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## ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT UNDER THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA

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USAWC RESEARCH ELEMENT  
(Essay)

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT  
UNDER THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA

by

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22 April 1966

## SUMMARY

Arms control and disarmament studies and negotiations continue in the face of the limited conflict and cold war setting of today. It is recognized that the superior U.S. nuclear power has successfully prevented a World War III and that the survivable nuclear forces of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. will continue to balance the scales of world power. However, the threat created by the progress of France and, more particularly, Red China in the development of independent nuclear capabilities, coupled with the continued mistrust between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., makes reduction of the opposing nuclear umbrellas unacceptable to either power. A further consideration of the treaty commitments of the U.S., coupled with several U.S. presidential doctrines of assistance to free peoples, reveals that the U.S. cannot enter into a plan of even conventional military force disarmament with the U.S.S.R. There is a need for a world policeman, and until the United Nations develops such a capability, the U.S. must continue to play the part in order to ensure its national security.

ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT  
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Louis Henkin in his book Arms Control: Issues for the Public (published by Prentice Hall in 1961) had the following to say about progress toward disarmament:

Never perhaps in relations between nations has any policy been so universally espoused as has the policy of disarmament. . . . Never has any policy been the subject of so much discussion and negotiation between nations. No extended negotiations have seen so little progress. No negotiations have persisted in the face of so little progress.

Both President Johnson and former President Kennedy have indicated disarmament as one of the national objectives of the United States in achieving a free and warless world, and they have relentlessly pushed study and negotiations in this field. In 1961, President Kennedy secured the formation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) as an independent element of the executive department of the United States. Mr. William C. Foster, Director of ACDA, has been the United States representative at the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee meetings. The study and policy development mission of the ACDA continues to be indicated best by the words of President Johnson in his State of the Union address of January 1964: "We must take new steps toward the control and the eventual abolition of arms."

Ardor is certainly no substitute for precision but when it comes from the President of the United States it is sufficient to keep alive the progressing search for the means to promote peace through

disarmament. The current build-up of U.S. arms and forces to fulfill overseas commitments in standing against Communist aggression has not diverted effort from the studies and negotiations toward arms control and disarmament agreements. The U.S. direct involvement in the Vietnam conflict has already been the subject of Soviet propaganda at the meetings of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva, but it has not been allowed to overshadow the primary business at hand.

In the international considerations of arms control and disarmament measures, there has been a natural division of the subject into nuclear and non-nuclear war-making means. This essay will explore the nuclear umbrellas, or deterrent, justify the retention of the U.S. deterrent and its continued improvement, and examine the possibilities of non-nuclear arms control and disarmament.

Since the late 1950's, the subject of a thermonuclear war and its effect upon humanity has received the attention of educators, authors, diplomats and politicians and--through their books, articles, and speeches--the worldwide public. Novels such as Fail Safe and movies such as Dr. Strangelove have attempted to show how easily, by human or mechanical failure, that a nuclear holocaust could be precipitated by either of the opposing nuclear forces. Civil defense exercises have predicted casualty figures in order to give an order of magnitude to their recovery planning. The British Broadcasting Corporation has reportedly just completed a movie depicting the conditions anticipated in a nuclear exchange among nations, and

the British Government is currently considering whether the movie is too horrifying to be released for public viewing.

Despite the novels, movies, and other predictions of a nuclear doomsday, a nuclear exchange has not occurred by design or accident. This record attests to the great care that both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. have apparently taken to institute fail safe methods of control of nuclear weapons. The attempted improvement of communications between Washington and Moscow with the opening of the "hot line" in 1963, is one of the few arms control measures in which agreement has been reached. Today it is contributing to world peace by being immediately available for personal dialogue between the two chiefs of states in times of crisis and doubt.

The U.S. nuclear power in readiness has been sufficiently superior to deter the Soviet use of nuclear weapons and even to force the withdrawal of the nuclear threat emplaced in Cuba by the U.S.S.R. in 1962. The hardening of the U.S. retaliatory nuclear forces and the fielding of elusive Polaris submarine forces have now been balanced by the construction of similar survivable means by the U.S.S.R. In the production of numbers of weapons, and therefore total power, the U.S. is superior. This overwhelming power is the deterrent keeping the U.S.S.R. from launching a nuclear attack against the U.S. or its allies. Maintaining this kind of superiority is not a static proposition; it is dynamic and must continue to be so until the U.S. can convince the Soviet leaders that it can stay in the nuclear arms race as long as they can and that they cannot win.

Nevertheless, the fear of a nuclear war and the prevalent belief of its futility in terms of winning vis-a-vis destruction of the human society caused the United Nations last year to request the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee to give priority to a nuclear non-proliferation treaty and an extension of the current limited nuclear test ban treaty. The Committee, meeting in Geneva since the first of the year, has temporarily set aside its deliberations on the proposals for complete and total disarmament and is concentrating on the nuclear issues at hand.

The "eighteen nation" aspect of the committee is no longer valid since France, an original member, has refused to participate in the deliberations for the past two years. Herein lies the flaw in any accord which may be reached by the seventeen nations (including the U.S.S.R.)--and may even be adopted by the United Nations. France, with its rising independent nuclear capability, is not obligated to sign such a treaty and, in fact, has indicated that it opposes any such attempt to infringe upon the rights of sovereign nations. Of course, Communist China with its strides into the nuclear field is more remote from participating in the negotiations and is even more adamant about pursuing an independent course of achieving world power and domination. As both of these rising capabilities threaten the peace of the world under the opposing nuclear umbrellas of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S., there is little room for agreement between the two major powers to limit the development or production of their nuclear weapons.



As the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. each maintain a survivable nuclear capacity to retaliate, they, through mistrustful eyes, see each other maintaining the capacity to attack. In such a situation neither power feels safe until it is convinced that its margin of superiority is sufficient to discourage an attack. The United States has increased its nuclear weapons and delivery means manyfold such that it is felt that this superior capability has been responsible for deterring Soviet overt aggression and use of nuclear weapons. In this situation, neither the U.S. with its superior capability and mistrust of the U.S.S.R., nor the U.S.S.R. with its aggressive ambition and apparent mistrust of the U.S. will voluntarily give up their nuclear capabilities or allow them to stagnate.

However, this position has not been impregnable to agreement on limiting arms control measures. Following the signing of the "hot line" agreement in June of 1963, the U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R. entered into a partial nuclear test ban treaty in August. Observance of the treaty definitely limits the ability of the parties to improve their nuclear weapons and defenses as it, in the interests of world health, severely reduces the otherwise possible contamination of the earth's waters and atmosphere. The accord secured in these two areas might be construed as evidence of successful negotiations when only a few parties are involved. However, at every other negotiation opportunity the U.S.S.R. has seen fit to cloud the issue by the introduction of a multitude of participants.

Thus, today, the world lives under two nuclear umbrellas, each fabricated of the fear of the nuclear destruction that each major power could place on the homeland of the other. The present power status makes the U.S. umbrella larger and more waterproof than that of the U.S.S.R., but both countries have been steadily improving their equipment. These shelters from the elements plus a variable waterproofing added by world opinion as aired in the United Nations have protected the world from a fatal pneumonia epidemic but they have not prevented incidents of colds and virus infections. The overt Communist invasion of South Korea and the present Communist subversion, or war of national liberation, in South Vietnam have caused and are causing expenditures of life and material resources with accompanying destruction to society, which though not of the magnitude predicted in nuclear war, still warrant preventive measures. Reallocation of the resources put into military preparedness and conflict to the peaceful needs of mankind has continued to be a major objective of all disarmament considerations.

Accepting the premise as discussed, that the opposing nuclear weapons of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are mutual deterrents promoting a degree of world stability and that neither country can risk nuclear disarmament because of the potential threat from France and Red China, what are the possibilities of at least partial disarmament of the conventional military forces? To the strategists, this consideration would mean shelving the present "flexible response" and returning to the old "nuclear response" strategy. The reduction of solely conventional military forces has not been considered in

the nuclear age disarmament talks because of the overshadowing fear of nuclear warfare. However, any reduction in the cost of the arms race is the best way to provide substantial funds to deal with the causes of economic and political strife in underdeveloped countries.

Since the United States is obviously involved today in increasing its conventional war forces, we must make certain assumptions in order to determine whether the U.S. could otherwise be free to institute all or part of conventional disarmament. In projecting ourselves into the 1970-1980 time frame we will assume that the Vietnam conflict was settled by a truce recognizing the separate and sovereign states in North and South Vietnam and that both the U.S.S.R. and Communist China indicated their desire to participate with the U.S. in negotiations to secure reductions in conventional military forces. At first thought this somewhat unbelievable assumed situation would look like a breakthrough in the eyes of U.S. disarmament negotiators. It is in the area of conventional forces that the U.S.S.R. has superiority to the U.S. and the Communist Chinese manpower resources have always seemed to be limitless. However, further thought indicates the need to consider the effects of any conventional disarmament measures upon the U.S. capability in the 1970's to protect its homeland and people and to fulfill its worldwide commitments.

In the defense of the United States, the retention of all air defense forces of NORAD is most vital for protection against nuclear attack, and therefore no reduction of forces is possible under this disarmament consideration. Conventional war forces of particularly

the naval and ground type must be retained for the defense of the homeland only in proportion to the U.S.S.R. and Red China conventional forces capable of reaching the Western Hemisphere. The lower limit of these forces would be that necessary to counter the combined Communist threat including that of nearby Cuba.

The Monroe Doctrine has committed the U.S. since 1823 to the defense of the Western Hemisphere from "outside" interference and aggression. It was reaffirmed in May 1965, by what may become known as the Johnson Doctrine. President Johnson, in reference to U.S. action in the Dominican Republic crisis, applied it to "Communitistic dictatorship" and specified "hemispheric action." This specific application of the senior doctrine is also a unilateral declaration in the interests of U.S. homeland defense which requires conventional military forces in readiness to be moved and committed within the hemisphere at any time. As the most powerful member of the Organization of American States, the U.S. must be prepared to support OAS actions and yet retain the preponderance of military means of initiative on the spot.

The U.S. is committed to share in the defense of the NATO countries by means of both nuclear and conventional military forces. The immediate threat is the military power of the U.S.S.R. and its eastern European satellites. The Soviet conventional strength is so impressive numbers-wise that any U.S. proportionate reductions under a disarmament plan would have to be viewed with caution to ensure an adequate defense for the NATO region. With this commitment,

the U.S. cannot reduce its major conventional forces under NATO in the 1970's.

Other U.S. commitments which must be considered include the philosophical pledge made by President Truman on 12 March 1947, when he told Congress: "It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." Though at the time this was being directed at the problems in Greece and Turkey, and the intended results were achieved, the Truman Doctrine continued to be a pledge which undoubtedly prevented unheard of wars.

The Eisenhower Doctrine (also known as the American Doctrine for the Middle East), was another unilateral pledge made by the United States to give a helping hand to any nation resisting Communist aggression. President Eisenhower secured the passage of a Congressional resolution in January 1957 which, in addition to economic and military aid, even pledged employment of U.S. armed forces if requested by the Middle East countries to protect their territorial integrity and political independence.

These doctrines supplement many bilateral and multilateral U.S. military aid agreements with countries throughout the world. Most of them provide for attempting to work through the United Nations and existing alliances such as NATO, CENTO and SEATO, but under no circumstances are they so limited. In each case they place a moral commitment upon the U.S. to maintain, in addition to our nuclear deterrent forces, conventional military forces capable of worldwide movement and engagement in defensive conflict.

In support of the national policy of protection of the free world and containment of Communism, the U.S. finds itself committed in Vietnam to a military action which requires more conventional forces (particularly manpower) per enemy than previous conflicts. Since such wars of national liberation are most economical from the Communist standpoint, it is prudent to assume that similar crises will be triggered by the U.S.S.R., Red China, and Cuba as the opportunities are developed. Countering these crises will require prompt and sure conventional military response. In each case the U.S. must be prepared with increased military manpower and for long sustained operations.

There is no questioning the fact that nuclear weapons are a deterrent to general war. Knowledge of the extensive destruction possible from the use of nuclear weapons, maintenance of survivable nuclear retaliatory forces, and world opinion, have made them deterrents. However, conventional military forces do not become a deterrent until they have turned back the enemy repeatedly and no doubt is left in the mind of the enemy that they will do otherwise when he tries again.

Through 1965, no proposals have been made in the disarmament negotiations for solely conventional force disarmament. Longstanding general and complete disarmament proposals treat military power across-the-board with reductions specified in both nuclear and non-nuclear means.

From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that as long as the U.S. continues to assume the role of world policeman--championing the right of self determination and freedom, and containing Communism in the interests of U.S. national security--it cannot reduce its conventional military forces in a disarmament plan, even under the protection of its existing nuclear umbrella. Further, the future of the 1970's can only show a continuing buildup of both nuclear and non-nuclear military power tempered perhaps by a period of economic retrenchment of the U.S.S.R., but exacerbated by the rising irresponsible Communist Chinese threat.

This prediction undoubtedly is most discouraging to those attempting to secure a free and warless world through disarmament. The author is firmly convinced that disarmament of any note cannot begin until the United Nations has, through evolution, achieved a degree of world government sufficient to enforce world law, settle disputes, and protect all nations with a U.N. peacekeeping force.



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