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10 March 1986

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

FINANCIAL EXPERT REVIEWS POTENTIAL GULF FINANCING AVENUES

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 21, 28 Dec 85, 4 Jan 86

[Article by Rami Nabil Khuri: "Financial Development in the Gulf -- Five Essential Decisions"]

[21 Dec 85 p 34]

[Text] One obvious constant is that actual development in every industrial country begins with financial development. Proceeding from this premise, we consider that the Arab Gulf countries must make rapid decisions, at this time specifically, to move from the stage of a consumption economy to that of an investment and production economy.

So far, government institutions have been the main motive force for growth in all the Gulf countries. The private sector has made a minor contribution to production. The time has come to get this basic element to participate in the growth stage extending from 1985 to 2000.

This week's article will talk about the need for financial development. The financial markets grew rapidly in conjunction with the rapid growth which was realized between 1973 and 1983. The banks in the Gulf have now become financial institutions competing with international banks in terms of human capability and the area of assets.

However, the capital markets still are as they were. The overwhelming majority of projects are financed by government institutions or syndicated loans.

A very small number of private companies engage in the issuance of debt and capital instruments, and Gulf banks have played a small role in the area of subscribing to Eurobond issues.

Aside from the existing Kuwait stock market, the other markets are still waiting for registration permits.

For these and other reasons, the scope for investment in the Gulf countries in local long-term or medium-term business transactions is very minor.

The development of every financial market in every advanced country allows these countries to realize better, competent use of their resources, and it increases the ratio of financial assets to total real assets in a given country.

The failure to develop the financial market makes using resources in an optimum, competent manner a difficult process and lowers the level of savings, which is the basis of investment. Consequently it prevents numerous businessmen from long-term investment, increasing inflation and finally after the passage of time inversely affecting the process of growth and especially the growth of the private sector.

Moreover, following the drop in oil prices and the drop in production rates in many Gulf countries, the points we referred to above have become extremely essential. It has also become necessary competently to use savings and profits, especially since a number of infrastructure projects have been completed and the trend toward industrialization has started to take off.

There is no doubt that a number of businessmen will think a long time before venturing to enter into long-term projects, especially since the financial market is not favorable for that.

Financial development will help these people choose the projects which will yield the highest rate of return and it will prompt many investors who have put their money abroad to bring part of it back for the sake of domestic investment.

In the next instalment on financial development, we will talk about the need to put the private sector's resources in operation.

[28 Dec 85 p 35]

[Text] If the development of the financial market in the Gulf countries is considered one of the most prominent necessary decisions aimed at rounding out the course of economic development which started in 1973, putting the private sector's resources in operation should be considered the second step which must be taken.

During the past 10 years, the Arab Gulf States Cooperation Council has been the basic motive force for growth in all the Gulf countries, by means of the government decrees which it adopted, which have entailed the expenditure of enormous funds for the sake of creating a financial-human-social structure. The private sector has just been a beneficiary of all the decisions which have been taken.

The government authorities in all the Gulf countries acknowledged the existence of this shortcoming, and the budgets for the years 1985-1990 were drawn up for that purpose in all the Gulf countries. They contain indices which prove that the private sector will play a much greater role than the one it has played so far.

If the Gulf countries want to put the private sector's resources into operation, there are a number of deficiencies which must be overcome. The basic

decision which must be taken involves creating a new structure for the sake of realizing better financial achievements and creating a better oversight system. It is possible to bring that about by creating the proper financial climate, providing the people with financial guidance and turning their attention to new areas in the savings and investment fields.

At the outset, the government authorities and private, large and public institutions must issue treasury bonds and sell them to the private sector at low prices.

With the passage of time, after this becomes the customary method for issuing debt, the banks, insurance companies, industrial companies and other private institutions must provide bonds for Gulf country subjects. In this way, the first step toward creating a financial market will have been taken. It could begin with a primary financial market, then secondary financial markets.

However, in order to establish and create such markets, it is necessary that the specialized money markets agree to underwrite these bonds, then invest in them and create markets for them in order to encourage citizens to accept them as useful investment instruments. The pioneering institution in this area could be the Gulf Investment Corporation of Kuwait, which the six Gulf countries support.

Issuing treasury bonds supported by government institutions or large private institutions is the optimum way to limit the flight of capital abroad, because if the investor finds that scope for profit is open to him in his country, he will undoubtedly prefer to invest inside the country, especially if the interest during the bond years is greater than what he would realize if he put his money in a bank savings account.

However, the most important question is: will the banks in the Gulf countries agree to enter into medium- or long-term industrial financing operations in the local market? This is because indications are that the banks have so far refrained from financing economic activity in all Gulf countries, and all the figures confirm this. The assets deposited in local banks and invested abroad are around 71 billion Saudi riyals, while the term deposits invested locally are around 8.5 billion riyals. The Saudi institution SANA [sic] has quoted these figures.

This is with respect to Saudi banks. In the case of other Gulf banks, the figures are similar and indicate that the Gulf banks prefer foreign to local investment.

A senior official source in a Gulf bank answered these charges, saying that the reason the banks adopted these decisions can be attributed to the absence of medium- and long-term financing sources. For this reason, the banks cannot bear to sustain such risks in local investment. If the authorities in the Gulf countries agreed to encourage the start of development of the financial markets, as we pointed out previously in the first article, the banks would be prepared actually to participate and would invest the necessary funds at the outset, after confirming the authorities' determination

seriously to create a financial market which alone could realize economic development for the Gulf countries in the coming years.

There will be a followup to the discussion next week.

[4 Jan 86 p 35]

[Text] The third decision the Gulf countries must make, after developing the financial markets and putting the private sector's resources in operation, which we discussed in the two previous articles, is embodied in the establishment of new financial and monetary systems, especially since the situation has become urgent with the decline that oil prices and production have witnessed in all the Gulf countries and the deficit in the 1985-86 budget anticipated for many of these countries.

The deficit the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia recorded in the 1984-85 budget was around \$10.2 billion; it is expected that the kingdom will realize a balanced budget this year. Gulf countries such as Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and the Emirates all expect a deficit in their budgets for 1985-86.

In addition, the governments of the Gulf countries are all seeking methods to guarantee that public spending is limited and non-oil income sources are developed.

One such method which can be pursued is the conversion of some public commercial organizations into private ones managed by the private sector on a basis of profit and loss. In this way, the Gulf countries will be able to reduce the sums they spend administering these organizations. However, the authorities have just ventured to make some such decisions; one example of this was when the stock of the Saudi Sabic International Corporation (SABIC) and National Industrial Corporation was floated.

As regards non-oil revenues, the authorities must start by collecting taxes and reducing the aid they offer to maintain the prices of some goods and services. However, that must be ventured on step by step, especially since none of these things meet with an enthusiastic response on the part of the public.

It is also necessary to venture on issuing government treasury bonds whose purpose is not to attract additional revenues but to be used as a means for carrying out a competent monetary policy and consequently guaranteeing a new local channel for investment on behalf of the private sector.

The United Arab Emirates have started to follow this system by issuing treasury bonds, and the Saudi financial institution SANA has offered the banks compulsory bonds (CDs) for a 90-day period. This may represent the beginning in the goal of developing the financial market. The Saudi financial organization can also influence the money in the banks' possession in this way.

In addition, the Saudi financial organization has not stopped at the provisions it has made, but ventured to make a second decision at the beginning of last April by offering non-compulsory treasury bonds (BDSA) for a period of

180 days. These were offered to citizens and their purpose was to bring about greater flexibility and support the bonds' role in the market.

The authorities there have started to reap the fruit of these bonds, since the banks have started seriously to participate in these bonds at a rate of about 500 million riyals a week over a period of 180 days. Thus, by offering these two bonds, the Saudi financial institution was able to obtain 1 billion riyals a week in accordance with the banking statute. The Saudi financial organization, by means of these steps, sought to create a monetary structure through which it would be possible to proceed to develop the financial market and also use it as a short-term monetary instrument which could be disbursed by SANA at times a liquidity crisis occurred.

On the other hand, a number of banks and citizens in Gulf countries have started to follow this method of investment because they have found that it entails a guarantee for their money.

The Saudi Budget from 1978 to 1985

Fiscal Year	Revenues		Expenditures		Budget Billions of Dollars
	Billions of Dollars	Percent Annual Change	Billions of Dollars	Percent Annual Change	
1978	38.38	+3.7	43.52	+11.3	-5.14
1979	62.86	+63.8	56.06	+28.8	+6.80
1980	104.53	+66.3	71.04	+26.7	+33.49
1981	108.88	+4.2	84.22	+18.6	+24.66
1982	71.77	-34.1	71.40	-15.2	+0.37
1983	55.29	-23.0	64.69	-9.4	-9.40
1984	47.41	-14.3	60.48	-6.5	-13.07
1985	55.40	+16.9	55.40	-8.4	--

Oil Prices in 1984-85 Currencies

	1984	1985	Percent Above Marker	Percent Below Marker
US Dollar	28.5	27	0.9	19.3
German Mark	81	84	50.6	Maximum
Japanese Yen	5,830	6,793	22.7	14.2
French Franc	249	257	51.5	Maximum
Pound Sterling	21.3	21.9	29.9	Maximum

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10 March 1986

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

ITALIAN EXPORTS TO ARAB AFRICAN NAVIES VIEWED

Paris AFRICAN DEFENCE JOURNAL in English Jan 86 pp 30-33

[Article by Antony Preston: "Italian Exports to African Navies"]

[Excerpts]

Italy, having lost a colonial empire in Africa, has gained another one, this time commercial. Italy's remarkable success in the naval export business rests on her ability to produce equipment and ships tailored to the needs of smaller navies. Taking account of the reluctance of small navies to invest in large frigates Fincantieri-Cantieri Navali Italiani (ex Cantieri Navali Riuniti) produced their 550-ton corvette, basically an enlarged fast patrol boat with enhanced command and control facilities. This design was sold to Libya in 1974, and has since been sold to Ecuador and Iraq, proof of its appeal to the export market.

Although Italy has not been particularly active in the design and export of smaller missile boats (apart from hydrofoils) the strong domestic market for fast patrol craft has produced a number of attractive designs. Sadly the famous Baglietto yard at Varazze, north of Genoa has closed down. Its «Mangusta» 30-metre and 20GC 20.4-metre designs were bought in the 1970s for the Algerian Coast Guard. These handsome craft are capable of speeds of up to 36 knots. Another builder of fast light craft is Cantieri Navali Picchiotti of Viareggio. Their 42-metre design was bought by the Republic of Seychelles in 1981, but it remains to be seen if the projected sister to the Andromanche is ordered.

A shipbuilding industry producing high-speed hulls for the Guardia di Finanza and other customers has encouraged builders of propulsion systems of light weight and low volume. CRM and Isotta-Fraschini are well known for lightweight diesels, and Castoldi has a world-wide reputation for waterjet units for small craft.

It is, however, in the design and manufacture of weapons and sensors that the Italian defence industry has been most

successful. Although development was protracted and other missiles achieved faster sales, the Franco-Italian Otomat anti-ship missile is now reaping the success which it deserves. With its air-breathing engine it has great range (60-80 km in the original MK1 version and 150 km in the MK2 version).

The Italian version of Otomat Mk2 differs in its homing system. The seeker is made by SMA and improvements in the guidance system have converted it from a diving missile to a sea-skimmer. Trials have shown that the destructive effect of Otomat's 200kg warheads is greatly enhanced by the large amount of fuel carried.

Italian ingenuity has turned the original American Sparrow airframe into the Aspide multi-role air defence missile. By reworking the electronics Aspide has become a «family» of air-to-air, surface-to-air and ground-to-air missiles with a high degree of commonality.

From the naval customer's point of view Aspide's main appeal is that it has inter-operability with the well-established Sea Sparrow «family.» Oto-Melara's launchers can take either NATO Sea Sparrow or Aspide with only a small conversion and the change is also easily reversible.

The Sistel Sea Killer missile has also been reworked with a seeker and as the Marte Mk 2 it provides helicopters with a useful helicopter missile for attacking strike craft and similar light targets. Marte equips Sea King helicopters of the Italian Navy and is ideal for small navies looking for a cost-effective air-to-surface strike capability.

The Oto-Melara factory outside La Spezia has been producing naval gun mountings for nearly 80 years. With the encouragement of NATO since the 1950s the company has developed a standard weapon for small and medium-sized warships. This line of development culminated in the 76mm/62 cal. compact, a weapon which can truly claim to be in service throughout the world. Right from the start it was designed to use standard US Navy 76mm ammunition to ensure an easy supply of ammunition and to ensure what was then regarded as the smallest size

of shell capable of using a VT or proximity fuse. Although most popular in corvettes and fast strike craft, the 76mm Compact also serves as a main gun for many classes of frigates. Its rate of fire of 80 rounds per minute gives it a useful dual role in air defence and surface gunfire support.

The latest refinement is the Super-rapid Compact, which has had its ammunition feed re-engineered to boost rate of fire to 120 rounds per minute. This increase of 50% to the Compact's already impressive rate of fire has put it in the category of point defence weapons capable of dealing with sea-skimming missiles, using new pre-fragmented anti-missile munitions. To make it attractive to export customers the Super-Rapid is also available as a retrofit to existing models of 76mm Compact, using a conversion «kit.»

Breda Meccanica Bresciana's 40mm twin Compact was designed to provide ships with a close-in defence against the sea-skimmer. It uses Bofors' well-tried 40mm L/70 gun but with a remarkable ammunition-feed capable of pumping 300 rounds per minute through each barrel. The ammunition has been pre-fragmented to create a dense mass of tungsten balls and fragments of casing in the immediate path of an incoming missile, to detonate the warhead or destroy the missile itself.

The latest version of the Breda Compact will enhance its lethality against anti-ship missiles. By adapting the feed it is possible to switch from the standard pre-fragmented 40mm ammunition to a new armour-piercing round for the last moments of the engagement, to make certain of piercing any protection given to the warhead. The rate of fire is boosted as well. Performance

considerably higher than the present 600 rounds per minute from the mounting can be expected.

Linked with Selenia and Elsa's Dardo fire control system, the Breda twin Compact provides frigates with an effective defence against close-range air attack and anti-ship missile attack. It also provides small strike craft with a powerful secondary gun system, and many strike craft designs feature the 76mm Oto-Melara and 40mm Breda in combination. Even with a simpler fire control system it provides ships with a potent close-range defence against air attack.

For frigates and destroyers' medium-calibre armament Oto-Melara produced the 127mm/54 cal. gun. Like the 76mm it is designed to fire a standard US Navy 5-inch round to simplify ammunition supplies in time of emergency or war.

The name Whitehead has been synonymous with torpedo-design for more than a century, although the modern Whitehead-Motofides company is on Italian soil, not Austrian. Both lightweight anti-submarine torpedoes and heavyweight submarine-launched weapons are manufactured. The A-244 lightweight is compatible with launchers firing the US Navy-pattern Mk 44 and Mk 46, but incorporates up-to-date circuitry to cope with the unique shallow-water environment of the Mediterranean, and a faster weapon, the A-290 is in an advanced state of development. Both types are designed to be dropped by helicopters and fired from surface ships as a quick-reaction defence.

Space does not permit a detailed description of the range of sensors and electronic equipment produced for export, but it is a field in which Italian design has proved very successful. The Orion RTN-20X is the tracker for the Dardo point-defence system, while the RTN-30 forms part of the Albatros air defence system associated with the Aspide missile. Italian systems are also easily integrated with other equipment. The British, for example, use the RTN-10X tracker in combination with Ferranti WSA4 equipment for controlling guns and Seacat point-defence missiles in their Amazon class frigates.

In the field of underwater sensors the Italians use American and Dutch sonars, but the associated systems are Italian-designed. The AN/SQQ-14 mine-hunting sonar, for example, is made under licence. As with the above-water sensors Italian systems are easily interfaced with foreign equipment. The French Didon sonar forms part of the CNR 550-ton corvette's equipment, and there are other examples.

The secret of Italian success seems to be the combination of good engineering and a willingness to buy off-the-shelf components. The Italian naval industry makes no attempt to design indigenous equipment «across the board,» and chooses instead to concentrate its efforts on packaging proven equipment in ways which meet the customer's needs.

Algeria

Some years ago the Coast Guard bought ten GC20 patrol craft from Baglietto, followed by three larger 'Mangusta' type. Two new 'Kebir' class strike craft are armed with the 76mm Compact, while the two tank landing ships built in Great Britain have the Breda 40mm twin Compact. With a large inventory of ex-Soviet ships, future purchases of Italian equipment are hard to forecast, but clearly Algerian procurement plans are no longer tied to Soviet equipment.

Egypt

Although Italian companies have made strong efforts to sell equipment to the Egyptian Government they have so far achieved only a limited success. The Oto-Melara 76mm gun and the Breda 40mm were specified for the six Ramadan class missile boats, along with the Otomat anti-ship missile. The class includes the Khyber, El Kadessya, El Yarmouk, Badr and Hettein, but rumours of a further six have so far come to nothing.

As an interim measure the British shipyard Vosper Thornycroft was asked to refurbish and arm six locally-built wooden strike craft (October 1985) based on the Soviet 'Komar' class. The bare hulls were transformed by the addition of two Otomat missiles, and in addition the Russian diesels were replaced by CRM 18-cylinder diesel engines. Nos. 207-212 were completed in 1979-81, slightly ahead of the Ramadan class. The Descubierta corvettes are fitted with 76mm/62 guns and Albatros/Aspide air defence weapons.

Libya

The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is without doubt one of Italy's most successful export markets. The 10 Combattante II class missile boats completed in 1982-83 are armed with four Otomat missiles each as well as 76mm Oto-Melara and 40mm Breda guns. The four Assad class corvettes (formerly the Wadi class) were built by Cantieri Navali Riuniti in 1974-81 with a predominantly Italian suite of weapons and sensors.

The Assad al Bihar, Assad al Toumour, Assad al Kalij and Assad al Hudud are armed with four Otomat missiles and a single 76mm Oto-Melara gun. As secondary armament they carry a unique gun mounting: twin 35mm Oerlikon guns in an Oto-Melara mounting.

With the exception of the sonar, which is French, the entire outfit of electronics and sensors is Italian. Selenia's RAN 11L/X and RTN 10X radars provide surveillance and gun-tracking, while the mini-combat system is Selenia's IPN-10. Selenia also provided the ISN-1 intercept gear for the electronic warfare suite. Although rated as corvettes they resemble enlarged strike craft in layout, but have a heavier gun-armament. The design is excellent for coastal defence missions, but the limited internal space would inhibit them from undertaking lengthy missions.

An interesting example of Italian expertise is the modernisation undergone by the British-built corvette Dat Assawari. Built by Vosper Thornycroft to their Mk7 design, since 1979 she has had her Seacat short-range SAMs and Mk 10 depth-charge mortar replaced by a 4-round launcher for Aspide SAMs. Four Otomat missile canisters have been added on the quarterdeck but the twin 35mm Oerlikon gun turret right aft and the 4.5inch (114mm) Mk 8 gun forward have been retained. Triple launchers for Whitehead-Motofides A-244 ASW torpedoes are now sited at the break of the forecastle.

A new outfit of sensors has been supplied. Selenia has provided the RAN-10S as the main surveillance radar. Two RTN-10X trackers and the IPN-10 combat system. The ship was damaged by a bomb in 1980 but was repaired and ran her trials in 1983-84.

Morocco

The Moroccan Navy bought Selenia's Albatros air defence system for its Spanish-built corvette Colonel Errhamani, delivered in 1983. The ship is also armed with the Oto-Melara 76mm Compact and two single 40mm Bofors guns with Breda improved feed.

The four Spanish-built missile boats, Commandant Al Khattabi, Cdt Boutouba, Cdt El Harti and Cdt Azouggar are all armed with a 76mm Compact gun forward and a single Breda Bofors 40mm aft, as are the French-built gunboats Okba and Triki.

Tunisia

The three Combattante III type missile boats, La Galite, Tunis and Carthage are armed with the Oto-Melara 76mm gun and the twin 40mm Breda Compact.

The future

Many African navies are too small to be a market for the most advanced naval systems, but they have a continuing need for ships capable of defending coastal waters. We can expect to see more strike craft and patrol craft, the type of warships suited to weapons such as the 76mm Compact gun. For strike craft the Otomat missile is beginning to erode markets previously dominated by Exocet.

For the few countries able to afford major warships the Italians have a number of systems, notably the Albatros air defence system, and Agusta helicopters such as the AB-212 meet the needs for shipborne operations. The importance of retrofit work should not be ignored. Here Nigeria and Egypt are the likeliest markets.

The success in selling modern minehunters to Nigeria suggests that other African navies may follow suit, and Intermarine's known expertise in the field of GRP construction makes the yard a leading contender for such a contract.

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EGYPT

DANGERS FACING PRESS EXAMINED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 22 Dec 85 p 7

[Article by Salamah Ahmad Salamah: "About Press and Democracy"]

[Text] Like a stone thrown into a calm lake, news of the return of a prominent writer and journalist to the Egyptian press' world has aroused wide circles of interest and attention. The BBC and the Arab press have carried the news as an important event heralding more important things that surpass the mere resumption by a prominent writer and journalist of his writing after a long absence. Political circles and lobbies have also circulated the news, with supporters viewing it as something normal for a writer to resume his press activity in a broad arena throbbing with numerous and varied tendencies and interpretations, especially since the [Muhammad Hasanayn] Haykal of the 1980's will not necessarily be the Haykal of the 1960's, and with opponents fearing that the old political shadows of the Haykalist positions and opinions will extend to existing conditions and structures.

But the details of this issue are not what we seek to dwell on today because we know nothing more about the underlying nature of this issue-- nothing that is greatly or meagerly beneficial to the reader. However, we have to pause before this issue's indications and ramifications when the question of the return of an Egyptian writer and journalist well known at the Arab and international levels becomes an issue that provokes debate and argument and that nearly turns attention from more serious issues and problems that directly touch our daily lives through new economic policies that they seek to have implemented and requiring a degree of followup and concentration or through external conditions that change rapidly and influence fateful issues connected with our existence and survival.

There is nothing more indicative of the Egyptian press' need for review in order that the Egyptian press may exercise a real awareness in a climate of freedom guaranteed by the existing constitutional institutions and in order that this press may be able to face whatever winds and changes may blow up so that it may achieve a greater degree of stability, a more advanced system, and ceaseless serious work--there is nothing more indicative of this need than this vast clamor raised by some people over a prominent writer's return to exercising a right enjoyed by all prominent

and minor journalists, politicians, and public opinion leaders within the press circle and outside it and in both the national and the partisan press. It is even a right enjoyed on the pages of the Egyptian press by non-Egyptian writers and journalists, some of whom do not necessarily write out of a heart overflowing with love for Egypt or with a pen owing its loyalty to Egypt.

In democratic systems that believe in partisan multiplicity, that permit differences of opinion and a multiplicity of tendencies, that are founded on interaction between opinions and tendencies, by constitutional, legal, and institutional controls, the guarantees of free expression for individuals, groups, and parties are supposed to be an indisputable and undebatable matter of fact. This is the case in deep-rooted systems with established traditions. As for us, it seems that the matter requires reaffirming these principles and calls for entrenching and bolstering them in thought and in practice. It is obvious that the state leadership's political thinking and democratic acts outdistance some of the influential elements involved in political action. It has been evident on numerous occasions that the state, embodied in its presidential leadership, has been more eager to safeguard the freedom of the press and the multiplicity of opinions and that it has refused to respond to the calls and appeals to impose restrictions on pens and opinions tarnished by unacceptable excesses or by sharp criticism founded on no basis, contenting itself with offering advice and with warning of the consequences of persisting on a path that neither enriches nor advances democracy but rather harms all, both rulers and ruled, majority and opposition.

Therefore, we believe that this clamor would have not materialized if a political awareness of the need to underline and entrench the freedom of the press as a guarantee of the democratic process, of its enrichment, and of its entrenchment had penetrated partisan political thinking at all levels, thus making it the journalist's right to write or refrain from writing of his own free will and without asking for permission and making it the right of a paper or of a press establishment to publish or refrain from publishing in accordance with its own policies--be they national or partisan--which are supposed to be charted by the editorial boards whose formation in the press establishments is stipulated by the law.

However, this political aspect--which explains part of the phenomenon--is countered by a professional aspect whose dimensions have become grave and whose dangers have intensified. This is the aspect to which the agencies in charge of the Egyptian press, whether the Journalists Union or the Higher Press Council, must devote a great part of their attention. I mean by the professional aspect here the presence of chaos in the press labor market and in relations between the national and partisan press establishments on the one hand and between the Egyptian and non-Egyptian establishments on the other. Should such chaos go on unchecked, it is sure to influence the national press establishments from within and to turn them in the long run into entities similar to the losing public-sector companies that need annual state subsidies to rescue them from collapse. But at the

same time, this subsidy renders them incapable of achieving the minimum degree of autonomy and of the ability to move and keep pace with the technological developments that seize the press with fearful rapidity these days. We will have thus wiped out all hope of real press freedom.

It is well known that most of the major Egyptian press establishments experienced in the past few years an important phase of growth when they tried to rejuvenate their printing, technological, and technical capabilities through enormous loans and investments so that they may be able to keep pace with the rapid and sweeping developments in the press, communications, and information world and so that they may withstand the strong competition by numerous Arab papers born in the lap of the vast oil wealth. These papers have not held back in spending enormous sums of money to acquire the best and latest products of modern printing technology and to obtain Arab technical and professional expertise, coming mostly from Egypt and from its press establishments, of course, and, finally, to attract the most prominent pens and writers and a large number of qualified and trained press cadres, who are also from Egypt and from its press establishments, of course.

The problem is not in those who work outside Egypt in various parts of the Arab world or who work in Arab newspapers and magazines issued in Europe. This is an important pan-Arab and Egyptian role which we must not abandon. Moreover, this is an open sphere for emigrant Egyptian labor. The problem lies in the chaotic relations of press activity--relations that permit a journalist to collect his salary from a national press establishment and to secure through his position in this establishment his pension, insurance, medical care, allowances, profits, and incentives, if there are profits or incentives, and then to work at the same time for one or more partisan papers and for any number of Arab oil papers. In this respect, prominent writers preceded the minor and young journalists. It has become familiar to some of these writers to publish their work abroad first and then to re-publish it at home.

The writers and journalists, both big and small, are excused in this regard. The Arab papers pay, and pay handsomely, and so do some of the partisan papers, not to mention all of them. The low incomes and wages and the critical economic conditions motivate one to seek other sources of income. But these financial pressures have undermined many of the values of press work on the one hand and have devoured or are about to devour the national press of its most important press cadres and its best-known pens on the other hand. These pressures have undermined the press work values that preserve journalistic secrets, that regard press scoops and honesty and accuracy in reporting, and that set capability, integrity, and excellence as criteria in the hierarchy of press work. They have replaced these values by vile "open-door oriented" values, if we may use the expression. Briefcase and black-market merchants have become numerous in the Egyptian press and they sell to the highest bidder, without regard for the public interest. Regrettably, many of these represent the rising press generations that gained a limited degree of the press skill and then stopped under the pressure of the financial need to get money from any direction.

The consequence emanating from this is that the national press, which has spent heavily to develop its capabilities, will find itself incapable of continuing the required technological development if the young editors continue to put quantity ahead of quality and to seek immediate financial benefits without long-range professional skills. This is a loss whose cost will not be paid by the national press alone. Moreover, the confusion, the presence in the national press of those who work in the partisan press and vice versa, and the seizure by some of the efforts and sweat of others without justification and without any recompense will lead in a few years to devoiding certain press establishments of their content and to creating a stronger atmosphere of dependence and of mercenary activity than is prevalent at present, with the subsequent disappearance of the ability to form an opinion or to defend one, not to mention respecting opinions and performing the primary duty toward public opinion by expressing, publishing, and explaining it. All this will result in the fall of the journalism profession and its honor.

The picture from within the Egyptian press, both national and partisan, does not evoke optimism. We see in the uproar raised unjustifiably over a national press establishment's resorting to a prominent writer nothing but a reflection of the crisis of the Egyptian press, in both its political and its professional aspects. We must seek a rapid cure for this crisis, especially since the false saturation limit which has permitted some papers to drop their prices to the subsistence level will soon disappear. Moreover, the hopes attached to the challenges that the great awakening programs carry with them will continue to be tied to the ability of the Egyptian media, especially the printed press--both national and partisan--to rise to the level of these challenges as a profession and as an instrument for enhancing political awareness.

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CSO: 4505/132

EGYPT

ISRAELI PROTESTS ABOUT EGYPTIAN PRESS DENOUNCED

Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 26 Jan 86 p 5

[Commentary by Muhammad al-Hayawan: "Word of Love"]

[Text] In Egypt, freedom of the press has become a fact, and the press is still demanding more. In spite of everything, the government has not interfered with or made any attempts against the freedom of the press; the most that the government might ever have said to the press is a word of reproach. It is not even thinking of oppressing views or free speech.

Nevertheless, Israel does not want to acknowledge this. In fact, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry receives protests over what the Egyptian newspapers publish from only two parties: the Israeli embassy and the Soviet embassy. The Foreign Ministry always replies, "The press is free in Egypt; we have no right to reprimand it; you have to protest directly to the newspapers." However, Israel knows that its reaction will always end up in the wastebasket, for no journalist in Egypt wants to be accused of dealing with Israel or publishing its point of view.

Even so, Israel wants to impose control on Egypt's newspapers by means of an international treaty, and is making that one of the conditions for returning Taba to Egypt. Israel knows that Taba is Egyptian territory, but it wants to gain something, and is demanding a stop to the Egyptian information media's anti-Israeli propaganda.

In every meeting between Egypt and Israel, Israel has demanded and insisted on that.

Even though there is no connection between the return of usurped territory in Taba and Israel's demands, the question might occur to the Egyptian citizen: What is this anti-Israeli propaganda?

Should we change history to please Israel? Should we change Israel's black history into a white book, thus overturning the facts of history and what has happened ever since 1948 and what is still going on?

The big difference between what the Arabs understand and what Israel wants to say is that they call what happened in 1948 a war of independence, while we know it as the usurpation of Palestine. They call the PLO a terrorist organization, while we believe that it represents the people of Palestine and is demanding their rights.

Even so, what could Israel call Dayr Yasin? Kafr Qasim? Sabra and Shatila? Bahr al-Baqr? Abu-Za'bal? Could it include the murder of children under the heading of a war for independence? Can slashing open the bellies of Arab women be considered birth control?

How can we describe the downing of the civilian airliner coming from Libya? How can we justify the invasion of Lebanon, or explain to people the annexation of Jerusalem and Golan? How can we describe what is happening on the West Bank, and the desecration of Islamic and Christian holy places in Jerusalem?

How can we forget the sabotage in Sinai--how they demolished it before withdrawing--how they poisoned the wells if they didn't destroy them outright--how they put microbes in the wells which would kill whoever drank from them?

We welcome peace whole-heartedly, but peace must not be partial, and must not be based on obliterating people's memory so easily and giving them the opposite of the truth. With that, I'll see you tomorrow.

8559

CSO: 4504/188

EGYPT

GOVERNMENT PAPER ANSWERS WAFDIST CRITICISM

Revolution's Achievements Extolled

Cairo MAYU in Arabic 6 Jan 86 p 3

[Text] Frankly, MAYU's editorial family had intended not to allow the re-printing of the vituperation of some people who claim to be an opposition, and to ignore the allegations and slander they have directed at such massive achievements as the high dam and the public sector.

Our view was that we would thereby be helping to focus attention on falsely heroic stands and opposition for its own sake.

However, the reader's right to know prevailed over our opinion. Yes, the reader does have the right to know the secrets about people who have become professional at auctioneering and people whose positions and statements have changed with the change in regime and rulers.

The reader has the right to learn the truth about the auctioneers and the story of the deputy who rode the current at the beginning of the revolution, told the young people, "The Wafd Party is the party of corruption and patronage," then after 30 years joined the Wafd!

How could he change his skin and his ideas with amazing speed! How could he say, "I am 'Abd-al-Nasir's son," then proceed to attack the public sector which 'Abd-al-Nasir established!

What is the story of the picture taken of him at the late President Anwar al-Sadat's side? How did he use it in the elections, then start to attack al-Sadat's era?

MAYU, in all this, is seeking only a lesson from which people might learn, a moral for people who might reflect, and in the end the caravan will continue. The public sector will not go to the devil, as they wish, but will help advance the wheel of development and alleviate the burden on millions of citizens. The gains of the workers who are forging the hope of the nation will go on and the High Dam will remain a perseverant, proud citadel and a symbol of beneficence and bounty for the good earth, the earth of us all, Egypt, in spite of them!

Wafdist Attack Rebutted

Cairo MAYU in Arabic 6 Jan 86 p 3

[Text] President Husni Mubarak's statement, which was discussed in the People's Assembly, has come forth as a philosophy of executive action, policies and directives. Nonetheless, the Wafd Party deputies, specifically Yasan Siraj-al-Din and 'Ulwi Hafiz, have attacked the public sector and the workers' and peasants' gains. They have attacked the 23 July revolution and the gains it realized. Yasan Siraj-al-Din has said, "Let the public sector go to the devil," and the Wafd, as it attacks the public sector, has forgotten that workers before the revolution worked 16 hours and did not have social or health insurance. The workers would go to their jobs barefoot! The Wafdist deputy 'Ulwi Hafiz has forgotten his statement that he was 'Abd-al-Nasir's son and the first person to teach young people at the beginning of the revolution that the Wafd Party was corruption, feudalism and favoritism.

The workers' deputy Muhammad Khalil Hafiz, National Party, challenged all attempts to attack the July revolution and said, "The members of the Wafd Party have forgotten that their party's program was built on commitment to the principles of the 23 July revolution, but they have now tried to settle their scores with the revolution. I do not know on the basis of what foundation these parties are proceeding. The entire people, who have benefitted from the revolution, will not listen to any party that wants to settle personal scores with some leaders of the 23 July revolution. There are some people who have come to this assembly with it in mind to settle scores because they were not appointed to a ministerial or leadership position. One of those was a person who when we were young taught us that we should cry out to the revolution. He is the one who attacks the High Dam. He is the one who won us over to the idea that this dam should be built and that it was to Egypt's benefit."

The deputy from al-Darb al-Ahmar added, "The people who talk about corruption today are themselves the ones who told us that the Wafd was responsible for the corruption before the revolution. They are the ones who have joined the Wafd today. One should bear in mind that at some point they said that they were members of the Revolutionary Command Council. 'Ulwi Hafiz made statements to us when we were young and he was young, then has come back and taken them back today."

The deputy from al-Darb al-Ahmar said, "Egypt's young people know the truth, which is what these people will face when they seek to attack the revolution and the regime, because these young people have heard someone eager for the people's trust saying that he was Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir's son, then coming back and saying that he was al-Sadat's colleague and using his picture with al-Sadat while he was touring around during the 1976 election campaign. He won this campaign, then came back and attacked 'Abd-al-Nasir and al-Sadat and joined the Wafd. I respect every Wafdist who was originally a Wafdist, but I do not like people who change color according to circumstances and conditions and change their skin and their political beliefs, at one stage being among the children of the revolution and on another day being Wafdist, so that they can settle their scores with the revolution. We tell

them, you will not be able to settle your personal scores, even if this person is in a leadership position and attacks the revolution."

The deputy from al-Darb al-Ahmar continued, "I will mention to you what our situation was before the revolution when we looked for work and the employer would control us and would dismiss the people he did not like. We were searching for crusts of bread and the employer would control us and choose whom he liked. We worked 16 hours a day and got only a quarter of a day's wage, and the people who protested he expelled. Workers were told, 'the most fortunate one is beleaguered and the least fortunate is a beggar, and there is no safety, no guarantee and no future.' The public sector guarantees the rights to work and increase production. The public sector provides job insurance in health and social terms. I defy any owner of capital before the revolution to have established a heavy industry such as iron and steel. Their goal was to establish consumer industries for rapid profit. The public sector is what has protected Egypt from the international wave of price rises. The public sector has helped achieve social balance and support for the toiling classes.

"Taking a look at elections before the revolution, a rich person would buy votes for half a pound per person. He would split the pound, give half of it to the voters and keep the other half. He would mark their backs with chalk; if they voted for him they would get the other half and if they did not vote for him they would be whipped. I say they are not to talk about democracy and freedom now. Corruption exists all over the world but we are not quiet about corruption. We are working to confront it and fight it. Standing up to corruption is a sacred duty and is not done by slandering or polluting the society. Have the people who are demanding the abrogation of the public sector now paid taxes? Have they helped pay off Egypt's debts? The people who attack the public sector are people who own palaces. The Egyptian people are not familiar with palaces; they are familiar with ordinary apartments. The owners of the palaces are the people who lived, ruled and held control before the revolution."

Wafdist Deputy's Past Reviewed

Cairo MAYU in Arabic 6 Jan 86 p 3

[Text] The Wafdist deputy 'Ulwi Hafiz Yaqut, member of the Revolutionary Command Council, attacked feudalism in Kamshish, then made the laudatory statement that Shahanda Muqallad was a heroine fighting feudalism and attacked the Wafd at the beginning of the revolution. Recently he joined the Wafd Party notwithstanding his description of the Wafd as the apex of corruption and patronage.

The Wafdist deputy is auctioneering by claiming to demand the application of Islamic law and raising that as a slogan to traffic in. Has he forgotten that he personally burned down the Moslem Brothers' headquarters in al-Darb al-Ahmar? That he is the one who trod God's holy book underfoot? That he is the one who entered the mosque with shoes on? That he is the one who hit Shaykh Mustafa Isma'il, the famous reader of the Koran, in the Mosque of Our Lady Fatimah al-Nabawiyah and expelled him from the mosque?

Ask 'Ulwi Hafiz

Was there intercession on his behalf in getting into the War College? Who took Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir's side against Muhammad Najib? Who in the early part of the revolution loudly extolled his imprisonment of the Wafd leader in the War College building?

Why does 'Ulwi Hafiz talk about good examples and offer advice to young and old while he is in the severest need of it? He has been receiving a deputy minister's allowance since the revolution, while not doing any work.

At his people's conferences after the revolution, the Wafdist deputy 'Ilwi Hafiz said "The blood of the Wafd and its leaders must be shed and the revolution must not be white. It must be steeped in the blood of the Wafdists!"

Ask 'Ulwi Hafiz. And, if he is silent in responding,

Forgive him!

Assembly Speaker Al-Mahjub Replies

Cairo MAYU in Arabic 6 Jan 86 p 3

[Text] Without any occasion for doing so, and without preliminaries, the Wafdist deputy 'Ilwi Hafiz stood up during the discussion of the report of the committee to reply to the president's statement and said, "The Muhammad 'Ali family had 417 palaces and these palaces must be used as educational buildings and hospitals." Dr Rif'at al-Mahjub wondered if that was true and if the government had to clarify that.

Dr al-Sayyid 'Ali al-Sayyid, minister of People's and Consultative Assembly affairs, replied by saying "This is not true and if there were 417 palaces, as the deputy 'Ilwi Hafiz says, it would have been possible to use them all. I ask him to explain to us where these palaces are."

Dr Rif'at al-Mahjub said:

"The Muhammad 'Ali family did not have 417 families such that each family would need at least a palace. If that was true, the responsibility for the existence of these palaces belongs to the parties before the revolution."

At that point the Wafdist deputy 'Ali Salamah rushed up and said, "This is an opinion, and opinions cannot be made on the podium."

The assembly chairman said "It is not an opinion. Rather, in accordance with the bill, the assembly chairman has the right to preserve the assembly's dignity. There is no reason to shout, Mr 'Ali, we are explaining things. Things must not be presented to this assembly in this form without clarification, lest things get confused. Young people need to know the truth about what went on in Egypt before the revolution. They should know that in Egypt before the revolution there was a corrupt king, the door to this assembly was locked with chains and democracy before the revolution was the democracy

of 'Put out the lights, Mahir.' Democracy before the revolution was not real. Had it not been for the revolution no one would have got into this assembly, and the majority of the opposition that is present here would not have got into this assembly. Thanks to the revolution and the transformation which occurred, the people rose up and we got into this assembly after the revolution."

The assembly chairman said, "The opposition must realize that it knows more than we do about the democracy it is mourning. It was the democracy of dissolving assemblies and locking doors with chains. This is the democracy you are mourning. It is not proper to portray conditions as if they were the worst they could be."

Dr Rif'at al-Mahjub said, "Young people have the right to know the facts, to know their country and know what went on in Egypt before the revolution. We were distressed with what went on. We were distressed with the injustices, corrupt rule and tyrannical feudalism that went on, and with some agents of foreign regimes. Egypt did not have a say. Had it not been for the revolution, the people would not have had the right to hope, to go to school or come to this assembly. Had it not been for the revolution our role would have stopped at giving our votes to other people.

"A corrupt king, parties that cooperated with him and colonialists -- all these together ruled Egypt. Is it a matter of casting doubts on top of casting doubts? Is the plan to cast doubts about everything going on in Egypt and paint a picture that Egypt before the revolution was snow white?"

Engineer Rebuts Dam Claims

Cairo MAYU in Arabic 6 Jan 86 p 3

[Text] The Wafdist deputy 'Ulwi Hafiz alleged that the high dam was built on an earth fault, that it was on the verge of collapsing and that one of its side-effects has been the erosion of the banks.

Eng 'Abd-al-Hadi Samahah challenged these claims and confronted the slander with facts. He answered ignorance with information in the form of figures and reports by international consulting firms.

Eng 'Abd-al-Hadi Samahah said:

"The High Dam perseveres and is sublime, in spite of all that is said. I wish that God would inspire everyone to proper conduct. We do not know the truth of everything that has been said. I as a citizen cannot imagine that my country would be so bad. I had hoped that our brother 'Ilwi would refrain from living in a country such as the one he described. He ought to have spoken frankly with the people about all the facts. I have lived as an official, and someone who is not an official, in the government and outside it, and have not heard it said that Egypt has reached such a low level. Its people do not allow themselves to be described in this way. We noble Egyptians cannot speak about something or an activity that is as bad as this. I will talk about the High Dam. This Wafdist deputy does not know what the

High Dam has given to Egypt. Truly, if it had not been for this dam, neither the poor nor the rich would have eaten."

Eng 'Abd-al-Hadi Samahah added, "The government has not ignored any of the side effects of the High Dam. We have been constantly examining everything concerning the High Dam. They had previously estimated the erosion of the river at dozens of meters and estimated that it would cause the deterioration of the agricultural soil; I can say that what the river takes on the one hand it gives on the other hand, which is the nature of rivers.

"Regarding what has been said about earthquakes and cracks, the Ministry of Irrigation has not ignored them. This has been broached internationally to consulting firms and international experts from all countries, including China, Japan, America and Argentina. We have brought them here and talked with them and the studies have been studied with international consulting firms which are not partial to east or west. The government has insisted that there be an arbitration committee member from the Soviet consulting firms, and he actually came to Egypt. He is one of the engineers who designed, planned and took part in the construction of the High Dam. This massive structure has protected Egypt from a drought more severe than the one Pharaoh dreamed of in the days of our lord Joseph, on whom be peace. The studies have affirmed that the High Dam endures, in spite of everything that is said."

11887

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EGYPT

LEADERSHIP HELD RESPONSIBLE TO SOCIETY, YOUTH

Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 24 Jan 86 p 5

[Commentary by Muhammad al-Hayawan: "Word of Love"]

[Text] The shaykh told his young pupil, "My boy, the people are indebted to their kings. If the shepherd is upright, so is the flock. The people love to imitate their rulers. Walid bin 'Abd-al-Malik was fond of architecture, so the people of his time turned to such arts. Then came Sulayman bin 'Abd-al-Malik, who loved food, and the people became engrossed with various kinds of dishes and culinary arts. After him came 'Umar bin 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the ascetic, the recluse, the penitent, so moderation spread, the people adopted the manners of the Prophet's friends, even in the marketplaces, and voices were heard uplifted in prayer in people's homes in the final hours of the night."

The shaykh fell silent, and then said, "If you don't behave fairly and put an end to your detestable behavior, God is capable of bringing down your evils upon you, and if the ones you chose [as leaders] ask God to deliver them, he will not listen to them."

If we turn to our heritage for inspiration, we find that this is true, and that there is nothing new under the sun. Some people study our heritage for pleasure and entertainment, while some do so for advice and admonition. Most people ignore their entire heritage, and the Islamic governments forget it deliberately, because holding fast to the moral code of the early Muslims is hard, burdensome and grueling. He who grasps the reins of God in these times is taking hold of fire. But does that mean that evil overtakes good in its path, that evil is victorious, that corruption is about to consume people who will be unable to escape it? Actually, good does exist and is in the majority, but good people are widely-scattered islands with no bonds or relationship between them. The good people are a silent majority, doing what they have to do in silence, suffering in silence, isolating themselves from evil as much as possible. As for the bad people, their voices are louder, their barking is stronger, and their corruption is like a flood.

The leadership has a responsibility. Taking on public work is a hard question. Justice is the king's foundation, and justice alone can bring together these islands representing the good people in order to form a dam against the flood, to hold back and oppose evil and corruption.

The leader faces a serious responsibility in choosing his assistants, for the people do not deal with the head of state, and cannot know what is going on inside his head except through his assistants. They are the leader's hands among the people. If they reach out to good, the head of state will be blessed. If they reach out to evil, he and the leadership will be fully accountable.

The leader's responsibility to the young people is even more serious and important, because the young people believe in righteousness. If the corrupt own the state and have won over the nation, then what use is the young peoples' adherence to upright moral values? There must be an example to follow. The people imitate the stars of the society. If the leading personalities point the way to corruption, the young people, and the very basis of society, will be corrupted.

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CSO: 4504/188

EGYPT

IMPORTED JOURNALISM SEEN HARMFUL TO SOCIETY

Cairo AKHBAR AL-YAWM in Arabic 25 Jan 86 p 5

[Commentary by Nabil Abazah: "The Correct Note"]

[Text] Strange logic indeed! The state prohibits the importation of many foreign goods on the pretext of protecting local industries, while at the same time leaving the door wide open to all sorts of dubious newspapers and magazines published in Arabic, of known or unknown affiliation or source of financing, published in London, Paris and Cyprus!

The state protects our national industries from foreign industrial competition, but does not protect our traditions, concepts, or our social, economic and political stability. These newspapers and magazines influence Egyptian public opinion as a result of the biased thoughts they disseminate, and help spread confusion through their false news and trumped-up rumors, going to great lengths to emphasize that these are facts and news items which only they have been able to acquire and find out!

It is strange that the state should allow complete freedom for these newspapers and magazines to enter Egypt under the pretext of freedom and democracy, forgetting that it has a duty to protect Egyptian journalism and the Egyptian people from this dubious, imported journalism which preaches impulses, spreads confusion, and threatens our social and political stability through glossy printing techniques and flighty stories and tales which our national journalism cannot keep up with!

The state also forgets that prohibiting the entry of these suspicious newspapers and magazines does not threaten democracy at all. In addition to the national papers, there are strong party newspapers which are free to publish whatever they want, without state control or intervention, and which play the role of the opposition very well. We don't need an Arabic-language foreign press, imported with hard currency, to teach us about democracy. Such press contains slanted news and articles, aimed at either spreading confusion or at hatching intrigue among the Egyptian parties or between the people and the government!

Instead of abandoning the market to these suspect newspapers and journals, why don't the national press organizations think of issuing new papers and magazines to attract new readers? At the same time, these new papers and magazines would employ many of the young people who graduate each year from our universities' schools of journalism, thus providing them job opportunities-- especially since these organizations have recently improved their printing presses, the printing capacity of which now far exceeds the volume of material which these press organizations are now printing.

The state would also benefit from prohibiting the entry of these dubious newspapers and magazines, for it would save all those dollars which are flowing out of the country as a result of the conversion of these publications' sales prices. At the same time, the state would also benefit from the publication of new Egyptian papers and magazines, since the government imposes high fees and taxes on the advertisements printed in the Egyptian press, and these fees and taxes are a big source of revenue.

Our traditions, our moral code, and our first thought is to protect our industries. Also, the state should first and foremost protect our social and political stability and prohibit the entry of newspapers and magazines published by adventurers, pranksters and swindlers in London, Paris, Cyprus and elsewhere.

I also hope that a law will be passed prohibiting any Egyptian company or organization to pay to advertise themselves in these foreign publications; our national press should be the first to get such advertisements.

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CSO: 4504/188

EGYPT

FUTURE OF TEXTILE INDUSTRY DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AHRAM: AL-TAB'AH AL-DUWALIYAH in Arabic 24 Dec 85 and Cairo
AL-AHRAM in Arabic 25 Dec 85

[Article by Ahmad al-'Attar and Amal 'Allam: "Yarn Industry: Where To?"]

[AL-AHRAM: AL-TAB'AH AL-DUWALIYAH 24 Dec 85 p 9]

[Text] The decision to adjust the price of cotton yarn produced locally has evoked a broad reaction from many yarn producers and consumers in Egypt. Even though the decision was necessary to make up for half the cost shouldered by the state as a result of raising the price of purchasing cotton from the farmers to encourage them to cultivate it, numerous experts and owners of textile and readymade clothing plants in the private sector emphasize that the price adjustment will affect production and the possibilities of marketing it, especially since the market is suffering to a large degree from a state of stagnation and from an obvious drop in demand for many kinds of textile products and readymade clothing. This adjustment will lead to a further drop in the demand for these products and will increase the export difficulties.

Engineer Raruq Abu al-Makarim, a member of the Executive Council of the Yarn and Textile Chamber and the owner of a plant, said that the market cannot withstand such an increase now because there is what is known as a stockpile and there is a state of stagnation in the local market which is a secret to nobody. This price increase will undoubtedly intensify the state of stagnation and will increase the stockpile. The prices of yarn were increased before on 1 July 1985 and the market has not yet absorbed that increase. So how can we raise prices now? Engr Abu al-Makarim added that it would have been better to introduce a gradual increase into the prices so that the market may accept the increase. On the other hand, he proposed that the current yarn prices be maintained as they are and that at the same time, a high-quality yarn be produced in order that it may be used for the production of high-quality textiles, with the price of these textiles allowed to rise and without an increase in the price of the free popular textiles.

Al-Hajj Mustafa Matar, owner of a textile plant and a member of the Chamber's Executive Council, believes that this increase will lead to increasing the

price of textiles and that this represents another burden on the consumer. The price of textiles will increase by the same degree as the increase in the price of yarn. He also believes that comprehensive studies should have been conducted, taking into consideration all the tendencies and consequences, and that the decision should have been postponed until the beginning of the new fiscal year on 1 July 1986, especially since the price of yarn has increased by a large degree in the past period and since this increase has led to the well-known state of stagnation in the textile product market of both the public and private sectors. This increase will intensify the problem of many private-sector plants that are actually facing difficulties. If the increase is necessary, then the timing is not right for the private-sector textile plants, especially since the private sector shoulders some burdens unknown to most of the public-sector companies, such as the cost of transportation and other costs. This increase will add a new burden to the private sector's burdens.

Adjustment of Prices Was Necessary To Counter Increase in Cotton Prices

Fu'ad 'Imran, general director of the Yarn and Textile Industry Chamber, said, that there is no doubt that the decision to increase yarn prices was necessary to counter the increase in the price the state pays to purchase cotton from the farmers. But this decision will have its consequences to the yarn, textile, and readymade clothing industries. It will increase the production cost and, consequently, the price of textile products and readymade clothing will increase in the local market. Even though the increase in cost will not on the average exceed 5 percent, which is a small increase, an increase in price under the canopy of the current conditions prevalent in the market which suffers from a drop in demand for numerous textile products and readymade clothing will lead to a further drop in the demand for these products and, consequently, to the difficulty of marketing such products, whether by the public sector or by the private sector. Moreover, the increase in production cost will intensify the difficulties of exporting the yarn and textile products and readymade clothing which are currently facing fierce competition in numerous world markets from similar products made by many other countries which offer to sell at prices below the prices of our production. Furthermore, there are plants which have already concluded contracts to export textiles and readymade clothing and these plants will be surprised by the increase in the cost of the products they will export without a counter increase in the prices of their exports. This may make it impossible for these plants to fulfill their commitments. Fu'ad 'Imran added that the yarn, textile, and readymade clothing industry is already facing illegal competition from similar imported products that enter the country through certain inlets, either by smuggling or with Egyptians returning from abroad. This affects the demand for local products. To deal with this situation, it is required:

- That the owners of private-sector textile and readymade clothing plants be offered soft-term and low-interest loans to purchase modern machinery in order to help them develop their products. It is also required that they be provided with foreign currency on convenient terms so that they may purchase the imported requirements for production.

- That control over the country's entry portals be intensified so as to wipe out any attempts to smuggle foreign clothing and textiles when a similar local product is available.
- That the possibility of offering incentives to encourage the export of yarn and textile products and readymade clothing be studied, in addition to studying the means to assist the owners of plants who already have export contracts and who have been caught by surprise by the increase in yarn prices.
- That the numbered displays by the public-sector distribution outlets of the production of the private-sector plants be increased so as to increase the private sector's sales.
- That an immediate decision be made on the demand for increasing the pay rates given to the private-sector plants operating for the public sector. A committee has been formed in the Ministry of Industry to study increasing these rates.
- That the amount of attention devoted to training new generations of trained technical labor in the sphere of the textile and readymade clothing industry be increased.

[AL-AHRAM 25 Dec 85 p 9]

[Text] The economic page discussed yesterday the issue of applying the adjustment in the cotton yarn price to textile and readymade clothing products. This page continues today its discussion of the position of the yarn industry and of how to achieve the maximum benefit possible from this industry both in the local market and in exports, especially since the phenomenon of the "return to cotton" has spread in the preceding period and since numerous markets in various parts of the world have begun to resume the demand for cotton products. Naturally, this gives Egyptian industry a major opportunity to increase its exports of yarn and textile products and of readymade clothing, especially since the Egyptian cotton from which these products are made is characterized by distinctive specifications that make it possible to manufacture these products at top quality. But how can these exports be increased and how can maximum benefits be reaped from Egyptian cotton products?

Engineer Ahmad al-Baz, head of the technical sectors of the Public Yarn, Textile, and Readymade Clothing Authority, said: The clothing industry with its various types is of major importance to Egypt, whether in terms of meeting the citizens' needs of clothing or in terms of exporting part of the production to bring in big revenues in foreign currencies which are extremely important to the national economy. Despite the major efforts being exerted currently by the yarn, textile, and readymade clothing industry in this regard, this industry can still yield a big increase in its revenues, in addition to meeting local needs and to exporting part of its production. In the recent past, the phenomenon of the "return to

cotton" has spread in most of the major world markets and the demand for cotton products has increased because many of the consumers in these markets have realized that products made of cotton have their many advantages over numerous other products manufactured from other raw materials, especially since cotton products cause no problems to people wearing them. There is no doubt that this gives Egyptian industry an enormous opportunity to utilize the development and to achieve a big increase in our yarn, textile, and readymade clothing exports to various parts of the world, thus generating big returns from this production. Engr al-Baz added: To achieve this, no thick-yarn threads should be produced from Egyptian long-staple cotton, as is happening now, because this reduces greatly the advantages of this variety of cotton, considering that the price of the thick-yarn thread produced from this cotton exceeds by only a small fraction the price of thick-yarn thread spun from the short-staple cottons produced in many other countries. Consequently, the revenues from exporting thick-yarn thread spun from long-staple cotton exceed by a very small fraction the revenues of exporting long-staple cotton without processing. If we add to this the cost of processing this cotton, including wages, the cost of machinery, and other costs incurred to turn this cotton into thick-yarn thread, then the use of Egyptian long-staple cotton to produce thick-yarn thread becomes totally uneconomical. Consequently, this activity must stop, except for the production of thick yarn sold by the meter for embroidery. Moreover, there must be an immediate expansion in the production of fine-yarn thread from the Egyptian long-staple cotton because this type of yarn will make it possible to demonstrate the advantages of Egyptian cotton in the various products manufactured from this cotton. The spinning of fine yarn and the manufacture of products made from this yarn will generate a big yield because the manufacture of products, such as textiles and readymade clothing, from fine yarn will make it possible to turn out excellent products of a very high quality. This will generate a big added value and the revenues reaped from such production will amount to three times the revenues earned from exporting Egyptian cotton unprocessed. Engr Ahmad al-Baz also stressed that in addition to the importance of focusing on the quality of the product, the marketing outfits of Egyptian yarn and textile companies play a major role in opening new markets for manufactured products, including yarn, textiles, and readymade clothing, and in increasing our exports to the current markets. These outfits should study these markets' needs and should contact the importers in these markets to find out the preferences of their consumers and to persuade the importers to purchase Egyptian products so as to achieve a big increase in our exports of these products and, consequently, to increase the revenues earned. This should be done so that what happened 15 years ago when many British yarn plants closed their doors because of old age, and when a major shortage developed in the production of the fine yarns needed by many of the textile plants in various parts of the world, may not recur. At that time, the Egyptian industry failed to exploit the opportunity. Al-Baz added that a single variety of high-quality cotton yarn should be produced instead of what is currently being done by a number of plants which produce yarns of various quality levels. This results at times in a drop in the general quality of the yarn produced by such plants.

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CSO: 4504/133

LIBYA

BANK GOVERNOR DISCUSSES LABOR EXPULSIONS, PAYMENT DELAYS

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic Dec 85 pp 61-63

[Interview with Central Bank Governor Rajab Misallati: "'We Have Overcome Crisis and Have Achieved Balance of Payments Surplus'"; date and place not given]

[Text] There have been many press reports recently about Libya's economic situation, particularly following the expulsion of thousands of Tunisian and Egyptian workers. In this interview, the governor of the Libyan Central Bank, Rajab Misallati, describes this situation, explaining that Libya has overcome "the cash flow crisis" and in fact realized a balance of payments surplus this year. At the same time, most development projects, the "great man-made river" being the foremost, have been or are being implemented. The bottom line is that Libya is emerging from the crisis without any external debt. The interview follows:

[Question] The expulsion of foreign workers from the Jamahiriyah caused a great outcry and led to a deterioration in relations with Tunisia. What were the reasons behind this expulsion?

[Answer] As you know, Libya is a developing country with a limited population; for this reason, we need foreign labor. However, our revenues have decreased recently, requiring that many foreign workers leave the country. We gave these workers the option of remaining as Libyan citizens with full rights and not as foreign workers.

We are not the first country to dispense with certain foreign workers. This has happened and is happening in many of the great industrial countries and Arab oil-producing countries as well.

There are two types of foreign workers in Libya: those who enjoy full legal status; that is, they have employment contracts with the institutions for which they work. There are also workers who do not enjoy legal status; these must of course return to their countries because they have violated our laws. When the sixth 5-year plan was completed, there was no need for many of the jobs held by foreign workers. In 1983, the People's Committees decided to do without many of the foreign workers in the country. The reasons were not solely financial, or a result of the oil and world economic crises; there were other reasons also, the most important being:

1. Ideological reasons, since we prohibit hired work and wages we have shared work, so that everyone will be equal. The private sector can no longer hire any new Libyan or non-Libyan worker; therefore, we can get along without many foreign workers in many different spheres.

2. There are approximately 200,000 foreign workers in Libya, a very large number in relation to the number of residents, approximately 3 million. Libyans have begun to rely on foreign workers in almost every aspect of their lives, which we consider to be a very grave social issue. We are currently urging women to work where they can. Before now, women did not work. We have begun to prohibit foreign workers from holding certain jobs, such as filing clerk, bookkeeper, typist, driver and other positions.

3. Remittances by foreign workers in Libya at one point reached more than \$1.5 billion a year, which poured outside the country, scarcely benefitting the Libyan economy.

However, the People's Committees delayed implementation of the decision taken in 1983, not enforcing it until April 1985.

We had approximately 60,000 Tunisian workers, of whom approximately half left. Most of those who left had entered illegally and had no legal status. They had not been prosecuted even though they were breaking the law. Workers whose contracts had expired were also sent out and given what they needed to leave. We are grateful to the foreign workers and acknowledge their help in developing the country.

Tunisia used the issue to cover up the domestic crisis the regime was suffering. As you know, Tunisia has a high rate of unemployment, 30 percent, and there are many internal disputes. Tunisia's current situation is not good.

For this reason, the issue of the workers was used solely to cover up the domestic crisis. We did not mistreat any Tunisian worker. In fact, we gave them everything they needed to leave, and we still have more than 30,000 Tunisians working in the country.

[Question] What is your assessment of the current economic and fiscal situation in the Jamahiriya?

[Answer] In my opinion, the current economic situation in the Jamahiriya, compared to that of the other oil-producers or other countries with similar economic systems, is very good. As you know, the oil crisis has affected us just as it has affected all the other oil-producing countries. The suffocating economic crisis throughout the world has affected the economic situation in the Jamahiriya.

As I have said, we in the Jamahiriya are an open country; we are not closed in upon ourselves. We have an economic give and take with the world, exchanging goods and services. We have hundreds of foreign companies operating in our country, as well as hundreds of thousands of foreign workers. The economic fluctuations occurring throughout the world affect us, particularly when they affect our primary source of revenue, oil.

Thank God, when the oil crisis began, our reserves were at their highest level. Because of the awareness and perception of our people, the appropriate decisions were made at an early date at the People's Congresses. We were aware at an early stage and took a number of steps which enabled us to decrease our balance of payments deficit. Approximate deficits for 1981 to 1984 were:

1981, 1.5 billion Libyan dinars; 1982, 680 million dinars; 1983, 580 million dinars and 1984, 480 million dinars. So far this year, we have a surplus of approximately 300 million dinars and expect to end the year with a surplus of 500 million dinars.

This shows that the Libyan people were aware of the crisis at an early stage. We took many steps, some of which we admit were severe. This is no disgrace, it is an indication of the strength of our people. Eighty percent of projects under the 1981-1985 development plan were either implemented or are being implemented. Naturally, we were forced by the circumstances to delay a very small number of projects.

The measures taken to deal with the recent economic situation were aimed at rationalizing imports and reducing expenditures of hard currencies.

We reviewed expenditures of hard currencies, whether for medical treatment abroad, tourism or imports of luxury and semi-luxury goods. In guiding expenditures of hard currencies, we have relied on two things: a budget for commodities containing our requirements according to a scale of priorities, followed by priorities for expenditures in other spheres, primarily production, spare parts and raw materials.

I must mention an important point: When we speak of the economic situation, we must say that Libya is the only non-debtor nation in our region (North Africa), which means that, thank God, we do not need the International Monetary Fund and are not subject to its harsh conditions. Consequently, we have not submitted to any political restrictions, nor have any measures that we do not approve of been imposed upon us, as is the case with many debtor nations that can do nothing but think about how to service and repay their debts.

Of course we have trade debts for our imports, but these are met by annual authorizations. We have always paid every penny.

You may have read in the foreign press that Libya's payments are in arrears. This is the responsibility of the foreigners who export to Libya. Just like any other country, we have a system and procedures to be followed in our foreign trade. Unfortunately, we find that the exporters deal with any Libyan who goes to them and says that he is a dealer or representative of a company and places orders. The goods are then shipped without the exporter verifying that the person is actually an importer, that he has an import or currency conversion license or that the goods he has ordered may be imported into Libya.

Of course we must postpone payment for such imports, particularly since some of the goods are prohibited.

We are not bankrupt, as some of the biased or uninformed news media have rumored. The Central Bank has intentionally, for the reasons described, stopped making these payments; this may be reviewed in the future. Some difficulties have arisen specifically with the Italians, who at times have exported to us without verifying that the Libyan importer had all the requirements for importing. For that matter, no one can go to a foreign country and import whatever he likes. There are conditions governing importation and governing prohibited goods, particularly in our system in the Jamahiriyah, where we have divided the economy into sectors and have restricted importation of every commodity to a specific company. For example, the Automated Clothing Company is the only company that may import clothing.

It is true that some Libyan companies bear responsibility for importing prohibited goods, but this is a domestic matter. In any case, we cannot pay the foreign exporter, because he was supposed to know in advance whether the importer was licensed to import such goods. Furthermore, all of these decisions and announcements are made public and distributed to embassies and commercial attaches in the country, and exporters must be aware of them. The latter cannot claim that they are not responsible because they did not know about these laws and decisions, for ignorance of the law is no excuse.

This has to do with the fiscal situation. We are now placing great importance on encouraging local production. We hope to process all of our raw materials that can be processed. There are huge projects to process petrochemical products (methanol, ethylene and ammoniac). We are also placing great importance on encouraging small manufacturers and what we call "cooperatives," where several people get together and establish a small factory which they run themselves, with no one person owning the business or the capital. They are all co-owners. Turning to agriculture, we are self-sufficient in fruits and vegetables, and this year did not import any meat. God willing, we will have sufficient grains, milk products, and meat when the man-made river project is finished. Thank God, 1984 to 1985 has seen many new oil discoveries, both on land and off shore. In Libya our wealth is complete in our land and our people, and we are not bankrupt. However, we are now experiencing a crisis we call a "cash flow problem." This is happening in every country, even in the great industrial countries. Treasury bonds issued by Great Britain, America, and others are merely means to deal with bottlenecks in this cash flow.

[Question] Foreign companies, particularly construction companies, are saying that Libya is in arrears in its payments to them. What do you have to say about this?

[Answer] Some foreign companies are awaiting payment, but the delay is for a reason. We know that every contracting company submits an invoice for the project when it is completed. This invoice is reviewed through many procedural stages. My information is that most of the delays have occurred during these procedural stages. God willing, at the end of this year we will make payments of between 54 and 60 million Libyan dinars (the dinar is equal to \$3.37).

[Question] Will the great man-made river project affect planned projects?

[Answer] I don't want to talk about the great importance of the project because many others have done so. I would like to concentrate on its financing. Many people were surprised when Libya announced that implementation had begun on the huge project under unfavorable circumstances. In fact, the project is divided into stages: The first is intended to bring water from the sources to the eastern and central coasts; this is being carried out at a cost of approximately 1.2 billion dinars.

Since the project concerns all Libyans and they must share in it, we have not made any authorization for it in the budget, and it has not affected any project in the budget. We have covered the cost from other income--a fee for the project, which we call the "great man-made river" fee imposed on certain goods and services, such as cigarettes, travel, transfers, opening letters of credit, etc. This fee is small, but it has provided us with project expenses for the first 2 years of its implementation. We assumed that we might need bank loans to cover the period between paying expenses and receiving income, but so far we have not needed to borrow. For this reason, this project will not affect other projects, at least during the first stage, since as I said earlier, it will cost approximately 1.2 billion dinars out of a total cost of 3.6 billion. The first stage of the project is expected to take 6 years to complete. The other stages are still being studied. Experts have suggested that we begin to cultivate the land and prepare the farms and people so that no water will be lost when it comes. We have sent experts abroad to study how to prepare and reclaim the land. This project will bring about a revolution in the country.

9882/9435

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TUNISIA

COMMUNIST PARTY EXPRESSES SOLIDARITY WITH TRADE UNION

Tunis AL-TARIQ AL-JADID in Arabic 25 Jan 86 p 3

[Report on interview in AL-HURRIYAH magazine: "Mohamed Harmel Talks with AL-HURRIYAH about the Past and Present of the Labor Union; Mohamed Ennafaa Talks about the Communist Party and the Labor Union"]

[Excerpts] Our Palestinian sister publication AL-HURRIYAH talked with several Tunisian political figures, including Mohamed Harmel, the first secretary of the Tunisian Communist Party, and Mohamed Ennafaa, the secretary of the party. From these conversations, we have excerpted Harmel's answers concerning the history of the labor unions and Mohamed Ennafaa's answers concerning relations between the party and the labor union.

[Question] To what extent is the party able to play a support role for the positions of the labor union organization?

[Answer] The Communist Party has entered the fight on the side of the organization by means of its position expressed in the newspaper AL-TARIQ AL-JADID, which is frequently subjected to suspension (or to seizure by being purchased from the dealer)! Also, the party has labor union strugglers, workers, employees, or professors, all of whom are in the labor unions and who defend their positions and illustrate them for the masses. Also, according to the information we have from prison, the positions of the party have met with admiration and appreciation, because they express agreement with what the workers and labor unionists feel.

[Question] What is the position of the middle classes in the battle?

[Answer] The middle classes, particularly the intelligentsia, are with the labor unions. But the middle classes are not just composed of the intelligentsia. There are urban classes that are in the middle economically and politically, and there are, particularly, middle classes among the Bedouin and farmers, who, in general, are influential in the ruling party and its position. But there is a new social phenomenon in Tunisia, which we call ("the poor helpers?"), which has a peasant character. It lives on the basis of a cooperative family peasant organization. All of these constitute middle classes in the rural areas

and have become relatively middle classes. Where do these groups fall?

Are they with the regime?

Many of the poor peasants and hired laborers are on the side of the labor unions. There is a strong federation, the federation of "peasant workers," which follows the UGTT.

12780/9190

CSO: 4504/180

TUNISIA

BRIEFS

REQUEST FOR AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL--On 20 January 1986 a group of citizens presented, for the fourth time, to the offices of the Ministry of the Interior, a request for legal endorsement for creation of a Tunisian branch of Amnesty International. The people struggling to establish Amnesty International in Tunisia have presented a similar request three times since August 1981. So far, they have not received a positive response. Amnesty International is concerned with the defense of those imprisoned for their beliefs throughout the world, and fights against execution and all forms of torture and inhuman and harsh treatment. In accordance with its basic charter and the organization's basic international charter, its work in Tunisia is confined to international issues. It is not empowered to take up the issue of Tunisian prisoners, but does have the right to defend human rights in other countries. This assures the neutrality and impartiality of its work. The provisional directorate of the organization is composed of the following people: Hechemi Jegham, president; Rachid Bellalouna, vice-president; Mahmoud Ben Romdhane, secretary-general; Hedhili Chaouach, assistant secretary-general; Abdellatif Baltagi, treasurer; Khaled Thameri, Mohamed Salah Fliss, Nouredine Kheder, Bechir El Bejaoui, and Zine El Abidine Hamda, members. [Text] [Tunis AL-RA'Y in Arabic 31 Jan 86 p 9] 12780/9190

RSP SUPPORTS LABOR MOVEMENT--The Progressive Socialist Grouping (RSP) politbureau considers that the actions of occupying the offices and organizations of the UGTT has "come as the crown of a series of attacks and occupations of headquarter buildings, arrests, trials, and dismissals that have the goal of again annexing the labor movement to the Destourian party and subjecting it to the requirements of the government." It emphasized that the overwhelming majority of the officials of the union have taken an honorable position of rejecting the logic of agents and hold firmly to the legal frameworks. The RSP said that the recent attack has not put a final end to the union as an organization which represents the interests of labor, because it only destroyed walls and furniture. The grouping's politbureau believes that "following the path of force and ignoring the confirmed and legitimate demands of the working class has proved to be a disappointing failure. There is no choice left but to talk with the legitimate representatives of the labor movement and to comply with the demands of the workers." [Text] [Tunis AL-RA'Y in Arabic 31 Jan 86 p 15] 12780/9190

POPULAR UNITY DEFENDS LABOR--At the end of its 22 January meeting, the Popular Unity Movement affirmed "the definite declaration of the legitimacy of recent decisions of the administrative board, particularly concerning establishment of a general secretariat." The movement considers the "abrogation of the 4 December agreement to be legal because the executive board was not, given the circumstances, provided with all of the elements needed for an independent decision." The movement's politbureau praised the steadfastness of the workers, the bases and the superstructure, for rejecting all dealings with parties that have newly entered the organization," and it declared "its strong anger concerning the provocative differences between the theoretical political speeches and actual practice in coping with the crisis." The movement's statement called upon "all of the national forces, parties, movements, and mass organizations, to flow as one for the sake of defending the labor organization." [Text] [Tunis AL-RA'Y in Arabic 31 Jan 85 p 15] 12780/9190

CSO: 4504/180

ISRAEL

MINISTER OF ABSORPTION TZUR INTERVIEWED ON FALASHAS

Jerusalem GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE in English 25 Dec 85 pp 1-2

[Interview with Ya'akov Tsur, minister of immigrants absorption, by Dov Alfon, originally published in KOTERET RASHEET WEEKLY on 25 December 1985: "The Ethiopian Jews: One Year Later"]

[Text] This week last year Aryeh Dulzin spoke with donors from the U.S. His loose talk that evening marked the onset of a whole media festival around the efforts to bring thousands of Jews from Ethiopia to Israel: "Operation Moses." Some 15,000 new immigrants have arrived in Israel from Ethiopia, of whom only 7,000 came in that famous operation. The immigrants' very young average age bespoke the hardships they endured on their long journey: 52 percent were minors, and 80 percent were under 34 (the national average is 63 percent). Most of the elderly never arrived. Some of the family frameworks disintegrated: 30 percent of them are one-parent families.

Handling their affairs is often difficult and complicated; sociologists told us this week that it brings to mind the methods used in the 1950's. The Immigrants Absorption Ministry's master-plan, published in July, proposes basing the social absorption process on the Ethiopian woman in the following manner: "As a result of her relatively inferior position, less emphasis has been placed on her education process. For this reason we should expect that she will be more open to new cultural influences, especially when these are likely to advance and strengthen her standing in the family." The sociologists are also upset about the immigrants' protracted stay in absorption centers and in hotels. Minister of Immigrants Absorption Ya'akov Tsur told KOTERET RASHEET: "By 1 January there will not be one immigrant in the various hotels; by 1 April, 2,500 families (out of 3,300) will be in permanent housing; by 1 April 1987, all the Ethiopian immigrants will have left the absorption centers. This is our plan, and as of now we are maintaining the necessary pace."

Question: Who in your opinion won the wearying battle between the chief rabbinate and the immigrants?

Tsur: I see a great victory for the (Ethiopian) community in that it succeeded in expressing its positions in an honorable manner, with strength and self-control that lasted a full month. The strikers created a very strong

impression, in my opinion, but the problem was not solved. I am very disappointed with the secular Israeli society. I expected that broader public backing would be forthcoming to people struggling for their social standing. I was disappointed in the behavior of the Israeli public and political establishment, its parties, streams and people. These people did not view the Ethiopians' struggle as a part of their struggle over the image of Israeli society. It's true they (the Ethiopians) did get good media coverage--Ethiopians are a colorful story--but I met too few people, too infrequently, who stood by the immigrants as an expression of the values of our society, as I would like to see them.

Question: Many saw in this strike an intra-religious struggle, since the immigrants themselves are religious.

Tsur: Here we're getting into the matter of excuses. When the strike erupted, a decision had to be made. The Jewish Agency, for example, preferred to sit on the fence. I felt that the Ethiopians were paying the price for struggles within the rabbinate, and for this reason I intervened. As to the question of whether the Ethiopians won or lost, there is still no answer: It is still pending in the form of their petition to the High Court of Justice.

Question: There is a great deal of bitterness among them over the fact that the operation to bring them here was leaked to the press. Some of them consider it a deliberate leak.

Tsur: Today I can definitely say that the fact that 10,000 Jews remained in Ethiopia is unrelated to the disclosure of the story. All the Jews who were on their way to Israel--arrived. When the press learned about the operation there was indeed a halt in the immigration, but that was very brief. The fact that some 10,000 Jews remained there is related to a change in the Sudanese political situation and to the fact that the Ethiopian Government is not permitting these Jews to leave. The Israel Government is continuing its efforts to achieve this goal. In the course of these efforts other elements got involved, in Canada for example, and presented Israel as being unwilling to absorb more Ethiopians. I think that as always, the facts are stronger than any allegation.

Question: Sociologists say that the bodies dealing with the Ethiopians are repeating the mistakes of the 1950's.

Tsur: We tried not to repeat the mistakes of the 1950's; perhaps we made some mistakes of the 1980's. We must remember that on the eve of the operation, there were already 7,000 Ethiopian Jewish immigrants in absorption centers; some of them remained there for a very long time. That was a mistake: There is a danger in the natural inclination to accompany them, to help them and to treat them like children. To maintain them in "hothouse" conditions is liable to bring about a regression in their ability to cope with life in Israel. The upshot was that the Absorption Ministry established an infrastructure to plan the long-term absorption, when the immigrants move from the Jewish Agency's purview to that of the ministry. This

planning is guided by two principles: the desire to bring them speedily to a realization of the actual situation here and to help them cope with it, and at the same time, to enable them to determine their future--for example, where they will live, whether their children will learn within a religious or secular framework.

Question: What is the ratio of observant to non-observant in the community?

Tsur: About 95 percent of the Ethiopian Jewish children are being educated in state-religious schools. With this, it seems to me that their conception of religion differs from ours. They relate more to the traditional side, and I don't think that they maintain an experience of a religious community in the full sense of the word.

Question: As an experienced politician, could you try to assess which party gained from their immigration to Israel?

Tsur: The people of Israel gained--so I believe. We granted them full freedom of choice, a minimum of coercion, and the right to struggle for their beliefs. There is no doubt that we also taught them a chapter in Israeli politics, and evidently also in the rules of our bureaucracy: Just this week I learned that in order to get an apartment the new immigrant must sign documents in seven different offices.

/6091

CSO: 4400/105

ISRAEL

DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES SEEN AS ORTHODOX EXPANSIONISM

Jerusalem GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE in English 2 Jan 86 pp 1-2

[Article by Eliyahu Salpetter, originally published in HA'ARETZ on 31 December 1985: "The Ultra-Orthodox Takeover: End of the Zionist State?"]

[Text] In Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Ashdod, Netanya, Herzliya-Pituah and other cities the ultra-orthodox are invading secular neighborhoods. In contrast to the past, when demographic pressure precipitated an expansion of religious neighborhoods in the suburbs, or the establishment of new religious neighborhoods, the emerging tendency in various places today is to infiltrate into the heart of secular neighborhoods, which will perforce change into religious ones. Veteran residents claim that this new tendency is no accident.

An overt religious lobby was set up in the Knesset, and is working to force the secular majority among Knesset members to pass legislation curtailing religious freedom in this country.

At a time when hospitals lack medicines and food and the education budget is being trimmed, the government is transferring to religious institutions--both existent and fictitious--billions of shekels, according to the clout possessed by the specific MK whose protection the institute enjoys.

Israel police patrols come under attacks in religious neighborhoods, and patrols in Me'a She'arim are reinforced like those in the Hebron Casbah or the Nablus market.

State-religious schools employing Zionist teachers and educators turn out ultra-orthodox students, and "Bnei Akiva" youth movement graduates enter ultra-orthodox yeshivas. The children and grandchildren of the founders of the Zionist State of Israel "repent" and join the ultra-orthodox who oppose the existence of a Zionist Jewish state.

Ultra-orthodox, anti-Zionist rabbis in the diaspora no longer object to their followers' immigration to Israel, and some of them even encourage this. Every family joining the ultra-orthodox camp accelerates the de-Zionization process of the state.

The Zionist, liberal, democratic state which the founders' generation and the 1948 generation sought to establish is foundering in a sea of religious fundamentalism and nationalism.

The existence and source of the ultra-orthodox offensive in Israel can be traced back to three processes:

--As in past Jewish history, a brief period of open-mindedness and enlightened thought is followed by an intolerant, fundamentalist surge submerging part of the people and driving the rest to assimilate. When fundamentalism combined with jingoism in the past, the nation was propelled into a confrontation with outside forces, with tragic results. The myth that "it was religion that preserved the Jewish people" can be countered by the claim that it was religious fundamentalism that divided the people into one camp that secluded itself in a physical and spiritual ghetto, and another that was left with no choice but to assimilate among the gentiles.

(Zionism was a liberal, secular movement that sought to break with an exilic past and normalize the Jewish people. Tolerance was part of the Zionist ethos. Naively--or out of intellectual arrogance--Zionism was also interested in the immigration of anti-Zionist, ultra-orthodox elements, and thus augmented the power of anti-Zionists not only among the pre-State Yishuv but also in the State of Israel itself.)

--Various regions of the world are currently undergoing a process of a return to religion, which has led to a strengthening of the fundamentalist streams in Christianity, the emergence of new, obscurantist sects inside Western democratic societies, and fundamentalist streams in the Islamic world. The most outstanding phenomenon is the Khomeinist takeover of Iran and its growing influence on Moslem Shi'ites. The Jewish version of this phenomenon is "repentance" and Kahane's fundamentalist-jingoist-racist movement, which strains towards the right and radicalizes even religious Zionists.

The process is being exacerbated by the demographic changes in Israel. The ultra-orthodox population (as well as the Arab population) is growing at a much faster pace than the secular Zionist population. The bulk of immigration from the West, which could have produced a liberal counterpoise, now comes from ultra-orthodox groups. Zionists, and especially the religious Zionists, are characterized by low birth rate, low immigration and high emigration. The day when the ultra-orthodox and the Arabs form the majority in this country is therefore not far off. The Zionist secular public will then have to choose between throwing their lot in with Jewish fundamentalists or Arab nationalists. The distance between an ultra-orthodox MK threatening to move to Los Angeles and the "Neturei Karta" group, who are offering to join a "PLO government," is smaller than many think.

--Israel is currently in the throes of a political crisis. The socialists and liberals who ran the country in the past have lost strength, and are compelled to share power with the nationalistic right. Against the backdrop of this division, the non-Zionist religious parties have the power to tip the scales between the two blocs. They lean towards the political right,

yet do not balk at using their standing to extort religious as well as financial concessions from both camps. Those who consider themselves the successors of Jabotinsky's brand of Zionism are today the partners of the non-Zionist and anti-Zionist ultra-orthodox camp.

Every year the ultra-orthodox circles evoke a new religious "cause celebre." Once it is autopsies and organ transplants, and once the stealing of corpses from their graves, archeological digs, construction of a stadium, the building of a mixed swimming pool, the Ramot road in Jerusalem, a hotel in Tiberias--and of course the repeated "who is a Jew" tune. Not only do they constantly resort to new (or renewed) issues--from banning soccer games on the Sabbath to banning the sale of pork--as part of their own internal wars, but these battles are also, and perhaps primarily, necessary as a manifestation of their strength vis-a-vis the non-ultra-orthodox majority.

There is a method to the madness. The more absurd the demand of the ultra-orthodox, the clearer the demonstration of strength. From this standpoint, the demand to forbid the opening of the Mormon University in Jerusalem is ideal.

However, the Mormon University affair not only graphically illustrates the weakness of the non-religious majority in the country, it is generating a confrontation which sheds clear light on the immediate significance and harm caused to Israel by the activities of the zealots.

De facto, the West has accepted Israeli rule of Jerusalem (and since 1967 all of Jerusalem), because it was convinced that the Jews were indeed willing and able to ensure free access to the holy places and freedom of worship to all faiths. The ultra-religious are striving to limit and undermine this freedom, whether via attempts to "capture the temple mount" or efforts to remove Christian institutions, such as the Mormon University, from the city. These endeavors will alienate thousands of Christian supporters of Israel, spark the renewal of the demands in the world for the internationalization of Jerusalem, and fan the calls in the Arab world for a "jihad" (holy war).

The religious fanatics are still numerically a minority in the country. But the liberal and secular majority lacks the determination, organization and willingness to struggle for the continuance of the free character of the Zionist state. The religious-nationalistic fanatic takeover, therefore, threatens the existence of Israel as a Zionist state--if not its very existence altogether.

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ISRAEL

IMAGE OF THE ARAB IN ISRAELI PRESS DISCUSSED

Jerusalem GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE in English 12 Jan 86 pp 1-2

[Article by Gabriel Strassman, originally published in MA'ARIV on 9 January 1986 (the writer serves as ombudsman of MA'ARIV)]

[Text] Do the Israeli media truly portray the Arab as rapist and murderer, or was MK Abd el-Wahab Drausha's presentation of the facts exaggerated?

Recently the Knesset's Education Committee held a discussion on the image of the Israeli Arab as depicted in our media. The discussion was initiated by Drausha, who was backed up by MK Zaydan Atshi (a Druze who ten years ago served as Israel's information consul in New York). The two received vigorous oral support from several Arab journalists who were invited to the discussion and from Danny Rubinstein, DAVAR correspondent for the territories.

Drausha maintained that the Hebrew press is guilty of three sins vis-a-vis the Arabs: It emphasizes the negative (the Arab is always portrayed as a rapist and a murderer; he says that after the murder of Hadass Kedmi it was stressed that Arab murderers were being sought, whereas when a Jewish suspect is arrested his Jewishness is not emphasized); it disregards the positive (the contribution of the Israeli Arabs to the country in various fields and their productive role in the society; he emphasized that his complaints were levelled mainly at Israel Television (ITV), which does not invite Arabs to appear on its prestigious talk shows); and it indulges in generalization. He also thought that the portrayal of the heads of the local Arab authorities who went on strike to protest their financial distress as "inciters against the country," was unjustified.

Danny Rubinstein went so far as to claim that the Israeli press has stamped the Israeli Arab with a completely negative stereotype, or prototype. It is he who declared that Israel TV's Arabic service holds no interest for the country's Arab population since it expresses the government's position; that the in-depth report in MA'ARIV on "two Arabs who caused the consumer index to climb during the summer by raising the price of tomatoes" was a "racist article"; and that the Israeli press has coined special terms designated for Arabs only: "villagers," as opposed to "farmers," which is a term reserved for Jews; "notables" instead of "intellectuals," and so forth.

Broadcasting Authority Director-General Uri Porat protested against Rubinstein's words and those of Atallah Mansour, the veteran Druze correspondent of HA'ARETZ in the north. Porat rejected the contention that Israel TV's Arabic service in a government tool. ITV's director, Yair Aloni, and news director Yair Stern refuted the generalizations against ITV, while an excellent job was done by Israel Radio's internal controller Ari Avner, who explained to the MK's the media's attempt to cope with these difficult problems on a daily basis.

As it happened, the Arab sound technician of ITV's Arabic service who was present, "threatened" to resign if he did not receive stronger backing, since "he had never felt that he was a government employee." The customary "Jewish wars" gave way for a bit to "Arab wars," when the Arab journalists who had been invited to the discussion were divided in their views concerning the Arab image conveyed by the media.

I allowed myself to answer MK Drausha's remarks, which though they certainly had some basis, were wrong in making a generalization equal to that of which he had accused the press. The MA'ARIV weekend magazine alone had published in recent weeks two highly positive profiles--on Zahi Armeli and Salwa Nakura (a soccer player and an actress, respectively--Ed.). Nakura's words included several extremely harsh anti-Israeli expressions: Had they been uttered by a Jew against Arabs, any rookie editor would have blue-pencilled them. Furthermore, generally the Israeli press is no different than that throughout the world: When a person's origin is a part of the item, it cannot be avoided. Even in THE NEW YORK TIMES the term "black" or "Hispanic" is sometimes found. The rule is to note only the name. At the same time, one cannot escape the reality in which we live. After all, at issue is a protracted dispute between two nations, which often finds expression in the media. This does not entail anti-Arabism. The ultra-orthodox sector is the target of far more abuse in the Israeli press than is the Arab population.

MK Amira Sartani also expressed the view that "the media have discriminated against the Arabs throughout the years." In her opinion, positive coverage of the Arabs should be augmented because the Jewish population is not sufficiently familiar with them and does not know the facts. The committee chairman, Nahman Raz, who put things in their true proportion by recalling the Arab-Israeli conflict, also stressed the need "to make an effort to ease the tension between the two peoples."

However, if the somewhat academic discussion between the MK's and the media representatives, who were divided in their views, related to the general problem, only two days later newspaper headlines gave us all an opportunity to examine the arguments. As usual, it turned out that both sides were right.

These were the headlines depicting the stabbing of a Jewish taxi driver near Ramle:

HA'ARETZ: "Ramle Taxi Driver Stabbed by Arab." Whereas the body of the report itself stated: "Stabbed in the back by a passenger whom he identified as being an Arab."

DAVAR: "Jewish Taxi Driver Stabbed by Arabic-Speaking Assailant Near Sha'alavim." The report itself said: "Stabbed by Arabic-speaking passenger."

AL HAMISHMAR: "Taxi Driver Stabbed by Passenger." And the text read: "ITIM: The driver said that according to the assailant's appearance, he seemed to belong to the minorities."

YEDIOT AHRONOT wrote: "Suddenly the Passenger Pointed a Gun at My Head and Pulled the Trigger..." The report itself stated: "According to Levi, the man spoke with a pronounced Arabic accent."

HADASHOT: "The Passenger Pulled the Trigger, and I Thought--This Is the End." The text of the report said: "Avraham Levi struggled with the passenger he had picked up in his car...was attacked yesterday when he picked up a young man who spoke with an Arabic accent."

MA'ARIV: "I Heard a Pistol Cocked, I Stopped the Car and Struggled With the Arab." And the report said: "Three Yeshiva students spotted a taxi driver struggling with the armed Arab passenger..."

Here, then, we can see different versions of the same event. At the time of publication of this article the person who stabbed the driver had not been caught. I still don't know whether he was an Arab, or a Jew with an Arabic accent. Two days later, the murder of another taxi driver near the spot where the first driver was stabbed, naturally increased the tension and the feeling that this was a terrorist act, i.e. a crime perpetrated by an Arab. MK Drausha and Danny Rubinstein cannot blame anyone for this. Nevertheless, it would have been worthwhile to have been more cautious in the formulation of the first report of the incident. After all, the news editors and headline writers were in possession of no details which could clearly point to the identity of the assailants.

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ISRAEL

ARAB ORGANIZATION FOR NONVIOLENCE DESCRIBED

Jerusalem GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE in English 22 Jan 86 pp 1-2

[Article by Danny Rubinstein, originally published in DAVAR on 22 January 1986: "Gandhi and Martin Luther King in the West Bank"]

[Text] It's worth taking notice of a tiny and unknown Arab organization preaching non-violence, whose center is located in East Jerusalem, near the "American Colony" hotel. The organization was established about two years ago by one man, Mubarak Aoud, a psychologist by profession, who has since been trying to operate it without great success.

Aoud comes from a Christian refugee family. His father was killed in 1948. He and his brother were brought up in Christian education institutions in East Jerusalem. Later he studied in the U.S. and was influenced by the teaching of Mahatma Gandhi and by the struggle tactics of Martin Luther King; together with a handful of friends, he is trying to implement these methods in the West Bank. Their activity is exemplified by a pamphlet Mubarak and his friends distributed in several places in the West Bank and East Jerusalem a few weeks ago. The pamphlet calls on Arab residents to choose one day a week or a month, each at his own convenience, on which to completely boycott the State of Israel. On that day they would refrain from buying Israeli products, from eating food produced in Israel, from wearing clothes made in Israel, from going to work in Israel or visiting Israeli territory. "Feel free at least for one day," the pamphlet says. Security authorities confiscated the pamphlets, and an Israeli security man even called Aoud, but apart from that nothing happened.

This week, when the anniversary of Martin Luther King's birth was marked in Israel, and Foreign Minister Shamir participated in the ceremony of naming a street after the American human rights fighter, the Arab Organization for Non-Violence issued a communique which said inter alia: "The life, struggle and methods of Martin Luther King are an example for us (the Palestinians) of how to fight the injustice and the wrongdoing we experience on a daily basis, and we hope that the waving of King's banner will not lead to our being arrested by the Israelis..."

Aoud's Organization for Non-Violence is a phenomenon characteristic of the frames of mind that have been increasingly spreading among the Palestinian

population (mainly in the territories) in recent years. People in Nablus, Hebron, and Gaza understand well that nowadays and in the foreseeable future there is absolutely no chance for an Arab military option which would strike at Israel and free them from the burden of the occupation. Around the same time that Aoud set up his organization (about two years ago) a meeting took place at Birzeit University between academics from the territories and Israeli Arab academics. The Israelis gave their colleagues from the territories details about their lengthy experience and their struggles. Many in the territories are saying, to all intents and purposes: Wars, terrorism and violence have not brought us national liberation; let us seek other ways.

The most conspicuous expression of this approach is to be found in an article published about two months ago by Dr. Seri Nusseibeh in the East Jerusalem weekly AL MAWQEF. Nusseibeh's article gave voice to remarks he also made on Israel TV: "If I have to choose between limited autonomy and annexation to Israel, I prefer annexation, with all the obligations and privileges it entails. As a citizen of the state, I will be able to fight for my standing and my rights."

Similar thoughts are increasingly being voiced among groups of the Arab intelligentsia in the West Bank and Gaza. If one begins with the assumption that it is all but impossible to set the clock back and that de facto annexation is a fait accompli, then the Arabs of the territories must look for other ways to pursue their struggle for civil rights. A struggle by means of passive resistance and non-violence.

How will Israel react to such a development? Already today, for example, 150,000 East Jerusalem Arabs could, if they wished, exercise their right to vote in municipal elections. If they voted en bloc, they could decide who the next mayor of Jerusalem will be. That's just one example. Today, nearly 40 percent of the population of the greater land of Israel are Arabs. Any attempt on their part to get or realize rights, will dramatize the real price Israel must pay for its control of the West Bank.

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ISRAEL

NEW PROGRAM TO TEACH ARAB HISTORY CAUSES CONTROVERSY

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 12 Jan 86 p 3

[Article by Joel Rebibo]

[Text] Parents and teachers feel threatened by a new programme that challenges pupils to see Arabs not only as individuals, but as part of a people with its own national interests.

This is how Nomi Teltsh explains why only 16 schools are now using "Neighbours," an experimental curriculum for eighth and ninth grades, now in its second year. It was developed by the Israel Interfaith Association, an organization of Jewish and Arab educators and edited by Teltsh.

Schools offer any number of reasons for turning down "Neighbours": There aren't enough hours in the budget-shortened school day; teachers are too overworked to prepare classes on Arab history and culture; the subject is too "sensitive."

The day after the curriculum was proposed at a secular junior high school in Jerusalem, one of the student's uncle, a Likud MK, reportedly asked: "Why are we suddenly introducing a subject like this into the schools?" He threatened to take the matter up with the Education Ministry.

But the subject is one of Education Minister Yitzhak Navon's stated priorities, and it appears to be necessary. Results of a questionnaire distributed at the start of the programme show that Israeli schoolchildren are incredibly naive about their Arab neighbours.

"They can't answer the most basic questions about Israel's Arabs," says Teltsh. "How many are there?

Where do they live? What are their legal rights? Can they vote or be elected to office? They don't know what the Green Line is."

The 140-page curriculum, which was three years in the making, introduces Israeli students to Arab culture and history. A comparable curriculum on Jewish culture and history is being prepared in Arabic.

Ironically, when the Interfaith Association has brought Jewish and Arab teachers together, they have had difficulty with a basic concept in the "Neighbours" curriculum - people are not only individuals but also part of a group.

"Fights broke out between Jewish and Arab teachers because the (Israeli) Arabs brought up the problem of a Palestinian homeland and land confiscation," recalls Teltsh. "The Jewish teachers felt betrayed and said: 'We came to meet you as people, and you inject politics.'

The response from the Arabs was: 'It's not enough that you see me as an individual, a graduate of the university. The State of Israel is a fact, but I'm part of a group that has been wronged. You want me to understand the Holocaust and its impact on you: you have to understand our history and pain as well.'

Teltsh is not a big supporter of Arab-Jewish encounters for pupils, since she feels they can be counter-productive.

"Experience shows that an awkward five-minute with another Arab pupil doesn't achieve that much."

The goal of the programme is to make the pupils more tolerant. Be-

coming more knowledgeable makes them think twice before making a judgement. But the goal is not to have either Jews or Arabs give up their identity, insists Teltsh.

Education Ministry officials acknowledge the deep-rooted resistance to such programmes, but point to several encouraging signs.

Educational TV is preparing a series to teach children co-existence and the Bnei Akiva movement has designed a curriculum for religious schools.

Slowly, the programme is making progress. One mother read the curriculum from cover to cover twice before giving her support: "Your father and I constantly fight about the subject. You're better off learning about Arabs through something like this."

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ISRAEL

AL-QUDS: NO SUBSTITUTE FOR SELF-DETERMINATION

TA120743 Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 10 Feb 1986 p 1

[Editorial: "The New-Old Substitute"]

[Text] All the parties to the peace process are now unanimous in their view that it has actually reached a total stalemate, in the wake of the U.S. refusal to recognize the Palestinian people's right to self-determination, which should have been considered the basis for and beginning of the peace process instead of being ignored in the beginning and rejected in the end.

The question that now arises with regard to the current events is: What is the substitute for the right to self-determination? As far as Israeli Prime Minister Shim'on Peres is concerned, he did not hesitate to announce what he sees as a substitute for a comprehensive and just settlement. He gave Jordan a 2-month deadline to begin separate talks with Israel, or else Israel will implement unilateral autonomy in the occupied territories.

Was it really necessary for all those contacts to take place and all those efforts to be made when all the roads would lead to the new-old substitute, namely autonomy? Peres himself acknowledges that this substitute is and will remain a heavy burden for the residents of the occupied territories, because it will maintain the status quo, ignore the will and the rights of the residents, and impose upon them continued occupation for an undetermined period.

The fact that the old autonomy term is again being considered proves that both the Alignment and the Likud possess the same stock of proposals, opinions, and ideas to which they return every now and then in order to pull out used and rejected terms. According to this premise, Peres is using the same merchandise as Likud, after having proved to everyone that his peace plans and initiatives are no more than mere slogans that do not even answer the minimum of legitimate Palestinian demands.

Thus, the Middle East has gone full circle, returning to a state of doubt and uncertainty about the future, unless a miracle occurs in the U.S.-Israeli camp leading to a fundamental change in their positions. And as long as the logic of our age precludes political miracles, the future is dark and doomed from the start to unexpected developments that will turn the region's political map upside down. The price will be further violence and calamities that could have been prevented had the United States and Israel possessed the wisdom and courage to grasp the rights and just aspirations of the Palestinian people.

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ISRAEL

AL-QUDS NOTES ANNIVERSARY OF AMMAN AGREEMENT

TA112125 Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 11 Feb 86 p 1

[Editorial: "A Year After the Agreement"]

[Text] In the course of the past 12 months the Amman agreement, signed by the PLO and the Jordanian Government, played an important role in the events witnessed by the Middle East. On the same day last year the Jordanian and Palestinian leaderships succeeded in signing a joint working agreement for a political movement to solve the Palestinian problem.

There were those who opposed the agreement from the point of view that it was a concession by the legitimate leadership of the PLO, and there were those who opposed the agreement merely because it was concluded in Amman, and numerous Arab sides adopted the stance of an onlooker or observer at best.

All this at a time when the United States and Israel rejected the agreement from its inception, and are still working to place obstacles that are apt to bury the agreement and consequently bury the PLO's role. Conditions began pouring one after the other, but it was proven to all the world that the barriers to the achievement of peace were not placed by the Arab side, and it became apparent that American and Israel were the ones that were placing obstacles in the way of the peace process.

The Jordanian-Palestinian partnership originated from the basic understanding of the need for PLO participation in drawing the future map of the Middle East, from the premise that the Palestinian problem is the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In return, the U.S.-Israeli partnership stemmed from principles and understandings totally in contradiction with the positions of the Arab side, and consequently, the American and Israeli intransigence reached a dead end.

A year after the agreement, the Arab partnership must be based on partnership in a common trench to confront the challenges represented by the U.S.-Israeli positions, and all Arab efforts should be aimed at breaking the deadlock created by the U.S. positions that are based on the weakness and fragmented nature of the Arab front. If the Arab situation continues as it is, we will not find anything to write about concerning the Arab political effort on 11 February of next year.

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CSO: 4400/110

ISRAEL

INEQUALITY IN RELIGIOUS COURTS PORTRAYED

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 5 Jan 86 p 5

[Article by Liora Moriel]

[Text] THE INEQUALITY of the sexes in the religious courts is not usually a matter of public discussion, but two cases have recently brought it to the attention of the media. Both involve the fact that when a Jewish woman refuses to be divorced by her husband, the rabbinical court can label her "rebellious" and permit the man to take a second wife. Men who refuse to grant a divorce cannot be forced to do so.

In the past decade, more than 90 Jewish men have been given permission to take a second wife. Whether or not they actually do so is immaterial; in any case, the first wife is rejected and must fight for her basic social rights.

While bigamy is a crime in Israel, the religious courts have the right to sanction a second wife without infringing the secular law. A spokesman for the Ministry for Religious Affairs told *The Jerusalem Post* that "the man always has the upper hand in the rabbinical courts." This is a built-in bias based on the fact that divorce is only possible when agreed to by the husband.

While a woman can refuse to accept a bill of divorcement - a *get* - the rabbinical court can by-pass her objection by granting her husband permission to marry again. In other words, there are loopholes for a man - but not for a woman. There have been hundreds of cases in Israel where men have adamantly refused to grant a *get* and preferred instead to go to prison.

The two cases presented here have little in common beyond the fact that they involve rabbinical sanction for dissatisfied husbands to take a second mate rather than settle fairly with the first.

HAYA HADAD, wearing the head-covering of the observant woman, was sitting at the simple table of an almost empty apartment in the Negev development town of Kiryat Gat. She explained why her garden, unlike the others all around, looked so uncared for.

"I've long been one step from eviction, and I couldn't stand the idea of taking care of a garden that I might have to leave at any moment."

Haya was brought to Israel from Djerba, Tunisia, in 1949 as a child of 11. Five years later her cousin Amos arrived, penniless, and went to live with her recently-married brother. After another two years Amos and Haya were married and bought a small apartment in Kiryat Gat. But Amos, who was now a teacher, was ambitious, and within two years they moved, with their small son, into the present semi-detached house, where five more children were born.

Amos began to take an interest in local affairs, and worked his way upwards to become head of the local religious council and deputy mayor of Kiryat Gat. At that time he was still observant and started writing for the religious daily, *Hatzofe*.

"At first everything was wonderful," said Haya. "I was the first

woman in the neighbourhood to have a telephone and I had a cleaning woman too. We went on vacations all over the country."

But things changed. Amos stopped being observant, switched to writing for *Ha'aretz*, and problems soon surfaced.

"The trouble began when Amos came home late one day and supper wasn't ready. He threw a hot plate at me - and that's when I had my first and only epileptic fit. In fact, until I was summoned to divorce proceedings I didn't know I was epileptic at all."

A year later, on the way to the *brit mila* ceremony for their youngest child, Amos made a detour and picked up a woman whom he introduced as Hanna and described as his secretary.

"From that moment she was with us everywhere. When we went to the movies, when we went on vacation and when we celebrated festivals, Hanna and her mother and her relations were always with us.

"Amos was under pressure and I wanted to discuss it with him, but he kept putting me off. Until one day in 1973, when I had a job at a knitting factory, he told me to meet him after work, and took me to a lawyer's office in Tel Aviv.

"There he gave me a shock. He told me he had a girlfriend, and that he and his lawyer wanted us to end everything. I said I wasn't going to agree. So Amos took me to the bus station and sent me home.

"In August 1974 I went to a family wedding in Safad without the children. When I returned two days later, late at night, the lock on the door had been changed, and there was a notice saying the family had moved." She had to get the police to let her in.

"The next day, his lawyer called to say there was a repossession order for the house. I went to court to oppose this, because I wanted what was mine. I wanted a home."

WHEN, in 1978, the rabbis gave Amos permission to take a second wife because Haya was an epileptic, he sold the house over her head and bought a small flat for her in the name of one of their sons. Only then did she discover that the house they had shared all the years was registered in his name alone. "He tells

the press that he bought the house with his own money," says Haya, "but when we married he had nothing and my family helped him. I worked hard at home all these years with no help from him, and meanwhile he built himself a villa in Ashkelon. Now he wants to evict me, to get me to leave this place where all my friends are. I love this house, these neighbours. It's quiet, clean. I don't want to leave."

But she must. The High Court of Justice in Jerusalem has declared that she must vacate her house because it belongs to the people Amos sold it to in 1978. The house was in his name and he could do what he liked with it. When she heard the verdict, she said, "I nearly killed myself. I have nobody. I have no home, no money. I make just under IS100,000 a month."

Her husband, meanwhile, has been made the Labour Ministry representative in New York, where he is responsible for getting Israeli *yordim* back to Israel. Thirty years ago, when they met, Haya struggled to learn to read and write and speak a new language. She was "good enough" to bear and rear six children. But when she no longer suited the position to which he had risen, she became a throwaway wife, with the rabbinate's blessing.

BECAUSE Haya and Amos are Sephardim, the rabbinical court was able to permit the taking of a second wife without further ado. The second case, however, involves an Ashkenazi couple, and here the procedure is complicated by the millennium-old pronouncement of Rabenu Gershom that such a ruling must be sanctioned by 100 rabbis. In Israel today the chief rabbi must also give his permission.

Rachel (she prefers not to give her family name) is 56 years old. She met her husband on a Hashomer Hatzar kibbutz. They moved to another kibbutz and then settled in Beersheba. In each of the three homes, a daughter was born. The biblical dictum to be fruitful and to multiply is interpreted to mean that a couple must have a son and a daughter at least; only sons or only daughters is not enough. Rachel is therefore now a rabbinically-sanctioned throwaway wife.

Although the three rabbis who considered the case have said that their decision had nothing to do with the fact that Rachel had borne only daughters, and that this point was added gratuitously by one of them, the document I saw summing up the case in their names is devoted mainly to this seemingly marginal issue.

"The poor woman fell ill and grew old and it is obvious that his eyes and his heart cannot allow him to live with her as husband and wife," it says, and therefore the court agrees that "she is repulsive in his eyes" and must be divorced. "She is old beyond repair." And they state in terms that she only bore three daughters.

Because Rachel's husband, who is also 56, can still bear children (and presumably bring a son into the world), the court allowed him to take a second wife. But it is a well-known fact that the sex of the offspring can be male only if the father's Y chromosome manages to unite with a woman's X chromosome, so there is no guarantee that the man will have sons with another woman.

In fact, Rachel says, her husband does not want another woman at all. He only wants to leave her penniless and homeless.

Following a lengthy conversation with each of the two women, each of them, living 50 kilometres apart, showed me a door. "See this door? See how it's partially destroyed? My husband did that."

The message of muted violence was powerful and inescapable.

THE REAL violence, however, is not what has been done to almost 100 women by the men who have discarded them. The real violence is that the rabbinate has the power to make this legal and acceptable.

"The chief rabbis have the right by law to allow second marriages and this is not bigamy," explains former Supreme Court justice Haim Cohn. "I was in the minority 15 years ago when the Supreme Court decided to allow this. In every case where the court decides that the man can give

his wife a divorce and the wife refuses to accept it, the rabbinical court can decide that she must, and then the chief rabbis can give their permission.

"The only thing that can be done is to abolish the right of the rabbinate to decide in this matter. The more cases publicized, the more the public is horrified into action, the more likely is this to happen.

"I stated at the time that the Moslem and Jewish laws concerning second wives must be the same. In other words, that only in those cases where the woman is mentally unable to accept a divorce will the rabbis be able to allow a man to take a second wife.

"The other two judges thought that this was already the case and there was no reason to put it down in writing. And in fact, this is indeed the law, but now we see that it is open to interpretation."

In the meantime, Judge Cohn advises, until the day the matter is no longer within the sole jurisdiction of the religious courts, women will do well to study their rights of common property and make sure it is in both the husband's and wife's name.

Not that this is enough. After all, Rabbi Haim Pardess, who heads the Tel Aviv rabbinical court, told the weekly *Koteret Rashit* that the secular lawmaker "doesn't interest me at all. The only thing that matters to me is the Tora and the Halacha. There is no other authority in the world."

Religious women in Israel tend to agree. When I asked the wife of the head of the Beersheba rabbinical court how she felt about the ruling that three daughters were sufficient grounds for divorce, she flared up and said: "You reporters know nothing, you only look for sensations. This was only a side issue."

Yes, I agreed, but the very fact that someone bothered to put it down on paper is perhaps a dangerous precedent.

"You don't understand anything," she retorted. "These men are lenient and full of heart, they go according to divine law."

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ISRAEL

JOURNALISTS LICENSING BILL DRAFTED

Journalist Licensing Bill Drafted

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 6 Jan 86 pp 1, 2

[Article by David Landau and David Horovitz]

[Text] Energy Minister Moshe Shahal (Labour) drafted a detailed bill, of some 70 sections, which would require all journalists to obtain licences from a Press Council which would be a statutorily constituted body.

Shahal drafted the proposed legislation more than one month ago under the title "The Press Council Law."

Shahal has, in recent days, repeatedly denied preparing a draft law which would require licensing of journalists. (See Peres blocks-Page 2) Shahal's draft bill was the subject of Attorney-General Yitzhak Zamir's forceful warning to leaders of the media and legal communities in Tel Aviv last Sunday, when he spoke "as one who is profoundly anxious about protecting the freedom of the press in Israel."

The Shahal bill would define the Press Council as a body "to licence journalists... and to exercise disciplinary proceedings."

"Only persons determined by the Press Council as qualified, shall be journalists," it reads.

Disqualifications listed in the bill include the commission of a crime that involves moral turpitude. Any member of the public can object to a person applying for a journalist's licence, and the Press Council's decision can be appealed to the District Court.

"Then... (the applicant) receives a journalist's certificate and is permitted to engage in the profession of journalism... No person shall be a journalist or shall be employed as a journalist unless he is so licenced," the bill states.

The envisaged Press Council is to comprise 30 members - 10 appointed by the president, 10 by the Publisher's Association and 10 by the Journalists Association.

The council, under the bill, would promulgate a code of ethics contravention of which could lead to penalties ranging from fines to confiscation of licence.

Peres Blocks Vote on Journalist Bill

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 6 Jan 86 p 2

[Text] Deputy Prime Minister Shamir proposed at yesterday's cabinet session that a vote be taken on Justice Minister Moshe Nissim's proposal to forbid publication of names of suspects except under certain limited conditions.

But Prime Minister Peres objected, saying that more ministers wanted to speak. He promised that the discussion would be completed, and a vote taken, at next week's cabinet session.

Cabinet approval for the Nissim proposal is a foregone conclusion, with all the Likud ministers, most of the religious ministers and a couple of the Alignment ministers resolved to push it through.

Energy Minister Moshe Shahal (Labour) maintained yesterday that Attorney-General Yitzhak Zamir had misunderstood him when he said in a public lecture last week that "a certain minister" had prepared a draft law that would require all journalists to be licensed, with licences liable to withdrawal for improper professional conduct.

Shahal said: "Prof. Zamir's misunderstanding is to be regretted. The published reports about my supposedly calling for licensing journalists are without foundation. I did not make such a proposal, and no such proposal exists or existed."

Shahal said he opposed Nissim's proposal. In any conflict between the public's right to know, through the medium of a free press, and the individual's right to privacy, he said, he would give priority to the public's right to know.

However, Shahal said, some way should be found to enforce the Press Council's code of ethics, which was adequate in itself.

To this end, Shahal said, the Knesset should give legal status to the Press Council, and provide for the council to lay down rules binding on all the media.

Shahal said that while the Knesset itself must not intervene in the substance of the rules, it should stipulate that any news report detrimental to an individual should provide for equal time for that individual. It should stipulate that Press Council

rules are binding for radio and television, as well as all news publications.

Communications Minister Amnon Rubinstein (Shinui), who also spoke, said he too objected to Nissim's proposal, although he felt some legislation was essential, since the media from time to time did not respect the good name of public figures and private citizens alike.

Rubinstein proposed that as a matter of course, suspects' names should be withheld from publication, but any medium which did publish them would have to be prepared to go to court and prove it had done so in good faith and because it was prompted by public interest. In addition, Rubinstein said, a suspect could demand that his name be made public.

Tourism Minister Avraham Sharir (Likud-Liberals) listed a number of recent cases in which the media had besmirched the good name of public figures and private citizens by premature or ill-considered publication. He appealed to Peres not to let the Newspaper Editors Committee influence him to bury the Nissim proposal.

Journalists are vigorously opposed to the bill, because it does not provide for free access to information and does not take public interest into account.

The investigation of public figures should not be kept secret, they stress, and the media should not have to wait 30 days before naming names.

There is no law like this in any other state, because no newspaper could accept it, they maintain.

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ISRAEL

LAND PURCHASING ON WEST BANK DESCRIBED

Jerusalem GOVERNMENT PRESS OFFICE in English 24 Dec 85 pp 1-3

[Article by Eyal Ehrlich, originally published in KOTERET RASHEET WEEKLY on 18 December 1985: "How the JNF Buys Land in the West Bank"]

[Text] Only once or twice has the name of the body that acquired the largest amount of land from Arabs, "Himanuta," been mentioned in recent days. It is a subsidiary of the Jewish National Fund (JNF), and this is no coincidence: In contrast to other buyers, "Himanuta" does its purchasing very quietly. The company was founded in June 1938, and even then it operated unobtrusively. "Himanuta" means "trust" in Aramaic and the company indeed operates as a trustee of the Jewish National Fund. It was fully controlled by the JNF, and under its charter, its directors are also directors of the JNF. It has no independent capital. The JNF finances its activities. "Himanuta" has a great advantage, which surfaced primarily after the Six-Day War; in contrast to the JNF, whose regulations prohibit it from selling lands in its possession or transferring ownership of them "Himanuta," a separate legal entity, is entitled to do so. For instance, to settlers in the territories. Following the Six-Day War the company began acquiring lands in the West Bank in two forms.

Purchases for the JNF: Using JNF money the company purchased 6,000 dunams in the West Bank (not including Jerusalem) and registered them under its name. The land was purchased in five areas defined by "Himanuta" managers as ones that "according to the consensus in the country are an inseparable part of Eretz-Israel under any arrangement": Gush Etzion, Latrun, Nebi Samwel, Mount Hebron, and the Jordan Rift Valley. According to the company managers, some \$30 million has been spent on these purchases since 1967.

Purchases for the state: It turns out that "Himanuta" also acts in the territories as an agent of the State of Israel. The initiative comes from the Israel Lands Administration acting through the staff officer for lands in the Judea-Samaria Command. Lands Administration personnel make contact with the owners of the land they want to buy and hear their asking price. The offer then goes to an inter-departmental committee for approval. If it is passed, "Himanuta" enters the picture; it examines the minutest details of the deal and is also the one to sign the agreement with the seller at the end. "Himanuta" receives the funds for the deal from the State of Israel,

but registers the purchased land under its name. In this fashion it has registered under its name about 7,500 dunams in the West Bank. These lands constitute part of the territory used for the establishment of about 50 settlements (the rest of the land was registered as "state lands," "government lands," or "lands seized for military purposes"). Among the settlements established partly on "Himanuta" lands are Ofra, Kedumim, Alon-Shevut, Kfar Etzion, and others.

The person responsible for "Himanuta" land purchases is lawyer Avraham Hilleli, director of the JNF's Lands Department. "The process is complex," Hilleli told me. The complexity, he says, stems mainly from the fact that most of the lands in Judea and Samaria are unregistered. Beginning in 1980, the Israel Government adopted a stand by which all land in the West Bank which is not cultivated and not registered is declared "state land." Whoever claims ownership of land may register it under his name only if he proves that he has cultivated it continuously for ten years or more, or if he is registered as a land owner in the survey carried out by Jordan's government in 1956 for establishing property tax ("maliya").

Indeed, the process is complex. "Himanuta" says it is being very scrupulous. Hilleli does not content himself with a certificate from the Jordanian property tax survey. He sends to the site a surveyor who prepares a map for the purpose of registering the land which is up for sale (in case it is not registered). "Himanuta" officials approach all the persons whose plots of land border upon the one offered for sale and requests that they confirm, on the map itself, the border between the plots. If there are differences of opinion between neighbors about a border, they go to litigation for a final decision.

Once the neighbors have signed the map, "Himanuta" officials also request the confirmation of the village mukhtar and notables, after which they submit a request for land registration in the name of the seller. This requires placing a notice in a daily paper announcing the intention to register a certain plot of land under the name in question and asking the public to voice any objections to the registration within two months. When "Himanuta" has doubts, it suggests to the land owner that he lease the plot to the company, and during this period hires a fellah to cultivate it. Should anyone else own the land, he will protest the trespass. Usually, about two months after the notice appears there are indeed objections. A Justice Ministry body known as "The Committee for Initial Registration" convenes, visits the site, and summons all those who have objections. When a plot is determined for which there are no objections, and when the committee is convinced that it belongs to the person who offered it for sale, it recommends to the land registrar (who is an official in the land registry office in the area where the land is located) to register the land under his name. The official scrutinizes the documents, assesses how much "registration tax" the owner must pay, and after the latter has appeared before him registers the land under his name. Following the registration stage, ownership of the land is transferred (in a different bureaucratic process) from the Arab owner to "Himanuta." "Himanuta" receives the check with which to pay the land owner from the Israel Lands Administration. Even this takes place in

such a proper manner, according to Hilleli, that it's not clear why the state needs "Himanuta"'s services and why it does not register the lands it buys under its own name.

There is an explanation, of course: According to international law and various conventions, an occupier may not buy land in the territories under occupation. It is doubtful whether the use of "Himanuta" as a straw company with the state behind it could pass the test of international legal forums, but at least it looks a bit better. Hilleli has a different explanation: According to the JNF's regulations (and those of "Himanuta"), land in its possession shall be handed over exclusively for Jewish use. Registration of land under the name of "Himanuta," even though it was bought with taxpayers' money, prevents the possibility of its being used by Arabs. Says Hilleli: "The advantage of registering land under the name of 'Himanuta' or of the JNF is that it can be used for Jewish settlement only. This is national and not state land." I asked Hilleli whether he doesn't see a problem in the state financing the purchase of lands which Arab citizens may not make use of. Hilleli: "It's legitimate that the state should place the land at the disposal of Jews alone. Quantitatively speaking, the land 'Himanuta' has in the West Bank is like a drop in the sea of Arab lands, so at least our lands will be for Jews only. I don't want to discuss whether it's unobjectionable from a legal standpoint, but on the other hand, the entire state was established in order to settle Jews in the country."

Whatever one's political attitude towards the activity of "Himanuta" in the West Bank, one thing has to be said for it: They know how to buy land. Moshe Rivlin, chairman of the board of the JNF, is also very proud of "Himanuta": "We have never been duped," he told me. In his opinion, the problems began in 1979 when the Israel Government decided that everyone could purchase land, unrestrictedly: "We had warned aloud against such a development. We said that under the terrible conditions of lack of land registration in the territories, not just anyone should be allowed to get involved in this domain. I hear Yitzhak Shamir say that land registration is a complicated affair. If it's complicated, the conclusion should be that not everybody can get in on the act."

Hilleli says that "Himanuta" received offers from Ahmed Ouda and other dealers to buy lands in the Kramim and Elkana areas. Hilleli: "We rejected these offers out of hand, and later on those lands were sold to Jewish entrepreneurs. Now everyone sees the results." (In an interview with KOTERET RASHEET in this issue, Ouda boasts, inter alia, about his ties with "Himanuta.")

The whole issue is patently far more political and far more controversial than the JNF heads are prepared to admit. Dr. Meron Benvenisti, director of the West Data Base Project, castigates the JNF for its involvement in West Bank land purchases. "If there is such a thing as hypocrisy," Benvenisti says, "it's the hypocrisy of Mapai members who sit in the JNF and think they are new Hankins (Yehoshua Hankin, 1864-1945, was active in settling the country on behalf of the JNF and was director of the "Palestine Land Development Co."--Ed.). Moshe Rivlin is convinced that he is sitting in Ussishkin's

chair. When some small-time thief in the Ministry of Agriculture who falsified documents is caught, everyone knows he's a thief. But the JNF sends small children on 'Tu-Bishvat' (Arbor Day) to plant trees in order 'to seize land.' What's the difference between 'seizing land' and theft? From the point of view of the person robbed, there's no difference. It's only the thief who invents these distinctions in order to assuage his conscience.

"When the JNF buys land from an Arab for the full price, supposedly, everything is all right, since he has a stony plot of land where nothing can be grown. The JNF, though, can initiate a change in the designation of this land, so that all of a sudden a city can be built on it. Then the value of the land increases 200-fold. That's highway robbery! Maybe the Arab also wants to build a city there? The fact that he can't develop a city there doesn't mean that the buyer can leave with a clear conscience. Some people say that an Arab can't build a city. Who builds the city? Who builds the houses? On top of this, they'll say that the Arab built the houses and profitted from it. It's sheer plunder."

All this, needless to say, goes for cases of direct deals. According to all the signs, there are such things. I asked Rivlin if he paid for the lands he purchases in the West Bank with money donated to the JNF. Rivlin didn't like this. "The lands that were bought are in areas about which there exists a national consensus. In no case have we spent one agura from the donations on the territories. Only 40 percent of the Jewish Agency budget derives from donations, the rest comes from the rent we receive and from other sources. Not a penny of the donations goes beyond the Green Line, nor will any go there. I'm not an idiot; the U.S. Government can check this, and as is known, they bar investment of donation funds from the U.S. in the West Bank."

I asked about the political stand of the JNF which lends its name and its machinery for purchasing land in the heart of Judea and Samaria. Rivlin didn't care for that question either. "Everything is done in accordance with authorized government decisions," he said. And those of the Zionist movement, the Zionist congress, and the executive as well.

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ISRAEL

EXPROPRIATED LAND TO BE RETURNED TO WEST BANK RESIDENTS

TA121014 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 12 Feb 86 p 1

[Report by political correspondent 'Aqiva Eldar]

[Text] Prime Minister Shim'on Peres is working on returning to local residents hundreds of dunams in the territories which had been expropriated for security needs. Practical steps to approve the establishment of an Arab bank in the West Bank have begun as part of the new policy in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Officials at the Prime Minister's Office are currently working out the details of the plan to transfer authority to the local residents and are checking out candidates to fill the posts of mayor in Ramallah, Al-Birah, Hebron, and Gaza.

A decision in principle was made in recent deliberations to unfreeze hundreds of dunams of land which had been expropriated for security needs in the last few years but had not been used. This move is considered very important in changing the climate among the residents of the territories. Land which had been expropriated for the paving of the trans-Samaria road has recently been returned to local residents through the intervention of the Prime Minister's Office. The Banks' Department examiner, Galia Ma'or, has submitted to Moshe Mandelbaum, the governor of the Bank of Israel, the department's recommendation that the establishment of a development and investment bank in the West Bank be approved, and the latter relayed this recommendation to the defense establishment.

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ISRAEL

TRADE WITH SWEDEN IMPROVING

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 12 Jan 86 p 6

Text] TEL AVIV. -- The moribund Israel-Sweden Chamber of Commerce is now coming vigorously alive again. The Swedish Ambassador to Israel, Sven Hirdman, has taken a personal interest in reviving the chamber, which dwindled in importance after the death of Efraim Gousman (head of Gousman & sons) six years ago.

Oded Gousman, his son, said last week that some 80 Israelis had already shown interest in joining the chamber, and he hoped that the number would soon grow to 200. The ambassador's solid support and initiative have been a blessing.

"We, the Gousmans, have been importing from Sweden since 1910 and we believe that a vigorous chamber can build a new record in this tradition."

Hirdman also recalled that Sweden sent its first known exports to this country in 1910, "and if I'm informed correctly it was a shipment of milking machines."

The ambassador added "that there is no reason why trade between our countries should not double, and even treble, within a few years."

Leif Krusberg, first secretary at the embassy, will be available by appointment every Thursday to help Israeli exporters and importers.

Ambassador Hirdman noted that Sweden's exports to Israel peaked in 1983 at more than \$100 million, but then fell to about \$80m. in 1984. The first half of 1985 shows a slight drop.

Imports by Sweden from Israel rose from \$39m. in 1983 to \$45m. in 1984, and there are indications that they will be slightly higher in 1985. (The exact figures are difficult to fix, since Sweden lists both its exports and imports in Swedish crowns, whose value has declined against the dollar in the past few years.)

What is evident, however, is that the trade imbalance between the two countries is correcting itself. The ambassador noted that one reason for this is that Sweden's exports consist mainly of investment goods, which are not in demand today due to Israel's economic recession. Israel's exports, on the other hand, mainly consumer goods, are more and more in demand, since the value of the dollar is falling.

"It was a mistake in past years for Israel to peg its shekel to the dollar," the ambassador said, "for the dollar itself, and the shekel also, were overpriced."

At one point, Sweden started buying citrus from Spain, since the overvalued shekel made the Spanish fruit much more reasonable in price.

As for the future, the ambassador believes that Sweden can increase its main exports, which are iron and steel, passenger cars and trucks, and paper and pulp, while Israel's fresh vegetables and fruits will find welcome markets. Both countries also buy different types of specialized electronic instruments from the other. He also believes that Israeli

medical instruments and electronics (like the Sharplan laser) and Scitex products, could be sold in greater quantities.

"Competition for the Swedish market is fierce, and Israelis will have to go out and really fight for sales," he added.

Israel had another export which could expand its market in Sweden, and this was "turning research projects into practical applications. The Israelis in this field have a very fast turnabout time, from theory into instruments, considerably faster than similar teams in Sweden. Our process is slower, perhaps due to bureaucratic details, but on the other hand our quality is superior."

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ISRAEL

SHARON'S MISUSE OF MILLIONS IN WATER PROJECTS

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 7 Jan 86 p 2

[Text]

Ariel Sharon ordered the Mekorot national water company to carry out \$4.5m. worth of unauthorized work in Judea and Samaria during his term as minister of agriculture in the first Begin government, it was alleged yesterday.

Alignment MK Aharon Harel, who revealed this at a meeting of the Knesset State Control Committee, asserted that some of Mekorot's financial problems are due to the Finance Ministry's refusal to pay Mekorot for the work. Harel is acting chairman of the committee.

During the discussion on the State Comptroller's report on Mekorot, Water Commissioner Zerah Yishai said it costs more to supply water via Mekorot than it does via private producers, because Mekorot is inefficient and has an inflated work-roll.

Mekorot director-general Yehezkel Zakkai told the committee that the company had already dismissed 300 employees and would save \$10m. this year through belt-tightening measures.

Deputy Minister of Agriculture Avraham Katz-Oz said that, since 60 per cent of the cost of water production reflects the price of electricity, cheaper current would result in cheaper water.

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ISRAEL

BRIEFS

TERRITORY AUTONOMY IMPLEMENTATION--Next week officials in the Prime Minister's Bureau will begin discussions in an attempt to consolidate a new policy in the territories, in preparation for the implementation of autonomy. Summoned to participate in the discussions are experts on matters concerning the territories, including Knesset Member Binyamin Ben-Eli'ezer and Major General (Reserves) Shlomo Gazit, both of whom served as coordinator of activities in the territories. The prime minister's associates say that in fact Shim'on Peres has abandoned the idea of territorial compromise as a first stage in negotiations on finding a political solution for the region. They say that even if a breakthrough is made in the political negotiations with Jordan, a transition period with a new governing policy in the territories that will lay down the conditions for a permanent political solution will be required. Therefore, officials in the Prime Minister's Bureau claim that ultimately there will be no choice but to begin the autonomy process in the territories. The Prime Minister's Office is pessimistic about the chances of receiving a positive reply from King Husayn about his willingness to enter negotiations. In order to spur the monarch on, officials in the Prime Minister's Office believe that Israel should make a few moves in the territories which will signal to Jordan that if it responds negatively, Israel will take unilateral action in the territories. [Report by Roni Shaqed, Gid'on Reicher, Smadar Peri, and Yisra'el Tomer] [Excerpt] [Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 4 Feb 86 p 2 TA]/6662

'LAW OF RETURN' AMENDMENT REJECTED--By a large majority, the Knesset has rejected the proposal by the religious lobby to alter the clause "Who is a Jew" in the Law of Return. Sixty-one Knesset members [MK's] voted against the proposal and only 47 supported it. MK's Olmert, Likud, and Eytan, Tehiya, abstained. MK's Doron, Weinstein, and Tikhon voted against the amendment. Ministers Burg, Arens, Sharon, and Sharir, and Likud MK's Ben-Eli'ezer, Grupper, Linn, Magen, and Reiser were absent from the voting. By a large majority, the Knesset also rejected two other proposals to amend the Law of Return. One was that of MK Shulamit Aloni, Citizens Rights Movement, and the other was by MK Granot, MAPAM. [Text] [Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 5 Feb 86 TA] /6662

10 March 1986

SERIOUS EARTHQUAKE 'EXPECTED'--An average of one earthquake is registered in Israel each day, but the quakes are very minor and most of them are not felt. The geologists confidently expect a serious earthquake, but they cannot state when and where. This emerges from a survey report prepared by our correspondent Elihu Ben-On. Not long ago the Geological Institute in Jerusalem completed some conclusive maps of quakes in Israel. The areas most sensitive to earthquakes are located in the Dan Bloc, Zefat, and Elat. However, there is no institution in Israel at present that is in charge of dealing with damage caused by an earthquake. [Text] Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 1 Feb 86 TA] /6662

ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH--Israeli and Egyptian scientists are to cooperate in research on irrigating tomatoes and melons with saline water and on using salt bushes for fodder. Agreement on this was reached at a meeting last week in Alexandria of U.S., Israeli and Egyptian scientists involved in the tripartite Cooperative Arid Lands Agricultural Research programme (CALAR), according to Prof. Dov Pasternak of Ben-Gurion University who returned from the conference yesterday. Some 100 Egyptians, Israelis and Americans are involved in CALAR, which is initially funded at \$1m. a year for five years. [Excerts] [Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 28 Jan 86 p 2 TA] /6662

AL-FAJR INTERNAL DISPUTE--The management of the East Jerusalem AL-FAJR newspaper has sent all employees dismissal notices which will take effect in the middle of the month. Our correspondent Arye Gus has learned from the paper's editorial board that the management intends to effect reorganization in the paper. However, it was impossible to obtain an official explanation on this move. Rumors are circulating in East Jerusalem journalistic circles that the owner of the paper, Paul 'Ajluni, who resides in the United States, wants to close it down due to political disagreements with editor in chief Hanna Sanyurah. Sanyurah himself is currently in Amman. [Text] [Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 4 Feb 86 TA] /6662

CSO: 4400/100

JORDAN

GOVERNMENT TOTALS PROFITS, LOSSES OF GULF WAR

Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic 6 Nov 85 p 43

[Article: "Adding up the Profits and Losses of the Gulf War"]

[Text] Jordan's stand on the side of Iraq has formed one of the principal reasons for the deterioration of relations between Amman and Damascus during the past years. While Jordan sees its support for Iraq as a duty, Syria stands on Iran's side, supporting it politically and militarily. What has the Gulf war brought Jordan on the economic level?

In the context of answering this question, Jordanian economists believe that if it is possible to talk about any benefits from the war, then Jordan had reaped three principal benefits from the Gulf War.

A. In light of Iraq's change to dependency on al-Aqabah port for importing a large portion of its needs, this port has become a major import/export facility on the Red Sea. Before the war, less than 1,500 ships would dock annually at the port, but now this figure has risen to 2,500 ships annually. Recently, al-Aqabah port has become one of the new Iraqi petroleum export outlets to the outside world. A new loading dock for oil export has been built at a cost of \$20 million.

Jordanian shipping sources expect an increase in sea shipping to the port of al-Aqabah in the coming months, following Iraqi authorities' approval of contracts to import from abroad via al-Aqabah port, and this because of the increase in Iranian sea piracy operations in the Arabian Gulf and the seizure of ships transmitting it, knowing that Iran has already detained about 300 ships in the Arabian Gulf during the past 2 months.

The Jordanian shipping sources also indicated that there is the possibility that several Gulf importing states will shift to al-Aqabah port for the same reasons.

B. Also the transportations sector has benefitted to a major extent from transporting goods destined for Iraq from al-Aqabah, and the number of Jordanian trucks working in the area has increased from 3,500 to 8,000 trucks.

C. Iraqi markets have opened their doors for Jordanian goods, from gas stoves to tomato juice and medical supplies. Iraq now absorbs 35 percent of Jordanian exports. If we exclude phosphate exports, Iraq absorbs about 50 percent of Jordanian products.

Iraq is the Number One Partner in the Field of Trade.

Iraq had embarked rather suddenly on closing its markets against Jordanian products in 1982, and proceeded to cancel all contracts with Jordanian merchants, and with transportation and construction companies, all this as part of the economic austerity measures against the increasing war costs.

This decision had a shattering impact on the Jordanian economy during 1983 in that many Jordanian companies found themselves debarred from the possibilities of exporting to Iraq--keeping in mind that many of these companies were set up to meet the demands of the Iraqi market. Thus, after the value of Iraqi exports in Jordan had reached \$175 million in 1982, it dropped to \$65 million in 1983. At this stage, the Jordanian government resorted to granting Iraqi importers credit facilitations, and suggested that Iraq utilize the method of bartering in trade exchange so Iraq could pay for its Jordanian goods and services with oil.

Iraqi oil at this time makes up 25 percent of the crude oil refined in al Zarqa' Refinery. As a result of this arrangement, the trade exchange flourished anew between the two countries and Iraq became the number one trade partner for Jordan in 1984, with imports valued at \$175 million.

Stoppage of Arab Aid

In contrast, the Iraqi-Iranian war had several negative results with regard to Jordan, whether on the economic or the political levels.

Since 1982, Iraq has totally stopped paying its share of Arab aid to Jordan, amounting to \$182 million. Soon afterwards, several other Gulf states such as the United Arab Emirates and Qatar stopped or greatly curtailed their total aid obligations to the Jordanian Treasury for 1984. Kuwait also decided to eliminate its obligations and to pay instead a yearly sum in accordance with specific circumstances the current aid level. Saudi Arabia has remained the only state fulfilling its obligation fully, amounting to about \$232 million. The reason behind this curtailment or reductions of aid from the Gulf states is the decline in their oil revenues.

Return of Workers in the Gulf and the Specter of Unemployment

The curtailment of financial aid was not the only negative result which affected Jordan from the on-going Gulf war. The economic stagnation in the region resulted in the laying off of 20,000 Jordanian workers in the Gulf countries during the past 2 years. There are about 30,000 Jordanians working in the Gulf, and it is inevitable that the economic stagnation will lead to

an increase in the number of Jordanian workers returning to their country and causing an increase in unemployment--which is estimated today to be about 6 percent of the total labor force or approximately 32,000 persons. Despite the fact that there is in Jordan today an estimated 160,000 foreign workers, most of whom are engaged in agricultural or manual labor, it is unlikely that the returning immigrants, who are mostly engaged in professional and white collar jobs, will replace the foreign laborers.

Simultaneously, Jordanian worker remittances have experienced a sharp decline. Whereas it used to amount to \$ 1.4 billion in the seventies and early eighties, it amounted to \$ 1.1 billion in 1984.

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SYRIA

AGRICULTURAL COUNCIL FORMULATES SEASONAL PLANS

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 8 Nov 85 p 3

[Article: "The Regional Agricultural Council adopts the Winter and Summer Agricultural plan for Both Irrigated and Non-Irrigated Lands"]

[Text] The regional agricultural council meeting was chaired by the governor of al-Hasakah, and culminated in discussing the topic of the agricultural cycle for non-irrigated lands in the stable zone for the 1985-1986 farming season, in accordance with what was decided at the higher agricultural council in its last meeting in regard to the production plan for winter crops and vegetables and to authorizing the regional agricultural council to amend the proposed farming cycle for non-irrigated lands in the first stable zone so that this zone would be farmed 100 percent during the coming season. The proposals for the agricultural cycle were adopted according to the following distribution of percentages:

High Productivity Wheat	40%
Regular Wheat	10%
Lentils	10%
Garbanzo Beans	2%
Vetch	12%
Mountain Vetch	1%
Assorted Winter Crops	1%
White Corn	4%
Sesame	4%
Sun Flower	1%
Egyptian Cucumber	14%
Assorted Summer Crops	1%

This proposed cycle was presented to the higher agricultural council for adoption in order to enable the Directorate of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform to embark on the agricultural organization for the first stable zone before more passage of time keeping in mind that the successful planting of these proposed crops in the cycle requires the securing of all their production needs. This is done through fair and incentive pricing of the new crops, and the announcement of the prices at an early stage, with the necessity of ensuring the availability of seeds, fertilizers, and fuels for the crops at the appropriate times, specifying the authorities responsible for buying and marketing the production of these crops before the date of harvest in an appropriate time.

Condition of the Summer and Intensive Crops

The council then examined the report of the Directorate of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform on the general situation for summer and intensive crops, and especially the cotton crop, indicating that cotton harvest operations are proceeding well as the quantities of cotton harvested to date have reached 27,000 tons, and that cotton marketing operations for the cotton gins have reached 12,000 tons. The council also examined the Cotton Bureau's letter urging peasants, associations, and farmers with the necessity of quickly harvesting the cotton in order to protect its quality and to avoid the decline of its price as a result of rain, and of preventing sheep from grazing on the cotton until after it is completely harvested.

It was also decided to send a telegram to heads of the districts and sub-districts to urge peasants, farmers, and associations to speed up the cotton harvest, this in cooperation with the peasant cooperatives, agricultural establishments, and guidance units prior to the rain fall and in order to prevent the grazing of the cotton by sheep until after it is completely harvested.

The General Condition of Animal Resources

After that, the Council reviewed the general condition of animal resources in the province. It became clear that the general condition is good, that there is no current sickness, and that the necessary fodder for this resource is available through the fodder establishment branch, where distribution operations to breeders are currently taking place. Furthermore, medicine and veterinary immunizations are available in a satisfactory manner, except for external parasite medicines which have been unavailable since the 7th month. These medicines are expected to arrive at the ministry during the current month, and elements of the veterinary protective service are immunizing the sheep against small-fox and are utilizing collective treatment for internal parasites.

After this, the Council moved to discuss the topic of chemical fertilizer availability for the winter season, and it found that the province is suffering from a shortage of phosphoric and nitrogenous fertilizers. The council decided to request that the general administration of the Agricultural Bank secure the necessary quantities of chemical fertilizers for the branches of the Agricultural Bank in the province, amounting to 16,900 tons, including 9,900 tons of phosphoric fertilizer and 7,000 tons of nitrogenous fertilizer. The council then proceeded to discuss the problem of barley seeds to be provided to the brother peasants and farmers for the current season since the authority responsible for selling barley seeds has not been specified to date. The council decided to send a telegram to the minister of agriculture and agrarian reform so that he will specify authority which will be distributing the barley seeds, its pricing, and the way in which later sales will be conducted, and all this prior to the seeding operations.

The Agricultural Cycle for Irrigated Lands

After this, the council looked over a report of the Directorate of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform containing a request to adopt the agricultural plan for the 1985-1986 season for irrigated lands located around the city of al-Hasakah and within a radius of 5 km, in order to fulfill local consumption needs for vegetables, and to secure part of the needs of the canned foods factory, given that this cycle was proposed by the agricultural committee in al-Hasakah, and it is distributed as follows:

1. Winter Crops	33%
High Productivity Wheat	2%
Peas	1%
Grazing Vetch	1%
Grazing Vegetation	1%
Winter Vegetables	13%
Spring Potatoes	1%
Total	<u>50%</u>
2. Summer Crops	
Cotton	25%
Tomatoes	10%
Dry Onions	5%
Green Beans	2%
Summer Vegetables	8%
Total	<u>50%</u>

At the end, the council received a petition of the village farmers located on the al-Khabur river and belonging to the subdistrict of Tall Tamr, which deals with the refusal of the Agricultural Bank in al-Hasakah to fund them for the farming season because of the lack of certification of the agricultural rental contracts by the clerk of the court, although the Agricultural Bank has in past seasons funded them in accordance with leases signed by the sub-district manager or village chief, in view of the fact that the land holding is small in the Tall Tamr sub-district villages and in addition, a great number of the landlords are deceased or have emigrated outside the region.

After discussing the topic, the council decided to ask the director general of the Cooperative Agricultural Bank to consent and direct the Agricultural Bank in al-Hasakah to accept the agricultural rental contracts in the Tall Tamr subdistrict that are signed by the village chief and the subdistrict director because of the circumstances mentioned above and in order to guarantee the fulfillment of the agricultural production plan for al-Hasakah Province for the 1985-1986 season for winter crops at the proper time.

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SYRIA

DEVELOPMENT PLAN CONCENTRATES ON FOOD SELF-SUFFICIENCY

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 17 Nov 85 p 5

[Article by Walid Najm: "Food Security Is the Most Viable Basis of the New Syrian Development Plan"]

[Text] In his speech to the FAO Conference, Mr Muhammad al-Kurdi, the Syrian minister of agriculture and agrarian reform, stated that his country considers the problem of food as the basic tenet of the 5-year economic and social development plan for 1986-1990. He mentioned that the plan aims at achieving self-sufficiency in food by stressing the role of human resources, and its participation in the agricultural and rural development, by increasing the area of farmed and irrigated land, by utilizing agricultural machines, by increasing the productivity of the agricultural sector, and by achieving an equitable price increase.

Food sufficiency forms a basic ingredient of development strategy in Syria. For this reason several conferences have been held, the last of which took place at the invitation of the Professional Union, and which was attended by the deputy prime minister for Services Affairs, the minister of agriculture and other specialists responsible for land reclamation in Syria, in order to discuss the problem of food self-sufficiency.

Future Needs

The most important points that were discussed were the setting of a general position on the requirements for relative food sufficiency until the year 2000. Also presented were the production figures for the principal foodstuffs in Syria, the per capita share, and future need. On the basis of these figures, Syria produced the following principal foodstuffs for the year 1984 [all figures as published]:

Grains: 1.98 million tons. The need for the year 2000 will reach 6.8 million tons, while the 1984 need was 4 million tons, i.e. production equalled 39 percent of consumption needs.

Meats: 99,000 tons. The need for the year 2000 will be 720,000 tons, while the 1984 need was 420,000 tons, leaving a shortage of 48 percent.

Dairy: 702,000 tons. The need for the year 2000 will be 3.9 million tons, while the 1984 need was 2.5 million tons, i.e., a production of only 40 percent.

Eggs: 856 million eggs. The need for the year 2000 will be 3.1 billion eggs, while the 1984 consumption level was around 1.8 billion eggs, i.e., a production of about 90 percent.

Vegetables: 2,177,000 tons. The need for the year 2000 will be 4,080,000 tons, while the consumption level for 1984 was 2,400,000 tons, i.e., a production of around 96 percent.

Fruits: 742,000 tons. The need for the year 2000 will be 1,300,000 tons, while the consumption level for 1984 reached 900,000 tons, i.e., 105 percent.

Industrial Products: 651,000 tons. The need for the year 2000 will be 3 million tons, while consumption for 1984 reached 1.77 million tons.

Production Shortage

From examining these figures it becomes clear that the individual's share of foodstuffs in Syria is lower in comparison to the world consumption averages, and these figures also indicate that the production average is in constant deficit during the 1975-1984 period and that the yearly rate of increase is less than the average population increase during the same period.

By analyzing the population census for the year 1984 to the year 2000, and considering that the average individual consumption for principal foodstuffs should not be less than half of the world consumption, and by comparing the minimum calculated need, it is possible to outline the requirements of food security in Syria, and the land area necessary for reclamation and farming until the year 2000.

The minimum production need for basic foodstuffs mentioned above depends on the exploitation of water resources and both cultivated irrigated and non-irrigated lands in Syria. Possible production in nonirrigated land in Syria is estimated as follows:

--There are around 1.8 million hectares of farm land in which the average yearly rainfall varies between 350-600 mm. It is possible to sow 2/3 of this area with grain, providing an annual yield of about 4 million tons.

--There are around 2.9 million hectares of farm land in which the yearly rainfall varies between 250-350 mm. It is possible to farm 2/3 of this area with grain to produce an estimated annual yield of 3 to 4 tons.

This means that improved exploitation of non-irrigated lands by utilizing farming equipment, fertilizers and insecticides should help fulfill a great deal of the food needs for grains, in addition to some other crops such as vegetables, fruits, fodder, and some industrial crops.

The non-irrigated land in Syria is capable of meeting needs until the year 2000 if exploited, but what about irrigated lands? The cumulative Syrian irrigated land area necessary until the year 2000 has to be set as follows:

--Vegetables and fruits, 100,000 hectares

--Hay, 900,000 hectares

--Agro-industrial Crops, 200,000 tons

This means that the total area will be 1.2 million hectares which is what Syria needs from irrigated agricultural lands in order to meet its food needs for the year 2000. Since the currently exploited and irrigated land is around 600,000 hectares, this means that it is necessary to reclaim around 600,000 other acres. Will Syria be able to do this?

Looking at the availability of both land and water shows that this goal is not impossible to achieve. Syria's total acreage is 18.51 billion hectares of which 580,000 is currently irrigated, 3.49 million is non-irrigated and fully within the settled agricultural districts, and 2,035,000 is unfarmed lands. In addition, 8,387,000 hectares is desert, 500,000 hectares are forest and woods, and 3,518,000 hectares are lakes and swamps.

Abundant Water Resources

With regard to available water resources in Syria, they are distributed as follows: 4.95 billion square meters of rivers including the Euphrates water tributaries only, 1.2 billion square meters of springs, and 1.6 billion square meters of ground water, and 1.5 billion square meter of surface dams.

Syria's share of the Euphrates River on the Syrian-Turkish border is about 28 billion square meters, and of the Tigris River about 18 billion square meters, which can be added to water yield in Syria.

This means that land is available and is capable of expansion, as are water resources. What is left is the problem of planning and means of achieving it without delay. Land reclamation would benefit from practical planning in order to meet the needs of food security.

Reports indicate that efforts to implement land reclamation operations and to farm the land will greatly improve the Syrian trade balance, making it profitable, in addition to providing productive jobs for the citizens, and most important of all, achieving a modicum of food security.

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

BRAZIL PLANS INCREASED TRADE

Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 10 Feb 86 p 17

[Text] RIO DE JANEIRO—The oil price rise of the 1970s left Brazil with a cumulative trade deficit of \$45.2 billion with Arab states. Now businessmen here are planning an export drive in the Middle East to balance the books.

They hope to boost Brazilian exports to the Arab world by up to 30 per cent by the end of the decade, but first, warn officials of the Arab-Brazilian Chamber of Commerce in Sao Paulo, traders must take marketing more seriously.

The chamber's secretary-general, Omar Hamam, said, "If the Brazilian exporter doesn't conduct a more aggressive campaign to sell his product, the Arabs will continue to buy from traditional producers."

Since Arab countries import practically all their consumer goods, officials are convinced there is potential to increase Middle East sales of Brazil's quality and lower-priced products.

There are practical difficulties, such as the high cost of maritime freight and differences of language and culture.

But chamber president Laurencio Chohfi believes these problems can be overcome. "Patience, reason, and honesty in trade dealings is the recipe for improved business relations," he said.

Of Arab imports totalling \$120 billion in 1984, the latest year for which figures are available, Brazilian goods represented just \$1.4 billion or 1.1 per cent, Mr Chohfi said, while Arab exports to Brazil, mostly oil and its by-products, were worth \$3.8 billion.

From 1975 to 1983, he said, Brazil accumulated a commercial deficit of \$45.2 billion with the Arabs.

Brazil's major trading partners among Arab states are Egypt, Algeria, Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

Its biggest commercial deficits are with the latter two.

Even with a programme to substitute alcohol for petroleum and a concerted export drive, Brazil's balance of payments with the Arab world will take time to level out, the Chamber of Commerce believes.

"In the short run we have to penetrate the Arab world through consortiums of complementary industrial trade," where the Arabs would supply capital and Brazil technology and raw materials, Mr Chohfi said.

Such ventures would open up new investment opportunities and markets in Arab countries, easing dependence on traditional world markets. "Protectionism is on the rise in developed nations," he said.

Mr Hamam said the official trade balance ignored arms sales and re-exports. The latter include Brazilian pineapple juice bought by Japan's Mitsubishi and resold to the Arabs, cashew nuts and juice canned in Switzerland, and leather belt buckles finished by American firms.

Last November the Chamber of Commerce issued a report on Brazil's commercial relations with the Arab world, containing a social, economic and cultural profile of each state and important basic information. It includes a section for Arab importers outlining Brazil's industrial capacity and economy.

Quality products

Mr Hamam said exporters had to overcome the fact that their products were mostly new to Arab markets. "The Arab are demanding in their scrutiny of product quality because they are used to European standards."

The Chamber of Commerce opened

offices in the southern Brazilian city of Curitiba last October and the capital Brasilia in December, the latter in the bid to cut administrative red tape.

At its base in Sao Paulo, Brazil's commercial capital, the chamber plans this year to establish a documentation centre with catalogued information including lists of importers and business opportunities in the Arab world.

Already there are success stories, including exports of honey to Saudi Arabia by an agricultural cooperative and negotiations with the household appliances manufacturer, Brasmotor, for the transfer of technology to Egypt, one of the largest Arab markets with a population of 45 million.

Central Agricola Vale of Itajai, in the southern state of Santa Catarina, recently sold 6,884 jars of its honey, which has won international awards, to Saudi Arabia at an undisclosed price.

The cooperative's president, Harry Dorow, said the deal, which took nine months of negotiations, could be the forerunner for sales throughout the Middle East.

An Egyptian trade mission led by

Kamal Elerian, general director of the Islamic Company for Industrialisation, visited four Brasmotor factories making dishwashers, fans, refrigerators and freezers under the trademarks of Brastemp, Consul, Semer and Embraco.

"Brazilian products are not as sophisticated as American and European technology, but they are ideal for Egypt because Brazil is also a developing nation," Mr Elerian said.

Mr Elerian, who is a director of the Faisal Islamic Bank, said he planned to study further commercial exchanges between Brazil and Egypt.

Mr Elerian's Brazilian counterpart, Abdel Wahab Mansour, president of Lotas Foreign Commerce, which has offices in Sao Paulo and Cairo, accompanied the Egyptian mission and flew to Egypt in December. His company aims to promote Brazilian sales to all the Arab nations.

Brasmotor plans to take part in the International Fair of Cairo in March, and Mr Mansour said it was an opportunity for Brazilian industry, services and products "to show themselves to the Arab world"—Compass

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

IMPACT OF DROP IN REVENUES ASSESSED

Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 9 Feb 86 p 15

[Text] ALTHOUGH UAE's oil income is expected to decline to Dh25 to 30 billion this year from Dh45 billion in 1984, the country's economy will not be so badly off as some predictions suggest, according to a banking study released in Dubai.

Also, economic indicators for the current year do not warrant a devaluation of the local currency, Ashiq Husain, senior manager, Middle East Bank, said in his study yesterday.

UAE's imports which fell by nine per cent in 1984 and seven per cent last year, are projected to decline by 10 per cent this year. Balance of payments deficits and similar problems which motivate other governments to go in for devaluation are nowhere on the economic horizon.

On the other hand, the net return on every dirham spent in the country will be higher than in the seventies although public expenditure, already on the decline is expected to go down further.

"The psychology of abundance is giving way to the psychology of rationalisation," the study argues, referring to the increasing incidence of re-tendering of projects. "In the seventies, everyone was competing make more profits. Now they are competing to get work."

Mr Husain explained that many of the projects now being undertaken would have cost much more in the seventies because rationalisation of expenditure was never stressed during those days of plenty. This could be one of the positive aspects of the current economy drive.

Similarly new projects are being reviewed all the time and as a result, if the government finally decides to spend money on anything, it makes it certain that returns from expenditure will be higher than before.

He said published figures of UAE's oil income in 1984 put it at Dh45 billion while estimates for last year were around Dh43 billion. This year's drop is expected to be unprecedented.

The nine per cent drop in imports in 1984 also refer to published figures, but the seven per cent decline for last year has been worked out the basis of an average of three quarters.

The projected drop for 1986 is much more than for previous years, but is still less than in other Gulf states suffering from a similar erosion in oil income.

Dubai's role

Although imports have fallen, Dubai's role as an entrepot is unlikely to be affected because of the composition of its imports. While the imports of machinery, heavy equipment and other items that were needed for infrastructure projects have declined, there is no perceptible drop in the inflow of consumer durables.

Import of foodstuff and other consumer items that constitute the core of Dubai' imports is unlikely to be affected.

A decline in imports is further expected to reduce strains on the balance of payments position. Mr Husain hoped the current rationalisation efforts and a change in spending psychology would lead to greater planning for the years ahead.

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

INSUFFICIENT RAINFALL PROBLEM FOR AGRICULTURE

Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 5 Feb 86 p 3

[Article by Latheef Farook: "Rainfall Not Enough for Cultivation"]

[Text] ALTHOUGH last week's (January 30 and 31) rainfall was apparently heavy, most of it was absorbed by the soil and except in Wadi Idhin in Ras Al Khaimah, there was hardly any flow of water in any wadi in the northern and eastern areas.

Experts described the rainfall as too small for agricultural purposes as also for recharging underground water levels in the agricultural regions. Even in the Wadi Idhin area the water collected was not sufficient for recharging the underground water table.

A spokesman of the Dubai office of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries told Khaleej Times yesterday that the maximum rainfall (38.8mm) was recorded in Fujairah on January 31—and that, too, was not enough to recharge the underground water table which touched down an unexpected low level due to inadequate or no rain at all in the past two to three years.

Since the rain season, mainly in the agricultural regions of the northern and eastern emirates, begins by January and continues up to March and even April, the possibility of more rains cannot be ruled out.

According to the spokesman there should be at least a minimum of 50mm of heavy and continuous rainfall for a moderate recharging of the underground water table. The intensity and antecedent rainfall, he pointed out, have been crucial in this region for causing flood. But a mere flood is not sufficient. Intensity is important.

The figures of rainfall in millimetres

in different parts of Dubai and the northern emirates/ on January 30 and 31 were: 2.3 and 11.6 in Dubai, 1.5 and 19.7 Sharjah, 1.0 and 12.0 Ras Al Khaimah, 0.4 and 28.6 Masfut, 4.6 and 14.6 Dhaid, 8.6 and 13.8 Jebel Sermal, 9.0 and 15.0 Marbad, 7.6 and 18.4 Masafi, 4.0 and 17.0 Bithna, 16.6 and 17.4 Farah, 3.2 and 38.8 Fujairah, 2.4 and 14.0 Digdaga, 0.8 and 5.0 Burayrat, 1.4 and 21.6 Shaam, 0.8 and 12.4 Hamranyah, 1.0 and 11.2 Khatt, 2.8 and 33.6 Idhin, 6.4 and 26.2 Ghail, 2.8 and 20.6 Meliha, 1.0 and 23.6 Fili, 0.8 and 20.6 Hibab, 6.0 and 26.0 Awir, 4.8 and 19.4 Munai and 2.2 and 28.8 Howeilat.

Rains were heavier at most of the places on the second day.

The spokesman said in many areas the water table had gone down to a very low level and rain was badly needed. In some areas, he said, the wells had dried up.

Agricultural activities in these areas depend to a great extent on rains and the lack of it for the past two years had caused numerous problems for the farmers. The government has been systematically trying to conserve every drop of rainwater by building dams at all important places.

The dam at Wadih Bieh at Ras Al Khaimah built at a cost of Dh10 million was opened in December 1982. This 220-metre-long, 18-metre-high and 92-metre-wide dam has a capacity of conserving nine million cubic metres of water. Adhin and Al Ghail in Ras Al Khaimah and Al Ham at Fujairah are three more dams completed.

In addition, the ministry introduced the drip irrigation system to prevent the wastage of water and this helped reduce

the requirement of 400 million cubic metres of water to 200 million cubic metres.

Measures were also taken to educate the farmers of modern methods of irrigation to economise the use of water. A working paper published by the ministry in 1982 on the water situation pointed out that the ground water available then for agricultural and domestic use was only 200 million cubic metres although the overall annual consumption stood around 625 million cubic metres.

The ministry also undertook several studies in cooperation with UN Development Programme and the Food and Agriculture Organisation to explore means of conserving water resources while increasing the agricultural output.

Meanwhile, Agriculture and Fisheries Minister Saeed Mohamed Al

Raghabani held a meeting this week to discuss ways and means of assisting farmers to carry out their work uninterrupted.

At this meeting, attended by under-secretary Hamad Salman and assistant under-secretary Mohamed Moosa Jassim, the minister reiterated the importance of popularising modern irrigation methods among the farmers to continue their activities. He asked officials to make the necessary arrangements to introduce new irrigation methods and to train the farmers in these methods.

He also instructed the officials concerned to ensure that the farmers in all agricultural zones obtain the services needed from the ministry. Officials were told to seek means to eliminate diseases afflicting livestock and train personnel towards this end.

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CSO: 4400/102

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

DUBAYY GOLD IMPORTS DESCRIBED

Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 2 Feb 86 p 15

[Text] ABOUT 10 per cent of the world's annual production of gold ends up in Dubai either for local consumption or for re-export, the director of an international association of gold miners said yesterday.

Mr Andre Bisang, who looks after the Middle East interests of Geneva-based International Gold Corporation (IGC), was in Dubai meeting investors, gold importers and jewellers as part of the corporation's efforts to promote the yellow metal.

He told Khaleej Times that the 10 per cent figure for Dubai which remained steady for the last two years represented an increase over the emirate's offtake for previous years.

Mr Bisang declined to predict demand for the current year, but said gold prices now reflect the actual value of the precious metal. "It used to be said at one time that gold is the barometer of the anxieties of the world—not any more."

Since 1980 political events have had little influence on the price of gold. Periodic crises or a flare up here and there may affect prices, but no more than for a few hours.

Gold prices are now more influenced by economic than political factors and Mr Bisang believed that nothing less than the possibility of a confrontation between the Superpowers would have any political influence on the value of gold.

Recent market intelligence suggested large scale gold purchase by Middle Eastern investors between November and January, one of the factors behind an escalation in gold prices. Published reports in the West estimated Middle Eastern purchases at around three million ounces.

"Arab buyers are today in a position to influence the international price of gold," Mr Bisang said the much talked about recession in the Gulf was not

reflected in the gold trade despite pessimistic predictions by local jewellers.

On the other hand, investors here seem to be realising that it is better to keep their assets in different forms, one of them being physical gold.

This, in fact, has been the thrust of an IGC campaign in this region and local gold trade said this campaign was partly responsible for a recent spurt in demand here for the yellow metal.

Mr Bisang pointed out that while gold may have depreciated against the dollar since 1980, price of the metal in terms of several currencies such as the French franc, the Italian lira and the Indian rupee, is higher now than six years ago when gold prices reached their peak against the dollar.

Figures available with IGC indicated that consumption of gold jewellery in the Gulf was 10 times more than the average in Europe, making it one of the largest markets for jewellery.

The corporation has been stressing the need for changing the approach of jewellers to marketing and the need for a more aggressive sales campaign. "The society here is changing. Shoppers now have more choice of goods than before and gold at times has to be promoted like any other consumer item."

The concept of traditional souks is changing although conservative jewellers have been less willing to respond to changes. During his meeting with importers and investors here, Mr Bisang emphasised that the value of the dollar was too high earlier and that the currency was likely to weaken further.

He said 60 per cent of the world's total gold production was going into jewellery, about eight per cent into dentistry and an equal amount into electronic integrated circuits.

The corporation was established in 1972 to promote gold and includes miners all over the world except the USSR.

10 March 1986

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

PROMINENT FIGURE RELATES TRIUMPH OF LIBERATION MOVEMENT

Sanaa AL-AMAL in Arabic 8 Dec 85 pp 4-6

[Interview with 'Ali Salim al-Bid: "The Story of the Liberation of the Regions Prior to Independence"; date and place not specified]

[Text] On the occasion of independence day in the south of the nation, AL-AMAL, as usual, is writing intensively about issues which had not previously been published.

AL-AMAL met with our brother the fighting man 'Ali Salim al-Bid, member of the political bureau of the Yemeni Socialist Party, who experienced the actual circumstances of these events and helped make them, along with his other comrades.

From memory, our brother al-Bid talked about the events which burst forth during the armed struggle, especially in the areas of Hadramawt -- events which led to the revolutionaries' control of the regions -- and about the state of the struggle at that time and the momentum of the fighting which led to the triumph of the revolution.

How were the regions overthrown? What were the difficulties and obstacles which faced the fighting men? How was government carried out after the takeover of the regions? Our brother the fighting man 'Ali Salim al-Bid related all these events for the reader.

AL-AMAL: On the occasion of the 18th anniversary of national independence, the newspaper AL-AMAL would like to have an interview with you dealing with an aspect of the commemoration of this great occasion which is dear to our people's hearts.

At the outset, there is a question the newspaper would like to present to you, which is, how was the choice made to overthrow the regions in the rural areas, even though the British forces had not yet left the area?

Al-Bid: First of all, we thank the editorial family of the newspaper AL-AMAL for this meeting, and we will try to provide what we have concerning these circumstances. The choice of overthrowing and liberating the regions came as

an expression of an upsurge in the movement of the revolution and the rallying of the masses around it, and it happened that the masses started to converge on all the regions. In the light of this, the choice on the part of the command of endorsing the overthrow of the regions was not made in advance -- rather, it was a response on the command's part to the mass upheaval which had taken place during this period.

That is, I remember, for example, when we received news that some regions in the central province, Mudiyah, had been overthrown, and before that of course al-Dali' had fallen, after that the general command paused to discuss what had happened in June and July, and reports started to reach the general command concerning these events between June and July. Therefore the beginning of the liberation of the regions was not a decision on the command's part but was an expression of a mass uprising about which the command of the national front managed to rally the masses -- the local command in these regions, al-Dali', the central province. It was also an extension of what happened on 20 June during the occupation of Crater. This whole situation manifested itself and started to yield its results without a decision from the command. The overthrow or liberation of the regions was not a choice the command opted for but was a position on the part of the command in order to absorb the mass upheaval which had started to take place in these areas.

After the occupation of Crater, the rural areas started to respond to this occupation, since we managed to occupy Crater for a few days and we had a greater opportunity to occupy and liberate regions. This is the significance of the uprising which occurred in Crater on 20 June, which reflected itself on our masses. You know the interaction between the people and the revolution in all areas had this strong, firm connection and reflected itself on our masses' position in these regions. They started to express their ability to liberate and overthrow the regions more capably than had been the case in Crater. While Crater, in the context of the presence of the English, was the "main base in Aden," they managed to overthrow sections and occupy them for days, and there was a greater opportunity. However, it was not by prior decision of the command. I was in the command and understand this situation, in the light of what happened in al-Dali' and the central province. That is, the command paused and the first decision the general command made was to overthrow the Abyan region. That was in late August, that is, the last week of August. We made a decision in the general command that the general command had to decide and appoint command personnel to overthrow the Abyan region.

That choice was not a prior decision on the part of the command. However, in the light of what happened, the command paused and absorbed this mass upsurge of rallying around the armed uprising, which was an expression of the revolution's power to take decisions at that time. This decision was made and Salimayn and I were assigned to overthrow the Abyan area, the al-Fadli Sultanate at that time. That happened in the last week. Some brothers were with us. We took them with us with the goal of accompanying us, but Salimayn and I had the assignment of overthrowing the Sultanate of al-Fadli, and with us were the brothers Muhsin (Muhammad Sa'id 'Abdallah), 'Umar al-'Ilwani and Farhan ('Ali Husayn). These brothers were with us and were present on this mission with us. However, I and Salimayn were personally assigned to

overthrow the region, on grounds that I was assigned by the general command and Salimayn was someone from the region.

AL-AMAL: How was this decision made by the general command at the time, the first decision which was determined by the center to overthrow a region carried out? Before that, could you talk to us about the conditions which were caused by the force of the people's momentum to overthrow the other regions, that is, before the general command decision?

Al-Bid: Of course this was the situation and as a result of this mass uprising in the course of the revolution, we found that we were in a situation which enabled us actually to embark directly on coping with the people's causes. The first thing we did of course was to form the people's committees in these regions. The people's committees were made up of ordinary personnel who were influential because of their relationship with the masses, and they directly took charge of coping with the people's causes. That is, this was the form of the authority which we ourselves started to exercise in the regions which had already been liberated, and people's committees were formed in all these regions which were liberated or fell at the hands of the National Front. We consider that the people's committees which emerged in this period before independence as a result of the fall of the regions were the nucleus of the authority that we are now exercising; the nucleus if we ourselves followed up on it could evolve the forms of democratic action in a better manner. However, some interruptions occurred in a specific period, but we ourselves consider that we were not exercising power and the legislative activity lay with the masses after independence and after the establishment of the people's committees. However, the people's committees were formed at this beginning so that the masses could play their part in power and in the establishment of authority. The people's committees dealt with all issues in various areas. At that time they were truthful because they actually reflected the people's will, the people's pains. That is, the people's committees stood against all tribal wars, rejected all forms of tribal dealings and all traditions which had been inherited, and started to present new things which we understand through the perception of the revolution, that is, in dealing with the people's causes.

There also were the land issues; they took a position against feudal forms of dealings from the beginning. There was a progressive liberationist position in the ranks of the revolution from the beginning.

The people's committees indeed did constitute a forward step along the road toward the masses' exercise of power in the revolution; they had a great effect and managed to represent a state of upheaval in dealing with people's causes and avoid bureaucratic office dealings. A period continued after independence in some regions, but this was the beginning; when the regions were liberated, people's committees were formed in them.

AL-AMAL: How was the decision assigned to you by the general command, to overthrow the al-Fadli Sultanate, carried out?

Al-Bid: Of course when we started to discuss the nature of the general command decision assigning us to overthrow the al-Fadli Sultanate, we sat down

in advance with the brothers, specifically Salimayn at that time, and held discussions as people of the region who had contacts with our organization internally, that is, in the sultanate itself. We had of course an organization in Zinjibar and an organization in the Mudiyah regions. Agreement was reached that the brothers in the al-Fadli region would meet in Shaqrah and our comrades had to go on from here. Salimayn, Muhsin, Farhan and 'Umar al-'Ilwani went on to Shaqrah, of course, after we studied the plan, and the comrades who were with us met, with our resources that existed in the area of Fadl (which they called it previously). They all met in Shaqrah. We in Shaqrah had two targets, to reply to the police station, which any small group could occupy, and the other target, which was the Interior [Ministry]'s road camp, the camp protecting people working on the road. This road had been paved from Shaqrah in the direction of al-'Arqub and there was a camp called the road camp in which there were equipment, cars and resources. We agreed that we would take this camp over in order to take the resources for moving about by car, the equipment and some existing weapons, because there was a force to protect the roads, and its resources were greater than the force present in the small station in Shaqrah. Our comrades went there directly and took this small post, taking a Bren gun from it and some minor things such as bullets.

The people who had been in the post replied quickly. They told us, "We are on the side of the National Front." Our comrades also occupied the big camp belonging to the interior; this occupation took place in the evening, because we acted at a late hour of the evening on 26 August 1967.

My mission was different. I moved on to al-'Alam. In al-'Alam we had someone who is now an assistant governor; he was working in the al-Fadli police, but he had a link with us. Because we knew that he was a comrade of ours there, we went to him and he took us to Zinjibar. Since there were no weapons on me, he gave me a pistol. We went to Zinjibar and reached Zinjibar after dusk. We sat down there with our comrades -- an organization existed -- and discussed the situation, whether the situation had become ripe, or would become so. The whole situation was ready, and we told them our plans. We would move on from Shaqrah. We drew up two focal points in two main sections of the sultanate, and described to them all the routes by which we would move. After that, we moved.

When I was there, the vice-sultan was present. He was called One-Eye -- he could see with one eye -- and I cannot remember his name now. We made plans on the assumption that he would be present and that we would take over. After that, I moved, after we had agreed with the brothers in Zinjibar and had given them our plans to visit the region and their role internally. In addition, there was a force in this sultan's palace, but some of them were on our side. We had personnel inside this force, and told our comrades to inform them that at least if they could not take over, they should delay the takeover by the others until we arrived. Their role was to delay the takeover of the sultan's force in the palace itself.

The tasks were apportioned among our comrades and they acted. I moved on to Shaqrah and found that the comrades there had carried out the mission; they had taken over the interior's camp and the police post and we met there, we

and them, started to act and drew up our plans as they were to move on to Hassan. From Hassan we would go to two focal points, a point which would take the southern post, the camp of the sultan's palace, and a second focal point which Salimayn would take, in which the sultans' houses were situated. The sultans were not present. After we reached Shaqrah and were on our way to moving, we received news that the vice-sultan had escaped from the country. We ourselves took this place over without any difficulty and carried out our plans. By dawn we had taken over these regions.

The following day we then had power and forces everywhere. We had great resources which enabled us to obtain arms and ammunition, and we got the masses in movement. I might point out that a great march set out, consisting of thousands of people from all regions. After that a great mass incursion from Zinjabar took place with all the weapons and so forth that they had. It was an amazing thing, the rallying of the people on the side of the revolution and their enthusiasm for it.

Citizens who had cars brought their cars and weapons and did not ask for anything. Rather, they came by themselves, rushed forth with great enthusiasm and headed for any target they now specified. There was unusual rallying of the masses on the side of the revolution and enthusiasm among them for it. After that, I went to the headquarters in Zinjabar and Salimayn acted with the others, by virtue of his familiarity with the people. There I worked under the name Abu Bakr, an alias.

This was the first stage in carrying out the decision. After that, I was assigned a second time by the command to get going to Lahij because our situation in Lahij -- pressure had been exerted on the National Front in al-Hawtah itself by the Liberation Front and our situation had become difficult. I asked the command to move to Lahij to reinforce the situation and take control of the situation there, because the situation was difficult.

I took a force with me and went to Lawdar. I took people in cars to Ja'ar with me. We assembled a force from Ja'ar and from Abyan and the other areas, and moved forward along the route of the road passing to Lahij. With us at that time was the brother 'Abdallah al-Ashtal, a young student who did not know anything, but was with us. I took him on this operation with the objective of his gaining experience and getting to know people. There was a warm relationship between us. He had come from the Democratic Party and came to our place after the movement to work with us. I familiarized him with the regions and took him with me even on this assault, when we moved on to Lahij.

We entered Lahij and found our friends in a difficult situation. Five of our comrades had died in the fighting. We began to control the situation. We had a large force and seized defensive positions, then, after we got to the place, studied the situation in full, reconnoitered the situation around us, set up focal points there and tried to liberate regions and take over Lahij. After that, the army came in, since it had a connection with our situation there, the situation in Dar Sa'd, in which there had been an uprising. These things happened with us.

When there was an uprising in the situation in Dar Sa'd, our comrades' ammunition ran out and no one helped them, the command started to be affected and feel as if we had started to weaken. All right, we did not take Dar Sa'd over then, but we were present in many areas and had a large force in them. The command started to agree to negotiations with the Liberation [Front] and the army to solve the problems of the other regions such as Lahij and so forth.

Our comrades came and told us, It's finished, we have agreed that the army will be an alternative to the Liberation and National [Fronts] in Lahij. We did not accept this statement, because we had started to reinforce our positions, liquidate regions and strengthen our positions in these regions.

The command's decision had an effect on us. Many comrades such as the martyr 'Abbas and the martyr Sa'id Salih 'Aydarus were with me and Muhammad 'Ali Ahmad and the martyr Muhammad 'Ali Salim Mudrim were with us. That is, there were many comrades greatly affected by the decision, because they considered that this decision on the command's part had not been carefully studied and was not suited to the existing situation. The decision came and when we told them, it's finished, we have orders from the command to move and get out of Lahij, and the army is to be an alternative, the decision, as far as we were concerned, was a shock, but the decision came from the high command, from Aden.

AL-AMAL: Who were they?

Al-Bid: I do not remember the names now, but I do remember that Sayf al-Dali'i was present, and even Qahtan al-Sha'bi was present, and Sultan Ahmad 'Umar, who held the discussions with the army and the communications.

After that, we withdrew in the wake of that decision, proceeded to Aden and joined in fighting the civil war going on in Shaykh 'Uthman, which was the first. I brought the comrades who were with me a second time into al-'Alam. I brought some of them there with me, and we took part in the fighting in Shaykh 'Uthman. The comrades who were with us, such as 'Abbas, died in combat. He was with us in Lahij. Salih 'Aydarus died in battle in Shaykh 'Uthman. That was in the early part of September. 'Abbas' death was as we were entering with our personnel into Shaykh 'Uthman, because the Liberation [Front] put pressure on us in Shaykh 'Uthman and al-Mansurah with their forces from the al-'Azibah areas. From there, they started to attack after their victory in Dar Sa'd. The People's Organization, the Egyptian intelligence organization in the Liberation [Front], was on their side.

AL-AMAL: After the decision to overthrow the Sultanate of al-Fadli was carried out, for example, the National Front organization was there. Did it start to engage in activity in an official capacity in the region, by having a specific command headquarters in its presence, if the people's committees were carrying out the mission of the local authorities in the case of the other side, the organization? How were things?

Al-Bid: After liberating or overthrowing the Sultanate of al-Fadli, we managed to move our command there. We moved our command directly from Aden to

al-Kud, the National Front command, since we had unliberated areas and the National Front command was there. We had meetings in al-Kud which were very important in the history of the revolution. I do not know where the minutes on them are, but I attended some of them. We studied in al-Kud and held discussions in the light of newly-arising conditions and developments that had occurred and the definitive position on the Liberation Front. There were two views but the view which won was the one which constituted the predominant view, which was that the Liberation Front at that time and in our opinion, something which happened around September, the Liberation Front constituted a reserve for the opposition front, and on this basis we considered that it was our right to continue the struggle against it until it weakened and for us to strengthen the presence of the National Front in the whole region.

This decision or opinion which existed in the command was contested later, because the decision we made was that we had come to carry out tasks. The command rallied around the decision and tried to reach a decision with the Liberation Front, a short period after this, when Qahtan al-Sha'bi went with al-Makkawi and they tried to direct an appeal from Cairo to the masses later on the basis of unity and reconciliation. We consider that that was an agreement to neutralize the general command at that time in a position on the Liberation Front. After the command was stabilized there, each of us was assigned a task. In the second week of September, in the light of information which reached us from Hadramawt, I was assigned to go to Hadramawt to assume responsibility for the situation there. Some problems began to appear, the confrontation between the National Front organization there and the local command, which took place on 17 September, then the overthrow of the former Sultanate of al-Qu'ayti, which consisted of al-Mukalla and all the other areas except for Say'un and Tiryam, which belonged to the al-Kathiri, and the rest of the areas which are the Governorate of Hadramawt now. The al-Kathiri Sultanate is just a small area in Wadi Hadramawt which was overthrown later on 2 October.

The events took place in the following manner: the sultans of the al-Qu'ayti and the al-Kathiri arrived in a boat at al-Mukallah harbor. They had been on the pilgrimage and came to al-Mukalla. Before there had been preparations based on overthrowing the region under the command of the National Front. Discussions were even held with some personnel present in the old agencies of the sultanate and the military agencies, as it is said. I was not there at that time. I asked the bodies present in the local agencies to join up with the front, but we considered that the sultans should return on condition that no one touch them or arrest them, and they should leave the country. We were prepared to take power for the National Front.

We were not present at these negotiations, but they were held with personnel from the local command. Among them was someone named Sa'id al-'Akbari, who is now with the counterrevolution, Salim al-Kindi, who was executed, and Khalid 'Abd-al-'Aziz, who is now working in the Arab League. They were the ones who held the negotiations and discussions with the old military and civilian agencies, and they told them, "If you want us to come with you with the sultans ahead of us, let them leave; we will not touch them."

In a differing view within the command, other comrades who were guerrilla personnel rejected this view and insisted on overthrowing the region and not letting the sultans go, or getting those people's opinion. "If these people join the revolution, they are welcome, and if not, we can bring the situation down." We have the ability and we are part of the force that now is present in the whole country.

When the overthrow of Hadramawt was raised, two views came into being in the local command. One view was expressed by the personnel who negotiated and were connected to the personnel in the old sultanate, the desert army and the regime's army, the "armed police," personnel belonging to the old authorities in the civilian agencies, and those who carried out the communications, Sa'id al-'Akbari, Salim al-Kindi and Khalid 'Abd-al-'Aziz; in the light of their communications a view came into being among them that it was possible for them to deal with the people in power and that we should accept their view that we should let the sultans return from the ocean and prevent them from entering the country, in response to the opinion of the personnel belonging to the old authorities. The other view was that this was not an overthrow -- we had great ability to overthrow the region and had to make a plan to bring it down for good. The sultans were the men of the old regime.

They differed and after the dispute the good guerrilla personnel withdrew, headed by Khalid Baras, who is now a nominated member of the central committee. This person headed the guerrillas and the personnel who rejected this view and demanded that any decision on the sultans in the harbor was that they had to be arrested and we had to overthrow the region and also get rid of the old personnel and establish the real power of the revolution.

We were the people with the power in this situation. However, the basic personnel in the command, Sa'id al-'Akbari, Salim al-Kindi and Khalid 'Abd-al-'Aziz, did not respond to them, and they withdrew from al-Mukallah to Hajar and overthrew Hajar. After the fall of the Hajar area, they concentrated themselves there.

That was al-Mukalla because they were not in agreement with the main personnel of the command, because Khalid 'Abd-al-'Aziz was a general command member, but we hid under a secret elevator, because it was present indoors. After the dispute in views, the comrades split up. A group of the good fighting guerrilla personnel went to Hajar and the other comrades remained there. They reached an understanding with the others, took power and permitted the sultans to leave the country from the port.

In the context of this problem, I was assigned to go there to remedy the situation. I went. As soon as I went of course I took personnel with me and some resources from the regions we had taken over. We moved via the port of Shaqrah, managed to take some resources from the old authorities' agencies, in the form of the Ministry of Agriculture, and took five cars.

Al-Ashtal was also with me in this operation. We went there, assaulted the ministry after regular working hours and took five cars. We apportioned them among the sections and changed their color with a coat of paint the same night. We then brought them into the port and loaded them on the ship

because we had people in the authorities' agencies in customs in the port. We brought them in a skiff to Shaqrah, and from Shaqrah we brought our weapons and comrades and went to al-Mukalla. We slept there, then moved our weapons and personnel, the people of Fadl, who are good guerrilla personnel, out of the area. Some of them had been with us in Lahij and we got to know them during the armed struggle, and took them to al-Mukalla. I went to Hajar and went up into Hajar because we knew that these personnel were good. We took them, entered Mukallah, brought out our comrades from the port who had come with us, and began to broadcast a statement on the situation. We took a position of raising a provocation with the cars in the sections and they threw a bomb at our personnel when they went about in the cars and talked to the people. The bomb injured many citizens.

These were the preliminaries for us to take action, in the light of this. We moved and the same night arrested all the personnel belonging to the old authorities in al-Mukalla, outside al-Mukallah, in al-Shahr and in other areas. The same day we spread out and arrested all the personnel belonging to the old authorities, using this as a justification and arrested command personnel belonging to the league. We took control of the situation, started to correct conditions in the direction of a total takeover by the revolution, and finished doing what our comrades had not finished in the first step, because the first step had been aimed at an understanding with the men belonging to the old authorities and had failed to settle things. We came with the personnel which had proceeded with us from there, the angry personnel who were in Hajar under the command of Khalid Baras, entered al-Mukalla and made additional arrests. The National Front at that time then indeed had total control, and we reconstituted the people's committee, because there were old people in the people's committee.

We reconstituted the higher people's committee in the region and brought new personnel into it. We removed the senior officers and men belonging to the old authorities from it. This happened at the end of the third week of September.

AL-AMAL: How did you deal with the dispute which existed within the organization or what was represented by two views concerning overthrowing the region?

Al-Bid: In actuality, the other view, which was that there had to be a total liberation, won. That was the view of the comrades who for the most part consisted of guerrilla personnel and fighting personnel. When we came we finished what the others had not done. We finished arresting the personnel belonging to the old authorities. This meant that these comrades' opinion was the right one. That was their view. It is true that a liberation could not take place if we let the sultans go. Of course we condemned the comrades who let the sultans go, the command of the military organizations who were present with them in the people's committee and the men belonging to the authorities, some of whom were present with them. That was not reasonable.

We criticized this conduct and reconstituted the people's committee. We removed the men belonging to the old authorities and brought in good personnel. We arrested all the personnel that had dealt with them. That was the proper position.

AL-AMAL: Was the organization rearranged, that is, the local command?

Al-Bid: Yes, but we did not remove the comrades who were with us. However, we criticized the measures in a proper manner and after that established the conditions for the revolution in the various regions, formed people's committees and created the people's guard. In our presence in Hadramawt we took a step which we called "formation of the democratic people's army," directly after independence. Out of the guerrilla personnel of the liberation army, we formed a nucleus for this army in al-Rayyan, the place where the English forces had been. It is well known that the English army's forces had been present in al-Rayyan. We placed our comrades there and formed a nucleus of the army out of them. In Hadramawt we merged all these institutions into a single military institution to which we appointed commanders from the guerrilla personnel of the liberation army, including Khalid Baras, al-Hajj Salih Baqis and 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Atiq. They were personnel who had been with us. We handed the command over to them although they did not have military expertise, but they were combative fighting personnel and they had the capability to develop. We strengthened the conditions of the region. In fact we were the first region to manage to celebrate or greet the commemoration of the 14 October revolution before independence.

On 14 October, before independence, since we were a large isolated area, our situation was good, we had a system we had inherited, and there was a possibility for us to act through it, we had a government which had a budget, agencies and great resources. We managed to greet the anniversary of 14 October 1967 and greeted very great celebrations for which there are pictures and documentation which are in our possession. We also managed at the same time to establish a branch for the party school for scientific socialism. The comrade 'Abdallah al-Ashtal was a teacher in this school. We created a school for the first time, without a law. We told the command that this was an initiative on our part, brought progressive books, and sent the comrade 'Abdallah al-Ashtal to Lebanon. He managed to bring books from there whose price we paid as money from the region, and we opened a branch. Among the first people who studied in this school were 'Abdallah al-Bar, Salih Munsir al-Sayili and Sa'd Salim Faraj Aydarus. We brought them into the school in October 1967, before independence.

AL-AMAL: Was the al-Qu'ayti Sultanate overthrown in the context of the presence of the British forces which were present in al-Rayyan, or later?

Al-Bid: After the events occurred in these areas, the English withdrew from there and did not remain there. We conducted strikes against the military personnel, the British experts and advisors. As for the military force, there was no military force after the takeover of the region. After that, we took over al-Rayyan and on 2 October overthrew the al-Kathiri Sultanate. We finished the rest of the region, which was the al-Kathiri Sultanate, Say'un and Tiryam, basically, from within. The small force which was in al-Rayyan withdrew and did not remain, because it was not able to offer protection, especially when the other regions in the country started to be shaken.

Our conditions in the eastern region, which is the region of Hadramawt, were exceptional. We had inherited agencies, resources existed, and we had a

budget and personnel. We went to Aden and found that the conditions in the center, specifically our command, which was present in al-Kud in Zinjabar, had started to be in convulsion. We found that there was a view whose basis was that "we must reach an understanding with the Liberation [Front]" -- that is, in the direction of a retreat. That happened toward the end of the month of October. This hesitant position existed, and when we sat down with the leaders, we realized that we did not have resources. Al-Asnaj brought in millions and managed to strengthen his position. We told them, We have resources and we can strengthen you, but we want money. They said, Al-Asnaj brought in 3 million. We said, we will give you 6 million. We have greater resources than him, we have whole areas, and resources exist.

We indeed could. If you remember the comrade 'Abd-al-Qadir Amin, I gave him a paper and sent him to Hadramawt in a special airplane we had taken from there, and he brought 300,000 dinars, that is, 6 million shillings. At that time there was a great need, and 'Abd-al-Qadir Amin is alive and living. Sayf al-Dali'i was the financial official, and he said, I do not have 10 shillings. We told him, here are 6 million shillings.

I sat down with the comrade Sultan Ahmad 'Umar and Muhsin in al-Khassaf in Aden, and we agreed that we had to continue the issues we had agreed on and the dissolution of the command we had agreed on in Abyan, "the position on the Liberation Front."

We actually could. We had money. We gave them 100,000 shillings, as I remember, when Muhsin and Sultan were present, so that we could start to get some resources, ammunition, from them and maintain our position. I consider the region constituted support here when our conditions in Aden started to be somewhat shaken; the eastern region constituted support for the comrades in circumstances in which they faced pressure from the Liberation Front in the western regions.

After that, the second civil struggle occurred between the National Front and the Liberation Front, on 6 November 1967, and it was the decisive one. The last battle was in al-Mansurah. After that, the National Front managed to take control of situations here in Aden. On 6 November the situation was totally resolved in the National Front's favor, and in the last one the army stood alongside the National Front.

AL-AMAL: The conversation now has passed through three elements which we had raised which were related to the option of overthrowing the regions, then some reminiscences. Of course, these issues came together at a climax, as you pointed out, but how do you yourselves evaluate the preparations for this climax?

Al-Bid: We actually have distanced ourselves a certain amount from this period; more than two decades of time have elapsed since the revolution in this period, until the regions were overthrown and liberated.

The revolution faced many difficulties, relapses and fiascos and managed to transcend them. However, we always and permanently say that we triumphed over the revolution's predicaments or when we reached a bottleneck we always

triumphed when we went back to the authorities, collective opinions and reliance on the masses. Whenever we faced difficulties, we had a way out. The organization was the first and last point of reference, and although there were people in the organization who had some principles which were considered indifferent, nonetheless at their time they were of service, in the days of the movement, for example, the Arab Nationalist Movement, which was one of the organizations which entered the National Front in a basic capacity.

One of the principles of the movement was "execute then debate." At that time, this principle had meaning. Execution was carried out in decisive form regarding anything that came from the command and later if there were mistakes, it would be possible to eliminate them and criticize them.

That served us in a specific circumstance. That does not mean that it was valid in every time and place, but there was a readiness on people's part to sacrifice, decide and execute firmly, regardless of any point of view on anyone's part. The other thing is that finally we were accustomed to collective views, and these personalities did not become very prominent except during the final period. Rather, earlier, people were dominated by the collective view. It was our nature, as people fighting underground who did not want noise, that is, on the basis of the psychology of people in secret activity who had no love for prominence and display and always avoided the limelight -- that dominated the collective spirit and the individual spirit was not strong enough to constitute a problem.

We always went back to the authorities, to the organization at the time, and would have the collective opinion predominate in regard to everything. We always kept strong relations with the masses regarding all our issues and relied on them greatly.

Readiness to sacrifice exists among the people, but when the vanguard starts to help it, first of all, in the sense that when the vanguard is in the forefront, the masses will follow it, and when the vanguard retreats they will retreat further with it. If you go forward one inch, they will advance 2 inches after you. When you go back an inch, they will go back 2 inches. You must understand how to advance and retreat. The vanguard always has a great effect in intervening in circumstances and hastening the process of causing circumstances to ripen and the process of development itself. The more we can represent this vanguard position which is persuasive to the masses, that is, in words and practice, our activities and practices will be all the much stronger than our words. However, that is not to derogate the theoretical position at all. Rather, this power, the power of behavior, affects people, and it had a great effect on the masses. The people must have conviction in your behavior, and the strength of behavior of course starts from the proper ideas and issues you present theoretically. However, the thing that embodies it, the material, is the power of tangible, material, practical daily behavior, positions on issues, conduct, sacrifice. What you offer on a daily basis is the thing that convinces people. The power of behavior always was a model with the vanguard. It thus managed to rally the masses around itself extensively. The more we in the Yemeni Socialist Party, which is the legitimate heir of the Yemeni national movement and the

fighting heritage of our entire people -- the more we can represent some of these practices and values, the better it will be.

Of course, the circumstances are different now and the nature of the complexities is different. At that time there was a colonialist foreigner and people were against him, but today there are other things. However, our treatment of contradictions must assume a unified position and we must distinguish between what is basic and what is secondary in dealing with issues. What is secondary must remain secondary and what is basic must ultimately prevail in the decisive position in dealing with problems. However, we need to give our generation, our children and our young brothers everything we have. When we were in the revolution we did not have resources, but we had a readiness to make sacrifices, exert efforts and give. Now, everything even a mass march to go out to Abyan, that is, people want something for everything.

There was a time people would bring themselves, their resources, their effort and their sweat and take part. Why has this not been the case while it is now their authority and working for their interests and all that there is is basically in the service of the toiling people?

That is, there was a time citizens would fight with nothing in their hands. Now the power is in their hands, the power of the toiling people, and we say that it is working for the sake of realizing the interests of the toiling people. However, why isn't the situation, that is, more advanced than what was the case in the past? We must review the methods and forms of our activity with the masses. We must exert effort with the coming generation, the children, so that they can understand exactly, that is, how the revolution came. It did not come like that, from fate. When the revolution started they laughed at us. They said now what is your ability to remove colonialism from the biggest colonial base in the Middle East, which exists in Aden? Some people laughed and called us dervishes. However, there was the potential for change within them, and after the revolution went on it started to have the presence of a myth among the people. They would view the guerrillas as a myth after the activities of resisting colonialism by getting rid of it through their fighting which they had sensed in them. After that people started to look in wonderment, from an ambivalent position to a position of wonderment and one which was exaggerated. That is, these people would tell you, these guerrillas have been turned into "goats" to pass into the centers and the hand grenades had been turned into apples so that they could pass them through. That is, look at the exaggeration among the people when they started to be amazed at the role of the fighting men in resisting colonialism by offering themselves for sacrifice to a point where they said that no one could catch the guerrillas.

Of course, this talk about the guerrillas is not correct. What is correct is that we would enter the centers through our agencies. That is, we had people in the military and civilian agencies who were officials in the regime, and we would pass the checkpoints with Arab officers who belonged to the old authorities but were with us in the organization, and we would pass through the checkpoints with them and on top of that would receive greetings, but for the officer while you were passing with him. The citizens exaggerate and

say, how can these people go in with their grenades, in spite of the inspection and the guards? How can they come in?

I say that we now have to tell this generation of ours how it happened. There are things one can talk about for hours, and not just on this occasion, that is, how the revolution began, what the resources were, where they came from and how a readiness for sacrifice existed.

We can tell tales of suffering. They can be told to small children in the schools. People have gone abroad and there are young people 20 to 25 years old who do not know about the revolution. When it is written sometimes it is written in a theoretical form, concerning issues which were exaggerated and do not touch people.

We must touch upon the facts and tell stories, how, for example, a comrade met death in battle, how the resistance took place in a specific operation, how for example the masses took part with us, how people hid the guerrillas, how citizens cooperated with us, hiding and feeding us, that is, an operation would take place and you would come out of it then enter the nearest home for shelter, in the midst of the people, who welcomed you and gave you clothes.

Even independence day, the papers wrote that these people went out with their clothes in tatters, and nothing in their possession, and that was true. There was nothing in our possession. We lived on half a shilling's worth of beans, in a cafe in Shaykh 'Uthman, but we believed in a cause and were convinced that we had to offer this sacrifice so that the revolution could triumph. We were convinced that these people had the readiness to offer sacrifice and if people understood and grasped many of the manifestations of tyranny and arbitrary rule, there was a possibility that they would form a great material force to support the revolution.

I consider that we have to seek the aid of this generation and explain to them what happened. Now some interviews with fighting men have been collected and they exist, in an attempt to write the history of the revolution, but we must feel even small issues in every incident in the events, how a comrade met his death in battle, how 'Abbud died, 'Abbas, and Mudrim.

Or, for example, how an operation took place in a specific place. How the regions were overthrown. We have now been talking in general terms, but what happened when the regions were overthrown? What were the events? Fighting took place there and there were martyrs and there were vexations -- how were the resources? Also, how was the people's readiness to make sacrifices?

I remember when we went to bring people from Lawdar and take them to certain areas, to Lahij, the cars could not accommodate some citizens and they stayed with us. Some of them were adults with their weapons, their rifles, and they cried. Why? They wanted to come with us and did not get a place, and were not able to force us, but they cried out of sorrow, though they were adults, because they wanted to fight.

When someone explains these things to people, they must know that they actually happened to these people. This means that the people have the

readiness to make this sort of sacrifice, and more. Conversely, now, as far as their issues and their interests go, I say, they have greater readiness than before. We must now classify the methods and forms of our activity with the people and our ability to explain issues to the people and draw them into their class causes and interests. We came to govern and we have passed through this period, but now we face the real test, which is how, that is, now we are present in power, and how can we realize the interests of the toiling people through our presence in power? Are we really using power in a good way now? Are we realizing the interests of the toiling people, the workers and their allies in the form of the peasants and the other toiling groups of the people?

Today you have power, and yesterday you were on the street. You must now while you in power make every effort in your power and exert all the facilities and resources you have that you can. By virtue of your presence in power, you must offer the people something better.

These are truly the masses which gave sacrifices, offered martyrs and expressed these positions in a manner by which we were affected, and we must now be faithful and return this favor to the masses by offering everything that will have the effect of improving their living, showing concern for their interests, strengthening the national democratic regime in our country and carrying out the tasks to come.

Of course these days we are talking about the results of the activities of the Yemeni Socialist Party's third general conference. This conference indeed constituted a success and replied to all the counterrevolution's slanders and rumors. However, what is required now is that we actually initiate practical measures on what the conference produced in its documents, whether in the political report, the document on trends in the third 5-year plan, which is considered the party's second program, or the other resolutions of the conference.

We now indeed have to embark on tangible practical measures. I believe that the party command and the government of the revolution are now preparing for this task, and inserting it in the various plans of the party and the plans of government bodies and local authorities so that we will be able to embark on the pursuit of these tasks in a tangible way.

The country is witnessing extensive activities and a penetration down into the party organizations and the agencies of the central and local authorities, so that we can carry out the conference resolutions and its tasks in the coming years. The main task which faces us now is to begin to put out the plan for next year, 1986, in the third 5-year plan. This is indeed to be considered an urgent task.

On the other hand, we must exert concentrated effort in ideological activity and educational activity in the ranks of the party in a manner which will enable us to strengthen the unity of the Yemeni Socialist Party. I believe that all conspiracies and allegations will be dashed against the steel unity of the party.

I believe that there is a great potential for realizing this goal in the party. We must continue our struggle and the people must embark on the tangible practical tasks which will strengthen this unity and take place through the daily struggle of the tasks to come. I am confident that time will prove that our party, no matter what the difficulties that face it might be, has sufficient immunity to transcend all the difficulties and continue the struggle on behalf of the coming tasks.

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CSO: 4404/207

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

EXILE PAPER REPORTS ON EARLY PHASES OF ADEN FIGHTING

Events in Aden Detailed

Cairo AL-AMAL in Arabic 19 Jan 86 pp 1-3

[Text] Last Monday morning, 13 January 1986, Radio Aden interrupted its regularly scheduled program to broadcast a communique issued by the Politburo of the YSP, the ruling communist party of the country. The communique said that an abortive attempt to overthrow the regime had taken place and an attempt had been made against the life of Yemeni President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad by Yemeni and imperialist elements. The communique also said that the leaders of the abortive attempt had been summarily tried, convicted, and executed. These leaders were:

1. 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il: Former president, member of the Politburo, and member of the Central Committee of the ruling communist party.
2. 'Ali Ahmad Nasir 'Antar: Deputy chairman of the Supreme People's Council, member of the Politburo, and member of the Central Committee of the YSP.
3. 'Ali Salim al-Bayd: Deputy prime minister, minister of local government, member of the Politburo, and member of the Central Committee of the YSP.
4. 'Ali Hadi Shayi'

Thereafter, Radio Aden began broadcasting music and reporting from time to time news of the conspiracy and the execution of sentences against the perpetrators.

The country and the outside world were thus informed of the outbreak of the struggle between the factions and of serious events taking place in the country.

News agencies raced to report on events in South Yemen, saying that a severe and serious schism had occurred in South Yemen between rival party factions.

Thereafter, news began pouring in. News about South Yemen dominated most world news broadcasts. News agencies began racing to obtain more news about Aden and about what was happening there, especially after Radio Aden went off the air when it was hit during the fighting around the radio station. Contacts between Aden and the outside world were cut off and Aden became completely isolated.

Only hours after the government communique had been issued in Aden, a real war broke out between pro- and anti-'Ali Nasir forces in the army. Suddenly the state and the army were transformed into tribes and clans engaging in the worse kind of power struggle while they seemed to say "power above party, principle, and ideology, and my brother and I against my cousin and my cousin and I against the stranger."

The government was split. The party was split. The party was split into two factions and the government disappeared from the scene. The army turned into two armies fighting in the streets, on the roofs, and from door to door, each group extending to spread its control over as large a piece of land as possible in preparation for seizing power.

Rockets, tanks, guns--machine guns roared everywhere and from anywhere. The sky was on fire and the ground was on fire. Fires raged everywhere while everyone was trying to take control of this or that building. Battles grew more fierce and casualties began piling up.

Naval and Air Forces

The navy split at the beginning of the struggle, but this schism was settled in favor of President 'Ali Nasir. As for the air force, it sided with the anti-regime elements. The navy supported 'Ali Nasir and the air force supported Salih Muslih. It is common knowledge that most air force elements belong to the 'Ali 'Antar and Salih Muslih groups. Thus the armed forces suffered a general split and the sound of arms became the only criterion for establishing one's presence.

Fighting between warring forces has been raging since last Monday in the streets and around strategic areas each side has occupied. It looks like the wrangling and fighting will go on for a long time.

The question is:

What is the truth in all that has happened?

Was there in fact a conspiracy against the president to overthrow his regime and assassinate him?

And are the elements imperialist rightists as described by a communique issued by the YSP's Politburo?

And did this struggle have deep roots or did it erupt suddenly?

Ever since 'Ali Nasir rose to power in South Yemen, he and his vice president, 'Ali 'Antar, have been at odds. At times their disagreement reached the point of plots and machinations and, at other times, it faded into the background.

The first public dispute between them occurred when 'Ali Nasir tried to introduce a ministerial amendment to oust 'Ali 'Antar from the defense ministry, which he had headed for 5 years. 'Ali 'Antar refused to leave and 'Ali Nasir was unable to name a successor. Finally, the two worked out a compromise calling on 'Ali 'Antar to quit his post, providing that he be succeeded by a close associate, Salih Muslih, who still holds the post of defense minister.

'Ali 'Antar had long claimed the position of prime minister, thus aggravating the conflict between them. As a result, 'Ali 'Antar demanded the return of 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il from exile in the Soviet Union to resume his party and government activities, notwithstanding the fact that the former was the one who had championed the cause of removing the latter from the premiership and sending him into exile in the Soviet Union.

Upon his return, 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il entered into a strong alliance with 'Antar and his wing against 'Ali Nasir. 'Ali 'Antar represented a tribal and military force while 'Abd-al-Fattah was a seasoned politician and party ideologue.

Last Monday, 13 January 1986, 'Ali 'Antar demanded the resignation of the cabinet, as is the norm after the general party conference, and the formation of a new government after the conclusion of the conference. However, this matter continued to be put off.

'Ali Nasir, however, refused to dismiss the cabinet, which was headed by one of his men, Haydar Abu Bakr al-'Attas, who enjoyed Hadramawti support and who could help 'Ali Nasir draw Hadramawti capital into the country and, at the same time, was acceptable to the countries of the region.

How Did the Situation Explode?

Some sources reported that on Monday morning, 13 January 1986, the Politburo held meetings which were attended by a number of Central Committee members. However, Brig Gen Salih Muslih, by agreement with 'Ali 'Antar, did not attend. These sources said that during the new cabinet debates, a heated argument developed to the point of disagreement, indignation, and provocation. 'Ali 'Antar drew his gun and fired three shots at 'Ali Nasir who fell in a pool of blood after being hit in the chest. This prompted 'Ali Nasir supporters to fire at 'Ali 'Antar inside the meeting hall, killing him instantly. Indiscriminate firing then ensued.

The special guards who had stormed the hall took part in the shooting which claimed a large number of victims on both sides, including 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il, 'Ali Salim al-Bayd, and 'Ali Hadi Shayi', plus three others from the Politburo and the Central Committee. Sources said that 'Ali Nasir was taken to the military hospital on a stretcher, bleeding profusely. The others were taken to the military hospital on Hayl Mountain in al-Tawahi.

The dead were transported in a military vehicle to the hospital as well. These sources said that another Politburo member died Wednesday morning in the hospital after doctors failed to save his life because a bullet was lodged in his brain.

This is what happened Monday morning, according to the sources. It refutes the theory of an attempted military coup or a plot against 'Ali Nasir.

News about 'Ali 'Antar's death and the massacre spread instantly among the armed forces and the party, and the struggle for power and control of the situation began. Pro-'Ali 'Antar forces moved under the leadership of Defense Minister Salih Muslih to take over the radio station, the general intelligence building, the presidential palace, and al-Tawahi Port. Fierce fighting, with all kinds of weapons, broke out between the two sides and navy and army personnel joined the battle either on the side of or against the regime.

Sources say that Brig Gen Salih Muslih took over the Aden Hotel, which is located at a major intersection leading to the First Governorate. He also took control of the Mount Hadid areas, where major arms and munition depots are located, the al-'Ubayd Island area, and Caltex area, the front parts of the Mukassar Bay area, and al-Mu'alla City. In addition, he tightened his grip on the pro-'Ali Nasir forces in al-Tawahi, considered to be the most important district in the capital because that is where the defense ministry, the presidential palace, the general intelligence building, and the country's most important port, the main outlet to the sea, are located. Al-Tawahi witnessed fierce land, sea, and air battles. Tanks, heavy artillery, and rockets were the key to the fighting and inflicted total ruin.

On the other hand, Brig Gen Salih Muslih tried to occupy Aden International Airport by advancing his forces toward the airport area where fierce battles raged between the two sides. The Muslih forces' march on the airport was halted when a group of aircraft bombarded the advancing troops. The march on the presidential palace was also halted when these forces came under heavy air bombardment.

Soviet Position

Sources close to the scene said that, although the Soviets were surprised by the eruption of hostilities between party and government forces in

Democratic Yemen, they did not intervene during the first 2 days of fighting, nor did they declare their position publicly, out of their belief that the followers of 'Ali Nasir would be able to control the situation in al-Tawahi, the country's major city. But the Soviets shifted position, according to these sources, when the defense minister succeeded in seizing large quantities of weapons and materiel from the depots in the Mount Hadid area, quickly settling the situation in his favor in some camps such as al-'Ind Camp, where pro-Nasir elements were quickly liquidated, and spreading his control over the whole northern region with its important camps such as al-Jabaylin and al-'Ind, Bir Nasir Airport, and Bir Ahmad Airport, which fell under his complete control. Following these developments, the Soviet Union hastened to adopt a pro-'Ali Nasir public stand and lent limited support to the pro-'Ali Nasir forces.

Aircraft flown by Soviet pilots bombed troops marching on the presidential palace to halt their advance and also shelled those forces that were attempting to take control of the airport, thus halting the advance of anti-'Ali Nasir elements at the two axes and forcing them to pull back to the outskirts of Mukassar Bay City with a view to easing the pressure on the 'Ali Nasir elements and creating a kind of military balance between the warring forces in order to contain the situation and find a reasonable and acceptable solution, according to these sources.

On another front, the Soviet Union moved a large quantity of weapons and munitions from Ethiopia to South Yemen by sea for delivery to Muhammad 'Ali Ahmad, governor of the Third Governorate, who commands the pro-'Ali Nasir troops.

High-level Casualties

Cairo AL-AMAL in Arabic 19 Jan 86 p 1

[Text] Some reports said that 'Ali 'Antar, deputy chairman of the Supreme People's Council, fired three shots at the president in Aden, hitting him right in the chest. The president keeled over the meeting table, thus prompting the followers of 'Ali Nasir Muhammad to open fire inside the meeting hall at 'Ali 'Antar, who was killed instantly. Subsequent indiscriminate firing inside the meeting hall at the YSP's Central Committee meeting led to the killing or wounding of a large number of people, including 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il, 'Ali Salim al-Bayd, and 'Ali Hadi Shayi', who lost their lives. These sources say that the wounded were transferred to the armed forces hospital in al-Tawahi region in Hayl Mountain and that a number of them were in critical condition.

As for the dead, they were transported in an army vehicle to the hospital as well.

Tribes Move Toward Aden

Cairo AL-AMAL in Arabic 19 Jan 86 p 1

[Text] Some reports said that as of last Tuesday morning, pro-'Ali 'Antar tribal elements began rushing to the First Governorate from Radfan, al-Dali', al-Shu'ayb, and other areas to lend their support to anti-regime forces. These sources say that tribal troops, carrying machineguns at the behest of the anti-regime elements, were held outside the First Governorate and that a small number of them had been taking part in the fighting in the city of Aden only since last Thursday.

Limited Soviet Intervention

Cairo AL-AMAL in Arabic 19 Jan 86 p 1

[Text] Some reports from Aden said that Soviet troops took part in the fighting alongside the pro-'Ali Nasir forces in al-Tawahi, thus easing some of the pressure brought about by forces loyal to Defense Minister Salih Muslih as a result of the victories they had scored in al-Tawahi before marching on the presidential palace. Furthermore, a number of aircraft flown by Soviet pilots took part in the fighting at the time of the Salih Muslih forces' advance on the presidential palace and the occupation of Aden Port. Soviet pilots also bombed anti-'Ali Nasir troops who were continuing their advance to occupy the Aden airport, thus creating a kind of military balance in the First Governorate and preventing the fall of Aden airport, al-Tawahi Port, and the presidential palace into the hands of anti-'Ali Nasir elements.

Soviets Guard Presidential Palace

Cairo AL-AMAL in Arabic 19 Jan 86 p 1

[Text] Well-informed sources in Aden reported that the presidential palace in al-Tawahi was being guarded by Soviet troops who surrounded the palace and took control of all palace gates. Soviet troops also took charge of the military hospital in al-Tawahi where a large number of casualties were taken following the exchange of fire between rival wings in Aden, thus sparking an all-out war between the two factions. Fighting is still raging at this moment.

Soviet Arms Support

Cairo AL-AMAL in Arabic 19 Jan 86 p 3

[Text] Some information from Aden indicates that the Soviet Union has transferred military materiel by sea to Governorate I for the benefit of the forces of Muhammad 'Ali Ahmad, who is leading the forces supporting the regime of 'Ali Nasir. This information added that what pushed the Soviets to transfer the weapons to the 'Ali Nasir wing was the ability of

the former defense minister to take possession of the arms and ammunition arsenal at Jabal Hadid. He also took control of a number of arms depots in Governorate I and in army camps in Governorate II.

Sons of the South Statement

Cairo AL-AMAL in Arabic 19 Jan 86 p 4

[Text] The League of the Sons of the South issued an important communique on the current struggle for power in South Yemen between the ruling factions. The communique said that the league had sent a message to government leaders in Aden when the crisis between them intensified and almost erupted in June 1985. Due to the importance of this communique and message, we have decided to publish the full text, as follows:

Monday morning, the 4th day of Jamadi al-Awwal 1406 (13 January 1986), we received news of the outbreak of fierce fighting among Aden's rulers. We are neither surprised nor astonished by what we heard for it is but another episode in a long series of struggles for power which is bound to continue unless justice is restored and the situation is restored to normal.

We had been expecting this turn of events since the eve of independence in November 1967 when, in a written statement, we expressed the opinion that such a hodgepodge of conflicting and incompatible ruling bands was headed, sooner or later, for a fierce struggle. The only thing that brought such a mixture together was a desire to dominate, a spirit of opportunism, and a lust for power. They embraced communism as an ideology and socialist internationalism as a doctrine to attain power with the help of alien forces, for they could not find one Arab country or force willing to support them. They had excluded themselves from an Arab, Islamic, and national consensus.

The league believes that past and present events do not serve the interests of South Yemen or its proud Muslim Arab people. Indeed, such events sanctify tribal struggle, which no shallow slogan has been able to obliterate or overcome, or indeed, reaffirm, beyond any doubt, that the concepts on which government leaders claim to have founded their rule are nothing but phony principles and a piece of flowing apparel specially imported to cover the corrupt regime's deficiency and that personal and tribal ambitions and upstart opportunism are the underlying essence of all such hollow slogans and imported principles.

The league, through its nationalist perception and total devotion to the people of the south, sensed that something like this was imminent, so it decided, out of a sense of responsibility to the people of the south, to alert the Aden rulers to the errors of their ways and warn them of the dangers such an autocratic course can pose. It attempted to open their eyes to the necessity of going back to the South Yemeni people, who alone have the legal right to their country and to self-determination and to choose freely and willingly their rulers, not by force, coercion, and

intimidation but rather through the ability to exercise their fundamental rights to democracy and basic freedoms and to reaffirm their Arab affiliation and adherence to their noble Islamic beliefs. The regime cannot thrive unless these principles are upheld and opposing views are respected for the country belongs to everyone. For this and other reasons, the league, on 20 May 1985, sent messages to the leaders of the warring parties in Aden reminding them of and cautioning them against the consequences of persisting in denying the South Yemeni people their basic rights and in adhering to their philosophy of rule which the least that can be said about it is that it is coercive and suppressive and herds people like livestock.

Proper rule in a country like South Yemen can only be achieved through choice and consent through free elections and not by force, repression, and treacherous bullets in the dark of night. The age of conspiracies and coups against the people is over and the Arab nation has awakened from its slumber, abandoning such tactics which have brought upon it nothing but defeat, ruin, and disaster.

We refrained from publishing these messages at the time because our intention was not to show off or engage in propaganda or blackmail, and because we did not want the rulers of Aden to feel any embarrassment in contemplating their content or accepting our appeals.

But their eyes were covered and they were blinded. They are blinded now as they were blinded in the past. They did not learn from the fate of their leaders before them and of their kind everywhere. No idol has been able to survive and no tyrant has been able to rise. God Almighty gives respite but does not fail to notice, and the eyes of the people are forever open.

One of the two parties unleashed the fighting despite our warnings to each of them. Blood is being shed between them, including the blood of our innocent people, just as the blood of their leaders was shed in the past and just as they had spilled the pure blood of honorable people, simple, innocent, and silent people, thus proving the maxims: "As you judge, you shall be judged"; "give tidings to the murderers that in due time, they will be killed"; and "those who do wrong will come to know by what a great reverse they will be overturned."

Oh God, we do not rejoice in the misfortune of your infidel mortal enemies who deny Your grace and attack Your creation, those who have and will continue to go down in the dunghill of history. This is a South Yemeni internal affair and any foreign intervention is bound to fuel the fire and will be rejected and resisted by the South Yemeni people.

Regardless of the outcome of this bloody struggle between the rival factions, the time has come to bring all the heedless, deluded, infatuated tyrants, who are still in power in Aden, to their senses so that they may follow the right path and pursue the right course for restoring justice

to the South Yemeni people who alone have the right to choose their rulers entirely of their own free will. It is also time for the Yemeni exiles, deportees, and refugees to return to their country to lead a safe and comfortable life as equal partners now and in the future, partners in destiny. O God, help us attain this goal. "The sequel is for those who do their duty" and woe unto the evildoers.

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AFGHANISTAN

EXPORT OF FRUITS INCREASES

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES In English 11 Dec 85 pp 1-2

[Text]

In view of the recent agreement between the Commerce Ministry of the DRA and the Commerce Ministry of India, signed in Kabul, it is considered to export fresh fruits at a value of 45 million Indian rupees through the Department of Afghan Vegetables Enterprise up to the end of the current Afghan year (begun March 21, 1985).

During the current year the enterprise has included in its plan to export 6,000 tons of pomegranates to the friendly country of the Soviet Union and 10,000 tons of pomegranates to India. The process of export is being continued.

Similarly, it is considered to export nearly 3,000 tons of citrus fruits and conserved olives to the Soviet Union and an amount of 200 tons of raisins to other countries of the world through the same enterprise.

This enterprise, under the present conditions, has imported chicken meat, butter, cheese and eggs from Holland and

Hungary and it supplies fresh vegetables and fruits from within the country. For instance, this enterprise has been able to provide over 26 per cent of chicken meat from inside the country on the basis of people's demand compared to the plan target.

The vegetables enterprise distributes 5-6 tons of chicken meat through its 30 stores in Kabul city every day to our compatriots at a price of Afs 140 per kilo. The low price of chicken meat at the present condition has a positive impact on the price stabilization of similar commodities, decreasing on the one hand, the price of mutton and beef in Kabul markets and, on the other hand, has increased the quantity of meat all over the country.

According to the future development plan of the enterprise which is being designed at the time being a large quantity of fruits and vegetables will

be provided inside the country and simultaneously distributed to our compatriots.

Likewise, with the establishment of a large poultry farm, considered in the future plan of the institution, the people's requirements, mainly meat and eggs, will be met from inside the country.

The General Manager of Afghan Vegetables Enterprise said this to a KNT correspondent.

He added: "The Enterprise which is functioning in the frame work of the Commerce Ministry of the DRA, maintains close connection with the Union of Agricultural Co-operatives and the Peasant Co-operative Union of the DRA in order to improve work of the enterprise. The enterprise is not only trying to seek appropriate markets to supply and sell the surplus commodities of the co-operatives but also provides further facilities to export the productions of peasants and gardeners.

AFGHANISTAN

VINE GROWERS BOOST YIELDS

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 14 Dec 85 p 1

[Text]

The yields of vine yards of Mirbachakoat district, Kabul province, on the one hand, help meet the needs of hard working gardeners of the region and on the other, help further development of the economy of the country.

Mirbachakoat district is located 30 kilometers north of Kabul and consists of 30 residential villages. The majority of their inhabitants are engaged in gardening and vine growing. The most abundant yields of the region are many sorts of grapes and raisins. Having realised the fact that their yields (grapes and raisins) from some of the most important export items of the country, the gardeners make incessant and indefatigable efforts to boost them. For example, sound competition among the gardeners of the region (to raise better vineyards and harvest better and higher yields) has now become a part of the traditions of the inhabitants of the region.

Likewise, the gardeners have set up peasantry,

agricultural and consumer cooperatives in their villages and towns to raise the quality, quantity and efficiency of their productions. At present, 380 gardeners of Mirbachakoat district have joined these co-operatives. The cooperatives provide the gardeners with favorable means and facilities such as chemical fertilizers, sulphur and pesticides against vine and other plant diseases.

Faqir Mohammad, one of the gardeners of Khwajagian of Mirbachakoat district in an interview with a KNT reporter said, I have been engaged in gardening for forty years and at present have two thousand vines. Thanks to my experience and skill in gardening, the inhabitants of the region have elected me the head of the agriculture and consumer cooperative of the residential area.

Prior to the April Revolution because of lack of cooperation of the state with the peasants and disorganized way of gardening we were not able to harvest more than 20 ki-

los of grapes from one vine. However, currently thanks to the cooperation of the state and improvement of organisational work by the unions and cooperatives we are able to obtain about fifty kilos of grapes from one vine.

'At present, the cooperative unions, on the one hand have created facilities for the gardeners to meet their primary needs and on the other hand, they assist them in marketing and sale of their surplus yields.

'In Mirbachakoat district, the elections of the people's deputies to the local jirgahs (councils) have taken place in a free and democratic atmosphere and the people have successfully elected their true representatives today, they solve most of their problems through consulting with their deputies.

'The youth of the district, in order to maintain peace, have formed revolutionary defenders groups and are always on the alert to safeguard their farms and lands. Likewise, literacy courses are being run in the villages and towns of the district in which a lot of inhabitants and gardeners are organised and engaged in learning to read and write.'

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AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

AGRICULTURAL SUPPORT SIGNED--Kabul, (BIA)--A protocol on technical co-operation aimed at material and technical support of agricultural sector in the country was concluded here on Thursday between the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reforms and the Sovkhoz Promexport Company of the Soviet Union. Under the protocol, two agricultural mechanised stations will be newly built with technical and economic assistance from the Soviet Union in Jalalabad and Khwaja Ghar districts of Takhar province, helping peasants as well as state farms to mechanise agricultural operations. Also 3,000 tons of anti-locust pesticide will be delivered during the current year by the Soviet Union as free aid to Afghanistan. Another contract was also signed between the authorities concerned on delivery of pesticides for raising the level of productivity in the area irrigated by Jalalabad irrigation complex. The contracts were signed by Abdul Ghafar Lakanwal, Minister of Agriculture and Land Reforms and Sayed Kinlov, assistant head of Sovkhoz Promexport Company of the Soviet Union in the presence of Sarwar Mangal, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and President of the State Planning Committee and Khailov, Deputy Chairman of the Soviet-Afghan Commission on Technical and Economic Co-operations. [Text] [Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 21 Dec 85 p 2] /9274

CSO: 4600/218

INDIA

VICE PRESIDENT CALLS FOR REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR ARMS

Calcutta THE TELEGRAPH in English 7 Jan 86 p 4

[Excerpts] New Delhi, 6 Jan (PTI)--The vice-president, Mr R. Venkataraman, today called for a moratorium on stockpiling of nuclear arms and militarisation of outer space.

Inaugurating the eighth Commonwealth Conference of Speakers and Presiding Officers here, Mr Venkataraman stressed the need for strengthening the Commonwealth in order to promote world peace and the parliamentary system of government.

Welcoming delegates from 26 Commonwealth countries and members of the Indian Parliament and ministers who attended the inaugural session at the Central Hall of Parliament House here, Mr Venkataraman emphasised the need for the Commonwealth to remain together in achieving the ideal of world unity and co-operation.

Pointing out that the Commonwealth presented the third largest group of nations in the world after the United Nations and the nonaligned movement, Mr Venkataraman said, "It is not easy to establish peace and harmony today in a world that is riven with conflicts and strife. And yet, the endeavour must go on ceaselessly for the peace and progress of humanity," he added.

In his speech, Mr Venkataraman emphasised the need for a determined endeavour to bridge the widening gap between the developed and the developing countries in providing basic necessities of life to the people, but expressed his unhappiness that the creations of science and technology were "posing a danger to life on our planet."

He said: "More than 50,000 nuclear warheads, capable of destroying mankind from the face of earth several times over, are stockpiled in the arsenals of the nuclear weapon states. The development of new weapon systems is bound to lead to a further escalation of the nuclear arms race and enhance the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war."

Stating that the global military expenditure has emerged as a major factor responsible for the structural malfunctioning of the world economy, Mr Venkataraman said, "We have, therefore, to urge upon the nuclear weapon states

to make every effort to reach an agreement on substantial reductions in their stockpiles of nuclear warheads."

Indian Electorate 'Mature'

"No person or party can take the Indian electorate for granted nor predict their behaviour," Mr Venkataraman said, adding that election results have "demonstrated unmistakably their (electorate's) ability to choose a government for themselves."

The elections have also proved the people's "maturity to call parties and governments to account at the time of each general election," he added. "This is a sign of maturity and wisdom," he said.

Mr Venkataraman told the conference that adult franchise has created amongst the people of India a renewed awareness of their right to shape their destiny. He said he was also proud that the country had retained and successfully worked the party system of elections and government.

He told them that India has not only the largest democracy, but also "one of the healthiest and most vibrant democracies in the world." Mr Venkataraman said Parliament was a growing and constantly evolving institution. As the ministers are responsible to Parliament, it is necessary that Parliament and its members remain responsible to the people. "And this accountability is continuous, concurrent and not merely periodical," he added.

In his 22-page address, Mr Venkataraman pointed out that another regrettable feature of our time was the practice by some states of racial discrimination, depriving human beings of their legitimate political and social rights.

'Colonial Era Over'

The sovereign states of Australia and Zimbabwe represented the "A to Z" of the process of dismantling of the British Empire over which the sun was not supposed to set, Mr Venkataraman said.

But this was now part of history, and today "nations widely different in history, culture and tradition, in size and economic status, stand knitted together as a brotherhood born out of our colonial past. Within the Commonwealth, there are a great many features in our political systems which make every one of our countries unique."

/9274

CSO: 5150/0063

IRAN

TURKISH ATTITUDE TOWARD IRAQ, TIES WITH ISRAEL CITED

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 1 Jan 86 p 11

[Interview with Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Özal, date and place not specified]

[Text] On the eve of the Turkish prime minister's trip to Iran, Iran's ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY held an exclusive interview with Mr. Turgut Özal, which was published, to the extent permitted by their internal conditions, by Tehran's morning and evening newspapers.

This long and voluminous interview with Mr. Özal, which took up more than 4,000 words on the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY telex, and through which the Iranian press allowed the Turkish prime minister to express his views without any abridgement in various economic and political areas, created a suitable propaganda opportunity for those traveling to Iran. Since the triumph of the revolution, this opportunity has never been given to the Islamic Republic of Iran and its officials by the official Turkish news agency ANATOLIA or that country's press (which adheres to the policies of the Turkish government without exception).

Some of Tehran's morning and evening Press, along with the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY, printed the entire unabridged text of the Turkish prime minister's remarks and even devoted some of their front page articles to this interview. In general, they treated the Turkish delegation's trip as an extraordinary event with unrealistic importance.

What was expected of press insiders in publishing this interview was appropriate and timely sensitivity to some of his remarks, which the press unfortunately did not display, or perhaps they deferred this to another time. In any case, it appears necessary to discuss some of his incorrect interpretations of economic and political issues, especially concerning the imposed war and the condemnation of the aggressor.

The most natural thing for the Islamic Republic of Iran to expect of its Muslim neighbors at the start of the Ba'thist Iraqi regime's aggression was not only not neutrality, but help in identifying and punishing the aggressor and applying pressure to the principal agents of disruption in the area. Sealing one's lips with silence and watching the oppressor on parade is not only unjust and non-neutral, but from the Islamic and revolutionary point of view of the Muslim people of Iran, there could even be other terms for it.

For the Muslim people of Iran it is not acceptable for the most logical humanitarian and international principles to be ignored, and for them to be asked to postpone identification of the aggressor until judgement day. If Turkey were invaded, would the trial of the aggressor be postponed to resurrection day? Did the people of Europe postpone punishment of the perpetrators of World War II to the next world?

On the other hand, it appears that Turkey is seeking to bolster its failing economy by expanding its commercial relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. It must not be forgotten, however, that Iran is not simply an unconditional market for the products of the owners of Turkish industry. It chooses the things it needs from the various items produced internationally. The expectation that Iran will buy Turkish products without accountability, that it will remove tariffs and open Iranian markets for the haphazard import of Turkish goods, as discussed by Mr. Turgut Özal, is unrealistic.

At the conclusion of this short introduction, we direct the attention of readers to ISLAMIC REPUBLIC NEWS AGENCY's interview with Mr Turgut Özal, the prime minister of Turkey. Due to the length of the interview (more than 4,000 words), it is not possible to print all of it. What follows is a summary.

[Question] Now that you are on your way to Islamic Iran, what issues will you discuss, and what are your expectations for this trip?

Özal: Of course Iran is at war. This war has been going on for about six years. We know the problems of the war. We were also involved in a long-term war for a number of years. These wars lasted from 1910 to 1933. We know the difficulties of war and the resultant problems, including the loss of manpower and the disturbances created. When we speak of extensive cooperation with Iran, we are naturally taking this into consideration, asking ourselves what work can be done and what are the existing resources. I also acknowledge that your most important current concern is the war. At the same time, Iran has had a great revolution, and basic changes have taken place in that country. They speak of revolution in many countries; they even use the name 'revolution' for non-revolutionary movements, but Iran's revolution is a revolution of all criteria. I can compare the situation in Iran before and after the revolution because I went to Tehran four or five times between 1967 and 1971 during the shah's period to participate in a conference for the RSD Planning Council as chief of the Turkish Planning Commission. There is no comparison between the Iran of that day and the Iran of today. Since 1978 Iran has seen great changes. For this reason, in spite of all of these things, we must make our relations logical and realistic. That is, with an understanding of your problem, there is the possibility of establishing relations and cooperation. Now let us see what work can be done under today's conditions.

Today commerce plays a big part, but my hopes, beyond today's conditions, are that steps will be taken to resolve more firmly the fundamental problems between the two countries, because extensive cooperation in the future will have greater credibility when it is strong and fundamental cooperation.

He then discussed areas of cooperation between Iran and Turkey. He said: One issue pertaining to Iran is the preservation of the oil and gas pipelines. I also raised this issue in 1982 during my trip to Iran. If it had been practical then, it could now be useful. The construction of an oil pipeline from Port Iskandarun to Iran was studied previously under the shah's government.

In the same connection there is the matter of natural gas. I know that Iran has the largest natural gas reserves in the Middle East, but this is also a long-range plan.

Continuing, he said: Within the framework of these resources, if we make it possible for reciprocal imports without customs levies or some small amount taken as customs, this will encourage investment in industry, like the measures taken previously by the European Common Market.

Özal discussed the economic position of the Islamic Republic of Iran. He said:

I cannot say anything now concerning Iran's economic position; one cannot speak on a issue without having information on the subject. Even so, according to information obtained, Iran is not facing many shortages. If this war had taken place in other countries it might have created bigger problems. It is apparent that with all these conditions the country is being managed well. Of course one hopes that the war will be ended and resolved, so that energy, manpower, and all resources can be used for the country's growth, human welfare, and a better life for people and the future. I think is the main problem. I also know about your oil export problems, and I know the problems pertaining to Khark Island. Despite all these things, however, Iran is exceeding expectations with very good activities to solve its problems, and circumstances show this.

Mr Özal then discussed the establishment of Turkish airlines and the renewal of flights by Turkish aircraft to Iran. He said:

I will personally fly to Iran on Turkish Airlines aircraft. We have also discussed this matter with the Iraqis, that is we have told them to keep passenger aircraft and the Tehran airport out of the war. What is their quarrel with passenger aircraft? If you have fighting to do elsewhere, in the ports, do so. I can say nothing concerning this. We told them to leave the airways open for the use of ourselves and others, but I cannot say what the result will be.

[Question] Turkey has clear positions on Cyprus, Bulgaria, and Afghanistan. Are these positions serious and clear only because Turkey is involved in these issues? Would Turkey still be neutral if the opposite situation existed in these countries?

Özal: Relations between governments are different from relations between people, because relations between people can be established with greater emphasis on rights, truth, and justice. Governments, however, must pursue issues with an eye to the future. For example, if the situation were reversed and Iran had attacked Iraq with Iraq on the defensive and today's conditions existed, Turkey would still be pursuing its current policy. The reason is that both countries are Turkey's neighbors. I personally may like one more than the other, but as long as neighborly relations are to continue between the countries, Turkey must accept the fact that it is the only country that shares borders with both countries. In my view the war is extremely damaging to both countries, but both countries have their own ways of thinking. I am not presently a judge, and I cannot say which one is right, but my greatest value would be to recommend peace as a go-between, if one or both sides should want me to be one, for this would be my most important role.

If I were take sides today I would lose my credibility with the other side. For this reason, although our own thoughts may be different, we must study the problem with a long-range view. With regard to our helping solve the problem, it is better if we do not sacrifice this chance. I have defended Iran in some foreign conferences. For example, at meetings of the DAVUS Western countries in Switzerland I defended Iran and talked about the establishment of the Iranian

government. I told them that Iran is not a government of mullahs, as they imagine. The officials are educated people who are aware of their problems. I said these things because we must definitely take justice into consideration in our relations with both countries, but I cannot now say on my own behalf that we are a court and you should come let us try you, you are a criminal, you must do this. Such relations are not possible between governments. At least relations between governments are not like relations between people. For this reason I say that the best role for Turkey to play is that of helper.

He continued: It is not a question of announcing that one of the sides is right. I believe, and I have said several times, that in the end God will settle accounts with the oppressor. To some extent this matter must be deferred to the day of judgement. Perhaps one must also await the passage of time. If Turkey were to tell one party that it was on their side and wanted to help them, there would then be bigger problems in the area. Other countries would also become involved and the problems would become more complex. This is why I say that the role we are playing is good. Our role is in the interest of both Iran and Iraq. If there are thoughts of peace, we can play a role, because there would then be people in both Iran and Iraq with confidence in us. When steps are to be taken towards peace, for whatever reason, you will also want a just mediator.

As I said at the beginning of my remarks, suppose the Iran-Iraq war were to end in some form today and a peace treaty were signed, I fear a problem, which I have also noted with regard to Iran: This may happen again in three years, because this war creates so much damage that it could lead to an even longer one. Perhaps in a few years, if one side had the opportunity, it would attack again. The important thing is that if peace is established it must be guaranteed. What is the solution to this? Can old enemies live side-by-side? Ultimately they must.

[Question] Don't you think that Turkey's relations with Israel, although they are at a low level, are an obstacle to the expansion of Turkey's relations with Islamic countries?

Özal: Turkey's relations with Israel have a long history. These relations were established before our government, but they were subsequently reduced. It must be acknowledged today that Israel is an issue in the Middle East with power behind it such as that of America. I do not mean only that America supports Israel; Israel itself has great effect in America. The primary issue is that we must acknowledge that we have relations with the two superpowers, America and the Soviet Union, and several factors have a bearing on these relations. In my view, today Turkey does not have much of a relationship with Israel, but it can be useful for these relations to continue. If you view these relations as a window, maintaining this window for use with events in the future will be useful. Today I see that they want talks. Perhaps it was also printed in your press that a Jewish representative met with me on my trip to America, but in some cases one must not avoid talking with human beings; if you do this and cut off relations, the situation will worsen, or at least it will not proceed along the lines you would like. I anticipate that Turkey will be able to play a role in solving the problems of the Middle East. Of course I am not speaking only of the Iran-Iraq war, but of all the problems of the Middle East. However, in order for Turkey to play this role, that window must be open; otherwise we would not have established new relations with Israel.

9310

CSO: 4640/178

IRAN

IDENTIFICATION, RENTING OF VACANT BUILDINGS DETAILED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 25 Nov 85 p 18

[Interview with Yusef Nowbakht, Chief Justice of the Tehran Arbitration Courts, date and place not specified]

[Text] In order to gain acquaintance with the accomplishments of the arbitration courts in connection with the rental of vacant houses and recent steps by these courts to resolve the student housing problem and the problems these courts have had with respect to their activities, Yusef Nowbakht, Chief Justice of the Tehran Arbitration Courts, was interviewed. The text follows below:

[Question] Please explain how vacant houses are being rented by the Tehran arbitration courts.

[Answer] According to Note Three, Article 14 of the Rental Act enacted by the respected Majlis, and its executive guidelines approved by the respected Supreme Judicial Council, if a property is habitable and vacant, and the owner refuses to rent without a good reason, it may be rented by court order. The purpose of this note is to persuade landowners to market and rent as much housing as possible at just prices, and to prevent monopolization and profiteering in the face of the daily increasing demand for housing.

[Question] What are the conditions for the issuance of a court order on this?

[Answer] (1) The property must be vacant, (2) It must be residential (3) The landlord must have no excuse for keeping the property vacant. (4) The applicant must be qualified (5) The property must fit the applicant in terms of size, quality, and ability to pay the rent, and the court will determine whether all of these qualifications are met.

[Question] What procedure will the court follow in investigating applications to rent vacant houses and issuing judgements?

[Answer] According to this law's executive guidelines, written applications must be sent by mail to the address of the Tehran Arbitration Court, and the application must indicate the place to be rented and provide particulars on the owner. After the application reaches the court's general office it will

be referred to one of the special branches for investigating housing rental applications. The court will make an on-site inspection to determine the truth or falsehood of the claim and the conditions. After it is assured that the property is vacant and suitable for habitation, the owner will be invited to submit a statement. If he does not respond within the specified period or if he fails to provide a good reason for keeping the property vacant, the court will have an expert set a rental price, and, if needed and if the applicant is qualified, it will then issue an order acting in behalf of the owner to rent the property to the applicant. If it determines that the owner's reason for keeping the property vacant is a good one, it will deny the applicant's request.

[Question] After an opinion is issued, can an appeal be made?

[Answer] Since the Supreme Judicial Council's special communique on this matter was issued only to arbitration courts, and other courts did not receive it, and in view of the exigencies and nature of the task, which must of necessity be done quickly, opinions issued concerning the rental of vacant houses cannot be revised or appealed in other courts such as the general courts. An appeal can be heard only in the same court where a verdict was issued in the event of a default judgement where evidence favoring the owner is discovered. Appeals have been heard in many cases where the previous verdict was upheld or overturned.

[Question] Has this law and the court's work to put more housing on the market been of effective assistance to housing applicants or not?

[Answer] As a positive fundamental step, although transitional and conciliatory, it has been effective. In other words, as long as the restrictions and conditions for ownership are not specified by law, and as long as Article 49 of the Constitution and the just distribution of goods are not put into practice, and the matter of emigration is not resolved, the problem of housing will not be solved at its roots with this law.

The working procedure used by the government to obtain bread at low prices in times of high prices and inflation can also be used for the problem of land and housing. Otherwise, a landlord with more than 50 housing units will go to court to evict tenants or raise rent; the law gives him this authorization and others are left without shelter. The note under discussion has been useful and effective as a quick short-term solution for those who have been given eviction orders and are left without shelter, especially since in this period the Tehran Arbitration Court has been able, with revolutionary legal opinions, to give rental housing to many oppressed people, and to move more than 3,000 students into various places serving as dormitories, on requests from universities. The students, who have passed university entrance examinations and admissions with much struggle and have mostly come to Tehran from the municipalities to study, were in a state of disarray concerning housing, and rightfully expected the government to find housing for them. It would be contrary to the ethical and cultural interest of the Islamic republic for these young men and women to be vagrant and without shelter in this big city, to be turned over to the real estate foundation to secure housing with their families in a state of anxiety. In finding student housing for these

students, the Tehran Arbitration Court has actually relieved the revolutionary government of a burden in time of war.

[Question] Have there been difficulties with the task of renting housing?

[Answer] To the same degree that the oppressed people and the dear students have been pleased and satisfied with this law and the work of the courts, a wave of protest has also been sparked from capitalists and unaware or self-interested people. After learning of these court measures, some landowners immediately returned to the country from abroad and began opposing this law and the judgements of the courts with various tricks and pretexts, trying to make the housing appear occupied by filling it with furnishings, claiming that the housing was not ready for occupation or under repair by cutting off the water, electricity, and gas or removing structural materials, and claiming that the building was built for business rather than residential purposes by presenting city permits, ignoring the fact that a business permit does not prevent the court, which has secular authority, from designating a building as residential. Some landowners have also used forged promissory notes and bills of sale. Here it is necessary to explain that some of these protests were justified. It is completely natural that of the hundreds of verdicts issued, mistakes have been made in a few cases, and if the court determines that the claims are correct and is satisfied that the landlord is right, it will reverse its decision and restore the property to its original status. These are exceptional cases, however. In the majority of cases the appeals are without justification. For example, a multi-level building in Shemiran which was empty for some time and whose owner was unwilling to sell it even for 420 million tomans, and which was also suitable for habitation, was rented by a branch of the Tehran Arbitration Court as a student dormitory to one of the government organizations at a monthly rate of 144,000 tomans. The landlord took extensive steps in his unjustified appeal to prevent the implementation of the court's decision, even contacting some of the respected representatives of the Majlis. I am sorry to say that one of the representatives was influenced by this landlord and summoned the judge issuing the verdict. Here it is necessary to explain that a complaint concerning the work of some of the respected Majlis representatives is not a denial of the Majlis' respectability and sanctity as the nation's highest organization, and it does not indicate a lack of respect and humility with regard to many of the esteemed representatives, especially the respected and thoughtful speaker. It was with this very belief that the judge issuing the opinion went to the respected Majlis to meet the two protesting representatives. There, he saw with complete surprise that the aforesaid building owner was sitting with one of the protesting Majlis representatives, and the respected representative, in the presence of the protesting capitalist, called the prosecuting judge to account for issuing this opinion. Of course the presence of an ordinary citizen at the Majlis, which is the home of the nation, is no cause for surprise or protest; but would it have been as easy for other citizens, such as the aforementioned students, to go to that place as quickly? Again, there is nothing wrong with a representative learning of a court decision, but there is no justification for a respected Majlis representative reprimanding a judge in the presence of the defendant for issuing a legal and revolutionary opinion. It would have been proper if the respected representative, instead of reprimanding the judge, had asked the landowner where he got a 420-million-

toman building. If there were anything improper in the judge's ruling, an appeals process is provided by law. Of course the opinion, which was based on an enactment by the respected Majlis, was implemented and the dear students, who are precious investments of this revolution, were saved from homelessness and vagrancy, and were given rental housing in that building.

9310

CSO: 4640/146

PAKISTAN

POLITICAL PARTIES URGED TO WORK FOR, NOT AGAINST DEMOCRACY

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 10 Jan 86 p 3

[Editorial] Hardly 8 days have passed since democracy was restored in the country, center and provincial governments and ministeries have not even formally started their work, Prime Minister Junejo's Muslim League parliamentary party has not yet been formally formed and he is still making efforts to that end, but the MRD's friends have already embarked on their obstructionist tactics. So long as the lifting of martial law had not been announced, so long as the decision to end the 20-year-old state of emergency and to restore fundamental rights had not been announced, the MRD leaders were all praise for the determination of Prime Minister Junejo and were saying that their prayers were with the prime minister. They called upon God to grant him success in the pious mission of lifting martial law by 31 December and were promising to congratulate him on accomplishing this great work. But, strangely enough, now that martial law has been lifted, the state of emergency is over, political freedom has been restored and, more important still, when the biggest party of the MRD, the Peoples Party of Pakistan, has been observing the anniversary of its beloved leader through the length and bredth of Pakistan and has been holding its meetings and spreading innuendoes in its peculiar style in towns and villages, now, at this juncture, the most popular leaders of this party have remembered that they neither accept the elections nor recognize the assemblies formed as a result of these elections, nor are they prepared to accept any other reality. In the words of veteran politician Mian Mahmood Ali Qasoori the late Bhutto, too, used to consider himself superior in every respect and above all criticism and he used to say that a Sindhi vadera has more intelligence than any Pakistani politician. According to Mr Qasoori, it is this mistake that first snuffed out his rule and later his life.

Mr Ghulam Mustapha Jatoi is a Pakistani politician who occupies a unique place in the politics of moderation and is respected by and acceptable to practically every segment of politics, like Abdul Wali Khan, a Khan of Frontier. General Ziaul Haq had been throwing him hints of prime ministership of Pakistan, and tales of their meetings and schemings have been on everyone's lips. The distance between him and the prime ministership was as small as between the cup and the lip in the English idiom. But nothing happened and things went wrong at the last moment.

Now in the MRD there is only one worthwhile and effective party, and Mr Jatoi is its leader. Even though he does not command the support of all groups of the party and, according to newspaper reports, did not receive a tumultuous welcome when he came to Lahore recently he is known for his moderation. In Punjab, he is considered a supporter of the Ghulam Mustapha Khar group. For the last few weeks we have been hearing reports that the Lion of Punjab is about to return to his beloved land. If the Lion of Punjab wants to play politics or wants to rule in Punjab, then clearly Mr Jatoi is once again dreaming of prime ministership and this is not possible without some sort of contact with the government or the powers to be.

The question is how long will our politicians keep on paving the way for martial law in time of democracy and fighting the battle of democracy in time of martial law. They demand elections and, when elections are held, they boycott them. When elections are held despite them, they announce that they cannot wait for 5 years and demand mid-term elections. In other words, they want to play politics on their own terms; otherwise, they won't permit anyone to play, even though it may lead to another period of martial law. And if martial law is imposed, then, in the words of retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan, who recently issued a voluntary gag on himself, they may well have to tackle a new martial law.

One fails to understand if our politicians will or will not permit our people to live in peace. Will they or will they not permit restoration and normal government so that Pakistan may also raise its head among the free nations and the Pakistani people may also savor the blessings of genuine freedom.

Pakistani politics is still in the grip of vaderas, tribal leaders and landlords. Occasionally, military generals come into power after a show of force. But they too remain dependent on bureaucracy and these elements. Now, with great difficulty, General Ziaul Haq has agreed to transfer power. Even though he has lifted martial law and ended the state of emergency, unlike a civilian president, he has not discarded his uniform. General opinion is that if politicians help him he might take off his uniform. Will the politicians in the Assembly and especially outside the Assembly help him to discard his uniform? Socialist revolution has reached our border and is knocking at our very door. Are our politicians prepared to read the writing on the wall?

12286/12913
CSO: 4656/42

PAKISTAN

MUSLIM LEAGUE MAKING TRANSITION TO RULING PARTY

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 18 Jan 86 p 3

[Editorial: "Muslim League Organization--Without Workers!"]

[Excerpt] Mr Iqbal Ahmad, federal minister of law and parliamentary affairs, announced that a new charter will be approved in the central council meeting of the Muslim League being held today in Islamabad. At the same time, new central officers will be elected and the new chairman of the party (Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo) will address the council later. This statement by the federal minister implies that a decision to transform the Muslim League into a ruling party has already been made.

This strategy has been chosen because it is "necessary." In support of this move it is being circulated that Muslim League members of elected assemblies (provincial and federal) will be the members of those councils. Also, as long as the Muslim League as a party is not reorganized, officers elected from legislative assemblies will run the party. This approach can be forced by necessity, but whatever form of Muslim League emerges as the result of this will just be called a parliamentary party. And as long as the cooperation of Muslim Leaguers who have kept their loyalty to the party through thick and thin is not obtained, it will not become a people's party. It will be called a ruling party because of the majority members belonging to it. However, at the popular front it will have to face new problems.

Plans to make the Muslim League the ruling party started when the "government parliamentary group" was established. Implementation of this plan, however, started only a day before (29 December 85) martial law was lifted when Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo was declared chairman of the Muslim League in a session of the government parliamentary group. It was announced later that a similar approach will be taken in provincial assemblies, with chief ministers in each province chairing their Muslim League groups. To this end the prime minister visited all provincial capitals. A large majority of provincial assembly members assured him of their cooperation. During this period so much progress has been made in this direction that 76 members of the Sind assembly (including all ministers) have filled out application forms for membership in the Muslim League, and chief minister Sayyed Ghaush Ali Shah has been appointed chairman. According to some newspaper reports Mr Shah thanked all Muslim League assembly members and promised to try his best to successfully carry out his dual responsibility. Similar ceremonies will be carried out in

the other three provinces and this phase of the Muslim League's (temporary) reorganization will be completed. The Muslim League, then, will achieve the position of the ruling party in the four provinces as well as at the center. This strategy for reorganizing the Muslim League appears to be simple and, in view of the need, very effective. This simplicity, however, will cause problems later. As ruling parties and with the cooperation of assembly members, the Republican Party and the Convention League had also established similar organizations. Both these parties existed only as long as they were in government because it is essential for all political parties to strengthen their roots among the people. The Muslim League is well respected. Most people have a high regard for Muslim League because it had the honor of establishing Pakistan. It lost the majority status in 1954 when it was defeated in provincial assembly elections in East Pakistan. It was all but obliterated in 1956 when the Republican party was established. However, people who had taken part in the Pakistan movement under the leadership of Quaid-e Azam and were rewarded with the establishment of Pakistan remained loyal to the Muslim League. Even some elected legislatures kept their membership in it. However, there was also a large number of people whose first and last love was the Muslim League. The Muslim League was almost their only reason for existence. There is apprehension and open complaint about the way the Muslim League is being reorganized now. People who were always faithful to this party are not being consulted or asked for cooperation. They are being totally ignored. All this is being done with the cooperation of assembly members who always make a beeline to the ruling party's offices.

We do not have to describe the anger and deprivation felt by old party officers by this neglect. The question whether Pir Sahib Pagara has yet resigned from chairmanship of the Muslim League party is also being raised. What will happen to Muslim League officers who are also members of provincial and national assemblies? And what about local office holders of the "defunct" Muslim League party if leadership at the local level is given to chairmen of local municipal committees and district councils? This question has already been raised in NWFP where the provincial chairman of the Muslim League is a cabinet member. If the chairmanship is given to the chief minister under the new system, the present chairman will have to accept party leadership by a person who was not even remotely connected with the party. Similar situations will arise in other provinces, districts and cities. This system, perhaps, will work within the assemblies. However, it will lead to factionalism and other problems outside the legislatures. If this practice continues even after the reorganization, Muslim League members will become complacent and the party will not be able to keep its promise of being with the people. A political party cannot win over other political parties without the help, cooperation and loyal support of party workers and volunteers. Political opponents are in such a mood that they used the United States' threat to Libya as an excuse to bring out processions!

7997/12913
CSO: 4656/43

PAKISTAN

COMMENTARY EXPRESSES CONCERN OVER DISTURBANCES IN SIND

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 21 Jan 86 p 4

[Article by Minhaj Barna]

[Text] Increasing concern is being expressed over the situation in the Sind province. Makhdoom Khaliquzzaman, Vice-President, PPP, who was released last week is the latest among those who drew the attention of all concerned towards the disturbed conditions in the province. Earlier, statements had been issued by politicians and public figures on various occasions, including Sardar Mohammad Khan Magsi (Awami Tehrik), Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, Syed Ghulam Mustafa Shah, Dr. Hamida Khuro, Iqbal Haider, and Shah Faridul Haq as well as by student organisations.

The most conspicuous of the abnormal features of the current scenario is the conflict among various sections of students belonging to different ethnic and ideological groups and organisations. Such conflicts flow, on the surface, from acquisitive trends, such as vying for more seats and admissions and control over hostels. Ostensibly, the acute lack of educational facilities and the multi ethnic character of the learning and teaching communities is one factor responsible for the complex plethora of frictions. Group chauvinism is another. Recently a number of left-oriented student organisations such as PSF, NSF and DSF accused the Jiye Sind Students Federation of being behind the violent attacks on them. They also alleged patronage of the JSSF by the authorities. The JSSF has, however, denied it. The recent clash between the supporters of Islam Jamiate Tulaba and the Punjabi Students Association at the Dow Medical College and later at the Karachi University campus adds a new dimension to the persistent and endless fratricidal frays.

Periodically, the Karachi University, the Sind Medical College, the Jamshoro University, the Larkana and Nawabshah Colleges have been the scene of violent clashes leading to closure of institutions for long periods. According to one survey, the teaching and examination arrangements are running at least one and a half to two years behind schedule. The worst incident occurred recently at the Larkana Railway Station where a fracas over a petty issue resulted in the death of three students from Zhob (Baluchistan).

In this incident the JSSF was again accused, but the Federation again denied it.

Conflicts

Who is fanning these conflicts is the pertinent question. And the question assumes significance when seen in the context of apparent apathy and inefficiency on the part of the authorities. It seems they do not have the will or the capacity or even the time to take note of the situation and adopt corrective measures.

But the students affairs is only part of the story. More alarming is the overall political situation. Sind is the only province where a considerable number of political leaders and activists are still languishing in jails, many of them without trial. Those who were convicted by military courts for political activities such as raising political slogans, etc., during the long years of Martial Law, are in addition. And their number is in hundreds if not in thousands. There is no earthly reason, for instance, for continued detention without trial of leaders like Rasool Bakhsh Palejo and Fazil Rahu. There is no rationality again behind the unending trial of Prof. Jamal Naqvi and Jam Saqi. After all what it is feared they will do that all the leftist elements of the three other provinces put together (who go about scotfree) cannot do? Staging military trials on charges of publishing some critical or even anti-government posters and pamphlets is as wasteful as a wild-goose chase signifying nothing except a fear complex on the part of those who indulge in this meaningless exercise. Few people know that the most inefficient of our services are those which spy on the activities of politicians. They more often than not make mountains out of molehills and thus distort the conclusions and evaluations for their superiors. And the superiors are no better than their juniors. Who does not know the way the comparative study of various political parties and their strength in the 1970 elections was conducted when these agencies predicted that Jamaat-i-Islami would win 40 percent of the seats in former East Pakistan?

The most unfortunate aspect of the Sind situation is the strange behaviour on the part of the law enforcing agencies, particularly in the interior of the province. Such statements that the Martial Law still rules over the province should not be taken lightly. These are not 'fantastic outbursts' of a frustrated gentry. The things that happened during the last eight-and-a-half years of military rule in Sind and the way the strong arm of Martial Law with its courts was used is an issue that should be fully grasped in depth. This is not to say that the military rule was not an agonising experience in other provinces of the country. But in Sind there is a feeling, right or wrong, that they were treated like aliens in their own province. Statements are now being issued demanding removal of cantonments and forces like the Frontier Constabulary from Sind.

Incident

One incident can give an idea of how events help develop an agitated mind. Only a few days back a "charwaha" was shot at and killed allegedly by a Constabulary man. The reported reason was that a goat was lifted by the latter and the "charwaha" went to protest and demand its return. All this in the backdrop of grievances that most of the fertile land of Sind is

allotted to and owned by the "settlers". Makhdoom Khaliqzaman said that even the labour for some factories and oil fields are brought from outside and jobs are not given to the locals. He raised a pertinent question: Why has some canal land in Punjab not been allotted to people from Sind and how many Sindhis have jobs in factories situated in that province?

While the past history cannot be changed the fact remains that the feelings of deprivation in Sind are rampant and each mishap adds to its intensity. It is time some Interior Minister visited the province to make an indepth study of the prevailing conditions at least for his own information if not for the benefit of the regime. For the regime appears to be more engrossed in affairs like setting up a Muslim League than dealing with the problems faced by the people.

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PAKISTAN

COMMENTARY VIEWS POLITICAL PARTIES ACT

Karachi DAWN in English 6 Feb 86 p 5

[Text]

SINCE the lifting of Martial Law, scarcely anything has caused more confusion than the shadows cast by the Political Parties Act. Repeated amendments have turned a once simple law into a formidable piece of legislation designed to tax the ingenuity of the cleverest lawyer. A consensus behind it might still have been worth something but, barring the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal, no opposition party worth the name has been able to swallow it. All they have agreed to is to submit their accounts to the Election Commission. But registration, which is the centrepiece of the Act, they have rejected out of hand. To put matters baldly, the Act as it presently stands requires the political parties to get an NOC from the Election Commission should they be interested in participating in any forthcoming elections. It also provides for the summary dissolution of any political party considered to be working against "the Islamic ideology or the sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan, or morality, or maintenance of public order." It is not hard to see that these grounds are capable of the

most flexible interpretation. It is perhaps not widely understood that the sweeping disqualifications for parliamentary candidates announced prior to the February 1985 elections are still in force. In order to lend credibility to those elections, these disqualifications were waived at the eleventh hour but not repealed. According to them, leading office-bearers of political parties not registered in 1979 are ineligible to contest elections for a period of seven years. As for the latest amendments which penalise floor-crossing and restrict the Election Commission from registering parties with similar names, they seem tailor-made to suit the requirements of the official Muslim League.

It should be clear that as long as the Election Commission is given blind authority in the matter of registration, and as long as the government of the day is empowered to ban a party it in effect does not like, the Political Parties Act will continue to draw fire as an instrument of blatant discrimination. As such it can only perpetuate the division and bitterness which characterised the long years of Martial Law. And if, as

a consequence of this, the Government is always trying to restrain the Opposition and the Opposition is perpetually trying to demonstrate its street power, how can anything be said with certainty about the long term stability of this system? It is all right to urge realism upon the political parties and to say that they must make use of whatever options are available. But if the options are narrow enough to be invisible, the political parties risk their credibility by accepting them. The law is indeed devised in such a manner that even if registration is granted now, it can be withdrawn, say, six months before the elections. What, then, do the political parties gain by going in for it now? If the Junejo Cabinet wants the opposition parties to eschew the path of confrontation and be on their best behaviour between now and 1990, it must provide them with the assurance that in the next elections they stand a reasonable chance of coming to power. That assurance can only be given by improving the Political Parties Act and removing all unnecessary restrictions from it.

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PAKISTAN

CHANCES TO REJOIN COMMONWEALTH SAID BRIGHT

Karachi DAWN in English 6 Feb 86 p 8

[Article by M. A. Mansuri]

[Text]

LONDON, Feb 5: Prospects of Pakistan's re-entry into the Commonwealth have brightened with more of its members assuring Pakistan of their support. The latest in the series is believed to be Canada whose Foreign Minister is said to have offered his country's support in an unambiguous language. His assurance is believed to have been conveyed to Pakistan authorities in reply to an unofficial inquiry.

Western diplomatic circles in London believe that a majority of the Commonwealth members were inclined to support Pakistan's reentry into the Commonwealth. In fact, India has been the only factor so far which has prevented the question from being raised formally at the Commonwealth meetings. However, Western diplomats

believe that the situation has now changed and India too can be neutralised.

They believe that the issue can be successfully raised at the next Commonwealth summit, to be held in the last quarter of 1987 at Vancouver. However, to raise the issue formally, the Pakistan Government will have to make a formal request. So far it has been discussed outside the conference but was never placed on its agenda.

Pakistan had walked out of the Commonwealth in 1973 as a protest when the British Government accorded recognition to the newly-emerged State of Bangladesh. But within a few years after that, the Pakistan Government began lobbying for readmission, which was blocked by the Indians.

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PAKISTAN

WALI KHAN TERMS CONDITIONS IN COUNTRY 'VIOLENT'

Karachi DAWN in English 6 Feb 86 p 8

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Feb 5: Khan Abdul Wali Khan, chief of the National Democratic Party, has appealed to people to form defence committees to protect their life and property in view of the violent condition prevailing in the country.

Addressing a news conference at Bilour House here this afternoon, he said the situation had been deliberately created by the Government whose functionaries were pursuing a policy of violence against people by encouraging the enemies of people to coerce the public into total submission to American interests in Pakistan, with special reference to the imperialists' obdurate approach to the Afghanistan issue.

Khan Abdul Wali Khan charged the Jamaat-i-Islami and its Amir, Mian Tufail Mohammad, with preparing a hit-list, to be taken care of by their "Millat Wing" on the pattern of Al-Shams and Al-Badar in the former East Pakistan where they massacred 250 Bengali intellectuals in a single night in 1971.

The Jamaat, under the patronage of the present Government which had liberally provided arms, received for the Afghan 'insurgents' from United States, to the JI combatants all over the country, was organising itself on the pattern on

Ikhwanul Muslimeen.

Wali Khan warned that the way the situation was deteriorating in the NWFP the province would soon become another Lebanon, and Peshawar yet another Beirut.

He said: "We want a change in the present set-up but only through politics and democratic means."

Taking strong exception to the Government's attempt to risk life and property of peaceful citizens by encouraging the rowdy elements in the Jammal through open supply of arms to them, Khan Abdul Wali Khan said the NWFP was not a Bengal where people had no defence other than sticks.

He appealed to people to start forming defence committees, and urged all peaceful and peace-loving political parties to take cognisance of the situation as it was a matter of safety of people.

Recalling recent events, Wali Khan said that while his party was not allowed to take out processions on the day of the NDP's recent public meeting at Peshawar, the Jamaat had been given fully freedom to organise processions in one of which recently the Afghan refugees were also encouraged to participate. He said it was a deliberate attempt on the part of the Government to involve the refugees "who otherwise are our brethren

both as Muslims and as Paktoons" in the country's politics.

"This is going to lead to very dangerous consequences," Wali Khan warned.

As regards the current situation on the border with Afghanistan, bombing and explosions, Wali Khan said they did not heed to the patriotic advice given to resolve the issue through negotiations. The net result was before everybody. Not only in the settled area of the province but also in the tribal belt hundreds of houses were pulled down and people made to run to Afghanistan.

Since there was no change in the policy of the Government, time would soon come when the people from the NWFP would also be escaping to Afghanistan in large numbers for their life and that of their children, Wali Khan said.

"This policy," he said, "is being pursued to protect the interest of the U.S."

Wali Khan also warned politicians that their expectation that a change would come through fresh elections was false as the present Government would not do so.

He said: "We will have to organise ourselves right now. If the Government wants to heat up the country's politics, it will find us prepared for it."

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PAKISTAN

IMPORT OF DAILY USE ITEMS DEPLORED

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 18 Jan 86 p 2

[Article by Zahid Malik in the column "Bainas Satur": "And Now Even Ginger and Onions!]

[Text] People used to be amazed at the abundance of expensive smuggled things such as clothes, perfume, watches, china, juicers and mixers in Bara Market near Peshawar. If a foreign-made item was seen in a household, the head of the family was always asked if he had bought it at Bara Market. During the last few years, because of the policy of live and let live practiced by the martial law government, such markets have opened in every city. Anything that is available in the United States, England, Japan and Hong Kong can be found in any city of Pakistan. Newspapers raised a hue and cry over this development, but the government left this issue in the hands of God. Sins do not go unpunished, you know. Smugglers will also be punished by God along with other sinners when they die.

Personally, I am bothered by the abundance of foreign luxury goods in the market. Even more perturbing is that I am seeing little things like sewing needles or thread also being foreign made. Even small things like pencils, erasers and sharpeners needed by school children appear to be made in other countries. Ballpoint pens and fountain pens are also imported. Can we not make these things ourselves? How can we become self-sufficient and be proud of being Pakistanis? How can we have a Pakistani mind when we eat and dress foreign?

After the negotiations with India's minister of trade, it was announced that relations between the two countries will become normal and mutual trade will be increased. I do not want to discuss the question of compromising with India on every issue in this column. I am worried why we have regressed so much that after importing wheat we are forced now to import ginger and onions. If we stay on this course, the day is not far when we will be forced to import drinking water also!

We are becoming a lazy society. Our habits are not those of people in a developing country; we are just sleeping. We do not know or care what will happen to us tomorrow. We have spent 8 years arguing over Islamic and non-Islamic ideologies and now are engrossed in party or non-party politics. As a wise man said, ministers who should be planning economic development have us

absorbed in political planning and developments. Who can pay attention to long-range planning and economic development in such an atmosphere? The private sector had been trying to make some progress. We have no faith in Pakistan-made goods because we do not have any faith in ourselves. Against this background, it is obvious that it will be India from which we have to import ginger and onions.

We have passed all limits in our zeal to increase our trade with India at all costs. After long talks with the Indian trade minister, Pakistani businessmen want to import 42 items from India. These include things like tea, betel leaf, betel nut, bidi [Indian cigarettes], tamarind seed, ginger and onions. Other things included in the list of 42 items are: drilling rigs, ball bearings, compressors for air conditioners and elevators and fire engines. What else? We are also importing spices, vegetables, flower and fruit seeds, thread, hair oil, machines to dig potatoes and onions and lumber.

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PAKISTAN

CONSTRUCTION OF KALABAGH DAM URGED

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 5 Jan 86 p 3

[Editorial] Federal Minister for Treasury and Planning Dr Mahboob Al Haq has disclosed that the federal cabinet sub-committee on dams is to meet this month. A decision on building Kalabagh Dam will be taken, keeping in view the national interest and the interests of the four provinces. According to a proposal, if it is considered necessary, the question of issuing a white paper on this project (which has been considered vital to national survival) will be taken up. The voices which had been raised against this project (under consideration for 3 years) were definitely very loud 2.5 to 3 months ago, but the loudest among them were from elements from the neighboring Frontier Province who (both inside and outside the country) have been active in opposition to Pakistan. Because opposition to the dam cropped up suddenly before construction began, it is natural that attention be paid to the other reasons whose explicit mention was not considered advisable in the course of the opposition. Meanwhile, it is gratifying to note that despite this wave, or rather storm, of opposition the federal government has decided to examine the pros and cons and to take the nation into its confidence.

Even though the federal minister for the treasury has said that opposition to such a vast project is natural and that echoes of this were heard about Mangla and Tarbela Dams too, it is no secret that a major reason for this opposition is that this is the first dam to be built in Punjab. This feeling has been expressed by Shah Balkhuldin, a religious scholar and member of the national assembly, this way: "About 50-55 billion rupees will be spent on this dam being built in Punjab, and similar big projects should also be started in other provinces, especially Sind." The superficiality of this argument becomes clear when it is recalled that 23 billion to 24 billion rupees were spent on Tarbela Dam in Frontier Province. Even more money has been spent on a steel mill being constructed near Karachi. In connection with these projects, the question of other parts of the country was never raised. But this would be an undesirable controversy and it is no use getting into it. It can only harm the national level thinking.

Projects like Tarbela Dam and the steel mill serve not regional, but national interests. Even if only a part of the country benefits directly from them, no part of the country is deprived of their vast but indirect benefits. The same holds true of Kalabagh Dam (notwithstanding the opposition and the bitter furor). The electricity produced from this dam will benefit the entire

country, its reservoir of 750,000 acre feet of water will irrigate land in every part of the country and its canal water will meet the basic need of the land in all four provinces by quenching the many years of drought. One can well understand Mr Wali Khan and his aged father's bitter and poisonous words in opposition to the dam. To say that if the dam is bombed everything all the way to Karachi will be completely destroyed is something that only they could say. No patriotic Pakistani can even imagine, much less utter, anything like that. Meanwhile, when everything possible has been said, it would only be proper that a courageous decision be taken about Kalabagh Dam without any further delay and that the entire nation be convinced that whatever decision is taken by the federal cabinet sub-committee is in the interests of the country and its four provinces. We should not display the weakness of being cowed by such elements as have made destruction of the Pakistan created by Qaid-e Azam their main theme. By the grace of God, Pakistan was formed in the teeth of opposition by these elements and it has proved to be the foundation of good luck, progress and prosperity for all Muslims. Even now it will survive by the grace of God and despite the opposition and it will remain the guarantee of the freedom, good, progress, prosperity, security and well-being of all Muslims.

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PAKISTAN

BRIEFS

MUMTAZ BHUTTO ON SBPF ACTIVITIES--Mr Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, a leader of the Sindhi-Baluch-Pakhtoon Front (SPF), who is arriving in the country on Friday has said he will set up a body in Pakistan to supervise the Front's propaganda and activities. In an interview to BBC on Wednesday, he said PPP would suffer, particularly in smaller provinces, because it was opposed to the confederation idea, which supported the rights of the smaller provinces. The Mumtaz Bhutto claimed that the PPP and the NDP were supporting the Front's cause, in principle, although they were not using the word 'confederation'. The two parties had already called for the rights of the smaller provinces. He said: "We had discussions with Mr Bizenjo and Khan Abdul Wali Khan and we are satisfied with their ideas." He added that these leaders would support the Front's programme if other details were discussed with them. Mr Mumtaz Bhutto said the claim of the present Government to have introduced democracy in the country would be tested when he would reach there. He said if the Government thought it would crush the slogan of confederation by arresting or hanging him it would be its mistake. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 6 Feb 86 p 8] /9274

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