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**(U) TAB D (OTHER REGIONAL FORCES) APPENDIX 1 (INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE)
TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) TO V CORPS (US) OPLAN FINAL VICTORY**

1. (U) Kurdish Regional Forces (not all inclusive).

a. (U) **Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)**

(1) Key Points

(a) (U//~~FOUO~~) The KDP's greatest threats are the Turkish insurgents of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the remnants of the Iraqi paramilitary forces scattered throughout Iraq and the Turkish Army. The chance of conflict between the KDP and its rival Kurdish group, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), is currently assessed to be low.

(b) (~~S//NF~~) KDP soldiers are skilled in mountain warfare, but lack key weapon systems, equipment, ammunition, and parts. They are not as well organized or disciplined as a conventional force.

(c) (~~S//NF~~) KDP ground forces are structured similarly to U.S. Army light infantry brigades and battalions, and probably specialize in small unit raids and ambushes.

(d) (~~S//NF~~) KDP ground forces are capable of achieving limited, local successes, but need external assistance to mount a serious attack. KDP units will be hesitant to initiate ground operations against a large conventional force, unless their leaders are convinced of external support.

(e) (~~S//REL~~) KDP (and PUK) forces will maintain their military structure during post hostilities IOT support the political influence of the Kurdish parties in the new government. They will not target US interests, and will generally obey US directives to withdraw forces from key areas such as Kirkuk and Mosul. They will seek to exercise influence in and around the areas surrounding Kirkuk, Mosul and Tuz Khurmatu, using small elements of Peshmerga presence, allied with local Kurdish Tribes. They will also participate (in small numbers) in evicting Arabs from homes formally occupied by Kurds. These actions will be low level in nature, designed not to cause a US or Turkish reaction. Forces from both parties will seize abandoned weapons left along the Green Line, IOT bolster their capabilities. Though both the KDP and PUK have cooperated thus far, they have rarely gone more than a few years without factional infighting. Now that the regime



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has fallen (their common enemy), both parties will be jockeying for predominance in Kurdish politics and the new government, which will result in political tension and possibly minor infighting. Open, military conflict is not likely. As long as its goals of federalism and limited Kurdish autonomy in postwar Iraq are on the Coalition agenda, the KDP (and PUK) will remain a pro-Coalition force. Recently, the PUK has been more cooperative with the Coalition than the KDP.

(2) (U) Background

(a) (U//~~FOUO~~) In August 1946, The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) was established in Baghdad by Mullah Mustafa Barzani—father of current KDP leader Massoud Barzani. The KDP consists of a secular political movement and a subordinate military wing, which opposed the Saddam Hussein regime. Its goal is to create an autonomous Kurdistan state in northern Iraq that is dominated by the KDP. This group operates mainly in the Irbil area in northwest Iraq. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), its main Kurdish, operates further to the southeast in the area around As Sulaymaniyah.

(b) (U//~~FOUO~~) The failure of the Kurds' uprising against the Iraqi Army at the conclusion of Operation DESERT STORM resulted in the establishment of a safe haven by the international community in northern Iraq. This area was reinforced by the creation of the "no-fly" zone above the 36th parallel that was enforced by British and U.S. military aircraft. Within this enclave the Kurds have been able to control their own affairs: the KDP administers the western portion while the PUK dominates the eastern section. Clashes between the KDP and PUK broke out after 1991 due to a history of political and personal rivalries and chronic mutual mistrust. Relations between the groups have been further strained due to the KDP's past willingness to work with the Iraqi government against the PUK. This conflict had been further exacerbated by tensions over revenue from the lucrative border trade in oil, which until recently, passed exclusively through KDP controlled territory into Turkey.

(c) (U//~~FOUO~~) Relations between the KDP and PUK have improved over the last several years, particularly since 1998 when both groups signed the U.S.-brokered Washington Agreement that normalized relations between the two groups. The possibility of further fighting between the KDP and PUK is thus currently assessed as low, particularly after the leaders of the two groups signed an agreement on 8 September 2002 to resolve lingering disputes from

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the 1998 peace agreement. Another regional threat to the KDP has been the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), an ethnically Turkish-Kurd organization, which in Spring 2002 was renamed the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK).

(d) (U//~~FOUO~~) Turkey is openly hostile to a possible independent Kurdish state or any significant measure of autonomy for Iraq's Kurds and has formally branded KADEK as a terrorist organization. Iran and Syria are also against Kurdish statehood due to the destabilizing influence this would have on their own restive Kurdish populations. Unlike the PUK, the KDP does not have a relationship with Iran. Iraqi Kurdistan remains an area of significant interest for Iraq and the other surrounding nations not only for its vast oilfields, but because rainfall and snow from its plateaus and mountains provide a critical water resource for the entire region.

(e) (~~C~~) The KDP is a tribally based group whose leadership largely belongs to the Barzani family. This group is essentially urban-based and seeks to maintain the status quo by defending its portion of Iraqi Kurdistan. Despite its mistrust of the Hussein government, the KDP had been forced by circumstances to cooperate with it by smuggling Iraqi oil into Turkey and providing information on the regional activities of the United States and other opposition groups. The KDP also turned to the Iraqis for support as a means to offset the PUK's relationship with Iran—it aided Iraqi forces in their attack against the PUK in Irbil in 1996. The KDP also continues to strive to maintain a good working relationship with the Turkish government due to their common border. The KDP is distrustful of the U.S. government, whom it perceives as inconsistent and not necessarily supportive of Kurdish goals.

(f) (U//~~FOUO~~) The main armed forces in the Kurdistan Autonomous Zone (KAZ) are under the control of the KDP and PUK. Both groups maintain a military wing run by their respective defense ministries in Irbil and As Sulaymaniyah. The KDP is supported by donations from Kurdish communities overseas and some international aid.

(3) (U) Organization and Deployment

(a) (~~S//NF~~) The KDP military wing, called the Falak, is estimated to have the ability to surge to around 33,000 regular soldiers, and possibly up to 50,000 when village militia are included. The Turkish military estimates the KDP's total military

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manpower at 42,000 soldiers. The KDP's Peshmerga Command controls two regional commands: a Western Command located at Dohuk, and an Eastern Command located at Irbil.



(U) KDP Ground Order of Battle

(b) (~~S//NF~~) NOTE: Kurdish military structures are flexible; the size of units can vary. Terms used to describe Kurdish peshmerga units can vary, depending on which dialect of Kurdish or which language (e.g., Turkish, Arabic) they are being described in.

(c) (~~S//NF~~) The Western Command controls 6 Supays (each equivalent to a light infantry regiment, with 2500-3500 fighters),

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a 3000 member Special Force, and a smaller unit. The Eastern Command consists of 4 Fermandes (each equivalent to a U.S. light infantry brigade, with 3500-5000 fighters). Each Supay or Fermande appears to be assigned a geographic area of responsibility, such as a city or district. Other elements under the control of the Peshmerga Command are: a Partisans Force of 300 personnel (with 5 subordinates), a Guards Unit of 750 personnel (with 3 subordinates), an independent Special Force of 1900 personnel (with 3 subordinates), and a 4000 man Special Regiment (2 subordinates).

(d) ~~(S//NF)~~ Each Supay (and probably each Fermande) is assessed to contain three Hez's (equivalent to a U.S. light infantry battalion, with approximately 400 or more fighters) and each Hez in turn is composed of 3 Teps (each is equivalent to a light infantry company) and possibly a combat support company that employs the battalion's mortars and heavy machineguns. The KDP's antitank (AT) systems, which include both recoilless rifles and ATGMs, may be employed by independent AT battalions. The KDP is also believed to possess three independent Supays and three independent Hez's (NOTE: KDP ground force unit structures and strengths are speculative in some cases, given a lack of detailed 1.4c).

(d) ~~(S//NF)~~ The Turkish military claims that the KDP has two artillery "battalions" directly subordinate to its Peshmerga Command: the 1st Artillery Battalion is headquartered in Zawita (365400N 0430900E), with a battery in Spilik (364000N 0442000E); and the 2d Artillery Battalion is headquartered in Sari Rash (350000N 0450800E). These "battalions" are reportedly equipped with older howitzers and 82-mm and 120-mm mortars. Any indirect fire weapons will be used partisan-warfare style (singly or in pairs) and are unlikely to appear as traditional 4- to 6-weapon-firing batteries. Even though the KDP may have ammunition stocks sufficient to support guerilla or partisan mountain-warfare, they are unlikely to have enough assets to support extended, conventional, mid-intensity warfare.

(f) ~~(S//NF)~~ The KDP Falak is reportedly divided into three types of ground force units:

(i) ~~(S//NF)~~ Standing army units, which are composed of draftees selected on the basis of family affiliation, tribe, and aptitude.

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(ii) ~~(S//NF)~~ Peshmerga (guerilla; translated as "he who faces death" in Kurdish) units, which consist of non-uniformed irregulars.

(iii) ~~(S//NF)~~ KDP Special Forces units that consist of uniformed soldiers with infantry training and are capable of conducting light mountain-infantry operations, sabotage, anti-armor ambushes, and infiltration behind enemy lines. KDP Special Forces soldiers wear red berets and standardized uniforms with complete load-bearing equipment (LBE).

(4) (U) Weapons and Equipment

(a) ~~(S//NF)~~ The KDP is lightly armed with assault rifles, sniper rifles, light and heavy machineguns, antitank grenade launchers, guided missiles, and landmines. Its forces have limited amounts of medium-caliber mortars, limited amounts of 106-mm recoilless rifles, and two battalions worth of older howitzers (see table 1). Some recoilless rifles are mounted on Toyota pickup trucks. The number of field artillery pieces, rocket launchers (RLs), and air defense (AD) systems which include captured 23-mm heavy machineguns and SA-7s is also limited. Their utility is limited by a lack of ammunition. Because resupply of ammunition and spare parts is problematic, the KDP (like the PUK) probably purchases much of its supplies on the black market. Lack of artillery ammunition means that KDP forces rarely train with their howitzers or mortars, and they receive no training in targeting or counter-battery fire. The KDP and PUK both have obtained abandoned Iraqi Army equipment since the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Exact numbers are unknown, but it is believed that between the two groups they have acquired over 100 tanks, as well as numerous artillery pieces, and air defense systems.

Table 1. (U) Types of KDP Equipment

AK-47 Assault Rifle
G-3 Rifle
RPG-7
RPK Machinegun
PKM Machinegun
Sniper Rifle (NFI)
12.7-mm Machinegun
14.5-mm Machinegun
23-mm Machinegun
SA-7 SAM
AT-3 ATGM
"Katyusha" (107mm) 12-tube MRL

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Howitzer (NFI)
81-mm/82-mm Mortar
87.6-mm Mortar
100-mm Mortar
120-mm Mortar
106-mm Recoilless Rifle
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(b) (~~S//NF~~) The KDP uses "Motorola-type" hand-held radios, satellite phones, and cell telephones to communicate. The group's cell phone net is quite extensive; however, it is restricted to urban areas such as Salah ad Din, Irbil, and Dohuk. For radio networks, the KDP employs a daily code system. KDP field commanders use HF radios that are frequently intercepted by Iraqi, Turkish, and Iranian signal intelligence units.

(5) (U) Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

(a) (~~S//NF~~) Small unit raids and ambushes are the primary tactics employed by the KDP peshmergas. In addition, traditional mountain-fighting skills are passed from one generation to the next. KDP forces usually attack at night and will engage two adjoining listening/observation posts with two or three men while a larger force penetrates the perimeter and engages the interior line of the opposing force. The initial attack employs mortar fire, RPGs, multiple rocket launchers (likely 122 mm), "Katyusha" rockets (likely 107 mm), and cannon fire. ADA weapons are used in the ground-attack mode and as a diversion. After the artillery attack, KDP forces will advance on foot to conduct a raid and then retreat; however, the retreat will probably not be covered by artillery. After each engagement, the commanders routinely critique the mission in order to improve their tactics. Their goals when engaging consist of gathering intelligence, acquiring equipment, and adversely affecting the morale of their adversaries. The KDP has similar tactics, training and equipment as the PUK.

(b) (~~S//NF~~) KDP forces are capable of interdicting roads, ambushing convoys, and defending in mountainous terrain. They would be able to achieve localized tactical successes against ground forces if backed by airpower, but they would be challenged to exploit their tactical successes or to hold ground against concerted conventional counterattacks.

(c) (~~S//NF~~) The KDP has a military academy located in Zakho, where officers and peshmergas receive formal military training (3 years for officers and 6 months for peshmergas). The curriculum

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probably follows that of the former Iraqi military, which is based on 1950s British tactics and drills. Additionally, it may include technical classes on weapons common to the KDP and its enemies, as well as weapon assembly and maintenance. Both the KDP and PUK have received training from Turkish Special Forces (SF) and both groups have conducted joint anti-PKK operations with Turkish SF units in northern Iraq. The KDP has reportedly formed a Special Forces unit comprised of personnel trained by the Turks.

(6) (U) Characteristics of the Force

(a) (U//~~FOUO~~) Most peshmergas are in the service of one of the Kurdish political parties, although traditionally they fought in the service of tribal chiefs and were supported by those chiefs. These guerillas wear traditional Kurdish dress, which for men consists of loose trousers with a shirt and jacket, cummerbund, and a skullcap over which is worn a turban folded from a large square of material. Colors of clothing are frequently symbolic of the tribe, alliance, or political party: yellow is the color of the KDP and green is the color of the PUK. Younger Kurds, however, may dress more in Western fashion. Traditional dress is sometimes mixed with olive drab and woodland pattern U.S. or U.K. Battle Dress Uniforms (BDU).

(b) (~~S//NF~~) Large numbers of Kurds have served in the Iraqi military and later gained experience fighting against Iraqi forces. Other strengths include plentiful experience in mountain fighting and an excellent knowledge of the region's difficult terrain. The symbiotic relationship between the Kurds and their mountains is so strong that they have become synonymous: the Kurds' home ends where the mountains end and the Kurds as a distinct people have survived throughout history only when living in the mountains.

(c) (~~S//NF~~) Despite their reputation as accomplished mountain fighters, the Kurds lack sufficient inventories of armored vehicles, heavy weapons (fire support, anti-armor, and air defense), military transport, communications equipment, and night vision equipment. They have augmented their equipment by acquiring an unknown quantity of abandoned Iraqi Army equipment. They also do not have a cohesive or structured military organization to successfully plan and engage a conventional army. While the KDP tries to maintain both logistical and maintenance support for their weapons and other military equipment, both are insufficient to maintain prolonged, conventional warfare. Despite these shortcomings, Kurdish forces have proved to be a significant challenge to Iraqi armor-heavy offensives in mountainous terrain in

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the past. The militia nature of Kurdish forces makes their numbers difficult to verify; many are reservists or village militiamen, who join units near their home and receive only rudimentary training.

(d) (~~S//NF~~) Kurdish forces lack discipline and cohesion (from a Western perspective). For example, they reportedly have a tendency to overreach when they achieve success and to break ranks and revert to protecting their families when they feel the military situation is against them. Kurdish groups have a history of shifting loyalties/alliances and decades of insurgent combat experience, but little ability to operate as part of a conventional force.

(7) (U) Outlook

(a) (~~S//NF~~) The KDP is not assessed to be able to conduct conventional combat operations against conventional ground units without outside support. However, despite their operational deficiencies and resource shortcomings, the KDP's peshmergas would be tenacious and skilled fighters when motivated to defend their territory. They have invaluable unconventional mountain warfare expertise. The KDP is not assessed to be capable of projecting significant forces outside of its portion of the Kurdish safe haven in northern Iraq without outside assistance.


(b) (S) The KDP will seek to expand its influence over the general areas of Mosul and Kirkuk without alarming the Coalition or causing a Turkish reaction. They will gain additional weaponry abandoned by the Iraqis, and support Kurdish tribes and Kurd attempts to reclaim lost property due to Arabization. Actions will be at the small unit level, difficult to detect, and providing some plausible deniability to the political leadership. All KDP actions will also be shaped by perceived gains by their rival, the PUK.

(c) (~~S//NF~~) In the mountainous environment of Iraqi Kurdistan, the KDP could sustain a long-term, low-level insurgency.

b. (U) **Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)**

(1) Key Points

(a) (U//~~FOUO~~) The PUK's greatest threats are conventional military forces (Turkish forces currently) remaining Iraqi paramilitary and the insurgents of the Ansar



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al-Islam. Conflict with its rival Kurdish group, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) is currently assessed to be low. The PUK will also resist Badr Corps attempts to extend influence in northeastern Iraq.

(b) (~~S//NF~~) PUK soldiers are skilled in mountain warfare but lack key weapon systems, ammunition, and repair parts. They are neither well organized nor disciplined as a conventional force.

(c) (~~S//NF~~) PUK ground forces are structured similarly to U.S. Army light infantry brigades and battalions and specialize in small unit raids and ambushes.

(d) (~~C//REL TO USA, FRA, GBR and GER~~) The PUK is developing its own rocket launchers and extended-range rockets.

(e) (~~S//NF~~) PUK ground forces cannot defeat conventional forces. They are capable of achieving limited, local successes, but need external assistance to mount a serious challenge.

(f) (~~S//REL~~) PUK forces will maintain their military structure during post hostilities IOT support the political influence of the Kurdish parties in the new government. They will not target US interests, and will generally obey US directives to withdraw forces from key areas such as Kirkuk and Mosul. They will seek to exercise influence in and around the areas surrounding Kirkuk, Mosul and Tuz Khurmatu, using small elements of Peshmerga presence, allied with local Kurdish Tribes. They will also participate (in small numbers) in evicting Arabs from homes formally occupied by Kurds. These actions will be low level in nature, designed not to cause a US or Turkish reaction. Forces from both parties will seize abandoned weapons left along the Green Line, IOT bolster their capabilities. Though both the KDP and PUK have cooperated thus far, they have rarely gone more than a few years without factional infighting. Now that the regime has fallen (their common enemy), both parties will be jockeying for predominance in Kurdish politics and the new government, which will result in political tension and possibly minor infighting. Open, military conflict is not likely. As long as its goals of federalism and limited Kurdish autonomy in postwar Iraq are on the Coalition agenda, the PUK will remain a pro-Coalition force. Recently, the PUK has been more cooperative with the Coalition than the KDP.

(2) (U) Background

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(a) (U//~~FOUO~~) Jalal Talabani established the PUK in 1975 in Damascus, Syria. The PUK consists of a secular political movement and a subordinate insurgent group, which are opposed to the Saddam Hussein. Its goal is to create an autonomous Kurdistan state in northern Iraq. This group operates mainly in the As Sulaymaniyah area in northeast Iraq. The KDP, its main Kurdish insurgent rival, operates further to the northwest.

(b) (U//~~FOUO~~) The failure of the Kurds' uprising against the Iraqi Army in 1991, at the conclusion of Operation DESERT STORM, resulted in the establishment of a safe haven by the international community of the various Kurdish factions in northern Iraq. This area was reinforced by the creation of the "no-fly" zone above the 36th parallel and enforced by British and U.S. forces. Within this enclave in northern Iraq, the Kurds have been able to control their own affairs: The KDP administers the northwest portion, while the PUK dominates the southeast. Clashes broke out after 1991 between the PUK and KDP as a result of a history of political and personal rivalries and chronic mutual mistrust. This conflict has been further exacerbated by tensions over revenue from the lucrative border trade in oil, which until recently, passed exclusively through KDP controlled territory into Turkey.

(c) (U//~~FOUO~~) Relations between the PUK and KDP have improved over the last several years, particularly since 1998 when both groups signed the Washington Agreement that normalized relations between the two groups. The possibility of further fighting between the PUK and KDP is thus currently deemed to be low. However, a more serious internal threat for the PUK has been the recent emergence of the Ansar al-Islam (AI or "Supporters of Islam") group, a radical and violently anti-Western Islamic element operating within the PUK's portion of the Kurdish enclave, along the eastern border with Iran. They have been responsible for conducting assassinations and attacks against PUK forces in the border region. AI is believed to be supported by Iran as a check against the autonomous desires of the PUK. Iran regards the various Kurdish groups in northern Iraq as apostates who should be fought.

(d) (U//~~FOUO~~) Turkey is openly hostile to the idea of a future independent Kurdish state or any significant measure of autonomy for Iraq's Kurds. Iran and Syria are also against Kurdish statehood in this region due to the destabilizing influence this would have on their own restive Kurdish populations.

14b

1.4b

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1.4b	This region remains an area of significant interest for Iran and Iraq and for the other surrounding nations not only for its vast oilfields but because its plateaus and mountains (which are characterized by heavy rainfall and in winter a heavy coat of snow) provide a critical water resource for the entire region.

(e) (U//~~FOUO~~) The main armed forces in the Kurdistan Autonomous Zone (KAZ) in northern Iraq are under the control of the PUK and KDP. Both groups maintain a military wing run by their respective defense ministries in As Sulaymaniyah and Irbil. The command structure of the PUK is based primarily on seniority within its constituent tribes. Leading clansmen operate their own militia groups but owe allegiance to the PUK leadership headed by Jalal Talabani. This group is essentially urban based and concentrated on attacking Iraqi military units and elements of the AI. Donations from Kurdish communities overseas, some international aid, and intermittent funding and weapons from Iran support the PUK.

(2) (U) Organization and Deployment

(a) ~~(S//NF)~~ The PUK military wing is estimated to have an active strength of 25-30,000 guerillas, including combat support troops who are also used in combat operations. Jalal Talabani is the Commander in Chief, who supervises the Peshmerga General Command, a "Cobra Forces" special forces (SF) brigade (estimated to have two SF battalions and an artillery battalion), and a UI infantry brigade with their three Iraqi-type infantry battalions. Talabani also oversees the PUK Military Academy.

(U) PUK Ground Order of Battle

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(b)(6)

(b) ~~(S//NF)~~ Directly under the Pashmerga General Command are 24 active Fermendes (equivalent to a US light infantry brigade, with 800-1200 fighters), each of which is assigned a geographic area of responsibility, such as a city or district. Each of the brigades is assessed to contain three Leshkirs (equivalent to a U.S. light infantry battalion, with 500-700 fighters), and each Leshkir in turn is composed of three Hez (each is equivalent to a light infantry company, with 150-200 fighters) and probably a combat support company which employs the battalion's mortars (six 60-mm mortars and three 82-mm mortars), and three 12.5-mm heavy machineguns (HMG). The PUK's antitank (AT) systems, which include both recoilless rifles and ATGMs, may be employed by independent AT battalions.

(c) ~~(S//NF)~~ The PUK's special forces (SF) units based at Talabani's headquarters near As Sulaymaniyah, reportedly conducted long-range patrols, reconnaissance, sabotage, and close protection operations against the Iraqi Army. The PUK is believed to have about 17 reserve commands that are similar in size and composition to the active brigades, which also have regional assignments. The PUK reportedly also has two mobile units based in Irbil and As

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Sulaymaniyah, which contain lightly armored civilian and armored vehicles, and a military police force scattered throughout PUK-controlled territory.

(3) (U) Weapons and Equipment

(a) (~~S//NF~~) The PUK is lightly armed with assault rifles, sniper rifles, light and heavy machineguns, antitank grenade launchers and guided missiles, and landmines. As mentioned earlier, its forces have limited amounts of medium-caliber mortars and 106-mm recoilless rifles. The number of field artillery pieces, rocket launchers (RLs) and air defense (AD) systems, which include 23-mm heavy machineguns and SA-7s, mostly captured from the Iraqis, is also limited. Their utility is limited by a lack of ammunition. Because resupply of ammunition and spare parts is problematic, the PUK purchases much of its supplies on the black market. Lack of artillery ammunition means that PUK forces rarely train with their howitzers or mortars, and they receive no training in targeting or counter-battery fire. The PUK and KDP both have obtained abandoned Iraqi Army equipment since the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Exact numbers are unknown, but it is believed that between the two groups they have acquired over 100 tanks, as well as numerous artillery pieces, and air defense systems.

(b) (~~S//NF~~) PUK Equipment Inventory

Equipment Inventory	
AK-47 assault rifle	18,000
G-3 rifle	1200
RPG-7	2800
RPK machinegun	1700
PKM machinegun	900
Sniper rifle (NFI)	450
12.7-mm machinegun	20
14.5-mm machinegun	20
23-mm machinegun	2
SA-7 SAM	30
AT-3 ATGM	30
"Katyusha" (107-mm) 12-tube MRL	15
81-mm mortar	20

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87.6-mm mortar	10
100-mm mortar	5
120-mm mortar	10
106-mm recoilless rifle	15

(c) (~~C//REL TO USA, FRA, GBR and GER~~) Recent reports (since mid-July 2002) indicate that the PUK has developed its own rocket launchers and has conducted R&D on both extended-range, 122-mm rockets and on its own 274-mm large caliber rocket. Both programs have been active since at least 1996. Two "Grad" rocket launcher versions have been identified: a four-tube launcher and a six-tube launcher. The four-tube launcher uses a UNIMOG truck, and the six-tube launcher is mounted on a Mercedes cargo truck. Both launchers were constructed using components that were scavenged from equipment from the Iran-Iraq War and from Iraqi launchers captured by PUK forces since 1991. The peshmergas possess at least 6500 122-mm rockets, both Russian- and Iranian-made.

(d) (~~C//REL TO USA, FRA, GBR and GER~~) An Iraqi air defense weapons technician who defected and joined the PUK in 1996 has reportedly aided PUK rocket-development efforts. One of these efforts has involved modifications to the 122-mm rocket to extend its range beyond the 20.5-21.0-km standard range: extension of the rocket motor body, and replacement of the rear pop-out fins with eight fins, four mounted just aft of the warhead and four just forward of the rocket nozzle assembly. If fielded, this type of rocket would require a new rail launcher instead of the tubes used with standard 122-mm rockets

(e) (~~C//REL TO USA, FRA, GBR and GER~~) The PUK has also developed a large-caliber (274-mm), possibly long-range, unguided rocket, which is 3200-mm long and mounts three 122-mm warheads. The three rocket warheads are fused (probably with impact/point-detonating fuses) and a metal cap (nosecone) placed over the entire warhead assembly. This program began in 1999, but no details on current capability, numbers made, or launcher construction are known at this time. As with the fixed-fin, 122-mm rocket, this rocket would require a rail launcher.

(4) (U) Communications

(a) (~~S//NF~~) The PUK uses cell phones, handheld radios ("Motorola type"), satellite phones, and cell telephones to communicate. The group also uses a daily radio code for HF radio

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nets that are frequently monitored by Iraqi, Turkish, and Iranian forces.

(b) (~~S//NF~~) Reportedly the KDP communicates between units by using both secure HF tactical radios and nonsecure UHF hand-held radios. The exact model and capabilities of these HF/UHF radios are unknown. Some of the more common commercial VHF radios used by transnational and insurgent groups are the IC-V68 (Icom), IC-H16 (Icom), IC-V100 (Icom), TH-28 (Kenwood), TH-22 (Kenwood), FT-23R (Yaesu), FT-411(Yaesu), and DJ-195 (Alinco). It is likely that the KDP, PUK, and KADEK/PKK are using hand-held VHF radios similar to these.

(c) (U) A cellular telephone operation was established in the Kurdish area of Iraq in 2000 by the Asia Company, a private corporation. GSM-900 cellular service is available in the Kurd-controlled northern Iraqi cities of Sulaymaniyah and Irbil. Planning is underway to expand cellular coverage to the city of Dahuk in northwest Iraq and eventually throughout the entire Kurdish region. The cellular system in use in Sulaymaniyah covers about 8 km of the city and its suburbs. Cellular coverage in Irbil is probably less extensive.

(d) (U) Apart from the Kurdish area, Iraq does not currently have a cellular telephone network, although Baghdad was seeking UN approval to purchase one prior to hostilities. This severely limits KDP, PUK, and KADEK/PKK use of cellular phones as a means of communications when outside of Kurd-controlled northern Iraq. The possibility exists for these groups to use overlapping cellular phone service from other countries along the border of Iraq.

(e) (~~S//NF~~) Portable satellite telephones offer an alternate method of wireless communications that is effective in areas of the world, like northern Iraq, that lack an adequate communications infrastructure. It is highly likely that all three Kurdish groups have access to satellite telephones from Thuraya, INMARSAT, Globalstar, or AsiaSat. Thuraya GSM/satellite phones are readily available within the Kurdish region and look similar to cellular handsets. Satellite phones would most likely be reserved for KDP, PUK, and KADEK/PKK leaders and commanders, and not used by the average group member.

(f) (U) The INMARSAT-C system was introduced in 1991. INMARSAT-C provides telex and low-speed data communication services (600 bps) in a store-and-forward format. INMARSAT-C also provides Email services. The terminal can have a built-in Global Positioning

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System (GPS) or can connect to GPS equipment. Manufacturers have produced more than 50 models of INMARSAT-C terminals for a wide range of purposes including maritime and road-fleet controller management, remote monitoring and control, and report transmission.

(g) (U) The INMARSAT-M terminal was the first worldwide portable personal geo-satellite-communications (SATCOM) telephone in the form of an attaché case. INMARSAT-M provides voice, data, and fax services. The terminals use their own independent power source (batteries). INMARSAT-M terminals are also available in truck, car, and maritime/river vessel models. INMARSAT-M offers digital SATCOM for voice, fax, and data (2.4 kbps).

(5) (U) Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

(a) ~~(S//NF)~~ Small unit raids and ambushes are the primary tactics employed by the PUK peshmergas. In addition, traditional mountain fighting skills are passed from one generation to the next. PUK forces usually attack at night. They will engage two adjoining listening/observation posts with two or three men while a larger peshmerga force penetrates the perimeter and engages the interior line of the main force. The initial attack employs mortar fire, RPGs, multiple rocket launchers (likely 122-mm), "Katyusha" rockets (likely 107-mm), and cannon fire, with ADA weapons used in the ground-attack mode and as a diversion. After the artillery attack, PUK forces will advance on foot to conduct a raid and then retreat. After each engagement, the commanders routinely critique the mission in order to improve their tactics. Their goals when engaging consist of gathering intelligence, acquiring equipment, and adversely affecting the morale of their adversaries.

(b) ~~(S//NF)~~ PUK forces are capable of interdicting roads, ambushing convoys, and defending against Iraqi attacks in mountainous terrain. They would be able to achieve localized tactical successes against conventional ground forces if backed by U.S. airpower, but they would be challenged to exploit their tactical successes or to hold ground against concerted counterattacks. However, the PUK has had some limited success against a Iraqi conventional forces, especially recently when aided by coalition air strikes: It was able to cause the collapse of two forward battalions of the poorly equipped and underfed Iraqi (Regular Army) 38th Infantry Division in Al Kuwayr in early April 1996.

1.4b
1.4b However, lightly armed PUK forces collapsed and fled during the Iraqi seizure of Irbil in August 1996, when Iraqi forces used a

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doctrinal, combined arms assault, which was supported by a Republican Guard SF brigade, which led the attack.

(c) (~~S//NF~~) The PUK has a military college located in As Sulaymaniyah where regimental and brigade commanders receive formal training. The curriculum follows that of the Iraqi military, which is based on British tactics and drills and includes technical classes on weapons common to the PUK and its enemies as well as assembly and weapon maintenance. Both the PUK and KDP have received training from Turkish special forces (SF), and both groups have conducted joint anti-Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) operations with Turkish SF in northern Iraq.

(6) (U) Characteristics of the Force

(a) (U//~~FOUO~~) Most peshmergas (guerillas, translated as "they who face death" in Kurdish) are in the service of one or the other Kurdish political parties, although traditionally they fought in the service of tribal chiefs and were supported by those chiefs. These guerillas wear traditional Kurdish dress, which for men consists of loose trousers with a shirt and jacket, cummerbund, and a skullcap over which is worn a turban folded from a large square of material. Colors of clothing are frequently symbolic of the tribe, alliance or political party its wearer belongs to: Yellow is the color of the KDP, and green the color of the PUK. Younger Kurds, however, may be dressed more in Western fashion. This traditional dress is sometimes mixed with olive drab and woodland pattern U.S. or UK Battle Dress Uniforms (BDU).

(b) (~~S//NF~~) Large numbers of Kurds have served in the Iraqi military, and later gained experience fighting against Iraqi forces. Other strengths include plentiful experience in mountain fighting and an excellent knowledge of the region's difficult terrain. The symbiotic relationship between the Kurds and their mountains is so strong that they have become synonymous: The Kurds' home ends where the mountains end, and the Kurds as a distinct people have survived throughout history only when living in the mountains.

(c) (~~S//NF~~) Despite their reputation as accomplished mountain fighters, in most situations the Kurds lack sufficient inventories of armored vehicles, heavy weapons (fire support, antiarmor and air defense), military transport, and communications and night vision equipment. They also do not have a cohesive or structured military organization to successfully plan and engage a conventional army. Although the PUK tries to maintain both logistical and maintenance

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support for their weapons and for other military equipment, both are insufficient to maintain prolonged, conventional warfare. The militia nature of Kurdish forces makes their numbers difficult to verify; many are reservists or village militiamen, who join units near their homes and receive only a little rudimentary training.

(d) ~~(S//NF)~~ Kurdish forces lack discipline and cohesion: They reportedly have a tendency to overreach when they achieve success in engaging an enemy and to break ranks and revert to protecting their families when they feel the military situation is against them. Kurdish groups have a history of shifting loyalties/alliances and decades of insurgent combat experience, but little ability to operate as part of a conventional force.

(7) (U) Outlook

(a) ~~(S//NF)~~ The PUK is not assessed to be able to conduct conventional combat without outside support. However, despite their operational deficiencies and resource shortcomings, the PUK's peshmergas are tenacious and skilled fighters. They have invaluable unconventional mountain warfare expertise. The PUK is not assessed to be capable of projecting significant forces outside of its portion of the Kurdish safe haven in northern Iraq.

(b) ~~(S)~~ The POK will seek to expand its influence over the general areas of Tuz Khurmatu (and south to Diyala Province), Kirkuk and to a lesser extent Mosul, without alarming the Coalition or causing a Turkish reaction. They will gain additional weaponry abandoned by the Iraqis, and support Kurdish tribes and Kurd attempts to reclaim lost property due to Arabization. Actions will be at the small unit level, difficult to detect, and providing some plausible deniability to the political leadership. All PUK actions will also be shaped by perceived gains by their rival, the KDP.

(c) ~~(S//NF)~~ The PUK is one of the few non-national organizations that performs adequate artillery maintenance, as well as conducting its own R&D and production programs. The artillery weapons they possess, including the locally fabricated 122-mm rocket launchers, can provide limited fire support, and could remain effective as long as ammunition, repair parts, and transportation assets remain available. The PUK has demonstrated that if all three are available, its forces can accomplish the artillery missions of shooting and moving.

(d) ~~(S//NF)~~ In the mountainous environment of Iraqi Kurdistan, the PUK could sustain a long-term, low-level insurgency

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if the group were to have external support. They would be able to impose a logistical strain on conventional ground forces by interdicting roads and attacking convoys.



(U) Kurdish Autonomous Zone and Major Groups

c. (U) **Islamic Unity Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan (IMKI)**

(1) (~~S//REL TO USA and NATO~~) This longstanding Kurdish Fundamental Islamist group has splintered and renamed itself several times. It

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remains under the control of Sheikh Ali Bad al-Asia, generally controlling villages south of the Ansar al Islam (AI) enclave, around Tawilah in As Sulaymaniyah Province.

(2) (~~S//REL TO USA and NATO~~) While it has many AI sympathizers in its ranks, IMKI's recent public statements suggest moderates within the organization are trying to sever any ties, fearing this otherwise legitimate Islamist party will be labeled a terrorist ally.

(3) (~~S//NF~~) Since the early 1990s, Saudi Arabia and Iran sent funding through the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK), sometimes known as Kurdish Hizbullah, with generous cash handouts. 1.4b

1.4b

between the Islamic fighters congregating in Halabjah and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), began as early as December 1993, the precursor to the current fighting there between the PUK and the Ansar al-Islam (AI) extremist group.

(4) (~~S//NF~~) IMKI had ties to AI--mainly through hard-liner Tahsin Abd al-Aziz--but heeded a January PUK demand to cease links. Moderates, mainly Sadiq Abd-al-Aziz, became ascendant and exiled Tahsin. During the PUK/Coalition attack, IMKI fighters reportedly tried to fight off an AI incursion, but were driven from their Tawilah headquarters, which Tahsin's hardliners controlled. The PUK subsequently occupied Tawilah, probably to the consternation of IMKI officials. For its limited displays of "loyalty," the PUK will favor IMKI over IGK, and may seek to bolster the group's influence at IGK's expense. The group will seek to return to its traditional region as soon as possible, and expand into former AI regions to the extent the PUK allows it. Nonetheless, IMKI will not be a real ally to the PUK, more a wary, occasional partner. Some of Tahsin's loyal 150 fighters probably remain active in IMKI--though many of these extremists probably fought with AI and were defeated or fled--and may pose a possible future terrorist threat to coalition forces. However, the organization as a whole will scrupulously avoid the perception of extremism to avoid sharing AI's fate. IMKI will not be supportive of coalition presence.

(4) (~~S//NF~~) The group has perhaps 500 militants and 500-1,000 other members. While it has many AI sympathizers in its ranks--including Tahsin's 150 loyal fighters--IMKI has long been a legitimate Islamist party.

d. (U) **Islamic Group of Kurdistan (IGK)**

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(1) (~~S//REL TO USA and NATO~~) The IGK of Mullah Ali Bapir was formed in May 2001 after it broke away from the IMKI. It is based in Ahmad Awah, north of AI territory. IGK is pro-Iran and had dealings with AI, allowing AI fighters to traverse its territory, although not participating directly in terrorist attacks.

(2) (~~S//REL TO USA and NATO~~) Bapir is often characterized as pro-Iran and sympathizing with AI, though not overly supporting them. Like IMKI, the IGK will probably seek to minimize contacts with AI and portray themselves as a legitimate Fundamentalist Islamic party.

(3) (~~S//REL TO USA and NATO~~) IGK's military HQ was struck on the first night of coalition attacks on AI, prompting apologies from the PUK, who later made a deal for IGK to temporarily withdraw north to Darishana. While initial reports claimed 100 IGK fighters killed, they later cited 39, of perhaps some 150-300 total fighters. Reportedly, approximately 25 fighters left to join AI. IGK will likely push for a swift return to their territory and lobby Iran to push for departure of PUK troops. Some AI fighters likely fled with IGK, and some IGK extremists almost certainly remain in the group, yielding a possible, individual-level terrorist threat to coalition forces. Given the group's patronage from Iran, it will probably reestablish itself as a small political party, albeit severely weakened. IGK will not be supportive of coalition presence.

e. (U) **Iraqi Turkoman Front (ITF)**

(1) (~~S//REL TO USA and NATO~~) The ITF is a coalition of Turkoman parties, though other ethnic parties outside their umbrella exist. The Turkomen minority are scattered across north Iraq—most outside the Kurdish-controlled region. It represents the nationalist fringe of the Turkoman population, despite Ankara's insistence it speaks for all Turkomans. Despite its limited actual representation within the IZ Turkoman population, it wields great influence due to the backing of Turkey. Turkey uses the ITF (under the auspices of protecting Turkomans) as a vehicle to exert influence in the area.



(2) (~~S//REL TO USA and NATO~~) There have been years of friction between the ITF and the ruling Kurd factions, such as refusing to register ITF militia weapons or participate in the Kurdish-controlled parliament. The group is headquartered in Irbil, led by Sannan Aga.


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(3) (~~S//REL TO USA, AUS, and GBR~~) The ITF routinely opposes the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), refusing to register its militia weapons or participate in KRG institutions like parliament. Although there is no history of ethnic hatred, there have been several armed clashes and instances of vandalism between Kurds and the ITF Turkomans throughout the 1990s. The group is headquartered in Irbil, led by Sannan Aga. Its militia, the Akincilar--"Raiders"--are perhaps 1,000 strong, but the party likely has many more armed members with various degrees of training. While there are other Turkoman parties, the ITF is by far the most important given its ties to Ankara.




(4) (~~S//REL TO USA, AUS, and GBR~~) The party will continue to loudly call for greater Turkoman rights and oppose any Baghdad concessions for Kurdish autonomy. ITF members will continue to frequently complain of Kurdish harassment to Coalition forces, claims which in the early days of the postwar era proved false or exaggerated on investigation. Recent reports indicate Turkish SOF has supplied the ITF with additional small arms. It is unlikely the ITF would target US/coalition forces, but conflict with Kurdish Peshmerga is possible. Sunni Tribes will seek ITF support against Kurdish influence, knowing that Turkey will ultimately protect the ITF, and provide a counter balance.

f. (U) **Assyrian Democratic Movement in Northern Iraq (ADM)**

(1) (~~S//REL TO USA and NATO~~) Formed in 1979 to represent the estimated 100,000 Assyrian Christians in Northern Iraq, the ADM claims 5,000 members, half of them lightly armed.

(2) (~~S//REL TO USA and NATO~~) The ADM has tried to stay neutral in intra-Kurd



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fighting, but bad blood exists with KDP going back a decade. It is led by Junadam Kanna, who has participated in Kurd-controlled northern Iraq governing institutions. The ADM holds four of the five Assyrian seats in the Kurdistan Parliament. The party is based in Irbil and is represented by the color purple.

(3) ~~(S//REL TO USA and NATO)~~ The ADM has adopted a more conciliatory stance with the Kurds in recent years, and there is not a recent history of ethnic hatred between the groups. However, the ADM often trumps up claims of Kurdish harassment to justify fund-raising among the diaspora. Like the ITF and the Turkomans, the ADM is not the definitive representative of the Assyrian people, only the most powerful. The party will continue to push for Assyrian rights and reestablishing influence and settlers in the traditional "Assyrian Triangle" region southeast of Mosul. However it does not advocate an autonomous region or similar destabilizing initiatives, and should remain relatively pro-Coalition and of no threat to US forces.

2. Regional Terrorist Groups (not all inclusive).

a. (U) **Ansar al-Islam (AI)**

(1) (U) Key Points

(a) ~~(S//NF)~~ AI's current fighting capabilities are generally equal to those of a light infantry (mountain) unit.

(b) ~~(S//NF)~~ The Ansar Al-Islam (AI) group has suffered serious damage and disruption through the aggressive actions of the Coalition and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) forces over the last week. The loss and dispersal of core AI fighters, including key figures and facilitators, has left the organization in disarray. Since the strikes began, a significant decrease in voice communications has occurred between AI and its allied Sunni extremist facilitators since 28 March 2003

(c) ~~(S//NF)~~ As of 30 March, Iranian officials reportedly detained several key Ansar al-Islam (AI) members, along with 150 AI fighters, as they crossed into Iran near Bi ara. Among those captured were [redacted] (b)(6). Reportedly, the Iranians will turn over the AI personnel into Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) custody. [redacted] b 6 has been acting as AI's leader since Mullah Krekar was arrested in September 2002. [redacted] (b)(6) reportedly is the Iraqi regime's contact with AI. [redacted] (b)(6), who had earlier been reported as killed, is one of AI's senior trainers and explosives/ lethal toxins experts. The

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loss of 150 fighters reduces AI's fighting force by roughly one quarter. Iran's willingness to arrest AI leaders and crackdown on border crossings is contrary to previous covert support provided by elements within the security services.

(d) (~~S//NF~~) As of 26 Mar 03 , senior AI official Kamaran Mawlud Kakil, also known as Abu Afghani was reported killed along with six other AI fighters in the Talak area in Northeastern Iraq. In addition, AI official Mullah Ali Abd Al Aziz and other fighters were wounded at a checkpoint in Sayyid Salim. However Iranian authorities claim Abu Afghani is one of the AI officials detained crossing the Iraq-Iran border in the recent reporting on 30 Mar 03.

(e) (~~S//NF~~) At the start of the coalition/PUK offensive in northeastern Iraq, AI's strength was estimated at 700 fighters. Currently the number of AI fighters killed in coalition operations is estimated at 300, including an unknown number of "Arab Afghans" and an unknown number of wounded, captured, or detained. Casualty figures may include extremists from the Islamic Group of Kurdistan (IGK)

(f) (~~S//NF~~) AI forces are in disarray. PUK forces that overran the former AI strongholds of Sargat, Hanadin, and Damar encountered only sporadic resistance, mainly sniper fire, from the surrounding high ground. Given its dwindling range of options, the AI played what is probably its closest thing to a trump card: suicide bomb attacks. One AI fighter in Zardahal, feigning surrender, conducted a suicide bomb attack that killed three Peshmerga soldiers.

(g) (~~S//NF~~) Confronted with coalition and PUK supremacy, the loss of its secure enclave, and the possible denial of sanctuary in Iran, the AI is assessing its options for continued survival and resistance. The group will likely attempt to engage targets of opportunity, conducting suicide attacks or other terrorist missions using improvised explosive devices, while concentrating on the reconstitution of its surviving forces. Without an established base of operations in Iraqi territory, AI's ability to plan and effectively launch terrorist operations against its adversaries has been impaired. Elements reportedly headed into the mountains and caves within Iraq, and will also present a terrorist and guerilla threat. AI's long-term threat is much reduced with the removal of its sanctuary and apparent withdrawal of Tehran's patronage. Nonetheless, in the short-term, AI members seeking revenge for their eviction will probably seek to target PUK and Coalition forces in northern Iraq

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(2) (U) Recruitment and Motivation

(a) (~~S//NF~~) Most AI fighters are Iraqi Kurds who have been exposed to an extremist version of Islamic preaching that has been rising in Northern Iraq since the late 1990s. Prior to their joining AI, most fighters have lived their entire lives in the mountains; usually living simple lives as shepherds or farmers.

(b) (~~S//NF~~) Some AI fighters are of foreign origin, i.e., from Jordan, Syria, Iran, Afghanistan, or Pakistan. These foreign fighters either have traveled from their home country to fight alongside fellow extremists or are refugees (from Afghanistan, Pakistan, etc.). Some of these foreign fighters are experienced veterans from conflicts in Afghanistan (against either the United States or Soviet Union, or both), Chechnya, and the Kashmir area of Pakistan/India.

(c) (~~S//NF~~) Both type of recruits are highly motivated and are ready to die for their version of Islam. This motivation is reinforced by the local clerics who preach extremist views on a daily basis. The typical AI fighter has been taught that the PUK and other Kurd opposition parties are enemies of Islam, especially the AI's fundamentalist version. Their dream is to consolidate Iraq under a Taliban style of government.

(3) (U) Mentality and Education

(a) (~~S//NF~~) The AI fighters are not well educated. They have been raised in an area that has been under strife for close to 20 years and are educated only in Islam, farming, and violence. They have spent their lives in the mountains and valleys, thus giving them great advantage in knowledge of the terrain and surroundings.

(b) Since the average fighter has spent his life in the mountains of northern Iraq, he has survived during combat on what he can carry or procure from his neighbors. Living in this area has made him tolerant of the extreme weather and terrain of the northern Iraq.

(4) (U) Morale

(~~S//NF~~) Morale within the AI was reportedly high during its initial formation in December 2001. However, recent PUK reports have stated that morale is currently low because of the continued military engagements with the Kurds and coalition.

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(5) (U) Training

(a) ~~(S//NF)~~ Veterans from Chechnya and Afghanistan help train AI fighters. Unconfirmed reports have stated that officers and senior AI fighters received training in Afghanistan prior to the fall of the Taliban and that many senior leaders were members of al-Qaida in Afghanistan. Uncorroborated PUK reports state that refugee al-Qaida and Taliban fighters are training fighters in AI camps in northern Iraq.

(b) The typical AI fighter basic training consists of round-robin-type training in small arms, martial arts, grenades, and explosives/mines. This training is reported to last up to 45 days and includes 3- to 8-km runs, 50- to 150-km full-gear marches, and nighttime operations. Most AI fighters are cross-trained in mortars, 107-mm rocket launchers, and basic communications; however, training is dependent on what equipment is available.

(c) Special recruits, usually younger zealous recruits, receive special training in assassinations, bombings, and ambushes. Most of these recruits are willing to conduct suicidal operations. Throughout their daily activities at the camps, religious training is continuous. Many combat leaders of AI consider themselves clerics.

(6) (U) Uniforms

~~(S//NF)~~ AI fighters have not been reported to have a standard uniform. Unconfirmed reports have stated that in July 2002 AI received a shipment of combat uniforms from Iran. AI fighters are most likely to be clothed in native garb, which would enable them to "blend" back into their surroundings.

(7) (U) Weapons

(a) ~~(S//NF)~~ The primary weapon of AI is a variant of the AK series of rifles. Many leftover AK rifles from the Iran/Iraq War have fallen into the hands of the AI fighters. Other sources of AKs have reportedly come from 1.4b would most likely supply AI with older versions of AKs (AK-47) produced by the former Soviet Union. Although specific handguns have not been attributed to AI, it is more likely that they are using older Soviet-made Tokarev models and possibly 1.4b leftover U.S. M1911's. AI fighters have also been observed armed with the 1.4b version of the German G3 rifle.

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(b) ~~(S//NF)~~ AI is reported to have both heavy machineguns (HMGs) and light machineguns (LMGs). 1.4b may be supplying AI with machineguns. If 1.4b supplied, these machineguns are most likely the older Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact-manufactured guns. Imagery has shown that AI has possibly placed several DShK 12.7-mm HMGs in some defensive positions. These emplacements probably serve in both the air defense and ground support mode. PUK forces have reported observing AI fighters using the RPK or RPD 7.62-mm LMGs.

(c) ~~(S//NF)~~ AI has not been reported using any type of medium or heavy artillery. AI's main artillery system is the mortar. AI uses older Iranian/Soviet/Warsaw Pact 60-mm, 82-mm, and 120-mm mortars of various nomenclatures. PUK has reported that AI units are well supplied in mortar rounds. The heaviest weapon in the AI arsenal is the 107-mm multiple rocket launcher (MRL) (Katushya) or the Iranian-produced version of the Chinese Type 63 system. AI units have outfitted their Toyota pickups with these 107-mm systems. Mounting 107-mm launchers in the trucks is not a new concept and has been seen in military and insurgent forces worldwide. Whether AI possesses 122-mm rocket launchers is not known.

(d) ~~(S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN and GBR)~~ The smaller 60- and 82-mm mortars can be man- or animal-pack transported in the rough terrain of northern Iraq. The 120-mm mortars would require at least a light truck to carry or tow the weapon. The 107-mm rocket launchers can be broken down into man-pack loads. The launcher disassembly and assembly can be accomplished by hand, no tools are necessary.

(f) (U) It is likely that AI uses its fire-support weapons to attack targets at relatively short ranges rather than using their maximum range capabilities. Attacking targets at weapon maximum ranges would require trained forward observers and good communications. Attacking targets at shorter ranges would allow the crews to see the targets, align the weapon onto the target, and conduct any necessary adjustments for attacks. A single or pair of mortars or rocket launchers will be used to engage targets. It is unlikely that four or six weapon firing batteries are used.

(g) ~~(S//NF)~~ AI has used a version of the 106-mm recoilless rifle, which is most likely an 1.4b-produced (and former U.S.) M40 106-mm recoilless rifle. However, the SPG-9 (73-mm antitank recoilless rifle) is similar in appearance to the M40 and is a weapon commonly found in this area.

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(h) ~~(S//NF)~~ The only confirmed air defense weapon used by AI is the DShK HMG. Since most AI HMG positions are on top of mountains or hills, they can be easily used against low-flying aircraft, especially helicopters navigating through mountains, valleys, and the canyons of northern Iraq. Uncorroborated reports have stated that AI is in possible possession of an older man-portable air defense system (MANPADS).

(8) (U) Vehicles

~~(S//NF)~~ AI units have not been observed using any type of military vehicles. They have been confirmed to be using Toyota pickup trucks as their main utility vehicles, including as a platform for crude MRL and mounted HMG/LMG systems. AI also has used Toyota Landcruisers.

(9) (U) Communications

(a) ~~(S//NF)~~ The AI is reliant upon its "host" nations telecommunications infrastructure. Because of the poor state of telecommunications within northern Iraq, the AI resorts to the most basic and safest form of communication, the courier. Reportedly, the AI has provided couriers taxis for their frequent trips.

(b) ~~(S//NF)~~ PUK reports indicate AI is using cellular phone systems. Although there are no cellular phone systems or towers in the northern Iraq area, there are cellular communication systems on the Iranian side of the border. These cellular phones are possibly are part of the Global System Mobile (GSM) cellular phone system registered to neighboring countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Syria.

(c) ~~(S//NF)~~ Thuraya GSM satellite phones are readily available within the near east region. These phones can be easily confused with other mobile telephone handsets. It is highly likely AI has access to satellite telephones from Thuraya, INMARSAT, Globalstar, or AsiaSat. The average AI fighter would probably not have a phone; phones would be reserved for leaders and commanders.

(d) ~~(S//NF)~~ AI has not been confirmed using any specific type of military communication system. Unconfirmed PUK reports indicate AI units are using a very-high-frequency (VHF) hand-held radio system that operates on line of sight, and they use repeater towers located in the vicinity of the Biyara and Shram mountains. Most likely these systems are the CARACAL PRM4740. This radio is in use within Iraq and could have been acquired by the AI. Reports that AI

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units are using Arinco radios are probably in error. More than likely these reports are referring to Alinco radios. Alinco is a Japanese manufacturer of commercial mobile transceivers. It offers a wide variety of hand-held HF/VHF/UHF radios. Alinco radios have been associated with many small groups and factions. AI units, especially in static positions, are most likely using 1.4b supplied, older Soviet, and possibly U.S. wire-connected field telephones. The PUK has also reported that AI is using a frequency-hopping communications system.

(10) (U) Explosives/Land Mines

(a) ~~(S//NF)~~ AI units use antipersonnel (AP) land mines. The PUK has reported AI is using 1.4b-supplied Valmara and VS AP mines. AI units have also created improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that are used in their landmine operations. These devices are simply TNT and/or C4 material placed in a metal can, flashlight, and milk tins.

~~(S//NF)~~ AI units have also constructed pipe bombs. Several sources have stated it is easy to purchase explosives in the open markets throughout the area.

(c) ~~(S//NF)~~ AI has recently resorted to use of car bombs against the PUK.

(11) (U) Chemical

(a) ~~(S//NF)~~ AI has not implemented any type of chemical-warfare (CW) operations. Unconfirmed reports have stated that the AI is experimenting with a homemade type of AP chemical. According to PUK reports, within the town of Sargat (now controlled by PUK), specifically below an AI armory, is a small chemical lab. This is not the same suspected CW site reported in the vicinity of Khurma. This lab is reported to have a tunnel system under the facility. The PUK estimates AI will initially use chemicals on PUK leaders. Unconfirmed reports indicate AI is attempting to manufacture or modify its mortar and rocket warheads to carry chemical agents.

(b) Unconfirmed reports also indicate that members of al-Qaida are possibly assisting in CW development for AI. AI fighters reportedly receive basic training in nuclear-biological-chemical (NBC) skills, but so far use of NBC protective equipment at the training camps has not been observed.

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(c) (~~S//NF~~) According to clandestine intelligence, on 26 December 02 PUK personnel recovered at least two Italian-made "Valmara 69" anti-personnel mines planted by Ansar al-Islam (AI) in the Sayyid Sadiq area, approximately 12 miles northwest of Halabja. Personnel from the 21st Sharazur Fermande, headquartered in Sayyid Sadiq, were apparently the targets for the mines set to detonate approximately six minutes apart on 26 December. AI personnel reportedly modified the mines to disperse a chemical burning agent. This incident marks a significant refinement of AI tactics in their guerrilla war against PUK forces.

(12) (U) Weapons and Equipment Maintenance

(a) (~~S//NF~~) Weapons maintenance is reported to be high. AI maintained a heavily guarded and defended armory in the town of Sargat., however this is now occupied by the PUK. It is believed that AI lost many weapons in the recent PUK offensive.

(b) AI armorers have been able to keep a steady supply of mortar rounds issued to their field units. Most of these mortar rounds and rockets are believed to be munitions left over from the Iraq-Iran War that have been re-fused for new use.

(13) (U) Tactics

(a) (~~S//NF~~) Since September 2001, AI and PUK forces have been engaged in several small-unit engagements. Most of the fighting has consisted of hit-and-run ambush attacks or mortar/MRL interdiction or harassment bombardments. Because of the terrain and the continuous threat from Iraq, the PUK had chosen not to stage major forces or conduct large operations against the AI. However, as of late August 2002, the PUK has reportedly been planning a major strike. Currently, AI units do not have the manpower or equipment to stage a major operation.

(b) (~~S//NF~~) AI has concentrated most of its resources for defensive operations. AI units are spread through several towns and villages in the area. Each AI commander is responsible for defending his "specific" village. Because of the mountainous terrain, AI defensive positions are assessed to be nothing more than rocky outcroppings, ruins, or ditches/gullies. These positions can easily serve as strongpoints and observation points. AI commanders most likely have these positions pre-plotted, ready to use and dependent upon their mission. For example, the AI defense a village would probably appear as described below:

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(i) (~~S//NF~~) 1st Line of Defense: mines and IEDs. AI has planted AP mines on the major avenues of approach. PUK intelligence has stated they prefer to plant their mines near rocks to create more shrapnel against the attacker. Many civilians and farm animals in the area have already been killed by AI mines and explosive devices. AI units have also rigged explosives and mines in their own positions, to be detonated should their positions be overrun.

(ii) (~~S//NF~~) 2d Line of Defense: approximately 20 to 50 fighters would be located in teams and section-size units inside the village or in fighting positions on the outskirts of the village. These fighters have taken an oath to fight to the death.

(iii) (~~S//NF~~) 3d Line of Defense: the final line of defensive will be other AI units that can respond to the threatened village. For example, if Sargat were attacked, units from the village of Golp would respond by bringing DShK HMGs and mortar fire from the hills overlooking Sargat. They would attempt to lay down suppressive or harassing fire on the attackers. The remaining fighters would either run or march or load into Toyota pickups and Land Rovers to get to the threatened area. Once the third line of defenders arrive, AI commanders would plan a counterattack or reinforce their front line resistance. For the Sargat example, this would take AI commanders up to an hour to implement, including travel time of the counterattacking forces. The attackers would be under continuous mortar attack during the entire operation. Additionally, AI units have several outposts and lookout positions throughout their area of control. The attacking force could expect to be subjected to harassing fire from these positions. Note: AI's actual defense of Sargat against the PUK was similar, but their level of resistance was minimal, perhaps due to surprise.


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AI DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS



Derived from: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: X1

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(c) (~~S//NF~~) AI units construct bunkers. An AI bunker is usually covered with 1 to 2 meters of dirt and rocks. Trenches surround the bunker, which usually lead to other bunkers or positions into a village area. A typical bunker can hold 6 to 12 fighters. Sandbags are used to surround the bunker opening, trench system, and fighting positions. The following imagery shows former suspected AI positions in the vicinity of Khurma. Note the suspected weapon positions on the high ground can be used for AAA, OP, or suppressive fire operations. The second image shows a possible AI weapon position northeast of Khurma. This position appears to be the ruins of a structure, however, there also appears to be a sandbagged position to the south (lower left) of the ruins. Both of these positions are in PUK hands, but give indications of how AI fights.

(~~S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN and GBR~~) Suspected AI Positions in the Vicinity of

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1.4c

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1.4c

~~(S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN and GBR)~~ Possible AI Weapon Position Northeast
of Khurma

(d) ~~(S//NF)~~ AI units have conducted several attacks against
PUK forces. These attacks have not been in large numbers, and the
PUK has been successful in defending against them. In the early
days of the PUK/AI conflict, AI units conducted hit-and-run raids,
which did little damage to PUK forces. Since AI units have been

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undergoing training from experienced fighters from Chechnya and Afghanistan, their attacks have improved. For example, on 4 July 2002 AI units conducted a night attack on PUK forces defending the city of Halabja. PUK officers reported that AI has never conducted a coordinated attack, especially at night. AI units have also improved in conducting reconnaissance of PUK positions. At the outset of a deliberate attack against a PUK fortified position, AI forces attempt to suppress PUK defensive position with HMG and mortar fire. During the attack, AI units will attempt a diversion, while the main assault force positions for an assault. During the assault, fires are mass and units attack with rifles and hand grenades.

(e) (~~S//NF~~) The other common type of AI operation is the ambush. Since hostilities began in September 2001, AI units have frequently conducted ambushes. AI ambushes consist of mortar and infantry attacks against isolated PUK convoys and positions. Harassment from snipers is also used frequently. It is assessed that AI units are using their AK variants for these missions or the older Soviet/Iranian SVD sniper rifles.

(f) (~~S//NF~~) Whether conducting an attack or ambush, AI units practice basic retrograde operations. These operations usually consist of planting mines and IEDs during movement to the rear. Explosives are planted on likely avenues of approach by the pursuer, as well as on left-behind fighting positions or abandoned/disabled equipment. Forces pursuing AI withdrawals will also be lured into ambush sites and/or be interdicted by mortars and 107-mm MRLs.

(g) (~~S//NF~~) AI has recently employed car bombs, and suicide bombs (while appearing to surrender).

(14) (U) Conclusion

(a) (~~S//NF~~) Recent PUK and coalition operations have degraded, but probably not destroyed AI. Nonetheless, they are skilled light fighters, and up to several hundred fighters may remain.

(b) (~~S//NF~~) Confronted with coalition and PUK supremacy, the loss of its secure enclave, and the possible denial of sanctuary in Iran, the AI is assessing its options for continued survival and resistance. The group will likely attempt to engage targets of opportunity, conducting suicide attacks or other terrorist missions

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using improvised explosive devices, while concentrating on the reconstitution of its surviving forces. Without an established base of operations in Iraqi territory, AI's ability to plan and effectively launch terrorist operations against its adversaries has been impaired. Elements reportedly headed into the mountains and caves within Iraq, and will also present a terrorist and guerilla threat. AI's long-term threat is much reduced with the removal of its sanctuary and apparent withdrawal of Tehran's patronage. Nonetheless, in the short-term, AI members seeking revenge for their eviction will probably seek to target PUK and Coalition forces in northern Iraq

b. (U) **The Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK/former PKK)**

(1) Key Points

(a) (U//~~FOUO~~) KADEK's focus is to defend the limited territory it controls in northern Iraq against Turkish military forces operating in this region and against possible attacks by the rival KDP and PUK Iraqi Kurdish groups.

(b) (~~S//NF~~) The previous Iraqi government did not consider KADEK a threat and, in fact, provided limited military support to the group. KADEK is a US recognized terrorist organization, though it has never targeted US interests.

(c) (~~S//NF~~) KADEK fighters are skilled in rural and urban insurgent warfare, but lack heavy weapon systems and effective command and control. They operate in small (40-50 man), scattered light-infantry type units and specialize in raids and ambushes.

(d) (~~S//NF~~) KADEK has been weakened due to the effectiveness of Turkish counterinsurgency operations and continuing internal fractures over its role and methods. Because of this, some of its members may be defecting to the KDP and PUK.

(e) (~~S//NF~~) KADEK did not assist U.S. ground forces in offensive operations against the Iraqi Army, but is not expected to target U.S. military forces unless it mistakes them for elements of the Turkish military. KADEK units will nevertheless defend



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themselves if attacked. KADEK will seek to avoid contact with coalition forces, staying in their mountain enclaves.

(2) (U) Background

(a) (U) The Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK), known before 2002 as the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), developed primarily from the Revolutionary Youth Federation (Dev-Genc), a Marxist student organization in Turkey in the 1960s. The Turkish leftist movement had accommodated Kurdish nationalists, but the more militant Kurds (the younger, inexperienced, rural, and adventurous members) who opted for armed struggle eventually disassociated themselves from the leftists—as a result of crushing defeats by the Turkish Army. Abdullah Ocalan, an Ankara University dropout from a poor, illiterate farming family in rural southeast Turkey, founded the PKK in Ankara in November 1978. Ocalan had seen that "liberating" the Kurds was more important than supporting a broader leftist revolution throughout Turkey as a whole, and began to build an organization geared toward such a task. It was he who laid down the group's goals, strategy, and structure.

(b) (U) KADEK's original goal was to set up an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey. Even before his 1999 capture, however, Ocalan announced that the group had abandoned that objective: KADEK's avowed goal now is simply to protect Kurdish rights. Like many of Turkey's student-based urban-radical groups, the PKK initially conducted limited armed activities within the country against perceived "state collaborators" and Kurdish tribes that had historically coexisted peacefully with the Turkish government. To obtain funds, the PKK became involved in robberies and drug trafficking. However, the PKK was forced to flee Turkey in 1980, on the eve of the 12 September coup and declaration of martial law—both conducted by the Turkish military to lessen radical violence and restore stability. The PKK operated in the early 1980s out of the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon under Syrian control. While there, PKK militants trained with Palestinian fighters and then fought alongside them during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. This cooperation led to financial and political backing from Libya and training at camps in Lebanon and Syria, from where the PKK was able to plan its insurgent campaign against the heavily Kurdish-populated region in southeast Turkey.

(c) (U) The PKK began its guerilla war against Turkey in 1984 mainly from its Syrian bases, but was forced to move its base of operations after the October 1998 Adana Accords—in which Damascus agreed to stop its support for the group, in return for Turkish

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assurances that its forces would not move into Syria against those PKK bases—and as a result of the increasing effectiveness of Turkish counterinsurgency operations within Turkey. Most of the group's bases moved to northern Iraq once the Iraqi Kurds were able to establish a de facto state there after the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

(d) ~~(S//NF)~~ Most KADEK fighters are now based in northern Iraq, and the group uses the Kurdish Autonomous Zone (KAZ) as a safe haven and training locale. In the past, KADEK had often been the object of attacks by the other major Kurdish groups, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and also the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK); KADEK had even declared war against the KDP in 1995. The KDP no longer independently attacks KADEK elements; however, due to deteriorating relations between the KDP and the Turkish government. Instead, the KDP merely provides intelligence and support to Turkish Special Forces (SF) operations against KADEK. Relations are better between KADEK and the PUK: the Iranians brokered a peace agreement between the two groups in December 2000 and KADEK has been staying in the areas allocated to them, in addition to adhering to the other terms of the agreement. Turkish SF has provided training to the KDP and PUK while pressuring them to conduct operations against KADEK. KADEK has operated under a unilateral, self-imposed ceasefire for almost three years, but its cells do fight back when attacked by Turkish forces.

(3) (U) Organization and Functions

(a) ~~(S//NF)~~ KADEK consists of a political wing, the Brussels-based Democratic People's Union (YDK, formerly known as the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan or ERNK); a self-proclaimed Kurdistan parliament, the Kurdish National Congress (KNK); and a military wing, the People's Defense Force (HSK, formerly known as Kurdistan National Liberation Army or ARGK).

(b) (U) The ERNK was established in 1984 to conduct selected political violence to draw new recruits, but its hit-and-run missions in Turkey were unable to garner regional support leading Ocalan to transfer responsibility for armed operations to the ARGK in 1985. The ERNK thereafter became the PKK's political front. In 1995, Ocalan reorganized the leadership of KADEK, adding a Chairmanship Council that assists the Chairman (Ocalan) and controls all ideological, political, organizational, military, and front activities. Another organization created in 1995 by Ocalan was KADEK's Central Committee, which elects the Chairmanship

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Council from among its members for four-year terms, and is in charge of organizing and controlling all other party organizations and committees.

(c) ~~(S//NF)~~ The YDF is now composed of numerous cultural and front organizations and serves as KADEK's political propaganda, financial, recruitment, and logistical base in Europe. It has representatives in nearly every European country and controls its own newspaper (Ozgur Politika), magazine (Serxwebun), and the London-based Kurdish television channel: MEDYA-TV. The YDF raises substantial sums of money through legal businesses and illegal operations such as alien and drug smuggling and extorting money from Kurdish businesses. A small percentage of these funds are used to purchase weapons and equipment for KADEK's military wing, the HSK.

(d) ~~(S//NF)~~ KADEK receives financial assistance through donations from private individuals, charitable groups, and non-governmental organizations (NGO); much of these come from the sizeable Kurdish émigré community in Western Europe. Iran—formerly a state sponsor who until 2000 permitted the PKK to launch attacks from bases on its territory—may still provide some funding. Conservative elements in Iran had encouraged these attacks on Turkish military personnel due to Turkish support of the United States and Israel. The PKK also receives nominal support from Lebanon and Armenia. However, Syria's withdrawal of basing and financial support has hurt KADEK significantly. KADEK's current primary source of support appears to be the Iraqi government. KADEK reportedly has an office in Baghdad and the Hussein regime is also providing some military support to the group.

(e) ~~(S//NF)~~ KADEK's military wing, the HSK, is currently based mainly in northern Iraq and in the Kurdish area of northwest Iran. It was established as the ARGK in 1985, and was designed to gather the non-Marxist and often-religious Kurdish masses together and to organize them into guerilla units that would be the nucleus of a people's army. KADEK insurgents in Iraq wear a mix of military and civilian clothing; in addition, the group reportedly employs some women in its ranks.

(f) (U) PKK fighters within Turkey in the 1980s were organized in military units from platoons to regiments and operated under tight military-style discipline. There were three types of PKK units: Military Units, Local Units, and People's Defense Units. Structurally, the PKK functioned under the Central Military Council, which was in charge of the Field Commands, Provincial

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Military Councils, Regional Command Offices, and Local Stations. These military forces operated out of three forms of bases that were identified as: supportive base; main base; and operations base.

(g) (~~S~~) During this period, the PKK was able to field combat units larger than 50 men, but their command and control was poor, and as a result, commanders lacked knowledge of the battlefield. Coordination and planning were also lacking among many PKK units and coordination among lower-ranking members was not encouraged; this was due largely to the group's compartmentation and hierarchical organization.

(4) (U) Areas of Operation

(a) (U//~~FOUO~~) KADEK has effectively operated from two main regions in the KAZ. Its primary base of operations until around 1998 was in the mountains northeast of Zakho (370800N 0424100E), along the northern border with Turkey (which connected to the PKK-dominated Cudi Mountain range inside Turkey); the region north of Amadiya (370500N 0432900E), opposite the Gare and Mateen Mountains; and to the southeast in the White Mountains, which stretch between Zakho and Dahuk. Since mid-1997, Turkish incursions and more determined efforts by the KDP to force KADEK from the region have resulted in KADEK being significantly weakened, such that it no longer has any permanent bases or secure training facilities in this region.

(b) (~~S//NF~~) Since 1998, KADEK has occupied small camps in the extremely rugged Qandil Mountains of northeastern Iraq along the Iranian border, within PUK-controlled territory. KADEK's military headquarters is also in this area. While the group has small units operating in the Sirsenk Valley, they have no permanent camps there. The PUK attempted an offensive in 2001 to oust the KADEK guerillas from its territory, but after heavy losses abandoned the effort.

(c) (~~S//NF~~) KADEK is thus not a significant factor in terms of overall Kurdish capabilities against a conventional force like the Turkish military. Unlike the KDP and PUK, KADEK does not control significant amounts of territory. Whereas KADEK fighters used to mass at major camps in groups up to 500; they are now dispersed in smaller numbers at multiple locations including caves, according to the Turkish military. KADEK units are difficult to locate due to their insurgent nature, but they tend toward the Khunera (370000N 0445100E) and As Sulaymaniyah areas. Evidence of

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Iraqi government support to KADEK had been observed at a refugee camp of Turkish Kurds and KADEK fighters under Iraqi control at Makhmur (354531N 0433552E): the Iraqi Army provided air defense assets nearby to defend this camp.

(d) (~~S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR and NZL~~) There are approximately 2000-4000 KADEK fighters in Iraq (well down from recent years), mainly in the northeast area of the KAZ. Their focus is avoiding Turkish security forces, defending against possible attacks by the KDP and PUK, and maintaining the group's local support structures. They may have possessed a limited relationship with the Iraqi government, but appear to have had no defined position on internal Iraqi politics.

(e) (~~S//NF~~) Unconfirmed Turkish press reporting indicates that since Abdullah Ocalan's capture in 1999, KADEK has been having retention problems. Up to 2000 of its fighters have deserted over the last three years and many who desert are joining the KDP or PUK. To reduce the numbers of defectors, KADEK is imposing death sentences on the commanders of groups that have high desertion rates and has increased the amount of rewards for information on potential deserters. This increase in defections is a result of several factors: continuing fractures within the PKK leadership and dissent in the organization caused by its unilateral ceasefire and renunciation of armed struggle; Abdullah Ocalan's abandonment of autonomy for Kurds in Turkey, which has politically weakened KADEK; effective counterinsurgency operations and a constant Turkish military presence in northern Iraq; and the weakening of the group's military capabilities through continuous clashes with Turkish SF. If such reports are true, KADEK's efforts to stem this flow will probably have little impact.

(5) (U) Weapons and Equipment

(~~S//REL TO USA, AUS, CAN, GBR and NZL~~) KADEK troops in northern Iraq are infantry-based with older generation small arms and heavy machineguns, mines, mortars, and some shoulder-fired SAMs. They reportedly also possess some rocket launchers and captured Turkish/Iraqi air defense systems.

(6) (U) Strategy

(a) (U) KADEK's past methods focused on guerilla warfare. Laid down in the early 1980s, the group's strategy saw the battle in three stages: strategic defense, balance of forces, and strategic offense. The group's overall concept of "revolutionary

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terror" was based on conducting armed propaganda, creating a guerilla army, and developing this army into a true military force. The first phase, which lasted until approximately 1995, consisted of propaganda activities, selected political violence to attract recruits, the continuation of attacks against "state collaborators," and the beginning of preparations for an armed-engagement phase. Between 1980-84, during the early part of this stage when the opposing forces were strong and the PKK's "revolutionary forces" were weak, Ocalan consolidated the party's structure and established himself as the undisputed leader of the organization, often by employing brutal methods against dissenters.

(b) (U) The second phase, from 1995 to 2000, was designed to create zones that the Kurds could use for escape or evasion, establish alliances with other left-wing Turkish radicals, and build up the PKK's forces capable of engaging in a large-scale "guerilla war." The third phase, which was to have begun sometime after 2000, called for abandoning the defensive strategy in favor of a full-scale offensive that was expected to turn into a popular uprising. Ocalan's capture by Turkish commandos in Kenya in February 1999 (b)(3) 50 USC § 3507; his trial later that year where he was sentenced to death by a state security court for treason (the Turkish government has suspended Ocalan's execution pending the results of an appeal by his lawyers to the European Court of Human Rights); and his imprisonment since then have forced the KADEK to change its plans. In August 1999, Ocalan announced a "peace initiative," ordering members of KADEK to refrain from violence and requesting a dialogue with the Turkish government on Kurdish issues. The group's membership supported this initiative at its 7th Party Congress in January 2000. Since then the group has claimed it would use only political means to achieve its new goal-improved rights for Kurds in Turkey.

(c) ~~(S//NF)~~ During its 8th Party Congress in April 2002, the PKK changed its name to the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK). This was a bid to help erase associations with its terrorist past, and to avoid having the group's assets frozen and activities restricted (as would occur to a group designated as a terrorist organization). This was a well-timed renaming: although the European Union had designated the PKK as a terrorist organization, KADEK has not yet been added to the EU's terrorist organization list. KADEK would like the international community to believe it has shifted its focus entirely to political and civil-society issues, and it appears that the group's primary aim is simply to survive as an organization and to hold onto what it has in northern Iraq. Many KADEK members have laid down their arms in

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response to Ocalan's call and KADEK's public statements that "the armed struggle is over" illustrate this change in strategy.

(7) (U) Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

(a) (U) Up to the mid-1990s, KADEK's tactics consisted of staging rural hit-and-run attacks against Turkish military units (which were unfamiliar with counter-guerilla operations), raiding villages, and terrorizing innocent civilians then escaping into mountainous territory. KADEK enjoyed the initiative when operating in isolated parts of southeast Turkey, where it was able to choose the place and timing of its attacks. Attacks against government entities usually featured ambushes on security patrols, raids on police stations and outposts, laying mines, sabotage against infrastructure, and assassination. KADEK often preferred to conduct operations at night, engaged with fire from maximum range, and used caves in the rugged forested heights of southeastern Turkey as winter havens and weapons caches. The insurgents also used elevated vantage points to launch raids and fire on Turkish security forces.

(b) (U) Turkish forces began to more effectively counter KADEK in the mid-1990s by replacing their search and evacuation operations with area saturation operations that allowed the permanent seizing of the forested heights and the establishment of Turkish patrol bases. In response to Turkish offensive ground operations (by regular army, paramilitary, and counter-insurgency police forces) that featured encirclement operations and airborne insertions, KADEK revised its tactics. The insurgents began to operate in roving bands of up to 40 fighters that communicated with cellular telephones and were able to amalgamate into 150- to 200-strong units. These guerilla units performed rudimentary reconnaissance, with lookouts positioned on crags overlooking Turkish bases that relayed the Turks' troop movements to KADEK ambush groups. Turkish units so effectively used helicopters for airmobile operations that the guerilla lookouts learned to fire off a few magazines of ammunition when they heard the helicopters approaching; this alerted the main group to retreat in the face of the Turkish units' superior numbers.

(c) (U) In the late 1980s to mid-1990s, KADEK moved beyond rural-based insurgent activities to include urban terrorism, where it continued to target both official activities and innocent noncombatants. The group consistently targeted schools in the Kurdish region and also attacked development projects and infrastructure such as railroads, bridges, and hospitals. In an attempt to damage Turkey's tourist industry, KADEK bombed tourist

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sites and hotels and kidnapped foreign tourists. KADEK also expanded its operations during this period to Turkish diplomatic and commercial targets in dozens of West European cities. The group also targeted civilians in Kurdish towns in northern Iraq through ambushes, killings, and kidnappings.

(d) ~~(S)~~ HSK training is conducted in groups of 100-300 trainees per training cycle. Initial training lasts from 3-7 months, and is composed of instruction in small-arms fire, physical training, the use of explosives, and political indoctrination.

(f) ~~(S//NF)~~ Turkish military forces (between 2000-4000 men) occupy fixed installations and continue to target KADEK elements in northern Iraq. This has heightened existing tensions between Turkey and the KDP over fears that Turkey could intervene to block the Kurds from setting up an independent state in the KAZ. Iraqi Kurdish leaders continue to insist, however, that they only want a united, federal Iraq in the aftermath of the U.S. military offensive to topple the Saddam Hussein regime. Other factors have exacerbated this tension, such as an agreement between the former Iraqi regime and the Turkish government to create a second border crossing. KADEK probably also sees Ansar al-Islam, a radical Islamist group located in northeastern Iraq, as a threat.

(8) (U) Outlook

(a) ~~(S)~~ KADEK did not cooperate with a military effort against the Iraqi Army. In any Kurdish action against US or Turkish forces, KADEK units would be more likely to remain neutral.

(b) ~~(S//NF)~~ So long as its leader's fate remains undecided, KADEK will continue to refrain from violence and continue to transform the organization into a political party. If Abdullah Ocalan is executed or if he dies from health problems that KADEK believes were caused by his prison conditions; however, the group may resume its insurgent campaign.

(c) ~~(S//NF)~~ Despite U.S. help in orchestrating Ocalan's 1999 capture, KADEK has never targeted U.S. interests and will continue to refrain from doing so as long as Ocalan lives. The group's leaders most likely believe that the U.S. Government may be able to positively influence Turkey, or other European governments from where KADEK receives significant amounts of financial assistance. Even if KADEK does return to insurgent operations, it will probably continue to refrain from targeting U.S. personnel or activities unless it mistakes them for those of Turkey.

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3. (U) Other Regional Forces (not all inclusive).

a. (U) **BADR Corps**

(1) Key Points:

(a) ~~(S//NF)~~ The 9th Badr Corps has inefficient command and control and lacks the cohesion to effectively confront most conventional military forces.

(b) ~~(S//NF)~~ According to multiple sources, the 9th Badr Corps receives orders from SCIRI civilian leaders, the

1.4b

(c) ~~(S//NF)~~ Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim, leader of SCIRI and the 9th Badr Corps putative commander in chief, may be losing his authority over SCIRI and, consequently, the 9th Badr Corps. Foreign government reports indicate that as of last June the SCIRI leadership began to splinter, owing to the unilateral approach that Baqr al-Hakim takes to decision-making and ideological disputes. Hakim remains in charge at this point.

(d) ~~(S//NF)~~ With the defeat of its traditional enemy, the MEK, Badr Corps will be used to ensure SCIRI is well represented in a new IZ government. They will continue to monitor the activities of the now "disbanded" MEK in Diyala Province. Their main effort will be in the Shia dominated south. In the north (a supporting effort for SCIRI and Badr), efforts will include exerting influence over villages in As Sulaymaniyah and northern Diyala Province (to include Ba'qubah) through physical presence of groups of fighters. They will also attempt to extend their influence to Kirkuk and Mosul, the major population centers. Badr Corps will also be used to create instability in any new government that SCIRI finds unacceptable. Their tactics would include terrorism, intimidation and small unit ambushes, targeting local officials in villages, representatives of the new government, as well as members of the previous regime. Badr Corps does present a threat to US forces, but they will not

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seek direct confrontation with the US. They will usually exert their influence behind the scenes at the local level. If employed against US forces, their tactics would be more terrorist, than conventional. They will seek an early departure of coalition forces IOT exert influence over the new government for SCIRI.

(e) ~~(S//NF)~~ To our advantage, the PUK will most likely resist any large influx of Badr Corps into northern Iraq, as it threatens their sphere of influence. Some reports have indicated PUK Peshmerga have made groups of Badr Corps return to Iran. Nonetheless, up to several thousand Badr Corps will remain in northern Iraq, dispersed in small units primarily in the eastern KAZ. Small-scale conflict between the PUK and Badr Corps is likely if Badr attempts significant movement into the north. Badr has not historically been associated with the groups of the Islamist-dominated Halabja area, though they share the same basic operating areas.

(2) (U) Weapons and Equipment

(a) ~~(S//NF)~~ Lacking heavy weapons and equipment, the 9th Badr Corps would be unable to engage most conventional force units.

(b) (U) The corps is lightly equipped with small arms, machineguns, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and mortars. Equipment includes AK-47s, RPG-7s, 60-mm mortars, 106-mm and 73-mm SPG-9 recoilless rifles, antiaircraft weapons, and possibly antiaircraft missiles.

(c) ~~(S//NF)~~ According to sensitive reports, the 9th Badr Corps reportedly has a few T-55, modified T-55, and possibly T-62 tanks, in addition to APCs, weaponized Jeeps, and trucks.

(d) ~~(S//NF)~~ These heavy weapons may not be readily available for operations in southern Iraq. Most reportedly are either with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in As Sulaymaniyah, or with 1.4b Moving the tanks south would require planning, major logistic preparations, and approval from Kurdish 1.4b authorities.

(3) (U) Numbers, Organization, and Training

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(a) ~~(S//NF)~~ The 9th Badr Corps' traditional guerrilla-style tactics, lack of firepower, and inexperience in maneuver warfare would place it at a great disadvantage against most conventional army units. The corps tends to rely on tactics such as assassination, rocket attacks, car bombings, and sabotage. In the past, typical targets included Iraqi regime leadership, members of the military, internal security forces, and members of the Baath Party.

(b) ~~(S//NF)~~ The Intelligence Community estimates that the overall 9th Badr Corps' normal manning is 3,000-5,000 troops, with the ability to surge to 11,000-15,000. Recent intelligence suggests [1.4b] reservists for the 9th Badr Corps has increased overall manning levels, but we cannot confirm a specific number. Estimates of troop strength in the north are ~2,000, with the ability to move several thousand more across the border quickly.

(c) ~~(S//NF)~~ According to sensitive reports, some members of the 9th Badr Corps have received special forces and urban warfare training from the [1.4b]. Although 9th Badr Corps' special forces are not equal to Western special forces, their mobility and knowledge of the landscape and local traditions are strengths.

(d) ~~(S//NF)~~ As of July 2002, [1.4b] reportedly reduced 9th Badr Corps funding by 50 percent, which led to a reduction in pay and training for both the officer and enlisted corps. Since then, [1.4b] also has ordered the 9th Badr Corps to limit its activities.

(4) (U) Movement of Personnel and Equipment from [1.4b]

(a) ~~(S)~~ One method of moving Badr Corps personnel has been to fly them to the border using [1.4b] Air Force helicopters and then transport them in busses and trucks from the [1.4b] side of the border to the Badr Corps camp in Bani Pay, Iraq (350255N 0454222E), approximately 6 km south of Darbandikhan.

(b) ~~(S)~~ Another option has been to transport them overland all the way from [1.4b]. The primary method for moving supplies and vehicles has

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been to transport them overland [1.4b]
[1.4b] across the Iran-Iraq border to the
camp. [1.4b] is the most likely point of origin
for overland resupply because [1.4b] faces
the area of Iraq where the Badr Corps camp is located,
and the three primary Badr Corps supply routes all
cross the Iran-Iraq border in [1.4b].

(c) ~~(S)~~ The [1.4b] command headquartered in
[1.4b] probably exercises primary
responsibility for Badr Corps support operations. [1.4b]
ammunition and supply depots in and around [1.4b]
could provide the required materiel for transport into
Iraq. The [1.4b] probably
coordinates support from that end.

(5) (U) Principal Iran-Iraq Border Crossings

(a) ~~(S)~~ Based on [1.4c]
during the period Jan-Mar 2003, we assess that the
three road border crossings most likely being used as
primary border crossings are:

(b) ~~(S)~~ Paveh (IR) - Khurmali (IZ) // 3516N 04608E
// Loose-Surfaced/Earth Road

(c) ~~(S)~~ Pol-e Zahab (IR) - Iraq Border (vic
Maidan, IZ) // 3450N 04544E // Loose-Surfaced/Earth
Road

(d) [1.4b]
[1.4b]

(e) ~~(S)~~ All of these border crossings are
controlled on the Iraqi side by the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK), with whom [1.4b] also maintains a
relationship.

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1.4b

(6) (U) Assessment

(a) ~~(S//NF)~~ The Badr Corps lacks the leadership, manning, and firepower necessary to directly challenge a conventional military. It is capable of small unit and terrorist activity.

(b) ~~(S//NF)~~ In the absence of Iraqi formations owing to US/coalition operations, the southern opposition could seize territory or abandoned garrisons and weapons. The 9th Badr Corps aspires to occupy a city such as Basrah but realistically could occupy only small towns and villages. They have also been active recently in Al Kut, and to a lesser degree also An Nasiriyah, Karbala and An Najaf. They will continue to exploit Shia fundamentalist aspirations in the south to further their influence and infiltrate members into the area. Their effort in the north is a supporting effort. Several thousand lightly equipped Badr Corps fighters will attempt to exert influence over parts of As

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Sulaymaniyah and possible north Diyala province (to include Ba'qubah). They do pose a threat to US forces, but will avoid direct confrontation.

(c) (~~S//NF~~) It is likely the PUK will oppose and significant expansion of Badr Corps presence in northern Iraq.

b. (~~S//REF~~) **MEK.** The MEK have entered into a "Cease Fire" agreement with US forces. The MEK state that they have not resisted or fired upon US or PUK forces during this conflict. CFSOC ODA's are monitoring the MEK forces to ensure that they abide by the cease fire agreement and don't take fighting equipment or soldiers from the cantonment sites. Reports indicate that MEK are still active NE of Ba'qubah, manning checkpoints.

1) (~~S//REF~~) Cantonment Locations:

Unit Area 1: MC 5676 - MC 6876 - MC 6864 - MC 5664
Unit Area 2: NC 0371 - NC 0671 - NC 0666 - NC 0366
Unit Area 3: NC 1784 - NC 3184 - NC 3158 - NC 2258
Unit Area 4: NC 1762 - NC 2562 - NC 2255 - NC 1755
Unit Area 5: NC 1646 - NC 2153 - NC 2550 - NC 2044

4. (~~S//REF~~) Groups and factions will continue to emerge in post hostilities. The above information does is only a partial listing of active elements. Refer to the VC web site for current information.

Enclosures

a. Enclosure 1 Emerging Iraqi Leadership

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