

THE AL-QAEDA ORGANIZATION AND THE ISLAMIC STATE ORGANIZATION

History, Doctrine, Modus Operandi, and U.S. Policy to Degrade and Defeat Terrorism Conducted in the Name of Sunni Islam



PAUL KAMOLNICK



The United States Army War College

The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application of Landpower.

The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduates who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers. Concurrently, it is our duty to the U.S. Army to also act as a “think factory” for commanders and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage in discourse and debate concerning the role of ground forces in achieving national security objectives.



The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national security and strategic research and analysis to influence policy debate and bridge the gap between military and academia.



The Center for Strategic Leadership contributes to the education of world class senior leaders, develops expert knowledge, and provides solutions to strategic Army issues affecting the national security community.



The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute provides subject matter expertise, technical review, and writing expertise to agencies that develop stability operations concepts and doctrines.



The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, and by serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in the analysis, evaluation, and refinement of professional expertise in war, strategy, operations, national security, resource management, and responsible command.



The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center acquires, conserves, and exhibits historical materials for use to support the U.S. Army, educate an international audience, and honor Soldiers—past and present.

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE



The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related to national security and military strategy with emphasis on geostrategic analysis.

The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct strategic studies that develop policy recommendations on:

- Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined employment of military forces;
- Regional strategic appraisals;
- The nature of land warfare;
- Matters affecting the Army's future;
- The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and,
- Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.

Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern topics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of Defense, and the larger national security community.

In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics of special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings of conferences and topically oriented roundtables, expanded trip reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders.

The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army participation in national security policy formulation.

**Strategic Studies Institute
and
U.S. Army War College Press**

**THE AL-QAEDA ORGANIZATION AND THE
ISLAMIC STATE ORGANIZATION: HISTORY,
DOCTRINE, MODUS OPERANDI, AND
U.S. POLICY TO DEGRADE AND DEFEAT
TERRORISM CONDUCTED IN THE NAME OF
SUNNI ISLAM**

Paul Kamolnick

February 2017

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted.

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010.

This manuscript was funded by the U.S. Army War College External Research Associates Program. Information on this program is available on our website, *www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil*, at the Opportunities tab.

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications may be downloaded free of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of certain reports may also be obtained free of charge while supplies last by placing an order on the SSI website. Check the website for availability. SSI publications may be quoted or reprinted in part or in full with permission and appropriate credit given to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA. Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address: *www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil*.

The Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press publishes a monthly email newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the SSI website at *www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter*.

ISBN 1-58487-744-8

CONTENTS

Foreword.....	xi
About the Author.....	xiii
Summary.....	xv
Prologue.....	1
1. Belief-System, Creed, Worldview, Doctrine.....	3
I. Introduction.....	3
II. The Al-Qaeda Organization (<i>Tanzim</i> <i>Qa'idat Al-Jihad</i>).....	5
Sunni Islamic Orthodoxy.....	5
Sunni-Salafism/"Fundamentalism".....	6
The Muwahhidun/Wahhabism/ Salafi-Wahhabism.....	6
Shaykh Scholar-Mujahid, Dr. Abdallah Azzam: The Individual Obligation to Join the Caravan in Defense of Muslim Lands: An Armed Muslim Brotherhood-Salafi-Wahhabi Synthesis.....	11
The "Base of the Jihad"; Al-Qaeda (<i>Qa'idat Al-Jihad</i>).....	17
From <i>Qa'idat Al-Jihad</i> to Bin Ladenism.....	26
From Bin Ladenism Back to <i>Qa'idat Al-Jihad</i> ? Back to the Future? Hubris, Delusion, Disaster, and the Remaking/Rebirth of a Post-Bin Laden, Post-Arab Spring <i>Qa'idat Al-Jihad</i>	35
"What is <i>Qa'idat Al-Jihad</i> ?" In a Nutshell: Fazul Abdullah and Adam Gadahn.....	44
III. Islamic State Organization (<i>Tanzim</i> <i>Al-Dawla Al-Islamiyya</i>).....	53

“Zarqawism” vs. AQO: Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi’s Worldview and Doctrine: 1989-June 7, 2006.....	57
From Non-Religious Violent Street Tough to Ultra-Sectarian Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadist Prison Tough: 1980-1999.....	61
Al-Zarqawi’s Private Jihassist Armies of the Levant: 1999-2004.....	64
Abdallah Al-Muhajir’s Ultra-Extremism in <i>Takfir</i> , and <i>Takfir</i> of the Shia	66
Abu Musa’b Al-Zarqawi’s Embrace of Abu Abdallah Al-Muhajir’s Extremism in <i>Takfir</i>	68
Zarqawism Unveiled as Doctrine and Strategy: Al-Zarqawi’s Negotiation and <i>Bay’ah</i> to Osama Bin Laden.....	72
Zarqawism: Its Three Essential Elements.....	77
“Neo-Zarqawism”: The Birth and Declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq (<i>Dawlat Al’Iraq Al-Islamiyyah</i>), and Rise of the New Emirs.....	81
Credal/Doctrinal/Policy Comparision of ISO and AQO.....	91
Apocalypticism and Mahdism in Abu Hamza Al-Muhajir and Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi.....	96
The History, Doctrines, and Worldview of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi’s “Caliphate”: May 2010-Present.....	97
From ISI to the Caliphate: Brief Organizational History.....	99
Self-Proclaimed Emir Al-Muminin Abu Bakr Al-Hussaini Al-Qurayshi Al-Baghdadi: A Brief History.....	102
Current ISO Worldview, Beliefs, Creed, and Doctrine.....	112
ISO’s <i>Differentia Specifica</i> : Four Essential Categorical Divergences from AQO.....	112
The Imminence of the End Times (Apocalypticism and Eschatology).....	113
The Caliphate Now!.....	118
The “Final Solution” to the “Shia Problem”	120
The Nearest Enemy is the <i>Ummah</i> ’s Truest Enemy!.....	123
ISO Relative Divergences from AQO.....	124


2. Terrorist Modus Operandi.....	127
I. Introduction.....	127
Terrorist Quadrangle Analysis (TQA).....	127
II. The Al-Qaeda Organization (<i>Tanzim</i> <i>Qa'idat Al-Jihad</i>).....	131
TQA, I: The “Classical” Base First Bin Ladenist “Far Enemy” Strategy.....	131
TQA, II: The AQAP “Lone Mujahid” “Far Enemy” Strategy.....	137
III. Islamic State Organization (<i>Tanzim</i> <i>Al-Dawla Al-Islamiyya</i>).....	143
TQA: The ISO “State/Caliphate-First” Strategy.....	143
3. Conclusions, Implications, and Recommendations for U.S. Government Policy and Strategy.....	167
I. Key Findings.....	167
Macro-Level Conclusion.....	167
Belief-Systems, Worldviews, Doctrines, Creeds.....	170
Strategies and Terrorist Modus Operandi.....	172
II. Implications for U.S. Government Policy and Strategies.....	177
Implications for Existing USG Policy and Strategy to Permanently Defeat AQO and its Affiliates.....	177
Implications for Existing USG Policy and Strategy to Permanently Defeat the ISO.....	181

III. Recommendations.....	191
Recommendations for Senior Military Leaders, Planners, and Strategists.....	191
Recommendations for Leader Development and Education.....	195
Endnotes.....	198

FOREWORD

Dr. Kamolnick's book is a meticulously documented investigation and comparison of the al-Qaeda Organization (AQO) and the Islamic State Organization (ISO) across three key strategically relevant dimensions: essential doctrine, beliefs, and worldview; strategic concept, including terrorist *modus operandi*; and in the final chapter, specific implications, and recommendations for current U.S. Government policy and strategy. Through this comparison, he supplies far greater clarity on, incisive analysis of, and potential answers for such key questions as: How is each terrorist entity related historically and doctrinally to the broader phenomenon of transnational Sunni "jihadism"? What is the exact nature of the ISO? How, if at all, does ISO differ in strategically relevant ways from AQO? What doctrinal differences essentially define these entities? How does each understand and operationalize strategy? What critical requirements and vulnerabilities characterize each entity? Finally, what implications, recommendations, and proposals are advanced that are of particular interest to U.S. Government strategists and professional military educators?

Dr. Kamolnick's book substantially advances the knowledge and strategy pertinent to combating these terrorist entities more effectively. I highly recommend it.



DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

PAUL KAMOLNICK is a professor of sociology at East Tennessee State University, USA, where he teaches courses in classical and contemporary sociological theory, and the sociology of global terrorism. He has published articles and reviews in *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*; *Terrorism and Political Violence*; *Perspectives on Terrorism*; and *The Small Wars Journal*. Dr. Kamolnick is also the author of two previous Strategic Studies Institute monographs focused on countering al-Qaeda-based anti-American mass casualty terrorism: *Delegitimizing Al-Qaeda: A Jihad-Realist Approach* (2012), and *Countering Radicalization and Recruitment to Al-Qaeda: Fighting the War of Deeds* (2014). He holds a Ph.D. from Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida, USA.

SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION

It is declared U.S. Government (USG) policy to degrade, defeat, and destroy two transnational adversaries that conduct terrorism in the name of Sunni Islam: the al-Qaeda Organization (AQO) and the Islamic State Organization (ISO). The present book has been written to assist policymakers, military planners, strategists, and professional military educators to more effectively accomplish that objective. Chapter 1 documents the distinct history and doctrinal beliefs of each organization; Chapter 2 examines AQO's and ISO's basic strategic concept and terrorist modus operandi; and Chapter 3 recapitulates chief conclusions, considers strategic implications, and supplies select recommendations.

AQO and ISO claim to represent the true and abiding interests of the world's Sunni Muslims (*Ahl-us Sunnah*), estimated to number 1.4 billion persons. This book finds that this is unsupported by the evidence. Instead, AQO and ISO may be conceived in the very terms of the Sunni Islam they themselves profess, as deviant criminal terrorist organizations guilty of committing reprehensible and forbidden acts, undermining Islamic interests, and besmirching rather than elevating Islam in the eyes of the non-Muslim world. A more optimistic prognosis for the future destruction of each entity is therefore warranted. The world's Sunni Muslims must make that determination, however, and define for themselves where the bounds of faith, godly fear (*taqwa*), and righteous conduct begin and end; who may or may not legitimately claim to speak and act in **their** name; and who may or may not

be deemed a genuine ally, fellow soldier, friend, or enemy in this historic endeavor.

CONCLUSIONS

Despite their common genus as violent transnational Sunni “jihadist” organizations, AQO and ISO are distinct species that substantially diverge in conceptions of doctrine and creed, strategy, and terrorist modus operandi. Doctrinally, the original AQO “idea” first arises in opposition to Palestinian-Jordanian Shaykh Dr. Abdallah Azzam’s conception of Sunni global jihadism. AQO shares with “Azzamism” a Sunni pan-Islamic ecumenical approach embodied in Azzam’s Muslim Brotherhood-Salafi-Wahhabi fusion. This mission is originally one of lumping, **not** splitting, Church **not** sect, openness **not** exclusivity, and emphasizes intra-Sunni solidarity, unity, community, brotherhood, and the tolerance of differences among all fighting elements willing to serve as force multipliers and allies within broader alliances in a now-fermenting Arab Muslim world.

AQO differs from Azzamism in two key respects. Osama bin Laden sought to create an autonomous bin Laden-led army; whereas Azzam viewed his role as one of assisting, complementing, and subordinating Arabic volunteers to the Afghan-led Islamic forces fighting against the Communist-installed and backed Afghan regime. Second, for Azzam, Palestine occupied a privileged theater of future near-term operations, whereas the original AQO, instead, de-privileged Palestine and conceived itself as an Arab-led transnational military expeditionary force, a type of Arabic jihadi Foreign Legion, serving as a force multiplier. Consequently, they deployed high-quality operatives

with advanced training possessed of the AQO world-view, belief-system, and a desire to co-opt localized insurgencies into various AQO nodes, fighting to first win Islamic lands with the intent of reestablishing an Islamic Caliphate, and eventually launching a future offensive jihad against the original infidels.

The AQO idea's second chief opponent was *jihadi takfirism*, i.e., rigidly-extremist sectarians who extravagantly accuse other Muslims of apostasy (*Ridda*). Though bin Laden's emergent "Base of the Jihad Organization" (*Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad*) viewed the Shia as a wayward and deviant sect, it did not at any time privilege a war against Shi'ism per se as the essential starting point for the purification and revivification of Sunni orthodoxy as a ruling imperium. Moreover, AQO in its training camps deliberately policed and opposed *takfirism*, and in its stead supplied indoctrination into the uniquely ecumenical AQO pan-Islamist Sunni jihadist vision of a vanguard Sunni armed organization whose singular mission was to unite disparate struggles into a broader transnational struggle to eventually restore a supranational Caliphal sovereign. The AQO idea is not exclusively Salafist, though it includes a significant number. It is not exclusively Salafi-Wahhabi or Wahhabi, though it also includes their number; it is not exclusively inspired by Sayyid Qutb, though he is recognized and honored as a pioneering jihadi thinker. It is rather a broad, transnational Church-like conglomerate whose vision, values, and mission statement prohibit extremely strict "Muslimness" tests or other instruments designed to split into ever-smaller numbers those considered virtuous enough to wage a united Sunni war against the occupying "Crusaders" of Muslim lands.

This original AQO idea was eventually transformed into a terrorist entity controlled by bin Laden and focused nearly exclusively on orchestrating highly symbolic mass casualty attacks against all Americans – civilian and military – wherever they may be found. Five key elements, according to AQO chief spokesman Adam Yahiyeh Gadahn, characterize this “bin Ladenism”: its global/international reach and membership as a type of “Islamic Internationale”; its exclusive focus on fighting America, the Crusader West, and the Jews; its lack of a written religious creed, doctrine, or specific strategy that every prospective member must agree to before joining; emphasis on the critical role of Muslim popular support for an enduring, long-term victory; and its unique privileging of, and subordination to, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (i.e., the Afghan Taliban).

Bin Ladenism is characterized by a unique mixture of profound ignorance, delusion, resentment, and hubris. It rests on a deeply flawed analogy between the United States and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and a grossly caricatured understanding of the civil society foundations of enduring American power. Moreover, there is no precedent in Sunni Islam for bin Ladenism’s signature “Far Enemy” doctrine. It was never embraced by the vast majority of existing Sunni Islamist insurgents. Bin Laden was deeply criticized from within his own ranks for having caused the practical extinction of a decade’s long effort to recruit, train, deploy, and create a global Sunni jihadist movement, and by other Salafi-Jihadists as unlawful and at the very least imprudent. 9/11 may be usefully viewed as a “lone wolf” terrorist attack and AQO’s first and last great “one-off” based in treachery, criminality, and the USG’s unpreparedness

for that plot's unprecedented use of American civil aviation as a weapon of mass destruction.

AQO's most lethal affiliate, *Qa'idat al-Jihad* in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), has amended but not ended classical bin Ladenism. There is no discernible difference from classical bin Ladenism as doctrine, and its accompanying "Far Enemy" economic attrition conception of collapsing the American economy and forcing its withdrawal from Islamic lands.

ISO, in stark contrast, is that very type of extreme ultra-sectarian *jihadi takfiri* organization AQO opposes. ISO's "idea" originates in Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's "Zarqawism," and is characterized by three principal doctrines: ultra-sectarianism, an abiding fundamental commitment to annihilate in masse all Shia Muslims, leader and lay; an unprecedented conduct of ultra-violence as a media-based spectacle; and focus on the immediate creation of an Islamic State as a base for the prophesied return of the Caliphate. Zarqawi's original notions are later extended to "Neo-Zarqawism," and its current incarnation as "Baghdadism." Four doctrines uniquely characterize the present ISO's "idea," each of which starkly contrasts with the AQO's species of Sunni global jihadism: apocalyptic and eschatological beliefs informing its sense of temporality and morality; its doctrine proclaiming the mass annihilation of all Shia Muslims; its prioritizing of the "Nearest" and "Near Enemies," and postponement of jihad against the "original *Kufr*"; and, its belief in its right to monopolize and immediately declare the Islamic State/Caliphate. These key elements of ISO's worldview and doctrine place it on the remote fringes not just of Sunni Islam generally, but also of the vast majority of Sunni global jihadist organizations.

AQO and ISO exhibit similarities as transnational terrorist entities, but as the author's Terrorist Quadrangle Analysis (TQA) heuristic confirms, they substantially diverge in their respective conceptions of strategy and terrorist modus operandi. Bin Ladenism's sequenced strategy requires the removal of U.S. and allied militaries from the Arab Muslim world and territories, thus undermining U.S. military presence, power projection, and access to energy reserves; the overthrow of so-called apostate pro-Western regimes and replacing them with orthodox Sunni Muslim governments that adhere to strict Islamic legal orthodoxy; uniting Muslim states into a supra-state caliphate that shall serve as a religio-political base for further amassing Muslim power and conducting offensive jihad to confront the remaining world of infidelity (*dar al-Kufr*); and, a sustained, permanent offensive jihad to be fought until all other forms of worship and polity are overthrown.

The USG, while still focused on AQO external operations, intentions, and capacities, has practically decimated AQO. Assisted by recent upheavals in the Arab Muslim world, AQO has apparently shifted to focus far more on the Near rather than Far Enemy. This new direction suggests a more gradual, evolutionary insurgent strategy involving a greater emphasis on preaching (*da'wa*); embedding within various ongoing rebellions and working within and through the various nationalist-Islamist currents often dominant in these theaters; and rebranding as local supporters/helpers for the rule of Islamic law (*Ansar al-Sharia*), such as has appeared in Tunisia, Yemen, and Egypt.

AQO's affiliate AQAP, while maintaining deep doctrinal affinities to AQO, has substantially departed in practice from the classic Bin Ladenist, top-down

model for carefully planned, long-term, high-visibility, strategically symbolic “Far Enemy” targeting. AQAP’s terrorist modus operandi is based in what it calls “lone jihad” or the “lone mujahid” strategy. In its essence, it combines media and non-media terrorist operations to incite, galvanize, mobilize, train, and deploy individual persons – glorified in its media operations as “lone mujahids” whose martyrdom (*Shuhada*) destines them for the highest reaches of Paradise – to commit what the vast majority of Muslims consider forbidden terrorist acts, such as sabotage, targeted assassination, mass arson, mass-casualty bombings, and a vast array of highly deviant acts generally classified within religious law as major sins and crimes, and within secular law as intentional acts of malicious, felonious criminal conduct.

The ISO’s strategy and terrorist modus operandi is carefully outlined in its inaugural online publication *Dabiq*, and ideally comprises five key stages: (1) emigration from a hostile milieu to one where sanctuary exists or can be created through terrorist acts (*Hijra*); (2) creation of the nucleus jihadist organization (*Jama’ah*); (3) destabilization of the existing “infidel” regime through inflicting mass injury (*Nikayah*) eventuating in the collapse of existing authority, and thereby fomenting chaos and mayhem (*Tawahhush*); (4) creation and consolidation of a territory, resources, and base accompanied with the immediate declaration of the Islamic State (*Tamkin*); and (5) further consolidation and expansion of the Islamic State with the immediate declaration of the Caliphate (*Khilafa*).

However, this idealized five-stage blueprint for restoring the Caliphate (*Khilafa*) was **not** followed in practice. The very nature of the ISO as an ultra-sectarian *jihadi takfiri* organization led it to hereticize (*takfir*)

virtually all other organizations, tendencies, groups, and movements. As a result, the stage of *Fitnah* (conflict, strife)—a stage not specified in their ideal model—has accompanied ISO from its beginnings in Abu Musab al-Zarqawi through each of its metamorphoses. Further, the ISO’s blueprint exhibits ambiguity regarding the precise timing for declaring a State and later Caliphate. ISO’s achievements have been substantially assisted by its fearsome and highly professional military leadership cadre, comprised of former Ba’athist military and intelligence officers, and by the revengeful anti-Sunni policies pursued by former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Kamil Mohammed Hasan al-Maliki in the context of a dramatically changed regional dynamic enervated by the “Arab Spring.”

Our findings largely support existing USG policy and strategy vis-à-vis classic bin Ladenism. What arose in its wake, however—though AQO classic “Far Enemy” attacks must still be countered—was an alternative “lone mujahid” terrorist modus operandi currently employed by AQO’s most lethal affiliate, AQAP. Current policy and strategy are sufficient to meet that latter challenge. Findings also substantially support current USG policy and strategy to degrade, defeat, and destroy ISO, though further recommendations are suggested by the present author to address its specific “stateness” dimension. Our findings also strongly support current USG explicit repeated declarations that the USG could **temporarily defeat** ISO within a brief period; however, the **permanent defeat** of the ISO idea will only occur when Iraqis themselves make the choice to create a new social compact in which its Sunni citizens are respected, represented, and protected.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Doctrine-independent recommendations include advocating well-known methods for combating terrorism. Doctrine-dependent recommendations include developing a deeper understanding of Sunni Islam, of AQO's and ISO's extreme deviance in relation to Sunni Islam, and of how Sunni Islamic orthodoxy, including some militant strands, may be leveraged to more effectively delegitimize, marginalize, and implode these unlawful criminal terrorist entities.

PROLOGUE

RELEVANCE

The present book holds relevance for military planners, strategists, and professional military educators whose mission demands a deep understanding of the strategically relevant differences between two transnational terrorist entities, the al-Qaeda Organization (AQO) and the Islamic State Organization (ISO). The only investment required is one's willingness to sequester an afternoon or two for careful reading and reflection. It is presumed that a significant sub-set of readers do not possess requisite knowledge of Islam generally, and militant Islamic politics specifically; therefore, brief expository asides and explanatory notes clarifying key Islamic religious and religio-political concepts are sprinkled throughout.

INTRODUCTION

This book analyzes the AQO (*Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad*) and the ISO (*Tanzim al-Dawla al-Islamiyya*) and proposes U.S. Government (USG) strategies for their permanent defeat.¹ AQO and ISO claim to represent the true and abiding interests of the world's Sunni Muslims (*Ahl-us-Sunnah*), estimated to number 1.4 billion persons.² It is the argument of this book, however, that grounds exist for why this need not be the case. AQO and ISO may be conceived in the theology they themselves profess as two deviant organizations guilty of committing major sins and besmirching the Islamic Call. I believe a more optimistic prognosis for the future destruction of each entity is warranted. It will be for the world's Sunni Muslims (*Ahl-us Sunnah*)

to make that determination; to define for themselves where the bounds of faith, godly fear and piety (*taqwa*), and righteous conduct begin and end; and who may or may not legitimately claim to speak in **their** name.

AQO and ISO have distinct doctrines, methodologies, and strategies of victory. Each entails distinct implications for USG strategy. This book is organized as follows. Chapter 1 documents the distinct history and doctrinal beliefs of each organization. In Chapter 2, AQO's and ISO's basic terrorist modus operandi is examined. Lastly, in Chapter 3, a summary of conclusions is first supplied, and implications and recommendations are then offered for further enhancing USG policy, strategy, and professional military educators' effectiveness in expediting the demise of these two terrorist entities.

CHAPTER 1

BELIEF-SYSTEM, CREED, WORLDVIEW, DOCTRINE

I. INTRODUCTION

The concept “doctrine” as used throughout refers to a more or less presumed “worldview” or “ideology” rooted in a set of core beliefs about how the world works, and in particular, about a presumed reality that describes the factual state of Islam and Muslims in the present socio-political, socio-cultural world. Doctrine is rooted in belief-systems: it is about what is true or false, real or unreal. Belief-systems are about statements of fact; and for their adherents, about what they take to be the definite factual reality of the world as it is. Belief-systems are not knowingly rooted in the will or intention to deceive others; they are Truth, and a Truth to be known and shared. Beliefs are not therefore deceptive, manipulative, or intentionally distorted propaganda – a form of communication, which will be discussed in Chapter 2. One can refer to an adherent as a believer, ideologue, or doctrinaire, but not a deceiver, or not an intentional deceiver at least.

The term “doctrine” is similar but distinct from the term “creed” (*aqida*) in that doctrine extends beyond orthodox beliefs that cannot be denied if one is to maintain one’s status as an orthodox adherent of a particular faith. They include religious faith but extend beyond to beliefs about past and current history as it pertains to the origins, development, rise and fall, and the current status of Sunni Muslims in the present world. In other words, it also involves certain fundamental beliefs about the how, why, and “what

for” of politics, culture, power, and violence that encompass and extend beyond the articles of creedal faith that makes one an “orthodox Sunni Muslim,” a term that seems to encompass both worldview or *weltanschauung*—literally “world picture”—captures these elements in a simple phrase and will be used interchangeably with belief-system in this course of exposition.

II. THE AL-QAEDA ORGANIZATION (TANZIM QA'IDAT AL-JIHAD)

SUNNI ISLAMIC ORTHODOXY

AQO's worldview or doctrine has been consistently propounded over the course of nearly 30 years and is contained in a number of publicly available sources. Relative to the ISO, it has been subject to extensive scholarly analysis, and a more or less rough consensus has been reached regarding its essential premise. Though simplified, the following is an accurate depiction. First, a Perfect and Final faith was revealed by the seal of the prophet, Prophet Muhammad. Second, the one and almighty sovereign, Allah (God), blessed this singular faith to conquer the Earth and eventually to establish Allah's rule, manifest especially in the maintaining of essential legal requirements and punishments contained in Allah's Divine word, the Quran and other sources and principles deemed essential to a proper legal judgment; for example, the Traditions of the Prophet (*ahadith*), consensus of the learned scholars and jurists (*ijma*), and use of analogical reasoning to infer to new cases from past judgments (*qiyas*). Third, Allah's rule on Earth as manifest in conquered lands ruled by an imperial Muslim religio-political sovereign, the Caliph, represented the singular triumph and exclusive example of Allah's word, law, and sovereignty. That Islam is the perfected final faith—revealed through the perfected final prophet and his immediate companions and successors; blessed by the singular sovereign Allah to conquer and rule; and to be manifest in an earthly Caliphal imperium charged with upholding and further spreading the worship of Allah—is an essential

starting point for discerning the AQO worldview. Contained here is an inarguable premise within Sunni orthodoxy that Allah is the one and only God, and that Muhammad is his final messenger.

SUNNI SALAFISM/“FUNDAMENTALISM”

A “Salafist” sub-set of Sunnism is also key, however. Salafism as a genus—despite its varieties—is manifest in the belief that Islam reached its noblest and purest expression in Prophet Muhammad’s own exemplary conduct (*Sunnah*), and those of his closest companions and the first three generations of his successors known collectively as *al-salaf al-salih* (the pious ancestors).³ Salafists seek to emulate these truest and most faithful exemplars of the Prophet’s Message, and believe that genuine Islam—Prophet Muhammad’s Islam—requires that one adhere as faithfully as possible to what is known of their sayings and doings, without amendment. To introduce innovation (*bida*) to what is believed to be the Prophet’s own exemplary path (*Sunnah*), or “the prophetic methodology” (*manhaj*), is to insinuate an imperfect present into the perfected past.

THE MUWAHHIDUN/WAHHABISM/ SALAFI-WAHHABISM

The reformist *Muwahhidun* (Oneness of *Allah*) or “*Wahhabi*” movement established by the neo-Hanbali Najd Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792) and his faithful adherents and proponents furnish an essential re-statement of the orthodox Sunni fundamentals in their most rigorous form.⁴ These consist in the following. Chief among al-Wahhab’s con-

tributions was his reconceptualization of the manner in which “faith” or *Iman* – what it actually means to believe – is to be proven as fact. This also applies to its opposite – *Kufr* (unbelief/infidelity), and whether *takfir* (apostasy, heresy) is declared against persons accused of such. Al-Wahhab declared that genuine faith is not merely a matter of an internal belief – belief of the heart or the mind – of those twin creedal essentials comprising the *Shahada* or first pillar of Islam – Allah is One, and Muhammad is his final messenger. Private confessions of faith are necessary, but insufficient. Faith must also and especially be manifest publicly through active worship of Allah in public utterance, as well as deeds that openly signify the operationalization of the principle of Allah’s Oneness (*tawhid*) in one’s life activities. Other pillars of Islam – the obligatory five prayers (*salat*), obligatory giving of alms (*zakaat*), obligatory fasting on Ramadan (*sawm*), and the obligatory pilgrimage (*Hajj*) – are essential dimensions of faith in action and as action.

Failure to actively and correctly worship Allah may indicate ignorance, error, moral weakness, or coercion, and an active program of education, instruction, and moral rectification may be required. This is the function of preachers and learned scholars (*ulema*), and the Call to *Tawhid* (*da’wa*). However, to voluntarily and intentionally deny in one’s mind, heart, tongue, or hand these practical manifestations of faith; to willfully and knowingly deny the worship of Allah through these visible signs of submission and surrender, is to be guilty of infidelity (*Kufr*). It is to deny Allah what is owed to Allah. It is to be guilty of disloyalty, infidelity (*Kufr*). For al-Wahhab, the rigorous enforcement of all practical dimensions of worship, including but extending far beyond an internal conviction of belief, is

therefore essential to proving one's faith in Islam. The question of what exactly constitutes idolatry (*shirk*), distinctions between greater and lesser *shirk*, and the lawful and prudent means for combating *shirk*, are core theological questions at the heart of the present schism between AQO and ISO.

At the core of al-Wahhab's preaching and program for reforming Islam is the essential master concept that Judaism, and later Islam, bequeaths to the world: the concept of God's/Allah's Oneness (*tawhid*). *Tawhid*, according to al-Wahhab, following Shaykh ul Islam Ibn Taymiyyah's (d. 1328) original coinage, comprises three integral dimensions: Allah's Oneness as Sovereign Creator, Sustainer, Provider (*Tawhid al-Ruboobiyyah*); Allah's Oneness as Sovereign Lord worthy of exclusive worship (*Tawhid al-Uloohiyyah*); and Allah's Oneness as His Unique Names (*Tawheed al-Asma' was-Sifaat*).⁵ The implications al-Wahhab derived from this re-statement of Sunni orthodoxy was profound, highly controversial, profoundly unsettling, and even revolutionary for his present milieu. The opposite of *tawhid*, and the greatest of sins in Islam which even Allah does not forgive, is the sin of worshipping/ associating other deities with Allah (*shirk*). The absolute uncompromising monotheism represented by al-Wahhab's *Muwahiddun* reformist movement demands monolatry. It is unsparing in its denunciation and disavowal of, and obligation to, uproot *shirk*.

Theologically armed with a re-conceptualized notion of *Iman* as faith, as actualized in essential worshipful acts and rituals; and *Tawhid* actualized in beliefs and actions displaying loyalty to the Singular Absolute Sovereign that is Allah as Creator, Lord, and Unique and Ineffable Names; al-Wahhab and his *Muwahiddun* movement proceeded to purge the Saudi

landmass and its immediate environs. Sharing a divine kinship with Islam, we find the “People of the Book/Covenant/Divine Scripture” (*Ahl al-Khitab*). Jews, Christians, and often Zoroastrians, though deemed guilty of adulterating original scripture were—owing to their adherence to worshiping a singular Deity—granted the right to retain ancestral faiths and practices, though not in Prophet Muhammad’s ancestral homeland. Though subject to submission and humiliation displays, and liabilities to their further expansion and preservation, these groups could maintain their worship in their status as *dhimmi*s required to pay a “protection” or head tax, the *jizya*.

Toleration, even if intolerant, was not to be extended any further, however. For the *Muwahhidun* followers of al-Wahhab, the true eternal, abiding threat to Allah’s Sovereignty does not come from the original infidels (original *Kufr*)—obvious enemies from without and against whom jihad, both defensive if necessary and offensive if legal and prudent, be waged.⁶ True, targets **outside** the faith included sorcerers, magicians, and others claiming intercessory powers that the *Muwahhidun* claimed were the exclusive prerogative of Allah. However, **within** the faith, the *Muwahhidun* waged war against Sufi mysticism and its doctrines and practices granting mystics and holy men intercessory powers. And, also against the Shia—those partisans of the Prophet’s son-in-law Ali, the fourth Caliph—who based in unique theological conceptions endowing and privileging the Prophet’s family with divinely-sanctioned spiritual powers, engaged in reverential treatment and worship of saints, shrines, and tombs, and attributed divine qualities and powers to an infallible Imamate.

For the followers of al-Wahhab—the *Muwahhidun*—the genuine, abiding, and eternally greatest threat is this **internal** enemy—this **nearest** enemy. At best, it is the one who **claims** Islam, but who is either a pretender (the hypocrite), or an innovator (*bida*) (the heretic). At worst, it is a Muslim apostate (*murtadd*) who willfully, with complete knowledge, publicly disavows essential tenets of *tawhid* as conceptualized by al-Wahhab and, if unrepentant, is guilty of Islam’s greatest sin: apostasy (*ridda*). The narrowness of the *Muwahhidun* bridge to salvation—rooted in its unique conceptions of *iman/Kufr*, *Sunnah/bida*, *tawhid/shirk*—narrows the distance between salvation and sin, salvation and heresy, and salvation and apostasy.

It is not just in Islam that the true enemy of genuine faith arises from within. It is the unique nature of orthodoxy (literally, “correct belief”) that gives rise to the fact that it is what is closest, not furthest and most obviously distant, from one’s essential core tenets that genuinely threatens one’s foundations. One only has to recall the very origins of the concept of the satanic in the Gospel of Matthew’s denunciation of the Jewish Pharisees,⁷ or the rise of the Reformation and its inauguration of bloody centuries of intra-Christian warfare, to understand an essential sociological law explaining the intensity of conflict: i.e., that a feared and dreaded treason **within** mobilizes far greater enmity, and policing, than the expected and prepared for enemy **without**; again, the smaller the differences that divide, the greater the perceived injury those smaller differences make.⁸

This depiction of Sunni theological orthodoxy, Sunni conservative Salafism, and Muhammad al-Wahhab’s *Muwahhidun* movement provides the essential theological background required for under-

standing precisely how the AQO and ISO dip from the same well – Sunni, Salafi-*Muwahhidun*/Wahhabi – but with varying foci, in quite different doses, and with quite different additives that led to novel synthetic organisms.⁹ It marks an essential point of departure required to understand their last shared common ancestor before their marked divergence as species, and eventually with additional mutation, as contemporary terrorist entities claiming to represent the worldwide Sunni (*Ahl-us Sunnah*). Our first task is to describe the terrorist species *Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad* (AQO). To do so, we will trace a brief history that begins with Abdullah Azzam and ends with the codification of Osama bin Laden's mature "Far Enemy" doctrine.

SHAYKH SCHOLAR-MUJAHID, DR. ABDALLAH AZZAM: THE INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATION TO JOIN THE CARAVAN IN DEFENSE OF MUSLIM LANDS: AN ARMED MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD-SALAFI-WAHHABI SYNTHESIS

Dr. Abdullah Azzam is the Palestinian-Jordanian Shaykh, scholar, charismatic preacher, and inspirational organizer whose firebrand sermons and passionate calls for mobilization against the Soviet Communist-installed and militarily backed Afghan regime, provides the entre point for understanding AQO's mature doctrine.¹⁰ Besides the qualities listed earlier, there are three essential contributions Azzam made toward AQO. First, Azzam characterized the armed Muslim opposition to Soviet occupation as a defensive jihad (*jihad al-daf*),¹¹ and authored **the** key legal opinion (*fatwa*) – backed by evidence from the Quran, authoritative traditions (*ahadith*), and scholarly consensus (*ijma*) of all four Sunni schools (*mad'haab*)

of jurisprudence (*fiqh*)—requiring participation in the anti-Communist jihad as an individual obligation (*fard 'ayn*) devolving on every able-bodied, capable member of the Muslim community (the *Ummah*). This opinion, *Defense of Muslim Lands: The First Obligation After Iman*, was vetted by highly-prestigious senior religious scholars, and provided what became the contemporary restatement of the classical jurisprudence governing the waging of defensive jihad.¹²

Second, Azzam re-conceptualized the concept of “defensive jihad” to justify military jihad against all existing non-Muslim governments ruling over majority or minority Muslim populations. For this Shaykh, and Sunni orthodoxy generally, once a land has been conquered and ruled by Islam, it forever remains a permanent territory belonging to the Abode of Islam (*Dar al-Islam*) and Allah’s True Faith. Azzam’s conception of a nation’s “Muslimness” is essentially populist-territorial, and it is not the existence or non-existence of Islamic law, but the existence of a Muslim populace that defines the “Muslimness” of this land. Having a people, and a land, what is needed is the restoration of the state governed by the Sharia or legal prescriptions and proscriptions enjoined by the Quran and learned jurists and legal officials. Of special importance to the Brotherhood, to Azzam, and to many that would later be enticed to AQO’s call, was what was regarded as the great catastrophe or *nakhbah* that befell the indigenous Palestinian population following the creation of the State of Israel in 1948; and over the next several decades, the degradation, humiliation, and powerlessness befalling a Palestinian population uprooted, and now a diasporic people unwelcome in other lands and occupying permanent refugee camps. While many Muslim peoples now living in non-Muslim lands would eventually be

encompassed in Azzam's transnational call to individual Muslims to assist brothers and sisters fighting to recover, secure, or restore Muslim-ruled states or statelets in Chechnya, Bosnia, Kashmir, and the Philippines, for example, Palestine was without question at the very heart of Azzam's mission. It was the next stop, after Afghanistan, which the caravan enjoining defensive jihad should travel.

Azzam's affiliation with and assimilation of a pan-Islamic and ecumenical conception of the Muslim *Ummah* likely derives from his Muslim Brotherhood roots. This earliest modern pan-Islamic organization, conceived and founded in 1928 by the Egyptian school teacher Hassan al-Banna, arose as a direct response to his revulsion toward the European colonization of formerly Islamically-governed territories and their broader Western, secular, scientific civilizational imports that demoted and delegitimized a conservative Islamic-centered polity, culture, and social order. As a form of anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, anti-secular, conservative religious social movement, the Brotherhood eventually spread to dozens of nations, and pioneered a variety of reformist strategies for re-Islamizing these secular liberal colonial-oriented states.

Azzam was also influenced, like many others of his generation—as noted in his published writings—by the emergence of a uniquely radical variant of Brotherhood thought and activism originating in the writings, personal example, and inspired followers of the Egyptian literary intellectual and totalistic Islamic philosophical system builder Sayyid Qutb.¹³ It was Qutb who decried the gradualist, reformist, cultural, and educational Islamization strategy of the existing mainstream Brothers, and in its place, appropriating key concepts from secular revolutionary thinkers like Marx and Lenin, and also the thought and writings of

the Pakistani Islamist intellectual Mawlana Mawdudi, he argued in favor of the creation of an elite vanguard leading a comprehensive revolution against the existing Muslim and Western orders. This total revolution was required to reinstall what Qutb believed had been a Past Perfect Quranic revelation that owing to contemporary forms of non-Allah-centered sociocultural, sociopolitical order was subverted and completely extracted from current history. Qutb claimed that a modern ignorance of Allah, a modern *Jahiliyyah* or Age of Ignorance, one analogous to that Arab pagan and polytheistic ignorance preceding the Truthful Revelation received by the very first Quranic generation, had now enveloped all existing Muslim societies. The overthrow of this Modern *Jahiliyyah* by a Revolutionary Vanguard re-immersed into the now-hidden truth of Allah's Absolute Rulership, was the method required for a complete liberation.

The modern *Jahiliyyah* is defined by Man's rule over Man, subject to the tyranny of Man's vicarious whims and oppressive and unjust instincts, and ensconced in materialist ethics. It was Man's absolute and complete dependence on God's Absolute Sovereignty – the Rule of Divine Law and the Divine Legislator – and complete and total submission to this Absolute, that is the liberating condition of Man's emancipation from the Rulership of Man, and its replacement by the Absolute Sovereignty of God. Gone would be the alienated social order evacuated from the contemporary world; present would be the absolute authority of Allah at the level of Rulership, Legislation, and Sovereignty. Qutb's principal contribution, then, was to propose an amendment to Ibn Taymiyyah's, and later Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab's, tri-partite conception of *Tawhid*. Added to Allah's Unicity as Sole Creator,

Sole Lord, and Uniquely Named, is Allah's character as Sole Divine Ruler/Legislator/Law-Giver and Law-Maker, captured in the Qutbist employed concept *Hakimiyyah*.

Qutb claimed that it was this fourth dimension of *tawhid*, *Hakimiyyah*, then, that truly provides the missing master key explaining in total the abyss in which existing Islam has fallen, and despite a somewhat enviable material success, the vacuousness, spiritual putridness, and worship of Man typified by the Western mind, philosophy, and sociopolitical order remains. We shall see that this Qutbian *Hakimiyyah* straddles the AQO versus ISO divide, and each finds in it a means of legitimizing the violent overthrow of every existing Muslim order. For now, however, we return to the remaining Azzamist contributions to the AQO Doctrine.

Third, Azzam viewed his role as one of assisting and complementing the Islamic forces fighting against the Communist-installed and backed Afghan regime, and not one of creating an autonomous Arab army that would usurp existing forces and impose its will, vision, and particular Islamic creedal beliefs on these indigenous forces. Melting into the fabric of the Afghan jihad and assisting in the recruitment of Arab manpower to its cause, Azzam played the role of catalyst, charismatic preacher, and a scholar-mujahid, not an imperious and distant commander demanding obedience to an alien cause. Solidarity with the Afghan mujahidin, and the willingness to accede to their unique cultural milieu and in solidarity fight the forces of the invading Communist *Kufr*, was essential to his mission.

Finally, Shaykh Azzam was remarkable for his obsessive fascination with and prolific contribution to what may be called jihadist martyrology. As ably

documented by David Cook,¹⁴ ample precedent exists within Islam for the production of a unique form of literature, which exalts, celebrates, and creates a virtual cult around the superlative and extraordinary rewards that accompany those who willingly sacrifice themselves on the field of jihad. Killing in the process of one being killed is viewed as a means of salvific action, a means of worshiping Allah and receiving in exchange for one's life an eternal paradise resplendent with the sumptuous delights befitting a noble knight upholding with one's life, honor, and wealth – Allah's True Word. The virtues, delights, and superlatives of jihad as salvific martyrdom are another contribution, we shall see, that also spans the AQO-ISO divide.

To summarize, Azzam's main contributions to the AQO Doctrine are the following: authoring the legal opinion (*fatwa*) justifying defensive jihad (*jihad al-daf*) in Afghanistan as an individual obligation (*fard 'ayn*); his conception that this defensive jihad was obligatory not just in Afghanistan but in all former Muslim-conquered territories and peoples, now under the sovereignty of non-Muslim rulers; his prioritizing of the Palestine question as central to the *Ummah's* concerns; and Azzam's Muslim Brotherhood-influenced conceptions that first include commitment to an anti-colonial, anti-imperialist, pan-Islamic *Ummah*, conceived broadly and in non-sectarian terms in opposition primarily to the original *Kufr* – European Christianity and secularism in particular – and not in opposition to other Muslims on the basis of their strictness in adherence to "Wahhabi" or Salafist orthodoxy. In addition, the Qutbist legacy identifies the militant requirement to privilege Allah's Sovereign Rule as an element of fully restoring the Islamic State.

THE “BASE OF THE JIHAD”; AL-QAEDA (QA’IDAT AL-JIHAD)

Al-Qaeda, or *Qa’idat al-Jihad*, is the name given for a type of expeditionary or mobile global army – the Revolutionary Sunni International fighting force – that emerged in 1988 from the coalescence of several fighting organizations from various lands who, having determined the Afghan jihad was nearing its end, sought to create an enduring organizational form to permanently institutionalize an elite army of Islamic fighters – a kind of Islamic Foreign Legion.¹⁵ The idea behind this organization, whose Founding Minutes make for fascinating reading, was to basically seed various theaters of jihad with a highly-skilled, highly trained cadre of Islamic fighters whose goal was to support and direct armed fighters toward the overthrow of non-Muslim or so-called apostate governments and supplant them with governments based on the primacy of Islamic law or Sharia, and the rulership of Muslim sovereigns. These Islamic insurgents, guerrillas, or “jihadis” differed from the vast majority of insurgents by privileging a transnational, pan-Islamic, *Ummah*-based concept. Just as in a previous century, Karl Marx imagined workers who had no nation to defend, or to lose, since it was only the universality of the proletarian class and international communism that represented the perfected future; this *Qa’idat al-Jihad*, though composed of specific fighters from specific lands, was to disprivilege land, people, nation, and all other affiliations other than their soldiery on behalf of Allah wherever Allah’s soldiers would be needed. These quality recruits would be force multipliers, a kind of highest quality recruit, a kind of special forces operative, who would embed, train, supply, and assist

in the triumph of polities whose identities would melt into and become one node in a broader re-imagined, and recreated proto-caliphate – though one in its very earliest and barely sketched features. This Army of Allah, or Islamic Army, had its marching orders.

The very name of this entity – The Base of the Jihad – tells all. This Base, as the Founding Minutes, By-Laws, and Constitutional Charter confirm,¹⁶ was initially understood in a military sense as a military base camp for general and more highly qualified recruits that would – through a process of recruitment, vetting, training, supplying, and deploying – make the critical difference. The ultimate religio-political goal is repeated in these earliest documents and is unambiguous: “To Raise the Word of Allah until it is triumphant throughout the Earth.” Moreover, the means to pursue this ultimate objective is also unambiguous: “Jihad.” Other organizations can be involved in relief work, *da’wa* work, political work, educational work, and cultural work. However, *Qa’idat al-Jihad* is exclusively dedicated to jihad as a fighting vanguard, as *Mujahidin* – those who engage in military jihad – and nothing else. This self-definition is aptly represented in the term “jihadism” or “jihadist,” and in its adjectival form “global jihadism” and “global jihadist.” This may also be expanded slightly and accurately to “global Sunni Islamic jihadism.”

Contained in this formula is *Qa’idat al-Jihad’s* ultimate identity as a distinct type of fighting organization; but also contained, as we will soon see, are the seeds of its ultimate conflict with other types of “jihadist” organizations whose passion and mission is far closer to that espoused by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and other variants of Salafism. The first fracture was between Osama bin Laden and Shaykh Azzam over

the precise nature and function of this newly constituted "Base." Abdullah Azzam envisioned a more protracted involvement, with the Afghan mujahidin as a supporting player and not the organizer of a separatist contingent of "Arab" Afghans.¹⁷ This tension was evident at the time of the formation with bin Laden of the Peshawar-based processing center, or Services Center (*Maktab al-Khidimat*), for newly arriving Arab recruits seeking to "join the caravan" in the Afghan theater. Bin Laden had already embarked, despite his lack of battlefield skill, on creating what amounted to a private Arab army under his direct command, and also a "legend" surrounding his actual role and accomplishments in a particular battlefield engagement in Baiji against Soviet units. Lauded in the Arab press at the time, bin Laden would (assisted by his financial largesse and unique persona as a tall, wealthy, soft-spoken, deeply pious, apparently world-renouncing, martyrdom-seeking son of a Yemeni-born Saudi billionaire father) continue to cultivate his image. It was this emergent private army that bin Laden had assembled that became part of the founding moments of "The Base." A second dispute arose between Shaykh Azzam and bin Laden over prioritizing the next phase of the jihad. For Azzam, Palestine beckoned; for bin Laden, despite definite allegiances shared over the centrality of Palestine for Islam, it was other newly emerging fields that beckoned, including the desire to wage jihad in his ancestral homeland Yemen, its southern half then occupied by a Marxist state.

On November 24, 1989, Shaykh Abdullah Azzam, who was a hugely significant inspiration for the mobilization of Sunnis for the Afghan jihad, and more generally the "defense of Muslim lands," was assassinated along with two of his sons by a road-

side improvised explosive device (IED). His enemies had earlier placed, and his allies discovered, a bomb planted behind the lectern where he was to deliver the mosque sermon. The case remains unsolved, with various potential perpetrators in conflict with the Shaykh being suggested: Ayman al-Zawahiri and the Egyptians from Islamic Jihad; Osama bin Laden; or others annoyed by his alleged role in mismanagement or sequestering of funds for his beloved Palestinian cause. Azzam's absence was still notable by its presence in having inspired a reawakening to the necessity of defensive jihad, and those other contributions noted previously (i.e., his legal argument, expansive conception of defensive jihad and Muslim lands, and his passionate jihadism and martyrological beliefs and writings). The scholar-mujahid Dr. Abdullah Azzam's exit further narrowed the leadership cadre and self-definition of the post-Afghan phase of this newly anointed global transnational conception of individualized Sunni jihadism.

Bin Laden's other fracture was not with what might be termed "Azzamism" or the Azzamist variant of Sunni global jihadism. In fact, it shares with Azzamism a Sunni ecumenicalism that has far more to do with the Muslim Brotherhood quest for a unified Muslim front, without strict tests of "Muslimness," beyond obvious adherence to general tenets and a militant desire to confront the cultural and socio-political imperialism encased in the modern, secular, liberal-democratic – or Communist – state. The awakening of a stupefied Muslim *Ummah* through education, proselytization, organization, and "lumping" rather than "splitting" based on acid tests of "Muslimness," was the path, it was believed, for eventually reconquering the state for Islam. This Sunni pan-Islamic ecumenical

approach was embodied in Azzam's Muslim Brotherhood-Salafi-Wahhabi fusion; it was also at the heart of how bin Laden envisioned the al-Qaeda mission and doctrine.

The danger bin Laden detected came from the Salafi-Wahhabi direction. It was represented in individuals, organizations, movements, and parties who focused far more on the internal enemy than the external. In common with the mission of the *Muwahiddun* movement and also many Salafist-inspired offshoots, these groups espoused what from bin Laden's and many orthodox Sunni Muslim quarters is a deviant and extremist penchant to emphasize sectarian purity, which taken to its extreme lends itself to what may be termed *jihadi takfirism*, or excessiveness in accusations against and the willingness to *takfir* other Muslims. This takes two forms. First, bin Laden's emergent *Qa'idat al-Jihad*, though viewing the Shia as a wayward and deviant sect, did not at any time privilege a war against Shi'ism per se as the essential starting point for the purification and revivification of Sunni orthodoxy as a ruling imperium. The problem of Shi'ism was a secondary matter that would await the necessary focus that now must be placed on the permanent mobilization of Sunni mujahidin, and arousing of the Sunni Muslim masses (*Ummah*), to rid formerly Muslim-conquered lands of their infidel overlords. From Spain to Indonesia, from Mauritania to Afghanistan, European and Westernized secular hegemony first required removal. Seeding the battlefields of jihad as empires or secular despotisms receded or collapsed – for example, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia, and South Yemen – was the order of the day. The fight against *Kufr*, and original *Kufr* at that, required a Sunni Muslim “church” in the sociological sense –

that is, a broad-based, inclusive united front whose criteria for membership was significantly broad and its defining feature—the readiness and willingness to join the caravan and fight in the path of Allah to make Allah’s Word supreme in the lands now occupied by the Cross.¹⁸ This United Sunni Front approach applied equally to the key goal of recovering the now Zionist-occupied land of Palestine and the revered holy sites, including *al Haram Al Sharif* (Temple Mount) and Al Aqsa Mosque in occupied Jerusalem (*al-Quds*).

Additional sources of bin Laden’s penchant to demote the struggle against the Shia likely includes *Qa’idat al-Jihad’s* unique post-9/11 dependence on, and sometimes exploitation of, their Iranian captivity. Several high-ranking members of al-Qaeda remained in what amounted to house arrest with restricted privileges, and al-Qaeda engaged in tit-for-tat bargaining which in recent times, has led to the freeing of some of the USG’s most sought after terrorist operatives.¹⁹ Additionally, bin Laden’s mother is Syrian with an Alawite background, and his known filial tenderness cannot be discounted. However, it is likely that these factors were secondary to bin Laden’s vision of the true and genuine enemy—the original *Kufr*. To this day, al-Qaeda’s jurisprudence strictly differentiates Shia culpability. Known and openly professing leaders engaged in war against the Sunni are legitimate targets, and any and all who assist in the support of subverting or denying Allah’s Rule are to be fought. However, the Shia masses are not targeted, owing to the fact that like the vast majority of Sunnis, they are likely ignorant of the fundamentals of their own faith, and this ignorance is a hindrance for *takfir* of the Shia lay masses. Unlike the ISO, as we shall soon see, there is no cosmic backdrop asserting that venomously

treacherous Shia are the chief antagonists responsible for present Sunni humiliation and powerlessness. In short, a principled focus on targeting the Shia on grounds of their apostasy, heresy, or supposed treasonous nature is rarely to be found.

The predominant sectarian threat for bin Laden occurs within the people of the Sunnah (*Ahl us-Sunnah*). Sunnis attacking Sunnis on the grounds of their insufficient creedal orthodoxy, or orthopraxy, led to one negative object lesson in "How not to do jihad!" This involved what began and could have ended as a successful Sunni overthrow of a secular Westernized Algerian Government, but instead led to a bloodbath, which eventually consumed the jihadi movement itself. *Takfir, Qa'idat al-Jihad* proclaims, can be applied to the ruling regime and its loyal and obvious supporters in the security forces, police, and essential internal security apparatuses. This "*takfir* of the regime," however, is very different from the "*takfir* of society." In the Algerian case, *takfir* was eventually extended, by the bloody logic of its own extremist premises: first to apply to the regime; then to supporters of the regime; then to families – including women, children, and the elderly – of the supporters of the regime; and finally, to those denying that these persons are guilty of apostasy from Islam. The Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA; from the French, *Groupe Islamique Arme*; Arabic, *Jama'ah al-Islamiyya al-Musallaha*) became for al-Qaeda in the mid-to-latter 1990s, and many other Sunni jihadists including senior Sharia official and operative Atiyatullah al-Libi, a negative case study confirming the fratricidal consequences that arise from what is in effect, an uncontainable logic. This highly policed containment of *takfirism* within the "Base of the Jihad," and indoctrination into the uniquely pan-Islamist

Sunni jihadist vision of a vanguard seeding various insurgencies and rebellions against secular autocratic rule, meant that al-Qaeda would be viewed as a broad, inclusive, Sunni-armed organization whose singular mission was to unite disparate struggles into a broader transnational struggle to eventually restore a supranational Caliphal sovereign empowered to continue the long-term battle against the original *Kufr* and continuing infidelity. This *Qa'idat al-Jihad* is not exclusively Salafist, though it includes a significant number. It is not exclusively Salafi-Wahhabi or Wahhabi, though it also includes their number; it is not those exclusively inspired by Sayyid Qutb, though he is recognized and honored as a pioneering jihadi thinker. *Qa'idat al-Jihad* is rather a broad, transnational church-like conglomerate whose vision, values, and mission statement do not employ "Muslimness" tests, purity tests, or other instruments designed to split into ever smaller numbers, those who are considered virtuous enough to wage a united Sunni war against the occupying "Crusaders" of Muslim lands.

One excellent recent example illustrating this fact is exemplified by Adam Yahye Gadahn's (whom we shall later encounter) account of his own journey to becoming a Muslim, and his answer to the question "Who is a Muslim?"

Strictly speaking, one becomes a Muslim by pronouncing the *Shahaadah* even if there is no one around to hear you; announcing it publicly is not a precondition of your Islam to be correct for you to be considered a Muslim in the eyes of God. Islam isn't like the man-made and adulterated religions which have elaborate and formal initiation ceremonies presided over by priests and rabbis. Therefore, as soon as one comes to the realization that Islam is the truth and all other reli-

gions today are either false or abrogated, he must declare right then and there that there is no God worthy of worship but God and Muhammad is the Messenger of God (from the bottom of his heart and with full conviction), and preferably in Arabic too (if possible), because death can come suddenly and unexpectedly and one never knows when his time might come; and then after that, he is obligated to start discharging his Islamic duties as they come along [italics in original].²⁰

Gadahn's view that becoming a Muslim is first achieved as a deeply private act based in the "leap of faith" one makes when professing a complete belief in a chosen creed, is **not** based in the Hanbali, Salafi-Wahhabi tradition **at all**. It is essential to the Hanafi School, the most "liberal" of schools; but for Salafi-Wahhabis, it is a deficient and even heretical approach to faith (*Iman*). As described earlier, faith for them consists of "faith as action," and only exists when beliefs are externalized in visible, essential worshipful practices that uphold the doctrine of Allah's Oneness (*tawhid*), and also, the complete disavowal and disassociation from infidels, and avowal and love of worshipers of Allah's Oneness (*al-wala wa'l bara*).²¹

Shared by al-Qaeda and the worldwide Muslim *Ummah* is the basic Quranic idea that humans are created with great moral liabilities, though they may aspire to righteous faith and virtuous conduct. Muslims, like all human beings, are prone to sin; and as sinners, are fallible, morally weak, prone to hedonic excess, slow to forgive, and quick to anger. This basic conception of a constrained and limited capability for human goodness, and the expectation of a permanent though malleable imperfection, explains the general mercy and leniency with which bin Laden and the senior theoreticians, religious scholars, jurists, and

ideologues associated, extend to the Sunni *Ummah*, and often though with far more restriction, beyond. The project of purifying the *Ummah* of its moral foibles and failings shall continue under the guidance of the righteous scholars and Callers (*Du'at*; preachers).

FROM QA'IDAT AL-JIHAD TO BIN LADENISM

A final move is required before fully understanding the doctrinal DNA of *Qa'idat al-Jihad*: the shift from *Qa'idat al-Jihad* to what may be infelicitously described as "Bin Ladenism." Let us examine this more closely. *Qa'idat al-Jihad's* original uniqueness was defined by its conception as a military expeditionary force serving as a seeding mechanism, force multiplier, and insurgency-directing organization that sought to transform locally focused national liberation movements into transnational Islamic insurgencies. Following Gompert and Gordon,²² we may distinguish among four insurgency types: purely local, based on purely local resources; local, with external help; local, transformed with internal and external support into insurgency conceived in transnational, pan-Islamic terms; and global, pure and simple. *Qa'idat al-Jihad* is an excellent example of the "Type 3" insurgency strategy, whereby high-quality operatives and training enter the fray and, based in its unique worldview and belief-system, transform localized insurgents into nodes seeking to win Islamic lands back generally, and placing this local context, in those general Sunni Islamic terms. However, this original *Qa'idat al-Jihad* underwent what in retrospect must be deemed a great metamorphosis.

“Bin Ladenism”: The Far Enemy is the Master Key to the Near Enemy.

The original *Qa'idat al-Jihad* “idea” arose as a joint endeavor anointed in two meetings during August 1988 as referenced in the Founding Minutes cited earlier. Over the next decade, this same organization morphed into a terrorist entity controlled by Osama bin Laden, whose uniqueness consisted in creating a global conspiratorial underground terrorist organization. Its “brand” was based in a type of high-quality, carefully-planned, mass casualty terrorist attack designed to monopolize the world’s attention, galvanize the world’s Sunni population, and following successive assaults in a prolonged war of attrition, destroy the American economy, eliminate the American presence in the Muslim Middle East and North Africa (and other lands), eliminate American support for the Zionist occupation of Palestine, and over time, permit the operational space to recommence the struggle against apostate Muslim regimes, ultimately restoring Islamic hegemony and the long-lost Sunni Caliphate throughout the now-recovered Muslim world.

In retrospect, one may identify two unique causes leading to the rise of “bin Ladenism” and the end of the original *Qa'idat al-Jihad* “Base” concept. The first is the failure of the violent Sunni armed movements in the 1980s and 1990s to overthrow their respective governments. This was especially the case with current Emir Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, who took what was a haunted, hunted, and bankrupt Egyptian Islamic Jihad organization, and folded it into bin Laden’s enterprise. Joining *Qa'idat al-Jihad* in this manner amounts to turning a vice – weakness, marginalization, implosion, repression – into a virtue, i.e., re-focusing one’s

jihadi animus in the direction of a very different enemy known not for its nearness and apostasy, but for its distance and original infidelity. The second was bin Laden's personal agenda.

Bin Ladenism's Anti-Americanism and Anti-Semitism: Irrational, Delusional, and Strategically Disastrous.

Osama bin Laden's mature doctrine arises in the 1990s. Its precise motivation is hard to discern, but some hints exist. Beginning during the Gulf War commencing on August 2, 1990, and soon thereafter, the original *Qa'idat al-Jihad* was transformed into bin Laden's primary vehicle for plotting and planning mass casualty terrorist attacks against the United States. This began with his apparent humiliation and possible deep resentment at the Saudi Government rejecting his offer to use his private Mujahidin army to counter Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in July 1990. This was seconded by his apparent humiliation and resentment of having the United States invited instead to fight against Saddam's forces, and during the early to mid-1990s, to be stationed in various installations and barracks on Saudi soil. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's (KSA) reasoning was that, given Saddam Hussein's formidable military and the likelihood that Saudi Arabia was also vulnerable to invasion, instead of the mere paltry force of bin Laden's hundreds or few thousands, a massive counter-attack was required for which only a great power could muster. Further, there is precedent within Sunni jurisprudence for seeking the assistance of infidel forces if deemed necessary and prudent if one is under attack by other infidel forces. Saddam's Ba'athist regime was nominally

secular, pan-Arabist, socialist, and anti-Persian racialist, and it was therefore permissible and legal, and the KSA managed, though with controversy, to secure from the Wahhabi senior *ulema* (religious scholars) the necessary *fatwa* (legal opinion) permitting such.²³

By the early-1990s, then, one can say the transition occurred from the original *Qa'idat al-Jihad* to bin Ladenism as defined through an obsessive "Far Enemy" focus on attacking the United States as the closest path to freeing Muslim lands and occupied Palestine. Relocating to East Africa between 1992 and 1996, al-Qaeda organized attacks in Aden in 1992 and in Somalia in 1993. Bin Laden would soon declare war against America in a 1996 message; and through a new self-named "World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders," he would issue a February 1998 *hukm* (judgment) asserting the Islamic legality of killing Americans, civilian or military, anywhere they may be found. The world would soon discover that this legal cover was necessary for what would come to be bin Laden's inaugural signature attack: the August 11, 1998, major mass casualty terrorist attacks against two United States embassies, one in Kenya and the other in Tanzania.²⁴

Over the next 13 years until his targeted killing by the United States on May 2, 2012, bin Laden would strike or attempt to strike the United States, its chief allies, and interests. From the most infamous attack, 9/11, to others less spectacular or prevented, the newly defined enemy would be the supposed "Crusader-Zionist," "Zio-Crusader," or "Crusader," and bin Ladenism's chief charge would be repeated *ad infinitum*: that this supposed Zionist-Crusader alliance was waging an unrelenting, hateful, deceitful war against Islam; that bin Ladenism represented the chief adversary of this global conspiracy to subvert and destroy

Islam and Muslims; and that the Mujahidin carrying out these attacks were the vanguard of the worldwide *Ummah*, nobly engaged in fighting the mortal enemies of Islam in order to prevent the humiliation, subservience, and utter degradation of Islam and Muslims. Bin Laden actually believed—or certainly seemed to believe—these things, not in words destined for public consumption, but in words intended for the privacy of secret communiques or spoken within his privileged inner circle.

Bin Ladenism as a belief system—as a worldview—is premised in what at best, must be regarded as profound ignorance and unlearnedness about the nature of the enemies he believed he was destined to fight and conquer—first and foremost, the United States. At worst—and I suspect this is closer to the mark—bin Ladenism is premised in *hubris*, or even a delusional or nearly delusional conception of his own powers, and those of his arch foes. The following assertions succinctly summarize bin Laden’s beliefs sustaining his obsessive focus on attacking the “Far Enemy.”

A Deeply Flawed Analogy and a Deeply Flawed Strategy.

Osama bin Laden’s “Far Enemy” strategy was based on a deeply flawed analogy. In his telling, it goes something like this: The former Communist Soviet Union was a mighty empire. The Sunni Mujahidin, owing to their willingness and ability to wage jihad, and to Allah’s Divine mercy and assistance, dealt a crushing blow to this atheistic empire. Locked into an unwinnable counterinsurgency, the Mujahidin would force a war of attrition; and owing to its crushing economic costs, the Soviet empire would collapse. Allah’s Divine aid, the Mujahidin’s glorious triumphs,

the former Soviet Union's atheistic shallowness, and the economic costs borne were the necessary and sufficient factors explaining the Soviet withdrawal, and later, the Soviet collapse.

Before interrogating bin Laden's forced analogy, it is worth offering an alternative account of these events, one that does not require Divine aid or mythic thinking, and one that is very much keeping with the facts. The Soviet Union by 1979, the year of its decision to intervene in Afghanistan to support a pro-Soviet surrogate, was a weakened and weakening Communist state 6 years away from its future disintegration, which began under Gorbachev's call for "perestroika," or restructuring. The United States had entered upon a Cold War commencing in the immediate aftermath of World War II, its former tactical ally against Nazism and Japanese Imperialism, now a Stalinist totalitarian enemy whose social system and one-party state represented the theoretical and practical antithesis of the voluntarist, liberal-democratic capitalist federal republican United States. The collapse of Soviet Communism began well before their Afghan debacle, but the United States wasted no time in helping to turn that debacle to the Soviet's supreme disadvantage and help to create for them a Soviet "Vietnam."

Through an anti-Communist alliance involving primarily the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, money from the Saudis and Americans would be funneled primarily through Pakistan, and through the covert services of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), anti-Soviet guerrillas would be recruited, trained, armed, and deployed. A decisive turning point occurred when the USG supplied the extremely lethal anti-aircraft shoulder-fired, ground-to-air Stinger mis-

siles to Islamist guerrillas. Suffering greatly in their air campaign as a result, and increasingly bogged down in an unwinnable war of attrition, the Soviets determined they would end their involvement, and by 1988, began the exodus that was concluded by 1989.²⁵

Though the Mujahidin inarguably played a role in the Soviet defeat, without Saudi and U.S. largesse, CIA and ISI involvement, and the furnishing of the game-changing Stinger missiles to neutralize Soviet air assets, the Mujahidin and others contesting the Soviet intervention would likely have been crushed. Possessed of a more objective account of facts, let us now consider bin Laden's deeply flawed analogy.

Bin Laden believed that, if subject to direct assault through mass casualty terrorist attacks, the United States—"the head of the [infidel] snake" or "base of the tree"—would, like the Soviet Union, be pushed to a state of economic exhaustion and ultimate collapse. However, there is a serious problem here. The Soviet Union's collapse was not rooted in the exhaustion of its economic resources, but rather, in a Communist order whose command economy, inefficiency, crisis of human motivation, and corrupted totalitarian police state, had developed deep and potentially irreparable fractures. Furthermore, a calculated effort by stridently anti-Communist American officials and citizens, who rejected a policy of détente and peaceful coexistence for rollback and collapse of the Soviet state, intentionally expedited this process of dissolution, decay, and bankruptcy by inaugurating an arms buildup, placing further massive pressure on an already creaking economic order. One may add to this the deliberate objective by these self-same persons of bogging the Soviet Union down in a very expensive, unwinnable war of attrition, and one comes much closer to a fuller understanding of the causes of the eventual Soviet collapse.

Finally, just as it was not economic exhaustion per se that doomed the Soviet Union, bin Laden profoundly misunderstood the true nature and power of America's liberal democratic capitalist social structure and its capacity for absorbing shocks, adjusting course, empowering a free populace with expansive opportunities for employment, education, mobility, property ownership, self-government and, if deemed necessary, deploying its fighting forces and economic resources to challenge any foe that would endanger such. Bin Laden failed profoundly to understand the forces and values that lie behind the American economic juggernaut. This was a rather predictable consequence of his other prejudices to which we now turn.

Delusional Anti-Semitism and Anti-Americanism.

Bin Laden held an economic-reductionist theory of America's strength: that it is only owing to vast material and economic resources at its command, and it possesses no other redeeming values. This wealth is believed to be tightly held by a relatively small cabal of soulless, greedy, powerful capitalists. Not only does this wealthy money-grubbing capitalist elite control American society through its control of capital, assets, banking and finance, and stock and bond markets, they are controlled in turn by an even tinier minority of Zionists. It is owing to this Zionist stranglehold on the American Government, economy, and military, that the existence of de-fanged pro-American, Zionist-accommodating regimes are put in place and supported throughout the Arab Muslim world. As an ultimate consequence, the Muslim world is robbed of its wealth and energy reserves; subjected to anti-Islamic tyrannies; the Zionist regime that usurped

the *Ummah's* sacred lands and rights is defended; and the Sunni world, which should have the world beholden to it, kneels divided, subjugated, conquered, and humiliated.

Bin Laden's "demon theory" of Sunni Muslim humiliation, which is used to explain the present predicament of the Arab Muslim world, does not originate with him. Rather, bin Laden is a fellow traveler perpetuating and trafficking in unfortunately commonly believed frustration, resentment, and hate-based unidimensional, demonized caricatures widely circulating throughout these lands. While understandable as products arising in despair, projection, humiliation, scapegoating, and a will for revenge, these premises utterly fail to accurately, coherently, and judiciously comprehend the actual qualities of his chosen foe. This preposterous caricature of American society, economy, and government led bin Laden to massively inflate his own strengths and capacities for inflicting damage on America and Americans. This flawed perception caused him to massively underestimate the actual power that would be brought to bear against his terrorist enterprise and the actual sources of that power.

**FROM BIN LADENISM BACK TO QA'IDAT
AL-JIHAD? BACK TO THE FUTURE? HUBRIS,
DELUSION, DISASTER, AND THE REMAKING/
REBIRTH OF A POST-BIN LADEN, POST-ARAB
SPRING QA'IDAT AL-JIHAD**

The Catastrophe (*The Nakhbah*).

Against the significant plurality of his own Shura Committee, and with senior level dissenters having made their opinions known, bin Laden nevertheless carried out the 9/11 attack.²⁶ The United States of America, it turns out, was in fact, far from being a cowardly, hollowed-out, spiritually vacuous and materialistic “Paper Tiger.” From that date until his own demise nearly 11 years later, bin Laden would face a global war of his own making, and in the process, its brand would suffer irreparable harm, and its operatives would be practically hunted to extinction. 9/11 was in its essence a lone-wolf terrorist operation: the final and successful operationalizing of a plan originally attempted in its first incarnation by Khalid Shaykh Muhammad’s (KSM) nephew Ramzi Yousef in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing; successfully thwarted owing to operational errors in its second incarnation as the 1995 Bojinka plot; and consummated in a plot known fully to only a half-dozen insiders, and excluding current *Qa’idat al-Jihad* Emir al-Zawahiri. The “planes operation” was suggested by KSM to bin Laden in 1996, and 3 years later, finally set in motion. Two years from then, KSM finally extracted the revenge he and his nephew sought,²⁷ their self-professed motive to punish America for what they claimed was its support for authoritarian regimes countenancing Israel’s existence and thus underwrit-

ing and enabling “Zionist” attacks, oppression, and the continued occupation of Palestinian lands. Whatever the imagined virtues of the 9/11 “planes operation” to its perpetrators were, the consequences were clear: those whose unilateral actions to organize and execute this ignominious attack – one based in stealth, treachery, and the willful desire to murder thousands in cold blood – and potentially tens of thousands of ordinary civilians and residents, 32 of whom were Muslim²⁸ – would launch a war to hunt down and bring to justice those responsible. The world’s most formidable superpower would – and did – act,²⁹ the consequences of which have led to what now appears to be the latest metamorphosis in the *Qa’idat al-Jihad* saga: a recent practical abandonment of bin Ladenism as doctrine, and a return with a difference, to a previous strategy focused far more on the “Near” rather than “Far Enemy,”³⁰ and among its *Qa’idat al-Jihad* in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) affiliate, a new strategy of “lone mujahid” terrorism.

A Name Change Anyone?

Hunkered down in Abbottabad, Pakistan for several years, connected to the world through trusted couriers and flash drives for uploading instructions to key operatives, it appears bin Laden well-understood the practical failure of his strategy to attack the “head of the snake,” or the “base of the tree trunk.” Attacking the head of a snake does not make sense if you are a gnat, and sawing at the base of a massive tree does not make sense if you have a plastic knife. Strangely, bin Laden had learned little from the theory and practice of asymmetric warfare or of the data reporting that nations who believe attacks are existential will

respond mercilessly to such.³¹ Owing to his prejudices, ignorance, arrogance, and hubris, he imagined that he would be the new *Salahuddin* who would usher in the age of a defeated Crusaderdom, and re-open the Gates of Jerusalem to Allah's faithful. Of the discoveries learned in Abbottabad,³² several are of relevance to the issues under consideration here. First, former President George W. Bush's gut and basic instincts proved exactly right in the aftermath of that dastardly attack. It was not Islam that was at issue – a great faith, with noble values, and fully welcomed in our pluralistic nation, even in a religiously conservative mode – it was terrorism, and very specifically the *Qa'idat al-Jihad* terrorist organization, with whom we were now "at war." Bush succeeded in detaching *Qa'idat al-Jihad* from Sunni Islam far more effectively than bin Laden detached President Bush from a legitimate war waged in self-defense against terrorists. Terrorism belongs to no religion, he would say. A murderer is not a martyr.³³ Despite his Texas folksiness, and infamous "Bushisms," Bush understood clearly what the battle lines of this new war would be. Apparently, some years later, bin Laden did as well. President Bush would declare, in a joint session of Congress merely 9 days after 9/11:

The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda. They are some of the murderers indicted for bombing American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya and responsible for bombing the USS Cole . . . Al Qaeda is to terror what the Mafia is to crime. But its goal is not making money, its goal is remaking the world and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere. The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of Muslim clerics; a

fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings of Islam. The terrorists' directive commands them to kill Christians and Jews, to kill all Americans and make no distinctions among military and civilians, including women and children. This group and its leader, a person named Osama bin Laden, are linked to many other organizations in different countries, including the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. There are thousands of these terrorists in more than 60 countries. . . . The Taliban must act and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists or they will share in their fate. . . . I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the world. We respect your faith. It's practiced freely by many millions of Americans and by millions more in countries that America counts as friends. Its teachings are good and peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of *Allah* blaspheme the name of *Allah*. The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself. The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends. It is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists and every government that supports them. Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.³⁴

Eight years later, during his 2009 speech in Cairo, former President Obama would do the same:

I have come here to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world; one based upon mutual interest and mutual respect; and one based upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive, and need not be in competition. Instead, they overlap, and share common principles—principles of justice and progress; tolerance and the dignity of all human beings. . . . Moreover, freedom in America is indivisible from the freedom to practice one's religion. That is why there is a mosque in every state of our union, and over 1,200 mosques within our

borders. That is why the U.S. government has gone to court to protect the right of women and girls to wear the hijab, and to punish those who would deny it . . . So let there be no doubt: Islam is a part of America. And I believe that America holds within her the truth that regardless of race, religion, or station in life, all of us share common aspirations – to live in peace and security; to get an education and to work with dignity; to love our families, our communities, and our God. These things we share. This is the hope of all humanity . . . In Ankara, I made clear that America is not – and never will be – at war with Islam. We will, however, relentlessly confront violent extremists who pose a grave threat to our security. Because we reject the same thing that people of all faiths reject: the killing of innocent men, women, and children. And it is my first duty as President to protect the American people.³⁵

In his November 2015 speech at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Kuala Lumpur, the widely read, influential English-language daily Islamabad outlet *The News International* would report:

US President Barack Obama has said that his country cannot be at war with an entire religion simply because of the actions of the Islamic State (IS) or Daesh militants . . . He added that many Muslim leaders have joined the global movement against the terrorist group, and Daesh only represents a ‘tiny fraction’ of the Muslim community. He said that the US is not at war with Muslims but with IS militants . . . whom he described as a ‘bunch of killers with very good social media.’³⁶

Three months later, in his first speech as president delivered in an American mosque, President Obama on February 3, 2016, again adamantly asserted that the United States is allied with the vast majority of Mus-

lims in a common war not against Islam, but against a terrorist fringe whose principal victims are mostly Muslim and whose forbidden and reprehensible murderous acts committed against non-combatant civilians condemn them to the furthest fringes of deviant criminality. Seven years after his 2009 speech in Cairo, the President would again proclaim:

[T]here is an organized extremist element that draws selectively from Islamic texts, twists them in an attempt to justify their killing and their terror. They combine it with false claims that America and the West are at war with Islam. And this warped thinking that has found adherents around the world – including as we saw, tragically, in Boston and Chattanooga and San Bernardino – is real. It’s there. And it creates a tension and pressure that disproportionately burdens the overwhelming majority of law-abiding Muslim citizens. . . . Groups like ISIL are desperate for legitimacy. They try to portray themselves as religious leaders and holy warriors who speak for Islam. I refuse to give them legitimacy. We must never give them legitimacy. (Applause.) They’re not defending Islam. They’re not defending Muslims. The vast majority of the people they kill are innocent Muslim men, women, and children. (Applause.) And, by the way, the notion that America is at war with Islam ignores the fact that the world’s religions are a part of who we are. We can’t be at war with any other religion because the world’s religions are a part of the very fabric of the United States, our national character. (Applause.) So the best way for us to fight terrorism is to deny these organizations legitimacy and to show that here in the United States of America, we do not suppress Islam; we celebrate and lift up the success of Muslim Americans. That’s how we show the lie that they are trying to propagate. (Applause.)³⁷

In a telling letter from an unknown author, the damage done to *Qa'idat al-Jihad's* "brand" is explicitly addressed. Not blaming AQO's own terrorist modus operandi as the principal culprit, this author instead blames its name — "*al-Qa'ida*" — for it fails to signify a cause, rather than merely an organization (*Tanzim*).³⁸ An organization, no less, that now stands marginalized, divorced from its self-proclaimed mission as vanguard of the people of the Sunnah (*Ahl-us Sunnah*).³⁹ It is worth quoting in full:

I make mention to you (plural) of a very important matter that came to me, which is changing the name of [Qa'ida al-Jihad], because there are several necessary and attention-worthy reasons to change it, of them:

1. This name (Qa'ida al-Jihad) was abridged by the people and only a few people remember this name; it has come to be known as (al-Qa'ida) and this name reduces the feeling of Muslims that we belong to them, and allows the enemies to claim deceptively that they are not at war with Islam and Muslims, but they are at war with the organization of al-Qa'ida, which is an outside entity from the teachings of Islam and this is what was raised repeatedly in the past as indicated by Obama, that our war is not on Islam or on the Muslim people but rather our war is on the al-Qa'ida organization, so if the word al-Qa'ida was derived from or had strong ties to the word Islam or Muslims; or if it had the name Islamic party, it would be difficult for Obama to say that. It is clear from the past also that they [the enemies] have largely stopped using the phrase "the war on terror" in the context of not wanting to provoke Muslims, because they felt that saying the war on terror could appear to most people to be a war on Islam . . .

2. The name of an entity carries its message and represents it. Al-Qa'ida describes a military base with fighters without a reference to our broader mission to unify the nation. Building on what is presented, it would be nice if you could discuss and come up with appropriate names that would not be easily shortened to a word that does not represent us. It would help if the name is a method of delivery of our message to reach the sons of the *Ummah*/nation.⁴⁰

This unknown author then suggests potential alternative names that attempt to re-brand AQO in a manner that masks its militarist roots and terrorist modus operandi:

These are some suggestions [for alternative names]:

Taifat al-tawhid wal-jihad (TN: Monotheism and Jihad Group)

Taifat al-tawhid wal-difa' an al-Islam (TN: Monotheism and Defending Islam Group)

Jama'at i'at al-khilafat al-rashida (TN: Restoration of the Caliphate Group)

Jama'at nasr al-Islam wal-aksa (TN: Support of Islam and Al-Aqsa Group)

Jama'at wihda al-Muslimin (TN: Muslim Unity Group)

Tanthim al-Jihadi li-tawhid al-Ummah wa-inkathiha (TN: Jihad Organization for Unification [Monotheism] and Rescue of the Nation)

Tanthim al-Jihadi litahrir al-aksa wa-tawhid al-Ummah (TN: Jihad Organization to Liberate Al-Aqsa and Unify the Nation)

Hizb tawhid al-Ummah al-Islamiya (TN: Islamic Nation Unification Party)

Jama'at tahrir al-aksa (TN: Al-Aqsa Liberation Group)

Jama'at inkath wanahdat al-Ummah (TN: Rescue and Revitalization of the Nation Group)⁴¹

A second theme emerges from these captured documents.⁴² Bin Laden was in the midst of “new think-

ing." Although killed in the beginning months of the "Arab Spring," bin Laden had earlier begun to question whether an alternative path to the Caliphate might be required. It was not the Muslim Brotherhood path of education, politics, reform, eschewal of violence, and pursuit of a long-term cultural revolution Islamizing societies from below, slowly capturing them through a creeping majority seeking, and winning office to return Islamicity to the public square. Nor, however, was it exclusively the planning and executing of mass casualty terrorist attacks directed at the head of world infidelity. This new direction seemed to suggest a gradual, evolutionary insurgent strategy involving a greater emphasis on preaching (*da'wa*), on embedding within various ongoing rebellions, and working within and through the various nationalist-Islamist currents often dominant in these theaters. This slow march also called for working within existing "Sykes-Picot" borders, rather than advocating their smashing. Nationalist sensibilities and territorial boundaries, while anathema to the ultimate reconstituted global Caliphate, were the necessary starting-points, and it was crucial not to proceed faster than the *Ummah* was prepared to go. Also, a rebranding of the local supporters and helpers for the rule of Islamic law (*Ansar al-Sharia*) is one organizational result that has appeared in Tunisia, Yemen, and Egypt, for example.⁴³ It was still a seeding process, and the furnishing of high-quality *Qa'idat al-Jihad's* recruits, but the openings now presented by the tottering, falling, and decaying dictatorships called for a new way to approach the question of raising Allah's Word supreme; as well as its timing, and alliance strategy.

“WHAT IS QA’IDAT AL-JIHAD?” IN A NUTSHELL: FAZUL ABDULLAH AND ADAM GADAHN

Following bin Laden’s death, the non-linear course of an unanticipated Arab Spring and AQO’s role within it remained undefined. Some fresh beginnings were suggested, and organizational forms founded. What futures these hold remain to be seen in the coming years. It is prudent, however, to conclude this historical account with a final summation of the classical AQO doctrine: that belief system, worldview, doctrine, and a set of assumptions at the heart of bin Laden’s declaration of a jihad against the Jews and Crusader America; that which anchored his terrorist campaign beginning in the early-1990s.⁴⁴

Fortunately, two such accounts exist: the first is a brief, telling excerpt from long-time AQO terrorist mastermind Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, appearing in the Spring 2013 10th Issue of AQAP online magazine, *Inspire*;⁴⁵ and the second excerpt is by long-time AQO member, senior AQO spokesman, and senior communications operative Adam Yahiyeh Gadahn.⁴⁶ Let us consider in turn each answer to the question, “What is *Qa’idat al-Jihad*?” For Fazul Abdullah:

Al-Qaeda is an Islamic group which raises the flag of *Jihad* to espouse and support the *Haqq* (truth of Islam) wherever it is found.

Al-Qaeda literally means ‘a firm foundation,’ this name is enough to clarify that it was found[ed] to remain fighting Jihad. Allah says, ‘And [remember; sic] when you, [O Muhammad; sic] left your family in the morning to post the believers at their stations (*maqaa’ida*—a derivation of *Qa’idah*) for the battle [of Uhud; sic]—and Allah is All-Hearer and All-Knower.’

Thus it is military posts with equipments [sic] prepared to fight the enemies of Allah among the combatant kuffar and their allies wherever they are by the Grace of Allah. Allah says about the mujahideen who fight His enemies, 'You [believers; sic] are more terrorizing within their breasts than Allah.' We ask Allah to make us among those who terrorize the infidels.

Al-Qaeda is not a separated [sic] party as many think, we do not believe in any party but one—The Glorious Party of Allah. And this group is made up of [the] *Ummah* (nation) of Muhammad. We are against the concept of partisanship which lays down certain special program [sic] and obliges the members to abide by their understandings. And whoever differs with them is counted [i.e., considered] to be on *batil* (the wrong path). There are many Islamic movements founded on these policies, and this opposes the principle of 'It is He (Allah) who has named you Muslims' and 'Truly! This, your *Ummah* . . . is one religion.' Therefore, we are Muslims of the vanguard of the Muslim *Ummah* who call not to partisanship.

Al-Qaeda's main goal in this stage—at least—is to aid every oppressed Muslim in the world regardless of his *madhhab* [i.e., his jurisprudential orientation, whether Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, or Hanbali] and race. As for its long-term goal, [it] is to reestablish the Islamic Caliphate through *Jihad* in cause of Allah and to implement the *Shari'a* of Allah in the whole land of Allah, *Bi'idhmillah*. [sic; i.e., 'God willing']

We are proud that every Muslim believes in Islamic unity and waging *jihad* against kuffar who occupy our lands. And every Muslim has the same ideology as that of Al-Qaeda's.

Alhamdulillah [i.e., 'Praise Allah'] we have conveyed the ideology to the people. It is up to them to stand and strive for the Islamic caliphate through different ways, and to implement the pure law of Allah.⁴⁷

In a recently published extensive interview in the new online magazine *Resurgence*, Gadahn provides

an excellent precis of AQO's doctrine.⁴⁸ As the reader will soon detect, Gadahn's account incorporates, though spun to magnify AQO's truth and greatness, every key dimension examined earlier. According to Gadahn, AQO is distinguished by five key doctrines:

First, its global/international reach and membership, as opposed to some other groups which focused almost exclusively on particular countries or regions . . . [A]-Qa'eda from its inception has always been an 'Islamic Internationale' and has never limited itself to a particular country or region. Rather, it has always had a global outlook and a presence in dozens of countries around the region, and has [leadership and rank-and-file from] many different countries and origins: Hijazis, Najdis, Yemenis, Egyptians, Iraqis, Syrians, Lebanese, Libyans, Maghrebis, Tunisians, Europeans, Pakistanis, Indians, Bengalis, Balochis: you name it [emphasis in original].

The second thing which distinguishes al-Qa'eda—and still does is **its focus on fighting America, the Crusader West, and the Jews** (the far enemy/original unbelievers) [emphasis in original].⁴⁹

It is worth pausing to focus on this second point for a moment as Gadahn feels it is necessary to defend it in a way that he does not the others. In this defense, he quotes from an actual captured Abbottabad letter written by bin Laden that employs the "base of the tree trunk" simile, and acknowledges that this "Far Enemy" doctrine is still resisted by many. Gadahn's excerpt is taken from a letter from *Qa'idat al-Jihad's* Emir Osama bin Laden to the AQAP emir and former bin Laden personal secretary, Shaykh Abu Baseer al-Wuhayshi:

I would like to remind you of the general policy of al-Qaida in the military and media spheres. Al Qaida has been distinguished by its concentration on the larger external enemy before the internal enemy, because while the internal enemy is greater in terms of unbelief, the external enemy's unbelief is clearer, and is also more dangerous at the present time. [Today,] America is the head of unbelief. If Allah cuts it off, the wings will be weakened. . . . [T]he enemies of the Ummah are like a malignant tree, and America is its trunk with a diameter of 50cm . . . We want to topple this tree by sawing it down, but our power and energy is limited. Therefore the safest and most effective way to bring down the tree is for us to focus on the sawing at the American base of the tree . . . You have a practical example of that, which is how the Mujahideen in Afghanistan were able to cut the root of the Russian tree, after which all its branches fell one after the other, from South Yemen to Eastern Europe, without us expending any effort on these branches at that time. Therefore, any arrow and landmine which can be used to target Americans while other enemies are present should be spent on Americans instead of on other members of the NATO pact, to say nothing of lesser enemies. . . . The one who keeps abreast of events can see that it is our operations and messages which have really exhausted and strained Americans, especially after September 11th. So we should increase pressure on them until the balance of terror is achieved and the cost of war, occupation, domination of our countries becomes more than its benefits for them and they reach a state of exhaustion which will motivate them to submit, withdraw from our countries and stop supporting the Jews [italics in original].⁵⁰

Gadahn, admitting that this is a controversial position, then attempts its defense:

Regrettably, this strategic policy choice was – and still is – viewed by some other groups and movements as amounting to deviation from the path of Jihad and the ‘true methodology,’ and is used as a gateway for criticism and condemnation of *al-Qa’eda*, even though

the issue is essentially one of strategy, tactics, and priorities and not a dispute over the obligatory nature of fighting the apostate regimes. In this regard, Shaykh Usama says in the recently released video entitled *Bushriyaat* (Glad Tidings), in reply to a question concerning the groups which prefer to focus on the near enemy: “As I said, strike the head, and the legs, arms and everything else will come down. It’s an octopus, and its head is Crusader/Zionist America and Israel. Some people are of the opinion that it is beneficial to strike the tentacles of the octopus . . . [B]ut . . . as long as the number of [Mujahid] youth is few and our capabilities are limited, we should condense matters by striking the head. They [i.e., those who believe in striking the tentacles] deserve to be rewarded for their *ijtihad* [discretionary judgment] and their deeds, but according to our *fiqh*, we believe that we should strike the more important part, the head. This is what we believe, and in any case, these are matters of *ijtihad* (discretion); do you strike America first or Hosni Mubarak first, or second, or third. These are matters of discretion, and our *ijtihad* has led us to take the position that we should first strike the head of Unbelief and the leaders of Unbelief, in accordance with the texts [italics in original].”⁵¹

Gadahh concludes his attempted “Islamic” case by citing a case from Islamic history where the first two caliphs succeeding Prophet Muhammad (Umar and Abu Bakr) launched attacks against the Byzantines, despite the fact that they were fighting internal wars against rebels and early seceders, and cites Quran 9:12, “Then fight the leaders of disbelief – for they have no binding oaths – in order that they may desist.”⁵²

A third distinctive feature, Gadahh claims, is *Qa’idat al-Jihad*’s: “**lack of a written ‘aqeedah (doctrine/creed) or manhaj (methodology) which every prospective member has to agree to before joining** [emphasis in original].”⁵³ He continues that this is:

in contrast to some groups which have strict conditions for membership which may lead to many people being excluded for not being up to the mark, as if Jihad is the exclusive domain of an elite few. Al Qa'eda, on the other hand, tends to be much more open in accepting members even if they may not agree with all the positions of the leadership, so long as they are Muslims who have been vetted security-wise and are not known for major bid'a, or outright criminality. I for one think this approach is the best suited for making use of the capabilities of the Ummah and rallying the Muslims to fight their enemies, and restore the Islamic system. On the other hand, when you limit membership of your group to those who agree with you in every minutae of fiqh and 'aqeedah, I think you may be guilty of closing doors which Allah has left open and isolating your self, the Jihad, and the Mujahideen from the wider *Ummah*. Allah has not limited Jihad to people who follow a certain fiqh or madhhab; on the contrary, Allah has ordained Jihad for the entire *Ummah*, even sinful Muslims, so what about those who follow a different madhhab from ours or even the same madhhab except that they differ with you on a few minor points of fiqh or 'aqeedah? How can you turn them away unless they change their views and positions which are open to debate and discussion and – more often than not – have little bearing on day-to-day operations? As long as someone agrees with the practical approach and policies of your group and is prepared to listen and obey the ameer except in disobedience to Allah, then why should they be prevented from joining you? I would like to point out that I am not talking here in terms of permissibility or impermissibility, but rather in terms of appropriateness and what is in the best interest of the *Ummah*.⁵⁴

Fourth, for Gadahn, AQO's distinctiveness is in:

its recognition of the importance of public relations for the Mujahideen and of winning and preserving

popular support of the Muslim masses (while always relying on Allah alone), as opposed to some groups which reject or belittle the concept of maintaining a popular support base and consider it be a ‘sophism’ or even an ‘idol’ (we seek **refuge** in Allah) [emphasis in original].⁵⁵

The fifth and final distinct AQO doctrine is “**its particularly close ties with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.**”⁵⁶ At this point, Gadahn begins a discussion of various groups that denounced the Taliban on grounds of party, or:

due to their deviant understanding of Islam and extreme application of the principle of *takfeer* (excommunication). The irony was that when these Takfeeri types came to Afghanistan for training—or were forced to come to Afghanistan after being chased out of their homes in Peshawar and Khyber . . . they were warmly welcomed by the Emirate . . . But . . . these extremists have always been relatively few in this part of the world and never very well organized.⁵⁷

Having identified this “*takfiri*” extremism, the interviewer then asks Gadahn for his own definition of that phenomenon. Gadahn responds:

A *Takfeeri* is someone who has gone beyond the limits of the Shari’ah in terms of his application of the principle of *Takfeer* and has adopted excessiveness and extremism as his methodology, thus making it his defining characteristic. In other words, we’re not talking about someone who has made a few mistakes in this regard; we’re talking about a person who lives and breathes unregulated *Takfeer*. . . . [W]hat is important for us to know [is] that both *Takfeerism* and *Kharijism* are deviant ideologies which we must never tire of warning against and combating, due to the danger

they pose to Islam and Muslims in general and the Jihad and Mujahideen in particular.⁵⁸

Toward the very end of the interview, Gadahn again lists what he believes is, in essence, that upon which *Qa'idat al-Jihad* as a distinct organization is founded. Again, we shall see a distinction drawn between an open church and a closed sect; between softness, mercy, and leniency, and hardness, brutality, and severity.

let us . . . make sure our intentions are sound and our actions correct . . . we are fighting for . . . Allah, not for [the] sake of ameer, group, temporal power or worldly gain . . . let us show mercy and kindness toward the weak and helpless; let us display tolerance of our fellow Muslims and Mujahideen [even if] . . . they have let us down; let us beware of the deviant *Takfeeri* methodology which continues to rear its ugly head every now and again in some of the theatres of jihad; let us beware of making *Takfeer* of Muslims or Mujahideen or deeming their blood, wealth and honor to be permissible without right; let us beware of turning into 'Jihadi supremacists' (if you get my drift); let us show respect for our 'Ulama, leaders and elders and let us abide by their rulings, advice and instructions except in clear disobedience to Allah; let us adhere to and comply with the principles of Shari'ah and justice in all of our actions and dealings; and let us work towards unity on a sound basis of *taqwa* and Islamic precepts, because if we can't unify our own ranks, how can we expect the *Ummah* to unify itself [italics in original].⁵⁹

Having examined AQO's worldview and doctrines from its origins to the present, Gadahn provides us with the perfect segue for transitioning from *Qa'idat al-Jihad's* worldview, beliefs, and doctrine to that about which he warned, posed the greatest of dangers

to “Islam and Muslims in general and the Jihad and Mujahideen in particular”⁶⁰ – a second species of deviant Sunni terrorist organization, *Tanzim al-Dawla al-Islamiyya*, the ISO. It is to that terrorist entity that we now turn.

III. ISLAMIC STATE ORGANIZATION (TANZIM AL-DAWLA AL-ISLAMIYYA)

To understand the uniqueness of ISO vis-à-vis AQQO, we must first return to the place where their common ancestry diverges: the *Salafi-Muwahhidun* (*Wahhabi*) Call. We shall then more fully understand why the ISO and AQQO, although Sunni and jihadist, are and have always been distinctly different at the level of core beliefs, worldview, and doctrine. It is a profound error to view AQQO and ISO as disagreeing only about the path or strategy to the Caliphate. No, these organizations disagree on genuine religious fundamentals. ISO and AQQO differ, for example, on such core questions as: What does it actually mean to be a “Muslim”? Who is a *Muslim*? What constitutes proof of one’s faith (*Iman*)? What constitutes proof of one’s lack of faith (*Kufr*)? What are the necessary legal requisites for proof of another’s apostasy (*ridda*)?

While these disagreements are vital, four key creedal differences are perhaps the most distinctive and consequential, and most fully distinguish ISO from AQQO. These, considered collectively, explain why ISO has engaged in a level of brutality, cruelty, and inhumane conduct so extreme that it has led Muslims and non-Muslims alike to proclaim that “these are not men of religion” and that “no religion on Earth,” no matter how militant, engages in this type of “barbaric, cruel, and evil” behavior.⁶¹ These most distinguishing elements include: (1) an apocalyptic and eschatological belief in the “Imminence of the End Times”; (2) a belief in the necessity of immediately reestablishing the Islamic Caliphate; (3) a belief that the Shia represent an existential threat to Sunni Islam and must be completely exterminated; and, (4) that it

is the “Nearest Enemy” and not the “Far Enemy” that is the *Ummah’s* truest existential foe. Considered collectively, these four core beliefs transform what was in the beginning, an extremely sectarian variant of Salafi-Wahhabism into a kind of monstrous killing machine that seems devoid of a moral compass except for that required to secure absolute authority and absolute loyalty, through consent or coercion, through power and conquest, over those poor souls unlucky enough to be in their way, and which ISO truly believes is the only salvific path to be followed as precursor to Allah’s imminent “Divine Judgment” of souls.

The ISO’s present status as a seemingly merciless killing machine now ensconced in a type of proto-state did not occur in a vacuum, of course. The ISO would not exist, or at this level of severity at least, had the ruling Shia elements in Iraq following the USG occupation made the essential, painful choices required to pursue a new social compact with the nation’s Sunni population. Or, had the USG not operationalized Ahmad Chalabi’s long-dreamt of goal of imposing a punitive de-Ba`athification.⁶² Or, had the USG not imposed the disastrous policy of dissolving the Iraqi armed forces and security forces, numbering in the hundreds of thousands,⁶³ or had been prepared for a Sunni insurgency; or had developed a realistic post-occupation, longer-term stabilization policy based in a keen and learned awareness that the USG’s decapitation, occupation, and empowerment of Iraq’s Shia would profoundly destabilize an existing equilibrium in Iraq;⁶⁴ or understood that the decapitation of the Iraqi regime would profoundly alter the terms of the broader Sunni-Shia rivalry inaugurated by the emergence of a Shia revolutionary State in 1979, and thereby further energizing proponents and antagonists who view this schism as a difference so wide as that

between God and the Devil; or, finally, had the USG not first gone into Iraq the wrong way, and later repeated the error by disengaging from Iraq the wrong way. The pretext for decapitation was proved wrong, and the consequences of a premature exit, though understandable owing to Iraqi intransigence, bad faith, and an Iranian-backed political agenda, have proved enormously costly.

Another way to understand what the United States is now dealing with is the following: when the ISO's previous incarnation as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was hunted to practical extinction, the United States failed to completely douse the fire. It left a burning ember. It did not understand at the time the profound and unique nature of this distinct terrorist organization. It had much too casually and erroneously viewed the ISI as AQO on steroids. And despite AQO's genuine concerns, they did not publicly denounce this organization's penchant for extreme brutality and alienating its Sunni base, though they did so in private.

The USG possessed captured letters between senior AQO and the Emir al-Zarqawi of what was then known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI; "The Base of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers [Tigris and Euphrates]"; *Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn*). It knew of a captured letter sent in January 2004, 10 months before al-Zarqawi's official October 14, 2004, pledge of loyalty (*bay'ah*) to AQO Emir Osama bin Laden; one that strongly intimated the distinctly different priorities of each organization.⁶⁵ More recently we learned through captured documents that, by 2006, a profound disconnect had emerged between the former ISI and AQO, to the extent that senior spokesman and communications operative Adam Yahiyeh Gadahn would request that AQO openly denounce and disavow any

relation to ISI; this, in late-2010, a full 4 years before this was finally consummated by AQO's current Emir al-Zawahiri on February 3, 2014.⁶⁶ But since 9/11, and perhaps understandably, the world understood the words "al-Qaeda terrorism" and through ignorance, error, and good intentions, no public distinctions were made between what was obviously a level of unprecedented savagery and cruelty being meted out by the al-Zarqawi organization in Iraq, and AQO's various plots directed primarily at the American homeland and American interests and embassies overseas.

Through a combination of re-learned counterinsurgency, U.S. Special Forces, working with and empowering the newly-emergent Anbar tribal resistance, as well as ultra-lethal counter-terrorism operations conducted by the U.S. CIA, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), and Iraqi Special Forces, nearly eviscerated high-value leadership targets of the former ISI by 2008-2009, through killing and imprisonment. But, and this cannot be stressed too strongly, absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Unbeknownst to the USG at the time, and only truly understood over the past few years, a hidden, smoldering, white-hot ember had been left behind. Its glow and smoke and other signs carefully hidden from view, in safe houses, sanctuary in cities and remote regions, or in plain sight in a major prison – Camp Bucca – later turned out to have been a virtual hatchery, incubator, and launching pad for the latest mutation of the original al-Zarqawi organization.

A systematic campaign that began with carefully orchestrated prison breaks, a talented and vicious leadership cadre, and the kindling, tinder, gasoline, and oxygen provided by those contextual factors cited previously – now also include the Syrian rebellion

and civil war, and the emergence of an unanticipated Syrian sanctuary beginning especially after March 2011—transformed this ISI remnant into one that would explode on the world stage as a type of exotic and unexpected state-building killing machine which seemed, and to some still seems, unstoppable. Still thinking only in terms of *Qa'idat al-Jihad*, the ISO was misnamed, misrecognized, and its unique sameness, but also critical differences as a unique species—ultra-sectarian, former Ba'athist-led, Sunni Salafi-Wahhabi, apocalyptic global jihadism—remained, and still remains, misunderstood. Let us now retrace the steps that must be understood to discover how this divergent path from their last commonly shared ancestor within a renascent Sunni global jihadism occurred; and its consequences for creed, strategy, and intra-jihadi civil war. It is to that journey we now turn.

**“ZARQAWISM” VS. AQO: ABU MUSAB
AL-ZARQAWI’S WORLDVIEW AND DOCTRINE:
1989-JUNE 7, 2006**

The phenomenon represents a series of continuities and discontinuities commencing with the rise of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in the latter 1990s—original progenitor of the doctrine and modus operandi now under investigation—to the June 29, 2014, self-proclamation of a so-called Islamic State (*al-Dawlat al-Islamiyya*, or *al-Khalifa al-Islamiyya*) of the Caliphate, to which the world’s Sunni Muslims (*Ahl-us Sunnah*) are now obligated to pledge obedience (*bay’ah*).

History and doctrine intertwine, and we will discover that al-Zarqawi’s original notions are never negated, but are extended from “Zarqawism” to “Neo-Zarqawism,” to what might now be termed

“Baghdadism.” Because of our ignorance of certain details of this highly secretive terrorist entity, it is not yet possible to fully paint the differences between the original progenitor and his successors.

As described previously, sectarian bloodbaths are always fierce – whether based in Islam, Communism, or Christianity, to take three faiths proclaiming a universal mission and followership. **Everything** is at stake in that smallest of smallest differences. It is as if a millimeter separates two men standing on the edge of a cliff, and the one just a thousandth of a millimeter closer to its edge must now, owing to an unpardonable error, face eternal death. In addition, this splintering of splinters leads to ever more severe acid tests of what it means to be “true” to the genuine “Truth.” Who is a loyal adherent? Who, an enemy within? Who is the greater enemy to be fought? For splintered splinters, it is invariably the one closest in creed that commits the greatest of travesties endangering the path to Salvation. They took the road **before** the true road, or a left fork and **not** a right fork, and it is **they who took the wrong path** to eternal perdition and damnation. But this is not merely a matter for the damned. It is one that also, and especially for these ultra-sectarians, threatens to carry all others (including **themselves**) in their path. Obliterating the followers of the wrong path, then, translates into an obsessive demand to create the “Truest Sect of the Pure,” all of this of course as a self-proclaimed vanguard speaking in the name of the entire multitude to be saved. For communism, the vanguard represents the proletariat. For the adherents of the ISO, the true Mujahidin professedly represents the worldwide Muslim *Ummah*.

For these ultra-sectarians, the Muslim *Ummah* must first be cleansed of its greatest internal enemies – the

Shia—and nearly as close, of Sunnism’s own false and heretical, and even apostate elements. Then, and only then, should the final battles commence against the ultimate and final Enemy, the original *Kufr* or Worshipers of the Cross, and all other forms of supposedly modern idolatry—nationalism, secularism, and democracy, the most often mentioned. And for these ultra-sectarians, Islam is to be understood **not** as an ethic of all times—proclaiming the necessity of righteous intention, praiseworthy deeds, mercy, and forgiveness—but as an ethic of the “End Times,” demanding a virtually unlimited relaxing of moral strictures and unleashing of unprecedented vicious brutality, against Allah’s most determined final antagonists.

ISO is not *Qa’idat al-Jihad*, the Church for all Sunnis, whose principal and immediate arch-enemy is the original external “Far Enemy” *Kufr*, demonically presented in AQO’s terrorist messaging as the Cross-Worshipping, Muslim-hating “Crusader” America and the Cross-Worshippers’ true behind-the-scenes demonic master, “Zionism.” ISO is not *Qa’idat al-Jihad*, the Base for a Sunni Islamic International Organization or for a “World Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders.” As a conglomerate organization, it is designed to welcome the maximum number of Sunnis willing to go to war with these original *Kufr* who have usurped Muslim lands, honor, power, and the right to rule; to maximize and synchronize the combined power of its parts; accommodate Salafis and non-Salafis, Salafi-Wahhabis and non-Salafi-Wahhabis, Salafi-Jihadis and non-Salafi-Jihadis, and all Sunnis—saints and sinners; and shall all remain, for all times, sinners that must constantly pray for Allah’s Divine mercy and compassion—who profess an intention to adhere to the empowerment of *Ahl-us Sunnah*, and

work for the elimination of the “Crusader-Zionist” occupation of “Muslim” lands.

A remarkable example of the AQO ecumenical conception of “Sunniness” and “Muslimness” is evidenced in two separate documents by *Qa’idat al-Jihad* senior spokesmen and senior communication representative Adam Gadahn. First, Gadahn’s truly broad conception of Sunnism is evident in his biting criticism of the ultra-sectarian, exclusivist, and self-righteous nature of certain so-called jihadist online forums.⁶⁷ A second example is provided in that posthumously published interview earlier referenced, in which Gadahn discusses his own conversion to Islam, and also his reflections on the essential requirements of faith.⁶⁸

Lumping not splitting, Church not sect, openness not closedness, patience not impatience; these are AQO’s signature attributes, declared by one at the apex of AQO since his *bay’ah* in the latter 1990s, and one trusted and actually charged with presentations of AQO’s creed and methods. It is important to understand how powerful this path emphasizing intra-Sunni solidarity, unity, community, brotherhood, and the tolerance of differences may become if, as is possible, the AQO is in transition from its “Far Enemy” exclusive “Bin Ladenism,” to a revised “*Qa’idat al-Jihad*” focused far more on becoming fully embedded as force multipliers and allies within broader alliances in a now-fermenting Arab Muslim world. Further reflections on strategy must wait; however, and will be taken up in subsequent chapters of this book.

Having introduced the ISO by way of a broader reflection on the genus to which it belongs—ultra-sectarianism—and having drawn preliminary contrasts between a Churchly AQO and Sectarian ISO, we shall now begin with Zarqawism and end with self-declared Caliph Ibrahim’s Caliphate of the End Times,

tracing the rise of this other markedly sectarian, and in other highly consequential ways unique, species of Sunni global jihadism.

FROM NON-RELIGIOUS VIOLENT STREET TOUGH TO ULTRA-SECTARIAN SALAFI-WAHABI JIHADIST PRISON TOUGH: 1980-1999

If one attempts a composite based on standard sources and known writings, “Zarqawism” appears to be a novel synthesis derived from several elements.⁶⁹ First, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (b. 1966, birth name: Ahmad Fadil Nazal-Khalayah) in his youth and youngest adulthood appears as a sinner among sinners, born in and roaming the urban, industrial, gritty Jordanian city Zarqa’s streets, and sharing a profile that is not dissimilar from that of a particular demographic now finding its way into the global jihad: petty thieves and criminals engaged in violent assault, including sexual battery, and spending time imprisoned. We may add to this al-Zarqawi’s loss of his father when he was 17. The portrait presented is of a street tough, known for petty criminality and a kind of fearless toughness. He was known to do drugs, imbibe alcohol, engage in non-marital sex, and other activities anathema to the trends to which he would later declare unconditional fidelity.

Al-Zarqawi at some point “found” or reverted to Islam, having been drawn in and convinced of its truth. Again, not unlike others similarly disposed, al-Zarqawi’s reversion to a variant of Salafist Islam led him to abandon his criminal activities and commit to a strict behavioral regimen prohibiting drugs, alcohol, tobacco, pre- or non-marital sex, and a strict sex-segregation and expectation of female sexual modesty in demeanor and dress.

Al-Zarqawi sojourned to Afghanistan to partake in the jihad against the Soviet occupation, but by the time he arrived in 1989, the Soviets were in the process of exiting the theater and the jihad had entered a post-Soviet occupation phase characterized by an emerging civil war among the various armed organizations, and uncertainty regarding the fate and future of the Arab Afghan emigrants, and also the many “Near Enemy” insurgents from Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere now caught between a homeland to which they could not return, and a jihad with an ill-defined future. Al-Zarqawi’s role was that of an amateur journalist writing for the periodical *Al-Boniani al Marsous*, but more fateful for his future was his introduction and later discipleship to Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (b. 1959, Asim Muhammad Tahir al-Barqawi).⁷⁰

Al-Maqdisi is deemed one of the most influential and consequential major scholarly authorities to which AQO and others refer.⁷¹ His creedal orientation is based in a specific strand of Salafi-Wahhabism originating in a particular ultra-conservative 19th-century Wahhabi movement of scholars from the Najd region of Saudi Arabia (the Najd Scholars Movement [NSM]).⁷² Its form is a variant of “Rejectionist” Salafi-Wahhabism represented by Juhayman al-Otaybi and those of his circle, who, building their case on the NSM and the authority of an earlier incarnation known as the *Ikhwan*⁷³ (Brotherhood),—a fierce, uncompromising jihadist army deployed against perceived adversaries including what was deemed Ottoman usurpation of Salafi-Wahhabism—called into question the Islamic nature of the existing Saudi State.⁷⁴ Unlike al-Otaybi, who did not call for the actual overthrow of the Saudi State, despite its demonstrable infidelity on important matters, al-Maqdisi, in a series of key works, did.

Despite al-Maqdisi's critique of the Saudi state, however, it was Jordan, Jerusalem, and the more immediate Levantine environs that provided the basis of his focus. Organizing semi-underground, and preaching and recruiting for their secretive ultra-conservative Salafi-Wahhabi Call, an organization informally called *Jama'at al-Muwahhidin* (Society for the Upholders of Absolute Monotheism) would capture this mission.⁷⁵ The group's activities consisted of vigilante-style activities, a kind of privatized *hisbah* or policing of prohibited or reprehensible conduct, and was directed at what they considered secular debauchery: bars, red-light districts, and co-mingling of the sexes. It was al-Maqdisi's decision to smuggle in hand grenades, and their mutual decision to oppose the recently conducted Oslo accords and Jordanian treaty-in-the-making with the Israeli state, declared in 1994, that led later to their imprisonment on terrorism-related charges. Al-Zarqawi's transition from street tough to Salafist to Maqdisian-inspired ultra-conservative Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadism was on display in his trial as he denied the legitimacy of the court and its laws. Sentenced to 15 years in prison, a decisive phase had begun.

Al-Zarqawi and al-Maqdisi were imprisoned from 1994 to 1999, their sentences cut short by the accession and royal pardon of Jordanian King Abdullah II. Accounts of this period agree that the al-Zarqawi and al-Maqdisi relationship underwent a fundamental transformation. Initially, his student-disciple al-Zarqawi proved to be a determined, fearless, loyal enforcer. He developed a reputation as a tough, charismatic, dominating leader, imposing exacting demands from inmates regarding their Islam and decorum. He was also noted for a type of fearless loyalty, and known for unusually overt displays of emotion, for example,

while memorizing the Quran, one of the achievements of this period. With regard to the latter, al-Zarqawi was also known for a juvenile-like effusive and almost romantic affection directed toward his mother and sisters.

The net result of these prison years together (1994-1999) was a transformation in the authority relations between emir-scholar-teacher al-Maqdisi and pupil-disciple al-Zarqawi. Al-Maqdisi eventually conceded emirship to al-Zarqawi, and continued in his studies and fastidious commitment to produce an exacting scholarship using classical sources to support a maximalist position calling for the overthrow of existing Arab states that did not rule by the Sharia. Al-Zarqawi, transforming himself into a muscular and tough person through daily routines of bench-lifting rock-laden buckets, developed a reputation as a fearless leader, defender of inmates, and was no longer in a subordinate relation to the man who had taught him the ultimate meaning of "The Community of Abraham," as al-Maqdisi professed it.

AL-ZARQAWI'S PRIVATE JIHADIST ARMIES OF THE LEVANT: 1999-2004

Al-Zarqawi's second and most consequential journey to Afghanistan occurred upon his release. Two years before 9/11, and equipped with a basically Maqdisian ultra-conservative Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadism, al-Zarqawi traveled to the land ruled by then-emir of the Afghan Taliban, Mullah Muhammad bin Omar, to build an army designed to overthrow the Jordanian state, and more broadly, to target regimes throughout the Levant. Though supplied a letter of introduction vouching for his character, the senior

leadership of AQO was not impressed. Bin Laden and others expressed disdain and genuine concern over his brashness, arrogance, and extremist and sectarian tendencies. Senior AQO operative Sayf al-Adl indicates in an important recollection how AQO initially placed al-Zarqawi under surveillance not only to ensure his trustworthiness, but also to determine his character and creed. Evidence is cited of a genuine distance between Osama bin Laden and al-Zarqawi, and al-Zarqawi's repeated refusals to pledge allegiance/obedience (*bay'ah*) to bin Laden, the undisputed emir of AQO.

Though al-Maqdisi was a key mentor from the latter 1980s through their mutual imprisonment, and during this second Afghan sojourn, he does not furnish al-Zarqawi's Nazi-like anti-Shi'ism. Another key influence, Sheikh Abu Abdallah Al-Muhajir (born, Abdul Rahman al-Ali), appears to provide the key to al-Zarqawi's signature vitriolic, ultra-sectarian anti-Shi'ism, and his doctrine calling for the mass annihilation of the Shia, laypersons included.⁷⁶ Without this, al-Zarqawi would have been another Salafi-Jihadist waging war on "apostate" Arab regimes, Jordan especially; with this, Zarqawism was unleashed in a manner the jihadi currents had neither witnessed, nor condoned. Let us examine this more closely.

ABDALLAH AL-MUHAJIR'S ULTRA-EXTREMISM IN TAKFIR, AND TAKFIR OF THE SHIA

An Egyptian national, Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir graduated from the Islamic University in Islamabad, participated in jihad in Afghanistan, and taught at jihadi camps in Kabul. He was later recruited by al-Zarqawi to become the senior Sharia instructor for his camp in Herat.⁷⁷ Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir's extremism in *takfir* was well known. According to al-Khateeb, Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir's "book on the dogma of jihad greatly influenced al-Zarqawi, who actually studied the book under [Abu Abdallah al-] Muhajir."⁷⁸ Al-Khateeb summarizes Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir's book in the following manner:

More a book about the dogma of blood, [Abu Abdallah al-] Muhajir posits that any country deferring to the rule of positive law is a land of infidelity that Muslims are obligated to leave. He also wrote that there is absolute consensus on the unconditional bloodshed of an infidel unless he or she is under the protection of circumstances stipulated by Shariah. He adds that siding with apostates against Muslims is the greatest infidelity of all, and that Islam does not differentiate between military and civilians. He wrote that 'the brutality of beheading is intended, even delightful to God and His Prophet.'⁷⁹

A document posted anonymously online in 2012, supposing it is accurate, offers far greater detail on Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir's pivotal role in Afghanistan, and also his unique influences on al-Zarqawi's doctrine, than any others of which the present author is aware. The following claims are made therein. First,

a shorthand summation of Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir's doctrine is made: extremes in *takfir*, sectarianism, and anti-Shi'ism, and with reference to the latter, legalizing the categorical annihilation of the Shia laity; and finally, on these *takfiri* grounds, he opposed both the Afghan Taliban's and Osama bin Laden's doctrines. Second, that other analysts have overestimated Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi's influence on al-Zarqawi and that in fact his mentorship was restricted to a specific time of al-Zarqawi's life, and was only one of several potential influences. Third, despite a fairly lackluster online presence, Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir's influence at the camps in Afghanistan was very significant. Fourth, he was an Egyptian who traveled to Afghanistan in the 1980s, received his master's degree in Sharia from the Islamic University of Islamabad, and remained in Afghanistan. Fifth, he was a major figure whose primary mission was to recruit and indoctrinate those *takfiri* factions, mostly Arabs from the Maghreb, to return home to overthrow their respective regimes. Sixth, within this capacity, he held court in Khalden camp in Khost, Afghanistan, becoming its senior Sharia official (*mas'ul shara'i*), thus overseeing Sharia matters, and theological sessions dealing with governance and creed. He further institutionalized his *takfirism* through the creation of an Institute for Faith Brigades (*ma'had kata'ib al iman*). This Institute was an annex to Khalden camp, and consisted of a dormitory, lecture hall, and a small room for Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir's workspace and library. It was there that he delivered a series of seven lectures, whose primary focus was to provide the Sharia foundations of *takfirist* operations and create groups of various nationalities to fight their respective "apostate" governments. In sum, an anonymous blog entry concludes that Abu Abdallah

al-Muhajir essentially represented the *takfiri* faction in Afghanistan, and embodied a hardline, doctrinaire, and extremely inflexible *takfiri* line, one that led him to accuse bin Laden of deviance; and to actually *takfir* the Taliban, owing to their willingness to permit traditional prohibited intercessory practices among the populace.⁸⁰

ABU MUSA' B AL-ZARQAWI'S EMBRACE OF ABU ABDALLAH AL-MUHAJIR'S EXTREMISM IN TAKFIR

The anonymous blog entry provides essential insight into al-Zarqawi's transformation from one who, though a Salafi-Jihadi committed to overthrowing "apostate" regimes, did not engage in actions for which he would later be widely condemned throughout his own Salafi-Jihadi community.

[H]e [Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir] passed on his doctrinal legs in Herat [al-Zarqawi's own training camp] to al Zarqawi and his Levantine group [*Jund al-Sham*; Soldiers of the Levant]. It is here worthwhile remembering that before getting along [i.e., agreeing] with [Abu Abdallah] al-Muhajir, al Zarqawi had always been against suicide operations. That was his position both during his first stay in Afghanistan and when he went back to Jordan. Given how later al Qa'ida in Iraq heavily reflected this method, it is safe to say that this encounter has been a major step in his radicalization trajectory. Al Zarqawi explained that he changed his mind after having 'discussed the matter of martyrdom' and listened to several tapes of the Shaykh (he also said that he read what he deemed 'an excellent paper' by Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir on the issue). He further remembered that 'Allah has expanded my breast to accept his position on martyrdom operations. Not only

did I see that they (martyrdom operations) are permitted but I was convinced that they were desirable. I proceeded then to arrange for Sheikh [Abu Abdallah] Al-Muhajir to give a 10-days [sic] work shop in Hirat [sic] Camp to explain the legality of these operations to the brothers there – this had a very positive impact on the brothers.’ According to a *takfiri* militant, the suicide operations issue was one of the various topics which have been dealt with during the Institute heyday, during a course on jihad.⁸¹

The anonymous blog entry further reveals that Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s *Pioneers of Spreading the Sunnah and the Landmarks of the Victorious Sect*, and *The Jurisprudence of Jihad*, were the works most extensively taught in the camps. In addition, it was Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir who provided to al-Zarqawi the justifications he would use in his refutations of al-Maqqdisi’s refusals to legitimate the blood, honor, and wealth of the Shia in jihad. Finally, the anonymous blog entry reports that al-Zarqawi reportedly said, according to a senior *Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn* figure (the late Abu Azzam al-Iraqi):

I was not influenced by anyone I met among the seekers of knowledge in my whole life like (as I was by) Shaykh Abu Anas al-Shami (may Allah accept him) and Shaykh Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir (may Allah protect him).⁸²

Nibras Kazimi also offers critical insight into al-Zarqawi’s embrace of Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s extremeness in *takfir*.⁸³ Kazimi here reproduces an excerpt from a speech in which al-Zarqawi upbraids his former mentor al-Maqqdisi, and in so doing, identifies Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir’s doctrinal significance for the *takfir* of **all** Shia. Al-Zarqawi asserts to al-Maqqdisi:

He who knows their [the Shia] situation in Iraq would surely realize that *they are no longer laypeople* in the sense you [al-Maqdisi] put, for they have become soldiers for the unbeliever occupiers, and the eyes that watch the true mujahedeen, and would Ja'afari and Hakim and other reprobates have come into power had it not been for the votes of these laypeople?! And it is *unjust to cite a fatwa from Ibn Taymiyyeh's era* and have it apply to the reprobates today without judging the differences between the two eras, and then there are scholars who have spoken of lay Shias as unbelievers like Sheikh Hmoud Al-'Aqla' may he rest in peace, and Sheikh Suleiman Al-'Alwan and Sheikh Ali Al-Khudhair (may God set them free) and *Sheikh Abu Abdallah Al-Muhajir* and Sheikh Al-Rashoud may he rest in peace, and others [emphasis added].⁸⁴

Despite al-Zarqawi's penchant for extremism, AQO ultimately decided that its dearth of Levantine connections and al-Zarqawi's success as an inspirational leader warranted the expenditure of "\$5,000 or so in 'seed money'" to establish his own training camp outside the western Afghan city of Herat, near the Iranian border. Then-Qa'idat al-Jihad chief of security Saif al-Adl – a former Egyptian Army colonel who had trained in special operations – perceived merit in al-Zarqawi's focus on "apostate" Arab regimes, and was designated the middleman.⁸⁵

His newly named group, *Jund al-Sham* (Soldiers of the Levant), starting with a few dozen recruits from Jordan, Syria, Palestine, and Lebanon would eventually grow to hundreds, and then to the low thousands.⁸⁶ Soon *Jund al-Sham*, under the influence of another key Salafi-Jihadi religious influence and his chief spiritual advisor, Abu Anas al-Shami (killed September 17, 2004), would take on its new name *Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad* (Group for Monotheism and Jihad), one it

would only abandon upon finally making *bay'ah* to Osama bin Laden 5 years later, on October 17, 2004.

Al-Zarqawi's *Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad* operated on two distinct fronts. One privileged the overthrow of the Jordanian monarchy and focused on terrorist operations in the Levant.⁸⁷ This included the attempted 1999 Millennium bombing, 2002 assassination of the U.S. Diplomat Lawrence Foley, a disrupted massive bombing plot in 2004 targeting the headquarters of the Jordanian intelligence services, and the November 9, 2005, hotel bombing in Amman, Jordan.⁸⁸

The second front is the one that would soon open up in Iraq. The American attack on the Afghan Taliban and AQO following 9/11 led to al-Zarqawi's departure, first into Iran along with many AQO senior level operatives, and soon thereafter into a region a few miles from the Iranian border in northern Kurdistan, then controlled by a virtual mini-statelet run by the ultra-conservative Salafi-Wahhabi Sunni Kurdish organization, *Ansar al-Islam*. It was from this camp that al-Zarqawi departed in the run-up to the U.S. invasion—something becoming increasingly imminent—following 9/11 and the disastrously inaccurate argument linking weapons of mass destruction (flawed premise no. 1), and an al-Qaeda terrorist presence (flawed premise no. 2), with a rogue regime (correct premise no. 3). Al-Zarqawi began carefully preparing for a future assault by building networks, establishing safe houses, and storing weapons and munitions.

The American invasion, occupation, and failed stabilization of Iraq, commencing in March 2003, provided the context in which al-Zarqawi's ultra-conservative Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadist *Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad* would soon introduce the world to a particularly brutal and savage type of jihad, one that owing to the

utter dominance of AQO and wildly inaccurate official claims that directly linked 9/11 and bin Laden to Saddam Hussein, and also to al-Zarqawi, failed to do justice to the phenomenon that in fact existed. What was occurring in Iraq under al-Zarqawi was **not** *Qa'idat al-Jihad* 2.0, or *Qa'idat al-Jihad's* "Second Generation." It was not *Qa'idat al-Jihad* **at all**. In an important sense, it was everything *Qa'idat al-Jihad* **was not**. This was al-Zarqawi's ultra-sectarian Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadi *Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad* launching its own war, in its own name, for its own goals. It is the very type of Islam silenced or expelled from *Qa'idat al-Jihad's* fold, owing to its penchant for intra-Sunni division, extremism, and *takfiri* nature.

ZARQAWISM UNVEILED AS DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY: AL-ZARQAWI'S NEGOTIATION AND BAY'AH TO OSAMA BIN LADEN

Al-Zarqawi's Zarqawism is on full display in its earliest documents, particularly those involved in the negotiations that unfolded over the course of 10 months as al-Zarqawi considered *Qa'idat al-Jihad's* offer to become an official AQO affiliate.⁸⁹

The January 2004 Letter to Osama bin Laden.

[T]he only solution is for us to strike the religious, military, and other cadres among the Shi'a with blow after blow until they bend to the Sunnis. Someone may say that, in this matter, we are being hasty and rash and leading the [Islamic] nation into a battle for which it is not ready, [a battle] that will be revolting and in which blood will be spilled. This is exactly what we want, since right and wrong no longer have any place in our current situation. The Shi'a have destroyed all those balances. God's religion is more precious than

lives and souls. When the overwhelming [Sunni] majority stands in the ranks of truth, there has to be sacrifice for this religion. Let blood be spilled, and we will soothe and speed those who are good to their paradise. [As for] those who, unlike them, are evil, we will be delivered from them, since, by God, God's religion is more precious than anything and has priority over lives, wealth, and children.⁹⁰

This letter from al-Zarqawi to al-Qaeda's most senior leaders, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, discloses his theory of victory, including discussion of key target audiences and groups, and valuable insight into potentially fatal strategic challenges. It also offers a window into the mind of a fanatically self-righteous killer. Al-Zarqawi reveals himself as "Sheikh of the slaughterers," whose conscience is clear, owing to the satanization of various "others" dehumanized beyond the pale of empathy or sympathy.

In this letter, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri are presented with an offer: either to endorse al-Zarqawi's doctrine and strategy, and thereby earn al-Zarqawi's oath of fealty (*bay'ah*), or to stand aside offering their "brotherly" advice and support. Al-Qaeda Emir bin Laden and second-in-command al-Zawahiri are referred to as "gracious brothers, . . . the leaders, guides, and symbolic figures of jihad and battle," and al-Zarqawi stated that he does not see himself as one that is "fit to challenge you," but only to be "the spearhead, the enabling vanguard, and the bridge on which the [Islamic] nation crosses over to the victory that is promised and the tomorrow to which we aspire."⁹¹ Al-Zarqawi, having taken the time to explain his "vision" and "path," then issued what amounted to be an ultimatum.

If you agree with us on it, if you adopt it as a program and road, and if you are convinced of the idea of fighting the sects of apostasy, [then] we will be your readied soldiers, working under your banner, complying with your orders, and indeed swearing fealty to you publicly and in the news media . . . If things appear otherwise to you, [then] we are brothers, and the disagreement will not spoil [our] friendship. [This is] a cause [in which] we are cooperating for the good and supporting jihad. Awaiting your response . . . [emphasis added].⁹²

Zarqawi's primary political objective is sectarian: to empower Sunni Islam and violently attack, suppress, and uproot Shia Islam. While anti-Shi'ism is a long-standing orthodox Sunnite policy, one enhanced since the 1979 Iranian Khomeinist revolutionary Shia revival and self-conscious Salafist and Wahhabi-Salafi Sunni-led opposition to this revival,⁹³ Al-Zarqawi's anti-Shi'ism is fanatical, obsessive, and characterized by satanization/demonization.⁹⁴ The language he uses to describe the Shia is identical to that used in precursors to mass atrocities committed by a variety of violent hate-based movements,⁹⁵ and represents the furthest extremes of dehumanization required to morally disengage and justify wholesale slaughter. Consider for example, the terms used to characterize, *in toto*, the Shia of Iraq and the Levant:

[T]he Shi`a, have declared a secret war against the people of Islam. They are the proximate, dangerous enemy of the Sunnis, even if the Americans are also an archenemy. The danger from the Shi`a, however, is greater and their damage is worse and more destructive to the [Islamic] nation than the Americans, on whom you find a quasi-consensus about killing them as an assailing enemy.

[They are] the insurmountable obstacle, the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion, the spying enemy, and the penetrating venom.

[They are] a crafty enemy who wears the garb of a friend, manifests agreement, and calls for comradeship, but harbors ill will.

Shi`ism is the looming danger and the true challenge. They are the enemy. Beware of them. Fight them. By God, they lie.

These [have been] a sect of treachery and betrayal throughout history and throughout the ages. It is a creed that aims to combat the Sunnis.

They are infiltrating like snakes to reign over the army and police apparatus, which is the strike force and iron fist in our Third World, and to take complete control over the economy like their tutors the Jews.

The *Qur'an* has told us that the machinations of the hypocrites, the deceit of the fifth column, and the cunning of those of our fellow countrymen whose tongues speak honeyed words but whose hearts are those of devils in the bodies of men-these are where the disease lies, these are the secret of our distress, these are the rat of the dike. They are the enemy.

[T]hey are a bone in the throats of the mujahidin and a dagger in [the backs of] their leading personalities. People without exception know that most of the mujahidin who have fallen in war have done so at the hands of these people. The wounds are still spreading, and they are working the daggers of hatred and cunning in them assiduously, Night or day, they do not let up.

I mean that targeting and hitting them in [their] religious, political, and military depth will provoke them to show the Sunnis their rabies . . . and bare the teeth of the hidden rancor working in their breasts.⁹⁶

The October 17, 2004, *Bay'ah* by Emir al-Zarqawi (*Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad*) to Emir Osama bin Laden (*Qa'idat al-Jihad*).⁹⁷

Al-Zarqawi's *bay'ah* to bin Laden does not substantially compromise in any recognizable way the path he charts in this letter. First, it indicates that it is bin Laden who has "seen the light" and come to accept al-Zarqawi's vision for Iraq. Consider al-Zarqawi's account of these "past 8 months," roughly the date separating the previous letter from this one.

Numerous messages were passed between 'Abu Musab' (God protect him) and the al-Qaeda brotherhood over the past eight months, establishing a dialogue between them. No sooner had the calls been cut off than God chose to restore them, and *our most generous brothers in al-Qaeda came to understand the strategy of the Tawhid wal-Jihad organization in Iraq, the land of the two rivers and of the Caliphs, and their hearts warmed to its methods and overall mission* [emphasis added].⁹⁸

It is on this basis, then, that al-Zarqawi's organization *Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad* assumes a name change – but **neither** a doctrinal **nor** a strategic change. The new name, *Tanzim Qai'dat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn*, which would in public commentary almost always be signified by the shorthand, al-Qaeda in Iraq or AQI, appeared to indicate a subordinate franchise in a superordinate conglomerate. Moreover, in public, al-Zarqawi seemed to have fully subordinated his organization and placed its entire machinery at bin Laden's disposal. Al-Zarqawi declared here that:

[A]l-Tawhid wal-Jihad pledges both its leaders and its soldiers to the mujahid commander, Sheikh "Osama bin Laden" (in word and in deed) and to jihad for the sake of God until there is no more discord (*Fitnah*) and all of the religion turns toward God. . . . By God, O sheikh of the mujahideen [bin Laden], if you bid us plunge into the ocean, we would follow you. If you ordered it so, we would obey. If you forbade us something, we would abide by your wishes. For what a fine commander you are to the armies of Islam, against the inveterate infidels and apostates! . . . Now then, people of Islam, come rally to the flag of the leader of the mujahideen, which we raise together, and let us cry ['there is no God but the one God'], as the flag waves, raised by our newest heroes. Let us cleanse all Muslim lands of every infidel and wicked apostate until Islam enters the home of every city-dweller and nomad.⁹⁹

ZARQAWISM: ITS THREE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS

Zarqawism is defined through its ultra-sectarianism, uncompromising ultra-violence, and focus on the immediate creation of an Islamic State as a base for the prophesied return of the Caliphate.¹⁰⁰ Let us consider its three signature elements.

First, al-Zarqawi declared that the Shia were the single greatest threat to the very existence of *Ahl-us Sunnah*. As an existential threat, the language he employed is calculated to inoculate persons from any form of empathy or recognition that the Shia are even human beings. As stated previously, it is virtually identical to that used by persons, groups, and organizations who have committed mass murder, widespread atrocities, and even genocide against a categorical enemy declared the archenemy. For Hitler, for example, the singular greatest divide among humans was that between "the Aryan" and "the Jew"; the lat-

ter was not only subhuman, but also the pernicious, treacherous parasite that was the exclusive cause of Germany's then-present humiliation, powerlessness, and subversion of its destined rulership of the Earth's natural resources and inhabitants. For al-Zarqawi, the great world division was that between the "*Ahl-us Sunnah*," and the "*Shia*." This ultra-sectarian, genocidal "Final Solution" doctrine toward the Shia, as we shall see, remains a fundamental ISO premise maintained to this day.¹⁰¹

Second, Zarqawism expressed its will to power in a theretofore-unprecedented combination, in global jihadist circles of the commission of barbaric ultra-violence, and just as important, its transformation into a media-borne grotesque spectacle and weapon of terror-inducing coercion. Here, it was not the mass annihilation of the Shia, declared as a fundamental first principle of policy, but the carefully-staged, carefully-filmed, carefully-calculated horror inducing spectacle of a hooded executioner standing above a helpless, terrified, non-combatant captive, berating and blaming the United States for the horror soon to unfold, climaxing as the executioner's knife saws off this hapless victim's head and then, in macabre fashion, later dropped into place and displayed on its lifeless torso.

Unpublicized and unprecedented brutality in the name of *Ahl-us Sunnah* was also being committed as al-Zarqawi's campaign pursued the systematic, cold-blooded assassination of all opponents from all parties deemed apostate, owing to their capacity and willingness to partake in a non-sectarian, non-Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadi Sunni political organization.¹⁰² These enemies were Sunni Muslims, but in al-Zarqawi's eyes, they could be at best hypocrites, but more likely heretics, or apostates only worthy of death.

Finally, al-Zarqawi focused on the necessity of immediately establishing the foundations of an Islamic State as a necessary precursor for the liberation of the entire Levant, and ultimately the future restoration and final triumph of the historic Sunni Caliphate. This policy was originally pursued under the banner of *Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad*. Following al-Zarqawi's *bay'ah* to bin Laden on October 17, 2004, and under the banner of this new AQO "affiliate," *Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn* (The Base of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; AQI) –beginning on October 17, 2004, until his demise June 7, 2006, since al-Zarqawi's organization's name was almost always translated as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) –these actions would appear to the world to be those sanctioned and perpetrated by AQO itself. And despite internal pleas to overtly distance AQO from these acts, in principle and owing to their damage to the AQO brand, AQO's advice and counsel to al-Zarqawi occurred only in secret correspondence, while officially the AQO continued publicly to endorse the overall goal of mercilessly attacking the Iraqi state and preventing the emergence of a democratic transition. This urgency to create an ultra-sectarian Salafi-Wahhabi state when manifest in its severest, most punitive, and least flexible forms, spawned Sunni resistance based in tribes and personages attacked and disprivileged in Iraq's western Al-Anbar province. Later assisted by a USG unconventional warfare strategy and organized into a USG-assisted full-blown tribal revolt, this was a proximate cause of the organization's future marginalization, implosion, short-term defeat, and near-extinction.¹⁰³

It is important to note that though apocalypticism can be found in al-Zarqawi's speeches and writings, compared to their elevated status in current ISO

media operations, it appears far less pronounced. For example, the quote appearing at the top of the contents page in each issue of the ISO's flagship online English-language magazine *Dabiq*, is excerpted from a single sentence from a single speech, in which al-Zarqawi states: "Behold, the spark has been lit in Iraq and its flames will blaze, Allah willing, until they consume the Armies of the Cross in Dabiq."¹⁰⁴ Other instances have been noted, but they are relatively few.¹⁰⁵ It is unlikely, then, that the apocalypticism animating the present ISO represents continuity from al-Zarqawi's Zarqawism. Its existence, or at the very least its amplification and prominence, likely originates in the beliefs of other ISO progenitors.

In the end, al-Zarqawi failed to foment a Sunni-Shia civil war, prevent democratic participation in the new Iraqi government-in-the-making, establish abiding alliances with other insurgent groups, or defeat the tribal "Awakening" councils (*Sahwat*). In a despairing, semi-delusional letter written 5 months before his June 7, 2006, targeted killing, he speculated that possibly a new strategy might be required: fomenting a major war between the United States and Iran. He opined that a calculated deception campaign could be orchestrated to induce an offensive attack by the USG on Iran. Secretively manipulating these adversaries into the presumption that Iran possessed and was prepared to attack the United States with weapons of mass destruction (WMD's), a war between these adversaries would neutralize each in the Iraqi theater, thus enabling his organization the possibility of regaining its positioning in this theater of war. Resigned to defeat, he would invoke the inevitability of fate that awaited those true bearers of the Prophet's Religion, "*Al-Ghuraba*" (The Stranger): an often-cited

trope based in the Quran that basically states that Islam entered the world as a stranger, and as a stranger, it shall depart. This truth shall be and remain in the end, unrecognized as Truth.¹⁰⁶

Had al-Zarqawi's death ended his terrorist enterprise, a very different history would have been written. That was not to be. Waiting in the wings were others ready and willing to continue Zarqawism as doctrine, and as strategy. It is to them we now turn.

“NEO-ZARQAWISM”: THE BIRTH AND DECLARATION OF THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ (DAWLAT AL ‘IRAQ AL-ISLAMIYYAH), AND RISE OF THE NEW EMIRS

“Neo-Zarqawism” refers to a phase following the killing of al-Zarqawi on June 7, 2006, characterized not only by definite doctrinal continuity, but also by the actual declaration and creation of an Islamic State, which remained in al-Zarqawi's lifetime as a yet unrealized goal. Let us now consider some of its historical landmarks, and then examine its key doctrinal elements.

History.

The process concluding in the declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq occurred over a 10-month period in 2006. To this point, al-Zarqawi's original Army of the Levant had gone through several phases, from *Jund al-Sham*, to *Jama'at al-Tawhid wa'al Jihad*, to AQO-affiliated *Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn*. Three key phases awaited. First, on January 15, 2006, 6 months before al-Zarqawi's death, his *Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn* was folded into a newly formed larger

group of like-minded insurgent factions, the Mujahidin Shura Council (MSC; *Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin*). Al-Zarqawi remained emir of *Tanzim Qa'adat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn*, but was also a key member of MSC leadership. While putting on an “Iraqi face” and partially heeding AQO’s advice from afar may partially explain this emergent organization, for al-Zarqawi it was a key milestone on the way to the Islamic State.

In an April 21, 2006, video posted to the Internet, he states:

[W]e bring good tidings to the nation: *The establishment of the Shura Council of Mujahideen in Iraq, which, Allah willing, will be the nucleus for the establishment of an Islamic state in which the word of Allah will reign supreme . . . Allah willing, this council will serve as an umbrella for every loyal mujahid. I have the honor to be one of the members of this blessed council which has a blessed leadership. At the same time, I am the emir of Al-Qaeda in the Land of the Two Rivers, the servant of jihad and the mujihadeen, who derives his strength from Allah [emphasis added].*¹⁰⁷

Al-Zarqawi did not live to see the birth of his proto-caliphal Islamic State of Iraq. Al-Zarqawi was killed June 7, 2006, and during the next 6 months, an additional series of milestones were passed. First, a new emir, former Egyptian Islamic Jihad member Abu Hamza al-Muhajir (b. 1968, aka Abu Ayyub al-Masri), was selected 6 days later on June 13, 2006. Second, 4 months later, for 3 days (October 12, 2006, to October 15, 2006), an oath-bound group was formed. Their culminating oath, known as the *Hilf al-Mutayyabin* (“Oath of Scented Ones”), spearheaded by the MSC, symbolically re-enacts a ritual originating in the pre-Islamic era among several of the clans in the Prophet’s Quraysh tribe, later adopted into Islam by the Prophet. The

re-enacted ritual has each party to the pact—in this case, five white-robed representatives—assemble and dip their hands in a perfumed mix and later, placing their hands upon each other, and uttering an oath concluding a permanent pact of solidarity on “behalf of the oppressed and wronged.”¹⁰⁸ The organizations committing to this oath reportedly include: the MSC itself, consisting of the *Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn* and its seven other allied groups, including among them four jihad groups in Iraq, the Shura Council of the Jihad Fighters in Iraq; *Jaysh Al-Fatihin* (“The Army of the Conquerors”); *Jund Al-Sahaba* (“The Army of the Companions”); and *Kataib Ansar Al-Tawhid wal-Sunna* (“The Monotheism and Sunna Brigades”), as well as tribal elements.

On October 15, 2006, the long-awaited Islamic State of Iraq (ISI; *Dawlat al ‘Iraq al-Islamiyyah*) was officially declared. Owing to this pivotal moment in clarifying the fundamental distinction between ISO “stateness” and AQO “baseness” as paths to the resurrected Sunni global caliphate, and also signifying what in retrospect was the formal emergence of a formal independence from AQO, the complete announcement is reprinted below:¹⁰⁹

**The Mutayibeen Alliance [*Hilf al-Mutayibeen*]
Brings You Good News of the Establishment of The
Islamic State of Iraq [emphasis added].**

After the Kurds turned to the State of the North, and the Rafidah [Shiites] were granted the federation of the South and Central Province, and with aid from the Jews in the North and the Saffavids in the South, protected by black-minded, black-hearted and black-acting military militias, they turned to our brothers from *Ahl-us-Sunnah* and went far in spilling their blood and desecrating their honor, making them suffer the most ugly forms of killing, torture and expulsion, until *Ahl-As-Sunnah* became like the orphans in the banquet of the wicked. It therefore

became necessary for the honorable and the free among *Ahl-As-Sunnah*, the *Mujahideen*, the working *Ulema* and the dignitaries to offer something to their brothers, their sons and families, especially under this façade called the State of Maliki, who regretfully carried out acts of [the] traitors of [better: 'from'] *Ahl-As-Sunnah*, obscuring the religion of the people and willingly forfeiting the nation's rights.

Therefore, **your brothers in the Mutayibeen Alliance (*Hilf al-Mutayibeen*) bring you good news of the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq, in Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salahadeen, Naynawa [Ninawah] and parts of Babel and Waset province** [emphasis added], in order to protect our religion and our people so that there is no *Fitnah* (Disbelief; [better: Strife, Disunity]) and so that the blood and sacrifices of your *Mujahideen* sons are not lost in vain.

And why not since we are blessed with Allah's Power and Assistance that is spread widely, our arms reaching farther, and our bases more secure than the government of Palestine whose legitimacy was accepted by many despite the fact that the occupying Zionist kills and captures whoever they will and frees whoever they will at any time and place, as is clear from the capture of more than 60 of their ministers and statesmen, while the American occupier doesn't even reach one of our soldiers without us spilling their blood, and Allah is a witness to that many times over.

And we, as we announce the establishment of this state [emphasis added], relying on the Sunnah of the Prophet . . . when he went from Mecca to Medina and established the State of Islam there, despite the fact that a coalition of polytheists and the people of the book were against him. Since the Jews had their separate areas and were at the very high levels [i.e., highly competent and organized] of administration, military training and organization and while the hypocrites and the polytheists who joined them headed by Ibn Sulul who craved to rule over Medina, challenged the young state, the Prophet . . . was ready to give a third of Medina's harvest [to those enemies]. Despite their limited numbers and equipment, it was necessary so that the state became a refuge to the

Muslims, where their rights were protected against those who sought to hurt them. And we, with Allah's Might and Power, [now] have control over many parts (of Iraq) that [are] equal to the area of the first Medina state; a state where the enemies had no presence and the *Mujahideen* established the Sharia Hudud (Punishments) at the earnest request of *Ahl-us-Sunnah* themselves.

Let the invader aggressors [USG] and the spiteful Rafidah (Shiites) know that the blood of *Ahl-As-Sunnah* is dear and valuable and they will not be spilt apparently in vain after today. We will face any transgression from them with Allah's Strength, with a harsher and more severe retaliation that has no limits. And let them know that the Baghdad of Rasheed, the Land of the Khilafah, was built by our ancestors and it will not leave our hands except over our dead bodies and skulls, and we will continue to plant in it anew the Flag of Tawhid, the Flag of the State.

And we call upon all the *Mujahideen*, the Scholars of Iraq, the Tribal Chiefs, and the masses among *Ahl-us-Sunnah* to pledge allegiance [*bay'ah*] to the *Emir* of the *Mu'mineem*, ["Leader/Ruler of the Faithful"] the honorable Sheikh Abu Umar al-Baghdadi today, to listen and obey his orders whether favorable or not, and to work hard to strengthen the pillars of this state; to sacrifice for it our lives and what we hold valuable, and we promise you that we will be sincere and loyal, dealing with you in justice and kindness, pro[viding] you us[e] . . . the Book of Allah, and the Sunnah of the Prophet . . . not deviating from it a single inch. We will drive away invaders, and establish peace and security, an honorable life, not depriving you of your goods of your land, for it is yours, and we will extend our hands to our Muslim brothers around the world, especially, around our dear country, providing them our good[s] and experience, while we benefit from what they have that is good and knowledge.

In addition, we call upon all Muslims from *Ahl-us-Sunnah* around the world, to aid us in starting with words and ending with blood for you are the source of power and it is in you we extend our hope after Allah, so do not fail us, and stand with us. Defend us and burn the land under the one who wants to harm us.

And we extend a special appeal to the learned, the people of Knowledge, asking them to fear Allah in us, and be a support for us, and incite the people to defend us and pray for us.

Honor, power and glory belong to Allah, to his messenger, and to the believers, but the hypocrites know not.
—Spokesman, Ministry of Information, The Islamic State of Iraq, 22 Ramadan 1427, October 15, 2006.¹¹⁰

As a formal public declaration, this document contains not only elements of deliberate agitational, motivational, and incitement propaganda, but also key evidence for ISI's worldview. The latter is our primary interest. Two sets of observations are significant. First, two of three key elements deemed core to Zarqawism, and in opposition to AQO, are present—an ultra-conservative, Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadism manifest in ultra-sectarian, genocidal anti-Shi'ism; and a focus on founding without delay an Islamic State. The third element—ultra-violence—is implicit in the dehumanizing language used to place the Shia not only beyond the pale of humanity, but also in several other categories of intolerable being—hypocrites, traitors, betrayers, back-stabbers—not possessed of the Truth of the Islamic State. Also implicit is not only the creation of a brand-new obligation for all persons now inhabiting this self-declared Islamic State's self-claimed geographic boundaries—the predominantly and partially Sunni provinces listed above—but also the predicament now placed on the worldwide *Ahl-us Sunnah* to defend a state conceived on the model of Prophet Muhammad's very own, with an analogy drawn to Prophet Muhammad's Medinan phase (c. A.D. 622-632), with the apparent intention of recreating Prophet Muhammad's, and the later Sunni Caliphate's, very own state in the heart of the earlier Abbasid empire

(c. 750-1258), Baghdad. It is not just that an Islamic State of Iraq has been proclaimed, but a state to which all occupants of its territory are either loyal or in rebellion, and an Islamic State, to which Iraq's and the world's *Ahl-us Sunnah* should now look to for leadership of the renaissance of global Sunni supremacy.

The second set of observations concerns the still-unresolved question of whether, and if so how, the ISI-AQO relationship was altered by ISI's formal declaration of statehood. Upon al-Zarqawi's death, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir was selected as emir of *Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn*. Documents indicate that AQO was not involved in this leadership choice, expressed deep reservations, and requested a detailed response to several questions. AQO states that Abu Hamza al-Muhajir pledged *bay'ah* to AQO, though this was kept secret. Abu Hamza al-Muhajir denied any formal *bay'ah*, though openly expressed a willingness to make available to AQO the forces at his disposal. Once the formal dissolution of AQO's "affiliate" *Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn* was accomplished, and the ISI was declared, it appears that any formal connections between these two entities was dissolved. Al-Zarqawi's October 17, 2004, *bay'ah* to bin Laden needed to be renewed, as it does not transfer as a hereditary artifact. Soon thereafter, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir stepped aside and pledged allegiance to the new Emir Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. It clearly appears that it is Omar al-Baghdadi (not to be confused with the present Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi) and not AQO that receives the disposition of Abu Hamza al-Muhajir's forces. As Kazimi states:

[Abu Hamza] Al-Muhajir pledges allegiance to the hitherto unheard of 'Abu Omar al-Baghdadi.' The

glaring hint that he is indeed Al Qaeda's [read: ISI's] candidate for the job of caliph is [Abu Hamza] al-Muhajir's insistence on highlighting [Abu Omar] al-Baghdadi's Hashemite pedigree—a traditional must-have for any would-be caliph . . . [Abu Hamza] Al-Muhajir also pledges the allegedly 12,000-strong 'Army of Al Qaeda' and their 10,000 reservists to fight under [Abu Omar] al-Baghdadi's banner to the death. Oddly enough, there is no mention of Osama bin Laden, who is not a Hashemite. But probably [Abu Hamza] al-Muhajir sees bin Laden as a relic of the past . . . and consequently he really doesn't have a role to play in this current phase of the jihad.¹¹¹

Beyond AQO being left out of the leadership loop, which would involve a fundamental breach of the terms of any binding *bay'ah*, we also learn through captured documents that AQO was not consulted in any way before the formal declaration of the ISI; and according to Gadahn, relations between the two entities had been practically non-existent for several years.¹¹² AQO's al-Zawahiri claimed that the new Emir Abu Omar al-Baghdadi did in fact give *bay'ah* to AQO, but that by mutual agreement and for strategic reasons, this would remain unpublicized.¹¹³ Let us now examine the sources of continuity and discontinuity in key elements of the Zarqawist worldview and doctrine.

Key Doctrinal/Creedal Elements.

Senior military commander Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and Emir Abu Omar al-Baghdadi (born, Hamid Dawud Mohamed Khalil al-Zawi) were at the helm of the ISI from late-2006 until their April 18, 2010, killing in a joint U.S.-Iraqi military attack on their safe house, about 6 miles southwest of the Iraqi city of Tikrit. Abu Omar would, during that period, assume the caliphal-originated title "Commander of the Faithful"

(*Emir al-Mu'minin*), and his earlier pseudonym suitably expanded to "Abu Omar al-Husseini al-Qurayshi al-Baghdadi," signifying his *Qurayshite* and therefore caliph-in-waiting genealogical pedigree.

Known facts about Abu Omar al-Baghdadi's specific path to the ISI are few. A former Iraqi officer, after dismissal from the army he began actively preaching in mosques an extreme variant of Salafi-Jihadism. He first reportedly joined *Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn* under al-Zarqawi, and later, the MSC and ISI.¹¹⁴

Fortunately, a sufficient number of available speeches and writings exist, clarifying the essential core beliefs and doctrines of ISI's first leaders.¹¹⁵ What is essential is the ability to discern ISI's relation to AQO on doctrinal grounds, seeking both common ground and that which marks each off as unique species. It is both the sameness and difference within the Sunni global jihadist forces that is at issue. This is key for doctrine, but as we shall discover later, also for strategy.

Fundamentals of an Ultra-Conservative, Salafi-Wahhabi, Jihadi, and Anti-Shia Sectarianism.

An excellent starting-point is provided in Abu Omar's third speech as ISI emir/"Emir al-Muminim"/proto-caliph.¹¹⁶ By March 13, 2007, the date of this speech, the combined forces of the USG's counterinsurgency, counterterrorist, and unconventional warfare strategies; and the self-defeating policies of the ISI had clearly reversed the ISI's short-term fortunes. Kazimi asserts that this speech's content addresses that context, and in it, Abu Omar has determined he must "clearly spell out the doctrine of his faction." Determined to counter what he believed to

be an orchestrated smear campaign by venomous enemies, and also the need to reassure potential recruits and donors that ISI's path to the Caliphate remained viable, he provided a summation of ISI doctrinal essentials. Abu Omar declares:

The people have libeled us with countless and unfounded lies about our doctrine, saying that we have cast the accusation of 'infidels' against lay Muslims, and that we legitimize [the shedding of] their blood and [the looting of] their money, and that we force the people to enter into our State by the sword, and as such, here are a few of our tenets to answer those lies so that the liar would have no more excuse [to continue lying] and so that bewilderment is lifted from he who loves us.¹¹⁷

Of the 19 doctrinal elements soon to be listed, according to Kazimi only two are "notable innovations," namely:

judging that Jews and Christians who live among Muslims are no longer protected as Dhimmis [see #12 below], and that the Sunnis who participated in the political process, specifically Tariq al-Hashemi's [Sunni] Islamic Party, are apostates and infidels, who are marked for death [#7 below].¹¹⁸

We have taken the liberty of providing subheadings, rearranging, and more succinctly stating these 19 doctrinal points in order to facilitate a comparison of ISI and AQO. The original numbering is retained in square brackets. If we accept Abu Omar's assertions at face value, 9 points of convergence and 10 points of divergence seem to exist. It is critical to remember, however, that AQO should not be understood as a compulsory ultra-conservative Wahhabi-Salafi Jihadi ultra-sectarian organization, though in principle all

who accepted its overall doctrine and modus operandi, no matter how conservative, were welcomed. AQO provides a large tent and seeks maximal force to attack the original *Kufr*. The very opposite is illustrated below, particularly in the 10 or so points of clearest divergence.

CREEDAL/DOCTRINAL/POLICY COMPARISION OF ISO AND AQO

Most Likely Points of Divergence from AQO – Extremism in the Application of *Takfir*.

Extreme Salafi-Wahhabi Anti-Shia Eliminationism/ Magic-Sorcery Eliminationism.

- [1] Annihilate all manifestations of shirk (idolatry), including statues and raised graves;
- [2] All Shia are idolatrous, apostates, inhibit Sunni rites, and must be eliminated;
- [3] Execute sorcerers and magicians.

Extreme Salafi-Wahhabism Jihadism Applied to Fight Against Nearest Enemies.

- [8] Any support of any type, including medicine and food [provided by contractors], to American occupiers is unbelief and apostasy;
- [10] The unbelief of all rulers and armies in all the lands of Islam require that they first be fought, and not the Crusader; unbelief does not apply to all inhabitants of the lands ruled by the Taghut:

We see that the lands where the laws of the infidel are prevalent over the laws of Islam as lands of

unbelief and this does not necessitate counting a resident of this land an infidel, but **since the laws of the tyrant prevail over the laws of Islam in all the lands of Islam, then we see the apostasy and heresy of all the rulers of these lands [as well as] their armies, and fighting them is more pressing than fighting the crusading occupier** [emphasis in original]. Thus we want to call to attention that we will fight any armies invading the State of Islam in Iraq whether they be under any Arab or Islamic name, and we advise and warn them that this army should not be the scapegoat for the occupier, as is being suggested to end the crisis of the crusading occupier in Iraq.¹¹⁹

Extreme Salafi-Wahhabism Applied to "People of the Book" (Ahl al-Kitab).

[12] People of the Book must renew their dhimmi contracts owing to treacherous violations they have committed:

We find that the sects of the people of the book [Jews, Christians] and other from the Sabians and so in the State of Islam today are people of war who qualify for no protection, for they have transgressed against whatever they agreed to in many countless ways, and if they want peace and security then they must start a new era with the State of Islam according to [the Caliph] Omar's stipulations that they have annulled.¹²⁰

Islamic State of Iraq is Exclusive Leader of Ahl-us Sunnah and the Mujahidin of Iraq.

[13] All jihadis from other groups that do not subordinate to the ISI are neither infidels nor heretics, but they are rebels (*bughat*) and must unite behind the ISI banner;

- [14] All agreements between the occupier and other groups other than the Islamic State are null and void;
- [15] Defend “active and truthful ulama,” and oppose all who oppose us.

Extreme Salafi-Wahhabi Sexual Conservatism.

- [19] Mandatory veiling of female face, and censoring of media to prevent female public displays or any activities that violate strict sex segregation and mate-guarding.

Most Likely Points of Convergence with AQO.

Basic Privileging of the “Ahl-us-Sunnah” in Jihad.

- [4] Do not hereticize/ *takfir* Sunnis who pray, believe, and observe Sunni rites; Sunni sinners are not heretics or apostates, and sins may vary in their severity; only the greatest of sins nullify one’s Islam. Judgments of apostasy must be established in each individual case, and all conditions and factors considered; claim to represent the “middle way” between those who equate sin with infidelity (the Kharijites), and those who are negligent in judging even major sins (Murji’ites).¹²¹
- [6] Necessity of revering and protecting the Prophet;
- [9] Jihad to free all Muslim lands from the fall of Andalus [Spain] to the liberation of [all] Muslim lands is an individual obligation second only to Belief;
- [16] Honor predecessors in jihad;

- [17] Take care of prisoners and martyrs' families;
[18] We engage in *da'wa*; encourage worldly knowledge, as long as does not violate Tawhid.

Takfir of Existing "Apostate" Governments.

- [5] Only Allah's Sharia is valid and Sharia courts shall rule.
[7] Every leader of every political party that participates in the democratic process, and every other form of secularism or nationalism, is apostate, though this does not apply as a general rule to all who enter the process, i.e., individual voters:

We believe that secularism, in all its different banners and varied sects such as nationalism or patriotism or Communism or Ba'athism, is clearly faithless and in contradiction to Islam and it takes [one] outside the [bounds] of religion. We also see the apostasy and heresy of whoever participates in the political process like the party of Mutleg and Duleimi and Hashemi and others. Because this process seeks to replace the law of Allah and pave the way for the enemies of Allah such as the Crusaders and the rawafidh [Shia] and all the apostates to lean upon the necks of the believers. . . We also see that the program of the Islamic Party is one of apostasy and heresy that is no different from all the other infidel and apostate programs such as the parties of Ja'afari and Allawi. And as such, their leaders are apostates and there is no difference between a party branch head or an official in the government, but we do not see the heresy of all its members unless a judicial opinion is reached [in individual cases].¹²²

[11] All army, police, and security forces of these states are apostates.

The previous contrast suffices to illustrate key points of convergence and divergence between Abu Omar al-Baghdadi's ISI and AQO. The convergences belong to their genus – global Sunni jihadism in defense of *Ahl-us Sunnah* – and are most evident in those doctrines subsumed under “Basic Privileging of the *Ahl-us-Sunnah* in Jihad.” Next, we find a basic convergence arising in Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadism for pronouncing “*Takfir* on Existing ‘Apostate’ Governments.” However, AQO would be more discriminant and determine whether those supporting the state were in positions of power or weakness, plenty or necessity, cooperating or coerced, and whether neutrality was also an option. Yet serious doctrinal divergences mark each organization off as a competitor rather than complementary global jihadist species.

AQO's focus on a “Crusader-Zionist” enemy is conspicuous by its complete neglect, or its repudiation and reversal (see, number 10 above). For Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and the ISI, it is all about the internal purification of Nearest and Near Enemies that threaten the self-understanding of salvation provided in the narrowest passages of an ultra-conservative Salafi-Wahhabi ultra-sectarianism. Internal enemies are targeted ferociously, Sunnis who accede to the prescribed orthodoxy receive a warm and inviting welcome, and the Far Enemy that stays far away will be spared for now, as a relentless war is waged against their supposed idolatrous lackeys. The pact with Jews and Christians, and many other religious minorities who adhere to a variant of monotheist worship, is considered abrogated and must therefore be renegotiated.

For AQO, the execution of magicians and sorcerers, blowing up of Shia graves and shrines, and the condemnation of all Shia, leaders and led, scholars and lay, is barred by the authority of a still-valid ruling by medieval jurist Ibn Taymiyyah, and in more proximate range, the very influential Sunni Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadi Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi.

Yet, the species of Sunni global jihadist exemplified in Abu Omar al-Baghdadi has placed these very Shia laity, whose blood is forbidden, at the very top of its hit list of *Ahl-us Sunnah's* chief idolatrous enemies, and therefore of Allah's chief enemies. Finally, the new ISI demand that all existing Mujahidin in Iraq must be subordinate, or be declared rebels, contrasts with AQO's vision of political authority as a more distant aspirational objective, and supposes a broader process of affirmation and consultation. For ISI, however, the debate has ended, the Emir is chosen, the Jihad on the model of the Prophet's Sunnah is in process, and all not ready to commit to **this** State, and **this** leadership, are forewarned that they stand as rebels and must repent, or will be fought into submission or death.

APOCALYPTICISM AND MAHDISM IN ABU HAMZA AL-MUHAJIR AND ABU OMAR AL-BAGHDADI

The previous speech provides an excellent means for drawing key contrasts between ISI and AQO. Absent from that list of 19 elements, however, was mention of a critical doctrinal belief maintained by both Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi: belief in an End Times apocalypticism, and also in the imminent appearance of a Redeemer Messianic figure, the Mahdi. An element appearing only occasionally in

Zarqawism, it is manifest here to a far greater degree.¹²³ For example, William McCants reports that Abu Hamza al-Muhajir speedily dissolved *Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn* and the MSC and “rushed to establish the State because he believed the Mahdi, the Muslim savior, would come within a year.”¹²⁴ Further, both Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi maintained beliefs in the imminence of the End Times, leading them to privilege the Iraqi locus for the re-emergence of the historic Baghdad-based Abbasid Caliphate, and the northern Syrian town of Dabiq—earlier mentioned by al-Zarqawi—as the prophesized theater for End Times battles involving the anti-Christ and eventually the Mahdi’s final return.¹²⁵ McCants further notes that despite continuity in beliefs in the End Times and apocalyptic worldviews, the Mahdist focus of these earliest progenitors is later replaced by the ISO’s emphasis on the great battles, signs, and events prophesied before that culminating event.¹²⁶

THE HISTORY, DOCTRINES, AND WORLDVIEW OF ABU BAKR AL-BAGHDADI’S “CALIPHATE”: MAY 2010-PRESENT

On April 18, 2010, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and ISI Emir and proto-Caliph Emir al-Muminin ‘Umar al-Husseini al-Qurayshi al-Baghdadi, lie dead. A long manhunt had finally culminated in a joint Iraq-U.S. operation in the Tharthar area near Tikrit in Salahuddin province. Subsequently, the USG and its Iraqi allies exploited intelligence and captured documents to quickly decimate 34 of 42 known high value ISI targets.¹²⁷ Despite profound doctrinal and strategic differences between AQO and ISI, then deputy-Emir Ayman al-Zawahiri would issue a public eulogy

praising these leaders' efforts in jihad and against the Crusader-Zionist visions for the new Iraq.¹²⁸

The ISI was not decimated, however. Its "idea" was kept alive. Seasoned military intelligence analysts have described it as a deliberate, highly organized, brutally-executed systematic campaign—from prison breaks, to annihilating Iraqi security forces, to taking and holding ground.¹²⁹ Evidence now also confirms that during imprisonment at Camp Bucca in Iraq, several persons who would later fill the highest leadership ranks of the organization were busily creating strategic blueprints, rebuilding its secret network, reconstituting its leadership, and forging new alliances between highly competent Sunni-Salafist former Ba'athist military and intelligence officers, and those already possessed of the Zarqawist and neo-Zarqawist doctrine and worldview.¹³⁰ Indeed, this actually continues a policy begun under Abu Omar al-Baghdadi who reached out to those officers whose lives were likely shattered by the USG's de-Ba'athification policies. He states in his inaugural address from December 22, 2006:

Initially, we call upon officers of the former Iraqi Army and that is from the rank of lieutenant to major to join the army of the Islamic State on condition that the applicant must know, at a minimum, three sections of the Holy Koran by rote and must pass an ideological examination by a clerical commission, that exists in every region, to make sure that he is not beholden to the idolatry of the Ba'ath and its tyrant [Saddam]. And we will, Allah willing, provide him with transportation, housing and the appropriate salary that guarantees an honorable life for him as is provided to the mujaheddin who fight under the banner of the Islamic State of Iraq.¹³¹

Any effort to accurately characterize this period must presume humility, and in former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's coinage, admit to varying degrees of knowledge from known knowns, some of which shall be discussed shortly; known unknowns, many to which we shall refer; unknown knowns, which the present author will humbly assume afflicts both his and others' present accounts; and finally, unknown unknowns, probably the greatest sum of what truly exists. The full story can only be told in retrospect, on the basis of now-classified data, and only after the dust finally settles – as hopefully it must – so that this particular species of terrorist entity can be fully dissected and understood for “its idea” and “its strategy.”

Fortunately, enough open source information exists to sketch a reasonably accurate account of some features of select key landmarks—organizationally, doctrinally, and strategically—of the ISI's path to the self-proclaimed caliphate. We first begin with a very brief summation of the ISI's organizational evolution; then we proceed to describe relevant biographical facts about the ISO's current self-declared caliph, whose full and proper name has unmistakable parallels to his immediate predecessor is Emir al-Muminin Abu Bakr al-Hussaini al-Qurayshi al-Baghdadi; and we conclude with an analysis of the ISO's worldview, creed, and doctrines.

FROM ISI TO THE CALIPHATE: BRIEF ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY

The ISO is the latest organizational incarnation of the “idea” that originated in al-Zarqawi's Zarqawism: transitioning into its embodiment as State, and

unequivocally and unambiguously declaring itself as the Caliphate of the world's Sunni Muslims. Let us now retrace these steps.

Zarqawi lived to create and bequeath four distinct organizational forms before his death on June 7, 2006. During his second Afghan sojourn (c. 1999–2001), he founded and was undisputed emir of an organization called Soldiers of the Levant (*Jund al-Sham*). Later changed to *Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad*, this latter organization existed until al-Zarqawi's October 14, 2004, official *bay'ah* to Osama bin Laden. A few days later, the new organization, *Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn* (The Base of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers), was declared. Careful examination of the 10-month "negotiation" between al-Zarqawi and AQO preceding his *bay'ah*, and the terms of the *bay'ah* itself, furnish evidence that this new organization retained full-throttle the Zarqawist "idea." Its shorthand media tag, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the failure of AQO to openly and publicly denounce and disavow this organization, and a more general ignorance about how fundamentally distinct these organizations were, led to a general misrecognizing of Zarqawism. It was viewed by many as merely a more brash, unrelenting, inflexible, and violent version of AQO. Except for an expert and largely unknown scholarly trickle continuing to note this fact, most would rediscover this difference only in this most recent era (c. 2013-present) of a renascent organization whose brutal conquest of Sunni lands and re-introduction of unconscionable slaughter and advertised genocide as spectacle, has caused the world to again take notice.

Al-Zarqawi's *Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn* was later dissolved. This occurred in two stages. The first was in January 2006 when it was folded into a broader coalition of its own making, the MSC on

whose leadership council al-Zarqawi would serve. The next two organizational incarnations followed al-Zarqawi's death. If McCants is correct, the prime mover behind the expedited timing for dissolving the MSC was Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, and he did so based on his belief that the long-prophesied Mahdi would imminently return. Whatever the motive for timing, however, the logic of the Zarqawist "idea" was to create a separate entity – an actual **State** of Islam. To this end, the *Hilf al-Mutayyibin* or "Oath of Scented Ones," was concluded on October 12, 2006, and 3 short days later, the organizational realization of the Zarqawist idea – the Islamic State of Iraq (*Dawlat al-'Iraq al-Islamiyya*) – was proclaimed.¹³²

The ISI existed from October 15, 2006, to April 7, 2013. Upon that latter date, then Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi transformed its nomenclature to reflect a dramatic expansion in its intended sovereign reign.¹³³ Its new name, *Dawla Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Shaam* (The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham), signified its newly extended self-proclaimed domain in both Iraq and al-Sham (i.e., the Levant, or Levantine states of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine). The English acronym ISIS and ISIL reflect this alternation in referring to either Syria (ISIS) or the Levant (ISIL); ISIL is the more accurate term. The word "Daesh" is an acronym fashioned from its fuller Arabic name but is itself not an Arabic word, and its use among the opposition and USG officials – civilian and military – deliberately intends to counter any associations to legitimate Islamic statehood when discussing this terrorist entity.¹³⁴

Despite AQO's formal rejection of its April 7, 2013, expansion from the ISI to *Dawla Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Shaam*,¹³⁵ only further extensions and no reversal in scope have occurred. The final extension, and logically its last, is from **Emirship** of *Ahl-us Sunnah* in the

“apostate ruled” lands of Iraq and the Levant, to Caliph, sovereign and supreme religio-political rulership of the *Ahl-us Sunnah* throughout the “apostate ruled lands” of **the Earth**. This was formally proclaimed June 28, 2014, by formerly incarcerated Camp Bucca inmate and now deceased chief spokesman Abu Mohammed al-Adnani. On that day, for those self-proclaiming this event, the Islamic State (*al-Dawla al-Islamiya*) or Islamic Caliphate (*al-Khilafa al-Islamiya*) was born. The final symbolic moment was yet to come: the newly installed Caliph Ibrahim’s first speech on July 2, 2014, a Friday sermon in Ramadan proclaiming the Caliphate from the grand mosque of newly conquered Mosul, to his worldwide flock, and to the infidels and apostates of the Earth.¹³⁶

SELF-PROCLAIMED EMIR AL-MUMININ ABU BAKR AL-HUSSAINI AL-QURAYSHI AL-BAGHDADI: A BRIEF HISTORY

“The journey was complete, and Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri al-Samarrai [sic] — the local imam, academic, US-held prisoner and al-Qaeda officer — had become Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.”¹³⁷

Contained in the previous quote from Hashem is the journey we shall now briefly trace. We are provided his birth name — Ibrahim bin Awwad bin Ibrahim al-Badri al-Samarrai — indicating his kinship to the Al-Bu’Badri tribe, and his location, the Sunni Anbar province containing the Iraqi city of Samarra. We learn that he was an imam and an academic, and as we shall soon learn, extremely devout and devoted to pursuing religious scholarship. We will also examine his time at Camp Bucca, and its consequences. Finally, we learn he was “an al-Qaeda officer” — soon to be specified with more detail — and that in the end, this

person is the same who is now the self-proclaimed Caliph of the world's Sunni Muslims. His mission is to engage on multiple fronts those various agents of infidelity he and his organization perceive as warring against and subverting Allah's chosen instrument for a final consummation of world history. For convenience, a few select sub-headings are employed to assist in navigating this journey.¹³⁸

Biography, Temperament, Early Primary Religious Influences, and Education.

Self-proclaimed Caliph Ibrahim was born near the city of Samarra in 1971; his name of birth: Ibrahim bin Awwad bin Ibrahim al-Badri al-Radawi al-Husseini al-Samarrai.¹³⁹ He was raised in a deeply, or even ultra-conservative Sunni (possibly) Salafi religious family with some of these to include preachers and professors of Arabic language, rhetoric, and logic. His father, Sheikh Awwad, is among the elders of the Al-Bu'Badri tribe, and his grandfather, Haj Ibrahim, passed on at nearly 95 years of age. Ibrahim bin Awwad focused intensely, even in his youth, on religious studies. In the mosque where his father taught, he was wholly committed to mastering techniques of Quranic recitation, and he engaged in a "fastidious devotion to master the subtleties of the art."¹⁴⁰ This fastidiousness was accompanied by other temperamental traits, for example, a tendency to be withdrawn, taciturn, of glowering intensity, quick to admonish, strict, and uncompromising, and barely audible in his personal interactions.¹⁴¹

At 18, he moved with his family to Tobji, in north-west Baghdad, where he later was a Sunni mosque imam.¹⁴² At the mosque, besides the call to prayer

over the mosque loudspeakers, Ibrahim bin Awwad taught Quranic recitation to the neighborhood's children. He also exhibited a deep sexual conservatism. His two wives were sequestered from public view as they shared a small apartment in a poor neighborhood near the mosque, and he openly forbade any public mixing of sexes, including dancing at weddings.¹⁴³

An exception to what otherwise appears to be a strict, ultra-conservative Salafi Sunnism was Ibrahim bin Awwad's passion for soccer (football). As a youth and young adult, he was widely regarded as an outstanding player and was the star of his mosque's football club. However, he was also known for his competitiveness, obsession with scoring goals, and for getting extremely upset at losing. Other inmates also later noted his soccer expertise during his stint at Camp Bucca.

Ibrahim bin Awwad earned both an M.A. (1999) and a Ph.D. (2007) from the College of Islamic Sciences, University of Baghdad. His specialization across both was phonetics and recitation of the Quran. He produced for his Ph.D. project in Quranic Sciences a commentary on a medieval poem on Quran recitation. It was defended March 13, 2007, receiving the grade of "Very Good."¹⁴⁴

Ibrahim bin Awwad's Path to Ultra-Conservative Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadism: Before the U.S. March 2003 Overthrow of Iraqi Dictator Saddam Hussein and Occupation of Iraq.

To this point, the "known knowns" of Ibrahim bin Awwad's journey are relatively unambiguous. Documents, interviews, transcripts, and good investigative journalism turn up an archival trail that seems reasonably sound. We now enter a zone of greater

uncertainty and attempt to reconstruct the broad lines of what may be deemed his behavioral evolution from an ultra-conservative Sunni Salafi-Wahhabi, and a life characterized by a rigidly-maintained sexual conservatism, intense immersion in religious scholarship, a vocational dedication to the mosque, and teaching the young Quran recitation, to that of a member and eventual leader in armed, violent Salafi-Jihadi organizations. This journey of theological politics, or “theopolitical”¹⁴⁵ engagement, is murkier, less defined, and by design, enveloped by that secrecy characterizing underground organizations. Nevertheless, some important facts have been reported and are useful as a starting point for the detailed history yet to be written.

Ibrahim bin Awwad’s transition began well before the March 2003 U.S. decision to overthrow the regime of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. McCants’ conclusion here seems well in line with other observations when he states:

Although the American invasion fed the fire and enabled it to spread, in fact, his radicalization began much earlier, ignited by an unlikely but highly volatile mixture of fundamentalism, Saddam Hussein’s secular totalitarianism, and his own need to control others.¹⁴⁶

McCants dates this to a period after 1999-2000, 3 years before the U.S. occupation, as Ibrahim bin Awwad “moved rapidly to the right” and went from being an ultra-conservative Salafist flirting with a Qutbi wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, to “embracing revolutionary jihadist Salafism.”¹⁴⁷

One may begin with Ibrahim bin Awwad’s brother ‘Jomaa. According to reports, ‘Jomaa, unlike Ibrahim bin Awwad at the time, was an “extreme Salafist”

well before the U.S. invasion and occupation. It is further reported that “[Abu Bakr] Baghdadi was not yet part of that circle, [and that it ended up] causing many problems between them.”¹⁴⁸ ‘Jomaa is now his brother’s body guard and one of his closest aids. The period McCants describes as a transition (1999-2000) is characterized by a very significant shift in Ibrahim bin Awwad’s theo-political orientation. It was a Dr. Ismail al-Badri who directed him to membership in a “Qutbist” or “*jihadist Ikhwan*” (Brotherhood) tendency. However, at that point he was seeking what must be considered a violent alternative to that being offered, and concluded that action, and not mere talking, was required.

Ibrahim bin Awwad’s Path to Ultra-Conservative Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadism: After the U.S. March 2003 Overthrow of Iraqi Dictator Saddam Hussein and Occupation of Iraq.

The U.S. overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime, and subsequent occupation, inaugurated a new phase of Ibrahim bin Awwad’s involvement in violent insurgent activities. Abu Muhammed al-Mufti al-Aali, a major “ideologue” on the Iraqi Salafi-Jihadi scene, seems to have been instrumental in Ibrahim bin Awwad’s transition into an actual armed insurgent. Muhammad al-Mufti al-al-Aali’s Salafi-Jihadi *Ahlus Sunna wal-Jama’a* movement had members based in Baghdad and Samarra, and it was only a short period afterwards that Ibrahim bin Awwad would co-found and become the head of the Sharia committee for a new Salafi-Jihadi insurgent organization, *Jaysh Ahl al-Sunnah wa’al-Gama’ah* (Army of the Sunni Creed and Community), that would establish an active presence in Diyala province, Samarra, and Baghdad.¹⁴⁹

Contrary to several published accounts, Ibrahim bin Awwad did not spend 5 years in Camp Bucca; he was arrested on January 31, 2004, and released on December 6, 2004, just under 1 year.¹⁵⁰ His time there proved highly consequential, however, for what he himself became and the future operational linkages he would form, and as a virtual hatchery for elements that would, when freed through prison breaks, help reconstitute and repopulate in an even more brutal fashion the then-decimated ISI leadership cadre.¹⁵¹ Accounts of his Bucca incarceration indicate that he led religious prayers and on many occasions Friday sermons; asserted himself as an intermediary and mediator in various disputes; and continued his soccer stardom; but of greatest consequence, he acquired key ingredients essential to his future path.

It was in Bucca that Ibrahim bin Awwad developed a “Rolodex” of contacts for future operational pursuits. There, he also developed a symbiotic relationship with former Ba’athist military and intelligence officers, including: Haji Bakr (birth name: Samir Abd Muhammad al-Khelifawi), Abu Mumammad al-Suedawi, and Abu Ahmed al-Alwani. They were impressed with his extensive religious background, especially Quranic expertise, and he was impressed with their military knowledge. It was at Bucca that he secretly pledged *bay’ah* to al-Zarqawi, and increasingly absorbed Salafi-Jihadism. Though his sermons were noted for their lack of power and charisma, notice was taken by others deemed major heavy weights in the Salafi-Jihadi movement—for example, Abu Mutaz, Abu Abdul Rahman al-Bilawi, and IS spokesman Abu Muhammed al-Adnani.¹⁵²

Ibrahim bin Awwad exited Camp Bucca on December 6, 2004. Immediately assuming the alias “Abu Dua,” he would begin a methodical climb beginning

with the lowest rungs established in Camp Bucca to eventually occupy the very highest rung of the ISI. It is probably apt to conclude—as McCants has—that Ibrahim bin Awwad is “a cunning bureaucrat that rose through the cutthroat ranks of the Islamic State by building alliances among its factions and eliminating his rivals once he got to the top spot.”¹⁵³ Data is sparse for Abu Dua’s activities after his release, but facts are now known about several key developments in his organizational relationships. It is known that his organization *Jaysh Ahl-us Sunnah wa’al Al-Gama’a* pledged *bay’ah* and joined the *Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin* (MSC) 1 week after its January 15, 2006, declaration. Abu Dua, through the influence of an important Shaykh Fawzi al-Jobouri, was granted permission by *Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn’s* Minister of Information Muharaib Abdul Latif al-Jubouri to travel to Syria in order to complete his doctoral studies. This permission was granted pending Abu Dua’s willingness to assist in media-related functions if requested. Having completed his doctoral work after June 2006, Abu Dua traveled back to Syria as a key facilitator for foreign fighters entering Iraq. An airstrike killed his assistant Abu Ghadiya, and following this near miss on his own life, Abu Dua returned to Baghdad where his quick ascent began.

Abu Dua’s former prison mate, Haji Samir, introduced him to Abu Hamza al-Muhajir—second-in-command and military chief of *Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn*. Abu Hamza al-Muhajir’s highly favorable impressions led him to introduce Abu Dua to the Emir of *Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn*, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. Abu Hamza al-Muhajir as well as others within the organization were very impressed and greatly assisted his vertical ascension, particularly on matters related to Sharia, but also in a

senior advisory capacity. Abu Dua was charged with such high-level tasks as drafting letters on behalf of Emir Abu Omar al-Baghdadi to AQO Emir Osama bin Laden; and, the highly selective and secretive task of ensuring coordinated communication among leaders and the *Wilayat* (provinces).

Abu Dua first joined the Sharia Committee of the MSC, and then became a member of its more restricted *Majlis Al-Shura* (Senior Advisory Council). After the October 15, 2006, declaration of *Dawlat al-'Iraq al-Islamiyya* (ISI), as supervisor of the ISI Sharia Committee, he was given a general supervisory role over all Sharia committees operating in the ISI's provinces (*Wilayahs*). He also became a member of the ISI's 11-member *Majlis Al-Shura*. Abu Dua rose further and, it is strongly suggested, that he was appointed chief of the Islamic State's powerful three-person Coordination Committee, a position reserved for persons deemed most worthy and trusted, whose task involved coordinating between ISI Emir Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and the governors of the ISI's *Wilayat* (provinces).¹⁵⁴

From Abu Dua, to Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of ISI (*Dawlat al-'Iraq al-Islamiyya*) and ISIS/ISIL (*Dawla Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Shaam*), to Emir al-Muminin Abu Bakr al-Hussaini al-Qurayshi al-Baghdadi of The Islamic State (*al-Dawla al-Islamiyya*) of the Islamic Caliphate (*al-Khilafa al-Islamiyya*).

The April 18, 2010, targeted killing of ISI second-in-command Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and the ISI Emir and self-declared Emir al-Muminin Abu Umar al-Husseini al-Qurayshi al-Baghdadi (Abu Omar al-Baghdadi) proved to be a momentous event. Within the next 2 years, an organization that had appeared

beaten into dormancy would re-emerge and begin a carefully calculated strategy, later taking full advantage of dramatic changes inaugurated by an “Arab Spring” and later Syrian civil war, and utterly transforming the Sunni Salafi-Jihadi organizational landscape. The first steps lay, however, in selecting a new emir; and owing to the USG eliminating 34 out of 42 key ISI leadership targets, that began in early January 2006, replacing these leaders with a new, very distinct cadre as well.¹⁵⁵

Osama bin Laden’s choice for emir, Haji Iman, was not to be. Rather, a heretofore unknown shadowy individual Haji Bakr¹⁵⁶ – a former colonel, weapons development expert, and military intelligence operative in Saddam Hussein’s Air Force – would lobby and manipulate the existing Shura to secure a 9-2 vote in favor of the 39-year old Abu Dua. The Sharia Council reportedly abstained. The new emir, formerly Abu Dua, took on the new alias Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and his chief mission was revitalizing the ISI and reconstituting its leadership. Two scholarly accounts provide information on this phase. McCants claims:

According to insiders, the first order of business [as the new senior Military Emir] for the prince of shadows [Haji Bakr] was to purge the Islamic State of leaders he suspected of disloyalty; those who didn’t leave their posts willingly were killed. He and his boss [Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi] replaced them with their Iraqi allies, many of whom had served as officers in Saddam’s military and intelligence services.¹⁵⁷

Hasan Haniyeh, in a highly detailed and illuminating analysis of the ISI’s organizational structure, adds additional clarity.¹⁵⁸ First, though the post-Mosul (June 2014) conquest has led to a greater number of

non-native Arab and foreign-born leaders, “Iraqis still dominate the highest, most sensitive positions in IS’ upper echelons.”¹⁵⁹ Second, a profound reorganization and professionalization of the military and security forces was carried out.¹⁶⁰ He claims:

Under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the [ISI] organisation [sic] entered a phase of extreme secrecy and paranoia. Once he took over, he restructured the organisation [sic], putting Salafis and former Iraqi Army officers in charge of the military, such as Haji Bakr and Abdul Rahman al-Bilawi, turning the military corps into a more professional, cohesive entity . . . [Abu Bakr] Baghdadi put Turkmen from Tal Afar into key security positions, most prominently Abu Ali al-Anbari [a former Iraqi Major General]; and put Arabs and foreigners in charge of his media machine, led by Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, the Syrian spokesman for IS.¹⁶¹

The final organizational metamorphoses occurred as described earlier: the August 7, 2013, official declaration of the expansion from the ISI to *Dawla Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Shaam* (ISIS/ISIL; The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham). On June 28, 2014, based on Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s appointment as Caliph by only four persons – Abu Mohammad al-Adnani, Abu Ibrahim al-Masri, Turki al-Binali, and Abu Suleiman al-Utaybi – the declaration of a self-proclaimed Islamic State (*al-Dawla al-Islamiya*) or Islamic Caliphate (*al-Khilafa al-Islamiya*) had finally arrived. Claiming descent from Prophet Muhammad through the tenth Shia Imam,¹⁶² and secretly declaring *bay’ah* to both Osama bin Laden, and later Ayman al-Zawahiri,¹⁶³ this new entity would soon overtly clash with AQO on matters of doctrine and strategy.

CURRENT ISO WORLDVIEW, BELIEFS, CREED, AND DOCTRINE

Despite their common genus as Sunni global jihadist terrorist organizations, ISO and AQO profoundly differ in doctrine, creed, jurisprudence, and strategy. AQO's has already been laid bare and, in the earlier discussion, key contrasts were drawn between the "AQO Sunni Jihadist Church" and the "ISO Ultra-Conservative, Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadist Sect."

The historical journey we just examined began in the birth of al-Zarqawi's Zarqawism in the latter 1980s, and continued through neo-Zarqawism and and its various metamorphoses, marking the rise of the self-proclaimed Islamic Caliphate. ISO doctrine has been described, but not yet exclusively focused on. In this concluding section, we offer a succinct summary of ISO doctrine as we earlier did for AQO. These key doctrinal elements are "DNA-like" in that they practically define the precise mutation ISO represents.

ISO'S DIFFERENTIA SPECIFICA: FOUR ESSENTIAL CATEGORICAL DIVERGENCES FROM AQO

Four key beliefs account for the greatest source of ISO's divergence from AQO: (1) the imminence of the End Times (apocalypticism and eschatology), (2) the immediate demand to re-establish the Islamic Caliphate, (3) the *takfir* and policy of extermination of **all** Shia, and (4) an absolute priority of jihad against the nearest enemies. These four, considered together, constitute the "essential ISO difference" from AQO. There is here no overlap with AQO as it is a matter of presence or absence, and not one of degree.

THE IMMINENCE OF THE END TIMES (APOCALYPTICISM AND ESCHATOLOGY)

ISO believes that humankind is approaching the End Times, and as the True Saved Sect, they must wage a series of prophesized battles that will soon lead to the final and greatest of battles (*Al-Malahim*). There is a voluminous, systematic, and persistent focus within ISO's publicly available media production in support of this belief. These battles are essential before the truly culminating events involving the return of Jesus (*Isa*) to fight the anti-Christ (*Dajjal*), the return of the Redeemer (*Mahdi*), and the Final Day of Judgment (*Yawm al-Qiyamah*, literally, "Day of Resurrection"), when Allah shall, on the basis of true belief and righteous deeds, determine the eternal abode of all human souls.¹⁶⁴

The quantitative divergence in the attention given to this theme by the ISO versus that given by the AQO is dramatic. Consider these results arising from a comprehensive content analysis of their respective flagship publications.¹⁶⁵ The total of articles or lift-out paragraphs/graphics devoted to specifically apocalyptic (i.e., writings devoted to revealing the secret meanings of the past, present, and future) and eschatological End Times (i.e., writings concerned with the final culmination of all existence and its portents and signs) themes appearing in *Inspire*, *Resurgence*, and *Al-Risala* include the following: Over a period of 5 years—from summer 2010 to summer 2015—across 14 separate issues of *Inspire*, a **single reference** appears in Issue 13 by Abu Saleh. However, in this single reference to the "*fitnah* of *Masih Ad-Dajjal*" (Anti-Christ), it is re-contextualized as an anti-American diatribe. He asks:

“If you are weak and deceived by the *fitnah* of America, how will you be safe from the *Dajjal*?”¹⁶⁶ Within the new AQIS online magazine, *Resurgence*, across its two issues, **a single article** appears – by Shaykh Muhammad bin Mahmud al Bahteeti (aka: Abu Dujana al Pasha) – referring to the prophesied “End Times” battles.¹⁶⁷ This is described in stock fashion in a long paragraph. Overall, however, the article emphasizes the need to privilege Syria for several reasons at this moment as a key field of jihad.¹⁶⁸ Finally, AQO’s formal Syrian affiliate’s new magazine, *Al-Risala*, contains **not a single reference** to any apocalyptic themes in its first two issues.¹⁶⁹ In sum, three flagship AQO-based online magazines over the course of 5 years contain no more than one actual apocalyptic quote – and that along with several other reasons for jihad in Syria – and one reference to the future *Dajjal* or anti-Christ.

Now let us consider a comprehensive content analysis of the ISO’s flagship English-language online publication, *Dabiq*, Issues 1-14, from July 5, 2014, to April 14, 2016.¹⁷⁰ Apocalyptic and eschatological themes are evidenced in the following. First, each issue is sandwiched by apocalypticism on its contents page and back cover. The contents page in every issue, except Issue 7, brands the publication with a quote from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi: “The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify – by Allah’s permission – until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq.” This quote is excised from a September 11, 2004, audiotape issued 2 months before the historic and tactically decisive “second battle for Fallujah,” (November-December 2004); the first was April 2004 – Operation *al-Fajr* (“The Dawn”) and “Operation Phantom Fury” – where he issues the following call:

This is a call for help from the depths to the lions in Baghdad and Al-Anbar, and to the heroes in Diyala and Samarra, and to the tigers in Mosul and the north: prepare for battle . . . be alert to what is going on around you. . . . You are facing fierce civil strife, but then victory shall be yours, Allah willing. . . . Behold, the spark has been lit in Iraq and its flames will blaze, Allah willing, until they consume the Armies of the Cross in Dabiq.¹⁷¹

Second, the back page of 10 out of 14 issues explicitly addresses apocalyptic themes. One quote in particular, a *locus classicus* for ISO apocalypticism, but by no means the only one, is found in one highly-cited apocalyptic tradition in particular (No. 6924), found in one of the most authoritative collections of *ahadith* in Sunni Islam, *Sahih-Muslim*.¹⁷² It appears on the back page of the first issue, and is frequently encountered in ISO writings. The full quote is:

Abu Hurayrah [Prophet Muhammad's companion] reported that Allah's Messenger [Prophet Muhammad] . . . said: "The hour will not be established until the Romans land at al-'A'maq or Dabiq (two places near each other in the northern countryside of Halab). Then an army from al-Madinah of the best people on the earth at that time will leave for them. When they line up in ranks, the Romans will say, 'Leave us and those who were taken as prisoners among us so we can fight them.' The Muslims will say, 'Nay, by Allah, we will not abandon our brothers to you.' [So] they will fight them. Then one third of them will flee; Allah will never forgive them. One third will be killed; they will be the best martyrs with Allah. And one third will conquer them; they will never be afflicted with fitnah [internal strife]. They will conquer Constantinople.

While they are dividing the war booty, having hung their swords on olive trees, Shaytan [Satan] will shout, 'The [false; sic] Messiah has followed after your families [who were left behind.; sic] So they will leave [for their families; sic], but Shaytan's claim is false. When they arrive to Sham he comes out. Then while they are preparing for battle and filing their ranks, the prayer is called. So 'Isa Ibn Maryam [Jesus, son of Mary], will descend and lead them. When the enemy of Allah sees him, he will melt as salt melts in water. If he were to leave him, he would melt until he perished, but he [Jesus] kills him with his own hand, and then shows them his blood upon his spear.¹⁷³

A consistent drumbeat of apocalypticism also appears **between** the contents and final page.¹⁷⁴ These establish beyond any reasonable doubt that, at the very least, those charged with the production, distribution, and publication of this flagship online English language magazine have determined that apocalypticism is an essential feature of ISO branding. This profound divergence between AQO and ISO, i.e., its virtual non-existence for the former versus its centrality as a foundational, doctrinal, and core belief for the latter is remarkable and highly consequential. Furthermore, the ISO or at least some elements in the ISO have published an enormous amount of online material beyond *Dabiq*, focusing on "End Times" prophetic materials celebrating, elaborating upon, and amplifying apocalypticism.¹⁷⁵

Why is it important to establish whether apocalyptic and eschatological themes are present in Sunni global jihadist publications and writings, and why, one must assume, genuine beliefs and worldviews? First, to confirm, in fact, that a divergence exists between AQO and ISO. However, more important is to

establish the likelihood that a fundamentally different conception of historical time is operative for each organization. A highly instructive scholarly literature on apocalypticism exists.¹⁷⁶ Apocalypticism is by no means an invention of Islam, and with respect to the specific traditions of greatest relevance to us—those ancient Near Eastern civilizations that gave birth to the Abrahamic salvation religions—apocalypticism has its earliest known origins in Zoroastrianism and Judaism, and is later developed by Christianity and Islam.

The greatest practical consequences arising from these beliefs are in the realm of human morality and practical action. If one believes one is actually and undoubtedly living in a time of imminent and catastrophic battles; an active, essential agent in catalyzing these battles; fighting the final enemies of the One True God and the destination of one's soul is critically—as in no other time before or after—in the balance; that the enemies of the Truth are presenting themselves deceptively as Friends of the Truth; that within one's own lifetime events of a scale heretofore unimaginable **will happen**—these thoughts, these beliefs, **must** have consequences. What they create is an "Ethic of the End Times," rather than an "Ethic for All Times." They affect life choices. Acting as if one will **not** be living tomorrow is radically unlike believing that one's life and circumstances will unfold similarly over the course of one's natural life with no dramatic ruptures destined to occur in any near-term at the very least. Whether one believes tomorrow is the last day, or tomorrow is another day with thousands more to follow, is of profound consequence for how one will choose to act. It is conceivable then, if this apocalypticism is something other than a bizarre side note with a tiny number of proponents within ISO, that some

portion of ISO's impatience, brutality, and will to absolute power finds explanation here.¹⁷⁷ It is now time to turn to other themes that may also have dramatic consequences for ISO's ways of thinking, being, and acting.

THE CALIPHATE NOW!

AQO and ISO also fundamentally differ not on whether the Sunni Caliphate should be re-instituted, but on how this is to be realized. This is not just a matter of strategy, prudence, and timing, but of fundamental divergences in worldview. AQO's conception of the Caliphate is inspirational, aspirational, and a longer-term achievement that presumes several necessary stages of building popular support, transforming states, acquiring the necessary prerequisites for sustaining defense, education, welfare, and upholding the essential legal requisites of an Islamic State. It is conceived as resting in the *Ummah's* ultimate consent to its legitimacy, not through unbridled force, but through legal means; it is an Islam that belongs to the *Ummah*, but is won and led by its "Mujahid vanguard," *Qa'idat al-Jihad*, charged with the long-term strategy for its culmination. For AQO, "right makes might" when it comes to *Ahl-us Sunnah's* ultimate dream realized in the restored Caliphate.

ISO's "Caliphate Now!" is likely based first and foremost on its eschatological worldview. The Caliphate is a necessary milestone that must be attained before the destined End Times battles consummate human history and all shall be judged. Its organizational imperative is therefore rooted in the same "Ethic of End Times" driving a variety of other – if viewed from the standpoint of normal, historical time – extremely

deviant behaviors: in particular, a heightened sense of a finalized cosmic duality of Good and Evil, Allah, and Shaytan (Satan). In *Dabiq*, though a few key articles lay the doctrinal foundations of the necessity of the Khilafa Now,¹⁷⁸ the Caliphate is treated far more as a practical fact, i.e., legitimized as delivering security, services, and enforcing the Sharia of a state to which it is now time to declare allegiance.¹⁷⁹ The Caliphate's fuller eschatological sense can be found in a series of "Black Flag" publications specific to the Caliphate;¹⁸⁰ in self-proclaimed Caliph Ibrahim's July 2, 2014, Caliphal inaugural address;¹⁸¹ and in ISO's now-deceased former senior spokesman al-Adnani's Caliphate announcement.¹⁸²

A second basis for the ISO's Caliphate declaration is its sense of election: that the ISO, and **no other**, is the destined sect — **the Victorious Sect** — chosen to establish Allah's Khalifa, thereby accelerating momentum toward End Times. A chief consequence of this self-proclaimed status as the Victorious Sect — of this arrogance regarding sovereign leadership — was that from that moment forward, **all** existing groups, organizations, and individuals not bound by *bay'ah* to the new sovereign were presented a stark choice: between *bay'ah* to Caliph Ibrahim, or being regarded as a rebel (*bughat*) at best or apostate (*murtadd*) at worst. This demand that all existing organizations, including *Qa'idat al-Jihad's* affiliate *Al-Nusra*, dissolve and declare *bay'ah* to their new Caliph Ibrahim was at first met with confusion and consternation, but after advice, mediation, and legal remedies were categorically or surreptitiously refused by ISO, a state of outright rebellion and civil war recommenced.

THE “FINAL SOLUTION” TO THE “SHIA PROBLEM”

There is little novelty in the current ISO’s approach to the Shia. ISO continues the policies of its founding father Abu Musab al-Zarqawi vis-à-vis the “Shia Question”: the Shia are considered unredeemable apostates, treacherous subverters of Allah’s *Ahl-us Sunnah*, and must be decimated. Throughout ISO speeches and publications, the Shia are referred to pejoratively as *Rafidah* (rejectors, those who reject, those who refuse), based on the Shia doctrine that Prophet Muhammad’s son-in-law Ali was illegitimately denied his right to succeed the Prophet as *Khalifa* and lead the nascent Muslim community, and thus all successors after Muhammad except for Ali are denied (rejected). Within militant Shi’ism, indeed, there is a systematic disparagement and delegitimization of the first three successors after Muhammad (Abu Bakr, Umar ibn al-Khattab, and Uthman ibn ‘Affan). This also finds expression in Shia rituals of cursing those first successors, and all of those who illegitimately usurped the Prophet’s own family. Moreover, owing to the depth of this schism, Shi’ism and Sunnism (those claiming successorship through the first three successors, but also Ali, for them, the fourth legitimate Caliph) have developed distinctly different theological, juridical, ritual, and canonical traditions. Disregarding Shi’ism’s further splintering—quite numerous—this primordial split has distinct parallels in the Christian faith to the bitter, bloody battles pitting defenders of the True Universal Church (Roman Catholicism) against Protestants, who from the point of view of Catholic orthodoxy were deemed heretics and apostates to be converted or killed. For Protestants who

consider themselves the “True Universal Church,” it is Catholics who are accused of Romanism, Papism, and being agents of the Anti-Christ or Satan. We earlier described, when examining Zarqawism and neo-Zarqawism, the nature of this sectarianism. What is key here is to contextualize it within a broader revival of Sunni Salafi orthodoxy, the 1979 Iranian revolution, and finally, the cataclysmic effects for Sunnis in general and Sunni Salafis in particular of the U.S. decision to decapitate the Saddam Hussein regime and thus by default, empower their greatest earthly foes, the Shia and Iran.

The ISO’s uniqueness, again earlier described, is not their demonization of Shi’ism as heresy or their doctrine calling for the conversion or killing of their leadership. It is ISO’s extension of that charge and the actions it sanctions against the Shia laity itself. Every Shi’ite is to be killed, regardless of how learned, powerful, or likely to be responsible for systematic policies dis-privileging Sunnism that they may be. The reasons are two-fold. First, they are accused of an unpardonable idolatry and are therefore guilty of the greatest sin a Muslim can commit: *shirk*, i.e., associating others worthy of worship, with Allah. This is manifest, ISO and many militant Sunni Salafis would claim, in various rituals of veneration and adoration directed toward persons deemed in possession of intercessory spiritual powers, and has its most common ritual expression in the visitation of tombs and shrines; therefore, for ISO, there was the necessity of destroying them.¹⁸³ This destruction of Shia tombs, shrines, and attack on all forms of ritual associated with intercessory means is not an ISO invention, but rather a Salafi-Wahhabi trademark, as earlier described. Yet, even Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328), the esteemed neo-Hanbali

scholar-mujahid and Salafi-Wahhabi exemplar for orthodoxy and orthopraxy, did **not** *takfir* the Shia laity. Their ignorance, lack of proximate responsibility, and their proximity to Allah led to a policy of immunity from those punishments required for genuine idolatry and *shirk*. Al-Zarqawi's rejection of Ibn Taymiyya's fatwa legalizing Shia lay immunity has been continued by the ISO. Recall also Abu Omar al-Baghdadi's clarification, in 19 principles of the ISI's core creed, and the priority placed on the Shia as the **first two** of these. Its more brutal execution lay not in the intent but in ISO's dramatically increased means for realizing their intended "final solution."

Despite their common ancestry in Sunnism and Salafism, and to a lesser extent Salafi-Wahhabism, AQO's divergence from ISO on the "Shia question" is enormous. A comprehensive examination of *Inspire*, *Resurgence*, and *Al-Risala* turns up merely two articles that discuss the "*Rafida*." The first is by former founder and editor Samir Khan, though even here, he excludes a particular Shia offshoot, the Zaydi, from criticism altogether.¹⁸⁴ The second is in the earlier-mentioned single instance of an apocalypticism in the article by Shaykh Muhammad bin Mahmud al Bahteeti.¹⁸⁵ His comment does not *takfir* the Shia, but he accuses them in the context of the Syrian civil war and their support of the regime of Bashar Assad, and of revealing their "true colors" as hypocrites. He states: "[T]he war in Syria has uncovered the true nature of the Rawafid [i.e., "*Rafidah*"] and their deep loathing for Islam and the Muslims. The hollow slogans with which the Rawafid have tried to deceive the *Ummah* for so long have now lost their efficacy. The veneer they had coated their hypocrisy with has finally worn out." Hardly a call to arms, and certainly a vast distance from the

policy of systematic extermination currently being prosecuted by the ISO.¹⁸⁶

THE NEAREST ENEMY IS THE *UMMAH'S* TRUEST ENEMY!

The prioritizing of the “Nearest Enemy” rather than the “Far Enemy” is a final point of furthest divergence. This is not strategic but instead a fundamental disagreement rooted in creed and ultimate beliefs.

AQO’s “Far Enemy” focus is derived from its orienting principle: “The Sunni Church of the United *Ummah* and Its Mujahidin versus The Craven Original *Kufr* and Their Apostate Lackeys Who Oppress and Exploit the Muslim World.” For ISO, the world is quite different. The original sin is not the original *Kufr*, but the nearest of my former Muslim brothers who treacherously left Allah for *shirk*, and in so doing, split Allah’s true faith and true warriors with the ultimate consequence that the original *Kufr* now dominate the *Ummah*. Internal treason, subversion, and treachery must first be exorcised; then, Allah’s true army is organized from those remnants who survive these battles; and finally assembled on the fields of Dabiq, they fight the final battles of the End Times. The ISI’s first proto-caliph, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, clarifies this worldview in a form that only the blind could fail to recognize:

And know this well: the *malicious rafidah* [Shiites] and the *infidel occupiers* will never forget that only yesterday you were their enemies, and they have begun to stab you already, so return to us and we will not forget that yesterday you were our friends. . . . If you refuse to repent before we get a hold of you then, by Allah, *to kill an apostate is more preferable to me than a hundred*

Crusader heads, and you know all about our vigor and our reach, and the mantle of the [Shias] and the wood of the Crusader occupiers will do you no good [italics supplied].¹⁸⁷

This speech was delivered in the midst of the ISI's precipitous decline and the fundamental threat now posed to its Caliphal ambitions by the "apostate" Sunni elements that had "abandoned" the ISI. Three primary enemies are identified—"the malicious rafidah," "the infidel occupiers," and "unrepentant apostate[s]." "If you refuse to repent before we get hold of you then, by Allah, to kill an apostate is more preferable than a hundred Crusader heads" refers to the Sunni "Sah-wat" or "Tribal Awakening," as well as other insurgent Sunni formations that ultimately doomed any pretense that the ISI represented the heart and soul of *Ahl-us Sunnah*. Note, *takfir* has been declared against Sunnis who refuse ISI rule. Since ISI is Allah's chosen instrument for the realization of the End Time, they are guilty of *shirk*. Second in priority is "the malicious rafidah," and a distant third, "the infidel occupiers." Abu Omar al-Baghdadi's ISI, which has alienated the *Ahl-us Sunnah* beyond any possible reconciliation, attempts to persuade these *Ahl-us Sunnah* that they are not your friends or your future—"never forget that only yesterday you were their enemies, and they have begun [again] to stab you already, so return to us and we will not forget that yesterday you were our friends."¹⁸⁸

ISO RELATIVE DIVERGENCES FROM AQO

ISO's less definitive divergences from AQO, though highly consequential, are more finely nuanced, require extensive elaboration, and suppose a specialized knowledge of Islamic theology and juris-

prudence (*Fiqh*) exceeding that possessed by the present author.¹⁸⁹ These debates concern such fundamental concepts as faith and its opposite, infidelity (*Iman* versus *Kufr*); and based on one's answer to the questions, "What is faith? What is infidelity?" How one determines, in fact, whether one has veered too far from the "middle path" – claimed to be Prophet Muhammad's true path – and instead has become either negligent and guilty of postponing (*irja*) essential acts of faith and thereby accused of belonging to the negligent postponers (*Murj'ites*); or on the other extreme, judge sinning itself as *Kufr*, and thereby exhibit an extremist ultra-radicalism like the early sect of Kharijites (*Khawarij*).¹⁹⁰ Still other debates deal with key theological and theopolitical concepts such as: the doctrine of *al Wala wa'l bara* – the notion that a true Muslim must openly disavow, disassociate from, and hate idolaters – and on the other hand, exclusively avow, associate with, and love the advocates of monotheism; the doctrine of *tawhid*, or the absolute Oneness of Allah as Creator, Lord, and in His Names, and its opposite, *shirk* or idolatry, and what in fact counts as idolatry particularly in the modern world; the doctrine of *Hakimiyyah*, and the notion that a state can only be governed by the "Rulings that Allah Sent Down," i.e., the Sharia, and how that is to be operationalized; and, the question of when and how the obligatory prescribed criminal punishments (*Hudud*) of lashing, permanent dismemberment, and stoning are to be enforced for the crimes of fornication, theft, adultery, and intentional homicide.

The point of greatest convergence and with which we conclude this section, is the genus "global Sunni jihadism" to which each of these deviant species subscribe. The definitive quality that marks these orga-

nizations off from every other form of Islamic activism is their claim that *jihad fi sabil Allah* – fighting and striving in the path of Allah to Raise Allah’s Word – is until the Day of Final Judgment, an immediate and unconditional obligation that is at the same time, the superlative means of worshipping Allah, expiating one’s sins, and purchasing (through sacrifices of blood and treasure) those superlative privileges only attained by those killing and being killed on this path (*Shuhada*) (re: Quran 9:111).¹⁹¹

CHAPTER 2

TERRORIST MODUS OPERANDI

I. INTRODUCTION

Having systematically examined AQO's and ISO's core beliefs, worldviews, doctrine, and creed, let us now examine the governing dynamics of their terrorist strategies: their terrorist modus operandi. The author's Terrorist Quadrangle Analysis (TQA), a heuristic for modeling the dynamics of terrorist organizations, is employed to facilitate this task. This heuristic is first briefly described, and subsequently applied to AQO (part one) and ISO (part two).

TERRORIST QUADRANGLE ANALYSIS (TQA)

The Terrorist Quadrangle Analysis (TQA) is a tool created by the present author for conceptualizing the four key intrinsically-related dynamic elements of a terrorist organization – (1) religio-political objectives, (2) media warfare, (3) terrorist operations (other than media), and (4) proximate strategic objectives.¹⁹² A brief discussion of each element and their interrelation follows (see Figure 1).




Figure 1. The Terrorist Quadrangle: Relations of Religio-Political Objectives, Media Operations, Terror Operations (Non-Media) and Strategic Objectives.

“Religio-Political Objectives” refers to the proximate and ultimate “end state” sought by the terrorist entity: its declared ideal ultimate objective and those proximate to it. “Media Operations” refers to the deliberate use of all available media to facilitate the achievement of terrorist organizational objectives. “Terrorist Operations (Non-Media)” are all actions, operations, and campaigns designed and executed for attaining proximate and ultimate religio-political objectives. “Strategic Objectives” are key proximate end states necessary for the full realization of the terrorist entity’s ultimate religio-political objectives. They maintain a direct causal relation to proximate and ultimate religio-political objectives. For example, if an ultimate religio-political objective were the creation of a state

ruled exclusively by Sharia, a key strategic objective would be the successful elimination of a non-Sharia-based legal system, and the successful creation of an alternative juridical system.

Terrorism as strategy is motive-independent. It is in its essence, reducible to a stick of dynamite, a film crew, an immediate target that serves as a sign vehicle, and a broader indirect target audience whose will, resolve, and psychological state is deemed essential to the realization of the terrorist's ultimate objectives. Though ultimate objectives, means of destruction, media, direct targets, and indirect targets are variables, terrorism as strategy remains identical to what it has always been: the deliberate use of terrorism directed at direct and indirect targets (the way), using media and non-media instruments of power/influence (the means), to achieve ends (in this case, religio-political ends).¹⁹³ Let us now examine the terrorist modus operandi of AQO and ISO.

II. THE AL-QAEDA ORGANIZATION (TANZIM QA'IDAT AL-JIHAD)

Despite the previous chapter's focus on core beliefs, worldviews, creed, and doctrine, we also learned about AQO's basic terrorist modus operandi. The AQO doctrine as we observed sought to galvanize and mobilize Sunni Muslims to deploy as part of bin Ladenism's "Sunni Internationale," to systematically attrite the "Crusader-Zionist" alliance through persistent, economically damaging attacks on "Far Enemy" targets. Let us now briefly describe the TQA of the "classical" AQO "Far Enemy" bin Ladenism strategy.¹⁹⁴

TQA, I: THE "CLASSICAL" BASE FIRST BIN LADENIST "FAR ENEMY" STRATEGY

Proximate and Ultimate Religio-Political Objectives.

AQO's ongoing transnational terrorist campaign is directed at attaining an ultimate religio-political object: Islamic supremacy, global worship of Allah, and the reign of an Islamic super-state. This objective is to be attained in stages.¹⁹⁵ First, the United States and its principal allies are to be territorially and militarily removed from the Arab Muslim world, thus undermining U.S. military presence, power projection, and access to energy reserves. Second, is the overthrowing of so-called apostate pro-Western regimes and replacing these with orthodox Sunni Muslim governments, which are adherent to strict Islamic legal orthodoxy. Third, is uniting Muslim states into a supra-state

caliphate that shall serve as a religio-political base for further amassing Muslim power and conducting of offensive jihad to confront the remaining world of infidelity (*dar al-Kufr*). This supra-state caliphal Sovereign is envisioned as an alternative international order that eschews, denies, and is at war with the present United Nations-based system of territorially independent, equal, sovereign nation-states. Fourth, mobilized within this caliphal block of militant Muslim states, a sustained, permanent offensive jihad is to be fought until all other forms of worship and polity are overthrown. It is at that point that Allah's worship will be universal throughout the Earth and the reign of justice, peace, and Allah's absolute sovereignty fully realized.

The Instrumental Role of Media Warfare, Terrorist Attacks, and the Strategic Object.

Media warfare is viewed by AQO as an essential dimension of their strategy.¹⁹⁶ Media warfare, terrorist attacks, and strategic objectives are conceived by AQO as strictly subordinate to AQO's religio-political objectives. Phases one and two of the religio-political object are paramount at the present time, i.e., removal of the United States and its principal allies territorially and militarily from the Arab Muslim world, and overthrowing so-called apostate pro-Western regimes and replacing these with Sunni Muslim governments that adhere to strict Islamic legal orthodoxy.

A central task of media warfare during these initial phases is to reinforce an essential Manichaeic dichotomy between the "Crusader" United States of America and the "Defender" AQO. The Crusader must be portrayed as the Satanic other: a mortal foe of Godly forces mobilized to vanquish evil personi-

fied. Designed to galvanize, incite, and morally outrage, this process of “satanization” has, since Harold D. Lasswell’s early study,¹⁹⁷ been well-documented as a key strategic dimension of wartime propaganda. This first key strategic media warfare task—mobilize animosity/hatred by the Muslim Nation (*Ummah*) of the enemy—is complemented by three other strategic media warfare tasks that correlate with key target audiences: securing and preserving the friendship of allies; preserving and if possible, securing, the cooperation of neutrals or even arousing neutrals’ opposition to one’s own enemies; and, demoralizing and disintegrating the enemy’s will to persevere.¹⁹⁸

The terrorist attacks AQO conceptualized, organized, executed, and endorsed are strictly subordinate to the attainment of the proximate religio-political object; and, the rationale and subsequent justification for these terrorist attacks is provided in AQO media warfare. They aim, again, at specific target audiences whose function is deemed essential at this stage of the campaign. The enemy’s determination, resolve, and willingness to pay the price of military power projection and support of regional allies must be undermined. Potential AQO allies and neutrals are excluded from these carefully selected, highly symbolic terrorist targets and thus, appealed and recruited to the AQO cause. Inciting, catalyzing, and galvanizing the *Ummah* is also key.

Finally, AQO’s key strategic objectives directly correlate with its strategic media warfare and terrorist attacks. Given this present phase focused on removing the U.S. presence in the Arab Muslim world and installing strictly adherent Sunni Muslim states, these four objectives are realized if AQO is successfully undermining “Crusader” enemy motivation, means, and

opportunity to remain militarily, economically, and politically engaged in the Arab Middle East; expanding AQO's terrorist enterprise, base of support, and unity among potential allies; securing neutrality or even cooperation among neutrals; and further galvanizing AQO's fighting forces and broader base within the Muslim *Ummah*. In Figure 2, we present AQO's five-stage theory of realizing the Khilafa, along with the TQA model used to analyze each stage.




Figure 2. From *Qa'idat al-Jihad* to *Khilafah*: A TQA Analysis of AQO.

However, a calculated USG policy during nearly 15 years following 9/11 to degrade, disrupt, and ultimately defeat Aqo has successfully accomplished two of three key strategic objectives: relentlessly attacking Aqo's leadership and network, and success-

fully protecting the U.S. homeland from mass casualty terrorist attacks. The third objective – countering radicalization and recruitment to AQO – remains a work in progress.¹⁹⁹ Fortunately, AQO’s marginalization from the vast majority of *Ahl-us Sunnah*, and Sunni rejection of AQO’s terrorist modus operandi, has assisted where less successful counter-radicalization efforts have not.²⁰⁰ We shall return in Chapter 3 to examine USG efforts along that line of effort.

It is possible, as suggested in Chapter 1, that AQO is now reorienting in the direction of a type of unconventional warfare strategy – embedding, training, and acting as force multipliers among an auxiliary training to overthrow an existing state, as well as establishing essentially political fronts – *Ansar al-Sharia* organizations (i.e., supporters/helpers of the Sharia) – as was noted in relation to its present Syrian affiliate *Jabhat al-Nusrah li-ahl al-Sham min Mujahidi al-Sham fi Sahat al-Jihad* (“Protection Front for the People of the Levant by the Mujahadin of the Levant in the Battlefields of Jihad”; hereafter, *Jabhat al-Nusrah*), and the broader Islamist coalitions within which it operates.²⁰¹ This is actually closer to the original al-Qaeda idea – a mobile Islamic foreign legion assisting embattled Brothers on various fronts – before it morphed via bin Laden’s post-1990s obsession with anti-American mass casualty terrorism.²⁰²

“Classical” AQO still requires USG attention. However, it is widely acknowledged that AQO’s Yemeni-based affiliate AQAP now poses the greatest present threat to the U.S. homeland. This is particularly true of its external operations branch. AQAP has practically amended the “classical” AQO model of top-down, long-range, high-quality, mass casualty, anti-American terrorism to pioneer a very different

terrorist modus operandi centered on an individualized “lone mujahid” model of decentralized direct terrorist action. The emergence of homegrown and home-based terrorism as a direct result of this “lone mujahid” strategy represents a fundamental strategic shift. Let us now examine this most lethal AQO affiliate of greatest concern to the West and USG in particular.

TQA, II: THE AQAP “LONE MUJAHID” “FAR ENEMY” STRATEGY

AQAP’s “lone mujahid” strategy represents a major development in AQO’s strategic evolution.²⁰³ It has recently been suggested that because bin Laden often questioned AQAP’s strategic acumen and registered criticisms of its target selection, that it should not really be characterized as the “real” AQO, at least not as bin Laden’s “classical,” “Far Enemy” strategy is concerned.²⁰⁴ Furthermore, bin Laden maintained “a seeming distrust of AQAP’s competence as a jihadi entity, not least its lack of a sound understanding of politics.”²⁰⁵ This observation is accurate, but practically irrelevant. For one, it is possible to lodge the same criticism of bin Laden whose knowledge of reality, politics included, was based in a profound ignorance, conspiracism, delusion, and hubris, enough so that key members of his own inner circle accused him of destroying in months what it had taken years, even decades, to build. Second, classical bin Ladenism has been hammered into oblivion by a sustained U.S. campaign that has attrited its leadership, gutted its finances, and overcome initial sanctuary-based AQO advantages through a lethal and relentless policy of drone-based targeting²⁰⁶ of high value targets.²⁰⁷

Third, AQAP remains a clear and present danger to the U.S. homeland, and its “lone mujahid” strategy currently poses the single greatest ongoing threat to law enforcement, the intelligence community, and all who are charged with preventing lone-wolf-style terrorist attacks on American soil. We believe it is highly likely that this phase of AQAP’s evolution represents not just a strategic evolution but also a strategic dead end. One way terrorist groups finally end, Audrey Cronin points out, is by reorienting into pure criminality.²⁰⁸ As we will soon see, AQAP’s terrorist modus operandi appears not only to promote this kind of conduct, but also to elevate those who engage in this truly reprehensible and forbidden (*haram*) conduct to the highest levels of Paradise as *Shuhada*.

It is highly unlikely that *Ahl-us Sunnah* will recognize this conduct as anything other than what it actually is: sinful, ghastly, evil, and wrong; and more to the point, not the Islam that embodies those ideals and religious principles upon which the world’s 1.6 billion Muslims—Sunni and Shia—stand. These objections will be more fully discussed in our final chapter. For now, let us take a brief and telling tour of AQAP’s self-professed path to the highest of seven levels of *Jannah* (Paradise).

The online magazine *Inspire* provides the master key to AQAP’s terrorist modus operandi. The objective of our earlier tour through each of its fourteen issues published between summer 2010 and summer 2015 (see Chapter 1) was to document certain sources of major divergence from ISO. We discovered that ISO’s four signature creedal/doctrinal themes most divergent from AQO—apocalypticism, ultra-sectarian anti-Shi’ism, Caliphate Now! and Nearest Enemy Now!—were virtually non-existent in AQAP’s *Inspire*.

Doctrinally, a comprehensive analysis reveals that AQAP embraces AQO's "party line" privileging, attacking the "Far Enemy" and, importantly, a longer-term, stage-theory for eventually restoring the rightful Caliphate.²⁰⁹ What we seek to document in this second tour of *Inspire* is not doctrine, but its "lone mujahid" strategy for attaining its declared proximate and ultimate religio-political objectives. To do so, we will again attempt to use the TQA to capture the dynamics of a terrorist modus operandi which links religio-political objectives with its media operations, non-media terrorist operations, and strategic objectives.

AQAP Media Operations.

AQAP's media operations are single-mindedly and unabashedly devoted to promoting the strategy of "lone mujahid" terrorism. First, the works and speeches of key strategists, advocates, and theorists of individualized jihad, such as Abu Musab al-Suri's *Global Islamic Resistance Call*²¹⁰ and Anwar al-Awlaki's *Why Did I Choose Al Qaeda?*²¹¹ extolling individualized jihadi terrorism, are made accessible in serialized form. Second, Sharia scholars produce a legal rationale in defense of individualized jihadi terrorism.²¹² Third, knowledge of terror craft tactics, techniques, and procedures is made available through publication of the "Open Source Jihad" section in *Inspire*.²¹³ Fourth, major "special operations," particularly those envisioning the "lone mujahid" or lone wolf type terrorist attack are celebrated.²¹⁴ Fifth, encrypted communication links are routinely advertised that permit anonymized, individualized terrorist communication links with AQAP.²¹⁵

Finally, the lion's share of AQAP's focus, if measured by sheer column inches, is its obsessive advocacy of "martyrdom" (*Shuhada*).²¹⁶ This involves extolling, celebrating, honoring, inspiring, inciting, and lionizing martyrdom in general, and individualized "lone mujahid," "martyrdom operations," and "martyrs" in particular.

"Jihadism" by its very nature has reduced Islam to fighting and dying in the process of killing others. As the singular path advanced for the raising of Allah's Word, empowering individuals to sacrifice all that is dear on this Earth, and in this life, is essential. Individualized jihadism (the "lone mujahid") is the true "center of gravity" for AQAP's media operations, because it focuses directly on the critical requirement and the potential critical vulnerability of this terrorist modus operandi: generating, motivating, and deploying an ample supply of persons willing to kill fellow human beings and citizens in the process of killing themselves. Such an unnatural, aberrant, truly reprehensible, and morally condemnable act requires the most careful attention—to emotive manipulation, addressing fears and doubts, providing assurances for loved ones left behind, sowing doubt about one's manliness and courage, exacerbating alienation and identity crises—should *Shahada* not be pursued to the end.

Non-Media Terrorist Operations and Strategic Objectives.

A comprehensive analysis of *Inspire's* media operations also discloses the types of non-media terrorist operations pursued, and their relation to strategic objectives. First and foremost are "Far Enemy"

operations designed to attack predominantly economic targets—institutions, infrastructure, energy corridors, global shipping, commercial aviation—and personalities, including world-renowned entrepreneurs, scholars, intellectuals, and philanthropists. Second, is the emergent focus on a type of radically individualistic violence comprised of a hybridization of ultra-anarchism and gangsterism.²¹⁷ Possessed of the knowledge, motivation, opportunities, and tools, every Muslim is urged to murder any non-Muslim, destroy their honor, steal their wealth, and wreak havoc on their lives. The ideal Muslim is portrayed as a treacherous, murderous, criminal psychopath who spills oil on highways to ambush and later murder his hapless victims; sets fire to forests and burns every life form and residence that would lie in its path; and who would assassinate the creators, inventors, and intellects responsible for pioneering institutions and running global enterprises. This appears to be AQAP's most considered answer to the question, "What would Prophet Muhammad Do?" It does not take much imagination to predict the probable trajectory of an entity whose highest ideals for contemporary Islam are the greatest sins after apostasy: homicide, suicide, treachery, deceit, and attacking the lives, honor, posterity, and wealth, of Allah's creation.

AQAP's primary strategic objective is captured in its simplified formula: **If** we Remove the United States from Muslim Lands + **If** we Preach the Call (*Da'wa*) + **If** we Defend the *Ummah's* State and Lands = **Then** we will realize Caliphate.²¹⁸ The first (**If** we Remove the United States from Muslim Lands) of this Caliphate syllogism presumes knowledge of the United States. However, like Osama bin Laden, AQAP appears profoundly and dangerously ignorant and maintains delusions about its chief "Crusader" nemesis. It has

mistaken its hollowed out, demonized, conspiracy-riddled, anti-semitic caricature for the real thing. Based on its own published record, along with the virtual decimation of its first-tier leadership cadre, one might conclude that AQAP lacks knowledge of the adversary it insists on terrorizing. This includes its apparent ignorance of U.S. values, institutions, motivations, and the sustained commitment of its residents and citizens who identify with America's promise, opportunities, and freedoms – including genuine religious freedoms cherished and celebrated by its Muslim citizens and residents.

It is likely, as suggested earlier, that AQAP is transforming from an AQO-based "Far Enemy" terrorist organization possessed of a leadership, resources, sanctuary, finances, logistics, and recruits, to little more than an inspirer of anarchistic-like individualized terrorism, parasitizing the electromagnetic and cyber dimensions to promote what has become nothing more – to persons less ignorant and deluded – than sinful and criminal conduct. The strategic implications for USG efforts to counter this organization are straightforward, and shall be taken up in our final chapter. It is now time to take up our second terrorist entity: the ISO (*Tanzim al-Dawla al-Islamiyya*).

III. ISLAMIC STATE ORGANIZATION (TANZIM AL-DAWLA AL-ISLAMIYYA)

Let us now examine the ISO's strategy and terrorist modus operandi. We anchor our analysis in the ISO's own selective, apologetic history of its own beginnings in al-Zarqawi and Zarqawism, the pithiest formulation of which is ISO's proposed five-stage strategy for realizing the Caliphate in *Dabiq's* inaugural issue.²¹⁹ We will learn in ISO's re-telling of its self-understanding of Zarqawism's distinct differences from every other jihadist tendency, and why it is deemed the exclusive "bridge" to *Khilafa*. However, instead of parroting ISO's self-presentation, where necessary and practicable, we supply known facts in place of ISO distortions and myths. We shall also further substantiate ISO's self-presentation by drawing on the fuller range of materials made available across 11 issues of *Dabiq*. As we shall soon see, the ISO has in practice significantly departed from its idealized five-stage strategy. The reasons for this shall be obvious in the course of our presentation.

TQA: THE ISO "STATE/CALIPHATE-FIRST" STRATEGY

ISO declares five necessary stages (see Figure 3) marking the path to the restoration of the Sunni Islamic Caliphate:

1. Emigrating to an ideal locale (*Hijrah*);
2. Establishing the jihadist state-building nuclei (*Jama'ah*);
3. Using terrorist "vexation and exhaustion" operations to attack, collapse, and destroy existing state authority (*Nikayah*), to create mayhem/chaos (*Tawahhush*);

4. Controlling territory, persons, resources, and consolidating an alternative Islamic State structure (*Tamkin*); and finally,
5. Declaring, consolidating, and expanding the Islamic State/Caliphate (*Khilafah*). These may be visually represented using the TQA heuristic.




Figure 3. From Hijra to Khilafah: A TQA Analysis.²²⁰

ISO Proximate and Ultimate Religio-Political Objectives.

ISO declares very clearly its ultimate religio-political objective. It is stated thrice: “[e]stablishing Khilafah”; “reviving the Khilafah”; and “The goal of Khilafah without hesitation.”²²¹ What ISO meant precisely by “without hesitation” is unclear, since this could mean: “We must begin now to work toward the Caliphate” or “We must now without hesitation **declare** The Islamic State of the Caliphate.” In practice, it appears the latter course was taken, and if so, this **contradicts** ISO’s own self-declared stage strategy by placing the Caliphate far ahead of the other necessary stages it posits are essential to its effective “remaining and expanding.” We shall leave this for now, as it will soon reappear as an essential ingredient of ongoing *Fitnah* and ISO’s civil war with other Islamic, Salafi, and Salafi-Jihadist organizations.

ISO Terrorist Operations (Non-Media), and Accompanying Media Operations.

The ISO lays out a very brief and telling summary of its grand strategy. It clarifies for us exactly how it envisions strategy, and the essential phases for realizing its end state. This description is based on its recapitulation of the stages it claims al-Zarqawi’s initial organization followed:

In short, these phases consist of [1] **immigrating** [hi-jra] to a land with a weak central authority to use as a base where a [2] **jama’ah** can form, recruit members, and train them. (If such a land does not exist or hi-jrah is not possible, the place can be formed through long campaigns of nikayah [vexation and exhaustion])

attacks carried out by underground mujahid cells These attacks will compel apostate forces to partially withdraw from rural territory and regroup in major urban regions.) The jama'ah would then take advantage of the situation by [3] **increasing the chaos** to the point of leading to the **complete collapse** of the taghut regime in entire areas, a situation some refer to as '**tawahhush**' ('**mayhem**'). The next step would be to fill the vacuum by managing the state of affairs to the point of [4] **developing into a full-fledged state** [tamkin], and continuing expansion into territory still under control of the taghut [emphasis added].²²²

A concluding sentence, in boldface type and a larger font size, supplies our final stage. "**This has always been the roadmap towards [stage 5] Khilafah for the mujahidin.**"²²³ Let us now attempt to follow this path.

Phase 1: Emigration (Hijra).

In the beginning is Emigration (*Hijra*). Conceived on the model of Prophet Muhammad, ISO envisions its origins in emigration from a land of persecution to one where the rudiments of a new organization may be planted and defended. For al-Zarqawi, this new land is "a place where they could operate without the threat of a powerful police state," and ISO asserts that this led him from Afghanistan (recall his *Jund al-Sham* based in Herat), to Kurdistan, "as a base to form *Jama'atut-Tawhidi wal-Jihad* [italics added]."²²⁴

Phase 2: Group Formation (Jama'ah).

Interestingly, *Dabiq* asserts that the creedal core of Zarqawism is the way of moderation, or the middle way, and that the ISO is based on Quran, Sunnah, and

a Salafism “free from the extremities,” i.e., neither negligent (*murji’ite*) nor equating sin with disbelief (*khawarij*). Further, it is based in the doctrines of *tawhid*, *al-wala wa’l bara*, and the demand that all governance be based in Sharia. It views “jihad as its fundamental means for change” (citing, Quran 8:39), and that jihad be based upon “*hijrah* [emigration], *bay’ah* [an oath of loyalty to the emir], *sam’* [listening], *ta’ah* [obedience], and *i’dad* [training], leading to *ribat* [manning frontiers] and *qital* [fighting], then *Khilafah* or *shahadah* [martyrdom], [italics added].”²²⁵ Having claimed to adhere to what seems like a mainline Salafi-Jihadi creed, however, we soon learn otherwise. Zarqawism is presented instead as the exclusive “bridge” to the Caliphate, with all others accused of varying degrees of intolerable deviance.

The story begins in the Afghanistan camps, the era of united fronts, anti-Communist coalitions, and Az-zamist defensive jihad. Because of the overwhelming emphasis placed on fighting a “common enemy,” it is claimed this led to “ignoring all matters that distinguished them from each other, even if those matters were an obstacle in the pursuit of *Khilafah*,” with the most significant of these being “nationalism” and other “serious innovations that destroyed the creed and healthy body of the Muslim *jama’ah* required for reviving the *Khalifah*.”²²⁶ Note here ISO’s declared opposition to Azzamism and AQO-based Church-like “lumping” strategies. Those ecumenical conceptions of “Muslimness” were vehemently opposed to sectarian splitting and internecine warfare at the expense of the “apostate” government installed by the “original *Kufr*,” in this case the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). For al-Zarqawi and the ISO, however, what is decisive is “all matters that distin-

guished them [each fighting group] from each other.” In other words, it is only the purity of the Pure Sect that ensures the True Muslimness of the Muslim, and therefore it is in the process of winnowing wheat from chaff and True Believers from hypocrites, negligence, heresy, and outright apostasy, that *Khilafa* can and should be restored. The Caliphate can only be built from steel. It is “the creed and healthy body of the Jama’ah” cleansed of “serious innovations” that will be the instrument for the restoration. Moreover, many “would become the bridges upon which jihad would pass over toward the awaited Khilafah,” the one of greatest consequence “was that of the *mujaddid* (reviver) Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.”²²⁷

It is essential to pause for a moment to see that this second stage of — *Jama’ah* — Zarqawism, by its very nature, views itself as operating on two key battle fronts. The **least** important is the front that fights “the occupier” in the wake of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, and involves a number of Islamic, nationalist, Ba’athist, and other opponents;²²⁸ the **most** important was the al-Zarqawi-incited civil war against other Islamic groups for their alleged failure to rigidly adhere to his particular variant of ultra-conservative, ultra-sectarian Wahhabi-Salafi jihadism. This second front is the front against the **nearer** (Shia) and **nearest** enemies (insufficiently Muslim Sunnis); and as we have already learned, is the essential, obsessive front that sectarians must first — and forever — fight. It is only in this purging, cleansing, and destruction of opponents (i.e., the tribulations that are the oven that separates the pure and impure) that Allah opens the way for Allah’s True Soldiers and exposes and destroys hypocrites, sinners, heretics, and apostates, to create the State of the Caliphate. The moment al-Zarqawi’s *Jama’at al-Tawhid*

wal-Jihad is born (*Jama'ah*), *Fitnah* is also born. We shall treat this more extensively in the following section, but for now "*Fitnah*," defined as intra-Muslim "tribulation," "trial," or "conflict," refers to a state of civil war or conflict among jihadist groups based on a state of enmity, fundamental disagreement, and is characterized by the outbreak of overt hostilities. Its deeper meaning for ISO is that it is Allah's method for refining and distilling through trials, tribulations, conflict, and fighting, that steel from which the true bridge to *Khalifa* shall be built.

Phase 3: Injury, Vexation, Exhaustion (Nikayah), and Collapse, Chaos, Mayhem (Tawahhush).

By using methods that led to maximum chaos and targeting apostates of all different backgrounds, the mujahidin were able to keep Iraq in constant instability and war, never allowing any apostate group to enjoy a moment of security [emphasis added].²²⁹

Phase 3 commences as al-Zarqawi's organization *Jund al-Sham*, and later *Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad*, destroy all that is not him, and leaves chaos in his wake: "In short," *Dabiq* claims:

he strived to create as much chaos as possible with the means permitted by the Shari'ah using attacks sometimes referred to as operations of 'nikayah' (injury) that focus on causing the enemy death, injury, and damage . . . [And] [w]ith chaos, he intended to prevent any taghut [idolatrous] regime from ever achieving a degree of stability that would enable it to reach a status quo similar to that existing in the Muslim lands ruled for decades by tawaghit. . . . To achieve maximum chaos, the Shaykh focused on the most effective weapons in the arsenal of the mujahidin for creat-

ing chaos—vehicle bombs, IEDs, and *istishadiyyin* [specialized suicide ops brigades].²³⁰

What truly distinguished al-Zarqawi's organization, however—and not adequately captured in the previous quote—was **not** his attacks on regime targets or American forces, or even on those in the highest levels of leadership who could be reasonably accused of voluntarily aiding and abetting the occupation. Instead, virtually all Islamic insurgents could agree on the objective of launching “daily operations against the crusader forces in Iraq whose main goal was to set up an apostate puppet regime loyal to them.”²³¹ Zarqawism **as** Zarqawism was defined rather by its legitimization of targets deemed by the vast majority of these insurgents as forbidden on **Islamic** grounds or detrimental to the insurgency on **practical** grounds. It is through al-Zarqawi's use of ultra-*takfiri* epithets and euphemistic language that this dramatic expansion of theretofore forbidden targets is condoned.

For example, it is stated that: “He [al-Zarqawi] would order [persons] to carry out nikayah operations dozens of times in a dozen areas daily, targeting and killing sometimes hundreds of apostates from the police forces and Rafidah.”²³² However, “hundreds of apostates from the police forces” refer not just to leadership and collaborators, but everyday persons, Sunni and Shia, who are far from a chain of command and are the sons of the Iraqi masses. “The Rafidah,” of course, refers to al-Zarqawi's wholesale slaughter of the Shia, leaders and led; this is deemed reprehensible and indeed forbidden (*haram*), even among deeply conservative Sunni Salafi-Wahhabis. This panoply of prohibited targets and forbidden conduct is further celebrated as Zarqawism's fodder in this phase whose

proximate objectives are maximum injury, chaos, and collapse. But the list of al-Zarqawi's permissible targets is further clarified, and extended. "In addition," *Dabiq* declares:

he tried to force every apostate group present in Iraq into an all-out war with *Ahlu-Sunnah*. So he targeted the Iraqi apostate forces (army, police, and intelligence), the Rafidah (Shia markets, temples, and militias), and the Kurdish secularists (Barzani and Talabani partisans). . . . In his speech titled '*Hadha Bayanullin-Nasi wa li Yundharu Bih*' (This is a Declaration for the People That They May Be Warned by It), he threatened war on any Sunni tribe, party, or assembly that would support the crusaders. . . . Then when some so-called 'Islamists' entered into the democratic political process—ignoring what it entails of clear-cut major *shirk*—he officially declared war on them in his speech titled '*Wa li Tastabina Sabilul-Mujrimin*' (And Thus the Way of the Criminals Becomes Evident).²³³

Let us consider these now licit targets, i.e., Iraqi "apostate" forces, the Rafidah (Shia markets, temples, and militias, Kurdish secularists, any Sunni tribe, party, or assembly that would support the Crusaders, and so-called Islamists [that] entered into the democratic political process. Count the bodies, count the souls. Recall that these were the days (2004-2006) of dozens of bombs and bombers, in dozens of cities, leading to hundreds and hundreds of dead, mangled, wounded, shocked, displaced, and horrified. This is the precise moment (see Chapter 1) that al-Zawahiri, al-Maqdisi, and Atiyatullah al-Libi, among others, privately registered their deep reservations on legal-moral **and** prudential grounds. Moreover, following the October 17, 2004, *bay'ah* to bin Laden, this would all be publicly attributed to AQO's *Tanzim Qa'idat*

al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn. Those darkest days marked by violence, injury, chaos, and mayhem were precisely the days sought during this third phase, supposedly marking the path to the Caliphate. Moreover, in *Dabiq's* telling, no sacred blood had ever been targeted or spilled in this strategic phase. "Obviously," *Dabiq* asserts:

their operations never targeted Sunni public places and gatherings—contrary to the claims of the crusader and apostate media. Those crimes were carried out by rafidi militia seeking revenge against *Ahlu-Sunnah*, and by crusader mercenaries trying to blemish the true image of the mujahidin.²³⁴

Supposing facts do matter, this is a blatant falsehood. Based on a detailed study of open source data on reported terrorist incidents in Iraq—using exclusively the Arabic language press to enhance credibility—from 2004-2008 a very different conclusion is revealed:

The results show that non-Westerners are much more likely to be killed in an al-Qa'ida [in Iraq] attack. From 2004 to 2008, only 15% of the 3,010 victims were Western. During the most recent period studied the numbers skewed even further. From 2006-2008, only 2% (12 of 661 victims) are from the West, and the remaining 98% are inhabitants of countries with Muslim majorities. During this period, a person of non-Western origin was 54 times more likely to die in an al-Qa'ida [in Iraq] attack than an individual from the West. The overwhelming majority of al-Qa'ida [in Iraq's] victims are Muslims living in Muslim countries, and many are citizens of Iraq, which suffered more al-Qa'ida attacks than any other country courtesy of the al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) affiliate.²³⁵

Of course, al-Zarqawi and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi could easily retort on the basis of **their** creed, which essentially states: We do not distinguish between Westerners and non-Westerners, but only between believers and apostates, and we have killed only those, regardless of residence or nationality, who have forsaken Allah for idolatry.

That claim though, in the end, did not prove very persuasive to *Ahl-us Sunnah*. The fact that the greatest fear an Iraqi would face—whether man, woman, child, elderly, Sunni, Shia, secular, religious, sinner, or pious—was from a fanatical, blood-thirsty, violent, ultra-sectarian organization committed to inflicting massive injury, chaos, and mayhem on persons who worship Allah, and not on the “Crusader” occupier, did not require circuitous reasoning, dubitable assumptions, or questionable facts. The facts, by **design** (*Nikayah* and *Tawahhush*, Phase 3), were laid bare for all to see: bodies blown to bits, families torn apart, worshippers turned into flying body parts, and “martyrdom seekers” turned into human shrapnel. The renewal of these attacks subsequent to ISO’s post-2010 reorganization and reconstitution is well-attested and fully celebrated in *Dabiq*’s own pages.²³⁶

Phase 4: Consolidation, Remaining, Declaration of the State of Islam (Tamkin).

“The State” (*Tamkin*) stage is the next “signature” moment of Zarqawism. So far, all other stages traversed—*Hijra*, *Jama’ah*, and *Nikayah/Tawahhush*—are mere preface. Again, this is claimed to be “the Prophetic methodology,” i.e., a recapitulation of Prophet Muhammad’s earliest Medinan state, and later that tiny statelet of Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd

al-Wahhab. Every state has its founding myths, and those surrounding *Dabiq's* portrayal of ISI's birth are no exception. In Chapter 1, we carefully traced the evolution of the ISI from al-Zarqawi's Zarqawism in the latter 1980s to its official declaration on October 15, 2006. Its chief characteristics are the urgency with which the State's declaration was sought, the paltry number of persons involved in its declaration, and the complete surprise with which AQO and every other organization was taken. It was also discovered, if McCants is correct, that a decisive reason for its early proclamation was Abu Hamza al-Muhajir's belief in the imminent return of the Mahdi.²³⁷ We also learned from al-Zarqawi's final letter that he despaired, owing to his failure to foment a Sunni-Shia civil war, turn back the tide of the emergent "Sahwat," or successfully obstruct the nascent Iraqi democratic process. He was reduced to either contriving a war between the two great Satans, "Rafidi" Iran and the "Crusader" United States – on the basis of fabricated evidence – or ending up again *al-Ghuraba* (a stranger) in a strange land, pushed to again roam to find a land of possibility for Allah's Truest Soldiers. The tide had turned by the time of al-Zarqawi's death on June 7, 2006. His organization was in disarray. It was losing ground, losing battles, and losing recruits. Myths rarely do full, if any, justice to facts, yet such founding myths are presented in *Dabiq*.

Shaykh Abu Mus'ab planned [before his June 7, 2006, death] to later execute more complex attacks of a larger scale sometimes referred to as operations of 'tamkin' (consolidation), which were meant to pave the way for the claiming of territory [for a State]. All this [eventually?] led to the gradual collapse of any authority in the areas the crusaders would refer to as 'the Sunni

Triangle'. . . The collapse was followed by the mujahidin quickly entering the vacuum left, to announce and establish the Islamic State of Iraq, [October 15, 2006] under the leadership of Amirul-Mu'minin Abu 'Umar al-Husayni al-Baghdadi [Abu Omar al-Baghdadi] . . . a monumental event in the history of the *Ummah*. It was the first state in 'modern' times set up exclusively by the mujahidin – the active participants in the jihad – in the heart of the Muslim world just a stone's throw away from Makkah, al-Madinah, and Bayt al-Maqdis.²³⁸

The ISO alleges here that the "State" had arisen as a necessity – now that territory had been cleared in "the Sunni Triangle." But there is a problem. If that were the case, why would it "enter quickly into the vacuum left" if it had, in fact, actually consolidated anything like a defended territory, with persons, resources, and power? An obvious answer recommends itself; the declaration of the State occurred **despite** the absence of these conditions and **despite** a lack of consultation beyond the narrowest groups associated with its own self-created Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC), and later *Hilf al-Mutayyibeen*.

Moreover, this event is declared a first in the modern history of the *Ummah* since it was declared and established "exclusively by the mujahidin – the active participants in the jihad." Sunni concepts of state generally regard consultation on a far broader scale – including persons of reputation and authority entrusted with the power to loosen and bind (*ahl al-hall waal'aqd*), as well as *Shura* or an advisory council. It may be that these alleged requirements describe the ideal Caliphate more than the real.²³⁹ Nevertheless, the idea that "The Islamic State" would be declared "exclusively by the mujahidin" (read: members of the *Hilf al-Muy-*

tayybeen) was a startling innovation indeed. It is also critical to understand that the title then conferred on its emir—“Amirul-Mu’minin Abu ‘Umar al-Husayni al-Baghdadi”²⁴⁰—was one reserved throughout Sunni history beginning with Sunni Islam’s second caliph Umar, to refer to the Caliph of **all** the Muslims. This “monumental event in the history of the *Ummah*” would not, however, be met with anything but perplexity and predictable resistance. Thus, the ongoing *Fitnah* recommences with even more ferocity now that a tiny self-chosen *takfiri* group regards itself in exclusive possession of **the** exclusive authority to rule what it deems “**The Islamic State of All Muslims.**”

Even presuming ISO’s own strategy of *Khilafa*, the following objections can be raised. Does the declaration of the ISI make sense at this phase of consolidation (*tamkin*)? Was not the ISI, having **not** established any recognizable consolidated territory and no means of defending it, actually hanging by a mere thread?

This questionable and imprudent declaration of *Khilafa* is further obfuscated by the ambiguity of the expression, “The goal of *Khilafah* **without hesitation** [emphasis added].” Does this mean: “Once we announce it, then it will exist, and they will come, and they will obey!” But should not prudence and reality have instead led to a contrary conclusion? For example, “Once we have created and defended the rudiments of a genuine state, and once others are sufficiently convinced of our right to obedience, then we may **possibly** declare a restricted **emirate**—though there are definite liabilities even to this, but **certainly not** for a very long time should we imagine ourselves declaring let alone ruling a **Caliphate** of the **world-wide Ummah!**”

A re-sequencing of stages was carried out, in fact and in defiance, of ISO's very own blueprint for *Khilafa*. The final, Caliphate, stage (Stage 5) was announced simultaneously with the consolidation (Stage 4, *tamkin*) declaration of the ISI, and as we have noted, was based in the myth and not reality of territorial consolidation. An emir of an emirate at most, if even this was to be granted, was instead declared "Amirul-Mu'minin Abu 'Umar al-Husayni al-Baghdadi . . . a monumental event in the history of the *Ummah*."

Dabiq's Missing Phase: The Fitnah.

As earlier stated, *Fitnah* was born in the very womb of al-Zarqawi's conception of *Jama'ah*. Al-Zarqawi's ruthlessness and *takfiri* terrorism led to his self-declared and self-initiated war on all those whose blood, honor, property, and security he deemed it lawful to shed, steal, and destroy. With the birth of "The State," a further intensification of *fitnah* occurred. It was not now a question of intra-organizational civil war, but a new "either/or" from the "The State's/Caliphate's" point of view: **either** repentance, renunciation of all other loyalty ties and pledging *bay'ah* to the new Caliph; **or**, rebellion and capital punishment by beheading, crucifixion, or other murderous means.

Let us now return to *Dabiq's* account and pick up the story immediately after the October 15, 2006, declaration of the ISI. We shall break this up into distinct milestones: the initial ISI declaration and intensification of *Fitnah*; the ISI's exodus following its **near** defeat; the post-Caliphate Umar regrouping; the Syrian civil war as opportunity for rebirth; the Caliphate declared; and finally, the present demand that all pledge *bay'ah* to their Caliph Ibrahim. The listed statements

below represent the present author's sense for ISO's declared imperative accompanying each milestone.

1. Curses, Fighting, and Death for Those Who Reject Allah's Chosen!

When the Islamic State of Iraq was announced [October 15, 2006]—after going through these phases of war—it had the effect of exposing all the jihad claimants in Iraq, splitting them into two camps. *Every group and individual with iman [faith] and ikhlas [fidelity, sincerity] quickly pledged allegiance to the Islamic State's leader, for none had ever selflessly taken a step in the direction of jihad except with an Islamic state as their ultimate goal.* Those that resisted the newborn state [i.e., did not pledge allegiance] did so for two reasons: deviant methodologies and corrupt desires for fame, wealth, and power. Consequently, the announcement caused some of the hidden deviance to surface. The suppressed corruption waiting irritably to arise finally did so as well. Some of those carrying corruption in their hearts quickly allowed their pride and envy to possess them, pushing them to enter into both hidden and open alliances with the crusaders, the new apostate regime, and the neighboring tawaghit, against the newborn Islamic State, thereby forming the 'sahwah' ('awakening'), a term coined by the American pawns to beautify their apostasy and treachery. The sahwah received financial, political, and 'scholarly' support from Al-Sa'ud, the Ikhwan, and even America [italics added].²⁴¹

An extreme *takfiri* logic runs through this account, which explains its expansive enemies list. It occurs in the phrase "for none had ever selflessly taken a step in the direction of jihad except with an Islamic state as their ultimate goal." It is inarguable that all or mostly all of the Islamic fighting factions held a commitment to "an Islamic state as their ultimate goal."

But ISI made “the Islamic State” an **immediately imposed reality**; and that, by persons mostly unknown except to a handful of self-selected insiders. For most, the creation of an actual Islamic State required a great deal more preparation, considering it was not to be imposed by ruthless terrorism from above, but with significant support from a considerable section of *Ahl-us Sunnah*. But *Dabiq* views things otherwise. Those unconvinced and resisting the ISI are not legitimately disagreeing based on acceptable differences of interpretation (*ijtihad*); instead, they are accused of moral turpitude or viciousness. All who opposed the state are dastardly, not just disagreeable. All who fail to pledge loyalty shall be killed. One is now not a Sunni Muslim respected, admired, and consulted on matters as grave as declaring the rulership over all Muslims. No, one is evil with “corruption in their hearts,” motivated by “pride and envy” and their attempts “to beautify their apostasy,” and are driven by either “deviant methodologies” or “corrupt desires for fame, wealth, and power.”

Is there not a simpler explanation for opposition and resistance to the ISI’s declaration of the Islamic State? For example, ISI’s violence, coercion, treachery, and terror; of its sectarian bloodbath targeting the lay Shia; of intolerant and arrogant usurping of leadership prerogatives; of committing forbidden acts, and prohibiting commanded acts; of the killing of sons and the forced marriage of Sunni daughters; of the killing of elders, scholars, women, children, worshippers in mosques, passersby on streets; of the killing of nationalist insurgents, Islamist insurgents; or of slaughtering innocent hostages like bleating sheep. None of these reasons is cited in *Dabiq* for the emergence of revulsion, and the eventual rejection and ejection of the ISI from the lands of *Ahl-us Sunnah*. Instead, a likely projection

by ISI onto others has occurred. And if one were to impute this projection back onto the projectors – characterize the ISI itself using all of the pejoratives it has used to describe others – perhaps one might be closer to understanding how mythic projection can, in the minds of the projector, trump self-evident facts.

2. Oh How Allah Tries His True *Mujahidin!*

The period from approximately late-2006 to 2010 was ISI's self-created nadir. Marginalized, imploding, hunted to extinction, evacuated from strongholds owing to its own will to power through terror and violence and ultra-sectarian brutality, this burning ember would seek refuge from this storm.²⁴² But for mythic thinking, again, reality is otherwise:

Then Allah . . . tried the mujahidin as He had done with His slaves before in Makkah (prior to the Hijrah), Uhud (when the archer disobeyed left their posts), Hunayn (when the new Muslims were amazed by their own numbers), and the Arabian Peninsula (during the Wars of Apostasy).

This is a test decreed by Allah . . . so He would see the patient mujahidin and expel the weak-hearted from their ranks, and thereby solidify the newborn Islamic State and prepare it for greater responsibilities. As ash-Shafi'i [i.e., founder of classical Shafi'i school of Sunni jurisprudence] . . . once said, 'One's authority will not be consolidated except after overcoming tribulation. [Fitnah]' . . . During this period, the Islamic State was forced to withdraw mostly into the desert regions of al-Anbar, where its soldiers regrouped, planned and trained. From the desert, they continued to carry out attacks against the crusaders and the treacherous apostates in coordination with operations, executed by the underground units in urban areas.²⁴³

3. Behold How All Pledged *Bay'ah* to Our New *Khalifa!*

In Chapter 1, we learned that following the April 18, 2010, killing of Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi (aka: Amirul-Mu'minin Abu 'Umar al-Husayni al-Baghdadi), a secretive cabal led by former Ba'athist Colonel Haji Bakr lobbied strenuously and also manipulated the vote for Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's selection as new emir. The vote on the Shura Council was 9 for, 2 against; and the Sharia Council abstained. These are the **facts**. This lack of consensus is passed over in *Dabiq* and only the final result is described:

when Amirul-Mu'minin Abu 'Umar al-Baghdadi . . . gained shahadah alongside Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir . . . the Islamic State did not waver, rather its leadership unanimously pledged allegiance to Amirul-Mu'minin Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi . . . continuing upon the path for a single Khilafah that unites the *Ummah*.²⁴⁴

4. Behold the *Khilafa* of Iraq and *Al-Sham!*

The Syrian opposition inspired by the "Arab Spring" began peaceful protests against the 40-year rule of the autocratic Assad dynasty beginning February-March 2011. On March 18, 2011, the regime's first shots were fired into crowds of unarmed protesters. Within 5 months, over 2000 had been killed or wounded; nevertheless, the protests remained peaceful, gaining inspiration from the quickly unraveling regime of Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi.²⁴⁵ By summer 2011, a then-unknown organization, *Jabhat al-Nusrah li-ahl al-Sham min Mujahidi al-Sham fi Sahat al-Jihad* (Protection Front for the People of the Levant by the Mujahadin of the Levant in the Battlefields of

Jihad; heretofore, *Jabhat al-Nusra*), had been sent to Syria by ISI's Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. On April 7, 2013, ISI Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (*Dawla Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Shaam* (ISIS/ISIL/Daesh). Like the original ISI declaration, this ISIS declaration ferociously recommenced the long-simmering *Fitnah* between ISI and every other group, organization, and tendency. In *Dabiq's* inaugural issue, a very brief account of this period between entry into Syria and the declaration of ISIS is offered.

Then the event of Sham began to unfold [c. February-March 2011] and the Islamic State quickly got involved, answering the cries of the weak and oppressed Muslims by sending a mission from Iraq [c. Summer-2011], to activate its units in Sham and later make the announcement of its official expansion [April 7, 2013]. Again, pride, envy, nationalism, and innovation, led to events similar to those of Iraq [post-October 15, 2006]. New *sahwat* were formed with the exact same financial, political, and 'scholarly' support. They repeated the mistakes of their predecessors in Iraq and decided to enter into war with the Islamic State, but here Allah . . . blessed the mujahidin in a manner unique to the lands of Sham, so that quickly *Sahwah* treachery was exposed and destroyed. Then, by Allah's grace, the mujahidin gained control over territory larger than many states claiming 'legality' today, lands formerly under control of the historical Umawi khulafa' of Sham and 'Abbasi khulafa' of Iraq.²⁴⁶

Zarqawism again is here on full display. Again, we are treated to the ISO's sense of entitlement as Allah's chosen to monopolize religio-political authority. Again, it is the near enemy that is the focus of attack: those Sunni Muslims considered insufficiently loyal and subordinate to **its** command.

Much had transformed that smoldering ember into a terrorist juggernaut, however. Recall the reconstituting of its cadre by highly professional former Ba'athist military and intelligence officers now in key leadership roles. Recall its successful suicide operations freeing hundreds of high value detainees that would later fill its ranks. Also, recall the opportunities that were provided by dramatic developments in strategic context, including the Syrian uprising and then-Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Kamil Mohammed Hasan al-Maliki's Iranian-backed sectarian persecution of Iraq's highly marginalized Sunnis.²⁴⁷ Also notable is the generalization of the word "Sahwah," – initially wholly referring to the Iraqi Sunni tribal "Awakening" councils – now used to refer to any and all opposition to ISO, regardless of context.

Vitriolic, hyperbolic, deeply disrespectful denunciations by ISO of these various tendencies – in particular of AQO's senior leadership and its appointed emissaries charged with attempting to arbitrate these differences on the basis of long-established Sunni juridical precedent – is characteristic of this period.²⁴⁸ However, the ISO's vitriol goes beyond mere words, as senior-level leaders in AQO-related organizations were subjected to a murderous assassination campaign. Consider just the most notable examples: the January 1, 2014, kidnapping and gruesome torture and murder of Dr. Hussein al-Suleiman, a senior commander under Ahrar al-Sham Emir Hassan Abboud; the February 23, 2014, assassination of AQO mediator Abu Khalid al-Suri; the April 15, 2014, murders of *al-Nusra*h Sheikh Abu Muhammad Fatih, his wife, brother, and children; and the September 9, 2014, murders of dozens of Ahrar al-Sham Leaders in a mass suicide bombing, including Emir Abboud.²⁴⁹ This targeted assassination was also accompanied by intra-jihadist

warfare leading to hundreds and eventually thousands killed, and key territorial shifts and displacement.²⁵⁰ This raging *fitnah* would gather even greater intensity with ISIS's declaration of the *Khilafa*.

5. The *Khalifa* Has Returned!

We finally arrive at the time when *Dabiq's* inaugural issue appears (July 4, 2014). It is on the heels of the ISO's *blitzkrieg*, resulting in its conquest of Iraq's second most populous city, Mosul. With apparently unstoppable momentum, forces that had been hollowed out by cronyism and corruption, and completely outgunned, rather than stand and fight, collapsed, cut, and run. Sunni populations that were overrun had to determine whether Maliki's vindictive, revengeful Shia rule was a lesser or greater evil than these charging fighters apparently committed to defending the lives, honor, property, and security of *Ahl-us Sunnah*. It is upon these victories sealed in blood, power, and terror, which in reality involved a systematic campaign of subversion, assassination, and counter-intelligence, i.e., "shaping operations" and "preparation of the battlefield," that ISIS would proclaim its final phase, the return of *Khilafa*:

Thereafter, the hopes of *Khilafah* became an undeniable reality, one that allowed no room for anyone claiming any excuse to resist the authority of the imam except to be dealt with by the decisive law of Allah. The victories in Ninawa, al-Anbar, Salahuudin, al-Khayr, al-Barakah, and elsewhere, all aided the declaration made by the Islamic State on the first of Ramadan 1435H [June 28, 2014], in which the *Khilafah* was officially announced. **This new condition opens the path for the complete unification of all Muslim**

peoples and lands under the single authority of the Khalifah [emphasis in original].²⁵¹

Predictably, this would further intensify the *fitnah*, and is evidenced by yet another round of ISO's viciously acrimonious charges, and those seeking to rebut them but notably resisting the ISO's *takfiri* arsenal and demonization techniques.²⁵² It is also here that *Dabiq* portrays in its pages the fruits of consolidation (*tamkin*), as it chronicles the transition it claims is occurring from the ashes of terror, injury, chaos, collapse, and mayhem, to the fruit of its own Islamic State.²⁵³

6. Long Live *Khalifa* Ibrahim! Pledge *Bay'ah*, or Death!

There remains only a single act required of every Muslim on Earth: an oath of loyalty pledged to their new master. This act is also due from all who consider themselves fighters in the path of Allah (*Mujahidin*). But to give Caliph Ibrahim his moment in the sun, we shall allow *Dabiq* to present Islam's new self-appointed master in all of his glory.

It [This new condition] also emphasizes the necessity for obeying the Messenger . . . in his order, 'Whoever comes to you while your condition is united behind a single man, and intends to break your solidarity or disrupt your unity, then kill him.'²⁵⁴ The obligation is now clearer than ever before for all Muslims to raise their voices and pledge their allegiance to Imam ul-Muslimin and Amirul-Mu'minin — the Khalifah — Abu Bakr al-Husayni al-Baghdadi (may Allah raise his allies and humiliate his enemies) . . . May Allah protect this Khalifah state and continue guiding it until its legions fight the crusader armies who will gather near Dabiq.²⁵⁵

Appearing beneath this prophecy is a stylized picture of a stupendous army amassed on the plains of *Dabiq*—that promised locale for the End Times mother of all battles (*Al-Malahim*). And on an accompanying page, three boys about 12 years old appear wearing Maoist-type uniforms with IS patches on their sleeves, with their index fingers pointed skyward in yet another IS media operation designed to inspire the love of death, martyrdom, and paradise, in defense of Allah's chosen *Khilafa*.

CHAPTER 3

CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY AND STRATEGY

This book concludes by reporting its central findings and discerning their implications for current USG counterterrorism policy and strategy.²⁵⁶ For the purposes of clarity and brevity, the focus here shall be on warranted conclusions based in previously discussed findings, unless deemed necessary or practicable for expository purposes. The present writer's central thesis is first reiterated. We then present chief findings vis-à-vis two core areas of greatest present interest: doctrine and strategy/terrorist modus operandi. We conclude by deducing their implications for USG counterterrorism policy and strategy, and leader development and education.

I. KEY FINDINGS

MACRO-LEVEL CONCLUSION

The present author's primary thesis presented in this book's Introduction section appears supported by the data presented herein. For convenience, this thesis is reproduced below:

AQO and ISO claim to represent the true and abiding interests of the world's Sunni Muslims (*Ahl-us-Sunnah*), estimated to number 1.4 billion persons. It is the argument of this book, however, that grounds exist for why this need not be the case. AQO and ISO may be conceived in the theology they themselves profess, as two deviant organizations guilty of committing

major sins and besmirching the Islamic Call.²⁵⁷ I believe a more optimistic prognosis for the future destruction of each entity is warranted. It will be for the world's Sunni Muslims (*Ahl-us Sunnah*) to make that determination; to define for themselves where the bounds of faith, godly fear and piety (*taqwa*), and righteous conduct begin and end; and who may or may not legitimately claim to speak in **their** name [emphasis in original].²⁵⁸

Our focus here is on substantiating the primary claim of greatest interest to delegitimizing AQO and ISO in the eyes of not just Muslims and non-Muslims generally, but also deeply observant Islamist, Salafist, and Salafi-Jihadi adherents, namely from the previous quote: “AQO and ISO may be conceived as . . . **two deviant organizations guilty of committing major sins and besmirching the Islamic Call** [emphasis added].”

It is essential, we believe, to view AQO and ISO as deviant organizations, rather than as some have charged, in relation to ISO in particular for example, as “non-Muslim” or “having nothing to do with Islam.” That is understandable, but it is an error. It is like saying that a human being, guilty of committing reprehensible and truly repugnant acts – say viciously attacking an innocent bystander, or intentionally murdering or raping or pillaging or violently assaulting others – is no longer a human being. They **are** human and that is not at issue. What is at issue is that they have egregiously violated basic moral codes that govern human life, society, and interpersonal interaction to such an extent that we deem them extremely aberrant, deviant individuals. If religiously conceived, these deviant acts are sins. Within Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and arguably every genuine contemporary faith, acts that intentionally violate the fundamental integrity of innocent human lives and souls

are deemed the greatest of all sins, excepting idolatry. If non-religiously conceived, these are deemed egregious moral deviations whose commission justifies punishment using our harshest methods. No human society could last long that would not view ISO's acts and perpetrators as enemies of a civilized human existence. Our sensibilities, customs, and laws—religious and secular—regard such deviant behavior as unacceptable. The only question remaining is in what proportions justice and mercy shall be applied to their punishment.

A second reason to avoid the label “non-Muslim,” no matter how laudable the motive, is that unlike the ISO, the United States should never equate sinning, no matter how grave, with disbelief. This is the core equation underlying virtually every *takfiri* terrorist modus operandi. A sinner is not a disbeliever; however, they are believers in violation of their own moral code.²⁵⁹ Even the greatest of sins, excepting disbelief itself, does not remove one from a faith community. Its secular counterpart is the commission of a grave, felonious, and even heinous act. Certain liberties and privileges may be revoked; for example, the franchise. But even the felon remains a citizen, and that is because he did not forfeit citizenship but only those liberties and privileges a citizen enjoys. On the other hand, treason is to citizenship what infidelity is to faith: the ultimate act of disavowal and that single act of disloyalty for which one cannot, and will not, be permitted to remain a member of a community—whether a community of God fearers or of loyal and patriotic citizens.

AQO and ISO stand condemned of extreme deviance from *Ahl-us Sunnah's* own self-understanding and expectations regarding the rudiments of religiosity, morality, legality, and humanity.²⁶⁰ This is less

true of the ultimate end state they seek—the Righteous Caliphate—though for the vast majority this remains a distant ideal—than for their terrorist methods and means. AQO’s and ISO’s most important judge is ironically, yet predictably, the Sunni creed and community (*Ahl-us Sunnah*) they now stand of having warred against, and besmirched. Let us now summarize the chief findings supporting this macro-level thesis/conclusion.

BELIEF-SYSTEMS, WORLDVIEWS, DOCTRINES, CREEDS

The Al-Qaeda Organization (*Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad*).

The mature AQO doctrine is exemplified in bin Ladenism, and is characterized by a unique mixture of profound ignorance, delusion, resentment, and hubris, which from the early-1990s innovated an unprecedented “Far Enemy” doctrine manifest in an actual declaration of war against Americans, both military and civilian, calling for their murder wherever they could be found. Bin Ladenism rests on a deeply flawed analogy—that of the United States and the former USSR—leading its followers to believe, without evidence, that sustained direct terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens and government entities would generate economic exhaustion leading either to collapse or at least withdraw from the Arab Middle East. This false analogy was rooted in bin Laden’s deeply misinformed conception of American society, culture, economics, government, and most consequentially, the civil society foundations of enduring American power.

The AQO's signature "Far Enemy" doctrine has no precedent in Islam. It was never embraced by "Near Enemy" advocates: the vast majority of existing Islamist insurgent activities. Attacking the "original *Kufr*" in this way was roundly criticized even by bonafide unrepentant Salafi-Jihadists as illegal, criminal, and imprudent. 9/11 was itself AQO's first and last great "one-off" based in treachery, criminality, and the USG's unpreparedness for that plot's unprecedented use of American civil aviation as a weapon of mass destruction. Bin Laden was deeply criticized from within his own ranks for having caused the practical extinction of a decade's long effort to recruit, train, deploy, and create a global Sunni jihadist movement.

AQO's most lethal affiliate, AQAP, has amended but not ended classical bin Ladenism. There is no discernible difference from classical bin Ladenism as doctrine, and its accompanying "Far Enemy" economic attrition conception of collapsing the American economy and forcing its withdrawal from Islamic lands.

The Islamic State Organization (*Tanzim al-Dawla al-Islamiyya*).

The ISO doctrine is based in an apocalyptic, ultra-conservative, ultra-sectarian, Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadism. Four doctrines uniquely characterize this deviance generally and in relation to AQO's species of Sunni global jihadism: apocalyptic and eschatological beliefs informing its sense of temporality and morality; proclaiming the mass annihilation of all Shia Muslims, including lay Shia; prioritizing the "Nearest" and "Near Enemies," and postponement of jihad against the "original *Kufr*"; and, its belief in its right to monopolize and immediately declare the Islamic State/Caliphate. These key elements of

ISO's worldview and doctrine place it on the remote fringes, not just within Sunni Islam generally, but also among the vast majority of Sunni global jihadist organizations.²⁶¹

STRATEGIES AND TERRORIST MODUS OPERANDI.

The al-Qaeda Organization (*Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad*).

Bin Ladenism is based in a sequenced strategy that eventually culminates in the restoration of a Sunni Caliphate over historic Sunni lands. Strategy begins with the formation of a military base organization (*Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad*) or "base organization of the jihad." With this, AQO carefully orchestrates simultaneous mass-casualty terrorist attacks directed at "the head of the snake" or the "base of the tree," two of bin Laden's favorite metaphors. Though earlier attacks presaged this phase, its spectacular debut was the 1998 mass casualty terrorist attacks on the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar as-Salaam, Tanzania. Subsequent attacks, culminating in and subsequent to 9/11, were also orchestrated.

Before bin Ladenism, the classical *Qa'idat al-Jihad* was conceived as an Islamic foreign legion or "Islamic Internationale," designed to transform local insurgencies into globalized transnational insurgencies. The "Crusader-Zionist" enemy had not yet emerged as the demonized "other," and AQO viewed itself as a kind of central command and headquarters for recruiting, indoctrinating, training, and deploying its own operatives throughout various emergent theaters of jihad. It is possible that with the practical demise of bin Ladenism, the AQO original conception will be undergoing

a revival in such places as Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Tunisia.

AQO's affiliate AQAP, while maintaining deep doctrinal affinities to AQO Central, has substantially departed in practice from the classic Bin Ladenist, top-down model for carefully planned, long-term, high-visibility, strategically symbolic "Far Enemy" targeting. AQAP's terrorist modus operandi is based in what it calls "lone jihad" or the "lone mujahid" strategy. In its essence, it combines media and non-media terrorist operations to incite, galvanize, mobilize, train, and deploy individual persons – glorified in its media operations as "lone mujahids" whose martyrdom (*Shuhada*) destines them for the highest reaches of Paradise – to commit for what the vast majority of Muslims consider forbidden terrorist acts: sabotage, targeted assassination, mass arson, mass-casualty bombings, and a vast array of highly deviant, abominable acts generally classified within religious law as major sins and crimes, and within secular law, intentional acts of malicious, felonious criminal conduct.

Islamic State Organization (*Tanzim al-Dawla al-Islamiyya*).

The ISO's terrorist modus operandi is carefully outlined in its inaugural online publication *Dabiq*, and comprises five key stages:

1. Emigration from a hostile milieu to one where sanctuary exists or can be created through terrorist acts (*Hijra*);
2. Creation of the nucleus jihadist organization (*Jama'ah*);
3. Destabilization of the existing "infidel" regime through inflicting mass injury (*Nikayah*) even-

tuating in the collapse of existing authority, and thereby fomenting chaos, and mayhem (*Tawahhush*);

4. Creation and consolidation of a territory, resources, and base accompanied with the immediate declaration of the Islamic State (*Tamkin*); and,
5. Further consolidation expansion of the Islamic State with the immediate declaration of the Caliphate (*Khilafa*).

This ideal five-stage blueprint for restoring the Caliphate (*Khilafa*) was **not** followed in practice, however. The very nature of the ISO as an ultra-conservative, ultra-sectarian, Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadi organization led it to hereticize (*takfir*) virtually all other organizations, tendencies, groups, and movements. As a result, a stage not specified in their ideal model—the stage of *Fitnah* (conflict, strife)—has accompanied ISO from its beginnings in Abu Musab al-Zarqawi through each of its metamorphoses. The ISO's extremism in *takfir* is considered extremely deviant within Sunni Islam, and also again, among virtually every armed Sunni Islamic organization.²⁶²

The ISO's apocalypticism, anti-Shia extermination, "Nearest Enemy" and "Near Enemy," and "Caliphate Now!" doctrines would be little more than a hindrance were these not combined with two additional factors. First, its creation of a fearsome, highly professional, military leadership cadre comprised of former Ba'athist military and intelligence officers whose tactics, techniques, and procedures mimic those of totalitarian Soviet and Nazi-era secret police. Second, the revengeful anti-Sunni policies pursued by former Prime Minister al-Maliki, in the context of a dramatically changed regional dynamic enervated by the

“Arab Spring,” precipitating deep alienation among Iraq’s embattled and marginalized Sunnis, and thus enhancing the ISO’s short-term credibility as their rescuers and defenders.

II. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY AND STRATEGIES

Let us now consider the implications of AQO's and ISO's history, doctrine, and modus operandi for current USG policies and strategies designed to permanently defeat these terrorist entities. As in previous chapters, we shall treat each organization in succession.

IMPLICATIONS FOR EXISTING USG POLICY AND STRATEGY TO PERMANENTLY DEFEAT AQO AND ITS AFFILIATES

The present USG policy is to disrupt, dismantle, and ultimately defeat AQO, its affiliates, associated movements, and those inspired by its doctrine.²⁶³ This policy was first declared soon after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and has been reiterated and sharpened in subsequent years.²⁶⁴ The strategy designed to realize that policy has also been clearly established and is centered on the achievement of three key strategic objectives: attacking and destroying the existing AQO network, countering radicalization and recruitment to that network, and protecting the U.S. homeland against terrorist attacks.²⁶⁵ As earlier stated, the first and third of these objectives has been largely attained, while the second continues to present formidable challenges. Let us briefly describe the implications of our chief findings for policy and these three strategic objectives, and also describe the chief instruments of national power required to realize these.

Existing U.S. policy has been largely effective in disrupting, dismantling, and ultimately defeating

the AQO terrorist entity and accomplishing its three key strategic objectives. This applies especially to effectively countering the mature Bin Ladenist doctrine and strategy of executing highly symbolic, simultaneous mass-casualty terrorist attacks on American soil. Let us consider how the chief instruments of national power – diplomatic, informational, cyber, economic, financial, intelligence, legal, and military (DICE-FILM) – have been wielded to accomplish this.²⁶⁶

Following bin Laden’s mid-1990s debut as self-professed enemy of the United States – evidenced in his 1996 declaration of war, series of high-profile interviews, and formal issuance of the 1998 fatwa – his status changed from that of a little-known wealthy Saudi associated with the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad, to a high-profile clear and present danger to American citizens and interests. The 1998 East Africa embassy bombings clarified any doubts that USG analysts may have had about bin Laden’s intentions and lethality. Diplomatic, economic, financial, intelligence, legal, and to a much lesser extent military instruments, were used from 1998 to the 9/11 attacks to attempt to persuade then ruling emir of the Afghan Taliban Mullah Omar, on the basis of extensive and incontrovertible evidence, to extradite Osama bin Laden to the United States to stand trial for the embassy bombings.²⁶⁷ Mullah Omar’s stubborn refusal to do so – whether on grounds of affinity with a brother Muslim, duty owed a person granted sanctuary and hospitality under the Pashtun code, or idiosyncratic motives – led former President George W. Bush to issue his final ultimatum in his September 20, 2001, Address to the Joint Session of Congress: that Omar’s failure to extradite bin Laden would lead him and the Taliban to share bin Laden’s fate.

9/11 dramatically changed the mix of instruments of national power that would be used to disrupt, dismantle, and ultimately defeat AQO. While those earlier instruments remained significant, others central to an invasion to overthrow the Taliban regime and to destroy AQO's terrorist capabilities were soon in play. Counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and unconventional warfare, using all necessary means, were pursued across the relevant theaters of operation. The legal instrument (through the United Nations Security Council, North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], and U.S. legal codes) was employed to classify and thereby outlaw foreign terrorist organizations, foreign terrorists, terrorist travel, finances, weapons flows, and terrorist sanctuaries. The USG employed diplomatic, economic, and military instruments to create international coalitions, create incentives for cooperation and disincentives for non-cooperation, and hunt down high value targets in a lethal and systematic campaign employing elite Special Operations Command forces and the Intelligence Community (IC). On the American home front, the intelligence and legal instruments, most notably the Department of Justice (DoJ) and its Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), along with key partners such as the New York Police Department (NYPD) and later the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), would protect against and prepare for possible mass casualty attacks. Hardening civil aviation and transportation more broadly; creating tamper-proof identification; developing intelligence assets and informants that could monitor potential terrorist organizations; and restricting and preventing terrorist travel all had profound effects.²⁶⁸

It is our belief that our findings have few implications for existing USG policy vis-à-vis classic bin

Ladenism. The net result of this sustained assault on AQO was the practical decimation of that organization and that classic terrorist modus operandi responsible for organizing and executing bin Ladenism's classic "Far Enemy" spectacular mass-casualty terrorist attacks. What arose in its wake, however – though AQO's classic "Far Enemy" attacks must still be countered²⁶⁹ – was an alternative "lone mujahid" terrorist modus operandi currently employed by AQO's most lethal affiliate, AQAP.

As noted earlier, AQAP's central strategic focus at present is inciting and recruiting random "home-based" and "home-grown" persons willing to plan, train for, and successfully execute felonious criminal terrorist acts on American soil. Delusionally believed to affect actual American economic activity or power, its principal consequence lay rather in successfully inspiring a paltry number of loners and sometimes clusters to carry out murderous attacks.²⁷⁰

The USG has, over the past 5 years or so, rebalanced its strategy and chosen instruments of national power to address this AQAP "lone jihad" strategy. This involves a far greater emphasis on intelligence and legal instruments. It also has led to the need to more forcefully respond to and counter AQAP's media operations, now deemed a critical medium for connecting AQAP media operatives in the cyber and electromagnetic spectrums, with potential individual recruits apprised of AQAP's encryption software, downloading incitement media, terror craft, and the broader doctrinal beliefs espoused. The lethal targeting of senior AQAP communications operatives such as Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan is key. The inter-agency initiative, Center for Strategic Counterterrorist Communications (CSCC), begun in 2011, pioneered counter-AQO media warfare; and through its "Think

Again Turn Away” campaign, deliberately focused its messengers, messages, and media to target key audiences believed to be most susceptible to AQO’s and AQAP’s inspirational terrorist media operations. A more sustained emphasis on bottom-up buy-in, self-monitoring and policing, and enhancing community trust and resilience, now compliments the cyber, informational, and legal instruments most critical to effective domestic counterterrorist operations.²⁷¹

It is advisable that the USG continue this present line of effort, i.e., encouraging individual behavioral dissuasion, discouragement, and disengagement from terrorism,²⁷² using these existing instruments of national power.

IMPLICATIONS FOR EXISTING USG POLICY AND STRATEGY TO PERMANENTLY DEFEAT THE ISO

The current declared USG policy is to degrade and permanently defeat the ISO.²⁷³ USG officials believe this can only be achieved through accomplishing defined tasks across key lines of effort (LOEs). Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army General (Retired) Martin E. Dempsey, identified nine key LOEs:

1. Inclusive effective governance;
2. Military-led denial of sanctuary;
3. Military-led building of partner capacity;
4. Enhancing intelligence collection;
5. Disrupting finances;
6. Countering messaging;
7. Disrupting the flow of foreign fighters;
8. Providing humanitarian support to displaced and vulnerable persons; and,

9. Disruption of terrorist threats to the homeland.²⁷⁴

General Ret. John Allen, former special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL, identifies five LOEs:

1. Denial of sanctuary and security force assistance;
2. Disrupting the flow of foreign fighters;
3. Disrupting local and international financial channels;
4. Providing humanitarian relief and stabilization support; and,
5. Counter-messaging or defeating Daesch as an idea.²⁷⁵

Whether described as five or nine LOEs, each proposal envisions a holistic long-term Coalition effort characterized by deep awareness of the political essence of insurgency and the demand that the military instrument be carefully integrated as one vital but insufficient instrument/means of national power wielded to defeat the ISO. Each also envisions a strong and effective role for a counterterrorist communications strategy designed in particular not only to exploit a critical requirement/vulnerability of the ISO – foreign fighter recruitment – but also for delegitimizing home-based terrorist activities. Recent comprehensive reviews of USG and Coalition efforts to date have further iterated the vital importance of fully sourcing, expediting, and more aggressively countering ISO along these LOEs.²⁷⁶

Findings based in the author's examination of the ISOs doctrinal and strategic concepts appear to substantially support current USG policy and strategy, though recommendations are suggested by the pres-

ent author to address the specific “stateness” dimension of ISO. These LOEs may be neatly categorized into three distinct clusters that correspond to the three key strategic objectives earlier identified as key to anti-AQO strategy: attacking and destroying the terrorist network, preventing radicalization (i.e., encouraging behavioral disengagement from) and recruitment to terrorism, and protecting against and preparing the U.S. homeland from terrorist attacks.²⁷⁷ The third strategic objective is straightforward and we here examine the first two in greater detail.

- 1. Attacking and destroying the ISO:** (military): military-led denial of sanctuary and building partner capacity; (intelligence): enhancing intelligence collection; (financial, legal): disrupting local and international financial channels; (legal, cyber, informational): disrupting the flow of foreign fighters.
- 2. Encouraging behavioral disengagement from ISO terrorism:** (cyber, informational): counter-messaging or defeating ISO as an idea.
- 3. Preventing against and preparing for ISO terrorist attacks:** (intelligence, legal): disruption of terrorist threats to the homeland.

Let us examine these first two strategic objectives in more detail. The first strategic objective, attacking and destroying the ISO, is mostly well-supported by its relevant LOEs and those instruments of national power required for their realization. For example, denial of sanctuary, disrupting finances,²⁷⁸ and disrupting foreign fighters²⁷⁹ directly addresses the spatial, monetary, and kinetic resources essential to recruit-

ing, training, fielding, furnishing, and deploying terrorist operatives. The critical roles of U.S. airpower²⁸⁰ and building partner-capacity are key to preventing additional ISO offensive gains, and potentially a non-U.S. indigenous capacity for sustained counter-offensive action. Though not mentioned in the military LOEs, one must also include the present activities of JSOC and CIA operatives methodically hunting, neutralizing, or capturing key leadership and other ISO high value targets,²⁸¹ and meticulously pursuing intelligence-driven, high-tempo find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze, and disseminate (F3EAD) operations.²⁸² Reports suggest that from January through early-June 2016 alone, “more than 120 Islamic State leaders, commanders, propagandists, recruiters and other so-called high-value individuals” have been killed.²⁸³ Some of the most notable include:

- Tarkhan Tayumurazovich Batirashvili (aka: Abu Omar al-Shishani), ISO’s “minister of war” (March 2016).²⁸⁴
- Abd al-Rahman Mustafa al-Qaduli (aka: Haji Iman), ISO’s second-in-command and major operational planner and organizer, and Minister of Finance (March 2016).²⁸⁵
- Abu al-Haijaa al-Tunisi, senior ISO military leader in Aleppo area (March 2016).²⁸⁶
- Shaker Wahib al-Fahdawi al-Dulaimi (aka: Abu Waheeb), ISO military emir for Anbar province (May 2016).²⁸⁷

Several key high value targets have also been killed since, among them:

- Basim Muhammad Ahmad Sultan al-Bajari, ISO deputy minister of war (June 25, 2016).²⁸⁸
- Hatim Talib al-Hamduni, ISO military commander (June 25, 2016).²⁸⁹

- Saad Emarati, ISO in Afghanistan/Pakistan region, founder and senior military leader (July 2016).²⁹⁰
- Hafez Sayed, senior ISO commander in Afghanistan (July 26, 2016).²⁹¹
- Abu Muhammad al-Adnani al-Shami, ISO senior spokesman, propagandist, external operations chief, strategist (August 30, 2016).²⁹²
- Abu-Muhammad Furqan, ISO Chief of Media Operations (September 7, 2016).²⁹³

Moreover, focus has been placed on silently decimating the ranks of nearly 40 “external operations leaders, planners, and facilitators” conducting external terrorist operations directed against Coalition and other allied countries,²⁹⁴ and also the JSOC-led capture of key operatives and critical intelligence. For example, four to seven terabytes of critical data contained on laptop computers, cell phones, and other sources detailing ISO’s financial, logistical, and leadership operations was recovered by a JSOC-led operation designed to capture senior ISO financial official Abu Sayyaf. Additional critical information was elicited from the 3-month interrogation of his wife, Umm Sayyaf.²⁹⁵ The capture and interrogation of another ISO senior operative, Sulayman Dawud al-Bakkar (aka: Suleiman Daoud al-Afari)—a key operative in ISO’s chemical weapons program—has led to far greater knowledge of this program, including how the group weaponized sulfur mustard and loaded it onto artillery shells, and also facilitated target selection used to attack and destroy existing manufacturing sites and tactical units.²⁹⁶ USG shaping operations now in progress in Mosul led to intelligence facilitating what is described as “one of the largest airstrikes yet on an Islamic State car bomb

factory. . . hitting a sprawling compound south of Mosul."²⁹⁷ The recent liberation of the key strategic northern Syrian town of Manbij contributed a huge trove of vital intelligence that further fed this F3EAD cycle.²⁹⁸ Most recently, in the wake of Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter's specific demands, the USG has tasked the U.S. Cyber Command to embark on a systematic campaign of publicly acknowledged offensive cyberattacks directed at disrupting, degrading, and disassembling ISO's command and control.²⁹⁹

The previously mentioned LOEs, however, insufficiently recognize that the ISO is not just a terrorist network or organization with sanctuary, but is endeavoring to build and sustain a state-centered terrorist enterprise. Though the ISO is a criminal, exploitative, coercive, proto-police-state neither representative nor supported by the vast majority of Sunnis who suffer its rule, it is in de-facto control of territory, resources, persons, substantial infrastructure, and various means of extracting monies. It is for this reason that traditional counterterrorism strategies require supplementing. Suggestive candidates include unconventional warfare³⁰⁰ developed with a broader policy objective of short-term containment and a final objective of permanent defeat and destruction.³⁰¹

ISO is an occupying power lacking authority, legitimacy, and support from the vast majority of persons residing in its conquered territories. It has much in common with a Ba'athist totalitarian police state and virtually nothing in common with the sovereign that most persons, if able to determine their own fate, would choose. Brutal terror, murder, extortion, coercion, and assassination do not furnish the foundations of a state bound to last.³⁰² Given these facts, which resemble those applicable to Communist and

Fascist-conquered Europe, it is highly probable that an unconventional warfare strategy can pay large dividends. It is true that resistance to occupation is mercilessly punished through exemplary crucifixions and beheadings, and so this is a project that requires a broadened scope and longer time-frame. Much can be done to sever essential logistical links to the occupying ISO terrorist State, and many of the LOEs designed to repress terrorist networks can be modified to address states.³⁰³

The present author therefore agrees with those analysts who have recently suggested the prudence of a short-term containment-to-roll-back strategy to address ISO's expansionist designs.³⁰⁴

The second strategic objective—encouraging behavioral disengagement from ISO terrorism—exploits a key ISO critical vulnerability: the need for a steady supply of persons willing to either travel to Syria and assist ISIS's terrorist State, or—as is increasingly likely—to remain in one's own homeland and mercilessly and brutally murder anyone within one's potential reach. This message of: "No More Hijra! Stay Home and Mercilessly Slaughter Your Infidel Neighbor!" has become far more prevalent following the USG's August 7, 2014, commencement of aerial bombing to prevent a potential genocidal slaughter of the Yezidi ethno-religious minority, and also an ISO offensive on the key provincial city of Arbil.³⁰⁵

ISO's terrorist media operations, as noted by scores of analysts, surpass those of any terrorist organization on record.³⁰⁶ Vastly eclipsing classical bin Ladenism or AQO's relatively media-savvy affiliate AQAP, the ISO employs cutting edge film and editing techniques to produce high-quality, action-packed, dramatically-compelling videos; operates a virtual social media

army operating across a range of platforms, including Twitter and Instagram to broadcast tens of thousands of messages and images per day; and has employed a cadre of groomers whose sole mission is to target and recruit individuals from abroad to either emigrate to Syria and remain, or increasingly more likely, to plan and execute home-based terrorist attacks.³⁰⁷

ISO's juggernaut has finally been facing a far stiffer wind, however,³⁰⁸ and its media operations have forced several nations and organizations to develop effective campaigns designed to counter ISO's siren song and effectively encourage behavioral disengagement from ISO's terrorist enterprise.³⁰⁹ Leaving terrorism behind, being based on deeply personal, psychological realities, has now replaced a rationalistically conceived "de-radicalization" process as the more effective approach to detaching human lives and souls from ISO's terrorist enterprise. Though it has taken time to adapt, a coterie of media operatives is now busy developing tactics, techniques, and procedures to counter those ISO has to date used with great effect.³¹⁰ Other efforts include targeted removal and exploiting ISO's online presence to develop actionable intelligence on ISO's operatives and even military operations.³¹¹

A notable evolution in USG counter-ISO information operations has been effected that substantially extends beyond the CSCC's earlier tactics, techniques, and procedures directed exclusively at AQO/AQAP. The CSCC shifted from countering AQAP's "lone mujahid" terrorism to exclusively focusing on the ISO,³¹² and has used ISO defectors' compelling testimony³¹³ in a series of videos that employ highly-compelling techniques to drive home, rationally and emotionally, several reasons to disengage from terrorism; for example: observed hypocrisy, deceit, cruelty, murder,

dishonor, loneliness, broken promises, missed love one's, and wasted and destroyed lives.³¹⁴ The CSCC's "Think Again Turn Away" campaign, while laudable, has recently ceased in its present form, and counter-ISO information operations reorganized to more effectively pursue and realize the Obama administration's demand for a more nimble, sophisticated, and effective counter-ISO posture in the cyber domain.³¹⁵

Concluding Observation: What is the Difference between "Defeat," and "Permanent Defeat" of the ISO "Idea"?

All LOEs, except one, have now been examined. We have saved the most important for last. For in a very real sense it is the beginning and the end of the ISO story. This LOE is described earlier by the two senior-most USG officials, below the Commander-in-Chief, charged with overseeing the nation's armed forces. It is **inclusive effective governance**. It was said earlier by the present author when examining the ISO's doctrine that:

The ISO's apocalypticism, anti-Shia extermination, 'Nearest Enemy' and 'Near Enemy,' and "Caliphate Now!" doctrines would be little more than hindrance were these not combined with two additional factors. First, its creation of a fearsome, highly professional, military leadership cadre comprised of former Ba'athist military and intelligence officers whose tactics, techniques, and procedures mimic those of totalitarian Soviet and Nazi-era secret police. Second, the revengeful anti-Sunni policies pursued by former Prime Minister al-Maliki, in the context of a dramatically changed regional dynamic enervated by the 'Arab Spring,' precipitating deep alienation among Iraq's embattled and marginalized Sun-

*nis, and thus enhancing the ISO's short-term credibility as their rescuers and defenders [italics added].*³¹⁶

It is this second point that is of grave concern here. If it was willing to employ the means required, the USG could **temporarily defeat** ISO within a brief period. This can be done; it is not beyond U.S. means. Our reluctance to do so is based in a hard-earned wisdom, one bathed in the blood and treasure of America, its allies, and hundreds of thousands of Iraqis and now Syrians. This simple, hard-won truth is that every genuine insurgency, in this case the Sunni insurgency, is at heart a political struggle. ISO was able to opportunistically and ruthlessly exploit current Sunni disenchantment, disfranchisement, and a revengeful Iranian-backed al-Maliki regime that broke promises and delivered repression, exclusion, and despair. The **permanent defeat** of the ISO idea will only occur when Iraqis make the choice to create a new social compact in which its Sunni citizens are respected, represented, and protected.³¹⁷

III. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are suggested to further strengthen existing policy, strategy, and professional leader education.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SENIOR MILITARY LEADERS, PLANNERS, AND STRATEGISTS

Two classes of recommendations are suggested: one is doctrine-independent, and the second is doctrine-dependent.

Doctrine-Independent Recommendations.

By “doctrine independent,” the recommendations are meant to hold regardless of the worldview, creed, and doctrine of one’s adversary. It is likely that the vast majority of relevant recommendations fall into this category. Terrorism, as earlier described, is a distinct method. Combating terrorism (CbT), which combines counterterrorism (CT) and anti-terrorism (AT), demands knowledge of the method of terror, regardless of the substantive presuppositions of the terrorist doctrine. The author’s Terrorist Quadrangle Analysis (TQA) is recommended, however, as a heuristic for conceptualizing and countering the terrorist enterprise and *modus operandi*. It facilitates ready visualization of its four key inter-related dimensions, and thereby the clarification of critical requirements, critical vulnerabilities, and opportunities.

Irregular warfare (IW), most notably unconventional warfare (UW) and counterinsurgency (COIN), regardless of specific adversarial worldview and doctrine, adeptly attack adversarial states and insurgents.

U.S. military leadership has for nearly a decade been crystal clear about how to degrade, defeat, and destroy the ISO modus operandi.³¹⁸ It is not knowledge but the mangled, compromised political dynamics of the present Iraqi state that have limited its effectiveness. The present book offers no greater clarity than that already possessed by the USG's highly competent leadership now possessed of a realistic policy, strategy, and its essential LOEs.

Doctrine-Dependent Recommendations.

Islam, a major world religion, is the third of three great faiths whose eponymous ancestor Abraham is considered the superlative exemplar of one who forsook all, including the unimaginable, his firstborn son, to worship God. Islamic orthodoxy presumes man by nature is a born monotheist (*fitra*) endowed by the Creator with the pure knowledge of all worshipful practices demanded of God's slave. The Arabic word for God (or better, "the God") is "Allah" (*al-ilah*). "Allah is the Greatest" (*Allahu-akhbar*) is for non-Muslims recognizable only as the battle cry of criminal and sinful mass murderers who profess to realize Allah's Divine will by murdering in cold blood. This is a great travesty and predicament now facing potentially billions of persons – Muslim and non-Muslim – who must on the grounds of Islam itself answer these perpetrators and criminal masterminds and assist their utter defeat. Fortunately, in the present author's view, Islam does amply provide without question the answers necessary.

This does not demand that one deny that violence or religiously-inspired warfare has accompanied Islam's rise. In earlier writings, the present author has

insisted that a proper and effective answer to countering terrorism conducted in the name of Sunni Islam cannot honestly, and should not in practice be based, in denying that the military jihad remains for observant orthodox militant Sunni Muslims a superlative religious obligation binding until the Day of Final Judgment.³¹⁹ Having conceded this “jihad-realist” premise, however, rather than a slippery slope authorizing further AQO and ISO terrorism, one can and should be led to the exact opposite conclusion. The military jihad, even if it is an offensive jihad carried out to raise Allah’s Word supreme, is governed by a strict jurisprudence rooted in core religious principles and values that amounts to an Islamic variant of international law. The present author has previously illustrated how this jurisprudence of lawful jihad may be used to great effect to attack AQO’s terrorist modus operandi.³²⁰ A brief but pointed critique of ISO has also been penned.³²¹ It is highly recommended that senior military leaders, planners, and strategists fully comprehend this jurisprudence of lawful military jihad, and how key dissident and non-dissident orthodox Sunni scholars may be leveraged to categorically condemn and proscribe AQO and ISO terrorism committed in the name of Sunni Islam.³²²

AQO and ISO are extreme deviant criminal outliers within the Sunni Islamic spectrum. Their marginalization ensures their eventual implosion. The vast majority of Sunni Muslims ascribe neither to the ends they seek—a supranational Caliphate governed by medieval Sharia—nor to the means they use. Permanently prying these parasitic organizations away from their healthy hosts is best achieved by strengthening the host societies, i.e., creating viable, functional, representative polities capable of protecting populations,

resolving internal divides, and delivering essential services. AQO cannot survive if its claim to defend against a supposed “Crusader War Against Islam” rings insincere, incredible, and hollow. Its three futures appear to be either evisceration at the hands of the USG’s lethal campaign to destroy this entity and its leadership; criminal reorientation into “lone mujahid” anarchistic-like small-scale terrorist attacks on defenseless populations, Muslim and non-Muslim; and what may turn out to be its last lifeline, a long-term reinvention of AQO as secretly-embedded insurgents within nationalist-territorial Islamist fronts focused not on attacking the “Far Enemy,” but on transforming “Near Enemy” regimes into Sharia-based states (e.g. Syria, Yemen, Algeria, and Tunisia).³²³

The ISO based in four signature premises – apocalypticism, genocidal anti-Shi’ism, Caliphalism, and “Near Enemy” obsession – provide, despite alarmist interpretations now widely in vogue, a far easier target for near-term elimination. ISO is essentially an ultra-sectarian mass-murdering terrorist army whose wealth, social media sophistication, and recent territorial conquests have led many to mistake a mouse for a lion, and a molehill for a mountain. This ferocity, lethality, brutality, coercion, and police-state sophistication of former Ba’athist officers leading an apocalyptically-inclined ultra-sectarian extremely deviant organization, has no base and no future in the world of actually existing Sunni Islam. Mass murder, threatened and actual genocidal intention, criminal extortion, ransoming, theft, despotism, tyranny, and hubris have led the ISO to become a permanent target of virtually every nation and people who shall ensure its relatively swift destruction. ISO is at the time of this writing on the strategic defensive.³²⁴ ISO

defeats in Kobani (January 2015), Shadadi (February 2015), Tikrit (March 2015), Baiji (October 2015), Ramadi (December 2015),³²⁵ Fallujah (June 2016), Manbij, Syria (August 2016), Jarablus, Syria (September 2016), and Sirte, Libya (August/September 2016),³²⁶ coupled with the apparent momentum across a range of other ISO strongholds, provide key evidence confirming ISO's loss of momentum, territory, and battlefield initiative.³²⁷ ISO's strategic defensive posture is now also evident not only in its brutally vicious tactics directed at retaining physical terrain and population control,³²⁸ but also tactically as it shifts like its predecessor AQI when losing ground, toward increased emphasis on high-visibility mass-casualty terrorist attacks.³²⁹

The **permanent** destruction of ISO requires, as earlier stated, resolution of the intra-Islamic sectarian divide among Sunni and Shia Muslims,³³⁰ though ISO's targeting of even lay Shia creates the potential for Sunni-Shia cooperation to prevent this murderous result. Strategic patience will pay off, and it is highly recommended that focus also be placed on preparing for and preventing against ISO's potential to wreak massive destruction in the process of its inevitable defeat.³³¹

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEADER DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION

The present author presumes that highly competent professionals are already effectively educating leaders to engage these two terrorist adversaries. However, in conclusion, we here offer a few reminders or perhaps further extrapolations on points earlier made. It is highly recommended that leaders acquire a deepened knowledge of Islam: its essential religious core; key facts of history and evolution; and a

clear comprehension of the contemporary spectrum of Islamic activism, including the varieties of political Islam—violent and non-violent—that now and into the foreseeable future shall also play their role in shaping the world’s sociopolitical and sociocultural life. Having a deepened knowledge and genuine respect for this Abrahamic-derived faith, one will also discover why the vast majority of Muslims can easily and justifiably disassociate AQO and ISO **terrorism** from this faith. The criminal essence of terrorism—treachery, deceit, murder, creating insecurity, dread, fear, horror, and calamity—is so far from the essential religious core defining Islam that many deny that Muslims themselves can actually be behind this madness and murder. Conspiracy theory is rampant, and denial that this has anything to do with Islam at all is a certain and emphatic conviction, especially in those regions suffering its brunt. What is certain is that persons act in the name of Islam, and as earlier stated, it is for Sunni Muslims themselves to ultimately determine the legitimate versus illegitimate bounds of this world faith.

Possessed of a deepened knowledge and respect for Islam, however, leaders can become natural allies in what can and should be an inter-civilizational, long-term alliance to extinguish terrorist enterprises as legitimate vehicles for changing lives and social orders. Healthy sociopolitical orders surely doom AQO and ISO to inevitable marginalization and implosion. Strengthened host societies and competent security forces defending legitimate borders, in alliance with the world’s civilizations—including most certainly Islam—will lead AQO to occupy only virtual territories and ever-shriveling sanctuaries. The only card left to play is to poison, polarize, and plot attacks designed

to estrange Islam and Muslims from the world, and to incessantly parrot their “Crusader War Against Islam” mantra to ever-diminishing target audiences. Islamophobia, ironically, is their only genuine potential Western ally, and inter-civilizational dialogue, cooperation, and evolution their only actual genuine enemy. It turns out that “the tyrant,” the “idol worshipper,” and the “Crusader” has not been the West at all, but these organizations themselves who have made their own desires and “will to power” their object of worship, **their God**; their self-anointing as usurpers of all authority, **their Idol**; and their fabricated defense against a non-existent war against Islam, **their Crusade**.

AQO and ISO are two extremely deviant Salafijihadi organizations. Fully understanding Sunni Islam in all its complexity, variety, and majesty, and how these two deviant criminal terrorist entities attach to this faith, requires knowledge. Professional educators should ensure that this knowledge is being adequately conveyed to those who now, and in the near future, shall ally with Sunni Islam against these terrorist entities.

The war we now wage is not now and has never been against Islam. Rather, it is the war first quite accurately declared by former President Bush and more recently by former President Obama: it is a war against terrorist murderers who act in the name of a faith worthy of great admiration and respect. Detached from a faith they have maligned, besmirched, and unfairly damaged in the eyes of the world, they shall again sooner rather than later become strangers wandering without land or followers. It is a fate they have earned for themselves, by their own hands. A murderer is not a martyr, after all.

ENDNOTES

1. Describing each of these terrorist entities as “organizations” (*Tanzim*) is justifiable on the following grounds. First, this is actually the full and proper name chosen by “al-Qaeda” for itself in its original documents and nomenclature, despite the much-cited abbreviated form. Second, it is an accurate way to characterize how Sunni Muslims, including militant Sunni advocates of jihad who dissent from the Islamic State Organization’s (ISO’s) doctrine and methods, choose to describe this entity. The Islamic State (IS) is a terrorist organization that has declared itself the exclusive caliphate of the world’s Sunni Muslims. Until this self-designation triumphs more generally, its existence as an organization (*Tanzim*) should be recognized, yet owing to the centrality of its state-centered doctrine and methods, it is advisable to retain the concept “State” as well. The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was self-declared on October 15, 2006; the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham/Levant (ISIS), was self-declared on April 7, 2013; and the IS was self-declared on June 29, 2014. Each self-declaration was made exclusively by a single terrorist organization and, despite pretensions otherwise, has not received recognition beyond a relatively small circle of adherents. For this notion that the IS is an organization, and not a state, in the writings of a highly-influential Salafi-jihadi, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, see Pieter Van Ostaeeyen, “Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi: The Case of ISIS and the Position of the Duty Toward It,” pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/05/27/abu-muhammad-al-maqdisi-the-case-of-isis-and-the-position-of-the-duty-toward-it/, accessed on December 9, 2014; For discussion on the naming conventions for this terrorist entity, see Zack Beauchamp, “ISIS, Islamic State or ISIL? What to call the group the US is bombing in Iraq and Syria,” September 17, 2014, available from www.vox.com/2014/9/17/6259923/isis-isil-the-islamic-state-daesh-what-is-isis-why-does-obama-use-isil, accessed on September 19, 2014; Hamid Lellou, “Lost in Translation: ISIS’s Intention Was in Their Name, But We Missed It,” August 4, 2014, available from smallwarsjournal.com/print/15998, accessed on August 4, 2014.

2. Pew Research Center, “Mapping the Global Muslim Population,” October 7, 2009, available from www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-population/, accessed on October 4, 2013. The global total is estimated at 1.57 billion Mus-

lisms, with 87-90 percent affiliated as Sunni. The phrase “Defending *Ahl-us Sunnah*” (People of the Sunnah, or “Right Path”); or less frequently, *Ahl-us-Sunnah wa’l-Gama’at* (People of the Sunnah and Community), is frequently encountered in this terrorist literature.

3. For a comprehensive recent analysis, see Roel Meijer, ed., *Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.

4. For its classic statement, see Sheikh-ul-Islam Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, *The Book of Monotheism (Kitab at-Tauhid)*, transl. by Compilation and Research Department Dar-us-Salam, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Dar-us-Salam, 1996. For its incorporation into Hanbali law, the predominant school of Sunni jurisprudence in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), see Mahmoud Ridha Murad, *The Islamic Digest of Aqeedah and Fiqh*, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Darussalam, 1998; Shaykh ‘Abdul-‘Aziz bin ‘Abdullah bin Baz, Shaykh Muhammad bin Salih Al-‘Uthaimin, and Shaykh ‘Abdullah bin ‘Abdur-Rahman Al-Jibreen, along with The Permanent Committee and the decisions of the Fiqh Council, *Fatawa Islamiyah: Islamic Verdicts*, Vol. 1: Creed, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Darussalam, 2001. For seminal studies and classic expositions of the fundamentals of “Wahhabism,” see David Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, London, UK and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006 and 2009; Natana J. DeLong-Bas, *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004; Michael Cook, “On the Origins of Wahhabism,” *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 3rd Series, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1992, pp. 191-202; Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, “Wahhabism in Arabia: Past and Present,” *Journal of the Central Asian Society*, Vol. 16, No. 4, 1929, pp. 458-467; Phoenix, “A Brief Outline of the Wahabi Movement,” *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1930, pp. 401-416; Joseph A. Kechichian, “The Role of the Ulema in the Politics of an Islamic State: The Case of Saudi Arabia,” *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 1, February 1986, pp. 53-71; and Joseph Kostiner, “On Instruments and Their Designers: The Ikhwan of Najd and the Emergence of the Saudi State,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 3, July 1985, pp. 298-323. For key encyclopedia articles on al-Wahhab and key Wahhabi concepts, see H. Laoust, “Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab,” in B. Lewis, V. Menage, Ch. Pellat, and J. Schacht, eds., *Encyclopedia of Islam Vol. 3*, 2nd Edition, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1971, pp. 677-679; D. Gimaret, “Tawhid,” in

P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W. Heinrichs, and G. Lecomte eds., *Encyclopedia of Islam Vol. 10*, 2nd Edition, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2000, p. 389; D. Gimaret, "Shirk," in C. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W. Heinrichs, and G. Lecomte eds., *Encyclopedia of Islam Vol. 8*, 2nd Edition, Leiden: E. J. Brill 1995, pp. 484-486; J. Robson, "Bid'a," in B. Lewis, Ch. Pellat, and J. Schacht, eds., *Encyclopedia of Islam Vol. 1*, 2nd Edition, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1960, p. 1199; Editor [n.n.], "Djahilliyya," in B. Lewis, Ch. Pellat, and J. Schacht eds., *Encyclopedia of Islam Vol. 2*, 2nd Edition, Leiden: E. J. Brill 1965, pp. 383-384; W. Ende, "Wahhabiyya," in *Encyclopedia of Islam Vol. 11*, 2nd Edition, P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, and W. Heinrich eds., Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2002, pp. 39-47; Stephanie Lacroix and Thomas Hegghammer, *Saudi Arabia Background: Who are the Islamists?* International Crisis Group, Middle East Report No. 31, Amman/Riyadh/Brussels, September 21, 2004; International Crisis Group, *Can Saudi Arabia Reform Itself?* International Crisis Group, Middle East Report No. 28, Cairo/Brussels, July 14, 2004; Thomas Hegghammer, *The Failure of Jihad in Saudi Arabia*, Occasional Paper Series, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, February 25, 2010; and Joshua Teitelbaum, *Holier Than Thou: Saudi Arabia's Islamic Opposition*, Policy Papers No. 52, Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000, available from www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PP_52_HOLIER_THAN_THOU.pdf, accessed on October 2, 2014.

5. Mahmoud Rida Murad, *The Islamic Digest of Aqeedah and Fiqh*, pp. 20-22.

6. For further clarification of this jihad-realist imperative, see Paul Kamolnick, *Delegitimizing Al-Qa'ida: A Jihad-Realist Approach*, Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012, pp. 4-6; and Paul Kamolnick, "The Egyptian Islamic Group's Critique of Al-Qaeda's Interpretation of Jihad," *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. 7, No. 5, October 2013, pp. 93-97, available from www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/293/591.

7. See Elaine Pagels, *The Origin of Satan: How Christians Demonized Jews, Pagans, and Heretics*, New York: Random House, 1995, esp. chapters 2-3, 6. In a particularly insightful quote Pagels remarks:

At first glance these stories of Satan may seem to have little in common. Yet they all agree on one thing: that this greatest and most dangerous enemy did not originate, as one might expect, as an outsider, an alien, or a stranger. Satan is not a distant enemy but the intimate enemy – one’s trusted colleague, close associate, brother. He is the kind of person on whose loyalty and goodwill the well-being of family and society depend – but one who turns unexpectedly jealous and hostile. Whichever version of his origin one chooses, then, and there are many, all depict Satan as an *intimate* enemy – the attribute that qualifies him so well to express conflict among Jewish groups. Those who asked, ‘How could God’s own angel become his enemy?’ were thus asking in effect, “How could one of *us* become one of *them*?” Stories of Satan and other fallen angels proliferated in these troubled times, especially within those radical groups that had turned against the rest of the Jewish community and, consequently, concluded that others had turned against them – or (as they put it) against *God*.

8. For pioneering insights by this classical social theorist, see Georg Simmel, auth., Kurt H. Wolff and Reinhard Bendix, transl., *Conflict & The Web of Group Affiliations*, New York: The Free Press, 1955, pp. 45-50.

9. For important examinations of Wahhabism and its possible variations from mainstream to ultra-conservative, see Abdulaziz H. al-Fahad, “From Exclusivism to Accommodation: Doctrinal and Legal Evolution of Wahhabism,” *New York University Law Review*, Vol. 79, No. 2, May 2004, pp. 485-519; Hala Fattah, “‘Wahhabi’ Influences, Salafi Responses: Shaikh Mahmud Shukri and the Iraqi Salafi Movement, 1745-1930,” *Journal of Islamic Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2003, pp. 127-148; Elizabeth Sirriyeh, “Wahhabis, Unbelievers and the Problems of Exclusivism,” *Bulletin*, British Society for Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2, 1989, pp. 123-132; Shawana A. Aziz (compiled, transl.), “Is Ignorance an Excuse in Matters of Aqeedah [Creed]?” *Fatawa* by Shaykh Abdul Aziz ibn Baz and Shaykh Salih ibn Fawzan al-Fawzan, available from www.qsep.com/media/172.php, accessed on March 27, 2015; Joas Wagemakers, “The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quietist and Radical Wahhabi Contestations of al-Walā’ wa-l-Barā,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 1, February 2012, pp. 93-110; Madawi al-Rasheed, “Prohibiting Politics: Saudi Wahhabi Religious Discourse,” June 4, 2007, available from www.

madawialrasheed.org/site/more/112, accessed on March 26, 2015; Abu Hashim, "Uncomfortable Contradictions (part 1): The Hidden Problem with Modern Salafism in Relation to Takfir; Part 1 of a Series of Translated Extracts from the Durar al-Saniyyah," available from *www.masud.co.uk/ISLAM/misc/uncomfortable-contradictions.htm*, accessed on March 26, 2015; Quran Sunnah Educational Programs, "Was Shaykh Muhammad ibn 'Abdul-Wahhab's call based on *Takfir*?" Fatwa response by Shaykh 'Abdul 'Aziz ibn 'Abdullah ibn Muhammad al al-Shaykh, available from *www.qsep.com/modules.php?name=ilm&d_op=article&sid=196*, accessed on March 26, 2015; Munirah al-Hudayb, "Da'ish Urges Saudi Supporters to Kill Their Relatives Before Emigrating," London Al-Hayah Online, March 17, 2015, available from *www.opensource.com*, accessed on March 23, 2015; Dr. Sharif Hatim al-'Awni, "Hatim al-'Awni: 'Imitation of the Disbelievers' Amongst the Ranks of the Islamists," transl. by Namazi, n.d, n.p.; Dr. Ibrahim b. Abd Allah al-Duwayyish *et al.* [48 additional signatories, including Dr. Sharif Hatim b. Arif al-'Awni], "Our Statement Concerning the Riyadh Bombings," January 1, 2003, available from *en.islamtoday.net/print/2972*, accessed on March 26, 2015; Dr. Sharif Hatim al-'Awni, "Saudi ('salafi') shaykh al sharif Hatim Al-'Awni on the Ash'aris," Statement published October 26, 2013, n.p.; and Cole Bunzel in a very informative analytic report comparing ISO and Wahhabiyya. See Cole Bunzel, *The Kingdom and the Caliphate: Duel of the Islamic States*, February 2016, available from *carnegieendowment.org/2016/02/18/kingdom-and-caliphate-duel-of-islamic-states-pub-62810*, accessed on August 1, 2016, which identifies four key points of ISO's divergence from a classical unreconstructed Saudi-based Wahhabism: [1] ISO's rejection on grounds of "apostasy" of an alliance with the family dynasty of Al Saud; [2] its central aspiration to establish a caliphate; [3] its ultra-violence, about which Cole writes:

Violence was by no means absent from the first Saudi-Wahhabi state . . . But the Islamic State's gut-wrenching displays of beheading, immolation, and other forms of extreme violence aimed at inspiring fear are no throwback to Wahhabi practices. They were introduced by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi . . .

and finally, [4] ISO's apocalypticism, which lacks a mainstream Wahhabi precedent.

10. See Muhammad Haniff Hassan, *The Father of Jihad: 'Abd Allah Azzam's Jihad Ideas and Implications to National Security*, London: Imperial College Press, 2014, pp. 99-142, for selective insights. For a key recent overview of Azzam's significance and writings, see Thomas Hegghammer, "Introduction: Abdallah Azzam, The Imam of Jihad," in Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, eds., Pascale Ghazaleh, transl., *Al Qaeda in its Own Words*, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2010, pp. 81-101. The two seminal Azzam writings of greatest interest for present purposes are: Dr. Abdullah Azzam, *Defense of the Muslim Lands: The First Obligation after Iman* [Faith], (ca. 1985), available from archive.org/stream/Defense_of_the_Muslim_Lands/Defense_of_the_Muslim_Lands, accessed on November 6, 2014; and, Shaykh 'Abdullah Azzam, *Join the Caravan*, (c. 1987-1988), available from archive.org/stream/JoinTheCaravan/Join-TheCaravan_djvu.txt, accessed on November 6, 2014; see also, Dr. Abdallah Azzam, "Al-Qa'ida al-Subah: The Solid Base," *al-Jihad* (magazine), April 1988, available from insidethejihad.com/2014/03/al-qaida-al-subah-the-solid-base/, accessed on November 10, 2014.

11. Offensive jihad (*jihad al-talab*) is a collective responsibility (*fard al-khifaya*), that may be discharged by a select number from the *Ummah* who fight on their behalf.

12. The four letters preceding Azzam's fatwa that consent and advise that it be accepted as sound on scholarly grounds, are translated in English and can be read at the head of Abdullah Azzam, *Defense of the Muslim Lands*.

13. Qutb's comprehensive vision and foundational "Qutbist" concepts are contained in his book, Sayyid Qutb, *Signposts [Milestones] on the Road (Ma'alim fi-l-Tariq)*, Cedar Rapids, IA: The Mother Mosque Foundation, 1993 [1964].

14. See David Cook, *Understanding Jihad*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2005, pp. 153-157. See also in the ISO's "Original Shuhada Series," an English translation of Abdullah Azzam's, *Lovers of [Virgins] Maidens of Paradise [Lovers of the Hur al Ayn]*. New title provided by ISO, *The Martyrs of Afghanistan*, Azzam Publications [online publisher], available from archive.org/download/BlackFlagNShuhadaStoriesEbooks/Black%20Flag%20n%20Shuhada%20Stories%20Ebooks.rar, accessed on May 13, 2015. Azzam covers a period of anti-Soviet Afghan jihad, from 1979-1989.

15. Key references that inform this interpretation of AQO's evolution include: Peter L. Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden*, New York: Touchstone, 2002 [2001]; Peter L. Bergen, *The Osama bin Laden I Know*, New York: The Free Press, 2006; Peter L. Bergen, *The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict Between America and al-Qaeda*, New York: Free Press, 2011; Najwa bin Laden, Omar bin Laden, and Jean Sasson, *Growing Up bin Laden: Osama's Wife and Son Take Us Inside Their Secret World*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 2009; Steve Coll, *The Bin Ladens: An Arabian Family in the American Century*, New York: The Penguin Press, 2008; Michael Scheuer, *Osama bin Laden*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011; Abdel Bari Atwan, *The Secret History of al Qaeda*, Updated Ed., Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2008 [2006]; Montasser al-Zayyat, auth., Ahmed Fekry, transl., Sara Nimis, ed., *The Road to Al-Qaeda: The Story of Bin-Laden's Right-Hand Man*, London, UK and Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2004 [2002]; Camille Tawil, auth., Robin Bray, transl., *Brothers in Arms: The Story of Al-Qa'ida and the Arab Jihadists*, London, UK: Saqi Books, 2010 [2007]; Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, New York: Berkeley Books, 2003 [2002]; Fawaz A. Gerges, *The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda*, Oxford, UK and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011; Fawaz A. Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005; Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*, New York: Penguin Books, 2004; Lawrence Wright, *The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006; Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers: The 9/11 Hijackers: Who They Were, Why They Did It*, New York: HarperCollins, 2005; Thomas Hegghammer, *Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, Authorized Edition, New York: Norton, 2004, ch. 2, pp. 47-70.

16. "Al Qaeda Founding Minutes," "TAREEKHOSAMA/50 Tareekh Osama 122-123," August 11, 1988, *Intelwire.com*, accessed on April 13, 2011; "Al Qaeda Founding Minutes," "TAREEKHOSAMA/50 Tareekh Osama 127-127a," August 20, 1988, available from *Intelwire.com*, accessed on April 13, 2011; "Al-Qa-ida Bylaws (English Translation)," Harmony Program Doc. No. AFGP-2002-600048, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, available from www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-qaida-bylaws-english

translation, accessed on May 21, 2013 (full English translation of this document was completed April 18, 2002, the original is 19 pages in Arabic); “Al-Qa’ida Constitutional Charter (English Translation),” Harmony Program Doc. No. AFGP-2002-600045, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, available from www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-qaida-constitutional-charter-english-translation, accessed on May 21, 2013; (Another version is also available from the Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC) Doc. No. AQ-PMPR-D-000-105, Conflict Records Research Center, Washington, DC); “Employment Contract,” Harmony Program Doc. No. AFGT-2002-600175, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, available from <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Employment-Contract-Translation.pdf>, accessed on August 3, 2016, (full English translation completed March 20, 2002). A more accurate title than that provided by the Harmony Program interpreter is given in another version of this same document. See “An Employment Contract that Describes Al Qaeda Beliefs, Objectives, And Sphere Of Activity, Including Requirements For Joining, Regulations, And Instructions,” CRRC Doc. No. AQ-PMPR-D-072, Conflict Records Research Center, Washington, DC.

17. See for example: *United States of America v. Enaam M. Arnaout*, United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, No. 02 CR 892, “Governments Evidentiary Prof-fer Supporting The Admissibility of Coconspirator Statements [Captured Documents],” esp. pp. 19-20, 28-34, available from news.findlaw.com/wsj/docs/bif/usarnaout10603prof.pdf, accessed on December 12, 2016.

Bin Laden and Azzam went their separate ways in approximately 1988 because Bin Laden wanted to conduct jihad outside of Afghanistan and Azzam was not prepared to do so. After the split, Bin Laden remained aligned with Hekmatyar who held views similar to Bin Laden, while Azzam continued with MK until he was killed. Hekmatyar provided Bin Laden with training camps in geographic areas that Hekmatyar controlled (p. 20).

18. For a comprehensive sociological exposition of the key literature and research on notions of “Church” and “sect” and other relevant forms of religious organization, see Keith A. Roberts, *Religion in Sociological Perspective*, 4th ed., Australia: Wadsworth Publishing, 2004, ch. 8, pp. 177-198.

19. See Rukmini Callimachi and Eric Schmitt, "Iran Released Top Members of Al Qaeda in Trade," *The New York Times*, September 17, 2015, available from www.nytimes.com/2015/09/18/world/middleeast/iran-released-top-members-of-al-qaeda-in-a-trade.html, accessed on September 18, 2015.

20. Hassaan Yusuf, ed., "An Exclusive Interview with Adam Yahiye Gadahn," *Resurgence*, No. 2, Special Iss., Summer 2015, released online c. June 28, 2015, archived copy available from pi-eteroanostaeyen.files.wordpress.com/2015/06/resurgence-special-issue-summer-2015.pdf, accessed on June 29, 2015, p. 14-15. The "*Shahada*" (or, Witness/Testament to Islam) is considered the essential creedal pillar upon which Islam rests. It consists in stating, and deeply and sincerely believing as Adam Gadahn asserts, the following: "there is no God worthy of worship but God, and Muhammad is the Messenger of God." This foundational belief is to Islam what "Jesus is Lord" is for a Christian believer. It literally means "witness" as in "I witness that . . ." or "I testify that . . ." If Allah determines they indeed have earned Paradise, after judging one's righteous intentions and praiseworthy deeds throughout the course of one's life, and granting mercy, compassion, and clemency as well, He may grant martyrdom (*Shahada*).

21. For the fullest examination of these differences in faith among theological/juridical schools, see Daniel Lav, *Radical Islam and the Revival of Medieval Theology*, Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

22. David C. Gompert and John Gordon, IV, *War By Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency*, Rand Counterinsurgency Study, Final Report, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008, pp. 23-31.

23. This fatwa and intra-Wahhabi debates over its legitimacy is discussed in Abdulaziz H. al-Fahad, "From Exclusivism to Accommodation," pp. 485-519.

24. See Kamolnick, *Delegitimizing Al-Qaeda*, pp. 61-64 for bin Laden's legal argument, and the revulsion expressed by one of his operatives, Wadih El-Hage, at learning of the massive losses of civilian life. These terrorist bombings were conducted on August 7, 1998: the casualties in Nairobi, Kenya, 213 persons killed,

and 4,500 injured; in Dar as Salam, Tanzania, (literally, "House of Peace"), 11 dead, and 85 injured; also see *United States of America v. Usama bin Laden, et al.*, S(7) 98 Cr. 1023, United States District Court, Southern District of New York, NY, March 12, 2001, Super-seding Indictment, pp. 43-44.

25. Coll, *Ghost Wars*; Wright, *The Looming Tower*.

26. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report*, pp. 250-253, and p. 532 n. 80; A recent not-so-implicit critique is found in the inaugural issue of *Resurgence* that included an excerpt from a book by Abu Obaida al-Maqqadi (*Maqalat fi as Siyasa wal Fikr*). Said to be a close confidant of several leading military and Sharia figures in AQO, this excerpt is presented under the article's sub-heading, "Overstretch in Special Operations," (i.e., mass-casualty terrorist operations). He states:

New jihadi groups that strive to gain empowerment on earth and establish the rule of Allah on the land, instead of merely inflicting losses on the enemy at the tactical level [i.e., 9/11], should avoid beginning special operations against the enemy until they have guaranteed the basic conditions of their own survival. Carrying out special operations is tantamount to entering into an all out war with the enemy in which the weaker side (usually the Mujahideen) tends to be unprepared for the reaction. The enemy will escalate the conflict in reaction to these operations.

Shaykh Abu Obaida al Maqqadi, "Strategic Overreach in Guerrilla Warfare," *Resurgence*, No. 1, Fall 2014, released online c. October 2014, archived copy available from <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2015/04/resurgence-1.pdf>, accessed on August 2, 2016, p. 108.

27. By that time, for his criminal activities in support of the 1993 WTC bombing and the attempted 1995 Bojinka Plot to crash 12 trans-Pacific airliners, Ramzi Yousef (born Abdul Basit Mahmud Abdul Karim), had begun his life-sentence in solitary confinement, without parole, at the Super Max prison in Florence, Colorado. The "blind shaykh," Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel Rahman, convicted for the 1993 WTC bombing, seditious conspiracy to blow up several New York City landmarks, and plots to assassinate U.S. politicians (See United States District Court, Southern

District of New York, *United States of America v. Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel Rahman, et al.*, S5 93 Cr. 181, 1994), was by then serving his own life-sentence, without parole in the Federal Medical Center, Butner, part of the Butner Federal Corrections Center, Butner, North Carolina.

28. 32 Muslims (26 men, and 6 women) were murdered in the 9/11 attacks. 28 Muslims died in the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center, and 3 were among the passengers on the hijacked planes. These three were a husband and a wife, who was at the time 7 months pregnant. Their nationalities included: Pakistan, Bangladesh, Guiana, Sri Lanka, Gambia, Ivory Coast, Yemen, Iran, Ethiopia, Turkey, Trinidad and Tobago, Burma, Albania, Greece, and India. According to Kamal Kobeisi:

the most famous Muslim victim is the only Arab among all 9/11 victims, the Yemeni Abdul Salam Mallahi, who worked at the Marriott Hotel in World Trade Center. He was very brave and helped people escape the building. His body has never been found. The oldest victim was an Iranian woman who was 69 years old, and the youngest were two 25-year old men, Zohoto Ibis, from Turkey, and a Pakistani, Khaled Shahid.

Kamal Kobeisi, "Remembering the Muslims who were killed in the 9/11 attacks," *Al Arabiya*, September 11, 2011, available from english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/09/11/166286.html, accessed on March 5, 2014. Murder left in its wake many family tragedies; see also, Rick Hampson, "For families of Muslim 9/11 victims, a new pain," *USA Today*, September 9, 2010, available from usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-09-03-1amuslims911_cv_n.htm, accessed on August 2, 2016:

Mehr Tariq's husband Taiq Amanullah, an assistant vice president at Fiduciary Trust, died in the south tower. She is 49 and lives with her two young adult children in California's Silicon Valley, where they moved in 2005 to be near her brothers. . . . Baraheen Ashrafi's husband, Mohammed Chowdhury, died atop the north tower, where he was a waiter at Windows on the World. Ashrafi, 38, lives in Edmond, Okla., where she moved with her two children to be near her sister. . . . Ysuff Salie's daughter Rahma, who was seven months pregnant, and Rahma's husband, Michael, were passengers aboard the jet that crashed into the north tower. Ysuff, 64, and his wife, Haleema, 58, live in Newton, Mass., and run two bakery-cafes.

29. See especially, Sayf al-'Adl (Muhammad Salah al-Din Zaydan al-Misri), "Letter To My Beloved Brother Mukhtar [Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM)]," June 13, 2002, available from *www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Al-Adl-letter-Translation1.pdf*, accessed on March 6, 2014, for a damning critique of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad and Osama bin Laden's catastrophic act. Consider these excerpts that confirm the "lone wolf" nature of the 9/11 attack. On bin Laden:

The Teacher [Translator: Bin Laden] corresponds directly with you [KSM] and that, unfortunately, is his absolute habit that he will not abandon. If someone opposes him, he immediately puts forward another person to render an opinion in his support, clinging to his opinion and totally disregarding those around him, so there is no advice, no nothing. . . . To absolve my conscience before Allah, and to announce my innocence in front of Allah, I say today [June 13, 2002] we must completely halt all external operations until we sit down and consider the disaster we caused. . . . The East Asia, Europe, America, Horn of Africa, Yemen, Gulf, and Morocco groups have fallen, and Pakistan has almost been drowned in one push. I, not to mention the other individuals who have also moved and fallen, have often advised on this matter. Regrettably, my brother, if you look back, you will find that you are the person solely responsible for all this because you undertook the mission, and during six months, we only lost what we built in years.

See also the following letter from Abu Musab al-Suri and Abu Khalid al-Suri, written July 19, 1999, to Ayman al-Zawahiri about bin Laden, expressing extreme concern at the latter's impolite, impolitic, and defiant behavior toward then-ruling Mullah Umar, emir of the Afghan Taliban. See Alan Cullison, "Al-Qaeda's Hard Drive: A Fortuitous Discovery Reveals Budget Squabbles, Baby Pictures, Office Rivalries—and the Path to 9/11," *The Atlantic Monthly*, September 2004, pp. 59-60:

The results of this crisis can be felt even here in Kabul and other places. Talk about closing down the camps has spread. Discontent with the Arabs has become clear. Whispers between the Taliban with some of our non-Arab brothers has become customary. In short, our brother Abu Abdullah's [bin Laden] latest troublemaking with the Taliban and the Leader of the Faithful jeopardizes the Arabs, and the Arab presence, today in all of Afghanistan, for no good reason. It provides a ripe opportunity

for all adversaries including America, the West, the Jews, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, the Mas'ud-Dostum alliance, etc, to serve the Arabs a blow that could end up causing their most faithful allies to kick them out . . . Our brother [bin Laden] will help our enemies reach their goal free of charge! . . . The strangest thing I have heard so far is Abu Abdullah's saying that he wouldn't listen to the Leader of the Faithful when he asked him to stop giving interviews . . . I think our brother [bin Laden] has caught the disease of screens, flashes, fans, and applause. . . The only solution out of this dilemma is what a number of knowledgeable and experienced people have agreed upon . . . Abu Abdullah [Osama bin Laden] should go to the Leader of the Faithful with some of his brothers and tell him that . . . [1] the Leader of the Faithful was right when he asked you to refrain from interviews, announcements, and media encounters, and [2] that you will help the Taliban as much as you can in their battle, until they achieve control over Afghanistan. [3] You should apologize for any inconvenience or pressure you have caused . . . [4] and commit to the wishes and orders of the Leader of the Faithful on matters that concern his circumstances here . . . The Leader of the Faithful, who should be obeyed where he reigns, is Muhammad Omar, not Osama bin Laden. Osama bin Laden and his companions are only guests seeking refuge and have to adhere to the terms laid out by the person who provided it for them. This is legitimate and logical.

30. This latest metamorphosis is more fully explored in Chapters 2 and 3.

31. See especially, Robert A. Pape, "The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 97, No. 3, August 2003, pp. 343-345.

32. For a description of these letters, and access to English translations, see Will McCants, "Abbottabad Documents," Jihadica, blog entry, posted May 3, 2012, available from www.jihadica.com/abbottabad-documents/, for all 17 declassified Special Operations Command (SOCOM) seized documents made available in easy to access format, in Arabic and English; (Alternately, see Harmony Program, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, available from <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/programs-resources/harmony-program/>); See also especially, Nelly Lahoud, Stuart Caudill, Liam Collins, Gabriel Koehler-Derrick, Don Ressler, and Muhammad al-'Ubaydi, "Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Side-

lined?" Harmony Program Report, West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, May 3, 2012, available from www.ctc.usma.edu, who describe these as consisting of electronic letters or drafts, totaling 175 pages in the original Arabic and 197 pages in the English translation, dating from between September 2006 and April 2011. See also their Appendix (pp. 54-59) for a brief summary of the facts surrounding and an interpretation of each letter.

33. A similar argument is advanced on Sharia grounds of those Muslims who deliberately commit intentional homicide. See Paul Kamolnick, "Has Adam Gadahn Forsaken the Lawful Jihad for Anti-Americanism? A Case Study of Ideological Contradictions," *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. 8, No. 6, December 2014, pp. 36-42, available from www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/390.

34. See "Text: President Bush Addresses the Nation," *The Washington Post*, September 20, 2001, transcript available from www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html, accessed on May 20, 2014.

35. See "Text: Obama's Speech in Cairo," *The New York Times*, June 4, 2009, available from www.nytimes.com/2009/06/04/us/politics/04obama.text.html?_r=0, accessed on August 12, 2013. See also more recently, Tanya Somanader, "President Obama on the Causes and Antidotes to Violent Extremism," blog entry, posted February 19, 2015, www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/02/19/president-obama-causes-and-antidotes-violent-extremism, accessed on February 20, 2015.

36. "Tiny fraction, not all Muslims, involved in terrorism, says Obama," *The News International*, November 23, 2015, available from <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/15796-tiny-fraction-not-all-muslims-involved-in-terrorism-says-obama>, accessed on August 2, 2016.

37. See "Video and Transcript: President Obama: Baltimore Mosque Speech, Weds., Feb. 3, 2016," available from www.shal-lownation.com/2016/02/03/video-president-obama-baltimore-mosque-speech-weds-feb-3-2016/, accessed on February 4, 2016; Michelle Boorstein, "At Baltimore mosque, President Obama encourages

U.S. Muslims: 'You fit in here'," *The Washington Post*, February 3, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2016/02/03/president-obamas-mosque-visit-will-spotlight-a-new-generation-of-muslim-americans/, accessed on February 4, 2016; Elahé Izadi, "Obama, Thomas Jefferson and the fascinating history of Founding Fathers defending Muslim rights," *The Washington Post*, February 3, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/12/11/how-thomas-jefferson-and-other-founding-fathers-defended-muslim-rights/, accessed on February 4, 2016.

38. See "A Suggestion to Change the Name of Al-Qa'ida (English Translation)," SOCOM-2012-0000009, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, available from <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-suggestion-to-change-the-name-of-al-qaida-english-translation-2>. Also, Jason Burke, "Bin Laden wanted to change al-Qaida's bloodied name: Documents obtained in US assassination reveal frustrations of al-Qaida leader and desire to win over world's Muslims," *The Guardian*, June 24, 2011, available from www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/24/bin-laden-documents-alqaida-struggle, accessed on August 12, 2013. President Obama was made aware of this later after the Abbottabad raid. It was reported by Jo Becker and Scott Shane, "Secret 'Kill List' Proves a Test of Obama's Principles and Will," *The New York Times*, May 29, 2012, available from www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html, accessed on May 29, 2012:

Mr. Obama was heartened, aides say, by a letter discovered in the raid on Osama bin Laden's compound in Pakistan. It complained that the American president had undermined Al Qaeda's support by repeatedly declaring that the United States was at war not with Islam, but with the terrorist network. 'We must be doing a pretty good job,' Mr. Obama told his secretary of state.

39. For key insight on why this was predictable, see Charles Kurzman, *The Missing Martyrs: Why There Are So Few Muslim Terrorists*, Oxford, UK and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, ch. 1, pp. 3-24.

40. See "A Suggestion to Change the Name of Al-Qa'ida (English Translation)," SOCOM-2012-0000009.

41. *Ibid.*

42. See esp., "Letter from UBL to 'Atiyatullah Al-Libi 2 (English Translation)," SOCOM-2012-0000010, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, available from <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/letter-from-ubl-to-atiyatullah-al-libi-2-english-translation-2>; see also, Lahoud, *et al.*, *Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined?* p. 3, 48-52.

43. See for example: Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Jason Fritz, Bridget Moreng, and Nathaniel Barr, "SMA Support to SOCCENT: The War between the Islamic State and al-Qaeda: Strategic Dimensions of a Patricidal Conflict," Valens Global International Strategies and Securities Study, September 2015, available from www.tbo.com/assets/pdf/TB212921.PDF, accessed on September 21, 2015; also, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Bridget Moreng, and Nathaniel Barr, "The Strategic Dimensions of the Competition between the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and al-Qaeda," in Allison Astorino-Courtois and Sarah Canna, eds., "White Paper on SMA Support to SOCCENT: ISIL Influence and Resolve," September 2015, available from <https://info.publicintelligence.net/SOCCENT-ISIL-InfluenceResolve.pdf>, accessed on September 24, 2015. Though the present author does see merit in viewing AQO's embedding strategy as a likely evolutionary move, we believe that Gartenstein-Ross is incorrect in stating that AQO and ISO as Salafi jihadi organizations are virtually identical in creed, doctrine, and worldview, or in their words, share "similar ideologies" (p. 3), and that the key differences between AQO and ISO are technology (the ISO being "more technology savvy") and temporality (the ISO "expects to experience success in a shorter timeframe than al-Qaeda"). This doctrinal identity assumption leads these authors to then analyze competition between them as purely "strategic competition" essentially reducible to a two-person game employing unique "Focoist" (ISO) and "Maoist" (AQO) strategies. For another example of a strategically-reductionist analysis that fails to appreciate the core creedal, theological, and legal fault lines at the heart of the ISO/AQO conflict; see also, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr, "How al-Qaeda Survived the Islamic State Challenge," August 30, 2016, available from www.hudson.org/research/12788-how-al-qaeda-survived-the-islamic-state-challenge, accessed September 2, 2016. Interested readers are referred to chapter one for our primary supporting data.

44. For key statements evidencing the distinctive AQO "idea," see "Al Qaeda Founding Minutes," "TAREEKHOSA-MA/50 Tareekh Osama 122-123"; "Al Qaeda Founding Minutes," "TAREEKHOSAMA/50 Tareekh Osama 127-127a"; "Al-Qaida Bylaws (English Translation)," Harmony Program Doc. No. AFGP-2002-600048; "Al-Qa'ida Constitutional Charter (English Translation)," Harmony Program Doc. No. AFGP-2002-600045; "Employment Contract," Harmony Program Doc. No. AFGT-2002-600175, (or the alternate translation, "An Employment Contract that Describes Al Qaeda Beliefs, Objectives, And Sphere Of Activity, Including Requirements For Joining, Regulations, And Instructions," CRRC Doc. No. AQ-PMPR-D-072); "Letter from Usama Bin Laden to 'Atiyatullah Al-Libi (English Translation)," SOCOM-2012-0000003, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, available from <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/letter-from-usama-bin-laden-to-atiyatullah-al-libi-english-translation-2>; "Letter Regarding Al-Qa'ida Strategy (English Translation)," SOCOM-2012-0000017, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, available from <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/letter-regarding-al-qaida-strategy-english-translation-2> (Combating Terrorism Center presumption that author is either Osama bin Ladin or Shaykh Mahmud Attiya Abdul Rahman); *United States of America v. Enaam M. Arnaout*, pp. 19-20, 28-34.

45. Fazul Abdallah, "What is Al-Qaeda?" *Inspire*, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, archived copy available from azelin.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/inspire-magazine-issue-10.pdf. Fazul Abdallah Mohammad's (d. 2011) extensive involvement in AQO terrorist activities, from the masterminding of the 1998 East Africa Embassy bombings, to military commander of the Somalian Al-Shabab, to logistical and financial operative assisting the birth of AQAP, can be found in an obituary written about him. See "Fazul Abdullah Mohammed obituary," *The Guardian*, available from www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/12/fazul-abdullah-mohammed-obituary. For an excellent, detailed comprehensive analysis of his apologetic 1,156 page autobiography, intended as a corrective to sectarian interpretations of AQO and regarded as the "richest primary source available regarding *al-Qa'ida*" (p. 3), see Nelly Lahoud, *Beware of Imitators: Al-Qa'ida through the Lens of its Confidential Secretary*, Harmony Program, Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, NY, June 4, 2012, available from www.ctc.usma.edu, accessed on June 8, 2012. Referenced on p. 4, Fadil Harun (1972-

2011) (aka: Fazul Abdullah Muhammad, full name is Abdallah bin Muhammad 'Ali bin Fadil bin Hussein Al al-Mulla Fadil al-Qumari) was born in the Comoros Islands off the East African coast, of Indian Shi'ite parents. His voluminous autobiography, *al-Harb 'ala al-Islam: Qissat Fadil Harun* (The War Against Islam: The Story of Fadil Harun), was self-released and posted online to the jihadi website *Shabakat Ansar al-Mujahidin* on February 26, 2009. See especially pp. 41-49, for the detailed examination of Harun's criticism of those who regard *Qa'idat al-Jihad* as Salafi-Jihadi, Salafi, or especially, *takfiri*.

46. For a more comprehensive analysis and evaluation of Adam Gadahn, see Paul Kamolnick, "When Muslim Defenders Became 'Blood Spilling' Crusaders: Adam Gadahn's Critique of the 'Jihadist' Subversion of Al-Qaeda's Media Warfare Strategy," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Published Online, June 18, 2015, available from [dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1043996](https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1043996); Kamolnick, "Has Adam Gadahn Forsaken the Lawful Jihad for Anti-Americanism?" pp. 36-62.

47. Abdallah, "What is Al-Qaeda?"

48. Hassaan Yusuf, ed., "An Exclusive Interview with Adam Yahye Gadahn."

49. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

50. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29. In the interview, Gadahn gives a quote taken from a letter from bin Laden to al-Wuhayshi, and cites the letter using its official Harmony Document nomenclature "SOCOM-2012-0000016," for the full text of the letter, refer to "Letter to Nasir al-Wuhayshi (English Translation)," SOCOM-2012-0000016, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, available from <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/letter-to-nasir-al-wuhayshi-english-translation-2>. AQAP Emir Nasir al-Wuhayshi was eventually killed by a drone strike in early-June 2015. See Thomas Joscelyn, "AQAP confirms death of senior leader," The Long War Journal, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/06/aqap-confirms-death-of-senior-leader.php, accessed on June 16, 2015.

51. Hassaan Yusuf, ed., "An Exclusive Interview with Adam Yahye Gadahn," pp. 29-30.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

54. *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

56. *Ibid.*

57. *Ibid.*

58. *Ibid.*

59. *Ibid.*, pp. 89-90.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

61. See for examples: Alastair Crooke, "Islamic State: Rough Violence," n.d. (c. June-July 2014), available from www.spokesmanbooks.com/Spokesman/PDF/Crooke125.pdf, accessed on December 17, 2014; "Portsmouth Muslim leaders condemn Islamic State," *BBC News*, October 29, 2014, available from www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-hampshire-29800590, accessed on August 2, 2016; Salam al-Marayati, "Islam's theology of life and ISIS' cult of death," *CNN*, September 5, 2014, available from religion.blogs.cnn.com/2014/09/05/islams-theology-of-life-is-stronger-than-isis-cult-of-death/, accessed on October 30, 2014; "Muslim clerics denounce attacks on Tunisia, Kuwait, France," *Al-Masry Al-Youm Online*, June 26, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on June 29, 2015.

62. The De-Ba'athification policy and the dissolving of the existing security forces were the very first two orders of business under the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). See L. Paul Bremer III, "Iraq Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number One, De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society," Council on Foreign Relations, May 16, 2003, available from www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-coalition-provisional-authority-order-number-one-de-baathification-iraqi-society/p30235, accessed on September 24, 2014; L. Paul Bremer III, "Iraq Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number Two, Dissolution of Entities," Council on Foreign Relations, August 23, 2003, avail-

able from www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-coalition-provisional-authority-order-number-two-dissolution-entities/p30236, accessed on September 24, 2014. For Ahmad Chalabi's role in helping facilitate a policy of revengeful de-Ba'athification, see Adam Roston, *The Man Who Pushed America to War: The Extraordinary Life, Adventures, and Obsessions of Ahmad Chalabi*, New York: Nation Books, 2008, esp. Part IV, pp. 173-275. See also critical commentary following Chalabi's death on November 3, 2015, see Al-Araby al-Jadeed, "Iraq's Ahmad Chalabi, key lobbyist behind 2003 invasion, dies," November 3, 2015, available from www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2015/11/3/iraqs-ahmad-chalabi-key-lobbyist-behind-2003-invasion-dies, accessed on November 3, 2015, where it is asserted:

Following the invasion, Chalabi, a secular Shia, was one of the main proponents of the 'de-Ba'athification' drive to remove alleged Saddam supporters from public life, which alienated Iraq's Sunni Arab minority and fueled the revolt against US-led occupation forces.

See also, Patrick Wintour and Ewen MacAskill, "UK foreign secretary: US decision on Iraqi army led to rise of Isis," *The Guardian*, July 7, 2016, available from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/07/uk-foreign-secretary-us-decision-iraqi-army-rise-isis-philip-hammond>, accessed on July 8, 2016, for additional testimony on the deeply negative results of these CPA policies.

63. For early reports, see Joe Klein, "Saddam's Revenge: The secret history of U.S. mistakes, misjudgments and intelligence failures that let the Iraqi dictator and his allies launch an insurgency now ripping Iraq apart," *Time*, September 26, 2005, pp. 44-52; Michael Ware, with Sally B. Donnelly, "Chasing the Ghosts: With doubts about Iraq growing at home, U.S forces are struggling to put down an elusive and inexhaustible enemy. Michael Ware reports on the state of the counterinsurgency from the front lines of the biggest battle of the year," *Time*, September 26, 2005, pp. 33-40; Fred Kaplan, "Who Disbanded the Iraqi Army? And why was nobody held accountable?" September 7, 2007, available from www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/war_stories/2007/09/who_disbanded_the_iraqi_army.html, accessed on August 3, 2016.

64. See especially Ahmed S. Hashim, *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006, for

an early, incisive, and comprehensive critique of the USG's execution of the post-decapitation phase of the Second Gulf War.

65. Jeffrey Pool, trans., "Zarqawi's Pledge of Allegiance to Al-Qaeda: From *Mu'askar al-Battar*, Issue 21," December 16, 2004, *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 2, Issue 24, pp. 4-6.

66. "Translation of al-Qaeda Statement on February 3, 2014, Acknowledging ISIS Officially Isn't Party of AQ," archived copy available from azelin.files.wordpress.com/2014/02/al-qc481_idah-22on-the-relationship-of-qc481idat-al-jihc481d-and-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-shc481m22-en.pdf.

67. See "Letter from Adam Gadahn (English Translation)," SOCOM 2012-000004, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, available from <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/letter-from-adam-gadahn-english-translation-2>, p. 4.

68. Yusuf, ed., "An Exclusive Interview with Adam Yahiyeh Gadahn," pp. 8-92.

69. Mary Anne Weaver, "The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi," *The Atlantic*, June 8, 2006, www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/07/the-short-violent-life-of-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/304983/, accessed on May 23, 2014.

70. *Ibid.* Weaver reports that, according to his brother-in-law and one of his closest friends, Salah al-Hami, a Jordanian of Palestinian descent:

al-Zarqawi had not been a fighter but had tried his hand at being a journalist. Al-Hami was a correspondent for *Al-Jihad* magazine, which the mujahideen published in Peshawar. But then one day al-Hami stepped on a land mine and lost one of his legs.

71. Joas Wagemakers, *A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi*, Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012; Lav, *Radical Islam and the Revival of Medieval Theology*, pp. 129ff; Thomas Hegghammer and Stéphane Lacroix, "Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia: The Story of Juhayman al-'Utaybi Revisited," *International Journal of Middle*

East Studies, Vol. 39, 2007, pp. 103-122. For an autobiographical account, see "Biography and interview with shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Maqqisi," adapted from *Al-Nida Magazine*, n.d., in *This is our 'Aqidah*, At-Tibyan Publications, pp. 4-19, https://archive.org/stream/ThisIsOuraqidah-AbiMuhammadAl-maqqisi/our_aqeedah_djou.txt, accessed on March 17, 2010. Cited by Steven Brooke, "The Preacher and the Jihadi," in Hillel Fradkin, Husain Haqqani and Eric Brown, eds., *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, Vol. III, Washington DC: Hudson Institute, 2006, in note 1, p. 63, in original Arabic as: "'An Encounter Behind the Apostates' Bars in Jordan: an interview with Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Maqqisi,' *Nida'ul Islam*, conducted in two parts, in the December 1997-January 1998 (#21) and February-March 1998 (#22) issues."

72. See Hegghammer and Lacroix, "Rejectionist Islamism in Saudi Arabia," pp. 103-122; and Wagemakers, "The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State," pp. 93-110. In "Biography and interview with shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Maqqisi," adapted from *Al-Nida Magazine*, p. 4, al-Maqqisi states that he was:

[a]ttracted to the books of Sheikh Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, his students, sons and grandsons, the Imams of the Najdi Da'wa . . . I dedicated myself for quite a long time to the study of these books. These books had a tremendous influence on my direction later on.

73. Joseph Kostiner, "On Instruments and Their Designers: The Ikhwan of Najd and the Emergence of the Saudi State," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 3, July 1985, pp. 298-323; Federal Research Division, U.S. Library of Congress, *Saudi Arabia: a country study*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993, pp. 235-237, available from <https://www.loc.gov/item/93028506/>, accessed on August 4, 2016.

74. See Abu Hashim, "Uncomfortable Contradictions (part 1)"; Madawi al-Rasheed, "Prohibiting Politics."

75. Joas Wagemakers, "A Terrorist Organization that Never Was: the Jordanian 'Bay'at al-Imam' Group," *Middle East Institute*, Vol. 68, No. 1, Winter 2014, pp. 59-75.

76. See Y. Yehoshua, "Dispute in Islamist Circles over the Legitimacy of Attacking Muslims, Shi'ites, and Non-combatant Non-Muslims in Jihad Operations in Iraq: al-Maqqdisi vs. His Disciple al-Zarqawi," The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Inquiry and Analysis Series, Report No. 239, September 11, 2005, available from www.memri.org/report/en/print1473.htm, accessed on May 23, 2014, p. 8; See also, Nibras Kazimi, "A Virulent Ideology in Mutation: Zarqawi Upstages Maqqdisi," *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, Vol. 2, 2005, p. 68 for corroboration of Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir's decisive role in overcoming al-Zarqawi's initial reluctance to target lay-Shia, and also, condone so-called suicide operations. The following discussion is indebted to several sources: Motaz al-Khateeb, "Daesh's Intellectual Origins: From Jurisprudence to Reality," Aljazeera Centre For Studies, January 18, 2015, available from studies.aljazeera.net/en/dossiers/deciphering-daeshoriginsimpactandfuture/2014/12/2014123981882756.html, accessed on May 1, 2015; Hassan Abu Haniyeh, "Daesh's Organisational Structure," Aljazeera Centre For Studies, December 4, 2014, available from studies.aljazeera.net/en/dossiers/decipheringdaeshoriginsimpactandfuture/2014/12/201412395930929444.html, accessed on June 26, 2015; Ali Hashem, "Who holds the real power in IS?," Al-Monitor, February 19, 2015, available from www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/02/islamic-state-sharia-council-power.html; Ziad al-Zaatari, "Takfiri Literature Makes Headway in Lebanon," Al-Akhbar (English), September 11, 2012, available from english.al-akhbar.com/content/takfiri-literature-makes-headway-lebanon, accessed on August 4, 2016. This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition; Mbaye Bashir Lo, "The Rise of the Islamic State and How to Reverse It," November 7, 2014, available from www.smallwarsjournal.com/print/17204, accessed on June 23, 2015; Anonymous, "Abu Mus'ab al Zarqawi under influence," *Alleyesonjihadism* (blog); Yusuf, ed., "An Exclusive Interview with Adam Yahye Gadahn," p. 87; Kazimi, "A Virulent Ideology in Mutation," pp. 59-73.

77. Motaz al-Khateeb, "Daesh's Intellectual Origins: From Jurisprudence to Reality."

78. *Ibid.*; Most unfortunately these lectures have not been translated into English. They appear to be available as audio recordings under the heading, "Introduction to the jurisprudence of jihad." The online purveyors describe them: "This lectures on

Introduction to the jurisprudence of jihad in islam by Sheikh Abu Abdullah Al-Muhajir [sic]. The lecture place is Afghanistan. The number of the lectures is 14." Available in Arabic as audio files, from <https://archive.org/details/FIFTH-SERISE-PRESENTAION-OF-FIQH-EL-JIHAD>, accessed on January 8, 2015.

79. *Ibid.*; See also, Ziad al-Zaatari, "Takfiri Literature Makes Headway in Lebanon"; Mbaye Bashir Lo, "The Rise of the Islamic State and How to Reverse It."

80. Anonymous, "Abu Mus'ab al Zaraqawi under influence: one mentor?" *Alleyesonjihadism*, blog entry, posted May 15, 2012, available from alleyesonjihadism.wordpress.com/2012/05/15/abu-musab-al-zaraqawi, accessed on June 23, 2015. Also, according to the blog, Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir also lectured on plans aiming at the wealth of Western countries.

81. *Ibid.*

82. *Ibid.*

83. See Kazimi, "A Virulent Ideology in Mutation," pp. 59-73.

84. *Ibid.* Its original Arabic citation is referenced at note 47 as: Abu Musa'ab Al-Zaraqawi, "Bayan wa tawdheeh lima athraehu Al-Sheikh Al-Maqdisi fir liqa'ih me'a qanat Aljazeera," n.d., but c. July 8, 2005, since the al-Maqdisi interview was posted July 5, 2005, and al-Zaraqawi's rebuttal was offered a few days afterward.

85. See Weaver, "The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zaraqawi."

86. *Ibid.* Weaver states:

In early 2000, with a dozen or so followers who had arrived from Peshawar and Amman, al-Zaraqawi set out for the western desert encircling Herat. His goal: to build an army that he could export to anywhere in the world. Al-Adel paid monthly visits to al-Zaraqawi's training camp; later, on his Web site, he would write that he was amazed at what he saw there. The number of al-Zaraqawi's fighters multiplied from dozens to hundreds during the following year, and by the time the forces evacuated their camp, prior to the U.S. air strikes of October 2001, the fighters and their families numbered some 2,000 to 3,000. According

to al-Adel, the wives of al-Zarqawi's followers served lavish Levantine cuisine in the camp.

87. *Ibid.*

88. Matthew Levitt, "Zarqawi's Jordanian Agenda," *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 2, No. 24, December 15, 2004, available from www.jamestown.org, accessed on December 15, 2014. Critical details are provided in: The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), "Al-Qaeda Explains Amman Bombings," MEMRI, Special Dispatch No. 1043, December 8, 2005, available from memri.org/bin/opener_latest.cgi?ID=SD104305, accessed on December 8, 2008. Five communiqués are collected here: November 10 (2 communiqués on this date), November 11, November 18, 2005, and April 2004. Though al-Zarqawi claims that the civilian casualties were unintended—the bomb's severity caused a roof to collapse on nearby wedding-goers—the operation is defended, and despite bin Laden's later deep consternation, and lack of any operational role, it was conducted in the name of *Tanzim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn*.

89. Weaver, "The Short Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi," reports that al-Zarqawi's previous reluctance to pledge *bay'ah* to bin Laden in 2000-2001 was based in a different rationale: al-Zarqawi did not support the Afghan Taliban's war against the Northern Alliance, and also "did not believe that either bin Laden or the Taliban was serious enough about jihad."

90. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, "Zarqawi Letter: February 2004 Coalition Provisional Authority English translation of terrorist Musab al Zarqawi letter obtained by United States Government in Iraq," U.S. Department of State Archive, p. 11; available from 2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/31694.htm, accessed on June 21, 2014.

91. *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

92. *Ibid.*

93. See for example: European Council on Foreign Relations, "The Gulf and Sectarianism," November 2013, www.ecfr.eu/page/-?ECFR91_GULF_ANALYSIS_AW.pdf; David Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia*, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2006, ch. 5-6.

94. See Kazimi, "A Virulent Ideology in Mutation," pp. 59-73; Yehoshua, "Dispute in Islamist Circles over the Legitimacy of Attacking Muslims, Shi'ites, and Non-combat Non-Muslims in Jihad Operations in Iraq: Al-Maqdisi vs. His Disciple Al-Zarqawi"; Emily Hunt, "Zarqawi's 'Total War' on Iraqi Shiites Exposes a Divide among Sunni Jihadists," Policy Watch No. 1049, November 15, 2005, www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis; Bernard Haykel, "Jihadis and the Shi'a," in Assaf Moghadam and Brian Fishman, eds., *Self-Inflicted Wounds: Debates and Divisions within Al-Qa'ida and Its Periphery*, West Point, NY: Harmony Project, Combating Terrorism Center, December 16, 2010, pp. 202-223, available from <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/self-inflicted-wounds>; Al-Hayat, "Rift grows between Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS," Al-Monitor, November 15, 2013, www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2013/11/isis-jabhat-nusra-rift-syria-jordan-1.html; Nelly Lahoud, *The Jihadis' Path to Self-Destruction*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2010, ch. 5.

95. See Dwight Raymond, Cliff Bernath, Don Braum, and Ken Zurcher, *Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Options (MAPRO): A Policy Planning Handbook*, Carlisle, PA: Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2012, esp. pp. 8-16; Gregory H. Stanton, "The 8 Stages of Genocide," (orig. 1996/1998), www.genocidewatch.org/images/8stagesBriefingpaper.pdf.

96. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, "Zarqawi Letter," pp. 2-6, 9-12; For further reading on this topic see also, Aaron Y. Zelin, "The Vocabulary of Sectarianism," *Foreign Policy*, January 29, 2014, available from foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/29/the-vocabulary-of-sectarianism/, accessed on August 4, 2016; Fanar Haddad, "The language of anti-Shiism," *Foreign Policy*, August 9, 2013, available from foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/09/the-language-of-anti-shiism/, accessed on August 4, 2016; Ibrahim Kalin, "Sectarianism: A Recipe for Disaster for Sunnis and Shiites," June 17, 2014, available from www.dailysabah.com/columns/ibrahim-kalin/2014/06/17/sectarianism-a-recipe-for-disaster-for-sunnis-and-shiites, accessed on August 4, 2016.

97. Pool, "Zarqawi's Pledge of Allegiance to Al-Qaeda," pp. 4-6.

98. *Ibid.*

99. *Ibid.*

100. For a prescient, brief analysis of “Zarqawism” and “bin Ladinism” as two distinct species, immediately following al-Zarqawi’s death on June 8, 2006, see Mawassi Lahcen, “Moroccan Islamist leader says religious scholars must eliminate ‘Zarqawism’,” *Magharebia*, June 11, 2006.

101. For a highly incisive analysis of Zarqawism’s likely social-psychological core, see David Frankfurter, “The Construction of Evil and the Violence of Purification,” in Mark Juergensmeyer, Margo Kitts, and Michael Jerryson, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Violence*, Oxford, UK and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 521-531.

102. See “Al-Qa’ida in Iraq Situation Report (English Translation),” IZ-060316-01, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, available from www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/al-qaida-in-iraq-situation-report-english-translation, accessed on May 21, 2013. This document is also discussed in Brian Fishman, “After Zarqawi: The Dilemmas and Future of Al Qaeda in Iraq,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2006, p. 32, n. 14. This anonymous, undated letter is described by translators as “a letter updating a high member in AQI’s council on events in Anbar province.” It is, however, clearly addressed to “My Sheikh” [al-Zarqawi] and focuses on two subjects: questioning whether targeting the Shia at this moment is prudent, and documenting the brutal, merciless assassination campaign then underway to target Sunni leaders that have turned on al-Zarqawi’s organization and joined the political process. This letter must be read to fully understand how the behind-the-scenes liquidation campaign was inaugurated well before its recent reincarnation in the ISO.

103. Major Niel Smith, U.S. Army, and Colonel Sean MacFarland, U.S. Army, “Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point,” *Military Review*, March-April 2008, pp. 41-52.

104. The Middle East Media Research Institute, “Al-Zarqawi’s Message to the Fighters of Jihad in Iraq on September 11, 2004,” transcript of a speech by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 785, September 15, 2004, available from www.memri.org/report/en/print1219.htm, accessed on December 17, 2014.

Another example is provided in a section of al-Zarqawi's *bay'ah* to bin Laden (see Pool, "Zarqawi's Pledge of Allegiance to Al-Qaeda," pp. 4-6), where he cites the apocalyptic and eschatological tradition of the final reign of four kingdoms, the final one restoring the Caliphate:

Prophethood will remain with you for as long as God wills it to remain, then God will raise it up wherever He wills to raise it up. Afterward, there will be a caliphate that follows the guidance of Prophethood remaining with you for as long as God wills it to remain. Then, He will raise it up whenever He wills to raise it up. Afterward, there will be a reign of violently oppressive rule [unjust Muslim kings] and it will remain as long as God wills it. Then, there will be a reign of tyrannical rule and it will remain for as long as God wills it to remain. Then God will raise it up whenever He wills to raise it up. Finally there will be a caliphate that follows the guidance of Prophethood.

105. For one of the few scholarly accounts of al-Zarqawi's apocalypticism, see David Cook, "Abu Mus'ab al-Suri and Abu-Musa'b al-Zarqawi: The Apocalyptic Theorist and the Apocalyptic Practitioner," Unpublished Manuscript, 2007, esp. pp. 9-14.

106. See Fishman, "After Zarqawi," pp. 21-23, for an incisive analysis of this theme in al-Zarqawi's own sojourn.

107. See The Middle East Media Research Institute, "New Video by Al-Qaeda Commander in Iraq Abu Mus'ab Al-Zarqawi," MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 1149, April 26, 2006, available from www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/1671.htm, accessed on December 17, 2014. The video was originally posted to an Islamist web forum on April 25, 2006.

108. See The Middle East Media Research Institute, "Islamist Websites Monitor No. 8," MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 1324, October 17, 2006, available from www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/1910.htm, accessed on August 4, 2016. The dispatch reports that: "The Shura Council of the Jihad Fighters in Iraq Announces the Establishment of an Islamic State. . . . On October 15, 2006."

109. "A Full Text of the Proclamation of the ISI Has Been Published," October 16, 2006, available from www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2006/10/16/5985, accessed on December 12, 2014.

Despite its grammatical challenges, the phraseology used in the English translation by these Uzbek translators is maintained where possible with very slight alteration indicated in brackets, and where it seemed necessary and advisable, though with no change in sense.

110. *Ibid.*

111. Nibras Kazimi, "Al-Muhajir's Evil Presence," *The New York Sun*, November 20, 2006, available from www.nysun.com/opinion/al-muhajirs-evil-presence/43815/, accessed on August 18, 2014.

112. See "Letter of Advice to UBL (English Translation)," SOCOM-2012-0000018, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, available from <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/letter-of-advice-to-ubl-english-translation-2>, p. 8.

113. See Pieter Van Ostaeeyen, "Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri – Testimonial to Preserve the Blood of Mujahideen in as-Sham," pietervanostaeyen, blog entry, posted May 3, 2014, available from pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2014/05/03/dr-ayman-az-zawahiri-testimonial-to-preserve-the-blood-of-mujahideen-in-as-sham/, accessed on May 5, 2015; Pieter Van Ostaeeyen, "Jabhat an-Nusra reacts on ISIS spokesman al-'Adnāni (Part I) – Abū Sulaymān al-Muhājir," pietervanostaeyen, original statement published March 18, 2014, blog entry, posted March 27, 2014, available from pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2014/03/27/jabhat-an-nusra-reacts-on-isis-spokesman-al-adnani-part-i/, accessed on December 8, 2014.

114. Asharq Aawsat, "Who was the real Abu Omar al-Baghdadi," April 20, 2010, available from english.aawsat.com/2010/04/article55251030/who-was-the-real-abu-omar-al-baghdadi, accessed on October 13, 2015.

115. They are available in the original Arabic, in Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi (audio addresses, 2006-2010, collected and transcribed in), *al-Majmu li-qadat Dawlat al-'Iraq al-Islamiyya Nukhba al-l'am al-Jihadi*, 2010, available from archive.org/download/Dwla_Nokhba/mjdawl.doc; See Cole Bunzel, "From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State," The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic

World, Analysis Paper No. 19, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, March 2015, available from <https://www.brookings.edu/research/from-paper-state-to-caliphate-the-ideology-of-the-islamic-state/>, accessed on August 4, 2016. Bunzel provides a listing of “Some of our Fundamentals” from Abu Umar al-Baghdādī, and cites the original from March 13, 2007 as “*Qul innī ‘alā bayyina min Rabbī,*” *Mu’assasat al-Furqān*, which was transcribed in *al-Majmū ‘li-qādat Dawlat al-‘Irāq al-Islāmiyya*, in 2010 (pp. 38-41). Bunzel’s paper notes: “The 38 speeches of the group’s first two senior leaders, Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi and Abū Hamza al-Mujāhir . . . run to nearly 17 hours of audio and occupy more than 200 pages transcribed” (p. 4 footnote 3). The present author is indebted to those whose labors have made some of these available in English translation, in particular Nibras Kazimi, Cole Bunzel, and William McCants. Their efforts are duly noted when referenced in the following discussion.

116. See Bunzel, “From Paper State to Caliphate,” pp. 38-41; See also, Nibras Kazimi, “Al-Baghdadi’s Third-Speech—Sounding Worried,” March 14, 2007, available from talismangate.blogspot.com/2007/03/al-baghdadis-third-speech-sounding.html, accessed on October 13, 2014.

117. Kazimi, *Ibid.*

118. Kazimi, *Ibid.*

119. Kazimi, *Ibid.*

120. Kazimi, *Ibid.* Kazimi provides important insight into the meaning of this ruling:

the position of such non-Muslims within the expanding Islamic empire was codified under the second caliph, Omar. [Abu Omar] Al-Baghdadi is claiming that whatever protections and exceptions that Islam had extended to Dhimmis are void and no longer valid, and that the previous agreement with the Caliph Omar must be renegotiated; this sounds like a determination that only a caliph can make but maybe al-Baghdadi sees himself in such a role already.

Kazimi’s last point is doubtful, however, since the speech is signed “Your brother, Abu Omar al-Husseini al-Qurayshi al-Baghdadi,”

and not your Caliph, or even emir, since its likely audience went well beyond his immediate environs.

121. See Lav, *Radical Islam and the Revival of Medieval Theology*, for the single best volume this author has encountered of the theological and ‘theopolitical’ foundations and implications of this debate. The issue to which Abu Omar refers is the question of what qualifies as faith (*Iman*), whether faith is something that is or is not, or varies in its quantity/quality; what qualifies as infidelity (*Kufr*); and what must be taken into account to fully determine another’s potential *Kufr*. He refers to the two extremes, which all proponents of the *Ahl-us-Sunnah wa’al Gama’at* proclaim represent the extremes of excess (*Khawarij*) and of negligence (or *irja*) captured in the epithet *Murji’ites*.

122. Kazimi, “Al-Baghdadi’s Third-Speech—Sounding Worried.”

123. William McCants, *The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State*, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015, esp. ch. 5, “Sectarian Apocalypse,” pp. 99-119.

124. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

125. *Ibid.*, esp. pp. 99-119.

126. *Ibid.*, p. 142. See also, Brian Fishman, “The First Defector: Abu Sulayman al-Utaybi, the Islamic State, and *al-Qa’ida*,” *CTC Sentinel*, October 2015, available from www.ctc.usma.edu, accessed on October 23, 2015.

127. Bill Roggio, “US and Iraqi forces kill Al Masri and Baghdadi, al Qaeda in Iraq’s top two leaders,” *The Long War Journal*, April 19, 2010, available in www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/04/al_qaeda_in_iraqs_to.php, accessed on August 4, 2016; Nibras Kazimi, “And so ends the saga of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi . . .,” blog entry, posted April 19, 2010, available from talismangate.blogspot.com/2010/04/and-so-ends-saga-of-abu-omar-al.html, accessed on August 15, 2014; Nibras Kazimi, “CONFIRMED: It WAS al-Baghdadi and al-Muhajir,” blog entry, posted April 24, 2010, available from talismangate.blogspot.com/2010/04/confirmed-it-was-al-baghdadi-and-al.html, accessed on August 15, 2014.

128. Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, "Eulogy for the Two Commanders: Emir of the Believers Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Minister of War Abu Hamza al-Mujhahir, May Allah Have Mercy on Them," May 24, 2010, available from triceratops.bynmawr.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10066/8488/ZAW20100524.pdf?sequence=3, accessed on December 5, 2014. (A 26-minute, 49-second, video produced by *as-Sahab*.)

129. See Jessica D. Lewis, *Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent: The Breaking the Walls Campaign, Part 1*, Middle East Security Report 14, Washington, DC, Institute for the Study of War, September 2013, available from www.understandingwar.org, accessed on November 8, 2013; Jessica D. Lewis, "AQI's 'Soldiers' Harvest' Campaign," Backgrounder, Washington, DC, Institute for the Study of War, October 9, 2013, available from www.understandingwar.org, accessed on November 8, 2013; Jessica D. Lewis, *Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent, Part II*, Middle East Security Report 15, Washington, DC, Institute for the Study of War, October 2013, available from www.understandingwar.org, accessed on November 8, 2013.

130. Martin Chulov, "Isis: the inside story," *The Guardian*, December 11, 2014, available from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/sp-isis-the-inside-story>, accessed on April 28, 2015.

131. Nibras Kazimi, "Would-Be Caliph's Inaugural Address to the Islamic 'Ummah'," December 23, 2006, available from talismangate.blogspot.no/2006/12/would-be-caliphs-inaugural-address-to.html, accessed on August 18, 2014.

132. Bunzel, "From Paper State to Caliphate," p. 17, claims the ISI actually equivocated in its use of titles. The most restrictive is that cited earlier, the "Islamic State of Iraq," others were more expansive in implication, for example: "the Islamic State in Iraq" (*al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi l-'Iraq*), or simply "the Islamic State" (*al-Dawla al-Islamiyya*).

133. Amir al-Muminin Abu Bakr al-Hussaini al-Quraishi al-Baghdadi, "The Declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham," April 7, 2013, archived copy available from azelin.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/shaykh-abc5ab-bakr-al-e1b8a5ussaync4ab-al-qurayshc4ab-al-baghdhc48ldc4ab-e2809cannouncment-of-the-islamic

state-of-iraq-and-al-shc48lm22-en.pdf, accessed on December 3, 2014. (A 21-minute audio uploaded late Monday evening April 7, 2013.)

134. Alah Yuhasin, "US general rebrands Isis 'Daesh' after requests from regional partners: Leader of operations against group uses alternative name—a pejorative in Arab that rejects fighters' claims on Islam," *The Guardian*, December 19, 2014, available from www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/19/us-general-rebrands-isis, accessed on December 28, 2014; Pieter Van Ostaeyen, "On the Origin of the 'Name' DAESH—The Islamic State in Iraq and as-Sham," *pietervanostaeyen*, blog entry, posted February 18, 2014, available from pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2014/02/18/, accessed on December 28, 2014.

135. Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Emir of Qa'idat al-Jihad, "Translation of al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri's letter to the leaders of the two Jihadi groups," May 23, 2013, available from s3.documentcloud/documents/710588/translation-of-al-zawahiris-letter.pdf, accessed on December 1, 2014.

136. Amir ul-Mu'minin Abu Bakr Al-Husayni Al-Qurashi al-Baghdadi, "A Message to the Mujahidin and the Muslim *Ummah* in the Month of Ramadan," July 2, 2014, available from triceratops.brynmawr.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/10066/14241/ABB20140701.pdf?sequence=1, accessed on July 3, 2014. According to Hisham al-Hashimi, the timing of this announcement was driven by other leadership elements, overriding Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's hesitance:

Four men declared him caliph—Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, Abu Ibrahim al-Masry, Turki al-Binali and Abu Suleiman al-Otaibi [Utaybi]—before his [Utaybi's] defection. . . . They convinced him to take this step fearing that Zawahiri might precede them; [and that] such a declaration attracts new recruits and donations.

See Hisham al-Hashimi, as quoted in Ali Hashem, "The many names of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi," *Al-Monitor*, March 23, 2015, available from www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/03/isis-baghdadi-islamic-state-caliph-many-names-al-qaeda.html, accessed on March 24, 2015.

137. Hashem, "The many names of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi."

138. Unless otherwise indicated, the following sources have been used to create the composite portrait of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi: McCants, *The ISIS Apocalypse*; William McCants, "The Believer: How an Introvert became the leader of the Islamic State," September 1, 2015, available from www.brookings.edu/research/essays/2015/thebeliever, accessed on September 10, 2015; William McCants, "Baghdadi's Family Tree," Jihadica, blog entry, posted September 9, 2015, available from www.jihadica.com/baghdadis-family-tree/, accessed on September 10, 2015; William McCants, "Don't (Completely) Blame America for Baghdadi," September 13, 2015, available from www.lawfareblog.com/dont-completely-blame-america-baghdadi, accessed on September 15, 2015; Octavian Manea, "Deconstructing ISIS," Interview with William McCants on *The ISIS Apocalypse*, September 24, 2015, available from smallwarsjournal.com/print/30741, accessed on September 25, 2015; Hashem, "The many names of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi"; Pieter Van Ostaeyen, "Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi – A Short Biography of the ISIS Sheikh," pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2013/07/15/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-a-short-biography/, accessed on September 22, 2014 (hagiography, but key data furnished); Abdel Bari Atwan, *Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate*, Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2015, pp. 110-121; Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, *ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror*, New York: Regan Arts, ch. 8; Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger, *ISIS: The State of Terror*, New York: Harper Collins, pp. 33-39.

139. To maintain chronology I will use the given name most appropriate to each phase of his life. For example, he begins as "Ibrahim bin Awwad" (Ibrahim, son of Awwad).

140. McCants, "The Believer."

141. *Ibid.*

142. Weiss and Hassan, *ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror*, p. 117.

143. McCants, "The Believer."

144. *Ibid.*; see also, McCants, *The ISIS Apocalypse*, pp. 74-75.

145. A coinage I owe to Lav's truly excellent book, *Radical Islam and the Revival of Medieval Theology*.

146. McCants, "The Believer."

147. McCants, *The ISIS Apocalypse*, p. 75.

148. Hashem, "The many names of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi."

149. McCants, "The Believer."

150. Weiss and Hassan, *ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror*, pp. 118-119.

151. McCants, "The Believer."

152 . McCants, *The ISIS Apocalypse*, pp. 75-76; Weiss and Hassan, *ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror*, pp. 116-117.

153 . McCants, "Don't (Completely) Blame America for Baghdadi."

154 . McCants, "The Believer."

155 . Bill Roggio, "Al Qaeda in Iraq is 'broken,' cut off from leadership in Pakistan, says top US general," *The Long War Journal*, June 5, 2010, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/06/al_qaeda_in_iraq_is-3.php, accessed on July 27, 2016. Presciently, that top U.S. general, Odierno, would claim at the time that AQI:

will attempt to regenerate. . . . I would just say that they will, obviously, attempt to reconstitute. . . . The issue is, though, they've lost a lot of top leadership very quickly, and so they're going to have to develop some new leadership. . . . They want complete failure of the government of Iraq. . . . They want to establish the caliphate in Iraq.

Odierno indicates that major intelligence breaks occurred as a result of U.S. operations in early-2008 in northern Iraq, and also in early-2010 in Mosul. According to Roggio, these latter raids "targeted al Qaeda's leadership, finance, and extortion cells in

the Mosul region [and] proved crucial to denuding the terror network's top commanders." Roggio lists the following top leaders who were killed or captured between January 5, 2010, and May 3, 2010:

- Mahmoud Suleiman, top Anbar province military commander (captured);
- Ahmad Ali Abbas Dahir al Ubayd, top military commander for northern Iraq (killed);
- Emir of Mosul, and the emir of eastern Mosul (detained);
- Bashar Khalaf Husyan Ali al Juburi, emir of Mosul (killed);
- Abu Ahmad al Afri, overall economic security emir (killed);
- Khalid Muhammad Hasan Shallub al Juburi, top emir in northern Iraq (killed);
- Manaf Abdulrehim al Rawi, emir for Baghdad (captured);
- Abu Khalaf, most senior foreign fighter facilitator (killed);
- Ali Hussein Alwan al Azawi, responsible for first major suicide attack in Baghdad, summer 2003 (detained); and,
- Abu Na'im al Afri, leader in northern Iraq operations (killed).

156. For Haji Bakr's significant role in reconstituting the ISI along professional military, military intelligence, and Ba'athist police-state lines, see Christoph Reuter, "The Terror Strategist: Secret Files Reveal Structure of Islamic State," April 18, 2015, available from www.spiegel.de/international/world/islamic-state-files-show-structure-of-islamist-terror-group-a-1029274.html, accessed on April 20, 2015; Kevin Drum, "New Document Cache Shows the Real Roots of ISIS are as Much Secular as Religious," April 21, 2015, available from www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2015/04/new-document-cache-shows-real-roots-isis-are-much-secular-religious, accessed on April 24, 2015; Ben Macintyre, "Isis Owes More to the Kremlin than the Koran," April 24, 2015, available from www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/columnists/article4420853.ece, accessed on April 24, 2015; Denise Natali, "The Islamic State's Baathist Roots," *Al-Monitor*, April 24, 2015, available from www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/04/baathists-behind-the-islamic-state.html, accessed on April 27, 2015; Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, "Islamic State: The Myth of a Baathist 'Hidden Hand'," *IHS Jane's Terrorism and Insurgency Monitor*, June 2015, available from www.meforum.org/5312/isis-baathist-hidden-hand, accessed on August 19, 2015. (Al-Tamimi sent the present author the previous article since it was not available

online previously.) Samia Nakhoul, "Saddam's former army is secret of Baghdadi's success," Reuters, June 16, 2015, available from www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-baghdadi-insight-idUSKBN0OW1VN20150616, accessed on August 5, 2016; Liz Sly, "The hidden hand behind the Islamic State militants? Saddam Hussein's," *The Washington Post*, April 4, 2015, available in https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/the-hidden-hand-behind-the-islamic-state-militants-saddam-husseins/2015/04/04/aa97676c-cc32-11e4-8730-4f473416e759_story.html, accessed on August 5, 2016.

For invaluable insider information on Haji Bakr (birth name, Samid Abd Muhammad al-Khlifawi), likely provided by a defector or dissenter, but providing deeply revealing facts on the internal history and personal relations among key ISI figures, see Yousef Bin Tashfin (Twitter name: @abounour2006), "English Translation of @Wikibaghdaddy," [n.d.] available from <https://justpaste.it/e90q>, accessed on September 23, 2014. Yousef provided an English translation of all collected tweets for the following days: December 14-15, 17-18, 20, 24, 27, and 29-31, 2014; January 1, 5, 8, 12, 19, and 24, 2015; Jacob Siegel, "Someone is Spilling ISIS's Secrets on Twitter," *The Daily Beast*, June 18, 2014, available from www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/18/someone-is-spilling-isis-secrets-on-twitter.html, accessed on September 23, 2014. Siegel's article covers the June 13, 2014 tweets; Quilliam Foundation, "Quilliam Exclusive—Alleged Leaks from Islamic State Reveal International Network of Bribery," blog entry, posted November 14, 2014, available from www.quilliamfoundation.org/blog/quilliam-exclusive-alleged-leaks-from-islamic-state-reveal-international-network-of-bribery/, accessed on November 14, 2014. This post covers a November 13, 2014 leak on Twitter; For a commentary on the leaker and its significance, see Matthew Barber, "New ISIS Leaks Reveal Particulars of al-Qaida Strategy," *Syria Comment*, January 12, 2014, available from www.joshualandis.com/blog/new-isis-leaks-reveal-particulars-of-al-qaida-strategy/, accessed on September 22, 2014. This includes extensive extracts from the original tweets of December 10, 14, 15, and 17-18, 2014, along with commentary; Radwan Mortada, "Al-Qaeda Leaks: Baghdadi and Golani Fight over the Levant Emirate," *Al-Akhbar* (English), January 10, 2014, available from english.al-akhbar.com/content/al-qaeda-leaks-baghdadi-and-golani-fight-over-levant-emirate/, accessed on September 23, 2014; this article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition; Radwan Mortada, "Al-Qaeda Leaks II: Baghdadi Loses His Shadow," *Al-Akhbar* (English), January 14, 2014, available from english.al-akhbar.com/node/18219, accessed on September 23, 2014; this

article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition; Mshari al-Zaydi, "Opinion: The Haji Bakr files," *Asharq Al-Awsat* (English), January 29, 2014, available from www.aawsat.net/2014/01/article55328174/opinion-the-haji-bakr-files-2, accessed on October 9, 2014; Truls Hallberg Tonnessen, "Heirs of Zarqawi or Saddam? The Relationship Between al-Qaida in Iraq and the Islamic State," *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. 9, No. 4, August 2015, pp. 48-61.

Kyle Orton authored three important essays that counsel caution regarding the extreme position being advanced on the basis of the Haji Bakr files confirming a deeply influential role for former Ba'athists in leadership positions. His key point is that while that is true, they have not been ideological Ba'athists for a long time, and are committed to ISO on theological and religious grounds, though their military and intelligence bona fides have transformed ISO into a formidable terrorist army. See Kyle Orton, "Saddam's Former Loyalists are Leading ISIS—as True Believers," *National Review*, July 20, 2015, available from www.nationalreview.com/node/421370/print, accessed on September 18, 2015; Kyle Orton, "A Response to Criticism: Why the Ex-Saddamists in the Islamic State Matter," *The Syrian Intifada*, blog entry, posted August 10, 2015, available from <https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2015/08/10/a-response-to-criticism-why-the-ex-saddamists-in-the-islamic-state-matter/>, accessed on September 18, 2015; Kyle Orton, "How Saddam Hussein Gave Us ISIS," *The New York Times*, December 23, 2015, available from www.nytimes.com/2015/12/23/opinion/how-saddam-hussein-gave-us-isis.html?ref=opinion&_r0, accessed on December 23, 2015. His essential thesis is the following:

After long neglect, the media has finally recognized the role of the FREs—former (Saddam) regime elements—within the Islamic State (ISIS). But the pendulum has now swung too far: Some reports are now claiming that the FREs have transformed the leader of the terror army, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, into nothing more than a front man for the Baathists. These suppositions are mistaken. Most FREs within ISIS have not been ideologically Baathists for a long time. . . . [T]he ISIS-as-front-for-Ba'athists storyline has a very serious timeline problem. One of the infamous FREs within ISIS was Haji Bakr (real name: Samir Abd Muhammad al-Khelifawi), a former colonel in Saddam's army, who masterminded ISIS's expansion into Syria; he was killed by Syrian rebels when they rose against ISIS in January 2014. What is noteworthy is that al-Khelifawi had joined ISIS in 2003 when it was a foreign-led organization with al-Zarqawi—the

patron saint of the *takfiriyeen* (those who regard only Salafipurists as Muslims)—as its emir. A ‘socialist infidel’—as ISIS refers to Ba’athists—was not going to pass muster in ISIS at that time. Abu Abdulrahman al-Bilawi (real name: Adnan Ismail Najem al-Bilawi), a former captain in Saddam’s army and until his death in June 2014 the head of ISIS’s military council (believed to be the most important ISIS military institution), also joined ISIS in 2003. Abu Ali al-Anbari, the overseer of ISIS-held territory in Syria, joined ISIS in 2003 as well. It’s no surprise that al-Khlifawi, al-Bilawi, and al-Anbari were already Islamic militants in 2003. From the mid-1980s, and with added intensity after the formal onset of Saddam’s ‘Faith Campaign’ in June 1993, Saddam’s regime Islamized. This was ‘most likely a cynical step’ on the part of Saddam, wrote Amatzia Baram, an expert on Iraqi Islam with the University of Haifa, but it gave Iraq “an extra push in the direction of an authentic Islamization process.” In other words, it took on a life of its own. . . . The FREs [Former Regime Elements] matter because they highlight the hybrid nature of ISIS—its fusion of elements of Ba’athists with Salafism—and also how difficult ISIS will be defeat. The FREs are the products of a military-intelligence service trained by the KGB [former, Soviet Secret Police]. They have brought to ISIS unique military and counterintelligence skills, directly in battle and in propaganda. Their skills are aiding ISIS’s military effort, bringing in fanatical foreigners to use as shock troops, and helping ISIS restructure the identities of local populations who have joined ISIS only out of necessity or convenience (as a means to restore order or against Iran’s proxies, for example).

157. McCants, *The ISIS Apocalypse*, p. 79.

158. Hassan Abu Haniyeh, “Daesh’s Organizational Structure.”

159. *Ibid.*

160. For the transformative military relevance of this ISO professional military and security cadre, see Ben Hubbard and Eric Schmitt, “Military Skill and Terrorist Technique Fuel Success of ISIS,” *The New York Times*, August 27, 2014, available from www.nytimes.com/2014/08/28/world/middleeast/army-know-how-seen-as-factor-in-isis-successes.html?_r=0; Alex Bilger, “ISIS Annual Reports Reveal Metrics-Driven Military Command,” Backgrounder, Washington, DC, Institute for the Study of War, May 22, 2014, available from www.understandingwar.org, accessed on June 2,

2014; As-Safir, "ISIS gains from Iraqi military defectors," Al-Monitor, June 11, 2014, available from www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/06/iraq-isis-control-expansion-experience.html, accessed on June 12, 2014.

161. For detailed background on IS leadership, see Staff Writer, Al Arabiya News, "Exclusive: Top ISIS leaders revealed," Al Arabiya (English), February 13, 2014, available from english.alarabiya.net/en/News/2014/02/13/Exclusive-Top-ISIS-leaders-revealed.html, accessed on April 29, 2015; Charles Lister, "Islamic State Senior Leadership: Who's Who," c. November 2014, available from https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/en_whos_who.pdf, accessed on January 12, 2015; Ruth Sherlock, "Inside the leadership of Islamic State: how the new 'caliphate' is run," *The Telegraph*, July 9, 2014, available from www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10956280/Inside-the-leadership-of-Islamic-State-how-the-new-caliphate-is-run.html, accessed on August 5, 2016.

162. McCants, "Baghdadi's Family Tree."

163. McCants, *The ISIS Apocalypse*, pp. 78-79. Soon after bin Laden's death, ISI publicly affirmed its continuing support for AQO under its new Emir al-Zawahiri. See Rania El Gamal, rpt., Myra MacDonald, ed., "Iraq's Qaeda pledges support for Zawahiri, vows attacks," Reuters, May 9, 2011, available from www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-qaeda-zawahiri-idUSTRE74835A20110509, accessed on December 15, 2015. However, the actual renewal of a formal *bay'ah* from Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to al-Zawahiri remained secret. See Van Ostaeyen, "Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri – Testimonial to Preserve the Blood of Mujahideen in as-Sham"; see also, Van Ostaeyen, "Jabhat an-Nusra reacts on ISIS spokesman al-'Adnānī (Part I) – Abū Sulaymān al-Muhājir."

Al-Zawahiri amplifies this assertion in a more recent communique. In it he claims to quote verbatim from an October 23, 2012 letter he received from al-Baghdadi:

we are a part of you, and we are from you and for you, and we owe it to Allah that you are the caretakers of our affairs and you have upon us the right of listening and obeying as long as we live. . . . Your advice and reminding us what is right upon us, and your commands are obligatory upon us, but the issues

may sometimes require some clarification due to us living the reality of the events in our field. Therefore, we hope that your heart would widen to hear our viewpoint, but the matter after that is for you, and we are nothing but arrows in your quiver.

See Thomas Joscelyn, "Zawahiri again addresses jihadist infighting in Syria," *The Long War Journal*, May 25, 2014, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/05/zawahiri_addresses_j.php, accessed on May 27, 2014. Though AQO had strategically and organizationally sound reasons, i.e., plausible deniability, for hiding this formal *bay'ah*, this would deeply complicate al-Zawahiri's task of later putting down the ISO rebellion. The ISI spokesman al-Adnani later forcefully denied that ISO, indeed ISI itself, had at any time been formally subordinate to AQO; see especially, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, trans. by Musa Cerantonio, "Apologies, Amir of al-Qaidah," Speech by Shaykh Abu Muhammad al Adnani ash-Shaami, available from archive.org/stream/ApologiesOhAmir/Apologies%20Oh%20Amir_djvu.txt, accessed on December 1, 2014.

164. Salvific jihadism and martyrology, to which we shall later turn, is one way to attempt to avoid these travails since the true Mujahid (fighter on Allah's path), it is hoped, will be immediately evacuated to Paradise and not only enjoy its magnificence in proximity to Allah and its promised fruits, but also to intervene on behalf of loved ones to increase their odds of attaining the same.

165. For AQO, the following AQO-affiliated English-language online publications were analyzed (as of October 15, 2015): [1] *Inspire*, *Qa'idat al-Jihad* in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Issues, 1-14, Summer 2010 to Summer 2015. Archived copies of all issues of *Inspire* are available from jihadology.net/category/inspire-magazine/, accessed on September 24, 2015; [2] *Resurgence*, *Qa'idat al-Jihad* in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) Issues 1-2, Fall 2014 to Summer 2015. See *Resurgence*, Iss. 1, Fall 2014, available from azelin.files.wordpress.com/2015/04/resurgence-1.pdf, accessed on May 5, 2015; *Resurgence*, Iss. 2, Summer 2015, available from pietervanostaeyen.files.wordpress.com/2015/06/resurgence-special-issue_summer-2015.pdf, accessed on June 29, 2015; [3] *Al-Risalah* (The Letter) Issue 1, July 2015. See *Al Risalah*, Iss. 1, July 2015, available from <https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2015/07/05/magazine-by-the-mujahideen-of->

shaam-al-risalah-issue-1/, accessed on July 8, 2015. *Al Risalah* is produced by AQO's Syrian affiliate, Nusrah Front (*Jabhat al-Nusrah li-ahl al-Sham min Mujahidi al-Sham fi Sahat al-Jihad* [Protection Front for the People of the Levant by the Mujahadin of the Levant in the Battlefields of Jihad]; hereafter, *Jabhat al-Nusrah*).

166. Abu Saleh, "Insightful Opinions from the Frontlines: Just a Thought: How Can They Handle It," *Dabiq*, Iss.13, January 19, 2016 [1437 Rabi' Al-Akhir], p. 48.

167. Shaykh Muhammad bin Mahmud al Bahteeti (aka: Abu Dujana al Pasha), "The Land of the Prophets Awaits You," *Resurgence*, Iss. 1, Fall 2014, p. 39. Note: the more common English spelling of this author's name is Muhammad bin Mahmoud Rabie al-Bahtiyti (aka: Abu Dujana al-Basha), this book uses the spelling provided in the referenced *Resurgence* issue.

168. Background on Dujana is found in Thomas Joscelyn, "Al Qaeda official warns against Islamic State in new speech," *The Long War Journal*, September 27, 2014, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/09/a_senior_al_qaeda_of.php, accessed on October 15, 2015. Abu Dujana is Ayman al-Zawahiri's son-in-law, and was a long-time Egyptian Islamic Jihad member, who has closed ranks with AQO against the ISO's claim to the Caliphate, extremism in *takfir* in the Syrian theater, and violation of what he deems essential Sharia regulations pertaining to intra-Muslim disputes.

169. *Al-Risalah*, Iss. 1, July 2015; *Al-Risalah*, Iss. 2, October 2015, archived copy available from <https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2015/10/26/magazine-by-the-mujahideen-of-shaam-al-risalah-issue-2/>, accessed on October 26, 2015.

170. An English version of all the listed issues, 1-14 of *Dabiq*, is available from www.clarionproject.org/news/islamic-state-isis-isis-propaganda-magazine-dabiq#, accessed on August 11, 2016. Specific issues and dates are as follows: *Dabiq*, Iss. 1, July 5, 2014 [Ramadan 1435]; *Dabiq*, Iss. 2, July 28, 2014 [Ramadan 1435]; *Dabiq*, Iss. 3, August 2014 [Shawwal 1435]; *Dabiq*, Iss. 4, c. September/October 2014 [Dhul-Hijjah 1435]; *Dabiq*, Iss. 5, November 22, 2014 [Muharram 1436]; *Dabiq*, Iss. 6, c. December/January 2015 [Rabi' al-Awwal 1436]; *Dabiq*, Iss. 7, February 12, 2015 [Rabi' al-Akhir

1436]; *Dabiq*, Iss. 8, c. March 2015 [Jumada al-Akhirah 1436]; *Dabiq*, Iss. 9, c. May 2015 [1436 Sha'ban]; *Dabiq*, Iss. 10, c. July 2015 [1436 Ramadan]; *Dabiq*, Iss. 11, September 9, 2015 [1436 Dul-Qa'dah]; *Dabiq*, Iss. 12, November 2015 [1437 Safar]; *Dabiq*, Iss. 13, January 19, 2016 [1437 Rabi' Al-Akhir]; *Dabiq*, Iss. 14, April 2016 [1437 Rajab]. Hereafter all citations to *Dabiq* articles or graphics refer only to issue number without the publication date. To this author's knowledge while AQO dedicates extensive attention in its various online publications *Inspire*, *Resurgence*, and *Al-Risala* to the superlative value of jihadist martyrology (as does Azzam and the ISO), apocalypticism and eschatology are virtually non-existent. Their predominantly inspirational, agitational, and exemplary role in strategic communication will be taken up in Chapter 2 of this book on strategy.

171. Middle East Media Research Institute, "Al-Zarqawi's Message to the Fighters of Jihad in Iraq on September 11, 2004." The original speech on September 11, 2004 was recorded and broadcast by several Islamist websites the next day. For a prescient article noting the possibility for this development, see David Cook, "Iraq as the Focus for Apocalyptic Scenarios," *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 1, No. 11, October 2008, available from www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Vol1Iss11-Art8.pdf, accessed on April 21, 2015; For a deep scholarly analysis of original sources, consult David Cook, *Studies in Muslim Apocalyptic*, Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press, 2002; For his pioneering role in scholarly study of what many consider to be merely a "crank fringe," see David Cook, *Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic Literature*, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2008; David Cook, "Dajjal," in Kate Fleet, F. Kramer, D. Matringe, J. Nawas, E. Rowson, eds., *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 3rd Edition, Leiden, UK: E. J. Brill, 2007-present, available from referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-3/dajjal-COM_25826, accessed on August 2, 2016. Finally, see McCants, *The ISIS Apocalypse*, pp. 161-181, for a brief, but accessible compilation of key excerpts from the classical source literature – the *ahadith*, or Traditions of the Prophet – covering "The Final Days," "The Victorious Group," "The Mahdi is Preceded by an Islamic State," and "Twelve Caliphs."

172. See *Sahih-Muslim*, Vol. 4, Book 39, ["Kitab al-Fitan wa Ashrat as-Sa'ah"] (Book pertaining the turmoil and portents of the last hour), No. 6924, p. 1501. In Abdul Hamid Siddiqi, transl., *Sahih Muslim*, Sh. Lahore, Pakistan: Muhammad Ashraf, 2004.

173. *Dabiq*, Iss. 1, p. 26.

174. These all refer to the following: *Dabiq*, Iss. 2, "The Flood" cover art with Noah's ark, p. 1, and Abū 'Amr Al-Kinānī, "It's Either the Islamic State or the Flood," pp. 5-11; *Dabiq*, Iss. 3, "A Call to Hijrah," cover art, p. 1; this connects Hijrah to al-Sham as the land of the final apocalyptic battles. Also "The Islamic State before Al-Malhamah (The Immigrants to the Land of Malahim [Final End Times Battles])," pp. 5-11, and "The Liberation of Dabiq," p.15, which links Dabiq to its apocalyptic and prophesied relation to the End Times battles, and also the name of the magazine; *Dabiq*, Iss. 4, p. 1, cover cites the following 2 articles: see "The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour," pp. 14-17, and "Reflections on the Final Crusade," pp. 32-44, i.e., the Final Crusade, the Final Hour, which includes a section "The Islamic State Founders on Signs of the Hour," that contains quotes from Shaykh Abū Mus'ab az-Zarqāwī, Abū Hamzah al-Muhājir, and Abū 'Umar al-Baghdādī; *Dabiq*, Iss. 5, "YAHYĀ: LESSONS FROM A SHAHĪD," pp. 4-9, which discusses End Times battles and tribulations; *Dabiq*, Iss. 7, "THE SALVATION FROM FITNAH IS KHILĀFAH AND JIHĀD," pp. 44-45, and "The Hour Will Not Be Established until Seventy Thousand From the Children of Ishāq Attack Constantinople," p. 83; *Dabiq*, Iss. 9, "And Allah is the Best of the Plotters," pp. 50-59, in the concluding section, "An Analysis of a Doomed Plot," pp. 57-59, is End Times based, for example, p. 57:

In his words [referring to Abū 'Umar al-Baghdādī's quoted speech referred to above] there is a summary on this final plot . . . of the crusaders and their apostate allies before the major malhamah [great battles of The End Times].

Next, see "INTERVIEW WITH THE AMĪR OF THE YARMŪK CAMP REGION," pp.66-73, which is also presented within framework of End Times. For example, p. 66:

In light of the victories this month in Wilayat Dimashq (Damascus) as the Islamic State continues to advance towards the future stronghold of the believers during the Malahim, *Dabiq* presented a number of questions to the amir of the region encompassing the Yarmuk Camp in the Wilayah.

And a final example in its concluding paragraph pp. 72-73 (see pp. 66-73 for entire article):

Our role model and noble Messenger . . . praised Dimashq very much, and this was mentioned in a number of authentic narrations. Dimashq is the camp of the Muslims during the great battle (al-Malhamah al-Kubra). But every Muslim who cannot come and wants to perform jihad and support the Islamic State can do so wherever he may be, just as he was ordered by the Khalifah in his latest address. A simple supplication from our Muslim brothers practicing ribat is in itself support—a great support for us. Any advance of the Khilafah against the Nusayriyyah and Rafidah, any manifestation of unity through new *bay'āt* to the Khalifah, and any attack against the supporters of the Sahwah—the crusaders and Al Salul—strengthens the mujahidin in Dimashq. May Allah facilitate for the armies of the Khilafah to liberate Dimashq.

See *Dabiq*, Iss. 10, p. 79, for an untitled, very unflattering picture of al-Nur Salafi members of the Egyptian Parliament—two were asleep, and two were distracted—with a note, “The murtaddin of the ‘Nur’ party in the Egyptian parliament,” accompanied by an End Times prophecy quote; *Dabiq*, Iss. 11, “The ‘Mahdī’ of the Rāfidah: THE DAJJĀL,” p. 16, with a big picture of former Iranian Prime Minister Ahmadenijad with an ultra-orthodox, anti-Zionist rabbi sharing space and face-time. The article begins:

As the Hour approaches, it becomes important to reflect upon the fabricated accounts of future events, as they will undoubtedly play a role in actions by various deviant sects. Of these accounts is that of the ‘Mahdī’ of the Rafidah who wages war against Islam and the Muslims, contrary to the just and rightly guided Mahdi of the future described in the Sunnah. The closer the Hour approaches, the more the Rafidah fall in line with the Jews in preparation for the appearance of this awaited evil leader. Upon reading the Rafidi account of the “Mahdi,” it becomes clear that he is none other than the Dajjal.

The article’s concluding paragraph, p. 17: “We seek refuge with Allah for Ahlus-Sunnah from the evil of the Dajjal.” Next, see “FROM THE BATTLE OF AL-AZHĀB TO THE WAR OF COALITIONS,” *Dabiq*, Iss. 11, pp. 46-55, whose final paragraph (p. 55) ends with an Apocalyptic statement:

Finally, it is not the apostasy and deviance of the weak-hearted and the hypocrites that will lead to the truce with the Romans before the Hour, rather it is the patience and perseverance of

the mujahidin on their way to further consolidation and greater expansion in the face of the international crusade against Islam that will achieve such. O Allah, turner of hearts, keep our hearts firm upon Your path until the last of us fights under the banner of al-Masih [the Mahdi, Messiah] against ad-Dajjal [Anti-Christ].

See also, "THE BEST SHUHADĀ'," *Dabiq*, Iss. 13, pp. 20-21, which contains an image with the words: "A Word of Truth" on a letter resting in a hangman's noose; and finally, "THE RĀFIDAH: From Ibn Saba' to the Dajjāl," *Dabiq*, Iss. 13, esp. pp. 44-45.

175. The following book series is devoted exclusively to prophecies, preparations, and the privileges associated with martyrdom (*Shuhada*) in these End Times tribulations and battles:

For the original series of 6, Conquest, End Times battle-type works confirmed by prophecy: East, Syria, Arabia, Persia, Rome, and Palestine [then Major End Times Signs, Events]:

Unattributed, *Black Flags of the East: The Movements Past. Present. & Future-1979-2012+*, n.p., n.d., available from <https://archive.org/details/BlackFlagsFromTheEast>, accessed on August 12, 2016; Unattributed, *Black Flags From Syria: Revolution 2011-2020+*, n.p., n.d., available from <https://archive.org/details/BlackFlagsFromSyria-Ebook>, accessed on August 12, 2016; Unattributed, *Black Flags From Arabia*; n.p., n.d., available from <https://archive.org/details/EbookBlackFlagsFromArabia>, accessed on August 12, 2016; Unattributed, *Black Flags from Persia . . . which merge the Khorasanis' with the Arabs*, n.p., n.d., available from <https://archive.org/details/Ebook-BlackFlagsFromPersia>, accessed on August 12, 2016; Unattributed, *Black Flags from Rome: (Europe) – Armed Gangs & Missiles*, available from <https://archive.org/details/EbookBlackFlagsFromRome>, accessed on August 12, 2016; Unattributed, *Black Flags from Palestine: (Magic, Deception & War)*, n.p., n.d., available from <https://archive.org/details/EbookBlackFlagsFromPalestine-Final>, accessed on August 12, 2016; Unattributed, *How to Survive in the West: A Mujahid Guide (2015)*, n.p.: The Islamic State, 2015, available from www.memrijttm.org/e-book-distributed-via-twitter-how-to-survive-in-the-west-a-mujahid-guide.html, accessed on August 12, 2016; *Hijrah to the Islamic State: What to pack up, who to contact and where to go. Stories and more!* n.p.: The Islamic State, 2015 available from <https://archive.org/details/GuideBookHijrah2015-ToTheIslamicState>, accessed on August 12, 2016; The *Shuhada [Martyrs] Book Series* is available from

Archive.org/download/BlackFlagNShuhadaStoriesEbooks/Black%20Flag%20n%20Shuhada%Stories%20Ebooks.rar, accessed on August 12, 2016; The Original Shuhada Series includes: *Lover's of Maidens of Paradise [Lover's of the Hur al Ayn]*, available from *archive.org/download/BlackFlagNShuhadaStoriesEbooks/Black%20Flag%20n%20Shuhada%Stories%20Ebooks.rar*, accessed on August 12, 2016. This is an English translation of Abdullah Azzam's, *The Martyrs of Afghanistan*, Azzam Publications, available from *archive.org/stream/MiraclesOffihadInAfghanistan-AbdullahAzzam/Signs_of_ar-Rahman_djvu.txt*, accessed on August 12, 2016. Azzam covers period 1979-1989; Unattributed, *Miracles in Syria (2012-13)*, available from *archive.org/download/BlackFlagNShuhadaStoriesEbooks/Black%20Flag%20n%20Shuhada%Stories%20Ebooks.rar*, accessed on August 12, 2016; Unattributed, *Martyr's of Syria (2014)*, [2011-2014] available from *archive.org/download/BlackFlagNShuhadaStoriesEbooks/Black%20Flag%20n%20Shuhada%Stories%20Ebooks.rar*, accessed on August 12, 2016; Unattributed, *The Undead Warriors, [Iraq, 2003-2006]*, available from *archive.org/download/BlackFlagNShuhadaStoriesEbooks/Black%20Flag%20n%20Shuhada%Stories%20Ebooks.rar*, accessed on August 12, 2016; Unattributed, *Revivers of the Khilafah (Global Caliphate) [2005-2010]*, available from *archive.org/download/BlackFlagNShuhadaStoriesEbooks/Black%20Flag%20n%20Shuhada%Stories%20Ebooks.rar*, accessed on August 12, 2016.

176. For a terse presentation of the four essentials of apocalypticism—dualism, pessimism, judgment, and imminence—see Bart D. Ehrman, *How Jesus Became God: The Exaltation of a Jewish Preacher from Galilee*, New York: HarperOne, 2014, pp. 99-102. For comprehensive scholarly accounts of apocalyptic, see Norman Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millenium*, rev. and enlarged ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 1970 [1957]; Norman Cohn, *Chaos, Cosmos, and the World to Come: The Ancient Roots of Apocalyptic Faith*, Second edition, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999 [1993]; John R. Hall, *Apocalypse: From Antiquity to the Empire of Modernity*, Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2009; Richard Landes, *Heaven on Earth: The Varieties of the Millennial Experience*, New York and Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011; Arthur P. Mendel, *Vision and Violence*, Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1992/1999; Richard Landes, "Millennialism (Millenarianism, Chiliasm)," Draft of article for *Merriam-Webster Encyclopedia of World Religions*, 1999, available from *www.mille.org/people/rlpages/millennialism-mw-encyl.html*, accessed on April 30, 2015.

177. Graeme Wood successfully corroborates this dimension in ISO, as well as its strict adherence to key tenets of Salafi-Wahhabi Jihadism. See Graeme Wood, "What ISIS Really Wants: The Islamic State is no mere collection of psychopaths. It is a religious group with carefully considered beliefs, among them that it is a key agent of the coming apocalypse. Here's what that means for its strategy—and for how to stop it," *The Atlantic*, March 2015, available from www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants/384980/, accessed on February 20, 2015. A vigorous debate was spawned by Graeme's article that centered on his primary thesis:

The reality is that the Islamic State is Islamic. Very Islamic. Yes, it has attracted psychopaths and adventure seekers, drawn largely from the disaffected populations of the Middle East and Europe. But the religion preached by its most ardent followers derives from coherent and even learned interpretations of Islam.

By February 20, 2015, 6,543 online comments had been made; by May 13, 2015, comments more than doubled to a total of 14,163; see also, Graeme Wood, "'What ISIS Really Wants': The Response: A survey of reactions to *The Atlantic's* cover story—from think tanks to jihadist Twitter," February 24, 2015, available from www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants-reader-response-atlantic/385710/, accessed on September 15, 2015. An initial spate of commentary argued for a complete disjuncture between the ISO and Islam, for example: Mehdi Hasan, "How Islamic Is the Islamic State? Not at All: What The Atlantic got wrong about ISIS," March 12, 2015, available from www.newrepublic.com/article/121286/how-islamic-islamic-state, accessed on September 15, 2015 (originally in *New Statesman*); Fareed Zakaria, "The limits of the 'Islamic' label," *The Washington Post*, February 19, 2015, available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-limits-of-the-islamic-label/2015/02/19/6571004e-b878-11e4-a200-c008a01a6692_story.html?utm_term=.f6b14917d392, accessed on February 20, 2015; Caner K. Dagli, "The Phony Islam of ISIS," *The Atlantic*, February 27, 2015, available from www.theatlantic.com/global/archive/2015/02/the-phony-islam-of-isis/386156, accessed on March 2, 2015; J. M. Berger, "Enough about Islam: Why religion is not the most useful way to understand ISIS," Order From Chaos blog entry, posted February 18, 2015, available from <https://www.brookings.edu/2015/02/18/enough-about-islam-why-religion-is-not-the-most-useful-way-to-understand-isis/>, accessed on August 12,

2016. However, a more reasoned (in the opinion of the present author) position was soon advanced. More carefully developing the theological nuances to which Wood's principal expert on Salafism, Bernard Haykel, had testified, this literature concludes that while ISO is **an** Islam, Islam has a robustness, and possible futures, and pasts, that the ISO has failed to convey. Moreover, there are good grounds for believing that what 1.6 billion Muslims come to regard as an Islam that deserves its place at the historic banquet of contemporary value systems will in the end determine what Islam **is**. For key sources articulating this latter position, see Robert Wright, "The Clash of Civilizations That Isn't," *The New Yorker*, February 25, 2015, available from www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/clash-civilizations-isnt, accessed on February 27, 2015; Jack Jenkins, "What The Atlantic Left Out About ISIS According To Their Own Expert," ThinkProgress, February 20, 2015, available from thinkprogress.org/world/2015/02/20/3625446/atlantic-left-isis-conversation-bernard-haykel/, accessed on September 16, 2015; Hussein Ibish, "How 'Islamic' is the 'Islamic State?: recent controversies have revived a pointless debate from the Bush era'," March 3, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on March 3, 2015; Mustafa Akyol, "Is the 'Islamic State' Islamic?," February 28, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on February 28, 2015.

178. "FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH," *Dabiq*, Iss. 1, pp. 35-41; "The Salvation from Fitnah is Khilafah and Jihad," *Dabiq*, Iss. 7, pp. 44-45; "And as For the Blessings of Your Lord Then Mention It," *Dabiq*, Iss. 12, pp. 29-32.

179. The "stateness" dimension of the Caliphate, distinct from its destined existence as eschatological necessity, will be taken up in the following chapter on ISO strategy under the heading "Tamkin," i.e., consolidation and expansion. The "stateness" of Khilafa is exemplified in *Dabiq*, Iss. 9, "Healthcare in the Khilafah," pp. 24-26, (with data and pictures on an actually functioning health care sector); *Dabiq*, Iss. 11, p. 3: One page ad for: "The Rise of the Khalifah: Return of the Gold Dinar," movie translated into multiple languages with subtitles.

180. Unattributed, *Revivers of the Khilafah (Global Caliphate): Stories of Muslim Shuhadaa' (Martyrs)*, n.p., 2013 (1434 H), available from <https://archive.org/stream/Revivers-of-Global-Khilafah-Shu>

hada-stories-2013#page/n0/mode/2up, accessed on August 12, 2016; Unattributed, *The Revived Caliphate*, (2014) /*The Islamic State, 2003-2014+*, *archive.org/download/BlackFlagNShuhadaStoriesEbooks/Black%20Flag%20n%20Shuhada%Stories%20Ebooks.rar*, accessed on May 13, 2015; Unattributed, *The Islamic State* (2015), available from *archive.org/download/BlackFlagNShuhadaStoriesEbooks/Black%20Flag%20n%20Shuhada%Stories%20Ebooks.rar*, accessed on May 13, 2015.

181. Amir ul-Mu'minin Abu Bakr Al-Husayni Al-Qurashi al-Baghdadi, "A Message to the Mujahidin and the Muslim *Ummah* in the Month of Ramadan."

182. Abu Muhammad al-'Adnani al-Shami, "This is The Promise of Allah," June 28, 2014, available from *myreader.toile-libre.org/uploads/My_563039f00cb03.pdf*, accessed on June 29, 2014.

183. See for example: "Photo Report: On the Destruction of Shirk in Wilayat Ninawa," *Dabiq*, Iss. 2, pp. 13-17.

184. See Samir Khan, "RAFIDHA FOCUS: WINTER 2010," *Inspire*, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, p. 5.

185. Bin Mahmud al Bahteeti, "The Land of the Prophets Awaits You," pp. 38-42.

186. In the second issue of *Al-Risalah*, Shi'ism is addressed. See *Al-Risalah*, Iss. 2. In the full page illustration, p. 20, *Al-Nusrah* Emir Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Joulani offers a reward for killing *Hizb Allah* [Party of God] leader Hassan Nasrullah, but also states: "even if they [the assassins] be from his people or family . . . we will provide security for him and his family, and deliver him to wherever he wishes, and I am guarantor of that, Allah willing"; The same reward, and willingness to protect his family and kin, is offered for the killing of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, in the full page illustration, pp. 69-70. Then, see Sheikh Abu Qatada, "The Markets of Faith," pp. 41-44. On p. 41, Sheikh Abu Qatada refers to Hassan Nasrullah as: "the evil leader of the Rafidha party in Lebanon," which he says: "is of course a serious issue, along with some people's adopting attributes of the Rawafidh," but in his brief Sharia lesson, he distinguishes between the "Rawafidh" (an extreme disbelieving sect of the Shia), and implicitly other

Shia less extreme. There is nothing in his article, however, that calls for killing even the leadership of the Shia since its consequences for *Fitnah* are greater than its benefits for the jihad. There is, in short, no demonization or *takfir* of the Shia in general, nor the Shia laity in particular.

187. From Abu Omar al-Baghdadi's 12th Speech, released as an audio recording to the Internet September 24, 2008; see Nibras Kazimi, "Fascinating: The Jihadists Admit Defeat in Iraq," May 15, 2008, available in talismanagate.blogspot.com/2008/05/fascinating-jihadists-admit-defeat-in.html, accessed on August 18, 2014.

188. See also, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, "As For the Foam, it Passes Away as Scum," Speech presented c. between October 15, 2007, and January 29, 2008, available from https://archive.org/stream/AsForTheFoamItPassesAwayAsScum/As%20For%20the%20Foam,%20it%20Passes%20Away%20as%20Scum_djvu.txt, accessed on August 10, 2016.

189. The present author believes that the key source for understanding the deeper theological structure of these debates is, as earlier stated, Lav, *Radical Islam and the Revival of Medieval Theology*. Also of considerable value, are several scholarly contributions by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi expert: Joas Wagemakers, "The Transformation of a Radical Concept: *al-wala' wa-l-bara'* in the Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi," in Meijer, ed., *Global Salafism*, pp. 81-106; Joas Wagemakers, "A Purist Jihadi-Salafi: The Ideology of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, August 2009, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 281-297; Joas Wagemakers, "The Enduring Legacy of the Second Saudi State: Quietist and Radical Wahhabi Contestations of al-Walā' wa-l-Barā'," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 1, February 2012, pp. 93-110; Joas Wagemakers, "'Seceders' and 'Postponers'? An Analysis of the 'Khawarij' and 'Murji'a' Labels in Polemical Debates between Quietest and Jihadi-Salafis," in Jeevan Deol and Zaheer Kazmi, eds., *Contextualizing Jihadi Thought*, London, UK: Hurst and Company, 2012, pp. 145-164; Joas Wagemakers, "What's in a Name? A Jihadi Labels Himself," *Jihadica*, blog entry, posted September 11, 2012, available from www.jihadica.com, accessed on March 27, 2014; Joas Wagemakers, "Everything you always wanted to know about al-Maqdisi (but were afraid to ask)," *Jihadica*, blog entry, posted June 25, 2012,

available from www.jihadica.com, accessed on March 27, 2014; Joas Wagemakers, "Al-Maqdisi and the Jordanian Jihadi-Salafi Movement," *Jihadica*, blog entry, posted December 1, 2012, available from www.jihadica.com, accessed on March 27, 2014; Wagemakers, *A Quietest Jihadi*; Joas Wagemakers, "An Inquiry into Ignorance: A Jihadi-Salafi Debate on Jahl as an Obstacle to Takfir," in Nicolet Boekhoff-van der Voort, Kees Versteegh, and Joas Wagemakers, eds., *The Transmission and Dynamics of Textual Sources of Islam: Essays in Honor of Harald Motzki*, Leiden: Brill, 2011, pp. 301-327; Joas Wagemakers, "Protecting Jihad: The Sharia Council of the Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad," *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 18, No. 2, Summer 2011, pp. 148-162; Joas Wagemakers, "In Search of 'Lions and Hawks': Abū Muhammad al-Maqdisī's Palestinian Identity," *Die Welt des Islams*, 2013, Vol. 53, Iss. 3-4, pp. 388-415; Wagemakers, "A Terrorist Organization that Never Was," pp. 59-75. Finally, for very important insights into the nuanced possibilities leading to ultra-extremist and ultra-sectarian futures, see Lahoud, *The Jihadis' Path to Self-Destruction*.

The present author has enormously benefited from Nibras Kazimi's truly prescient (though rarely cited), and nuanced understanding of al-Zarqawi, Zarqawism, the Islamic State phenomenon, and later, writing 2 years before the Syrian rebellion began, on why the Syrian regime would prove to be — on Salafi and anti-Shia sectarian grounds — the "perfect enemy."

For the emergence of Zarqawism, through the April 18, 2010 killing of Abu Hamza al-Muhajir and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, see Kazimi, "A Virulent Ideology in Mutation," pp. 59-73; Nibras Kazimi, "Interesting Jihadist Critique of the 'Islamic State of Iraq'," blog entry, posted on January 11, 2007, available from talismangate.blogspot.com/2007_01_01_archive.html, accessed on August 15, 2016; Nibras Kazimi, "Al-Qaeda is Losing It," blog entry, posted on February 3, 2007, available from talismangate.blogspot.com/2007_02_01_archive.html, accessed on August 15, 2016; Nibras Kazimi, "Blackout of the Press," *The New York Sun*, February 8, 2007, available from www.nysun.com/opinion/blackout-of-the-press/48291/, accessed on October 13, 2014; Nibras Kazimi, "Oh Brother, Where Art Thou?," blog entry, posted on February 28, 2007, available from talismangate.blogspot.com/2007_02_01_archive.html, accessed on August 15, 2016; Nibras Kazimi, "Jihadist Meltdown," *The New York Sun*, March 12, 2007, available from www.nysun.com/opinion/jihadist-meltdown/50244/, accessed on August 19, 2014; Nibras Kazimi, "Let Beasts Devour Beasts," *The New*

York Sun, June 19, 2007, available from www.nysun.com/opinion/let-beasts-devour-beasts/56857/, accessed on August 18, 2014; Nibras Kazimi, "The Caliphate Attempted: Zarqawi's Ideological Heirs, Their Choice for a Caliph, and the Collapse of Their Self-Styled 'Islamic State of Iraq'," *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, Vol. 7, July 1, 2008, available from www.hudson.org/research/9854-the-caliphate-attempted-zarqawi-s-ideological-heirs-their-choice-for-a-caliph-and-the-collapse-of-their-self-styled-islamic-state-of-iraq, accessed on September 7, 2016; Kazimi, "And so ends the saga of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi . . ."; Kazimi, "CONFIRMED: It WAS al-Baghdadi and al-Muhajir."

On Zarqawism/Neo-Zarqawism and Syria: Nibras Kazimi, *Syria Through Jihadist Eyes: A Perfect Enemy*, Stanford, CA: Hoover University Press, 2010; Nibras Kazimi, "A Perfect Enemy," [essay adapted from Kazimi, *Syria Through Jihadist Eyes*], *Defining Ideas*, August 17, 2011, available from www.hoover.org/research/perfect-enemy, accessed on August 15, 2014; Nibras Kazimi, "Western Inaction, Lebensraum for Jihad," *The Caravan*, Iss. 1201, February 23, 2012, available from www.hoover.org/research/western-inaction-lebensraum-jihad, accessed on October 10, 2014.

190. For a highly informative examination of the Kharijites, see Lahoud, *The Jihadis' Path to Self-Destruction*.

191. For a critical examination of this fallacious reduction of Islam's means of raising the Word of Allah to "jihadism," see Paul Kamolnick, "The Egyptian Islamic Group's Critique of Al-Qaeda's Interpretation of Jihad," pp. 93-110; Paul Kamolnick, "Al-Qaeda's Shari'a Crisis: Sayyid Imam and the Jurisprudence of Lawful Military Jihad," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 36, No. 5, May 2013, pp. 394-418, available from www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1057610X.2013.775478.

192. To date, the author has applied TQA to examine AQO's media warfare strategy; see Paul Kamolnick, *Countering Radicalization and Recruitment to Al Qaeda: Fighting the War of Deeds*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2014, for the fuller exposition of the TQA rationale and concept (pp. 67-69), and its systematic application to analyzing and countering AQO media warfare (pp. 69); For the use of TQA to analyze former senior AQO spokesman and media operative Adam Gadahn's media warfare strategy, see Paul Kamolnick, "When Muslim Defenders Became 'Blood Spilling' Crusaders."

193. A very insightful analysis of a triangular structure that links violence or the threat of violence, mass communication, and feelings of chronic fear (terror), can be found in Alex P. Schmid, "The Response Problem as a Definition Problem," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1992, pp. 7-13, p. 10: Figure 1, "The Triangle of Insurgent Terrorism" (original source: Alex P. Schmid and J. de Graaf, *Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media*, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982, p. 176); and, Alex P. Schmid, "Frameworks for Conceptualizing Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 16, No. 2, Summer 2004, pp. 197-221, esp. "Terrorism as/and Communication," pp. 205-210. The key role of mass media in transmitting terrorist signals explains how "deeds themselves," if propagated like waves beyond their initial victims to the ultimate target, also have this effect. It is this mediated function that permits terror to function as a tactical and political strategy. See also, Thomas Perry Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation," in Harry Eckstein, ed., *Internal War: Problems and Approaches*, New York: The Free Press, 1964, pp. 71-99; Ronald D. Crelinsten, "Analysing Terrorism and Counter-terrorism: A Communication Model," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2002, pp. 77-122; Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2006, pp. 49-80; Ariel Merari, "Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1993, pp. 213-251. For the original formulations of the notion "propaganda of the deed," see John Most, "Advice for Terrorists," *Freiheit*, September 13, 1884; "Action as Propaganda," in Walter Laqueur and Yonah Alexander, eds., *The Terrorism Reader*, New York: Penguin, 1987, pp. 100-108, esp. part III, "Action as Propaganda," pp. 105-106. For a comprehensive state-of-the-art definition of terrorism, see Alex P. Schmid, "The Revised Academic Consensus Definition of Terrorism," *Perspectives in Terrorism*, Vol. 6, No. 2, May 2012, pp. 158-159, reprinted from: Alex P. Schmid, ed., *Handbook of Terrorism Research*, London, UK: Routledge, 2011, pp. 86-87.

194. The "classical" AQO "Far Enemy" TQA has been sufficiently examined in previous works by the present author to which interested readers may refer. See Kamolnick, "Has Adam Gadahn Forsaken the Lawful Jihad for Anti-Americanism? See also, Kamolnick, *Countering Radicalization and Recruitment to Al Qaeda: Fighting the War of Deeds*.

195. In addition to the documents earlier consulted (See Chapter 1, and endnotes 15 and 16), the following commentaries are key to understanding AQO's proximate and ultimate religio-political objectives, and terrorist modus operandi: Thomas Hegghammer, *Jihad in Saudi Arabia: Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979*, p. 6 (Table 1); Thomas Hegghammer, "Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionaries?: On Religion and Politics in the Study of Militant Islamism," in Meijer, ed., *Global Salafism*, pp. 244-266, 259 (Table 1); Mark E. Stout, Jessica M. Huckabey, John R. Schindler, with Jim Lacey, *The Terrorist Perspectives Project: Strategic and Operational Views of Al Qaida and Associated Movements*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008, p. 139: "Al Qaida's grand strategy as enunciated from 1996 onward"; David Cook, *Understanding Jihad*, pp. 138-141; Thomas Joscelyn, "Global al Qaeda: Affiliates, objectives, and future challenges," Transcript of Thomas Joscelyn's testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, July 18, 2013, available from www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/global-al-qaeda-affiliates-objectives-and-future-challenges/, accessed on August 15, 2016; Thomas Joscelyn, "Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan: an enduring threat," May 20, 2014, Transcript of Thomas Joscelyn's testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Trade, The Long War Journal, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/05/al_qaeda_in_afghanis.php, accessed on August 15, 2016; Yoram Schweitzer and Aviv Oreg, "Al-Qaeda's Odyssey to the Global Jihad," Memorandum No. 134, Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, March 2014, available from www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4538&articleid=6866; Lahoud, *Beware of Imitators*, p. 70.

196. See for example: "Zawahiri's Letter to Zarqawi (English Translation)," Original dated July 9, 2005, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, p. 10, available from <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Zawahiris-Letter-to-Zarqawi-Translation.pdf>, accessed on May 21, 2013; "Letter to Nasir al-Wuhayshi (English Translation)," SOCOM-2012-0000016, p. 18; "Letter from UBL to 'Atiyatullah Al-Libi 3 (English Translation)," SOCOM-2012-0000015, Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, available from <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/letter-from-ubl-to-atiyatullah-al-libi-3-english-translation-2>, p. 5. The original letter, dated October 21, 2010, is from Zamarai [Osama bin Laden] to Shaykh Mahmud [Atiyya]; Cole Bunzel, "Al Qaeda Advises the Syrian Revolution: Shumukh al-Islam's 'Comprehen-

sive Strategy' for Syria," Jihadica, blog entry, posted February 25, 2013, available from www.jihadica.com, accessed on March 27, 2014; See the undated, but post-1996 Taliban conquest, "Letter to Mullah Muhammed 'Umar from Bin Laden (English Translation) AFGP-2002-600321," Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, available from <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/letter-to-mullah-muhammed-umar-from-bin-laden-english-translation-2>, accessed on May 21, 2013, [or the alternate translation, "Letter From Usama Bin Laden To Mullah Omar Emphasizing Cooperation In Continuing Jihad To Keep Russians And Americans Busy In Order To Divert Them Away From Afghanistan," CRRC Doc. No. AQ-SHPD-D-000-055, Conflict Records Research Center, Washington, DC]; For an incisive insider critique of AQO's over-reliance on the Al Jazeera conduit and its organizational failure to explicitly incorporate media warfare into strategy, see "A Memo to Sheikh Abu 'Abdullah (English Translation) AFGP-2002-003251," Combating Terrorism Center, West Point, NY, available from <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-memo-to-sheikh-abu-abdullah-english-translation-2>, accessed on May 21, 2013. The original memo, written in Kandahar, AFG, was dated Tuesday 18 Rabeei Al Awaal 1421 AH (c. June 20, 2000) and was from Abu Huthayfa, [or Hadhafah, or Huzayfah] to Sheikh Abu Abdullah.

197. Harold D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War*, New York: Peter Smith, 1938 [1927], ch. 4.

198. See *Ibid.*, esp. pp. 10, 17, and 195, for a summary of these four key strategic objectives—targeting enemies, allies, neutrals, and one's own population—though conceived within the context of nation-state warfare, they remain valid for present purposes.

199. See Kamolnick, *Countering Radicalization and Recruitment to Al Qaeda*, pp. 20-34.

200. Kurzman, *The Missing Martyrs*, ch. 1.

201. For background on the origins and nature of *Jabhat al-Nusra*, see Noman Benotman and Roison Blake, "Jabhat al-Nusra li-ahl al-Sham min Mujahedi al-Sham fi Sahat al-Jihad: A Strategic Briefing," Quilliam, n.d., available from www.quilliam.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/jabhat-al-nusra-a-strategic-briefing.pdf, accessed on January 9, 2013; Aron Lund, "Syria's Salafi Insurgents: The Rise of the Syrian Islamic Front," Occasional Papers,

No. 17, March 2013, available from www.ui.se/eng/upl/files/86861.pdf, accessed on December 2, 2014; Jennifer Cafarella, "Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria: An Islamic Emirate for Al-Qaeda," Middle East Security Report 25, December 2014, available from www.understandingwar.org/jabhat-al-nusra-syria-islamic-emirate-al-qaeda, accessed on June 2, 2015; "Jabhat al-Nusra," Mapping Militant Organizations, November 12, 2014, available from web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/493, accessed on July 15, 2015.

On July 28, 2016, AQO affiliate *Jabhat al-Nusra* officially changed its name to *Jabhat Fateh al-Sham* (Front for the Conquest of the Levant). Commentary is deeply divided. Some assert this name change is purely cosmetic, no actual evidence of formal disaffiliation has been produced, and that the USG's recent formal proposal to isolate and specifically target *Jabhat al-Nusra*, and not abandonment of AQO's "jihadism," sufficiently explains this latest development. See for example: Thomas Joscelyn, "Analysis: Al Nusra Front rebrands itself as Jabhat Fath Al Sham," *The Long War Journal*, July 28, 2016, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/07/analysis-al-nusra-front-rebrands-itself-as-jabhat-fath-al-sham.php, accessed on July 29, 2016; Thomas Joscelyn, "Transcript of Abu Muhammad al Julani's speech," *The Long War Journal*, July 29, 2016, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/07/transcript-of-abu-muhammad-al-julani-s-speech.php, accessed on July 29, 2016; Charles Lister, "The Nusra Front is Dead and Stronger Than Ever Before," *Foreign Policy*, July 28, 2016, available from foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/28/the-nusra-front-is-dead-and-stronger-than-ever-before/, accessed on July 29, 2016; Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Thomas Joscelyn, "Rebranding Terror: Nusra's Renaming is Part of al Qaeda's Plan," *Foreign Affairs*, August 28, 2016, available from www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2016-08-28, accessed on August 29, 2016. Other reporting, however, provides evidence indicating that changes are not merely cosmetic but involve important strategic compromises now being made to further unify the revolutionary anti-Assad Islamist insurgency. These recent changes, then, are responses to *Jabhat al-Nusra*'s previous unwillingness to openly distance themselves from AQO's "global jihadism" targeting the West; genuine intra-Islamist conflicts over *Jabhat al-Nusra*'s reluctance to openly identify with a national-Islamist Syrian project; actual splits within *Jabhat al-Nusra* between its hardline AQO-first wing, and its predominantly Syrian Islamist nationalist membership; and also, a defensive measure designed to subvert

recent USG initiatives explicitly and adamantly targeting *Jabhat al-Nusra* as a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). For some of this reporting and commentary, see Liz Sly and Karen DeYoung, "Syria's Jabhat al-Nusra splits from al-Qaeda and changes its name," *The Washington Post*, July 28, 2016; "Al-Qaeda tells Syrian branch Nusra Front it can drop links," *Ammun News*, July 28, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on July 29, 2016; Unattributed, "'Ahrar al-Sham' Official: Outcome of Aleppo Battle 'Will Change the Rules of the Political Game'," *Al-Hayah*, August 10, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on August 11, 2016; Mona Alami, [interview with Iyyad al-Sha'ar, commander of the Aharar al-Sham Islamic Movement], "Al-Sha'ar: I Hope 'Fath al-Sham' Will Act in Way that Confirms Its Complete Disengagement from 'Al-Qa'ida; Al-Sharq al-Awsat in Interview with Leader in 'Ahrar al-Sham'," *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, September 12, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on September 16, 2016; Mona Alami, "Jabhat al-Nusra's rebranding is more than simple name change," *Al-Monitor*, August 5, 2016, available from www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/08/jabhat-al-nusra-sever-al-qaeda-focus-local-syria.html, accessed on August 9, 2016; Mu'ayyad Bajis, "Jordanian Abu Julaybib and Abu-Kadijah Defect from Fath al-Sham," *Arabi 21*, August 23, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on August 26, 2016; Alex Crawford, "Rebranded Nusra Front Uniting Syria's Rebels," *Sky News*, August 18, 2016, news.sky.com/story/rebels-unite-in-fight-against-horsemen-of-syrian-apocalypse-10541843, accessed on August 19, 2016.

202. For an incisive commentary documenting AQO's transformation and re-emphasizing of "Near Enemy" strategic conceptions, see Thomas Joscelyn, "Fifteen years after the 9/11 attacks, al Qaeda fights on," *The Long War Journal*, September 11, 2016, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/09/fifteen-years-after-the-911-attacks-al-qaeda-fights-on.php, accessed on September 12, 2016. Joscelyn, an indefatigable documentarian of AQO's "jihadism," remarks:

[T]here is another aspect to evaluating the al Qaeda threat that is seldom appreciated. It is widely assumed that al Qaeda is only interested in attacking the West. This is flat false. Most of the organization's resources are devoted to waging insurgencies in Muslim majority countries. . . . [T]he point is that al Qaeda hasn't been attempting to hit the West nearly as much as some in the West assume.

203. For the broader history of AQAP, and its relation to AQO, see Gregory D. Johnsen, *The Last Refuge: Yemen, Al-Qaeda, and America's War in Arabia*, New York and London, UK: W.W. Norton, 2013.

204. See for example: Lahoud, *et al.*, *Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Ladin Sidelined?* pp. 29-35.

205. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

206. See Kamolnick, *Countering Radicalization and Recruitment to Al Qaeda*, pp. 7-17, for a comprehensive evaluation of this policy, its legality, and its consequences for overcoming the formidable barriers created by nations unable or unwilling to prevent the terrorist entities from planning external operations on their soil.

207. USG successes in attriting AQO and AQAP leadership has been substantial. Consider the following extremely high value leadership targets permanently eliminated from these organizations:

- AQO, Founder, Emir, Osama bin Laden (May 2, 2011);
- AQO, Deputy-Emir Abu Yahya al-Libi (June 4, 2012);
- AQO, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman (aka: Atiyatullah al-Libi; born, Jamal Ibrahim Ashtiwi al Misrati) (August 22, 2011);
- AQAP, Samir Ibn Zafar Khan (Founding Editor, *Inspire*) (September 30, 2011);
- AQAP, Anwar al-Awlaki (Major Anti-American English-language terror-incitement propagandist, Sharia source) (September 30, 2011);
- AQAP, Deputy Emir, Saudi Sa'id al-Shihri, (2013);
- AQO, Abu Dujana al-Basha, 'hidden commander' and son-in-law and trusted aid to Ayman al-Zawahiri (August 2014);
- AQO, Adnan Shukrijumah, Major AQ External Ops figure (December 2014);
- AQO, Adam Yahye Gadahn (January 19, 2015);
- AQAP, Harith bin Gahazi al-Nadari (aka: Muhammad al-Murshidi), leader and member of Sharia committee (January 31, 2015);
- AQAP, Mufti, Saudi Ibrahim al-Rubaysh (c. April 2015);
- AQAP, Deputy general manager, Nasser bin Ali al Ansi (April 2015);
- AQAP, Emir Nasir al Wuhayshi (early-June 2015);

- AQO, Muhsin al Fadhli, major operative “Khorasan Group” in Syria (July 8, 2015);
- AQO, Sanafi al-Nasr (aka: Abdul Mohsin Abdullah Ibrahim Al Sharikh), a major Senior Leader in AQO and dispatched to Syria as part of external operations-focused ‘Khorasan’ Group (October 15, 2015);
- AQAP, Jalal Belaidi, aka Abu Hamza, top commander and regional emir;
- AQO, Al-Shabab, Hassan Ali Dhoore, high level security and intelligence operative (April 2016);
- AQO, long-time veteran and senior member *al-Nusra* Shura Council, Abu Firas al-Suri (April 2016); and,
- AQO, Khorasan Group, Rifai Ahmed Taha Musa, Signatory to February 1998 ‘fatwa’ (April 2016).

208. Audrey K. Cronin, *How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns*, Princeton, NJ and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press, 2009/2011, pp. 148-153.

209. See for example: the succinct graphic in *Inspire*, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, p. 43, representing what is described as a “Simple Equation”: “America’s Defeat + Da’awah + Defense = Establishing Khilafa.” An explanatory subheading is provided:

The existence of America, policing the world vanishes [sic] any hope for the Mujahideen conquering any part of the earth. . . . That is why we have to converge all our efforts in defeating America. And place plans and efforts to destroy the American Economy, which is the main reason for America’s power and dominance.

And at the bottom are eight Terrorist Operations other than media that are suggested as: “THE TYPES OF OPERATIONS THAT WILL DEplete THE AMERICAN ECONOMY.” They are:

Operation Hemorrhage, 1998 Nairobi and Darasalaam Operation, Boston Marathon, USS Cole Bombing, September 11, Umar Farouk – Detroit Operation, Nidal Hassan – Fort Hood Operation, Muhahham Youssef Abdulazeez.

This core AQO “grand strategy” is well represented in various issues, see for examples: “Letter from the editor,” *Inspire*, Iss. 1,

Summer 2010, p. 2, which defines the magazine's mission; Yahya Ibrahim, "LETTER FROM THE EDITOR," *Inspire*, Iss. 7, Fall 2011, p. 3; Yahya Ibrahim, "THE GREATEST SPECIAL OPERATION OF ALL TIME: THE EXPEDITIONS OF WASHINGTON D.C. AND NEW YORK," *Inspire*, Iss. 7, Fall 2011, pp. 12-13; Samir Khan, "THE MEDIA CONFLICT," *Inspire*, Iss. 7, Fall 2011, pp. 8-11, where a quote from Khan contains basic AQO worldview, p. 8:

I remember his advice being spot-on as I stood there nearly 2 years ago in front of AQAP's Amir, Shaykh Abu Basir, may Allah preserve him. 'Remember,' he said as other mujahidin were busy working on their computers in the background. 'The media work is half of the jihad.'

Abdallah, [Fadil Harun, c. 2009-2011], "What is Al-Qaeda?" p. 35; "Words of Wisdom," *Inspire*, Iss. 11, Special Issue, Spring 2013, pp. 10-11, consisting of quotes from: bin Laden, Sheikh Abu Hamza Al-Muhajir (AQI/MS/ISI), Sheikh Mukhtar Abu Zubeir (Amir of Harakatu Shabaab Al-Mujahideen), Sheikh Anwar al-'Alwaki, Sheikh Ayman Adh-Dhawahiry [al-Zawahiri] (Amir of Al-Qaeda), Sheikh Abu Abdul Ilaah Ambed (Amir of AQIM Media), Sheikh Abu Baseer Al-Wuhayshi (Amir of AQAP), Al Hafidh Abu Talh Al-Almani; "Jihadisphere: Reviewing important books and articles concerning the Ummah and Jihad," Review of Sheikh Abdallah Azzâm, "Defense of Muslim Lands: The First Obligation After Iman," *Inspire*, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, p. 49; Abu 'Abdillah Almoravid, "THE BATTLE OF MARATHON: MESSAGE TO THE 99% OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE," *Inspire*, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, p. 50; Full page illustration, *Inspire*, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, p. 51, has an image of Tzarnaev—next to him, a poem, SHEIKH ABU BISHR NASSIRUD DEEN BIN ABDULLAH, "FAREWELL, O HERO!" [written to Tzarnaev]; Yahya Ibrahim, "Editor's Letter," *Inspire*, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, p. 4, lays out assumptions well in the first paragraph:

Muslims continue to face the results and consequences of the fierce crusade aggression against Islam. The aggression that clearly manifested itself after the blessed 9/11 attacks. Exposing the hidden and true enmity they had towards Muslims and Islam. Revealing themselves in different forms of aggression: plundering Muslim wealth, occupying their lands, imprisoning their men and women, killing their

scholars and the worst of all is the aggression towards the very core principles of Islam. . . . We at *Inspire*, and in the cause of the events of 9/11 encourage the Muslims in the West to join the Lone Jihad caravan. The caravan that has and will always continue to trouble and bring nightmares to the west.

“WORDS OF WISDOM,” *Inspire*, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 14-15, contains quotes from: Sheikh Anwar Al-’Awlaqi, Yahya Gadahn, Sheikh Ayman Adh-Dhawāhiri, Sheikh Abu Mus’ab Az-Zarqawy, Sayyed Qutb, Sheikh Hussam ‘Abdul-Ra’uf, Hamza Usama Bin Laden.

See also, the issues of *Inspire*, which contain works by AQO senior leadership. For example: Osama bin Laden, “THE WAY TO SAVE THE EARTH,” *Inspire*, Iss. 1, Summer 2010, pp. 8-10; “RELIVING USAMA’S WORDS,” *Inspire*, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, pp. 18-19, which quotes from Osama bin Laden, “Address to the American People,” Address presented in 2004; “An Address to the Revolutionaries,” *Inspire*, Iss. 6, Summer 2011, pp. 51-53; “Freedom from Blind Following,” *Inspire*, Iss. 8, Fall 2011, p. 56 (excerpt from bin Laden’s book, *Methodological Instructions* [Tawjihāt al-Manhajīyyah]); Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Message to the People of Yemen,” *Inspire*, Iss. 1, Summer 2010, p. 11; “The Open Meeting with Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri,” *Inspire*, Iss. 2, Fall 2010, p. 10 (Palestine focused); “Taken from ‘The Open Meeting with Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri,’” *Inspire*, Iss. 2, Fall 2010, p. 32; “Defending the Prophet,” *Inspire*, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 12-13, where he says: “America has allowed the production of a film which commits blasphemy against the Prophet”; see also, the “Zio-crusade war” and “Judaizing of Al-Quds”; “Iman defeats Arrogance,” *Inspire*, Iss. 12, Spring 2014, pp. 10-12, described as the first part of a transcript from a recently released As-Sahab film with same name, a speech; “Letter to the American People,” *Inspire*, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 12-14, includes first heading, “Why Do We Fight and Resist You?,” and next heading, “To What Do We Call You and What Do We Want of You?,” then lists seven demands, and conclusion; Adam Yahiyeh Gadahn, “Legitimate Demands, Barack’s Dilemma,” *Inspire*, Iss. 2, Fall 2010, pp. 69-70; “Know that Jihad is Your Duty,” *Inspire*, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, p. 17; “INSPIRE EXCLUSIVE: From Adam Gadahn,” *Inspire*, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, pp. 36-38. At the bottom of p. 36 it describes Gadahn’s promised contribution: “The following is an extract from the promised interview ‘The Arab Intifada,’ which we were not able to release for timing

reasons . . .” The excerpt comprises three parts: “To the Governments of the Crusader West”; “To the Mujahideen Around the World”; and “Finally, To Those Calling to Islam and Jihad in General, and Those Working on the Internet in Particular.” Gadhafi’s message to the West (p. 37) is essentially “Get out! Or else!” To “the Mujahidin” he offers the Classic AQO Bleed USA, France and Britain to economic crisis and near-collapse, and offers a trade-off—“either the continuation of the Crusade against the Muslims and the continuation of their backing of Israel, or the continuation of viable governments and basic public services [in the West]” (p. 38). Again: “[T]he Arab uprisings show that the American empire is at an unprecedented stage of weakness and decline” (*Ibid.*). Our strategy? “[L]et’s continue to bleed the head of unbelief dry and let’s beware of all attempts to divert us from our strategic objective or draw us into any battles of lower priority, particularly in light of the new realities in the region” (*Ibid.*). And, to “the Callers and Media,” he advises to use every method, and every media—old and new—to reach every segment, in a way they understand:

we should fully acquaint ourselves with both the people to whom we are reaching out as well as the methodology and cause to which we are inviting them, so that we are able to hone our methods, refine our techniques and spread our message in an intelligent and educated fashion accessible to all sectors, sections, levels and factions of the *Ummah* (*Ibid.*).

Abu Yahya al-Libi, “The Middle Path and the Enemy’s Plot,” *Inspire*, Iss. 5, Spring 2011, pp. 13-15; “It is either Jihad or Disgrace. So Choose,” Iss. 6, pp. 55-56; “Take from their guidance for there is no refuge from jihad,” *Inspire*, Iss. 8, Fall 2011, pp. 54-55 (excerpts from his book, *Jihad and the Battle of Misconceptions*); “Cowardliness will always be cowardliness even if you consider it to be using wisdom,” *Inspire*, Iss. 9, Winter 2012, p. 49; “The American Army & War Ethics,” *Inspire*, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 26-27. This is stock propaganda extolling the Truth and Allah, and the False America and Shaytan. It attempts to Satanize the American military over a few select abuses that occurred but were neither officially sponsored nor condoned. The spirit:

This test is the battle between the camp of Tawheed and the camp of Kufr; the allies of Allah and the allies of Shaytan. The allies of Shaytan have a disease in their hearts. This disease manifests itself with their jealousy and plotting against those

who believe. With their total hate of Allah's guidance and His laws [p.26].

210. See the following issues of *Inspire*, which contain excerpts from Abū Muṣ'ab al-Sūrī, *The Global Islamic Resistance Call*, n.p., n.d., in a series. Abū Muṣ'ab al-Sūrī, "THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: [THE SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD]," *Inspire*, Iss. 1, Summer 2010, pp. 48-54, contains excerpts from ch. 8, sec. 4. The following issues continue ch. 8, sec. 4, defending the necessity of an individualized terrorist modus operandi:

- Abū Muṣ'ab al-Sūrī, "THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: [THE SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD]," *Inspire*, Iss. 2, Fall 2010, pp. 17-21;
- Abū Muṣ'ab al-Sūrī, "THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: [THE SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD]," *Inspire*, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, pp. 31-35;
- Abū Muṣ'ab al-Sūrī, "THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: [THE SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD]," *Inspire*, Iss. 5, Spring 2011, pp. 29-32;
- Abū Muṣ'ab al-Sūrī, "THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: [THE SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD]," *Inspire*, Iss. 6, Summer 2011, p. 15;
- Abū Muṣ'ab al-Sūrī, "THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: [THE SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD]," *Inspire*, Iss. 8, Fall 2011, pp. 18-19;
- Abū Muṣ'ab al-Sūrī, "THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: [THE SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD]," *Inspire*, Iss. 9, Winter 2012, pp. 23-24;
- Abū Muṣ'ab al-Sūrī, "THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: [THE SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD]," *Inspire*, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, pp. 22-24;
- Abū Muṣ'ab al-Sūrī, "THE JIHĀDĪ EXPERIENCES: [THE SCHOOLS OF JIHĀD]," *Inspire*, Iss. 12, Spring 2014, pp. 42-43.

211. See the following article series: Anwar al-Awlaki, "Why Did I Choose Al Qaeda?" in the following issues of *Inspire*: Iss. 4, Winter 2010, pp. 48-50; Iss. 5, Spring 2011, pp. 62-64; Iss. 6, Summer 2011, pp. 32-34; Iss. 8, Fall 2011, pp. 50-53; Iss.9, Winter 2012, pp. 42-43; Iss. 10, Spring 2013, pp. 34-35; Iss.11, Spring 2013, p. 27; Iss. 12, Spring 2014, pp. 32-33.

212. "Spying: I am a Muslim, Spying is *Kufr*," *Inspire*, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, p. 36 (likely related to drone warfare); Anwar al-Awlaki, "The Ruling on Dispossessing the Disbelievers wealth in Dar al-Harb," *Inspire*, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, pp. 55-60; "Targeting the Populations of Countries that are at War with the Muslims: Coming Soon," *Inspire*, Iss. 7, Fall 2011, p. 36 (Advertisement for al-Awlaki's upcoming article). Anwar al-Awlaki, "Targeting the Populations of Countries that are at War with the Muslims," *Inspire*, Iss. 8, Fall 2011, pp. 40-47; Shaykh Harith al-Nadhari, "The Ruling of Burning the Forests in the Lands of the Kuffar Enemies," *Inspire*, Iss. 9, Winter 2012, pp. 45-48; Sheikh Harith An-Nadhari, "Condition for the Word of Tawheed," *Inspire*, Iss. 12, Spring 2014, pp. 34-35; Sheikh Nasr Al-Anisi, "A Message to the American People Regarding the Killing of the Hostage Luke Summers," *Inspire*, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 8-9; "Excerpts from Al-Malahem's Q & A Session with Sheikh Nasr Al-Anisi," *Inspire*, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, p. 9 (Includes the question, "What is the role of the lone Mujahideen in repelling this crusade?"); Sheikh Harith An-Nadhari, "The Word of Tawheed: Part 2: The Meaning and the Pillars of the Word of Tawheed," *Inspire*, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 38-39 (also advertises "Next Issue: The Types of Tawheed" [p. 39]); "Q & A with Sheikh Anwar al-Awlaki," *Inspire*, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 52-53 (responses to five emailed questions); Sheikh Harith An-Nadhari, "Conditions of the Word of Tawheed," *Inspire*, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 24-29.

213. See the ongoing article series, "Open Source Jihad" (OS) in the following issues of *Inspire*: Iss. 1, Summer 2010, pp. 31-44; Iss. 2, Fall 2010, pp. 51-59; Iss. 4, Winter 2010, pp. 37-43; Iss. 5, Spring 2011, pp. 22-25; Iss. 6, Summer 2011, pp. 36-45; Iss. 8, Fall 2011, pp. 27-39; Iss.9, Winter 2012, pp. 26-40 (includes creedal permission to firebomb and start forest fires, etc.); Iss. 10, Spring 2013, pp. 49-57 (includes torching parked cars, causing road accidents with oil, ambushing, and tire bursters). For their delusional reasoning:

The goal is . . . that if enough Muslims fulfill their obligations to Jihad, the Kuffar and their insurance companies will be so sick of the terror caused and money wasted by these simple operations that they will press their government to stop the tyranny against Muslims. These operations come under the umbrella of deterrence operations [p. 55].

See also, OSJ Specialist Consultant, "You Ask, We Answer," *Inspire*, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 56, who put the question, "Who can use OSJ tools and ideas?" and supplies the answer:

Inspire Magazine seeks to free the oppressed nations from the Western Hegemony [sic]. There tools are for muslims [sic] in particular, but others could also use them in their war against the present oppressors, America and its allies [emphasis in original].

"Lone Mujahid Pocketbook: A step to step guide on how to become a successful lone mujahid. Collected from *Inspire* Magazine Issue 1-10's OSJ [sic]," *Inspire*, Open Source Jihad Special, No Number given, pp. 1-63; *Inspire*, Iss. 12, Spring 2014, pp. 62-72 (on car bombs; at pp. 71-72, a large photograph with the heading, "The right man in the right place devastates the enemy: Choose wisely"); *Inspire*, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, p. 15, presents a "martyrdom seeker" with New York City in the background, and states: "If you Have the Knowledge and Inspiration all That's Left is to Take Action. OSJ: Empowering Muslims"; "Interview with the AQ-Chef [bombmaker]," *Inspire*, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 20-21; "From AQ's Kitchen: The Hidden Bomb: 1. Breaching Airport Security; 2. Making the Hidden Bomb; 3. Field Tactics," *Inspire*, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 66-109. This OSJ section is earlier introduced by Yahya Ibrahim, "Editor's Letter," p. 4, in the following words:

Hereby, *Inspire* Magazine is committed to arm Muslim individuals – as well as Muslim groups as is in this issue – in their Jihad on America. Previously, we have presented Muslims with different weapons, including bombs and tactics. . . . Now we are obliged to give your *ummah* something special. Something unique that can easily be prepared at home.

Also, at p. 69, see the following dedication:

Dedication: To the vanguard of lone jihad; Ramzi Yusuf, 'Umar Farouq, Richard Ried [sic] among other brothers. . . . To he who Humiliated American's [sic] arrogance, the lion behind bars, Khalid Sheikh Muhammad. . . . To our amir Dr. Aiman Adwawahir [al-Zawahiri]. . . . To every Muslim concerned with supporting the religion.

At the end of this OSJ section an assassination list is supplied, which includes the following:

American Economy High Profile Target: We can categorize them into two groups . . . Economic Personalities. . . and Wealthy Entrepreneurs—These are people who run the American economy. They are considered to be the great economic minds. It is not necessary for them to have a large capital [sic]. One example is Ben Shalom Bernanke. He is the current Chairman of the Federal Reserve, the central bank of the United States, one of the most important influential personalities in the stock market and world economy.

(A photo of Bernanke accompanies this section.) Also on *Inspire's* assassins list are: "'Company Owners': They have the largest capitals [sic], the greatest investors in America. One of them is William Henry 'Bill' Gates, the current chairman of Microsoft. He has a great influence in the American economy" [sic] (also accompanied by a picture of Gates). See also, p. 111: Detailed instructions on how to carry out an assassination of these persons, under the heading, "Preparation Steps of the Operation," where one is instructed to wait for a "Chance," and instructions are offered to potential targets on how they may avoid assassination:

The economists and wealthy people can save themselves and their money by following simple conditions: 1. Drawing all their money from American banks, and moving them to banks that are not related to the American stock market. 2. Investing their wealth outside American soil. 3. Declaring via media that he is far from American policies towards Muslims and America's support for Israel.

See also, *Inspire*, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, p. 61, appearing just before the official OSJ section, a "Did You Know?" claiming a 95.7% success rate of smuggling a water bottle through United States Transportation Security Administration (TSA) security measures; "Assassination Operations," *Inspire*, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 62-71, includes the following: "A. Specifying a Target, B. Collecting Information, C. Generating a Plan, Preparing for the Operation, Executing the Operation"; The AQ-Chef, "Designing a Hand Grenade," *Inspire*, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 72-81; Reconnaissance Team, "Assassinations: Field Tactics," *Inspire*, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 82-87. Presented here are photographs of: "Economic Personalities" Bernanke and Robert James Shiller (listing the latter's accomplishments, and as a co-recipient of 2013 Nobel in

Economic Science); "Wealthy Enterpreneuers [sic] and Company Owners," listing multi-billionaires Bill Gates, Warren Buffet, Lawrence Joseph (Oracle), Charlie and David Koch, Sam Walton, Sheldon Adelson, and Michael Bloomberg. The article repeats (see p. 87) the conditions required for removal from their targeted assassination list:

And we repeat what we had mentioned in the previous issue to whosoever wants to secure himself and wealth [sic], we say. . . 1. Drawing all their money from American banks, and moving them to banks that are not related to the American stock market. 2. Investing their wealth outside American soil. 3. Declaring via media that he is far from American policies towards Muslims and America's support for Israel.

214. See *Inspire*, Iss. 1, Summer 2010, pp. 5-29 for statements about Nigerian Umar al-Faruq Friday, December 25, 2009, attempted downing of Northwest Airlines flight 253 jet; "Operation Hemorrhage," *Inspire*, Iss. 3, November 2010, pp. 3-10, 13-16 (explosive cartridges sent to Jewish synagogues); "Prepared by The External Operations Team: Neurotmesis: Cutting the Nerves & Isolating the Head [of the Snake]," *Inspire*, Iss. 13, front cover, Winter 2014, and pp. 60-63: This article declares:

In short, the program [Neurotmesis] is about targeting different modes of transport. These are counted as the security's Achilles' heel, e.g. aviation and others. These targets include public and private, passenger and freight transport system.

It continues: "this program is for you, Muslim in the West. We single you out because you yearn to act and support, to repel and expel aggressors and oppressors" (p. 60). It then outlines a general program, including identifying "main pillars of the American power. [sic] American's war – like any other country or organization – is based on four main pillars: 1. Military technology; 2. Manpower; 3. Media; 4. Economy." The article concludes by describing "the Military Policy of Al-Qaeda in its War Against America" (pp. 62-63) and various direct and indirect economic targets (pp. 62-64); Sheikh Nasr Al-Anisi [AQAP], "Statement Regarding the Blessed Paris Operation: 'Vengeance for the Prophet'," *Inspire*, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 7-9; Ibrahim Hassan Az-A'sir, "Charlie Hebdo: Military Analysis," *Inspire*, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 38-42; "Timeline: Selected list of operations targeting those who

insult the prophet [sic] and religion of Islam" (10 listed, both successful and unsuccessful attacks), in *Inspire*, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 48-49 (see also, An-Nadhary and al-Awlaki listed at bottom with lift-out quotes); see also, "The Greatest Special Operation of all Time: The Expeditions of Washington, D.C. and New York," *Inspire*, Iss. 7, Fall 2011, Special Issue: 10th Anniversary of 9/11, pp. 12-14; "A Decade in Pictures: From 9/11 Till Today," *Inspire*, Iss. 7, Fall 2011, pp. 16-35, which leads off with this quote, p. 16:

A great and powerful nation, isolated from the rest of the world by two great oceans, America believed it could carry on with an imperialistic policy in the Muslim world without suffering the consequences. 9/11 proved America wrong. American's [sic] evil has come back to haunt it. Following 9/11, George W. Bush promised a war on Islam and Muslims, which he termed the 'War on Terror.' He also forecasted [sic] that this war would be a long one. Here we look into the main events and consequences of what is turning out to be an epic conflict between the Muslims and the West.

215. See for example: "How to communicate with us" page appearing in various issues: *Inspire*, Iss. 2, Fall 2010, p. 72; *Inspire*, Iss. 3, November 2010, p. 22; *Inspire*, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, pp. 44-46 (including here an extensive discussion of operational security); *Inspire*, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, p. 65; *Inspire*, Iss. 5, Spring 2011, p. 67 (includes advertisement for digital downloads); *Inspire*, Iss. 5, Spring 2011, p. 69; *Inspire*, Iss. 6, Summer 2011, p. 60; *Inspire*, Iss. 7, Fall 2011, p. 37; *Inspire*, Iss. 8, Fall 2011, p. 62; *Inspire*, Iss. 9, Winter 2012, p. 61; *Inspire*, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 60; *Inspire*, Iss. 11, Special Issue, Spring 2013, p. 38.

216. The following is the virtual universal set of these themes as presented in *Inspire*. See "O Martyr, You have illuminated," *Inspire*, Iss. 1, Summer 2010, p. 30; "MY LIFE IN JIHAD: THE STORY OF COMMANDER `UTHMAN AL-GHAMIDI," *Inspire*, Iss. 2, Fall 2010, pp. 11-16; Abu Dujanah al-Khurasani "O HESITANT ONE: IT'S AN OBLIGATION," *Inspire*, Iss. 2, Fall 2010, pp. 65-66 ("author" murdered a CIA team in Khost in blackmail); *Inspire*, Iss. 2, Fall 2010, pp. 67-68 (re: martyrs); *Inspire*, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, p. 25 (re: advertisement, "What Will You Choose," Jannah [Paradise] or Hellish Torment, and at the bottom of the page the tag line states: "This ad a product of INDIVIDUAL JIHAD"; Abu

Khowla, "WHICH IS BETTER: MARTYRDOM OR VICTORY?" *Inspire*, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, pp. 26-28; *Inspire*, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, p. 62 (re: Jihadi Cool, Gangsta-type rap poem); *Inspire*, Iss. 4, Winter 2010, p. 64 (re: Shuhada [martyrdom]-type videos); *Inspire*, Iss. 5, Spring 2011, pp. 56-59 (re: Jihad Stories); *Inspire*, Iss. 5, Spring 2011, p. 61 (re: Abyan, Yemen In Search of Martyrdom); "Shuhada Exclusive," *Inspire*, Iss. 6, Summer 2011, pp. 16-30, with focus on Abu Ali Al-Harithi, Ammar al-Wa'ili, and Fawaz al-Ma'ribi. Some lift out quotes include: "So why do you continue to rush to your homes and not to the palaces of Paradise" (p. 24), and "Before he would set out in any operation, he would raise his hands to the heavens and beg Allah for shahada, crying endlessly" (p. 29); "Progeny of the Exceptional" *Inspire*, Iss. 6, Summer 2011, p. 54; *Inspire*, Iss. 6, Summer 2011, p. 57 (re: a quote from *Sahih al-Bukhari*):

All my [Prophet Muhammad] followers will enter Paradise except those who refuse. They [his followers] asked, 'O Allah's Apostle! Who will refuse?' He said, 'Whoever obeys me will enter Paradise, and whoever disobeys me is the one who refuses (to enter it).'

Shaykh Ibrahim al-Banna, "The martyrdom of the Commander Abu Ayman," *Inspire*, Iss. 8, Fall 2011, pp. 12-15; Ayub Sideeq, "The unique trait of al-mu'minîn," *Inspire*, Iss. 8, Fall 2011, p. 58-59 (re: The unique trait of the faithful is incitement to martyrdom); *Inspire*, Iss. 8, Fall 2011, pp. 60-61 (re: two pages—one an advertisement for the "Convoy of Martyrs" video, and the second a poem, "The hymn of my life"; *Inspire*, Iss. 9, Winter 2012, pp. 8-21 (re: the section, "Shuhada' Special"). This includes an ultra-martyrdom quote from Prophet Muhammad, p. 8, and the following articles: Shaykh Harith Al Nadari, "My story with Al Awlaki," pp. 9-13; Abu Yazeed, "Samir Khan: The Face of Joy," pp. 14-19; Um Ahmed, "They Killed Father, They Killed Son," p. 20, "The Path of Honor," p. 21 (re: martyrdom-celebrating prose); "OSJ," *Inspire*, Iss. 9, Winter 2012, p. 28 (re: "The Convoy of Martyrs: Rise up and board with us"), located at the beginning of the OSJ section, reads:

The objective of this workshop is to communicate with those seekmartyrdom [sic] operations or those who want to execute a slaughter to the enemies of Islam, those who have no means of contacting their Mujahideen brothers whatever the reasons, the

aim is to activate them in the midst of the enemy weather [sic] the enemy was [sic] the Jews, the Christians or the apostates. It is becoming obvious to many that the concept of individual jihad which features [sic] have begun to appear recently has been called for by the leaders of jihad. it [sic] is briefly that one individual only carries out the entire jihadi operation. For more information about the concept of individual jihad, watch the film entitled 'You are not held responsible except for yourself' produced by al-Sahab jihadi foundation. [And at the very bottom of this one-page introduction, targets are identified] . . . "Targets: 1-Personalities who are at war with Islam and Muslims; 2-Economic targets belonging to the enemy; 3-Military targets belonging to the enemy; 4-Media targets belonging to the enemy.

It continues under the heading "Targets according to priority" . . . "American targets; Israeli targets; French targets; British targets; Apostate regimes targets in the Muslims's lands" (p. 28); *Inspire*, Iss. 9, Winter 2012, (re: quote from the Quran: "The Day their faces will be turned about in the Fire, they will say, 'How we wish we had obeyed Allah and obeyed the Messenger'" [Quran 33:67] (p. 44); Abu Muhammad, "Unremorseful Mujahid," *Inspire*, Iss. 9, Winter 2012, p. 59 (re: Umar al-Faruq al-Nigiri); Samir Zafar Khan, "The Dust Will Never Settle Down," *Inspire*, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, pp. 12-13 (re: It states: "Written by martyred Brother: Samir Zafar Khan (may Alah [sic] accept his martyrdom); *Inspire*, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 14 (re: a full-page ad which states, "Yes We Can: A Bullet a Day Keeps the Infidel Away; Defend Prophet Muhammed peace be upon him."), *Inspire*, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 15 (re: "Wanted Dead or Alive for Crimes Against Islam"; eleven pictures are posted, and two names without pictures in large font, for targeted assassination accused of insulting/blaspheming the Prophet); *Inspire*, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 19 (re: advertisement for "a video coming soon" . . . "He Takes from Among You Martyrs, 5."); *Inspire*, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 20 (re: quote, Quran 9:111 [i.e., a key covenant promise of eternal life and abundance for killing and being killed in military jihad] centered on page, as stand-alone); *Inspire*, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 21, (re: Abu Ziyad Al-Muhajir, "Brother 'Askar, Abu Yazeed Al-Qatary," obituary on his "martyrdom" in Sana'a); *Inspire*, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 25 (re: a photograph of a "mujahid" with gun strapped on shoulder longing to fight with a poem placed in the foreground which reads: "Whoever does not die by the sword, will die by other means, Various are the means but death is one, Provided there

is no escape from death, it is of weakness that you die in a cowardly manner.”); Taiel Haya, Women of Jihad—Facebook, “My Wish: If only I was a mujahid,” *Inspire*, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 30; Umm Yahya, “Women of the Glorious *Ummah*,” *Inspire*, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, pp. 31-33 (re: After deconstructing the shallowness of materialism, instilling guilt, and perplexity about purpose, and addressing doubts others raise about female weakness and value, the following is stated:

O sister, you have to wake up the hearts of the men, and arouse the determination of the heroes, and say, ‘We refuse humiliation and subjection, misery or subservience; and we want to be free from having to bow to the cross worshippers. You have to push your loved ones to the battlefield’ [emphasis added]. The Lord of the worlds is more deserving that we sacrifice what is most beloved to us for His sake, from our lives and our wealth. I say to you my Muslim sister, the least that is expected from you is when the men leave for Jihad, that you stay patient and are pleased with Allah’s orders [p. 32].

It continues:

Our everyday life struggle is nothing compared to the agony and pain of our sisters in Palestine, Burma, Syria, Somalia and Afghanistan. There is so much more within your reach than the narrow path you have carved out for yourself. You are not like the others, you are a strong-willed muslimah [Muslim woman] who wants to build a nation that says no to oppression. A muslimah who wants to abide by the rules of Allah [p. 33].

Abu ‘Ubaydah Al-Hadramy, “Oh Who Sits Behind,” *Inspire*, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 40; Ansar Dine, Salafi Media, “America will never Profit from the Assassination of Imam Anwar Awlaki,” *Inspire*, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 41; Yahya Ibrahim, “We Are all Usama,” *Inspire*, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, pp. 42-44 (re: Hagiographic account of Osama bin Laden, and editor Yahya Ibrahim’s wishful thinking on bin-Laden’s role in current Arab uprisings; Sheikh Harith An-Nadhary, [killed in USG drone strike, January 31, 2015] “To the Knights of Lone Jihad,” *Inspire*, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 46, (re: Lecture excerpt from his “Mujahideen in the Cities,”) it begins:

You are Lethal! You are Devastating! You are the knight who strikes the enemy’s heart, penetrating his armor, exposing his

vulnerabilities. You are the David who cuts down the Goliath. This unique heroic act can only be performed by you, with steadfast determination, unfaltering courage and rock-solid resolution. Few are selected for Allah for this purpose. **The following advises [sic] are presented to the knights of lone jihad** [emphasis added, p. 46].

Sheikh Harith An-Nadhary then lays out six principles: Reliance on Allah, Avoidance of Sins, Trust in the Promise and Reward of Allah, Perseverance, “‘Have a good omen,’ i.e., Don’t worry, you will again be near your target, and Patience,” *Inspire*, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, p. 47 (re: A lone jihad ad; hoodie-clad, dark, overseeing a huge metropolis, with quote from Quran “So fight in the cause of Allah, you are not held responsible except for yourself. And inspire the believers” [4: 84]); “The Battalion of Terror,” *Inspire*, Iss. 10, Spring 2013, pp. 58-59 (re: A full-page ad with M-16, and suicide belt). It states:

IT IS YOU, YES IT’S YOU AND YOU ALONE—THE TERRORIST NEXT DOOR. SO BE TRUE TO ALLAH, AND BEING TRUE TO ALLAH IS TAKING YOUR WEAPON, PRAYING YOUR TWO RAKAAT, ASKING ALLAH TO HELP YOU—GET OUT TO YOUR ENEMY, HE IS JUST NEXT DOOR.

Among the quotes to follow: “It’s Either Victory or Martyrdom! . . . Did you Know that the Oppressed Muslims all Over the World are Waiting for You to Act?” pp. 58-59; “Dear American Muslim,” *Inspire*, Iss. 11, Special Issue, Spring 2013, pp. 16-17 (re: includes Boston Marathon bombing); *Inspire*, Iss. 11, Special Issue, Spring 2013, pp. 18-25 (re: Several short incitement jihad/martyrdom pieces and photographs concluding with Boston bomber); *Inspire*, Iss. 11, Special Issue, Spring 2013, p. 26 (re: Advertisement for “Convoy of Martyrs, 2,” a video with English subtitles); Muhammad As-San’ani, “An Eye for an Eye; The Dear Price & The Constant Turmoil,” *Inspire*, Iss. 11, Special Issue, Spring 2013, p. 24 (re: adulatory account of the savage beheading of an off-duty British soldier by Adebolajo and Adebowale; Boston Marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev referenced using agitational propaganda (“agitprop”)); Tamerlan Tsaraev is shown decked out like a gangsta in Paradise; Abu Abdillah, “Cover Story: Who and Why,” *Inspire*, Iss. 11, Special Issue, Spring 2013, pp. 28-37 (re: on the Boston Marathon terrorist act, an account using incitement agitprop; “The Arson Jihad: lex talionis,” *Inspire*, Iss. 12, Spring

2014, p. 14; "Sincere advice from a muhajir," *Inspire*, Iss. 12, Spring 2014, p. 15; "City Wolves," *Inspire*, Iss. 12, Spring 2014, pp. 30-31; Muhannad J. S., "24/7 Terrorism," *Inspire*, Iss. 12, Spring 2014, pp. 36-40 (re: includes a quote from Rep. Peter T. King in lift out, "We have an enemy that is 24/7 trying to find ways to kill us in many forms" at pp. 36-37); Abu Nuh, "The Good, the Lamb and the Ugly," *Inspire*, Iss. 12, Spring 2014, p. 41; *Inspire*, Iss. 12, Spring 2014, pp. 50-51 (this includes a photograph of a lone traveler in a train and the statement: "For how long will you live in tension? Instead of just sitting, having no solution, Simply stand up, pack your tools of destruction. Assemble your bomb, ready for detonation."); "Interview with the AQ-Chef [bombmaker]," *Inspire*, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 20-21 (At page p. 21, after stating "**All in all, we call Muslims to participate in lone Jihad and make use of what the Mujahideen write and advise so that they achieve a better result Biidhnillah** [emphasis added].") – article includes six "lone mujahid" quotes including Michael Adebolajo Mujahid (i.e., the British terrorist who attacked Rigby), Tamour Abudl-Wahhab, Nidal Hassan (Fort Hood terrorist), Ali Muhammad Brown, and Faizal Shahzad (attempted but failed detonation of New York City Times Square Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Device [VBIED]); Sheikh Abul-Harith Al-Iraqi, "Strike the Sea with Your Stick," *Inspire*, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 26-27, the lift out paragraph reads:

Fight in the Way of Allah, even if you have nothing but the kitchen of your mom, even if you have nothing but matchsticks, even if you have nothing but a pressure cooker. Know that Allah has subdued everything for us. So be determined and place your trust in Allah, and have sincerity [emphasis added].

Also presents photographs of over one dozen "martyrs"; Commander Shamel Basayev, "Independence and Courage," *Inspire*, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, p. 30 (Excerpt adapted from the book, "The Book of a Mujahid."); "The Journey of Jihad," *Inspire*, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, p. 30 (re: Advertisement for three part documentary); Sheikh Ibrahim Al-Banna, "Between yesterday & tomorrow: the language America understands," *Inspire*, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 32-33; *Inspire*, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 34-35 (re: Interview with AQAP's Abu Dahdah and Basil Az-Zahrani, "I talk to *Inspire* [double entendre intended]"); "Jihad profiles," *Inspire*, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 40-41 (re: focus on Ramzi Yusuf [real name:

Abdul Basit Mahmoud Abdul Kareem], with pictures and timeline); further states that he is the “First Mujahid to Attack the US Homeland” (p. 40); provides a lift out quote at top of page 41 of Ramzi Yusuf’s testimony to the court:

Yes, I am a terrorist, and proud of it as long as it is against the U.S. government and against Israel, because you are more than terrorists; you are the one [sic] who invented terrorism and using [sic] it every day. You are butchers, liars and hypocrites.”

Also lists eight separate terrorist attacks or attempts, from 1993-1995; “The Virtues of Inghimaasi: Immersing oneself deep into enemy lines to inflict damage or attain Shahada,” *Inspire*, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 42-45, described as “Chapter in the book *Mashari’ul Ashwaq*, by Iman Ibnu Nuhas, translated by Sheikh Anwar Al-’Awlaqi.” Also includes “[five] [e]xamples of Inghimaasi operations,” which are listed below along with photographs: the 2008 Mumbai, India, attack; 2013 Westgate attacks, Nairobi, Kenya; Fort Hood Shooter Nidal Hassan; Yemen Defense Ministry, and United Nations Headquarters in Mogadishu. It states: “More than 23 apostates & 17 crusaders killed,” and in a lift out quote,

The Messenger of Allah said: ‘A time will come when the best among mankind would be a man holding on to the bridle of his horse in the Sake of Allah, [sic] whenever he hears a call to battle he mounts his horse and searches for death’ [p. 45].

“It’s Not Necessary,” *Inspire*, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, p. 53, shows a picture of a “lone wolf” standing over a crowded street, with the following words written above:

It’s not necessary to do what Muhammad ‘Atta did, [key 9/11 terrorist perpetrator] it’s enough to do what Nidal Hassan [Fort Hood terrorist] did. It’s not necessary to see victory over the enemy, it’s enough to be part of making the victory. It’s not necessary to travel to the battlefield, it’s enough to kill the enemy back home [emphasis added].

Abu Muhammad as-Sana-ani, “Inspire Exclusive: Inspiration: The Story of Abu Rawi As-Sway’ari,” *Inspire*, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 54-55 (includes a description of “Operation: Martyrdom operation on US drone operations base, Say’un, Hadramat); Muhsin Ali, “Facing Fear in Jihad,” *Inspire*, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 56-57

(includes sidebar, “10 useless matters [i.e., excuses] that cannot be benefited from [sic]”); *Inspire*, Iss. 13, Winter 2014, pp. 58-59 (includes an advertisement sponsored by “A Lone Jihad,” showing a man walking a big city street with huge knife, backpack, and a grenade); Khalid As-San’ani, “Suleiman Al-Halaby: 18th Century Lone Mujahid Assassin: Suleiman Al-Halabi First Lone Mujahid to Attack the French,” *Inspire*, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 30-31; “Some Things are too Beautiful to be Forgotten: Will We Ever Experience Such a Sight Once More?” *Inspire*, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 32-33 (shows a picture of 9/11 WTC towers exploding); Qadhi Bishr, “Remembering Boston: Friday lecture,” *Inspire*, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 34-36; Abu Nuh, “A Mountain of Ice,” *Inspire*, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, p. 37; *Inspire*, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 44-45 (Photograph of al-AQAP Emir al-Wuhayshi killed by USG drone strike in June); “Timeline: Selected list of operations targeting those who insult the prophet and religion of Islam,” *Inspire*, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 48-49 (includes 10 listed [successful and unsuccessful] attacks); and, An-Nadhary and al-Awlaki (listed at bottom with lift out quotes); Shaykh Batal’i, “If you Return We Too Shall Return,” *Inspire*, Iss. 14, Summer 2015, pp. 52-55.

217. For potential insights on ISO derived from social scientific research on gangs, see Scott H. Decker and David C. Pyrooz, “‘I’m down for a Jihad’: How 100 Years of Gang Research can inform the Study of Terrorism, Radicalization and Extremism,” *Perspective on Terrorism*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2015, pp. 104-112, available from www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/405.

218. “THE MURTADD BROTHERHOOD,” *Dabiq*, Iss. 14, p. 43.

219. “FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH,” *Dabiq*, Iss. 1, pp. 38-41.

220. Figure 3 adapted from *Ibid.*, p. 38.

221. *Ibid.*, pp. 34-36 (respectively); See also, “THE CONCEPT OF IMAMAH (LEADERSHIP): IS FROM THE MILLAH (PATH) OF IBRAHIM,” *Dabiq*, Iss. 1, pp. 20-30 (4-part presentation); The requirement of Hijrah and *Bay’ah* to the Caliph is discussed in “FOREWORD,” *Dabiq*, Iss. 2, pp. 3-4; Abu Muhammad al-Adnani al-Shami, “This is The Promise of Allah,”; Al-Qurashi al-Baghda-

di, "A Message to the Mujahidin and the Muslim Ummah in the Month of Ramadan."

222. "FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH," *Dabiq*, Iss. 1, p. 38.

223. *Ibid.*

224. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

225. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

226. *Ibid.*

227. *Ibid.* The use of the term "mujaddid" here is curious. It refers not to the Quran but to a hadith in *Sunan Abu Dawood*, Book 37: *Kitab al-Malahim* [Battles], Hadith Number 4278, available from kalamullah.com/sunan-abu-dawood.html, accessed on October 22, 2015, in which it is declared: "Abu Hurairah narrated that the Islamic prophet Muhammad said 'Allah will raise for this community at the end of every hundred years the one who will renovate its religion for it.'" According to Islamic tradition, this great renewer returns the faith to purity, cleansing it of unacceptable accretions, but arises from among the most prominent of Islamic scholars or pious rulers. See the question and answer from Islamqa.org, "Concept of a Mujaddid and the past and present ones," available from islamqa.org/hanafi/darululoomtt/52180, accessed on October 21, 2015. Al-Zarqawi's organization emerges c. 2000, and it appears his sycophantic followers have bequeathed on him this title, which was reserved in past times for sages and pious rulers.

228. See Ahmed S. Hashim, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq*, chs. 1, 2.

229. "FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH," *Dabiq*, Iss. 1, p. 37.

230. *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37. The "istishadiyyin" [i.e., those who volunteer to become 'martyrdom seekers'] are what we now refer to as "suicide bombers" or "martyrdom operations." Recall that al-Zarqawi's encounter with Abu Abdallah al-Muhajir was key to his acceptance of these operations on Sharia grounds. See also, Hamza Mustafa, "Inghimasis' . . . Fourth Generation of ISIS's

Bombers,” *Asharq Al-Awsat*, July 11, 2016, available from *www.opensource.gov*, accessed on July 11, 2016, for a description of this ultra-fanatical special unit designed, according to Mustafa, to “fight till the last breath before they explode themselves . . . [and as] . . . a special faction of ISIS, which pledged victory or death and never to be captured or run away.”

231. “FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH,” *Dabiq*, Iss. 1, p. 37.

232. *Ibid.*

233. *Ibid.*

234. *Ibid.*

235. See Scott Helfstein, Nassir Abdullah, and Muhammad al-Obaidi, *Deadly Vanguard: A Study of al-Qa’ida’s Violence Against Muslims*, Occasional Paper Series, West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, December 1, 2009, pp. 2-3, available from <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/deadly-vanguards-a-study-of-al-qaidas-violence-against-muslims>, accessed on January 3, 2010.

236. For examples of the earliest publicity glorifying these terrorist operations, and easily classifiable as pertinent to this phase, see *ISLAMIC STATE NEWS*, Iss. 1, June 1, 2014, available from jihadology.net/2014/05/31/al-%e1%b8%a5ayat-media-center-presents-a-new-issue-of-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-shams-newsletter-islamic-state-news-1/, accessed on August 6, 2014; *ISLAMIC STATE NEWS*, Iss. 2, c. June 2014, available from jihadology.net/2014/06/05/al-%e1%b8%a5ayat-media-center-presents-a-new-issue-of-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-shams-newsletter-islamic-state-news-2/, accessed August 20, 2014; *ISLAMIC STATE REPORT*, Iss. 2, c. June 2014, available from jihadology.net/2014/06/07/al-%e1%b8%a5ayat-media-center-presents-a-new-issue-of-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-shams-magazine-islamic-state-report-2/, accessed on July 8, 2014; and, *ISLAMIC STATE NEWS*, Iss. 3, c. June 2014, available from jihadology.net/2014/06/10/al-%e1%b8%a5ayat-media-center-presents-a-new-issue-of-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-shams-newsletter-islamic-state-news-3/, accessed on August 28, 2014. Hereafter all citations to the *Islamic State News* or *The Islamic State Reports* magazines refer only to issue number without the publication date. This graphic pictorial format accompanied by brief reports on terrorist “ni-

kaya" attacks was later incorporated in sections of their flagship publication, *Dabiq*. For evidence in *Dabiq*, see "ISLAMIC STATE NEWS," *Dabiq*, Iss. 1, pp. 42-48 (which documents terror attacks and alleged acts of "repentance"); "ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS," *Dabiq*, Iss. 2, pp. 13-17 (discussion of fighting, destruction of "Shirk" (i.e., destruction of Shia tombs, shrines, and mosques); "ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS," *Dabiq*, Iss. 3, pp. 12-22 (documents "punishing the Sahwat," i.e., punishing in practice **everyone** who opposes ISO, does not repent and turn in their weapons; this section includes coverage of terror, destruction, murder, assassination, and the destruction of shrines); "IN THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY," *Dabiq*, Iss. 3, pp. 35-40; "ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS," *Dabiq*, Iss. 4, pp. 18-29 (includes reports on various aspects of destabilization and terror, but also descriptions of consolidation [*tamkin*]of the State, e.g. creation of a new province "Wilayat Al-Furat" on basis of the alleged elimination of the historic Sykes-Picot border, [pp. 18-19]; the conquest of Al-Faluja [p. 20], a pledge from Ansar al-Islam [pp. 21-2], various terrorist operations [23-26]; and, "A Window into the Islamic State" [pp. 27-29] which focuses on repaired bridges, restored electricity, elderly home care, cancer treatment of a child, and services for Muslims, including street cleaning [pp. 27-29]); "ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS," *Dabiq*, Iss. 6, pp. 26-33 (includes training camps, fighting and consolidation, killing of opponents); "MAJOR OPERATIONS IN LIBYA AND SINAI," *Dabiq*, Iss. 7, pp. 40-41; "SOLDIERS OF TERROR," *Dabiq*, Iss. 8, pp. 17-19 (documents horrific ISO terror attacks in Yemen and Tunisia); "FOREWORD," *Dabiq*, Iss. 9, pp. 3-4 (lauds Garland, TX, terrorist attack); "For the Sake of Allah FISABILIL-LAH," *Dabiq*, Iss. 9, p. 5 (a terrorist incitement/recruitment advertisement directed at Germany, Britain, France, and Australia); *Dabiq*, Iss. 9, p. 27 (several videos advertised, including presentation in the 4th video of a horrified person displaying an extreme fear face, and also includes attack and terror scenes); "HARVESTING THE SAHWAH" and "THE CAPTURE OF THE 4TH REGIMENT BASE," *Dabiq*, Iss. 9, pp. 28-30; "The Yarmūk Camp," *Dabiq*, Iss. 9, pp. 34-36 (directed at "the tawaghit [idolaters] of [Palestinian] Hamas . . . [who are] appealing to Iran for intervention, while the PLO tawaghit are agreeing to have their militias serve as a Nusayri Sahwah"); "Until There Came to Them Clear Evidence," *Dabiq*, Iss. 9, p. 43 (a one-page gang-like murderdom advertisement that portrays a brutal assassin standing above a kneeling, submissive hostage — with subtitles in English, French,

Kurdish, Turkish, and German—and providing instructions on how to download it); *Dabiq*, Iss. 9, p. 78 (a one-page advertisement for 10 videos whose covers portray destruction, execution, bombings, and extreme fear-faces of victims; mimics format of widely-available shooter-videos); “AMERICAN KURDISTAN,” *Dabiq*, Iss. 10, pp. 30-34 (a dehumanized, demonization of Kurds); “THE FINAL STATEMENT OF ABŪ SINĀN AN-NAJDĪ,” *Dabiq*, Iss. 11, pp. 34-35 (the Saudi terrorist who carried out a terrorist operation on Saudi soil; his “Shahid” [martyrdom] statement published here); “SELECTED10,” *Dabiq*, Iss. 11, p. 15 (a one-page advertisement for 10 videos focused on murder, terror, fighting, and “repentance”; the 10th video is titled, “There is Life in Retribution,” displays a sheathed sword).

237. McCants, *The ISIS Apocalypse*, p. 32.

238. “FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH,” *Dabiq*, Iss. 1, pp. 37-38.

239. For an excellent and incisive examination of the ISI’s Caliphate pretension, and their relation to the history of the Sunni Caliphate, see especially: Nibras Kazimi, “The Caliphate Attempted,” p. 1, Kazimi states, for example, “The Islamic State of Iraq was to be the first incarnation of the resurrected caliphate, and its leader Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi was to be the caliph in waiting.” For earlier critiques of Caliphism within Islam, owing to the divergence between its ideal and real existence in Islamic governance, see Abdel Azim Ramadan, “Fundamentalist Influence in Egypt: The Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood and the *Takfir* Groups,” in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Politics, Economies, and Militance*, Chicago and London, UK: University of Chicago Press, 1993, p. 153.

240. There are multiple spellings of this person’s name; however, this book commonly refers to this person as Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. In keeping with the quoted material from “FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH,” *Dabiq*, Iss. 1, pp. 34-40, in this section (Phase 4: *Consolidation, Remaining, Declaration of the State of Islam [Tamkin]*) of this book, the spelling is presented as Amirul-Mu’minin Abu ‘Umar al-Husayni al-Baghdadi.

241. "FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH," *Dabiq*, Iss. 1, p. 39.

242. For an excellent report based on captured documents between 2005-2009, see Brian Fishman, *Dysfunction and Decline: Lessons Learned from Inside Al-Qa'ida in Iraq*, March 16, 2009, available from www.ctc.usma.edu, accessed on November 8, 2014.

243. "FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH," *Dabiq*, Iss. 1, pp. 38-39.

244. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

245. Associated Press (AP), "Syrian protestors taunt Assad, saying regime next to unravel," *Al Arabiya News*, August 23, 2011, available from www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/08/23/163646.html, accessed on August 31, 2016; Roula Hajjar, "Libyan rebels' advance emboldens Syrian activists: Protesters say uprisings in the region are connected and that they will continue their peaceful movement against President Bashar Assad," *Los Angeles Times*, August 22, 2011, available from articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/22/world/la-fg-libya-syria-20110823, accessed on August 16, 2016.

246. "FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH," *Dabiq*, Iss. 1, p. 40.

247. These developments were emerging as a source of great concern for scholars then beginning to examine the consequences of Syria's rebellion for re-igniting this Zarqawist ember. See for example: Kazimi, "Western Inaction, Lebensraum for Jihad"; Michael R. Gordon and Wesley S. Morgan, "The General's Gambit: Petraeus tried to warn Assad about the foreign fighters in Iraq. Now they're coming for him," *Foreign Policy*, October 1, 2012, available from foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/01/the-generals-gambit/, accessed on August 16, 2016; Murad Batal al-Shishani, "Syria Emerges as a New Battlefield for Jordan's Jihadists," *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 11, No. 1, January 10, 2013, available from www.jamestown.org, accessed on October 2, 2014; Brian Fishman, "Syria Proving More Fertile than Iraq to Al-Qa'ida's Operations," *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 6, No. 11-12, November 2013, pp. 1-6, available from www.ctc.usma.edu, accessed on December 2, 2013; Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, "Op-Ed: Will the Syrian Civil War Last 10 More Years?" December 30, 2013, available from www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Will-the-Syrian-Civil-War-Last-10-More-Years/2013/12/30, accessed on January 6, 2014. The scholarly analysis of the ISI's re-emergence within Iraq c. 2012-2013 is also on

display: Bruce Riedel, "Zarqawism Lives: Iraq's al Qaeda Nightmare Is Back," Op-Ed, August 12, 2013, available from <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/zarqawism-lives-iraqs-al-qaeda-nightmare-is-back/>, accessed on August 16, 2016.

248. Fortunately, much of this is now available in English translation, and interested readers may experience for themselves the documentary evidence of this *fitnah*, and why it is inconceivable without a fundamental transformation of ISO creed, to imagine any future reconciliation between these two Sunni terrorist organizations. To preserve the historical record, and to fully comprehend how this unfolded, we present these in chronological order, alternating between organizations (labeled ISO and AQO) as they level charges and respond.

For Fitnah Speeches/Writings subsequent to his April 7, 2013 ISIS declaration, but before the official Caliphate speech by ISO spokesman al-Adnani June 28, 2014, see:

- **[ISO] April 7, 2013**, see al-Quraishi al-Baghdadi, "The Declaration of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham," April 7, 2013;
- **[AQO] May 23, 2013**, see al-Zawahiri, "Translation of al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri's letter to the leaders of the two Jihadi groups," May 23, 2013;
- **[ISO] June 15, 2013**, see Abū Bakr al-Hussaynī al-Baghdādī, "Remaining in Iraq and al-Shām," Audio-visual message aired June 15, 2013, original Arabic only, available from www.youtube.com/watch?v=AS77jfttxkc, or from Aaron Y. Yelin, "New audio-visual message from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām's Abū Bakr al-Hussaynī al-Baghdādī: 'Remaining in Iraq and al-Shām'," Jihadology, blog entry, posted June 15, 2013, available from jihadology.net/2013/06/15/new-audio-visual-message-from-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-al-shams-abu-bakr-al-%E1%B8%A5ussayni-al-baghdadi-remaining-in-iraq-and-al-sham/, accessed on June 18, 2013, (7-minute audio message that rejects AQO's Ayman al-Zawahiri's 'Ruling' that ISIS be dissolved and that al-Baghdadi return to the Iraqi theater exclusively);
- **[ISO] July 30, 2013**, see Abu Muhammad al-'Adnani al-Shami, "ISIL Spokesman Responds to Accusations, Announces Military Campaign," July 30, 2013, Audio transcript, available from triceratops.brynmawr.edu:8080/dspace/bitstream/handle/10066/13829/ADN20130730_2.

pdf?sequence=1, accessed on December 8, 2014. (From al-'Adnani al-Shami speech, "They shall by no means harm you but with a slight evil," released by al-Furqan Media Foundation July 30, 2013; translation of the speech also available from archive.org/stream/AlAdnaniMayAllahBeWithYouOOppressedState/Al-Adnani-%20They%20Shall%20by%20no%20means%20Harm%20you_djvu.txt, accessed on December 1, 2014;

- **[AQO] September 14, 2013**, see Ayman al-Zawahiri, "General Guidelines for Jihad," Written message archived online by Aaron Y. Yelin, "As-Sahāb Media presents a new release from al-Qā'idah's Dr. Ayman al-Zawāhiri: 'General Guidelines for the Work of aJihādī'," Jihadology, blog entry, posted September 14, 2013, available from <https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/dr-ayman-al-e1ba93awc481hirc4ab-22general-guidelines-for-the-work-of-a-jihc481dc4ab22-en.pdf>, accessed on October 10, 2014. (A key document identifying AQO's TQA at this point; also creedal, methodological);
- **[AQO] October 8, 2013**, see Abdel Moneim al Moshawah, "Zawahiri speech, though confused, shows U.S. is still main al-Qaeda target," Perspective, Al Arabiya Institute For Studies, October 8, 2013, available from english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/alarabiya-studies/2013/10/08/Zawahiri-speech-though-confused-shows-U-S-is-still-key-al-Qaeda-target.html, accessed on December 8, 2014;
- **[AQO] January 7, 2014**, see Abu Muhammad al-Golani, *al-Nusrah* emir, Audio message posted on Twitter January 7, 2014, (Audio tape only in Arabic. Condemns ISIS policy and strategy of weakening war against Assad; calling for truce, prisoner exchange, Sharia adjudication);
- **[ISO] c. early to mid-January 2014**, see Abu Muhammad al-'Adnani al-Shami, "The Scout Doesn't Lie to His People," translated, transcribed, and archived online by Aaron Y. Yelin, "al-Furqān Media presents a new audio message from Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām's Shaykh Abū Muhammad al 'Adnānī: 'The Scout Doesn't Lie To His People'," Jihadology, blog entry, posted on January 7, 2014, available from azelin.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/shaykh-abc5ab-mue1b8a5ammad-al-adnc481nc4ab-22the-scout-doesnt-lie-to-his-people22-en.pdf, accessed on August 31, 2016. A hardcore response explicating ISO's alterna-

tive creed and methods based on power, blood, fear, terror, submission, and an enemies list; responding to the previously mentioned speeches, but also references al-Golani's January 7, 2014 audio message;

- **[AQO] January 16, 2014**, see Thomas Joscelyn, "Statement from Zawahiri's representative shows Syrian rebel group tied to al Qaeda," *The Long War Journal*, January 18, 2014, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/01/statement_from_zawah.php, accessed on January 20, 2014. Provides translated excerpts of Abu Khalid al-Suri's posted Twitter statement criticizing ISIS;
- **[ISO] January 19, 2014**, see Pieter Van Ostaeyen, "Translation of the new audio-message by Abū Bakr al-Baghdādī," *pietervanostaeyen*, blog entry, posted January 19, 2014, available from pietervanostaeyen.wordpress.com/2014/01/19/translation-of-the-new-audio-message-by-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi/, accessed on December 8, 2014. (Addresses "fitnah" among Syrian rebel groups);
- **[AQO] January 23, 2014**, see Ayman al-Zawahiri's speech, in Pieter Van Ostaeyen, "Ayman al-Zawahiri's Attempt to Stop Syria's Fitna," *pietervanostaeyen*, blog entry, posted January 26, 2014, available from <https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/01/26/ayman-az-zawahiris-attempt-to-stop-syrias-fitna/>, accessed on August 31, 2016, (Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri urges Mujahideen of Levant to immediately stop infighting);
- **[AQO] January 23, 2014**, see Scott Lucas, "Syria: Statement of Al Qaeda Leader al-Zawahiri: An urgent call to our people in the Levant," *EA Worldview*, January 23, 2014, available from eaworldview.com/2014/01/syria-statement-al-qaeda-leader-al-zawahiri/, accessed on December 8, 2014. (English translation by Flashpoint Partners of full audio statement);
- **[AQO] January 23, 2014**, see Aaron Y. Zelin, "New statement from Dr. 'Abd Allah bin Muhammad al-Muhaysini: "Mubādarah al-Ummah," *Jihadology*, blog entry, posted January 23, 2014, available from jihadology.net/2014/01/23/new-statement-from-dr-abd-allah-bin-mu%E1%B8%A5ammad-al-mu%E1%B8%A5aysini-mubadarah-al-ummah/, accessed on December 8, 2014. (9-point plan for ending "fitnah," delivered hours after al-Zawahiri's own address on January 23, 2014; asserts "deadline" of 4 days [January 27] for acceptance);

- **[ISO] January 27, 2014**, see Abu Muhammad al-'Adnani al-Shami, "ISIL's rejection of the Moheisini peace plan," Excerpts of a translation of Statement in Aron Lund, Twitter Post, January 27, 2014, available from twitter.com/aron_1d/status/427857578014437376/photo/1, accessed on December 8, 2014;
- **[AQO] January 30, 2014**, Associated Press, "Radical Preacher Rebukes Extremists in Syria," Yahoo News, available from <https://www.yahoo.com/news/radical-preacher-rebukes-extremists-syria-135716934.html?ref=gs>, accessed on August 31, 2016. (Abu Qatada quoted, during break from trial after extradition from UK to Jordan);
- **[AQO] February 3, 2014**, see Ayman al-Zawahiri, in Pieter Van Ostaeen, "al-Qaeda disavows ISIS in Syria," [pietervanostaeyen](http://pietervanostaeyen.com), blog entry, posted February 3, 2014, English translation of speech by @IraqiWitness, available from <https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/02/03/al-qaedas-disavows-isis-in-syria/>, accessed on August 31, 2016. (The formal AQO disavowal of ISO);
- **[ISO] c. February 2014**, see the Brotherhood of Iman statement in, Aaron Y. Zelin, "New release from al-Ghurabā' Foundation for Media Production: 'Brotherhood of Faith in Support of the Islamic State'," blog entry, posted February 17, 2014, available from jihadology.net/2014/02/17/new-release-from-al-ghuraba-foundation-for-media-production-brotherhood-faith-in-support-of-the-islamic-state/, accessed on August 31, 2016. (ISO militant claim to exclusive authority, power, right);
- **[AQO] February 24, 2014**, see Aron Lund, "Syria in Crisis: Who and What Was Abu Khalid al-Suri? Part I," DIWAN: Middle East Insights From Carnegie, February 24, 2014, available from carnegieendowment.org/syriaincrisis/?fa=54618, accessed on May 6, 2015. (Abu Khalid al-Suri, a top commander in Ahrar al-Sham, was killed by ISO February 23, 2014; a solid background article);
- **[AQO] February 25, 2014**, see Abu Muhammad al-Golani, *al-Nusra* emir, five-day ultimatum to al-Baghdadi to agree to terms of formal arbitration, etc. Reports, and English-language excerpts from Arabic original available, see Associated Press, "Syria al-Qaeda leader gives rivals ultimatum," Al Jazeera, February 25, 2014, available from

www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/02/syria-al-qaeda-leader-gives-rivals-ultimatum-2014225173857928923.html, accessed on December 8, 2014; Naharnet Newsdesk, "Al-Nusra Gives ISIL Ultimatum after Commander's Death," February 25, 2014, available from www.naharnet.com/stories/en/120150, accessed on December 8, 2014;

- **[AQO] March 5, 2014**, see Abu 'Abdullah as-Shami, in Pieter Van Ostaeyen, "A Message from Abu 'Abdullah as-Shami, member of Majlis Shura of Jabhat an-Nusra and a member of the Sharia Committee," *pietervanostaeyen*, original video, March 5, 2014, blog entry, posted March 8, 2014, available from <https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/03/08/a-message-from-abu-abdullah-as-shami-member-of-majlis-shura-of-jabhat-an-nusra-and-a-member-of-the-shariah-committee/>, accessed on December 8, 2014. (After 1 year of hostility, lays out a comprehensive, point-by-point case against ISO based on creed, method, Sharia, efforts at reconciliation, and also, the alternative principles and positive grounds for fighting ISO);
- **[ISO] March 7, 2014**, see Shaykh Al-Mujāhid Abū Muhammad Al-'Adnānī Ash-Shāmī, "Then let us invoke the curse of Allah upon the liars," Speech, Eng. trans. by Musa Cerantonio, available from justpaste.it/eo3h, accessed on December 1, 2014, ("rebutts" March 5, 2014 *al-Nusrah* allegations);
- **[AQO], March 18, 2014**, see Abū Sulaymān al-Muhājir statements, in Van Ostaeyen, "Jabhat an-Nusra reacts on ISIS spokesman al-'Adnānī (Part I) – Abū Sulaymān al-Muhājir";
- **[AQO], c. b/f March 20, 2014**, see Abu Firas as-Suri, in Pieter Van Ostaeyen, "Nusra reacts on ISIS spokesman al-'Adnānī (Part II) – Abu Firās as-Sūrī," *pietervanostaeyen*, blog entry, posted March 27, 2014, available from <https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/03/27/jabhat-an-nusra-reacts-on-isis-spokesman-al-adnani-part-ii-abu-firas-as-suri/>, accessed on December 8, 2014;
- **[AQO] c. late-March 2014**, see Shaykh Faruq Abu Hamam as-Suri, in Pieter Van Ostaeyen, "Jabhat an-Nusra reacts on ISIS spokesman al-'Adnānī (Part III) – Shaykh Fārūq Abū Hamām as-Sūrī," *pietervanostaeyen*, blog entry, posted March 27, 2014, available from <https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/03/27/jabhat-an-nusra-reacts-on-isis-spokesman-al-adnani-part-iii-shaykh-faruq-abu-hamam-as-suri/>;

- **[ISO] April 14, 2014**, see Abu Muhammad al-'Adnani al-Shami, "A translation of the speech of Abu Muhammad al Adnani, official spokesman of the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham," blog entry, posted April 14, 2014, available from ansaaar1.wordpress.com/2014/04/14/a-translation-of-the-speech-of-abu-mu%E1%B8%A5ammad-al-adnani-official-spokesman-of-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-sham/, accessed on December 1, 2014;
- **[ISO] April 17, 2014**, see Pieter Van Ostaeeyen, "Message by ISIS Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-'Adnani as-Shami," pietervanostaeyen, original audio message, April 17, 2014, blog entry, posted April 18, 2014, available from <https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/04/18/message-by-isis-shaykh-abu-muhammad-al-adnani-as-shami/>, accessed on August 31, 2014;
- **[AQO] April 21, 2014**, see Thomas Joscelyn, "Zawahiri discusses infighting in Syria, opposition to Egyptian government," The Long War Journal, April 21, 2014, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/04/zawahiri_discusses_i.php, accessed on April 22, 2014. (Discusses and provides excerpts from al-Zawahiri's newly released audio interview with As Sahab, titled "Reality Between Pain and Hope);
- **[AQO] c. April 15-18, 2014**, see Pieter Van Ostaeeyen, "Jabhat an-Nusra: Shaykh Abu Sulayman al-Muhajir about the Murder of Shaykh Abu Muhammad Fatih," pietervanostaeyen, blog entry, posted April 18, 2014, available from <https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/04/18/jabhat-an-nusra-shaykh-abu-sulayman-al-muhajir-about-the-murder-of-shaykh-abu-muhammad-fatih/>, accessed on December 9, 2014 (a eulogy by Shaykh Abu Sulayman al-Muhajir);
- **[AQO] April 18, 2014**, see Pieter Van Ostaeeyen, "Jabhat an-Nusra ~ This is their methodology," pietervanostaeyen, blog entry, posted April 19, 2014, available from <https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/04/19/jabhat-an-nusra-this-is-their-methodology/>, accessed on August 31, 2014. (Contains the original video message published April 18, 2014 of Baseerah Media Productions, "This is Their Manhaj: Uncovering the details of the assassination of Amir Abu Muhammad Fateh and His Family Members," and the English translation and transcription published April 19, 2014);

- **[AQO] April 28, 2014**, see Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “A message of Shaykh Abū Qatādat al-Filistīnī— A Letter to the People of Jihād,” pietervanostaeyen, blog entry, posted April 28, 2014, available from <https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/04/28/a-message-of-shaykh-abu-qatadat-al-filistini-a-letter-to-the-people-of-jihad/>, accessed on December 9, 2014. (Abu Qatada al-Filistini accuses ISO of being adherents of a non-Sunni deviant rejectionist sect, the Kharijites);
- **[AQO] May 3, 2014**, see Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri— Testimonial to Preserve the Blood of Mujahideen in as-Sham,” pietervanostaeyen, May 3, 2014, available from <https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/05/03/dr-ayman-az-zawahiri-testimonial-to-preserve-the-blood-of-mujahideen-in-as-sham/>, accessed on August 31, 2016. (Ayman al-Zawahiri responding to Dr. Hani al-Sibai’s Islamist Sunni scholar’s request that he [al-Zawahiri] responds specifically to ISO charges; Ayman al-Zawahiri extensively documents his claims in 119 numbered sentences.);
- **[ISO] May 11, 2014**, see Pieter Van Ostaeyen, “New audio message by ISIS Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-’Adnani as-Shami – Apologies Amir al-Qa’ida,” pietervanostaeyen, blog entry, posted May 12, 2014, available from <https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/05/12/new-audio-message-by-isis-shaykh-abu-muhammad-al-adnani-as-shami-apologies-amir-al-qaida/>, accessed on August 31, 2016. (Vitriolic response to al-Zawahiri’s recent video speech in which he openly denies any official *bay’ah* to AQO. See March 18, 2014 sworn testimony by al-Muhajir cited earlier for evidence that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had in fact given Ayman al-Zawahiri the full *bay’ah*).

249. “Ahrar al-Sham leader killed in Syria,” *Al Araby al-Jadeed*, July 15, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on July 16, 2015.

250. See for example: Ryan Lucas, Associated Press, “Syrian Rebels Clash with Al-Qaida-Linked Fighters,” *The World Post*, January 5, 2014, available from www.huffingtonpost.com/huffwires/20140105/ml--syria/, accessed on August 16, 2016; Reuters, “Al-Qaida Affiliate Pulls Out of Northern Syria Strongholds,” *Voice of America News*, January 5, 2014, available from www.

voanews.com/articleprintview/1823727.html, accessed on January 6, 2014; Ryan Lucas, Associated Press, "Nearly 500 dead in Syria rebel clashes: Activists," *The Washington Times*, January 10, 2014, available from www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jan/10/nearly-500-dead-syria-rebel-clashes-activists/, accessed on August 16, 2016; Nelly Lahoud and Muhammad al-'Ubaydi, "The War of Jihadists Against Jihadists in Syria," *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 7, No. 3, March 2014, pp. 1-6, available from www.ctc.usma.edu, accessed on March 24, 2014.

251. "FROM HIJRAH TO KILAFAH," *Dabiq*, Iss. 1, p. 40.

252. See for example:

- **[ISO] September 22, 2014**, see Abu Muhammad al-'Adnani al-Shami, in Pieter Van Ostaeeyen, "Abū Muhammad al-'Adnānī ash-Shāmī—Indeed Your Lord Is Ever Watchful: A new statement by IS spokesman Abū Muhammad al-'Adnānī ash-Shāmī, dated September 22 2014," pietervanostaeyen, blog entry, posted September 25, 2014, available from <https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/09/25/abu-muhammad-al-adnani-ash-shami-indeed-your-lord-is-ever-watchful/>, accessed on August 31, 2016;
- **[ISO] October 3, 2014**, see Shaykh Turki al-Binali Abu Sufyaan as-Sulami, "Stretch Your Hands to Give the Bay'ah to al-Baghdadi," in ansarukhilafah, "Stretch Forth Your Hands To Give The Bay'ah To Al-Baghdadi," Ansar Al-Kilafah Media, Statement translated by Ubaidullah Ibn Adam Aal-Ebrahim, blog entry, posted December 21, 2014, available from <https://ansarukhilafah.wordpress.com/2014/12/21/stretch-forth-your-hands-to-give-the-bayah-to-al-baghdadi/>, accessed on September 7, 2016;
- **[AQO] November 4, 2014**, see Pieter Van Ostaeeyen, "English Translation of the Interview with Jabhat an-Nusra leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani [sic]," pietervanostaeyen, blog entry, posted November 11, 2014, available from <https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/11/11/english-translation-of-the-interview-with-jabhat-an-nusra-leader-abu-muhammad-al-julani/>, accessed on November 24, 2014 (Abu Muhammad al-Golani, *al-Nusra* emir, audio statement originally published November 4, 2014);
- **[ISO] November 13, 2014**, see Amirul-Mu'minin, the Khalifah of the Muslims, Abu Bakr al-Husayni al-Qurashi

al-Baghdadi in, Pieter Van Ostaeyen, "Audio Message by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi – Even if the Disbelievers Despise Such," pietervanostaeyen, original statement published November 13, 2014, blog entry, posted November 14, 2014, available from <https://pietervanostaeyen.com/2014/11/14/audio-message-by-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-even-if-the-disbelievers-despise-such/>, accessed on August 31, 2016;

- **[AQO] November 21, 2014**, see Thomas Joscelyn, "AQAP rejects Islamic State's 'caliphate,' blasts group for sowing dissent among jihadists," *The Long War Journal*, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/11/al_qaeda_in_the_arab_1.php, accessed on November 24, 2014. (Covers AQAP senior Sharia official Harith bin Ghazi al Nadhari's November 13, 2014 response to al-Baghdadi's speech; al-Nadhari killed by drone January 31, 2015.)

253. This concept of "consolidation" (*Tamkin*) is the second primary focus – the first is terror and inflicting catastrophic injury – of the short-lived, 10+ page full-color online magazines, *Islamic State News*, and *Islamic State Reports*. For examples: *Islamic State News*, Iss. 1, pp. 5-6 (Focus on repentant "Sahwat"; "State" functions of aid distribution, da'wa, Sharia court, and execution of "sorcerer"); *Islamic State News*, Iss. 2, pp. 1-3, 9, (Major focus on trade flourishing, fresh produce [see front cover], implementing the prescribed criminal punishments [*hudud*], aid, and enforcing participation in prayer.). See also, *Islamic State News*, Iss. 2, p. 5, focus on "TO REPENT . . . OR NOT," showing photos of persons having to dig their own graves before being murdered; *Islamic State News*, Iss. 2, p. 7 ("hunting for sahwat snipers" [i.e., abusing the term 'Sahwat' to refer to every element that opposes this State]); *Islamic State Reports*, Iss. 2, pp. 1-4 (Focus on "state-ness" in economic harvest, and collection of the alms tax [*zakat*]); "On the Beat Interview [with Abul-'Abbas Ash Shami, Head of the Islamic Police, Wilayat Ar-Raqqah]: ISR examines how the Islamic Police safeguards Ar-Raqqah and their importance in State Building," *Islamic State Reports*, Iss. 2, pp. 5-6; *Islamic State News*, Iss. 3, cover page, pp. 3-6 (implementing *Hadd* punishments, including amputations, executions; distribution of flyers explaining its "*aqida*" [creed]; provision of security to farmers; "repentance" from opponents).

Dabiq's emphasis on *tamkin* can be found in the following articles and elements: "ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS," *Dabiq*, Iss. 1, pp. 13-18; "THE ISLAMIC STATE: IN THE WORDS OF THE

ENEMY," *Dabiq*, Iss. 1, pp. 32-33; "FROM HIJRAH TO KHILAFAH," *Dabiq*, Iss. 1 pp. 35-41, and "ISLAMIC STATE NEWS," pp. 42-48 focuses on destruction and "repentance"; "IN THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY," *Dabiq*, Iss. 2, pp. 31-32; "ISLAMIC STATE NEWS," *Dabiq*, Iss. 2, pp. 33-43 ("Stateness" demonstrated in now-incorporated "News" Section from previous *Islamic State News*, and *Islamic State Reports* format with photographs and reports from various provinces, e.g. Halab, Kirkuk, Ninawa, Ar-Raqqa, Al-Anbar, Salahuddin, Al-Barakah, and Homs, displaying ferocity, momentum, devastation, terror, taking territory, capturing bases, carrying out *Hadd* punishments including beheadings and stonings, distributing "ghanima" (war spoils) to orphans, i.e., "CARING FOR THE ORPHANS," *Dabiq*, Iss. 2, p. 38; "FOREWORD," *Dabiq*, Iss. 3, pp. 3-4, talks of the gruesome beheading of James Foley; "DA'WAH AND HISBAH IN THE ISLAMIC STATE," *Dabiq*, Iss. 3, pp. 16-17 (Da'wah [preaching] and Hisbah [enforcing religious law]); "IN THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY," *Dabiq*, Iss. 3, pp. 35-40; "REFLECTIONS ON THE FINAL CRUSADE," *Dabiq*, Iss. 4, p. 44. The conclusion of this apocalyptic article orders ISO adherents to attack any and every citizen in every Crusader country. Under the heading, "RUSH TO SUPPORT YOUR STATE O MUSLIM," it declares:

At this point in the crusade against the Islamic State, it is very important that attacks take place in every country that has entered into the alliance against the Islamic State, especially the US, UK, France, Australia, and Germany. Rather, the citizens of crusader nations should be targeted wherever they can be found [emphasis added]. Let the muwahhid not be affected by 'analysis paralysis' and thus abandon every operation only because his was-was [sic] and perfectionism pushes him towards an operation that supposedly can never fail – one that only exists theoretically on paper. **He should be pleased to meet his Lord even if with just one dead kafir's name written in his scroll of deeds [emphasis added],** as the Prophet . . . said, 'A kafir and his killer will never gather in Hellfire' [Sahih Muslim]. **Every Muslim should get out of his house, find a crusader, and kill him. It is important that the killing becomes attributed to the Islamic State who have obeyed its leadership [emphasis added].** This can easily be done with anonymity. Otherwise, crusader media makes such attacks appear to be random killings. . . . 'Rely on Allah and stab the crusader' should be the battle cry for all Islamic State patrons. Finally, do not forget that Allah is with the Muslims and will not abandon

them to His enemies. And the Islamic State will remain until its banner flies over Rome.

"IN THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY," *Dabiq*, Iss. 4, pp. 45-51, (Vicious, horrific murder and propaganda, including murdered American-Israeli journalist Steven Sotloff); see also, ISO propagandist John Cantlie, "HARD TALK: THE REAL STORY BEHIND MY VIDEOS"; *Dabiq*, Iss. 4, pp. 52-55; *Dabiq*, Iss. 5, cover page; "THE FIGHT FOR WILĀYAT AL-ANBĀR," *Dabiq*, Iss. 5, pp. 10-11 ("Remaining and Expanding"); "FOREWORD," *Dabiq*, Iss. 5, p. 3, presents "evidence" of ISO's expansion in the form of officially announced *bay'ah* [loyalty oaths secured] and wilayat [provinces conquered]; "ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS," *Dabiq*, Iss. 5, pp. 10-33 (Again, provides *Islamic State Report*-type format with photographs and brief text), for examples see the following "reports": "THE FIGHT FOR WILĀYAT AL-ANBĀR," pp. 10-11; "UNIFYING THE RANKS," pp.12-14, (Claims of *bay'ah* from various quarters); "THE FIGHT FOR 'AYN AL-ISLĀM," pp. 15-17, (formerly Ayn al-Arab, or Kobani); "THE CURRENCY OF THE KHILAFĀH," pp. 18-19; "REMAINING AND EXPANDING," pp. 20-33. This includes an extensive quote from former ISI Emir Abu Omar al-Baghdadi's most famous speech "Hasad as-Sinin bi Dawlat al-Muwahhidin" (The Harvest of Years in the State of Muwahhidin) in Rabi' al-Awwal 1428 [April 2007]):

And indeed the Islamic State will remain. It will remain because it was built upon the corpses of martyrs and it quenched its thirst with their blood, and by such the market for Jannah [paradise] was convened [emphasis added]. It will remain because the success granted by Allah in this jihad is more obvious than the sun at the center of the sky. It will remain because it did not become contaminated by a prohibited income or distorted methodology. . . . It will remain because kufr in all its religions and sects gathered against us, and every treacherous person of desire and innovation began to slander and vilify us, so we become certain of the truthfulness of the goal and the correctness of the path [pp. 32-33].

"IN THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY," *Dabiq*, Iss. 5, pp. 34-35; "FOREWORD," *Dabiq*, Iss. 6, pp. 3-5 (in support of lone wolf attack carried out in Sydney and elsewhere, emphasizing its connection to IS); "ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS," *Dabiq*, Iss. 6, pp. 26-33 ("reports" include: training camps, fighting and consolidation, and killing of opponents); "THE CAPTURE OF A CRUSADER

PILOT," *Dabiq*, Iss. 6 , pp. 34-37 (report is of the Jordanian al-Kasibah ["an apostate pilot flying for the crusader alliance was captured by the Islamic State"]) who is "interviewed" as he is subjected to manipulation, terror, humiliation; "IN THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY," *Dabiq*, Iss. 6, pp. 56-57; John Cantlie, "MELTDOWN," *Dabiq*, Iss. 6 , pp. 58-62 (on meltdown of currency freed from gold standard, and minting of ISO tied to gold); "ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS," *Dabiq*, Iss. 7, pp. 26-45, "reports" include: ("WILĀYAT KHURĀSĀN AND THE BAY'ĀT FROM QAWQĀZ [Caucasus]," pp. 33-37; "DOZENS OF 'NUSRAH' AND 'AHRĀR' FIGHTERS REPENT AND JOIN THE ISLAMIC STATE," pp. 38-39 [with heading "ABANDONING FACTIONALISM AND RAISING THE BANNER OF THE KHILĀFAH"]); "IN THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY," *Dabiq*, Iss. 7, pp. 52-53 (with a focus on "The Kafir Patrick Cockburn" and others); John Cantlie, "THE ANGER FACTORY," *Dabiq*, Iss. 7, pp. 76-82 (justifying the State terrorist attacks against the West with anti-Western propaganda advertisement for a "New Release . . . From Inside Halab" with John Cantlie as a host); *Dabiq*, Iss. 8, cover page ("Sharia Alone Will Rule Africa" [cover art, with monumental feel]); "THE BAY'AH FROM WEST AFRICA," *Dabiq*, Iss. 8, pp. 14-15, which is announced:

On the 16th of Jumada al-Ula the mujahid Shaykh Abu Bakr Shekau . . . leader of Jama'at Ahlis-Sunnah lid-Da'awah wal-Jihad in West Africa, announced his group's bay'ah to Amirul-Mu'minin Ibrahim Ibn Awwad al-Qurashi. The bay'ah came on the heels of a widely successful campaign being waged by the mujahidin across Nigeria and into neighboring regions, was a tremendous cause of celebration for the Muslims and yet another source of gloom for the kuffar. The hearts of the Muslims were healed as they [saw] their brothers in West Africa terrorizing the Christians and the Nigerian army of murtaddin.

"THE LIONS OF TOMORROW: THE LION CUBS OF THE KHILĀFAH," *Dabiq*, Iss. 8, pp. 20-21; "ERASING THE LEGACY OF A RUINED NATION," *Dabiq*, Iss. 8, pp. 22-24, announced thusly:

Last month, the soldiers of the Khilafah, with sledgehammers in hand, revived the Sunnah of their father Ibrahim . . . when they laid waste to the shirki legacy of a nation that had long passed from the face of the earth. They entered the ruins of the ancient Assyrians in Wilayat Ninawa and demolished their

sculptures, and engravings of idols and kings. This caused an outcry from the enemies of the Islamic State, who were furious at losing a 'treasured heritage.' The mujahidin, however, were not the least concerned about the feelings and sentiments of the kuffar, just as Ibrahim was not concerned about the feelings and sentiments of his people when he destroyed their idols [p. 22].

"THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF TWO NEW WILĀYĀT IN IRAQ," *Dabiq*, Iss. 8, p. 27; "AMONG THE BELIEVERS ARE MEN: SHAYKH ABŪ TALHAH," *Dabiq*, Iss. 8, p. 31, shows his death photo as a "martyr" and provides a brief quote:

After the announcement of the Khurāsāni bay'ah, Shaykh Abū Talhah began touring the region in a caravan of the Khilāfah's soldiers, calling the local tribes to give bay'ah to the Khilāfah.

Dabiq, Iss. 8, p. 38, (advertisement for "A Message to the People of Kurdistan"); "IN THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY," *Dabiq*, Iss. 8, pp. 57-58; John Cantilie, "PARADIGM SHIFT," *Dabiq*, Iss. 8, pp. 64-67, with lift out quote:

After all the gnashing of teeth in September, there appears to be a grudging acceptance by many Western politicians that the Islamic State is different to anything they've seen before. Their response, by necessity, has to be different too [p. 64].

"ISLAMIC STATE REPORTS," *Dabiq*, Iss. 9, pp. 24-37, ("reports" include: "HEALTHCARE IN THE KHILĀFAH," pp. 24-26, with data and photographs depicting an actually functioning health care sector; "SELECTED10," p. 27, videos advertised, including presence of hisbah, zakah, monitoring and inspection; "ADVANCING EAST AND WEST," pp. 31-32; "SELECTED10," p. 33, advertising for 10 more videos including terror-inducing images, including extreme fear-face, slaughter, and battle. Second place is "The Islamic State Health Service" and in tenth is "The Lion Cubs Raised under the Wings of the Khilafah"; "The Yarmūk Camp," pp. 34-36, directed at: "the tawāghīt of Hamas are appealing to Iran for intervention, while PLO tawāghīt are agreeing to have their militias serve as a Nusayrī Sahwah [p.35]"); "IN THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY," *Dabiq*, Iss. 9, pp. 60-64; *Dabiq*, Iss. 9, p. 65, advertisement for "AlBayan Radio, Broadcast by the Islamic State" in multiple languages; "FOREWORD," *Dabiq*, Iss. 10, pp. 3-4, again dedicated to slaughter carried out on Western

soil by “mujahids”; *Dabiq*, Iss. 10, p. 5, advertisement for “Join the Caravan of Islamic State Knights in the Lands of the Crusaders,” with thirteen photos of IS operatives, and evidence of a shift from soliciting emigration (Hijrah) to soliciting localized slaughter; “SELECTED10,” *Dabiq*, Iss. 10, p. 25, videos advertised that include terror, murder, repentance, and in the tenth “MEDICAL CARE IN THE WILAYAH”; *Dabiq*, Iss. 10, p. 35, advertisement for “HONOR IS IN JIHAD: A MESSAGE FOR THE PEOPLE OF THE BALKANS”; “THE QAWQĀZĪ [CAUCASUS] CARAVAN GAINS PACE,” *Dabiq*, Iss. 10, pp. 36-37; *Dabiq*, Iss. 10, p. 49, advertisement for video “And They Give Zakah,” showing devastating scenes on top of the page, but the majority of the page shows an ultra-abundant harvest of ultra-wheat with an ultra-devoted person possessing a share in hand, representing the “purification” tax owed to the “Khilafah”; “SELECTED10,” *Dabiq*, Iss. 10, pp. 65, advertising for 10 more videos including the recently horrifically drowned prisoners, emphasizing brutality and submission, consolidation and expansion, for example: “ONE YEAR OF THE KHILAFAH”; “ELIMINATING THE JUDGES,” shows an assassin with a rifle attacking an automobile with inhabitants inside; “CELEBRATING THE ONE YEAR MILESTONE OF THE KHILAFAH”; “HARVESTING THE SPIES 2”; THE LIFE OF RIBAT IN THE MONTH OF JIHAD”; “AND HE WILL REPLACE THEIR FEAR WITH SECURITY 2”; includes one at bottom of page from “WILAYAH WEST AFRICA,” entitled “A GLIMPSE AT THE COURSE OF BATTLES”; “IN THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY,” *Dabiq*, Iss. 10, pp. 66-69; “INTERVIEW WITH ABŪ SAMĪR AL-URDUNĪ,” *Dabiq*, Iss. 10, pp. 70-76, with AQO’s Ayman al-Zawahiri in backdrop, with lift out quote:

Allah facilitated for Dabiq to interview the brother Abū Samīr al-Urdunī (the Jordanian), a former member of Jawlānī’s [Jabhat al-Nusra] shūrā council. He broke off from the Jawlānī front until Allah blessed him by showing him the contradictions in the methodology and policies of the Jawlānī front. He also belessed him by allowing him to witness the realization of hakimiyah (tawhīd of Allah in judgment) in the land of the Khilāfah. He returned to the ranks of the Islamic State and the following is the conversation we had with him [p. 70].

“SELECTED10,” *Dabiq*, Iss. 11, p. 15, advertisement for 10 videos focused on murder, terror, fighting, repentance, and curiously in the 8th video shows a young, smiling girl’s face exemplifying the title, “THE AMBIANCE OF EID AL-FITR IN AR-RAQQAH

CITY," her face fully unveiled, smiling, and in Western clothes, and in the 10th, "THERE IS LIFE IN RETRIBUTION," showing a sheathed sword; "THE DANGER Of Abandoning Dārul-Islām," *Dabiq*, Iss. 11, p. 22-23, with a horrific use of the picture of the drowned toddler Alan Kurdi, and provides the accompanying passage:

The repeated events of Syrians and Libyans dying on the shores of Turkey, Libya, and Italy, or even on the highways of Austria, is one that should awaken the heart into reflecting upon the issue of hijrah.

"A SELECTION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS ACROSS THE ISLAMIC STATE," *Dabiq*, Iss. 11, pp. 28-30, "report" includes terror operations, military operations, taking and holding ground, and in one picture describes in a subheading: "Imposing the Jizyah [tax imposed on certain qualified categories of vanquished non-Muslim groups] on the Christians of al-Qaryatayn after liberating the city [p.30]" and depicts a large gathering of Christians shown seated in an auditorium, with an ISO official in fatigues at a lectern signing an official document; "SELECTED10," *Dabiq*, Iss. 11, p. 39, advertisement for 10 videos, including: "THE ING-HIMASIYYIN ARE THE PRIDE OF THE UMMAH"; "KILLING THE APOSTATES IN REVENGE FOR THE MUWAHHIDIN 2"; "THE TRAVELS OF THE MUSLIM"; "THE KNIGHTS OF IFRIQIYYAH" from "WILAYAH WEST IFRIQIYYAH"; "DETECTING THE CRIMINALS" etc., depicting terror, submission, death, and a video-game like death cult; "IN THE WORDS OF THE ENEMY," *Dabiq*, Iss. 11, pp. 56-58; "SELECTED10," *Dabiq*, Iss. 11, p. 59, advertisement for 10 videos again in shooter-type video format with examples of terror, destruction, consolidation, expansion, and Stateness; "INTERVIEW WITH ABUL-MUGHĪRAH AL-QAHTĀNĪ: The Delegated Leader for the Libyan Wilāyāt," *Dabiq*, Iss. 11, pp. 60-63, and involves "Fitnah" with AQO's groups.

254. Reference here is to Sahih Muslim, but without full citation. This is from *Sahih Muslim*, No. 1852, and it is considered Sahih (sound, reliable). See Abu Amina Elias, "Is it required for Muslims to have one ruler?" available from abuaminaelias.com/is-it-required-for-muslims-to-have-one-ruler.

255. "FROM HIJRAH TO KILAFAH," *Dabiq*, Iss. 1, p. 40.

256. Readers interested in examining the primary documents, research, and commentary that warrant these conclusions are encouraged to consult the relevant information presented in Chapters 2 and 3 of this book and their corresponding endnotes.

257. The concept of a “deviant organization” is chosen carefully and intends to signify two facts. First, as organizations, they are **deviant** in a statistical sense; they are terrorist outliers operating on the extreme unlawful, criminal fringes far from Sunni Muslims generally, let alone other non-terrorist religio-political organizations seeking to represent and empower Sunni Muslims (*Ahl-us Sunnah*). Second, these are **organizations**, and not States, regimes, or representative bodies. While they aspire to represent the world’s 1.4 billion Sunni Muslims, their very nature as terrorist entities resting on a terrorist modus operandi ensures their continuing marginality. The present writer concedes that despite its sociological utility, the concept of a “deviant organization” can be abused by regime apologists, to de-legitimize and thereby proscribe various types of oppositional politics.

258. See the Introduction of this book.

259. In an oft-quoted tradition (*hadith*), the notion that a true Muslim is one that regards other Muslims’ lives as sacred, is the essence of the matter. Narrated by Abdullah bin ‘Amr, the Prophet [Muhammad] said, “A Muslim is the one who avoids harming Muslims with his tongue and hands. And a Muhajir (emigrant) is the one who gives up (abandons) all what Allah has forbidden.” Abdullah bin ‘Amr, “The Book of Belief Faith),” in Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan, *The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih Al-Bukhari: Arabic-English*, Vol. 1, Book 2, No. 10, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Darussalam, 1997, p. 59.

260. A final tally of ISO’s mass murder, crimes against humanity, torture, brutality, and inhumane conduct will one day be conducted. Ironically, ISO’s own penchant for fully documenting these atrocities will likely serve as exemplary exhibits in future proceedings. For a very brief summary of some of these, see Anup Kaphle, “The Islamic State’s atrocities,” *The Washington Post*, February 17, 2015, available from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/apps/g/page/world/the-islamic-states-atrocities/1608/>, accessed on March 17, 2015; Jon Gambrell, Associated Press (AP), “A history

of the Islamic State group's atrocities, gains," *The San Diego Union-Tribune*, February 16, 2015, available from www.sandiegounion-tribune.com/news/2015/feb/16/a-history-of-the-islamic-state-groups-atrocities/, accessed on August 31, 2016; Agence France-Presse (AFP), "Foreigners executed by IS militants: a factfile," Yahoo News, August 12, 2015, available from news.yahoo.com/foreigners-executed-militants-factfile-154627843.html, accessed on August 13, 2015; "Syria: IS murders over 3,000 in year-long 'caliphate'," Al-Araby al-Jadeed (The New Arab), June 29, 2015, available from www.opensource.co, accessed on June 29, 2015; IntelCenter, "Top 10 Most Deadly Terrorist/Rebel Groups in 2014," IntelCenter Database, July 25, 2015, available from intelcenter.com/reports/charts/most-deadly-groups-2014/index.html, accessed on January 12, 2015; Rami Abdurrahman (Ossama Suleiman), "Islamic State executes 2154 people since the declaration of its alleged 'Caliphate'," Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, April 28, 2015, available from www.syriahr.com/en/?p=18320, accessed on August 31, 2016; Sarah Almkhtar and Derek Watkins, "The Deadliest Attacks in Baghdad This Year," *The New York Times*, July 3, 2016, available from www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/05/18/world/middleeast/baghdad-attacks-isis-map.html?_r=0, accessed on July 6, 2016; Associated Press, "Some of the Most Recent Deadly Attacks Claimed by IS," Daily Mail, July 23, 2016, available from www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-3704877/Some-recent-deadly-attacks-claimed-IS.html, accessed on July 25, 2016; Agence France-Presse (AFP), "Paris – Islamic State attacks on Western targets," Agence France-Presse (AFP), August 8, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on August 9, 2016; Thomas Joscelyn, "Islamic State claims more than 700 suicide attacks since beginning of the year," *The Long War Journal*, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/09/islamic-state-claims-more-than-700-suicide-attacks-since-beginning-of-the-year.php, accessed on September 7, 2016; Agence France-Presse (AFP), "Paris – Attacks in France since Charlie Hebdo slayings," AFP, July 18, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on July 18, 2016; Erin Miller, "Patterns of Islamic State-Related Terrorism, 2002-2015," START Background Report, College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), August 2016, available from www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_IslamicStateTerrorismPatterns_BackgroundReport_Aug2016.pdf, accessed on August 9, 2016; Lori Hinnant and Desmond Butler, "IS Buried Thousands in 72 Mass Graves, AP Finds," AP The Big Story, August 30,

2016, available from bigstory.ap.org/article/7b538929486f493da85e84d7ee7470a5/buried-thousands-72-mass-graves-ap-finds, accessed on August 30, 2016.

261. That the “idea” of the ISO had yet to be understood, and required our full attention, was described by Major General Michael Nagata, U.S. Army, Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT), former Director Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF). See Michael Nagata, “Preface,” in Hriar Cabayan, Sarah Canna, eds., “Multi-Method Assessment of ISIL,” NSI White Paper, December 2014, pp. 1-2; see also, Eric Schmitt, “In Battle to Defang ISIS, U.S. Targets Its Psychology,” *The New York Times*, December 28, 2014, available from www.nytimes.com/2014/12/29/us/politics/in-battle-to-defang-isis-us-targets-its-psychology-.html?_r=0, accessed on September 14, 2015.

262. See for example: Paul Kamolnick, “On Self-Declared Caliph Ibrahim’s May 2015 Message to Muslims: Key Problems of Motivation, Marginalization, Illogic, and Empirical Delusion in the Caliphate Project,” *Small Wars Journal*, June 4, 2015, available from smallwarsjournal.com/print/24089, accessed on June 5, 2015.

263. Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks of President Barack Obama,” May 23, 2013, Washington, DC: The White House, available from www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-barack-obama, accessed on May 30, 2013.

264. For earlier formulations, see Barack Obama, *2010 National Security Strategy*, Washington, DC: The White House, May 2010, p. 4, pp. 19-22, available from www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf; Barack Obama, *National Strategy for Countering Terrorism*, Washington, DC: The White House, June 2011, p. 1, 3, available from www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf; Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review 2010*, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, February 2010, p. v, 6, 15, available from www.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defense_reviews/QDR/QDR_as_of_29JAN10_1600.pdf; Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, *The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America’s National Security Needs in the 21st Century, Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel*, Corrected Advance Copy, 2010, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, p. 26.

265. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, *Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* (aka: *The 9/11 Commission Report*), New York: W.W. Norton, 2004, ch. 12.

266. For background on this acronym and its relation to DIME, and DIMEFIL, see Kamolnick, *Countering Radicalization and Recruitment to Al Qaeda*, pp. 75-76.

267. For this incontrovertible evidence, and the United Nations Security Council Resolutions formulated in response, see Paul Kamolnick, "Terrorism, Counterterrorism and the Rule of Law," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 23, 2011, p. 841, Notes #19 and #20. For USG diplomatic efforts, beginning with our recognition of the Taliban's rise in 1994 until the immediate pre-9/11 attack, see Kamolnick, *Countering Radicalization and Recruitment to Al-Qaeda*, pp. 69-70, especially endnote #173 for an extensive examination of the declassified intelligence cables specifically pertinent to the claim that the USG at Mullah Omar's initial request, had direct communication with then Emir Mullah Omar and his representatives. See finally, a telling excerpt from members of the Egyptian Islamic Group, translated from Arabic, in their book, *Islam and the Laws of War*, which appeared in serial form in the newspaper *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* (London), August-September 2006; Translated and excerpted in: The Middle East Media Research Institute, "Al-Gama'a Al-Islamiyya vs. Al-Qaeda," MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 1301, available from www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/804/1887.htm, accessed on January 16, 2013. They state in response to bin Laden's and AQO's accusation that the United States was intent on overthrowing the Taliban as part of its declared "War against Islam":

The conception that America is waging a Crusade against Muslims is not true. . . in the worst of cases [one can say that] at times there have been American policies that have had a religious dimension in opposing some – and not all – of the Islamic world's causes. [The fact that this is not a Crusade] explains America's positive stand in support of the Afghani mujahideen in their fight against the Soviet occupation, and [America's] positive stand [against] the ethnic cleansing operation against the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the province of Kosovo. Likewise, the conception that America aimed to bring down the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and could not

have been deterred from doing so is not true. Reality attests to the fact that America attempted to come to terms with the Taliban regime in order to realize common strategic goals. . . and these attempts to come to an understanding ran up against the Al-Qaeda organization's actions, which were launched from Afghanistan and targeted America, and which the Taliban authorities did not restrain . . . America at that time was looking for new strategies for a new century, and if the Front [i.e., Al-Qaeda] and other interpreters of Islam had adopted serious Islamic strategy that would have given consideration to American interests together with Islamic interests, this would have prevented the continuation of this war or [at least] would have kept it from taking on a comprehensive nature.

268. See Kamolnick, *Countering Radicalization and Recruitment to Al-Qaeda*, for more detailed discussion of these measures.

269. For attriting of AQO's external operations branch (i.e., "the Khorasan Group") based in Syria, see Bill Roggio and Thomas Joscelyn, "US military confirms it killed senior al Qaeda strategist Sanafi al Nasr in airstrike in Syria," *The Long War Journal*, October 18, 2015, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/10/us-military-confirms-it-killed-senior-al-qaeda-strategist-sanafi-al-nasr-in-airstrike-in-syria.php, accessed on October 20, 2015; Thomas Joscelyn, "Pentagon says al Qaeda veteran killed in 'kinetic strike' in Syria," *The Long War Journal*, July 22, 2015, www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/07/pentagon-says-al-qaeda-veteran-killed-in-kinetic-strike-in-syria.php, accessed on July 22, 2015.

270. See for example: Kamolnick, *Countering Radicalization and Recruitment to Al-Qaeda*, pp. 20-34.

271. See for example: Jessica Rivinius, "Recommendations to counter violent extremism: New report offers framework to law enforcement, government agencies, community members," September 28, 2015, available from www.start.umd.edu/news/recommendations-counter-violent-extremism, accessed on September 29, 2015; Telegraph View (staff), "Stopping ISI's Grooming," June 15, 2015, *The Telegraph*, available from www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11676316/Stopping-Isils-grooming.html, accessed on June 16, 2015.

272. Behavioral disengagement from terrorism, not “de-radicalization” or “counter-radicalization,” is a preferable objective since radicalism per se, in attitude, beliefs, and ultimate objectives, is not a predictor of terrorist action; and, a great majority of terrorist actors have no discernible coherent “radicalization” path that may be intercepted. For that reason, cessation from terrorist actions, and campaigns focused on the motivational factors most associated with that probability, is now considered the relevant objective. See for example: Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and collective disengagement*, London and New York: Routledge, 2009; John Horgan and Max Taylor, “Disengagement, De-radicalization and the Arc of Terrorism: Future Directions for Research,” in Rik Coolsaet, ed., *Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalisation Challenge: European and American Experiences*, 2nd ed., Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011, ch. 13, pp. 173-225; Mary Beth Altier, Christian N. Thoroughgood, and John Horgan, “Turning away from terrorism: Lessons from psychology, sociology, and criminology,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 51, No. 5, 2014, pp. 647-661; Kira J. Harris, “Review: Disillusionment with Radical Social Groups,” 2010, orig. published in “Proceedings of the 1st Australian Counter Terrorism Conference,” Edith Cowan University, Perth Western Australia, November 30, 2010, available from ro.ecu.edu.au/act/4.

273. Office of the Press Secretary, “Statement by the President on ISIL,” September 10, 2014, Washington, DC: The White House, available from www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/remarks-president-barack-obama-address-nation, accessed on September 11, 2014; Jim Garamone, “Obama Discusses Anti-ISIL Strategy with National Security Team at Pentagon,” *DoD News*, July 6, 2015, available from www.defense.gov/news, accessed on July 9, 2015; Terri Moon Cronk, “Carter Vows Lasting Defeat of ISIL Forces,” *DoD News*, June 17, 2015, available from www.defense.gov/news, accessed on June 22, 2015; Cheryl Pellerin, “Carter: DoD, Global Coalition Seek ISIL’s Lasting Defeat,” *DoD News*, July 7, 2015, available from www.defense.gov/news, accessed on July 8, 2015.

274. Cronk, “Carter Vows Lasting Defeat of ISIL Forces”; Jim Garamone, “Success Against ISIL Requires Time, Partners, Dempsey Says,” *DoD News*, June 17, 2015, available from www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/604837/success-against-isil-requires-time-partners-dempsey-says, accessed on July 28, 2016.

275. General John Allen, USMC (Ret.), "Keynote Address by General John Allen," Transcript of Address presented at the 12th annual U.S.-Islamic World Forum, at The Brookings Doha Center in Doha, Qatar, June 3, 2015, available from www.brookings.edu/~media/events/2015/06/01-2015-us-islamic-world-forum/060315brookingsdoha.pdf, accessed on August 19, 2015. Though Gen. Allen describes these five lines of effort (LOE), he combines categories that are disaggregated by Secretary of Defense Carter and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Dempsey into nine LOEs.

276. Cheryl Pellerin, "Carter: Lasting Defeat of ISIL Depends on Coalition Strength," *DoD News*, January 13, 2016, available from www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/642976/carter-lasting-defeat-of-isil-depends-on-coalition-strength, accessed on January 14, 2016; Andrew Tilghman, "This is the Pentagon's new strategy to defeat ISIS," *Military Times*, January 14, 2016, available from www.militarytimes.com/story/military/war-on-is/2016/01/14/pentagon-strategy-islamic-state-iraq-syria/78269180/, accessed on January 18, 2016; Dan Lamothe, "The fight against the Islamic State just entered a new phase—and it could grow soon," *The Washington Post*, January 20, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/01/20/fight-against-the-islamic-state-enters-a-new-phase-with-pledge-from-seven-countries/, accessed on January 21, 2016; Lolita C. Baldor, Associated Press (AP), "US, allies agree to intensify fight against Islamic State," *U.S. News & World Report*, January 20, 2016, available from www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2016-01-20/us-allies-agree-to-intensify-fight-against-islamic-state, accessed on September 2, 2016; Ash Carter, "War Room: Ash Carter: It's Time to Accelerate the ISIL Fight," January 22, 2016, *Politico*, available from www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/01/ash-carter-isil-fight-213554, accessed on January 22, 2016; European Union External Action, "Statement by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Small Group of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL/Da'esh," Statement of the Small Group Meeting in Rome, February 2, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on February 4, 2016; see also, U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State, *Strategy for the Middle East and to Counter Violent Extremism*, Section 1222 Report, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State, c. March 24, 2016, [submitted to relevant Congressional committees past the deadline date of February 15, 2016], available from https://armedservices.house.gov/sites/republicans.armedservices.house.gov/files/wysiwyg_uploaded/

Section%201222%20Report.pdf, accessed on September 7, 2016; Jim Garamone, "Rice Details U.S. Whole-of-Government Approach to Defeating ISIL," *DoD News*, April 15, 2016, available from www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/722259/rice-details-us-whole-of-government-approach-to-defeating-isil, accessed on April 18, 2016; Jim Garamone, "Carter Details U.S. Strategy to Accelerate ISIL's Defeat," *DoD News*, April 28, 2016, available from www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/745265/carter-details-us-strategy-to-accelerate-isils-defeat, accessed on April 29, 2016. Jim Garamone, "ISIL Knows It Will Lose, Already Shifting Strategy, Obama Says at Pentagon," August 4, 2016, available from www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/905447/isil-knows-it-will-lose-already-shifting-strategy-obama-says-at-pentagon, accessed on August 8, 2016; "Joint Press Conference by Secretary Carter and Gen. Votel on the Counter-ISIL Coalition, Joint Base Andrews, Maryland," News Transcript, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, Press Operations, July 20, 2016, available from www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/851184/joint-press-conference-by-secretary-carter-and-gen-votel-on-the-counter-isil-co, accessed on July 21, 2016; U.S. Department of State, "Remarks at the Counter-ISIL Ministerial Meeting," July 21, 2016, available from www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2016/07/260362.htm, accessed on July 22, 2016.

277. One LOE—providing humanitarian relief and stabilization support—is vital, and should for present purposes be subsumed to strategic objective no. 1. Stabilization operations are a crucial third dimension in a full-spectrum model comprising offensive, defensive, and stabilization operations. See Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2014, available from [pksoi.army.mil/default/assets/File/fm3_07\(1\).pdf](http://pksoi.army.mil/default/assets/File/fm3_07(1).pdf), accessed October 26, 2015; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-07, *Stability Operations*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011, available from www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_07.pdf, accessed on June 16, 2012. For recognition of the decisive role stabilization operations and genuinely effective inclusive governance shall play in determining the long-term success of present USG policy and strategy, see Hardin Lang and Muath Al Wari, "After Liberation: Assessing Stabilization Efforts in Areas Cleared of the Islamic State, Center for American Progress," Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, July 26, 2016, available from <https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/report/2016/07/26/141814/>

after-liberation/, accessed on August 30, 2016; Maj. Gen. Eric T. Olson, "When the Islamic State is Gone, What Comes Next?," *War on the Rocks*, August 9, 2016, available from warontherocks.com/2016/08/when-the-islamic-state-is-gone-what-comes-next/, accessed on August 9, 2016; James Kitfield, "'Our Greatest Challenge': CJCS Gen. Dunford," *Breaking Defense*, August 12, 2016, available from breakingdefense.com/2016/08/our-greatest-challenge-cjcs-gen-dunford/, accessed on August 12, 2016; Joe Gerth/ProPublica and Joby Warrick, "Promises unfulfilled: How a State Department plan to stabilize Iraq broke apart," *The Washington Post*, August 15, 2016, available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/promises-unfulfilled-how-a-state-department-plan-to-stabilize-iraq-broke-apart/2016/08/15/82e2324e-5a8c-11e6-831d-0324760ca856_story.html, accessed on August 16, 2016. See also how stabilization operations are discussed as an essential dimension of the ongoing campaign to decisively defeat ISO in Mosul: Dan Lamothe, "The 'biggest strategic concern' about Mosul? Putting it back together after ISIS loses," *The Washington Post*, July 21, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/07/20/the-biggest-strategic-concern-about-mosul-putting-it-back-together-after-isis-loses/, accessed on July 21, 2016; Rick Gladstone, "1.2 Million Iraqis Could Be Uprooted in Mosul Battle, U.N. Says," *The New York Times*, August 23, 2016, available from www.nytimes.com/2016/08/24/world/middleeast/isis-mosul-iraq.html?_r=0, accessed on August 23, 2016; Gen. David Petraeus, "The challenge in Mosul won't be to defeat the Islamic State. It will be what comes after," *The Washington Post*, August 12, 2016, available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the-challenge-in-mosul-wont-be-to-defeat-the-islamic-state-it-will-be-what-comes-after/2016/08/12/ce972904-5f2a-11e6-af8e-54aa2e849447_story.html?utm_term=.bdde7715b689, accessed on August 15, 2016.

278. See for example: Mike Richman, "US Sanctions IS Backers, Targets Finances," *Voice of America News*, September 29, 2015, available from www.voanews.com/articleprintview/2984252.html, accessed on October 1, 2015; "Report: Islamic State Funds Will Dwindle Without New Territory," *Voice of America News*, February 27, 2015, available from www.voanews.com/articleprintview/2661413.html, accessed on February 27, 2015; Geoff D. Porter, "CTC PERSPECTIVES: THE IMPACT OF CRUDE'S COLLAPSE ON THE ISLAMIC STATE," West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center,

January 13, 2015, available from www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/ctc-perspectives-the-impact-of-crudes-collapse-on-the-islamic-state, accessed on January 13, 2015; Matthew Reed, "Tidal Wave II: Understanding The Pentagon's New Strategy To Cripple ISIS Oil," The Fuse, blog entry, posted November 23, 2015, available from energyfuse.org/tidal-wave-ii-understanding-the-pentagons-strategy-to-cripple-isiss-oil-operations/, accessed on June 3, 2016; Daniel Graeber, "Islamic State losing revenue, IHS finds," UPI, May 27, 2016, available from www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Industry/2016/05/27/Islamic-State-losing-revenue-IHS-finds/9141464351657/, accessed on June 2, 2016; Joby Warrick and Liz Sly, "U.S.-led strikes putting a financial squeeze on the Islamic State," *The Washington Post*, available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-led-strikes-putting-a-financial-squeeze-on-the-islamic-state/2016/04/02/e739a7be-f848-11e5-a3ce-f06b5ba21f33_story.html, accessed on April 4, 2016; Jim Michaels, "Air campaign shifts to ISIL's cash and oil," *USA Today*, April 17, 2016, available from www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/04/17/air-campaign-shifts-isils-cash-and-oil/83157118/, accessed on April 18, 2016; "Islamic State: Up to \$800m of funds 'destroyed by strikes'," *BBC News*, April 26, 2016, available from www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36145301, accessed on April 27, 2016; "US-led coalition strike 'destroys IS bank in Iraq'," *BBC News*, January 12, 2016, available from www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-35291574, accessed on August 10, 2016; Lisa Ferdinando, "Progress Made in Degrading ISIL Oil Revenues, Official Says," *DoD News*, December 15, 2015, available from www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/636401/progress-made-in-degrading-isil-oil-revenues-official-says, accessed on December 16, 2015; Tara Copp, "US airstrikes have destroyed Islamic State cash worth hundreds of millions," February 17, 2016, *Stars and Stripes*, available from www.stripes.com/news/us-airstrikes-have-destroyed-islamic-state-cash-worth-hundreds-of-millions-1.394612, accessed on February 18, 2016. Jim Michaels, "ISIL oil trucks, worth \$11 million, destroyed in massive airstrike," *USA Today*, August 10, 2016, available from www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/08/09/islamic-state-oil-trucks-destroyed-massive-strike/88459864/, accessed on August 11, 2016; Reuters, "Kurds Say Islamic State Oil Overseer Killed in Joint Ops with U.S.," *The New York Times*, August 11, 2016, available from www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-kurds-islamic-state-idUSKCN10M20C, accessed on August 12, 2016; Sirwan Kajjo, "As Battlefield Losses Mount, IS Struggles Economically," *Voice of America News*, September 3, 2016, available from

www.voanews.com/a/battlefield-losses-hurt-islamic-state-economically/3492185.html, accessed on September 6, 2016. For a comprehensive report identifying the effects of, and ISO's shifting options to, the U.S.-led Coalition on ISO finances, see "ISIS Financing: 2015," CAT Report, Paris, FR: Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, May 2016, available from cat-int.org/index.php/2016/06/01/ISIS-financing-in-2015-report-and-summary, accessed on June 2, 2016.

279. See for example: Griff Witte, Sudarsan Raghavan and James McAuley, "Flow of foreign fighters plummets as Islamic State loses its edge," *The Washington Post*, September 9, 2016, available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/flow-of-foreign-fighters-plummets-as-isis-loses-its-edge/2016/09/09/ed3e0dda-751b-11e6-9781-49e591781754_story.html?utm_term=.0244fc74cc34, accessed on September 12, 2016; "Australia: Islamic State fight: France sees sharp fall in number of citizens joining terror group," *The Age*, September 7, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on September 7, 2016.

280. See Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Says Its Strikes Are Hitting More Significant ISIS Targets," *The New York Times*, May 25, 2016, available from www.nytimes.com/2016/05/26/us/politics/us-strikes-isis-targets.html, accessed on June 2, 2016; Terri Moon Cronk, "As Strikes Weaken ISIL, Work Remains, Air Component Commander Says," *DoD News*, May 26, 2016, available from www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/783138/as-strikes-weaken-isil-work-remains-air-component-commander-says, accessed on June 2, 2016; Terri Moon Cronk, "Air Power Vital to Counter-ISIL Success, Commander Says," *DoD News*, February 18, 2016, available from www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/658294/air-power-vital-to-counter-isil-success-commander-says, accessed on February 19, 2016; Cheryl Pellerin, "Inherent Resolve Commander: Strikes, Indigenous Forces Grind Down ISIL," *DoD News*, February 1, 2016, available from www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/647881/inherent-resolve-commander-strikes-indigenous-forces-grind-down-isil, accessed on February 3, 2016.

281. See Ken Dilanian, "CIA, special ops cooperate to kill extremists in Syria, Iraq," *Military Times*, September 28, 2015, available from www.militarytimes.com/story/military/2015/09/28/cia-special-ops-cooperate-kill-extremists-syria-iraq/72969854/, accessed on September 6, 2016; Howard Altman, "Obama digs into Special

Ops playbook for Islamic State proposal," TBO, February 15, 2015, available from tbo.com/list/military-news/altman/Obama-digs-into-special-ops-playbook-for-islamic-state-proposal-20150215, accessed on August 10, 2016; Greg Miller, "U.S. launches secret drone campaign to hunt Islamic State leaders in Syria: Confronting the 'Caliphate'," *The Washington Post*, Occasional Series, September 1, 2015, available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-launches-secret-drone-campaign-to-hunt-islamic-state-leaders-in-syria/2015/09/01/723b3e04-5033-11e5-933e-7d06c647a395_story.html, accessed on September 2, 2015; Tyler Rogoway, "Those Old OV-10 Broncos Sent To Fight ISIS Were Laser Rocket-Slinging Manhunters: Their mission was to find, fix, and finish the enemy – and they did just that," *The Drive*, May 17, 2016, available from www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/3519/those-old-ov-10-broncos-sent-to-fight-isis-were-laser-rocket-slinging-manhunters, accessed on May 20, 2016; Mary Alice Salinas, "Obama Ramps Up Strategy in Fight Against Islamic State," *Voice of America News*, January 29, 2016, available from www.voanews.com/article/printview/3168897.html, accessed on February 1, 2016; Dan Lamothe, "Elite U.S. targeting force has arrived in Iraq to fight the Islamic State," *The Washington Post*, January 13, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/01/13/elite-u-s-targeting-force-has-arrived-in-iraq-pentagon-chief-tells-soldiers/, accessed on January 14, 2016; Stephen Kalin and Maher Chmaytelli, "Special forces target Islamic State in Hawija, Iraq official says," *Reuters*, January 8, 2016, available from www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-raids-idUSKBN0UM0PX20160108, accessed on January 8, 2016; Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Sees Elite Military Unite as Key to Bigger Push Against ISIS," *The New York Times*, December 2, 2015, available from www.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/world/middleeast/us-sees-elite-military-unit-as-key-to-bigger-push-against-isis.html, accessed on December 3, 2015; Jeff Seldin, "US Prepares to Strike at Heart of Islamic State," *Voice of America News*, December 1, 2015, available from www.voanews.com/content/us-to-send-specialized-force-to-iraq-to-fight-islamic-state/3082884.html, accessed on December 2, 2015; Kimberly Dozier, "How Special-Ops is Taking ISIS Out," *The Daily Beast*, May 28, 2016, available from www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/05/28/the-gloves-finally-come-off-in-the-isis-war.html, accessed on June 2, 2016.

282. See Afghan War News Website, "F3EAD," (Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, and Disseminate [F3EAD]) webpage

available from www.afghanwarnews.info/intelligence/F3EAD.htm, accessed on September 2, 2015; Michael T. Flynn, Rich Juergens, and Thomas L. Cantrell, "Employing ISR: SOF Best Practices," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Iss. 50, 3rd Qtr., 2008, pp. 56-61.

283. See W. J. Hennigan, "US military says it has killed more than 120 Islamic State leaders," *Los Angeles Times*, June 10, 2016, available from www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-isis-air-strikes-20160607-snap-story.html, accessed on June 13, 2016; see also, Karen DeYoung, "U.S. eliminates a mid-to high-level ISIS figure every 2 days, official says," *The Washington Post*, December 3, 2015, available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-eliminates-a-mid-to-high-level-isis-figure-every-2-days-official-says/2015/12/03/6b43ae3c-99ea-11e5-b499-76cbec161973_story.html, accessed on December 4, 2015; Lisa Ferdinando, "Coalition Decimates ISIL Ranks, Leadership, OIR Spokesman Says," *DoD News*, February 3, 2016, available from www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/649481/coalition-decimates-isil-ranks-leadership-oir-spokesman-says, accessed on February 4, 2016.

284. Eric Schmitt and Michael S. Schmidt, "Omar the Chechen, a Senior Leader in ISIS, Dies After U.S. Airstrike," *The New York Times*, March 15, 2016, available from www.nytimes.com/2016/03/15/world/middleeast/omar-chechen-isis-killed-us-airstrike-syria.html?_r=0, accessed on March 15, 2016.

285. Richard Engel, Jim Miklaszewski, Courtney Kube, and Erik Ortiz, "ISIS' Finance Minister, Haji Iman, Killed: Defense Officials," March 25, 2016, available from www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/isis-s-second-command-killed-raid-sources-n545451, accessed on March 25, 2016; Bill Roggio and Thomas Joscelyn, "Pentagon announces death of senior Islamic State leader," *The Long War Journal*, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/03/pentagon-announces-death-of-senior-islamic-state-leader.php, accessed on March 28, 2016.

286. "Drone kills the envoy of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to Aleppo," Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, March 31, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on March 31, 2016.

287. Bill Roggio, "US kills Islamic State's military emir for Anbar province," *The Long War Journal*, May 10, 2016, avail-

able from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/05/us-kills-islamic-states-military-emir-for-anbar-province.php, accessed on May 10, 2016.

288. Agence France-Presse (AFP), "Airstrike kills two Isis military leaders in Iraq," *The Guardian*, July 1, 2016, available from www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/01/airstrike-kills-two-isis-military-leaders-in-iraq, accessed on July 6, 2016.

289. *Ibid.*

290. "Key Islamic State leader Saad Emarati 'killed in Afghanistan,'" *BBC News*, July 26, 2016, available from www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36892100, accessed on July 27, 2016.

291. "US confirms death of IS leader in Afghanistan—TV," *Tolo News*, August 13, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on August 15, 2016.

292. Eric Schmitt and Anne Barnard, "Senior ISIS Strategist and Spokesman Is Reported Killed in Syria," *The New York Times*, August 30, 2016, available from www.nytimes.com/2016/08/31/world/middleeast/al-adnani-islamic-state-isis-syria.html, accessed on August 31, 2016; Thomas Joscelyn, "Islamic State says senior official killed in Aleppo province," *The Long War Journal*, August 30, 2016, available from www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/08/islamic-state-says-senior-official-killed-in-aleppo-syria.php, accessed on October 30, 2016.

293. "Islamic State's Chief of Media Operations killed in Iraqi raid," *ARA News*, September 12, 2016, available from aranews.net/2016/09/islamic-states-chief-media-operations-killed-iraqi-raid/, accessed on September 12, 2016.

294. See Kimberly Dozier, "U.S. Special Ops Kill 40 ISIS Operatives Responsible for Attacks From Paris to Egypt," *The Daily Beast*, April 28, 2016, available from www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/04/28/u-s-kills-isis-operatives-linked-to-europe-attacks.html, accessed on September 6, 2016.

295. The mission to capture him alive was unsuccessful: Abu Sayyaf was killed resisting his apprehension. This operation involved a Delta Force raid involving two dozen commandos

entering Syria from Iraq aboard Black Hawk helicopters and V-22 Ospreys. See Eric Schmitt, "A Raid on ISIS Yields a Trove of Intelligence," *The New York Times*, June 8, 2015, available from www.nytimes.com/2015/06/09/world/middleeast/us-raid-in-syria-uncovers-details-on-isis-leadership-and-finances.html?_r=0, accessed on June 15, 2015.

296. Helene Cooper and Eric Schmitt, "ISIS Detainee's Information Led to 2 U.S. Airstrikes, Officials Say," *The New York Times*, March 9, 2016, available from www.nytimes.com/2016/03/10/world/middleeast/isis-detainee-mustard-gas.html, accessed on September 6, 2016; Karen Parish, "Information From Captured ISIL Leader Enables Counter-Chemical Strikes," *DoD News*, March 10, 2016, available from www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/690456/information-from-captured-isil-leader-enables-counter-chemical-strikes, accessed on March 10, 2016.

297. This airstrike is further described as resulting from "the culmination of months of intelligence gathering." See Jim Michaels, "Seen from above, how one of the largest airstrikes against ISIS unfolded," *USA Today*, August 26, 2016, available from www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/08/26/united-states-led-coalition-airstrikes-islamic-state-iraq/89409134/, accessed on August 26, 2016.

298. This trove is described as consisting of "more than 10,000 ISIL documents and 4.5 terabytes of data." See Terri Moon Cronk, "Coalition Forces Uncover Vital ISIL Intelligence in Key Syrian City," *DoD News*, July 15, 2016, available from www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/841764/coalition-forces-uncover-vital-isil-intelligence-in-key-syrian-city, accessed on July 18, 2016; Terri Moon Cronk, "OIR Official: Captured Info Describes ISIL Operations in Manbij," *DoD News*, July 27, 2016, available from www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/873632/oir-official-captured-info-describes-isil-operations-in-manbij, accessed on July 28, 2016; Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Secures Vast New Trove of Intelligence on ISIS," *The New York Times*, July 27, 2016, available from www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/world/middleeast/us-intelligence-isis.html, accessed on July 28, 2016.

299. Lisa Ferdinando, "Carter Encourages Cyber Command to Intensify Fight Against ISIL," *DoD News*, January 27, 2016, available from www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/645212/carter-encourages-cyber-command-to-intensify-fight-against-isil, ac-

cessed on January 28, 2016; Loren Thompson, "Pentagon Cyber Campaign Against ISIS Signals a New Era of Warfare," *Forbes*, March 1, 2016, www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2016/03/01/pentagon-cyber-campaign-against-isis-signals-a-new-era-in-warfare/#772421f53ee2, accessed on March 2, 2016; Shane Harris and Nancy A. Youssef, "U.S. Ratchets Up Cyber Attacks on ISIS," *The Daily Beast*, April 17, 2016, available from www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/04/17/u-s-ratchets-up-cyber-attacks-on-isis.html, accessed on April 18, 2016; David Sanger, "U.S. Cyberattacks Target ISIS in a New U.S. Line of Combat," *The New York Times*, April 24, 2016, available from www.nytimes.com/2016/04/25/us/politics/us-directs-cyberweapons-at-isis-for-first-time.html, accessed on April 25, 2016; Sean Lyngaas, "Cybercom touts attacks on ISIS," *FCW The Business of Federal Technology*, June 22, 2016 available from fcw.com/articles/2016/06/22/isis-cyber-command.aspx, accessed on June 24, 2016; Ellen Nakashima and Missy Ryan, "U.S. military has launched a new digital war against the Islamic State," *The Washington Post*, July 15, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-militarys-digital-war-against-the-islamic-state-is-off-to-a-slow-start/2016/07/15/76a3fe82-3da3-11e6-a66f-aa6c1883b6b1_story.html, accessed on July 18, 2016; Warren Strobel, "Obama prepares to boost U.S. military's cyber role: sources," *Reuters*, available from www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cyber-idUSKCN10G254, accessed on August 8, 2016.

300. Unconventional Warfare (UW) is defined by the Department of Defense (DOD) as:

Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.

See U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 8, 2010 (as amended through May 15, 2011), available from www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/, accessed on August 5, 2014. For the application of unconventional warfare (UW) to Mosul, Iraq's second largest city, see James Denselow, "Mosul—a city on death row," *Al Jazeera*, December 9, 2014, available from www.aljazeera.com/in-depth/opinion/2014/12/mosul-city-death-row-20141275406466428.

html, accessed on September 6, 2016; "Iraqi army drops leaflets on Mosul about 'Fallujah liberation'," Rudaw, July 7, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on July 7, 2016; Hamza Mustafa, "DA'ISH Faces Internal Uprising, Rebellion in Mosul," July 16, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on July 22, 2016; Adam Mahmud, "Resistance Stiffens in Mosul; Clandestine Factions Threaten DA'ISH Existence," August 16, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on August 23, 2016.

301. For James Jeffrey's advocacy of a "roll back and destroy" policy, see James Jeffrey, "Leave Root Causes Aside – Destroy the ISIS 'State'," *The Atlantic*, April 29, 2016, available from www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/04/destroy-isis-as-state/480531/, accessed on May 2, 2016. This appears to the present writer more credible and substantiated than the "contain and be patient" approach advocated by Stephen Biddle and Jacob Shapiro; see Stephen Biddle and Jacob Shapiro, "America Can't Do Much About ISIS," *The Atlantic*, April 20, 2016, available from www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/04/isis-containment-civil-war/478725/, accessed on May 2, 2016.

302. Matthew Rosenberg, Nicholas Kulish, and Steven Lee Myers, "Predatory Islamic State Wrings Money From Those It Rules," *The New York Times*, November 29, 2015, available from www.nytimes.com/2015/11/30/world/middleeast/predatory-islamic-state-wrings-money-from-those-it-rules.html?_r=0, accessed on November 30, 2015. Escaped and disillusioned ISO defectors, and other eyewitness accounts, provide particular insight into the mechanics of ISO's brutally repressive methods and occupation. See for example: "He Was an Islamic State Cameraman," *TF1 News*, June 8, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on June 9, 2015; "Raqqa: Fear and treachery inside Islamic State's capital," *Zaman al-Wasl*, June 15, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on June 15, 2015; Cathy Otten, "Mosul residents feel the 'IS' stranglehold," *DW*, June 29, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on July 1, 2015; Uwe Buse and Katrin Kuntz, "Relentless Terror: The Everyday Horrors of the Islamic State," *Speigel*, July 1, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on July 1, 2015; Adil al-Ayid, "In Extreme Secrecy: Controversial DA'ISH Defections in Dayr az Zawr," *Orient News*, July 19, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on July 22, 2015; Luc Mathieu, "Al-Raqqa: 'the Atmosphere Has Become Tense,

Paranoia is Growing’,” *Liberation*, September 17, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on September 21, 2015; “Migrant Crisis: Felling life under Islamic State in Syria,” *BBC News*, September 24, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on September 24, 2015; Robert F. Worth, “The Reluctant Jihadi: How One Recruit Lost Faith in Isis,” *The Guardian*, April 12, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on April 15, 2016; Sharon Behn, “Iraqis Fleeing Islamic State Describe Militants’ Tactics,” *Voice of America News*, April 14, 2016, available from www.voanews.com/articleprintview/3285169.html, accessed on April 15, 2016; Richard Engel, Ben Plesser, and Tracy Connor, “NYC Man Who Joined Then Escaped ISIS Speaks Out Against ‘Evil’,” *NBC News*, May 19, 2016, available from www.nbcnews.com, accessed on May 20, 2016; Louise Callaghan, “Defectors Pour From Crumbling Caliphate,” *The Sunday Times*, June 12, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on June 13, 2016; “‘We Feel We Are Cursed’: Life under ISIS in Sirte, Libya,” Human Rights Watch, May 18, 2016, available from www.hrw.org/node/289875/, accessed on May 18, 2016.

303. Important evidence suggests USG efforts along the financial LOE is very effective as a component of UW strategy. See for example: Lizzie Dearden, “Isis ‘halves salaries for fighters in Raqqa’ as US-led coalition air strikes continue to target oil and revenue streams,” *The Independent*, January 18, 2016, available from www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-halves-salaries-for-fighters-in-raqqa-as-us-led-coalition-air-strikes-continue-to-target-oil-a6818526.html, accessed on January 18, 2016; Hugh Naylor, “Islamic State moneymaking streams take a hit as it loses territory,” *The Washington Post*, December 4, 2015, available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/islamic-states-money-makers-take-a-hit-as-it-loses-territory/2015/12/03/b08910aa-91f6-11e5-befa-99ceeb-cbb272_story.html, accessed on December 4, 2015; Jack Moore, “ISIS CUTTING BACK AS U.S.-LED COALITION STRIKES DEGRADE GROUP’S OIL TRADE,” *Newsweek*, December 8, 2015, www.newsweek.com/isis-cutting-back-us-led-coalition-strikes-degrade-groups-oil-trade-402485, accessed on December 10, 2015; Lori Hinnant, Zeina Karam, and Susannah George, “Islamic State faces budget crunch, cuts salaries and perks,” *The Boston Globe*, February 16, 2016, available from www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2016/02/16/islamic-state-faces-budget-crunch-cuts-salaries-and-perks/W5xwKU59MkfO8oXcjb3mUO/story.html, accessed on February 16, 2016.

304. See for example: Audrey Kurth Cronin, "ISIS Is Not a Terrorist Group: Why Counterterrorism Won't Stop the Latest Jihadist Threat," *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2015, Vol. 94, No. 2, pp. 87-98, available from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/isis-not-terrorist-group>, accessed on February 20, 2015; Stephen M. Walt, "ISIS as Revolutionary State: New Twist on an Old Story," October 21, 2015, *Foreign Affairs*, available from www.foreignaffairs.com/print/1115576, accessed on October 22, 2015; Jessica Lewis McFate, "The Islamic State Digs In," *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2015, pp. 1-8. And for a highly insightful historical and non-romantic/realist account of state-formation, see Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschmeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 169-187.

305. For the decisive significance of the American air campaign in blunting ISO's momentum c. June 2014—February 2015, see John R. Allen, "General Allen Opening Statement," Opening Statement for the Record presented to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, "The Fight Against ISIS: Building The Coalition And Ensuring Military Effectiveness," Washington, DC: U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 25, 2015, available from www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Gen_Allen_Testimony.pdf, accessed on February 26, 2015. Special Envoy General John Allen recalls ISO's June 2014 blitzkrieg and the U.S. decision to act:

In June of last year, ISIL burst into the international scene as a genocidal and seemingly unstoppable juggernaut. It conquered a city, Mosul, of 1.5 million, then poured South toward Baghdad, taking cities, towns, and villages along the way. Outside Tikrit, it rounded up and massacred over 1,000 Iraqi Air Force recruits. To the west, it broke through the border town of al Qaim, and poured east toward Baghdad. ISIL's spokesman, Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, vowed, "The battle would soon rage in Baghdad and [in the holy city of] Karbala." Shortly thereafter, ISIL launched a multiple pronged attack further into northern Iraq, massacring minority populations, enslaving hundreds of women and girls, surrounding tens of thousands of Yazidis at Sinjar mountain, and opening a clear route to Erbil, the region's capital. Then The United States acted. Since our first airstrikes in August, ISIL's advance has been largely

blunted, and has been driven back from the regional capitals of Baghdad and Erbil.

The effects of the U.S. campaign is reflected in ISO's terrorist media operations. In *Dabiq*, Iss. 4, the first to appear subsequent to the August 8, 2014 commencement of the U.S. air campaign, toward the end of an apocalyptic article entitled "Reflections of the Last Crusade," the order to attack any and every citizen in every Crusader country is given (see p. 44). Under the heading, "Rush to Support your State O Muslim," it declares:

At this point in the crusade against the Islamic State, it is very important that attacks take place in every country that has entered into the alliance against the Islamic State, especially the US, UK, France, Australia, and Germany. Rather, the citizens of crusader nations should be targeted wherever they can be found [emphasis added]. Let the muwahhid not be affected by 'analysis paralysis' and thus abandon every operation only because his was-was [sic] and perfectionism pushes him towards an operation that supposedly can never fail—one that only exists theoretically on paper. He should be pleased to meet his Lord even if with just one dead kafir's name written in his scroll of deeds, [emphasis added] as the Prophet . . . said, "A kafir and his killer will never gather in Hellfire [Sahih Muslim]." Every Muslim should get out of his house, find a crusader, and kill him. It is important that the killing becomes attributed to the Islamic State who have obeyed its leadership [emphasis added]. This can easily be done with anonymity. Otherwise, crusader media makes such attacks appear to be random killings. . . . 'Rely on Allah and stab the crusader' should be the battle cry for all Islamic State patrons. Finally, do not forget that Allah is with the Muslims and will not abandon them to His enemies. And the Islamic State will remain until its banner flies over Rome [emphasis added].

See also, Kamolnick, "On Self-Declared Caliph Ibrahim's May 2015 Message to Muslims," for this strategic shift; and finally, its most recent explicit iteration in the May 21, 2016 speech by ISO spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, "That They Live By Proof," see the English translation by S.J. Prince, "READ: ISIS Spokesman Abu Muhammad al Adnani 'That They Live By Proof' English Speech Translation," Heavy, May 23, 2016, available from heavy.com/news/2016/05/new-isis-islamic-state-al-furqan-media-audio-message-that-they-live-by-proof-egyptair-flight-ms804-804-mp3-read-english-translation-text-download/2/, accessed on May 24, 2016.

306. This has been noted by numerous analysts. See examples: Gabi Siboni, Daniel Cohen, and Tal Koren, "The Islamic State's Strategy in Cyberspace," *Military and Strategic Affairs*, Vol. 7, No. 1, March 2015, pp. 127-143.; Atwan, *Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate*, pp. 15-31; Stern and Berger, *ISIS: The State of Terror*, chs. 5-7; J.M. Berger, "Tailored Online Interventions: The Islamic State's Recruitment Strategy," *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2015, pp. 19-23; J. M. Berger, "OPINION: MAKING SENSE OF ISIS'S USE OF TWITTER," *Newsweek*, March 11, 2015, available from www.newsweek.com/making-sense-isiss-use-twitter-312983, accessed on March 17, 2015; Mark Mazzetti and Michael R. Gordon, "ISIS Is Winning the Social Media War, U.S. Concludes," *The New York Times*, June 12, 2015, available from www.nytimes.com/2015/06/13/world/middleeast/isis-is-winning-message-war-us-concludes.html?_r=0, accessed on July 15, 2015. For a recent comprehensive analysis of ISO's media warfare strategy, including messages, media, messengers, and target audience analysis, see Charlie Winter, *The Virtual 'Caliphate': Understanding Islamic State's Propaganda Strategy*, London, UK: The Quilliam Foundation, July 2015, available from www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/the-virtual-caliphate-understanding-islamic-states-propaganda-strategy.pdf, accessed on July 7, 2015; Charlie Winter, *Documenting the Virtual 'Caliphate'*, London, UK: The Quilliam Foundation, October 2015, available from www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/FINAL-documenting-the-virtual-caliphate.pdf, accessed on October 6, 2015; Ali Fisher, "Swarmcast: How Jihadist Networks Maintain Persistent Online Presence," *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. 9, No. 3, June 2015, pp. 3-20. For an extensive treatment of the broader phenomenon of terrorism in cyberspace, see Gabriel Weimann, *Terrorism in Cyberspace: The Next Generation*, New York: Columbia University Press/Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2015 [original 2006, Updated].

307. For an incisive recent expose based on defectors testimony, see Greg Miller and Souad Mekhennet, "Inside the surreal world of the Islamic State's propaganda machine," *The Washington Post*, November 20, 2015, available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/inside-the-islamic-states-propaganda-machine/2015/11/20/051e997a-8ce6-11e5-acff-673ae92ddd2b_story.html, accessed on November 23, 2015. See also, "He Was an Islamic State Cameraman," *TF1 News*; Lizzie Dearden, "Former Isis Militant Reveals the Reality of 'Staged' Propaganda Videos

and Brutal Life Under the 'Islamic State'," *The Independent*, May 1, 2016, available from www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/former-isis-militant-harry-sarfo-uk-reveals-reality-of-staged-propaganda-videos-and-brutal-life-a698a6982831.html, accessed on May 2, 2016.

308. See "Islamic State: Unfriended: There are signs that Islamic State's propaganda machine is losing its edge," *The Economist*, December 12, 2015, available from www.economist.com/node/21679805/print, accessed on December 15, 2015.

309. For examples: the Joint USG-United Arab Emirates Sawab Center, based in Abu Dhabi, see Anwar Gargash and Richard Stengel, "Sawab means the right path, ISIL the wrong one," *The National Online*, July 9, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on July 19, 2015; Singapore, see Nur Sayiqin Mohamad Salleh, "Helpline to be set up to counter ISIS propaganda," *The Straits Times Online*, June 10, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on June 11, 2015; France, see Alain Barluet, "Cyber-War on ISIL Has Begun," *Le Figaro*, September 25, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on September 25, 2015, and "France unveils anti-jihad campaign with video and web site," *Reuters*, January 28, 2015, available from www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USKBN0L11VT20150128, accessed on January 29, 2015; Australia, see Fergus Hanson, "Australia: Countering ISIS online," *The Interpreter*, April 20, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on April 21, 2015. See also, the recently published report, a follow-on product of Australia's Regional Summit to Counter Violent Extremism held in Sydney, June 2015: Sara Zeiger, "Undermining Violent Extremist Narratives in South East Asia: A How-To Guide," *Hedayah*, August 2016, available from www.hedayahcenter.org/Admin/Content/File-3182016115528.pdf, accessed on September 14, 2016; Malaysia, see Leanne Goh, "PM: Take the Fight Against IS Online," *The Star Online*, October 1, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on October 1, 2015; "ASEAN centre to push message: Nothing Islamic about IS," *TODAY*, July 16, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on July 28, 2016; "Malaysia: PM: Obama lauds Malaysia for setting up regional hub to curb Islamic State influence," *The Malay Mail*, September 8, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on September 9, 2016; Al-Azhar in Egypt, see Reham Mokbel, "Al-Azhar goes online to fight extremism," Al-

Monitor, June 26, 2015, available from www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/06/egypt-al-azhar-internet-social-media-religious.html, accessed on June 29, 2015; Indonesia, see "Preventing Terrorism Not Just About Catching Terrorists," *Kompas*, March 24, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on May 11, 2015.

For recent Iraqi and joint USG-Iraqi efforts to counter ISO media warfare, see "Iraq's Abadi opens anti-Islamic State world conference," BBC Monitoring, August 10, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on August 10, 2016; Chad Garland, "Marines Arm Iraqis, Kurds with 'Clever' Messages to Defeat IS," *Stars and Stripes*, August 14, 2016, available from www.stripes.com/news/marines-arm-iraqis-kurds-with-clever-messages-to-defeat-is-1.423810, accessed on August 16, 2016.

310. See for example: Christina Nemr, "Countering Islamic State Recruitment: You're Doing It Totally Wrong," *War on the Rocks*, July 14, 2015, available from warontherocks.com/2015/07/countering-islamic-state-recruitment-youre-doing-it-totally-wrong/, accessed on July 15, 2015; Justine Drennan, "Making 'Countering Violent Extremism' Sound Sexy," *Foreign Policy*, June 4, 2015, available from foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/04/making-countering-violent-extremism-sound-sexy-islamic-state-social-media/, accessed on June 5, 2015; "The Guardian view on fighting terror: we must win the war for young imaginations," *The Guardian*, June 16, 2015, available from <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/16/guardian-view-on-fighting-terror-we-must-win-war-for-young-imaginations>, accessed on September 6, 2016; Asawin Suebsaeng, "U.S. Turns to 'Zero Dark Thirty' Writer for Anti-ISIS Propaganda," *The Daily Beast*, September 28, 2015, www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/09/28/u-s-turns-to-zero-dark-thirty-writer-for-anti-isis-propaganda.html, accessed on October 1, 2015; Dina Temple-Raston, "How to Take the Internet Back from ISIS," *The New Yorker*, May 7, 2015, www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/how-to-take-the-internet-back-from-isis, accessed on May 22, 2015; Shannon N. Green "Changing the Narrative: Countering Violent Extremist Propaganda," *CSIS Commentary*, September 25, 2015, available from <https://www.csis.org/analysis/changing-narrative-countering-violent-extremist-propaganda>, accessed on September 6, 2016.

311. Mark Townsend, "How a team of social media experts is able to keep track of the UK jihadis," *The Guardian*, January 17, 2015, www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/17/social-media-

british-jihadists-islamic-state-facebook-twitter, accessed on January 20, 2015; "Islamic State web accounts to be blocked by new police team," *BBC News*, June 22, 2015, available from www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33220037, accessed on September 6, 2016; Brian Ross, James Gordon Meek, and Lee Ferran, "Twitter Escalates its Own ISIS Battle: 2,000 Accounts Suspended Last Week," *ABC News*, May 2, 2015, available from abcnews.go.com/International/twitter-escalates-isis-skirmish-2000-accounts-suspended-week/story?id=29335434; Brian Everstine, "Carlisle: Air Force intel uses ISIS 'moron's' social media posts to target airstrikes," *Air Force Times*, June 4, 2015, available from www.airforcetimes.com/story/military/tech/2015/06/04/air-force-isis-social-media-target/28473723/, accessed on October 27, 2015; Vikram Dodd, "Europol web unit to hunt extremists behind Isis social media propaganda," *The Guardian*, June 21, 2015, available from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/21/europol-internet-unit-track-down-extremists-isis-social-media-propaganda>, accessed on September 6, 2016; Brandon Bailey and Julie Pace, AP, "U.S. recruits tech leaders to help disrupt Islamic State group," *Chicago Tribune*, January 7, 2016, available from www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-tech-leaders-disrupt-islamic-state-20160107-story.html, accessed on January 8, 2016. Bradley Klapper, "AP: Islamic State's Twitter traffic drops amid US efforts," *AP The Big Story*, July 9, 2016, available from www.bigstory.ap.org/article/21c9eb68e6294bdfa0a099a0632b8056/ap-exclusive-islamic-states-twitter-traffic-plunges, accessed on July 11, 2016; Ellen Nakashima, "Twitter says it shut down more than 235,000 accounts promoting terrorism since February," *The Washington Post*, August 18, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/twitter-says-it-shut-down-more-than-235000-accounts-promoting-terrorism-since-february/2016/08/18/7fc5b7b4-653d-11e6-96c0-37533479f3f5_story.html, accessed on August 19, 2016. ISO has partially adapted to USG counter-ISO information operations by shifting to other less-vulnerable, encrypted social media applications, especially Telegram. See for example: Jake Ryan and Mike Sullivan, "'Anything Can Work If Allah Helps': Sun Investigation Exposes ISIS's Sick Car Bomb Bid to Strike Heart of UK," *The Sun*, July 28, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on July 28, 2016; Mehdi Jedinia, "IS Followers Flock to Telegram After being Driven From Twitter," *Voice of America News*, August 28, 2016, available from www.voanews.com/a/western-nations-target-islamic-state-favorite-encrypted-app/3483900.html, accessed on August 29, 2016; Agence France-

Presse (AFP), "Paris: French terror investigators grapple with Telegram app," AFP, September 13, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on September 13, 2016; Toby Antony, "Sleuths in a Fix Over App-Alling Telegram," *The New Indian Express*, July 16, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on July 13, 2016. For the preeminent role of Telegram as a communications medium used by ISO-inspired Adel Kermiche and Abdel Malik Petitjean, who on July 26, 2016, slaughtered the 85-year old Catholic priest Father Jacques Hamel, see Victor Garcia and Jérémie Pham-Lê, "'You Go Into a Church and Cause a Carnage': Kermiche's chilling Recording," *L'Express*, July 28, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on July 29, 2016; Victor Garcia, "Inside Ansar al-Tawhid, Telegram's and Kermiche's 'Jihad Channel'," *L'Express*, August 18, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on August 19, 2016.

312. Greg Miller and Scott Higham, "In a propaganda war against ISIS, the U.S. tried to play by the enemy's rules: Confronting the 'Caliphate'," *The Washington Post*, Occasional Series, May 8, 2015, www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-a-propaganda-war-us-tried-to-play-by-the-enemys-rules/2015/05/08/6eb6b732-e52f-11e4-81ea-0649268f729e_story.html, accessed on September 1, 2015.

313. The Center for Strategic Counterterrorist Communications (CSCC) has also made very persuasive use of this recent defector anti-ISO messaging, see for example: "Daesh Defectors: I Knew It Was Time to Get Out," YouTube video, available from www.youtube.com/watch?v=IL9H4On2egU, accessed on September 6, 2016; "Daesh Defectors: 3 women leave al-Khansaa brigade," YouTube video, available from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bEd8LojF9gk>, accessed on September 28, 2015; "Daesh Defectors: 'This is no Caliphate'," YouTube video, available from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XOdUIjsihiU>, accessed on September 6, 2016. For a unique, pivotal report demonstrating the unique power and credibility of former ISO defector's testimonials, see Peter R. Neumann, *Victims, Perpetrators, Assets: the Narratives of Islamic State Defectors*, ICSR Report, September 2015, available from icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/ICSR-Report-Victims-Perpertrators-Assets-The-Narratives-of-Islamic-State-Defectors.pdf, accessed on September 22, 2015. For follow-up stories based on Neumann's research, see "More Islamic State defectors speaking out – report," *BBC News*, September 21, 2015, available

from www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34313337, accessed on September 22, 2015; Kimiko De Freytas-Tamura, "ISIS Defectors Reveal Disillusionment," *The New York Times*, September 20, 2015, available from www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/world/europe/isis-defectors-reveal-disillusionment.html, accessed on September 21, 2015; Sarah Sinno, "The defectors' handbook to destroying Islamic State," *The Telegraph*, September 23, 2015, available from www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/islamic-state/11883028/The-defectors-handbook-to-destroying-Islamic-State.html, accessed on September 6, 2016; "State Should Use Deserters' Accounts Against ISIL," *Nederlandse Omroep Stichting (NOS)*, September 22, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on September 23, 2015. For a unique early Finnish defector whose exit from his self-sought role as a key ISO social media disseminator was accompanied by his trenchant theological/legal critique of the ISO's extreme deviance, see Aleksi Teivainen, "'Isis can't be defeated by bombs,' says Finn who turned his back on the terrorist group," *Helsinki Times Online*, June 10, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on June 12, 2015. See also, Kevin Sullivan's five-part series, "Life in the Islamic State," based on interviews with current or former residents of ISO territory that provides an overview, and specific focus on women, justice, the economy, and education:

- Kevin Sullivan, "Spoils for the rulers, terror for the ruled," *The Washington Post*, October 1, 2015, available from www.washingtonpost.com/sf/life-in-the-islamic-state/2015/10/01/overview/, accessed on September 6, 2016;
- Kevin Sullivan, "Till Martyrdom do Us Part," *The Washington Post*, October 1, 2015, available from www.washingtonpost.com/sf/life-in-the-islamic-state/2015/10/01/women/, accessed on September 6, 2016;
- Kevin Sullivan, "Life in the Islamic State: A climate of fear and violence," *The Washington Post*, October 1, 2015, available from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/tablet/wp/2015/10/04/2015/10/04/life-in-the-islamic-state-a-climate-of-fear-and-violence/>, accessed on September 6, 2016;
- Kevin Sullivan, "Life in the 'Islamic State': Economy Where the poor starve and the tax man carries a whip," *The Washington Post*, October 1, 2015, available from www.washingtonpost.com/sf/life-in-the-islamic-state/2015/10/01/economy/, accessed on September 6, 2016;
- Kevin Sullivan, "Life in the 'Islamic State': Education For boys, God and guns; for girls, God and cooking," *The*

Washington Post, October 1, 2015, available from www.washingtonpost.com/sf/life-in-the-islamic-state/2015/10/01/education/, accessed on September 6, 2016.

See also, Cameron Sumter, "Disillusioned defectors key to rebutting Islamic State rhetoric," *The Interpreter*, blog entry, posted May 23, 2016, available from www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2016/05/23/Disillusioned-defectors-key-to-rebutting-Islamic-State-rhetoric.aspx, accessed on May 23, 2016.

314. The ISO's top-down monopolistic entitlement conception of rulership, use of coercion, and extremely deviant doctrinal positions create a virtual immunity from rationally conceived logical and empirical critiques. An admirable recent effort to sketch some of the terms of a rationalist juridical critique may be found in Dr. Alex P. Schmid, *Challenging the Narrative of the "Islamic State,"* ICCT Research Paper, The Hague: International Centre for Counter Terrorism, June 4, 2015, available from <https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/ICCT-Schmid-Challenging-the-Narrative-of-the-Islamic-State-June2015.pdf>, accessed on September 28, 2015.

315. For the Obama Administration's critical review, other critical commentary, and facts surrounding current proposals for reorienting current anti-ISO efforts directed at behavioral disengagement from terrorism, see Greg Miller, "Panel casts doubt on U.S. propaganda efforts against ISIS," *The Washington Post*, December 2, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/panel-casts-doubt-on-us-propaganda-efforts-against-isis/2015/12/02/ab7f9a14-9851-11e5-94f0-9eeaff906ef3_story.html, accessed on December 3, 2016; Greg Miller and Karen DeYoung, "Obama administration plans shake-up in propaganda war against the Islamic State," *The Washington Post*, January 8, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-plans-shake-up-in-propaganda-war-against-the-islamic-state/2016/01/08/d482255c-b585-11e5-a842-0feb51d1d124_story.html, accessed on January 8, 2016; Patrick Tucker, "America's New Plan to Fight ISIS Online," *Defense One*, January 11, 2016, available from www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/01/americas-new-plan-fight-isis-online/125043/, accessed on January 12, 2016; Patrick Tucker, "Inside the New US War with Brand ISIS,"

Defense One, June 9, 2016, available from www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/06/inside-new-us-war-brand-isis/128938/, accessed on June 10, 2016.

Present USG counter-ISO information operations are distributed across four government agencies: the U.S. Department of State, Justice, Homeland Security, and Defense. The Department of State, for example, has dismantled the Center for Strategic Counterterrorist Communications, established the Global Engagement Center, and along with founding and seeding major regional counter-ISO initiatives and identifying and developing credible third-party messengers, is actively assisting in the development of themes, messaging, and overall campaign conception. The Department of Defense, Central Command (CENTCOM), currently conducts offensive cyber operations designed to attack ISO's command and control, communications, logistics, recruitment, finances, and overall kinetic capacities. CENTCOM is also extensively engaged in counter-ISO information operations via its Digital Engagement Team (DET)—an 11-person team fluent in Arabic, Urdu, Russian, Farsi, Dari, and Pashto—actively countering ISO's recruitment in cyberspace. Finally, CENTCOM's Web Ops, involving nearly 120 persons and in coordination with the State Department, is now systematically countering ISO recruitment in cyberspace using classical methods of counter-propaganda and psychological warfare—newly renamed, Military Information Support Operations (MISO). For key background on these initiatives, including Homeland Security and the Department of Justice, see Jeff Seldin, "US in 'Crisis Mode' in Fight Against IS Online Messaging," *Voice of America News*, July 6, 2016, available from www.voanews.com/a/united-states-crisis-mode-fight-islamic-state-online-messaging/3407346.html, accessed on July 7, 2016; Helene Cooper, "U.S. Drops Snark in Favor of Emotion to Undercut Extremists," *The New York Times*, July 28, 2016, available from www.nytimes.com/2016/07/29/world/middleeast/isis-recruiting.html, accessed on July 29, 2016; Mark Pomerleau, "DoD, State partnering to fight ISIS online," C4ISRNET, July 11, 2016, available from www.c4isrnet.com/story/military-tech/cyber/2016/07/11/dod-state-partnering-fight-isis-online/86867566/, accessed on July 13, 2016; Karen Parrish, "Centcom Counters ISIL Propaganda," *DoD News*, July 6, 2016, available from www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/827761/centcom-counters-isis-propaganda, accessed on July 7, 2016; Eleanor Mueller, "Islamic State intensifying its battle on social media, Congress hears," *The News & Observer*, July 6, 2016,

available from www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/article88081202.html, accessed on July 7, 2016.

316. See Chapter 3, section I, *Islamic State Organization (Tanzim al-Dawla al-Islamiyya)*, of this book.

317. This essential truth was known and factored into USG strategy immediately following ISO's occupation of Mosul, and its resolution critical to whether and when the USG would commence military operations. See for example: Mark Landler and Michael R. Gordon, "Obama Pushes Iraqis to Mend Sectarian Rifts," *The New York Times*, June 15, 2014, available from www.nytimes.com/2014/06/16/world/middleeast/republicans-press-obama-to-move-swiftly-to-halt-extremists-advances-in-iraq.html, accessed on June 16, 2014. See also, Ali Mamouri, "Sistani stresses need for unity over sectarianism in battle for Iraq," *Al-Monitor*, June 16, 2014, available from www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/06/iraq-isis-crisis-sistani-avoid-sectarianism.html, accessed on June 17, 2014.

The critical importance of the political essence of the Iraqi conflict is the conclusion drawn by scores of articles, a selective sample of which is the following: Garamone, "Success Against ISIL Requires Time, Partners, Dempsey Say"; see also, Jim Garamone, "Dempsey Discusses Unsettled, Unpredictable World Situation," *DoD News*, September 22, 2015, available from www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/618118/dempsey-discusses-unsettled-unpredictable-world-situation, accessed on September 23, 2015; Carla Babb, "Top US General: Islamic State Fight 'Stalemated'," *Voice of America News*, September 9, 2015, available from www.voanews.com/a/top-us-general-says-islamic-state-fight-stalemated/2954918.html, accessed on September 7, 2016; Peter Beinart, "The Surge Fallacy: Having misunderstood the Iraq War, U.S. Republicans are taking a dangerously hawkish turn on foreign policy," *The Atlantic*, September 2015, available from www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/09/the-surge-fallacy/399344/, accessed on August 11, 2015; Lolita C. Baldor, AP, "Top General: US should consider embedding troops in Iraq," *Business Insider*, August 12, 2015, available from www.businessinsider.com/ap-top-general-us-should-consider-embedding-troops-in-iraq-2015-8, accessed on August 13, 2015; Anthony H. Cordesman, "The Defeat of Ramadi: A Time for Transparency, Integrity, and Change," May 21, 2015, available from <https://www.csis.org/analysis/defeat-ramadi-time-transparency>

integrity-and-change, accessed on September 7, 2016; Anthony H. Cordesman, "Iraqi Stability and the 'ISIS War'," August 12, 2015, available from [csis.org/files/publication/150812_Iraq_Stability_and_the_War_on_ISIS.pdf](https://www.csis.org/files/publication/150812_Iraq_Stability_and_the_War_on_ISIS.pdf), accessed on August 17, 2015; Anthony H. Cordesman, "Rethinking the Wars Against ISIS and the U.S. Strategy for Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency," September 28, 2015, available from <https://www.csis.org/analysis/rethinking-wars-against-isis-and-us-strategy-counter-terrorism-and-counter-insurgency>, accessed on September 7, 2016; Robert C. Jones, "Interview: Thinking About ISIS in Strategic Terms," *Small Wars Journal*, August 9, 2015, available from smallwarsjournal.com/print/26481, accessed on August 10, 2015; Andrew Watkins, "Islamic State Operations and Iraqi Fault Lines," *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 8, No. 5, May 2015, pp. 17-20; Vivian Salama and Qassim Abdul-Zahra, AP, June 20, 2015, "Sunni tribes, abandoned by Iraq, key to Islamic State fight," *Salon*, June 20, 2015, available from www.salon.com/2015/06/20/sunni_tribes_abandoned_by_iraq_key_to_islamic_state_fight/, accessed on September 7, 2016; Paul McCleary and Lara Jakes, "U.S. Works to Bring More Sunni Tribal Fighters into Islamic State War," *Foreign Policy*, June 10, 2015, available from foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/10, accessed on June 11, 2015; David Ignatius, "Baghdad must empower Sunnis or lose Iraq," *The Daily Star*, May 20, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on May 21, 2015; Al-Araby al-Jadeed, "Top Iraqi politicians: we created sectarian firestorm," February 6, 2016, available from www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2016/2/2/top-iraqi-politicians-we-created-sectarian-firestorm, accessed on February 3, 2016; Olson, "When the Islamic State is Gone, What Comes Next?"; Kitfield, "'Our Greatest Challenge': CJCS Gen. Dunford"; Petraeus, "The Challenge in Mosul won't be to defeat the Islamic State. It will be what comes after"; "Joint Press Conference by Secretary Carter and Gen. Votel on the Counter-ISIL Coalition, Joint Base Andrews, Maryland," U.S. Department of Defense, Press Operations; U.S. Department of State, "Remarks at the Counter-ISIL Ministerial Meeting."

318. General David Petraeus, "Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance," *Military Review*, Vol. 88, No. 5, September-October 2008, pp. 2-4.

319. Kamolnick, *Delegitimizing Al-Qaeda*.

320. Paul Kamolnick, "Al Qaeda's Shari'a Crisis"; Kamolnick, "The Egyptian Islamic Group's Critique of Al-Qaeda's Interpretation of Jihad"; Kamolnick, "Has Adam Gadahn Forsaken the Lawful Jihad for Anti-Americanism?"

321. Paul Kamolnick, "On Self-Declared Caliph Ibrahim's May 2015 Message to Muslims"; Paul Kamolnick, "On Self-Declared Caliph Ibrahim's December 2015 Speech: Further Evidence for Critical Vulnerabilities in the Crumbling Caliphate," *Small Wars Journal*, January 2, 2016, available from smallwarsjournal.com/print/36330; Paul Kamolnick, "Abu Muhammad al-Adnani's May 21, 2016 Speech: More Evidence for Extreme Marginalization, Implosion, and the Islamic State Organization's Certain Future as a Hunted Underground Ultra-Takfiri Terrorist Criminal Entity," *Small Wars Journal*, July 2, 2016, available from smallwarsjournal.com/printpdf/46941, accessed on August 1, 2016.

322. Until a comprehensive jihad-realist Sharia critique of ISO may be compiled, two important English-language sources may be fruitfully consulted. See Shaykh Muhammad al-Yaqoubi, *Refuting ISIS*, 2nd ed., Herndon, Virginia: Sacred Knowledge, 2016; Sheikh Muhammad al-Yaqoubi, with 126 original signatories, "Letter to Baghdadi," September 19, 2014, available from www.lettertobaghdadi.com/14/english-v14.pdf, accessed September 26, 2014. The principal deficiency of Sheikh Yaqoubi's scholarship, in the present author's opinion, is his apologetic account of offensive jihad, and idealized version of Sufism as a path to the Divine. Nevertheless, these resources martial critical original sources – Quran, ahadith, scholarly consensus, in particular – and present a reliable account of the Sharia of lawful jihad maintained within the mainstream traditions of Sunni Islam. For an excellent scholarly English-language work that presumes a jihad-realist approach yet forcefully demonstrates, using classical Islamic sources, the fundamental legal distinction between the concepts "jihad" and "terrorism," see ElSayed M. A. Amin, *Reclaiming Jihad: A Qur'anic Critique of Terrorism*, Leicestershire, UK: The Islamic Foundation, 2014.

323. The Syrian theater provides keen evidence for AQO's strategic acumen, patience, formidable military and political prowess, and present embeddedness in the broader anti-Assad Islamist revolutionary insurgency. Given this strategic embeddedness and AQO's calculated focus on unifying Sharia-based, Sunni

Islamist insurgents, it is proving extremely difficult for the USG to strictly disaggregate and specifically target AQO-identified insurgent terrorist actors. See for example: David Ignatius, "A new jihadist threat may be on the horizon in Syria," *The Washington Post*, July 19, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/a-new-jihadist-threat-rises-in-syria-as-the-islamic-state-recedes/2016/07/19/f9fd6ae6-4df4-11e6-a422-83ab49ed5e6a_story.html?utm_term=.6a0defc160da, accessed on July 20, 2016; Karen DeYoung and Adam Goldman, "Is al-Qaeda's affiliate in Syria no longer a 'sideshow'?" *The Washington Post*, July 20, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/is-al-qaedas-affiliate-in-syria-no-longer-a-sideshow/2016/07/20/e29f9012-4e9a-11e6-aa14-e0c1087f7583_story.html, accessed on July 21, 2016; Sly and DeYoung, "Syria's Jabhat al-Nusra splits from al-Qaeda and changes its name"; Jamie Dettmer, "Syrian Rebel Alignment Likely as al-Qaida Leader Blesses Split," *Voice of America News*, July 28, 2016, www.voanews.com/articleprintview/3438911.html, accessed on July 29, 2016. For the recently-disclosed USG policy and strategy designed to isolate, identify, and target *Jabhat al-Nusra* as an AQO-affiliated FTO, within the framework of a ceasefire designed to strengthen a cessation of hostilities, and support a political transition, see "A Grand Bargain for Syria," Stratfor, July 1, 2016, available from www.stratfor.com/geopolitical-diary/grand-bargain-syria, accessed on July 1, 2016; "Terms of Reference for the Joint Implementation Group," *The Washington Post*, July 13, 2016 [orig. June 27, 2016], available from https://www.washingtonpost.com/r/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2016/07/13/Editorial-Opinion/Graphics/terms_of_reference_for_the_Joint_Implementation_Group.pdf, accessed on July 20, 2016. Most recently, it appears that the USG in the wake of the previously mentioned policy initiative has undertaken efforts to further isolate AQO-aligned elements in the Syrian Islamist insurgency, and to deter former *Jabhat al-Nusra* elements from further embedding themselves within an Islamist united front. See for example: Bradley Klapper and Matthew Lee, "Officials outline new details of Syria cease-fire deal," Associated Press (AP), September 13, 2016, available from bigstory.ap.org/article/3338883a3bf548be9431e03d2236381a/officials-outline-new-details-syria-cessation-deal, accessed on September 14, 2016; Carla Babb and Steve Herman, "US, Russia Look at Creating Joint Integration Center on Syria," *Voice of America News*, September 13, 2016, available from www.voanews.com/a/us-russia-joint-integration-center-syria/3505864.html, accessed on September 14, 2016; "Kerry:

Going after al-Qaeda in Syria ‘not a concession to anybody’,” *Al-Monitor*, Week in Review, September 11, 2016, available from www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/09/syria-kerry-nusra-al-qaeda-russia-iran-pyd-syria-turkey.html, accessed on September 12, 2016; Nathir Rida, “Targeting Jaysh al-Fath Military Commander After Meeting to Form United Army Under Leadership of Fath al-Sham; His Killing Represents Targeting of Global Wing Formed of Hard-Line Opponents of Disengagement from Al-Qa’ida,” *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, September 10, 2016, available from www.open-source.gov, accessed on September 16, 2016; Suleiman Al-Khalidi, “Air strike kills top commander of former Nusra group in Syria,” *Reuters*, September 8, 2016, available from www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-militants-idUSKCN11E2YD, accessed on September 9, 2016; “Ahrar al-Sham: Merger with Fath al-Sham is Suspended Until Further Notice!” *Al-Watan*, September 11, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on September 13, 2016.

For a cogent, Syrian Sunni salafi nationalist-Islamist description of the actual Syrian Islamist spectrum, and the dangers of the USG confounding Islamism—even if conservative salafist variants seeking the rule of Sharia and an Islamic state, with globally-focused anti-Western terrorist elements, see Labib Al Nahhas [head of foreign political relations, Ahrar al-Sham], “The deadly consequences of mislabeling Syria’s revolutionaries,” Op-Ed, *The Washington Post*, July 10, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-deadly-consequences-of-mislabeling-syrias-revolutionaries/2015/07/10/6dec139e-266e-11e5-aae2-6c4f59b050aa_story.html?utm_term=.f9ffcbed5d47, accessed on July 15, 2016.

324. See for example: Paul McCleary, Dan De Luce, and C.K. Hickey, “Mapped: The Islamic State Isn’t Doing as Well as You Think,” *Foreign Policy News: The Cable*, December 30, 2015, available from foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/30/mapped-the-islamic-state-isnt-doing-as-well-as-you-think/, accessed on September 7, 2016; Jim Michaels, “ISIL loses 45% of territory in Iraq, 20% in Syria,” *USA Today*, May 18, 2016, available from www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/05/17/exclusive-isil-loses-45-territory-iraq-20-syria/84499682/, accessed on May 20, 2016; Jeff Seldin, “Islamic State Caliphate Crunched by US-Backed Forces,” *Voice of America News*, January 29, 2016, www.voanews.com/a/islamic-state-caliphate-territory-us-backed-forces/3168752.html, accessed on September 6, 2016; Ishaan Tharoor, “The Islamic State has lost more than a

fifth of its territory, says report," *The Washington Post*, March 16, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/03/16/the-islamic-state-has-lost-more-than-a-fifth-of-its-territory-says-report/, accessed on March 17, 2016; Liz Sly, "In Syria and Iraq, the Islamic State is in retreat on multiple fronts," *The Washington Post*, March 24, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-syria-and-iraq-the-islamic-state-is-in-retreat-on-multiple-fronts/2016/03/24/a0e33774-f101-11e5-a2a3-d4e9697917d1_story.html, accessed on March 25, 2016; "IS loses 12% of territory since January – IHS," *BBC News*, July 11, 2016, available from www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36762874, accessed on July 11, 2016; AP, "Isis ranks dwindle to 15,000 amid 'retreat on all fronts', claims Pentagon," *The Guardian*, August 10, 2016, available from www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/11/isis-ranks-dwindle-to-15000-amid-retreat-on-all-fronts-claims-pentagon, accessed on August 11, 2016; Balint Szlanko, "IS struggles to retain grip as it loses ground in Iraq," AP The Big Story, August 23, 2016, available from bigstory.ap.org/article/30cd6162cb41452e92d35feb37309cc5/struggles-retain-grip-it-loses-ground-iraq, accessed on August 24, 2016; W.J. Hennigan and Brian Bennett, "U.S. intelligence sees Islamic State as weakened after series of defeats," *The Los Angeles Times*, August 27, 2016, available from www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-isis-intel-20160825-snap-story.html, accessed on August 20, 2016.

325. For excellent background on the battle to retake Ramadi from ISO written at the commencement in May 2015, of operations, including a somber and prescient account of the political essence of the Sunni-Shia divide, see U.S. Department of State, "Background Briefing on Iraq," Special Briefing, Washington, DC: Office of the Spokesperson, Senior State Department Official, May 20, 2015, available from www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/05/242665.htm, accessed on May 22, 2015. For key assessments following ISO strategic defeat, see Helene Cooper, "As U.S. Hails Iraqi Success in Ramadi, Focus Turns to Next Move in ISIS Fight," *The New York Times*, December 29, 2015, available from www.nytimes.com/2015/12/30/world/middleeast/isis-ramadi-iraq.html, accessed on December 30, 2015; Jean Marc Mojon, AFP, "Sunni tribal fighters deployed in reconquered Ramadi areas," Yahoo News, December 29, 2015, available from www.yahoo.com/news/sunni-tribal-fighters-deployed-reconquered-ramadi-areas-141209437.html?ref=gs, accessed on December 30, 2015; For an in-depth account by a journalist

embedded with U.S. Special Forces, see Jane Arraf, "How Iraqi Forces Drove ISIS From Ramadi," *Newsweek*, February 25, 2016, available from www.newsweek.com/2016/03/04/iraqi-forces-fighting-isis-ramadi-fallujah-mosul-430042.html/, accessed on February 26, 2016. The pernicious role of Iranian proxies should not be underestimated, and the merest sample of what is actually an avalanche of persistently sectarian information operations designed to minimize the role of Sunni's in the liberation and reoccupation of Ramadi, may be sampled here: Fars News Agency, December 30, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on December 31, 2015. The first two sentences read:

Desperation can make the War Party in Washington do surprising things, and that's exactly what they are doing now as regards the recapture of the Anbar Province city of Ramadi by Iraqi forces. Feeling desperate and lost, they are using Ramadi capture [sic] as 'vindication' and proof that they will eventually win the war on ISIL — the monster they helped create.

326. ISO's complete defeat in Sirte is in progress at the time of this writing. See Carla Babb, "Pentagon: IS Down to 3 Neighborhoods in Former Libyan Stronghold," *Voice of America News*, September 1, 2016, available from www.voanews.com/a/pentagon-islamic-state-down-three-neighborhoods-sirte-libya/3490285.html, accessed on September 2, 2016; Paul Shinkman, "Nowhere to Run for ISIS in Libya," *U.S. News and World Report*, September 1, 2016, available from www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016-09-01/pentagon-nowhere-to-run-for-isis-in-libya, accessed on September 2, 2016.

327. Shaping operations for the battle to liberate Mosul, occupied by ISO since June 2014, are at the time of this writing full-on and an expedited time-table to launch a full-scale counter-offensive is in evidence. For facts related to these shaping operations, see Missy Ryan, "This is the general set to oversee the biggest battle yet against the Islamic State," *The Washington Post*, July 8, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/07/08/this-is-the-general-set-to-oversee-the-biggest-battle-yet-against-the-islamic-state/, accessed on July 8, 2016; Dan Lamothe and Loveday Morris, "Pentagon will send hundreds of more troops to Iraq following seizure of key airfield," *The Washington Post*, July 11, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/07/11/seizure-of-key-air-base-near-mosul-raises-

prospect-of-u-s-escalation-against-isis/, accessed on July 11, 2016; Jeff Seldin, "Retaking Mosul is 'Now Upon Us' top US Official Declares," *Voice of America News*, July 19, 2016, available from www.voanews.com/a/retaking-mosul-upon-us-united-states-official-declares/3426634.html, accessed on July 20, 2016; Richard Sisk, "US Troops Move Down to Battalion Level with Iraqis," *Military.com*, available from www.military.com/daily-news/2016/07/27/us-troops-move-down-to-battalion-level-with-iraqis.html, accessed on July 28, 2016; Corey Dickstein, "101st Airborne soldiers tapped to fight Islamic State group," *Stars and Stripes*, August 5, 2016, available from www.stripes.com/news/101st-airborne-soldiers-tapped-to-fight-islamic-state-group-1.422639, accessed on August 8, 2016; Mike Giglio, "Inside the Real US Ground War on ISIS," *BuzzFeed News Middle East*, August 16, 2016, available from www.buzzfeed.com/mikegiglio/inside-the-real-us-ground-war-on-isis?utm_term=.ttBg-k0lY0#.dpO4OoR5o, accessed on August 18, 2016; Hope Hodge Seck, "Marines Collect Intel, Pinpoint ISIS Targets as Mosul Fight Draws Near," *Military.com*, available from www.military.com/daily-news/2016/09/02/marines-collect-intel-pinpoint-isis-targets-mosul-fight-near.html, accessed on September 6, 2016; Stephen Kalin, "Iraq gears up for late-year push to retake Mosul from Islamic State," *Reuters*, September 9, 2016, available from www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-mosul-insight-idUSKCN11E2DE, accessed on September 9, 2016; Orla Guerin, "Is Mosul heading for a last 'apocalyptic' IS stand?," *BBC News*, September 14, 2016, available from www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37353081, accessed on September 14, 2016. The centrality of stabilization operations and humanitarian intervention in this upcoming battle has received considerable attention. See for example: "IS conflict: UN warns of 'huge impact' of Mosul assault," *BBC News*, August 23, 2016, available from www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37164630, accessed on August 23, 2016; Rick Gladstone, "1.2 Million Iraqis Could Be Uprooted in Mosul Battle, U.N. Says," *The New York Times*, August 23, 2016, available from www.ny-times.com/2016/08/24/world/middleeast/isis-mosul-iraq.html?_r=0, accessed on August 23, 2016.

328. ISO's willingness to deploy snipers to murder non-combatant civilians as they flee, and coerce and exploit them for battle cover as "human shields" is also critical, see for example: "IS conflict: 50,000 Iraqi civilians 'at great risk' in Falluja," *BBC News*, May 24, 2016, available from www.bbc.com/news/world-mid

dle-east-36367561, accessed on May 25, 2016; "Iraqi civilians 'shot by ISIL' while fleeing Fallujah," *Al Jazeera*, June 6, 2016, available from www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/iraq-civilians-shot-isil-fleeing-fallujah-160606070833953.html, accessed on September 7, 2016; AFP, "Civilians face Islamic State sniper fire trying to flee Iraq's besieged Fallujah, residents say," *Australian Broadcasting Corporation*, June 6, 2016, available from www.abc.net.au/news/2016-06-07/civilians-die-trying-to-flee-iraq-s-besieged-fallujah/7483576, accessed on September 7, 2016; Sharon Behn, "'We Lived Like Animals' Under IS Rule in Fallujah," *Voice of America News*, May 30, 2016, available from www.voanews.com/a/we-live-like-animals-under-is-rule-in-fallujah/3351785.html, accessed on June 2, 2016; Tom Miles, "Islamic State captures up to 3,000 fleeing Iraqis: UNHCR," *Reuters*, August 5, 2016, available from www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-capture-idUSKCN10G0PT, accessed on August 5, 2016; "ISIL Releases Hundreds of Civilians Captured in Manbij to Use as Human Shields; Washington Affirms that the Syrian Democratic Forces Took Control of the City Center," Ra'y al-Yawm, with Agence France-Presse (AFP) and Anadolu Agency, August 13, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on August 15, 2016; Bara' al-Shammari, "DA'ISH Executes 62 Civilians in Northern Iraq," *Al-'Arabi al-Jadid*, August 6, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on August 8, 2016.

329. Richard Barrett, "The Islamic State Goes Global," *CTC Sentinel*, Vol. 8, No. 11, November/December 2015, pp. 1-4; Anthony H. Cordesman, "U.S. Strategy and the War in Iraq and Syria," *CSIS Commentary*, May 13, 2016, available from <https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-strategy-and-war-iraq-and-syria>, accessed on September 6, 2016; Terri Moon Cronk, "OIR Spokesman: Attacks in Baghdad Show ISIL Reverting to 'Terrorist Roots'," *DoD News*, May 18, 2016, available from www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/775516/oir-spokesman-attacks-in-baghdad-show-isil-reverting-to-terrorist-roots, accessed on May 20, 2016; Taylor Luck, "ISIS, losing territory in Syria, signals strategic shift," *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 27, 2016, available from www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2016/0527/ISIS-losing-territory-in-Syria-signals-strategic-shift, accessed on June 2, 2016; "IS conflict: Dozens killed in Baghdad car bombings," May 11, 2016, *BBC News*, available from www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36265245, accessed on May 11, 2016; Christoph Reuter, "Islamic State Adopts a New Strategy in Europe," *Speigel*, March 29, 2016, available

from *www.opensource.gov*, accessed on March 30, 2016; The Editorial Board, "Fighting ISIS as It Shifts Tactics," *The New York Times*, July 5, 2016, available from *www.nytimes.com/2016/07/06/opinion/fighting-isis-as-it-shifts-tactics.html*, accessed on July 6, 2016; Roy Gutman, "Islamic State shifts strategy from building territory to spreading terror worldwide," *The Los Angeles Times*, July 5, 2016, available from *www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-islamic-state-attacks-20160704-snap-story.html*, accessed on July 6, 2016; Joby Warrick and Souad Mekhennet, "Inside ISIS: Quietly preparing for the loss of the 'caliphate'," *The Washington Post*, July 12, 2016, available from *www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/inside-isis-quietly-preparing-for-the-loss-of-the-caliphate/2016/07/12/9a1a8a02-454b-11e6-8856-f26de2537a9d_story.html*, accessed on July 13, 2016; Joseph Goldstein, "Defeat of ISIS Could Send 'Terrorist Diaspora' to West, F.B.I. Chief Says," *The New York Times*, July 27, 2016, available from *www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/world/isis-attacks.html*, accessed on July 28, 2016; "EU police agency warns of extremist threats to Europe," *U.S. News and World Report*, July 20, 2016, available from *www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2016-07-20/eu-police-agency-warns-of-extremist-threats-to-europe*, accessed on July 20, 2016; Barak Mendelsohn, "ISIS' Lone-Wolf Strategy: And How the West Should Respond, Foreign Affairs, August 25, 2016, available from *www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-08-25/isis-lone-wolf-strategy*, accessed on August 29, 2016; Marcel Furstenu, "German Intelligence Agency Says Terror Perpetrators Are 'Controlled From Afar'," *Deutsche Welle (DW)*, September 14, 2016, available from *www.opensource.gov*, accessed on September 15, 2016. This relation between the strategic defensive and a tactical reorientation to individualized mass casualty terrorist operations greatly resembles ISO's earlier shift in Iraq when in response to its decisive losses of terrain, population, and freedom of maneuver, its then-emir called for the brutal unleashing of mass casualty terrorist operations. Abu Omar al-Baghdadi would demand sometime between October 15, 2007, and January 29, 2008, (see Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, "As For the Foam, it Passes Away as Scum"):

The bedrock of this expedition [i.e., the new campaign of mass terrorist bombing] is explosives, and its materials IED's and VBIED's. Its targets is agents from the apostates and the 'uprisings' [Sahwat]. . . . In this expedition, I call upon every mujahid in Mesopotamia who hope in meeting Allah and the Afterlife . . . the soldiers of the Islamic State. I call upon every soldier to blow up at least 3 IED's before the end of the expedition, start-

ing with hand grenades, to nocturnal and diurnal booby traps, ending with the best of works, the mightiest and most valuable: martyrdom operations. Whoever has thought about performing one before or has already made the intention to do so, let him be keen on doing it during these days. As for those who are unsure or were just awaiting the call of those who they think to people of authority or leaders in Jihad, here we are encouraging him, calling upon him, and selecting him specifically to do so. So take the initiative, O beloved servant of Allah, and carry out martyrdom operations, for they are, by Allah, the most painful and effective. By them you rip out their hearts, terrify them, and destroy their hopes and put an end to their lineage.

330. See the following for documented criminal and murderous attacks directed against Sunni civilians by select Shia militia elements: For evidence of Shia atrocities committed against Sunni's upon recapturing the city of Tikrit, see Human Rights Watch, *Ruinous Aftermath: Militia Abuses Following Iraq's Recapture of Tikrit*, NY: Human Right's Watch, September 2015, available from www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/iraq0915_4up_0.pdf, accessed on September 22, 2015; *Al-Araby al-Jadeed*, "Iraq; pro government militias violated 'laws of war'," September 21, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on September 22, 2015. For official denials, see Baghdad Prime Minister's Office, "Iraqi Prime Minister's Office Responds to Human Rights Watch Report on Iraq's Tikrit Incidents," September 22, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on September 23, 2015. For further evidence of Sunni marginalization and legitimate grievances, see Ma'd Fayyad, "Senior Iraqi Official: The Officials in Charge of Decision-making do not Believe in National Reconciliation; He said that Al-Abadi's Policy is not Different from his Predecessor's in Marginalizing the Sunnis and the Kurds," *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, June 14, 2015, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on June 18, 2015; Ned Parker, Babak Dehghanpisheh, and Isabel Coles, "Special Report: How Iran's military chiefs operate in Iraq," Reuters, February 24, 2015, available from www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USKBN0LS0VD20150224, accessed on February 25, 2015. See for example: Fali Hassan and Tim Arango, "Iraqi Forces Try to Retake Falluja From ISIS," *The New York Times*, May 23, 2016, available from www.nytimes.com/2016/05/24/world/middleeast/iraq-falluja-isis.html?ref=world, accessed on May 23, 2016; Emily Anagnostos and Patrick Martin, "Fallujah Control of Terrain Map: May 31, 2016," Backgrounder, Washington, DC:

Institute for the Study of War, May 31, 2016, available from www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/fallujah-control-terrain-map-may-31-2016, accessed on June 2, 2016; Dan De Luce and Henry Johnson, "Can the U.S. Control the [Shia] Militias in the Fight for Fallujah?," *Foreign Policy*, June 9, 2016, available from foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/09/can-the-u-s-control-irans-militias-in-the-fight-for-fallujah-shiite-iraq-isis/, accessed on June 10, 2016; "Iraqi premier admits 'excesses' by security in Fallujah battle," *Al Iraqiyah Television*, June 4, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on June 6, 2016. Iraq's highest Shia religious authority, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani's recommendations revealed during Friday that prayers were explicit about the need to ensure strict compliance with humanitarian standards during this recapturing of Fallujah. See for example: BBC Monitoring, "Iraq's Sistani urges anti-IS fighters not to harm people," *Al Iraqiyah Television*, June 17, 2016, available from www.opensource.gov, accessed on June 17, 2016. See also, more recently: Sharon Behn and Jeff Seldin, "Sectarian Abuses in Iraq Help Ensure IS Survival," *Voice of America News*, August 24, 2016, available from www.voanews.com/a/sectarian-abuses-iraq-ensure-islamic-state-survival/3478470.html, accessed on August 26, 2016; Ned Parker and Jonathan Landay, "Special Report: Massacre reports show U.S. inability to curb Iraq militias," *Reuters*, August 23, 2016, available from www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-massacres-falluja-special-report-idUSKCN10Y1VD, accessed on August 24, 2016; Julian Pecquet, "Rise of Iran-backed militias jeopardizes US aid to Iraq," *Al Monitor*, September 14, 2016, available from www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/09/rise-iran-backed-militias-pmu-iraq-threat-us-aid.html, accessed on September 14, 2016.

331. See Paul Kamolnick, "Baghdadi's Bunker: Five Essential Tasks for Which the World Should Now Prepare," *Small Wars Journal*, November 19, 2015, available from smallwarsjournal.com/print/34123, accessed on November 19, 2015, for a brief examination of these five essentials: securing WMD; preventing mass murder and genocide; defending wholesale destruction of the cultural treasures of the ancient Near East; rescuing, rehabilitating, and reintegrating former residents of the 'caliphate'; and, pursuing reconciliation and peace-keeping in post-ISO occupied lands. See Missy Ryan and Greg Jaffe, "As ISIS closed in, a race to remove chemical-weapon precursors in Libya," *The Washington Post*, September 13, 2016, available from www.washingtonpost.com.

com/world/national-security/as-isis-closed-in-a-race-to-remove-chemical-weapon-precursors-in-libya/2016/09/13/85094326-78f7-11e6-beac-57a4a412e93a_story.html; and Agence France-Presse (AFP) “Coalition planes destroy IS chemical factory in Mosul,” AFP, September 13, 2016, available from *www.yahoo.com/news/coalition-planes-destroy-chemical-factory-near-mosul-181635867.html*, for recent USG and anti-ISO Coalition successes in securing precursor chemicals for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Libya, and destruction of chemical weapons manufacturing facilities in Mosul, Iraq.

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

**Major General William E. Rapp
Commandant**

**STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
and
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS**

**Director
Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.**


**Director of Research
Dr. Steven K. Metz**

**Author
Dr. Paul Kamolnick**

**Editor for Production
Dr. James G. Pierce**

**Publications Assistant
Ms. Denise J. Kersting**

**Composition
Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil**



FOR THIS AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS, VISIT US AT
<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/>

ISBN 1-58487-744-8



This Publication



SSI Website



USAWC Website