sans autre dépense que celle du tems, m'avoient rendu dans l'oisieveté ie plus heureux des mortels."—Les Rêveries, Promenade 5 et 7. If it is allowed, then, that there is a pleasure annexed, by the constitution of our nature, to the exercise of imagination; and if the illustrations in the first chapter are just, which are intended to show, that when this exercise of mind is not produced, the emotions of taste are unfelt, and that when it is increased, these emotions are increased with it, we seem to possess sufficient evidence to conclude, that this pleasure exists, and forms a part of that peculiar pleasure which we receive from objects of sublimity and beauty.

The pleasure, therefore, which accompanies the emotions of taste, may be considered not as a simple, but as a complex pleasure; and as arising, not from any separate and peculiar sense, but from the union of the pleasure of SIMPLE EMOTION, with that which is annexed, by the constitution of the human mind, to the exercise of IMAGINATION.

IV. The distinction which thus appears to subsist between the emotions of simple pleasure, and that complex pleasure, which accompanies the emotions of taste, seems to require a similar distinction in philosophical language. I believe, indeed, that the distinction is actually to be found in the common language of conversation ; and I apprehend that the term DELIGHT is very generally used to express the peculiar pleasure which attends the emotions of taste, in contradistinction to the general term *pleasure*, which is appropriated to simple emotion. We are pleased, we say, with the gratification of any appetite or affection-with food when hungry, and with rest when tiredwith the gratification of curiosity, of benevolence, or of resent. ment. But we say, we are *delighted* with the prospect of a beautiful landscape, with the sight of a fine statue, with hearing a pathetic piece of music, with the perusal of a celebrated poem. In these cases the term delight is used to denote that

If what has been said be allowed to be true, to form what conclusion does there seem to be sufficient evidence? How may the pleasure, therefore, which accompanies taste be considered; and as arising from what? What does the distinction, which is thus found to exist, seem to require? Where does our author believe that this distinction is actually found; and of the term delight what does he apprehend? How is this remark illustrated? In these cases, to denote what, is the term delight used? Of this distinction what does our

pleasure which arises from sublimity and beauty, and to distinguish it from those simpler pleasures which arise from objects that are only agreeable. I acknowledge, indeed, that this distinction is not very accurately adhered to in common language, because, in most cases, either of the terms equally expresses our meaning; but I apprehend, that the observation of it is sufficiently general, to shew some consciousness in mankind of a difference between these pleasures, and to justify such a distinction in philosophical language as may express it.

If I were permitted therefore, I should wish to appropriate the term *delight*, to signify the peculiar pleasure which attends the emotions of TASTE, or which is felt, WHEN THE IMAGINATION IS EMPLOYED IN THE PROSECUTION OF A REGULAR TRAIN OF IDEAS OF EMOTION.

author acknowledge; and why? But what does he apprehend? What appropriation does he desire should be made of the term delight?

ESSAY II.

OF THE SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY OF THE MATERIAL WORLD.

CHAPTER. I.

INTRODUCTORY.

IF the illustrations in the preceding Essay are just, if that exercise of mind which takes place when the emotions of beauty or sublimity are felt consists in the prosecution of a regular train of ideas of emotion, and if no other objects are in fact productive of the emotions of taste, but such as are fitted to produce some simple emotion, there arises a question of some difficulty, and of very considerable importance, viz. What is the source of the sublimity and BEAUTY of the MATERIAL WORLD?

It cannot be doubted, that many objects of the material world are productive of the emotions of sublimity and beauty: some of the fine arts are altogether employed about material objects; and far the greater part of the instances of beauty or sublimity which occur in every man's experience, are found in matter, or in some of its qualities.

On the other hand, I think it must be allowed, that matter, in itself, is unfitted to produce any kind of emotion. The various

Under what circumstances, does a question of some difficulty arise; and what is it? What cannot be doubted? How is this illustrated? On the other hand, what must be allowed? How is this illustrated? What language

qualities of matter are known to us only by means of our external senses; but all that such powers of our nature convey, is sensation and perception; and whoever will take the trouble of attending to the effect which such qualities, when simple and unassociated, produce upon his mind, will be satisfied, that in no case do they produce emotion, or the exercise of any of his affections. The common language of mankind upon this subject, perfectly coincides with this observation. Such qualities, when simple, are always spoken of as producing sensation, but in no case as producing emotion; and although perhaps the general word *feeling*, as applied both to our external and internal senses, may sometimes be used ambiguously, yet if we attend to it, we shall find, that, with regard to material qualities, it is uniformly used to express sensation, and that if we substitute emotion for it, every man will perceive the mistake. The smell of a rose, the color of scarlet, the taste of a pine-apple, when spoken of merely as qualities, and abstracted from the objects in which they are found, are said to produce agreeable sensations, but not agreeable emotions. In the same manner, the smell of assafeetida, or the taste of aloes, when spoken of as abstract qualities, are uniformly said to produce unpleasing sensations, but not unpleasing emotions. If we could conceive ourselves possessed of those powers only which we have by means of our external senses, I apprehend there can be no doubt, that, in such a case, the qualities of matter would produce only sensation and perception; that such sensations might be either pleasing or painful, but that, in no case, could they be attended with any emotion.

But although the qualities of matter are, in themselves, incapable of producing emotion, or the exercise of any affection, yet it is obvious that they may produce this effect, from their association with other qualities; being, either the signs or ex-

perfectly coincides with this observation? How are such qualities, when simple, always spoken of; and of the general word *feeling*, what is observed? What observation on the smell of the rose, of assafcetida, &c. follows? If we could conceive ourselves possessed of those powers only which we have by means of our external senses, of what would there be no doubt? Though the qualities of matter are, in themselves, incapable of producing emotion, yet how may they produce this effect; and why? From the human body, pressions of such qualities as are fitted, by the constitution of our nature, to produce emotion. Thus, in the human body, particular forms or colors are the signs of particular passions or affections. In works of art, particular forms are the signs of dexterity, of taste, of convenience, of utility. In the works of nature, particular sounds and colors, &c. are the signs of peace, or danger, or plenty, or desolation, &c. In such cases, the constant connexion which we discover between the sign and the thing signified, between the material quality and the quality productive of emotion, renders, at last, the one expressive to us of the other, and very often disposes us to attribute to the sign, that effect which is produced only by the quality signified.

That such associations are formed with material qualities, every man has sufficient evidence in his own experience; and there are many causes which may be assigned, both of the extent and of the universality of such associations. I shall remark a few of these, without pretending to an accurate enumeration.

1. All those external objects, which, from their nature or constitution, are productive to us, either of use, of convenience, or of pleasure, or which in any other way are fitted to produce emotion, are known and distinguished by their qualities of form and color. Such qualities, therefore, are naturally, and even necessarily expressive to us of those uses, or conveniences, or pleasures. It is by them that we become acquainted with the subjects from which such utilities arise; it is by them that we learn to distinguish such subjects from one another; and as they are the permanent signs of these several utilities, they affect us with the same emotion which the utilities signified by them are fitted to produce. The material qualities, for instance, which distinguish a ship, a plough, a printing-press, or a musical

from works of art, and from works of nature, how is this remark illustrated? In such cases, what is the effect of the constant connexion which we discover between the sign and the thing signified, &c.? That such associations are formed with material qualities, in what has every man sufficient evidence; and what remark follows? What only will our author remark? What objects are known and distinguished by their qualities of form and color; and of such qualities, what is observed? By them, with what do we become acquainted, what do we learn, and what follows? How is this remark illusinstrument, do not afford us the perception of certain colors or forms only, but along with this perception they bring the conception of the different uses or pleasures which such compositions of material qualities produce, and excite in us the same emotion with the utilities or pleasures thus signified. As, in this manner, the utilities or pleasures of all external objects are expressed to us by their material signs of color and of form, such signs are naturally productive of the emotions which properly arise from the qualities signified.

2. The qualities of design, of wisdom, of skill, are uniformly expressed to us by certain qualities of form, and certain compositions of forms, colors, and sounds. Such qualities, therefore, or compositions of qualities, become the signs of design, or wisdom, or skill, and, like all other signs, affect us with the same emotion we receive from the qualities signified.

3. All our knowledge of the minds of other men, and of their various qualities, is gained by means of material signs. Power, strength, wisdom, fortitude, justice, benevolence, magnanimity, gentleness, tenderness, love, &c. are all known to us by means of the external signs of them in the countenance, gesture, or voice. Such material signs are therefore very early associated in our minds with the qualities they signify; and as they are constant and invariable, become soon productive to us of the same emotions with the qualities themselves.

In the same manner, the characters, the dispositions, the instincts of all the various tribes of animals, are known to us by certain signs in their frame, or voice, or gesture. Such signs become therefore expressive to us of these characters, or instincts, or dispositions, and affect us with all the emotions which such qualities are fitted to produce.

4. Besides these immediate expressions of qualities of mind by material signs, there are others which arise from resemblance, in which the qualities of matter become significant to us

trated? What observation follows? How are the qualities of design, of wisdom, or of skill, uniformly expressed to us? Of such qualities, therefore, what is observed? How is all our knowledge of the minds of other men gained? How is this illustrated? Of such material signs, what is remarked? In the same manner, what are known to us, and by what? Of what do these signs become expressive; and how do they affect us? Besides these,

of some affecting or interesting quality of mind. We learn from experience, that certain qualities of mind are signified by certain qualities of body. When we find similar qualities of body in inanimate matter, we are apt to attribute to them the same expression, and to conceive them as signifying the same qualities in this case, as in those cases where they derive their expression immediately from mind. Thus, strength and delieacy, boldness and modesty, old age and youth, &c. are all expressed by particular material signs in the human form, and in many cases by similar signs in the forms of animals. When we find similar appearances in the forms of inanimate matter. we are disposed to consider them as expressive of the same qualities, and to regard them with similar emotions. The universality of such associations is evident from the structure of the rudest languages. The strength of the oak, the delicacy of the myrtle, the boldness of a rock, the modesty of the violet, &c., are expressions common in all languages, and so common that they are scarcely in any considered as figurative ; yet every man knows, that strength and weakness, boldness and modesty, are qualities, not of matter, but of mind, and that without our knowledge of mind, it is impossible that we should ever have had any conception of them. How much the effect of descriptions of natural scenery arises from that personification, which is founded upon such associations, I believe there is no man of common taste who must not often have been sensible.

5. We are led, by the constitution of our nature, also, to perceive resemblances between our sensations and emotions, and of consequence between the objects that produce them. Thus, there is some analogy between the sensation of gradual ascent, and the emotion of ambition—between the sensation of gradual descent, and the emotion of decay—between the lively sensation of sunshine, and the cheerful emotion of joy—between the painful sensation of darkness, and the dispiriting emo-

what others are there? What do we learn from experience; and what remark follows? How is this remark illustrated? When we find similar appearances in the forms of inanimate matter, what is the consequence? From what is the universality of such associations evident? How is this illustrated? Of what must every man of common taste, often have been sensible? What other resemblances are we, by the constitution of our nature also, led to perceive? How is this remark fully illustrated? Of the objects, there-

tion of sorrow. In the same manner, there are analogies between silence and tranquillity-between the lustre of morning, and the gaiety of hope-between softness of coloring, and gentleness of character-between slenderness of form, and delicacy of mind, &c. The objects, therefore, which produce such sensations, though in themselves not the immediate signs of such interesting or affecting qualities, yet in consequence of this resemblance, become gradually expressive of them, and if not always, yet at those times at least, when we are under the dominion of any emotion, serve to bring to our minds the images of all those affecting or interesting qualities, which we have been accustomed to suppose they resemble. How extensive this source of association is, may easily be observed, in the extent of such kinds of figurative expression in every language.

6. Besides these, language itself is another very important cause of the extent of such associations.—The analogies between the qualities of matter, and the qualities of mind, which any individual might discover or observe, might perhaps be few, and must of course be limited by his situation and circumstances; but the use of language gives, to every individual who employs it, the possession of all the analogies which so many ages have observed, between material qualities, and qualities capable of producing emotion. Of how much consequence this is, may be discovered in the different impressions which are made by the same objects on the common people whose vocabulary is limited by their wants, and on those who have had the advantage of a liberal education.

7. To all these sources of associations is to be added, that which is peculiar to every individual. There is scarcely any man who has not, from accident, from the events of his life, or from the nature of his studies, connected agreeable or interesting recollections with particular colors, or sounds, or forms, and to whom such sounds or colors, &c. are not pleasing from such

fore, which produce such associations, what is observed? From what may the extent of this source of association be perceived? What is another very important cause of the extent of such associations? How is this illustrated? In what may the importance of this be discovered? To these sources of association what is to be added? What illustration of this remark follows? How an association. They affect us, in some measure, as the signs of these interesting qualities, and, as in other cases, produce in us the same emotion with the qualities they signify.

These observations are probably sufficient to show the numerous and extensive associations we have with matter and its various qualities, as well as to illustrate some of the means by which it becomes significant or expressive to us of very different, and far more interesting qualities than those it possesses in itself. By means of the connexion, or resemblance, which subsists between the qualities of matter, and qualities capable of producing emotion, the perception of the one immediately, and very often irresistibly, suggests the idea of the other; and so early are these associations formed, that it requires afterwards some pains to separate this connexion, and to prevent us from attributing to the sign, that effect which is produced alone by the quality signified.

Whatever may be the truth of these observations, it cannot, at least, be doubted, that the qualities of matter are often associated with others, and that they affect us in such cases, like all other signs, by leading our imaginations to the qualities they signify. It seems to be equally obvious, that in all cases where matter, or any of its qualities, produces the emotions of sublimity or beauty, this effect must arise, either from those material qualities themselves, from their being fitted by the constitution of our nature to produce such emotions : or from some other qualities with which they are associated, and of which they operate as the signs or expressions.

It should seem, therefore, that a very simple, and a very obvious principle is sufficient to guide our investigation into the source of the sublimity and beauty of the qualities of matter. If these qualities are, in themselves, fitted to produce the emotions of sublimity or beauty, or, in other words, are in themselves beautiful and sublime, I think it is obvious that they must produce these emotions, independently of any association.

do these affect us? For what are these observations, probably, sufficient? By means of what connexion, does the perception of the one often suggest the idea of the other; and what follows? Whatever may be the truth of these observations, what cannot be doubted? What seems to be equally obvious? What, therefore, should seem evident? If these qualities are, in themselves,

If, on the contrary, it is found that these qualities only produce such emotions when they are associated with interesting or affecting qualities, and that when such associations are destroyed, they no longer produce the same emotions, I think it must also be allowed, that their beauty or sublimity is to be ascribed, not to the material, but to the associated qualities.

That this is in reality the case, I shall endeavor to show, by a great variety of illustrations. It is necessary, however, for me to premise, that I am very far from considering the inquiries which follow, as a complete examination of the subject. They are indeed only detached observations on the sublimity and beauty of some of the most important classes of material qualities, but which, however imperfect they may severally be, yet seem to possess considerable weight from their collective evidence.

fitted to produce the emotions of sublimity or beauty, what is obvious? What remark follows? How is it to be shown that this is, in reality, the case? What is it necessary to premise? Of these what is observed?

CHAPTER II.

ON THE SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY OF SOUND.

THE senses by which we chiefly discover beauty or sublimity in material objects, are HEARING and SEEING.

The objects of the first are sounds, whether SIMPLE or COM-POSED.

The objects of the second are, colors, Forms, and MOTION.

SECTION I.

OF SIMPLE SOUNDS.

I shall begin with considering some of those instances, where simple sounds are productive of the emotions of sublimity or beauty. Such sounds are capable of many divisions, but it may be sufficient at present, to consider them in the following order—

1. Sounds that occur in inanimate nature.

2. The notes of animals.

3. The tones of the human voice.

PART I.

OF MISCELLANEOUS SOUNDS.

Or the first class, or of those miscellaneous sounds that occur in inanimate nature, there are many which produce emotions of sublimity and beauty.

By what senses chiefly, do we discover beauty or sublimity in material objects? What are the objects of the first? What, of the second? With considering what does our author begin; and what is observed of them? In what order are they to be considered?

Of the first class of those miscellaneous sounds that occur in inanimate nature, what is observed? In the first place, what sounds are, in general,

I. 1. All sounds in general are SUBLINE, which are associated with ideas of danger; such as the howling of a storm, the murmuring of an earthquake—the report of artillery—the explosion of thunder, &c.

2. All sounds are in general sublime, which are associated • with ideas of great power or might; such as the noise of a torrent—the fall of a cataract—the uproar of a tempest—the explosion of gunpowder—the dashing of the waves, &c.

3. All sounds, in the same manner, are sublime, which are associated with ideas of majesty, or solemnity, or deep melancholy, or any other strong emotion; such as the sound of the trumpet, and all other warlike instruments—the note of the organ—the sound of the curfew—the tolling of the passing bell, &c.

That the sublimity of such sounds arises from the ideas of danger, or power, or majesty, &c. which are associated with them, and not from the sounds themselves, or from any original fitness in such sounds, to produce this emotion, seems to be obvious from the following considerations:

1. Such sounds, instead of having any permanent or definite character of sublimity, vary in their effect with the qualities they happen to express, and assume different characters, according to the nature of these qualities.

If sounds in themselves were sublime, it might reasonably be expected in this, as in every other case of sense, that their difference of effect would be strictly proportioned to their difference of character, and that sounds of the same kind or character would invariably produce the same emotion. The following instances, however, seem to show, that no specific character of sublimity belongs to mere sound, and that the same sounds may produce very different kinds of emotion, according to the qualities with which we associate them.

The sound of thunder is, perhaps of all others in nature, the most sublime. In the generality of mankind, this sublimity is

sublime; and what examples are given? What, in the second place; and what are the examples? In the third place, what sounds are sublime; and what are examples? From what does the sublimity of such sounds arise; and from what does it not? Of such sounds what is remarked? If sounds in themselves were sublime, what might reasonably be expected? What, however, do the following instances seem to show? How is this illustrated in

founded on awe, and some degree of terror; yet how different is the emotion which it gives to the peasant who sees at last, after a long drought, the consent of heaven to his pravers for rain-to the philosopher, who from the height of the Alps, hears it roll beneath his feet-to the soldier, who, under the impression of ancient superstition, welcomes it, upon the moment of engagement, as the omen of victory ! in all these cases, the sound itself is the same; but how different the nature of the sublimity it produces ! The report of artillery is sublime, from the images both of power and of danger we associate with it. The noise of an engagement heard from a distance is dreadfully The firing of a review is scarcely more than magsublime. The sound of a real skirmish between a few hundred nificent. men, would be more sublime than all the noise of a feigned engagement between a hundred thousand men. The straggling fire of a company of soldiers upon a field-day, is contemptible, and always excites laughter. The straggling fire of the same number of men, in a riot, would be extremely sublime, and perhaps more terrible than an uniform report.

The howling of a tempest is powerfully sublime from many associations; yet how different to the inhabitant of the land, and the sailor, who is far from refuge—to the inhabitant of the sheltered plain, and the traveller bewildered in the mountains to the poor man who has nothing to lose, and the wealthy, whose fortunes are at the mercy of the storm ! In all these cases, the sound itself is the same, but the nature of the sublimity it produces is altogether different, and corresponds, not to the effect upon the organ of hearing, but to the character or situations of the men by whom it is heard, and the different qualities of which it is expressive to them.

The sound of a cascade is almost always sublime; yet no man ever felt in it the same species of sublimity, in a fruitful plain, and in a wild and romantic country—in the pride of summer, and the desolation of winter—in the hours of gaiety, or

the case of thunder ? How is it farther illustrated from the report of artillery ? Of the effect of the howling of a tempest upon different individuals, what is observed ? Of the sound itself, in all these cases, what is remarked ? To what does the sublimity which it produces, correspond ? Of the degrees of sublimity of the sound of a cascade, what is observed ? What is remarked of

tranquillity, or elevation, and in seasons of melancholy, or anxiety, or despair. The sound of a trumpet is often sublime; but how different the sublimity in the day of battle—in the march of an army in peace, or amid the splendors of a procession. There are few simple sounds more sublime than the report of a cannon; yet every one must have felt the different emotions of sublimity with which the same sound affects him, and at the same intervals, in moments of public sorrow, or public rejoicing.

In these, and in many other instances that might be mentioned, the nature of the emotion that we experience, corresponds not to the nature of the sound itself, but to the nature of the association we connect with it; and is in fact altogether the same with the emotion which the same quality produces, when unaccompanied with sound. If sounds' in themselves were fitted, by the constitution of our nature, to produce these emotions, it would seem that greater uniformity would be found in their effects; that the difference of their effects would be proportioned to the difference of their nature as sounds; and that the same sounds would permanently produce the same emotion.

2. If any particular sounds are fitted, by our constitution, to produce the emotion of sublimity, it seems impossible that sounds of a contrary kind should produce the same emotion. If, on the contrary, the sublimity of sounds arises from the qualities we associate with them, it may reasonably be expected, that sounds of all kinds will produce this emotion, when they are expressive of such qualities as are in themselves sublime. Many very familiar observations seem to illustrate this point.

The most general character, perhaps, of sublimity in sounds, is that of loudness; and there are, doubtless, many instances

the sound of a trumpet; and of the report of a cannon? In these, and in many other instances that might be mentioned, of the nature of the emotion that we experience, what is remarked? If sounds, in themselves were fitted, by the constitution of our nature, to produce these emotions, what would seem to follow? If any particular sounds are fitted, by the constitution of our nature, to produce the emotion of sublimity, what seems impossible; and, on the contrary, what is remarked? What is, perhaps, the most general character of sublimity in sounds; and of it what is remarked? Yet, of what where such sounds are constantly sublime : yet these are many instances also, where the centrary quality of sounds is also sublime ; and when this happens, it will universally be found, that such sounds are associated with ideas of power or danger, or some other quality capable of exciting strong emotion. The loud and tumultuous sound of a storm is undoubtedly sublime ; but there is a low and feeble sound which frequently precedes it, more sublime, in reality, than all the uproar of the storm itself, and which has, accordingly, been frequently made use of by poets in heightening their descriptions of such scenes.

> Along the woods, along the moorish fens Sighs the sad genius of the coming storm, And up among the loose disjointed cliffs And fractured mountains wide, the brawling brook And cave, presageful, send a hollow moan, Resounding long in fancy's listening ear. Then comes the father of the tempest forth, &c. Thomson's Winter.

"Did you never observe," says Mr. Gray in a letter to a friend, " while rocking winds are piping loud, that pause, as the gust is "recollecting itself, and rising upon the ear in a shrill and " plaintive note, like the swell of an Æolian harp? I do assure " you there is nothing in the world so like the voice of a spirit." Such a sound, in itself, is inconsiderable, and resembles many others which are very far from being sublime ; but as the forerunner of the storm, and the sign of all the imagery we connect with it, it is sublime in a very great degree. There is in the same manner said to be a low rumbling noise preceding an earthquake, in itself, very inconsiderable, and generally likened to some very contemptible sounds; yet in such a situation, and with all the images of danger and horror to which it leads, I question whether there is any other sound so dreadfully sublime. The soft and placid tone of the human voice is surely not sublime; yet in the following passage, which of the great

also, are there many instances; and when this happens, with what are they always found to be associated? What illustration follows? Repeat the passage here introduced from Thomson's Winter. What says Mr. Gray, in a letter to a friend? Of such a sound, what is observed? What is remarked of the low rumbling noise that precedes an earthquake? Of the effect of the soft and placid tone of the human voice, in the following passage, what is

images that precede is so powerfully so? It is a passage from the first book of Kings, in which the Deity is descr bed as appearing to the prophet Elijah. "And he said, Go forth, and "stand upon the mount before the Lord. And behold, the "Lord passed by, and a great and strong wind rent the moun-"tains, and brake in pieces the rocks before the Lord; but "the Lord was not in the wind: and after the wind an earth-"quake; but the Lord was not in the earthquake: and after "the earthquake a fire; but the Lord was not in the fire: and "after the fire *a still small voice*. And it was so, when Elijah "heard it, that he wrapped his face in his mantle."

Another great division of sounds is into grave and acute. If either of these classes of sound is sublime in itself, it should follow, according to the general laws of sensation, that the other should not be so. In fact, however, the sublime is found in both, and perhaps it may be difficult to say to which of them it most permanently belongs. Instances of this kind are within the reach of every person's observation.

In the same manner, it may be observed, that the most common, and, in general, the most insignificant sounds become sublime, whenever they are associated with images belonging to power, or danger, or melancholy; or any other strong emotion, although in other cases they affect us with no emotion whatever. There is scarcely in nature a more trifling sound than the buzz of flies, yet I believe there is no man of common taste, who, in the deep silence of a summer's noon, has not found something strikingly sublime in this inconsiderable sound. The falling of a drop of water, produces, in general, a very insignificant and unexpressive sound; yet sometimes in vaults, and in large cathedrals, a single drop is heard to fall at intervals, from the roof, than which, I know not if there is a single sound more strikingly sublime. One can scarcely men-

observed? Repeat the passage. What is another great division of sounds? If either of these classes of sounds is sublime in itself, what should follow? What, however, is the fact; and what might be a difficult task? When do the most common, and, in general, the most insignificant sounds, become sublime? How is this illustrated from the buzz of flies, the falling of a drop of water, and the sound of a hammer? Repeat the passage in which Shakapeare has made the last remarkably sublime. What is observed of the sound tion a sound less productive of the sublime, than the sound of a hammer. How powerfully, however, in the following description, has Shakspeare made this vulgar sound sublime!

> From camp to camp, through the foul womb of night, The hum of either army stilly sounds, That the fix'd sentinels almost receive The secret whispers of each other's watch. Fire answers fire, and through their paly flames Each battle sees the other's umber'd face : Steed answers steed in high and boastful neighs Piercing the earth's dull ear, and from the tents The armorers accomplishing the knights With busy hammers, closing rivets up, Give dreadful note of preparation.

Henry V. Act iii. Chorus.

The sound of oars in water is surely very far from being sublime, yet in a tragedy of Thomson's, this sound is made strikingly sublime, when, in the person of a man who had been left by the treachery of his companions upon a desert island, he describes the horrors he felt, when he first found his being deserted : and adds,

> I never heard A sound so dismal as their parting cars.----

Instances of the same kind are so numerous, that it is unnecessary to insist upon them. If sounds are sublime in themselves, independently of all association, it seems difficult to account for contrary sounds producing the same effect, and for the same sounds producing differing effects, according to the associations with which they are connected.

3. When such associations are dissolved, the sounds themselves cease to be sublime. There are many cases, undoubtedly, in which this experiment cannot be made, because in many cases the connexion between such sounds, and the qualities they indicate, is constant and invariable. The connexion between the sound of thunder, of a whirlwind, of a torrent, of an earthquake, and the qualities of power, or danger, or aw-

of oars in water, in a Tragedy of Thomson's; and under what circumstances? If sounds are sublime in themselves, independently of all association, to account for what seems difficult? When such associations are dissolved, what is the consequence? Why are there many cases in which this

fulness, which they signify, and which the objects themselves permanently involve, is established not by man, but by nature. It has no dependence upon his will, and cannot be affected by any discipline of his imagination. It is no wonder, therefore, while such connexions are so permanent, that the sublimity which belongs to the qualities of the objects themselves, should be attributed to their external signs, and that such signs should be considered in themselves as fitted to produce this emotion. The only case in which these associations are positively dissolved, is when, by some error of judgment, we either mistake some different sound for the sound of any of these objects, or are imposed upon by some imitation of these sounds. In such cases, I think it will not be denied, that when we discover our mistake, the sounds are no longer sublime.

There is nothing more common than for people who are afraid of thunder, to mistake some very common and indifferent sound for it; as the rumbling of a cart, or the rattling of a carriage. While their mistake continues, they feel the sound to be sublime; but the moment they are undeceived, they are the first to laugh at their error, and to ridicule the sound which occasioned it. Children at first are as much alarmed at the thunder of a stage, as at real thunder. Whenever they find that it is only a deception, they amuse themselves with mimicking it. It may be observed also, that very young children show no symptoms of fear or admiration at thunder, unless, perhaps, when it is painfully loud, or when they see other people alarmed about them; obviously from their not having yet associated with it the idea of danger: and perhaps, also, because their imagination assists the report, and makes it appear much louder than it really is-a circumstance which seems to be confirmed by the common mistake they make of very inconsiderable

experiment cannot be made? How is this remark illustrated? Why is this the case? What, therefore, is not a matter of wonder? What is the only case in which these associations are positively dissolved? In such cases, what will not be desired? What mistake do people very commonly make; and of it what is observed? How is this illustrated in children? What may also be observed of very young children? Why is this the case? In what countries are mistakes, in the same manner, very often made: and between what? In this case, of what can there be no doubt; and in all other cases.

noises for it. Mistakes in the same manner are often made in those countries where earthquakes are common, between very inconsiderable sounds, and that low rumbling sound which is said to precede such an event. There cannot be a doubt, that the moment the mistake is discovered, the noise ceases to be In all other cases of the same kind, where mistakes sublime. of this nature happen, or where we are deceived by imitation, I believe it is agreeable to every person's experience, that while the mistake continues, the sounds affect us as sublime; but that as soon as we are undeceived, and that the sign is found not to be accompanied with the qualities usually signified, it ceases immediately to affect us with any emotion. If any sounds were, in themselves, sublime, or were fitted, by the constitution of our nature, to produce this emotion, independently of all association, it would seem that there could be no change of our emotion, and that these sounds would as permanently produce their correspondent emotion, as the objects of every other sense produce their correspondent ideas.

In all cases, however, where these associations are either accidental or temporary, and not, as in the former case, permanent in their nature, it will be found, that sounds are sublime only, when they are expressive of qualities capable of producing some powerful emotion, and that, in all other cases, the same sounds are simply indifferent. In some of the instances formerly mentioned, where common or vulgar sounds are rendered sublime by association, it is obvious that the same sounds in general, when they have no such expression to us, are very different from sublimity. The buzz of flies, the dropping of water, the sound of a hammer, the dashing of an oar, and many others which might easily be mentioned, are, in general, sounds absolutely indifferent, and so far from possessing any sublimity in themselves, that it might be difficult at first to persuade any

what is agreeable to every person's experience? If any sounds were in themselves sublime, or were fitted, by the constitution of our nature to produce this emotion, independently of all association, what would seem to follow? In all cases where these associations are either accidental or temporary, when only will it be found that sounds are sublime? In some of the instances formerly mentioned, what is obvious? How is this illustrated? To what only, can their sublimity therefore be attributed? What is observed of the

man that they could be made so. Their sublimity, therefore, can only be attributed to the qualities which they signify.

There are few sounds, in the same manner, much more sublime, than the striking of a clock at midnight. In other situations the very same sound is altogether different in its expression. In the morning it is cheerful-at noon indifferent, or at least unnoticed. In the evening plaintive-at night only sublime. In the tolling of a bell, the sound is uniformly the same; yet such a sound has very different expressions, from the peculiar purposes to which it is applied. The passing bell, and the funeral bell, alone are sublime. The whistling of the wind in an autumnal, or in a wintry night, is often felt to be sublime, and has accordingly been frequently introduced into poetical descriptions of a similar character. The nicest ear, however, is unable to distinguish any difference betwixt this sound, in the seasons before mentioned, and in spring or summer, when, if it has any character at all, it has a character very different from sublimity. The trumpet is very generally employed in scenes of magnificence or solemnity. The sound of the trumpet in such situations is accordingly very sublime, and seems to us to be expressive of that solemnity or magnificence. This instrument, however, as every one knows, is very often degraded to very mean offices. In such cases, the sound is altogether indifferent, if not contemptible. The bagpipe has, to a Scotch Highlander, no inconsiderable degree of sublimity, from its being the martial instrument of the country, and of consequence associated with many spirited and many magnificent images. To the rest of the world, the sound of this instrument is, at best, but barely tolerable. They who are acquainted with the history of superstition, will recollect many instances where sounds have become sublime from this association,

striking of the clock at midnight, in the morning, at noon, and in the evening? What is remarked of the tolling of the bell; and which only are sublime? Of the effect of the whistling of the wind in an autumnal, or in a winter night, and in spring or summer, what is observed? How is the trumpet very generally employed; and in such situations what is its effect? What is observed of the sound of this instrument, when degraded to mean offices? Why has the bagpipe to a Scotch Highlander, much sublimity; and how is the sound of this instrument regarded by the rest of the world? What will those persons who are acquainted with the history of superstition readily which, to the rest of mankind, were very insignificant, and which have become also insignificant both to individuals and to nations, when the superstitions upon which their expression was founded had ceased.

There are several other considerations, from which the principle I here endeavor to illustrate might be confirmed-the uniform connexion between sublime sounds, and some quality capable of producing emotion, and the impossibility of finding an instance where sound is sublime, independently of all association-the great difference in the number of sounds that are sublime to the common people, and men of cultivated or poetical imagination-and the difference which every man feels in the effect of such sounds in producing this emotion, according to the particular state of his own mind, or according to the particular strength or weakness of his sensibility to the qualities which such sounds express. But I am unwilling to anticipate the reader in speculations which he can so easily prosecute for himself. If the illustrations I have already offered are justif sounds of all kinds are sublime, when they are expressive of any qualities capable of producing strong emotions-and if no sounds continue to be sublime, when they cease to be expressive of such qualities; it is, I think, reasonable to conclude, that the sublimity of such sounds is to be ascribed, not to the mere quality of sound, but to those associated qualities of which it is significant.

II. There is a great variety of sounds also, that occur in the scenes of nature, which are productive of the emotion of **BEAUTX**; such as the sound of a waterfall, the murmuring of a rivulet, the whispering of the winds, the sheepfold bell, the sound of the curfew, &c.

That such sounds are associated in our minds, with various qualities capable of producing emotion, I think every man may

recollect? What, among other considerations, are here mentioned, from which this principle might be confirmed; but what is our author unwilling to do? Under what circumstances is it reasonable to conclude that the sublimity of such sounds is to be ascribed to those associated qualities of which it is significant? A great variety of sounds also, that occur in the course of nature, are productive of what; and what are examples? How may every be satisfied from his own experience. When such sounds occur, they are expressive to us of some particular character: they suit one species of emotion, and not others; and if this were not obvious in itself, it might be made sufficiently obvious, from the use of such sounds in poetical composition. Every man, there, judges of the propriety of their introduction, and determines with regard to the taste and judgment of the poet, by their suitableness to the nature of the emotion he has it in his view to excite. Every man, therefore, has some peculiar emotion associated with such sounds, or some quality, of which they are considered as the signs or expressions.

That the beauty of such sounds arises from the qualities of which they are expressive, and not from any original fitness in them to produce this emotion, may, perhaps, be evident from the following considerations:

1. To those who have no such associations, or who consider them simply as sounds, they have no beauty. It is long before children show any degree of sensibility to the beauty of such sounds. To the greater number of them, in the same manner, the common people are altogether indifferent. To the peasant the curfew is only the mark of the hour of the evening—the sheep-bell, the sign of the neighborhood of the flock—the sound of a cascade, the sign of the falling of water, &c. Give them the associations which men of cultivated imagination have with such sounds, and they will infallibly feel their beauty.

In the same manner, men of the best natural taste, who have not formed such associations, are equally insensible to the beauty of such sounds. The inhabitant of a country where there are no waterfalls is stunned at first with the noise of a

one be satisfied that such sounds are associated in our minds, with various qualities, capable of producing emotion? When such sounds occur, of what are they expressive; and what do they suit? If this were not obvious in itself, how might it be made sufficiently obvious? What does every man there do; and what follows? From the following considerations, what may, perhaps, be evident? To whom have they no beauty? How is this illustrated in the case of children, of common people, and the peasant? How may they be made to feel their beauty? What is remarked of men of the best natural taste, who have not formed such associations? How is this illustrated from the inhabitant of a country, where there are no waterfalls—from those who are not accustomed to the curfew—and from the sound of the sheepfold bell? cascade, but is not delighted with it. They who are not accustomed to the curfew, and who are ignorant of its being the evening bell, and, as such, associated with all those images of tranquillity and peace, which render that season of the day so charming, feel nothing more from its sound, than from the sound of a bell at any other hour of the day. The sound of the sheepfold bell is but an insignificant noise to those who have never lived in a pastoral country, and who do not consider it as expressive of those images of simple and romantic pleasure, which are so naturally connected with such scenes. Every man acquainted with the poetry of distant nations, knows, in the same manner, how much the beauty of many allusions to peculiar sounds of these countries is lost to those who are strangers to them, and who, of consequence, have none of those associations which render them so expressive to the natives.

2. It is farther observable, that such sounds are beautiful only in particular tempers of mind, or when we are under the influence of such emotions as accord with the expressions which they possess. If, on the contrary, such sounds were beautiful in themselves, although in different states of mind, we might afford them different degrees of attention; yet in all situations they would be beautiful, in the same manner as in every state of mind the objects of all other senses uniformly produce their correspondent ideas. The sound of the curfew, for instance, so beautiful in moments of melancholy, or tranquility, in a joyful or even in a cheerful hour, would be directly the reverse. The sound of a waterfall, so valued amid the luxuriant scenery of summer, is scarcely observed, or if observed, simply disagreeable amid the rigors of winter. The sound of the hunting horn, so extremely picturesque in seasons of gaiety, would be insupportable in hours of melancholy.

It is at particular seasons only, in truth, that we are sensible to the beauty of any of the sounds before mentioned. Where

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What does every man, acquainted with the poetry of distant nations, know? What is farther observable? If, on the contrary, such sounds were beautiful in themselves, yet in all situations, in what manner would they be beautiful? How is this illustrated from the sound of the curfew, the sound of a waterfall, and the sound of the hunting horn? When only are we sensible to the beauty of any of the sounds before mentioned; and why? Under what circumstances

they affect us once, they occur to us ten times without effect. The real and the most important business of life could not be carried on, if we were, at all times, to indulge our sensibility, either to sublimity or beauty. It is only at those seasons, when we happen to be in that temper of mind, which corresponds with the qualities of which they are expressive, that such sounds affect us with any emotions of beauty. In our common hours, when we are either thoughtless or busy, we suffer them to pass without notice. If such sounds were beautiful in themselves, such variations in their effects could not possibly happen.

3. When such associations are dissolved, the sounds, themselves, cease to be beautiful. If a man of the most common taste were carried into any striking scene of an ornamented garden, and placed within the hearing of a cascade, and were told in the midst of his enthusiasm, that what he takes for a cascade is only a deception, the sound continues the same, but the beauty of it would be irrecoverably gone. The tinkling of the sheepfold bell may be imitated by many very common sounds ; but who is there who could for a moment listen to any imitation of this romantic sound? There are a great number of sounds which exactly resemble the sound of the hunting horn, and which are frequently heard also in the same scenes: when known, however, some of them are ridiculous, none beautiful. The same bell which is so strikingly beautiful in the evening, is altogether unnoticed at noon. "The flute of a shepherd," says Dr. Beattie, with his usual beauty of expression, "heard "at a distance, in a fine summer's day, amidst a romantic "scene of groves, hills, and waters, will give rapture to the "ear of the wanderer; though the tune, the instrument, and "the musician be such as he could not endure in any other "place." Instances of a similar kind are so numerous, that I

could not the real and necessary business of life be carried on? When only do such sounds affect us with any emotions of beauty; and when do we suffer them to pass without notice? If such sounds were beautiful in themselves, what would be the consequence? When such associations are dissolved, what follows? How is this illustrated, from a deceptive cascade—the tinkling of the sheepfold bell—and the sound of the hunting horn? Of the same bell in the evening and at noon, what is observed? What says Dr. forbear to detail them. Upon the supposition of any original and independent beauty in sounds, such variations are alto.' gether unaccountable.

I shall only farther observe upon this subject, that when it is considered, how few sounds are beautiful amid the infinite number which occur in the scenes of nature, and that wherever they do occur, there is always some pleasing or interesting quality of which they are expressive, there arises a very strong presumption, independently of all other considerations, that the beauty of such particular sounds is derived from the qualities which they express, and not the effect of the mere sounds themselves.

PART II.

OF THE NOTES OF ANIMALS.

There are instances, I believe, both of sublimity and beauty in the notes of animals. That such sounds are associated with the qualities of the animals to which they belong, and become expressive of these qualities, cannot, I think, be denied. There are besides other associations we have with them, from their manner of life, the scenes which they usually inhabit, and the countries from which they come.

I. That the notes or cries of some animals are sublime, every one knows; such as the roar of the lion, the growling of bears, the howling of wolves, the scream of the eagle, &c. In all those cases, these are the notes of animals remarkable for their strength, and formidable for their ferocity. It would seem very natural, therefore, that the sublimity of such sounds should arise from the qualities of which they are expressive; and which are of a nature fitted to excite very powerful emotions in our minds.

That this is in reality the case, and that it is not the sounds

Beattie of the flute of a shepherd? Upon what supposition are such variations unaccountable? What only, on this subject, is farther observed?

In what are there instances, both of sublimity and beauty? Of such sounds what cannot be denied? From what have we other associations with them? Of the notes or cries of some animals, what is observed; and what are examples? These are the notes of animals of what kind? Of the sublimity of

themselves which have this effect, appears to be obvious from the two following considerations:

1. When we have no associations of this kind, such sounds are productive of no such emotion. There is not one of these sounds which may not be imitated in some manner or other; and which, while we are ignorant of the deception, does not produce the same emotion with the real sound : when we are undeceived, however, we are conscious of no other emotion, but that, perhaps, of simple pain from its loudness. The howl of the wolf is little distinguished from the howl of the dog, either in its tone or in its strength, but there is no comparison between their sublimity. There are few, if any of these sounds so loud as the most common of all sounds, the lowing of a cow; yet this is the very reverse of sublimity. Imagine this sound, on the contrary, expressive of fierceness or strength, and there can be no doubt that it would become sublime. The hooting of the owl at midnight, or amid ruins, is strikingly sublime. The same sound at noon, or during the day, is very far from being so. The scream of the eagle is simply disagreeable, when the bird is either tamed or confined; it is sublime only, when it is heard amid rocks and deserts, and when it is expressive to us of liberty, and independence, and savage majesty. The neighing of a war-horse in the field of battle, or of a young and untamed horse when at large among mountains, is powerfully sublime. The same sound in a cart-horse, or a horse in the stable, is simply indifferent, if not disagreeable. No sound is more absolutely mean, than the grunting of swine. The same sound in the wild boar-an animal remarkable both for fierceness and strength, is sublime. The memory of the reader will supply many other instances.

2. The sublimity of such sounds corresponds not to their nature as sounds, but to the nature of the qualities they signify. Sounds of all kinds are sublime, in proportion as they are expressive of power or fierceness, or strength, or any other quality capable

such sounds, what would seem very natural? Of this what is remarked? When we have no association of this kind, what is the consequence? What is the effect of imitating these sounds? When we are undeceived, of what only are we conscious? How is this illustrated from the howl of the wolf the lowing of a cow—the hooting of the owl—the scream of the eagle—the ueighing of a horse—and the grunting of swinc? To what does the sub-

128

of producing strong emotions in the animals which they distinguish. There are many instances, undoubtedly, where loud cries are sublime, but there are many also, where such notes are very far from being so. The lowing of cows, the braying of the ass, the scream of the peacock, and many other inoffensive birds, are only mean or disagreeable.

Low or feeble sounds, in the same manner, are generally considered as the contrary of sublime ; yet there are also many instances where such sounds are strongly sublime---when they distinguish the notes of fierce, or dangerous, or powerful animals. There is not a sound so generally contemptible as that which we distinguish by the name of hissing, yet this is the sound appropriated to serpents and the greater part of poisonous reptiles, and, as such, is extremely sublime. The noise of the rattlesnake, that most dangerous animal of all his tribe, is very little different from the noise of a child's plaything, yet who will deny its sublimity ! The growl of the tyger resembles the purring of a cat: the one is sublime, the other insignificant. Nothing can be more trifling than the sound produced by that little animal, which among the common people is called the death-watch; yet many a bold heart hath felt its power. The inhabitants of modern Europe would smile, if they were asked, if there were any sublimity in the notes of chickens, or swallows, or magpies; yet under the influence of ancient superstition, when such animals were considered ominous, the bravest among the people have trembled at their sound. The superstitions of other countries afford innumerable instances of the same kind.

If these illustrations are just, it should seem, that the sublimity of the notes of animals is to be ascribed to the associations we connect with them, and not to any original fitness in the mere sounds themselves, to produce this emotion.

17

limity of such sounds correspond ? In proportion to what are sounds of all kinds sublime ? Of loud sounds what is observed ? What sounds are mentioned as examples ? Of low or feeble sounds what is observed ? How is this illustrated from that sound to which we give the name of hissing—the noise of the ratilesnake—the growl of the tyger—the sound of the death-watch —the notes of chickens, or swallows, or magpies ? What afford innumerable instances of the same kind ? If these illustrations are just, what would seem

SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY

II. That the BEAUTY of the notes or cries of animals arise from the same cause, or from the qualities of which they are expressive to us, may perhaps be obvious from considerations equally familiar.

It seems, at least, very difficult to account for the instances of such sounds which are universally reckoned beautiful, if we consider the sounds themselves as the causes of this emotion. The number of notes is as various as the different species of animals, and amid these there are a thousand instances, where similar sounds are by no means productive of similar effects; and where, although the difference to the ear is extremely small, there is yet a great difference in their capacity of producing such emotions. If, on the contrary, we consider the source of their beauty as consisting in the pleasing or affecting qualities with which such sounds are associated, we have an easy solution of the difficulty, and which will be found at the same time perfectly to agree with the facts.

It would lead to a very long and very unnecessary inquiry, if I were to attempt to enumerate the various notes of this kind that are beautiful, and the different associations we have with them. That with many such sounds we have, in fact, such associations, is a matter, I apprehend, so conformable to every man's experience, that it would be superfluous to attempt to prove it.

There is indeed one class of animals, of which the notes are in a singular degree objects of beauty—I mean birds; and for this we may assign very sufficient reasons. 1st, Such notes approach much nearer than any other to the tones of the human voice, and are, therefore, much more strongly expressive to us of those qualities by which we are affected. 2dly, These animals are, much more than any other, the objects of our interest and regard: not only from our greater acquaintance with them, and from the minuteness and delicacy of their

to follow? Of the beauty of the notes of animals, what is observed ? If we consider the sounds themselves, as the cause of this emotion, what seems a difficult task? How is this illustrated from the number of notes of the different species of animals? What would lead to a very long, and very unnecessary inquiry? What remark follows? What is remarked of the notes of birds? What is the first reason for this...the second; and why? From what

forms, which renders them, in some measure, the objects of tenderness; but chiefly from their modes of life, and from the little domestic arrangements and attachments which we observe among them so much more strongly than among any other animals, and which indicate more affecting and endearing qualities in the animals themselves, than in any others we know. That we have such associations with birds is very obvious, from the use which is made of their instincts and manner of life, in the poetical compositions of all nations.

That it is from such associations, that the beauty of the notes of animals arises, may appear from the following considerations :

1. They who have no such associations, feel no emotion of beauty from them. A peasant would laugh, if he were asked if the call of a goat, or the bleat of a sheep, or the lowing of a cow were beautiful; yet in certain situations, all of these are undoubtedly so. A child shows no symptom of admiration at those sounds which are most affecting in natural scenery to other people. Every one will recollect, in what total indifference his early years were passed, to that multitude of beautiful sounds which occur in the country; and I believe, if we attend to it sufficiently, it will be found, that the period when we became sensible to their beauty, was when we first began to feel them to be expressive, either from our own observation of nature, or from the perusal of books of poetry. In the same manner, those who travel into very distant countries, are, at first insensible to the beauty which the natives of these countries ascribe to the notes of the animals belonging to them, obviously from their not having yet acquired the associations which are the foundation of their beauty. The notes which are sacred from any kind of superstition, are beautiful only to those who are under the dominion of that superstition. A foreigner does not distinguish any beauty in the note of the

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is it obvious that we have such associations with birds? What is said of those who have no such associations? How is this illustrated in the case of a peasant, and of a child? What will every one recollect; and when did we first become sensible to their beauty? In the same manner, what is observed of those who travel into very distant countries? To whom only, are the notes which are sacred from any kind of superstition, beautiful? How is this illustrated from the notes of the stork? When only are such sounds as are stork. To the Hollander, however, to whom that bird is the object of a very popular and very pleasing superstition, this note is singularly beautiful.

2. Such sounds as are either from experience, or from imagination, associated with certain qualities capable of producing emotion, are beautiful only when they are perceived in those tempers of mind which are favorable to these emotions. In. stances of this are very numerous. The bleating of a lamb is beautiful in a fine day in spring : in the depth of winter it is very far from being so. The lowing of a cow, at a distance, amid the scenery of a pastoral landscape in summer, is extremely beautiful: in a farmyard it is absolutely disagreeable. The hum of the beetle is beautiful in a fine summer evening, as appearing to suit the stillness and repose of that pleasing season : in the noon of day it is perfectly indifferent. The twittering of the swallow is beautiful in the morning, and seems to be expressive of the cheerfulness of that time; at any other hour it is quite insignificant. Even the song of the nightingale, so wonderfully charming in the twilight, or at night, is altogether disregarded during the day; so much so, that it has given rise to the common mistake, that this bird sings only at night. If such notes were beautiful in themselves, independently of all associations, they would, necessarily, at all times be beautiful.

3. In this, as in other cases before mentioned, when such associations are destroyed, the beauty of the sounds ceases to be felt. The call of a goat, for instance, among rocks, is strikingly beautiful, as expressing wildness and independence. In a farm yard, or in a common enclosure, it is very far from being so. The plaintive and interesting bleat of the lamb ceases to be beautiful whenever it ceases to be the sign of infancy, and the call for that tenderness which the infancy of all animals so naturally demands. There is a bird that imitates

associated with certain qualities capable of producing emotions beautiful? How is this illustrated from the bleating of a lamb—the lowing of a cow—the hum of the beetle—the twitter of the swallow—and the song of the nightingale? If such notes were beautiful in themselves, what would follow? In this, as in other cases before mentioned, when does the beauty of the sounds cease to be felt? How is this remark illustrated from the call of the goat the plaintive and interesting bleat of the lamb—the mocking bird—and people

the notes of all other birds with great accuracy. Such imita. tions, however, are not in the least beautiful in it. There are people, in the same manner, who imitate the song of birds with surprising dexterity. It is the imitation, however, in such a case, that alone pleases us, and not the notes themselves. It is possible, according to the curious experiments of Mr. Barrington, to teach a bird of any species the notes of any other species : It may however, I think, very justly be doubted, whether the acquired notes would be equally beautiful. The connexion we observe between particular birds, and the peculiar scenes in nature which they inhabit, and the different seasons at which they appear; and the great difference in their instincts and manner of life, render their notes expressive to us of very dissimilar characters; and we accordingly distinguish them by epithets expressive of this variety. The wildness of the linnet, the tenderness of the redbreast, the pertness of the sparrow, the cheerfulness of the lark, the softness of the bullfinch, the plaintiveness of the nightingale, the melancholy of the owl, are expressions in general use, and the associations we thus connect with them, very obviously determine the character or expression of their notes. By the artificial education before mentioned, all these associations would be destroyed ; and, as far as I am able to judge, all, or at least a great part of the beauty we feel from their songs. It is in the same manner that we are generally unhappy, instead of being delighted with the song of a bird in the cage.. It is somewhat like the smile of grief, which is much more dreadful than tears, or like the playfulness of an infant, amid scenes of sorrow. It is difficult therefore to say, whether in this cruel practice there is a greater want of taste or of humanity; and there could be, in fact, no excuse for it, if there were not a kind of tenderness excited towards them, from the reflection that they are altogether de-

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who imitate the sound of birds? What, according to Mr. Barrington, may be done; but what, however, may be justly doubted? What render the notes of birds expressive to us of dissimilar characters; and how do we accordingly distinguish them? What examples are mentioned, illustrative of this remark? By the artificial education before mentioned, what effect would be produced? We are generally affected in the same manner by what; and why? Of this cruet practice, what therefore is observed; and under what circumstances

pendent upon our benevolence, and a very natural gratitude awakened, by the exertions they make for our pleasure.

I forbear to produce any farther illustrations on this subject. From those that have been produced, it seems to me that we have sufficient ground for concluding, that, of those sounds which have been considered, the sounds that occur in the scenes of nature, and the sounds produced by animals, the sublimity or beauty arises from the qualities of which they are considered as the signs or expressions, and not from any original fitness in the sounds themselves to produce such emotions.

I have only farther to add, that upon the principle of the absolute and independent sublimity or beauty of sounds, it is very difficult to account for the different sounds which have been mentioned as productive of these emotions. There is certainly no resemblance as sounds, between the noise of thunder and the hissing of a serpent—between the growling of a tyger and the explosion of gunpowder—between the scream of an eagle and the shouting of a multitude; yet all of these are sublime. In the same manner, there is as little resemblance between the tinkling of the sheepfold bell, and the murmuring of the breeze between the hum of the beetle, and the sound of the lark—between the twitter of the swallow, and the sound of the curfew ; yet all of these are beautiful. Upon the principle which I endeavor to illustrate, they are all perfectly accountable.

PART III.

OF THE TONES OF THE HUMAN VOICE.

There is a similar sublimity or beauty felt in particular notes or tones of the human voice.

That such sounds are associated in our imaginations, with the qualities of mind of which they are, in general, expressive,

In what is there a similar beauty or sublimity? Of these sounds what is obvious? How have these been regarded by philosophers; and of this

would there be no excuse for it? From the illustrations that have been produced, for what conclusion have we sufficient ground? What only has our author farther to add? How is this remark illustrated? In the same manner, there is as little relation between what? How are they all perfectly accountable?

and that they naturally produce in us the conception of these qualities, is a fact so obvious, that there is no man who must not have observed it. There are some philosophers who consider these as the natural signs of passion or affection, and who believe that it is not from experience, but by means of an original faculty, that we interpret them : and this opinion is supported by great authorities. Whether this is so, or not, in the present inquiry, is of no very great importance; since, although it should be denied that we understand such signs instinctively, it cannot be denied, that very early in infancy this association is formed, and that our opinions and conduct are regulated by it.

That the beauty or sublimity of such tones arises from the nature of the qualities they express, and not from the nature of the sounds themselves, may, perhaps, appear from the following observations:

1. Such sounds are beautiful or sublime, only as they express passions or affections which excite our sympathy. There are a great variety of tones in the human voice, yet all these tones are not beautiful. If we inquire what are the particular tones which are so, it will universally be found, that they are such as are expressive of pleasing or interesting affections. The tones peculiar to anger, peevishness, malice, envy, misanthropy, deceit, &c. are neither agreeable nor beautiful. The tone of good nature, though very agreeable, is not beautiful except at particular seasons, because the quality itself is, in general, rather the source of complacence than pleasure : we regret the want of it, but we do not much enjoy its presence. On the contrary, the tones peculiar to hope, joy, humility, gentleness, modesty, melancholy, &c. though all extremely different, are all beautiful; because the qualities they express are all the objects of interest and approbation. In the same manner, the tones peculiar to magnanimity, fortitude, self-denial,

opinion what is observed? Why is it not of great importance, in the present inquiry, to ascertain whether this is so or not? What remark follows? Such sounds are beautiful or sublime, only as they express what? Of the variety of tones in the human voice, what is observed? What tones are so? How is this illustrated? Why are the tones peculiar to hope, joy, &c., beautiful? What tones are peculiar to the sublime; and why? Of this coincidence of

patience, resignation, &cc. are all sublime; and for a similar reason. This coincidence of the beauty and sublimity of the tones of the human voice, with those qualities of mind that are interesting or affecting to us, if it is not a formal proof, is yet a strong presumption, that it is from the expression of such qualities that these sounds derive their sublimity or beauty.

2. The effect of such sounds in producing these emotions, instead of being permanent, is limited by the particular temper of mind we happen to be in, or by the coincidence between that temper, and the peculiar qualities of which such sounds are expressive. To most men, for instance, the tone of hope is beautiful. To a man in despair, I presume it would be far from being so. To a man in grief, the tone of cheerfulness is simply painful. The tone of indignation, though in particular situations strongly sublime, to a man of a quiet and placid temper, is unpleasant. To men of an ardent and sanguine character, the tone of patience is contemptible. To peevish and irritable spirits, the voice of humility, so peculiarly beautiful, is provoking. Such observations may be extended to many diversities of passion: and it may still farther be remarked, that those sounds in the human voice, which are most beautiful or most sublime to us, are always those that are expressive of the qualities of mind, by which, from our particular constitutions or habits, we are most disposed to be affected. If the beauty or sublimity of such tones were independent of the qualities of mind we thus associate with them, such diversities could not happen, and the same sounds would produce uniformly the same emotions, as the same colors or smells produce uniformly the same sensations.

3. Similar tones, in this case, do not produce similar emotions, as should seem to happen if these effects were produced

the beauty and sublimity of the tones of the human voice, what is remarked? By what is the effect of such sounds in producing these emotions, limited? How is this illustrated from the tone of hope—the tone of cheerfulness—the tone of indignation—the tone of patience—the voice of humility? To what may such observations be extended; and what may still farther be remarked? Under what circumstances could not such diversities happen; and what would follow? Of similar tones in this case what is observed? How is this

by the mere sounds themselves. There is little affinity, for instance, between the low and depressed tone of grief, and the shrill and piercing note of joy; yet both are beautiful. There is little resemblance between the loud sound of rage, and the low placid tone of patience; yet both are, in many cases, sublime. The tone of peevishness is not very different from the tone of melancholy; yet the one is beautiful, but the other is positively disagreeable. The tone of pusillanimity is little distinguishable from the tone of patience; but how different in the effects they produce upon our minds!---Observations of this kind, it is in the power of every one to extend.

4. Whenever these tones are counterfeited, or whenever they cease to be the signs of those qualities of mind of which we have generally found them significant, they immediately cease to be, either sublime or beautiful. Every one must have observed that this is the effect of mimicry. Wherever, in the same manner, any species of deceit is used; or where we know that these tones are employed, without the existence of the correspondent passions, we no longer feel them to be beautiful or sublime. If the sounds themselves were the cause of these emotions, whatever we might think of the person, the sounds themselves would continue to produce the emotions of sublimity or beauty, in the same manner, as the most absurd misapplication of colors never disturbs our perception of them as colors.

5. There is yet a farther consideration, which may, perhaps, more clearly illustrate this opinion, viz. That the beauty or sublimity of such sounds in the human voice, altogether depends on our opinion of the propriety or impropriety of the affections which they express. We know either from nature, or from experience, that particular sounds or tones are the expression of

remark illustrated from the tone of grief, and the note of joy—the loud sound of rage, and the placid tone of patience—the tone of peevishness, and the tone of melancholy—the tone of pusillanimity, and the tone of patience? When do these tones cease to be either sublime or beautiful? When must every one have observed this to be the case? Where also is the same effect produced? If the sounds themselves were the cause of these emotions, what would follow? What farther consideration may, perhaps, more clearly illustrate this opinion? What do we know, either from nature or experience; and with what is the perception of such sounds immediately accompanied?

particular passions and affections; and the perception of such sounds is immediately accompanied with the conception of such affections in the person from whom they proceed. But it is only from actual observation or inquiry, that we can know what is the cause of these affections. Our sympathy, or our interest, it is plain, depends on the nature of this connexion,on our opinion of the propriety or impropriety of such affections in such circumstances. All this, however, does not, in any degree, affect the nature of the sound, which is still the same, whether the affection be proper or improper. It is very obvious, however, that our sense of the beauty or sublimity of such sounds, depends on our opinion of this propriety. No tone of passion or affection is beautiful, with which we do not sympathize. The tone of joy, for instance, is beautiful in most cases where it is heard. Suppose we find that such a sound proceeds from some very trifling or ridiculous cause, our sense of its beauty is instantly destroyed with our opinion of its propriety. The tone of melancholy, or moderated grief, is affecting and beautiful beyond most others: assign some frivolous reason for it, and instantly it becomes contemptible. The tone of patience is sublime in a great degree : tell us that it is pusillanimity, and its effect is instantly gone. The high, imperious note of rage is often sublime: a triffing cause renders it simply painful. The same observation may be extended to the tones of all our passions. It is, I conceive, extremely difficult, if not impossible, to account for this change of emotion, on the principle of the original and independent beauty of such sounds.

With regard to the human voice, however, it is to be observed, that besides all this, there is also a beauty in particular degrees of the same tones. Although the expression of the different passions is the same in all men, yet it necessarily happens, that there is a sensible difference in the degree or cha-

How only can we know the cause of these affections? On what does our sympathy or interest depend? Of all this, however, what is observed? On what is it obvious, that our sense of the beauty or sublimity of such objects depends? How is this illustrated from the tone of joy—the tone of melancholy—the tone of patience—and the note of rage? To what may the same observations be extended? To account for what is extremely difficult? With regard to the human voice, what is to be observed? Although the expression of the different passions is the same in all men, yet what necessarily

racter of these similar sounds. There is no man of any delicacy of organs, who must not have been sensible of such differences. These also are expressive to us of several qualities. They are, in the *first* place, expressive of the perfection or imperfection of the organs of speech, and of the health or indisposition of the person-circumstances which often determine in a great degree, when either of these expressions are strong, the pleasure or pain we have in their conversation. 2dly. They are expressive also of the temper or character of mind. As we are naturally led to judge of the character of the person, from the peculiar tones of his voice, and to believe that such passions have the principal dominion of his mind, which have the most prevalent expression in his speech, so we are led, in the same way, to judge of the degree or force of these passions, by the degree or strength of such tones in his voice. This kind of inference is so natural, that there is, perhaps, no person who has not made it. That the beauty of such degrees of sound arises from such associations is apparent, as it is expressive to us of moderation and self-command-as it expresses habit more than immediate impulse-as it is peculiar to such tones only as are expressive of affecting passions or dispositions of mind-as it is felt alone by those who are affected by such dispositions-and as it is beautiful only in those cases where this temperance of emotion, of which it is the sign, is considered proper. I forbear therefore any farther illustration of it.

The observations which I have offered on the subject of simple sounds, are, perhaps, sufficient to show, that the sublimity and beauty of these sounds arise, in all cases, from the qualities with which we have observed them connected, and of which they appear to us to be the signs or expressions; and that no sounds, in themselves, are fitted, by the constitution of our nature, to produce these emotions.

happens? Who must have been sensible of this? Of what qualities are these, in the first place, expressive in us; and of what, in the second place? What observation follows? Of this kind of inference what is observed? From what is it apparent that the beauty of such degrees of sound arises from such associations? The observations offered on the subject of simple

139

It is natural, however, to suppose, that in this, as in every other case, our experience should gradually lead to the formation of some general rules with regard to this expression; and that different sounds should appear to us to have a difference of character, according to the nature of the qualities with which we most frequently find them conjoined. This supposition will appear more probable, when we consider, not only that the diversities of sounds are few, and consequently that rules of this kind can be more easily formed; but particularly, that these diversities of sounds are the immediate expressions of different qualities of mind in the human voice, and consequently, that their character becomes more certain and definite.

I believe, in fact, that something of this kind takes place early in life, and that, long before we are able to attend to their formation, we have formed certain general associations, with all the great diversities of sound, and that, in after life, they continue to be generally expressive of these characters.

To enumerate these general expressions, is a very delicate, as well as a very difficult task. I hazard, therefore, the following observations, only as hints for the prosecution of the subject; and as I am sensible of their imperfection, I am willing to rest no conclusion upon them:

The great divisions of sound are into loud and low, grave and acute, long and short, increasing and diminishing. The two first divisions are expressive in themselves: the two last only in conjunction with others.

1. Loud sound is connected with ideas of power, and danger. Many objects in nature which have such qualities, are distinguished by such sounds, and this association is farther confirmed from the human voice, in which all violent and impetuous passions are expressed in loud tones.

sounds arc, perhaps, sufficient to show what? What is, however, in this, as in every other case, natural? What consideration will render the supposition more probable? On this subject, what does our author believe to be the case? Of the enumeration of these general expressions what is remarked? What does our author, therefore, hazard; and what is observed of them? What are the great divisions of sound; and what is observed of them? With what ideas is loud sound connected; and of many objects in nature which have such qualities, what is observed? What expression has loud sound; and

2. Low sound has a contrary expression, and is connected with ideas of weakness, gentleness and delicacy. This association takes its rise, not only from the observation of inanimate nature, or of animals, where, in a great number of cases, such sounds distinguish objects with such qualities, but particularly from the human voice, where all gentle, or delicate, or sorrowful affections, are expressed by such tones.

3. Grave sound is connected with ideas of moderation, dignity, solemnity, &c. principally, I believe, from all moderate, or restrained, or chastened affections being distinguished by such tones in the human voice.

4. Acute sound is expressive of pain, or fear, or surprise, &c. and generally operates by producing some degree of astonishment. This association, also, seems principally to arise from our experience of such connexions in the human voice.

5. Long or lengthened sound seems to me to have no expression in itself, but only to signify the continuance of that quality which is signified by other qualities of sound. A loud, or a low, a grave, or an acute sound prolonged, expresses, to us, no more than the continuance of the quality which is generally signified by such sounds.

6. Short or abrupt sound has a contrary expression, and signifies the cessation of the quality thus expressed.

7. Increasing sound signifies, in the same manner, the increase of the quality expressed : as

8. Decreasing sound signifies the gradual diminution of such qualities.

I shall leave the reader to attend to the diversity of expression which arises from the different combination of these diversities of sound.

The most sublime of these sounds appears to me to be a loud, grave, lengthened, and increasing sound.

with what ideas is it connected? From what does this association take its rise? With what ideas is grave sound connected; and why? Of what is acute sound expressive; and how does it generally operate? From what does this association also seem principally to arise? Of a long or lengthened sound what is observed? How is this illustrated? What expression has short or abrupt sound; and what does it signify? What do increasing and decreasing sounds respectively signify? What does our author leave to the The least sublime, to be a low, acute, abrupt, or decreasing sound.

The most beautiful, to be a low, grave, and decreasing sound.

The least beautiful, to be a loud, acute, lengthened, and increasing sound.

Such are the few general principles that, as far as I can judge, take place with regard to the sublimity or beauty of sounds. The innumerable exceptions that there are to every one of these rules, afford a sufficient proof, that this sublimity or beauty does not arise from the sounds themselves. Wherever, however, any new sound occurs, it is, I think, by its approach to one or an other of these classes that we determine its sublimity or beauty.

SECTION II.

OF COMPOSED SOUNDS, OR MUSIC.

I. In the preceding illustrations, I have considered only simple sounds as producing the emotions of sublimity or beauty.

Sounds, however, are capable of being united by certain laws, and of forming a whole. To such a composition of sounds we give the name of Music—an art, confessedly, of great power, in producing emotions, both of sublimity and beauty, and the source of one of the finest and purest pleasures of which our nature is susceptible.

Upon this subject, I shall beg leave to offer a few observations, although it is with great diffidence that I speak upon an art of which I have no theoretical knowledge, and of which I can judge only from the effect that it produces on myself.

The essence of music consists in continued sounds. The same sound, however, when continued, has no beauty, farther

142

reader? Of these sounds which are the most sublime—which the least sublime—which the most beautiful—which the least beautiful? What remark follows?

What only have been considered in the preceding illustrations? How are sounds capable of being united? What name is given to such a composition of sounds; and what is said of it? How does our author speak on this subject; and why? In what does the essence of music consist; and of the same sound when continued, what is observed? What consequence follows?

than as a simple sound, and when long continued, becomes positively disagreeable : Music therefore must necessarily consist in the composition of different sounds.

The succession or composition of all different sounds is not equally pleasing. By a peculiar law of our nature, there are certain sounds of which the union is agreeable, and others of which the union is disagreeable. There is, therefore, a relation between sounds, established by nature, which cannot be violated without pain. Music, consequently, as an art intended to produce pleasure, must consist in the composition of related sounds.

These observations are sufficiently obvious. There are, however, two other circumstances in the succession of sounds, necessary to constitute music.

1. The mere succession of related sounds is not, in itself, pleasing. Although the succession of any two related sounds is agreeable, yet a whole series of such sounds, in which no other relation was observed but the relation between individual sounds, would be absolutely disagreeable. To render such a series pleasing, it is necessary that it should possess unity, or that we should discern a relation not only between the individual sounds, but also among the whole number of sounds that constitute the series. Although every word in language is significant, and there is a necessary relation among words, established by the rules of grammar; yet it is obviously possible to arrange words according to grammatical rules, which yet shall possess no meaning. In the same manner, a series of sounds may be composed, according to their individual relations, which yet may possess no general relation, and from which, as we can discover no end, we can derive no pleasure. What thought is to the arrangement of words, the key, or the fundamental tone, is to the arrangement of sounds; and as the one constitutes a whole in language, by establishing a certain and definite idea, to which all the words in a sentence bear a relation, so the other

Why is not the succession of all different sounds pleasing? Of the relation, therefore, established between sounds, what is observed? Of what must music consequently consist? Of these observations what is remarked; yet what follows? Of the succession of any two related sounds, what is observed? To render such a series pleasing, what is necessary? How is this fully illustrated? What is, therefore, the first circumstance that distinguishes

constitutes a whole in music, by establishing a definite and leading sound, to which all the other sounds in the series bear a similar relation. The first circumstance, therefore, that distinguishes musical succession, is the preservation of this relation among all the individual sounds, to one key, or fundamental tone, which is the foundation and end of the composition.

2. The second circumstance which distinguishes musical succession, is the regularity or uniformity of that succession. In natural events, succession without regularity is confusion; and wherever art or design is supposed, is positively disagreeable. In music therefore, as an art designed to please, regularity or uniformity is absolutely necessary. The most pleasing succession of sounds, without the preservation of this regularity, or what is commonly called time, every one knows, is positively displeasing. For this purpose, every succession of sounds is supposed to be divided into certain equal intervals, which, whether they comprehend more or fewer notes, occupy the same space of time in the succession of these notes. То preserve this uniformity, if there are few sounds in this interval, these sounds must be prolonged to occupy the whole space of time. If there are many, they must be sounded quickly for The one constitutes what, in common lanthe same reason. guage, is called slow time, the other what is called quick. In both cases, however, the space or portion of time allotted to each interval is uniformly the same, and constitutes the only regularity of which sounds in succession are capable. A regular or uniform succession of sounds, therefore, related to one key or fundamental note, may be considered as constituting musical succession, and as distinguishing it from all other successions of sound. The accurate perception both of this regularity, and of this relation, constitutes that faculty which is generally called a good, or a musical ear.

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144

musical succession? What is the second? What is observed of succession without regularity in natural events; and what, consequently, follows in music? What does every one know to be positively displeasing? For this purpose, how is every succession of sound divided? To preserve this uniformity, what is requisite? If there are many how must they be sounded; and why? In both cases, what is the case? Of a regular or uniform sound, therefore, what is observed? What constitutes a good one? If music be

II. If, therefore, we consider music to be such a succession of sounds as I have now described, the two circumstances which distinguish or determine the nature or character of every composition, are, the nature of the key, and the nature of the progress; the nature of the fundamental and governing sound, and the nature, or as it is commonly called, the time of the succession.

With both of these characteristics of musical composition I apprehend that we have many associations.

The key or fundamental tone of every composition, from its relation to the tones of the human voice, is naturally expressive to us of those qualities or affections of mind which are signified by such sounds. It is, perhaps, unnecessary to offer any illustration of this, because it is so obvious to every man's observation. The relation of such tones in music to the expression of the qualities of mind is indeed so strong, that all musicians understand what keys or what tones are fitted for the expression of those affections, which it is within the reach of music to express. It is also observable, that they who are most unacquainted with music, are yet able immediately to say, what is the affection which any particular key is fitted to ex. press. Whether any piece of music is beautiful or not, may be a subject of dispute, and very often is so; but whether the sounds of which it is composed are gay or solemn, cheerful or melancholy, elevating or depressing, there is seldom any dispute.

That the time of musical composition is also expressive to us of various affecting or interesting qualities, can scarcely be disputed. In all ages, quick time, or a rapid succession of sounds, has been appropriated to the expression of mirth and gaiety: slow time, or a slow succession of sounds, to the expression of melancholy or sadness. All the passions or affec-

considered such a succession of sounds as has been described, what two circumstances determine the nature of every composition? What have we with both of these characteristics of musical composition? Of what is the key of every composition naturally expressive? Why is it not necessary to offer any illustration of this? Of the strength of this relation, what is remarked? What is also observable? What observation follows? Of the time of musical composition, what is remarked? How is this illustrated from the uniform appropriation of quick time; and of slow? On the manner in which

tions, therefore, which partake of either of these ingredients. may be generally expressed by such circumstances in the composition, and the different degrees of such movements may, in the same manner, express such affections as partake of any intermediate nature between these extremes. In what manner the conception of such affections is associated with such circumstances in the progress of sound, it is not my business to explain: it is sufficient that the fact itself is acknowledged. I cannot avoid, however, observing, that there is a very strong analogy, not only between the progress of musical sounds, and the progress of sounds in the human voice, in the case of particular passions; but that there is, also, a similar analogy between such progress in sounds, and the progress of thought in the case of such passions. Under the influence of pleasing or agreeable passions, the articulation is quick; in the case of contrary passions it is slow: and so strong is this expression, that we are disposed to judge of the passion with which any person is affected, although we do not hear the words he utters, merely from the slowness or rapidity of his articulation. It is observable, in the same manner, that different passions have an influence upon the progress of our thoughts, and that they operate very sensibly either in accelerating or retarding this progress. All the passions which belong to pleasure, are attended with a rapid succession of thoughts, and seem to give an unusual degree of vigor to our imagination. The passions, on the contrary, which belong to pain, produce, in general, a slow and languid succession of thought, and seem to depress our imagination below its usual tone. This is so obvious, that every person must have observed it, even in conversation.

The progress of musical sounds, therefore, may very naturally express to us the nature or character of particular passions, not only from the analogy between such progress of sounds, and the progress of thought; but still more from its

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the passions or affections may be expressed, what remark follows? What is it not the business of our author to explain; and what is sufficient? What observation, however, can he not avoid making? How is this observation illustrated? What is, in the same manner, observable? How is this illus trated from the passions that belong to pleasure, and from those that belong to pain? Where must every person have observed this to be the case? What may the progress of musical sound very naturally express to us; and in what

being, in a great measure, the sign of such affections of mind, by making use of the same sounds or tones, and the same varieties in the progress of these sounds, which are, in real life, the signs of such affections in the human voice. Whether these observations account for the associations we have with musical time or not, is at present a matter of no consequence, as the fact itself is sufficiently certain. The appropriation of particular time, to particular emotions, has taken place in every age and country, is understood by every man, and is not the less certain, though no account can be given of the reason of it.

It is in thus being able to express both the tone of passion or affection, and that progress of thought or sentiment which belongs to such affections, that, in as far as I am able to judge, the real foundation of musical expression consists, It is far beyond the bounds which I prescribe to myself in these observations, to enter into any minute investigation of the different expressions which such sounds, and such compositions of sounds in general possess. But if the reader will recollect, what are the distinct associations which it has formerly been observed we have with sounds or tones, as loud or soft, grave or acute, and the particular associations which it has now been observed we have with the different pregressions of sound, as quick, or moderate, or slow; and will further attend to the possible number of ways in which these different characteristics of music may be combined, he will be fully sensible, both of the different emotions which it is in the power of music to express, and of the great variety which it affords in the expression of these emotions.

If I am not mistaken, the real extent of musical expression coincides in a great degree with this account of it. These signs in the human voice are general signs. They express particular classes of passion or emotion, but they do not express

manner? What is, at present, a matter of no consequence; and what remark follows? In what does the real sound of musical expression consist? What is far beyond the bounds which our author has here prescribed to himself? By recollecting what, will the reader be fully sensible, both of the different emotions, which it is in the power of music to express, and of the great variety which it affords in the expression of these emotions? From what does it appear that these signs in the human voice are general signs? If we

any particular passion. If we had no other means of intercourse or of information, we might from such signs infer, that the person was elevated or depressed, gay or solemn, cheerful or plaintive, joyous or sad; but we could not, I think, infer, what was the particular passion which produced these expres-Music, which can avail itself of these signs only, can sions. express nothing more particular than the signs themselves. It will be found, accordingly, that it is within this limit that musical expression is really confined; that such classes of emotion it can perfectly express; but that when it goes beyond this limit. it ceases to be either expressive or beautiful. The general emotions of gaiety, elevation, solemnity, melancholy, or sadness, it is every day found to express; and with regard to such general expressions there is never any mistake; but when it attempts to go further-when it attempts to express particular passions, ambition, fortitude, pity, love, gratitude, &c. it either fails altogether in its effect, or is obliged to have recourse to the assistance of words to render it intelligible. "It is in general true," says Dr. Beattie, "that poetry is the most immediate and the "most accurate interpreter of music. Without this auxiliary, "a piece of the best music, heard for the first time, might be "said to mean something, but we should not be able to say It might incline the heart to sensibility, but poetry or " what. " or language would be necessary to improve that sensibility "into a real emotion, by fixing the fancy upon some definite "and affecting ideas. A fine instrumental symphony, well "performed, is like an oration delivered with propriety, but "in an unknown tongue; it may affect us a little, but con-"veys no determinate feeling. We are alarmed, perhaps, or "melted, or soothed; but it is very imperfectly, because we "know not why. The singer, by taking up the same air, "and applying words to it, immediately translates the oration "into our own language. Then all uncertainty vanishes, the "fancy is filled with determinate ideas, and determinate emo-"tions take possession of the heart."-Essay upon Poetry and Music, part 1, chap. vi.

had no other means of information, what might we, but what could we not infer? What remark follows; and what will, accordingly, be found to be true? How is this illustrated? What remark of Dr. Beattie is here intro-

148

Nor is this confining the expression of which music is capable within narrower limits than is consistent with our experience of its effects. Although its real power consists in its imitation of those signs of emotion or passion which take place in the human voice, yet from its nature it possesses advantages which these signs have not, and which render it, within those limits, one of the most powerful means which can be used in exciting emotion. As far as I am able to judge, these advantages principally consists in the two following circumstances—

1. In that variety of sounds which it admits in conformity to the key, or fundamental tone. In the real expression of passion in the human voice, the sound is nearly uniform, or at least admits of very small variation. So far, therefore, as mere sound is concerned, the tone of any passion would, in a short time, become unpleasing from its uniformity; and if this effect were not forgotten, in our attention to the language and sentiments of the person who addresses us, it would be perceived by every ear. In music, on the contrary, the variety of related sounds which may be introduced, not only prevents this unpleasing effect of uniformity, and preserves the emotion which the prevailing tone is, of itself, able to excite, but, by varying the expression of it, keeps both our attention and our imagination The one resembles what we should feel continually awake. from the passion of any person, who uniformly made use of the same words to express to us what he felt. The other, what we feel from that eloquence of passion, where new images are continually presenting themselves to the mind of the speaker, and a new source of delight is afforded to our imagination, in the perception of the agreement of those images with the emotions from which they arise. The effect of musical composition, in this light, resembles, in some measure, the progress of an oration, in which our interest is continually kept alive; and if it were possible for us, for a moment, to forget that the performer

duced? This is not confining the expression of which music is capable within what? What observation follows? What is the first circumstance in which these advantages consist? In the real expression of passion in the human voice, what is observed of the sound; and what remark follows? What, on the contrary, is the case in music? What do they respectively resemble? What does the effect of musical composition, in this light, resemble; and under what circumstances might it be said to resemble the effect of

is only repeating a lesson, were it possible for us to imagine, that the sounds we hear were the immediate expressions of his own emotion, the effect of music might be conceived, in some measure, to approach to the effect of eloquence. To those who have felt this influence, in the degree in which, in some seasons of sensibility, it may be felt, there is no improbability in the accounts of the effects of music in earlier times, when the professions of poetry and music were not separated: when the bard, under the influence of some strong and present impression, accommodated his melody to the language of his own passion; and when the hearers, under the influence of the same impression, were prepared to go along with him, in every variety of that emotion which he felt and expressed himself.

2. But, besides this, there is another circumstance in which the expression of music differs materially from the expression of natural signs, and which serves to add considerably to the strength of its effect. Such natural sounds express to us immediately, if they express at all, the emotion of the person from whom they proceed, and therefore immediately excite our own emotion. As these sounds, however, have little or no variety, and excite immediately their correspondent emotion, it necessarily happens, that they become weaker as they proceed, until at last they become positively disagreeable. In musical composition, on the contrary, as such sounds constitute a whole, and have all a relation to the key, or fundamental note in which they close, they not only afford us a satisfaction as parts of a regular whole, but, what is of much more consequence, they keep our attention continually awake, and our expectation excited, until we arrive at that fundamental tone, which is both the close of the composition, and the end of our expectation. Instead, therefore, as in the former case, of our emotion becoming more languid as the sounds proceed, it becomes, in the case of musical composition, on the contrary, more strong. The peculiar affection we feel is kept continually increasing,

eloquence? To those who have felt this influence very considerably, in what accounts is there no improbability? But besides this there is what? What do such natural sounds immediately express to us? As these sounds have little or no variety, what follows? In musical composition, on the contrary, what is their effect? What remark follows? How is this illustrated? In

by means of the expectation which is excited for the perfection of this whole, and the one and the other are only gratified when we arrive at this desired and expected end.

In this respect, indeed, musical expression is in itself superior even to the expression of language; and were the passions or affections which it can express, as definite or particular as those which can be communicated by words, it may well be doubted, whether there is any composition of words, which could so powerfully affect us, as such a composition of sounds. In language, every person under the influence of passion or emotion, naturally begins with expressing the cause of his emotion-an observation, which every one must have made in real life, and which might easily be confirmed by instances from dramatic poetry. In this case, our emotion is immediately at its height. and as it has no longer any assistance from curiosity, naturally cools as the speaker goes on. In music, on the contrary, the manner of this communication resembles the artful, but interesting conduct of the epic or dramatic poem, where we find ourselves at once involved in the progress of some great interest, where our curiosity is wound up to its utmost to discover the event, and where at every step this interest increases, from bringing us nearer to the expected end. That the effect of musical composition is similar, that while it excites emotion from the nature of the sounds, it excites also an increasing expectation and interest from the conduct of these sounds, and from their continued dependence upon the close, has, I am persuaded, been felt in the strongest manner by every person of common sensibility; and indeed is, in itself, extremely obvious, from the effect which is universally produced by any pathetic composition upon the audience. The increasing silence---the impatience of interruption, which are so evident as the composition goes on-the arts by which the performer is almost in. stinctively led to enhance the merit of the close, by seeming to

this respect, musical expression is superior to what; and what observation follows? In language, how does every person, under the influence of passion, begin? Of this observation, what is remarked? In this case, what is observed of the emotion? In music, on the contrary, what does the manner of this communication resemble; by which, how are we affected? What observation follows? What testify, in the strongest manner, the increasing nature

SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY

depart from it—the suppression of every sign of emotion till the whole is completed, and the violence either of sensibility or applause, that are immediately displayed, whenever a full and harmonious close is produced; all testify, in the strongest manner, the increasing nature of the emotion, and the singular advantage which music thus possesses, in keeping the attention and the sensibility so powerfully awake.

Such seems to me the natural effect of music on the human mind: in expressing to us those affections or emotions, which are signified by the tones of the voice, and the progress of articulate sounds; limited, indeed, in the reach of its imitation or expression, and far inferior to language, in being confined to the expression only of general emotions; but powerful within those limits, beyond any other means we know, both by the variety which it can afford, and the continued and increasing interest which it can raise.

It is obvious, that the observations which I have now offered, relate principally to vocal music, and to that simple species of composition, which is commonly called song, or air. I believe it will be found that this is in reality, not only the most expressive species of composition, but the only one which affects the minds of uninstructed men. It is the only music of early ages. the only music of the common people, the only music which pleases us in infancy and early youth. It is a considerable time before we discern the beauties of more artificial composition, or indeed before we understand it. In such kinds of composition, a young person, whatever may be his natural taste, seldom discovers any continued relation. He is disposed to divide it in his own mind into different parts; to consider it as a collection of distinct airs; and he is apt to judge of it, not as a whole, but as the separate parts of it are expressive to him or not. There is nothing accordingly more common, than to find young people expressing their admiration of a particular strain or divi-

of the emotion? In expressing what, does this seem to be the effect of music upon the human mind? In what respect is it inferior to language; but what is observed of it within those limits? To what do these observations obviously relate? Of this species of composition, what is remarked? It is the only music of whom, and of what period? What remarks follow? What, among young people is, accordingly, very common? But what are they seldom able sion of the composition, and such strains are always the most simple, and those which approach most to the nature of airs; but it is seldom, I believe, that they are able to follow the whole of a concerto, or that they are found to express their admiration of it as a whole.

With such a species of composition, however, they who are instructed in music have many and very interesting associations, A song or an air leads us always to think of the sentiment, and seldom disposes us to think of any thing else. An overture, or a concerto, disposes us to think of the composer. It is a work in which much invention, much judgment, and much taste may be displayed; and it may have, therefore, to those who are capable of judging of it, all that pleasing effect upon the mind, which the composition of an excellent poem or oration has upon the minds of those who are judges of such works. The qualities of skill, of novelty, of learning, of invention, of taste, may, in this manner, be expressed by such compositions -qualities, it is obvious, which are the foundation, both of sublimity and beauty in other cases, and which may, undoubtedly, be the foundation of such characters in musical composition, even although it should have no other or more affecting expression to recommend it. Nor is this all; such compositions are not read in private, but are publicly recited. There is. therefore, the additional circumstance of the performance to be attended to-a circumstance of no mean consequence, and of which every man will acknowledge the importance, who recollects the different effects the same composition has produced on him, when performed by different people. There is, therefore, the judgment, the taste, the expression of the performer, in addition to all those different qualities of excellence which may distinguish the composition; and the whole effect is similar to that which every one has felt from any celebrated

to do? How is such a species of composition regarded by those who are instructed in music? How does a song or an air always affect us? How, an overture; and of it, what is observed? What qualities may be expressed by such compositions; and of them, what is remarked? As such compositions are publicly recited, what follows; and of this circumstance, what is remarked? In addition to these advantages, what others has it; and the whole effect is similar to what? What remark follows? While music possesses this power,

piece of poetry, when recited by an able and harmonious declaimer. Even to the very worst music this gives an effect, and the effect may easily be conceived when the music also is good.

III. While music has this power in expressing some of the most interesting and affecting passions of the human mind; and is, in its more artificial state, significant to us of so many pleasing and delightful qualities, it will not, I hope, be considered rash, if I presume to think that from these associations it derives all its power in producing the emotions of sublimity or beauty, and that wherever it does produce either of these effects, it is by being expressive to us, either of some interesting passion, or of some valuable and pleasing quality in the composition, or the performance.

When any musical composition affects us with the emotions, either of sublimity or beauty, it should seem that this effect must arise from one or other of the following causes : 1st, From the nature of the single or individual sounds which enter into the composition. 2dly, From the nature of the composition itself, or from those laws, which, as has before been observed, are necessary to render a succession of sounds agreeable, or to constitute music : or, 3dly, From the associations we connect with it, or the qualities of which it is expressive to us. That the beauty or sublimity of single sounds is not a quality of the sounds themselves, but arises from their expression, I have already endeavored to illustrate. That the beauty of musical composition does not arise from the second of those causes, or from the circumstances of the composition itself, and that it is altogether to be ascribed to the qualities of which it is expressive to us, I am disposed to conclude from the following considerations :

1. If the beauty of music arose from the regular composition of sounds, according to those laws, which are necessary

what opinion should not be considered rash? When any musical composition affects us with the emotions, either of sublimity or beauty, from what must this effect arise? What has our author already endeavored to illustrate? From the following considerations, what is he disposed to conclude? If the beauty of music arose from the regular composition of sounds, &c.

to constitute music, or an agreeable succession of sounds, it would necessarily follow, that every composition, where these laws were observed, would be beautiful. Every man, however, knows that there is a very wide distinction between music and beautiful music. If a composition is expressive of no sentiment, a common hearer feels no beauty from it : if it is quite common, and has neither novelty nor skill in it, a connoisseur in music feels as little. If it has neither one nor the other, all the world pronounce it bad music. Yet such a composition may be perfectly regular, may be in obedience to the strictest laws of composition; and will give to every one that inferior pleasure which arises from a regular succession of sounds. As there is, therefore, a very evident distinction between that mechanical pleasure which we receive from mere music, and that delight which we feel from music when beautiful or sublime, it is obvious that the mere regular composition of related sounds, is not the cause of the emotions either of sublimity or beauty.

2. If the beauty of music arose from any of those qualities, either of sound, or of the composition of sounds which are immediately perceivable by the ear, it is obvious, that this would be expressed in language, and that the terms by which such music was characterized, would be significant of some quality or qualities discernible by the ear: If, on the contrary, this beauty arises from the interesting or affecting qualities of which it is expressive to us, such qualities, in the same manner, ought, in common language, to be assigned as the causes of this emotion; and the terms by which such music is characterized ought to be significant of such qualities. That the last is the case, I think there can be no dispute. The terms plaintive, tender, cheerful, gay, elevating, solemn, &c. are not only constantly applied to every kind of music that is either sublime or beautiful; but it is, in fact, by such terms only that men ever

what would necessarily follow? What, however, does every man know? What remark follows; and of such a composition, what is observed? From this, what conclusion is drawn? If the beauty of music arcse from any of those qualities, &c., what would obviously follow? If, on the contrary, this beauty arises from the interesting or affecting qualities of which it is expressive to us, what should be the consequence? From what does it appear

characterize the compositions from which they receive such emotions. If any man were asked what it was that rendered such an air so beautiful, he would immediately answer, because it was plaintive, solemn, cheerful, &c. but he never would think of describing its peculiar nature as a composition of sounds. In the same manner, if he were accounting to any person for the beauty or sublimity of any composition-if he were to describe it in the most accurate way possible, as having particular characters of composition, he might, indeed, make him wonder at his learning, but he would leave him as ignorant as before, with regard to the source of its beauty. Were he to tell him, on the other hand, that it was expressive of melancholy, gajety, or tenderness, he would make him understand, at once, the reason of his emotion. If the beauty or sublimity of music arose from the laws of its composition, the very reverse of all this would obviously be the case.

It is observable, in the same manner, that even they who are best acquainted with the principles of composition, and who are most disposed to forget the end, in attending to the rules of the science, never think of expressing the beauty or sublimity of any piece of music, by terms significant of its nature as a composition, but by such as are significant of some pleasing or interesting association. If they forget the expression of music, they never forget the merits of the composer. When they speak, therefore, of the sublimity or beauty of any such composition, if they are farther questioned upon the subject, it will always be found, that it is either the learning, the invention, or the taste, which it displays, that they assign as the foundation of their admiration, or some other quality, either in the composition or performance, perfectly distinct from the mere qualities, either of sound or composition. This universal

that this last is the case? If any man were asked what it was that rendered such an air so beautiful, what would he reply? In the same manner, if he were accounting for the beauty or sublimity of any composition, what would be the effect of minute description, and of expression of its general characteristics? Under what circumstances would the reverse of this be the case? What, in the same manner, is also observable? If they forget the expression of music, what do they never forget? When they speak of the sublimity or beauty of such composition, if farther questioned upon the subject, what will they assign as the foundation of their admiration? Of

language of mankind is not only a proof of the connexion between the beauty and sublimity of music, and the expressions which it conveys; but it is impossible that this language should ever have been either employed, or understood, if the sublimity or beauty of music were independent of such expressions.

3. If the beauty or sublimity of music depended solely upon the nature of its composition, and was independent of the qualities of which it is expressive, it would necessarily follow, that the same compositions must always be beautiful or sublime, which were once so; and that in every situation they must produce the same emotion, in the same manner as every other object of sense uniformly produces its correspondent sensation. The truth is, however, that no such thing takes place, and that on the contrary, music is beautiful or sublime, only when it is accommodated to the emotion which it is intended to express. If the passion of revenge, for instance, were expressed by the most beautiful composition of sounds conceivable, which either naturally, or from habit, were considered as expressive of tenderness, every man, instead of being affected with its beauty, would laugh at its absurdity. In the same manner, if love or tenderness were expressed by any sounds, or composition of sounds, generally appropriated to the expression of rage, or revenge, however sublime they might be according to their own expression, they would undoubtedly cease to be so by such an appropriation. Instances of the same kind might easily be multiplied. If we could suppose, that, by a miracle, the present system of sounds in the human voice were altogether changed; that the tones which now express mirth, should then express melancholy, the sounds which now express rage, should then express tenderness, &c., and that a similar revolution should, at the same time, take place in the expression of the progress of sounds. I think every man will allow, that the

what is this universal language of mankind a proof? If the beauty or sublimity of music depended solely upon the nature of its composition, &c., what would necessarily happen? What, however, is the truth on this subject? How is this illustrated from the passion of revenge—and of love? Upon what supposition would the whole system of music, of necessity, be changed; and what would follow? In such a case, what would have undergone no revolu-

whole system of music must, of necessity, be changed; that a new music must arise, accommodated to this change in the system of expressive sounds, and that if it were not changed, instead of affording us any emotions of beauty or sublimity, it would either be unintelligible, or absolutely absurd : yet in such a case, all that arises from the mere mechanical structure of sounds would remain—all that is immediately perceived by the ear, either in sound itself, or in the composition of sound, would have undergone no revolution. There cannot well be a stronger proof, that the beauty or sublimity of music arises from the qualities which it expresses, and not from the means by which they are expressed.

4. It is observable, that the beauty or sublimity of music is felt by those who have no perception of the relation of sounds. either in point of tune or time, and who, consequently, must be unconscious of any pleasure that arises from the mere composition of sounds. Every one who will take the trouble of inquiring, will find many people who have, as is generally called, no musical ear, who are unabled to learn the simplest tune, and who can scarcely distinguish one tune from another, who are yet sensible to the beauty or sublimity of music, and who feel delight from different kinds of composition. The want of a musical ear is not uncommon ; but I believe there is no instance of any person who is insensible, either to the expression of different tones in the human voice, or who is not differently affected by the different progress of sounds. In such cases, although music has not the same extent of expression to them, that it has to those who are born with a good ear, yet still it has some expression; and the proof of it is, that although they cannot tell whether any note is just or not, or whether the time of any composition is perfectly preserved, they can still tell whether a song is gay or plaintive, whether fitted to inspire mirth or melancholy. They have, therefore, that degree of delight from it, which the scenes of nature usually inspire,

tion? Of what is this a strong proof? By whom is it observable that the beauty or sublimity of music is felt? People of what kind will every one, who will take the trouble of inquiring, find? Though the want of a musical ear is not uncommon, yet of persons of what sort is there no instance? In such cases, what is observed; and what is the proof of this? What degree

where a general but indistinct relation is observed to some interesting or affecting qualities, and where, in consequence of this relation, such scenes naturally tend to excite or to encourage a correspondent emotion; but they are insensible to that greater delight, which, as has already been shown, every man of a good ear feels, both from the variety of this expression, and from the continued and increasing interest which it awakens. If the sublimity or beauty of music arose from the discernment of such relations as constitute the laws of composition, it is obvious that they, who are incapable of discerning such relations, would be incapable, at the same time, of discovering either its sublimity or beauty.

In the preceding observations, I have considered only the permanent associations we have with musical composition, or the expressions which are every where felt, both in the tone and the time of such successions of sound, from their analogy to the character and progress of sound in the human voice. With music, however, we have often many accidental associations, both individual and national; and the influence of such associations upon our opinions of the beauty or sublimity of music might be shown from many considerations. On the one hand, from the dependence of the beauty of music upon the temporary or habitual dispositions of our minds-from the different effect which is produced by the same composition, according to the associations we happen to connect with it-and from the tendency which all national music has to render those who are accustomed to it, insensible to the beauty of any foreign music, from their association of particular sentiments with peculiar characters or modes of composition : And, on the other hand, from the influence of individual or national associations, in increasing the sublimity or beauty of music, both by increasing its natural expressions, and by rendering these expressions more definite and precise. I am unwilling, how-

of delight have they, therefore, for it; but to what are they insensible? If the sublimity or beauty of music arose from the discernment of such relations as constitute the laws of composition, what would follow? In the preceding observations, what only has our author considered? With music, however, what associations have we; and of their influence, what is observed ? From what, on the one hand, might this influence be shown ? On the other, from

SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY

ever, to swell these very imperfect remarks, by illustrations, which every one can so easily prosecute for himself.

From the whole, I am induced to conclude, that music is productive to us of two distinct and separate pleasures-

1. Of that mechanical pleasure, which, by the constitution of our nature, accompanies the perception of a regular succession of related sounds—

2. Of that pleasure which such compositions of sound may produce, either by the expression of some pathetic or interesting affection, or by being the sign of some pleasing or valuable quality, either in the composition or the performance.

That it is to this last source the beauty or sublimity of music is to be ascribed, or that it is beautiful or sublime only when it is expressive of some pleasing or interesting quality, I hope is evident from the preceding observations.

what? To do what is our author unwilling? From the whole, what is he induced to conclude? What is the first? What is the second? What, is it hoped, is evident, from the preceding observations?

CHAPTER III.

OF THE OBJECTS OF SIGHT.

THE greater part of the external objects, in which we discover sublimity or beauty, are such as are perceived by the sense of sight. It has even been imagined by some philosophers, that it is to such objects only that the name of beauty is properly applied, and that it is only from analogy that the same term is applied to the objects of our other senses. This opinion however, seems at first sight ill founded. The terms beauty and sublimity are applied by all men to sounds, and even sometimes to smells. In our own experience, we very often find, that the same emotion is produced by sounds, which is produced by forms or colors; and the nature of language sufficiently shows, that this is conformable also to general experience. There seems no reason, therefore, for limiting the objects of sublimity or beauty, to the sole class of visible objects.

It must, however, be acknowledged, that by far the greatest number of these objects are such as we discover by means of this sense; nor does it seem difficult to assign the reason of this superiority. By the rest of our senses, we discover single qualities of objects only; but by the sense of seeing, we discover all that assemblage of qualities which constitute, in our imaginations, the peculiar nature of such objects. By our other senses, we discover, in general, such qualities, only when the bodies are in contact with us; but the sense of sight affords us a very wide field of observation, and enables us to

By what sense are the greater part of external objects in which we discover sublimity or beauty, perceived ? What has, by some philosophers, been imagined ? Why does this opinion seem ill-founded ? In our own experience, what do we often find; and what does the nature of language sufficiently show ? For what, therefore, does there seem no reason ? What may, however, be acknowledged ? Why is it not difficult to assign the reason of this

make them the objects of attention, when they are at very considerable distances from ourselves. It is natural, therefore. that the greater power of this sense should dispose us to greater confidence in it, and that the qualities of bodies which we discover by means of it, should more powerfully impress themselves upon our imagination and memory, than those single qualities which we discover by the means of our other The visible qualities of objects, accordingly, become, senses. to us, not only the distinguished characteristics of external bodies, but they become also, in a great measure, the signs of all their other qualities; and by recalling to our minds the qualities signified, affect us, in some degree, with the same emotion which the objects themselves can excite. Not only the smell of the rose, or the violet, is expressed, to us, by their colors and forms; but the utility of a machine, the elegance of a design, the proportion of a column, the speed of the horse, the ferocity of the lion-even all the qualities of the human mind are naturally expressed to us by certain visible appearances: because our experience has taught us, that such qualities are connected with such appearances, and the presence of the one immediately suggests, to us, the idea of the other. Such visible qualities, therefore, are gradually considered as the signs of other qualities, and are productive, to us, of the same emotions with the qualities they signify.

But, besides this, it is also to be observed, that by this sense we not only discover the nature of individual objects, and therefore naturally associate their qualities with their visible appearance; but that by it also we discover the relation of objects to each other; and that hence a great variety of objects in nature become expressive of qualities which do not immediately belong to themselves, but to the object with which we have found them connected. Thus, for instance, it is by this sense we discover that the eagle inhabits rocks and mountains; that the red-breast leaves the woods in winter, to

superiority? What is, therefore, natural? Of the visible qualities of objects, accordingly, what is observed? How is this remark illustrated; and why is this the case? How are such visible qualities gradually considered; and of what are they productive? But besides this, what also is to be observed; and hence what follows? How is this illustrated from the eagle—the red-breastseek shelter and food among the dwellings of men; that the song of the nightingale is peculiar to the evening and the night, &c. In consequence of this permanent connexion, these animals acquire a character from the scenes they inhabit, or the seasons in which they appear, and are expressive, to us, in some measure of the character of these seasons and scenes. It is hence that so many objects become expressive, which, perhaps, in themselves, would never have been so; that the curfew is so solemn from accompanying the close of day, the twitter of the swallow so cheerful, from its being heard in the morning, the bleating of sheep, the call of the goat, the lowing of kine, so beautiful from their occurring in pastoral or romantic situations; in short, that the greatest number of natural objects acquire their expression from their connexion with particular or affecting scenes.

As, in this way, the visible qualities of objects become expressive to us of all the qualities which they possess; and besides, in so many cases receive expression from their connexion with other objects, it is extremely natural, that such qualities should form the greatest and most numerous class of the objects of material beauty.

I proceed to a more particular investigation of the sublimity and beauty of some of the most remarkable classes of these qualities.

SECTION I.

OF THE BEAUTY OF COLORS.

THE greater part of colors are connected with a kind of established imagery in our minds, and are considered expressive of many very pleasing and affecting qualities.

With what are the greater part of colors connected; and how are they considered? In what may these associations be included? When we have been

and the nightingale? What is the consequence of this permanent connexion? Hence what follows? Why should such qualities form the greatest and most numerous class of the objects of material beauty? To what does our author now proceed?

These associations may, perhaps, be included in the following enumeration: 1st, Such as arise from the nature of the objects thus permanently colored: 2dly, Such as arise from some analogy between certain colors, and certain dispositions of mind: and 3dly, Such as arise from accidental connexions, whether national or particular.

1. When we have been accustomed to see any object capable of exciting emotion, distinguished by some fixed or permanent color, we are apt to extend to the color, the qualities of the object thus colored; and to feel, when separated from it, some degree of the same emotion which is properly excited by the object itself. Instances of this kind are within every person's observation. White, as it is the color of day, is expressive to us of the cheerfulness or gaiety which the return of day brings. Black, as the color of darkness, is expressive of gloom and melancholy. The color of the heavens, in serene weather, is blue: blue therefore is expressive to us of somewhat the same pleasing and temperate character. Green is the color of the earth in spring: it is consequently expressive to us of some of those delightful images which we associate with that season. The colors of vegetables and minerals acquire, in the same manner, a kind of character from the character of the species which they distinguish. With the expression of those colors, which are the signs of particular passions in the human countenance, and which, from this connexion, derive their effect, every one is acquainted.

2. There are many colors which derive expression from some analogy we discover between them and certain affections of the human mind. Soft or strong, mild or bold, gay or gloomy, cheerful or solemn, &c. are terms in all languages applied to colors—terms obviously metaphorical, and the use of which indicates their connexion with particular qualities of mind. In the same manner, different degrees or shades of the

accustomed to see any object capable of exciting emotion, distinguished by some permanent color, to it what are we apt to extend; and to feel what? How is this remark illustrated from the colors of white—black—the color of the heavens—green—and the colors of vegetables and minerals? With what is every one acquainted? From what do many colors derive their expression? What are examples; and what is observed of them? In the same manner, same color have similar characters, as strong, or temperate, or gentle, &c. In consequence of this association, which is, in truth, so strong, that it is to be found among all mankind, such colors derive a character from this resemblance, and produce, in our minds, some faint degree of the same emotion, which the qualities they express are fitted to produce.

3. Many colors acquire character from accidental associa-Purple, for instance, has acquired a character of dignity, tion. from its accidental connexion with the dress of kings. The colors of ermine have a similar character from the same cause. The colors, in every country, which distinguish the dress of magistrates, judges, &c. acquire dignity in the same manner. Scarlet, in this country, as the color which distinguishes the dress of the army, has, in some measure, a character correspondent to its employment; and it was perhaps this association, though unknown to himself, that induced the blind man, mentioned by Mr. Locke, to liken his notion of scarlet to the sound of a trumpet. Every person will, in the same manner, probably recollect particular colors which are pleasing to him, from their having been worn by people whom he loved, or from some other accidental association.

In these several ways, colors become significant, to us, of many interesting or affecting qualities, and excite, in us, some degree of the emotions which such qualities, in thmeselves, are fitted to produce. Whether some colors may not, of themselves, produce agreeable sensations, and others, disagreeable sensations, I am not anxious to dispute: but wherever colors are felt as producing the emotion of beauty, that it is by means of their expression, and not from any original fitness in the colors, themselves, to produce this effect, may, perhaps, be obvious from the following considerations:—

1. The different sentiments of mankind, with regard to the beauty of colors, are inconsistent with the opinion that such

what is observed of different degrees or shades of the same color; and of this association what is remarked? How does it appear that many colors acquire character from accidental association? What was the effect of this association upon the blind man mentioned by Mr. Locke? In the same manner, what will every person probably recollect? In these several ways, of what do colors become significant; and what excitement do they produce? What is our author not anxious to dispute; but from the following considerations,

qualities are beautiful in themselves. It is impossible to infer, that because any particular color is beautiful in one country, it will also be beautiful in another : and there are, in fact, many instances where the same color produces very different opinions of beauty in different races of men. Black, to us, is in general an unpleasant color. In Spain, and in Venice, it is otherwise. Yellow is, to us, at least in dress, a disagreeable color. In China, it is the favorite color. White is, to us, extremely beautiful. In China, on the contrary, it is extremely disagreeable. Instances of the same kind must have occurred to every person.

If we inquire, on the other hand, what is the reason of this difference of opinion, we shall uniformly find that it arises from the different associations which these different people have with such colors; and that their opinion of their beauty is permanently regulated by the nature of the qualities of which they are expressive. Black is to us an unpleasent color, because it is the color appropriated to mourning. In Venice and Spain, it is the color which distinguishes the dress of the great. Yellow is in China the imperial color, and sacred to the emperor and his property : it is therefore associated with ideas of mag. nificence and royalty. Among us it has no distinct associa-Utits degree, or shade. White is beautiful to us in a supreme degree, as emblematical, both of innecessory In China, on the other hand, it is the color appropriated to mourning, and consequently, very far from being generally beautiful. In the same manner, wherever any peculiar colors are permanently favorite, there will always be found some pleasing associations which the people have with that color, and of which they, in some measure, consider it significant.

> 2. It is farther observable, that no colors, in fact, are beautiful, but such as are expressive to us of pleasing or interesting

what may be obvious? What are inconsistent with the opinion that such qualities are beautiful in themselves? What is it impossible to infer; and of what are there many instances? How is this illustrated from black, yellow, and white? If we inquire what is the reason of this difference of opinion, what shall we find it to be? How is this remark illustrated from the different effects of black, yellow, and white? In the same manner, wherever any peculiar colors are permanently favorite, what will follow? What is farther

qualities. All colors obviously are not beautiful: the same colors are beautiful only when they are expressive of such qualities; and, in general, I believe it will be found, that among all the variety of colors with which we are acquainted, those only are beautiful which have similar expressions.

The common colors, for instance, of many indifferent things which surround us, of the earth, of stone, of wood, &c. have no kind of beauty, and are never mentioned as such. The things, themselves, are so indifferent to us, that they excite no kind of emotion, and of consequence their colors produce no greater emotion, as the signs of such qualities, than the qualities themselves. The colors, in the same manner, which distinguish the ordinary dress of the common people, are never considered as beautiful. It is the colors only of the dress of the great, of the opulent, or of distinguished professions, which are ever considered in this light. The colors of common furniture, in the same way, are never beautiful : it is the colors only of fashionable, or costly, or magnificent furniture, which are ever considered as such.

It is observable, farther, that even the most beautiful colors, or those which are expressive to us of the most pleasing associations, cease to appear beautiful whenever they are familiar, or when the objects which they distinguish have ceased to produce their usual emotions. The blush of the rose, the blue of a serene sky, the green of the spring, are beautiful only when they are new, or unfamiliar. In a short time we observe them with the same indifference with which we observe the most common and unnoticed colors. That, in the same manner, our perception of their beauty depends on the state of our own minds, and that it is only in seasons of sensibility that we are conscious of it, is a fact which every man knows so well from his own experience, that it would be needless to illustrate it.

It may be observed, also, that no new color is ever beau-

observable; and what remarks follow? How is this illustrated from the common colors of many indifferent things which surround us?---the ordinary dress of the common people--the dress of the great?---and common and costly furniture? When do the most beautiful colors cease to appear beautiful? What illustration follows? With what fact, also, is every man so familiar,

tiful, until we have acquired some pleasing association with it, This is peculiarly observable in the article of dress; and indeed it is the best instance of it, because in such cases, no other circumstance intervenes by which the experiment can be influenced. Every man must have observed, that, in the great variety of new colors which the caprice of fashion is perpetually introducing, no new color appears at first to be beautiful. We feel, on the contrary, a kind of disappointment, when we see such a color in the dress of those 'who regulate the fashions, instead of that which used to distinguish them; and even, although the color should be such, as in other subjects we consider as beautiful, our disappointment still overbalances the pleasure it might give. A few weeks, even a few days, alter our opinion; as soon as it is generally adopted by those who lead the public taste, and has become, of consequence, the mark of rank and elegance, it immediately becomes beautiful. This, it is observable, is not peculiar to colors that, in themselves, may be agreeable; for it often happens, that the caprice of fashion leads us to admire colors that are disagreeable; and that not only in themselves, but also from the associations with which they are connected. A plain man would scarcely believe, that the colors of a glass bottle, of a dead leaf, of clay, &c. could ever be beautiful; yet within these few years, not only these, but some much more unpleasant colors that might be mentioned, have been fashionable and admired. As soon, however, as the fashion changes-as soon as they whose rank or accomplishments give this fictitious value to the colors they wear, think proper to desert them, so soon the beauty of the color is at an end. A new color succeeds; a new disappointment attends its first appearance: its beauty is gradually acknowledged; and the color which was formerly the favorite, sinks into neglect and

that it would be needless to illustrate it? Of new colors, what is observed? In what is this peculiarly the case; and why is it the best instance of it? What must every man have observed; and when do we, on the contrary, feel a kind of disappointment? When does it become beautiful? How does it appear that this is not peculiar to colors that, in themselves, may be agreeable? What would a plain man scarcely believe; yet what follows? When does a new color succeed; and what follows? Under what circumstances

contempt. If the faculty by which the beauty of colors is perceived, had any analogy to a sense, it is obvious that such variations, in our opinion of their beauty, could not take place.

3. When the particular associations we have with such colors are destroyed, their beauty is at the same time also destroyed.

The different machines, instruments, &c. which minister to the convenience of life, have in general, from the materials of which they are composed, or from the uses to which they are applied, a fixed and determined color. This color becomes accordingly in some degree beautiful, from its being the sign of such qualities; and although this effect is, in a great measure, lost from the frequency of observation, it is still observable upon many occasions. Change the accustomed color of such objects, and every man feels a kind of disappointment. This is so strong, that even if a color more generally beautiful is substituted, yet still our dissatisfaction is the same, and the new color, instead of being beautiful, becomes the reverse. Rosecolor, for instance, is a more beautiful color than that of mahogany; yet if any man were to paint his doors and windows with rose-color, he would certainly not add to their beauty. The color of a polished steel grate is agreeable, but is not, in itself, very beautiful. Suppose it to be painted green, or violet, or crimson, all of which are much more beautiful colors, and the beauty of it will be altogether destroyed. The colors of cedar, of mahogany, of satin-wood, are not nearly so beautiful as many other colors that may be mentioned. There is no color, however, with which such woods can be painted, that would be so beautiful as the colors of the woods themselves; because they are very valuable, and the colors are, in some measure, significant to us of this value. Instances of this kind are innumerable.

There are different professions in every country, which are distinguished by different colored dresses. Whatever may

could not such variations take place? Of the different machines, instruments, &c., that minister to the convenience of life, what is remarked? From what does this color become, in some degree, beautiful; and what is said of this effect? Change the accustomed color of such objects, and what will follow? Of the strength of this disappointment, what is observed? How is this illustrated from the color of rose-wood?—from a polished grate?—and from the

have led to this appropriation, and however fanciful and extravagant it may sometimes be, after it is established, there is felt a kind of propriety in the dress; and it is strongly associated in our minds with the qualities which such professions seem to indicate. We are in some measure disappointed, therefore, when we see a professional man not in the dress of his profession ; and when he is in this dress, we conceive that there is a propriety and beauty in such a color. Change the colors of these several dresses, and all this species of beauty is destroyed. We should not only laugh at the supposition of the army and navy being dressed in black, and the church and the bar in scarlet ; but we should feel, also, a discontent, as if these colors had, in themselves, a separate expression, and were in these cases misapplied. Even in reversing the dress of individuals of these different professions, the whole beauty of their dress is destroyed; and we are conscious of a feeling of impropriety, as if the qualities which are peculiar to such professions were necessarily connected with the dress they wear. So strong is this association even in trifles, and so naturally do colors become expressive to us of the qualities with which we have found them generally connected.

In natural objects the same circumstance is very apparent. There are colors, perhaps, more generally beautiful than those which distinguish trees, or rocks, or waters, or cottage's, or ruins, or any of the ordinary ingredients of rural 'scenery; yet no colors, but the natural, could possibly be beautiful, in the imitation of such scenes; because no other colors could be expressive, to us, of those qualities which are the sources of our emotion from such objects in nature. That all the beauty, in the same manner, of plants or animals, would be destroyed, if any new colors, however generally beautiful, were substituted in the place of those by which nature has

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colors of cedar, mahogany, and satin wood? What is remarked of colors peculiar to the dresses of particular professions? When we see a professional man not in the dress of his profession, and when he is in this dress, how are we affected? Change the color of these several dresses, and what will be the consequence? How is this illustrated? What is the effect of reversing the dress of individuals of the different professions? How does it appear that in natural objects the same circumstance is apparent? Of the obviousness of the beauty of plants and animals, from the same associations, what is remarked? distinguished their different classes, and which are of consequence associated in our minds with all the qualities which they possess, is so obvious, that it is altogether unnecessary to attempt the illustration of it. That this principle applies also to the colors of dress, and that the same color is beautiful or not, as the expression which it has is suited to the character or situation of the person who wears it, every person may satisfy himself by a little attention. As thus there is no color whatever, which, in all situations, is beautiful, and as, on the contrary, the beauty of every color is destroyed, whenever the associations we have with it are dissolved, it seems reasonable to conclude, that the beauty of such qualities arises from their expression, and not from any original fitness in them to produce this emotion.

4. If the beauty of colors arose from any original fitness in ! them to produce this emotion, it is apparent, that they who are incapable of such perceptions, must be incapable of such emotion. That the blind, however, may receive the same delight, from the ideas which they associate with colors, that they do who see, is a fact of which I think every one will be convinced,¹ who reads the poems of Dr. Blacklock. No man who is not acquainted with the history of their ingenious author, could perceive that he had the misfortune to lose his sight in early infancy. That from conversation, and from the perusal of books of poetry, it was possible for him to learn the distinguishing colors of certain objects, and to apply them with sufficient propriety in his own verses, I do not deny ; but the circumstance of importance at present is this, that his poetry is full of the same sentiments, and expresses the same admiration with regard to the different visible qualities of matter, with that of poets who have had no such defect; and that the same power is ascribed to them in producing the emotions of beauty, and with as great accuracy with regard to particular instances, as in

Of what may every person satisfy himself by a little attention? What conclusion seems reasonable? If the beauty of colors arose from any original fitness in them to produce this emotion, what is apparent? Of what will every one be convinced, who reads the poems of Dr. Blacklock? What could no man, unacquainted with his history, perceive? What does our author not deny; but at present what is the circumstance of importance? If our per-

the compositions of those who have had the sense of sight in its fullest perfection. If our perception of the beauty of colors arose from some original fitness in such qualities to produce this emotion, it is obvious, that the blind must be as incapable of perceiving this beauty, as of perceiving the colors themselves; but if the beauty of colors arises from the associations we connect with them, this fact, in the case of Dr. Blacklock, admits of a very simple solution. From reading, and from conversation, he has acquired the same associations with the words that express such colors, as we have with the colors themselves; that the word white, for instance, signifies a quality in objects expressive of cheerfulness and innocence; the word purple, the quality of majesty; the word black, the quality of gloom and melancholy, &c. In this case, it is obvious, that he may feel the same emotions from the use of these words, that we do from the colors which they express; and that from the permanence of these associations in a great variety of cases, he may apply the terms with sufficient propriety, either in sublime or beautiful description. As this is, in reality, the case, it seems to be a very strong confirmation of the opinion, that the beauty of such qualities arises from the associations we connect with them, and not from any original or independent beauty in the colors themselves.

ception of the beauty of colors arose from some original fitness in such qualities to produce this emotion, what is obvious; but what follows? From reading and from conversation, what has he acquired? What instances are mentioned? In this case what may he feel: and what may he do? As this is, in reality, the case, of what opinion does it seem to be a very strong confirmation?

CHAPTER IV.

OF FORMS.

OF all material qualities, that which is most generally, and most naturally productive of the emotions of sublimity and beauty, is form. Other qualities may be separated from most objects, without destroying their nature; but the form of every material object, in a great measure, constitutes its nature and essence, and cannot be destroyed, without destroying the individual subject to which it belongs. From whatever cause, therefore, the beauty of any material object proceeds, it is natural to ascribe it to the form, or to that quality which most intimately belongs to the object, and constitutes its essence to The common opinion, therefore, undoubtedly is, our senses. that forms, in themselves, are beautiful; that there is an original and essential beauty in some particular forms; and that this quality is as immediately discernible in them, as the forms themselves.

Philosophers, however, have not been satisfied with this common opinion. The supposition of such an original and independent beauty in forms, has been found inconsistent with many phenomena, and some more general principle was wanted, under which the different facts upon this subject might be tolerably arranged. Many theories, accordingly, have been formed to account for this species of beauty. Some have resolved it into a sense of proportion, and endeavored to establish, by

Of all material qualities, which is most naturally productive of the emotions of sublimity and beauty? What is remarked of other qualities; but of form, what is observed? What remark follows? What, therefore, is the common opinion? Of the supposition of such an original and independent beauty in forms, what is observed? Among the many theories that have been formed to account for this species of beauty, into what have some resolved it; and what have they endeavored to establish? What farther opinions have been

analogy from our other senses, certain proportions which are immediately and permanently beautiful. Others have accounted for this beauty from the union of uniformity and variety. Some have supposed it to arise from the consideration of utility. Others have asserted, that the beauty of forms arises from their commonness, and that the beautiful form is that which is most generally met with in objects of the same kind. Mr. Hogarth, in opposition to all, considers the beautiful form, as being described by lines of a particular kind, and has produced a great variety of instances in support of his opinion.

It is not my design at present, to enter into any examination of these several opinions. In all of them, I believe, there is something true to a certain extent; though I believe also, that they have arisen from a partial view of the subject, and are inadequate to account for the greater number of the phenomena.

I may be allowed, however, to observe, that of the two, the common opinion is by much the most defensible. To reduce the great variety of instances of beauty in forms to any single principle, seems, at first sight, altogether impossible; not only from this variety, but also, in innumerable cases, from the contrary nature of the forms, which, in fact, are beautiful. As no theory, besides, can possibly be maintained without some foundation in nature, the number of theories which have been produced upon this subject, are, in themselves, an evidence, that this beauty arises from more causes than any one of these theories comprehends.

The principle which I have endeavored to illustrate, with regard to the beauty and sublimity of sounds and colors, will, perhaps, be found to be equally applicable to the beauty or sublimity of forms: and as far as I can judge, is free from the objections which may be stated, both to the common and the philosophical opinions. In the observations which follow, I

maintained? What is Mr. Hogarth's opinion? What is not, at present, our author's design; and what does he, of all of them, believe? What, however, may he be allowed to observe? What seems, at first, altogether impossible; and why? As no theory can possibly be maintained without some foundation in nature, what follows? The principle already illustrated is equally applicable to what; and from what is it free? In the observations that follow; shall therefore endeavor to shew, that the sublimity or beauty of forms arises altogether from the associations we connect with them, or the qualities of which they are expressive to us; and I shall endeavor to explain, with as much accuracy as I am able, the different expressions of which forms are susceptible, and which are the foundation of that sublimity and beauty which we ascribe to them. The importance of the subject, will, I hope, be my excuse for the length, and perhaps for the tediousness of some of these illustrations.

Forms are naturally divisible into two kinds, into animated and inanimate forms. It is the latter of these only which I propose at present to consider; as it is obviously necessary first to consider the source of the beauty of which form itself is capable, before we can properly ascertain that superior beauty which arises from animation.

With regard to inanimate forms, the principal expressions which they have to us, seem to me to be, 1st, The expressions of such qualities as arise from the mature of the bodies distinguished by such forms; and, 2dly, The expressions of such qualities as arise from their being the subject or production of art. The first of these constitutes what may be called their NATURAL beauty; the second, what may be called their RELA-TIVE beauty. There is, also, another source of expression in such qualities from accidental association, and which, perhaps, may be termed their ACCIDENTAL beauty.

Upon each of these sources of the beauty of forms, I shall offer some observations.

therefore, what shall our author endeavor to show; and what shall he endeavor to explain? Of the importance of the work, what is observed? Into what two kinds are forms naturally divisible? Why does our author propose to consider the latter only? What seems to be the principal expression of inanimate forms? What do they respectively constitute? What other source of expression is there?

SECTION I.

OF THE NATURAL SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY OF FORMS.

PART I.

OF THE SUBLIMITY OF FORMS.

THE sublimity of inanimate forms seems to arise chiefly from two sources: 1st, From the nature of the objects distinguished by that form; and, 2dly, From the quantity or magnitude of the form itself. There are other circumstances in the nature of forms, which may extend or increase this character; but I apprehend that the two now mentioned, are the only ones, which, of themselves constitute sublimity. Both of them, I believe, are productive of this effect, by being expressive to us of qualities capable of exciting very strong emotions.

I. 1. The forms which distinguish bodies that are connected in our minds with ideas of danger or power, are in general sublime. There is scarcely any thing in inanimate nature more remarkably so, than all those forms which are appropriated to the instruments of war. The forms of cannon, mortars, &c, have all a character of this kind. Military ensigns, although approaching to very common and neglected forms, partake of the same character. There are few things more sublime than the forms of armor, particularly the steel armor, which was in use in the middle ages. Even the familiarity of common use does not altogether destroy this effect—the sword, the spear, the javelin, the dagger, are still sublime forms, and enter with propriety, into the sublimest descriptions, either of poetry or painting.

From what two sources does the sublimity of inanimate forms seem to arise? Of other circumstances in the nature of forms, what does our author remark? How are both of them expressive to us of this effect? What forms are, in general, sublime? What forms are remarkably so? What are examples? Of military ensigns, and of the forms of armor, what is observed? What is remarked of the effect of the familiarity of common use;

2. The forms that in general distinguish bodies of great duration, and, which, of consequence, express to us great power or strength, are in most cases sublime. In the vegetable kingdom, the forms of trees are sublime, principally in proportion to their expression of this quality. Nothing is more sublime than the form of rocks, which seem to be coëval with creation, and which all the convulsions of nature have not been able to destroy. The sublimest of all mechanical arts is architecture, principally from the durableness of its productions; and these productions are, in themselves, sublime, in proportion to their antiquity, or the extent of their duration. The Gothic castle is still more sublime than all, because, besides the desolation of time, it seems also to have withstood the assaults of war.

3. The forms which distinguish bodies that are connected in our minds, with ideas of splendor or magnificence, are in general sublime. The forms of the throne, the sceptre, and the diadem, approach, in fact, to very common and very neglected forms, yet they are all sublime, from being the signs of the splendor and magnificence of royalty. The triumphal car, and the triumphal arch, are sublime forms, from similar associations.

4. The forms in the same manner, which distinguish bodies connected in our minds with ideas of awe or solemnity, are in general sublime. The forms of temples, although very different as forms, have, in all ages been accounted as sublime. Even the most common forms employed in religious service, derive a character of this kind from the qualities with which they are connected. The thunderbolt of Jupiter, the trident of Neptune, &c. seem to have been considered by the ancients as sublime forms, although, in themselves, they are insignificant. The forms of all those things, in the same manner, which are employed in the burial of the dead, are strikingly sublime. The pall, the hearse, the robes of mourners, &c. even the plumes,

177

and what instances of illustration are mentioned? What other forms are also in most cases sublime? How is this illustrated from the forms of trees —the forms of rocks—the forms of architecture—and the gothic castle? What other forms are, in general, sublime? How is this illustrated from the forms of the throne, the sceptre, the diadem, and the triumphal car and arch? What other forms are, in general, in the same manner sublime? How is this illustrated from the forms of temples—the forms employed in religious service—the thunderbolt of Jupiter—and in the pall, the hearse, and the robes of mourning?

which in general are so beautiful, and the color of which is in most cases so cheerful, are, in this situation, above all other things, powerfully sublime.

That these and probably other associations of a similar kind, have an effect in bestowing sublimity upon the forms which generally distinguish such bodies, every person, I think, will be satisfied, both from his own experience, and from conversation. That the sublimity of such forms arises from the qualities which they express, and not from an original fitness in any peculiar form to produce this emotion, is so apparent, from the single consideration of the great variety of forms that are sublime, that I will not fatigue the reader by any further illustration of it.

II. The sublimity of forms, in many cases also, arises from their magnitude; and this quality, alone, is often sufficient to bestow sublimity. With magnitude, accordingly, we have many distinct and powerful associations.

In animal forms, magnitude is strongly associated in our minds with the idea of proportionable power or strength; and is chiefly sublime from its expression of this quality. Animals of great size, but feeble or harmless, are so far from being sublime, that they are in general contemptible—a fact which may easily be observed, even in the opinions of children.

In inanimate forms, magnitude seems to have different expressions to us, according to its different appearance or description.

Magnitude in height, is expressive of elevation and magnanimity. The source of this association is so obvious, and the association itself so natural, that such qualities of mind, have, in all ages, been expressed by these images, and such magnitudes described by terms drawn from these qualities of mind.

Magnitude in depth is expressive of danger or terror, and from

Of what may every one be satisfied, both from his own experience, and from conversation? What remark follows? From what does the sublimity of forms, in many cases, also arise; and of this quality, what is observed? In animal forms, with what is magnitude strongly associated; and why is it sublime? What is remarked of feeble animals of great size? According to what, does magnitude in inanimate forms vary in its expression? Of what is magnitude in height expressive; and of this association what is observed?

178

our constant experience, of images of horror. In all countries, the popular hell is considered an unfathomable abyss, into which the souls of the wicked are plunged.

Magnitude in length, is expressive of vastness, and when apparently unbounded, of infinity; that being naturally imagined to be without end, to which we can discern none. It is impossible to see a vast plain, and above all, the ocean without this impression. In spite of the knowledge we have of the immense space between us and the fixed stars, and of the comparatively trifling distance between any two points in this globe, yet the former is not nearly so sublime as the view of the ocean without shore, or even of a great plain without bounds.

Magnitude in breadth, is expressive of stability, of duration, and of superiority to destruction. Towers, forts, castles, &c. are sublime in consequence of this association, though very often they have no other considerable magnitude. The pyramids of Egypt are strikingly sublime in point of form, from this expression, as well as from the real knowledge we have of their duration. We are so accustomed to judge of the stability of every thing by the proportion of its base, that terms borrowed from this material quality, are, in every language, appropriated to the expression of some of the sublimest conceptions we can form—to the stability of nations, of empires, of the laws of nature, and of the future hopes of good men.

For the reality of these associations, I might appeal to every man's own experience, as well as to the common language of mankind. That it is from such expressions, or from being the sign of such qualities that magnitude is sublime, and not from any original fitness in the quality itself to produce this emotion, seems to be obvious from the following considerations: 1st, That there is no determinate magnitude, which is solely or peculiarly sublime, which would necessarily be the case, were

Of what is magnitude in depth expressive? How is this illustrated? Of what is magnitude in length expressive; and why? What illustration of this remark follows? Of what is magnitude in breadth expressive? How is this illustrated from towers, forts, castles, and the pyramids of Egypt? What remark follows? For the reality of these associations, to what might our author appeal? From what considerations does it appear that the sublimity of magnitude arises from such associations?

magnitude, itself, the cause of this emotion; 2dly, That the same visible magnitude, which is sublime in one subject, is often very far from being sublime in another, and vice versa: and 3dly, That magnitude, according to its different appearances, has different characters of sublimity corresponding to the different expressions which such appearances have; whereas if it were, in itself, sublime, independently of all expression, it would, in all cases, have the same degree, and the same character of sublimity.

PART II.

OF THE NATURAL BEAUTY OF FORMS.

THE most obvious definition of FORM, is that of matter, bounded or circumscribed by lines. As no straight line, however, can include matter, it follows, that the only lines which can constitute form, must be either angular, curved or winding lines. Every form whatever must be composed, either by one or other of these lines, or by the union of them.

When forms are composed by one of these lines solely, they may be termed SIMPLE forms. When they are composed by the union of them, they may be termed COMPLEX forms.

For the sake of perspicuity, I shall first consider what it is that constitutes the beauty of simple forms, and then, what constitutes the beauty of complex forms.

Simple forms may be considered as described, either by angular or winding lines. These different forms seem to me to be connected, in our minds, with very different associations, or to be expressive to us of very different qualities. I shall beg leave to mention some of these, without pretending to a complete enumeration.

1. The greater part of those bodies in nature, which possess hardness, strength, or durability, are distinguished by angular

180

What is the most obvious definition of form? As no straight line, however, can include matter, what follows? Of what must every form be composed? When may forms be termed simple forms; and when complex? For the sake of perspicuity, what order does our author propose to pursue? How may simple forms be considered? Of these different forms what is remarked? What bodies are distinguished by angular forms; and what by winding or

forms. The greater part of those bodies, on the contrary, which possess weakness, fragility, or delicacy, are distinguished by winding or curvilinear forms. In the mineral kingdom, all rocks, stones, and metals—the hardest and most durable bodies we know, universally assume angular forms. In the vegetable kingdom, all strong and durable plants are, in general, distinguished by similar forms. The feebler and more delicate race of vegetables, on the contrary, are mostly distinguished by winding forms. In the animal kingdom, in the same manner, strong and powerful animals are generally characterized by angular forms; feeble and delicate animals by forms of the contrary kind. In consequence of this very general connexion in nature, these different forms become expressive to us of the different qualities of strength and delicacy.

2. In all those bodies which have a progress, or which grow and decay within our own observation, the same character of form is observable. In the vegetable kingdom, the infancy or youth of plants is, in general, distinguished by winding forms. The infancy and youth of animals is, in the same manner, distinguished by winding or serpentine forms; their mature and perfect age, by forms more direct and angular. In consequence of this connexion, forms of the first kind become, in such cases, expressive to us of infancy, and tenderness, and delicacy; and those of the second kind, of ma urity, and strength, and vigor.

3. Besides these very obvious associations, it is also to be observed, that from the sense of touch, angular forms are expressive to us of roughness, sharpness, and harshness; winding forms on the contrary, of softness, smoothness, delicacy, and fineness; and this connexion is so permanent, that we immediately infer the existence of these qualities, when the bodies are only perceived by the eye. There is a very strong analogy between such qualities as are perceived by the sense of touch,

curvilinear? How is this illustrated from the mineral, the vegetable, and the animal kingdoms? What is the consequence of this very general connexion in nature? In what other bodies is the same character of form observable? What evidence of this is given from the vegetable and animal kingdoms? What is the consequence of this connexion? Besides these very obvious associations, what is also to be observed? From the permanency of this connexion what do we immediately infer? Between what qualities is there a very

and certain qualities of mind; as in all languages such qualities are expressed by terms drawn from the perceptions of the ex-Such forms, therefore, when presented to the ternal sense. eye, not only lead us to infer those material qualities which are perceived by the sense of touch, but along with these, to infer also those qualities of mind, which, from analogy, are signified by such qualities of matter, and to feel from them some degree of that emotion which these dispositions of mind, themselves, are fitted to, produce. The epithets bold, harsh, gentle, and delicate, are universally applied to forms. In all languages figurative expressions of a similar kind will be found; and whoever attends, either to his own feelings, or to the meanings, which men, in general, annex to such words in applying them to forms, will, I believe, be convinced, that the emotion which they signify, and are intended to signify, is founded upon the associated qualities, and very different from the mere agreeable or disagreeable sensation which the material qualities alone convey.

1. The observations which I have now made, relate principally to simple curves, or to forms in which a single curvature takes place; as the curve of the weeping willow, of the young shoots of trees, of the stem of the tulip, and the lily of the valley. There is another species of form, commonly distinguished by the name of the winding, or serpentine form, in which different curves take place, or in which a continued line winds into several curvatures. With this form, I apprehend we have another, and a very important association—I mean that of ease. From what cause this association arises, I will not now stop to inquire; but I conceive every one must have observed, that wherever we find vegetables, or any other delicate or attenuated body assume such forms, we are impressed with the conviction of its being easy, agreeable to their nature, and free

strong analogy; and why? To what inferences do such forms, when presented to the eye, lead? What epithets are universally applied to forms? As in all languages figurative expressions of a similar kind will be found, what follows? To what do the observations now made principally relate; and what examples are given? What other species of form is there, and what is asid of it? What association have we with this form; and what is observed of it? When such bodies, in the line of their progress, assume angular forms, what

from force or constraint. On the contrary, when such bodies, in the line of their progress, assume angular forms, we have a strong impression of the operation of force-of something that either prevents them from their natural direction, or that constrains them to assume an unnatural one. That winding forms are thus expressive to us of volition and ease, and angular forms of the operation of force or constraint, appears from a singular circumstance in language, viz. That, in general, all the former directions are expressed by verbs in the active voice; a river winds, a vine wreaths itself about the elm, a flower bends, &c. while, on the other hand, all directions of the latter kind are expressed, in general, by the passive voice of verbs. I believe, also, I may appeal to the observation of the reader, whether from the winding of a river, of the ivy, or of the tendrils of the vine, he has not an impression of ease, of freedom, of something agreeable to the object : and whether, in the contrary forms, in such cases, he has not an impression of uneasiness, from the conviction of force having been applied, or some obstacle having occurred, to constrain them to assume a direction unnatural to them. In general, therefore, I apprehend, that winding or serpentine forms are expressive to us of ease, and angular forms of force or constraint. Such seem to me the principal associations we have with the great division of simple forms; winding forms being expressive to us of fineness, delicacy, and ease; and angular forms of strength, roughness, and in some cases, of the operation of force or constraint.

All forms, as perceived by the eye, are constituted by lines; and their beauty is dependent upon the nature of these constituent parts. It is natural, therefore, to inquire, whether, from such associations, any general principles can be formed, which may direct the artist in the invention of beautiful forms, by determining the character and expression of lines.

is the consequence? From what singular circumstance in language, does this appear manifestly the case? For what does onr author think he may also appeal to the reader? In general, therefore, what does he apprehend? Of what are winding forms expressive; and of what, regular? Of what are all forms, as perceived by the eye, constituted; and upon what is their beauty dependent? What inquiry, therefore, is natural? How do lines differ? Lines differ either in regard to their nature, or their direction.

1. Lines differ in regard to their nature according to the different degrees of their consistence or strength. Strong and vigorous lines are expressive of strength and stability when perpendicular; and of some degree of harshness or roughness when horizontal, or in an oblique direction. Fine and faint lines are expressive of smoothness, fineness, and delicacy. In any given number of straight lines, that is always most beautiful which is finest, or which, while it preserves its continuity, has the appearance of the smallest quantity of matter employed in the formation of it. Hence, in every subject, either of art or nature, one of the principal causes of the beauty of delicate outline.

2. Lines differ in their direction in two ways: they are either even or uneven, that is, straight or irregular. Irregular lines differ again; they are either in angles or curves.

1. Even lines are expressive of softness and smoothness.

2. Uneven lines are either angular or winding.

Angular lines are expressive of harshness, roughness, &c. Winding lines of pliancy, delicacy, ease, &c.

The real and actual beauty of lines will be found to correspond to those associations; and these are in fact the most beautiful, which have the most pleasing or affecting expression.

1. Strong and even lines express strength and smoothness: they have therefore a degree of beauty. Fine and even lines express delicacy and smoothness: they are, accordingly, more beautiful than the former.

2. Strong and angular lines express strength and harshness: they are therefore very seldom beautiful. Fine angular lines

According to what do lines differ in regard to their nature? Of what are strong and rigorous lines expressive; and of what are faint? In any given number of straight lines, which is always most beautiful; and hence, what follows? In what two ways do lines differ in their direction? Of what are even lines expressive—of what, uneven? Of what, angular lines—of what, winding? On the real and actual beauty of lines, what remark follows? What do strong and even lines express; and what follows? What do fine and even lines express; and what is the consequence? What do strong and angular lines express; and what follows? What do fine angular lines

express delicacy, together with roughness: they are beautiful therefore only, when the expression of delicacy prevails over the other.

8. Strong and winding lines, express strength and gentleness, or delicacy. Their effect is mutually destroyed, and they are accordingly indifferent, if not unpleasing. Fine and winding lines express delicacy and ease: they are accordingly peculiarly beautiful.

4. The least beautiful lines are strong and angular, and the most beautiful are fine and winding.

Considering, therefore, lines in this abstracted view, and independent of the nature of the bodies which they distinguish, it seems very natural to conclude, that those forms will be the most beautiful which are described by the most beautiful lines, and that, of consequence, the serpentine or winding form must necessarily be the most beautiful. It was this view of the subject which seems to have influenced Mr. Hogarth, in the opinions which he published in his analysis of beauty. He saw clearly, and his art afforded him continual proofs of it, that the winding line was, of all others, the most beautiful in proportion to the predominance of this line in their composition; and his opinion falls in so much with the general observation of mankind, that it has been very universally adopted.

If, however, the observations which I have made upon the different expressions of forms are just—if the winding or serpentine form is beautiful, not of itself, and originally, but in consequence of the associations we connect with it, it ought to follow, that whenever this association is destroyed, the form should be no longer beautiful, and that wherever the same associations are connected with the contrary form, that form should then be felt as beautiful.

express; and when only are they beautiful? Of strong and winding lines, what is observed; and what is said of fine and winding lines? What are the least beautiful, and which the most beautiful lines? Considering, therefore, lines in this abstracted view, what does it seem natural to conclude? What was the consequence of this view of the subject to Mr. Hogarth? If the observations which our author has made on the different expressions of forms That this is actually the case, I shall now endeavor to show from several very familiar illustrations.

1. If such forms were, in themselves, beautiful, it is reasonable to think that this should be expressed in language, and that the circumstances of the form should be assigned as the cause of our emotion. If, on the contrary, such forms are beautiful from their being expressive of particular qualities, it is equally reasonable to think, that, in common language, this expression should be assigned as the cause of the emotion. That the latter is the case, cannot, I think, well be disputed. No man. when he is speaking of the beauty of any form, unless he has some theory in his mind, thinks of ascribing it to the peculiar nature of the form, or of describing its beauty to other people, as consisting in this form. The terms, on the contrary, which are generally used upon these occasions, are such as signify some quality of which the form is expressive ; and the epithets by which the beauty of the form is marked, are such as are significant of these qualities. Among these qualities, those of gentleness, fineness, or delicacy, as far as I can judge, are the most remarkable, and the most generally expressed in common language. In describing the beautiful forms of ground, we speak of gentle declivities, and gentle swells. In describing the beautiful forms of water, we speak of a mild current, gentle falls, soft windings, a tranquil stream. In describing the beautiful forms of the vegetable kingdom, we use a similar language. The delicacy of flowers, of toliage, of the young shoots of trees and shrubs, are expressions every where to be heard, and which every where convey the belief of beauty in these forms. In the same manner, in those ornamental forms, which are the production of art, we employ the same language to express our opinion of their beauty. The delicacy of a wreath, of a festoon,

are just, what ought to follow? If such forms were, in themselves, beautiful, what would be reasonable? If, on the contrary, they are beautiful from being expressive of particular qualities, what is equally reasonable? How does it appear that the latter is the case? What, on the contrary, are the terms which are generally used on such occasions; and what epithets are employed? Among these qualities, which are the most reasonable? How is this illutrated from our descriptions of the beautiful forms of ground—the beautiful forms of water—the beautiful forms of the vegetable kingdom—and the delicacy of flowers? In the same manner, in what forms do we use the 'same

of drapery, of a column, or of a vase, are terms universally employed, and employed to signify the reason of our admiration of their forms.

It may be observed also, that in comparing similar forms, and determining with regard to their beauty, we employ the same language; and that the reason we assign for our preference of one form to another, is in general, from its superior expression of fineness or delicacy. In comparing two vases, or two wreaths, or two festoons, or any other ornamental forms, a person unacquainted with the theories of philosophers, when he is asked the reason of his preference, very readily answers, because it is more delicate; but never thinks of assigning any circumstance of the form itself, as the foundation of his admira. tion. The least attention to the common language of mankind on such subjects, will sufficiently show how much the expression of delicacy determines the beauty of all ornamental forms. In describing any beautiful form, in the same manner, to other people, we usually employ the same language, and this language is not only perfectly understood, but also immediately conveys to others the conception of the beauty of this form. If we were to describe the most beautiful vase in technical terms, and according to the distinguished characteristics of its form, no one but an artist would have any tolerable conception of its beauty; but if we were simply to describe it, as peculiarly deficate in all its parts, I believe it would leave, with every one, the impression of the beauty of its form. If however, there were any original and independent beauty in barticular forms, the description of this form would be alone sufficient to convey the idea of its beauty, and the circumstance of its delicacy or fineness would be as little able to convey this idea, as that of its color.

language; and what are mentioned as examples? In comparing similar forms, what may also be observed; and for our preference, what reason do we assign? How is this illustrated from the comparison of two vases? What will the least attention to the common language of mankind, on such subjects, sufficiently show? In describing any beautiful form to others, what course do we pursue; and of the language we use what is observed? How is this remark illustrated in the description of a vase? If, however, there were any original and independent beauty in particular forms, what would follow? What only does our author farther observe upon this subject? How I shall only farther observe upon this subject, that the language and opinions of children, and of common people, are inconsistent with the notion of any original or absolute beauty in any particular forms. Every form is beautiful to children that distinguishes objects which they love, or in which they take pleasure; and so far are they, or the common people, from having any conception of the abstract beauty of any peculiar forms, that it is very seldom they distinguish between the form and the subject formed, or feel any other emotion from it, than as it is expressive to them of the qualities of the object distinguished by that form. If, on the contrary, there were any original and independent beauty in any peculiar form, the preference of this form would be early and decidedly marked, both in the language of children, and in the opinions of mankind.

As there appears, therefore, to be no form which is peculiarly or solely beautiful, and as in winding or curvilinear forms, the general nature of language seems to ascribe this beauty to their expression of delicacy, and not to the mere circumstance of form itself, it appears probable, that the beauty of such forms arises from this expression, and not from any original fitness in such forms to excite this emotion.

2. When this association is destroyed, or when winding or curvilinear forms cease to be expressive of tenderness or delicacy, I believe it will be found, that they cease also to be felt as beautiful. The origin of our association of delicacy with such forms arises, as I have before observed, from our general experience, that bodies of such a kind are distinguished by such forms. This association, therefore, will be destroyed, when such forms are given to, or assumed by bodies of a contrary kind.

The greater part of beautiful forms in nature, are to be found in the vegetable kingdom, in the forms of flowers, of foliage, of shrubs, and in those assumed by the young shoots of trees.

is this remark illustrated ? If, on the contrary, there were any original and independent beauty in any peculiar form, what consequence would follow ? What conclusion is drawn from the preceding remarks ? When this association is destroyed, what is the consequence ? From what does the origin of our association of delicacy with such forms arise; and when will this association be

It is from them accordingly, that almost all those forms have been imitated, which have been employed by artists for the purposes of ornament and elegance : and whoever will take the trouble of reviewing these different ornamental forms, will find that they are almost invariably the forms of such vegetables, or of such parts of vegetables, as are distinguished by the delicacy and tenderness of their texture.

There are many parts, however, of the vegetable kingdom, which are not distinguished by this character of delicacy. The stem of some species of flowers, and of almost all shrubs, the trunk and branches of trees, are distinguished by opposite characters, and would, indeed, be unfit for the purposes of vegetation if they were not. In these subjects, accordingly, the winding or serpentine form is very far from being beautiful, as it has no longer its usual expression of fineness or delicacy.

In the smaller and feebler tribe of flowers, for instance, as in the violet, the daisy, or the lily of the valley, the bending of the stem constitutes a very beautiful form, because we immediately perceive that it is the consequence of the weakness and delicacy of the flower. In the rose, on the contrary, and the white lily, and in the tribe of flowering shrubs, a class of vegetables of greater strength, the same form assumed by the stem is felt as a defect, and instead of impressing us with the idea of delicacy, leads us to believe the operation of some force to twist it into this direction. In the young and feeble branches of such plants, however, this form is again beautiful, when we perceive that it is the consequence of the delicacy of their texture, and of their being overpowered by the weight of the flower. In the vine or ivy, in the same manner, the winding

destroyed? Where are the greater part of beautiful forms in nature to be found? From them, accordingly, what have been imitated; and what will the person find who will take the trouble of reviewing them? There are many parts of the vegetable kingdom, however, that are not distinguished in what manner? What illustrations of this remark are given? In these subjects, accordingly, of the winding or serpentine form, what is observed? From the smaller and feebler tribe of flowers, as the violet, dcc., how is this illustrated – how from the rose, the white lily, dcc.? In the young and feeble branches of such plants, when is this form again beautiful? In the vine or ivy, what constitutes very beautiful forms; and where are such forms felt as

of the young shoots and feebler branches, constitutes very beautiful forms. In the direction of the stem, on the other hand, such forms are felt as a defect, as no longer expressive of delicacy, but of force. In the growth of the stronger vegetables, as of trees, where we know and expect great strength, nothing can be so far from being beautiful, as any winding or serpentine form assumed by the trunk. The beautiful form of such objects is of so very different a kind, that it is in the opposite form only that we perceive it. In the direction of the branches, the same character is expected, and a similar defect would be felt in their assuming any regularly winding or curvilinear form. It is only when we arrive at the young shoots, and that only in their infant season, in spring, that we discover again the serpentine form to be beautiful, because it is then only that we perceive it to be really expressive of tenderness or delicacy. Observations of this kind are within every person's reach, and I believe it will be found, that, in the vegetable kingdom, the winding or serpentine form is no longer beautiful than while it is expressive of some degree of delicacy or fineness, and that it ceases to be beautiful, whenever it is assumed by bodies of a different kind.

All the different bodies which constitute the mineral kingdom, are distinguished by a greater degree of hardness and solidity, than is to be found in any other of the productions of nature. Such bodies, however, by different exertions of art, may be moulded into any form we please; but the beauty of the serpentine form, in such cases, is lost, from our consciousness of the absence of that delicacy which, in general, accompanies such forms. It is possible, for instance, to imitate the winding of the ivy, the tendrils of the vine, or the beautiful curves of the rose tree, in iron, or in any other metal. It is possible also, to color such imitations in so perfect a manner, as at first to deceive the spectator. If I am not mistaken, however, the moment we are undeceived, the moment we know

a defect? In the growth of trees where is the beautiful to be found, and where is it not? As observations of this kind are in every person's reach, what will be found true? How are the different bodies which constitute the mineral kingdom distinguished? In such bodies, how is the beauty of the serpentine form lost? How is this remark illustrated? When is the beauty

that the subject is so different from that which characterizes such forms in real nature, the beauty of the forms is destroyed. and instead of that pleasing sentiment of tenderness which the delicacy of the vegetables excites, a sentiment of disappointment and uneasiness succeeds-of disappointment, from the absence of that delicacy which we generally infer from the appearance of such forms; and of uneasiness, from the conviction of force having been applied to twist the subject into so unnatural directions. If the same observation is further pursued, I think it will be found, in general, that wherever the delicate forms of the vegetable world are imitated in metal. or any other hard and durable substance, the character of the form is lost, and that instead of that lively emotion of beauty, which we receive from the original forms, we are conscious of a feeling of discontent, from the seeming impropriety of giving to such durable substances a character which does not belong to them.

There are, however, undoubtedly, cases in which curvilinear forms in such subjects are beautiful; I apprehend, that this takes place only when a kind of adventitious delicacy is given to such substances, and consequently the same character is retained by the form which we have generally associated with it in real nature. This effect is, in general, produced by the following causes—1st, When the quantity of matter is so small, as to overcome our sense of its strength and durability : and 2dly, When the workmanship is so excellent, as to produce an opinion of fineness or delicacy, independent of the nature of the subject upon which it is employed. In either of these cases, such forms may be beautiful, though assumed by the hardest or most durable substances.

A bar of iron, for instance, or of any other metal, may be twisted by force into the most perfect spiral form; but in such a case, the conviction of force and labor destroys, altogether, the beauty of the general form. Suppose this bar lengthened, until it becomes as slender as the wires which are made use of

of such forms destroyed? What sentiment succeeds; and why? If the same observation is extended, what will, in general, be found to be the case? What cases, however, are these; and when only, does this take place? By what causes is this effect, in general, produced? In either of these cases, what is observed? How is this illustrated from a bar of iron-how, from a

in musical instruments, and as delicate as such wires are, and the form becomes immediately beautiful. The same bar may be bent by force into the form of any given curve. In such a case the curve is not beautiful. Make the same experiment with a chain of iron, or of any other metal, which in some respects is yielding and pliant, and where we know that no force is requisite to make it assume such forms, and the curves which it produces will be found very different in point of beauty. The imitation of any vegetable form, in the same manner, as the vine, or the rose, in any kind of metal, and as large as it is found in nature, would be very far from being beautiful. The imitation of such forms in miniature, and in relief, when the character of the substance is, in some measure, forgotten in the diminution of its quantity, may be, and very often is, extremely beautiful. The embellishments of a vase, or of an urn, which in general consist in the imitation of vegetable forms, are beautiful, both from the diminution of their size, and from the delicacy of their workmanship. If either of these circumstances were wanting, if they were massy in their substance, or imperfect in their execution, I apprehend a proportionable degree of their beauty would be lost. In the same manner, although none of the forms of the greater vegetables are beautiful, when imitated in their full size, many of the smaller and more delicate plants may be imitated with propriety, because such imitations suppose, not only small quantities of matter, but great accuracy and perfection of art.

The same observation may be extended to the ornaments of architecture. These ornaments being executed in a very hard and durable substance, are, in fact, beautiful only when they appear as minute parts of the whole. The great constituent parts of every building require direct and angular lines, because in such parts we require the expression of stability and strength.

chain of iron? How is the same principle illustrated from the imitation of any vegetable form? When is such imitation beautiful? How is this illustrated in the embellishment of a vase? If either of these circumstances were wanting, what would follow? What remark follows? To what may the same observation be extended? These ornaments being executed in very hard substances, what follows? What do the great constituent parts of every building require; and why? Where only are ornaments attempted with

It is only in the minute and delicate parts of the work, that any kind of ornament is attempted with propriety; and whenever such ornaments exceed, in size, in their quantity of matter or in the prominence of their relief, that proportion which, in point of lightness or delicacy we expect them to hold with respect to the whole of the building, the imitation of the most beautiful vegetable forms does not preserve them from the censure of clumsiness and deformity. A balustrade might with equal propriety be finished in waving lines; but certainly it would not be beautiful. A twisted column, though affording very pleasing curves to the eye, is acknowledged to be less beautiful than the common and regular one. In short, if the serpentine form were the only form of beauty, it might, with sufficient propriety, be introduced into a great number of the ornamental parts of architecture. The fact, of which every person may assure himself, that such forms are beautiful only in those parts where the quantity of matter is minute, the relief small, and the workmanship more exquisite, affords a strong presumption, that such forms cease to be beautiful, when the general association we have with them is destroyed.

It is the same limit which seems to determine the beauty of those forms which are executed either in wood or plaster, for the ornament of our houses. Every person must have observed in old houses, the absolute deformity of those figures with which the roofs were decorated; and in comparing them with those of modern times, will perceive that the great superiority of the latter consists in the greater delicacy of the forms, as well as in the greater perfection of the execution. In both, flowers and foliage are imitated; but in the one in full relief, and upon a scale sometimes greater than that of nature. In the other, with the simplest relief, and the finest lines, that are consistent with the preparation of the subject. The terms,

propriety; and of such ornaments what is observed? How is this illustrated from a balustrade, and a twisted column? If the serpentine form were the only form of beauty, how extensively might it be introduced? Of what fact may every person assure himself, and of what does it afford a strong presumption? What does the same limit seem to determine? What must every person have observed; and in comparing them with those of modern times, what will be perceive? In both, what are imitated, and to what extent? By what terms, accordingly, do we express our contempt or admiration of them?

accordingly, by which we express our contempt or our admiration of them, are those of heaviness or lightness—terms which in this subject are synonymous with massiness or delicacy. The subjects, however, are the same, and no other circumstances intervene, but the superior delicacy of the forms, and the greater accuracy of the workmanship.

It would lead me into too long a digression, if I were to enter into any detail on these subjects. The hints which I have offered, may, perhaps, lead the reader to satisfy himself by his own observation, that the winding or curvilinear form is beautiful only in those subjects which are distinguished by softness or delicacy of texture ; that in substances of a hard and durable nature, it, in general, ceases to be beautiful; and that, in those cases where it is found to be beautiful, it arises from that adventitious delicacy, if I may so call it, which is produced. either when the quantity of matter employed is so small as to overcome our opinion of its strength or durability, or when the workmanship is so excellent, as to bestow, on the subject, a character of delicacy which does not properly belong to it. If in this manner it is found, that when the association is destroyed. the curvilinear form ceases to be beautiful, it is obvious, that this beauty is to be ascribed, not to the form itself, but to the quality of which it is expressive.

3. As the beauty of the winding or curvilinear form is thus destroyed, when those associations of tenderness and of delicacy, which we, in general, connect with it, are dissolved, so, in the same manner, it may be observed, that all other forms, when they have this character or expression, are considered and felt as beautiful. If there is any form, or species of forms, which, by the constitution of our nature, is fitted immediately to excite the emotion of beauty, and independent of all association, it is obvious, that there never could have been a doubt

As the subjects are the same, what circumstances only intervene? What would lead into too long a digression? Of what may the hints already offered, lead the reader to satisfy himself? If, in this manner it is found, that when the association is destroyed, the curvilinear form ceases to be beautiful, what will be obvious? As the beauty of the winding or curvilinear form is thus destroyed, &c., so what may be observed? If there is any form, which, by the constitution of our nature, is fitted to excite the emotion of

upon the subject ; and that, in every class of objects, we should have been as able to point out the beautiful form, as to point out its color or smell. The fact is, however, that in no class of objects is there any such permanent form of beauty ; and, besides the disagreement of different ages and nations in the beauty of forms, every man must have perceived, in the course of his experience, that every general rule on this subject is liable to innumerable exceptions, and that there is no one form, or species of form, which, to the exclusion of all others, demands and obtains admiration.

That angular forms, accordingly, are also beautiful when they are expressive of fineness, of tenderness, of delicacy, or such affecting qualities, may, perhaps, appear from the consideration of the following instances.

In the vegetable world, although it is generally true that winding forms are those that are assumed by young, or feeble, or delicate plants, yet this rule is far from being uniform, and there are many instances of similar productions being distinguished by forms of an angular kind. There are, accordingly, many cases in which this form is considered beautiful, because it is then expressive of the same qualities which are generally expressed by forms of the other kind. The myrtle, for instance, is generally reckoned a beautiful form, yet the growth of its stem is perpendicular, the junction of its branches form regular and similar angles, and their direction is in straight or angular lines. The known delicacy, however, and tenderness of the vegetable, at least in this climate, prevails over the general expression of the form, and gives it the same beauty which we generally find in forms of a contrary kind. How much more beautiful is the rose tree when its buds begin to blow, than afterwards when its flowers are full and in their greatest perfection: yet in this first situation, its form has much less winding surface, and is much more composed of straight lines and of angles, than afterwards, when the weight of the flower

beauty, what is obvious? What, however, is the fact; and besides this disagreement, what must every man have perceived? When are angular forms, also, beautiful? In the vegetable world, what is generally true; yet of what are there many instances? Why, accordingly, is this form, in many cases considered beautiful? How is this remark illustrated from the myrtle; and

weighs down the feeble branches, and describes the easiest and most varied curves. The circumstance of its youth-a circumstance in all cases so affecting; the delicacy of its blossom, so well expressed by the care which nature has taken in surrounding the opening bud with leaves, prevail so much upon our imagination, that we behold the form itself with more de. light in this situation, than afterwards, when it assumes the more general form of delicacy. It is on a similar account that the leaves of vegetables form a very common, and a very beautiful decoration, though they are less distinguished by winding lines, than almost any other part of the plants. There are an infinite number of the feebler vegetables, and many of the common grasses, the forms of which are altogether distinguished by angles and straight lines, and where there is not a single curvature through the whole, yet all of which are beautiful; and some of which also are imitated in different ornamental forms with excellent effect, merely from the fineness and delicacy of their texture, which is so very striking that they never fail, when we attend to them, to afford us that sentiment of interest and tenderness, which, in general, we receive from the opposite form. There are few things in the vegetable world more beautiful than the knotted and angular stem of the balsam; merely from its singular transparency, at which it is impossible to look, without a strong impression of the fineness and delicacy of the vegetable. Such observations, with regard to flowers or plants, every person has it in his power to pursue. There is not, perhaps, any individual of this kingdom, which, if it is remarkable for its delicacy or tenderness, is not also considered beautiful in its form, whether that form be winding or angular.

It deserves also to be remarked, that the form of the great constituent parts of all vegetables, whether strong or delicate, is nearly the same; the growth of the stem and the direction

also from the rose tree? On a similar account, what is observed of the leaves of vegetables? What remark, on an infinite number of feebler vegetables, follows? How is this illustrated in the case of the balsam? How does it appear that every person has it in his power to pursue such observations? What also deserves to be remarked; and why? Where do they principally

of the branches being in both alike, and in both also either in straight or in angular lines. It is principally in the more delicate parts of the first in the young shoots, and in the foliage, that they deviate from this form, and assume winding or curvilinear directions. It is in these parts only, as I have before observed, that we discover beautiful forms. In the class of feeble or delicate plants, on the contrary, the forms which we neglect in the first, are regarded as beautiful, because they have that expression which is found only in the opposite forms of the The same form has thus a different effect from the other. difference of its expression ; and the straght lines and angular junctions, which are merely indifferent in the elm and the oak, are beheld with delight in the plant or the flower, when we are convinced that they are accompanied with tenderness and delicacy.

In many of those arts, where the beauty of form is chiefly consulted, the same circumstance is observable. In all of them, the beauty of form is principally determined by its expression of delicacy; but as in many of them the curvilinear form is necessarily less expressive of this quality than the angular one, it is accordingly less beautiful.

In the manufacture of glass, for instance, the great beauty of the form is in proportion to this expression. Nothing is less beautiful than thick and massy glass, which, from its quantity, seems intended to compensate for its fragility. Nothing, on the contrary, is more generally beautiful, than thin and transparent glass, which, from experience, we know to be the most decisive sign of its delicacy and weakness. In such a manufacture, winding lines cannot be observed without necessarily increasing the quantity and thickness of the material, and of consequence diminishing its fineness and transparency. Such forms, accordingly, are less beautiful than those composed of more direct and angular lines, which, while they admit of greater

deviate from this form; and of these parts, what was before observed? In the class of feeble or delicate plants, on the contrary, what is remarked? What, from this circumstance, follows? In arts of what kind is the same circumstance observable? In all of them, how is the beauty of form principally determined; yet what follows? How is this remark fully illustrated from the manufacturing of glass; and what very common instance

transparency, express also greater delicacy and fineness. Tο take a very common instance; the stalk of a wineglass might, with equal ease, be fashioned into serpentine or winding forms, as into the angular compartments in which we generally find it; yet I am much deceived if it would be nearly as beautiful, because these lines could not admit of that apparent fineness of surface, or transparency of matter, which is obtained by its angular divisions. In a lustre, in the same manner, one of the most beautiful productions of this manufacture, all is angular. The form of the prism-one of the most regular and angular of all forms, obtains every where; the festoons even are angular, and instead of any winding or waving line, the whole surface is broken into a thousand little triangles; yet I conceive no person will deny its beauty. A lustre, on the other hand, composed of the most beautiful curves, and studiously varied into the most waving surface, would not be nearly so beautiful; because the necessary thickness which it would give to the glass, would, in this case, be expressive of strength and of solidity, instead of delicacy, and would diminish, altogether, that fine transparency, which, in this manufacture, is immediately the sign of tenderness and fragility.

The same observation will apply to the manufacture of steel, or any other of the metals. The greatest expression of delicacy which a hard substance like steel can receive, is from the fineness and brilliancy of its surface. It demands, of consequence, angular forms, which, by admitting greater perfection of polish, or, at least, by displaying it better, are more beautiful than curves, which require both greater solidity, and have less brilliancy. A sword hilt, or a watch chain, are infinitely finer and more beautiful, when they are composed of angular forms, than when they are composed of curves. In the forms which are given to jewels, the same rule universally obtains. The delicacy of such subjects is in their brilliancy. The only form, therefore, that is beautiful in them, is that which displays it.

is taken? How is the same thing farther illustrated from a lustre and a prism? To what will the same observation apply? From what do hard substances receive their greatest expression of delicacy? What does it consequently demand; and why? What examples are mentioned? Where is the

There is no subject of this kind, in which beauty of form is more generally consulted, or indeed more generally found, than in the different articles of household furniture. Such objects, by being composed of the uniform material of wood, and that a hard and durable one, admit of little difference in point of delicacy, but in the quantity, or in the form which is given to this material. With regard to the first, all furniture, I apprehend, is beautiful in proportion to the smallness of its quantity of matter, or the fineness or delicacy of its parts. Strong and massy furniture is every where vulgar and unpleasing; and though, in point of utility, we pardon it in general use, yet wherever we expect elegance or beauty, we naturally look for fineness and delicacy. The actual progress of taste in this article is from strength to delicacy. The first articles of furniture in every country are strong and substan-As taste improves, and as it is found that beauty, as well tial. as utility, may be consulted in such subjects, their strength and solidity are gradually diminished, until at last, by successive improvement, the progress terminates in that last degree of delicacy, and even of fragility, which is consistent, either with the nature of the workmanship, or the preservation of the subject.

In this progress, it is discovered, that where the material which is employed is hard and durable, the greatest delicacy which can be given to the form, is rather in the use of direct and angular lines, than in winding and serpentine ones; and chiefly from the reason I have before mentioned, that curves cannot be employed without a proportionable and very obvious increase of solidity, and by these means, destroying, in a great measure, the expression of delicacy. Whoever will look into any of those books, which have made us acquainted with the forms of Grecian or Roman furniture, in their periods of cultivated taste, will perceive accordingly, that in scarcely any of

beauty of forms very generally consulted; and of such objects, what is remarked? With regard to the first, what is apprehended? How is this illustrated from strong and masay furniture; and from the first articles of furniture in every country? What is the effect of an improvement in taste? In this progress, what is discovered; and why is this the case? What illustration is given from Grecian and Roman furniture, in their periods of culti-

them, is the winding or serpentine form observed; and that, on the contrary, the lightest and most beautiful of them. are almost universally distinguished by straight or angular lines, and by the utmost possible diminution of solidity, that is consistent, either with convenience or use. What is there, for instance, more beautiful in this kind, than the form of the ancient tripod, in the best periods of Roman taste? The feet gradually lessening to the end, and converging as they approach it; the plane of the table placed, with little ornament, nearly at right angles to the feet; and the whole appearing to form an imperfect triangle, whose base is above. There is scarcely in such a subject, a possibility of contriving a more angular form, yet there can be none more completely beautiful; because this form itself is more immediately expressive of delicacy, than almost any other which could have been imagined: the slightness of the whole fabric, the decreasing proportion of the feet as they descend to the ground, the convergence of the feet themselves, and the narrowness of the base for the superstructure, expressing not only the utmost degree of delicacy that is consistent with use, but impressing us also with the further conviction of the necessity of approaching or handling it with tenderness, for fear of destroying its slight stability. From this elegant model, accordingly, or from others, in which the same principle obtains, the greater part of the most beautiful articles of modern furniture are imitated. It is the form which prevails in the construction of chairs, tables, sofas, beds, &c. and it is the delicacy which it so well expresses, that bestows upon them the greater part of their beauty. The application of winding or serpentine lines, or of the more general form of beauty, would tend only to diminish their effect, by bestowing upon them the appearance of a greater degree of solidity, and thus lessening, instead of increasing, the expression which is the cause of this effect.

vated taste? What instance is mentioned? What description of it is given? Though in such a subject, there is scarcely a possibility of contriving a more angular form, yet why can there be none more completely beautiful? From this, or from other models, what is imitated? How is this illustrated from chairs, tables, sofas, &c.? What would tend to diminish their effect; and how? In the course of these observations, upon what sup-

In the course of these observations, the reader will observe, that I have all along gone upon the supposition, that there is, in reality, only one species of winding or curvilinear form; and that I have confined my observations upon their expression to this general character of form. Every one knows, however, that such forms admit of great variety, and that the number of different curvatures that may be produced are almost infinite. Whoever then will take the trouble of pursuing this investigation, may, I think, easily satisfy himself, that among these, there is none uniformly and permanently beautiful; that the same curve which is beautiful in one case, is very often not beautiful in others : and that in all cases, that curvature is the most beautiful, which is most fully expressive of delicacy or ease in the subject which it distinguishes. As forms of this kind differ also in the number, as well as in the nature of their curvatures, he will perceive also, that the same dependence upon their expressions continues; that the same number of curvatures or windings which are beautiful in one subject, are not beautiful in others; and that whenever, in any subject, the number of windings exceeds our opinion of ease or facility, it. from that period, becomes unpleasing, and expressive only of The limits which I must prescribe to myforce or constraint. self in these observations, oblige me, in this, as in every other part of them, to refer much of the illustration which might be produced, to the reader's own reflection and investigation.

If the observations which I have now offered on the natural beauty of forms, or that beauty which arises from the consideration of form itself, be just, we may perhaps, without much impropriety, rest in the following conclusions on the subject—

1. That the beauty of such forms arises from the qualities of fineness, delicacy, or ease, of which they are expressive;

2. That in every subject, that form, whether angular or cur-

position has our author gone? What, however, does every one know? Of what may any one easily satisfy himself, who will take the trouble to pursue this investigation? As forms of this kind differ in the number, as well as in the nature of their curvatures, what will he also perceive? To do what is our author obliged? If these observations are true, what is the first conclusion in which we may rest? What is the second? What is the third '

vilinear, which is most expressive of these qualities, is the most beautiful form : and

3. That, in general, the curvilinear or winding form, as most frequently expressive of these qualities, is the most beautiful.

With regard also to those arts which are employed in the imitation or invention of ornamental forms, the following observations may not be without their use :

1. That wherever natural forms are imitated, those will be the most beautiful, which are most expressive of delicacy and ease:

2. That wherever new or arbitrary forms are invented, that form will be the most beautiful which is composed by the most beautiful lines, or in other words, by lines which have the most pleasing expression: and

3. That wherever the subject of the form is of a hard or durable nature, that form will be the most beautiful, in which the smallest quantity of matter is employed, and the greatest delicacy of execution exerted.

The truth of these remarks I leave to be determined altogether by the observation of the reader. I shall only observe, that in the prosecution of this inquiry, it is necessary to leave out of consideration every circumstance of design, of fitness, or of utility, and to consider forms in the light only of their appearance to the eye, without any relation, either to an author or an end. These relations, as will afterwards be shown, are the foundation of a distinct species of beauty, to which the principles of their natural beauty do not apply.

Although, however, I have thus been led to conclusions different from those of Mr. Hogarth, yet it is but justice to a performance of uncommon ingenuity, to acknowledge, that the principle which he has endeavored to establish in his analysis of beauty, is perhaps, of all others the justest and best founded

With regard to those arts which are employed in the imitation or invention of ornamental forms, of the observations which may not be useless, what is the first—the second—and the third? By whom does our author leave the truth of these observations to be determined? In the prosecution of this inquiry, what is necessary? Of what are these relations the foundation? Although our author has been led to conclusions, differing from those of Mr.

principle which has hitherto been maintained, in the investigation of the natural beauty of forms. The instances which I have produced, and many others of the same kind, that will probably occur to every man of reflection, seem to me very strongly to show, that the principle of the absolute beauty of serpentine forms is to be considered only as a general principle, subject to many exceptions; and that not only this form is beautiful, from being the sign of particular, interesting, and affecting qualities, but that, in fact, forms of the contrary kind also are likewise beautiful, when they are expressive of the same qualities.

PART III.

OF THE COMPOSITION OF FORMS.

I. The preceding observations relate altogether to simple forms, or to such forms as are described by a single line.

It is obvious, however, that there are few forms of such a kind. In the greater part of beautiful forms, whether in nature or in art, lines of different descriptions unite, and there is a beauty felt in certain combinations of these lines, or in the production of a complex form. The principles, therefore, which account for the beauty of simple forms, cannot be supposed to account also for that peculiar beauty which arises from the union of such forms in composition.

Simple forms are distinguished to the eye, by the uniformity or similarity of the line by which they are described. Complex forms are distinguished by the mixture of similarity and dissimilarity in these lines, or, in other words, by their uniformity and variety. The same principle which leads us to ascribe the beauty of simple forms to some original beauty in these forms themselves, leads us also to ascribe the beauty of

Hogarth, yet what is it but justice to acknowledge? The instances produced, seem strongly to show what?

To what do the preceding observations altogether relate? Why are there, however, few forms of such a kind? Of the principle, therefore, that accounts for the beauty of simple forms, what is observed? How are simple forms distinguished to the eye; and how complex? What remark follows? What

SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY

complex forms to some original fitness in the composition of uniformity and variety, to produce this emotion.

That the composition of uniformity and variety, in forms, is agreeable, or is fitted, by the constitution of our nature, to excite an agreeable sensation in the sense of sight, I am not disposed to dispute. That these qualities are also capable of conveying, to us, very pleasing and very interesting expressions, and that in this manner they are felt as beautiful, I shall endeavor to show in the next chapter; but that the union of such inaterial qualities as perceived by the eye, and without reference to any expression, is not in itself, and essentially beautiful, is obvious from the following considerations, the illustration of which I shall impose upon the reader himself.

1. If the composition of uniformity and variety in forms were, in itself, beautiful, it would necessarily follow, that in every case where this composition was found, the form would be beautiful. The greater part of forms, both in art and nature, are possessed of this union: the greater part of these forms, however, are not beautiful.

2. If it is said, that it is not the mere union of uniformity and variety, but a certain union of them, which is beautiful, then this peculiar union must, in all cases, be necessarily beautiful. The only difference between forms in this respect, must be either in the number or in the degree of their uniform, or of their varied parts. Let any particular or certain composition of these parts be fixed upon, and it will be found, that so far is this union of uniformity and variety from being, in itself, beautiful, that it cannot be extended to objects of any different kind, without altogether destroying their beauty.

3. If it is farther said that it is not any certain, but a proper composition of uniformity and variety which is beautiful, then it is obvious, that this propriety is not the object of our external

is our author not disposed to dispute? What will he endeavor to show in the next chapter? But from the following considerations, what is obvious? If the composition of uniformity and variety in forms were, in itself, beautiful, what would follow; and for what reason? Under what circumstances must this peculiar union, in all cases be beautiful; and why? Let any particular or certain composition of these parts be fixed upon, and what consequence will follow? If it is farther said that it is not any certain, but a proper composition of uniformity and variety which is beautiful, what then is obvious? If,

OF THE MATERIAL WORLD.

senses, and that whatever beauty arises from the composition of these qualities, is to be ascribed to some other principle rather than to the mere material qualities alone.

II. If, on the other hand, the account which has been given of the natural beauty of forms, as expressive of certain affecting or interesting qualities, is just, it seems natural to suppose, that in the composition of forms, same propriety should arise from the composition of EXPRESSION—that as lines are distinguished by different characters, the mixture of different lines should produce confusion, instead of beauty—and that the composition of form should then only be beautiful, when the same relation is preserved amid variety, which is demanded in all other cases of composition.*

That this is really the case, will, I trust, appear probable, from the following considerations—

1. I conceive it will be found, that the union of such qualities is felt to be beautiful, only in those cases where the object, itself, has some determinate expression; and that in objects where no such general expression is found, no beauty is expected in their composition.

In the present case, uniformity and variety mean similarity and dissimilarity of form. Every one knows, however, that the mere union of similarity and dissimilarity does not constitute a beautiful form. In the forms of ground, of water, of vegetables, of ornaments, &c. it is difficult to find any instance of a perfectly simple form, or in which lines of different descriptions do not unite. It is obvious, however, that such objects are not beautiful in so great a proportion, and that on the contrary, in all of them there are cases where this mixture is mere confusion, and in no respect considered beautiful. If we inquire farther, what circumstance it is, which distinguishes beautiful objects of these kinds, it will be found, I believe, that it is

* Essay I, chap. 2, sect. 3.

on the other hand, the account which has been given is just, what does it seem natural to suppose? In what cases only, is the union of such sounds felt to be beautiful? In the present case, what do uniformity and variety mean? What, however, does every one know? What illustrations are given? What, however, is obvious? If we inquire farther what circumstance it is which distinguishes beautiful objects of these kinds, what will it be found to be?

some determinate character or expression which they have to us; and that when this expression is once perceived, we immediately look for and expect, some relation among the different parts to this general character.

It is almost impossible, for instance, to find any form of ground which is not complex, or in which different forms do not unite. Amid a great extent of landscape, however, there are few spots in which we are sensible of any beauty in their original formation; and wherever such spots occur, they are always distinguished by some prominent character-the character of greatness, wildness, gaiety, tranquillity, or melancholy. As soon as this impression is made-as soon as we feel the expression of the scene, we immediately become sensible, that the different forms which compose it are suited to this character; we perceive, and very often we imagine a correspondence among these parts, and we say, accordingly, that there is a relation, an harmony among them, and that nature has been kind, in combining different circumstances with so much propriety, for the production of one effect. We amuse ourselves, also, in imagining improvements to the scene, either in throwing out some circumstances which do not correspond. or in introducing new ones, by which the general character may be more effectually supported. All this beauty of composition, however would have been unheeded, if the scene itself had not some determinate character; and all that we intend, by these imaginary improvements, either in the preservation of great uniformity, or in the introduction of greater variety, is to establish a more perfect relation among the different parts to this peculiar character.

In the laying out of grounds, in the same manner, every man knows, that the mere composition of similar and dissimilar forms does not constitute beauty; that some character is necessary, to which we may refer the relation of the different

To find what is it almost impossible; yet what remark, however, follows? As soon as this impression is made, of what do we become sensible; what do we perceive; and what do we say? In imagining what, do we also amuse ourselves? Under what circumstances would all this beauty of composition have been unheeded; and what only is all that we intend by these improvements? In the laying out of grounds, what does every man know?

parts; and that where no such character can be created, the composition, itself, is only confusion. It is upon these principles, accordingly, that we uniformly judge of the beauty of such scenes. If there is no character discernible, no general expression, which may afford our imaginations the key of the scene, although we may be pleased with its neatness, or its cultivation, we feel no beauty whatever in its composition; and we leave it with no other impression than that of regret, that so much labor and expense should be thrown away upon so confused and ungrateful a subject. If, on the other hand, the scene is expressive, if the general form is such as to inspire some peculiar emotion, and the different circumstances such as to correspond to this effect, or to increase it, we immediately conclude, that the composition is good, and yield ourselves willingly to its influence. If, lastly, amid such a scene, we find circumstances introduced, which have no relation to the general expression; if forms of gaiety and gloom, greatness and ornament, rudeness and tranquillity, &c. are mingled together without any attention to one determinate effect, we turn with indignation from the confusion, and conclude that the composition is defective in its first principles. In all cases of this kind, we become sensible of the beauty of composition, only when the scene has some general character, to which the different forms in composition can refer; and determine its beauty by the effect of this union in maintaining or promoting this general expression. The same observation may be extended to the forms of wood and water: but I willingly refer the reader to Mr. Whateley's excellent "Observations upon Modern Gardening," for the full illustration of this remark, with regard to the different objects of natural scenery.

In the vegetable world, also, if the mere composition of uniformity and variety were sufficient to constitute beauty, it

Judging of the beauty of such scenes upon these principles, if there is no character discernible, what follows? If on the other hand the scene is expressive, what do we immediately conclude? Lastly what is remarked? In all cases of this kind, when only do we become sensible of the beauty of composition? To what may the same observations be extended; but to what work does our author willingly refer the reader, and for what purpose? In the vegetable world also, if the mere composition of uniformity and variety were sufficient to constitute beauty, to find what would it be almost impos-

would almost be impossible to find any instance where vegetable forms should not be beautiful. That this is not the case every one knows; and the least attention to the language of mankind will show, that wherever such forms are beautiful, they are felt as characteristic or expressive; and that the beauty of the composition is determined by the same principle which regulates our opinion with regard to the composition of the forms of ground. The beautiful forms which we ourselves remark in this kingdom-the forms which have been selected by sculp. tors for embellishment or ornament, by painters for the effect of landscape, by poets for description or allusion, are all such as have some determinate expression or association : their beauty is generally expressed by epithets significant of this character; and if we are asked the reason of our admiration, we immediately assign this expression as a reason satisfactory to ourselves for the beauty we discover in them. As soon also as we feel this expression in any vegetable form, we perceive or demand a relation among the different parts to this peculiar character. If this relation is maintained, we immediately feel that the composition of the form is good. We show it as a beautiful instance of the operation of nature, and we speak of it, as a form in which the utmost harmony and felicity of composition is displayed. If, on the contrary, the different parts do not seem adjusted to the general character-if instead of an agreement among these parts in maintaining or promoting this expression, there appears only a mixture of similar and dissimilar parts, without any correspondence or alliance, we reject it as a confused and insignificant form, without meaning or beauty. If, in the same manner, the general form has no expression, we pass it by without attention, and with a conviction, that where there is no character to which the relation of the different parts may be referred, there can be no propriety or beauty in its composition.

sible? What will the least attention to the language of mankind show? What are the beautiful forms which we ourselves remark in this kingdom? If we are asked for the reason of our admiration, what reason do we assign? When we feel this expression in any vegetable form, what follows? If this relation is maintained, what do we immediately feel, and what is the consequence? If the different parts do not seem adjusted to the general character, how do we treat it? If, in the same manner, the general form has no axpression, with what

In the different species of vegetables which possess expression, and which consequently admit of beauty in composition, it is observable also, that every individual does not possess this beauty: and it is the same principle which determines our opinion of the beauty of individuals, that determines our opinion of the beauty of different species. The oak, the myrtle, the weeping willow, the vine, the ivy, the rose, &c. are beautiful classes of plants: but every oak and myrtle, &c. does not constitute a beautiful form. The many physical causes which affect their growth, affect also their expression; and it is only when they possess, in purity, the peculiar character of the class, that the individuals are felt to be beautiful. In the judgment, accordingly, that we form of this beauty, we are uniformly guided by the circumstance of their expression. When, in any of these instances, we find an accumulation of forms, different from what we generally meet with, we feel a kind of disappointment; and however much the composition may exhibit of mere uniform and varied parts, we pass it by with some degree of indignation. When the discordant parts are few, we lament that accident should have introduced a variety which is so prejudicial, and we amuse ourselves with fancying how beautiful the form would be, if these parts were omitted. It is only when we discover a general correspondence among the different parts, to the whole of the character, and perceive the uniformity of this character maintained amid all their varieties, that we are fully satisfied with the beauty of the form. The superiority of the productions of sculpture and painting, to their originals in nature, altogether consists in the power which the arts have to correct these accidental defects, by keeping out every circumstance which can interrupt the general expression of the subject or the form, and by present-

conviction do we pass it by? In the different species of vegetables which possess expression, what is observable; and what remark follows? What examples are given illustrative of this remark; and what is said of them? In the judgment that we form of this beauty, by what are we uniformly guided? When do we feel a kind of. disappointment; and what effect is produced? When the discordant parts are few, what do we lament? When only are we fully satisfied with the beauty of the form? In what does the superiority of scalpture and painting, to their originals in nature, altogether con-

ing pure and unmixed, the character which we have associated with the objects in real nature.

The same observation extends to every species of artificial form; but the pursuit of it would necessarily lead to a very long, and I believe, a very unnecessary discussion. With regard to this subject, I shall leave the reader to his own observation, and shall only beg of him to reflect, whether, if the composition of uniformity and variety were necessarily beautiful, every species almost of artificial form would not be found to be beautiful, whether, on the contrary, the beauty of composition is not perceived in those subjects only where the form itself has some character or expression, or where it affords him some distinct principle, to which the relation of the different parts may be referred; and whether he does not determine the beauty of the composition, by the effect of this union of different parts in exciting one definite emotion? It is perhaps unnecessary to remark, that, in pursuing such observations, it is proper to leave out every consideration of design or of utility, and that the fittest subjects for such experiments are ornamental forms, or those forms in which no other object is sought, but the mere production of beauty.

I shall content myself with observing, upon this subject, that whatever is the source of the beauty of complex forms, it is natural to suppose, it should be expressed in language; and that if uniformity and variety were beautiful in themselves, and by the constitution of our nature, it is reasonable to think, that, in describing beautiful forms, such qualities should be assigned as the foundation of their beauty. If I am not deceived howover, this is very far from being the case. In describing such objects, we never satisfy ourselves with distinguishing them by such characters, and if any person were in such terms to describe any from to ourselves, we should be at as great a loss as ever, with regard to its beauty. I apprehend, on the contrary, that the natural and uniform method we take for this purpose is,

sist? To what do the same observations extend; but why is it not persued? With regard to this subject, what reflections does our author beg the reader to make? What remark is, perhaps, unnecessary? With observing what will our author content himself? From what does it appear that this is very far from being the case? On the contrary what does our author apprehend

first, to convey, to our hearers, the idea of its character or expression; and after having given them this general conception of it, we enter into the detail of its composition, and endeavor to explain to them, with how great propriety the different parts are accommodated, to preserve and to promote this characteristic expression: and if we succeed in this description, we never fail, not only to be understood, but to convey also to those who hear us, a perfect belief of the excellence and beauty of the composition. If the mere mixture of uniformity and variety were beautiful, independent of any relation to expression, all this natural process could never take place, and if it did, it could never convey any opinion of beauty.

2. I believe it will be found that different proportions of uniformity and variety, are required in forms of different characters; and that the principle from which we determine the beauty of such proportion, is from its correspondence to the nature of the peculiar emotion which the form, itself, is fitted to excite. Every one knows, that some emotions require a greater degree of uniformity in their objects, and others a greater degree of variety; and perhaps, in general, all strong or powerful emotions, and all emotions which border upon pain, demand uniformity or sameness, and all weak emotions, and all emotions which belong to positive pleasure, demand variety or novelty. Upon this constitution of our nature, the beauty of composition seems chiefly to depend; and the judgment, which we form of this beauty appears, in all cases, to be determined by the correspondence of the different parts of the composition in preserving or promoting the peculiar expression by which the object, itself, is distinguished.

In the forms of ground, for instance, there is very obviously no certain proportion of uniformity and variety, which is permanently beautiful. The same degree of uniformity which is pleasing in a scene of greatness or melancholy, would be disa-

to be the natural and uniform method that we take for this purpose? What remark follows? What are required in forms of different characters; and how do we determine the beauty of such proportion? What does every one know; and what remark follows? Upon this constitution of our nature what depends, and how does the judgment which we form of this beauty appear to be determined? From the different forms of ground, how is this illustrated?

greeable or dull in a scene of gaiety or splendor. The same degree of variety which would be beautiful in these, would be distressing in the others. By what rule, however, do we determine the different beauty of these proportions? Not surely by the composition itself, else one determinate composition would be permanently beautiful : but by the relation of this composition to the expression or character of the scene; by its according with the demand and expectation of our minds; and by its being suited to that particular state of attention or of fancy, which is produced by the emotion that the scene inspires. When this effect is, accordingly, produced, when the proportion either of uniformity or variety corresponds to the nature of this emotion, we conclude that the composition is good. When this proportion is violated, when there is more uniformity of expression than we choose to dwell upon, or more variety than we can follow without distraction. we conclude that the composition is defective, and speak of it either as dull or confused. Whatever may be the number of distinct characters, which the forms of ground possess, there is an equal number of different proportions required in the composition of them : and so strong is this natural determination of the beauty of composition, that after admiring the composition of one scene, we often in a few minutes afterwards, find equal beauty in a composition of a totally different kind, when it distinguishes a scene of an opposite character.

"The style of every part," says Mr. Whately, in the conclusion of his observations upon ground, "must be accommo-"dated to the character of the whole; for every piece of "ground is distinguished by certain properties: it is either "tame or bold, gentle or rude, continued or broken; and if "any variety inconsistent with these properties be obtruded, it "has no other effect than to weaken one idea, without raising "another. The insipidity of a flat is not taken away by a few "scattered hillocks; a continuation of uneven ground can "alone give the idea of inequality. A large, deep, abrupt

By what rule, however, do we determine the different beauty of these proportions? When do we, accordingly, conclude that the composition is good; and when do we speak of it, either as dull or confused? What remark follows? What says Mr. Whately in his observations upon ground? After observing that " break, among easy swells and falls, seems at best but a piece " left unfinished, and which ought to have been softened : it is " not more natural, because it is more rude. On the other " hand, a small, fine polished form, in the midst of rough, mis-" shapen ground, though more elegant than all about it, is gene-" rally no better than a patch, itself disgraced, and disfiguring " the scene. A thousand instances might be added, to show, " that the prevailing idea ought to pervade every part, so far at " least indispensably, as to exclude whatever distracts it; and as " much further as possible to accommodate the character of " the ground to that of the scene it belongs to."

After observing that the same principle extends to the proportion, and to the number of the parts, he observes, "That " ground is seldom beautiful or natural without variety, or even " without contrast; and the precautions which have been given, " extend no farther, than to prevent variety from degenerating " into inconsistency, and contrast into contradiction. Within "the extremes nature supplies an inexhaustible fund; and va-" riety thus limited, so far from destroying, improves the gene-Each distinguished part makes a separate im-« ral effect. " pression; and all bearing the same stamp, all concurring to "the same end, every one is an additional support to the pre-"vailing idea. An accurate observer will see in every form " several circumstances, by which it is distinguished from every "other. If the scene be mild and quiet, he will place together " those which do not differ widely, and he will gradually depart "from the similitude. In ruder scenes, the succession will be " less regular, and the transitions more sudden. The character " of the place must determine the degree of difference between An assemblage of the most elegant forms, « contiguous forms. " in the happiest situations is to a degree indiscriminate, if they " have not been selected and arranged with a design to produce " certain expressions : an air of magnificence or of simplicity. " of cheerfulness, tranquillity, or some other general character. "ought to pervade the whole; and objects pleasing in them-"selves, if they contradict that character, should therefore be "excluded; those which are only indifferent must sometimes "make room for such as are more significant; many will often " be introduced for no other merit than their expression; and

"some which are in general rather disagreeable, may occa-"sionally be recommended by it. Barrenness itself may be "an acceptable circumstance in a spot dedicated to solitude and "melancholy." As the great secret of gardening seems thus to consist in the accurate preservation of the character of every scene, whether original or created, so it is the same principle that determines the opinion of men with regard to its beauty; and whoever will read Mr. Whately's excellent book with attention, will perceive, that all his rules with regard to the forms of ground, of water, of wood, of rocks, and of buildings, may be referred to this leading principle; and that they are nothing more than investigations of the character of these different forms, and directions how to apply them in scenes of different expression.

Our opinion of the beauty of vegetable forms seems directed by the same principle. Many of the classes of trees have distinct characters: there are therefore different compositions which are beautiful in their forms; and in all of them, that composition only is beautiful which corresponds to the nature of the expression they have, or of the emotion which they excite. The character, for instance, of the weeping-willow, is melancholy, of the birch and of the aspin, gaiety : the character of the horse-chesnut, is solemnity, of the oak, majesty, and of the yew, sadness. In each of these cases, the general form or composition of the parts is altogether different; all of them, however, are beautiful; and were this proportion in point of composition changed-were the weeping-willow to assume an equal degree of variety with the oak, or the oak to show an equal degree of uniformity with the weeping-willow, we should undoubtedly feel it to be a defect, and conclude that, in this change of form, the beauty of the character and of the composition was lost.

the same principle extends to the proportion, and to the number of the parts what does he observe? As the great secret of gardening seems thus to consist in the accurate preservation of the character of every scene, what follows? What will he perceive who reads Mr. Whately's excellent book with attention? From what does it appear that our opinions of vegetable forms seem to be directed by the same principle? How is this illustrated from the weepping willow, &c. In each of these cases, what are different; but of all o It is in this manner, accordingly, that we judge of the beauty of individuals, in these different classes. All these individuals are not beautiful; and wherever they appear to be beautiful, it is when their form adheres perfectly to their character—when no greater degree, either of uniformity or variety is assumed, than suits that peculiar emotion which their expression excites in our minds. An oak, which wreaths not into vigorous or fantastic branches, a yew, which grows into thin and varied forms, a plane-tree, or a horse-chesnut, which assumes not a deep, and almost solid mass of foliage, &c. appear to us as imperfect and deformed productions. They seem to aim at an expression which they do not reach, and we speak of them, accordingly, as wanting the beauty, because they want the character of their class.

In the formation of beautiful groups, the same adherence to expression is necessary; and whatever may be the character of the group, the real limit to variety is correspondence in this expression. The permanent character of trees arises from their form or their color. So far as form is concerned, forms of different character are never found to unite, or to constitute a beautiful composition. A mixture, for instance, of the light and upright branches of the almond, with the falling branches of the willow, the heavy branches of the horse-chesnut, and the wild arms of the oak, would be absolute confusion, and would be intolerable in any scene where design or intention could be supposed. The mixtures of trees, on the other hand, that correspond in their forms, and that unite in the production of one character, are found to constitute beautiful groups : we speak of them accordingly as beautiful from this cause. When we meet with them in natural scenery, we are pleased with the fortunate, though accidental connexion, and we say, that they

them, what is observed? Of individuals in these different classes, what is observed; and when do they appear beautiful? How is this illustrated from the oak, the yew, and the horse-chesnut? At what do they seem to aim? Where is the same adherence necessary; and there what is the real limit to variety? From what does the permanent character of trees arise? So far as form is concerned, what never unite? From the almond, the willow, &c. how is this illustrated? The mixture of what trees, on the contrary, form beautiful groups; and how do we, accordingly, speak of them? When we

SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY

could not have been better united by the hand of art. When we meet with them in cultivated scenes, we praise the taste of the artist, and say that the composition is pure and harmonious

"Trees," says Mr. Whately, "which differ but in one of these "circumstances, whether of shape, of green, or of growth, "though they agree in every other, are sufficiently distinguish-"ed for the purpose, of variety; if they differ in two or three, "they become contrasts: if in all, they are opposite, and sel-"dom group well together. Those, on the contrary, which "are of one character, and are distinguished only as the cha-"racteristic mark is strongly or faintly impressed upon them, "as a young beech, and a birch, an acacia, and a larch, all "pendant, though in different degrees, form a beautiful mass, "in which unity is preserved without sameness." How farthe same principle extends to landscape-painting, they who are acquainted with the art will be at no loss to determine.

In all the different kinds of ORNAMENTAL forms, in the same manner, instead of there being any one determinate proportion of uniformity and variety beautiful, there are, in fact, as many varieties of beautiful composition, as there are varieties of character ; and the rule by which we judge of this beauty, in every particular case, is by the correspondence of the composition to the character, which the form is intended to express. To give the same proportion of uniform or of varied parts to every species of ornamental form-to forms of splendor, of magnificence, of gaiety, of delicacy, or of melancholy, would be to sin against the very first principle of composition, and would immediately be detected, even by those who never heard of the principles of composition. The beautiful form of the vase, for instance, is employed in many different kinds of ornament, and may either be magnificent, elegant, simple, gay, or melancholy; in all these cases, however, the composition is different. A greater proportion of uniformity distinguishes it

meet with them in natural scenery, and when in cultivated scenes, how are we affected? What says Mr. Whately on this subject? In all the different kinds of ornamental forms, what do we find, and by what rule do we judge of their beauty? What would be a sin against the very first principles of composition; and what is said of it? How is this remark illustrated from the beautiful form of the rose? When does a greater proportion of uniformity,

when destined to the expression of simplicity, magnificence, or melancholy, and a greater proportion of variety, when destined to the expression of elegance or gaiety. We immediately perceive also that there is propriety and beauty in this difference of composition; and if we are asked why it is so, we readily answer, because it accords with the peculiar character which the form is there intended to have. If, on the other hand, this proportion is inverted—if the vase upon a tomb has all the varieties of a goblet, or the latter all the uniformity of the funeral urn, we immediately perceive an impropriety and deformity, and as readily explain it, by saying, that the composition is unfitted to the expression which the object is intended to have.

The orders of architecture have different characters from several causes, and chiefly, I believe, from the different quantities of matter in their entablatures. The Tuscan is distinguished by its severity; the Doric by its simplicity; the Ionic by its elegance; the Corinthian and Composite by their lightness and gaiety. To these characters their several ornaments are suited with consummate taste. Change these ornamentsgive to the Tuscan the Corinthian capital, or to the Corinthian the Tuscan, and every person would feel, not only a disappointment from this unexpected composition, but a sentiment also of impropriety, from the appropriation of a grave or sober ornament to a subject of splendor, and of a rich or gaudy ornament to a subject of severity. Even in the commonest of all forms, the forms of furniture, the same principle is obvious. Chairs, tables, mirrors, candlesticks, &c. may have very different characters; they may be either simple, elegant, rich, or magnificent. Whatever, this character may be, we demand a correspondence in the composition. The same number of uniform parts, which is beautiful in any simple form, is insipid

and when of variety distinguish it? What do we also immediately perceive; and if asked why it is so, how do we readily answer? If, on the other hand, the proportion is inverted, what follows; and how do we explain it? Why have the orders of architecture different characters? What illustration of this remark is given? Of their ornaments what is observed; and should they be changed, what would follow? In what common forms, is the same principle obvious; and what instances are mentioned? Whatever this chagracter may be, what do we demand in the composition? How is this illus-

in an elegant, and mean in a rich or magnificent one. The same variety of parts which is beautiful in a form of splendor or magnificence, is confused in an elegant, and tawdry in a simple one.

In these, and a thousand other cases of the same kind, it will be found, that no certain proportion of uniformity and variety is permanently felt to be beautiful; that, on the contrarv. wherever the form, either in itself, or from its situation, has any determinate expression, the beauty of composition arises from its correspondence to that expression; and that wherever forms differ in character, a different composition is approved, and is said to be approved, upon this account. T shall only add to these hints upon the subject, that the natural language of men is uniformly guided by this principle; and that whenever they attempt to describe the excellence of any composition, it is not by explaining the peculiar proportions of uniformity and variety which may obtain in it, but by showing how well this proportion accords with the expression by which the object, itself, is distinguished.

If the illustrations which I have now offered are just, we shall have reason to conclude, that the mere composition of uniformity and variety is not beautiful in itself, or from the original constitution of our nature—that it is felt as beautiful only in those cases, where the form is distinguished by some character or expression—and, that the beauty of the composition arises, in every case, from its correspondence to the nature of that emotion which this expression is fitted to excite.

These conclusions seem to lead to a very different rule for the composition of beautiful forms, from that which Mr. Hogarth has laid down in his analysis of beauty. "The way," says he, "of composing forms, is to be accomplished by making choice "of variety of lines, as to their shapes and dimensions; and "then again by varying their situations with each other, by all "the different ways that can be conceived, and at the same

trated ? In these and a thousand other cases of the same kind, what will be found ? To these limits, what only does our author add on this subject ? If the illustrations now offered are just, what shall we have reason to conclude ? To what do these conclusions seem to lead ? What does he say is the way to compose pleasing forms ? Though our author differs, with much diffidence,

"time, if a solid figure be the object of the composition, the "contents or space that is to be inclosed within those lines, "must be duly considered and varied too, as much as possible "with propriety." Although it is with much diffidence that I differ from Mr. Hogarth, yet I cannot help being of opinion, so far, at least, as the natural beauty of forms is concerned, that this rule might be followed in a thousand cases, without the production of any degree of beauty—that if the distinguishing form is inexpressive or indifferent, all this variety would only create confusion; and that in its application to forms of different characters or expression, it would excite a sentiment of impropriety, instead of pleasure.

On the other hand, the view which I have now given of the subject, would seem to lead to the following rules for beautiful composition—

1. That wherever beautiful form is intended, some characteristic or expressive form should be selected, as the ground or subject of the composition-And,

2. That the variety, whether in the form, the number, or the proportion of the parts, should be adapted to the peculiar nature of this expression, or of that emotion which this expression is fitted to excite in the mind of the spectator.

3. Forms of this kind are either single or dependent. In single, or in dependent forms, their character is at the pleasure of the artist; and that will be always most beautiful, in which the character is best preserved.

4. In dependent forms, on the contrary, or those which are designed for particular scenes or situations, their character must be determined by that of the scene or situation; and that also will be the most beautiful form, in the composition of which the alliance to the general character is most precise and delicate.

III. The same principle seems to extend to the composition of COLORS. The mere mixture of colors is not beautiful. In

from Mr. Hogarth, yet of what opinion can he not help being. What is the first rule to which the view which has now been given of the subject, would seem to lead? What is the second? What is the third? What is the fourth? To what does the same relation seem to extend? How does it appear that the

the different colors that are mingled upon a painter's pallet, or in a book of patterns, we say there is no beauty, because there is no relation. What then is the relation which is necessary to constitute beautiful composition? It is not their mere relation as colors, because colors of very different kinds are found to produce beautiful compositions. It is not any established relation between particular colors which is beautiful from our original constitution, because, in different subjects, different compositions are necessary. I humbly apprehend, that it is the relation of expression.

In natural scenery, for instance, the colors of the great ingredients, ground, water, wood, rocks, and buildings, are very different, and are susceptible of great varieties. In every scene, however, which is expressive, we look for and demand an unity in the expression of these different colors. We often find fault, accordingly, with the color of particular objects in such scenes, and say that they are too rich, too solemn, or too cheerful for the rest of the scene. The vivid green, for instance, which is so pleasing in a cheerful landscape, would ill suit a scene of melancholy or desolation. The brown heath, which so singularly accords with scenes of gloom or barrenness, would be intolerable in a landscape of gaiety. The grey rock, which throws so venerable an air over grave or solemn scenes, would have but a feeble effect in scenes of horror. The blue and peaceful stream, which gives such loveliness to the solitary valley, would appear altogether misplaced amid scenes of rude and savage majesty. The white foam and discolored waters of the torrent, alone suit the wildness of their expression.

The great difference in the colors of trees, requires attention in their composition into groups. If the oak, the yew, the birch, the fir, the aspin, the willow, &c., were mixed together indiscriminately, every one would exclaim at the impropriety of

mere mixture of colors is not beautiful ? What then is not, and what is the relation which is necessary to constitute beautiful composition? In natural scenery, what is observed of the colors of the great ingredients ? In every scene, however, which is expressive, for what do we look ? With what do we, accordingly, often find fault ? How is this remark illustrated from the vivid green ?—the brown heath ?—the grey rock ?—the blue and peaceful stream ? —and white foam ? In what order does the great difference in the colors of trees require attention ? How is this illustrated ? If such trees only are

the composition, and say that there was no relation, and no character preserved. Unite however, only such trees, as are distinguished by colors of a similar character, the composition will be beautiful, and the variety will only serve to enhance and strengthen the expression. If any other rule but their expression were followed, would the effect be the same ?

Different compositions of colors also are necessary in the different appearances of trees, whether as a clump, a thicket, a grove, or a wood. The same degree of uniformity in coloring which is beautiful in a wood, is displeasing in a thicket or open grove; the same degree of variety which is beautiful in these, is unpleasing in the other. To what principle shall these differences be referred, but to the difference of character—to the airiness and gaiety of the one, to the majesty and solemnity of the other ?

The scenes of nature often derive their character even from the season of the day in which they are viewed, and the aspect which they regard. How much the beauty of the composition of colors, in such scenes, arises from the composition of their expression, is beautifully illustrated in the following observations of Mr. Whately.

"Some species and situations of objects are in themselves "adapted to receive or to make the impressions which charac-"terize the principal parts of the day; their splendor and so-"briety, and other peculiarities recommend or prohibit them "upon different occasions: the same considerations direct the choice also of their appendages: and in consequence of a judicious assemblage and arrangement of such as are proper "for the purpose, the *spirit* of the morning, the *excess* of noon, " or the *temperance* of evening, may be improved or corrected " by the application of the scene to the season.

"In the morning, the freshness of the air allays the force of "the sun-beams, and their brightness is free from glare; the "most splendid objects do not offend the eye, nor suggest the

united as are distinguished by colors of a similar character, what will be the effect? Where are different compositions of colors also necessary? How is this illustrated? To what principle shall these differences be referred? Whence do the scenes of nature often derive their character? Repeat Mr.

"idea of heat in the extreme; but they correspond with the "gluter of the dew which bespangles all the produce of the "earth, and with the cheerfulness diffused over the whole face of "creation. A variety of buildings may therefore be introduced "to enliven the view, their color may be the purest white with-"out danger of excess, though they face the eastern sun; and "those which are in other aspects should be so contrived, that "their turrets, their pinnacles, or other points, may catch "glances of the rays, and contribute to illuminate the scene. "The trees in general ought to be of the lightest greens, and "so situated as not to darken much of the landscape by the "length of their shadows. Vivacity in the streams and trans-"parency in a lake, are more important at this than at any other "hour of the day; and an open exposure is commonly the most "delightful, both for the effect of particular objects, and the "general character of the scene.

"At noon, every expedient should be used to correct the ex-"cess of the season; the shades are shortened, they must "therefore be thick, but open plantations are generally prefer-"able to a close covert : they afford a passage, or at least, ad-"mittance to the air, which, tempered by the coolness of the " place, soft to the touch, and refreshing at once to all the senses, "renders the shade a delightful climate, not a mere refuge "from heat. Groves, even at a distance, suggest the ideas "which they realize upon the spot, and by multiplying the ap-" pearances, improve the sensations of relief from the extremity " of the weather; grottos, caves, and cells, are on the same "account agreeable circumstances in a sequestered recess: "and though the chill within be hardly ever tolerable, the eye "catches only an idea of coolness from the sight of them. "Other buildings ought in general to be cast into shade, that "the glare of reflection from them may be obscured. The "large expanse of a lake is also too dazzling: but a broad "river moving gently, and partially darkened with shadow, is " very refreshing, more so perhaps than a little rill, for the viva-"city of the latter rather disturbs the repose which generally " prevails at mid-day : every breeze then is still; the reflection "of an aspin leaf scarcely trembles on the water; the animals "remit their search of food, and man ceases from his labor; "the stream of heat seems to oppress all the faculties of the

"mind, and all the active powers of the body; and any very "lively motion discomposes the languor in which we then de-"light to indulge.

"In the evening, all splendor fades; no buildings glare, no "water dazzles, the calmness of a lake suits the quiet of the " time, the light hovers there, and prolongs the duration of day. "An open reach of a river has a similar though a fainter effect, " and a continued stream all exposed preserves the last rays of "the sun along the whole length of its course, to beautify "the landscape. But a brisk current is not so consistent as a "lake, with the tranquillity of evening, and other objects "should in general conform to the temper of the time: build-"ings of a dusky hue are most agreeable to it. No contrast "of light and shade can then be produced; but if the planta-"tions, which by their situation are the first to be obscured, be " of the darkest greens, if the buildings which have a western "aspect be of a light color, and if the management of the "lawns and the water be adapted to the same purpose, a diver-"sity of tints will be preserved long after the greater effects are " faded."

There are few subjects where the beauty or deformity of the composition of colors is more observable, or, at least, more commonly observed, than in the article of DRESS. The following hints may, perhaps, lead the reader to perceive, that this beauty is also dependent upon expression:

1. It may be observed, that no dress is beautiful, in which there is not some leading or predominant color displayed, or in which, if I may use the expression, there is not some unity of coloring. A dress in which different colors were employed in equal quantities, in which one half of the body was distinguished by one color, and the other by another, or in which each particular limb was differently colored, would be ridiclous, instead of being beautiful. It is in this way accordingly, that mountebanks are dressed, and it never fails to produce the

Whately's beautiful illustration of this remark, throughout. In what is the beauty or deformity of the composition of colors particularly observable? To what, perhaps, may the following hints lead the reader? No dress is beautiful without what? A dress of what sort would be ridiculous instead of being beautiful? Who dress in this way, and what is its effect? No dress is re-

effect that is intended by it-to excite the mirth and the ridicule of the common people.

2. No dress is ever remarked to be beautiful, in which the prevailing color has not some pleasing or affecting expression. There are a variety of colors which are chosen for common apparel, which have no character or expression in themselves, and which are chosen for no other reason, than because they are convenient for the peculiar occupations or amusements in which we are engaged : such dress accordingly has no beauty. When we say, that it is a useful or a convenient color, we give it all the approbation to which it is entitled. There are on the contrary, a variety of colors which are expressive from peculiar associations, which are either gay, or delicate, or rich, or grave, or melancholy. It is always such colors that are chosen for what is properly called dress, or for that species of apparel, in which something more than mere convenience is intended. When we speak of such dress, accordingly, we generally describe its beauty by its character, by its being delicate or rich, or gay or magnificent, or in other words, by its being distinguished by some pleasing or affecting expression. We should feel an equal impropriety in any person's choosing the color of ornamental dress, on account of its convenience, as in his choosing the color of his common apparel, because it was gay, or delicate, or splendid.

This difference of expression constitutes the only distinction that seems to subsist between the colors that are fit for common, and those that are fit for ornamental apparel. But besides this, there is another constituent of the beauty of the prevailing color—its relation to the character or situation of the person who wears it. The same color, which would be beautiful in the dress of a prince, would be ridiculous in the dress of a peasant. We expect gay colors in the dress of youth, and sober and temperate colors in the dress of age. We feel a

marked to be beautiful, without what? How is this illustrated from the colors chosen for common apparel? When do we give it all the approbation to which it is entitled? There are, on the contrary, a variety of what colors; and what is observed of them? When we speak of such colors, accordingly, by what do we generally describe them? In what should we feel an equal impropriety? What does this difference of expression constitute? Besides this, what other constituent of the beauty of colors is there? How is this

propriety in the cheerful colors of a marriage, and in the melancholy coloring of mourning. There is a propriety of relation also, between the colors that distinguish the dress of certain situations, and these situations themselves, which we never see violated without some degree of pain. Besides all this, there is a relation of a still more delicate kind, between the colors of dress, and the character that distinguishes the countenance of the person who wears it; which, however little attended to, is one of the most important articles in the composition of dress, and which is never observed or violated without either increasing or diminishing the beauty of the person it distinguishes. As the general beauty of dress depends upon the predominant color being distinguished by some pleasing or interesting expression, so the beauty of dress in any particular situation or character, depends upon this expression being suited to that character or situation.

3. No dress is ever considered beautiful, in which the composition of the inferior colors is not adapted to the peculiar expression of the prevailing color. The mere accumulation of different colors, without any regard to the general color of the dress, every one knows to be proverbially expressive of ignorance and vulgarity. To suit these colors, on the other hand, to the prevailing color, is considered the great criterion of taste in this kind of composition. If you inquire, accordingly, why, in any particular case, such colors are not suited to the dress, you will be told, that they are either too glaring, too solemn, too gay, or too delicate, for the predominant color; in other words, that they do not accord with the expression of the dress, and that on this account the composition is not beautiful. Wherever in this article, it is said, that colors either suit, or do not suit, what is meant or felt, I believe is, that their expressions either agree or do not agree.

225

illustrated? In what other relation is there also a propriety? What relation of a still more delicate kind is there; and what is said of it? What remark follows? Without what adaptation is no dress ever considered beautiful? What does every one know to be expressive of ignorance and vulgarity: and what is considered the great criterion of taste in this kind of composition? If you inquire, accordingly, why, in any particular case, such colors are not suited to the dress, what will you be told? Wherever it is said that colors suit or do not suit, what is meant? Of what do different colors in dress, on the same

It is upon the same account that different colors in dress, admit of very different degrees of variety, in the composition of Rich colors admit of little variety : the subordinate colors. grave or melancholy colors of less. Delicate colors admit more of contrast than of variety: gay or cheerful colors demand a great proportion of variety. In all these cases, the proportion which is beautiful is that which accords with the peculiar nature of the emotion that the predominant color excites. Strong emotions, and emotions which border upon pain, require uniformity in their objects: rich, or magnificent, or mournful dresses, require therefore a great proportion of uniformity in the composition of the coloring. Weak emotions require to be supported and enlivened: dresses of a gentle or delicate character are therefore best illustrated by contrast. Emotions which belong to pleasure, demand variety in their objects ; dresses of a gay character, admit therefore of a greater proportion of variety in their coloring, than any of the others.

These slight hints, and the subject deserves no more, may perhaps lead the reader to conclude, that the beauty of dress, so far as it relates to the composition of colors, depends upon the unity of expression; and that taste, in this respect, consists in the accurate perception of the expressions of colors, and of their relation, both to each other, and to the character or situation of the person for whom they are destined.

There is one subject in which some attention to these principles might, perhaps, be productive of no unimportant effect: I mean dramatic representation. Every one has perceived the impropriety of the greater part of the dresses which are seen upon the stage. The confusion of rich and tawdry, gay and grave drapery, in the same performance—the neglect of every kind of correspondence between the dress, and the character it

account admit? How is this remark illustrated? In all these cases, what is the proportion which is beautiful? What do strong emotions require; and what do rich, or magnificent, or mournful dresses require? Of weak emotions what is observed; and what follows? What do emotions which belong to pleasure require; and what is the consequence? To what may these slight hints lead the reader? To what subject might attention to these principles be productive of important effects? What has every one perceived? What are left to be determined by the caprice or vanity of the actor? What

distinguishes-comedy and tragedy clothed in the same colors ; and instead of any relation among the different dresses of the same performance, or any correspondence to the character of that performance, each particular dress at variance with another, and all of them left to be determined by the caprice or vanity of the actor. If instead of this, we were to find, in each distinguished character, some agreement between the expression of the dress and the nature of that character-if different ages and professions, and situations, were attired with the same regard to propriety that we expect in real life-if the whole of the dresses, in every particular performance had some relation to the character of that performance, and to the emotion it is destined to excite in our minds-if no greater degree of variety was admitted in this respect, than was consistent with this unity of expression---and if the whole were so imagined, as to compose a beautiful mass or group of coloring, in those scenes where any number of personages were assembled together; some addition, I conceive, would be given to the effect of an art, which has the capacity, at least, of becoming one of the most powerful means we know, both of strengthening virtue, and of communicating knowledge.

Whether the principle which I have now explained may not extend to what is called the harmony of coloring in historical painting—whether the beauty of the prevailing color is not dependent upon the agreement of its expression, with that peculiar expression or character which distinguishes the scene—and whether the beauty of the composition of the subordinate colors is not determined by its effect in preserving this unity of expression, I shall leave to be determined by those who are more learned in the art, and better acquainted with instances by which the truth of the observation may be tried.

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would be giving some addition to the effect to this art; and of the art itself what is remarked? What does our author leave to be determined by those who are more learned in the art than he is himself?

SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY

SECTION II.

OF THE RELATIVE BEAUTY OF FORMS.

Besides those qualities of which forms, in themselves, are expressive to us, and which constitute what I have called their NATURAL beauty, there are other qualities of which they are the signs, from their being the subjects of art, or produced by wisdom or design, for some end. Whatever is the effect of art, naturally leads us to the consideration of that art which is its cause, and of that end or purpose for which it was produced. When we discover skill or wisdom in the one, or useful. ness or propriety in the other, we are conscious of a very pleasing emotion; and the forms which we have found by experience to be associated with such qualities, become naturally and necessarily expressive of them, and affect us with the emotions which properly belong to the qualities they signify. There is, therefore, an additional source of beauty in forms, from the expression of such qualities; which, for the sake of perspicuity, I shall beg leave to call their RELATIVE beauty.

Every work of design may be considered in one or other of the following lights:-Either in relation to the art or design which produced it-to the nature of its construction, for the purpose or end intended-or to the nature of the end which it is thus destined to serve; and its beauty accordingly depends, either upon the excellence or wisdom of this design, upon the fitness or propriety of this construction, or upon the utility of this end. The considerations of design, of fitness, and of utility, therefore, may be considered as the three great sources

Besides the natural beauty of forms, from what are they the signs of other qualities? Whatever is the effect of art, naturally leads us to what consideration? When we discover skill or wisdom in the one, or usefulness or propriety in the other, of what are we conscious; and of the forms, what is remarked? From what is there, therefore, an additional source of beauty in forms; and what is it called? In one or the other of what lighta, may every work of design be considered; and upon what does its beauty, accordingly, depend? What may, therefore, be considered as the three great sources of

of the relative beauty of forms. In many cases, this beauty arises from all these expressions together; but it may be useful to consider them separately, and to remark the peculiar influence of each, upon the beauty of forms.

PART I.

OF THE INFLUENCE OF DESIGN UPON THE BEAUTY OF FORMS.

I. That the quality of design, is, in many cases, productive of the emotion of beauty, seems to me too obvious to require any illustration. The beauty of design in a poem, in a painting, in a musical composition, or in a machine, are expressions which perpetually occur, both in books and in conversation, and which sufficiently indicate the cause or source of the emotion.

Wherever we discover fitness or utility, we infer the existence of design. In those forms, accordingly, which are distinguished by such qualities, the discovery of an end immediately suggests to us the belief of intention or design; and the same material qualities of form, which signify to us this fitness or usefulness, are the signs also of the design or thought which produced them.

It is obvious, however, that we often perceive the expression of design in forms, both in art and nature, in which we discover neither fitness nor utility. By what means then do we infer the existence of design in such cases; and are there any qualities of form, which are, in themselves, expressive to us of design and intention? I apprehend that there are—that there are certain qualities of form which are immediately and permanently expressive to us of these qualities of mind, and which derive their beauty from this expression.

the relative beauty of forms? From what, in many cases, does this beauty arise; but in what manner may it be useful to consider them?

What seems too obvious to require illustration? What expressions perpetually occur, both in books and in conversation, and what do they sufficiently indicate? Where do we infer the existence of design? What remark follows? Where is it obvious, however, that we often perceive the expression of design in forms? What interrogation follows; and of it, what is apprehended? In

1. In this view, it will easily be observed, that the material quality which is most naturally and most powerfully expressive to us of design, is UNIFORMITY OF REGULARITY. Wherever in any form, we observe this quality, we immediately infer design. In every form, on the contrary, where we discover a total want of this quality, we are disposed to consider it as the production of chance, or of some power which has operated without thought or intention. "In all cases," says Dr. Reid, "regu-"larity expresses design and art : for nothing regular was ever "the work of chance." In what manner this connexion is formed, whether it is derived from experience, or to be considered as an original principle of our nature, I do not inquire. It is however, very obvious in children, at a very early age : and it may be observed, that the popular superstitions of all nations are, in a great measure, founded upon it; and that all uniform or regular appearances in nature are referred by them to some intelligent mind.

The terms regularity and uniformity are used so synonymously, that it is difficult to explain their difference. As far as I am able to judge, the following account of this difference is not very far from the truth.

With regard to both terms, when applied to forms, two things are observable. 1st, That they are only applied to such objects as compose a whole; and that they express a relation either between the parts of it considered separately, or among the parts considered as constituting the whole. The relations between different wholes, or the parts of different wholes, are expressed by other terms. 2dly, That they express always similarity or resemblance of parts. With regard to uniformity, the term itself is an evidence of it; uniformity being nothing but similarity of form. With regard to regularity it is not less evident. A regular form is a form where all the parts are simi-

this view, what will be easily observed? Wherever we observe this quality, what do we infer? In every form, on the contrary, where we discover a total want of this quality, to what are we disposed? What says Dr. Reid? What does our author not inquire? In whom is it very obvious; and what may be farther observed? How are the terms regularity and uniformity used? With regard to both terms, when applied to forms, what two things are observable? With recard to uniformity, what is observed; and what, with lar: an irregular form is a form where all the parts are dissimilar. A form partly regular and partly irregular, is a form where some parts are similar and others dissimilar. This is, I conceive, the literal meaning of regularity, as applied to forms, and what we always mean by it when applied to natural objects. There is, however, another meaning of the term, when applied to works of art, viz. the imitation of a model. Thus, we say, that a pillar is regular, that a poem is regular, that any composition is regular, when they have the same proportions, and the same parts, which are found in the model, or prescribed by the rule. In this case it is still the similarity of parts which constitutes regularity; the similarity between all the parts in the copy, and those in the original from which it is borrowed.

Considering then regularity and uniformity as both expressing similarity of parts in a whole, it is plain, that we may consider every form composed of parts, either in relation to the similarity of individual parts, or in relation to the similarity of the whole parts. In the first case, the resemblance of any two or more parts constitutes its uniformity. In the second, the resemblance or similarity of all the parts constitutes its regularity. Thus, we say that any two sides of a prism are uniform, but that the prism itself is a regular figure; that the sides of a cube are uniform, but that the cube itself is regular; that the sides of many of the different crystals are uniform, but that the crystals themselves are regular solids.

In this view, both uniformity and regularity are constituted by similarity of parts; and the difference between them is, that uniformity expresses the similarity of parts considered separately, and regularity the similarity of parts as constituting the whole. There may therefore be uniformity without regu-

regard to regularity? What is a regular form; and what is an irregular one. What is a form partly regular and partly irregular? Of this definition, what is observed? What other meaning has the term when applied to works of art; and what example of illustration is given? In this case, what is it that constitutes the regularity? Considering their regularity and uniformity as both expressing similarity of parts in a whole, what plainly follows? In the first case, what constitutes uniformity; and in the second, what constitutes regularity? Constituted? In this view, how are both uniformity and regularity constituted; and what is the difference between them? Why may there, therefore, be uniformity without regularity; but larity, because there may be a similarity between any two or more parts of a form, without a general similarity among the whole; but there cannot be regularity without uniformity, or without this general resemblance of the whole parts to each other.

Whatever may be the truth of this explanation, it seems sufficiently obvious, that both these qualities are naturally expressive to us of design, and that from the appearance of the one, we are disposed to infer the exertion of the other.

I believe also it will be found, that the beauty of such qualities in forms, arises from this expression of design, and that they are not beautiful in themselves, independently of this expression.

1. Whenever we know that such appearances in nature are the effect of chance, or seem to have been produced without any design, they are not beautiful. Of this every one must have had many instances in his own experience. We often meet with vegetable productions, which assume perfectly regular forms, and which approach to a resemblance to animals. However exact such a resemblance may be, or however regular the form, we never consider such productions beautiful. We say only that they are curious : we run to see them as novelties. but we never speak of their beauty or feel from them that emotion of delight which beauty excites. In many stones, in the same manner, we often find resemblances to vegetables, to animals, and to the human countenance. We never say, however, that such instances are beautiful, but that they are curious. The appearance of regularity or uniformity in rocks or mountains, or in any of the ingredients of natural scenery, is every where considered as a defect, instead of a beauty, and is beheld, with no other emotion than that of surprise. If uniformity or regularity were beautiful in themselves, it is manifest, that such

232

what can there not be? Whatever may be the truth of this expression, what seems sufficiently obvious? From what will it also be found that the beauty of such qualities in forms arises? When are such appearances not beautiful? How is this remark illustrated in the case of vegetable productions? In many stones, in the same manner, what do we often find; and what is observed of them? How is the appearance of regularity in rocks or mountains, every where considered; and how is it beheld? If uniformity or regularity were beautiful in themselves, what is manifest? As uniformity is not, inv

productions of chance would be equally beautiful with those that are produced by design.

2. It is obvious, that uniformity is not, in every case, equally beautiful, and that this beauty is, in all cases, proportioned to the difficulty of its attainment, or to the more forcible expression of design or skill. In simple forms, or such as are constituted by lines of one kind, uniformity is beautiful but in a very small degree. Increase the number of parts, and its beauty increases in proportion to their number. We are not much struck with the uniformity of two leaves of a tree: the uniformity of the whole number of leaves is a very beautiful consideration. The uniformity of these minute parts in every individual of the class, in every tree of the same kind in nature, is a consideration of still greater effect, and can scarcely be presented to the mind, without awakening a very. powerful conviction of wisdom and design. It is upon this principle chiefly, I apprehend, that we determine the beauty of mathematical figures, when we consider them simply as figures, without relation either to their connexion with science. or with any of the productions of art. An equilateral triangle is more beautiful than a scalene or an isosceles, a square than a rhombus, a hexagon than a square, an ellipse than a parabola, a circle than an ellipse; because the number of their uniform parts is greater, and their expression of design more complete. In general, in this subject regular figures are more beautiful than irregular, and regular figures of a greater number of parts more beautiful than the same figures of a smaller number of parts; they cease only to be beautiful when the number of their parts is so great as to produce confusion, and of consequence to obscure the expression of design. It is the same principle which seems to produce the beauty of INTRICACY. Nothing is more delightful, than in any subject

every case, equally beautiful, to what, is this beauty in all cases proportioned? In what forms is it beautiful in a very small degree; and how may it be increased? How is this illustrated from the leaves of a tree? What is a consideration of still greater effect, and without what, can it not be presented to the mind? The beauty of what figures are determined in this way; and how? What examples of illustrations are given? What remark follows; and when only do they cease to be beautiful? What beauty also does the

where we at first perceived only confusion, to find regularity gradually emerging, and to discover, amid the apparent chaos, some uniform principle which reconciles the whole. To reduce a number of apparently dissimilar particulars, under one general law of resemblance, as it is one of the strongest evidences of the exertion of wisdom and design, so it is also productive of one of the strongest emotions of beauty, which design can excite.

II. The view which I have now given of the beauty of regularity and uniformity, arising from the expression of design, seems also very sufficiently to account for a fact, which every one that is conversant in the history of the fine arts must have observed: I mean in the universal prevalence of uniformity, in the earlier periods of these arts: and perhaps a general view of the progress of taste in this respect is the best method, by which I can explain the influence of design upon the beauty of forms.

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1. In the infancy of society, when art was first cultivated, and the attention of men first directed to works of design, it is natural to imagine, that such forms would be employed in those arts which were intended to please, as were most strongly expressive of design or skill. This would take place from two causes—1st, From their ignorance of those more interesting qualities which such productions might express, and which the gradual advancement of the arts alone could unfold; and, 2dly, From the peculiar value which design or art itself, in such periods, possessed, and the consequent admiration which it raised. When any art was discovered among a rude people, the circumstance that would most strongly affect them, would be the art itself, and the design or skill which it exhibited : of the real capacities or consequences of the art, they must be

same principle seem to produce? What sight is most delightful? What is observed of reducing a number of apparently dissimilar parts under one general law of resemblance? The view which has now been given of the beauty of regularity and uniformity, seems also sufficiently to account for what; and what remark follows? In the infancy of society, what is it natural to imagine? From what two causes would this take place? When any art was discovered among a rude people, what circumstance would most strongly affect them? Of what must they be altogether ignorant? Upon what would

altogether ignorant. That, upon which the artist would value himself, would be the production of a work of skill. What the spectator would admire, would be the invention or ingenuity of the workman who was capable of imagining and executing such a work. What the workman, therefore, would study, would be to give his work as full and complete an expression of this skill or design as he could : he would naturally, therefore, give it the appearance of perfect uniformity. In proportion as it had this appearance, it would more or less testify the exertion of this skill, and, consequently, more or less excite the admiration of the spectator. The circumstance of art itself would thus naturally prevail over every other expression of form ; and the value as well as the uncommonness of such talents would give, to uniformity, a degree of beauty, which it is, perhaps, difficult for those to imagine who are accustomed to the advancement of the arts in a polished age. How naturally all this would take place, may still, however, be seen in the tastes and opinions of children. What they perpetually admire is uniformity and regularity. The first little essays they make in art, are all distinguished by this character; the opinion they form of the value or beauty of any object that is shown to them, is from the prevalence of uniformity in its composition; and the triumph which they display, when they are able to produce any kind of regularity in their little productions, very sufficiently indicates the connexion that subsists in their minds, between such qualities and the expression of design.

In the earlier periods of society, therefore, it seems reasonable to imagine, that all those arts which were directed only to ornament, or to the production of beauty, should employ, in preference to all others, the admired form; and that the artist should attempt to give to every thing that constituted the fine

the artist value himself; and what would the spectator admire? What would the workman, therefore, study; and what appearance would he naturally give it? In proportion as it had this appearance, what would it testify; and what effect would it, consequently, produce? Over what would the circumstance of this art naturally prevail; and what would follow? Where may the facility with which all this would take place be seen; and how is this fully illustrated? In the earlier periods of society, therefore, what does it seem arts of such an age, that uniformity, which was expressive of the quality most valued, and most admired among them. It is found, accordingly, that this is the fact, and that the form, which, in such periods, universally characterizes the productions of taste, is uniformity or regularity.

The first appearance of the arts of sculpture and painting, has, in every country, been distinguished by this character. The earliest attempts to imitate the human form could have little merit, as an imitation, and could be valued only for the skill and dexterity they appeared, at such a period, to exhibit. What the spectator admired, was not so much the resemblance to man, as the invention and art which produced this resemblance; what the artist therefore would study, would be to make his work as expressive of this skill as possible. He could, however, do this in no way so effectually, as by the production of uniformity-by making choice of an attitude in which both sides of the body were perfectly similar, and every article of drapery, &c. upon the one side, having a correspondent article of the same kind upon the other. Such a work carried with it immediately the conviction of design, and of course, excited the admiration of an age to which design was not familiar. The figures of the gods, and of the heroes of rude nations, are accordingly represented by every traveller, as fashioned in this manner; and whoever will take the trouble of reading the Abbé Winkelman's laborious History of Ancient Sculpture, will find that the earliest period even of Grecian art, was distinguished by the same character.

As the favorite form of such an age would be regularity, the first step of the progress of the art would naturally consist in the greater perfection of this form, in the higher finishing of the parts, and in the increase of their number. It is at this period that the Egyptian sculpture seems to have stopped; the

236

reasonable to imagine? What is, accordingly, found to be the fact? The first appearance of what arts, has in every country, accordingly, been distinguished by this character? Of the earliest attempts to imitate the human form, what is observed? What did the spectator admire, and what would the artist, consequently, study? In what way could he most effectually do this? What did such a work carry with it; and what was its effect? How are the figures of the gods, &c., represented; and what remark follows? As the favorite form of such an age would be regularity, what would be the first step

accuracy and the delicacy of its workmanship appear not to have been exceeded by any other people; but the possibility of adding variety to uniformity, or of copying the more graceful attitudes of the human form, seems, either to have been unknown, or unattempted among them. From what cause this peculiarity arose, it is now difficult to explain, if it may not be conceived to have been the effect of a law of religion, by which the artists were forbidden to give any other appearance or attitude to the objects of their worship, than those which were to be found in their ancient sculptures. Every history of painting sufficiently shows, that the first periods of this art have been uniformly distinguished by the same character.

The art of gardening seems to have been governed, and long governed, by the same principle. When men first began to consider a garden as a subject capable of beauty, or of bestowing any distinction upon its possessor, it was natural that they should endeavor to render its forms as different as possible from that of the country around it; and to mark, to the spectator, as strongly as they could, both the design and the labor which they had bestowed upon it. Irregular forms, however convenient or agreeable, might still be the production of nature; but forms perfectly regular, and divisions completely uniform, immediately excited the belief of design, and with this belief, all the admiration which follows the employment of skill, or even of expense. That this principle would naturally lead the first artists in gardening to the production of uniformity, may easily be conceived, as even at present, when so different a system of gardening prevails, the common people universally follow the first system; and even men of the best taste, in the cultivation of waste or neglected lands, still enclose them by uniform lines, and in regular divisions, as more immediately

in the progress of the art? How does it appear that the Egyptian sculpture here stopped? It is now difficult to explain from what cause this peculiarity arose, if it may not be conceived to have been what? What does every history of painting sufficiently show? What art seems to have been governed by the same principle? When men first began to consider a garden as a subject capable of beauty, what was natural? What might still be the production of nature; but forms perfectly regular, and divisions completely uniform, produced what excitement? From what may it be conceived that this principle would naturally lead the first artists in gardening to the production

signifying what they wish should be signified—their industry or spirit in their improvement.

As gardens, however, are both a costly and permanent subject, and are, consequently, less liable to the influence of fashion, this taste would not easily be altered; and the principal improvements which they would receive, would consist, rather in the greater employment of uniformity and expense, than in the introduction of any new design. The whole history of antiquity, accordingly, contains not, I believe, a single instance where this character was deviated from, in a spot considered solely as a garden; and till within this century, and in this country, it seems not any where to have been imagined, that a garden was capable of any other beauty, than what might arise from utility, and from the display of art and design. It deserves also farther to be remarked, that the additional ornaments of gardening, have in every country partaken of the same character, and have been directed to the purpose of increasing the appearance and the beauty of design. Hence Jet d'Eaus, artificial fountains, regular cascades, trees in the form of animals, &c. have, in all countries, been the principal ormaments of gardening. The violation of the usual appearances of nature in such objects, strongly exhibited the employment of art. They, therefore, perfectly accorded with the character which the scene was intended to have; and they increased its beauty as they increased the effect of that quality upon which this beauty was founded.

The same principle which has thus influenced the taste of men in the earlier periods of society, with regard to sculpture and gardening, appears to have extended to every other art which was employed in the beauty of form. The art of dancing, one of the fine arts of a rude people, and which is capa-

238

of uniformity? Why would not this taste be easily altered; and in what would the principal improvements which they would receive, consist? Accordingly, what does not the whole history of antiquity contain; and what remark follows? What deserves also farther to be remarked? How is this illustrated? What does the violation of the principles of nature, in such objects, strongly exhibit? With what did they, therefore, perfectly accord; and in what degree did they increase its beauty? To what does the same principle appear to have extended? What is observed of the art of dancing illustrative of this rémark? What is observed of general motions of the human

ble indeed of being one of the fine arts of the most improved people, is distinguished, in its first periods, by the same character, and from the same cause. The common or general motions of the human body are acquired in so early infancy, and are performed with so little reflection, that they appear to be more the exertion of a natural power, than an acquisition of labor or art. When men then first began to take pleasure in the exertion of their agility, and to expect praise or admiration for their skill, it is obvious, that the motions and gestures, which they would adopt, would be such as were farthest removed from the natural or easy motions of the body, and which, from this difference, were most strongly expressive of the address or agility of the dancer. Hence naturally arose the invention of all those uniform attitudes, in which the two sides of the body were rendered perfectly correspondent ; those artificial gestures, in which the same motion of the limbs is repeated, without any change of place; and as the art advanced, those regular figures in which the same form is perpetually described; and those more complicated dances, in which a number of performers are engaged in repeating some intricate figure, within a definite interval. Such gestures and figures, as are essentially different from the usual gestures of the body, were immediately expressive, both of design and skill. The performer would study to excel in them ; the spectator would admire him in proportion as he did excel ; and hence the art would almost necessarily assume the same character of regularity or uniformity that distinguished the other arts which were destined to please.

It would be very easy to illustrate the same observation, from a variety of other particulars in the ornamental forms of rude nations, if it did not lead to a very minute, and I believe a very unnecessary investigation. The reader, will perhaps, forgive me, if I avail myself of this opportunity to hazard a conjecture, whether the same principle is not the cause of the invention of rhyme and measure in poetry, and whether

body? When men first began to take pleasure in the exertions of their agility, what course would they obviously pursue? Hence, naturally arose what invention? And as the art advanced, what? Of what were those gestures immediately expressive? What would the performer study; and the spectator admire; and hence, what would the art assume? From what it may not serve to account for a very remarkable fact with which every one is acquainted, viz. the precedence of poetical, over prosaic composition.

The use of language is acquired so early in life, and is practised upon common occasions with so little study or thought, that it appears to a rude people, as it does to the common people of every country, rather as an inherent power of our nature, than as an acquisition of labor or study; and upon such occasions, is considered as no more axpressive of design or skill, than the notes of birds, or the cries of animals. When, therefore, men first began to think of composition, and to expect admiration from their skill in it, they would very naturally endeavor to make it as expressive as they could of this skill, by distinguishing it, as much as possible, from common language. There was no way so obvious for this, as by the production of some kind of regularity or uniformity-by the production either of regularity in the succession of these sounds, or of uniformity or resemblance in the sounds themselves. Such qualities in composition would immediately suggest the belief of skill and design, and would, consequently, excite all that admiration which, in the commencement of every art, such qualities so strongly and so justly raise. The same cause, therefore, which induced the sculptor to give, to his performances, that form which was most strongly expressive of his skill, would induce the poet to employ that regularity or uniformity of sounds, which was most immediately expressive also of his skill, and which was most likely to excite the admiration of his people. Rhyme or measure then, according to the nature of the language, and the superior difficulty of either, would naturally come to be the constituent mark of poetry, or of that species of

would it be very easy to illustrate the same observation? What conjecture does our author hazard? What is the consequence of the early period at which language is acquired, and the little study with which it is practised on common occasions? When men, therefore, first began to think of composition, and to expect admiration from their skill in it, what would they very naturally do; and how? For this, what was the most natural way? What would such qualities immediately suggest? How would the poet? Of what would such qualities in the case of the sculptor, and the poet? Of what would rhyme or measure then naturally become the constituent mark? For what would it be the simplest resource of the poet; and in what proportion composition which was destined to affect or to please. It would be the simplest resource of the poet, to distinguish his productions from common language; and it would, accordingly, please, just in proportion to the perfection of its regularity, or to the degree in which it was expressive of his labor and skill. With the greater and more important characteristics of the art, a rude people must necessarily be unacquainted : and what would naturally constitute the distinction to them between poetry and common language, would be the appearance of uniformity or regularity in the one, and the want of them in the other.

As thus, the first instances of composition would be distinguished by some species of uniformity, every kind of composition would gradually borrow, or come to be distinguished by, the same character. If it was necessary for the poet to study rhyme or measure, to distinguish his verses from common language, it would be equally necessary for the lawgiver to study the same in the composition of his laws, and the sage in the composition of his aphorisms. Without this character, they had no distinction from usual or familiar expression-they had no mark by which they might be known to be the fruit of thought or reflection, instead of the immediate effusion of fancy. Before the invention of writing, the only expedient by which it seems possible that composition could be distinguished from common language, must have been some species of uniformity or regularity, which might immediately convey the belief of art or design, and thus separate it from that vulgar language which appeared to imply neither. It is hence that, in every country, proverbs, or the ancient maxims of wisdom, are distinguished by alliteration, or measure, or some other artifice of a like nature; that in many countries the earliest laws have been written in verse; and, in general, that the arti-

would it please? With what must a rude people necessarily be unacquainted; and what remark follows? As thus, the first instances of composition would be distinguished by some species of uniformity, what would be the consequence? If it was necessary for the poet to study rhyme or measure, to distinguish his verses from common language, what would be equally necessary? Without this character, what did they not possess? What seems to be the only expedient by which composition could be distinguished from common language, before the invention of writing? Hence, what arcse? What influence did the invention of writing exert? Prose, therefore, when written

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ficial composition which is now appropriated to poetry alone, and distinguished by the name of *poetical composition*, was naturally the prevailing character of composition, and applied to every subject which was the fruit of labor or meditation; as the mark, and indeed the only mark that could then be given, of the employment of this labor and meditation.

The invention of writing occasioned a very great revolution in composition : what was written, was of itself expressive of design. Prose, therefore, when written, was equally expressive of design with verse or rhyme; and the restraints which these imposed, led men naturally to forsake that artificial composition, which now no longer had the value it bore, before this invention. The discovery of writing, seems, therefore, naturally to have led to composition in prose. It might be expected also, that the same cause should have freed poetry from the restraints with which the ignorance or the necessities of a rude age had thus shackled it; and that the great distinctions of imagery, of enthusiasm, of being directed to the imagination, instead of the understanding, &c. should have been sufficient distinctions of it from prosaic composition, without preserving those rude inventions, which were founded solely upon the expression of art. There are, however, two causes which serve to prevent this natural effect, and which it is probable will every where continue to appropriate rhyme or measure to poetical composition-1st, The permanence of poetical models, and the irresistible prejudice we have in their favor, even from no other cause than their antiquity: and 2dly, The real difficulty of the art itself, which, in opposition to the general history of art, remains still as difficult, and perhaps more so, than in the first periods of its cultivation; and which consequently renders it still as much the object of admiration, as when it first began to be cultivated. The generality of men judge of poetry by the perfection or imperfection of its rhymes; and the art or skill of the poet, in the management of them, constitutes a very great share of the pleasure they have in the perusal of it.

was equally expressive of design with what; and to what did the restraints which these imposed lead men? What remark follows? What might also be expected? What two causes serve to prevent this natural effect? How do the generality of man judge of poetry; and what constitutes a very great Whatever truth there may be in this conjecture, with regard to the origin of rhyme and measure, it is a fact sufficiently certain, that the first periods of the history of the fine arts, are distinguished by uniformity and regularity; and perhaps the observations which I have offered may lead the reader to believe, that this arises from the early, and perhaps instinctive association we have of such qualities in form, with design and skill, and the great and peculiar value they necessarily have in such a period of society.

2. When, however, the fine arts have made this progress, circumstances arise which alter, in a great measure, the taste of mankind, and introduce a different opinion with regard to the beauty of design. Two causes more especially conspire to this—1st, The discovery that is gradually made, that other and more affecting qualities are capable of being expressed by forms, than that of mere design : and 2dly, The progress of the arts themselves, which naturally renders easy what at first was difficult, and consequently renders the production of regularity or uniformity less forcibly the sign of skill than at first. Both tend immediately to the introduction of VARIETY.

When the painter and sculptor, for instance, had advanced so far in this art, as to be able to imitate exactly the form of the human body, it could not well be long before they applied themselves to particular imitations of it. Some forms are beautiful, others not. They would study therefore to imitate the former; and perhaps endeavor to investigate the circumstances which constituted the difference between such cases. The imitation of the beautiful, from the imitation of mere form, was itself, a great step in the art, but was of still greater consequence in leading to another. Beautiful forms were more beautiful in one attitude than in another—under the influence of some passions or affections, than under the influence of

share of the pleasure they have in the perusal of it? Whatever truth there may be in this conjecture, what fact is sufficiently certain; and what may the observations made lead the reader to believe? When, however, the fine arts have made this progress, what follows? What two causes especially conspire to this? To what do both immediately tend? How is this illustrated from the painter and sculptor? As some forms are beautiful and others not, what would they study, and endeavor also to do? Of the imitation of the beautiful

others. To imitate such objects, therefore, it was necessary to study, not only the general beauty of form, but such attitudes and expressions, as were the signs of such passions or affec-The most beautiful forms in real life, were still in some tions. respects deficient, and it was difficult to find instances, where such forms might display the most beautiful attitudes or expres. sions. The imagination of the painter, or the sculptor, could alone supply this want; he would endeavor by degrees, therefore, to unite the beauty of form with the beauty of expression; and would thus gradually ascend to conception of ideal beauty, and to the production of form and of attitude, more beautiful than any that were to be found in nature itself. In these various steps, the uniformity of the earlier ages would insensibly be deserted. Beautiful attitudes have little uniformity, and in the expression of passion or affection, every variety of form must be introduced which takes place in real life. The artist, therefore, would not only be under the necessity of introducing variety, but the admiration of the spectator would, necessarily, keep pace with its introduction; both because the expression which his forms now assumed, was, of itself, much more pleasing and interesting, than the mere expression of design, and because this variety was, in fact, now significant of greater skill and dexterity in the artist, than the mere uniformity of the former age. In those arts, therefore, variety of form would not only be considered as expressive of design, but as that which distinguished the old and the modern school, was the uniformity of the one, and the variety of the other, it would be considered as the peculiar sign of elegant or of improved design.

In all the other arts, which were either directed to the production of beauty of form, or which were susceptible of it, the same causes would produce the same effect. In all of them,

from the imitation of mere form, what is observed? To imitate such objects, therefore, what was it necessary to study? What remark follows? What could alone supply this want; what would he endeavor by degrees, therefore, to do; and what would follow? In these various steps, what would be deserted? Of beautiful attitudes what is observed? From this, what consequence would follow, both to the artist, and to the admiration of the spectator? In these arts, therefore, how would variety of form be considered? What would be the case in all the other arts? Why would the difficulty be

in proportion as the art was cultivated, the difficulty of it would decrease : the same form which was beautiful, and solely beautiful, when the circumstance of art or skill only was considered, would every day become less beautiful, as that skill became more common : the natural rivalship of artists would lead them to deviate from this principle of uniformity, and by the introduction of some degree of variety, to give greater proofs of their art and dexterity :--- it would not fail to be observed, that in such inventions some were more beautiful or more pleasing than others : some farther qualities, therefore, would be sought for in forms, than that which was merely expressive of design : the forms which were beautiful in nature, would be imitated in the productions of art; succeeding ages would gradually refine upon these beginnings of improvement; until, at last, the most common forms would receive all that degree of beauty, which was consistent with their usefulness or ends.

The forms, however, that are beautiful in nature, are, in general, such as are distinguished by variety : in the imitation of them, therefore, variety would necessarily be introduced. The imitation of such forms, the application of them to common objects, was, in itself, more laborious, more difficult, and demanded more skill in the artist, than the production of mere uniformity. The variety, therefore, which took place in this period of the arts, would naturally become the sign of improved or of elegant design, as uniformity had formerly been the sign of design itself; and as the one distinguished the rude period of these arts, and the other the improved and elegant one, uniformity, in this, as in the former case, would come to be considered as the sign of rude or imperfect design, and variety, of that which was refined and cultivated. The application of these principles to the different arts, which are conversant in the beauty of form, is far beyond the limit of these observations.

increased in proportion as the art was cultivated; and what would be the effect of the natural rivalship of artists? What would not fail to be observed; and what would follow? What are the forms that are beautiful in nature; and in the imitation of them, what is the consequence? Of the application of such forms to common objects, what is remarked? Of the variety, therefore, that took place in this period of the arts, what is observed? What is beyond the limit of these observations? How would society

By such means as these-by the imitation of nature-by the invention which rivalship would naturally excite, and by the natural progress of art itself, variety would gradually be introduced; in different degrees indeed in different arts, according to their nature, and the costliness and permanence of the subjects upon which they were employed, but still, in all, in some degree, and according to the measure in which they admitted As it thus also became the principal visible distinction beit. tween the rude and the improved state of these arts, it would become the sign of this improvement and refinement; the excellence of the artist would, in a great degree, be measured by the proportion of it which he was capable of giving to his works; and as the love of uniformity had distinguished the earlier periods of society, the love of variety would, from the same cause, distinguish the periods of cultivation and refinement. It is found accordingly, that this is the great characteristic of the taste of polished ages : and so strong is this principle, that wherever, in the arts of any country, variety is found to predominate, it may be safely inferred, that they have long been cultivated in that country; as, on the other hand, wherever the love of uniformity prevails, it may with equal safety be inferred, that they are in that country but in the first stage of their improvement.

There is one art, however, in which the same effect seems to have arisen from very different causes. The variety which distinguishes the modern art of gardening in this island, beautiful as it undoubtedly is, appears not, however, to be equally natural to this art, as it has been shown to be to others. It is, at least, of a very late origin: it is to be found in no other country, and those nations of antiquity, who had carried the arts of taste to the greatest perfection which they have ever yet attained, while they had arrived at beauty in every other species of form, seem never to have imagined, that the principle of variety was applicable to gardening, or to have devi-

gradually be introduced; and in what order? What is remarked as a consequence of this? This being the great characteristic of a polished people, of the strength of this principle what is observed? In what art does the same effect seem to have arisen from very different causes; and what is ated, in any respect, from the regularity or uniformity of their ancestors.

Nor does it indeed seem to be either a very natural or a very obvious invention. A garden is a spot surrounding or contiguous to a house, and cultivated for the convenience or pleasure of the family. When men began first to ornament such a spot, it was natural that they should do with it, as they did with the house to which it was subordinate, viz. by giving it every possible appearance of uniformity, to show that they had bestowed labor and expense upon the improvement of it. In the countries that were most proper for gardening, in those distinguished by a fine climate and a beautiful scenery, this labor and expense could, in fact, in no other way be expressed than by the production of such uniformity. To imitate the beauty of nature in the small scale of the garden, would have been ridiculous in a country, where this beauty was to be found upon the great scale of nature; and for what purpose should they bestow labor or expense, for which every man expects credit, in erecting a scene, which, as it could be little superior to the general scenery around them, could, consequently, but little communicate, to the spectator, the belief of this labor or this expense having been bestowed? The beauty of landscape, nature had sufficiently provided. The beauty, therefore, that was left for man to create, was the beauty of convenience or magnificence; both of them dependent upon the employment of art and expense, and both of them best expressed by such forms, as immediately signify the employment of such means. In such a situation, therefore, it does not seem natural, that men should think of proceeding in this art beyond the first and earliest forms, which it had acquired; or that any farther improvement should be attempted in it, than merely in the extension of the scale of this design.

In this view, I cannot help thinking that the modern taste in

remarked of it? Why does it not seem to have been a very natural, or a very obvious intention? In fine countries how only could this expense be expressed? In a country of what sort would it have been ridiculous to imitate the beauties of nature on the small scale of a garden; and what remark follows? As nature, therefore, had provided the beauty of landscape, what beauty was left for man to create; and of both of them, what is observed? In such a situation, therefore, what does not seem natural? In this view, to what two

gardening, or what Mr. Walpole very justly, and very emphatically calls the art of creating landscape, owes its origin to two circumstances, which may, at first, appear paradoxical, viz.—To the accidental circumstance of our taste in natural beauty being founded upon foreign models; and to the difference or inferiority of the scenery of our own country, to that which we were accustomed peculiarly to admire.

The influence of these circumstances will, perhaps, be sufficiently obvious to those who recollect that the compositions which serve most early, and indeed most universally, to fix our taste in this respect, are those which have been produced in Italy and Greece; in countries much superior to our own, in the articles of climate and of natural beauty; which are almost sacred in our imaginations, from the events by which they have been distinguished, and which, besides all this, have an additional charm to us, from the very compositions in which they are celebrated. The poems of Homer and Theocritus, of Virgil and Horace, have been now for a considerable length of time, the first poetical compositions to which the youth of modern Europe are accustomed; and they have influenced accordingly, in a very sensible degree, the taste of all those who have been so early engaged in the study of them. Besides this, the effect of painting, and particularly of landscape painting, has been very great, both in awakening our taste to natural beauty, and in determining it. The great masters in this art have been principally Italians-men who were born amid scenes of distinguished beauty, who passed their lives in copying those features either of real or of adventitious expression with which Italy presented them; and whose works have disseminated in every country where they found their way, the admiration of the scenes which they copied. From both these causes, and from the strong prejudice, which, since the revival of letters, we so early and so deeply feel, in favor of

248

circumstances does the modern taste in gardening owe its origin? To whom will the influence of these circumstances be sufficiently obvious? Of those countries, what is observed? How is this illustrated from the poems of Homer, &c.? Besides this, what has been the effect of painting? What is remarked of the great masters of this art? What is the effect of both these causes; and what remark follows? With these impressions what was very

every thing that relates to Grecian or to Roman antiquity, the imagery of Italian scenery had strongly obtained possession of our imagination. Our first impressions of the beauty of nature had been gained from the compositions which delineated such scenery; and we were gradually accustomed to consider them as the standard of natural beauty.

With these impressions, it was very natural for the inhabitants of a country, of which the scenery, however beautiful in itself, was yet, in many respects, very different from that which they were accustomed to consider as solely or supremely beautiful, to attempt to imitate what they did not possess; to import, as it were, the beauties which were not of their own growth : and in fact to create, according to Mr. Walpole's vigorous expression, that scenery which nature and fortune had denied them.

Such improvements, however, being extremely expensive, could not be, at first, upon a very large scale. They could, for various reasons, occupy only that spot of ground which surrounded the house : and as they thus supplanted what had formerly been the garden, they came, very naturally, to be considered only as another species of gardening. A scene of so peculiar a kind; could not well unite with the country around : it would gradually, therefore, extend, so as to embrace all the ground that was within view, or in the possession of the impro-From the garden, it naturally extended to the park, which ver. became, therefore, also the subject of this new, but very fortunate mode of improvement : and thus, from the nature of modern education, and the habit we are in of receiving our first rudiments of taste from foreign models, together with the admiration which so many causes have conspired to excite in our minds with regard to antiquity, seems, very probably, to have arisen that modern taste in gardening, which is so different from every other that men have followed, and which has tended so much to the ornament of this country.

natural? Why could not such insprovements, at first, be on a very large scale; and how did they come to be considered only as another species of gurdening? As a scene of so pecultar a kind could not well make with the country round, in what manner would it gradually extend? And thus what followed? In confirmation of what has been said, what is also to be ob-32

It is to be observed also, in confirmation of what I have said, that the first attempts of this kind in England, were very far from being an imitation of the general scenery of nature. It was solely the imitation of Italian scenery : and it is not improbable, that they who first practised the art, were, themselves, ignorant of the possible beauties which it at length, might ac-Statues, temples, urns, ruins, colonades, &c., were the quire. first ornaments of all such scenes. Whatever distinguished the real scenes of nature in Italy, was here employed in artificial scenery with the most thoughtless profusion; and the object of the art in general was the creation, not of natural, but of Italian landscape. The fine satire of Mr. Pope upon this subject, is a sufficient proof of the degree to which this fashion was carried; and it deserves to be remarked, to the honor of his taste, that he so soon saw the possible beauties of this infant art, and was so superior to the universal prejudices upon the subject.

It was but a short step, however, from this state of the art, to the pursuit of general beauty. The great step had already been made, in the destruction of the regular forms which constituted the former system of gardening, and in the imitation of nature, which, although foreign, and very different from the appearances or the character of nature in our own country, was vet still the imitation of nature. The profusion which was lavished upon temples, ruins, statues, and all the other adventitious articles of Italian scenery, soon became ridiculous. The destruction of these, it was found, did not destroy the beauty of landscape. The power of simple nature was felt and acknowledged, and the removal of the articles of acquired expression, only led men more strongly to attend to the natural expression of scenery, and to study the means by which it might be maintained or improved. The publication also, at this time, of the Seasons of Thomson, in the opinion of a very competent

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served? As it was solely the imitation of Italian scenery, what is not probable; and what remark follows? Of what is the fine satire of Mr. Pope a sufficient proof; and what deserves to be remarked? What, however, was but a'short step from this state of the art; and in what had the great step already been made? What soon became ridiculous? How does it appear that the destruction of these did not destroy the beauty of landscape? What

judge,* contributed, in no small degree, both to influence and direct the taste of men in this art. The peculiar merit of the work itself, the singular felicity of its descriptions, and above all, the fine enthusiasm which it displays, and which it is so fitted to excite, with regard to the works of nature, were most singularly adapted to promote the growth of an infant art, which had for its object the production of natural beauty; and by diffusing every where, both the admiration of nature, and the knowledge of its expression, prepared, in a peculiar degree, the minds of men in general, both to feel the effects, and to judge of the fidelity, of those scenes in which it was imitated. By these means, and by the singular genius of some late masters, the art of gardening has gradually ascended from the pursuit of particular, to the pursuit of general beauty---to realize whatever the fancy of the painter has imagined, and to create a scenery, more pure, more harmonious, and more expressive, than any that is to be found in nature itself.

From the slight view which I have now given of the progress of those arts, which respect the beauty of form, the reader may, perhaps, be satisfied, that this progress, itself, produces a difference in the sentiments of men with regard to the beauty of design, and to those material qualities in forms, which are expressive of it : that the same degree of art or skill which is the object of admiration in an early age, ceases to be so, in an age of greater improvement ; and that hence as UNIFORMITY is the distinguishing form of beauty in the first periods of these arts, VARIETY is, from the same cause, in the latter.

These qualities, however, though in a great measure characteristic of the rude and the improved periods of the arts, are

was the effect of the publication of Thomson's Seasons? What properties of the work were most singularly adapted to promote the growth of an art, which had for its object the production of natural beauty? By diffusing every where, both the admiration of nature, and the knowledge of its expression, for what did it prepare the minds of men? By these means, and by the singular genius of some late masters, to what has the art of gardening gradually ascended? From the slight view which has now been given of the progress of those arts which respect the beauty of form, of what may the reader be satisfied? Of these qualities, however, what is observed? Where

neither opposite nor irreconciliable. In every perfect form of beauty they must be united, and the same quality of design or skill which is the foundation of their beauty, affords also the lew of their union.

Every work of art supposes unity of design, or some one end which the artist had in view in its structure or composition. In forms, however, considered simply as expressive of design, and without any other relation, the only possible sign of unity of design, is uniformity or regularity. It is this which alone distinguishes the productions of chance, from those of design; and without the appearance of this, variety is, confessedly, only confusion.

In every beautiful work of art, something more than mere design is demanded, viz. elegant or embellished design. The only material sign of this is variety. It is this which distinguishes, in general, beautiful from plain forms; and without this, in some degree, uniformity is only dullness and insipidity. Beautiful forms, therefore, must necessarily be composed both of uniformity and variety; and this union will be perfect, when the proportion of uniformity does not encroach upon the beauty of embellishment, and the propostion of variety does not encroach upon the beauty of unity.

Considering, therefore, forms in this light, as beautiful merely from their expression of design, the observation of Dr. Hutcheson may, perhaps, be considered an axiom with regard to their beauty. That where the uniformity is equal, the beauty of forms is in proportion to their variety; and when their variety is equal, their beauty is in proportion to their uniformity: that is, according to the view which I have now presented to the reader, when the unity of design is equal, the beauty of forms will be in proportion to their embellishment; and when the

252

must they be united, and what forms the law of their union? What does every work of art suppose? In forms, however, what is observed; and what remark follows? In every beautiful work of art, what is demanded; and of this, what is the only material sign? What does this, in general, distinguish; and without it, what follows? Of what must beautiful forms, therefore, be compased; and when will this union be perfect? Considering, therefore, forms as beautiful merely from their expression of design, what observation of Dr. Hutcheson may, perhaps, be considered an axiom, with regard to their beauty? In the view now presented to the reader, how have the qualities of

embellishment of forms is equal, their beauty will be in proportion to the unity of their design.

JII. In the view which I have now presented to the reader, the qualities of uniformity and variety are considered as beautiful from their expression of design. In the preceding section, on the other hand, these qualities are considered as beautiful, from the effect of their composition, in maintaining and promoting the emotion which the subject, itself, is capable of exciting. That these qualities are in fact beautiful from both these causes—that their composition is in some cases beautiful from being expressive of the skill and taste of the artist; and in others, from being correspondent to the character or expression of the subject, are propositions, so obvious, that I will not detain the reader by any illustration of them. The confounding of these distinct expressions has also, I believe, been the cause of the greater part of mistakes which have been made in the investigation of the beauty of these qualities.

The beauty of these expressions, however, is very different ; and as it is in the power of the artist, either to sacrifice the beauty of design to that of character or expression, or to sacrifice the beauty of character to that of design, there is not. perhaps, any sircumstance of more importance to him, or to the arts of taste in general, than a proper comprehension of the difference of this beauty, and of the great superiority which the one has over the other. The superiority of the beauty of expression or character seems to consist in three things-lst. In the greater and more affecting emotion which is produced by it, than that which is produced by the mere expression of design ; 2dly, In this beauty being more universally felt, it being dependent only upon sensibility, while the beauty of design is fully felt only by those who are proficients in the art. and who are able, accordingly, to judge of the skill or taste which is displayed : and 3dly, in the permanence of this beauty.

uniformity and variety been considered? How were they considered in the preceding section? To illustrate what, will our author not detain the reader? What has been the effect of confounding these distinct expressions? The beauty of these expressions being very different, what remark follows? In what three things does the superiority of the beauty of expression or charac-

arising from certain invariable principles of our nature, while the beauty of design is dependent upon the period of the art in which it is displayed, and ceases to be beautiful, when the art has made a farther progress, either in improvement or de. cline. In all those arts, therefore, that have, for their object, the production of beautiful forms, it may be considered as a first and fundamental principle, that the expression of design should be subject to the expression of character; and that in every form, proportion of uniformity and variety, which the artist should study, ought to be that which is accommodated to the nature of this character, and not to the expression of his own dexterity or skill. As in the mechanical arts, the object of which is utility. and in which the ability of the artist is more surely displayed by the production of useful form, it would be absurd in himr to sacrifice this utility, to the display of his own dexterity or address; so in the arts of taste, the object of which is beauty. and in which the taste or genius of the artist is in like manner most surely displayed by the production of beautiful form, it is equally absurd to sacrifice the superior beauty of character or expression, to that meaner and less permanent beauty, which may arise from the display of his own ability or art.

However obvious or important the principle which I have now stated may be, the fine arts have been unfortunately governed by a very different principle; and the undue preference which artists are naturally disposed to give to the display of design, has been one of the most powerful causes of that decline and degeneracy which has uniformly marked the history of the fine arts, after they have arrived at a certain period of perfection. To a common spectator, the great test of excellence in beautiful forms is character or expression, or, in other words, the appearance of some interesting or affecting quality in the form itself. To the artist, on the other hand,

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ter seem to consist? In all those arts, therefore, that have, for their object, the production of beautiful forms, what may be considered as a fundamental principle? As in the mechanical arts, it would be absurd in him to sacrifice this utility, to the display of his own dexterity or address; so in the arts of taste what is equally absurd? However obvious or important the principle now stated may be, on the fine arts what remark follows? To a common spectator, what is the great test of excellence in beautiful forms; and what to

the great test of excellence is skill-the production of something new in point of design, or difficult in point of execution. It is by the expression of character, therefore, that the generality of men determine the beauty of forms; but it is by the expression of design, that the artist determines it. When, therefore, the arts which are conversant in the beauty of form, have attained to that fortunate stage of their progress, when this expression of character is itself the great expression of design, the invention and taste of the artist take, almost necessarily, a different direction. When his excellence can no longer be distinguished by the production of merely beautiful or expressive form, he is naturally led to distinguish it by the production of what is uncommon or difficult; to signalize his works by the fertility of his invention, or the dexterity of his execution; and thus gradually to forget the end of his art, in his attention to display his superiority in the art itself. While the artist thus insensibly deviates from the true principles of composition, other causes unfortunately tend to mislead also the taste of the public. In the mechanical arts, the object of which is utility, this utility is itself the principle by which we determine the perfection of every production : utility, however, is a permanent principle, and necessarily renders our opinion of this perfection as permanent. In the fine arts, the object of which is beauty, it is by its effect upon our imagination alone, that we determine the excellence of any production. There is no quality however, which has a more powerful effect upon our imagination than novelty. The taste of the generality of mankind, therefore, very naturally falls in with the invention of the artist, and is gratified by that continued production of novelty which the art affords to it. In the mechanical arts, which are directed to general utility, all men are, in some mea.

the artist? How do they, therefore, respectively determine the beauty of forms? When, therefore, does the invention of the artist almost necessarily take a different direction? When his excellence can no longer be distinguished by the production of merely beautiful or expressive form, to what is he naturally led? While the artist thus insensibly deviates from the true principle of composition, what is the effect of other causes? How is this remark illustrated from the mechanical, and from the fine arts? Of novelty, and of its effect upon the generality of mankind, what is remarked? In the mechanical arts, why are all men judges of the excellence of their produc-

sure, judges of the excellence of their productions, because they are, in some measure, judges of this utility. But in the fine arts, which seem to require peculiar talents, and which require at least talents that are not generally exerted, all men neither are, nor conceive themselves to be judges. They willingly, therefore, submit their opinions to the guidance of those, who, by their practice in these arts, appear very naturally the most competent to judge with regard to their beauty; and while the arts amuse them with perpetual novelty, very readily take for granted, that what is new is also beautiful. Bv these means-by the preference which artists are so naturally disposed to give to the expression of design, above the expression of character-by the nature of these arts themselves, which afford no permanent principle of judging; and by the disposition of men in general to submit their opinions to the opinions of those who have the strongest propensity, and the greatest interest in their corruption ; have the arts of taste, in every country, after a certain period of perfection, degenerated into the mere expressions of the skill and execution of the artist, and gradually sunk into a state of barbarity, almost as great as that from which they first arose. "Alit æmulatio in-" genia," says Velleius Paterculus, in speaking of the same subject, " et nunc invidia, nunc admiratio incitationem accon-"dit; naturaque quod summo studio petitum est, adscendit in "summum, difficilisque in perfecto mora est : naturaliterque " quod procedere non potest, recedit; et ut primo, ad conse-"quendos quos priores ducimus, accendimur, ita, ubi aut præ-"teriri aut æquari eos posse desperavimus, studium cum spe "senescit, et quod assegui non potest, segui desinit : et velut "eccupatam relinguens materiam; querit novam ; præteriteque " eo, in quo eminere non possumus, aliquid in quo nitamur con-"quirimus."-Vell. Patercul. L. 1. ad fin.*

* Emulation nourishes genius; envy and admiration alternately excite it. That which is sought after and obtained by the greatest zeal, naturally reaches

tions; but of the fine arts what is observed? To whom do they, therefore, willingly submit their opinion; and what do they readily take for granted? On the manner in which the arts of trists have degenerated, what remark follows? In speaking of the same subject, what says Velleius Paterculus? To Nor is this melancholy progress peculiar to those arts which respect the beauty of form. The same causes extend to every other of those arts which are employed in the production of beauty; and they who are acquainted with the history of the fine arts of antiquity, will recollect that the history of statuary, of painting, of music, of poetry, and of prose composition, have been equally distinguished, in their later periods, by the same gradual desertion of the end of the art, for the display of the art itself; and by the same prevalence of the expression of design, over the expression of the composition in which it was employed. It has been seldom found in the history of any of these arts, that the artist, like the great master of painting in this country,* has united the philosophy with the practice of his art, and regulated his own sublime inventions, by the chaste principles of truth and science.

For an error, which so immediately arises from the nature, and from the practice of these arts themselves, it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to find a remedy. Whether, as I am willing to believe, there may not be circumstances in the modern state of Europe, which may serve to check at least, this unfortunate progression---whether the beautiful models of antiquity in every art, may not serve to fix, in some degree, the standard of taste in these arts--whether the progress of philosophy and criticism may not tend to introduce greater stability, as well as greater delicacy of taste; and whether the general diffusion of science, by increasing in so great a proportion the number

the summit. It is difficult to keep perfection stationary—that which cannot *proceed*, naturally *recedes*, and, as at first we are ambitious of following those whom we deem pre-eminent, so when we deepair of equalling or surpassing them, our zeal flags with our hope, and we cease to follow that which we can never overtake. A new occupation is substituted for the one relinquished, and forsaking that in which we cannot become eminent, we seek something else in which we may shine.

what is not this melancholy progress peculiar? To what do the same causes extend; and what will they, who are acquainted with the fine arts of antiquity, recollect? What has seldom been found in the history of any of these arts? For this error, what is a difficult task; and what is far beyond the of judges, may not rescue these arts from the sole dominion of the artists, and thus establish more just and philosophical principles of decision, it is far beyond the limits of these essays to inquire. But I humbly conceive, that there is no rule of criticism more important in itself, or more fitted to preserve the taste of the individual, or of the public, than to consider every composition as faulty and defective, in which the expression of the art is more striking than the expression of the subject, or in which the beauty of design prevails over the beauty of character or expression.

PART II.

OF THE INFLUENCE OF FITNESS UPON THE BEAUTY OF FORMS.

THE second source of the relative beauty of forms is FIT-NESS, or the proper adaptation of means to an end.

That this quality in forms, is productive of the emotions of beauty, every one must probably have perceived. In the forms of furniture, of machines, and of instruments in the different arts, the greater part of their beauty arises from this consideration; nor is there any form which does not become beautiful, where it is found to be perfectly adapted to its end. "A "ship which is well built, and which promises to sail well," says Mr. Hogarth, "is called by sailors a beauty." In every profession, in like manner, all machines or instruments are called beautiful by the artists, which are well adapted to the end of their arts. Even the most common and disregarded articles of convenience, are felt to be beautiful, when we forget their familiarity, and consider them only in relation to the purposes which they serve.

That fitness is not the only source of beauty in forms, is sufficiently obvious. But I apprehend that the elegant and inge-

258

limits of these essays to inquire? What rule of criticism is of the greatest importance?

What is the second source of the relative beauty of forms? What must every one probably have perceived? How is this illustrated from the forms of furniture, &c.? What says Mr. Hogarth? In every other profession, what practice is followed; and when are the most common articles of convenience felt to be beautiful? Though filness is not the only source of beauty in forms, yet of the author of the "Essay upon the sublime and beautiful,"

mous author of the "essay upon the sublime and beautiful," has yielded too much to the love of system, when he will not allow it to be any source of beauty at all. The common experience and common language of mankind are at variance with this opinion, nor does it seem to be sufficiently supported by any of the instances he brings. "On this principle," says he, "the wedge-like snout of the swine, the little sunk eyes, and "the whole make of the head, so well adapted to its offices of " digging and rooting, would be extremely beautiful. The great " bag hanging to the bill of the pelican, a thing likewise highly " useful to this animal, would be likewise as beautiful in our eyes. "The hedge-hog, so well secured against all assaults by his " prickly hide, and the porcupine, with his missile quills, would " be then considered as creatures of no small elegance. There " are few animals whose parts are better contrived than those " of the monkey. He has the hands of a man, joined to the " springy limbs of a beast; he is admirably calculated for run-"ning, leaping, grappling, and climbing: and yet there are " few animals which seem to have less beauty in the eyes of all "mankind,"* &c. In these instances, and in all the others he mentions, it is clear, that the animals are not, in general, considered as beautiful; but if I am not deceived, the reason of this is, not that the fitness of their construction is not a consideration capable of producing the emotion of beauty, but that, in general, we never consider the animals in the light of this fitness of their construction. Such forms are not naturally beautiful, or have none of those ingredients which were before mentioned as constituting the natural beauty of forms. It is the natural heauty of forms, however, which first strikes us, because it demands neither any previous knowledge, nor any fixed Such animals, besides, have many unpleasing quaattention. lities from their instincts, their characters, and their modes of life. It is in the light of these qualities, however, that we

* Burke, revised by Mills.

what is apprehended? What are at variance with this opinion? Repeat the passage introduced to illustrate this remark. In these instances, and in all the others that he mentions, what is clear; but what is the reason of this? Of such forms, what is observed? What is it that first strikes us; and why? From what have such animals many unpleasing qualities? Why is it in the light of these qualities that we generally consider them? When do their

generally consider them; because painful or disagreeable qualities much more suddenly, as well as more powerfully affect us, than qualities of an opposite kind. But whenever we can prevail upon ourselves to disregard these unpleasing considerations, and to consider the animals in the light of the fitness of their construction. I believe it is agreeable to every man's experience, that their forms then became, in some degree objects of beauty. To say at first that the head of the swine was a beautiful form, might perhaps expose the person who asserted it to ridicule ; but if the admirable fitness of its construction, for the necessities of the animal, are explained, there is no person who will not feel, from this view of it, an emotion of beauty. There is nothing more common, accordingly, in books of anatomy, or natural history, than the term of beauty applied to many common, and many disagreeable parts of the animal frame : nor is there any reader, who considers the subject in the light of their fitness alone, who does not feel the same emotions with the writers. A physician talks even of a beautiful theory of dropsies or fevers, a surgeon of a beautiful instrument for operations, an anatomist of a beautiful subject or preparation. The rest of the world, indeed, hear this language with some degree of astonishment, it is in the light only of horror or disgust that such objects appear to them ; but to the artists these qualities have long disappeared, and the only light in which they regard them, is their fitness for the purposes of their arts. These instances are, perhaps, sufficient to show, that even the objects which are most destitute of natural beauty, become beautiful, when they are regarded only in the light of their fitness; and that the reason why they do not always appear beautiful to us, is, that we, in general, leave this quality out of our consideration. That pleasing or agreeable forms receive beauty from their fitness; and that the most perfect form of natural beauty may receive additional beauty from its being wisely adapted to some end, are facts too obvious to require

forms become objects of beauty? What might expose the person who asserted it to ridicule; but what follows? From books of anatomy, &c., how is this illustrated? Who feels the same emotion? Of what do physicians and surgeons talk? How do the rest of the world hear this language; and why? But of the artists what is remarked? To show what, are these

any illustration. It is only to be observed, that this quality, in its effect of producing the emotion of beauty, is subject to the same limitations with every other quality of emotion. Such qualities, when either familiar or minute, fail in producing an emotion sufficiently strong to be the foundation of beauty; and as the emotion which we receive from fitness, is in itself greatly inferior to many other emotions of pleasure, there are, perhaps, more instances, where this quality is observed, without the sentiment of beauty, than in most other qualities of a similar kind with which we are acquainted. Unless when it is either great or new, the generality of men feel little beauty in any expression of fitness.

PROPORTION.

OF THE BEAUTY OF PROPORTION.

I apprehend also, that the beauty of **PROPORTION**, in forms, is to be ascribed to this cause; and that certain proportions affect us with the emotion of beauty, not from any original capacity in such qualities to excite this emotion, but from their being expressive of the fitness of the parts to the end designed. It is impossible for me, within the bounds which I prescribe to myself, to enter fully into the investigation of the nature of proportion. All I intend is, to produce some of the considerations which induce me to join with Mr. Hogarth in this conclusion.

1. I conceive that the emotion of pleasure which proportion affords, has no resemblance to any pleasure of sensation, but that it resembles that feeling of satisfaction which we have in other cases, where means are properly adapted to their end. When a chair, or a table, or any other common object is well-

instances sufficient? What facts are too obvious to require any illustration? What only is to be observed? Of such qualities, when either familiar or minute, what is observed; and what remark follows? Only when do the generality of men feel little beauty in any expression of fitness? Of the beauty of *proportion* in forms, what does our author apprehend? Why do certain proportions affect us with the idea of beauty? What is it impossible to do; and what is all that is intended to be done? To what has the emotion of pleasure, which proportion affords, no resemblance; but what does it

proportioned, as far as I can judge, what we feel, is not a mere sensation of pleasure, from a certain arrangement of parts, but an agreeable emotion, from the perception of the proper disposition of these parts for the end designed. In the same manner, the effect of disproportion seems to me to bear no resemblance to that immediate painful sensation which we feel from any disagreeable sound or smell, but to resemble that kind of dissatisfaction which we feel, when means are unfitted to their end. Thus the disproportion in the legs of a chair or table, does not affect us with a simple sensation of pain, but with a very observable emotion of dissatisfaction or discontent, from the unsuitableness of this construction for the purposes which the objects are intended to serve. Of the truth of this, every man must judge from his own experience.

The habit, indeed, which we have in a great many familiar cases, of immediately conceiving this fitness from the mere appearance of the form, leads us to imagine, as it is expressed in common language, that we determine proportion by the eye; and this quality of fitness is so immediately expressed to us by the material form, that we are sensible of little difference between such judgments and a mere determination of sense; yet every man must have observed, that in those cases, when either the object is not familiar to us, or the construction intricate, our judgment is by no means so speedy; and that we never discover the proportion, until we previously discover the principle of the machine, or the means by which the end is produced.

2. The nature of language seems also very strongly to show the dependence of proportion upon fitness, and that it produces the emotion of beauty, by being considered as the sign of this quality. If a common person were asked, why the proportion of some particular building, or machine, or instrument pleased him, he would naturally answer, because it rendered the object fit or proper for its end. If we were describing a machine or

262

resemble? How is this illustrated from a chair or table? In the same manner, of the effect of disproportion, what is remarked? How is this illustrated? In many familiar cases, what habit have we; and what does it lead us to imagine? Of this quality of fitness, what is remarked; yet what must every man have observed? What does the nature of language also seem very strongly to show? How is this remark illustrated from the case of a common person; and from the description of a machine or instrument?

instrument, to any person who was unacquainted with the meaning of the term proportion, and wished to inform him of the beauty of this proportion, we could do it perfectly well by substituting the term fitness instead of it, and explaining to him the singular accuracy with which the several parts were adapted to the general end of the machine; and if we succeeded in this description, he would have the same emotion from the consideration of this fitness, that we ourselves have from the consideration of, what we call, its proportion. It very often happens, in the same manner, that we read or hear accounts of forms which we have never seen, and consequently of the proportions of which, if proportion is a real and original quality in objects, it is impossible for us to judge; yet I think, if we were convinced that the form is well contrived, and that its several parts are properly adjusted to their end, we immediately satisfy ourselves that it is well-proportioned; and if we perfectly understand its nature or mechanism, we never hesitate to speak of its proportion, though we never have seen it. Tf proportion on the contrary consisted in certain determinate relations, discoverable only by a peculiar sense, all this could not possibly happen. The consideration of fitness could no more influence our opinion of proportion, than any other consideration; and we could as little collect the belief of proportion in any form from the consideration of its fitness, as from that of its sound or color.

In a great variety of cases, the terms fitness and proportion are perfectly synonymous. There is, however, a distinction between them, which it may be necessary to explain, as it will afford a more accurate conception of the nature of proportion, and of the foundation of its beauty.

Every form which is susceptible of proportion, may be considered in either one or other of the following lights. 1st, In the light of its whole or general relation to the end designed, or when it is considered as a whole, without any distinction of

What, in the same manner, very often happens; yet what remark follows? Under what circumstances, would not all this be possible; and why? In a great variety of cases, what terms are synonymous? Why, however, is it necessary to explain the distinction that exists between them? In one or the other of what lights may every form susceptible of comparison be con-

parts : or 2dly, In the light of the relation of its several parts to this end. Thus, in the case of a machine, we may sometimes consider it in the light of its general utility for the end it is destined to serve, and sometimes in the light of the propriety of the different parts, for the attainment of this end. When we consider it in the first light, it is its fitness which we properly consider : and when we consider it in the second light, it is its proportion we consider. Fitness may therefore be supposed to express the general relation of propriety between means and an end, and proportion a peculiar or subordinate relation of this kind, viz. the proper relation of parts to an end. Both agree in expressing the relation of propriety between means and their ends. Fitness expresses the proper relation of the whole of the means to the end. Proportion the proper relation of a part, or of parts to their end.

In common language, accordingly, whenever we speak of this relation in a subject which has no division of parts, the terms are used synonymously. Thus we say, that a man's expenses are fitted, or are proportioned to his income—that a man's ambition is fitted or proportioned to his talents—that an undertaking is fitted or proportioned to one's powers.

In subjects which are capable of division into parts, on the other hand, the terms fitness and proportion are not used synonymously, but according to the explanation which I have now given. Thus we say, that the form of the eye is admirably fitted for vision—that the telescope is fitted for discovering objects at a distance—that the steam-engine is fitted for raising water: but we could not say, in any of these cases, that they were proportioned to their ends. When we consider these subjects as composed of parts, and attend to the form of these parts for the attainment of their ends, we immediately speak of the proportion of these parts. The just proportion of such parts

sidered? How is this illustrated from a machine? When we consider it in the first light, what do we properly consider; and what, when in the second? What may they, therefore, be supposed respectively to express? In what, do they both agree; and how? When are the terms, accordingly, used synonymously; and what illustrations follow? In subjects, which are capable of division into parts, how are they used? How is this illustrated? When do we immediately speak of the proportion of the parts of these subjects? What,

is, accordingly, nothing more than that peculiar form or dimension which has been found from experience best fitted for the accomplishment of the purpose of the instrument or the machine. Proportion therefore may, I apprehend, be considered applicable only to forms composed of parts, and to express the relation of propriety between any part, or parts, and the end they are destined to serve.

3. It may be farther observed, that forms are just susceptible of as many proportions, as they are susceptible of parts necessary to the end for which they are intended: and that every part which has no immediate relation to this end, is unsusceptible of any accurate proportion. In many forms of the most common kind, there are a great number of parts which have no relation to the end or purpose of the form, and which are intended to serve the purpose of ornament rather than of use. In such parts, accordingly, we never expect or perceive any accurate proportion, nor is there any settled and permanent opinion of beauty in them, as there is in the great and necessary parts of the form. In the form of a chair, for instance, or table or sofa, or door or window, several of the parts are merely ornamental-they have no immediate relation to the fitness of the form, and they vary accordingly almost every year in their forms and sizes. All that is required of them is, that they should not obstruct the general fitness : within that limit they are susceptible of perpetual and pleasing variety. There are other parts, however, of the same forms, which are necessary to the general end or purpose of their construction, as the height of the chair for the convenience of sitting, of the table for its peculiar purposes, &c. These parts accord. ingly, have all a proportion, which is immediately discerned, and which is never greatly violated without producing an emotion of dissatisfaction. If, on the contrary, proportion was

accordingly, is the just proportion of such parts? To what may proportion, therefore, be considered applicable? What may be farther observed? In many forms of the most common kind, there are what? In such parts, accordingly, what do we not expect? In the form of a chair, &c., how is this illustrated? What is all that is required of them? Of other parts of the same form, however, what is observed; and what do these parts possees? If, on the contrary, proportion was something absolute and independent in forms,

something absolute and independent in forms, it seems difficult to imagine, that it should be found in those forms only, which are susceptible of fitness, and in those parts only of such forms as admit of this quality.

4. Our sense of proportion in every form, keeps pace with our knowledge of the fitness of its construction. Where we have no acquaintance with the fitness of any form, we have no sense of its peculiar proportions. No man, for instance, ever presumes to speak of the proportions of a machine, of the use or purpose of which he is ignorant. When a new machine is shown us, we may pronounce with regard to the simplicity or the complexness of its construction, but we never venture to pronounce with regard to the propriety or impropriety of its proportions. When our acquaintance is greater with the uses or purposes of any particular class of forms, than the generality of people, we are sensible of a greater number of pleasing proportions in such objects, than the rest of the world; and the same parts upon which others look with indifference, we perceive to be beautiful, from our knowledge of the propriety of their construction for the end designed. This every person must have observed in the language of artists, upon the subject of the instruments of their own arts; in the language of anatomists, and proficients in natural history, on many different subjects of their science; as well as in the increase of his own sense of proportion in different forms, with the increase of his knowledge of the ends that such forms are destined to serve. When any improvement, in the same manner, is made in the construction of the forms of art, so that different proportions of parts are introduced, and produce their end better than the former, the new proportions gradually become beautiful, while the former lose their beauty. In general it may be observed, that the certainty of proportion, is in all cases dependent

266

what does it seem difficult to imagine? With what does our sense of proportion in every form keep pace; and what remark follows? How is this illustrated? When a new machine is shown us, with regard to what may we speak; but of what may we not? What results from greater acquaintance? In whose language must every one have observed this? When any improvement, in the same manner, is made in the construction of the forms of art, what results? The certainty of proportion is, in all cases, dependent upon

upon the certainty of fitness. 1st, Where this fitness is absolutely determined, as in many cases of mechanics, the proportion is equally determined. 2dly, Where it is determined only by experience, the opinion of the beauty of proportion varies with the progress of such experience. 3dly, Where this fitness cannot be subjected to experience, as in the case of natural forms, the common proportion is generally conceived to be the fittest, and is therefore considered the most beautiful. It is impossible, I apprehend, to reconcile these cases of the dependence of our sense of proportion upon our opinion of fitness, to the belief that there are any certain and established proportions in forms, which are originally and independently beautiful.

These illustrations seem to me very strongly to show the intimate connexion which subsists between proportion and fitness; and to afford a much more easy and simple solution of the delight which proportion produces, than the opinion of its being a real and independent quality in objects.

There is, however, one case, in which it may still be doubted, whether this explanation of the nature of proportion is sufficient to account for the phenomena—the case of ARCHITECTURE. The writers on this subject who have best understood the art, have been unanimous in considering the proportions which have been discovered in it, as deriving their effect from the original constitution of our nature, and as beautiful in themselves without relation to any expression. They have been willing also, sometimes, to support their opinion by analogies drawn from proportions in other subjects, and have remarked several cases in which similar proportions are beautiful in music and in numbers. The futility of all reasoning from such analogies has been so often exposed, and is in itself, indeed, so very obvious, that I shall not stop to consider it.

what? How is this remark illustrated? To reconcile what, is it impossible? What do these illustrations show, and what do they afford? There is, however, one case, of which what is observed? From what have the writers, who have best understood the art, considered the proportions discovered in it, to derive their effect? How have they been willing to support their opinion; and what have they remarked? On the fullility of such reasoning, what

I flatter myself, therefore, that it will not be considered an unnecessary digression, if I endeavor to show, that the beauty of the proportions in this art, are resolvable into the same principle, and that they please us, not from any original law of our nature, but as expressive of fitness.

The proportions in ARCHITECTURE relate either to its EXTER-NAL or its INTERNAL parts. I shall offer some observations upon these subjects separately.

ARCHITECTURE,

OF THE EXTERNAL PROPORTIONS OF ARCHITECTURE.

THE propriety or fitness of any building intended for the habitation of man, as far as its external appearance is concerned, consists chiefly in two things-lst, in its stability ; and 2dly, in its being sufficient for the support of the roof. Walls, in every country, at the same period of time, are nearly of an equal thickness. It is easy, therefore, for the spectator to judge from their external appearance, whether they are or are not sufficient for these two purposes. In plain buildings, intended merely for use, and without any view to ornament, it is these considerations which chiefly determine our opinions of proportion. When the walls are of such a height as seems sufficient, both for their own stability, and for the support of the weight which is imposed upon them; and when the distance between them is such, as to appear sufficient for supporting the weight of the roof, we consider the house well or as properly proportioned. When any of these circumstances, on the contrary, are different-when the walls are either so high as to seem insecure, or the roof so large as to seem too heavy for its sup-

remark follows? What does our author flatter himself, therefore, will not be an unnecessary digression? To what do the proportions of architecture relate?

In what two things does the propriety or fitness of any building, intended for the habitation of man, consist? Of the walls of buildings, in every country, at the same period, what is remarked; and what, therefore, is an easy task? In plain buildings, when do we consider the house well and properly proportioned? When do we say the building is ill proportioned? In such

port, or the side walls so distant as to induce an opinion of its insecurity, we say, that the building, in such particulars is ill-proportioned. In such cases, what we mean by proportion, is merely fitness for the ends of stability and support; and as this fitness cannot be very accurately measured, and is, in itself, capable of wide limits, there are, accordingly, no accurate proportions of this kind, and no architect has ever attempted to settle them. The general conclusions that we have formed from experience, with regard to the fitness of such forms, are the sole guides of our opinion, with respect to these proportions. It may be observed also, that our sentiments of the proportion of such buildings depend upon the nature of the buildings themselves, and even upon the materials of which they are composed. Gothic buildings, the walls of which we know to be considerably thicker than those of modern days, admit of greater height, and of a greater appearance of weight in the roof, than buildings of the present age. A house built of brick or of wood does not admit of the same height of wall, &c. with a house built of stone, because the walls are seldom so strong. A house which is united with others, admits of a greater height than if it stood alone, because we conceive it to be supported by the adjoining houses: and a building which has no roof, or nothing which it appears to support, as a tower, or spire, admits of a much greater height than any other species of building. These principles are all that seem to regulate the external proportions of simple buildings; all of them so obviously depending upon fitness, that it is unnecessary to illustrate them farther.

It is not in such buildings, accordingly, that any very accurate external proportions have ever been settled. This is peculiar to what are called the orders of architecture, in which the whole genius of the art has been displayed, and in which

cases, what do we mean by proportion; and what remark follows? What are the sole guides of our opinion, with respect to these proportions; and what also may be observed? How is this illustrated from Gothic buildings—from a house built of brick or of wood—from a house united with others—and from a building which has no roof? Of these principles, what is remarked? What remark follows; to what is it peculiar, and what is observed of it?

the proportions are settled with a certainty so absolute, as to forbid almost an attempt at innovation.

There are generally said to be five orders of architecture, viz. the Tuscan, the Doric, the Ionic, the Corinthian, and the Composite. There are properly, however, only four, and some writers have further reduced them to three. What constitutes an order is its proportions, and not its ornaments. The Composite having the same proportions with the Corinthian, though very different in respect of its ornaments, is properly, therefore, considered only as a corrupted Corinthian.

Every order consists of three great parts or divisions—the base, the column, and the entablature; and the governing proportions relate to this division. The whole of them compose the wall, or what answers to the wall of a common building, and supports the roof.

There is one great difference, however, to be observed between a common wall and that assemblage of parts which constitutes an order. A common wall is intended to support a roof, and derives its proportions, in a great measure, from this destination. To an order, the consideration of the roof is unnecessary. It is complete without any roof, and where a roof is necessary, it is generally so contrived as not to appear. The weight which is supported, or which appears to be supported in an order, is the entablature. The fitness of a wall consists in its appearing adequate to the support of the roof. The fitness of an order, or of the proportions of an order, it should from analogy seem also reasonable to conclude, consists in their appearing adequate to the support of the entablature, or of the weight which is imposed upon them.

That this is really the case, and that it is from their being expressive of this fitness, that the proportions of these different orders appear beautiful, may, perhaps, seem probable from the following considerations—

What are the five orders of architecture; and what remark follows? What is it that constitutes an order; and of the Composite, what is, therefore, observed? Of what does every order consist; and what relates to this division? What do the whole of these compose? What great difference, however, is there to be observed, between a common wall, and that assemblage of parts which constitutes an order? In what does it seem reasonable, from analogy also, to conclude that the fitness of an order consists? What remark

1. The appearance of these proportions themselves, seems very naturally to lead us to this conclusion. In all the orders, the fitness of the parts to the support of the peculiar weight, or appearance of weight in the entablature, is apparent to every person, and constitutes an undoubted part of the pleasure we receive from them. In the Tuscan, where the entablature is heavier than in the rest, the column and base are proportionably stronger. In the Corinthian, where the entablature is lightest, the column and base are proportionably slighter. In the Doric and Ionic, which are between these extremes, the forms of the column and base are in the same manner proportioned to the reciprocal weights of their entablatures, being neither so strong as the one, nor so slight as the other. If the beauty of such proportions is altogether independent of fitness, and derived from the immediate constitution of our nature, it is difficult to account for this coincidence; and as the beauty of fitness in these several cases is universally allowed, it is altogether unphilosophical, to substitute other causes of the same effect, until the insufficiency of this cause is clearly pointed out.

2. The language of mankind upon this subject, seems to confirm the same opinion. Whenever we either speak or think of the proportions of these different orders, the circumstance of weight and support enter both into our consideration and our expression. The term *proportion*, in its general acception, implies them; and if this term is not used, the same idea and the same pleasure may be communicated by terms expressive of fitness for the support of weight. Heaviness, and slightness or insufficiency, are the terms most generally used to express a deviation on either side, from the proper relation; both of them obviously including the consideration of support, and expressing the want of proportion. When it is said that a

follows? What seems very naturally to lead us to this conclusion? In all the orders, what is apparent to every person; and what does it constitute? How is this illustrated from the Tuscan, the Corinthian, the Doric, and Ionic? Under what circumstances is it difficult to account for this coincidence; and what is altogether unphilosophical? What seems to confirm the same opinion? How is this illustrated? Of the term *proportion*, in its general acceptation, what is observed? For what are the terms heaviness and slightness most generally used; and what do they both obviously include? What illus-

base, a column, or an entablature is disproportioned, it is the same thing as saying, that this part is unfitted to the rest, and inadequate to the proper end of the building. When it is said, on the other hand, that all these several parts are properly adjusted to their end, that the base appears just sufficient for the support of the column, and both for that of the entablature, every person immediately concludes that the parts are perfectly proportioned: and, I apprehend that it is very possible to give a man a perfect conception of the beauty of these proportions, and to make him feel it in the strongest manner, without ever mentioning the name of proportion, but merely by explaining them under the consideration of fitness, and by showing him from examples, that these forms are the most proper that can be devised for the end to which they are destined. If our perception of the beauty of proportion, in such cases, were altogether independent of any such considerations, I think that these circumstances in language could not possibly take place; and that it would be as possible to explain the nature and beauty of proportion by terms expressive of sound or color, as by terms expressive of fitness or propriety.

3. The natural sentiments of mankind on this subject, seem to have a different progress from what they would naturally have, if there were any absolute beauty in such proportions discoverable by the eye. It cannot surely be imagined, that an infant will perceive, or does perceive, the beauty of such proportions in the same manner in which he perceives the objects of any other external sense. It is not found either, that the generality of mankind, even when come to mature age, express any sense of the absolute beauty of such objects. It is true, indeed, that very early in life, we are sensible of disproportion in building, because the ideas of bulk and support are so early and so necessarily acquired, and the eye is so soon habituated to judge of weight from visible figure, that what is

tration of this remark follows? What does our author apprehend to be very possible; and in what manner? Under what circumstances could not these things take place; and what remark follows? Of the natural sentiments of mankind, on this subject, what is observed? How is this remark illustrated from the case of an infant, and from the generality of mankind? Of what are we, in very early life sensible? What is it that a common person, upon

fit for the support of weight, is very soon generally ascertained. What a common person, therefore expresses upon the view of such proportions, is rather satisfaction, than delight. It is not the proportions which most affect him : it is the magnificence. the grandeur, and the costliness which such buildings usually display; and though he is much pleased with such expressions, he is generally silent with regard to the beauty of those proportions with which connoisseurs are so much enraptured. If proportion, on the contrary, were something absolutely beautiful in such objects, the progress of taste would be reversed : the admiration of the infant would be given to these proportions, long before he was able to judge of their fitness; and the satisfaction which arises from the expression of fitness, would be the last ingredient in his pleasure, instead of being, as it now is. the first.

4. The nature of these proportions, themselves, seems very strongly to indicate their dependence upon the expression of fitness. The beauty of such forms on the supposition of their absolute and independent beauty must consist, either in their beauty, considered as individual objects, or in their relation to each other. If the effect arises from the nature of the individual forms, then it must obviously follow, that such forms or proportions must be beautiful in all cases. I think, however, that there is no reason to believe this to be the case. The base of a column, for instance, taken by itself, and independent of its ornaments, which in this inquiry are entirely to be excluded from consideration, is not a more beautiful form than many others that may be given to the same quality of matter. The peculiar form which its proportions give it, is very far from being beautiful in every other case, as would necessarily happen, if it were beautiful in itself, and independent of every expression. A plain stone of the same magnitude may surely be carved into

the view of such proportions, expresses? What is it not, and what is it that mosts affects him; and what consequence follows? If proportion, on the contrary, were something absolutely beautiful in such objects, what would follew? What does the nature of these proportions, themselves, seem very strongly to indicate? In what must the beauty of such forms consist? If the effect arises from the nature of the individual forms, what must obviously follow? From what does it appear that this is not the case? How is this

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very different forms from those which constitute the bases of any of the orders, and may still be beautiful. In the same manner, the column, considered as in the former case, merely in relation to its peculiar form, and independent of its ornaments, is not more beautiful, as a form, and perhaps not so beautiful as many other forms of a similar kind. The trunk of many trees, the mast of a ship, the long and slender Gothic column, and many other similar objects, are equally as beautiful, when considered merely as forms, without relation to any end, as any of the columns in architecture. If, on the contrary, these forms were beautiful in themselves, and as individual objects, no other similar forms could be equally beautiful, but such as had the same proportions. The same observation will apply equally to the form of the entablature. It would appear, therefore, that it is not from any absolute beauty in these forms, considered individually, that our opinion of their beauty in composition arises.

If it is said, on the other hand, that the beauty of proportion in such cases arises from the relation of these parts, and that there is something in the relation of such forms and magnitudes, in itself beautiful, independent of any consideration of fitness, there seem to be equal difficulties. Besides the relation of fit. ness for the support of weight, the only relations which take place among these parts are, the relations of length and breadth, and the relation of magnitude. If this beauty arose from the relation of length, it is necessary to show, that such a proportion of three parts in point of length, is solely and permanently beautiful: if from the relation of breadth, there is the same necessity of showing, that such a proportion of three parts in point of breadth is as permanently beautiful: if from both together, then the same proportions only ought to be felt as beautiful, in all cases to which the relations of length and breadth can apply. If, again, this beauty arose from the relation of

farther illustrated from the trunk of trees, the mast of a ship, Gothic column, and many other similar objects? If, on the contrary, these forms were beautiful in themselves, what consequence would follow? To what will the same observation equally apply; and what consequence follows? What remark presents equal difficulties; and why? If this beauty arose from the relation of length, breadth, or from both together, what is it necessary to show? If,

magnitude, it is necessary, in the same manner, to show, that three magnitudes, or quantities of matter, have in fact no other beautiful proportions but those which take place in such orders. But as it is very obvious, that there is no foundation for supposing any such law in our nature, and that, on the contrary, in innumerable cases of all such relations, different and contrary proportions are beautiful, it cannot be supposed that such proportions are absolutely beautiful from any of these relations.

The only relation, therefore, that remains, is the relation of fitness; and if the same inquiry is carried on, I believe it will soon be found, that a certain proportion of parts is necessarily demanded by this relation; and very probably also, that this certain proportion is, in fact, that of each of these orders, according to the particular bulk or weight that is given.

If an order is considered as an assemblage of weight, and parts to support that weight, our experience immediately leads us to conceive a proper relation of these parts to their end. If the entablature be considered as the weight, then, of course, a certain form and size in the column is demanded for the sup. port of it, and in the base for the support of both. A plain stene, for instance, set upon its end, has no proportion further than for the purpose of stability. If it appears firm, it has all the proportions we desire or demand, and its form may be varied in a thousand ways, without interfering with our sense of its proportion. Place a column or any other weight upon this stone, and another proportion is immediately demanded,---its proportion to the support of this weight. The form supported, how. ever, has no proportion farther than that which is necessary for its stability, or for continuing in its situation. It may be more or less beautiful in point of form, from other considerations, but not upon account of its proportion. Above this again place an additional body, and the intermediate form immediately de-

275

again, this beauty arose from the relation of magnitude, what, in the same manner, would be necessary? But what is very obvious? What is the only relation that remains; and what remark follows? If an order is considered as an assemblage of weight, and parts to support that weight, to conceive what, does our experience immediately lead us? If the entablature be considered as the weight, what is demanded? How is this illustrated? What proportion only, has the form supported? and what remark follows? Above this

mands a new proportion, viz. to the weight it supports; and the first part, or the base, demands also another proportion, in consideration of the additional weight which is thus imposed upon it. In this supposition, it is obvious, that the consideration of fitness alone, leads us to expect a certain proportion among each of these parts; the parts are beautiful or pleasing, just as they answer to this demand; and where the parts are few, and experiments easy, it seems not difficult at last, to arrive at that perfect proportion which satisfies the eye, as sufficient for the purposes of support and stability. If we leave, therefore, every thing else out of consideration, the consideration of fitness alone seems sufficient to account, both for the origin of such proportions in architecture, and for the pleasare which attends the observation of them.

1 Although, however, the influence of the expression of fitness upon the beauty of proportion should be allowed, and the doctrine of the original beauty of proportion should he deserted, as inconsistent with experience, yet it may still be doubted whether this expression is sufficient to account for the delight which most men feel from the orders of architecture; and it may naturally be asked, why mankind have so long adhered to these forms, without attempting to deviate from them, if they are not solely and peculiarly beautiful. The satisfaction which we feel from the observation of fitness, it may be said, is a moderate and feeble pleasure, when compared with that delight with which the models of architecture are surveyed : and the uniform adherence of men to the established proportions, is too strong a proof of their absolute or peculiar beauty, to be opposed by any arguments of a distant or metaphysical kind.

With regard to the first of these objections, I acknowledge, that the mere consideration of fitness is insufficient to account

again, place an additional body, and what will follow? In this supposition what is obvious? For what does the consideration of fitness alone, seem sufficient to account? Although the influence of the expression of fitness upon the beauty of proportion should be allowed, yet what may still be doubted; and what question may be asked? Of the satisfaction which we feel from the observation of fitness, what may be said; and what remark follows? With regard to the first of these objections, what is acknowledged; but what at the

for the pleasure which is generally derived from the established orders. But I apprehend, that this pleasure arises from very different causes, than their proportions, and that, in fact, when these proportions only are considered, the pleasure which is generally felt, is not greater than that which we experience, when we perceive, in any great work, the proper relation of means to an end.

The proportions of these orders, it is to be remembered, are distinct subjects of beauty from the ornaments with which they are embellished, from the magnificence with which they are executed, from the purposes of elegance they are intended to serve, or the scenes of grandeur they are destined to adorn. It is in such scenes, however, and with such additions, that we are accustomed to observe them; and while we feel the effect of all these accidental associations, we are seldom willing to examine what are the causes of the complex emotion we feel, and readily attribute to the nature of the architecture itself, the whole pleasure which we enjoy. But besides these, there are other associations we have with these forms, that still more powerfully serve to command our admiration; for they are the GRECIAN orders: they derive their origin from those times, and were the ornament of those countries, which are most hallowed in our imaginations; and it is difficult for us to see them. even in their modern copies, without feeling them operate upon our minds, as relics of those polished nations where they first arose, and of that greater people by whom they were afterwards borrowed. While this species of architecture is attended with so many and so pleasing associations, it is difficult, even for a man of reflection to distinguish between the different sources of his emotion; or in the moments in which this delight is felt, to ascertain what is the exact portion of his pleasure which is to be attributed to these proportions alone; and two different causes combine to lead us to attribute to the style of architecture itself, the beauty which arises from many

same time, is apprehended? Of the proportions of these orders, what is to be remembered? Observing them, however, in such scenes, what is the consequence? But besides these, what other associations have we with these forms? While this species of architecture is attended with so many, and with so pleasing associations, what is a difficult task? What two different causes

other associations. In the first place, while it is under our eye, this architecture, itself, is the great object of our regard, and the central object of all these associations. It is the material sign, in fact, of all the various affecting qualities which are connected with it, and it disposes us in this, as in every other case, to attribute to the sign, the effect which is produced by the qualities signified. When we reflect, upon the other hand, in our calmer moments, upon the source of our emotion, another motive arises to induce us to consider these proportions as the sole or the principal cause of our pleasure; for these proportions are the only qualities of the object which are perfectly or accurately ascertained-they have received the assent of all ages since their discovery-they are the acknowledged objects of beauty; and having thus possession of one undoubted principle, our natural love of system induces us to ascribe the whole of the effect to this principle alone, and easily satisfies our minds, by saving us the trouble of a long and tedious investigation. That this cause has had its full effect in this case, will. I believe, appear very evident to those, who attend to the enthusiasm with which, in general, the writers upon architec. ture speak of the beauty of proportion, and compare it with the common sentiments of mon upon the subject of this beauty. Both these causes conspire to mislead our judgment in this point, and to induce us to attribute to one quality in such objects, that beauty which in truth results from many united qua. lities.

It will be found, I believe, on the other hand, that the real beauty of such proportions is in fact not greater than that which we feel in many cases where we perceive means properly adapted to their end; and that the admiration we feel from the prospect of the orders of antiquity, is necessarily to be ascribed to other causes besides these proportions. Common people, undoubtedly, feel a very inferior emotion of beauty from such objects, to that which is felt by men of liberal education, be-

combine, to lead us to attribute to the style of architecture itself the beauty which arises from many other associations? To whom will it appear evident that this cause has, in this case, had its full effect? To do what do both conspire? What will, on the other hand, be found to be true? How is this illustrated from common people, and from the man of letters? How may the

cause they have none of those associations which modern education so early connects with them. The man of letters feels also a weaker emotion than that which is felt by the connoisseur or the architect; because he has none of the associations which belong to the art, and never considers them in relation to the genius, or skill, or invention which they display. Deprive these orders, in the same manner, of their customary orname ts, and leave only the great and governing proportions; or change only in the slightest degree their forms, without altering these proportions, and their beauty will be, in a great measure, destroyed. Preserve, on the other hand, the whole of the orders, but diminish in a great degree their scale, and though they will still be beautiful, yet their beauty will be infinitely inferior to that which they have upon their usual scale of magnificence. It is possible, in the form of a candlestick, or some other trifling utensil, to imitate with accuracy, any of these orders. It is possible in many of the common articles of furniture, to imitate some of the greatest models of this art; but who does not know that their great beauty in such an employment would be lost ? yet still their proportions are the same, if their proportions are the sole cause of their beauty. Destroy, in the same manner, all the associations of elegance, of magnificence, of costliness, and still more than all, of antiquity, which are so strongly connected with such forms, and I conceive every man will acknowledge, that the pleasure which their proportions would afford, would not, in fact, be greater than that which we feel in other cases, where means are properly adapted to their end.

With regard to the second objection, viz. That the uniform adherence of mankind to these proportions, is in itself a sufficient proof of their sole or absolute beauty; I conceive that many other causes of this adherence may be assigned, and that these causes are sufficient to account for the effect, without supposing any peculiar law of our nature, by which such pro-

beauty of these orders, in a great measure, be destroyed? What will render this beauty, inferior to that which they have upon their usual scale of magnificence? How is this illustrated? If the associations of elegance, antiquity, fcc. be destroyed, what will every man acknowledge? With regard to the second objection, what opinion does our author conceive? Of what will these

portions are originally beautiful. They who have had opportunities of remarking the extensive influence which the associations of antiquity have upon our minds, will be convinced, that this cause alone has had a very powerful effect in producing this uniformity of opinion : and they who consider, that the real effect of proportion is to produce only a very moderate delight, will easily perceive, that an almost insurmountable obstacle has been placed to every invention or improvement in this art, when such inventions could oppose only a calm and rational pleasure, to that enthusiasm which is founded upon so many, and so interesting associations.

But besides these, there are other causes in the nature of the art itself, which sufficiently account for the permanence of taste upon this subject. In every production of human labor, the influence of variety is limited by two circumstances, by the costliness, and the permanence of the materials upon which that labor is employed. Wherever the materials of any object, whether of use or of luxury, are costly-wherever the original price of such subjects is great, the influence of the love of variety is diminished : the objects of a great intrinsic value, independent of their particular form or fashion; and as the destruction of the form is in most cases the destruction of the subject itself, the same form is adhered to with little variation. In dress, for instance, in which the variation of fashion is more observable than in most other subjects, it is those parts of dress which are least costly, of which the forms are most frequently changed: in proportion as the original value increases, the disposition to variety diminishes; and in some objects, which are extremely costly, as in the case of jewels, there is no change of fashion whatever, except in circumstances different from the value of the objects themselves; as in their setting or disposition. Of all the fine arts, however, architecture is the most costly. The

be convinced, who have had opportunities of remarking the extensive influence, which the associations of antiquity have upon our minds? What will those easily perceive who consider, that the real effect of proportion is to produce only a very moderate delight? In every production of human labor, by what two circumstances is the influence of variety limited? Where is the influence of the love of variety diminished; and why? How is this remark fully illustrated from dress? What is the consequence of the exceed-

wealth of individuals is frequently dissipated by it; and even the revenue of nations is equal only to very slow, and very infrequent productions of this kind. The value, therefore, of such objects is, in a great measure, independent of their forms: the invention of men is little excited to give an additional value to subjects, which in themselves are so valuable; and the art itself, after it has arrived at a certain necessary degree of perfection, remains, in a great measure, stationary, both from the infrequency of cases in which invention can be employed, and from the little demand there is for the exercise of that invention. The nature of the Grecian orders very plainly indicates, that they were originally executed in wood, and that they were settled before the Greeks had begun to make use of stone in their buildings. From the period that stone was employed, and that of course public buildings became more costly, little farther progress seems to have been made in the art. The costliness of the subject, in this as in every other case, gave a kind of permanent value to the form by which it was distinguished.

If, besides the costliness of the subject, it is also permanent or durable, this character is still farther increased. Those productions, of which the materials are perishable, and must often be renewed, are from their nature subjected to the influence of variety. Chairs and tables, for instance, and the other common articles of furniture, cannot well last above a few years, and very often not so long. In such articles accordingly, there is room for the invention of the artist to display itself, and as the subject itself is of no very great value, and may derive a considerable one from its form, a strong motive is given to the exercise of this invention. But buildings may last, and are intended to last, for centuries. The life of man is very inadequate to the duration of such productions: and the present period of the world, though old with respect to those arts, which are employed upon perishable subjects, is yet young in relation

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ing costliness of architecture, as a fine art? What does the nature of the Grecian orders very plainly indicate; and what remarks follow? How is this character still farther increased? What productions are, from their nature, subject to the influence of variety? What examples are given, and of them what is observed? But of buildings what is remarked; and what consequence

to an art, which is employed upon so durable materials as those of architecture. Instead of a few years, therefore, centuries must probably pass before such productions demand to be renewed, and long before that period is elapsed, the sacredness of antiquity is acquired by the subject itself, and a new motive given for the preservation of similar forms. In every country, accordingly, the same effect has taken place : and the same causes which have thus served to produce among us, for so many years, an uniformity of taste with regard to the style of Grecian architecture, have produced also among the nations of the east, for a much longer course of time, a similar uniformity of taste with regard to their ornamental style of architecture; and have perpetuated among them the same forms, which were in use among their forefathers, before the Grecian orders were invented.

It is impossible for me to pursue these speculations, with regard to the foundation of beauty in architecture, to the extent to which they would lead. The hints which I have now offered, may, perhaps, satisfy the reader, that the beauty of the external proportions of architecture, is to be ascribed to their expression of fitness; that this beauty is in fact not greater than what is often felt from similar expression in other subjects; and that both the admiration of mankind, and the uniformity of their taste with regard to the style of Grecian architecture, is to be ascribed to other causes, besides any absolute or independent beauty in the proportions by which it is distinguished.

ARCHITECTURE.

OF THE INTERNAL PROPORTIONS OF ARCHITECTURE.

By the internal proportions of architecture, I mean that disposition of the three dimensions of length, breadth, and height, which is necessary to render a room or apartment beautiful or

By the internal proportions of architecture, what is meant? To say what

follows? How does it appear that, in every country, the same effect has taken place? As it is impossible for our author to pursue these speculations, to the extent to which they would lead, of what may the hints which have been offered, satisfy the reader?

pleasing in its form. Every man is able at first sight to say, whether a room is well or ill-proportioned; although, perhaps, it is difficult to say, what is the principle from which this propriety is determined. Many of the writers upon architecture consider certain proportions of this kind beautiful, from the original constitution of our nature, and without relation to any expression. I apprehend, on the contrary, that the beauty of proportion, in this, as in the former case, arises from its expression of fitness.

I have already observed that a plain wall is susceptible of no other proportion, than that proportion of height which is necessary for the expression of strength or stability. If it appears firm and sufficient, it has all the proportion we desire. Suppose any space inclosed by four walls, the same proportion remains : we require that the height should be such as to indicate stability, and if this is answered, we require no more. The form of the inclosure may be more or less beautiful, from other causes; but we never say that it is beautiful on account of its proportion. Add a roof to this inclosure, and immediately a variety of other proportions are demanded, from the consideration of the weight which is now to be supported. If the walls are very high, they have the appearance of insufficiency for this support; if very low, they indicate an unnecessary and unusual weight in the roof: a certain proportion therefore in point of height is demanded. If the length of the inclosure is great, the roof appears also to be insufficiently supported, and from the laws of perspective its weight seems to increase as it retires from the eye : a certain proportion, therefore, in point of length, is demanded. If, in the last case, the breadth of the inclosure is very great, a still stronger conviction of its insufficiency arises from the distance of the supporting walls : a certain proportion, therefore, in point of breadth is demanded, for

is every man able; yet what may be difficult? From what do many of the writers upon architecture consider certain proportions of this kind beautiful; but what, on the contrary, is apprehended? Of a plain wall, what has already been observed; and why? Of a space inclosed by four walls, what do we require; and of the form of the inclosure what is remarked? If a roof be added to the inclosure, what consequence will follow? Why is a certain proportion in point of height demanded—why in length, and why in the same end. Wherever a form of this kind is produced —wherever walls are united for the support of a roof, these proportions are necessarily required : and so far are they from being remote from common observation, that there is no man who is not immediately sensible of any great violation of them. Every apartment, however, is an inclosure of this kind : it seems natural, therefore, to imagine, that the proportions of an apartment will be pleasing, when they appear sufficient for the full and easy support of the roof; and that they are beautiful from being expressive of this fitness. This proposition may, perhaps, be more obvious from the following considerations :

1. It may be observed, that the real beauty of proportion in this case, is not greater than that which attends the expression of fitness in other cases; and that this expression is perfectly sufficient to account for the whole of the delight which men in general feel from these objects. Artists, indeed, very frequently talk, with enthusiasm, of the beauty of such proportions, and are willing to ascribe to the proportions themselves, that emotion which they in reality receive from the associations which their art and their education have connected with them; but whatever may be the language of artists, the uniform language of the bulk of mankind is very different. What they feel from the appearance of a well proportioned room, is satisfaction, rather than positive delight; they are hurt with the want of proportion; but they are not greatly enraptured with its presence. That with which they are delighted in apartments where this beauty has been studied, is their decoration and their furniture-the convenience, or elegance, or magnificence which they exhibit. Every one knows, accordingly, that the best proportioned room, before it is finished, and while nothing but its proportions are discernible, produces only a very calm and moderate pleasure, in no respect greater than that which we feel from a well-constructed machine, or convenient piece

breadth? Why are these proportions necessarily required; and what remark follows? As every apartment is an inclosure of this kind, what seems natural? Of the real beauty of proportion in this case, what may be observed? How do artists very frequently talk of the beauty of such proportions; and what are they willing to do? But what follows? How is this illustrated? With what are they delighted? Of the best proportioned rooms, what does

of furniture. Remove even the furniture from the most finished apartment, and the delight which we receive from it is immediately diminished; yet the proportions are altogether independent of the furniture, and are much more discernible when it is removed. No person in the same manner, remarks the proportions of the miserable room of a cottage, or any other mean dwelling; yet the most regular proportions may, and sometimes are to be found in a cottage. If the apartments in such a building were purposely constructed according to the most rigorous law of proportion, I apprehend, that they would produce no emotion greater than that of simple satisfaction; yet if these proportions were themselves originally beautiful, they ought in this case to produce the same delight that they produce in the senate-house or the palace. If therefore, as seems to be evident, certain proportions are demanded in a room, as expressive of fitness; and if the emotion that is produced by the established and regular proportions, is no greater than that which we receive in other cases, from the expression of this quality, it seems reasonable to conclude, that these proportions are in fact beautiful, from the expression of this fitness.

2. The general language of mankind seems to confirm the same opinion. Whoever has had occasion to attend to the common language of men on this subject, must have observed, that the usual terms by which they express their sense of proportion, or of the want of proportion in a room, are those of lightness and heaviness—terms which obviously suppose the belief of weight and of support, and which couldnot have been used, if the beauty of form, in this case, did not depend upon the fitness or propriety of this relation. The terms proportion and disproportion are in truth altogether unintelligible to the common people; and to describe to them, any apartment, in such terms, leaves them as ignorant as ever of its beauty; but there is hardly any man who does not readily apprehend, that

every one, accordingly, know? What will be the effect of removing, even the furniture from the most finished apartment? What does no man, in the same manner, remark; yet what follows? How is this remark illustrated? What conclusion seems reasonable? What must he have observed, who attends to the common language of men, on this subject? Of the terms proportion, and disproportion, to the common people, what is observed? What

an apartment is of a pleasing form, when he is told that the walls are neither too high, nor too low, nor too wide for the support of the roof; or who will not as readily apprehend the contrary, when he is told, that in either of these respects, an appearance of insecurity is produced. A room which is low or wide in the roof, is, in general, said to be heavy : a room, on the contrary, which is high in the roof, and in which this weight seems to be properly and easily sustained, is said to be light. If we were under the necessity of interpreting, to a common person, the language of artists, or of explaining to him in what the beauty of form in this respect consists, I apprehend we should naturally do it, by representing it as light, or as so contrived that the support was perfectly adapted to the weight: and, on the other hand, if we were to explain to him in what respect any room was deficient, we should as naturally do it, by pointing out where the construction was deficient in fitness, and had the appearance of heaviness or insufficient support. In this manner also, without ever hearing of the terms of proportion ordisproportion, or considering the subject in any other light than that of fitness, he might acquire a perfect conception of this beauty; and be led in fact, to the same conclusions with regard to the proper composition of these dimensions, that are already established under the title of proportion. If these proportions, however, were originally and independently beautiful, no explanation of them from another sense could possibly be intelligible; and the substitution of the term fitness would be as unmeaning as that of sound or color. I am far from contending, that the generality of men are very accurate in their notions of the propriety of the relation of weight and support, or in this respect very proper judges of the perfection of proportion. But I apprehend, that the terms of heaviness and lightness which they employ, and universally understand, are a sufficient evidence of the principle upon which their

does every may readily apprehend? How is this illustrated? If we should be under the necessity of interpreting, to a common person, the language of artists, how should we do it? How should we explain to him in what respect any room was deficient? In this manuer, without what, what might he require? If these proportions, however, were independently beautiful, what would be the consequence? For what is our author far from contending;

judgments are formed, and that they show, that it is from the expression of fitness for the support of weight that their admiration is determined.

The same observation which was made with regard to the progress of taste, in the external proportions of this art, is applicable also to its internal proportions. If they were originally and independently beautiful, the earlier period of life would be most remarkable for the discovery of them: and it would be only in later life, and in proportion to our experience, that we could discover the additional beauty which they derive from their fitness. Every one knows, however, that the real progress is different-that during the years of infancy and childhood no sensibility whatever is shown to this beauty-that it is only as our experience enables us to judge of the relation between weight and support, that we begin to be sensible of it-that they whose occupations have prevented them from forming any very accurate judgment of this kind, are proportionably deficient in the accuracy of their taste; and that, in general, the bulk of mankind have no farther conception of this species of beauty, than that which arises from the consideration of fitness for the support of weight.

3. If there were any absolute and independent beauty in such proportions, it seems reasonable to imagine, that every violation of them would be equally painful; and that the deviation from them in each of these dimensions, would be attended with a similar emotion of discontent. All these proportions relate either to the height, the length, or the breadth of an apartment. Every man, however, must have observed, that it is with very different feelings he regards the want of proportion in these three respects. Too great a height in a room is not nearly so painful as too little height; and too great a length produces a triffing emotion of discontent, compared with that

but what does he apprehend? To what is the same observation which was made with regard to the progress of taste, in the external proportions of this art, also applicable? If they were originally and independently beautiful, what would follow? What, however does every one know? If there were any absolute and independent beauty in such proportions, what does it seem reasonable to inquire? To what do all these proportions relate? What, however, must any man have observed; and how is this illustrated? What

which we feel from too great breadth. Whether a room is a few feet too high, or too long, few people observe; but every one observes a much less disproportion, either in the diminution of its height, or in the extent of its breadth. The most general faults, accordingly, which common people find with apartments is either in their being too low, or too broad. To the proportions of height and length they seldom attend, if they are not greatly violated. These facts, though not easily reconcilable with the doctrine of the absolute beauty of these proportions, agree very minutely with the account which I have given of the origin of this beauty. If this beauty arises from the expression of fitness, the proportions, the violation of which should affect us the most, ought to be those which are most necessary for the production of this fitness. These, however, are very obviously, either too little height, or too great breadth ; the first immediately indicating an unusual weight in the roof, and the other expressing the greatest possible insufficiency for the support of this weight. The most unpleasing form of an apartment, accordingly, that it is possible to contrive, is that of being at the same time very broad, and very low in the roof. Too great height, and too great length, on the other hand, have not so disagreeable expressions. By the first, at least, fitness is, in no material degree, violated, and what we feel from it is chiefly a slight emotion of discontent, from its being unsuited to the general character or destination of rooms. Our indifference to the second disproportion, or to too great length, arises from a different cause, viz. from our knowledge that the beams which support the roof are laid latitudinally, and our consequent belief that the difference of length makes no difference with regard to the sufficiency of support. Change, accordingly, in any apartment, this disposition of the beams; let the spectator

288

do few people observe; but what does every one notice? What, accordingly, are the most general faults that common people find? To what do they sometimes attend; and of these facts what is observed? If this beauty arises from the expression of fitness, the violation of what proportions should the most affect us? What, however, are these, and what do they indicate? What, accordingly, is the most unpleasing form of an apartment, that it is possible to conceive? What have not so disagreeable expressions; and why? From what does our indifference to the second disproportion arise? If in any

perceive, that they are placed according to the length, and not as usual according to the breadth of the room; and whatever may be its other dimensions, or however great length these dimensions may require, no greater length will be permitted without pain, than that which is expressive of perfect sufficiency in the beams for the support of the roof. As there is thus no uniform emotion which attends the perception of these proportions, which would necessarily be the case, if their beauty were perceived by any peculiar sense; and as the emotion which we in fact receive from them is different, according to their different expressions of fitness, it seems reasonable to ascribe their beauty to this expression, and not to any original beauty in the proportions themselves.

4. If there were any original beauty in such proportions, they would necessarily be as certain as the objects of any other sense; and there would be one precise proportion of the three dimensions of length, breadth, and height, solely and permanently beautiful. Every one knows, however, that this is not the case; no artist has ever presumed to fix on such proportions; and so far is there from being any permanent beauty in any one relation of these dimensions, that the same proportions which are beautiful in one apartment, are not beautiful in others. From whatever causes these variations in the beauty of proportion arise, they conclude immediately against the doctrine of their original beauty. There seem, however, to be three principal causes of this difference in our opinion of the beauty of proportion, with barely mentioning which I must be satisfied, without attempting the full illustration of them.

1. The first is the consideration of the weight supported. As all roofs are supported by the side walls, and composed, in general, of the uniform material of wood, there is a certain, though not a very precise limit which we impose to their breadth, from

apartment this disposition be changed, what will be the consequence? Why does it seem reasonable to ascribe their beauty to this expression? If there were any original beauty in such proportions, what would follow? What, however, does every one know, and what has been the consequence? From whatever causes these variations arise, against what do they conclude? There are how many causes of this difference of opinion, and what is observed of them? What is the first? As all roofs are supported by the side walls, what

our knowledge that if they pass this limit, they are insufficient and insecure. To the length and to the height, on the other hand, we do not impose any such rigorous limits, because neither of these proportions interfere materially with our opinion of security. Within this limit of breadth, there may be several proportions to the length and height, which shall be universally pleasing. But beyond this limit, these proportions cease to be pleasing, and become painful in the same degree in which they pass this boundary of apparent security. Thus, a room of twelve feet square, may constitute a pleasing form; but a room of sixty feet square would be positively disagreeable. A room twenty-four feet in length, by eighteen in breadth, may be sufficiently pleasing; but a room sixty feet in length, by fifty in breadth, would constitute a very unpleasing form-Many other instances might easily be produced, to show, that the beauty of every apartment depends on the appearance of proper support to the roof; and that, on this account, the same proportion of breadth that is beautiful in one case, becomes positively painful in others.

2. A second cause of this difference in our opinion of the beauty of proportion, arises from the character of the apartment. Every one must have observed, that the different forms of rooms, their difference of magnitude, and various other causes, give them distinct characters, as those of gaiety, simplicity, solemnity, grandeur, magnificence, &c. No room is ever beautiful which has not some such pleasing character. the terms by which we express this beauty are significant of these characters; and however regular the proportions of an apartment may be, if they do not correspond to the general expression, we consider the form defective or imperfect. Thus, the same proportion of height which is beautiful in a room of gaiety, or cheerfulness, would be felt as a defect in an apartment of

consequence follows? Why do we not impose such rigorous limits to the length and to the height? What may be found within this limit of breadth? What is remarked of these proportions beyond this limit; and what illustrations are given? To show what, might many other instances easily be produced? From what does a second cause of this difference arise? What must every one have observed ? No room is ever beautiful without what; and what remark follows? How is this fully illustrated? In proportion as apart-

which the character was severity or melancholy. The same proportion of length which is pleasing in an elegant or convenient room, would be a defect in an apartment of magnificence The great proportion of breadth which suits a or splendor. temple or a senate-house, according with the severe and solemn character of the apartment, would be positively unpleasing in any room which was expressive of cheerfulness or lightness. In proportion also as apartments differ in size, different proportions become necessary in this respect, to accord with the characters which the difference of magnitude produces. The same proportion of height which is pleasing in a cheerful room, would be too little for the hall of a great castle, where vastness is necessary to agree with the sublimity of its character; and the same relation of breadth and height which is so wonderfully affecting in the Gothic cathedral, although at variance with all the classic rules of proportion, would be both absurd and painful, in the forms of any common apartment. In general, I believe it will be found, that the great and positive beauty of apartments arises from their character-that where no charac. ter is discovered, the generality of men express little admiration even at the most regular proportions-that every difference of character requires a correspondent difference in the composition of the dimensions ; and that this demand is satisfied, or a beautiful form produced, only, when the composition of the different proportions is such as to produce one pure and unmingled expression.

3. The third cause of the difference of our opinion of the beauty of proportion arises from the destination of the apartment. All apartments are intended for some use or purpose of human life : we demand, therefore, that the form of them should be accommodated to these ends; and wherever the form is at variance with the end, however regular, or generally beautiful its proportions may be, we are conscious of an emotion of dis-

ments differ in size, what follows? How is this remark illustrated? From what will it be found that the great and positive beauty of apartments, in general, arises? From what does the third cause of the difference of our opinion arise? As all apartments are intended for some one purpose of human life, in the form what do we demand; and when are we conscious of

satisfaction and discontent. The most obvious illustration of the dependence of the beauty of proportion on this species of utility may be taken from the common system that natural taste has dictated in the proportion of different apartments in great houses. The hall, the saloon, the anti-chamber, the drawingroom, the dining-room, the bed-chamber, the dressing-room, the library, the chapel, &c., have all different forms and different proportions. Change these proportions—give to the diningroom the proportions of the saloon, to the dressing-room those of the library, to the chapel the proportions of the anti-chamber, or to the drawing-room those of the hall, &c., and every one will consider them unpleasing and defective forms, because they are unfitted to the ends they are destined to serve.

The observations which I have now offered on the beauty of the internal proportions of architecture, seem to afford sufficient evidence for concluding in general, that the beauty of these proportions is not original and independent, but that it arises, in all cases, from the expression of some species of FITNESS.

The fitness, however, which such proportions may express, is of different kinds; and the reader who will pursue the slight hints that I have suggested upon the subject, may perhaps agree with me in the following conclusions—

1. That one beauty of these proportions arises from their expression of fitness for the support of the weight imposed---

2. That a second source of their beauty consists in their expression of fitness for the preservation of the character of the apartment—

3. That a third source of their beauty consists in their expression of fitness, in the general form, for its peculiar purpose or end.

The first two expressions constitute the PERMANENT beauty, and the third the ACCIDENTAL beauty of an apartment.

an emotion of dissatisfaction and discontent? From what may the most obvious illustrations of the dependence of the beauty of proportion on this species of utility, be taken? Repeat the illustration that follows. For what conclusion do the observations now offered, seem to afford sufficient evidence? Of the fitness which such proportions may express, what is observed; and what follows? What are they, and what is observed of them? In every

In every beautiful apartment, the first two expressions must be united. An apartment, of which the proportions express the most perfect fitness for the support of the roof, but which is, itself, expressive of no character, is beheld rather with satisfaction than delight, and is never remarked to be beautiful. The beauty of character on the other hand, is neglected, if the proportions of the apartment are such as to indicate insufficiency or insecurity. The first constitutes what may be called the negative, and the second the positive, beauty of an apartment; and every apartment, considered only in relation to its proportions, and without any respect to its end, will be beautiful in the same degree in which these expressions are united, or in which the same proportions that produce the appearance of perfect sufficiency, agree also in maintaining the general character of the apartment.

When, however, the apartment is considered in relation to its end, the beauty of its proportions is determined in a great measure by their expression of fitness for this end. To this, as to every other species of apartment, the expression of security is necessary, and such an apartment will accordingly be beautiful, when these expressions coincide.

The most perfect beauty that the proportions of an apartment can exhibit, is perceived when all these expressions unite; or when the same relations of dimension which are productive of the expression of sufficiency, agree also in the preservation of character, and in the indication of use.

PART III.

OF THE INFLUENCE OF UTILITY UPON THE BEAUTY OF FORMS.

The third source of the RELATIVE beauty of forms is UTILITY. That the expression of this quality is sufficient to give beauty

What is the third source of the relative beauty of forms ; and relative to it,

beautiful apartment, which of these expressions must be united; and why? When, on the other hand, is the beauty of character neglected? What do they respectively constitute, and in what degree will they be beautiful? When the apartment is considered in relation to its end, by what is the beauty of its proportions determined; and what remark follows? When is the most perfect beauty that the proportions of an apartment can exhibit, perceived?

to forms, and that forms of the most different and opposite kinds become beautiful from this expression, are facts which have often been observed, and which are within the reach of every person's observation. I shall not therefore presume to add any illustrations on a subject, which has already been so beautifully illustrated by Mr. Smith, in the most eloquent work* on the subject of MORALS, that modern Europe has produced.

SECTION III.

OF THE ACCIDENTAL BEAUTY OF FORMS.

Beside the expressions that have now been enumerated, and which constitute the two great and permanent sources of the beauty of forms, there are others of a casual or accidental kind, which have a very observable effect in producing the same emotion in our minds, and which constitute what may be called the ACCIDENTAL beauty of forms. Such associations, instead of being common to all mankind, are peculiar to the individual. They take their rise from education, from peculiar habits of thought, from situation, from profession; and the beauty they produce is felt by those only, whom similar causes have led to the formation of similar associations. There are few men who have not associations of this kind, with particular forms, from their being familiar to them from their infancy, and thus connected with the gay and pleasing imagery of that period of life; from their connexion with scenes to which they look back with pleasure, or people whose memories they love : and such forms, from this accidental connexion, are never seen, without being, in some measure, the signs of all those affecting and endearing recollections. When such associations are of a more general kind, and are common to many individuals, they

* Theory of Moral Sentiments.

what facts have often been observed ? What will our author, therefore, not presume to do?

With what remark is this section commenced? Of such associations what is observed; whence do they take their rise, and what is remarked of the beauty which they produce? There are few men without what associations; and without what are such forms never seen? When such associations are

sometimes acquire a superiority over the more permanent principles of beauty, and determine, for a time, even the taste of nations. The admiration which is paid to the forms of architecture, of furniture, of ornament, which we derive from antiquity, though undoubtedly very justly due to these forms themselves, originates, in the greater part of mankind, from the associations which they connect with these forms. These associations, however, are merely accidental; and were these forms much inferior in point of beauty, the admiration which modern Europe bestows on them would not be less enthusiastic than it is now. There are even cases, where in a few years, the taste of a nation, in such respects, undergoes an absolute change, from associations of a different kind becoming general or fashionable ; and where the beautiful form is always found to correspond to the prevailing association. They who are familiar with the history of dress, will recollect many instances of this kind. In every other species of ornament it is also observable; a single instance will be sufficient.

In the succession of fashions which have taken place, within these few years, in the article of ornamental furniture, every one must have observed how much their beauty has been determined by accidental associations of this kind, and how little the real and permanent beauty of such forms has been regarded. Some years ago, every article of this kind was made in what was called the CHINESE taste, and however fantastic and uncouth the forms in reality were, they were yet universally admired, because they brought to mind those images of eastern magnificence and splendor, of which we have heard so much. and which we are always willing to believe, because they are To this succeeded the GOTHIC taste. Every thing distant. was now made in imitation, not indeed of Gothic furniture, but in imitation of the forms and ornament of Gothic halls and cathedrals. This slight association, however, was sufficient to

of a more general kind, what is the consequence? What remark follows; and what is observed of these associations? How is this illustrated? Who will recollect many instances of this kind; and what remark follows? In the succession of fashions, which have taken place within these few years, in the article of ornamental furniture, what must every one have observed? What illustration of this remark is given? Why was this slight association suffi-

give beauty to such forms, because it led to ideas of Gothic manners and adventure, which had become fashionable in the world from many beautiful compositions both in prose and verse. The taste which now reigns is that of the ANTIQUE.— Every thing we now use, is made in imitation of those models which have been lately discovered in Italy; and they serve, in the same manner, to occupy our imagination, by leading to those recollections of Grecian or Roman taste, which, from the studies and amusements of our youth, have so much the possession of our minds.

I shall only farther observe upon this subject, that all such instances of the effect of accidental expression, in bestowing a temporary beauty upon forms, conclude immediately against the doctrine of their absolute or independent beauty; and that they afford a very strong presumption, if not a direct proof, that their permanent beauty arises also from the expressions they permanently convey to us.

From the illustrations that I have offered in this long chapter, on the beauty of FORMS, we seem to have sufficient reason for concluding in general, that no forms, or species of forms, are in themselves originally beautiful; but that their beauty in all cases arises from their being expressive of some pleasing or affecting qualities.

If the views also that I have presented on the subject are just, we may perhaps still farther conclude, that the principal sources of the beauty of forms, are, 1st, the expressions we connect with peculiar forms, either from the form itself, or the nature of the subject thus formed: 2dly, The qualities of design, and fitness, and utility, which they indicate; and 3dly, The accidental associations which we happen to connect with them. The consideration of these different expressions may afford, perhaps, some general rules that may not be without

cient to give beauty to such forms? What is the taste which now reigns? In imitation of what is every thing we now use made, and in what manner do they serve to occupy our imaginations? What only is farther observed upon this subject? From the illustrations offered, on the beauty of forms, for what conclusion do we seem to have sufficient reason? If the views presented be just, what may we, perhaps, still farther conclude? What may the consi-

their use, to those arts that are employed in the production of beauty.

All forms are either ORNAMENTAL OF USEFUL.

I. The beauty of merely ORNAMENTAL forms appears to arise from three sources :

1. From the expression of the form itself:

2. From the expression of design :

3. From accidental expression.

The real and positive beauty, therefore, of every ornamental form, will be in proportion to the nature and the permanence of the expression by which it is distinguished. The strongest and most permanent emotion, however, we can receive from such expressions, is that which arises from the nature of the form itself. The emotion we receive from the expression of design, as I have already shown, is neither so strong nor so permanent; and that which accidental associations produce, perishes often with the year which gave it birth. The beauty of accidental expression, is as variable as the caprice or fancy of mankind. The beauty of the expression of design, varies with every period of art. The beauty which arises from the expression of form itself, is alone permanent, being founded upon the uniform constitution of the human mind. Considering, therefore, the beauty of forms as constituted by the degree and the permanence of their expression, the following conclusions seem immediately to suggest themselves-

1. That the greatest beauty which ornamental forms can receive will be that which arises from the expression of the form itself—

2. That the next will be that which arises from the expression of design or skill. And,

3. That the least will be that which arises from accidental or temporary expressions.

deration of these different expressions, afford? All forms are one of what two kinds? From what three sources does the beauty of merely ornamental forms appear to arise? In proportion to what, will the real and positive beauty of every ornamental form be? What is the strongest and most permanent emotion, that we can receive from such expressions; and what remarks follow? Considering, therefore, the beauty of forms as constituted by the degree and permanence of their expression, what conclusions seem im-

In all those arts, therefore, that respect the beauty of form. it ought to be the unceasing study of the artist, to disengage his mind from the accidental associations of his age, as well as the common prejudices of his art; to labor to distinguish his productions by that pure and permanent expression, which may be felt in every age; and to disdain to borrow a transitory fame, by yielding to the temporary caprices of his time, or by exhibiting only the display of his own dexterity or skill. Or if the accidental taste of mankind must be gratified, it is still to be remembered, that it is only in those arts, which are employed upon perishable subjects, that it can be gratified with safety ; that in those greater productions of art, which are destined to last for centuries, the fame of the artist must altogether depend upon the permanence of the expression, which he can communicate to his work; and that the only expression which is thus permanent, and which can awaken the admiration of every succeeding age, is that which arises from the nature of form itself, and which is founded upon the uniform constitution of man and of nature.

II. The beauty of USRFUL forms arises, either from the expression of fitness or of utility.

With regard to this species of beauty, it is necessary at present only to observe, 1st, that it is, in itself, productive of a much weaker emotion, than that which arises from the different sources of ornamental beauty; but, 2dly, that this emotion is of a more constant and permanent kind, and much more uniformly fitted to excite the admiration of mankind.

To unite these different kinds of beauty—to dignify ornamental forms also by use, and to raise merely useful forms into beauty, is the great object of ambition among every class of artists.— Wherever both these objects can be attained, the greatest possible beauty that form can receive, will be produced; but as

mediately to suggest themselves? In all these acts, therefore, that respect the beauty of form, what should be the unceasing study of the artist? If the accidental taste of mankind must be gratified, what is still to be remembered? From what does the beauty of useful forms arise? With regard to this species of beauty, what only is it necessary at present to observe? What is the great object of ambition among every class of artists? When both these

this can very seldom be the case, the following rules seem immediately to present themselves, for the direction of the artist-

1. That where the utility of forms is equal, that will be the most beautiful, to which the most pleasing expression of form is given—

2. That when those expressions are at variance, when the utility of the form cannot be produced, without sacrificing its natural beauty, or when this beauty of form cannot be preserved without sacrificing its utility, that form will be most universally and most permanently beautiful, in which the expression of utility is most fully preserved.

To human art, indeed, this union will always be difficult, and often impossible; and the artist, whatever may be his genius, must be content to suffer that sublime distress, which a great mind alone can feel, "to dedicate his life to the attain-"ment of an ideal beauty, and to die at last without attaining " it."* Yet, if it is painful to us to feel the limits that are thus set to the invention of man, it is pleasing, from the narrow schools of human art, to turn our regard to the great school of nature, and to observe the stupendous wisdom with which these expressions are united in almost every form. "And here, I think," says Mr. Hogarth, "will be the most proper place to " speak of a most curious difference between the living ma-" chines of nature in respect of fitness, and such poor ones in " comparison with them, as men are only capable of making. "A clock, by the government's order, has been made by Mr. " Harrison, for the keeping of true time at sea; which is per-" haps one of the most exquisite movements ever made.---"Happy the ingenious contriver ! although the form of the " whole, or of every part of this curious machine, should be "ever so confused, or displeasingly shaped to the eye, and " although even its movements should be disagreeable to look "at, provided it answers the end proposed : an ornamental

* Sir Joshua Reynolds.

objects can be attained, what will follow? But as this can seldom be the case, what rules seem to suggest themselves for the direction of the artist? Of this union what is observed; and what must the artist be content to suffer? Yet if it is painful to us to feel the limits that are thus set to the invention of man, what is a pleasing task? On this subject what says Mr. Hogarth? Of

SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY

" composition was no part of his scheme, otherwise than as a "polish might be necessary; if ornaments are required to be "added to mend its shape, care must be taken that they are "no obstruction to the movement itself, and the more as they "would be superfluous as to the main design. But, in nature's "machines, how wonderfully do we see beauty and use go hand "in hand! Had a machine for this purpose been nature's "work, the whole and every individual part might have had "exquisite beauty of form, without danger of destroying the "the sole aim; its movements too might have been graceful "without one superfluous title added for either of these lovely "purposes. Now this is that curious difference between the "fitness of nature's machines, and those made by mortal "hands."

The application of this fine observation, to innumerable instances, both of inanimate and animated forms, it is in the power of every one to make; and I am much more willing to leave the impression which it must produce upon every mind entire, than to weaken it by any illustrations of my own.

the application of this fine observation, what is observed; and what remark follows?

CHAPTER V.

OF THE BEAUTY AND SUBLIMITY OF MOTION.

Morron is in many cases productive of the emotions of sublimity and beauty : with this quality, accordingly, we have many interesting and affecting associations. These associations arise, either from the nature of motion itself, or from the nature of the bodies moved. The following illustrations may, perhaps, show that the beauty and sub-imity of motion arises from these associations, and that we have no reason to believe that this quality of matter is, in itself, either beautiful or sublime.

I. All motion is produced either by visible or invisible power: by some cause which we perceive, or by some which is not the object of sense.

With all motions of the latter kind, we connect the idea of voluntary power; and such motions are in fact expressive to us of the exertion of power. Whether this association is the consequence of experience, or whether it is the effect of an original principle, it is not at present material to inquire. The instance of children, and even of animals, who uniformly infer life, where they perceive motion without any material cause, are sufficient evidences of the fact.

That the sublimity and beauty of motion arises from their expression of power, seems to be evident from the two following considerations—

Of what is motion in many cases productive; and what is the consequence? From what do these associations arise? The following illustrations may show what? How is all motion produced? With all motions of the latter kind, what ideas do we connect; and of what are they expressive? What is it not at present material to inquire; and what are sufficient evidences of the

SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY

1. There is no instance where motion, which is the apparent effect of force, is beautiful or sublime. It is impossible to conceive the motion of a body that is dragged or visibly impelled by another body, to be either sublime or beautiful.

2. All beautiful or sublime motion is expressed in language by verbs in the active voice. We say even in common language, that a torrent pours—a stream glides—a rivulet winds—that lightning darts—that light streams.—Change these expressions, by means of any verbs in the passive voice, and the whole beauty of their motion is destroyed. In poetical composition, the same circumstance is uniformly observable. If motion were, in itself, beautiful or sublime, or if any particular kinds of motion were so, these circumstances could no: happen; and such motions would still be beautiful or sublime, whether they were expressive of power or not.

The character of power varies according to its degree, and produces, according to this difference, different emotions in our mind. Great power produces an emotion of awe and admiration: gentle, or moderate, or diminutive power, produces an emotion of tenderness, of interest, of affection. To every species of power that is pleasing, the idea of superiority to obstacle is necessary. All power, whether great or small, which is inferior to obstacle, induces the idea of imperfection, and is considered with a kind of dissatisfaction.

These considerations will probably explain a great part of the absolute sublimity and heauty of motion.

Motion differs according to its DEGREE, and according to its DIBECTION.

I. Of the DEGREE of MOTION. All motion, when rapid, is, I apprehend, accompanied with the idea of great power: when

fact? That the sublimity and beauty of motion arises from their expression of power, scenes evident from what two considerations? How may the whole beauty of their motion be destroyed; and of poetry what is observed? Under what circumstances could not this happen; and what follows? According to what does the character of power vary, and what does it produce? How is this illustrated? To every species of power that is pleasing, what idea is necessary; and why? What will these considerations probably explain? According to what does motion difter? With what is all motion when rapid accompanied; and with what when slow? For the truth of this remark, to what

slow, on the other hand, with the idea of gentle or diminutive power. For the truth of this remark, I must appeal to the reader's own observation. Rapid motion, accordingly, is sublime, slow motion beautiful.

II. Of the DIRECTION of MOTION. Motion is either in-a straight line, in an angular line, or in a serpentine or curvilinear line.

1. Motion in a straight line chiefly derives its expression from its degree. When rapid, it is simply sublime : when slow, it is simply beautiful.

2. Motion in an angular line is expressive of obstruction, or of imperfect power: when considered therefore in itself, and without relation to the body moving, it is simply unpleasing.

3. Motion in curves is expressive of ease, of freedom, of playfulness; and is consequently beautiful.

The truth of this account of our associations with motion, I refer to the examination of the reader. The real beauty and sublimity of the different appearances of motion, seem to me to correspond very accurately with the expressions which the different combinations of the degree, and the direction of motion, convey.

1. Rapid motion, in a straight line, is simply expressive of great power: it is, accordingly, in general, sublime. Rapid motion, in angular lines, is expressive of great, but imperfect power—of a power which every obstacle is sufficient to overcome: I believe that motion of this kind is accordingly very seldom sublime. Rapid motion in curve lines is expressive of great power, united with ease, freedom, or playfulness: motion of this kind, accordingly, though more sublime than the preceding, is less sublime than the first species of motion. The course of a torrent, when in a straight line, is more sublime than when it winds into curves, and much more sublime than

does our author appeal; and what remark follows? What are the directions of motion? From what does motion in a straight line chiefly derive its expression; and what is observed of it when rapid, and when slow? Of what is motion in an angular line expressive; and what follows? Of what is motion in curves expressive; and what is the consequence? To what is the truth of this account of our associations referred? With what does the real beauty and sublimity of the different appearances of motion seem to correspond? How is this remark illustrated? Of what is rapid motion in curve lines expressive; and what follows? How is this remark illustrated from the course

when it is broken into angles. The impetuous shooting of the eagle would lose much of its sublimity, if it were to deviate from the straight line, and would be simply painful, if it were to degenerate into an angular line.

2. Slow motion, in a straight line, is simply expressive of gentle and delicate power; it is accordingly beautiful. Slow motion, in angular lines, is expressive of gentle power, and of imperfection or obstruction; these expressions, however, do not well accord, and mutually destroy each other. Motion of this kind, is, accordingly, very seldom beautiful. Slow motion in curves is expressive of gentle power, united with case, freedom, and playfulness; it is accordingly peculiarly beautiful. The soft gliding of a stream, the light traces of a summer breeze upon a field of corn, are beautiful when in a straight line; they are much more beautiful when they describe serpentine or winding lines: but they are scarcely beautiful, when their direction is in sharp angles, and sudden deviations.

The most sublime motion, is that of rapid motion in a straight line: the most beautiful, is that of slow motion in a line of curves. I humbly apprehend, that these conclusions are not very distant from common experience upon this subject.

II. Besides these, however, which may be called the permanent expressions of motion, there are others which arise from the nature of the bodies moved, and which have a very obvious effect in giving beauty or sublimity to the peculiar motions by which they are dis inguished. Instances of this kind are so familiar, that it will be necessary only to point out a few.

Slow motion is, in general, simply beautiful: where, however, the body is of great magnitude, slow motion is sublime. The slow motion of a first rate man of war; the slow ascent

of a torrent, and from the impetuous shooting of the eagle? Of slow motion in str ight, and of slow motion in angular lines, what is observed? As the expressions do not well accord, what is the consequence? Of what is slow motion in curves expressive; and what is its character? What illustration of this remark follows? What is the most sublime, and what the most beautiful motion? Of these conclusions, what is apprehended? Besides these permanent expressions of motion, what others are there? Of instances of this kind what is observed? Though slow motion is, in general, simply heautiful, yet when is it sublime? How is this illustrated? Though rapid motion

of a great balloon; the slow march of an embattled army, are all sublime motions, and no person can observe

> The cloud stupendous, from th' Atlantic wave, High tow'ring sail along the horizon blue,

without an emotion of this kind.

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Rapid motion is, in general, sublime; yet where the bodies excite only pleasing or moderate affections, motion of this kind becomes beautiful. The rapid shooting of the Aurora Borealis, the quick ascent of fire-works, a sudden stream of light from a small luminous object in the dark, are familiar instances of this kind. The motion of the humming-bird is more rapid perhaps than that of the eagle, yet the motion of the humming-bird is only beautiful.

Motion in angular lines is, in general, productive of an emotion of discontent, rather than of any emotion either of sublimity or beauty. Yet the motion of lightning, which is commonly of this kind, is strikingly sublime—the same appearance in electrical experiments is beautiful.

Slow motion in waving lines, is, in general, the most beautiful of all: but the motion of snakes or of serpents, is of all others the most disagreeable and painful.

In these instances, and many others that might be mentioned, it is obvious, that the sublimity or beauty of the motion arises from the expression or character of the bodies moved, and that in such cases, the expression of the body predominates over the general expression which we associate with the motion by which it is distinguished.

From the facts that I have mentioned we may conclude :

1st, That the beauty and sublimity of motion, arises from the associations we connect either with the motion itself, or with the bodies moved---

2dly, That this sublimity or beauty, in any particular case, will be most perfect, when the expression of the motion, and that of the body moved, coincide.

305

is, in general sublime, yet when does it become simply beautiful? How is this illustrated? Of what emotion, is motion in angular lines productive; yet of the motion of lightning, what is observed? Of slow motion in waving lines, what is observed? In these instances, and many others that might be mentioned, what is obvious? From the facts mentioned, what conclusions may be drawn?

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE BEAUTY OF THE HUMAN COUNTENANCE AND FORM.

SECTION I.

INTRODUCTORY.

THE preceding inquiries relate only to the beauty and sublimity of inanimate matter. I proceed to consider the origin of the beauty or sublimity which we perceive in the countenance and form of MAN—the being, amid all the innumerable classes of material existence, who, in this respect enjoys the most undoubted pre-eminence; and to whom the liberality of nature has been most conspicuous, in accommodating the majesty and beauty of his external frame to the supreme rank which she has assigned him among her works.

The full investigation of the principles of human beauty, and the application of them to the arts of painting and of statuary, would furnish one of the most pleasing speculations which the science of taste affords. I am necessarily restrained to a more humble inquiry; and must confine myself to the examination of a single question—Whether the beauty of the human species is to be ascribed to any law of our nature, by which certain appearances in the countenance and form are originally, and independently, beautiful or sublime? or whether, as in the case of inanimate matter, it is to be ascribed to the various pleasing or interesting expressions we connect with such appearances ?

In entering upon this investigation, it is impossible not to ob-

To what only do the preceding inquiries relate? To consider what does our author now proceed; and of this being what is observed? What would furnish one of the most pleasing speculations which the science of taste affords? To what is our author necessarily restrained, and to what question must be confine himself? In entering upon this investigation, what is it impossible not

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serve, that if the human frame is, of all material objects, that in which the greatest degree of beauty is found, it is also the object with which we have the most numerous, and the most interesting associations. The greatest beauty of inanimate matter arises from some resemblances we discover between particular qualities of it, and certain qualities or dispositions of mind: but the effect which such resemblances or analogies produce, is feeble, in comparison of that which is produced by the immediate expression of such qualities or dispositions in the human frame. Such resemblances also are few, as well as distant; but to the expressions of the human frame there are no other limits than those that are imposed upon the intellectual or moral powers of man.

That a great part of the beauty of the human countenance and form arises from such expressions, is, accordingly, very generally acknowledged. It is not, however, supposed, that the whole beauty of the countenance and form is to be ascribed to this cause; and the term *expression* is very generally used to distinguish that species of beauty which arises from the direct expression of mind, from that which is supposed to consist in certain visible appearances in the countenance and form. I shall endeavor now to show, that the same principle of expression is also the foundation of all the beauty or sublimity that is supposed to consist in certain visible appearances in the countenance and form; and that the whole beauty or sublimity which is to be found in the external frame of man, is to be ascribed to the various pleasing or interesting qualities, which are either directly or indirectly expressed by such appearances.

All that is beautiful or sublime in the human frame, may, perhaps, be included in the following enumeration :

- 1. In the countenance-
- 2. In the form-
- 3. In attitude-
- 4. In gesture.

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to observe? From what does the greatest beauty of inanimate matter arise; but of the effect which such resemblances produce, what is observed? What remark follows? What is, accordingly, very generally acknowledged? What, however, is not supposed, and for what is the term *expression* very generally used? What will our author now endeavor to show? In what

SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY

For the sake of perspicuity, I am under the necessity of considering these subjects separately.

SECTION II.

OF THE HUMAN COUNTENANCE.

The beauty or sublimity of the human countenance arises from three sources: 1st, From its colors: 2dly, from the forms of the features; and 3dly, From the composition of these colors and features.

PART I.

OF THE COLORS OF THE COUNTENANCE.

There are two distinct species of color in the human countenance which produce the emotion of sublimity or beauty : 1st, The *permanent*; and 2dly, the *variable* colors of the countenance. The first are the general and characteristic colors of the countenance, the peculiarity of its complexion, the color of the eyes, the lips, the hair, the beard, &c. The second are those colors which are produced by particular or temporary affections of the mind, as the blush of modesty, the paleness of fear, the glow of indignation, the vivid light which animates the eye of joy, or the dark cloud which seems to hang over the eye of melancholy and grief, &c.

With both of these species of colors, I think it will be acknowledged that we have distinct and important associations.

enumeration may all that is beautiful or sublime in the human frame, be included? For the sake of perspicuity, how are these to be considered?

What are the colors of the human countenance that produce emotions of beauty or sublimity? What are the first of these colors? How are the second produced, and what are they? With both of these species of colors,

308

From what three sources does the beauty of the human countenance arise?

OF THE PERMANENT COLORS.

1. Such colors have expression to us simply as colors, and upon the same principles which have formerly been stated.* It is thus that the pure white of the countenance is expressive, according to its different degrees of purity, fineness, and gaiety : the dark complexion, on the other hand, is expressive of melancholy, gloom, or sadness. Clear and uniform colors are significant of perfection and consistency: mixed or mottled complexions, of confusion and imperfection. In the color of the eyes, blue, according to its different degrees, is expressive of softness, gentleness, cheerfulness, of serenity : black, of thought, or gravity, or of sadness. A bright or brilliant eye is significant of happiness, vivacity, and gaiety; a dim and turbid eye, on the contrary, of confusion, imperfection, or melancholv. The reality of such associations is too well evinced by common experience and common language, to need any farther illustration.

2. Certain colors in the countenance are expressive to us of youth or of age, of health or of disease, and convey all the emotions which we thus understand them to express. There is no child who does not distinguish between the bloom of youth, and the paleness of old age—who does not understand the difference between the brilliant eye of health, and the languid eye of disease; and who has not, therefore, acquired associations which are to govern his future life, and to make these permanent signs of the accidents of the human frame, significant to him of the state or condition they express.

3. It is yet farther to be observed, that certain colors in the permanent complexion, are expressive, and very powerfully expressive too, of peculiar characters or dispositions of mind.

* Essay II. Chap. iii. Sect. 2.

what will it be acknowledged we have? Of the expression of the permanent colors of the countenance, what is remarked? How is this remark fully illustrated? Why do not the reality of such associations need any farther illustrations? Of what are certain colors in the countenance expressive; and what do they convey? How is this remark illustrated? Of what is it farther to be observed that certain colors in the permanent complexion are express

In this respect all men are physiogomists. The opinions we form at first sight of the character of strangers, the language of the young, and the loose opinions we hear every day in the world, are all significant of some propensity to judgment from these external signs : and when we investigate the foundation of these judgments, we shall find them chiefly to rest upon the associations we have connected with the colors of the countenance.

The complexion, in this view, admits of four principal variations: It is either dark or fair, or pale or blooming. Each of these has established expressions. Dark complexions are expressive of strength, of gravity, and melancholy: fair complexions, of cheerfulness, feebleness, and delicacy. The complexion, in the same manner, when pale, is expressive of gentleness, tenderness, and debility; when blooming, of gaiety, and vigor, and animation.

It is in the same manner that the eyes admit of four principal varieties of permanent color, which are accompanied with as many different expressions: they are either black or blue, brilliant or languid. Black eyes are expressive of thoughtfulness, seriousness, melancholy; blue eyes, on the contrary, of softness, serenity, or cheerfulness. Brilliant eyes are expressive of joy, vivacity, penetration; languid eyes, on the contrary, of mildness, sensibility, or sorrow. The different compositions of such colors in the eyes, or in the complexion, produce a correspondent variety or diversity of expression.

Whatever may be the foundation of such associations, there seems to be no doubt of their reality, and a day scarcely passes in which, either in our own experience, or in the language of conversation around us, we may not be sensible of their existence. There seems, however, to be a sufficient foundation for some

ive? What are all significant of some propensity to judgment from these external signs; and when we investigate the foundation of these judgments, on what shall we find them chiefly to rest? Of what variations does the complexion in this view admit? Of each of these what are the established expressions? Of the varieties of permanent colors of the eye, what is, in the same manner observed? Of what are they respectively expressive? What do the different compositions of such colors in the eyes, or in the complexion produce? What remark follows? In what, however, does there seem to be

associations of this kind, in our experience of the permanent connexion of certain qualities of mind, with certain external appearances of color in the human countenance. The two great varieties of complexion, the fair and the dark, are, in fact, very generally found to be connected with the opposite characters of cheerfulness and melancholy; and so far is this from being a fanciful relation, that it is generally admitted by those who have the best opportunities of ascertaining it-the professors of medical science. The foundation of our association of paleness of complexion with delicacy and debility, and of bloom with vigor and animation seems to be equally solid, as these colors are in general the signs of health, or of indisposition, and as commonly united with such qualities of body and such dispositions of mind as they generally produce. The expression of color in the eyes, seems to arise from two different sources. Black eyes are commonly united with the dark, and blue eyes with the fair complexion: they have, therefore, the different expressions of these different complexions. With respect to the brilliancy or languor of the eye, on the other hand, we have often reason to observe, that all joyful or animating affections, and all vigorous exertions of mind, give lustre and brilliancy, and that all sorrowful, or dispiriting, or pathetic emotions, give softness and languor to the colors of the eye. Such appearances, therefore, are early and strongly associated with the qualities of mind with which they have so generally been found to be accompanied, and are naturally regarded as the signs of these qualities.

The expression of the variable colors of the countenance is still more distinct and precise. That the affections and passions of the human mind have correspondent appearances in the colors of the countenance, is a fact which all men understand,

a sufficient foundation for some associations of this kind? With what are the two great varieties of complexion, the fair and the dark, very generally found to be connected; and of this relation what is remarked? The foundation of what association seems to be equally solid; and why? From what two different sources does the expression of color in the eyes seem to arise? With respect to the hilarity or languor of the eye, on the other hand, what have we often reason to observe? Of such appearances, therefore, what is observed? What expression is still more distinct and precise? What fact

and have understood from infancy. There is no man who does not distinguish between the blush of modesty and the glow of indignation; the paleness of fear and the lividness of envy; the sparkling eye of joy, and the piercing eye of rage; the dim and languid eye of grief and the open and passive eye of astonishment, &c. These appearances are so uniform in the human countenance, and are so strongly associated with their correspondent affections of mind, that even the first period of infancy is sufficient to establish the connexion: it seems to me, therefore, altogether unnecessary farther to illustrate the reality of these associations.

I have thus very briefly stated some of the associations we have with the colors of the human countenance, or some of the characters or dispositions of mind of which they are expressive. It remains for me now to show, that such colors owe their beauty or sublimity to this cause; and that, when these expressions are withdrawn, or no longer accompany them, our sentiment of beauty or sublimity is withdrawn with them.

The beauty of colors, in this instance, must obviously arise from one or another of these three sources—

Either, 1st. From some original beauty in these colors themselves: 2dly. From some law of our nature, by which the appearance of such colors in the countenance is fitted immediately and permanently to produce the emotion of beauty: or, 3dly. From their being significant of certain qualities capable of producing pleasing or interesting emotion.

1. That such colors are not beautiful simply as colors, or as objects of sensation, has been already sufficiently shown in the former chapter of colors.

2. That we have no reason to suppose any law of our nature, by which certain colors in the human countenance are immediately and permanently beautiful, may, perhaps, be obvious from the following considerations—

do all men understand, and have understood from infancy? How is this illustrated? Of these appearances what is remarked, and what, therefore, seems altogether unnecessary? What has our author thus very briefly stated; and what does it remain for him now to show? From one or another of what three sources, must the beauty of color, in this instance, obviously arise? What has already been sufficiently shown; and what may, perhaps. 1. If there were any such law of our nature, it would be obvious, like every other, in infancy. The child would mark its love or admiration according to the complexion or colors of the countenances of those who surround it; and its aversion would be shown to all who varied from these sole and central colors of beauty. The reverse of this is so much the case, that every one must have remarked it. For the first years of life, no sense of beauty among individuals, in this respect, is testified by children. The countenances of the old, on the contrary, with all their loss of coloring, are more delightful to them, than those of youth and infancy; and if there are any colors that appear to them peculiarly beautiful, it is the pale countenance of the mother, in whose looks they read her affection, or the faded complexion of the aged nurse, for whose looks they mingle love with reverence.

2. If there were any such law of beauty, our opinions of such a kind would be permanent. One central color in every feature or portion of the countenance, would alone be beautiful, and every deviation from it would be felt as a deviation from this original and prescribed beauty. How much the reverse of all this is the case, every man must have felt from his own experience. In countenances of different character, we look for different tones of complexion, and different degrees of color. In different individuals we admire not only different, but opposite colors of eyes, of hair, of complexion; and what is still more, in the same individual, we admire, at different times, very different appearances of the same colors, on the same complexion. Such facts are altogether irreconcilable with the belief of any sole or central color, which alone is beautiful.

3. If there were any such law of the beauty of colors, it would, like all the other laws of our nature, be *universal*, and

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be obvious from the following considerations? If there were any such law of our nature, when would it be obvious; and why? From what does it appear that the reverse of this is the case; and if there are any colors that appear to them peculiarly beautiful, what are they? If there were any such law of beauty, what would follow? What would alone be beautiful, and what would be the consequence of every deviation from it? In countenances of different character, for what do we look? In different individuals what do we admire; and what is still more surprising? With what are such facts altogether irreconcileable? If there were any such law of the beauty of colors, how exten-

all nations would have agreed on some certain colors of the human countenance, which alone were beautiful. How far this is from being true, and how much, on the contrary, every nation has its own national and peculiar sense of beauty in this respect, it would be very unnecessary to attempt to illustrate.

The remaining supposition is, that the beauty of colors in the human countenance is derived from their being significant of certain qualities, capable of producing pleasing or interesting emotion.

That this is the case, and that the common sentiments of mankind are governed by this principle, may, I trust, appear from the following simple illustrations—

I. The same color which is beautiful in one countenance is not beautiful in another : whereas if there were any law of nature, by which certain colors were permanently beautiful, these colors alone would be beautiful in every case. Of the truth of the fact which I have stated, no person can be ignorant. The colors which we admire in childhood are unsuitable to youth : those which we admire in youth, are as unsuitable to manhood : and both are different from those which we expect, and which we love in age. Reverse the order; give to age the colors of manhood, to manhood those of youth, or to youth those of childhood : and while the colors are the same, every eye would discover that there was something unnatural in their appearance, and that they were significant of very different expressions, from those which we were in the habit of connecting with them.

The distinction of the sexes, and the very different expectations we form from them, afford another illustration. If any certain colors are instinctively beautiful in the human countenance, they must be equally beautiful in every countenance.

sively would it prevail; and on what would all nations have agreed? What would it be very unnecessary to attempt to illustrate? What is the remaining supposition; and what may appear from the following simple illustrations? How is the same color which is beautiful in one countenance, regarded in another; and what remark follows? From what does the truth of this remark appear? How may the order be reversed; and then what will follow? What affords another illustration? If any certain colors are instinctively

Yet there is no one who does not, at least, expect a very different degree of color in the two sexes; and who does not find, that the same color which is beautiful in the one, as expressive of the character he expects, is positively painful and disagreeable in the other. The dark red or the firm brown of complexion, so significant in man of energy and vigor, would be simply painful in the complexion of woman; while the pearly white, and the evanescent bloom which expresses so well all the gentleness, and all the delicacy of the female character, would be simply painful, or disgusting to us in the complexion of man.

The same observation may be extended to all the professions of human life. In the shepherd and in the warrior, in the sage and in the citizen, in the tyrant and in the martyr, we imagine, and we expect very different colors of complexion. To these expectations, the painter and the poet have always instinctively yielded, and in the imagination of color, have not less exhibited their powers, than in the conception of feature, and in the disposal of attitude or gesture. Every color of the human countenance we feel to be beautiful only when it corresponds to the the character which is presented to us; and every color, on the contrary, which is contradictory to the character that is meant to be expressed, we feel to be imperfect or displeasing. Such feelings or conclusions, it is obvious, could never occur, if there were any certain or precise colors of the human countenance which were beautiful by some previous law of nature.

II. The most *different*, and even *opposite* colors are felt to be beautiful, when they are significant of pleasing or of interesting qualities in the countenances to which they belong.

There is nothing more opposite in point of coloring, than the bloom of youth to the paleness of old age; yet both, we know, 2

beautiful in the human countenance, what is the inference? Yet there is no one who does not, at least, expect, and find what? How is this remark illustrated? To what may the same observation be extended? In whom do we imagine and expect very different colors of complexion? To these expectations who have instinctively yielded, and in the imagination of colors, what have they done? When only do we feel the colors of the human countenance to be beautiful; and what colors, on the contrary, do we feel to be imperfect or displeasing? Under what circumstances could not such feelings or conclusions occur? When are the most different, and even opposite colors felt to be beautiful? How is this remark illustrated? In the recluse stu-

are beautiful. We love the dazzling white of complexion of the infant in its cradle : we love afterwards the firm brown of color which distinguishes the young adventurer in exercise or arms. In the recluse student, we expect the pale complexion, which signifies watching, and midnight meditation: in the soldier and sailor we look for a complexion hardened to climate, and embrowned with honorable toil. In all the variety of classes into which society has distributed mankind, we look for, in the same manner, some distinct coloring as significant of this classification. We meet with it in the descriptions of the poet, and the representations of the painter; and we feel our minds unsatisfied if we do not discover it in real life.

No colors can be more different than those of the eyes and of the hair. The dark and blue eye, the fair and the black hair, are not only different but almost opposite; yet who will pretend that they have not felt beauty in all of them? and to what principle are we to ascribe the effect, if we maintain that there are only certain colors in this respect which nature has made beautiful?

It is still farther observable, that even in the *same* countenance the most different colors are beautiful, when they are expressive of pleasing or interesting qualities. The blush of modesty is very different from the paleness of sensibility. The glow of indignation is equally different from the pallid hue of concentrated affliction: the bloom of health and joy, from the languor of sickness and sorrow. Yet in the same person we may often witness these striking contrasts; and perhaps it would be difficult for us to say when the same countenance was most beautiful. In the color of the eyes, the same differences are observable: the dark and brilliant eye may sometimes be veiled in dimness and distress. The softness of the blue eye may be exalted to temporary vigor and brilliancy: the manly eye of the soldier may be suffused with pity; and the timid eye of

dent, what do we expect; and in the soldier and the sailor for what do we look? In the same manner, for what do we look, in all the variety of classes into which society has distributed mankind? Where do we meet with it; and when do we feel our minds unsatisfied? Of the different colors of the eyes and the hair, what is observed? What is still farther observable? How is thisillustrated? How does it appear that the same differences are observable

woman burn with just resentment or with dignified scorn. In all such differences of color, we may still feel the emotion of beauty; an effect which could not possibly happen if there were any law of our nature, by which certain colors only in the human countenance were productive of this emotion.

III. In pursuing these observations, it is still more important to observe, that our feelings of beauty in the colors of the human countenance, are so far from being precise and definite, as they would necessarily be, if they arose from any original law of our nature, that, in reality, they are altogether dependent on our *moral* opinions, and that, not only in respect to the dispositions they signify, but even in respect to the *degree* of these dispositions. Of this very important fact, I shall offer only a few illustrations, because every one of my readers will be able to illustrate it himself.

The difference of the permanent colors of the countenance is obvious to every one: every one, however, has not observed, that the same colors have affected him with very different emotions, in different circumstances. There is a paleness of complexion which arises from grief, from sensibility, and from study. There is a similar paleness which arises from envy, from guilty fear, and from deep revenge. If the color alone were beautiful, its beauty would remain in every case; but no one will say that this is true. The beauty of the color is always dependent upon the disposition it signifies: the same color varies in its effect with the expression, of which it is the sign; and the painter, while he spreads it upon his pallet, knows that by the same mechanical means, he can either create beauty or disgust, and make us, according to the expression which it signifies, glow with moral admiration, or thrill with moral terror.

in the color of the eyes? In all such differences of color, what emotions may we still feel; and of this effect, what is remarked? In pursuing these observations, what is it still more important to observe? Of this very important fact, why does our author offer only a few illustrations? Though the difference of the permanent colors of the countenance is obvious to every one, yet what has not any one observed? How is this remark illustrated? If the color alone were beautiful, what would follow? Upon what is the beauty of the color always dependent; and how does the same color vary in its effect? Of the painter, what remark follows? To what is the opposite color of the

The opposite color of the countenance, the blooming or florid complexion, is subject to the same moral criticism. It is the sign in many cases, of joy, of hope, of enthusiasm, of virtuous indignation, and of kind and benevolent affections. In all such cases, it is, to a certain degree, beautiful. In other cases it may be the sign of pride, of anger, of intemperate passion, or of selfish arrogance. In such cases it is not only not beautiful, but positively painful. How often are we deceived in this respect, in our first speculation upon any human countenance! and how permanently do we return to interpret the sign by the qualities we find it to signify, and to feel it either beautiful or otherwise by the nature of these qualities ! The aversion which mankind have ever shown to the painting of the countenance, has thus a real foundation in nature. It is a sign, which deceives, and, what is worse, which is intended to deceive. It never can harmonize with the genuine character of the countenance; it never can vary with those unexpected incidents which give us our best insight into human character; and it never can be practised except by those who have no character but that which fashion lends them, or those who wish to affect a character different from their own. The same observation may be extended to the colors of the eye. If we had no other principles of judgment than some original law of our nature. certain colors, or degrees of coloring, would alone be perma-How little this is the case ; how much we nently beautiful. appreciate the language of the eye, on the contrary, and how strikingly its beauty is determined by the emotions or passions it signifies, I leave with confidence to my readers to verify by their own experience.

In the variable colors of the countenance, or those which arise from present or transitory feelings, the same fact is easily

countenance subject; and of what is it the sign? In all such cases what is observed of it? In other cases, of what may it be the sign; and in such cases, what is observed of it What exclanations follow, and has thus a real foundation in nature? As a sign what is observed of it? With what can it never harmonize; with what can it not vary, and by whom alone can it be practised? To what may the same observation be extended; and whay? On the contrary, what *language* is much appreciated; and what is left to the reader to verify by his own experience? In what colors is the same fact

discernible. No things, in point of coloring, are so analogous as the blush of modesty, and that of conscious guilt; yet, when we know the emotions they signify, is their effect the same? The paleness of fear is beautiful, because it is ever interesting, in the female countenance. Tell us, that it arises from some trivial or absurd cause, and it becomes immediately ridiculous. There is a color of indignation or of scorn, which may accord with the most heroic beauty; say to us, that it arises from some childish source of etiquette or precedence, and our sentiment of beauty is instantly converted into disgust. There is a softness and languor both in the light and in the motion of the eye, which we never see without deep interest, when we consider it to be expressive of general sensibility, or of occasional sorrow. Tell us, that it is affectation, that it is the manner of the ill-judging fair one who has adopted it, and instead of interest, we feel nothing but contempt. Illustrations of this kind might be easily extended to every emotion or passion of the human mind. I leave them to the prosecution of my readers; and I flatter myself they will see that such varieties in our sense of beauty could never exist, if there were any certain and definite colors in the human countenance, which alone were originally and permanently beautiful.

PART II.

OF THE FRATURES OF THE HUMAN COUNTENANCE.

There is a similar division of the features of the countenance of men, to that of its colors, in what may be called, though with some restriction, the *permanent* and the *variable*. The permanent features are such as give the individual distinc-

easily discernible? How is this illustrated? Why is the paleness of fear beautiful; but when does it become ridiculous? Of the color of scorn also what is observed? What is remarked of a softness and languor which we sometimes perceive, both in the light and in the motion of the eye; and when does it produce only contempt? How far might illustrations of this kind be easily extended? To whom does our author leave them, and of what does he flatter himself?

In what is there a similar division of the features of men, to that of its colors? Which are the permanent features? What examples are given?

tion, or form the peculiar character of the countenance in moments of tranquillity and repose. Such are the peculiar form of the head, the proportion of the face, the forms of the forehead, eyebrows, nose, cheeks, mouth, and chin, with their relation to the forms of the neck, shoulders, &c. The variable features are such forms of the permanent features, as are assumed under the influence of occasional or temporary passions; as the contracted brow of anger, the elevated eye-brow of surprise, the closed eye-lids of mirth, the open eye of astonishment, the raised lip of cheerfulness, the depressed lip of sorrow, &c. &c.

With both of these appearances, I apprehend that we have distinct and powerful associations; or in other words, that they are expressive to us, either directly or indirectly, of qualities of mind capable of producing emotion.

1. Such forms in the countenance, have expression simply as forms, and are beautiful upon the same principles, as I have endeavored to illustrate. Independent of all direct expression, small, smooth, and well-outlined features, are expressive of delicacy or fineness; harsh and prominent features, with a coarse and imperfect outline, of imperfection, roughness, and coarseness. The union of the features, perhaps the most important of all physical observations, admits in the same manner, either of a flowing and undulating outline, or of harsh and angular conjunction. The first is ever expressive of ease, freedom, and of fineness, the second of stillness, of constraint, and of imperfection. These indirect expressions prevail, not indeed over the more direct expressions which intimacy or knowledge gives : but that they govern us in some degree with regard to those who are strangers to us; that we are disposed . to attribute to the character of those who are unknown to us, the character which their physical features exhibit; and that

Which are the variable features; and of them what are examples? With both of these we have what, or of what are they expressive? As what have such forms expression, and upon what principle are they beautiful? Independent of all direct expression, what are expressive of delicacy or fineness; and what of imperfection, roughness, and coarseness? Of what does the union of features, in the same manner, admit? Of what are they respectively expressive? Where do they not, and where do these indirect ex-

even with regard to those we love most, we are sometimes apt to lament that the form of their features is so little expressive of their character, are facts which every one knows, and which need not be illustrated.

2. Such forms of features are, in general, directly expressive of particular characters or dispositions of mind. That certain appearances or conformations of the features of the human countenance, are significant of certain qualities or distinctions of mind, is a fact which every child knows, even in its nurse's arms, and which, whether it arises from any original instinct, or from experience, is yet sufficient to establish a natural language, long before any artificial language is formed or under-There are probably three sources from which these stood. associations arise-lst. The expression of physical form, which I have just stated : 2dly, Experience of the uniform connexion of such appearances with certain characters or dispositions of the human mind; a fact of which no evidence can be greater than that of the distinction which the infant makes between the countenance of children, of women, and of men: and 3dly. The observation of the influence which habitual passions have upon the permanent conformation of the features, and the consequent belief that the sign indicates the disposition usually signified.

Of the variable features it is unnecessary to enter into any explanation. That the human countenance possesses a degree of expression in this respect, beyond every other animated being; that, in its genuine state, it is the mirror of whatever passes in the mind; and that all that is great or lovely in human character may there be read, even by the material eye, are truths which every one knows, and upon which the painter, the sculptor, and the poet, have formed the most exquisite productions of their arts. I cannot therefore fatigue my readers with any enumeration of effects which all have known, and all must have felt.

pressions prevail? Of what are such forms of feature, in general, directly expressive? What does every child, even in its nurse's arms, know; and of it what is remarked? From what three sources do these associations arise? Of what features is it unnecessary to enter into any explanation? What are truths which every one knows; and upon them, what have the painter, the That the beauty or sublimity of the forms which occur in the features of the human countenance arises from such expressions alone, and not from any original beauty in such forms themselves, may perhaps be evident from the following illustrations—

1. If there were any original beauty in peculiar forms of this kind, altogether independent of the expressions of mind we associate with them, it would necessarily follow, that the *same* forms of features would be permanently beautiful, and that every form that deviated from this original and prescribed form would, in the same degree, deviate from the form of beauty.

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The slightest experience is, I apprehend, sufficient to show the fallacy of this opinion. It is impossible to conceive a greater difference to take place in the same being, in the form and construction and proportion of features, than that which uniformly takes place in the progress of man from infancy to old age. In this progress there is not a single feature which is not changed in form, in size, or in proportion to the rest: yet in all these, we not only discover beauty, but what is more important, we discover it, at different ages, in forms different, if not opposite, from those in which we had discovered it before. The round cheek, the tumid lip, the unmarked eyebrow, &c. which are all so beautiful in infancy, yield to the muscular cheek, the firm and contracted lip, the dark and prominent eyebrow, and all the opposite forms which create the beauty of manhood. It is again the want of all this muscular power, and the new change of all the forms which it induces-the collapsed cheek, the trembling lip, the gray eyebrow, &c. which constitute the beauty of age. The poet and the painter know it; but were they, from any visionary theory, to alter these signatures of expression; were they to give to manhood the features of infancy, however beautiful, or to age those of manhood, however eloquently commented upon, is there any one who for

poet, and the sculptor, formed ? What remark follows? What may, perhaps be evident from the following illustrations ? If there were any original beauty in peculiar forms of this kind, what would necessarily follow? What is sufficient to show the fallacy of this opinion? How is this remark fully illustrated, in the progress of man from infancy to old age? Under what circumstances, could no one look upon the productions of the poet and the a moment could look upon their representations? It is needless for me to say, that the same observation extends equally to the features that are characteristic of sex; that the form or proportion of the same features is very different in the different sexes; that even in that sex where alone they are the general objects of emotion, these forms vary with the progress of time; and that, in general, no forms of features are beautiful, but those which accord with the character we expect in the age or period of the person we contemplate.

With regard to the variable leatures, the proposition I have stated is yet more generally observable. If there is any peculiar form of any feature which is permanently beautiful, let the inquirer state it to himself, and then let him examine the countenances of actual nature, or the representations of the painter by this standard. He will find, if I mistake not, not only that this peculiar form has no permanency of beauty, but, on the contrary, that it is often the reverse: that there is some other law that governs his opinion upon the subject; and that the most different conformations of the same features are beautiful, or otherwise, according to the emotions they signify. If the smooth and open brow of youth and gaiety is instinctively beautiful, the dark and wrinkled brow of indignation, or passion, ought to be positively displeasing : yet the experience of nature, and of the representation of the imitative arts, will show us how false would be the conclusion. If the elevated evebrow of hope or mirth is beautiful, how shall we account for the still more powerful beauty of the contracted, and even convulsed eyebrow of fear, of horror, or of guilt? The form of the Grecian nose is said to be originally beautiful : and in many cases, and in the manner in which the artists of antiquity employed it. it is undoubtedly beautiful, because it is the conformation of that feature which best expresses the character they wished to

painter? What observation is it needless for our author to make? With regard to what features, is the proposition stated, yet more observable? What remark follows; and by doing this, what will the inquirer find? If the smooth and open brow of youth and gaiety, is instinctively beautiful, what should follow; yet what will the experience of nature; &c. show us? If the elevated eyebrow of hope or mirth is beautiful, for what shall we find a difficulty to account? Of the form of the Grecian nose, what is observed; and

represent. Apply, however, this beautiful form to the countenance of the warrior, the bandit, the martyr, &c., or to any countenance which is meant to express deep or powerful passion, and the most vulgar spectator would be sensible of dissatisfaction, if not of disgust. Is the mouth of youth, of hope, of rapture, beautiful? No contrast of the same feature can be so great as that of the same mouth, under the influence of grief, of age, or of melancholy. And yet the painter is able to render these conformations beautiful, and they who have lived but a little in the world, have known, that they are in fact more beautiful, than all that the same feature can receive from hope. or youth, or joy. It would be unpardonable to extend these illustrations to a greater length: it is enough to lead my readers to observe for themselves, and to attend to the general truth, that, if there were any forms of features originally and permanently beautiful, these, and these only, could be beautiful in all situations : and that every form that deviated from this prescribed and central form, would necessarily be the object, either of disgust or disappointment.

2. It is very easy to see, in the 2d place, that the most different forms of feature are actually beautiful; and that their beauty uniformly arises from the expressions of which they are significant. The open forehead is expressive of candor and generosity, and suits a countenance which has that expression. The low forehead, on the contrary, is expressive of thought, of gloom, or melancholy: it becomes, therefore, a different expression of countenance. The full and blooming cheek suits the countenance of youth, and mirth, and female loveliness: the sunk and faded cheek, the face of sensibility, of grief, or of penitence. The raised lip, the elevated eyebrow, the rapid motion of the eye, are all the concomitants of joyous beauty. The reverse of all these, the depressed lip, the contracted eyebrow, the slow and languid motion of the eye, are the circum-

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by what application of it, will its beauty be destroyed? What is remarked of the mouth of youth, of hope, and of rapture; yet what is the painter able to do; and what have those known, who have lived but little in the world? Why would it be unpardonable to extend these illustrations to a greater length? In the second place, what is it very easy to see? How is this illustrated, from the forehead, the blooming wheek, &c.? Where do we expect

stances which we expect and require in the countenances of sorrow or of sensibility. Change any of these conformations; give to the open and candid countenance the low forehead: to the face of grief, the fresh and bloomig cheek of joy; to the mourner the raised hp, or the elevated eyebrow, which are expressive of cheerful or joyous passions; and the picture becomes a monster, from which even then the most vulgar taste would fly, as from something unnatural and disgusting. If there were any real or original beauty in such conformations, nothing of this kind could happen; and however discordant our emotions of beauty and sentiment might be, we should still feel these conformations beautiful, just as we perceive, under all circumstances, colors to be permanently colors, or forms to be forms.

3. The slight illustrations which I have now offered seem to me sufficient to convince those who will prosecute them, that there is no original beauty in any peculiar or distinct forms of the human features. There is another illustration which perhaps may still more strongly show the real origin of such beauty to consist in the expressions of which they are significant, viz. That the same form of feature is beautiful or not, in proportion as it is expressive or not of qualities of mind which are amiable or interesting.

With regard to the permanent features, every one must have remarked, that the same form of feature which is beautiful in the one sex is not beautiful in the other: that as we expect a different expression, there are different signs by which we expect it to be signified; and that consequently the same signs are productive of very different emotions, when they are thus significant, improper, or of unamiable expressions. They who are cconversant in the production of the fine arts, must have equally observed, that the forms and proportions of features,

and require the reverse of all these? How may the picture be rendered a monster, from which even the most vulgar taste would fly? Under what circumstances could nothing of this kind happen; and what remark follows? For what are the slight illustrations, now offered, sufficient? What may be shown by another illustration; and what is it? With regard to the permanent features, what must every one have remarked? What must they, who are conversant in the productions of the fine arts, have equally observed?

which the sculptor and the painter have given to their works, are very different, according to the nature of the character they represent, and the emotion they wish to excite. The form or proportions of the features of Jove are different from those of Hercules, those of Apollo from those of Ganymede, those of the fawn from those of the gladiator. In female beauty, the form and proportions in the features of Juno are very different from those of Venus, those of Minerva from those of Diana, those of Niobe from those of the Graces. All, however, are beautiful, because all are adapted, with exquisite taste, to the characters they wish the countenance to express. Let the theorist change them, and substitute for this varied and significant beauty, the forms which he chooses to consider solely beautiful, and the experiment will very soon show, that the beauty of these forms is not original and independent, but relative and significant; and that when they cease to be expressive ef the character we expect, they cease, in the same moment, to be beautiful.

The illustration, however, may be made still more precise; for even, in the same countenance, and in the same hour, the same form of feature may be beautiful or otherwise. Although there is an obvious distinction between the permanence of some features of the countenance, it is at the same time true, that even the permanent features are susceptible of some change of form; that they vary with the employment of the muscles which move them; and that, therefore, their permanence is rather relatively than positively true. The forehead changes in its form and dimensions, with various passions. The line of the nose is varied by the elevation or depression of the muscles of the eyebrow; and its whole form is still more altered by the contraction or expansion of the nostrils. The cheeks sink or swell, as they are influenced by different emotions; and no one need to be told that the mouth is so susceptible of variety

How is this illustrated? Why are all, however, beautiful? Should the theorist change them, what would the experiment soon show? Why may the illustration be made still more precise? Although there is an obvious distinction between the permanence of some of the features of the countenance, yet, what is, at the same time, true? How is this remark illustrated; and of

of form, that from that feature alone, every one is able to interpret the emotion of the person: the same observation is applicable to the rest of the features. If there were, therefore, any original form in all these features which was instinc. tively beautiful, it would follow, that in all these changes, there was one only that was beautiful, and that all the rest would. according to their variations, be, so far, deviations from beauty. The real fact however is, that every one of these varieties are beautiful, when they are expressive of emotions of which we approve, and in which we sympathize; that none is beautiful when it has not this expression; that any feature unsusceptible of these changes, would be felt as imperfect or monstrous; and that the degree of change or variation, which is beautiful or otherwise, is always determined by its correspondence to our sentiment of the propriety or impropriety of the emotion which it signifies. The reader will find innumerable illustrations of this truth, both in his observation of common nature, and of the representations of the painter and the sculptor.

With regard to the *variable* features, those which are expressive of momentary or local emotion, that the beauty of their forms does not arise from their approach to any one standard, but from the nature of the expressions they signify, is a truth which may be easily observed in the study, even of the same countenance. Nothing can be more different in point of form, than what occurs in the same face, in the muscles of the eyebrow, in the close or open conformation of the eyelids, in the contraction or dilatation of the nostrils, in the elevation or depression of the lips, in the smoothness or swelling of the muscles of the throat and neck : yet all of these are beautiful, or at least susceptible of beauty. It may have been our fortune to see all these variations of form take place in the same countenance, within the space of a few hours. And if we recollect

the mouth, what need no one be told? As the same observation is applicable to the rest of the features, what follows? What, however, is the real fact on the subject? Where will the reader find innumerable illustrations of this truth? With regard to the variable features, what may be easily observed in the study, even of the same countenance? What illustration follows? Where may it have been our fortune to see all these variations of form take place? If we recollect our sentiments, what shall we find? If

SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY

our sentiments, we shall find that all of them were not only beautiful, when they were the genuine signs of emotions with which we sympathized, but what is more, that they were the only forms which, in such circumstances, could have been beautiful : that their variety corresponded to the variety of emotions which the mind experienced; and that any other conformations of feature, however beautiful in other circumstances, would then have been painful or distressing. If any of my readers have not felt this in their own experience, let them attend, while it is yet in their power, to the countenance of Mrs. Siddons, in the progress of any of her great parts in tragedy. Let them observe how the forms and proportions of every feature vary with the passions which they so faithfully express-let them mark almost every variety of form, of which the human countenance is capable, to take place in the space of a few short hours -let them then ask themselves what is the common source of this infinite beauty; and although, in this examination, they will still have but a feeble sense of the excellencies of this illustrious actress, they will be sensible, that there is no original or prescribed form of feature which alone is beautiful, but that every conformation is beautiful when it is expressive of the emotions we expect and approve.

PART III.

OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE COLORS AND FEATURES IN THE HUMAN COUNTENANCE.

The illustrations which I have given in the two former sections, relate to the beauty of the colors or features of the countenance, as single or individual objects of observation. It is very obvious, however, that all these are only parts of *a whole*: that some relation, at least, exists between those parts of the

328

any reader has not felt this in his own experience, to what should he attend ? What should he observe; what mark, and what should he then ask himself? In this examination what will he still have, yet of what will he be sensible?

To what do the illustrations given in the two former sections relate? What, however, is obvious? What will afford an additional proof of the real nature

countenance, and the countenance itself; and that there is some harmony or accordance which we expect and demand in the composition of these ingredients, before we feel that the whole is beautiful. The investigation of the principles which govern us in our sentiment of composition will, I trust, afford an additional proof of the real nature and origin of human beauty.

If there were any original and independent beauty in any peculiar colors or forms, it would necessarily follow, that the union of these beautiful forms and colors would compose a countenance of beauty, and that every deviation, in composition, from these original principles of beauty would, in proportion to this deviation, affect us with sentiments, either of indifference or disgust. If such were the constitution of our nature, the painter and the sculptor would possess a simple and determinate rule for the creation of beauty; the beautiful forms and colors of the human countenance would be as definite as the proportions of architecture; and the production of beauty might be as certainly attained by the artist, as arithmetical truth is by the arithmetician. That this is not the case-that the beauty of the human countenance is not governed by such definite rules; and that there are some other qualities necessary for the painter and the sculptor, besides the mere observation of physical appearances, are truths with which every one is acquainted, and which, therefore, it is unnecessary to attempt to illustrate.

If, on the other hand, the principles which I have before attempted to illustrate are just, if the beauty of every individual color or form in the countenance is determined by its expression of some pleasing or interesting quality, then it should follow, as in all other cases of composition, that the expression of the whole ought to regulate the beauty of the parts—that the actual beauty of these parts, or ingredients, ought to depend upon their relation to the general character; and that the composition, therefore, should only be beautiful, when this relation

42

and origin of human beauty? If there were any original and independent beauty in any peculiar colors or forms, what would necessarily follow? If such were the constitution of our nature, what would be the consequence? What, on the contrary, are truths with which every one is acquainted? If, on

of expression was justly preserved, and when no color or feature was admitted, but what tended to the production of one harmonious and unmingled emotion.

That this is really the case—that our opinion of the beauty of the human countenance is determined by this law; and that, in every particular case, our sense of the beauty of the constituent parts is decided by their relation to the prevailing character or expression of the countenance, may, perhaps, be obvious from the following considerations—

I. I formerly endeavored to show, that in the case of physical forms, no form was, in reality, beautiful, which was not the sign of some pleasing or interesting expression, or which, in other words, was not productive of some emotion. It is natural to think, that the same law should be preserved in the forms, &c., of the human countenance; and it is still more natural to think so, when we consider, that the expressions of the countenance are direct expressions of mind. That the beauty, therefore, of every countenance, arises from its expression of some pleasing or interesting quality, in which our imagination loves to indulge; and that no countenance is ever felt to be beautiful where such indirect or direct expressions are not found, is a proposition which I trust the readers of the previous illustrations will both expect and demand. The truth of it may, perhaps, be made clear by the following illustrations-

1. I would appeal, in the first place, to common experience. If the real beauty of the human countenance arises from the union of certain forms and colors that are originally beautiful, then every man ought to feel the sentiment of beauty in those cases alone, where those certain appearances were united. Of

the other hand, the principles which our author has attempted to illustrate, are just, then what should follow? What may, perhaps, be obvious from the following considerations? What did our author formerly endeavor to show; and what is it natural ³to think? What proposition, therefore, will the readers of the previous illustrations both expect and demand? In the first place, to what does our author appeal? If the real beauty of the human countenance, arises from the union of certain forms and colors, that are originally beautiful, then what ought every man to feel? Of the truth of the truth of this proposition every man is a judge. I will presume, on the contrary, to say, that there is no man who has ever felt the sentiment of beauty, who will not acknowledge that he has felt it in the most various and even opposite conformations of features; that he has felt, that instead of being governed by any physical law of form or color, it has been governed by the individual circumstances of the countenance; that whenever it has been felt, it has been felt to be significant of some pleasing or interesting disposition of mind; that the union of every feature and color has been experienced as beautiful, when it was felt to be expressive of amiable or interesting sentiment; and that, in fact, the only limit to the beauty of the human countenance, is the limit which separates vice from virtue—which separates the dispositions or affections we approve, from those which we disapprove or despise.

If this evidence should be insufficient, there is a yet stronger one, which arises from the usual language of mankind. We hear, every day, the admiration of beauty :- Ask, then, the enthusiast to explain to you, in what this beauty consists. Did he feel that it were in any certain conformation of features, or any precise tone of coloring that beauty consists, he would tell you minutely the forms and proportions and colors of this admired countenance; and were this the law of your nature, you could feel it only by this physical description. But is it thus, in fact, that the communication is made? Is it not, on the contrary, by stating the expression which this countenance conveys to him? Are not the forms and magnitude of the features, and the tone and degree of coloring, all made subservient in his description, to the character of mind he wishes to convey to you? And do you not feel, at the same time, that if he succeeds in persuading you of the lovely or interesting expression of the countenance, you take for granted, at once, that whatever may be the form of the features, or the nature of the coloring, the countenance, itself, has that simplicity and strength

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this proposition, what is remarked? What does our author on the contrary presume to say? If this evidence should be insufficient, whence arises a stronger one? The admiration of what do we daily hear? Should we ask the enthusiast to explain in what this beauty consists, what would he tell us? Repeat the following interrogations. Only upon what principle is all this in-

of expression which justifies the admiration of the person who describes it? All this, however, which may happen every day, is utterly inexplicable upon any other principle, than the foundation of beauty in expression; and the language itself would be unintelligible, if it arose only from some definite form of features, or definite appearance of color.

The observation may be extended to the usual and habitual language of the world. There is no one who must not have observed, that the description of human beauty in common life, is always by terms significant of its expression. When we say that a countenance is noble, or magnanimous, or heroic, or gentle, or feeling, or melancholy, we convey at once to every hearer, a belief of some degree of sublimity or beauty ; but no one ever asks us to describe the form of the features which compose it. When we differ, in the same manner, with regard to individual beauty, we do not support ourselves by any physical investigation of features. It is the character of the countenance in which we disagree: and when we feel that this character is either unmeaning, or expressive of unpleasing dispositions, no conformation of features, and no splendor of colors. will ever render it beautiful. How much this is the case in society-how much the opinion of beauty is dependent upon the character of the mind which observes it-how profusely the good find beauty in every class of mankind around themhow much, on the contrary, the habits of vice tend to obliterate all the genuine beauty of nature to the vicious, must, to every man of common thought, have been the subject both of pleas. ing and of melancholy observation.

It is observable, in the same manner, that the most beautiful countenance is not permanently and uniformly beautiful, as it necessarily would be, if this beauty arose from any original law of our nature; but that its beauty is always dependent upon the nature of the temporary dispositions or qualities of mind

explicable; and under what circumstances would the language itself be unintelligible? To what may the observation be extended; and what must every one have observed? When we say that a countenance is noble, &c., what belief do we convey; but what does no one ever ask us to do? When we, in the same manner differ, what is observed? In what is it that we agree; and

which it signifies. Every man who has had the good fortune to live in the society of beautiful women, must often have observed, that there were many days of his life, and many hours in every day, when he was altogether insensible to their beauty. The little unmeaning and uninteresting details of domestic life, the usual cares and concerns of female duty; sometimes, perhaps, the irritations and disturbances of domestic economy, produce expressions which are neither interesting nor affecting; and, while they produce these, the beauty of the countenance, however latently great, is unfelt and unobserved. Whenever the countenance assumes the expression of any amiable or interesting emotion, the beauty of it immediately returns.

While there is scarcely any countenance that thus remains beautiful under the expression of vulgar or uninteresting emotions, and none which can preserve it under the dominion of vicious or improper dispositions, it may, at the same time, be observed, that there are very few countenances which are not raised into beauty, by the influence of anniable or lofty expression. They, who have had the happiness to witness the effects of sudden joy or unlooked for hope in the countenances, even of the lowest of the people; who have attended to the influence of sorrow, or sympathy, in the expression of faces unknown to affectation-they, still more, who have ever looked steadily upon the bed of sickness or of death, and have seen the influences of submission and of resignation upon every feature of the suffering or expiring countenance, can, I am persuaded, well tell, that there is scarcely any form of features which such interesting and lofty expressions cannot, and do not, exalt into beauty. It is on the same account that the young who live

when will nothing ever render it beautiful? What must, to every man of common thought, have been the subject, both of pleasing and of mclancholy observation? What is, in the same manner, observable? What must every man have often observed, who has had the good fortune to live in the society of beautiful women? What produce expressions which are neither interesting nor affecting; and what follows? When does the beauty of it immediately return? While there is scarcely any countenance that thus remains beautiful under the expression of vulgar or uninteresting emotions, what may, at the same time be observed? Who can well tell that there is scarcely any form of features, which interesting and lofty expressions cannot exalt into beauty? On the same account, how are the young, who live familiarly familiarly together, are so seldom sensible to each other's beauty. The countenance, however beautiful, must often appear to them with very unmeaning and uninteresting expressions : the quiet detail of domestic life gives birth to no strong emotions in the countenances of either; they meet without animation, and they separate without tenderness: the habits of simple friendship call forth no transports of passion, and they go abroad into less known societies, to look for those agitations of hope or fear which they do not experience at home. To lovers, on the contrary, and for the same reason, every look and every feature is beautiful, because they are expressive to them of the most delightful emotions which their age can feel; because the countenance is then animated with expressions the most amiable and genuine which it ever can display, and still more, perhaps, because they are the signs of those imaginary scenes of future happiness, in the promise of which youth and love are so happily profuse.

It is the same principle which is the obvious cause of the infrequency of beauty among the lower orders. Something of this is undoubtedly to be ascribed to the influences of climate, and of weather, and to the negligence of those arts, by which, in the higher ranks of life, the physical beauty, at least of feature and of complexion, is so assiduously preserved. But the principal cause of it is in the character of mind, which such situations too naturally create. They who live for subsistence cannot live for beauty. The occupations in which they are engaged, the modes of life to which they are doomed, are little consistent with any amiable or interesting emotions; and their countenances, therefore, however latently beautiful, express nothing but low care or painful occupation. In their usual hours. therefore, their beauty is scarcely more than that of youth and health; and we observe it with satisfaction rather than pleasure. Let us follow them, however, from these vulgar and degrading

together, affected; and why is this the case? To lovers, on the contrary, why is every look and every feature beautiful? Of what is the same principle obviously the cause? To what is something of this undoubtedly to be ascribed; but in what is the principle cause of it? Why cannot they who live for subsistence live for beauty? What, therefore, in their usual hours is their only beauty; and how do we observe it? By following them where, shall

occupations, into the scenes of their gaiety and enjoymentlet us follow them into scenes of distress or sympathy, when finer emotions are excited, or when their countenances waken into correspondent expression, and we shall be astonished to find, that amid the most common features, beauty arises, and amid the most common forms grace is to be found. In every country of Europe, I believe, in the same manner, the traveller has felt that the greatest beauty exists among women of the highest rank, or in those who live in affluence and independence: and it ought to be so. They who live not for subsistence, but for society; who, from their earliest days are unbroken by labor, or by care; who, still more, exist for their hour only in the search of admiration, are under the necessity of gaining it by every flattery to the feelings of others, by assuming virtues if they possess them not, and by counterfeiting, for the time, at least, every disposition of mind and every expression of countenance which renders society amiable, or woman lovely.

Observations of this kind may be extended to almost every scene of our intercourse with mankind. I presume only to add the following, which perhaps every one of my readers can verify by his own experience.

Were the beauty of the human countenance dependent altogether upon certain forms, or colors, it would be very difficult to account for those different beauties of age or sex, in which all men and all ages have agreed. If we consider them as arising from the expression of those qualities or dispositions which we expect and love in sex and in age, we shall find no difficulty in reconciling the facts with the theory. In men and in women, every countenance is, to a certain degree, beautiful, which is expressive of interesting or amiable dispositions; and from the cradle to the grave, every conformation of the human countenance is, in some measure beautiful, which is significant

we find beauty to arise amid the most common features? In every country of Europe, in the same manner, what has the traveller felt? Why ought it to be so? How far may observations of this kind be extended; and how may the following be verified? If the beauty of the human countenance were dependent altogether upon certain forms, or colors, to account for what would be a difficult task? By considering them in what light, shall we find

of the qualities or character of mind, which we think that age ought to display.

There is, however, a difference in this respect, and it is obviously with very different sentiments that we regard male and female beauty. The one we regard with love and admiration, the other scarcely with more than satisfaction; of these different sentiments the account is simple. The forms of the male countenance in manhood, are not, in general, expressive of very amiable qualities, nor do we expect them to be. It is spirit, thought, and resolution, which we look for as the predominant expressions of that age; but none of these are expressions extremely interesting, and all of them may be painful or exaggerated. The dispositions of mind, on the contrary, that we look for in the female countenance, are modesty, humility, timidity, sensibility, and kindness. These are dispositions which we never observe without deep emotion. They are not only delightful in themselves, but they are such as we expect in that sex; and there is no expression of them which does not affect us, both with the tenderness of love and with the sentiment of propriety. But while this is the case with the countenance of manhood, it is not the same, as every one has observed, with other periods of male existence. Infancy is equally beautiful in the one sex as in the other, and the early youth of man, before it is corrupted by the business of the world, is not unfrequently susceptible of as great a degree of beauty as is, perhaps, ever to be found in human conformation. In old age again, the male countenance re-assumes, as it were, its beauty, because the character it expresses, the disposition which it displays, and still more, the melancholy contrast which we draw between its maturity and its decline, affect us with emotions of a far more profound and exquisite kind, than we ever experienced in the noon-day of its strength.

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336

no difficulty in reconciling the facts with the theory; and for what reason? What difference is there in this respect; and what is obviously the case? How do we respectively regard them? In the form of the male countenance for what expressions do we look, and what is observed of them? For what dispositions of mind do we look in the female countenance; and of these what is remarked? But while this is the case with regard to the countenance of manhood, with what is it not the same? How is this remark illus-

I forbear to add to those illustrations, and I have stated them with all the brevity in my power, because I wish my readers to observe for themselves, and because I am convinced, that they who will exert this attention, will soon be satisfied of the truth of the proposition.

2. While the beauty of every countenance seems thus fundamentally to arise from the expression of some pleasing or interesting quality, I would observe, in the second place, that the composition of the countenance is dependent upon the preservation of the unity of this expression, and that our sense of the beauty of the individual colors or features, is always determined by the preservation of this relation.

There are, properly, three distinct species of beauty of which the human countenance is capable. 1st. Physical beauty, or that of forms or colors, considered simply as colors or forms, and independent of any direct expression of character or emotion: 2dly. The beauty of character, or the expression of some permanent and distinctive disposition of amiableness or interest: and, 3dly. The beauty of emotion, or the expression of some temporary or immediate feeling which we love or approve. In each of these distinct cases, I apprehend our common experience will justify us in concluding, that the beauty of the countenance depends upon the preservation of the unity of expression; and that our opinion of the beauty of the separate colors or features, is uniformly governed by their relation to this end.

1. There are many countenances which are beautiful only as physical objects, which signify no character of mind, and of which we judge precisely in the same manner that we do of inanimate forms or colors. They are significant of strength or delicacy, of coarsenesss or fineness, of health or indisposition, of youth or of age, &c.; but they are significant of nothing more. Of countenances of this kind, whatever be their character, our sense of the beauty of every separate feature is uniformly de-

trated from the state of infancy, and of old age? Why has our author stated these illustrations with brevity? What is, in the second place observed? What three distinct species of beauty are there of which the human countenance is capable? In each of these cases, in what conclusion will our common experience justify us? There are many countenances of which what is observed; and of what are they significant? Of countenances of

SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY

termined by its relation to this general character, and the countenance is only wholly beautiful when this relation is preserved. Our judgments of this kind are so common and so rapid, that we very seldom examine upon what they are founded ; but a very few illustrations will be sufficient to satisfy any one that they ultimately rest upon this unity of expression. Features, small in form, and fine in outline, with a complexion clear and pale, are generally expressive of delicacy, gentleness, fineness, &c. To such a countenance, give the addition of a Roman nose, or tumid lips, or thick and heavy eyebrows, &c., and every one feels that the beauty of the countenance is destroyed. We see that there is inconsistence in the arrangement: we lament it; and we employ ourselves in imagining the form of feature that is wanted, and which would render the whole complete. To a countenance of manliness and vigor, in which the general form of the colors and features bears a relation to the general character, add one feature of infant or of feminine beauty-a Grecian nose, a small mouth, the round cheek, or the small and regular teeth of infancy; and the countenance is not only hurt, but becomes ludicrous; and yet the destructive feature is, in other cases, singularly beautiful. There is beauty in the smooth complex. ion of youth, and in the wrinkled and furrowed complexion of age-in the paleness of the delicate form, and in the high bloom of health and enjoyment-in the open front of honor and vigor, and the close and contracted brow of thought and deep reflection, &c. &c. Yet let them be fortuitously mingled, or let the painter attempt to use them as elementary principles of beauty. and every one will feel that their beauty depends upon relation, and that this relation is that of their correspondence to the general expression of the countenance. It would be absurd to multiply illustrations upon a subject which every one expresses

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this kind, by what is our sense of the beauty of every separate feature uniformly determined? Of our judgments of this kind what is remarked; but for what will a very few illustrations be sufficient? What features are generally expressive of delicacy, gentleness, &c.; and by what addition will the beauty of such a countenance be destroyed? Why is this the case? What farther illustration of the same principle follows? In what is there beauty; yet what remark follows? To multiply what illustrations would it be ab-

almost every day of his life, in the language he uses with regard to human beauty.

2. The truth of the proposition is still more apparent in relation to the second species of beauty, or that of character. Wherever, in actual life, we are conscious, in any great degree, of the influence of beauty, we shall always find that it is in the general or characteristic expression of the countenance -that the language by which we describe it to others, or by which we attempt to explain it to ourselves, is always by terms significant of this expression-that the expressions which are not interesting are never the foundation of beauty to us, however much they may be to others-that the degree of beauty we perceive is uniformly correspondent to the degree of this expression which we love or approve; and that this beauty is in fact either felt or unfelt, precisely as the state of our own minds induces us, either to sympathize or not with the disposition of mind which the countenance displays. These are truths of which, I apprehend, every one who has ever attended to the history of his own feelings must immediately be conscious. If it were possible, however, to doubt, that the beauty of color or feature in any countenance arises from their correspondence and subservience to the general character of the expression, the following hints may, perhaps, be sufficient to satisfy it-

1st. When we find fault with any feature or color in a characteristic or expressive countenance, what is the reason of our objection, and the principle upon which we defend it in convesation? 2dly. When we meet with this want of correspondence, in any beeutiful countenance, do we attribute it to the absence of some positively beautiful form or color, or to the want of harmony with the general tone and character of the countenance? 3dly. Are not the most different forms and colors of the countenance beautiful, when they are felt to be the signs of just and interesting expressions; and is any form or color, however beautiful, in one circumstance, capable of being transferred to others, without affecting

surd? In relation to what is the truth of the proposition still more apparent? Wherever, in actual life, we are conscious, in any great degree, of the influence of beauty, what shall we always find to be the case? These are truths of which who must be conscious; but what remark follows? What is the first of these hints ?--the second ?--the third ?---the fourth ?---and the

us with emotions very different from beauty? 4thly. When we picture to ourselves some countenance of unmingled beauty, does the operation of our fancy consist in bringing together single and individual colors or features which we have seen in individual cases to be beautiful? or does it consist in composing them into one imaginary whole, in which every feature and color unites in the signification of one lovely or interesting expression, and in which we see the character we love, unmingled and unallayed by the usual discordance of vulgar features? 5thly. When the statuary, or the painter, has executed any of those great works which command the admiration of ages, is it by uniting together features or colors of individual beauty, or is it by seizing, as by inspiration, the character they wish to represent, by throwing off all the incumbrances of vulgar nature, and by bringing out the general and ideal correspondence of every line and color to the character he portrays, and thus leaving, upon the mind of the spectator, that pure and unmingled emotion which he is never destined to feel in real life? To these queries, every one is able to answer; and I flatter myself the answer to them will be sufficient to convince any candid mind, that the real beauty of the features of the countenance is ultimately determined by their relation to the general expression ; that many which are beautiful in one case are not beautiful in others; and that their real beauty consists in their correspondence to that unity of character which we ever expect and demand in this higher species of beauty.

3. The same mode of reasoning may easily be extended to the third species of beauty, or that which arises from temporary or accidental emotion. The great object of the painter, of modern timee at least, has been to represent the countenance under the dominion of such strong or sudden emotions: the beauty which is generally admired upon the stage, is that which is represented in scenes of deep interest or effect; and every one must have perceived, in common life, that in such moments,

fifth? As every one is able to answer to these queries, to effect what, does our author flatter himself, the answer to them will be sufficient? To what may the same mode of reasoning easily be extended? What has been the great object of the painter of modern times; what is the beauty which is generally admired upon the stage, and what must every one have perceived?

the influence of beauty has been felt in a very different degree from what it is in the tranquil scenes of ordinary life.

Every one, perhaps, has formed to himself some general conception of the beauty of the human countenance, under the influence of innocence, gaiety, hope, joy, rapture; or under the dominion of sensibility, melancholy, grief, or terror, &c. If he attends to the nature of this operation of fancy, he will find that the principle which governs this ideal composition is unity of expression; that he admits into this sketch no feature or color which does not correspond with the character which interests him; and that he is, at last, only satisfied when he has formed the conception of one uniform and harmonious whole. If we look to our actual experience, we shall find, in the same manner, that the same obstacles occur as in the case of character. istic beauty which I have just mentioned-that few countenances possess this opulence of expression-that some unmeaning feature either checks, or some contradictory feature destroys, the unity of the expression; and that, when we wish to feel it in reflection, we are under the necessity of throwing out the discordant feature, and composing a new and more harmonious combination.

Of the many circumstances of common observation which are evidences of this truth, I limit myself to the mention of a very few.

Whenever the countenance has any distinguished character, it is seldom susceptible of beauty, when under the dominion of opposite or unanalogous emotions. In countenances of deep melancholy, laughter is painful : in those of extreme gaiety, melancholy is not less so. Dignified features are disgraced by mirth, and mirthful features made ridiculous by the assumption of dignity. Nothing is more distressing than for the manly countenance to affect the look of softness or effeminacy; and

Under the influence of what has every one formed to himself some general conception of the beauty of the numan countenance? If he attends to the nature of this operation of fancy, what will he find? What shall we find, if we, in the same manner, look to our own actual experience? Of the many circumstances, &c., to what does our author limit himself? Whenever the countenance has any distinguished character, when is it seldom susceptible of beauty? How is this remark illustrated? As such observations

SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY

nothing more absurd than for the effiminate countenance to affect the expression of manliness. Such observations are in the power of every one; and I believe it will be universally found, that whenever the countenance possesses any characteristic species of beauty, no emotion is ever beautiful in it, but those that accord with this predominant expression.

It is on the same account that our experience of the different dispositions that become the different ages of 1 fe, govern, in so great a degree, our opinion of the beauty of the countenance in those different ages. We expect mirth and joy in infancy ; firmness and vigor in manhood; gravity and serenity in old age. Nothing is more painful than the confusion or alteration of these expressions. Gravity in youthful features, or the heedless mirth of infancy in the features of maturity, or the passionate joy of youth in the features of old age, are expressions which we never observe without censure or disgust, and which, however beautiful in other cases, are, in these, painful and revolting. It is hence, too, very obviously, that there arises a certain propriety or decency which we expect in men of different professions; and that the expressions of countenance which we feel to be beautiful or appropriate in one character. we feel to be very different in others. 'The fearless and gallant look which we love in the sailor and the soldier, we should disapprove in the countenance of a judge, and still more, in that of a minister of religion. The gravity and sober thought which we expect in the looks of these, we should also disapprove in the courtier or the man of the world. We expect a different expression in the countenance of the great merchant and the little shopkeeper-in the landlord and the farmer-in the teacher of science, and in the disciple. Each of these may be appropriate, and so far beautiful; but we feel them only to be beautiful in their proper cases, or when they correspond to that general character of expression which we expect in such cases. I forbear to allude to the expressions of the female counte-

are in the power of every one, what will be universally found to be the case? What opinions are formed on the same account? How is this illustrated? What, also, hence, very obviously arises? How is this remark, also, illustrated? Of each of these what is observed; and when only do we feel them to be beautiful? To what does our author forbear to allude; and why? What

3. The illustrations which I have offered of the truth of the general proposition, "That the beauty of colors or features in "the human countenance, is estimated by their harmony or cor-"respondence with the general expression, and from no original "and positive beauty in themselves," has been supported by that reference to common fact and common experience, of which every reader can judge. There is another argument, which arises from our consciousness, in which, perhaps, some of my readers may find a deeper interest.

If there were any original beauty in certain colors or forms of the human countenance, or if the human mind were adapted to experience the emotion of beauty only from such forms or colors, it would then inevitably follow, as in the case of every other sense, that one single and individual sentiment of pleasure would be felt upon such appearances, that the emotion of beauty would be a simple and unassociated sentiment; and that language, every where, would have conveyed it with the same unity and accuracy, as it does the sentiments of right or wrong, of justice or injustice.

If, on the contrary, our sense of the beauty of such forms or colors, is dependent upon their relation to a general expression, if our sentiment of their beauty varies with that relation; and if the same forms and colors that are beautiful in one case are not beautiful in others, then it ought to follow, that our consciousness and our language, as expressive of that consciousness, should vary with the different circumstances of composition—that instead of one peculiar emotion of beauty, we should

illustration has been offered; and what is observed of it? What other argument is there; and of it what is remarked? If there were any original beauty in certain colors or forms of the human countenance, &c., what would then inevitably follow? If, on the contrary, our sense of the beauty of the forms or colors, is dependent upon their relation to the general expression, &c.,

experience as many different emotions of beauty as the qualities of the human mind can excite—that the countenance of each sex, and of every age, should be susceptible of beauty wherever the composition of its features, &c. corresponded with the character we expected and wished; and that no countenance should be felt or expressed by us, to be beautiful, but when the conformation of the various features and colors corresponded with the characteristic, or temporary character, which we wished and expected under the circumstances in which we perceived them.

Which of these two theories is the most just, or the most correspondent to our plain and common experience, I willingly leave to my readers to determine.

From the illustrations that I have offered in this chapter, with regard to the origin of the beauty of the human countenance, there are some general conclusions which seem to follow, to which it may not be unuseful to the observers of nature to attend; and to the artists who are engaged in the representation of beautiful nature to remember.

I. There seem to be three distinct sources of the beauty or sublimity of the countenance of man—

Ist, From physical beauty, or the beauty of certain colors and forms, considered simply as forms or colors: 2d. From the beauty of expression and character: or that habitual form of features and color of complexion, which, from experience, we consider as significant of those habitual dispositions of the human mind, which we love, or approve, or admire. And, 3d. From the beauty of emotion, or the expression of certain local or temporary affections of mind, which we approve, or love, or admire.

II. Each of these species of beauty will be perfect, when the composition of the countenance is such as to preserve, pure

344

what ought then to follow? What does our author willingly leave to his readers to determine? Of the general conclusions drawn from the illustrations now offered, what is observed? What are the three distinct sources of the beauty or sublimity of the countenance of man? When will each of

and unmingled, the expression which it predominantly conveys; and when no feature or color is admitted, but which is subservient to the unity of this expression.

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III. The last or highest degree of beauty or sublimity of the human countenance, will only be attained when *all* these expressions are united—when the physical beauty corresponds to the characteristic—when the beauty of temporary emotion harmonizes with the beauty of character; and when all fall upon the heart of the spectator as one whole, in which matter, in all its most exquisite forms, is only felt to be the sign of one great or amiable character of mind.

SECTION III.

OF THE BEAUTY AND SUBLIMITY OF THE HUMAN FORM.

The same principle which leads us to ascribe the beauty of inanimate forms to some one original and independent configuration of beautiful form, has a tendency to mislead us with regard to the beauty of the human form. In some species of form we perceive beauty : in others we perceive none. Of so uniform an effect, we believe there must be an equally uniform cause, and as the apparent cause is in the nature and circum. stances of the material form, we very naturally satisfy the indolence of inquiry, by supposing that there must be some one appearance or character of this material form which is originally beautiful; and that, consequently, the absence of beauty arises, in any case, from the absence of this peculiar and gifted Such is the first and most natural theory of mankind. form. It is that which we universally find among the lower ranks of men, and which, though it does not satisfy them, perhaps, in any individual case to which they give their attention, is yet

these species of beauty be perfect? When only will the last or highest degree of beauty or sublimity of the human countenance be attained?

What principle has a tendency to mislead us with regard to the human form ? What do we perceive in different species of form ? Of so uniform an effect, what do we believe there must be; and how do we satisfy the indolence of inquiry ? This being the first and most natural theory of mankind, where does it pre-

sufficient to give them some thing like a general principle, which, while it has the appearance of truth, has still more the great convenience of theory—that of saving them from the labor of farther investigation. Of this popular and infant theory, it is needless for me to enter into any investigation. It is always abandoned as soon as men are capable of observation: when they are able to perceive, that there is in fact no such supposed form of original beauty; and when they begin to feel, from their own experience, that the sentiment of beauty is felt from many different and even opposite appearances of human form.

From this early hypothesis, the next step has uniformly been to the imagination of some original beauty in certain proportions of the human form. The belief that there is one central and sacred form which alone is beautiful, must be abandoned as soon as men are capable of observation. But the natural prejudice to refer the cause of this emotion to the material qualities alone which excite it, is not so soon abandoned; and as these are susceptible of measurement and precision, there is an obvious motive given, both to the philosopher and to the artist, to establish a correspondent precision in the system of the one, and productions of the other.

The human form is composed of different parts. In the natural or in the imitated form, there are some relations or proportions of these parts, which are every where felt to be beautiful. It is natural, therefore, to conclude, that the adoption of such measures or proportions will always secure the production of the same effect: it seems hence naturally to follow, that the latent beauty of form arises from these peculiar proportions; and that if these proportions were precisely ascertained, there would be a certain rule given, by which the production of beauty, in this respect, would infallibly be attained. Artists, accordingly, in every age, have taken pains

vail; and what is observed of it? Of this infant theory what is remarked; and when is it abandoned? From this early hypothesis, what has uniformly been the next step? When must the belief, that there is one central and sacred form which glone is beautiful be abandoned? But what is not soon abandoned; and what remark follows? Of what is the human form composed; and what are every where felt to be beautiful? What conclusion, therefore, is natural? What have artists, accordingly, in every age done?

to ascertain the most exact measurements of the human form, and of all its parts. They have imagined also various standards of this measurement; and many disputes have arisen whether the length of the head, of the foot, or of the nose, was to be considered as this central and sacred standard. Of such questions and such disputes, it is not possible to speak with seriousness, when they occur in the present times. But it ought, at the same time, to be remembered, that this theory, however, imperfect, was yet a step, and indeed a great one, in the progress both of the art and of the science of taste. It supposed observation----it animated attention ; and what is more, under the name of physical proportion, as I shall afterwards show, it involved the study of higher and more genuine proportion. The artist, in attending to the rude grammar of his language, learned something of its spirit and capacity; and when the progressive expansion of genius left behind it the rules and proportions of the school, the philosopher learned also to extend his induction, and to perceive that there were other principles by which his emotions were governed, and which yet remained for his investigation.

Of this second theory, therefore, "That there are certain re-"lations or proportions of the different parts of the human form, "which are originally and essentially beautiful, and from the "perceptionof which all our sentiment of beauty in this respect "arises"—it is, Itrust, now unnecessary for me to enter into any lengthened refutation. Yet, as some opinions of this kind still linger among connoisseurs and men of taste; and as the anxiety for some definite rules of judgment is ever more prevalent among such men, than the desire of investigating their truth, it may not be unuseful to suggest the following very simple considerations, which every one of my intelligent readers must fully have anticipated.

what have they also inquired; and about what have many disputes arisen? How only is it possible to speak of such questions, and of such disputes? But what ought, at the same time, to be remembered? What was its effect? In attending to the rude grammar of his language, what did the artist, and what did the philosopher, also, learn? What is the second theory; and of it what is observed? Yet why may it not be unuseful to suggest the fol1. If there were any definite proportions of the parts of the human form, which, by the constitution of our nature, were solely and essentially beautiful, it must inevitably have followed, that the beauty of these proportions must have been as positively and definitely settled as the relations of justice or of geometry. To take an original sense for granted, and, at the same time, to suppose, that the indications of this sense are variable, or contradictory, is a solecism in reasoning, which ne man will venture to support. If such a sense is supposed, then the universal opinion of mankind ought to be found to agree in some precise and definite proportion of the parts of the human form. If the opinions of mankind do not agree in such certain and definite proportion, then no peculiar sense can be supposed to exist, by which these sentiments are received.

That not only the sentiments of mankind do not agree upon this subject, but that the sentiments of the same individual differ, in a most material manner, is a truth very susceptible of illustration. There is no form, perhaps, in nature, which admits of such variety, both in appearance and proportion of parts, as the body of man; and which, therefore, seems so little capable of being reduced to any definite system of proportion. The proportions of the form of the infant are different from those of youth; these again from those of manhood: and these again, perhaps, still more from these of old age and decav. If there were any instinctive sense of beauty in form, in this long history, there would be one age only in which this sense could be gratified. Yet every one knows, not only that each of these periods is susceptible of beautiful form, but what is much more, that the actual beauty of every period consists in the preservation of the proportions, peculiar to that period, and that these differ in every article almost from those that are beautiful in other periods of the life of the same individual.

lowing very simple considerations? If there were any definite proportions of the parts of the human form, &c., what must have inevitably followed? What is a solecism in reasoning, which no man will venture to support? If such a sense is supposed, what ought to follow? If the opinions of mankind do not agree in such certain and definite proportion, what is the consequence? What is a truth very susceptible of illustration? What illustration of it follows? If there were any instinctive sense of beauty in forms, what would The same observation is still more obvious with regard to the difference of sex. In every part of the form, the proportions which are beautiful in the two sexes are different, and the application of the proportions of the one to the form of the other, is every where felt to be painful and digusting. If, however, there were any original and essential beauty in some definite proportion of parts, such effects could never happen. This definite proportion, in every case, would be solely beautiful, and every variation from it would affect us as a deviation or opposition to the genuine form of beauty.

It may be observed, in the same manner, that if the beauty of form consisted in any original proportion, the productions of the fine arts would every where have testified to it; and that in the works of the statuary and the painter, we should have found this sole and sacred system of proportion only. The fact however is, as every one knows, that in such productions no such rule is observed-that there is no one proportion of parts which belongs to the most beautiful productions of these arts-that the proportions of the Apollo, for instance, are different from those of the Hercules, the Antinous, the Gladiator, &c., and that there are not, in the whole catalogue of ancient statues, two perhaps, of which the proportions are actually the Against the hypothesis of an instinctive beauty in prosame. portion, no fact can be so decisive as this-If there were any original beauty in peculiar proportions of the human form, the artists of antiquity must have perceived it, when it might so easily have been ascertained, simply by the labor of measurement and calculation : and that their productions are independent of such definite proportions, and that their effect is still produced. amid all this variation of proportion, are irrefragable proofs, not only that the beauty of their works is not dependent upon such a theory of proportion, but that it arises from some higher causes, and from some more profound attention to those feel-

fellow; yet what does every one know? How does it appear that the same observation is still more obvious with regard to sex? Under what circumstances could not such effects happen; and why? What may, in the same manner, be observed; but in such productions, what, as every one knows, is the fact? Against the hypothesis of an instinctive beauty in proportion,

SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY

ings of human nature in which the sentiment of beauty is to be found.

2. If there were any original beauty in certain proportions. of the human form, independent of all other considerations, then it must necessarily follow, that the same proportions of that form would, in all cases, be beautiful, and that all other proportions would affect us with sentiments of pain or of displeasure. If such a theory were maintained, let the philosopher state with accuracy the proportions that are thus instinc. tively beautiful; let him then examine whether this doctrine corresponds with the most obvious facts in nature. The various ages of man are, in some cases, and in all cases may be made, beautiful by the genius of the painter or the statuary. Are the rules of proportion applicable to all these cases? and do we admire the form of the child, the youth, the man, and the aged man, because they retain, amid all their changes, the same proportions? Is the beauty of the female form demonstrable only because it contains the same proportions with that of man? And is every thing that deviates from the male proportion, a blemish and a deviation from beauty in the female? These are obvious considerations; the pursuit of them, however, will lead every one that is capable of observation, to still more satisfactory conclusions. If it is still farther proposed, in aid of this infant theory, that there are certain proportions in sex, and in the various ages of human life, which are originally beautiful, it will not easily be supposed or maintained, that there are similar instincts correspondent to the casual occupations of mankind; and that i every age in the progress of society, and in every society into which civilized man is formed, new or accidental instincts must be given, by which alone he can perceive the beauty of the forms around him. Yet all this must be supposed before, upon these principles, it is possible to ac-

what fact is most decisive? If there were any original beauty in certain proportions of the human form, then what must necessarily follow? If such a theory were maintained, what is the philosopher called upon to state; and then to examine what? As the various ages of man are, in some cases, made beautiful by the genius of the painter or the statuary, what interrogations follow? To what will these obvious considerations lead? If it be still farther supposed, in aid of this infant theory, that there are certain proportions in sex, dcc., what will not easily be supposed or maintained? Yet be-

count for the sentiments we every day feel, and for the illustrations which the artist every day gives us, with regard to the beauty of proportion. We see every day, around us, some forms of our species which affect us with sentiments of beauty. In our own sex, we see the forms of the legislator, the man of rank, the general, the man of science, the private soldier, the sailor, the laborer, the beggar, &c. In the other sex, we see the forms of the matron, the widow, the young woman, the nurse, the domestic servant, &c. Is it by the principle of proportion alone, that in all these cases our sentiment of beauty is determined? Are the proportions the same in all these cases? Is not, in fact, our sentiment of beauty determined by the difference of these proportions; and would not the application of the same principles to each, destroy, altogether, the characteristic beauty which we expect and look for in such different cases? It is obviously the same in the arts of imitation. We expect different proportions of form from the painter, in his representation of a warrior and of a shepherd, of a senator and of a peasant, of a wrestler and of a boatman, of a sayage and of a man of cultivated manners. We expect, in the same manner, from the statuary; very different proportions in the forms of Jove and of Apollo, of Hercules and of Antinous, of a Grace and of Andromache, of a Bacchanal and of Minerva. Sc. It is of no consequence at present why we expect all this, and why the greatest artists have so faithfully fulfilled this expectation. It is only of consequence to observe, that all this could not happen if there were any sole and original beauty in certain proportions alone; and that, if this had been the case, neither could we have formed the expectation, for could the artist have dared to obey it, by deviating from the sole and established principle of beauty. The farther prosecution of this illustration I very willingly leave to the reader.

fore what, must all this be supposed? What do we every day see around us—in our own, and in the other sex? Out of this remark what interrogations are drawn? How is this illustrated, from the different forms that we expect in different individuals, and in different pieces of statuary? What is, at present, of no consequence; and what only is of consequence? To whom is the farther illustration of this subject left? If the beauty of the human If the beauty, then, of the human form does not arise from any certain proportions which are solely and essentially beautiful, we must look for the source of it in those expressions, of which, like every other material form, it may be significant. There are two principal classes of expression, which the

human form seems to me to have, and which I shall consider separately, as they are the foundation of very different kinds of beauty, and have not, perhaps, been so accurately distinguished as they deserve.

I. The first of these expressions is that of fitness for the end for which the form was designed. The human body is a machine sitted for many and important ends; every member of it, in the same manner, has distinct employments, and may be either well or ill formed for these ends. The knowledge of this fitness in the whole form, or in the various parts of it, we learn from our own experience, and from our continual observation of others; and the appearance of every form immediately suggests the ideas, either of fitness or unfitness for these ends. That the appearance of fitness, in this respect, is pleasing and satisfactory; and that the appearance, on the contrary. of any unfitness, either in the general form or in any, of its members, is painful and unsatisfactory, are propositions which med no illustration. Our opinions upon the subject, are, perhaps, very seldom very accurate or scientific, and the standard by which we judge is, in general, perhaps, only the common or average form. But that we have all some standard of judgment on this subject, and that we actually feel this sentiment, either of fitness or unfitness, in observing the forms of those around us, the experience of every day may convince us.

It is this expression of *fitness* which is, I apprehend, the source of the beauty of that which is strictly and properly

form does not arise from any certain proportions, &c., where must we look for the source of it? Why are the two principal classes of expression which the human form seems to have, to be considered separately? What is the first of these expressions; and how is the human body considered? Whence de we have the knowledge of this fitness; and what does the appearance of every form immediately suggest? What propositions need no illustration? Of our opinion upon the subject, and of the standard by which we judge, what is remarked? Of what may the experience of every day convince us? This expression of fitness is the source of what beauty? What is the

352



called *proportion* in the parts of the human form. The considerations which lead me to this opinion, are the following-----

1st, From language. The terms of proportion and of fitness are convertible. If we describe to any person the circumstances of a form perfectly fitted for the animal ends of men, we give him immediately the idea of its proportion: if we describe a form in any respect unfitted for these ends, we give him immediately, in the same manner, the conception of disproportion. If on the other hand, we describe a form, or a part of the form, as well or ill proportioned, we immediately convey the idea, either of the fitness or unfitness of the form, &c. Such circumstances could not occur, if our sentiments on these subjects arose from different causes.

2d, Our sensibility to the beauty of proportion is limited by our knowledge of this fitness. Children, it may always be observable, though sensible to the beauty of forms from other causes, are a long time before they are sensible to the beauty of proportion, obviously because they have yet acquired the knowledge upon which the sense of this relation is founded, Every one may have observed, in the same manner, that women are very imperfect judges of the beauties of proportion in the male figure, and that their sentiments of beauty are formed upon very different principles; because they are naturally unacquainted, from their own experience, with the various ends to which this fine machine is so wonderfully adapted; and while they remain ignorant of them, they want that sense of fitness upon which the sentiment of proportion is founded. The common professions of society demand the exertions of certain members of the body, in preference to the rest, and each has the tendency, therefore, to give peculiar strength and amplitude to these peculiar members. Such appearances of the human form, are, perhaps, unpleasing to the general spectator,

first consideration which leads to this opinion; and without what could not such circumstances occur? In the second place, by what is our sensibility to the beauty of proportion limited? Of children, what may always be observable; and what, in the same manner, may every one have observed? Why is this the case? What do the common professions of society demand, and what tendency has each? To whom are such appearances of the human as deviations from the common forms. But to those who consider them in the view of the ends which they serve, they not only acquire the beauty of proportion, but the form would appear to them imperfect and unsatisfactory without these appearances. Every one expects a different conformation of members in the seldier, the sailor, the waterman, the shepherd, the huntsman, the ploughman, &c., and every painter accommodates himself to his expectation. If we ask what is the cause of this difference of our expectation, we shall find it to be in our previous knowledge of the purposes which they serve---that the conformation which is suited to the end, has always the beauty of proportion; and that, when we assign our reason for our approbation, the reason is always that of fitness for the occupation of the person. When we are ignorant of this end, we never fail to feel the conformation unpleasing.

3d. When the opinion of fitness varies, the sense of proportion uniformly varies with it. The most striking illustration of this proposition is in the sentiments we feel with regard to the form and proportion of the sexes. Nothing is more pleasing or satisfactory than the full proportions of the male form, when every member of the form is significant of the vigor and energy for which we know it was designed; the same proportions in the female form are both painful and unsatisfactory. Nothing, in the same manner, that form can exhibit, is so beautiful as the genuine proportions of the female form ; yet nothing is so positively painful, and even shocking, as the appearance of such proportions in the form of man. We may trace the influence of the same opinion, in our judgments of the proportions which are pleasing, in the progress of the individual form, from infancy to manhood. In the age of infancy we look for health and happiness, and vivacity, but not for energy or strength : the

854

form unpleasing; and why? But how are they regarded by those who consider them in the view of the ends which they serve? In what does every one expect a different conformation of members; and what does every painter, consequently, do? If we ask what is the cause of this difference of our expectations, where will it be found? What is the consequence of our ignorance of this? In the third place, when the opinion of fitness varies, what follows? Where is the most striking illustration of this propositon to be found? Repeat it. In our judgment of what, may we trace the influence of the same opinion? What

pleasing proportions of that age are, therefore, those only which are conducive to those ends; and the appearance of premature strength or energy, always affects us with a sense of something unnatural and monstrous. In the form of youth, we look for vivacity, agility, speed, and all the incipient marks of muscular power; but we do not look for the traces of confirmed strength, or habitual exertion. It is in manhood only, that we expect the full evolution of the members of the human form; and that we learn those general maxims of proportion, which net only guide our opinion of the form in that age, but which, in some measure, guide also our opinions of the different forms of the same individual in earlier ages, as the signs or indications of the promised and mature form. In these different stages of human life, it is obvious that the proportions of the same form are very different, and it is equally obvious, that they are pleasing only when they are accommodated to the ends which we conceive to belong to these different periods.

We are conscious of the same effect in the opinions we form of the proportions of the human body, in the various business and occupations of life; and the most different conformations are pleasing when they are significant of their fitness to these occupations. We expect a different form, and a different conformation of limbs, in a running-footman and a waterman, in a wrestler and a racing-groom, in a shepherd and a sailor, &c. If, with the idle and ineffectual labor of the connoisseur, we should measure the proportions of the Faun and the Gladiator, the Hercules and the Antinous, the Jupiter and the Apollo, we should find that not only the proportions of the form, but those of every limb were different; and that the pleasure we feel in these proportions arises from their exquisite fitness for the physical ends which the artists were consulting, and not from any original or definite conformations, which alone are pleasing,

illustration follows, from the age of infancy, and the form of youth? In manhood alone what do we expect; and from it what do we learn? In these different stages of human life what is obvious? In what are we conscious of the same effect; and when are the most different conformations pleasing? How is this illustrated? By what measurement should we find that not only the proportions of the form, but those of every link were different; and that the pleasure we feel in these proportions arises from what?

independent of any such fitness. Even the most unobserving of mankind are conscious of the influence of this opinion; and we have only to attend to the common language of conversation to perceive, that men, in general, judge of the propriety of every form by its suitableness to the profession, or age, or occupation of the person; and that some sentiment of dissatisfaction is always expressed, when this fitness or suitableness does not appear in the peculiar form or configuration.

4th. I would observe in the last place, that the sentiment of pleasure we feel from proportion in the human form is precisely similar, both in kind and degree, to that which we experience from the appearance of fitness in other subjects. The sentiment of fitness is a pleasing and satisfactory one, but it is not, in itself, a sentiment of much effect or enthusiasm. We are pleased, but not transported ; it satisfies the understanding, but it has little effect upon the imagination. The sentiment we experience from the observation of proportion in this subject, is precisely similar. The just or expedient conformation of the human form, or any of its members, to their ends, is undoubtedly a pleasing and satisfactory observation; but it is not one, which, of itself, leads to any deeper emotion. We are more displeased with its absence, than pleased with its occurrence. If we describe to any person a form of this kind, we shall find that we give him satisfaction rather than emotion; and if we wish to give him the impression of beauty, we shall also find that we must have recourse to other principles, and suggest other images to his mind, besides those of mere fitness or proportion.

If the reader has followed me in the preceding slight illus., trations, he will be induced to conclude—1st, That there are no original and definite proportions which *alone* are beautiful, by any peculiar law in the human form : 2dly, That the beauty

What evidence have we that the most unobserving of mankind, are conscious of the influence of this opinion ? In the last place, what is observed ? Of the sentiment of fitness what is remarked; why; and what sentiment is precisely similar ? What is, doubtless a pleasing and satisfactory observation; but to what does it not lead; and why? If we describe to any person a form of this kind, what effect will be produced; and if we wish to give him the impression of beauty, to what must we have recourse? If the reader has followed the author in the preceding illustrations, what conclusion will he

of these proportions, whenever they are felt, is resolvable into the more general beauty of fitness; And, 3dly, That this expression of fitness, though a source of calm and satisfactory pleasure, is yet very insufficient to account for the intense and profound delight we are conscious of experiencing from the appearances of the human form.

Proportion, therefore, though necessary to the beauty or sublimity of the form of man, does not constitute it. Every one knows that forms may be perfectly proportioned, and yet not be beautiful. In its proper and restricted sense, it is the just relation of animal members to the ends of an animal frame; and it is a term therefore, equally applicable to the forms of animals as to those of man. So far as it influences our minds, it is a source rather of negative than of positive beauty: without it, beauty cannot exist, but it does not exist in it alone; and to account, therefore, for the effects we feel from the appearances of the human form, we must look for other causes and higher principles.

II. The second class of expressions which the form of man possesses is that of CHARACTER, or of some amiable or interesting quality of mind. When we consider this form merely as an animal frame, we determine its beauty only by its fitness for the ends of animal existence; when we consider it as the habitation of mind, we perceive it to be significant, in every member, of the disposition or character of that mind.

That such expressions exist; or that the human form is actually significant of mental qualities, and as such, is productive of the emotions which such qualities in themselves produce, is proved beyond dispute by the universal language of mankind. We not only speak of forms as majestic, or heroic, or gentle, or benevolent, or gay, or spirited, or melancholy, or despondent,

be induced to form? Of proportion, therefore, what is remarked? What does every one know; and in its proper and restricted sense what is it? So far as it influences our minds, of what is it the source; why; and what follows? What is the second class of expressions which the form of man possesses? When we consider this form merely as an animal frame, by what do we determine its beauty; and when do we perceive it to be significant of the dispositions or character of the mind? What is proved beyond dispute by the

dsc., but what is much more, they are the only terms in which, in infant languages, or among the common people, the human form is described and distinguished. The progress of art, indeed, gives to the artist and the connoisseur the advantage, and with it all the abuses, of technical terms; but in every country, the great body of mankind adhere to their first impressions, and distinguish the individual forms of those around them, by the qualities of mind of which they feel them to be significant. Without pretending to any accurate enumeration, I apprehend the following sources of expression are consistent with every man's experience.

1. From the nature of form itself; in the same manner as was formerly explained in the case of inanimate forms. Thus smooth and polished surfaces are expressive of fineness, and some kind of animal perfection; slender and attenuated forms, of fineness, gentleness, tenderness, &c. forms which are described by flowing and waving outlines, of delicacy, ease, and pliability. The opposite appearances in the human formrough or unpolished surfaces, square or massy substances. sharp or angular outlines, are naturally expressive of the contrary qualities of rudeness, coarseness, harshness, and imperfection. That such effects are produced upon our minds by the appearances of the human form, may be very often observed in the opinions we form of the character of strangers, when we have no better grounds of opinion; and that they have always some effect, even in the impressions we receive from the forms of those we know best, I think every man will at least suspect, who attends to his own feelings.

2. The different forms of age and of sex; for I must limit myself to the great illustrations which nature affords me; are expressive to us, from experience, of different characters, and become thus significant of those characters. The peculiar

universal language of mankind? How is this illustrated? What advantage does the progress of art give to the artist; but in every country, what do the great body of mankind do? Without pretending to any accurate enumeration, what is apprehended? From the nature of form itself, in the same manner as what? How is this illustrated? Of what are the opposite appearances in the human form naturally expressive? What remark follows? Of what are the different forms of age and sex, expressive; and of what do

OF THE MATERIAL WORLD.

forms of infancy are expressive of innocence, ignorance, feebleness, thoughtlessness, and vivacity. Those of youth are expressive of sprightliness, activity, hope, and ardor. The mature form of man is expressive of strength, fortitude, thought, and the capacity of exercion. The mature female form is expressive of delicacy, modesty, humility, beneficence, and tenderness. The peculiar forms of old age in both sexes, of decay, diminished strength, abated capacity, and approaching dissolution. That these different expressions exist in these different forms, it is surely unnecessary to attempt to illustrate.

3. The form is susceptible of another class of expressions, as an animal form. Thus, there are certain appearances which are significant of health or disease, of strength or of weakness, of activity or of inactivity, of agility or of unwieldiness, of ease or of constraint, &c. &c. The least attention to our own experience, or to the language of others, may easily convince us, both how generally these expressions occur in our observation of the human form, and how strongly they affect us with correspondent sentiments, either of pleasure or pain.

4. The greatest and the most important class of expressions, however, of which the appearances of the form of man are significant, is that of peculiar characters or dispositions of MIND. Of the certainty and universality of this fact, it would be absurd to enter into any formal illustration. We acknowledge it ourselves, whenever we describe any form as majestic, humble, gay, thoughtful, despondent, &c. We understand it, whenever we hear the language of others describe them in the same terms; and we recognise it, whenever, in the works of the painter or the statuary, we feel ourselves affected by emotions of awe, admiration, respect, pity, or sympathy.

they thus become significant? How is this remark illustrated from the peculiar forms of infancy, those of youth, the mature form of man, the mature female form, and the peculiar form of old age? What is it unnecessary to attempt to illustrate? Of what other class of expressions is the form susceptible? Of what may the least attention to our own experience, easily convince us? What, however, is the greatest and most important class of expressions, of which the appearances of the form of man are expressive? Of the certainty and universality of this fact, what is remarked; and why? When do we understand, and when do we recognise it? What question is of

SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY

Whether the knowledge which all men, in some degree, have of these expressions, is to be ascribed to an original sense, or whether, as is more probable, it is the result of experience, is a question of no consequence in the present inquiry. It is sufficient for me, if it is allowed, that the forms of the human body are descriptive of characters of mind: that one form, for instance, is expressive of dignity, another of humility, another of gaiety, and another of melancholy; and that such forms actually convey the belief of the dispositions and characters of which we have generally found them significant. If it should be allowed that they have such expressions, it will not easily be denied, that such expressions must have their natural and necessary influence upon our feelings and emotions.

I may be permitted however to state, that there are many reasons, both in our own experience, and in our observation of the frame of others, which may lead us very early to some general conclusions of this kind. Every one who knows how much the form of man is affected and changed by the passions which happen to influence him: there is no child who does not know the distinction between the form of dignity, of arrogance, of humility, of supplication, of pity, or of melancholy. When we come to think of these varieties, we cannot fail to perceive that every passion has its distinct influence upon the form and proportions of the general frame-that all the animating and cheerful passions, such as hope, ardor, fortitude, magnanimity, &c., have an effect in dilating and extending the general form; and that all those passions, on the contrary, which are dispiriting or depressing, have a contrary effect in contracting the limits, and diminishing the proportions, and lessening the volume of the general form. Were observations of this kind carried as far as they deserve to be, I am persuaded it would be found that every genuine passion has its own peculiar influence upon the form, by its influence upon some pecu-

no consequence, in the present inquiry? What being allowed, is sufficient for our author's purpose? If it should be allowed that they have such expressions, what will not be easily denied? What, however, may our author be permitted to state? What does every one know; and there is not even a child without what knowledge? When we come to think of these varieties what can we not fail to perceive? If observations of this kind were carried as far as they deserve to be, what is our author persuaded would be found to follow? liar members of it—that certain passions have certain effects, either in the contraction or dilation of certain parts of the human frame; and that the language of the form might be made as intelligible by the painter or the statuary, as the language of the voice is made by the composer of genius. It belongs to the artist to pursue inquiries of this kind: it is sufficient for me only to observe, that there are certain indications in the human form of the dispositions which inhabit it—that different passions produce different conformations of the members and proportions of this form—that habitual dispositions are necessarily accompanied by habitual conformations; and that from this experience we all become sensible to these effects, and do in fact judge and speak of the forms of those around us as expressive of these characters or dispositions.

That it is from these sources, or from the expression of pleasing or interesting qualities or dispositions of mind, that the human form derives all its positive beauty, appears to be evident, from the following considerations—

1. Every form which is felt to be expressive of amiable or interesting character, is, in some degree or other, beautiful. Whenever we speak of a form as being heroic, or majestic, or compassionate, or tender, or gay, or modest, melancholy, &cc., we always convey to others, and we mean to convey, the opinion of beauty. Whenever such a description is made to ourselves, we are uniformly impressed with the belief of beauty in that form. In the works of the painter and the statuary, all the forms which represent pleasing or interesting characters of mind, are beautiful; and all those which express painful, or vicious dispositions, are of an opposite character. If our sense of the beauty of form arose from material proportions alone, and were altogether independent of expression, such a coincidence could not happen: forms would be beautiful only as

To whom does it belong to pursue inquiries of this kind; and what only does our author consider sufficient for him to observe? What appears evident from the following considerations? Every form of what kind is, in some degree, beautiful? When do we convey to others the opinion of beauty; and whenever such a description is made to ourselves, what follows? How is this remark illustrated from the works of the painter and the statuary? Under what circumstances could not such a coincidence happen; and what conse-

they approached to a certain material standard; and whatever were the expressions they signified, our sense of their beauty would be determined, not by this expression, but by their approach or deviation from this standard.

2. The most different forms are beautiful when they are expressive of interesting characters. What can be so different as the forms of infancy, of youth, of manhood, and of old age? Yet all are beautiful when they are expressive of the character which belongs to that age. What similarity is there between the forms of hope and of humility, of melancholy and of heroism, of fortitude and of compassion, of joy and gratitude? Yet all of these are beautiful. How different in every respect almost, are the genuine forms of sex? and yet no one will pretend that beauty is limited to one alone. If our sense of beauty in the human form were the result of material appearances only, such differences of effect would be altogether impossible.

3. The sentiment of beauty which we feel in these cases, is precisely similar to those which we feel from the characters of mind of which such forms are expressive. If the emotion of beauty were the effect of any law of our nature by which certain forms or proportions were immediately productive of this emotion, the emotion itself would be a uniform and homogeneous one, and would differ only in degree, but not in kind. Every sound and color produces one definite sensation, and all colors and sounds of the same kind, according to their degree, produce the same sensation. If there were any peculiar sense, by which the emotion of beauty, with regard to forms, was received, the emotion would in every case be similar, and as readily distinguishable from all other emotions, as the sense of sound is from that of color, or the sentiment of justice from that of expedience.

362

quence would follow? When are the most different forms beautiful? How is this remark fully illustrated? Under what circumstances would such differences of effect be altogether impossible? The sentiment of beauty which we feel in these cases is precisely similar to what? If the emotion of beauty were the effect of any law of our nature, &c., what would follow? What remark follows? If there were any peculiar sense by which the emotion of beauty, with regard to forms, was received, what would be the consequence?

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In his experience of the beauty of forms, I apprehend, every man is conscious that there is no such uniformity of emotion. as any sense of material beauty, independent of all expression, would produce. In his admiration of the forms of heroism, of gaiety, of majesty, of pity, of grief, of resignation, is it one uniform and peculiar emotion he feels? or is it, on the contrary, an emotion founded upon the peculiar character he contemplates, and which corresponds to the emotion he feels from the same character of mind, when he meets with it in real life, or when it is represented to him in the page of the historian or the novelist? It would be a singular anomaly in nature, if the same cause should produce in our minds gaiety and sadness, admiration and pity, laughter and tears : yet all of these different effects are produced by the appearances of the human form; and, in all of these various and contradictory appearances, we, at the same time, feel the sentiment of beauty. No imaginable theory seems to be able to account for these discordant facts, which rest upon any original sense of beauty in form alone; and no other theory seems to be able to include them, but that which attributes the origin of beauty to the expressions of which the form is significant, and which therefore admits every variety of form to be beautiful, which is expressive of pleasing or interesting character.

4. In the preceding observations, I have considered the human form only as a simple form, the beauty of which was to be determined, either by some law of material form, or as significant of various interesting and affecting characters of mind. Fearful as I am of fatiguing my readers, I must yet entreat their patience to follow me in another view of the subject; in which, I apprehend, the same truth will more strongly appear, and from which, perhaps, some conclusions may be derived of consequence, both to the artist and the man of philosophic taste.

Of what is every man, in his experience of the beauty of forms, conscious? How is this remark illustrated? What would be a singular anomaly in nature; yet what follows? What is not able to account for these discordant facts; and what theory only seems to be able to include them? In the preceding observations, how has the human form been considered, and how was the beauty of it to be determined? Though fearful of fatiguing his readers, yet

The human form is not a simple form : it is a complicated frame, composed of many parts, in which some relation of these parts is required by every eye, and from which relation, beauty, or deformity, is the actual and experienced result. If the principle which I have stated is just, if the positive beauty of the human form arises in all various and different cases, from its expression of character of mind, then it ought to follow, that the beauty of composition in this complicated form ought, as in all other cases of composition, to arise from the preservation of unity of character; that no forms or proportions ought to be felt as beautiful, but those which accord with this central expression; and that different forms and different proportions ought to be felt as beautiful, whenever they are significant of the characters we wish and expect. If these are found to be facts, I apprehend it will not only be sufficient to show the real origin of the beauty of form, but to establish some more definite conceptions, with regard to the nature of the beauty we experience in these relations of the parts of the human form.

That the beauty of composition in the form of man is determined by this unity of character or expression; or in other words, that the principle by which we judge of the beauty of any member or members of the form, is that of their correspondence to the general expression, is a proposition which seems very consistent with common experience. Every form which we remark for beauty has always some specific character which is the foundation of our admiration. It is either manly, or gallant, or majestic, or dignified; or it is feminine, or gentle, or modest, or delicate: as such we feel, and as such we describe it. It seldom happens, however, in actual life, that any form of this kind appears to us in which we are not conscious of some defect, of some limb or member being unsuitable to the rest, and affecting us with some sense of pain or dis-

for whatdoes he entreat their patience? As the human form is not a simple form, what is it? If the principle which has been stated is just, what ought to follow? If these are found to be facts, what will it be sufficient to show? What proposition seems very consistent with common experience? Of every form which we remark for beauty, what is observed; and what characteristics are mentioned? What, however, seldom happens in actual life? If we

satisfaction. If we ask ourselves what is the reason of our disapprobation, or if we attend to the language of others, we shall find, I think, that it is always resolvable into the want of correspondent expression ; and that the imaginary attempts we make to rectify it, consist in new-modelling the faulty members, so as to accord with this expression. It is painful to us, thus, to see a form of general delicacy, with any strong or muscular limb; to see a bust of manliness or strength, with limbs either short or attenuated; or limbs of great strength and vigor, with a thin and hectic form of body, &c. In the general form of woman, it is, in the same manner, painful to observe any limb of masculine size or strength; and so delicate is even the rudest feeling upon this subject, that the form of a foot, or of a finger, can detract from the most perfect beauty. When we have the misfortune to witness any defect of this kind, we wish, and perhaps we express our wishes, to remedy it; and what is the object of our wishes? Is it not to reduce the too powerful, or to increase the too attenuated limb to the general character of the form; to maintain throughout it that unity of expression which is necessary to our complete emotion; and if, either in idea or in imitation, we can succeed in these wishes, do we not feel ourselves, and teach others to feel, the full effect of that beautiful form, which nature or accident has left imperfect? Is it not consistent, in the same manner, with general experience, that in describing a beautiful form to those who have not seen it, we always begin by stating the character which it signifies; and if we end by asserting that all the various members of the form correspond in maintaining this characteristic expression. do we not succeed in convincing them that the form is beautiful, and that its composition is as perfect as its expression?

The standard, I believe, by which we chiefly estimate the character of the form, is the expression of the countenance. We very seldom, I apprehend, pretend to judge of the *beauty*

ask ourselves what is the reason of our disapprobation, &c., into what shall we find it resolvable; and in what do the attempts which we make to rectify it consist? How is this remark illustrated? When we have the misfortune to witness any defect of this kind, and wish to remedy it, what is the object of our wishes? What, in the same manner, is consistent with general experience? By what standard do we chiefly estimate the general character of the

of the form of any person whose countenance we have not vet seen. We might speak securely of the propriety of the mere physical proportions of a mutilated statue of which the head was lost; but I think we should not speak with equal security of the beauty of the composition of its members. In studying any of the greater forms of statuary or painting, I conceive, in the same manner, that we shall feel in ourselves, and that we may observe in others, that our eye is perpetually moving from the countenance to the form-that until we feel distinctly the character which the countenance expresses, we are at a loss to conceive the meaning of the composition; and that when we do feel it, we then immediately conceive that we are in possession of the key by which the form and the proportion of every member is to be estimated. The moment, either in the observation of nature or of the arts of imitation, that we feel the countenance to be expressive of character, we instantly expect, and look for a unity in the composition of every member of the form. The most insignificant portions of the frame seem then to arise into meaning and consequence; we demand that all of these should contribute, by the nature of their character, to the general character of the countenance ; and if any of them are defective, we lament, either over the accidents of nature, or the incapacity of the artist. Were we to state to any person, that a statue had all the proportions which the assiduity of technical taste had ascertained, that every limb was fashioned according to the most approved rule, and the whole composed of the most perfect individual members, the impression, I think, we should leave upon him, would be, that it was a work of consummate art, and that the labor of the artist was deserving of much reward. Were we, on the other hand, to state to him, that this statue had some great or interesting cha-

form; and what remark follows? Of what might we speak securely, but of what could we not speak with equal security? In studying any of the great forms of statuary or painting, how will we be affected? When do we expect and look for a unity in the composition of every member of the form; and why? By what statement should we leave an impression that the statue was a work of consummate art, and that the labor of the artist was deserving of much reward; and how should we leave the conviction that it was a masterpiece of genius, and that no language of enthusiasm was superior to its de-

racter, that the countenance expressed some heroic or some amiable passion, and that every limb and every line of the form was in full correspondence with this expression, I apprehend we should give him the conjection, that the statue was a masterpiece of genius, and that no language of enthusiasm was superior to its deserts.

In prosecuting this inquiry, and I attempt nothing but to lead the minds of my readers to the prosecution of the subject for themselves, I trust they will find the second proposition, or, "that no forms or proportions are actually felt to be beautiful, "which do not accord with the characteristic expression of the " general form," to be equally consistent with experience. It is undoubtedly natural, at first, to imagine, that a beautiful form is that which consists of beautiful parts, and that, therefore, nothing more is necessary than to unite the most beautiful parts together. Such is the first rude idea of the mind of taste, and such also, perhaps, the first attempt of the young artist. A very little experience is sufficient to overturn this infant theory. It teaches, both in nature and in the imitation of it, that the mere assemblage of beautiful parts is not sufficient to constitute beauty; that some other principle is wanting; and that no forms or proportions are in themselves essentially beautiful, but as they accord with the character of the whole form, and unite with its peculiar expression.

There is no man, however ignorant of the language of taste, who would not feel shocked at seeing the delicate arm of a woman joined to the body of a warrior, or the athletic limb of the warrior united with the form of youthful gaiety, or the muscular bust of labor with the light and elastic limbs of joy and activity; each of these parts, however, are beautiful in peculiar circumstances: and why are they here disapproved of —but because they do not agree with the character of the form, and contradict the expression we were prepared to indulge? Nothing that the genius of man has ever produced,

serts? In prosecuting this inquiry, what will be found to be equally consistent with experience? What is it undoubtedly natural, at first, to imagine; and of this, what is observed? For what is a very little experience sufficient; and what does it teach? At what would every man feel shocked; and why

is, perhaps, so beautiful as the limbs of the Belvidere Apollo. and the forms which reign in the head and neck and bust of the Medicean Venus. Yet let us, even in fancy, apply these exquisite forms to any other statue; let us give to the form of Jove or Hercules, the limbs of the Apollo, and to those of Juno or of Minerva the head and bust of the Venus, and we shall feel the assemblage, not only painful, but ludicrous. If we were asked, or if we were to ask ourselves, the reason of this displeasure, we should immediately say that it was because these forms were discordant with the general character; and that they affected us precisely in the same manner as we are affected in real life, when we see age or dignity counterfeit the manners of youth, or matron gravity assume the affectation of youthful bashfulness. These indeed are extreme cases; but they are important in showing the principle from which our most common judgments are formed; and whoever will prosecute the inquiry by his own observation, will perceive, that even in his most familiar intercourse with others, it is this demand which chiefly determines them: that in every form which we feel to be characteristic, we look for unity in the expression of its parts; and that our criticisms upon the forms of those around us are permanently occasioned by the want of this correspondence, and the contradiction we feel between the expression of the limbs and that of the general form. It is unnecessary for me to say, that such feelings and such criticism never could take place, if there were any essential beauty in such forms, independent of all expression.

These observations, slight as they are, lead so necessarily to establish the truth of the third proposition, "that different forms "and different proportions of form are felt to be beautiful, when "they correspond with the character of the general form," that I can scarcely presume to fatigue my readers with any illustration. If no forms of parts are beautiful but those which accord with the general expression, it must follow that different

are they here disapproved of? How is this illustrated? If we were asked the reason of this displeasure, what should we say? Of these cases what is remarked; for showing what are they important, and what will be perceive who prosecutes this inquiry? What is it unnecessary for our author to remark? To what do these observations lead? If no forms of parts are beau-

forms of these parts may be beautiful. To show how fully this is the case, we have the testimony of experience. Nothing is more different than both the forms and proportions of the same members in infancy, in youth, in manhood, and in age; yet in all these we discover beauty, when they are expressive of the character which is amiable, or respectable, or interesting in these different periods of human life. I forbear to speak of the difference of sexual forms, and of the principle which so obviously determines the difference of our admiration. I leave my readers to attend to the illustrations which painting, and which, above all, statuary can afford them, where they will find that the great masters of this art have governed themselves by principles very different from those who, in later ages, have satisfied themselves with the humble glory of being their admirers and expositors-that the deep effect which they have produced, is by the magical harmony of their compositionthat in this study, they have made use of the most different forms, and proportions of form, in every member of the human body-that there are not perhaps two examples existing, in which these proportions are found to be the same; and that, even in the representation of the same ideal being, these proportions are found to vary, whenever the expression, by which it was distinguished, varied either in kind or degree. I shall only observe, that the principle from which they executed their unrivalled works, is the same which the lowest of us experience in daily life. We are all acquainted with the influences of passion or emotion upon the general form, and upon its different members; and we every day judge of the existence of such emotions or passions by such appearances of the form. Even in the same individual we have seen, perhaps, all these changes take place; the muscular limbs of health and the shrunk limbs of disease, the elevated chest of hope or ardor, and the bent form of despondence or grief, the firm and compressed form of fortitude, or the lengthened and elastic spring

tiful, but such as accord with the general expression, what must follow? From what does it appear that this is the case; and of what does our author forbear to speak? To what illustrations are the readers left to attend for themselves; and of them what is remarked? What only is observed? With what are we all acquainted, and of what do we every day judge? Even in

of gaiety or joy, &c. We have felt the influence of these expressions of mind, therefore, even in the same individual : under different forms and proportions of form, we have recognised, by this experience, the principle which has given to the statuary his power over the feelings of manking : and whenever we look back upon our experience, we shall find that the forms which we thus felt to be most beautiful in the same individual, were permanently those which were expressive of the most amiable, or the most interesting dispositions of mind. They who have sufficiently felt the power of theatrical representation, who have attended not only to the voice and the countenance, but to the variety of form, or proportions of form, which Mr. Garrick and Mrs. Siddons assumed, according to the passions they represented, will feel better than by any cold illustration, that different forms are capable of beauty, and that all are beautiful which express noble passions and interesting emotions.

From the illustrations, which I have limited myself to suggest only, but not to pursue, I flatter myself my readers will perceive, that the form of man is actually significant of two distinct and important expressions—1st. As a physical form, in which the form itself, and every member of it, is expressive, either of fitness or unfitness for its physical ends: 2dly. As a form expressive of mind, in which every passion or emotion has its distinct signs, in the appearance of the form itself, and in the appearance of its different members.

The term proportion has unfortunately been promiscuously applied to both expressions; and in the ambiguity of the term both the artist and the philosopher, have been often misled, in their research into the origin of this beauty.

I am not presumptuous enough to attempt to introduce any new language into a science in which technical terms are so

the same individual what have we seen to take place ? What have we felt, what have we recognised; and in looking back upon our experience, what shall we find ? What will they feel, who have sufficiently felt the power of theatrical representation ? From the illustrations suggested, what will the reader perceive; and what are they ? To what has the term proportion unfortunately been promiscuously applied; and what has been the consequence ? Though our author does not introduce any new language, yet what does he rigidly cherished; but I may presume to suggest to my younger readers a very simple rule, by which they may know to what cause they are, in such cases, to ascribe the emotions they feel.

A human form has all the beauty of strict *proportion*, when nothing hurts us in its form, and when no impropriety appears in any of its members for the physical ends, for which the form, either in nature or art, is designed.

A human form, on the contrary, has only the beauty of *cha*racter, when some amiable or interesting disposition of mind is expressed by it, and when we perceive a positive relation between the expression of every different member, and the expression of the general character.

Some attention to this distinction may perhaps be of use, both to the man of genuine taste, and to the artist. It may relieve the first from the trammels of technical language, and raise him to higher speculations than the usual schools of art permit or employ; and it may teach the latter, that his ambition is only to be gratified when he can excite the sympathies of mankind, and make the human form expressive of all that the human mind can either exert or feel.

I finish this long section, by stating the general conclusions, with regard to the beauty that is peculiar to the form of man, which seem to follow from the considerations I have suggested—

I. That the beauty or sublimity of the human form, does not arise from any original and essential beauty in this form, or in its composition—

II. That there is a negative species of beauty necessary to every beautiful form, but not constituting it, which arises from the expression of physical fitness or propriety—

III. That the real and positive beauty of the form arises from its expression of some amiable or interesting character of mind,

suggest? When has a human form all the beauty of strict proportion? When, on the contrary, has it only the beauty of character? To whom may some attention to this distinction be of use, and how? How is this long section finished? What is the first?—the second ?—the third ?—and the fourth?

and that the degree of this beauty is proportionate to the degree in which this character is interesting or affecting to us: and,

IV. That the beauty of composition in the human form arises, as in all other cases, from the unity of expression; and that the law by which we determine the beauty of the several members of this form, is that of their correspondence to the peculiar nature of the characteristic expression.

SECTION V.

OF THE SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY OF ATTITUDE AND GESTURE.

Beside the general beauty of form which I have considered, there are various emotions of beauty felt from peculiar POSI-TIONS, OR MOTIONS of the human body. The first of these constitutes the beauty of *attitude*, the second the beauty of *gesture*.

i.

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The proper expression of form is that of permanent character or disposition of mind. The expressions, on the contrary, of attitude and of gesture, are those of temporary or occasional passion or affection. They have, therefore, the same relation to the expression of the general form, that the variable colors and features of the countenance have to the expression of the general countenance.

I have only farther to premise, that proportion, or that proper conformation of parts, which is necessary for the purpose of the animal frame, is as essential to the beauty of attitude and gesture, as it is to that of form in general. No form can be beautiful which is disproportioned; but every form that is proportioned is not beautiful. In the same manner, no attitude or gesture can properly be beautiful in a form, which is disproportioned or deformed; but every attitude or gesture, in a well proportioned form, is not felt to be beautiful : for this beauty, therefore, we must search for other causes.

Besides the general beauty of forms which have been considered, from what are various emotions of beauty felt; and what do they respectively constitute? What is the proper expression of form; and of the expression of attitude and gesture, on the contrary, what is observed? What relations, therefore, have they? What has our author only farther to premise? What illustrations follow? What ever may be the result of our investigations, what

Whatever may be the result of our investigation, it is to be observed, in the first place, that in this case as in the foregoing case of form, there are two very distinct expressions, which any attitude or gesture may signify.

1. The first is that of ease or constraint, of physicial pleasure or physical pain. Our knowledge of this expression is derived from all the sources of our knowledge-from our own experience, from our sympathy with others, and from their analogous experience. There is no child, perhaps, that does not immediately perceive, from the attitude or gestures of others, whether they are easy or constrained; and that does not feel pain when he witnesses any gesture or attitude which seems to be forced or extreme. The same principle guides us in a still greater degree in maturity. And in the fine arts, in those representations of human form or action, where something greater and more perfect than ordinary nature is attempted to be produced, we still feel that ease is necessary to the beauty either of attitude or gesture and that we are incapable of en. tering into the full expression of the form, if any thing harsh or constrained appears in its composition. Of the truth of this proposition, I shall enter into no farther explanation. I have only to add, that while it is an expression necessary to the beauty either of attitude of gesture, it does not constitute this beauty. Many attitudes and gestures may be easy and unconstrained, but they are not therefore beautiful. In every mechanical profession, ease is acquired by the laborers or artists ; but the attitudes or gestures which such professions exhibit, are not therefore beautiful. In the common business of life, we every where see ease in the performance of it, but we do not every where see beauty in gesture or attitude.

The expression, therefore, of ease or facility, is necessary to the beauty of attitude or gesture, in the same manner as

is, in the first place, to be observed? What is the first; and from what is our knowledge of this expression derived? How is this illustrated? When does the same principle guide us in a still greater degree; and in the fine arts, what do we still feel? As our author does not enter farther into the proof of this proposition, what only does he add? How is the remark illustrated, that many attitudes and gestures may be easy and unconstrained, but not therefore beautiful? In what manner is the expression of ease or facility neces-

SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY

that of propertion is to the beauty of form. It is the *negative* beauty of gesture and attitude, because without it this beauty cannot exist; but as it does not of itself constitute it, we must look to other causes for the origin of their *positive* beauty.

2. The second great expression of which attitude and geshave in the human form are significant, is that of passion or emotion, or of some pleasing or interesting quality of an intellectual or moral kind. That such expressions of mind do exist---that in our earliest years we interpret the sentiments of the minds of sthers, from the external appearances of their gesture or attitrude, that, whether an original or acquired language, it is yet a banguage which all men understand-that in the defect of artificial language it is the universal language, to which all men instinctively have recoarse, and which all men as instinctively comprehend-that the attitudes, in short, of majesty, fortitude, hope, love, pity, and despondence ; and that the gestures of galety, mirth, rapture, anger, revenge, melancholy and despair, are intelligible to mankind, without any previous instruction; and that, when they are understood, they convey the peculiar emotions which the affections of mind they signify are fitted to convey; are propositions so plain and so universally acknowledged, that I cannot detain my readers by any formal illustration of them.

The object which I have in view, is, to solicit them to observe, that all the *positive* beauty or sublimity which they experience in such attitudes or gestures, is finally to be escribed to the characters or dispositions of mind of which they are significant.

I. If there were any gestures or attitudes of the human form which were necessarily and originally beautiful, it would follow that such gestures or attitudes of beauty might be found

sary to the beauty of attitude or gesture? Why is it the *negative* beauty of gesture and attitude; but what follows? What is the second great expression of which attitude and gesture in the human form are significant? What propositions are so plain, and so universally acknowledged, that the author is not willing to detain the reader by any formal illustration of them? What is the object which is had in view? If there were any gestures or attitudes of the human form, which were necessarily and originally beautiful, what should follow; and if, on the contrary, the beauty of these conformations

under every variety of expression. If, on the contrary, the beauty of these conformations arises from the expressions of mind which they signify, then it ought to follow, that no gestures or attitudes should be beautiful that are not expressive of interesting or amiable affections.

For the determination of this question, the most ignorant man has all the knowledge that is necessary. Every man can distinguish between the attitudes or gestures of amiable or unamiable dispositions; between the attitudes or gestures of gaiety, gentleness, pity or humility; and those of fear, rage, envy, pride, or cruelty. Of all these various attitudes and gestures, the human form is susceptible. The only question is, which of these classes of expression is beautiful ? and what the answer to that question is to be, I leave most wilkingly to my readers to determine.

If this is the case in real life, it is naturally the same in the representation of it. The genius of painting and statuary has imagined and represented all the classes of expression of which the human form is capable. Which of these is it that we feel, and of which we speak as being beautiful? What are the gestures or attitudes on which our imagination loves to dwell, and which seem to give a higher intelligence and meaning to the rude language of common nature? Is it not upon those, which are expressive of great, or heroic, or amiable dispositions alone; and do we not wish to forget those, on the other hand, which convey the idea of dark, or malignant, or selfish affections? We yield, perhaps, to the powers of the artist : We acknowledge the use of such forms and such expressions for the general effect of contrast in the composition; but we never mistake between the original and the artificial beauty; and we only lament, as we do in real life, that the forms of vice should be necessary to give effect to the character and the expression of virtue. The artist may speak, in the language of art, of the

arises, from the expressions of mind which they signify, what ought to follow? Between what can every man distinguish; and what remark follows? What then is the only question; and to whom is the answer referred? If this is the case in real hife, what follows; and what has the genius of painting and statuary imagined and represented? What interrogations follow; and what are their answers? To what do we yield, and what do we acknowledge; but between what do we never mistake, and what only do we lament? In what

beauty of such attitudes or gestures, in the same manner as the lover of dramatic art may speak of the beauty of the representation of *Richard* or *Iago*. But these are obviously conventional terms—terms which express, not the beauty of the character represented, but of the justness of the representation: and of which every one has it in his power to judge, when he separates the character from the composition; and considers whether the attitude or gestures which express such characters are beautiful *in themselves*, or only beautiful in reference to the end of the composition.

If it were necessary to say any thing more upon a principle so obvious, I would entreat my readers to make a simple though an imaginary experiment; to assume to themselves, in the first place, the most perfect form they have known, whether of male or female beauty; and then to throw this same exquisite form into the situations I shall suggest, and which their own experience of the influence of mind upon the material frame will sufficiently justify.

Let them, in the first place, suppose this form under the influence of some very uninteresting or vulgar emotion, such as ever occurs, and must ever occur, in the common business of life, even to the greatest and the best of mankind. In such circumstances, are any attitudes or gestures felt to be beautiful? The most perfect form of man may be doomed to low and degrading labor-may follow the plough, or toil at the oar, or labor at the anvil, or be extenuated at the shuttle. The most interesting form of woman may, in the same manner, be employed in the various debasing offices of common servitude, or in the low higgling of the market, or in the angry contests of narrow economy. In such situations, is the attitude or gesture of any form, however naturally beautiful in itself, ever remarked to be beautiful? And do we not wish for some higher or more

manner may the artist speak of the beauty of such attitudes and gestures; but these are obviously terms of what sort, and what is observed of them? If it were necessary to say any thing more upon a principle so obvious, what simple experiment are readers requested to make? Under what influence must they, in the first place, suppose this form to be? To what may the most perfect form of man be doomed; and how may the most interesting form of woman be employed? In such situations, what follows? What says the interesting expression, before we expect to find it? "No "man," says the French proverb, "is a hero to his valet de "chambre." The truth of the proverb may be extended much farther; and there is no man capable of observation who must not have been often struck with the contradictory emotions he has felt from the appearances of the same form, and the complete absence of beauty in the attitudes and gestures of the same person, in whom, at other times, and when under the dominion of any interesting emotion, he felt all the influence of gesture or of attitude.

Let the experimentalist suppose, in the second place, the assumed form under the dominion of any *unamiable* or *vicious* emotion.—Let him imagine it under the influence of rage, or envy, or cruelty, or revenge, or remorse; and then ask himself whether, in such circumstances, the gestures or the attitudes of the form are beautiful? Such experiments it may have been the misfortune of some to verify; such attitudes or gestures, all, in some degree, may have seen, in the representations of the painter or the sculptor; and whatever may be the illusion of art, or the artificial beauty which arises from the powers of invention or composition, there is no one who will not acknowledge that, *in themselves* at least, such gestures or attitudes are not beautiful: and that if they occurred in real life, they would be felt either to be painful or revolting.

Let the observer then, in the last place, suppose his assumed form under the dominion only of *amiable or of interesting emotions*; let him animate it with hope, or love, or joy, or tenderness, or melancholy, or dignity, or patriotism, or benevolence, or devotion; and let him then ask himself, what is the character of the attitudes or gestures which the instincts of his imagination supply? He will find, if I do not much deceive myself, that all the attitudes or gestures which then rise before him are

French proverb? What is remarked of the truth of this proverb; and with what may every man, capable of observation, have been often struck? In the second place, under what should the experimentalist suppose the assumed form to be; and then ask himself what? Of such experiments what is ob served; and what remark follows? In the last place, under what influence should the observer suppose his assumed form to be; and then what should he ask himself? What will he then find? An illustration of what sort has

beautiful; that every conformation of the human frame which is expressive of such dispositions is pleasing and delightful to him: and what is more, that the emotion they produce in him, is precisely the same with that which he feels from the expression of the same dispositions by the artificial communication of language. I have used the simplest illustration that occurs to me; but if my readers are conscious of its justice, it will be sufficient to show them, that the beauty of attitude or gesture arises, not from any original and independent beauty in certain conformations of the members of the human form, but from the expression they convey of the dispositions or passions by which it is animated.

2. In addition to this very obvious consideration, I must observe, that if the beauty of attitude or gesture is predetermined by any law of our constitution, it cannot obviously exist in different and contrary appearances or conformations. If, for instance, the full display of all the muscular force or vigor of the form affords the central beauty of the attitudes or gestures of that form, then no attitude or gesture which hides, which diminishes, or which contracts this display, can possibly be beautiful. If the absolute beauty of the form depends, according to another theory, upon the preservation of certain lines, or propertions, or sinuosities; then it is equally obvious that no form can possibly be beautiful which does not possess these positive lines or curvatures. Whatever may be the hypothesis we assume with regard to the material origin of this beauty, nothing can be more obvious, than that the truth of the hypothesis must finally rest upon the uniformity of our sentiments upon this subject; and that no hypothesis can be deserving of regard, if it is found that opposite and different appearances are yet productive of the same sentiment of beauty.

The facts, which are within the reach of every person's observation, seem to me to conclude decisively against every hypothesis of this kind; and to show that the most *dissimilar*

our author used; but it will be sufficient to show the reader what? In addition to this very obvious consideration, what is observed? How is this remark illustrated? Whatever hypothesis we assume, with regard to the natural origin of this beauty, what is very obvious? How do the facts, which are within the reach of every person's observation seem to conclude; and to

and opposite attitudes and gestures are actually felt to be beautiful, whenever they are expressive of emotions or dispositions of mind, in which we sympathize and are interested. I limit myself to the suggestion of a very few examples.

In the attitudes of majesty, or dignity, or heroism, or virtuous pride, the form is elevated, the head is raised, the chest expanded, the limbs firmly and vigorously pronounced, &cc. In the attitudes, on the contrary, of the same form, under the impression of humility, pity, adoration, penitence, or melancholy, the reverse of all these configurations takes place. The head droops, the form bends, the chest contracts, the limbs yield, and the whole frame assumes not only a different, but an opposite appearance. All of these attitudes, however, are beautiful in nature, as well as in the representations of art. Could this happen if there were any certain conformations which alone were beautiful; or can they be explained upon any other principle than that of their being beautiful only, as the signs of the characters and dispositions of mind?

There is great beauty, in the same manner, in the gestures of all the gay and exhibirating passions ; in the frolic of infancy, the elastic step of joy, the expanded arms of hope, the clasped hands of thankfulness, in the reclining head, and heaving bosom, which express the long-drawn sigh of rapture. These. however, are all different appearances, and not reconcileable certainly to the hypothesis of any original or independent conformation, in which the beautiful only consists. But if those different appearances are irreconcileable with such hypotheses, what shall we say to the still more beautiful gestures which even the same form exhibits under the dominion of other emotions? and when the conformations presented are not only different but opposite ;---to the slow and heavy step of grief, the drooping form of melancholy, the bent posture of supplication, the reposing limbs of infant slumber, or the prostration of the

show what? To what does our author limit himself; what attitudes are mentioned, and what is observed of their effect? Where are all these attitudes, however, beautiful; and what follows? In what, in the same manner, is their great beauty? Of these, however, what is remarked? But if these different appearances are irreconcileable with such hypotheses, what queries whole form in ardent devotion. If we look for the origin of the beauty of these appearances in the qualities of the material form alone, we shall find it difficult to account for the production of the same effect from causes so different and even contradictory; but if we look for it in the expressions of which such appearances are significant, we shall receive a very simple solution, when we consider that all these various signs are expressive of passions which are pleasing or interesting, and when were member, that the nature of the emotion we receive from these signs is precisely the same in every case, with that which we receive from our sympathy with the passions or emotions of which they are significant.

3. In the slight illustrations which I have now offered, I have for a moment taken it for granted, that our sentiment of the beauty of attitude or gesture is uniform; and that, whatever may be the origin of beauty in this respect, the same gesture or attitude which is once beautiful, is always beautiful. It is an admission, however, very inconsistent with experience; and I have therefore to solicit my readers to observe farther, that, not only the most different and opposite gestures or attitudes of the human form are felt to be beautiful, but that even the *same* attitude or gesture is felt sometimes to be beautiful, and sometimes the reverse: and that this difference of our opinion is always to be referred to our sense of the propriety or impropriety of the emotion which it expresses.

Every one is sensible of the beauty of the attitudes or gestures of infancy, of the careless play of limbs, and the elastic vigor of motion, which distinguish that happy age. The same attitudes or gestures in manhood or in age would be either indecorous or painful, and would express nothing but imbecility or insanity. The helpless attitudes, the slow and feeble gestures

follow? If we look for the origin of the beauty of the appearances in the qualities of the natural form alone, to account for what, shall we find it difficult; but whence shall we receive a very simple solution? In the slight illustrations which have now been offered, what has been taken for granted? With what is this admission, however, inconsistent; and to observe what, has our author, therefore, to solicit his readers? Of what is every one sensible; and what effect would the same attitudes in manhood or age produce? What attitudes and gestures are beautiful in an extreme degree; and without

of old age, are beautiful in an extreme degree, and can never be imitated by the artist without producing a deep and interesting emotion. The same attitudes or gestures in youth or in manhood would be positively painful, as expressing nothing but the most abject terror or servility. There are a thousand gestures and attitudes which belong to the female sex, which arise from their peculiar character, and constitution, and habits; and which, as expressive of female character, are, and ever must be beautiful. Give the male figure any of these characteristic attitudes or gestures, and you will soon find that the only effect is that of positive disgust and abhorrence. The assumption of the most beautiful or of the most sublime gestures of the male form, by the female sex, is ever productive of similar pain and dissatisfaction.

There is in the same manner a certain consistency, that we expect in common life, between the attitude or gesture of my person and the nature of the character we attribute to him; and we never observe any violation of this consistency without pain.

The same attitude of gaiety which we feel to be beautiful in the young, we should feel to be disgraceful in the mature. The same gesture of joy which we should approve in the thoughtful and the old, we should consider as tame and unfeeling in the young. The grief of a young woman we expect to be expressed by greater violence of gesture, than we should approve in the character of matron firmness; and the calm and subdued gesture of matron grief, would, in the same manner, be painful or unsatisfactory in the form of the former. In pursuing this observation it will be found, that not only old age, but profession, occupation, character of form, character of countenance, and a thousand other circumstances, determine our sentiments of the beauty of attitude or gesture, by determining the nature of the expression we expect from the individual we contemplate; and

what can they not be imitated? In what would the same attitudes or gestures be positively painful; and why? Of gestures exclusively belonging to the female sex, and of those of the male figure, what farther remarks are made illustrative of the same principle? Between what do we, in the same manner, expect consistency in common life; and how are we affected, when we observe a violation of it? How is this remark illustrated? In pursuing this

that the same gesture is beautiful or otherwise precisely as it accords, or does not accord with the character we attribute to the form.

The severe and thoughtful gravity we admire in the attitude of a judge, would be absurd in a young lawyer: the step of dignity, the attitude of command which we love in the general of an army, would be ludicrous in a subaltern officer. The same gestures or attitudes which we feel to be beautiful or sublime in tragic imitation upon the stage, would be ludicrous if they were employed even in the higher comedy, nor would they even be permitted by good taste in the inferior and less interesting characters of tragedy. It is unnecessary to say that the most approved or fascinating gestures of comedy would be altogether insufferable if they were employed in tragic representatations. I shall only farther request my readers to call to their remembrance the attitudes and gestures which they have so often admired in classic sculpture, and to ask themselves whether the same gestures would be beautiful in all characters; which would necessarily be the case, if beauty, in this respect, arose from any definite conformations,-whether the gesture of the Apollo would be beautiful in the Hercules, or in the Jupiter; or the a titudes of the Venus beautiful in the forms of Juno or Minerva? Even in the lowest employment of the art of painting,---in portrait painting,---we feel the necessity of this corres. pondence of attitude to character; and we blame the painter whenever he chooses any attitude or position which appears to us inconsistent with the character of mind which is expressed by the countenance. In feeling and in expressing, on the contrary, this correspondence; in selecting the attitude or gesture which best suits the character he represents; consists one of the chief evidences of the genius of the artist; and by this means the portrait of an obscure individual may sometimes possess the value of an original composition.

observation, what will be found to be true? What instances of illustration follow? What is it unnecessary to observe; and what only does our author farther request his readers to call to their remembrance? Whence do we feel the necessity of this correspondence of attitude to character; and when do we blame the painter? In what does one of the chief evidences of the artist's genius consist, and by this means what may sometimes be effected? What

I shall only add to these illustrations by requesting my readers to observe, in the last place, that in a great variety of cases our sense of the beauty of the same attitude or gesture in the same individual, is actually determined, not by the appearances which are exhibited to the eye, but by our opinion of the propriety or impropriety of the emotion which it expresses. Indignation for instance, or rage, or revenge, are passions capable of producing very sublime attitudes and gestures; and when these passions arise from great or noble motives, the attitudes by which they are expressed are felt to be sublime. Let us witness the same attitudes when they are expressive of little, or trivial, or degrading sentiments, and they immediately become painful or ridiculous. The gestures of Don Quixote in encountering the windmills, or in routing the flock of sheep, are precisely the same with those that must have been employed by the Amadises or the Orlandos of romance; yet they would be beheld certainly with very different emotions. The attitudes of grief, of sorrow, or of melancholy, are beautiful in an extreme degree, particularly in the female form. Tell us, however, that they arise from some triffing cause, from the disappointment of a party, from the loss of a trinket, or the success of a rival beauty, and we feel no emotions but those of contempt or ridicule. The gestures of almost all the gay and exhilarating passions are beautiful; and our sympathy with happiness is so great, that we never observe them without the disposition to believe that they are just. Inform us, however, that all these expressions of happiness arise from some childish, or some worthless motive; that the philosopher has only disco. vered a new butterfly; or that the warrior has only advanced a step in the army; that the joy of the youthful beauty is only occasioned by the present of a new dress, and that of the matron by a fifty pound prize in the lottery; and the gestures we formerly admired, become, at once either ludicrous or disgusting.

request, only, does our author add to these illustrations? What instances are given, and what is observed of them? When do the same attitudes become painful or ridiculous; and what illustrations are given? When do they excite no emetion but those of contempt or ridicule? What farther illustration of the same principle is given, from the gay and exhilarating passions; and when do the gestures formerly admired become ludicrous or disObservations of this kind may be extended to every emotion or passion; and I think it will be found, in every case, that no gesture or attitude, expressive of such passions or emotions, is permanently and originally beautiful—that our opinion of this beauty varies according to circumstances; and that the circumstance, in every case, which determines our sentiment of beauty, is our opinion of the justness or propriety of the emotion which such attitude or gesture signifies.

SECTION V.

OF GRACE.

The preceding illustrations are intended to show that the sublimity ro beauty of attitude and gesture arises, not from any causes of a material kind, nor from any law by which certain material appearances are immediately productive of these sentiments, but from their being adapted to express, and being felt to be expressive, of amiable, or interesting, or respectable qualities of the human mind. In concluding those illustrations, I have completed all that I had properly in view in that investigation.

There is, however, a quality of which the human form is susceptible, and which is occasionally found both in its positions and in its emotions, which is not sufficiently accounted for by this theory. This quality is GRACE—a quality different from, beauty though nearly allied to it. It is never observed without affecting us with emotions of peculiar delight, and it is, perhaps, the first object of the arts of sculpture and of painting to study and to present to us. Upon this subject, while I presume to offer a few additional observations, I am yet to request my readers to consider them rather as conjectures, than as the results of any formal inquiry.

gusting? How far may observations of this kind be extended; and what will, in every case be found to be true?

To show what, are the preceding illustrations intended? In concluding these illustrations, what has been completed? What is there still which is not sufficiently accounted for in this theory? What is it called; and what is observed of it? How are the few observations offered on this subject to be

That there is a difference between the qualities of beauty and of grace, in the human form, must, I conceive, every where be admitted. The terms themselves are neither synonymous, nor are they used synonymously; the emotions we receive from them are easily distinguishable, and are every day distinguished in common language; and when we refer to experience, we may find a thousand instances in which the positions and movements of the form are beautiful without being graceful. Beauty, indeed, in some degree or other, is to be found in the most common appearances of man; but grace is rarely seen. We often lament its absence while we are conscious of the presence of beauty; and it every where seems to us to demand some higher and more uncommon requisites than those which are necessary to mere beauty.

It seems to me, still farther, that the appearances of grace in the attitudes or gestures of the form, are never perceived without affecting us with some sentiment of respect or admiration, for the person whose form expresses them. When we observe the attitudes of joy, or hope, or innocent gaiety, we feel delight, but not respect for those who exhibit them. When we observe the attitudes of grief, or melancholy, or despondence, we feel sympathy, and the delight which nature has annexed to social interest, but we do not necessarily feel admiration. The gestures of rage, of force, of anguish and of terror, may, in the same manner, affect us with very sublime emotions of fear, of astonishment, and of awful interest, but they may be unaccompanied with any emotion of admiration or respect for the individual who displays them. Whenever, on the contrary, we witness the graceful in gesture or attitude, we feel, I apprehend, an additional sentiment of respect; a conviction of something dignified or exalted in the mind of the person, and of which the gesture or attitude employed is felt to be significant. How

considered? What must be every where admitted; and why? Where is beauty to be found; of grace what is observed; and what remark follows? The appearances of grace in the attitudes or gestures of the form, are never seen without what? How is this remark illustrated from the attitudes of joy, and of grief; and from the gestures of rage, &c.? Whenever, on the contrary, we witness the graceful in gesture or attitude, what effect does it produce upon us? By what must the truth of this proposition be determined;

far this proposition is true, must be finally determined by the consciousness of my readers : I shall observe only, that it seems to me very strongly justified, both by the language of philosophers, and the common language of the world. When we hear any attitude or gesture described as graceful, we are conscious, I think, of immediately feeling some sentiment of respect or admiration for the individual who displays it. Whenever we use the same term ourselves, we always mean to convey to those who hear us, a similar sentiment. Every attitude or gesture of a well proportioned form, which is at once easy and expressive of some amiable or interesting feeling, is beautiful, and is accordingly spoken of as beautiful; but when we add the term graceful, we wish, I think, always to convey the idea of some additional quality, which is entitled to respect, and which is expressive of some conceived dignity or superiority in the mind of the person who exhibits it. Whenever, in the same manner, any attitude or gesture affects us, beside the emotion of beauty, with the sense of respect or admiration for the individual in whose form it appears, I apprehend we use the term graceful in addition to the term beautiful, to express our sense of this superiority or dignity. The application of the same observation to the sublime, either in movement or position, is within the reach of every person's inquiry; and I apprehend that the experience of every one will teach him that the sublime of this kind may often exist without grace; and that when grace is perceived it is always felt as an additional quality, and as expressive of something in the character of the person which excites veneration, or astonishment, or respect.

I. From these preliminary remarks, I would observe, in the first place, "That there seems to be no one emotion or class of

and what only is observed? When we hear any attitude or gesture described as graceful, of what are we conscious; and when we use the same term ourselves, what sentiment do we mean to convey? How is this remark illustrated? Whenever, in the same manner, any attitude or gesture affects us, &cc., why do we use the term graceful? What application is within the reach of every person's inquiry; and what is it apprehended the experience of every one will teach him? From these preliminary remarks what is observed? Of

« emotions, to the expression of which the quality of grace is * exclusively limited ; but that, on the contrary, every emotion in " which the spectator can be interested, is susceptible of grace " in the expression of it, either in attitude or gesture." Of so general a proposition, the full illustration, within the limits to which I must confine myself, is impossible. I shall only request my readers to call to mind the different pleasing or interesting emotions of which the human form is expressive, and to examine for themselves whether there are any of them which do not admit of grace in these expressions. If we consult experience, I am much deceived if we shall not find that every class of human feelings is susceptible of grace in the movements or positions of the form which is significant of such qualities. All the gay and exhilarating emotions-the emotions of hope, of joy, of love, of beneficence, and of admiration, admit very obviously of grace, as well as of beauty, though it is much more rarely, perhaps, that we discover it. In the saddening or depressing class of emotions, on the other hand-in grief or sorrow, or penitence, or melancholy, the capacity of grace, will, I apprehend, equally be found. If we consult the productions of the fine arts, and more particularly of the fine arts of antiquity, the predominant feature of which is grace. we shall arrive at the same conclusion. In the remains which we possess of their sculpture, there is scarcely any emotion, or class of emotions of which man is susceptible, which they have not imitated. In all of these, grace is intended, and is produced, and in all of the minute or technical commentaries of connoisseurs, there is none which has limited this quality to any one expression, or class of expressions exclusively; or pointed out any appearance of the human form which is susceptible of beauty or sublimity, and which is not susceptible of grace. If the reader will take the trouble to follow out these slight suggestions, I apprehend he will be satisfied that grace

so general a proposition, what is impossible? To do what, only, are the readers requested? If we consult experience, what shall we find? How is this illustrated from the gay and exhilarating emotions—from the saddening and depressing emotions; and from ancient productions of the fine arts? In all of these what is intended and produced; and what remark follows? If the reader will take the trouble to follow out these slight suggestions, of what

SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY

is not the result of any peculiar quality in human character, but of some general quality which may be common to all.

II. I presume to observe, in the second place, "That, wherever " the attitude or gesture expressive of any emotion or passion, " is at the same time expressive of SELF-COMMAND, or of that " self-possession which includes, in our belief, both the pre-" sence of a lofty standard of character and conduct, and of " the habitual government of itself by this high principle, the "attitude or gesture is perceived or felt to be graceful; and "that, although every pleasing or virtuous quality of mind " may admit of beauty, and every great or exalted quality may " admit of sublimity, the sense of grace is only experienced "when, in the expression of these qualities, we perceive still " farther, the expression of that dignified self-command which "restrains them within those limits of refined, or of high " minded propriety, which it has prescribed to itself." Of a proposition of so general a kind, the proof, I am sensible, must finally rest upon the consciousness of those who will take the pains to examine it; I presume only to suggest a few topics of illustration, both from actual nature, and from the imitations of the fine arts, which may facilitate this examination.

I. It will be found, I think, in the first place, that the attitude or gesture of no passion or emotion, however pleasing or interesting, is actually felt to be graceful when it is thought to be violent, or intemperate, or significant of want of self-command. Nothing, for instance, is more beautiful than the attitudes of hope or joy, or the gestures of mirth and innocent gaiety. We love them in the frolics of infancy, in the sportive activities of youth, and in the cheerful "abandon" of rural dancing : but we rarely find them graceful. In this tumult and intemperance of happiness, there is something that always rather borders upon the ludicrous, and the slightest exaggeration of the ges-

will he be satisfied? What does our author, in the second place, presume to observe? Of the proof of a proposition of so general a kind, what is remarked, and what only is suggested? What, in the first place, will be found to be the case? What instances are mentioned illustrative of this remark? In this tumult and intemperance of happiness what is always found? Nothing

tures is sufficient to make them the objects of laughter, instead of admiration.

Nothing, in the same manner, is more lovely than the attitudes or movements of all the kind and benevolent affections, as pity, charity, beneficence, modesty, maternal tenderness, &c. yet how seldom do we, at the same time, see them graceful! Their hurry and intemperance, which are often additional sources of their beauty, detract in the same proportion from their grace, and tend to make them degenerate into positions of constraint, or into movements of violence and force.

In the other class of passions, in the severe, the suffering, the dreadful, &c. it will, I apprehend, be found, in the same manner, that no attitudes or gestures are ever felt to be graceful, which express that violence or intensity of passion, which indicates the absence of all self-command. The attitudes of horror, of fear, and of despair, for instance, may be, and very often are sublime, but no one is so absurd as to consider them graceful. The frantic gestures of rage, of agony, of revenge, &c. may often possess sublimity; but it would be a contradiction in terms to speak of them as possessing grace. I know not that there is any statue of antiquity in which extreme passion is represented, but in the Laocoon; and undoubtedly the first impression which it gives upon common spectators is very different from that of grace.

There is another illustration of the same proposition which is within every one's reach, I mean from the observation of the theatre. In actual life there are many circumstances which prevent the exhibition of grace in the positions or movements of the form; and amid the trivial scenes of common business or amusement, there would be an absurdity in any attempt to display it. But upon the stage, where stronger passions are represented, and more important interests transacted, some attempt, at least, of this kind, is both expected and exe-

in the same manner, is more lovely than what attitudes or movements; yet what is observed of them, and why? In the other class of passions, what will, in the same manner, be found to be the case? How is this illustrated from the attitudes of horror; and from the frantic gestures of rage, &c.; and of the statues of antiquity what remark follows? Whence is another illustration, within every one's reach, to be drawn? How is this contrasted with

cuted. It is to this illustration that I wish to direct the attention of my readers, and to request them to observe when it is that they are sensible of grace in the attitudes or gestures which are exhibited. If I do not much deceive myself, they will find that no gesture or attitude is ever felt to be graceful when it is expressive of violent or intemperate emotion; and that no character admits of grace in representation, which is distinguished, either by the extravagance of comic, or the violence of tragic passion.

It is on this account that grace is rarely to be found in the gestures either of infancy or of old age. The frolics of children, the wild playfulness of early youth are beautiful, but they do not amount to grace, or if they do, it is to a degree only of grace very inferior to that of which the perfect form is susceptible. Their age is yet incapable of any high sentiment of propriety and of any firm habit of self-command; and their gestures, therefore, are marked by a freedom and careless. ness, which excite delight rather than admiration or respect. In old age, on the other hand, the deficiency of grace arises from a different cause. The progress of years takes but too certainly from the vigor of the human mind, and from the capacity of physical expression; and however beautiful or sublime, therefore, the gestures of age may be, they seldom are expressive of high thought or conscious superiority. It is only in the perfection of the human system; in the age when the form has assumed all its powers, and the mind is awake to the consciousness of all the capacities it possesses, and the lofty obligations they impose, that the reign of physical grace commences; and that the form is capable of expressing, under the dominion of every passion or emotion, the high and habitual superiority which it possesses, either to the allurements of pleasure or the apprehensions of pain. It is this age, accordingly, which the artists of antiquity have uniformly represented, when they sought to display the perfection of grace, and

actual life? Directing their attention to this illustration, what does our author request of them; and what will they find to be true? On this account, where is grace seldom to be found; and why is this the case? When is it that the reign of physical grace commences, and that the form is capable of its greatest expression? When, accordingly, did the artists of antiquity uni-

when they succeeded in leaving their compositions as models of this perfection to every succeeding age.

It is from the same cause that grace is so seldom to be found in the attitudes or gestures of the lower orders of mankind. The usual occupations in which they are engaged are productive of no gestures or attitudes significant of emotion; and all that we look for in them is merely ease, or the absence of constraint. In their hours of sensibility or passion, on the other hand, as their education and the habits of their society seldom give them any high sentiments of propriety or decorum, the gestures which they employ are as seldom distinguished by any temperance or moderation. Their gaiety, therefore, is apt to be expressed by movements of homeliness and vulgarity, and their sufferings by correspondent movements of violence or extravagance. Whenever we do discover the rudiments of grace among them, we always find that they are expressive of some chastened or subdued passion ; of some expression which marks the predominance of mind over temporary emotion; and which is significant of a character superior to that tumult and hurry which we generally observe in their unstudied and unstrained gestures. That it is on the same account we expect some degree of gracefulness at least, in the higher ranks of life, in those who have possessed a more liberal education, and that it is from their habits of accommodating themselves to this expectation that we generally find it, are subjects of illustration too obvious to require any comment.

II. I would observe, in the second place, that the attitudes or gestures of every passion or emotion are felt to be graceful, when they appear to be significant of this self-command or selfpossession.

In the preceding illustrations I have stated that none of the gestures, or attitudes of the gay or cheerful passions, however

formly represent this age? Among whom, for the same reason, is grace seldom to be found; and why? What remark follows; and how is their gaiety, and their feelings apt to be expressed? Whenever we do discover the rudiments of grace among them, of what do we always find them expressive? What are subjects of illustration too obvious to require any comment? What is, in the second place, observed? In the preceding illustrations, what has been stated;

beautiful they may be, are felt to be graceful when they are violent or intemperate-when, then, are they felt to be graceful? Or what is the point or degree of emotion, when they rise from simple beauty into grace? If the reader will pursue the investigation, I think he will uniformly find, that it is when they are subdued into temperance, and when they indicate the possession of self-command. The sports of youth, the festivities of peasants, and the mirth of rural dancing, admit of pleasing, and sometimes of beautiful gestures, but seldom of attitudes or gestures which are graceful : and they very generally degenerate into movements either ludicrous or grotesque. When is it that we meet, amid such scenes, with grace? It is always, I apprehend, when some individual mingles with the group, whose gesture indicates a character superior to the scene, and in whose movements we read a mind incapable of the intemperance of the common joy. There may be beauty in the representation of the gayest dances of the nymphs of Diana; but the grace of the goddess can only be displayed by movements which are significant of purer taste; and more exalted character. In Mr. Hogarth's admirable print of "the Ball-Room," intended for the illustration of a very different theory, it is impossible for the most careless observer not to perceive. that even the very imperfect grace which he has given to the two principal figures arises from the composure and temperance of their feelings, compared with the tumult, and affectation, and overstrained efforts of the other dancers. The hasty and hurried gestures of joy, may often be compatible with beauty; but they are felt to be graceful only when they are softened down into chastisement and composure. There is a period in the emotion of mirth when it may assume gracefulness, but it is very different from that intemperance where "laughter is holding both his sides."

and what interrogations follow? If the reader will pursue the investigation, what will he uniformly find? How is this illustrated? When is it, that we meet, amid such scenes, with grace? Where may there he beauty; but by what only can the grace of the goddess be displayed? In Mr. Hogarth's admirable print of the "Ball Room," what must the most careless observer perceive? What may often be compatible with beauty, but when only are they

However beautifal, in the same manner, the expressions of all the social or benevolent affections are, it is only when we see them under the control of judgment and of tasts that we feel them to be graceful. It is not in the hurried step of compassion, in the wild disorder of maternal anxiety, or in the sudden ardors of generous friendship, that we find attitudes or gestures of grace. It is in the more temperate period of these affections, when we see the dominion of emotion, rather than passion, and when the gestures assume the repose of habitual character. There is not a more exquisite picture of generous affection than that which Virgil has described in the well known exchamation of Nisus,

Me, me adsum qui feci! in me convertite ferrum, &c.

"Me-me," he cried, "turn all your swords alone on me."

Yet the painter would certainly be much mistaken, who should seize this frantic and breathless moment as the moment of grace. There are no affections so susceptible perhaps of graceful attitude or gesture as those which belong to devotion; and they have, from many causes, been the great object of imitation among the painters of modern times. Every one must have observed, however, that it is not in their periods of violence or extremity, amid the transports of hope, or the raptures of joy, or the agonies of penitence, that grace is to be found; that the attitudes which are graceful are always those on the other hand which represent chastened and subdued emotion; and that the painters who are most eminent for the production of grace, are those who have given this chastened character to their forms, nnd repressed all the expressions of intemperate or unrestrained emotion.

In the opposite class of passions—in those which belong to pain and to suffering, it will be found, in the same manner,

felt to be graceful? What remark follows? When only do we feel the social affections to be graceful? When do we not, and when do we find the attitudes or gestures of grace? Where do we find an exquisite picture of generous affection; what is it, and what is observed of it? What affections are most susceptible of graceful attitude or gesture; and what has been the consequence? What, however, must every one have observed? In the opposite

that although the extreme violence of the expressions may be sublime, the point or degree of passion which alone is susceptible of grace, is that which evinces a mind unsubdued by affliction, and which continues to possess itself amid all the sufferings which surround it. There are none of these passions perhaps, which do not admit of the graceful either in position or in movement, and it is in the expression of some of them that the highest degree of grace is exhibited of which the human form is capable ; yet every one must have perceived that it is never in their state of violence and intemperance that this quality is found, and that the hurry and tumult of the gestures of fear, of pain, of horror, and of despair, if they cease to be felt as sublime, tend always to degenerate into the ridiculous or contemptible. Whenever, on the contrary, under such circumstances, we perceive the presence of a high and unconquered mind; whenever, in the composure of the attitudes, or in the tranquillity of the gestures, we see the dominion of lofty thought and exalted sentiment, we immediately feel these gestures and attitudes to be graceful; and as signs of these high qualities of mind, we regard them with the same sentiments of admiration and respect that we are formed to feel for the qualities they signify. Give to the dying Gladiator the attitude of agony or of horror, and, although the expression might be sublime, yet it would lose all the grace which is acknowledged to distinguish it. Give to the Apollo Belvidere any gesture of rage or revenge; and though its beauty would not be lost, it would lose all the matchless grace, which every age has felt, in that expression of divinity which radiates every limb of its form; in that composure which marks the superiority of a celestial being; and in that lofty scorn which disdains even to feel a victory over an enemy so unworthy of his arms. It is not, in the same manner, in the agonizing limbs, or in the convulsed muscles of the Laocoon, that the secret grace of its composition resides; it is in the majestic air of the head, which has

class of passions, what will, in the same manner, be found? Of these passions what is remarked; yet what must every one have perceived? When, on the contrary, do we feel these gestures and attitudes to be graceful; and how do we regard them? How is this illustrated from the dying Gladiator, and from the Apollo Belvidere? What is remarked illustrative of the same not yielded to suffering, and in the deep serenity of the forehead, which seems to be still superior to all its afflictions, and significant of a mind that cannot be subdued.

"What GRACE," says Mr. Smith with his usual persuasive eloquence, "what noble propriety do we not feel in the conduct of "those who exert that recollection and self-command which " constitute the dignity of every passion, and which bring it "down to what others can enter into? We are disgusted with "that clamorous grief, which, without any delicacy, calls upon " our compassion with sighs, and tears, and importunate lamenta-"tions. But we reverence that reserved, that silent and ma-" jestic sorrow, which discovers itself only in the swelling of "the eyes, in the quivering of the lips and cheeks, and in the "distant, but affecting coldness of the whole behavior. It im-"poses the like silence upon us; we regard it with respectful "attention, and watch over our whole behavior, lest, by any "impropriety we should disturb that concerted tranquillity, "which it requires so great an effort to support."* It is "this "recollection and self-command," which in such scenes constitutes what, even in common language, is called the graceful in behavior or deportment; and it is the expression of the same qualities in the attitude and gesture, which constitutes, in my apprehension, the grace of such gestures or attitudes.

As a farther illustration of the same truth, I must again hint to my readers the observation of the theatre. Within the limits which I must prescribe to myself, it is impossible for me to enter into any detail upon this pleasing subject. I shall satisfy myself by appealing to this observation, and by stating, that if the hypothesis which I have proposed is just, it ought to be found, that, whether in comic or in tragic passions, the moment of grace should be that of composure and self-command; that every attitude or gesture which is significant of this character

* Theory of Moral Sentiment, p. 31.

principle, of the Laocoon? What says Mr. Smith, with his usual persuasive eloquence? Of this recollection and self-command, and of the expression of the same qualities in the attitudes and gestures. what is remarked? As a farther illustration of the same truth, what is again hinted to the reader? Within the limits which our author must prescribe to himself, what is impos-

of mind should in some degree or other be graceful; that no characters should admit of grace in the representation, which are distinguished by violence or intemperance of passion; and that the scenes or moments in the representation of any character, which are most susceptible of graceful representation, should be those in which the dignity of the character is most displayed in superiority to the passions which subdue ordinary men. If the reader should arrive at these conclusions, he will, perhaps, be led to perceive the cause of the acknowledged superiority of the French to the English stage, in the article of grace; and that the bold delineations of character that distinguish the drama which Shakspeare has formed, can be represented only by the display of an energy and exemity of passion which is incompatible with the temperance of graceful gesture.

In the preceding observations I have alluded only to the positions and movements of the human form, under the dominion of emotion or passion. It seems to me, however that the observations may be carried farther, and that *wherever* in the movements of the form, self-command or self-possession is expressed, some degree of grace, at least, is always produced. I shall state only two instances of this; the first in the movement of the form, in cases of difficulty, and the second of similar movements in cases of danger.

The common motions of walking, running, &c., have in themselves nothing of difficulty, and are therefore, in general, incapable of producing any emotion. But dancing is an art of real difficulty, and we observe it always with the consciousness of this difficulty. To acquire all the different motions which are most commonly taught in this branch of education—to apprepriate them to the particular time and character of the music—to understand the figure of every dance, which is purposely made as intricate as the time will permit; and to be able

sible; and with what must be be satisfied ? If the reader should arrive at these conclusions, what will be, perhaps, be led to perceive ? In the preceding observations, under what circumstances only, has our author alluded to the poatitions and movements of the human form ? How far, however, does it seem that the observations may be carried ? What two instances only, of this are stated ? Of the common motions of walking, running, &c. ; and of dancing what is remarked ? What acquisitions are more difficult than we generally

to execute all this with ease and facility, are, in trath, acquisitions of more difficulty than we generally believe, and require more composure and presence of mind than we are commonly disposed to imagine. When, accordingly, we see all this well performed, when we see the dancer move without hurry or disorder; perform all the steps of the dance with ease, accommodate his motions with justice to the measure, and extricate him. self from all the apparent intricacies of the figure, with order and facility, we feel a very perceptible sentiment of surprise and admiration, and are conscious of the grace of gestures, in which so much skill, and composure, and presence of mind are displayed. If we compare such a performance with the rude gestures of the antaught vulgar, or with the hurried and extravagant postures of those who happen unfortunately to mingle in the dance without the requisite instruction, we shall soon perceive how much the grace of gesture is dependent upon the character of mind which it exhibits; and if we ascend from this common example to the higher exhibitions of the art-to the serious or heroic dancers of the opera stage, we shall see this grace expand from the same cause, into loftier dimensions, and be satisfied, that the applause we hear around us is justly due to every exhibition where dignity of mind is expressed, or where difficult things are performed with ease and facility. I have chosen this instance as the most familiar that occurs to me; but the reader who will prosecute the subject, will find a thousand illustrations of it, in his observation of the gestures of men in every performance which is difficult of execution, and in proportion to this difficulty ; and will perceive the influence of this presence or command of mind in bestow. ing grace, from the boatman at his oar, or the smith at his anvil. to the deportment of the higher ranks in the drawing-room,

believe them to be; and what do they require? When, accordingly, do we feel a very perceptible sentiment of surprise and admiration; and of what are we conscious? If we compare such a performance with the rude gestures of the untaught, vulgar, &c., what shall we soon perceive? If we ascend from this common example to the highest exhibitions of the art, into what shall we see this grace expand, and of what shall we be satisfied? Where may the reader who will prosecute this subject, find a thousand illustrations of it; and in what will be perceive the influence of this presence of

where presence and ease and elevation of mind, may be expressed in things so trifling as in the movement of a fan, or in the presentation of a snuff-box.

There is still a higher degree of grace observable in those movements which express this self-possession and serenity of mind, in cases of danger; and wherever the gestures or attitudes are expressive of this screnity, they appear to me always to be felt to be graceful. It is thus, I think, very observably, in feats of horsemanship, performances upon the tight-rope, &c., when they do not degenerate into tricks of mere agility, or unnatural postures. That they are felt to be graceful even by the lowest people, is obvious from their conduct during such performances. They observe them with still apprehension; they shout and exult at their success; and when they speak of them to their companions, they erect their forms, and assume somewhat of the sympathetic dignity they have felt from these expressions of superiority to danger. It is impossible, I think, in the same manner, to observe the easy and careless movements of a mason upon a roof, or of a sailor upon the mast, without some sentiment of this nature. Observations of this kind, every one may pursue; and that it is from the expression of this strength and serenity of mind that the grace of such attitudes or gestures arises, may easily be inferred, when it is recollected that the same attitudes or gestures upon the ground, or in a place of security, would be altogether unnoticed.

I entreat leave yet farther to remark, that the conjecture which I have now stated seems to be supported by the consideration of the *parts* of the human form, which are peculiarly expressive of grace, and by the nature of the *movement* of those parts when they are actually felt to be graceful. The *parts* or members of the form which are peculiarly expressive of the temperance or intemperance of passion, are those which

mind? In what movements is there a still higher degree of grace observable; and what remark follows? In what feats is this the case; and what evidence have we that they are felt to be graceful, even by the lowest people? To observe what, is, in the same manner, impossible? From what may it be inferred that the grace of such attitudes or gestures arises from the impression of strength or serenity of mind? What does our author entreat leave

are most susceptible of motion, or which are most easily and visibly influenced by the character of mind. It is in these parts or members accordingly, that grace chiefly, if not solely resides-in the air and posture of the head, the turn of the neck, the expansion of the chest, the position of the arms, the motion or step of the limbs, the forms of the hair, and the folds of the drapery. That it is in the slow and composed movement alone of those parts, in that measure of motion, if I may use the expression, which indicates self-possession and self-command, that the graceful is to be found, is an observation which every one must have made, and which has been made from the earliest antiquity. Grace, according to the luminous expression of Lord Bacon, consists "in gracious and decent motion;" and I need not remind my classical readers, that wherever the poets of antiquity have represented graceful attitude or motion, they have always represented it as composed or slow; and that wherever it has been represented by the sculptors of antiquity. it has been expressed by the same signs of self-command, and self-possession. I presume to add only one illustration from Virgil, in which the distinction between beauty and grace in the air and movements of the human form, seems to me to be expressed with his usual delicacy of taste and of imagination.

In the first appearance of Venus to Æneas she is thus described:

> Cui mater media sese tulit obvia sylva Virginis os habitumque gerens, et Virginis arma Spartanæ; vel qualis equor Threissa fatigat Harpalice, volucremque fuga prævertiur Eurum; Namque humeris de more habilem suspenderit arcum Venatrix, dederatque comam diffundere ventis Nuda genu, nodoque sinus collecta fluentes.

Æn. 1. 314.

farther to remark? What members of the form are peculiarly expressive of the temperance or intemperance of passion; and what is it in which grace chiefly or solely resides? What observation must every one have made, and must have been made from the earliest antiquity? In what, according to Lord Bacon, does grace consist; and of what need not classical readers be reminded? Of the illustration added from Virgil, what is observed? Repeat

SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY

Lo 1 in the deep recesses of the wood, Before his eyes, his goddess mother stood---A huntress in her habit, and her mien, Her dress a maid, her air confessed a queen. Bare wore her knees, and knots her garments bind; Loose was her hair, and wantoned in the wind; Her hand sustained a bow--her quiver hung behind. She seemed a virgin of the Spartan blood---With such array Harpalyce bestrode Her Thracian courser, and outstripped the rapid fleod. Dryden.

In these lines, Venus appears in all the glow and gaiety of rural beauty :--She bursts upon us, as upon her son, by surprise : her air, her attire, bespeak youth and animation, and her hair, floating upon the winds, marks the speed with which she has pursued her woodland game. All this is beautiful and picturesque, but it is not graceful. It is in the moment she disappears, and when she reveals herself by her gesture, that Virgil raises this fine being into the grace that belonged to her :

> Dixit, et avertens rosea cervice refulsit, Ambrosizque comz divinum vertice odorem Spiravere; pedes vestis defluxit ad imos, Et vera incessu patnit Dea.

> > Ibid. 402

Thus having said, she turned, and made appear Her neck refulgent, and dishevelled hair, Which flowing from her shoulders, reached the ground, And widely spread ambrosial scents around. In length of train descends her sweeping gown, And by her graceful walk, the queen of lows is known. Druden.

In this description every thing is changed and exalted; her form dilates into serener majesty: her locks cease to float upon the wind, and fall in dignity around her head; her robes descend, and assume those ampler folds which mark a more elevated form, and a loftier movement; and above all, her get

the passage. In these lines how does Venus appear? Of all this what is remarked; and when is she raised to the grace that belongs to her? Repeat the following passage also. In this description how does she appear? What rises from the gay hurry of the Spartan nymph, into the slow and measured step which evinces the conscious dignity of her genuine being.

The influence of this expression may be pursued farther; and it may, perhaps, amuse the reader to follow it into many appearances, both in the animal world and in inanimate nature. Wherever the powers and faculties of motion are possessed, there the capacity of grace, at least, is possessed with them : and whenever, in such motions, grace is actually perceived, I think it will always be found to be in slow, and, if I may use the expression, in restrained or measured motions. The motions of the horse, when wild in the pasture, are beautiful; when urged to his speed, and straining for victory, they are sublime; but it is chiefly in movements of a different kind that we feel them to be graceful-when in the impatience of the field, or in the curveting of the manege, he seems to be conscious of all the powers with which he is animated, and yet to restrain them from some principle of beneficence, or of dignity. Every movement of the stag almost is beautiful, from the fineness of his form, and the ease of his gestures; yet it is not in these, or in the heat of the chase, that he is graceful: it is when he pauses upon some eminence in the pursuit, when he erects his crested head, and when, looking with disdain upon the enemy who follows, he bounds to the freedom of his hills. It is not, in the same manner, in the rapid speed of the eagle when he darts upon his prey, that we perceive the grace of which his motions are capable : It is when he soars slowly up. wards to the sun, or when he wheels with easy and continuous motion in airy circles in the sky.

In the personification which we naturally give to all inanimate objects which are susceptible of movement, we may easily perceive the influence of the same association. We speak commonly, for instance, of the graceful motions of trees, and of the graceful movements of a river: It is never, however,

is remarked of the influence of this expression; and what may, perhaps, amuse the reader? Where is the capacity of grace possessed; and where, in such motions, is grace perceived? How is this remark illustrated from the motions of the horse, of the stag, and of the eagle? Where may we easily

when these motions are violent or extreme, that we apply to them the term of grace. It is the gentle waving of the tree in slow and measured cadence which is graceful: not the tossing of its branches amid the storm : It is the slow and easy winding which is graceful in the movements of the river, and not the burst of the cataract, or the fury of the torrent.

SECTION VI.

CONCLUSION OF THIS ESSAY.---OF THE FINAL CAUSE OF THIS CONSTITUTION OF OUR NATURE.

The illustrations that have been offered in the course of this Essay, upon the origin of the SUBLIMITY and BEAUTY of some of the principal qualities of MATTER, seem to afford sufficient evidence for the following conclusions:

I. That each of these qualities is either from nature, from experience, or from accident, the sign of some quality capable of producing emotion, or the exercise of some moral affection : and,

II. That when these associations are dissolved, or in other words, when the material qualities cease to be significant of the associated qualities, they cease also to produce the emotions, either of sublimity or beauty.

If these conclusions are admitted, it appears necessarily to follow, that the beauty and sublimity of such objects are to be ascribed, not to the material qualities themselves, but to the qualities they signify; and, consequently, that the qualities of matter are not to be considered sublime or beautiful in themselves, but as the SIGNS OF EXPRESSIONS of such qualities, as, by the constitution of our nature, are fitted to produce pleasing or interesting emotion.

The opinion I have now stated coincides, in a great degree, with a DOCTRINE that appears very early to have distinguished

perceive the influence of the same association? How is this illustrated from the motion of trees, and the motion of a river?

For what conclusions do the illustrations that have been offered in the course of this Essay, seem to afford sufficient evidence? If these conclusions are admitted, what appears necessarily to follow? With what doctrine

the PLATONIC school; which is to be traced, perhaps, amid their dark and figurative language, in all the philosophical systems of the East, and which has been maintained in this country, by several writers of eminence; such as Lord Shaftesbury, Dr. Hutcheson, Dr. Akenside, and Dr. Spence, but which has been maintained no where so firmly and so philosophically as by Dr. Reid in his invaluable work on THE INTEL-LECTUAL POWERS OF MAN. The doctrine to which I allude, is, that matter is not beautiful in itself, but derives its beauty from the expression of MIND.

As this doctrine, however, when stated in general terms, has somewhat the air of paradox, I shall beg leave, in a few words, to explain in what sense I understand and adopt it, by enumerating what appear to me the principal classes of this expression, or the principal means by which the qualities of matter become significant of those qualities of mind which are destined to affect us with pleasing or interesting emotion.

The qualities of MIND which are capable of producing emotion, are either its ACTIVE, or its PASSIVE qualities—either its powers and capacities, as beneficence, wisdom, fortitude, invention, fancy, &c. or its feelings and affections, as love, joy, hope, gratitude, purity, fidelity, innocence, &c. In the observation or belief of these qualities of mind, we are formed, by the original and moral constitution of our nature, to experience various and powerful emotions.

As it is only, however, through the medium of matter, that, in the present condition of our being, the qualities of mind are known to us, the qualities of matter become necessarily expressive of all the qualities of mind which they signify. They may be the signs, therefore, or expressions of these mental qualities, in the following ways:

I. As the immediate signs of the POWERS or capacities of mind. It is thus, that all the works of human art or design are

does the opinion now stated, coincide; and where is it to be traced? By what individuals of eminence has it been maintained; and what is it? As this doctrine, however, when stated in general terms, has somewhat the air of paradox, what does our author beg leave to do; and in what manner? What are the qualities of mind which are capable of producing emotion; and what remark follows? Why do the qualities of matter become necessarily expressive of all the qualities of the mind which they signify? In what two ways

directly significant of the wisdom, the invention, the taste, or the benevolence of the artist; and the works of nature, of the power, the wisdom and the beneficence of the Divine artist:

II. As the signs of all those AFFECTIONS, or dispositions of mind, which we love, or with which we are formed to sympathize. It is thus that the notes and motions of animals are expressive of their happiness and joy: that the tones of the human voice are significant of the various emotions by which it is animated; and that all the affections which we either love or admire in the human mind, are directly signified by the various appearances of the countenance and form.

These may be called the *direct* expressions of mind; and the material qualities which signify such powers or affections, immediately produce in us, the peculiar emotions which, by the laws of our nature, the mental qualities are fitted to produce. But beside these, there are other means by which the qualities of matter may be significant to us of the qualities of mind, *indirectly*, or by means of less universal and less permanent relations.

1. From experience, when peculiar forms or appearances of matter are considered as the *means* or *instruments* by which those feelings or affections of mind are produced with which we sympathize, or in which we are interested. It is thus that the productions of art are in so many various ways significant of the conveniences, the pleasures, or the happiness they bestow upon human life, and as the signs of happiness affect us with the emotion which this happiness itself is destined to produce. It is thus, also, that the scenes of nature acquire such an accession of beauty, when we consider them as fitted, with such exquisite wisdom, for the habitation of so many classes of sentient being; and when they become thus expressive of all the varied happiness they produce, and contain, and conceal—

2. From analogy or resemblance; from that resemblance which has every where been felt between the qualities of mat-

may they be the signs of these mental qualities; and how is this illustrated? What may these be called; and what effect do the material qualities which signify such powers produce? But besides these there are what? What is the first means mentioned; and what instances of illustration are given? What is the second; and how is it illustrated? What is the third; and what

ter and of mind, and by which the former becomes so powerfully expressive of the latter. It is thus, that the colors, the sounds, the forms, and above all, perhaps, the motions of inanimate objects are so universally felt to resemble peculiar qualities or affections of mind, and when thus felt, are so productive of the analogous emotion; that the personification of matter is so strongly marked in every period of the history of human thought; and that the poet, while he gives life and animation to every thing around him, is not displaying his own invention, but only obeying one of the most powerful laws which regulate the imagination of man—

3. From association, in the proper sense of that term, when by means of education, of fortune, or of accident, material objects are connected with pleasing or interesting qualities of mind; and from this connexion become, forever afterwards, expressive of them. It is thus that colors, forms, &c., derive their temporary beauty from fashion—that the objects which have been devoted to religion, to patriotism, or to honor, affect us with all the emotions of the qualities of which they become significant—that the beauty of natural scenery is so often exalted by the record of the events it has witnessed; and that in every country, the scenes which have the deepest effect upon the admiration of the people, are those which have become sacred by the memory of ancient virtue or ancient glory—

4. From *individual* association; when certain qualities or appearances of matter, are connected with our own private affections or remembrances; and when they give to these material qualities or appearances a character of interest which is solely the result of our own memory and affections.

Of the reality of these expressions I believe no person can doubt; and whoever will attend to the power and extent of their influence, will, I think, soon be persuaded, that they are sufficient to account for all the beauty or sublimity we discover in the qualities of matter.

are the examples of illustration? What is the fourth; and when is it perceived? Of the reality of these expressions, what is remarked; and of what will he who attends to the extent and power of their influence, soon be per-

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The conclusion, therefore, in which I wish to rest, is, that the beauty and sublimity mhich is felt in the various appearances of matter, are finally to be ascribed to their expression of mind; or to their being, either directly or indirectly, the signs of those qualities of mind which are fitted, by the constitution of our nature, to affect us with pleasing or interesting emotion.

Yet, before I conclude this long, and, I fear, very tedious essay, there is one view of the subject which I cannot prevail upon myself to withhold. It is the view of the end, or FINAL CAUSE of this constitution of our nature; or of the purpose which is served by this dependence of the beauty or sublimity of the material world, on the higher qualities of which it is made significant. It is, perhaps, the most striking and the most luminous fact in the history of our intellectual nature, that that principle of curiosity which is the instinctive spring of all scientific inquiry into the phenomena, either of matter or of mind, is never satisfied until it terminates in the discovery, not only of design, but of benevolent design : and the great advantage, in my humble apprehension, which man derives from inquiry into the laws of his own mind, is much less in the addition which it gives to his own power or wisdom, than in the evidence which it affords him of the wisdom with which his constitution is framed, and the magnificent purposes for which it is formed. It is in this conviction, that I submit, to my readers, the following hints, upon this constitution of our nature with regard to the material world :

I. It is, in a very obvious manner, the means of diffusing happiness, so far as it depends upon the pleasures of taste, with a very impartial equality among mankind. We are perpetually surrounded with the objects of the material world; they are capable of giving us either pleasure or pain; and it must therefore be according to the law of this relation, that our pain or

suaded ? In what conclusion, therefore, does our author wish to rest ? Yet, before he concludes this long essay, what view of the subject is he not willing to withhold? What is, perhaps, the most striking, and most luminous fact, in the history of our intellectual nature? What is the great advantage which man derives, from inquiry into the laws of his own mind? What is its first influence; and of the objects of the material world by which we are per-

our pleasure must be determined. If the beauty or sublimity of the objects of the material world arose from any original and determined law of our nature, by which certain colors, or sounds, or forms, were necessarily and solely beautiful, then there must necessarily have followed a great disproportion between the happiness of mankind, by the very constitution of their na. ture. If, for instance, certain colors, or forms, or magnitudes, or proportions, in the scenery of nature alone were beautiful, then all men to whom these appearances were unknown, must necessarily have been deprived of all the enjoyment which the scenery of external nature could give. The eye of taste would often have looked in vain for its gratification ; one certain form, in every class of objects, and one prescribed composition in every varied scenery, could alone have afforded this gratifica. tion; and all the prodigal variety of nature, which now affords so delightful a subject either of observation, or of reflection, would then have been significant only of partiality or imperfection. If, still farther in the human countenance and form, there were only certain colors, or forms, or proportions, that were essentially beautiful, how imperious a check would have been given, not only to human happiness, but to the most important affections and sensibilities of our nature !--- the influence of beauty would then have operated, in a thousand cases, in opposition to the principles of duty; whenever it was wanting in those with whom we were connected, some obstacle, at least, would be imposed to the freedom or the warmth of our regard ; and wherever it was present, an irresistible and fatal preference would be given to those in whom it was found. The parent would turn from the children, whose forms nature had neglected, to those on whom she had lavished her external favor; the friend and the husband would feel their gratitude and their affection decrease with every shade, which infirmity,

petually surrounded, what is remarked? Under what circumstances would there be a great disproportion between the happiness of mankind, by the very constitution of their nature? How is this remark fully illustrated? If, still farther, in the human countenance and form, there were only *certain* colors, or forms, or proportions, that were essentially beautiful, what consequence would follow? What would be its influence upon domestic life, and upon society? If the emotions of taste, on the other hand, are produced by the perpetual ex-

which sorrow, or which age threw over the countenances of those whom they once loved; the regards of general society would fall but too exclusively upon those who were casually in possession of these external advantages; and an aristocracy would be established even by nature itself, more irresistible, and more independent either of talents or of virtue, than any that the influence of property or of ancestry has ever yet created among mankind.

If the emotions of taste, on the other hand, and all the happiness they give, are produced by the perpetual expression of mind, the accommodation of this system to the happiness of human nature is not only in itself simple, but may be seen in the simplest instances. Wherever the appearances of the material world are expressive of qualities we love or admire--wherever, from our education, our connexions, our habits, or our pursuits, its qualities are associated in our minds with affecting or interesting emotion, there the pleasures of beauty or of sublimity are felt, or at least are capable of being felt. Our minds, instead of being governed by the character of external objects, are enabled to bestow upon them a character which does not belong to them; and even with the rudest, or the most common appearances of nature, to connect feelings of a nobler or a more interesting kind, than any that the mere influences of matter can ever convey. It is hence, that the inhabitant of savage and of barbarous countries clings to the rocks and the deserts in which he was nursed; that, if the pursuit of fortune unhappily forces him into the regions of fertility and cultivation, he sees in them no memorials of early love, or of ancient independence; and that he hastens to return to the rocks and the deserts which spoke to his infant heart, and amid which he recognises his first affections, and his genuine home. It is hence, that in the countenance of her dying infant, the eye of the mother discovers beauties which she feels not in those who require not her care; and that the bosom of the husband or the friend glows with deeper affection

pression of mind, what follows? Where are the pleasures of beauty or of sublimity felt, or capable of being felt; and why? How is this remark illustrated, from the conduct of the inhabitant of savage and of barbarous coun-

408

when he marks the advances of age, or disease, over those features which first awakened the emotions of friendship or of love. It is hence, in the same manner, that the eye of admiration turns involuntarily from the forms of those who possess only the advantages of physical beauty, to rest upon the humbler forms which are expressive of genius, of knowledge, or of virtue; and that in the public assemblies of every country, the justice of national taste neglects all the external advantages of youth, of rank, or of grace, to bestow the warmth of its enthusiasm upon the mutilated form of the warrior who has extended its power, or the gray hairs of the statesman who has maintained its liberty.

II. This dependence of the beauty of matter upon the qualities of which it is significant, is, in a very obvious manner, the great source of the progress and improvement of human ART in every department, whether mechanical or liberal. Were there any original and positive beauty in *certain* forms, or proportions, or combinations of matter, and were it to these alone that the sentiment of beauty was constitutionally restricted, a very obvious barrier would be imposed to the progress of every art that was conversant in material form; and the sense of taste would necessarily operate to oppose every new improvement.

As the peculiar forms, or combinations of form, which nature had thus prescribed, could alone be beautiful, the common artist would hardly dare to deviate from them, even when he felt the propriety of it; and whenever any strong motive of usefulness induced him to deviate from them, the spectator would feel that sentiment of dissatisfaction which attends vulgar and unenlightened workmanship. The sense of beauty would thus be opposed to the sense of utility; the rude but beautiful form, would become as permanent in the productions of art, as we now see it in those cases where the ideas of sanctity are attached to it;

tries—of the mother, the husband, or the friend, &c.? Of what is this dependence of the beauty of matter upon the qualities of which it is significant, the great source? Under what circumstances, would an obvious barrier be imposed to the progress of every art that was conversant in material form; and how would the sense of taste necessarily operate? As the peculiar forms which nature had thus prescribed, could alone be beautiful, what is observed of the course of the common artist? To what would the sense of beauty be

and thus, at once, an additional influence would be given to the rude inventions of antiquity, and an additional obstacle imposed to those progressive inventions, which are so necessarily demanded by the progress of society.

In the fine arts, still more, or in those arts which are directed solely to the production of beauty, this obstacle would seem to be permanent and invincible. As no forms, or combinations of forms could, in such a constitution of our nature, be beautiful, but those which this law of our nature prescribed, then the period of their discovery must have been the final period of every art of taste. The exertions of the artist must necessarily have been confined to strict imitation; the demand of the spectator could alone have been satisfied when accuracy and fidelity, in this respect, were attained; and the names of genius, of fancy, or of invention, must either have altogether been unknown, or known only to be contemned.

By the dependence of our sense of beauty, on the other hand, upon the qualities of which material forms are significant. and may be made significant, a very different, and a far nobler effect is produced upon the progress of human art. Being thus susceptible of the expressions of fitness, of utility, of invention, of study, or of genius, they are capable of producing all the emotions of admiration, or delight, which such qualities of mind themselves produce ; and a field is thus opened to the dignified ambition of the artist, not only unbounded in its extent, but in which. even in the lowest of the mechanical arts, the highest honors of genius or of benevolence may be won. Instead of a few forms which the superstition of early taste had canonized, every variety, and every possible combination of forms, is thus brought within the pale of cultivated taste; the mind of the spectator follows with joy the invention of the artist; wherever greater usefulness is produced, or greater fitness exhibited, he sees,

410

thus opposed; and what would be the consequence? In what arts would this obstacle seem to be permanent and invincible; and what remark follows? To what must the exertions of the artist have been strictly confined, when only could the demand of the spectator have been satisfied; and to the names of genius, &c., what would have been the consequence? How is a very different, and far nobler effect produced upon the progress of human art? Being thus susceptible of the expressions of fitness, &c. what emotions are they capable of producing; and a field of what extent is thus opened to the dignified

in the same forms, new beauty awakening. The sensibility of imagination thus follows the progress of genius and of usefulness; and instead of an obstacle being imposed to the progress of art, a new motive is thus afforded to its improvement, and a new reward provided for the attainment of excellence.

With regard to the fine arts, the influence of this constitution of our nature is still more apparent. Destined as they are to the production of beauty, the field in which they are to labor is not narrowed by the prescriptions of vulgar men or of vulgar nature; nor are they chained, like the Egyptian artists of old, to the servile accuracy of imitating those forms or compositions of form alone, which some irresistible law has prescribed. The forms and the scenery of material nature are around them, not to govern, but to awaken their genius-to invite them to investigate the sources of their beauty; and from this investigation to exalt their conceptions to the imagination of forms and compositions of form more pure and more perfect than any that nature herself ever presents to them. It is in this pursuit that that ideal beauty is at last perceived, which it is the loftiest ambition of the artist to feel and to express; and which, instead of being created by any vulgar rules, or measured by any organic effects, is capable of producing emotions of a more exquisite and profound delight than nature itself is ever destined to awaken.

III. It is far more important to observe, that it is by means of this constitution of our nature, that the emotions of taste are blended with mORAL sentiment; and that one of the greatest pleasures of which we are susceptible, is made finally subservient to moral improvement.

If the beauty of the material world were altogether independent of expression, if any original law had imperiously pre-

ambition of the artist? How is this remark illustrated? What does the sensibility of imagination thus follow, and what is the consequence? With regard to the fine arts, how does it appear that the influence of this constitution of our nature is still more apparent? For what purpose are the forms and scenery of material nature around them? In this pursuit what is perceived; and what is remarked of it? What is it of far more importance to observe? If the beauty of the material world were altograther independent

scribed the objects in which the eye and the ear alone could find delight, the pleasures of taste must have been independent of all moral emotion, and the qualities of beauty and sublimity as distinct from moral sensibility as those of number or of figure. The scenery of nature would have produced only an organic pleasure, which would have expired with the moment in which it was felt; and the compositions of the artist, instead of awakening all the enthusiasm of fancy and of feeling, must have been limited to excite only the cold approbation of faithful outline and accurate detail. No secret analogies, no silent expressions, would then have connected enjoyment with improvement; and in contradiction to every other appearance of human nature, an important source of pleasure would have been bestowed without any relation to the individual or the social advancement of the human race.

In the system which is established, on the contrary-in that system which makes matter sublime or beautiful only as it is significant of mind; we perceive the lofty end which is pursued, and that pleasure is here, as in every other case, made instrumental to the moral purposes of our being. While the objects of the material world are made to attract our infant eyes, there are latent ties by which they reach our hearts; and wherever they afford us delight, they are always the signs or expressions of higher qualities, by which our moral sensibilities are called It may not be our fortune, perhaps, to have been born forth. amid its nobler scenes : but wander where we will, trees wave, rivers flow, mountains ascend, clouds darken, or winds animate the face of heaven; and over the whole scenery, the sun sheds the cheerfulness of his morning, the splendor of his noonday, or the tenderness of his evening light. There is not one of these features of scenery which is not fitted to awaken us to moral emotion-to lead us, when once the key of our imagination is struck, to trains of facinating and of endless imagery;

of expression, what must have been the consequence? What pleasure only, would the scenery of nature have produced, and to what must the compositions of the artist have been limited? What remark follows? In the system which is established, on the contrary, what do we perceive; and what remark follows? What may not be our fortune; yet wander where we will, what is equally manifest? Each of these features of scenery is fitted to produce

and in the indulgence of them to make our bosoms either glow with conceptions of mental excellence, or melt in the dreams of moral good. Even upon the man of the most uncultivated taste, the scenes of nature have some inexplicable charm: there is not a chord perhaps of the human heart which may not be awakened by their influence; and I believe there is no man of genuine taste, who has not often felt, in the lone majesty of nature, some unseen spirit to dwell, which in his happier hours touched, as if with magic hand, all the springs of his moral sensibility, and rekindled in his heart those original conceptions of the moral or intellectual excellence of his nature, which it is the melancholy tendency of the vulgar pursuits of life to diminish, if not altogether to destroy.

In the sublimity or beauty of the works of art, this purpose of nature is still more evident. If it is from their natural beauty they affect us, from their being expressive of fineness. delicacy, gentleness, majesty, solemnity, &c.; they then awaken corresponding emotions in our bosoms, and give exercise to some of the most virtuous feelings of our nature. If it is from their relative beauty, from their being expressive of invention, genius, taste, or fancy, in the artist, they produce effects no less important to our intellectual improvement. They raise us to those high conceptions of the powers and of the attainments of the human mind, which is the foundation of every noble ambition : they extend our views of the capacities of our nature for whatever is great or excellent; and whatever be the pursuits from which we come, they stimulate us to higher exertions in them, by the prospect of the genius which has been exhibited, and the excellence which has been attained.

But it is chiefly in the beauty of the human countenance and form that the great purpose of nature is most apparent. When we feel these, it is not a mere organic or animal effect we experience. Whatever is lovely or beloved in the character of MIND, whatever in the powers or dispositions of man can

what effect? Even upon whom have the scenes of nature some inexplicable charm; and what has every man of genuine taste felt? In what is this purpose of nature still more evident, and what considerations prove this to be the case? To what do they raise us, in what manner do they extend our views; and what follows? But in what is the great purpose of nature most appaawaken admiration or excite sensibility; the loveliness of innocence, the charms of opening genius, the varied tenderness of domestic affection; the dignity of heroic, or the majesty of patriotic virtue—all these are expressed in the features of the countenance, or in the positions and movements of the form. While we behold them, we feel not only a feeling of temporary pleasure, but what Lord Kames profoundly and emphatically called the "sympathetic emotion of virtue;" we share in some measure in those high dispositions, the expression of which we contemplate; our own bosoms glow with kindred sensibilities; and we return to life and to its duties, with minds either softened to a wider benevolence, or awakened to a higher tone of morality.

It is thus, by means of the expressions of which it is every where significant, that the material universe around us becomes a scene of moral discipline; and that in the hours when we are most unconscious of it, an influence is perpetually operating, by which our moral feelings are awakened, and our moral sensibility exercised. Whether in the scenery of nature, amid the works and inventions of men, amid the affections of home. or in the intercourse of general society, the material forms which surround us are secretly but incessantly influencing our character and dispositions. And in the hours of the most innocent delight, while we are conscious of nothing but the pleasures we enjoy, the beneficence of Him that made us, is employed in conducting a secret discipline, by which our moral improvement is consulted, and those sentiments and principles are formed, which are afterwards to create not only our own genuine honor, but the happiness of all with whom it is our fortune to be connected.

There is yet, however, a greater expression which the appearances of the material world are fitted to convey, and a

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414

rent; and why? What is expressed in the features of the countenance, or in the positions and movements of the form? While we behold them, what is their effect? What effect is thus produced by the material universe; and where are the material forms which surround secretly, but incessantly influencing our character and dispositions? And in the hours of the most innocent delight, in what manner is the beneficerce of Him that made us employed? What greater expression, however, are the appearances of the ma-

more important influence which, in the design of nature, they are destined to produce upon us: their influence I mean in leading us directly to RELIGIOUS sentiment. Had organic enjoyment been the only object of our formation, it would have been sufficient to establish senses for the reception of these enjoyments. But if the promises of our nature are greater—if it is destined to a nobler conclusion—if it is enabled to look to the Author of Being himself, and to feel its proud relation to HIM; then nature, in all its aspects around us, ought only to be felt as signs of his providence, and as conducting us, by the universal language of these signs, to the throne of the DETTY.

How much this is the case with every pure and innocent mind, I flatter myself few of my readers will require any illustration. Wherever, in fact, the eve of man opens upon any sublime or beautiful scene of nature, the first impression is to consider it as designed, as the effect or workmanship of the Author of nature, and as significant of his power, his wisdom, or his goodness : and perhaps it is chiefly for this fine issue, that the heart of man is thus finely touched that devotion may spring from delight; that the imagination, in the midst of its highest enjoyment, may be led to terminate in the only object in which it finally can repose; and that all the noblest convictions, and confidences of religion, may be acquired in the simple school of nature, and amid the scenes which perpetually surround us. Wherever we observe, accordingly, the workings of the human mind, whether in its rudest or its most improved appearances, we every where see this union of devotional sentiment with sensibility to the expressions of natural scenery : it calls forth the hymn of the infant bard, as well as the anthem of the poet of classic times : it prompts the nursery tale of superstition, as well as the demonstration of the school of philoso-There is no era in which man has existed, so barbarous phy.

terial world fitted to convey? Had organic enjoyment been the only object of our formation, for what would it have been sufficient; but what remark follows? Of what will few readers require any illustration? Wherever the eye of man opens upon any sublime or beautiful scene in nature, what is the first impression; and why, perhaps, is this the case? Wherever we observe, accordingly, the workings of the human mind, what do we see; and what is its effect? In the most barbarous eras, what are to be seen; and amid the

that in it the traces are not to be seen of the alliance which he has felt between earth and heaven ; or of the conviction he has acquired of the mind that created nature, by the signs which it exhibits : and amid the wildest, as well as amid the most genial scenes of an uncultivated world, the rude altar of the savage every where marks the emotions that swelled in his bosom when he erected it to the awful or the beneficent deities, whose imaginary presence it records. In ages of civilization and refinement, this union of devotional sentiment with sensibility to the beauties of natural scenery, forms one of the most characteristic marks of human improvement, and may be perceived in every art which professes to give delight to the imagination. The funereal urn, and the inscription to the dead, present themselves every where as the most interesting incidents in the scenes of ornamental nature. In the landscape of the painter, the columns of the temple, or the spire of the church, rise amid the ceaseless luxuriance of vegetable life, and by their contrast. give the mighty moral to the scene, which we love, even while we dread it: the powers of music have reached only their highest perfection when they have been devoted to the services of religion; and the description of the genuine poet has seldom concluded without some hymn to the Author of the universe, or some warm appeal to the devotional sensibility of mankind.

Even the thoughtless and the dissipated yield unconsciously to this beneficent instinct; and in the pursuit of pleasure, return, without knowing it, to the first and the noblest sentiments of their nature. They leave the society of cities, and all the artificial pleasures, which they feel to have occupied, without satiating their imagination. They hasten into those solitary and those uncultivated scenes, where they seem to breathe a purer air, and to experience some more profound delight. They leave behind them all the arts, and all the labors of man,

wildest scenes of an uncultivated world, what does the rude altar of the savage every where mark? In ages of civilization and refinement, what does this union form, and where may it be perceived? How is this illustrated from the funereal urn, the landscape of the painter, the powers of music; and the descriptions of the genuine poet? How are the thoughtless and the disto meet nature in her primeval magnificence and beauty. Amid the slumber of their usual thoughts, they love to feel themselves awakened to those deep and majestic emotions which give a new and a nobler expansion to their hearts, and amid the tumult and astonishment of their imagination,

> Præsentiorem conspicere DEUM Per invias rupes, fera per juga, Clivosque præruptos, sonantes Inter aquas, nemorumque noctom.

To behold the present God On the rocks by man untrod, On the hill-tops wild and rude, On the cliff's deep solitude-Where the roaring waters move--In the darkness of the grove.

It is on this account that it is of so much consequence in the education of the young, to encourage their instinctive taste for the beauty and sublimity of nature. While it opens to the years of infancy or youth a source of pure and of permanent enjoyment, it has consequences on the character and happiness of future life, which they are unable to foresee. It is to provide them, amid all the agitations and trials of society, with one gentle and unreproaching friend, whose voice is ever in alliance with goodness and virtue, and which, when once understood, is able both to sooth misfortune, and to reclaim from folly. It is to identify them with the happiness of that nature to which they belong; to give them an interest in every species of being which surrounds them; and, amid the hours of curiosity and delight, to awaken those latent feelings of benevolence and of sympathy, from which all the moral or intellec-

sipated affected by this beneficent instinct; and what do they do? Amid the slumber of their usual thoughts, to what do they love to feel themselves awakened; and amid the tumult and astonishment of their imagination to behold what? On this account, what is of the utmost consequence in the education of the young; and why? Amid the agitations and trials of society, with what is it to provide them, with what to identify them, in what to give them an interest, and amid the hours of curiosity and delight, to awaken

418 SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY OF THE MATERIAL WORLD.

tual greatness of man finally arises. It is to lay the foundation of an early and of a manly piety: amid the magnificent system of material signs in which they reside, to give them the mighty key which can interpret them; and to make them look upon the universe which they inhabit, not as the abode of human cares, or human joys only, but as the temple of the LIVING GOD, in which praise is due, and where service is to be performed.

what feelings? Of what is it to lay the foundation, what to give them, and to make them look upon the universe which they inhabit in what light?

THE END.