

LECTURE 7: INTERNALISM AND EXTERNALISM

How Agrippan trillema (and the responses to it) presupposes an 'internalist' framework according to which to be justified you must be able to provide a justification to the skeptic.

How the externalist can simply deny this, and thus stop the regress of justifications characteristic of the trillema from even starting.

Bonjour: "Internalism/Externalism"

132; Internalism requires that all of the factors relevant for epistemic justification be cognitively accessible.

132: strong internalism requires speakers be actually aware of justifying factors.

133: weak internalism requires only that such factors are available to a subject who focuses attention.

133: how both foundationalists and coherentists can be internalists.

133: Reliabilism as most prominent recent version of externalism -- belief is justified if produced by a process that is objectively likely to yield truth.

133: how some internalists think that reliabilism just amounts to changing the subject.

133-4: Externalism has the advantage of unproblematically endorsing 'commonsense' knowledge ascriptions to animals and small children.

134: Externalism has the advantage of dealing quickly with skeptical puzzles that the internalist seems unable to solve.

134: objections and purported counterexamples to externalism.

135: attempts to give hybrid accounts, and theories that are externalist about knowledge, but not necessarily justification.

136: relation between externalistic accounts of justification and content.

Stewart Cohen "Relevant Alternatives"

430-1: relevant alternatives theory tries to resolve the tensions between the intuitions that (1) knowledge is an absolute concept that requires ruling out all alternatives, and (2) we do, in fact, know many things

431: theory suggests that knowledge requires not the ability to rule out all alternatives to the proposition known, but only the relevant one's.

431: how skeptical alternatives may not be relevant.

431: comparison to other absolute concepts like 'flat' and 'empty'.

432: How relevant alternative theory incompatible with the 'closure principle' to the effect that if you know 'p' and 'p' entails 'q', then you should know 'q'.

432: Problems determining just what the relevant alternatives are.

Alvin Goldman: "Reliabilism"

433: The view that a belief acquires favorable epistemic status by having some kind of reliable linkage to the truth.

433: counterfactual dependence theories.

433: Reliable indicator vs. reliable process theories.

433-4: The reliable process theory is grounded on two main points. First, the justificational status of a belief depends on the psychological processes that cause (or causally sustain) it, not simply on the logical status of the proposition, or its evidential relations to other propositions.

434: 'Good' processes are one's whose belief outputs have a high ratio of truths.

434: People do not generally keep a mental diary of their belief's ancestries, nor are they always in a position to reconstruct such ancestries. This does not prevent these beliefs from being justified.

434: The 'non-undermining' condition requires that the agent not believe that the generating process is unreliable, and not be in any mental state ... from which reliable processes would lead him to conclude that the generating process was unreliable.

434: Problem of trying to decide how finally the belief forming process should be individuated.

435: 'daemon world' counterexample where seemingly unreliable process seems justified.

435: 'clairvoyance' counterexample where reliable, but untrusted, process does not seem to produce justified beliefs.

435: Normal worlds Reliabilism says that a belief (in any possible world) is justified just in case its generating processes have high truth ratios in normal worlds.

435: Reliabilism not necessarily a competitor to foundationalism and coherentism, since defenders of each view could also be reliabilists.

Goldman: “What is Justified Belief?”

340: Wants to explicate our ordinary concept of justification.

340: Wants to explicate it in non-epistemic terms.

341: No prior assumption that the person with the justified belief can provide the justification.

341: Must be justifying processes, but these need not be possessed by the believer.

341-2: Problems with attempting to account for justification in terms of “self-evidence”, “indubitability”, “self-presentation”, etc.

343: “nomological” vs “logical” readings of self-presentation, etc.

345: Reliability as what determines justificatory status of belief: “the justificational status of a belief is a function of the reliability of the process or processes that cause it.”

346: Problem with ‘degree of generality’ of process individuation.

347: ‘base’ and ‘recursive’ elements in definition of justification.

347: 'historical' vs 'time slice' theories of justification.

348: can be justified without knowing that you are justified.

348: Gettier cases.

349: Processes should be reliable in the actual world.

350: Problem with the believer whose belief forming processes are reliable but has good reason to doubt that they are.

Keith DeRose: "Solving the Skeptical Problem"

482: 'Argument from ignorance' (AI)

1. I don't know that non-H
2. If I don't know that non-H, then I don't know that O.
3. I don't know that O.

483: Contextualists claim that skeptic's denial of H is compatible with our everyday knowing of O.

483: Skeptic invokes very high standards for knowledge.

484: Still need to explain why (AI) puzzling hand how the skeptic raises the relevant standards.

485: Subjunctive conditional accounts (SCA) of knowledge like Nozick's.

485: Can't know P if I would believe that P even if it were false.

485: SCA deals with lottery paradox

487: We assume that S doesn't know that P if we assume his belief insensitive to the truth of P.

489: How Nozick mistakenly uses SCA to deny premise 2 of AI.