




JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS

THE PUBLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS ASSOCIATION



SPECIAL REPORT:

Crisis in Sudan

Violence in East Timor
Ambassador Cohen on Chad
South African Legislation

Volume 2, Number 1
July/August 2006

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
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We live in a world that gets smaller each day.


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IPOA PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

- 4 Focusing on Sudan**
Doug Brooks

IPOA MEMBER PROFILE

- 5 EOD Technology**
Munitions Response, Security, Support

COVER STORY: CRISIS IN SUDAN

- 7 A Sudan Primer**
All you ever wanted to know. Almost.
- 8 When Will We Learn the Lesson?**
Sloan Mann
- 9 Send Private Security Companies Into Sudan**
Max Boot
- 10 What Next for the North-South Conflict in Sudan?**
Dale Erickson
- 11 Advancing the Transition to Peace**
Marv Koop

VIOLENCE IN TIMOR

- 13 Peacekeepers Return to Timor**
Déjà vu for Australia
- 14 A Lesson in How Not to Leave**
Emily Messner and J. J. Messner

GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS

- 15 South African Legislation Threatens Peace Industry**
Peter Leon and Kevin Williams
- 16 PSCs Testify Before Congress**
Diana Basto Castro

STUDY OF PEACE OPERATIONS

- 17 Combatants or Non-Combatants?**
Robert Bunker

COLUMNISTS

- 19 Déby Must Go for the Sake of Chad ... and Sudan**
Ambassador Herman Cohen
- 20 A Role for the Private Sector in DRC**
Derek Wright

THE IPOA LION

- 21 Standards Committee Simulation**
Tanner Ivie
- 21 IPOA Roundtables**
Bujana Perolli and Diana Basto Castro

NGO PROFILES

- 22 SOS Children's Villages**
NGO Supporting Children Worldwide
- 22 Pact**
NGO Building Grassroots Capacity



COVER PHOTO: One of Sudan's many child soldiers, a problem endemic the conflict. *Photo courtesy SOS Children's Villages.*



Photo: UNICEF

CRISIS IN SUDAN: As the long-running conflict between north and south seems to be nearing peace, the international community dithers on its response to the tragedy in Darfur. Pages 7-12



Photo: UNDPKO

VIOLENCE IN TIMOR: Once a show piece of nation-building, the fledgling nation of Timor-Leste is again a basket case. Pages 13-14

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I P O A P R E S I D E N T ' S M E S S A G E

Focusing on Sudan

And a New Publication for the International Peace Operations Association

*D o u g B r o o k s*

AS YOU MAY HAVE noticed, this is not the old IPOA Quarterly newsletter. Under the leadership and initiative of IPOA's new Director of Programs, J.J. Messner, we have expanded our Association newsletter into a full-fledged bi-monthly journal. The expanded format allows us to focus more broadly on key issues and include more articles and ideas. It will also soon include a letters section, and I encourage readers to join the discourse in this forum, whether they agree or disagree with the points of view expressed.

While IPOA is best known as an association of private sector companies that provide services in conflict and post conflict environments, we have no intention of limiting the scope of our journal only to private sector issues. Our goal is to explore ideas and concerns related to improving peace operations around the world, by bringing together all of the critical actors in the field, including the UN and other international organizations, governments and their aid organizations, militaries, nongovernmental and humanitarian organizations and academics. We hope our broad readership will find the articles provocative, informative and useful. What we will not do, however, is ignore the vital role the private sector plays in peace and stability operations today.

CRISIS IN SUDAN

This issue's focus on Sudan could not be a more appropriate topic for our new format. The conflict in Darfur by itself encapsulates many of the critical issues facing the international peace operations, including limits on international political will, challenges regarding the responsibility to protect, the limits of "Westernless" peacekeeping and the increasingly prominent role of the private sector.

The potential role of the private sector in Darfur is something IPOA has been asked about frequently of late by journalists, NGOs and policy makers. It should be noted that IPOA members have been involved in supporting the African Union mission in Darfur from day one, providing logistics, base construction, management and operations, medical services, and helicopters and vehicles for AU troops. Nevertheless, most analysts agree that the AU mission in Darfur is simply too under-resourced to adequately fulfill its mandate in the vast area affected by the conflict.

IPOA has been working with NGOs, policy makers and academics to explore what additional resources and capabilities could be provided to support and enhance the capacity of the AU peacekeepers to bring stability to Darfur. The possibilities include unmanned aerial vehicles to provide reconnaissance, enhanced airmobile

capabilities to enable the AU observers to cover more territory, and private security that could protect at-risk villages and camps for the internally displaced. All of these life-saving operations could be provided to the Darfur mission in weeks and could help bridge the gap until the proposed UN force is able to deploy, in six to eight months' time.

These possibilities bring with them questions of funding, appropriate legal structures, contractual controls, and rules to ensure that the private sector resources are used most effectively. Furthermore, enhanced peacekeeping does not automatically mean an end to the conflict in itself. As with any peacekeeping operation, effective security can do much to reduce the killing, but it may also simply preserve an untenable political status quo. So while the private sector can vastly enhance the ability of AU or UN peacekeepers to end the killing, ultimately it is still up to governments and international organizations to broker a long-term political settlement and to NGOs and humanitarian organizations to provide the leadership required for critical community reconciliation and reconstruction.

Private security companies have some of the greatest potential to provide desperately needed humanitarian security services in support of the AU and UN peacekeepers. By directly protecting at-risk populations, they could allow the international military forces to focus on enforcing their mandate. Effective security combined with logistical assistance for the existing peacekeepers would vastly reduce loss of life and help end the violence until a long-term political solution can be worked out by international mediators. While IPOA strongly advocates greater utilization of private sector capabilities, we do not advocate moving this direction blindly, without adequate consideration of the need for transparency and accountability or without full consideration of how private services can be best woven into the larger mission.

International peace operations face grave challenges today, and Sudan certainly highlights many of the most daunting. Given the enormous human cost of even relatively small conflicts, it is imperative that the international community be realistic about its goals and capabilities while exploring ways to make better use of existing resources.

Increasing utilization of the private sector shows a growing pragmatism among policy makers and indicates that they place a greater value on humanitarian results than in the past. The private sector offers realistic and less expensive answers to many dilemmas facing peace operations and empowers policy makers with new tools and more effective peacekeepers. Ignoring these readily available resources would be positively ruthless, not just in today's Sudan, but in the future of international peace operations.

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Conference focus

The UN currently has over 71,000 members deployed in 19 peacekeeping operations around the world. New UN peacekeeping operations are being launched on average once every six months with four of the top five peacekeeping personnel contributing nations being regional states (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Nepal combined provide 42.5% of the total amount of UN Peacekeepers). In addition to this, the need to assist regional neighbours post natural disasters, and those experiencing internal instability is on the rise. The cost of these varied operations is escalating, with the need to minimise costs and broaden the base of contributors becoming powerful across the Asia Pacific region. By participating in this forum a greater understanding of the composition and conduct of future peacekeeping and stabilisation operations will be achieved. Organisational structures for effective future operations will also be proposed. The need for streamlining stability efforts through increased civilian and private enterprise participation will be examined, accentuating the need for unification of interagency cooperation. The event will also include an in depth look at the future requirements for training and education of personnel prior to peacekeeping and stabilisation operations.

Key issues to be covered

- Civilian police and their role in peacekeeping and stabilisation programmes
- Corruption and mismanagement: their effect on the success of an operation
- Creating stable economic development and nation building efforts
- Cross cultural/language differences – dealing with these factors
- DDR – disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
- Effective use of contractors, maximising value and oversight
- Force command, composition and structure
- Foreign aid, aid organisations and their role in intervention efforts
- Intervention operations: Ensuring a swift and sure response
- Military preparedness to protect civilians in conflict
- New and future technologies for peacekeeping and stability operations
- New possibilities for humanitarian intervention
- Reviving infrastructure – restoring public confidence
- The changing threat environment – using the right amount of force
- UN Peace-building Commission and the need for ongoing support
- Understanding the military role within large multi-organizational operations
- Unifying interagency operations – an integrated system
- Winning the hearts and minds of a populace

Potential case studies

- Afghanistan
- Iraq
- Namibia
- Sierra Leone
- Somalia
- Darfur
- Korea
- Rwanda
- Solomon Islands
- Timor-Leste

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US Navy

General Al Gray
USMC

General Richard Meyers
USAF

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US Navy

Vice Admiral Doug Katz
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Lieutenant General Camporini
Italian Army

Lieutenant General Sattler
USMC

Lieutenant General Shea
USMC

Brigadier Andrew Smith
Australian Army

Brigadier General Joseph Votel
US Army

Defence profile

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- Directors of Training
- Senior Military and Civilian Security Personnel
- Tactical Reserve Commanders
- Agency Commanders
- Defence Departments
- Directors of Peacekeeping and/or Stabilisation Response
- Foreign Aid Departments
- Intelligence / Information Managers
- International Deployment Groups
- Managers of Threat Detection
- Project and Contracting Officers
- Reconstruction Teams
- Regional and International Organisations with peacekeeping interests: (EU/UN/NATO/AU/ASEAN)
- State Departments
- Treasury Departments

Industry profile

- Infrastructure reconstruction contractors
- Support services providers
- Stability service providers
- Security personnel providers
- Security equipment contractors

COVER STORY: CRISIS IN SUDAN

A Sudan Primer

Sudan's Biggest Exports Have Become Conflict, Genocide, Refugees and Terrorism



J. J. Messner

STRETCHING FROM Egypt and Libya in the north to Uganda and Kenya in the south, Sudan is the largest country in Africa by land mass. The country has also become one of Africa's largest trouble spots.

Sudan is a crossroads of Africa, where the black, Christian and Animist south meets the Arab, Islamic north. Despite its racial and ethnic mix, Sudan has been dominated by Islamic governments since it gained independence from British colonial rule in 1956.

For the last 21 years, Sudan has endured a civil war between the mainly Muslim north and the Animist and Christian south. Southern rebels cite oppression and marginalization by the northern authorities, and the war is rooted in the north's economic, political and social domination of the south.

The current ruling regime — a mixture of a military elite and Islamists — came to power in a 1989 coup d'état. The regime has continued to wage the civil war against the south and an alliance of northern anti-government forces. The conflict has come closer to resolution since the signing of several accords — including a cease-fire agreement — in 2002-03 and a comprehensive peace deal in 2005.

A separate conflict in the three western states of the

Darfur region began in 2003, when rebels attacked government targets, claiming neglect by the authorities in Khartoum. Darfur has been beset by conflict between the black and Arab populations, deeply rooted in competition for land rights and the scarce food and resources in the desolate region. The Sudanese government has been guilty of providing significant support to Arab militia, known as the Janjaweed, who ride into villages on horses and camels, slaughtering, raping and abducting the black population.

Despite the conflict in Darfur being described as genocide, the international response has been minimal. The African Union has more than 7,000 peacekeepers deployed with a weak mandate restricting their activities largely to observation. The United Nations has agreed to deploy a peacekeeping force, but the size, timeframe and mandate of such a force has yet to be established.

The conflict in Darfur has now begun to spread into neighboring Chad. Sudanese authorities say the main rebel groups — the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement — are operating from across the border and are being supported by the Chadian government.

Since 1983, the effects of civil war and famine have claimed more than 2 million lives, and have displaced at least 4 million people. Over the past three years, the conflict in Darfur has killed 200,000 people and has placed 3 million at risk of starvation.



Photo: SOS Children's Villages

One of the many child soldiers produced by the Sudanese conflicts.

REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN FACTBOX	
<p>Map: International Peace Operations Association</p>	<p>Population: 41.2 million</p> <p>Major Languages: Arabic, Nubian, Ta Bedawie</p> <p>Major Religions: Islam, indigenous beliefs, Christianity</p> <p>Major Ethnicities: Black, Arab, Beja</p> <p>Life Expectancy: Men 55 years, Women 58 years</p>
	<p>Independence: 1956 (from United Kingdom)</p> <p>Capital: Khartoum</p> <p>President: Field Marshal Umar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir</p> <p>Area: 966,757 sq. miles/2.5 million sq. km.</p> <p>Divisions: 26 states</p>
	<p>Main Exports: Oil, cotton, sesame, livestock, hides</p> <p>GNI per Capita: US\$530</p>

COVER STORY: CRISIS IN SUDAN

When Will We Learn the Lesson?

In Search of Successful Humanitarian Intervention in Sudan

Sloan Mann

OVER ONE BILLION U.S. dollars in humanitarian aid has been spent in Darfur and eastern Chad since the beginning of the crisis in 2004. As so many of us working on the ground in Darfur understand, having millions of dollars for humanitarian programs means nothing when armed militias freely roam the countryside burning villages, killing, raping, and terrorizing the people.

Establishing a safe and secure environment during a humanitarian crisis is critical to successful interventions and emergency programming. It not only helps protect the lives of humanitarian workers and beneficiaries, it sets the conditions for internally displaced person and refugee returns and facilitates a quicker transition from emergency-type programs to transformational programming.

By encouraging communities to come back together and begin a reconciliation process, transformational programming goes beyond providing emergency food, water, basic sanitation and health care. It reinforces traditional methods of conflict resolution and helps restore livelihoods. Without the fear of attack, displaced people will consider returning home and settling differences. Ultimately, a safe and secure environment allows humanitarian programs to enable faster progress toward a return to normalcy, can shorten the timeline to recovery, and reduce the amount of money the international community spends alleviating the consequences of the crisis.

It is well known that the African Union force was a band-aid solution to a gushing problem, as it has never had the training, equipment, or mandate for effective action. Because the AU has not been able to keep the ongoing violence in check, the displacement camps in Darfur are getting larger and more permanent by the month. A vicious cycle of dependency is developing that grows harder to break by the day. As the security situation deteriorates, rural communities seek safety and humanitarian services in larger villages with established

displacement camps. NGOs are increasingly unable to operate safely in rural areas and must focus their programs in towns with the most displaced people.

Thus, with a greater international presence around displacement camps — and free humanitarian services — the population increases as rural villagers gain a perception of security. Displacement camps are meant to be temporary but in Darfur, as they did in South Sudan, they are becoming permanent with devastating consequences. Permanent displacement camps destroy traditional ways of life, lead to economic underdevelopment, and become incredibly expensive for the international community to maintain.

While the recently signed Darfur Peace Agreement is

a step in the right direction, there is little confidence on the ground that the Sudanese Government will live up to its commitment of disarming and demobilizing the Janjaweed by mid-October 2006. In fact, the entire peace deal is predicated on this happening and many believe that even if the government had the will, it is not capable of forcefully disarming the Janjaweed. Additionally, it is doubtful that peace will hold on the ground as the local level commanders are



Photo: UNICEF

The Sudanese government has demonstrated a severe lack of will in disarming the Janjaweed militia.

increasingly acting with autonomy and impunity.

Recent events confirm that the peace agreement has made little tangible impact on the precarious security situation in Darfur. AU representatives claim that attacks continue, and UN officials report no change in the threatening, sometimes deadly, security environment outside displacement camps. West Darfur remains essentially closed to humanitarian organizations as only essential staff operate in the regional capital Geneina.

Establishing a safe and secure environment must be a priority. From the initial deployment, any effective peacekeeping force must have a robust mandate and adequate resources. As the cases of Bosnia and Rwanda illustrate, peacekeeping forces with weak mandates achieve little and sometimes cannot even protect themselves. For a maiden deployment, the AU has done the best it could with the bare minimum of resources. Although it has reduced violence and saved some lives, it has never had the muscle or the mandate to stop attacks on civilians.

The author is a senior regional manager for MPRI supporting the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program. He worked as a field officer in Darfur, Sudan for the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.

SEE Humanitarian, Page 12

COVER STORY: CRISIS IN SUDAN

Send Private Security Companies into Sudan

Darfur needs someone to stop the bloodshed, not more empty U.N. promises.



Max Boot

SO THE UNITED STATES has brokered a cease-fire among the warring factions in Darfur, and the U.N. Security Council has authorized the deployment of a peacekeeping force. To anyone blissfully unfamiliar with history, this sounds like a decisive step that will finally end the violence that has left at least 200,000 dead and 2 million homeless.

Alas, this is not the first cease-fire agreement in Darfur. An accord was reached in 2004 and was immediately violated. There is no reason to think that the current treaty will fare any better, especially because one of the main rebel groups has refused to sign it.

Pieces of paper, no matter how promising, require power in order to be enforced. The question is: Who will provide that power in Darfur? The African Union force deployed in 2004 has proven woefully inadequate. Its 7,000 soldiers lack the numbers, training and equipment to patrol an undeveloped region the size of

France. They don't even have a mandate to stop ethnic cleansing; they are only supposed to monitor the situation.

If you listen to the bloviators at Turtle Bay, salvation will come from the deployment of a larger corps of blue helmets. If only. What is there in the history of United Nations peacekeepers that gives anyone any confidence that they can stop a determined adversary?

The odds are much greater that U.N. representatives will instead be taken as hostages by bloodthirsty thugs, as happened in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sierra Leone. Or that, rather than protecting the people, the peacekeepers will prey on them — as allegedly has happened in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea and Congo, all places where blue helmets have been accused of pedophilia, rape and prostitution.

Even if these worst-case scenarios don't come to pass, the U.N. is likely to prove ineffectual in the face of determined opposition. Look at what is happening in East Timor, where, after seven years of U.N. stewardship, the capital has been paralyzed by fighting among armed

gangs. The situation is even worse in Haiti, where a Brazilian-led U.N. force has done little to stem growing chaos. It is worse still in Somalia — the most lawless country on Earth — where a U.N. deployment failed in the early 1990s.

And to think that some self-described realists had the temerity to suggest that everything would have worked out in Iraq if only the lead role had been turned over to the U.N. East Timor and Haiti are much smaller and more isolated, but the U.N. hasn't worked its multilateral magic in either place.

My point here isn't to indulge in U.N.-bashing for its



The best solution to confronting Sudan's squads of young militiamen may be private security companies

Photo: UNICEF

own sake but simply to suggest that we should temper our expectations for the peacekeeping force that is due to arrive in Darfur in six to nine months' time. The drawn-out timetable itself suggests how ineffectual the U.N. is. Even under the best of circumstances, the Janjaweed militia will enjoy another half-year of rapine without serious interference.

If the so-called civilized nations of the world were serious about ending what the U.S. government has

described as genocide, they would not fob off the job on the U.N. They would send their own troops. But of course they're not serious. At least not that serious.

But perhaps there is a way to stop the killing even without sending an American or European army. Send a private army. A number of commercial security firms such as Blackwater USA are willing, for the right price, to send their own forces made up in large part of veterans of Western militaries, to stop the genocide.

We know from experience that such private units would be far more effective than any U.N. peacekeepers. In the 1990s, the South African firm Executive Outcomes and the British firm Sandline made quick work of rebel movements in Angola and Sierra Leone. Critics complain that these companies offered only a temporary respite from the violence, but that was all they were hired to do. Presumably longer-term contracts could create longer-term security, and at a fraction of the cost of a U.N. mission.

Yet this solution is deemed unacceptable by the moral giants who run the United Nations. They claim that it is objectionable to employ private security companies. More objectionable, it seems, than passing empty resolutions, sending ineffectual peacekeeping forces and letting genocide continue.

The author is a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a regular columnist for The Los Angeles Times and former Editorial Editor of The Wall Street Journal. This article reprinted with permission from The Los Angeles Times.

COVER STORY: CRISIS IN SUDAN

What Next for the North-South Conflict in Sudan?

Attempts at Peace Give Cause for Optimism, but History Gives Cause for Concern

Dale Erickson



GIVEN THE CURRENT level of media and diplomatic attention on the conflict in Darfur, it is possible to see how the international community might lose focus on the other major conflict in Sudan, between the north and the south, the longest running civil war in Africa. To do so however, would be a grave mistake.

The peace building process in Sudan did not end with the completion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005. Rather, this is when it only truly began in earnest. The CPA between the two principal conflict parties, the Khartoum-based Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement established the conditions required to painstakingly address the myriad inequities between the two sides.

The sources of conflict in Sudan are deeply embedded in a host of root causes stemming from various underlying social, economic, political and cultural issues.¹ Significantly, the terms of the CPA do not by themselves provide solutions to these many complex, interrelated problems. Instead, through a series of specific implementation modalities, they identify the mechanisms and provide the framework to methodically execute more a detailed conflict transformation processes. These activities will likely take years of commitment by all Sudanese participants, and must be accompanied by extensive support from the international community.

The civil war in Sudan is generally recognized as two distinct periods of active conflict, separated by an intervening 11-year attempt at peaceful resolution. The brutal second war commenced in 1983 following the collapse of the Addis Ababa Accords, and only terminated after nearly two and a half years of almost constant negotiation conducted under the auspices of the east African regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development. The CPA is not a single document, but was actually an iterative process that built on the successes and compromises achieved in prior agreements to

provide the basis for a succession of agreements.² In addition to the prerequisite ceasefire agreements, the CPA focuses on four themes recognized as particularly essential for successful transformation of the conflict during the six-year interim period: southern self-determination; power sharing between the government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement; wealth sharing arrangements; and mitigation of the effects of war.

The CPA addresses the issue of self-determination by specifying provisions for a southern referendum on autonomy prior to the end of the interim period. The degree to which all interested parties can demonstrate



Photo: UNDPKO

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement is being supported and monitored by the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).

tangible progress toward mitigation of the conflict's root causes during the time remaining in the interim period will undoubtedly have a direct effect on the referendum's outcome. Of particular significance, and specifically related to issues of self-determination, is the acquiescence in the CPA by the Khartoum government on the installation of Shari'a law in the south — one of the proximate causes for the renewed hostilities

in 1983. Power-sharing issues are addressed through creation of a Government of National Unity which specifies key government positions for members of both conflict parties and establishes formulas for the creation of representative government. The CPA addresses wealth-sharing issues through detailed modalities on a series of economic details, while emphasizing the administration and management of oil resources. The establishment of several parallel government financial management and oversight activities in the south seems in some ways to foreshadow the eventual separation of the south and appears designed to build institutional capacity now.

Without question, the most dramatic effect of the war in the south lies in the vast numbers of internally displaced persons and refugees. This single aspect requires significant international assistance. Conversely, war damage to physical infrastructure — while certainly important to those who were directly affected — might be considered less critical for the society as a whole. After all, infrastructure was generally lacking already as a result of government marginalization of development in the south from the time of Sudanese independence, in 1956, onward.

The author is a U.S. Army Reserve civil affairs officer with experience in a number of peace operations in Haiti, the Middle East and Central Asia. He is currently pursuing graduate studies at George Mason University's Peace Operations Policy Program.

SEE North-South, Page 12

COVER STORY: CRISIS IN SUDAN

Advancing Sudan's Transition to Peace

Operating Effectively in Southern Sudan from the NGO Perspective



Marv Koop

OPERATING IN SUDAN presents a wide variety of challenges and obstacles that require creativity and patience to overcome. These include underdeveloped infrastructure, nascent and overburdened government institutions, security issues related to conflict and violence, and cultural and economic disparities between aid workers and recipients.

There are many challenges NGOs must address in order to support the Sudanese in their efforts to achieve real justice and a sustainable peace after decades of conflict. The dearth of roads and all-weather airstrips means that efficient, reliable forward planning is a myth during much of the year, and even plan B and plan C are usually overtaken by changing realities. Organizing, refueling and maintenance of vehicles is a major undertaking, particularly in many of the southern states of Sudan.

Along with the challenges presented by a lack of physical infrastructure, NGO plans are often changed due to the difficulty of organizing and convening stakeholders. With the ongoing establishment of new governance institutions at the national, state and county levels, the huge demands on authorities means constant adjustment to their schedules and priorities.

However, promoting their leadership and ownership in peace building and governance programming is a key to sustainability. Plans are set, invitations issued, planes booked, local support workers hired, materials and equipment delivered on site to support an important planning or governance workshop, then at the last minute the dates are changed. Or an outbreak of ethnic violence, usually related to cattle looting or problems with the forced disarmament of civilians means postponing the event indefinitely.

Violence and continued conflict also present challenges to program implementation. Close working relationships with local tribal leaders and the civil authorities are essential in order for NGOs to have a good understanding of the local security conditions and to be able to continue to implement programs, in spite of regular incidents of local violence and conflict. Supporting peace building and conflict resolution often requires staff to work in difficult and threatening situations. In the end, however, the identification with and support of these processes means strengthened relationships and tangible results.

The gap between the well-equipped NGOs and UN agencies, with numerous white Land Cruisers, satellite



Photo: PACT

A peace and reconciliation meeting in Southern Sudan.

communications, computers, generators and radios, and local authorities working from basic tukuls with pencil and paper under candle light, can easily spark resentment and make the international agency's talk of capacity building an affront to local and state authorities. There is also a huge challenge in appointing qualified personnel to the myriad positions required to staff the new government in southern Sudan, while adequately responding to demands that those who spent years in the

SEE NGOs, Page 12

Pact's Operations in Sudan



Pact's overall strategic focus in Sudan is to support the implementation of the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Pact's approach involves working closely with Sudanese authorities and partners to support, consolidate and deepen community-driven initiatives to resolve conflicts, promote improved individual and community security, build peace, manage natural resources and develop systems of good governance.

Pact currently is working in two categories of activities in Sudan. First, Pact supports people-to-people peace and reconciliation dialogues and the empowerment of local institutions — especially peace committees, peace councils and community based organizations — to lead and direct their own peace building and recovery initiatives. Second, Pact is implementing a variety of projects to improve the provision of water to support conflict management and the massive return of former internally displaced persons and refugees to their homes in southern Sudan.

Pact was gratified when a number of our senior staff agreed to join the Government of Southern Sudan in mid-2005.

The author is the Sudan country representative for the Washington, D.C.-based NGO Pact.

Humanitarian Intervention in Sudan

FROM Page 8

Unfortunately for the people of Darfur, there is little hope for a better future until militias are disarmed. The UN and humanitarian agencies are making heroic efforts to reach out to communities in need, often at great risk to their safety, and frequently see the fruits of their labor destroyed as communities are attacked, equipment and supplies looted, and more people displaced.

Transformational programming is nearly impossible in such an insecure environment so humanitarian agencies just do their best to keep people alive. When will the international community learn the lesson that without real security, there is little to no chance for societies to

recover from a crisis? Robust, early interventions have a much better chance of success and act as a kind of investment against future losses — both in terms of money and lives.

The recent UN resolution calling for a transition from the AU to a much larger UN peacekeeping force should have happened from the outset. This force will not be in place until spring or summer of 2007. In the interim, all indications point to a maintenance of the status quo: continued violence, civilians suffering and dying, and the international community spending hundreds of millions of dollars in emergency aid on overcrowded displacement camps.

North-South Peace Attempts

FROM Page 10

Ultimate success, as defined either by a reconciled Sudan or through the creation of a new sovereign state in southern Sudan, will be measured in terms of how well the various responsibilities assigned to each actor were supported or ignored. Significantly, Sudan has a history of failed agreements. Today, nearly a year into the six-year interim period, there is cause for both hope and concern. Shortly after the agreement was signed, the United Nations moved swiftly to establish the UN Mission in Sudan and provided a credible international presence to provide support for implementation of the CPA. Likewise, the United Nations Development Programme-sponsored 2006 Work Plan for Sudan builds on the original 2005 plan, and provides a comprehensive roadmap for prioritization and coordination of the international capacity building efforts across all sectors.³

But in some cases, international donor commitments have fallen short and in light of the Darfur situation, the United States continues to support sanctions against Sudan. The clock is rapidly running on the interim period and traction on the peace building effort is required to address multi-generational, societal problems between the north and south remains dangerously elusive.

ENDNOTES

1. *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars* by Douglas H. Johnson (2003) provides detailed analysis of the root causes and issues in the Sudan conflict.
2. U.S. Institute of Peace (http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sudan/pa_sudan.html) provides a library of the various Sudanese peace treaties and agreements.
3. *UN Development Programme*. 2006. United Nations and Partners 2006 Work Plan for Sudan. http://ochadms.unog.ch/cap_upload.nsf/0/3BE3A21EDD5A1AFDC12570CA0060058E/SFILE/2006_Sudan_Workplan_SCREEN.pdf.



Photo: UNDPKO

Meeting between the UNMIS force commanders and the commanders of the SPLM army at the first session of the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee.

NGOs and Peace in Southern Sudan

FROM Page 11

bush in support of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement Army without access to education or any other basic services are not shut out of the peace dividend. The increasing number of well paid positions with the UN peacekeepers, other UN agencies, and international NGOs can also make the task of the government in filling posts even more challenging.

Decades of rule by AK-47 will take significant vision, energy, and financial and human resources to transition into rule of law that is efficient and respected by the populace. Customary law and its proponents have been undermined during years of highly militarized rule, and the vacuum of statutory law, courts, policing and prisons will likely take decades to be addressed in the further reaches of southern Sudan. It is critical for all international agencies to invest deeply in promoting community-driven analysis and agreed approaches to support the Sudanese to own, lead and manage their recovery from more than two decades of civil war.

V I O L E N C E I N T I M O R

Peacekeepers Return to East Timor

Australia Leads New Multinational Force Back to Its Troubled Northern Neighbor



J. J. Messner

JUST SEVEN YEARS since the successful InterFET mission, Australia has again been called upon to lead an ad hoc peace keeping mission to East Timor. Along with troops from New Zealand, Malaysia and Portugal, Australia has deployed in excess of 1,000 personnel to East Timor to attempt to quell the violence that has led to dozens of deaths, gang violence, arson, looting and has displaced thousands of people.

The violence began in April and May this year when hundreds of soldiers from the East Timorese Defence Force deserted their barracks in protest of alleged discrimination by a political and military elite from the east of the country. In response, Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri dismissed 600 troops (from a total of 1,500), mostly from the west of the country. The backlash was rapid and violent, as the dismissed troops and large numbers of sympathizers began a campaign of destruction in the capital, Dili.

Arguably, the violence may have occurred regardless of Alkatiri's dismissal of the deserters. Besides allegations that Alkatiri was arming his own private militia to dispose of his

political opponents, his arrogant, elitist and corrupt administration had allowed significant tensions to grow within Timorese society, and this tension had become a proverbial powder keg just waiting to be ignited. During Indonesian occupation, the Timorese were united in their struggle against their rulers; now that enemy is gone, and the opportunity for introspection has deepened societal divisions.



Photo: UNDPKO

A UN officer aids a member of the East Timorese Defence Force, injured as part of the recent bloodshed.

The deployment of the multinational peacekeeping force was necessitated by the weak security situation in the country. Though the UN continued to have a presence in Dili before and during the violence, the mission was much smaller and less capable than its predecessor missions, and was unable to deal with the security situation. Furthermore, given that the local armed forces and police had themselves become combatants and perpetrators of the trouble, they were not only inadequately equipped but unwilling to deal with the violence.



Photo: UNDPKO

In a repeat of the post-independence referendum militia violence in 1999, Dili is again set ablaze.

The multinational force is expected to stay in East Timor for at least a year, and the UNOTIL mission — which was due to wind up in May — has been extended slightly. Given the deep divisions in East Timorese society this violence has revealed, and the weakness of the young country's institutions, this force will be required for quite some time to come.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF TIMOR-LESTE FACTBOX



Map: International Peace Operations Association

Population: 1.1 million
Major Languages: Portuguese, Tetum, Bahasa
Major Religions: Catholicism, Islam
Major Ethnicities: Austronesian, Papuan, Chinese
Life Expectancy: Men 64 years, Women 69 years



Independence: 2002 (from Indonesia)
Capital: Dili
President: Xanana Gusmao
Area: 9,813 sq. miles/15,700 sq. km.
Divisions: 13 districts

Main Exports: Coffee, sandalwood, marble, oil, gas
GNP per Capita: US\$400

VIOLENCE IN TIMOR

When Not to Leave

A Tragic Example of Why the UN Cannot Afford to do Peacekeeping on the Cheap*Emily and J. J. Messner*

WITH THE East Timorese military split into two warring camps, soldiers loyal to the government laid siege to police headquarters last month. A proposal for ending the standoff called for all parties to disarm, and the police complied. When the unarmed officers came outside, the soldiers gunned them down.

This is what has become of East Timor, until recently touted as a success story of UN peacekeeping. Yet it was the United Nations that laid the groundwork for this degeneration by reducing its missions in East Timor too much, too soon and too abruptly.

Walking around the capital city Dili earlier this year, we saw throngs of unemployed, idle young men. The large international presence had provided temporary relief by hiring local support staff and by pumping dollars and demand into the economy. But when most of the foreigners left a year ago, the jobs disappeared.

When a UN mission's mandate runs out, the exodus of personnel leaves a gaping hole in the economy. In tiny East Timor, the UN presence peaked at upward of 10,000 peacekeepers and transitional staff after the 1999 vote to break from Indonesia. In 2002, when East Timor officially declared independence, the size of the mission was cut in half, eliminating 800 local staff positions in less than two months. Another massive drawdown three years later axed 500 more local jobs in a matter of weeks. Each drawdown results in a glut of unemployed vying for precious few opportunities in an economy too small to absorb the workers.

The United Nations cannot be expected to stay indefinitely just to create a job market for locals, but it can take steps to mitigate the effects of its departure. If it does not, it will continue to leave scores of jobless people in its wake after each mission to an economically weak country — helping to set the stage for future unrest.

To this end, the United Nations should plan for

longer and more gradual withdrawals from nation-building missions. Members of the Security Council sought an early exit from East Timor, despite the recommendations of the secretary general and a plea from the young nation's president. The Security Council must resist the urge to do peacekeeping on the cheap.

The deadline-driven nature of UN mandates encourages a system in which the native government has many responsibilities suddenly handed over to it and then has logistical support taken away on the date the mission ends. The shifting of responsibilities to a nascent government should begin as early as possible, but it should then be drawn out over a longer period. After



Photo: Emily Messner

Anna, a young girl in Dili, typifies the optimism of East Timor prior to the resurgence of violence.

handing off one area of authority, UN personnel should remain available to help work out the kinks that inevitably arise. When external support is no longer necessary, those staffers can withdraw, and the focus can shift to giving the fledgling government its next dose of responsibility.

As the government's burden increases, it should be encouraged to expand its ranks. Donor nations may desire a small, efficient government, but in a post-conflict country with a meager private sector, it makes sense for the government to create jobs in administration and infrastructure development. Sadly, in East Timor, many unemployed youths have now turned to violence, roaming the streets as part of armed gangs.

Bolstering the civil service also increases the number of people with a vested interest in the stability of the government. For a country to succeed in recovering from conflict, it needs strong public institutions. This was a key factor in the success of the UN-administered transition in Namibia, which inherited its institutions from South Africa and remains relatively stable 15 years later.

East Timor was progressing well, but it was not ready to be cast adrift. The United Nations pared down its mission to fewer than 150 people (all advisers) even before a fully functioning judicial system was in place. Handicapped by a lack of local judges proficient in the required Portuguese legal language, the judiciary consisted of a skeleton staff of international judges.

GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS

South African Legislation Threatens Peace Industry

ANC-Sponsored Prohibition of Mercenary Activity Bill Gains Traction Despite Testimony



Peter Leon and Kevin Williams

In November 2005, the South African Department of Defence introduced the *Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Prohibition and Regulation of Certain Activities in an Area of Armed Conflict Bill*. In an explanatory memorandum, the DoD said that the bill's purpose was to "close gaps" in the current Regulation of Military Assistance Act of 1998 which prohibits mercenary activity and regulates foreign military assistance in areas of armed conflict. As the memorandum notes, the draft bill is a reaction both to the arrest in Zimbabwe of 69 South Africans on charges related to an alleged plot to topple the government of Equatorial Guinea, as well as to the continuing recruitment of South Africans to provide military and security services in areas of conflict; indeed, the memorandum makes specific reference to Iraq.

While the Regulation of Military Assistance Act applies only to South African citizens, permanent residents, South African juristic persons and those who contravene its provisions within South Africa, the proposed bill will apply to any person, anywhere in the world. In its current form, the conduct the bill will proscribe is also considerably wider.

The bill proposes to regulate much more than so-called mercenary activity, defined in the bill as "combat for private gain in an armed conflict." It will also regulate "assistance or service in an area of armed conflict" by any person. The way in which the bill does this, however, criminalizes it, subject to obtaining authorization from the National Conventional Arms Control Committee, a committee comprising senior Cabinet ministers. The bill will also prohibit South Africans from enlisting in "foreign armed forces" without authorization.

One of the bill's most controversial features is that it will prohibit any person from taking part in "humanitarian assistance in an armed conflict," unless authorization is granted, even if there is no link to South Africa whatsoever and the activities are entirely legal where they take place.

During parliamentary hearings on the bill in May, private security companies, academics, industry bodies (including IPOA) and humanitarian organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross criticized, among other issues, the bill's:

- sweeping extraterritoriality;
- so-called "liberation struggle" exemption;

- broad definition of armed conflict, leading to uncertainty as to when it will be applicable; and
- potential chilling effect on peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction and humanitarian assistance, particularly in Africa.

While humanitarian workers in Iraq, assisting the Iraqi government, might face prosecution under the bill, al Qaeda fighters could argue that they fall within the bill's exemption for those "resisting occupation by foreign forces."

The British Association of Private Security Companies noted that while they support appropriate regulation of the industry, the bill went too far. In their presentation, they noted that under the bill, a Sudanese nurse would be required to obtain authorization from the Arms Control Committee to travel in an ambulance in Darfur, while working for the ICRC. Failing to do so could well be an offence under the bill and the nurse (and representatives of the ICRC) could be arrested if she (or they) ever visited South Africa, entered its territorial waters or boarded a South African registered aircraft. The bill was almost certainly not intended to apply in such a situation.

Following the hearings, the DoD, the South African Police Service and the State Law Adviser briefed the Parliament's Portfolio Committee on Defence, responding to these concerns. The DoD suggested that the bill's extraterritorial application should be significantly reduced, while the SLA mirrored many of the concerns raised in the hearings regarding the bill's potential unconstitutionality.

The bill has been postponed to Parliament's next session, which begins on July 31, 2006. The committee will have to make any amendments before its second reading in Parliament, which may well take place in the next parliamentary session.

Read IPOA's testimony to the South African Parliament and United States Congress at www.IPOAonline.org

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Peter Leon is a partner and Kevin Williams is a senior associate at the Johannesburg-based South African law firm Webber Wentzel Bowens.

GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS

Private Security Companies Testify Before Congress

Congressmen Shays Invites Companies, IPOA to Testify on PSC Activity in Iraq



Diana Basto Castro

IPOA PRESIDENT Doug Brooks, along with representatives from government and various private security companies, testified before the House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations on June 13 in Washington, D.C. Convened by Rep. Christopher Shays (R-Conn.), the five hour hearing examined the roles, missions, standards, capabilities, oversight, training, vetting, coordination and actions of private security companies protecting government and contractor personnel in Iraq.

Members of the subcommittee were concerned about reports of corruption taking place within these contracts with the private sector, reported lack of standards and laws to regulate PSCs and possible human rights violations. The need for a more transparent framework was highlighted as well as the need for improved statistics. In spite of all these concerns, it was recognized that PSCs are playing an essential role in the reconstruction of Iraq because they provide security to companies while they perform the reconstruction work and protect U.S. government assets. In addition, PSCs were lauded for being cost-effective.

The first panel included William M. Solis, Director of defense capabilities and management at the Government Accountability Office; Shay Assad, from the Department of Defense; Greg Starr, deputy assistant secretary in the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security; and

James Kundar, assistant administrator (Near East and Africa) for the U.S. Agency for International Development. The representatives queried this panel in particular about statistics on the PSCs working for U.S. government agencies in Iraq — numbers of contracts, value, standards, vetting and training of PSC personnel.

Much of the panel's discussion revolved around the GAO's earlier reports on the industry and efforts to correct some of the problems highlighted. The rules and standards set out in the Department of Defense Instruction (3020.41) were frequently cited to address congressional queries. The representatives pushed for faster and more thorough follow up on departmental commitments to provide information to Congress.

In the second panel witnesses from PSCs operating in Iraq and industry associations discussed their companies' personnel standards and training, their roles and mission, as well as their experiences in Iraq. The witnesses described the complex and numerous rules, laws and requirements that guide their contract compliance, and provided information on their coordination with the Coalition forces and Iraq

security forces. The panel consisted of Chris Taylor, vice president of Blackwater USA; Major-General Robert Rosenkranz, president of the International Technical Service of DynCorp International; Iggy Balderas former CEO and current Board of Directors member of Triple Canopy; Alan Chvotkin of the Professional Services Council; and IPOA President Doug Brooks.

Although some of the questions had clear political undertones, others revealed an obvious need for the industry to do a better educational effort for Congress. The panel largely contradicted perceptions articulated in some representative's opening statements claiming a lack of regulation and control of the industry.

IPOA and Blackwater underlined the value of the IPOA Code of Conduct as a means of ensuring that contractors are operating professionally and ethically. The panel also gave a number of examples emphasizing the enormous cost-effectiveness of their services compared to the regular military and highlighted the value local nationals and third-country nationals bring to their contracts. It was further mentioned that the majority of PSC employees on the ground in Iraq are in fact Iraqi, something that benefits reconstruction efforts. Finally, the panel highlighted the industry's support for enhanced coordination with Coalition forces and willingness to work with Congress to address concerns and issues.



Photo: U.S. House of Representatives
Rep. Christopher Shays (R-Connecticut), right, is the chairman of the subcommittee.

The author is currently a research associate for IPOA.

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STUDY OF PEACE OPERATIONS

Combatants or Non-Combatants?

Where Private Military Companies Fit in Modern, Classical and Legal Definitions

Dr. Robert J. Bunker

Many perspectives exist for why private military companies have emerged over the last decade or so: cost-effectiveness, fast reaction cycles, lack of will or inability of governments to send their own troops into peace operations. This short essay will not attempt to debate these traditional reasons given for PMC growth and operational fielding. Rather, it will make some basic observations concerning the changing nature of warfare, attempt to place PMC ascendancy within the historical context, and make some policy suggestions concerning the relationship of PMCs to international law and the state.

The most striking aspect of state-on-state based warfare and international law (specifically, the laws of war) is that it cleanly divides the world into soldiers and civilians — combatants and non-combatants, respectively. This form of warfare is a response to the horrors of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) and the rise of the Westphalian state. For centuries, this type of state-on-state warfare based upon the Clausewitzian “continuation of politics by other means” has come to dominate our Western understanding of what war is and should be.

The small hitch with this perception of warfare comes with the emergence of the “blurring of crime and war” at the operational level. This trend towards the blurring of distinct law enforcement (within a state) and military (between states) concerns has accelerated over the last few decades. Terms such as peace enforcement, peacekeeping, military operations other than war, and stability and support, all address this concern.

The tragic events of 9/11 readily illustrate this point. Was 9/11 a criminal act or an act of war? The answer of course is yes to both. Non-state groups, like Al Qaeda, are not allowed to wage war. Such activity is criminal because only states may engage in war. Apparently, these non-state entities either do not know they are not supposed to engage in private war or simply don't care about the laws of warfare. The idealists among us can argue all they want

about the sanctity of international law but the simple fact is the state has lost its centuries old monopoly on warfare.

This brings us to the issue of the rise of the “criminal soldier.” That “soldier” is our 21st century public enemy No. 1. He or she has many faces — drug cartel enforcer, terrorist, insurgent, guerilla, suicide-bomber, pirate, tribal warrior, third generation gang member, gangster in uniform — the list goes on and on. International law, or for that matter, the sovereign law of states, is meaningless to such criminal combatants. Criminal soldiers gladly kill soldier and civilian alike with machete, gun, bomb, or any other weapon at their disposal.

Death at the hands of this “soldier” is not guaranteed to be clean or quick — torture, rape and dismemberment are tools of their trade. We don't seem to have a shortage of these “soldiers” either. As more cities and slums produce “no go zones,” states fail and regions become destabilized, the numbers of these criminal combatants seem likely to increase.

Criminal soldiers, found in an operational environment characterized by the blurring of crime and war and building themselves into larger entities that now engage in private

warfare, pose a daunting challenge for the modern state. Terms for this new type of warfare include Fourth-Generation Warfare, Fourth Epoch War, and Non-Trinitarian War. The rise and fielding of private military corporations makes perfect sense when viewed within the

SEE *International Law*, Page 18



Picture: SHSU

The Thirty Years War provided a catalyst for the international laws on war and combatants.

The author is CEO of the Counter-OPFOR Corporation, a consulting entity focused on “criminal-soldier” mitigation and neutralization strategies.

HUMANITARIAN DEVELOPMENT SUMMIT

3-5 October 2006 — Nairobi, Kenya

The Humanitarian Development Summit is being organized as a high level meetings-based event to bring the international private sector closer to the business of the United Nations and international aid agencies. Sustainable development to support the humanitarian sector is one of the key themes. International companies and local operators will have the chance to demonstrate their capabilities to potential partners from UN Agencies, NGOs and Aid Agencies, Foundations and International Donor Agencies. The summit is about promoting partnerships for ongoing sustainable development required to ensure that humanitarian aid is at its most effective.

For further details, call +44 (207) 749-9695, e-mail info@developmentprogram.org or log on to www.humanitariandevelopmentprogram.org



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International Law and Private Military Companies

FROM Page 17

context of the emergence of the criminal combatant globally. Private military corporations represent a Western response to the criminal soldier.¹ This response is not modeled on the lines of the now defunct South African Executive Outcomes group, which itself engaged in predatory forms of capitalism as “corporate shock troops,” but on that of the better regulated and legitimized groups belonging to IPOA that work under strict governmental mandate and direction in peace and stability operations. It is for this reason these corporations are considered ascendant — the PMCs of today are but small affairs compared to what they will someday become. The extent to which they will be allowed to engage in the direct killing of criminal soldiers is still unknown.²

This observation concerning PMC ascendancy is all the more striking when coupled with the fact that the old dichotomy in international law based on soldier and civilian, combatant and non-combatant, will morph into a multi-faceted typology with two, if not possibly three or more, types of combatants added to it. We are unable get



Photo: USDA

Is he a combatant in modern warfare?

around the fact that the criminal soldier is a combatant — albeit an illegal and unwanted one — on the new battlefield that has emerged. The manner in which this criminal combatant will be countered and what limited legal battlefield rights they are given, if any, based on sliding scales of the application of military and law enforcement power, is still evolving.

Arguably, the forces of private military corporations could be considered legitimate combatants because they work as contractual agents of the state and, as agents of the state, they must be protected by international law.³ In return for this military contractual agency, an oath of allegiance to the state should be required. In addition, the application of the Intergovernmental Personnel Act should be considered in the regulation and institutionalization of private military personnel by the state.

Finally, on the home front, responders from the law enforcement, fire, rescue and health service communities have all unwittingly become “combatants” in our struggle against the criminal soldier and the entities it has spawned. Few would argue that the sacrifices by the New York Fire Department on 9/11, within the context of the new war we are facing, were heroic. The benefit, if any, that a legitimate combatant designation under international law may provide these responder personnel, while fulfilling their homeland security role, is unknown. It is entirely possible that such a designation could even be detrimental to their mission or simply impractical. Ultimately, however, domestic responders, like the personnel serving within private military corporations under state mandate, have now become de facto legitimate combatants against the criminal soldier.

Timor Returns to Violence

FROM Page 14

The highly unpopular prime minister whose actions caused the military to fracture now refuses to give up his authority, and yet the East Timorese aren't scheduled to go to the polls again until next year. Elections are popularly perceived as a post-conflict exit strategy, but strong, effective peace-and-stability operations should remain in place at least through two consecutive parliamentary elections. Staying close helps ensure a peaceful first transition between native governments.

Unfortunately, nations are often all too eager to withdraw their military personnel, risking flare-ups that may lead to costlier interventions in the future. The current mission to East Timor contains no security component whatsoever — not a single UN peacekeeper or police officer beyond advisers was present when the latest round of violence erupted. Ultimately, all arguments about nation-building are irrelevant if there is inadequate security for it even to be attempted.

Not long ago, East Timor was a model of how to get things right. Now, it should serve as a lesson in how not to get things wrong.

This article was first published in The Washington Post on June 9, 2006.

ENDNOTES

1. This is by no means the only response to the criminal soldier. The growing importance of Special Forces within the American military establishment and the development of Terrorism Early Warning Groups domestically for network response and intelligence fusion are but two other examples.
2. For this reason, we must make sure that PMCs employed by the state always remain loyal to the state and that the links between the government and the governed are never threatened in democratic societies which choose to utilize PMCs.
3. The amount of good this protection will afford them is questionable because, in the struggle against criminal soldiers, death may for many be preferable to capture.

The views expressed in the Journal of International Peace Operations do not necessarily reflect the views of IPOA or IPOA Member Companies.

C O L U M N I S T S

Déby Must Go for the Sake of Chad ... and Sudan

Time Is Up for Chad's Exporter of Violence, an Engineer of the Crisis in Darfur



Ambassador Herman Cohen

THE REPUBLIC of Chad has suffered from chronic instability ever since it achieved independence from France in 1960. Now, with violence spilling over its eastern border from the genocidal conflict in Sudan's Darfur region, the government of Chad finds itself in an extremely precarious position.

Chad has the same north-south cultural-religious-linguistic divisions as neighboring Sudan. The deep incompatibility of the peoples on both sides of the north-south divide is at the heart of Chad's political instability. At independence, the more numerous, highly educated, Christianized southern peoples came to power in the first elections controlled by the French administration.

Between 1960 and 1978, the southern-dominated regimes engaged in severe discrimination and repression against the Islamicized northern peoples, leading to rebellion and insurgency. Chad's security problems were exacerbated by armed Libyan interventions starting in 1980 and lasting until 1987. The Libyans favored the Muslim ethnic groups in the north, bringing them to power to the detriment of the southerners. Between 1985 and 1987, Libyan forces in Chad were in an increasingly repressive occupation mode.

Northerner President Hissène Habré, with the help of France and the United States, was able to inflict a military defeat on the Libyans, forcing them out of Chad in 1987. President Habré turned out to be such a murderous tyrant that the French government felt compelled to engineer his overthrow by his army chief of staff Idriss Déby in 1990.

After a period of relative calm until 1998, there was increasing disaffection among the northern groups because President Déby was directing resources and power mainly toward his own Zaghawa ethnic group which represents less than five percent of the Chadian population. To complicate matters, oil discoveries in

southwestern Chad made the control of power potentially quite lucrative. As a result Déby had to deal with several attempted coups.

In 2005, Déby forced through a constitutional amendment that eliminated the two-term limit, thereby sending a signal that he intended to be president for life. This alienated people in his own ethnic group who saw their potential oil wealth slipping from their grasp.

Feeling increasingly isolated, Déby decided in 2005 to export his internal problems by sending Zaghawa fighters across the border into Darfur to rally their ethnic cousins into an armed rebellion against the government of Sudan. This was the beginning of the horrendous Darfur disaster as the government of Sudan responded with massive force that included genocide and massive refugee flows.

In Chad itself, Déby decided to break a pioneering agreement with the World Bank that was supposed to channel oil revenue into social spending for health and education. He used the money instead to purchase arms to keep himself in power. In late 2005, significant numbers of Déby's own army and presidential guard defected to eastern Sudan where they received support from the Sudanese government.

In April 2006, these Chadian rebels arrived in the capital city of Ndjamena, but were prevented from overthrowing Déby by the French military garrison who provided Déby with intelligence and air power. As of June 2006 this active rebellion against Déby was continuing, with a base in Darfur. As so often happens, Déby as an exporter of insurgency is now being hit by an insurgency blowback.

As long as President Déby remains in power with the support of his tiny minority ethnic group, which is starting

to split apart, Chad will continue to suffer from instability and bouts of violence. The majority southerners of Chad are essentially observers as they watch the northern groups tear themselves apart and steal all of the oil money. The Sudanese-supported anti-Déby insurgency will certainly continue, resulting in considerable hardship and population displacement in eastern Chad. The French government is facing a dilemma in Chad because the only alternative to Déby appears to be Somalia-style chaos. For the immediate future, they seem to be condemned to support Déby.



*Photo: Government of the Republic of Chad
Chadian President Idriss Déby.*



*Photo: World Food Programme
Refugees fleeing from Darfur to Chad
are finding conflict wherever they go.*

Ambassador Herman Cohen is a regular columnist. A former assistant secretary of state for Africa, Ambassador Cohen is president of Cohen and Woods International.

C O L U M N I S T S

A Role for the Private Sector in D.R. Congo

As the UN displays inadequacy and the EU promises more of the same, it is time for Plan B



Derek Wright

IT IS ENCOURAGING to see that the developments in the political and security-related affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo are

able to draw headlines in major world newspapers. Alas, public interest is not enough to help the DRC transform itself into a stable, democratically-run country.

As the DRC approaches the half-century mark of its independence, a time that has been marked by almost constant violence and conflict, the time is far overdue for the world (and the West in particular) to step forward and help the DRC end its wars and begin the process of rehabilitation. As Western governments remain shamefully reluctant to send their own militaries to the DRC, the time has come for the international community to utilize the expertise of the private sector.

The European Union has agreed to temporarily supply nearly 2,000 troops to support the UN mission in the DRC (MONUC) as the country prepares for its elections. Limited to only seven months for their deployment and stationed mostly in neighboring Gabon, the few hundred troops actually deployed to the DRC will be restricted to patrolling the airport in Kinshasa and nowhere else. The German contingent, making up the bulk of the EU force, has been scornfully described by the German parliament's special commissioner for the armed forces, Reinhold Robbe, as largely unprepared for service in Africa, and has overtly demonstrated its reluctance to deploy in Africa's so-called Heart of Darkness. Most feel that the EU's contribution is mostly symbolic, and few expect it to be of much assistance to the beleaguered Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Indian, Uruguayan and Nepalese UN troops that have

been in the DRC since 2000.

The victimized citizens of the DRC, of whom some 4 million have been killed and millions more displaced since 1998, deserve better. The people of the DRC deserve the full military capabilities that can only be provided by NATO class militaries from developed countries.



Photo: UNDPKO

Pakistani peacekeepers deploy to the DRC as part of the MONUC mission.



Photo: UNDPKO

Indian peacekeepers on patrol in the DRC as part of the MONUC mission.

Unfortunately, due to the West's general abrogation of its responsibilities to contribute to peace operations in places such as the DRC, Congolese citizens continue to die at a rate of more than 1,000 per day, a mortality rate that far exceeds that of Iraq and Afghanistan combined.

Fortunately, the citizens of the DRC do not have to be doomed to the ineffectiveness of the UN or the unwillingness of the EU forces. The private sector, which has played a relatively limited role in the DRC for nearly a decade, can be utilized to a far greater extent to support the flagging UN peacekeeping mission there. The peace and stability industry provides a broad array of services ranging from de-mining, medical supply, logistics and heavy lift, to security, police training, economic and civil society development, and many others. These companies specialize in conflict and post-conflict operations, and have proven their merits time and again in places such as Afghanistan, the Balkans, Iraq, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.

The West may not have the political will to significantly engage in humanitarian interventions with its own troops to places such as the DRC, but it does have the resources to support the UN mission there more robustly by paying for the expertise and capabilities of private sector operators. Until MONUC receives realistic and substantive support from the West, the DRC will continue to languish as a country trapped in a vortex of violent conflict. EU countries must recognize the role that the peace and stability industry can play in places such as the DRC, and push for greater use of the private sector instead of larger numbers of reluctant and highly constrained EU troops.

Derek Wright is a guest columnist. He is currently the director of membership for IPOA.

THE IPOA LION

Standards Committee Holds Landmark Simulation

IPOA Code of Conduct and Complaints Procedure Tested by Committee, NGOs



Tanner Ivie

DURING JUNE, the members of IPOA's Standards Committee came together with various representatives of the NGO community to participate in a simulation hosted by George Mason University's Peace Operations Policy Program. The first ever of its type, the simulation involved presenting the Standards Committee with four scenarios in which fictional member companies had been accused of breaching IPOA's Code of Conduct. The various grievances ranged from contractual complaints to employment of third-country nationals to rules of engagement. The Standards Committee members were

The author is currently a research associate at IPOA.

then given the opportunity to judge what, if any, action they should take in each situation.

The NGO representatives were in attendance to comment on and express their opinions about the decision process. The main questions and ideas that resulted from the deliberations dealt with the proper conduct of the investigation process and procedures by the IPOA and Standards Committee, the inquisitorial and investigative powers of the committee, the referral process, the role of the companies involved, and suggested future revisions to the Code of Conduct. The simulation was important for the issues it raised and the groundwork it laid for future simulations of its type. The event also provided an opportunity for outside observers to see the strong desire of the private sector for accountability and transparency, and the companies' willingness to evolve to meet the legal and ethical requirements.

NGO Community Dialog with IPOA Members

IPOA Roundtable Furthers Understanding Between NGOs and Private Firms



Diana Basto Castro

IPOA'S MAY ROUNDTABLE dealt with issues related to the relationship between NGOs and private firms in peace and stability operations abroad. Around 70 people attended from various companies and affiliations, including representatives from IPOA member companies.

The panel discussion included a group of key executives from international NGOs based in the United States and abroad. The panel members discussed how their organizations have dealt with recent challenges in the realm of humanitarian security. As the UN and NGOs are increasingly becoming targets in conflict, there is a necessity on their part to gain acceptance with the combatants so that they are seen as mediators, not participants. Panelists delivered a general and informative overview of the NGO community's acceptance approach to security and its application in non-permissive environments.

Subsequent discussions focused on the role of private companies in guaranteeing security for NGOs, and also exchanging lessons learned from the field.

The author is currently a research associate at IPOA.

Andrew Natsios Addresses IPOA

IPOA Members-Only Roundtable Explores Government Contracting Issues



Bujana Perolli

FORMER USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios spoke to IPOA members at the organization's June roundtable. He discussed USAID's involvement in fragile and failed states, its efforts for post-conflict reconstruction, and its new business model of working with non-traditional partners, such as for-profit contractors.

Mr. Natsios argued that the world's fragile states all face similar challenges and that the international community should be very cautious about giving a lot of aid to states which lack the institutions to absorb the money, which leads to more corruption. He also stated there is "no one size fits all" solution and that approaches need to adapt to the local conditions of the developing countries.

Mr. Natsios also presented the new business model of USAID called the Global Development Alliance, which consists of engaging in partnerships with the private sector, not-for-profits, and government agencies to combine resources and technologies in tackling the problems of developing nations.

The author is currently a research associate at IPOA.

NGO PROFILE

Pact

Strengthening the Capacity of Grassroots Organizations, Coalitions and Networks

PACT'S MISSION is to help build strong communities globally that provide people with an opportunity to earn a dignified living, raise healthy families, and participate in democratic life. Pact achieves this by strengthening the capacity of grassroots organizations, coalitions and networks and by forging linkages among government, business and the citizen sectors to achieve social, economic and environmental justice.



Pact currently operates in 24 countries, implementing projects funded by a combination of public and private donors. Projects focus on providing grants management and/or general capacity building services to NGOs and NGO networks in democracy and governance, HIV/AIDS, livelihoods, natural resource management, peace building, and equity empowerment of vulnerable groups.



Photo: PACT

Pact meets the challenges of its mission through program innovation and leadership that encourages new ideas and taking risks. It has led the way in testing and scaling up innovative, cross-sectoral development approaches, including pioneering work in using media to reach rural entrepreneurs in Mongolia, supporting community-led alternative basic education centers in Ethiopia, and managing over \$100 million in grant funds going to local community organizations fighting HIV/AIDS. Pact's innovative women's empowerment literacy and livelihoods program, WORTH, has received six international awards and is now being implemented in six African and two Asian countries. Pact is a founding member of the Impact Alliance, a global marketplace for capacity building service providers and those seeking their services.

P A C T

<i>Founded:</i>	1971
<i>Organization:</i>	501(c)(3) nonprofit
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NGO PROFILE

SOS Children's Villages USA

Helping to Support the Education and Health of Orphans and Children at Risk

SOS CHILDREN'S Villages-USA supports the global work of our international parent organization, Kinderdorf International, based in Vienna, Austria. The mission of this office is to help support over 450 SOS Children's Villages in 132 countries.



The primary activities of SOS Children's Villages-USA include creating public awareness in regards to the state of orphans worldwide; building public support for the work of the organization and creating partnerships with donors, corporations and foundations to ensure the stability and growth of the SOS family-based model of care. In addition, the U.S. office works closely with its SOS Village in Illinois as well as its two SOS Villages in Florida.

SOS Children's Villages-USA contributes to SOS global educational programs. These programs consist of day care centers, elementary and secondary schools as well as vocational training for SOS children who are reaching the age of independence.

HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention are a key focus where SOS Children's Villages are located. The organization also contributes to community outreach aimed at preventing child abandonment. The various efforts of SOS Children's Villages in providing emergency relief also receive support.

SOS Children's Villages is the Official Charity Campaign of the 2006 FIFA World Cup.

S O S C H I L D R E N ' S V I L L A G E S U S A

<i>Founded:</i>	1950 (became SOS-Children's Villages USA in 1988)
<i>Organization:</i>	501(c)(3) nonprofit
<i>Head Office:</i>	Washington, D.C.
<i>Member:</i>	SOS-Kinderdorf International
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JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE OPERATIONS

Want your NGO or non-profit to be profiled in the *Journal of International Peace Operations*? Contact Editor-in-Chief J. J. Messner at +1 (202) 464-0721 or jmessner@ipoaonline.org. NGO and non-profit profiles are free of charge.

Iraq Development Program IDP برنامج تنمية العراق أيدي بي

12-13 September 2006, UAE

Iraq Defence & Security Summit

12-13 September 2006, Sharjah, UAE

www.iraqdevelopmentprogram.org

The ISTC Summit enables private companies to meet with the Ministers of Defence, Interior and National Security to discuss the major issues within the defence and security sectors in order to aid the rebuilding of Iraq.

The summit will also host the Ministers of Communications and Science & Technology, there to discuss the key technology themes for improving the security environment in Iraq.

Delegates will have the opportunity to meet face-to-face with ministers, US military officials and prime contractors.

The ISTC Summit has attracted support from some of the world's leading companies, including

ArmorGroup, Boeing, Control Risks, EADS, General Dynamics, BAE Systems, Northrop Grumman,


Raytheon, AMEC, GE, MCI, Motorola, Microsoft and Sun Microsystems.

All IPOA member companies qualify for a 10% discount on the cost of their attendance.

Companies looking to attend this crucial event should contact:

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to abide by the International Peace Operations Association Code of Conduct, to provide service of a high quality and to demonstrate an equally high standard of ethics.

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And then there is the International Peace Operations Association.

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