

Metaphor and space:
A cognitive-based analysis
of Irish and Italian prepositions

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Declaration

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Abstract

The present research study aims at providing an insight on the issue of metaphor and space conceptualization through the comparative analysis of Irish and Italian prepositions, based on the theoretical foundations of cognitive linguistics, an insight into which was provided in the form of a literature review.

In order to pursue this end, two distinct corpora were set up for the two languages by drawing textual strings containing instances of morphologically simple prepositions. Subsequently, it was illustrated how simple prepositions, both in Irish and Italian, primarily express relations of a spatial kind. Once this was done, prepositions were grouped together according to their basic spatial meaning (BSM), and three such BSMs were chosen for being analyzed cross-linguistically with respect to their non-spatial readings, which were shown to be linked to their spatial meanings by means of metaphorical mapping of conceptual structure, according to the expectations that the theoretical background adopted would engender.

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Abbreviations

| | | | |
|---------|------------------------|---------|-----------------------------|
| ADJ | adjective | MSC | masculine |
| AdjP | adjectival phrase | N | noun |
| APSTPTC | active past participle | NEG | negative particle |
| AUT | autonomous | NOM | nominative |
| AUX | auxiliary | NP | noun phrase |
| BSM | basic spatial meaning | NT | neuter |
| Ch | chapter | OBJ | object |
| COMPL | complementizer | OBL | oblique |
| COND | conditional | OIr. | Old Irish |
| COP | copula | PASSV | passive, passivizing |
| DET | determiner | PERF | perfect |
| DIM | diminutive | PL | plural |
| Eng. | English | PLPF | pluperfect |
| FEM | feminine | PP | prepositional phrase |
| FUT | future | PPSTPTC | passive past participle |
| GER | gerund | PTC | particle |
| Gr. | Greek | RCPR | reciprocal pronoun |
| HAB | habitual | REFL | reflexive pronoun |
| IE. | Indo-European | REL | relative pronoun |
| IMP | imperative | SG | singular |
| IMPF | imperfect | Sp. | Spanish |
| IMPS | impersonal | SUBJ | subject |
| INF | infinitive | SUBJN | subjunctive |
| Ir. | Irish | VN | verbal noun |
| It. | Italian | VP | verbal phrase |
| Lat. | Latin | < | diachronically derived from |
| lit. | literally | > | diachronically yielding |

1 Introduction

The present research study aims at providing support, through a comparative, cross-linguistic analysis, to the positions of cognitive linguistics theories with respect to the issues of spatial conceptualization and its centrality in structuring other, less concrete conceptual domains, such as time, causation, psychological affections and dispositions, and so on. According to a widespread view in cognitive linguistics, whose diffusion and defence is to a great degree due to the earlier studies of Andrew Ortony and, later, George Lakoff, metaphor is the key to understand how spatial thought can structure abstract and rather complex domains, and why it should be so.

We should like to begin with the ‘why’, and observe that Lakoff in particular has greatly stressed the importance of physical, everyday, and we daresay, trivial experience of the environment surrounding us as the source of our most basic concepts. In other words, what we can have direct, non-mediated experience of, is what we understand better. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that concepts that we cannot grasp as immediately be understood by analogy with concepts of which we have already got a secure comprehension, and it is precisely in the potential of establishing analogical connections that lies the power of metaphor as a tool capable of engendering new knowledge.

As to the ‘how’, analogy is the answer: analogical links are established between the physical, better known domain and the abstract one, yet to be understood, via what Lakoff terms as metaphorical mapping of structure, whose modalities and functioning shall be explored in chapter 2.

Our objective being to back the above exposed views, we set to doing so by disguising a comparison between two languages, Irish and Italian, and their preposition systems.

As to the choice of the languages, Italian has been chosen in that it is the writer’s mother tongue, and Irish as a way of paying homage to a local idiom which was once thriving and is now facing the risk of becoming extinct (cf. Ó Murchu’s [1993] observations apropos of the sociolinguistic status of Irish in the Republic of Ireland).

On the other hand, the choice to examine the speech class of prepositions is mainly due to Talmy and Zelinsky-Wibbelt's considerations about prepositions being both capable of great degrees of abstraction (in that they function according to spatial schemata, abstracting away from certain details and thus being capable to adapt to a gamut of very different relations) and highly polysemous in nature (which is but a consequence of their remarkable power of abstraction). We are going to examine morphologically simple prepositions with the aid of grammatical descriptions of the two languages and lexical repertoires (dictionaries), to show that all simple prepositions primarily express spatial relations. To prove that such spatial relations are primary in nature, an attempt will subsequently be made to explain non-spatial functions in terms of the spatial ones. To this end, two corpora have been set up comprised of textual strings drawn from Irish and Italian fictional works, with the aim of retrieving a number of different prepositional readings as well as a number of examples thereof. Patterns of sense extensions, that is metaphorical readings, that are found to be shown by either language will be examined in detail and compared cross-linguistically. Our hope is to find that such patterns will let themselves be explained by means of conceptual linking with the spatial meaning of prepositions

The present study is therefore structured as follows: chapter 2 will be devoted to the review of the existing studies on the topics we will be concerned with, i.e., space, conceptualizations, metaphor, and prepositions; chapter 3, to expounding the methods we have followed in setting up the corpora, their sources, and how we are going to compare the data thus obtained. Chapter 4 will be concerned the notion of basic spatial meanings (BSMs), that is, a series of categories, or simply labels, under which it will be possible to group together prepositions from both languages according to the kind of relation they profile in the spatial domain; a table of correspondences will be therein provided between Irish and Italian prepositions belonging under the same label, and various examples presented of spatial usages of prepositions arranged in BSMs. Chapter 5 will contain the detailed analysis of our linguistic data, carried out in a cross-linguistic fashion for three of the ten BSMs defined in chapter 4: they are IN(TO), WITH, and OFF/FROM/OUT OF. In the course of the discussion, schematic diagrams will be provided to illustrate the patterns of sense extensions for these BSMs. Finally, chapter 6 will summarize our findings and the way they fit in the theoretical assumptions that we have chosen as our starting point.

2 Polysemy, metaphor, and space

2.0 Introduction

This chapter is devoted to the review of the existing literature related to the two fundamental issues on which our comparison of the Italian and Irish prepositions will be based. These are (i) polysemy as a pervasive feature of prepositions, and (ii) the assumption of spatial thought as a domain systematically exploited to make sense of other domains, and specifically less tangible ones like time, emotions, and so forth.

These ideas are characteristic of the cognitively based approach to linguistics and have been set forth by such scholars as Lakoff (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1987, Lakoff and Turner 1989), Talmy (Talmy 2000 is an extensive collection of previously published papers), Jackendoff (1996), and Bierwisch (1996). (A compendary exposition of the cognitive view and its tenets can be found in Zelinsky-Wibbelt 1993b: pp.12–4.) These will provide the framework for the analysis which will be conducted in the present paper. Further observations on spatial thought as a culture-specific phenomenon have been presented by Levinson (Levinson 2003 employs earlier work and analyses in the scope of a more experimental, in-the-field setting).

Earlier studies of metaphor had already been conducted in the wake of the advent of constructivism, which also provided the basic intuitions for much of the following studies carried out in the cognitive perspective (cf. Ortony 1979b).

2.1 Polysemy and metaphor: The centrality of space

A definition of polysemy as found in Cruse (1995) is based on a number of parameters along which the degree of distinctness between two or more readings of a word is defined. Distinct readings of a word can be thus in a relation of increasing antagonism to one another. The limiting case is, according to Cruse, best defined by the term “polylexy”, which defines a subset of polysemic relations, namely those for which separate lexical entries would be – to a varying extent – justified. While, for instance, the two readings of *book* (*book*₁ as the material object where a text is written or printed, and *book*₂ as the text or content) are characterized by Cruse as being co-operating, the two readings of *bank* (*bank*₁ ‘financial institution’, *bank*₂ ‘edge of a river’) are said to be antagonistic. A diagnostic test for determining the position of a

given polysemic relation along the co-operation ~ antagonism continuum is for example whether the competing readings may or may not occur simultaneously. The two co-operating readings of *book*, for instance, may occur simultaneously, as in (1):

- (1) Mary is reading a book.
(Cruse 1995: p.35)

while the two antagonistic readings of *bank* may not, as shown in (2), where one is forced to choose only one of them:

- (2) We finally reached the bank.
(Cruse 1995: p.35)

which cannot be uttered to mean that we at once reached both the bank of a river and a financial institution.

Polysemy is a distinctive feature of many a preposition. As an example, Lakoff (1993) contrasts the two different meanings of *through* in (3) and (4):

- (3) I drove through the tunnel.
(Lakoff 1993: p.27)
- (4) I got my job through my uncle.
(Lakoff 1993: p.27)

Two distinct readings of *through* are shown here: the meaning of passage through a physical medium, which is found in (3), is not found in (4). Lakoff is concerned with the proliferation of *cases* (or *semantic roles*) within the Fillmorean theory of *case grammar* (Fillmore 1968). *Through* in (3) is an instance of the Fillmorean PATH role, just as *to* is an instance of the DESTINATION role in (5):

- (5) He came to me.
(Lakoff 1993: p.27)

Lakoff contrasts (5) with (6), which apparently requires that a new role be postulated for the same preposition:

- (6) That idea came to me.
(Lakoff 1993: p.27)

According to Lakoff, either one states an ad hoc rule, like “EXPERIENCERS can be expressed as an object of the preposition *to*”, or one can understand (6) as an instance of a conventional metaphor that ideas are external objects coming into one’s head from outside. If one adopts the second view, one should not draw upon ad hoc rules. This theory has an advantage over any ad hoc rule, namely that it is independently motivated.

Lakoff’s (1993) point is that *truth conditional semantics* proves inadequate to the task of studying semantic roles, and that a theory of *metaphorical semantics* is required in order to capture such generalizations about language as those presented by prepositional polysemy, without leading to a proliferation of semantic roles. That is, the object of the preposition *to* in (6) is to be understood as a metaphorical DESTINATION. This allows for just one semantic role to work in different contexts, one of physical (more precisely, spatial) relationships, and one of metaphorical relationships, where THOUGHTS ARE EXTERNAL OBJECTS and people’s minds are DESTINATIONS for such objects.

Much of Lakoff’s work is devoted to the aim of explaining how metaphors are to be taken as conceptual, rather than merely linguistic, phenomena, and how a theory of metaphorical semantics leads to rejecting an objectivistic point of view on semantics (truth conditional semantics being an aspect thereof), allowing for wider generalizations about cognitive processes to be captured in a more economic way than positing homonyms or ad hoc rules (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Turner 1989).

The objectivist view, as targeted by Lakoff (Lakoff 1987: pp.157–228, in particular, provides extensive references to the advocates of objectivism and their positions), is based on the idea that meaning is a function relating words to their external-world referents directly, without human cognitive operations mediating the process by means of any conceptualization. Reality exists independently of the human mind and it is possible for human beings to achieve objective knowledge of reality in an exact fashion, given the principle that truth is only assessed via the correspondence of sentences with the situations they refer to in the real world (truth conditional semantics). The objectivist view often associates the possibility of accounting for such exact knowledge of objectively given reality to the field of scientific disciplines like mathematics, physics, natural sciences, where no room is left for what is considered as subjective assessments, i.e., matters of human-specific conceptualization, and data

are to be sorted out in a way that corresponds to the natural state of affairs. In Ortony (1979b: p.1), this view is termed as “logical positivism” and described as committed to the position that “reality could be precisely described through the medium of language in a manner that was clear, unambiguous, and, in principle, testable ... literally describable”.

The major challenge Lakoff poses to the objectivist theory lies in its inadequacy to account for prototype effects in categorization. In real life, categorization is a matter of gradients and continua: most categories have fuzzy edges and membership in a category is defined by what has been called prototypicality, that is, the existence of best examples within categories. Some members are better examples of a given category than others: for instance, sparrows are better examples of the category of birds than penguins are. Better examples of a category are the category’s prototypes. Prototypes, or prototypical members, are defined in terms of saliency and recurrence, i.e., basically, by the common observation that, when people are asked to name the member of a given category, prototypes tend to be picked up more often than non-prototypes. Such notions are ultimately linked to the work of the cognitive psychologist Eleanor Rosch (see Lakoff and Johnson 1980 and Lakoff 1987 for references), whose experiments show a substantial correlation between prototypicality and judgments of membership on the subjects’ behalf.

According to the objectivist view, categorization is a clear-cut result of functions that assign membership on the basis of a well-defined set of features which are shared by all the members of a certain category. But, Lakoff points out, the very domain of natural science poses serious challenges to the possibility of such an objective treatment of categorization (Lakoff 1987: pp.185ff.): zebras and fish, for instance, are two natural categories that admit of contrasting membership assessment – i.e., depending on what scientific criteria are used (either phenetic or cladistic), the same species may or may not be taken to belong to the same natural kind. We direct the reader to Lakoff’s pages for further illustration of the above mentioned criteria of natural classification, and move on to clarify that it is not *subjectivism*, however, what Lakoff offers as an alternative to objectivism. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) define subjectivism as an utter refusal of any reality-based constraint on the conceptualization of reality, or as they put it, as the claim that “you can make the world in your own image” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: p.185).

The third way they see themselves as offering is what they dub *experientialism*. Experientialism is defined as a synthesis between the two alternatives. The core of such a view is that human cognition actively plays an important role in defining reality through categorization and conceptualization, as opposed to the objectivist claim that reality exists independent of its human experiencers, but that such cognitive operations as categorization and conceptualization are, anyhow, constrained by the real world, as opposed to the subjectivist claim that the world is what one conceives of it as. Thus, on the one hand, reality enters our cognitive systems through our everyday *experience* of it, so that our cognitive processes are constrained by the input provided by what actually exists; on the other hand, reality cannot be assessed without the medium of our experience. Experience is possible for human beings through their bodily functioning in the environment they operate in, that is, through the various sensory faculties we are physically endowed with. This is an important point that we will come back to later, when discussing of how sensorial inputs of different kind are brought together at the conceptual level (section 2.2).

Within such a theory of reality and understanding, metaphor is regarded by Lakoff as a very important analytic tool. The explanatory power of metaphor lies in its being considered not as a surface phenomenon, that is, as a matter of words, but as a conceptual one: as Lakoff and Johnson (1980: p.56) put it, “most concepts are partially understood in terms of other concepts”. The alternative view on metaphors, that they are a matter of rhetorical embellishment and fanciful linguistic expression, is specifically discussed, and rejected, in Lakoff and Turner (1989). Metaphors, they claim, are a phenomenon that takes place at the conceptual level and consist of mapping of a conceptual schema onto another one: “We use a metaphor to map certain aspects of the source domain onto the target domain, thereby producing a new understanding of that target domain” (Lakoff and Turner 1989: p.38). His position owes much to Black’s theorization about metaphors as “an instrument for drawing implications grounded in perceived analogies of structure between two subjects belonging to different domains” and one that “can sometimes generate new knowledge and insight by *changing* relationships between the things designated” (1979: p.32, 37). The implications of this are examined in Schön’s (1979) study of how employing metaphors to describe reality produces a biased – if not distorted – description of the facts.

The nature and mechanics of metaphorical mappings are extensively considered in Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and Lakoff and Turner (1989). It involves a *source* domain and a *target* domain. To exemplify, we shall consider the metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY as examined in Lakoff and Turner (1989: pp.61ff.). Here, JOURNEY is the source domain, i.e., where the structures involved in the mapping are taken from; LIFE is the target domain, i.e., the domain which is metaphorically structured in terms of the source domain.

To understand the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor, it is necessary to know what a journey conventionally implies, that is, a path, a traveller, the fact that it can have a destination or can be simply wandering about. Then it is necessary to know what the correspondences are between those elements and the elements of the target domain, e.g., the path corresponds to one's lifetime, the traveller to the person living their life, the starting point to birth, and the end of journey to death. They correspond to *slots* of the schema that *must* be filled – there may be other slots which are *optional*: the schema for a journey *requires* a TRAVELLER, a PATH, a STARTING POINT, and an END, whereas COMPANIONS and VEHICLES, for instance, are optional. These correspondences define the mapping itself: when we say the source-domain element x is mapped onto the target-domain element x' , we are saying that x corresponds to x' .

The strength of it is that the *schema* of journey is just a skeletal one, i.e., it has enough details to distinguish journeys from other kinds of activities, but not so many as to rule out any particular kind of journey. Therefore we are free to use the schema for a journey to characterize a wide range of different kinds of lifestyles, because we have many options as to the different kinds of journeys. For instance, someone who is strongly determined to achieve their goals can be said to be living a strongly oriented life, while someone who entertains no particular ambition can be said to be living their life as though they were wandering about.

Metaphorical understanding, Lakoff and Turner point out, is *not* necessary per se. Life *need not* be understood in terms of a journey. But when we understand it through the journey schema, it *structures* the way we understand life. This means that, given certain mapping relations between source and target domains, we can make the same inferences about the target domain as we can make about the source, e.g., because we can infer that someone finding an obstacle on their path has to remove or get around it in order to proceed, we can infer that someone who is facing a problem has to solve it if they want to go on living as before.

As has already been recalled, most concepts are – according to this view – metaphorical in nature. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) go on questioning whether there exist concepts that are understood *per se*, i.e., non-metaphorically. The answer is that there do exist such basic concepts: simple spatial concepts like UP, for instance, are the prime candidates for concepts that are understood directly, because they come from our daily physical experience. Other such concepts, deeply rooted in our bodily experience, are taken to be NEAR–FAR, IN–OUT, FRONT–BACK, LIGHT–DARK, WARM–COLD, MALE–FEMALE, OBJECT, SUBSTANCE, CONTAINER. Lakoff and Johnson clearly pose spatial experience as a primary source for such basic concepts. Such a view is backed, for instance, by Levinson’s observation that

- (i) [s]patial cognition is at the heart of our thinking. It has long been noted that spatial thinking provides us with analogies and tools for understanding other domains, as shown by the efficacy of diagrams, the pervasive spatial metaphors of everyday language, the evocativeness of place in memory ... Spatial cognition probably plays this central role because it seems to be the evolutionarily earliest domain of systematic cross-modal cognition: any animal needs to relate what its eyes, ears and limbs tell it about the immediate structure of the world around it. (Levinson 2003: p.xvii)

Jackendoff (1996: p.13) shares the same view (“many nonspatial concepts are semantically structured in a way very similar to spatial concepts”), and Bierwisch (1996: p.48) observes that time appears to be conceptualized as a one-dimensional, oriented space. Talmy (2000: p.179) points out that the conceptual domain of space “may play a central role by functioning as a (metaphoric) model for the structuring of other domains”, and Sweetser (1990: pp.18, 27ff. and *passim*) emphasizes that semantic shifts in general tend to go from concrete to abstract rather than the other way round. Zelinsky-Wibbelt (1993b: p.4), commenting upon Lakoff (1987), summarizes the point saying that “all abstract concepts are metaphorizations and metonymies of semantically concrete spatial predications”.

To put it in the words of Lakoff and Johnson (1980: p.59), “we typically conceptualize the nonphysical *in terms of* the physical – that is, we conceptualize the less clearly delineated in terms of the more clearly delineated”. According to this position, space is the physical domain *par excellence*, and other physical domains (such as time), as well as non-physical ones (such as emotions), are conceptualized in terms of it via metaphors like TIME IS A CONTAINER or EMOTIONS ARE STATES (e.g. *He*

did it *in* ten minutes, Harry is *in* love).¹ It is then clear that basic concepts, being themselves understood independent of any metaphorical structuring, provide the ultimate basis for grounding non-basic, metaphorically understood concepts in our daily experience.

Levinson (2003: p.276f.) puts forward the tempting idea that the centrality of space among the conceptual domains may be rooted in the physiology of our brain's evolution. The hippocampus, which in mammals is the area of the brain endowed with the encoding of spatial experience, seems to "have been invaded by other functions in the case of humans and other primates". Such "invasion of the 'spatial organ' by non-spatial functions accounts for the remarkable way in which spatial thinking seems to lie at the heart of much human reasoning" (ibid.).

In what follows, the notion of metaphor as permitting conceptual transposal from spatial domain to different areas of cognition shall be coupled with the observation that "the meaning of a word relies on all knowledge resources which may be accessed by the speakers [...] linguistic meaning only being processed as part of a more comprehensive cognitive routine", which magnifies the role of *context* in determining meaning resolution where polysemous items are involved and sanctions the inseparability of semantics and pragmatics (Zelinsky-Wibbelt 1993b: p.3).

2.2 *Space and the mind*

Having seen how metaphor is considered to function as an instrument for turning abstract concepts into ones that are more easily dealt with in physical terms, and

¹ This example opens up another, interesting discussion, namely the distinction between 'dead' and 'live' metaphors. Such metaphorical expressions as *Harry is in love* are the case in point. According to Black (1979: pp.25ff.), an expression like *be fall in love* is a dead metaphor, that is, "not a metaphor at all, but merely an expression that no longer has a pregnant metaphorical use", in other words, a fossilized expression which might as well have originated as a metaphor but is no longer such. The opposite stance is taken by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), who define a dead metaphor as a metaphor which is "unsystematic, isolated and so scarcely productive", in other words a relic (1980: p.55): for instance, a metaphor like A MOUNTAIN IS A PERSON – whose productivity is confined to sporadic expressions such as *the foot of the mountain* – is to be considered a dead metaphor in Lakoff and Johnson's (ibid.) sense of the term. Metaphorical expressions like *be in love* are considered examples of "conventional metaphors", whose pervasive presence in linguistic usage testifies for their vitality rather than their being dead (ibid.: pp.152ff., 211ff.). The latter is the stance we take in our approach to the issue, as opposed to the one subscribed by Black.

how the spatial domain is considered, in this regard, to provide the source domain for a number of metaphorical mappings, we shall turn to the related issue of how space itself is conceptualized and how spatial concepts are linked to their linguistic expressions. The guidelines for this analysis are provided by Jackendoff (1996), Bierwisch (1996), Talmy (2000a), and Levinson (2003).

Jackendoff (1996) postulates the necessity of having a system of intermediate cognitive processes relating visual information and linguistic information, as – he points out – no direct relation can be maintained to exist between vision as a “retinotopic map” and linguistic expression as “phonological encoding”. Such processes are structured, according to Jackendoff, in a modular way, with each module providing a specific kind of spatial representation – hence the name of *Representational Modularity* whereby he dubs his theory. Whereas the modular structure of mental representation is borrowed from Fodor (1983), Jackendoff is here concerned with explaining how different modules communicate with each other. He proposes the idea that inter-modular communication takes place through highly-specialized *interface modules*. An interface module partially translates information from one module to the other (and vice versa), and only works between two adjacent modules, without having access to any other kind of information: thus, the interface module posited between the phonological and the syntactic modules only has access to phonological and syntactic information.




Figure 2.1: Jackendoff’s Representational Modularity schematized (slightly simplified version of Jackendoff 1996: p.3, Figure 1.2).

Jackendoff’s modular system can be represented, in a simplified fashion, by the diagram of Figure 2.1, where each box represents a module (“auditory” and “eye” might be better termed “inputs”, and “motor”, referring to linguistic articulation, as

“output”). Interface modules, which can be either unidirectional or bidirectional, are represented by the arrows. For instance, the phonology-syntax interface functions from left to right in speech perception and from right to left in speech production.

Jackendoff considers the upper layer of the schema (comprising the modules of phonology, syntax, and conceptual structure) as pertaining to the linguistic faculties, while the lower layer (retinotopic, imagistic, and spatial representation modules) as pertaining to visual faculties. (The sequence *retinotopic – imagistic – spatial representation* is said to correspond to Marr’s [1982] *primal sketch – 2½-D sketch – 3-D model*. Also cf. Levinson 2003.)

The crucial interface module is, according to Jackendoff, the one translating between conceptual structure (or CS) and spatial representation (or SR):

- (ii) CS encodes “propositional” representations, and SR is the locus of “image schema” or “mental model” representations. (Jackendoff 1996: p.5)

CS is conceived of as being an encoding of linguistic meaning, independent of any specific language. Meaning in CS is represented in what Jackendoff calls an “algebraic” fashion, where concepts are characterized in terms of “discrete primitive features and functions” (Jackendoff 1996: p.5). Although CS supports rules of inference, it is not “propositional” in the *standard* logical sense, in that its expressions refer neither to the real world nor to possible worlds, but to the world as is conceptualized by the human mind. Lexical semantics is processed by CS in terms of semantic primes (i.e., in a decompositional fashion): lexical items are thus characterized in terms of their *lexical conceptual structure* (LCS). CS must also be able to distinguish between tokens and types, so as to account for the ability to tell apart any individual from its category.

As to the CS–syntax interface, Jackendoff maintains that a verb in syntax corresponds to a function in CS and the arguments of the verb are also the arguments of the function. The most striking difference between syntax and CS is that the latter is *indifferent to linear order*.

Jackendoff’s characterization of SR largely draws upon Marr (1982). It involves a series of features having to do with recognition of physical space. In particular, SR must be able to encode the shape of objects for them to be recognizable from many different perspectives and distances, along with information about parts of objects that are not directly accessible to vision, e.g. the hollowness of a balloon. As a

counterpart to the token/type distinction featured by CS, SR must include ways of distinguishing differences among similarities, so that one may at once, for example, recognize two cups as being both *cups* (“visual object categorization”) and tell them apart as to distinct cups (“visual object identification”). SR must also encode a *full layout* of a spatial scene, so that different perspectives of it can be somehow generated and taken into consideration. SR is characterized as being *independent of any particular spatial modality* (e.g., haptic information, auditory localization, felt body position), so as to be able to bring all of these different kinds of information together – in Jackendoff’s (1996: p.9) terms, “[i]t is important to know by looking at an object where you expect to find it when you reach for it and what it should feel like when you handle it”.

The main difference between SR and CS is thus that the former is geometric in character (“quasi-topological”), while the latter is algebraic (or propositional). Strictly speaking, SR is not *imagistic*, in that an image may only be regarded from a particular point of view, while any SR must allow for multiple-perspective visualization. Also, as far as categorization is concerned, an image can record just one member of a given category, while an SR must include information sufficient for recognizing different members (e.g., different kinds of the type *triangle*). An image would also be an inadequate comparison because, as hinted to before, SR is not restricted to the visual modality. Nevertheless, Jackendoff maintains, it makes sense to conceive of SR as *image-schematic*, i.e., encoding “abstract representations from which a variety of images can be generated” (Jackendoff 1996: p.9; also compare Lakoff 1987: pp.453ff.).

The same position – although with minor, mainly terminological adjustments – is maintained by Bierwisch (1996). His analysis combines a schema originally proposed by Chomsky (1986, 1993), which he modifies according to Jackendoff’s observations. In this schema, Jackendoff’s CS is paralleled by the *semantic form* (SF), which Bierwisch regards as an interface between the level of *I-language* (“internal language”) and *C-I* (“conceptual-intentional system”). I-language and C-I are notions borrowed from Chomsky: the former refers to the computational aspects of the innate Universal Grammar (comprised of phonetic form, syntax, and logical form); the latter is one of the two aspects of external language (or E-language), the other being the articulation and perception system (or A-P). SF thus functions as a bridge between facts that are internal to language proper and facts that are inherent to the level of thought. Similarly, Bierwisch regards Jackendoff’s SR as a level interfacing between

what he calls *I-space* and *E-space*, corresponding to spatial representation in I-language and to external, physical space respectively. Following Jackendoff, Bierwisch (1996: p.45) describes CS as “abstract, propositional, algebraic, that is, nondepictive”, and SR as “depictive of or analogous to what it represents in crucial respects”.

In SR there are no *explicit* units representing relational concepts (e.g. OVER, LEFT OF, etc.). In CS, on the other hand, there are no *explicit* elements representing the geometric properties (angles, dimensions, etc.) of concepts like CIRCLE, SQUARE, etc. So an SR configuration can only be described in CS at the price of losing geometric or topological information, which is implicit in the SR but must be explicitly stated in CS (by means of separate coding for measures, for instance).

Since spatial structures appear to be extensively employed in the conceptualization of many different domains, Bierwisch assumes that such conceptual structures organize conceptual knowledge at a general level; in order to do so, they must exceed the limits of I-space proper. The problem then is whether (i) such conceptual structures are general over different domains, so that SR is just an instantiation of more general schematic structures (as they are imposed onto the spatial domain); or (ii) they are originated within I-space proper and then projected to other (nonspatial) domains. Bierwisch tentatively suggests that alternative (ii) is the more plausible because “I-space is not only a privileged instantiation of spatial structure but is also the richest and most detailed instantiation of spatial structure, compared to other domains. Whereas I-space is basically three-dimensional, other domains are usually of reduced dimensionality” (Bierwisch 1996: p.49): time, for instance, is conceived of as a one-dimensional oriented space, as has already been noted.

Bierwisch also distinguishes two kinds of structure transfer from spatial domain to other domains, an *implicit* and an *explicit* one. He defines explicit transfer as a result of explicit stipulation (he sets the notion of a *colour space* as an example of explicitly transferred spatial structures), but does not further insist on this concept – he prefers to focus on that of implicit transfer, which takes place without explicit stipulation and is held responsible for the lack of a clear distinction between spatial and nonspatial terms: for example, *enter* and *leave* have two readings which are not clearly distinct – in the sense just defined – in examples (7) and (8):

(7) He entered the church.
(Bierwisch 1996: p.32)

(8) He left the institute.
(Bierwisch 1996: p.36)

Thus (7) can be taken to mean either that someone physically entered a temple (spatial domain) or that he became a priest (social domain). Accordingly, (8) means either that someone left a specific academic building (spatial domain) or that he resigned his affiliation with a social institution (social domain). Implicit transfer, according to Bierwisch, is what makes (7) and (8) sound ambiguous.

2.3 *Space in language. Prepositions and metaphors*

2.3.1 *Ception and fictivity*

The problem of how space is represented in language is specifically addressed by Talmy (2000), whose analysis is based on a functional distinction between closed-class and open-class forms of linguistic expression. Briefly, closed-class forms are taken to be relatively few and not easily augmentable in number, and to include both what are traditionally called free morphemes (e.g. autonomous lexical entries) and what are known as bounded morphemes (e.g. number and case endings). Open-class forms (otherwise “lexical” forms), on the other hand, belong to repertoires which members can be easily augmented in number (e.g. the word class of nouns, whose number is constantly accrued by loanwords and the formation of neologisms).

Talmy is not particularly concerned with issues of modularity in the mental representation of conceptual semantics, as is made clear by the introduction of the notion of *ception*, meant to be general over those of perception and conception, and which he founds on the claim that psychologists are unsure as to where to draw a boundary between perceptual and conceptual (cognitive) phenomena:

(iii) ... as I view a particular figure before me, is my identification of it as a knife to be understood as part of my perceptual processing of the visual stimuli, or instead part of some other ... cognitive processing?

(Talmy 2000: p.139)

Accordingly, Talmy’s ception doesn’t imply discrete categories and clear-cut boundaries and is in fact meant to include “all the cognitive phenomena, conscious and

unconscious, understood by the conjunction of perception and conception” (*ibid.*). However, Talmy does not mean to eliminate the distinction between perception and conception all together. He rather reckons that they are the two ends of a continuum and posits a number of parameters closely co-varying with one another, the most important being what Talmy terms the parameter of *palpability*. The maximum of palpability is thus associated with high values along such parameters as clarity, intensity, ostension, objectivity, localizability, identifiability, accessibility to consciousness, accessibility to physical manipulation (“actionability”), and stimulus dependence (the degree to which something can be evoked in awareness in the absence of perceptual stimuli) among the others. The minimum of palpability is therefore associated with low values along the same parameters.

While high degrees of overall palpability are typical of the physical domain (e.g., concrete objects), it is more interesting to examine closely the two “levels of palpability” dubbed by Talmy *semiabstract* and *abstract* respectively. According to Talmy, frames of reference (see below) and the recognition of an object’s structure belong in this level of palpability; the semantic referents of linguistic forms, which can also be evoked in awareness by hearing or thinking of those forms even without perceiving any physical stimulus, are instead taken to pertain to the abstract level.

Another parameter that correlates with palpability is the *content ~ structure* one. Content is taken to correlate with rather high values of palpability, as opposed to structure; in other words, toward the content end an entity is being assessed/experienced as to its substantive content, whereas toward the *structure* end it is being assessed/experienced as to its structure. Since closed-class forms are taken by Talmy to represent more structural and abstract concepts, they are most likely to be those conveying “the character of the fully abstract end of the palpability gradient, at least insofar as it is linguistically associated” (Talmy 2000: p.155). Such image schemas as those associated with prepositions like *across*, or the conceptualization of time associated with verbal tenses, are given as examples of the association between closed-class items and abstract level of conceptualization. What Talmy envisages is a structure where each of the two distinct cognitive systems of vision and language has a *content subsystem* and a *structure subsystem*. In vision, the content subsystem pertains to the concrete level of palpability, while the structure subsystem pertains to the semiabstract level of palpability; in language, open-class forms refers to the con-

tent subsystem, while closed-class forms generally refers to the structure subsystem only.

The structure subsystems of vision and language seem to work in parallel; therefore,

- (iv) one can visually sense ... an “inclusion” type of structural schema on viewing a two-object complex in which one object is sensed as located at a point or points of the interior space defined by the other object. This schema can be topologically ... abstracted away from particulars of ... size, shape, state of closure [etc.] ... Now, the spatial schema specified by the English preposition *in* exhibits all these same properties. This closed-class form can thus be used ... to refer to some object as located *in a thimble, in a volcano, in a well, in a trench* ... (Talmy 2000: p.163)

This is viewed as the typical behaviour of prepositions, which also abstract away from other metrical features and are, for instance, magnitude neutral, as is the case of *across*, which “can be applied to paths of a few centimeters, as in *The ant crawled across my palm*, as well as to paths of thousands of miles, as in *The bus drove across the country*” (*ibid.*: p.164). Language and vision thus show the same kind of topology-like schematic abstractions, which is, according to Talmy, tantamount to saying that what is expressed grammatically is pretty much what is sensed visually.

In Talmy’s account, the topological abstractness of image schemas allows for the employment of the spatial-related conceptual structures in the characterization of other domains via the theory of *fictivity*. The opposition between *fictive* and *factive*, which is introduced for the purpose of motivating the linguistic description of static scenes in dynamic terms (Talmy 2000: pp.99–137), is explained as the contrast between what is sensed as more real and veridical (*factive*) and what is less real and non-veridical. The opposition can be exemplified by the sentence in (9):

- (9) This fence goes from the plateau to the valley.
(Talmy 2000: p.99)

where the *factive* situation is a motionless one (a static fence extends from one point of the scenario to the other), whereas the *fictive* description of the scene encodes it as though motion were involved in the scene via the meaning of the linguistic form *go from x to y*. Hence there is said to be a *discrepancy* between the two cognitive representations of the same scene, the *factive* and the *fictive* ones.

The fictivity paradigm allows for a direct comparison with the theory of metaphor – in particular, as Talmy points out, with the detailed account thereof given by Lakoff and Johnson (1980):

- (v) The source domain and the target domain of a metaphor supply the two discrepant representations. The representation of an entity within the target domain is understood as factive and more veridical. The representation from the source domain that is mapped onto the entity in the target domain, on the other hand, is understood as fictive and less veridical.

(Talmy 2000: p.168)

Talmy would thus rewrite each of Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) three-term formulas (for example, LOVE IS A JOURNEY, i.e., "x is y") by means of two complementary formulas, fictive "x is y" and factive "x is not y". In other words, Talmy regards metaphor as essentially defined by the factive/fictive discrepancy.

2.3.2 Prepositions and space

Two characteristics of prepositions make them particularly suitable instruments for the task of gaining some insight into the mechanisms of metaphor and its bearings on human cognition processes: (i) the fact that "in their prototypical meaning most prepositions are spatial predicates", and (ii) their being "highly polysemous" (Zelinksy-Wibbelt 1993b: pp.2, 10).

The relations outlined above as typical of image schemas are, typically, asymmetrical predications (Taylor 1993: p.153, Talmy 2000: pp.183ff.). As Taylor puts it, asymmetry occurs because the object of the preposition, i.e., the nominal in a prepositional phrase, introduces the background with respect to which something else is brought to the hearer/reader's attention. Truth conditions are irrelevant when it comes to the foreground/background opposition, as the following examples are meant to show:

- (10) a. the picture above the sofa
b. the sofa below the picture

(Taylor 1993: p.153)

That is, although the same truth conditions may hold of (10.a) and (10.b), the two propositions differ with respect to foregrounding: the picture is foregrounded in (10.a), while the sofa is in (10.b). This distinction was already known in Gestalt psychology

as the *figure* vs. *ground*: cf. Zelinsky-Wibbelt (1993b: p.9), who also points out that eligibility of the components of a given scenario as either figure or ground is not at all arbitrary, “although they depend largely on the focus of attention”:

- (vi) They are not totally arbitrary in that ‘certain mental organizations are highly improbable either for gestalt reasons, or because they are unnatural or pragmatically unusual. [...] The moving or moveable object of a scene is also the one which is likely to be conceived as foreground’. (ibid.)

When it comes to terminology, it should be observed that different authors use different terminology: Langacker (1987) adopts the binomial *trajector* vs. *landmark* to refer to the foregrounded and the backgrounded elements, respectively, and so does Taylor (1993), explicitly following him, whereas Talmy (2000: p.183) prefers to speak about *primary* and *secondary* objects. In the present research study, Langacker’s binomial *trajectory* : *landmark* will be employed.

2.4 Summary

In this chapter the fundamental notions concerning space conceptualization, metaphor and prepositions have been presented. The point has been emphasized that the dialogic interaction between space perception (imagistic) and space conception (schematic) requires the ability of abstracting away from spatial details such as magnitude while preserving geometric relations such as proportions and relative positions of different bodies. It has also been observed that prepositions do precisely comply with such requirements, in that they typically abstract away from metric details and can thus be employed to express geometric relations between their trajectors and landmarks in a schematic way.

The hypothesis has been put forward that space conceptualization provides the grounds for conceptualizing domains other than the spatial one. This is made possible by the pervasive character of metaphorical thought, that is, the mapping of conceptual structure from more concrete domains onto more abstract ones, according to the principle that our primary experiences are of a physical nature and arise from our daily interaction with the environment we live in and the inputs that are filtered hence through our senses. In other words, metaphorical thought enables us to make sense of abstract relations by fitting aspects thereof into the structure provided by more basic, concrete ones.

In this sense, metaphor is not what it has been long taken to be, that is, a mere rhetoric embellishment or a witty wordplay, apt to fall within the realm of literary criticism – as Lakoff, in particular, makes clear, metaphors which do fall within that realm are the less conventional ones, and are well distinct from conventional, productive metaphors which sometimes, due to their recurrent employ, have long ceased to be considered such and erroneously – still according to Lakoff’s viewpoint – defined as ‘dead’ metaphors.

The issues just presented will provide the theoretical background for the tasks undertaken in chapters 4 and 5, that is, setting up a repertoire of basic prepositional meanings out of a comparative analysis of the Irish and Italian prepositions, subsequently used to fathom what sense extensions they are capable of yielding by means of metaphorical mappings.

Examples of such extensions will be taken from two specially set-up linguistic corpora, and chapter 3 will be devoted to discussing the methodology employed in their design and implementation.

3 A comparative analysis of Irish and Italian prepositions: methodology

3.0 *Introduction*

We have seen in chapter 2 that wide consensus has gathered in cognitive linguistics around the view that spatial language informs a number of other conceptual domains such as time, social status, emotions, etc., by virtue of its power of visualizing and thus making tangible and understandable concepts that would otherwise appear fairly abstracted away from the immediately available domain of physical experience, which has been argued by theoreticians such as Lakoff to provide the basis for our understanding of the environment we live in. Such understanding, as has been claimed, is primarily achieved by means of metaphoric mappings that superimpose physical models onto abstract conceptual structures.

Another point made in Chapter 2 concerns the role of prepositions in expressing both spatial relations and metaphorically extended senses thereof. What will be addressed in the rest of this paper is a comparative analysis of Irish and Italian prepositions, whose aim is to search and describe patterns of similarity occurring between metaphorically extended senses of prepositions from a cross-linguistic point of view.

The present chapter will therefore be devoted to a brief outlining of the methodology that will be employed in order to (a) provide a consistent corpus of examples for each of the two languages and (b) establish and analyze the above mentioned correspondences or patterns of similarity.

3.1 *Corpora*

3.1.1 *Content*

The choice of the prepositions to be included in the corpora has been determined by criteria of both morphological simplicity and traditional grammatical description. That is, the items to be included in our collection had to be monomorphemic prepositions that had been traditionally described as *simple*, or

proper prepositions by the grammarians. *Simple prepositions* and *preposizioni proprie* (‘proper prepositions’) are terms to be found in grammatical descriptions of Irish and Italian respectively (Mac Congáil 2004: p.62; Sensini 1992: p.240).² Mac Congáil makes use of the term ‘simple prepositions’ to distinguish them from compound prepositions, i.e., phrases functioning as prepositions and generally comprised of a simple preposition plus a nominal. On the other hand, Sensini labels as “proper” those prepositions which can only act as such, as opposed to other lexical items which can also work as adverbs (the only exception being *su*, both a preposition ‘on, over’ and an adverb ‘up’, which is traditionally included in the list of proper prepositions). Since some Irish and Italian prepositions which we are going to take into account can also function as subordinating conjunctions (e.g., Irish *go, chun*, Italian *di, per*), we shall henceforth employ the term “simple preposition” to refer to the content of our corpora. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show what prepositions are included in the Irish and Italian corpora respectively.

| | |
|---|---|
| <i>Followed by the nominative case:</i> | gan, idir, seachas |
| <i>Followed by the dative case:</i> | ag, ar, as, chuig, de, do, faoi, go, i, le, ó, roimh, thar, trí, um |
| <i>Followed by the genitive case:</i> | chun, dála, fearacht, timpeall, trasna |

Table 3.1: *Simple* prepositions as included in the Irish corpus.

² The forms of Irish and Italian being considered in this study are the standard ones, as described, for instances, by the aforementioned grammars. As to Irish, the introduction of a standard form distinct from any one of its three main dialects (Connacht, Ulster and Munster) poses some problems, as some scholars (cf. Ó Dochartaigh 1992: p.29) prefer to describe the features of the actually spoken languages rather than the artificial construction imposed as a standard. Our data (see section 3.1.2) are based on the usage of two different writers, who show no differences as far as the class of prepositions is concerned. For a description of modern Irish which takes into account the most prominent dialectal differentiations, see Ó Dochartaigh (1992), and also Mac Eoin (1993).

di, a, da, in, con, su, per, tra/fra³

Table 3.2: Proper prepositions as included in the Italian corpus.

The corpora were set up by using text-searching tools in Microsoft Word documents, which were obtained by optical scanning of printed material. Because only simple or proper prepositions were searched for, occurrences of compound prepositions (e.g., Irish *in aghaidh* + genitive, Italian *di fronte a* ‘in front of’) were included in our corpora as they were found, but no list of compound prepositions was prepared and used for the purposes of specifically retrieving them.

Most simple prepositions, in both Irish and Italian, can occur in different forms which can be arranged into specific paradigms. More precisely, (the majority of) Irish simple prepositions can incorporate personal pronouns and therefore be inflected according to person and number (“prepositional pronouns”), whereas (almost all) Italian simple prepositions can incorporate the definite article and therefore be inflected according to gender and number (“preposizioni articolate”). In addition, some Irish prepositions can also incorporate the article, the possessive and the relative pronouns. Tables showing the most recurrent inflected forms of Irish and Italian prepositions are to be found in Appendix A. For instance, Irish *i* ‘in’ can show the forms *ionam* ‘in me’, *ionat* ‘in you’ (singular), *ann* ‘in him/it’ etc. with a conflated pronoun, *sa/san/sna* ‘in the’ with a conflated article, *ina* ‘in his/her/its’/*linár* ‘in our’ with a conflated possessive pronoun, and *ina/inar* ‘in whom/in which’ with a conflated relative pronoun. Italian *in* ‘in’, on the other hand, can exhibit the inflected forms *nel/nello* ‘in the’ (masculine singular), *nelle* ‘in the’ (feminine plural), etc., with a conflated article. (Mac Congáil 2004: 62–83; Sensini 1992: p.240.)

³ *Tra* and *fra* are traditionally considered variants of the same prepositions (although historically they might have developed from two different Latin prepositions, i.e., *intra* ‘within’ and *infra* ‘under’, respectively). Synchronically, they have no difference whatever in meaning and their choice seems to be only determined by euphony, to avoid the repetition of the same consonant cluster (e.g., *tra fratelli* ‘between brothers’ is preferred to *fra fratelli*, *fra Treviso e Venezia* ‘between Treviso and Venice’ to *tra Treviso e Venezia*): cf. Cortelazzo and Zolli (1980: s.v. *fra*; 1988: s.v. *tra*); Sensini (1988: p.216).

3.1.2 Sources for data

The prepositions contained in the corpora were retrieved from word-processed texts, allowing for a quick retrieval of all inflected forms of every single preposition to be included (where such forms were found). The Irish texts amounted to 5,660 words distributed as follows: 2,778 words making up the first chapter of Ní Dhuibhne (2000: pp.1–10) and the first 2,882 words of Ó Cíosóig (1997: pp.5–12). The Italian data were gathered from 17 short stories by Italo Calvino (1972), to the amount of 5,044 words. They are the following (the Roman number preceding each item is the number whereby they will be referred to in the examples and in appendix C):

- | | |
|--|--|
| I. <i>Le città e il desiderio</i> (2), p.20 | X. <i>Le città e gli scambi</i> (5), pp.95f. |
| II. <i>Le città e il desiderio</i> (3), p.25 | XI. <i>Le città e il nome</i> (3), pp.99f. |
| III. <i>Le città e la memoria</i> (5), pp.37f. | XII. <i>Le città e i morti</i> (2), p.101 |
| IV. <i>Le città e il desiderio</i> (4), p.39 | XIII. <i>Le città e il cielo</i> (1), pp.103f. |
| V. <i>Le città e i segni</i> (3), p.40 | XIV. <i>Le città e i morti</i> (3), pp.115f. |
| VI. <i>Le città e i segni</i> (4), pp.53f. | XV. <i>Le città e i morti</i> (4), p.133 |
| VII. <i>Le città e il nome</i> (1), pp.73f. | XVI. <i>Le città nascoste</i> (1), p.136 |
| VIII. <i>Le città sottili</i> (5), p.81 | XVII. <i>Le città e il cielo</i> (5), pp.156f. |
| IX. <i>Le città e gli occhi</i> (3), p.83 | |

3.1.3 Translations

Authorship for the English translations of Irish and Italian passages is thus flagged: all translations from Italian, when not otherwise specified, are to be considered the writer's work; so are all the translations from Ní Dhuibhne (2000) and Ó Cíosóig (1997), sometimes realized with the aid of Irish speakers (whose contributions have been recognized in the Acknowledgments section, where it has been also stated the final responsibility for all mistakes that might have occurred is entirely mine). Translations from the *NIG* are the writer's, whereas all other translations from Irish grammars and lexica were provided by their authors.

3.2 Analysis of data: Methodology outline

Each occurrence of a given preposition in its immediate context was retrieved and glossed in English; an English translation of each textual string was provided as well. The corpora thus built are appended to this paper (Appendices B and C). They will be used to provide examples for a cross-linguistic comparison between the semantics of the Irish and Italian prepositions. We shall start from the assumption,

which we have examined in chapter 2, that the spatial domain provides the conceptual structures which allow for metaphoric mapping and extension of meaning onto different domains. Therefore, in comparing the preposition systems of Irish and Italian we shall start from their spatial meanings and attempt to define sets of basic spatial meanings along with the prepositions that express them in Irish and Italian. Once we have done so, we shall end up with having a number of semantic links between the two preposition systems. At this point, we will be concerned with considering what kind of semantic extensions prepositions that have the same kind of spatial meaning in both Irish and Italian can undergo. For instance, we shall come across the fact that Irish *i* and Italian *in* can be used in a spatial sense to express both static position and dynamic positioning ('it is *in* the bag' vs. 'he put it *in(to)* the bag'). Subsequently, we may be able to observe that both Italian *in* and Irish *i* can express temporal concepts – sometimes in a very similar way, e.g. It. '*in capo* a una settimana', Ir. '*i gceann seachtaine*' = Eng. 'in a week's time', where both Italian and Irish literally express the concept as 'in head to/of a week'.

In order to contain the extension of the present research study within limits that might be appropriate to an M.Phil. dissertation, the analysis of our corpora will not cover the entire amount of retrieved data. Instead, after prepositions in both languages have been compared and correspondences between them have been assessed and categorized (chapter 4), only three of the groupings thus obtained will be thoroughly analyzed (chapter 5).

Although an etymological comparison would be interesting, especially in the light of the much debated – and now rather discredited – Italo-Celtic hypothesis which would assume a common origin for Italic and Celtic within the Indo-European family (see for instance Fife 1993: p.5, Macaulay 1992b: pp.4f.), we shall leave this issue to further studies, as any accurate etymological inquiry aiming at establishing historical cognates across Irish and Italian prepositions would require an amount of investigations that goes beyond the scope and the limits of the present research study.

4 Spatial relations: The core meanings of prepositions

4.0 Introduction

In the previous chapter (3.2) we have briefly outlined the methodology we shall follow in analyzing our corpora. What we do in this chapter is set up a restricted selection of semantically basic spatial concepts. Once we have done so, it will be possible to analyze the Irish and Italian data against the background of that conceptual catalogue.

4.1 Basic spatial meanings (BSMs): A repertoire

4.1.1 Setting up the repertoire

| ITALIAN | | BASIC SPATIAL MEANINGS (BSMs) | | IRISH |
|----------|--|-------------------------------|--|----------------------------|
| Di Da | | OFF, FROM, OUT OF | | De As Ó |
| A | | AT | | Ag |
| | | ABOUT | | Um |
| | | TO, TOWARDS | | Chun, chuig Go Do |
| Per | | THROUGH, ACROSS | | Tír Trasna |
| Tra, fra | | BETWEEN, AMONG | | Idir |
| Su | | ABOVE | | |
| | | ON, ONTO | | Ar |
| In | | IN, INTO | | I(n) |
| Con | | WITH | | Le |

Figure 4.1: Interrelationships between the basic spatial meanings of Italian (leftmost column) and Irish prepositions (rightmost column) shown against the *tertium comparationis* of English glosses.

It is important to emphasize that the spatial concepts we are taking as being basic and about to describe in the present chapter are not extracted from the corpora, but independently set, that is, their list is compiled on the basis of the basic spatial meanings (henceforth, BSMs) as are found in grammatical references and dictionaries. Figure 4.1 is a graphic representation of the relationships between each set of prepositions (Italian and Irish on the leftmost and rightmost columns, respectively) and their BSMs (glossed in English). In the next section (4.2), a fully-fledged catalogue of examples will be provided.

Figure 4.1 can be compared to Taylor’s (1993) list of English prepositions on which he conducted his own study of meaning extensions. It will be observed that a number of Irish prepositions which were included in Tables 3.1–2 (chapter 3) are excluded from Figure 4.1; these include the following:

| | | | |
|-----------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|
| <i>dála</i> | ‘like, as’ | <i>roimh</i> | ‘before, in front of’ |
| <i>faoi</i> | ‘under, beneath’ | <i>seachas</i> | ‘besides, other than’ |
| <i>fearacht</i> | ‘like, as’ | <i>timpeall</i> | ‘around’ |
| <i>gan</i> | ‘without’ | <i>thar</i> | ‘past’ |

The reason why they have been excluded is that no equivalents are to be found for them among Italian simple prepositions (“simple” as defined in 3.1.1 above), and therefore no comparison could be established for them.

4.1.2 BSMs: A brief characterization

What will follow is a tentative description of basic, i.e., spatial usages of the prepositions displayed in Figure 4.1. A preliminary caveat is necessary at this stage. All of the following examples provide an English translation, which – although necessary – is potentially misleading, in that it may obscure the fact that different languages conceptualize the same facts in different ways. For instance, Irish and English conceptualize DWELLING as a state of affairs which takes place IN a given location, while Italian conceptualizes the same concept as a state of affairs which takes place AT a given location. Accordingly, the prepositional phrase in the English (*living*) *in Dublin* will be rendered by the Irish (*cónaí*) *i mBaile Átha Cliath* (therefore glossed ‘in Dublin’), and by the Italian *abitare a Dublino* (therefore glossed ‘at Dublin’): both will be nonetheless translated as ‘living in Dublin’.

Before going into the examples proper, a brief description will follow of the BSMs that shall be analyzed, keeping in mind Dirven's (1993: pp.73f.) classification of English prepositions (*basic* space prepositions, e.g. *at, in, on*; *proximity* prepositions, e.g. *by, with*; *path* prepositions, e.g. *through*; *separation/source* prepositions, e.g. *from, off, out of*), as well as Talmy's (2000b: p.55) "Ground's Conformations":

- i. **OFF/FROM/OUT OF**: denoting source relations. Prototypically, separation of tr from some lm (*The mosquito was hit and fell **off** the wall*) and lm as the physical origin of the tr's movement (*Mary comes **from** the States*). Static relations are also expressed (*My tools are **out of** place*).
- ii. **AT**: denoting a generic relation of proximity between tr and lm. According to Dirven (1993: p.75), spatial functions like this are poorly specified from the point of view of spatial relation. For instance, *Mary is waiting **at** the airport* says nothing about the exact location of Mary (tr) with respect to the airport (lm), i.e., whether she is waiting outside or inside the building, or at the taxi rank, etc.
- iii. **ABOUT**: akin in meaning to AT, ABOUT is typically general with regard to orientation – so that while *sitting **AT** the piano* is sitting at the keyboard, i.e., functionally oriented with respect to the piano, *sitting **ABOUT** the piano* may denote any possible location of tr with respect to the piano (in front of it, behind it, at its side). This lack of orientational information about the tr makes it possible for ABOUT to denote a tr located at different lm's at different times (*Carla is annoyed at John's being always **ABOUT**⁴*), thus virtually encircling lm.⁵ In Irish, *um* is marginally employed in this sense (as we shall see, it is most productively employed in non-spatial senses), whereas in Italian there is no simple prepositions conveying this meaning.

⁴ This example features what Jackendoff (1973) and Taylor (1993: pp.160, 173) would call a preposition used *intransitively*, i.e., with no prepositional object (in other words, a PP without a nominal). Although we shall not be concerned with either the intransitive usage of prepositions in this study, we appeal to this theoretically useful notion in order to exemplify a marginal use of a BSM which is scarcely represented in English by transitive prepositions.

⁵ This characteristic makes ABOUT suitable for extension in the time domain, where its meaning is roughly 'either shortly before or shortly after' a given temporal-lm (*She said she's coming **at** **ABOUT** 6 o'clock*).

- iv. **TO, TOWARDS:** denoting goal, i.e., lm as either the location where the tr is as result of a movement which originated somewhere else, or the location where the tr is meant to be after the movement is completed (cf. *I left for Rome, but I never got there* vs. *I went to Rome, *but I never got there*: the former profiles lm as intended goal, the latter as reached/actual goal). In the ‘intended direction’ meaning, TO/TOWARDS may denote static relations (*What is she pointing at?, He was standing with his back towards me*).
- v. **THROUGH, ACROSS:** lm acts as a medium, and tr occupies several locations (lm₀–lm_n) in subsequent moments (t₀–t_n), with lm₀–lm_n all belonging to lm and (prototypically) arranged in some linear path. In some languages (e.g., in English) a preposition expressing such BSM may also have denote a static relation, namely that of a tr being at the endpoint lm_n of the aforementioned path (*The shop is just across the street*). Furthermore, lm can be either a region proper, i.e., a spatial continuum (*They are walking across the field*), or a number of distinct entities (i.e., individuals in a group) seen as occupying a region, i.e., a multiplex lm (*She is pushing her way through the crowd*).
- vi. **BETWEEN, AMONG:** in this BSM, the tr/lm relation typically involve two or more lm’s. When a preposition expressing this BSM has a pluralized nominal as its object (e.g., *The hammock hangs between the trees*), the different lm’s are considered to belong in the same category. The tr is profiled as located in a location lm_m which is considered to be roughly equidistant from lm₁, lm₂, ..., lm_n.
- vii. **ABOVE:** denoting a tr which is vertically higher than lm, with no contact occurring between them. It will be noted in what follows (4.1.2.1.6), as Figure 4.1 graphically shows, that Irish has no simple preposition denoting this kind of relation.
- viii. **ON, ONTO:** denoting a tr/lm relationship where tr is prototypically located vertically higher than lm with contact occurring between them (static), or ends up being likewise located with respect to lm after a movement which originated somewhere else (dynamic) – cf. *She is on the bus* vs. *She got on(to) the bus*. At any rate, the ‘contact’ component seems to be predominant in this BSM, at least in its realization in English, Italian, and Irish: as it turns out, prepositions expressing ON/ONTO in these languages (Eng. *on(to)*, It. *su*, Ir. *ar*) may express tr–lm contact even if tr is *not* located vertically higher than lm (cf.

Eng. *on the sole of my shoe* = It. *sulla suola della mia scarpa* = Ir. *ar bhonn mo bhróige*⁶).

- ix. **IN, INTO:** in the relationship profiled by this BSM, a *lm* is evoked which has certain boundaries within which *tr* is located (static) or ends up being located after a movement (dynamic). Cf. *Your toys are in the box* vs. *Put your toys in(to) the box*.
- x. **WITH:** in the spatial domain, this BSM acts as a function assigning to *tr* the value ‘being where *lm* is’ (*John is with Mary*, *The hammer is with the other tools*). Apart from this specific meaning (i.e., location sharing between *tr* and *lm*), its level of genericness is as high as AT’s is: in *John is with Mary*, for instance, we know that if we find *Mary* we are likely to find *John* as well, but we do not know if he is in front of, behind, or beside her; nor does this BSM per se specify the location (which might be noted *lm*_?) where *tr* and *lm* both are. Used with a dynamic meaning, WITH implies that *tr* and *lm* continue to share location for the entire duration of a certain movement (*I will go to Rome with him*, *This dish comes with a portion of fries*).

4.2 Prepositions expressing BSMs: Examples

4.2.1 Irish

4.2.1.1 OFF/FROM/OUT OF

(1) DE

a. *ribe d’ fhéasóg an fhir*
 hair from beard DET man.GEN
 ‘a hair of the man’s beard’

b. *cuid den airgead* c. *duine de na daoine*
 share off.DET money person from DET people
 ‘some of the money’ ‘one of the people’

d. *Bain de dhuine eile é*
 take.IMP.2SG off person other OBJ:3SG.MSC
 ‘Take it off someone else’

⁶ The source for this rather illuminating example is Ó Donaill (1977: s.v. *ar*), the English and Italian counterparts merely being its translations.

- e. *Tóg den chathaoir é*
 lift.IMP.2SG off.DET chair OBJ:3SG.MSC
 ‘Lift it off the chair’
- f. *Bain díot do chóta*
 take.IMP.2SG off.2SG.OBJ POSS:2SG coat
 ‘Take off your coat’

(a–f: Mac Congáil 2004: pp.69f.)

(2) AS

- a. *as áit* b. *as gloine*
 out of place out of place
 ‘out of place’ ‘out of place’
- c. *as a teach*
 out of POSS:3SG.FEM house
 ‘out of her house’
- d. *Is as Gaillimh é*
 COP from Galway SUBJ:3SG.MSC⁷
 ‘He is from Galway’
- e. *mile as Doire*
 mile from Derry
 ‘a mile from Derry’
- f. *Tóg as seo é*
 take.IMP.2SG from here OBJ:3SG.MSC
 ‘Take it away from here’

(a–e: Mac Congáil 2004: p.67; f: *NIG*: p.136)

(3) Ó

- a. *ó Dhoire go Béal Feirste*
 from Derry to Belfast
 ‘from Derry to Belfast’
- b. *ó duine go duine* c. *ón áit seo*
 from person to person from.DET place this
 ‘from person to person’ ‘from this place’

⁷ In Irish the third-person subject of the copula is expressed by what are described as object pronouns, i.e., *é* (masculine singular), *í* (feminine singular), *iad* (plural) rather than *sé*, *sí*, and *siad* (subject pronouns), respectively (Mc Congáil 2004: p.109, Ó Dochartaigh 1992: p.65). Nonetheless, to avoid confusion, in this study *é*, *í*, and *iad* will be glossed as SUBJ when they are copular subjects.

- d.** *an t-athair ónar thóg sé an nós sin*
 DET father from.REL.PAST took SUBJ:3SG.MSC DET habit that
 ‘the father **from whom** he took that habit’
- e.** *Ó Liam a fuair mé iad*
from Liam REL get.PAST SUBJ:1SG 3PL.OBJ
 ‘(It is) from Liam that I got them’
- f.** *Caith uait é*
 cast.IMP.2SG **from.OBJ:2G** OBJ.3SG.MASC
 ‘Throw it away from you’
- (**a, e, f:** *NIG*: pp.136, 135; **b–d:** Mac Congáil 2004: p.79)

4.2.1.2 AT (ABOUT)

(4) AG

- a.** *ag baile* **b.** *ag an ngeata*
 at town at DET gate
 ‘at a town’ ‘at the gate’
- c.** *Tá sí ag an teach*
 be SUBJ:3SG.FEM at DET house
 ‘She is at the house’
- d.** *Bhí mé ag an gcóisir*
 be.PAST SUBJ:1SG at DET party
 ‘I was at the party’

(**a–d:** Mac Congáil 2004: p.64)

(5) UM

- a.** *do chóta a chur umat* **b.** *um Shionainn*
 POSS:2SG coat to⁸ put.VN about.OBJ:2SG at Shannon
 ‘to put one’s coat on’ ‘by the banks of the Shannon’

(**a:** Mac Mathúna and Ó Corráin 2003: s.v.; **b:** Ó Dónaill 1977: s.v.)

⁸A represents the phonetic development of *do* ‘to’ when followed by a verbal noun. It is therefore a preposition in its own right, which we are not going to deal with in this research for it has eventually become fossilized in this function: *a* is not otherwise to be found as a preposition, although – as Eoin Mac Cárthaigh (p.c.) has suggested to me – dialectal forms like the Munster one found in our corpus (Ó Cíosóig 1997: *d’admháil* = Standard Ir. *a admháil* ‘to admit’) sometime show the original phonetic shape of the preposition in hiatus position. Its function is ‘to connect a preceding noun or pron[oun] with v[erbal] n[oun]’ (Ó Dónaill 1977: s.v. *a*⁴).

4.2.1.3 TO, TOWARDS

(6) *CHUN, CHUIG*⁹

- a.** *dul chun na Róimhe*
 go.VN to DET Rome
 ‘to go to Rome’
- b.** *Chuaig sé chun na scoile*
 go.PAST SUBJ:3SG.MSC to DET school.GEN
 ‘He went to school’
- c.** *Chuaig sé chuig an teach*
 go.PAST SUBJ:3SG.MSC to DET house
 ‘He went to the house’

(a: Mac Mathúna and Ó Corráin 2003: s.v. *chun*; b–c: *NIG*: p.136)

(7) *GO*

- a.** *ó cheann go ceann*
 from head to head
 ‘from end to end’
- b.** *dul go Meiriceá*
 go.VN to America
 ‘to go to America’
- c.** *ag tiomáint abhaile ón Daingean go*
 at drive.VN home from.DET Dingle to
Dún Dearg
Dún Dearg
 ‘driving home from Dingle to Dún Dearg’

(a–b: Mac Mathúna and Ó Corráin 2003: s.v.; b: Ó Dónaill 1977: s.v., c: Ní Dhuibhne 2000: p.1)

⁹ Although *chun* and *chuig* are two distinct prepositions – the former governing in the genitive case, the latter in the dative (cf. 3.1.1; Ó Dochartaigh 1992: p.59) – they have rather similar shape and their distinction seems to be somewhat confused: Ó Donaill 1977 (s.vv.), for instance, features a very short entry for *chuig* (6 lines), where he directs the reader to the entry *chun* (which takes up more than half a page) for the list of the pronominal forms (*chugam, chugat*, etc.). Mac Congáil (2004: p.68), on the other hand, lists both the pronominal forms and the most common usages under the heading *chuig*.

- (8) *DO*
- a. *imeacht don Fhrainc*
 leave.VN to.DET France
 ‘to depart for France’¹⁰
- b. *dul don siopa* c. *dul don Spáinn*
 go.VN to.DET shop go.VN to.DET Spain
 ‘to go to the shop’ ‘to go to Spain’
- (a: Mac Mathúna and Ó Corráin 2003: s.v.; b–c: Ó Dónaill 1977: s.v.)

4.2.1.4 THROUGH, ACROSS

- (9) *TRÍ*
- a. *tríd an tír* b. *tríd an pholl*
 through DET country through DET hole
 ‘through the country’ ‘through the hole’
- c. *an t-urlár trína sileann an t-uisce*
 DET floor through.REL leaks DET water
 ‘the floor through which the water leaks/leaked’
- d. *ghluaiseacht trín slua*
 move.VN through.DET crowd
 ‘moving through the crowd’
- (a–b: *NIG*: p.134; c: Mac Congáil 2004: p.82; d: Ó Cíosóig 1997: p.8)
- (10) *TRASNA*
- a. *Chuaigh sé trasna na sráide*
 go.PAST SUBJ:3SG.MSC across DET street.GEN
 ‘He went across the street’
- b. *trasna na páirce*
 across the field.GEN
 ‘across the field’
- c. *Bhogas trasna an tseomra go bhfeicfinn cérbh í*
 move.PAST.1SG across DET room COMPL see.COND.1SG who.be.PAST
 SUBJ:3SG.FEM
 ‘I crossed the room to see who she was’
- (a: Mac Mathúna and Ó Corráin 2003: s.v.; b: *NIG*: p.134; c: Ó Cíosóig 1997: p.8)

¹⁰ At a finer-grained level of analysis, it might be argued that Eng. *for* (as in (8 a)) profiles a different relation from TO, namely what might be termed a ‘wished-direction’ extension. Note that whereas Irish does not distinguish this sense, Italian does (cf. *il treno per Roma, partire per il Messico* in 4.1.2.2.4).

4.2.1.5 BETWEEN, AMONG

(11) *IDIR*

- a. *idir Ciarraí agus Corcaigh*
 between Kerry and Cork
 ‘between Kerry and Cork’
- b. *an pasáiste idir na suíocháin*
 DET corridor between DET seats
 ‘the corridor between the seats’
- c. *idir an dá thaobh den abhainn*
 between DET two side of.DET river
 ‘between the two sides of the river’

(a: Mc Congáil 2004: p.76, b: Ní Dhuibhne 2000: p.8; c: Ó Dónaill 1977: s.v.)

4.2.1.6 ABOVE

Irish has no simple preposition for this BSM as described in 4.1.2.0

(vii).

4.2.1.7 ON, ONTO

(12) *AR*

- a. *ar chathaoir* b. *ar an talamh*
 on chair on DET ground
 ‘on a chair’ ‘on the ground’
- c. *na héadaí áiféiseacha faiseanta a chaith*
 DET clothes ridiculous fashionable REL wear.PAST
daoine ar Shráid Grafton
 people on Street Grafton
 ‘the ridiculous, fashionable clothes worn by the people in Grafton Street’
- d. *Leag sí lámh ar ghualainn Phatsy*
 cast.PAST SUBJ:3SG.FEM hand on shoulder Patsy.GEN
 ‘She laid a hand on(to) Patsy’s shoulder’

(a–b: Mac Congáil 2004: pp.65f.; c–d: Ní Dhuibhne 2000: p.2)

4.2.1.8 IN, INTO

(13) *I(N)*

- a. *i mbád* in boat 'in a boat'
- b. *i gcarr* in car 'in a car'
- c. *in dhá áit* in two place 'in two places'
- d. *san uisce* in.DET water 'in the water'
- e. *Ag obair sa chathair* at work in.DET city 'Working in the city'
- f. *chuir sí an teileafón ina mála droma* put.PAST SUBJ:3SG.FEM DET telephone into.POSS:3SG.FEM bag back.GEN 'she put the telephone into her backpack'

(a–d: Mac Congáil 2004: p.75; e: Ó Dónaill 1977: s.v.; f: Ní Dhuibhne 2000: p.9)

4.2.1.9 WITH

(14) *LE*

- a. *Tá sí ina cónaí linn* be.PRES SUBJ:3SG.FEM in.POSS:3SG.FEM live.VN with.OBJ:1PL 'She is living with us'
- b. *Siúl le duine* walk.VN with person 'To walk with someone'

(a–b: Ó Dónaill 1977: s.v.)

4.2.2 Italian

4.2.2.1 OFF/FROM/OUT OF

(15) *DI*

- a. *Uno di noi sarà eletto capoclasse* one from OBJ:1PL be.FUT.3SG elected class representative 'One of us shall be elected as our class representative'
- b. *Il più bravo della squadra è stato premiato* DET more good from.DET team be.PERF.3SG awarded 'The best member of the team was given a prize'
- c. *È di Firenze* be.3SG from Florence ' (S/he) is from Florence'
- d. *Isidoro di Siviglia* Isidore from Seville 'Isidore of Seville'

- e. *Andiamo di città in città*
 go.1PL from town to town
 ‘We go from town to town’

(a–b, e: Sensini 1988: pp.209f; c–d: <http://demauroparavia.it/32332> [accessed August 2005])

(16) DA

- a. *Il treno proveniente da Roma è in ritardo*
 DET train coming from Rome be.3SG in delay
 ‘The train from Rome is late’

- b. *Lo zio è tornato da Londra ieri sera*
 DET uncle return.PERF.3SG from London yesterday night
 ‘Uncle came back from London yesterday night’

- c. *Le Alpi separano l’Italia da vari stati europei*
 DET Alps divide.3PL DET Italy from various states
 European
 ‘The Alps divide Italy from various European states’

- d. *I miei parenti abitano a venti chilometri da Napoli*
 DET POSS:1SG relatives live.3PL at twenty kilometers from
 Naples
 ‘My family live twenty kilometres away from Naples’

(a–d: Sensini 1988: p.212)

4.2.2.2 AT¹¹

(17) A

- a. *stare a casa* b. *vivere a Roma*
 stay.INF at home live.INF at Rome
 ‘to stay at home’ ‘to live in Rome’

- c. *abitare al terzo piano*
 live.INF at third floor
 ‘to live on the third floor’

(a–c: <http://oxfordparavia.it/lemmaIta12> [accessed August 2005])

4.2.2.3 TO, TOWARDS

(18) A

- a. *recarsi al lavoro / a Londra*
 go.INF to.DET work / to London
 ‘to go to work/to London’

¹¹ Italian does not have a simple preposition for the BSM ABOUT (see 4.1.2.0, iii).

- b. *andare a letto*
 go.INF to bed
 ‘to go to bed’
- c. *arrivare all’ aeroporto*
 arrive.INF to.DET airport
 ‘to arrive at the airport’

(a–c: <http://oxfordparavia.it/lemmaIta12> [accessed August 2005])

(19) PER

- a. *Il treno per Roma è in ritardo*
 DET train to Rome be.3SG in delay
 ‘The train to Rome is late’
- b. *partire per il Messico*
 leave.INF to DET Mexico
 ‘to leave for Mexico’

(a: Sensini 1988: p.215; b: <http://oxfordparavia.it/lemmaIta20385> [accessed August 2005])

4.2.2.4 THROUGH, ACROSS

(20) PER

- a. *Il Giro passerà per Napoli*
 the tour pass.FUT.3SG through Naples
 ‘The Giro d’Italia will pass through Naples’
- b. *uscire per la porta*
 exit.INF through DET door
 ‘to go out through the door’
- c. *Ho passeggiato a lungo per la città*
 stroll.PERF.1SG to long through the town
 ‘I took a long stroll around town’

(a–c: Sensini 1988: p.215)

(21) TRA/FRA

- a. *farsi largo tra la folla*
 make.INF.REFL room through DET crowd
 ‘to push oneself through the crowd’
- b. *Il sole filtrava tra le tende*
 DET sun filter.IMP.3SG through DET curtains
 ‘the sun was filtering through the curtains’¹²

(a–b: <http://oxfordparavia.it/lemmaIta29961> [accessed August 2005])

¹² A literal meaning of (21.b) is implausible and cannot be assigned a positive truth value, as the curtains are not a medium through which the sun moves in the way profiled by It. *filtrare tra*, Eng. *to*

4.2.2.5 BETWEEN, AMONG

(22) TRA/FRA

- a. *Despina, città di confine tra due deserti*
 Despina, city of border **between** two **deserts**
 ‘Despina, a border city between two deserts’
- b. *io andavo tra le siepi*
 SUBJ:1SG walk.IMPF.1SG **between** DET **hedges**
 ‘I walked between the hedges’¹³
- c. *mettere un quadrifoglio tra le pagine del libro*
 put.INF one four-leaf clover **between** DET **pages** of.DET **book**
 ‘to put a four-leaf clover in between two pages of a book’

(a–b: Calvino 1972: II, VI; c: <http://demauroparavia.it/121528> [accessed August 2005])

4.2.2.6 ABOVE

(23) SU

- a. *Ho visto un bel ristorante sul lago*
 see.PERF.1SG one nice restaurant **above**.DETlake
 ‘I’ve seen a nice restaurant overlooking the lake’
- b. *un ponte sul fiume*
 one bridge **above**.DETriver
 ‘a bridge over the river’
- c. *cinquecento metri sul livello del mare*
 five hundred metres **above**.DETlevel of.DET sea
 ‘five hundred metres above sea level’

(a: Sensini 1988: p.214; b–c: <http://oxfordparavia.it/lemmaIta28676> [accessed August 2005])

4.2.2.7 ON, ONTO

- (24) a. *La tazza è sul tavolo*
 DET cup be.3SG **on**.DET **table**
 ‘The cup is on the table’
- b. *dimenticare l’ ombrello sul treno*
 forget.INF DET umbrella **on**.DET **train**
 ‘to leave one’s umbrella on the train’
- c. *battere il pugno sul tavolo*

filter through. The sentence can, all the same, be taken as exemplifying the BSM THROUGH, once it is made clear that the required reading for *sun* is a metonymic one, where *sun* stands for the light the sun emits, which can in turn be said to physically pass through the curtains.

¹³ The *tr* here is the path the subject is walking along, which is located between two parallel hedges.

- slam.INF DET fist onto.DET table
 ‘to slam one’s fist on the table’
- d. *salire* *sul* *treno*
 ascend.INF onto.DET train
 ‘to get onto the train’
- e. *Mettilo* *su* *quel* *mucchio*
 put.IMP.2SG-OBJ:3SG.MSC onto.DET that pile
 ‘Put it on top of that pile’

(a–e: <http://oxfordparavia.it/lemmaIta28676> [accessed August 2005])

4.2.2.8 IN, INTO

- (25) a. *La banda suonerà in piazza*
 DET band play.FUT.3SG in square
 ‘The band will play in the square’
- b. *Abita in Italia da anni*
 live.3SG in Italy since years
 ‘S/he’s been living in Italy for ages’
- c. *vivere in città / in campagna*
 live.INF in town / in countryside
 ‘to live in town/in the country’
- d. *entrare in una stanza*
 enter.INF into one room
 ‘to go into a room’
- e. *salire in macchina*
 ascend.INF into car
 ‘to get into the car’
- f. *andare in Francia / in città / in campagna*
 go.INF into France / into city / into countryside
 ‘to go to France/to town/to the country’

(a–b: Sensini 1988: p.213; c–f: <http://oxfordparavia.it/lemmaIta13647> [accessed August 2005])

4.2.2.9 WITH

- (26) CON
- a. *vivere con qualcuno*
 live.INF with somebody
 ‘to live with somebody’
- b. *una bistecca con le patatine*
 one steak with DET chips
 ‘a steak with chips’

c. *Vado in vacanza con mio fratello*
go.1SG in holiday with POSS:1SG brother
'I'll go on holiday with my brother'

(a–b: <http://www.demauroparavia.it/25299> [accessed June 2005]; c: Sensini 1988: p.214).

4.3 Summary

In this chapter a repertoire of basic spatial meanings which can be expressed by Irish and Italian simple prepositions has been set up as a prerequisite to the analysis of meaning extensions into domains other than the spatial one. The reason for proceeding thus is our assumption – based on the theoretical grounds discussed in chapters 2 and 3 – that propositional meaning extensions are expected to go from the domain of space to other domains, such as time, state, etc. Ten BSMs have been isolated and a brief description has been provided for each of them (4.1). Finally, a set of examples, mainly tapped from grammatical and lexical sources (and occasionally from our corpora), has been provided for both Irish and Italian, to show by means of which preposition(s) every single BSM is expressed in either language.

In the next chapter, meaning extensions will be examined for three of the above described BSMs, namely, IN(TO), WITH, and OFF/FROM/OUT OF, chosen after criteria that will be explained therein.

5 Patterns of metaphorical extensions

5.0 Introduction

The present chapter will exploit the preparatory work done in chapter 4, that is, starting from the repertoire of BSMs isolated therein an analysis will be conducted of the meaning extensions associated with the Irish and Italian simple prepositions that are used to express such BSMs. The methodology that shall be followed is expounded in section 5.1.1, while sections from 5.1.2 on will be concerned with the analytical work proper.

Of the ten BSMs defined in 4.1.2, only three will be examined, as already anticipated at the end of the previous chapter. These are IN(TO), WITH, and OFF/FROM/OUT OF. The reasons why they have been chosen over the others, as will be made clearer in the relative sections, are that they formed a well-assorted set with respect of two distinct parameters, (i) whether they express static or dynamic tr/lm relationship, and (ii) the kind of mapping existing between each BSM and the prepositions expressing it, as follows:

- with regard to (i), WITH is taken as basically expressing static relationships, whereas OFF/FROM/OUT OF as basically expressing dynamic ones. IN(TO), on the other hands, is taken as capable of expressing both kind of tr/lm relationships;
- with regard to (ii), as can be seen from Figure 4.1, IN(TO) and WITH are taken to be in a one-to-one mapping with the prepositions expressing them in both languages (the point is further elucidated in 5.1.2–3), whereas OFF/FROM/OUT OF is taken as being represented by more than just one preposition in either language.

5.1 Metaphorical extensions: An analysis

5.1.1 Analysis methodology

In order to carry out our analysis, some coordinates were deemed to be necessary in order to proceed. These were provided by Taylor's (1993) preliminary distinction between 'categories of relations expressed by prepositions'. "Relation" is

here used by Taylor in a technical sense: prepositions are viewed as functional operators expressing a relation between trajector (tr) and landmark (lm) (see 2.3.2 above). Taylor posits four such categories of relations, i.e., *place*, *goal*, *path*, *source* (Taylor 1993: p.153). These are but four of Fillmore's (1968) cases, which Talmy (2000: p.185) replaces by the more general notion of Ground.

In what follows, we have structured our analysis accordingly: a first classification of our data was carried out along the lines of static vs. dynamic relations. Within either domain, instances of physical, i.e., spatial relations were distinguished from temporal ones and from other metaphorical extensions – starting from an assumption, which was thus meant to be tested, that metaphorical extensions into the time domain were more akin to spatial relations, or “more natural”, than other kind of metaphorical extensions.

5.1.2 IN(TO)

The reason why IN(TO) has been chosen to start this analysis with is that, among the BSMs, not only does it display a simple one-to-one mapping between the correspondent Irish and Italian prepositions, but these are also etymologically related (Ir. *i(n)*, It. *in*).¹⁴

5.1.2.1 Static relations

In the domain of static relations, the spatial meaning of Ir. *i(n)*, It. *in*, is of location within a lm conceived of as enclosure-like:

| | | | | | | | | |
|-----|----------------------|--------------------|----------------------|------------|-----------|--------------|--------------|----------|
| (1) | Ir. | | | | | | | |
| | <i>bhí</i> | <i>sí</i> | <i>ina</i> | <i>luí</i> | <i>ar</i> | <i>a</i> | <i>droim</i> | <i>i</i> |
| | be.PAST | SUBJ:3SG.FEM | in.POSS:3SG | lie.VN | on | POSS:3SG.FEM | back | in |
| | <i>seomra</i> | <i>beag</i> | <i>dorcha</i> | | | | | |
| | room | small | dark | | | | | |

¹⁴ Cf. Watkins (2000: s.v. *en*), Pokorny (1994: s.v. *I.en*), Cortelazzo and Zolli (1983: s.v. *in*) Ir. *i(n)* (< OIr. *in*) nasalizes certain following phonemes, which is taken to represent an earlier stage of the language when the shape of the preposition was always /in/ (cf. Ó Dochartaigh 1992: p.95). Cf. the following examples from Ó Cíosóig (1997): *í line* ('in line', no nasalization) vs. *i mBaile Átha Cliath* ('in Dublin', with nasalization of the following stop segment) vs. *in Éirinn* ('in Ireland', preposition including the nasal segment). See Ó Dochartaigh (1992) and Mac Eoin (1993) for more exhaustive treatments of the phenomenon of initial mutation in Irish.

‘she was lying on her back in a small, dark room’

(Ní Dhuibhne 2000: p.9)

(2) It.

fare il bagno nella vasca di un giardino
do.INF DET bath in.DET pool of one garden

‘take a bath in a garden pool’

(Calvino 1972: I)

Any area which has boundaries, albeit non-physical ones, is eligible as a prepositional object for *in* in both Irish and Italian:

(3) Ir.

Fuair eas jab le comhlacht beag turasóireachta
get.PAST.1SG job with company small tourism.GEN

i mBaile Átha Cliath

in Dublin

‘I got a job with a small tourist agency in Dublin’

(Ó Cíosóig 1997: p.6)

(4) It.

tutte le cose contenute nella città sono comprese
all DET things contained in.DET city include.PASSV.3PL

nel disegno

in.DET drawing

‘all the things that are contained in the city are also included in the drawing’

(Calvino 1972: XIII)

5.1.2.1.i Time. Extensions in the temporal domain are easily profiled in either language as the location of an event *tr* within the boundaries of a time period which acts as a *lm*:

(5) Ir.

Tráthnóna ceathach i dtús mhí Aibreáin a
afternoon showery in beginning month April.GEN REL

bhí ann

be.PAST there

‘It was a showery afternoon at the beginning of April’

(Ní Dhuibhne 2000: p.1)

- (6) It.
- | | | | | | | | |
|---------------|------------------|---------------|--------------|----------------|----------|-------------|---------------|
| <i>Venne</i> | <i>il</i> | <i>giorno</i> | <i>in</i> | <i>cui</i> | <i>i</i> | <i>miei</i> | <i>viaggi</i> |
| come.PAST.3SG | DET | day | in | REL.OBL | DET | POSS:1SG | journeys |
| <i>mi</i> | <i>portarono</i> | <i>a</i> | <i>Pirra</i> | | | | |
| OBJ:1SG | take.PAST.3PL | to | Pirra | | | | |
- ‘The day came when my travelling led me to Pirra’
(Calvino 1972: XI)

Other kinds of metaphorical extension can be more or less language-specific, and in particular Irish largely employs *i(n)* to mark a particular kind of progressive verbal aspect and to express the fact of belonging in a category in a way Italian does not.

5.1.2.1.ii METAPHORICAL STATE and MANNER. Let’s examine first metaphorical usages that are common to the two languages: among the examples of our corpora the most consistent are METAPHORICAL PLACE and MANNER.

By METAPHORICAL PLACE, any kind of relationship is meant between a tr and a lm which, being not a physical place, is nonetheless profiled as such, or a lm which, although *being* a physical place, can only metaphorically be profiled as containing tr. Sentences (7) and (8) below are examples of METAPHORICAL PLACE:

- (7) Ir.
- a. *tá spéis agam sa leabhar sin*
be interest at.OBJ:1SG **in.DET** **book** **that**
‘I’m interested in that book’
- b. *Sheasfá i do laige*
stand.COND.2SG **in** **POSS:2SG.SG** **weakness**
‘[There was not even space to fall down. Even if you had fainted,] you would stand, unconscious’
- c. *D’fhéadfainn Tom a chloisint im aigne*
be able.COND.1SG Tom to hear.VN **in.POSS:1SG** **mind**
istigh ag rá “Wowie!”
inside at say.VN “Wowie!”
‘I could hear Tom in my mind saying “Wowie!”’
- d. *Bhí sí beag, ... gruaig rua, faghairt sna súile*
be.PAST SUBJ:3SG.FEM small hair red fire **in.DET** eyes
glasa
green
‘She was small, ... red hair, fire in her green eyes’
- e. *níor dhein siad botúin ina gcuid*
NEG make.PAST SUBJ:3PL blunders **in.POSS:3PL** **share**

meastachán

estimates.GEN

‘they did not make any gross mistake in their estimates’

- f. *Bhí sí go mór i ngrá leis*
 be.PAST SUBJ:3SG.FEM to big in love with.OBJ:3SG.MSC
 ‘She had been very much in love with him’

(a: *NIG*: p.137; c–d: Ó Cíosóig 1997: p.10; b, e–f: Ní Dhuibhne 2000: p.5, 4, 8)

(8) It.

- a. *occorre che il viaggiatore lodi la città nelle cartoline*
 be necessary.3SG COMPL DET traveller praise.SUBJN.3SG DET
 city in.DET postcards

‘the visitor ought to praise the city that appears in the postcards’

- b. *una città che vedo in sogno*
 one city REL see.1SG in dream
 ‘a city that I am seeing in a dream’

- c. *il mare non è in vista della città, nascosto da una duna della costa*
 DET sea NEG be.3SG in sight of.DET city
 hidden from one dune of.the coast

‘the sea – hidden by a dune of the coast – is not visible from the city’ (lit. ‘is not in the visual field of the city’)

- d. *tutte le cose contenute nella città sono comprese nel disegno*
 all DET things contained in.DET city include.PASSV.3PL
 in.DET drawing

‘all the things that are contained in the city are also included in the drawing’

(Calvino 1972: III, XII, XI, XIII)

METAPHORICAL PLACE appears to be an easily available sense extension, as it does not but project the enclosure-relationship between tr and lm in domains where such relationship is not physically observable. Such mapping is of two kinds:

- (i) a material tr is profiled as being in a material lm, although such relationship is not a factual one;
- (ii) either tr or lm is physically apt to take part in a spatial IN-relationship (i.e., it is something material if tr, and an enclosure-like place if lm), but its counterpart is not; or neither one is. Therefore three possible sub-kinds are given, namely, (A) apt tr + non-apt lm, (B) non-apt tr + apt lm, (C) non-apt tr + non-apt lm.

If we consider our examples, (7.d) falls within the case of (i), as it does of course *not* profile the indeed painful situation of someone’s eyes being on fire, nor describes a statue whose transparent eyeballs contain flames; and so do (8.a, d), as a city cannot be located in the bounded space of a postcard or other kinds of picture.¹⁵




Figure 5.1: ‘The sea – hidden by a dune of the coast – is not visible from the city.’

(ii.A) includes (7.b, f), where *lm* (*laige* ‘weakness’, *grá* ‘love’) is a state and the expression abides by the STATES ARE CONTAINERS metaphor examined by Lakoff and Johnson (1980: pp.31f.). (7.c) can also be taken as an instance of (ii.A), where some non-factual process being imagined or remembered is treated as though happening in the mind, rather than in the external world – *im aigne* ‘in my mind’ explicitly sets up what might be termed, in Fauconnier’s terms, a *mental space* where the event described is represented (cf. Sweetser and Fauconnier 1996, Fauconnier 1996, Rubba 1996; also cf. Lakoff and Johnson’s [1980: p.152] THE MIND IS A CONTAINER

¹⁵ One must, however, recognize that the image of the city, in (10.a), *is* indeed enclosed within such space. But either the sentence is taken to contain a metonymical usage of *city* referring to the image of the city, or the postcard is metaphorically taken as containing a 3-D space that extends beyond its flat surface (as an illusory *trompe-l’œil*), through which a frozen city is seen. In neither case, however, can (10.a) be read as meaning that the material *tr* (a city) is spatially *IN* the material *lm* (a small, flat cardboard slip).

metaphor). (8.b) can be likened to (7.b, f), where *Im* is something in between a state and an activity – dreaming is an activity of the brain, but it is common to envisage it as a state one is in (cf. such common expressions as *I was like in a dream*, *He saw his grandmother in a dream*, etc.), possibly because, when they dream, people can see themselves as playing an active role as characters in the dream scenario. Again, STATES ARE CONTAINERS seems to provide a suitable motivation for an exponent preposition of this BSM. (8.c) presents us with a somewhat similar situation and may therefore be taken as falling within the scope of (i.A) too. The situation depicted is that of a physical *tr* being included in someone’s visual field, more precisely, that of an observer who is in the city (*in vista delle città*). *Visual field* is a common expression which is based upon an elementary conceptualization of objects that can be seen as being inside an area – as opposed to invisible objects, which fall outside such area (cf. Lakoff and Johnson’s [1980: p.30] VISUAL FIELDS ARE CONTAINERS). Such conceptualization is still extensively grounded in the space domain, for what one sees is a portion of the external environment which is limited by certain angles and is often represented as a 3-D cone whose vertex coincides with the beholder’s eyes; in the example, a visible dune intercepts the visual cone thus hiding away from the visual field the sea (see Figure 5.1 and cf. the discussion of example 55.a in 5.1.3.9).

(ii.B) is exemplified by (7.a), which has a physical *Im* (a book) but a non-physical *tr*, i.e., the abstract concept of interest which stands for all the things that someone cares about, or – as is likely to be the case here – the fact of caring about something, which is a state of mind or inner disposition treated according to a STATES ARE OBJECTS and EXPERIENCE IS CONTAINED IN ITS CAUSE (cf. 5.1.4.1, example 69.h) metaphors, as the book is what causes the speaker’s interest.

Finally, an instance of (ii.C) can be recognized in (7.e), where the expression *making mistakes in one’s estimates* can be paraphrased as ‘formulating wrong judgments while estimating’, i.e., ‘estimating wrongly’. In the expression, each time something goes wrong in the process of assessing corresponds to the occurrence of a ‘mistake’ (ACTIONS ARE OBJECTS, cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980: pp.30ff.); at the same time, the action of estimating is conceptualized as a SUBSTANCE and subsequently as a CONTAINER (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980: pp.30f.).

Examples (9) and (10) present a instances of the MANNER sense extension:

- (9) Ir.
'Hi!' *a* *dúirt...* *sí* *i* *nguth* *ard* *láidir*
 'Hi!' REL say.PAST SUBJ:3SG.FEM in voice high strong
féinmhuíneach
 self-confident
 "‘Hi!’ she said ... in a loud, strong, self-confident voice"
 (Ní Dhuibhne 2000: p.9)

- (10) It.
Olinda non è certo la sola città a
 Olinda NEG be.3SG certainly DET only city to
creocere in cerchi concentrici, come i tronchi
 grow.INF in circles concentric as DET trunks
degli alberi
 of.DET trees
 'Olinda is certainly not the only city that grows in concentric circles, like a tree's trunk'
 (Calvino 1972: XVI)

As to the MANNER examples, (9) appears to be readily available to being analyzed as an instance of the pervasive CONDUIT METAPHOR amply discussed by Reddy (1979), which views messages as being packed into apt container-like carriers by the speaker/writer and sent to the hearer/reader, whose task is to unpack them/extract their meaning. This metaphor, he argues, motivates common expressions like *Try to put more meaning into fewer words* (and others of which Reddy provides an ample repertoire). In (9), the means whereby what the woman says can reach her interlocutor is her voice, which is therefore conceptualized by the CONDUIT METAPHOR as a container-like carrier and is expressed by the nominal object of the preposition *i(n)*. Therefore, what appears to be an expression of MANNER would originally be an expression of MEANS.

The case of (10) is different: here we have a borderline case of a sense extension which is highly ambiguous, in that it can be interpreted as not being an extension at all, but rather describing a spatial process of growth: as the city grows, its new neighbourhoods form a belt surrounding the older ones, a process which recurs in the same way when a still newer belt of neighbourhoods is added. If (10) is undoubtedly meant to capture this basic idea, the question still remains why the preposition *in* is employed. A possible explanation would be that the material of a dilating city seems to brim over the city's existing circle of walls so that new, concentric circles are required to contain it. Therefore, what appears to be an

expression of MANNER would originally be – in the Italian case – an expression of dynamic goal (that is, in the Fillmorean sense, place as destination).

5.1.2.1.iii CATEGORIZING *I(N)* and PROGRESSIVE. When it comes to more language-specific metaphorical extensions, Irish largely employs a special construction which might be motivated metaphorically by the conceptualization of categories as sets (Lakoff 1987 provides a fully-fledged insight into this topic). This construction is made up of the so-called substantive verb *bí* ('be') "in combination with the preposition *i* 'in' and a possessive pronoun anaphoric to the subject" (Ó Dochartaigh 1992: p.41, who includes it under the heading of 'classificatory sentences'). (11) provides two examples of such construction, which is unparalleled in Italian:

(11) Ir.

- a.** *nuair a bhí mé i mo ghasúr*
when be.PAST SUBJ:1SG in POSS:1SG boy
'when I was a boy'
- b.** *Cailín gealgháireach a bhí inti*
girl cheerful REL be.PAST in.OBJ:3SG.FEM
'She was a cheerful girl'

(a: MacMathúna and Ó Corráin 2003: s.v. *i*; b: Ó Cíosóig 1997: p.9)

This construction, which might be termed CATEGORIZING *I(N)*, may be compared to another, rather idiosyncratic usage of Irish, i.e., the '*i(n)* + verbal noun' construction (a verbal noun is a non-finite verbal form often glossed in English with the gerund; cf. Mc Congáil 2004: p.135), used to express the progressive aspect of the verb. While the English *in* + gerund is used most often as a subordinate clause (as in [*Paul hurt himself [in chopping a log]*]), the Irish construction rather parallels the English *be* + gerund, as shown in (12):

(12) Ir.

- a.** *dá mbeadh fear agus bean ina seasamh taobh le taobh*
if be.COND man and woman in.POSS:3PL
stand.VN side with side
'if a man and a woman were standing side by side'
- b.** *tá siad ina gcodladh*
be SUBJ:3PL in.POSS:3PL sleep.VN
'they are asleep'

| | | | | | | |
|-----------|--|--------------|------------------|------------|-----------|-----------|
| c. | <i>D'fhan</i> | <i>sí</i> | <i>ina</i> | <i>suí</i> | <i>ag</i> | <i>an</i> |
| | remain.PAST | SUBJ:3SG.FEM | in.POSS:3SG.FEM | sit.VN | at | DET |
| | <i>mbinse, ar</i> | <i>an</i> | <i>gcathaoir</i> | | | |
| | bench, on | DET | chair | | | |
| | ‘She remained seated at the bench, on the chair’ | | | | | |

(a, c: Ní Dhuibhne 2000: p.8, 2; b: Mac Congáil 2004: p.75)

(12.c), in particular, shows that the construction we are examining is not necessarily found with the verb *bí*, but may occur with other predicative verbs. To find a motivation for this construction, we can think of English expressions such as ‘being in one’s prime/in full bloom/in good form’ and similar, i.e., expressions where a quality is predicated of a subject by projecting the latter in a metaphorical space onto which the quality itself is mapped. Thus, the subject is described as being fully within the boundaries of a given state (cf. Lakoff and Johnson’s STATES ARE CONTAINERS [1980: pp.31f.]). Such extension, we reckon, is very closely linked to the time-domain one: were this actually the case, it would not be haphazard that this construction is traditionally said to denote states of affairs that are transient, i.e., only valid in a circumscribed time regions – as opposed to the construction with the copula and no preposition, e.g.:

| | | | |
|------|----------------------------|-------------|--------------|
| (13) | <i>Is</i> | <i>fear</i> | <i>é</i> |
| | COP | man | SUBJ:3SG.MSC |
| | ‘He is a man’ | | |
| | (Ó Dochartaigh 1992: p.41) | | |

This is, at least traditionally, described as expressing permanent states of affairs, and we might therefore term this the PROGRESSIVE/TRANSIENT sense extension of Irish *i(n)*. (As a matter of fact, this distinction is seemingly being lost among the younger generations of speakers, and both constructions now abstract away from the transient/permanent distinction: cf. NIG: pp.117f., Ó Dochartaigh 1992: p.41).

5.1.2.1.iv MATTERS and MEANS. Examples of language-specific usages peculiar to Italian, albeit only marginally represented in our corpus, are MATTER and MEANS, as shown in (14) and (15) respectively:

| | | | | | | | | |
|------|---|------------|-------------------|--------------|-----------|-------------------|-----------|------------------|
| (14) | <i>scaffali</i> | <i>che</i> | <i>crollavano</i> | <i>sotto</i> | <i>le</i> | <i>rilegature</i> | <i>in</i> | <i>pergamena</i> |
| | shelves | REL | crumble.IMP.F.3PL | under | DET | bindings | in | parchment |
| | ‘shelves crumbling down under (the weight of) parchment bindings’ | | | | | | | |
| | (Calvino 1972: VI) | | | | | | | |

- (15) *[tracciati] segnati in inchiostri di diverso colore*
 [routes] draw.PPSTPTC.PL in inks of different colour
 ‘[routes] drawn [on a map] by means of many-coloured inks’
 (Calvino 1972: X)

A motivation for the MATTER-extension is not easily available. It may be compared, it seems, to a similar English construction which is used to mark INHERENT PROPERTY, as in example (16):

- (16) This shirt is very nice. Does it come **in red/in a larger size**?

The PPs *in red/in a large size* express qualities of the shirt that are inherent to it, that is, qualities that may not be altered. Matter, too, is an inherent property, and it is possible to find it expressed by an *in*-PP in the same English construction with *come*:¹⁶

- (17) This jacket comes **in both tweed and wool**.

Still, the reason why IN is cross-linguistically available to the expression of INHERENT PROPERTY is not clear. This sense extension of the prepositions expressing this BSM also appears to be in contrast with the motivation we have proposed for the PROGRESSIVE/TRANSIENT sense extension of Irish *i(n)* – that is, a state being conceptualized as being comprised within certain temporal boundaries, or in other words a temporal enclosure. A motivation for the INHERENT PROPERTY sense extension, together with an attempt to settle the apparent contrast with the PROGRESSIVE/TRANSIENT one, appears – we reckon – to lie beyond the scope of our data and ought therefore to be left to further investigation.

As to example (15), it might be necessary to disambiguate first in what sense it is taken to represent MEANS rather than MATTER: at a first glance, it seems to us, the latter sense extension might be recognized in the PP *in inchiostri di diverso colore*, which was translated as ‘by means of many-coloured inks’. It is not impossible to see it as expressing MATTER, and in fact ink is precisely the matter constituting the lines on the map. Yet the pluralized nominal for ‘inks’ and the specification ‘many-

¹⁶ Note that here the verb *come* does *not* profile a dynamic relation but a static one. That the object does not (and not even metaphorically) move into a state of being red or larger in size is clear when one consider the synonymic expression *Is it also available in red/in a larger size?*

coloured’ make it clear that what is emphasized is the exploitation of a set of different inks (namely, different in colours) as the means by which different items are made to stand out against each other on the map. The example is notwithstanding a borderline one, in that inks, pencils, crayons and such – as opposed, for instance, to a brush – are *consumed* as they are used. Therefore, whereas a brush can be considered as merely an instrument (a means), inks and such are both the means and the matter. In Italian, this is reflected in the fact that only this latter kind of MEANS may be expressed by the preposition *in*, as (15’) shows:

(15’) **[tracciati]* *segnati* **in** *pennelli* *di* *diversa grandezza*
 [routes] draw.PPSTPTC.PL **in** **brushes** of different size
 ‘[routes] drawn [on a map] by means of many-sized brushes’

In the intended meaning, (15’) appears to me not to be acceptable in any standard variety of Italian. The brushes being the means whereby the signs are traced on the paper, a correct alternative would be the PP *con* [= ‘with’] *pennelli di diversa grandezza*. It might be observed at this stage that it is only a very specific kind of means which can be expressed by It. *in*, i.e., one that is closely akin to, and partakes in, the concept of MATTER, which in turn brings us back to the previous case of sense extension into the INHERENT PROPERTY domain, thus presenting us with the same kind of questions.

5.1.2.2 Dynamic relations

There are two kinds of basic dynamic relations expressed by Ir. *i(n)* and It. *in*, one in which tr is located within the boundaries of a lm conceived of as enclosure-like after moving from some other point in space (goal relation), and one in which the motion itself is emphasized and it is left unspecified whether tr has reached its goal (path relation, since the prepositional object or lm denotes a path). In either case, in Irish, the preposition is sometimes preceded by the adverbial *isteach* ‘inwards’:¹⁷ in

¹⁷ Ó Dónaill (1977: s.v.) defines *isteach* as ‘in, into’, which translates the analogous adverbial usage of English *in* (in Jackendoff’s [1973] terms, its intransitive use; see note 5 above): cf. Ir.

Doirt *isteach é*
 pour.IMP.2SG **in** it.OBJ:3SG.MSC
 ‘pour it in’
 (Source: Ó Dónaill 1977: s.v.)

other words, prepositional INTO is rendered by *in* in Italian, by either *i(n)* or *isteach i(n)* in Irish. This is shown for the goal relation by examples (18) and (19), respectively:

- (18) It.
- | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|----------------|---------------------|-----------------|--------------|-------------------|
| <i>devi</i> | <i>entrare</i> | <i>nelle</i> | <i>scuderie</i> | <i>e</i> | <i>nei</i> |
| must.2SG | enter.INF | into.DET | stables | and | into.DET |
| <i>maneggi</i> | <i>per</i> | <i>vedere</i> | <i>le</i> | <i>belle</i> | <i>donne</i> |
| maneges | for | see.INF | DET | beautiful | women |
- ‘you must go **into the stables** and **the maneges** to see beautiful women’
(Calvino 1972: VI)

- (19) Ir.
- a. *Chuir Saoirse an pictiúr ar ais i mbút an Toyota*
 put.PAST Saoirse DET picture on back into boot DET
 Toyota.GEN
 ‘Saoirse put the picture back in the boot of her Toyota’
- b. *threoraigh [Tom] í isteach san oifig*
 direct.PAST Tom OBJ:3SG.FEM inside into.DET office
 ‘Tom directed her **into the office**’
- (a: Ní Dhuibhne 2000: p.1; b: Ó Cíosóig 1997: p.10)

The PATH relation is exemplified by (20) and (21):

- (20) It.
- | | | | | | | | |
|---------------|-------------|------------------|------------|-------------|------------|----------------|-----------------|
| <i>quest’</i> | <i>aria</i> | <i>in</i> | <i>cui</i> | <i>vola</i> | <i>una</i> | <i>polvere</i> | <i>giallina</i> |
| this | air | in | REL.OBL | fly.3SG | one | dust | pale yellow |
- ‘this air in which a pale yellowish dust is suspended’¹⁸
(Calvino 1972: XI)

- (21) Ir.
- a. *Chaith sé leabhar beag im threo*
 throw.PAST SUBJ:3SG.MSC book little in.POSS:1SG direction
 ‘He threw a small book at me’

Isteach cannot take a prepositional object itself, but may precede *i(n)*, which in turn *must* take one.

¹⁸ Although the English translation has ‘is suspended’, the original *vola* ‘flies’ describes a dynamic rather than a static relationship, the air being the medium through which the dust moves.

| | | | | | | |
|-----------|---|--------------------|-----------|-----------|--------------|----------------|
| b. | <i>bhrúigh gach</i> | <i>duine</i> | <i>ar</i> | <i>an</i> | <i>ardán</i> | <i>isteach</i> |
| | press.PAST every | person | on | the | platform | inwards |
| | <i>ina</i> | <i>treo</i> | | | | |
| | in.POSS:3SG.FEM | direction | | | | |
| | ‘everyone on the platform pushed towards her’ | | | | | |

(a: Ó Cíosóig 1997: p.11; b: Ní Dhuibhne 2000: p.5)

As can be observed in (21), the path relation, too, may be expressed in Irish by either the simple-*i(n)* construction or the *isteach i(n)* one. Another way of analyzing the path relation is to consider its dynamic factor as a feature of the process taking place in *lm* rather than one of the *tr-lm* relation. In this sense (which is described in Taylor 1993: p.153), we have a process (one that is per se dynamic) acting as the static *tr* of the relationship, in which case *lm* is a place (rather than a path). Such an analysis is easily available for (20), where the dust flying acts as the process-type *tr* occurring in the place-type *lm*; but, at any rate, this is not the case for (21), where *im threo/ina treo* ‘in my/her direction’ clearly indicates a path-type *lm* for the *tr* (the book in 21.a, the people in 21.b). Furthermore, in (21.b) the place-type *lm* is explicitly designated by the PP *ar an ardán* ‘on the platform’, i.e., where the process-type *tr* represented by the people pushing occurs. (Note that this is a two-level *tr/lm* analysis: *tr*₁ (object) and *lm*₁ (path) are the people and the path towards the woman respectively; *tr*₂ (process) and *lm*₂ (place) are the people’s pushing and the platform respectively.)

5.1.2.2.i Time. We are now going to examine dynamic *IN*’s sense extensions beginning with the one in the temporal domain, which seems to be available to It. *in* but *not* to Ir. *i(n)*. Within the schema adopted for space-domain dynamic relations (i.e., goal- vs. path-type relations), what we are faced with by our data is in a situation where Irish *i(n)* supports the extension of neither type of dynamic relations into the time domain, whereas Italian only supports the extension of the path type. (This is of course what emerges from the data we have collected, and precisely what is being asserted is that no examples traceable to such dynamic types have been found for the temporal domain; further data might of course lend itself to contradicting this analysis.) Example (22) is meant to exemplify the path-type extension into the time domain:

- (22) a. *Da quel momento in poi il nome*
 from that moment into afterwards DET name
Pirra richiama alla mia mente questa vista
 Pirra bring back.3SG to.DET my mind this sight
 ‘From that moment on, the name Pirra has brought back to my mind this sight’
- b. *Andria è la sola città che io conosca*
 Andria be.3SG DET only city REL SUBJ:1SG know.SUBJN.1SG
cui convenga restare immobile nel tempo
 REL.OBL be appropriate.SUBJN.3SG stay.INF immobile in.DET time
 ‘Andria is the only city I know which should never change over time’

(Calvino 1972: XI, XVII)

It should be clear from (22) why we are considering this extension as being path-like: in both (22.a) and (b) the *in*-PP relates a tr to a lm which is viewed as a path towards a future point in time. More precisely, in (22.a) the tr is the reminding process whereby the name of a place evokes a sight of that place in the mind of the speaker; the lm is a span of time going from a *definite* source-point in time (*quel momento* ‘that moment’) to an *indefinite* goal-point in time, which is left unspecified. In other words, in (22.a) the lm is a temporal path aiming an unspecified moment in the future, which is expressed by *in poi* ‘onwards’. In (22.b), on the other hand, a temporal path is present whose source and goal moments are *both* left unspecified. More precisely, again, a city ideally undergoing no change whatsoever acts as the tr, which is located within a non-defined time span. This might as well be taken as a static relation, and indeed, if tr and lm were some physical entity and place respectively, that would be exactly the case in point (cf. *Jane stood motionless in the doorway*): it is “knowledge of how the world (normally) is” (Taylor 1993: p.167) – which according to Taylor (ibid.) is among the first disambiguation factor in sentence interpretation’s strategies – which biases us towards a different interpretation, that is, towards recognizing a dynamic relation. The crucial element here is our metaphorical conception of time as a moving entity, reflected in many a commonplace expression such as *time goes by*, and the closely related one whereby people and things move through time from their past to their future (in Lakoff and Johnson’s [1980: pp.43ff.] terms, the TIMES IS A MOVING OBJECT and TIME IS STATIONARY AND WE MOVE THROUGH IT metaphors respectively). In (22.b), accordingly, the two images might be profiled of (i) a city staying still in the time flow may be compared or (ii) a city never undergoing any mutation as it moves through time (which is precisely the reason why we have refrained from glossing *nel*

tempo as ‘into.DET time’ in 22.b, choosing instead the gloss ‘in’). In either case, it is a dynamic relation rather than a static one that our interpretation picks up, such interpretation being of the path (rather than goal) kind.

5.1.2.2.ii Metaphorical GOAL. Curiously, as far as dynamic relations go, the reverse situation occurs for sense extensions into domains other than the temporal one. That is, whereas only the Italian data presented examples of extensions into the time domain, it is only the Irish which give us examples of extensions from the spatial domain into non-temporal ones, which – as far as our data go – only occurs with goal relations, as (23) is meant to show:

- (23) a. *ag dul in olcas / i bhfeabhas*
at go.VN into badness / into improvement
‘getting worse/better’
- b. *Dá dtitfeá i laige*
if fall.COND.2SG into weakness
‘If you fainted’
- c. *tháinig ... gliondar ina croí istigh*
come.PAST happiness into.POSS:3SG.FEM heart inside
‘Happiness came into her heart’
- d. *Cheapfaí go raibh sé chun lámh a*
think.COND.AUT COMPL be.PAST SUBJ:3SG.MSC to hand to
chur ina bhás féin
set.VN in.OBJ:3SG.MSC death own
‘One would think he was going to commit suicide’ (lit. ‘to put a hand into his own death’)

(a: *NIG*: p.136; b–c: Ní Dhuibhne 2000: pp.5, 3; d: Ó Cíosóig 1997: p.11)

At any rate, as we have warned above, we always ought to be wary of jumping at negative conclusions on the basis of something not appearing in our database, which is what one could be tempted to do here, saying that Italian does not support metaphorical sense extensions of INTO-relations in domains other than the time one. As (24) shows, such extensions are possible and rather common in Italian, too:

- (24) a. *di bene in meglio*
 from well into better
 ‘getting better and better’
- b. *Entra immediatamente in azione l’ unità di crisi*
 enter.3SG immediately into action DET unit of crisis
 ‘The Crisis Unit immediately goes into action’
- (a: <http://www.demauroparavia.it/32332> [accessed August 2005];
 b: <http://www.repubblica.it/2004/i/sezioni/esteri/itarap/reapaci/reapaci.html> [accessed August 2005])

5.1.2.3 Graphic recap.

The relations we have seen so far can be represented in a graphic way as shown in Figure 5.2.¹⁹




Figure 5.2: The BSM IN(TO) and its sense extensions.

5.1.3 WITH

Just as was the case with IN(TO), WITH shows one-to-one relationships with the prepositions expressing it in both Italian (*con*) and Irish (*le*); that is, not only is just

¹⁹ In the series of figures that will serve to represent sense extensions from each of the three BSMs analyzed in this chapter, a single-headed arrow signifies derivation ($A \rightarrow B = B$ is a sense extension of A), a double-headed arrow signifies that it has not been established which sense develops from the other ($A \leftrightarrow B =$ either A derives from B or B derives from A), and a dashed arrow indicates problematic derivation ($A \dashrightarrow B = B$ might derive from A through some obscure semantic path).

one simple preposition used to express this BSM in either language, but the same prepositions are not used to express any other BSM. On the other hand, the treatments of IN(TO) and WITH will differ in that dynamic senses of WITH appear to be marginal occurrences in our corpora, which – as shall be seen – are descriptions of translational movements, i.e., of *tr* and *lm* moving simultaneously, and descriptions which disregard any change of relative position between them. That is, a translation is a description of an internally static arrangement of two or more elements which are considered as staying reciprocally static as the whole arrangement moves. Therefore, we are going to treat this BSM unitarily rather than disjoining static vs. dynamic relations as has instead been done with regard to IN(TO) (5.1.2). The peculiarity of IN(TO) and WITH, graphically shown in Figure 4.1 – i.e., the one-to-one mapping with their exponent prepositions – is not exhibited by any other BSM.

5.1.3.1 COMPANY/VICINITY and PART-WHOLE

In 4.1.2 (x), we have summarily described this BSM as a function locating *tr* where *lm* is: WITH (*x*, *y*) therefore means that *x* is to be found where *y* is. As has also been mentioned therein, this function abstracts away from orientational details, i.e., does not assign *tr* a *search scope*. A search scope, in Levinson's (2003) sense, identifies a specific area – relative to *lm* – within which *tr* is to be found. In this sense, VICINITY and COMPANY are the specific senses of this BSM in both Irish and Italian. Although there might appear to be no difference between the two terms as far as the spatial relationship just described is involved, it should be noted that it is customary to reserve COMPANY for those cases in which the function takes animated arguments.²⁰ Nonetheless, proximity between two animated entities is possible which does *not* involve company: for there to be COMPANY, therefore, some degree of volition is also required on behalf of either *tr* or *lm*. Keeping this in mind, we can take (25) and (26) as exemplifying the Irish and Italian COMPANY sense, respectively:

²⁰ Cf. the *Oxford English Dictionary* (online edition: s.v.), at http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50045354?query_type=word&queryword=company&first=1&max_to_show=10&sort_type=alpha&result_place=1&search_id=87od-67eJgi-4313&hilite=50045354 (accessed August 2005).

(25) Ir.

- a.** *Níl sé ciallmhar brú ar fhear ar bith teacht chun cónaithe leat*
 NEG.COP SUBJ:3SG.MSC reasonable press.VN on
 man on world come.VN to live.VN.GEN **with.OBJ:2SG**
 ‘It is not sensible to put pressure on any man to come live with you’
- b.** *ag ithe lóin le do chairde*
 at eat.VN lunch **with** POSS:2SG friends
 ‘having lunch with your friends’

(a–b: Ní Dhuibhne 2000: pp.5, 4)

(26) It.

- a.** *[donne che] invitano – si racconta – il passeggero*
 women REL invite.3PL PASSV recount. 3SG DET passer-by
a spogliarsi con loro
 to undress.INF.REFL **with** OBJ:3PL
 ‘[women who] invite – such is the rumour – the passer-by to take off his clothes in their company’
- b.** *il marinaio che prese al volo la cima*
 DET sailor REL catch.PAST.3SG at.DET flight DET rope
e la legò alla bitta somigliava
 and OBJ:3SG.FEM tie.PAST.3SG to.DET bollard look similar.IMPF.3SG
a uno che era stato soldato con me
 to one REL be.PLPF.3SG soldier **with** OBJ:1SG
 ‘the sailor who caught the rope in midair and tied it to the bollard looked like someone who had been a comrade of mine in the army’

(Calvino 1972: I, XII)

(27) and (28), on the other hand, are meant to exemplify the VICINITY sense. As will be noted, in this sense either tr and lm are non-animated (27.a,²¹ 28), or – if they are (27.a,²² b–c) – their VICINITY relation is not described as intentional:

²¹ We are here referring to the first occurrence of *le* in *taobh le taobh* ‘side by side’, where the arguments of the function (tr: *taobh*, lm: *taobh*) are not animated.

²² Here reference is made to the second occurrence of *le* in *in aice le suíochán* ‘near a seat’.

- (27) Ir.
- a. *dá mbeadh fear agus bean ina seasamh*
 if be.COND man and woman in.POSS:3 standing
taobh le taobh in aice le suíochán
 side with side in nearness with seat
 ‘if a man and a woman were standing side by side, near a seat’
- b. *sheas sí in aice le bean*
 stood SUBJ:3SG.FEM in near with woman
 ‘she stood next to a woman’
- c. *bhí na deora / an t-allas / an fhuil*
 be.PAST DET.PL tears / DET sweat / DET blood
liom
 with.OBJ:1SG
 ‘I was in tears/sweating/bleeding’

(a–b: Ní Dhuibhne2000: pp.8, 9; c: *NIG*: p.136)

- (28) It.
- a. *Era un giardino con giochi infantili*
 be.IMPF.3SG one garden with toys puerile
 ‘It was a garden with children toys’
- b. *vasi con piante*
 pots with plants
 ‘pots containing plants’
- c. *sa che è una città ma la*
 know.3sg COMPL be.3SG one city but OBJ:3SG.FEM
pensa come un vapore con la caldaia che vibra
 think.3SG as one steamer with the boiler REL shake.3SG
nella carena di ferro
 in.DET keel of iron
 ‘he knows it is a city, but he’d rather think of it as though it was a steamship, with its boiler vibrating in the iron keel’

(Calvino 1972: VI, VIII, II)

In (27), the *le*-PP merely denotes physical vicinity, which in the case of humans is marked by means of the phrase *in aice* (lit. ‘in nearness’) governing it – although in the case of (27.c) the relation of physical (bodily) vicinity is meant to describe bodily states and conditions. In (28), however, the *con*-PP goes as far as suggesting an idea of BELONGINGNESS or PART-WHOLE relationship, which manifests itself as physical proximity: in this sense, the children toys (Im) in (28.a) belong in the garden (tr) in a part-whole relationship, the plants (Im) contained in the pots (tr) in (28.

b) stand in a part-part relationship as members of a complex gestalt, and the boiler (lm) in (28.c) belongs in the ship (tr), again in a part-whole relationship. (28.b) stands out as a part-part relationship in that neither tr nor lm can be said to represent the whole of which the other element is a part, whereas plant + pot is a commonly found gestalt, a complex physical object which is capable of being displaced as a unit.²³ In cases of part-part relationships, in theory, the two arguments are ontologically of equal status and should therefore be interchangeable so that, at least in principle, ‘pots with plants’ and ‘plants with pots’, each emphasizing its own tr, are equally acceptable. In cases of part-whole relationship, on the other hand, It. *con* envisages a hierarchical relationship where tr and lm correspond to whole and part respectively – therefore, WITH (whole, part), or ‘WHOLE *con* PART’. This formula safely predicts that in (28.a, c) the tr’s – namely, the garden and the steamer – are the wholes, while the lm’s – the toys and the boiler – are the parts. Correspondingly, changing the order of the arguments may result in odd collocations: ‘They were toys with a garden’ and ‘... it was a boiler, with its steamship’ are felt to require at least some additional context in order to be deemed acceptable. It may also appear unusual, and in fact it does not occur in Italian with any other preposition, that the tr be the whole where the part (lm) is found (cf. *a garden_{tr} with toys_{lm}* vs. *toys_{tr} in a garden_{lm}*; *a ship_{tr} with its boiler_{lm}* vs. *the boiler_{tr} of the ship_{lm}*).

The Irish corpus also contains cases of DYNAMIC VICINITY, i.e., a situation where tr-lm vicinity results from a dynamic event. (29) offers some examples of this, which are to be compared to their Italian counterparts in (30), which are not present in the Italian corpus and have been retrieved from other sources.

- (29) Ir.
- | | | | |
|----|--|-------------|---------------|
| a. | <i>Bhuail sí</i> | <i>le</i> | <i>Marcas</i> |
| | hit.PAST SUBJ:3SG.FEM | with | Marcas |
| | ‘She met Marcas’ [cf. <i>She bumped into him</i>] | | |

²³ This most likely results from our knowledge of ordinary states of affairs in the world: a pot is a vessel, whose function is to contain something; and a plant is most naturally perceived as being in a precarious situation if it is neither rooted in the ground or contained in a vase.

- b. *agus an traein ag druidim leis an gcéad*
 and the train at approach.VN with the first
stáisiún eile
 station other
 ‘as the train moves/moved closer to the next station’

(a–b: Ní Dhuibhne 2000: pp.4, 9)

(30) It.

- a. *Martì rientra dall’ esilio e si incontra*
 Martì come back.3SG from.DET exile and REFL meet.3SG
con i vecchi compagni
 with DET old comrades
 ‘Martì comes back from his exile and meets his old comrades’

- b. *Una sonda spaziale si scontra con la*
 one space probe REFL collide.3SG with DET
Cometa Tempel 1
 comet Tempel 1
 ‘A space probe collides with comet Tempel 1’

(a: <http://www.repubblica.it/online/dossier/cubadossie/storia/storia.html> [accessed August 2005]; b: <http://www.granma.cu/italiano/2005/julio/mar5/sonda.html> [accessed August 2005])

Examples of the COMPANY sense as viewed in a dynamic perspective can be also retrieved from the Irish corpus, as seen in (31); again, the Italian corpus does not present us with an analogous usage, which is all the same possible as is shown in example (32) which is taken from a different source:

- (31) *tabhair leat do chuid leabhar as seo*
 take.IMP.2SG with.OBJ:2G POSS:2SG share books.GEN from here
 ‘take your books away with you’
 (NIG: p.136)

- (32) *Nesso prese Deianira e la portò*
 Nessus seize.PAST.3SG Deianira and OBJ:3SG.FEM take.PAST.3SG
via con sé
 away with REFL
 ‘Nessus seized Deianira and took her with himself’
 (<http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deianira> [accessed August 2005])

5.1.3.2 POSSESSIVE

The PART-WHOLE sense of WITH is closely related to what we shall term the POSSESSIVE sense, which appears to be peculiar to Irish. A few examples (schematic

examples from grammars in 33, context-richer ones from corpus in 34) will precede a fuller explanation of this concept:

- (33) a. *leabhar le Máire*
 book with Mary
 ‘Mary’s book’ or ‘the book Mary has’
- b. *mac leis* c. *is liomsa é*
 son with.3SG.MSC COP with.OBJ:1SG SUBJ:3SG.MSC
 ‘his son’ or ‘the son he has’ ‘it is mine’
- d. *is le Séan an teach*
 COP with John DET house
 ‘John owns the house’
- (a–b: *NIG*: p.136; c–d: Mac Congáil 2004: p.77)

- (34) a. *Mac le hiar-aire rialtais ba ea*
 son with ex-minister government.GEN be.PAST 3SG.NT
Kenneth
 Kenneth
 ‘Kenneth was the son of an ex government minister’
- b. *Bhí lámh léi in ascaill an fhir*
 be.PAST arm with.OBJ:3SG.FEM in armpit DET man.GEN
 ‘Her arm was on the man’s arm’
- c. *Kenneth, ... a raibh gaolta leis*
 Kenneth REL be.PAST relatives with.OBJ:3SG.MSC
faoin tuath
 about.DET country
 ‘Kenneth, ... who had relatives in the country’
- (a–c: Ó Cíosóig 1997: pp.7f.)

The POSSESSIVE meaning might be seen as a further specification of the PART-WHOLE one, where the POSSESSOR role (typically filled in by a human) replaces the WHOLE role, while the POSSESSED role is substituted for the PART one. Alternatively, both the PART-WHOLE relation and the POSSESSIVE one can be taken as stemming from the VICINITY or COMPANY relation, in that spatial proximity is a recurrent relation between parts and wholes on the one hand, possessor and possessed on the other. In either case, their close conceptual relatedness is testified for by the cross-linguistic recurrence of identical linguistic expressions to convey both possess and part-whole relationship: cf.

It. *la casa della famiglia*²⁴ ('the family's house', possess) vs. *un membro della famiglia*²⁵ ('a member of the family', part-whole).

5.1.3.3 DESCRIPTIVE

Closely related to the POSSESSIVE sense is what we might term the DESCRIPTIVE one, which arises from the Italian use of employing spatial-*vicinity/possessive con* to express a quality (structurally treated as *lm*) of some entity (treated as *tr*). A motivation for this usage is to be found in the cross-linguistically common metaphor QUALITIES ARE SOMETHING ONE POSSESSES, as illustrated by the English *She has a vivid sense of humour/A girl with a vivid sense of humour*. The following Italian examples (35) show how descriptions can be performed by means of the preposition *con*:

- (35) a. *finestre illuminate a pian terreno, ognuna*
 windows lighted at floor ground each
con una donna che si pettina
 with one woman REL REFL comb.3SG
 'lighted ground-floor windows, each one of them with a woman combing her hair'
- b. *la stessa identica piazza con una gallina al posto*
 DET same identical piazza with one hen at.DET place
della stazione degli autobus
 of.DET station of.DET buses
 'the very same piazza with a hen instead of the bus station'
- c. *attraversai sei cortili di maiolica con*
 go through.PAST.1SG six courts of majolica with
zampilli
 waterworks
 'I went through six majolica courts (decorated) with waterworks'
- d. *i forzati con nere catene al piede issavano*
 DET convicts with black chains at.DET foot hoist.IMP.3PL
rocce di basalto
 rocks of basalt
 'the convicts, with dark chains tied to their feet, were hoisting basalt rocks from an underground quarry'

²⁴ http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xii/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xii_enc_15091951_ingrumentum-malorum_it.html.

²⁵ <http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32003R1981:IT:HTML>.

- e. *due signorine col parasole bianco*
 two ladies with.DET parasol white
 ‘two ladies with their white parasols’

(Calvino 1972: II, III, VI, VI, III)

5.1.3.4 COMMUNICATION and TRADE-OFF

The last spatial-domain use of Ir. *le*, It. *con* is to express the two interconnected concepts of COMMUNICATION and TRADE-OFF. Once again, only the Irish corpus provide us with examples of these concepts, so that different sources will be tapped to obtain analogous examples for the Italian, where such use is equally common:

(36) Ir. (COMMUNICATION)

- a. *labhair sé liom*
 speak.PAST SUBJ:3SG.MSC with.OBJ:1SG
 ‘he spoke to me’
- b. *nuair a dúras liom féin go rabhas*
 when say.PAST.1SG with.OBJ:1SG self COMPL be.PAST.1SG
tuirseach
 tired
 ‘When I said to myself that I was tired of loitering about inside and outside the hotel’
- c. *Ba bheag a dúirt sí liom*
 COP.PAST little REL say.PAST SUBJ:3SG.FEM with.OBJ:1SG
riamh
 ever
 ‘It was not much that she ever said to me’
- d. *Bhí sí ag caint le triúr nó ceathrar fear*
 be.PAST SUBJ:3SG.FEM at speak.VN with three or
 four man
 ‘She was speaking to three or four men’
- e. *Cad a abróid léi?*
 what REL SAY.FUT.1SG with.OBJ:3SG.FEM
 ‘What will I tell her?’
- f. *dul chun réasúin le duine*
 go.VN to reason.GEN with person
 ‘to reason with someone’
- g. *éist leis*
 listen with.OBJ:3SG.MSC
 ‘listen to him’

- h.** *bhíodh sé de nós ag an bhfear comhartha*
 be.PAST SUBJ:3SG.MSC of custom at DET man sign.GEN
éigin a dhéanamh leis an mbean
 some to make.VN with DET woman
 ‘the man would customarily make some sign to the woman’

(**a, g**: Mac Congáil 2004: p.78; **b–e**: Ó Cíosóig 1997: pp.5, 11, 8, 5; **f**: Ó Dónaill 1977: s.v. *réasún*; **h**: Ní Dhuibhne 2000: p.8)

(37) Ir. (TRADE-OFF)

- a.** *dhíol sé an bhó le Tadhg*
 trade.PAST SUBJ:3SG.MSC DET cow with Tadhg
 ‘he sold the cow to Tadhg’
- b.** *Margadh a dhéanamh le duine*
 bargain to make.VN with person
 ‘To make a bargain with someone’
- c.** *Chuir sé geall liom*
 set.PAST SUBJ:3SG.MSC bet with.OBJ:1SG
 ‘He made a bet with me’

(**a**: *NIG*: p.135; **b–c**: Ó Dónaill 1977: s.v. *le*)

(38) It. (COMMUNICATION)

- a.** *Bush parlava con i genitori di Casey*
 Bush talk.IMPF.3SG with DET parents of Casey
 ‘Bush was talking to Casey’s parents’
- b.** *apparvero loro Mosè ed Elia, che conversavano con lui*
 appear.PAST.3PL OBL.3PL Moses and Elijah REL
 converse.IMPF.3PL with OBJ:3SG.MSC
 ‘there appeared unto them Moses and Elijah talking with him’
- c.** *Putin ha espresso il desiderio di discutere con Powell*
 Putin express.PERF.3SG DET desire of discuss.INF
 with Powell
 ‘Putin has expressed his wish to discuss with Powell’
- d.** *Così il boss mafioso ... comunicava con i suoi uomini*
 thus DET boss Mafia.ADJ communicate.IMPF.3SG with
 DET POSS:3SG men
 ‘The Mafia boss ... would thus communicate with his men’

(**a**: <http://www.ilmanifesto.it/g8/dopogenova/42fb8716c47c9.html> [accessed August 2005]; **b**: Matthew 17:2–3; **c**: http://www.usembassy.it/file2003_05/alia/A3051401ir.htm [accessed August 2005]; **d**:

<http://www.repubblica.it/2005/g/sezioni/cronaca/bosscatania/bosscatania/bosscatania.html>

[accessed August 2005])

(39) It. (TRADE-OFF)

a. *già nel VII secolo a.C. gli Istri*
 already in.DET seventh century B.C. DET Hystrians

commerciavano con i Greci
 trade.IMPF.3PL with DET Greeks

‘as soon as the 7th century B.C. the Hystrians were trading with the Greeks’

b. *Le autorità di vigilanza italiane competenti*
 DET authorities of vigilance Italian.PL competent.PL

scambiano informazioni con le altre autorità
 trade.3PL information with DET other authorities

di vigilanza

of vigilance

‘the competent Italian vigilance authorities exchange information with other vigilance authorities’

c. *Bush faceva affari con Bin Laden*

Bush do.IMPF.3SG business with Bin Laden

‘Bush used to do business with Bin Laden’

d. *questi infatti intratteneva una fitta corrispondenza*

this man indeed entertain.IMPF.3SG one tight correspondence

con le due figlie maggiori

with DET two daughters elder

‘he would indeed entertain a vivid epistolary correspondence with his two elder daughters’

(a: http://www.istriadalmazia.it/scoprire/paesi/nesazio/nesazio_01.htm; b:

<http://www.parlamento.it/parlam/leggi/deleghe/05142dl.htm>; c:

http://www.feltrinelli.it/foreign_rights/SchedaTesti?id_testo=1026&id_int=1025; d:

www.archiviodistato.firenze.it/memoriadonne/materiali_donne/menconi.pdf; [all accessed August 2005])

The close interrelationship between COMMUNICATION and TRADE-OFF is rather easily explained by the similar structure they share in terms of argument structure: at least two participants are involved in both processes, and by virtue of the CONDUIT METAPHOR (see above 5.1.2.1) communication can be seen as an instance of trade-off (a speaker sends/gives/delivers a message to a hearer, then roles are typically swapped and the hearer-turned-speaker sends/gives/delivers a message to the speaker-turned-hearer). Important as it may be to emphasize the importance of the role played by the CONDUIT METAPHOR in the conceptualization of communication as trade-off, we cannot but notice that the metaphorical role mapping PARTICIPANTS IN COMMUNICA-

TION → TRADERS is made possible by the fact that both processes typically occur in a scenario where the two parts are keeping company to each other, so that it might hardly be surprising that we find the same preposition involved in the expression of both. Examples like (36.f, h) and (39.b, d) are interesting in that they lie somewhere in between the two senses: reasoning with somebody, making signs to somebody (reciprocally), exchanging (i.e., transmitting and receiving) information, or letters, are examples of communication processes described as mutual, diachronic processes, and therefore most closely resembling the trading practice. On the other hand, expressions like (36.e) (telling something to someone) and (g) (listening to someone), capture a single act of transmission/reception, i.e., communication in its unilateral, synchronic aspect.

5.1.3.5 TEMPORAL COINCIDENCE

SIMULTANEITY or TEMPORAL COINCIDENCE of two events is the meaning expressed by both Ir. *le* and It. *con* in this domain. (26) above may be taken as representing the motivating link between the spatial sense of *con* and its temporal extension: in (26.a), *spogliarsi con loro* ‘to undress with them’ is ambiguous over the two distinct readings (i) ‘for tr to undress in lm’s company’ and (ii) ‘for tr to undress as lm’s also do so’. (26.b), presents a similar case, i.e., a spatial meaning ‘for tr to have been a draftee *where* lm also was a draftee’ and a temporal one ‘for tr to be a draftee *when* lm also was a draftee’. The context seems to suggest as most likely a scenario where both readings hold true, for the acquaintance between the two soldiers is probably due to their having been draftees not only in the same period, but also in the same detachment. This seems to be but a natural, obvious consequence of spatial proximity also involving temporal coincidence. The sense extension proper can only be appreciated in (26.a), as reading (ii) ‘as they also do so’ is by no means implied by the mere spatial contiguity of tr and lm. Temporal sense extension proper arises when no reference to spatial vicinity is to be found, either because lm is physical but cannot be read in a spatial-vicinity sense (40.a, 41.a), or because lm is no physical entity altogether (40.b–c).

- (40) Ir.
- | | | | | | | |
|----|---------------------------|--------------|-----------|--------------|-----------|---------------|
| a. | <i>d'eirigh</i> | <i>sé</i> | <i>le</i> | <i>héirí</i> | <i>na</i> | <i>gréine</i> |
| | rise.PAST | SUBJ:3SG.MSC | with | rise.VN | DET | sun.GEN |
| | ‘he woke up with the sun’ | | | | | |

- b. *le linn an chogaidh*
 with period the war.GEN
 ‘during the war’
- c. *Le linn na seachtaine ina dhiaidh sin*
 with period the week.GEN in.its_i aftermath that_i
 ‘For a week’s time later’ [lit. ‘in the aftermath of that’]

(a–b: *NIG*: pp.135, 138; c: Ó Cíosóig: 1997: p.11)

(41) It.

- a. *prima, con la Maurilia provinciale sotto gli*
 before with DET Maurilia provincial under DET
occhi, di grazioso non ci si vedeva proprio
 eyes of charming NEG there PASSV see.IMPF.3SG quite
nulla
 nothing
 ‘in the past, as one could only see the provincial Maurilia, there was quite nothing charming to be seen’
- b. *un veliero che stia per salpare, col*
 one sailing ship REL stay.SUBJN.3SG for sail.INF with.DET
vento che già gonfia le vele
 wind REL already fill.3SG the sails
 ‘a sailing ship which is about to sail, the wind already filling its sails’

(Calvino 1972: III, II)

In (41.b), the temporal meaning arises – in our opinion – from encyclopaedic knowledge about the world. The wind, as a physically experienceable phenomenon, is undoubtedly in a relation of vicinity to the ship, although it is probably not what would be considered a prototypical instance of physical object (physical objects being what spatial proximity is typically predicated of). Therefore, given that the preposition governs in a nominal modified by a relative clause containing a temporal adverbial (*già* ‘already’), the TEMPORAL COINCIDENCE sense is made available to replace the not so suitable spatial-VICINITY one.²⁶

(41.b) and (c) express coincidence with an extended period of time by means of the nominal *linn* ‘period (of time)’ governed by the preposition *le*. Any process tr of which such relation were predicated would be therefore taken to occur in coincidence with an extended time span – further specified by a genitive NP which

²⁶ It might be further observed that, were the nominal not modified by the relative clause (and the PP preferably not separated by a comma from the preceding VP), the preferred reading would have been – once again – not the VICINITY one but a MEANS one (‘to sail thanks to the wind’).

associates such time span with another event (40.b) or its duration (40.c). Although this construction – taken as a whole – specifically denotes duration, the *le*-PP (governing in the nominal *linn*) merely expresses coincidence. Irish can also express DURATION by means of the simple *le*-PP – that is, without *linn* – when the nominal governed by *le* already denotes an extended time span. This is shown by (42):

- (42) a. *ní fhaca mé le seachtain é*
 NEG see.PAST SUBJ:1SG **with** week OBJ:3SG.MSC
 ‘I didn’t see him for the past week’
- b. *tá sé anseo le bliain*
 be SUBJ:3SG.MSC here **with** year
 ‘he is here for a year now’
- c. *tá sí ar shiúl le tamall*
 be SUBJ:3SG.FEM on go.VN **with** while
 ‘she is gone a while/for some time’
- d. *Bhí sí go mór i ngrá leis,*
 be.PAST SUBJ:3SG.FEM to big in love with.OBJ:3SG.MSC
le sé bliana anuas
with six years down
 ‘She had been very much in love with him for the past six years’

(a: *NIG*: p.135; b–c: Mac Congáil 2004: p.78; d: Ní Dhuibhne 2000: p.4)

5.1.3.6 COMPARISON

COMPARISON can be considered as another cross-linguistically widespread employ of the prepositions expressing WITH and one which is firmly grounded in our experiential basis of reality, as comparison prototypically involves spatial proximity of the compared objects. As it turns out, the metaphorical extensions of such non-metaphorical, spatially-motivated use of WITH are also possible and commonly found: such are all comparisons between abstract, or at least non-physical concepts such as measures, numbers, feelings, etc. (43) and (44) are meant to exemplify COMPARATIVE WITH’s in Irish and Italian respectively. An attempt has been made to sort our examples from concrete to abstract.

- (43) Ir.
 a. *chomh geal le sneachta*
 as white **with** snow
 ‘as white as snow’

- b.** *Bhí na pictiúir an-chosúil lena*
 be.PAST DET pictures.MSC very-resembling with.POSS.3SG.MSC
chéile
 fellow
 ‘The pictures were very similar to each other’
- c.** *D’fhreastal Kenneth ar an scoil chéanna*
 attend.PAST Kenneth on DET school same
liom féin
 with.OBJ:1SG self
 ‘Kenneth attended the same school as I did’
- d.** *culaith a chosain a trí oiread airgid le*
 suit REL cost.PAST PTC three time money.GEN with
ceann ar bith díobh sin
 head on world of.OBJ:3PL those
 ‘a suit that cost three times as much as any one of those’
- e.** *Deirtear go bhfuil sí ar comh-aois²⁷*
 say.AUT COMPL COP SUBJ:3SG.FEM on same-age
linn
 with.OBJ:1PL
 ‘She is said to be as old as us’
- f.** *nuair a rug sí barróg air ba*
 when bear.PAST SUBJ:3SG.FEM hug on.OBJ:3SG.MSC COP.PAST
chosúil le buile orm é
 resembling with madness on.OBJ:1SG SUBJ:3SG.MSC
 ‘when she hugged him I felt as in a fury’
- g.** *Tá sí máistriúil, cosúil le múinteoir*
 be SUBJ:3SG.FEM bossy resembling with teacher
scoile
 school.GEN
 ‘She is bossy, like a school teacher’

(a: Ó Dónaill 1977: s.v. *chomh*; b, d: Ní Dhuibhne 2000: p.4, 3; c, e–g: Ó Cíosóig 1997: pp.7–9)

In (43.a) a physical quality of the missing *tr*, i.e., being white, is compared to a physical entity which – in a given cultural model – exhibits the same quality par excellence; (43.b) expresses a comparison between two physical objects in a reciprocal fashion, that is, *na pictiúir* (‘the pictures’, masculine) collectively constitute

²⁷ *Comhaois* is customarily written in the non-hyphenated form, and so it is found in the quotation’s source. The hyphen has been inserted to isolate the prefixal *chomh-* which shall be object of further discussion below.

both the *tr* and (via the masculine possessive *a*²⁸ amalgamated into the preposition *le*) the *lm*. In (43.c) the speaker compares and identifies the school Kenneth attended (*tr* = school attended by Kenneth) with the school he himself (*lm* = speaker) attended.²⁹ (43.d) is the first in a series of comparisons which are more abstract inasmuch as they involve abstract concepts as measure units, e.g., *a trí oiread ... le* ‘three times as ... as’, which expresses a ratio between two prices (= measures), i.e., two non-physical entities, while in (43.e) the fact of being as old as someone is conceptualized as being – so to say – on the same landing³⁰ as them (which would also provide a motivation for the choice of the preposition *ar* ‘on’): that is, a comparison of relative spatial position is metaphorically mapped onto the temporal domain of age as a comparison of relative position on a time scale. (43.f) is metaphorical in that the speaker likens his state as he is made jealous to that of himself turned mad – madness and jealousy, that is, two inner states or feelings, are compared as though they were physical objects. Finally, (43.g) resembles (43.a) in that *tr* and *lm* are compared with respect to a certain quality, but whereas in (.a) the quality was physical, in (g) it is a feature of *tr*’s character – an abstract, not bodily quality – which makes *tr* (she) resembling *lm* (a school teacher). It is also interesting to note that – with the sole exception of (43.d), Irish seems to customarily express the COMPARATIVE sense not by just the preposition *le*, but by some preceding element that correlates with it (adverbial *chomh*, prefixal *comh*- ‘same/as’; *cosúil* ‘resembling’; *céanna* ‘same’).

²⁸ The Irish possessive *a* shows its gender and number in that it is responsible for the initial mutation affecting the following nominal, here *céile* ‘fellow, counterpart’ > *chéile*. Cf. Mac Congáil (2004: p.99).

²⁹ The *tr* is taken to be the school attended by Kenneth, and not Kenneth himself, because the adjective *céanna* ‘same’ – which is in correlation with *le* (cf. the analogous English correlation *same ... as*) – modifies *scoil* ‘school’. Therefore, the 1st-person pronoun amalgamated in *liom* ‘(with) me’ – acting as *lm* – must in turn be taken to stand for ‘the school I attended’.

³⁰ As though, for instance, growing older were seen as climbing up subsequent flights of stairs.

(44) It.

a. *[gli antichi osservatori] attribuirono ad Aglaura il suo durevole assortimento di qualità, certo confrontandole con altre città dei loro tempi*
 DET ancient observers assign.PAST.3PL to Aglaura DET
 POSS:3SG long-lasting array of qualities for sure
 comparing-OBJ:3PL.FEM **with other cities** of.DET POSS:3PL times
 ‘[the ancient observers] ascribed such a long-lasting array of qualities to Aglaura, comparing them, for sure, with other cities of their times’

b. *la magnificenza e prosperità di Maurilia ... se confrontate con la vecchia Maurilia provinciale*
 DET magnificence and prosperity of Maurilia
 if compare.PPSTPTC **with DET old Maurilia provincial**
 ‘Maurilia’s magnificence and prosperity ... when compared to the old, provincial Maurilia’

(Calvino 1972: VII, III)

The Italian examples are structurally different from the Irish ones, in that the COMPARATIVE sense of *con* is only found if

- either the *con*-PP follows such nominals as *confronto*, *paragone* ‘comparison’ (Figure 5.3: the syntactic status of tr is irrelevant),³¹
- or tr fills in the direct-object argument of a comparative verb such as *confrontare* ‘compare’, *paragonare* ‘liken’ (Figure 5.4) (e.g., 44).³²

³¹ E.g.:

[Ladykillers] non regge il confronto con la pellicola originale film original
 ‘Ladykillers’ NEG stand.3SG DET comparison **with** DET
film original

‘Ladykillers’ remake cannot stand the comparison to the original’

(Source: http://www.unita.it/index.asp?sezione_cod=cinearchivik)

³² Also cf. the following example with *paragonare*:

[Lenin] potrebbe essere paragonato con Marx
 Lenin can.COND.3SG liken.INF.PASSV **with** Marx

‘[Lenin] might be likened to Marx’

(Source: <http://www.resistenze.org/sito/te/cu/ur/cuur4a21.htm>)




Figure 5.3: Syntactic structure for *confronto/paragone* + *con*-PP.




Figure 5.4: Syntactic structure for *confrontare/paragonare* + Object *tr* + *lm con*-PP.

This diversion is meant to clarify that although the semantic concept of comparison can be expressed by both Ir. *le* and It. *con*, we are dealing with two different kinds of comparative construction, in that the Irish *chomh/cosúil/céanna ... le* is an equative comparative structure, i.e., one expressing identity between *tr* and *lm* as far as some quality of theirs goes. The two Italian constructions just reviewed, on the other hand, simply introduce the fact that a comparison is going on, while saying nothing as to ‘who is the winner’, whether *tr* or *lm*.

5.1.3.7 MEANS

MEANS is another of the conceptually most concrete sense extensions of WITH, at least when it expresses a physical relation of instrumentality, i.e., by means of what something goes on/is carried out. Metaphorical treatments of more abstract processes

as instrumental relationships are also possible; therefore in the following examples (45–46), too, an effort has been made to sort the instances from concrete to abstract.

- (45) Ir.
- a. *an tslat lena mbuailtear an madra*
 the stick with.REL beat.PASSV.3SG DET dog
 ‘the stick with which the dog is beaten’
- b. *d’fhéadfainn í a chaitheamh san aer*
 be able.COND.1SG OBJ:3SG.FEM to throw.VN in.DET air
le lámh amháin
 with hand one
 ‘I could have thrown her in the air with just one hand’
- c. *D’fhéadfaí mise a leagadh le cleite*
 be able.COND.AUT 1SG-EMPH to knock.VN with feather
 ‘One would be able to knock me with a feather’
- d. *duine éigin ... a líon an carráiste le boladh*
 person some REL fill.PAST DET carriage with smell
bréan, te, náiriúil
 foul warm shameful
 ‘someone ... who filled the carriage with a foul, warm, shameful smell’
- e. *Bhí an stáisiún liath gruama plódaithe le daoine*
 be.PAST DET station grey gloomy pack.PPSTPTC with people
 ‘The grey, gloomy station was packed with people’
- f. *dhíol sé as an teach le hairgead*
 pay.PAST SUBJ:3SG.MSC from³³ DET house with money
a athar
 POSS:3SG.MSC father.GEN
 ‘he paid the house with his father’s money’

³³ It is not immediately clear why what is being paid for is expressed by a nominal which is governed by a source preposition like *as* ‘from, out of’. *Díol* is used transitively as meaning ‘to sell’,

Dhíol mé ar phunt é
 x.PAST I on pound it.OBJ

‘I sold it for a pound’

but when an *as*-PP is added its meaning is ‘to pay’ (*as rud* ‘for something’) (Ó Dónaill 1977: s.v.). For want of further investigation into the semantic history of *díol* – the only way, we think, to answer our question – we must be content of an apparently incongruent English glossing such as ‘pay from something’.

g. *le neart feirge*
 with strength anger.GEN
 ‘by dint of anger’

(a: Mac Congáil 2004: p.77; **b–c**: Ó Cíosóig 1997: pp.8, 10; **d–e**: Ní Dhuibhne 2000: pp.6, 3; **f–g**: *NIG*: p.135)

(46) It.

a. *la città è sul vuoto, legata alle due*
 the city be.3SG on.DET void secure.PPSTPTC to.DET two
creste con funi e catene
 ridges with ropes and chains

‘the city stands on the void, secured to the mountain ridges by means of ropes and chains’

b. *Ci si sale con scalette*
 there IMPS ascend.3SG with ladders

‘You can climb up there using a ladder’

c. *Gli astronomi scrutano coi telescopi*
 DET astronomers scan.3PL with.DET telescopes

‘With their telescopes, the astronomers scan (the sky)’

d. *lo rovesciano su mucchi di fieno o di*
 OBJ:3SG.MSC push back.3PL onto heaps of hay or of
segatura e lo premono con i saldi
 sawdust and OBJ:3SG.MSC press.3PL with DET firm
capezzoli

nipples

‘they push him onto heaps of hay or sawdust and press him back **with** their firm breasts’

e. *la carne del fagiano dorato che qui ...*
 DET meat of.DET pheasant golden REL here
si cosparge con molto origano
 PASSV sprinkle.3SG with much oregano

‘the meat of the golden pheasant which here ... they sprinkle with abundant oregano’

f. *A Eudossia, che si estende in alto e*
 at Eudossia REL REFL spread.3SG upwards and
in basso, con vicoli tortuosi
 downwards with alleys tortuous

‘In Eudossia, which spreads both upwards and downwards, with tortuous alleys’

- g.** *la città alta sul golfo è sempre là, ...*
 DET city high on.DET gulf be.3SG always there
ma non posso più chiamarla con un
 but NEG can.1SG more call.INF-OBJ:3SG.FEM with one
nome
 name
 ‘the city overlooking the gulf is still there, ... but I can no longer call it by a name’
- h.** *Ma con queste notizie non ti direi la*
 but with this information NEG OBL.2SG say.COND.1SG DET
vera essenza della città
 real essence of.THE city
 ‘Were I to tell you all that, I still wouldn’t be telling you the city’s quintessential quality’

(Calvino 1972: VIII, IX, XVII, VI, I, XIII, XI, I)

In (45.a) the *le*-PP is used to express the instrument used to perform the action of beating the dog, i.e., the stick. The same occurs in (45.c), although the physical instrumentality is part of a counterfactual, hyperbolic expression, its meaning being non-compositional, i.e., different from what results from the mere adding together of the linguistic components of the sentence: what the utterer of (45.c) means is that he was feeling exceptionally fragile from an emotional point of view. (46.a–c) express the same instrumental sense: ropes and chains are the physical means whereby Calvino’s imaginary city hangs over the void beneath, ladders are the means whereby ascension is made possible, telescopes are instruments that make possible scanning distant heavenly regions. In (45.b) and (46.d) the instrument is a part of the body whereby force is applied to some object.

(45.d) expresses a physical yet intangible means by which an enclosed space is filled by someone, that is a (bad) odour. Instrumentality proper, in this case, might as well be questioned, in that there is no volition on behalf of the subject, yet the sentence is phrased as though volition were actually there.³⁴ Apart from volition, a non-instrumental reading of MEANS is also justified by considerations analogous to those already seen for instrumental IN (see 5.1.2.1 above), that is, the consumable

³⁴ Cf.

Soitheach a líonadh le rud
 vessel to fill.VN with thing
 ‘To fill a vessel with something’
 (Source: Ó Dónaill 1977: s.v. *líon*)

nature of the instrument which makes it very akin in nature to MATTER. This is made clearer by (46.e), where oregano is the means whereby meat is cooked and also the matter of which its dressing is made. As meat is cooked, oregano is consumed and is no longer available (as opposed to cooking instruments proper, e.g., pans and pots). (45.e) is similar – as a matter of spatial configuration profiled – to (45.d), but here the means by which the station is filled up is people, thereby a volitional *lm*, the usage of the *le*-PP thus being not very distant from AGENTIVITY expression (see below). The case of (45.f) is a very similar one, in that money, too, is consumed as it is used, and is the means the house is bought by. Its physical character might, though, be questioned, for reasons that concern our extra-linguistic knowledge of monetary transaction in our society: it is unlikely that amounts of money the size which is required to buy a house are physically handled.³⁵

(46.f) is a metaphorical case of instrumentality in that it visualizes a city (Eudossia) extending upwards and downwards from its central nucleus almost as though it were an octopus spreading out its sinuous tentacles, which are the means whereby this animal reaches things located around its body and onto which the city's winding alleys are mapped. Metaphorical is also the case of (45.g), in that anger is conceptualized as some living being which by means of its physical strength is able to make the angry person perform some action. Here, it might be further said that *strength* is at any rate an abstract term, therefore even non-metaphorical expressions like *He lifted the sofa with the force of his arms* are to be read metonymically, the actual instruments being the person's arms exerting force on the sofa, not his strength.

(46.g) and (h) are again examples of metaphorical use: in *chiamarla con un nome* 'to call it **by a name**' the PP indicates that the city in question is defined/recalled to memory by means of its association with a name. Although a name can – strictly speaking – be considered a physical entity (insomuch as it is a sound pattern or a visually perceptible sequence of written characters), it is not one single, physical occurrence (token) of the name that triggers identification with a concept, but its abstract representation (type) which is instantiated in every single token. What the

³⁵ At any rate, even in transactions where money is likely to have been physically handed (cf. *I bought this biro with your 50 cents*), money cannot be really considered a (prototypical) instrument in that no physical force is exerted through it. The same considerations applies – of course – to the oregano example of (46.e) discussed above.

writer means is that he is no longer able to perform this conceptual association between the city and any possible name that it might be given. Furthermore, even if *chiamare* had been used in its other sense of ‘trying to catch somebody’s attention by calling out their name’, the instrumental status of that name could be questioned – it might be argued, for instance, that the actual instrument is the caller’s voice rather than what they do with their voice (calling out a name), and ultimately air and phonatory organs, rather than voice they produce, would be considered as the means by which the calling occurs. As to (46.h), *I wouldn’t be telling you the city’s quintessential quality by (giving you) this information* (that is, something else or something more than such information is needed in order for the hearer to capture that the essence of the city) has some *information* as the means by which the hearer assumes he would be able to get an essential description of some place. As for (46.g), the process whereby an uttered or written sequence of words (the information) is able to perform changes in the conceptual content of the hearer’s mind is metaphorically seen as a process of physical manipulation that one performs through some object used instrumentally.

5.1.3.8 METAPHORICAL COMPANY

Metaphorical transfers from spatial/concrete to more abstract domains are also common in the basic sense of COMPANY, as the following examples prove (47–49). (48) is set apart from the other Irish examples in that it presents some interpretation difficulties:

- (47) Ir.
- a. *Bhí sí go mór i ngrá leis*
 be.PAST SUBJ:3SG.FEM to big in love with.OBJ:3SG.MSC
 ‘She had been very much in love with him’
- b. *Tá an t-ádh leat*
 be DET luck with.OBJ:2SG
 ‘Fortune is with you’
- c. *thaispeáin na scrúduithe nach raibh mórán cearr léi*
 show.PAST DET examinations COMPL.NEG be.PAST much
 wrong with.OBJ:3SG.FEM
 ‘the examinations showed that there was not much wrong with her’
- d. *Bíodh go ndúras gur aontaíos leis*
 be.IMPF COMPL say.PAST.1SG COMPL unite.PAST.1SG with.OBJ:3SG.MSC

- ‘Despite the fact that I agreed with him’
- e. *Dhá chéad punt, imithe le gaoth*
 two hundred pound go.APSTPTC with wind
 ‘Two hundred pounds, gone with the wind’
- f. *Chuaigh an laghmhisneach le meon an ealaíontóra*
 go.PAST DET lowness of spirits with temperament DET
 artist.GEN
 ‘Lowness of spirits went with the artistic temperament’
- (a–c, e, f: Ní Dhuibhne 2000: pp.4, 6, 9, 10, 4; d: Ó Cíosóig 1997: pp.11f.)

(48) Ir.

- a. *d'éirigh léi* b. *bhí léi*
 rise.PAST.3SG with.OBJ:3SG.FEM be.PAST with.OBJ:3SG.FEM
 ‘she succeeded’ ‘she succeeded’
- c. *tá áthas orm gur éirigh go geal*
 be gladness on.OBJ:1SG COMPL rise.PAST.3SG to bright
leat
 with.OBJ:2SG
 ‘I am glad that you succeeded’
- d. *Níor éirigh le Saoirse riamh suíochán a fháil*
 NEG rise.PAST.3SG with Saoirse ever seat to get.VN
 ‘Saoirse never succeeded in finding a seat’

(a, b: Mac Mathúna and Ó Corráin 2003: s.v. *le*; c: *NIG*: p.137; d: Ní Dhuibhne 2000: p.8)

(49) It.

- nomi che portano con sé una figura*
 names REL carry.3PL with REFL one shape
 ‘names carrying along a shape’

By METAPHORICAL COMPANY we mean a tr/lm relationship which is conceptualized as a physical company relationship between two people by virtue of some shared structure. (47.a), for instance, has human tr and lm, but the relationship between the two is not spatial. In fact, it depicts love (a feeling) as a place (see also the discussion of (7.f) above), and the fact that tr loves lm as tr being in that place with lm: therefore, it is the context that tells us that the relation is not one of spatial company, as it does not actually take place in a physical space.

(47.b–c) have a human lm which is described as being in the company of some state of affairs (luck = the fact of being lucky in 47.b) or some form of illness (described as something ‘wrong’ in 47.c). In either case, being lucky or ill is described

as being accompanied by, respectively, ‘(good) luck’ and ‘illness’ (two abstract names for two states of affairs). In (47.d) *tr* and *lm* are once again both human, and the verb (*aontaigh* ‘to unite’) is apt to envisage a spatial relationship. In this case, the metaphorical quality of the sentence resides in the spatial relationship being mapped onto the fact of *tr* being of the same opinion as *lm*, that is, agreement. Agreement maps onto a common space in the physical domain which is shared by people agreeing with one another. The metaphor involved might be schematized as BEING OF THE SAME OPINION AS SOMEBODY IS BEING IN THEIR COMPANY.

In (47.e–f) neither *tr* nor *lm* is a human being. In (e) they are both material objects (money and wind, although the same considerations about the physicality of money sums apply here as are discussed above). What is metaphorical here is the fact that there is no actual movement and – of the two entities mentioned – only money is actually part of the intended meaning of the expression (i.e., ‘£ 200 have been lost’): the wind is not involved in the loss. Nonetheless, the loss is described as the wind taking away with itself the money, and here lies a further level of metaphoricity, in that – even in the actual case of a gust of wind blowing away a banknote – the phrasing *imithe le* ‘gone with’ suggests personification (of the money, and presumably of the wind, too) inasmuch as, strictly speaking, volition is required to go (away) with someone.³⁶ As to (47.f), *tr* is an abstract description of an inner feeling (translated in English as ‘lowness of spirits’, literally ‘weak courage’),³⁷ and *lm* is another abstraction (the artist’s nature, i.e., a label for a full set of externally perceived behaviour which is seen as dictated by one’s nature). In other words, an inner-felt condition and a series of temperamental traits are both personified and described as accompanying each other, which pertains to the metaphorical level of the expression.

(48) shows a number of instances of a construction frequently recurring in Irish, where a subjectless verb (*éirigh* ‘to rise’) is used in conjunction with a *le*-PP, in the schematic template V + *le* + *lm*, translating the English equivalent ‘*lm* succeeds’, either used absolutely (a, c) or with a following tail specifying what *lm* succeeded in (d). A variant of this construction has the substantive verb *bí* ‘to be’ instead of *éirigh*,

³⁶ A personification, as argued by Lakoff and Turner (1989: p.38) is itself a metaphor which maps certain aspects of the concept being personified (source) onto corresponding concepts of a human being (target), thus adding new conceptual structure – predominantly, volition – to the source domain.

³⁷ Cf. Ó Dónaill (1977: s.v. *laghmhisneach*).

the meaning remaining the same. Ó Dónaill (1977: s.v. *le*), which does not have the COMPANY sense as the primary meaning of *le*,³⁸ lists this construction under the meaning (4) ‘in company with’, submeaning (*d*) ‘on the side of, favouring’, which – in itself – is precisely a metaphorical extension of the spatial-COMPANY sense into the domain of someone’s good disposition towards someone else/something (again, BEING OF THE SAME OPINION AS SOMEBODY IS BEING IN THEIR COMPANY). As to us, we reckon that further investigation is needed in order to assess (i) whether this construction originally had a subject and, if so, (ii) what its subject used to be. Without this preliminary knowledge, it will be hard to determine the direction of this sense extension involving Irish *le*.

As to the Italian (example 49), the corpus proves poor of examples of an otherwise common use of It. *con*. Therefore, it seems to us necessary to add a few examples taken from different sources (50) in order to proceed with the discussion.

(50) It.³⁹

- a.** *quando la fortuna è con te*
 when DET fortune be.3SG with OBJ:2SG
 ‘when fortune is with you’
- b.** *Nel film di Haneke l’estetica va di pari passo con la morale*
 in.DET film of Haneke DET aesthetics go.3SG
 of equal pace with DET ethics
 ‘In Haneke’s film, aesthetics goes hand in hand with ethics’
- c.** *Chi non è d’ accordo con me è un nazista*
 SUBJ:3SG.REL NEG be.3SG of agreement with OBJ:1SG
 be.3SG one nazi
 ‘All who disagree with me are nazis’

³⁸ Which must not be taken as clashing with our stance, in that we made clear (in chapter 4) that the association of a preposition with a BSM is not to be read as ‘preposition y primarily expresses BSM Y in a given language’, but as ‘BSM Y is primarily expressed in a given language by preposition y’. To be precise, the primary meanings of *le* according to Ó Dónaill have to do with VICINITY sense (e.g., ‘in proximity to, in contact with, beside’).

³⁹ Sources:

a: <http://www.repubblica.it/online/formulauno2003/grigliaultimo/grigliaultimo/grigliaultimo.html>;

b: http://www.repubblica.it/online/cinema_recensioni/storie/storie/storie.html;

c: http://www.corriere.it/Primo_Piano/Documento/2005/05_Maggio/18/buruma.shtml.

Example (49) provides an example of METAPHORICAL COMPANY as resulting from personification. The concept expressed here is the same as seen in (46.g), i.e., the conceptual-level association between a name and its referent. But, whereas in (46.g) the relation was of means, as a distinct agent – the speaker – was responsible for using the name as instrument to recall something to his memory, in (49) it is names themselves which are portrayed agentively (which implies being personified) and thus made capable of carrying along shapes. Of course, this is another metaphorical representation of the above discussed capacity of names to trigger the recovering of some information stored in one's mind.

(50.a–b) is another example of personification. In (a) – as in (47.b) – fortune (a state of affairs) is personified and can thus entertain a company relationship with *lm* (a real person). The expression means of course, as in the Irish example just mentioned, that *lm* is a lucky person.

In (50.b), which is quite similar to (47.f), both *tr* and *lm* undergo personification. That is, the relationship between two conceptual abstractions like aesthetics (a label for the sensorial appreciation of the film as resulting from its makers' stylistic choices, the actors' performance, the music score, etc.) and ethics (a label for the appreciation of the film's content in terms of the message it wants to get across), is described through the image of two people taking a stroll together (the Italian expression, translated by a grossly equivalent English idiom, has the couple proceeding at the same speed). The metaphor involved is AIMING AT THE SAME END AS SOMEBODY IS GOING WITH THEM, which is obviously motivated by the fact that two people walking along the same path at the same pace will both end up reaching the same location simultaneously. In order to express the fact that the film's aesthetics is dictated/motivated by its ethics, aesthetics and ethics are mapped onto two people walking together, which are the only two roles explicitly mentioned. The third, implicit role in the mapping's target domain – i.e., the destination – is not mentioned because of the rather idiosyncratic nature of this example, where the relationship is not symmetrical in that ethics is clearly leading the way, and is, in a sense, the way itself, in that the aim aesthetics serves is precisely getting the ethic message across. Conveying such a message is what ethics, supported by aesthetics in a subservient role, is aiming at, and is therefore what maps onto the destination role in the target domain.

(50.c) is conceptually very akin to (47.d), in that the concept of agreement is what both are about. Again, agreement is conceptualized as sharing a common point of view (taken in the physical sense of point of observation) on some topic. From the same point of observation, any two people will be able to get a glimpse of the same surrounding landscape.

5.1.3.9 ASSOCIATION as METAPHORICAL VICINITY

Other metaphorical sense extensions related to WITH have broadly to do with the concept of ASSOCIATION. This comes, as to say, in different shades, but the basic idea is that – to a great extent in Irish – *le* is used to express a vast gamut of associatitive relationship between its tr and lm. METAPHORICAL VICINITY might be considered as a ‘Trojan horse’ in that it opens the door to let in more generic instances of ASSOCIATION. An example of METAPHORICAL VICINITY is (51):

- (51) Ir.

| | | | | | |
|------------------|------------|-----------|------------------|-------------|-----------------------|
| <i>Fuairesas</i> | <i>jab</i> | <i>le</i> | <i>comhlacht</i> | <i>beag</i> | <i>turasóireachta</i> |
| get.PAST.1SG | job | with | company | small | tourism.GEN |

‘I got a job with a small tourist agency’
 (Ó Cíosóig 1997: p.6)

METAPHORICAL VICINITY results from conceptualizing a tr/lm relationship as though it were one of spatial proximity. In this sense, (51) can be interpreted as thus associating a job (tr) with the company where the job has been found (lm). Motivation for this resides in the workplace being the physical location where the tasks involved with the job are (typically) carried out. Metaphorical mapping has occurred so that a complex expression like ‘I came to an agreement with someone working for a social institution for me to work there too’ might be expressed through the compendiary formulation of (51): mapping involves *job* (a series of tasks one is paid for carrying out) being envisaged as a physical object that one finds in proximity of the place where such job is to be done (metonymically referred to by *company*, i.e., the institution based herein).

More generic instances of ASSOCIATION are listed in (52):

- (52) Ir.

| | | | | | | |
|-----------|-----------|--------------|------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|
| a. | <i>ní</i> | <i>raibh</i> | <i>aon</i> | <i>bhrí</i> | <i>leo</i> | <i>anseo</i> |
| | NEG | be.PAST | one | meaning | with.OBJ:3PL | now |

‘they [dramas and politics] had no meaning now’

- b.** *'Hello'* *ní* *déarfadh* *sé* *mura* *mbíodh* *gá*
 'Hello' NEG say.COND SUBJ:3SG.MSC unless be.IMPF need
leis
 with.OBJ:3SG.MSC⁴⁰
 'He would not say "hello" if it was not necessary'
- c.** *tá* *éad* *aige* *liom*
 COP jealousy at.OBJ:3SG.MSC with.OBJ:1SG
 'he is jealous of me'
- d.** *bhí* *súil* *aige* *le* *punt* *uaim*
 be.PAST eye at.OBJ:3SG.MSC with pound from.OBJ:1SG
 'he was expecting a pound from me' (lit. 'he had an eye with a pound from me')
- e.** *bhí* *súil* *agam* *le* *Dia* *nach* *bhfaca* *éinne*
 be.PAST eye at.OBJ:1SG with God COMPL.NEG see.PAST anyone
an *tslí* *a* *baineadh* *siar* *asam*
 DET way REL take.PAST.AUT back off.OBJ:1SG
 'I hoped to God that nobody saw the way I was taken aback'
- e'.** *beidh* *mé* *ag* *súil* *leat*
 be.FUT SUBJ:1SG at eye with.OBJ:2SG
 'I will be expecting you'
- f.** *thart* *ar* *theach* *Phatsy Mhic Cárthaigh,* *cara* *léi*
 around on house Patsy.GEN Mac Cárthaigh friend with.OBJ:3SG.FEM
 'around the house of Patsy Mac Cárthaigh, a friend of hers'
- g.** *mar* *ba* *ghnách* *léi* *ag* *an* *am* *sin*
 as COP.PAST customary with.OBJ:3SG.FEM at DET time that
den *bhliain*
 of.DET year
 '[she was on the DART]⁴¹ as she used to do at that time of the year' (lit. 'as was customary for her to do...')

(a–b, f–g: Ní Dhuibhne 2000: pp.2, 10, 1, 3; c–d, e': NIG: p.137; e: Ó Cíosóig 1997: p.8)

In (52.a–c) *le* expresses some kind of association between tr and lm, that is, the fact that tr is felt or described as somewhat attached to lm. ATTACHMENT is a metaphorical way of expressing the close mental association between tr and lm which

⁴⁰ The 3rd-person pronoun amalgamated into the prepositional pronoun *leis* is masculine and might therefore be taken as ambiguous between two readings, one where it refers back to the subject of the previous clause ('he') and one in which it is understood as a reference to the speech act described in the previous sentence (i.e., 'saying hello'). However, the normal expectation with this construction, as testified by Ó Dónaill (1977: s.v. *gá*), is *gá a bheith agat le rud*, i.e., 'for you to have need of something', where the person in need is introduced by the preposition *ag* and the thing needed by *le*. Therefore, in (52.b) the intended reference for *leis* is to the *thing* needed, that is, saying 'hello'.

⁴¹ DART is the name for a local railway service operating in Dublin.

maps, of course, onto physical attachment. In the physical world, two things which are attached are found in reciprocal proximity. Yet, it is not a direct association with physical proximity what seems to us to be conveyed by such examples, that is, for instance, it is not the image of meaning as a physical object sitting in the vicinity of dramas and politics, visualized as another set of physical objects, which is suggested by (52.a). In fact, in our opinion, in these examples *le* is simply used in almost a polysemous way to mean association – metaphorical motivation via the physical world, if once the reason for this usage, is no longer active in the speakers' mind. What the hearer of (52.a–c) visualizes is – respectively – that there is no meaning *attached to* certain things, there is no necessity *attached to* saying 'hello', there is a feeling of jealousy *associated to* me on someone's behalf. It is in this sense that we prefer not to speak of METAPHORICAL VICINITY in relation to these usages, but of generic ASSOCIATION or ATTACHMENT between tr and lm.

Similarly, (52.d–e) show a construction expressing hope/expectation as ASSOCIATION between hopefulness (tr) and either the thing hoped for (lm) (as in d) or the person (lm) who might grant what is hoped for (as in e). A slightly different construction, illustrated in (e'), has the hoper as tr, while both hopefulness/expectation and the thing hoped for/expected are construed as lm's, but governed in by two different prepositions (*ag* 'at' and *le*, respectively). What is peculiar, in this expression, is the semantic status of the nominal for 'hope/expectation', *súil* 'eye'. Most likely because of the fact that one would stare at something that they wish they could have, in the case of physical objects, hoping for something has come to be expressed in Irish by the usual possessive construction with the substantive verb *bí*, with the possessed thing (the eye) as its subject and the possessor as the nominal object of the *ag*-PP (cf. the 'literal' translation of 52.d) (cf. Mac Congáil 2004: p.155, Ó Dónaill 1977: s.v. *súil*). (e') stands out in this respect too, i.e., its different syntactic construction – though, at any rate, what is hoped for (= 'you') still is the prepositional object of *le*.

(52.f) provides another example of association: friendly relationship with someone in (f). Again, this kind of association and, in general, the idea of society among living beings typically involves sharing some common habitat, which is a concept closely akin to that of COMPANY. In (52.g), the relation between someone (lm) and a habit of theirs (tr) is expressed by an AdjP governing a *le*-PP ('tr is customary for lm'), which is another case of generic association.

A different, more specific shade of ASSOCIATION – exemplified in (53) – has to do with the expression of someone’s good/bad disposition towards something/someone else, or, more generally, their ATTITUDE:

- (53) Ir.
- a.** is *fuath liom an áit sin*
 COP disgust **with.OBJ:1SG** DET place that
 ‘I hate that place’
- b.** *B’ fhuath le Saoirse seasamh*
 COP.PAST disgust **with** Saoirse stand.VN
 ‘Saoirse hated to stand’
- c.** is *gráin liom luchá*
 COP abhorrence **with.OBJ:1SG** mice
 ‘I abhor mice’
- d.** *is deas liom é*
 COP nice **with.OBJ:1SG** SUBJ:3SG.MSC
 ‘I think it’s nice’
- e.** *is maith léi bainne*
 COP good **with.OBJ:3SG.FEM** milk
 ‘she likes milk’
- f.** *Céard tá cearr leatsa?*
 what be wrong **with.OBJ:2SG-EMPH**
 ‘What’s wrong with you?’
- g.** *thaitin sé léi*
 shine.PAST SUBJ:3SG.MSC **with.OBJ:3SG.FEM**
 ‘she liked him/it’ (lit. ‘he/it was brilliant for her’)
- h.** *Thaitníodh The Arts’ Show léi*
 shine.IMPF The Arts’ Show **with.OBJ:3SG.FEM**
 ‘She used to like The Arts’ Show’

(a, c: *NIG*: p.137; b, h: Ní Dhuibhne 2000: pp.8, 2; d, g: Mac Congáil 2004: p.78; e: Mac Mathúna and Ó Corráin 2003: s.v. *le*; f: Ó Cíosóig 1997: p.9)

The examples in (53) generally describe somebody’s attitude towards something. Such attitude is evoked by means of an (abstract) noun in examples (a–c), of an adjective in (d–f); in both groups, the nominal expressing the attitude is predicated of the object (tr) towards which the attitude is shown by someone (lm); tr is the subject of the copula (or, as in f, of the substantive verb), while lm is expressed by a *le*-PP. In examples (g–h), while tr and lm hold the same status of subject and PP-

adjunct respectively, the affection/attitude is expressed by the verb *taitin* ‘to shine’.⁴² Attitude being an affection, the EXPERIENCER of a more or less pleasant affection is expressed by a *le*-PP, which, as it were – limits the affection predication to the EXPERIENCER’s whereabouts. In other words, it is only in the EXPERIENCER’s whereabouts that the predication ‘tr is x’ holds true. The ASSOCIATION between EXPERIENCER and EXPERIENCE (the affection) lends itself to be thus conceptualized, most likely, because human beings experience feelings through bodily sensations (cf. Sweetser 1990: pp.27ff., 45), Lakoff’s [1987: pp.380–415] analysis of *anger*). In a sense, the affection experienced is seen as being caused by tr entering in the physical whereabouts of lm. The simultaneous presence in the same place (what the BSM WITH expresses) of *both* tr and lm is necessary to trigger a given feeling of affection, so that – for example – the place mentioned in (53.a) is not necessarily hated by any EXPERIENCER other than the speaker, and standing (as in .b) is a state that other people might as well enjoy. Simultaneous presence is what the relationship between tr and lm maps onto, so that the same linguistic expression (e), for instance, might be felicitously uttered even when that milk is not in that person’s whereabouts.⁴³

As to (53.g–h), as we have already hinted to, two metaphors are involved: one maps *feeling pleasure* onto *perceiving something as shining* (possibly a conventional metaphor in Lakoff’s terms), the other – as we have just seen – conceptualizing EXPERIENCER as physically close to THING EXPERIENCED.

Keeping ASSOCIATION as a loose label for any tr/lm relation generically seen as associative, we are able to fit into it two modal constructions peculiar of Irish, as exemplified in (54) and (55):

⁴² The primary meaning of *taitin*, according to Ó Dónaill (1977: s.v.) is precisely ‘to shine’. The conventional metaphor (in Lakoff and Johnson’s [1980] sense) whereby this verb came to mean ‘to please’ (with a *le*-PP) is so pervasive in the language that Ó Dónaill has a separate sub-entry for the latter meaning. In our discussion, thinking of the existence in other languages of pleasure expressed by ‘brightness’-related terminology (cf. the English *brilliant* used to translate 53.g), we would rather make the conventional metaphor visible.

⁴³ At this stage, it might be interesting, but would bring us too far, to consider (53.e) with the milk actually being there: would the sentence any longer involve any metaphorical mapping? A preliminary step towards answering this question would be, in our opinion, to ascertain whether examples like (53.e) are actually read by Irish speakers as ‘milk is good in my vicinity’, which we doubt, but leave to further investigation.

- (54) Ir.
- a.** *tá an chistin le glanadh*
 be DET kitchen with clean.VN
 ‘the kitchen has to be cleaned’
- b.** *tá sé le himeacht anois*
 be SUBJ:3SG.MSC with leave.VN now
 ‘he’s due to leave now’
- c.** *san agallamh do phost bainistíochta a bhí le bheith ann i gceann seachtaine*
 in.DET interview to post management.GEN REL be.PAST with
 be.VN there in head week.GEN
 ‘in the interview for a managerial position that was to take place in a week’s time’
- d.** *nuair a fuarthas amach go raibh boss nua le bheith ar an oifig*
 when find.PAST.1SG out COMPL be.PAST boss new with
 be.VN on DET office
 ‘when I found out that a new boss was to be over the office’
- e.** *na rudaí a bhí le rá ag daoine ina dtaobh*
 DET things DET be.PAST with say.VN at people
 in.POSS:3PL side
 ‘the things that the people had to say about them’
- (a–b: Mac Congáil 2004: p.77; c, e: Ní Dhuibhne 2000: pp.3, 2; d: Ó Cíosóig 1997: p.9)

- (55) Ir.
- a.** *Bhí bolaithe éagsúla le fáil ar an DART*
 be.PAST odours strange with get.VN on DET DART
 ‘One could smell strange odours on the DART’ (lit. ‘Strange odours could be smelt on the DART’)
- b.** *ní raibh le feiscint agam ach a folt rua*
 NEG be.PAST with see.VN at.OBJ:1SG but POSS:3SG.FEM
 head of hair red
 ‘All I could see was her red head of hair’ (lit. ‘There was nothing for me to see except her head of hair’)
- (a: Ní Dhuibhne 2000: p.6; b: Ó Cíosóig 1997: p.8)

We might label (54) as examples of DEONTIC *le* and (55) as POSSIBILITY *le*. The syntactic construction employed is the same and employs the verbal noun as the prepositional object of *le*, in conjunction with the substantive verb *bí*: *bí* + tr + [*le* VN-Im] translates English ‘tr is to be V(lm)-ed’, (54) or ‘tr can be V(lm)-ed’ (55). An additional *ag*-PP (*ag* lm’) can be used to express the agent (so ‘tr is to/can be V(lm)-

ed by *lm*" = 'lm' has to V(lm) tr'). The distinction may be not so clear-cut: in (54.e) the translation 'the things that the people had to say' does not necessarily mean that they were bound to say, and might as well be read, just like its Irish counterpart, 'the things that the people were able to say' (cf. *He knew he had nothing to say in his defence*, i.e., he could not find any argument to defend himself). So disambiguation is largely context-based: that is, encyclopaedic knowledge makes us prefer the DEONTIC reading in (54.a) (extra-linguistic knowledge: houses should be kept tidy) and the POSSIBILITY reading in (55.a) (extra-linguistic knowledge: nobody is *bound* to smell odours, they just happen to be perceived). A motivating factor for verbal modality to be expressed through a nominalized form of the verb governed by *le* is, precisely, association: the object of the transitive verb is associated with the conceptual sphere expressed by the nominalized verb, the nature of such association being largely determined by contextual information. In (55.a), for instance, strange odours are associated with perceiving ('getting') in a given context (being on the DART), yielding the interpretation that if you are on the DART, one might happen to perceive strange odours (one might as well not). ASSOCIATION, as we have seen, metaphorically maps onto physical vicinity. There are some borderline cases which are particularly apt to clarify this point, as illustrated by the English expression *to be in one's visual field*: if something enters one's visual field, they can see it. And, loosely speaking, if one takes *field* as meaning a physical area, objects that can be seen do actually lie *in* the visual field of the beholder (cf. Lakoff and Johnson's [1980: p.30] formulation VISUAL FIELDS ARE CONTAINERS). Metaphorical mapping kicks in when one introduces – for instance – the concept of 'sphere of attention' as in *Things passing through my sphere of attention* ('things I notice'), as not only there is no such physical object as a sphere of attention, but there is no need of physical proximity altogether for something to be recorded by one's attention: cf. *The intelligence report about the arms trade didn't fail the journalist's attention* (physical proximity: the journalist saw the report) vs. *The arms trade didn't fail the journalist's attention* (no physical proximity: the journalist did not see the arms trade).

5.1.3.10 AGENT/CAUSE and EXPRESSIVE

ASSOCIATION might also provide motivation for another sense extension of Irish *le*, namely the expression of AGENT, as illustrated in (56):

- (56) Ir.
- a. *scéal le Pádraig Ó Cónaire*
 story with Pádraig Ó Cónaire
 ‘a story by Pádraig Ó Cónaire’
- b. *Bhí an doras ar leathadh agus isteach léi*
 be.PAST DET door on open wide.VN and inwards
with.OBJ:3SG.FEM
 ‘The door was open wide and in she went’
- c. *Amach leis*
 outwards **with.OBJ:3SG.MSC**
 ‘Out he went’
- d. *shocraigh mé ar imeacht liom suas staighre*
 settle.PAST SUBJ:1SG on go.VN **with.OBJ:1SG** up
 stairs
 ‘I decided to go upstairs’
- e. *imigh leat*
 go.IMP.2SG **with.OBJ:2SG**
 ‘go away!’
- f. *Chúbas agus d’éalaíos liom*
 shrink.PAST.1SG and escape.PAST.1SG **with.OBJ:1SG**
 ‘I shrank back and slipped away’
- g. *shleamhnaigh Annagael léi as mo sheomrasa*
 slip.PAST Annagael **with.OBJ:3SG.FEM** out of POSS:1SG
 room-EMPH
 ‘Annagael slipped away out of my room’

(a: Mac Mathúna and Ó Corráin 2003: s.v. *le*; b: Ní Dhuibhne 2000: p.1; c: Ó Dónaill 1977: s.v. *le*; d, f–g: Ó Cíosóig 1997: pp.5, 9, 6; e: Mac Congáil 2004: p.78)

The examples in (56) can be divided in two groups: A (a–d) and B (e–g) on the basis of the following criterion: is the *le*-PP the only element providing information about AGENT? The answer to this question is positive in the case of A, negative in the case of B. In the former case, then, one can legitimately speak of AGENTIVE *le*, whereas in the latter other characterizations ought to be sought. In A-examples, *le* introduces the logical subject of the action profiled by each utterance; such action might or might not be expressed by a verb. In (56.a), for instance, a simple NP introduces somebody’s artifact (as tr) and its author (as lm). There is an understood, not explicitly mentioned active relationship between tr and lm, namely, ‘tr wrote lm’. (It is interesting to notice

that, if a nominalized form of the verb, e.g., a passive participle, were present, the current usage would have *ag* rather than *le* to express AGENT.⁴⁴)

In (56.b–c) there is no verb either, and the [*le* Im]-PP stands for ‘Im goes/went’, as required by the motion adverbials *isteach* ‘in(wards)’ and *amach* ‘out(wards)’. The situation differs from that in (a) in that the missing verb is intransitive and tr is not an object but a process (moving in/out) which *le* associates with its AGENT. Something similar occurs with (d), where the verb is present in a non-finite form (namely, the verbal noun) and the information about AGENT is only provided by the *le*-PP in the same fashion as with (.b–c).

Group B, on the other side, has *le*-PP in addition to finite verbal elements which come with person information: the PP introduces no further elements to the argument structure of the verb, in that its nominal object is co-referential with the expressed subject of the verb (cf. *imigh* 2nd-person imperative + *leat* ‘with you’ [e], *chúbas* 1st-person + *liom* ‘with me’ [f], *shleamhnaigh Annagael* 3rd-person + *léi* ‘with her [= Annagael]’ [g]). Since these PPs carry no essential information, their presence is merely EXPRESSIVE, i.e., they emphasize information which is already given by repeating it. Ó Dónaill (1977: s.v. *le*) and Mac Congáil (2004: p.78) describe this usage as denoting ‘continued action’ (both use the same phrasing),⁴⁵ which is clearly

⁴⁴ Cf. the following example:

| | | | |
|------------|--------------|---------------|-------------|
| <i>níl</i> | <i>sé</i> | <i>déanta</i> | <i>agam</i> |
| NEG | SUBJ:3SG.MSC | done | at.OBJ.1SG |

‘I haven’t done it’ (lit. ‘It is not done by me’)

(Source: Mac Mathúna and Ó Corrain 2003: s.v. *ag*)

Cf. also Ó Dónaill (1977: s.v. *le*), who has agentive *le* with passive verbal forms marked as ‘literary use’.

⁴⁵ They provide examples like

| | |
|--------------|--------------|
| <i>imir</i> | <i>leat!</i> |
| play.IMP.2SG | with.OBJ.2SG |

‘play away!’ (i.e., ‘go on playing’)

(Source: Mac Congáil 2004: p.78)

and

| | | |
|------------------|-----------|--------------|
| <i>D’oibrigh</i> | <i>mé</i> | <i>liom</i> |
| work.PAST | SUBJ:1SG | with.OBJ.1SG |

‘I kept on working’

(Source: Ó Dónaill 1977: s.v. *le*)

a reductive formula if one looks at group-B examples, where the action is clearly not continuative (one cannot keep on going away or slipping away).⁴⁶

To argue in favour of our EXPRESSIVE interpretation of *le* in this kind of usage, we would like to introduce a few examples (57) of expressive pronouns taken from currently spoken Italian, that is, pronouns which are co-referential with the subject and – in some cases – are not otherwise allowed in the argument structure of the verb.

- (57) It.
- a.** *l' Orco tutti i cristiani che vede se*
 DET ogre_i all DET christians REL see.3SG REFL.OBL_i
li mangia
 OBJ:3PL eat.PAST.3SG_i
 'the Ogre eats every human he sees'
- b.** *E venne il gatto che si mangiò*
 and come.PAST.3SG DET cat_i REL_i REFL.OBL_i eat.PAST.3SG_i
il topo
 DET mouse
 'And along came the Cat, who ate up the Mouse'

(a: Calvino 1996: p.36 (original and English translation); b: *Alla fiera dell'est*, traditional nursery rhyme)

The unstressed *si* is a 3rd-person reflexive pronoun which use is sometimes defined as 'affective' ('funzione affettivo-intensiva' in Serianni's [1988: p.214] terminology). It can be used as both a direct- and an indirect-object pronoun (Cordin 1988, Burzio 1986: p.416). In (57), given that the direct-object slot is filled by a noun in both (a) (*il dinosauro*) and (b) (*il topo*), *si* is an indirect object,⁴⁷ roughly equivalent to 'for/to himself' (so 57.a 'the mammal ate the dinosaur for himself', b 'the Cat ate the Mouse to himself'): cf. Burzio's example in (58):

⁴⁶ One must also be wary of the ambiguity of the English translation *away* which is actually employed to express continuity (*Play away!*) or distance in space (*Go away!*). It might not be haphazard to hypothesize that the ambiguous medium of English (Ó Dónaill 1977 and Mac Congáil 2004 are bilingual, English/Irish reference works) has engendered confusion in the description of these two separate usages of *le*, as is apparently the case when Ó Dónaill (1977: s.v. *le*) lists *D'imigh sé leis* 'He took himself off' under the heading of 'continued action'.

⁴⁷ An indirect object which is not governed by a preposition is glossed as OBL (oblique).

- (58) *Giovanni si è comprato un' auto*
 Giovanni REFL.OBL buy.PERF.3SG one automobile
 'Giovanni has bought an automobile **to himself**'.
 (Burzio 1986: p.416)

The EXPRESSIVE (i.e., aiming at emphasis by means of redundancy) is evident in (57) as opposed to (58), in that the latter example would still make sense if *si* were replaced by an adjunct specifying a BENEFICIARY other than Giovanni (e.g., *Giovanni mi ha comprato un'auto*⁴⁸ 'Giovanni bought **me** an automobile'), while *mangiare* would not allow a similar substitution with the same BENEFICIARY meaning: in fact, as (59) shows, any non-reflexive pronoun – far from expressing BENEFICIARY – would rather denote SOURCE (and a disadvantaged one!):

- (59) a. *Il gatto ti ha mangiato la lingua?*
 DET cat OBL.2SG eat.PERF.3SG DET tongue
 'Did the cat eat your tongue?' (lit. 'Did the cat eat the tongue **off you**?')
 (Proverbial for 'Why don't you speak?')

The question is still unresolved why the EXPRESSIVE function is entrusted to *le* rather than other prepositions, that is, what motivates the choice of *le* to this purpose. Such motivation, we reckon, might be the AGENTIVE sense of *le*, in that – if the purpose is to achieve redundancy – then duplicating the AGENT information in both the VP subject and the *le*-PP (which is otherwise used as an AGENTIVE adjunct) can be considered an effective way of doing so.

Closely linked to the expression of AGENT is – in a cross-linguistic perspective – that of CAUSE: in the passive it is often the case, among European languages at least, that both are expressed by the same kind of PP, as shown by (60–63):

⁴⁸ As can be observed, the latter example (*Giovanni mi ha comprato un'automobile*) differs from (58) not only in the pronoun, but also in the formation of the analytic perfect tense (*è comprato* vs. *ha comprato*). This latter difference is due to a language-specific rule forcing the choice of the auxiliary *essere* 'to be' rather than *avere* 'to have' when the verb follows an unstressed, reflexive pronoun (although *avere* is otherwise the obligatory auxiliary for all transitive verbs). (Cf. Sensini 1988: pp.167f.) This formal difference does not affect the meaning, so that the two sentences can still be considered a minimal pair.

(60) Eng.

- a. He was killed **by** the policemen. (AGENT)
 b. He was killed **by** a chronic illness. (CAUSE)

(61) Ir.

- a. *Tá sé briste agat*
 be SUBJ:3SG.MSC break.PPSTPTC at.OBJ:2SG

‘It’s been broken by you’

- b. *Caite ag an aois*
 wear.PPSTPTC at DET age

‘Worn out with age’

(a–b: Ó Dónaill 1977: s.v. *le*)

(62) It.

- a. *ucciso per errore da agenti speciali britannici*
 kill.PPSTPTC for error from agents special british

‘killed by mistake by British special agents’

- b. *ucciso accidentalmente da un colpo di pistola*
 kill.PPSTPTC accidentally from one hit of gun

‘accidentally killed by a gunshot’

(a: <http://www.agenews.it/speciali/londra/notizie-attentato-londra.php?c=66&in=16130>

[accessed August 2005]; b: http://www.anpi.it/pavia_caduti/pavia_caduti_d.htm [accessed August 2005])

(63) Sp.

- a. *reportero de radio haitiano ... matado por la policía*
 reporter of radio Haitian kill.PPSTPTC by DET
 police

‘a Haitian radio reporter ... killed by the police’

- b. *matado por armas ligeras*
 kill.PPSTPTC by weapons light

‘killed by light weapons’

(a: http://portal.unesco.org/es/ev.php-URL_ID=24855&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html [accessed August 2005]; b:

www.onu.org/Noticias/resumen/2000/bol1020.htm [accessed August 2005])

That there is a conceptual link between AGENT and CAUSE, on the other hand, is almost a trivial notion when one considers that an agent is precisely one who *causes* something to happen, so that AGENT can be considered but a special case of CAUSE,

and precisely one in which the cause is animated. What Irish does is use *le* to express CAUSE even when the verb is not passive, as shown in (64):⁴⁹

- (64) Ir.
ar crith le heagla
 on tremble.VN with fear
 ‘shaking with fear’
 (NIG: p.135)

5.1.3.11 MANNER

The adjunct constituted by a *con*-PP in Italian is rather used to express MANNER, as illustrated in (65):

- (65) It.
- a. *le merci che qui si comprano con vantaggio*
 DET goods REL here PASSV buy.3PL with convenience
 ‘the goods that are here conveniently purchased’
- b. *pensavo, con impazienza e con paura*
 think.IMPF.1SG with impatience and with fear
 ‘I thought, eagerly, but scared at the same time’
- c. *se ti fermi a osservarlo con attenzione*
 if OBJ:2SG stop.2SG to observe.INF-OBJ:3SG.MSC with attention
 ‘but if you stop to observe it carefully’
- d. *contornando grondaie con passo da funamboli*
 outline.GER gutters with pace from tightrope walkers
 ‘stepping along the gutters like a tightrope walker’
 (Calvino 1972: I, XII, XIII, X)

In (65.a–c), the *con*-PPs may be replaced by adverbs derived – via the corresponding denominal adjectives – by the nouns which function as the prepositional objects of *con*, e.g., in the order, *vantaggiosamente*, *impazientemente*, *paurosamente*,

⁴⁹ Italian, though not permitting causation to be expressed by *con*, uses in constructions analogous to (64) the preposition *da*, which – interestingly enough – is the same used to express AGENT/CAUSE in passive sentences – compare (62) above to the following example:

tremare dallo spavento
 tremble from.DET fear
 ‘shaking with fear’

(Source: <http://www.demauroparavia.it/122806>)

Cf. *?tremare *con* lo spavento.

attentamente.⁵⁰ (65.d) does not allow a similar substitution in that no denominal adjective may be derived by *passo* ‘pace’ – besides, ‘pace’ is further specified by *da funambolo* (‘a pace similar to that of tightrope walkers’).⁵¹ The *con*-PP – in each example – denotes something (a feeling, a circumstance) which accompanies or characterizes the action described by the verb: (a) *comprare con vantaggio* ‘to buy under conditions of exchange favourable to the buyer’, (b) *pensare con impazienza/con paura* ‘to think while feeling impatient/scared’, (c) *osservare con attenzione* ‘to observe while paying particular attention’, (d) *con passo da funamboli* ‘[stepping along the gutters] while walking like a tightrope walker would’. A side condition that accompanies/characterizes, i.e., is *associated* to a given course of events, is a natural candidate for being expressed by a preposition which bears a sense extension of the BSM WITH. In Irish, this employment of *le* seems to be rather marginal, if one is to judge from the fact that only once is it recorded in our corpus (and grammars and dictionaries appear to generally ignore it):

- (66) Ir.
- | | | | | | | |
|-------------|-------------------|-----------|--------------|---------------|----------------|--------------|
| <i>ba</i> | <i>ghearr ...</i> | <i>go</i> | <i>raibh</i> | <i>orm</i> | <i>imeacht</i> | <i>liom</i> |
| COP.PAST | short | COMPL | be.PAST | on.OBJ:1SG | go.VN | with.OBJ:1SG |
| <i>im</i> | <i>Raifteirí</i> | <i>le</i> | <i>pócaí</i> | <i>folmha</i> | | |
| in.POSS:1SG | Raifteirí | with | pockets | empty | | |
- ‘it would not be long ... until I had to go away, as Raifteirí, with empty pockets’⁵²

5.1.3.12 PURPOSIVE

The last, and rather marginal in our corpus, usage of *le* is the PURPOSIVE one, shown in (67):

⁵⁰ As a matter of fact, while the PP *con paura* denotes fear that the subject feels and can therefore be translated as ‘scared’, the denominal adjective *pauroso* means both ‘fearful’ and ‘frightening’, and so does the derived adverb *paurosamente* ‘fearfully/frighteningly’.

⁵¹ The whole complex phrase [*con passo [da funamboli]*] may however be substituted by the adverb *funambolescamente* (from the denominal adjective *funambolesco* ‘peculiar to a tightrope walker’).

⁵² Reference is here made to the Irish poet Antoine Ó Raifteiri and the final line of a poem he composed (*Mise Raifteirí an File* ‘I am Raifteirí, the poet’), where he mentions his empty pockets (Eoin Mac Cárthaigh, p.c.; cf. <http://www.irishcultureandcustoms.com/Poetry/Antoine%20ORaifteiri.html>).

- (67) Ir.
- a. *Saol raibiléiseach an bhunaitheora ba bhonn*
 life Rabelaisian DET founder.GEN COP.PAST foundation
leis an ainm
 with DET name
 ‘The founder’s Rabelaisian life was the reason for the (company’s) name’
- b. *ach bheadh a fhios ag an*
 but be.COND POSS:3SG.MSC knowledge at DET
bhfear dall, nach raibh bonn lena
 man blind COMPL.NEG be.PAST foundation with.POSS:3SG.MSC
bhriathra
 words
 ‘but even a blind man would know that there was not a reason for his words’
- c. *Bhí cúis mhaith leis sin: bhí sí*
 be.PAST cause good with.OBJ:3SG.MSC that be.PAST SUBJ:3SG.FEM
pósta
 married
 ‘There was a good reason for that: she was married’
- d. *Ní raibh spás ann le titim*
 NEG be.PAST space there with fall.VN
 ‘There was no space to fall down’
- (a–c: Ó Cíosóig 1997: pp.7, 11, 5; d: Ní Dhuibhne 2000: p.5)

Examples (67.a–c) – which differ from (d) in that the latter has a verbal noun as the prepositional object and is therefore left for separate discussion – are ordered along a concrete–abstract continuum (or, perhaps more appropriately, a less abstract–more abstract one). In (a–b) the spatial metaphor is tangible in the lexical choice of *bonn* ‘foundation’. The formula *bonn le* ‘foundation for’ introduce the purpose (Im) for which the foundation (tr) is there, in a relationship that may be viewed as purposive or causal: generally speaking, one’s purpose in doing something is what causes them to do it.⁵³ Our choice of the label PURPOSIVE is based on the fact that the *le*-PP answer seems to answer the question ‘for what?’: ‘a foundation for what?’ in (67.a), where an entrepreneur’s lifestyle is taken as the foundation *for establishing* his company name upon it, and in (67.b), where the foundation *for someone’s words to be motivated* is described as being absent. In both examples a metaphorical mapping links motivation (CAUSE) to foundation, and PURPOSE (for a name/one’s word to be motivated) to what

⁵³ Cf. *I am saving some money to go on holiday* (purpose) vs. *I am saving some money because I want to go on holiday* (cause).

is built upon such foundation: the target domain of the metaphor would therefore be the building activity. *Coherence*, which is one of the attributes of sound metaphorical systems according to Lakoff (cf. Lakoff and Turner 1989: p.89, Lakoff and Johnson 1980: Ch 5 and passim), is found in that not only are CAUSE and PURPOSE closely associated (*le* as expressing generic ASSOCIATION), but also foundation and building are in contact in the target domain (*le* as expressing physical proximity).

(67.c)'s PURPOSIVE interpretation seems to be motivated by just the generic ASSOCIATION sense of *le* – there is not the same imagery as is involved in the metaphorical mapping of (a–b): a woman's being married is a good reason *for something else to make sense*. In this sense, i.e., for lack of concrete imagery, we have deemed this example to be more abstract than the previous ones.

By virtue of the nominalized verbal being the prepositional object of *le*, (67.d) has the PP functioning as a subordinate clause. It associates two concrete, physical concepts as are space (tr) and dynamic motion (falling down, lm), yielding the composite, concrete concept of 'free space within which downwards vertical motion to the ground is possible' – which English would express, with different prepositional choice, as 'space to fall/space for something to fall to the ground': again, the relation is CAUSAL/PURPOSIVE depending on the point of view: a clear, free space is needed *for something to fall* all the way down until reaching the ground (purposive) – on the other hand, a loose mass would fall to the ground *because of the absence of any prop/obstacle* (causal).




Figure 5.5: The BSM WITH and its sense extensions.

5.1.3.13 Graphic recap.

To conclude our analysis of the BSM WITH, Figure 5.5 is meant to represent schematically the links we have so far traced between its various sense extensions. Sense extensions are represented as stemming from either COMPANY or VICINITY according to the interpretation provided in the text. COMPARISON – still according to the text – is represented as originating from a reading which is general over both.

5.1.4 OFF/FROM/OUT OF

As has been said already (4.1.2, i), SEPARATION is what this BSM chiefly expresses. SEPARATION is of course a dynamic relation, and what static relations can be expressed by exponent prepositions of this BSM describe the state resulting from a dynamic event – so that, to come back to the example presented above, for something to *be out of place* entails that there is a place where it is supposed to be and whence it has been moved; accordingly, for someone to *be from Someplace* means that, wherever they are at present, they were born there and they have at a certain stage moved from there.

Therefore, as opposed to our treatment of IN(TO) (5.1.2), and as has already been done with regard to WITH (5.1.3), we are going to deal with the static relations of this BSM as motivated by sense extension (namely, RESULTATIVE STATE), which means we are not going to devote two distinct sections to dynamic relations and to static ones. In other words, the situation is reversed if compared to that of WITH, which has been considered as fundamentally static.

Furthermore, whereas IN(TO) and WITH exhibit one-to-one BSM-prepositions correspondence, this is not what happens with OFF/FROM/OUT OF. In fact, as has been illustrated in 4.2.1.1 and 4.2.2.1, this BSM has three exponent prepositions in Irish (*de*, *as*, *ó*) and two in Italian (*di*, *da*).

As a last word of warning, it is by no means to be understood that the three-fold labelling that we have chosen for this BSM reflected a hypothetical one-to-one correspondence with the Irish exponent prepositions or some more elaborate correspondence with the Italian ones. The reason why this BSM has been thus labelled is but one of completeness, in that it schematically resumes three ways of describing SEPARATION, i.e., when the emphasis is on a state of tr-lm *contact* prior to their SEPARATION (OFF), of tr being somehow *enclosed* in lm (OUT OF) prior to separation, and finally – with neither such emphasis meant – when the tr-lm relation prior to SEPARATION was of *generic* PROXIMITY (FROM). As shall be shortly seen, it is not the case that any of these three kinds of description has a fixed prepositional counterpart in either language: this will show up in the glosses, which will at each time reflect the way the relations expressed in the examples would be expressed in English. This variation in the glosses, which contrasts with the fixity of the glossing for the two previous BSMs, will not per se be object of further analysis, but it is only meant to allow the glosses to sound more natural to English ears.

5.1.4.1 SEPARATION

Instances of physical separation are a large part of our corpora. In Irish, all of the three prepositions *de*, *as* and *ó* are capable of expressing this, as illustrated in (68–70):

- (68) Ir. *de*
- | | | | | |
|----|----------------------|-------------|-----------|--------------|
| a. | <i>bain</i> | <i>díot</i> | <i>do</i> | <i>chóta</i> |
| | take | off.OBJ:2SG | POSS:2SG | coat |
| | 'take off your coat' | | | |

- b.** *tóg* *den* *chathaoir* *é*
 lift.IMP.2SG **from.DET** chair OBJ:3SG.MSC
 ‘lift it off the chair’
- c.** *léim sé* *den* *chapall*
 jump.PAST SUBJ:3SG.MSC **off.DET** horse
 ‘he jumped off the horse’
- d.** *thit sé* *den* *stól*
 fall.PAST SUBJ:3SG.MSC **from.DET** stool
 ‘he fell off the stool’
- e.** *bain* *de* *duine eile* *é*
 take.IMP.2SG **off** person other OBJ:3SG.MSC
 ‘take it off someone else’
- f.** *Thosaigh daoine ag tuirlingt den traein ag*
 start.PAST people at descend.VN **off.DET** train at
an gCarraig Dhubh
 DET Black Rock
 ‘people started to get off the train at Black Rock’
- g.** *bhí sé deacair orm mo shúile a*
 be.PAST SUBJ:3SG.SCM hard on.OBJ:1SG POSS:1SG eyes to
bhaint di
 take **off.OBJ:3SG.FEM**
 ‘it was hard for me to take my eyes off her’
- h.** *baineadh an anáil díom*
 take.PAST.AUT DET breath **out of.OBJ:1SG**
 ‘my breath was taken away’
- i.** *stad sí den ól*
 stop.PAST SUBJ:3SG.FEM **from.DET** drink.VN
 ‘she stopped drinking’
- j.** *ceangail den ráille é*
 tie.IMP.2SG **from.DET** railing OBJ:3SG.MSC
 ‘tie it to the railing’

(**a–b**, **e**, **i**: Mac Congáil 2004: pp.69f.; **c**: *NIG*: p.136; **d**, **j**: Mac Mathúna and Ó Corráin 2003: s.v. *de*; **f**: Ní Dhuibhne 2000: p.6; **g–h**: Ó Cíosóig 1997: pp.12, 10)

In (68) the OFF and FROM senses of *de* are clearly illustrated: contact prior to movement away from *lm* is evident in (a–c). (e) is a borderline case: the English translation provided here assumes contact or at least possession-as-contact, that is – as has already been seen in the case of WITH – possession associated with close spatial vicinity; it may or may not be the case that *tr* was *on* the person it is now taken from, but – at any rate – possession would still be conceptualized as proximity, if not contact, in either case: (e) might still be uttered if what was taken away were money

from *lm*'s bank account, i.e., when there is no actual contact between *tr* (money) and *lm*. In (f), leaving a train might be conceptualized at least in two different ways, i.e., as emphasizing either previous contact (OFF) or previous enclosure (OUT OF): a train might be schematized as either a surface or a box.

(g) has physical *tr* and *lm*, yet is metaphorical in that actual contact cannot be assumed to have been there prior to the averting movement between the speaker's eyeballs (*tr*) and the woman (*lm*), nor can it be understood that the speaker is trying to get his eyeballs back into his eyesockets from the woman's whereabouts. The act of directing one's eyes towards something is mapped onto that of laying them on it, or in Lakoff's (1993: p.35) terms SEEING IS TOUCHING. If (h) is metaphorical, in that it seems to imply that someone can physically grab someone else's breath and take it away, it is not so at the level of *tr*-*lm* relationship, which can quite accurately be described as OUT OF (breath, i.e. a physical mass of air, does actually flow out of someone). Another reading is possible yet, namely that *breath* metonymically stands for the faculty of breathing, in which case (h) actually means that someone is made incapable of normal respiration. In that case, the metaphor involved is FACULTIES ARE POSSESSIONS and the same considerations apply here as in (e), that is possessor and thing possessed are characterized as physically close and either the OFF or FROM reading is available.

(i) is particularly interesting in that for someone to cease doing something is conceptualized as separating from such activity, i.e., here, drinking. It seems here that the metaphorical mapping is ACTIVITIES ARE LOCATIONS, so that abandoning a place is tantamount to ceasing the corresponding activity.

The inclusion of (j) among the expressions of the SEPARATION sense might at first seem odd, therefore requiring some effort in order to be understood. The apparent contradiction can be read as either the choice of a BSM of SEPARATION, or – the difference is more than a terminological one – the choice of a *preposition which normally expresses* a BSM of SEPARATION, to express attachment (tying something to something else). But a look at the semantic implicature of the lexical elements in the example does in fact provide a satisfactory motivation to the choice of this particular BSM: the verb *ceangail* 'to bind, tie' implies the use of a rope or thread as the instrument by which something is tied to *lm* (a railing). A rope or thread has two ends which are separated by a certain distance, which corresponds of course to the length of the rope and allows *lm* to freely roam as far away from the knot as the stretch of

rope goes. In this light, cross-linguistic counterexamples fit in perfectly well: cf. Eng. *the lamp hangs **from** the ceiling* (and is attached to it), It. *un corpo che pende **da** una corda*⁵⁴ ‘a body hanging **from** a rope [to which it is attached]’.

(69) Ir. *as*

- a.** *tóg as seo é*
take.IMP.2SG **from here** it
‘take it away from here’
- b.** *bhogfadh sí as a suíochán*
move.COND SUBJ:3SG.FEM **off** POSS:3SG.FEM **seat**
‘she would leave her seat’
- c.** *tharraing [sé] leabhar as a phóca*
pull.PAST SUBJ:3SG.MSC book **out of** POSS:3SG.MSC **pocket**
‘he drew a book out of his pocket’
- d.** *Shleamhnaigh an traein as an stáisiún*
slid.PAST DET train **out of** DET station
‘The train slid out of the station’
- e.** *shleamhnaigh Annagael léi as mo sheomrasa*
slip.PAST Annagael with.OBJ:3SG.FEM **out of** POSS:1SG **room-EMPH**
‘Annagael slipped out of my room’
- f.** *Tháinig Tom amach as a hoifig*
come.PAST Tom outwards **out of** POSS:3SG.FEM **office**
‘Tom came out of her office’
- g.** *Lig Tom fead as*
let.PAST Tom whistle **out of.OBJ:3SG.MSC**
‘Tom whistled’ (lit. ‘Tom let a whistling sound out of himself’)
- h.** *ag baint suilt as*
at take.VN fun.GEN **out of.OBJ:3SG.MSC**
‘enjoying it’
- i.** *Bhuel, bhain sin geit asam!*
well take.PAST that jump **out of.OBJ.1SG**
‘Well, that startled me!’

(a: *NIG*: p.136; **b–d**: Ní Dhuibhne 2000: pp.7, 9, 9; **e–i**: Ó Cíosóig 1997: pp.6, 11, 10, 5, 8)

The examples in (69) suggest that the Ir. *as* mainly conveys the OUT OF sense, except for (a), where the spatial deictic does not allow any inference as to the nature of tr-lm

⁵⁴ Source: http://www2.radio24.ilsole24ore.com/speciali/speciale_gialloenero20032004_6.htm (accessed September 2005).

SEPARATION (*here* might be an enclosure like a room or a space conceptualized as enclosing tr, e.g. a field or a city, but it might as well be not so), and for (b), which has a seat as lm, so that it might be assumed that previous contact (rather than enclosure) is not an incompatible feature with the choice of *as*. (c–g), at any rate, clearly describe processes whereby a tr previously enclosed within lm is taken out of the latter: book/pocket (c), train/station (d), person/room (e–f), whistle (flowing air mass)/person.

(h) introduces the metaphorical dimension, in that enjoying something is conceptualized as taking amusement (tr), as though a concrete object, out of it (lm), according to a metaphorical mapping which goes along the lines of EXPERIENCE IS CONTAINED IN ITS CAUSE (CAUSE can be anything, from a person, to an object, or an event). Similarly, in (i), to make someone react in a certain way (here, making them startle), is conceptualized as extracting that reaction from its source (POTENTIAL ACTIONS ARE CONTAINED WITHIN PEOPLE, and ACTING_x IS LETTING POTENTIAL ACTION_x OUT).

(70) Ir. ó

a. *an sneachta ag stealladh anuas ó na*
 DET snow at pour.VN down from DET

flaithis

kingdoms

‘the snow pouring down from the sky’ (lit. ‘from the (heavenly) kingdoms’)

b. *Bhí Tom ann, fear óg a d'éalaih ó*
 be.PAST Tom there man young REL escape.PAST from

Chontae Liatroma

County Leitrim

‘There was Tom, a young man who escaped from County Leitrim’

c. *Chas sí uaim láithreach agus thosaigh*
 turn.PAST SUBJ:3SG.FEM from.ISG immediately and start.PAST

ag bogadh amach ón ngasra beag
 at move.VN outwards from.DET group small

‘She immediately turned away from me and began to pull out of the small group’

d. *Bhí Saoirse ar an DART ag filleadh ón oifig*
 be.PAST Saoirse on DET DART at return.VN from.DET office

‘Saoirse was on the DART, on her way home from the office’

e. *ag ullmhú don turas uafásach ón*
 at prepar.VN to.DET journey horrible from.DET

suíochán go dtí doras na traenach

- seat** up to⁵⁵ door DET train.GEN
 ‘preparing for the horrible journey from the seat to the doors of the train’
- f.** *ag cur uaithi a Walkman*
 at put.VN from.OBJ:3SG.FEM POSS:3 Walkman.GEN
 ‘putting away her Walkman’
- g.** *Leag sí cás beag leathair*
 cast.PAST SUBJ:3SG.FEM case small leather.GEN
uaithi
from.OBJ:3SG.FEM
 ‘She cast aside the small leather bag’
- h.** *níor ghá sin a dhéanamh agus sinn*
 be.PAST.NEG need that to do.VN and SUBJ:1PL
i bhfad ón oifig
 in distance from.DET office
 ‘there was no need to do so as we were away from the office’
- i.** *an t-athair oná dtógann sé an nós sin*
 DET father from.REL take SUBJ:3SG.MSC DET habit that
 ‘the father from whom he takes that habit’
- j.** *theastaigh uaidh é sin a dhéanamh*
 be wanting.PAST from.OBJ:3SG.MSC OBJ:3SG.MSC that to do.VN
 ‘he needed to do that’
- k.** *saor ó cháin l. slán ó chontúirt*
 free from tax safe from danger
 ‘tax-free’ ‘safe from danger’
- m.** *D’éalaigh mo chiall uaim*
 escape.PAST POSS:1SG reason from.OBJ:1SG
 ‘My reason abandoned me’

(**a, d–f**: Ní Dhuibhne 2000: pp.1, 3, 7, 7; **b–c, g–h, m**: Ó Cíosóig 1997: pp.7, 8, 10, 5, 6; **i–l**: Mac Congáil 2004: p.79)

⁵⁵ If ‘up to’ is an effective way of glossing the Irish compound preposition *go dtí* as far as its spatial meaning goes, it is not the most accurate one. In fact, *dtí* is a form of present subjunctive of the verb *tar* ‘to come’ which usage (still in vigour in Early Modern Irish [Eoin Mac Cárthaigh, p.c.]) is described by Ó Dónaill (1977: s.v. *dtí*) as ‘literary’ and is presented as a lexical entry of its own, since the current present subjunctive of *tar* is *taga* (cf. Mac Congáil 2004: p.150). In the light of this, *go dtí* is best analyzed as a complementizer + verb sequence (which might be glossed ‘COMPL go.SUBJ’), while the lm of this putative ‘compound preposition’ is actually the subject of *dtí* – which would also explain why the lm of *go dtí* is in the nominative case rather than in the dative like most prepositions (Mac Congáil 2004: p.62). Thus, the example sequence *go dtí doras na traenach* ‘up to the train door’ would actually mean ‘until the door comes (into view)’ (Eoin Mac Cárthaigh, p.c.).

\acute{O} seems to denote the basic, generic FROM sense, that is SEPARATION of tr and lm which were in a relation of not better defined spatial proximity. This is the case of (a), where the snow falling from the sky is not described as either leaving an enclosure or coming off a surface, but simply approaching the ground from a previous, vertically higher position. (b) has someone leaving some place, namely a county, which might as well, in fact, be conceptualized as an enclosure insomuch as all administrative districts normally have well-defined boundaries, so that either a generic FROM reading or a more specific OUT OF one is available.

In (c), we see the 1st-person pronominal form of \acute{o} employed in what is clearly an angular reading. The woman portrayed in the sentence acts as a pivot around which her gaze can freely swivel. Not too differently from the above mentioned metaphor SEEING IS TOUCHING, tr's gaze is here conceptualized as describing a linear path going from her eyes up to the person seen, here the speaker. As the beholder turns away from what was the object of her sight, her gaze line describes an angle with regard to its previous direction, as in Figure 5.6:




Figure 5.6: ‘She turned away from me.’

In the figure, the paler head is oriented toward the Speaker and so is the dashed line representing her gaze: the beholder is looking at the Speaker. As she turns away, the beholder swivels her gaze around, describing an angle α (symbolized by the curved arrow-headed line). The darker head pointed towards x represents the new direction of the beholder's gaze, which is represented by the continuous line. The preposition \acute{o} is used to express the angular SEPARATION between the initial and final gaze-directions. A second form of \acute{o} , with the determiner, appears in the same example (c) in what

appears to be the OUT OF sense by virtue of the adverbial *amach* ‘out(wards)’: a group of people might be easily conceptualized as an enclosure in that the spatial area they occupy is taken as being fairly well determined by their very presence. Furthermore, as common-fact knowledge about the world would suggest, pulling out of a group of people implies having previously been engaged in interaction with them, that is, having actively been a part of the group – hence, having been *in* the group.

(d–g) all suggest the generic meaning of SEPARATION. In (d), the ‘commuter’ scenario refers to one’s journey back home from their workplace, hence no emphasis is put on leaving one’s office as ‘walking out of a specific room’. (e) – same scenario – gloomily evokes tr’s SEPARATION from *lm* (their seat) and the path from there to the doors. Again, the generic reading FROM seems to be preferable, this time by virtue of the lexical element *turas* ‘journey’ which does not emphasize the contact sense of OFF – in a journey from the seat to the door, one’s starting position is not necessarily a sitting one.

(f) and (g) are similar in that they both picture the act of ‘setting aside’ something, i.e., of interrupting a previous state of interaction with some object, as would be playing a Walkman in (f), or ‘backgrounding’ some object, like the bag in (g). In both case, such objects are *removed from sight or attention*, e.g., the putting away one’s Walkman would typically involve stopping it and putting it into a bag or pocket; casting aside a bag (the verb *leag* in the example describes a forceful motion event, for which Ó Dónaill’s [1977: s.v.] primary equivalent is ‘knock down’), perhaps with violence, is likely to imply a strong will of removing it from one’s attention, or to get rid of its weight after having been carrying it for a while. Such removal, whether from a physical, sensorial domain (one’s sight), or a more abstract one (one’s attention), is of course an instance of SEPARATION.

In (h), the higher-order prepositional phrase *i bhfad* ‘in distance’, governing in the subordinate one *ón oifig* ‘from the office’, enforces a globally static, resultative reading, so that on the whole the meaning of the sentence is ‘statically located at a point remote from *lm*’. Locally, that is at the level of the subordinate *ó*-PP, the sense can still be considered dynamic, in that movement is still a semantic requisite of SEPARATION.

Metaphorical mappings based on sense extensions of SEPARATION are shown in examples (i–l). In (i), features that are peculiar to somebody’s character are conceptualized as though it were their belongings, that is, physical objects that can be

taken or borrowed from them. (In this case, another common metaphor would have those traits being *inherited*.)

In (j), what is needed (tr) is conceptualized as something missing from the needing person (lm); in the example in case, what is needed is doing something (*sin a dhéanamh* ‘to do that’). The motivation would appear to be that if one already *has* something (POSSESSION IS PHYSICAL PROXIMITY; cf. discussion in 5.1.3 above, examples 33–34), they do *not* need it. By analogy, for tr not to be subject to obligations or exposed to dangers (examples k and l, respectively) is for it to kept *separate from* them, for common sense suggests that one is most likely to be affected by objects it comes into contact with (AFFECTING IS TOUCHING; cf. Lakoff and Johnson’s [1980: pp.69ff.] ‘direct manipulation’ as prototypical causation), and is likewise spared being affected by distant objects.

Finally, (70.m) shares with (68.h) the metaphorical mapping FACULTIES ARE POSSESSIONS (as also strongly conveyed by the possessive *mo* ‘my’), to which the further mapping is added that LOSING A POSSESSION IS FOR IT TO GO AWAY (cf. 5.1.3, example 47.e ‘Two hundred pounds, gone with the wind’). Thus, being able to reason maps onto possessing the faculty of reason, and being no longer able to do so, onto the departure of the such faculty.

Instances of SEPARATION in the Italian corpus are exemplified by (71) for *di*, and (72) for *da*.

(71) It. *di*

- a.** *Poco saprei dirti di Aglaura fuori delle cose che gli abitanti ... ripetono da sempre*
little know.COND.1SG tell.INF-OBL:2G of Aglaura outside of.DET things REL DET inhabitants repeat.3PL from always
 ‘Little could I tell you about Aglaura besides what the inhabitants ... have always been saying’
- b.** *[la confraternita] non manca di dar loro una mano*
[DET confraternity] NEG be missing.3SG from give.INF OBL:3PL one hand
 ‘the brethren never fail to help them’

(Calvino 1972: VII, XIV)

(72) It. *da*

a. *La città si presenta differente a chi*
 DET city REFL present.3SG different to OBJ:3SG.REL

viene da terra e a chi dal
 come.3SG from land and to OBJ:3SG.REL from.DET

mare

sea

‘The city looks different to those who come overland and to those who come from overseas’

b. *i forzati con nere catene al piede issavano*
 DET convicts with black chains at.DET foot hoist.IMPF.3PL

rocce di basalto da una cava che s’ apre
 rocks of basalt out of one quarry REL REFL open.3SG

sottoterra

underground

‘the convicts, with black chains tied to their feet, were hoisting basalt rocks from an underground quarry’

c. *non staccava le labbra da una pipa*
 NEG detach.IMPF.3SG DET lips from one pipe

‘(he) would not take his lips off some pipe of his’

d. *un bastimento che lo porti via*
 one vessel REL OBJ:3SG.MSC take.SUBJN.3SG away

dal deserto

from.DET desert

‘a vessel that might take him away from the desert’

e. *I sottili trampoli che s’ alzano dal*
 DET thin stilts REL REFL rise.3PL from.THE

suolo a gran distanza l’ uno dall’ altro
 ground at great distance DET one from.THE other

‘The thin stilts rising from the ground, very distant from one another’

f. *un cammello dal cui basto pendono*
 one camel from.DET REL.OBL saddle hang.3PL

otri e bisacce

goatskins and saddle bags

‘a camel from whose saddle there hang goatskins and bags’

g. *non staccavo gli occhi da loro*
 NEG detach.IMPF.1SG DET eyes from OBJ:3PL

‘I could not take my eyes off them’

h. *il salto dalla vita alla morte*
 DET leap from.DET life to.DET death

‘the leap from life to death’

- i. *la tua fatica che dà forma al desiderio*
 DET POSS.2SG labour REL give.3SG shape to.DET desire
prende dal desiderio la sua forma
 take.3SG from.DET desire DET POSS.3SG shape
 ‘your labour, which shapes your desire, takes its own shape from your desire’
- j. *dovevo liberarmi dalle immagini*
 must.IMPF.1SG free.INF-OBJ:1SG from.DET images
 ‘I had to get rid of the images’
- k. *Guardatevi dal dir loro che ...*
 watch.IMP.2PL-OBJ:2PL from.THE tell.VN them COMPL
 ‘Refrain from telling them ...’

(Calvino 1972: II, VI, VI, II, IX, II, XII, XIV, I, VI, III)

The basic sense of SEPARATION, as would appear from the corpus evidence, is sporadically associated with the Italian preposition *di*, which we shall see has rather specialized in other senses. This is at any rate what the scarcity of examples from our corpus suggests (example 71, but cf. other examples of SEPARATION *di* in 4.2.2.1 above, example 15). In (71.a) the SEPARATION sense is strongly enhanced by the presence of the adverbial *fuori* ‘outside’: here, at any rate, the reading is not spatial but – by means of metaphorical mapping – the equivalent of Eng. *except for*. In the metaphorical mapping, things said by the Aglaurians map onto concrete objects that might be stored in some place, while fresh information, that does not belong in that place, are therefore located somewhere *outside, separate from* the former repertoire. The verb *manicare* ‘to be missing’ followed by the infinitive (71.b) seems to parallel such English expressions as *to fall short of*, which seems to preserve its spatial motivation in that it suggests that it is a (short) distance what prevents one from reaching their goal. Accordingly, ‘be missing from’ (*manicare di*) followed by a nominalized verbal form like the infinitive, conceptualizes one’s failure to act as being away from acting (cf. Eng. *Far from helping them, he left instead*).

It is *da*, as (72) provides copious evidence of, which does the most of the job as far as SEPARATION is concerned. Concrete spatial SEPARATION is illustrated in examples (a–f). As shall be made clear by the following discussion, It. *da* is semantically general over the three distinct readings we have examined above of FROM, OFF, and OUT OF – that is, each one of them needs be enforced by the given contextual information.

In (a), the Im’s *terra* ‘land’ and *mare* ‘sea’ fill in the SOURCE-adjunct role for the verb *venire* ‘to come’. A city built along the seashore can be reached either *from*

the sea or *from* its hinterland. The generic sense FROM is here evident in that neither of the *lm*'s in point is enclosure-like, nor is any emphasis put on issues of contact – most likely, the *tr* coming from the sea or the land is conceptualized as never loosing contact with his/her path. In (b), SEPARATION of *tr* (basalt rocks) from *lm* (quarry) is the result of some AGENT's volitional action. Here, the reading OUT OF, although not explicitly determined by any closed-class element, is made available by encyclopedical notions about quarries as bounded locations plus the contextually given characterization of the quarry in question as being an underground one. (c) and (d)'s being instances of sheer SEPARATION is blatant and hardly deserves further discussion, except that Talmy's (2000) observation (discussed in 2.3.1 above) that relations expressed by prepositions are typically highly schematic and general over details such as size (*lips_{tr}* : *pipe_{lm}* vs. *traveller_{tr}* : *desert_{lm}*); (c) and (d) differ in that the former clearly profiles an OFF reading, while the latter does not appear to authorize but the generic reading FROM (see discussion of example a).

(e) is interesting in that SEPARATION is conceptualized as *fictive* motion (cf. Talmy 2000: pp.99–137 and discussion in 2.3.1 above). Italo Calvino is here describing a city built upon elevated platforms which are kept at a distance from ground level by means of long, standing stilts. These upright standing stilts are described as *rising* from the ground (lit. 'raising themselves': *s'alzano dal suolo*), that is, in Talmy's terms, their static, 'factive' position is described, 'fictively', as being a dynamic one. Although, as far as I can judge, the expression has become somewhat stiff and formulaic, its motivation is probably to be found in the analogy with objects being raised upwards and vertically, as a flag along its pole – rather than, for instance, a person rising up from a squatting or sitting position. If our guess is correct, then the fictive motion involved is that of the observer's gaze running along the stilts from bottom to top. (A second, alternative explanation would be quite different in that it would rather have the verb *alzarsi* employed in a resultative fashion, that is, by virtue of the stilts having once being raised – literally – by those who built the elevated city.)

In the same example (72.e), a second *da(ll')* recurs, used in exactly the same way as the Ir. *i bhfad ó* (= It. *a distanza da*) in example (70.h) above (see discussion there). Similarly, (72.f) can be compared to the Irish example in (68.j): goatskins and bags are attached to the camel's saddle, their lower extremities hanging loose at a distance from it.

(g) is based on the same metaphor as (70.c) above – SEEING IS TOUCHING – but does not describe the same kind of pivoting movement. In fact, the metaphorical mapping is built upon the same OFF sense illustrated in (72.c), that is a ‘parallel’, rather than ‘angular’, SEPARATION. (h) too is based on a metaphorical mapping, namely STATES ARE LOCATIONS (cf. Lakoff and Turner 1989: p.7), which enables dying to be conceptualized as going from state₁ (being alive) to state₂ (being dead) – basic SEPARATION or generic FROM sense.

(i) can be likened to the Irish example in (70.i), in that ‘taking after’ someone is described as taking some feature from someone, but the expression here is based on a multiple-metaphor interaction which makes it more complicated than (70.i). The sentence aims to describe the relation existing between one’s efforts (‘your labour’) and goals (‘your desire’), which is described as reciprocal: more precisely, efforts are said to be shaped by goals, that is, it is one’s goals that determine what kind of efforts one should make to reach them; on the other hand, goals are also said to be shaped by efforts, i.e. – which may appear less obvious – efforts determine what goals one should pursue. (Calvino’s bitter point seems to be that for ambitious that one’s aims may originally be, they are eventually discarded and replaced by less ambitious ones on account of too great an effort that they would have required.) The role of the person whose efforts and desires are described is not taken into account, the interaction being viewed merely as one between his/her activities and feelings, so that the first metaphorical mapping has one’s ACTIVITIES AND FEELINGS PERSONIFIED AS ANIMATE AGENTS, who are able to interact mutually and to take after one another, which has the effect of diminishing the subject’s responsibility so as to view him/her as conditioned by both his/her desires and endurance. A second metaphoric level, which has already been seen in (70.i) above, is enabled by the former, in that it takes two people for there to be mutual exchange of characteristic features seen as personal belongings.

In (72.j), the same conception of affection as physical contact as in (70.k) is at work, and the same rider (physical distance = impossibility to affect) applies, the only difference being that the *process* of getting free, separate from images that might otherwise affect the subject, is expressed here through a verb, whereas in (70.k) a *state* of freedom was expressed by an adjective. Finally, the same concept recurs in (72.k), which more closely parallels (70.l) (‘safe from’), in that It. *guardarsi da* (‘watch oneself against’) expresses what should be done in order to secure oneself

from some peril: besides, the same metaphor ACTIVITIES ARE LOCATIONS as described apropos of (68.i) ('she *refrained from* drinking') applies here too.

Another common instance of fictive SEPARATION occurs in expressions describing ORIGIN, which are typically formed with stative verbs such as *be*, *see*, etc. In such cases, *Im* (expressed by the prepositional object) denotes the starting point from which what is predicated of *tr* makes sense or holds true (e.g., *My house is just a five minutes walk from yours*, *You can't actually see it from here*). A few examples will make the point clearer:

(73) Ir.

- a. *bhí a fear céile ina sheasamh*
 be.IMPF POSS.3SG.FEM husband in.POSS.3SG.MSC stand.VN
cúpla slat uaim
 couple yards.GEN from.OBJ:1SG
 'her husband was standing a couple of yards from me'
- b. *mile as Doire* c. *mile ón staisiún*
 mile from Derry mile from.DET station
 'a mile from Derry' 'a mile from the station'

(a: Ó Cíosóig 1997: p.5; b: Mac Congáil 2004: p.67; c: Mac Mathúna and Ó Corráin 2003: s.v. *ó*)

(74) It.

- a. *Di Argia, da qua sopra, non si vede nulla*
 of Argia from here above NEG PASSV see.3SG nothing
 'No part of Argia can be seen from up here'
- b. *c' è un punto dal quale la città*
 there be.3SG one point from.DET REL DET city
mostra le sue vere proporzioni
 show.3SG DET POSS.3SG real proportions
 'there is a viewpoint from which the city shows its real proportions'
- c. *I miei parenti abitano a venti chilometri da*
 DET POSS:1SG relatives live.3PL at twenty kilometers from
Napoli
 Naples
 'My family live twenty kilometres away from Naples'

(a–b: Calvino 1972: XV, XIII; c: Sensini 1988: p.212)

In all of the examples in (73), *Im* is taken to be the starting point from which a given linear distance ℓ is measured to reach *tr*; in other words, ℓ is a measure of the SEPARATION between *tr* and *Im*. Similar expressions, although absent from our corpus,

are common in Italian too (cf. example 16.d in 4.2.2.1 above, just repeated as 74.c). This extension can be defined as based on fictive motion in that a static situation is described as though a motion had occurred, namely, going from tr to lm. Employing a term well explained by Levison (2003: 2.3.1 and passim), a *search scope* for tr is defined by the given data $\ell + \text{lm}$ (an essential element, the direction, is of course missing): someone who wished to find tr, should start from lm and proceed for the whole distance ℓ .

In (74.a–b), lm refers to the ORIGIN of one’s gaze, in close analogy with the fictive description analyzed in the case of example (72.e) above. According to the by now well-known metaphor SEEING IS TOUCHING, lm sets up a starting point for the observer’s gaze to reach the object of his/her vision. A search scope is defined here, too, so that such object might be seen (encountered by one’s gaze) by someone located in viewpoint lm.

5.1.4.2 PARTITIVE

PARTITIVE is an easily motivated extension of SEPARATION and falls within the spatial domain, where it singles element x_i out of a set X comprised of elements x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n all exchangeable with x_i and with one another with respect to some property of theirs. The PARTITIVE function in this basic sense is illustrated by the *of*-PP in such English examples as *one of us, a member of the family, two heads of cattle*. In all of these examples, the lm denotes a set made of distinct entities which can be individually and exactly singled out, and which are all equivalent from the given viewpoint: anyone of us is ‘one of us’, anyone who belongs in a family is a member, in a herd of cattle every animal is a head. As a second possibility, the PARTITIVE function extracts a portion x out of some mass X , where the size of the portion taken, as well as the precise region of X it is taken from, are not determined by X ’s properties (that is, X does *not* come with pre-determined inner boundaries but as an indistinct mass): cf. *a loaf of bread, a cup of tea, a spoonful of flour*.

As to the motivation for the PARTITIVE sense to be associated with the BSM OFF/FROM/OUT OF, it can be easily seen that the act of singling/carving out x (tr) from X (lm) may consist in either a physical separation of the formerly undivided whole (as in *Have a piece of cake!*) or the psychological process of concentrating one’s attention on x as *separate*, distinct from X .

As opposed to the PARTITIVE function, which shall be examined in the present section, a similar and potentially confusable sense shall now be introduced to be left for discussion in the following section. This is the BELONGING IN sense, which may otherwise be dubbed as the PART-WHOLE sense. A PART-WHOLE function does not extract peer from peers (that is, some x from the set of all x 's): it rather assigns x to a complex system Σ of which x is a part along with other the parts w, y, z , etc. This function, too, can distinguish between a singulative use (e.g., *the breastplate of the armour, the trigger of the gun, the head of the family*) and a mass one (e.g., *the top of my head, the tip of my finger*). Confusion between PARTITIVE and BELONGING IN may arise precisely from the fact that the former is a special case of the latter, one which assumes identity between all x 's involved in the partition.

The PARTITIVE use of this BSM in Irish and Italian is illustrated by examples (75–76). It should be regarded as most notable that either language entrusts this function to a single preposition and that the two prepositions in question, Ir. *de* and It. *di*, are both deemed as developing from a common Indo-European ancestor.⁵⁶ On account of the abstract, non-strictly spatial character of this sense extension, the prepositions expressing it shall be glossed by their English equivalent *of*, as a means of generalizing over OFF, FROM, and OUT OF.

(75) Ir. *de*

- a.** *a lán de na cláir ar an raidió*
 POSS.3SG full:N **of** DET **programmes** on DET
 radio
 ‘many of the radio programmes’
- b.** *culaith a chosain a trí oiread airgid le ceann ar bith díobh sin*
 suit REL cost.PAST PTC three time money.GEN
 with head on world **of.OBJ:3PL** **those**
 ‘a suit that cost three times as much as any one of those’
- c.** *an duine ba ghlóraí den bhfoireann*
 DET person PAST-most vociferous **of.DET** **staff**
 ‘the most vociferous person of the staff’

⁵⁶ It. *di* < Lat. *dē*, Ir. *de* < OIr. *dī*, both from IE. **dē*. Cf. Watkins (2000: s.v. *de-*); Cortelazzo and Zolli (1980: s.v. *di*); Pokorny (1994: s.v. *dē*).

- d.** *scata meidhreach ina raibh an fear céile damanta*
 group merry in.REL be.PAST DET husband damned
sin agus roinnt dá gcairde
 that and some of.POSS:3PL friends
 ‘a merry group among whom was (her) damned husband and some of their friends’
- e.** *cuid de rud*
 part of thing
 ‘part of thing’
- f.** *cuid den airgead*
 part from.DET money
 ‘some of the money’
- g.** *níl de locht air ach sin*
 be.NEG of fault on.OBJ:3SG.MSC but that
 ‘that’s the only fault with it’ (lit. ‘there is not a part of fault on it, except for that’)
- (a, b: Ní Dhuibhne 2000: pp.2, 3; c–d: Ó Cíosóig 1997: pp.9, 5; e, g: Mac Mathúna and Ó Corráin 2003: s.v. *de*; f: Mac Congáil 2004: p.70)

Examples (75.a–d) illustrate cases of singulative PARTITIVE (whether *lm* is a plural noun like *cairde* ‘friends’, or a singular, collective one like *foireann* ‘staff’, a group of distinct individuals is meant), while (e–g) are examples of mass PARTITIVE. (g) is particularly interesting in that a conceptual partition rather than a physical one is profiled: a fault is characterized as an element *f* of a set *F* which is comprised of every sort of faults ($F = \{f \mid f \text{ is a fault}\}$), therefore something which is faulty is said to have one of all possible faults on it.

(76) It. *di*

- a.** *Era una delle tante città dove*
 be.IMPF.3SG one of.DET so many cities where
non sono mai arrivato
 NEG AUX.1SG never arrive.APSTPTC
 ‘I used to consider it but one of the several cities I have never been to’
- b.** *già ero uno di loro*
 already be.IMPF.1SG one of OBJ:3PL
 ‘I had become one of them already’

- c. *Di tutti i cambiamenti di lingua che deve*
of all DET changes of language REL must.3SG
affrontare il viaggiatore in terre lontane,
face.INF DET traveller in lands far
nessuno uguaglia quello che lo attende
none equal.3SG that REL OBJ:3SG.MSC await.3SG
nella città di Ipazia
in.DET city of Ipazia
‘Although many times will the language change on the traveller’s route through far away lands, no linguistic change will equal that awaiting for him in the city of Ipazia’
- d. *molto di quel che ci vuole*
much of that REL there want.3SG
‘much of what is needed’
- e. *qualcosa di inconfondibile, di raro, magari*
something of unmistakable of rare perchance
di magnifico
of magnificent
‘something outstanding, rare, perchance magnificent’
(Calvino 1972: XI, XII, VI, VII, VII)

(76) has two examples of concrete, physical partition (a and b) and one (c) where a conventional metaphor (EVENTS AND ACTIONS ARE OBJECTS, cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980: pp.30ff.) allows for a series of interrelated events (the traveller coming across a different language each time s/he crosses the territory of a different community of people) to be considered as a group of things out of which the most remarkable one is singled out. (d) and (e) parallel the Irish example of (75.g): all that is needed (d) constitutes a set or category *W* from where a remarkable quantity (*molto*) is singled out and referred to; likewise, in (e), all that is outstanding, rare or magnificent forms a set from where something is singled out and brought to attention.

5.1.4.3 BELONGING IN/TO and TOKEN OF TYPE

The BELONGING IN sense extension has already been hinted to in the previous section, where it was defined as referring to the relation existing between a tr and the complex lm it is part of, and a general case including the more specific PARTITIVE. Examples from the Irish and Italian corpora are provided in (77) and (78) respectively. Given the close link between this sense and the PARTITIVE one, it will not perhaps strike us as a surprise that, once again, both in Irish and Italian the task of expressing

this sense is peculiar to the same two prepositions *de* and *di* respectively. As to the English glossing, the same considerations apply here as formulated in 5.1.4.2 above.

- (77) Ir.
- a.** *ar an taobh eile den seomra*
on DET other side of.DET room
‘on the other side of the room’
- b.** *i gcúinne den bhfoyer*
in corner of.DET foyer
‘in a corner of the foyer’
- c.** *ag an am sin den lá*
at DET time that of.DET day
‘at that time of the day’
- d.** *ag an am sin den bhliain*
at DET time that of.THE year
‘at that time of the year’
- e.** *taobh istigh d’ uair an chloig*
side inside of hour the clock.GEN
‘within an hour’
- f.** *Leasbhainisteoir éigin ar cheann de na rannóga*
vice-manager some on head of DET sectors
ba mhó sa chomhlacht idirnáisiúnta s’
PAST-biggest in.DET company international this
againne
at.OBJ:1PL-EMPH
‘Some vice-manager in charge of the biggest sectors of our corporation’
- g.** *cuidín beag bideach d’ eagraíocht an-mhór idirnáisiúnta*
part.DIM small tiny of organization very-big international
be [sic!]⁵⁷ ea é
COP.PAST 3SG.NT SUBJ:3SG.MSC
‘it was a very very small part of a huge international organization’
- (a–b, e–g: Ó Cíosóig 1997: pp.9, 5, 10, 8, 7; c–d: Ní Dhuibhne 2004: p.3)

- (78) It.
- a.** *lodare la carne del fagiano*
praise.INF DET flesh of.DET pheasant
‘praising the pheasant meat’
- b.** *legno di ciliegio* **c.** *foglie di tabacco*
wood of cherry tree leaves of tobacco
‘cherry-tree wood’ ‘tobacco leaves’

⁵⁷ A typo for *ba* (Eoin Mac Cárthaigh, p.c.).

- d.** *una capocchia di spillo*
 one head of pin
 ‘a pinhead’
- e.** *nei padiglioni dell’ antico lazaretto*
 in.DET pavilions of.DET ancient lazaretto
 ‘in the pavilions of the ancient lazaretto’
- f.** *Il cammelliere che vede spuntare all’ orizzonte*
 DET camel driver REL see.3SG show up.INF at.DET horizon
dell’ altipiano i pinnacoli dei grattacieli
 of.DET plateau DET pinnacles of.DET skyscrapers
 ‘The camel driver, who sees the skyscrapers’ pinnacles show up beyond the skyline of the plateau’
- g.** *fare il bagno nella vasca d’ un giardino*
 do.INF the bath in.the pool of one garden
 ‘bathing in a garden pool’
- h.** *In ogni città dell’ impero*
 in each city of.DET empire
 ‘In every city of the empire’
- i.** *gli orologi fermi della sua bottega*
 DET clocks still of.DET POSS.3SG shop
 ‘all the stopped clocks of his shop’
- j.** *I gatti di Smeraldina*
 DET cats of Smeraldina
 ‘The cats of Smeraldina’
- k.** *Despina, città di confine tra due deserti*
 Despina city of border between two deserts
 ‘Despina, a border city between two deserts’
- l.** *La città ti appare come un tutto ... di cui tu fai parte*
 DET city OBL.2SG appear.3SGas one whole of REL.OBL
 SUBJ.2SG make.2SG part
 ‘The city appears to your eyes as a whole you are a part of’
- m.** *altre città dei loro tempi*
 other cities of.DET POSS:3PL times
 ‘other cities of their times’
- n.** *Ogni abitante di Eudossia confronta all’ ordine immobile del tappeto una sua immagine della città*
 each inhabitant of Eudossia compare.3SG to.DET order motionless of.DET carpet one POSS.3SG image of.DET
 city
 ‘every single inhabitant of Eudossia compares their own image of the city to the frozen order of the carpet’

- o. *Convinti* *che* *ogni* *innovazione* *nella* *città*
 sure.PL COMPL every innovation in.DET city
influisca *sul* *disegno* *del* *cielo*, ...
 have bearing.SUBJN.3SG on.DET conformation of.DET sky
 ‘Sure as they are that all innovation in the city has a bearing on the conformation of the sky, they ...’
- p. *la* *vera* *essenza* *della* *città*
 DET real essence of.DET city
 ‘the city’s quintessential quality’
- (Calvino 1972: I, I, II, XVI, XVII, II, I, V, XIV, X, II, I, VII, XIII, XVII, I)

The Italian examples in particular provide a number of different shades that this concept can come in. To begin with the most concrete examples of PART-WHOLE relationships, Ir. (77.a–b) and It. (78.a–i) all introduce *lm*’s which refer to more or less complex systems, i.e., orderly conjoined elements, of which the respective *tr*’s are material and (more or less) discernible parts. In (77.a), for instance, a room is a system which is schematically comprised of such parts as bottom, top, corners and sides, one of which is singled out; (77.b) has a special case of room – a foyer – which likewise has different parts, one of which, a corner, is referred to. Animals and plants (78.a–c) are living organisms which are highly structured and have different parts serving different functions and being clearly recognizable: animals in particular have flesh as one of these parts (a), while plants (b, c) have wood and leaves. Artifacts have different parts too: pins have heads (d), a statement based on a metaphorical projection of parts of human body onto parts of objects (vertical orientation determining the mapping); buildings have wings and pavilions (e: hospital = the building hosting it), and pinnacles (f), which are clearly discernible parts of structures. (78.f) also refers to the ‘skyline of the plateau’ (*orizzonte dell’altipiano*), which is a more abstract kind of PART-WHOLE relation, a skyline being an ideal boundary (where the land *appears* to end and the sky *appears* to begin), and a boundary being a part of any physically circumscribed region. The pool of (g) is something – among other items – that the garden in question contains, and that makes up the garden setting. The empire in (h) is a rather complicate construction which contains – among other things such as a physical territory with its natural features, inhabitants, infrastructures and so on – a number of cities which are part of the empire administrative division subdivision. Finally, the clocks in (i) are an essential part of the business of a clockmaker and are therefore found in his/her workshop along with other equally

essential items like his/her tools etc. (j) describes the cats as the inhabitants of the city they live in, inhabitants being a fundamental component of what makes a city, together with its territory, buildings, administration and so on; (k) has the city of Despina as located somewhere along the borderline between two geographic areas, and being somehow part of that borderline.

(77.c–d) are motivated by a metaphorical mapping TIME IS A CONTAINER (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980: pp.58f.); its content are time spans which, although being part of a continuum, are also pretty much segmentable by virtue of the functions that society typically assigns them (for instance, there is in our society a well-established division of the week into weekdays – meant for working – and weekend – meant for leisure). Likewise, days and years can be subdivided according to natural criteria (morning, afternoon, night, etc.; summer, winter, etc.) or functional ones (work hours, lunchtime, etc.; school terms, holidays, etc.) – so that *an am sin den lá/bhliain* ‘that time **of the day/year**’ picks out a certain time span that can be either naturally or functionally discernible from others. (e) too is based on the same metaphor, which allows an hour, insomuch as it is a container, to be viewed as having sides; people, as well as events (EVENTS ARE OBJECTS: cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980: p.30), are located in the current time span (for events, in the time span when they happen) – therefore, for some event to occur in the current hour is for it to be located where its witnesses are located, that is, within the boundaries (sides) of the current hour. TIME AS A CONTAINER also motivates (78.m), where the possessive *loro* ‘their’ refers back to some people and the whole PP *dei loro tempi* to the period that used to contain both them and the cities in question.

(77.f)’s motivation parallels that of (78.d) discussed above. Beside the metaphorical mapping of parts of object onto parts of human body, another conventional metaphor is at work here, namely Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980: p.18) CONTROL IS UP, which allows for verticality to direct the mapping between parts of a human organization onto parts of human body (i.e., the upper part = the head of a human organization is where control is exerted).

(78.n) has two occurrences of the preposition *di*, the former employed in the same sense as in (j), i.e., to express the PART-WHOLE relationship existing between inhabitants and city, and the latter a rather abstract one between a physical artifact (a carpet) and some abstract representation (a city plan): the patterns on the carpet supposedly constitute a schematic representation of the city routes; such

representation is referred to by the NP *ordine immobile* ‘a motionless order’, which describes both the representation’s being immutable over time and its being highly orderly and schematic (it is to such frozen representation that the actual city, as experienced by every single inhabitant, is compared to). The patterns are but motives realized by means of the same interwoven threads as those constituting the body of the carpet, thus being in all respects *part* of the carpet. Somewhat similar is the usage of this preposition in (o), where *il disegno del cielo* ‘the conformation of the sky’ seems to refer to the schematic maps of the firmament which represent the constellations, so that what is being described is actually some part of the very many and very different physical phenomena that go collectively under the name of ‘sky’. On a higher level of abstraction, (p) has some intangible and subjectively variable perception of a city described as its essence (the essence of any given x being what makes of x an x),⁵⁸ i.e., that distinctive part of whole by which it is made distinguishable from other wholes.

BELONGING TO (OR POSSESSIVE) might be described as a sense extension of BELONGING IN brought about by means of *ellipsis*. To clarify the point, we should consider two sets of examples:

- (79) a. This estate belongs **in** my possession.
 b. That money belongs **in** our budget.
 c. That key actually belongs **in** my set of keys.
- (80) a. This estate belongs **to** me.
 b. That money belongs **to** us.
 c. That key actually belongs **to** me.

Sentences marked by the same letter can be considered *roughly* equivalent across (79) and (80).⁵⁹ The point is that for x to belong *to* y is for x to belong *in* a set X which is

⁵⁸ Cf. the OED’s definition of *essence* as the “Objective character, intrinsic nature as a ‘thing-in-itself’; ‘that internal constitution, on which all the sensible properties depend’” (http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50078144?query_type=word&queryword=essence&first=1&max_to_show=10&sort_type=alpha&result_place=2&search_id=cyqv-yetSXg-5649&hilite=50078144).

⁵⁹ It is a fact that whereas (79.a, c) and (80.a, c) mean the same thing (possession), (79.b) and (80.b) do not (the former does not refer to *us* as the owners of the money, but simply as people who have a sum at their disposal for specific purposes).

comprised of all things that are at *y*'s disposal, which can be written as the formula in (81):

(81) BELONG TO (*x, y*) = BELONG IN (*x, X*), where $X = \{x \mid \text{AVAILABLE TO } (x, y)\}$

As is illustrated in (82), it is common in Italian to employ the preposition *di* in this sense. Irish would rather employ a NP in the genitive case: cf. Mac Congáil 2004: p.31), and the only example of *de* used in this sense is (83):

- (82) It. *di*
- a. *distingue quali sono i palazzi dei principi,*
discern.3SG which be.3PL DET palaces of.DET princes
quali i templi dei grandi sacerdoti
which DET temples of.DET great priests
'he can tell which buildings are the potentates' dwellings, which are the high priests's temples'
- b. *tanto il lazaretto dei lebbrosi quanto*
so much DET lazaretto of.DET lepers as much
le terme delle odalische
DET thermal baths of.DET odalisques
'both the lepers' lazaretto and the odalisques' thermal baths'
- c. *gli occhi inebetiti d' un adolescente*
DET eyes dazed of one.MSC adolescent
'the dazed eyes of a boy'
- d. *agli occhi della mente*
to.DET eyes of.DET mind
'to the eyes of the mind'
- e. *fino al cuore della città*
up to.DET heart of.the city
'up to the very heart of the city'
- f. *la stessa identica piazza con una gallina al posto*
DET same identical square with one hen at.DET place
della stazione
of.DET station
'the very same square with a hen instead of the station'
- g. *i nomi degli abitanti*
DET names of.DET inhabitants
'the inhabitants' names'
- h. *l' autorità di questa congregazione*
DET influence of this congregation
'the influence of this congregation'

- i. *la vita degli abitanti*
 DET life of.DET inhabitants
 ‘the lives of the inhabitants’
- j. *Del carattere degli abitanti*
 of.DET character of.DET inhabitants
 ‘of the inhabitants’ character’
- k. *una carcassa di giovenca*
 one carcass of heifer
 ‘the carcass of a heifer’

(Calvino 1972: V, V, VI, XI, XVI, III, III, XIV, VIII, XVII, XIV)

- (83) Ir. *de*
fear darb ainm Séan
 man of.REL.COP name John
 ‘a man whose name is John’
 (Mac Congáil 2004: p.69)

(82.a) illustrates a typical example of the BELONGING TO sense extension as has been explained above, for saying that a building belongs to someone is tantamount to saying that it belongs in their possession, i.e., in the set of all that they own. It might be argued that – though being this the case for the ‘potentates’ buildings’ – the situation is somewhat different for the ‘high priests’ temples’: temples, as it happens, do not normally belong to priests; yet the pluralized expression is apt to be interpreted as referring to a caste, a kind of Church, which controls religious issues and actually *owns* the sanctuaries, in which case the BELONGING TO interpretation is a legitimate one. This is not the case of (b), where a strict BELONGING TO interpretation would be unjustified as it would be quite unusual for a hospital to be run or owned by the patients who are treated there. If our analysis were correct, i.e., if (b) is nonetheless to be considered an instance of belonging to, then a loose reading would be one which associates a lazaretto to the conceptual sphere of the lepers, especially in the light of a (cliché) scenario of a lazaretto as a place they used to be relegated to – by ‘conceptual sphere’ of *x* we roughly mean ‘what people thinks about when they think of *x*. To give an idea of how deeply this sort of conceptual association is linked to the idea of BELONGING TO, suffice it to say that *possessive* adjectives and pronouns are not alien to expressing it: such common phrases as *my college*, *my school*, *my street*, and so on, do not of course signify possession/ownership – what they do is picking up *these* given college, school, and

street out of all possible colleges, schools, streets, and associating them with me on the basis of the fact that I attended that school, not another, and I live in that street, not another. (So to say, if any street is to belong to me, that is most likely going to be the street I live in rather than any other.) As to the odalisques and their thermal baths (same example), either the girls are the members of a guild that actually *owns* and runs the baths, or these are simply the place they are found in/associate with (in which case, the same considerations apply as for the lepers' lazaretto).

(82.c) has an instance of inalienable possession – that is, with reference to the above-mentioned set *X* of all things which are at someone's disposal, one's body parts are for sure among the things most readily and securely available to them, and the most steadily so over time. The same applies to (82.d), which is consistent with the KNOWING IS SEEING metaphor (cf. Lakoff and Turner 1989: p.48; Sweetser 1990: p.39): since the mind (a complex, abstract notion itself, delving any further into which would be far beyond the scope of this study) is associated with such faculties as learning and understanding, which in turn are associated with the faculty of vision (cf. conventional expressions like *I can't see your point*, *He had clearly foreseen their real intentions*), a description of the mind has having eyes of its own appears to be perfectly well-motivated – and again, eyes being body parts, the same BELONGING TO relation can be profiled as seen in (c).

What has been said about the BELONGING TO relation between people and their body parts might apply to the motivation of (e) alike, given the already mentioned metaphorical mapping PARTS OF OBJECTS ARE PART OF THE HUMAN BODY (77.f, 78.d) – a central part of the city is mapped onto a central part of the body. The evidence suggests, at any rate, that It. *cuore* (as well as Eng. *heart*) have become polysemous, as their dictionary entries would suggest, so that the two meanings (1) organ to pump blood and (2) “central or innermost part of something”⁶⁰ might be regarded as quite distinct from each other – in which case, the relation between heart₂ and city would better be described as a BELONGING IN one.

(82.f) refers to the context of a postcard representing a view of some city as it used to be some time before. In the light of this premise, the expression *al posto di x* ‘instead of *x*’ is to be read quite materially as ‘in the place where *x* used to be’. The place where *x* is located is characterized by means of the preposition *di* as an attribute

⁶⁰ Zingarelli (1949: s.v. *cuore*); *NODE* (s.v. *heart*).

of *x*, something belonging in the sphere of all the things associated to it, which authorizes a loose BELONGING TO reading along the lines of (82.b). Close tr-lm association seems to provide a justification for the BELONGING TO reading of (g–k) as well: people’s names, influence, lives, and characters, all are things that one closely associates with the people they are said to *belong to*; similarly, a dead animal’s corpse falls within the same conceptual sphere inasmuch as it is an essential part of what the alive animal used to be. Again, it is noteworthy to observe that in each of these cases a possessive adjective is perfectly acceptable, both in Italian and English (e.g., *al suo posto* ‘in its place’, *i loro nomi* ‘their names’, *la loro autorità* ‘their influence’, etc.).

As to the Irish example in (83), not much can be said on the basis of just one example. However, although we have seen that the name-person association can be expressed as a BELONGING TO relationship, more data should be collected to establish the extent to which Ir. *de* can be employed to such purpose. Anyway, could it be firmly established that Irish treats the two senses BELONGING IN and BELONGING TO differently, that would give further support to the intuition that they should be kept separate.

TOKEN OF TYPE is what we may term the relation existing between a range of *x*’s (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) and an archetypal *X* which is not a concrete object but only exists inasmuch as $x_1 \dots x_n$ exist. A very simple example of this relation is provided by the expression *a copy of the Irish Times*: the copy (tr) is a concrete object, or token; the Irish Times (lm) is the name given to the newspaper and – in the expression we are considering – stands for ‘a given day’s issue of the paper’. The lm of this expression is not a material, tangible object, in that no actual printout of the paper is to be found of which all the other printouts are copies (replicas); lm is an abstraction (*X*) that is only materialized in the printouts ($x_1 \dots x_n$).

A few examples from Irish and Italian are provided in (84–85). Again, only Ir. *de* and It. *di* are employed in expressing this sense.

- (84) Ir. *de*
- | | | | | |
|-----------|-------------------------------|-------------|-----------|------------------------|
| a. | <i>a</i> | <i>cóip</i> | <i>de</i> | <i>The Irish Times</i> |
| | POSS:3SG.FEM | copy | of | The Irish Times |
| | ‘her copy of the Irish Times’ | | | |

- b.** *bhí cóip faighte d' iris inmheánach an*
 be.PAST copy find.PPSTPTC of magazine internal DET
chomhlachta
 company.GEN
 'a copy of the company newsletter was found'
- c.** *a leithéid d' amadán*
 POSS:3SG like of fool
 'such a fool' (lit. 'of a fool, his like')
- d.** *seafóid den chuid is measa*
 nonsense of.DET share PRES-worst
 'nonsense of the worst kind'
- e.** *míoneolas de shaghas eile*
 detailed knowledge of sort other
 'detailed information of a different kind'

(a, e: Ní Dhuibhne 2000: pp.7, 6; b, d: Ó Cíosóig 1997: pp.10, 8; c: Mac Congáil 2004: p.69)

(85) It. *di*

- a.** *una copia di Repubblica*
 one copy of Repubblica
 'a copy of Repubblica'
- b.** *altre varietà di calcedonio*
 other varieties of chalcedony
 'other varieties of chalcedony'

(a: http://www.euromeeting.it/repubblica.scuola/file_html/iniziativa/iniziativa1.html [accessed September 2005; b: Calvino 1972: I)

(84.a–b) and (85.a) fall within the scope of the preliminary description of this sense, and need therefore no further discussion. (84.c) has a near synonym of 'copy' as its tr, i.e., *leithéid* ('like, counterpart, equal'; cf. Ó Dónaill 1977: s.v.). *A leithéid*, with the 3rd-person possessive adjective,⁶¹ constitutes a formulaic expression which translates 'such'. 'The like of a fool' (= a fool) and 'the copy of the newspaper' can be easily compared on the basis of the similar character of their lm's. In 'the like of a fool', in fact, the prepositional object *a fool* refers to an ideal, or archetypical fool, or the concept of a fool, rather than any specific person. (85.b) is another fine example of TOKEN-TYPE, one that resembles such classic distinctions as allophone/phoneme in linguistics. If chalcedony comes in varieties, it might be the case that one of them is

⁶¹ The gender of the 3rd person cannot be decided in that the determined nominal, *leithéid*, begins with a consonant /l/ that lends itself to no initial mutation (initial mutation being the criterion whereby the gender of the possessive is determined). Cf. Mac Congáil (2004: pp.14f., 99).

the most commonly found, but no one variety is *more* chalcidony than the others (just like different realizations of the same phoneme can differ as to which is the most common, although none of them may be discarded from an exhaustive description of a language-specific repertory). Therefore, they can all be considered tokens of a classificatory type that include them all.

If BELONGING IN differs from PARTITIVE in that no equivalence is assumed to exist between the components of the superordinate system, TOKEN OF TYPE is similar to PARTITIVE precisely in assuming equivalence between the *x*'s (or even, as in the case of copies of a newspaper, identity); yet it differs from PARTITIVE in that such pool is referred to by means of an *abstract type, that does not exist independent of its concrete instances*, each of which *identifies with it*.⁶²

5.1.4.4 MATTER

Closely related to SEPARATION and cross-linguistically widespread is the sense extension of the BSM currently analyzed to express MATTER. The English translation of the Irish and Italian examples will itself provide but a hint of the cross-linguistical aptitude of this BSM for this particular sense extension. A discussion of this topic is to be found in Lakoff and Johnson (1980: pp.72–6), where the metaphor THE OBJECT COMES OUT OF THE SUBSTANCE is taken into account together with its mirror-image counterpart THE SUBSTANCE GOES INTO THE OBJECT (which the authors illustrate with *I made a statue out of clay* and *I made the clay you gave me into a statue*, respectively):

- (vii) We conceptualize changes of this kind – from one state into another, having a new form and function – in terms of the metaphor THE OBJECT COMES OUT OF THE SUBSTANCE. This is why the expression *out of* is used in the above examples: ... the statue is viewed as emerging out of the clay. ... the substance clay is viewed as the CONTAINER (via the SUBSTANCE IS A CONTAINER metaphor) from which the object – namely, the statue – emerges. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: p.73)

A few examples of the MATTER sense are provided below. As to the English glosses, two notations have been employed, namely *out of* and simple *of*, according to

⁶² The latest clause is remarkable, in that it is true that a school class – for instance – does not exist independent of its pupils either, but whereas a variety of chalcidony *is* chalcidony (cf. example 85.b), a pupil *is not* a school class.

common English usage.⁶³ Irish (86–87) expresses it by means of two exponent prepositions of our BSM (*de* and *as*), whereas Italian (88) only employs the preposition *di*.

(86) Ir. *de*

- a.** *an* *t-ábhar dá* *ndéantar* *é*
 DET material **out of**.REL made.AUT it
 ‘the material from which it is made’
- b.** *tá* *sé* *déanta* *de* *phrás*
 be SUBJ:3SG.MSC make.PPSTPTC **out of** **brass**
 ‘it is made of brass’
- c.** *rinneadh* *gual* *dem* *chroí*
 make.PAST.AUT charcoal **out of**.POSS:1SG **heart**
 ‘my heart was seared’ (lit. ‘charcoal was made out of my heart’)
- d.** *sraith de* *chomhlachtaí* *innealtóireachta*
 swath **of** **companies** **engineering**.GEN
 ‘a series of engineering companies’

(a: Mac Congáil 2004: p.69; b: *NIG*: p.135; c–d: Ó Cíosóig 1997: pp.8, 7)

(87) Ir. *as*

- a.** *Rud* *a* *dhéanamh* *as* *cré*
 thing to make.VN **out of** **clay**
 ‘To make something from clay’
- b.** *abair* *as* *Gaeilge é*
 say.IMP.2SG **out of** **Irish** OBJ:3SG.MSC
 ‘say it in Irish’
- c.** *abair* *as* *Béarla é*
 say.IMP.2SG **out of** **English** OBJ:3SG.MSC
 ‘say it in English’
- d.** *bhain sé* *úsáid as* *dathanna* *éagsúla i*
 took SUBJ:3SG.MSC use **out of** **colours** **various** **in**
ngach ceann acu
 each head at.OBJ:3PL
 ‘he made use of several colours in each one of them [= paintings]’

⁶³ That is, *out of* when Im is an adjunct and is not part of the same NP as tr (e.g., [*to make [a ring]*]_{tr-NP} [*out of solid gold*]_{Im-PP}]_{VP}), simple *of* when tr and Im are part of the same NP (e.g., [*to lose [[a ring]*]_{tr-NP} [*of solid gold*]_{Im-PP}]_{(tr+Im)-NP}]_{VP}).

- e. *Boladh nua ar bhain Saoirse triail as*
 scent new REL take.PAST Saoirse test out of.OBJ:3SG.MSC
 ‘A new scent that Saoirse was trying on’ (lit. ‘out of which Saoirse was taking a trial’)
 (a: Ó Dónaill 1977: s.v. *as*; b: *NIG*: p.136; c: Mac Congáil 2004: p.67; d–e: Ní Dhuibhne
 2000: pp.4, 6)

Examples (86.a–b) are quite clear in the light of the premises and need not be further discussed; (c) is interesting in that, although it would make perfect sense in its literal meaning (a heart can *actually* be burned and reduced to charcoal), that would yield, of course, a counterfactual situation (the speaker would be dead; notice that the same considerations apply to the English translation). A body of cultural clichés, or commonplace knowledge – where a long-established link between love-related feelings and the heart is found – assists the hearer/reader of this expression in their quest for a suitable interpretation; such a body would also comprise conventional metaphors such as PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTRESS IS PHYSICAL PAIN (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980: pp.84–6). Therefore, psychological distress associated with love would most naturally be likened to physical pain felt in one’s heart. Finally, a pain in the heart can be described by referring to some kind of similar, physically experienced pain (e.g., but not necessarily, that inflicted by some incandescent object).

The case of (86.d) is easily motivated by reference to the physical meaning of Ir. *sraith* (a spread of something, such as land, corn, etc.; see Ó Dónaill 1977: s.v): in the expression *sraith de* + *lm*, *lm* refers to what constitutes the spread in question, although such spread is not a physical extension of *lm*, but some abstract conceptualization of a series of functionally identical companies, linked to each other, as forming a compact group.

The preposition *as* is also used to express the MATTER relation, as shown in (87.a); as we have seen in 5.1.4.1 (example 69), this preposition appear to almost exclusively associate with the OUT OF subsense of the BSM. (87.b–c) refer to linguistic medium, but in the light of (87.a) it is seems that what they really express is still MATTER, according to a metaphor MESSAGES ARE ARTIFACTS which is the necessary foundation for the CONDUIT METAPHOR discussed above (5.1.2.1). Since messages are objects, and the same message can assume different realizations if expressed in different languages, then languages can be thought of as the different materials that the same object can be made of, so that it might retain the same function, but look, and feel, different. Therefore, LANGUAGE IS THE MATTER MESSAGES ARE

MADE OF is a perfectly well-motivated rider of the CONDUIT METAPHOR. As such, it will not surprise us if other languages had expressions that can be interpreted as arising from such rider: Eng. *A speech in Italian, Say it in French*, and so on, can be viewed as metaphorical extensions of the MATTER sense of the BSM IN (cf. 5.1.2.1, examples 14–15 and discussion).

As to (d–e), they seem to be consistent with what has been said already, and therefore to parallel (a–c), except for what appears to be their more abstract character, which seems to be due to shift from the previous template *to make tr out of lm* to a new one *to take tr out of lm*, but more precisely to the substitution of an abstract tr for a concrete one: in the second template, *úsáid* ‘use’ and *triall* ‘test’ do not refer to concrete objects,⁶⁴ but *lm* still refers to the concrete materials employed (in d reference is made to paintings, therefore *dathanna* ‘colours’ refer to the dyes, while in e *lm* is a perfume). The substitution of an abstract tr for a concrete one might be characterized as one of semantic argument reduction, in that it allows to fill the MATTER role with a specific referent and leave the ARTIFACT role unspecified – in other words, to say what material is being utilized but *not* what it is being made in.

(88) will now provide some examples of the MATTER sense extension in Italian.

(88) It. *di*

- a. *Al centro di Fedora, metropoli di pietra grigia,*
at.DET centre of Fedora metropolis of stone grey
sta un palazzo di metallo con una sfera di
stand.3SG a building of metal with one sphere of
vetro in ogni stanza
glass in every room
‘In the very centre of Fedora, a grey-stone metropolis, is a building made of metal,
with a crystal sphere in each room’
- b. *i forzati ... issavano rocce di basalto*
DET convicts hoist.IMP.F.3PL rocks of basalt
‘the convicts ... were hoisting basalt rocks’
- c. *nuvola di fumo*
cloud of smoke
‘a haze of smoke’
- d. *qui [la carne] si cucina sulla fiamma di legno*

⁶⁴ Italian has a comparable expression with the tr *uso* ‘use’ inserted in the previous template (*fare uso di qualcosa* ‘to utilize something’: cf. <http://www.demauroparavia.it/125332> [accessed September 2005]).

- here DET meat PASSV cook.3SG on.DET flame of wood
di ciliegio
of cherry tree
‘the meat is here cooked on the flames of cherry-tree wood’
- e. *una sella ricamata di frange luccicanti*
one saddle embroidered of fringes glittering
‘a saddle embroidered with glittering fringe’
- f. *i capelli verdi di alghe*
the hair green of seaweed
‘hair green with seaweed’
- g. *un reticolo di canali e un reticolo di strade*
a grid of canals and one grid of streets
‘a grid of canals and one of streets are superimposed’
- h. *un giardino di magnolie*
one garden of magnolias
‘the magnolias of a garden were being reflected by the waters of a blue lagoon’
- i. *una confraternita di incappucciati*
one confraternity of hooded
‘a confraternity of hooded brethren’
- j. *Ogni cambiamento implica una catena d’altri*
each change entail.3SG one chain of other
cambiamenti
changes
‘Every single change brings about a chain of new changes’
- k. *l’insieme della città e dei mondi*
DET set of.DET city and of.DET worlds
‘the city and the worlds taken as a whole’
- (Calvino 1972: IV, VI, VI, I, II, VI, X, VI, XIV, XVII, XVII)

The remarkable amount of examples provided by the Italian corpus can be subdivided in four groups: A (87.a–d), B (e–f), C (g–i), and D (j–k).

Group A contains examples of concrete, basic MATTER relations, e.g., what a city is made of (stone), what a building is made of (metal), what some rocks are made of (basalt), what a cloud is made of (smoke), and so on. It is not always the case that the making is initiated by a volitional AGENT, as in the case of prototypical causation brought forward by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and discussed above: for instance, *rocce di basalto* ‘basalt rocks’ can be either standard-sized rocks carved out of an indefinite mass by the miners, or the very indefinite masses as they are found and hoisted up; certainly, a haze of smoke is not smoke made into a cloud by someone, but – as Calvino’s context implies – smoke coming from someone’s pipe and forming

a thick cloud around him. The relation profiled in (f) is not volitional either: here, a flame is described which the *di*-PP connects to the wood – what we want to establish is the nature of such connection. Encyclopaedic knowledge supplies the information that fire (flames) is how combustion of matter manifests itself, given certain conditions. Therefore, the specification contained in the PP is meant to distinguish different kind of flames as to the MATTER they originate from (and consume up).

Group B contains ambiguous cases. (87.e) is an instance of the above-discussed (cf. example 15 in 5.1.2.1) ‘MATTER AND MEANS’ relation, that is, a relation where *lm* can be said to act as *both* MATTER *and* MEANS (we introduced in 5.1.2.1 the example of a pencil, an instrument which is consumed as it is utilized): in this light we can regard a fringe as something which *is used* to decorate the saddle (MEANS) and *is* the ornament itself (MATTER). In (f), *capelli verdi di alghe* describes a head of hair which is covered in, or scattered with, seaweed, thus appearing to be green – the seaweed is therefore both the MATTER of which the hair is covered and the CAUSE why it is green.⁶⁵

In group C we have *tr*’s referring to highly-structured bodies which are made up of multiplex *lm*’s: such is the case of a grid, which is the name given to a particular conformation of intersecting sets of parallel lines and is substantiated, in the example (g), by canals and streets – that is, canals and streets are the substance or MATTER that the two grids are made of; the relation is a more abstract one than, say, that of *rocce di basalto* ‘basalt rocks’ (cf. b above), in that one might see two canals, or two streets, intersecting, and still fail to see the grid (it would take an aerial perspective or a map to recognize it), whereas it is just very difficult to see the basalt and not the rock.⁶⁶ The same considerations apply to (h), where the organized structure – inasmuch as it is planned by people – is the garden (in the specific case, one made up, chiefly or remarkably, by magnolia trees): again, one might as well come across, and see, any

⁶⁵ To make the point clearer, consider the following example:

| | | |
|---|-----------|--------------|
| <i>è morta</i> | <i>di</i> | <i>paura</i> |
| die.PERF.3SG-FEM | out of | fear |
| ‘she was scared to death’ (lit. ‘she died of fear’) | | |

(Source: <http://www1.emergency.it/mdgidp/storia.php?id=63> [accessed September 2005])

where the *di*-PP expresses CAUSE, but not MATTER.

⁶⁶ Again, it is an issue of perspective, in that it does not take an aerial sight to recognize the sea, but from a close enough perspective (imagine a close-up frame in a film) one might see just the water.

single constituent (or ‘item of MATTER’), yet fail to realize s/he is in a magnolia garden. In the light of (g–h), it should be clear in what sense a confraternity is made up of brethren (example i). In all of group-C examples, the tr’s are bodies designed/organized volitionally, by people.⁶⁷

Group D contains examples of more abstract relations. (87.j) is based on the EVENTS ARE OBJECTS metaphor already discussed apropos of (77.e). Given the EVENTS AS OBJECTS mapping, a series of events – each one caused by the preceding one and/or causing the following one – maps onto the concrete schema of a chain, *made up of* rings which are bound to one another in a linear succession. Likewise abstractly, (h) describes two (indeed rather distinct) entities as *making up* a set, on the basis of some considerations made clear in the context.⁶⁸

5.1.4.5 Time: ORIGIN

A rather elementary sense extension of the FROM sub-sense of this complex BSM is that of ORIGIN from a point in time (for short, ORIGIN IN TIME). This extension is based on the TIME IS A PATH metaphor (i.e., a space extent – this is a special case of the more general TIME IS A SUBSTANCE, cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980: p.66). TIME IS A PATH provides grounds for such common expressions as *from now on* (‘starting from this moment in time’), *from Monday to Friday*, *from his childhood to his coming of age*, and so on. Both Irish and Italian admit for exponent preposition of the sub-BSM FROM (namely, *ó* in Irish and *da* in Italian) to express this sense, as is illustrated in (89–90):

- (89) Ir. *ó*
- | | | | | |
|----|-----------------------------------|-------------|-----------|---------------|
| a. | <i>ó</i> | <i>thús</i> | <i>na</i> | <i>bliana</i> |
| | from | origin | the.GEN | year |
| | ‘since the beginning of the year’ | | | |

⁶⁷ Apropos of (87.i), notice that it might as well be the case the brethren currently belonging to a given confraternity are not the same people who once founded it.

⁶⁸ Which, for the sake of completeness, is reported as follows in my English translation: ‘Sure as they are that every innovation brought about in the city has a bearing on the shape of the sky, before taking any decision they examine risks and advantages that may affect themselves, as well as their city and the worlds taken as a whole.’

- b.** *idir a naoi agus a cúig, ón Luan go dtí an Satharn*
 between PTC nine and PTC five **from.DET Monday** up to DET
 Saturday
 ‘between nine and five, from Monday to Saturday’
- c.** *an t-am caite agam ó am dinnéir*
 DET time past.PPSTPTC at.OBJ:1SG **from time dinner.GEN**
 ‘the time I spent since dinner-time’
- d.** *Bhí sé tamall ón gcéad uair a leagas súil uirthi*
 be.PAST SUBJ:3SG.MSC while **from.DET first time** REL lay.PAST.1SG
 eye on.OBJ:3SG.FEM
 ‘It had been a while since the first time I laid eyes on her’

(a: Mac Mathúna and Ó Corráin 2003: s.v. *ó*; b: Ní Dhuibhne 2000: p.10; c–d: Ó Cíosóig 1997: pp.5, 6)

(90) It. *da*

- a.** *Da quel momento in poi il nome Pirra richiama alla mia mente questa vista*
from that moment in afterwards DET name Pirra
 bring back.3SG to.DET POSS:1SG mind this sight
 ‘From that moment on, the name Pirra has brought back to my mind this view’
- b.** *sono forse molto cambiate da allora*
 AUX.3PL perhaps much change.PSTPTC **from then**
 ‘perhaps they have changed a lot since then’
- c.** *già da tempo erano certi che l’armonico disegno del tappeto fosse di fattura divina*
 already **from/for time** be.IMPF.3PL sure COMPL DET harmonic
 pattern of.DET carpet be.SUBJN.3SG of make divine
 ‘They had long been sure that the harmonic pattern of the carpet was the work of some god’
- d.** *cose che gli abitanti stessi della città ripetono da sempre*
 things REL the inhabitants themselves of.DET city
 repeat.3PL **from/for always**
 ‘things that the inhabitants of the city themselves have always been saying’

(Calvino 1972: XI, VII, XIII, VII)

In (89) and (90.a–b), the prepositional object of the *ó*- or *da*-PPs refers to some moment considered as a point on an oriented spatial vector, starting from which some connection is made to some point further ahead in time (when this is not specified, it is generally assumed to coincide with the present time, i.e., the utterance

moment). In (89.d) this further point in time is to be identified with the ending point of a time span (*tamall* ‘a while’), which is at any rate an indefinite term for a period of time of some remarkable yet unknown length.

The situation is at any rate different for (90.c–d), where the gloss *from/for* is meant to show that ORIGIN IN TIME is defined not punctually but by means of duration Δ . In other words, given t_0 as the moment of the utterance, the PP “da Δ ” identifies starting point t_Δ as $t_\Delta = (t_0 - \Delta)$. Since the Δ s of examples (90.c–d) are indefinite (we shall see why shortly), example (91) may better serve the purpose of exemplifying this point:

(91) It.

- a. *Giuliana Sgrena da un mese nelle mani dei rapitori*
 Giuliana Sgrena from/for one month in.DET hands of.DET kidnappers
 ‘Giuliana Sgrena [has been] in her kidnappers’ hands for a month’
- b. *se ne occupa da oltre dieci anni*
 REFL OBL:3SG occupy.3SG from/for beyond ten years
 ‘he has been dealing with it for more than ten years’

(a: <http://www.rainews24.rai.it/Notizia.asp?NewsID=52801> [accessed September 2005]; b: <http://www.espressonline.it/eol/free/jsp/moda.jsp?m1s=null&m2s=moda&kind=moda&idCategory=4930&idContent=724152> [accessed September 2005])

(91.a–b) mean of course that the woman was kidnapped one month before the article was issued and that someone started dealing with something more than ten years ago (time of the article). On the other hand, the indefinite prepositional objects of (90.c–d) do not pick up a precise moment in time – yet, whereas (d) is quite clear in suggesting that something has been going on since a very long time, by virtue of the hyperbolic *da sempre* ‘from the beginning of times’, (c) requires that the idiomatic sense of *tempo* ‘a noticeably long time span’⁶⁹ be known to the listener/reader (it stands for a remarkably long period of time) for its interpretation to be accessible.

5.1.4.6 CAUSE/AGENT and PURPOSE

CAUSE is a rather productive sense extension of the FROM/OUT OF sub-BSMs, both in terms of examples available in the corpora and number of prepositions involved in both Irish and Italian, of which (92–96) are meant to provide an illustration:

⁶⁹ Cf. Zingarelli (1949: s.v. *tempo*) for *tempo* as “spazio di tempo di non breve durata”.

(92) Ir. *as*

- a.** *D'éiríos míshocair míchompordach as í a*
 rise.PAST.1SG uneasy uncomfortable out of OBJ:3SG.FEM to
bheith i ngar dom
 be.VN in proximity to.OBJ:1SG
 'I grew uneasy, uncomfortable, because she was near me' (lit. 'out of her being near me')
- b.** *d'íoc mé as an leabhar*
 pay.PAST SUBJ:1SG out of DET book
 'I paid for the book'

(a: Ó Cíosóig 1997: p.12; b: Mac Congáil 2004: p.67)

(93) Ir. *de*

- a.** *bréan den obair*
 tired from.DET work
 'tired of the work'
- b.** *tuirseach de bheith ag guairdeall*
 tired from be.VN at loitering
 'that I was tired of loitering about'
- c.** *fuair sé bás den ocras*
 get.PAST SUBJ:3SG.MSC death from.DET hunger
 'he starved to death' (lit. 'he died from hunger')

(a: Mac Congáil 2004: p.70; b: Ó Cíosóig 1997: p.5; c: *NIG*: p.135)

(94) Ir. *ó*

- a.** *na haimiseoirí a bhí leathmharbh ón seasamh*
 DET weak.PL REL be.PAST half-dead from.DET
 stand.VN
 'the miserable who were half-dead from standing'
- b.** *marbh ón obair*
 dead from work
 'exhausted with work'

(a: Ní Dhuibhne 2004: p.6; b: *NIG*: p.135)

(95) It. *di*

- a.** *un malato di febbri*
 one sick man from fever.PL
 'The sight of a man sick with fever'
- b.** *era impazzita d' amore*
 become mad.PLPF.3SG.FEM from love
 'love had driven her mad' (lit. 'she had become mad from love')

(Calvino 1972: XII, XII)

In (92.a), the *as*-PP introduces the factor which causes the speaker to grow uncomfortable: his uneasy feeling is depicted as *coming out of* the woman's presence. There is a metaphor which motivates this usage both in Irish and in English (cf. *Her good performance resulted from her sound preparation*) and runs along the lines of CAUSES ARE ORIGINS, EFFECTS ARE TRAJECTORS. This metaphor is a rather pervasive one, and is in fact responsible for such common expressions as *the origin of life* (= 'what caused life to appear'), *Where does his money come from?* (= 'what makes him so rich?'); its counterpart is CAUSES ARE ORIGINS, EFFECTS ARE GOALS (cf. *This behaviour will result in your expulsion* = 'will cause your expulsion'). Its implications are widespread and cross-linguistically tangible: we speak of *ways*, *procedures* and *methods* to achieve something (*procedure* < Lat. *prōcēdo* 'to go forth';⁷⁰ *method* < Gr. *méthodos* 'following after, pursuit' [Gr. *hodós* 'street']⁷¹), in accordance with the PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS metaphor discussed by Lakoff and Turner (1989: p.52) – purposes being something that we try to *bring to effect*.

In the light of the above considerations, we should be more prone to accept a conventionalization of this way of expressing CAUSE even when the conceptual links appear less clear, as in example (92.b), where the (purchase of the) book is what causes me to pay (one might, on the other hand, be inclined to read the English translation *for the book* as conveying a PURPOSIVE sense).

In (93) the objects of the PP refer to activities or states which induce (CAUSE) a state of weariness or even death. The same considerations apply to (94). As long as CAUSE is conceptualized as ORIGIN, it seems not to matter what preposition is utilized. (Perhaps a greater amount of data would lead to determining exactly what factors are implied in the choice of which preposition.)

The Italian examples of (95) are similar to the Irish ones: fever is what makes the man in (a) sick, i.e., the CAUSE of his illness; likewise, (unrequited) love is the CAUSE of the girl's insanity in (b).

⁷⁰ Source: Charlton T. Lewis, Charles Short, *A Latin Dictionary*, available on line at <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0059%3Aentry%3D%2338436> (accessed September 2005).

⁷¹ Source: Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, available on line at <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0057%3Aentry%3D%2365641> (accessed September 2005).

The examples with *da* in (96) lead the way to the closely related AGENT sense which is illustrated in (97). The issue of the conceptual motivation linking AGENT and CAUSE has already been brought up and considered in 5.1.3.10 (see examples 61–63 and related discussion).

(96) It. *da* (CAUSE)

a. *il mare non è in vista della città,*
 DET sea NEG be.3SG in sight of.DET city
nascosto da una duna della costa
 hidden from one dune of.the coast
 ‘the sea – hidden by a dune of the coast – is not visible from the city’

b. *sfuggono al tuo occhio distratto dall’*
 escape.3PL to.DET POSS:2SG eye distract.PPSTPTC from.DET
andirivieni
 toing and froing
 ‘they pass unnoticed to your eyes, distracted by the people’s toing and froing’

(Calvino 1972: XI, XIII)

(97) It. *da* (AGENT)

a. *una città vera, abitata da vivi*
 one city real inhabit.PSTPTC from living.PL
 ‘a real city, inhabited by the living’

b. *mi vedevo assalito da facce inaspettate*
 OBJ:1SG see.IMPF.1SG assail.PSTPTC from faces unexpect.PSTPTC
 ‘I would find myself assailed by unexpected faces’

(Calvino 1972: XII, XII)

PURPOSE, as we have already hinted to above in this section and before (5.1.3.12), is the other side of the CAUSE coin. As has been observed therein, Ir. *le* can express both CAUSES and PURPOSES; in Italian, the same double-dealing is performed by both *da* and *di*, as illustrated in (98–99) (no Irish preposition expressing the BSM OF SEPARATION lends itself to that).

(98) It. *da*⁷²

a. *una rete che serve da passaggio e da*
 one net REL serve.3SG for passage and for

sostegno

support

‘a net serving as a passage and a support’

b. *barili di polvere da sparo*
 barrels of powder for shooting

‘barrels of gunpowder’

c. *un piatto da minestra*
 one bowl for soup

‘a soup bowl’

(Calvino 1972: VIII, X, XVI)

(99) It. *di*

a. *Era l' ora del mercato del pesce*
 be.IMPF.3SG DET hour of.DET market of.DET fish

‘It was the time for the fish market’

b. *stazione degli autobus*
 station of.DET buses

‘bus station’

c. *Nel più remoto gabinetto dei papiri*
 in.DET most remote room of.DET papyri

‘In the most remote papyri room [of the library]’

d. *becchi del gas*
 beaks of.DET gas

‘gas burners’

(Calvino 1972: XII, III, VI, VIII)

In the examples of (98), the object of the *da*-PP (= *lm*) specifies what the *tr* is meant for, what its use or function is: a rope net whose function is to let people cross a gorge (a), powder whose function is to make guns shoot (b), a bowl whose function is to serve soup (c). The same happens with those of (99), where the fish market takes place at a certain time of the day which is intended for that purpose (a), buses arrive at, and depart from, a building that is designed for them to do so (b), papyri are stored in a library room reserved for them (c), and gas is made to burn in expressly-designed containers (d).

⁷² All over the examples of (98) the gloss *from* has been avoided as it would have sounded highly unnatural for the English, and the unrelated, yet less disturbing *for* has been adopted instead.

5.1.4.7 REPRESENTATION

REPRESENTATION is a tr-lm relationship where tr is some kind of effigy of lm. This relationship may or may not reflect on the syntactic level. In English, for instance, *Susan's picture* is ambiguous over the two readings 'a picture portraying Susan' and 'a picture belonging to Susan', but *a picture of Susan* and *a picture of Susan's* are not – in fact, they can be only interpreted as, respectively, 'a picture portraying Susan' and 'a picture belonging to Susan'. In Italian, on the other hand, ambiguity cannot be avoided in that, there being no genitive case, *una foto di Susanna* is the only syntactic construction available, and – as one would expect – ambiguous over the two readings mentioned. Of these, the former is what we refer to as the REPRESENTATION reading, while the latter is an instance of the already discussed BELONGING TO sense (cf. 5.1.4.3 above).

Before any further discussion, we turn to a few examples from our corpora (100–101):

(100) Ir. *de*

- a. *Bhí pictiúir di ar fáil go fuirist agus go flúirseach*
 be.PAST pictures of(f).OBJ:3SG.FEM on find.VN to easy and to
 abundant
 'Several pictures of her were easily available'
- b. *Shocraigh Tom ar ghrianghraf di a lorg*
 decide.PAST Tom on photograph of(f).OBJ:3SG.FEM to
 seek.VN
 'Tom decided to look for a photograph of her'
- c. *iris inmheánach an chomhlachta ina raibh grianghraf di*
 magazine internal DET company.GEN in.REL be.PAST
 photograph of(f).OBJ:3SG.FEM
 '[a copy of the] company newsletter where there was a photograph of her'

(Ó Cíosóig 1997: pp.10, 9)

(101) It. *di*

- a. *una statua di Talete*
 a statue of(f) Thales
 'a statue of Thales'

- b.** *Nella mappa del tuo impero*
in.DET map of.DET POSS.2SG empire
‘On the map of your empire’
- c.** *Una mappa di Smeraldina*
one map of Smeraldina
‘a map of Smeraldina’
- d.** *se ne trae un’ immagine solida e compatta*
PASSV OBL:3SG draw.3SG one image solid and compact
di città
of city
‘one can draw from it a solid, compact representation of a city’

(Calvino 1972: XVII, IV, X, VII)

The Irish examples (100), who unfortunately only refer to ‘pictures’ and ‘photographs’ (the context confirms that reference is in both cases made to photographs), do not provide data about other types of effigies, but *do* provide an insight into the syntactic reflection of REPRESENTATION, which, in Irish too, is kept apart from that of the BELONGING TO sense (as we have seen, this is expressed by the genitive case). On the other hand, the Italian examples of (101) refer to a number of different kinds of effigies, both 3-D (like the statue in a) and 2-D ones (the city maps of b and c). Finally, (d) seemingly refers to a different sort of REPRESENTATION, a non-dimensional one – non-dimensional, at least, in the physical domain – namely, a mental representation⁷³ (the oblique pronoun *ne* ‘from it’ refers back to the context of a verbal description of the city).

The reason why REPRESENTATION should be linked to a BSM expressing SEPARATION – that is, the motivation for this kind of sense extension – is not unequivocally patent to us. The REPRESENTATION sense extension may directly stem from SEPARATION, as well as involve the BELONGING IN sense. It would seem as though an effigy of *x* were conceptualized as something that is taken *off x*, or *out of* the set of *x*’s properties (for someone’s image undoubtedly belongs in the set of their characteristic properties). Not only do English and Irish seem to express this idea in the very common expression *to take a picture of someone* (Ir. *grianghraf a thógáil de rud*),⁷⁴ but also a number of popular beliefs and superstitions seem to be consistent

⁷³ Multi-dimensionality of mental representations was discussed in section 2.2 above.

⁷⁴ The two expressions are perfectly parallel:

with this view: Carolyn J. Marr (1989: p.53) reports about the negative attitude of the Cowlitz people (a native American ethnic group) towards being photographed, for “the Cowlitz [reportedly] believed that any image made of a person stole away his soul”, and Bram Stoker hints at that in his novel, *Dracula* (chapter 2), where the vampire – a creature whose existence is trapped in a limbo between life and death, and deprived of a soul – cannot be reflected by mirrors.⁷⁵

It should be made clear, at any rate, that this interpretation does *not* involve that such conceptualization is necessarily still ‘going on’ in the mind of the speakers (no comparable expression is to be found in Italian),⁷⁶ but that it *might have*, historically speaking, motivated the choice of this BSM to express the REPRESENTATION relation.

5.1.4.8 COMPARISON

Italian exhibits a remarkable way of exploiting the potentialities of the BSM of SEPARATION, and in particular, if our analysis is correct, of its ORIGIN sub-sense, i.e.,

| | | | | |
|-------------------|----------|----------------|-----------|------------|
| <i>grianghraf</i> | <i>a</i> | <i>thógáil</i> | <i>de</i> | <i>rud</i> |
| photograph | to | take.VN | off | thing |

‘to take a photograph of something’

(Source: Mac Mathúna and Ó Corrain 2003: s.v. *grianghraf*)

⁷⁵ From an anthropological point of view, the question is far from settled: a sharp criticism to a number of very similar reports from various parts of the world, involving hostility of certain populations towards photography as a means of soul-stealing, has been put forward by the anthropologist Rodney Needham (1976), who asserted that such reports (whose sources he quotes) are – in his words – mere variations on a “cliché” theme. His target is the tendency – found in such reports – to indulge in the use of the translation “soul” for concepts that originated in different cultures and might as well have had nothing to do with the connotations intrinsic in a word laden with centuries of Western philosophical speculations. (I wish to thank R. H. Barnes from the Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology, Oxford) for bringing Needham’s contribution to my attention.)

⁷⁶ The Italian equivalent of *taking a picture of* is *fare una fotografia a*, i.e.:

| | | | | | |
|-------------|------------|-------------------|----------|-----------|--------------|
| <i>Fare</i> | <i>una</i> | <i>fotografia</i> | <i>a</i> | <i>un</i> | <i>amico</i> |
| make.INF | one | photograph | to | one | friend |

‘taking a photograph of a friend’

(Source: <http://www.mediamente.rai.it/home/tv2rete/mm9798/98051822/e980519.htm>

[accessed September 2005])

the COMPARATIVE reading of *di*, whose PP serves to introduce the reference point in comparative constructions with adjectives and adverbs. This is shown in (102):⁷⁷

(102) It. *di*

- a. *un punto non più grande d' una capocchia*
 one spot NEG larger than a head
di spillo
 of pin
 'a spot no larger than a pinhead'
- b. *se essi sono migliori o peggiori degli antichi*
 if SUBJ:3PL.MSC be.3PL better.PL or worse.PL than.DET
old.PL
 'whether they are better or worse than the old ones'
- c. *i morti sono più dei vivi*
 DET dead be.3PL more than.DET living
 'the dead outnumber the living' (lit. 'the dead are more numerous than the living')
- d. *Sanno che più di tanto la rete non regge*
 know.3PL COMPL more than so much DET net NEG hold.3SG
 'They know the net won't hold for ever' (lit. 'for longer than so much')
- e. *che la amino com' era prima di loro*
 COMPL OBJ:3SG.FEM love.SUBJN.3PL as be.IMPF.3SG earlier than
them
 'that they love it as it was before they came' (lit. 'before them')
- f. *mio padre pochi giorni prima di morire aveva gli occhi gialli*
 POSS:1SG father few days earlier than die.INF have.IMPF.3SG
 DET eyes yellow
 'A few days before he died, my father's eyes were yellow'

(Calvino 1972: XVI, III, XII, VIII, IX, XII)

Interestingly enough, Italian more spatial-like preposition *da* can be used for this purpose too, but only with a limited range of adjectives which imply comparison without employing the syntax of comparative constructions seen in (102). Such adjectives as *diverso*, *differente* 'different', *distinto* 'distinct', and the like are normally found in conjunction with a *da*-PP whose object refers to the entity

⁷⁷ The English gloss chosen for this sense of *di* is the normal comparative particle *than*. Although we argue that such sense develops from an ORIGIN/SEPARATION meaning too, a gloss such as *from* has been avoided as rather disturbing.

identified as different *from* the one they are predicated of (103).⁷⁸ (Incidentally, the same employ of *from* is found in English.)

- (103) It. *da*
Ciò che fa Argia diversa dalle altre città
 that REL make.3SG Argia different from.DET other cities
 ‘What makes Argia different from the other cities’
 (Calvino 1972: XV)

This association between COMPARISON and SEPARATION is not an isolated one. One of the means Classic Greek had to express the reference point, or term of comparison, was a NP in the genitive case, as in (104):

- (104) *ho Dēmosthēnēs kreíttōn toû Sōkrátous*
 DET.NOM Demosthenes.NOM stronger.NOM DET.GEN Socrates.GEN
 ‘Demosthenes is stronger than Socrates’
 (Mastronarde 1993: p.229)

Genitive case is commonly described by Greek grammars as “the case used to indicate possession, source, origin” (Mastronarde 1993: pp.24, 219). Greek originally formed comparative adjectives by means of a suffix **-yos-*, “an INTENSIVE marker signifying ‘very, rather; to a marked degree’” (Sihler 1995: p.356).

- (viii) The suffix **-yos-* added to a root *X* originally meant ‘*X* to a pronounced degree; very *X*’... Pragmatically, of course, a statement like *Fruit is sweet, but honey is very sweet* is equivalent to *Fruit is sweet, but honey is sweeter*.
 (Sihler 1995: p.358)

The syntactic construction with the genitive of example (104), if we accept this interpretation of the genitive of ORIGIN, could be interpreted as (originally) meaning *Demosthenes is remarkably strong, starting from Socrates as a reference point*.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ Cf. <http://www.demauparavia.it/32851>, <http://oxfordparavia.it/lemmaIta9060> (both accessed September 2005).

⁷⁹ Classic Greek would employ the genitive case where Italian has a *da*-PP in conjunctions with adjectives expressing difference/diversity, e.g.,

- diaphérei tōn álloñ*
 differ.3SG DET.GEN.PL other.GEN.PL
 ‘He differs from the others’
 (Mastronarde 1993: p.219)

This usage parallels the concrete sense of the genitive in spatial contexts like that of (105):

- (105) *apékhomen tês póleōs dúo stádia*
 be distant.1PL DET.GEN city.GEN two.ACC stades.ACC
 ‘we are two stades distant from the city’
 (Mastrorarde 1993: p.219)




Figure 5.7: The BSM OFF/FROM/OUT OF and its sense extensions.

5.1.4.9 Graphic recap

The various sense extensions which can be traced back to SEPARATION can be represented as in Figure 5.7. The three SEPARATION subsenses are represented as belonging in a wider circle which represents SEPARATION in general. Sense extensions are represented as stemming from each particular subsense. BELONGING IN – according to the explanation adopted in the text, has been linked to SEPARATION in general.

5.1.4.10 Summary

In this chapter we have examined three of the BSMs belonging in the repertoire that had been set up in the chapter 4. The three BSMs, IN(TO), WITH, and

OFF/FROM/OUT OF, were chosen according to the criteria specified in 5.1. In the next chapter, our findings will be examined in the light of the theoretical background outlined in chapter 2, trying to stress their significance and implications with respect to it.

6 Discussion

6.0 Introduction

In chapter 2 a series of notions were expounded regarding space conceptualization and how it might be employed to structure more abstract domains. Accordingly, chapter 5 was devoted to identifying common instances of sense extensions for three BSMs, as resulting from examples extracted from texts, and to seeking motivations that could be traced back to spatial thought.

In this chapter, starting from the observation that such motivations were readily available in the majority of cases, we shall review the patterns of permitted sense extensions and see what inferences can be drawn from their cross-linguistical comparison.

6.1 Patterns of sense extensions for *IN(TO)*, *WITH*, *OFF/FROM/OUT OF*

6.1.1 *IN(TO)*

In 5.1.2, we observed that *IN(TO)* has a double valence in that it can define both static and dynamic relations in the space domain. Its pattern of sense extensions, as observed from our data and schematized in Figure 5.2, is quite simple: static *IN* has sense extensions into the time domain, where *IN-PPs* basically answer the question ‘when?’ both in Irish and Italian (5.1.2.1.i); it can express a number of relations between *tr* and *lm* when they are more or less apt to profile proper spatial relationships (METAPHORICAL PLACE), again in both languages (5.1.2.1.ii). The time-domain extension of static *IN* yields a sub-extension, which is peculiar to Irish and has been labelled PROGRESSIVE/TRANSIENT: it still has to do with the time domain, but involves morphosyntactic constructions unknown to Italian to express the durative aspect of events or transient classifications (5.1.2.1.iii). Finally, static *IN* has a sense extension in a domain which is still material in nature, that is, what we have labelled the MATTER/MEANS reading: this usage is peculiar to Italian, and a satisfactory motivation has not been found to justify its occurrence (5.1.2.1.iv). A few words were also spent on the MANNER extension in 5.1.2.1.i, whose two instances were found to

be in various way related to the METAPHORICAL PLACE one, but not systematically and consistently so, and which was therefore not included in Figure 5.2.

INTO (that is, dynamic IN) has fewer sense extensions that are shared by both Irish and Italian, that is, PATH (5.1.2.2) and METAPHORICAL GOAL (5.1.2.2.ii). The former is a function of the physical domain, while the latter is an expression of various metaphorical mappings of abstract tr's and/or lm's onto concrete entities which might be involved in spatial relationships. PATH further yields a time-domain sense extension which is only found in the Italian corpus (with IN[TO]-PPs answering the question 'until when?', that is, profiling a time span that goes from a certain moment in time to a second one located in the future).

6.1.2 WITH

Section 5.1.3 was devoted to the analysis of the BSM WITH, which was characterized in terms of the two spatial functions VICINITY and COMPANYY. The latter was defined as a special case of the former which involves that arguments be characterized by both animacy and volition. As can be seen from Figure 5.5, most metaphorical sense extensions were taken as stemming from the VICINITY pole of what is represented as a whole comprised of the two relations. Only two readings, DYNAMIC VICINITY (5.1.3.1) and COMPARISON (5.1.3.6), were taken as arising from the binomial gestalt, as they are indifferent as to whether or not their arguments are of the animate/volitional kind; their motivation were deemed to be closely rooted in the physical domain. Both were shown to be available to both Irish and Italian, although COMPARISON appears in the two languages with different functions and morphosyntactic constructions.

Motivations for COMMUNICATION/TRADE-OFF (5.1.3.4) and METAPHORICAL COMPANYY (5.1.3.8) were found to be in their derivation from the COMPANYY pole of the proximity gestalt and they are also the only two sense extensions whose derivation was traced back to it, the former (COMMUNICATION/TRADE-OFF) as typically involving animate participants, the latter as arising from metaphorical mappings whose target-domain roles are animate participants. Both are available to Irish and Italian alike.

Time-domain sense extensions all appear to be motivated by links to the VICINITY side of the gestalt. Co-occurrence of events, i.e., TEMPORAL COINCIDENCE (5.1.3.5), is most naturally associated with spatial proximity between them, precisely because TEMPORAL COINCIDENCE itself is a sine qua non for spatial proximity to be

possible at all, so that, really, bare TEMPORAL COINCIDENCE can be re-formulated as equal to VICINITY minus spatial dimension. This sense extension is available to both Irish and Italian – although a subsequent sense extension expressing DURATION seems to be exclusively peculiar to Irish.

The MEANS sense extension (5.1.3.7) also appears to be closely related to the VICINITY reading of the BSM WITH and available to both Irish and Italian.

Other motivational patterns of sense extensions for this BSM show that multiple passages of the kind $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C$ are possible where intermediate stages (say B) find no expression in the same language in which final stages (e.g., C) are found: for instance, A can be some reading available to both Irish and Italian, and B some reading motivated by A that is only available to Irish – still, C can appear to be motivated by B and still be available to Italian, which for some reason does not exploit the intermediate sense extension B . What we have just described is the situation we are faced with a couple of sense extensions of VICINITY, namely PART-WHOLE and METAPHORICAL VICINITY (= conceptual ASSOCIATION).

PART-WHOLE (5.1.3.1) had exponent prepositions of the BSM WITH acting as functions whose *lm* argument is a part belonging in whole referred to by the *tr* argument. (An isolated instance of PART-PART relation, where both *tr* and *lm* are really parts of a whole which is named in the expression, was also retrieved.) Although PART-WHOLE seems to be only available to Italian, a sense extension thereof (POSSESSIVE) is apparently found only in Irish (where the preposition *le* takes a *tr* referring to POSSESSED THING and a *lm* referring to POSSESSOR). We shall here remind that a second, alternative motivation was brought forward for the POSSESSIVE sense extension, namely, that it derives not from the PART-WHOLE one, but directly from VICINITY.

A further still sense extension has a DESCRIPTIVE reading (5.1.3.3) stemming from the POSSESSIVE, but this time it seems to be available to Italian only. This sense extension has been thus labelled in that it describes *tr* by expressing some quality (*lm*) thereof as though qualities were properties or things possessed.

Another bunch of sense extensions were found to be related to VICINITY via its metaphorical extension, which was dubbed METAPHORICAL VICINITY or simply ASSOCIATION (5.1.3.9). Our data only refer such extension to the Irish corpus, within which a number of further sub-extensions seem to develop from ASSOCIATION. ATTITUDE, POSSIBILITY and DEONTIC *le* – in Irish – all appear to be related to it (5.1.3.9), and so do CAUSE/AGENT (5.1.3.10) and PURPOSIVE (5.1.3.12) *le*. Dubiously related to

AGENT is the motivation proposed for the so-labelled EXPRESSIVE sense extension which was examined in (5.1.3.10) – this, too, is only available to the Irish *le*.

Although stemming from the Irish-peculiar ASSOCIATION reading, not only is MANNER (5.1.3.11) available to the Italian preposition *con*, it also appears to be scarcely or marginally available to the Irish *le*.

6.1.3 OFF/FROM/OUT OF

The BSM OFF/FROM/OUT OF (5.1.4), which we have also been referring to as SEPARATION – or, in Fillmorean terms, SOURCE – is a dynamic spatial relator, which we have analyzed in three of its aspects chosen after Dirven (1993) and Talmy (2000b) (cf. 4.1.2), namely losing previous contact (OFF), leaving enclosure (OUT OF), and generic separation (FROM).

As can be seen from Figure 5.7, four sense extensions were found to stem directly from the spatial concept. One of them, BELONGING IN (5.1.4.3), is deemed to originate from a SEPARATION sense potentially including all of the three aforementioned sub-senses; the other extensions are considered to be elaborations of some specific sub-sense each.

BELONGING IN is available to both Irish and Italian and proves a rather productive extension. Its basic function is to express a relation between a part and the whole/set it belongs in. Further refinements of such relation lead to the two sub-cases BELONGING TO (= POSSESSIVE) (5.1.4.3) and PARTITIVE (5.1.4.2), which does in turn sub-specifies into the TOKEN OF TYPE sub-extension (5.1.4.3). All of those are available to both languages and their expression is committed to just one preposition per language, Ir. *de* and It. *di*, which were – furthermore – found to be etymologically related.

It might be observed that extensions originating from senses that are either general over the three sub-senses (like those just reviewed) or the most generic of the sub-extensions (namely, FROM) are by far the most productive and those that reach the highest degree of abstraction. TOKEN OF TYPE is a case in point (see 5.1.4.3), and other abstract instances are to be found like CAUSE/PURPOSE among the extensions of FROM. Conversely, sense extensions from more specific SEPARATION readings (OFF and OUT OF) were only found to yield one sub-extension each.

ORIGIN (5.1.4.1) is described as an instance of fictive SEPARATION in that a static relation, which might be phrased as ‘there is a distance ℓ between x and y ’, is

expressed through a static verb and a dynamic (SOURCE) preposition (' x is ℓ distant from y '), just as though a motion from y to x , of the length/duration ℓ , were involved – or, more precisely, the result of that motion. ORIGIN is available to both Italian and Irish and so are its sub-extensions in the time and causation domains. ORIGIN IN TIME (5.1.4.5) is an elementary sub-extension of ORIGIN. ORIGIN IN TIME is most naturally linked to spatial ORIGIN, in that motion (here, SEPARATION) cannot be perceived but as a function of both space and time.

The peculiar graphic arrangement of Figure 5.7 for CAUSE/PURPOSE (5.1.4.6) is meant to reflect (i) how these are but point of view of the same concept and (ii) the resulting difficulty in deciding which derives from which, while both are taken to stem from ORIGIN via the CAUSES ARE ORIGINS metaphorical mapping. At any rate, CAUSE might be taken as more basic, as it does not involve volition (whereas PURPOSE does). Furthermore, however significant that may be, CAUSE is available to both languages, while PURPOSE just to Italian. AGENT, clearly a sub-case of CAUSE (more precisely, animate/volitional CAUSE), is also only available to Italian.

An attempt was also made, and some evidence sought in Classic Greek, in order to show derivation from ORIGIN for the COMPARISON sense extension of this BSM (5.1.4.8), an extension which was only found in Italian corpus. A second problematic attempt to seek a motivation involves the REPRESENTATION sense extension (5.1.4.7), retrieved in both corpora and traced back to the OFF sub-sense of the BSM of SEPARATION.

More straightforward appears to be the motivation for the MATTER sense extension (5.1.4.4), which abides by a series of observations made by Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and in particular to their THE OBJECT COMES OUT OF THE SUBSTANCE metaphor. This too is found in both Italian and Irish, and is traced back to the OUT OF sub-sense.

6.2 *Generalizations*

To conclude the present discussion, we should like to draw a few significant generalizations from our findings.

First and foremost, we have been able to show that basic spatial relations easily lend themselves to a number of metaphorical mappings where the spatial meaning is preserved in the background, thus granting a great degree of transparency to the motivations of the expressions. That is, beside more opaque sense extensions

whose motivations were more difficult to find, if not rather tentative, we find such transparent sense extensions as we have labelled – for instance – METAPHORICAL PLACE, METAPHORICAL GOAL, METAPHORICAL VICINITY and so on. Normally, this kind of transparent mappings is more readily available cross-linguistically.

As a second point, which has been especially observed in the case of the BSMs WITH and OFF/FROM/OUT OF, sense extensions into the time domain fall within the scope of transparent mapping. Time, itself a physical dimension, is readily available to cross-linguistically valid, space-wise transparent metaphorical mapping, more so than in the case of rather abstract relations like ATTITUDE or POSSESSIVE (cf. the discussion of the BSM WITH) which are both less transparent and limited to just one of the two languages.

Finally, we have been able to show that – with the exception of only a few problematic cases – most sense extensions, however abstract they are, let themselves be tracked down to their spatial motivations.

6.3 *Theoretical implications*

We have started off this study with a review of the cognitive grammar positions about issues such as space conceptualization, metaphor, and the character of spatial relations encoded by prepositions. Our aim was to test those statements against a comparison between patterns of sense extensions as exhibited by three groups of Irish and Italian prepositions.

A major assumption of cognitive grammar and one we have greatly insisted on in our literature review has to do with the centrality of spatial thought as a powerful tool allowing us to make sense of less concrete domains, through the projection of conceptual structure borrowed from spatial relations onto those abstract domains. As we have seen, cognitive researchers such as Lakoff have dubbed this kind of structural projection, or mapping, by the name of metaphor – thus giving new life to a notion that had long been relegated almost exclusively to literary criticism or to the realm of pragmatics which was considered as a domain separate from semantics and to which people resorted to in order to interpret expressions for which no ‘literal’ meaning was available. This separation too, as we have seen in chapter 2, has been questioned by some cognitive grammarians (e.g., Zelinsky-Wibbelt) who now prefer to think of semantics and pragmatics as complementary to, and inseparable from, one another.

By illustrating how “simple” (in the sense expounded in chapter 3) prepositions all have basic spatial meanings, and how all of their abstract readings can be tracked down to the spatial domain if we follow backwards their patterns of metaphorical sense extensions, we believe we have contributed to provide evidence in favour of the views of cognitive grammar and to strengthen its positions.

We have also observed that more immediate sense extensions (e.g., time-domain ones) are more easily retrieved in different languages, which was demonstrated not only by the Irish and Italian cases but, occasionally, by reference to other languages. This, we believe, leaves the door open for further research aimed at showing if such a direct correlation between the two continua TRANSPARENT → OPAQUE and cross-linguistically MORE AVAILABLE → LESS AVAILABLE might be positively proved.

7 Conclusions

To end our research study, we should like to summarize what our objectives were and how our results comply with the task we had set out to undertake.

Our aim was to test against a textual body of linguistic evidence the statements, put forward by cognitive linguistics studies, that spatial conceptualization is central to human thought in that it allows us to make sense of non-spatial concepts through the metaphorical projection of structures and inferences valid in the spatial domain onto non-spatial domains, that is, the processing of knowledge that pertains to abstract, non-physical domains as though it pertained to the spatial one. In this way, for instance, descriptions that are valid in the spatial domain (e.g., trajector comes out of enclosure) are employed in characterizing non-spatial ones (e.g., in the conceptual domain of causation, effect comes out of cause), authorizing analogical descriptions (*His money comes **from** illicit business*) and analogical inferences (if x comes from y , then x was in y : *The key to understand his richness lies **in** his relationships with the mob*). In other words, the question we wished to answer was whether it was possible to explain patterns of sense extensions from the spatial to other domains as the result of metaphorical projection of conceptual structure.

To answer such question, morphologically simple prepositions were chosen as the ideal subjects of our experiment, in that they can be shown to express primarily relations that are spatial in character and exhibit a high degree of polysemy, thus providing a vast range of different readings that we might attempt to explain as developing from the physical, space-domain ones.

Since – in order to do so – a substantial amount of linguistic material was needed, as a repertoire of examples of linguistic usage, two distinct corpora were set up for Irish and Italian, two languages in whose grammatical descriptions traditionally encoded repertoires of “simple” prepositions are found. These two corpora were subsequently scanned for examples of non-spatial readings of prepositions to be semantically categorized and explained as resulting from metaphorical mappings of spatial structure.

What emerges from our analysis is that most sense extensions *do* actually lend themselves to being explained in precisely this way. Furthermore, a distinction has

been found between extensions that are more basic, or transparent, i.e., yielded by a smaller number of intermediate mappings, and extensions that are more complex or opaque. As it appears, the former group includes readings that are most easily found in both Irish and Italian, as well as in other languages that were at times utilized to gauge the cross-linguistic diffusion of a given extension of meaning. In particular, sense extensions having to do with the time domain have been found to fall within the scope of the more transparent family of readings. This has been interpreted as a result of time being itself a physical dimension which is, as far as many physical phenomena are concerned (e.g., motion), strictly interwoven with space.

To conclude, we are able to present the results of our research as supporting the cognitive linguistics stands, examined at the outset of this work and assumed as a guideline for it, that space is a central domain in human thought and conceptual organization, and that metaphorical mapping is the key to understanding how it is possible to make sense of abstract concepts by means of simpler, more immediate knowledge and logic inferences retrieved from everyday spatial experience.

We were also able to bring to light a potential correlation between the transparency, or immediacy of a given sense extension and its degree of cross-linguistic availability. Such an issue, we believe, could be explored by future research projects, and would undoubtedly profit from a greater availability of time and resources that might permit to design and implement larger corpora and more sophisticated instruments of analysis.

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Appendices