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
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UNCLASSIFIED SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Date Entered) READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE . GOVT ACCESSION NO. 3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER 59 D-AARTA RADC-/TR-80-111 TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED TIN' & fand Subtition DESIGN GUIDELINES AND OPTIMIZATION PROCEDURES Final Technical Report May 1978 - May 1979 FOR TEST SUBSYSTEM DESIGN 6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER . CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s) AUTHOR(+) Donald N. Lord 15 F30602-78-C-0167 A George A. Walz Stan/Green PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS Grumman Aerospace Corporation 62702F Bethpage NY 11714 23380224 1. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Z. REPORT DATE April 1980 Rome Air Development Center (RBET) 13. NUMBER OF PAGES Griffiss AFB NY 13441 250 AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS(If different from Controlling Office) 15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED Same 154. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING N/A 16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited  $\langle I2, \rangle$ 263 17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the obstract entered in Black 20, if different from Report) ral Fort. Man 19-Ma. 115 Same 18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES RADC Project Engineer: Daniel Gleason, 1Lt. USAF (RBET) 9. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Ground Electronic System Built-in-Test Avionic Automatic Test Test Equipment AGE ASTNACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) The study provides guidelines and procedures to optimize the design of built-in-test equipment. The procedures are applicable to the design of both avionic and ground electronic systems. Optimization of the test subsystem is achieved by properly specifying three key design parameters (test effectiveness, mean corrective maintenance time, and test subsystem production costs) during the Conceptual Phase. These parameters then form the design to criteria for optimization during DD 1 JAN 73 1473 EDITION OF I NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE UNCLASSIFIED SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered) st 28124H

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#### SUMMARY

The objectives of this study were to develop guidelines, mathematical tools, and procedures that can be used by equipment designers to optimize the cost effectiveness of the test subsystem. In the context of this study, the term "test subsystem" refers to Built-In-Test (BIT) or test points and external test equipment, or any combination thereof. Specifically, the guidelines and procedures were to provide:

- Techniques applicable to both early design and detailed design phases
- Techniques which are applicable to the design of test subsystems for both avionics and ground electronic systems
- Mathematical procedures and models to select the most cost effective test subsystem design, taking into account development, production, and total life cycle costs.

The study was initiated with a literature search and evaluation to establish a firm technology baseline and point of departure. Two significant conclusions drawn from the three-month review of current technology were:

- The terminology and parameters relating to BIT, test diagnostics, and fault isolation performance have proliferated, are frequently used improperly, or are misunderstood. In an effort to avoid such confusion, this report includes definitions of such terms and parameters
- There is unanimous agreement among the authoritative authors and the study team members that the performance of the test subsystem must be specified early in the system design cycle, i.e., during the Conceptual Phase. There is also unanimity that the driving factors in selecting the test subsystem's characteristics (BIT or external test equipment and its performance, automatic, semi-automatic, or manual) are the prime systems availability requirements.

However, all literature reviewed by the study fails to provide practical

design tools to relate availability to test subsystem performance and life cycle cost.

Therefore, the main body of this report addresses the four major phases of system design - The Conceptual Design Phase, the System Design Phase, the Subsystem Design Phase, and the Detailed Design Phase. Each section addresses availability, test subsystem's performance, and life cycle cost.

#### CONCEPTUAL DESIGN PHASE

The major objective of the Conceptual Design Phase is to select optimum system technologies which satisfy mission and operational requirements within a specified cost envelope. Similarly, the test subsystem design objective is to define the test subsystem technology and performance requirements within the overall cost target. To do this, a new definition of test subsystem "effectiveness" is provided. This effectiveness parameter is calculable during each design phase and is also measurable in the field. There is a complex relationship between prime system availability and test subsystem effectiveness. To complete the triad necessary to specify the test subsystem, the relationships between test subsystem effectiveness, mean active repair time, reliability and prime system life cycle cost are provided, together with the necessary guidelines, procedures, and mathematical design tools.

### SYSTEM DESIGN PHASE

Alternate system configurations are traded-off considering all elements of performance and cost. The test subsystem designer's task is to configure an optimum test subsystem for each candidate prime system within its specified performance, mean time to repair, and life cycle cost. The mathematical tools and procedures of the Conceptual Design Phase are equally applicable during the System Design Phase, with the exception that they are applied at a lower level of indenture. Thus, the optimization process is one of tailoring the test subsystem to the candidate prime system characteristics.

Two major issues facing the test subsystem designer during this phase are evaluating the cost impact of using existing subsystems (with less than adequate BIT) vs the development of a new subsystem, and selection of the BIT architecture. The System Design Phase Section of the report addresses these issues.

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#### SUBSYSTEM DESIGN PHASE

Test subsystem capability is determined by the number and quality of tests and by the thoroughness with which the resulting information is used. For this reason, the subsystem design methodology optimized the choice of signals measured and quality of measurement in terms of information gained per unit of test subsystem cost. These parameters are calculated individually for each signal, traded off to select the optimal set of measurements, and summed to calculate resulting test subsystem effectiveness and mean corrective maintenance times. In this methodology, the optimal test subsystem is one which meets or betters effectiveness and mean corrective maintenance time requirements of the design specification, within the given cost envelope, and at least production cost.

Initially, the subsystem is analyzed to identify functions, signals, and functional paths, and this information is recorded in functional diagrams. The signals are then analyzed in terms of their test requirements and parameters, and these data are recorded in matrix format. Both the diagrams and matrices are used as permanent design documents that identify and record the information developed during the process of test subsystem design. At any given time, these diagrams and matrices provide a complete architectural and parametric description of the test subsystem at its current stage of design completion.

Each of the signals listed in the matrices is analyzed to determine its tradeoff merit (worth) in terms of the actual testing information developed versus cost of measurement. Signal measurements of least worth are eliminated to the degree necessary to ensure that the evolving design remains within its production cost envelope. Effectiveness and mean corrective maintenance time are calculated, compared with specified values, and the design is reiterated as necessary to comply with the subsystem design specification. These trade-offs and design iterations occur in parallel with the mainstream subsystem design effort, and reach completion when the main effort is completed. The signal matrices and test subsystem design are then expressed in LRU design specifications.

#### **DETAILED DESIGN PHASE**

The principal additional design effort undertaken during detailed LRU design is to calculate final values of measurement quality by analysis of actual

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circuit failure modes and frequencies. From these results, effectiveness and mean corrective maintenance times are recalculated. If necessary, the test subsystem design is adjusted to bring it into compliance with the effectiveness and/or mean corrective maintenance times of the LRU design specification.

Because effectiveness and mean corrective maintenance time may be actually measured in deployed systems, the results of test subsystem design calculations and signal matrices are saved for reference.

#### STUDY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The study objective to develop straightforward engineering tools which permit optimization of the test subsystem design during the overall system design phase and also during the detailed design phase has been met. During the conceptual and system design phases, the test subsystem must be specified in realistic performance and cost parameters depending on the prime system's mission, operational and support concepts. Using the guidelines and design procedures provided, these parameters will fall within the following ranges:

- Test subsystems Effectiveness  $(E_{T}) = 75\%$  to 95%
- Mean Corrective Maintenance Time  $(\overline{M}_{ct}) = 30$  minutes to 4 hours
- Reliability of BIT (R<sub>BIT</sub>) less than 10% of the prime system's overall failure rate due to BIT
- Design-to-cost target for the Test Subsystem = 10% to 20% of the prime system's production costs

By designing to the above parameters during each phase of system design (using the study equations and models) an optimized test subsystem will be achieved.

The resultant test subsystem's performance will, at best, be less than perfect. This is due to the fact that hardware and/or software designers are faced with an inaccurate knowledge of what will fail and how often. Thus the major study recommendations are that the test subsystem must be tested and demonstrated in the field, prior to full-scale production. Further, a tracking and analysis system for all no defect removals will materially reduce the reported number of false alarms and significantly improve system availability.

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It is recommended that further subject related studies of existing military data sources and design reporting systems be performed. The objective would be to provide filtered data bases, and a procedural handbook to implement the application of the recommended design guidelines and procedures advanced in this report.

### PREFACE

This technical report presents the results of a study to develop design guidelines and optimization procedures for test subsystem designs. The study was performed under Contract F30602-78-C-0167. This report is prepared in accordance with CDRL item A002 and data item description DI-S-3591A/M.

The guidelines and optimization procedures detailed in this report satisfactorily achieve the objectives of the study.

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#### EVALUATION

1. The objective of this study was the investigation and development of optimization tools and algorithms that can be used during the design phases of a test subsystem, to aid in forming the most cost effective design configuration. The developed techniques were to take into account prime system failure rates, and test subsystem characteristics such as fault detection/isolation capabilities, false alarm rates, production costs and life cycle costs.

2. The methodology developed herein satisfactorily achieves the objectives for which it was intended. The methodology is applicable to all phases of the design of test subsystems. The study contains realistic design guidelines pertaining to the development of cost effective test subsystems. The optimization procedure is structured to systematically produce specified fault detection and isolation levels within a specified cost envelope.

3. The design and development of effective test subsystems is a critically important task in the effort to reduce the support costs associated with modern defense systems. The output of this study contributes to that end and will be used as input to future acquisition guides for test support

systems.

DANIEL GLEASON, 1Lt, USAF Project Engineer

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
#### 1. INTRODUCTION

Although there is a consensus that weapon systems and ground electronic systems maintenance and logistic costs are excessive, there is seldom agreement as to the causes. Built-In-Test (BIT) is a singular exception. The overwhelming evidence is that BIT performance has fallen far short of expectations. As a major cost driver, the failure of BIT to detect and fault-isolate impacts the entire spectrum of maintenance and logistic costs. The objective of this study is to develop optimization tools and algorithms that can be used to select the most cost-effective BIT designs.

### 1.1 SCOPE

Systematic methodologies and procedures for the design of BIT subsystems for avionic and ground electronics are to be developed. These techniques are to take into account the failure rate of each isolatable module, the total proportion of equipment faults that the BIT subsystem will recognize, the life cycle costs associated with fault detection and isolation of each failure, false alarm characteristics, and the resulting impact on equipment maintainability. All these factors, in combination, are to be used to guide the design of BIT subsystems

The quantitative requirements for a BIT subsystem are so inextricably woven into the prime system cost effectiveness equation that the determination of "how much and where" must be made as an integral part of the system design process. To optimize the BIT subsystem, its performance requirements must be analyzed and specified to the appropriate level during each phase of design. The only viable approach to deriving a systematic methodology is to include all phases of system design which are: the Conceptual Design Phase, the System Design Phase, the Subsystem Design Phase, and the Detailed Design Phase as shown by Fig. 1-1.



rig. 1-1 Test Subsystem Design Optimization Procedure

### 1.2 BACKGROUND

In present day military electronics, more and more use is being made of BIT to aid in maintenance. BIT usually makes it possible to have fewer and less qualified maintenance personnel and less external test equipment. However, even though the use of BIT is rapidly expanding, little research has been done to aid designers in how to apply BIT and diagnostics in a cost-effective fashion.

### **1.3 LITERATURE SEARCH**

The initial study task was to perform a thorough literature search and review existing technology to establish a state-of-the-art baseline from which the required BIT design procedures and diagnostic methodologies could be selected or developed.

Starting with an initial list of 44 books, articles, reports, and specifications, the study library grew to more than 100 reference documents. Most of these documents addressed procedures and methodologies to optimize a particular facet of detailed BIT circuit design. A few addressed the subject of test subsystem optimization procedures, giving general guidelines and "do's and don'ts" rather than quantitative data, mathematical tools, and trade-off procedures.

The documents and specifications which were most relevant and which formed the study baseline are listed in Fig. 1-2, together with the Design Phase addressed by that document.

Following Section 5 is a Bibliography of all references which are quoted or used in preparing this final report (see page 175).

### **1.4 TECHNICAL PROBLEMS**

The review of current military literature, specifications, and handbooks indicates that the fundamental principles of BIT design and optimization are frequently misunderstood or have not received adequate attention in the early phases of system design. In most cases, the first indication that performance requirements will not be met comes during the Full Scale Development Phase. In some cases additional funds are allocated to achieve improvements, such as greater reliability and effectiveness. In many cases, however, the BIT require-

					DES	GN PH	ASE
ITEM	REFERENCE DOCUMENTS		CONCEPTUAL		aYSTEM	SUBSYSTEM	DETAIL
1	AFLCP 800-3 LOGISTICS PERFORMANCE FACTORS IN INTEGRATED LOGISTIC SUPPORT	×		×	1		
2	AFSC DH 1-9, MAINTAINABILITY DESIGN HANDBOOK, AIR FORCE SYSTEMS COMMAND, 20 DECEMBER 1973	x		x	$\uparrow$	x	· 
3	ARINC RESEARCH CORPORATION, "A TECHNIQUE FOR EVALUATING AVIONICS BUILT-IN TEST, FINAL REPORT," PREPARED FOR NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND, WASHINGTON, D.C. UNDER CONTRACT N00019-71-C-0312, SEPTEMBER 1971	×		x		x	×
4	AFFDL-TR-123, MODULAR LIFE CYCLE COST MODEL FOR ADVANCED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS, AIR FORCE FLIGHT DYNAMICS LABORATORY, OCTOBER 1976	X		х		x	
5	AFSCM 375-5 SYSTEMS ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES, 1966	X					
6	A NOTE ON MAN-COMPUTER ADAPTIVE FAULT ISOLATION, S. I. FIRSTMAN AND A. J. TRUELOVE, SYMPOSIUM FOR ADVANCED MAINTAINABILITY, 1966					x	×
7	MIL-STD-1591 ON AIRCRAFT, FAULT DIAGNOSIS, SUBSYSTEMS ANALYSIS/SYNTHESIS OF					x	×
8	NAVMATINST 3960.9, BUILT-IN TEST (BIT) DESIGN GUIDE, TEST AND MONITORING SYSTEMS OFFICE (MAT 04T), NAVAL MATERIAL COMMAND, 1 JULY 1976	x		x		x	x
9	NAVORD OD 39223, MAINTAINABILITY ENGINEERING HANDBOOK	×		×		x	x
10	PERONNET, J. AND ROSENFELD, M., "BUILT-IN TEST IN AN ILS DESIGN TO COST ENVIRONMENT," PROCEEDINGS OF THE SOCIETY OF LOGISTIC ENGINEERS, 10TH INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS SYMPOSIUM, AUGUST 1975						
11	RADC-TR-71-281 DESIGN OF INTEGRAL SENSOR TEST SYSTEM, ROME AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER, REPORT AD-890479L					x	×
12	RADC-TR-69-356 MAINTAINABILITY PREDICTION AND DEMONSTRA- TION TECHNIQUES, VOL. II, ROME AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER, REPORT NOS. AD 869396 AND AD 872873 (TR-70-89)	x		×		×	
13	RADC-TR-74-308, MAINTAINABILITY AND ENGINEERING DESIGN NOTEBOOK, REVISION II, AND COST OF MAINTAINABILITY, ROME AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER, REPORT NOS. AD-A009043, A009044, A009045, JANUARY 1975	×		X		X	×
14	STUDY TO ANALYZE THE ACQUISITION OF AUTOMATIC TEST EQUIPMENT (ATE) SYSTEMS, U. S. NAVAL ELECTRONICS LABORA- TORY CENTER	×		×		×	×

Fig. 1-2 Primary Reference Documents

ments are simply lowered and the BIT system accepted without consideration of the resulting increase in maintenance and logistic costs.

The fundamental question to be answered by the study is, therefore, "How much funding should be expended to achieve what degree of BIT capability to meet the overall mission requirements?"

#### 1.4.1 Specifying BIT Effectiveness

The effectiveness of BIT has been specified for avionics in AR-10A as: "3.3.3 <u>Built in Test (BIT) Dependability</u> - The BIT features shall be such that at least 98% of the equipment failures shall be detected. At least 99% of the detected failures shall be located to the faulty WRA. At least 99% of the failure indications shall result from equipment failures (performance below acceptable levels)." Also: "3.4.2.2 <u>Non-Ambiguity (N-A) Ratio</u> - The ratio of the number of probable malfunctions detected and isolated directly to the WRA with built-intest features without ambiguity, to the total number of probable malfunctions, shall not be less than 0.97 unless otherwise specified in the detail specification. An example of this computation is shown in:

Non-ambiguity (N-A) ratio = Number of probable malfunctions isolated directly to faulty WRA/Total number of probable malfunctions"

BIT dependability and non-ambiguity as specified above are subject to interpretation, difficult (if not impossible) to measure in actual operations, and seldom, if ever, achieved.

Generalized maintainability and BIT requirements such as contained in AR-10A represented a significant step forward in 1969. However, the results of specifying either the "best that we can hope for" or "utopia" without regard to life cycle cost is not acceptable today. Rather, to optimize BIT, it must be specified in terms that are calculable during the systems engineering process and also measurable during system test, evaluation, and deployment.

The problem of specifying test effectiveness, (i.e., fault detection and isolation capability) for either BIT or external test equipment is complicated by the rapidly advancing state-of-the-art. The recorded performance of existing

test subsystems in the field (when available) is at best an inadequate measure of how much fault detection and isolation performance can be achieved.

Of equal importance, the problem of relating the BIT performance specification to its impact on system complexity, reliability, maintainability, and LCC remains virtually unaddressed in the current literature. Therefore, the derivation of means to specify BIT effectiveness is considered a prime objective of the study.

### 1.4.2 The BIT "Cost Data" Problem

Life cycle cost data are generally acknowledged to be elusive and inaccurate. Cost data for BIT are virtually non-existent since they are not an identifiable subsystem within the work-breakdown-structure (WBS) cost accounting system. With the exception of item 10 of Fig. 1-2, no substantive BIT cost data were found. While the "BIT LCC Trade-off Model" of Appendix A is an excellent vehicle for the collection of engineering estimates of LCC during the Design Phase, there is no apparent means to collect actual expended cost data for BIT hardware and software.

### 1.4.3 BIT "Performance Data" Problem

The basic objective of BIT or external testing is to detect and isolate equipment malfunctions to a replaceable unit. The measure of BIT performance, it would seem, is straightforward and could be recorded into the AFR 66-1/65-110 data system. However, the following issues complicate the recording of such data:

- False Alarms in which BIT falsely identifies an LRU as a malfunctioning unit where, in fact, there is no malfunction
- BIT Diagnostic Errors in which BIT incorrectly isolates an actual fault to one or more non-malfunctioning LRUs
- Undetected Failures in which BIT fails to detect a malfunctioning LRU
- BIT Ambiguity in which BIT detects a fault and correctly isolates to two or more LRUs
- Intermittents in which an electrical malfunction is present only at certain times, and which at all other times appears to be a false alarm.

This report addresses all of the above issues and their impact on the test subsystem design. However, these problems are not reported in the AFR 66-1/ 65-110 or the Navy 3M maintenance data systems. They can and should be included in a maintenance action tracking and analysis system to permit quantitative recording of their existence, analysis of their causes, and identification of corrective actions.

### 1.5 GENERAL METHODOLOGY

The DoD Acquisition Process emphasizes cost effectiveness and reduction of risk through validation, demonstration, and hardware proofing prior to production commitment. The process is one of optimizing the total system design. The "test subsystem" is an integral part of each system, subsystem, and LRU, and as such is not a uniquely identifiable subsystem. However, the term is useful in referring to the test points, BIT hardware and software, performance monitor, and external test equipment and will be used in that context throughout this report.

During the early system design phase, the engineering design progresses iteratively in increasing detail with the outputs of the preceding phase serving as the design requirements for the next phase. During these early phases the system designer requires mathematical tools for use in determining the optimum test subsystem (BIT or external), the degree of fault isolation to be achieved, and a valid projection of the resulting LCC benefits.

During the detailed design phase, the designer, who must implement actual hardware and software, requires similar mathematical tools tailored to his own disciplines. The cost/benefit aspect of his design must be weighed against its capability to detect and isolate faults. This means he needs a methodology to allocate BIT functions to those locations in his design where benefits are maximum per unit of life cycle cost.

The general methodology of the study then, is to address each phase of the system design cycle and provide optimization tools and procedures based on the evaluation and analysis of current literature and Grumman test subsystems design experience.

Because it is important that the tools and procedures be readily usable, we have performed a verification that simulated their application to an existing avionics subsystem E-2C Advanced Radar Processing System (ARPS) of the AN/APS-125 Radar System. (See Appendix C - Application of the Test Subsystem Coptimization Procedures).

### 1.5.1 Study Approach

The design of a new system and the optimization of its test subsystem is an evolutionary process. Development proceeds in an orderly progression of system engineering during the System Acquisition Cycle, starting with the Conceptual Phase through the Production Phase as shown in Fig. 1-3. Optimization is achieved by applying the proven systems engineering methods of AFSCM 375-5 to the prime and subsystem designs to achieve a balance and depth of engineering effort during each phase.

The study approach has been influenced by our conviction that the optimization of a system or subsystem design is best achieved through strict adherence to the DoD system design procedures. The system engineering methods of AFSCM 375-5 and AFSCP 800-3, and the engineering management processes of MIL-STD-499A (USAF), as tailored to meet the needs of each program, provide the necessary methodology and management procedures to optimize the prime system design, including the test subsystem. Therefore, the study identified procedures consistent with the above referenced documents.

1.5.2 Fundamental Test Subsystem Optimization Concepts and Guidelines


The following concepts and guidelines are based on the review and evaluation of current literature, and Grumman experience in system design.

Early specification of test subsystem performance requirements and cost objectives is necessary.

Early, in this case, means during the Conceptual Design Phase. In the past, failure to specify these parameters early enough has led to a test capability that is sacrificed to achieve either greater prime system performance, reduced production cost, or both.

#### Optimization of built-in test must be accomplished by optimizing the system design.

BIT functions are not only inseparable from the prime mission functions of the system but are also critical to the performance of that mission. For example, if the BIT component or software fails, then the subsystem or LRU has failed since it can no longer perform as designed. BIT should not be deemed an entity that exists separately from the system's primary function and equipment.





The performance of the test subsystem must be specified in parameters which are observable, measurable, and reportable in field operation.

The parameters should be equally applicable to BIT, external test equipment, and built-in-test equipment.

The analysis and design of the test subsystem must include all components and all known failure modes.

It will be shown that the test subsystem performance, at its best, will be far from perfect.

The test subsystem must be treated as a high risk element of the system design.

The abilities of the circuit design engineer, the reliability engineer, and the maintainability engineer are severely taxed to perform a thorough failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA). It is improbable that a test subsystem can be designed to detect all possible malfunctions or to incorporate the infallible logic necessary for isolation to a single replaceable unit. Errors in paper analysis are magnified by the inability of the analyst to accurately predict the frequency of operational failures. Thus, the hardware and software designers are faced with an inaccurate knowledge of what will fail, and how often it will fail.

Other factors lead to the conclusion that the test subsystem is inherently a high risk design element:

- Intermittents cannot be readily isolated with state-of-the-art test subsystems (See Appendix D)
- Multiple faults cannot be accurately predicted or isolated with state-ofthe-art test subsystems
- Wiring harness and connector faults are generally not susceptible to BIT.

The study procedures and optimization tools presented herein provide a method of quantifying some of the above problems. The approaches taken in the study were to recognize that these problems exist, determine the elements of risk that they impose, and identify means to correct remaining design problems.

#### Early test and evaluation is required to optimize the test subsystem.

The time-phased relationship between the System Acquisition Cycle and the Design Cycle for new systems is shown in Fig. 1-3. Early prototype test and evaluation, during full scale development, is necessary for all complex, newly designed systems and subsystems. This will reduce the high risk elements of test subsystems with extensive BIT. Test and evaluation is necessary to identify and resolve the problems listed in the previous paragraph and the following additional problems which are not readily identified during the design process:

- BIT logic problems associated with multiple subsystem interfaces
- Signal tolerance problems which occur only when subsystems are married and operated as a system
- Operator and BIT human interface problems which cannot be predicted except in actual operation
- Maintenance personnel and BIT interface problems which cannot be predicted except in actual operation.

The prototype test and evaluation hardware must be close enough to the production system configuration to validate the BIT performance requirements specified in the Allocated Baseline Configuration Items (CI) Specification. Changes and modifications to achieve the specified performance are incorporated in the Product Baseline and Production CI Specifications.

To assure the quality of production BIT, formal qualification testing is required to demonstrate BIT performance. This requirement will ensure that BIT is utilized in maintenance of the prime system from its initial operation to its operational deployment.

# 1.6 DEFINITION OF SELECTED TERMS AND PARAMETERS

Definitions of common terms used in this report may be found in MIL-STD-1309 and MIL-STD-721. The definitions and discussions that follow involve selected terms whose meaning is unique to the study and/or which are frequently subject to misinterpretation.

#### 1.6.1 System

The study addressed the design of BIT and test equipment to support avionic and ground-based electronic systems. The term "system" will therefore refer to avionic and ground electronic equipment including its built-in test and/ or test equipment. When referring to the total weapon or ground system (e.g., F-15, F-4D, AN/FPS-27), the terms "prime system" or "host system" will be used. The procedure for BIT optimization will generally be applicable to both major or large scale system designs and to small scale systems except as noted in the text.

### 1.6.2 Subsystem

This term, as used in the study, denotes either a single equipment or a group of electronic equipments whose functions are interrelated within the group, but relatively isolated from those of other groups:


- Flight Controls and Displays
- Communication, Navigation, Identification (CNI)
- Weapon Control
- Weapon Delivery
- Electronic Countermeasures.

The definition of avionic subsystems will vary dependent upon the aircraft mission and the avionic system's design characteristics (i.e., attack, fighter, bomber, cargo) or the degree to which the functions are integrated (such as the CNI).

Ground electronic subsystems are extremely varied in function and complexity. For example, referring to Fig. 1-4, functional subsystems would be at either level 3 or 4, dependent upon the degree of autonomy. Figure 1-4 also illustrates the interdependence of systems and subsystems in specifying and achieving operational performance and maintainability goals.

# 1.6.3 Performance Monitor/BIT (PM/BIT)

Performance Monitoring equipment is designed to detect a malfunction within a series of critical functions. The monitoring equipment is required to alert the



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Fig. 1-4 Functional Level Breakdown of a Hypothetical Ground Electronic System

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operator of a failure or impending failure. Since performance monitoring equipment is required to achieve mission requirements, it is specified as one of the prime system functions.

Both hardware and software are required to control system operation as well as monitor performance. The performance monitoring function is accomplished using a multiplicity of sensors, displays, computer programs, and, in many cases, built-in-test equipment. The relation between the monitor function and BIT is complex and in many cases overlapping.

In this report BIT is defined as hardware and software added to the prime system for the sole purpose of detecting and isolating a malfunction to a replaceable unit. BIT does benefit from the overlap of Performance Monitoring capabilities. While the system designer will seek to optimize both BIT and System Performance Monitoring as a single integrated test subsystem, the cost and capabilities of the Performance Monitoring equipment cannot be traded off or degraded.

The following ground rule applies to the system analyst when dealing with the obvious overlap of Performance Monitoring and BIT (PM/BIT). They will be treated as a single combined function whose cost and performance is specified and designed as a single entity. However, during trade-off studies (e.g., BIT vs external test equipment) the costs of each (PM and BIT) must be estimated as separate entities and only the cost of BIT hardware will be considered in the trade studies.

#### 1.6.4 Mission Cost Effectiveness

During the Conceptual Phase, the analyst must evaluate alternative system configurations to achieve the desired Mission Effectiveness (E) at the lowest LCC. The interrelationship of prime system cost and effectiveness  $\frac{E}{\epsilon}$  is described by:

$$\frac{\mathbf{E}}{\mathbf{\xi}} = \mathbf{f} \left( \frac{\mathbf{PARS}}{\mathbf{LCC}} \right) \tag{Eq. 1}$$

where P = Performance, A = Operational Availability, R = Mission Reliability, S = Mission Survivability, and LCC = The Life Cycle Cost of the total system or subsystem.

The systems analyst must make both quantitative and qualitative judgments of the technological, military, and economic feasibility of the total system. The analysis and modeling of mission performance and survivability parameters are not a subject of this study. However, the MTBF used to calculate operational availability is impacted by BIT hardware and software.

The reliability of the cost effectiveness equation is the mission reliability:  $R = e^{-t/MTBF}$  (Eq. 2)

where t = mission time, and  $MTBF_0 = Operational$  mean time between failure.

The reciprocal of  $MTBF_0$  is the mission failure rate:

$$\lambda = \lambda_{\text{prime system}} + \lambda_{\text{BIT}}$$
(Eq. 3)

Operational availability is the unconditional probability that the system will be capable of operating at or above a specified level of performance if called upon to do so at a random point in time:

$$A_{0} = \frac{MTBF_{0}}{MTBF_{0} + MDT_{0}}$$
(Eq. 4)

where  $MDT_0$  = mean downtime, including active repair time, administrative time, and logistic delay time. Mean downtime is expressed as:

$$MDT_{o} = \overline{M}_{ct} + \overline{M}_{1} + \overline{M}_{a} + \overline{M}_{pt}$$
(Eq. 5)

where  $\overline{M}_{ct}$  = mean corrective maintenance time (active repair time),  $\overline{M}_1$  = mean logistic delay time,  $\overline{M}_a$  = mean administrative delay time, and  $\overline{M}_{pt}$  = mean preventive (scheduled) maintenance time and technical modification time.

Thus,  $MDT_0$  partly determines a prime system or subsystem's turnaround time (TAT). When combined with operational reliability, it defines the system or subsystem's operational availability.

The remaining term of the effectiveness equation (LCC) is also impacted by BIT. The classic elements of LCC as specified by DoD are:

- RDT&E
- Acquisition Cost (which includes Design, Production, and Ini<sup>\*</sup>ial Support Costs)

• Operation and Support (O&S) Costs.

These will be further defined in the sections that follow.

#### 1.6.5 Inherent Availability

Inherent availability is the conditional probability that a system or equipment will be capable of operating at or above a specified level of performance if called upon to do so at a random point in time, given that there is no waiting time for spares or delays before or during a maintenance action. This definition relates the readiness of the system or equipment to its inherent design characteristics and does not penalize the readiness assessment due to logistic shortages or administrative delays. Inherent availability, then, is the value which would be achieved under ideal conditions. It is defined as:

$$A_{i} = \frac{MTBF}{MTBF + M_{et}}$$
(Eq. 6)

where MTBF = the calculated mean time between failure, and  $\overline{M}_{ct}$  = the mean corrective maintenance time.

### 1.6.6 Corrective Maintenance Time and Mean Time to Repair

The terms  $M_{ct_i}$ ,  $\overline{M}_{ct_i}$ , and  $\overline{M}_{ct}$  will be used throughout this report. To avoid confusion, the abbreviation MTTR often denoted as  $\overline{M}_{ct}$  will not be used. The following definitions will be used:

- Corrective Maintenance Action the action required to repair a single failure, comprised of all those individual maintenance tasks (e.g., fault localization, isolation, repair, checkout, etc.) involved in the maintenance procedure. A maintenance event is comprised of one or more maintenance actions required to repair all failures associated with an equipment malfunction
- Individual Corrective Maintenance Task Time (M<sub>cti</sub>) the time required to complete an individual maintenance task or an individual maintenance action. Individual maintenance task or maintenance action times observed during a test, for example, would be denoted as M<sub>cti</sub>. When maintenance time estimates are based on an average of several observa-

tions, as used in prediction analysis for example, individual maintenance task or action times are denoted by  $\overline{M}_{ct_i}$  to indicate that the value is an average value for the individual task or action. The following notations for individual corrective maintenance time are used throughout and are interchangeable in the equations in which they appear:

- M<sub>cti</sub> = corrective maintenance required to complete the ith individual maintenance task or action, based on a single observation
- $-\overline{M}_{ct_i} = \frac{\Sigma M_{ct_i}}{N} = \text{average corrective maintenance time required to complete}$ the ith individual maintenance task or the ith individual maintenance action, averaged over several (e.g., N) observations for the same (ith) task or action
- <u>Mean corrective n.</u>  $tenance time (\overline{M}_{ct})$  the mean time required to complete a maintenance action, i.e., the total maintenance downtime divided by the total maintenance actions, over a given period of time. Mean corrective maintenance time is defined by MIL-STD-471 as the summation of all maintenance downtime during a given period divided by the number of maintenance actions during the same period of time, given as:

$$\overline{M}_{ct} = \Sigma(\lambda_i \ \overline{M}_{ct_i}) / \Sigma \lambda_i$$
(Eq. 7)

where  $\lambda_i$  = failure rate of the individual (ith) element of the item for which maintainability is to be determined, adjusted for duty cycle, catastrophic failures, tolerance and interaction failures, etc., which will result in deterioration of item performancé to the point that a maintenance action will be initiated and  $M_{ct_i}$ , in this case is the average repair time required to correct the ith repairable element in the event of its failure.

## 1.6.7 As-Designed MTBF vs MTBFo

 $MTBF_0$  is the achieved apparent failure rate as reflected in AFR-66-1/65-110 data. It is expressed as:

 $MTBF_{0} = \frac{Sum of operating hours for all systems}{Sum of all maintenance actions due to an indicated malfunction}$ 



where the number of maintenance actions includes "No-Defect Removals"  $(R_{nd})$ , "Repair in Place" (C), and "Remove and Replace"  $(R_r)$ .

The ratio of as-designed MTBF to operational  $MTBF_0$  is a heuristic K factor and will vary greatly according to system characteristics, maintenance policy, operational use of the equipment, and quality of maintenance. In general, the K factor represents the difference between the average (benign) environment for which MTBF is calculated and the actual multiplicity of environments (harsh) encountered for all operational systems. The K factor also accounts for the very real problems of maintenance induced failures, variable duty cycles, ground operate and off-line operate time, full systems capability vs alternate operational modes, etc. Regardless of the rationale, the K factor is very real as detailed below and must be used when converting from the as-designed MTBF to the operational MTBF<sub>0</sub>.

The following text and Fig. 1-5 are excerpted from AFLCP 800-3, "Logistic Performance Factors in Integrated Logistic Support," 19 April 1973, Section C, "Life Cycle Trends of Logistics Performance Factors," Pages 27, 28, and 29.

"It is common knowledge there is poor correlation between operational and design or test reliability. There is, however, a difference of this relationship. Many efforts have been made to compare operational MTBF with design MTBF and to determine why the lack of correlation. Results of these efforts have been the identification of reasons why they are different and the development of conversion or K factors by which to convert from one to the other. There are two categories of reasons for the difference; those that management can do something about, and those that are not subject to alteration by management. In addition to correcting the first, all agencies need to understand the latter in terms of the real world. In the first case, efforts are being made to standardize statistical elements and definitions used in measuring reliability through the life cycle, to develop a single-thread data system and prescribe more realistic test plans. In the second case, the production and test world does not simulate the operational world. We should not expect it to; we are not apt to spend the amount of test money that would be required to simulate a ten-year life cycle. As a consequence, mature reliability can only be measured during the operational

phase. Hardware characteristics alone do not determine operational results. Operational performance is affected by such things as:

- (1) Mission profile
- (2) Maintenance operating procedures and skills
- (3) Operational and maintenance concepts
- (4) Support and test equipment availability and effectiveness
- (5) Changes in operational requirements and use which exceed or differ from original specifications
- (6) Configuration changes after initial design
- (7) Systems interface of subsystems and equipment.

It is not likely that operation of military systems/equipment will be mandatorily constrained in a manner necessary to achieve precise correlation with design performance. Figure 14 [herein Fig. 1-5] provides additional insight into the relationship between test and operational reliability. Two additional factors are shown: The K factor which is the design or test MTBF divided by the operational MTBF and the & achieved which is the latter divided by the test MTBF. Both of these factors are useful in estimating one of the values when only the other is known. While general inferences can be drawn from these tables, the specific cause factors for variation in each equipment must be examined to determine appropriate corrective action if any, and K factors used in prediction of operational reliability should consider the particular system/equipment and mission being proposed."

	MTBF, HR				
MAJOR SUBSYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS	TEST MIN ACC	к	OPERATIONAL	% ACHIEVE	
A-7D BOMB NAVIGATION SYS				[	
FORWARD LOOKING RADAR	125	6.25	20	0.167	
WEAPON DELIVERY COMPUTER	650	6.84	95	0.146	
AIR DATA COMPUTER	500	2.85	175	0.350	
DOPPLER RADAR	250	5.20	48	0.192	
HEAD UP DISPLAY	350	3.97	88	0.251	
INERTIAL MEASUREMENT	325	4.22	77	0.237	
F-4 RADIO NAVIGATION SYS					
NAVIGATION COMPUTER SET					
(ASN 46A) (RF-4C)	320	8.00	40	0.125	
NAVIGATION COMPUTER SET (F-4E)	320	3.67	87	0.272	
INERTIAL NAVIGATION SYS (RF-4C)	175	4.60	38	0.217	
INERTIAL NAVIGATION SYS (F-4E)	180	2.90	62	0.344	
LORAN (RF-4C)	50	2.00	25	0.500	
INTEGRATED ELECTRONIC CENTRAL				1	
(ASQ-19A) (F-4C)	27.5	1.61	17	0.630	
INTEGRATED ELECTRONIC CENTRAL					
(ASQ-19B) (F-4E)	27.5	0.85	32	1.16	
RADAR NAVIGATION SYSTEM	27.0	0.00			
BADAR ALTIMETER (RF-4C)	400	15.38	26	0.065	
RADAR MAPPING SYSTEM FORWARD	400	10.00	20	0.005	
LOOKING RADAR (RF-4C)	90	6.00	15	0.160	
SIDE LOCKING RADAR (RF-4C)	56	4.66	12	0.100	
BOMBING NAVIGATION SYSTEM	50	4.00		0.214	
ATTITUDE REFERENCE BOMB					
COMPUTER SET (F-4D)	173	1.86	93	0.537	
COMPUTER SYSTEM (ASQ-91) (F-4D)	250	1.01	246	0.984	
FIRE CONTROL SYSTEM	200	1.01	240	0.904	
RADAR SET (APQ-120) (F-4E)	9	0.75	10	1 1 2 2	
	600*		12	1.33	
TUNING DRIVE (F-4E) LEAD COMPUTER SIGHT (F-4E)	300	0.94 0.69	632 430	1.05	
*SPECIFICATIONS WERE NOT AVAIL MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE FIGURE.	ABLE; THEREFORE,	AIR FORCE C	FFICIALS ESTIMATE	L D THE	
SYSTEM	· <u> </u>	1	1	t	
ARN-96 TACAN	350	3.50	100	0.285	
ARN-65 TACAN	150	1.76	85	0.567	
ARN-91 TACAN	700	2.33	300	0.429	
ARN-92 LORAN	70	1.16	60	0.429	
MA-1 IRAM COMPUTER	600	7.89	76	0.857	
	-	2.30			
	350	1	152	0.434	
B-58 SEARCH RADAR	60 600	4.00	15	0.250	
WILCOX 807 RADIO	600	1.42	420	0.700	
ARC-109 UEF RADIO ALQ-87 ECM POD	450 57	3.14 0.38	143 150	0.318	
	L	+	- +		

Fig. 1-5 Reprint from AFLCP 800-3, "Logistic Performance Factors in Integrated Logistic Support"

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## 2. DESIGN GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES - CONCEPTUAL PHASE

During this phase, the avionic or ground electronic system performance parameters are defined based on the prime system mission and operational performance requirements. The system engineering process depicted in Figure 2-1 is as specified in AFLCP 800-3 and MIL-STD-499.

Top and first level function and sub-function flow diagrams are prepared reflecting the results of a system operational analysis. Each function is allocated a set of performance and design requirements per Requirements Allocation Sheets (RASs). Time requirements, which are prerequisites for functions affecting mission success, safety, and availability are derived. These mission requirements and constraints, when developed in sufficient detail, provide the necessary parameters for derivation of prime system hardware and software performance requirements, maintenance concept, and test subsystem performance requirements.

## 2.1 SELECTION OF THE MAINTENANCE CONCEPT

The system analyst's overriding objective is to optimize system cost effectiveness. He is faced with the problem of minimizing LCC while maximizing the Performance (P), Availability (A), Reliability (R), and Survivability (S) parameters in Eq. 1 of paragraph 1.6.4. The solution of this equation will vary significantly between aircraft avionic systems and ground electronic systems. Equally significant variations in its solution will result from the different avionics requirements for fighter, attack, cargo, and bomber aircraft. This holds true for communications, data processing, early warning radar, and satellite ground e'octionic systems as well.

Thus, the performance time requirements, parameters, and constraints listed below, as derived for each unique aircraft or ground electronic system, are the driving factors that determine the Support Concept and its test subsystem performance characteristics:




Fig. 2-1 System Engineering Process - Conceptual Phase

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- Performance/Time Parameters
  - Mean Down Time (MDT<sub>o</sub>)
  - Operational Availability (A)
  - Utilization Rate (operating hours or duty cycle per unit time)
  - Duty Cycle (uptime and downtime limits -- continuous, regularly scheduled, random)
- Overriding Constraints/Limitations
  - System characteristics
  - Funding
  - Personnel quantity/skills
  - Existing equipment and facilities
  - Logistic support/supply
  - Environment.

The Maintenance Concept basically defines criteria governing the scope and proposed methods of test and repair at each level (O, I, and D) of maintenance. It attempts to satisfy the time line parameters above, within the overriding constraints and limitations. The guidelines and procedures for test subsystems design that follow address the usual prime system, supported within the existing Air Force supply system by existing personnel skills, etc. These procedures can be readily modified to account for any exceptional overriding constraints or limitations imposed due to a unique prime system or support concept.

For most avionic and ground electronic systems, the organizational level support concept limits the maintenance tasks to system testing, fault detection, fault isolation, and repair. During the System Conceptual Design Phase, the prime consideration is to define and specify a cost effective test subsystem to perform the above tasks within the prime system operating time lines. The specification must also provide sufficient flexibility and latitude to permit the system and subsystem designers to optimize the detailed hardware and software designs. The procedure for test subsystem design, and its complex interrelationship with the prime system design, is presented in a simplified form in Fig. 2-2. This is an iterative process which is not shown in the figure. Progressively more detailed trade-offs are performed as the prime system and test subsystem's functional requirements are analyzed with increasing detail. Avoiding the redundancy of addressing the iterative nature of this optimization procedure, the study will provide test subsystem design tools and guidelines for its accomplishment. The prime system design will be influenced by the proper selection of:

- Test Subsystem Performance Requirements (Block 1 of Fig. 2-2) which include
  - Effectiveness and Uncertainty (E $_{\rm T}$  and U $_{\rm T}$ ) as defined below
  - Allowable Mean Down Time (MDT<sub>0</sub>) and Mean Corrective Maintenance Time  $(\overline{M}_{ct})$
- Test Subsystem Life Cycle Cost Target (Block 3 of Fig. 2-2).

The simplified procedure of Fig. 2-2 will be addressed in a logical flow as follows:

- Specify test subsystem performance requirements
- Select alternate test subsystem concepts
- Evaluate LCC impact of the test subsystem
- Evaluate each candidate test subsystem's performance and LCC.

Having exhausted all viable concepts the optimum test subsystem is then selected and specified.


2.2 TEST SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS ( $E_T$  and  $U_T$ ) (STEP 1A)

The effectiveness ( $E_T$ ) of PM/BIT, external test equipment or any combination of the two is:

 $E_{T} = \frac{\text{the total No. of malfunctioning LRUs (1)}}{\text{the total No. of O-level maintenance actions (2)}}$ (Eq. 8)

The delta or difference between (1) and (2) is the number of no defect maintenance actions/removals that occur due to test subsystem lack of capability.

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The uncertainty  $(U_r)$  of the test subsystem is the reciprocal of  $E_r$ , i.e.:

 $U_{T} = \frac{\text{the total No. of O-level maintenance actions (2)}}{\text{the total No. of malfunctioning LRUs (1)}}$ (Eq. 9)

The AFR-66-1/65-110 maintenance reporting system currently provides:

- The number of repair-in-place or adjustment maintenance actions
- The number of remove and replace actions resulting from an identified malfunction
- The number of no-defect removals as determined in the I-level shop.

The inaccuracy of the AFR 66-1/65-110 reporting system is inherent in the last term since there is no way of knowing whether the no-defect LRU was due to a technician error, a pilot or crew squawk error, a test subsystem error, or an error made by the I-level test equipment. The inability of the AFR 66-1/65-110 system to report no-defect O-level removals and their cause, can and should be resolved by instituting a maintenance action tracking and analysis system which permits detection of their occurrence, analysis of their cause, and corrective action to be taken. For purposes of this study, it is assumed that such a system will be instituted and that AFR 66-1/65-110 data will be available to record no-defect O-level removals due to test subsystem lack of capability.

With the addition of these data both  $E_T$  and  $U_T$  can be calculated during the various system design phases and then measured using that data. The equations are:

$$E_{T} = \frac{C+R_{r}}{R_{nd}+C+R_{r}} \text{ and } U_{T} = \frac{R_{nd}+C+R_{r}}{C+R_{r}}$$
(Eqs. 10 and 11)

where  $E_T$  = the effectiveness of the test subsystem,  $U_T$  = the uncertainty of the test subsystem, C = the number of repair-in-place or adjustments required,  $R_r$  = the number of remove and replace actions due to a failure, and  $R_{nd}$  = the number of O-level no-defect removals due to test subsystem lack of capability.

Thus, the number of no-defect removals determines the test subsystem's effectiveness and uncertainty.

The maximum allowable number of no-defect removals may be specified as a percentage of the total number of true malfunctioning LRUs:

$$\Re R_{nd} = \frac{R_{nd}}{C+R_{r}}$$
(Eq. 12)

where the terms are as previously defined. This percentage then may be further subdivided into an allowable or specified percentage for each of the test subsystem attributes. These are:

- FA = % no-defect removals due to False Alarms
- BDE = % no-defect removals due to BIT Diagnostic Errors
- UF = % no-defect removals due to Undetected Failures
- BA = % no-defect removals due to BIT Ambiguity

Therefore:

$$R_{nd} = FA + BDE + UF + BA$$
 (Eq. 13)

where the above terms are as defined in paragraph 1.4.3. In the discussions which follow it will be shown that no-defect removals are generally caused by these four test subsystem attributes. Guidelines for establishing allowable nodefect removal rates for each attribute will be provided. This not to infer that these specific parameters must be achieved and demonstrated for each selected subsystem. Rather, the intent is to provide a basis for specifying the maximum total no-defect removals  $(R_{nd})$  for each subsystem. The specification and demonstration of this composite parameter will provide the necessary flexibility and latitude for the designer to optimize the test subsystem. Achievement of the required composite no-defect removal rate should be demonstrated at both the subsystem and system level to a high degree of confidence (2 to 3 sigma). The demonstration should be made on the prototype test and evaluation unit during the Full Scale Development Phase to permit hardware and software changes or modifications prior to the Production Phase. To further assure the quality of the production test subsystem, formal qualification testing should be required using initial preproduction systems. These engineering tests are to resolve reported errors and make the necessary design changes.

#### 2.2.1 PM/BIT False Alarms (FA)

A false alarm occurs when PM/BIT or external test equipment identifies an LRU as faulty when in fact there is no malfunction. Units removed due to false alarms are processed from the O-level to the I-level and/or D-level shop and are indistinguishable from other no-defect removals. Therefore, false alarms must (for the present) be considered an unidentifiable subset of no-defect removals.

A false alarm may be caused by the improper setting of PM/BIT or external test equipment tolerances. An apparent false alarm may be caused by intermittents and transients which temporarily degrade the equipment's performance. The technology exists to eliminate or reduce false alarms to an acceptable level, especially if they are investigated early in the equipment design and test phase. This is recommended because the cost of making changes to production nardware and software to eliminate false alarms may be prohibitive.

The apparent number of false alarms is significantly inflated by the following causes which may or may not be true test subsystem false alarms:

- A transient or intermittent which temporarily degrades operational performance and which cannot be duplicated in the system test mode (this is a true fault)
- A malfunction within the PM/BIT or external test equipment (this is a true fault)
- The inability of the I-level AGE or ATE test programs to detect certain modes of failure (these are not false alarms)
- Crew or operator squawks which are in error (these are squawk errors).

The symptom vs problem truth table of Fig. 2-3 illustrates the subtlety of the last two errors. If the I-level test equipment erroneously identifies a malfunctioning unit as a no-defect removal, as illustrated in lines 2 and 4 of the figure, it may circulate in the supply system continuously building up the number of no-defect removals until the problem is identified. These are often referred to as "loser" boxes.

	SQUAWK	BIT	O-LEVEL Symptom	ATE/GSE INDICATION	ACTUAL PROBLEM
1	NO GO	NO GO	LRU MALFUNCTION	GO (TRUE)	FALSE
2*	NO GO	NO GO	LRU MALFUNCTION	GO (FALSE)	ATE/AGE ERROR
3	GO	NO GO	BIT FALSE ALARM	GO (TRUE)	FALSE ALARM
4*	GO	NO GO	BIT FALSE ALARM	GO (FALSE)	ATE/AGE ERROR

Fig. 2-3 False Alarms? Symptoms vs Actual Problems:

Our study concludes that false alarms, whether apparent or actual, generally indicate actual problems that can and should be corrected. This discussion is further amplified in Appendix D - Interrelationships Between Intermittents and BIT False Alarms, and Some BIT Design Guidelines Relating to These Issues.

### 2.2.2 PM/BIT Diagnostic Errors (BDE)

Given that a malfunction exists within a system, a PM/BIT diagnostic error has occurred when the PM/BIT identifies a good LRU as faulty due to that system malfunction. The symptoms of the error as observed by an O-level maintenance technician may be identical to a false alarm when the true faulty LRU is undetected by PM/BIT. The PM/BIT diagnostic error is a significant cause of no-defect removals since it reflects the inability of the test subsystem designer to accurately predict all failure modes and to perfectly evaluate these using sensors and software logic. As with false alarms we conclude that the technology exists to eliminate the test subsystem design omissions and/or errors through the process of early test and correction both at the subsystem and integrated system level. We therefore conclude that the specified maximum allowable PM/ BIT diagnostic error rate can be held to a small and acceptable percent of the actual failure rate.

### 2.2.3 PM/BIT Undetected Failures (UF)

An undetected failure occurs when the operator or maintenance technician observes the symptoms of a malfunction and is unable to detect or to isolate to the malfunctioning LRU using his test subsystem. Undetected failures manifest the inability of the test subsystem designer to predetermine all failure modes so that he can incorporate the logic necessary to detect and isolate them.

Given that a malfunction has occurred which is not detected by PM/BIT, but is observed by the operator, the maintenance approach in most cases will be to replace an indeterminate number of suspect or likely-to-fail LRUs until a fix is achieved. Thus undetected failures are also a subset of no-defect removals since the result is an increased flow of no-defect LRUs into the I or D-level shops. Without the recommended tracking and analysis system, undetected failures are confused with squawk errors, BIT tolerance errors, and I-level ATE/AGE tolerance errors as shown in Fig. 2-4.

	SQUAWK	BIT	O-LEVEL Symptom	ATE/GSE INDICATION	ACTUAL PROBLEM
1	NO GO	GO	UNDETECTED FAILURE	GO (TRUE)	SQUAWK ERROR
2*	NO GO	GO	UNDETECTED FAILURE	GO (FALSE)	ATE ERROR UNDET FAIL.
3	NO GO	GO	UNDETECTED FAILURE	NO GO (TRUE)	
4**	NO GO	GO	UNDETECTED FAILURE	NO GO (FALSE)	ATE/AGE ERROR

Fig. 2-4 Undetected Failures? Symptoms vs Actual Problems

Similiar to false alarms, undetected failures can be reduced to a tolerable minimum through early test and evaluation during the Full Scale Development Phase.

## 2.2.4 PM/BIT Ambiguity (BA)

The ambiguity of a test subsystem is a measure of its capability to detect and fault isolate a failure to one or more LRUs. A non-ambiguous test subsystem would isolate all detected failures to a single faulty LRU. This objective is seldom, if ever, achieved in state-of-the-art designs. The reesons are usually design cost, hardware and software complexity, added volume, weight, and unreliability of the test subsystem. During the Conceptual Phase, these details of the system design are seldom known and are almost impossible to estimate with any degree of certainty. Therefore, to determine the allowable BIT or test subsystem ambiguity (BA), the test subsystem designer must weigh the penalties vs the benefits of alternate test subsystem concepts as reflected in historical data and experience.

2.2.5 Specification of  $E_T$  Based on Historical Data

Test subsystem effectiveness  $(E_T)$ , as stated previously, is determined by the no-defect removal rate  $(R_{nd})$ . The historical data necessary to statistically quantify or specify the elements of  $R_{nd}$  (FA, BDE, UF, BA) is currently unavailable. However, estimates of achievable  $E_T$  and  $R_{nd}$  for test subsystems with varying degrees of automation and/or external test equipment can be based on the study literature survey and Grumman experience. These data are reflected in Fig. 2-5.

The broad range of values shown is due to large variations in avionic and ground electronic system characteristics and complexity. The key points illustrated are:

- Mean corrective maintenance time  $(\overline{M}_{ct})$  is the major determinant in selecting the candidate test subsystem
- The prime system's characteristics are a key determinant in selecting the optimum PM/BIT effectiveness goal.






Fig. 2-5 State-of-the-Art (Circa '75 - '80) Prime System vs Test Subsystem Characteristica

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Since  $\overline{M}_{ct}$  is determined by the prime system's operational analysis, it is a test subsystem requirement which cannot be traded off. The question then arises, "What is the impact of the test subsystem's performance ( $E_T$ ) on the prime system's availability and mean down time?" Also, "How does the reliability of the test subsystem affect the prime system's availability?" These questions will be addressed in the paragraphs that follow.

# 2.3 TEST SUBSYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS (MDT<sub>o</sub> & M<sub>ct</sub>) (STEP 1B)

During conceptual design trade-offs between reliability, maintainability, effectiveness, and cost, the designer strives to achieve high operational readiness and/or mission reliability. The presenters which have the greatest impact on operational readiness and availability are MDT<sub>o</sub> and MTBF<sub>o</sub>. Mean down time includes unscheduled and scheduled maintenance time (NORM), logistic down time (NORS), and awaiting maintenance time (AWM) and other administrative or handling delay time. All of these are, for the most part, determined by the operating, maintenance, and logistic support concepts with the exception of NORM which is strongly influenced by the maintenance characteristics ( $\overline{M}_{ct}$ ) of the equipment.

A theoretical, but practical definition of availability which can be used for relative evaluation purposes when comparing existing systems, is Eq. 4 of paragraph 1.6.4:

$$A_{o} = \frac{MTBF_{o}}{MTBF_{o} + MDT_{o}} = \frac{1}{\frac{MDT_{o}}{1 + \frac{MDT_{o}}{MTBF_{o}}}}$$
(Eq. 14)

where  $\text{MTBF}_{O}$  = O-level mean time between failure based on true maintenance actions, and  $\text{MDT}_{O}$  = mean down time, including active repair time, administrative time, and logistic delay time. Mean down time as was expressed in Eq. 5 is:

 $MDT_{o} = \overline{M}_{ct} + \overline{M}_{l} + \overline{M}_{a} + \overline{M}_{pt}$ 

where  $\overline{M}_{ct}$  = mean corrective maintenance time,  $\overline{M}_{l}$  = mean logistic delay time,  $\overline{M}_{a}$  = mean administrative delay time, and  $\overline{M}_{pt}$  = mean preventive (scheduled) maintenance time plus modifications.

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n Le laters and The test subsystem's performance, while not the controlling factor (since logistics and administrative delay times are frequently major items) may have a significant influence on each of the above terms, with the exception of  $\overline{M}_{pt}$ .

Addition of BIT will increase the system complexity and hence the failure rate  $(MTBF_0)$  to the degree that components and/or software are added to accomplish the BIT function. A figure of merit is used to express the change in failure rate due to BIT:

$$R_{BIT} = \frac{\lambda_{system}}{\lambda_{system} + \lambda_{BIT}}$$
(Eq. 15)

It is generally concluded in the study literature that the failure rate of BIT circuitry and/or software should not exceed 10% of the system's failure rate, i.e.:  $R_{BIT} \ge 0.9$  (note that only BIT circuitry and software are considered, not PM/BIT, since performance monitoring is a system function).

The uncertainty  $(U_T)$  of the test subsystem, reflected in no-defect removals, will drive  $\overline{M}_{ct}$ ,  $\overline{M}_1$ , and  $\overline{M}_a$  as some function of  $U_T$  depending on the support, maintenance, and logistic concepts. For the purpose of comparing different system concepts, use of the following linear relationship will provide sufficient accuracy:

$$MDT_{o} \approx (\overline{M}_{ct} + \overline{M}_{l} + \overline{M}_{a}) f(U_{T}) + \overline{M}_{pt}$$
 (Eq. 16)

which yields:

$$MDT_{o} \approx (\overline{M}_{ct} + \overline{M}_{l} + \overline{M}_{a}) (U_{T}) + \overline{M}_{pt}$$
(Eq. 17)

The scheduled maintenance  $(\overline{M}_{pt})$  for both avionics and ground electronics is negligibly small, especially when comparing prime systems.

Applying the above relationships to Eq. 14 for existing equipment, the impact of adding BIT would yield:

$$A_{o} = \frac{1}{1 + (\frac{M_{ct} + M_{1} + M_{a}) U_{T}}{MTBF_{o} \times R_{BIT}}}$$
(Eq. 18)

$$A_{o} = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{MDT_{o}}{MTBF_{o}} \times F}$$
 (Eq. 19)

where F equals the figure of merit for the test subsystem and is defined as:

$$F = \frac{U_T}{R_{BIT}}$$
(Eq. 20)

The definition applies equally to prime systems and subsystems. It is not applicable to systems in standby, alert, or in a degraded mode of operation. Figure 2-6, a log plot of this equation, shows that both  $MDT_0$  and  $MTBF_0$  are sensitive parameters in the calculation of operational availability. It also shows the impact of test subsystem performance on the availability characteristics of a system.

A similar relationship exists for Inherent Availability  $(A_i)$  as impacted by the test subsystem performance:

$$A_{i} \approx \frac{1}{\frac{\overline{M}_{ct}}{1 + \frac{ct}{MTBF}}}$$
(Eq. 21)

The curves of Figure 2-6 provide a theoretical measure of the sensitivity of the prime system's availability to the test subsystem's performance and reliability. Several conclusions and guidelines are:

For  $\overline{M}_{ct}/MTBF$  ratios << 0.01, the prime system availability is relatively insensitive to the test subsystem performance. Therefore, in this region other parameters such as cost, weight, size, etc. become dominant factors in specifying the test subsystem's performance.

For  $\overline{M}_{cl}/MTBF > 0.01$ , the prime system availability becomes increasingly sensitive to the ratio of  $U_T/R_{BIT}$ . Equally important, as the test subsystem designer attempts to improve the effectiveness of BIT, the greater the likelihood that the BIT reliability penalty ( $R_{BIT}$ ) will offset the improvement. This suggests that the factor F might be specified, where  $F \leq$  approximately 1.5, thus providing the test subsystem designer the opportunity to optimize the ratio of  $U_T$  to  $R_{BIT}$ .




Fig. 2-6 Theoretical Relationship Between Availability, Maintainability and Reliability

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## 2.4 SELECTION OF ALTERNATE TEST SUBSYSTEM CONCEPTS (STEP 2)

The system mission and operations analysis must quantify and optimize performance based on the critical operational requirements, use conditions, and the maintenance concept. The quantitative requirements leading to the mainte-` nance concept are:

- Operational Readiness Requirements this includes operational ready rate, turn-around time, steady state availability, and any mission dictated reaction time
- Deployment and Support Plans this includes system or equipment installation configuration and, as applicable, the systems or vehicles into which the new system is to be integrated. Also included are maintenance and support provisions dictated by the proposed deployment and by the existing support system
- Use Conditions and Limitations such as personnel resource constraints in terms of skills, skill levels, and quantities, maintenance manhours per operating hour, packaging and dimensional requirements and like restrictions.

The organizational level test and repair concepts are therefore constrained to achieve the above quantitative requirements within the planned logistic support environment. Due to the wide variation of such requirements, there is no single global solution to optimizing a test subsystem. Rather, the solution will be unique to each prime system.

In the following paragraphs, general guidelines, criteria and procedures for selecting the candidate test subsystem concepts will be given for both avionic systems and ground electronic systems. Operational or mission reliability is the dominant parameter. Mission reliability of the equipment determines the O-level workload, while the system allowable down time (MDT<sub>o</sub>) or turn-around time dictates the elapsed time within which the workload must be accomplished.

2.4.1 Test Subsystem Selection For Avionic Systems

The interrelationship between the mean down time  $(MDT_0)$  and the aircraft operational readiness rate (which is driven by the turn-around time) is complex as illustrated in a simplified form in Fig. 2-7.




Fig. 2-7 Operational Mean Downtime

The aircraft system designer incorporates maintenance features to minimize both scheduled and unscheduled maintenance and turn-around time (TAT) for each maintenance activity shown in the figure. As stated earlier in Subsection 2.3, the operational mean down time ( $MDT_{o}$ ), calculated as:

$$MDT_{o} \approx (\overline{M}_{ct} + \overline{M}_{l} + \overline{M}_{a}) f(U_{T}) + \overline{M}_{pt}$$
 (See Eq. 16)

is illustrative of the avionic system designer's problems. Assume that the required TAT is 30 minutes or less (typical of current aircraft designs), and that the mean logistic and administrative delay times  $(\overline{M}_1 + \overline{M}_a)$  are in the order of 10 to 20 minutes, as dictated by the operation, deployment, and logistic support concepts. These delays will be further amplified by no-defect removals as a function of the test subsystem's uncertainty  $(U_T)$ . The degree of these delays is a unique characteristic of each prime system and is an output of the system's operational and mission models.




Fig. 2-8 Task and Time Composition of a Corrective Maintenance Action


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The task timelines for  $\overline{M}_{ct_i}$  of Fig. 2-8 show that all elements of a corrective maintenance action except "gain access," "repair or replace," and "reassemble" are reduced in time by PM/BIT. The amount of reduction, over that of manual fault isolation using external test equipment is highly dependent on the equipment complexity, characteristics, and other factors. The data presented in Fig. 2-9 are derived from NAVSHIPS 94324 and based on experience with shipboard and shorebased electronic equipment. These data illustrate the reduction in  $\overline{M}_{ct}$  which can be obtained with fully automatic and semi-automatic test subsystems.

Returning to the example, in which the required aircraft TAT is in the order of 30 minutes and the mean logistics and administrative delay time is in the order of 10 to 20 minutes, the achieveable  $\overline{M}_{ct}$  of Fig. 2-9 indicates a necessity for rapid, fully automatic PM/BIT. Further, this necessity coupled with the MTBF (for avionics systems in the order of 1 to 10 hours), dictates a need to specify the minimum achievable test subsystem uncertainty  $(U_{T})$ .

FAULT LOCATION METHOD	REPAIR BY MODULE REPLACEMENT	REPAIR IN PLACE BY PARTS REPLACEMENT		
MANUAL (NO ATE)*	1.0 HR	2.5 HR		
SEMI-AUTOMATIC**	0.5 HR	1.5 HR		
FULLY AUTOMATIC***	0.2 HR	N/A		
**Semi-automatic fault location ident	ed using external test equipment and built-in tifies the approximate location of fault. Isola aced is then accomplished manually, using ex-	tion to the		
<ul> <li>*Semi-automatic fault location ident particular module or part to be repl equipment.</li> <li>**Fully automatic fault location iden test equipment is required.</li> <li>Note: Data presented are derived from</li> </ul>		ntion to the kternal test lo external h shipboard		



Therefore, fully automated PM/BIT is recommended for avionic O-level support, except for non-critical highly reliable functions which, for reasons of weight, volume, or infrequent use are not reasonable candidates for PM/BIT.

For these exceptions an allocated  $\overline{M}_{ct_i}$  and the acquisition cost for each item of external test equipment should be established based on historical data and specified as a test subsystem requirement.

As will be discussed in Subsection 2.5, specifying these requirements affects many elements of the LCC. Acquisition costs are increased, OaS costs are decreased, and improved effectiveness is achieved in accordance with the relationships and estimating procedures defined in this Subsection. The evaluation of LCC, however, is made to establish and trade-off the total cost of PM/BIT implementations. It is not made to trade-off alternatives, such as external support equipment, since there is no viable alternative to BIT (within the current stateof-the-art) for the test and fault isolation of avionic equipment at the O-level.

## 2.4.2 Test Subsystem Selection for Ground Electronic Systems

The test subsystem optimization processes for ground electronic systems and avionic systems are similar in most respects. The criteria for selecting the test subsystem is different due to the inherent differences in mission and operational requirements. The relative lack of weight, volume and power constraints allows the ground system designer much broader latitude in selecting both system configuration and the test subsystem concept.

2.4.2.1 Ground System with Critical Operational Demand - Similar to the avionic system design process, functional flow diagrams, requirements analysis sheets, and time lines are prepared as the first step. The ground electronics designer is faced with the problem of minimizing LCC while maximizing Performance (P), Availability (A), Reliability (R), and also Survivability (S), where applicable. However, unlike the avionics designer, the ground electronics system designer can incorporate single or multiple redundancy to achieve  $t_{1/2}$  required mission reliability and availability.



As in avionic systems, the required operational availability, the operational demand period, and the allowable mean down time vary with the mission, the operational concept, and the support concept. There is, however, a degree of commonality of operational demand and allowable down time, even among such diverse systems as the AN/FPS-27 air-defense search radar, the AN/GPA-67 frequency-diversion data-link equipment, the AN/TRC-66 Tropo-scatter radio set, etc.

A selected group of 52 Air Force ground equipments and subsystems were classified according to operational demand and criticality. These are summarized in Fig. 2-10 to indicate the spectrum of existing or anticipated cperating profiles for Air Force ground equipments. The two non-critical/random use equipments are a public address system and a manual meteorological set, both of which are exceptions, rather than the rule.

		OPERATIONAL DEMAND			
		A	В	С	
	CRITICALITY	CONTINUOUS 24 HR/DAY	REGULARLY/SCHED LESS THAN 24 HR/DAY	RANDOM	
A	OPERATION ESSENTIAL FOR PERIOD OF DEMAND	18	7	17	
8	OPERATION IMPORTANT FOR PERIOD OF DEMAND, EQUIP MUST BE REPAIRED IN 4 HR	5	1	1	
С	OPERATION IS NON-CRITICAL, CAN BE REPAIRED ON NON- PRIORITY BASIS	0	1	2 0179-063W	

Fig. 2-10 Survey of Ground Equipment Operational Demand vs Criticality

The equipment whose operational demand is required, i.e., "Continuous 24 Hours per Day" and "Random Use" account for 67% of the equipment surveyed. These operational requirements are usually achieved by partial or total redundancy with on-line maintenance. For these systems, the operational maintenance concept usually requires that O-level maintenance technicians be available at all times. Upon indication of a failure, the faulty unit(s) are switched off-line, fault isolated, repaired, and placed on standby.

The test subsystem concept selection guidelines for ground electronic systems whose operation is essential and continuous, or essential and random, are;

Evaluate the sensitivity of the prime system's Availability (A) parameter to the test subsystem performance as detailed in subsection 2.3 and Fig. 2-6.

For ratios of  $\overline{M}_{ct}/MTBF$  in the order of 0.01 and greater, the prime system's availability is seriously influenced by the test subsystem selected. This, in turn, should influence the selection of a fully automatic PM/BIT test subsystem.

For ratios of  $\overline{M}_{ct}/MTBF$  in the order of 0.01 and smaller, the test subsystem can be selected from alternatives 1 through 4 of Fig. 2-5.

The performance of each candidate is then evaluated by selecting the required  $E_T$  and BIT reliability figure of merit ( $R_{BIT}$ ). With these parameters, the theoretical Availability ( $A_i$ ) achieved by each candidate can be calculated as described in subsection 2.3.

2.4.2.2 <u>Ground Systems with Non-Critical Operational Demand</u> - This class of ground electronic systems is characterized by a less stringent down time (typically 1 or more hours) for maintenance during the operational demand period. The lack of criticality, however, does not imply that there is no critical maintenance requirement. For this class of equipment, the critical maintenance requirement may be shifted from  $\overline{M}_{ct}$  to mean down time (MDT<sub>0</sub>), which then would place the emphasis on logistics delay ( $\overline{M}_1$ ) and administrative delay ( $\overline{M}_2$ ).

On the other hand, the critical maintenance requirement may be the maximum allowable time to repair  $(M_{max_{ct}})$ , which will then be converted per MIL-STD-471 to the required  $\overline{M}_{ct}$ . In either case, the problem and the procedure for selecting the test subsystem is similar to that outlined in paragraph 2.4.2.1.

For ground electronic systems with non-critical operational demand the ratio of  $\overline{M}_{ct}$ /MTBF will generally be in the order of 0.1 and smaller and, therefore, the test subsystem can be selected from alternatives 1 through 5 of Fig. 2-5. For these non-critical demand systems, external test equipment or PM/BIT with varying degrees of external test equipment should be considered. In specifying new or existing external test equipment, the equipment designer should consider the performance of the external test equipment, vs PM/BIT and also the LCC impact of external test equipment vs PM/BIT.

2.4.2.3 External Test Equipment vs PM/BIT Evaluation - The objective of evaluating test subsystem candidates during the Conceptual Phase is to select the generic type of test subsystem and its performance requirements to be imposed during the System Design Phase, and also to estimate its LCC costs. It is entirely conceivable that external test equipment or some combination of BIT and external test equipment may achieve comparable test effectiveness, especially if the prime system is functionally simple. For systems of this nature, test subsystem acquisition costs may prove to be the determining factor.

The acquisition costs of both PM/BIT and external test equipment are extremely sensitive to the number of systems per site and other factors as shown in Fig. 2-11. The major points illustrated by this hypothetical trade-off are:

 <u>PM/BIT</u> - Production costs include the initial software cost plus the incremental BIT hardware costs. Performance Monitoring software and hardware costs should be excluded.

External Test Equipment - O-level test equipment requirements should be calculated based on the expected workload multiplied by a factor to account for queuing of the repairables and the expected availability of the test equipment.

(2) <u>PM/BIT</u> - The maintenance man-hours per operating hour cannot be reduced below the minimum maintenance manning level. The minimum maintenance manning level is defined as the minimum number of personnel of each skill level required (per shift) to perform 0-level maintenance for the number of systems per site.

External Test Equipment - The maintenance per operating hour is as defined for PM/BIT above with the exception that the expected main-tenance workload and skill requirements will be greater due to the greater  $\overline{M}_{ct}$  and reduced  $E_{T}$ .




Fig. 2-11 PM/BIT vs External Test Equipment

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(3) <u>PM/BIT vs External Test Equipment</u> - The intent of Fig. 2-11 is to provide the basic approach and procedures for evaluating the cost impact of PM/BIT vs External Test Equipment. The details of Life Cycle Cost Analysis are provided in subsection 2.5

### 2.5 TEST SUBSYSTEM LIFE CYCLE COST (STEP 3)

To optimize the test subsystem design, the relative worth of each alternate test concept must be established. Life cycle costing techniques, models, and cost data available from industry and DoD permit, at best rough order of magnitude estimates. These estimates are of sufficient validity to permit trade-offs and to provide a "not-to-exceed" design-to-cost (DTC) target.

The guidelines and procedures of the following paragraphs utilize historical factors, percentages, and cost estimating relationships that will result in a valid, realistic cost target rather than an absolutely accurate cost estimate. Further refinement and improved accuracy of the LCC will be achieved during the System and Subsystem Design Phases.

## 2.5.1 Test Subsystem RDT&E Costs

For most systems this term will be zero. However, in certain cases where the implementation of a new test concept, sensor, or measurement technique requires research, development, test, or evaluation, costs will be estimated for these efforts. Each estimate is unique and must be a "grass roots" engineering estimate based on experience and/or historical cost data. Estimates must include costs to develop both new advanced state-of-the-art hardware as well as any required software. On the other hand, the cost of applying the new hardware/ software in a deliverable system design would be acquisition costs.

## 2.5.2 Test Subsystem Acquisition Costs

Acquisition costs are all program costs beyond the RDT&E phase required to introduce into operational use a new capability. They include all Procurement Appropriation and Military Construction Appropriation costs except RDT&E, Military Personnel, and Operation and Maintenance Appropriation costs. Acquisition costs are divided into two major cost elements: the weapon system production costs; and initial support costs. These, in turn, are sub-divided into the following:

## Aircraft Production Costs

- Vehicle (Airframe)
- Avionics
- Power Plant(s).

## Ground Electronic System Production Costs

- Facilities
- Electro-Mechanical/Electro-Optical equipment
- Electronic equipment.

Initial Support Costs (for both aircraft or ground electronic systems)

- Spares
- Support equipment
- Training/Trainers
- Tech orders.

2.5.2.1 <u>Test Subsystem Production Costs</u> - The estimate of the test subsystem production costs will be a function of the prime system characteristics such as:

- Size, complexity, number of functions, number of systems procured
- Characteristics (RF, analog, digital, etc.)
- Performance requirements (state-of-the-art, advanced state-of-the-art, etc.)
- Reliability and maintainability requirements.

Since most of these are evolving during the Conceptual Phase, the cost estimating approach should relate the prime system characteristics to the test subsystem performance requirements.

Assume that alternate system concepts have progressed to the point that the following are available:

- Prime system performance requirements
- Level I and II functional flow diagrams, Requirement Allocation Sheets and their associated time-lines
- Conceptual levels of maintenance and logistic support.

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From these data, it is feasible to estimate the prime system production costs using historical data, or the "Price Models" for electronic systems hardware and software or the "Modular Life Cycle Cost Model (MLCCM)" for avionic systems.

Given that the characteristics of the prime system design are known, the maximum production costs for its test subsystem can be estimated using the relationship between test subsystem performance and the prime system production cost of Fig. 2-12.


The relationships and data of Fig. 2-12 are subject to important guidelines and constraints as follows:

- The percentage of prime system production cost is relative to the portion of the system supported by the test subsystem
- The data of Fig. 2-12 apply equally to avionics and ground electronics. They do not apply to electro-mechanical or electro-optical systems
- The resulting typical production cost estimate is for AGE or PM/BIT and includes the cost of the performance monitor function
- The costs are for fault isolation to the LRU.

2.5.2.2 Initial Support Costs - During the Conceptual Phase, initial support costs are usually estimated from both historical data for similar weapon systems and/or as a historical percentage of weapon system production costs. Neither of these methods provides an accurate estimate. However, a satisfactory "not to-exceed" cost estimate will result if the analysis is concentrated on major cost elements and the factors which drive them. Initial support costs for both avionics or ground electronic systems include all logistic support elements required to make the prime system operational. Spares, support equipment, initial training, unique training equipment, and the Technical Orders are the major cost elements.

As shown in Fig. 2-13, the initial spares and support equipment account for over 70% of the initial support costs. They are driven by:

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


Fig. 2-13 Typical Breakdown of LCC Elements Affected by the Test Subsystem Design

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- Reliability and maintainability characteristics
- The number of systems produced, the number of systems per site, and the number of depots and training sites
- The system duty cycle and the support equipment workload
- Intermediate and depot turnaround time.

Development of initial support costs is not a subject of this study. Rather, the question to be answered is "How does the test subsystem design impact the initial support costs?" The following guidelines are provided in response to this question.

- <u>Initial Outfitting Spares</u> The cost of initial spares is dominated by the cost of on-site high value LRUs, the initial pipe line fill, and the war reserve for these expensive items. These high cost items generally account for over 70% of the initial spares costs. While these costs are affected by the test subsystem's effectiveness, the relationship is not linear. For instance, an extreme improvement in the effectiveness of the test subsystem would not reduce the quantity of high reliability/high cost spares which normally are provisioned as one per site. Based on this logic, a conservative estimate of the cost savings due to improved test subsystem effectiveness should be made. The maximum improvement that could be made is in the order of 10% to 20% for the cost of initial spares.
- Support Equipment The costs of organizational, intermediate, and depot level support equipment generally acount for 20 to 30% of initial support costs. The cost of organizational level equipment is seldom greater than 20% of the total support equipment costs even in the total absence of BIT. The savings due to incorporating a highly effective BIT are directly proportional to the degree and completeness of implementation, and the consequent reduction or elimination of the organizational equipment. Therefore, 20% is the maximum cost reduction that should be attributed to BIT.
- Training, Trainers, T.O.'s, and Other The cost of these initial support elements is seldom greater than 15% of the initial support cost.

The training, trainers, and T.O.'s cost impact will generally be too small to be estimated during the Conceptual Phase.

## 2.5.3 Operating and Support (O&S) Costs

The elements of O&S costs listed below encompass the total personnel and material costs necessary to operate and maintain a weapon system over its life cycle:

- Base Maintenance
- Base Operations
- Base Training
- Depot Component Repair
- Replenishment Spares
- Fuel and Consumable Material
- Other.

Of the above LCC elements, only base maintenance is significantly impacted by the O-level test subsystem concept. Base maintenance is estimated during the Conceptual Phase by assigning estimated or allocated, maintenance manhours per operating hours (MMHr/Op.Hr.) for ground electronic systems or maintenance manhours per flight hour (MMHr/Flt. Hr.) for avionic systems.

The potential for O&S cost savings and/or cost increases, as a result of implementing PM/BIT vs the use of external test equipment are:

Potential O&S Cost Saving Due to PM/BIT	Potential O&S Cost Increases Due to PM/BIT
Reduced system checkout and fault isolation time, which results in reduced O-level MMHrs.	Degraded system reliability due to the addition of BIT results in additional failures and:
Less no-defect removals, which result in: • Reduced O-level MMHrs • Reduced I-level MMHrs • Reduced D-level MMHrs.	<ul> <li>Increased O-level MMHrs</li> <li>Increased I-level MMHrs</li> <li>Increased D-level MMHrs.</li> </ul>

Given that both PM/BIT and the external test equipment are equally well designed, it is most likely that:

- System reliability will not be significantly degraded by the implementation of PM/BIT (This will only be true if extensive performance monitoring is a system requirement and the added BIT is highly reliable)
- System checkout and fault isolation times will be reduced
- No-defect removals will be significantly less due to the implementation of PM/BIT.

Significant or insignificant as the first two items may be, it is virtually impossible to estimate with accuracy the cost impact of "system reliability degradation" and "system checkout time reduction" during the Conceptual Phase. Therefore, consideration of potential cost savings/increases due to these items should be deferred until the System Design Phase.

However, the impact of a reduction in no-defect removals may be significant and should be assessed. PM/BIT is expected to change the required MMHr for organizational maintenance over the total life cycle as expressed by the following equation:

$$\Delta O \text{-Level Cost} = M \times T (U_{T2} - U_{T1}) L_R$$
(Eq. 22)

where M = Estimated O-level MMHr per operating hour for ground electronics of the estimated O-level MMHr per flight hour for avionics, T = Total operating hours or flight hours over the total life cycle for the system or aircraft,  $U_{T1}$  = Estimated Uncertainty of PM/BIT,  $U_{T2}$  = Estimated Uncertainty of external test equipment, and  $L_R$  = The cost of a direct maintenance man-hour as defined in Appendix A, paragraph 3.3.

## 2.6 SELECTION OF THE TEST SUBSYSTEM CONCEPT (STEP 4)

Mission, performance, and availability requirements for current military aircraft have dictated mean turn-around times in the order of 30 minutes or less. This, coupled with the sensitivity of the prime systems availability to the test subsystems performance (i.e.,  $\frac{M_{ct}}{MTBF}$  ratios of 0.01 and greater) limits consideration of alternates to fully automatic BIT with fault isolation to the LRU level. Similarly, ground electronic systems whose operational demand is "essential and continuous" or "essential and random" with  $\frac{M_{ct}}{MTBF}$  ratios in the order of 0.01 and greater require fully automatic BIT with fault isolation to the LRU.

Cost effectiveness and risk trade-offs are used to select the test subsystem concept when operational demand is not critical and the prime systems availability is relatively insensitive to the test subsystems performance (i.e.,  $\frac{M}{MTBF}$  ratios of 0.01 or less). For such systems, a trade-off considering cost alone will generally drive the decision towards external test equipment. This cost advantage must be carefully weighed against the increased effectiveness and reduced maintenance skills made possible by PM/BIT. On the other hand, the risk element generally would favor external test equipment for a simpler system and PM/BIT for a large complex system. Thus, the choice is unique for each individual prime system and its inherent characteristics.

2.7 TEST SUBSYSTEM REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATION (STEP 5)

The objective of the Conceptual Phase is to translate an operational need into documents used to select the most cost-effective system during the System Design Phase.

These include:

- The Program Requirements Baseline which includes Functional Flow Diagrams, RASs and Time Lines
- A Broad System Performance Specification such as MIL-STD-490 Type A Format
- Preliminary plans and conceptual documents describing the operational, logistics, support and maintenance concepts
- Preliminary cost and schedule estimates where LCC estimates and design to cost targets are provided.

These system engineering documents are supported by preliminary acquisition and management planning documents and directives including the Program

Management Plan, the Request for Proposal, and the Statement of Work which describe the scope of the system designers efforts for the next phase.

#### 2.7.1 System Performance Specification

The Program Requirements Baseline Data provide the basis for the Preliminary System Performance Specification. These documents have, in the past, frequently specified the system performance parameters while ignoring or deferring the test subsystem performance until later phases.

To optimize the test subsystems performance and design the following prime system and test subsystem performance parameters must be provided in the System Performance Specification:

- Operational demand and criticality
- Mission duration and operational modes
- Mission reliability
- BIT MTBF
- Maximum turn-around time (as applicable)
- Allowable mean down time (as applicable)
- Expected mean logistics and administrative delay times ( $\overline{M}_1$  and  $\overline{M}_a$ )
- Mean corrective maintenance time  $(\overline{M}_{ct})$
- Test subsystem Effectiveness (ET)
- Percentage of false alarms, no defect removals (FA).

## 2.7.2 Preliminary Plans and Conceptual Documents

The preliminary operational, maintenance, and logistic support plans should provide the following system and test subsystem design concepts as a minimum:

- The Operational Concept which includes:
  - The man/machine operator interface definition
  - Performance monitor requirements at the operator interface(s) and/or remote interfaces

- The alternate modes of system operation and their application during the mission and during maintenance.
- The O-Level Maintenance Concept which includes:
  - The selected test subsystem concept (i.e., PM/BIT or external test equipment or a combination of both)
  - The degree of automation desired (fully automatic or semiautomatic) or t<sub>i</sub> e criteria for trading off and selecting automatic vs semi-automatic
  - The level of fault isolation to be accomplished by the test subsystem (i.e., subsystem, LRU, or module)
  - The desired maintenance manning and skill levels
  - The desired MMHr/OP HR
  - The O-level maintenance constraints, including facilities and environments.
- The O-Level Logistic Support Concept which includes:
  - The O-level supply concepts including the mean logistic and administrative delay times
  - The O-level general, standard and/or peculiar test equipment which is available on site to support the system.

#### 2.7.3 Request for Proposal (RFP) and Statement of Work (SOW)

The two most important considerations in drafting the RFP and SOW are the technical risk and complexity of the procurement and the confidence in the estimated costs. In previous discussions it has been shown that the test subsystem is a high technical risk element of the conceptual design. This is because of the lack of historical cost data and the resulting low confidence in the estimated cost.

By setting Design-to-Cost (DTC) targets for the test subsystem within the SOW, emphasis will be placed on achieving the specified test subsystem performance at the specified cost. The DTC target should, at the conceptual level of design, be an acquisition cost target expressed as a percentage of the systems acquisition costs.

Life cycle cost estimates for the alternate candidate prime systems and test subsystems should be required to provide the visibility and detail necessary to evaluate the impact of alternate test subsystems on the total life cycle cost.



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# 3. DESIGN GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES - SYSTEM DESIGN PHASE


Frequently, the system design process has treated test subsystem performance and costs as a third or fourth order effect, if at all. The net result is that the prime equipment's performance requirements are achieved at the lowest possible procurement costs. However, the test subsystem's lack of performance is usually not visible prior to deployment.

As will be shown, the system engineering procedures of AFSCP 800-3 and AFSCM 375-5 provide all necessary tools and techniques to optimize the test subsystem performance, but only if the test subsystem is recognized and accepted as a major determinant of LCC. The DoD system analysis and design procedures need not be altered to optimize the test subsystem. Rather, the tools of system analysis, when properly applied and emphasized, will provide the optimized, cost effective test subsystem.

The initial task of the System Design Phase as illustrated in Fig. 3-1 is to extend the Conceptual Phase functional analysis to the subsystem level. The functional baseline requirements of the Conceptual Phase are allocated to subsystems via sub-functional flow diagrams. The performance and design requirements for each sub-function are specified in Requirement Allocation Sheets and time lines consistent with the mission and performance requirements of the Conceptual Phase System Specification. The test subsystems performance requirements are defined for each subsystem. Alternate test subsystem concepts are defined for each subsystem and the LCC cost impact of alternate concepts is evaluated to select an optimum test subsystem. Thus, the guidelines and test subsystem optimization procedures of the Conceptual Phase apply equally to the System Design Phase with the exception that they are carried out at the subsystem level.

Therefore, in the paragraphs that follow, the methodology relies on the Conceptual Phase design procedures. Also, for clarity, the many repetitive iterations of system design have been omitted.

As depicted in the simplified flow diagram of Fig. 3-2, the system functional analysis must be carried out in sufficient depth and detail to permit specification of the subsystems performance parameters and time lines prior to test subsystem design and optimization. The first steps in the procedure, the reliability





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
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and maintainability analyses, are pivotal in achieving an optimized design. They must therefore be based on an in-depth knowledge of the subsystem's functions, performance parameters, and time constraints.

# 3.1 QUANTIFICATION OF SUBSYSTEMS' RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY PARAMETERS (STEP 1)

The basic procedure of translating the system's reliability and maintainability parameters into subsystem parameters for each subsystem is as depicted in Fig. 3-3. As shown, the test subsystem is a major determinant of cost and performance. Subsystem reliability is driven by mission requirements, and maintainability is constrained by physical, environmental and operational requirements.

#### 3.1.1 Quantification of the Subsystem's Reliability Requirements


The specified weapon system reliability parameter is based on mission requirements and therefore cannot be traded off. The reliability parameters are allocated per MIL-STD-756A, based on mission reliability requirements for each particular subsystem, the subsystem criticality, and safety of flight considerations for avionics or operator safety for ground electronics. The system designer strives to incorporate the technology necessary to achieve the required reliability. Redundant subsystems or portions of a subsystem may be specified as an alternative to the risk and cost of new developments. As shown in Fig. 3-3, it is mandatory that the allowable PM/BIT reliability be assessed for each subsystem, and included in the mission reliability specification. It is equally important that the required (acceptable) PM/BIT reliability be specified as a test subsystem performance requirement.

#### 3.1.2 Quantification of the Subsystem's Maintainability

Maintainability analysis for both avionics and ground electronics is performed as an integral part of the total weapon system analysis. As shown in Fig. 3-3, the goal is an optimized maintenance system for the entire aircraft or ground system, with each subsystem's contribution constrained to achieve the specified weapon system maintainability goal.

The procedure, as detailed in MIL-HDBK-472, is one of allocating main-tainability parameters (such as  $M_{ct}$ , MMHR/OP.HR, MMHR/FLT HR, etc.) for

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Fig. 3-3 Avionic-GRD Electronics R&M Analysis During the System Design Process

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the total prime system into the classical maintenance elements for each subsystem:

- unscheduled maintenance
- scheduled maintenance
- support actions.

In the prime system design process each of these elements must be mutually optimized. However, in the test subsystem design and optimization process,  $\overline{M}_{ct}$ , (which is the O-level unscheduled maintenance) is of prime concern since it is the measure of the test subsystem's performance.

The allocation of O-level maintenance parameters is initiated by evaluating the timelines of the subsystem level functional analysis, the subsystem's assigned reliability, its functional and physical characteristics and, most important, its packaging and location within the aircraft or within the ground electronic equipment. Given these data, the O-level maintenance time lines for each subsystem are prepared to specify allocated times for each subelement of  $\overline{M}_{ct}$ , including:

- preparation time
- access time
- fault isolation time
- correction/repair time
- performance verification test time.

These classical elements of O-level  $\overline{M}_{ct}$  may seem academic and theoretical. They are not. For instance:

- Preparation Time. Hydraulic, electric, and air-conditioning carts are required for checkout of subsystems without main engine power. Stands, lifts, and dollies are required for personnel access to high and inaccessible areas
- Access Time and Correction Time Access doors require latching/ unlatching of from 4 to 40 and even more "quick acting" fasteners.



Electronics are frequently (of necessity) stacked two, three, or more deep within an electronics bay.

The lapsed maintenance time spent in the above activities (frequently 15 to 30 minutes or more) generally far exceeds the PM/BIT or most external test equipment test times of 2 to 3 minutes or less. The above realities lead to the conclusion that the currently specified maintainability requirements for state-of-the-art subsystems with critical operational demand will continue to be in the order of:

- an  $\overline{M}_{ct} \leq 30$  min
- a fully automatic fault-detect and isolation capability  $\leq 5$  min
- a functional test time after maintenance of  $\leq 3$  min
- having, with very few exceptions, no manual fault diagnostics
- having on-equipment storage/recording of subsystem failures with automated print-out.

The system designer, in his effort to optimize  $\overline{M}_{ct}$ , is also constrained by many other maintenance considerations. A most important constraint is personnel quantities and skills. Crew size and the O-level maintenance squad capabilities, together with the availability of ground support equipment and facilities, are reflected in the preparation of the maintenance timelines for each subsystem. Having incorporated all of these considerations into the allocated subsystem  $\overline{M}_{ct}$ , it is necessary to evaluate the composite average  $\overline{M}_{ct}$  for the overall system. This is calculated using the following equations:

$$\overline{M}_{ct} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \lambda_i U_{T_i} \overline{M}_{ct_i}}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} U_{T_i}}$$
(Eq. 23)

where n = the number of subsystems,  $U_{T_i}$  = the estimated/allocated test uncertainty for each subsystem,  $\overline{M}_{ct_i}$  = the estimated/allocated mean corrective maintenance time for each subsystem, and  $\lambda_i$  = the estimated/allocated failure rate for each subsystem.

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$$U_{T} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{\lambda_{i} U_{T_{i}}}{\lambda}$$
 (Eq. 24)

where  $\lambda$  = the system's failure rate,  $U_T$  = the system's test uncertainty,  $\lambda_i$  = the subsystem's reliability,  $U_{T_i}$  = the subsystem's test uncertainty, and n = the number of subsystems.


A comparison of Equation 23 above with Equation 7 of paragraph 1.6.6 will show that the only change is that the failure rate has been multiplied by the test subsystem uncertainty to account for the impact of no defect removals.

The problem remaining, then, is the selection of Test Uncertainty  $(U_{T_i})$  for each subsystem. Since each subsystem is unique in its function, criticality and characteristics, the overriding criteria which will determine the selected test subsystem  $E_{T_i}$  are also unique. The curves of Fig. 3-4 are a logical starting point in selecting  $E_{T_i}$ , with resulting test subsystem cost limits. The subsystem breakpoint, as identified in Fig. 3-4, will provide the maximum avionic system test effectiveness (minimum test uncertainty) per unit production cost. Using these points, the resulting avionic or ground electronic System Uncertainty  $(U_T)$  should be calculated per Equation 24.

At this point, the system designer has sufficient visibility and mathematical tools to adjust the "breakpoint"  $U_{T_i}$  for each subsystem based on engineering judgment and qualitative factors such as:

- mission criticality
- safety of flight or operation
- state-of-the-art technology
- PM/BIT reliability penalty.

Successive iterations of  $U_{T_i}$  into Equation 23 for  $\overline{M}_{ct}$  and Equation 24 for  $U_{T}$ , will result in optimized values of  $\overline{M}_{ct}$ ,  $E_{T}$  or  $U_{T}$ , and production cost.



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# 3.2 EVALUATE TEST SUBSYSTEM DESIGN CONCEPT FOR SUBSYSTEM CANDIDATES (STEP 2)

The purpose of the system and subsystems functional analysis thus far has been to determine the operational and maintenance requirements that must be met. These requirements (which cannot be traded off) provide the basis for evaluating and trading off prime subsystem candidates. Often the logical subsystem choice is an off-the-shelf design. On the other hand, it is very unlikely that the off-the-shelf candidate subsystem will have the desired PM/BIT characteristics. The approach that is frequently taken is to select the existing candidate subsystems which most nearly meet the prime system performance and production cost goals. The test subsystem's requirements are then modified to accept the available candidate's "test" characteristics without regard to degradation of PM/BIT performance and the resulting increase in operation and support costs. While this approach is clearly unacceptable, current systems procurement practices seldom invoke a requirement to evaluate the LCC impact of the resulting test subsystem. An exception is MIL-STD-1591, which provides the citeria for conducting trade studies and the analysis/synthesis of aircraft BIT using an LCC model.

#### 3.2.1 BIT LCC Trade-Off Model

The reasons for using a model are to provide uniform criteria and a consistent cost accounting structure for LCC evaluations and trade-off studies. The strict discipline inherent in a programmed procedure assures the design engineer that all relevant cost elements have been included. The standard cost elements in the pre-programmed equations are conveniently provided to the system designer. Therefore, using criteria and logic similar to the cost model of MIL-STD-1591, a model for test subsystem trade-offs was developed and is documented in Appendix A-Life Cycle Cost Trade-off Model.

#### 3.2.2 BIT LCC Trade-off Model Equations

Implementation of a given BIT feature will affect the RDT&E, acquisition, operational and support costs and availability of the host system. Thus, the incremental change in life cycle cost is the sum of incremental changes in these cost categories as discussed in the following paragraphs.

# $\Delta$ LCC = $\Delta$ RDT & Cost + $\Delta$ Acquisition Cost + $\Delta$ Operation and Support Cost + $\Delta$ Availability Cost + $\Delta$ Flight Penalty Costs

The decision for each trade-off takes the form of a question: "Does the life cycle cost of the system increase or decrease if this feature is incorporated?" If there is a decrease, then the feature is accepted. Conversely, if there is a null result or an increase, the feature is rejected. All individual terms are of negative sign for a cost decrease or positive for a cost increase. Total life cycle cost incremental change for each category is defined by the following terms:

$$\Delta RDT \& E Cost = C_{(Lq. 26)}$$

(Eq. 25)

where  $C_r$  is the research, development, test and evaluation costs necessary to develop new (beyond the state-of-the-art) BIT technology and to reduce it to practice.

$$\Delta Acquisition = C_d + C_p + C_t + C_{is}$$
(Eq. 27)

where  $C_d$  is the incremental change in design cost due to the postulated BIT feature(s),  $C_p$  is the production cost of that BIT feature(s),  $C_t$  is the incremental change in the cost of test equipment and test software as the result of that BIT feature(s), and  $C_{is}$  is the incremental change in the cost of initial spares out-fitting resultant from that postulated BIT feature(s).

 $\Delta Operation and Support Cost = C_{os}$ (Eq. 28)

where  $C_{os}$  is the incremental change in operational and support costs due to the postulated BIT feature(s).

$$\Delta Availability Cost = C_{a}$$
(Eq. 29)

where  $C_{a}$  is the incremental cost change required for system procurement (quantity) due to availability changes resulting from the BIT feature(s).

$$\Delta$$
 Flight Penalty Cost = C<sub>fo</sub> (Eq. 30)

where  $C_{fp}$  is the flight penalty cost resultant from addition of the postulated BIT feature(s), and is null for ground systems.

#### 3.2.3 Application of the BIT LCC Trade-off Model

The trade-off procedures of the System Design Phase must include the evaluation of the test subsystem performance as well as the evaluation of the prime system's performance, as shown in the simplified flow diagram of Fig. 3-5. The BIT LCC trade-off model was designed to fulfill this requirement. The model is tailored to evaluate only those components of LCC that are sensitive to the test subsystem cost and performance characteristics. All other elements of the prime system's LCC are excluded.

The LCC model, as detailed in Appendix  $A_{\pm}$  is simple and versatile. Although the description of the previous paragraph refers to trading off alternative BIT features, the features may be as simple as alternate sensor designs or as complex as:


- BIT vs external testers
- BIT hardware vs BIT software
- centralized BIT vs decentralized BIT.

The model uses reliability and maintainability parameters as reported in AFR 66-1/65-110 at the LRU level. The LCC elements for each LRU are automatically summed to evaluate subsystem trade-offs. Successive runs for each subsystem are required to perform system level trade-off studies.

## 3.3 CONFIGURE TEST SUBSYSTEM ARCHITECTURE (STEP 3)

At this point in the system design, previously evaluated candidate subsystems are configured into competing systems and sized (space, weight, power, etc.) for the required vehicle or facility. Electronic, electro-mechanical, and optical interfaces are defined first in general terms and then in further detail, as the iterative system design/evaluation and trade-off proceeds. During this process, both the system operation and control function and the system performance monitor/display functions must be defined in detail prior to the analysis and design of the PM/BIT subsystem architecture.

Operation and control functions include the man-machine interface necessary to operate and control the system as a whole. The operator interface



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200 ----- Fig. 3-5 Procedure for Evaluating Existing Candidate Subsystem's BIT LCC

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determines the type and character of subsystem controls, protective devices, and operational monitoring devices. These, in turn, contribute to and form a part of the BIT.

Performance monitor and display functions encompass the displays, indicators, and alarms required to assure the operator(s) that mission-critical functions are being performed. Included are audio visual displays necessary for the operator to perform alternate mission functions, switch to alternate modes of operation, and take appropriate action to shut the system down for reasons of safety. Thus, the performance monitor function imposes requirements for specific sensors, and fault detection and diagnostic capability. These will all be an integral part of the PM/BIT. However, since the performance monitor function cannot be traded off, it must be clearly identified as such, rather than as an integral part of the BIT.

The BIT concept and its architecture is not only driven by the operator/ display function, but also by the system packaging, maintenance philosophy, and support concepts. For example, the interface between BIT and the organizational level maintenance personnel may be a single panel located at the operator interface or at a remote location. On the other hand, cost, maintenance, and packaging considerations might dictate distribution of this function with a small panel for each subsystem. Depending on the  $\overline{M}_{ct}$  and  $E_T$  specified, the BIT function may be fully automated, semi-automated, manual, or various combinations of these. The designer, in selecting from an almost infinite number of alternatives will be constrained by the PM/BIT LCC budget specified during the Conceptual Phase. The system designer's problem is to select a PM/BIT subsystem architecture tailored to the system technology characteristics.

#### 3.3.1 Avionics System PM/BIT Architecture

The requirement for a fully automatic test subsystem (as detailed in paragraph 2.4.1) with a minimum achievable uncertainty  $(U_T)$  and a mean time to repair  $(\overline{M}_{ct})$  of less than 30 minutes dictates the need for a centralized test program under computer control. This program is required to activate the LRUs and their BIT circuits during preflight, inflight, and postflight test routines. It is also required to recognize failure responses from the subsystem or LRUs and to deduce the true failure. The central computer program is required to

process and format both performance monitoring and BIT data for display and/ or recording.

For the above reasons, there is no viable trade-off between a totally centralized and a totally decentralized PM/BIT architecture in performing the functions of test initiation, diagnostics and test data formatting. A central processor is required and will be specified by the system designer along with the subsystem's hardware and software interfaces.


The additional functions of thresholding, deduction, fault isolation, and signal conversion (to the format of the centralized computer) must be considered. For these functions there is no single optimum PM/BIT (centralized or decentralized) architecture, since cost-effective PM/BIT implementation depends on the state-of-the-art and technology of the subsystem. Improved PM/BIT concepts for avionic subsystems have evolved rapidly over the past decade and there is every reason to believe that this trend will continue. Two examples are provided to illustrate this progress and its current direction:

- F-14A PM/BIT (circa '70) is fully automatic with central computer control
- ULAIDS (circa '80) is the Universal Locator Airborne Integrated Data System which has fully automatic central computer control PM/BIT plus decentralized subsystem microcomputers and diagnostics.

3.3.1.1 <u>F-14A PM/BIT</u> - The F-14A PM/BIT provides rapid, automatic checkout (less than 2 minutes) during preflight, postflight, and/or inflight operation. It also provides continuous monitoring of vital performance functions. Figure 3-6, "F-14A PM/BIT Block Diagram," is illustrative of typical operator display interfaces.

The principal components of the F-14A PM/BIT system are the sensors, status indicators, and BIT circuits of the weapon control system, avionics and electro-mechanical subsystems. Other principal components are:

- AWG-9 Computer
- Computer Address Panel
- Computer Signal Data Converter (CSDC)



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Fig. 3-6 F-14A PM/BIT Block Diagram



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- AWG-9 Tactical Information Display
- Horizontal Situation Display.

Timing and subsystem test initiate codes are generated in the AWG-9 computer and transferred to the CSDC. The BIT program is stored in magnetic tape memory. The CSDC is the on-board computer input-output unit responsible for interfacing with the avionics being interrogated. The CSDC software converts the AWG-9 Computer test initiate codes, and applies the appropriate discrete signals to subsystems under test to remotely activate their PM/BIT. The CSDC accumulates the subsystem status and sends this information to the AWG-9. Failure acronyms are displayed on the Tactical Information Display, and during ground checkout on the Horizontal Situation Display.

For the F-14, there are three BIT routines stored in memory:

- Continuous Monitoring (CM) The CM evaluates certain avionics by performing continuous signal monitoring of individual subsystem status. The CM routine is an integral part of the tactical program, displaying system failure information during normal tactical processing. The routine is permanently stored, and executed in flight every two seconds.
- <u>Command Initiated Test</u> (CMD) Command initiated tests are of three classes: tests performed in-flight only because they radiate power, tests which are designated for preflight because a failure of these systems constitues a flight safety hazard, and tests which neither radiate energy nor relate to safety of flight.
- <u>Maintenance Readout</u> (MR) This routine is utilized during preflight and postflight maintenance. The MR routine cycles through a failure history file and displays LRU failure acronyms on the Tactical Information Display.

3.3.1.2 <u>ULAIDS FM/BIT</u> - A data bus design concept utilizing central computer control and subsystem decentralized microcomputer controlled PM/BIT is used in the ULAIDS system. In this PM/BIT subsystem the computers, both central and remote, are combined into a multiplexed network using the MIL-STD-1553 serial digital data bus.

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ULAIDS is an airborne data acquisition system which monitors, records, and displays the inflight status of the airframe, engine, and avionic components. Recorded data are stored on magnetic tape cassette for further processing in a ground terminal unit.


Design features of the ULAIDS system are:

- Polled contention distributed data bus system
- Flexibility is achieved using distributed processing in which each subsystem is a "stand alone" intelligent terminal. Changes in formatting, processing, and control can be accomplished under software control. Any subsystem terminal can be reprogrammed to accommodate a specific operational requirement.
- Expandability is easily accomplished by adding additional terminal units to the communications bus
- Modularity is designed-in through the use of standard plug-in modules
- Self-Test is provided for each functional module under software controls.

Figure 3-7 is a block diagram of the ULAIDS system. It consists of five airborne stations. A ground terminal unit is also provided for processing airborne recorded data. The five data terminals are:

- Engine Signal Acquisition and Control Terminal (SACT 1)
- Aircraft SACT (SACT 2)
- Aircraft Health Monitor Recorder (AHMR)
- Flight Incident Recorder and Universal Locator (FIR/UL)
- Master Monitor Display and Data Entry Panel (MMD/DEP).

Each of the subsystems is of the distributed processor type, i.e., each subsystem is capable of initiating communications with other subsystems to gather data or give information regarding system failure. The individual subsystems are self sufficient in that they are capable of processing any data that is collected and initiating appropriate action.






Fig. 3-7 ULAIDS Functional Diagram

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يولي: م Signals received from the aircraft subsystems are processed in real-time by microprocessors in the SACTs. The SACT preconditions, performs conversions, and multiplexes processed data for transmission on either the primary or secondary busses. Processed data is passed from the SACT to other subsystems for display and recording. Data transfers are controlled by the AN/ AYK-14 computer.

Each of the major LRUs interface with the primary and secondary 1553A multiplex data busses by means of its own microprocessor-controlled terminal. Each of these LRUs has the capability of processing data and acting as a remote terminal.

Depending on the established data reporting and system priorities, certain parameters are processed by the SACT and, upon detection of out-of-tolerance conditions these parameters are passed to the AHMR for recording. Periodic "snap-shots" of these parameters are also passed to the AHMR for recording. They can also be stored in the non-volatile memory of the MMD/MT. Selected messages are displayed in real-time on the MMD if any action by the pilot can alleviate the condition or if safety of flight is threatened. All such data are stored by the MMD for post-flight maintenance check.

The SACT provides facilities for monitoring transducer outputs and discrete signals. The design is flexible to accommodate new or different sensors. Sampling rates and channel selection are internally programmable to facilitate application of the SACT to different engines and LRUs.

3.3.1.3 Optimization of Avionic Test Subsystem Architecture. Large scale integration has made microprocessors readily available in both MIL Spec and commercial versions. These components provide the means to apply programmed test sequences and to evaluate test results at the subsystem level. When combined with data bus technology, the microcomputer provides the necessary dedicated interface to communicate with the central computer with acceptable volume, weight, power, and cost. Thus, the centralized computer with distributed remote subsystem terminals communicating via data bus, currently offers the most advanced PM/BIT architectures for new avionic system designs.

Status word feedback to the central computer enhances physical interface confidence and informs the computer that a particular remote terminal has correctly or incorrectly received or transmitted data. Thus, the data bus protocol results in a more localized detection of a malfunctioning subsystem.

Microprocessor-based subsystems allow more comprehensive and structurally partitioned PM/BIT when software controlled. Thus, in conjunction with the data storage capabilities of the subsystem, the data bus enables transmission of a wide variety of subsystem signature data to the central computer and also enhances partitioning of each subsystem's PM/BIT.

#### 3.3.2 Ground Electronic Systems PM/BIT Design

The rigid limitations of weight, volume, power, and cooling imposed on an avionic system designer are not a factor in ground electronics system design. Rather, these parameters are traded off to achieve system performance, reliability, and maintainability at the lowest LCC. For example, redundant (and even triple redundant) systems, subsystems or LRUs are often used to achieve mission reliability.

Diametrically opposite to most avionic system designs, ground electronic systems are designed to accommodate repair and replacement during system operation. This feature, coupled with redundancy, not only provides greater system reliability, but also imposes additional performance requirements on the operator control and PM/BIT design.

Since ground electronic systems are designed for the less severe environment of MIL-E-4158E vice MIL-E-5400 for avionics, the incorporation of generalpurpose computers and microcomputers has often been accomplished without the costly RDT & effort to develop militarized versions.

3.3.2.1 Test Subsystem Architecture - Non-Critical Demand. Optimization of the test subsystem architecture for ground electronic subsystem whose required  $\overline{M}_{ct}$ /MTBF ratio is in the order of 0.1 or smaller, and having an  $\overline{M}_{ct}$  greater than 1 hour is initiated with a thorough evaluation of both the performance monitoring requirements and the maintenance concept.

First, the operator control interfaces and performance monitoring requirements are derived and specified. These requirements, to be included in subsystem Configuration Item Specifications, include:

- the number of operating personnel and their location
- the operator interface(s)
- displays required (central and/or distributed within the subsystem) and the functions to be monitored
- the central monitor and control interface signals and their characteristics, data format and transmission means (to and from the subsystems).

Having selected the optimum control and performance monitor configuration, the system designer still faces the question of where to place the performance monitor signal processor and evaluator.

The problem of selecting centralized vs decentralized processing may be solved by cost considerations alone when a general-purpose computer is planned. However, there are some negative factors in this approach:

- all data must be interconnected to the central processor; the connectors and cabling could easi'y become a significant liability
- multiplexing can reduce the number of interconnections at the cost of multiplex interfaces at each terminal
- when the control processor is down, the entire system is inoperable.

The question of where to perform the processing remains. The solution recommended is to examine the interrelation of functions and then subfunctions within the subsystems. The system designer will reach a level of hierarchy where a particular group of subsystem functions are interrelated within themselves but are relatively isolated from other functions or subfunctions. At this level, deductive evaluation of the sensors' output is optimally realized. Data provided by the decentralized processors can be either fed to a central computer or directly to the operator.

For systems with non-critical operational demand, the performance monitor and data processing architecture are selected to achieve optimum total system operation only. This is not to infer that the maintenance and test concepts are ignored. Rather the system designer must optimize both in the design of an optimum system. The procedure for optimizing the maintenance/repair task is initiated by preparing time-lines for the average time required to repair each subsystem. The Conceptual Phase Specification which indentifies personnel resource constraints in terms of skills, quantities, and maintenance man-hours per operating hour limitations provides the upper bounds within which the maintenance/repair task times can be allocated.

While the procedure used to prepare maintenance/repair time-lines for the ground electronic system is almost identical to that for avionic systems, the constraints of the aircraft and avionics packaging requirements are gone, simplifying the task. There are other considerations, however, which complicate the analysis, such as:

- the distribution of the subsystems and AGE within the facility or facilities
- limited access to certain equipments due to EMI shielding, high voltage barriers, and rotating equipment hazards
- start-up and shut-down times for repair/replacement/retest for ground electronic systems
- power/weight/volume may dictate repair in place.

Nevertheless, a thorough analysis of the repair techniques to be applied and detailed maintenance time-lines are necessary in determining:

- subsystems which require BIT and those in which the necessity is marginal
- subsystems in which the BIT should be totally automatic and those in which operator participation (with the extended test times) is allowable
- logical location of the centralized or decentralized processor/evaluator functions for BIT
- the maintenance parameters necessary to perform trade-offs of alternate test concepts.

In performing such trade-offs, the PM/BIT LCC Model of Appendix A is recommended. The proper application of the model would necessitate successive runs for alternate hardware concepts in which performance of the test subsystem is held constant.

3.3.2.2 Test Subsystem Architecture - Critical Operational Demand - Centralized performance monitoring and control capabilities are required to achieve continuous availability of a ground electronic system with critical operational demand. Early Warning, Command, Control, Communication and Satellite Data Processing Systems will require a general-purpose computer or distributed microcomputers for PM, for switching to redundant units, and also for off-line BIT. The degree of BIT or external test equipment used to diagnose faults will depend on LRU reliability, criticality, and required  $M_{ct}$ . Thus, the optimum test subsystem architecture for ground electronic systems whose operational demand is essential and continuous, or essential and random, is extremely similar to that of avionics.

The optimum test subsystem architecture for this category of ground electronics should be similar to that described for the ULAIDS system in paragraph 3.3.1.2. It should be an integrated data bus system under central computer control with remote microprocessor terminals.

#### 3.4 SELECT AND SPECIFY TEST SUBSYSTEM DESIGN (STEP 4)

The objective of the previous steps of this procedure has been to derive optimized test subsystems for each competing candidate prime system configuration. Each test subsystem will have been tailored to the technological and physical features of its host system. Performance parameters  $\overline{M}_{ct}$ ,  $E_T$ ,  $R_{BIT}$ , and the LCC targets will have been allocated for each subsystem of each candidate prime system.

The test subsystem selection process then is not one of trading-off test subsystems, rather, the test subsystem will be selected as a result of tradingoff candidate prime systems and selecting the optimum prime system configuration. However, the importance of the test subsystem in these trade-offs must be recognized.

For complex avionic systems, the extensive, costly PM/BIT hardware and software may be a major factor in selecting an all new integrated suite vs existing designs. The achievement of specified turnaround-time may depend on PM/BIT performance. The prime system's LCC will be severely impacted by PM/BIT Uncertainty  $(U_T)$ . The impact of specifying PM/BIT or an optimized mix of PM/BIT and AGE for a ground electronics systems will generally have significant impact on the prime system's mission performance and resultant LCC.

## 3.4.1 Specification of the Test Subsystem Requirements

The allocated design requirements baseline is an output of the System Design Phase. It defines the selected system configuration developed to satisfy the Conceptual Phase's functional baseline (program requirements baseline), translating them into System and Subsystem CI performance requirements. The resulting systems engineering documents include:

- Program Requirements Baseline, which includes Functional Flow Diagrams, RAS's and time-lines carried to the Subsystem level and below as necessary
- A further refined system performance specification (MIL-STD-490 Type A)
- Broad subsystem performance specifications for each development item or existing equipment of the prime system (MIL-STD-490 Type B (Part 1))
- Plans and conceptual phase documents expanded to describe subsystem operational, logistics, support and maintenance concepts
- Cost and schedule estimates for the total system and its subsystems including LCC and design-to-cost targets for levels 1, 2, and 3 of the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS).

3.4.1.1 <u>System Performance Specification</u> - The preliminary System Specification of the Conceptual Phase must be updated and expanded to encompass both the total prime system's performance as reflected in the characteristics of the subsystems.

Since the test subsystem (PM/BIT) is distributed across the subsystems, it is of primary importance that the PM/BIT hardware, software, and subsystem interfaces be documented in detail as required in Section 3 of the Systems Specification. The Integrated Test Plan of Section 4 must identify evaluation tests for each performance parameter of Section 3, and accept/reject criteria. As has been previously indicated, this integrated test program and the resulting corrective actions (design changes) are vital to achieving the specified PM/BIT performance.

Similar to the Conceptual Phase, the key test subsystem parameters which must be provided in the System Specification, are:

- operational demand and criticality
- mission duration and operational modes
- mission reliability
- BIT circuitry/software MTBF (expressed as a maximum percentage of the prime system MTBF)
- maximum Turnaround Time (TAT)
- allowable Mean Down Time (MDT<sub>o</sub>)
- expected Mean Logistics and Administrative Delay Times ( $\overline{M}_1$  and  $\overline{M}_a$ )
- the Mean Corrective Maintenance Time  $(\overline{M}_{ct})$
- the test subsystem Effectiveness  $(E_T)$
- % False Alarms no defect removals (FA).

3.4.1.2 Subsystem Performance Specifications - The prime outputs of the System Design Phase are detailed Specifications (MIL-STD-490, Type B) for each subsystem. The detail of these specifications with respect to performance, functional characteristics, physical characteristics, and the integrated test plan, per MIL-STD-490, is similar in content to that of the prime system specification. Functional and performance requirements are stated in the broades: terms possible to provide the subsystem designer sufficient latitude to select an optimum cost-effective design and physical arrangement of the equipment. As a minimum, each Subsystem Performance Specification must include the following test subsystem parameters:

- operational demand and criticality
- mission duration and operational modes
- mission reliability
- BIT circuitry/software MTBF (expressed as a maximum percentage of the subsystem MTBF)
- maxinum turnaround time
- allowable mean down time
- expected mean logistics and administrative delay times
- the mean corrective maintenance time
- The test subsystem effectiveness
- % False Alarms no defect removals.

The system specifications must detail the performance characteristics of the centralized PM/BIT hardware and software and/or the selected external test equipment. These details are usually provided in the format of separate specifications for the performance monitor/operator interface subsystems, the central computer/processor subsystem, and the computer program development specification. Regardless of format, sufficient interface detail must be provided to permit the test subsystem design to be optimized as a single entity. This requirement for interface data is of prime importance for both centralized PM/BIT and for decentralized PM/BIT. This is true since each element of the decentralized test subsystem must communicate to achieve the total prime system's PM/BIT performance requirements even though greater design latitude is available to the designer of decentralized PM/BIT.

Subsystem packaging, arrangement, and physical characteristics must be defined in quantitative terms to achieve the total system's mission. This is particularly true of avionics where the size, weight, and power of the subsystem is critical. While the packaging arrangement of ground electronics is seldom critical, the requirement to define facilities, structure, power and cooling, and the

need for standardization, dictates that the packaging, arrangement, and physical characteristics be defined.

Therefore, all elements of organizational  $\overline{M}_{ct}$  which are a result of the system design must be specified. These include:

- Preparation Time Connecting and detaching power, test lines, cooling and access stands
- <u>Access Time</u> Opening and closing doors, removing and reinstalling panels and in-the-way components
- <u>Correction Time</u> Removing and replacing the faulty unit, in place repair, adjustment, alignment, or calibration
- <u>Functional Test Time</u> Checking operational capability to verify the adequacy of corrective action.

In place repair, alignment, and/or calibration times are also specified by the system designer and must be in the subsystem specification together with the required  $\overline{M}_{ct}$ 

The remaining component of  $\overline{M}_{ct}$  to be specified is the mean time in which faults must be detected, isolated, and displayed ( $\overline{M}_{tt}$ ). This parameter includes all diagnostic, trouble shooting, and maintenance technician participation time. It will be a key test subsystem criterion during subsystem design.

Specification of subsystem test and demonstration of each PM/BIT performance parameter is mandatory to assure that the subsystem, standing alone, meets its performance requirements prior to initiating the total system's integrated test program. Section 4 of the subsystem Performance Specification should include the integrated test plan in which subsystem performance reliability, maintainability, and the test subsystem requirements are demonstrated and verified.

3.4.1.3 <u>Plans and Documents</u> - A major task of the System Design Phase is to finalize the Operational Maintenance and Logistic Support Plans. The preliminary plans of the Conceptual Phase must be expanded to include the impact of decisions such as subsystem make or buy, Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) vs Contractor Furnished Equipment (CFE), preliminary level-of-repair, etc. These decisions will generally modify the key elements of Conceptual Phase preliminary plans and documents.

In updating and modifying the plans and documents, the following test subsystem concepts should be addressed:

- The Operational Concept
  - the man/machine operator interface
  - performance monitor requirements at the operator interface(s) and/or remote
  - alternate modes of system operation
- The O-Level Maintenance Concept
  - the selected test subsystem concept (i.e., PM/BIT or external test equipment or a combination of both)
  - the degree of automation desired (fully automatic or semi-automatic) or the criteria for trading off and selecting automatic vs semi-automatic
  - the level of fault detection and fault isolation to be accomplished by the test subsystem (i.e., subsystem, LRU, or module)
  - the desired maintenance manning level and skill level
  - the desired MMHR/OP.HR
  - The O-level maintenance constraints, including facilities and environments.
- The O-Level Logistic Support Concept
  - The O-level supply concepts including the mean logistic and administrative delay times
  - the O-level general, standard, and/or peculiar test equipment which is available on site to support the system.
- The Design-to-Cost (DTC) Targets for the Test Subsystem
  - the design to cost target should be set by specifying the maximum acquisition cost of the total test subsystem (PM/BIT and/or external test equipment) expressed as a percentage of the avionics or ground electronics system's acquisition costs.

### 4. DESIGN GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES - SUBSYSTEM DESIGN PHASE

### 4.1 BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGY

This section presents a straightforward design methodology for optimizing the types, quantities, and locations of BIT capability. The optimal BIT design is defined as one which meets the performance criteria and cost requirements set during the System Design Phase.

The thrust of the optimization process is to achieve a subsystem design which meets these requirements, and which has been further optimized for minimal life cycle cost. The product of the subsystem design is a set of LRU requirements expressed in the individual specifications for the LRUs which comprise the subsystem.


During the literature search a very large body of relevant technical material (specifications, standards, technical papers, etc.) was collected and evaluated. This effort has identified a clear dichotomy in state-of-the-art BIT engineering methodology:

- there is a wealth of material definitive of BIT circuit design and functions
- there is an almost total absence of material defining BIT performance criteria, and how BIT systems may best be configured to meet defined performance and cost goals.

The methods described in this report are intended to fill the need for a means of determining how much "BIT" a subsystem must have, how to most effectively allocate that resource, how to compute, optimize, and measure the resulting capability.

The recommended methodology consists of seven procedures, several tradeoffs, and several design guidelines. These are performed in the order indicated by Fig. 4-1, which summarizes the process. Each procedure is a logical and/or





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mathematical process that contributes to the development of BIT requirements into an implemented BIT design.

At various steps in the process, technical guidelines are provided. These are in the nature of advisory considerations, checklists of technical issues the designer should consider, and/or design pitfalls to be avoided. They are intended to provide a measure of guidance to the BIT designer by defining "good-BIT engineering practice" as distilled from the research and experience of the study team, and should be regarded as advisory in nature.

The recommended design process emphasizes continuity from the beginning of the subsystem design effort through the detailed design, and into the actual deployment of the product. The effectiveness and mean corrective time parameters embodied in this methodology are suitable for derivation by a subsystem designer, for computation by a detailed designer, and for measurement in the deployed field organization.

The methodology as detailed is simple, straightforward, and usable as a day-to-day engineering tool. However, in the mathematical sense, global optimization of BIT would require a universal solution of over two dozen variables: this would be too complex to solve by known processes. Since the methodology recommended in this document fills a gap in existing engineering processes, it has been deliberately simplified to produce a local optimum based on the most significant variables that must be treated by the designer. This requirement is imposed in order to obtain a practical and usable process.

#### 4.2 IDENTIFICATION / ANALYSIS OF SUBSYSTEM FUNCTIONS (STEP 1)

This procedure is the first step in BIT optimization. Its objective is to define the BIT-related technical characteristics of the subsystem as early as possible, and in a form that lends itself to subsequent BIT design optimization. It should be performed as soon as quantitative subsystem performance requirements and at least one candidate subsystem architecture have been generated by the conventional engineering process.

Identification and initial analysis of subsystem functions is carried out by generating three documents to describe the conceptual subsystem in terms of functional flow and parametric/modal characteristics. These documents are:

- A Level I Functional Flow Block Diagram this is an overall diagram of the conceptual system architecture, showing its inputs, outputs, elements, and inter-relationships; emphasis is placed on defining the functional path associated with each required subsystem function
- An Output Signal Matrix this is a list of all signal outputs, showing their amplitudes, tolerances, units, etc., by mode of subsystem operation; it provides the "first cut" definition of what quantities must be measured to detect and isolate faults
- An Input/Stimulus Signal Matrix this is a list of all stimuli provided to the system (again in terms of units, amplitudes, nominal values, and tolerances) by mode of subsystem operation.

The above three documents will become a permanent tool, and will be used and updated during all phases of the BIT design process.

#### 4.2.1 Design Guidelines

BIT optimization should be carried out as an integral part of the subsystem design effort, rather than as a separate effort.

The technical issues which must be considered in order to accomplish the BIT design are interwoven with most of the normal efforts intrinsic to the design of an electronic subsystem. The information needed to accurately define functional paths and stimuli/response signals would be difficult for a BIT designer to obtain unless he is a part of the design "team," rather than an "outside specialist."

A "Test" mode must be included in every subsystem specification, and defined in the same detail and with the same care as are the requirements for every other mode of the required subsystem.

Every electronic subsystem must be tested many times, from the day it is fabricated and delivered to the years during which it must be tested for maintenance reasons. It follows, therefore, that all systems should have a test mode, and that every system function should be designed to perform its test function accurately and economically.

#### 4.2.2 Preparation of Level I Functional Flow Block Diagram (Step 1A)

This diagram is prepared to identify the required functions and associated functional paths of the subsystem being designed. It is an adaption of the block diagram normal to this stage of design, but distinguished by emphasis upon functional paths:

- FUNCTION is defined as the signal processing capability of the electronic subsystem being designed; the design control specification will identify required functions and their parametric values
- FUNCTIONAL PATH is defined as the path taken by subsystem throughput, from input to output, associated with the given function. The functional path therefore includes all the subsystem elements which accomplish a function, and illustrates their inter-relationships.

Functions are candidates for either BIT or a performance monitoring capability. Functional paths are candidates for a fault isolation capability. The intent of the Level I Functional Flow Block Diagram is to initially identify these aspects of the subsystem. Figure 4-2 illustrates such a diagram, using a conceptual airborne radar subsystem as it might exist at this point in the design effort. Note that the design is diagrammed as a set of inter-related functions, and is not yet necessarily partitioned into physical subassemblies. Functions are identified, and will be subject to further analysis as the design evolves.

#### 4.2.3 Preparation of Output Signal Matrix (Step 1B)

This matrix is prepared to define and characterize signals required for testing the subsystem. At this stage of the design, it is preliminary. As the design effort progresses, it will be revised to maintain it current at all times, because it will be used as the basic reference tool for the orderly and logical design of the test subsystem.

The matrix will tabulate two general classes of signals that must be tested:

• <u>Primary Output Signals</u> - these are subsystem outputs which must be present and correct in order to obtain normal subsystem performance; conversely, these are signals, the failure of which denotes subsystem failure

• <u>Secondary Output Signals</u> - these are subsystem internal output signals which are required for fault isolation testing as they relate to failed primary output; in general, these signals do not appear as subsystem outputs to the "parent" system, but usually appear at test points.

The matrix is a tabulation of signal number, signal nomenclature, related subsystem function, and signal properties by subsystem mode. Figure 4-3 presents the format of an Output Signal Matrix, with the data headings as they would appear for the conceptual radar of Fig. 4-2. Following are brief descriptions of the headings.

<u>Signal Number</u> - is a numerical descriptor uniquely defined to identify each particular signal.

<u>Signal Nomenclature</u> - is the "name" of the signal, and should be chosen to be as descriptive of its nature as possible within a reasonable number of characters.


<u>Related Function</u> - is the name of the subsystem function which this signal partly or wholly implements; signals should be grouped together by subsystem function.

<u>Function Number</u> - is the numerical descriptor which uniquely identifies the subsystem function associated with each signal.

<u>Class</u> - the class entry will be "P" for primary signals, or "S" for secondary signals. The matrix should be ordered such that the first portion of tabulated signals are primary and the remainder are secondary.

The next several columns identify the technical and parametric characteristics of the signals tabulated, in a summary form. The precise terms used in any particular subsystem effort will be dependent upon the nature of the subsystem. For purposes of Fig. 4-3, the following terms have been used to describe the properties of the signals likely to be indigenous to the conceptual radar of Fig. 4-2:

<u>Analog</u> - in the example, this column would contain a blank for signals characterized as non-analog. For analog signals, a code letter is assigned to further define the signal, such as:





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	SIGNAL	RELATED FUNCTION		5							g	MODE								
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N EXT PM INT DETECT 180LATE 180LATE ATTER TOL DIST TOL OTHER WORTH, W<sub>i</sub> x 10<sup>-6</sup> WORTH, W<sub>D</sub> x 10<sup>-6</sup> CONT SIG NO. 1 QUAL FACT. TIME, MS SAMPLE RATE СОЯТ, \$К SENSOR TYPE EVAL Fig. 4-3 Output Signal Matrix 3 95 R RAN WAR Sec. Sec

- S: sawtooth
- T: timing or trigger function
- R: ramp
- D: a DC level

The set of code letters are chosen by the designer, in the above manner, such that the class of analog signals is defined in a granular form that he judges to be complete with respect to the character of the subsystem.

<u>Digital</u> - in the example, this column would be blank for all non-digital signals. For digital signals, it would contain further definition of the signal. For example:

- <u>Name</u> the name assigned to the Boolean term implemented by this signal
- Family the logic family used to implement this signal, such as
  - T: TTL
  - M: MOS
  - C: CMOS
  - I: I<sup>2</sup>L
  - E: ECL

and so forth, according to the planned hardware designs and the judgement of the designer.

 Format - a code letter to describe data format, such as "S" for serial, "P" for parallel, "A" for ASCII, "M" for Manchester, or any similar set of descriptors chosen by the BIT designer.

Discrete - this column defines signals of discrete origin, such as:

- R: relay output
- F: solid state discrete (flag)

or any other set of appropriate codes chosen by the designer, and would of course be left blank for non-discrete signals.

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 $\underline{RF}$  - this column would be used to characterize signals of an  $\underline{RF}$  nature, for example:

- T: Magnetron output
- R: Receiver detector output
- I: Intermediate signal frequency
- L: Local oscillator

# and so forth.

<u>Video</u> - this column would be used to characterize signals of a video nature, by a set of code letters such as:

- C: Composite video
- M: Marker video
- R: Range line video
- T: Target video

and so forth.

<u>Power</u> - this column would be used to characterize AC or DC power quantities, using codes such as:

- DC: for DC power
- AC: for AC power, single phase

• A3: for AC and multiphase power (3 denoting phase number three) and so forth.

The next several columns identify the parameters of each signal, by mode, with tolerances. They define those quantities which must be measured, by mode, to determine that the signals tabulated are performing properly or have failed. Here again, the contents of the "mode" columns will vary widely according to the specific nature of the subsystem being designed, and is left to the judgement of the designer. In the Fig. 4-3 example, the following conventions can be used to characterize signal nominal values and tolerances:

- Modes 1 through n: These might represent the various range, warmup, and standby modes of the hypothetical radar, including its test mode. (The requirement that every signal have a test mode is of paramount importance for reasons explained earlier. In fact, any signal that cannot be parametrically described in its test mode is a signal which by definition cannot be tested.) Signals intentionally designed to be untestable should be coded "X" to highlight this intentional design feature.
- EMAX, EMIN, ENOM, ZS: These codes might represent the nominal value of the signal, its maximum instantaneous voltage, its minimum instantaneous voltage, and its source impedance. If left blank for a given mode, this would denote "signal absent," except that signals absent in the test mode should be coded "X." These descriptors would locate the time domain voltage minima, maxima, and nominal levels of any class of signal previously defined in other portions of this matrix row, to provide an indication of measurement ranges.
- <u>FREQUENCY/TOLERANCE</u>: The nominal, upper limit, and lower limit of this signal, in this mode, for normal operation.
- <u>VOLTAGE/TOLERANCE</u>: The nominal, upper limit, and lower limit of signal voltage in this mode, for normal operation, with an indication of how the voltage is to be measured, i.e., DC, RMS, peak, peak-to-peak, average, etc.
- <u>TIMING/TOLERANCE</u>: For signals whose timing is contingent upon triggers or clocks, this parameter would define when the measurement is to be made, the signal number of the reference timing function, and the tolerance in units of time.
- <u>JITTER/TOLERANCE</u>: For signals where jitter is a consideration, this entry would define maximum allowable jitter with respect to average measured time value.
- <u>DISTORTION/TOLERANCE</u>: Similarly, the distortion (nominal and maximum) for signals where this characteristic is of interest.
- <u>OTHER/TOLERANCE</u>: An entry to define unusual testing parameters, and their required nominal values and tolerances.

To the degree possible at this stage of the subsystem design, the above signal parameters should be defined by mode, to form the basic definition of quantities to be measured in the subsystem being designed. In cases where these parameters are not yet known, they should be coded "TBD" to indicate a later requirement, or left blank to denote that they are not appropriate.

The next several columns identify, for each mode, the contingency of each signal upon other signals, and upon stimuli:

- when a signal is contingent upon a related signal, that related signal is coded by entering its signal number in the "contingency" columns
- when a signal is contingent upon a stimulus provided to the subsystem during normal operation, the stimulus number is coded by entering the number preceded by an "S" in the "contingency" columns
- when the signal is contingent upon a special stimulus provided to allow it to be tested, then the special stimulus number (preceded by a "T") is entered in the "contingency" columns.

The final group of columns identify test strategies and related BIT design data required for optimization. At this stage of the design effort, these will almost always be still undefined. The significant issue is that these items are included in the matrix because they must ultimately be completed to optimize BIT, record the results of this effort, and permit systems evaluation when they are ultimately deployed. Items in this category are denoted as follows:

 $F_{rp}$ : Failure rate per hour is required as an input to the optimal allocation of BIT test points, and will be determined later in the BIT effort. As coded in the matrix, the figure is the estimated value for all circuits between stimulus-inputs and the signal output in question, and includes PM/BIT failure rates.

<u>TEST</u>?: This descriptor is coded as "Y" for "yes," or "N" for "no." By completion of this entry for every output signal of the subsystem, a decision is forced, such that the signal will be tested, or will not be tested.

<u>PM INTRINSIC?</u>: This column is provided for the BIT designer to indicate that his analysis shows the signal to have intrinsic performance monitoring



capability, or not to have this capability. Many signals produced by subsystems have visible means by which the operator may determine whether or not they are present. For example, displays indicate video signals, meters are often present to indicate voltage and current, etc. Optimization of BIT will make maximum use of such intrinsic capability, because it provides fault detection and/or isolation capability without being chargeable to the test subsystem cost. This column is provided to ensure that every signal is analyzed for this capability, and the results of this analysis recorded for reference.

<u>PM EXTRINSIC</u>?: Wherever a signal must be provided with fault detection capability in order to meet the needs of the user (not the maintenance personnel), this descriptor is coded "Y." Examples of such signals might be those related to operational safety of the system, flight safety, etc. Such capability must be implemented in the subsystem, but its costs are not chargeable to BIT.

FAULT DETECT?: Whenever a primary output signal is determined to require BIT fault detection, this descriptor is coded "Y". Such fault detection may be required to meet the effectiveness requirement for a BIT capability. Its costs are chargeable to BIT.

<u>FAULT ISOLATE?</u>: Whenever a primary output signal fails, fault isolation of its secondary signals will be considered by the BIT designer. Whenever it is determined that the signal must have a BIT capability to meet specified effectiveness and  $\overline{M}_{++}$ , this column will be coded "Y."

<u>AGE?</u>: Signals having no performance monitoring or BIT capability must obviously be tested by AGE, unless there is a design decision not to test them. For example, if a system specification required detection of less than all potential failures, it might be decided that certain signals would not be tested. Each primary output that carries the value "Y" for its "TEST?" descriptor, and has neither PM nor BIT, must be coded for AGE.

QUALITY FACTOR?: This descriptor represents the designer's estimate of the percentage of measurements at the signal output in question that correctly pass and/or fail a signal for purposes of fault detection. It is used

in combination with the failure rate to calculate the overall effectiveness of BIT. Any values entered at this stage of system design are in the nature of "first cut" estimates from experience, and will be updated when actual circuit design permits more accurate values to be entered.

<u>TIME FACTOR</u>: This descriptor represents the designer's estimate of the number of minutes required for performance monitoring, BIT, or AGE to fault detect (for primary output signals), or fault isolate (for secondary output signals). It is used to compute subsystem mean corrective maintenance time. For online BIT the term is near zero, and may be entered as zero. For offline BIT, and for AGE tests, the term has a finite value in minutes. Initial values are an estimate, but should be reviewed and updated as the design progresses.

<u>SAMPLE RATE/SECOND</u>: A descriptor of how often the signal is tested by BIT. Depending upon the particular BIT circuits or capability implemented, this could have values in the following ranges:

- "C," for continuous, as for example with an analog output having an associated BIT comparator
- every few microseconds, as for a repetitive digital signal
- at some rate determined by a data bus rate
- at times dependent upon system turn-on, as might be the case with offline BIT
- whenever AGE is used, for signals tested by AGE.

The numerical value coded for this descriptor will be used to estimate the probability that a given signal may fail between test samples, and is thus another measure of how effective a BIT design may prove to be.

<u>\$\$\$\$:</u> The designer's estimate of the cost of implementing BIT for this signal (viz., the cost of design, component parts, fabrication, and/or the cost of software programming for diagnostics.)

<u>SENSOR</u>: The type of BIT implementation. Many signals will be directly measurable, others will require signal conditioning or transducers. The

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designer should code this column with suitable descriptors defining that BIT actually implemented.

<u>EVALUATION</u>: When the evaluation of signals is local, this is coded "L," or conversely "C" if central. When BIT is implemented by software diagnostics, this could be coded "S."

#### 4.2.4 Preparation of Input/Stimulus Signal Matrix (Step 1C)

This matrix is prepared to define and characterize the input signals and test stimuli required for testing the subsystem, and is also preliminary at this stage of design. As the design progresses, it will be reviewed, updated, and completed in final form. It will be a permanent reference for the design effort, and will be used to facilitate later evaluation of BIT performance and cost.

The Input/Stimulus Signal Matrix will tabulate two classes of signals used to test the subsystem:

- <u>Primary Input Signals</u> These are stimuli normal to the operation of the subsystem; they are either provided from the system interface by other subsystems or are provided from the system external environment, as would be the case with such signals as inertial forces, flight displacements, airspeed parameters such as pitot/static, or RF signals.
- <u>Test Stimuli</u> These are stimuli required to test the subsystem, provided by BIT or external test equipment; in general, they are needed to evaluate system functions in the absence of primary input signals, since the latter are not developed with the system in a quiescent state. Whenever an output signal must be tested in the absence of its primary input signal(s), the designer must of necessity provide corollary test stimuli.

The matrix is very similar to the Output Signal Matrix defined in paragraph 4.2.3. It is changed slightly to reflect the descriptions of stimuli rather than outputs. The following describe the columns in Fig. 4-4:

Signal Number - is coded as the character "S" for a primary input, or "T" for a test stimulus, plus a number to uniquely identify the particular signal.

Signal Nomenclature - is coded as the name of the signal.

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Fig. 4-4 Input/Stimulus Signal Matrix

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<u>Related Function</u> - is coded as the name of the subsystem function whose test is dependent upon the availability of this stimulus signal. Thus, this parameter identifies the relationship between stimuli and subsystem functions.

Function Number - is the number of the above related function.

<u>Class</u> - this entry is coded as "I" for primary input signal, or "T" for special test stimuli of BIT or AGE origin.

The next several columns identify the technical and parametric characteristics of the input signals and test stimuli, in a summary manner. Again, the specific descriptors and coding have been selected to be appropriate for the Fig. 4-2 conceptual radar, and must be tailored by the BIT designer to suit his particular subsystem. Note that the example matrix shown in Fig. 4-4 has the same columns and meaning as did the same portions of the Output Signal Matrix exemplified by Fig. 4-3, because the same information is desired. However, there is no identification of signal contingency because Fig. 4-4 is a description of stimuli and primary inputs.

The remaining columns of the Input/Stimulus Signal Matrix identify the strategy chosen to generate each of the stimuli or input signals and record certain BIT design decisions and data required for optimization. At this stage of the design effort, these columns will also be blank, but again, ultimately all must be filled to perform the BIT design task properly. Items coded in these columns are:

 $\frac{F_{ri}/F_{rp}}{F_{rot}}$  - Failure rate per hour of this stimulus generation function which may be a functional element ( $F_{ri}$ ) or an input signal ( $F_{rp}$ ).

<u>TEST?</u> - "Y" for yes", or "N" for "no" to indicate whether this stimulus signal must be tested to determine that it is operative. For most BIT implementations, this decision will usually be negative, while for AGE stimuli it is expected normally to be affirmative. The intent of this column is to force a decision on this question.

 $\underline{RATE}$  - The rate at which this stimulus is generated, ranging from continuous, to a system clock rate, or several hours between applications for AGE.

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<u>CALIBRATION</u> - A descriptor of whether or not the stimulus function requires periodic calibration, and how often. Coding used would simply be a time interval or left blank for stimuli not needing calibration.

 $\frac{$$$}{100}$  - The total production cost, estimated by the designer, for implementing this stimulus signal.

## 4.3 FUNCTIONAL PATH DEFINITION (STEP 2)

Referring to the Fig. 4-1 flow chart, the second precedure for BIT optimization is to define functional paths of the subsystem under design. This effort is carried out as soon as the mainstream subsystem design process has reached a stage where its functions have been at least tentatively partitioned into physical subassemblies or into line replaceable units (LRUs).

Functional path definition is performed by updating the Level I Functional Flow Block Diagram and signal matrices, and by preparing a Level II Functional Flow Block Diagram to define the elements of each individual functional path. Thus, every functional path will be the subject of an individual Level II diagram.

The products of functional path definition are sufficient to describe the subsystem in a form that lends itself to subsequent BIT analysis and optimization:

- the updated Level I diagram defines the overall subsystem as the sum of its input, output, throughput, elements, and inter-relationships
- Level II diagrams define each functional path in the same terms, but in a more granular and detailed manner
- the signal matrices define the characteristics of all input, internal, and output signals, thus providing the parameters that quantitatively describe how elements process throughput to produce output
- the signal matrices also provide a checklist of BIT design decisions that will be made during subsequent analysis and optimization, and a place to record these decisions in consistent format.

#### 4.3.1 Design Guidelines

Special care should be given to design features that need to be incorporated into a subsystem to support its test mode.

At this stage of the design process, many test-related architectural features of the subsystem become defined and some of these will tend to inhibit economical testing. In particular, feedback loops, test and stimulus access, logical (functional) partitioning of assemblies, and cases where signals must have unusually tight tolerances are of interest. The designer must analyze the subsystem for these properties and consider/devise design alternatives to reduce the difficulty of subsystem testing.


# Justification of the BIT designer's recommendations should be based upon the quantitative data in the signal matrices.

Neither the subsystem design team nor its management can be expected to consider design features unless their need relates to the achievement of specified performance requirements. Upon completion of the functional path definition, the signal matrices will be expected to contain a preliminary tabulation of all signals which are system outputs, and all stimuli upon which they depend, with the initial costs of implementation. This permits the designer to make quantitative comparisons between the Effectiveness and Mean Corrective Maintenance Time required by the specification, and such preliminary data as:

- the number of system output signals which are likely to ultimately exist, versus the number which are likely to be tested.
- the number of secondary output signals required for fault isolation
- the degree to which every output to be tested is furnished with test stimuli.

#### 4.3.2 Updated Level I Functional Flow Block Diagram (Step 2A)

It is now necessary to further develop the Level I diagram to identify and name each functional path. Figure 4-5 depicts such an updated Level I diagram and would be simply a more granular configuration of the preliminary version shown in Fig. 4-2. Using the updated diagram and signal matrices to identify the signal paths:



- every function may be traced from input to output
- the functional paths are identified by numbers that are assigned to each function and its associated path
- the elements of the subsystem appear in more or less final configuration. This means that the functions have been collected into LRUs, and these functions will be implemented in either hardware or software. The term "element," used here denotes a subsystem entity which processes throughput.

At this point in the analysis, two new items are introduced into the information depicted by the Level I block diagram.

- (1) <u>Test Functions and Test Elements</u>: The subsystem being designed has, as explained earlier, a "TEST" mode. Any elements which are present in the system and have TEST functions must therefore be shown on the diagram or else the diagram would not depict the complete system. This means that tentative PM and BIT functions will be shown in their proper places within each subsystem LRU. If the subsystem design concept calls out AGE, then the AGE is also shown on the Level I diagram, because it is part of the subsystem.
- (2) Software Elements: Software processes subsystem throughput in the same sense as the subsystem hardware, and is therefore by definition, an element. Major software programs that implement subsystem functions are thus included in the Level I diagram, and are shown as parts of their respective functional paths. The rationale for this is:
  - software is as much a part of a digital subsystem as its hardware, and software failure can be a significant subsystem maintenance and operational problem
  - BIT may at times be implemented with software rather than hardware, that is, as diagnostic programs.

The main reason for this requirement to show software on the Level I diagram is that a complete overview of the subsystem makes this approach a logical necessity.

#### 4.3.3 Preparation of Level II Functional Flow Block Diagrams (Step 2B)

Each functional path of the subsystem will now be the subject of its own Level II Functional Flow Block Diagram. These diagrams will depict each of the functional paths in more detail, and each function will be shown in terms of the signal(s) which implement its outputs. Figure 4-6 illustrates a functional path from the hypothetical radar. Note that both input and output signal numbers appear on the diagram, including test stimulus signals. Also, note that the internal elements of the subsystem LRUs which contribute to this functional path are shown in abbreviated form such as partial circuit or logic diagrams, or as LRU internal block diagrams.

The Level II diagrams complete the chain of logically organized technical subsystem descriptions required for analysis. The continuity of information extends from the system specification and its requirements to each input and output signal of every functional path, and includes all test elements and all software elements. Every feature of the subsystem has been described in a unified and interrelated manner which may be used to indicate two critical BIT design considerations:

- what subsystem responses must be considered for testing
- what stimuli are required to achieve these tests.

There is now an organized and well defined set of technical decisions to be made by the BIT designer, and he has a set of documentation that will assist him in ensuring complete analysis of the subsystem.

## 4.3.4 Updating of Signal Matrices (Step 2C)

At this time the designer can use the detailed information developed on the Level II diagrams to review the signal matrices, add new information, and modify initial data. This will bring the signal matrices to a stage of completion commensurate with the degree to which the subsystem design has evolved. From




Fig. 4-6 Level II Functional Flow Diagram - AFC Function

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the analysis which was necessary to prepare the Level II diagrams, it is likely that there will be additional primary or secondary output signals to be added to the matrices, along with their defined stimulus requirements.

The BIT designer will then be in a position to review both matrices and ensure that the signal parameters are updated for every mode of system operation. A design review by all members of the team is recommended at this point, to be certain that the information is as accurate and complete as possible, consistent with the degree to which subsystem design is complete.

Those columns of the output matrix which define test strategy now present the designer with a detailed set of technical data to permit preliminary decisions as to which signals will have to be tested. Once these columns have been filled with initial entries, the designer will be able to make a first estimate of the detection percentages which would result from this set of decisions. In summary, the appropriate columns will identify:

- the numbers of signals that exist
- the numbers that are tentatively to be tested
- the types of signals involved, and their electrical ranges
- the numbers of stimuli required for the signals to be tested, and where these stimuli will be obtained
- initial estmates of BIT cost, assuming that the design has reached a stage where the cost columns are filled.

At this point, care should be taken to be certain that every signal which must be tested has corresponding stimuli available, either from the system if tested in an active mode, or from a special test mode source.

4.4 DEVELOPMENT OF THE PM/BIT DESIGN CONCEPT (STEP 3)

At this stage of subsystem development, one or more design concepts will have been defined in sufficient detail to allow the development of corollary PM/BIT design concepts. Based upon the subsystem concepts, and the signal matrices and diagrams produced by Steps (1) and (2) of this methodology, the PM/BIT design concepts can now be generated. A PM/BIT design concept consists of the key hardware and software features of a PM/BIT implementation which are compatible with the evolving subsystem maintenance concept and/or maintenance plan. It must also meet the Effectiveness and Mean Test Time parameters required by the subsystem specification.

A design concept details and interrelates the following key PM/BIT design features that are to be intrinsic parts of its related subsystem design concept:

- signals measured, by mode
- stimuli required, by mode
- nominal and tolerance values, by mode
- sensor types and locations
- signal conditioner types and locations
- location and processing capability of PM/BIT evaluator function(s)
- format of PM/BIT information between sensors and evaluators
- display devices and display formats
- PM/BIT architecture (viz., the overall scheme for interconnecting sensor, evaluation, and display elements)
- the estimated cost of the PM/BIT configuration, as the summation of costs of the above.

The procedure for developing a PM/BIT design concept is summarized as consisting of the following seven sub-steps:

- Review the preliminary subsystem maintenance concept and/or maintenance plan and develop a complete understanding of how the subsystem is to be used and maintained.
- (2) Make initial decisions as to signals to be tested by PM/BIT, and define the types of sensors and signal conditioners required and their estimated costs. Record these data in the signal matrices.

- (3) Choose a candidate PM/BIT architecture that integrates the above devices with the evaluator capability. The evaluator capability may be either centralized or distributed, depending on the overall subsystem architecture. Estimate the costs of the evaluator capability.
- (4) From the data in the signal matrices, compute an initial estimate of PM/BIT effectiveness.
- (5) From the data in the signal matrices, compute an initial estimate of subsystem mean test time.
- (6) Take the sum of the above estimated cost factors.
- (7) Compare estimated effectiveness, mean test time, and costs with the like parameters of the subsystem design control specification, and adjust the design concept to the point where these estimates and the specifications agree to within approximately 10%.

If repeated adjustments to the PM/BIT design concept do not produce sufficient agreement with the costs, effectiveness, and mean test times set forth in the subsystem design control specification, then it may be that:

- the specified values are not realistic; in this case, the PM/BIT designer must recommend changes, and justify these on the basis of data and analyses to date
- the overall subsystem design concept may be excessively difficult or costly to test, and the data and analyses to date will support this conclusion; testability improvements will be required, or an alternate design concept may afford improved testability.

The two most fundamental determinants of PM/BIT effectiveness are the numbers and locations of signals measured, and the quality of these measurements. The numbers and kinds of signals measured determine the degree to which faults may be detected and isolated by PM/BIT. The quality with which these signals are measured determine the degree to which the information available from the signals is actually realized. Small changes in either of these fundamentals often have a very significant effect on PM/BIT effectiveness, and the significance of these changes is more pronounced as subsystem complexity increases.

# 4.4.1 Design Guidelines

*PM/BIT* tolerances should be set to values appropriate for maintenance testing, not necessarily the same as those used for purposes of qualification and acceptance test.

Field maintenance personnel and subsystem operators apply the terms "fault," "failure," or "malfunction" to any case where a system is observed to perform less than adequately by its operator. The classic engineering definitions in terms of nominal values and tolerances are used for design, qualification, and acceptance, but do not necessarily apply in the context of field maintenance. Moreover, tolerances used for qualification and acceptance do not necessarily represent optimal tolerances for field operation.

In *d cermining* which primary output signals are to be tested, the object is to satisfy any performance monitoring requirement, and be certain that an ample capability to detect faults exists for purposes of maintenance effectiveness.

Performance monitoring capability is not "optional." It is a requirement because the subsystem operator needs to know system status for reasons of safety or mission effectiveness. Beyond the PM requirement, it will be necessary to detect a subset of failure modes sufficient to meet the effectiveness requirement.

Do not expect PM/BIT functions which monitor primary output signals to produce fault isolation information. The purpose of these functions is to detect, not to isolate.

Primary output signals are always monitored at the output nodes of a functional path, because that is the only location which can logically confirm functional path integrity. From information theory, it can be shown that these locations produce minimal fault isolation information. Two distinct types of information are produced: 1) functional path status, that is, information which shows a path to be "food" or "bad"; and, 2) fault isolation information, that is, information as to where a fault is located along a functional path. Primary Output Signals produce only the former (status) information.

Do not expect BIT functions that monitor secondary output signals to produce fault detection information. Their purpose is to isolate known faults, not to detect faults.

A test point that provides maximum fault isolation information will inherently provide only about 50% confidence that a fault within its tested group of elements will be detected. Thus, the further away from an output node, the poorer the fault detection capability. The purpose of secondary output sensors is to enable fault isolation, and this intrinsically makes them less than optimal for detection.

Design the PM/BIT evaluator function to make thorough use of all available fault detection and fault isolation information.

Many of the PM/BIT designs reviewed suffer from too narrow a definition of information to be evoluated. The designer should at least consider providing a capability to include the following kinds of information in the PM/BIT evaluation process:

- evaluate the pattern of signals which fail; this will produce more useful results than just designing PM/BIT to look at signals or functions on a "one-by-one" basis
- evaluate the sequence in which signals fail; a given pattern of signal failure may imply different failure modes, depending upon the temporal order of signal failure
- evaluate related (non-signal) information; most subsystem failures are accompanied by operator perceptions. For example, subsystems often incorporate meters, displays, numerical readouts, fuse indicator lights, power indicator lights, and other devices which provide information to the operator or maintenance technician, but these devices are not part of PM/BIT in any formal sense. However, it would be a mistake to ignore such an obvious datum as a tripped circuit breaker in deciding the maintenance action to be taken for a given BIT failure pattern
- evaluate relat d subsystems' PM/BIT indications; these may provide an indication that inputs to the subsystem of interest are missing or out of tolerance; obviously, such information would have to be taken into account in determining the subsequent maintenance actions.

Before implementing PM/BIT to monitor, evaluate, and display a signal's status, check to see if that capability is not already inherent in the subsystem, or in a related subsystem.

Historically, the earliest implementations of PM/BIT occurred after the fact, by using existing subsystem circuits and indicators to add a new PM/BIT function. These implementations were very cost effective because they did not add new hardware to achieve the PM/BIT capability. Since the BIT designer is constrained to achieve the required effectiveness and mean corrective maintenance time within the specified cost envelope, this guideline offers the chance that some such capability will have no cost at all (i.e., no cost assignable to his BIT). This would allow the designer to assign his fiscal resources to the goal of increasing fault detection/isolation capability in subsystem areas which lack such intrinsic possibilities.

Experience indicates that many of the most severe problems encountered in electronic subsystem maintenance arise from intermittent failures, bent connector pins, open or shorted cable conductors, etc. The BIT designer should not ignore these issues. He should familiarize himself with these issues, and configure his PM/BIT design to minimize their impact.

Study research has shown that the above issues overshadow the more conventional requirement to merely detect and isolate catastrophic failures, while at the same time, PM/BIT designs make little or no attempt to address these matters. PM/BIT offers some potential for very significant reduction of these maintenance problems. Any solutions, however partial, would be of major significance. Appendix D to this report contains technical discussions of "False Alarms" and "Intermittents," and the relationship between these phenomena.

Feedback loops present inherent testability problems for PM/BIT or any other test subsystem. Special testability design features must be provided to permit adequate fault detection and isolation.

In general, feedback loops have the inherent property of continued function when internal elements are marginal. Often, operation at limit conditions, or outright catastrophic failure, is a prerequisite for loop faults to be detectable. Historically, these properties of feedback loops present significant testing difficulties to any method of test. PM/BIT testing is no exception in this respect.

There are three design tactics for making feedback loops testable by PM/BIT:

(1) When the feedback element is much more reliable than the forward element of a loop (i.e., 20 times or more), it can be made part of an acceptable ambiguity in isolation, since statistically

derived T.O. instructions to remove the least reliable element would be incorrect for only one out of 20 failures.

- (2) The forward and feedback elements of the loop can be combined into the same LRU, to obviate fault isolation ambiguity.
- (3) The feedback path can be provided with special testability design features.

The first of the above alternatives is not really a solution, because it is simply a judgment that the issue is not significant in a given case. The second alternative is an architectural solution which may or may not apply to a given design case. The third alternative, incorporation of special testability design features, is the only really viable approach to the issue. The choice of testability features will depend upon the specific design of the loop being considered. Some potential features which should be considered include:

- <u>Dynamic Modeling</u> When there is adequate computer memory and processing capacity, it may be feasible to model the feedback loop dynamically, and compare actual outputs with modeled outputs for the same inputs. This would require that both the input and output of the loop be accessible for test purposes
- Voting Redundant Elements Certain designs will yield to the use of redundant elements, and voting of their outputs to select (for example) the best two identical outputs of three elements. This may be useful where loop inputs are inaccessible and redundant elements are inexpensive, such as in the sensors of a flight control system
- <u>Test Loops When Quiescent</u> In some cases, particularly analog control systems, the feedback element may be quiescent for long periods of time. A low level test signal with a mean value of zero could be used to test the feedback element at such times. If the chosen signal is within the passband of the element under test, but outside the passband of the loop, it may even be possible to use this approach when the loop is active

- Provide Localized Tests Within a Loop Digital parity checks, checksum tests, or "echo-back" of digital data are examples of localized tests that may be built into the active functions of a loop
- Provide Means for Opening the Loop This is the only design tactic which will always result in a valid ability to test the elements of a feedback loop. However, it must be used during periods of loop quiescency. Additionally, in using this approach for safety-related systems (such as flight controls), absolutely fail-safe design is required to ensure that the loop will not be driven to the open condition by a PM/BIT failure.

## 4.4.2 Subsystem Maintenance Concept/Maintenance Plan Review (Step 3A)

Information from the subsystem maintenance concept and maintenance plan defines the environment in which the PM/BIT must function. To ensure that the designer is fully cognizant of such issues, he should obtain copies of these documents at their current stages of completion, and study them to ascertain the following logistic and technical constraints:

- what will be the designated levels of maintenance, and what tasks will be carried out at each?
- what personnel skills and skill levels will typify the maintenance personnel who are to maintain his subsystem?
- what training courses are these maintenance personnel expected to have completed?
- what is the policy with respect to spares locations, quantities, resupply times, etc.?
- what will be the types and quantities of technical orders provided to guide maintenance personnel in maintaining the subsystem, and what will be their contents with respect to the employment of PM/BIT?
- what maintenance management procedures will guide the above subsystem maintenance, and what maintenance data will be recorded to describe the effectiveness of PM/BIT?

• what organizational and intermediate maintenance level AGE is specified for maintenance of his subsystem, and what are its characteristics and capabilities? How are the signals and tolerances measured by this AGE determined?

It must be understood that the maintenance concept and/or maintenance plan are often preliminary at this stage of subsystem design. However, DoD acquisition procedures require that they exist. To some degree, the designer is expected to consult with systems engineering personnel preparing these documents, to not only obtain their inputs to his design requirements, but also to provide them with technical information as to the design features and capabilities of the subsystem he is designing. This is intended to be a two-way process:

- the subsystem must be designed to function with the resources and procedures called out in the maintenance plan, but also,
- the resources and procedures must be determined on the basis of the subsystem design concept.

## 4.4.3 Initial Determination of Output Signals To Be Measured (Step 3B)

A specific list of primary and secondary output signals to be measured should be designated and recorded in the signal matrices. The goal is to approximate PM/BIT effectiveness, mean test time, and cost envelope parameters given in the design control specification. Optimization will take place in subsequent steps of the methodology.

There are three considerations which lead to the choice of these signals, in the following order of priority:

- Performance Monitoring Requirements The functions requiring PM are given in the subsystem design control specification. These requirements stem from reasons of operational necessity, safety, or mission essentiality, and are of mandatory first priority.
- 2) <u>BIT Fault Detection</u> Primary output signals not measured for performance monitoring are candidates for BIT fault detection. These will be selected by criteria of signal failure rate, measurement quality, and cost of measurement.

3) <u>BIT Fault Isolation</u> - The secondary output signals along each path leading to a primary output signal are candidate locations for BIT fault isolation measurement, but only if the primary output signal is one which is to be measured. The numbers and locations of secondary output signals to be measured are determined by criteria of fault isolation information produced, measurement quality, and cost of measurement.

The following discussions provide recommended procedures for use in designating signals to be measured, by class.

4.4.3.1 <u>Signals Requiring Performance Monitoring</u> - The primary output signals of each function designated for PM by the subsystem design control specification must be designated for measurement. The signals and/or stimuli which these outputs are contingent upon must also be designated as required in the appropriate mode:

- there must be stimuli present in the operational modes, to provide operator information as to function status
- If the subsystem is partly quiescent during maintenance, it may also be necessary to provide alternate stimuli to support testing (this would be a frequent requirement with certain classes of avionic subsystems).

At this time, the BIT designer should review the subsystem diagrams and signal matrices, designate the PM signals and stimuli, and complete the costs, quality factor, and time factor entries in the matrices. Also, an initial failure rate should be estimated and entered for each of these signals.

4.4.3.2 Initial Designation of Signals Measured for Bit Fault Detection - It can be shown that an undetected failure results in a maintenance uncertainty approximately equal to the number of LRUs in the subsystem. That is, when a maintenance technician is faced with failure symptoms undetected by BIT, he will tend to sequentially replace LRUs until the symptoms are no longer apparent. For this reason, the designer should initially designate all remaining primary output signals for BIT fault detection measurement (i.e., those which have not been designated for PM).

In many cases this approach will not yield a BIT design within the cost envelope specified for BIT. Later steps in this methodology therefore describe a

technique for eliminating the least cost effective of these measurements, in the form of a trade-off based upon signal failure rate, measurement quality factor, and production cost of the measuring capability:

- <u>Failure rate</u> is a measure of the fault detection information theoretically available when a given signal is measured. The more often the path leading to a signal output fails the more information obtained by testing that signal
- Quality factor is the designer's estimate of the percent of the measurements of a signal that reach a correct go/no-go conclusion
- <u>Cost factor</u> is the designer's estimate of the costs of implementing the chosen sensor/signal conditioner. It is employed to measure the worth of detecting a failure.

The trade-off will take the general form of ranking BIT fault detection measurements in terms of their worth, and eliminating those which have the least worth, according to the algorithm:

$$W_{d} = \frac{F_{rp} \times Q_{f}}{C_{p}}$$
(Eq. 31)

where  $W_d$  is the worth of each primary output signal to be measured,  $F_{rp}$  is the failure rate of the path leading to that primary output,  $Q_f$  is the measurement quality factor as a percentage of unity and  $C_p$  is the estimated cost of the PM/BIT capability to measure that signal.

In ranking the primary output signals, the costs used must include those of generating related stimuli whenever these stimuli are not normally present in the test mode. In the general case, for avionics, it is relatively common for contingent signals to be absent during ground testing, so that BIT requires special stimuli to be generated. For ground electronic subsystems, the necessary stimuli are usually available, making BIT cost less. In both cases, however, it is necessary to show that any stimuli, needed to produce a signal, will be present when BIT measures that signal, and to account for its costs in the  $C_p$  term of the trade-off.

For those signals which have intrinsic fault detection capability,  $W_d$  is indeterminate because  $C_p$  is zero insofar as the trade-off. In ranking these particular signals for fault detection worth, they are assigned the greatest figure of merit.

4.4.3.3 Initial Designation of Signals For Fault Isolation - When a primary output signal failure is detected, and there is no fault isolation capability, maintenance uncertainty is approximately equal to the number of LRUs in the path leading to that signal. Maintenance personnel will tend to sequentially replace these LRUs in order of failure probability until the failure symptoms are no longer apparent.

Initially, the BIT designer should designate enough fault isolation sensors to isolate every primary output signal failure to the LRU. Here again, this will tend to produce an "ideal" capability with costs in excess of those allowed by the cost envelope. The subsequent trade-offs will eliminate the least cost effective of these sensors.

Fault isolation sensors resolve uncertainty as to the location of faults detected by fault detection sensors. Each fault isolation sensor divides its functional path into two sub-paths, one containing the fault and the other known not to contain the fault. The sensor which resolves the greatest uncertainty as to fault location therefore offers the most fault isolation capability.

Information theory states that, given a fault, the uncertainty resolved as to its location when a sensor makes a test is equal to the summation, over all elements of the tested path, of the probabilities that the fault is between the input and the sensor, multiplied by  $Log_2$  of this probability. The universal solution of this function is plotted graphically in Fig. 4-7, where:

- the vertical axis shows relative uncertainty resolved on a scale of zero (none) to unity (all possible)
- the horizontal axis shows the probability  $(P_f)$  that the fault lies between the input and the sensor.






Fig. 4-7 Amount of Uncertainty Resolved by a Sensor

It will be noted that  $P_f = 0.5$  is the optimal sensor location. This is the socalled "half-split" well known to test designers. It will also be noted that the uncertainty resolved decreases to zero as the sensor is located at either end of the path. To determine the uncertainty resolved by a given sensor location, it is only necessary to determine  $P_f$ , then refer to the graph to obtain its argument (that is, to obtain the relative amount of uncertainty which may be resolved by the sensor at  $P_f$ ).

For all the sensors on a path, the  $P_f$  values may be rapidly determined by the following process:

- since it is given that the path has failed, P<sub>f</sub> for the total path equals unity
- the relative failure probability of any element in the path is in direct arithmetic proportion to its failure rate
- therefore, normalize the elemental failure rates such that their sum equals unity

• take the sum of each normalized value between the input to the path and the sensor location, and this is the value of P<sub>r</sub> for that sensor.

Refer to the graph and obtain  $U_f$  as the argument of  $P_f$ .

The worth of each fault isolation sensor is then computed in terms of the uncertainty resolved at its location, the quality with which it measures the related signal, and the cost of implementation by the following:

$$W_{i} = \frac{U_{f} \times Q_{f}}{C_{p}}$$
(Eq. 32)

with the same definition of terms used in calculating the worth of fault detection sensors, except that  $U_f$  replaces  $F_{rp}$ .

By the above process, the BIT designer may readily list all the fault isolation sensors in their relative order of worth. Having completed that process, he should be certain that the related entries are made and/or updated in the signal matrices.

#### 4.4.4 Development of a PM/BIT Architecture (Step 3C)

Having initially designated sensor locations, the next step in formulating a PM/BIT design concept will be the choice of an architecture. The fundamental issue is the degree to which measurement, signal conditioning, and evaluation are to be centralized or decentralized. Most literature researched by the study deals with the boundaries of this issue and is briefly summarized as follows.

- Centralization is the only alternative which permits deductive use of all the information obtained from the sensors by analysis of fault patterns rather than isolated faults. This implies the use of a processor (computer), either in the subsystem, at the system level, or both. On the other hand, computer failure renders the PM/BIT capability useless.
- Decentralization makes it simple, straightforward, and reliable to evaluate each signal at its sensor location. When a given sensor, signal conditioner, or measurement circuit fails, the remaining PM/BIT capability is relatively unimpaired. On the other hand, total decentralization makes it impossible to evaluate failure patterns/signatures, and would appear to

preclude the high degree of PM/BIT effectiveness that must necessarily be typical of future subsystem designs.

Between these two boundaries, there exist various degrees of centralization and decentralization. The choice of some set of hierarchical levels for comparison and evaluation depends fundamentally on the architecture of the subsystem itself. The designer should therefore review the Level I Functional Flow Block Diagram and the subsystem design control specification, and determine these levels in light of the following subsystem requirements and characteristics:

- Does the subsystem employ a data bus? Many current subsystem designs use data bus concepts, and this design feature makes centralized fault evaluation a more likely choice. Additionally, the format and protocols for a subsystem bus will define the format of the PM/BIT data as well.
- Does the design control specification define a system level evaluation and/or display function? Some specifications may require very high reliability in PM detection and display. This may leave the BIT designer little choice other than to perform the comparison of measured signals with limits very close to the point of signal origin, and provide a "hardwired" go/no-go discrete from that point to a central master caution display. The BIT evaluation function will require these signals as well, in order to use them for deductive fault pattern analysis. A PM configuration of this type would influence the choice of a BIT configuration.

In addition to the above, many specifications may define a system level evaluation and display function, and require the subsystem PM/BIT to interface with this function for centralized evaluation and display of subsystem signal status. This presents an issue in using BIT for maintenance. The subsystem under design may require its own evaluation function because there is no certainty that the evaluation performed by an adjacent subsystem will be operative or available when needed.

System level evaluation and display also implies that signals from other subsystems which provide inputs to the subsystem at hand will also have their own BIT or PM detectors. If this is the case, then the system level evaluator will

"know" when an input to the subsystem has failed. This information could be acquired by a local subsystem evaluator, and used to define when an input to that subsystem has failed. This approach would have obvious advantages in maintaining that subsystem. For example:

- when an input is missing, the subsystem BIT would not indicate a failure
- when an input from another subsystem is "good," a sensor within the subsystem at hand could make a second (redundant) measurement to determine whether wiring harness failure caused loss of the input signal, even though it was "good" at the point of origin.

Either of the above possibilities would address the currently severe organizational level maintenance problems associated with wiring harness troubles and BIT diagnostic errors.

To clarify the above, consider a radar subsystem that requires a certain input from an inertial subsystem. Assume that the input is missing and the radar's BIT indicates a radar malfunction. Further assume that the inertial subsystem's BIT indicates that it is providing that particular output. Now, if both of these items of information were made available to an overall system evaluator, it would indicate a harness problem.

What is the lowest hierarchical level at which the deductive function of a BIT evaluator can be validly performed? In order to evaluate the combinational and/or sequential implications of fault patterns, the evaluator must capture the measurement indicatior from the signals which comprise these patterns. Hence, the answer to this question defines the lowest level at which evaluation can be performed fully. It may be answered readily from examination of the Level I Functional Flow Block Diagram:

- consider the functional inter-relationships of the LRUs which make up the subsystem being designed
- divide the set of LRUs into groups that are heavily interrelated to members of a group, but where groups are relatively autonomous, one from the other

• it would follow that each of these groups could have its own evaluator, and still achieve full deductive capability.

Thus, the overall subsystem architecture defines the level at which evaluation should be performed. Evaluation at the lowest possible level will minimize interconnections between LRUs without compromise to fault isolation capability. In cases where the subsystem itself contains a suitable processor/computer, evaluation would more than likely be assigned to that unit. In cases where it does not, evaluation at the lowest level, selected as indicated above, is recommended. The evaluator will then be either the computer element of the subsystem, or one or more separate local evaluators (i.e., one for each autonomous LRU group). The latter could be relatively simple microprocessor-based units with firmware programs.

What is the lowest hierarchical level at which the "thresholding" function can be performed? The term "sensors" as used thus far denotes a device or circuit that acquires a signal to be measured (that is, to be thresholded and evaluated). Both analog and digital signals require this thresholding function, to determine that an analog signal is or is not within tolerance, or to determine that a digital signal has specific voltage levels indicating true or false logic states. Digital signals may also require evaluation to determine whether a group of states are correct or incorrect, as would be the case with parallel or serial word formats.

In defining the level of hierarchy at which signals are to be thresholded, the paramount consideration is one of accuracy and reliability of the go/no-go conclusion obtained by each such decision. This is 'he "Quality" term in the signal matrices, and is simply the percent of measurements that correctly reach a go or no-go indication for a signal.

It can be shown that this "Quality" factor is just as significant in determining PM/BIT effectiveness as was the choice of signals to be measured. Furthermore, small changes in the Quality of measurements will have relatively significant influence upon the Effectiveness parameter. For the degrees of PM/BIT effectiveness required of future electronic subsystems (90 to 95%), the PM/BIT designer has little choice but to maximize Quality.

The electrical path between the origin of a signal and its thresholding circuit is exposed to EMI (noise), and also introduces errors due to distributed path constants and connector interfaces. It follows that these error sources are minimized by locating the thresholding function as close to the point of a signal origin as is possible.

What are the requirements for PM/BIT displays? As noted earlier, the results of PM/BIT evaluation may be displayed by the subsystem, at the overall system level, or both:

- if there is an overall system level requirement to display PM/BIT information, the subsystem must be designed for compatibility with this function; either the "thresholded" data, or the results of local evaluation must be passed to the system in a compatible format
- if there is no overall system level display, or if it is required that the PM/BIT subsystem remain fully operative even when the system level display is inoperative, then a local display function will be required
- if there is a central (system level) display, it may not be convenient for maintenance purposes. This could also justify a local display of PM/BIT information. For example, many aircraft avionic systems display PM/BIT data in the cockpit for use by the flight crew, but provide a more complete display of these data at a point more convenient to the ground maintenance personnel.

What information formats are most appropriate from the threshold function to the evaluation function and to the display function, and also, to and from the system level PM/BIT? This choice will be apparent in light of the subsystem design concept and the related PM/BIT design concept thus far derived. In general, if there is already a subsystem and/or system level data bus, then this will be the most economical choice for PM/BIT formats between threshold, evaluator, and display. If there is no existing bus, then the designer should choose the most noise-immune and least expensive means available.

Having reviewed the emerging subsystem design with respect to the above factors, and having thereby defined the BIT design concept, the PM/BIT designer will now be able to update the Level I and Level II diagrams to show these de-

tails. Likewise, the signal matrices should once again be reviewed and brought to a point of completion appropriate to this stage of subsystem design.

A remaining aspect of the BIT architecture that can now be defined is the cost of the thresholding, evaluation, and display devices. Costs of these functions as they relate to PM are not to be estimated. However, costs of these functions with respect to BIT are significant and may be initially approximated by standard engineering methods, based on:

- the numbers and generic types of sensors, thresholding devices, and signal conditioners
- the complexity of the evaluation function, in terms of computational and memory functions, either as a portion of the subsystem computer resource, or as separate BIT evaluation processor(s), as applicable
- the types, locations, complexity, etc., of the display devices.

#### 4.4.5 Initial Estimation of PM/BIT Effectiveness (Step 3D)

In the earlier conceptual Design Phase, the Effectiveness of PM/BIT was defined as the ratio of total malfunctions to total maintenance actions, expressed as:

$$E_{T} = \frac{C + R_{r}}{R_{nd} + C + R_{r}}$$
 (Eq. 10 of Paragraph 2.2)

where C is the number of repair-in-place adjustments,  $R_{nd}$  is the number of nodefect removals, and  $R_r \approx$  the number of removals resulting from actual malfunctions.

The Effectiveness requirement,  $E_T$ , as specified in the subsystem design control specification, must now be calculated with respect to the PM/BIT design concept just developed. Effectiveness may be calculated from the data in the signal matrices, and the subsystem functional path information in the block diagrams, by a mathematically identical expression derived as follows:

$$E_{T} = \frac{\text{Total Malfunctions}}{\text{Total Maintenance Actions}} = \frac{F_{rs} \times \text{time}}{MA_{r} \times \text{time}} = \frac{F_{rs}}{MA_{r}}$$
(Eq. 33)

where  $F_{rs}$  is the summation of all failure rates in the signal matrices and  $MA_r$  is the estimated overall maintenance action rate.

For purposes of arriving at an accurate initial estimate of effectiveness, the above terms require further discussion and explanation.

The failure rate of the subsystem  $(F_{rs})$  is the sum of all estimated failure rates for its elements, and includes the estimated failure rates for PM/BIT circuits. By this definition, PM/BIT failure is classified as subsystem failure, and not as a false alarm, because such failures are just as "real" as failures of non-BIT circuits.

The maintenance action rate will be greater than the above failure rate, because it is necessary to approximate the effects of undetected faults (UF), BIT diagnostic errors (BDE), and ambiguity errors (BA). Since all faults must either be detected or not detected, the incidence of undetected faults and BIT diagnostic errors would be equal to  $F_{rs} \propto (1-Q)$ . On the other hand, false alarms (FA) present a more complex issue for the BIT designer. He cannot control the incidence of "intermittents," nor can he control the frequency with which organizational or intermediate level AGE will detect and verify the faults detected by PM/BIT. We suggest that many apparent false alarms result from detection of real faults that are not corroborated by other means, and that often cannot be reproduced at the time of the maintenance actions which result. These causes of false alarms are beyond the scope of PM/BIT design. For the above reasons, the optimization equations make use of an estimated FA rate as specified in the system design specification.

When undetected faults occur, experience shows that users will judge the subsystem to be defective even though PM/BIT provides no such indication. When a fault is observed, but its location is unknown, any LRU in the related functional path could be defective. LRUs of that functional path tend to be sequentially replaced, one-by-one, until the symptom is no longer apparent. In the mean, this would lead to the replacement of slightly more than half the LRUs in the path. By this logic the rate of invalid maintenance actions would be  $F_{rs} \times (1-Q) \times 0.5 (N+1)$ , where N is the average number of LRUs in the functional paths of the subsystem. Using averages for Q and N, a preliminary estimate of effectiveness ( $E_T$ ) can be made as follows:

$$E_{T} \approx \frac{F_{rs}}{F_{rs} + F_{rs} \times (1-Q) \times 0.5 (N+1)} = \frac{1}{1 + (1-Q) \times 0.5 (N+1)}$$
(Eq. 34)

In other words, since all the signals of the design have initially been designated for measurement, PM/BIT effectiveness is determined by the quality of measurement and the LRUs-per-path variability of the subsystem. Later, when measurements of least worth are eliminated by cost effectiveness tradeoffs, additional maintenance actions will arise from the undetected faults and/or ambiguous fault isolation which thereby results. A more detailed calculation of effectiveness will be made at that time. The above approximation of  $E_T$  is sufficient for initial calculation of the maximum likely effectiveness for the selected subsystem and PM/BIT concepts. It does not, however, include the false alarm factor and is therefore somewhat optimistic.

Consider the relationship between  $E_T$ , Q, and N, depicted graphically in Fig. 4-8. From the relationship expressed by this plot, it follows that high degrees of PM/BIT effectiveness mandate that the quality of sensors and thresholding functions be extremely high. Reconsider the initial values of Q in the signal matrices, and define them such that they are in a region consistent with the number of LRUs per path, and high enough to produce the specified effectiveness. It must be remembered that this must be a design goal for the circuit/LRU designers, and that the value of Q must allow for the possibility that measurement of some signals may have to be deleted for reasons of cost effectiveness, and also, that the calculations of Q are at best inexact.

#### 4.4.6 Initial Estimate of Mean Test Time (Step 3E)

Mean Test Time  $(\overline{M}_{tt})$  from the subsystem design control specification is the time for PM/BIT, in the mean, to detect and isolate faults. Maintenance technician activities, administrative processes, and their related times are excluded, so that  $\overline{M}_{tt}$  is a measure of how fast PM/BIT operates, from the time when a primary output signal fails to the time that a fault isolation conclusion is displayed to the maintenance technician. This is determined by the time factor, sample rate, and failure rate data in the primary and secondary output signal matrices:

• the sample rate entry represents the designer's estimate of how often




Fig. 4-8 Effectiveness as a Function of Measurement Quality and LRUs per Path

BIT checks each signal, and may vary from continuous to some rather accurately defined iteration period (interval)

- the time factor is the designer's estimate of how long it will require for a detected primary or secondary signal failure to be processed to a conclusion (i.e., to be evaluated and the results displayed)
- the failure rates of each signal path determine the relative contribution of each path to the overall  $\overline{M}_{tt}$  figure. That is, the times associated with the highest failure rate path contribute more weight to the  $\overline{M}_{tt}$  figure than those of the most reliable paths.

In many cases, it will be obvious by inspection that a given PM/BIT design concept will be capable of operating fast enough to satisfy the corresponding  $\overline{M}_{tt}$  requirement. In the event that the PM/BIT design does not obviously meet this requirement, then a more detailed initial estimate of  $\overline{M}_{tt}$  may be made and compared with the specified requirement.

If a more detailed estimate of  $\overline{M}_{tt}$  is desired, this may be computed from the time factors, sample rates, and failure rates in the signal matrices:

- take the sum of the reciprocals of all the sample rates for the sensors of each signal path; this provides the "worst case" time to acquire fault detection/isolation data for each of the paths. In the case of offline BIT, the definitions of sample rates account for the time necessary to use the BIT capability, as well as its inherent iteration rate
- multiply each of the above path times by the path failure rate; this provides the weighted contribution of each path to the overall average acquisition time
- take the sum of the above weighted path times, and divide it by the overall subsystem failure rate; this gives the estimated overall subsystem data acquisition time
- add the above acquisition time to the estimated processing time required by the evaluation function, and the estimated average time to display the results; this will provide a conservative estimate of  $\overline{M}_{tt}$  for the design.

#### 4.4.7 PM/BIT Cost Estimates (Step 3F)

The PM/BIT design concept is still too preliminary to provide a definition of the data necessary for life cycle cost estimating. For this reason, the signal matrices have been developed using LRU production costs.

The DoD standard definition of production costs includes the cost of design, production, material, and test. Wherever PM/BIT uses portions of the subsystem which would be present even if there were no BIT requirement imposed, the costs chargeable to PM/BIT are zero. Likewise, if it is required that



these items have expanded capacity to meet PM/BIT requirements, then pro-rated costs should be employed.

After reviewing the costs in the signal matrices, the designer should now take their sum, and add this to the costs of evaluation and display. This produces a PM/BIT initial cost estimate which may be compared with the specified subsystem design cost envelope.

## 4.4.8 Adjustment of PM/BIT Design Concept (Step 3G)

Thus far, the design concept is one where a defined PM/BIT architecture measures all primary and secondary output signals and, therefore, has fault isolation capabilities limited only by the quality of measurement and evaluation. The concept is accompanied by initial estimates of effectiveness, mean test time, and BIT production costs. These estimates should now be compared with the like parameters of required subsystem performance and costs. If the estimated parameters are found to meet these requirements, no adjustment to the design concept is necessary at this time. If one or more of the estimated parameters do not meet the requirements of the specification, the design concept should be adjusted.

If the costs of the BIT design concept are in excess of the specified cost envelope, then adjustment is possible by removing measurements of least worth, to the point where costs fall within the limit, but effectiveness and mean corrective maintenance time are still in compliance with the specification.

If there is insufficient effectiveness, measuring or evaluation quality, these may possibly be increased to the limit of additional costs within the cost envelope. In the (unlikely) event that mean test time is too long, architectural or processing changes to the design concept will be required to increase PM/BIT speed. Again, such changes must, of necessity, be made within the specified cost envelope.

Recognize that effectiveness and mean test time requirements are to be balanced against cost, and that the goal of this effort is to meet the capability requirements within the specified cost envelope. If the parameters of the subsystem design control specification are realistic in this respect, it should be possible to derive a PM/BIT design concept which is in compliance. If none of

the trial PM/BIT design concepts can be adjusted such that their estimated parameters converge within a reasonable degree (approximately 10%) with those specified, then it will be necessary to recommend changes to the specification, or possibly to the overall subsystem design concept, since the latter may simply be too difficult and expensive to test.

In the great majority of cases, the PM/BIT design concepts derived by this methodology will be expected to suffer from an excessive cost estimate. This is to be expected because our initial approach is that all possible signals have been deliberately designated for measurement and evaluation. This results in nearideal fault detection and fault isolation capability. In this case, adjustment of the design concept should be carried out as discussed in the following paragraphs.

4.4.8.1 <u>Eliminate "Virtual" Test Measurement Hardware</u> - Whenever the paths leading to two or more primary output signals intersect, the status of the common circuitry may be deduced from the status of the associated primary outputs (e.g., when both primary output signals fail simultaneously, it is deductively certain that the only possible single-point failure must be located at the common circuitry. The PM/BIT designer should evaluate the functional flow diagrams to identify these intersections, and the measurement hardware at each such intersection should be deleted from the design concept. BIT costs may then be recomputed to determine whether the savings are sufficient to bring the design concept within the specified cost envelope. Effectiveness and mean test time will not have been affected significantly, and hence need not be recomputed. Figure 4-9 illustrates the concept of a virtual sensor.

1.4.8.2 Delete the Least Cost Effective BIT Capabilities - Further cost reductions require a series of trade-offs to delete those capabilities which are least cost effective. Each deletion will reduce BIT effectiveness by causing invalid maintenance actions because faults are either not detected or ambiguously isolated. When initially computing effectiveness, these invalid  $\pi$ -intenance actions were approximated as  $F_{rs} \times (1-Q) \times 0.5 (N+1)$  for the overall subsystem with all signals measured and evaluated. Q, the measurement quality factor, will obviously be zero if a given signal is not measured any longer; therefore the




Fig. 4-9 Example of "Virtual Sensor"

failure rate times 0.5 (N + 1) would be the expected rate of invalid maintenance actions for the deletion of a particular measurement.

Recall that the worth of all primary output signal measurements has already been computed in terms of  $F_{rp}$ ,  $Q_f$ , and the cost of measurement. These values of worth ( $W_d$ ) appear in the signal matrix. With the additional consideration of path ambituity, a trade-off algorithm to define the relative loss of effectiveness due to the deletion of a primary output signal measurement  $E_d$  can be defined as:

$$E_{d} = W_{d} \ge 0.5 (N + 1)$$
 (Eq. 35)

For secondary output signals, the trade-off is very similar, except that their computed worth must be modified. Recall that  $W_i$  of the secondary outputs was computed as a function of fault location uncertainty resolved, measurement quality, and cost of measurement, with the apriori assumption that such "faults" had been detected as primary output failures, hence they in fact existed.

Thus, it is necessary to modify the worth of a fault isolation sensor to reflect the likelihood that a "fault" exists, in order to use this term in trade-offs. In this case, the trade-off algorithm for secondary outputs becomes:

$$E_i = W_i \times F_{rp} \times 0.5 (N + 1)$$
 (Eq. 36)

which weights the secondary output trade-off in terms of capability.

Although the information produced by measuring primary and secondary outputs is of two distinct categories (fault existence in the one case, and fault location in the other), its quantity has been derived as relative on a scale from zero (no information) to unity (all possible information). Since all the other terms used in computing worth and path ambiguity are directly interchangeable, it appears logical to compare values of E directly for both classes of signal measurements. The proposed trade-off to eliminate the least cost effective measurements is then as follows:

- compute  $E_d$  for all primary output signals
- compute E<sub>i</sub> for all secondary output signals
- order both of the above signals in terms of their E values, from maximum to minimum
- delete the signal measurements of minimum E, to the point where enough signals have been deleted to bring the PM/BIT design concept into agreement with its cost envelope.

## 4.4.9 Adjustment of Design Concept Effectiveness Parameter (Step 3H)

Effectiveness can now be computed in a more accurate manner based upon subsystem failure rate, the rate of valid maintenance actions for the subsystem, and the summation of invalid maintenance action rates for the individual signal paths.

Recall that the subsystem invalid maintenance action rate was  $F_{rs} x (1 - Q) x 0.5 (N + 1)$ . For a given primary output signal, its contribution to the rate of invalid maintenance actions as a result of no detection, is therefore:

$$MA_{rid} = F_{rp} \times (1-Q_d) \times 0.5 (N+1)$$
 (Eq. 37)

where  $MA_{rid}$  is the rate of invalid maintenance actions because of no detect,  $F_{rp}$  is the failure rate of the signal path in question,  $Q_d$  is the quality factor of the fault detection sensor (measurement), and has the value zero if the signal is not to be measured, and N is the number of LRUs in the path from input to primary output.

We must also consider the case where faults are detected, but ambiguously isolated due to incorrect fault isolation measurements, or because one or more secondary output signals are not measured. Consider a path such as that shown in Fig. 4-10 with a fault detected by a sensor at point D, five elements (LRUs in this case), and with the LRU normalized failure ( $F_R$ 's) indicated. If the sensor at P reaches an incorrect conclusion, it will point to the group of LRUs which do not contain the fault. For the path shown in the figure, the fault isolation sensor, when it makes a "mistake," will point to the "wrong" group of two LRUs 60% of the time, and the other "wrong" group of three LRUs 40% of the time. Thus, with a mistake rate of  $(1-Q_i)$ , there will be  $(1-Q_i) \times 0.6 \times 2 \text{ LRUs} + (1-Q_i) \times 0.4 \times 3 \text{ LRUs}$  (per unit of time) implicated as "bad," when they are really "good." Recall that these "mistakes" can only happen when a primary output sensor indicates that a fault has occurred.




Fig. 4-10 Typical Signal Path

This also has a significant impact on maintenance. Every mistaken fault isolation measurement indicates that a group of LRUs contains a fault when in fact the fault is in the other group within its path. There may be other fault isolation sensors at other points of the path, however:



- if the other fault isolation sensors reach a correct conclusion, the outcome leads to confusion due to misleading and ambiguous diagnostics
- if one or more of the fault isolation sensors reach an incorrect conclusion, that is, the sensor at P indicates several "good" LRU's as "bad," the other mistaken sensor confirms the lie and the actual fault is in the group of LRU's judged "good"
- in either of the above cases, the preprogrammed logic of a diagnostic program and/or the technical manual's trouble shooting chart is of little use in identifying the true malfunctioning LRU.

This resulting confusion in the minds of maintenance personnel will cause invalid maintenance actions. These invalid maintenance actions, contributed by each fault isolation sensor, can be modeled as:

 $MA_{rii} = (P_f x A2) + ((1 - P_f) x A1) x (1 - Q_i) x F_{rp} x Q_d$  (Eq. 38) where MA ril is the rate of invalid maintenance actions due to a given fault isolation sensor, but is null when the sensor is "virtual,"  $P_f$  is the location of the sensor along the failure probability length of the path, where path probability has been normalized to unity, and is exactly the same value of  $P_f$  already determined when fault isolation sensor locations were designated, A1 is the number of LRUs between the input and the sensor at  $P_f$ , A2 is the number of LRUs between point  $P_f$  and the primary output signal,  $Q_i$  is the quality factor of this isolation sensor,  $Q_d$  is the quality factor of the related fault detection sensor, and  $F_{rp}$  is the failure rate of the signal path.

Thus, for each signal path in the system, the rate of invalid maintenance actions is the sum of  $MA_{rid}$  for its primary output signal sensor, plus the values of  $MA_{rii}$  for each of the fault isolation sensors along that signal path. plus the false alarms specified for the subsystem (FA x  $F_{rp}$ ). Effectiveness of the BIT concept is computed in this fashion. The overall invalid maintenance action rate for the subsystem is the sum of the rates for each signal path. In turn, the effectiveness of the design concept can be computed as the rate of failure divided by the rate of maintenance actions, both valid and invalid.



## 4.4.10 Adjustment of $\overline{M}_{tt}$ Parameter (Step 3I)

The initial estimate of  $\overline{M}_{tt}$  must now be modified to account for the effect of signals no longer measured. Obviously, when PM/BIT does not measure a primary output signal, fault detection and fault isolation must be performed manually, and will require more time than if PM/BIT were present.

The earlier estimate of  $\overline{M}_{tt}$  is modified as follows to account for the signals no longer measured:

- (1) Recompute  $\overline{M}_{tt}$  for those signals still measured by PM/BIT, using the methods detailed in paragraph 4.4.6.
- (2) Estimate the time required to perform manual testing of those signals and paths no longer measured by PM/BIT. For each path which no longer has its primary output signal measured, assume, based on experience, that manual fault detection/isolation will require approximately two hours depending on test complexity.
- (3) From the signal matrices, obtain the path failure rates for those paths which are have PM/BIT, and for those which are tested manually, and take the sum of each of these two categories. This will give the overall failure rate for manually tested paths.
- (4) Overall  $\overline{M}_{tt}$  may now be estimated as the weighted average of the above two values:

$$\overline{\mathbf{M}}_{tt} = \underbrace{\begin{pmatrix} \overline{\mathbf{M}}_{tt} & \mathbf{X} & \mathbf{F}_{r_{bit}} \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} \overline{\mathbf{M}}_{tt} & \mathbf{X} & \mathbf{F}_{r_{manual}} \end{pmatrix}}_{\mathbf{F}_{r_{subsystem}}}$$
(Eq. 39)

## 4.4.11 System Effectiveness and $\overline{M}_{++}$ (Step 3J)

System Effectiveness and  $\overline{M}_{tt}$  are not necessarily the same as those derived for the BIT design concept itself. Consider that any signal not measured by BIT could have been measured by AGE. Thus, it may be useful to recompute effectiveness and mean test times, with the assumption that AGE is used to measure all or some of those signals not measured by BIT. The estimated costs of such AGE could also be compared with those of BIT for the same set of signals. To compute effectiveness for a combination of BIT and AGE, do the following:

- (1) For every primary output signal measured by AGE, compute the corresponding value of MA<sub>rid</sub>, using the estimated quality of the AGE measurement as the "Q" value, and solving the same expression used for the BIT primary output sensors.
- (2) For every secondary output signal measured by AGE, compute the corresponding values of  $MA_{rii}$ , using the quality of the AGE measurement as "Q," but employing the constant 1.2 in place of path ambiguity (i.e.,  $(P_f \times A2) + (1-P_f) \times A1$ ). The 1.2 factor is based on study data and experience which indicates that AGE, averaged over many recorded maintenance actions, results in about five LRU maintenance actions for every four faulty LRUs.
- (3) Compute the overall value of effectiveness as discussed previously, by summing the maintenance action rates for all paths in the subsystem. This approximates the expected effectiveness for any given combination of signals measured by BIT, by AGE, or not measured at all.

To determine the mean test time for a subsystem using a combination of BIT and AGE, additional factors must be considered. When using AGE, it should be possible to locate a defective LRU faster than by the random replacement or shotgun method. At the same time, AGE introduces the additional time factors for locating the test equipment, hooking it up, running the test, disconnecting the test equipment, and returning it to storage.

For those signals which are measured by AGE, the designer must make a reasonable estimate of these time factors and include them as a third term in the equation used for the overall computation of  $\overline{M}_{tt}$ . The resulting solution is the estimated subsystem mean test time for the BIT/AGE combination.

In practice, the time necessary to employ AGE may equal or exceed the time required by the shotgun approach. Thus, the original estimated subsystem mean test time may not change significantly when AGE is introduced. Further, it is seldom the case that the use of AGE will ever require less than 60 minutes per maintenance action. For this reason, as was discussed earlier in Section 2 of this report, AGE is not recommended as a primary organizational level maintenace tool for avionics.

## 4.5 UPDATED ESTIMATE OF FAILURE RATES AND MEASUREMENT QUALITY (STEP 4)

The ability of a test system to detect faults and isolate failures depends upon the number of measurements made, the quality of measurement, and the failure rates and modes of the subsystem it tests. The procedures presented thus far reflect these fundamental considerations. Unless the failure rates and measurement quality factors are known with sufficient accuracy, the resulting PM/BIT performance will not agree with that predicted. Given the design concept(s) just developed, and that the mainstream subsystem design has evolved to a point where failure modes and rates may be more accurately defined, it is then appropriate to update these parameters before attempting further PM/BIT optimization.

## 4.5.1 Design Guidelines

The quality of measurement factors for each sensor can only be established as target values, pending actual LRU and circuit design. The objective at this point is to establish target values of "Q" for each sensor which are consistent with the overall effectiveness required for the subsystem.

Every circuit measured will have modes of failure dependent upon its detailed design and components. " $Q_f$ " for a given measurement depends upon the parametric failure symptoms associated with each mode of failure, upon the failure frequencies of all the modes of failure, and upon the ability of the BIT sensor/measurement to detect each of these modes. For example, a given circuit may fail with an output which is "high," "low," "missing," "distorted," "noisy," or parametrically deficient in any number of other failure modes as determined by the detailed circuit design and component failure characteristics. For example, a measurement made on a circuit which detects "output level," would fail to detect many of its other potential failure modes. A calculated estimate of the " $Q_f$ " parameter would require that modal failure frequencies be compared with the modes detectable by the intended measurement. This would derive " $Q_f$ " as the quotient of overall failures likely to be detected divided by total failures likely to occur. This is only possible for circuits that have already been designed.

The best approach available to the subsystem designer at this point is to set up measurement " $Q_f$ " values which represent realistic estimates of what is likely to be achieved during the circuit design efforts. Thus, the subsystem specification will contain measurement " $Q_f$ " as a requirement given to the circuit designer. The values specified will therefore represent those which must be achieved to suppot the effectiveness and  $\overline{M}_{tt}$  parameters which are also part of the subsystem specification.

Experience must be conservatively applied in order to set up realistic target values for the quality parameter. Avoid overly simplistic or optimistic values for quality.

As a matter of experience, we have found that many BIT designs rely upon simplistic views of the measurement process. More often than not, it has been assumed that a measurement of signal nominal frequency, voltage, or related parameters with respect to "tolerances" will detect all "out of tolerance" conditions. This assumption is true only in a very limited sense; such measurements detect only what they are designed to detect, and therefore tend not to detect unusual modes of failure. For example, a frequency measurement will not detect jitter, or a rise time measurement on a ramp signal will not detect nonlinearity, or a digital measurement may not detect so-called "splinter pulses." In estimating the " $Q_f$ " for a given measurement, the system engineer must take into account such factors as the above.

The uncertainty with which circuit jauure rates may be predicted is critical for PM/BIT optimization, but only for those circuits that are not measured. Therefore, take particular care in predicting unforeseen reliability problems in circuits for which the design concept does not allocate measurement capability.

The design concept thus far evolved will designate certain signals to be measured, and may also designate certain other signals as not measured. As noted earlier, when a signal has intentionally not been measured, this results from a trade-off based on the worth of that signal as partly a function of its failure rate. If the actual rate of failure is greater than the predicted rate, the trade-off is not only invalid, but PM/BIT performance will be less than specified.

For a signal which is measured, an unexpectedly high failure rate would have no adverse effect upon PM/BIT effectiveness, and could even lead to an increase in effectiveness. This might occur because the relative population of detected failures would increase when signals measured prove less reliable than was expected during PM/BIT optimization.

## 4.5.2 Updated Reliability Estimates (Step 4A)

In both the literature and the experience of the study staff, there have been many cases in which the empirical (actual) failure rates of a subsystem are significantly different from rates predicted during the reliability analyses which were part of the design efforts.

In context with the above fundamental considerations, it is now necessary to update the signal failure rates in the signal matrices. It is assumed that the subsystem design team will have reliability engineering personnel involved in the design process, and that they will prepare a set of estimated signal failure rates which the PM/BIT designer will use to update his matrices. Based on this assumption, the process should be conducted as follows:

- (1) Obtain the updated values, and enter them into the matrices.
- (2) List the non-measured signals, and their updated failure rates.
- (3) Consult with the reliability engineering and circuit design personnel assigned to the subsystem development effort, and review with them the estimated failure rates of the non-measured signals. A design review meeting is recommended for this task, and should consider the possibility of critical circuit design errors, inadvertently high component stress levels, and unusually stringent circuit performance requirements insofar as these factors may lead to unforseen rates of failure.
- (4) Update the failure rate data for non-measured signals to reflect the results of the above design review.

The methodology used in the above design review depends on the nature of the subsystem being designed, and the stage of design reached at this point. Methodologies potentially applicable, and the circumstances which would suggest their application, are summarized in the following paragraphs, to assist in the selection of the most practical methods for the given subsystem:

- If any of the circuit designs to be employed are likely to be used "offthe-shelf," the use of actual (empirical) failure rates for such modules or circuits should be the preferred method. Data from the AFR 66-1 or 3M systems fall into this category. However, in using this data, differences between existing and projected applications should be taken into account to see if the existing failure rates should be modified for the newly projected application.
- If there are actual circuit designs available, but no empirical failure rates as yet, then it is suggested that MIL-HDBK-217 methods be used to estimate signal failure rates. In using this approach, particular care is required in assessing the stress levels upon components, since unexpected stress levels would lead to unrealistically low failure rates.
- If the actual circuit designs are not yet available, then consider using the active element count method. This method is subject to even greater uncertainty than the above two alternatives.
- If none of the above methods appears applicable, consider the use of an extended regression analysis from previous designs of like nature. A trend-line regression from several empirical values of failure rate for prior designs may yield a more accurate estimated failure rate than the above active element count method. Hence, in any case where it is necessary to use the active element count, consider the regression approach also, and, if possible, do both. Select the highest of the two failure rates arrived at by these two methods, and enter it into the signal matrices for use in subsequent optimization, as a conservatism.

## 4.5.3 Updated Measurement Quality Estimates (Step 4B)

Given the final set of updated failure rate data for both primary and secondary output signals, it will be useful for the PM/BIT designer to consider the quality factors he has associated with designated measurements, and update these. Considering each measurement that has been designated, three factors enter into the choice of the most "reasonable" quality factor as the specified goal for measurement:

(1) Failure Rate by Mode - The more often a signal fails, the more de-

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sirable it is that the associated sensor detect a high percentage of failures. As noted earlier, failures occur in multiple possible modes for a given signal, and these modes have different sub-rates of failure. It is suggested that the PM/BIT designer review those signals having failure rates in the top 10 percentile of his measured signals, and attempt, on the basis of experience, to define the likely modes of failure for each, and their relative frequency of occurrence.

- (2) Cost of Measurement, by Signal Some generic circuit classes are inexpensive to measure, while others are not. In circuits that yield to inexpensive sensors, it may be relatively inexpensive to obtain high measurement "Q." Conversely, in circuits that require complex and expensive sensors, high "Q" may be expensive or even impossible to realize.
- (3) Cost of Measurement, by Mode Measured Some failure modes of a given signal will prove detectable by inexpensive BIT circuits. Other failure modes will require relatively expensive BIT implementation. For example, a digital "stuck at one" or "stuck at zero" measurement is relatively inexpensive to implement as BIT, while circuitry to measure other modes of failure for the same signal may lead to increased costs out of proportion to their frequency of occurrence.

As a matter of experience, 90% of all subsystem failures originate from 10% of the circuits employed in their design. Hence, the quality factors given to the LRU and circuit designers as goals ought to be reviewed in detail with particular emphasis upon those signals that are expected to fail most often. It is suggested that signals with failure rates in the upper 10 percentile of all signal rates be individually evaluated, as follows:

- (1) Identify the probable modes of signal failure, and the relative frequency of each.
- (2) Estimate, from experience, the cost of BIT circuits necessary to detect the most prevalent mode of failure, and note the percentage of failures thereby detected.

- (3) Make a similar estimate of modal detection cost for each mode, and note the related percentages of failures detected.
- (4) Set a maximum BIT cost for the measurement of the signal, and select the set of BIT measurement capabilities which "captures" the highest possible percentage of failures for that signal.
- (5) Set the value of  $Q_f$  as equal to the failures detectable, divided by all failures implied by the overall signal failure rate estimate. This will be an optimistic value, as previously described.
- (6) If the resulting Q is insufficient to meet the projected BIT effectiveness requirement, consider using a less expensive sensor in the measurement of the secondary output signal which has the lowest failure rate in the projected subsystem, and reassign its cost saving to see if the signal under consideration can be measured with greater quality.

A uniform value of Q throughout the PM/BIT configuration would not be realistic for the reasons discussed above. The goal, in a final update of signal measurement Q values, is to upgrade measurement quality in high failure rate signals/modes by a series of trade-offs between high and low failure rate signals and modes. Reassigning sensor capability in this manner may result in a higher detection percentage and enhanced effectiveness. The final Q values established by that process will be those written into the subsystem specification, and represent the design goal for subsequent LRU and circuit design.

4.6 FINAL CALCULATION OF PM/BIT PERFORMANCE AND COST PARAMETERS (STEP 5)

Effectiveness,  $\overline{M}_{tt}$ , and production cost may now be calculated in their final form, for inclusion in the specification, and to furnish a production cost target. Actual calculations are simply a reiteration of the process used to derive and adjust the design concept. Likewise, the updated data for these calculations may be taken directly from the signal matrices.

Conceivably, any of the three required PM/BIT parameters may or may not meet the parametric requirements of the system design specification. This yields eight possible outcomes, when the new calculated values are compared with the same values in the design specification. Each of these will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

# 4.6.1 Calculated Effectiveness, $\overline{M}_{tt}$ , and Production Cost Meet the Requirements of the Specification (Step 5A)

In the case where all three parameters either meet or exceed the original values given in the system design specification, no further optimization is recommended. The design concept, in its current state, should be "written into" the LRU design specifications.

## 4.6.2 Calculated Effectiveness and $\overline{M}_{tt}$ Are Less Than Specified, and Costs Are Greater Than the PM/BIT Production Cost Envelope (Step 5B)

In this case, the PM/BIT design concept, and its accompanying subsystem design concept, are judged to be not viable. If overriding system level tradeoffs still dictate choice of a subsystem design with such inherent PM/BIT problems, then it will be necessary to revise the system level design specification to reflect more realistic levels of PM/BIT performance and cost.

## 4.6.3 Calculated Effectiveness and $\overline{M}_{tt}$ Are not Acceptable, while Costs Are Equal To or Less Than the PM/BIT Production Cost Envelope (Step 5C)

In this outcome, further adjustment of the design concept is necessary. It may be possible to increase the PM/BIT performance by adding more measurements, to the point where projected production cost exactly meets the originally specified cost envelope. The need to increase the speed with which BIT operates, in order to decrease the  $\overline{M}_{tt}$  parameter, should be met by one of the following means:

- Testing functions projected for AGE may be reassigned to the PM/BIT concept
- The PM/BIT architecture may be reconsidered
- Re-examine the PM/BIT processing and display concepts.

In the above efforts, calculations are simply reiterations of the trade-offs made during formulation and adjustment of the design concept. The goal is to bring the PM/BIT performance parameters within the originally specified values, without increasing the cost envelope beyond that originally given. If this cannot be done by repeated design iteration, then this result becomes identical to that discussed under Step 5B, that is, a non-viable design concept.

# 4.6.4 Calculated Effectiveness Is Equal To or Greater Than Specified, but the $\overline{M}_{tt}$ Is Too Great, while Costs Are Equal To or Less Than the Cost Envelope Originally Specified (Step 5D)

Since  $\overline{F}_{tt}$  is a parameter that must be met in order for the overall system to achieve its required functions and availability, it will be necessary to make the design concept operate faster, while continuing to meet required effectiveness, and without exceeding the cost envelope. For this case, the recommended design reiteration would be as follows:

- increase PM/BIT operating speed by the tactics recommended in Step 5C, up to the point where costs are exactly equal to the cost envelope
- If the  $\overline{M}_{tt}$  parameter is still not met, then decrease the effectiveness parameter by removing the least valuable measurements in the signal matrices; apply the cost reductions thereby obtained to additional capabilities designed to increase the speed of PM/BIT operation.

If the above efforts do not produce agreement between effectiveness,  $\overline{M}_{tt}$ , and costs calculated and those of the design specification, then this case also reduces to a non-viable design concept, and the measures recommended in Step 5B must be taken. That is, either the system specification must be modified, or an alternate design concept must be selected.

# 4.6.5 Calculated Effectiveness Is Equal To or Greater Than Specified, but Both $\overline{M}_{tt}$ and Cost Appear Too Great (Step 5E)

This case is similar to the immediately preceding case, but more difficult to resolve, because options for redesign are more limited. It is recommended that the design concept be reiterated as follows:

- remove measurement capabilities by reiterating the trade-offs made during adjustment of the design concept, to the point where the effectiveness parameter is exactly met
- apply the cost savings resultant from the above step to increases in the speed of the PM/BIT configuration.

If the newly calculated  $\overline{M}_{tt}$  is still too great, then this case also reduces to a non-viable design concept.

# 4.6.6 Calculated Effectiveness Is Insufficient, while $\overline{M}_{tt}$ and Cost Are Both Acceptable (Step 5F)

Here, the option is to increase cost in favor of more measurement capability, up to the cost envelope. If this still does not produce acceptable effectiveness, then the designer must be prepared to trade off PM/BIT operating speed in favor of still more or better measurements, up to the  $\overline{M}_{tt}$  limit. These recommended trade-offs are made by reiterating the calculations and trade-offs made durin g formulation of the PM/BIT design concept. If no amount of reiteration results in a concept that jointly meets all three criteria, then either an alternate subsystem concept or changes to the specified parameters will be necessary.

## 4.6.7 Calculated Effectiveness Is Insufficient, M<sub>tt</sub> Is Acceptable, and Costs Are Too High (Step 5G)

This outcome is similar to the outcome of Step 5F, but options for redesign are much more limited. All the designer can do is trade off speed in favor of cost reductions, and more and better measurements. It is improbable that this will result in a concept that meets all three requirements, and in most cases, this outcome will quickly resolve to a non-viable solution.

# 4.6.8 Calculated Effectiveness and $\overline{M}_{tt}$ Are Acceptable, but Costs Are Too Great (Step 5H)

In this final case, it is recommended that the BIT designer trade off system speed against reduced costs first, then secondly trade off effectiveness against reduced costs. This order of preference is judged best because the uncertainty of predicting speed is less than the uncertainty inherent in predicting failure rates and quality factors defining effectiveness.

## 4.7 LIFE CYCLE COST TRADEOFF (STEP 6)

At this point in the methodology, one or more optimized PM/BIT design concepts converge on a life cycle cost trade-off that will select the most advantageous concept for implementation. Since all concepts surviving Step 5 meet or exceed the performance and cost requirements in the subsystem design specification, least life cycle cost becomes the criterion of choice.

The trade-off should make use of the life cycle costing equations and pro-

cedure detailed in Appendix A. The data required to perform the trade-off, while still preliminary in some cases, should all be available to the PM/BIT designer:

- production cost is a term in the signal matrices, and should be used "as-is" in the equations of the trade-off
- the other data required for the trade-off should be acquired as "best estimates" from the developing program logistics and management planning functions
- in some instances, such as with the costs of maintenance personnel, the data sources are either given by, or provided as part of, the life cycle cost trade-off procedure of Appendix A.

Any PM/BIT design concept that shows a positive result would be one whose life cycle cost, with BIT, is greater than without BIT. All such concepts should be rejected. Of the remaining concepts, the one with the greatest negative incremental life cycle cost should be the preferred candidate. However, since the PM/BIT concepts are interwoven with the alternative prime subsystem design concepts, any PM/BIT configuration which meets the criteria thus far developed, and which results in a net decrease in subsystem life cycle cost, should be acceptable to the BIT designer. That is, the choice from among two or more acceptable PM/BIT concepts involves an overall system trade-off beyond the scope of PM/BIT optimization, and the overall subsystem design which results will only employ BIT performance and cost as elements of an overall trade-off.

## 4.8 SPECIFYING LRU REQUIREMENTS

For the chosen PM/BIT design concept, the final task of subsystem design is to specify the requirements to be imposed upon each LRU of the subsystem. The methodology we have presented is designed to facilitate that effort. The information required to specify effectiveness,  $\overline{M}_{tt}$ , and cost envelope is present in the signal matrices, and the designer need only calculate those values pertaining to each LRU in order to provide the required information.

In addition to the overall performance and cost parameters of each LRU, it is recommended that the signal matrices be broken down by LRU, and made part of the LRU specification. This information will thereby provide the details of which signals are to be measured, the quality factor for each measurement, and the signal characteristics that were the basis for their derivation. In effect, this provides the LRU/circuit designer with a configuration which, if implemented, will meet his required performance and cost targets. It also provides him with an engineering tool which may be used to monitor his design compliance, and make changes necessary to compensate for cases where his design does not appear to meet these requirements.

Similarly, the overall functional flow block diagram (Level I), and detailed functional path block diagrams (Level II) should be provided to the LRU/circuit designers. These serve the purpose of detailing the overall PM/BIT concept and its signal flow and interfaces. They are therefore a design tool which assists in implementing the configuration.

It is envisioned that an end-item specification will be written for each LRU in the subsystem, and that it will contain the following PM/BIT parameter information:

- LRU PM/BIT Effectiveness
- Primary and Secondary Output signals to be measured
- Primary and Secondary Stimuli required to support measurements
- the signal matrices defining the above output signals and stimuli
- $\overline{M}_{++}$  for the LRU, in terms of the time elements in the matrices
- the LRU interface with the rest of the subsystem, in terms of primary input and output signals
- text and narrative defining the architecture and functional requirements for PM/BIT implementation, to clarify and explain the contents of the above information.

Thus, the resulting end item specification will define PM/BIT in terms of its inputs, outputs, elements, interrelationships between elements, and the parameters by which each element processes information. This provides a complete technical description of the design concept that is to be implemented. It

also provides detailed technical information which may be used to monitor the design implementation, and adapt it to the changing conditions and conclusions reached during the detailed design process.

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#### 5. DESIGN GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES - DETAILED DESIGN PHASE


## 5.1 BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGY

This section presents design guidelines and procedures for use in LRU circuit design, prototype testing, and design acceptance. These are the final stages of the design process, during which LRU specifications are reduced to actual hardware and software. For PM/BIT, the designer's task is to be certain that this hardware and software provides the effectiveness and  $\overline{M}_{tt}$  required by the LRU specification, without exceeding either the production cost envelope or life cycle cost parameters defined during the system/subsystem design processes. The detailed PM/BIT design effort resolves to a process that monitors the design for effectiveness and  $\overline{M}_{tt}$ , modifies it where necessary to compensate for design changes, tests the prototype for compliance, and documents the results.

The conventional engineering methodologies normal to this phase of the design process are more than adequate for the design of PM/BIT circuits. The need for additional methodology appears only as a need to relate detailed design features to their cumulative effects upon overall performance of the PM/BIT function. Thus, the additional tasks recommended in this section are minimal, and are to serve as a means for estimating the functional performance and adequacy of the detailed PM/BIT implementation.

The recommended methodology consists of eight procedures superimposed on various stages of the normal LRU circuit design process, as shown in Fig. 5-1. During the design of LRU circuits, a more detailed analysis of measurement quality  $(Q_f)$  is made, based on the now-developed circuits that are to be measured, and their probable modes of failure. Effectiveness is then recalculated, based on the new values of " $Q_f$ ". If necessary, trade-offs are made to add more measurements, or increase the " $Q_f$ " of existing measurements, within the production cost envelope. While prototype hardware is being fabricated, test requirements are formulated to demonstrate PM/BIT performance during laboratory testing of the prototype hardware. During the actual laboratory effort,

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these tests determine specification compliance, and changes are made to the PM/BIT design to remedy cases of non-compliance. During the design acceptance process, PM/BIT performance factors are tested in the same manner as other required performance parameters.

Costs treated during this design phase are both production and life cycle costs. Production costs are used as the measure of the allowable cost of PM/ BIT, that is, as the cost envelope not to be exceeded by the implemented design. Life cycle costs are treated indirectly, by accounting for those factors of PM/BIT design which drive life cycle cost: effectiveness, reliability, and production cost.

### 5.2 CIRCUIT IMPLEMENTATION ANALYSIS (STEP 1)

As defined in Section 4, quality factors in the signal matrices are critical design requirements that specify the percentage of all possible signal failures that must be detected by each measurement sensor. The PM/BIT circuits must be designed to provide these " $Q_f$ " values for the LRU and its subsystem to meet the required level of effectiveness. The first task in LRU circuit optimization is to analyze the LRU and BL' circuitry and derive estimates of measurement quality for each primary and secondary output. Comparison of the required with the estimated " $Q_f$ " on a circuit-by-circuit basis, will identify any cases where the measurement quality specified cannot be met. This will require trade-offs to either increase the quality of measurement, or measure additional signals. Finally, the updated values of " $Q_f$ " will be recorded for subsequent recalculation of the effectiveness parameter.

### 5.2.1 Design Guidelines

#### Do not take a statistical approach to the analysis of measurement tolerances.

In the literature researched by this study, some recommend the use of statistics to set tolerances for BIT measurements. Such methods rely upon trade-offs between buyers' and producers' risks at various standard deviations from nominal circuit parameters. They offer a convenient mathematical procedure for determining how many "good" units will be rejected, or how many "bad" units accepted, with a given set of test tole ances. However, these methods have meaning only in the context of a single test of each unit in a production

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run. We conclude that the statistical approach to setting tolerances does not apply to tolerances for PM/BIT measurements, because a measurement that passes once will continue to pass unless there is a physical change (e.g., failure) in the circuit measured.

For purposes of evaluating measurement quality make the assumption that a sensor designed to measure/detect a given mode of failure will do so 100% of the time.

Any signal will be possessed of one or more "nominal" values of time, amplitude, etc. Absence of one of the nominal values may be defined as a failure, and a measurement may be devised to detect that absence. In this abstract case, tolerances define how much deviation from the nominal is regarded as a "failure." Either by analysis or empirically in the laboratory, a design engineer can always establish a measurement tolerance which will, for all practical purposes, detect 100% of the failures he intends to detect.

As a corollary to the above guideline, also make the assumption that a sensor will not detect any mode of failure it was not designed to detect.

Absence of a "nominal" parameter of performance is not the only condition that may denote failure. Other conditions that may denote failure are the presence of a non-intended parameter of that signal (e.g., noise, distortion, etc.), or the absence of a non-specified parameter of the signal, which a BIT sensor will therefore not be designed to detect. For example, consider the case where a signal has excessive "jitter," that is, lacks temporal consistency, but no such requirement was specified as a required parameter. It is very unlikely that a sensor would detect such a failure, because its design did not anticipate that need.

### 5.2.2 Identification of Signal Failure Modes (Step 1A)

The first step in establishing the measurement quality factors is to examine each LRU path leading to both primary and secondary output signals and identify the possible modes of signal failure. The precise electrical symptoms defining failure are highly dependent upon the specific design of the circuits which produce the measured signals. However, recognize that there is a potential for modes of failure far more numerous than generally anticipated. As a minimum, it is recommended that the designer consider the following modes of signal failure for all signals in his LRU:

- output gain low or high
- shorted or open output
- stuck at one/zero (digital) •
- splinter pulse (digital)
- distortion
  - wrong damping characteristic
    - unspecified transients
- excessive ripple.

nonlinearity

jitter

• wrong phase relationship

overshoot/undershoot

wrong rise/fall times

wrong timing relationship

The intent of this effort is to identify not just the most common signal failure modes, but as many of the uncommon modes as is possible to anticipate. All signals measured should be tabulated, along with the signal failure modes identified for each. The above will provide a starting point for subsequent evaluation of the significance of each mode, and the ability of its assigned sensor/ measurement to detect such incidence.

### 5.2.3 Modal Failure Rate Estimate (Step 1B)

The signal matrices carry a failure rate parameter for every signal and its related path. It is recommended that the designer apportion this overall failure rate term to the identified failure modes of its associated signal. For example, consider a signal with a failure rate of 200 x  $10^{-6}$ /hr, six identified failure modes, and its failure rates apportioned as follows:

	Mode of Failure	$F_{rp} = 200 \times 10^{\circ}$
(1)	Stuck at "One"	$F_{r1} = 70 \times 10^{-6}$
(2)	Stuck at "Zero"	$F_{r2} = 70 \times 10^{-6}$
(3)	Marginal "One" Level	$F_{r3} = 20 \times 10^{-6}$
(4)	Marginal "Zero" Level	$F_{r4} = 20 \times 10^{-6}$
(5)	"Splinter Pulse"	$F_{r5} = 15 \times 10^{-6}$
(6)	Race due to internal node failure	$F_{r6} = 5 \times 10^{-6}$



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Since current reliability prediction methods do not 'e. d themselves to such an apportionment, it appears that the designer will have to apportion largely on the basis of experience with circuits of similar design and application. In some cases, the MIL-HDBK-217 stress level method may be useful in predicting the relative frequency of component failures associated with each of the identified failure modes. However, since the failure modes were identified largely on the basis of the designer's judgment as to the causes of each mode, it is not unreasonable to assume that he has a grasp of the components likely to be at fault, and their relative frequencies of failure.

#### 5.2.4 Analysis of Failure Detection, by Mode (Step 1C)

The designer should now consider the specific PM/BIT circuits and/or software diagnostics that have been implemented for each signal measured in the LRU, and compare these with the failure modes he has identified for the same group of signals. The effort here is to identify which modes will and will not be detected by the measurement (sensor, thresholding device, etc.) that has been implemented. Most experienced designers will have little or no difficulty in making this judgment, given only the schematic and general performance parameters of both the circuits measured and the related PM/BIT circuits. Similarly, measurements made by software diagnostics will usually be easy to classify with respect to their ability to detect the given failure modes.

### 5.2.5 Calculation of Signal Measurement Quality (Step 1D)

Finally, it is necessary to calculate the estimated  $Q_f$  value for each measurement from the data developed by the above three steps (1A through 1C). The  $Q_f$  value for either a fault detection or fault isolation sensor is estimated as:

 $Q_f = \frac{\text{Total failure rate for modes detected by the given sensor}}{\text{Total failure rate for the signal}}$ 

For example, with the six failure modes identified for the hypothetical signal discussed in paragraph 5.2.3, assume that the sensor employed was judged capable of detecting modes (1) through (4), but not modes (5) and (6). The  $Q_{f}$  for that measurement is:

$$Q_f = \frac{180 \times 10^{-6}}{200 \times 10^{-6}} = 0.9$$

The designer should now calculate the  $Q_f$  of each implemented measurement, and enter these values as updated " $Q_f$ " factors in the signal matrices.

These resulting values of " $Q_f$ " are optimistic because they take only known failure modes and effects into account. The effects of unanticipated failure modes will, in the deployed subsystem, almost certainly lead to actual  $Q_f$  values somewhat lower than those which now appear in the matrices.

### 5.3 CALCULATION OF DESIGN COMPLIANCE (STEP 2)

Given the updated values of measurement quality, and an actual preliminary LRU circuit design, it is now appropriate to calculate the degree of specification compliance inherent in the PM/BIT design. Four parameters are of interest:

- effectiveness
- M<sub>tt</sub>
- production cost of BIT
- life cycle cost of B<sub>1</sub>T.

This step provides a convenient way to evaluate each of these four aspects of the design, and identify those areas which require change in order to meet the specified performance and cost targets.

### 5.3.1 Calculation of Effectiveness (Step 2A)

As noted earlier in this report, effectiveness  $(E_T)$  is the ratio of total failure rate  $(F_r)$  to the maintenance action rate  $(MA_r)$ . The maintenance action rate has components which are the valid maintenance action rate (the same rate as  $F_r$ ), and the invalid maintenance action rate. Invalid maintenance actions result from subsystem failures not detected by PM/BIT, and from ambiguous fault isolation of detected failures. For primary output signals, the invalid maintenance action rate (MA<sub>rid</sub>) is:

 $MA_{rid} = F_{rp} \times (1-Q_d) \times 0.5 (N + 1)$  (Eq. 37 of paragraph 4.4.9)

where  $F_{rp}$  is the failure rate of the path.  $Q_d$  is the quality factor associated with its measurement, and N is the number of LRUs in the path from input to output.

For secondary output signals, the invalid maintenance action rate,  $MA_{rii}$ , is:

$$MA_{rii} = (P_{f} \times A2) + ((1-P_{f}) \times A1) \times (1-Q_{i}) \times F_{rp} \times Q_{d}$$
 (Eq. 38 of paragraph 4.4.9)

where P is the location of the secondary output sensor along the failure probability length of the path, where path failure probability has been normalized to unity, A1 is the number of LRUs between the input and the sensor at P, A2 is the number of LRUs between point P and the primary output signal at issue,  $Q_i$ is the quality factor for this fault isolation sensor,  $Q_d$  is the quality factor for the related fault detection sensor, and  $F_{rp}$  is the failure rate of the signal path.

Now compute the value of  $MA_{rid}$  for each primary output signal, and the value of  $MA_{rii}$  for each secondary output signal which is measured. (Recall that primary outputs which are not measured have  $MA_{rid}$  equal to  $F_{rp} \ge 0.5(N+1)$  because in that case  $Q_d$  is null.) The summation of these rates is the overall rate of invalid maintenance actions,  $MA_{ri}$ , and is used to compute effectiveness,  $E_T$ , as:

$$E_{T} = \frac{F_{rs}}{F_{rs} + (FA \times F_{rs}) + MA_{ri}}$$
 (Eq. 40)

where FA is the specified maximum allowable percentage of false alarms, and  $MA_{ri}$  is equal to  $MA_{rid} + MA_{rii}$ .

The computed value of  $E_T$  is then compared with the specified value to determine whether reiteration of the design is necessary to bring the preliminary LRU design into compliance with the specification.

# 5.3.2 Calculation of $\overline{M}_{tt}$ (Step 2B)

That portion of  $\overline{M}_{tt}$  within control of the PM/BIT designer is the time element between occurrence of a failure and its related fault isolation. For online built-in-test, this will usually be in the order of one second or less, compared to minutes or possibly hours because of various administrative delays. For off-line BIT, or for PIT configurations where there is a fixed (diagnostic) time associated with the procedural use of the BIT, then a calculation of  $\overline{M}_{tt}$  by the method recommended in paragraph 4.4.12 should be made, and the result compared with the requirement of the LRU specification.

### 5.3.3 Calculation of BIT Production Cost (Step 2C)

Assuming that the production cost entry in the signal matrices has been kep<sup>+</sup> up-to-date, a summation of these entries, plus the centralized costs of the evaluation and display elements can be used to determine whether the projected BIT production cost is within the cost envelope. In the event that PM and BIT share evaluation and display functions, care should be taken to pro-rate costs such that PM evaluation and display is not charged to the cost of BIT.

### 5.3.4 Assessment of BIT Life Cycle Cost Factors (Step 2D)

No formal life cycle cost effort is recommended at the level of LRU BIT design. Rather, the designer may assume that the results of life cycle cost analysis are embodied in the parameters of the LRU design specification. Those factors which determine LRU life cycle cost (as influenced by BIT) should therefore be assessed to be certain they are in agreement with the system or subsystem level LCC results.

Effectiveness,  $\overline{M}_{tt}$ , production cost, and reliability are the LRU parameters which drive life cycle cost. The first three have already been addressed in terms of whether or not they comply with the requirements of the LRU specification. Reliability, the remaining parameter, may now be considered, since actual circuit designs will have made it possible for reliability engineering personnel to calculate projected reliability by stress level analysis. It is recommended that the projected failure rates in the signal matrices now be updated with this information. If the newly calculated failure rates agree with the similar requirements of the LRU design specification then LRU life cycle cost will agree with the results of the subsystem life cycle cost analysis.

### 5.4 DESIGN ADJUSTMENT (STEP 3)

The only trade-off available at this point is between capability and production cost. If one or more performance parameters do not meet specified values, capability can be increased up to the limiting factor of production cost. Conversely, if calculated production cost is too great, capability can be traded off in favor of cost reductions, to the limit where effectiveness and  $\overline{M}_{tt}$  requirements are barely met. Should such trade-offs appear necessary, then the methods

discussed in paragraph 4.4.8 should be employed to determine additions or deletions in terms of their capability per unit of cost.

In the case where calculated values of effectiveness,  $\overline{M}_{tt}$  and cost are already at or beyond the limits specified, then the above trade-offs cannot be made, and it will be necessary to obtain changes in the specification or cost envelope. This action would require life cycle cost analysis of the proposed changes, because there is a system level trade-off between increasing production cost versus increasing life cycle cost. More BIT capability may tend to decrease life cycle cost even though production cost is increased. In any event, the necessary life cycle cost analysis can only be carried out at the subsystem or higher level of design.

### 5.5 PROTOTYPE TEST PLANNING (STEP 4)

The test of PM/BIT capability should be performed as an integral part of the laboratory circuit design test effort. This approach regards PM/BIT as another required LRU function, to be tested and verified in the same manner as any other specified function. The degree of formality, and the format for PM/ BIT laboratory tests will be governed by the specific resources and requirements of the mainstream design effort. However, the PM/BIT test plan should be sufficiently thorough, including the following activities and functions as a minimum:

- <u>Tolerance Verification</u> Tolerances designed into the prototype PM/BIT configuration should be verified. This activity should prove the ability of the chosen tolerances to accept good signals, and detect defective signals. Consideration should be given to verification of tolerances in as many modes of failure as possible for each signal.
- <u>Failure Simulation</u> An effort should be made to simulate a failure of every signal in every mode of failure that has been identified. With relatively simple LRUs this may be possible. For very complex designs, universal failure simulation may be too expensive or time consuming. As a minimum, the PM/BIT designer should prepare a list of a statistically significant number of randomly selected failures to be introduced into the prototype hardware.

#### 5.6 PROTOTYPE TESTING (STEP 5)

PM/BIT laboratory testing is superimposed on the normal prototype test process. The key requirement is that effectiveness and  $\overline{M}_{tt}$  values be demonstrated, just as all the other requirements of the LRU and its subsystem are tested. Generally, it will be sufficient for the PM/BIT designer to work as part of the laboratory test team, execute the PM/BIT tests, and observe the other tests in process so that he may note the occurrence of LRU design changes requiring compensatory PM/BIT redesign.

### 5.7 FINAL DESIGN ADJUSTMENT (STEP 6)

Depending upon the evaluated results of prototype testing, there may be a requirement for changes to increase fault detection/isolation, or for changes to the PM/BIT configuration in response to changes in the design of the LRU itself. In either case, the designer should retest to prove that these changes had their intended effects. The results of this retest should be documented along with the final results of LRU prototype testing.

In the event that PM/BIT changes in either or both of the above categories involve additional measurement, evaluation, or display hardware, then the BIT production costs should once again be totalled to ensure that the overall production cost envelope is still met.

### 5.8 QUALIFICATION AND ACCEPTANCE TEST CONSIDERATIONS (STEP 7)

Provision should be made to demonstrate the functions of PM/BIT fault detection and isolation during both qualification testing and individual acceptance testing of the production LRUs, subsystems, and systems. The degree and formality of such PM/BIT test requirements would be of a level consistent with the overall LRU qualification and acceptance testing efforts. The approach here is simply that PM/BIT fault detection and isolation results determine effectiveness and  $\overline{M}_{ct}$  achieved by the systems and LRUs under test, and that tests of these functions receive the same level of consideration as do tests of all other LRU functions. It is recommended that test plans make use of failures occurring naturally to the LRU while testing is in progress, plus a significant number of randomly chosen failures to produce a statistically significant measure of PM/ BIT performance.

### 5.9 DOCUMENTATION OF PM/BIT DESIGN AND PERFORMANCE (STEP 8)

At the conclusion of the engineering design effort, when the LRU and its host subsystem have been qualified, it is recommended that the PM/BIT design documentation originated by this methodology be preserved for two potential future uses:

- (1) The signal matrices and the Level I and II Functional Block Diagrams contain a very detailed set of information useful in the preparation of maintenance technical orders. Use of this information in that manner is recommended to optimize the instructions to maintenance personnel so that they are able to make the best possible use of the PM/BIT capability.
- (2) These data should also be retained for record purposes. Empirical measurements of PM/BIT performance with deployed systems may be made, and resolution of issues arising from field experience would be facilitated if the data is available to engineering personnel on a more or less permanent basis.



# DEFINITION OF FREQUENTLY USED ABBREVIATIONS, TERMINOLOGY, AND PARAMETERS

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### ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMINOLOGY

- ATE Automatic Test Equipment.
- BIT Built-In-Test.
- BIT Performance Terminology:

False Alarms - in which BIT falsely identifies an LRU as a malfunctioning unit where, in fact, there is no malfunction.

BIT Diagnostic Errors - in which BIT incorrectly isolates an actual fault to one or more non-malfunctioning LRU's.

Undetected Failures - in which BIT fails to detect a malfunctioning LRU.

BIT Ambiguity - in which BIT detects a fault and correctly isolates to two or more LRU's.

Intermittents – in which an electrical malfunction is present only at certain times, and which at all other times appears to be a false alarm.

FMEA - Failure Mode and Effects Analysis:

- Input/Stimulus Signal Matrix a list of all stimuli provided to the system (in terms of units, amplitudes, nominal values, and tolerances) by mode of the subsystem operation.
- Level I Functional Flow Block Diagram an overall diagram of the conceptualsubsystem system architecture, showing its inputs, outputs, elements, and interrelationships; emphasis is placed on defining the functional path associated with each required subsystem function.
- Level II Functional Flow Block Diagrams define the functional paths in the same terms as above, but in a more granular manner.
- Output Signal Matrix a list of all signal outputs, showing their amplitudes. tolerances, units, etc., by mode of subsystem operation.

PM - Performance Monitor.

PM BIT in the second encompassing both PM and BIT.

<sup>2</sup> A. Requirement Allocation Sheets.

ULAIDS - Universal Locator Airborne Integration Data System.

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### PARAMETERS


Α	- Operational Availability (Generic).
A <sub>i</sub>	- Inherent Availability.
A <sub>o</sub>	- Operational Availability as recorded in the field.
BA	- % no-defect removals due to BIT ambiguity.
BDE	- % no-defect removals due to BIT diagnostic errors.
С	- Repair in Place. Quantity per operating hours.
с <sub>р</sub>	- Estimated cost of PM/BIT capability to measure a given signal.
Е	- Mission Effectiveness.
Ed	- Relative loss of effectiveness due to the deletion of a primary output sensor.
E.	- Relative loss of effectiveness due to the deletion of a secondary output sensor.
<sup>Е</sup> т	- Test Subsystem Effectiveness - The total number of malfunction- ing LRU's divided by the total number of O-level maintenance actions.
F	- Figure of merit for the test subsystem, equal to $U_{\mathrm{T}}^{}/\mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{BiT}}^{}$ .
FA	- % no-defect removals due to false alarms.
F <sub>ri</sub> (or F <sub>RI</sub> )	- Failure rate of a functional element.
$F_{rp}$ (or $F_{RP}$ )	- Failure rate of a given functional path leading to a primary output.
F <sub>rs</sub> (or F <sub>RS</sub> )	- Failure rate of the subsystem.
К	- The ratio of as-designed MTBF to operational MTBF <sub>0</sub> .
LCC	- Life cyclo cost of the total system or subsystem.
λ	- Mission failure rate, or 1/MTBF <sub>0</sub> .
MA <sub>r</sub>	- Estimated overall maintenance action rate for the subsystem.

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MA <sub>ri</sub>	- Sum of MA <sub>rid</sub> and MA <sub>rii</sub> .
<sup>MA</sup> rid	- Rate of invalid maintenance actions for a given primary output signal.
MA <sub>rii</sub>	- Rate of invalid maintenance actions for a given secondary output signal.
₩ <sub>a</sub>	- Mean administrative delay time.
$\bar{M}_{et}$	- Mean corrective maintenance time.
<sup>M</sup> et <sub>i</sub>	- Individual corrective maintenance task time - the time required to complete an individual maintenance task or action.
<sup>M</sup> et <sub>i</sub>	- Average corrective maintenance time required to complete the ith individual maintenance task or the ith individual mainte- nance action. averaged over several (e.g., N) observations for the same (ith) task or action.
MDT <sub>o</sub>	- Operational mean downtime, including active repair time. ad- ministrative time, and logistic delay time. This includes scheduled and unscheduled maintenance time (NORM), logistic down time (NORS), awaiting maintenance time (AWM), and other administrative or handling delay time.
<sup>M</sup> pt	- Mean preventive (scheduled) maintenance time plus technical modification time.
MTBF	- Calculated mean time between failure.
MTBF <sub>o</sub>	- Operational mean time between failure. The achieved apparent failure rate as reflected in AFR-66-1/65-110 data, expressed as the sum of all operating hours for all systems divided by the sum of all maintenance actions due to an indicated malfunction, where the number of maintenance actions includes $R_{nd}$ , C. and $R_{r}$ .
M <sub>tt</sub>	- The mean time in which faults must be detected, isolated, and displayed. This parameter includes all diagnostic, trouble-shooting and maintenance technician participation time.

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N	- The average number of LRU's in the functional paths of a sub- system, or the number of LRU's of a single functional path.
P	- Performance.
P <sub>f</sub>	- The probability that the fault lies between input and sensor.
Q	- Quality Factor - A generic term referring to the measurement or test subsystem's measurement validity. The designer's estimate of the percentage of measurements that correctly pass and/or fail a signal for purposes of fault detection/isolation.
Q <sub>d</sub>	- Quality factor for a fault detection measurement.
Q <sub>f</sub>	- Quality factor for a specific fault detection or isolation measurement.
Q <sub>i</sub>	- Quality factor for a fault isolation measurement.
R	- Mission Reliability.
<sup>R</sup> BIT	- Figure of merit used to express the change in failure rate due to BIT. The failure rate of the system, divided by the sum of failure rate of the system plus the failure rate of BIT.
R <sub>nd</sub>	- No-Defect removals. Quantity per operating hour(s).
<sup>%R</sup> nd	- Percentage that no-defect removals are of the total maintenance actions due to a true malfunction.
R <sub>r</sub>	- Remove and Replace. Quantity per operating hour(s).
S	- Mission Survivability.
t	- Mission time.
UF	- % no-defect removals due to undetected faults.
U <sub>f</sub>	- The amount of uncertainty resolved by a given measurement.
U <sub>T</sub>	- Test subsystem uncertainty - The total number of O-level maintenance actions divided by the total number of malfunction- ing LRU's.

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# - Worth of a fault detection signal measurement.


- Worth of a fault isolation measurement.

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### APPENDIX A

## BIT LIFE CYCLE COST TRADE-OFF MODEL

### APPENDIX A

### BIT LIFE CYCLE COST TRADE-OFF MODEL

### 1. INTRODUCTION

The BIT Life Cycle Cost (LCC) Trade-off Model was developed to assist system designers in the selection of alternate BIT concepts and design features through LCC trade-offs. This model consists of five mathematical equations. Each equation describes a simplified method of computing an element of LCC which is sensitive to the BIT features. On the other hand, life cycle cost elements which are insensitive to the BIT design have been purposely omitted. The equations of the model have been simplified to minimize the requirement for the extensive input data which usually characterizes LCC models. As such, the costs calculated by the model should not be viewed as the total (real world) cost of an LCC element, but rather as a relevant cost element that is useful in analyzing the cost impact of alternate designs, concepts, and test subsystem features. As such, the model is configured to use LRU level performance and design parameters. The LCC impact (delta) of the subsystems constituent LRUs is summed by the model to provide the total subsystem incremental cost benefit or penalty.

### 2. BIT LCC TRADE-OFF MODEL EQUATIONS

Implementation of a given BIT feature or features will affect the classic RDT&E, Acquisition, and Operational and Support Costs of the host avionic or ground electronics system. Thus, the incremental change in life cycle cost is the sum of incremental changes in these three cost categories plus the incremental Availability and Flight Penalty Cost. In the equations that follow, the terms are defined as elements of incremental change in these categories. The decision for each trade-off takes the form of a question: "Does the Life Cycle Cost of the system increase or decrease if this feature(s) is incorporated?" If there is a decrease, then the feature is accepted. Conversely, if there is a null result or an increase, the feature is rejected. All individual terms are of negative sign for a cost decrease, or positive for a cost increase. Total life cycle cost incremental change is defined by the equations:

 $\Delta LCC = \Delta RDT \&E Cost + \Delta Acquisition Cost$ 

+  $\Delta$  Operation and Support Cost

### 2.1 INCREMENTAL RDT&E COSTS (C<sub>n</sub>).

 $C_r$  is the RDT &E cost as defined by DoD of a given BIT feature. In most cases, this term will be null. However, in certain cases where the implementation of a potential BIT feature requires unique research and development or related activity, this term will be the estimated cost of these efforts. For example, there could well be cases where a specific BIT feature might require the development of a new type of sensor to implement a test point, or the development of a new family of logic circuits with BIT provisions. In such cases the  $C_r$  term will be the estimated cost of these RDT &E efforts.

# 2.2 INCREMENTAL ACQUISITION COSTS (C aca)

The incremental Acquisition Costs are the sum of the Production Costs  $(C_p)$  plus the Initial Support Cost  $(C_{is})$ :

$$C_{acq} = C_{p} + C_{is}$$
 (Eq. A-2)

The incremental production costs are the sum of the design costs  $(C_d)$  and the manufacturing cost  $(C_m)$ . The terms include the impact of BIT features on both recurring and non-recurring production costs:

$$C_{p} = C_{d} + C_{m}$$
 (Eq. A-3)

The  $C_d$  term includes such cost elements as design engineering, drafting, prototype work, etc. Note that the design cost of a postulated BIT feature is therefore an increment of cost added to the fundamental cost of the LRU because of the implementation of the BIT feature.

The  $C_m$  term is the production cost of a projected BIT feature, and therefore this cost estimate becomes an increment of cost to the system as the result of such BIT implementation. For purposes of this trade-off algorithm, the value of  $C_m$  is computed as:

$$C_m = N_n (P + L) (1.0 + A)$$
 (Eq. A-4)

where P is the purchase cost of parts and material for the BIT feature in a single production unit, L is the labor cost necessary to fabricate the BIT feature into the single production unit, A is the administrative cost of adding that BIT feature to the production process, and includes such factors as burden, profit, etc., expressed as a fraction of production costs, and N<sub>p</sub> is the number of production LRUs expected to incorporate the BIT feature in question, i.e., N<sub>p</sub> = number of systems produced, times the number of LRUs per system.

### 2.2.2 Incremental Initial Support Costs (C<sub>is</sub>)

The incremental Initial Support Costs are the sum of the test equipment and test software costs  $(C_{+})$  plus the cost of the initial spares  $(C_{c})$ :

$$C_{is} = C_t + C_s \qquad (Eq. A-5)$$

A given BIT implementation may influence the cost of test equipment and software required to support the resulting system. For this reason, the tradeoff model provides the  $C_t$  term to account for these factors.  $C_t$  is computed based on the designer's estimate of the impact (if any) that his postulated BIT feature(s) may have on the cost of a set of test equipment and test software, should that BIT be incorporated:

 $C_t = SO + NQ (TO_w - TO_{wO}) + SID + NID (TID_w - TID_{wO})$  (Eq. A-6) where SO is the estimated cost change in Organizational Level software design as the result of the given BIT feature(s), NQ is the number of Organizational Level test equipment sets per site multiplied by the number of sites to be outfitted,  $TO_w$  is the estimated cost of a single set of Organizational Level test equipment to support the host system with the given BIT feature(s) incorporated,  $TO_{wO}$ is the estimated cost of a single set of Organizational Level test equipment to support the host system with the given BIT feature(s) not incorporated, SID is the estimated cost change for Intermediate and Depot Level software design as the result of the given BIT feature(s), NID is the number of Intermediate and Depot Level test equipment sets per site multiplied by the number of sites to be outfitted,  $TID_w$  is the estimated cost of a single set of a single set of Intermediate/ Depot Level test equipment to support the host system with the given BIT feature(s) incorporated, and  $TID_{wO}$  is the estimated cost of a single set of the support test equipment to support the host system with the given BIT feature(s) incorporated, and  $TID_{wO}$  is the estimated cost of a single set of

Intermediate/Depot Level test equipment to support the host system with the given BJT feature(s) not incorporated.

Guidelines for the derivation and use of the  $C_{t}$  term are:

One recognized description of BIT is "that portion of the automatic test equipment which is contained within the system to be tested." It follows that a given BIT implementation will tend to achieve functions of test systems within the prime system, with consequent cost reductions to the test equipment. The designer should consider this tendency in light of the specifics of his postulated BIT feature(s).

Automatic test software, as a very major program cost, is driven significantly by the "testability" of a given electronic design. BIT implementation often improves this "testability" by adding test points, control inputs, sensors, signal conditioning, or interface circuits. Thus, it is recommended that the designers of built-in-test who use this trade-off algorithm approach the estimation of software cost change by considering the effect the hardware implementation of BIT will have on the prime design.

The addition of BIT circuitry requires a capability to test that very same circuitry at one or more levels of maintenance. Thus, in estimating the test equipment cost terms, the designer should examine the complexity of the BIT circuits, and their intrinsic testability, to arrive at the impact on the cost of a set of test equipment.

In most instances the effect of a BIT feature on the quantity of "Test Equipment Sets" required for I and D level (NID) will be minimal. Therefore, this term is a constant in the equation with or without BIT incorporated.

The cost of initial outfitting spares  $(C_s)$  required to support a given number of systems at a site may change as a result of a given BIT feature(s). To the degree that the frequency of LRU removal/replacement varies as a result of the BIT feature(s), the number of LRU spares may vary. Thus the trade-off model term  $C_s$  must account for both the improved test subsystem effectiveness  $E_T$  and the change in the LRUs reliability (if any) due to the postulated BIT feature.

To compute the incremental change in spares required for a system with a given BIT feature(s) incorporated, it is necessary to determine the required number of spares with and without the feature, subtract these two values, and

assign a dollar value to the change in spares required. By this logic,  $C_s$  is computed according to the following equation:

$$C_s = M (N_w CS_w - N_{wo} CS_{wo})$$
(Eq. A-7)

where M = the number of bases,  $N_w$  = the number of spares per base with the postulated BIT feature incorporated,  $N_{wo}$  = The number of spares per base without the postulated BIT features incorporated,  $CS_w$  = the cost of a spare with the postulated BIT feature, and  $CS_{wo}$  = the cost of a spare without the postulated BIT feature.

The number of spares required (i.e.,  $N_w$  or  $N_{w0}$ ) for a given set of removal rates is an exponential function of these rates. The change in number of spares required for a given change in removal rates is therefore nonlinear, according to the Poisson density function (constant Lambda model) for electronic failures:

$$P(n) = \sum_{N=0}^{N=\infty} \frac{e^{-\lambda t} (\lambda t)^{N}}{N!}$$
(Eq. A-8)

where P(n) is the probability of n or more removals in operating time t, with an hourly removal rate  $\lambda$ . Thus, with P(n) as the probability of N or more removals, unity minus P(n) is the probability of <u>not having</u> N or more removals, and N-1 spares will provide that probability of no spares out-of-stock condition. Operating time t is the number of operating hours per month of the LRU under consideration multiplied by the quantity of that LRU being supported at each base, multiplied by the number of months of the provisioning period (generally one month (approx.) for Air Force avionics and/or ground electronic systems).  $\lambda$ is the mean demand rate per base as expressed by  $\lambda_{WO}$  or  $\lambda_W$  (where  $\lambda_{WO}$  and  $\lambda_W$  are the mean demand without and with the postulated BIT feature).

For existing equipment:

$$\lambda_{\rm wo} = \frac{1}{\rm MTBF_0}$$
 (Eq. A-9)

where MTBF is derived from AFR 66-1/65-110 data.

For new designs or modified equipment:

$$\lambda_{w} \text{ or } \lambda_{w0} \approx \frac{U_{T}}{\text{MTBF (K) (R_{BIT})}}$$

(Note that this is an approximation, since  $U_T$  is a result of on-equipment plus remove and replace maintenance.)

(Eq. A-10)

where  $U_T$  = the BIT Uncertainty as defined in subsection 2.2 of the study report, MTBF is the designer's estimate of MTBF as derived from MIL-HDBK-217, K is the ratio of the operational MTBF<sub>0</sub> to the as-designed MTBF for the particular design defined in paragraph 1.6.7 of the study report, and

$$R_{BIT} = \frac{\lambda_{LRU}}{\lambda_{LRU} + \lambda_{BIT}}$$

(see subsection 2.3 of the study report).

The spares model as defined above is not only an approximation of the initial outfitting spares, but also omits consideration of such elements as depot repair pipeline fill, war reserves, safety stockage against random fluctuations in demand, etc. However, the model as given will capture the major cost of initial spares outfitting, and is also sensitive to test subsystem design parameters.

### 2.3 INCREMENTAL OPERATION AND SUPPORT COSTS (C )

One of the major cost categories to be accounted for in the trade-off is that of operational and support costs. These are all costs of system ownership and operation, and exclude the initial set of logistic resources.

BIT is expected to change the required maintenance effort, by affecting the total number of hours of maintenance that a system will require during its operational life. This change in total maintenance hours is equated to a change in operational and support costs by the following computation:

$$C_{os} = (W_o + W_{id}) L_R$$
 (Eq. A-11)

where  $W_0$  is the change in organizational level life cycle maintenance manhours due to the BIT feature(s) considered in the trade-off,  $W_{id}$  is the change in intermediate and depot level life cycle maintenance manhours due to the BIT feature(s) considered in the trade-off, and  $W_0$  and  $W_{id}$  express the expected change in life cycle direct maintenance manhours due to the influence of the BIT features under consideration. BIT will in most cases increase the failure rate of the system due to the addition of BIT circuits. At the same time, the BIT capability will reduce the amount of effort needed to restore the system, by improving the quality of maintenance.

By this logic:

$$W_{o} = T_{o} \left(\lambda_{w} \overline{M}_{ct_{w}} - \lambda_{wo} \overline{M}_{ct_{wo}}\right)$$
(Eq. A-12)

$$W_{id} = T_{o} \left( \lambda_{w} \widetilde{M}_{id_{w}} - \lambda_{wo} \widetilde{M}_{id_{wo}} \right)$$
(Eq. A-13)

where  $T_0$  is the total life cycle operating hours of the system (the product of the number of systems to be built, the number of years of total operational life of these systems, and the yearly operating hours of a single such system),  $\lambda_w$  and  $\lambda_w$  are as defined in Eq. 8,  $\overline{M}_{ct}$  and  $\overline{M}_{ct}$  are the O-level mean corrective maintenance times for the LRU with and without the postulated BIT feature, and  $\overline{M}_{id}_{wo}$  are the I and D-level mean corrective maintenance times for the LRU with and without the postulated BIT feature.

 $L_{R}$  is the total cost of a direct maintenance manhour defined as:

$$L_{\mathbf{R}} = \frac{K1 K3}{12 K2} = $20.80$$
 (Eq. A-14)

where K1 is the annual direct cost of a maintenance technician (from AFR 173-10 this is \$10,888 for fiscal year 1979), K2 is the number of direct maintenance manhours produced by the same technician in a given month (from AFR 173-10 aircraft maintenance and personnel data this is 56.7 for fiscal year 1979), and K3 is a factor of 1.3, reflecting the numbers of supporting personnel (staff, base, etc.) required to support a group of maintenance technicians (derived from AFR 173-10 FY 1979 data).

## 2.4 INCREMENTAL AVAILABILITY COSTS (Cor)

The need to improve system availability is one of the major motivations for using Built-In-Test. As an axiom, military capability is the product of the number of systems and the availability of each:

$$C = N A \qquad (Eq. A-15)$$

By the Commutative Law, the numerical values of N (the number of systems), and A (the availability parameter), can be interchanged without effect upon C, the capability. Obviously, the cost of systems can therefore be traded off against the cost of improved availability. By this logic, any improvement to availability may be equated to the cost of those systems needed to produce the same change in capability, but without such improvement.

The BIT trade-off model therefore includes a term to express the fiscal value of availability changes due to the postulated BIT feature(s) and is defined as  $C_{or}$  which is the worth of a change in availability, where:

$$C_{or} = N_{p} C S_{w} C_{a}$$
(Eq. A-16)

where  $N_p$  is the number of LRUs procured,  $CS_w$  is the cost per LRU with the BIT feature, and  $C_a$  is the change in availability due to the postulated BIT feature and is calculated in the model as:

$$C_{a} = \left(\frac{1}{1 + \overline{M}_{ct_{wo}}\lambda_{wo}}\right) - \left(\frac{1}{1 + \overline{M}_{ct_{w}}\lambda_{w}}\right)$$
(Eq. A-17)

where the terms are as previously defined.

### 2.5 INCREMENTAL FLIGHT PENALTY COST (C<sub>fp</sub>)

When BIT hardware is added to avionics, it affects the fuel consumption and performance of the host aircraft by adding weight. The  $C_{fp}$  term has been provided to account for these effects in the trade-off model. In the majority of candidate BIT implementations considered, the overall dollar cost  $(C_{fp})$  may be expected to be small, but finite. Essentially the term has been included to ensure that rare cases in which the weight of BIT may be unusually large are penalized appropriately in the trade-off process. Based on the above, the  $C_{fp}$  term:

- Does not apply to ground electronic systems
- Does not apply at the detailed level of electronic or avionic design
- Applies only to those (overall system or subsystem level) trade-offs where the total weight of BIT hardware is greater than approximately 10 pounds.

The life cycle cost per pound of added weight depends on the class of aircraft, the specific aircraft type, its payload, energy envelope, or similar measures of performance, and cannot be generalized from available data. For this reason, whenever a system-level design engineer considers the  $C_{\rm fp}$  term potentially significant he is advised to consult with operations research and/or aerodynamic engineering personnel and request the appropriate cost determination from their sources.

APPENDIX B

## SIMULATION, AS APPLIED TO THE OPTIMIZATION

OF BUILT-IN-TEST

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### APPENDIX B

### SIMULATION, AS APPLIED TO THE OPTIMIZATION OF BUILT-IN-TEST 1. BACKGROUND

Since digital computers came into general use in the mid-1950's, simulation of military and economic systems has become a commonplace technique for evaluating system behavior. The simulation process is one where a "model" is operated to allow observation of system functions over a period of time.

Reference material for this study indicates at least one case where simulation was employed for BIT optimization. In the mid-1960's, the Norden Division of United Aircraft employed a stochastic simulation to evaluate the performance of BIT in a complex airborne radar. This permitted improvement of system BIT by a cut-and-try method involving the evaluation of different and progressively more refined BIT configurations.

With respect to this study, the issue to be resolved is whether or not simulation, in one form or another, offers sufficient benefits to recommend its use in general BIT optimization. This requires a consideration of the results achieved vs the costs of using simulation. The remainder of this Appendix provides further definition of simulation, an evaluation of potential applications, and conclusions as to the cost vs benefit factors for each potential application.

### 2. DEFINITION OF SIMULATION

Simulation is the process of tracing the detailed behavior of a system model through time, to observe and record performance data of interest. For purposes of this discussion, the term "model" is applied to the category of mathematical or logical models of systems, and excludes physical models such as wind-tunnel models, structural or electronic prototypes, etc. Thus, the simulation process is defined operationally as follows:

• Identify the goals of analysis in terms of the specific questions to be answered, and the significance of the results obtained, (e.g., the accuracy and usefulness of each conclusion)

- Identify, interrelate, and describe the factors that are to be simulated
- Prepare a (mathematical) model that contains the system description, and prepare input data
- Code, debug, and process the model to record data descriptive of modeled system behavior
- Validate the model by comparison of its performance with the actual system, using qualitative comparisons and mathematical techniques such as statistical confidence testing
- Perform repeated experimentation, operating the model with revised system descriptions, ranges of input data, etc.

Thus, it can be seen that the usual simulation process involves scientific experimentation rather than the solution of a set of deterministically exact equations. The effectiveness of a model depends on the system boundaries chosen, the pertinence of its variables, and the numerical values of its parameters, in that order. The ability of a given simulation to quantitatively predict the future state of the actual system at various times is not regarded as a test of its usefulness. Rather, the ability to predict the relative changes in system behavior resulting from simulated system changes, or the ability to identify the sensitivity of a system to changes in input variables, are the usual measures of usefulness.

### 3. BIT OPTIMIZATION IN THE SIMULATION CONTEXT

The thrust of this study is in the direction of a design methodology useful in configuring efficient, optimal BIT capability into new electronic systems. The criteria of optimization are therefore function and cost. If there were such methodology, the present system acquisition process would have to be studied and possibly revised to ensure its application at the appropriate stages of a system design. However this study is concerned with methodology, and studies of the acquisition process are beychid its scope. Therefore, we are concerned with the issue of whether or not, and to what degree, simulation may find usefulness as a BIT design methodology.

In considering the above, there are several axiomatic characteristics of the BIT optimization process and/or the simulation technique to be kept in mind:

- The projected reliability of a system and its elements is an essential parameter for such optimization. This makes the process stochastic, rather than deterministically exact
- Historically, actual system and elemental reliabilities are not well correlated with predicted values. Thus, the essential parameter is not only stochastic, but often of questionable accuracy as well
- Almost all accepted electronic design methodologies rely on the solution of exact systems of equations. There is very little application of the experimental method, except as an adjunct to exact design methods (e.g., laboratory debugging of circuit prototypes is used to confirm exact design solutions, and to account for the effect of distributed constants not included in classic circuit equations. It is not the primary method, but only a useful secondary technique)
- The technical tasks necessary to perform simulation tend to be just as complex and lengthy as those involved in using more exact methods. In some cases, simulation may actually require relatively greater effort.

The BIT Optimization Study seeks a design methodology that produces a global optimum, or as near perfect a local optimum as is possible at the state-of-the-art. From this frame of reference:

- It appears desirable to avoid the use of "cut-and-try" experimental methods such as simulation wherever more exact methods are possible
- Simulation is rarely used by circuit designers. The ideal optimization technique would be more in harmony with the circuit designer's normal methods, to encourage ready acceptance of methodology derived by the study
- The inherent uncertainty in using predicted elemental reliabilities as a BIT optimization parameter is acceptable because there is no other

alternative. It would be desirable to avoid the uncertainty of simulation as an absolute rather than relative predictor of system performance, since this would appear only to add an unnecessary element of additional risk.

Simulation is most useful in solution of problems that do not yield to other analytical approaches. It is often used to shed light on the behavior of very complex systems, or to evaluate system behavior under limit parameter inputs not feasible with an actual system. Its primary benefit is in these areas, and its accuracies are relative to a simulation baseline rather than in terms of absolute system performance values. Some examples of such application will be provided to illustrate this point.

### 4. BIT ALLOCATION BY SIMULATION

As noted in the introduction to this discussion, Norden employed simulation to optimize the allocation of BIT to an airborne radar. Their procedure was as follows.

A GPSS-language simulation of the conceptual radar was constructed to describe the system in terms of its major assemblies and circuit modules, their electronic functions, and their projected failure rates. This "model" was then further amplified by including a hypothetical BIT configuration in the radar system.

The model was then processed by computer. The simulation represented a significant period of simulated radar operation, during which time simulated failures occurred. The logic of the model then evaluated the BIT configuration to determine which of these failures were detected, and which were not detected. This provided a measure of how "good" that particular BIT configuration was in the detection and isolation of system malfunctions.

The system designer could then modify the model to improve the ability of the BIT to detect and isolate faults. He simply evaluated the simulation data to see which system failures occurred often enough to need BIT, and added this to the related system elements, while conversely, deleting BIT functions where the related failures did not occur often enough to warrant the cost. This process

was aided by a CRT and keyboard that permitted interactive modification of the model.

The process was continued until the desired level of BIT performance was achieved.

The above procedure resulted in a BIT configuration which was measurably more effective as a result of the experimental optimization. That is, it could be accurately asserted that the resulting BIT configuration was quantitatively better at fault detection and isolation than its original version, because the simulation produced this data. However, it must be noted that the quantity of improvement was relative to the baseline BIT originally simulated, and hence relative, rather than absolute as would be the case for a technique which predicted actual system behavior. The absolute accuracy of such data would depend on the validity of the model, that is, upon its precise correspondence to the actual system in point of structure, gain, feedback, etc. Note also that the elemental failure rates employed as input data were those projected for the designs in question, and were therefore subject to the same errors found in the process of reliability prediction.

It could be concluded that the above simulation would lead to more effective BIT than the largely intuitive methods used prior to its time. Experience with the actual system (in the A-6E aircraft) indicates that its BIT was in fact a step botter than prior systems. However:

- There is no way to tell whether this configuration was either a local or global optimum with respect to fault detection and fault isolation
- The model did not tabulate costs of any kind. This was up to the user to account for. He was merely concerned with the improvement of function by allocating BIT to points in the system where its need was most apparent, and by removing BIT functions which did not detect faults of sufficient frequency of occurrence
- The analysis did not provide a known accuracy in predicting the actual system BIT performance, because it could only have been validated after the system was actually constructed.

Such an approach could be used for BIT optimization, but would be expensive and subject to the same limitations discussed above. It should not be completely ru. 1 out, but simpler and more accurate approaches would be preferable. Finally, it should not be used by personnel not specifically experienced in simulation.

# 5. CIRCUIT SIMULATION

Today, dynamically exact circuit analysis software is available. If such systems were reiteratively used to simulate failure of each and every component at values between "shorted" and "open," this would be considered a simulation. In theory, it would provide a total evaluation of BIT capability. For example:

- Digital automatic test generators perform deterministic simulation and exactly reproduce the "output" consequences of a digital gate failure. An analogous simulation system could be developed to include BIT functional capability, thus permitting the fault detection and fault isolation capabilities of any given BIT to be exactly predicted
- Analog circuit design programs also exist, and could be adapted to the same end, with the same results.

Unfortunately, reiterative use of such software would be prohibitively expensive in time and computer costs, because it was designed for such other purposes as test generation or circuit design.

As the state-of-the-art for circuit simulation improves, there may come a time when a circuit-level BIT optimization software system could be developed. This would be an expensive undertaking, but would provide an exact measure of BIT function. It is suggested that the state-of-the-art of test generation be monitored to see if such a program would be feasible in the future. Digital Automatic Test Generators (ATGs) are well ahead of analog ATGs and may present the first opportunity for such an advance. Analog ATGs do not yet exist, in other than the most elementary forms.

With respect to this potential future development, two things must be emphasized:

- Cost is not a factor in the processes inherent to these classes of simulators. Function could potentially be optimized by these methods, but not costs vs function
- Applications of such methods are likely to be limited to the circuitmodule level of complexity within the foreseeable future. The large amount of computer time necessary to process such algorithms will probably limit their application to modules, rather than entire systems or "black boxes."

# 6. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Simulation is often used in cases where a problem is insoluble by other means. Such an application can be suggested in the context of BIT optimization:

- Assume, for purposes of discussion, that the current study synthesizes a methodology that will produce an efficient BIT configuration by criteria of cost and function
- The fundamental uncertainties of reliability prediction would still remain, and the optimum would be only as good as the failure rates used as input data
- It would be desirable to know the effects of such uncertainty upon the efficiency of a specific BIT configuration or configurations.

A stochastic simulation of the kind discussed earlier would provide some useful insights into the effects of different elemental reliabilities on the fault detection and isolation capability of BIT configurations:

- Construct a model of the (BIT-optimized) system, and operate the model with the same input data as were used to design that particular BIT configuration.
- Subsequently, randomly vary the elemental failure rates of the system components between judiciously selected limits, and observe the BIT capability under those conditions

• This would provide an insight into how actual systems designed along such lines would behave in the field.

This analysis could be done manually by simply repeating the optimization using different element failure rates. However, this could require literally years of effort. Automatic simulation would provide equivalent conclusions in only a few weeks or months.

# 7. CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS

For the immediate requirement, simulation does not appear to offer any significant advantages. A more conventional method is recommended for the sake of accuracy and user acceptability.

Monitor the progress of automatic test generators for the next few years. At some future time these may become adaptable to dynamically exact simulation of BIT and host circuits, yielding exact measures of fault detection and isolation that are independent of reliability estimates.

The impact of presently uncertain reliability predictions on the effectiveness of BIT optimization could be evaluated by simulation. This could provide useful insights that might lead to improvements to future BIT/Diagnostics methodology. APPENDIX C

# SIMULATED APPLICATION OF THE SUBSYSTEM

# BIT OF FIMIZATION METHODOLOGY

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### APPENDIX C

# SIMULATED APPLICATION OF THE SUBSYSTEM

# BIT OPTIMIZATION METHODOLOGY

This appendix presents an example of the BIT optimization procedure of Section 4 applied to the E-2C Advanced Radar Processing System (ARPS). The ARPS was chosen because it is a contemporary subsystem incorporating a broad spectrum of technologies, with a requirement for high BIT effectiveness.


# 1. ARPS DESCRIPTION

The Advanced Radar Processing System is a modification of the AN/APS-125, providing increased reliability, improved BIT, increased detection range, and automatic overland performance (see Fig. C-1). The ARPS is comprised of nine LRUs:

- Receiver-Converter
- Pulse Generator
- Radar Set Control
- Performance Indicator
- Dual Pulse Attenuator-Compressor
- Comparator-Filter
- Detector Processor
- Digital Data Comparator
- Digital Signal Converter.

There are six fundamental input signals from the aircraft antennas:

- Sum channel
- Difference channel
- Auxiliary 1
- Auxiliary 2



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- Auxiliary 3
- Auxiliary 4.

The sum and difference channel signals are fed through the Receiver-Converter to the Comparator-Filter, where unwanted signals from the antenna sidelobes are canceled. As shown in Fig. C-1, AUX 1 and AUX 2 signals are multiplexed/demultiplexed by LRUs not part of ARPS. They are then fed through the Receiver-Converter to the Comparator-Filter where they are used for sidelobe cancellation. AUX 3 and AUX 4 signals are direct inputs to the Receiver-Converter and are also used for side-lobe cancellation.

The Dual Pulse Attenuator-Compressor compresses and equalizes the sum and difference pulses. It sends clutter gate information to the external interface (Control Voltage Simulator) and clutter envelope information to the Detector Processor via the Digital Data Comparator. The sum and difference signals are converted from analog to digital format in the Digital Data Comparator. Each A to D conversion produces in-phase and quadrature outputs.

The sum channel contains a digital delay canceler that supplies two eightbit outputs in parallel to the Digital Signal Converter. The difference channel contains a single delay canceler whose output is used for real time blanking in the Detector-Processor.

The in-phase and quadrature outputs for each moving target are sent to the Digital Signal Converter, which performs a fast Fourier transform of these signals. This transform results in 16 doppler filter outputs to the Detector-Processor. Depending upon its radial velocity, each target return will appear in a particular filter.

The Detector-Processor determines a threshold level for the output of each doppler filter. If a return exceeds its threshold, it is processed as a possible target. Real time blanking, predictive blanking, and noncoherent integration are performed on these signals. Resulting outputs are provided to the external interface as real time synthetic video and pseudo-synthetic video.

# **1.1 PULSE GENERATOR FUNCTIONS**

The Pulse Generator provides the basic timing. A 15 MHz crystal-controlled oscillator is used to generate the 5, 10, 30, 45, 60, 75, and 105 MHz timing references used throughout the system.

# **1.2 RECEIVEP-CONVERTER FUNCTIONS**

The Receiver-Converter contains six similar channels for processing the six input signals (sum, difference, and AUX 1 through AUX 4). It contains the filters, amplifiers, and mixers necessary to produce a system IF of 30 MHz for each of the six input signals.

# **1.3 COMPARATOR-FILTER FUNCTIONS**

There are two main Comparator-Filter Functions:

- removal of wide band jamming from the sum and difference channels
- removal of narrow band jamming from the sum and difference channels.

The Comparator-Filter contains eight wide band correlators and two narrow band correlators used to eliminate jamming. For wide band jamming rejection, jamming signals are correlated against the auxiliary inputs. For narrow band jamming rejection, autocorrelation is required because there are no narrow band auxiliary signals.

The Comparator-Filter also contains an oscillator amplifier and a power amplifier which produces local oscillator inputs to the Receiver-Converter and Multiplexer.

# **1.4 DUAL PULSE ATTENUATOR-COMPRESSOR FUNCTIONS**

The Dual Pulse Attenuator-Compressor is a complex 2.75 MHz dual filter which filters, compresses, and equalizes the sum and difference channel signals.

# **1.5 DIGITAL DATA COMPARATOR FUNCTIONS**

The Digital Data Comparator contains 10 SRUs which perform the following seven functions:

- convert the incoming 30 MHz IF into in-phase and quadrature video
- convert the analog signals to a 10-bit digital output

- cancel ground clutter (Airborne Moving Target Indicator, AMTI)
- generate automatic gain control for land clutter, jamming residue, and large discrete target signals
- evaluate doppler shift of the main lobe clutter
- detect large discrete targets in both the main lobe and side lobes of the antenna pattern and blank those returns from the side lobes
- generate video.

# **1.6 DETECTOR-PROCESSOR FUNCTIONS**

The Detector-Processor detects and processes targets for the tracking system. Among the operations performed on the detected targets are beamsplitting, range rate calculation, and target report formatting into a serial 64bit message. It contains a computer which processes the target data, computes its characteristics, formats reports, and controls outputs to the central weapon system computer.

# **1.7 DIGITAL SIGNAL CONVERTER FUNCTIONS**

The Digital Signal Converter performs a fast Fourier transform on the AMTI output of the Digital Data Converter. It uses the resulting frequency domain information to determine the doppler shift of the targets.

# **1.8 RADAR SET CONTROL FUNCTIONS**

This unit is the Operator Control.

# **1.9 PERFORMANCE INDICATOR FUNCTIONS**

This unit has light indicators which provide performance monitoring and fault isolation information. An arithmetic logic unit counts the number of consecutive faults for each bit of each fault data word and recirculates the count through a RAM. When 15 consecutive faults occur, the unit outputs a fault report.

#### 1.10 IN-FLIGHT PERFORMANCE MONITOR (IFPM)

The E-2C aircraft In-Flight Performance Monitor integrates the performance monitoring and fault isolation functions (PM/BIT) of the avionics suite. ARPS

transmits fault information to the IFPM so that ARPS failures are flagged to the operator. Although evaluation is done locally in the LRUs, the difficulty of personnel moving from LRU to LRU necessitates a central monitoring point such as the IFPM.

# 2. BIT DESIGN PROCEDURE

The following steps describe application of the subsystem design methodology to the ARPS. The BIT design effort considers the technical guidelines described in Section 4. Data sources used in preparing the ARPS signal matrices consisted of LRU and SRU logic diagrams, schematics, training, and technical manuals supplemented by discussions with ARPS engineering personnel.

# Step 1 Identification/Analysis of Subsystem Functions

The initial step in the BIT design methodology is to develop an overall block diagram of the conceptual subsystem architecture. Figure C-1 illustrates such a diagram. For the purpose of illustrating the methodology, input and output signal matrices were completed for two ARPS functions (Range - Normal Operating Mode and TACCAR - Test Mode). The matrices are provided in Figs. C-2 through C-4. The figures illustrate preliminary matrices that have gone through the initial steps of the procedure. The failure rates and costs have been extracted from the E-2C "Maintenance Engineering Analysis Summary Sheets."

# Step 2 Functional Path Definition

Next, functional path diagrams were drawn for the Range and TACCAR functions. These include all subsystem elements that accomplish these two functions and depict their relationships. Figures C-5 and C-6 are the preliminary functional flow diagrams. Input and output signal numbers are noted on the flow diagrams with the corresponding elemental failure rates  $(F_{\rm mi})$ .

For the Range function, the functional flow is serial. The TACCAR function, however, typifies a functional flow with feedback. This is why the TACCAR signal matrix shows the same failure rate  $(F_{ri})$  for each output line.

# Step ? Development of Bit Design Concept

The following tasks, each of which is discussed in the designated subsections below, are associated with developing a BIT design concept:

SIGNAL NO.	SIGNAL NOMEN- CLATURE	RELATED FUNCTION/ NAME/ NUMBER	FUNCT NO.	CLASS	ANALOG	DIGITAL	DISCRETE	RF	VIDEO	POWER	MODE NAME	ENOM	EMAX	EMIN	UNIT	TOL, %	CONT. SIGNAL NO. 1	CONT. SIGNAL NO. 2
M200	RNG013	RNGE	01	Р		PTTL-14B					NORM	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	M210	M220
M210	FLTRH		01	s		PTTL-8B					NORM	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	M215	M225
M220	FLTRL	RNGE	01	s		PTTL-8B					NORM	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	M215	M225
M215	INPH	RNGE	01	s		PTTL-8B					NORM	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	M216	M218
M225	QUAD	RNGE	01	s		PTTL-8B					NORM	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	M216	M218
M216	SUMC	RNGE	01	s				IF			NORM		2.55		VOLT	N/A	M217	M219
M218	DIFFC	RNGE	01	s				IF			NORM		2.55		VOLT	N/A	M217	M219
M217	SUMF	RNGE	01	s				IF			NORM	2.55			VOLT	5	M221	M223
M219	DIFFF	RNGE	01	s			l	IF			NORM	2.55			VOLT	5	M221	M223
M221	SUMV	RNGE	01	s				IF			NORM	2.55		i	VOLT	5	S100	S110
M223	DIFFV	RNGE	01	s				IF			NORM	2.55			VOLT	5	S100	S110
M228	PLS	RNGE	01	s	т						NORM	5.0			VOLT	5	S120	
M227	PLS	RNGE	01	s	т						NORM	5.0			VOLT	5	S120	
M229	PLS	RNGE	01	s	т						NORM	5.0			VOLT	5	S120	

FRS = 3638 x 10-6 FAILURES/HR

NOTE:

(1) FRP OF EACH SIGNAL PATH IS EQUAL TO THE FRI OF THE FUNCTIONAL ELEMENT BECAUSE OF COMMON CIRCUITRY, AND IS THE CUMULATI FUNCTIONAL ELEMENT.

(2) RANGE AND TACCAR FUNCTIONS HAVE CONSOLE CRTs AND INDICATORS WHICH PROVIDE INTRINSIC BIT. EXTRINSIC BIT, IN THE FORM OF TO ACHIEVE THE NECESSARY EFFECTIVENESS.

(3) THESE OUTPUTS FROM THE PULSE GENERATOR ARE IN PARALLEL TO THE SERIAL PATH OF THE REMAINING FUNCTIONAL FLEMENTS.

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	UNIT	TOL.	CONT. SIGNAL NO. 1	CONT. SIGNAL NO. 2	CONT. SIGNAL NO. 3	F <sub>RP</sub> x 10 <sup>-6</sup>	TEST?	PM INT	PM EXT	DETECT	ISOLATE	Q <sub>f,</sub> %	TIME. ms	SAMP Rate	COST, \$K	SENSOR TY PE	EVAL	WORTH (ISO), Wi x 10 <sup>-6</sup>	WORTH (DET), WD x 10 <sup>-6</sup>	NOTES
ľ	N/A	N/A	M210	M220	M229	3638	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	95	1200	300	40	COMPUTER	S	TBD	TBD	SEE NOTE (2)
	N/A	N/A	M215	M225	M228	2926	Y	v	Y	Y	Y	95	3.0	300	12.5	COMPAR	L	TBD	тво	SEE NOTE (1)
	N/A	N/A	M215	M225	M228	2926	۲	v	Υ	Y	Y	95	3.0	300	12.5	COMPAR	L	TBD	TBD	SEE NOTE (1)
	N/A	N/A	M216	M218	M227	1733	۱v	<sub>Y</sub>	Y	Y	Y	95	900	300	3.5	COMPAR	L	TBD	TBD	SEE NUTE (1)
	N/A	N/A	M216	M218	M227	1733	v	Y	Y	Y	Ŷ	95	900	300	3.5	COMPAR	L	TBD	TBD	SEE NOTE (1)
	VOLT	N/A	M21 /	M219		838	v	Y	Y	Y	Y	85	1.0	c	2.5	THRESH.	ι	TBD	TBD	SEE NOTE (1)
	VOLT	N/A	M217	M219	ł	838	Υ	Y	Y	Y	Y	85	1.0	с	2.5	THRESH.	]ι	TBD	TBD	SEE NOTE (1)
	VOLT	5	M221	M223	}	665	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	85	1,0	300	2.5	THRESH.	L	тво	тво	SEE NOTE (1)
	VOLT	5	M221	M223		665	Υ	Y	Y	Y	Y	85	1.0	300	2.5	THRESH.	L	TBD	TBD	SEE NOTE (1)
	VOLT	5	\$100	S110	Į	185	v	۱v	Y	Y	Y	85	1.0	300	4.25	THRESH.	<b>ι</b>	TBD	TBD	SEE NOTE (1)
	VOLT	5	\$100	\$110		185	v	1	<sub>Y</sub>	Y	Y	85	1.0	300	4.25	THRESH.	L	TBD	TBD	SEE NOTE (1)
	VOLT	5	5120	]		227	1	<sub>Y</sub>	Y	Y	Y	85	1,0	c	5	THRESH.	L	TBD	TBD	SEE NOTE (3)
	VOLT		\$120			227	v	Y	۱v	v	Y	85	1,0	c	5	THRESH.	<b>ι</b>	TPD	TBD	SEE NOTE (3)
	VOLT	5	\$120			227		Y	_	<sub>Y</sub>	Y	85	1,0	c	5	THRESH.	L	TBD	TBD	SEE NOTE (3)
	VOLT	5	S120			227	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	85	1,0	С	5	THRESH.	L	TBD	TBD	SEE NOT

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FRS = 3638 x 10-6 FAILURES/HR

TOTAL COST = \$105.5

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DN CIRCUITRY, AND IS THE CUMULATIVE SUM OF THE SIGNAL PATH INPUT TO THE OUTPUT OF THE

BIT. EXTRINSIC BIT, IN THE FORM OF SENSORS AND TEST TARGETS, PROVIDE THE ADDITIONAL BIT REQUIRED

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Fig. C-2 Preliminary Output Signal Matrix (Range Function)

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SIGNAL NO.	SIGNAL NOMEN- CLATURE	RELATED FUNCTION/ NAME/ NUMBER	FUNCT NO.	CLASS	ANALOG	DIGITAL	DISCRETE	RF	VIDEO	POWER	MODE NAME	ENOM	EMAX	Emin	AMPLITUDE	UNIT	TOL,	CONT SIGNAL NO. 1	CONT SIGNAL NO. 2	F <sub>F</sub> x 1
M400	TACOUT	TACCAR	02	P	DC		_				TEST	2.55				VOLT	5	M340	M345	26
M310	XMTPLS	TACCAR	02	s				LPV			TEST	10				VOLT	5	M320		26
M315	DSCOUT	TACCAR	02	s	DC						TEST		0.5	-0.5		VOLT	N/A	M320	[	26
M320	CVSOUT	TACCAR	02	s	DC						TEST	3				VOLT	5	M330	M315	26
M330	TACCO	TACCAR	02	s	DC						TEST	3				VOLT	5	M340	M345	26
M340	SUMC	TACCAR	02	s				IF			TEST		2.55			VOLT	N/A	M350	M355	26
M345	DIFFC	TACCAR	02	s				IF			TEST		2.55			VOLT	N/A	M350	M355	26
M350	SUMF	TACCAR	02	s				IF			TEST		2.55			VOLT	N/A	M360	M365	26
M355	DIFFF	TACCAR	02	s			ļ	IF			TEST		2.55			VOLT	N/A	M360	M365	26
M360	SUMV	TACCAR	02	s				IF			TEST		2.55			VOLT	N/A	M370	S410	26
M365	DIFFV	TACCAR	02	s				IF			TEST		2.55			VOLT	N/A	M370	S410	26
M370	SUMD	TACCAR	02	s				ANT			TEST				-50	DBM	N/A	S400	M310	20

FRS = 2629 x 10-6 FAILUR

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NOTE:

(1) SENSOR NOT REQUIRED SINCE PERFORMANCE MONITOR SENSOR ALREADY EXISTS FOR TRANSMITTER AS PART OF ADS-125. (2) RANGE AND TACCAR FUNCTIONS HAVE CONSOLE CRTS AND INDICATORS WHICH PROVIDE INTRINSIC BIT. EXTRINSIC BIT, IN THE FORM OF SEN TO ACHIEVE THE NECESSARY EFFECTIVENESS.

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IN	AMPLITUDE	UNIT	TOL,	CONT SIGNAL NO. 1	CONT SIGNAL NO. 2	• F <sub>RP</sub> x 10 <sup>-6</sup>	TEST ?	PM INT	PM EXT	DETECT	ISOLATE	Q <sub>f</sub> %	TIME, MS	SAMP RATE	COST, \$K	SENSOR	EVAL	WORTH (ISO), Wi x 10 <sup>-6</sup>	WORTH (DET), WD x 10 <sup>-6</sup>	NOTES
		VOLT	5	M340	M345	2629	Y	Y	Y	Υ	Y	85	100	с	4.0	THRESH.	L	TBD	TBD	NOTE (2)
		VOLT	5	м320		2629	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	85	3.0	300	5.0	THRESH.	L	TBD	TBD	
15		VOLT	N/A	M320		2629	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	85	3.0	300	2.5	THRESH.	Ł	TBD	TBD	}
		VOLT	5	M330	M315	2629	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	85	10	с	3.0	THRESH.	L	TBD	TBD	
		VOLT	5	M340	M345	2629	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	85	3,0	300	2.5	THRESH.	L	TBD	TBD	
		VOLT	N/A	M350	M355	2629	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	85	1.0	c	2.5	THRESH.	L	TBD	TBD	
		VOLT	N/A	M350	M355	2629	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	85	1.0	с	2.5	THRESH.	L	TBD	TBD	
		VOLT	N/A	M360	M365	2629	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	85	1.0	300	2.5	THRESH.	L	TBD	TBD	
		VOLT	N/A	M360	M365	2629	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	85	1.0	300	2.5	THRESH.	L	TBD	TBD	1
		VOLT	N/A	M370	S410	2629	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	85	1.0	300	4.25	THRESH.	L	TBD	TBD	
1		VOLT	N/A	M370	S410	2629	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	85	1.0	300	4.25	THRESH.	L	TBD	TBD	}
	-50	DBM	N/A	S400	M310	2629	N	Y	N	Y	Y	85	1.0	300	0	-		TBD	TBD	SEE NOTE (1)

FRS = 2629 x 10-6 FAILURES/HR

TOTAL COST = \$35.5K

MITTER AS PART OF ADS-125.

INSIC BIT. EXTRINSIC BIT, IN THE FORM OF SENSORS AND TEST TARGETS PROVIDE THE ADDITIONAL BIT REQUIRED

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Fig. C-3 Preliminary Output Signal Matrix (TACCAR Function)

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
SIGNAL NO.	SIGNAL NOMEN	RELATED FUNCTION/ NAME/ NUMBER	FUNCT	ರ	ANALOG	DIGITAL	CISCRETE RF	Ĕ	VIDEO	POWER	POWER MODE	INPUT	UNITS TOL	TOL.	TYPE	Fr./ Fr.p X10 <sup>-6</sup>		RATE	CALIB. HR	COST.
00 v 50	SUM	RNGE	10	-				ANT			NORM	ŝ	DBM		MON	010	z	300	0001	8
5110	DIFFQ	RNGE	5	-				ANT			NORM	ş	DBM		PNOM	010	z	300	000 000	8
										8	NORM	ŝ	VOLT		ENOM	8	z	с U	000 00	§
									<u>.                                    </u>						_					
S400	SUM	TACCAR	03					ANT			NORM	ş	NBO		MON	010	z	90	9001	8
0195	DIFF	TACCAR	60					ANT			NORM	Ŗ	NBO		PNOM	010	z	90	0001	8
2181-006W	06W			]	Fia.	A Inpu	Fig. C4 Input Signal Matrix, Range and TACCAR	Mat	rix. R	nge an	A TA	CCAF		]	}		1		]	

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


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- (A) review the subsystem maintenance concept/maintenance plan
- (B) determine the output signals to be measured
- (C) develop a PM/BIT architecture
- (D) estimate PM/BIT effectiveness
- (E) estimate  $\overline{M}_{tt}$
- (F) estimate PM/BIT cost
- (G) adjust initial PM/BIT design concept
- (H) adjust PM/BIT design concept effectiveness
- (I) adjust  $\overline{M}_{++}$ .

#### Step 3A Review of the Maintenance Concept/Plan

A review of the preliminary subsystem maintenance concept/plan for the ARPS, derived from the Grumman Design Specification for the APS-125 Radar, shows:

- level of maintenance is flight line
- level of fault isolation is to the LRU
- test concept BIT and PM fault detection of 97.5% with an  $\overline{M}_{ct}$  of 30 minutes; the  $\overline{M}_{tt}$  target is 3 minutes
- external test equipment will not be required
- false alarm rate = 1% of total subsystem failure rate
- fault isolation will be done automatically unless an "on demand," manually initiated test mode offers significant advantages
- fault criteria as a minimum, the subsystem will provide failure indications with the characteristics defined in Fig. C-7 (note that T = failure criteria for TACCAR function, and R = failure criteria for Range function).

# Step 3B Initial Determination of the Output Signals to be Measured

The primary output signals have been designated on the signal matrices. For the TACCAR function, the primary output signal is the "TACOUT" signal. For the Range function, the primary output signal is the "RNG013" signal. The

FAILURE INDICATION	FAILURE INDICATIONS AND CRITERIA
INTERFACE FAULT (R)	LOSS OF DATA, CLOCK, GR DATA BUS TRANSMISSION BETWEEN LRUS.
DIGITAL DATA COMPARATOR POWER SUPPLY (T, R)	LOSS OR DEGRADATION OF POWER SUPPLY.
WIDE BAND NO. 1 (T, R)	LOSS OR DEGRADATION OF SIDE LOBE CANCELER NO. 1.
WIDE BAND NO. 2 (T, R)	LOSS OR DEGRADATION OF SIDE LOBE CANCELER NO. 2.
NARROW BAND (T, R)	30 Db DEGRADATION.
CANCELED VIDEO (R)	LOSS OR DEGRADATION OF CIRCUIT THAT AFFECTS THE DIGITAL SIGNAL CONVERTER INPUTS BUT NOT CANCELED VIDEO.
DIGITAL SIGNAL CONVERTER DEGRADED (R)	DEGRADATION OF DIGITAL SIGNAL CONVERTER GREATER THAN 3 Db.
DIGITAL SIGNAL CONVERTER AND/OR DATA-PROCESSOR OVERHEAT (R)	OVERTEMPERATURE.
PULST COMPRESSED VIDEO (R)	LOSS OR DEGRADATION OF CIRCUIT THAT AFFECTS DIGITAL SIGNAL CONVERTER INPUTS CANCELED VIDEO BUT NOT PULSE COMPRESSED VIDEO.
LONG PULSE COMPRESSED VIDEO (T,R)	LOSS OR DEGRADATION OF CIRCUIT THAT AFFECTS DIGITAL SIGNAL CONVERTER INPUTS, CANCELED VIDEO & PULSE COM- PRESSED VIDEO, BUT NOT LONG PULSE VIDEO.
DETECTOR PROCESSOR FAULT (R)	LOSS OR DEGRADATION OF CIRCUIT THAT AFFECTS DETECTOR PROCESSOR.
RANGE (R)	LOSS OR DEGRADATION OF DETECTOR PROCESSOR RANGE.
VELOCITY (R)	LOSS OR DEGRADATION OF DETECTOR PROCESSOR VELOCITY.
0719-035	

Fig. C-7 Mini	mum Fault	Indications	and	Characteristics
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Range function is tested automatically, on-line, during an inactive period of the antenna sweep. To test the TACCAR function, the operator initiates the TACCAR test mode via the Radar Control. Signals were designated as follows:

• Initial Designation of Signals Measured for BIT Fault Detection - Since "TACOUT" and "RNG013" are the only two primary outputs in this illustration, and since they are needed for performance monitoring, they will not be traded off. However, in order to illustrate the methodology, the worth of sensing each output is calculated.

In determining the worth of fault-detecting these two outputs, the following equation is solved:

$$W_{d} = \frac{F_{rp} \times Q_{f}}{C_{p}}$$

where  $W_d$  = worth of each primary output signal to be tested,  $F_{rp}$  = failure rate (x10<sup>-6</sup> hours) of path leading to that primary output (obtained from signal matrices),  $Q_f$  = measurement quality factor (average), and  $C_p$  = estimated production cost of PM/BIT (from signal matrices).

For the Range function:

$$F_{rp} = 3638 \times 10^{-6}$$
  
 $C_p = $105,500$   
 $Q_f = 0.90 (average)$ 

So that

$$W_{d} = \frac{3638 \times 0.90 \times 10^{-6}}{105,500}$$
$$= 0.03 \times 10^{-6}$$

# For the TACCAR function:

 $W_d$  is indeterminately high because the path has intrinsic fault detection. If the TACCAR function was not working, excessive clutter would result, enabling the operator to see this in his video display. Because of this,  $C_p \approx 0$ . For a completed BIT design, the worth factors measuring other primary outputs would be combined with the two that are shown and ranked in order of decreasing worth. This ranking would be used in later tradeoffs.

Initial Designation of Signals for Fault Isolation - The next step in the design process is to designate sensors on all the secondary outputs and compute their worth. Subsequent trade-offs may see the elimination of those with least worth (W<sub>i</sub>). The computed worth for these trade-offs is given in Figs. C-8 and C-9. The relationships between the signal outputs, as derived from the signal matrices, and the uncertainty resolved by their sensors, are shown. Failure rates are obtained from the functional flow diagrams. However, before the worth of the sensors in the TACCAR functional path can be computed, the feedback loop was broken at the M330 output.

The  $Q_f$ 's shown considered the use of software diagnostics for the digital units, with  $Q_f$  estimated as 95%, and hardware sensors for the remaining LRUs with  $Q_f$  estimated as 85%.

Fault isolation data are displayed on the Performance Indicator and include information from sensors monitoring the sum and difference frequencies, Aux 1, 2, 3, 4, wide band and narrow band correlators, and UHF amplifier.

There is another group of faults sensed by hardwired sensors. These faults are clock failure, power supply malfunction, overheat, and degraded performance. These faults are also displayed on the Performance Indicator and are transmitted to the IFPM where they are used for fault isolation.

The worth of each sensor (whether hardware or software) is computed as:

$$W_{i} = \frac{U_{f} \times Q_{f}}{C_{p}}$$

where  $W_i$  = worth of each secondary output to be tested,  $U_f$  = uncertainty resolved in terms of relative failure rate (reference paragraph 4.4.3.3),  $Q_f$  = measurement quality factor of sensor, and  $C_p$  = estimated production cost of sensor (from signal matrices).

SIGNAL OUTPUT NO.	∑ NORMALIZED FAILURE RATES, P <sub>1</sub>	RELATIVE UNCERTAINTY RESOLVED, U <sub>1</sub>	oʻ	С <sub>р</sub> , \$	wi
M216, M218	0.23	0,82	0.85	5,000	139 x 10 <sup>-6</sup>
M215, M225	0.41	0,97	0.95	7,000	132 × 10 <sup>-6</sup>
M217, M219	0.18	0.70	0.85	5,000	119 x 10 <sup>-6</sup>
M223, M221	0.05	0.30	0.85	8,500	30 x 10 <sup>-6</sup>
M210, M220	0.74	0.80	0.95	25,000	30 x 10 <sup>-6</sup>
M227, M228, M229	0,06	0.30	0.85	15,000	17 x 10 <sup>-6</sup>
M200	1.0	0	0.95	40,000	0
			ļ	\$105,500	

Fig. C-8	Ranking of Sensors	For	Range	Function
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SIGNAL OUTPUT NO.	∑ NORMALIZED FAILURE RATES, P <sub>f</sub>	RELATIVE UNCERTAINTY RESOLVED, U <sub>f</sub>	Qŧ	С <sub>р</sub> \$	w,
M370	0.55	0.98	0,85	0	
M350, M355	0.80	0.74	0.85	5,000	126 × 10 <sup>-6</sup>
M340, M345	0.87	0.55	0,85	5,000	94 x 10 <sup>-6</sup>
M360, M365	0.62	0.93	0,85	8,500	93 × 10 <sup>-6</sup>
M310, M315	0.13	0.60	0,85	7,500	68 x 10 <sup>-6</sup>
M320	0.04	0.22	0.85	3,000	62 × 10 <sup>-6</sup>
M330, M400	1.0	0	0,85	6,500	D
				\$35,500	

Fig. C-9 Ranking of Sensors for TACCAR Function

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#### The results are shown in Figs. C-8 and C-9.

# Step 3C Development of a PM/BIT Architecture

The next task is to formulate a PM/BIT architecture that will satisfy the design requirements and stay within the target cost.

The ARPS has an architecture utilizing both a centralized and decentralized PM/BIT design. Each ARPS LRU contains both the sensor and evaluator, and transmits a fault report via the data bus to the Performance Indicator. Fault reports are also sent to the IFPM for display to the system operator. Figures C-10 and C-11 illustrate the PM/BIT architecture. Note that the TACCAR feedback loop can be opened by means of a manually initiated control designed to facilitate testing.

Hardwired BIT sensors of the following characteristics are chosen:

- <u>Servo/Gate</u> This sensor is part of the control voltage simulator. It detects a follow-up error of less than 8° or greater than 15° and also detects the presence of a TACCAR clutter gate
- Sync Test This sensor (in the Pulse Generator) detects the presence of a fault if the interpulse period is in error by ±20%. It also detects the absence of the data bus clock
- <u>AFC</u> This sensor (located in the Control Voltage Simulator) detects incremental change in frequency of the Pulse Generator outputs in excess of 20 Hz at 15 MHz
- LVPS Test This sensor detects loss of Power Supply regulation
- DSC Power This sensor detects overvoltage greater than 10%, over current greater than 125% of maximum load, and an overheat condition greater than 85°C.

The quality factors of these hardwired sensors are estimated to be 85%.

The Detector-Processor, Digital Data Comparator, and Digital Signal Converter are tested exclusively through the use of software BIT. Data Processor monitoring is done using stored test vectors or test targets. Test targets are injected at ranges from 0 to 19 miles and greater than the maximum active range




Fig. C-10 Range Function Proposed PM/BIT Output Configuration

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


Fig. C-11 TACCAR Function Proposed PM/BIT Output Configuration

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of 240 miles. Since no real targets are processed in these ranges, target reports are automatically inhibited.

If either the Detector Processor, Digital Data Comparator, or the Digital Signal Converter are faulty, a BIT indication is transmitted to the Performance Indicator and IFPM via the data bus.


Since the Detector-Processor contains a computer, it is practical to utilize diagnostics or test targets stored in PROMs for BIT functions. This implementation is very cost-effective since little new hardware is required. Also, the subsystem is amenable to this approach because ample "dead time" exists for online testing during the inactive ranges. The sampling time is approximately 1.2 seconds to process one test target, or 15.6 seconds for the required 13 test targets. This provides a complete test of the Detector Processor, with a quality factor estimated as 95%.

The APS-125 and ARPS utilize a data bus for control and fault reporting. Evaluation is done locally in each LRU. Control information is transmitted from the Radar Set Control to the various LRUs, and fault reports from individual LRUs are received by the Performance Indicator.

Figure C-12 shows the data bus control and fault reporting system. The Performance Indicator is used to display fault reports. Figure C-13 is a block diagram of the assembly.

The following guidelines were used in designing the LRU:

- particular attention was paid to the reliability of the display itself to ensure that failure of the display circuitry does not mask a function failure or erroneously indicate a failure
- the information content of the display was no more than the observer requires
- use of the display for presenting maintenance information was considered in establishing display requirements
- the prominence and placement of the display is consistent with the importance of the information it provides. In this regard, displays of other than radar functions were taken into account.





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


Fig. C-13 Performance Indicator Signal Processing Circuitry, Block Diagram



While the assembly can be viewed during flight, its primary function is to assist the maintenance technician in ground testing. LRU faults automatically appear on front panel lights. Additional capability exists by fault isolation operator intervention.

# Step 3D Initial Estimation of PM/BIT Effectiveness

BIT Effectiveness is now calculated from the following equation (from paragraph 4.4.5):

$$E_{T} = \frac{F_{rs}}{F_{rs} + F_{rs} \times (1-Q) \times 0.5 (N+1)}$$

where  $F_{rs}$  is the summation of all failure rates in the signal matrices, Q is the sensor quality factor, and N is the average number of LRUs in the function paths of the ARPS.

Q = 0.875 (an average of Range and TACCAR functions) and N = 7. Effectiveness is:

$$E_{T} = \frac{1}{1 + (1 - Q) \times 0.5 \times (7 + 1)}$$
$$= \frac{1}{1 + (0.125 \times 4)} = 67\%$$

This approximation of  $E_T$  is less than the requirement. This indicates that all designated sensors must remain and none can be traded off. In fact, measurement quality factors must be increased. Note that the effect of false alarms has not been included. This will further decrease BIT effectiveness in the final calculation.

Step 3E Initial Estimate of Mean Test Time

The  $\overline{M}_{tt}$  requirement is 3 minutes. The initial estimate of  $\overline{M}_{tt}$  is calculated using the processing times shown in Fig. C-14.



Processing Time  $(\Sigma M_{tt}) \ge F_{rp} = 16,507 \ge 10^{-3} \ge 3638 \ge 10^{-6}$   $= 60 \ge 10^{-3} \sec (\text{Range})$ Processing Time  $(\Sigma \overline{M}_{tt}) \ge F_{rp} = 117 \ge 10^{-3} \ge 2629 \ge 10^{-6}$   $= 0.3 \ge 10^{-3} \sec (\text{TACCAR})$ Overall Acquisition Time  $= \frac{\Sigma (F_{rp} \ge \overline{M}_{tt})}{F_{rs}}$   $= \frac{60 \ge 10^{-3} + 0.3 \ge 10^{-3}}{6267 \ge 10^{-6}}$  $= 9.6 \sec$ 

Performance Indicator Processing Time = 2.5 sec

IFPM Processing Time	= 2.5 sec
$\overline{M}_{\star\star}$ Processing Time	
tt (Total)	= 14.6  sec

	BAN	IGE	TAC	CAR
LRU	PROC TIME (M <sub>tt</sub> ), MS	FRI X 10 <sup>-6</sup>	PROC TIME (M <sub>tt</sub> ), MS	F <sub>RI</sub> X 10 <sup>-6</sup>
RECEIVER-CONVERTER	1.0	135	1.0	185
COMPARATOR-FILTER	1.0	480	1.0	480
DUAL PULSE ATTENUATOR- COMPRESSOR	1.0	173	1.0	173
PULSE GENERATOR	1.0	227	3.0	227
DIGITAL DATA COMPARATOR	900	668	100	350
DIGITAL SIGNAL CONVERTER	3.0	1193	-	-
DETECTOR PROCESSOR	15,600*	712	_	-
TRANSMITTER	-	-	1.0	1100
CONTROL VOLTAGE SIMULATOR	-	-	10.0	114
TOTALS	16,507	3638	117	2629
*13 TEST TARGETS AT 1200 MS EACH.				
0719-042WR				

Fig. C-14 LRU Processing Times

#### Step 3F PM/BIT Cost Estimate

To estimate the production costs of PM/BIT for the Range and TACCAR functions, the cost entries shown on the matrices are added.

For the TACCAR function: PM/BIT = \$35,500; for the Range function: PM/BIT = \$105,500.

Adding the costs of the Performance Indicator and the Radar Set Control to this, we arrive at the following:

<b>Performance</b> Indicator	=	\$ 43,600	I	
Radar Set Control	=	\$ 4,600	(PM/BIT	portion only)
TACCAR PM/BIT	=	\$ 35,500		
Range PM/BIT	=	\$ 105,500		
		\$ 189,200	-	

These costs represent 6.8% of the overall ARPS production costs (\$2.8M). From Fig. 3-4, the cost target is 20% for digital systems (some analog).

Step 3G Adjustment of PM/BIT Design Concept

The initial estimates of PM/BIT effectiveness,  $\overline{M}_{tt}$ , and cost are compared to the like parameters of the design specification in Fig. C-15. Note that  $E_T$  must now be improved without exceeding the cost envelope.

Step 3H Adjustment of Design Concept Effectiveness Parameter

 $\boldsymbol{E}_{\mathrm{T}}$  will now be computed in terms of valid and invalid maintenance actions.

PARAMETER	REQUIREMENTS	INITIAL ESTIMATES	
ĒT	97,5%	67%	
M <sub>tt</sub>	180 SEC	14.6 SEC	
COST (% OF TOTAL COST) 0719-043WR	20%	6.8%	

Fig. C-15 Comparison of Parameters to the Design Specification

From paragraph 4.4.5 of the methodology, the rate of invalid maintenance actions is  $F_{rp} \propto (1-Q) \propto 0.5$  (N+1).

Where for the ARPS N<sub>p</sub> = 7,  $F_{rp}$  = 3638 x 10<sup>-6</sup> (Range),  $F_{rp}$  = 2629 x 10<sup>-6</sup> (TACCAR), and Q<sub>f</sub> = 85% to 95% (from the signal matrices).

For a given primary output signal (Range and TACCAR functions), the rate of invalid maintenance actions is:

 $MA_{rid} = F_{rp} \times (1-Q_f) \times 0.5 (N )$ 

Where  $F_{rp}$  = failure rate of signal path,  $Q_f$  = quality factor of the fault detection sensors (average), and N = number of LRUs in the path from input to primary output.

For the Range function, where N = 7,  $F_{rp} = 3638 \times 10^{-6}$ , and  $Q_f$ (average) = 0.90:

$$MA_{rid} = 3638 \times 10^{-6} \times (1-0.90) \times 4$$
$$= 1455 \times 10^{-6}$$

This results in an E<sub>T</sub> (RNGE) of:

$$\frac{F_{rp}}{F_{rp} + MA_{rid}} = \frac{3638}{3638 + 1455} = 0.71$$

For the TACCAR function, where N = 7,  $F_{rp} = 2629 \times 10^{-6}$ , and  $Q_f$  (average) = 0.85:

$$MA_{rid} = 2629 \times 10^{-6} \times (1-0.85) \times 4$$
$$= 1577 \times 10^{-6}$$

Resulting in an  $E_{T(TAC)}$  of:

$$\frac{2629}{2629 + 1577} = 0.63$$

For both functions,  $E_T = \frac{6267}{6267 + 1455 + 1577} = 0.67$ 

An  $E_T$  of 67%, caused solely by undetected failures, obviates the need to calculate the invalid maintenance action rate contributed by improper fault isolation.

The concept is therefore adjusted by placing a fault detection sensor in each LRU and making all of them independent of the inputs from preceding LRUs. BIT effectiveness is improved. Stimulus injection and/or measurement of the output lines is done automatically, with N = 1. Fault isolation is therefore to the LRU containing the sensor.

Figures C-16 and C-17 list the invalid maintenance action rates,  $MA_{(rid)1}$ and  $MA_{(rid)2}$  of the Range and TACCAR signal paths, respectively. N = 1 and  $F_{ri}$  is the failure rate of each LRU and the false alarm rate (FA) is 1%.

For both functions (from paragraph 4.4.9):

BIT Effectiveness,  $E_T$ , =  $\frac{F_{rs}}{F_{rs} + MA_{(rid)1} + MA_{(rid)2} + FA_{(F_{rs})}}$ =  $\frac{6267}{6267 + 289 + 395 + 63}$ = 0.90

Step 3I Adjustment of Design Concept  $\overline{M}_{tt}$  Parameter

Since reliability and maintainability considerations, coupled with the unique mechanical configurations of the LRUs, are the driving forces in ARPS, PM/BIT processing times have negligible impact on  $\overline{M}_{ct}$ . For this design, the  $\overline{M}_{tt}$  will be evaluated. For the two ARPS functions selected for this illustration, 14.6 seconds appear reasonable as an average. We can proceed now to the next step.

Step 3J System Effectiveness and  $\overline{M}_{tt}$ 

AGE is not used for ARPS, hence this design step is not applicable.

# Step 4 UPDATED ESTIMATE OF FAILURE RATES AND MEASUREMENT QUALITY

Accuracy of the failure rates was re-examined, emphasizing LRUs with lower  $Q_f$  sensors. The  $Q_f$  of each sensor was also re-evaluated to see that it was as realistic as possible.

# Step 4A Updated Reliability Estimates

The failure rates used up to this point were extracted from the E-2C Maintenance Engineering Analysis Summary Sheets, dated December 13, 1978. MIL-HDBK-217B methods were employed therein and the failure rates represent the best predictions for an initial design.

LRU	<sup>F</sup> RI (x10 <sup>-6</sup> )	o,	MA <sub>(rid)</sub> 1 (x10 <sup>-6</sup> )			
RECEIVER-CONVERTER	185	0.85	28			
COMPARATOR-FILTER	480	0.85	72			
DUAL PULSE ATTENUATOR- COMPRESSOR	173	0.85	26			
PULSE GENERATOR	227	0.85	34			
DIGITAL DATA COMPARATOR	668	0.95	33			
DIGITAL SIGNAL CONVERTER	1 <b>193</b>	0.95	60			
DETECTOR-PROCESSOR	712	0.95	36			
$\Sigma F_{R1 = 3638 \times 10^{-6}}$ $\Sigma MA_{(rid) 1} = 289$						
$E_{T(RNGE)} = \frac{F_{RI}}{F_{RI} + \Sigma MA_{(rid) 1}} = \frac{3638(100)}{3638 + 289} = 93\%$						
2181-008W						

Fig. C-16 Maintenance Action Rate Due to Undetected Failures for the Range Function

LRU	F <sub>RI</sub> (x 10 <sup>-6</sup> )	<del>o</del> t	MA <sub>(rid)2</sub> (x 10 <sup>-6</sup> )		
PULSE GENERATOR	227	0.85	34		
DIGITAL DATA COMPARATOR	350	0.85	53		
DUAL PULSE ATTENUATOR - COMPRESSOR	173	0.85	26		
COMPARATOR - FILTER	480	0.85	72		
RECEIVER - CONVERTER	185	0.85	28		
CONTROL VOLTAGE SIMULATOR	114	0.85	17		
TRANSMITTER	1100	0.85	165		
$\Sigma F_{R1} = 2629 \times 10^{-6}$ $\Sigma MA_{(rid)2} = 395$					
$E_{T(TAC)} = \frac{2629 (100)}{2629 + 395} = 87\%$ 2181-009W					

Fig. C-17 Maintenance Action Rate Due to Undetected Failures for the TACCAR Function

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For the ARPS, however, initial 3M data has started to flow back from the field. It shows that the observed (operational) failure rates are about 4.5 times the predicted. The ARPS sample is still small and the ratio may not be accurate. A point of interest, however, is that it is consistent with the discussion of paragraph 1.6.7 of Section 1.

At this stage in the BIT design process, the designer must rely on the predicted failure rates derived by the reliability engineer. For the ARPS example, these are the numbers that will be used in developing the BIT design.

#### Step 4B Updated Measurement Quality Estimates

A summary is presented in Figs. C-18 and C-19 of the quality factors, failure rates, primary vs secondary outputs,  $M_{tt}$ 's and costs for each LRU used in the Range and TACCAR functions.

# Step 5 Final Calculation of PM/BIT Performance and Cost Parameters

In this final step,  $E_T$ ,  $\overline{M}_{tt}$ , and the target production costs are finalized and compared with the same values in the subsystem design specificiation.

Once this is done we see that of the three parameters,  $E_T$  is out of specification. In considering  $E_T$ , the BIT effectiveness is 90% as compared to the specified 97.5%.

# Step 5A Calculated Effectiveness is Insufficient, While $\overline{M}_{tt}$ and Cost are Acceptable

We must establish which LRU quality factors must be improved. For the Range function there are several sensors of analog design whose quality factors depend on component tolerance and comprehensive circuit design. By tightening these tolerances, the initial estimate of  $Q_f = 0.85$  can be increased to 0.90.

Similarly for the TACCAR function, the  $Q_f$  of the analog sensors can also be increased from 0.85 to 0.90. In addition, since the Digital Data Comparator is primarily digital, the  $Q_f$  of its sensor can increase from 0.85 to 0.95 by expansion of the software diagnostics. The transmitter sensor  $Q_f$  can also be increased to 0.95.

Repeating step 3H, the number of invalid maintenance actions is calculated for the Range and TACCAR functions, using the revised  $Q_f$ 's. The results are tabulated in Figs. C-20 and C-21.

LRU	F <sub>R1</sub> × 10 <sup>-6</sup>	Qf	TARGET COST \$	PRIMARY/ SECOND- ARY	M <sub>tt</sub> • SEC
RECEIVER-CONVERTER	185	0.85	8500	Р	5.0
COMPARATOR-FILTER	480	0.85	5000	Р	5.0
DUAL PULSE ATTENUATOR- COMPRESSOR	173	0.85	5000	P	5.0
DIGITAL DATA COMPARATOR	668	0.95	7000	Р	5.9
DIGITAL SIGNAL CONVERTER	1193	0.95	25000	Р	5.0
DETECTOR PROCESSOR	712	0.95	40000	Р	20.0
PULSE GENERATOR	227	0.85	15000	Р	5.0
RANGE BIT COSTS = \$105,500 *THESE NUMBERS ARE DERIVED FRO OF THE PERFORMANCE INDICATOR /			TOTAL 5 SEC	OND PROCESS	ING TIME

0719-046WR

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LRU	F <sub>RI</sub> x 10 <sup>-6</sup>	Qf	TARGET COST \$	PRIMARY/ SECOND- ARY	M <sub>tt</sub> * SEC
TRANSMITTER	1100	0.85	0	Р	5.0
RECEIVER-CONVERTER	185	0.85	8500	Р	5.0
COMPARATOR-FILTER	480	0.85	5000	Р	5.0
DUAL PULSE ATTENUATOR- COMPRESSOR	173	0.85	5000	Р	5.0
DIGITAL DATA COMPARATOR	350	0.85	6500	Р	5.1
CONTROL VOLTAGE SIMULATOR	114	0.85	3000	Р	5.0
PULSE GENERATOR 0719-047WR	227	0.85	7500	P	5.0
	TACCAR BIT	r costs ≕\$35	,500	·	

\* THESE NUMBERS ARE DERIVED FROM STEP 3E AND INCLUDE THE TOTAL 5 SECOND PROCESSING TIME OF THE PERFORMANCE INDICATOR AND IFPM.

Fig. C-19 Summary of Updated Measurement Quality Estimates, TACCAR Function

LRU	F <sub>RI</sub> (x 10 <sup>-6</sup> )	Qf	MA <sub>(rid)</sub> 1 (x 10 <sup>-6</sup> )
RECEIVER-CONVERTER	185	0.90	19
COMPARATOR-FILTER	480	0.90	48
DUAL PULSE ATTENUATOR COMPRESSOR	173	0.90	17
PULSE GENERATOR	227	0.90	23
DIGITAL DATA COMPARATOR	668	0.95	33
DIGITAL SIGNAL CONVERTER	1193	0.95	6u
DETECTOR PROCESSOR	712	0.95	36
Σ <sub>F<sub>RI</sub> = 36</sub>	538 x 10 <sup>-6</sup>	Σ MA <sub>(rid)</sub> 1	= 236
	38 (100) 38 + 236	%	

Fig. C-20 Revised Maintenance Action Rate Due to Undetected Failures for the Range Function

LRU	F <sub>RI</sub> (x10 <sup>-6</sup> )	Q <sub>f</sub>	MA <sub>(rid)</sub> 2 (x10 <sup>-6</sup> )
PULSE GENERATOR	227	0.90	23
DIGITAL DATA COMPARATOR	350	0.95	18
DUAL PULSE ATTENUATOR- COMPRESSOR	173	0.95	9
COMPARATOR-FILTER	480	0.90	48
RECEIVER-CONVERTEF	185	0.90	19
CONTROL VOLTAGE SIMULATOR	114	0.90	11
TRANSMITTER	1100	0.95	55
		Σ MA <sub>(rid) 2</sub>	- 183
$E_{T(TAC)} = \frac{2629}{2629 + 2181-011W}$	<u>100)</u> = 94% 183		



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For both functions shown in Figs. C-20 and C-21,

BIT Effectiveness, 
$$E_T = \frac{6267}{6267 + 236 + 183 + 0.01 (6267)} = 0.93$$

This would then be the maximum  $E_T$  that can be obtained from the BIT design as conceived by our illustration, since the revised sensor  $Q_f$ 's are the best that can be achieved within reasonable bounds of cost and availability.

The specified PM/BIT parameters and costs to be used for the LRU design phase are listed in Fig. C-22.

The costs for each function shown in Fig. C-22 have been combined. BIT costs, therefore, have increased from an initial estimate of \$189,200 or 6.8% of the total cost, to \$250,200 or 8.9%. These costs are within the allowable cost envelope and will be specified to the LRU designer. The completed signal matrices are shown in Figs. C-23 and C-24.

#### BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 1. E-2C Advanced Radar Processing System, GE Aerospace Electronic Systems Department, Contract No. N00019-75-C-0326, Training Manual.
- 2. Navy 3M Data (E-2C), 1 January 1977 to 30 May 1978.
- E-2C Maintenance Engineering Analysis (MEA) Summary Sheets, 13 December 1978.
- 4. APS-125 Radar, Technical Manual No. NAVAIR 01-E2AAA-2-16.
- 5. APS-125 Design Specification, No. 123UIDCVAQ255.

LRU	Q <sub>f</sub>	M <sub>tt</sub> , sec	TARGET COST, \$
RECEIVER-CONVERTER	0.90	5.0	34,000
COMPARATOR-FILTER	0.90	5.0	20,000
DUAL PULSE ATTENUATOR-COMPRESSOR	0.90	5.0	20,000
DIGITAL DATA COMPARATOR	0.95	5.0	27,000
DIGITAL SIGNAL CONVERTER	0.95	5.0	25,000
DETECTOR-PROCESSOR	0.95	20.0	40,000
PULSE GENERATOR	0.90	5.0	30,000
CONTROL VOLTAGE SIMULATOR	0.90	5.0	6000
PERFORMANCE INDICATOR	0.75	60.0	43,600
RADAR SET CONTROL	0.75	60.0	4,600
0719-050WR			\$250,200

Fig. C-22 Summary of LRU PM/BIT Target Parameters and Costs

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SIGNAL NO.	SIGNAL NOMEN- CLATURE	RELATED FUNCTION/ NAME/ NUMBER	FUNCT NO.	CLASS	ANALOG	DIGITAL	DISCRETE	RF	VIDEO	POWER	MODE NAME	ENOM	EMAX	EMIN	UNIT	TOL, %	CONT SIGNAL NO. 1	CONT SIGNAL NO. 2
M200 .	RNG013	RNGE	01	Р		PTTL-148					NORM	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	M210	M220
M210	FLTRH	RNGE	01	Р		PTTL-8B				ł	NORM	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	M215	M225
M220	FLTRL	RNGE	01	Р		PTTL-8B				{	NORM	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	M215	M225
M215	INPH	RNGE	01	Ρ		PTTL-8B					NORM	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	M216	M218
M225	QUAD	RNGE	01	P		PTTL-8B					NORM	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	M216	M218
M216	SUMC	RNGE	01	Р				IF		ļ	NORM		2.55		VOLT	N/A	M217	M219
M218	DIFFC	RNGE	01	Ρ				IF			NORM		2.55		VOLT	N/A	M217	M219
M217	SUMF	RNGE	01	Ρ				١F			NORM	2.55			VOLT	5	M221	M223
M219	DIFFF	RNGE	01	Ρ				IF			NORM	2.55			VOLT	5	M221	M223
M221	SUMV	RNGE	01	Ρ				١F			NORM	2.55			VOLT	5	S100	S110
M223	DIFFV	RNGE	01	P				IF			NORM	2.55			VOLT	5	S100	S110
M228	PLS	RNGE	01	Ρ	т						NORM	5.0			VOLT	5	S120	
M227	PLS	RNGE	01	Ρ	т						NORM	5.0			VOLT	5	S120	
M229	PLS	RNGE	01	Ρ	т						NORM	5.0			VOLT	5	S120	

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\*WITHOUT COSTS OF PERFORMANCE INDICATOR & RADAR SET CONTROL

\*\* $W_i = W_d$  SINCE THERE ARE FAULT DETECT SENSORS IN EACH LRU WITH A RESOLVED UNCERTAINTY OF ONE (1); HENCE  $W_i$  AND  $W_d$  ARE CALCULATED USING EQUATION NO. 31

2181-012W

01N	UNIT	TOL,	CONT SIGNAL NO. 1	CONT SIGNAL NO. 2	CONT SIGNAL NO. 3	F <sub>RP</sub> x 10-6	TEST ?	PM INT	PM EXT	DETECT	ISOLATE	Qf. %	TIME, MS	SAMP RATE	COST, \$K	SENSOR TYPE	EVAL	** WORTH (ISO), Wi x 10 <sup>-6</sup>	** (DET), WD x 10-6	NOTES
A	N/A	N/A	M210	M220	M229	712	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	95	1200	300	40	COMPUTER	S	0.017	0.017	
<b>A</b>	N/A	N/A	M215	M225	M228	596	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	95	3.0	300	12.5	COMPAR	L	0.045	0.045	
A	N/A	N/A	M215	M225	M228	597	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	95	3.0	300	12.5	COMPAR	L	0.045	0.045	ł
	N/A	N/A	M216	M218	M227	334	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	95	900	300	8.5	COMPAR	Ł	0.037	0,037	}
A	N/A	N/A	M216	M218	M227	334	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	95	900	300	8.5	COMPAR	L	0.037	0.037	{
	VOLT	N/A	M217	M219		86	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	90	1.0	с	5.0	THRESH.	L	0.015	0.015	}
	VOLT	N/A	M217	M219		87	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	90	1.0	с	5.0	THRESH.	L	0.016	0.016	ļ
	VOLT	5	M221	M223		240	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	90	1.0	300	5.0	THRESH.	L	0.043	0.043	
	VOLT	5	M221	M223		240	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	90	1.0	300	5.0	THRESH.	L	0.043	0.043	
	VOLT	5	S100	S110		92	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	90	1.0	300	8.5	THRESH.	L	0.010	0,010	ł
	VOLT	5	S100	S110		93	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	90	1.0	300	8.5	THRESH.	L	0.010	0.010	
	VOLT	5	S120			75	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	90	1.0	c	5.0	THRESH.	ι	0.014	0.014	
	VOLT	5	S120			76	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	90	1.0	c	5.0	THRESH.	L	0.014	0.014	
	VOLT	5	S120			76	Y	Y	Y	۲.	Y	90	1.0	c	5.0	THRESH.	L	0.014	0.014	

Frp = 3638 x 10-6 FAILURES/HR

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TOTAL COST = \$134K\*

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Fig. C-23 Example of Completed Output Signal Matrix (Range Function)

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FRECEDING FREE BLANK-NOT FILM

SIGNAL NO.	SIGNAL NOMEN- CLATURE	RELATED FUNCTION/ NAME/ NUMBER	FUNCT NO.	CLASS	ANALOG	DIGITAL	DISCRETE	RF	VIDEO	POWER	MODE NAME	ENOM	EMAX	EMIN	PWR OUT	UNIT	TOL,	CONT SIGNAL NO. 1	CONT SIGNAL NO. 2
M400	TACOUT	TACCAR	02	Ρ	DC						TEST	2.55				VOLT	5	M340	M345
M310	XMTPLS	TACCAR	02	Р				LPV			TEST	10				VOLT	5	M320	
· M315	DSCOUT	TACCAR	02	S	DC						TEST		0.5	-0.5		VOLT	N/A	M320	
M320	CVSOUT	TACCAR	02	Р	DC		:				TEST	3				VOLT	5	M330	M315
м330	TACCO	TACCAR	02	Ρ	DC						TEST	3				VOLT	5	M340	M345
M340	SUMC	TACCAR	02	Р				IF			TEST		2.55			VOLT	N/A	M350	M355
M345	DIFFC	TACCAR	02	Р				IF			TEST		2.55			VOLT	N/A	M350	M355
M350	SUMF	TACCAR	02	Р				IF			TEST		2.55			VOLT	N/A	M360	M365
M355	DIFFF	TACCAR	02	Р				IF			TEST		2.55			VOLT	N/A	M360	M365
M360	รบทง	TACCAR	02	Ρ				tF			TEST		2.55			VOLT	N/A	M370	S410
M365	DIFFV	TACCAR	<b>0</b> 2	Р				IF			TEST		2.55			VOLT	N/A	M370	S410
M370	SUMD	TACCAR	02	Ρ				ANT			TEST				-50	DBM	N/A	<b>S40</b> 0	M310

1997) 1997 - 1997 1997 - 1997 :

Frp = 2629 x 10<sup>-6</sup> FAILURES/HR

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NOTES: (1) SENSOR DELETED SINCE M315 IS A SIMPLE FEEDBACK WITH LOW FAILURE RATE. ADEQUATE FAULT ISOLATION EXISTS WITH SENSORS AT M310

(2) SENSOR NOT REQUIRED SINCE PERFORMANCE MONITOR SENSOR FOR TRANSMITTER ALREADY EXISTS AS PART OF APS-125.

(3)  $W_d = \infty$  SINCE THE PATH HAS INTRINSIC FAULT DETECTION (SEE PAGE 216)

\*WITHOUT COSTS OF PERFORMANCE INDICATOR & RADAR SET CONTROL

\*\*SINCE THERE ARE FAULT DETECT SENSORS IN EACH LRU WITH A RESOLVED UNCERTAINTY OF (1), W, IS CALCULATED USING EQUATION NO. 31 2181-013W



MIN	PWR	UNIT	TOL,	CONT SIGNAL NO. 1	CONT SIGNAL NO. 2	Frp x 10-6	TEST ?	PM INT	PM EXT	DETECT	ISOLATE	Qf, %	TIME, MS	SAMP RATE	COST, \$K	SENSOR	EVAL	** WORTH W <sub>i</sub> X 10 <sup>-6</sup>	SEE NOTE (3) WORTH WD X 10 <sup>-6</sup>	NOTES
		VOLT	<u> </u>	M340	M345	175	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	90	100	с	5.0	THRESH.	L	0.032	<b>30</b>	
		VOLT	ł	M320		205	Ŷ	γ	Y	Y	Y	90	3	300	15.0	THRESH.	L	0.012	<b>907</b>	
.5		VOLT	N/A	M320		22	N	Y	N	Y	Y	0	3	300	0	-	-	0	œ	SEE NOTE (1)
		VOLT	5	M330	M315	114	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	90	10	с	6.0	THRESH.	L	0.017	~	
		VOLT	5	M340	M345	175	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	90	3	300	5.0	THRESH.	<b>ι</b>	0.026	~	
		VOLT	N/A	M350	M355	86	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	95	1	c	5.0	THRESH.	L	0.016	20	
		VOLT	N/A	M350	M355	87	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	95	1	c	5.0	THRESH.	L	0.017	80	
		VOLT	N/A	M360	M365	240	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	90	1	300	5.0	THRESH.	L	0.043	- m	
- {		VOLT	N/A	M360	M365	240	Y	Y	Y	) v	Y	90	1	300	5.0	THRESH		0.043	- <b>a</b> a	
		VOLT	N/A	M370	S410	92	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	90	1	300	8.5	THRESH	1	0.010	30	
		VOLT	N/A	M370	S410	93	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	90	1	300	8.5	THRESH	1	0,010	92	SEE NOTE (2)
	-50	DBM	N/A	S400	M310	1100	N	Y	N	Y	Y	95	1	300	0	N/A	N/A	1		
T IS	DLATI	ON EXI	ISTS WI	TH SENSO	RS AT M310	AND M3	20.													
ISTS	AS PA	RT OF	APS-12																	
(1875	AS PA	RT OF	APS-12	5.		) AND M3									Fig.	C-24 Exe	imple o rix (TA	f Complet	ted Output	Signal.
(ISTS	AS PA	RT OF	APS-12	5.		) AND M3									Fig.	C-24 Exa Mar	imple o irix (TA	f Complet	unction/	Signal.
ISTS	AS PA	RT OF	APS-12	5.		) AND M3					c				Fig.	C-24 Exa Mar	trix (TP	ACCAR PI	239	Signal.
(ISTS	AS PA	RT OF	APS-12	5.		) AND M3					 	×			Fig.	C-24 Exe Mat	trix (TP	ACCAR PI	239	

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### APPENDIX D

INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INTERMITTENT MALFUNCTIONS AND BIT FALSE ALARMS, AND SOME BIT DESIGN GUIDELINES RELATING TO THESE ISSUES.

FREDERING FRIE BLANK-NOT FILMER

#### 1. INTRODUCTION

Although current maintenance information systems do not report any significant information about the frequency and maintenance impact of intermittent malfunctions, it is a well known fact that this is by far one of the most serious issues faced in electronic maintenance. Experience indicates that such "intermittents" occur somewhat less frequently than "hard" failures, but present such extreme difficulty of maintenance that their impact is greatly out of proportion to the frequency with which they occur. It can be shown that intermittents contribute to the apparent frequency of BIT false alarms. Some design guidelines can be suggested to deal with the issue of BIT apparent false alarms due to intermittent system malfunctions. Since these intermittents are true system failures, guidelines leading to BIT capabilities would offer potentially major gains to the efficiency of troubleshooting, while also minimizing the apparent frequency of BIT false alarms. Discussions that follow define such possibilities conceptually.

A second issue in dealing with BIT false alarms arises because a significant number of electronic system failures do not originate within any so-called "black box," but rather are caused by cable or connector malfunctions. In such cases, BIT will logically tend to detect failure of those system functions affected, and must (by current design practice) necessarily indicate a "black box" failure, even though the fault is indigenous to system cables/connectors. These phenomena therefore present a difficult maintenance issue, because it is literally possible to change every replaceable unit in an entire system without actually affecting the fault symptoms. Here again, we have a very old and well known maintenance problem that presents an issue in scoring the performance of a given BIT configuration.

#### 2. DEFINITIONS AND RELATED EXPLANATORY DISCUSSION

<u>INTERMITTENT</u>: An electronic malfunction which presents itself at times, and which does not present itself at other times. As a class, intermittents are one of the oldest and most difficult problems faced during electronic maintenance. and their impact outweighs that of the more frequently occurring "hard" or

catastrophic failure modes. Despite the fact that this is universally known to be the case, there has been little or no effort to reduce the occurrence of intermittents, or to developing equipment and techniques to deal effectively with them. Indeed, the causes of intermittent malfunction have not even been studied extensively in the formal sense. Thus, at the present state-of-the-art, one of the most serious problems in electronic (and particularly avionic) maintenance has been virtually ignored by the scientific community, and maintenance personnel have been, in most cases, left to fend for themselves when faced with such malfunctions.

<u>BIT FALSE ALARM</u>: The commonly accepted definition is any BIT failure indication not confirmed by personal observation, related AGE testing, or related system testing. In general, whenever the maintenance process leads to a determination that a BIT alarm has occurred, but is not substantiated by related system or black box tests, the BIT indication will be classified as a false alarm. Such classification obviously presumes that the system or black box tests are infallible, which is hardly the case. Worse yet, such classification also tends to presume that no intermittent condition caused the BIT to trigger. Furthermore, such classification may at times deny the existence of cable and connector faults: (Q.E.D: If all the "black boxes" test good, maintenance personnel may tend to assert that a BIT alarm was "false." In such a circumstance, the system will stubbornly refuse to "work" no matter how many black boxes are changed). In terms of accurately evaluating actual BIT performance, there needs to be greater precision in the classification of BIT indications as "false."

LOSER BOX: An electronic subassembly (viz., an LRU) that is removed from its host system for apparent malfunction, subsequently tests "good" on AGE, but is actually defective. The inability of AGE to detect all possible UUT faults often leads to this condition. At the same time, it can be shown that for all practical purposes, AGE will never be able to detect all possible failure modes. At the current state of the maintenance art, such LRUs tend to be reissued (classified RFI), reinstalled to fail again in the host system, and repetitively removed to be once more retested "good." There are no formal procedures for dealing with this problem, so it continues indefinitely until some maintenance technician exercises the initiative necessary to recognize that a fault is present

whether or not the AGE so indicates. Such initiative may break the endless loop of removal/testing/replacement/removal, but forces the maintenance personnel to either send the unit to Depot (to get rid of it) or employ "ad hoc" troubleshooting procedures in an effort to identify and isolate the actual fault. It must also be noted that AGE and test design provides no inherent means to perform ad hoc tests, that T.O.s generally provide no guidance in their execution, and that military regulations discourage such personnel initiatives. In at least one case where a controlled maintenance experiment was carried out on Grumman aircraft in production and flight test, three such Loser Boxes accounted for approximately 50% of all the approximately 200 malfunctions observed in a fleet of 24 aircraft over a period of several weeks. When these units were taken aside and accurately diagnosed/isolated, the apparent MTBF of their host system actually doubled. In military field maintenance, where facilities, engineering personnel, procedures, and authority to deal with this problem are not present, we may infer that the Loser Box issue is of major import. To the degree that BIT detects such problems, it would appear to offer significant benefits. However, under present procedures, most such BIT alarms will tend to be classified as "false."

#### 3. CAUSES OF INTERMITTENTS

Although the cause of every intermittent is a true failure of some component or electrical parameter, it is the time-related and seemingly random nature of the intermittent which makes it difficult to troubleshoot. Experience shows that close investigation will reveal the intermittent malfunction to be introduced by one or more of the following:

Heat, or Changes in Temperature: As a system warms up or cools off, the coefficient of material expansion causes minor stresses or mechanical dislocations. In the presence of a "loose joint" or "loose connection," this will often lead to malfunctions of a transient nature. In addition to the purely mechanical effects of heat, there is also a slight but well known effect on the electrical constants of component performance. Resistors change resistance, capacitors change capacitance, inductors change inductance, and, in particular, transistors change gain. A component of marginal initial value may change value due

to temperature variation to the point where it and its associated circuit are normal at some times, and fail at other times.

<u>Shock</u>, Vibration, and G-Load: Under varying values of these forces, loose components and loose connections often fail temporarily. A wire may at times touch an adjacent point in the circuit, a loose connector pin may not always make contact, or even a loose screw may rattle around inside an assembly, causing all manner of electrical havoc, but not necessarily leaving any evidence of its effects once the system comes to rest after flight.

<u>Moisture:</u> Condensation of moisture vapor when a "warm" system cools off in moist ambient air has been known to cause intermittent malfunctions along with more permanent damage such as corrosion or moisture-induced catastrophic failure.

<u>Acoustic Effects:</u> High ambient noise levels have an effect similar to that discussed under the heading of shock, vibration, and G-load.

Altitude or Pressure Changes: These have an effect similar to shock, vibration, and G-forces, and may also increase the effects of moisture by causing physical vapor penetration of joints or seals.

<u>Electrical Transient Phenomena</u>: Whenever the prime power to a system is shared with other loads that present EMI transients, or step functions in prime power load, intermittent electronic failures often result. Again as a matter of experience, this may be the most frequent cause of intermittent failure.

Marginal Components Operating Under Voltage Variations: Whenever a system has one or more marginal components, normal (e.g., within tolerance) variations in power supply potentials may lead to intermittent failures.

From the above summarized list of "causes" it should be apparent that an intermittent results from the temporal application of one or more such forces, in such a manner as to increase the impact of some inherent physical or electrical defect in the equipment. Since a non-existent fault can not be detected or isolated, conventional AGE tests are powerless to resolve such problems unless chance causes the intermittent failure to occur during the time of test.

From the above casual definition, it follows that fault isolation of an intermittent is a matter of chance unless maintenance personnel take measures to induce its symptoms. Although most current military maintenance processes do not embody this approach, it is useful to note that commercial electronic maintenance often has resort to such measures as:

- Heat guns and localized freon cold sprays
- Component-tapping, or even manual pounding on an assembly, to induce shock
- Deliberate temporary minor misadjustment of power supply voltages to accentuate the effects of marginal component performance.
  - 4. POTENTIALS OF BIT IN DEALING WITH INTERMITTENTS

.BIT has the inherent advantage of being a part of the host system, and therefore able to observe intermittent phenomena as they occur, rather than after the fact. Furthermore, since most BIT implementations provide parallel observation of a number of system signals, this offers the chance to evaluate the significance of time-parallel failure events to see if they are related. Also, because BIT is indigenous to the host system, it offers the potential of being theoretically capable of detecting system faults not localized to a "black box." Thus, in the theoretical sense, BIT ought to be considered as a means to reduce the severity of the problems discussed earlier. It should not be regarded as a panacea in these respects, but merely as a way of partially solving the problems at issue. Since these are the most significant problems faced in the day-to-day realities of electronic maintenance, any solution, even a partial one, would be of very significant logistic value.

At the same time, it must be recognized that the effective application of BIT to these problems, to whatever degree, depends on improvements to the judgmental process which presently classifies "false alarms." So long as real alarms are inadvertently classified as false, BIT will be criticized rather than used to maximum advantage. The most creative applications of BIT to the problems that have been discussed would meet with little or no success so long as the users refuse to believe the indicated results. Since neither AGE tests, personal observations, or BIT can ever be expected to reach states of absolute perfection,

there will be no absolute reference to use in judging the veracity of conflicting failure indications from different test sources. What is needed is an objective, thorough, and scientific procedure to be used in investigating and properly classifying each such conflict.

Universal guidelines cannot be suggested at the present state-of-the-art. What is needed is a realistic understanding of the issues, and a creative approach to designing BIT. To date, most BIT designs have addressed only "hard" failure modes. Design requirements should be expanded to provide some degree of consideration to intermittent and non-system-indigenous failures. Some initial suggestions along these lines follow. It is not suggested that the measures given be applied categorically to every BIT design, but only that these concepts and others should be considered:

- Monitor prime system power for nominal voltage, frequency, and phase angles, with a relatively simple and reliable electronic package capable of detecting steady state and transient power phenomena. When other BIT indicators in a system indicate transient failure, the power monitor unit would tend to identify those cases where power or EMI phenomena were at fault, because both the power and system BIT would trigger in temporal proximity. A variation of this approach would use "and" functions to inhibit a BIT signal failure indication when power problems were coincidentally detected. One such power indicator unit might suffice for an entire vehicle or system
- Apply the same philosophy as above, but monitor the characteristics of DC power within each subsystem. Again, this would identify the temporal correlation or non-correlation between signal failures and power failures, either transient or "hard"
- Design BIT to evalute the sequential occurrence of failure, rather than just the combinational occurrence of fail indications. For example, in cases where two conflicting BIT indications might lead maintenance personnel to conclude that an impossible system failure had occurred, the sequential detection of symptoms might lead to an exactly opposite and very useful set of information

- Design BIT to indicate cable/harness failure and localize it to a non-LRU portion of a system. For example, where an LRU has BIT on an output, consider putting BIT on the input to the next LRU receiving that signal. If the "copper path" between LRUs were to open, the first BIT indicator would then show the "signal good" indication, while the second would indicate a "signal bad" conclusion. These two conflicting observations would tend to define a "false alarm" under existing maintenance practices. In fact, such a BIT capability would in this case be definitive of a "bad harness or connector" in the system, but not in any one LRU
- Consider using BIT to generate marginal electronic stimuli and thereby accentuate the detection of intermittents resulting from marginal component constants or gain. There are many precedents for testing systems at reduced voltage supply levels, or reduced signal levels, to identify circuits tending to fail intermittently as a function of marginal performance
- Consider designing BIT to simulate the dynamic stimuli of flight when a system is on the ground. In some cases this is simple to accomplish, and in other cases it is difficult or impossible. However, the "simple" implementations are often effective in making flight symptoms reproducible on the ground. For example, accelerometers or rate gyro assemblies can often be designed to generate sample stimuli very inexpensively, thereby permitting flight symptoms to be approximated at rest
- Keep accurate maintenance records for each LRU, by serial number. When an individual LRU is removed from one or more host systems for the same apparent cause, but tested "good" on AGE more than once, recognize that there is a high probability that the LRU is "bad" and the AGE cannot detect the fault. Remove such LRUs to a maintenance level with adequate diagnostic skills and equipment, and require that they not be classified "RFI" until the cause has been positively identified and corrected.

- Conceivably, as a corollary to the above, BIT could be designed not to just indicate "fault number XXX," but additionally to show "same fault as last time." This would preclude continued O-Level reinstallation of a "bad" LRU which the GSE indicates to be "good"
- In designing BIT, be prepared to trade off rapid test execution in favor of thorough testing. For example, a quick "memory cruncher" diagnostic, executed one time, may show a "good" conclusion. The same diagnostic, executed 500 times may show a parity problem. The slower test will lead to greater system readiness, and less maintenance workload, to the degree that it detects faults otherwise missed.

#### 5. SUMMARY

- By applying logic to maintenance experience, there is reason to suspect that many "false alarms" are not false at all
- A significant subset of the "not-false-false alarms" would be expected to relate to system intermittents and/or non-LRU-indigenous failures of harness, cables, or power. These have historically been among the most severe maintenance problems in day-to-day military and commerical electronic maintenance
- Extend the goals of BIT design and optimization to encompass intermittents. To the degree that this is done, benefits could be out of proportion to the frequency with which such faults occur. The BIT false alarm rate would tend to decrease. The ability of BIT to highlight the causes of severe maintenance dificulty would increase
- Creative design will be required if the false alarm syndrome is to be turned into an opportunity to minimize the most severe kinds of maintenance actions. BIT designers must be encouraged to apply themselves to failures of "non-hard" character
- Devise means to get "Loser Boxes" out of the normal maintenance cycle, and subject them to in-depth special troubleshooting processes by highly qualified personnel. Require that a "Loser" remain in this category until its fault has been identified and repaired with absolute certainty.

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