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
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**Monthly
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AD-A953 634



JANUARY 1970

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
U. S. NAVAL FORCES, VIETNAM
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1. The U. S. Naval Forces, Vietnam Monthly Historical Summary is forwarded for information and retention.
2. The Civic Action Statistical Summary includes data which applies to the period 26 November through 25 December.

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MONTHLY HISTORICAL SUMMARY
JANUARY 1970

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FOREWARD

The overall barometer of enemy activity in January fluctuated between a low and moderate level with the former accounting for the majority of the action. Attacks by fire, minor probes, and sapper attacks characterized the enemy's apparent intention to avoid large unit confrontation and emphasize anti-pacification operations, to resupply and regroup his forces, and to gather intelligence information of allied tactics and operations. In comparison to the entire month, the significant increases of enemy activity on 3/4 and 5/6 January in I CTZ, on 20/21 January in III CTZ, and on 19/20 January in IV CTZ continued to reiterate the enemy's ability to conduct isolated incidents of concentrated attacks by fire.

In January, Vietnamization continued with the commissioning of Task Force 213 - considered a major milestone in the development of a fully combined USN/VNN surveillance and interdiction effort - and with the VNN successfully taking over the important SEA LORDS, Ready Deck Campaign. Also during January, one of the largest combat demolition jobs in the history of the Navy began and, by the end of the month, neared completion. Known as Deep Channel II, this operation is designed to connect, using military explosives, the Kinh Gay and Kinh Lagrange Extension, which are located in the Giant Slingshot AO. In the Border Interdiction AO, contact with unusually large groups of enemy troops was made during January. Large scale crossing attempts were thwarted and intelligence reports continued to be received indicating that enemy units were delayed for up to weeks at time from crossing the barriers with weapons and supplies needed to the south.

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
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OPERATION SEA LORDS SUMMARY

During the month of January, combined SEA LORDS forces operating in the Giant Slingshot, Border Interdiction, Search Turn, Ready Deck, and Breezy Cove campaigns accounted for a total of 304 enemy killed (by body count) and 17 captured. These totals are not too dissimilar when compared with December's 378 enemy killed and 47 captured, and they reflect similar overall activity levels for both months, which ranged from low to moderate. Friendly casualties for this period increased moderately from 12 killed and 84 wounded in December to this month's 22 killed and 122 wounded. In January, Vietnamization continued as Operation Ready Deck was removed from the SEA LORDS Campaign and redesignated as a 3rd Riverine Area VNN operation with both VNN and USN units assigned. A breakdown of complete USN and VNN SEA LORDS statistics for January and statistical totals computed since the start of operations are located at the end of this section following the discussion of the various campaigns.

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Giant Slingshot

During January, there were an average of 63 U. S. Navy craft and 55 VNN craft assigned to the Giant Slingshot Campaign, and, in addition to performing escort duty, troop lifts, and blocking and support missions, these craft set a daily average of 22 WBGP's along the Vam Co Dong and Vam Co Tay Rivers. During the month, enemy activity remained at the low to moderate level with enemy casualties increasing from December's 142 killed to January's 182 killed. However, this increase did not come about without cost to friendly units. Friendly casualties also increased from nine killed and 37 wounded last month to this month's 18 killed and 72 wounded.

In addition to other duties, CTG 194.9 assumed the opcon, on 5 January, of all elements assigned to Operation Deep Chamel II, one of the largest combat demolition jobs in the history of the Navy. The purpose of this operation is to connect the Kinh Gay and Kinh La-grange Extension, using military explosives. This will in turn provide a patrolling route for river patrol craft in a formerly inaccessible area and established a cordon to enemy infiltration from the tip of the "Parrot's Beak" southwest along the Kinh Bo Bo - a known enemy infiltration route. The new six mile channel when completed will have the added benefit of providing the civilian population in the area with a short cut between Tuyen Nhon and Tra Cu, thus making it easier for them to transport products to the Market in Saigon, Tay Ninh City, and elsewhere. By the end of January, Detachment Delta of Underwater Demolition Team Twelve (UDT-12) and a detachment of Vietnamese Navy

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Frogmen, all under LTJG Walter R. Harvey, were well on their way to completion of the channel blasting. In addition, other units were involved as seen on the following Task Organization Chart.

<u>TASK DESIGNATOR</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>COMMANDER</u>	<u>EXECUTION</u>
A. TG 194.9	GIANT SLINGSHOT	COMMANDER, GIANT SLINGSHOT	Provide over-all coordination
B. TG 115.9	COASTAL SURVEILLANCE GROUP	COMMANDER, TG 115.1	Provide UDT personnel
C. TG 115.7	SOLID ANCHOR	COMMANDER, TG 115.7	Provide UDT personnel
D. TU 194.9.1	TRA CU INTERDICTION UNIT	COMRIVDIV 552	Provide support as requested by CTE 194.9.9.3
E. TU 194.9.5	TUYEN NHON INTERDICTION UNIT	COMRAD 153	Coordinate employment of USA infantry platoons
F. TE 76.0.6.2	UDT TWELVE	COMMANDER, UDT TWELVE	Provide one officer/ten enlisted to CTE 194.9.9.3
G. TE 194.9.9.3	KINH GAY SPECOPSGRU	OINC, KINH GAY SPECOPSGRU	Assume opcon UDT personnel. Direct extending and clearing operations. Coordinate between USA and USN
H. TE 194.9.5.3	USA INF PLT AS ASSIGNED	CO, USA INF PLT AS ASSIGNED	Provide direct support to CTU 194.9.5
I.	NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY, SAIGON	COMNAVSUPPACT SGN	Provide logistics support

The following narrative includes examples of the more significant incidents occurring in the Giant Slingshot AO in January.

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On the first day of the month, two VNN PBR's of RPG 53 were in WBGF on the Vam Co Dong River, three miles west northwest of Ben Luc (XS 573 777), when they observed a sampan moving north along the west bank. The Vietnamese units, with U. S. Navy advisor EM1 Herrera aboard, waited until the sampan closed within twenty yards and then opened fire killing all four occupants. The sampan was then searched and found to contain an AK-47, two ammo cans containing political progress reports, and medical and supply lists. Black Ponies placed a strike on the west bank, but there was no further contact.

On the night of 2 January, two Seawolves flown by Commander Hamman and Lieutenant Catone were diverted to assist TU 194.9.7 craft in contact with VC six miles northwest of Moc Hoa on the Vam Co Tay River (XT 965 965). The two aircraft received and suppressed light small arms and automatic weapons fire as they placed multiple rocket and machine gun strikes on the target. A later sweep by 194.9.7 units revealed that the airstrikes had killed six VC, and subsequent intelligence reports from agents in the area indicated that an additional five VC had been killed and 12 wounded.

Beginning at 1400H on 8 January and continuing into the morning of 10 January, RF troops made contact with an estimated VC/NVA battalion located in a rubber plantation five miles north of Go Dau Ha (XT 360 332). U. S. Navy units from Go Dau Ha provided blocking forces and waterborne guardposts in the Vam Co Dong River while Seawolves and Black Ponies conducted air strikes in support of the operations. At the same time, RAC at Go Dau Ha were standing by to lift additional troops into the

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area should a need for them arise. As it turned out, there was no need since the enemy was resoundly defeated and lost 89 VC/NVA killed while inflicting only light casualties on friendly forces - two RF killed, one RF wounded, and two U. S. Army wounded.

In the meantime, on the afternoon of 9 January, Navy Seawolves scrambled to support ARVN and U. S. troops in heavy contact 11 miles southeast of Ben Keo (XT 370 350). The two Seawolves, flown by Lieutenant Catone and LTJG Pinegar, arrived on the scene and coordinated with a U. S. Army FAC as they placed multiple rocket and machine gun attacks on two sides of the friendly position. After returning to Tay Ninh to rearm and refuel, the LHFT arrived back in the contact area as armored vehicles, which had been moved in to suppress the enemy offensive, began taking heavy RPG fire. The aircraft placed strikes in support of retreating friendly forces until their ammunition was expended, and their fuel state required them to return to their home base. By this time, TACAIR was enroute. The Navy helos were credited with ten probable kills, and, despite receiving heavy A/W fire on all passes, suffered no casualties with the exception of two small holes in one of the aircraft.

In the same general area, also on 9 January, four RIVDIV 594 PBR's were enroute to night WBGD positions when they came under heavy B-40 and A/W fire from the south bank of the Vam Co Dong River three miles south of Ben Keo (XT 223 433). A total of nine B-40's were fired, and one of the PBR's took two hits resulting in a three foot hole in the port bow and shattered coaming on the portside forward.

To avoid sinking, the PBR beached on the north bank west of the contact area and twenty minutes later was taken in tow to Ben Keo by an ATC with a Monitor providing cover. An artillery sweep of the contact area was followed by Army LHFT and Navy Black Pony airstrikes. However, enemy casualties were unknown. Friendly casualties were one USN killed and four USN wounded who were medevaced less than 16 minutes after the start of the action.

SEAL's of SEAL Team, Det Golf, were inserted by LSSC three miles northeast of Ben Luc (XS 586 770) on the evening of 13 January. The nine SEAL's, two of which were LDNN's, under LTJG Duggan, patrolled north about 600 meters to an east-west commo-liaison trail discovering five bunkers along the route. Turning east on the trail, the SEAL's had patrolled another 500 meters when they heard numerous voices from a large hootch nearby (XS 590 775). One of the LDNN's stated that the voices were directing preparations for a VC meeting, which he estimated 20 VC were attending. While maneuvering toward the hootch, the SEAL's observed nine VC armed with AK-47's moving east. The SEAL's set up on the hootch, called for Seawolves, and then initiated fire after which they withdrew 50 meters to direct the Seawolf airstrikes. During the subsequent strikes, the Seawolves received light A/W fire, and, as the SEAL's moved south for extraction, they also received fire. The results of the action were 15 VC probably killed (five by air) and no friendly casualties.


One platoon of MSF troops and four PBR's of TU 194.9.7 were operating together on 16 January and were in night WBGF when they sighted


approximately five VC on the south bank of the Vam Co Tay River, four miles northwest of Moc Hoa (WS 951 974). The PBR's, under Patrol Officers SMC Chambless and BMC Blackwell, made firing runs and received two B-40 rockets and small arms fire in return from an undetermined size force. Seawolves were diverted to the scene and placed two strikes in the contact area followed by an MSF troop sweep which netted two VC bodies, two AK-47's, and one B-41 rocket. The boats reset the WBGF, and when it became light, another troop sweep was made recovering a B-40 round and 25 back packs filled with personal gear and khaki colored uniforms. Later in the morning, an informant, relating information obtained from villagers in the area, reported that 11 VC had been killed and 12 wounded in the action. There were no friendly casualties.

The enemy had better success on the 21st day of January in an action against the ATSB at Go Dau Ha on the Vam Co Dong River. At 0111H, an explosion occurred between the galley ammo of the ATSB and an ATC (T-36) which completely demolished the galley and caused the ATC to sink within three minutes. General Quarters was set immediately on the ATSB, and fields to the north were strafed with machine gun and mortar fire. In addition, boats dropped concussion grenades into the water in the vicinity. A VC was seen evading to the west along a canal by the north perimeter. Seawolves were scrambled and upon arrival, observed several VC evading to the west, 800 meters south of the base. They were taken under fire by the Seawolves, and artillery was called in and fired blocking rounds to the north and southwest.

Of the six U. S. Navy crewmen onboard the ATC four escaped. Two men, below decks at the time of the explosion, were killed. Of the four that escaped, three were slightly wounded. Enemy casualties are unknown.

The same day, after having been alerted to enemy movement by portable sensors, CTU 194.9.7 PBR's set up in night WEGP five miles northwest of Moc Hoa (WS 948 978). Sighting approximately 30 VC on the river bank, the four PBR's, under Patrol Officers SMC Chambless and BMC Lewis, took the enemy under fire and received grenade and heavy automatic weapons fire in return. Seawolves and a U. S. Army LHFT conducted numerous strikes in the contact area. Also, a Shadow aircraft arrived on the scene but was unable to fire because of clearance problems. The afloat units discovered four VC bodies in the river after the strikes. There were no friendly casualties.





Border Interdiction

At the end of January, there were 278 river craft and 6 helos assigned to the Border Interdiction Campaign. During the month, these units continued to hamper the VC's slowly disintegrating logistics chain despite the seasonally decreasing water level which was detrimental to waterborne interdiction efforts. The number of enemy contacts and sightings in the Border Interdiction AO indicates that the enemy is still trying to move through the Tran Hung Dao and Barrier Reef interdiction barriers, and this month that effort cost him 41 confirmed killed and 67 more probably killed. On the other hand, friendly Border Interdiction forces suffered no kills during December and at month's end had only 33 wounded.

The degree of effectiveness of Navy forces in the Border Interdiction Campaign was reflected in a statement by a VC who had surrendered to friendly forces. He revealed that a 300 man unit with needed weapons and supplies had been prevented from crossing into the "Seven Mountains" area for several weeks by Navy forces. Major General Wetherill, CG DMAC, had passed to the units concerned, a message which contained a well done for their unsurpassed "Courage, determination, and aggressive action." The following incident narrative includes examples of such action.

At 0205H on 3 January, a VC/NVA element of unknown size launched a coordinated attack on the Vinh Gia Special Forces Camp and waterborne units in guardpost positions nearby. The camp, located 30 miles southwest of Chau Doc, in the central sector of the Vinh Te

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Canal, received four recoilless rifle rounds and AK-47 fire; ten minutes later, a RIVDIV 512 PBR in WBGP five miles west of the camp (VS 733 612) began receiving automatic weapons fire. Seawolf support was requested at this time, and even though HAL 3, DET 3 helos were theoretically "pinned down" at Vinh Gia due to the incoming enemy fire, LCDR Thomas and LTJG Watts made emergency take-offs in order to provide support for the PBR, including Medevac. While the Medevac was being conducted, a RIVDIV 515 PBR came under B-40 and heavy automatic weapons fire one mile east of Vinh Gia (VS 815 612). An Army LHFT in the area observed the attack and diverted to assist, arriving prior to HAL 3, DET 5, Seawolves scrambled from YRBM-16. Airstrikes were placed in the ambush area, and a Medevac was conducted. Another RIVDIV 515 PBR, also at VS 815 612, reported that an 82mm mortar round had landed on the boat and fortunately failed to detonate. The crew was evacuated to the cover boat and a security perimeter was set. Later, EOD personnel were lifted to the scene to dispose of the dud mortar round, and they arrived shortly after 40 MSF troops who were lifted in by PBR's and inserted near the westernmost contact area (VS 730 613) for a sweep. Results of the action were three VC killed and seven USN and three VNN wounded. In addition, an AK-47, 100 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, numerous hand grenades, and miscellaneous personal and medical gear were recovered.

That night, just to the east of the previous incident, a fierce battle erupted. Initially, the attack was launched by

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an estimated 100 VC/NVA against a RIVDIV 535 PBR, under Patrol Officer BMC Marriner, in WBGP 24 miles southwest of Chau Doc (VS 840 612). During the action, heavy automatic weapons fire was received from the north bank and random small arms fire was received from the south bank by the PBR. At one point, the enemy approached the boat closely enough to throw a hand grenade at it. Fighting was so intense that the PBR had to be rearmed. By this time, two Seawolf Det's, three flights of Black Ponies, and Army Hunter-Killer Team, and TACAIR were supporting the action, which was characterized by a series of individual engagements in which the enemy would initiate fire on the PBR, followed by airstrikes suppressing the enemy fire, only to have the enemy open fire again a short time later. The next morning MSF troops were inserted, and they found one NVA body and evidence of five more enemy probably killed. In addition, mortar positions, one 105mm booby trapped projectile, and a small amount of ammunition were found. Remarkably, there were no friendly casualties.

On the same night, still further to the east, a RAD 132 ATC reported receiving A/W fire and B-40 rockets from the north bank of the Vinh Te Canal, five miles southwest of Chau Doc (WS 058 803). The ATC (T-2), with GMG2 Jones aboard as Patrol Officer, returned and suppressed the fire. Another ATC (T-19), with GMG1 Johnson as Patrol Officer, also came under fire one half mile to the southwest (WS 053 798) while enroute to assist T-2. Seawolves of HAL 3, DET 9, placed two strikes in the vicinity of WS 049 798

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where six people were sighted on the north bank. There was no further contact or any friendly casualties. PF troops were inserted into the area after the action and captured a VC who was suffering from a serious face wound. Rapid interrogation of the prisoner while awaiting Medevac revealed that he was part of a 14 man team assigned to attack boats on the Vinh Te Canal. The PF troops also recovered a small amount of ammunition including two F-40 rockets wired for command detonation.

Not all the significant action occurred in the Vinh Te Canal Section of the Border Interdiction AO. In the Barrier Reef AO, on the night of 10 January, an RF guard post on the Grand Canal seven miles west of Ap Bac (XS 047 744) was attacked by an unknown-sized enemy force. RIVDIV 551 PBR's, under Patrol officer PR1 Davidson, picked up 20 troops at a Vietnamese outpost located two miles to the east and inserted them at the contact site. The PBR's provided fire support for one and a half hours until extraction. The following morning a troop sweep revealed three VC bodies, 1000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, six rifle grenades, and some miscellaneous supplies and documents (bcobytrapped). Friendly casualties in the engagement were two RF troops killed and one wounded.

Moving back to the Vinh Te Canal, on the night of 17-18 January, an enemy crossing attempt by approximately 100 VC was thwarted by RPG 54 PBR's, MINDIV 113 MSR's, RAD 132 RAC's, and Hai 3, Det's 3 and 5, Seawolves. The first crossing attempt of the night was

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foiled at 2230H when, in response to NCD and radar sightings, Seawolves and Black Ponies placed rocket and machine gun strikes in the contact area, 12 miles southwest of Chau Doc (VS 972 752). Fifty minutes later, four VNN PBR's of RPG 54 in WEGP a half mile to the northeast (VS 979 755 and VS 989 760) spotted an estimated 100 VC approaching their position. When the enemy was within 20 meters, the PBR's opened fire and called in Seawolves, who again placed machine gun and rocket strikes. Both the Seawolves and the PBR's received return fire. Later, daylight sweeps of both areas produced five VC bodies and numerous blood trails leading toward Cambodia. Aircraft, as a result were credited with 25 probable kills. In addition, a small amount of enemy ammunition was captured in the actions that yielded no friendly casualties. In a smaller engagement at VS 990 763 that occurred later still, KSB personnel accounted for four additional VC killed (two probables) as the VC were observed crawling toward a nearby PBR.

Several nights later, on the Grand Canal (Barrier Reef), a Monitor (M-3) or RAD 132, while in WEGP 14 miles west of Ap Bac (WS 920 769), received seven B-40 rockets and heavy automatic weapons fire from both banks. The Monitor returned fire even though she had sustained six rocket hits. An ASPB and a Zippo nearby broke their guard post position to assist, and arriving on the scene suppressed the hostile fire. The Monitor, escorted by the ASPB, cleared to the west to Medevac four wounded USN, while the Zippo remained behind destroying enemy positions. Seawolves, in addition to Medevac services, placed strikes on the enemy positions.

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A troop sweep the following morning revealed eight civilian hootches destroyed, five civilians killed, and seven civilians wounded (all Medevaced). Enemy casualties are unknown.

On the night of 25-26 January, RIVDIV 573 PBR's in WBGF eight miles northeast of Vinh Gia, on the Vinh Te Canal, sighted two VC 150 meters north of their guard post. CIIG troops, attached as boat security, pursued the VC north until contact was lost. Seawolves were overhead at 2046H, 20 minutes after the initial sighting, and illuminated the area. While placing airstrikes, the Seawolves, flown by LTJG Watts and LTJG Leach, received return fire. At 2228H, PBR's initiated fire on at least 12 VC observed south of the boats, this time Black Ponies were on hand and raked the area with fire until they were relieved by Seawolves. At 2305H, PBR's of RIVDIV 571, in the contact area, observed two VC running from the scene and took them under fire with unknown results. Seawolves, providing support, were seen taking automatic weapons fire from the eastern end of Nui Gia Mountain. At 0330H, 20 MSF troops swept the area while under Black Pony cover with the following results: eight VC killed (one by air); six AK-47's; numerous hand grenades, and two pistols captured; and numerous documents confiscated. There were no friendly casualties.

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Search Turn

With an end of month asset strength of two Seawolves and 36 water craft, which included 29 PBR's, three Boston Whalers, two MSD's, one CCB, and one LSSC, Search Turn units (TG 194.3) continued their interdiction operations in January with patrols in the Gulf of Thailand and the Three Sisters area and with waterborne guardposts on the Ba The and Rach Gia-Ha Tien Canals and along the Kien An coast, an area indicated in intelligence reports as the site of a major enemy resupply effort.

January also saw Search Turn personnel aid the victims of a VC terrorist attack in Rach Gia. At 1955H on 7 January, CTG 194.3 NOC was notified that a terrorist had thrown a grenade into the Chau Van Theatre in downtown Rach Gia. Five civilians were killed and 25 were hospitalized, eight of which required emergency surgery. The VN TOC initiated a request for blood and a medevac to be sent from Can Tho. U. S. personnel in Rach Gia and at the Naval Base at Rach Soi responded with immediate blood donations.

On the 15th of the month, the USS HUNTERDON COUNTY (LST 838) arrived on station in the vicinity of Rach Gia to relieve the USS HARNETT COUNTY (LST 821) and assumed task designator CTU 194.3.4.

Hostile fire incidents in the Search Turn A. O. dropped again in January with only 14 recorded as compared to 19 in December. Enemy losses, however, rose during the month from 12 kills and 18 probables in December to 24 kills and 20 probables. Search Turn units

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also increased the number of VC captured from two in December to five in January and accounted for 19 enemy craft destroyed and six damaged. USN losses for the month dropped from three wounded and one PBR damaged in December to two wounded and no lost craft in January.

While on routine patrol in the Gulf of Thailand 16 miles southwest of Rach Gia (VR 898 870) on the evening of 2 January, units of RIVDIV 513, under Patrol Officer LT Graham and Boat Captains BM1 Furman and GMG1 Combs, sighted a sampan with six occupants towing another sampan toward the coast. The sampan in tow was loaded with 600 pounds of rice for which there was no manifest or reasonable explanation although all six occupants had I. D. cards. The two men, three women, and one infant were detained and turned over to NIO Rach Gia who discovered that two of the detainees were village level VC cadre and classified them as prisoners of war.

An LHFT which was on coastal patrol on the night of 8 January 13 miles west southwest of Rach Gia (VS 913 154) spotted a sampan in a curfew zone. Once sighted, the sampan began to evade and headed into a canal in the direction of the Three Sisters area. When warning shots were placed, small weapons fire was received in return. The LHFT then placed a strike upon the sampan, which was of a large type and which was carrying two smaller sampans. The LHFT departed the area and returned 45 minutes later to discover that a previously sighted body and the smaller sampans had been removed from the larger craft. Although the aircraft took one hit during the action, there

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were no friendly casualties. Enemy losses included one VC killed (BC), one VC probably killed, two sampans destroyed, and one sampan damaged.

In response to intelligence reports of enemy resupply efforts along the Kien An coast, LCDR Hock, CTG 194.3, attempted to insert a Boston Whaler, under the cover of noise created by patrolling PBR's, into a non-restricted zone along the coast 13 miles southwest of Rach Gia (VR 950 910) during the late evening of 14 January, but it grounded approximately 800 meters off the beach. Twenty minutes after the PBR's cleared the area, four lights appeared along the coast. One of these began flashing and was answered by a junk which started toward the shore. The whaler could not intercept the craft due to an engine problem; so it notified the PBR's which then returned to the scene but not before the junk had entered the tree line along the coast and had extinguished its lights. With the permission of the district chief, the area was reconed by fire. There were no friendly casualties, and enemy casualties are unknown. Since this area and the coast south of Three Sisters are inaccessible to PCF's, three or four Kenner ski barges were requested in order to perform continuous operations in this area if the infiltration route is confirmed. Meanwhile, presently available assets will be used to continue this type of operations.

PBR's of RIVDIV 554 were in WBGF on the Ba The Canal 13 miles north of Rach Gia (WS 102 282) on the evening of 17 January when they sighted a swimmer in the water moving east to west. At the same time, approximately nine VC were sighted 100 meters inland on the west bank

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and were taken under fire by the units, which were under Patrol Officer SM1 Shoemaker and Boat Captains EN3 Collins and RD1 Stogner. An immediate retaliation of small arms fire was directed at the boats from the east bank where five more VC were sighted and also taken under fire. At 2330H, Seawolves put in a strike in the contact area. The river units reassumed their guardpost positions and kept the barrier under surveillance for the rest of the night. An early morning sweep revealed many tracks, one NVA hat, one VC pamphlet, and blood trails. The action produced no friendly casualties while the enemy probably lost one VC.

PBR's of RIVDIV 553, under Boat Captains EM1 Kovi and GMG2 Goodwin, were on a routine Gulf patrol in the Three Sisters area (VS 872 156) in the early evening of 21 January when a sampan with four occupants was observed close to the beach in a 24 hour curfew area. Upon illumination, the occupants jumped from the sampan and were then taken under fire. Two VC were killed, and two were seen running for the beach. Twelve to 15 more were observed to come out of the tree line in an apparent attempt to retrieve the bodies and the sampan. They were taken under fire by the PBR's; there was no return fire. At this time, nine bodies were clearly sighted in the contact area. Seawolves then put in a strike and provided cover while an attempt to recover the sampan was made. This try, however, was thwarted by shallow water and enemy LAW fire from the tree line on the beach. Black Ponies also arrived on station and put a strike into the contact area, and PBR's, while firing into the area, observed

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one large secondary explosion. With the assistance of Sector artillery illumination, the contact area was kept under surveillance throughout the night. Another attempt to retrieve the sampan during the early morning using a borrowed Army Boston Whaler with Seawolves overhead was prevented by shallow water and deep mud. The sampan was then destroyed. Enemy losses also included nine VC killed. There were no friendly casualties.

While in routine WBGp on the following evening, PBR's of TU 194.3.2 observed five VC crossing a field south of the Rach Gia-Ha Tien Canal and took them under fire at 500 meters; there was no return fire. Thirteen minutes later, artillery illumination was requested, and the first round went out 35 minutes later. Five minutes after, the units investigated the contact area and found one VC body and one heavy drag trail. Air assistance was not requested because of the scene's proximity to a populated area. The enemy suffered one VC killed and one VC probably killed while friendly casualties were held down to one USN slightly wounded.

During the early morning hours of 24 January, units of RIVDIV 553, while in WBGp under Patrol Officer LTJG Nickerson, received sensor activation and observed four VC approaching their position 14 miles northwest of Rach Gia (VS 957 238). These four were taken under fire, but no return fire was received. Seawolves were requested on Scramble III. They arrived on station and put in a strike 15 minutes later. There was no further activity, and the units reestablished their guardpost position. About four hours later, the units

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again received sensor activation and observed VC moving in the contact area. Once again, the enemy were taken under fire with no return fire being received. Illumination was requested, and a sweep by the units produced one heavy blood trail. The enemy suffered one VC probably killed. There were no friendly casualties.

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Riverine Strike Group

During January, as last month, all RAC formerly assigned to CTG 194.7 (Riverine Strike Group) remained out-chopped to other operational commanders with the exception of those craft undergoing overhaul.

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Market Time Raiders Campaign

There were 52 SEA LORDS missions conducted during January by the Market Time Raiders along the rivers and canals of the III and IV Coastal Zones. There were 17 hostile fire incidents reported, seven friendly initiated, three enemy initiated and seven unilateral fire-fights. Enemy material losses for January were 41 craft and 186 structures destroyed, 81 structures damaged and two craft captured. There were 13 enemy troops killed (6 body count, 7 probable), one wounded and eight captured.

There were no U.S. casualties in any of these operations; however, there were four RF/PF troops killed and four RF/PF troops wounded. There was one USCG WPB damaged and required repairs are being performed at the shipyard in Singapore.

A SEA LORDS mission was conducted on 30 December along canals about 15 miles east of Soc Trang (XR 263 675). PCF's 21, 32 and 102, the PT GRACE (USCG WPB), two Coastal Group 36 skimmers and personnel, and CTF 116 EOD Team entered the canals taking targets of opportunity under fire. Eight sampans were sighted and when their occupants evaded they were taken under fire. Coastal Group 36 personnel searched the structures that had been rapidly vacated. The "Swift" boats played psyops tapes throughout the mission. Initial reports indicated that one VC was probably killed and one VC captured along with several training documents and miscellaneous gear. Follow-up intelligence the first of January credited the Market Time Raiders with an additional GDA of four Hoi Chanhs and 12 VC killed by body count.

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PCF's 60 and 103 picked up Popular Force (PF) troops from Dai Ngai on the morning of 10 January at the Coastal Group 36 base and inserted them on Dung Island about 20 miles southwest of Tra Vinh (XR 247 686) while PCF 98 acted as a blocking force. The PF troops and an EOD team swept southeast along the canals destroying bunkers and structures. Four females in a sampan exiting a canal were detained by PCF 98 and later turned over to Coastal Group 36 for disposition. The troops and EOD team were extracted having made no contact with the enemy. The ground forces destroyed 67 bunkers, 33 structures and two sampans with engines. There was one large secondary explosion believed to be mortar ammunition. There were no friendly casualties in the operation.

On the morning of 11 January, PCF's 53 and 102 picked up a 40-man Regional Force (RF) security force and an EOD team for a bunker and structure destruction mission along the canals off the Bassac River about 20 miles southeast of Can Tho (XR 027 906). PCF 102 detained one sampan and a woman and child prior to the insertion of the troops. Light enemy contact was made as soon as the troops were inserted and the "Swift" boats reconned the area by fire. Following the sweep the troops were extracted and all units exited the canal without further incident. There were no friendly casualties and enemy casualties were unknown. The EOD team destroyed 22 bunkers, 13 structures and 9 sampans.

In a SEA LORDS mission on the night of 14 January, PCF 59, LTJG Gorne commanding, picked up 30 Kit Carson Scouts (KCS) and a U.S.

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Advisor and inserted them along the Co Chien River about 12 miles northeast of Tra Vinh (XS 370 180). The KCS made contact with an unknown number of VC carrying grenades. The "Swift" boat provided mortar fire to cover the troop extraction and exited the area without further incident. There were no friendly casualties while six enemy were killed.

Ten Viet Cong were captured in a SEA LORDS mission on 21 January about 10 miles east of Soc Trang (XR 225 753). PCF's 60, 95 and 97 and two Coastal Group 36 units embarked 90 Long Phu Popular Force troops and 80 Ba Xuyen Regional Force troops and inserted them on Dung Island for ground sweeps to the site for a new outpost. The new outpost was established by the Regional Force troops. The "Swift" boats stoodby for support and then extracted the Popular Force troops without incident. There were no friendly casualties, and further enemy casualties were unknown.

The USCG WPB's PT GREY and PT GRACE conducted a SEA LORDS mission on the afternoon of 22 January about 20 miles south of Tra Vinh (XR 690 704). The WPB's entered a large canal and investigated small side canals en route taking targets of opportunity under fire. During the canal transit only occasional sniper fire was received. The WPB's exited the canal without suffering any casualties, while 11 enemy were killed (1 body count, 10 probable). There were 15 structures, two bunkers and six sampans destroyed, and five structures and five bunkers heavily damaged. In addition, 10 acres of rice field and four large rice piles were burned.

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On the afternoon of 28 January, the PT JEFFERSON (USCG WPB), PT MARONE (USCG WPB) and 199th RAC Unit 21 conducted a SEA LORDS mission about 22 miles south of Tra Vinh (XR 410 620). All units entered the canal taking targets of opportunity under fire. Small arms fire was received and suppressed with 50 caliber fire and defensive fortifications were taken under fire with 81mm mortars. All units then exited the canal with no further enemy contact. There were four structures, two bunkers and nine sampans destroyed, and 28 structures and 21 bunkers heavily damaged. There were also several large secondary explosions. There were no friendly casualties and enemy casualties were unknown.

The USCG WPB PT GRACE was hit by a B-40 rocket while involved in a SEA LORDS mission on 30 January sustaining the following damage: one hole 10" X 6"; one hole 2" X 2" four feet above the water line at frame 17 starboard side; considerable damage interior forward berthing; watertight bulkhead 20 penetrated by many small holes; hull port side penetrated at frame 20 two feet above water line by 1/4 inch hole; bulkhead forward of frame 11 buckled, four inch protrusion. Repairs to the PT GRACE were not within the ship's capabilities. The PT GRACE and PT CYPRESS had entered a canal off the Ham Luong River about 10 miles east of Tra Vinh (AS 729 081) to conduct maximum boarding of craft and a psyops mission. There were 52 craft boarded and various psyops material distributed, all without incident. While exiting the canal the PT GRACE came under heavy rocket and automatic weapons fire sustaining one rocket

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
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hit. The fire was suppressed by 50 caliber and small arms fire while the WPB cleared the area. The WPB's destroyed 10 bunkers, eight structures and two sampans and damaged five structures. There were four enemy killed, and no friendly casualties. The mid-watch on the PT GRACE had just proceeded topside prior to receiving the rocket hit otherwise there would probably have been three Coast Guardsmen killed. One Coast Guardsman had all his clothing except what he was wearing, destroyed. The PT GRACE was ordered to the shipyard at Singapore for repairs.

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MARKET TIME RAIDER CAMPAIGN
OPERATIONS IN THE THIRD COASTAL ZONE



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Operation Ready Deck

In January, Tran Hung Dao V/Operation Ready Deck became a Vietnamese Navy operation as the combined forces of TG 194.6, the 1st Infantry Division, USA, and the 5th ARVN Division continued to interdict the enemy in the areas adjacent to the upper Saigon River north and northwest of Saigon. The units of TG 194.6, which operated on the Saigon River from Phu Cuong upstream to Tri Tam (XT 803 140 to XT 480 470) and on the Saigon River northwest of Phu Cuong, were primarily employed in the very successful waterborne guard posts. They also conducted regular day and night river patrols, ACTOV training, troops and logistics movements, Psyops missions, and bunker destruction operations.

The intensity of enemy activity was comparable to previous months as it fluctuated between a low and moderate level. On 6 January there were two separate instances where allied operations recovered large enemy caches. At one location (XT 532 338), there were 18 57mm recoilless rifle rounds, 87 81mm mortars and 36 107mm rockets, and in the other (XT 648 425), there were 150 60mm mortars. The type of weapons uncovered in these caches suggested the enemy possible had plans for stand off attacks in the area. The 58 enemy attacks by fire that were recorded during the high point of the month in the 3CTZ on the evening of 20-21 January agreed with this line of thought.

While on a search and destroy operation on 9 January, RAG 24 units discovered and destroyed a new enemy bunker tunnel complex

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northwest of Phu Cuong (XT 710 216) which contained a small, 10 kilogram conical shaped command detonated water mine. This was the second water mine of this type found recently in the area. A large, 25 kilogram conical command detonated mine was found on the river bank (XT 719 210) on 2 January. The area was also within three to four kilometers of where three contacts involving RAG 24 units had occurred in the previous three weeks. There were possible swimmer sapper attacks on 29 December (XT 674 234), sporadic contact throughout the night of 31 December at the same location, and heavy contact with land sappers and possible swimmer sappers on 9 January (XT 675 234). Also on 9 January two groups of swimmers and 20 VC were sighted in the tree line (XT 680 235). This reoccurrence of water mine incidents confirmed document readouts which stated that several enemy units had the mission of attacking the boats during the winter-spring campaign. Later in the month there was a noticeable increase in the number of enemy initiated firefights involving TG 194.6 units. The enemy's activity targeted against the boats not only added credence to the recent intelligence reports but pointed out the successfulness of the interdiction operations.

The casualty figures are somewhat misleading in January. In November and December the USN units were credited with the majority of the enemy KIA's. However, in January, this was completely reversed. In reality, the VNN enemy KIA figures for January include some of the late entries of December when the VNN had several large actions. Taking the combined totals of USN versus VNN enemy KIA's for December

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and January, 57 versus 71, respectively, it can be deduced that when the VNN were put in command of Operation Ready Deck on 11 December they did effectively assume the responsibility.

The following narrative includes examples of the more significant incidents occurring in the Ready Deck AO in January.

On the evening of 9 January, seven units of RAG 24 and their senior USN advisor, LT W. R. Blakely, were positioned in a waterborne guardpost nine miles northwest of Phu Cuong (XT 680 235) four to six swimmers were sighted in the water about 100 meters north of the RAG location. They were immediately taken under devastating fire. Twenty minutes later, the VNN spotted 20 VC in the tree line 300 meters inland, took them under fire, and received return fire. A USA LHFT reported on station after another twenty minutes passed and placed strikes into the tree line with unknown results. RAG 24 units cleared the area to the south and reset the WBGp when FAC aircraft arrived on station to place additional strikes in the suspected enemy positions.

Two RPG 51 PBR's with their advisor, GMG1 Morris, had established a night WBGp eight miles northwest of Phu Cuong (XT 684 223) on 13 January. Shortly before midnight, the sailors, poised for action, spotted three swimmers in the water crossing from south to north approximately 1000 meters north of the WBGp. Twenty minutes passed, and another ten to twelve VC were on the bank and in the water. With deadly accuracy the PBR's opened fire killing 8 VC (2 prob). Illumination was requested from the 25th Infantry Division, and the first

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round was on deck in six minutes. The illumination was cancelled at this time as Nighthawk aircraft with infrared and white light was on station. Before departing the area, the Nighthawk had killed three VC (1 prob). Resetting the ambush in the same general area, the PBR's had no further contact that evening.

On 19 January, 14 miles northwest of Phu Cuong (XT 632 321), 12 RAG 24 units in a night WBGF with seven companies of the 5th ARVN Division embarked, sighted and took under fire three VC in the water five meters from the north bank (XT 629 321). Within approximately 20 minutes, a USA LHFT arrived on station and spotted two VC which they killed in the original contact area. The LHFT was vectored to the south bank where they detected another seven VC 200 meters to the east. Four of these were killed by air before the LHFT had to depart the area because of a low fuel state. Two hours later, five VC were seen by the RAG as they crossed the river from south to north in the vicinity of the original contact. The RAG's killed one of them, and the LHFT, which by this time was back on station, killed four more. Continuing the search along the river bank, the RAG units sighted an unknown number of VC in a canal immediately across from their positions. The LHFT placed a strike in this area resulting in two VC killed. After all the aircraft departed, H and I artillery from Fire Support Base Tennessee was placed in the area. There was no further contact that night, and a ground sweep by the embarked ARVN troops was planned to commence at daybreak that morning. The overall results of the contact were 13 VC killed (4 prob).

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Breezy Cove

The level of activity in the Breezy Cove AO decreased slightly during January. Enemy KIA's dropped from 40 killed last month to this month's 30 killed, and there was a corresponding decrease in friendly casualties which dropped from 12 wounded to four wounded. The total number of ENIFF's, FRIFF's, and unilateral firings did increase slightly, however, from 56 to 59.

At the end of January, 26 craft and two Seawolves were assigned for operations as follows:

CTU 194.2.4	USS GARRETT COUNTY (LST 786)
CTU 194.2.1	10 PBR's, 2 Boston Whalers
CTU 194.2.3	5 ASPB's, 5 ATC's, 1 Monitor
CTU 194.2.5	2 UH-1B's
CTU 194.2.6	1 HSSC, 1 LSSC, 1 Boston Whaler

On 7 January, the USCGC DALLAS (WHEC 716) provided Breezy Cove with its first naval gunfire support in reaction to a PBR contact. Additional support by DALLAS is included in the following narrative which contains the more significant incidents occurring in the Breezy Cove AO during January.

Four SEAL's and two LDNN's, under Platoon Leader LTJG Mihalic, were inserted by sampan three miles northeast of Song Ong Doc (WR 007 052) on the afternoon of 2 January. Shortly after setting up a guardpost, male voices were heard to the west. A Seawolf was

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scrambled, and when it was overhead, the SEAL's moved into some huts west of the guardpost and captured three VC.

On the afternoon of 6 January, Pham Van Trang rallied to a PBR patrol under the Chieu Hoi program. Upon his initial interrogation by NILO Song Ong Doc, the Hoi Chanh revealed the location of 100 VC five miles northeast of Song Ong Doc (WR 052 046 to WR 063 052). That night an airstrike was placed on the target with unknown results; the pilots reported receiving ground fire. On 9 January, a NILO Ca Mau agent reported that 32 VC had been killed as a result of the airstrike.

On 8 January, Pham Van Trang was shot and killed by a petty officer of the Vietnamese Navy.

After he had turned himself in, the Hoi Chanh was quartered ashore under 24 hour surveillance. During this time, he passed intelligence information to NILO Song Ong Doc, helped plan a SEAL operation, and made a psyops tape urging his friends to rally to the side of the government. SEAL's and LDNN's, however, considered the Hoi Chanh's suggested operation as a possible trap. The suspicion clouding Trang's true feelings were further heightened when he requested a weapon from the NILO's interpreter. Thus, arrangements were made to turn the Hoi Chanh over to local authorities as quickly as possible.

On the 8th of the month, at 0830H, Trang was placed in the custody of a sentry on the ASPB to be turned over to local authorities about an hour and a half later. At 0835H, P02 Vu Ba Hung of the

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Vietnamese Navy took Thang to Vam Song Ong Doc for a requested cup of coffee. While in a restaurant, the rallier insisted upon seeing a sister in town and persuaded Hung to let him go and see his sister alone. Petty Officer Hung had noticed that Trang was acting strangely, so he followed him from a distance. When Thang realized that he was being followed, he told Hung that he had changed his mind and would return to the ASPB by himself. Hung, however, again followed Thang closely.

At approximately 0900H, the Hoi Chanh looked back and saw the trailing Hung. The petty officer then observed Thang reach into his shirt where he detected a large bulge. Hung drew a .45 cal pistol and shot the Hoi Chanh twice. This shooting was witnessed by CPO Lee Anh Hoang also of the Vietnamese Navy who was on his way to the village market at the time. Hung and Hoang examined the body of Thang and found a fragmentation grenade clipped to his waistline.

The village doctor, Dang Vam Kim, pronounced the false rallier dead, and village officials accepted custody of the remains.

The village chief commended Hung's sharp observation and quick reaction which saved the lives of both civilians and allied sailors.

Petty Officer Hung has been recommended for the U. S. Navy Commendation Medal with Combat "V" for meritorious service while serving in a joint Vietnamese and United States Navy Task Group.

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In another action involving aircraft, two Seawolves sighted three evading sampans 11 miles north of Song Ong Doc (VR 827 184) on the afternoon of 14 January. As the helos arrived in the vicinity of the sampans, they received automatic weapons fire from both banks of the canal. The aircraft returned fire on the enemy positions, and, after successive strikes, the A/W fire still continued. At this point, CTG 194.2 requested and received clearance for naval gunfire support from the PSA An Xuyen. The USCGC DALLAS arrived in the area and commenced fire until Seawolves and Black Ponies arrived back in the area to place additional airstrikes. After the airstrikes (which still received return fire), the USCGC DALLAS opened fire again, pausing briefly for TACAIR strikes. When all fire finally ceased, enemy casualties were 13 VC killed and six more probably killed. There were no friendly casualties.

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NAVAL STATISTICAL SUMMARY (AS OF 2 FEB 70)

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	TRAN HUNG DAO	GIANT SLINGSHOT	BARRIER REEF	BREEZY COVE	SEARCH TURN	READY DECK
START OF OPERATION	21 NOV 68	6 DEC 68	2 JAN 69	28 SEP 69	1 NOV 68	3 JUN 69
FRIFF	207 (26)	455 (34)	58 (16)	39 (14)	145 (10)	46 (5)
ENIFF	166 (24)	682 (19)	49 (9)	34 (5)	77 (3)	52 (9)
UNILATERAL FIRINGS	367 (38)	1,309 (58)	174 (41)	107 (31)	254 (30)	196 (30)
MININGS	19 (0)	14 (1)	6 (0)	7 (1)	4 (0)	2 (0)
AMMUNITION CACHES & CACHE WT. (TONS)	5 (1) 11.5 (.01)	267 (14) 142.4 (3.0)	1 (0) .4 (0)	0 (0) 0 (0)	14 (0) 11 (0)	19 (3) 4 (.04)
OTHER CACHE & CACHE WT. (TONS)	0 (0) 0 (0)	24 (1) 384.9 (.12)	0 (0) 0 (0)	1 1.2 (0)	1 (0) 1 (0)	2 (1) .5 (.1)
REPORTS OF ENEMY PLANS TO ATTACK PATROL CRAFT	144 (4)	194 (5)	24 (5)	7 (1)	*	*
SAMPANS DESTROYED	250 (1)	314 (11)	147 (19)	158 (51)	301 (19)	140 (5)

9.8 tons munitions and 5.5 tons of other materials were captured during engagements with barrier units.

() - Monthly totals

* - Statistics not available

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NAVAL STATISTICAL SUMMARY (AS OF 2 FEB 1970)

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	TRAN HUNG DAO	GIANT SLINGSHOT	BARRIER REEF	BREEZY COVE	SEARCH TURN	READY DECK
<u>ENEMY KIA</u>						
BY USN	242 (270)	1,041 (36)	73 (4)	74 (24)	209 (25)	320 (10)
BY VNN	57 (7)	139 (13)	31 (2)	5 (1)	0 (0)	74 (68)
BY OTHER	288 (7)	1,043 (133)	109 (5)	22 (5)	43 (0)	245 (17)
<u>ENEMY CIA</u>						
BY USN	8 (1)	24 (0)	15 (0)	43 (4)	4 (2)	14 (0)
BY VNN	1 (0)	9 (0)	1 (0)	8 (2)	0 (0)	0 (0)
BY OTHER	18 (0)	205 (0)	34 (3)	6 (2)	30 (3)	112 (0)
<u>FRIENDLY KIA</u>						
USN	11 (0)	34 (4)	5 (0)	1 (0)	14 (0)	6 (1)
VNN	9 (0)	17 (2)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)
OTHER	19 (0)	124 (12)	17 (0)	2 (0)	19 (0)	20 (1)
<u>FRIENDLY WIA</u>						
USN	107 (20)	478 (12)	48 (7)	57 (20)	65 (2)	30 (1)
VNN	73 (13)	143 (24)	11 (0)	9 (0)	4 (0)	17 (0)
OTHER	138 (0)	646 (36)	88 (1)	6 (2)	92 (0)	84 (2)
<u>KILL RATIO</u>						
USN	22:1 (27:1)	30.5:1 (9:1)	14.6:1 (4:0)	74:1 (24:0)	15:1 (25:0)	53.5:1 (10:1)
VNN	6.8:1 (7:0)	8.2:1 (6.5:1)	31:0 (2:0)	5:0 (1:0)	-	74:0 (68:0)
OTHER	15.1:1 (7:0)	8.4:1 (11.1:1)	6.4:1 (2.5:1)	11.1 (5:0)	2.3:1 (0:0)	12.3:1 (17:1)

() - Monthly totals

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COASTAL SURVEILLANCE FORCE SUMMARY

During January, Market Time and Stable Door forces continued routine operations. The weather forced the "Swift" boats to vacate their patrol areas during most of the month in the First and Second Coastal Zones; however, in the Third Coastal Zone the weather was good the entire month. Task Force 115 units detected a total of 58,649 craft in their patrol areas along the coast and in the harbors of the Republic of Vietnam. A total of 12,761 craft were inspected and 12,561 were boarded. As a result of these checks, 104 craft and 513 persons were detained for lack of or faulty identification, violation of restricted zones, possession of contraband, incorrect or faulty manifests, or other suspicious activity. There were also 48 Viet Cong suspects detained. In the Game Warden area of operations in the lower Bassac and Co Chien Rivers, Market Time units detected 6,895 watercraft, inspecting 3,027 and boarding another 2,822. There were three craft and 21 persons detained.

Enemy initiated activity remained at the relatively low level of the preceding month. There were no known large scale infiltration of men or supplies attempted during January. Task Force 115 units continued to provide Naval gunfire and blocking patrols in support of friendly ground operations along the coasts and in the rivers and canals. There were 12 U.S. Navymen wounded during these missions while enemy losses to the naval gunfire of Market Time units came to 93 confirmed killed, 60 probably killed, seven wounded, and 30 captured.

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Operation Market Time

The tempo of naval gunfire, SEA LORDS, Sea Float and Sea Tiger missions decreased during January with 434 missions conducted. Gun damage assessment on these missions was 36 percent as compared to the 43.4 percent recorded in December. Results of these missions were:

153 Viet Cong killed (93 body count, 60 probable).

7 Viet Cong wounded.

30 Viet Cong captured.

140 Junks/sampans destroyed.

12 Junks/sampans damaged.

422 Structures/bunkers destroyed.

99 Structures/bunkers damaged.

There were 12 incidents of evading craft and personnel reported during the month. These were taken under fire and resulted in 28 craft destroyed, 43 Viet Cong killed (37 body count, 6 probable), one wounded, and nine captured.

Surveillance operations resulted in the detection of 24,240 watercraft. A total of 9,091 inspections and 10,065 boardings were carried out. There were 434 steel hulled vessels detected in Market Time areas and 324 of these were inspected and 11 boarded. All were determined to be non-suspicious.

During January, SEAL units attached to Task Force 115 continued to conduct almost daily operations in the IV Corps Tactical Zone in support of Sea Float operations.

During the New Year's cease fire period from 311800H December to 011800 January there was only one truce violation reported involving the PT BANKS (USCG WPB) and is discussed under the Third Coastal Zone operations.

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On 1 January, four VNN PCF's were chopped from CTU 115.2.1 to CTG 115.2 and assumed patrol responsibilities for areas 4E and 4H.

On 30 December, the trawler designated 23F1 ceased loitering approximately 100 miles north of the Malaca Straits and commenced a northerly course toward the general vicinity of the Paracel Islands. The USCGC CHASE (WHEC 718) maintained surveillance until relieved by the USS McMORRIS (DE 1036) on 4 January. The USS CAMP (DER 251) relieved the USS McMORRIS on 12 January. The trawler crossed the 12 nautical mile territorial waters of Hainan at 1042H on 19 January on course 310, speed 8.5 knots. Radar contact was lost at 1437H on 19 January at posit 18-40.5N; 110-36.7E, on course 030, speed 8 knots, and surveillance operations were discontinued.

On 1 September 1969, two U.S. Navy hydrofoil patrol gun boats, the USS FLAGSTAFF (PGH 1) and USS TUCUMCARI (PGH 2) were assigned to Commander Task Group 115.1 for an extended combat test and evaluation. Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam confidential message 270803Z Jan 1970 to Command in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet was the evaluation report and is quoted below.¹

"PGH EMPLOYMENT (U)

A. YOUR 170331Z JAN 70

1. (C) THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE SUBMITTED IAW REF A:

A. SUITABILITY OF SUBJ CRAFT IN PERFORMANCE OF ASSIGNED MISSION:

(1) THE MISSION OF THE PGH WAS TO CONDUCT AN OPERATIONAL EVALUATION IN A COMBAT ENVIRONMENT. SERVE AS A RAPID REACTION

Footnote

1 (MNAVFORV 270803Z JAN 1970 45

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UNIT AND AUGMENT MARKET TIME FORCES BY CONDUCTING RANDOM, HIGH SPEED PRE-PLANNED PATROLS.

(2) BECAUSE OF THEIR HIGH SPEED AND ABILITY TO GET UNDERWAY ON SHORT NOTICE, THESE CRAFT WERE IDEALY SUITED FOR A COASTAL SURVEILLANCE MISSION AND RAPID, SURFACE CONTACT INTERCEPTION.

(3) RADAR PERFORMANCE WAS GENERALLY GOOD WITH AVERAGE RADAR DETECTION ON TRAWLER SIZE CONTACTS AT 10-12 MILES.

(4) HOWEVER, THE PGH IS HIGHLY DEPENDENT UPON SEA AND WEATHER CONDITIONS FOR EFFECTIVE PATROL AND THESE FACTORS, EXCEPTIONALLY ADVERSE IN THE DANANG AREA DURING THE NE MONSOON PREVALENT DURING THE DEPLOYMENT, SEVERELY UNDERMINED PGH EFFECTIVENESS.

B. EVALUATION OF MATERIAL READINESS CONDITION WHILE DEPLOYED.

(1) TUCUMCARI DEMONSTRATED A HIGHER DEGREE OF MATERIAL READINESS THAN FLAGSTAFF THROUGHOUT THE DEPLOYMENT. IN GENERAL, MATERIAL READINESS WAS SATISFACTORY DUE TO THE VAST SUPPORT FACILITIES AVAILABLE IN DANANG, AND TECH REPS AND PECULIAR SPARE PARTS WHICH ACCOMPANIED THE CRAFT. TUCUMCARI SUFFERED THREE MAJOR CASUALTIES, TWO OF WHICH WERE REPAIRED BY SCRF DNG AND THE THIRD WITH SRF SUBIC ASSISTANCE.

(2) FLAGSTAFF SUFFERED MAJOR CASUALTIES TO HER TURBINE AND WAS RARELY AVAILABLE FOR PATROL OR OPEVAL. DURING THE PERIOD 15 OCT TO 25 DEC, TUCUMCARI CONDUCTED 40 DAYS OF OPEVAL AND WAS UNAVAILABLE ON 7 DAYS DUE TO MATERIAL CASUALTIES WHILE FLAGSTAFF CONDUCTED 9 DAYS OF OPEVAL AND WAS UNAVAILABLE FOR 14 DAYS DUE TO MATERIAL CASUALTIES.

(3) 20 DAYS WERE SCHEDULED FOR UPKEEP. TUCUMCARI REQUIRED 24 AND FLAGSTAFF REQUIRED 49 DAYS.

(4) HIGH HUMIDITY AND ROUGH SEAS, GREATER THAN STATE FOUR, ACCOUNTED FOR MANY MECHANICAL AND ELECTRICAL FAILURES, AND LIMITED DOCK SPACE AND CROWDED WORKING CONDITIONS CAUSED AND EXTENDED DOWN TIME.

C. ESTIMATE OF RELIABILITY FACTOR.

(1) THE SOPHISTICATED AND STILL UNPROVEN SYSTEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PGH DEMAND SPECIAL FACILITIES AND EXPERTS BE NOT USUALLY AVAILABLE AT CONVENTIONAL SURFACE CRAFT REPAIR FACILITIES. BY VIRTUE OF THE FACILITIES AVAILABLE AT SCRF DANANG, AIRCRAFT FACILITIES ALSO AVAILABLE IN DANANG, PREPLANNED PECULIAR SPARE PARTS SUPPORT AND THE PRESENCE OF TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVES, ONE PGH WAS ABLE TO PERFORM IN A SATISFACTORY MANNER WHILE THE OTHER SUFFERED PROLONGED DOWN TIME.

(2) CREW FATIGUE WAS AN EVER RECURRING FACTOR IN PGH DEPLOYMENT. THE HIGH TEMPO OF OPS IMPOSED UPON THESE

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CRAFT CONTRIBUTED TO MANY MECHANICAL FAILURES WHICH IN TURN LED TO UNUSUAL DEMANDS ON THE CREW.

(3) ONLY THE HIGH LEVEL OF MATERIAL SUPPORT AND DEDICATION OF ALL PERSONNEL KEPT THESE CRAFT OPERATIONAL.

D. MATERIAL AND MAINTENANCE SUPPORT AVAILABLE FOR DEPLOYED PGH'S.

(1) ALTHOUGH SPARE PART AUGMENTATION WAS INITIATED PRIOR TO THE AUGUST DEPLOYMENT, VARIOUS CONTRACTUAL PROBLEMS RESULTED IN THE CANCELLATION OF A MAJORITY OF PGH-1 SPARES AND LONG DELAYS FOR PGH-2 SPARES.

(2) DANANG WAS CHOSEN AS A BASE OF OPS DUE TO SCRF AND AIRCRAFT REPAIR FACILITIES. HOWEVER, THERE WERE INSTANCES WHERE EITHER SPECIAL MATERIAL OR UNUSUALLY DEMANDING SPECIFICATIONS PRECLUDED PART MANUFACTURE AT SCRF. A NUMBER OF JOBS HAD TO BE REDONE DUE TO INEXPERIENCED PERSONNEL AND LOCAL LABOR. DETAILED SUPERVISION BY PGH CREW MEMBERS WAS OFTEN REQUIRED. GENERALLY, JOBS UNDERTAKEN BY SCRF PROVED SATISFACTORY.

(3) ORIGINAL OUTFITTING AND PROVISIONING HAD TO BE BASED ON CONTRACTOR'S AND CREW'S ESTIMATES OF REQUIREMENTS. IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT A MUCH GREATER RANGE AND DEPTH OF SPARES AND REPAIR PARTS ARE REQUIRED TO SUSTAIN TOP MATERIAL CONDITION OVER A LONG TERM DEPLOYMENT. CURRENT DATA WILL PROVIDE A MORE ADQUATE SUPPORT PACKAGE FOR FUTURE EMPLOYMENTS.

2. (C) WHILE THE PGH CONCEPT IS HIGHLY SUITED TO A COASTAL SURVEILLANCE AND RAPID SURFACE CONTACT INTERCEPTION EFFORT, THE HIGH LEVEL OF SUPPORT REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN THEIR SOPHISTICATED SYSTEMS AND THE SEVERE LIMITATIONS IMPOSED BY MONSOON WEATHER MAKE THEM HIGHLY DEPENDENT UPON LARGE SUPPORT FACILITIES IN AO'S OF MODERATE WEATHER AND SEA CONDITIONS. WITHOUT THESE FACILITIES AND AT THIS STAGE IN THEIR DEVELOPMENT, THEY CURRENTLY ARE TOO UNRELIABLE FOR EFFECTIVE OPERATIONS."

First Coastal Zone

The northeast monsoon season continued to force Market Time surveillance units off their patrol areas during much of January. Even with the adverse weather, there were 6,970 craft detected, almost double the number detected in December. There were 2,027 craft inspected and another 3,187 craft boarded. Surveillance results remained high as over 74 percent of those craft detected were either inspected or boarded leading to the detention of 41 craft and 203 persons for lack of or faulty identification papers, violation of restricted zones, incorrect or faulty manifests, possession of contraband and curfew violations.

There were approximately 100 naval gunfire support and Sea Tiger missions conducted in the First Coastal Zone. The PBR's of Commander River Division 543 continued to operate in the Sea Tiger area of operations in those rivers and canals inaccessible to the "Swift" boats.

PBR's 67 and 114, with BMC Turnbull as Patrol Officer, were en route to a waterborne guardpost on the evening of 1 January when they sighted one man along the Ba Ren River, eight kilometers south of Hoi An (BT 140 505). When the PBR's closed, the man ran and was taken under fire. The PBR's then withdrew and returned 30 minutes later and sighted a sampan with two persons aboard crossing from north to south. As the PBR's approached, they attempted to evade and were taken under fire destroying the sampan and probably killing the two occupants. PBR's 59 and 95 with QMC(SS) Williams as Patrol Officer, joined up with PBR's 67 and 114 and established the WBCP on the Cam Ha River about four kilometers west of Hoi An (BT 104 578). Personnel on the opposite bank appeared to be watching the PBR's and were taken under fire. VC psyops broadcasts were heard from the opposite bank but stopped when the PBR's made their firing runs. There were two enemy killed and no friendly casualties. The substance of the Psyops broadcasts was for Vietnamese and U.S. personnel to give up; if not, the Viet Cong would kill them. The broadcasts further urged U.S. fighting men to go home.


In the afternoon of 11 January the USCGC HAMILTON (WHEC 715) conducted a gunfire support mission on a confirmed NVA position about 15 miles southeast of Quang Nga (BS 784 507). The mission was requested and cleared by the Duc Pho Naval Gunfire Liaison Officer (NGLO). The five inch guns of the cutter destroyed 15 structures and four fighting positions. Further enemy casualties were unknown.

On the night of 12 January, PBR's 59, 95, 114, and 131, with LT JONES and QMC(SS) Williams as Patrol Officers, established a waterborne guardpost on the Vinh Dien River about six miles northwest of Hoi An (BT 058 615). The WBGp was set with the assistance of two helo gunships making dry runs to mask the PBR's. Approximately an hour later, 20-25 Viet Cong with back packs and individual weapons were sighted on the west bank. The PBR's initiated contact and then cleared the area but not before killing seven VC. One sortie of gunships was called in to work the area over with negative results being reported.

While on normal Market Time patrol in area 2, 32 miles south of Cua Lao Re Island, on 14 January, the USCGC CHASE (WHEC 718) received a visual distress signal from a 40-foot sampan. Upon boarding the craft it was discovered there were four Vietnamese fishermen embarked from the village of Sa Quynh, and they had lost their propeller and had been adrift for six days. The Coast Guard cutter passed food and water to the crew and then took the craft in tow. The PT ARDEN (USCG WPB) relieved the CHASE and continued towing the craft to shore without incident.

Early in the morning of 25 January, PBR's 91 and 43 were on night stand-down about two miles west of Hoi An (BT 107 577), when a large explosion occurred under the stern of PBR 91. The boat was tossed on the bank upside down after traveling approximately 10 feet through the air. Parts of pumps and engines were found up to 100 meters

OPERATIONS IN THE FIRST COASTAL ZONE



- A. Sea Tiger (PBR's) 1 JAN
- B. USCGC HAMILTON - 11 JAN
- C. Seatiger (PBR's) - 12 JAN
- D. USCGC PT ARDEN 14 JAN
USCGC CHASE CHASE
- E. SEA TIGER (PBR's) 25 JAN

away. PBR 43 received only minor damage while there was extensive damage to the hull, internal damage to mechanical parts, and complete demolition of the stern of PBR 91. Initial estimates was that PBR 91 was a total loss. There were two U.S. sailors and two Vietnamese sailors wounded.

Second Coastal Zone

Weather conditions improved somewhat during January as Market Time units detected 6,957 craft, more than double the December detections. Surveillance results remained high as over 75 percent of those detected were either inspected or boarded. There were 3,258 inspections and 1,997 boardings reported during the month resulting in the detention of 29 craft and 192 persons. Reasons given for detentions were lack of or faulty identification papers, suspected draft dodgers, incorrect or faulty manifests, possession of contraband, and restricted zone violators.

There were only 25 naval gunfire support missions conducted during the month, and only a minimum of gun damage assessment was reported.

At midnight on 16 January eight 82mm mortar rounds landed in the vicinity of the Camp McDermott BOQ area at Nha Trang. LCDR D. D. Crabbe, Commander Task Group 115.2.2, received minor shrapnel wounds while en route to a bunker. He was treated at the 8th Field Hospital and released.

Third Coastal Zone

Indigenous coastal traffic increased in the Third Coastal Zone during January to almost three times the number of December detections. Surveillance results were not as impressive as in previous months as only 44 percent of the 20,187 craft detected were either boarded or inspected. There were 4,140 craft inspected and another 4,927 craft boarded resulting in the detention of 77 persons for lack of or faulty identification papers, incorrect or faulty manifests, and possession of contraband. There were 25 Viet Cong suspects and four confirmed Viet Cong detained by Market Time units. The "Swift" boats continued their patrols of the lower Bassac and Co Chien Rivers, detecting 6,895 watercraft and inspecting 3,027 and boarding 2,822. There were three craft and 21 persons detained and no incidents of evading craft reported.

During January, Market Time units of the Third Coastal Zone conducted approximately 140 naval gunfire support missions in response to requests for urgent naval gunfire support, H and I, targets of opportunity, or in pre-planned river and canal incursions.

The PT BANKS (USCG WFB), LTJG Chiswell commanding, established a pre-planned waterborne guardpost early on the morning of 1 January about 15 miles northeast of Tra Vinh (XS 735 027). The PT BANKS' skimmer proceeded about one mile to the north and conducted covert surveillance and heard a sampan with an outboard motor transiting the Rach Bang Cung. About 15 minutes later two heavily laden sampans

with armed guards approached from a large canal to the west. When hailed to stop, small arms fire was received by the skimmer and suppressive automatic weapons fire was returned. While attempting to close the sampans, small arms fire was received from the northwest bank and suppressed prior to the skimmer being extracted. There were no friendly casualties while five VC were killed, and two 20-foot sampans with long shaft motors were destroyed.

On the morning of 10 January, the PT CYPRESS, LTJG Godfrey commanding, while on normal Market Time patrol, 19 miles northeast of Tra Vinh (XS 740 030), spotted a large sampan exiting a canal. The sampan ignored the PT CYPRESS' flashing light, siren, and shots across the bow and turned to head back into the canal; however, strong current would not permit it. The sampan headed down stream away from the WPB. A skimmer was put in the water and overtook the sampan, capturing the four occupants. The occupants were turned over to Coastal Group 34, and initial interrogation indicated they were all Viet Cong.


While an normal Market Time patrol on the afternoon of 19 January, the PT GRACE (USCG WPB) detected and boarded a disabled junk BX 46 about 15 miles southeast of Soc Trang (XR 390 630). The junk was missing a rudder and was unable to make any headway against the wind and flooding currents. There were only women and children aboard the junk and it was towed to (XR 400 600) and released.

On the afternoon of 26 January, the PT CYPRESS (USCG WPB), while on normal Market Time patrol 17 miles southeast of Tra Vinh (XS 706 045), was ambushed with B-40 rockets and heavy automatic weapons fire. The WPB responded immediately with 50 caliber fire and suppressed the enemy fire; 81mm mortars were then fired into the area. Air strikes were called in; however, due to lack of continuous contact, air assets were not scrambled. The WPB received one rocket hit at frame 37 about eight feet above the water line causing light damage to the bulkhead. There were no friendly casualties, and enemy casualties were unknown.

The Province Sector Advisor from Binh Dai requested emergency naval gunfire support from the PT GRACE (USCG WPB) on the evening of 28 January. An outpost, 18 miles southeast of Ben Tre (XS 845 165) was under heavy enemy mortar attack. Friendly troops were in contact with an estimated platoon of Viet Cong, and the WPB was requested to act as a blocking force in an adjacent river. Upon securing from the blocking action, H and I fire was placed on an extortion station. When exiting the river, a sampan was detected and attempted to evade. It was taken under fire and the three occupants tried to swim ashore. There was one VC killed and two VC captured. The sampan sank before it could be searched for arms. There were no personnel casualties aboard the PT GRACE. Results of the ground action were unknown.


A friendly outpost 12 miles east of Soc Trang (XR 342 540) came under attack by an estimated 70 Viet Cong early on the morning

OPERATIONS IN THE THIRD COASTAL ZONE



- A. PT BANKS - 1 JAN
- B. PT CYPRESS - 10 JAN
- C. PT GRACE - 19 JAN
- D. PT CYPRESS - 26 JAN
- E. PT GRACE - 28 JAN
- F. PT PARTRIDGE - 31 JAN

SCALE:



of 31 January. The PT PARTRIDGE (USCGC WPB), on normal Market Time patrol was advised of the attack and proceeded to the area and fired 81mm mortars on the VC positions. A U.S. Army helo gunship and 221st RAC Unit 36 arrived on the scene a few minutes later and fired on the enemy positions. Upon departing the area, the WPB fired 50 caliber H and I along the shore line as requested by the sector advisor. There were no friendly casualties to the supporting units, and casualties to the outpost were unknown. There were 10 Viet Cong known killed and probably more. Numerous automatic weapons captured by the outpost.

Gulf of Thailand Surveillance Group CTG 115.4

While on normal Market Time patrol in area 9F on the morning of 3 January, PCF 17 boarded and searched a sampan about 22 miles southwest of Rach Gia (VR 840 750). There were two women and three children in the sampan, and they were in a restricted area. The women had identification but no papers for twelve 100 pound bags of rice. The rice was confiscated and turned over to the Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer at Song Ong Doc for disposition.

On 10 January, PCF 17 again stopped, boarded, and searched a sampan about three miles from the above location (VR 840 750) and detained one Vietnamese male who had thirty five 100 pound bags for which he had no papers. The 3,500 pounds of rice and the detainee were turned over to NIO Song Ong Doc for disposition.

The next day, PCF 37 detained one Vietnamese male in the same area for having no identification and fifteen 100 pound bags of rice without papers. The detainee and 1,500 pounds of rice were turned over to NILO Rach Gia for disposition.

On 12 January, PCF 37 stopped another sampan in the same area with 900 pounds of unmanifested rice. One male detainee and the rice were turned over to NILO Rach Gia for disposition.

Gulf of Thailand Offshore Patrol Unit Area 8/9

(WHEC Assigned) CTG 115.6

The USCGC DALLAS (WHEC 716) scored heavily against the enemy on the afternoon of 7 January, 6 and one half miles southeast of Song Ong Doc (VQ 890 930). The cutter provided destructive Naval gunfire support (NGFS) on Viet Cong structures and troops. There were three structures, and one large food cache destroyed and one bunker heavily damaged. A later report also credited the DALLAS with three NVA and three VC killed.

In response to a request from CTG 194.2 the USCGC TANBY (WHEC 37) fired a destructive NGFS mission ten miles north of the Song Ong Doc (VR 827 184) on the afternoon of 14 January. The targets were enemy troops and supplies, and the five-inch gun of the cutter destroyed one structure and heavily damaged three others. There were eight enemy killed and no friendly casualties.

Four targets were taken under destruction fire by the five-inch gun of the USCGC DALLAS (WHEC 716) on 25 January, 17 miles northwest of Thoi Binh (VR 830 475). Expending over 240 rounds, the cutter destroyed three structures and three bunkers and heavily damaged six structures and two sampans. The cutter was also credited with killing an estimated eight Viet Cong.

On the morning of 26 January, the USCGC DALLAS fired a destructive NGFS mission at a range of 17,000 yards, about 12 miles north of Song Ong Doc (VR 828 170). The targets were heavy automatic weapons positions. The five inch gun of the cutter destroyed one structure and three fish nets and heavily damaged three structures. There were three enemy troops killed.

Again on 27 January, the USCGC DALLAS (WHEC 716) was called upon to fire a destructive mission against VC bunkers and structures about ten miles northeast of Song Ong Doc (VR 285 170 and VR 880 133). This mission resulted in four structures destroyed and 11 damaged, four bunkers destroyed and two damaged, two sampans destroyed and six damaged, one large food cache, and 10 fish drying mats destroyed. There were two enemy troop probably killed.


The USCGC HAMILTON (WHEC 715) destroyed four structures, one bunker, and two sampans, while heavily damaging 19 structures, three bunkers, and six sampans in a NGFS mission on the evening of 30 January. The mission was requested and cleared by the Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer from Ca Mau and the targets consisted of structures,

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GULF OF THAILAND SURVEILLANCE GROUP - CTG 115.4

GULF OF THAILAND OFFSHORE PATROL UNIT AREA 8/9 - CTG 115.9

COASTAL ZONE



bunkers, and rice paddies located about ten miles north of Song Ong Doc (VR 846 145). In addition, one Viet Cong was probably killed.

Again on 31 January, the USCGC HAMILTON provided destructive fire on bunkers, structures and sampans 11 miles north of Song Ong Doc (VR 833 148). This mission was also requested and cleared by NILO Ca Mau. The five inch guns, firing at a range of 12,000 yards, destroyed two structures, four sampans, one heavily loaded, and eight bunkers and damaged 10 structures and five sampans. There were also one large secondary explosion and one secondary fire. The cutter was credited with killing 10 enemy troops.

Market Time Units

Patrol aircraft detachments from five Navy patrol squadrons manned the Market Time air barrier patrols during January. Patrol Squadron TWENTY-TWO (VP 22) operated out of U-Tapao, Thailand. Detachments from VP-17, VP-46, VP-47 and VP-50 operated from Cam Ranh Bay.

The following SEVENTH Fleet ships operated in Market Time during the month of January:

USS PRIME (MSO 466)	1 - 5
USS EMBATTLE (MSO 434)	6 - 31
USCGC HAMILTON (WHEC 715)	1, 12 -31
USCGC DALLAS (WHEC 716)	2 - 12, 15 - 25
USCGC TANEY (WHEC 37)	13 - 23

USCGC CHASE (WHEC 718)	1 - 14, 24 - 31
USS VIREO (MSC 205)	1 - 11
USS GANNET (MSC 290)	12 - 31
USS ACME (MSO 508)	1 - 5
USS REAPER (MSO 467)	6 - 31
USCGC KLAMATH (WHEC 66)	1 - 11, 26 - 31
USS VERNON COUNTY (LST 1161)	1 - 18
USS TIOGA COUNTY (LST 1158)	15 - 31

PCF's assigned to Coastal Divisions as of 11 February:

<u>ELEVEN</u> <u>An Thoi</u>	<u>TWELVE</u> <u>Danang</u>	<u>THIRTEEN</u> <u>Cat Lo</u>	<u>FOURTEEN</u> <u>Cam Ranh Bay</u>
3 52	10	6 63	61
5 56	13	20 65	70
9 64	15	21 71	75
12 72	39	24 74	
17 73	62	46 87	
18 82	69	48 95	
22 88	79	53 97	
25 89	80	54 98	
27 90	81	59 99	
35 93	92	60 102	
36 94	101	103	
37 96			
38 691			
40 672			
45 693			
50 694			
51 695			
(34)	(11)	(21)	(03)

Total Assigned PCF (69)

PCF's in Overhaul

<u>PCF Location</u>	<u>Commenced</u>	<u>ETC</u>	<u>EST Length</u>
55 Cam Ranh Bay	3 Jan 70	18 Feb 70	45 Days
78 Cam Ranh Bay	1 Feb 70	12 Mar 70	40 Days

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32 Cam Ranh Bay	16 Jan 70	2 Mar 70	45 Days
28 Cat Lo	7 Jan 70	21 Feb 70	45 Days
31 Qui Nhon	1 Feb 70	17 Mar 70	45 Days

Total Non-assigned PCF (05)
Grand Total (74)

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MARKET TIME
MONTHLY HISTORICAL SUMMARY
JANUARY 1970
STATISTICAL SECTION

Average No. U.S. ships/craft on patrol during month.

	<u>MSO</u>	<u>MSC</u>	<u>WPB</u>	<u>PCF</u>	<u>LST</u>	<u>PG</u>	<u>WHEC</u>
AVG	2	1	8	45	1	1	3

Average No. VNN ships/junks employed during month.

	<u>Sea Force</u>	<u>River Force</u>	<u>Coastal Force</u>
Total	41	303	198

U.S. Activity

Total Detected	Wood - Day	20,431	Night	3,609	<u>24,474</u>
	Steel - Day	198	Night	236	
Total Inspected	Wood - Day	7,308	Night	1,583	<u>9,215</u>
	Steel - Day	141	Night	183	
Total Boarded	Wood - Day	9,528	Night	537	<u>10,076</u>
	Steel - Day	7	Night	4	

VNN Activity

Junks Searched	80,611	Junks Detained	99
Persons Searched	255,136	Persons Detained	359


U.S. Activity

Junks Detained	104	Persons Detained	513
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Stable Door

Det	34,175
Ins	3,546
Brd	2,485

DETECTIONS, INSPECTIONS, BOARDINGS BY MARKET TIME UNITS



Operation Sea Float/Tran Hung Dao III

There were over 200 gunfire support missions conducted during January, including over 60 Sea Float and SEAL missions. These missions continued to maximize damage to known or suspected VC base camps, extortion stations, and secret zones although the primary emphasis continued to be pacification of the Ca Mau Peninsula. The following U.S. and VNN craft and units operated at Sea Float during part or all of the month: PCF's 3, 5, 9, 12, 18, 22, 27, 35, 40, 45, 50, 51, 52, 54, 56, 72, 73, 88, 94 and 96; USS VERNON COUNTY (LST 1161), USS WASHOE COUNTY (LST 1165); USS GALLUP (PG 85), USS ANTELOPE (PG 86), USS CROCKETT (PG 88); Sea Float River Assault Craft Detachment consisting of ATC's 4, 9, and 13, ASPB's 2 and 3, Zippo 2, Monitor 2, and Utility Boat 2; an LSSC; SEAL Team ONE; UDT 12; OV-10's; Seawolves, Slicks; LSSL's HQ229 and HQ321; LSM's 401, 403 and 405; Coastal Group 33, 35 and 36 craft and personnel; VNN PCF's 00, 01, 03, 09, 10, 11, 12; VNN POLWAR Team; VNN Reaction Team; VNN Rangers; EOD MUPAC Team VNN 06; Kit Carson Scouts; MST TWO Detachments F and G; Regional Force Troops; Revolutionary Development Team, and Mobile Strike Force. These forces conducted day and night blocking forces, strikes, patrols, waterborne guardposts, listening and observation post, psyops missions, and escort services for logistic craft along the rivers and canals of the Sea Float operating area. Air assets continued to provide psyops missions in those areas inaccessible to the craft. All afloat units and the Mobile Advance Tactical Support Base continued to conduct nightly H and I fire into known and suspected VC base camps and extortion areas.

On 8 January, CDR T. R. M. Emery, USN, returned to Sea Float after approximately three months at Cam Ranh Bay as Commander Task Force 115's Chief Staff Officer and assumed command of Sea Float. CDR J. C. Patrick, USN, who had been the Commander of Sea Float since 17 September returned to Cam Ranh Bay as Chief Staff Officer of CTF 115.

On 9 January, CDR Thinh, VNN arrived at Sea Float/Tran Hung Dao III and assumed duty as second in command.

On 10 January, 180 Mobile Strike Force troops arrived Sea Float to augment existing forces.

Senator Dominick, VADM E. R. Zumwalt, Jr., USN, Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam, and party visited Sea Float on 11 January and were briefed on current Sea Float operations and accomplishment. Following the briefings, they were given a tour of Solid Anchor and the Tran Hung Dao Villages.

Rear Admiral D. M. Ruble, USN, COMPHIBTRAPAC, Captain L. S. Curtin, USN, and party visited Sea Float on 17 January and were briefed on operations, accomplishments, intelligence and psyops followed by a tour of Solid Anchor and Tran Hung Dao II.

Mr. J. Grimes, SECNAV's Special Assistant for Vietnamization, visited Sea Float and was briefed and given a tour of Solid Anchor and Tran Hung Dao I on 20 January.

On 23 January, Rear Admiral H. Suerstedt, USN, prospective Deputy COMNAVFORV, visited Sea Float and Solid Anchor. He was briefed on the development, operations, intelligence, and progress of Sea Float, Solid Anchor, and the Annex. A tour of the Solid Anchor site and an overflight of the Annex followed the briefings.

The Honorable B. G. Shillito, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics, and VADM Zumwalt visited Sea Float on 28 January and were briefed on Sea Float, Solid Anchor, accomplishments at the Tran Hung Dao Villages and the tactical use of Sea Float assets.

SEAL Operations

On a reconnaissance patrol on 4 January south of the Rach Cai Chon, 16 kilometers southeast of Old Nam Cam (WQ 144 645), SEAL's were inserted by a U.S. Army Slick with Seawolves overhead. Camouflaged sampans were sighted during the patrol and taken under fire. A six hootch complex containing one elderly male and 30 women and children was searched with negative results. They were told they would be better off if they relocated to the Sea Float Annex which they agreed to do in three days. During the patrol, one VC was killed. There were four hootches, four sampans with motors and 2,500 pounds of shrimp destroyed. There were no friendly casualties.



A SEAL mission was conducted on 6 January about 10 kilometers northeast of Old Nam Can (WQ 048 763) to capture people and gain intelligence about the area. SEAL Team ONE, Detachment GOLF, departed Sea Float aboard a Slick, and during the insertion, heavy automatic weapons fire was received. The SEAL's were extracted and returned to Sea Float. Seawolves placed two strikes in the area, and two OV-10 Black Ponies placed a strike in the area 20 minutes later. One U.S. sailor received minor wounds, and one U.S. Army Slick helo received extensive damage. There was one Viet Cong killed, and one sampan destroyed.

Early on the morning of 8 January, SEAL's departed Sea Float via PCF's 45 and 50 and later transferred to an LSSC for insertion about 33 kilometers west of Sea Float (WQ 310 754), in a mission to capture six VC known to be living in the area. After patrolling 300 meters toward the objectives, a sampan with two VC was hailed and a short conversation with the VNN interpreter ensued. The patrol then continued and observed two lighted hootches with several people moving in the area. Another sampan with two VC was engaged in conversation, and they stated "We saw PCF's on the way in, they have brought a special force to attack us." Other sampans were taken under fire as they exited the canal. The SEAL's then patrolled to the hootches and destroyed them after a thorough search. During the extraction, automatic weapons fire was received, and Black Ponies from Binh Thuy were called in to suppress the enemy fire. The SEAL's killed eight VC (4 BC, 4 probable), destroyed two hootches, three sampans and captured two rockets and two rocket launchers. There were no friendly casualties.

SEAL Team ONE departed Sea Float late on the night of 11 January on a mission to capture four Viet Cong infrastructure about 10 kilometers northeast of Sea Float (WQ 084 822). The SEAL's were inserted via an LSSC and patrolled two kilometers to the north where a hootch was searched and one VC captured. During the search of other hootches small arms fire was received, and when the SEAL's were unable to suppress it, Seawolves and Black Ponies were scrambled to put strikes in the area. The air assets succeeded in suppressing the enemy fire, and the SEAL's were extracted via a U.S. Army Slick and returned to Sea Float. There were no friendly casualties while five VC were killed and one VC captured.

Seven Viet Cong were killed by the SEAL's in a mission to interdict commo-liaison and resupply routes along the Rach Ong Trang about 17 kilometers southwest of Sea Float (VQ 850 576) on the morning of 15 January. The SEAL's were inserted by LSSC at 0300H and set a listening post where shortly three sampans traveling south were hailed, and when they attempted to evade, they were taken under fire. They were unable to search a fourth sampan on the bank due to the area being heavily booby trapped. The SEAL's were extracted and returned to Sea Float without further incident. There were two sampans destroyed and one sampan captured. There were no friendly casualties.

While in waterborne interdiction site on the night of 21 January about 20 kilometers northeast of Old Nam Can (WQ 212 759), SEAL Team ONE sighted two sampans with six persons embarked. When the craft were hailed, they attempted to evade and were taken under fire, killing all six. The sampans were searched, and one German mauser rifle, three grenades, and several rounds of small arms ammunition were captured along with seven kilos of documents containing 25 maps. The two sampans were then destroyed, and the SEAL's were extracted and returned to Sea Float without incident. There were no friendly casualties.

Sea Float Missions

On the morning of 13 January, a Mobile Strike Force platoon of 42 men were inserted by PCF's 94, 22 and 35 and VNN PCF on the east bank of the Kinh Ngang Canal (WQ 010 732) and commenced a sweep to the southeast. An unoccupied Viet Cong Base Camp was located, and the structures, along with a sampan and two bunkers, were destroyed. The troops continued their sweep to the southeast without further incident and were extracted by LSSC. During the extraction, several rounds of harassing small arms fire were received; however, it was not returned since it could not be determined from what direction it originated. There were no friendly casualties. The troops destroyed 15 structures, one sampan, and two bunkers during the operation.

A VNN Reaction Team, a UDT team, and an EOD team embarked on PCF's 22, 35, 69 and 94 transited the Song Bo De and South China Sea to the Rach Nang (WQ 162 780), where the troops were inserted at the canals' mouth on both banks. The units swept down the canal encountering numerous booby traps on both banks and offensive bunkers on the south bank. An unknown type ordnance exploded on the port side of

PCF 94, causing numerous holes in the engineroom, flooding and knocking the port engine out of commission. There were two U.S. sailors slightly wounded. The troops swept down to the explosion site but were unable to uncover any evidence as to the type of explosion. The troops were extracted, and all units exited the canal without further incident. There were five bunkers, one structure, one sampan, and 35 traps destroyed. Enemy casualties were unknown.

A thirty man VNN Reaction Force, a UDT team, and an EOD team were inserted by PCF's 12, 18, and 27 on the Rach Cai Ngay (WQ 115 729) to conduct sweeps east along the banks on 16 January. Various booby trapped grenades, land mines, fish traps, hootches, and bunkers were destroyed. The "Swift" boats placed 81mm mortar prep fire in front of the sweeping troops. While sweeping the north bank an electrical wire was discovered leading from the river bank to an offensive bunker complex ten meters inland. Further investigation revealed that 3-4 personnel had been waiting in ambush with their primary weapon being an anti-boat mine located at the bottom of the canal. A battery firing assembly was recovered in the vicinity of the bunkers, and the electrical leads were cut. A line was secured around the object, and, utilizing a tow line, a PCF pulled the object onto the bank. It was then determined that it was a U.S. made 750 pound bomb converted into an electrically, command detonated water mine. The EOD team destroyed the mine, and all units returned to Sea Float without incident. There were seven booby trapped grenades, four bunkers, six hootches,

two fish trap, and one land mine destroyed in addition to the 750 pound mine. There were no friendly casualties during the operation.

On the morning of 19 January, PCF's 72, 94 and VNN 12 embarked a UDT, EOD, and 20 man VNN Reaction Team and proceeded up a canal running north of the Song Cua Lon (WQ 171 605). About 600 meters up the canal, a wire was found across the canal. The troops were inserted on both banks. After it was discovered that the wire was not booby trapped, it was pulled down by the PCF's. The troops then moved north and east up the canal with Seawolves providing cover. The USS CROCKETT (PG 88) was prep firing the area 1,000 meters in front of the troops. Five VC, camouflaging three sampans, were surprised on the east bank, and after small arms fire was exchanged, they made a hasty departure with friendly forces in pursuit; however, the VC quickly disappeared into the thick brush. The ground elements then encountered several structures, bunkers, a food cache, and a large fish trap. Continuing the sweep north along the canal, more structures, bunkers, punji stakes, and sampans were discovered. The troops then swept west, destroying bunkers en route, and were extracted for return to Sea Float without further incidents. The day operation resulted in the destruction of 19 bunkers, 12 sampans, 12 structures, and five canal obstructions. The ground forces also captured two mortars, 200 pounds of shrimp, 30 pounds of salt, 50 pounds dried fish, 75 pounds of rice, six large fishnets, and one pound of documents. There were no friendly casualties, and one VC was wounded.


On 24 January, 16 reaction force personnel were inserted by Slicks in two elements about 25 kilometers southwest of Sea Float (VQ 744 498) for a reconnaissance patrol. The patrol encountered enemy fire several times, and it was suppressed. Five VC were countered and taken under fire prior to setting an interdiction post. While on the interdiction post, several VC approached at various times by sampan and were either killed or captured. During interrogation of one of the VC, it was learned that there were 30 VC in the area looking for the patrol. During the operation, Seawolves placed strikes in the area, and on one strike received heavy automatic weapons fire. Black Ponies were called to place a strike in the same area, and the enemy fire was silenced. The patrol was extracted by Slicks at 2300H without further incident. There was one friendly seriously wounded (non-U.S.). Ten VC were killed and five VC captured. There were eight sampans, 30 uniforms, and 250 kilos of supplies destroyed and four small arms captured.

SEA FLOAT

COASTAL ZONE

LEGEND.

- = Coastal Surveillance Center
- X = Hostile Fire/Evasion Incident
- # = SAR/MEDEVAC Incident



- A. SEALS - 4 JAN
- B. SEALS - 6 JAN
- C. SEALS - 8 JAN
- D. SEALS - 11 JAN
- E. SEALS - 15 JAN
- F. SEALS - 21 JAN
- G. Sea Float - 13 JAN
- H. Sea Float - 14 JAN
- I. Sea Float - 16 JAN
- J. Sea Float - 19 JAN
- K. IVY/Covers - 24 JAN

Operation Stable Door

Adverse weather in the Second Coastal Zone harbors during most of January resulted in the detection of only 34,175 craft by Stable Door Forces approximately 7,000 less than during December. Of these 3,546 were inspected and another 2,485 were boarded. There were 30 craft and 88 persons detained primarily for restricted zone violations and or altered identification papers.

On 23 January, the Accelerated Turnover to Vietnamese (ACTOV) program began for Stable Door Units THREE and FOUR located in Qui Nhon and Nha Trang respectively. This turnover was expected to include all units in time and was expected to be completed for Units THREE and FOUR by June 1970 when these units are officially turned over. There are currently fourteen Vietnamese Navy Enlisted and one Vietnamese Navy Officer at each unit.

Unit ONE - Vung Tau

On 3 January the USS CHOWANOC (ATF 100) notified the Harbor Entrance Control Post (HECP) of a possible swimmer sighted near the ship. LCPL/33 and Picket 26 proceeded to the anchorage and commenced a search using a spot light and expending 25 grenades and 20 flares. LCPL 33 resumed normal patrol and Picket 26 continued the search until EOD personnel arrived on the scene. After a thorough search of the anchor chain and hull failed to produce any positive results, the search was terminated.

On 19 January the SS RUTGERS VICTORY notified the HECF that a body had been sighted floating off her starboard bow. PL35 proceeded to the scene and recovered the body. The body was taken to the De Long pier and turned over to the National Police and a CID Representative. The body was a Vietnamese male about 14 years old without any identification papers.

PL33 witnessed the collision of two Vietnamese junks on 28 January resulting in one of them sinking. Two persons, one seriously injured were taken aboard the PL 33. They were both taken to the MSTs pier where an awaiting ambulance took them to the Le Loi Hospital. The owner of one junk, Nguyen Van Dinh, died shortly after arrival at the hospital.

The USNS COMET, entering the Vung Tau harbor on 28 January reported a body floating down her port side in the vicinity of buoy two. Picket 26 proceeded to the area and recovered the body of a caucasian male wearing civilian clothes and about 23 years old. The only identification found on the body was military identification tag indicating his name as Thomas J. Kordosky and social security number [REDACTED]. The cause of death was undetermined. The body was taken to the De Long Pier and turned over to the 345th Medical Detachment.

The USNS CORPUS CHRISTI BAY reported a body floating down her port side on 29 January. Picket 33 recovered the body and transferred it to Picket 26, who proceeded the DeLong Pier and turned the body over to the 345th Medical Detachment. The body was that of a Negro wearing civilian clothes and containing no identification.

Unit TWO - Cam Ranh Bay

On the evening of 2 January, Skimmer 27 sighted several men entering Cam Ranh Village from the south along the beach. They were carrying either a 30 caliber or M-60 barrel and tripod and a box of 50 caliber ammunition. Warning shots were fired in an attempt to stop them, but to no avail as they all ran for the village.

On the night of 9 January, LCPL 37 reported a fire deep in the south bay. Picket 51 proceeded to investigate and reported that it appeared personnel were fishing in the area. Due to the shallow water Skimmer 26 was dispatched to assist LCPL 37, proceeded to 150 yards off the beach and reported that the fires were lanterns on fish nets strung out just off the beach.

While on routine patrol on 18 January, PL 39 sighted the Maritime Police Boat 143 coming out of Cam Ranh Village and headed straight toward them. PL 39 took evasive action but could not avoid the collision as the Maritime Boat was running too fast and was showing no lights. PL 39 received a three inch crack in her hull above the water line and damage to the beading around the port cleat. The Maritime Boat received damage to the forward section of her bow.

On 26 January the Harbor Entrance Control Post (HECP) received a call from Commander Operational Control Center (COCC) reporting a junk with one man on board landing at the RMK tower. Skimmers 26 and 30 were sent to investigate and received small arms fire about six minutes later. The Skimmers cleared the area, but it could not be

determined who was doing the firing. Later the HECF was informed that the man who beached at the RMK tower had worked for them and lived on the peninsula.

Unit THREE - Qui Nhon

During a RECON flight by the 1st platoon, 203rd Reconnaissance Company on 6 January, one person was spotted going into a bunker. Sea Cobras were inserted and skimmers set up a waterborne guardpost. The Sea Cobras made a sweep of the area with negative results. Three separate caves, all empty, were discovered and destroyed. Approximately 200 rounds of 30 caliber ammunition were found in a stream and destroyed with grenades.

On 7 January, Sea Cobras with Vietnamese Provincial Reconnaissance Unit (PRU) personnel embarked were dispatched to look for a reported Viet Cong who desired to surrender. Picket 39 with Sea Cobras aboard discovered a cave containing papers with writing, a flashlight, two pair of short pants, two harnesses, 50 AK-47 rounds, a camouflaged shirt and a camouflaged parachute. There was no enemy contact and all items were turned over to the PRU forces.

On 11 January, tower number one reported a junk proceeding from Hai Minh Village to the Qui Nhon docking area. LCPL 38 was called to intercept it, but the junk had entered shallow water and shots across her bow failed to stop the junk. The HECF reported that there were six men aboard the junk and that they unloaded several boxes at the Cam Docks area.

On 20 January a five ton truck loaded with ten tons of rice sunk in water just off the Mike Boat Landing at the LST Beach. The truck was backing off a Mike Boat and when the rear wheels got on the beach the tractor pushed the Mike Boat away from the beach. Salvage operations were conducted by Unit THREE's Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team and the truck and trailer were recovered along with ten tons of ruined rice.

On 11 January, Skimmers 12, 32 and 89 inserted Sea Cobras for an area sweep on the east side of the bay (CR 122 307), while the Skimmers and Picket 19 provided offshore support. As the Recondo team swept inland, the point man met and took under fire one VC at a distance of five feet. The Recondo team then withdrew and two more VC were encountered by the rear security element and taken under fire. The team was then extracted and B Battery, 41st Artillery responded with area saturation fire. There were two VC killed, one VC wounded and one sampan destroyed.

Also on 20 January, the boat captain of Skimmer 32 accidentally dropped a grenade in the skimmer while conducting grenade drops. Both crew members dove into the water and were later picked up by Skimmer 29 uninjured. Skimmer 29 then went alongside and extinguished the fire and towed the damaged skimmer to the LCPL Pier. Skimmer 32 had the starboard side transom blown out, engine wiring burned out and steering cables ruined.

Unit FOUR - Nha Trang


On 5 January, the Liberian Cargo Ship KADMILOS requested medical assistance from Unit FOUR. Skimmer 25 proceeded to the ship and found two seriously wounded personnel, one with a possible skull fracture, fractured jaw and a compound fracture of the right hip. The second man had a skull fracture and several contusions. The injuries were the result of falling into a cargo hold. The injured personnel were taken to the Cau Da pier where an ambulance met the skimmer and took the injured men to the Eight Field Hospital for treatment.

While on routine patrol on 11 January, LCPL-43 stopped a water taxi (DIOINTDC) and discovered 35 - 100 pound sacks of rice and 18 sand bags of corn. All of this cargo was not manifested and one male was detained for having an incorrect boat registration number, along with the unmanifested cargo.

The 228th Signal Company located on Hon Tre Island requested assistance on 15 January to search for a missing CATAMARAN sailing craft with two U.S. Army personnel on board after the craft had been missing for about five hours. PL43 was dispatched to search the coastline of Hon Tre, Hon Mieu, Hon Tam and the eastern coastline of the Dong Bo area. After four hours the search was terminated with negative results. On 16 January Skimmer 25 resumed search of the coastline. It was later reported by local Vietnamese fisherman that the missing personnel were located on Hon Tam Island. The craft was then towed to the LCU landing on Hon Tre Island.

The cargo ship SUNSHINE STATE requested medical assistance on 23 January, stating they had an injured man on board. PL48 was sent to the ship with an 8th Field Hospital Corpsman to determine the extent of the injuries. It was determined that the man had a skull concussion caused by a fall as the result of an epileptic fit. The injured man was transported to Unit FOUR's pier and further transferred to the 8th Field Hospital for treatment.

DETECTIONS, INSPECTIONS, BOARDINGS BY STABLE DOOR UNITS



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LESSONS LEARNED

The following Lessons Learned information was submitted by Commander Task Force 115, message 311340Z

a. Organization and Administration

1. Centralized maintenance of personnel records, pay, health, service, and dental, by the various support activities and detachments is of inestimable value as it not only relieves the afloat staffs of this responsibility but gives the operational commander complete freedom with his assets when reacting to intelligence, contingency plans, or special operations.

2. Problems continually arise within the area of mutual support/liaison which invariably have to be resolved by personal contact between higher echelons. These problems become even more complex when third country nationals are involved. The majority of the third country national liaison problems are usually immediately solvable through the liaison establishment. However, conflicts do arise when the liaison officer is not of an equal or higher level than those in command who are being advised. In essence, a well-established liaison network at command levels, province levels, sector levels, and even political levels can contribute much to the generation of mutual support, the minimization of mutual interference, and the elimination of safety corridors and havens for the enemy along the existing political and military boundaries.

3. Operation Sea Float, a Combined Command

(a) Organization and Administration: The initial organizational structure consisted of a staff comprised of USN and VNN officers, with a USN commander in charge and a VNN commander as

second in command. Waterborne assets, from which operations were conducted and logistic support was provided, also came from both the U.S. Navy and Vietnamese Navy. This organizational structure has remained the same and has proven to be a workable situation. One position in this structure that has proved marginally workable is that of second in command. It is currently held by the IV CZ commander, as a collateral duty. Because of his other responsibilities and the remoteness of Sea Float, he is unable to establish his headquarters at Sea Float. To compensate for this situation the IV CZ commander rotates his Chief of Staff Officer and COSDIV Commander to Sea Float to act in his place. This arrangement eases the situation. However, satisfactory solutions have always been achieved through discussion or, when absolutely necessary, by exercising the prerogative of command.

(b) Upon the assignment of ground forces for Sea Float/Solid Anchor base defense, other organizational problems arose. Two separate units were assigned. The VNN Rangers arrived with an American advisor and reported to COMMANDER SEA FLOAT. Accordingly they were an integral part of the chain of command and liaison could be easily established through the advisor. The other base defense unit assigned was a regional force company that arrived without an American advisor. Their chain of command initially went from the company commander straight to the district chief. Consequently, all orders had to come straight from the district chief. Also the lack of an advisor precluded any easy liaison between Sea Float and the company. This problem area was resolved when the district chief

instructed the company commander that he would take orders from COMMANDER SEA FLOAT. This problem was further alleviated with the assignment of a military assistance team. One base defense organizational problem area that still remains is the lack of cooperation between these two units. The RF company and the VNN Rangers each consider themselves superior to the other. An obvious solution to the problem is the assignment of one large unit with sufficient troops to defend the perimeter. This would provide for only one ground commander, with control of all the forces that comprise the base defense.

4. One of the most evident lessons learned from the organizational point of view is that programs similar to SCATTER AND START should be an integral part of any campaign undertaken by Free World Military Assistance Forces. The benefits of such a program are two fold.

(a) One: The purpose of the FWMAF is to do just that, assist, not do the job instead. The enforcement of J.G.S. promulgated law by the U. S. Navy and U. S. Coast Guard gets the tasks done but it does not necessarily enhance the image of the GVN. Conversely, combined USN/VNN or USCG/VNN crews with vessels flying dual ensigns not only signify the enforcement of the GVN law by the VNN but also shows the GVN flag.

(b) Two: The immediate formation of combined crews would enable the nation receiving the assistance to generate a well-informed, well-trained cadre of varying experience levels which

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would enhance the formation of an in-country training program as the armed forces expands. Since the training cadre would exist, the following on turnover programs would not be hindered by the requirement to train the training cadre.

b. Personnel:

1. Operation Sea Float:

(a) Personnel: There are approximately 700 personnel assigned to Operation Sea Float, of which 193 are U. S. Additional personnel could be effectively utilized in all areas of operations. However, the physical size of the Sea Float MATSB precludes any further personnel expansion. U. S. personnel assigned are highly motivated and professionally qualified. As is the case at most advanced bases, morale is high. The Vietnamese personnel assigned have progressed satisfactorily in taking over the operation. They are currently conducting all Psyops at the annex, participating in combined operations, taking an active part in the planning of operations, and conducting totally VNN operations other than Psyops. It is considered that by the time the Solid Anchor base is completed, the Vietnamese will be ready to assume full responsibility for the base and be adequately proficient in river operations to maintain a GVN presence in the area.

2. Personnel Assignment:

(a) In screening volunteers or nominees for duty in Vietnam, a close look should be given to suitability in living with others and sobriety. Personnel who are considered "poor neighbors"

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in stateside conditions are certainly not going to do better in the close quarters and heavy interdependence required of in-country sailors. The one year tour is a great morale factor. It also provides a good chance of choosing more desirable duty stations upon return. The incidence of extensions, especially among enlisted, is very high, providing a nucleus of highly-motivated, experienced PO's.

(b) The VNN personnel lack motivation and discipline when compared to USN personnel. This is because of the rapid expansion of the navy. It will be necessary to build their motivation and discipline considerably if they are to have an effective navy upon turn over. This can be done through the Personal Response program and by setting high standards of performance for VNN turned over assets by senior VNN officers. More often than not, senior VNN officers expect far less from their forces than do U. S. commanders. However, the important thing to remember above assessing VNN effectiveness or progress is that it must be viewed in terms of a six month or year basis, using this method of evaluation, the VNN progress has been excellent. Quantifying this on a 4.0 basis, the VNN would receive a 3.4 in progress and a 3.0 in performance.

3. PCF Manning:

(a) Manning ratio: Maintaining a 1.5 to 1 crew to boat ration on PCF's is a necessity. This ratio allows adequate relaxation periods between patrols, as well as ensuring more effective preventive maintenance on the in-port PCF's. Failure to maintain

this ratio results in crew fatigue and a decrease in morale associated with port and starboard Market Time patrols. It is also extremely important that administrative and operational commanders be kept informed of the number of operational craft assigned, since the manning ratio is based upon it.

(b) Inaccurate personnel documents: In conjunction with the maintenance of a 1.6 manning ratio, it is important that the BUPERS report 1080-14 and officers distribution control report be kept up to date, thus enabling more rapid identification of major personnel problem areas. The severe shortage of PCF OINC's and engineers in Coastal Squadron One was due, in part, to inherent in-country mail delays in feeder diaries coming from local reporting activities to the reporting and service record holding command at Naval Support Facility, Cam Ranh Bay. The personnel documents published by BUPERS may subsequently be as much as two and one half months out of date. This condition has been partially alleviated by the initiation of message reporting of feeder diaries to the squadron's reporting activity.

(c) OCS Ensign Program: Although the OCS Ensign Program did provide a ready source of PCF OINC's when they were needed, it is evident that OINC's of PCF's or similar craft should be fleet-experienced LT (JG's). The overall maturity and sense of responsibility for the craft and its crew, as well as more comprehensive training and experience in handling, displayed by fleet experienced OINC's results in more rapid in-country patrolling qualifications.

(d) Personnel Rotation: The need for rotation of personnel from high combat areas has been of major concern. To this end, Operation Billiard Shot was instituted with the PCF squadron, ensuring that an individual would remain in the heavy combat zone no longer than four months unless of his own volition, he chose to do so. This measure has resulted in increased squadron morale and subsequent improvement in overall performance of duties.

c. Material

1. Seafloat: Sea Float waterborne assets consist of 13 ammi pontoons which make up the MATSB, PCF's of which two are Vietnamese, 8 RAC, 11 Yabuta junks, 2 Seawolves, 1 LSSL, 1 LSM (H), and 1 PGM. During the initial phase of Sea Float all offensive operations were conducted by the PCF's, PG, and Seawolves which were the only assets available. As the scope of operations increased and ground troops became more frequently available, 8 RAC craft were added to assets. They have been utilized for troop transportation and for operations in areas of frequent enemy ambushed, because of their lesser vulnerability to extensive damage from B-40 rockets, and claymore mines. The Yabuta junks have been employed in the role of interdiction units on the Cua Lon, WBCP's and security for both the MATSB and the annex. The LSM (H) has been utilized exclusively as a hospital ship for the Vietnamese and as a Psyops platform at the annex. The PG and LSSL with their 3"/50 guns are utilized for NGF's for units in contact and to react to intelligence of targets outside the gunfire range of other units assigned. Unfortunately, no major repair

capability for the above units is available at Seafloat. There is a PCF maintenance team aboard. However, their capability is limited to minor repairs. Consequently, the majority of the PCF maintenance is accomplished at An Thoi. An APL is stationed off Song Ong Doc to provide a repair capability for the RAC and the VNN repair facility is at Saigon. Logistic support for the MATSB and all assets assigned is by a Vietnamese LSM which makes weekly runs. This is augmented by scheduled helo runs three times per week for urgent requirements.

2. WPB's: Maintenance is sometimes hindered by heavy operational schedules which leave limited time for **preventive maintenance** and overhauls. Also, no in-country dry dock has been available for WPB's since August 1969. Bottoms and shaft work cannot be accomplished. Serious underwater damage could cause the loss of a boat. Frequently the Naval Supply System does not supply needed parts on time. Fast supply action can be obtained, however, by CASREP of major systems. Many logistics problems have been solved by trading, borrowing, and jury rigging.

3. PCF Operational shortcomings: The use of the PCF for Market Time operations has proven the capability of the PCF to conduct coastal surveillance and deny the enemy use of ocean routes for resupply. With the advent of SEA LORDS, Sea Tiger, and Sea Float, PCF's have been charged with the task of patrolling the rivers and canals of Vietnam. On the major rivers of Vietnam, the PCF has performed superbly but has several shortcomings. The environment of narrower rivers and canals has highlighted more deficiencies.

These include:

(a) Loss of speed and maneuverability in shallow and restricted waters.

(b) Minimal armor for crew protection.

(c) Draft restriction (5') precludes patrolling in some areas.

(d) Noisy exhaust flaps warn the enemy of PCF presence in the rivers.

(e) The cooling water system of installed electrical generators becomes sand clogged and inoperable.

(f) Screws for coastal operations are not ideally suited for river patrolling and engines must be operated at lower RPM to preclude engine overload.

(g) Lack of skid protection for screws and rudder.

4. Off shore reaction units: The WHEC has, without a doubt, been the most valuable off shore reaction unit assigned to Market Time. Its long on-station time, high speed capabilities and 5"/38 gun have been of invaluable operational assistance. The reliability of the WHEC's has been exceptional.

d. Tactics:

1. Sea Float operations and tactics: Operations planned at and conducted by MATSB Nam Can fall generally into six categories:

(a) Troop sweeps and canal incursions.

(b) Polwar operations - including annex established and Psyops patrols.

- (c) Solid Anchor - Coordination of assets, escort duties.
- (d) SEAL support
- (e) Interdiction patrols and W&O.
- (f) Escort services.

(1) Tactics in the area of canal incursions and troop sweeps have evolved from the original maximum destruction PCF/SEA LOPDS raids to selective canal incursions with short troop sweeps of several hours duration. These tactics have been dictated by commitment of troops to defense of Solid Anchor AO site with a resulting limitation of operations and enemy static ambush positions in virtually all the canals south of the Song Cua Lon. Most successful missions have incorporated river assault craft as leading boats and PCF's providing 81mm fire support, bank security, and medevac services. Known or suspected ambush sites are reconned by fire. When ambushed, lead units continue through the kill zone and insert troops who then sweep back to the ambush point. This tactic has been countered by strategic placement and defense of ambush sites by the enemy. (i.e., ambush sites are located as far as possible between two side canals of sufficient size to prevent ease of foraging by troops. Also flanks and rear of site are well defended by claymore mines and mining positions. Although the MSF troops made some sweeps during the months of August and September, the interior-land areas off the major waterways are still uncontested enemy-held territory.

(2) The constant inundation of the area, which is essentially mangrove with isolated areas of hardwoods of higher

ground, makes movement extremely difficult. Communications were impaired by the dense foliage. Both of these problems could have been solved by use of an LOH to find objectives, direct troop movements, and relay communications. Close air support has been provided by Seawolves, OV-10's, and, on occasion, TAC air. Seawolves were permanently assigned to Sea Float and provided excellent service. Other assets had to be requested on a preplanned basis. Dedicated Slicks or LOH's were never available in quantities to make airborne assault feasible although the tactic lends itself to the area's terrain.

(3) The Polwar effort embodied in the Sea Float annex concept has resulted in the establishment of two government-controlled hamlets and a lucrative source of income for over 4,000 people in an area which was once a VC POW camp. While it started as an interdiction and census-taking effort, the concept, as it now stands, involves the use of PCF's with Psyops teams, broadcast equipment, and a large unit (PG, LSSL, LSM) with MEDCAP facilities and reaction force. The PCF's inform the people in the outlying areas of the presence of medical facilities, GVN hamlets, and GVN objectives in the area. The large unit also carries a Polwar team which tells the people of the advantages of relocation to GVN hamlets, and tries to obtain intelligence.

(4) MATSB's in the building of the base at Nam Can consists basically of logistic support, fire support and escort services. Logistically, MATSB's facilities were strained to support

personnel of all units. Efforts should be made to plan for expansion of all facilities in the event that success of the program makes this necessary. Defense was provided by one company each of RF troops and VNN Rangers. Electronic sensors were used extensively in the vicinity of MATSB. Fire support was provided by 81mm mortars aboard MATSB and attached PCF's, 3"/50 guns aboard LSSL and PC, and 105mm Howitzer aboard RAC monitor.

(5) SEAL operations were carried on successfully throughout the AO. Support was provided by Slick, Seawolves, MST, LSSC's, and LSPL's, PCF's, and junks. Operations were coordinated by MATSB to provide maximum support for personnel involved. Reconnaissance and intelligence gathering patrols employing ASW units have not been exploited. As most of MATSB's AO has been enemy-controlled for many years, old intelligence was nonexistent and new information relatively hard to gain. Clandestine patrols could have provided much pertinent information to be used in later operations by the SEALS themselves or for troop sweeps.

(6) Interdiction patrols and WBGPs were run by PCF's and VNN junks on a random basis. Contact was seldom made and it was noticed that the enemy kept track of the movement of friendly units on the river, signalling their presence with gunshots or flares. Tactics evolved to counter this were the use of skimmers masked by PCF's drifting with the current. (Insertion of reaction forces ambush teams, and PCF's tied alongside each other, inserting for a time and then leaving one behind.) Escort services were usually provided by PCF's whose radar, pathometer, speed and fire power made them ideal

for this purpose. One tactic used was to position PCF's close ahead and astern of the units and send two boats out ahead to scout out possible ambush points.

(7) Psyops efforts were highly successful at first in attracting a large population to the GVN controlled annex from other areas. As the rate of increase leveled off, the program was redirected towards enemy controlled populated areas south of the Cua Lon. The results were hardly spectacular and might indicate that the interdiction efforts had failed to put enough economic pressure on the VC controlled areas to make living there sufficiently austere. Since interdiction was on a random basis and the enemy listening posts kept close track of friendly movements, their logistic sampans could have avoided detection. The answer might be to provide 24 hour surveillance either through an increased number of surface units or saturation tactics employing troops in listening posts in conjunction with a limited number of waterborne assets. In the future it is recommended that, prior to constructing a base, provisions be made in the planning stages to provide for an adequate number of troops to provide for complete base defense during all stages of construction, with drawing down on troops assets assigned for offensive operations.

2. Operation Market Time:

(a) Operations: PCF's have effectively contributed to the blockade of South Vietnam's coastline and enforced fishing restrictions designed to prevent intra-country shipments of supplies by the VC. Market Time PCF's maintain continuous surveillance of the

coastline, boarding and searching upwards of sixty percent of all contacts. In addition, PCF's provide NGF's and conduct H and I missions as part of routine patrols. PCF's are capable of effectively patrolling an area twenty to thirty miles in length and ten to fifteen miles in width for a period of twenty to thirty six hours. For maximum effectiveness, two PCF's should be allotted to each coastal division for each assigned station, plus one back-up boat. Thus, if a coastal division is assigned five stations, it should be allotted eleven PCF's. Rough seas necessitate PCF's returning to port or seeking a lee and seas of moderate height cause crew discomfort, but do not endanger the crew or its mission. Larger craft have better sea-keeping qualities, but when relative cost and effectiveness under normal operational conditions are considered, the PCF is a highly desirable member of the coastal surveillance force. During the monsoon season, WPB's, with their better sea-keeping qualities, have been shifted to PCF Market Time stations affected by rough seas and PCF's have been shifted to WPB areas where rough seas were less prevalent. This trade-off of assets and stations has permitted continued Market Time operations with little loss of effectiveness or area coverage.

(b) Tactics: If junk and sampan density is sparse in a patrol area, one PCF can usually carry out its mission of inspecting, boarding, and searching alone. If there is a concentration of native craft, two or more PCF's should be used to "corral" the craft prior to investigation and search.

General

(c) Operations: All special operations conducted by PCF's involve patrolling the rivers and canals of Vietnam. Duties assigned have included boarding and searching watercraft, troop insertions, setting waterborne guardposts, Psyops, Medcaps, NGFS, H and I missions, and rescue operations. In larger rivers and canals, the PCF can perform these tasks well. Limitations previously listed in the material section of this report somewhat hamper effectiveness in inland waters, and consideration should be given to the design of a craft especially tailored to riverine operations, with respect to speed, maneuverability, draft and armor. The versatility of the PCF and the ingenuity of its crews are not being downgraded. This suggestion is merely an attempt to provide a better vehicle to utilize the valuable skills of the dedicated PCF crews.

(d) Tactics: While conducting special operations, the PCF must be on constant guard for ambushes from the banks of rivers and canals. The enemy can and will initiate an ambush at any time with extensive prior planning. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the officer-in-tactical command (OTC) to have a specific plan in the event an ambush should occur, with this plan distributed to participating OINC's. The incursion into a river or canal can be done by several methods. With four or more PCF's, the force can be split into two equal elements transitting 400-700 yards apart. Normally, the Viet Cong will ambush the lead element thereby exposing only the lead element to the "kill zone". Upon initiation of an ambush by the enemy, the lead element would normally commence suppressing fire while clearing the immediate "kill zone". Upon clearing this zone,

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the lead element should beach on the opposite bank of the river, commencing saturation mortar fire, and call in air support and artillery as appropriate to take the ambush site under fire. The second element will move as close to the "kill zone" as safety permits and commence saturation mortar fire. The split transit tactic can be modified according to the tactical situation. One PCF can "ride point" about 100 yards ahead of the main element. Again in the case of enemy ambush, the number of boats exposed to the "kill zone" is significantly reduced. PCF's then follow the same tactics, using heavy suppressive mortar fire. In addition to the "split transit" and "point boat" tactics, column formations have also proven useful. The column formation calls for PCF's to transit at 50 to 75 yard intervals in a single column, insuring that specific defensive assignments have been made. The column formation, although useful, does expose more people to the "kill zone" than previously mentioned tactics. During transits through hostile areas, recon fire using .50 cal. and M-50 machine guns has proved effective. Fire is directed at suspected ambush positions (possible fishing stakes, bushy areas, etc) with the anticipation of forcing the enemy, if in position to ambush, to show their hand early or distort their aim by forcing them to keep their heads down. Perhaps the most useful but hard to remember lesson learned in regard to tactics is that stereotyped operations and repeated operational patterns invite ambush or result in the enemy successfully eluding the patrols sent to seek him out. Patterned and stereotyped operations should therefore be avoided.

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3. Waterborne guard posts: on October 20th a new tactic in setting a waterborne guard post was tried for the first time. Two WPB's accompanied by two PCF's entered the Thanh Phu secret zone at 0100H where suspected enemy activity in the form of sampan crossings was reported. At the confluence of two large canals forming an "I" the WPB's twisted, making noise and creating a diversion, while the PCF's beached to establish WBGPs. The WPB's then exited by the same route by which they had entered and took both banks of the canal under harassing fire, giving the impression that all units had departed and using sporadic fire to keep the heads down, on any enemy observation post that may have counted more than two units entering the canal. The two PCF's in WBGPs sighted numerous sampan activity through NOD about two hours after insertion. Both PCF's opened fire simultaneously devastating three sampans of VC who were completely unaware of the WBGPs. An air strike was called in and OV-10's arrived after 20 minutes. Similar operations since this tactic was implemented have had OV-10's on standby for quick reaction time.

4. Readiness: Two coastal group operations have resulted in friendly fatalities when a standing rule of engagement was violated: Do not approach an evading or suspicious water craft unless you are prepared for hostile action. In one case a skimmer rapidly closed a large junk and was hit with a B-40 rocket at point blank range. The skimmer had completed a canal run and proceeded to search traffic in the main channel of a large river. Without waiting for his supporting skimmer and WPB, the operator tackled a much larger unit

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with tragic consequences. In another incident, a junk closed an evading sampan after dark. Seven armed VC appeared and threw hand grenades on the junk, resulting in one fatality. Units must exercise extreme caution when approaching suspicious or evading watercraft especially after nightfall. In the case of skimmer ops, no attempt should be made to board a large watercraft where there is a potential of being outgunned. Fire should be directed across evaders bow and engagement continued at standoff range until supporting units arrive. In the case of PCF-WPB or junks approaching an evading or suspicious sampan, the main battery should be trained on the watercraft and possible hostile action should be anticipated.

5. Air support: The use of close air support when an engagement has been made with the enemy is an invaluable tactic and can deal severe blows to enemy ambushes and discourage future attacks. If injury results to U. S. or friendly personnel from an enemy ambush, the first reaction is to clear the area and request a MEDEVAC. The information required for a MEDEVAC usually requires a few minutes to compile in the correct format. In the meantime the OIC should direct other units to use 81mm or MK-19 grenade launchers as anti-personnel weapons to saturate the ambush site and immediately call for close air support (OV-10's or LHFT).

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RIVER PATROL FORCE SUMMARY

By the first of January, the River Forces were consolidated in two major groupings at Binh Thuy and Nha Be with Light Attack Squadron Four, (Det B) at Vung Tau, Special Operation Support Unit BRAVO at Ben Luc, and Special Operations Support Unit CHARLIE at My Tho. The group at Binh Thuy consisted of Light Attack Squadron FOUR (Det A), Special Operations Support Unit, CO, Beach Jumper Unit 13, the Helicopter Support Group, and Explosive Ordnance Demolition Team THIRTY EIGHT. Forces for the Rung Sat Special Zone River Patrol Group were grouped at Nha Be and consisted of RSSZ Mine Countermeasure Unit A, RSSZ Helicopter Unit A, SEAL Teams A and D, and Special Support Units A and D.

The total number of enemy contacts decreased in the Rung Sat Special Zone during the month of January. The RSSZ River Patrol Forces conducted patrols, employed SEAL inserts, accompanied the Provincial Forces in sweeps of the area, dropped Chieu Hoi leaflets in selected areas, and made irregular and scattered contact with the enemy.

Game Warden SEAL Operations

First contact with the enemy occurred at 2200H on the 3rd of January at a canal guardpost set up by SEAL Team ALFA in the vicinity of XS 968 652. ENS Scott had inserted the SEAL Unit at 1600H that afternoon. At about 2200H, a motorized sampan was heard moving approximately 400 meters away. An hour and a half later, the enemy was

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sighted moving past the guardpost and was taken under fire. Two Viet Cong were killed. At 0015H, the LHFT from Nha Be provided overhead cover as the SEAL's were extracted. The LHFT placed strikes in the area until 0115H. There were no U.S. casualties, and further enemy casualties were unknown.

On the fifth of January, AO2 Kieth led a SEAL detachment into the RSSZ to patrol by LSSC skimmer. They were towed by LCPL to the Rach La Be where they began the patrol in the vicinity of XS 958 631 at 1400H. At about 1530H, the team sighted two recently constructed bunkers. At 1535H, the team moved ashore under covering mortar fire from the LCPL. An LHFT from Nha Be provided overhead cover. After firing LAW's into the bunkers, the team completed their destruction and extracted to Nha Be without further incident.

LTJG Bryson on SEAL patrol on the morning of 6 January detained one Vietnamese male as a Viet Cong suspect. The capture took place while the team searched a hootch located 12 kilometers south of Nha Be. The team remained in the area until 0300H then returned to Nha Be by LCPL. On arrival at Nha Be, the detainee was identified as an ARVN deserter and was then turned over to the Can Giuoc District Headquarters.

Again on the night of the 9th of January, LTJG Bryson, with 5 SEAL's, engaged the enemy after having set a waterborne guardpost. ENS Scott inserted the team at 1915H, by LCPL. The team continued by LSSC and set the post at YS 203 784. At 1930H, six Viet Cong were

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observed moving north in two sampans. Calling an LHFT as cover, the SEAL's took the sampans under fire. Two Viet Cong were killed, and the other four were probably killed. The Viet Cong had been on a resupply mission as the captured sampans contained 100 kilos of crabs, one kilo of rice, 20 kilos of miscellaneous clothing, 10 kilos of sugar, tea, salt, pepper, tobacco, assorted pots, pans, dishes, medicine, flashlights, hammocks, ponchos, one stove, water containers, and tools. All captured materials were destroyed. On extraction of the team, LT Wolniewicz and LTJG Cook in the covering Seawolves placed air strikes in the area.

LT Gardner and LT Sarace with SEAL Team Det A departed Nha Be at 1000H on the 14th to investigate a cache site reported by VNN intelligence. Three Vietnamese agents accompanied the detachment. GMG1 Thorton transported the group in an LCM towing an LSSC until impractical to continue due to low water. LTJG Hagard completed the insertion at 1130H by LSSC. An LHFT from Nha Be provided cover as the group found and investigated the cache site, eight kilometers southwest of Nha Be. In the vicinity of XS 884 728, about 15 meters from the bank, a near empty cache site was uncovered. Two B-40 rounds, three B-40 boosters, one M-16 magazine, and five primers were captured. The detachment was extracted at 1315H without incident.

Game Warden PBR, UH-1B, and OV-10A Operations

Light Attack Squadron, (Det B), Vung Tau and Helicopter Light Attack Squadron, (Unit A), Nha Be, supported VNN Forces operations in the Rung

Sat Special Zone throughout January. Planned operations in the RSSZ consisted of extended sweeps from point to point throughout the zone. A variety of forces were employed in order to effectively counter the scattered enemy in the water filled recesses of the Forest of Assassins. Naval Advisors and Marine Corps Advisors accompanied Regional Forces, Provincial Reconnaissance Units, VNN PBR's, VN Rangers, and Vietnamese Agents on the operations. U.S. Army Slicks, a U.S. Army Hunter-Killer Team, and VNAF A-1 airstrikes were also employed.

An example of these coordinated sweep tactics began at 0800H on the 6th of January. Captain Cowan, USMC, led three USMC advisors and five Provincial Forces Troops on patrol 36 kilometers south southeast of Nha Be. Fifteen minutes after insertion, the patrol received enemy semi-automatic fire from the rear. The Advisors and RF Troops returned fire suppressing the sniper fire. Results of this contact were unknown. The patrol continued its sweep and set a guardpost in an old enemy base camp in the vicinity of YS 141 512. At about 1215H, three Viet Cong entered the base camp. The PF troops opened fire. The Viet Cong returned fire and fled. Shortly thereafter, the patrol received enemy M-79 fire from the east and north of their position. There were no friendly casualties. The RSSZ tactical operations center directed the Seawolf LHFT to the scene. LT Wolneiwicz placed strikes on the enemy positions at the direction of the U.S. advisor. One bunker was destroyed. At 1240H the PF troops and the advisors from the Slick directed further air strikes on the position by two VNAF A-1's. Three bunkers and one structure were destroyed. The U.S. Army Slick returned

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the patrol to Nha Be.

At 0530H on the 8th, another extended planned operation was underway as two U.S. ASPB's, under command of BMC Oliverez, and two U.S. PBR's with LT Mc Ginley in charge, lifted RF troops to establish a base camp at YS 126 766 about 20 kilometers east of Nha Be. Once the troops were established, a "People Sniffer" aircraft began a search of the adjacent area. At 0900H the search was completed, and a LHFT with LT Kizer and LTJG Scott place air strikes in the areas of Strongest "sniffer" reading. A U.S. Army Hunter-Killer Team then commenced a search of the area. The ASPB's inserted RF Company 362 with 1st LT Groshans, USMC, as advisor in the area of the friendly base camp. At 0852H, a U.S. Army Slick had inserted RF Company 875, with Capt Cowan, USMC, in the vicinity of YS 068 777. These troops commenced a sweep to the northeast. The company was extracted at 0955H and reinserted by Slick at YS 101 748. The troops swept this area with negative results and at 1400H were returned to the base camp by Slick helicopter. During this action, RF Company 908, with GYSGT Leith as advisor, had been inserted at YS 037 784. The troops swept to YS 036 790, were extracted by Slick, and returned to the base camp at 1415H. RF Company 999, with WO1 Haferhamp, USMC as advisor, was inserted at YS 102 773 at 1025H. An old enemy base camp was discovered on their sweep with no enemy contact. At 1425H this company returned to the base camp.

As part of the combined operations, a USN SEAL Team was inserted by SLICK at YS 118 784. The team patrolled to YS 112 793 and set up

a guardpost at 1200H. Negative enemy contact was made and the team was extracted by Slick after patrolling to YS 112 790. The nature of the above operations was to keep strong friendly forces in the area of enemy activity. Hours of patrols and numerous reinsertions may produce no enemy contact, but continued planned combined operations supported by CTF 116 units are reducing the enemy presence in the Rung Sat Special Zone.

Enemy Mining/Harassment/Attacks on Merchant Shipping

There were no attacks on merchant shipping in the Long Tau shipping channel during the month of January.

CTF Clearwater

Although a high level of operations were maintained by the forces of CTF Clearwater during the month of January, the number of enemy contacts were greatly reduced. The Hue River Security Group and the Dong Ha River Security Group conducted daily sweeps of the Cua Viet and the Perfume Rivers. Enemy activity consisted of mining attempts and swimmer sapper activity. The River Security Groups conducted MEDCAPS and river patrols in accordance with the mission assigned.

In preparation for CTF Clearwater's plan to relocate his headquarters at NSAD Tan My in February, the Commanding General XXIV Corps promulgated the following mission on 13 January: Conduct patrol operations on the inland waterways of ICTZ to deny the enemy their use as logistic LOC's or infiltration route and, in conjunction with

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GVN/ARVN/VNN forces, conduct visit, search, and psychological operations to enforce curfews, recover contraband, and extend pacification efforts, and conduct mine countermeasure operations in the assigned areas, and maintain the capability to reopen the Cua Viet LOC when required for resupply or reinforcement, and also conduct combat support of U.S. and RVN ground operations in coordination with area commanders.

The first mining attempt of the month was thwarted on the morning of 12 December as Patrol Officer ENS Hampton with Boat Captain, SN Ovendag in a Boston Whaler patrolled the Cua Viet river in the Quang Tri Province about five kilometers southwest of Cua Viet. Random Scare charges were detonated on the morning sweep when a water spout rose 35 feet high approximately 1,000 meters in front of the boat at about 0720H. The size of the water spout and the distance the mine detonated from the scare charge led the crew to believe the explosion was an NVA pressure mine with a sensitive setting. Neither the boat nor the occupants were harmed.

At 1330H on the 13th of January, Patrol Officer BM2 Schliks observed a water spout approximately 1,000 meters ahead of MSM 14's (LCPL-28) position. Boat Captain BM2 Hecke with BM3 Southern brought the LCPL to the receding water's position. Seven personnel were then seen about 100 meters from the water spout standing waist deep in the river. BM2 Hecke bore down on the group. Six personnel were detained. One person was missing when the LCPL arrived. The boat crew turned the detainees over to Coastal Group Eleven for interrogation. The

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incident occurred about four kilometers southwest of Cua Viet. The Viet Cong apparently were attempting to moor a mine in the river when it inadvertently exploded. The U.S. personnel reported no casualties.

LCDR E. B. Jarrett, Coastal Group Eleven Advisor, reported the capture of a female Viet Cong Supply Platoon leader at a river check point one kilometer northwest of Cua Viet at 0800H on the 17th of January. Acting on information gained from the prisoner, Coastal Group Eleven Units were able to capture one male Viet Cong Hamlet Chief, one female Viet Cong Supply Squad leader, and six female Viet Cong guerrillas in Xuan Khanh Village later the same day. The captured personnel were returned to Coastal Group Eleven for interrogation.

At 2200H on the 21st of January, LCPL 12 was covering skimmer operations at Cua Viet. Skimmer personnel were dropping three pound charges in the Cua Viet harbor. Boat Captain BM3 Morgan and Patrol Officer BMC Mitts observed a secondary explosion in the vicinity of the skimmer. The second explosion followed the first by approximately one second causing boiling water about three feet high and eight feet in diameter. The water depth at the location was 30 feet. The charge was estimated at 15 pounds. The LCPL and skimmer searched the area for debris with no results. There were no U.S. personnel or material casualties.

Patrol Officer ENS Hampton with Boat Captain SN Reynolds in Pusher Boat Seven sighted a swimmer in the Cua Viet harbor at about 0423H on the 31st of January. The swimmer was 30 feet from the end of the

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new causeway. The swimmer dived as the Pusher Boat approached. EM3 Hughes and SN Ratliff in LCPL 26 joined the Pusher in employing concussion grenades in the area. A standby skimmer exploded three pound anti-personnel charges in the same area with negative results. The Cua Viet EOD Team then searched the causeway and nearby boat hulls for attached charges. None were found.

A new type mine was employed on the Cua Viet River during the first week of January. An NVA swimmer sapper, captured on 2 January, described the new mine as being a spherical moored mine weighing 28 pounds with a 20 pound charge. A ring of magnets around the mine are designed to attach the sphere to the metal hull of a passing boat. The boat's movement pulls out the mooring line triggering the device. Countermeasures to this mine were being developed in January.

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USN STATISTICAL SUMMARY

	<u>MARKET TIME</u>	<u>GAME WARDEN</u>
Detections	24,474	4,420
Inspections	9,215	1,602
Boardings	10,076	2,611
Craft detained	104	0
Persons detained	513	0
Viet Cong suspects	48	0
Hostile fire incidents	50	4
Enemy casualties:		
a. Killed	153 (93 BC, 60 EST)	45 (16 BC, 29 EST)
b. Wounded	7	0
c. Captured	30	0
USN casualties:		
a. Killed	0	0
b. Wounded	12	0
c. Captured	0	0
d. Missing	0	0
Enemy material losses:		
a. Destroyed:		
(1) Junks or sampans	140	3
(2) Structures	422	43
b. Captured:		
(1) Junks or sampans	*	3
(2) Weapons	*	4
(3) Ammunition (rounds)	*	0
(4) Rice (tons)	*	100 (kilos)
c. Damaged:		
(1) Junks or sampans	12	0
(2) Structures	99	24
USN material losses:		
a. Destroyed:		
(1) Surface craft	0	0
(2) Helicopters	0	0
b. Damaged:		
(1) Surface craft	12	0
(2) Helicopters	2	0
SAR missions	4	0

Remarks:

* Information not available

Game Warden statistics do not include SEA LORDS operations.

GROUP 4

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Downgraded at 3 year intervals

Declassified after 12 years

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NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP SUMMARY
Vietnamese Navy

Fleet Command and Central Task Force

In January the Fleet Command units, including the PCF's, the WPB's and the various patrol and support ships, conducted river and Market Time patrols, Sea Float operations, NGFS, logistic lifts, Psyops, and Civic Action missions. Although the 57 NGFS missions fired by the Fleet Command in January more than doubled the December total of 28 missions, the total was only five more than the October figure of 52.

The improved weather conditions along the coast partially reflected the increased surveillance figures accumulated during the month. A total of 25,181 people and 7,393 junks were searched by the Fleet Command. No detainerments were reported.

On 1 January, Task Force 213 was officially commissioned. The official activation was considered a major milestone in the development of a fully combined USN/VNN coastal and river surveillance and interdiction effort. The task organization by location, designation, and units is as follows:

<u>Designation</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Unit</u>
TG 213.1/115.1 VNN (Proposed)	Danang	3 WPB's
TG 213.2/115.2 VNN	Qui Nhon	13 PCF's
TG 213.3/115.3 VNN (Proposed)	Cat Lo	5 PCF's, 6 WPB's
TG 213.4/115.4 VNN	An Thoi	15 PCF's

The units operating out of Danang and Cat Lo are still patrolling in the overall areas within USN responsibility.

The majority of Fleet Command operations that were reported were NGFS missions with unknown results. The Central Task Force had a quiet month with no significant incidents.

Coastal Junk Forces

Two junks were surveyed in the Second Coastal Zone at the beginning of the month which reduced the total number of junks assigned to the Coastal Junk Groups to 223. Seventeen riverine craft remained assigned to RAG 32 at Hue.

The improved weather conditions along the coast had a favorable effect on the surveillance figures for January. There were 162,810 people and 53,230 junks searched and 358 people and 99 junks detained during the month.

First Coastal Zone

Although there were significant increases in enemy activity during the first and last weeks of the month, the general level of activity was low. The enemy appeared to place emphasis on attacks by fire, minor probes, and sapper attacks, which picked up noticeably in the Cua Viet River area.

A non-combat operation was carried out by CG 13 on 6 January. A USAF aircraft apparently experienced technical difficulties in the

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vicinity of the CG 13 base. The VNN watched the pilot eject and dispatched their Kenner ski barge to retrieve him (vicinity ZD 115 070). The pilot, LT T. Dunaway, attached to the 559th Tactical Squadron, 12th Tactical Fighter Wing, suffered only minor head cuts and bruises.

In an action earlier the same day, CG 15 and PF forces made contact with VC units in the bay area west of the CG 15 base (vicinity BT 420 120). Five VC were killed and one AK-47 was captured. Friendly casualties were three PF's killed and five wounded.

Acting on intelligence information received from a captured VC female, CG 11 units conducted a sweep in an area to the west of their base (CS 335 688 to YD 325 695) on 16 January. The quick reaction was extremely fruitful as the VNN captured one male VC hamlet chief, one female VC supply platoon member, and six other female VC. Interrogation of this group provided valuable information concerning mining operations in the Cua Viet River area.

Two U.S. PCF's and CG-14 forces, consisting of two junks, one Kenner ski barge, and the sweep team, had completed a land sweep on 28 January and were returning to the CG 14 base when the ski barge sighted one sampan (vicinity BT 163 532) in a restricted area headed toward Long Dong Island. Warning shots failed to stop the sampan, and it was taken under fire as it beached. The two VC escaped as they ran inland. A sweep of the area failed to produce anything more than the three grenades, two web belts, clothes, and food at the location of the sampan.

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First Coastal Zone Junk employment as of 1 February 1970.

<u>Coastal Group/Location</u>	<u>No. of Junks</u>	<u>No./Location</u>	<u>Ops</u>	<u>Type Ops</u>
CG 11 Cua Viet	8	3	River	River Check Pt.
		2	Base	Standby/PMS
		2 minor repairs, 1 await survey		
CG 12 Thuan An	8	6	Thuy Tu	Patrol
		1 minor repairs, 1 await survey		
CG 13 Tu Hien	8	1	Danang	Repair
		7	Cau Hai Bay	Patrol
CG 14 Hoi An	7	4	Hoi An/Cua Dai/Cua Lau	Patrol
		1	Base	Base defense
		1 minor repairs, 1 overhaul		
CG 15 An Hia	7	4	at sea	Coastal patrol
		3	Truong River	River patrol
CG 16 Co Luy	7	4	Tra Phu/Pho Tho	River patrol
		2	Base	Base defense
		1 overhaul		

Second Coastal Zone

In the Second Coastal Zone, there were increases in sapper attacks and attacks by fire that followed the end of the year cease fire. The remainder of the month was characterized by a relatively low level of enemy activity that indicated his major emphasis was probably placed on intelligence gathering, logistic resupply, and troop movements possibly in preparation for a Tet offensive in February.

Based on previously collected intelligence reports, CG 23 and a combined USN SEAL and VNN LDNN team joined forces for a sweep operation of a suspected VC area to the north of the CG 23 base (CQ 120 910 to CQ 140 890) on 19 January. Enemy contact was established which yielded one VC killed and the capture of three VC suspects, one M-1 carbine and loaded magazines, seven grenades, 12 hammocks, four web belts and gear, one portable radio, 400 pounds of salt, 400 pounds of rice, and documents identifying local VCI in the district.

Three CG 27 personnel and two U.S. advisors intercepted an evading sampan and two occupants while patrolling the Dam Nai Bay on 29 January (BN 862 834). The two Vietnamese were apprehended without firing a shot. Later they were confirmed as being VC.

Second Coastal Zone Junk employment as of 1 February 1970.

<u>CG/Location</u>	<u>No.of Junks</u>	<u>No.of Units/Location</u>	<u>Ops</u>	<u>Type Ops</u>
CG 21/Degi	11	5 Nioc Nguc Lagoon		Patrol
		2 Base		Base defense
		2 minor repairs, 2 overhaul		
CG 23/Song Cau	11	5 Ong Dien Cape		Patrol
		2 Unspecified		Special Ops
		1 Base		Base defense
		1 minor repairs, 2 overhaul		
CG 25/Dong Hai	8	5 Hon Khio		Patrol
		1 Base		Base defense
		1 minor repairs, 1 overhaul		

CG 26/Cam Ranh Bay	7	4	Cam Ranh Bay	Patrol
		2	Base	Base
			1 minor repairs	
CG 27/Phan Rang	9	5	Dong Nai Bay	Patrol
		3	Base	Base defense
			1 minor repairs	
CG 28/Phan Thiet	9	4	Coastal	Patrol
		3	Base	Base defense
			2 minor repairs	

Third Coastal Zone

During the middle of the month, there was a moderate increase in enemy activity that by the end of the month had returned to a low level attacks by fire, light probes, and action against the GVN pacification program continued to be the focal point of enemy actions.

In one of the more fruitful operations performed by the coastal groups of the 3rd Coastal Zone, two CG 34 units, the CG 34 skimmer, the CG 34 reaction team and two USN advisors, BMC Weichold and EN3 Sampson, carried out a sweep operation 20 miles southeast of Ben Tre on 4 January (vicinity XS 820 060). In the morning, the reaction team, divided into two units, were inserted several times in conjunction with the sweep of the area. The total results for the daylight operation were two VC killed, four booby traps, four structures, and two sampans destroyed, and two hand grenades, one sampan, one female VC, and seven suspected VC captured. One VNN was wounded in the action.

Late in the month on 29 January, two CG 33 junks and their advisors LT Bivins and EN2 Glendenning were on a routine patrol when they were approached by a local fisherman. The man showed the VNN where the VC had placed a hand made waterborne mine (YS 318 586). The VNN retrieved the mine and returned to their base where the mine could be examined by the EOD personnel located in Vung Tau.

Third Coastal Zone Junk employment as of 31 January 1970.

<u>CG/Location</u>	<u>No.of Junks</u>	<u>No of Units/Location</u>	<u>Ops</u>	<u>Type Ops</u>
CG 33/Vung Tau	16	4	Song Cua Lau	TAD Sea Float
		2	Rach Ong Ben	Coastal Patrol
		2	Rach Cua Lap	River Patrol
		7	Base	Base Defense
		1	overhaul	
CG 34/Tien Ton	16	2	Song Ban Luong	River Patrol
		7	Base	Base Defense
		2	minor repairs, 5	overhaul
CG 35/Hung My	15	3	Song Cua Lon	TAD Sea Float
		4	Song Co Chien	River Patrol
		1	Song Co Chien	PSYOPS
		2	Base	Base Defense
		3	minor repairs, 2	overhaul
CG 36/Dai An	15	3	Song Cua Lon	TAD Sea Float
		2	Song Gua Giang	Coastal Patrol
		3	Song Hau Giang	River Patrol
		4	Base	Base Defense
		1	minor repairs, 2	overhaul

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Fourth Coastal Zone

Moderate enemy action during the first week of the month tapered off to a low level that was experienced for the rest of the month. The majority of the enemy activity centered along the Barrier Interdiction line that bisects the routes to Base Area 470. There were several days of increased enemy operation, however, no high point was experienced in January.

The Market Time stations along the west coast of Vietnam that were augmented by ten USN PCF's in December as a result of intelligence reports of increased enemy attempts to infiltrate to the U-Minh Forest from the Gulf of Thailand received significant attention throughout January.

At the beginning of the month, a large concentration of fishing junks were reported from east west grid line 700 to 835 in area 9E1. Because of lucrative fishing in the area, the local people were refusing to observe the restricted zones. Third and Fourth time offenders were extremely frequent. The majority of the junks inspected were operated by honest fisherman from Kien Giang Province with their papers in order, flying the government flags, and doing a prosperous fishing business.

With the advent of the rice harvest in An Xuyen Province, reports of increased sampan traffic along the coast began to increase on 8 January. These sampans were usually traveling at night, close to

the coast, heading north, and carrying rice and general commodities. As an example, on 12 January four sampans that were inspected in area 9E1 contained a total of 45 bags of unmanifested rice with cache bag weighing an estimated 75 pounds.

On 16 January, CTF 115 submitted an evaluation of the special U-Minh Forest offshore patrol which stated that despite the vigorous patrolling of areas 9D1 and 9E1 in addition to the three special northern patrols in the vicinity of the Three Sisters/Ha Tien areas, the PCF's have, in general, failed to detect tangible evidence of substantial coastal shipment of munitions, personnel, or other supplies. During the period 22 December - 12 January, one significant rice shipment of 35 bags that was destined for the enemy was confiscated on 10 January.

The decision was made to continue the patrols and reevaluate again at the end of the month. On 2 February, CTF 115 summarized and apprised the U-Minh Forest special for the month of January. The following statistics were accumulated by the USN PCF's patrolling Market Time areas 9D1, 9E1, 9F1, 9G1 and 9H1 in January:

Total Detections (1 Jan - 27 Jan)	3,567
Total Inspections (1-27 Jan)	3,299
Persons Detained (1-27 Jan)	67
Sampans Detained (1-27 Jan)	25
Total amount rice confiscated (29 Dec - 25 Jan)	313 bags

Food stuffs confiscated	12 bags
Contraband confiscated	0
Arms detected	0
Munitions detected	0

As extremely high level of 93% of the craft detected were inspected. Three-fourths of the detainees taken into custody by the coastal patrol units were restricted zone violators. The remaining ones were determined to be ID card violators. Ignorance of the coastal restricted areas and curfew regulations has continued to be evident in the special patrol areas.

No troops, arms, or munitions were detected by the Market Time units. All Market Time patrol units have been dragging the bottom of the sampans and junks in order to determine if cargo and contraband has been suspended beneath the hull. Cargos have been thoroughly searched and moved in order to check for false bottoms. Inspectors have shattered selective cargoes of ice blocks used to cover cargoes in order to investigate the possibility of contraband being concealed inside the blocks.

The 9D1 and 9E1 PCF patrols have concentrated their operations in the northern portion of area 9E1 in response to the high density of fisherman in that area. During the period 19-25 January, the traffic decreased considerably as evidenced by the three detainees and 12 bags of confiscated rice.

A large number of personnel that were transiting the coastal areas claimed refugee status. This gave credence to the reports of extremely high extortion rates which have influenced a large number of people to move out of VC controlled areas. Although there have been no intelligence reports which confirmed the coastal areas of the Gulf of Thailand as being an established enemy commo-liaison route, the area has continued to be suspected for food supply transshipment. Based on all the available information, it was decided to retain the concentration of patrols into February.

Fourth Coastal Zone Junk employment as of 31 January 1970.

<u>CG/Location</u>	<u>No.of Junks</u>	<u>No.of Units/Location</u>	<u>Ops</u>	<u>Type Ops</u>
CG 41/Poule Obi	12	7	Ha Tien	River Patrol
		1	Kien Giang	Logistic
		1 minor repairs, 2 overhaul		
		1 waiting survey		
CG 42/An Thoi	17	5	Ha Tien	River Patrol
		3	An Thoi	Stand-down
		1	Poulo Panjang	Patrol
		2	9L	Coastal Patrol
3 minor repairs, 3 overhaul				
CG 43/Hon Tre	14	4	Ha Tien	River Patrol
		1	9F	Coastal Patrol
		1	Hon Tre	Base Defense
		6 minor repairs, 2 overhaul		

CG 44/Hon Tre	14	5 Ha Tien	River Patrol
		2 9E/9F	Coastal Patrol
		2 An Thoi	Logistics
		1 Hon Tre	Base Defense

River Patrol Groups

The arrival of five Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) PBR's at the beginning of the month increased the size of TF 212 to 88 units. The eight PBR's that were not assigned to RPG 51 through 54 served as the nucleus of RPG 55. On 9 January, the remaining RPG 54 units transited to Chau Doc and relieved RIVDIV 534 of Barrier Interdiction operations which in turn returned to Binh Thuy in order to serve as the training division for the new USN/VNN PBR school. The river patrol responsibilities on the My Tho River and the Cho Goa canal left by the departure of the RPG 54 PBR's were filled by the newly formed and operational RPG 55. As an additional mission, RPG 55 was tasked on 14 January with providing night security for the RMK dredge NEW JERSEY at Dong Tam.

The PBR's of RPG 51 continued to rotate between operation Ready Deck on the upper Saigon River and routine river patrols on the lower Saigon River. Special operations in the RSSZ and routine day and night river patrols of Long Tao and Soi Rap River were performed by RPG 52.

Based on intelligence information which indicated that Tay Ninh was a possible enemy target at the end of the month, Giant Slingshot

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forces were redeployed on 20 January in order to most effectively counteract the threat. River Division 594 departed Go Dau Ha and proceeded to Ben Keo. The vacancy at Go Dau Ha was filled by RPG 53 which transited north from Tan An.

In January TF 212 units conducted a total of 1070 river patrols and 1099 amphibious assaults.

TF 212 employment as of 31 January 1970.

<u>RPG/Location</u>	<u>No. of PBR's</u>	<u>Type of Operations</u>	<u>OPCON</u>
RPG 51/Cat Lai	12	River Patrols	CTF 212
Phu Cuong	8	Interdiction	CTF 194.6
		River Patrols	
RPG 52/Nha Be	20	Special Ops RSSZ	RSSZ
		River Patrols	
RPG 53/Go Dau Ha	20	River Patrols	CTF 194.9
Ben Luc		Interdiction	
RPG 54/Chau Doc	20	Interdiction	CTF 194.4
		River Patrols	
RPG 55/My Tho	8	Security	CTF 212
		River Patrols	

Third and Fourth Riverine River Assault Groups

In the Third and Fourth Riverine area, the RAG's completed 766 river patrols and 2,630 amphibious operations. They also performed escort duties, logistic lifts, base defense operation, PSYOPS, and Civic Action missions. Since the later part of 1968, there has been

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a drawdown of almost all USN PBR's engaged in Game Warden operations on the main rivers of Vietnam. Because the possibility existed that the enemy was still using the rivers for the movement of arms, ammunition, and food stuffs, the USN PCF's on the upper Bassac and Mekong Rivers and the VNN RAG's on the major rivers were directed to place a greater emphasis on Game Warden type operations.

The low level of activity that was generally recorded throughout the Third Riverine area was reflected in the absence of major incidents. RAG's 22 and 24, operating on the Vam Co Dong and the upper Saigon Rivers respectively, had the more significant action. While conducting an amphibious insertion of one company of the 25th ARVN Division on the Vam Co Dong River on 16 January RAG 22 and the ARVN units uncovered an enemy cache that contained 30 rounds of 81mm mortar (vicinity XS 675 671).

In action in the 4th Riverine area, seven RAG 29 units were underway on the morning of 9 January with 40 Revolutionary Development cadre members and supplies for new and old Song Ong Doc. The transit down the river was uneventful. However, late in the afternoon when the VNN retraced their trip, they received five B-40 rockets from the east bank (WR 074 103). All five B-40's were fired prematurely, missed their intended targets, and exploded on the opposite bank. The PAC returned the fire and resumed their journey to the vicinity of Ca Mau (WR 100 168).

Just after midnight on the evening of 18-19 January, the base at Dong Tam was the target for seven rounds of 120mm mortar fire. Six of the rounds impacted north of the RAG 21/33 compound, and one round landed inside the base, slightly damaging one building.

On 27 January RAG 21/33 boats had extracted ARVN units 14 miles south of My Tho on the Ham Luong River (XS 524 190) and reconned the area of extraction as LCM-6 units got underway. The boats had been underway for about 15 minutes when they came under heavy small arms and mortar fire (from XS 503 223 to XS 495 238). All the units returned the fire and proceeded to the Ham Luong ferry where the troops were disembarked. One mortar round exploded close aboard to one LCM-6 causing heavy shrapnel damage. One ARVN and two VNN were wounded in the action, and one VC was killed. Artillery was spotted into the area 20 minutes after the ambush was initiated.

Third and Fourth Riverine Area RAG employment as of 31 January 1970.

3rd Riverine Area.

<u>RAG/Admin Location</u>	<u>No.of RAC</u>	<u>Type/Location Ops</u>	<u>OPCON</u>
RAG 22/Nha Be	19	Troop Support Logistics/Vam Co Dong River	Long An Sector
RAG 24/Cuu Long	17	Interdiction, riverine patrol troops support/ upper Saigon River	3rd Riverine Area Commander/ CTG 194.6
RAG 28/Nha Be	14	River Patrol, troop support/lower Saigon River	3rd Riverine Area Commander

RAG 30/Cuu Long	12	Troop support, logistics/Can Guioe	5th Battalion VNMC
4th Riverine Area RAG 21-33/Dong Tam	17-18	Troop support, logistics/My Tho River	7th ARVN
RAG 23-31/Vinh Long	20-10	River patrols, troop support/Co Chien Mang Thit Rivers	4th Riverine Area Commander
RAG 25-29/Cam Tho	17-12	Troop support, logistics/Ca Mau	An Xuyen Sector
RAG 26/Long Xuyen	18	Troop support logistics/Ca Mau	Kien Giang Sector

River Assault and Interdiction Divisions

The ATF 211 with 109 RAC distributed among RAID's 70 through 75 carried out a total of 364 river patrols and 1,654 amphibious missions in December. Interdiction operations, logistic lifts, PSYOPS and Civic Action missions comprised the remainder of their employment in January.

The two RAID's, 70 and 71, participating in operation Giant Sling-shot, conducted interdiction operations and river patrols from the base locations at Tam Thu, Tan An, Moc Hoa, Ben Luc, Tra Cu, and Tuyen Nhon. The influx of intelligence information that indicated that Tay Ninh was a possible target during the expected increase in enemy activity at the end of the month was acted upon by CTG 194.9 with a redeployment of forces into the area. RAID 70 assumed the Tan An to the northwest AO vacated by RPG 53 on 20 January. All the RAID 70 units at Ben Luc returned to Tan An. Ten RAID 70 boats including all RAID 70 ATC's were deployed to Moc Hoa and relieved RAID 71. The

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released RAID 71 units proceeded to Ben Luc and assumed the AO's from Ben Luc and Tan An south to the confluence of the Vam Co Dong and Vam Co Tay Rivers. The relocation of forces lasted through the end of the month.

In January, RAID's 72, 74 and 75 rotated assets in and out of the AO while supporting a reconnaissance in force operation with the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Infantry Battalions, VNMC, in the Twin Rivers area of Chuong Thien Province (vicinity WR 370 700). Although the VNMC had several significant contacts during the month, the three RAID's carried out their mission of river patrols, troop lifts and NWBGP's with no significant action.

The majority of the RAID 72 units were undergoing maintenance next to the USS ASKARI (ARL 30) until 8 January where they transited to the AO and relieved RAID 75. The RAID 72 operated initially with the company of the 2nd Battalion, VNMC, (vicinity WR 325 650 - WR 345 575) and beginning on 15 January, with one company of 3rd Battalion, VNMC, (vicinity WR 320 640). As a result of changes in the RAID assets in the AO, the RAID 72 patrol area on the Cai Lon River was modified on 27 January (WR 260 740 to WR 380 720).

From 1-7 January, the primary mission of RAID 74 was river patrols on the Cai Lon and Cai Tu Rivers (from WR 370 724 to WR 206 765). RAID 74 departed the area on 8 January and returned to Long Xuyen for a period of stand-down and maintenance. Returning to the AO on

2095

26 January, RAID 74 relieved RAID 75 and assumed patrol responsibilities on the Cai Lon River (WR 165 800 to SR 430 760) and the Rach Nga Ba Cai Tau (from WR 310 682 north to Cai Lon). The river patrol assignment for RAID 74 was changed on 30 January to the Rach Nga Ba, Cai Tau, and the Rach Nga Ba Dinh (WR 320 680 to WR 345 570).

RAID 75 patrolled the Rach Nga Ba Cai Tau and operated with three companies of the 2nd Battalion, VNMC, (center mass at WR 330 640) from 1-7 January. On the evening of 5 January when the ATF Command Post (WR 360 690) came under mortar attack two 60mm rounds impacted 30 meters inland from where the RAID 75 units operating with 2nd Battalion were beached. One mortar detonated about three feet outside the entrance of the VNN communications center in the midst of a group of Marines proceeding down the road from the boat, and the other, a second later, exploded inside the entrance to the communications portacamper. In addition to the damage to communications gear, three VNMC and one VNN officer were killed and five VNMC and five VNN were wounded. RAID 75 relieved RAID 74 on 8 January and initiated patrols on the Cai Lon River (WR 165 800 - WR 430 760) and provided lift service for one company of the 3rd Battalion (vicinity WR 320 640). The patrol changes that were affected on 23 January gave RAID 75 the Rach Nga Ba Cai Tau north to the Cai Long (WR 310 700). After being relieved on 26 January, RAID 75 departed for Long Xuyen and a period of stand-down and maintenance along side the USS ASKARI (ARL 30).

From 1-25 January, RAID 73 supported the 31st Regiment of the 21st ARVN Division in the northern areas of the U-Minh Forest. Using

2095

the Cau Gao Canal the RAID provided a lift capability and carried out routine patrols. RAID 73 spent 26 and 27 January at the Command Post and then returned to operations with the 31st Regiment on 28 January.


ATF 211 employment as of 31 January 1970.

<u>RAID/Location</u>	<u>No.of RAC</u>	<u>Type of Ops</u>	<u>OPCON</u>
RAID 70/Tan An	20	River patrols interdiction	CTG 194.9
RAID 71/ Ben Luc	18	River patrols interdiction	CTG 194.9
RAID 72/Twin Rivers	19	River patrols troop lifts	ATF 211
RAID 73/U-Minh Forest	18	River patrols troop lifts	21st ARVN Div
RAID 74/Twin Rivers	19	River patrols troop lifts	ATF 211
RAID 75/Long Xuyen	15	Stand-down maintenance	ATF 211


Note: ATF 211, excluding RAID's 70 and 71 were under OPCON of 21st ARVN Division.

SEARCHES AND DETENTIONS BY VIETNAMESE FLEET COMMAND,
COASTAL AND RIVERINE FORCES

SEARCHES



DETENTIONS



JUNKS -----

PEOPLE -----

Vietnamese Marine Corps

Brigade "A"

Brigade "A" has been absorbed into the joint staff of ATF 211. The Brigade Commander has been designated as the Deputy Commander of ATF 211. Additional information of ATF 211 operations is found in the individual discussions of the infantry battalions.

Brigade "B"

Brigade "B", which included the 4th, 5th, and 6th Infantry Battalions and the 2nd Artillery Battalion, terminated its six hour alert status under JGS control on 2 January and was relocated to the vicinity of My Tho (XS 495 448), Dinh Tuong Province, in order to begin foot mobile battalion and company size reconnaissance in force operations under the OPCON of the 7th ARVN Division in Kien Hoa Province. With the support of airmobile and watermobile assets, the Brigade launched operation Hanh Quan "Song Than 801" on 4 January in an area approximately 13 miles south southeast of My Tho (4th Bn XS 574 187, 5th Bn XS 553 238, 6th Bn XS 553 238, 2nd Arty Bn XS 551 318). Sporadic enemy contacts generally involved small units and employed the ambush followed by a quick escape technique. While utilizing evasive tactics, the enemy inflicted the majority of the VNMC casualties by extensively mining the area.

Operation Hanh Quan "Song Than 802" began on 8 January and Phases I and II of the operation unofficially terminated on 15 January. Following a four day stand-down posture, Brigade "B" began RIF opera-

tions in the 7th ARVN Division AO of Dinh Tuong Province ten miles to the north and northwest of Vinh Long (4th Bn WS 991 496, 5th Bn XS 016 520, 6th Bn XS 061 474, 2nd Arty Bn WS 983 413). Confronting a situation similar to the operations earlier in the month, the Marines faced an evasive enemy who continued to place his major emphasis on mines and booby traps. In one booby trap incident that took place on 24 January, Capt William A. Griffis III, two VNMC, including the executive officer of the 4th Infantry Battalion, and one USA were killed when a booby trapped enemy ammunition container exploded within a helicopter. Three USA soldiers were also wounded, and the helo was completely destroyed.

The Brigade moved to central Dinh Tuong Province on 27 January (4th Bn XS 204 419, 5th Bn XS 368 490, 6th Bn XS 303 434, 2nd arty Bn XS 304 487) and resumed company size patrols, Eagle Flight operations, and local screening missions. Company size patrols continued to be successful in discovering small enemy caches and destroying significant quantities of mine and booby trap material.

1st Infantry Battalion

Under the OPCON of ATF 211 the 1st Infantry Battalion supported a reconnaissance in force mission in the Twin River area of Chuong Thien Province (vicinity WR 310 700). Initially assigned as the security force for the rice harvest in a sixty kilometer square area with the center located 31 miles south southeast of Rach Gia (WR 215 505), the 1st Battalion experienced scattered enemy contact while

conducting air and footmobile operations. An engagement with a small VC unit on 3 January resulted in three VC and one VNMC killed. Enemy small arms fire the same day wounded six Marines participating in footmobile operations. Similar operations on 4 January produced three VC killed and three GKC rifles. In enemy actions on 14 and 15 January, the Battalion surprised and killed six VC.

At approximately 0340 on the morning of 22 January, two VC Battalions, identified as the K-2 and K-6 of the 18th VC Regiment initiated a coordinated attack against one rifle company and the headquarters elements of the 1st Battalion (WR 220 664). The attack, which included mortar fire directed against the Brigade "A" forward Command Post and Battery B, (WR 184 740), was initiated with 82mm mortar. This was followed by B-40 rockets, .50 cal. machine gun and 75mm recoilless rifle fire. Two simultaneous ground assaults, a diversionary attack from the northwest and a main thrust from the southeast were then launched against the VNMC perimeter. The Marines had platoons in security, ambush, and outpost positions. Two companies were in night defensive positions 4 to 6,000 meters to the northwest of the battalion command post.

In a fiercely contested hand-to-hand encounter the Marines, supported by FAC, gunships, Navy OV-10's, U.S. and VNAF TACAIR, thwarted the enemy advance, held their ground, and forced the enemy to withdraw. The Battalion Commander then maneuvered the two companies in night defensive positions toward the Marine units in contact in

order to reinforce his contact and to block enemy routes of escape or withdrawal. The tactic proved extremely successful as the two VNMC companies established contact with the VC medical evacuation unit, killed an additional 16 VC, and forced the unit into a full, disorganized retreat. Meanwhile, the company under attack, countered the main VC thrust with an aggressive counterattack. At the same time, the second VC battalion attempted to break contact and withdraw to the east. However, two Marine platoons that relentlessly pursued the enemy, and reestablished contact, were successful in determining the enemy's route of withdrawal.

Once the escape route was identified elements of the 2nd Battalion were inserted in the area (WR 246 650) utilizing Air Cavalry troop assets for transportation. The 2nd Battalion regained enemy contact at 1510. Fighting lasted until 2300 when the enemy once again broke contact and executed a full retreat. During the day long battle there were 109 VC killed and four VC captured. Friendly losses were 28 VNMC killed and 59 VNMC and one U.S. advisor wounded. A break-down of enemy material and weapons captured follows:

<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Item</u>
1	12.7 Anti-aircraft machine gun
1	M-60 machine gun
3	Light machine guns
4	RPG launchers
1	75mm recoilless rifle tripod

1:25,000

BRIGADE "A" FWD. CP.
(WR184740)

68

RACH GIA
23 M NNW

DIVERSIONARY
ATTACK

67

66

MAIN ENEMY THRUST 2ND BN
INSERTED

65

ENEMY ESCAPE
ROUTE

- ▲ OUTPOST
- ⊙ AMBUSH POSITION
- ⊕ PLATOON
- ⊠ 1ST. BN. HDQ.
- ⊡ 1ST. BN. COMPANYS
- HOOTCH
- ⊥ RICE

APPROX. TIME FRAME:
 0340 2 VC BNS INITIATE ATTACK
 0400 2 VNMC COMPANIES REINFORCE
 CONTACT
 0430 VNMC COUNTERATTACK, VC
 WITHDRAW
 1440 2ND BN INSERTED
 1810 VNMC REGAIN CONTACT
 2300 FIGHTING BROKE OFF

64

20

21

22

23

24

32	Individual weapons
102	Mines and booby traps
-	Miscellaneous ammunition

After the 1st Battalion moved to the ATF Command Post (WR 364 697) on 25 January, they conducted local patrol and screening operations in conjunction with the command post security mission. Two mining incidents and the capture of five VC suspects concluded the 2nd Battalion activities for January.

2nd Infantry Battalion

Throughout the month, the 2nd Infantry Battalion supported a reconnaissance in force mission in the Twin River area of Chuong Thien Province under the operational control of ATF 211. The 2nd Battalion provided local security operations in defense of the ATF 211 Command Post and one company conducted watermobile and footmobile with RAID's 72 and 75 units. Light and scattered contact consisting primarily of mining incidents were recorded until 13 January when the Battalion was helo lifted into the northern sector of the U-Minh Forest (vicinity WR 090 720). A VC POW compound was discovered and destroyed on 14 January (vicinity WR 079 727). On 22 January, the 2nd Battalion reinforced a 1st Battalion contact. Successfully reestablishing contact with a withdrawing enemy force, the 2nd Battalion units killed 32 VC and captured another VC. A single B-40 launcher, one machine gun and four personal weapons were recovered from the enemy. Friendly losses for this

particular action of the 1st Battalion contact were eight VNMC killed and 11 VNMC wounded.

A VC platoon size contact on 26 January accounted for three VC and two VNMC killed. The following day the Marines discovered another five dead VC and two personal weapons. On 30 and 31 January, the 2nd Battalion carried out an airmobile assault into northern Bac Lieu Province (vicinity WR 358 498). The Marines engaged an enemy force, killing nine VC and capturing nine individual weapons, and they destroyed a VC Psyops base camp complete with typewriter, 300 kilograms of leaflet paper, two concrete bunkers, and 10,000 kilograms of rice.

3rd Infantry Battalion

Under the operational control of ATF 211, the 3rd Infantry Battalion supported a reconnaissance in force mission in the Twin Rivers area of Chuong Thien Province. Following airmobile operation on 4 January that resulted in the detainment of six VC suspects, the 3rd Battalion began providing security for the rice harvest over a 90 square kilometer area with the center 25 miles south southeast of Rach Gia (WR 230 610). Two VC that were captured on 5 January during footmobile operations were identified as being members of the 306th VC Battalion.

While providing security for the ATF 211 Command Post and at the forward command post (WR 184 740), 3rd Battalion units participated in local patrol, screening missions, airmobile operations,

and watermobile operations. Aside from the one VC killed at a Marine outpost on 13 January, the 3rd Battalion had negative contact until 25 January when the Battalion commenced reconnaissance in force operations in the field (vicinity WR 320 635). During the remainder of the month, the 3rd Battalion Marines surprised VC units on three separate occasions. The total results of these were eight VC killed and one VC and three individual weapons captured.

4th Infantry Battalion

On 2 January, the 4th Infantry Battalion terminated its six hour alert status under JGS control and transited to the vicinity of My Tho (XS 495 448) where the Battalion was placed under the OPCON of Brigade "B". Following a brief stay near Ben Tre, the 4th Battalion was helolifted into two landing zones 16 miles south of My Tho (XS 535 165 and XS 520 175). During a canal crossing the VC directed a B-40 attack against a sampan carrying troops (XS 522 160). Two Marines were killed and two were listed as missing. One VC and six VC suspects were detained during the same action. Although enemy contact was light and scattered, the Marines encountered heavy enemy mining of the area.

Two enemy caches that consisted of five 81mm mortar and 20 60mm mortars were uncovered on 7 January. The next day the 4th Battalion initiated assault landing with the 7th ARVN RAG boats in a new AO southeast of Ben Tre (vicinity XS 576 180). One contact was made that day that resulted in five VC killed. Mining incident

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in the new AO through 14 January accounted for nine VNMC killed and 24 VNMC wounded. Phase II of the Brigade "B" operation unofficially ended on 15 January and the 4th Battalion moved to Dong Tam for a four day stand-down. After traveling approximately 24 miles to the west northwest (WS 991 496) of Dong Tam on 19 January, the 4th Battalion was assigned the missions of security for Brigade "B" and Battery D, local patrols, screening missions, and Eagle Flight operations. Light contact and the reoccurrence of mining incidents characterized the activity through 27 January when the Brigade moved the operation to central Dinh Tuong Province. No significant contact were reported through 31 January.

5th Infantry Battalion

After concluding its six hour alert status under JGS control on 3 January, the 5th Infantry Battalion traveled to Ben Tre (vicinity XS 515 315) for operations under the OPCON of Brigade "B". The following day the 5th Battalion began watermobile assault landings with 7th ARVN RAG units to the southeast (at XS 513 207 and XS 505 220). Scattered enemy contacts included a five-round mortar attack on the battalion CP and one mining incident. On 8 January, the 5th Battalion moved further to the east (vicinity XS 569 221) and continued watermobile and footmobile operations in conjunction with the 7th ARVN RAG boats. Operations on 9 and 10 January yielded two VC captured and four VNMC wounded from mines. The Battalion completed field operations on 15 January, returned to Dong Tam, and were assigned as the 7th ARVN Division reserve unit. Company size combat

patrols and Eagle Flight operations were commenced on 19 January in central Dinh Tuong Province (vicinity XS 016 520). In two separate incidents a total of 12 VC were killed and two VC were captured. Four VNMC sustained wounds from mining incidents on 21 January. Similar operations were carried out through 31 January. In one VNMC operation on 25 January, the 5th Battalion Marines killed 2 VC and captured another one with one AK-47.

6th Infantry Battalion

The 6th Infantry Battalion terminated its six hour alert status under JGS control on 3 January and transited to Ben Tre (vicinity XS 553 238) for operations under the OPCON of Brigade "B". The Battalion displaced by motor convoy to Mo Cay (XS 465 200) on 4 January and immediately commenced local security operations in defense of the Brigade B Command Post. Two VC and one VC suspect were captured during operations on 6 January, and the next day the Marines killed four VC and took another VC into custody. On 8 January the 6th Battalion, less one company that continued to provide the Brigade local security, conducted air mobile operations in a new AO southeast of Ben Tre (vicinity XS 553 238). There was no doubt of an enemy presence in the area as they established contact with an unknown size VC force (XS 588 219). Five VC were killed in this action and one AK-47, 24 hard grenades, and 24 rounds of AK-47 ammunition were captured. The enemy mines in the area hampered the Marines operations. However, when a VC unit attacked an outpost wounding two VNMC, the Marines responded rapidly, killed seven VC,

and confiscated two personal weapons, 500 rounds of ammunition, 20 grenades, two mines, five kilograms of medicine and two VC uniforms.

The 6th Battalion stood-down with the other Brigade "B" elements until 19 January when they began company size RIF patrols and Eagle Flight operations in central Dinh Tuong Province (vicinity XS 061 474). On the afternoon of 24 January Marine units killed ten VC and captured two AK-47's and some miscellaneous equipment (WS 923 467). At the end of the month on 29 January, a VC squad leader and his weapons and documents were taken into Marine custody.

7th Infantry Battalion

A three day Battalion field exercise from 21 through 23 January concluded seven weeks of initial unit training for the 7th Infantry Battalion at the Van Kiep National Training Center (YS 390 610). After graduation ceremonies on 24 January, the 7th Battalion moved to the 4th Battalion base camp in Vung Tau in preparation for amphibious training that commenced on 27 January.

Division Artillery

Battery I graduated from the Duc My National Training Center (BP 844 869) on 24 January and at the end of the month they were finalizing preparation for the move to Thu Duc. Battery J was in the process of initial unit formation and organization at Thu Duc in January. Employment of the other artillery batteries is in the operational control summary which follows.

VNMC OPERATIONAL CONTROL SUMMARY JANUARY 1970

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATES</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF</u>	<u>OPERATION NAME</u>	<u>MISSION</u>
Brigade A	1-31	ATF 211 (VNMC/VNN) 21st ARVNDIV	Cuu Long/SD 21/ 01/Song Than 747/70	RIF
Brigade B	1-2	JGS	None	Reserve
	3-7	7th ARVNDIV	Song Than 801	RIF
	8-15	7th ARVNDIV	Song Than 802	RIF
	16-18	7th ARVNDIV	None	Reserve
	19-31	7th ARVNDIV	Song Than 804	RIF
First InfBn	1-31	ATF 211 (VNMC/VNN)	Cuu Long/SD 21 01/Song Than 747/70	RIF
Second InfBn	1-31	ATF 211 (VNMC/VNN)	Cuu Long/SD 21 01/Song Than 747/70	RIF
Third InfBn	1-31	ATF 211 (VNMC/VNN)	Cuu Long/SD 21 01/Song Than 747/70	RIF
Fourth InfBn	1-2	JGS	None	Reserve
	3-7	Brigade B	Song Than 801	RIF
	8-15	Brigade B	Song Than 802	RIF
	16-18	Brigade E	None	Reserve
	19-31	Brigade B	Song Than 804	RIF
Fifth InfBn	1-2	JGS	None	Reserve
	3-7	Brigade B	Song Than 801	RIF
	8-14	Brigade B	Song Than 802	RIF
	15-18	7th ARVNDIV	None	Reserve
	19-31	Brigade B	Song Than 804	RIF

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATES</u>	<u>OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF</u>	<u>OPERATION NAME</u>	<u>MISSION</u>
Sixth InfBn	1-2 3-7 8-15 16-18 19-31	JGS Brigade B Brigade B Brigade B Brigade B	None Song Than 801 Song Than 802 None Song Than 804	Reserve RIF RIF Reserve RIF
Seventh InfBn	1-31	JGS	None	Training
First ArtyBn(-) 1-		ATF 211 (VNMC/VNN)	Cuu Long/SD 21 01/Song Than 747/70	D/S
Btry C	1-16	ATF 211 (VNMC/VNN)	Cuu Long/SD 21 01/Song Than 747/70	D/S
Btry C	17-31	JGS	None	Reserve
Second ArtyBn(-) 1-2		JGS	None	Reserve
	3-7	Brigade B	Song Than 801	D/S
	8-15	Brigade B	Song Than 802	D/S
	16-18	Brigade B	None	Reserve
	19-31	Brigade B	Song Than 804	D/S
Btry F	1-16 17-18 19-31 1-31	JGS Brigade B Brigade B JGS	None None Song Than 804 None	Reserve Reserve D/S Training
Btry I				
Btry J	1-31	JGS	None	Training

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VNN/VNMC STATISTICAL SUMMARY

VIETNAMESE NAVY:

	<u>Daily Average</u>		<u>Searched</u>		<u>Detained</u>	
	<u>Oper</u>	<u>Empl</u>	<u>Junks</u>	<u>People</u>	<u>Junks</u>	<u>People</u>
<u>COASTAL FORCE</u>						
I	39.8/12.5	37.6/12.2	18,150	64,533	44	155
II	43.6	41.0	17,403	43,685	43	156
III	51.5	49.9	8,374	26,859	11	36
IV	39.5	36.0	9,303	27,733	1	11
	Sub-totals:		53,230	162,810	99	358

*FLEET COMMAND

<u>PATROL SHIPS</u>	28.3	23.1	1,383	8,383	0	1
TF 213	8.6/29.1	4.8/18.0	6,010	16,798	0	0
	Sub-totals:		7,393	25,	0	1

RIVERINE AREA

<u>RAGS</u>	122.4	116.9	8,522	35,314	0	0
TF 211	77.2	65.7	2,854	6,590	0	0
TF 212	78.6	73.1	8,612	25,241	0	0
			19,988	67,145	0	0

CENTRAL TASK FORCE

RAG's 27, 81, 91	47.6	46.9	0	0	0	0
	TOTALS:		80,611	255,136	99	359

CASUALTIES

	<u>VNN</u>	<u>ENEMY</u>
Killed	2	89
Wounded	52	32
Captured	--	23
Missing	--	--

VIETNAMESE MARINE CORPS:

2 JAN - 29 JAN

VC/NVA:	KIA <u>207</u>	Captured <u>26</u>	Suspects detained <u>49</u>
VNMC:	KIA <u>63</u>	WIA <u>220</u>	MIA <u>2</u>

*Provided 57 gunfire support missions.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIC ACTION SUMMARY

There were ten VC who rallied to USN/VNN units in January. Hunger, disillusionment with the VC cause, and family separation were the principle reasons given for rallying.

Seabee teams of the Third Naval Construction Brigade completed ten Civic Action projects in January. Among these were street repairs completed and a storage shed constructed for under privileged families at Boc Lieu City (WR 813 275) and playground equipment built for provincial schools at Tra Vinh City (485 985).

There were reported to be 200 Vietnamese nationals in training in January under 3NCB supervision. During the month, 14 of these trainees were graduated.

Corpsmen from the Naval Support Activity, Danang, while conducting voluntary work at local dispensaries and aboard the German hospital ship HEIGOLAND, treated approximately 500 Vietnamese during the month. Civic action assistance from Navy personnel at Danang was rendered at 28 schools, two orphanages, three dispensaries, and 40 separate institutions in January.

In Medcaps conducted throughout the Republic of Vietnam in January by Naval Medical Teams, skin diseases and respiratory infections were the predominant medical problems. Besides the medical attention administered during Medcaps, hygiene leaflets and kits, bars of soap, clothing, toothbrushes, and baby formula were distributed, and Psyops tapes were played.

On 18 January, the Vietnamese Minister of Social Welfare from Xuyen Province, Mr. Do Thai Chanh, visited the Sea Float community to determine how many people in the settlement wish to become permanent residents and are qualified to receive refugee benefits. Each qualifying family will receive 5,000 piasters (about 42 dollars U.S.) to help build a house and a six month food allowance of 18 piasters a day (15 cents U.S.) for each family member.

In the Rung Sat Special Zone, the USN/VNN Pacification Program accounted for 2,080 patients treated in 19 separate Medcaps/Dentcaps. USN Psyops personnel in the same area continued to deliver their message in January by dropping Chieu Hoi leaflets, weapons rewards, and safe conduct passes from aircraft and by playing Psyops tapes over loudspeakers.

Population figures in Sea Float for the month of January showed a decrease in stable and transient population, but this has been attributed to the fact that some families have been leaving the Tran Hung Dao I settlement to participate in rice crop harvests further north. The drop in population is viewed to be only temporary. The following are population statistics in Tran Hung Dao gathered by Psyops and polwar personnel on foot and in junks.

<u>Date</u>	<u>No. Houses</u>	<u>No. Sampans</u>	<u>Stable Population</u>	<u>Transient Population</u>
26 DEC	532	2,663	200	2,000
16 JAN	372	2,311	165	1,574

At Sea Float, the USN/VNN personnel participating in the civic action program treated 1,391 patients while conducting 29 Medcaps/Dentacaps. In one such mission on 15 January, the Sea Float Medical Officer delivered the first male infant born on board the Sea Float community.

Vietnamese Navy units continued to participate in Agricultural Self-Help projects. On 18 January, RPG 53 donated 2 hogs and 200 chickens at Ben Luc, and RPG 55 contributed 2 hogs to the project at My Tho.

COMRIVPATFLOT Five received 288 small battery powered radios for Psyops purposes in January. The radios will be distributed to Vietnamese civilians in areas where radios are few in number. Radios are felt to be an excellent Psyops medium permitting the people in remote areas to keep in touch with the happenings in the Republic.

Two incidents in January, one at Operation Sea Float, the other involving a Market Time unit, illustrated one of the difficulties of American and Vietnamese military personnel in gaining the support of the Vietnamese people in the midst of the war. On 27 January, at Tran Hung Dao I in Sea Float, a false report of VC in the area initiated defensive random fire by a Revolutionary Development Cadre which inadvertently killed a man and his two daughters. On 26 January, Market Time unit PCF 62 entered a village four miles southeast of Nha Trang to conduct a Psyops mission. The response from the villagers was extremely unfriendly. In a conversation with an elderly man, the PCF

personnel learned that on the night of 21 January, weapons fire from an unidentified helicopter operating near there had shot and killed a young girl.

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USN CIVIC ACTION STATISTICAL SUMMARY

26 NOV 69 - 25 DEC 69

TOTAL NUMBER OF MAN-DAYS* PERSONNEL OF UNITS ENGAGED IN CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS: 4,085

COST OF SUPPLIES CONTRIBUTED BY MILITARY RESOURCES FOR CIVIC ACTION PROJECTS: VN\$ 1,814,786

EXPENDITURES FROM THE US/FWMAF CIVIC ACTION PSYWAR FUND: VN\$ 334,090

VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS: VN\$ 741,741

PERCENTAGE OF U. S. MILITARY CIVIC ACTION ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED JOINTLY WITH:

Other FWMAF		<u>11%</u>
RVNAF		<u>18%</u>
U. S. civilian voluntary agencies		<u>3%</u>
Average percent of self-help by VN civilians:	Labor	<u>71%</u>
	Material	<u>4%</u>

PROGRAMS

	<u>Man Days</u>	<u>Expenditures (VN\$)</u>
Economic Development	<u>370</u>	<u>119,354</u>
Education	<u>1,155</u>	<u>875,343</u>
Social Welfare	<u>1,805</u>	<u>1,392,106</u>
Transportation	<u>500</u>	<u>247,554</u>
Refugee	<u>361</u>	<u>256,260</u>

INSTITUTES ASSISTED

	<u>Number</u>
Schools	<u>52</u>
Orphanages	<u>16</u>
Hospitals/Dispensaries	<u>5</u>
Others	<u>63</u>

SEA FLOAT USN/VNN NAVY PACIFICATION PROGRAM

	<u>Number</u>
Medcaps/Dentcaps	<u>29</u>
Medical Treatments Administered	<u>1391</u>

* One man-day equals one ten hour working day



ACCELERATED TURNOVER PROGRAM AND TRAINING SUMMARY

Progress of the Accelerated Turnover Program moved forward as additional milestones of the various phases were completed in January. The only USN or USCG asset turned over to the Vietnamese Navy was one USCG WPB.

The Coast Guard Cutter POINT WHITE (WPB 82308) which had the designation SCATTOR (Small Craft Assets, Training, and Turnover of Resources Program) 8 was decommissioned and turned over to the Vietnamese Navy during an impressive ceremony on 12 January at the Cat Lo Naval Support Activity. Captain David E. Perkins, Commander Coast Guard Activities, Vietnam, represented the United States and presented the WPB to Commander Bui Cuu Vien, the Vietnamese Navy Third Coastal Zone Commander. The new WPB under the VNN command rejoined the operating forces at the Cat Lo base and returned to Market Time operations in the 3rd and 4th Coastal Zones. The following is a summary of all the WPB's that have been turned over to the Vietnamese Navy under the SCATTOR Program.

<u>SCATTOR #</u>	<u>DATE OF T/O</u>	<u>USCG NAME</u>	<u>VNN #</u>	<u>COASTAL ZONE OPERATING IN</u>
1	16 MAY 1969	POINT GARNET	HQ 700	III & IV
2	16 MAY 1969	POINT LEAGUE	HQ 701	III & IV
3	15 SEP 1969	F INT CLEAR	HQ 702	III & IV
4	11 NOV 1969	POINT GAMMON	HQ 703	I
5	17 NOV 1969	POINT COMFORT	HQ 704	III & IV
9	9 DEC 1969	POINT ELLIS	HQ 707	III & IV
6	11 DEC 1969	POINT SLOCUM	HQ 705	I
7	11 DEC 1969	POINT HUDSON	HQ 706	I
8	12 JAN 1970	POINT WHITE	HQ 708	III & IV



The Actov Comm Program which was promulgated in November 1969 and defined as a plan of execution for the orderly transfer of USN communications - electronic (C-E) assets, hardware, and software (doctrine, concepts, and procedures) to the VNN to enable the VNN to fulfill their expanding operational responsibilities had several significant accomplishments recorded in January. On 12 January, four VNN arrived at the U. S. Naval Communications Station, Cam Ranh Bay for the AN/ERC 109 microwave course of five weeks duration.

This increased the total number of VNN undergoing communications related training to 26. The excellent progress made with the Electronic Technician (ET) Training Program at the U. S. Naval Support Activity, Danang prompted the selection of an additional six VNN trainees on 12 January. At the U. S. Naval Support Activity Detachment at Cat Lo, two ET's completed 12 weeks of on-the-job training (OJT) near the end of the month. In some cases, the VNN trainees who have successfully completed the course of instruction and training have remained at the various bases as instructors for new VNN trainees.

In the START Program, it was reported in the middle of the month that the VNN morale/training effort had increased at the COSDN 12 operation in Danang with the arrival of more Vietnamese foodstuffs such as seafood, rice, and vegetables from NSA Danang. All the PCF's for the 1 March 1970 turnover have had or are undergoing a regular availability (RAV), and all the 1 March turnover crews have been formed and are now patrolling as individual crews. The absence of VNN leading petty officers is being felt at this stage of the training. As a result, the VNN OINC's must spend more time supervising the maintenance and performing the functions of the leading petty officer. The problem of unauthorized absences has been combated with the introduction of a VNN liberty card system that is controlled by the OINC's. As of 25 January, a total of 67 VNN trainees had qualified for PCF operations.

On 21 January, COMRIVPATFLOT FIVE reported that all the remaining Boat Class 2 personnel have been transferred out of the River Division

with the qualified VN sailor going to CTF 212, and the unqualified going to the PBR school at Binh Thuy. The qualified Boat Class 3 personnel have been transferred to the River Division scheduled for turnover on 5 March, and the unqualified men have been going to the PBR school at Binh Thuy. The rate of VNN qualification has increased from eight trainees per week to approximately 20 trainees per week for the last two weeks of December. The VNN patrol officers assigned to the River Divisions are expected to assist and solve leadership patrols within the VNN ACTOV structure.

The CTF 116/212 PBR school at Binh Thuy convened classes on 19 January. The 112 VNN students ordered in for the first classes consisted of 39 VNN already qualified by the River Divisions, 65 enrolled as students and eight still in transit as of 27 January. The students have been enthusiastic and attentive in class and have generally been familiar with the boats and basic skills. The CTF 212 staff academic instructors have been very conscientious in the preparations and presentations of their lessons. At the end of the month, River Division 535, the PBR training division, was at full strength with the arrival of the tenth boat.

The training program for the PBR school is basically divided into two parts:

A. The first two weeks are devoted to classroom training and practical factors. The students are divided into two groups, group A is in the classroom four hours in the morning while group B is on the river participating in practical demonstrations. The program is

reversed in the afternoon. The following subjects are taught during the first two week period:

(1) Operations (One hour each in classroom except where noted)

- a. Types of maps and symbols
- b. Reading grid coordinates
- c. River piloting
- d. NOC
- e. Patrol brief and debrief
- f. Operational reports
- g. Enemy watermines and booby traps
- h. River patrolling
- i. Coordinated land ops
- j. Small unit tactics
- k. Intel briefing
- l. R/T procedures
- m. Radio equip familiarization
- n. Comm security
- o. R/T drill
- p. Air support and medevac (2 hours)
- q. Artillery call (2 hours)
- r. Psyops
- s. Night Observation Devices
- t. Engagement tactics and rules
- u. Aircraft/Patrol Craft recognition (2 hours)
- v. Seamanship and towing (4 hours on river)
- w. Practical OS (14 hours on river)
- x. WBGP, Boarding and Search (8 hours on river)

(2) Engineering (One hour each, classroom and river)

- a. Engine description and Fuel Oil System
- b. Engine checkout
- c. Shafting, steering, throttles
- d. Jacuzzi jet pump
- e. Bilge pump
- f. Salt water system
- g. Electrical system
- h. Engine casualties
- i. Trouble shooting
- j. PMS
- k. Damage Control

(3) Weapons (One hour each in classroom except where noted)

- a. M-16, .38 and .45 CAL pistols
- b. M-60 MG
- c. M-79, 12 gauge shotgun
- d. Hand grenades
- e. .50 CAL MG (2 hours)
- f. Safety precautions
- g. Live firing (8 hours)

B. The second two weeks are devoted to patrol on the Bassac River. The VNN students under the direction of boat riders from RIVDIV 535 will actually stop, board, and inspect junks and in every way actually carry out day and night patrols. It has also been tentatively planned to include two or three days of coordinated operations with ground units on the Dung Island complex.

At the end of the month, 31 of the next 80 river assault craft had full VNN crews embarked. These particular units have commenced their team training with the various task groups in the delta.

On 26 January, the ACTOV training for the Inshore Underwater Warfare Group WestPac Detachment (IUWG-1) began with one VNN officer and ten VNN enlisted at Qui Nhon and one VNN officer and 15 enlisted at Nha Trang. The basic concept is to eliminate the Harbor Entrance Control Post (HECP) and combine the harbor defense mission of IUWG-1 with the Coastal Surveillance Centers. In addition to the Harbor Defense Units at Qui Nhon and Nha Trang, the units at Cam Ranh Bay and Vung Tau will also be transferred.

There were 2,554 VNN (47.6% of projected need) in various stages of craft maintenance training at bases throughout the country. In the base maintenance program, there were 168 VNN undergoing training (44% of ACTOV projections). Class A supply school has 90 VNN in classes, and there have been 303 VNN phased into their logistics support organization.

Seventeen of the bases and one ATSB scheduled for turnover are in various stages of construction. Three of the bases and eight of the ATSB's will require no additional construction.



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NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY, SAIGON

The Naval Support Activity Detachment (NSAD) Dong Tam received four mortar attacks during January causing minor shrapnel damage to two hootches in the living area. There was one U.S. sailor wounded and one U.S. civilian wounded in the attacks. At My Tho, the NSAD received three mortar attacks; however, there was no damage or casualties reported. The NSAD Binh Thuy's LCM-6 received automatic weapons fire from the south bank of the Bassac River about 10 miles northwest of Binh Thuy while transiting from Binh Thuy to the YREM at Chau Doc. The LCM crew returned the fire with unknown results. There was no damage or casualties reported. Mobile Base II reported a secondary explosion resulted from a grenade thrown at a floating object near the base. The explosion produced a red flash and a 25 foot water spout, but caused no damage. The Advanced Tactical Support Base at Go Dau Ha was mined causing heavy damage to the galley and sank one ATC. Two U.S. sailors were killed, and two were wounded.

The personnel status of the Naval Support Activity, Saigon at month's end was as follows:

	<u>Allowance</u>	<u>On Board</u>
Officer	186	160
Enlisted	3,225	3,163
Civilian	967	986

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The USS MARK (AKL 28), YW-126, YFR-889, YFR-890, YF-866, and the 100 foot utility boat MONDERO provided routine resupply services throughout the month. The USS BRULE (AKL 12) commenced a restricted availability at Subic Bay. The MOROCCO which suffered a casualty to her starboard main engine on 23 December at Dong Tam was expected to be repaired by 15 January; however, parts were not available, and the expected completion date is now 15 February. The USS KRISHNA (ARL 38) completed a restricted availability at Yokohama and was positioned off Square Bay to support Sea Float operations. The USS ASKARI (ARL 30) was positioned at Long Xuyen, and the USS SPHINX (ARL 24) was on the Vam Co River providing services to Giant Sling-shot. The USS SATYR (ARL 23) moved to the vicinity of Tan Chau to support CTG 194.4 river assault craft, and the USS TUTUILA (ARG 4) was at An Thoi providing support for PCF's. The USS BENEWAH (APB 35), YREM-16, YREM-20, and YREM-21 were positioned on the upper Bassac River supporting Border Interdiction operations. The APL 26 and APL 27 continued to provide additional berthing facilities at Saigon for the ACTOV program. APL-30 arrived at An Thoi on 15 January and relieved APL-21. The USS JASON (AR 8) was at Vung Tau from 29 December to 10 January providing tender availability for support craft. The YFU's 4, 24, and 59 conducted routine resupply in the Gulf of Thailand, and YFU's 55 and 57 arrived at Nha Be on 27 January from Danang.

During January at Cam Ranh Bay, the operation of brick plant at the Naval Support Facility and the block plant at the Naval Air

Facility continued without incident. Construction continued on the Vietnamese Navy dependent shelters at the Vietnam Navy Training Center and the Naval Support Facility. The desalination unit arrived at Qui Nhon during the month; however, it was anticipated that it would be 90 days before operations commenced. Construction of the ammo storage point at Vung Tau was completed, and construction commenced on the repair of the military hardstand. Two ammo desalination plants arrived at Nha Be, and test runs commenced in late January on the first plant. The water distribution system at Dong Tam was still awaiting parts for the pump to complete the system. The BOQ, head, and shower facilities for Commander Task Group 194.7 were completed. Construction of the dependent shelters continued, and plans were prepared for the public works maintenance training school. At Nha Trang, the final installation of the laundry facilities at the VNNTC was awaiting the power transformers. At Binh Thuy, the electrical distribution system was 90 percent complete, and the boat parts storage building and the capping of revetments were completed. At Go Dau Ha, the new galley ammo was destroyed by enemy action, and plans were prepared to move the galley ashore. The rocket fence was completed at Tra Cu; the new turtle ammo for berthing was completed at Ben Keo; the added revetment on the afloat complex was completed at Breezy Cove; and the bunkers and security fence were completed at Vinh Gia. The ACTOV construction continued at An Thoi, Cat Lo, Vung Tau, Dong Tam, Ben Luc, Rach Soi, and Ha Tien.

During January repair support was provided to TF-115 Market Time units by the USS TUTUILA (ARG 4), USS KRISHNA (ARL 38), NAVSUPPFAC Cam Ranh Bay, NAVSUPPACT DETs Qui Nhon, Cat Lo, and An Thoi. Eleven new PBR's were received in country during the month and were outfitted at Nha Be and turned over to Commander River Patrol Flotilla FIVE. The components and parts for the PBR bare hull assembly started arriving in country. The first bare hull was completed at Binh Thuy except for the installation of the siren and search light. The PBR ACTOV stand-down was slightly behind schedule at Nha Be; however, with a new completion date of 1 March, no difficulties were foreseen in meeting the deadline. The NSAD Binh Thuy still had to complete foam flotation backfits on three PBR's. During January, the PBR ACTOV stand-down commenced at NSAD Ben Luc.

The NSAD Dong Tam was the only River Assault Craft overhaul facility in the II, III, and IV Corps areas in January. Battle damage and operational repair support was provided as required by the USS ASKARI (ARL 30), USS KRISHNA (ARL 38), USS SATYR (ARL 23) and USS SPHINX (ARL 24), while the YREM-16, YREM-20, YREM-21 and ATSB's provided operational repair support. The overhaul cycle was changed from ten boats every twelve days to twelve boats every seventeen days providing an overhaul cycle of eleven months. Two M4A2 truck mounted napalm mixing and support units have been transferred from CONUS to provide immediate Zippo recharging. Ten E49R3 mixing and transfer units, flame fuel with required support equipment, has been contracted

for with an expected delivery date of May 1970. This equipment will require either an LCM-6 or ammi pontoon conversion. There is no depot level maintenance in country for the M4A2 flame thrower service units; however, limited parts and repair capability are available at Long Binh and Binh Thuy from the U.S. Army. Maximum effort to make rotatable engines ready for issue (RFI) has been requested. At month's end, 55 percent of rotatable 64HN9 engines were RFI and 40 percent of 12V71HS engines were RFI. An U-1 was converted to a Zippo recharger and arrived at Dong Tam on 28 January for final checkout.

The following personnel and craft were supported by the NSA

Detachments during January:

<u>Base</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Craft</u>
Cam Ranh Bay	130	1,325	45
Qui Nhon	55	543	34
Cat Lo	131	1,005	67
An Thoi	61	523	40
Nha Be	211	2,042	100
Sa Dec	40	145	8
Binh Thuy	614	1,636	55
My Tho	5	86	15
Dong Tam/YRBM-17	37	584	118
YREM-16	35	569	78
YREM-21	26	286	50
Mobile Base II	18	352	26

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YREM-20	24	505	32
Ben Luc	86	916	72

The gross and net supply effectiveness remained the same in January as the proceeding month with 71 percent and 81 percent respectively. Total issues for the month were 19,870, and total demands processed were 28,118. In addition, 669 back orders were released.

The entire Newport water system was converted to non-potable water with the exception of two storage tanks having a combined capacity of 850 gallons. Petroleum (POL) resupply channels was established for the Thuong Thoi Duffel Bag site via YREM-21. Field assistance was provided to Vinh Gia staging site to repair the helo refueling system which was damaged during a mortar attack. COMNAVFORV formalized an agreement with COMUSMACV wherein the NAVSUPACT Saigon would be reimbursed from Military Assistance Service Funds (MASF) for POL issues to VNN craft. Field assistance was provided to Mobile Base II and HA(L)-3 to determine the source of contamination in fuel receipts. POL test kits were distributed in an effort to prevent future reoccurrence.

NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY, DANANG

High winds and sea conditions hampered the I Corps Tactical Zone coastal operations on eight days during January as small craft warnings were in effect for 163 hours. Overall cargo operations for the month were satisfactory. Current report requirements and rates of cargo generation suggested a satisfactory situation during February. CONUS shipping projections indicated substantially the same level of import activity in February as was experienced in January. There was no cargo received by rail; however, ten flat cars and one engine were received by barge, loaded onto the tracks, and pulled out by locomotive without encountering any difficulties. The summary of port operations during January follows:

	<u>Offload</u>		<u>Backload</u>		<u>Through-put</u>	
	S/T	M/T	S/T	M/T	S/T	M/T
Danang	115,252	195,251	67,744	150,604	182,996	345,855
Chu Lai	24,623	42,643	4,856	20,119	29,479	62,762
Dong Ha/Cua Viet	9,347	14,546	4,837	14,420	14,184	29,066
Hue/Tan My	19,900	24,145	923	3,335	20,823	27,480
Sa Huynh	924	1,598	87	323	1,011	1,921

A record of 89,597 M/T was established for retrograde cargo backloaded out of I Corps in January, and of this total, 65,797 M/T were retrograded out of Vietnam.

Six LCU's were provided for U.S. Marine Corps unit moves for land clearing operations on Barrier Island. The USS MATACO (ATF 86) delivered YFNB-27 to Danang upon completion of a yard overhaul. T =

USNS NEW LONDON COUNTY (LST 1066) was mined on 13 January at Chu Lai. LCU 1619 was delivered to Danang on 15 January by the USS GUNSTON HALL (LSD 5) following a yard overhaul. The GUNSTON HALL departed Danang on 16 January for Subic Bay with LCU 1617 for overhaul and also carried pusher boat 24 for permanent transfer to the U.S. Naval Station, Subic Bay. The U.S. Marine Corps land clearing unit was removed from Barrier Island on 17 January by six LCU's. Dredging operations commenced on 18 January for the future location of the PBR Mobile Base ONE at Tan My. On 23 January, the USS GUNSTON HALL (LSD 5) departed Danang with YFU's 55 and 57 for permanent transfer to the Naval Support Activity, Saigon. Between 24 and 26 January, 12 LCU/YFU's participated in Keystone Bluejay conducting shuttle runs between Chu Lai and Danang. Four LCU's loaded the USS OGDEN (LPD 5) in Danang on 27 January in operation Keystone Bluejay. On 30 and 31 January, six LCU's loaded the USS PT DEFIANCE (LSD 31) and USS TRIPOLI (LPH 10) in Danang in support of operation Keystone Bluejay. In addition to the above operations, LCU-8/6's conducted 149 harbor shuttle runs carrying 335 short tons of cargo and made 12 amphibious beachings along the I CTZ coast carrying 378 short tons of cargo.

The depot operations at Danang and Chu Lai had a gross effectiveness rate of 91 percent and a net effectiveness rate of 95 percent during January. The overall Class I supply situation remained satisfactory with 14 days supply of A-rations on hand. There were 10,745,532 C-ration meals on hand at month's end with 1,739,912 meals due in.

Fuel issues increased in January to 1,397,000 gallons per day from the December rate of 1,372,000 gallons per day. Weather did not cause any significant delays in the movement of fuel to the I CTZ discharge ports or up the Cua Viet River. Both SEALOAD lines at Chu Lai were down for most of the month due to adverse weather as in the previous month.

The following was the personnel status for the Naval Support Activity, Danang at month's end:

<u>Allowance</u>	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>
NSA	418	9,002
YR-71	2	89
Total	420	9,091
Total on board	425	8,773

There were three enlisted personnel and one officer assigned TAD to Commander Naval Forces, Vietnam for various projects. During January, 113 personnel extended their tours in Vietnam. There were 804 persons performing base security duties and 135 persons performing afloat security duties during the month. The following numbers of personnel were performing cargo handling duties during January:

Hatch Teams	261
Ramp Teams	132
Checkers	148
Admin Support	183
Fleet Air Support	<u>38</u>
Total	762

Civilian personnel status:

<u>U.S. Civil Service</u>	<u>Ceiling on Board</u>		<u>Net Gain/Loss this Month</u>
NAVSUPPACT	63	52	Plus 2
COMNAVFORVREP	21	18	Minus 3
Total	84	70	Minus 1
Local National			
NAVSUPPACT	6,775	6,759	Plus 494
Other	8,418	7,727	Plus 249
Total	15,193	14,486	Plus 743

There was an average of 154,757 military personnel support by the Naval Support Activity, Danang in the I CTZ during January.

The dredge DAVISON removed 176,164 cubic meters from the channel entrance at Tan My and the dredge SANDCASTER dredged 115,349 cubic meters from the Perfume River and Navy Cove. At Gua Viet, the dredge SWELLMASTER removed 109,527 cubic meters from the entrance channel prior to departing the I Corps on 24 January for Cam Ranh Bay.

Construction of a 25,000 linear foot perimeter security lighting system commenced for the Chu Lai combat base. The critical portions of the system were scheduled for completion in early February. Construction also commenced on the addition to the security system at the Danang Air Base. This project includes 7,300 linear feet of fencing with lighting, 15 guard towers, and an additional perimeter road. In the northern I Corps, construction commenced on additional facilities for ARVN units under the Force Structures Increase program.

In early January, one regional force cantonment at Phy Vang providing berthing, messing, and admin facilities for 60 men was completed. Similar cantonments are under construction at An Lo, Phuong Dien and Nam Hoa. At Danang, the MAG-11 aircraft holding apron was completed on 5 January; the installation of the electrical generator and fuel storage for the Small Craft Repair Facility were completed on 10 January. Work commenced on the road rehabilitation project and the Vietnamese Navy Base. Structural repairs to the ferry landing pier were completed during the month. Project MOOD was 82 percent complete for Navy facilities and 43 percent complete for all military facilities at month's end.

The following is the status of personnel under the Philco Ford contract as of 31 January. The figures include program management, personnel in training, and personnel associated with Public Works, Supply, SCRF, and Third Naval Construction Brigade. These figures also include three local national employees directly hired to replace third country nationals.

	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>LN</u>	<u>TCN</u>	<u>Total</u>
On Board 26 Dec	123	1,251	2,432	3,806
On Board 31 Jan	116	1,255	2,066	3,437
Est On Board 28 Feb	110	1,240	2,017	3,367

The performance of the Korean Express-Keangnam LTD (KEKN) continued to be satisfactory during January and the guaranteed minimum contract requirements were met both seaside and pierside.

The following reflects the cargo handled during January:

Total Offload	55,434 S/T	85,802 M/T
Total Backload	12,536 S/T	32,977 M/T
Daily Average Thru-put	2,192 S/T	3,830 M/T

There were 1,188 patients admitted to the station hospital at Danang during the month. Of these, 331 were battle casualties, 67 for minor surgery, 277 for major surgery and 50 malaria admissions. There were 25 single amputations, nine double amputations and one triple amputation. The average daily patient census for January was 311 with 267 beds occupied at month's end including 31 prisoners-of-war.

THIRD NAVAL CONSTRUCTION BRIGADE

During January, there were five incidents of enemy activity reported involving Seabees, and all occurred in the southern I Corps Tactical Zone. This was three less than reported in December. The most significant incident occurred early on the morning of 6 January, 26 kilometers southeast of Hoi An, when the enemy launched a massive attack on Fire Support Base Ross. An estimated 200, 82mm mortar rounds, automatic weapons, and small arms fire were received followed by ground attacks. Satchel charges and grenades were thrown into huts of NMCB SEVEN personnel, and as they came out of the huts, A/W and S/A fire was received from the enemy that had penetrated the perimeter. Friendly forces suffered 14 killed and 64 wounded including seven NMCB SEVEN personnel wounded. Enemy losses were 38 killed and three captured. Of the four other incidents, three were mining and one small arms fire attack on a helo. BUCN Glen A. Jackson, III, USN, was killed on 31 January when the sixth vehicle of an NMCB SEVEN convoy struck a 100 pound mine while traveling on route 535 from landing zone Ross to landing zone Baldy, 40 miles north of Chu Lai. There were two other NMCB SEVEN and one U.S. marine wounded.

The major effort in the line of communication road upgrade program during January was south of Danang on routes QL-1, between Thanh Quit River and the intersection of routes QL-1 and 535. The Hai Van Pass also received extensive repair work and maintenance continued on routes ML-13C, ML-12E, ML-12W, ML-1C and ML-1D.

Work on the aircraft shelters continued during the month with 31 shelters under construction, 45 shelters complete except for concrete covers, and 77 shelters fully completed. There are 170 aircraft shelters in the approved program. There were eight shelters under procurement for the Fleet Air Support unit at the Danang Air Base, and a site had not been selected for the nine shelters at Chu Lai.

The airfield patching at Phu Bai and the overlay of the runway was rescheduled to begin about 1 April. The construction schedule will provide for minimal runway down time for both military and civilian aircraft. The overlay of the parking apron was completed in January, and the patching and overlay of the taxiways commenced. The construction of the third of four secondary bridges north of Hue was 10 percent complete with completion scheduled for mid March. Construction has not been scheduled for the fourth bridge. The beneficial occupancy date of 10 January was met for the Force Logistics Command retrograde facility at Red Beach. The fill requirements for the Hue detention facility has been completed under local contract, and on site construction was scheduled to begin in February as soon as several questions on building arrangements and construction details can be resolved with CORDS.

On 11 January, the Golden Gate Bridge at Hill 55 was damaged by a floating mine. There were two bents and three 20-foot spans destroyed. Reconstruction commenced on 12 January and was completed

on 26 January. Work on the ACTOV bases in the III and IV Corps Tactical Zones continued at Ha Tien, An Thoi, Nam Can, and Rach Soi. The facility at An Thoi was 98 percent complete; work at Ha Tien was 50 percent complete; and Rach Soi construction was six percent complete. Extensive fill work continued at Nam Can.

Naval Construction Forces have a projected backlog amounting to 37.7 weeks of horizontal work and 26.9 weeks of vertical work. The programmed backlog amounts to an additional 3.9 weeks of horizontal and 4.9 weeks of vertical work.

The following is the logistics status during the month:

In-country shipments:

	<u>Phu Bai</u>	<u>Chu Lai</u>	<u>Dong Ha</u>	<u>Delta Project</u>	<u>Total</u>
Material (S/T)	257	757	240	2,735	3,989
Material (M/T)	492	2,350	482	4,227	7,551
Equipment (Pieces)	0	17	0	61	78

Material Status:

	<u>Issues</u>	<u>Receipts</u>	<u>Total Inventory</u>
Project Material (\$000)	3,566	3,081	11,738
Tactical Support Functional Components - TSFC (\$000)	1,658	1,105	8,762

Repair Parts:

	<u>Issues</u>	<u>Receipts</u>	<u>Total Inventory</u>
Dollar Value (\$000)	501	155	1,869
Line Items	2,395	1,483	21,023

Equipment Deadline:

	<u>Total Equipment</u>	<u>Number Deadline</u>	<u>Percent</u>
NMCB Organic	1,557	73	4.7
Third NCB Augment	881	44	5.0

Equipment Retrograde Shipments:

Number of Pieces Shipped: 518

Number of Pieces Scheduled for Shipment: 18

The following was the personnel status at month's end:

Military:

	<u>Ceiling</u>	<u>On Board</u>
Officer	133	145
Enlisted	3,707	3,814
Total	3,840	3,959

Civilian:

Brigade Headquarters - 154 (66 TCN, 88 Vietnamese)

NMCB - 609

The following awards were presented to Third Naval Construction

Brigade personnel during January:

Legion of Merit	1
Bronze Star	13
Navy Commendation	47
Navy Achievement	89
Combat Action Ribbon	290
Purple Hearts	7

Rear Admiral H. Suerstedt, USN, Deputy Commander U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam was briefed by the Commander Third Naval Construction Brigade at Camp Haskins, Danang on 26 January.

On 29 January the Commander Third Naval Construction Brigade briefed Rear Admiral W. V. Combs, USN, Commander Service Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

On 15 January, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion 133 (NMCB-133) was relieved by NMCB-10 and redeployed to Gulfport, Mississippi. NMCB-10 established headquarters at Camp Wilkinson, Gia Le Combat Base.

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations and terms are commonly used in the combat zone by all agencies and are listed here in amplification of those used in the text:

ABF	Attack by fire
AMMI PONTON	A multi-purpose barge, standard size is twenty eight feet by ninety feet
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASPB	Assault Support Patrol Boat
ATC	Armored Troop Carrier
ATSB	Advance Tactical Support Base
A/W	Automatic Weapons
BLACK PONY/BRONCO	OV-10 Twin Engine Turboprop Counter-insurgency Aircraft
CCB	Command and Communication Boat
CG	Coastal Group (VNN)
CHICOM	Chinese Communist
CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Group-mercenaries of Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian descent who fight primarily around their own villages
COMMO LIAISON	Enemy communication routes or personnel
CP	Command Post
CRIP	Civilian Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoon
CS	Tear Gas Grenades
CTZ	Corps Tactical Zone
CZ	Coastal Zone

DELTA HAWK	Mohawk OV-10 Aircraft
D/S	Direct support
DUSTOFF	Medical evacuation by helicopter
EAGLE FLIGHT	A combined ground and air cavalry troop operation
ENIFF	Enemy initiated firefight
FSB	Fire Support Base
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces
GDA	Gun Damage Assesment
GVN	Government of Vietnam
H&I	Harassment and Interdiction Fire Support
JGS	Joint General Staff
KIA	Killed in Action
KIT CARSON SCOUTS	Former Viet Cong who have come over to the side of the Saigon government and serve with allied military units
LAFT	Light Attack Fire Team (OV-10's)
LAW	Light Anti-tank Weapon
LCPL	Landing Craft, Personnel, Large
LDNN	Vietnamese equivalent of USN underwater demolition team
LHFT	Light Helo Fire Team
LCH	OH-6 Light Observation Helicopter
LRRP	Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MATSB	Mobile Advanced Tactical Support Base
MEDCAP	Medical Civic Action Program

MONITOR	Heavily armored LCM-6 (40mm cannon or 105mm howitzer)
MRB	Mobile Riverine Base
MSE	Minesweeper, Boat
MSD	Minesweeper, Drone
MSF	Mobile Strike Force - mercenaries who deploy and go anywhere
NGFS	Naval Gunfire Support
NILO	Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer
NOD	Night Observation Device
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
OPCCN	Operational control.
PBR	Patrol Boat, River
PCF	Patrol Craft, Fast (Swift Boat)
PG	Patrol Gunboat
PRU	Provincial Reconnaissance Unit
PSA	Provincial Sector Advisor
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
RAD	River Assault Division
RAG	River Assault Group (VNN)
RAID	River Assault and Interdiction Division
RAS	River Assault Squadron
RF/PF	Regional Forces/Popular Forces
RIF	Reconnaissance in Force
RPG	Rocket Propelled Grenade
RSSZ	Rung Sat Special Zone
SAR	Search and Rescue

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SEAWOLF	UH-1B Helo, heavily armed, USN operated
SHADOW	C-119 aircraft
SKIMMER	20' fiberglass rowboat
SLICK	UH-1B helo
SOLID ANCHOR	Transition of Sea Float operations ashore
SPOOKY	C-47 aircraft
SSB	Swimmer support boat (skimmer)
STAB	SEAL Team Assault Boat
TAOR	Tactical Area of Responsibility (also referred to as AO)
TOE POPPER	Small explosive VC booby trap
USARV	United States Army, Vietnam
VNMC	Vietnamese Marine Corps
WBGF	Waterborne Guardpost (NWEGP - Night Waterborne Guardpost)
ZIPPO	Flame thrower equipped ATC or Monitor
BC	Body count
TACAIR	Tactical Air Support
RD CADRE	Revolutionary Development Cadre
RAV	Regular availability
SF	Square feet
SY	Square yards
VCI	Member of Viet Cong infrastructure
VNRS	Vietnamese railroad spur

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VNMC ADVISOR ASSIGNMENTS - JANUARY 1970

VNMC HEADQUARTERS

SMA
ASMA
OPNS ADV
ASST OPNS ADV
TRNG ADV
ASST TRANG ADV
G-1 ADV
ADMINO
ADMIN CHIEF
ADMIN NCO
ADMIN NCO
ADMIN NCO
ISO ADV
MED ADV
ASST MED ADV
LOG ADV
LOG ADV
SUP ADV
ASST SUP ADV
COM ADV
MT ADV
ENGR ADV
DIV ARTY

COL W. M. VAN ZUYEN (1-26)
COL T. D. PARSONS (1-16, 20-31)
MAJ M. E. O'CONNOR (1-28)
CAPT J. H. ADMIRE (1, 13-31)
CAPT H. R. OSTERBERG (1-31)
GYSGT J. C. STURGES (1-13)
CAPT L. C. ROBERTS (1-31)
1STLT L. JONES (1-19, 26-31)
SSGT D. L. ERIKSSON (1-31)
SSGT B. L. ANDERSON (7-11)
SSGT B. S. SHELDON (1-31)
SGT G. L. TOAL (1-31)
CAPT J. C. STERNBERG (1-31)
LT P. R. SHACKELFORD (1-31)
HMC J. T. JENKINS (1-31)
CAPT A. J. FINGER (1-20)
MAJ H. J. L. REID (12-31)
CAPT J. A. JOHNSON (1-31)
SSGT E. C. DANIELS (1-31)
CAPT J. N. PERRIN (1-27)
CAPT S. F. MAYFIELD (1-31)
CAPT G. F. SMITH (1-31)
CAPT R. L. SMITH (1-31)

BRIGADE A

MAJ M. D. CERRETA (1-31)
CAPT J. P. AYMOND (1-21)
CAPT N. P. RALPH (1-31)

BRIGADE B

MAJ T. L. GATCHEL (1-31)
CAPT M. D. CAREY (21-31)
CAPT E. E. BRIGHT (1-23)

FIRST BATTALION

CAPT B. B. CONATSER (1-21, 30-1)
CAPT W. E. HEALY (1-31)
GYSGT J. C. STURGES (22-31)

SECOND BATTALION

CAPT J. P. AYMOND (22-31)
CAPT M. E. RUDDICK (1-31)
GYSGT J. C. STURGES (14-21)
CAPT W. J. BUHL (1-24)

THIRD BATTALION

MAJ J. J. MULLEN (1-31)
CAPT L. P. WOODBURN (1-31)

FOURTH BATTALION

CAPT W. A. GRIFFIS (1-24)
CAPT M. W. SMITH (24-31)
2NDLT M. P. NEU (1-31)

FIFTH BATTALION

CAPT E. E. BRIGHT (24-31)
CAPT T. V. DRAUDE (1-15, 26-31)
CAPT M. W. SMITH (1-23)

SIXTH BATTALION

CAPT J. H. ADMIRE (2-12)
CAPT D. L. DAVIS (1, 13-31)
1STLT C. W. CAMPBELL (1-31)

SEVENTH BATTALION

CAPT R. M. REILLY (1-31)

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FIRST ARTILLERY BATTALION

CAPT W. B. BOVEE (1-31)
CAPT R. L. PORTER (1-17)

TAD

LTCOL T. D. PARSONS (17-19) OKI
LTCOL M. E. WHITE (1-18, 20-31)
ATF 211

HOSP

CAPT B. B. CONATSER (22-23)

KIA

CAPT W. A. GRIFFIS (24)

SECOND ARTILLERY BATTALION

CAPT D. A. BALFANZ (2-13, 18-24)
CAPT R. I. NEAL (23-31)
CAPT J. E. STOCKING (1-31)

JOINED

MAJ H. J. L. REID (12)
CAPT R. I. NEAL (16)

TRANSFERRED

CAPT A. J. FINGER (21)
CAPT J. P. PERKINS (1)
SSGT R. L. ANDERSON (12)

MAU

LTCOL M. E. WHITE (19)
CAPT D. A. BALFANZ (1, 14-17, 25-28)
CAPT W. J. BUHL (25-30)
CAPT M. D. CAREY (1-20)
CAPT B. B. CONATSER (24-29)
CAPT D. L. DAVIS (2-4, 12)
CAPT T. V. DRAUDE (16-17, 25)
CAPT R. I. NEAL (16-22)
CAPT R. L. PORTER (18-22, 31)

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