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UNITED STATES
MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM
COMMAND HISTORY

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ANNEX A
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1. REPORT NUMBER Volume II, HQ USMACV COMMAND HISTORY 72-73	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER	
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) Command History, UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND VIETNAM JANUARY 1972 - MARCH 1973 VOLUME II		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Final - Jan 72 - Mar 73	
7. AUTHOR(s) History Branch, Office of the Secretary Joint Staff, MACV		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER None	
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s) —	
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Hq Department of the Army (DAIM-FAR-AD) Information Management Support Agency Alexandria, VA 22331-0301		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS None	
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office) Records Access & Release Division Information Access Branch (DAIM-FAR-AI) Alexandria, VA 22331-0301		12. REPORT DATE 15 Jul 73	
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 336 pages & 16 Index Pages	
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED	
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release. Distribution unlimited. A Classified version of this document has been accessioned into DTIC under AD #		18a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE None	
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18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES This is the Second Volume of the Jan 72 - Mar 73, USMACV Annual Command History, ninth and last in a series of Histories covering the years 1964 thru March 1973, prepared in accordance with CINCPAC Instructions for Unified Commands.			
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Logistics, Support of RVNAF, Communications-Electronics, VNAF Support, Command Activities, The New Agencies, Countdown, Strategic Technical Directorate Assistance Team - 158, AN LOC, KONTUM, QUANG TRI AND HUE, US POW's, Vietnam Campaigns, Vietnamization of Facilities.			
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This Volume II, Command History, Jan 72 - Mar 73, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam contains Letter of Promulgation, Table of Contents, and Photographs consisting of 16 Index Pages. Following are: Annex E - Logistics; (Pages E-1 - E-62), Annex F - Command Activities; (Pages F-1 - F70), Annex G - The New Agencies; (Pages G-1 - G-28), Annex H - Countdown; (Pages H-1 - H-24),			

- >Annex I - Strategic Technical Directorate Assistance Team-158,
(Pages I-1 - I-20);
- Annex J - AN LOC, Attack on LOC NINH, Phases I & II the Sieges,
(Pages J-1 - J-32),
- Annex K - KONTUM, The NVA Buildup, Attacks & Counteroffensives,
(Pages K-1 - K-28,
- **Annex L - QUANG TRI AND HUE, Situation, Attack, Stabilization,
(Pages L-1 - L-36.
- Pages M-1 thru M-4, contain listing of Commanders and Principal Staff
Officers.
- Pages N-1 thru N-10, contain a Chronology of Events.
- Pages O-1 thru O-16, contain a Glossary of Acronyms used throughout Volumes
1 and 2.
- Pages P-1 thru P-6, contain Bibliographical Notes.

** Following each Annex are numbered footnotes to the information contained
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
**1972 — 1973
COMMAND HISTORY
VOLUME II**

Prepared by the Military History Branch
Office of the Secretary, Joint Staff
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

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
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ANNEX E

LOGISTICS

(U) During 1972 the mission of the Director of Logistics underwent a major shift from support of US activities in Vietnam to support and assistance for the RVNAF in their goal to attain logistics self-sufficiency. This task was substantially accom-

plished by year end, even in the face of the massive enemy offensive in the spring of the year, the RVNAF counteroffensive, and the continued US personnel drawdowns as the cease-fire approached.

SUPPORT OF THE RVNAF

(S) The focus of US logistics effort in Vietnam in 1972 was support of the RVNAF. As the inevitable total US withdrawal approached, intense efforts to guide, assist, and support the RVNAF toward a complete self-sufficiency became the objectives of the MACV Logistics Directorate.

(S) Two projects had been instituted in 1971 to furnish the RVNAF with the necessary equipment to strengthen their forces. Project 981 was originally conceived and implemented in the spring of 1971 with the objective of expediting the delivery of all major item TOE/TA shortages to the ARVN. Major item shortages were identified to the Department of the Army and delivery was made by expedited surface and air means. However, because of procurement lead time and difficulties in obtaining all required items, 1972 opened with a heavy receipt of items still arriving in Vietnam. As an adjunct to Project 981, Project 982 was initiated in August 1971. This project was a companion project to 981 and was initiated to raise the requisitioning objective of the RVNAF logistics elements to a 365 day level. Additionally, authority was given to allow RVNAF to stock up to three years' permissive overstockage. Project 982 covered secondary items and repair parts, a prime source of which were excesses held by USARV as a result of troop reductions under the KEYSTONE program.

(S) The NGUYEN HUE Offensive of March 1972 resulted in a massive resupply operation to provide for the immediate replacement of materiel lost in combat. As an outgrowth of this program, Project ENHANCE was established in May 1972 to increase the combat capability of RVNAF. Project ENHANCE was the term used to describe the total equipment required by the RVNAF to attain the goal of Vietnamization. It provided for the supply of major end items to permit the organization and activation of new combat units to be added to the RVNAF force structure. A total of seven new battalions were created under this project: two air defense artillery (ADA) battalions (project code

ICB); two M-48A3 tank battalions (project code ICD); and three 175mm gun battalions (project code ICE). Originally, the ADA battalions were to have consisted of Vulcans and M-42 Dusters. MACV recommended, however, that the Vulcans be deleted due to the problems inherent in the introduction of new high technology equipment and that M-55 Quad-50s be substituted. DA approved the MACV recommendation, and the programming and call forward of the Quad-50s was accomplished in September 1972.

(S) Simultaneous with the inception of Project ENHANCE in May 1972, Project VER was established. This project was directed at the accelerated delivery of repair parts to alleviate a critical zero balance position in RVNAF direct and general support units (DSUs and GSUs). During the initial phases of this project, DSUs and GSUs submitted high priority requisitions for repair parts needed to remove critical equipment from deadline. The target for submitting all requisitions to the US supply system was 8 July 1972. The maximum number of requisitions were to be satisfied from in-country assets. A total of 6,570 requisitions valued at \$7,871,563 were submitted. A second element of Project VER was the performance of a joint study to determine the reasons for the occurrence of zero balances and to provide a basis for corrective action.

(S) Projects 981, 982, VER, and ENHANCE were all active to varying degrees when Project ENHANCE PLUS was initiated in October 1972. ENHANCE PLUS provided for expedited delivery of undelivered balances of all these projects plus add-on materiel selected by JCS. The add-on materiel was identified by project code ICR. Equipment posture by the time of the cease-fire was better than it had been when the NGUYEN HUE Offensive began on 30 March, and any future equipment losses could be replaced on the one-for-one basis provided for under the supervision of the ICCS. Figure E-1 shows RVNAF and enemy equipment losses during the year.¹

E-1

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A C-5A Galaxy unloads Project ENHANCE PLUS equipment at Tan Son Nhut AB.

(C) The RVNAF logistics organization was similar to that of the US prior to 1962, in that it was organized along service and technical service lines, rather than on a functional basis (Fig. E-2). Five of the six technical services (engineer, ordnance, signal, quartermaster, and medical) provided common item supply and maintenance to ARVN, VNAF, and VNN. Commanders of VNAF and VNN had

under their commands installations which provided logistics support peculiar to aircraft and naval vessels, respectively. Technical services commanded the depots and units which constituted the logistics base organization. With the exception of transportation, each technical service maintained a base depot in Saigon which provided depot level maintenance. A move toward functionalization in 1972

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RVNAF AND ENEMY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

(1973)

EQUIPMENT	RVNAF	ENEMY
Individual Weapons.....	67,801	30,204
Crew Served Weapons.....	3,166	9,002
Artillery.....	382	489
Tracked Vehicles.....	622 (All Types)	721 (Tanks only)
Wheeled Vehicles.....	2,035	3,946
Communications.....	11,599	No specific figures are available
Fixed Wing Aircraft.....	105	67


RVNAF losses were validated by an RVNAF general officer. Aircraft were accounted for by serial number; above figures include only those aircraft actually dropped from accountable records.

RVNAF equipment losses included those items lost, destroyed, or unrepairable as a result of combat activity.

Source: MACDL

Figure: E-1

RVNAF ORGANIZATION FOR LOGISTICS



Source: MACDL

Figure: E-2

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resulted in the consolidation of the respective base depot supply functions at the 1st ARVN Associated Depot located at Long Binh.

(C) Area logistics support for the corps was provided by the area logistics commands (ALC). The ALCs provided command and control for the logistics units and installations within their areas. The ALCs were under the command of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics in his role as commander of the Central Logistics Command (CLC). Each ALC had various field depots, general support maintenance depots, direct support units, ammunition depots, and transportation groups under its control. Five ALCs were located in Vietnam, one in each corps area except II Corps which had two because of its large area. The ALCs were located at Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Cam Ranh (moved from Nha Trang in 1972), Long Binh, and Can Tho.

(C) Many programs contributed to the modernization of the RVNAF logistics system in 1972, with the ultimate goal being that of RVNAF logistics self-sufficiency. One of the most important improvements was made in the area of logistics management. In 1971 ARVN was still using manual stock records; by the cease-fire in January 1973

they were operating their own modern computerized logistical system patterned after the US Army's USARPAC system. The RVNAF Automated Materiel Management System (RAMMS) supported a new centralized commodity management organization: the National Materiel Management Agency (NMMA).²

(3) By the time of the cease-fire the overall RVNAF logistics capability was adequate to accomplish the required mission. The ENHANCE and ENHANCE PLUS programs insured that the required materiel was on hand, and US military advisors had provided the necessary training and guidance to their counterparts. In most cases, the facilities available for the accomplishment of the logistics mission were adequate. It was felt that, provided the RVNAF placed the required priority and command emphasis on the accomplishment of the logistics mission, the job would be done in a satisfactory manner. A sense of urgency, however, was necessary at all levels to insure that logistics be given its proper priority. At the time of the cease-fire, the US advisory and supply systems had done their job. The success of the system hinged on the will and motivation of the RVNAF.³

COMPONENT RVNAF SERVICE STATUS AT TIME OF US WITHDRAWAL

ARVN STATUS

(C) During the initial phases of the NGUYEN HUE Offensive, substantial losses of equipment were suffered by the ARVN. Replacements for these losses during 1972, however, brought the ARVN equipment status to a level approximately that immediately preceding the offensive, with no critical in-country equipment shortages existing by year end. Project ENHANCE PLUS equipment deliveries were sufficient to fill critical unit shortages, projected attrition, and combat losses for the balance of FY 73.

(C) Equipment excesses at year end resulted from the delivery of FY 73 and, in some cases, FY 74 attrition quantities. Overage of individual weapons was due to the title transfer of M-16 rifles to RVNAF by MACV and ROKFV elements, an action which had been directed by higher authority as part of ENHANCE PLUS. Communications equipment excesses resulted from a modernization which caused an overlap between old and new models on hand, such as the case of AN/PRC-10s vs AN/PRC-25s. Authorized levels were projected to be attained through a gradual attrition of the older models.

(S) In addition to equipment replacement, Pro-

ject ENHANCE PLUS further increased the ARVN combat capability with the addition of the equipment for three 175mm artillery battalions, two M-48 tank battalions, and two air defense battalions. One M-48E3 tank battalion moved to Pleiku on 13 November, completed its training, and deployed on 11 January 1973. The second battalion completed its training at Long Binh and deployed on 17 December 1972. The remaining equipment to replace shortages was in-country by early 1973 and awaiting issue to units. The three 175mm artillery battalions had a few equipment shortages, primarily in the area of fire direction equipment and tool kits. The 103d FA Battalion located the Pleiku completed training and deployed on 9 January 1973. The 104th FA Battalion was in its 16th week of training, had completed successful fire support missions, and was deployed by 7 February 1973. The 105th FA Battalion in Da Nang was scheduled to deploy on 7 March 1973. The air defense battalions were in the process of drawing their authorized equipment in February 1973. The 3d ADA Battalion at Da Nang was scheduled to deploy on 7 April 1973, and the 104th at Qui Nhon was scheduled to deploy on 8 May 1973. Figures E-3 through E-8 show ARVN equipment status through February 1973.⁴

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ARVN INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS

DATE	AUTHORIZED	ON HAND	LOSSES	REPLACEMENTS
APR 72	899,444	875,258	6,279	0
MAY 72	899,444	860,898	23,414	9,044
JUN 72	899,444	866,936	4,506	10,544
JUL 72	899,444	889,784	12,442	85,240
AUG 72	899,444	892,088	0	2,304
SEP 72	910,591*	891,626	18,489	18,007
OCT 72	910,591	889,160	2,466	0
NOV 72	910,591	949,683**	2,392	29,951
DEC 72	910,591	948,020	2,818	1,200
JAN 73	910,591	950,003	0	1,988
FEB 73***	910,591	948,008	2,000	0

NOTES:

- *Increase in authorizations due to reconciliation conducted at the FY 73 ARVN MASP Program Review.
- **Excesses were generated as a result of the title transfer of M-16 rifles from USARV units, MACV advisory elements, and ROKFV elements. The transfer had been directed by higher authority as part of ENHANCE PLUS. On hand quantity adjusted as a result of US-ARVN reconciliation.
- ***Projection.

Source: MACDL

Figure: E-3

ARVN CREW-SERVED WEAPONS

DATE	AUTHORIZED	ON HAND	LOSSES	REPLACEMENTS
APR 72	17,176	16,787	484	0
MAY 72	17,176	16,782	882	847
JUN 72	17,176	16,977	184	379
JUL 72	17,176	17,136	428	664
AUG 72	17,176	17,169	0	84
SEP 72	17,680*	16,737	661	219
OCT 72	17,680	16,680	87	0
NOV 72	17,680	20,273**	408	890
DEC 72	17,680	20,236	122	84
JAN 73	17,680	20,281	0	48
FEB 73***	17,680	20,001	200	0

NOTES:

- *Increase in authorizations due to reconciliation conducted at the FY 73 ARVN MASP Program Review.
- **Excesses due to the delivery of FY 73 attrition quantities. On hand quantity adjusted as a result of US-ARVN reconciliation.
- ***Projection.

Source: MACDL

Figure: E-4

ARVN ARTILLERY

DATE	AUTHORIZED	ON HAND	LOSSES	REPLACEMENTS
APR 72	1,569	1,516	54	50
MAY 72	1,569	1,478	150	112
JUN 72	1,569	1,529	52	108
JUL 72	1,569	1,485	70	6
AUG 72	1,569	1,542	0	77
SEP 72	1,615*	1,520	27	5
OCT 72	1,615	1,502	18	0
NOV 72	1,615	1,697**	3	108
DEC 72	1,615	1,722	8	28
JAN 73	1,615	1,758	8	28
FEB 73***	1,615	1,748	5	0

NOTES:

- *Increase in authorizations due to Project ENHANCE add on units.
- **Excesses due to the delivery of FY 73 and FY 74 attrition quantities and title transfer from ROKFV. On hand quantity adjusted as a result of US-ARVN reconciliation.
- ***Projection.

Source: MACDL

Figure: E-5

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ARVN TRACKED VEHICLES

DATE	AUTHORIZED	ON HAND	LOSSES	REPLACEMENTS
APR 72.....	1,765	1,677	145	13
MAY 72.....	1,765	1,722	188	233
JUN 72.....	1,765	1,721	135	134
JUL 72.....	1,765	1,713	8	0
AUG 72.....	1,765	1,743	0	30
SEP 72.....	1,955*	1,753	35	45
OCT 72.....	1,955	1,746	44	37
NOV 72.....	1,955	2,027**	5	196
DEC 72.....	1,955	2,139	9	121
JAN 73.....	1,955	2,254	52	167
FEB 73***	1,955	2,244	10	0

NOTES:

- *Increase in authorization due to Project ENHANCE add on units.
- **Excesses due to ENHANCE PLUS add on plus the delivery of all FY 73 and FY 74 attrition quantities. On hand quantity adjusted as a result of US-ARVN reconciliation.
- ***Projection.

Source: MACDL

Figure: E-6

ARVN WHEELED VEHICLES

DATE	AUTHORIZED	ON HAND	LOSSES	REPLACEMENTS
APR 72.....	49,388	48,148	410	1
MAY 72.....	49,388	47,872	650	378
JUN 72.....	49,388	48,784	184	1,096
JUL 72.....	49,388	50,348	538	2,102
AUG 72.....	49,388	50,620	10	282
SEP 72.....	51,056*	50,561	147	88
OCT 72.....	51,056	50,585	43	67
NOV 72.....	51,056	49,185**	25	2,420
DEC 72.....	51,056	49,490	28	372
JAN 73.....	51,056	50,090	0	593***
FEB 73****	51,056	50,060	30	7***

NOTES:

- *Increase in authorizations due to reconciliation conducted at the FY 73 ARVN MASF Program Review. Authorizations include 3,705 1/4 ton trucks utilized by US advisors. These authorizations were deleted as US advisors departed.
- **On hand quantity adjusted as a result of US-ARVN reconciliation.
- ***Receipt of seven 5 ton dump trucks not confirmed by documentation.
- ****Projection.

Source: MACDL

Figure: E-7

ARVN COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT

DATE	AUTHORIZED	ON HAND	LOSSES	REPLACEMENTS
APR 72.....	60,773	60,786	1,139	0
MAY 72.....	60,773	60,291	2,363	1,868
JUN 72.....	60,773	61,336	109	60
JUL 72.....	60,773	61,396	0	60
AUG 72.....	60,773	58,676	3,676	1,036
SEP 72.....	54,815*	58,418	808	550
OCT 72.....	54,815	58,412	395	389
NOV 72.....	54,815	66,760**	1,509	5,895
DEC 72.....	54,815	65,435	1,520	195
JAN 73.....	54,815	69,809	0	1,377
FEB 73****	54,815	69,109	700	2,797***

NOTES:

- *Decrease in authorizations due to reconciliation conducted at the FY 73 ARVN MASF Program Review.
- **Excesses due to including as on hand approximately 14,000 AM/PRC-10s, an authorized substitute for the AM/PRC-25; delivery of FY 73 and FY 74 attrition quantities and title transfer of communications equipment from ROKFV. On hand quantities adjusted as a result of US-ARVN reconciliation.
- ***Remaining 2,797 pieces of tactical communications equipment not confirmed by documentation.
- ****Projection.

Source: MACDL

Figure: E-8

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ARVN Supply Status

(C) Stock control for ARVN secondary items was centralized at the national level during 1972 and early 1973. With few exceptions ARVN supplies requisitioned from US supply sources after the US withdrawal would be managed by the recently established RVNAF National Materiel Management Agency (NMMA). In addition to the ARVN items, common secondary items for VNAF and VNN were also to be managed by NMMA. Requisition processing, analysis of demands, and computation of requisition objectives were accomplished for NMMA by the inventory control subsystem of the RVNAF Automated Materiel Management System (RAMMS). There was an operational requirement to retain a minimum of 27 US government civilians, 15 local nationals, and 11 US contractor personnel to support the new systems activation and maintenance through the end of FY 73. There was a projected operational requirement for 12 US government civilians, 10 local nationals, and five US contractor personnel to continue through mid-FY 74. NMMA Supply Division was to be affectively Vietnamized by mid-FY 74; however, there would be a residual requirement for 12 US government personnel to monitor execution of future MASF or MAP programs. Contractor personnel were training ARVN systems analysts and programmers to take over contractor-developed RAMMS programs at the time of the withdrawal. Those US government employees were required to teach ARVN personnel commodity management techniques needed to meet military assistance program requirements for US approval of MASF Program requisition objectives, to gain approval of MASF requisitions entering the US supply system, and to insure reporting of excesses for return to the US supply system.

(C) Stock control asset accounting and planning for MASF major items furnished to ARVN was centralized at the national level by December 1972. A new RAMMS system for major items accountability was to be completed by September 1973. The issue, receipt, and validation of combat losses and gains and retrograde of excess materiel from Vietnam of major items from US supply sources was to be controlled by the RAMMS system. In support of this operation there was a requirement to retain a minimum of 12 US government civilians, three local nationals, and four US contractor personnel to support the new systems activation and maintenance through the end of the first quarter of FY 74. Contractor personnel and local national hires were developing detailed systems designs prerequisite to the writing of ADP programs. US government personnel provided functional guidance on system development.

(C) Planning and coordination for the movement of four ARVN base depots from Saigon and their consolidation into a single associated depot at Long Binh began in September 1972. Stock movement was coordinated by NMMA. The US government provided contractor support (\$US 2.2 million) to facilitate this movement. There was an operational requirement to retain a minimum of 13 US government civilians and some contractor personnel to coordinate and support the activation of the depot through the end of September 1973. US personnel monitored contractor performance, insured excess stocks were reported to the US supply system, and taught ARVN personnel general depot management techniques. The 1st ARVN Associated Depot was scheduled to be completely self-sufficient by December 1973.

(C) Planning and coordination of ARVN in-country depot rebuild was centralized at the national level by February 1973. A new RAMMS system for programming, requisitioning, and controlling rebuild production lines was scheduled to be completed by September 1973. All future depot maintenance programs and rebuild were to be managed by NMMA. Contractor personnel developed detailed systems design prerequisites to the writing of ADP programs. US government personnel provided functional guidance on design development.

ARVN Maintenance Status

(C) A depot upgrade program was initiated in 1969 to develop RVNAF self-sufficiency in maintenance. The program was specifically designed to provide ARVN with an in-country rebuild capability for most engineer, signal, and ordnance items of equipment through the improvement of facilities, utilities, technical skills, and equipment. The upgrade program was essentially complete by the end of 1972. The introduction of some new items and larger quantities of equipment, however, required some adjustment to be made in the maintenance programs with a resulting delay in reaching the desired goals.

(C) Programming for ARVN depot maintenance programs was centralized in the National Materiel Management Agency (NMMA), a subordinate activity of the Central Logistics Command (CLC). The centralization of depot maintenance programming was a new system in ARVN and was scheduled to require direct assistance by contractors until mid-FY 74. Contract assistance would be required to develop computer programs for implementing the planned systems. There would be a continuing requirement for a small US element to provide the interface between the ARVN maintenance and rebuild programs and US agencies for supply, MASF, MAP funding, and maintenance.

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(U) ARVN utilized three depots for overhaul: the Vietnamese Army Arsenal, the 60th Signal Base Depot, and the 40th Engineer Base Depot. Watercraft were repaired by the 306th Floating Craft Maintenance Group. All of these facilities were located in Saigon. Quarter ton trucks and selected assemblies were overhauled by the ordnance medium support battalions in each area logistics command. Additionally, ARVN supported common items which were found in the VNN and VNAF from 3d through 5th echelon maintenance.

(U) The original depot upgrade program did not include adequate repair facilities for combat vehicles. This situation, coupled with increases in the

combat vehicle fleet, delayed attainment of a satisfactory combat vehicle rebuild capability. A \$US 985,000 construction upgrade program was initiated to provide the necessary facilities and some equipment. This project was approved for funding by the Secretary of Defense on 6 December 1972 and was in the design stage in early 1973. The 40th Engineer Base Depot required some upgrade with the loss of its storage mission. The actual cost and plans were being developed by ARVN at year end, with advisory assistance as needed.

(C) ARVN was projected to require US contract assistance in-country in the services indicated in Figure E-9 until such time as a capability could be developed:

US CONTRACT ASSISTANCE FOR THE ARVN

SERVICE	COST (MILLIONS)	SUPPORT TO BE COMPLETE AT YEAR END
Field plant generator maintenance.....	\$2.0/yr	FY 75
.....	\$1.1/yr	FY 74
Integrated Military System (SIMS) Supply and Maintenance Support).....	\$1.23/mo	FY 75
Watercraft Maintenance.....	\$1.32/yr	FY 74
Lines of Communication Construction Equipment Maintenance.....	\$5.7/yr	CY 75
TOW Missile Maintenance.....	\$0.2/yr	FY 74
Engineer Field and Depot Maintenance.....	\$0.7/yr	FY 75

Source: MACDL

Figure: E-9

(C) Direct US support for ARVN maintenance would be required in some measure as long as ARVN retained US-made materiel. The primary reason for continued off-shore support was the lack of cost effectiveness for constructing in-country repair facilities for some of the more sophisticated items of equipment.⁶

VNAF STATUS

(S) The VNAF received 32 C-130A cargo aircraft under Project ENHANCE PLUS. Formed into two squadrons, the C-130A aircraft replaced five squadrons of C-119 and C-123 aircraft and more than doubled the cargo airlift capability of the VNAF.

(S) An intensive ground and flying training program for VNAF personnel was launched in November 1972 by TDY USAF personnel. Over 580 maintenance personnel were graduated by the training team which completed the ground phase of the program on 3 February 1973. The flying training program was more than 90 percent completed by late February.

(S) Progress of logistics support for the C-130 aircraft was unable to keep pace with the training program and was considered the most critical prob-

lem at the time of the US withdrawal. The C-130A aircraft arrived in-country with minimal support equipment or spare parts. The tremendous influx of assets received during ENHANCE PLUS for all weapons systems complicated the identification of many C-130 assets reportedly shipped from CONUS. Through time-consuming efforts shipments were traced, however, and on-hand assets were matched against authorizations so that shortages could be requisitioned on a priority basis. The criticality of the C-130 program in February 1973 is reflected in the following statistics:

- Number of aircraft possessed - 32
- Number of aircraft operationally ready - 3
- Number in storage - 1
- Number not operationally ready for maintenance - 12
- Number not operationally ready for supply - 16

Figures E-10 through E-13 reflect the VNAF equipment status through February 1973.⁷

VNMC STATUS

(C) A complete review and update of all VNMC TO&Es was completed in 1972. A reconciliation which compared the new equipment authorizations against the on-hand assets and due-in quantities was

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conducted, and the resultant equipment shortfall of 74 defined line items costing \$737,981 was programmed. In addition, deprogramming action was initiated for 27 defined line items in excess of material

due in at year end. Those excesses were generated as a result of the TO&E update, and the deprogramming action represented a reduction of \$216,624 in the FY 73 and prior year programs. Aside from the

VNAF O-1, O-2, U-6, U-17, T-37, AND T-41 AIRCRAFT

DATE	AUTHORIZED	ON HAND	LOSSES	REPLACEMENTS
APR 72.....	360	351	4	0
MAY 72.....	360	352	13	14
JUN 72.....	360	364	0	12
JUL 72.....	360	372	4	4
AUG 72.....	360	386	6	20
SEP 72.....	360	390	2	6
OCT 72.....	360	390	0	0
NOV 72.....	360	423	1	35
DEC 72.....	360	422	1	0
JAN 73.....	360	418	4	0
FEB 73*.....	360	414	4	0

NOTE: Authorized column includes unit equipment and nonoperational aircraft.
*Projection.

Source: AFGP

Figure: E-10

VNAF C-7, C-119, C-123, C-130, RC-47, EC-47, AC-47, AC-119G, AC-119K, AND VC-47 AIRCRAFT

DATE	AUTHORIZED	ON HAND	LOSSES	REPLACEMENTS
APR 72.....	272	162	3	2
MAY 72.....	272	164	5	7
JUN 72.....	272	187	2	16
JUL 72.....	272	196	2	10
AUG 72.....	272	232	1	37
SEP 72.....	272	233	0	1
OCT 72.....	272	250	2	19
NOV 72.....	272	311	2	63
DEC 72.....	272	296	15*	0
JAN 73.....	272	260	46**	0
FEB 73***.....	272	248	2	0

NOTE: Authorized column includes unit equipment and nonoperational aircraft.

*Includes 13 C-123 aircraft transferred from VNAF to USAF.

**Includes 21 C-123, 16 C-47, and 8 C-119 aircraft transferred from VNAF to USAF.

***Projection.

Source: AFGP

Figure: E-11

VNAF A-1, A-37, F-5, AND RF-5 AIRCRAFT

DATE	AUTHORIZED	ON HAND	LOSSES	REPLACEMENTS
APR 72.....	327	198	9	2
MAY 72.....	327	188	12	2
JUN 72.....	327	190	2	4
JUL 72.....	327	250	3	4
AUG 72.....	327	264	6	20
SEP 72.....	327	263	1	0
OCT 72.....	327	282	5	24
NOV 72.....	327	488	4	210
DEC 72.....	327	490	0	2
JAN 73.....	327	402	8	0
FEB 73*.....	327	476	6	0

NOTE: Authorized column includes unit equipment and nonoperational aircraft.

*Projection.

Source: AFGP

Figure: E-12

E-9

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VNAF UH-1 AND CH-47 HELICOPTERS

DATE	AUTHORIZED	ON HAND	LOSSES	REPLACEMENTS
APR 72.....	734	655	25	10
MAY 72.....	734	612	46*	3
JUN 72.....	734	665	20	78
JUL 72.....	734	694	15	44
AUG 72.....	734	680	17	8
SEP 72.....	734	669	11	0
OCT 72.....	734	948	20	299
NOV 72.....	734	984	15	0
DEC 72.....	734	987	6	9
JAN 73.....	734	982	5	0
FEB 78**.....	734	925	7	0

NOTE: Authorized column includes unit equipment and nonoperational aircraft.

*Includes 23 M-34 aircraft which were phased out of the inventory.

**Projection.

Source: AFGP

Figure: E-13

VNMC INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS

DATE	AUTHORIZED	ON HAND	LOSSES	REPLACEMENTS
APR 72.....	14,659	15,125	2,084	0
MAY 72.....	14,659	18,041	5	154
JUN 72.....	14,659	13,190	0	1,406
JUL 72.....	14,659	14,598	206	0
AUG 72.....	14,659	14,390	108	160
SEP 72.....	14,659	14,447	67	123
OCT 72.....	14,659	14,508	0	0
NOV 72.....	14,659	14,508	0	0
DEC 72.....	14,659	14,388	120	0
JAN 73*.....	15,716	14,148	0	0
FEB 78*.....	15,716	14,148	0	0

*Projection.

Source: NAVFORV

Figure: E-14

equipment shortfall identified above, the VNMC received approximately 95 percent of the equipment already in the existing MASF program. The VNMC had no critical supply shortage of major or secondary end items at the time of the US withdrawal.


(C) By 1973 the VNMC was capable of performing 100 percent of 1st and 2d echelon maintenance and 50 percent of 3d echelon maintenance on organic equipment. Force structure changes for FY 73 added 50 personnel to the Maintenance Company of the Amphibious Support Battalion, and many new items of equipment were added as a result of the TO&E review. It was expected that the VNMC would be capable of performing 75 percent of the 3d echelon maintenance on organic equipment by mid-1973. The VNMC would continue to rely on the ARVN direct support units for approximately 25 percent of 3d echelon (primarily overflow) and all higher level maintenance support.

(C) The VNMC was fully capable of providing organic transportation support, but required augmentation from the ARVN during high tempo operations. Transportation support was required from the VNAF on a daily basis. The VNMC had a requirement for logistics flights from Saigon to Hue/Phu Bai and return on a daily basis to move personnel and equipment to the VNMC area of combat operations. This support requirement would continue as long as the VNMC was deployed in Military Region 1. The VNMC remained capable of accomplishing all internal communications requirements without outside support. Figures E-14 through E-18 reflect VNMC equipment status through 1973.*

VNN STATUS

(C) The VNN ship status through February 1973 is shown in Figures E-19 through E-23. The logistics areas of supply, maintenance, transportation,

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A Vietnamese destroyer escort on Blue Water coastal patrol.

and communication are discussed below.⁹

(C) The Vietnamese Naval Supply Center (VNN-SC) carried the full range and depth of stock of Navy peculiar materiel known to be required in support of the VNN. The automated supply system implemented in December 1971 was functioning satisfactorily under VNN management. The comprehensive re-warehousing and inventorying project that was undertaken by a 49 member technical assistance team from the Naval Supply Center (NSC) in Oakland, Vietnamese naval personnel, and US advisors was completed in September 1972. Afloat supply operations, however, did not keep pace with the sudden growth of the VNN blue water fleet. In May 1972 supply overhauls were completed in all fleet command ships and resulted in the ordering of some 80,000 line items of stock to fill on-board repair parts deficiencies. The completion of the implementation of supply procedures and storing of materiel on board ships in February 1973 insured that VNN personnel were capable of managing the fleet command supply system with a minimum of US assistance.

(C) The Vietnamese Naval Shipyard (VNN-NSY) by February 1973 had the facilities and equipment to maintain the VNN blue water craft. However, a lack of skilled workers, coupled with the lack of operating management systems, prevented attainment of complete self-sufficiency by the VNN-NSY. Self-sufficiency was defined as the ability to overhaul and maintain all VNN blue water ships, including their major equipment, with all works being accomplished at VNN-NSY. The anticipated date of VNN-NSY achieving total self-sufficiency was 31 December 1973. The development of required management systems, including work estimating, planning and scheduling, fiscal and supply control, and production techniques was completed. However, implementation of these systems was in its infancy. US civilian instructors were to continue instruction in these areas until mid-1973.

(C) Materiel to support the VNN was transported from the Vietnamese Naval Supply Center (VNN-NSC) to VNN bases by VNN logistics ships and craft under the operational control of CLC/JGS; by land transportation furnished to the VNN under

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VNMC CREW-SERVED WEAPONS

DATE	AUTHORIZED	ON HAND	LOSSES	REPLACEMENTS
APR 72.....	675	449	201	0
MAY 72.....	675	248	0	176
JUN 72.....	675	424	0	269
JUL 72.....	675	698	8	0
AUG 72.....	675	690	4	27
SEP 72.....	675	718	6	22
OCT 72.....	675	729	0	0
NOV 72.....	678	729	4	1
DEC 72.....	678	726	0	0
JAN 73.....	678	722	0	0
FEB 73*.....	678	722	0	0

*Projection.

Source: NAVFORV

Figure: E-15

VNMC ARTILLERY

DATE	AUTHORIZED	ON HAND	LOSSES	REPLACEMENTS
APR 72.....	54	55	35	0
MAY 72.....	54	20	0	0
JUN 72.....	54	20	0	35
JUL 72.....	54	55	0	0
AUG 72.....	54	55	0	1
SEP 72.....	54	56	0	0
OCT 72.....	54	56	0	0
NOV 72.....	54	56	0	0
DEC 72.....	54	56	0	0
JAN 73*.....	54	56	0	0
FEB 73*.....	54	56	0	0

*Projection.

Source: NAVFORV

Figure: E-16

VNMC WHEELED VEHICLES

DATE	AUTHORIZED	ON HAND	LOSSES	REPLACEMENTS
APR 72.....	1,547	1,649	126	1
MAY 72.....	1,547	1,524	15	9
JUN 72.....	1,547	1,518	0	114
JUL 72.....	1,547	1,632	16	19
AUG 72.....	1,547	1,635	2	1
SEP 72.....	1,547	1,624	4	25
OCT 72.....	1,547	1,655	0	111*
NOV 72.....	1,547	1,655	0	0
DEC 72.....	1,547	1,655	0	0
JAN 73.....	1,576	1,698**	0	0
FEB 73***.....	1,516	1,598	0	0

*Replacements reflect equipment due in under current programs.

**Reflects inventory adjustment.

***Projection.

Source: NAVFORV

Figure: E-17

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VNMC COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT

DATE	AUTHORIZED	ON HAND	LOSSES	REPLACEMENTS
APR 72.....	3,292	3,054	620	0
MAY 72.....	3,292	2,425	49	273
JUN 72.....	3,292	2,649	0	279
JUL 72.....	3,292	2,928	14	11
AUG 72.....	3,292	2,925	13	153
SEP 72.....	3,292	3,212	17	304
OCT 72.....	3,292	3,213	0	1
NOV 72.....	3,292	3,213	0	0
DEC 72.....	3,292	3,213	12	4
JAN 73.....	1,092	1,085	0	4
FEB 73**.....	1,092	1,085	0	0

*Beginning in January 1973, radio sets only were reported, which accounts for the reduced authorized and on hand figures.

**Projection.

Source: NAVFORV

Figure: E-18

the ARVN common-user land transportation system; or by air, depending upon the destination of the cargo involved and the priority under which it was to be moved. Transportation was not always available under the ARVN common-user transportation system at the time and place required because of non-availability of transportation assets managed by CLC/JCS and ARVN. As a result, a contract was negotiated with the Vietnamese National Railway to provide trucking services to the VNN on an on-call basis to transport assets managed by CLC/JCS and ARVN. As a result, a contract was negotiated with the Vietnamese National Railway to provide trucking services to the VNN on an on-call basis to transport high priority materiel when common-user transportation was not available. It was anticipated that ARVN common-user transportation and VNN organic transportation would be sufficient by mid-1973 to manage the movement of VNNSC cargo.

(C) Logistic support for VNN communications was provided by VNN through ARVN supply channels. USN communications did not directly support VNN communications logistics. Repair of communications-electronics equipment was accomplished by the VNN and by technicians at each of the support bases. Some COMSEC equipment and some portions of the ICS equipment at Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay were the only equipment which VNN did not have the capability to repair. With the exception of COMSEC equipment, contracts provided for this repair. A communications interface was required with the US AUTODIN system to provide for communications with off-shore logistics, ships undergoing overhaul in foreign ports, and personnel in out-of-country schools. Continued communications security materiel support required continued supply of necessary software and repair of cryptographic equipment.

VNN BLUE WATER (OUTER BARRIER) SHIPS

DATE	AUTHORIZED	ON HAND	LOSSES	REPLACEMENTS
APR 72.....	17	14	0	0
MAY 72.....	17	14	0	0
JUN 72.....	17	16*	0	2
JUL 72.....	18	18**	0	2
AUG 72.....	18	18	0	0
SEP 72.....	18	18	0	0
OCT 72.....	18	18	0	0
NOV 72.....	18	18	0	0
DEC 72.....	18	18	0	0
JAN 73.....	18	18	0	0
FEB 73.....	18	18	0	0

NOTES:

*High Endurance Cutter-Coast Guard (WHEC) 16 and 17 added.

**WHEC 15 added.

Source: NAVFORV


Figure: E-19

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A PCF "Swiftboat" on coastal patrol.

VNN COASTAL SURVEILLANCE CRAFT

DATE	AUTHORIZED*	ON HAND	LOSSES	REPLACEMENTS
APR 72.....	429	372	2	10
MAY 72.....	429	380	4	2
JUN 72.....	429	378	1	7
JUL 72.....	429	386	2	7
AUG 72.....	429	391	3	6
SEP 72.....	429	394	4	4
OCT 72.....	429	394	4	4
NOV 72.....	429	381**	4	4
DEC 72.....	393	393	4	4
JAN 73.....	393	393	4	4
FEB 73***.....	393	393	4	4

NOTES:

- *Authorized level is Program Level.
- **Adjustment made for Coastal Raider replacements.
- ***Projection.

Source: NAYFORV

Figure: E-20

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VNN RIVERINE CRAFT

DATE	AUTHORIZED*	ON HAND	LOSSES	REPLACEMENTS
APR 72.....	732	781	11	0
MAY 72.....	732	770	15	0
JUN 72.....	732	755	3	0
JUL 72.....	732	752	7	0
AUG 72.....	782	745	2	0
SEP 72.....	782	743	1	0
OCT 72.....	782	741	0	0
NOV 72.....	732	744	0	8
DEC 72.....	740	744	0	0
JAN 73.....	745	745	0	0
FEB 73.....	745	748	2	0

NOTES:

*Authorized level is Program Level.

Source: NAVFORV

Figure: E-21

VNN HARBOR DEFENSE CRAFT

DATE	AUTHORIZED*	ON HAND	LOSSES	REPLACEMENTS
APR 72.....	117	111	1**	0
MAY 72.....	117	110	0	0
JUN 72.....	117	110	0	0
JUL 72.....	117	110	0	0
AUG 72.....	117	110	0	0
SEP 72.....	117	110	0	0
OCT 72.....	117	109	1***	0
NOV 72.....	117	109	0	0
DEC 72.....	109	109	0	0
JAN 73.....	110	110	0	0
FEB 73.....	110	110	0	0

NOTES:

*Authorized level is Program Level.

**Landing Craft, Personnel, Large (LCPL)

***Picket.

Source: NAVFORV

Figure: E-22

VNN LOGISTICS SUPPORT CRAFT

DATE	AUTHORIZED*	ON HAND	LOSSES	REPLACEMENTS
APR 72.....	280	259	2	1
MAY 72.....	280	258	0	0
JUN 72.....	280	258	2	8
JUL 72.....	280	262	0	0
AUG 72.....	280	262	0	0
SEP 72.....	280	262	0	0
OCT 72.....	280	262	0	1
NOV 72.....	280	263	0	0
DEC 72.....	263	263	0	0
JAN 73.....	263	263	0	0
FEB 73.....	263	263	0	0

NOTES:

*Authorized level is Program Level.

Source: NAVFORV


Figure: E-23

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A guard stands watch as 155mm howitzer ammunition is unloaded.

AMMUNITION

(U) Vietnamization of the ammunition system began with resource management obtained through two management systems: the Single Ammunition Logistics System (SALS) and the Improved ARVN Ammunition Control System (IAACONS). The SALS was proposed in 1970 as a system whereby ARVN was to manage the requisition, receipt, storage, and issue of ground munitions for the US and FWMAF. On 1 April 1972 SALS became an ARVN responsibility with the assumption of Class V support for all US and FWMAF in-country. To aid in the control of munitions the Improved ARVN Ammunition Control System was developed. The US objective was to monitor the entire ammunition system while retaining the capability to interject management controls with respect to selected *asscs*. Daily transaction data was collected at the depot level for automatic data processing where it was processed into the desired management reports. The system was developed in three basic phases, supplemented with a fourth phase covering special requirements designed to improve management and

to expand the capabilities of the system. The first three phases of IAACONS were completed and implemented prior to 1972. Phase IV was the development of special management reports to improve the capability to manage by exception project requirements and control ammunition costs. Begun in April 1972, Phase IV was scheduled for completion in late February 1973.


(U) During the NGUYEN HUE Offensive the use of ammunition increased from approximately 30,000 short tons (s.t) per month to 100,000 s/t per month. Some items became critical in late April and May before the pipeline was expanded to meet the increased need. During June, July, and August the supply began to equal or exceed most ammunition issue. However, the availability of some types of munitions, especially the artillery items, became a problem because issue was exceeding production. In July GEN Weyand recommended to GEN Vien that the tactical commanders be held strictly accountable for managing their ammunition resources within an available supply rate (ASR) and an ammunition credit system. In August GEN Vien established an

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TOTAL CLASS V TONNAGE

JANUARY 1972 — JANUARY 1973



Source: MACDL

Figure: E-24

ASR for selected critical munitions. Although the results were negligible in August, during September ammunition issues began to decrease as the tactical commanders began to observe the ASRs. In October GEN Vien dispatched additional instructions extending the ASR through the end of the calendar year. Ammunition issues were below the ASR on most items as combat activity decreased toward year's end and the tactical commanders observed the established ASRs. Figure E-24, Total Class Five Tonnage, shows the ammunition receipt, issue, and balance on hand from January 1972 to January 1973.¹⁰

(8) No ammunition stock management problems were foreseen after the US withdrawal, although difficulties were envisioned in ammunition surveillance, maintenance, and renovation. As one of the most costly commodities in the ARVN inventory, ammunition had to be given constant attention by commanders to be sure serviceable ammunition was


properly stored; unserviceable, repairable ammunition segregated and expeditiously renovated; and totally unserviceable items destroyed. Failure to accomplish these critical actions would directly impact upon the future combat effectiveness of ARVN forces. During the periods of intense combat activity in 1972 the inspection of ammunition stocks was not given its proper priority and support. During periods of high demand ammunition assets were received by the depots, stored for a short period of time, and issued without much exposure to the elements. In the post-cessate-fire period, however, issue of stocks stored in the open would slow to the point where ammunition would deteriorate and become unserviceable at a much faster rate. In the cessate-fire environment field maintenance stocks would be returned to storage depots and there would be an increased requirement for an expedited technical inspection and surveillance program and timely renovation of unserviceable, repairable stock.

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CLASS V LOSSES JANUARY 1972 - JANUARY 1973



	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN
STONS	0	392	1,572	6,094	7,629	32	4,330	7,448	1	0	3,517	3,433	955
VALUE	0	988	1,561	10,800	11,450	66	6,134	18,344	36	0	5,654	12,766	8,859
(\$1,000)	0	988	2,549	13,349	24,799	24,865	30,999	49,343	49,347	49,347	55,001	67,769	76,628

Source: MACDL

Figure: E-25

By late January 1973 approximately 165,000 s/t of ammunition were on hand in ARVN depots. Of this total approximately 7,400 s/t were unserviceable and required maintenance and renovation. ARVN commanders were emphasizing this program and significant progress was anticipated during 1973.¹¹

(C) Ammunition depots throughout the Republic of Vietnam provided lucrative targets for enemy attack. Ammunition losses during 1972 totaled 34,448 s/t valued at \$67,769,000. Because of a large ammunition loss at Bien Hoa in August, the Army Advisory Group was tasked by COMUSMACV to develop and implement a security training program for RVNAF Class III and Class V depot facilities. This training was started in October and the initial phase was completed in late November. In December GEN Weyand stressed to GEN Vien that command emphasis was necessary to effectively upgrade the ammunition security program. A summary of ammunition losses is showed in Figure E-25.¹²

(C) The ammunition depot upgrade program was initiated in 1971 with the approval of two of the

three programmed phases. Sixty-three stradley magazines (earth covered concrete storage facilities, measuring 40' x 80' and storing 350 s/t each) were constructed at Long Binh, and cinder block buildings were built on the unstable soil areas in the Delta. Maintenance facilities were also constructed at Da Nang, Qui Nhon, and Can Tho and renovation facilities at Dong Ba Thin and Bien Hoa. A sapper attack on Bien Hoa in August destroyed ten of the stradley magazines; repair was not scheduled to be completed until mid-1973.


TRANSPORTATION

(U) The MACDL Transportation Advisory Division goal during 1972 was to enhance ARVN self-reliance in operating a flexible, efficient, and integrated RVNAF transportation system. An indication of the success of this goal was the outstanding response of the RVNAF Department of Defense Transportation (DODT) to the large movement requirements generated by the NGUYEN RUE Offensive. The DODT rapidly adapted to the support requirement by redeploying organic transportation

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A container ship unloads at the Newport facility.

units. To augment shallow draft water movement services in Military Region 1 eight landing craft utility boats were deployed to Da Nang in May. At the same time one light truck company and one medium truck company were also deployed to Military Region 1. In Military Region 2 a composite unit of thirty 2-½ ton trucks and ten 5 ton tractors with semitrailers were sent to augment the highway movement capability. Transportation services fully met the challenges imposed by the Communist invasion and the RVNAF counteroffensive.

Port Operations

(U) Port operations in 1972 were marked by considerable progress toward RVNAF complete self-sufficiency. Although many port turnovers took place during periods of peak cargo volume caused by the Communist invasion, the transfers did not adversely affect the support of combat operations. Specific milestones were reached as follows:

—Da Nang: On 15 March ARVN assumed control of the bridge ramp facility which handled RVNAF cargo moved on shallow draft boats, land-


ing craft, and barges. This facility provided maximum support in meeting the shallow draft movement requirements in Military Region 1. On 1 October ARVN assumed the mission of discharging deep draft ammunition vessels. At the same time, the Da Nang Port Authority assumed operational control of the general cargo operation. Subsequently all port operations at Da Nang were handled capably by the Vietnamese.

—Cam Ranh: In May ARVN assumed responsibility for operating the ammunition discharge at pier five and for the shallow draft boat discharge at South Beach. Overall responsibility for port operations was assumed on 1 September when ARVN began operating the general cargo discharge at piers two and three. ARVN proved proficient in operating and managing this port.

—Saigon: In July a roll-on roll-off ramp was completed, providing Saigon port with an LST facility. A plan to upgrade the ammunition discharge site at Cat Lai, to include installing a Delong pier and improving the road net from Cat Lai to Long Binh Depot, was undergoing engineering and

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Unloading steel and lumber at the Newport facility.

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VIETNAM PORT HANDLING CAPABILITIES

PORT	US CONTRACTOR	PORT AUTHORITIES	SEA LAND	ARVN	TOTAL
Da Nang.....	—	1,000	333	1,000	2,333
Qui Nhon.....	—	—	333	1,500	1,833
Cam Ranh.....	—	—	3,600	1,000	4,600
Vung Tau.....	1,000	—	—	—	1,000
Saigon.....	—	—	—	2,000	2,000
Newport.....	1,500	—	1,000	—	2,500
Cat Lai.....	—	—	—	1,500	1,500
Can Tho.....	—	—	—	833	833
TOTAL.....	2,500	1,000	5,267	7,833	16,800

Source: MACDL

Figure: E-26

cost-benefit studies at year end. On 31 December the US contract for stevedore and tugboat services at Cat Lai expired, and ARVN assumed complete responsibility for operating the Cat Lai ammunition system.¹³

(C) Figure E-26 outlines the daily Republic of Vietnam port handling capabilities for both the US and ARVN (in short tons).

(C) Vung Tau was tentatively scheduled for turnover on 7 December when the Alaska Barge and Transport (AB&T) contract was to expire. However, action was taken to extend the contract through 28 March 1973, at which time it was to be transferred to the Government of Vietnam. Newport, under contract with AB&T, was tentatively scheduled for turnover to ARVN on 1 January 1973; however, US control would be retained until 28 March 1973. US stevedore and tug contracts at Cat Lai terminated 31 December 1972 and were replaced by ARVN contract and military personnel, thereby completing the Vietnamization of the port.

(U) RVNAF watercraft at the end of 1972 are shown below:

CRAFT	ARVN	VNM	TOTAL
LCU	10	12	22
LCM-8	96	41	137
LSM	—	5	5
LST	—	6	6

(C) At the time of the cease-fire RVNAF appeared to be self-sufficient in all but the larger watercraft. LSTs and LSMs had an abnormally high deadline rate, however, reaching as high as 50 percent, and in addition to assets available, US assistance was required. There was no indication that RVNAF LST availability would increase. RVNAF continued to require Military Sealift Command LST support for intra-Vietnam water shipments. This support included current and continuing requirements for transshipment of ammunition from Vung

Tau and Da Nang to the port of Tan My. During the month of January 1973, 12 LSTs available to MSCOV were used to support the RVNAF, shuttling ammunition from Vung Tau and Da Nang to Tan My and moving combat and combat support material. Increased requirements for LSTs were expected to arise should the tactical situation require relocation of ARVN combat and/or combat service support units.¹⁴

Highway Transportation

(U) ARVN transportation truck units assumed the transportation burden resulting from a complete phase-out of all US truck units in Vietnam during 1972. Tonnage and passengers carried to support ARVN counteroffensive operations against the Communists surpassed all previous records. Although peak movement requirements initially increased truck deadline rates, emphasis on unit level maintenance and improved repair parts support improved vehicle availability during the last half of the year.

HIGHWAY STATISTICS

(1972)

MONTH	MILITARY VEHICLES	
	METRIC TONS	PASSENGERS
JAN	278,222	342,991
FEB	291,411	287,978
MAR	250,731	281,960
APR	259,833	325,360
MAY	245,822	359,992
JUN	278,711	298,934
JUL	254,318	300,769
AUG	311,278	308,657
SEP	298,562	318,682
OCT	294,654	301,987
NOV	330,156	341,271
DEC	320,011	336,021
TOTAL	3,413,569	3,802,262

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(U) To increase the capability of transportation truck units, the Central Logistics Command approved the conversion of two light truck companies to medium truck companies in the first quarter. The unit personnel were trained, and by the end of the year 28 five ton tractors and 28 stake and platform semitrailers had been issued to the 1st Transportation Group for conversion of one company. The total conversion requirement was 120 five ton tractors and 130 stake and platform semitrailers.

(U) By the time of the US withdrawal the RVNAF was self-sufficient in intra-region highway movements, with the exception of heavy lift and container services. Restrictions imposed by lack of heavy lift and container capabilities and lack of intra-Vietnam open road nets necessitated US support. This support was to be discontinued with the opening of the road nets and the contracting of heavy lift and container services. The US, through Sea Land Container Services Inc., provided for the movement of 2,000 s/t of subsistence monthly. Composition of ARVN truck groups was as follows.¹⁵

ACTIVITY	TRK CO	TRK CO	TRK CO	TRK CO
	LT	LT/MED	MED	NAVY
1ST ALC	5	1	1	—
2D ALC	4	1	1	—
3D ALC	5	—	1	—
4TH ALC	4	1	1	—
5TH ALC	4	1	1	—
GCT/CLC*	6	—	2	1
TOTAL	28	4	7	1

*Office of the Chief Transportation/Central Logistics Command reserve.

Rail Transport

(U) The railroad was not considered to be a major transportation mode in Vietnam due to the lack of operations countrywide. No US military support was provided. The major operational segment was from Saigon to the Long Binh/Bien Hoa area. Traffic movement as of 2 February 1973 was as follows:¹⁶

Cargo and Passengers Transported

Net metric tons - 1973	3,281
Net metric - comparable period 1972	19,168
Net tons - kilometers - 1973	97,830
Net tons - kilometers	
comparable period 1972	1,628,099
Passenger count - 1973	112,080
Passenger count - comparable period 1972	267,145

Airlift

(U) As the US drawdown progressed during the year, less Military Airlift Command (MAC) cargo and passenger facilities were required in Vietnam.

The Vietnamization of aerial ports was completed with the 8th Aerial Port Squadron (Tan Son Nhut Air Base) conversion on 1 December. The Air Force Advisory Group continued to advise the VNAF with small advisory teams and limited contractor personnel to handle US secure cargo and mail requirements.¹⁷

(U) On 1 January 1973 VNAF was operating aerial ports at the following locations:

MAJOR TERMINAL	SATELLITE
Da Nang	Hue, Quang Ngai, Quang Tri
Nha Trang	Ban Me Thuot, Phan Thiet
Phan Rang	Cam Ranh Bay
Bien Hoa	None
Binh Thuy	Rach Gia, Tra Vinh
Soe Trang	Ca Mau
Saigon	Phu Quoc, Vung Tau, Dalat
Pleiku	Kontum, Phu Cat

(U) Progress in eliminating air movement of passengers and cargo with US aircraft was made until the NGUYEN HUE Offensive began. As the offensive slowed, US cargo airlift decreased until the last few weeks of the year, when VNAF began an intensive transition program from C-123 to C-130A aircraft (Project ENHANCE PLUS). This required a standdown of most VNAF C-123 squadrons and increased US airlift support requirements for moving RVNAF cargo. Passenger movement fluctuation resulted from the enemy offensive and the redeployment of US units to CONUS. The following US aircraft passenger and cargo statistics provide airlift trends during the year:

	PASSENGERS	CARGO (S/T)
JAN	98,517	3,029
FEB	70,913	2,614
MAR	59,295	2,477
APR	70,782	14,255
MAY	62,415	17,360
JUN	56,648	20,053
JUL	46,046	6,575
AUG	48,772	6,220
SEP	58,113	3,932
OCT	52,186	4,074
NOV	50,494	3,441
DEC	60,451	4,984
TOTAL	729,582	86,014

MEDICAL MATERIEL¹⁸

(U) US troop reductions had a profound influence on the medical supply area during the year. With the standdown of numerous units the redistribution of equipment and supplies to obtain optimal utilization was a major task. The retrograde of medical supplies and equipment was controlled to insure that all in-country requirements were fulfilled and disposition of the remaining property was properly accomplished.

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(U) The US force level reduction caused a major realignment of depot medical supply support. The logistical rollup included the closure of the Da Nang Advance Medical Depot and the consolidation of the 32d Medical Depot stock control functions with the US Army Hospital, Saigon supply account functions. Procedures were changed to permit the Da Nang MEDDAC to obtain supplies directly from the US Army Medical Materiel Agency in Okinawa. A combined manual and computer system was developed which, when coupled with the redistribution programs, reduced substantially the amount of medical stock in-country and the personnel required to manage the system. As the force structure changed, the management programs were modified to insure that the patient care continued at an optimal level.

(U) The US Army Health Services Group, Vietnam (USAHSVCGPV) was instrumental in realigning the USARV medical depot system to provide for direct deliveries from Okinawa to the Korean units. With the phasedown of the 32d Medical Depot, which had serviced the Korean troops, direct delivery was essential in order to permit a draw-down of personnel commensurate with the overall reduction of forces. This system provided for support of the ROKFV at four separate locations convenient to the serviced hospitals. An authorized stockage list (ASL) with a potential dollar ceiling was also developed for ROKFV to control items requisitioned and to better manage the financial aspects of their transactions.

(U) Large amounts of materiel became excess as the drawdown progressed, including medical equipment and supplies. Lists of excess materiel were obtained from all medical units, and procedures for redistribution were implemented enabling MACV to provide excess equipment and supplies to assist in improvement and modernization of the RVNAF medical service. Closure of medical depots and the medical treatment units generated excess materiel, particularly from the 1st Advance Medical Depot at Da Nang and the 32d Medical Depot. In addition, inactivation of medical units provided excess materiel for in-country redistribution. During 1972, \$US 2.5 million worth of medical equipment was retrograded from Vietnam. The prompt identification, redistribution, and disposition of excesses facilitated the orderly drawdown of medical units and reduced out-of-country requisitioning.

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Military Construction

(U) Military construction accomplished under the Military Assistance Service Funded/Military Construction (MASF/MILCON) Program was predominantly for wards at provincial hospitals under the Joint Utilization Program. For the most part construction had been completed and the facilities were in use by year end. Figure E-27 shows the major construction projects which were completed or underway at the end of 1972.

Facilities Transfer

(U) Medical facilities that were transferred to the Vietnamese Government for civilian or military use during 1972 are indicated in Figure E-28

(U) The medical materiel required to equip the facilities for RVNAF use was transferred in place. The equipment requirements were based upon existing or modified Vietnamese authorization documents. In addition, other commodity managed items such as generators, air conditioners, and laundry units also were transferred to the RVNAF medical

MAJOR CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS

LOCATION	(1972) COST (THOUSANDS OF US\$)	TYPE OF PROJECT
Binh Duong	1,050	100 Bed Hospital
Bien Hoa	925	100 Bed Hospital
Bac Lieu	514	Two-104 Bed Ward Additions
Can Tho	762	Rehabilitation
Vinh Long	400	104 Bed Ward Addition
Da Nang	500	Water and Sewage System Upgrade (Duy Tan)
Da Nang	1,023	400 Bed Convalescent Facility
Pleiku	290	Rehabilitation
Qui Nhon	231	Rehabilitation

CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS IN PROGRESS

Xuan Loc	169	104 Bed Ward Addition
Saigon	2,387	450 Bed Hospital

Source: USAHSVCGPV

Figure: E-27

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Medical equipment was transferred to the RVNAF as part of the medical facilities.

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US MEDICAL FACILITIES TRANSFERRED TO GVN US ARMY-FACILITIES

US UNIT	LOCATION	DATE TRANSFERRED	USM
8d Surg Hosp.....	Binh Thuy	APR 72	ARVN 4th Conv Ctr
98d Evac Hosp.....	Long Binh	OCT 72	ARVN Non-Medical Use
95th Evac Hosp.....	Da Nang	OCT 72	ARVN Hosp

US NAVY FACILITIES

Log Sup Base.....	An Thoi	JAN 72	VNN Dispensary
Log Sup Base.....	Long Xuyen	FEB 72	VNN Dispensary

US AIR FORCE

AF Base.....	Pleiku	APR 72	VNAF Dispensary
AF Base.....	Phan Rang	MAR 72	VNAF Dispensary
AF Base.....	Binh Thuy	APR 72	VNAF Dispensary
AF Base.....	Cam Ranh Bay	MAY 72	ARVN Hospital Annex

Source: USAHSVCGPV

Figure: E-28

facility so that when the RVNAF received a facility, it could be used immediately for patient care.

(U) The major problems concerning the Vietnamese operation of former US medical installations were facilities maintenance and utilities. For example, the US facilities at Nha Trang and Vung Tau received electric power and water from contractors. When these facilities were transferred, the power and water supply were continued for approximately one year, during which time the contractors were phasing down. The utilities' operating costs were borne by the RVNAF as well as the facility repair and maintenance costs. The high cost of providing electrical power for the facility was reduced considerably by the removal of air conditioners and modifications to permit natural ventilation of buildings. A further savings of maintenance costs was achieved by converting the Western style latrines to Vietnamese latrines, thus reducing the burden on the sewage disposal system.

Other Activities

(U) In 1969 a program began to establish an optical facility at the RVNAF 70th Medical Base Depot. Since then, Vietnamese have been trained and equipment procured to provide the RVNAF a spectacle fabrication capability. In the spring of 1971 the equipment required for an optical production facility was obtained and installed at the RVNAF 70th Medical Base Depot. On 1 June 1971 the optical branch of the depot commenced operation, and produced each month approximately 450 pairs of spectacles, using simple spherical corrections only. In March 1972 additional optical equipment was obtained when the optical facility of the US 32d Medical Depot closed. Two Vietnamese were trained in the use and maintenance of the

optical equipment and in the production of cylindrical corrective spectacles at the US depot. Consequently, the optical facility at the RVNAF 70th Medical Base Depot was capable of providing all but multivision spectacles to the RVNAF.

(U) One of the more significant US contributions to the RVNAF medical services was the medical materiel monetary support required to equip RVNAF facilities and to provide a medical supplies. The FY 72 and FY 73 medical MASF budgets provide a comparison of funds allocated (Fig. E-29).

(U) The RVNAF Medical Depot System consisted of the 70th Base Medical Depot in Saigon and five field medical depots located at Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, Can Tho, and Saigon. The medical supply system document flow was from the individual medical unit to the field medical depot and thence to the 70th Medical Base Depot. The total country requirements not satisfied at the base depot were consolidated and sent to the US Army Medical Materiel Agency, Pacific, in Okinawa. The 70th Medical Base Depot changed from a manual system to the RVNAF Automated Materiel Management System (RAMMS) in late 1972. Figure E-30 shows the location of the base and field medical depots.

(U) One area in which the USAHSVCGPV attempted to contribute toward furthering the economy of Vietnam was in the local procurement of medical items. Initially, a list of 51 items capable of being produced locally was developed. With the exception of insecticides all of the items were classified as drugs. Of the 51 items, the Ministry of Health was capable of providing quality control testing for 20. In coordination with the RVNAF Surgeon General and the Ministry of Health,

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specifications were developed to insure the local products were acceptable to the RVNAF medical doctors. It was anticipated that at least 3 million of the total FY 73 MASF medical budget of \$26.5 million would be used for local procurement. In the future the number of locally procured items would be limited only by the production capability of the industry and the testing capability of the Ministry of Health. In an attempt to institute controls and standards in the field of local pharmaceutical

production, USAID, with the concurrence of the Ministry of Health, initiated efforts to establish a Vietnamese National Drug Agency. The talented Vietnamese pharmacists and chemists had considerable technical knowledge; however, they lacked the administrative expertise required for establishing an adequate testing and monitoring facility. USAID requested that a senior US Federal Drug Agency official be sent to Vietnam to advise on plant, equipment, testing, and quality control requirements.

BUDGETS, FY 72-FY 73 MEDICAL MASF

CONSUMABLES	FY 72	FY 73
Drugs, Surgical Dressings.....	\$24,205,287	\$19,708,000
Other Medical Supplies.....	3,409,000	2,649,000
Medical Chemicals.....	148,491	161,000
Chemicals.....	1,460,514	2,375,000
Books and Publications.....	14,832	50,000
EQUIPMENT (INITIAL)		
Medical Equipment.....	370,117	444,000
Laboratory Equipment.....	76,768	46,000
X-Ray Equipment.....	133,857	105,000
EQUIPMENT (ATTRITION)		
Medical Equipment.....	22,810	708,000
Mattresses.....	25,009	25,000
Repair and Rehabilitation.....	16,000	18,000
Laboratory Equipment.....	7,901	67,000
X-Ray Equipment.....	14,384	197,000
TOTAL.....	\$29,904,000	\$26,546,000

Source: MACMD

Figure: E-29

LOGISTICS PROGRAMS

MACV RETROGRADE PROGRAM

(U) The MACV Retrograde Program was developed during FY 69 to manage the retrograde of excess and nonmission-essential equipment generated by the US forces standdown and redeployment. Previously, excesses had been identified routinely and shipped through the normal supply channels.

(U) The largest incremental redeployment of US forces took place between 1 February and 30 April 1972. The resulting turn-in, redistribution, and retrograde of excess materiel were major logistical operations, further complicated by the closing of Da Nang Depot and the retrograding of its stocks during the same period. By July 1972 the retrograde program was essentially complete and there was no further need for the intensive management program which had been instituted. Approximately 2,414,000 s/t of cargo had been retrograded, totaling over \$US 6 billion in value.

(C) A JCS requirement for forecasting monthly retrograde cargo requirements and for reporting tonnages shipped continued through September. By 30 September 1972 the total retrograde tonnage remaining in Vietnam was estimated to be 132,000 s/t. During October and November the combined planning for a total withdrawal of all US and Free World Military Assistance Forces and the execution of Project ENHANCE PLUS made infeasible the routine estimating and forecasting of retrograde cargo requirements. In addition, the quantity of US assets to be retrograded had diminished greatly. Accordingly, the requirement for reporting monthly forecasts and tonnage shipped was rescinded by JCS in November. By January 1973 retrograde cargo was no longer being moved by a dedicated retrograde system, but was being handled through normal evacuation channels. Specific problems with redistribution and disposal of excess materiel, such as materiel generated as a result of

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
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**MEDICAL MATERIEL
DISTRIBUTION
SYSTEM**



Source: MACMD

Figure: E-30

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ROKRV redeployment, was managed by exception rather than through a dedicated, continuous MACV retrograde program.¹⁹

TRANSFER OF SCRAP

(U) On 2 May 1972 the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) approved the transfer of US Government scrap to the Government of Vietnam as a part of a \$60 million economic support program. Proceeds from the sale of the scrap material were to accrue to the Ministry of National Defense as supplemental military assistance. Annual proceeds from the sale of scrap, initially estimated at \$13 million, were later revised to \$2 million when a declining trend became evident. Previous efforts to sell scrap to the Government of Vietnam at reduced rates under the "right of first purchase" agreements met with a lack of interest on the part of the Vietnamese. A request to authorize the US Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam (USAPAV) to sell scrap for the Vietnamese Government prior to transfer and to hold the proceeds in escrow was disapproved.

(U) Department of the Army instructions to transfer scrap to the Vietnamese were issued on 1 September 1972 to USARV. On 16 September the SECDEF authorized all unrecovered scrap ammunition brass to be included in the transfer. This was of particular significance because of the large volume of unrecovered brass that was believed to have accumulated in the Republic during the US buildup. Estimates were placed at 30,000 s/t valued at \$30 million. Although the Vietnamese had previously placed restrictions on the possession, sale, and export of scrap ammunition brass, recovery efforts had been relatively unsuccessful.

(U) Negotiations with the Vietnamese government concerning a scrap transfer agreement were held in abeyance pending designation of a Vietnamese Government agency to administer the program. On 17 September the Central Logistics Agency (CLA), the equivalent of the US General Services Administration, was designated to administer the program. The scrap transfer agreement was approved jointly by the US Secretaries of State and Defense on 7 November 1972, and was forwarded by the US Embassy, Saigon to the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs two days later. Under the provisions of the agreement, the Vietnamese Government was required to comply with DOD security trade controls, demilitarization, and competitive bid requirements. Sales and the use of proceeds were subject to audit by the US Government. The Vietnamese Government approved the agreement on 14 December.

(U) By 31 December 1972 the following quantities of scrap had been transferred to the Vietnamese:

LOCATION	SCRAP S/T
Qui Nhon	1,900
Cam Ranh Bay	3,500
Chu Lai	4,200
Tan Son Nhut	90

(U) Future Vietnamese government efforts with regard to unrecovered scrap ammunition brass were undetermined; however, it appeared that action would not be taken to recover brass from illegal holders, since past combined US/Vietnamese recovery efforts had proven unsuccessful. It was possible that the Vietnamese restriction on the export of brass would be relaxed in order to generate foreign exchange and provide revenues through export taxes. The matter was under discussion at high government levels at year end. Approximately 17,000 s/t of scrap at the Da Nang Property Disposal Holding Area (PDHA) and 45,000 s/t at the Long Binh PDHA were transferred in early 1973, following the segregation of dangerous scrap. Transfer was effected as soon as the scrap was segregated to allow the Central Logistics Agency (CLA) to commence sales. Major problems encountered by the CLA were a shortage of funds to initially finance the scrap operation and a shortage of personnel.²⁰

REAL ESTATE

(U) The termination of land use concurrences (the use of rent free land) held by the US and FWMAF was a 1972 goal. In July and August each US service component was requested to review its land holdings and terminate those no longer required. In November the JCS directed MACV to terminate all land holdings in Vietnam. By 30 November all land use concurrences were terminated except those required by the US Embassy and US-AID with the understanding that US forces would continue to occupy the land in use as long as necessary. On 1 January 1972 there were 206 total lease (rented facilities); the Army held 201 leases and the Navy held four leases (total rent: \$8,816,175). As of 1 January 1973 there were 88 total leases; the Army held 87 and the Navy held one (total rent: \$1,355,875).²¹

(U) A total of 318 facilities were transferred, abandoned, or dismantled during 1972, and an additional 211 facilities were title transferred. Major installations transferred under normal procedures included Cam Ranh Bay and Long Binh. By 10 November all US installations had been title transferred to either the Vietnamese or the US Embassy/USAID.

(U) The largest single logistical installation transferred to the Government of Vietnam was the Long Binh Army Post. Long Binh Post was built at a cost of \$120 million and by the end of 1967 it housed all US noncombat commands in Vietnam.

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
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On 21 May 1972 the Commander, National Materiel Management Agency (NMMA) was designated chairman of the ARVN committee to plan the move and consolidation of the 10th, 20th, 40th, and 60th ARVN Base Depots to Long Binh. Three US advisors were assigned to assist the ARVN in organizing the move, developing and monitoring contractual requirements, and providing advice and assistance to the Commander, 1st ARVN Associated Depot, Long Binh. At year end transportation, ordnance, engineer, POL, ammunition, and signal support units had relocated from the Saigon area to the associated depot. The 1st ARVN Associated Depot was the major logistical base in Military Region 3.²²

CONSTRUCTION

(U) With the MACV reorganization into staff directorates, changes were made which resulted in the consolidation of construction elements into the MACV Director of Construction and the formation of the Engineer Services Element (which was later designated the Engineer Branch, DAO). The Engineer Advisory Division (EAD) was terminated on 27 December 1972 after seven years, during which it was the primary advisory element to the RVNAF Corps of Engineers. Its discontinuance was based on the following factors:

—The increased self-sufficiency of the RVNAF Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE) in the fields



RVNAF engineers and contractors completely replaced US road construction units during 1972. A lead watches ARVN engineers constructing a road.

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of engineering, construction, maintenance, and supply matters.

—The creation of the RVNAF National Materiel Management Agency (NMMA) for consolidated supply and maintenance support.

—The reduction of US forces in Vietnam requiring a consolidation of residual functions of the US Army Engineer Group, Vietnam, the MACV Director of Construction, and the Engineer Advisory Division.

(U) The Engineer Branch, Defense Attache Office (DAO) became operational on 28 December 1972 with the following functions:

—Facilities maintenance coordination.

—Support of large generators (200KW and up) and air conditioners associated with large fixed power plants and the Single Integrated Military System (SIMS) communication sites.

—Lines of Communication (LOC) Program to include technical assistance, equipment maintenance support to MCA-LOC furnished equipment and materials support.

—Dependent Shelter Program (DSP).

—Bulk Construction Material Program (BCM).

—MASF/MILCON Program.²³

Lines of Communication (LOC) Program

(U) The LOC program objectives were to restore designated Vietnamese highways to support military operations, to assist pacification operations, and to stimulate national economic growth and unity. The RVNAF engineer participation in the LOC program not only developed the RVNAF engineers' capability to construct quality highways while making them a visible force in the process of nation building, but also assured the successful completion of the LOC program after the redeployment of US forces.

(U) RVNAF engineer participation in the LOC program from July 1968 through December 1969 was limited to the construction of approximately 3,000 meters of bridges on roads being upgraded by US engineer units. In November 1969 the RVNAF engineers expanded their participation by assuming the responsibility for restoring 185 kilometers of highway. By the end of 1972, 671 kilometers of highway had been constructed with major elements of five construction battalions and one combat battalion committed to the road restoration program. Further, elements of seven additional combat and construction battalions were tasked with bridge construction.

(1) To assist the RVNAF engineer construction effort, high capacity commercial construction equipment was required. By early 1973 the US had provided an approximate total of 550 items of special heavy construction equipment and contracted with a

US firm for equipment maintenance responsibility under a MASF contract.

(U) As a major step toward Vietnamization of the LOC program, industrial work sites required to support highway construction were turned over to the Vietnamese engineers. The RVNAF engineers initially operated quarries and rock crushers at Nui Sam and Chau Thoi and began operating the Freedom Hill Quarry at Da Nang in 1970. Asphalt plants were established at Gia Ray and Soc Trang. In late 1970 the RVNAF engineers began receiving on-the-job training at industrial sites supporting highway construction which permitted turnover of sites at Phu Loc, Da Nang, Weight-Davis, Nui Le, and Ban Me Thuot by the end of 1971. In addition the engineers assumed full responsibility for operations at the Dillard industrial work site south of Dalet in March 1972. A few US military and civilian advisors continued assisting at most sites until late 1972. A summary of highway construction through 1972 is as follows:

AGENT	KM COMPLETED
US Army Corps of Engineers.....	1,759
Cost Plus Award	
Fee Contractor (RMK-BRJ).....	989
RVNAF Engineers.....	291
Lump Sum Contractors (Vietnamese).....	24
Australian Army Engineers.....	12


The only construction agents still active in LOC work at the end of 1972 were the lump sum contractors and the RVNAF engineers. On 1 January 1973 USAID assumed the MACV responsibility for managing the LOC program.²⁴

RVNAF Bridge Construction

(U) The RVNAF engineers had been constructing permanent bridges as part of the LOC program since July 1968 and eventually became responsible for 11,478 meters of bridging. By the end of 1972 the RVNAF engineers had completed 7,572 equivalent meters (quantity of work in place) of bridges including 1,036 meters in 1972. There remained 3,904 meters of bridges to be completed.

(U) A total of 160 bridges, many on national highways, were destroyed in the 1972 NGUYEN HUE Offensive. The RVNAF engineers assigned area responsibility to the various engineer groups for repair of the urgently needed bridges. The military region commanders established the repair priorities. Through December 1972, 150 bridges totaling 3,738 meters had been damaged. Of this total 122 bridges had been repaired either permanently or with temporary tactical bridges, or the roads had been opened using bypasses or rafts. The following table summarizes bridges damaged and repaired or bypassed:

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Bridge construction along Vietnam's main highways was one of the ARVN engineers' most important tasks.

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Military Region	DAMAGED	
	Number of Bridges	Length (Meters) Total
1	42	1,112
2	64	1,254
3	15	561
4	29	811
TOTAL	150	3,738

Military Region	REPAIRED OR BYPASSED	
	Number of Bridges	Length (Meters) Total
1	30	799
2	58	939
3	9	265
4	27	742
TOTAL	122	2,745

Delta Rock Transportation Plan

(U) Rock was critically necessary in the construction of roads and airfields. The lack of available rock was a serious problem in the alluvial terrain of the Delta region and required careful acquisition and movement management. Rock shipments in the Delta were directed by the Delta Rock Agency and were carried out by a system of US Military Sealift Command (MSC) contracted tugs and barges and truck transport dedicated to support the LOC program for the Delta region. By 31 December 1971 a total of 7,158,125 s/t of crushed rock had been distributed by the Delta transportation plan.

(U) During 1972 a total of 1,194,887 s/t of rock were shipped by dedicated tugs and barges, against an allocation of 1,546,591 s/t. Monthly shipping allocation of 80,000 to 100,000 s/t were expected to increase to a maximum of 150,000 s/t as the crushing capacity of the Nui Sam Quarry increased to 60,000 s/t per month by July 1973.

(U) By 1 July 1972 the Delta Rock Agency was operating with two quarries, Nui Sap in An Giang Province and Nui Sam in Chau Doc Province. US-ARV had terminated operations at the Vung Tau Quarry on 28 February 1972, and the contract operation of the University Quarry of Saigon expired without renewal on 30 June. The Nui Sap Quarry was operated under contract using USAID funds by the Vinnell Corporation for the Ministry of Public Works. Nui Sam Quarry was operated by the ARVN engineers.

(U) Problems associated with the program centered on the continually increasing rock requirements imposed on the two remaining quarries, rock production shortfalls resulting from equipment maintenance difficulties, and the difficulties in rock movement by barge and truck throughout the Delta. In November and December 1972 several actions were taken to alleviate these problems. Stockpiled

rock from Dong Nai was contract hauled to various Delta rock ports, while purchased rock from the Saigon area was distributed north of the Bassac River, thus allowing rock produced at the two active quarries to be used in the area south of the river. Production was increased at Nui Sam, and a barge outloading facility was established at the quarry. Finally, the Nui Sap Vinnell Corporation contract was extended through December 1973. Transfer of the entire Delta rock program to USAID was scheduled in two phases and was to be effective in March and June 1973.²⁶

Dependent Shelters


(U) As early as 1961 the Government of Vietnam recognized the need for housing the serviceman's dependents. In the early 1960s the ambitious Dependent Shelter Program began with as many as 40,000 units being built in 1964 alone. In 1965 \$1.3 billion in plasters were budgeted for the program but the increasing tempo of the war aborted the plans. From 1966 the objectives and accomplishments were nominal with an annual budget allocation of \$VN 300 million through 1969.

(U) In early 1967 the US provided materials for a pilot self-help construction program in Military Region 3. The austere houses were limited to a cost of approximately \$US 300 per unit. More than 86,000 shelters were completed by the end of 1969, but many were lost to enemy action during the Tet Offensive of 1968. Only some 49,000 usable family shelters remained in the inventory by the beginning of 1970.

(U) In May 1970 President Nixon committed the US to support 20,000 units of housing each year over a five year period from 1971 to 1975. The programs were to be supported by the US at a funding level of \$US 6 million a year for the purchase of construction materials. The US Air Force and Navy initially sponsored separate programs for the VNAF and VNN/VNMC, because the overall RVNAF programs for 1970 and 1971 did not provide sufficient units quickly enough. Beginning in 1972 all construction for RVNAF service components was included in one program to avoid the fragmented, separate service approach. The \$US 6 million funding for dependent shelter materials was provided by each service proportionate to its share of the annual program. For 1972 and 1973 the Air Force and Navy contributions were \$US 600,000 each and the Army contribution was \$US 4.8 million. In addition, the US supported the Government of Vietnam defense budget at about \$US 1.5 million each year for shelter construction.

(U) Dependent shelter construction historically lagged behind the projected plan. The RVNAF indicated at times that construction delays were due

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The rock quarry at Mal Sog provided vital materials for road construction.

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to delays in receiving materials, a US responsibility. Therefore, considerable effort was expended to ensure that material delivery was timely so that the US was not held to be at fault for construction delay. The methods of construction employed in the program were troop construction, contract construction, and self-help. The contractors executing de-

pendent shelter construction throughout Vietnam were small companies, and there were usually several contractors at work in each area.²⁷ The status of the Dependent Shelter Program at year end is shown in Figure E-31. Some of the larger concentrations of dependent shelters in Vietnam are shown in Figure E-32.

RVNAF DEPENDENT SHELTER PROGRAM
(31 December 1972)

PROGRAM	GOAL	COMPLETIONS	UNDER CONSTRUCTION
Air Force	2,400	700	1,220
Navy/MC	5,184	4,419	458
RVNAF	11,745	11,395	280
Presidential Program			
RVNAF 1971	20,000	15,280	4,140
RVNAF 1972	20,000	1,690	10,480
RVNAF 1973-75	60,000	0	0
TOTALS	119,329	34,024	15,678

In addition to the above, 49,000 shelters constructed before 1970 remained in use.

Source: MACDL

Figure: E-31



When construction ends, dependent housing comes to life.

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Dependent housing was constructed with US aid.

TRAINING

(C) As a major part of the US phasedown and Vietnamization effort, the technical services advisory divisions of MACDL were extremely active in training RVNAF personnel to achieve self-sufficiency, both through formal instruction and on-the-job training programs. The following are several examples of training conducted under the Directorate of Logistics:

(C) A part of the upgrade program for the Signal Base Depot was the development of a capability to rebuild modules for the AN/PRC-25, AN/GRC-106, AN/PRC-74, and AN/PRC-12 series tactical radios. Technical data required for testing was requested from CONUS and arrived in May. Construction of mockups and test positions was completed the following month. Formal training class for the first group of repair technicians was completed on 1 July. By December the shop had seven rebuild positions and seven technicians. The instruction of eight additional technicians was programmed to be completed in June 1973. Continued contract technical

assistance would assure RVNAF of a self-sufficient radio module rebuild capability by the end of 1973.

(C) In early 1972, "C" level signal calibration support to ARVN and US forces was provided under a contract with Associated American Engineers Overseas, Incorporated (AAEOI). "A" level calibration support was provided by the USARPAC Calibration Agency (Okinawa) until July, when it was discontinued and made a part of the AAEOI contract. During this same time the ARVN "C" level shops at the signal field depots became operational. "A" level calibration training in-country began in May 1972. On 1 October the AAEOI calibration contract was renewed and MACV became responsible for calibration operations. The new contract contained provisions for ARVN calibration and repair training. In November all calibration equipment in the hands of the contractor was title transferred to the ARVN Calibration Center. ARVN calibration and repair training was conducted both in CONUS and in Vietnam by a US contractor and by ARVN. All training sites were to be turned over

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
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**LARGEST CONCENTRATION
OF DEPENDENT SHELTERS**



Source: MACDL

Figure: E-32

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to the ARVN Calibration Center by 30 June 1973 with the expiration of the calibration contract.

(C) On call joint US/RVNAF assistance teams were formed in the functional areas of highway operations, port operations, and marine maintenance as the US drawdown progressed. The teams

were available to each of the area logistics commands upon request. Formal reports were not made through command channels and ARVN unit commanders proved receptive to the team recommendations. Numerous visits were made and the teams proved highly beneficial.²⁸

COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS IMPROVEMENT AND MODERNIZATION PROGRAM (CEIMP)

(U) As a result of the Presidential decision to accelerate the redeployment of US forces from Vietnam, the Vietnamization of RVNAF communications-electronics was accelerated in 1971. By early 1972 it was determined that the RVNAF Communications-Electronics Improvement and Modernization Program (CEIMP) required extensive revision to make it useful and effective. Accordingly, beginning in January the Communications-Electronics Modernization and Improvement Committee reorganized

and rewrote the CEIMP to reflect the revised goals and programs. Following coordination between CINCPAC, MACTHAI, and MACV from February through April, the revised CEIMP was approved by CINCPAC and the JCS in May.²⁹

(U) The objective of the revised CEIMP was to produce an accurate and concise document emphasizing operational and planning data, highlighting progress in Vietnamization and the retrograde of US equipment, and identifying programs which directly supported communications-electronics (C-E) objectives. To this end, the revision eliminated most of the historical narrative and listed only items




Communications maintenance training was conducted at the Yung Tau and Nho Trung Signal Training Centers.

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Extensive training was conducted prior to assumption of responsibility of key communications sites by RVNAF.

relating to the then current and future tasks to be accomplished. This approach required more frequent updating to keep the document current. To meet this updating requirement CEIMP Automated Reporting System (CARS) was developed, which allowed changes to be made on a monthly basis. C-E asset status changes were forwarded to CINCPAC and JCS via magnetic tape to facilitate data revision and reporting. The CARS was designed to enable a higher headquarters to obtain answers to questions regarding the retrograde of US materiel and progress of the Vietnamization program. An additional requirement was the elimination of the Communications-Electronics Management Information System (CEMIS) and its output reports, since the revised CEIMP and the initiation of CARS eliminated the need for CEMIS. Accordingly, CEMIS was canceled in October. By the end

of 1972 the CEIMP no longer was published as a JCS document; only updates via CARS and magnetic tape were provided.⁸⁰

VIETNAMIZATION OF MAJOR C-E FACILITIES

(U) The progressive turnover of US communications-electronics facilities to the Vietnamese was based on a memorandum of understanding promulgated in September 1971. As the RVNAF achieved the capability to assume responsibility for site operations, a corresponding reduction in US responsibility and presence occurred. The progressive turnover of each facility was accomplished in three phases. A site status became Phase I when it was identified for turnover to the RVNAF. During Phase I the US retained the operation and maintenance responsibility and conducted formal on-the-job training for

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the assigned RVNAF personnel. Phase II began when the RVNAF had attained 100 percent manning with at least 60 percent of its personnel site qualified and when both the US and RVNAF authorities considered the RVNAF personnel prepared to assume great responsibilities.³¹

(U) During Phase II the RVNAF personnel assumed the operation and maintenance responsibility for the site, with US contractor personnel remaining on site to conduct training, provide technical assistance, and operate and maintain US SIMS system elements. The equipment and buildings at each site were turned over to the RVNAF following a joint inventory and sign-over ceremony on the Phase II initiation date. After approximately 60 days Phase III began as the RVNAF personnel assumed the responsibility to fully operate the site without assistance. US contractor personnel were removed and the site was completely owned and operated by the RVNAF.

(U) Prior to the site transitioning to Phase II or Phase III a combined US/RVNAF evaluation team conducted a pretransition evaluation under the direction and control of the RVNAF Communication Management Agency and the Vietnamese Defense Communication Agency (CMA-DCA-RVN). This evaluation insured that the site was operated in accordance with approved standards, that effective training of the RVNAF personnel was being carried out, and that the site was ready to transition to the next phase. Deficiencies were categorized as to US or RVNAF responsibility for correction. A bilingual evaluation report, which was directive in nature, was distributed to both the US and RVNAF operating agencies. As deficiencies were corrected, reports were submitted by the RVNAF and US operating agencies to the CMA/DCA-RVN.

(U) The program started with the turnover of the small sites and those located at the ends of the communications systems, followed by the turnover of larger sites and principal nodal points. Inland sites were the first turned over, followed by those along the coast.

First Quarter Activities

(C) In January 1972 the major US facilities approved for transition to the RVNAF consisted of 32 integrated communications system (ICS) sites, 16 dial telephone exchanges (DTE), four tandem switching centers (TCS), and five undersea cable-head terminals (CBH). A schedule was developed with target dates for transition to Phase II and/or Phase III for approximately 20 sites.³²

(C) In February a significant US policy decision affected the transition program. The US decided to continue operating multiplex equipment at sites associated with a Single Integrated Military Sys-

tem (SIMS) communications link, regardless of the number of channels required or in use of that link. It was difficult to pinpoint actual circuit requirements as troop units, headquarters elements, and support forces continually moved during periods of increased enemy activity. Thus the SIMS retained the flexibility to meet the combat environment it supported. This action preserved an adequate, responsive, and flexible communications system to support the RVNAF. The SIMS was expanded to meet the increasing needs of the RVNAF by upgrading the communications links and by adding several sites. Two ICS sites and 6 dial telephone exchanges were added to the SIMS, increasing the total ICS sites to 34 and the dial telephone exchanges to 31.³³

Second Quarter Activities

(C) The first complete transition program schedule was published during the second quarter which listed Phase II and Phase III transition dates for specific sites. All sites were scheduled to be in at least Phase II by June 1972, with 25 sites scheduled for transition to Phase III. MACV policy was to maintain a US presence on each ICS site which handled critical or essential US circuits. As the transition progressed, performance exceeded the expectation of US planners. Sites in Phase II and Phase III continued to provide high quality and reliable communications support to both the US and RVNAF forces.

(C) The pretransition evaluation program continued to improve as additional RVNAF personnel were assigned to the Communications Management Agency Evaluations Branch. These personnel were integrated into the evaluation process through US training and participation during active evaluations. They formed the nucleus of the RVNAF operations evaluation teams which continually evaluated the major SIMS sites.

(C) The Quang Tri ICS site was lost to the enemy in April. Subsequently, several minor items of C-E equipment were recovered from the site. This was the only major SIMS facility destroyed by combat in 1972. The Dong Tam ICS site entered Phase III on 26 June and was the first ICS site to be completely turned over to the RVNAF.

Third Quarter Activities

(C) This was the most dynamic quarter of the year for the Vietnamization program. The requirement for US personnel to remain on ICS sites handling US critical or essential circuits was relaxed, allowing Phase III dates to be established for all SIMS sites. Based on the performance of the RVNAF personnel on site, the number of RVNAF personnel graduating from the Vung Tau

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Signal School, and the rapid reduction of US forces, it was decided to accelerate the transition of many sites from Phase II to Phase III. The accelerated schedule, jointly approved by the US and the RVNAF, called for all sites to be in Phase III by April 1978.³⁴

(C) In August additional guidance was given to the US components regarding the retention of equipment on site. This direction was oriented toward retaining optimum flexibility at a site in view of the ongoing enemy offensive and the difficulties in determining the actual channel requirements for the various links in the system.

(C) On 6 September 1972 a revised US policy reflected the improvements in the transition program based on the previous nine months' experience. The Evaluations Branch, CMA, continued to add personnel whose training progressed rapidly. The RVNAF assumed the responsibility for conducting pre-Phase III evaluations and for producing the evaluation reports.³⁵

Fourth Quarter Activities

(C) The transition program continued to accelerate during the fourth quarter. The cease-fire negotiations precipitated some changes in the overall transition schedule. First, all scheduled sites were title transferred to the RVNAF on or before 10 November. Second, the two major US dial telephone exchanges in the Saigon area were retained and not title transferred to the RVNAF as originally planned. Third, the radio and multiplex equipment linking the Saigon area headquarters with the out-of-country access points and the Vung Tau and Nha Trang cablehead terminals were retained. Last, the

out-of-country portions of the Vung Tau and Nha Trang cablehead terminals were retained, as well as the interconnecting cable between the two terminals, and the cables to Thailand and the Philippines. These retained systems were title transferred to the American Embassy, Saigon. The status of C-E facilities in each phase during 1972 is shown in Figure E-33.³⁶

(C) In retrospect, the Communications-Electronics Vietnamization program exceeded expectations. The RVNAF plan for the year was completed and sufficient personnel were trained, using both CONUS and in-country schools, to meet the SIMS needs. US contractor personnel continued the on-site training. The RVNAF enthusiastically assumed an increasing role in the operation and maintenance of the SIMS. The SIMS emerged as a joint system with all three user services sharing the operation, maintenance, and support.

RVNAF-SIMS TRAINING

(U) One of the major pacing factors in the Vietnamization of communications-electronics was the training of RVNAF personnel to operate and maintain the SIMS facilities. The primary training sources were the CONUS military schools, the ARVN Vung Tau Signal Training Center, and the VNAF Signal School at Nha Trang. Four training courses were offered at Fort Monmouth, N.J., with a total of 31 ARVN students graduating during 1972. In addition, 30 VNAF students graduated from the Dial Central Office Repairman Course at Keesler AFB, Mississippi, and subsequently from the Tandem Switch Repair Course at Fort Monmouth.

**TRANSITION OF C-E FACILITIES
INTEGRATED COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM (ICS)
PHASES**

MONTH	I	II	III	TOTAL
JAN 72	29	3	0	32
APR 72	30	4	0	34
JUL 72	20	13	1	34
OCT 72	12	8	14	34
JAN 73	7	8	19	34

DIAL TELEPHONE EXCHANGES (DTE)

JAN 72	10	1	4	15
APR 72	14	3	4	21
JUL 72	10	5	6	21
OCT 72	7	4	10	21
JAN 73	6	4	11	21

The four tandem switching centers (TCS) were under US control throughout the year and thus remained in Phase I. Of the five undersea cable terminals (CSM), two progressed from Phase I to Phase II during the last quarter of 1972.

Source: MACCE

Figure: E-33

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(U) The in-country training for SIMS skills was conducted primarily at the ARVN Vung Tau Signal Training Center. During the year 220 strategic microwave repairmen and 142 dial central office repairmen were trained at the school. This represented the technical training accomplishments of the school. At year end there were 220 students attending technical classes who would graduate in 1973. Added to this were several hundred graduates in other less technical skills. A major change occurred at the signal school on 31 October when Page Communications Engineers, Inc., completed the contract for teaching technical subjects in English to students with previous English language training. Thereafter, the ARVN conducted all formal classroom training and graduated 49 students in three classes prior to the end of the year. All classes were conducted in Vietnamese, and thus the English language prerequisite for the technical courses was eliminated. Two other contract courses at Vung Tau related to SIMS were the instructor training program conducted by Page and the power plant supervisor course conducted by Pacific Architects and Engineers.

(U) The VNAF Signal School at Nha Trang trained 32 VNAF and 65 ARVN personnel in the Dial Central Office Repair Course. A formal on-the-job training program was also conducted for two ARVN classes of 14 personnel on the operation and maintenance of the AN/MRC-85 tropospheric scatter system in anticipation of future requirements.

VIETNAM TELECOMMUNICATIONS ORGANIZATION (VTO)

(U) In May 1970 the US and the Government of Vietnam signed a memorandum calling for the establishment of a Vietnam Telecommunications Organization (VTO) by May 1971. The VTO was to manage portions of the existing US military and Vietnamese commercial systems combined into a Single Integrated Telecommunications System (SITS). Subsequently, the VTO was to develop a commercial system and provide service to all customers. A lack of progress and the need to Vietnamize US military communications activities caused MACV, in March 1971, to reconfigure the existing US military communications systems into a network for only the RVNAF military and quasi-military needs. This system was the Single Integrated Military System (SIMS).⁴⁷

(U) Despite efforts by the Vietnamese legislature in February, a sub-committee of the MACV Communications-Electronics Staff Committee in April, the Vietnamese Prime Minister in July, and Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker in August, the Vietnamese Government failed to establish the

Vietnamese Telecommunication Organization during 1972. USAID deleted its FY 73 funding support for the VTO projects.

GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY

(C) The communications security (COMSEC) advisory program was shared by two organizations: the MACV COMSEC Advisory Branch and the COMSEC Management Unit, a JCS agency under MACV operational control.

(S) The types, quantities, and use of COMSEC equipment by the Vietnamese were specified in the JCS document, Communications-Electronics Improvement and Modernization Program (CEIMP). All changes to this document required JCS approval. A significant change during 1972 was the authorization for the Vietnamese to inspect the Presidential Palace without US participation. Each of the other 216 COMSEC accounts holding major COMSEC equipment required a quarterly inspection by a joint US/Government of Vietnam inspection team. The US team members were from the 509th Radio Research Group until 1 April when MACV and the COMSEC Management Unit assumed the role. Many serious deficiencies were noted in the first two quarters of the year in physical security and accounting procedures. Concentrated effort by the Vietnamese Joint General Staff COMSEC Branch and COMSEC advisors was reflected in significant improvement during the last quarter.⁴⁸

(S) All COMSEC equipment was loaned to the Vietnamese. RVNAF Unit 600 was the Vietnamese COMSEC Depot. Manned by 35 officers and men, it controlled the receipt, storage, and centralized accounting and control of all COMSEC material released to the RVNAF. In addition, the depot's internal, centralized COMSEC maintenance facility provided limited direct support maintenance for all COMSEC equipment (except the cryptographic systems NESTOR and OLYMPUS) on loan. During 1972 many major improvements were made in the training, location, structure, and efficiency of the depot. On 1 July 1972 elements of the 39th Signal Battalion, 1st US Signal Brigade completed the RVNAF logistics and maintenance training program, were phased out, and transferred functions to the MACV Communications-Electronics Directorate advisors. On 24 June the first advisory personnel of the MACV COMSEC Management Unit (CMU) arrived to provide COMSEC assistance to the Vietnamese. On 26 October a new building having stable power, environmental controls, and improved physical security was completed. The depot moved to the former USAF airlift command post where it was collocated with the Joint General Staff COMSEC Branch to provide close coordina-

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tion and a central point of contact for the COMSEC program.

(C) Throughout the year training was conducted on the use, operation, and maintenance of COMSEC equipment at all service schools. In Saigon classes were conducted on control and accounting for all key COMSEC custodians, both civilian and military. These custodians in turn trained hundreds of subordinate COMSEC account personnel and hand receipts holders in the new accounting and control procedures. Training manuals, training aids, and lesson materials were prepared and distributed concerning the threat to communications. Weak areas were made known and steps were taken to correct malpractices. Training in the use, operation, and maintenance of equipment was conducted by the civil or military services involved. COMSEC orientation became an integral part of all signal training for officers, non-commissioned officers, and newly enlisted members of all military services. By year end COMSEC training was being phased into a single management structure under the ARVN for all services, thus standardizing course material and eliminating duplication.

(C) On 1 September a new COMSEC accounting and control doctrine was adopted by the RVNAF Joint General Staff and placed into effect as the sole accounting system within all Vietnamese civilian and military agencies. Because a complete reconciliation of inventories was required, conversion to the system took several months. All centralized records had been converted to the new COMSEC accounts by the end of 1972.³⁹

(S) In October a MACV prepared COMSEC logistics support plan providing the information and guidance to support a national Vietnamese COMSEC logistics and maintenance program was submitted to the Joint General Staff. On 8 December the last part of a cryptographic security doctrine was completed and submitted to the National Security Agency for approval prior to release to the Vietnamese.⁴⁰

(S/NF) In late October, when the cease-fire appeared imminent, detailed planning began for the COMSEC assistance effort after the withdrawal of US military forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff provided planning guidance as follows:

—No additional COMSEC equipment would be turned over to the Vietnamese.

—COMSEC equipment would remain on loan, subject to withdrawal on demand.

—The flow of manual systems, keying material, and spare parts would not change.

—The bilateral COMSEC agreement would remain in effect, subject to determination of the terms of the cease-fire agreement.

—The MYSTERY STORY circuits would remain until no longer required.

—Management of the US/Government of Vietnam COMSEC effort would be vested in a civilian COMSEC section within the Defense Attache Office, Saigon. Included would be cryptographic custodianship and maintenance of all residual US COMSEC assets. A detailed plan was completed and continually updated as the drawdown progressed, covering all aspects of the future COMSEC assistance effort and support for the residual US COMSEC equipment.⁴¹

US COMMAND AND CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS Autovon

(S) Because of the requirement to Vietnamize the Nha Trang and Phu Lam AUTOVON facilities and to locate the AUTOVON access control points closer to major US troop concentrations, AUTOVON access circuits from the overseas switchboards (OSS) at Nha Trang and Phu Lam were rehomed to Gia Dinh and Tan Son Nhut respectively on the 1st and 30th of July. On 13 August work was begun to relocate all AUTOVON access circuits to the Gia Dinh dial service assistance (DSA) switchboard and to provide a single AUTOVON overseas switchboard for Vietnam. A cutover plan was published on 1 September and four of seven AUTOVON termination units for Gia Dinh were received and installed during August and September. Technical limitations at the Clark AB, Philippines, AUTOVON terminal and the nonreceipt of program changes delayed the Gia Dinh DSA AUTOVON circuit changeover until 24 December. The Tan Son Nhut Joint Overseas Switchboard (JOSS) was deactivated on 31 December 1972 with the retermination of the last two AUTOVON circuits to Nakhon Phanom, Thailand.⁴²

Dial Telephone Exchanges

(C) During 1972 dial telephone exchanges were deactivated at Da Nang West, Camp Eagle, Tuy Hoa, Cam Ranh AB, Plantation, Nha Be, Phu Lam, and Vinh Long. Two were installed at Dalat and Ban Me Thuot. In March the Southeast Asia-Automatic Telephone System (SEA-ATS) had a telephone capacity of 50,420 mainlines. Approximately 31,000 of these mainlines were in use with about 5,800 mainlines assigned to the RVNAF. The March Class A ratio for the complete SEA-ATS system was 24.4 percent, which was an increase of 0.6 percent from November 1971. During the 13 month period between June 1971 and July 1972 the number of dial telephone exchanges in Vietnam was reduced from 32 to 22. The number of subscribers fell from 38,711 to 26,358 for an overall reduction of 6 percent sub-

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scriber fill. This was attributed to the phaseout of manual switchboard and the consolidation of subscribers to larger exchanges. Although the number of dial telephone exchanges was reduced by 32 percent, there were still 19,364 US telephone mainlines in Vietnam on 31 July 1972. This equated to 0.44 telephone mainlines per American in Vietnam. The US subscribers dropped to 16,286 in November; however, the number of mainlines per person rose to 0.65, indicating that telephones were not being withdrawn from service in consonance with the US drawdown.⁴³

AUTOSEVOCOM

(C) During this year, the AUTOSEVOCOM system throughout Vietnam underwent several changes in configuration, most of which were deactivations related to the US troop withdrawal. The secure cord (SECORD) switchboard at Can Tho was deactivated on 15 April and installed by the USAF at Tan Son Nhut Air Base to provide the Tan Son Nhut Air Control Center with a rapid secure voice capability to subordinate units in Vietnam and Thailand. This capability was later assumed by the Saigon secure voice automatic switch board (FTC-31), and the SECORD was transferred to Korat, Thailand, on 12 August. The SECORD at Cam Ranh Bay was deactivated on 27 April and transferred to Thailand in December. To reduce the overloading of the AUTOSEVOCOM system in Vietnam as a result of increased combat activities, minimize was imposed from 21 May through 15 September on all in-country users. On 17 August an AUTOSEVOCOM narrow band terminal was installed at the Second Regional Assistance Command (SRAC) forward command post, Phu Cat Air Base, because of the rapidly developing tactical situation in Military Region 2. SECORD 61 at Da Nang was deactivated on 27 September, and subscribers were reterminated on SECORD 71 at Da Nang. Concurrent with the departure of US elements from Long Binh, SECORD 66 was deactivated on 2 October. SECORD 32 at Long Binh was deactivated on 10 November when the US Army, Vietnam (USARV) Headquarters relocated to Saigon. SECORD 24 at Pleiku was deactivated on 20 November after all subscribers were converted to the narrow band and rehomed to SECON 22 at Gia Dinh.

AUTODIN

(C) On 13 June the Automatic Switching Center (ASC) at Phu Lam, which provided message processing service to communications centers in the Republic, was deactivated. Those organizations and units requiring electrical message transmission service after 13 June were reconnected to an out-

of-country ASC at either Korat Air Base, Thailand, or Clark Air Base, Philippine Islands. The MACV Telecommunications Center maintained its full capability; therefore, no change or degradation in message processing occurred as a result of the reconfiguration. In the interest of improving operational effectiveness the MACV Command Communications Center was collocated with the MACV Telecommunications Center on 29 January and was redesignated the MACV Telecommunications Facility (TCF). Relocation was accomplished between 3 and 14 March. The MACV TCF 600 baud circuit to Clark AB was upgraded to 1200 baud on 15 December to handle the increased traffic resulting from the USARV relocation to Saigon. Additionally, on 27 August an optical character reader (OCR) was installed in the MACV TCF to reduce outgoing message processing time. An OCR reads the printed information on the message form, to include the addressee routing, and converts this information into properly formatted punched paper tape for subsequent transmission via AUTODIN. Maximum utilization had not been realized by year end because of the limited number of OCR typewriters in the headquarters and the excessive OCR maintenance down time (280 hours for the period 27 August through 20 December).

Command Record Communications

(C) To provide faster service between regional assistance command (RAC) headquarters and MACV for the Commanders Daily Evaluation Report, the RAC dedicated secure teletype circuits were upgraded to SPECAT in September. This provided direct SPECAT access to the MACV TCF. In addition, a dedicated 100 word per minute SPECAT circuit was installed direct to the First Regional Assistance Command (FRAC) Forward Command Post at Hue. These actions improved customer service by using dedicated rather than shared usage circuits.

Airborne Radio Relay

(C) Throughout the year, and particularly during the NVA offensive from April through June, the 1st Signal Brigade Aviation Section provided FM airborne radio support to all regional assistance commands. Missions varied from short period requirements of from one to four hours in duration to continuous 24 hour coverage for several days.

ICS Communications

(C) The ICS link between Gia Dinh and Tan Son Nhut was upgraded by 96 channels in July and August to provide alternate routes for the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC) BLUE CHIP.

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Satellite Communications

(C) The Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) Phase II was implemented on 1 August. Under Phase II the Ba Queo SATCOM station used the new WESTPAC (9432) satellite which was in a synchronous orbit over the Pacific. Under DSCS Phase I a series of small semi-synchronous satellites had been utilized. Shortly after Phase II began, problems were encountered with the satellite stabilization. The problems could not be corrected and the ground stations reverted to using the Phase I satellites.

Tactical Radio Communications

(C) During the month of September three AN/TRC-111 radio systems were deactivated and retrograded to Thailand. The three systems serviced the following locations: Long Binh-Tan Son Nhut, Long Binh-Long Thanh North, and Gia Dinh-Tan Son Nhut. Additionally, during the month of October an AN/TRC-24 radio system between Chi Lang and Long Xuyen and an AN/TRC-182 system between Pr Line and Tan Son Nhut were deactivated. All of the systems had provided tactical augmentation for fixed ICS. On 28 October the AN/GRC-170 radio system (60 channels) between Vung Tau and Pleiku was deactivated and the equipment transferred to the Republic of the Philippines Military Assistance Program (MAP), Project FORESIGHT SIERRA.

Frequencies

(U) A thorough review of the 1,761 frequencies assigned to the USAF and the USN in Vietnam was conducted during August. This review resulted in the deletion of approximately 300 frequency assignments from the US allocation and their return to the Vietnamese. A similar review of US Army frequencies was completed in September, including 4,827 frequency assignments controlled by MACV. This review resulted in a 41 percent reduction in the number of frequency assignments. The review of all MACV components frequency assignments was used to update both the MACV Radio Frequency Authorization (RFA) listing and the Department of Defense centralized Frequency Resource Record System (FRRS) maintained at the Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center (ECAC), Annapolis, Maryland. A 35 percent reduction in the MACV records was realized with 420 separate entries deleted or modified in the ECAC FRRS. The updating of both documents would streamline frequency management within MACV, PACOM, and DGD. In a related change the MACV Radio Frequency Interference Team, Project RIVET JACK, ceased operation on 26 October. The team equipment was transferred to the RVNAF and the training of RVNAF personnel was completed.

Major Relocations

(C) During June and July the 7th Air Force Intelligence Directorate and Operations Directorate relocated to MACV Headquarters and combined with the MACV staff. Included in this reorganization was the Tactical Air Control Center (TACC), BLUE CHIP. This relocation and reorganization required extensive engineering, installation, and testing of a vast, complex communications system which included secure and nonsecure voice, secure and nonsecure teletype, common user dial telephone service, HF and UHF radio, and approximately two hundred "hot lines." The communications were engineered and installed by PACAF and Federal Electric Corporation. The move was accomplished smoothly and without the disruption or delay of air operations.

(C) During the month of September the MACV Headquarters elements consolidated within building S-5000 to free approximately 40,000 square feet of office space for the relocation of USARV Headquarters and the 1st Signal Brigade, which were redesignated USARV/MACV Support Command and USASTRATCOM Southeast Asia, respectively. These moves generated a considerable workload requiring telephone, secure voice, "hot line," and intercom relocations and installations. Communications installations were completed on schedule.

(C) CINCPAC approval was received on 30 August to locate the Republic of Vietnam Contingency Communications Unit (RVN-CCU) to Thailand. The equipment and personnel were moved between September and November to Thailand. The RVN-CCU had the capability and the mission to rapidly deploy to Vietnam to restore an ICS site/system or a headquarters communications-electronics support facility which might be damaged or destroyed by enemy action or natural disaster.⁴⁴

DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY⁴⁵

(U) During 1972 there was an orderly phasedown of the Defense Communications Agency, Southeast Asia Mainland Region (DCA-SAM). There was a systematic, although at times accelerated, reduction in both the manning and the mission of DCA-SAM, and it was redesignated Defense Communications Agency, Republic of Vietnam Region (DCA-RVN) on 1 April 1972.

(U) In 1971 MACV received concept approval for transferring certain US communications systems to the RVNAF and for establishing an RVNAF agency to provide operational direction and management of the planned Single Integrated Military System (SIMS). On 1 October 1971 the combined missions of DCA-SAM, the Combined Telecommunications Engineering Agency (CTEA), and the Telephone Management Agency (TMA) were assigned to a new

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organization called the Communications Management Agency (CMA). This consolidation was directed by the Joint General Staff J6 (JGS J6) to alleviate the fragmentation, duplication of effort, and strain on the limited manpower resources of the RVNAF signal community.

(U) The major problem facing the accelerated RVNAF assumption of the complex communications network was the shortage of trained manpower, especially engineers and capable middle managers. To overcome this deficiency and allow the RVNAF to assume the management role, the decision was made to alleviate shortages in engineering and management capabilities by employing US contract civilians. A contract for communications engineering support and management advice for the CMA was awarded in November 1971 to Page Communications Engineers, Inc. Simultaneously, the DCA-SAM mission was expanded to provide the MACV J6 with the communications advisory, management, and engineering capability required to sustain the CMA until the contractor assumed his responsibilities. To accomplish this, DCA-SAM continued to operate in a realigned structure approximating that of the CMA. Under this arrangement, DCA-SAM was responsible to the Defense Communications Agency (DCA) for all assigned DCS functions, managed for MACV the non-DCS US communications in the Republic of Vietnam, and acted as an extension of the MACV J6 staff in providing management assistance, advice, and training to the CMA. Thus the DCA-SAM mission was greatly reduced with respect to DCA functions but greatly increased in the areas of management assistance, advice, and training.

(U) Along with planning for and advising the CMA, DCA-RVN maintained operational direction and management control over the Wetwash Submarine Cable, Nha Trang-Vung Tau 439L Submarine Cable, Vung Tau-Vayama Submarine Cable, Long Binh-Siet 96 Tropospheric Scatter Site (Tropo), Monkey Mountain-Warin Tropo, Pleiku-Warin Tropo, AUTOSEVOCOM Network, and AUTODIN.

(U) In January 1972 the DCA reportable circuitry totaled less than 400 circuits. In addition, the MACV critical and essential circuits, while generally the same as DCA's, further expanded the list to about 525 circuits. With the RVNAF system exceeding 4,000 circuits, the total of US critical and essential circuits was low enough that most of the long haul communications were placed under CMA's operational direction and management. Agreement be-

tween US and the Republic of Vietnam allowed the DCA-SAM to intervene if circumstances warranted.

(U) The division of communications in Vietnam dictated that a simple control and associated reporting system be developed and implemented for the CMA. The system developed was primarily narrative, with a minimum of formatting. In conjunction with developing and implementing the system, the protection of US interests was maintained by having the reports submitted to a combined operations center at Tan Son Nhut. The centralized center then prepared reports which satisfied the CMA, DCA, and MACV requirements.

(U) The establishment of CMA and the planned transfer of the Vietnam portion of the ICS-SEA to the RVNAF for inclusion in the SIMS, required the DCA-RVN ICS data base to be integrated with the data base for the Military Telecommunications System (MTS), thus creating a CMA SIMS data base. The RVNAF MTS was equivalent to the USARV Corps Area Communications System (CACS).

(U) The actual transition from DCA-RVN to the CMA support contractor, Page Communications Engineers, Inc., was in accordance with the approved contract manning schedule. The contract allowed a 60 day phase-in period which was to be completed 17 January 1972 with a minimum manning requirement of 81 people. To permit Page's orderly assumption of DCA's support to the CMA, key personnel were identified to provide an overlap with the contractor's personnel. As Page became effective, DCA rapidly phased down to an authorized in-country strength of 21 military and four civilian personnel. During the transition period DCA division chiefs acted as technical advisors.

(U) One of the most significant problems faced by the RVNAF CMA was the lack of directives governing the management and operation of the SIMS. As an interim measure a number of DCA and DCA-RVN publications were adapted to the needs of the CMA and SIMS, and subsequently were used by the CMA. A major portion of the Page contractual effort was devoted to reviewing and modifying DCA publications for use as CMA management tools. During 1972, 51 proposed publications were produced by Page.

(U) With the prospect of a cease-fire in late 1972, DCA-RVN's organic support equipment was transferred to CMA.

PROJECT ENHANCE PLUS

BACKGROUND

(C) In late October MACV was notified of an

accelerated equipment delivery program for RVNAF. As later became known, this massive delivery of

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military equipment was in preparation for the expected truce and was designed to complete equipping RVNAF before the cease-fire halted further delivery of additional materiel. The input of equipment sparked many associated actions and resulted in one of the most remarkable MACV achievements during the year.

(C) The Logistics Directorate (MACDL) and the AF Advisory Group (AFGP) were the focal points for planning and implementing Project ENHANCE PLUS. As a result of combined planning with the JCS each of the Vietnamese services handled the influx of new equipment differently. ARVN stockpiled or immediately issued the materiel to meet existing requirements, with no change to its force structure. On the other hand, the VNAF force structure was extensively modified, which created significant training and maintenance problems, as a result of receiving new aircraft or large numbers of additional type aircraft already on hand.

(C) The first delivery of ENHANCE PLUS cargo arrived in Tan Son Nhut Air Base on 23 October aboard a C-141 aircraft. The SS HOOD arrived at Newport on 12 December with the last shipload. Between 23 October and 23 November, a total of 186 sorties of C-5, C-141, and C-130 aircraft and nine sorties of civilian contract aircraft lifted 4,998 short tons of cargo to aerial ports within the Republic of Vietnam. A total of 99,351 measurement tons of cargo was sealifted to Vietnamese water ports, arriving between 24 November and 12 December. Over 105,000 major items were delivered (Fig. E-34).⁴⁶

ENHANCE PLUS TONNAGES RECEIVED
(23 Oct 1972 - 12 Dec 1972)

BY AIR	
Air Base	Short Tons
Tan Son Nhut	3,294
Bien Hoa	1,663
Da Nang	41
TOTAL	4,998
BY SEA	
Seaport	Measurement Tons
Newport	81,540
Qui Nhon	500
Cam Ranh and Nha Trang	4,617
Da Nang	12,694
TOTAL	99,351
Airlift - 195 sorties	
Sealift - 34 vessels	
Source: MACDL	

Figure: E-34

ARVN SUPPORT

(S) On 21 October ENHANCE PLUS was first announced by a Joint Chiefs of Staff message directing a halt to the retrograde of equipment from

Vietnam and the shipment of selected items of equipment to Vietnam, with a completion date of 1 November. A further Department of the Army (DA) message detailed quantities of equipment to be applied to various programs, such as ENHANCE augmentation, Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program (CRIMP), and FY 73-74 attrition. The next day the JCS rescinded the instructions. However, on 26 October the program was reinstated with a 20 November date for all equipment to be in, or en route to, Vietnam. Sources of the assets included active and reserve Army units and other international logistics sources. Besides listing specific equipment, the implementing message directed the following actions:

- 120 days of air munitions and 90 days of ground munitions would be stocked in-country.
- All POL tanks that could be secured would be topped off.
- One year of consumables would be stocked.
- All remaining bases to include equipment required for their operation would be turned over immediately.

-Immediate title transfer of all major items to be furnished the RVNAF. This would include equipment both within and outside Vietnam (but destined for Vietnam) including equipment in transit. Other actions were later directed by JCS, DA, or CINCPAC, such as the transfer of Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) and equipment from Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam (ROKFV). Quantities of equipment were segregated by existing NMMA project codes, with some new codes designated, and specific delivery dates were given.⁴⁷

Port and Title Transfer Teams

(C) Port and title transfer teams, composed of US and ARVN personnel, were formed and deployed on 21 October for the receipt, staging, processing, documenting, and clearing of cargo. When the JCS rescinded the implementing instructions on 22 October, the teams were recalled, only to be redeployed on 27 October when the program was reinstated. MASF title transfer documents were completed at the air and surface terminals and were forwarded to the MACDL ENHANCE PLUS Project Office. Upon receipt a control number was assigned to all documents for each ship or aircraft, and receipt of the cargo was immediately reported to DA and US supply activities. A copy of all documentation was sent to the RVNAF National Materiel Management Agency (NMMA) for records posting.

(C) Based on the 26 October DA implementing instructions, the immediate transfer to ARVN of all due-in equipment began. Transfer documents were prepared and signed by the Chief of Staff, RVNAF, the Central Logistics Command, and by

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A C-5 Galaxy delivers material during Project ENHANCE PLUS.

the Senior Advisor, Joint Logistics Advisory Division, MACV, effecting title transfer before the equipment arrived in Vietnam.⁴⁸

Reconciliation

(C) Problems arose in reconciling the US and ARVN equipment records. Two sets of asset records, ARVN and US, had been maintained for accountability and were posted separately with little correlation between the two. Differing policies were used by the Americans and the Vietnamese for posting records. For example, ARVN dropped assets shipped out of Vietnam for repair while the US continued to carry these items as ARVN assets; the RVNAF depot upgrade program had resulted in cross shipments of items between technical services; and during Projects 981 and ENHANCE, US records were based on title transfer documents and ARVN receiving reports, while ARVN records were based on depot receipt reports. Because of these factors and lag times in the US and ARVN

systems, the two sets of asset records rarely agreed.

(C) An initial reconciliation between the US and ARVN records was conducted between 20 and 28 October to overcome the differences. Joint US/ARVN teams visited the Area Logistics Commands (ALC) to examine property books and other documents. Of approximately 1,400 line items, 462 could not be reconciled. This required reconciliation of the 462 lines, plus 300 additional lines of substitute items, with 1,200 property books located throughout Vietnam, which took place between 2 to 6 November. However, many lines still showed major differences. On 11 November a further reconciliation was initiated for 160 lines. As of 20 December program changes based on the revised asset positions totaled \$US 3 million.⁴⁹

Government Furnished Equipment and
Commercial Design Administrative Use Vehicles

(C) On 4 November MACV directed the immediate

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title transfer to RVNAF of Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) in the hands of US contractors. This action was formalized for Army contracts on 14 November when an agreement was signed by the Chief, Joint Logistics Advisory Division and the Chief of Staff, RVNAF Central Logistics Command. Under the terms of this agreement equipment remained in the custody of contractors or other US Government agencies until it no longer was required. At that time control passed to the RVNAF. In order to control and facilitate inter-contractor transfers, one contractor was designated the accountable office for all GFE. All supply transactions were cleared through the contractor and he was responsible for providing RVNAF with periodic asset status reports.

(C) Action was also taken to transfer commercial designed administrative use vehicles (CDAUV). The original plan that all CDAUVs in the hands of the military be transferred to USAID was later changed so that on 8 December a memorandum of agreement was signed by representatives of MACV, USARV/MACV SUPCOM, and the US Embassy. Under the terms of this agreement CDAUVs belonging to US military motor pools were title transferred to the US Embassy with operational control retained by the military. The right to request transfer of vehicles to an out-of-country location was reserved, whereupon title would revert to the military. Plans called for civilian contractor operation of required motor pools in include maintenance.⁵⁰

Transfer of Equipment

(C) Between 26 October and 7 November DA directed that a total of 72 lines of USARV equipment be transferred to the RVNAF. In addition, the decision was made to transfer equipment in the hands of US advisory personnel. On 2 November subordinate commands were instructed to transfer all advisor equipment with the following exceptions: secure communications equipment, nonappropriated fund property, aircraft, personal clothing and equipment, and any items specifically prohibited by service directives. Similarly, on 3 November USARV was directed to title transfer all equipment on temporary loan to the RVNAF. In each of these cases, title transfer documents were processed through the six USARV transfer points and forwarded to the ENHANCE PLUS project office through the USARV/MACV SUPCOM DCSLOG. Transfer notification was reported to DA expeditiously.⁵¹

(S) On 31 October the JCS directed the transfer of four brigade sets of ROKFV equipment to the RVNAF. An agreement was signed on 1 November by the American Embassy, Korea and the Republic of Korea Government for the transfer. Subsequent-

ly, instructions were received to transfer the following items, whether or not they were in the brigade sets.

-72 105mm howitzers, 26 155mm howitzers, 737 M-79 grenade launchers, 28 armored personnel carriers, 667 2-1/2 ton cargo trucks, 9 UH-1D helicopters, and 27,000 M-16 rifles. Since these items were not included in the 1 November agreement, negotiations had to be reopened in Korea. On 11 November JCS directed that the title transfer of equipment be accomplished immediately. Since negotiations were still taking place in Korea between COMUSKOREA and the Ministry of National Defense (MND), Korea, it was impossible to execute the title transfer. ROKFV would not discuss the subject until they received specific guidance from their Ministry of National Defense (MND). While negotiations were underway in Korea, some confusion arose over brigade sets versus regimental sets of equipment. Also, CINCPAC became concerned that Project ENHANCE PLUS was more than compensating for RVNAF shortages. On 1 December DA instructed MACV to equip four ARVN regiments.

(S) COMUSKOREA and MNE, Korea, signed a memorandum of understanding on 4 December agreeing to the transfer of four ROKA regimental sets of equipment plus the additional items. MACV then met with representatives of ROKFV, MND and JUSMAG-K and mutually agreed upon which equipment would be transferred. MACV sent a message to CINCPAC and SECDEF listing the equipment to be transferred and advising that the equipment would be title transferred to RVNAF unless otherwise directed. The message also contained ARVN equipment authorizations and on-hand quantities. DA replied to MACV's message recommending that certain equipment not be transferred; however, neither CINCPAC nor SECDEF changed their previous guidance of transferring four regimental sets of equipment plus additional items. As a result, four regimental sets and the additional items were transferred to the RVNAF on 9 December.⁵²

Full Petroleum Storage Tank Policy

(C) The JCS also directed a full petroleum storage tank policy. All petroleum offices, to include the Sub Area Petroleum Office, Vietnam (SAPOV), the Quartermaster Commissary Procurement Advisory Division (QMCPAD), and the RVNAF Joint Petroleum Office (JPO), determined procedures and delivery schedules at a meeting on 30 October. Three commercial oil companies cooperated fully in implementing the schedule.

(C) On 3 November a letter was sent to the commander of the RVNAF Central Logistics Command informing him of the full tank program and ex-

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plaining that this project did not include any increase in funding and the increased deliveries would be paid for from the following quarter's allocation. Representatives of RVNAF questioned this matter of funding, but no authorization to increase funding was included in Project ENHANCE PLUS. The ARVN petroleum advisor calculated that if the full tank policy was to continue indefinitely an increase of \$1.5 million for MOGAS and \$2.8 million for diesel fuel would be required in the MASF budget. The total effect of the full tank program was to increase the on-hand quantities of 25 days of MOGAS and 27 days of diesel fuel to 46 days and 47 days respectively.

(U). Since Military Sealift Command (MSC) tankers normally did not discharge POL at night in Military Regions 1 and 2, night discharge procedures had to be developed and arrangements made for security during the discharge operations. Through the combined efforts of a joint US/ARVN team, both problems were solved expeditiously.²³

Facility Transfer

(C) Based on the guidance contained in the 26 October JCS message, actions were initiated to transfer the remaining US facilities in RVNAF. Selected facilities were identified for further use by the US Embassy, USAID, and other US agencies. All remaining US facilities were title transferred to RVNAF between 6 and 10 November, with the understanding that the US and FVMAF would continue to occupy these facilities until no longer required. All land use concurrences (LUC) were similarly terminated with the understanding that US forces would continue to use land until no longer required. LUCs identified by the US Embassy for further use were transferred to the Embassy or USAID for separate negotiation with the Government of Vietnam.

(C) Title transfer actions took place at MACV Headquarters by a joint Vietnamese-US team. Site inventory and the physical transfer took place at each individual site and involved US representatives from the Area Support Element, the Pacific Archi-



Filling all available petroleum tanks nearly doubled fuel reserves in Vietnam.

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pects & Engineers, the losing unit, and an advisor to the ARVN Logistics Command. Site transfers continued as sites became excess.⁵⁴


VNN SUPPORT

(S) The guidelines set forth by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Project ENHANCE PLUS did not include tasking the US Navy with delivery of any major equipment items to Vietnam. Therefore, the Navy was not formally a part of Project ENHANCE PLUS. The Commander, US Naval Forces, Vietnam, however, recognized a distinct need to acquire major line items and mission essential equipment for turnover to the Vietnamese Navy prior to the

Project ENHANCE PLUS deadline. CINCPACFLT was apprized of 25 secondary Project ENHANCE items which had not been received in Vietnam and additionally nominated 36 other items to be handled within the Project ENHANCE PLUS time schedule.

(TS) Subsequently, the decision was made to give the Vietnamese Marine Corps an amphibious capability and the Joint Chiefs of Staff added 30 LVTP-5 and one LVTR-1 amphibious vehicles to Project ENHANCE PLUS. These vehicles were turned over to the Vietnamese Marine Corps on 9 November and were delivered by Seventh Fleet LSTs to Saigon on 12 November.

(C) The US Naval Advisory Group title trans-



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ferred to the VNN air facilities at Tan Son Nhut and Da Nang and Loran stations at Tan My and Con Son. Similarly, advisor equipment and future TO&E equipment items were transferred during the period of ENHANCE PLUS.³⁵

VNAF SUPPORT

Force Structure Actions

(S) In October, prior to Project ENHANCE PLUS, the VNAF force structure encompassed 58 squadrons with 51 squadrons activated. The sudden influx of 619 aircraft under ENHANCE PLUS instigated a comprehensive planning process resulting in a revised VNAF FY 73-74 force structure. The initial planning considered two options: store the aircraft until the VNAF could train the required personnel or develop a transition program to absorb the more modern aircraft into the active flying inventory. The seriousness of the North Vietnamese threat dictated incorporating the ENHANCE PLUS assets into the VNAF air order of battle as rapidly as possible. The concept of operations that was developed to achieve this objective contained four essentials:

- Deactivate excess cargo aircraft.
- Redistribute VNAF personnel.
- Establish a trained VNAF instructor cadre while the USAF was still in-country.
- Provide for contract maintenance and training support after the USAF left the country.

(S) The addition of 32 C-130 aircraft to the VNAF made necessary the deactivation of five squadrons of older C-123, C-119, and C-147 transport aircraft. Aircrew and maintenance personnel derived from deactivating the five squadrons were

the basis for activating two C-130 squadrons, plus the additional F-5 and A-37 units. Additional trained personnel were obtained by a thorough review of the existing VNAF crew ratios of all weapons systems. The resulting adjustments provided a cadre of experienced crew members to man the more modern aircraft provided by ENHANCE PLUS. The resulting transition program was designed to train VNAF personnel to the maximum extent possible while USAF units were still in-country to assist and support. The goal of the program was to leave a well-trained nucleus of VNAF instructors for each weapons system received under Project ENHANCE PLUS, thereby enabling the VNAF to initiate and continue an 18 month training process. Civilian contract requirements were established to provide maintenance support and training for the additional weapons systems to support the early activations while the VNAF grew to full strength.

(S) An outline plan encompassing the entire VNAF transition program was agreed upon and jointly signed by the Chief, Air Force Advisory Group and the VNAF commander on 16 November 1972. The purpose of the plan was to establish guidance and responsibilities to bring the then existing VNAF force structure up to 66 squadrons based on the influx of ENHANCE PLUS equipment. This plan was the basis for the development of individual plans for each weapons system.³⁶

(S) Project ENHANCE PLUS provided for the transfer of aircraft to the RVNAF from USAF and third country assets. The aircraft transfer was initiated on 22 October and was completed on 18 December. Figure E-35 depicts the aircraft by type and the transfer actions.³⁷

ENHANCE PLUS AIRCRAFT TRANSFERS

ACFT	RECEIVED FROM	NO. TITLE TRANSFERRED	NO. RCVD	NO. TITLE TRANSFERRED	REMARKS
UH-1.....	ROK/RVN	286	0	27 OCT-13 DEC	286 loan to USA
CH-47.....	CONUS	23	23	27 OCT	23 storage
AC-119K.....	NKP/CONUS	22	16/6	22 OCT-1 NOV	14 loan to USAF
A-1.....	NKP/CONUS	28	19/9	22 OCT-1 NOV	
C-130A.....	CONUS	32	32	1 NOV	
A-37.....	CONUS/RVN	90	90	1 NOV	50 storage
C-7.....	RVN	4	4	27 OCT	
F-5A/B.....	CONUS/ 3d COUNTRY	118	118	1 NOV-18 OCT	Includes 2 F-5B
EC-47.....	RVN	23	23	28 OCT-8 NOV	10 loan to USAF
C-123.....	RVN	1	1	1 NOV	Loan to Air America
T-37.....	USAF/RVN	24	24	5 NOV	Storage
O-2.....	RVN	35	35	12 NOV	35 loans to USAF

NOTE: The CH-47 and T-37 were Project ENHANCE aircraft which were title transferred.

Source: AFGP

Figure: E-35

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Air Transportation

(S) Prior to implementation of Project ENHANCE PLUS, the VNAF Military Air Transportation Terminals (MATT) effort continued towards self-sufficiency in view of the US force troop withdrawals. Concurrently the transfer of aerial port operations from the USAF to the VNAF continued. The three largest USAF ports were transferred: Da Nang and Bien Hoa on 15 November and Tan Son Nhut on 2 December. The transfers included total operational responsibility as well as aerial port vehicle equipment, non-tactical radios, facilities, and administrative and personnel equipment.

(S) Immediately upon notification of the magnitude of the Project ENHANCE PLUS operation, an Air Force Advisory Group Logistics Readiness

Center (LRC) was established to monitor the massive amount of cargo to be airlifted into Vietnam. The LRC was manned with AFGP and VNAF transportation officers and non-commissioned officers to handle the varied coordination problems. Message traffic began on 26 October and within ten days over 300 messages were directed to the LRC for action. Of major importance was the introduction of rapid turn-around C-5 aircraft missions into Phan Rang and Bien Hoa Air Bases. Sixty-six A-37 aircraft were carried on 11 C-5 aircraft between 1 and 5 November and 32 F-5 aircraft on six C-5 aircraft between 2 and 5 November. Conducted concurrently was the massive C-141 airlift of vehicles and spare parts, AC-119K aircraft and spare parts, maintenance support equipment, personnel, and miscellaneous cargo (Fig. E-36).

AIRLIFTED EQUIPMENT SUMMARY

AIR BASE	TYPE CARGO	QUANTITY
Phan Rang	A-37 aircraft	66
	Aircraft support equipment	109,216 lbs
Bien Hoa	F-5 aircraft	32
	Aircraft support equipment	1,377,764 lbs
	General cargo	442,204 lbs
Tan Son Nhut	Vehicles	10
	Aircraft support equipment	301,486 lbs
	General cargo	876,173 lbs

Source: AFGP

Figure: E-36

(S) The LAC proved invaluable in monitoring the quantities of airlifted materiel. The records kept during its existence were used frequently to answer the multitude of inquiries, tracers, reports, and general questions about Project ENHANCE PLUS materiel. This was especially important, because the rapid arrival of aircraft often caused ramp saturation at a particular air base. Therefore, cargo destined for a specific base would be directed to another air base. This in turn led to cargo redistribution problems. In late December cargo was still being shuttled from base to base to get it to the proper destination.⁷⁸

C-130A Program

(S) VNAF received 32 C-130A aircraft under Project ENHANCE PLUS. At that time there were no C-130 aircraft in the VNAF inventory nor were any Vietnamese aircrews C-130 qualified. A training program was immediately established for both aircrews and maintenance personnel. C-123 squadrons were deactivated to provide crews for the C-130A training. Consequently, the 425th Transport Squadron terminated all operational missions and began the training program on 27 November, and on 11 December the 423d Transport Squadron was

deactivated. The squadron deactivations did not mean that unit integrity was maintained for the C-130 training; the best pilots from each of the C-123 squadrons were sent to the first C-130 pilot class.

(C) The idea of training flight crews in CONUS was considered and rejected because the requirements for security clearances, medical examinations, and language training would have imposed unacceptable delays. The USAF flight crew MTT, consisting of 20 officers and 26 enlisted instructors, began training eight VNAF aircrews in the first class. Twelve aircrews each were scheduled for the second and third classes. The MTT qualified 12 VNAF instructor cadre for each crew position, except that only eight navigators were upgraded to instructors. When the training concluded on 6 March, the VNAF had 32 qualified aircrews, including 12 instructor pilots, and a follow-on training capability.

(S) The provision of C-130A aircraft resulted in the deactivation of five squadrons of older C-123, C-119, and C-47 transport aircraft. Aircrew and maintenance personnel from the deactivated units were utilized in the two C-130A squadrons and the additional F-5A and A-37 units.


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(C) The USAF maintenance MTT of one officer and 14 enlisted personnel began training 408 VNAF maintenance technicians in 12 different air force speciality codes (AFSC) on 27 November. During the training course two VNAF airmen were identified in each AFSC and recycled to qualify as instructors, thus providing VNAF with a follow-on capability. A total of 583 maintenance personnel for the C-130s were ultimately trained.

(U) The quick response of the USAF and CINCPACAF to the AFGP's request for flight and maintenance MTTs resulted in the program beginning expeditiously. The VNAF personnel selected for the training were high caliber students; however, logistical and maintenance problems over which the instructors and students had no control delayed the scheduled completion of the initial flight training. Strenuous efforts were made throughout February and March 1973 to improve the parts and shop equipment maintenance situation. One C-123 squadron was temporarily retained in the VNAF inventory to offset the resulting C-130 airlift capability shortfall.

AC-119K Program

(S) The AC-119K was not part of the VNAF in-

ventory prior to Project ENHANCE PLUS. When 22 AC-119Ks were transferred to the VNAF, the early activation of a gunship unit at Da Nang Air Base was determined to be the best course of action. The USAF 18th and 86th Special Operations Wings (SOW) were tasked to provide a mobile training team (MTT) of 20 officers and 32 enlisted instructors for the flying training program. The first class began on 8 December; the second and third classes on 7 January and 7 February 1973, respectively. Each class was composed of five aircrews.

(C) In the first class five VNAF crew members with instructor potential were identified and given additional training to qualify as instructors. Upon completion of the training program VNAF would have 16 qualified crews and a follow-on training capability.

(U) When the USAF participation terminated on 2 March 1973, ten aircrews had been trained, and another five aircrews were 85 percent trained. The VNAF continued the training program which was completed in mid-March.

(C) Maintenance training was conducted by an MTT from the 6498th Air Base Wing using on-the-


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AR AC-119K

job training. A total of 132 VNAF maintenance personnel were trained by the MTT. Lear Siegler, Inc. replaced the MTT with civilian contract maintenance training personnel.¹⁰

A-37 Program

(S) By 15 November 90 A-37s had been either transferred from the USAF 8th Special Operations Squadron (808) or delivered from CONUS. This brought the VNAF total A-37 strength to 249 aircraft. VNAF and AFGP determined that expansion from seven to ten VNAF squadrons was the best course of action. By 20 November the concept for expansion had been determined. Two assumptions were inherent:

—Pilots would be available for transition into the A-37 aircraft.

—Combat commitments would be reduced during the transition period.

(U) Between 1 and 8 December, 40 O-1 and transport pilots were identified for transition to the A-37 aircraft. The first class of ten pilots began ground training at Binh Thuy AB on 18 December. Operational requirements delayed the program; however, by 23 January 14 pilots had completed training and 14 more began training on 12 March.¹¹

F-5 Program

(S) VNAF received 116 F-5As and two F-5Bs

under ENHANCE PLUS to bring the total strength to 153 F-5 aircraft. The existing 522d Fighter Squadron at Bien Hoa Air Base was divided into two squadrons to provide the nucleus for a total of six F-5 squadrons. The objective was to activate five squadrons: one immediately, two in March 1973, and two in June 1973. All squadrons initially would be activated at Bien Hoa Air Base, with one each relocating to Da Nang and Phu Cat Air Bases by 31 March 1973.

(S) The first class of six pilots began training at Bien Hoa Air Base on 30 November; the second class of eight pilots on 18 December. An additional 14 pilots were scheduled to begin training approximately every two weeks. By 23 January 28 former A-37 pilots had been trained for the F-5. Training then ceased because of operational requirements until mid-March, when 14 more started training.¹²

Helicopter Program

(C) An additional 286 UH-1H helicopters were provided to the VNAF under Project ENHANCE PLUS: 171 troop transports, 91 gunships, and 24 command and control helicopters. This resulted in the accelerated activation of units which were already planned in the force structure. Concurrently, the VNAF decided to accelerate activation of two CH-47 squadrons.

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(C) Employment of the UH-1H helicopters was as follows:

—Activate three squadrons, each containing 23 troop transports, 12 gunships, and 3 command and control aircraft.

—Activate MEDEVAC/SAR elements utilizing 108 aircraft, half of which would be gunships.

—Deploy the remaining aircraft to increase the existing squadrons from 33 to 38 aircraft and as maintenance backup.

(C) Activation Schedule:

UNIT	LOCATION	DATE
255th HS (UH-1H)	Binh Thuy AB	1 APR 73
253d HS (UH-1H)	Nha Trang AB	1 MAY 73
251st HS (UH-1H)	Bien Hoa AB	1 JUN 73
247th HS (CH-47)	Da Nang AB	15 JAN 73
249th HS (CH-47)	Binh Thuy AB	1 APR 73
MEDEVAC/SAR	Countrywide	ASAP

(C) By mid-March 1973 the CH-47 helicopters had been turned over to the VNAF; however, 146 UH-1s had been retained by the US Army to support the Four Party Joint Military Commission (FPJMC), the Defense Attache Office (DAC), and the International Commission for Control and Supervision

(ICCS). VNAF operational commitments, added to the delayed turnover of aircraft, resulted in the program being delayed.⁰³

O-2 Program

(S) VNAF received 35 O-2 aircraft in a one for one replacement for O-1 aircraft, to bring the total strength to 35 O-2 aircraft. This caused no change in the force structure and no unit activation acceleration.

(C) A training program was planned to begin shortly after the cease-fire for pilot and maintenance personnel transitioning from the O-1 to the O-2 aircraft. Training was scheduled for Da Nang Air Base with MTTs provided by the US 20th Tactical Air Support Squadron (TASS) at Da Nang AB, the 21st TASS at Tan Son Nhut AB, and the 56th Special Operations Wing at Nakhom Phanom, Thailand. USAF personnel would conduct the first class to qualify 14 VNAF instructor pilots, supervise the VNAF qualification of 14 pilots in the second class, and the VNAF would have complete responsibility for training ten pilots in the third class. Complete VNAF self-sufficiency was programmed for 45 days after the cease-fire went into effect. The plan recommended that a US civilian



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
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technical representative be provided for the maintenance program.

(C) On 20 January 1973, 13 pilots completed the first class; 13 additional pilots completed the second class in early February. Thereafter, the VNAF conducted the training, qualifying 12 pilots by the end of February. The USAF completed training 60 maintenance personnel on 20 February, which terminated the O-2 program.⁴⁷

Maintenance Support

(C) The VNAF lack of maintenance capability was identified as a major problem with respect to the influx of ENHANCE PLUS equipment. Contractor and USAF augmentation was planned to support the aircraft transfer to the VNAF and the on-the-job training of VNAF maintenance personnel.

(3) The following summary depicts the contractor augmentation required: (Clarification of terms: A contract field team (CFT) is required when the task is that of touch labor or the services are an integral part of producing a tangible end item. Contract engineering and technical services (CETS) denotes the task of elevating the skills of a second

party through instruction, training, advice, and the performance of technical assistance.)

- A-37 Program: CFT of 99 personnel; four CETS.
- AC-119K Program: CFT of 139 personnel; four CETS.
- C-130A Program: CFT of 199 personnel; two CETS.
- F-5 Program: CFT of 336 personnel; two CETS.
- UH-1H Program: CFT of 410 personnel.
- CH-47 Program: CFT of 88 personnel; two CETS.
- O-2 Program: One CET.
- EC-47 Program: CFT of 60 personnel; 36 CETS.
- T-37 Program: CFT of an unspecified number of personnel.⁴⁵

Armament and Munitions

(S) The AFGP assisted the VNAF with the receipt, storage, and accountable reporting for additional quantities of munitions and armament systems provided under Project ENHANCE PLUS. The 120 day stock level of munitions was previously identified under Project ENHANCE and delivery was accelerated under ENHANCE PLUS. In addi-

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tion to monitoring new shipments of munitions and armament systems, AFGP continued to assist the VNAF Airmunitions Directorate in programming expenditures of airmunitions to support VNAF tactical air strikes and sorties flown by 7th Air Force elements at Bien Hoa and Da Nang Air Bases.


(U) AFGP conducted daily meetings with the 7th Air Force Director of Munitions and the VNAF Chief of Airmunitions and Armament Division. These meetings covered programmed delivery of munitions, rerouting of ships to water ports to assure an uninterrupted flow of munitions through each port, lateral support between 7th Air Force and VNAF bases and the intracountry movement of munitions cargo between the ports and VNAF base storage areas. Procedures were also developed to transfer excess munitions to VNAF bases from

7th Air Force organizations in the event of a cease-fire. A weekly report was submitted to CONUS agencies which provided the complete recapitulation of receipt of munitions by type, quantity, and shipping agency.

(S) Several significant problems associated with airmunitions were:

—The quantity of munitions actually manifested on many vessels was less than the amount indicated in the programming message. This caused confusion in reconciling reports to CONUS agencies and generated many extra messages. In addition, cargo manifests and stowage plans did not precede the ships' arrival at port, thereby making it difficult to program an orderly flow of munitions at the port.

—The complete 120 day stockage objective established for ENHANCE PLUS could not be



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achieved for the CBU-55 Fuel Airmunition, MK 81 250 pound general purpose bomb and the MK 82 500 pound general purpose bomb due to limited production in the CONUS and combined expenditures by USAF and VNAF tactical forces.

—The attainment of the 120 day stockage objective was further limited due to losses of munitions stored at two ARVN depots. The munitions were destroyed by enemy forces.⁶⁶

Equipment Receipt

(C) Project ENHANCE PLUS tasked AFGP to accomplish a myriad of supply actions relative to the accelerated buildup of the VNAF inventory. Significant activities included:

—Transfer of vehicles, hospital equipment, helicopter support equipment, and advisor support equipment to the VNAF.

—Introduction of C-130 Bulk Aerial Fuels Delivery Systems (BAFDS). These systems are similar to those used with the C-123 aircraft except that they have approximately three times the capacity. Selected VNAF personnel were instructed in proper maintenance and operation of these fuel systems during a formal training course conducted in December 1972. The C-130 BAFDS were to replace C-123 Aerial Delivery Systems as the VNAF aircrews completed transition training in the C-130 aircraft.

—Receipt by the VNAF of nine R-2 refuelers and the first 35 R-8 refuelers. The action greatly increased the capability of the bases to meet the demand for efficient fuel operations.

—Receipt and storage by the VNAF of sufficient munitions, except for two types of general purpose bombs and one type of special purpose bomb, to attain their 120 day stockage objective. These munitions were moved from water ports to the nine VNAF bases and selected ARVN depots without any losses or accidents.⁶⁷

(C) Along with the buildup of aircraft a simultaneous increase in supporting aerospace ground equipment (AGE) and spares took place. The buildup began in late October with the arrival of the initial aircraft and supporting AGE and spares. It continued at an accelerated pace through 10 November and was followed by residue shipments. The equipment and materiel were shipped from various CONUS and overseas military installations and other MAP countries.

(C) Supporting AGE was shipped to the programmed bed-down base, while all spares, except for C-130A aircraft, were received at the Air Logistics Command (ALC) at Bien Hoa Air Base. Both the C-130A aircraft spares and AGE were processed at Tan Son Nhut Air Base. The huge influx of spares at ALC required the augmentation of the VNAF receipt and warehouse elements with TDY

personnel from the ALC. It was anticipated that from 60 to 90 days would be required to completely process all of the assets into the supply accounting system.

(S) A vehicle control center (VCC) was established and jointly manned by AFGP/VNAF personnel to monitor the arrival and disposition of approximately 1,350 vehicles transferred to the VNAF. The VCC insured that all vehicles were placed into active storage, depot repair, or distributed to fill existing requirements. Establishment of the VCC allowed monitoring of all vehicles arriving at both airports and seaports.⁶⁸

(C) Three USAF weather radars (AN/FPS-103) were transferred to the VNAF for use at Da Nang, Tan Son Nhut, and Binh Thuy Air Bases. The Binh Thuy radar was relocated from the Can Tho army installation, title transferred on 14 December, and installation completed on 24 December. The other two radars were transferred in place on 30 November at Tan Son Nhut and 8 December at Da Nang. The AFGP and VNAF logistics offices initiated the necessary actions to provide required spare parts and bench stocks. AFGP training for VNAF weather maintenance personnel was completed on 22 December.⁶⁹

(3) The AN/TPN-1A (Seek Point) radar was proposed as a combat required operational capability in December 1970 to provide VNAF with an all-weather bombing capability. Originally the first radar system delivery date was October 1972, which was later slipped to December. Under Project ENHANCE PLUS the first three sets were delivered to Bien Hoa Air Base on 6 November. Between 6 and 10 November a nine-man introductory team from the Tactical Air Command arrived to train VNAF ground personnel to operate the system and train the aircrews on operational procedures. On 20 December the first live bombing training was conducted.

(S) The accelerated radar deployment did not solve the VNAF lack of an all-weather bombing and air delivery system. Each of the radars required maintenance and calibration upgrading beyond the VNAF capability.⁷⁰

Aircraft Equipment Transfer From VNAF

(S) The addition of C-130A aircraft to the VNAF inventory resulted in the release of C-123, C-119K, and C-47 aircraft from the VNAF. Surplus aircraft were returned to the USAF and ferried to Clark AB as quickly as possible after inactivation of a squadron, so that the VNAF would not have to expend further maintenance resources. With the exception of one C-123 squadron which remained because of the C-130 maintenance delay, all transport aircraft had been returned to the USAF and withdrawn from Vietnam before the end of March.⁷¹

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CONUS Training

(S) The accelerated equipment deliveries and the force structure changes generated by ENHANCE PLUS had little effect on CONUS training. CONUS training was programmed far in advance because of the time required to schedule the training and to program, identify, and language qualify the students. In addition, pilot trainees were being trained in CONUS at the maximum capacity of the VNAF to provide qualified students. The FY 74 training program was not refined and approved until the annual Pacific Command (PACOM) workshop in February 1973. Thus, immediate changes to the CONUS training program were minor within the time frame of Project ENHANCE PLUS.

(S) One CONUS program that was affected was AC-119 training. On 27 October the AFGP Training Directorate was notified that because of the accelerated delivery of the AC-119K there would be no CONUS crew training for that aircraft. The departure of twenty VNAF crewmembers scheduled for 30 October was canceled.

(S) Between 7 and 9 November representatives from the CINCPAC Air Training Command (ATC)

and the Pacific Air Force (PACAF) met with members of the AFGP Training Directorate to evaluate and refine the FY74 Security Assistance Training Program. This annual workshop was concerned mainly with the training requests compiled prior to ENHANCE PLUS. However, ENHANCE PLUS activities caused a shift in priorities. The decision was made to reduce the flow of T-28 graduates to the C-47 combat crew training school (CCTS) to fill shortfalls in the T-38 classes scheduled for the F-5E CCTS. This would add 46 candidates to the T-38 training classes. Eleven other excess T-37 training graduates would be similarly shifted. These pilots would undergo T-38 undergraduate pilot training (UPT) phase III, with F-5E/A follow-on training in either Vietnam or in CONUS.

(C) ENHANCE PLUS also caused some priority revisions for future CONUS undergraduates pilot training (UPT). The accelerated F-5 deliveries created additional requirements for jet qualified UPT graduates. Therefore, over one-half of the students programmed for CONUS pilot training would attend the T-38 training program for application to the F-5 program.



Installation of additional huge POL bladders was required to support the increased aircraft inventory.

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(S) VNAF force structure changes concerning unit equipment and crew ratios would have a definite effect on the amount of CONUS training required. Were the proposed UEs and crew ratios approved, there would be a marked reduction of the original training requirements of ENHANCE PLUS, but an increase in the total amount of CONUS pilot training required. However, the FY 74 requests would not be altered to any great extent in terms of total spaces requested, because of the numbers of pilots in the program were less dependent upon the need for pilots than upon the ability of the VNAF to produce qualified students. The effects would be felt in FY 75 and FY 76 in the distribution of students between the T-37 and T-38 undergraduate pilot training, and in the probable cancellation of most CONUS combat crew training schools as the VNAF developed its own capability.⁷²

Civil Engineering

(U) Civil engineering support of Project ENHANCE PLUS was manifested in three distinct areas:

—The buildup of Bien Hoa Air Logistics Command (ALC) depot overhaul of C-130 and UH-1 aircraft, and 3rd Air Division buildup of field and organizational maintenance capability.

—Installation of additional POL tanks throughout the country to support the increased aircraft inventory.

—Reorganization of the civil engineering school to accelerate and improve the quality of student graduates. Figure E-37 lists the cost of the facility construction projects identified to support the above three areas.

ENHANCE PLUS FACILITY CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS

BASE	(\$000) COST
BIEN HOA	2,038.5
BINH THUY	135.6
DA NANG	53.0
NHA TRANG	119.9
PHAN RANG	95.7
PLEIKU	105.1
SOC TRANG	5.3
TAN SON NHUT	613.5
GRAND TOTAL	3,168.5

Source: AFGP

Figure: E-37

The POL projects at five of the bases were scheduled for construction award in April 1973 and completion in August 1973. The Bien Hoa construction and the remainder of the base projects were scheduled for construction award in March 1973 and completion in July 1973.

(U) Civil engineering support requirements for a rapidly expanding Vietnamese Air Force were being identified under Project ENHANCE prior to 26 October by the advisory team for the Air Logistics Command. ENHANCE PLUS greatly accelerated the identification of requirements and created a significantly earlier date for project completion. In short, the facility requirements were not known by the civil engineer advisors in Vietnam until the on-hand need was manifested. Therefore, the civil engineering ENHANCE PLUS mission was to greatly compress the normal time required to identify and develop requirements, program and design projects, and construct facilities by civilian contract.⁷²



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48. Same as #46, p 2.
49. Ibid., pp 3-4.
50. Ibid., pp 4-5.
51. Ibid., pp 5-6; Msg (TS), DA to COMUSMACV et al, 260320Z Oct 72, Subj: ENHANCE PLUS (U), GDS-82.
52. Same as #46, pp 6-7.
53. Ibid., p 7.
54. Ibid., pp 8-9.
55. Rpt (TS), NAVFORV, 22 Dec 72, Subj: After Action Report; Project ENHANCE PLUS (U), GDS-82.

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- 56. Rpt (S), AFGP, 3 Jan 73, Subj: ENHANCE PLUS After Action Report (U), pp 1-6, GDS-81.
- 57. Ibid., pp 56-57.
- 58. Ibid., pp 44-48.
- 59. Ibid., pp 22-28; Rpt (S), MACV, Jan 72, Subj: Measurement of Progress - Dec 72 (U), pp 2b, 2d, & 2m, GDS-81; Interview (C), LTC James R. Anderson, Air Force Division, Defense Attache Office, Saigon, by MAJ James L. Tedrick, MACV MHB, 27 Mar 73, Saigon, Vietnam.
- 60. Same as #56, pp 15-22; Same as #59, MOP Rpt (S), pp 2d, 2n; Same as #59, Interview (C).
- 61. Same as #56, pp 13-14; Same as #59, Interview (C).
- 62. Same as #56, pp 29-31; Same as #59, MOP Rpt (S), p 2; Same as #59, Interview (C).
- 63. Same as #56, pp 32-34; Same as #59, Interview (C).
- 64. Same as #56, pp 35-37; Same as #59, Interview (C).
- 65. Same as #56, pp 39-43.
- 66. Ibid., pp 49-54.
- 67. Same as #59, MOP Rpt (S), pp 2f, 2h.
- 68. Same as #56, pp 58-65.
- 69. Ibid., pp 66-69.
- 70. Ibid., pp 78-80; Same as #59, MOP Rpt (S), pp 2b, 2c.
- 71. Same as #56, pp 71-72; Same as #59, Interview (C).
- 72. Same as #56, pp 74-76.
- 73. Ibid., pp 91-93 and 103.



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COMMAND ACTIVITIES

ANNEX F

(U) There were many MACV functions which, although not directly related to the combat and combat support activities, were of vital concern to the war effort. These were primarily the prerogatives of the MACV special staff and the support elements in the Saigon area. As the US forces' phased withdrawal progressed throughout 1972, the diminishing presence of military units resulted in staff elements reorganizing and consolidating, with a corresponding shift in emphasis to providing advice and assistance to the Vietnamese. As the year

drew to a close, the imminence of the cease-fire caused an increase in the advisory tempo to accelerate and complete many programs and to prepare the Vietnamese to carry on without the US military presence. To a large extent, the success of the MACV effort depended upon the successful functioning of the special staff sections and the effective implementation of special programs in such areas as community relations, redeployment, and health services, which had great impact upon the efficiency and morale of the command.²

COMPTROLLER ACTIVITIES

MISSION

(U) The mission of the MACV Comptroller (MACCO) was to advise and assist COMUSMACV and Commanding General, USARV/MACV SUPCOM on all major aspects of the general management of the command through the maintaining of efficient finance services, budgeting, and utilization of resources for the achievement of the mission of the United States armed forces in Vietnam. MACCO provided for the conduct of audits on nonappropriated funds, internal review, program review and analysis, organization and procedures analysis, and management improvement. MACCO personnel advised the Director General, Finance and Audit (DGFA), Government of Vietnam Ministry of National Defense (MOND) on the development and execution of the national defense budget as well as on auditing, accounting, and other financial matters.

(U) On 10 November 1972 portions of MACCO and the DCSCOMPT, USARV/MACV SUPCOM were merged at MACV. As a result, four new divisions were created: Budget, Finance and Accounting Policy, Management, and Internal Review. The Vietnamese Advisory Division which had existed prior to the reorganization remained basically unchanged (Fig. F-1).¹

BUDGET DIVISION ACTIVITIES

(U) The Budget Division of the consolidated comptroller office had the mission of developing and monitoring execution of the MACV and USARV/MACV SUPCOM budgets. Specific funds monitored by the Budget Division were the Operations and Maintenance, Navy (O&M,N) support of MACV; Operations and Maintenance, Army (O&M,A) fund-

ing of Revolutionary Development (RD) cadre and MACV advisors; and contingency funds. In addition, on 1 July MACCO assumed the budget responsibility and functions of the Air Force Advisory Group.

O&M,N Support of HQ MACV


(U) In March 1972 the status of FY 72 obligations was reviewed and as a result MACV returned obligational authority in the amount of \$300,000 to CINCPAC. The new obligational authority was \$6,716,800. In May a further review was conducted; \$390,000 was returned to CINCPAC. The new obligational authority of \$6,326,800 for FY 72 was 100 percent obligated by the end of the fiscal year. In November a FY 73 new obligational authority for \$13,985,000 was received. The MACV budget request had been for \$14,281,500 or \$296,500 more than was received. The reduction did not impair or reduce support to MACV, as the first five months of FY 73 had been funded at the actual obligation rate.²

O&M,A Support of Advisor and RD Cadre

(U) During the first quarter, CY 72, the Annual Funding Program (AFP) was adjusted downward to \$7,688,000. The Command Operating Budget for FY 73 was submitted in the amount of \$23,468,000, of which \$16,468,000 was unfinanced. The significant difference from FY 72 resulted from the addition of funding responsibility for MACV Special Troops and the requirement to fund 7,545 local national employees of CORDS effective 1 January 1973. By November the Budget Execution Review (BER) for the programs funded by this budget was completed and forwarded to USARV. Results of the BER indicated that \$1.5 million was unfinanced. This amount was financed in December 1972.³

(U) The total approved Annual Funding Program (AFP) for RD cadre remained at \$28,666,000 during

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Source: MACCO

Figure: F-1

the first quarter of CY 72. The FY 73 Command Operating Budget submitted at that time was for \$30,465,000, of which \$15,165,000 was unfinanced due to a difference in expected actual strength on which the earlier Command Budget Estimate had been based. During the second quarter of CY 72, because of a more favorable exchange rate, the Annual Funding Program for RL cadre fell to \$18,526,000. By December it was completely financed.⁴

O&M,A Support of USARV

(U) The Budget Execution Review (BER) for the programs funded by this budget was completed in November 1972. It was signed by the Commander, USARV/MACV SUPCOM on 18 November and forwarded to USARPAC. The BER disclosed that the in-country budget requirement was \$118.4 million. This caused an unfunded requirement of \$18.4 million. The out-of-country budget was found to have an excess of \$13.6 million over the \$2.1 million needed. USARPAC was requested to apply the excess of \$13.6 million in out-of-country funds to the \$18.4 million unfunded in-country requirements. Approval of this transfer financed all in-country hard core requirements except \$5 million needed for the Da Lang pier retrograde.⁵

Contingency Funds

(U) There were three types of contingency funds: Army, Navy, and Official Mission Activity funds

received from USARV. At the beginning of FY 73, the Army fund totaled \$4,500 and the Navy \$5,800.⁶

FINANCIAL AND ACCOUNTING ACTIVITIES

(U) The Financial and Accounting Policy Division planned, coordinated, and issued policy guidance; and exercised staff supervision over matters concerning appropriated funds, the plaster expenditure control program, currency control, military banking facility functions, the military pay system, reports of survey, losses of funds, and other related matters concerning accounting and disbursing policy. It exercised operational control for the MACV Comptroller over the US Army Central Finance and Accounting Office, Vietnam.

Military Banking Facilities

(U) Throughout the years, as US troops were redeployed, military banking facilities terminated their operations. As of 28 January there were seven banking facilities, two conversion points, and two travelers checks selling points still open.

Currency Control

(U) MACV Directive 37-10, Conversion of Military Payment Certificates, was distributed during the first quarter. This updated procedure was for the C-Day conversions in the event there was a conversion to a new series of MPC in Vietnam.

(U) The following plaster rate changes occurred during 1972:⁷

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DATE	OLD RATE	NEW RATE
1 APR 72.....	\$VN 275.....	\$VN 410
28 APR 72.....	\$VN 410.....	\$VN 420
18 JUN 72.....	\$VN 420.....	\$VN 425
28 JUL 72.....	\$VN 425.....	\$VN 430
22 AUG 72.....	\$VN 430.....	\$VN 435
29 OCT 72.....	\$VN 435.....	\$VN 445
9 DEC 72.....	\$VN 445.....	\$VN 455
30 DEC 72.....	\$VN 455.....	\$VN 465
26 JAN 73.....	\$VN 465.....	\$VN 475

MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES

(U) On 10 November 1972 portions of the Financial Management Division, MACV Comptroller, and the Management and Internal Review Division, DCSCOMPT, USARV/MACV SUPCOM, were merged to form the Financial Management Division at MACV. The Management Division had the responsibility to maintain the organization & functions manuals for MACV and USARV/MACV SUPCOM, to perform management studies and organizational analyses, to administer the reports control program for MACV and USARV/MACV SUPCOM, to coordinate the civilian comptroller career program, and to administer the training program for the Comptroller.

Reports Control-

(U) MACV reported estimated annual savings of \$1,100,300 to CINCPAC as a result of a special review of recurring reports conducted in August and September 1972. This review resulted in the discontinuance of 39 recurring reports. As of 15 November 1972 there were 172 recurring reports required by the following agencies: MACV-105, CINCPAC-31, JCS-9, DOD-13, DA-8, and other-8.

Command Progress Report

(U) A new modified version of the Command Progress Report for the USARV/MACV SUPCOM was proposed. If approved, the report would be in narrative format and published and distributed by 30 January 1973. The new format would reduce the logistical requirements to a manageable level and supply adequate information needed by USARV/MACV SUPCOM and subordinate commanders.⁵

INTERNAL REVIEW DIVISION ACTIVITIES

(U) The Internal Review Division was formed on 10 November 1972, with the merger of the DCSCOMPT, HQ USARV/MACV SUPCOM and the MACV Comptroller. The mission of the new division was to conduct reviews, studies, and audits of operations and functions of the command and coordinate and monitor audits performed within the command by external audit agencies, the US Army Audit Agency, and the General Accounting Office.

External Audit Activities

(U) During the course of 1972 the General Accounting Office completed the following audits:

- Review of management of MPC.
- Ly Hai stevedoring contract.
- Estimates of certain dollar values of military assistance data provided by DOD to Subcommittee on Foreign Operations.

- Transportation of unaccompanied baggage.

- Impact of changes in exchange rate in pricing of US government contracts (offshoot of survey of DOD contracting activities in the Far East).

- Review of the ration supplement program for the RVNAF.

- Survey of transfer of facilities, equipment, and supplies to the RVNAF.

- Review of US assistance to Vietnam for national development.

- Survey of DOD contracting activities in the Far East.

(U) The following audits of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Audit) were coordinated and monitored by the Internal Review Division in 1972:

- Supply, stock control, and maintenance for the Free World Military Assistance Forces, Vietnam.

- Transportation and traffic management, RVNAF.

- Joint support funds.

(U) In addition USAID audit reports on two contracts with the Philco Ford Corporation were processed.

(U) The Internal Review Division, formed on 10 November 1972, performed terminal audits of non-appropriated funds.⁹

VIETNAMESE ADVISORY DIVISION (VNAD)

(U) The functions of the division included advising the Director General for Finance and Audit (DGFA), Government of Vietnam Ministry of National Defense (MOND), on financial matters; reviewing and monitoring the execution of the execution of the Government of Vietnam military budget and providing liaison between the US, the Vietnamese, and the FWMAF on assistance-in-kind (AIK) fund matters. The division also monitored the Government of Vietnam use of joint support funds contained in the defense budget.

(U) During the year the Advisory Division was involved in numerous projects designed to improve the professional competence of its counterpart organization, the DGFA. Some of the more noteworthy projects engaged in by the division were: review of RVNAF force structure; monitoring the RVNAF ration supplement program; assisting in the preparation of a new RVNAF pay and allowance manual; participating on the Joint Committee

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for RVNAF Pay Improvement; and assisting in the development of procedures for the reconciliation of personnel and payroll strengths.¹⁰

Assistance-In-Kind (AIK) Funding

(U) On 31 January 1972 the AIK function was transferred within the office of the Comptroller from the Financial Affairs Division to the Budget Branch of the VNAD. During CY 72 a total of \$VN 282,924,000 was allocated for AIK funds. These funds were used for such purposes as daily hires of indigenous personnel, payment of port handling charges at Newport, and local procurement of small purchases.¹¹

1972 Government of Vietnam Defense Budget

(U) During 1972, as in previous years, one of the major efforts of the Advisory Division was assisting in the formulation of the annual Government of Vietnam defense budget. On 10 February 1972 President Thieu signed into law the CY 72 national budget. The budget, which had been revised on the recommendation of the legislature, provided for a defense budget of \$VN 182,687,230,000.

(U) On 7 March 1972 the approved Government of Vietnam Defense Budget ceilings at the item level were furnished to the US Budget Project Officers (US BPOs) by VNAD, together with a request to update their recommendations for joint support of the defense budget. On 27 March 1972 a special package was prepared for the MACV Budget Screening Board (BSB), providing a summary of all US BPO's recommendations for change in joint support together with the complete CY 72 defense budget at item level and all associated joint support. On 29 March 1972 the US BPOs presented their recommended changes to the MACV Budget Screening Board, the effect of which was a net reduction of \$VN 1,503,942,000 from the US Mission Council CY 72 Government of Vietnam Defense Budget Guidance of \$VN 22,661,660,000 to \$VN 21,157,718,000. The principal reason for the net reduction was the reduction of budgetary ceilings for items to 100 percent by joint support, since joint support finding could not exceed the budgetary ceiling for any item. In the same meeting USAID stated that the joint support level of funding for CY 72 would probably be \$VN 86.8 billion, the highest level in the history of joint support. The increase resulted from several factors: changes in the exchange rate and major increases in the Commercial Import Program (CIP), coupled with no increase in plaster requirements from other US agencies utilizing joint support funds. The MACV BSB took the position that the additional joint support funds be utilized in the regular and Regional Forces budget chapters for pay and some allowances.

(U) On 5 October 1972 the Vice Minister signed a document approving a supplemental budget for CY 72 amounting to \$VN 21.1 billion, bring the total CY 72 Vietnamese defense budget from \$VN 182.7 billion to \$VN 203.8 billion. This increased covered costs resulting from the NGUYEN HUE Offensive. The ceiling did not include an estimated \$VN seven billion to cover a military pay raise effective 1 September 1972.

1973 Government of Vietnam Defense Budget

(U) On 5 June 1972 the Minister of National Defense signed the "Guidelines for Preparation of the 1973 Defense Budget" (CY 73 Guidelines). There were two significant changes from the CY 72 Guidelines. For the first time, defense objectives were stated. While these objectives were broad and rather nebulous, the use of objectives represented a significant advance in improving defense management. The objectives were developed by representatives from the DGFA and the General Research Office of the Ministry of National Defense (MOND). They were not staffed with any MOND agency or the Vietnamese Joint General Staff. The second significant change was the requirement that budgetary requirements be classified by objective and by priorities developed within each objective. The priorities were developed in the same manner as the objectives and had similar weaknesses. The classification of requirements during budget hearings and budgetary cutting was in line with the relative importance of each item instead of arbitrary cuts without regard to impact. Both changes were the result of advisory efforts of the Advisory Division.

(U) During the month of October 1972 the MOND recommended to the Director General for Budget and Foreign Aid (DGBFA) its CY 73 defense budget, totaling \$VN 243.4 billion. This amount did not include the estimated \$VN 28 billion required for the pay raise. The DGBFA presented the CY 73 national budget to the Government of Vietnam Cabinet Council for approval. During its review, the CY 73 defense budget ceiling was limited to \$VN 231 billion. This included \$VN 210 billion for normal budget requirements and \$VN 21 billion for the pay raise. The MACV BSB met on 28 October 1972 to reappraise the Vietnamese revised ceiling of \$VN 231 billion for the CY 73 defense budget and also to determine the joint support funding at line item level. As a result of the 28 October 1972 meeting, the MACV BSB recommended a budget ceiling of \$VN 202.7 billion, of which \$VN 97.0 was joint support funded. This recommended position was presented to and approved by the MACV Budget Advisory Committee on 13 November 1972.

(U) The proposed CY 73 national budget of \$VN 436.5 billion, which was transmitted to the National

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Assembly on 14 October 1972, was financed by government revenues and foreign assistance amounting to \$VN 281,007,281,000. The balance of \$VN 185,492,719,000 was deficit spending.¹²

Planning, Programming, and Budgeting

(U) Concurrent with formulation of the 1973 defense budget, Advisory Division personnel conducted research which demonstrated that implementation of a planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS) would facilitate progress toward the Vietnamese goal of cost efficient management. As a result of a recommendation by the Chief, VNAD, the Vice Minister of National Defense established a Joint US/RVNAF PPBS Committee to study the implementation of PPBS for CY 74. On 31 October 1972 the committee submitted a proposed program budget structure to the DGFA

and Chief, VNAD for concurrence or comment and also furnished a copy of the report to the Joint MOND Four Year Planning Committee for inclusion in its annual report. On 11 December 1972 the DGFA and Chief, VNAD approved a revision of the program budget structure which included a proposed fiscal code and the following major programs:

- Regular Ground Forces.
- Territorial Forces.
- Air Force.
- Navy.
- Logistics.
- Training.
- MOND and JGS (Administrative Agencies).

Major programs were subdivided into subprograms which were further broken down into program elements which were organizational entities.¹³

CHAPLAIN ACTIVITIES

MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

Mission

(U) The Command Chaplain provided professional advice to COMUSMACV and his staff pertaining to religion, morality, and morale incident to the commander's mission and functional responsibilities. Serving as staff chaplain, USARV/MACV SUPCOM, he directed and coordinated the commanding general's religious program and supervised the Human Self-Development Program to include developing related plans, policies, and training opportunities. He was responsible for area religious coverage and monitored mass media projects within the Republic of Vietnam.

1972 Reorganization/Drawdowns

(U) As a result of the continuing redeployment of US forces, the consolidation of the MACV and USARV Chaplains' offices was completed on 10 November 1972. Files, records, property, and personnel of the two offices were integrated and the office began to function as the Office of the Staff Chaplain, HQ USARV/MACV SUPCOM. Concurrent with the deployment of US troops there was a reduction in the number of chaplains in-country. At the end of January 1973 there were 21 chaplains assigned to the USARV/MACV SUPCOM in comparison with 152 assigned in November 1971. Chaplains remained in each of the four military regions until the withdrawal of all US troops from these regions was completed. One chaplain remained in Saigon until the date specified in the cease-fire agreement for the total withdrawal of US forces.¹⁴

1972 ACTIVITIES

Background

(U) Continuing a program developed in 1971 to ensure a cogent and contemporary ministry, in 1972 the Command Chaplain held monthly training conferences at HQ MACV. The principal topic of discussion at each session was the Human Self-Development Program, and one other relevant topic, such as "The Chaplain's Role as a Member of the Drug Team," was also included in the monthly agenda. Featured speakers during the year included MG James B. Adamson, USA, MACJ1, and BG R. J. Magillone, USAF, MACV Director of Personnel. In addition to the training conferences, chaplains periodically attended retreats, which were held at Vung Tau, and days of recollection with emphasis on spiritual renewal.¹⁵

Pastoral Activities

(U) Although greatly reduced in numbers during 1972, USARV/MACV SUPCOM chaplains continued to carry out their primary mission of ministering to the spiritual needs of US personnel assigned to Vietnam.

(U) In addition to normal religious ceremonies held on Sunday and holy days, MACV chaplains were involved in numerous other activities of a pastoral nature. Some of the more prominent of these were:

- Pre-marriage seminars for US personnel planning to marry Vietnamese nationals.
- Memorial services for US personnel killed in Vietnam, as well as for former Presidents Truman and Johnson.
- Participation with medical personnel in a drug addict rehabilitation program.
- Visits to prisoners held in US confinement facilities.
- Operation HOLIDAY, a project for the distri-

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bution of Christmas cards from religious, social, and civic organizations in the United States to military personnel in the Republic of Vietnam.¹⁶

Information Dissemination Efforts

(U) In an attempt to disseminate information of a religious nature to a widely scattered audience, staff chaplains prepared television and radio programs which were broadcast over AFVN. "Religion in the News," a 15-minute television program, was taped and presented Sunday nights at 2200 hours. The same program was broadcast on FM radio on Sunday at 0806 hours and on AM radio Sunday at 1800 hours. In addition, staff chaplains prepared daily devotional messages broadcast each morning at 0655 hours.¹⁷

Charitable Works

(U) The policy of the command was to allow each chaplain the freedom to devote his efforts to Vietnamese welfare projects located within his area of operation. Efforts of chaplains throughout Vietnam focused on monetary and material assistance to leprosariums, orphanages, clinics, schools, and churches. In these endeavors chaplains served as both coordinators and catalysts for charitable work by passing on unsolicited gifts of food, clothing, and toys, as well as monetary donations and by obtaining the wholehearted support of US personnel in carrying out various projects. In addition, special collections were taken to support specific projects. During 1972 the Command Chaplain was involved in a number of charitable projects. Among the more noteworthy were:

—The donation of wheelchairs, which were purchased with funds contributed by a church in the United States, to crippled Vietnamese war veterans.

—Providing money, materials, and labor to two orphanages that were forced to relocate as a result of the NGUYEN BUE Offensive (see the Advisory Program below for further details).¹⁸

The Advisory Program

(U) The MACV Advisory Program to the Republic of Vietnam Chaplain Directorates was established in 1965. The mission of the senior advisor was to assist and advise the three RVNAF Chiefs of Chaplains (Buddhist, Roman Catholic, and Protestant) in achieving their objectives. These were:

—To provide for the spiritual welfare of the members of the RVNAF, their dependents, widows, and orphans.

—To provide educational facilities and to build and operate schools for the dependents of military personnel.

—To provide social welfare services for military personnel, their dependents, widows, and orphans.¹⁹

(U) From late 1971 until the cease-fire, the main effort of the US advisory chaplain was to make Vietnamese chaplaincies self-sufficient by achieving

—Establish each chaplain directorate as a separate the following goals:

general department responsible to the Commanding General of the Joint General Staff (JGS) through the Chief of Staff, JGS, rather than to the General Department of Political Warfare.

—To secure enough expendable supplies for two years.

—To ensure that as American bases were turned over to RVNAF, sufficient chapels were turned over to the Vietnamese chaplaincies to handle the spiritual needs at these bases.

(U) At the time of the cease-fire the last two of these goals had been achieved; each directorate had set up a secured warehouse stocked with ample supplies of expendable and nonexpendable items; as the last US bases closed, their chapel buildings were transferred to the Vietnamese chaplain directorates. The first goal was not achieved; the chaplain directorates remained subordinate to the General Department of Political Warfare.²⁰

(U) In other related 1972 activities the advisory section engaged in charitable work, securing building materials and supplies needed by the chaplain directorates. To assist in the construction of three military dependent schools being built by the Catholic Directorate, over \$50,000 worth of material was procured through the US construction firm RMK-BRJ. To assist in the construction of the Buddhist Chaplains' School and Training Center an additional \$50,000 worth of material was procured. A dispensary for military dependents operated by the Buddhist Directorate was provided with over \$10,000 worth of pharmaceuticals.²¹

PW Camp Visits

(U) Continuing a program initiated in 1971, MACV chaplains visited Government of Vietnam PW camps on a monthly basis to ensure that the provisions of the Geneva Convention regarding religion were being complied with. While at the camps the chaplains also conducted religious services for US advisors assigned to the camps.²²

DATA MANAGEMENT AGENCY

MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

Mission

(U) The Data Management Agency (DMA), MACV, was responsible for providing automatic data

processing (ADP) services to all MACV staff elements except the MACV Director of Intelligence. The mission of DMA encompassed the three essential ADP functions outlined below.

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—DMA provided data processing support to MACV staff agencies and to other organizations in and around the Saigon area.

—As a member of the World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) for US forces, DMA was responsible for development and promulgation of joint ADP policies, procedures, and organizational guidance to subordinate commanders.

—As the senior advisor to COMUSMACV on ADP matters, DMA had an advisory role to the JGS in the development and promulgation of applicable RVNAF policies, organization, and procedures.²³

Organizational Changes

(U) Effective 1 May 1972, the Analysis and Programming Division (APD) underwent an organizational change wherein three Data System Project Offices (DSPO) were created and the Plans and Requirements Division was eliminated. The objectives of this change was to provide a structure which required fewer people while remaining responsive to customer requirements. The DSPO concept allowed each of the DSPOs to work in functional areas where each was responsible for the ADP requirements of a number of staff agencies and other military organizations. This concept also allowed the chief of each DSPO to act as liaison between the assigned staff agency and DMA, a job formerly conducted in the Plans and Requirements Division.²⁴

(U) Effective 1 November 1972 the Data Processing Division of DMA phased the IBM 360/20 computer out of operation and returned all IBM 360/20 hardware to IBM. The workload of the IBM 360/20 was assumed by special utility programs on the IBM 360/50 and by an IBM 557 punched card interpreter.

(U) Effective 1 December 1972 the Analysis and Programming Division (APD) underwent further organizational changes necessitated by the drawdown of American military forces in Vietnam. One DSPO within APD was abolished and personnel were reassigned to the remaining two DSPOs.

(U) In October 1972 DMA requested nine civilian (GS) spaces to augment the DMA military staff. These spaces were authorized in late November 1972. Because of the extended time period necessary to fill approved GS spaces, DMA took parallel action to obtain from the Computer Science Corporation (CSC) the four computer operations specialists necessary to meet DMA's ADP production requirements. CSC provided requested contractor personnel who began work at DMA in early December 1972.²⁵

DMA ACTIVITIES

(U) In addition to the daily support given to the MACV Headquarters complex, DMA extended its service to the Military Equipment Delivery Team Cambodia (MEDTC) during the second quarter of 1972.

(U) Increased military aid to the Khmer Republic necessitated ADP systems which were developed and operated by DMA to support MEDTC. These systems assisted in the effective management of the status of assets funded by Military Assistance Service Funds (MASF), provided automated support for all supply accounting and financial expenditure through MEDTC, and provided a Requisitions and Status Reporting System (RSRS) on all MASF requisitions, both outstanding and completed.²⁶

(U) The ADP capability of the USARV Data Service Center was eliminated during April and May. DMA assumed support responsibility for customers previously served by them. The support provided by DMA included operation of over 20 ADP systems covering such diverse areas as:

—Management of officer and enlisted personnel requisitions.

—Production of a USARV Command Postal Locator Roster.

—Assistance in the monitoring of status of the USARV commercial vehicle inventory.

—Compilation of statistical data concerning court martials being processed by USARV.

—Maintaining data and statistics concerning drug users within USARV.

—Maintaining data and statistics concerning prisoners of war.²⁷

(U) The Free-Flow Retrograde Cargo Movements Program was completed during the second quarter. This program allowed the 4th Transportation Command to efficiently handle a large surgence in retrograde cargo movements which occurred at about the same time they were required to reduce manpower. This computer program reduced the required clerical effort by about 50 percent, allowing the available manpower to be used more efficiently in the orderly withdrawal of US military equipment.²⁸

(U) During the third quarter, DMA continued its services to the MEDTC that were initiated in the second quarter. Systems proposed in the second quarter for the Khmer Republic were, with minor exceptions, brought into operational status. These support systems included:

—The ABC Report which provided MEDTC a monthly update and evaluation of all military equipment transferred to the Government of the Khmer Republic.

—The Khmer Republic Automated Supply System which was composed of a fund control report and a requisition and status report for control of

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Khmer supplies.

—The Military Assistance Program Equipment Authorization System which was used to manage the US Military Assistance Program to Cambodia with reference to projected needs, attrition factors, and current supplies.²⁹

(U) A new system, Projected Berthing of Ammunition Vessels, was proposed and completed by DMA during the third quarter. This system projected the berthing of ammunition vessels into specific Vietnamese ports dependent on ship tonnage, size, cargo, and expected arrival date.³⁰

(U) Members of the National Academy of Science working on studies of the herbicide programs carried out in the late 1960s were assisted by DMA personnel who provided background and historical information on the data available and the DMA participation in the herbicide program. DMA provided several programs to plot the tracks of selected herbicide flights from 1966 to 1969.³¹

(U) In July DMA assumed the responsibility for the USARV Drug Abuse System for the identification and rehabilitation of drug users. Together with this system, which was modified to run on DMA's IBM 360/50, there were also other requests for

support. One sought to identify those traits and characteristics unique to drug abusers and involved the processing of the data taken from questionnaires answered by known drug users.³²

ADP ACTIVITIES

Programmer/Analyst Training for Local Nationals

(U) Nine local national programmer/analysts completed a six-month DMA locally operated formal training course in January 1972. Along with eight programmer/analysts from the previous class, they then continued with on the job training in designing and programming various DMA system. It was anticipated that by the end of the calendar year, they would be able to work independently. They were expected to play an important role in future ADP applications in Vietnam.³³ During the second quarter three Vietnamese were given training in systems maintenance. This training provided experience in the maintenance of complex operating system software and assisted in the Vietnamization process.³⁴

(U) During the second quarter three Vietnamese were given training in systems maintenance. This training provided experience in the maintenance



Training on the IBM Model 1052 Console Printer was part of the instructional program for the Vietnamese.

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of complex operating system software and assisted in the Vietnamization process.²⁴

ADP Requirements

(U) On 1 April 1972, the MACV Chief of Staff recommended to the Chief of Staff, JGS, that a study be undertaken to determine the total RVNAF JGS automatic data processing (ADP) requirements. On 2 May 1972 the Chief of Staff, JGS, advised that a committee would be activated to study the JGS requirements. DMA representatives and the Chief of the Logistics Data Processing Center (LDPC), JGS, met and determined a timetable for the study committee activities, and the first meeting was held on 1 June 1972. Permanent members of the study group were the representatives of the LDPC, the Personnel ADP Center, the Navy Center, and the Chief, DMA. Meetings of the study group continued on a weekly basis with the main emphasis

centering on an RVNAF ADP organizational structure.²⁵

PHASEDOWN OF DMA ACTIVITIES

(U) Beginning in the third quarter, concurrent with US troop withdrawals, many of the DMA systems responsibilities were canceled. During this period the following were canceled:²⁶

- Seventh Air Force Awards System.
- AFVN Audience Survey for the MACV Office of Information.
- Secure Voice Outage System.
- Military Construction Fund Requirement System.
- Housing Management System.
- Standard JCS Geographic Location System.
- Force Redeployment Listing.
- Force Requirement and Deployment Monitoring System.
- Separated Employees Master List System.

1972 PRODUCTION STATISTICS IBM 360/50

QUARTER	NUMBER OF JOBS	METER TIME (hrs)	CPU TIME (hrs)
1st	14,889	1,813.81	1,173.72
2nd	14,298	1,725.14	959.18
3rd	13,551	1,657.38	906.59
4th	13,660	1,672.07	871.04
1972 Monthly Average	4,683	572.37	325.88
January 1973	4,537	525.46	333.75

IBM 360/20

QUARTER	NUMBER OF JOBS	METER TIME (hrs)
1st	1,293	331.34
2nd	1,001	292.90
3rd	783	259.94
4th *	108	56.24
1972 Monthly Average	319	94.0

*Excludes November and December 1972; machines returned to IBM 1 November 1972.

CALCOMP PLOTTER SYSTEM

QUARTER	NUMBER OF JOBS	CLOCK TIME (hrs)
1st	539	689.36
2nd	298	338.04
3rd	367	776.61
4th	186	311.97
1972 Monthly Average	120	176.33
January 1973	76	99.65

PUNCH CARD ACCOUNTING MACHINES

QUARTER	NUMBER OF JOBS	NUMBER OF CARDS PUNCHED	NUMBER OF CARDS VERIFIED
1st	2,731	929,011	512,400
2nd	2,694	923,230	422,641
3rd	2,414	655,900	139,351
4th	1,958	634,526	438,617
1972 Monthly Average	816	261,889	126,084
January 1973	669	143,508	107,123

Source: MACDMA

Figure: F-2

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—Ground Operations Reporting System.

(U) During December 1972, due to the drawdown of the Army Aviation Material Management Center servicing the First Aviation Brigade, two existing computer systems were transferred to the Data Management Agency. These systems, the Aircraft Inventory and Loss Report and the PEMA Replenishment Report, were received by DMA in December 1972 and modified to run on the IBM 360/50 computer. At the same time the following systems were canceled:

- Military Assistance Command Autoservocom System.
- Inspector General Complaints System.
- Military Assistance Command Automated Movement Management System.
- Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Language School System.
- Command Deadline Report.
- MEDEVAC Status Report.
- Force and Material Report.

(U) During January 1973 there were further cancellations of DMA systems. Due to the planned incremental drawdown of American forces in Vietnam and the realignment of systems the following computer systems were cancelled:

- Personnel Accounting Management System.
- Requisition Status Report.

(U) Due to the Vietnam cease-fire the following computer systems were canceled:

- Approved Recurring Reports System.
- USARV Officer Requisition System.
- MACV Officer Requisition System.

(U) Due to the Vietnam cease-fire the following computer system were canceled and transferred to the Republic of Vietnam:

- RVNAF Facilities Information and Data System.
- Medical Supply 1348-1 MILSTRIP Supply.
- RVNAF Stratification of Medical Supplies.

(U) Production statistics through January 1973 are as shown in Figure F-2.

HEALTH SERVICES³⁷

MISSIONS

(U) The US Army Health Services Group, Vietnam (USAHSVCGPV), was responsible for providing medical support to US military personnel in Vietnam. Other missions included:

- Providing backup hospitalization for the US Navy offshore, US civilians in-country, and the third country nationals employed by the US.
- Providing medical assistance to the Free World Military Assistance Forces (primarily Korean) and backup support for the RVNAF.
- Providing medical support for civilian war casualties within capabilities.
- Advising the RVNAF Surgeon General.
- Managing the medical portion of the Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) Program.

ORGANIZATION

(U) On 1 January 1972 US Army Medical Command, Vietnam (MEDCOMV), consisted of 53 subordinate units, to include five hospitals with 890 operating beds. During the course of the year, in conjunction with four incremental drawdowns, the command underwent two major reorganizations. On 1 May 1972 the JS Army Medical Command, Vietnam, was replaced by the USA Health Services Group, Vietnam (USAHSVCGPV). On 10 November 1972 Headquarters USA Health Services Group combined with the Surgeon's Office, MACV, under MACV/USARV SUPCOM and concluded the year with 14 subordinate units to include three hospitals with 180 operating beds. In addition to the 808 spaces authorized the USAHSVCGPV on 31 December 1972, 72 spaces were authorized on the MACV/USARV SUPCOM staff to operate the Drug Treatment Center and the Urine Testing Laboratory in support of the Drug Abuse Program. Additional spaces were carried by MACV to support the medical field advisory effort. Figure F-3 shows the major hospitals and medical facilities together with their

deactivate units, to include five hospitals with 890 operating beds. During the course of the year, in conjunction with four incremental drawdowns, the command underwent two major reorganizations. On 1 May 1972 the JS Army Medical Command, Vietnam, was replaced by the USA Health Services Group, Vietnam (USAHSVCGPV). On 10 November 1972 Headquarters USA Health Services Group combined with the Surgeon's Office, MACV, under MACV/USARV SUPCOM and concluded the year with 14 subordinate units to include three hospitals with 180 operating beds. In addition to the 808 spaces authorized the USAHSVCGPV on 31 December 1972, 72 spaces were authorized on the MACV/USARV SUPCOM staff to operate the Drug Treatment Center and the Urine Testing Laboratory in support of the Drug Abuse Program. Additional spaces were carried by MACV to support the medical field advisory effort. Figure F-3 shows the major hospitals and medical facilities together with their

MAJOR MEDCOM/USAHSVCGPV MEDICAL UNITS—1972-73

UNIT	DEACTIVATED OR REDEPLOYED	LOCATION
USAH SAIGON	27 MAR 73	SAIGON
3D FIELD HOSP	31 MAY 72	SAIGON
24TH EVAC HOSP	25 NOV 72	LONG BINH
61ST MED BN	17 FEB 72	DA NANG
67TH EVAC HOSP	27 MAR 78	PLEIKU
95TH EVAC HOSP	27 MAR 78	DA NANG
DRUG TREATMENT CTR	27 MAR 73	LONG BINH/SAIGON


Source: USAHSVCGPV

Figure: F-3

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**MAJOR MEDICAL UNITS
(DEC 1972)**

MED SPACES	808
OPERATING BEDS	180
EXPANSION BEDS	<u>160</u>
TOTAL BEDS AVAILABLE	340



Source: USAHSVCGPV

Figure: F-4

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status during 1972 and early 1973. Figure F-4 shows the location of the remaining major medical units in Vietnam as of December 1972.

PLANS AND OPERATIONS

(U) US Army Health Services Group, Vietnam, reduced medical assets by half during 1972 but retained a residual force of personnel and facilities to effectively accommodate the needs of the command. To insure continuity of medical service with reduced troop strengths, base closures, and the resultant shift in population centers was a complex task requiring careful planning and the ability to adjust to meet drawdown quotas, close units, and at the same time provide a viable medical support system to widely scattered troop populations.

Operation HOMECOMING (EGRESS RECAP)

(U) During the year intensive planning and coordination were dedicated to the repatriation of US prisoners of war (PWs). Many revisions were made to the existing plans in light of new guidance from DA and the availability of in-country medical

assets. Eventually the medical portion of the plan was reduced to provide only sufficient treatment to medically stabilize the PWs for their immediate aeromedical evacuation offshore.

Movement from Long Binh

(U) The movement of Headquarters USAHS-VCGPV and subordinate medical units was accomplished during the period from 11 October to 11 November. This move involved the turnover of facilities occupied at Long Binh and a relocation in the Saigon/Tan Son Nhut area. In spite of the complexity of the move, no significant problems were encountered, and the group experienced no disruption of its mission readiness.

Civilian War Casualty Program

(U) During the course of 1972, in spite of the NGUYEN HUE Offensive, it became apparent that the Vietnamese medical system was becoming more capable of handling the civilian war casualty patient load within its own system. As a direct result and in conjunction with the gradual with-



MEDEVAC provided rapid, timely transportation of wounded soldiers and civilians to treatment centers.

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drawal of US forces, the policy of maintaining 200 beds in the US system in support of the civilian war casualty program was changed to a policy of providing support as required within existing capabilities.

DUSTOFF Operations

(U) During 1972 USAHSVCGPV played a particularly active role in providing direct MEDEVAC support, not only to the US tactical units located throughout Vietnam but also to the FWMAF, RVNAF, and Vietnamese civilians. USAHSVCGPV aircraft flew a total of 11,373 missions consisting of 13,351 flight hours to evacuate 9,105 patients. The concept of the "DUSTOFF Shuttle", composed entirely of helicopter ambulances, was initiated. The sole purpose of this shuttle was to provide expeditious movement of medical personnel, medical supplies, and high priority distribution within and between the four military regions. Direct command and control was provided by the USAHSVCGPV Aviation Section (see Annex B, Air and Naval Operations).

VETERINARY ACTIVITIES

(U) The mission of the veterinary service was to protect the health of the troops and the financial interests of the government. During 1972 there was a major shift in certain functions. Among these, the military working dog strength decreased from 500 to 16, and consequently veterinary support for military dogs became a minor function. Added emphasis was given to the cyclic inspection of food items to prevent storage losses. Flour and cereal products were fumigated with phostoxin every three months to prevent storage losses. The veterinary service in Vietnam during 1972 was drastically reduced to coincide with reductions in troop strength and the closing of installations.

US CASUALTIES

(U) The completion of the withdrawal of US ground forces from Vietnam in 1972 resulted in a dramatic reduction in US casualty figures, which dropped to the lowest levels in all categories since 1964.

(U) During 1972 there were 300 US armed forces deaths due to hostile action in connection with the conflict in Vietnam. During January 1973 there were 13 additional deaths for a total of 313, which was approximately 23 percent of the 1971 total when 1,380 such deaths were reported (Fig. F-5). Deaths of US armed forces personnel not as a result of hostile action totaled 271 in 1972 through January 1973, which was approximately 28 percent of the 1971 total of 968 (Fig F-6). There were 1,267 US armed forces personnel nonfatally wounded dur-

ing 1972 and January 1973, as compared with 8,936 in 1971. Approximately 47 percent of those wounded required hospital care (Fig F-7).

PREVENTIVE MEDICINE

(U) In general, the health of the command remained excellent during 1972. The hospital admissions rate was 393.8 per 1000 troops per annum. This was a significant decrease from the 436.9 rate of 1971. This rate appeared to be comparable to the anticipated army-wide experience for 1972. The command was proud of this experience, due to the fact that Vietnam was notorious as a area containing many health hazards. Analysis of the medical statistical data compiled during the years of conflict in Vietnam reflected the historical trends and military highlights of the period. The disease admissions rate remained relatively stable during the past five years. As will be noted below, specific disease experiences fluctuated depending on the military activity occurring during a particular period of time. The injury rate for both nonhostile and hostile activity reflected a persistent decline over the past five years. Of commendable note was the nonbattle injury rate which was anticipated to increase as hostilities involving the command decreased and the withdrawal phase accelerated. However, this was not the case. A compilation of medical statistical data for the past five years is reflected in Figure F-8.

Veneral Disease

(U) The veneral disease rate for the command continued to increase over the past five years. Although the rising trend in veneral disease has been a worldwide phenomenon, it also has a unique significance to the historical aspect of military history. As US combat participation in Vietnam declined, the VD rate increased. This rate was always observed to be higher in support personnel than in the combat troops. The total VD rate for the command increased to a peak of 1068.7 cases/1000/annum in August 1972, and then began a progressive decline. Gonorrhea was consistently the disease of highest prevalence.

Infectious Hepatitis

(U) The infectious hepatitis experience was highest in the command during 1972, with a rate of 10.7 cases/1000/year. The major portion of the cases was unrelated to a common source. The relationship of drug abuse to hepatitis has consistently been difficult to ascertain. Clinicians treating patients estimated that one-tenth of all infectious hepatitis cases were proven to be drug related. This estimate is probably valid as the rise in this disease incidence coincided with the drug abuse situation.

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US DEATHS RESULTING FROM ACTION BY HOSTILE FORCES

YEAR	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	TOTAL	CUMULATIVE
1961.....	5	-	-	6	11	11
1962.....	17	-	-	14	31	42
1963.....	45	3	9	21	78	120
1964.....	118	1	2	26	147	267
1965.....	898	75	335	61	1,369	1,636
1966.....	3,073	120	1,681	134	5,008	6,644
1967.....	5,443	311	3,452	172	9,378	16,022
1968.....	9,333	464*	4,618	177	14,592	30,614
1969.....	6,710	295**	2,254	155	9,414	40,028
1970.....	3,508	88	533	92	4,221	44,249
1971.....	1,269	21	41	43	1,380	45,629
1972.....	172	47*	11	70	300	45,929
1972						
JAN.....	16	-	-	-	16	
FEB.....	15	2	-	1	18	
MAR.....	11	-	-	8	19	
APR.....	30	7*	1	15	53	
MAY.....	24	2	-	15	41	
JUN.....	18	3	3	7	31	
JUL.....	27	2	4	3	36	
AUG.....	4	2	2	5	13	
SEP.....	2	-	-	3	5	
OCT.....	21	26	-	1	48	
NOV.....	3	-	1	1	5	
DEC.....	1	3	-	11	15	
TOTAL.....	172	47*	11	70	300	
1973						
1-27 JAN.....	2	1	1	8	12	
28-31 JAN.....	1	-	-	-	1	
JAN (Total).....	3	1	1	8	13	45,942

* Includes 1 Coast Guard Member.
 ** Includes 3 Coast Guard Members.

Source: OSD (DIO)

Figure: F-5

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US DEATHS NOT THE RESULT OF ACTION BY HOSTILE FORCES

YEAR	ARMY	NAVY	MARINE CORPS	AIR FORCE	TOTAL	CUMULATIVE
1961.....	2	-	-	-	2	2
1962.....	10	3	5	3	21	23
1963.....	27	1	1	7	36	59
1964.....	29	6	2	11	48	107
1965.....	164	19	115	61	359	466
1966.....	665	124*	176	80	1,045	1,511
1967.....	1,004	257**	318	101	1,680	3,191
1968.....	1,257	134	428	100	1,919	5,110
1969.....	1,460	137	442	74	2,113	7,223
1970.....	1,475	127	154	88	1,844	9,067
1971.....	854	33	37	44	968	10,035
1972.....	198	32	2	29	251	10,296
1972						
JAN.....	26	-	-	2	28	
FEB.....	26	4	-	2	32	
MAR.....	25	-	-	5	30	
APR.....	22	1	-	3	26	
MAY.....	32	4	1	2	39	
JUN.....	31	6	-	3	40	
JUL.....	11	4	-	1	16	
AUG.....	7	6	-	7	20	
SEP.....	8	3	-	2	13	
OCT.....	5	-	-	-	5	
NOV.....	2	2	-	1	5	
DEC.....	3	2	1	1	7	
TOTAL.....	198	32	2	29	251	
1973						
1-27 JAN.....	1	6	-	1	8	
28-31 JAN.....	-	2	-	-	2	
JAN (Total).....	1	8	-	1	10	10,306

* Includes 2 Coast Guard Members.

** Includes 134 deaths resulting from fire on USS Forrestal.

Source: OSD (DIO)

Figure: F-6

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US NONFATAL WOUNDS by Hospital Care Required and Not Required

YEAR	ARMY		NAVY		MARINE CORPS		AIR FORCE		TOTAL	
	Reqd	Not Reqd	Reqd	Not Reqd	Reqd	Not Reqd	Reqd	Not Reqd	Reqd	Not Reqd
1961.....	1	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	1
1962.....	40	84	-	-	1	-	-	3	41	37
1963.....	206	175	1	-	6	5	5	13	218	193
1964.....	481	410	-	25	25	14	18	68	522	517
1965.....	1,965	1,674	53	171	1,241	759	49	202	3,308	2,806
1966.....	10,030	8,544	224	497	6,186	4,124	86	402	16,526	13,567
1967.....	18,270	15,302	864	1,476	13,088	12,437	148	439	32,370	29,654
1968.....	27,405	32,433	1,382	1,577	17,853	11,436	209	575	46,799	46,021
1969.....	21,811	28,732	1,098	1,457	9,890	6,722	141	365	32,940	37,276
1970.....	11,947	13,247	393	519	2,782	1,493	89	173	15,211	15,432
1971.....	4,272	3,780	110	136	309	176	76	77	4,767	4,169
1972.....	371	379	81	35	29	36	106	184	587	634
1972										
JAN.....	83	50	1	1	-	-	1	5	85	56
FEB.....	60	66	3	2	-	-	2	10	65	78
MAR.....	32	33	-	1	-	1	16	9	40	44
APR.....	67	65	13	10	3	6	22	18	105	99
MAY.....	37	34	-	1	1	9	6	32	44	78
JUN.....	26	37	1	10	1	7	12	15	40	69
JUL.....	22	23	-	-	14	5	3	16	39	44
AUG.....	14	22	-	4	5	3	4	44	23	73
SEP.....	9	6	1	3	4	2	-	14	14	25
OCT.....	12	28	35	2	1	-	2	9	50	39
NOV.....	4	7	24	-	-	-	8	3	36	10
DEC.....	5	8	3	1	-	3	30	9	38	21
TOTAL.....	371	379	81	35	29	36	106	184	587	634
1973										
1-27 JAN.....	3	8	2	5	3	-	4	17	12	30
28-31 JAN.....	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	3
JAN (Total).....	4	11	2	5	3	-	4	17	13	33

Source: OSD (DIO)

Figure: F-7

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MEDICAL STATISTICAL DATA, USARV/MACV, 1968-1972 (Per Thousand Troops Per Annum)

ADMISSIONS (Inop & Qtrs)	1972	1971	1970	1969	1968
Total Admissions.....	393.8	436.9	440.9	464.6	523.4
Disease.....	359.6	356.8	327.9	304.9	327.0
Nonbattle Injury.....	25.1	46.7	61.0	61.9	70.1
Battle Injury.....	8.6	26.0	52.0	85.9	126.4
Fever of Unknown Origin.....	15.9	38.0	72.3	57.7	56.7
Viral Hepatitis.....	10.7	8.9	7.4	6.0	8.5
Malaria.....	4.2	16.5	23.3	20.0	25.4
Upper Respiratory Infection.....	16.1	36.1	32.1	24.0	26.8
Influenza.....	1.1	4.7	6.4	5.4	5.6
Pneumonia.....	3.1	4.7	5.1	4.7	4.1
Tuberculosis.....	0.1	0.04	0.1	0.05	0.04
Other Respiratory Infections.....	2.1	1.6	1.3	1.0	0.3
Gastroenteritis.....	13.4	46.5	34.4	31.2	38.2
Bacillary Dysentery.....	2.1	1.3	1.5	1.4	2.0
Amebiasis.....	0.5	0.4	1.3	1.6	1.3
Dermatologic Disease.....	18.4	32.6	31.7	17.9	22.0
Psychosis.....	4.0	2.7	3.9	3.3	1.7
Psychoneurosis.....	1.8	10.1	3.3	1.8	2.0
Other Neuropsychiatric Disorders.....	6.9	20.9	17.0	10.0	9.1
GENERAL DISEASE (Outpatient)					
Total.....	708.4	322.1	223.7	186.9	184.8
Syphilis.....	5.4	2.1	2.7	1.8	1.8
Gonorrhea.....	631.6	282.3	204.4	169.0	166.2
Other VD.....	71.5	37.7	16.6	16.1	16.8

Source: USAHSVCGPV

Figure: F-8

Malaria

(U) The malaria rate for the command showed a persistent annual decline since 1968. The malaria incidence for 1972 diminished to 4.2 cases per 1000. This was more a reflection of the withdrawal of combat troops from the field environment than it was the improved utilization of chemoprophylaxis and individual protective measures.

Rabies

(U) The threat of rabies to the health of the command continued to mount during 1972 and culminated in the first case of human rabies in the Army being reported in December. The increase of rabies in the animal population in Vietnam was the direct result of two factors. Concurrent with the accelerated withdrawal of US forces personnel there was a marked increase of stray dogs and abandoned pets on and near US military compounds. The second factor contributing to the increase of rabies in Vietnam was the absence of an effective rabies control program by the civilian government. The provost marshal routinely had teams apprehending

and eliminating stray animals on military compounds. With the advent of the current rabies crisis, such endeavors increased significantly. The staff veterinarian assisted the Vietnamese Government in organizing an effective rabies control program. It was anticipated that these efforts would effectively reduce the threat of rabies.

Other Disease Rates

(U) Immersion foot, diarrheal disease, and skin disease all declined as the troops were returned from the field to a garrison environment.

DENTAL ACTIVITIES

(U) The dental support throughout Vietnam was provided on an area basis by supplementing dental personnel assigned to hospitals and dispensaries with personnel from the dental detachment. This ability to shift personnel to meet dental requirements as they developed throughout the country was essential to the maintenance of a favorable dentist to patient ratio during the year. As the withdrawal of US forces continued throughout the year with a concomitant reduction in dental spaces, level

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The Drug Abuse Research Program sought to determine the causes and symptoms of wide scale drug abuse.

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capability was maintained at a favorable level by retaining dental officer spaces at the expense of enlisted spaces and then hiring local national dental technicians to replace the enlisted specialists. By using this technique, military space savings were realized with no reduction in the quality of dental care provided. Preventive dentistry measures were undertaken through the Army Oral Health Maintenance Program throughout the country with varying degrees of success.

DRUG ABUSE PROGRAM

(U) One of the most significant contributions of USAHSVCGPV was the Drug Abuse Research Program. This program was continued until the Drug Research Team was deactivated 15 October 1972. The program received intense attention, not only at USARV and MACV but also at the De-

partment of the Army and Department of Defense. The data obtained greatly assisted in the improvement of the Department of Defense Drug Abuse Program in the US armed forces worldwide. The primary goals of the program were to investigate the two following aspects of heroin abuse: (1) socio-psychological aspects of the soldier identified as a heroin abuser in the Republic of Vietnam; (2) patho-physiological aspects of heroin dependency, tolerance and abstinence. The long term goals of the program were to provide information which would assist in prevention of another widespread use of illicit drugs among US military personnel and to gain a better understanding of heroin addiction and abstinence through the clinical and laboratory data obtained in studying heroin-dependent individuals.

INFORMATION AND THE PRESS

THE OFFICE OF INFORMATION

Mission

(U) The principal responsibilities of the MACV Office of Information (MACOI) were to provide maximum information to the public concerning the activities and operations of the US forces in Vietnam, consistent with security requirements, and to provide a vigorous and substantive command information program of news and feature material for the uniformed serviceman. As a member of the COMUSMACV personal staff, the Chief of Information was the principal advisor to the commander on all public and command information matters.

(U) Throughout 1972 the mission of MACOI remained unchanged. In spite of the accelerated decline in US assets and resources in the Republic of Vietnam and the diminishing US combat role, the pressing demands of news correspondents remained high and, in fact, increased substantially in the first few months of the NGUYEN HUE Offensive.

(U) In fulfilling its responsibilities to provide information, MACOI dealt with an average of 366 correspondents monthly. These correspondents represented both US and international news gathering organizations in all media, including printed matter, still picture, radio, television, and motion picture. The monthly number of correspondents ranged from a low of 287 in March to a high of 434 in May. In addition to providing news, the office was also charged with the general support of correspondents in arranging the accreditation, transportation, messing, and billeting of newsmen in the field.

Organization

(U) As of 1 January 1972 the MACV Office of Information was organized along functional lines

with four support divisions:

—The Public Information Division (PID) was charged with all external information, including public release of information to correspondents and daily dealings with the press corps.

—The Command Information Division (CID) was charged with monitoring all internal information programs of the various component commands and publication of the MACV weekly newspaper, The Observer.


—The American Forces Vietnam Network (AFVN) was charged with providing radio and television programs of news and entertainment for the US military personnel in the Republic.

—The Information Advisory and Accreditation Division (IAAD) was charged with handling the MACV accreditation of all correspondents and logistical support of the press corps in all areas other than the dissemination of the news.

Public Information Division

(U) Throughout 1972 a MACOI public affairs briefer (command spokesman) continued to meet with the Saigon press corps at 1315 hours daily, Monday through Saturday, at a formal press briefing at the National Press Center, Saigon. The MACV evening release communique, published by MACOI, was distributed to correspondents each afternoon (including Sundays) at the National Press Center. Although the Saigon press corps increased in membership during April and May, and press interest in the NGUYEN HUE Offensive reflected the additional public interest in the Vietnam conflict, it was not necessary for MACOI to conduct a Sunday briefing at the National Press Center. The final MACOI Evening News Release was issued

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The American Forces Vietnam Network studio and transmitter in Saigon.

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to the Saigon press corps on the evening of 28 January 1973.

Command Information Division

(U) The authorized MACV newspaper, The Observer, continued to be published throughout 1972 by the MACOI staff. Because of editorial staff reductions, the frequency of publication was reduced from weekly to semi-monthly on 1 September 1972. The MACOI staff provided composing machine support and layout assistance for the 7th Air Force News until 1 October 1972. All other unit publications were terminated during the first half of 1972 because of unit redeployments and personnel assignments. Vietnamese employees who were previously employed as composing machine operators were retrained to perform news editing, news layout, and secretarial functions in the various MACOI divisions and other agencies with the headquarters. The final edition on The Observer was published on 27 January 1973. It was a brief summary of US military involvement in Vietnam.

American Forces Vietnam Network

(U) The American Forces Vietnam Network deactivated several detachments in conjunction with the continued American withdrawal from Vietnam. In February 1972 the detachments at Qui Nhon and Hue were deactivated and the equipment was turned over to the Government of Vietnam. The American troops in the area continued to receive news and entertainment via unattended AM transmitters. In April 1972 the AM transmitter at Red Beach near Da Nang was turned over to the Government of Vietnam, and a new station was opened at Da Nang Air Base. Also in April the detachment at Cam Ranh Bay was deactivated and the television van was moved to Nha Trang where it became operational in June. All regional live television programming was discontinued during June, with only the key station in Saigon broadcasting live programs.

Information Advisory and Accreditation Division

(U) Throughout the course of US involvement in Vietnam, MACOI provided support and logistic services to the members of the accredited press corps. Some of the services such as transportation, messing, billeting, and vehicle support for newsmen covering operations with forces in the field were considered necessary to assist the press in properly performing its responsibility for reporting the war. Other support services, such as military exchanges, officers clubs, and postal privileges, although not necessary for the press to do its job, were considered minimal personal convenience services that could be provided without taxing the military support system.

(U) Some of the services previously provided members of the accredited press corps were reduced in scope as the year progressed due to the drawdown in US resources and personnel. Air travel, previously scheduled for correspondents, was changed to space available travel only. Field press centers were discontinued and the staffs of information offices in the field were also significantly reduced.

ACTIONS AGAINST NEWS CORRESPONDENTS

(U) Three news correspondents were cited in 1972 for unprofessional conduct in the Republic. Under the provisions of MACV Staff Memorandum 360-1, 21 April 1970, as changed, COMUSMACV appointed a board of officers to investigate each allegation of misconduct and to make appropriate recommendations.

(U) On 21 April 1972 an ad hoc board met to make recommendations concerning suspension or discreditation of Mr. Alan Dawson, UPI correspondent. The board was convened at the direction of the MACV Acting Chief of Information after a consultation with the Minister-Counselor for Press Affairs, US Embassy, Saigon. Following a review of all available evidence, the board found that Mr. Alan Dawson had violated MACV ground rules by releasing under his by-line a story which dealt with a troop movement while the operation was taking place. The board recommended that Mr. Dawson's accreditation be withdrawn for a period of 45 days. The Chief of Information concurred with the recommendation, which was approved by COMUSMACV.³⁴

(U) In a letter dated 4 May 1972, Mr. Arthur Higbee, UPI Manager for Vietnam, announced his intention to appeal the suspension of accreditation on behalf of Mr. Alan Dawson. Mr. Higbee contended that the confusion surrounding the actual author of the material released under Mr. Dawson's by-line should be sufficient grounds to revoke the suspension imposed on 27 April 1972. Mr. Higbee further contended that if the suspension could not be dropped completely, then either the on-scene reporter, Mr. Kellerman, the actual writer, Mr. Okuley (who was a temporary, unaccredited employee at the time of the incident), or he himself as the responsible bureau chief should be suspended instead. The appeal board met and recommended that Mr. Dawson's suspension be revoked. It further recommended that Mr. Higbee be informed that in all future ground rule violation cases where the exact responsibility could not be established and where a specific wire service moves a story without MACOI clearance, the bureau chief would be held responsible and action would be initiated against him. COMUSMACV approved the board's view.³⁵

(U) In another case the accreditation of Saigon Associated Press Bureau Chief Richard Pyle was

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suspended for two months effective 12 July by the Government of Vietnam. Pyle conceded that the Associated Press had violated the embargo concerning ARVN counteroffensive activities in Quang Tri Province, but said he and his deputy had been absent from the AP office when the violation occurred and that it was simply an unfortunate mistake for which he had apologized. When he was pressed by ARVN information officials to provide the name of the AP staffer guilty of violation of the embargo, he refused and argued that as bureau chief he felt that he should take the full responsibility. After reconsideration, Vietnamese officials decided to suspend his accreditation for a period of two months, which was accompanied by an automatic MACV suspension.⁴⁰

(U) In the last case the ad hoc board met on 19 August to make recommendations concerning the suspension or discreditation of Mr. Arthur Higbee, Bureau Chief, United Press International. The board was convened at the direction of the MACV Acting Chief of Information. Following a review of all available evidence, the board found that on 13 August Mr. Arthur Higbee violated the MACV ground rules by releasing a story concerning a downed US aircraft prior to the termination of search and rescue operations and prior to the official release of this information by MACOI. The board, by a unanimous vote, recommended that Mr. Higbee's accreditation be suspended for a period of 30 days. The Chief of Information concurred with the recommendation and it was approved by COMUSMACV.⁴¹

(U) These three actions in 1972 (Mr. Dawson's case was reversed by appeal) raised the total to 78 correspondents who either had been debarred from US military facilities, or had received temporary or permanent suspensions of accreditation between early 1967 and 1 November 1972. The reasons for withdrawals included such acts as unprofessional conduct, dealings on the black market, falsified documents, misrepresentations, failures to meet just financial obligations, subversive activities, money manipulations, and violations of the MACOI and Government of Vietnam ground rules governing release of information.

SPECIAL INFORMATION ACTIVITIES⁴²

Drug Information Program and Alcohol Abuse

(U) During 1972 the Drug Abuse Program was continually publicized through the command newspaper, The Observer, and through the facilities of AFVN. One to three feature articles on drug abuse were published in each issue of The Observer or during this period. Numerous other DOD-furnished information pamphlets, booklets, and "Commander's Notes" were used to provide additional information on drugs. Beginning in November 1972, The Observer staff

increased the emphasis on alcohol abuse information. As the number of troops decreased and the average age of members of the command increased, it was felt that there was a greater need for information on alcohol problems.

Absentee Voting

(U) To encourage participation in the November national elections MACOI conducted an extensive program of voting information. The Observer staff produced a total of 17 full page articles and 20 separate articles and notices on absentee voting procedures in all 50 states. A MACOI staff officer, designated Command Voting Officer, provided applications for absentee ballots and instructions on completion of the applications. AFVN provided considerable support of the absentee voting program in a series of highly innovative and appropriate spot announcements and special program broadcasts to generate interest in the election.

Operation HOMECOMING

(U) MACOI was tasked with exclusive responsibility for public affairs in all Phase I Operation HOMECOMING activities in the Republic of Vietnam. The Chief of Information, MACOI, reported directly to COMUSMACV, acted as sole command spokesman, and received guidance from CINCPAC and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. MACOI was responsible for coordination of all the services' public affairs in the Republic of Vietnam, and also coordinated and supervised public affairs photo support.

(U) During the planning stages MACOI participated in planning conferences, maintained close coordination with JPRC, MAC, DP, and USARV and prepared contingency plans for Operation HOMECOMING. A public affairs project officer was appointed in July 1972 within the MACOI staff. Duties of the project officer included preparing plans, monitoring message traffic and related Operation HOMECOMING information, and providing briefings and query responses for the media. Inclusion of the project officer in planning activities insured that the Chief of Information was apprised of all developments. MACOI further provided guidance for separate service public affairs officers and photographic units and planned HOMECOMING operations. Direct coordination between MACOI and regional assistance commands began in the fall of 1972 through staff visits and frequent exchanges of information.

(U) Events and circumstances upon implementation of the cease-fire caused considerable revision of initial planning. The operation of a Joint Information Bureau (JIB) was eliminated, as the transfer of returnees was accomplished with absolute minimum of time in the Republic of Vietnam. Photo opportuni-

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ties for the press were emphasized and accomplished under the direction of MACOI. Documentary photography and tapes were provided throughout the returnee reception and transfer procedures by Detachment 2, 601st Photo Squadron, USAF. Upon implementation of Operation HOMECOMING, activities were conducted by MACOI on 11 and 12 February 1973 in the sequence indicated:

11 February 1973

—"Callout" notification passed to media represen-

tatives advising them of time and place for transport to Tan Son Nhut to witness transfer of returnees.

—MACOI project officer and three man documentary photo team to accompany reception party briefed and prepared to depart.

—Coordination with 7th AF, RVNAF, and 701st MP Battalion accomplished to designate press area at Tan Son Nhut.

—Coordination with 7th AF to provide press conference accomplished.



CPT Robert T. White, USA, the last prisoner released by the Viet Cong, boards a C-9A Nightingale at Tan Son Nhut AB on 1 April 1973. Looking on are MG John E. Morrey, The Defense Attache, and members of the press corps.

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—Coordination with transportation agency for four 40 passenger busses for media accomplished.

—Coordination with Detachment 2, 601st Photo Squadron to insure documentary coverage of all phases of operation accomplished.

—Coordination with US Embassy accomplished.

—MACOI staff members organized for support of operation.

12 February 1973

—Project officer and a three man documentary nated transport and escorted media to Tan Son Nhut.

—Chief, PID of MACOI operated office at HQ MACV, maintained contact with HOMECOMING Operations Center, and provided query responses to media not physically at Tan Son Nhut.

—The Chief of Information, assisted by 7th Air Force IO staff and other MACOI personnel, controlled press activities at Tan Son Nhut; maintained contact with the US Embassy, Saigon, CINCPAC, OSD (PA), and COMUSMACV; and released information to media as it became available. Supervised official photography activities and briefed reception

team members upon return from Loc Ninh as to information which should be discussed at press conference. Designated members of press corps to attend press conference.

—CO, Det 2, 601st, collected all film and transferred it to PA Project Officer from Clark AFB to accompany returnees there.

—MACOI project officer provided Loc Ninh film to PA Project Officer from Clark AFB.

—Chief of Information introduced to the press conference CG, Force ALFA, the MACOI project officer and the CO, Aviation Company. The conference, conducted for approximately 20 minutes, was attended by 43 members of the Saigon press corps and included representatives from CBS, NBC, ABC Radio & TV, UFI, AP, Reuters, BBC, NY Times, LA Times, Chicago Tribune, London Times, London Daily Express, Ashai Shimbun, Washington Post, Newsweek, Time, US News and World Report, and other leading news agencies. A similar sequence of activities with respect to subsequent phases of Operation HOMECOMING, was performed by MACOI during the remainder of the post-cease-fire period.

INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIVITIES

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

Mission

(U) The MACV Inspector General (MACIG) was responsible for inquiring into and reporting on matters relating to the performance of the mission, state of discipline, efficiency, and exercise of economy of the command; for conducting inspections, investigations, surveys, visits, and studies; and for receiving, investigating, and reporting on allegations, complaints, and grievances of individuals and agencies. In addition, he was the principal US advisor to the IG, RVNAF.

1972 Reorganization

(U) The MACV force level reduction resulted in the steady decline in authorized strength of the MACIG office throughout the year. It was, however, authorized to exceed its JTD authorization and was reduced gradually by the process of attrition. This insured the successful completion of the many IG activities underway during 1972.

(U) Two organizational changes occurred: the Complaints Division was abolished by merging it with the Investigations Division on 1 May 1972, and the Inspections Division was combined with the Investigations Division on 23 October 1972. As of 31 December the IG office consisted of the Investigations/Inspections Division and the Advisory Division.⁴³

INSPECTIONS DURING 1972

Inspections and Audits

(U) During 1972 the Inspections Division, MACIG, conducted special inspections and audits in accordance with MACV Directive 20-1. The results provided the command with an impartial appraisal of mission accomplishment, the state of discipline, and the efficiency and economy of subordinate commands, installations, and activities. Special inspections and audits were conducted on a scheduled basis. Initially, COMUSMACV directed pre-Tet security inspections of units down to company and detachment levels. Twenty-three two-man teams inspected 468 units between 24 January and 5 February 1972. In late January the inspection of all province and division advisory teams by 30 June was directed. This schedule was interrupted as the NGUYEN HUE Offensive caused inspections of two regional assistance commands and several province and division advisory teams to be deferred. The area logistics command advisory team inspections were substituted in their place.⁴⁴

(U) The general scope of the inspections included personnel management; wear and discipline; unit administrative procedures; operation and efficiency of postal services; sanitation; intelligence; training; security of classified documents; operational readiness; and logistical matters to include maintenance,

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adequacy of support, management of resources, and economy of operation. In addition, throughout the year COMUSMACV designated special subjects of interest. These included management and control of nonappropriated fund activities, land use concurrence and lease agreements between US and Vietnamese agencies, local national overtime, and administration of the plaster conversion program.

(U) During the third quarter, increased emphasis was placed on the individual fulfillment of advisory responsibility. The scope of inspections and audits of open messes and special funds included the supervision, administration, operation, internal controls, and validation of the financial statement of funds. These inspections were reinstated from the schedule deferred during the second quarter as a result of the NVA invasion. They included three major headquarters: Delta Regional Assistance Command, Third Regional Assistance Command, and MACV Special Troops.⁴³

(U) A new concept of combined inspections was initiated during the third quarter. The schedule was adjusted so that advisory detachments and the corresponding Vietnamese units were inspected simultaneously by officers from the MACIG Advisory Division and RVNAF inspectors. Additional insight into the performance of the advisory mission was received because both US efforts and Vietnamese efforts were concurrently reviewed; only the results of the US effort were reported.⁴⁴

(U) Another concept employed for the first time was unannounced reinspections. The first occurred during the period 25 to 27 September 1972, when two assistant ICs visited the 2d Area Logistics Command Advisory Team, Advisory Team 8. The inspection inquired into the adequacy and currency of corrective actions taken on the previous IG inspection. This reinspection indicated that Team 8 had taken proper corrective action and had accurately reflected this action in their indorsement with only minor exceptions.⁴⁵

(U) During the fourth quarter inspections were completed of the two regional assistance commands deferred earlier because of the NVA invasion. The inspections revealed that the First and Second Regional Assistance Commands were accomplishing their missions in an excellent manner.⁴⁶

(C) On 15 November 1972 COMUSMACV directed MACIG to monitor planning and preparation for implementation of redeployment of personnel and equipment, as well as the transfer of equipment and facilities to the Government of Vietnam in the event of a cease-fire. This was to be accomplished in two phases. Phase one consisted of MACIG personnel deploying to subordinate commands to monitor Project ENHANCE and to examine redeployment planning and identify problem areas that could prove

to be disruptive when implementation was ordered. Phase II was to be the deployment of composite MACV assistance teams to assist in planning and preparation for redeployment operations.⁴⁹

(U) MACIG inspection teams were deployed to the four military regions in late November. Results of these visits indicated that Project ENHANCE material was being properly accounted for, maintained, and stored. Redeployment planning was ahead of schedule and adequate guidance had been provided by higher headquarters. No problem areas were found which would disrupt implementation.

(C) On 8 December 1972 MACIG was informed that COMUSMACV was particularly concerned about the following aspects of the cease-fire retrograde operations: property disposal; transfer of facilities, equipment, and supplies; black marketing; drug abuse; and nonappropriated funds. A MACIG plan for monitoring these areas was approved by COMUSMACV on 14 December. MACIG teams then deployed to the field to monitor these activities.

(C) An initial report was submitted to COMUSMACV on 10 January 1973, and subsequent reports were projected for 7 February 1973, and 22 February 1973. Early in the development of this project it became evident that the component commands would deploy assistance teams which obviated the need for similar MACIG teams. Consequently, Phase II was not fully implemented.

(U) The project of monitoring the retrograde of the command from the Republic was the last major project of MACIG. The phaseout of MACIG personnel was carefully planned to provide coverage of all COMUSMACV interest areas for as long as possible.

Inspector General Visits

(C) The Visits Branch, as part of the Inspections Division, continued to make MACV Inspector General visits to subordinate elements of the US Military Assistance Command in Vietnam. The purpose of these visits was to assess the effectiveness of the functioning of command within selected units. These visits provided a means of informing COMUSMACV and the chain of command of the effectiveness of units and their commanders, in compliance with COMUSMACV's message to the field on 26 May 1971.

(C) In March 1972, after nine months of concentrated effort in the area of inspector general visits to units, the Chief of Staff notified MACIG that the program had served its intended purpose of assessing the effectiveness of the functioning of command; therefore, the visit program for the foreseeable future would be continued on a limited basis only. Significant areas assessed by the MACIG visit teams were: command, accomplishment of missions,

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staff functioning, drug usage, race relations, troop appearance, morale, and local security.³⁰

PLANNED 1973 INSPECTIONS

(U) An inspection schedule was developed for the period January to June 1973 because there were indications that cease-fire negotiations could continue indefinitely. This schedule provided for small teams to inspect a representative group of the lower level advisory teams of all subordinate commands. Prior to the announcement of the cease-fire only the Airborne Division Advisory Team had been inspected. The MACIG inspection program terminated on 24 January 1973.

Base Turnover Inspections

(U) The rapid withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam required that many bases be transferred to Government of Vietnam control in a short period of time. To adequately inspect the maximum number of the major bases transferred, it was necessary to modify the inspection technique formerly used. Inspections prior to turnover were virtually eliminated, leaving only turnover and post-turnover inspections to be accomplished. Because of this change, the three combined inspection teams assigned to the base turnover program were able to inspect the actual transfer of ten bases and to conduct 28 post-turnover inspections during the first quarter of CY 72. During the second quarter the teams inspected the actual transfer of 13 bases and were able to conduct 26 post-turnover inspections. With the rapid drawdown continuing into the third quarter the remaining two inspection teams performed two additional actual inspections and 13 post-turnover inspections. During the fourth quarter inspection activity continued through 24 November 1972, at which time COMUSMACV approved the termination of the base turnover inspection program which had begun in October 1971. This decision was based upon the accelerated transfer of facilities and equipment which made the original inspection concept infeasible. A modified program was subsequently incorporated into the program for monitoring the retrograde of the command. Accomplishments of the entire program included the following inspection completions: 20 pre-turnover, 31 turnover, and 75 post-turnover, covering a total of 93 installations.

(U) Inspections performed by the Base Turnover Branch focused the attention of appropriate personnel, both US and Vietnamese, on base transfer matters and renewed interest in insuring proper use and control of transferred facilities.³¹

REPRESENTATIVE MACV INVESTIGATIONS

(U) The MACIG Investigations Division handled 129 investigations, inquiries, and staff actions during

the calendar year 1972. Representative investigations are summarized below.

Declassification and Release of Wooldridge

Report of Investigation

(U) The MACV Inspector General, in conjunction with the MACV SJA, reviewed an earlier MACIG report of investigation concerning former CSM Wooldridge and determined what parts were to be declassified and released for use in an official court action against Wooldridge. MACIG recommendations concerning release of the material were then forwarded to the Department of the Army Inspector General.³²

United Services Organization (USO)

(U) On 12 October 1971 a USO employee alleged to MACIG that she had been offered a bribe by her superior in order to allow him to operate a currency manipulation scheme. The Chief of Staff, MACV, directed an investigation. It was determined: that two USO employees had engaged in currency manipulation operations; that concession in USO clubs had not been approved by MACV; that USO property accountability procedures were ineffective; that some Class I supplies purchased from the US Army had been misappropriated; that the USO had contracted and paid for commercial entertainment in violation of MACV directives; and the USO in Vietnam had become misoriented from its primary mission to one of selling items to servicemen. Additionally, the USO Executive Office had little effective control over club operations, had abused military transportation and storage facilities, and taken ineffective action to correct irregularities of which it was aware or suspicious. The MACIG recommended that corrective action be taken by the USO and MACV to insure compliance with MACV directives. The directives themselves were revised to allow the operation of concessions in USO clubs only on an exception basis.³³

Property Disposal Operations

(U) MACV received information on 30 December 1971 that a Senate investigation team was traveling to Europe to conduct an investigation into allegations of inefficiency and lack of economy in connection with the property disposal activities within the European Command. It was indicated that the team would subsequently travel to the Far East to conduct a similar investigation. In January 1972 the MACIG office was directed to assist USARV in an overall analysis of the US logistics system in Vietnam. It was agreed that the MACIG office would conduct a detailed study of selected aspects of property disposal operations to determine if there had been complicity, conspiracy, or dereliction of duty.

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The study dealt not only with property disposal in Vietnam but also contained a series of analyses concerning audits of the overall logistics system, including interrelationships of various firms conducting business with the Property Disposal Agency, Vietnam, and a review of the crime prevention and physical security protective measures utilized during the time period 1969 to 1972. At the conclusion of the study the Chief of Staff directed that the Director of Logistics and Provost Marshal review the study and assure that appropriate corrective actions were accomplished to correct the deficiencies identified in the study. Approximately 7,000 man-hours were expended.⁵⁴

Alleged War Crime—U Minh Forest

(U) On 26 July 1971 helicopters from C Troop, 16th Cavalry, engaged in an operation in Military Region 4 in support of the 32d ARVN Regiment. Soon after the action a Vietnamese woman reported that three members of her family had sustained wounds and two sons had been killed by a helicopter firing into her home. Three investigations were conducted by successive echelons, the final investigation being conducted in November 1971 by Headquarters, USARV. Sufficient evidence was not developed to determine whether or not a war crime had been committed. However, the CG, DRAC, took disciplinary action against certain individuals who participated in the action for the exercise of poor judgment and failure to adhere strictly to the Rules of Engagement. The disciplinary action was upheld by the DCG, USARV. MACIG's analysis of the case determined that the investigations were administratively deficient in certain areas, but not so far as to invalidate the findings. MACIG concurred that there was insufficient evidence to substantiate the commission of a war crime and concurred with the CG, DRAC, and DCG, USARV, on the exercise of disciplinary action.⁵⁵

The VIKYN Case

(U) According to the terms of the Pentilateral Agreement of 1950, US forces received facilities fully and freely from the Government of Vietnam, which assumed all responsibility and obligations. Lai Khe, a French-owned experimental rubber plantation, was occupied by US forces in October 1965 under the terms of the above agreement. Subsequently, in October 1967 the Government of Vietnam, having decided it could not afford to pay the bill for Lai Khe, began a campaign to make the US pay the indemnification for destroyed rubber trees and rent for the plantation buildings. The United States, however, remained firm in its adherence to the Pentilateral Agreement. Ultimately, USAID took the position that money had to be obtained for the

Lai Khe Rubber Experimental Center (The Technical Services Institute—VIKYN) because of its importance to the recovery of the South Vietnamese economy. After lengthy discussions an agreement was reached whereby \$VN 90,000,000 was transferred from the CY 70 Defense Budget to USAID which then made a grant to VIKYN based strictly on the merits of VIKYN's potential contribution to the Vietnamese economy and not as a rent subsidy. A May 1972 MACIG examination of the grant showed serious potential irregularities. Some USAID employees were erroneously claiming that USAID was acting as a conduit to pay claims against the US Army. This was clearly in contravention to the Pentilateral Agreement and was condemned as such by MACIG.⁵⁶

Peers Report

(U) In May 1972 the Secretary of the General Staff, Department of the Army, requested that MACV conduct a security classification review of documents in the Peers Report that had been originated by the III Marine Amphibious Force and MACV, using the criterion spelled out in Executive Order 11652 which became effective on 1 June 1972. A reply was requested by 5 June 1972, as the documents were to be used in litigation established by the Federal Courts at the request of Representative Aspin of Wisconsin. MACIG was designated the coordinating agency and in due course received downgrading instructions from relevant staff agencies for the documents which were then transmitted to DA.⁵⁷

Study of Ammunition Waste and Materiel Excesses

(U) On 7 June 1972 the MACV Inspector General directed that a special study be conducted into the extent of improper handling and waste of ammunition and accumulation of excess equipment and materiel by RVNAF and US forces in Vietnam. The study was developed from review and analysis of 425 reports of inspection of advisory teams, RVNAF units, and Vietnamese Territorial Forces units conducted by MACIG and the JGS Inspection General (JGSIG). The study report specifically addressed improper storage and waste of ammunition assets, disposition of excess equipment and materiel, disposition of copper alloy and other ammunition scrap, control and disposition of CONEX containers, control and disposition of aluminum pallets, and related problems associated with base turnover. The report concluded that US forces' deficiencies relating to ammunition were negligible; RVNAF deficiencies were moderate and, with the exception of inadequate storage capacity, easily correctible; US forces' accumulation of excess materiel was not significant; RVNAF excesses were minor

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and overshadowed by shortages in Territorial Force units; improper disposition of copper alloy scrap was essentially a RVNAF problem requiring advisory and inspection emphasis; control of CONEX containers were virtually nonexistent; return of aluminum pallets was poor; and JGSIG inspection reports which addressed the above were too few to draw valid conclusions. The study report recommended increased advisory and inspection emphasis in the above areas. The report of study was completed 27 July 1972 and approved the MACIG on 2 August 1972.⁵⁸

1972 Christmas Mail Program (Reindeer Express)

(U) In September 1972 the MACV Inspector General directed that an informal inquiry be made to determine if adequate preparations for handling the 1972 Christmas mail were being made. The inquiry which was conducted between 19 September 1972 and 17 October 1972 concluded that the local postal systems were making adequate preparation for Christmas mail. Later, prior to the Christmas holidays, aircraft scheduling and maintenance problems had caused a slowdown in the delivery of Christmas mail and resulted in a number of complaints. MACIG then directed a review of mail problems. It was determined that mail delivery had seriously deteriorated. The problem was approached with other staff agencies and culminated in a request for additional airlift support in-country and a letter to the San Francisco Military Mail Terminal requesting assistance in mail movement to APOs.

Human Relations Survey

(U) On 15 November 1972 COMUSMACV indicated a desire to determine the existing human relations situation within the command. The review consisted of verbal reports and personal observations at various installations and concluded that racial tension was not a significant problem in Vietnam, that there was no evidence of polarization of ethnic groups, and that human relations programs in Vietnam were viable.⁵⁹

COMBINED INVESTIGATIONS

(U) By a written directive of 282 January 1972 signed by both GEN Abrams, COMUSMACV, and GEN Vien, Chief of the Vietnamese JGS, a series of combined follow-up inspections of the Vietnamese Navy logistics system was initiated. This directive provided for follow-up inspections to a previous Vietnamese Navy logistics investigation. The combined inspection team was formed with three US and four Vietnamese members. Composition of the team included technically and logistically qualified personnel from the Vietnamese Navy, the Central Logistics Command, US Naval Forces Vietnam, and

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. The itinerary of the inspections included visits to five logistical support bases, a supply center and Headquarters, Fleet Command. While inspecting the naval bases, visits were made to the supporting ARVN area logistics commands (ALCs) because of the Navy's reliance upon the ALCs for common items of support.⁶⁰

(U) By a written directive of 22 February 1972 signed by both GEN Abrams and GEN Vien, a series of combined inspections of the VNAF logistical system and procedures was begun. The purpose of these combined inspections was to determine if the VNAF, through the use of necessary controls, accountability, and distribution procedures, had the capability to provide centralized logistics management and adequate support for all assigned units and bases. The scope of the combined inspection included all supply maintenance activities of the VNAF Logistics Command, the five air divisions, and the Air Training Command.⁶¹

IG COMPLAINTS

(U) In 1972 the Complaints Division continued with its basic mission of correcting injustices affecting individuals and improving or eliminating conditions detrimental to the efficiency and reputation of MACV and the US forces. The majority of the complaints and requests for assistance received were in three major categories: unit administration, personnel administration, and pay and allowances. The specific categories of the majority of complaints concerned transfer, reassignment, and utilization caused by the individual personnel adjustments during the troop withdrawal. The large number of pay complaints was attributed to the personnel turbulence caused by the troop reductions and the conversion to JUMPS.

(U) Throughout 1972 there was a diminishing number of incidents and complaints in which race was suspected of being a factor. As a result of MACIG's continuing review of serious incident reports and inspections of 49 advisory teams, it was determined that only 36 of a total of 4,238 incidents and complaints were caused by racial problems.

ADVISORY EFFORT

(U) On 9 February 1972 the MACIG Deputy Senior Advisor forwarded to the RVNAF/JGS IG a summary of activities of the Advisory Division during 1971 and recommendations for improvement in the operation of the Vietnamese IG Directorate for 1972. It was recommended that:

—Formal inspection plans be prepared by all teams to aid in better programming and utilization of their inspection time.

—Unit notifications be expanded to provide more information to the units to be inspected.

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—Joint General Staff agencies be solicited for subjects to be established as special topics for inspection so that the Inspector General could most effectively serve the Chief of the Joint General Staff.

—Inspection objectives or other guidelines be established to gain more uniformity in inspections by all teams.

—A full team/full inspection trip practice be adopted to insure that all inspections provide thorough coverage of all scheduled units. If necessary, additional units could be scheduled in each inspection.

—Each inspection include at least some forward elements of the unit scheduled for inspection. This could require that the Chief, JGS, establish priority transportation for IG inspection teams to insure that

teams were able to move to forward locations on a timely basis.

—An Air Force and Navy inspection team be formed as presently authorized.⁶²

(U) During the second quarter of 1972 Navy and Air Force assistants to the Deputy Senior Advisor were assigned to MACIG Advisory Division. The authorized VNN and VNAF inspection team of the RVNAF/JGS IG Directorate had not been formed as of that date. The primary reason was the shortage of qualified IG officers in these armed services. The VNN and VNAF inspector general offices were authorized 24 officers each, but were assigned only 14 and 15 officers respectively. Until the VNN and VNAF inspection teams at JGS level were formed, the two assistants were to maintain liaison with the US advisors, provide service peculiar technical



Beginning in September RVNAF/JGS IG teams conducted unit inspections throughout the Republic.

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advice, and participate in combined JGS/MACIG inspections and investigations.⁶³

(U) The RVNAF/JGS IG conducted two IG orientation courses during the periods 19 April to 13 May and 25 July to 17 August. These courses were designed to provide professional training for RVNAF officers serving as inspectors general who had not had formal training in IG matters. During each course the Deputy Senior Advisor presented a four hour block of instruction on the US Inspector General system. Eighty-three officers from RVNAF corps, division, and sector IG offices attended.⁶⁴

(U) On 29 and 30 September the RVNAF/JGS IG hosted a seminar in the JGS conference room. Attendees included inspectors general from VNAF, VNN, ARVN corps, divisions, sectors, and the JGS IG Directorate. IG advisors from each regional assistance command and MACIG also attended. The purpose of the seminar was to announce and discuss

the 1973 inspection schedule, which was based on the vertical inspection concept currently used in the US Army. This concept would enable inspectors general at all echelons of command in RVNAF to have an opportunity to inspect a reasonable cross section of their units, starting at the lowest echelon and inspecting up through the major headquarters, and at the same time relieve the units of the burden of being inspected by too many higher headquarters. In conjunction with this seminar, the Deputy Senior Advisor hosted a one day seminar on 28 September for regional assistance command IG advisors. Briefings and discussions centered on the various problems confronting inspectors general who were assigned as RVNAF IGs.⁶⁵

RVNAF/JGS IG Inspections

(U) During 1972 RVNAF/JGS IG inspection teams completed inspections as shown in Figure F-9.⁶⁶

1972 RVNAF/JGS IG INSPECTIONS

TEAMS	NO. OF INSPS	NO. OF UNITS INSP	NO. OF US ADVISED INSP	NO. OF UNITS OBS BY US
Technical Inspections and Ration Supplement Program.....	170	432	79	254
General Inspections.....	154	421	55	178
Territorial Forces Inspections.....	158	554	59	176
TOTAL.....	482	1,407	193	607

Source: MACIG

Figure: F-9

MACV SPECIAL TROOPS

GENERAL

(U) MACV Special Troops (MACST) was a unique organization; it was responsible for providing logistical and service support to MACV Headquarters and for the defense and security of all US military installations except Tan Son Nhut Air Base within the Saigon/Cholon/Gia Dinh area. MACST was officially activated and assigned to MACV on 1 January 1972. Prior to January 1972 MACV Special Troops was known as the United States Army Headquarters Area Command (USAHAC) under control of United States Army Vietnam (USARV).⁶⁷

(U) During January 1972 the headquarters commandant, once solely responsible for logistical support of MACV, became an integral part of MACST which led to the consolidation of activities such as support functions and unit fund operations and eliminated duplication of effort.

SERVICES PROVIDED

(U) The telephone management office (TMO) was a functional responsibility of the Commander, MACST until it was transferred to the Signal Support Agency, Saigon on 1 July 1972.⁶⁸ It was responsible


for overseeing the 5,000 telephone mainlines on the MACV and Tiger dial telephone exchanges (DTEs). In February 1972 the Commander, MACST was directed by the Deputy Commander, USARV to reduce the percentage of class A telephones to 20 percent of the total line fill, which required 45 days to implement.⁶⁹

(C) In keeping with defense and security responsibility, the Commander, MACST had available quick reaction forces (QRF) from the military units located within Saigon for use in defending critical US installations as required. In February all QRFs were eliminated except the 718th Military Police Battalion QRF.⁷⁰ This termination was necessary as a result of strength reduction which degraded the ability of units to muster such forces. Other than the MP QRF for Saigon only one other US ground combat force existed at year end under MACST control: the Provisional Defense Force (PDF) Battalion. The PDF Battalion was solely responsible for the defense of the MACV complex. When C Company, 52d Infantry stood down, two M-113 APCs and a 1/4 ton truck were transferred to the PDF Battalion.

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ICCS headquarters in Saigon. MACST provided office space and billeting for ICCS delegations.

projects were initiated by MACST within Saigon and parts of Gia Dinh Province in 1972. They included alley and walkway paving, bridge construction, school improvements, medical projects, and sewage construction.

ICCS SUPPORT

(C) MACST was charged with providing initial logistical support to the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) and the Four Party Joint Military Commission (FPJMC) upon their arrival in late January. The support was primarily in the form of billeting accommodations, mess and office facilities, and transportation to allow the two commissions to proceed with their work as rapidly as possible.⁷⁶

(C) Among the parameters applied in fulfilling

requirements were the following:

—Locating the living, and administrative accommodations of the ICCS military delegations on Tan Son Nhut Air Base. These facilities were collocated as it was not necessary to provide separate compounds on Tan Son Nhut for each of the four nations represented, although national integrity was maintained.

—Establishing compounds for DRV and PRG separate from each other on Tan Son Nhut. The area chosen for ICCS personnel was the 1300 area of Tan Son Nhut Air Base. The group of buildings was close to the Tan Son Nhut Consolidated Mess and allowed the complete housing of ICCS personnel as well as providing office space for each country.

STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE

ORGANIZATION AND MISSION

(U) The Staff Judge Advocate was the principal legal advisor to COMUSMACV, MACV staff elements, and other agencies of the US mission in Vietnam. His duties fell into the three distinct areas of civil law and military affairs, advisory and inter-

national law, and military justice.

(U) On 10 November the MACV SJA was merged with the USARV SJA under the new USARV/MACV SUPCOM. Officers formerly assigned to the MACV SJA were reassigned to the USARV/MACV SUPCOM International/Civil Law Division; military

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justice functions were transferred to the USARV Military Justice Division; the MACV SJA military justice function ceased to be necessary beyond the maintenance of applicable MACV directives in the field of military justice.⁷⁷

CIVIL LAW AND MILITARY AFFAIRS DIVISION

(U) The Civil Law and Military Affairs Division continued to advise and assist the MACV staff and other agencies on the full range of civil law, including currency control, real property disposal, land use concurrences, leases, procurement, claims, foreign criminal jurisdiction, and taxation. A representative of the division served as the chairman of the MACV Appeals Board during 1972. The division continued its task of monitoring foreign claims. It also functioned as a member of the Joint Embassy/USAID/MACV Invitee Contractor Committee and attended several meetings and submitted opinions of the subjects discussed. The division reviewed all requests for solicitation rights and reviewed all decisions to withdraw logistical support and the right to employment. Numerous directives in the area of civil law were reviewed.⁷⁸

Foreign Claims

(U) An area which became of increasing interest in 1972 was that of contractor employee claims. Beginning in the second quarter, claims officers were appointed to monitor disputes between contractors and their employees. As of 15 June 1972 there were only 117 nonadjusted foreign claims on hand. The number of claims continued to be reduced throughout the year. During the third quarter Secretary of the Army Froehke wrote GEN Weyand suggesting that MACV study proposed agreements whereby the Vietnamese would assume responsibility for payment of all US civil law and military affairs claims. The division obtained an analysis from each of six other MACV staff elements and consolidated them into a reply which expressed GEN Weyand's opposition to the proposal.⁷⁹

(U) In the fourth quarter the number and dollar value of claims continued to be reduced. One significant question arose as to whether the United States Government was liable to private firms for damage done by US stevedoring contractors to ships docking, loading, or unloading in Vietnam. As the contractor firms were operated by a private company, the Mutual Waiver of Claims Agreements often in effect between states did not apply. The US Government therefore became liable but could implead the stevedoring firm in any suit arising out of the damage caused by that firm to various vessels.

MACV Appeals Board

(U) The MACV Appeals Board met twice per

month. Most of the cases were requests for reinstatement by individuals who had previously had their privileges withdrawn. In the second quarter the Justice Department asked for information regarding the MACV suspension list, since there was concern that the list was being used to bar people from employment in Thailand and other countries. The SJA traveled to Thailand to discuss this problem with the MACTHAI SA.

(U) During the third quarter the activities of the MACV Appeals Board again represented a significant portion of the workload of the division. The board averaged three meetings per month. Many of the cases involved a reevaluation of the status of persons associated with the USO centers.

(U) During the fourth quarter of 1972 the Chief of Civil Law continued to serve as a member and legal advisor of the MACV Appeals Board. A significant increase in caseload required weekly meetings of the board during this period. The upswing in cases resulted in part from a new policy allowing offenders to petition for reinstatement of privileges after three years. In one case it was discovered that MACV directives did not expressly prohibit making or using a false ration card. A recommendation was submitted to correct this oversight in the directive.

Miscellaneous

(U) A litigation report was submitted to the Department of the Army for use in the case of Sheldon Brady v. RMK-BRJ et al. This case arose from MACV's withdrawal of Brady's privileges during 1970 when he was found to be engaged in black market activities. Brady was discharged from the employment of the government contractor. The ultimate decision in this case would have far reaching impact in defining the administrative controls which may be used to govern US Government contractors in overseas areas.

(U) It was further determined that the travel orders for civilian contractor hired personnel should be simplified and that reimbursement for travel from the US to Saigon would not be required if the employee was hired locally. This resulted in the contractors' being able to more easily hire the personnel required as a result of the cease-fire and military drawdown.⁸⁰

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MILITARY JUSTICE DIVISION

(U) The division continued to give group briefings to all incoming personnel on the 1949 Geneva Conventions. At the beginning of the year there was an average of almost four per week. By the third quarter the number had dropped to less than one per week, and in the fourth quarter, due to the substantial decrease in the number of incoming person-

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nel, the briefing program was terminated.²¹

International Law

(U) The division continued to render advice and research assistance on various points of international law related to such matters as the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to MACV forces and the Government of Vietnam, the status of the Chieu Hoi Program as it related to the Geneva Conventions, questions relating to PWs, and war crimes.

(U) A staff action originated in 1971 concerned the abandonment of two army barges to Lotus Co., Ltd. for salvage. As there were about 20 such barges sunk in Vietnamese territorial waters, it was important to determine the proper means of disposition in view of both DCD disposal regulations and the Pentilateral Agreement. Letters of abandonment were sent to Lotus Co., Ltd. thus clearing the way for the salvage of the barges. This closed the matter with a proper disposal of the barges. The pattern used for the disposition of the two barges could be used in the future.²²

(C) During the second quarter the International Law Division was assigned to provide legal assistance to the inspector general in an investigation involving the Property Disposal Agency Vietnam (PDAV) and disposition of military property through open bidding contracts to international contractors. The initial phase of the legal analysis, concerning potential violations by certain parties and options open to PDAV and the US Army to control or prevent improper and illegal activities, was completed in June 1972. The division also continued to render advice and research assistance on various international law questions, including the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to various situations arising from the war situation. Noteworthy during the second quarter was the project to develop the joint US/Vietnamese PW repatriation plan. The relevant issues from a legal point of view were the interpretation of Articles 7 and 118 of the Geneva Protocols. Article 7 prohibits PWs from renouncing their rights under the convention, and Article 118 prohibits cruel treatment in connection with any form of preventive detention of PWs.

(U) During October the primary task of the division was the updating of the Vietnamese Tax Law Study for CINCPAC. Developments in the areas of customs and import tariffs had created substantial changes in Vietnamese tax law since November 1971. Changes resulted in the areas of import, customs, and certain tax credits developed for the encouragement of numerous local industries.

(U) In mid-December 1972 the National Assembly of the Republic of Vietnam enacted a new general income tax law which superseded prior laws governing the taxation of personal and corporate incomes

generated in the Republic. As many aspects of US activities in Vietnam might have been affected, an immediate analysis was undertaken of the tax law and its possible repercussions on US government activities in Vietnam. It was determined that there would be no increase in the cost of US government programs in Vietnam as a result of the new tax legislation since the Pentilateral Agreement and precedence provided that United States activities in Vietnam were not subject to taxes imposed by the Government of Vietnam. It was recognized that the employees of US government contractors who were bona fide residents of the Republic of Vietnam would be subject to an income tax on their salaries. Such action would be neither a violation of applicable international law nor current agreements in effect between the governments involved. It was determined that, should the government of Vietnam adopt such a policy, no significant effect would result in aid programs within the Republic of Vietnam.

War Crimes Investigations

(U) War crimes investigations received in the spring of 1972 demonstrated the need for updating the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, inasmuch as the protection it provided for mobile units such as ambulances was not extended to MEDEVAC helicopters regardless of the red cross painted on them. These reports were forwarded to the Department of the Army for use in demonstrating the need to modernize the convention in order to extend to these air ambulances the appropriate protection under the laws of warfare.²³

(U) During the second quarter reports of war crimes were down substantially. This was considered a natural outgrowth of the virtual elimination of American combat troops in Vietnam. The combat incidents reported consisted of enemy firing on MEDEVAC helicopters in an apparent attempt to prevent the evacuation of wounded personnel. Only one war crime investigation was received for review in the third quarter. Thereafter there were no reported war crimes.

Cease-Fire Related Activities

(C) Beginning in the third quarter the division became increasingly involved in projects concerned with the approaching cease-fire. Project EGRESS RECAP was rewritten and reviewed for concurrence. In July the joint JGS/MACV committee study on evacuation of NVA/VC Prisoners of War was completed and approved by JGS and MACV. After the cease-fire it served as a guide for the repatriation of enemy PWs by the Government of Vietnam.²⁴

(U) The announcement in late October regarding a possible cease-fire resulted in increased activity within the division. It became necessary to dispose

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of many classified records. The Chief, International Law Division, was custodian for all international agreements, most of which were classified. He was likewise the in-country custodian of all war crimes investigations arising out of incidents or allegations in Vietnam. Permission was granted to destroy all war crimes investigations, some dating from 1965. Only the 1972 war crimes files, which numbered less than ten, were retained pending developments. The single remaining active war crime investigation was forwarded to DA for further action. At the same time permission was obtained to retain all international agreements affecting the Free World Military Assistance Forces in Vietnam until the signing of the cease-fire. Those documents were transferred to USAID in order that copies of these agreements would be continually available to the United States mission remaining in Vietnam.⁸⁵

Miscellaneous

(U) During the third quarter the Chief, International Law Division, was requested by the CID to assist in the apprehension of a soldier who had taken a hostage with the avowed purpose of obtaining an aircraft to fly to the Middle East. Through the contribution of the office of the Staff Judge Advocate, the individual was returned to military jurisdiction without serious injury resulting to any of the personnel involved.⁸⁶

(U) From January to March 1973 the Staff Judge Advocate continued to provide advice and assistance to MACV directorates and component commands. Assistance was provided in the areas of cease-fire agreement interpretation, property dispositions, fund closures, and general aspects of international law and international law of the sea. Assistance was also provided to legal personnel of DAO in preparation for their assumption of duties.

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

US AWARDS POLICY

(U) In January the MACV Chief of Staff approved the consolidation of MACV Directive 872-1, Awards, General Policy in Vietnam; and 872-4, Awards, MACV Staff and Advisory Personnel. By the end of February MACAG had combined the two directives and the revised MACV Directive 872-1, Decorations, Awards and Honors, Military Decorations, was staffed to 7th Air Force and NAVFORV. By 31 March the staff work on the consolidation had been completed and the directive was published on 15 May 1972.

FOREIGN AWARDS

(U) DOD Directive 1005.3 prohibited the acceptance of foreign awards for meritorious service by

ADVISORY DIVISION

(U) In 1972 Advisory Division personnel were engaged in a wide range of activities with their counterparts in the RVNAF Directorate of Military Justice. These activities fell into several areas: lecturing on comparative law, teaching English to Vietnamese judges, inspection of ARVN military prisons and PW camps, and providing assistance to the Directorate of Military Justice.

(U) Division personnel voluntarily taught American comparative law at the request of the faculty of law, University of Saigon. They also taught English to the director and deputy director of the Directorate of Military Justice as well as to the Minister of Justice and two supreme court justices.⁸⁷

(U) Throughout the year visits were made to RVNAF military prisons and Government of Vietnam PW camps. During the first quarter large amounts of materiel and supplies were procured for the Da Nang military prison, which had been heavily damaged by a typhoon. Other Advisory Division efforts were aimed at improving the ARVN logistics system as it pertained to prison supply and obtaining necessary supplies and support for the Saigon military prison.⁸⁸

(U) In addition to traveling throughout Vietnam to view advisory efforts, the chief and personnel of the division worked closely with the Vietnamese Ministry of National Defense (MOND) in the preparation of a mobilization law. After the law was MOND drafting committee was given the additional MOND drafting committee was given the additional mission of preparing an RVNAF demobilization study. Finally, the division prepared a draft agreement between MACV and MOND concerning direct support funds for defense procurements through June 1973.⁸⁹

personnel involved with the Military Assistance Program with the exception of meritorious service by those involved in actual combat services of heroism involving the saving of life.

(C) Superimposed on the DOD Directive was the general feeling by COMUSMACV that to accept awards from the Khmer Republic could lead to misconceptions of the US role in the Khmer Republic's national defense effort. As a consequence, on at least two occasions it was recommended that awards proposed by the Khmer Republic for individuals or for units not directly involved in combat not be accepted.⁹⁰

ARVN Badges and Branch Insignia

(U) The Department of the Army was queried

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by USARV for guidance in determining which ARVN badges and insignia should be authorized for acceptance and wear by US personnel. The response left the decision to the CG, USARV. In June 1972 the following policy was announced:

—The ARVN Airborne, Ranger, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal Badges may be accepted for permanent wear and retention by US personnel after having obtained approval in accordance with Annex A of MACV Directive 672-2.

—All other ARVN badges, to include distinctive branch insignia, may be accepted for wear only while in Vietnam and only after having obtained approval from the first commissioned supervisor in the individual's chain of command.⁹¹
Temporary Wear of Republic of

Vietnam Unit Awards

(U) On 18 August 1972, after a review of the policy concerning temporary and permanent wear of Vietnamese unit awards, it was announced that they were authorized for wear only by personnel assigned or attached to the unit when the award was earned. French fourrageres could be worn as authorized by Chapters 7 and 8 of AR 672-5-1.⁹²

VIETNAM CAMPAIGNS

Fifteenth and Sixteenth Campaigns

(U) During July 1972 COMUSMACV received the 7th Air Force's position on the 16th campaign and the recommendation pertaining to the Army and Navy 15th and 16th campaigns covering the same periods. This resulted in all campaigns subsequent to the 16th being assigned a starting date of 30 March 1972 which coincided with the start of the NGUYEN HUE Offensive. COMUSMACV approved the submission of the USAF 15th and 16th campaigns and the development of material for the Army and Navy campaigns of the same numbers

with a closing date of 29 March 1972. All future campaigns were to be developed jointly.

Seventeenth Campaign

(U) On 23 November 1972 action was initiated to develop the 17th campaign; MACDO, MACDI, and MACSJSH furnished positions, and letters were sent to the component commanders. Although the campaign originally had been proposed to terminate on 16 September 1972, in view of the cease-fire it was extended through 28 January 1973. Concurrence was received from the component commanders in February 1973 and the proposed 17th campaign was designated "Peace and Honor" to date from 30 March 1972 to 28 January 1973.⁹³

Cease-fire Awards Policies

(U) On 25 January 1973 COMUSMACV approved streamlined awards-processing procedures for implementation effective with the cease-fire. A message was dispatched to the command and to the MACV staff which announced the revised procedures for those awards to be approved by Headquarters, MACV. The cease-fire awards policies eliminated the requirement for both narrative descriptions and proposed citations for meritorious service awards of the Bronze Star Medal (BSM), Joint Service Commendation Medal (JSCM), and the Army Commendation Medal (ARCOM). Also, for meritorious achievement awards of the BSM, JCSM, and ARCOM a narrative description would not be required but would be evaluated on the basis of a finalized citation. Policy concerning valor awards and awards of the Legion of Merit remained unchanged.⁹⁴

(U) There were 133 unit awards processed in 1972. Figures F-10, F-11, and F-12 summarize decorations awarded US and allied personnel and recommendations forwarded to other headquarters.⁹⁵

DECORATIONS AWARDED

(1972)

	JSCM	PH	ARCOM	ARCOM "V"	AA	AM "V"	BSM	BSM "V"
MACV.....	2,476	98	2,747	903	712	129	5,797	782
USARV.....	0	147	22,663	570	49,589	1,620	23,235	577
TOTAL.....	2,476	245	25,410	1,473	50,301	1,749	29,030	1,359
	SA	DFC	MSM	LM	SS	DSC	TOTAL	
MACV.....	24	55	0	519	183	0	14,425	
USARV.....	51	796	2	511	157	18	99,934	
TOTAL.....	75	851	2	1,030	340	18	114,359	

Source: MACAG

Figure: F-10

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RECOMMENDATIONS FORWARDED TO OTHER HEADQUARTERS (1972)

	*COM	AM	MSM	BSM	**SM	DFC	LM	SS	DSM	***DSC	MH	TOTAL
ARMY.....	0	2	4	3	0	3	9	3	14	21	7	68
NAVY.....	131	1	0	168	0	0	14	2	1	0	0	315
AIR FORCE.....	121	3	0	288	0	12	40	3	0	0	2	469
MARINE.....	15	0	0	42	0	0	9	0	1	0	0	67
RVNAF.....	14	1	0	7	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	23
THIRD COUNTRY.....	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2
TOTAL.....	281	7	4	506	0	15	75	8	16	21	9	942

NOTE:

*Includes Army, Navy and Air Force Commendation Medals.
 **Includes Soldiers, Navy, Marine Corps, and Airmen Medals.
 ***Includes Distinguished Service, Navy, and Air Force Crosses.

Source: MACAG

Figure: F-11

DECORATIONS AWARDED TO FOREIGN NATIONALS (1972)

AWARD	RVN	ROK	THAI	CHINESE	FILIPINO	SPANISH
SS.....	35	0	0	0	0	0
DFC.....	3	0	0	0	0	0
SM.....	1	0	0	0	0	0
BSM "V".....	544	0	8	0	0	0
BSM.....	72	9	4	2	1	1
AM "V".....	15	0	0	0	0	0
ARCOM "V".....	1,053	0	23	0	0	0
ARCOM.....	653	33	27	0	5	0
TOTAL.....	2,376	42	62	2	6	1

TOTAL ALL COUNTRIES: 2,489

Source: MACAG

Figure: F-12

DISCIPLINE, AND LAW AND ORDER

(U) The Office of the Provost Marshal, under the staff cognizance of the Director of Personnel, MACV, provided professional advice to COMUSMACV and his staff on matters pertaining to the state of discipline, and law and order within the command; and exercised staff supervision over law enforcement and enemy prisoner of war activities, customs and drug suppression, and the command crime prevention and physical security programs. In concert with the drawdown of forces, significant reductions within the Prisoner of War, Drug Suppression, and Investigation and Security Divisions were made.⁹⁴

(U) The drawdown of forces during 1972 did not reduce the types of serious disciplinary problems. There were still deserters, soldiers who used their exchange privileges for profit in the black market, and others who smuggled drugs or contraband to the US. However, with the reduction in troops the number of offenses was reduced, and the rate of deserters dropped significantly by year's end.

Approximately 700 US personnel remained on a deserter status from units stationed in Vietnam from 1965 through 1972.⁹⁷

WITHDRAWAL OF PRIVILEGES

(U) The withdrawal of privileges program originated in response to the need for control over US civilians and third country nationals directly employed by the US government or on government financed contracts. When these persons committed acts considered detrimental to the US mission in Vietnam, the Government of Vietnam frequently declined to exercise its jurisdiction. The withdrawal of privileges program was established by MACV Directive 190-13 to provide a means of administratively imposing sanctions on persons in this category. Possible sanctions included temporary or permanent removal of the authorization to possess or use MPC, to use the APO mailing system or its facilities, or to enter any military installation or building for any purpose whatsoever. The program

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was established in 1966 and became official US Mission policy in 1969. In the same year it also became US Mission policy that those persons whose privileges were completely withdrawn were no longer acceptable for employment in Vietnam. In 1970 the program assumed increased importance when the US Court of Military Review ruled that the armed forces did not have court-martial jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the US military in the Republic of Vietnam. By the end of 1972 there were more than 1,200 people on the MACV withdrawal of privileges list.⁹⁸

CURRENCY MANIPULATION

(U) From 1965 to 1968 inflation in the Republic of Vietnam reduced the purchasing power of the piaster, while the legal rate of exchange in the international market remained fixed at the rate established by the Government of Vietnam. The variance between the legal rate for the piaster and the true value of the piaster in the international market encouraged monetary speculation to convert the steadily declining Vietnamese piaster into a more stable form of currency, negotiable on the international market. As a result, a currency black market developed where persons holding large sums of Vietnamese currency would pay far more than the legal rate of exchange for stable currency, primarily US dollars. In the case of exchange from piasters to dollars, both parties to the illegal conversion would benefit. The Vietnamese would convert his piasters of declining value into a stable form of currency and the American would realize an exchange rate greater than the legal rate of exchange, thereby increasing his buying power on the local market.

(U) In October 1970 the Government of Vietnam approved a change in the rate of exchange for US personnel which more nearly reflected the true buying power of the piaster. While the legal rate of exchange remained fixed at \$VN 118 for each US dollar, a personal accommodation rate of \$VN 275 for each US dollar was established. This rate was increased to \$VN 410 in November 1971 and in January 1973 to \$VN 475. As a result, the purchasing power of the US citizen who was afforded the accommodation rate was considerably higher than the local Vietnamese citizen who was paid at the legal rate. Enterprising money manipulators who illegally accumulated military payment certificates (MPC) often would induce US personnel to exchange MPC for local currency at the accommodation rate, offering a portion of the profit to the individual who performed the exchange.

(U) In an effort to control the currency black market, MACV developed an automated computer program to monitor currency transactions of US

personnel. The Currency and Black Market Control System (CABOTS) which evolved provided the MACV Comptroller and Provost Marshal with timely information on the quantity of negotiable dollar instruments purchased by military and DOD civilian personnel in Vietnam. CABOTS was a file containing one record for every individual making currency transactions in Vietnam. The Provost Marshal, MACV, was responsible for monitoring the law enforcement application of CABOTS. Component command agencies replied by indorsement to MACPM concerning the disposition of investigations conducted on individuals identified as possible violators by CABOTS printouts.

(U) During 1971 and 1972 MACPM dispatched 1,063 Request for Currency Violation Investigation letters. From this number 303 replies were received from the action agency. Thirty replies indicated positive violations, 195 replies indicated that the suspicion was unfounded, and 78 replies indicated that the individual had already departed the Republic.⁹⁹

CUSTOMS

(U) In late 1970 MACV established the Joint Customs Group (JCG) to provide a joint service solution to the problem of preventing drugs and contraband from departing the Republic. This innovative approach became a model for PACOM. At its peak strength the JCG controlled over 250 military customs inspectors operating from over fifteen locations in Vietnam. The JCG was awarded the Commissioner's Plaque, the highest award of the US Bureau of Customs (BOC), for its success.

(U) On 15 August 1972 the JCG was deactivated. The customs control program was then allocated functionally in accordance with paragraph 7, CINCPAC Instruction 5840.3A dated 21 April 1972. Transportation hold baggage operations were augmented by military customs inspectors furnished by the USARV/MACV SUPCOM Provost Marshal. 7th Air Force Security Police assumed customs inspection responsibility for passengers and accompanied baggage departing through aerial ports. Local personnel performed customs inspections as required by applicable directives.

(U) The MACV Provost Marshal, with assistance from the BOC, monitored the military customs programs in Vietnam. The program exceeded the criteria outlined in DOD Regulation 5030.49R and CINCPAC Instruction 5840.3A. The military customs program in Vietnam was certified acceptable by the BOC.

(U) Coordination was effected with the BOC whereby at a certain point during withdrawal, the customs inspection mission was to be assumed by BOC representatives in CONUS.¹⁰⁰

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DRUG SUPPRESSION

(C) On 15 August 1972 the management of the Special Collection Program, TAN TURTLE, was transferred from MACV Director of Intelligence to the MACV Provost Marshal. The goal of the program was to receive and provide a means for coordinated collection of intelligence concerning the

production, refining, transportation, and distribution of drugs throughout Southeast Asia. Input for the program was received from all US military units in Southeast Asia, as well as the US Embassy, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the Bureau of Customs, and USAID representatives.¹⁰¹

(S) On 13 June 1972 a joint White House, State,



Dogs trained to detect marijuana were an integral part of the customs operation.

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Treasury, DOD, Justice, and CIA message implemented Program VAGABOND CLIPPER to interdict the flow of narcotics from Thailand to Vietnam and Hong Kong by Thai fishing trawlers. The MACV Provost Marshal was designated as overall coordinator for the project and was tasked to prepare an OPLAN to promulgate procedures to implement the program. On 15 November 1972 the responsibility of MACV for Project VAGABOND CLIPPER was terminated due to the loss of MACV assets, and support responsibility was transferred to CINCPAC.¹⁰²

PRISONERS OF WAR Internment Facilities

(U) The ARVN PW camp system was reduced during 1972 due to a mass relocation of PWs as part of the RVNAF response to the NGUYEN HUE Offensive. By 11 August 1972 the PW camp system had been reduced from five to four operational mainland camps. Two of these camps, Da Nang and Qui Nhon, were used as temporary internment centers, transferring PWs to the Central PW camp (CPWC), Bien Hoa camp, or Can Tho camp, as appropriate, whenever their camp population reached ten or more. The Bien Hoa camp remained the primary internment center for youths, paraplegics, and aged PWs. The Can Tho camp started operating as the primary female internment center when the female PWs were transferred from Qui Nhon to Can Tho in May 1972. The fifth camp, Pleiku, was transferred to the Pleiku province administrative office on 11 August 1972 for use as a refugee center. The Qui Nhon and Pleiku camps were later relocated at the Qui Nhon PW facility, with the Pleiku camp in a nonoperational status and the Qui Nhon camp operating from one compound and serving as a temporary internment facility for PWs captured in Military Region 2. The Pleiku camp organization, with a reduced strength, was retained in reserve in a nonoperational status should the PW situation require the reestablishment of a fifth mainland PW camp. The CPWC, located on Phu Quoc Island in the Gulf of Thailand, continued to operate as the main facility for enemy PWs interned in Vietnam.¹⁰³

PW Advisory Program

(U) As the drawdown continued in 1972, the MACV advisory program was altered in parallel with the reduction of PWs in the northern camps. PW advisory positions in the military regions were transferred to MACPM who assumed responsibility for the entire advisory effort of the PW program. This realignment facilitated centralized control with the least amount of degradation to the PW program. Because of the MACV requirement to monitor the PW program to ensure compliance with the Geneva

Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW), key advisory positions could not be reduced although many administrative positions and assistant advisory positions were eliminated. Thirty-eight personnel positions were established as the minimum necessary to successfully carry out the PW Advisory Program. These positions were carried by Team 14 which was the primary advisory team for MACPM. MACPM PW Division continued to operate as the overall staff coordinator between ARVN and US PW operations.¹⁰⁴

Relocation of PW

(C) Two major PW evacuation operations were conducted during the year, both of which were conducted by ARVN with the assistance of US aircraft. Both operations were conducted professionally and without incident. The first of these operations took place in May and involved evacuating PWs from the Da Nang, Pleiku, and Qui Nhon PW camps to insure PW safety during the NGUYEN HUE Offensive. The evacuation involved moving 4,186 PWs from the three northern PW camps and the Can Tho camp to CPWC, and an additional 1,027 from the northern camps to Bien Hoa and Can Tho, for a total of 5,213 PW moved.¹⁰⁵

(S) The second move involved the relocation of 3,295 PWs among the CPWC, Bien Hoa, and Can Tho camps in preparation for the anticipated repatriation of PWs at the end of hostilities. This move took place between 26 and 30 November and was accomplished entirely with the use of air transportation. Twenty-three sorties of US C-130 aircraft and eight sorties of RVNAF C-123 aircraft were used to accomplish the relocation. As a result of the relocation, all PWs categorized as sick and wounded by camp authorities for repatriation purposes and the young (youth) PWs were located at the Bien Hoa camp. All NVA and regroupes not categorized as sick and wounded or youth were located at the CPWC. The Can Tho camp remained the primary internment facility for female PWs and also was used to intern the majority of New Life PWs who had been approved for release by MOND. All of the PW camps retained other New Life PWs because these type prisoners were needed to maintain work and pay programs within the camps and provide work details for camp maintenance.¹⁰⁶

Work and Pay Activities


(U) In the fall of 1969 the RVNAF JGS initiated action to establish uniform work programs at its six PW camps. Before that time individual camps had been encouraged to provide work programs on a minimal basis as determined by the camp commanders. Work programs continued to progress

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The Qui Nhon Prisoner of War Camp.

and by 1972 a well-structured work and pay program was in existence. During 1972 the Bien Hoa PW camp engaged in such projects as manufacturing uniforms from precut cloth; manufacturing concrete blocks, tile, and wooden shipping pallets; and conducting carpentry, welding, and blacksmithing on a contract basis. The camp also manufactured artificial limbs for amputee PWs and conducted research on the production of soap. By the end of the year, the Bien Hoa camp had developed a soap consisting of 72 percent coconut oil of which they could produce 300,000 kilograms per year with existing equipment and stores.¹⁰⁷

(U) The CPWC had carpenter shops established in most New Life compounds and a small farm was in operation. Plans were made to increase the farmland, and more seed was issued to increase the vegetable growing capacity. Can Tho operated a successful vegetable, fish, and pig farming project

which was profitable to the entire PW camp system. The three northern camps operated small scale projects such as carpentry, tailoring, sandal making, and gardening. PWs received eight piasters per day for their work efforts based on a pay scale which had been approved in December 1967.¹⁰⁸

Nutritional Standards

(C) Nutritional requirements were highly emphasized during 1972 because of the concern generated by the International Red Cross (ICRC) reports which indicated that PWs were not getting a sufficient quantity of nutritional food. The ICRC had suggested in May 1971 that the PW ration allowance be increased from an average of 30.00 piasters to 50 piasters per PW per day. MACV approved Joint Support Funds for use by Vietnam to increase the ration allowance to 50 piasters for the balance of 1971. The government of Viet-

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nam chose not to increase the allowance and the funds were reprogrammed. MACV again approved Joint Support Funds to increase the ration allowance for 1972 in the amount of 191,844,000 piasters. This allocation of funds was made contingent on the increase of the ration rate to 50 piasters and stipulated that the funds could be used for no other purpose. The ration rate was increased effective 1 August 1972 based on a Minister of National Defense decree dated 29 July 1972.¹⁰⁹

(C) Because of the ICRC interest in this area, the US Army Medical Research and Nutrition Laboratory conducted a nutritional survey in August 1972. The results of this survey indicated that PW health was satisfactory and that PWs had in fact gained weight since their capture and were being provided a better diet than that received by the ARVN soldier. The survey team recommended that the amount of green and leafy vegetables in the PW diet be increased.¹¹⁰

Repatriation Release Planning

(C) Planning for the release and repatriation of enemy PWs was of paramount concern to both RVNAF and MACV during 1972. In September 1971 MACV published a plan for the repatriation of North Vietnamese prisoners of war (J204 Plan). That action prompted RVNAF interest in developing a similar plan and led to a joint MACV/RVNAF meeting on 10 May 1972. It was agreed that a combined plan for repatriation and release of enemy PWs would be published with an estimated completion date of 31 July 1972. The plan addressed as many contingencies as could be forecast and covered modes of transportation, release points, priorities for release, administrative processing, medical support, and press coverage. The plan was oriented toward the repatriation of NVA/regroupee PWs but could be used for VC PW release if required.¹¹¹

(S) Subsequent to the publication of the plan, procedures were implemented in Vietnamese PW camps to ready themselves for a possible PW release. As cease-fire negotiations heightened, pre-planning activities increased, culminating in extensive operations in December 1972. In addition to relocating PWs within the PW camps according to category, all PWs were brought up to date on their immunizations, medical records were prepared, new fingerprint cards were made, and rosters were prepared on PWs for manifesting purposes. All PW personal property was inventoried, personal funds audited, and receipts prepared for the anticipated return of funds and property at the time of repatriation.¹¹²

(U) The Republic of Vietnam made offers of

repatriation throughout the period of active hostilities, all of which were ignored by North Vietnam because they refused to acknowledge that they had forces in the South. Efforts were continued on a unilateral basis and by 1971 Vietnam had repatriated, released, or reclassified 5,960 PWs. The last of these releases came as an offer of good faith in commemoration of President Thieu's inauguration on 31 October 1971. This release, the largest in the history of the conflict, resulted in 2,300 PWs being transferred to Chieu Hoi centers and 623 VC PWs being released to their home provinces.

(C) During 1972 Chieu Hoi releases were halted by the President and no PWs gained their release through this program. The PW camps, however, continued an active program of identifying PWs eligible for this type release and by December carried 1,410 PWs approved for Chieu Hoi release.¹¹³

(U) Offers to release sick and wounded PWs eligible under Article 109, GPW, were made by the South but were ignored by North Vietnam. On the occasion of All Souls Day, 23 August 1972, an offer was made to release 600 sick and wounded PWs. The offer was ignored by the North and none of the 600 were released. The year ended with no PWs having been released from PW camps in South Vietnam.

Treatment of Enemy PWs

(U) Although North Vietnam refused to recognize application of the Geneva Convention to the Vietnam conflict, South Vietnam steadfastly complied with the articles of the convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war. This compliance with the GPW became a matter of interest to Dr. R. E. Shields, Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and Mr. Frank Sieverts, Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State during their visit to Vietnam in February 1972. During the visits they requested that a study be made to review Vietnam's adherence to the GPW. The results of this study indicated that Vietnam was doing an outstanding job in operating the PW program within the parameters established by the Convention. The study showed that Vietnam was complying with 95 percent of the applicable provisions of the Geneva Convention and all of the basic humanitarian provisions.¹¹⁵

(U) The International Committee of the Red Cross made regular inspections of PW camps and was granted free access to talk with PWs anywhere it chose and anytime it desired. The delegation was kept informed on all activities of the PW camps and was allowed to observe trials, visit prisons and

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hospitals, and provide gifts to the PWs when it requested to do so.

(U) Vietnam allowed PWs to send and receive mail and to receive packages from home with no interference from camp authorities other than routine censorship for security reasons. Family visits were also allowed until they were ordered curtailed by the President in May 1972 because of security problems associated with the NGUYEN

HUE Offensive.

(U) The MACPM Division's primary responsibilities during repatriation activities in the cease-fire period included: monitoring the Vietnamese PW program in South Vietnam to insure application of the Geneva Convention articles; close coordination with elements of the JGS, RVNAF, on all aspects of PW accountability; coordination with the MACV staff on PW matters and support for PW camps; and liaison with the US camp advisers, civilian agencies, and the US Embassy staff. The PW division provided close coordination with the JGS planners for the movement and release of enemy PWs (EPW). Transportation for EPW and return of South Vietnamese PWs was coordinated with the MACV staff and Joint Military Commission Operations Center. PW records and documentation on the release and repatriation of US captured EPW were obtained and forwarded to the PW Civilian Internee Information Center, Fort Meade, Maryland. PW strength accountability and repatriation activity was provided CINCPAC and DA. Various PW rosters were jointly prepared with ARVN, and printing was accomplished by the MACV Data Management Agency.

DRUG AND NARCOTIC ABATEMENT PROGRAM¹¹⁷

BACKGROUND

(U) The drug challenge was not new to Americans serving in Vietnam in 1972. For several years drug usage had been aggravated by the fact that some 30 to 50 percent of American soldiers had experimented with drugs prior to their entry into service or their arrival in Vietnam. During his first visit to Vietnam, Dr. Richard S. Wilbur, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health and Environment, developed statistics which indicated that over four-fifths of drug users detected in Vietnam had used drugs prior to their arrival there.

(U) Until early 1970 drug usage in Vietnam involved primarily the use of marijuana. At about the same time marijuana came under heavy attack and it was later alleged that this caused a shift to the more dangerous heroin. However, according to research of over 4,000 heroin users in Vietnam, only eight percent indicated that pressure against marijuana caused a switch to heroin. Avail-

ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR

(C) Pursuant to an agreement between COMUSMACV and the Chief of JGS, RVNAF on 27 September 1965, all enemy prisoners of war captured by US forces were to be transferred to RVNAF for internment. The US retained a residual responsibility which required the US to take corrective action or request return of US captured PWs if Vietnam should fail to treat PWs in accordance with the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW). MACV considered an active US advisory system as the best means of satisfying this residual responsibility. This advisory effort took the form of MACV advisers being placed in each mainland PW camp and a 28-man advisory team being used to monitor activities at the Central Prisoner of War Camp (CPWC). An advisory element was placed with the RVNAF MP Command to coordinate staff actions with RVNAF, and the PW division in the MACV Provost Marshal's Office coordinated overall PW operation between the two forces.

(C) In consonance with the Vietnamization program the reduction of the US combat role resulted in a corresponding reduction in US captured PWs. RVNAF continued to capture substantial numbers of PWs which, along with numerous losses through deaths, releases, and escapes, resulted in constant fluctuations in the PW population. As of 31 December, 37,479 PWs were interned in Vietnamese PW camps, 13,263 of which were US captured.¹¹⁶

ability, low cost, and a uniformly packaged, highly potent product, coupled with peer pressure, curiosity, and innumerable individual reasons accounted for its increased use.

(U) A wide variety of pharmaceutical products were also available in Vietnam. Amphetamines and barbiturates could be purchased with very little difficulty. However, the urinalysis program and other informational sources indicated that these drugs were not being heavily used. LSD was not much in evidence and appeared to be in general disfavor among US troops.

(U) Biographic and demographic data assembled by MACV led to several conclusions about the profile of a typical drug abuser stationed in Vietnam. He was from 18 to 25 years of age and ranked from E1 to E5. He was not the typically pictured drug addict; he generally a single Caucasian, first term enlisted man with a high school or higher level of education and from a city of over 100,000

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population. His parents were living together and not drug dependent. He had not had any civilian convictions as a drug abuser during the previous years.

HIGH LEVEL CONCERN AND MACV ACTIONS

(U) The large upsurge in drug abuse was of great concern to the highest levels of the US Government. This concern culminated in a June 1971 memorandum sent by the Secretary of Defense to the secretaries of the military departments and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directing that the drug abuse problem be given urgent and immediate attention. Close personal follow-up action with written reports was directed.

COMUSMACV ACTIONS TO CURB DRUG ABUSE

(U) The urgent attention directed by the President added impetus to an on-going MACV program to curb drug abuse in Vietnam. By August 1970 a MACV Drug Task Force had been formed. As a result of several months study of all aspects of drug abuse in Vietnam, MACV initiated a new drug abuse suppression program which provided for education, investigation, enforcement, and rehabilitation.

(U) On 20 May 1971 at the commander's conference, major subordinate commanders were directed to correct the drug abuse problem through the existing command structure and application of strong leadership. Component commanders were directed to maintain sufficient resources to combat drug abuse during redeployment. The suppression program was made a special subject for IG inspections.

(U) Enforcement continued to be an element of primary concern to every commander throughout 1972. The MACV enforcement efforts included suppression of use and possession of illegal drugs by servicemen, suppression of drug availability through detection and apprehension of peddlers and low-level suppliers, and attempts to interdict the flow of drugs at all levels of the trafficking network. The MACV Provost Marshal's office continued to work in conjunction with other law enforcement agencies, including the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, the US Bureau of Customs, the US Army Criminal Investigations Command, and the Vietnamese National Police.

(U) The treatment program, involving both detoxification and rehabilitation, was also a command responsibility. At one time there were a total of 13 rehabilitation centers and four drug treatment centers operational in Vietnam. However, consistent with the reduction of US forces, only the Sai-

gon rehabilitation center and one drug treatment center remained operational in December 1972.

DRUG EDUCATION PROGRAM

(U) Drug education continued to be presented to both the leaders and the men through many means. Drug literature, posters, and films were employed, with strong emphasis on presenting material which was factual, relevant, and credible. Additionally, the MACV Office of Information, in conjunction with AFVN radio and TV, broadcast some 60 spots daily over AM and FM radio and TV as part of the antidrug campaign.

(U) The education effort continued to be one of prevention. Throughout 1972 it represented a positive offensive against drug abuse, while other elements of the program were necessarily corrective or curative efforts which were applied only after the problem became evident. The continuous mission of the education effort was to take credible instruction to varied audiences of all services in their working or living areas. Instruction offered included the effects of drugs from alcohol to heroin. The education effort was targeted to motivate the appropriate audience in the most productive manner. One of the most successful of the education devices was the Drug Education Field Team.

DRUG EDUCATION FIELD TEAMS

(U) On 7 September 1971 a new concept in drug education was introduced in the Republic of Vietnam with the fielding of the first Drug Education Field Team (DEFT). This program was expanded so that by mid-November 1971 five DEFTs were operational in the field. Consistent with the draw-down of US forces in Vietnam, two DEFTs were inactivated in February and April 1972. During 1972 there were 1,303 DEFT presentations made to 48,272 persons. With the further withdrawal of US forces and consequent decline in the drug problem, the last two DEFTs were terminated on 30 November 1972.

(U) Because all DEFT sessions were small (the average US presentation was attended by 30 men), nearly always involved active discussion for periods of one to three hours, and captured the attention of the audience, the DEFT concept was believed to be a vital element in the overall campaign against drug abuse. As a by-product, a close relationship between unit drug problems and other leadership problems such as morale and racial relations was discovered. The communications generated as a result of the DEFT sessions provided unit leaders with valuable information in all of these areas.

(U) During the latter part of 1972 the increased utilization of the DEFTs demonstrated the DEFT concept had application throughout the military and

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civilian communities. The 7th Fleet successfully employed two teams on different occasions causing the Navy to endorse the DEFT concept. A DEFT team, while attending a week long Thailand-wide drug workshop, gave nonmilitary presentations to a teen club and other dependents on two different occasions with positive responses from both audiences. These sessions prompted a number of requests to send another team to Thailand.

IDENTIFICATION AND DETECTION OF USERS

(U) Beginning in June 1971 the urinalysis testing program was progressively expanded to include additional categories of personnel. In July 1972 the follow-up urinalysis requirement for all identified Army drug abusers was increased to submission of a weekly urinalysis until such time as eight consecutive negative samples were submitted. The testing of Army incoming replacement personnel, which began in March 1972, was positive on only one occasion. This attested to the excellent CONUS screening prior to departure for Vietnam. The numbers of detected drug offenders are shown in Figure F-13.

DETOXIFICATION AND REHABILITATION

(U) The goals of the MACV drug abuse program continued to be the early detection of users, the administration of proper treatment, and the offer of the most complete rehabilitation assistance possible within the environment of Vietnam. Detoxification and rehabilitation required a major effort by all MACV personnel involved.

VIETNAMESE ACTIONS TO CONTROL DRUG TRAFFICKING

(U) Prior to 1971 two drugs, Maxiton Forte and Obesitol, were heavily abused by US military personnel assigned to Vietnam. Intelligence from the Joint Narcotics Investigation Detachment indicated that restrictive controls by the Government of Vietnam officials alleviated the abuse of these drugs beginning in 1971.

(C) Starting in the spring of 1972 the Government of Vietnam began to stress its antinarcotic campaign. By the fall of 1972 the Vietnamese judiciary and prosecutors began to play essential roles in eradicating narcotics traffic. The cases outlined below demonstrate this by showing that the accused



Confiscated marijuana plants from rural areas were burned by the National Police.

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DETECTED MILITARY DRUG OFFENDERS


QUARTER	MARCOTICS	DANGEROUS DRUGS	MARIJUANA	ALL DRUGS	POPULATION
1970					
1	98	336	2,141	2,575	475,400
2	212	487	2,279	2,978	484,000
3	238	489	2,029	2,756	409,200
4	598	439	1,712	2,749	360,600
1971					
1	1,084	215	1,397	2,696	326,700
2	2,274	222	1,163	3,659	264,700
3	1,989	120	629	2,688	223,200
4	1,729	25	364	2,118	185,344
1972					
1	854	23	334	1,211	95,541
2	594	9	184	787	48,006
3	218	2	144	384	35,865
4	79	2	65	146	26,700

Source: MACDP

Figure: F-13

DEROS URINALYSIS TESTING (JUNE 1971 - DECEMBER 1972)

(PERCENT OF DETECTED DRUG USERS OF THOSE TESTED)



Source: MACDP

Figure: F-14

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were charged under antismuggling legislation which allowed stiffer penalties. and was allowed to observe trials, visit prisons and large-scale drug trafficker from Thailand guilty of smuggling three and one-half kilos of heroin into Vietnam in April 1971. He was sentenced to five years solitary confinement.

—On 9 March the court also convicted two Americans of importing 3,500 dosage units of LSD into the country in April 1971 for the purpose of selling these to US servicemen. Each was sentenced to four years in prison.

(C) Acting on President Thieu's orders, the Prime Minister's office retrieved from the Lower House comprehensive narcotics legislation previously submitted and strengthened it. Acting under his emergency powers, President Thieu promulgated the law on 12 August 1972. The main features included more stringent penalties for violators: life imprisonment for trafficking individually in any of most narcotics and the death penalty for individuals convicted as part of a trafficking ring. For trafficking in LSD or hallucinogens the penalty was fixed at imprisonment at hard labor, with the sentence of


life for members of organizations. Dealing in barbiturates and other specific toxic drugs brought less severe punishment. During the period of martial law, military field courts had jurisdiction over narcotics cases.

(U) By 15 September 1972 the National Police had 383 full-time specialized narcotics personnel who served in every province and autonomous city in Vietnam. Over 1,100 additional officers and judicial investigators had received specialized narcotics training and were able to augment narcotics investigation efforts as required. All National Police personnel had received some narcotics orientation and over 50,000 had received training in the subject.

DEROS TESTING

(U) Figure F-14 illustrates the overall downward trend in confirmed positives for DEROs urinalysis testing for the period June 1971 through December 1972 with an all time high of 5.18 percent in August 1972. It was believed the sharp rise in May 1972 followed by a continued downward trend was due to the large number of short notice curtailments. As a result of the unexpected curtailments, a signi-

UNANNOUNCED UNIT URINALYSIS TESTING
(SEPTEMBER 1971-OCTOBER 1972)



Source: MACDP

Figure: F-15

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ficant number of personnel considered to be experimenters were detected. Under normal circumstances, many of these abusers would have stopped the use of the drugs sufficiently in advance of their DEROS to avoid detection.

UNANNOUNCED UNIT TESTING

(U) Figure F-15 reflects the overall trend of the unannounced unit urinalysis test program for all services. In order to identify and treat as many users as possible, USARV broadened the scope of its random unit tests in February 1972 to include biweekly retesting of all units having an eight percent or higher rate of confirmed positive tests. The overall unit urinalysis rate since the program com-

menced on 25 August 1971 through October 1972 was 4.39 percent.

BIOGRAPHIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC DATA SUMMARY

(U) The table below reflects the grouping of abusers by age and rank.

DETECTED DRUG ABUSERS				
(Percent By Age Group)				
Under 21	22 - 25	26 - 28	29 - 36	37 and Over
51.1	45.1	1.6	0.9	0.1
(Percent By Grade Structure)				
E1 to E5	E6 to E9	W1 to W2	O1 to O3	O4 to O9
99.2	0.7	0.1	0.0	0.0

COMMUNITY/HUMAN RELATIONS

ORGANIZATION AND MANNING FOR COMMUNITY/HUMAN RELATIONS

(U) The Community/Human Relations Program was the responsibility of the MACV Director of Personnel. Due to the continuing drawdown of US personnel and the consequent reduced work load, there were several reorganizations and transfers of functions and personnel in 1972. The first occurred in January when the Community Relations Division became the Community Relations Branch and was placed under the staff supervision of the Drugs and Discipline Division. At the same time, as a result of the decentralization of the Project HIEU (Understanding) training program and a reduction in community relations staff actions, the branch was reduced in size.¹¹⁸

(U) Other changes within the branch occurred in December. As a result of incremental phase-downs, the Drugs, Discipline, and Community Relations Branch and Human Relations Branch were combined into a single unit within the Personnel Management Division, MACV Directorate of Personnel. The staff and authority for the publication of Thong Cam magazine were transferred to the Director of CORDS.¹¹⁹ This transfer was necessitated by the loss of supervisory capability within the Community Relations Branch due to the incremental drawdown of MACV personnel.

COMMUNITY RELATIONS

(U) After receiving confirmation in January 1972 that the Government of Vietnam Operation THIEN CHI Directive had reached at least one province in each military region, MACAG was notified to distribute the corresponding MACV Directive 550-11, Operation THIEN CHI, which had been held in abeyance. MACV Directive 550-12, Community Relations Programs (Long Range), was distributed at the same time. Also during January the Chaplain's

Conference was briefed by the Discipline and Human Relations Branch on race relations in Vietnam.¹²⁰

(U) In July a comprehensive community relations directive, MACV Directive 550-1 was published. This directive superseded four previous directives and accomplished the following:

—Provided all the MACV community relations guidance in one convenient source and eliminated obsolete information pertaining to military operations, military and civic actions, law enforcement, reduction in force, and communications.

—Modified and clarified reporting requirements. In addition, it provided guidance in the following areas not covered in the previous directives:

—Publication of Thong Cam magazine.

—Programming, budgeting, and funding for community relations activities.

—Medical assistance as related to community relations.

—Religious and humanitarian activities as related to community relations.

The revised edition also provided clarification and amplified guidance in the areas of:

—Planning and conducting community relations activities.

—Prevention of accidents and incidents.

—Functions of reaction assistance teams.

It also revised the guidance concerning Operation THIEN CHI to more closely conform with the Government of Vietnam directive establishing that program.¹²¹

HUMAN RELATIONS

Racial Complaints

(U) In 1972, as in the past, the media continued to add to tensions among the races in the US forces in Vietnam by their exaggerated reports of a racial maelstrom threatening to boil over at any moment, when in actuality the situation was much less

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severe. Racial tensions existed, to be sure, and according to many observers would continue to exist for a long time. However, to suggest that a race war was imminent seemed a blatant case of overstatement. By the end of the year MACIG's continuing review of serious incident reports and complaints and inspections of 49 advisory teams had determined that of a total of 4,238 incidents and complaints only 36 could be traced to racial problems. Observations made by MACIG as part of a human relations review conducted in late 1972 indicated that factors contributing to the favorable racial climate in Vietnam were troop reductions, the shift from a combat to a support role, and the continued sensitivity of field commanders. By January 1973 complaints of all types had fallen off drastically, probably due to the expected cease-fire and consequent early departure of US troops.¹²²

(U) While racial tensions were not considered high at year's end, tensions of a general nature continued to exist. A careful study attributed these to the uncertainties in the date of a cease-fire, long working hours, reductions in recreational facilities, and the daily stress of being in a combat zone. The study identified certain areas or types of units requiring particular attention:

—Areas of large troop concentrations with adjacent off limits civilian areas such as Da Nang or Bien Hoa.

—Units that had a significant number of troops assigned duties primarily involving security such as US Army combat aviation groups and the USAF security police in Da Nang.

—Areas that frequently came under rocket attack such as Da Nang, Bien Hoa, and Pleiku. Additionally, it was observed that there was a continuing need to educate all echelons of command regarding ethnic values.

(U) From the results of the study it was apparent that commanders were aware of the indicators of general tension and the need for continued education in racial relations. Effective vertical and lateral communications were evident throughout Vietnam. The study further concluded that commanders were vitally concerned with human relations and people-oriented programs.

(U) As with racial tensions, tensions of a general nature declined drastically, concurrent with the signing of the cease-fire and increased pace of troop withdrawals. By the end of January 1973 complaints had reached such a low level that MACIG canceled the requirement for monthly morale and discipline reports from major commands effective 1 February 1973.¹²³

Evaluation of Human Relations Program

(U) In connection with the analysis of the serious incidents reports and the IG complaints mentioned



Informal discussions, a part of human relations programs, aimed to highlight problems for the attention of commanders.

above, an assessment of race relations in the Republic of Vietnam for the calendar year 1972 was made. The findings as reported to COMUSMACV were as follows:

—The component commands had promulgated excellent human relations directives and were implementing and monitoring their human relations programs.

—All commands had a human relations program in effect. Human relations councils had been organized and met once a month or more frequently. This provided an excellent method for communication and discussion of morale problems.

—Significant progress was noted in race relations and equal opportunity education. Many commands had human and race relations seminars which proved very effective in providing for a free exchange of ideas and understanding of ethnic problems.

—Overall, it was observed that commanders in that field were demonstrating a high degree of leadership expertise in human relations and were

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willing to acknowledge the fact that they had or periodically would have human relations problems.

—It was concluded that the command would continue to experience a diminishing number of

incidents in which race was suspected to be a factor; however, the study indicated that during the last few months of 1972 such incidents involved only individual animosities.¹²⁴

LEAVE, REST, AND RECUPERATION

(U) The Leave, Rest, and Recuperation (R&R) Program for US military forces in Vietnam was developed early in 1962 to provide US servicemen a period of time outside Vietnam away from the tension and strain present in a combat zone. While in-country R&R facilities were available, they served only as rest areas where combat troops could have a brief respite from their austere and dangerous existence. These in-country facilities supplemented the R&R site out of Vietnam, but were not meant to replace them. Out-of-country R&R was a key factor in maintaining the overall high morale of US personnel in Vietnam.¹²⁵

R&R SITE CLOSURES

Closure of R&R Processing Center at Da Nang

(U) The troop drawdown and the closing of the R&R site at Sydney resulted in a sharp reduction in R&R flights from Da Nang. Only five flights to Bangkok and Taipei were scheduled to depart from Da Nang in January and February 1972. Consequently, it was directed that effective 1 January 1972 all Hawaii R&R passengers would use commercial block seat service out of Saigon, and effective 1 February 1972 all R&R flights would be scheduled to depart from Tan Son Nhut AB after personnel were processed through Camp Alpha.¹²⁶

The Taipei and Bangkok Sites

(C) In mid-January 1972 CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that negotiations for closing the R&R sites at Taipei and Bangkok begin at the Washington level and that CINCPAC be given the authority to establish the exact closure dates based on projected utilization. It was felt that the date for the closure of the R&R site at Taipei should be 1 April 1972. This projection was based on the low usage rates as of January 1972. It was also recommended that the Military Airlift Command be alerted for a requirement to support the Bangkok R&R program by military airlift after 1 April because of the nonavailability of a commercial carrier.

(U) On 10 March 1972 it was announced that the official closure date for the Taipei R&R site would be 5 April 1972 and that the last flight to Taipei would depart Vietnam on 29 March and return on 5 April 1972. Taipei would remain an authorized leave site.¹²⁷

(U) The sites shown in Figure F-16 operated

from 1962 to 1968 to keep pace with increased R&R participation during the troop buildup. All the sites except Sydney were operational by December 1966. The closure were tied to the troop drawdown; they were phased out as the decreasing usage rate made the airlift and the operational overhead at the sites uneconomical.

IN-COUNTRY R&R AUGMENTATION

(C) The FY 72 plans called for gradual termination of all out-of-country R&R programs except for Honolulu. As a result, MACV conducted a feasibility study which indicated the potential of using the USARSUPTHAI Pattaya Beach R&R Center on a joint basis to augment the MACV in-country R&R sites at Vung Tau and Chira Beach. Approval for the joint use concept was requested from CINCPAC and the American Embassy, Thailand, through MACTHAI. The embassy concurred with the joint use concept for the Pattaya Beach project in mid-January 1972. However, on 31 March MACV informed MACTHAI that due to the continued drawdown and the opening of the new site at Vung Tau, subsequent to the initiation of the Pattaya Beach project, MACV was canceling plans to enter into the joint agreement.¹²⁸

(U) On 30 November 1971 COMUSMACV had inquired of the Australian Forces Vietnam (AFV) about the possibility of US forces using the AFV R&R site at Vung Tau. The Commander, AFV informed COMUSMACV in early February 1972 that Australia agreed under the following conditions:

—The complex was only loaned on an interim basis until the US forces had no further military use for a leave center.

—Priority must be given to Australian servicemen to use the facility.

—On the cessation of a US requirement, the property would revert to Australia for final disposition.

(U) In February COMUSMACV informed the Commander, AFV that the proposed conditions were acceptable and tasked USARV with the responsibility for finalizing the arrangements. The site was used for several months, but was transferred back to Aust. military control in November. The original US Vung Tau R&R site remained in use.¹²⁹

TERMINATION OF R&R PROGRAM

(U) On 31 December 1972 MACV proposed to

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CINCPAC a continuation of the R&R program after the approaching cease-fire. The proposal recommended that the R&R program continue for approximately six months to allow participation by those personnel who had accrued R&R eligibility prior to the cease-fire and who would remain in SEA. After these personnel had been afforded the

opportunity to participate, the program would be terminated. CINCPAC concurred and on 27 January 1973 forwarded the proposal to the JCS. On 26 January 1973, USARV/MACV SUPCOM dispatched a message to all commands announcing the permanent closure of the Vung Tau R&R facility on 28 January 1973.¹³⁰

OUT-OF-COUNTRY R&R SITES
(Dec 1966 - Jan 1973)

SITE	DATE	STATUS
BANGKOK.....	JAN 73.....	STILL AVAILABLE
GUAM.....	JAN 73.....	STILL AVAILABLE (use limited to servicemen of Guamanian origin)
HAWAII.....	JAN 73.....	STILL AVAILABLE
HONG KONG.....	OCT 71.....	CLOSED (remained an authorized leave site)
KUALA LUMPUR.....	MAY 69.....	CLOSED
MANILA.....	JUN 70.....	CLOSED
PENANG.....	MAY 69.....	CLOSED
SINGAPORE.....	FEB 69.....	CLOSED
SYDNEY.....	JAN 72.....	CLOSED (remained an authorized leave site)
TAIPEI.....	APR 72.....	CLOSED (remained an authorized leave site)
TOKYO.....	SEP 71.....	CLOSED

Source: MACDP

Figure: F-16

US PRISONERS OF WAR

BACKGROUND

(U) In 1972, as in previous years, Hanoi used US Prisoners of War (PWs) as pawns in the Paris negotiations, hoping to gain concessions in exchange for their repatriation. Although a signatory of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention, North Vietnam refused to abide by the Convention. Impartial inspection of prison camps was not permitted and repatriation of seriously sick and wounded prisoners was refused, the enemy claiming that US prisoners were war criminals and thus not entitled to PW status.

(C) On 10 January 1973 there were 1,983 Americans officially listed as missing or captured in Southeast Asia. Of this figure 560 military and 36 civilians were officially confirmed as PWs. A total of 437 US military personnel were identified as PWs in North Vietnam. Hanoi, under pressure of world opinion, ultimately acknowledged that it was holding 400 US PWs (387 military and 13 civilians). The difference between US and North Vietnamese figures existed, according to Hanoi, because a number of PWs had died of injuries or illness while in captivity. US authorities further listed the following locations and numbers of unconfirmed US

PWs: North Vietnam-76, South Vietnam-79, Khmer Republic-13 and Laos-3.¹³¹

US PWs IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Enemy Release of US PWs Prior to 1972

(U) From the beginning of the Vietnam conflict until the end of 1971 the enemy released a total of 53 US armed forces personnel. Of those released, 42 were US Army personnel, seven US Air Force, two US Marine Corps, and two US Navy.¹³²

Release of US PWs, 1972 to Cease-fire

(U) The only US PWs released in 1972 were three aviators: Air Force MAJ Edward K. Elias, and Navy LTs Markham L. Gartley and Norris A. Charles. The first US PWs freed by North Vietnam since 1969, the trio was released in Hanoi on 25 September. Escorted by antiwar activists, they arrived in the United States on 28 September after stopovers in Peking and Moscow.¹³³

Treatment of US PWs

(U) It was very difficult to obtain comprehensive data on the treatment of US PWs. This was particularly true in South Vietnam, Laos, and the Khmer Republic, where no information whatsoever was

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forthcoming. In North Vietnam Communist officials continued to refuse to allow representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross to inspect PW camps. Information on camp conditions and on PWs came from three released PWs and from a limited number of visits to PWs which the North Vietnamese authorities allowed. Almost all American visitors were identified with antiwar groups or had been critical of the US conduct of the war. Even they were given only limited access to PWs and permitted to view only facilities selected in advance by their hosts.

(C) Typical of North Vietnamese handling of those allowed to visit US PWs were the experiences of Seymour Hersh of The New York Times, author of the first article on My Lai, and Harold Gibbons, Teamster Vice President, who visited Hanoi in March and April 1972. Hersh was permitted to speak with two PWs who had been interviewed previously. When he asked for private informal interviews and a visit to a PW camp his requests were denied. Similarly, Gibbons was unsuccessful when he inquired about sick PWs.¹³⁴

(C) From the limited information available it appeared that US PWs, or at least those allowed to have visitors, were receiving decent treatment from their captors and were in reasonably good physical condition. It was also apparent that the enemy was using the PWs for propaganda purposes. Only selected PWs were permitted to be interviewed and never in private; a Hanoi representative was always present.

(U) A prime example of the enemy's use of PWs for propaganda purposes was the release of the three flyers mentioned above which was announced in Paris on 2 September, the National Day of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The men were released in the custody of four prominent antiwar activities representing the Committee for Liaison with the Families of Prisoners of War in North Vietnam and the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice, described by one of the activists as an antiwar movement in the United States. Before being permitted to return home the pilots were taken on a tour of Hanoi and photographed inspecting bomb damage after which they were placed on a Soviet Aeroflot airliner which traveled via Peking and Moscow. The antiwar activists with the group stated that North Vietnam had chosen this route fearing that if a stop were made in Laos, American authorities would attempt to "kidnap" the flyers. Both Hanoi and the activists alleged that the US Government had impeded earlier releases by asserting military control over released PWs and had misled them by employing them for military purposes related to attacks on North Vietnam and for slander against the Democratic Re-

public of Vietnam. They predicted that there would be no further releases until the Nixon Administration stopped the war. This was a major theme of Hanoi's propaganda concerning US PWs throughout the year. Commenting on the release, Secretary Laird claimed the Communists' actions were "absolutely" in violation of the Geneva Convention on treatment of PWs and men missing in action. He also rejected the above conditions laid down by Hanoi for release of other prisoners.¹³⁵

(S) Despite Hanoi's use of PWs for propaganda purposes and to gain concessions at the Paris negotiations, there were indications that efforts to call attention to the enemy's violations of the Geneva Convention were having their effect. As stated above, Hanoi finally began to identify US PWs it was holding in North Vietnam. Several times during the year it provided lists of PWs captured in 1972; once at the Paris negotiations and several times via radio broadcasts. Furthermore, according to the terms of the Vietnam Peace Treaty, Hanoi pledged to exchange a complete list of captured military personnel and foreign civilians.¹³⁶

(U) It was only in early March 1973, after three groups of US PWs had been repatriated from Hanoi and Loc Ninh, that initial firsthand reports of their treatment at the hands of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong were made known. The reports were intentionally lacking in detail because military authorities in charge of Operation HOMECOMING feared for the safety of the 286 known US PWs who were still in captivity. Nevertheless, based on these early reports, it was possible to assemble a general picture of enemy treatment of US PWs. It appeared that the enemy used both physical torture and solitary confinement, at least in one case lasting 27 months, in an effort to get the PWs to make antiwar statements. Such statements for propaganda usage were the principal goal of the North Vietnamese interrogators. The repatriated PWs also reported that until approximately October 1969 harsh treatment in North Vietnamese PW camps continued; their captors did as much as possible to block communications among PWs and prevent the PWs from organizing. During this period the PWs were kept apart and permitted to speak only with their cellmates. Treatment improved in North Vietnam only after October 1969 and for those PWs held by the Viet Cong in early 1970. The released PWs conjectured that the improvement resulted from a combination of efforts of the Nixon administration for a peace settlement and the rise of sentiment on behalf of the PWs in the United States.¹³⁷

Repatriation and PW Rights Efforts

(U) Both the US Government and private organizations continued their efforts to secure humane treatment and the early release of US PWs. The

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government, as it had previously, worked through the United Nations, International Red Cross, and the Paris negotiations. As ultimately shown in the protocols concerning PW repatriation in the Cease-fire Agreement, PWs were a major topic of discussions during the negotiations.

(U) A highlight of government efforts to focus public attention on the plight of US PWs was the National Week of Concern for Prisoners of War—Missing in Action, proclaimed by President Nixon for the week of 26 March to 1 April 1972. The Presidential proclamation and the congressional action which it endorsed made clear that the PW issue was of national concern and that the refusal of North Vietnam and its allies in Indochina to respect the Geneva Convention of 1949 was a grave violation of international law and humane standards of civilized nations. In 1956, the International Committee of the Red Cross had formally notified North Vietnam and other parties to the Indochina conflict that it considered the Convention to apply fully to that conflict.¹³⁸

PW NEGOTIATION OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY

Objectives

(S) Throughout the duration of the negotiations in Paris the issue of the release of US PWs was an integral part of each proposal put forth by the US delegation. Failing to achieve this ultimate objective, the US delegation worked unceasingly to accomplish the following more immediate objectives:

—Obtain comprehensive lists of all PWs and an accounting of all missing personnel.

—Keep the PW issue on center stage at the Paris Peace Talks until some agreement was reached.

—Attempt to secure a PW repatriation agreement as part of a negotiated agreement for a cease-fire.

—Insist on PW repatriation before completion of major US/FWMAF withdrawals as part of the agreement on mutual withdrawal.

Strategy and Policy

(U) In all negotiations on PWs the following considerations were to guide US actions:

—US was to assist Vietnam in the release and repatriation of consenting Vietnamese PWs. The US view was that the Geneva Convention did not require forcible repatriation. Raising the issue of "freedom of choice" was avoided.

—US was to take the lead with respect to US PW repatriation.

—If exchange of US for enemy PWs was proposed, close coordination would be maintained with the Vietnamese government, as the government

controlled all enemy PWs.

—US was to urge that Vietnam reduce the number of PWs in camps before a settlement. The program was planned to be implemented on a low key.

—The Geneva Convention was to be the basic international agreement concerning PWs.

—Although Vietnam was the detaining power, the US would retain a residual legal obligation for PWs captured by US forces.¹³⁹

PW Release/Repatriation Planning (EGRESS RECAP/HOMECOMING)¹⁴⁰

(C) Planning for the repatriation of US PWs was initiated by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in January 1969 in a memorandum prescribing policies to the secretaries of the military departments and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Subsequently, each of the departments, theater commanders, and COMUSMACV revised existing OPLANS and directives to conform to this policy. Prior to the cease-fire the most current plan was COMUSMACV OPLAN J190 dated 3 November 1972, originally short-titled EGRESS RECAP. The plan's name was changed to HOMECOMING by order of Secretary Laird on 11 January 1973.

(C) The emphasis of Operation HOMECOMING was to get returned PWs home to their families as rapidly as possible, consistent with their physical condition. As soon as terms of the cease-fire became known, final arrangements were made for the transfer of PWs from their places of release to medical facilities for checkups and hospitalization, if required, to be followed as expeditiously as possible by their return to the United States. The protocol of the peace treaty concerning the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians contained the following clauses:

—All captured personnel were to be returned within 60 days of the signing of the agreement at a rate no slower than the withdrawal of US forces from South Vietnam.

—Persons seriously ill, wounded or maimed, old persons, and women were to be returned first. The remainder were to be returned from one detention place after another or in order of dates of capture, beginning with those who had been held the longest.¹⁴¹

(U) In consonance with the terms of the cease-fire concerning PW release, the following procedures for the reception, initial processing, and evacuation of recovered personnel were established:

—PWs returned in South Vietnam were to be brought by helicopter to either Tan Son Nhut or Bien Hoa Air Bases from which they were to be evacuated to Clark Air Base.

—PWs returned in North Vietnam were to be flown from Hanoi to Clark Air Base.

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Admiral Noel Gayler, Commander in Chief, Pacific, addresses the crowd at Clark AB with ex-POW Navy LCDR Adfred H. Agnew at his side.

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—Military Airlift Command assets, C-141s and C-9s, were tasked to evacuate the recovered personnel from their points of release to Clark for initial processing and medical examinations and thence to hospitals in the United States.

—Clark Air Base in the Philippines was designated as the initial reception point for returning US PWs. A Joint Central Processing Center (JCPC) was established there. At the JCPC returned PWs were to receive an initial medical evaluation; they would be placed in contact with their families and outfitted with new uniforms. As soon as medically fit, they would be transported by C-141s to Travis Air Force Base, California.

—Travis was merely a stopover. From there the PWs were to be transferred to smaller C-9 aircraft for flights directly to any one of 31 military hospitals nearest their homes.

(U) The purpose of Operation HOMECOMING was to get the returned men to hospitals near their homes in the quickest possible time consistent with their medical condition in order to effect reunions with their families. The families were briefed on the homecoming plan in advance. They knew the locations of the hospitals and most had indicated they preferred to have their reunions as close to home as possible.¹⁴²

REDEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES

(U) In 1972 the redeployment of US forces begun in 1969 continued unabated. Three additional redeployment increments reduced the force ceiling 112,000 spaces from 139,000 on 31 January to 27,000 on 31 December. Free World Military Assistance Forces also continued to reduce the size of their contingents with the Republic of Korea retaining the only FWMAF combat units in-country by the end of the year.

REDEPLOYMENTS PRIOR TO 31 JANUARY 1972

(C) A summary of the withdrawals broken out by component services is shown in Figure F-17 for each of the ten increments completed from 1 July 1969 through 31 January 1972. Redeployments carried out during this period resulted in a total reduction in US military strength from 549,500 to 139,000.¹⁴³

REDEPLOYMENTS — 1969 TO 1972

Increment Number

Space Reductions in Increment I-V: 1 July 1969 - 31 December 1970

	I	II	III	IV	V
ARMY.....	15,384	14,082	29,443	18,779	38,100
NAVY.....	1,222	5,412	2,050	8,800	1,300
AIR FORCE.....	0	2,541	5,807	7,400	600
USMC.....	8,394	18,483*	12,900	17,021	0
TOTAL.....	25,000	40,500	50,000	50,000	40,000

Space Reductions in Increments VI-X: 1 January 1971 - 31 January 1972

Increment Number

	VI	VII	VIII	IX	X
ARMY.....	41,848	15,030	21,769	35,000	36,718
NAVY.....	5,600	516	1,122	1,400	2,017
AIR FORCE.....	373	985	5,700	5,600	6,265
USMC.....	12,179	13,590**	109	0	0
TOTAL.....	60,000	29,300	28,700	42,000	45,000

*An additional 518 spaces were charged against the USMC. These are included in the increment II USMC figure of 18,483, but are not reflected in the total.

**An additional 821 spaces were charged against the USMC. These are included in the increment VII USMC figure of 13,950, but not reflected in the total.

Source: MACJ3

Figure: F-17

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1972 REDEPLOYMENTS¹⁴⁴

Increment XI—KEYSTONE OWL

(C) The Presidential announcement of 13 January 1972 reduced the MACV authorized ceiling of 139,000 spaces on 1 February 1972 to a level of 69,000 spaces to be effective 1 May 1972.¹⁴⁵ Increment XI, KEYSTONE OWL, begun on 1 February and

terminated on 30 April 1972, resulted in a 70,000 space reduction of US forces, divided among the component forces as shown in Figure F-18. Included in the Increment XI redeployment were four USAF tactical airlift squadrons, eleven US Army maneuver battalions, and three field artillery battalions.¹⁴⁶

Increment XI Space Reductions

	Combat	Combat Support	Combat Service Support	Total
ARMY.....	12,056	9,718	33,132	55,235
NAVY.....	0	986	3,008	3,994
AIR FORCE.....	2,195	4,438	3,957	10,590
USMC.....	13	0	168	181
TOTAL.....				70,000

Source: MACJ3

Figure: F-18

(C) The increase in enemy activity during April 1972 necessitated changes to the Increment XI redeployment schedule. Deployment of force augmentations to the Republic of Vietnam and the retention of selected assets programmed for rede-

ployment in Increment XI required that trade-off spaces be identified to accommodate the augmentations and retentions within the 69,000 space ceiling. A total of 4,110 spaces were involved as outlined in Figure F-19.¹⁴⁷

Augmentation/Retention of Spaces in Increment XI

	Augmentation Spaces	Retention Spaces	Total Spaces
ARMY.....	77	1,114	1,191
NAVY.....	6	0	6
AIR FORCE.....	423	1,411	1,839
USMC.....	1,074	0	1,074
TOTAL.....	1,580	2,525	4,105

Source: MACJ3

Figure: F-19

(C) Force augmentations deployed to Vietnam during April 1972 were as follows:

—Army: A seventy-seven man aerial delivery detachment was deployed from Okinawa to advise and assist the RVNAF on high altitude aerial resupply techniques.

—Navy: An ANGLICO augmentation of six USN personnel was effected.

—Air Force: The 35th TFS was deployed from Munsan, Korea to Da Nang; an AC-119K Gunship FOL was deployed from Thailand to Bien Hoa; the C-130 ROTE Squadron at Tan Son Nhut was reinforced with additional C-130 aircraft based on mission requirements; and an F-4 servicing site

was established at Bien Hoa to facilitate TACAIR operations in Military Region 2.

—Marine Corps: VMFA 115 and VMFA 212 were deployed from Iwakuni, Japan, and VMFA 212 was deployed from Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii; all to Da Nang. Sub-Unit One, FMFPAC ANGLICO was augmented with 32 marine personnel, and a TA-4 NGFS Detachment (Spotter) with 57 marine personnel was deployed to Da Nang.

(C) Increment XI retentions were as follows:

—Army: D Troop, 1/10 Air Cavalry; C Troop, 1/17 Air Cavalry; 361st Aerial Weapons Company; 57th Assault Helicopter Company; 322d Aviation Detachment; and aviation maintenance spaces in Military Regions 1 and 2.

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—Air Force: Retentions involved drawdown spaces associated with the 620th TSC, 8th SOS, 21st TASS, 374th TAL Wing, 7th AF Headquarters, and various spaces for security police,

aerial port, medical, air rescue, base support, and communication units.

The 1 May 1972 service ceilings were adjusted as indicated in Figure F-20.¹⁴⁸

Service Ceiling Adjustments for Increment XI

	Old Ceiling	New Ceiling	Difference
ARMY.....	49,278	46,417	-2,861
NAVY.....	3,067	3,029	- 38
AIR FORCE.....	16,308	18,133	+1,825
USMC.....	347	1,421	+1,074
TOTAL.....	69,000	69,000	0

Source: MACJ3

Figure: F-20

Increment XII—KEYSTONE PHEASANT

(C) The Presidential announcement of 26 April 1972 reduced the MACV authorized ceiling from 69,000 spaces on 1 May to a troop level of 49,000 spaces effective on 1 July 1972. The Increment XII, KEYSTONE PHEASANT, redeployment list was published on 29 April 1972. Unit standdowns, draw-downs, and redeployments were phased throughout

the period 15 May to 30 June. This increment resulted in a 20,000 space reduction of US forces, divided among the component forces as indicated in Figure F-21. Included in the Increment XII redeployment were one USAF tactical fighter wing composed of three squadrons, one additional USAF tactical fighter squadron, three USMC tactical fighter squadrons, four US Army maneuver battalions, and two artillery battalions.¹⁴⁹

Increment XII Space Reductions

	Combat	Combat Support	Combat Service Support	Total
ARMY.....	2,126	1,849	8,109	12,084
NAVY.....	0	65	472	537
AIR FORCE.....	1,439	2,152	2,706	6,297
USMC.....	0	98	984	1,082
TOTAL.....				20,000

Source: MACDO

Figure: F-21

(U) On 5 June COMUSMACV directed that the 49,000 force structure be reviewed and modified to accommodate those US assets which contributed most to the destruction of the enemy, to the assistance of the Government of Vietnam and RVNAF in their combat performance, to the reconstruction of units rendered ineffective in combat, and to the receipt and use of equipment being furnished under Project ENHANCE. As a result of the review 3,004

priority spaces were identified for accommodation in the 49,000 force structure. Trade-off spaces were provided by redeploying the 3d Brigade (Separate), 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).

(C) On 9 June COMUSMACV approved the 3,004 priority spaces outlined in Figure F-22 for retention in the 49,000 force structure. The adjusted 1 July 1972 service ceilings are indicated in Figure F-23.¹⁵⁰

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Retained Spaces for Increment XII

	Total Spaces	Requirements
ARMY.....	536	Advisor and support personnel for Project ENHANCE; QM rigger personnel; airborne radio direction finding (ARDF) personnel.
NAVY.....	11	ANGLICO; support of 2 USMC A-4 squadrons.
AIR FORCE.....	1,413	Tactical airlift; FAC support air rescue; communication; munitions handling; command and control; aerial port; base operations.
USMC.....	1,044	Two A-4 squadrons; ANGLICO; F-4 turn-around point.

Source: MACDO

Figure: F-22

Service Ceiling Adjustments for Increment XII

	Old Ceiling	New Ceiling	Difference
ARMY.....	34,333	31,866	-2,468
NAVY.....	2,492	2,503	+ 11
AIR FORCE.....	11,836	13,249	+1,413
USMC.....	339	1,383	+1,044
TOTAL.....	49,000	49,000	0

Source: MACDO

Figure: F-23

Increment XIII—KEYSTONE WREN

(U) The Presidential announcement of 29 June 1972 reduced the MACV ceiling from 49,000 spaces on 1 July to 39,000 spaces by 31 August. Increment XIII, KEYSTONE WREN, began on 1 July and was divided among the component forces as indicated in Figure F-24. During Increment XIII there were no

major USAF, USN, or USMC units redeployed. The only major US army combat units redeployed were Task Forces GIMLET and GARY OWEN. Task Force GIMLET, which redeployed on 23 August 1972, was the last major US ground combat unit in Vietnam.

Increment XIII Space Reductions

	Combat	Combat Support	Combat Service Support	Total
ARMY.....	2,517	2,310	3,756	8,583
NAVY.....	0	0	59	59
AIR FORCE.....	278	607	468	1,353
USMC.....	0	0	5	5
TOTAL.....				10,000

Source: MACDO

Figure: F-24

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(C) On 28 August the 1 September ceilings were revised to accommodate US mobile training teams (MTT) in the Republic of Vietnam for FANK and

ARVN training. The original and revised component service ceilings are shown in Figure F-25.

Service Ceiling Adjustments for Increment XIII

	Old Ceiling	New Ceiling	Difference
ARMY.....	23,281	23,381	+100
NAVY.....	2,448	2,348	-100
AIR FORCE.....	11,895	11,895	0
USMC.....	1,376	1,376	0
TOTAL.....	39,000	39,000	0

Source: MACDO.

Figure: F-25

Increment XIV—KEYSTONE PELICAN

(C) The final redeployment increment, Increment XIV, KEYSTONE PELICAN, announced on 29 August by the President, began on 1 September

and terminated on 30 November. The increment resulted in a force ceiling of 27,000 spaces. The 12,000 space reduction of US forces was divided among the component forces as shown in Figure F-26.

Increment XIV Space Reductions

	Combat	Combs Support	Combat Service Support	Total
ARMY.....	640	662	5,986	7,282
NAVY.....	0	95	508	603
AIR FORCE.....	797	1,577	834	3,208
USMC.....	0	336	571	907
TOTAL.....				12,000

Source: MACDO

Figure: F-26

(C) As a continuing requirement for Increment XIV, a review of the requirement to retain two USMC A-4 squadrons (MAG-12) was conducted. On 6 November the decision to retain the two squadrons was made. The 1 December ceilings were revised to accommodate the two squadrons. The

original and revised component service ceilings are shown in Figure F-27. Figure F-28 summarizes the redeployments from 1 February 1972 to 31 December 1972, and Figure F-29 graphically depicts the rate of redeployment from 1 December 1971 to 28 January, 1973.¹⁵¹

Service Ceiling Adjustments for Increment XIV

	Old Ceiling	New Ceiling	Difference
ARMY.....	16,099	15,457	-642
NAVY.....	1,745	1,710	-35
AIR FORCE.....	8,687	8,499	-188
USMC.....	469	1,334	+865
TOTAL.....	27,000	27,000	0

Source: MACDO

Figure: F-27

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Summary of Redeployments
(1 February 1972 — 31 December 1972)

Increment	Period	Authorized	Spaces	Combat		Att/Ptr*
		Ceilings	Reduced	Mvr Bn	Arty Bn	Sqdn
XII	1 May 72 to Jun 72.....	69,000	70,000	11	3	0
XII	1 May 72 to 30 Jun 72.....	49,000	20,000	4	2	7
XIII	1 Jul 72 to 31 Aug 72.....	39,000	10,000	3	0	0
XIV	1 Sep 72 to 30 Nov 72.....	27,000	12,000	0	0	0**
NONE	1 to 31 Dec 72.....	27,000	2,931	0	0	0


*Includes both USAF and USMC Squadrons.

**On 1 October the 8th SOS stood down. The standdown, however, was not directly associated with Increment XIV and is not reflected above.

Source: MACDO

Figure: F-28

REDEPLOYMENT OF US FORCES
(1 DEC 71-31 DEC 72, INCREMENTS X-XIV)



Source: MACDO

Figure: F-29

REDEPLOYMENT, INCREMENT XIV
TO CEASE-FIRE

(C) The Increment XIV 31 December force level ceiling of 27,000 spaces was actually met on 30 November, a month early. Actual strength de-

clined further in December in anticipation of the withdrawal of all US forces within 60 days of a cease-fire. On 31 December 1972 MACV troop strength was 24,069, or 2,931 below the authorized ceiling. During the month of January prior to the

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cease-fire an additional 553 troops were withdrawn, leaving the total in-country strength at 23,516 on 28 January 1973, the date of the cease-fire. During the two-month period from 30 November 1972 until 28 January 1973 no major combat units were redeployed; two USMC A-4 squadrons (MAG-12) were the only major combat units of any service remaining in-country.¹³²

POST CEASE-FIRE REDEPLOYMENT

(S) On 26 January 1973 COMUSMACV OPLAN J-215, THUNDERBOLT, which provided for the withdrawal of US and FWMAF from the Republic of Vietnam within 60 days of a cease-fire, was designated OPORD J-215 to be executed on 280800H January 1973. The code word THUNDERBOLT was changed to COUNTDOWN. Information on the redeployment after the cease-fire is contained in Annex H, Operation COUNTDOWN.¹³³

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

(S) The overall responsibility for PSYOP policy in SEASIA remained with the US Ambassador in Saigon, who controlled policy through the Mission PSYOP Committee. In December 1971 implementing responsibility for strategic PSYOP was transferred from JUSPAO to COMUSMACV for a six-month interim period (until 1 July 1972) when CINCPAC assumed implementing responsibility for the strategic PSYOP campaigns throughout SEASIA. Under CINCPAC direction, CINCUSARPAC's 7th PSYOP Group was tasked to conduct the campaign. MACV continued to provide liaison and coordination with the US Embassy, Saigon; the RVNAF General Political Warfare Department (GPWD); and USARPAC (7th PSYOP Group) to ensure that the US and Government of Vietnam strategic and tactical PSYOP campaigns were reinforcing in nature.¹³⁴

(S) The strategic PSYOP campaign received added emphasis in May 1972 with the formation of the Psychological Pressure Operations Group (PPOG) at the State Department level in Washington. The same month the Saigon Mission PSYOP Task Force was established to ensure that a similar high priority effort was exerted in Saigon. The USIS Director, Mr. Robert Lincoln, headed the PSYOP task force. MACV was represented by one officer from the Operations Directorate. The task force composition remained fixed until October, when a cadre from the 7th PSYOP Group, Okinawa, was placed on temporary duty in Saigon to form a leaflet development unit (LDU) comprised of local nationals. The LDU officer-in-charge was under the operational control of the task force director.¹³⁵

(S) Throughout the six month period in which MACV exercised strategic PSYOP implementing responsibility, the entire structure and emphasis for PSYOP changed. Preparations for CINCPAC's assumption of responsibility progressed as the 7th PSYOP Group, in conjunction with the Saigon Mission Task Force and the PPOG, developed the capability for timely analysis and development of propaganda, formerly held exclusively by the Southeast Asia Research Associates (SEARA). The

SEARA contract was not renewed when it expired on 30 June. In April, at the urging of highest authorities, preparations began for the resumption of leaflet operations against NVA forces in both South and North Vietnam. On 9 May the JCS directed immediate implementation of leaflet operations against NVA forces; on 10 May the first leaflet drop was made at An Loc. This campaign continued to accelerate throughout the year as prospects for a truce appeared to improve.¹³⁶

(S) The US strategic PSYOP program gathered momentum throughout the remainder of the year. In addition to dropping a multitude of leaflets, operations were expanded to include mini-radios disseminated to NVA concentrations throughout SEASIA and to the North Vietnamese population, in conjunction with increased Voice of America and Voice of Freedom broadcasting. Developments included air drops by B-52s in North Vietnam; C-130s in North and South Vietnam, the Khmer Republic, and Laos; drone aircraft and M-129 leaflet bombs during TACAIR strikes in North Vietnam; and mini-balloons and float bags along the coastal areas of North Vietnam. As the year drew to a close, preparations were completed for further intensified leaflet and mini-radio dissemination during the period between the signing of a truce and the date it became effective (code name TEMPO SURGE).¹³⁷

PSYOP THEMES AND PROGRAMS

(S) While the PSYOP objectives remained unchanged from previous years, the NVA offensive and resulting resumption of bombing in North Vietnam, together with the Kissinger-Tho truce talks, brought new themes to the intensified PSYOP programs. Beginning in May, emphasis was placed on President Nixon's 8 May interdiction speech and resumption of the bombing. During the summer, the NVA forces throughout Southeast Asia and the North Vietnamese population were exposed to such themes as: the Government of Vietnam peace proposal developments on the war in South Vietnam, and reasons for bombing the North—all of which

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emphasized the North Vietnamese leaders' responsibility for continuing the war—plus the destruction of NVA forces and the bombing of North Vietnam. As the peace talks moved forward and Dr. Kissinger made his "Peace Is at Hand" speech of 28 October, the themes of the US cease-fire proposals, NVA troops going home before Tet, and the North Vietnamese leadership recalcitrance for the cease-fire were added.¹⁵⁸

(S) Specific PSYOP programs conducted during 1972, most of which were ongoing from previous years, included the following:

—FRANTIC GOAT was the resumption of the PSYOP leaflet campaign against the NVA in South Vietnam (FRANTIC GOAT SOUTH) and both the military and civilian population in North Vietnam (FRANTIC GOAT NORTH). The objective was to create anxiety and resentment against the Hanoi regime concerning the invasion of South Vietnam, thereby reducing the populace's willingness to pursue the war. FRANTIC GOAT was later changed to FIELD GOAL (North Vietnam) and PRAIRIE LIGHTNING (South Vietnam).

—ELEPHANT WALK (Vietnam), BIG SKY (Laos), and BUFFALO TRACK (Khmer Republic) were programs aimed at the local populace in each country to secure the safe return of captured or missing US and FWMAF personnel, or to obtain information concerning their status or whereabouts.

—The NVA, Pathet Lao, and VC forces throughout the infiltration trail complex were the targets for a series of programs keyed to the geographical location and nationality of the enemy forces: PRAIRIE LIGHTNING, targeted at the NVA and VC forces in South Vietnam; TRAIL CAMPAIGN, targeted at the NVA forces in Laos along the infiltration trails; RICE RIVER, targeted at the NVA and VC forces in the Khmer Republic; and FOUNTAIN PEN, targeted at the NVA, Pathet Lao, and civilians in Laos. The objectives included lowering of morale, lessening support for the continuation of the war, encouraging desertion, and countering Hanoi's propaganda claims.

—The THONG CAM Magazine was transferred from MACDP to CORDS with the December 1972 issue, with the Defense Attache Office assuming responsibility when CORDS was disestablished. Written by Vietnamese for the indigenous population employed by the US forces in South Vietnam, the magazine was designed to promote harmonious relations between the two nationalities.

GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM POLWAR/PSYOP ACTIVITIES

(S) The Government of Vietnam lacked the re-

sources to conduct a strategic PSYOP program of the magnitude fostered by the US. The more limited South Vietnamese resources were directed primarily at RVNAF personnel and the local populace, with the enemy a distant third priority. The primary aims of the POLWAR efforts were to unify the military and civil populace, to increase the soldiers' morale and fighting spirit, and to enhance the peoples' confidence in the Saigon government. PSYOP campaigns were directed at inducing the enemy to defect or rally. The MACV role in this effort was strictly advisory.¹⁵⁹

MAJOR POLWAR CAMPAIGNS

—(S) COMPETITION FOR ACHIEVEMENT: An RVNAF motivation effort designed to recognize and reward both the individual and entire units for heroic and meritorious achievement.

—(S) ALL OUT FOR VICTORY: A nationwide campaign launched in mid-April with the purpose of gaining the support of the people for the combat troops. Cash and contributions in kind were encouraged for the soldier and his dependants; blood donation centers were established in major cities and civilians encouraged to visit military hospitals and donate gifts to the wounded.

—(S) RETURN TO LIFE: Begun in mid-June, this campaign was aimed at undermining enemy morale and fighting spirit and thus inducing enemy soldiers to rally, and was similar to the CHIEU HOI Program.

—(S) ARMY-PEOPLE SOLIDARITY PROGRAM: Begun in October, it was designed to align the common aspirations of soldiers and civilians and to gain popular support for RVNAF activities and operations.

—(S) A major program begun in November was the CADET POLWAR INFORMATION PROGRAM. Cadets from the National Military Academy, POLWAR College, Thu Duc Infantry School, and Nha Trang NCO School, and students from the National Administration Institute for Reinforcement of POLWAR Activities in the Provinces were dispatched to villages and hamlets throughout the four military regions to discuss with the people the CHIEU HOI Program, the Rural Development Program, and the Government of Vietnam position on the proposed cease-fire agreement.¹⁶⁰

(U) For information on the USAF support of PSYOP, see Annex B, Air and Naval Operations. Similarly, the 1972 CINCPAC Command History contains detailed information on the PSYOP programs, since CINCPAC assumed implementing responsibility for the Southeast Asia PSYOP campaign on 1 July 1972.

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ASSISTANCE TO THE KHMER REPUBLIC

MILITARY EQUIPMENT DELIVERY TEAM, CAMBODIA¹⁰¹

Background

(U) During November 1970, in response to a request from CINCPAC, COMUSMACV provided comments on US military representation in Cambodia and recommended that a Cambodia Military Assistance Group, a joint service organization of 113 personnel, be established. CINCPAC concurred with the concept and so recommended to the Chairman, JCS. The JCS, however, recommended to the Secretary of Defense that a 110-man military equipment delivery team (MEDT) be established. On 28 December 1970 the Secretary of Defense approved the JCS recommendation and on 30 January 1971 CINCPAC activated the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia (MEDTC), composed of 60 people; 16 were to be located in Cambodia, and the others would be colocated with MACV.

(U) The Chief, MEDTC functioned under the supervision of the Chief, US Diplomatic Mission, Cambodia and was the Secretary of Defense's representative to the Khmer Ministry of Defense. Initially the Chief, MEDTC supervised Khmer Military Assistance Program (MAP) deliveries through the Republic of Vietnam from Headquarters, MACV. However, as the supplies and equipment continued to build up in the Khmer Republic, control became increasingly difficult. In May 1971 the Secretary of Defense added 53 new spaces to the MEDTC staff, seven of which were in-country authorizations. In July 1971 the Secretary of Defense permitted a phased move of 27 additional MEDTC members to Phnom Penh, bringing to 50 the total MEDTC strength in the Khmer Republic. In August the Chief, MEDTC relocated to Phnom Penh and by 9 October there were 41 US military personnel permanently located in Cambodia. The remaining nine were phased in by the end of December 1971.

(C) Upon activation MEDTC assumed the responsibility for administering and directing the Military Assistance Program (MAP), Cambodia. COMUSMACV was designated coordinating authority to insure compatibility of US military assistance to Cambodia with that to Vietnam. The coordinating authority of MACV included the planning of force structures, programming of materiel, storage and delivery of equipment, and all other functions which would affect the planning and orderly execution of US and third-country programs in the Republic of Vietnam and the Khmer Republic. In addition, COMUSMACV provided administrative and logistic support to the MEDTC to include airlift. Throughout 1972 MACV supported and assisted MEDTC in providing materiel and training support to the

Khmer Republic.

1972 MEDTC Activities

(C) The phasing down of the US presence in the Republic of Vietnam brought about two major changes in the area of logistics:

—Beginning in May 1972 Kompong Som became the primary entry point for all surface shipment of MAP general cargo. Activation of the port led to the development of Route 4 as a second major line of communication in addition to the Mekong River. At the end of 1972 an in-transit ammunition storage area was under construction which when completed and provided with sufficient security would make Kompong Som an unrestricted port capable of handling hazardous, nonhazardous, and general cargo.

—In December 1972 logistical support provided by MEDTC from the Republic of Vietnam was transferred to Camp Samae San, Thailand. At the time of the cease-fire the transfer of functions was still underway.

(C) During the course of 1972 logistical support provided by MACV was instrumental in the success of MAP, Cambodia. This logistical support was in the form of airdrops of critical cargo (ammunition and rice); coordination of Mekong River ammunition convoys originating in the Republic of Vietnam and accounting for an average of 4,300 short tons per month into Cambodia; communications links; ADP; and medical support, to include on-site assistance visits by medical personnel.

(C) During 1972 MACV provided the following assistance to MEDTC in the training of FANK units:

—Army: During 1972 the Army Advisory Group (AAG) FANK Training Command trained one naval and 38 army infantry battalions, 100 medium range reconnaissance patrol cadre, and five mobile training teams (MTTs) which returned to the Khmer Republic to train regional battalions within their respective military regions. In addition, AAG supported three US MTTs from the USARPAC Intelligence Training Agency during the period September to November. These MTTs conducted counterintelligence collection, interrogation, and instructor training for 190 FANK officers and non-commissioned officers. AAG coordinated with the RVNAF the training of FANK specialists in a multitude of skills in the RVNAF school system and arranged for the movement to and from CONUS of 68 FANK officer students. See Annex C for further information on the Army Advisory Group's role in the training of FANK personnel.

—Navy: In its first two years of growth the Marine Nationale Khmere received the majority

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of its training in South Vietnam, initially at US naval bases and then at South Vietnamese installations as the strength of the US military community declined and the accelerated turnover of bases to the Vietnamese progressed. The last half of 1972 showed a shift of emphasis towards in-country self-sufficiency. All boat crews and naval infantry battalions were trained in the Khmer Republic. Through the end of 1972, 67 boat crews totalling 435 men had been trained in South Vietnam. An additional 689 Khmer naval infantrymen and 89 specialists had completed training in the Republic of Vietnam.

—Air Force: During 1972, 242 technicians, eight helicopter pilots, three fixed wing pilots, and three forward air controllers were trained in the Republic of Vietnam. Additionally, one air base security battalion was trained in Vietnam.

(C) With the acceleration of MAP deliveries to the Khmer Republic in the latter half of 1972, the process of ordering, receiving, and accounting for MAP furnished weapons and equipment became a monumental task, far outstripping the ability of the manual documents system to keep pace. In order to maintain an accurate and timely record of demand and receipt data, MACV assisted MEDTC in automating a number of essential management documents.

(C) In 1972 the Tripartite Deputies representing the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), and the Forces Armees Nationales Khmeres (FANK) met monthly. The deputies' meetings were preceded by meetings of the several tripartite study groups. The Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia (MEDTC) was represented at both the Tripartite Deputies' and study group meetings.

(C) The executive sessions of the Tripartite Deputies' meetings provided a device for developing cooperation between the Khmer and the Vietnamese. A number of combined operations resulted from these sessions. Through representation at the executive sessions MEDTC was able to adjust its activities to complement FANK participation in combined operations.

(C) The open sessions of the Tripartite Deputies' meetings and the study groups permitted the integration of MACV, RVNAF, FANK, and MEDTC staff personnel, who developed coordinated plans for the security of the Mekong River and National Routes 1, 2, and 4, all of which were vital lines of communication. Study groups also planned combined air-ground operations in the Khmer Republic and the training of FANK units and individuals in the Republic of Vietnam.

TRIPARTITE DEPUTIES¹⁶²

(C) The Tripartite Deputies Working Group, composed of FANK, RVNAF, MACV, and MEDTC members, was established in June 1971 to serve as a single point of contact for all matters of interest to the Tripartite Deputies (MACV, RVNAF, and FANK) and to provide liaison between the deputies and MACV, RVNAF, and FANK staffs. The MACV Tripartite Actions Branch served as the nucleus of the working group. The monthly meetings were conducted principally in French and were held in either Saigon or Phnom Penh.

(C) These monthly meetings regularly featured briefings on such matters as the NVA tactics during the NGUYEN HUE Offensive, the air war in SEA, the NVA military plans during 1972, the enemy and friendly situation in SEA, and the cease-fire accords. In addition, several groups were formed to study military problems of mutual interest requiring coordinated actions for combating the NVA. Although under the aegis of the Tripartite Deputies, these groups worked independently with MACV, RVNAF, and FANK participation. The monthly deputies' meetings provided these study groups with a forum for discussing problems, proposed solutions, and recommendations.

Route 1 Study Group

(C) Established in August 1972, this group developed plans for securing Route 1 in Khmer Republic through the establishment of 12 battalion size fire support bases, protection of critical terrain, utilization of engineer support, establishment of and monitoring a communications net, adoption of an air-ground coordination system, and the positioning of three reaction force brigades at critical points. The plan divided the mission geographically into three parts: from Phnom Penh to Neak Luong, from Neak Luong to Svay Rieng, and from Svay Rieng to the Khmer-Vietnamese border.

Air-Ground and Mekong Riverine Operations Study Group

(C) This group was originally established as two separate study groups, the Air-Ground Study Group and the Mekong River Security Study Group, which were combined in August 1972. This group was concerned with improving coordination and communications among the USAF, Khmer AF, and VNAF for combined air-ground operations and for Mekong River convoy operations from Tam Chau, Vietnam, to Phnom Penh. Because of the importance of maintaining a secure river line of communication to Phnom Penh, considerable effort was devoted to establishing and coordinating operational procedures for use by both the RVNAF and the Khmer forces involved in escorting river convoys to Phnom

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Penh. While RVNAF originally provided a convoy escort with US helicopters and tactical aircraft assistance, training programs and coordinated procedures allowed the FANK to assume full responsibility for convoy control and bank and riverine security on 1 March 1972. The study group continued to monitor this combined effort and to recommend improved procedures for all service components involved in the convoy escort and security. After the January 1973 cease-fire this group studied in detail the problems relating to passage of convoys (military and civilian) in light of the cease-fire accords.

Route 4 Study Group

(C) The security of Route 4 between the deep water port of Kompong Som and Phnom Penh was of major concern to the Khmer Government. A tripartite plan was developed and approved by Marshal Lon Nol on 1 May 1971 to establish fire support bases and otherwise improve the security of truck convoys traversing this line of communication. In March 1972 a Kompong Som harbor security and port improvement study was initiated. Implementation began immediately, and by July 1972 ninety percent of the port defenses had been completed. Improvement and repair of positions, fire support bases, and bridges continued under the auspices of this study group. Work was more recently begun to clear the roadsides in an effort to reduce the possibility of ambush.

Route 2 Study Group

(C) Established in November 1972 with the task of formulating plans to permanently maintain Route

2 open to traffic, the Route 2 Study Group developed a detailed plan for security. Included were provisions for ten mutually supporting fire support bases, each equipped with one section (two tubes) of 105mm howitzers; a total of 12,600 troops formed into three mobile intervention brigades and strategically placed for quick reaction; and 40 regional companies to protect the fire support bases, critical terrain, and important built-up areas.

FANK Training Coordination Committee

(U) Although not formally a tripartite study group, the training committee, consisting of FANK, RVNAF, AAG, and MEDTC representatives, convened periodically to resolve problems concerning FANK training in the Republic of Vietnam. Findings and recommendations were presented to the Tripartite Deputies.

Cease-Fire Problems Committee

(C) This committee was convened to study problems arising from the implementation of the January 1973 cease-fire in the Republic of Vietnam. The status of many areas of mutual concern was in doubt, given a cease-fire in Vietnam while hostilities continued in the Khmer Republic. This committee identified problem areas for the deputies' consideration.

Future Tripartite Activities

(C) With the disestablishment of MACV, the DAO in Saigon continued to represent the US in tripartite matters. However, the US role diminished to that of observation, with CINCPAC assuming the responsibility of furnishing the observers. Deputies' conferences were no longer held in Saigon.



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COMMAND ACTIVITIES — ANNEX F

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2. Ibid., Incl 3, p 1.
3. Rpt (U), MACCO, 31 Jan 73, Subj: Updating of 1972 Command History, pp 4-5, 9.
4. Ibid., pp 4, 6, 9.
5. Ibid., p 2.
6. Ibid., p 8.
7. Ibid., p 13.
8. Same as #1, Incl 3, p 4.
9. Same as #3, pp 15-19.
10. Same as #1, p 5; Same as #3, pp 22-26, 28-29.
11. Interview (U), Mr. H. Uchida, USARV AIK Budget Officer, by MAJ F. W. Seaman III, MACV MHB, 10 Mar 73, Saigon.
12. Same as #3, pp 34-36, 38-39.
13. Ibid., p 30.
14. Draft MS (U), MACCH, 7 Dec 72, Subj: Mission and Organization; News Letter (U), Office of the Command Chaplain, MACV/USARV SUPCOM, Jan 73, Incl 2; Draft MS (U), MACCH, 7 Feb 73, Subj: After Action Report—The US Army Chaplaincy in Vietnam at the Time of the Cessation of Hostilities, p 2; MS (U), MACCH, 7 Feb 73, Subj: Projection of Religious Services After X-Day.
15. Rpt (U), MACCH, 20 Apr 72, Subj: Chaplain's Historical Report, p 1; News Letter (U), Office of the Command Chaplain MACV/USARV SUPCOM, Dec 72, p 3; Rpts (U), MACCH, 1 Oct and 3 Dec 72, Subj: MACV Chaplains Activities Report, 1-30 Sep 72 and 1-30 Nov 72.
16. Rpt (U), MACCH, 19 Dec 72, Subj: Staffing of MACV 1972 Command History, Tabs E and F; Rpt (U), MACCH, 28 Jan 73, Subj: Updating of 1972 Command History, p 9.1.
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18. Ibid., pp 7-10; MS (U), MACCH, Jan 73, Subj: Charities; MS (U), MACCH, undtd, Subj: Chaplain Input for Briefing on Vietnamese Charity; Rpt (U), MACCH, 4 Sep 72, Subj: MACV Chaplain Activities Report, 1-31 Aug 72, p 2.
19. Rpt (U), MACCH-RVNAD, 1 Nov 72, Subj: A History of the US Chaplain Advisor to the RVNAF Chaplain Directorates, p 1.
20. Ibid., p 3; Interview (U), Chaplain (LCDR) David H. Fitzsimmons, Deputy Command Chaplain for RVNAF Affairs, by MAJ Frederic W. Seaman III, MACV MHB, 7 Feb 73, Saigon.
21. Same as #19, p 4.
22. Same as #15, Rpt (U), 20 Apr 72; Same as # 15, Rpt (U), 1 Oct 72; Same as #16, Rpt (U), 28 Jan 73.
23. MACV Command History, 1971, Vol II (S/NF), p X-53, GP-1.
24. Rpt (U), MACDMA, 20 Jul 72, Subj: Quarterly Historical Report, p 2.
25. Rpt (U), MACDMA, 24 Nov 72, Subj: Quarterly Historical Report, Incl 1, pp 2-3; DF (U), MACDMA, 19 Oct 72, Subj: Request for "Temporary Hire" of US Civilian Personnel-GS; Ltr (U), MACDMA, 16 Oct 72, Subj: Contract Modification; Msg (U), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 042200Z Nov 72, Subj: Contract Modification with Computer Sciences Corporation.
26. Same as #24.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Same as #25, Rpt (U), 24 Nov 72, Incl 1, p 1.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., p 2.
33. Rpt (U), MACDMA, 10 Apr 72, Subj: Historical Summary, p 1.
34. Rpt (U), MACDMA, 20 Jul 72, Subj: Quarterly Historical Report, p 2.
35. Ibid., p 2; Same as #25, Rpt (U), 24 Nov 72, Incl 1, p 1f.
36. Same as #25, Rpt (U), 24 Nov 69, Incl 1, pp 2-3.
37. Rpt (U), MACMD-OP, 8 Mar 73, Subj: Command History.
38. DF (U), MACOI, 25 Apr 72, Subj: Suspension of Accreditation of Mr. Alan Dawson, UPI Correspondent.
39. DF (U), MACOI, 22 May 72, Subj: Appeal of the Suspension of Accreditation of Mr. Alan Dawson, UPI Correspondent.
40. Msg (LOU), Dept of State, 19 Jul 72, Subj: Suspension of AP Bureau Chief Accreditation; DF (U), MACOI, 31 Jul 72, Subj: Disaccreditation Action - Mr. Richard A. Pyle.
41. DF (U), MACOI, 15 Sep 72, Subj: Suspension of Accreditation of Mr. Arthur Higbee, Bureau Chief, UPI.
42. Draft MS (U), MACOI, 4 Mar 73, Subj: Information and the Press.
43. Rpt (U), MACIG-INV, Jul 72, Subj: MACIG 2d Qtr Report, p 1; Rpt (U), MACIG-INV/INS, Dec 72, Subj: MACIG 4th Qtr Report, p 1.
44. Rpt (C), MACIG-SP, 3 Jun 72, Subj: MACIG 1st Qtr History (U), TAB B, p 1, GDS-Not Stated; Rpt (U), MACIG-INV, Sep 72, Subj: MACIG 2d Qtr History, Inspections, p 1.

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51. Ibid., Base Turnover Program, p 1; Same as #43, Rpt (U), Dec 72, Base Turnover Program: DF (FOUO), MACIG-INS, 9 Dec 72, Subj: Final Report of Base Turnover Inspections.
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53. Same as #44, Rpt (C), Jun 72, Tab B.
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55. Same as #44, Rpt (C), Jun 72, Tab E.
56. Same as #43, Rpt (U), Jul 72, Incl 2, p 1f.
57. Ibid., Incl 3.
58. Same as #45, Tab D.
59. Same as #43, Rpt (U), Dec 72, Tab A, Incl 2, 3.
60. Same as #44, Rpt (C), Jun 72, VNN Logistics Team.
61. Ibid., VNAF Logistics.
62. Same as #43, Rpt (U), Jul 72, Advisory Division, p 1.
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66. Same as #44, Rpt (C), 3 Jun 72; Advisory Division, p 5; Same as #43, Rpt (U), Jul 72, Advisory Division, p 3; Same as #45; Same as #43, Rpt (U), Dec 72, Advisory Division.
67. General Orders #5241 (U), HQ MACV, 27 Dec 71.
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69. Ltr (U), Dep Cdr USARV, Feb 72, Subj: Reduction Class A Fill.
70. Ltr (C), MACST-SPO, 23 Feb 72, Subj: Designated Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) Mission Termination (U), GP-Not Stated.
71. Msg (U), CG USARV, 220603Z Aug 72, Subj: Diversion of Incoming Unaccompanied Baggage Shipment to Long Binh, Bien Hoa Area.
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77. Rpt (C/NF), MACPM-DSIS, 3 Dec 72, Subj: MACV History (U), GDS-Not Stated.
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83. Same as #78.
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86. Same as #79.
87. Same as #78; Rpt (C), MACJA, 17 Jul 72, Subj: History Report 2d Quarter 1972 (U), GDS-74.
88. Ibid.; Same as #79.
89. Same as #77.
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94. Msg (C), COMUSMACV, 251135Z Jan 73, Subj: Cease-Fire Awards Policies (U), GDS-Not Stated.

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95. DF (U), MACAG-PA, 11 Jan 73, Subj: Workload Data - Decorations & Awards for the Months of January through December 72.
96. Fact Sheet (U), MACPM-SGM, 18 Nov 72, Subj: Joint Table of Distribution (JTD), MACPM Staff.
97. MS (U), MACPM, 10 Dec 72, Subj: Proposed Reply to CBS Questions on Deserters in Vietnam.
98. Fact Sheet (U), MACPM-DSIS, 7 Nov 72, Withdrawal of Privileges; Rpt (U), HQ MACV, 30 Jun 72, Subj: Withdrawal of Privileges Listing.
99. Fact Sheet (U), MACPM-DSIS, 29 Nov 72, Subj: Currency and Black Market Control System (CABOTS).
100. DF (C), MACPM, 16 Nov 72, Subj: Military Customs Program (U), GDS-Not Stated.
101. Ltr (C), MACJ212-2, 14 Aug 71, Subj: Special Collection Programs (U), Gp-Not Stated.
102. Msg (S), SECSTATE, 121000Z Jun 72, Subj: Narcotics Smuggling by Thai Fishing Trawler (C), GDS-Not Stated.
103. Fact Sheet (U), MACPM, 3 Nov 72, Subj: Prisoners of War in RVN.
104. Ibid.
105. Msg (U), COMUSMACV, 240409Z May 72, Subj: Evacuation of PW Camps.
106. Msg (U), COMUSMACV, 070145Z Dec 72, Subj: RVNAF Preparation for Repatriation.
107. Rpt (U), MP Command, JGS, 3 Oct 72, Subj: Result of the Test on the Soap Making at Bien Hoa PW Camp.
108. Fact Sheet (U), MACPM, 3 Nov 72, Subj: Prisoners of War in RVN.
109. MOND Decree #1835/QP/TCTT/ND (U), South Vietnamese Ministry of National Defense, 29 Jul 72.
110. Rpt (C), US Army Medical Research & Nutrition Laboratory, 2 Nov 72, Subj: Nutritional Survey of Enemy Prisoners of War, RVN (U), GDS-Not Stated.
111. Plan (U), 28 Aug 72, JGS/MACV, Subj: Repatriation and Release of Enemy Prisoners of War.
112. Msg (U), COMUSMACV, 280100Z Nov 72, Subj: Preparations for Repatriation.
113. Memo (U), MACPM, 8 Dec 72, Subj: New Life Chieu Hoi Release.
114. Communique (U), GVN, 22 Aug 72, Subj: Release of 600 Disabled and Incurably Sick Communist PW, on Occasion of All Souls Day.
115. COMUSMACV Talking Papers (U), 28 Jul 72, Subj: Review of GVN Adherence to the GPW.
116. Rpt (U), MACPM, 9 Dec 72, Subj: Mission Weekly PW Count as of 9 Dec 72.
117. Draft MS (U), MACDP, Dec 72, Subj: Drug and Narcotic Abatement Program.
118. Rpt (U), MACJ13, 19 Feb 72, Subj: Historical Summary 1-31 January 1972. Project HIEU was a cross-cultural human response program to improve the understanding, friendship, respect, and working relations between Vietnamese and US personnel and to improve the understanding of Vietnamese culture among US military and civilian personnel.
119. Draft MS (U), MACDP, Dec 72, Subj: Human Relations. Thong Cam was a monthly news and feature magazine for Vietnamese civilian employees of US military and civilian agencies. Its purpose was to encourage understanding good relationships between US and Vietnamese personnel.
120. Same as #118, p 2. Operation THIEN CHI (Good Will) was essentially a Government of Vietnam program supported by the US. Its purpose was to promote a friendly relationship between the Vietnamese people and US forces and to create favorable conditions for the resolution of disputes between Vietnamese and US personnel. (See MACV Dir 550-1 (U), 1 Jul 72 as amended, Subj: Foreign Countries and Nationals - Community Relations, pp 5-6.)
121. DF (U), MACDP-DCH, 25 Aug 72, Subj: Historical Summary 1-31 Jul 72, p 1.
122. DF (U), MACIG, 27 Dec 72, Subj: Human Relations Review; DF (U), MACIG, 2 Feb 73, Subj: Updating of Command History.
123. Same as #122, DF (U), 2 Feb 73.
124. Same as #122, DF (U), 27 Dec 72.
125. Dir (U), MACJ1, 10 Mar 71, Subj: MACV Dir 28-2, Welfare, Recreation and Morale, R&R Activities Out-of-Country, p 2; Same as #23, p X-66.
126. Msg (U), COMUSMACV, 060240Z Jan 72, Subj: Closure of R & R Processing Center at Da Nang.
127. Msg (C), CINCPAC to JCS, 190414Z Jan 72, Subj: R & R Program (U); Msg (U), CINCPAC, 100720Z Mar 72, Subj: Closure of Taipei R & R Site; Msg (U), AMIN COMUSDC, 100740 Mar 72, Subj: Closure of R & R Site at Taipei.
128. Msg (C), COMUSMACV, 061307Z Jan 72, Subj: R & R Program (U); Msg (C), COMUSMACV, 131235Z Jan 72, Subj: R & R Program (U); DF (U), MACJ12, 2 Mar 72, Subj: Pattaya Beach Outdoor Recreation Center; Msg (U), COMUSMACV, 111120Z Mar 72, Subj: Pattaya Beach Outdoor Recreation Center.
129. DF (U), MACJ12, 12 Feb 72, Subj: Vung Tau R&R Center; Ltr (U), AVHEN-FE-RP, 10 Nov 72, Subj: Vung Tau R&R Center.

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130. Msg (C), COMUSMACV, 310500Z Dec 72, Subj: Out-of-Country R&R (U), GDS-Not Stated; Msg (C), CINCPAC, 270042Z Jan 73, Subj: Out-of-Country R&R (U), GDS-Not Stated; Msg (U), USARV/MACV SUPCOM, 260056Z Jan 73, Subj: Vung Tau R&R Center.
131. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 100100Z Jan 73, Subj: BRIGHT LIGHT (U), GDS-79; Rpt (C), MACDI 13, 15 Jan 73, Subj: Summary of PW Internment (Machine Printout) (U), GDS-Not Stated.
132. Same as #23, p X-4.
133. Stars and Stripes (Pacific Edition), September 28, 30, 1972.
134. Msg (C), SECSTATE to USDEL France, 050202, 282341Z Mar 72, Subj: PW's—Travelers to North Vietnam (U), GDS-Not Stated; Msg (C), SECSTATE to AMEMBASSY Saigon, 064479, 141809Z Apr 72, Subj: PW's—Labor Group's Travel to NVN (U), GDS-Not Stated.
135. Mgs (LOU), USDEL France to SECSTATE, 16642, 021612Z Sep 72, Subj: DRV Release of Three American FW; Stars and Stripes (Pacific Edition), September 26, 1972.
136. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to JCS, 090104Z Jul 72, Subj: BRIGHT LIGHT (U), XGDS-3; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to JCS, 090208Z Sep 72, Subj: BRIGHT LIGHT (U), GDS-80; Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, Ch. III, p 6; Stars and Stripes (Pacific Edition), January 26, 1973.
137. Stars and Stripes (Pacific Edition), March 8 and 10, 1973.
138. Msg (LOU), SECSTATE to all diplomatic posts, 044331, 151848Z Mar 72, Subj: Prisoners of War: National Week of Concern.
139. Same as #23, pp X-6, X-7.
140. For further information of PW releases during February and March 1973 see Annex G - The New Agencies and Annex H - COUNTDOWN.
141. Chicago Tribune, January 19, 1973, p 1; Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, Protocol on the Return of Captured Military Personnel and Foreign Civilians, Articles 1, 2, 4, pp 1-2.
142. Plan (C), MACDP, 3 Nov 72, Subj: COMUSMACV OPLAN J190 (U), GDS-78; Plan (C), HQ 7th AF, 6 Apr 72, Subj: 7AF OP1 J190 (U), Gp-3; Msg (U), SECDEF to AIG 8799, 9348, 262058Z Jan 73, Subj: DOD Morning News Briefing by Acting ASD (PA), Mr. Jerry W. Friedheim and MGEN Daniel James, DASD (PA), Friday, Jan 26, 1973; Msg (U), CINCPAC to AIG 7058, 8399, 261747Z Jan 73, Subj: Public Announcement of JCPC and CONUS Hospital Sites.
143. Same as #23, pp F-5 to F-13.
144. Details of 1972 redeployment are found in Rpts (S/NF), Subj: Army Activities Report: SEASIA (U), published biweekly by the Deputy SGS (Coordination and Reports). Office of the Chief of Staff, DA.
145. Rpt (TS), MACJ3, Subj: J-3 Historical Summary for Feb 72 (U), p 2, Gp-4.
146. Ibid., Rpts (TS), MACJ3 Mar and Apr 72, Subj: J-3 Historical Summary (U), Gp-4.
147. Same as #146, Rpt (TS), Apr 72, pp 2-3.
148. Rpt (TS), MACJ3, Subj: J-3 Historical Summary for May 72 (U), p 23, Gp-4.
149. Same as #148; Rpt (TS), MACDO, Subj: DO Historical Summary for Jun 72 (U), GDS-82; Rpt (S/NF), Deputy SGS, DA, 5 Jul 72, Subj: Army Activities Report: SEASIA (U), pp 4, 7, GDS-80.
150. Same as #148, Rpt (TS), Jun 72, pp 35-37.
151. Rpt (TS), MACDO, Subj: DO Historical Summary for Nov 72 (U), p 43, GDS-82.
152. Msg (S/SPECAT), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 011443Z Feb 73, Subj: COMUSMACV Status Report of Selected SEASIA Activities (U), GDS-81.
153. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CDR FRAC et al, 271100Z Jan 73, Subj: Redeployment from the Republic of Vietnam (U), GDS-81.
154. Memo (S), MACDO, 11 Oct 72, Subj: Leaflet Development Activity (U), GDS-80.
155. Ibid.; Msg (S), SECSTATE to Saigon 252000Z May 72, Subj: Establishment of Psychological Pressure Operations Group (U), Gp-Not Stated.
156. Msg (S), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 092217Z May 72, Subj: FRANTIC GOAT (U), Gp-4; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 120215Z May 72, Subj: FRANTIC GOAT (U), Gp-4.
157. Msg (S), CINCPAC to JCS, 132049Z Dec 72, Subj: Status of SEA PSYOP (U), GDS-80.
158. Msg (S) CDR, 7PSYOP GP to CINCPAC 150956Z Dec 72, Subj: Strategic PSYOP Monthly Report (U), GDS-80.
159. Msg (S), Saigon to SECSTATE, 2220, 180612Z Feb 72, Subj: Joint Embassy, JUSPAO, MACV PSYOP Message (U), Gp-Not Stated; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 211029Z Apr 72, Subj: Propaganda Offensive (U), Gp-4.
160. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 130935Z Aug 72, Subj: Psychological Operations Summary (U), GDS-80; Msg (C), COMUSMACV to JCS, 310735Z Dec 72, Subj: Annual PSYOP Forces and Resources Report (U), GDS-78.
161. Ltr (C), MEDTC to COMUSMACV, 31 Jan 73, Subj: MEDTC Information for MACV 1972 Command History (U), GDS-Not Stated.
162. Memo (C), MACDO-342, Mar 73, Subj: Tripartite Deputies (U), GDS-Not Stated.

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ANNEX G

THE NEW AGENCIES

(TS) With the prospect of cease-fire negotiations nearing a successful conclusion, planning for new agencies to assume various MACV responsibilities began in late October. GEN Fred C. Weyand, COM-USMACV, formed a close-hold planning group consisting of representatives of the extant MACV staff elements under the direction of the Director of Operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff provided initial guidance to the field commanders on 27 October with a requirement that plans to be developed to:

—Terminate military operations against North Vietnam and execute a cease-fire in South Vietnam, while continuing combat operations in support of the Khmer and Lao Governments.

—Deploy all US/FWMA military forces from South Vietnam within 60 days and provide for the security of forces, materiel, and facilities during the redeployment.

—Establish command arrangements outside South Vietnam for the control of residual US missions and responsibilities in SEASIA which COMUSMACV then held.

—Retain the capability for resumption of combat air and naval support in South Vietnam, Laos, and the Khmer Republic and for the resumption of military action against North Vietnam.

—Establish a Defense Resources Surveillance and Termination Office in Saigon (renamed Defense Attache Office).

—Arrange for US in-country residual support of RVNAF to include management, control, and supervision of continued resupply and closed-loop maintenance and contractor support.

Additional planning guidance was provided concerning ongoing MACV activities, and comments were requested for planning to include an organization in Thailand for the post-hostilities period and a Defense Attache Office in Saigon. CINCPAC was requested to provide an initial reaction to the planning guidance in terms of recommended force levels, command control arrangements, and an accelerated transfer of equipment to the Republic of Vietnam. On 31 October JCS requested the initial authorities for either the implementation or the

planning envisioned to facilitate post-hostilities planning for Southeast Asia.¹

(U) In response to the JCS guidance the MACV planning group produced COMUSMACV OPLAN J-215 COUNTDOWN (originally published under the code name THUNDERBOLT), which included planning guidance for establishing a successor headquarters in Thailand and a Defense Attache Office in Saigon while completing the withdrawal of all US and FWMAF from Vietnam within 60 days of a cease-fire agreement. Simultaneously, planning also was undertaken for establishing a US element of a four party joint military commission to ensure that the cease-fire machinery was ready and in-place when the cease-fire went into effect.

(U) MACV was deeply involved in planning and developing these new agencies. For the most part, MACV personnel staffed the military positions when the agencies were established. The successor headquarters in Thailand became the USSAG/7th Air Force Headquarters at Nakhon Phanom. For the purpose of this MACV history included herein is the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC), which also moved to Thailand under the operational control of USSAG. The narrative terminates when USSAG assumed responsibility from MACV for air operations in SEA on 15 February. On the other hand, the DAO, Saigon, activated on 18 January, was under the operation control of COMUSMACV and assumed many of the MACV residual functions either before or when MACV was disestablished on 29 March 1973. Therefore historical coverage terminates with the disestablishment of MACV. Both USSAG and DAO as viable agencies at the time this history was written, have their own historians. It is anticipated that these historians will provide detailed histories covering the gestation period of MACV involvement, as well as subsequent activities. With respect to the US Delegation, Four Party Joint Military Commission, this agency was activated on 26 January 1973 and functioned until 31 March 1973. A MACV historian was assigned to the US Delegation throughout its two-month life span to provide a detailed historical account, which will be published separately. Therefore, only an overview of its planning and activities is provided in this annex. The narrative which follows shows the MACV involvement with these new agencies.

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US SUPPORT ACTIVITIES GROUP (USSAG)

INITIAL PLANNING

(U) The MACV Operations Directorate provided the close-hold element to develop plans for the new headquarters in Thailand. Chief of the Planning element was COL Frank L. Garrison, USA, MACDO Force Structure Division, assisted by COL Robert N. Habermehl, USA and MAJ Robert E. Cahalane, USA of the MACDO Manpower Control Branch. This group provided guidance to MACV staff elements which would be represented in the proposed headquarters. In turn, the staff elements developed JTDs for their parallel elements. Although the close-hold planning terminated in mid-November, reference to the proposed headquarters continued to be treated as sensitive information until after the initial JTD proposal was forwarded to the JCS and CINCPAC.

(TS) On 1 November MACV provided CINCPAC comments on the 27 October JCS requirement which developed the basic planning direction for the post-hostilities efforts. In a message to JCS on 5 November CINCPAC included the MACV proposal for a Southeast Asia Support Command as one of three options for an organization in Thailand following the disestablishment of MACV. The options were to establish one of the following:

—A subordinate unified command, US Southeast Asia Command (SEAC), to conduct SEASIA land-based air and logistics operations.

—A limited Southeast Asia sub-unified command, Southeast Asia Support Command (SEASO), with lesser responsibilities and scope of activities than envisioned for the preceding option.

—A USAF unilateral command.

(TS) Between the 6th and 21st of November, MACV continued to develop each of the three options, to include the preparation of organizations, missions, functions, JTDs, and the estimated requirements and assets needed to transition from the existing MACV configuration into each of the three options. On 19 November a CINCPAC message stated that the JCS planning awaiting SECDEF approval would recommend that the headquarters in Thailand be a multi-service headquarters entitled US Support Activities Group, 7th Air Force (hereafter referred to as USSAG) and would be located in Nakhon Phanom. The complete JCS planning memorandum JCSM 480-72 concerning all of the proposed changes resulting from the envisioned redeployment was received at MACV on the 21st. The contingency plans for Thailand delineated in that memorandum were the basis for all of the MACV planning that followed, as modified and refined by both local planning and higher headquarters direction. The guidance within the JCS memo-

randum for the proposed Thailand headquarters was designed to:

—Provide an orderly movement of command and control functions from Saigon to Thailand without loss of continuity of the required functions.

—Avoid complex command and control arrangements.

—Minimize personnel requirements in the existing arrangement for Laos, the Khmer Republic, and Thailand.

—Facilitate a later transition to a more austere command structure in Southeast Asia.

—Avoid changes in the existing relationship by which the US government dealt with the Royal Thai government.

—Maintain a capability to resume air and naval combat operations in Southeast Asia if required.²

(TS) To facilitate these goals JCS directed not only the establishment of the headquarters in Thailand, but also that the USSAG headquarters control the Defense Resources Surveillance and Termination Office (subsequently renamed the Defense Attache Office and hereafter referred to as DAO) which would provide RVNAF with the support previously provided by MACV.

(TS) Headquarters, USSAG was envisioned as a multi-service integrated headquarters (not a sub-unified command) under the operational command of CINCPAC. With Royal Thai Government approval the headquarters would be established at Nakhon Phanom in the vacated Task Force Alpha facilities. The headquarters of USSAG and 7th Air Force (7AF) would be collocated, and the Commander, 7th AF and elements of his staff would be dual hatted in the USSAG organization.³

(TS) USSAG was to be organized on an austere basis, in a form similar to the MACV Headquarters, staffed with the Saigon headquarters' personnel. The headquarters would be organized as a standard J staff with an USAF general as the dual hatted commander of both USSAG and 7th AF (COM-USSAG). The USSAG Deputy Commander would be an USA major general and the Deputy Commander, 7th AF (a USAF major general) would be Deputy Commander, 7th AF. J staff positions would be as follows:

J-1	Army 0-6
*J-2	Air Force 0-8
*J-3	Air Force 0-8
J-4	Army 0-7
*J-6	Air Force 0-6
*Dual hatted USSAG/7th AF position.	

—The reader should be aware that USSAG has a staff historian. A USSAG history will be prepared in accordance with existing CINCPAC instructions.

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
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HEADQUARTERS US SUPPORT ACTIVITIES GROUP



Source: USSAG

Figure: G-1

The JTD for the headquarters would include 589 military and 5 civilian spaces. In addition to the military spaces in the USSAG/7th AF JTDs, it was anticipated that a number of additional units such as the Strategic Air Command Advanced Command and Control Echelon (SACADVON), Fleet Coordinating Group, Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC), and a number of intelligence detachments would be required by COMUSSAG to adequately perform his missions. It also was anticipated that the base support elements of the 7th Air Force Headquarters in Nakhon Phanom would require appropriate augmentation (e.g., security police, chaplain, medical) to service the increased population. Organization is shown in Figure G-1.

MISSION

(TS) The mission of this organization would be four-fold upon its activation. Headquarters USSAG would:

—Plan for the resumption of an effective air campaign in Laos, the Khmer Republic, and North and South Vietnam in the event the provisions of the cease-fire were violated.

—Establish and maintain a command and control structure for the management of air elements which might be committed to it, to include the capability for interface with VNAF air control systems.

—Establish and maintain liaison with RVNAF JGS, Carrier Task Force 77, and committed USAF SAC elements.

—Control the Defense Attache Office (DAO).

(TS) To accomplish the mission it was envisioned that USSAG would fulfill the following functions:

—Accomplish the contingency planning required in the event of a cease-fire breakdown and be prepared to conduct combat air operations in Laos, the Khmer Republic, South Vietnam, and North Vietnam as directed by CINCPAC.

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—Assume operational control of USAF TACAIR resources when committed by CINCPAC.

—Maintain the necessary intelligence and target data to conduct effective combat air operations.

—Maintain the capability to interface with the VNAF tactical air control system and maintain liaison with the RVNAF JGS, CTF 77, and committed SAC forces.

—Accomplish planning in concert with RVNAF JGS liaison elements to reenter the Republic of Vietnam on short notice with appropriate air control parties, forward air controllers, and direct air support center liaison personnel.

—Conduct JCRC activities in Laos, the Khmer Republic, South Vietnam, and North Vietnam as directed by CINCPAC.

—Coordinate search and rescue operations in Southeast Asia and adjacent waters.

—Exercise operational control of all US forces and military agencies committed by CINCPAC.

—Supervise, through DAO, the management and coordination of US DOD contracted activities remaining in the Republic of Vietnam to include logistics, intelligence training, RVNAF JGS liaison, operations, and communications-electronics.

—Establish policies and procedures pertaining to the effective operations, maintenance, and management of communications-electronics facilities required for command and control of operations within the assigned areas of responsibility.

—Monitor through the DAO the security assistance planning for the Republic of Vietnam and make recommendations to CINCPAC and to the services as appropriate.

—Keep the US Ambassador to Thailand and COMUSMACTHAI informed on matters of mutual concern.

—Release US military information to foreign representatives only in accordance with disclosure authority directives.

—Support unilateral US efforts to determine general compliance with the military terms of the cease-fire agreement.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

(TS) The addition of a new headquarters in Southeast Asia and the rearrangement and shifting of responsibility concurrent with such an activation required significant shifts in command relationships. The command relationships were as follows:

—COMUSSAG was under the operational command of CINCPAC.

—COMUSSAG exercised operational control of Thailand-based USAF assets (except SAC units and PATMA controlled C-130 aircraft) when directed by CINCPAC.

—Commander, 13th AF, commanded assigned US Air Force units subject to the provisions of the preceding statement.

—Deputy Commander, 7th AF, acted as Deputy Commander 7th AF, to provide interface of the 7th and 13th AF missions.

—COMUSSAG maintained the capability to interface with the VNAF tactical air control system.

—COMUSMACTHAI remained the CINCPAC senior single representative in Thailand.

—COMUSSAG would deal directly with Chief, US Diplomatic Mission, Thailand on matters of mutual interest.

—COMUSSAG would be subject to the direction of the Ambassador, Thailand in contacting officials of the Royal Thai Government and would keep the Ambassador and CINCPAC fully informed.

—Defense Attache Office (DAO) would be under the operational command of COMUSMACV until MACV was disestablished, at which time COMUSSAG would assume operational command of the DAO.

These command relationships in no way altered the existing terms of reference of COMUSMACTHAI/CHJUSMAGTHAI/DEF CHJUSMAGTHAI or their relationships with the Chief, Diplomatic Mission, Thailand or with CINCPAC.

ACTIVATION

(S) The concept of establishing Headquarters, USSAG as originally planned envisioned a three-phase movement. In the initial phase the advance echelon would deploy, in order, to initiate liaison with like elements of 13th Air Force Headquarters and to prepare for the main body. The advance echelon would be composed of approximately 35 personnel and would deploy to Nakhon Phanom by dedicated C-130 aircraft. On order, after X-Day, the main body, consisting of approximately 452 personnel, would deploy to Nakhon Phanom within 30 days. Following substantial deployment of the main body, and on order from CINCPAC, COMUSSAG would assume his delineated missions and functions. The transfer of command and control of the air war was planned for 15 February. As quickly as possible thereafter, and no later than X+55, a small rear echelon involved in the closeout of MACV would complete its redeployment to Nakhon Phanom.

(U) Headquarters USSAG was activated at Nakhon Phanom on 10 February under the command of GEN John W. Vogt, Jr., USAF. Deployment of the advance echelon which initiated liaison with elements of the 13th Air Force and prepared for the main body was completed on 29 January. The planned movement of the main body, delayed several days by the lack of country clearance, began on 10 February, three days behind schedule. By com-

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pressing the movement schedule once country clearance was obtained, Headquarters, USSAG met the planned operational date of 15 February. A dual operational capability existed at MACV and USSAG from 10 through 14 February. Phased movement of the main body by C-130 aircraft from Vietnam was completed on 18 February. The remaining headquarters and support unit personnel moved from Vietnam over the subsequent 45 days as their MACV functions terminated.

(TS) Command and control of the air war previously exercised by COMUSMACV was transferred to COMUSSAG at 0800 hours, 15 February. In addition, on the same date USSAG assumed responsibility for:

—Contingency planning for a cease-fire breakdown and preparation for combat air operations in Laos, the Khmer Republic, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam, as directed by CINCPAC.

—Operational control of USAF TACAIR resources when committed by CINCPAC.

—The capability for interface with VNAF and liaison with the RVNAF JGS, CTF 77, and committed SAC forces.

—Contingency planning for reentry into the Republic of Vietnam with appropriate air control assets.

—Operational control of JCRC.

—Search and rescue operations in SEA and adjacent waters.

—Operational control of all US forces and agencies committed to USSAG by CINCPAC.

—Monitoring, evaluating, and recommending USAF levels in Thailand.

With the disestablishment of MACV on 29 March operational command of the Defense Attache Office (DAO) was transferred to COMUSSAG.

JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY CENTER/JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER (JPRC/JCRC)

(TS) The Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) was activated by COMUSMACV on 17 September 1966 as an element of the MACV Studies and Observations Group (MACSOG). According to the CINCPAC terms of reference promulgated at that time, the JPRC was to give MACV the capability for personnel recovery operations subsequent to the termination of the search and rescue (SAR) effort. In effect, the mission of the JPRC was to recover detained, evading, and escaped US military and civilian personnel as well as those of the FWMAF. In order to accomplish this mission, COMUSMACV was designated the coordinating authority for post-SAR recovery matters in South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, the Khmer Republic, and Thailand. The JPRC functioned as an element of MACSOG from its inception until 15 March 1972, when due to the change of the MACSOG mission and its redesignation as an advisory and assistance team, STDAT-158, JPRC became an element of MACJ2 (later MACD1).⁶

1972 CHANGES IN THE JPRC

(TS) By early 1972 the redeployment of US forces had created the requirement for a new concept of operations for the conduct of personnel recovery (PR) and crash site inspection (CSI) operations. The new concept, implemented by COMUSMACV CONPLAN 5100 dated 1 August 1972, provided for the utilization of offshore US forces and maximum participation of indigenous assets in PR/CSI operations.⁷

1972 MISSION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE JPRC

(C) The 1972 mission of the JPRC was:

—To collate all-source intelligence reports for target development of personnel recovery operations to free US, FWMAF, and Third Country National (TCN) personnel held prisoner by hostile forces.

—To collate all-source intelligence reports to determine the status of US, FWMAF, and TCN personnel declared missing the action (MIA).

—To coordinate and execute body recovery (BR) operations and maintain and coordinate a viable crash site inspection (CSI) program to recover the remains of personnel listed as killed in action body not recovered (KIA/BNR).

(C) In carrying out its mission, the JPRC was tasked with performing the following functions:

—Maintain intelligence files on PW camps and PW sightings in Southeast Asia.

—Maintain an individual dossier on each US, FWMAF, and TCN individual listed as PW, MIA, or KIA, BNR.

—Coordinate personnel recovery (PR) and body recovery (BR) operations throughout Southeast Asia.

—Monitor SAR efforts throughout Southeast Asia.

—Support implementation of MACV OPLAN J-190, EGRESS RECAP/HOMECOMING by assisting in the debriefing of US, FWMAF, and TCN personnel returned from hostile control.

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- Provide tasking and guidance in support of Special Collection Program BRIGHT LIGHT.
- Maintain an automated data processing (ADP) file in support of JPRC mission requirement.^a

JPRC-MANAGED PROGRAMS

(C) In support of its mission the JPRC was responsible for managing four programs: Reward Program, Leaflet Program, Crash Site Inspection Program, and Special Collection Program.

Reward Program

(C) The JPRC Reward Program was designed to encourage active participation by local nationals throughout Southeast Asia in providing information on US personnel in PW, MIA, and KIA/BNR status. The program provided for compensation in the following amounts in US dollars or equivalents thereof in foreign currencies (first amount for payment in Laos/second amount for payment in South Vietnam and other locations).

—\$2,000/5,000 for return of a US MIA or PW to friendly control.

—\$250,500 for providing information leading to the recovery of a US MIA or PW by friendly forces.

—\$200,400 for returning the remains of a deceased US person to friendly control.

—\$160,250 for providing information which led to the recovery of the remains of a deceased US person.

—\$100/150 for providing information or returning equipment or other evidence which revealed the disposition or status of missing US personnel. JPRC determined the value of information furnished or the assistance given and directed the payments of rewards. Whenever possible, the payment of a reward received maximum publicity. The rewards for the return of US deceased persons remains or for providing information which led to the recovery of deceased US persons remains were not advertised; however, monies were available for payment. The other rewards were publicized in leaflet drops made in South Vietnam, the Khmer Republic, and Laos. Reward payments were made by a representative of the JPRC directly to requesting agencies or organizations which were responsible for final payment. Reward payments were not authorized to US or RVNAF personnel.

Leaflet Program

(C) The JPRC Leaflet Program was designed to publicize the JPRC Reward Program. Target areas were selected by JPRC monthly. Field elements were encouraged to request leaflet drops within their area of responsibility. These areas were a minimum of 3,000 square kilometers in area. Requests for leaflet drops were classified SECRET, since they were proposed combat air missions.

Crash Site Inspection (CSI) Program

(C) The CSI Program served a twofold function: it determined the status of personnel listed as MIA who were involved in aircraft incidents, and recovered the remains of personnel KIA/BNR. It was supported by an ADP file which listed the location, circumstances, and disposition of all crash sites in Southeast Asia associated with US, FWMAF, or TCN personnel who were MIA or declared KIA/BNR. Extracts of the file were provided to each regional assistance command (RAC) to assist in search activities. Complete records were not always available for each crash site. Often the coordinates provided had been determined by the last known radio or radar contact. Field elements were therefore encouraged to provide the JPRC with any additional information available at the local level and to inform JPRC of any discrepancies noted in periodic CSI printouts. Field elements planning a CSI operation were requested to notify JPRC prior to the execution of the inspection to insure that qualified graves registration personnel accompanied participating units. This was to insure a professional search of the crash site and to assist operational units in training for future CSI operations. CSI operations were to be conducted only when there was negligible risk of casualties to friendly forces. With the redeployment of US forces, ARVN participation in CSI operations was encouraged. Similar to CSI operations were the excavations of suspected grave sites. These were referred to as body recovery (BR) operations.

Special Collection Program BRIGHT LIGHT

(C) An intelligence collection program, code name BRIGHT LIGHT, was designed by JPRC to provide the intelligence community with comprehensive requirements for the collection of information on US personnel listed as PW, MIA, or KIA. Requirements were disseminated to all DOD intelligence agencies operating in South Vietnam. Because Vietnamese nationals provided the most lucrative source of information in this area, US advisors were encouraged to improvise local programs to advertise the JPRC Reward Program which provided cash incentives for information concerning US personnel.²

1972 ACTIVITIES

(S/NF) Throughout 1972 the JPRC performed its missions of target development for personnel recovery operations, collation of intelligence to determine the status of personnel listed as MIA, and the coordination of operations to recover the remains of personnel listed as KIA/BNR. Late in the year JPRC personnel devoted an increasing amount of time to post-hostilities planning, to include provisional manning of the Joint Casualty

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Resolution Center (JCRC) and the revision of the BRIGHT LIGHT collection plan for the post-hostilities period.¹⁰ The major events of the JPRC during 1972 were the following:

—Transfer of JPRC from MACSOG to MACJ2 (MACDI) on 15 March 1972.

—Development of a new concept of operations for personnel recovery/crash site inspection (PR/CSI) which was promulgated in COMUSMACV CONPLAN 5100, dated 1 August 1972.

—Combining of JPRC and the Joint Central Graves Registration Office (JCGRO) on 30 October 1972 in preparation for the establishment of a CINCPAC Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC).

Returned PWs

(S) During 1972 no US or FWMAF personnel were recovered or escaped from enemy captivity. Three US officers were released by Hanoi on 25 September, however, and a total of 25 Third Country Nationals (ten Filipinos, 13 French, one Australian, and one Belgian) were released by enemy forces in the Republic of Vietnam, Laos, and the Khmer Republic.

(S) In addition to the released PWs, a total of eight bodies of US personnel were recovered in the Republic of Vietnam by US and ARVN units. All were either crew members or passengers who were killed in aircraft crashes.¹¹

Post-Hostilities Planning

(TS) JPRC post-hostilities planning took place throughout much of 1972, in anticipation of a Southeast Asia-wide cease-fire which made it apparent that efforts to resolve the status of missing personnel would continue after the cessation of hostilities. In addition, as has been true after past hostilities, a major effort to recover the remains of US deceased personnel was to be required. As of 10 January 1973, there were 1,373 US military and 14 US civilians listed as missing in Southeast Asia, while only 560 US military and 36 US civilians were carried as PW.¹²

(TS) In July CINCPAC proposed the establishment of the Joint Information Center (JIC) to resolve the status of MIAs and recover the remains of deceased US personnel throughout Southeast Asia and at the same time outlined the general concept of how this mission was to be accomplished. COMUSMACV was invited to participate in the refinement of the concept and did so by providing specific recommendations and comments as to its organization, location, and development in an exchange of messages with CINCPAC. The exchange culminated in the submission of a proposed 60-man organization to JCS for approval. The organization, renamed the Joint Casualty Resolution Center

(JCRC) was to be subordinate to CINCPAC and to be developed over the period of US force withdrawal from Vietnam. The first phase of development was completed on 30 October when the personnel and records of the JPRC and the MACV Joint Central Graves Registration Office (JCGRO), formerly an element of the MACV Directorate of Logistics, were combined. This did not signify the activation of the JCRC, but was rather a modification of the MACV JTD in preparation for its activation as a CINCPAC element. It resulted in the collocation of the two organizations most deeply involved in casualty resolution activities: the JPRC, its mission concerning PW/MIA; and the JCGRO, involved in the recovery and identification of deceased US personnel.¹³

(TS) The combining of the two organizations was followed in November by the JCS approval of the 60-man JTD. Further exchanges between COMUSMACV and CINCPAC during the remainder of 1972 resulted in the submission to the JCS of a new CONPLAN 5100 in December which provided for casualty resolution operations in Southeast Asia after cessation of hostilities. The concept plan was pending approval by JCS at the end of the year. To support the plan, CINCPAC in December proposed that the approved 60-man JTD be expanded to 110 spaces.

(TS) CONPLAN 5100 called for the activation of a 110-man CINCPAC JCRC staffed from MACV assets after the signing of the cease-fire. The JCRC was to be initially located at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand under the command of the US Support Activities Group/7th Air Force. JCRC field teams, augmented by additional skills and personnel as required, had the mission to conduct casualty resolution operations in coordination with the appropriate American embassies. To assist in coordination, the JCRC was to maintain liaison officers in Phnom Penh, Saigon, and Vientiane.


(S) A further aspect of the JPRC/JCRC mission both before and after the cessation of hostilities was its role in COMUSMACV OPLAN J-190, EGRESS RECAP/HOMECOMING. The plan called for the processing of personnel who were formerly captured or detained by hostile forces. The JPRC was to be the focal point for COMUSMACV intelligence aspects of EGRESS RECAP/HOMECOMING processing and coordinated the in-country debriefing of returnees, escapees, and recovered personnel. JPRC debriefing of returnees was designed to obtain information concerning US personnel remaining in captivity who might be recovered by immediate combat reaction. After a cease-fire the JPRC/JCRC was to continue to have a major supporting role in EGRESS RECAP/HOMECOMING activities. JCRC

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JCRC ORGANIZATION
29 JANUARY 1973



Source: JPRC

Figure: G-2

representatives were to be stationed at major returnee processing centers to assist in debriefing to acquire information necessary for immediate recovery attempts of other prisoners and to acquire information concerning other PW/MIA. Thus, a major JCRC responsibility during the repatriation of US PWs was to obtain the information required to resolve the status of those not released during the prisoner exchange.¹⁴

1973 JPRC/JCRC ACTIVITIES

(C) By late January 1973 the proposed 110-man JCRC JTD had been increased by 29 personnel on the recommendation of CINCPAC. This increase, approved by the JCS, resulted in a restructuring of the JCRC field team concept. The number of field teams was expanded to 11, six to conduct casualty resolution operations in Laos and the Khmer Republic and five in the Republic of Vietnam. The teams would be augmented by specialists as required. Two control teams and launch units were formed with the missions of dispatching the field teams and providing command and control while they were operating in the field.

(U) On 23 January, in anticipation of the formal signing of the cease-fire, the JCRC was activated

(Fig. G-2). On the same day, BG Robert C. Kingston, USA was announced as Chief, JCRC, with his headquarters temporarily established at MACV Headquarters in Saigon.

(U) The first activity of the newly activated organization was concerned with Operation HOMECOMING. When the first groups of US PWs were released by Hanoi and the Viet Cong on 28 January, JCRC personnel were dispatched to Clark AFB in the Philippines to participate in the initial debriefings of the returnees. There they worked with service debriefers, providing information from JCRC files on missing personnel and requesting specific answers to questions in an attempt to obtain more complete biographic data on those personnel who were still carried as MIA.

(U) On 16 February the JCRC deployed to Nakhon Phanom, Thailand where it came under the operational control of COMUSSAG. At that time 100 of 139 personnel had been identified; approximately 50 had already arrived in Nakhon Phanom. Four members of JCRC remained at MACV Headquarters in Saigon, where they provided for the orderly phase-out of residual JCRC activities in the Republic of Vietnam.¹⁵

DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE¹⁶

(S) The planning for an organization which was to assume post cease-fire MACV in-country functions and responsibilities began on 19 October 1972, when MG Jack C. Fuson, the MACV Director of Logistics, was tasked to organize a close-hold planning group to formulate both cease-fire withdrawal plans and the transition and conduct of operations after the withdrawal. The Defense Attache Office

(DAO), as the new organization was called, was to be headed by MG John E. Murray, who replaced MG Fuson on 13 December 1972. COL R. L. Branch, Chief, Logistics Operation Center, headed the close-hold planning group.

The reader should be aware that the Defense Attache Office, Saigon has a staff historian. A DAO history will be prepared in accordance with existing CINCPAC instructions.

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MISSION AND FUNCTIONS

(C) The basic mission and functions of the Defense Attache Office, Saigon underwent no major changes from the time of the first planning until approved by the JCS on 15 January 1973. The DAO was jointly staffed and organized to perform the traditional attache functions and to continue those functions in the areas of operations, logistics, and contract maintenance which were key to Vietnamization. The DAO was tasked to:

- Assure effective use of resources.
- Develop Vietnamese self-sufficiency.
- Phase out contractual support.
- Evaluate and report on RVNAF operational activities.
- Coordinate US military activities in-country, including PSYOP, JCRC, and search and rescue operations.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

(TS) The Defense Attache Office, Saigon was the remaining Department of Defense organization in Vietnam which assumed all DOD responsibilities after 29 March 1973. Therefore, all DOD personnel in South Vietnam were either assigned or attached to DAO, Saigon under the direction of the Defense Attache. The Defense Attache served as the senior military representative to the United States Diplomatic Mission in the Republic of Vietnam as a member of the American Embassy in-country team. In addition to this traditional attache role, he was the representative of the Secretary of Defense and CINCPAC with respect to the US Security Assistance Program in South Vietnam and coordinated with the services in planning and managing the respective Military Assistance Service funded programs in support of the Vietnamese Armed Forces. Under the operational command of COMUSMACV until the disestablishment of MACV on 29 March 1973, the DAO then came under the operational command of COMUSSAG. Upon disestablishment of USSAG, DAO would report to CINCPAC.

PLANNING AND ACTIVATION

(S) Because the DAO, Saigon was unique compared with a typical attache office, there were no published guidelines for establishing such an organization; that is, one office which would both perform the traditional attache functions and manage the US military assets and programs remaining in Vietnam after the cease-fire. The latter included logistical assistance to the RVNAF, in-country procurement and contract administration, and support to residual US personnel. Although JCS and CINCPAC in turn provided broad parameters, there was little specific guidance on the full range of what the organization was to be tasked to do.

(S) While identifying the requirements for the organization, planners had to identify all of the contracts that supported the US and RVNAF forces plus USAID, CORDS, and the embassy. The functions and personnel requirements to administer, modify, and terminate all of these contracts had to be considered and included in the organizational structure.

(S) Another major task was to hire civilian personnel to staff the organization. There was a continual difficulty in recruiting 1,200 DOD civilians because of a lack of available people and the unattractiveness to US civilians of a one-year tour of duty in Vietnam. Therefore, a request was made in early January for 242 TDY personnel to fill key positions. Mr. Richard C. Biggs became the senior civilian deputy to MG Murray. Other key individuals in the personnel and procurement fields were requested to work with the planning group in establishing the organization.

(S) Based on guidelines provided by JCS and CINCPAC, exigencies dictated by the progress of the cease-fire negotiations, and continuing evaluation of the DAO organization, numerous changes were made. In mid-November MACV was tasked to consider two forms for the organization, one with DOD civilians not authorized, which was found infeasible, and a second with DOD civilians authorized; the only ceiling established was 50 military spaces. Under the second condition, DOD civilians authorized, the planning group was tasked to address two Manning levels—950 and 1,650 spaces respectively. For the 950 space level a joint table of distribution (JTD) was prepared. However, it was determined that only the regulatory and statutory requirements of DOD could be met with this Manning level, and technical assistance to the RVNAF would be severely curtailed. For the 1,650 space Manning level, the planners prepared a joint table of distribution, including functions, for an organization capable of accomplishing the residual MACV tasks after MACV was disestablished. The final approval for a 1,250 space Manning level JTD was received on 7 March 1973.

(C) To perform the detailed functions outside of Saigon, DAO civilian personnel would be stationed in Long Binh, Bien Hoa, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, Da Nang, Pleiku, Binh Thuy, Can Tho, and Dong Tam. Local national and contract personnel would also be located in the same general areas, as shown in Figure G-3. The organization and staffing of the DAO proceeded simultaneously with the phasing down of MACV functions and the withdrawal of US and FWMAF in Vietnam. By 28 January, the activation date of DAO, 190 permanent DOD employees and 46 TDY personnel had been assigned


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**DAO PERSONNEL
(LOCATIONS & NUMBERS)
(PROPOSED - MARCH 1973)**

RECAP:

SAIGON AREA	1066
OTHER LOCATIONS	184
TOTAL	1250



Source: DAO

Figure: G-3

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DAO Army BY THE USF


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DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE



* MAJOR FUNCTIONAL DIVISIONS

Source: DAO

Figure: G-4

to DAO. By 29 March 90 percent of the personnel required by DAO had been recruited and 58 percent were in-country. Through the final days of the US troop withdrawal, MACV military personnel worked with the incoming civilian staff to assure an orderly transition of functions.

ORGANIZATION AND INITIAL OPERATIONS

(C) In addition to a headquarters staff, the DAO was organized with an attache element and six major functional divisions: Operations and Plans, Army, Navy, Air Force, Communications-Elec-

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tronics, and Support Divisions as shown in Figure G-4.

Attache Element

(C) Five attaches representing the three military services were assigned by the Defense Intelligence Agency to perform the traditional attache duties.

Operations and Plans Division

(C) The Operations and Plans Division was composed of 25 military and 287 civilians whose functions were to:

- Coordinate all military activities in-country.
- Coordinate, develop, and report intelligence.
- Evaluate and report on operational activities.
- Perform liaison with RVNAF JGS and MOND.
- Coordinate search and rescue operations.
- Monitor, coordinate, and support PSYOP.

As MACV continued to prepare for deactivation after the cease-fire, the Operations and Plans Division, on a phased basis, assumed the reduced missions of both the MACV Operations Directorate and Intelligence Directorate. Coordination was established with USSAG for all operational matters.

Army Division

(C) The Army Division was composed of three military and 277 civilians whose functions were to: monitor and promote the continued process of Vietnamization; supervise and monitor the ARVN MASF materiel programs; and provide technical assistance and support functions in the areas of transportation, supply, maintenance, medical, property disposal, and contract monitoring (including most of the contracts for the other service components receiving common support). MASF materiel program emphasis was in the following areas:

- Army Arsenal.
- ARVN Medium Maintenance Program.
- TOW weapons systems.
- RVNAF Automated Materiel Management System (RAMMS).
- ARVN Associated Depot.
- Engineer services and facility maintenance.

During the transition period from 28 January to 29 March, the following were the most significant activities of the Army Division. The RVNAF Materiel System (RAMMS) contract, keystone of the Vietnamese Materiel Management Agency, was awarded to the Computer Sciences Corporation. It involved both computer hardware and software programs, and materiel management activities. The Computer Science Corporation was fully operational on 1 March 1973; contract personnel relieved 46 military personnel on 10 March. Also, the Army Materiel Command (AMC) provided 34 personnel to give technical assistance to the ARVN in their field depot maintenance programs, and the civilianized US Army Property Disposal Office was transferred

to the DAO on 22 February. Finally, the Contract Administration Office was transferred from the US Army as an entity on 27 February. Civilianized while under the US Army, it became an element of the Army Division, which administered Army contracts in the Republic and performed local procurement for all services.

Navy Division

(C) the Navy Division was composed of four military and 120 civilians whose functions were to: monitor and promote the continued process of Vietnamization; supervise and monitor the VNN/VNMC MASF materiel programs; and provide technical assistance and support functions in the areas of transportation, supply, maintenance, medical property disposal, and contract monitoring. MASF materiel program emphasis was in the following areas:

- VNN Supply Center
- VNN Shipyard.
- VNN logistic support bases (LSB), intermediate support bases (ISB), and afloat support bases (ASB).
- Materiel readiness of microwave and other electronic equipment.
- Base construction and maintenance.

The majority of the Navy technical assistance to the VNN and VNMC was provided by DOD civilians rather than by contractors. Limited contracts were required in the logistics area and were fully operational by 28 March.

Air Force Division

(C) The Air Force Division was composed of three military and 192 DOD civilians whose functions were to: monitor and promote the continued process of Vietnamization; supervise and monitor the VNAF MASF materiel programs; and provide technical assistance and support functions in the areas of supply, maintenance, and contract monitoring. MASF materiel program emphasis was in the following areas:

- Augmentation of operational VNAF units as necessary, to provide maintenance and supply capabilities until VNAF personnel shortfalls were reduced.
 - Expansion of the Air Logistics Command Depot maintenance and supply capabilities.
 - Assistance in equipment storage and maintenance operations.
 - Assistance in VNAF base operation and maintenance.
 - Development of VNAF communications-electronics operators and maintenance personnel.
- During the two months preceding the disestablishment of MACV, the USAF had moved rapidly to train VNAF in the use of new aircraft and to

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augment their maintenance support capability by expanding existing contracts.

Communications-Electronics Division

(C) The C-E Division was composed of four military and 98 civilians whose functions were to:

—Monitor and promote the continued process of Vietnamization.

—Ensure continued effective communications in support of DAO and the US Embassy.

—Provide for the supervision of C-E contractors supporting the operations and maintenance of RVNAF and residual US C-E systems.

—Provide technical and managerial guidance to the RVNAF Communications Management Agency in support of the RVNAF Single Integrated Military Telecommunications System (SIMS).

—Provide liaison and assistance to the RVNAF JGS and the ARVN Signal Department.

—Supervise and coordinate RVNAF JGS C-E agencies' in-country and off-shore support.

—Coordinate and plan C-E support for DAO command and control functions.

—Serve as the US point of contact for the US

use of RVNAF-operated communications systems.

Support Division

(C) The Support Division was composed of one military and 93 civilians whose functions were to: plan, coordinate, supervise, and provide services for the DAO headquarters and other designated US personnel and agencies in the areas of commissary, postal, billeting, messing, POL, transportation, housekeeping, and security. In-country air transportation support for DAO was contracted with Air America, to include aeromedical evacuation. Out-of-country aeromedical evacuation was provided by the USAF 9th Aeromedical Evacuation Group from Clark AFB. The support of the DAO was provided by retaining 25 contracts in the general areas of maintenance, transportation, supply, and subsistence management. On 9 March a DOD civilian-manned post office was activated as part of DAO. Other facilities, including billets, offices, motor pools, and a post exchange were operational by 29 March. On 1 March DAO physical security functions were assumed under contract by the Pacific Architects and Engineers Corporation.

US DELEGATION TO THE FOUR PARTY JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION

PLANNING AND ORGANIZATION

(TS) On 30 October, shortly after Dr. Henry A. Kissinger's "Peace Is at Hand" speech, Washington wired Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker that planning should begin to have the supervisory machinery ready in place as soon as the impending cease-fire went into effect. Directed to form a very small, close-hold planning staff to work out the details of the proposed Four Party Joint Military Commission (FPJMC), GEN Weyand named COL George T. Balzer, USMC and MAJ Paul L. Miles, USA to the planning group. They were given a copy of the draft cease-fire agreement from which they extracted the tasks and worked out a plan for the organization of the FPJMC. By 4 November this initial planning had been completed and submitted to Washington by GEN Weyand and Ambassador Bunker. During the next month and a half messages and visits were exchanged with Washington which caused additional planning and major revisions to existing plans. For instance, the planning group produced an 87 point draft commander's agreement for the implementation of the cease-fire and establishment of the FPJMC. Further, in mid-December the planning group analyzed a draft protocol on the cease-fire drawn up by the North Vietnamese. By 26 December this preliminary planning and analysis was essentially complete; MG Gilbert H. Woodward, who was to be the US Chief Delegate to the FPJMC, and MAJ Miles

went to Paris in January to assist in the final details of the protocols.

(U) At the same time that GEN Weyand and his planners were working on and analyzing the agreements being reached in Paris, they were concerned with the practical considerations of the physical establishment and operation of the US Delegation to the FPJMC. The key areas of interest to them were functions, organization, and manning; location and office space for the central delegation; facilities for the regional delegations; and means of identification for members of the commission. BG John A. Wickham, USA headed the planning group tasked with these problems.

(S) A draft joint table of distribution drafted in mid-November underwent several stages of change and development, and the organization emerged as shown in Figure G-5. The final concept was to transfer the office of the MACV Chief of Staff, MG Woodward, intact as the nucleus of the US Delegation to the FPJMC. The MACV Secretary to the Joint Staff, COL Edward C. O'Conner, USA, became the Secretary to the US Delegation. Other MACV personnel were selected to staff the delegation positions and field teams.

—This abbreviated account of the US Delegation, Four Party Joint Military Commission is based on and extracted from an original draft manuscript written by MAJ W. Scott Dillard, USA, historian for the US Delegation. Interested readers should refer to MAJ Dillard's detailed history, scheduled for completion in the early summer 1973.

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—The Operations and Plans Division was headed by COL Ralph H. Detherow, USA. Within this division were a plans branch, an operations branch, a joint military teams branch, and a liaison section to the MACV Communications and Electronics Directorate.

—The Language and Liaison Division, established in the first days of the operation of the delegation, was headed by COL George T. Balzer, USMC. Within this division was the interpreter for the Chief of Delegation, MAJ Jean Sauvageot, USA.

—The Prisoner of War Division was headed by COL B. H. Russell, USA, formerly the MACV Provost Marshal and MACV Deputy Director of Personnel.


—The Administrative-Logistical Division was headed by COL John C. Evans, USA. Within this division were placed the personnel affairs, transportation, comptroller, conference site, and field logistics coordinator branches.

—The Public Affairs Division was under the charge of LTC D. J. Peterson, USAF, who had formerly been in the MACV Office of Information.

(TS) By the end of November, planning for the daily operation of the proposed delegation had proceeded to the point that a formal statement of functions was drawn up, based on the draft agreement of Paris, direction from Washington, and guidance

from GEN Weyand. In a memorandum of 30 November, BG Wickham outlined three basic functions of the Four Party Joint Military Commission. These were "to serve as a channel of communications for the four parties, to assist the parties in implementation of the basic agreement, and to assist in verifying compliance with the basic agreement." In order to accomplish these functions, there were certain specific tasks that had to be carried out by each of the delegations. Channels of communication for information concerning the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians had to be established. The dismantling of US and allied bases and the withdrawal of US and allied forces had to be verified. The commission had to receive an accounting of weapons turn-in and storage from disarmed military forces and verify the securing of such weapons in safe locations. Effective liaison and coordination with the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) and the Two Party Joint Military Commission (TPJMC) had to be established and maintained. Working procedures appropriate for the functions and responsibilities of the commission had to be adopted, to include daily meetings. Joint field teams had to be established and directed. Joint action by the four parties to enforce the cease-fire and cessation of all offensive acts had to be insured.

US DELEGATION TO THE FOUR PARTY JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION



* CONCURRENTLY, US DELEGATE TO THE FW SUBCOMMISSION

Source: FPJMC

Figure: G-5


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The FPJMC Regional Headquarters compound in Can Tho.

(TS) BG Wickham then directed the planners to prepare papers, with supporting material, for the initial meetings of the commission. An opening statement by the US chairman was to be prepared, including an overview on the functions of the commission and a proposal for agreement among the parties on organization and operating procedures. This entailed drafting an agreement on working procedures which were to include procedural and support matters for daily meetings, communications between delegations, liaison and coordination with the International Commission of Control and Supervision and the Two Party Joint Military Commission (Composed of the Republic of Vietnam and the PRG), and the organization and direction of joint field teams.

(TS) By early December the planners had a clearer picture of how and with whom they were going to establish the US Delegation. Their organizational planning extended by this time to the regional elements, and the chiefs of these elements had been designated. In essence, the organization was based upon the premise that the US Delegation to the central commission would be organized from the personnel and materiel assets of MACV

Headquarters, and the regional groups would similarly be organized from the available personnel of the military region within which they were assigned.

(TS) During this phase of planning, some difficulty was experienced with the South Vietnamese. Part of the difficulty was in getting them to support the logistics requirements, including facilities locations of the ICCS and Communist FPJMC delegations in the face of President Thieu's opposition to the proposed agreements in Paris. Part of it, however, was the unwillingness of the South Vietnamese armed forces to part with any equipment that was excess to their needs. Their interpretation was that they had no excess equipment; thus, they operated on the assumption that the United States would provide what was required. Probably as a result of pressure brought to bear on the Chief of the Vietnamese Central Logistics Command in a meeting with BG Wickham and COL Balzer, the deadlock was broken on 5 December. On that day the South Vietnamese acknowledged that as host country they had the responsibility to provide the facilities and equipment for the Four Party and Two Party Joint Military Commissions. This permitted the planning to proceed more smoothly and realistically.

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(U) In January 1973, when the requirement for seven (instead of four) regional commissions and 26 (instead of 20) joint control teams (Fig. G-6) became known, the logistical planners realized that adequate facilities did not exist at some sites. At this point GEN Weyand directed the MACV staff and the commanders of the regional assistance commands to provide support to the FPJMC and to the International Commission of Control and Supervision, which was in a similar position. MG John E. Murray, USA, the MACV Director of Logistics, formed a special task force under LTC R. C. Tashjian, USMC. Named the JMC/ICCS Support Office, this organization was responsible to coordinate the support requirements for the two supervisory bodies. Pacific Architects and Engineers was contracted for much of this support.

(U) Despite assurances to the contrary from the South Vietnamese high command in Saigon their commanders in the field continued to demonstrate a reluctance to provide support for the North Vietnamese and PRG elements in their areas. The difficulties centered on the locations and adequacy of facilities, furniture, and other equipment for offices and billets, vehicles, and adequate food. The question of food was significant because the South Vietnamese, ostensibly for reasons of security, would not permit the Communist delegations free-


dom of movement outside of the compounds to purchase food.

US DELEGATION ACTIVITIES

The Tan Son Nhut Incident

(U) From the beginning, operation of the FPJMC was inauspicious. Conflicts quickly surfaced, plaguing the efforts of the US Delegation to establish an effective cease-fire and secure the release of American prisoners of war. Among the major complicating factors were the hostility of the South Vietnamese toward the North Vietnamese and PRG delegations and the ideological positions assumed by the Communists, along with their continual demands for increased logistical support.


(U) The first of the North Vietnamese and PRG delegations arrived at Tan Son Nhut airport on Sunday afternoon, 28 January. The PRG flight had originated in Paris and, upon arrival at Saigon, the PRG delegates were required to complete debarkation forms by South Vietnamese. This they refused to do and a "sit-in" aboard the aircraft began which lasted throughout the night. The issue was finally resolved the following morning, when under American pressure, the South Vietnamese allowed the Communist delegates to leave the aircraft without completing the documentation procedures. Although there were similar problems with later flights the



A regional meeting of the FPJMC in Pleiku.

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ICCS AND JOINT MILITARY COMMISSION LOCATIONS



Source: FPJMC

Figure: G-6

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The ICCS Regional Headquarters in Da Nang.

PRG delegates completed the documents while registering mild objections.

Initial Delegation Meetings

(U) Once this issue was settled, attention shifted to the meetings of the Deputy Chiefs of Delegations which began on 29 January. The four parties were represented by BG John A. Wickham, Jr., for the United States, BG Phan Hoa Hiep for South Vietnam, COL Luu Van Loi for North Vietnam, and COL Dan Van Thu for the PRG. These meetings were held to work out procedural matters; meetings of the delegation chiefs could not be held until the senior PRG delegates arrived in Saigon.

(U) On 1 February at the morning session of the Deputy Chiefs' meeting the PRG representative opened by proposing that the FPJMC subcommittee on captured persons be established on 4 February. Although the United States had originally proposed 1 February, BG Wickham suggested that the subcommittee begin work on 3 February. This was agreed. BG Wickham also asked the North Vietnamese to provide prompt replies to the US requests for American PW information, including the numbers to be released, places of detention, and dates and places of release in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and Laos. Another request was for arrangements to obtain information on missing US personnel who were not listed on the published PW lists. When appropriate, such information was to include death certificates to assist in accounting

for the missing and procedures for the return of deceased remains.

(U) On 2 February the first meetings of the Chiefs of Delegations were held, following the PRG's Chief Delegate's arrival the previous day. The United States was represented by MG Gilbert H. Woodward, the host for the inaugural session. LTG Tran Van Tra represented the PRG, MG Le Quang Hoa represented the North Vietnamese, and LTG Ngo Dzu represented the South Vietnamese.

(U) In opening the meeting MG Woodward expressed his concern that five days had been consumed by arranging procedural matters. He stressed that the substantive problems to be solved included the release of American prisoners of war and the need for issuing appropriate instructions to insure the stability of the cease-fire. MG Woodward also presented the general plan for the US troop withdrawal in four 15-day increments, concurrent with the release of the US PWs. He noted that the withdrawal of Korean forces depended upon the cessation of hostilities along the roads to their ports of embarkation, one of which was then interdicted. He further stated that the United States was awaiting the North Vietnamese response to the proposed liaison meetings on mine clearing operations of North Vietnamese ports.

Field Facilities

(U) From the announcement of the cease-fire agreement, GEN Weyand and MG Woodward

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The leaders of the US Delegation of the initial Chiefs of Delegates meeting on 2 February 1973: From left to right, seated at the conference table, BG John A. Wickham, USA, Deputy Chief of the US Delegation, MG Gilbert H. Woodward, USA, Chief of the US Delegation, and COL Edward C. O'Connor, USA, Secretary to the US Delegation; second row, COL Byron H. Russell, USA, Prisoner of War Division, COL Ralph H. Detherow, USA, Operations and Plans Division, and COL George T. Balzer (partly hidden), USMC, Language and Liaison Division.

closely watched the development of facilities for the Communist delegations. At a meeting between representatives of the American, North Vietnamese, and PRG delegations in Saigon on 30 January, shortly after the FPJMC began its work, the two Communist delegations aired their immediate problems. Their concern was with basic logistical needs. They noted that their complete delegations had not yet arrived, and they required temporary assistance to carry out housekeeping tasks, such as cooking and cleaning. They emphasized that since the South Vietnamese government would not allow them to leave their compound (Camp Davis at Tan Son Nhut AB), and local merchants were kept away, the purchase of food was impossible. In addition, they could neither operate the US mess hall equipment nor maintain the electricity and running water. They also needed more office equipment.

(U) The US representatives offered to act as

intermediaries in hiring civilian contractors to solve most of the problem. The Americans noted that US forces were being withdrawn and personnel were not available, except on a temporary basis, to train the North Vietnamese and PRG personnel in the use of mess hall and utilities equipment. This seemed to satisfy them for the time being.

(U) Similar questions were brought up in the initial meetings of the Chiefs of Delegations when the Communist delegates complained about accommodations and the food at regional team sites. The American and South Vietnamese Chiefs responded that facilities were austere because of wartime conditions, but that improvements were being made. The point was made that early deployment of Communist teams to the countryside was more important than ideal amenities.

(U) Early reports on facilities from the US regional elements were also pessimistic. These re-

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ports indicated that the attitude of the South Vietnamese was a major problem resulting in extensive site preparation delays. The coincidence of the Tet holiday in the first week of February further compounded the delays, for little was accomplished by the Vietnamese workmen during the holiday period.

(U) Because these reports from the US regional elements painted a bleak picture for the prospects of early deployment of the joint military teams to the field, GEN Weyand intervened. He was concerned because he realized that the cease-fire would be ineffective without the teams' presence in the countryside. In a message to the USARV/MACV SUPCOM the plan was laid out. "The ultimate responsibility for initial support rests with the U.S.," stated the directive, "and where shortfall occurs. U.S. agencies must take the necessary steps to insure that the required support is provided." Step by step, the problem areas of facilities, vehicles, equipment, and supplies were covered, and the responsibility assigned for each. As a result, the American regional delegations began to play an active role, and the senior US military commanders in the South Vietnamese corps areas directed their attention to the difficulties, thereby gradually improving the facilities situation. Unfortunately, this American effort came too late to affect the early deployment of the North Vietnamese and PRG FPJMC team members to the field.

Physical Security Problems

(U) The issue of security, which had been a concern of all four parties, next came to the fore. Although the Communist delegations that had deployed had been met with resentful and hostile attitudes by the local inhabitants and government troops, there had been no significant overt incidents. But at Ban Me Thuot on 9 February, the situation radically changed. The first helicopter landed, and the North Vietnamese passengers moved to the covered platform where South Vietnamese officials were waiting to process the delegates. By the time the second helicopters landed, a crowd had gathered, banners had appeared, and the crowd began moving toward the helicopter. The North Vietnamese representatives reached the processing table safely, although the crowd pressed closer and became more excited. Some of the demonstrators moved onto the covered platform, within ten feet of the North Vietnamese. By this time, the apprehensive Americans had persuaded the South Vietnamese officials to halt their work, open the gates to the soccer field, and clear the way to the compound. As the group left, some of the crowd began to throw stones, dirt clods, and bricks at the delegates, while others began hitting the North

Vietnamese—and whoever else was with them—with sticks.

(U) Within the FPJMC the reaction to this incident was prompt. Early the following morning, the North Vietnamese and PRG delegates canceled their attendance at the subcommission meetings. In each case, the incident at Ban Me Thuot was cited as the reason.

(U) The North Vietnamese and PRG delegations' chiefs did attend the central commission meeting on 10 February, however. The North Vietnamese opened the session with a loud and strong protest over the Ban Me Thuot incident. Then the North Vietnamese announced that they had suspended further deployments to the field until they received US and South Vietnamese assurances that similar incidents would be prevented. The PRG also suspended further deployments. All parties agreed to dispatch a joint military team to Ban Me Thuot to investigate. Thereafter, throughout the life of the FPJMC, the lack of physical security was cited as a major reason for the Communist delegates' failure to occupy many field team locations.

AMERICAN PRISONER RELEASES Subcommission Meetings

(S/NF) At the first meeting of the Prisoner of War Subcommission on 3 February, several agreements were reached. First, the North Vietnamese and PRG agreed to provide 48 hours notice of the date and place of American prisoner releases. The PRG indicated that they would have one prisoner release point for US prisoners held in South Vietnam and that it would probably be the airfield at An Loc, in Military Region 3. They stated that 10 and 11 February were possible dates for the first prisoner release. The North Vietnamese noted that they would probably release more American prisoners than was required in the first increment; however, the specific number and date of release were not provided. The American PWs were to be released in four 15-day increments, during which the US forces and FWMAF would redeploy from South Vietnam.

(S/NF) At the meeting on the following day the PRG announced that 27 American military prisoners would be released at the airfield near An Loc in the first phase, but no date was given. The North Vietnamese asked for technical information on the support and evacuation aircraft to be used in removing the prisoners from North Vietnam. This data was furnished. The North Vietnamese also stated that all of the prisoners to be released in the first phase were in good physical condition and that there would not be a need for litters on the first evacuation aircraft.

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(U) For the next several days, the discussions focused on the mechanics of arranging for the release. Problems began to emerge on communications between Saigon and Hanoi, although it was difficult to determine if this was a North Vietnamese ploy to delay the prisoner release and keep the United States Delegation off balance.

(U) The South Vietnamese complicated the basic issue of release of military prisoners at the 4 February meeting. Although they had earlier stated that 7,000 NVA/VC prisoners would be released, they revised their figure downward to 2,000. This action complicated the release of American prisoners when the PRG and North Vietnamese attempted to connect the two. However, on the following day the South Vietnamese reversed their position and agreed to release the original 7,000 prisoners.

(U) At the meeting on 10 February, the North Vietnamese confirmed their intentions stated the day before to release the first American prisoners on 12 February in Hanoi. They provided the names of the 115 Americans who would be returned to US control. The PRG delegate handed over the names of 9 US civilian prisoners and 18 American military prisoners that they planned to release on 12 February. They stated that the point of pickup would be Quan Loi airfield, near An Loc. This was later changed to Loc Ninh.

The Initial Prisoner Release

(U) Early in the morning of 12 February the Americans were prepared for the reception of the prisoners. Code named Operation HOMECOMING, the freed prisoners were to be flown aboard US Air Force aircraft from North Vietnam and South Vietnam to Clark AB in the Philippines for the first leg of their return trip home.

(U) The prisoner release was accomplished at Hanoi with only minor hitches. There was an initial two hour delay because of bad weather reported by Hanoi's Gia Lam airport, but the remainder of the operation followed the prearranged sequence.

(U) The FPJMC observer team traveled from Saigon to Hanoi that morning. When the American observers arrived at Tan Son Nhut AB to join the observers from the other delegations, they discovered that there were no South Vietnamese observers. Nonetheless, the USAF C-130 aircraft departed Tan Son Nhut for Hanoi, with representatives of all four nations of the International Commission of Control and Supervision and the American, North Vietnamese, and PRG observers from the FPJMC aboard. They landed at Gia Lam airfield at 1000 hours Saigon time.

(U) The North Vietnamese briefed the ICCS team first. The prisoners were to be brought from

their place of detention to a "gathering point" near the airport. The airfield itself was to be the release point. The ICCS team raised the question of visiting the last place of detention, and negotiating on this point continued for several hours, finally being resolved in favor of a visit after the prisoner exchange was completed.

(U) The FPJMC observers were then briefed. The subsequent arrival of the American reception team was discussed in detail; their credentials were presented to the North Vietnamese, who accepted them without question.

(U) The American reception team arrived at 1105 hours and met immediately with North Vietnamese officials. The meetings began in the foyer of the main terminal building, which was extensively damaged. The North Vietnamese claimed that this had been done by the B-52 bombing raids. The Americans suspected that this room had been chosen for psychological reasons, although propaganda considerations were probably more important. The meeting was subsequently moved to a semi-private room on the second floor. The North Vietnamese stated that 116 Americans would be released, one more than originally planned.

(U) The chief of the US reception team, COL James R. Dennett, USAF, agreed to the North Vietnamese procedures for the release of the prisoners. When asked if the International Commission of Control and Supervision could visit the last place of detention, the North Vietnamese replied that this was a matter being discussed by the ICCS but that it could be done. The North Vietnamese agreed to a more rapid arrival of the C-141 evacuation aircraft than had been originally planned. COL Dennett agreed to place the sick and the wounded prisoners on the first aircraft. The last prisoners answered the roll call at 1421 hours. An approved joint statement was signed at 1430 hours and the final evacuation aircraft was airborne 18 minutes later.

(U) At 1600 hours, the FPJMC and ICCS observer teams were taken to the Hao Lo Prison (Hanoi Hilton), a facility constructed by the French sometime after World War I. The observers were shown only that part of the prison purportedly occupied by the 116 prisoners that day. The tour of prison facilities ended at 1638 hours and the FPJMC and ICCS teams returned to Gia Lam airfield. They began their return trip to Saigon at approximately 1745 hours.

(U) The prisoner release in Hanoi was a model of smoothness compared to the PRG transfer of prisoners at Loc Ninh. The release there was complicated by the fact that the South Vietnamese government had agreed to release Viet Cong prisoners at the same time. The PRG Delegation to the

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FPJMC seized this opportunity to attempt to link the release of American and Viet Cong prisoners.

(U) The operation began on schedule when the FPJMC observer team arrived in Loc Ninh at 0725 hours, a little more than an hour before the scheduled transfer time. Twenty minutes later BG Stan L. McClellan arrived by helicopter with the US reception team. He was immediately greeted by PRG officials, who explained the procedures for the release and noted that the prisoners would be turned over beginning at 0900 hours, thirty minutes later than planned. This was the first of many delays. The prisoners had not appeared by 0915 hours when the PRG representative informed BG McClellan that although the American and South Vietnamese prisoners held at Loc Ninh were ready for release, he was awaiting the arrival of the Viet Cong prisoners from Bien Hoa. BG McClellan responded that the release of the American prisoners was linked only to the withdrawal of American troops, and not the exchange of prisoners among the three Vietnamese parties. LTC Francis L. Brokaw, the US representative on the observer team, formally requested release of the American prisoners in accordance with the protocols. The PRG spokesman replied that they agreed in principle with this understanding, but that they must wait. The South Vietnamese were accused of causing the delay.

(U) The problem actually was with the Viet Cong prisoners at Bien Hoa who were to be released at Loc Ninh. They had staged a sitdown strike in their prison compound, claiming that there were no North Vietnamese and PRG on the Four Party Joint Military Commission. The implication was that these were South Vietnamese in disguise. An American observer felt that the delay was a "put-up job by the hard-core North Vietnamese in the camp." He suggested that their purpose was to demonstrate to North Vietnam how firm they were.

(U) Back in Saigon, the US Delegation to the FPJMC was taking prompt and strong action to resolve the impasse. Faced with the position taken by the enemy prisoners at Bien Hoa, the decision was made to send North Vietnamese and PRG FPJMC central commission delegates to convince the prisoners that they would be released to Communist forces. COL Russell then went to Davis Station where the Communist delegations were quartered, and was told that PRG Chief Delegate LTG Tra had ordered a suspension of the US PW release throughout South Vietnam.

(C) In the meantime, MG Woodward reaffirmed to BG McClellan that the release of American prisoners was linked only to American and FVMAF troop withdrawals from South Vietnam. He em-

phatically stated that there was no linkage in any way to the release of Viet Cong prisoners. In his opening statements at the Chiefs of Delegations meeting that morning he restated this position and protested the delay. LTG Tra responded that there had been an agreement that the release of the American prisoners would follow the release of the Viet Cong prisoners: if the latter were delayed, there would also be a delay in the return of the US prisoners. This argument was rejected by MG Woodward, who stated that unless he received assurance that American prisoners were being released, he would withdraw from the meeting and seek instructions from his government. LTG Tra subsequently agreed that delays at Bien Hoa had no relationship to the return of American prisoners. At 1150 hours he dispatched a liaison officer to Loc Ninh by helicopter, ostensibly to expedite the US prisoner release.

(U) Upon arrival at Loc Ninh the liaison officer huddled with the local Communist representatives. At 1455 hours the PRG liaison officer departed for Saigon without having accomplished the release of the prisoners. BG McClellan reported this development to MG Woodward.

(U) The FPJMC central commission was then holding its afternoon session and MG Woodward immediately announced that he was withdrawing from the meeting to consult with his authorities. He had warned LTG Tra in the morning session that his continued participation in the meetings depended upon a prompt resolution of the deadlock on the prisoners at Loc Ninh. This was a dramatic action calculated for maximum effect upon the PRG Delegation.

(U) About two and one-half hours later, at 1638 hours, the US Delegation Language and Liaison Division received a call from LTG Tra's interpreter. Speaking to LTC Gordon L. Kramer, he said that he was passing a message from Tra which would be followed by an official note. Tra's message began with the accusation that the entire problem was the fault of the South Vietnamese. "However," the message continued, "to show our good will and to carry out the return of prisoners to the limits of our possibilities, I have ordered to reverse the [previous] order of return [suspending the US prisoner release]." Tra assured the US delegation that the American prisoners would be released that afternoon.

(U) LTG Tra's representatives were flown by helicopter from Tan Son Nhut, reaching Loc Ninh at 1820 hours. LTC Kramer, the American liaison officer on the flight, informed BG McClellan that the PRG delegates had arrived with LTG Tra's instructions to release the American prisoners. Within

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tative. A short time later LCDR Pirie, the prisoner spokesman, was introduced and stated that the terms of the Paris agreement required the prisoners held in captivity the longest to be released first and the prisoners were standing by that agreement. He further stated that the prisoners would be released only on order of the senior American prisoner. The American team chief then asked to see the senior US prisoner, but the North Vietnamese refused. However, LCDR Pirie was allowed to meet with the senior prisoner and soon returned with word that the latter had ordered the release. By 1450 hours the release procedures were completed and the returnees boarded the evacuation aircraft, which left fifteen minutes later.

(U) When the 20 prisoners reached Clark AB, they reported that they had initially refused repatriation because they suspected that the North Vietnamese were tricking them. The prisoners were aware that it was not yet time for the second increment of prisoners to be released, and they did not believe the North Vietnamese claim that their return was intended as a good will gesture.

(U) Despite this expression of "good will" on the part of the North Vietnamese, the scheduled second increment of the prisoner release did not go smoothly. On 25 February the North Vietnamese said that poor communications with Hanoi were hampering their attempts to obtain the prisoner list and details of the release. The PRG claimed that poor communications with the field caused them the same difficulty. At subsequent meetings both Communist delegations adopted other stalling tactics, such as the North Vietnamese attempt to link prisoner release to US-provided liaison flights to Hanoi. In what appeared to be a concerted propaganda offensive, Radio Hanoi then tried to relate the issues to mine clearing of North Vietnamese waters and dismantlement of US bases to the prisoner agreements. The US response was swift. Coordinating an uncompromising stand in the FPJMC meetings with an international diplomatic offensive, by 27 February President Nixon had ordered Secretary of State William P. Rogers to withdraw from the International Conference on Vietnam then in progress in Paris. Concurrently, the President ordered the mine clearing operations in North Vietnamese waters suspended and American troop withdrawals from South Vietnam halted. On the 28th North Vietnamese resistance began to weaken, and at the 1 March meeting of the Chiefs of Delegations the Communists backed down, agreeing to supply information on the second increment PW releases. On 2 March the North Vietnamese announced a 4 March release date. The following day the PRG stated that they would release the second increment of American prisoners on 5 March.

Hanoi was the location for both releases. The impasse finally had been broken.

(U) The actual release procedures on 4 and 5 March were similar to those followed on 18 February. A total of 138 Americans were released.

(U) In comparison to the first two releases of American prisoners, the third was a model of smoothness. On 11 March, three days before the end of the third increment, the North Vietnamese informed the American delegation that the list of prisoners scheduled for return would be provided the following day. The release would take place in Hanoi on 14 March. The US delegation was assured that the PRG would provide its list in the near future. During the meeting of the PW Subcommittee, the PRG delegate stated that he would provide the list on 13 March, but without giving a date for release.

(U) The lists were delivered as promised. The PRG set the date for release of their prisoners at 16 March, two days after the North Vietnamese release. In general the scenario on both days followed the earlier releases in Hanoi. The North Vietnamese released 108 American prisoners on 14 March, and the PRG released 33 on 16 March.

The Final Prisoner Release

(U) Although the smooth operation in the third increment augured well for the final phase, US hopes for this were unfounded. Several issues clouded the prisoner release. These included the release of the ten prisoners held by the Pathet Lao, the redeployment of the USMC guard element at the American Embassy in Saigon, and the future status of the Four Party Joint Military Commission.

(C) The difficulty arising from the release of the American prisoners captured in Laos was complicated and involved. During the negotiations prior to the signing of the Paris Agreement, the North Vietnamese had assured the United States that all American military and civilian persons detained in Laos would be released no later than 60 days following the signing of the agreement, although this was not incorporated into the agreement itself. The North Vietnamese also had assured the American negotiators that Hanoi would be responsible for making the necessary arrangements with the Pathet Lao. Acting on this information, Dr. Kissinger had announced during his press conference on 24 January that these prisoners would be returned in Hanoi.

(U) MG Woodward and his delegation were not tasked specifically to negotiate the release of the Laotian prisoners. Because the American FPJMC delegation was aware of the understanding between Dr. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, they anticipated that the North Vietnamese would ensure the re-

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turn of the Laotian held PWs. At the PW Subcommittee meeting on 19 March the US delegate inquired whether the ten Laotian held PWs on a previously furnished list would be returned at Gia Lam airport. The North Vietnamese response was that they had no authority to discuss the release of these PWs, prompting GEN Weyand to cable Washington for clarification of the understanding reached in Paris. In the meantime, the US suspended increment four troop withdrawals.

(U) On 21 March, the North Vietnamese presented a proposal to return all of the prisoners held in Hanoi on 25 March, including those held by the PRG, on the condition that all American and other Free World Military Assistance Forces were withdrawn by the end of that day. The US Delegation agreed to this proposal on the condition that the prisoner lists be handed over by 1000 hours on 22 March and that the North Vietnamese and the PRG release all remaining US prisoners on 24 and 25 March. At the regular PW Subcommittee meeting that day, the issue of the prisoners held by the Pathet Lao was not pressed, based on information received from Ambassador Godley in Laos the day before. At a subsequent meeting between the United States and North Vietnamese delegations on 21 March, the North Vietnamese informed the Americans that they would arrange with the Pathet Lao for the release of the US prisoners captured in Laos.

(U) Based on instructions from Washington, the new American position set forth on 21 March was that the withdrawal of US forces would be completed in accordance with the terms of the Paris agreement and coincident with the release of all US prisoners throughout Indochina. Both Communist delegations took umbrage at the shift in US position, and the North Vietnamese denied that Laotian-held PW releases were part of the Paris agreement, perhaps to try to sustain the fiction that they had no influence in Laos.

(U) The impasse continued until 26 March when MG Woodward and MG Hoa held two private meetings. At the first MG Woodward assured that President Nixon's position was completely understood by the North Vietnamese. Woodward explained that there would be no further US troop withdrawal until the date, time, and place of release of prisoners held by the Pathet Lao were furnished. He emphasized that the release must occur by 28 March and that the FPJMC would remain in being until the prisoners were released and the troop withdrawals completed. For his part, Hoa assured Woodward that Hanoi acknowledged the Kissinger-Tho understanding and was attempting to settle the problem with the Pathet Lao. He emphasized that the language of the protocols did not justify

linking the troop withdrawals and the release of Pathet Lao held prisoners; to do so would infringe upon the sovereignty of the Pathet Lao. Woodward also proposed prisoner release and troop withdrawal dates of 27, 28, and 29 March, and explained the US position that the USMC embassy guards were not part of the MACV forces, but members of the embassy staff. Hoa assured Woodward that he was awaiting instructions from Hanoi and that communications problems between his delegation, Hanoi, and the Pathet Lao were the only difficulty.

(U) By the evening of 26 March, the communications problems apparently were solved, and the two chiefs of delegations again met at MG Hoa's request. The Pathet Lao had agreed to return the American prisoners. However, to maintain the appearance that this resulted from United States-Pathet Lao negotiations and was not part of the Paris Agreements on Vietnam, the FPJMC and ICCS would not be present at the release. A Pathet Lao representative would release the prisoners to an American reception team. In addition, the North Vietnamese and PRG would release their remaining prisoners on 27, 28, and 29 March in Hanoi. Hoa also stated that the North Vietnamese FPJMC delegation would terminate its activities and return to Hanoi on 30-31 March. The PRG Delegation would assemble in Saigon to begin its work with the South Vietnamese on the Two Party Joint Military Commission. Although MG Woodward informed Hoa that the US and South Vietnam might present a proposal in Paris for a 20-day extension of the FPJMC, Hoa replied that this must be handled at the diplomatic level and that he would abide by his redeployment instructions. During the course of the meeting no mention was made of the USMC embassy guard, implying tacit North Vietnamese acceptance of the US position.

(U) Thus the impasse had been broken, with the North Vietnamese acceptance of the US positions. The remaining 148 American prisoners, including those held by the Pathet Lao, were released on 27, 28, and 29 March as agreed in the 26 March meeting. The remaining US forces completed redeployment during the same period. A summary of the release of Communist-held prisoners is in Figure G-7.17

SUMMARY

(U) The initial task of the US Delegation to the FPJMC was to establish an effective vehicle for communication between parties and for negotiating and settling all matters concerning the implementation of particular provisions of the agreement and protocols. The central FPJMC proved to be an effective organization, although not successful in all its tasks. While the US and South Vietnamese deployed teams to all FPJMC sites, the two Communist delegations did not. The PRG initially used

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inadequate facilities and the lack of security, immunities, and privileges for not deploying. While the North Vietnamese deployed to all seven regions, and to five of the team sites, they withdrew from two regional sites in early March. The PRG deployed only to one region. Due to the PRG and North Vietnamese failure to fully deploy to the region and team sites, the field structure of the FPJMC was never developed, and the activities of the central FPJMC were dominant.

(U) A total cease-fire never took effect, although the intensity of the fighting in March was well below that of the pre-cessate-fire and immediate post-cessate-fire periods. Despite continuous US urgings at all levels, the Vietnamese parties remained unwilling to cease completely hostile military operations. A task allied to keeping a cease-fire, deterring and reporting cease-fire violations, was impossible because of the failure of the Communist teams to deploy. Their failure to allow complete investigations of alleged cease-fire violations further undermined the accomplishment of this task.

(U) An initial negotiating issue was to ensure that the release of US PWs was linked only to the withdrawal of FWMAF and US forces. The US consistently maintained its position, suspending increment three and delaying increment four withdrawals to ensure the clarity of that position.

(U) The resolution of the FPJMC role in troop withdrawals, base dismantlement, and redeployment of materiel was effectively along the lines of the

US positions. Although the North Vietnamese argued that the FPJMC should control and supervise the withdrawal, the actual FPJMC role was to observe the withdrawals, which were executed by MACV and USARV/MACV SUPCOM. While disagreement remained regarding base dismantlement and redeployment of war materiel, the US position that title transfer to the South Vietnamese of US bases and materiel prior to the signing of the cease-fire agreement on 27 January effectively transferred ownership was never seriously challenged.

(U) One of the last actions of the FPJMC was to establish a Four Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT) to resolve the status of the Americans listed as missing in action and to assist in the recovery of remains of those interred in Communist held areas.

(U) With the exception of a fully effective cease-fire, the US Delegation accomplished all its major tasks as of 29 March. The PW releases were completed, the FWMAF and US military forces were redeployed without incident, and the FPJMT to resolve the status of the MIA and recover the remains of the deceased had been organized. An effective central FPJMC was developed in Saigon, although it never functioned at most of its field sites.

(U) The North Vietnamese FPJMC delegation began redeploying to Hanoi on the US aircraft supporting Operation HOMECOMING and completed its

OPERATION HOMECOMING PW RELEASE

DATE	PLACE	RELEASED BY	US MILITARY	CIVILIAN
12 Feb	Hanoi	DRV	116	0
12 Feb	Loc Ninh (South Vietnam)	PRG	19	8 (US)
18 Feb	Hanoi	DRV	20	0
4 Mar	Hanoi	DRV	106	2 (Thai)
5 Mar	Hanoi	PRG	27	2 (Ger) 2 (Fil) 3 (US)
14 Mar	Hanoi	DRV	107	1 (US)
16 Mar	Hanoi	PRG	27	5 (US)
27 Mar	Hanoi	PRG	27	5 (US)
28 Mar	Hanoi	Pathet Lao	7	2 (US) 1 (Can)
28 Mar	Hanoi	DRV	40	0
29 Mar	Hanoi	DRV	67	0
1 Apr	Vinh Binh Province (South Vietnam)	PRG	1	0
TOTAL			564	31*

*Civilian total does not include Mr. Coyer (Canada) who was released but was not part of Operation HOMECOMING.

Source: CINCPAC

Figure: G-7

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withdrawal from Saigon on 30-31 March. The PRG delegation assembled in Saigon to reorganize in preparation for the TPJMC activities.

(U) The US Delegation members began redeploying with other US military personnel on 27 March. As of the 29 March disestablishment of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam the only US military

forces in South Vietnam were the US Delegation to the FPJMC, the DAO contingent, and the USMC embassy guard. On 30 and 31 March the last members of the US Delegation deployed from the Republic of Vietnam. At 1900 hours, Saigon time, 31 March, the US Delegation, FPJMC was disestablished.¹⁸




American prisoners at Gio Lam Airport wait for their release on 28 March. From front to rear: CPT Richard L. Francis, USAF, CPT Kenneth J. Frosser, USAF, CPT Richard J. Fulton, USAF, CPT Timothy R. Ayers, USAF, CPT James G. Cutter, USAF.

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THE NEW AGENCIES — ANNEX G

1. Msg (TS), JCS to COMUSMACV et al, 272238Z Oct 72, Subj: Contingency Withdrawal Planning (U), GDS-Dec 82.
2. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 011200Z Nov 72, Subj: Contingency Withdrawal Planning (U), GDS-82; Msg (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 050001Z Nov 72, Subj: Contingency Withdrawal Planning (U), GDS-82; Msg (TS), CINCPAC to COMUSMACV, 190042Z Nov 72, Subj: Contingency Withdrawal Planning (U), GDS-82; Msg (TS), JCS to CINCPAC, 2338Z Nov 72, Subj: Changes in Existing Military Procedure in Southeast Asia (U), GDS-82.
3. Msg (TS), JCS to CINCPAC, 220021Z Nov 72, Subj: Changes in Existing Military Procedures in Thailand (U), GDS-82.
4. Msg (TS), CINCPAC to JCS, 082325Z Dec 72, Subj: Changes in Existing Procedures in Thailand (U), GDS-82.
5. Msg (S), COMUSSAG to CJCS, 151140Z Feb 73, Subj: Commander USSAG Status Report of Selected SEASIA Activities (U), GDS-81; Rpt (U), 7th AF, 25 Mar 73, Subj: COMUSMACV OPLAN J-215 After Action Report.
6. Memo (TS), MACDI, 29 Dec 72, Subj: Joint Personnel Recovery Center/ Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JPRC/JCRC) (U), p 1, GDS-Not Stated.
7. Ibid.
8. Memo (C), MACDI, 29 Oct 72, Subj: Mission and Functions of the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (U), pp 1-2, GDS-Not Stated.
9. Ibid.
10. Msg (S/NF), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 080630Z Jan 73, Subj: BRIGHT LIGHT (U), GDS-81.
11. Same as #6, pp 3-4; Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 110655Z Mar 72, Subj: BRIGHT LIGHT (U), Gp-1; Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 090104Z Jul 72, Subj: BRIGHT LIGHT (U), Gp-1; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 090104Z Jul 72, Subj: BRIGHT LIGHT (U), GDS-Not Stated; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 090208Z Sep 72, Subj: BRIGHT LIGHT (U), GDS-Not Stated.
12. Msg (C), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 100100Z Jan 73, Subj: BRIGHT LIGHT (U), GDS-79.
13. Memo (TS), MACDI, 28 Dec 72, Subj: JPRC/JCRC (U), p 1, GDS-Not Stated.
14. Same as #8, p 4; Memo (TS), MACDI, undtd, Subj: JPRC/JCRC (U), p 3, GDS-Not Stated; Plan (C), MACDP, 3 Nov 72, Subj: COMUSMACV OPLAN J-190 (U), Annex B: Intelligence (U), pp B2-B-3, GDS-78.
15. MS (C), JCRC, 16 Feb 73, Subj: JPRC/JCRC Operations 1 Jan - 15 Feb 73 (U), GDS-Not Stated; GO 177 (U), HQ USMACV, 23 Jan 73, Subj: Unit Orders 1, HQ JCRC, 23 Jan 73.
16. MS (S), DAO, 21 Mar 73, Subj: Defense Attache Office, Saigon (U), GDS-Not Stated.
17. Draft Rpt (TS), USDEL FPJMC, Apr 73, Subj: FPJMC Historical Report (U), GDS-Not Stated.
18. Msg (U), CH USDEL FPJMC to CINCPAC et al, 310600Z Mar 73, Subj: Chief, USDEL, FPJMC, Interim After Action Report (28 Jan - 29 Mar 73).



USAF C-141 waits on the tarmac at Gia Lam Airport on 7 March to transport the final increment of American returnees.

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ANNEX H

COUNTDOWN

(U) Operation COUNTDOWN marked the final withdrawal of US and Free World forces from the Republic of Vietnam. This period culminated the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Vietnamization effort as redeployment of troops and equipment, disestablishment of advisory elements and commands, and the creation of new organizations ended the MACV activities in South Vietnam. US and Free World forces were redeployed in a 61-day period beginning on 28 January 1973. MACV Headquarters gradually drew down, either terminating

or transferring its functions to new agencies and was disestablished at 1900 hours on 29 March 1973. MACV field elements similarly drew down as they terminated their activities and assisted the newly formed Consulates General, Four Party Joint Military Commission (FPJMC), and International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS). USARV/MACV Support Command (USARV/MACV SUPCOM) assumed the responsibility for US Army equipment and personnel redeployment while gradually curtailing its pre-cessé-fire mission.

PLANNING

(C) Planning for a sixty-day withdrawal of the remaining US forces began in mid-October 1972. COMUSMACV OPLAN J215 — THUNDERBOLT (later renamed COUNTDOWN) was published on 9 November. In concept the plan embraced a phased redeployment of all US and Free World forces; turnover of selected equipment and facilities to the South Vietnamese; establishment of Headquarters, US Support Activities Group; 7th Air Force (USSAG) in Thailand and a Defense Attache Office in Saigon; and disestablishment of MACV. These actions were to proceed in three phases: Phase I—Standdown, prior to the day of the cease-fire (X-Day); Phase II—Withdrawal, from X-Day to X+45; and Phase III—Roll-up from X+45 to X+60. In Phase I selected units would standdown, complete the transfer of equipment, and prepare to depart; and the USSAG advance party would move to Nakhon Phanom, Thailand. All equipment and facilities would be transferred to the South Vietnamese prior to X-Day, including equipment designated for transfer under Project ENHANCE PLUS. South Vietnamese forces would displace to assume control of operational areas vacated by the Korean forces. OPLAN J215 provided for the activation of the Defense Attache Office (DAO) during the initial phase of redeployment and to be operational on X-59. Responsible for all in-country US military activities, DAO was to be composed of Department of Defense civilian and military personnel and would assume some of the MACV functions, particularly logistic support, monitoring RVNAF improvement, and supervising nation-building projects. Most US and Free World forces would depart during Phase II. Aerial redeployment for US forces was planned to require 45 days under optimum conditions at a rate of approximately 750 personnel per day; Republic of Korea forces, Vietnam

(ROKRV) would redeploy approximately 885 men per day by air and sea. The US Support Activities Group (USSAG) main body would deploy to Nakhon Phanom, Thailand. As personnel departed Vietnam and the MACV agencies ceased to exist, residual functions would be absorbed by the DAO and civilian organizations such as USAID and the Embassy. During Phase III all remaining US and Free World forces would depart. At X-60 MACV would be disestablished.

(C) Critical priorities were outlined within Operation COUNTDOWN to provide an orderly departure of US forces. Regional assistance command headquarters would gradually draw down, then commence standdown at X+30. Intra-crops advisory redeployment would be completed by X+10, while regional, divisional, and separate combat elements advisors would remain in place to provide continued reports to MACV until X+45. Sufficient air and communications assets to maintain command and control would remain in Vietnam until X-50. Responsibility for the redeployment of US forces was assigned to the respective service commands; Commander, ROKRV was responsible for redeploying his forces to Korea, in coordination with the USARV/MACV Support Command. Component commanders were charged with the final turnover of equipment and facilities to the South Vietnamese Government and RVNAF. The guidance specified that only TO&E equipment would be earmarked for transfer, but gave discretion to the major component commanders on other items. Since US personnel needed many items of equipment after X Day, materiel was to be title transferred to RVNAF units and hand-receipted back to US units until it was no longer needed. Serviceability criteria was waived in some cases; a policy of RVNAF pick-up as is, where is, was established. Facilities transfer

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was handled in a like fashion. US and Free World forces occupied 211 major facilities prior to the cease-fire. Except for a limited number to be retained by US agencies, these facilities were to be transferred to the Vietnamese government and RVNAF or were closed.

(U) When OPLAN J215 was published in early

November, it appeared that the cease-fire might be announced in the near future. Thus Phase I-Stand-down, would be of relatively short duration. The nearly three months which elapsed allowed more preparation time than originally was anticipated, with resulting changes in the sequence of some COUNT-DOWN activities.

THE NEW AGENCIES

(C) As the final two months of MACV activities began, two new agencies were activated to continue US Department of Defense missions and responsibilities in Southeast Asia. One was the US Support Activities Group Headquarters (USSAG); the other the Defense Attache Office, Saigon (DAO). In addition, the Four Party Joint Military Commission (FPJMC) was established under the provisions of the Paris agreement to provide interface between the four parties in South Vietnam concerning the implementation of the cease-fire. Narratives covering the establishment of these three agencies are contained in Annex G, The New Agencies. A summary of these three elements' significant activities during February and March follows.

(S) The US Support Activities Group (USSAG) was organized as a multi-service integrated headquarters under the operational command of CINCPAC. Headquartered at Nakhon Phanom in Thailand, USSAG was to plan for possible resumption of the air war in Southeast Asia; establish a command and control system for managing air assets; conduct liaison with RVNAF JGS, CTF 77, and USAF SAC elements; and control the Defense Attache Office, Saigon (DAO). Staffed principally by MACV personnel, the main body began deploying on 10 February. USSAG was activated on 10 February under the command of GEN John W. Vogt, Jr., USAF, and assumed responsibility for the air war from MACV on 15 February. Upon disestablishment of MACV on 29 March, USSAG assumed operational command of the DAO.

(C) The Defense Attache Office, Saigon (DAO) was organized to perform traditional attache functions and continue residual MACV activities, primarily in logistics and reporting. Activated on 28 January, the DAO gradually assumed the residual functions as MACV drew down during February and March. The period saw the departing US military officials and the incoming DAO civilians work together closely to insure that an effective transition was made. On 29 March, when MACV was disestablished, the DAO assumed responsibility for the DOD activities in Vietnam.

(U) The Four Party Joint Military Commission (FPJMC) was established to serve as a channel of communication between the four parties, assist in implementation of the basic agreements, and assist in verifying compliance with the terms of the cease-fire. The US Delegation to the FPJMC was headed, the MACV Chief of Staff. Staffed by MACV headquarters and field personnel, the US Delegation negotiated the US prisoner releases and attempted to establish a viable four party field organization. The central FPJMC in Saigon proved to be an effective, useful organization; however, the field structure did not fully develop, since only the US and South Vietnamese delegations deployed to all of the field sites. The four party activities terminated during the last week in March, and the US Delegation was disestablished on 31 March after the US and FWMAF withdrawal and prisoners exchange had been completed.

REDEPLOYMENT

US FORCES REDEPLOYMENT Personnel

(U) With the announcement of a cease-fire agreement, Phase II-Withdrawal, of Operation COUNT-DOWN commenced. X-Day began on 28 January 1973 at 0800 hours (midnight, 27 January, GMT). Nearly 59,000 US and Free World troops awaited redeployment, including 23,385 US personnel, 35,396 ROKFV personnel, and 113 others from Thailand, the Philippines, and the Republic of China. The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed a first increment

withdrawal of 6,000 to 6,500 US personnel to be completed during Increment 1, the first of four 15-day periods. During Increment 2, 4,000 to 4,500 personnel would be withdrawn (this was later changed to a maximum of 5,600 personnel). Instructions for Increments 3 and 4 were deferred, since the withdrawal of US forces was tied directly to the PRG and North Vietnamese release of US prisoners.² However, an approximately equal number of people would redeploy in each increment. Figure H-1 shows the planned replacement of US forces by service for each increment.

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PLANNED US TROOP REDEPLOYMENT

	X to X+15	X+15 to X+30	X+30 to X+45	X+45 to X+60	TOTAL
ARMY.....	2,646	2,979	3,795	3,794	13,214
NAVY.....	404	444	323	323	1,494
AIR FORCE.....	2,196	1,075	2,141	2,141	7,553
MARINES.....	899	87	32	31	1,049
TOTAL.....	6,146	4,585	6,291	6,289	23,310
PERCENT.....	26%	20%	27%	27%	100%

Source: MACDO

Figure: H-1

(U) The first three days of redeployment proceeded slowly as personnel moved to the Saigon and Da Nang airheads. Thereafter, the pace quickened. During Increment 1, from 28 January through 11 February, an average of 594 men were moved each day; US strength fell to 17,190, as 6,145 men were redeployed. During Increment 2, an average of 439 men were moved each day, with the US strength reduced to 12,806 personnel by 27 February.

(U) The release of US prisoners held by the VC and North Vietnamese was to occur in proportion to the US troop redeployment. The first group of 108 American prisoners were released well before X+15, and on 18 February (X+21) 20 additional PWs were released in Hanoi as a goodwill gesture, following Dr. Kissinger's visit to Hanoi. Thereafter, Communist recalcitrance provoked a halt in the US withdrawal.³ On 28 February the Joint Chiefs of Staff suspended US troop withdrawals until the PW release problems were solved. When the second increment release was announced, the redeployment resumed on 4 March. As a safeguard toward ensuring full North Vietnamese and PRG compliance with the prisoner release agreement, on 10 March the JCS directed all Increment 3 personnel (except for certain categories, such as emergency leaves, and other personnel on a case by case basis) to remain in Vietnam until the corresponding prisoner release was successfully concluded. Approximately 5,500 personnel were programmed for redeployment in Increment 3. Increment 4, intended to complete the American withdrawal by 28 March, was eventually modified to retain the maximum number of personnel in South Vietnam until the last US prisoners were released. In the 72 hours following resumption of the prisoner release, the personnel would be redeployed.

(U) The third prisoner release took place between 12 and 15 March when a total of 108 prisoners were freed in Hanoi. Increment 3 of the troop withdrawal resumed on 14 March and was completed on 16 March, when the US strength had been reduced to 6,289 personnel. Again, a hold was placed on further deployment, and between 17 and 26

March only 48 US personnel departed. Serious problems had developed concerning the return of US prisoners held by the Pathet Lao. The impasse was finally broken on 26 March when MG Le Quang Hoa, the Chief North Vietnamese delegate to the Four Party Joint Military Commission informed the US Chief Delegate, MG Gilbert H. Woodward, that the release of all prisoners, including those held by the Pathet Lao, would take place in Hanoi on 27, 28, and 29 March. MG Woodward reiterated the US intent to withdraw the remaining military personnel within 72 hours of the resumption of the release of US prisoners. The first aircraft carrying MACV personnel departed Tan Son Nhut AB as the first planeload of released prisoners left Gia Lam airfield in Hanoi on 27 March. When the last aircraft departed Saigon on 29 March, a total of 5,314 personnel had been redeployed. Over the ensuing two days, 30-31 March, the remaining 583 members of the US Delegation, FPJMC, also departed.⁴ Although problems with the prisoner releases caused changes in the planned redeployment of US forces, a total of 23,335 personnel departed Vietnam in the 62-day period of 28 January through 31 March.⁵

Unit Standdown

(U) The US units and elements remaining in Vietnam on X-Day ceased operations on 28 January and stood down throughout the ensuing 45 days. While some units initially remained in a ready status, others became involved in ICCS and FPJMC support, especially helicopter units. The following lists the standdown increment of the US units and elements:

X to X+15
 7 Air Cavalry Troops
 138th Aviation Company (RR)
 MAG-12 (A-4 Squadrons)
 Air Reconnaissance Squadron (VQ-1)
 Forward Air Controllers
 F-4/A-7 Turnaround Teams
 Mique Detachments
 (One site at Bien Hoa remained operational to 21 Mar 73.)

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M/1 Floyd J. Thompson, USA, right, is escorted to a USAF C-141 on 16 March after his release at Gio Lam Airport.

X+15 to X+30
180th Assault Support Helicopter Company
Fleet Air Support Unit (FASU)
Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
(ANGLICO)
716th Military Police Battalion
(Reduced by 1/3)
X+30 to X+45
57th Assault Helicopter Company
C0th Assault Helicopter Company

129th Assault Helicopter Company
716th Military Police Battalion
(Reduced by 1/3)
377th Security Police Squadron
(Reduced by 1/3)
6498th Security Police Squadron
(Reduced by 1/3)

Marine Air Group 12 (MAG-12) was the only US
close air support unit still operating from South
Vietnam when the cease-fire occurred. The unit

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US CARGO REDEPLOYMENT

Period	Port	Tonnage (Measurement Tons)
X-Day to X+15.....	Qui Nhon	990
	Newport	11,738
	Cam Ranh Bay	1,536
	Da Nang	6,216
X+15 to X+30.....	Qui Nhon	504
	Newport	39,345
	Cam Ranh Bay	721
	Da Nang	11,901
X+30 to X+45.....	Qui Nhon	1,146
	Newport	10,144
	Cam Ranh Bay	6,656
	Da Nang	15,224
X+45 to X+60.....	Qui Nhon	7,679
	Newport	24,833
	Cam Ranh Bay	4,077
	Da Nang	8,097
TOTAL.....		150,907

Source: DAO

Figure: H-2

stood down on 28 January, and its last elements departed Bien Hoa AB for Iwakuni AB, Japan on 2 February.

US Materiel

(U) The final phase of the US materiel retrograde program was completed within the planned 60 days of Phases 2 and 3. The US materiel that had not been title transferred to the Vietnamese or transferred to US civilian agencies remaining in-country was retrograded by aircraft and by ship. A total of 6,000 short tons of cargo was airlifted from Saigon (4,642 ST) and Da Nang (1,358 ST) between 28 January and 24 March. Figure H-2 lists the cargo retrograded by sealift. Loading operations were completed at Cam Ranh Bay on 27 March and at Da Nang, Qui Nhon, and Newport on 28 March. The last ships departed Vietnam on 28 March.⁶

FWMAF REDEPLOYMENT

Planning

(U) In October 1972 planning was completed for the redeployment of Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam (ROKFB) under COMUSMACV OPLAN 211A. This plan included increments and time frames for troop redeployment, lists and quantities of equipment to accompany the troops, provisions for personal property shipments, and the details of supervision and monitoring redeployment. Under this plan redeployment would take place over a six-month period.

(U) In response to the apparent proximity of a cease-fire in late October, planning began to revise the original plan to allow for a complete ROKFB

withdrawal within 60 days. The uncertainty of the exact timing of the cease-fire caused both plans to remain active. The major differences between the two plans were that the six-month plan called for most personnel to move by sealift, while the sixty day plan stipulated redeployment by aircraft for the majority of the personnel, with some troops and cargo moving by sea. With the declaration of the cease-fire the sixty-day withdrawal of ROKFB forces began.

(U) Only small detachments of Thai, Philippine, and Republic of China forces remained in Vietnam at the end of 1972. These elements were to redeploy via commercial aircraft servicing Saigon.

Personnel

(U) Between 30 January and 26 March, 35,509 Free World personnel redeployed from South Vietnam. The withdrawal of these forces was not linked to the release of US prisoners; thus the redeployment proceeded as scheduled. The Thailand and Philippine contingents completed their withdrawals on 2 March, the Koreans by 23 March, and the Republic of China's contingent on 26 March.⁷ Figure H-3 is a recapitulation of FWMAF redeployments.

(U) The redeployment of ROKFB from Vietnam was accomplished by airlift and sealift. For air movement Tan Son Nhut, Nha Trang, and Phu Cat served as embarkation points while Suwon and Taegu, Korea served as debarkation points. Commercial aircraft were utilized to lift nearly 34,000 troops between 28 January and 23 March as 900 troops were moved by sea. Aside from minor air-

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FWMAF REDEPLOYMENT

Korean Forces

Period	Planned	Actual
X to X+15.....	8,929	8,929
X+15 to X+30.....	12,369	11,406
X+30 to X+45.....	13,854	14,817
X+45 to X+60°.....	244	244
TOTAL.....	35,396	35,396

*ROKRV completed its redeployment on 23 March (X+54).

THAI ELEMENT: 31 personnel redeployed on 2 March.

PHILIPPINE ELEMENT: 51 personnel redeployed on 2 March.

REPUBLIC OF CHINA ELEMENTS: 26 personnel redeployed on 12 March; 5 personnel on 26 March.

Source: MACDO

Figure: H-3

ROKRV CARGO REDEPLOYMENT

Period	Port	Tonnage (Measurement Tons)
X-Day to X+15.....	Qui Nhon	4,320
	Newport	0
	Cam Ranh Bay	5,553
X+15 to X+30.....	Qui Nhon	28,275
	Newport	37
	Cam Ranh Bay	32,230
X+30 to X+45.....	Qui Nhon	5,405
	Newport	4,912
	Cam Ranh Bay	13,207
TOTAL.....		88,989

Source: DAO

Figure: H-4

craft maintenance delays, the redeployment was accomplished as planned.

ROKRV Equipment Retrograde

(S) Equipment redeployment was smoothly completed by 14 March. Newport, Cam Ranh Bay, and Qui Nhon served as the loading ports for Korean cargoes moved by ship. Figure H-4 summarizes ROKRV cargo movement during Operation COUNTDOWN.

ROKRV materiel loading was completed at Cam Ranh Bay on 7 March, Qui Nhon on 13 March, and Newport on 14 March. The only interruptions in the equipment redeployment were minor mechanical problems at the ports, two minor longshoremen strikes, and, early in the shipping effort, VC interdiction of Route 1 leading to Cam Ranh Bay. These delays did not materially alter the steady redeployment of ROKRV materiel from Vietnam.

MACV HEADQUARTERS

(U) Throughout Phase I of the COUNTDOWN period from November through January, planning for the gradual phaseout of MACV Headquarters activities progressed smoothly. Initially, when it appeared that a cease-fire was imminent, the planning moved rapidly, and within a short time the planned transfer or termination of functions was completed. Subsequently, the peace talks reached an impasse, which allowed plans to be reviewed, improved, and initiated over a less compressed period. MACV functions were eventually shifted to the Defense Attache Office (DAO), the American

Embassy, USAID, and to the South Vietnamese Government and the RVNAF. Many functions principally associated with the support of MACV agencies and personnel were terminated. The following provides information on the activities of MACV Headquarters and agencies during the COUNTDOWN period, as well as disposition of functions as reported by those elements and agencies.

OPERATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE

(U) The MACV operations and intelligence activities were gradually reduced during the COUNTDOWN period and eventually transferred to the

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DAO, USSAG, and the RVNAF. Continuity was assured by gradually phasing out the MACV personnel while familiarizing the gaining agency personnel with the ongoing functions. The DAO assumed the responsibility for limited intelligence monitoring and continuing the document exploitation effort with a 40,000 page per month processing capability. The US element, Combined Materiel Exploitation Center, terminated its activities on 27 February. Materiel exploitation publications and reports were passed to the DAO; the continued US effort was intended to provide liaison with the RVNAF without dedicated US personnel being active in the functional areas. US participation in the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV) terminated on 18 December 1972. Although a US liaison element continued working with the Vietnamese until 14 March (X+45), RVNAF assumed full responsibility for the CICV activities in mid-December. The MACV Counterintelligence Advisory Committee (CAC) activities terminated on 1 March. By 14 March the DAO had assumed all intelligence and reporting functions for which it was responsible, following an appropriate overlap between the outgoing military personnel and their civilian replacements.

(U) A similar phaseout and transfer or termination of operations functions began in Phase II and continued into Phase III. Certain functions passed to USSAG on 15 February, principally the responsibility for conducting air operations throughout SEA. With the exception of the Airlift Section, Command and Control Branch, which transferred on 27 March, all air operations functions were opera-

tional at Nakhon Phanom on 15 February. The transfer or termination of the following Operations Directorate (MACDO) functions occurred beginning in Phase II and were completed effective 29 March:

FUNCTION	DISPOSITION
Control of unilateral and combined operations	Terminated
Liaison With Director, JOC,	
JGS	Assumed by DAO
Command Center Operations	Assumed by DAO
Development and maintenance of General War Plans	Assumed by DAO as directed by USSAG
US and FWMA Force Structure	Terminated
US and Local National Manpower Control	Assumed by DAO

Along with these functions the responsibility for certain reports was transferred or terminated. The OPREP-3 and OPREP-4 reports were continued by DAO/USSAG; the OPREP-5 report was discontinued on 29 January. The COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal (renamed COMUSMACV Status Report of Selected SEASIA Activities beginning 30 January) was discontinued with the 28 March daily report. Thereafter, the DAO provided input data to the COMUSSAG Status Report of Selected SEASIA Activities, which began on 15 February.

(U) The reversion of COMUSMACV and COMUSSEASIA operations and concept plans was promulgated in several increments between 7 February and 28 March, as shown in Figure H-5.

OPLAN-CONPLAN RECISSIONS

Recission Date	COMUSMACV	COMUSSEASIA
7 Feb	508CB*	
15 Feb**	5020F 5027 5069 5071 5072 5100*	J183 J203 J210 J211A J214
1 Mar	5022	5001 5041 5042
28 Mar	5060A 5065 J171 J190 J193	J200 J202 J204 J215
		5032 5039 5049

NOTES: *Designates CONPLANS - all others were OPLANS.

**Three unnumbered plans also were rescinded on 15 February: the Country Logistics Improvement Plan, the Delta Transportation Plan, and the IV Corps Tactical Zone Transportation Contingency Plan.

Source: MACDO

Figure: H-5

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PERSONNEL

(U) The MACV Directorate of Personnel (MACDP) monitored the final withdrawal of US forces and the repatriation of US prisoners until X+60. Throughout Operation COUNTDOWN, MACDP conducted an orderly termination and transfer of functions as members departed, in addition to maintaining advisory relations with the J1 and Adjutant General of the RVNAF Joint General Staff and the Mobilization Directorate until March 14.⁸ Staff functions transferred from MACDP to DAO on 1 March included: Special Services activities, billeting policy, curfew in Saigon, presence of DOD and military dependents in Vietnam, casualty reporting, American National Red Cross, open mess and other military nonappropriated fund purchasing and construction, and disposition of deceased. The early transfer of responsibilities promoted continuity; the functions MACDP retained after 1 March were concerned with terminating Headquarters, MACV activities.⁹

(U) The rest and recuperation (R&R) program was extended after X-Day for personnel who had accrued R&R eligibility prior to X-Day. Control of the program was assumed by USSAG on 28 February for travel from both Saigon and Bangkok to Honolulu. Personnel on leave and R&R in the United States on 28 January were instructed not to return to Vietnam; exceptions to this policy were determined on a case by case basis.

(U) On 25 January 1973, the MACV Chief of Staff approved a MACDP proposal for streamlining approval of awards to go into effect with the cease-fire. The proposal waived the six-month eligibility criterion for meritorious service awards and deleted the requirement for a narrative description for Joint Service Commendation Medals and Army awards of the Bronze Star Medal (BSM) and Army Commendation Medal (ARCOM) to US personnel. Recommendations for meritorious service and achievement awards required the submission of a proposed citation which served as the basis for evaluating the proposed award; a narrative was no longer required. US awards of the BSM or ARCOM to RVNAF and FWMAF personnel for meritorious service did not require a proposed citation, only a narrative. A standard citation was issued with the award. Recommendation procedures for the Legion of Merit (and higher awards) for meritorious service and awards for valor remained unchanged. On 17 March authority to approve awards was withdrawn from MACV and assumed by the service components of the Pacific Command. The DAO assumed the approval authority previously exercised by MACV for US awards to RVNAF personnel.

(U) The American Red Cross phase out was linked to the troop withdrawal. A small contingent

of Red Cross workers remained at the MACV Annex until the troop withdrawal was complete.

(U) Plans for terminating the Army and Air Force Motion Picture Service (AAFMP) activities were developed by USARV/MACV SUPCOM and MACV Special Troops. The planned phase out of personnel at the various posts, camps, and stations affected the closure dates of 35mm and 16mm accounts. The closing of accounts were planned so that some motion picture service was provided up to the last possible moment. Accountability and control procedures were established to negate the loss of film and equipment.

(U) Although OPLAN J215 terminated all dependents visits to Vietnam after X-Day, on 27 January COMUSMACV directed that dependent visits could continue.

(U) The United Services Organization (USO) planned to continue normal operations until 12 February, continuing limited services, such as stateside phone calls, until the withdrawal was complete.

(U) MACDP monitored all planning for reducing and terminating exchange support; however, the actual planning was done within the Army and Air Force Exchange System. Exchange closure dates were developed in conjunction with USARV and 7th Air Force. A residual exchange support program was developed for the DAO.

(U) On 28 January the unit counselor's course at the Drug Rehabilitation Center was terminated, and all patient admissions ceased. The center's equipment was turned in beginning on 9 February, when its operations ceased; the facility was closed on the 16th. The Drug Treatment Center closed on 9 March. Initial planning was based on the assumption that a large patient load would be generated as a result of the drug testing of all military personnel leaving Vietnam. This assumption proved erroneous, as only 216 personnel tested positive. The staff requirements were reassessed on 12 February, and most of the staff departed prior to the 27th. On 3 March the center closed when the patient population reached zero. Thereafter, drug treatment was available in the US Army Hospital, Saigon.

(U) Close-out planning for Nonappropriated Fund (NAF) activities was accomplished by the appropriate service headquarters in accordance with service directives. In November 1972 MACV directed the service components to arrange disposition of NAF property in accordance with each service's guidelines. Property could be title transferred to RVNAF if allowed by the service directives. Furthermore, MACV directed that a clear audit trail be maintained on all property disposition. By 1 March

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the majority of fund property was retrograded or turned over to RVNAF. A large part of the retrograde property was sent to US bases in Thailand.

COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

(C) MACV Communications-Electronics (MACCE) continued to support the MACV agencies during COUNTDOWN, while the movement and installation of equipment to Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, was completed to enable the US Support Activities Group (USSAG) to assume its mission. The FPJMC and ICCS also were supported. Adequate facilities were retained for the DAO in Saigon.

(C) Preparations for these activities began on 15 November when the MACCE advisory teams at Can Tho, Pleiku, and Da Nang were withdrawn to Saigon, with the exception of two teams which remained in Military Region 1 until the end of January. In December and January MACCE Advisory Division personnel were reassigned to the Operations and Plans Division to assist in the retrograde of equipment from Vietnam and the redeployment and installation of USSAG equipment in Thailand. Equipment needed for the post-cease-fire support of US elements, the DAO, and the embassy was transferred to the American Embassy in November. Designated equipment and facilities were title transferred to the RVNAF early in the same month. The remaining C-E equipment was designated for retrograde.¹⁰

(C) The existing communications center at MACV Headquarters was retained to support the DAO. Operated and maintained by US contract personnel under the supervision of the Communications-Electronics Division, DAO, the center included two high speed teletype terminals. Most of the DOD civilians had arrived by 22 February and by 19 March had gradually assumed responsibility for the MACCE functions on a phased basis. On 19 March the DAO became responsible for the management of all US communications efforts remaining in-country. The final transfer of all MACCE functions was effective on 27 March.

(C) Communications facilities planning for the Tactical Air Command Center (Blue Chip) relocation to Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, began in late November, and the equipment installation was completed on 14 January. The system installed at Nakhon Phanom included AUTOVON, the Emergency Action Console, tropospheric terminals, and a satellite terminal. The satellite terminal initially was accommodated by the AN/TSC-54, moved to Nakhon Phanom from Utapao until the larger AN/TSC-46 in Vietnam could be deactivated after the cease-fire. The AN/TSC-54 had been installed on 18 December. In addition to these devices USSAG acquired a secure voice capability for 26 subscribers and six trunks. The secure voice terminal instal-

lation was operational on 4 February.

(C) On 29 January, MACCE finalized a readjusted AUTODIN terminal deactivation schedule. Twenty-one terminals were deactivated during February and March on a phased schedule to insure continued support as the withdrawal progressed. The deactivation progressed on or ahead of schedule; as terminals were deactivated, the associated equipment was redeployed.

(U) During the period 28 January to 10 February, the tactical radio equipment which was provided by RVNAF was issued to the US Delegation elements in the field. Communications personnel worked around the clock setting up their base stations and other communications support for the Joint Military Commission. By the 10th of February increased need had raised the communications personnel requirement for the US Delegation to 85, most of whom were provided by USASTRATCOM.

(U) As the withdrawal phase progressed, all seven regions were provided with non-secure voice communications, secure record communications, and common user telephone service with the Saigon area. Additionally, each regional headquarters had established communications with each of the field teams in their respective areas through a combination of HF-SSB radio, FM radio, or telephone communication.

(U) Late March found MACCE assisting the ICCS and the North Vietnamese and the PRG delegations in establishing their own communications systems. The ICCS was to inherit FPJMC supporting facilities, principally the communications centers and manual switchboards, for continued use in the post-COUNTDOWN period.

ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

(U) The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Economic Affairs (MACEA) was disestablished in mid-March, although all of its programs continued under the aegis of the DAO or USAID. In January the Secretary of Defense directed the continuance of various MACEA projects after the cease-fire. Among these was the DOD Economic Support Program, transferred to DAO, which was keyed for a \$60 million increase in funding for FY 1973. An omnibus package, the Economic Support Program covered civilian personnel hiring, construction, services, goods, scrap metals, and direct budget support.¹¹ Other MACEA programs transferred to the DAO included pharmaceutical procurement, manpower and demobilization, budget analysis, farm policy, and RVNAF procurement. Programs transferred to USAID included the Dreyfus Report, RVNAF commissary, and plaster expenditures. MACEA equipment and facilities were transferred to the DAO and USAID.

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CORDS

(C) The activities of the Directorate of CORDS during operation COUNTDOWN involved the dissolution of CORDS and the establishment of successor post-cease-fire civilian organizations. The functions of CORDS were either terminated or transferred to the four Consulates General, the Office of the Special Assistant to the Ambassador for Field Operations (SAAFO), USAID, or the Vietnamese Government. A transition period of briefings and overlap ensured minimum disruption and loss of momentum as responsibility changed hands. To ensure an orderly transfer of functions and responsibilities to new civilian organizations and insure no loss of continuity in Community Defense and Local Development (CDLD) programs, CORDS civilian personnel were selected for positions within the new organizations. The departure of military personnel was timed to coincide with the transfer of responsibility to the new organizations. CORDS was disestablished on 1 March.

(C) The security related advisory functions of the Associate Directorates for Territorial Security and Public Safety were terminated in accordance with the terms of the cease-fire agreement. Thanks largely to the success of phased plans, the termination of advisory functions was accomplished with essentially no adverse impact on the effectiveness of the major Vietnamese Government security programs.¹² Country-wide, the Public Safety Associate Directorate (PS) program had 150 public safety advisory personnel on the rolls as the cease-fire period commenced. In accordance with the terms of the cease-fire agreement, all PS activity was abolished, and all PS advisors had departed country by 25 March.

(C) All security-related advisory functions pertaining to Territorial Forces and the People's Self-Defense Force were terminated successfully and without incident prior to 27 February. The Territorial Force Activity Reporting System, the PSDF Management System, and the Local Security Management-by-Exception Output Format were transferred to the Vietnamese Government prior to 14 March.

(C) Redeployment of military personnel proceeded according to plans for termination or transfer of specific functions as they related to individual assignments and responsibilities. Sufficient flexibility was retained so that unanticipated staff actions or transfers of personnel to the FPJMC were accommodated. CORDS military personnel (80 authorized) were redeployed by 14 March. The major thrust of the civilian personnel effort (involving 123 CORDS and 220 field AID-funded spaces, and 40 CORDS and 14 field DOD-funded spaces) over the period to 29 February was in re-

view and identification of AID personnel to be retained in the new organizations either in the Office of the Special Assistant to the Ambassador for Field Operations, one of the four regional consulates, or one of the area or province resettlement and rehabilitation teams. Lists of valid positions were prepared and personnel were selected based on an evaluation of their capabilities and experience. AID personnel excess to the new organizations were identified; their onward assignment preferences ascertained; and the results transmitted to AID in Washington on 1 March 1973. Release actions for Vietnamese employees not required for the new organization were completed on 2 March.

(C) As of 1 February, the Offices of the Associate Directors for Community Development and War Victims, together with their personnel, were transferred to USAID. Functions transferred included US program management and advisory responsibilities pertaining to self-government, self-development, refugees, war victims, and social warfare programs described in the Four Year Community Defense and Local Development (CDLD) Plan. Program management of projects financed by US-AID related to the Community Development and War Victims Directorates was terminated with the transfer of these directorates to USAID on 1 February. Program management activities related to National Police programs were terminated on 14 March. Program management responsibility for the Technical Support Project and Chieu Hoi Program was transferred to US Embassy Office of the Special Assistant to the Ambassador for Field Operations (SAAFO) on 1 March.

(C) The reduced functions of the Pacification Studies Group; Associate Directorate for Plans, Programs, and Policies; and the Associate Directorate for Reports and Analysis were combined and transferred to SAAFO on 1 March. The Pacification Research Program was also transferred to SAAFO, with some reduction in local personnel support. It was expected that its principal product, the Pacification Attitude Analysis System (PAAS), would be continued as the Public Attitude Analysis System. The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) became a Vietnamese task during February with minimum US assistance; thereafter, it was a totally Vietnamese function.

(C) In the immediate post-cease-fire period a special requirement for observation and political reporting existed for US Mission elements. Approximately 50 foreign service officer observers and reporters were brought into country prior to 13 February to function under US Embassy control in locations throughout the country. Until these personnel and the Consuls General were officially established on 1 March 1973, MACV regional and

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provincial CORDS organizations assisted by providing reports, supplemental information, and administrative support.¹³

COMMAND ACTIVITIES

Data Management

(C) Termination of the Data Management Agency (MACDMA) activities was predicated on the US purchase and transfer of the IBM 360/50 computer to RVNAF. Funding for the purchase became a problem prior to the cease-fire, since assistance funds could not be used for purchase or lease after 28 January (X-Day). Further, IBM, Vietnam intended to close its operation in Vietnam after 28 March 1973. This problem was not resolved until 17 March, when the Secretary of Defense announced that negotiations with IBM had produced an arrangement for continuing computer lease through the Defense Attache Office.¹⁴ The uncertainty of the computer's disposition required the extension into March of some US personnel to train Vietnamese technicians and thus assure continuity of support. This provided an amicable solution when DAO received the automatic data processing responsibility, since RVNAF expertise continued to be applied under DAO auspices. DAO assumed the computer responsibility on 23 March.

(U) A program for retiring ADP systems and data had been in operation since early 1972, whereby every program that was no longer used was retired to one of several CONUS ADP agencies. Many MACV systems in use as the cease-fire began were discontinued and retired under this plan. Forty-six systems were retired to Wright-Patterson AFB, while 13 systems were sent to other locations. Set aside for RVNAF use were 23 remaining systems, such as the Ammunition Control System, Naval Center Supply Stock System, Friendly Order of Battle System, and Prisoner of War Statistical Accountability System.¹⁵

(C) The disposition of DMA equipment was determined from the needs of the succeeding DAO. The reduced scope of DAO data processing allowed many items to be released to IBM or, in the case of US-owned equipment, to another government agency. Software was forwarded to the National Military Command and Control System Support Center and to CINCPAC. Additionally, software commitments to the office of the Prime Minister Computer Center were transferred by 31 January.¹⁶

Health Services Group

(U) The US Army Health Services Group, Vietnam (USAHSVCGPV) provided medical support to US personnel and FWMAF throughout the withdrawal phase to include hospitalization, evacuation, detoxification, drug testing, preventive medicine,

veterinary, dental, and medical materiel support commensurate with the declining overall troop strength until the withdrawal of all US forces was completed.¹⁷ By 14 March USAHSVCGPV units had completed their standdown and transferred their medical support mission to the Four Party Joint Military Commission physicians and to the residual medical support system remaining in-country under the direction of the Medical Director, US Embassy.

(U) Medical support was provided to the Republic of Korean Forces Vietnam (ROKFV) during their withdrawal from South Vietnam. This consisted of hospitalization at the USAH, Saigon, emergency treatment at the 575th Dispensary, and aeromedical evacuation. On 30 November MACV agreed to provide emergency medical support to ROKFV beginning at X+24 for troops supported by the 201st Mobile Army Surgical Hospital, Vung Tau and at X-35 for troops supported by the 102d Evacuation Hospital, Nha Trang and 106th Evacuation Hospital, Qui Nhon. On 28 January 1973 the ROKFV Surgeon notified USAHSVCGPV that it would be necessary for the US to assume this support at X+16 (13 February). The 9th Aeromedical Evacuation Group (AEG), Clark AB, flew special missions on two different occasions to evacuate Korean patients from the ROKFV hospital prior to its closure. However, it was still necessary to transfer 23 patients to the Tan Son Nhut transfer facility and 44 patients to USAH, Saigon on 13 February. This could have been precluded had the ROKFV used its C-54 aircraft to evacuate these patients to Korea. The Korean reluctance to use their organic resources placed an additional and unnecessary workload on US medical and aeromedical resources.¹⁸

(U) USAHSVCGPV also provided medical support to Operation HOMECOMING. This support consisted of medical teams, composed of a physician and a medical specialist, and aeromedical evacuation. After 14 March this support was reduced to the medical teams only, as air support had been phased out. The medical teams evaluated each returnee at the release site to determine his ability to withstand further evacuation. Thereafter, the returnees were moved by helicopter to Tan Son Nhut AB where they were immediately transferred to USAF C-9 aeromedical evacuation aircraft for movement to Clark AB. The medical support for Operation HOMECOMING functioned smoothly and without incident.

(U) With the establishment of the Four Party Joint Military Commission (FPJMC) on 28 January, medical support for the US delegation became an item of concern. In view of the team locations at Hue, Da Nang, Pleiku, Phan Thiet, Bien Hoa, Saigon, My Tho, and Can Tho, US Army physicians

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were immediately assigned to those locations without a US medical facility in the immediate area (Hue, Phan Thiet, and My Tho). As US medical units phased down, an Army physician was assigned to the remaining locations (Da Nang, Pleiku, Bien Hoa, Saigon, and Can Tho). Throughout the re-deployment period, these physicians provided area medical support not only for the FPJMC, but for the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) and other US personnel in their respective areas.

(U) Sufficient medical equipment to operate the consulate dispensaries at Da Nang, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa, and Can Tho and a 150-bed hospital facility operated by the Seventh Day Adventists in Saigon (formerly the USAH, Saigon) were transferred to the American Embassy. Equipment lists for the dispensaries were formulated by the Medical Materiel Division and coordinated with the Medical Director of the US Embassy.

(U) Equipment designated for retrograde was determined by screening US Army worldwide requirements. During the withdrawal period, equipment valued at \$113,000 was retrograded. Transfers of supplies and equipment to the RVNAF were made on an as is, where is basis and consisted of medical and post, camp, and station property. All transfers of medical supplies and equipment were coordinated through the military regions medical advisory teams. These transfers provided the RVNAF logistical system with needed supplies and equipment which would otherwise have been required from off-shore US sources.¹⁹

(U) The following Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) Functions were assumed by the DAO Medical Service Element:

—Monitoring of contracts for MASF funded local procurement of pharmaceuticals and veterinary inspection of all food contracts.

—Developing and controlling the RVNAF MASF budget. This included the RVNAF submission of daily fund expenditure data to the DAO Medical Service Element.

—Validation of MASF supported requisitions submitted to US supply sources.

—Validation of RVNAF medical equipment requirements submitted for MASF support.

—Coordination of offshore RVNAF optical and medical maintenance support.

—Regulating the movement of American patients within and out of the Republic of Vietnam. Out-of-country air evacuation continued to be provided by 9th Aeromedical Evacuation Group. In-country air evacuation became the responsibility of Air America on 27 February.

—Off-shore medical training program monitoring.

Information Office

(U) The MACV Information Office (MACIO) remained operational until 29 March when the Defense Attache Office assumed its remaining duties. Command information services terminated with publication of the last OBSERVER on 7 February.

(U) Photographic and composition devices were transferred to DAO with the exception of special darkroom equipment, which became the property of USSAG. Public information briefings terminated on X-Day as the command spokesman rendered his final daily briefing. After 28 January memorandums were distributed to news correspondents on items of interest, e.g., Operation HOMECOMING and progress of the US troop withdrawal. The DAO Public Affairs Office assumed responsibility for news releases.²⁰

(U) Armed Forces Vietnam (AFVN) radio and television service was terminated on 22 March. The DAO continued FM radio broadcasting from Saigon, the only remaining US facility. AFVN equipment was retrograded except for the fixed antenna towers and television transmitters, which were turned over to the South Vietnamese State Commission for Information.²¹

Inspector General

(C) The MACV Inspector General activities during Operation COUNTDOWN included:

—Monitoring US and FWMAF redeployment planning including equipment retrograde and facilities transfer to the RVNAF.

—Monitoring redeployment execution including troop departures, facilities and equipment turnover, equipment and personal property retrograde, black marketing, drug abuse, and funds audit.

After the publication of OPLAN J215, MACIG continuously conducted a review of plans in the course of field trips throughout South Vietnam. Liaison was established with the Republic of Korea planners and US officials tasked to aid ROKFV redeployment. Equipment and facility transfers, which began in November, were subjected to joint MACIG and RVNAF IG inspections. Joint IG teams formulated an inspection program which systematically examined title transfer and physical turn-over procedures. Field teams conducted inspections verifying uniform compliance with the established procedures. On 10 January MACIG finished these activities, satisfied that adequate plans existed and that the title transfer of facilities and equipment was complete.²²

(C) With the commencement of withdrawal operations on 28 January, MACIG intensified its inspections. Field teams conducted visits to ROKFV redeployment sites at Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, and Cam Ranh Bay. An initial delay caused by VC in-

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
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The Can Tho Army Airfield was inspected on 11 February.

terdiction of Route 1 leading to Cam Ranh Bay had been overcome by utilizing air transport; otherwise ROKFV movement proceeded according to plan. The only irregularity encountered throughout the ROKFV redeployment resulted from a decision not to inspect ROKFV personal property boxes shipped to Korea. Some boxes were broken in transit to docks; their contents included plywood, copper wire, barbed wire, and other unusual items.²³ Shipment of these items to Korea represented a loss of government property.

(C) Base turnover progressed adequately. Field teams inspecting at Pleiku, Nha Trang, Can Tho, Da Nang, Saigon, Bien Hoa, Vung Tau, and Plantation noted that vandalism was a growing concern as US evacuation progressed. Generally RVNAF units did not occupy the facilities but placed a skeleton guard on them. Although the Vietnamese planned to eventually establish a responsible occupant on the US bases, prospects for avoiding massive stripping in the interim were dim.²⁴

(U) Analysis of drug abuse incidents and urinalysis surveys indicated a diminishing trend throughout the withdrawal. Of nearly 6,000 men tested shortly after X-Day, 1.3 percent were positive, compared with two percent prior to X-Day and 4.3 percent in July 1972.²⁵ Testing was completed and discontinued by 27 February when the laboratory equipment was redeployed.

(C) The black market was affected by post exchange closures and troop redeployment. Sources of black market supplies dried up and black market stands reflected a decline in stolen goods and rising prices. Legal piaster sales overcame illegal sales as the former provided the better exchange rate.

(C) Funds and fund property were inspected at Da Nang, Pleiku, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon, Newport, Long Binh, Saigon, Can Tho, and Binh Thuy. Special arrangements for terminal fund auditing reduced deficiencies and speeded closures; only four funds were investigated during the COUNT-DOWN period. Assistance in Kird (AIK) funds were used to support ICCS and FPJMC expenses.

(C) The unanticipated US support requirements for the ICCS and FPJMC prompted MACIG to conduct an extensive survey examining the cause of US involvement. The ICCS and FPJMC were expected to occupy sites throughout South Vietnam to monitor cease-fire violations, prisoner exchanges, redeployment of US and Free World forces, resupply of the South Vietnamese and PRG forces, and other aspects of the accords. Although it was clear that a great deal of preparation was necessary both in the nature of site preparation and logistic support, information relevant to the two bodies was closely held; initial guidance was limited, broad, and fragmentary. As the cease-fire approach-

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ed, verbal guidance was issued and written guidance followed as time allowed introducing a degree of confusion and duplication of effort. An overall written plan for ICCS and FPJMC support was never written; instead MACV published a message on 6 February 1973 summarizing support responsibilities. This document required US and South Vietnamese support of the FPJMC until its termination and support of the ICCS until it became established and could function on its own. The Government of Vietnam was responsible for supporting these two agencies. The RVNAF was tasked with the primary responsibility for supply and maintenance support common to its inventory; tactical vehicles support; communications support; consumable item support; post, camp, and station property allowances; and medical support, including medical evacuation. Selection of cantonments for the FPJMC was also an RVNAF mission. The US assumed overall responsibility, including initial preparation and filling any RVNAF shortcomings. MACV Special Troops assumed duties for the Saigon area, thereby acquiring reception duties as well as support responsibility for headquarters elements of both the ICCS and FPJMC. The regional assistance commands (RAC) fulfilled these duties in their respective military regions.²¹ The US agencies and commands responded with admirable alacrity, as the RVNAF support began to flounder immediately. RVNAF efforts were unsatisfactory, as supplies, materials, site selection, and vehicular support were consistently delayed.²² Consequently, US agencies stepped in to get the job done. Use of AIK funds had been authorized and most initial supply needs were met from available US assets. By 12 March nearly \$1 million had been spent for ICCS and FPJMC support. Modifications to existing contracts with the Pacific Architects and Engineers arranged messing, billeting, facilities engineer services, drivers and commercial vehicles, and central accounting. Other contractors were signed for laundry, communications, and reproduction service. MACV, therefore, provided virtually all of the essential ICCS and FPJMC support and arranged for its continuation. Although the initial guidance did not foresee a deep US involvement in support of these bodies, the RVNAF lassitude required the US to provide virtually everything required. Detailed MACIG inspections confirmed the adequacy of the facilities and support. By 16 March audits were in progress to fully account for the cost of this effort. A MACIG detailed report subsequently was prepared.

Special Troops

(U) MACV Special Troops (MACST) was committed to support the two international cease-fire

bodies, the US troop redeployment operation from Tan Son Nhut AB, and the nascent DAO during Operation COUNTDOWN.

(U) Starting on 16 January, MACST selected and prepared sites in the Saigon area for both the ICCS and FPJMC, determined vehicular support requirements and sources, arranged messing and billet facilities, arranged supply accounts and communications needs, and assumed overall responsibility for ICCS and FPJMC administrative support.²³ Although the ICCS and FPJMC support was originally a South Vietnamese mission, this considerable effort was added to the routine MACST functions.

(U) The redeployment of US forces was conducted through the aerial ports of Da Nang and Saigon in the initial phases of Operation COUNTDOWN and exclusively from Saigon in the later phase. The messing, billeting, and transportation needs of servicemen departing from Saigon were handled by MACST; flexible planning of the reduction in facilities was essential, as the withdrawal fluctuated with prisoner releases. By 14 March, 22 open mess facilities had been closed and the Defense Attache Office assumed responsibility for the five remaining open messes. Ten field ration messes had closed; four were retained by DAO.²⁴

(U) On 1 March the physical security for the MACV Headquarters compound was assumed by DAO, which contracted Pacific Architects and Engineers for the task as well as other security missions previously held by MACST throughout the Saigon area.

(U) The Administrative Services Division of DAO was developed by MACST. Since this division was responsible for preparing the DAO joint table of distribution, mission statement, and job descriptions, the task of briefing the entire DAO concept fell to MACST. Leases, building and equipment maintenance, communications, recreational facilities, billets, and rations were all provided by extension, or modification of existing contracts. Forty-nine leased facilities were disposed during Operation COUNTDOWN. Thirty-one leases were terminated. Of the remainder DAO acquired 11, the Chinese Embassy two, and the American Embassy five. An additional 67 rent-free facilities were disposed; DAO received 25, RVNAF 34, and the US Embassy eight.²⁵

Military Police

(U) Military Police (MACPM) advisors, working with the RVNAF Military Police Command, participated in the repatriation of NVA and VC prisoners. Over a 60-day period 26,508 NVA and VC PWs were released in four phases at five locations throughout Vietnam as shown in Figure H-6. The Four Party Joint Military Subcommittee on Captured Persons initially negotiated the four-

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VC/NVA PW RELEASE

PERIOD	NUMBER	LOCATION
X-Day to X+19.....	2,239	Loc Ninh
	4,761	Quang Tri
X+19 to X+45.....	2,256	Quang Tri
	1,000	Bong Son
	600	Minh Thanh
	1,699	Loc Ninh
X+45 to X+51.....	5,097	Quang Tri
	1,996	Thien Ngon
	201	Loc Ninh
X+51 to X+57.....	4,124	Quang Tri
	2,495	Thien Ngon
TOTAL.....	26,508	

Source: MACPM

Figure: H-6

phased PW release. The release of enemy PWs was not tied to the release of US prisoners. The four phases were established by the Four Party Joint Military Subcommittee to insure a continuous release during the sixty day period. The first to be repatriated were the sick, ill, and wounded, followed by the aged and women. There were 1,405 sick, ill and wounded, 35 aged, and 913 women to be released at the beginning of the first phase.³¹

(U) In addition to direct prisoner releases the South Vietnamese Government allowed 10,981 VC PWs to enter the Chieu Hoi Program between 28 January and 1 February. Of these 7,194 were formerly held at the Central PW Camp on Phu Quoc Island, 1,374 at Bien Hoa PW Camp, and 2,413 at Can Tho PW Camp. After entering the Chieu Hoi Program they were issued \$VN 4,000 each and released to proceed to a destination of their choosing.³²

(U) PW movement planning was conducted by MACPM primarily with the Logistics Directorate Air and Surface Movements Branch and the Operations Directorate Special Airlift Scheduling Branch. The initial planning for moving 7,000 enemy PWs included the use of aircraft, ships, and trucks. In the FPJMC negotiations it was agreed that the US would provide the bulk of the air movement support. Movements by LSTs and the troop ships Upsher and Barrett were proposed, but were not adopted because of lengthy movement time, lack of messing facilities, and limited latrine facilities aboard the vessels. US C-130 aircraft were selected as the primary means of transportation for the NVA and VC prisoner repatriation.

(U) US advisors were withdrawn from the Can Tho PW Camp on 18 February. On 25 March advisors at the remaining camps terminated their activities and departed for Saigon.³³

(C) At the completion of scheduled releases on

25 March, 103 US-captured PWs remained interned in the Bien Hoa PW Camp. The RVNAF did not release 41 who were serving civil court conviction sentences. The remaining 62 refused repatriation and were returned to the Bien Hoa camp pending disposition determination.³⁴

ADVISORY GROUPS
Army Advisory Group

(U) The Army Advisory Group (AAG) was disestablished on 22 March, its mission transferred to the Army Division, DAO. Effective with the cease-fire announcement the AAG field elements ceased their advisory and training functions except for those personnel advising the separate commands—armor, ranger, and artillery—who continued until 22 March. All service school and training center advisors terminated their activities and moved to Saigon by 4 February. An exception was one advisor who remained with the Airborne Division until 22 March. The Field Training Command personnel arrived in Saigon on 20 January, having closed out the Bien Hoa headquarters. The Field Training Command mobile training teams stood down on 27 and 28 January, since their battalion refresher training courses were not scheduled to commence until after the Tet holidays.³⁵

(U) On 28 January 1973, 2,179 Khmer soldiers were undergoing training in South Vietnam. Under the cease-fire agreement they had to be moved back to the Khmer Republic. Air movement began on 28 January and was completed on 1 February.

(U) By 19 March the Field Training Command field advisory elements returned to RVNAF the equipment previously title transferred. AAG headquarters equipment was returned to the Central Training Command (CTC) or turned in to the MACV Headquarters Commandant by 24 March 1973 with the exception of the equipment retained by the Training Management Section, Defense At-

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The Army Advisory Group ceased all advisory operations on 28 January with the exception of the separate commands.

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tache Office. The Field Liaison Directorate inspected the field elements property and fund records by 25 February.

(U) The monitoring of RVNAF training activities was transferred to the Training Management Section, Defense Attache Office on 22 March. The Technical Translation Branch, an AAG element which translated technical military documents, was added to this DAO section.³⁶

Naval Advisory Group

(U) The Naval Advisory Group (NAG) was deactivated on 6 March 1973, its mission transferred to the Navy Division, DAO. All US Navy field advisory personnel were withdrawn from the field by 22 February, with the exception of 38 harbor defense, EOD, and salvage advisors who remained at the ports of Da Nang, Vung Tau, Qui Nhon, and Cam Ranh Bay. The latter advisors departed Vung Tau on 1 March and all other locations on 6 March. Navy personnel located in Military Region 1 redeployed through the Army facility at Da Nang AB. Selected equipment from the field units was turned over to the Vietnamese Navy, while all other property, primarily sophisticated communications gear, was retained under US control and redeployed. Since all US naval bases had been turned over to the RVNAF in November 1972, real property turnover after 28 January was limited to buildings which housed offices and billets.³⁷

Air Force Advisory Group

(U) The Air Force Advisory Group (AFGP) terminated its advisory mission on 28 January; its mission transferred to the Air Force Division, DAO. Personnel redeployment commenced and field teams were moved to Saigon immediately after completing their equipment turnover. By 13 February all residual personnel were located in Saigon. Title transfer of equipment designated for the RVNAF had been accomplished by 7 November 1972. Physical turnover took place as the USAF elements redeployed. Turnover items, mostly communications equipment identified for VNAF use, were drawn from the equipment pool subsequently redeployed with the 7th Air Force to form the US Support Activities Group (USSAG) in Thailand.³⁸

REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMANDS

(U) The standdown of the four regional assistance commands (RAC) terminated the direct US assistance, influence, and advice to RVNAF field elements throughout Vietnam. The scope of this effort had diminished gradually throughout 1972. Consuls General of the US Embassy assumed many of the RAC functions on 1 March. Although staffed to replace the RAC and CORDS elements to some

degree, the consulates were not designed to administer all the functions and activities.

(U) The regional assistance commands began planning for the final withdrawal of US forces in November 1972. Prior to 28 January operational efforts were directed primarily towards monitoring the tactical situation, unit training, Project ENHANCE equipment replacement and augmentation, and the development and implementation of plans for the transfer of responsibility and functions to the RVNAF units. Additionally, equipment to be turned over to RVNAF was inventoried and title transferred, then retained on hand receipt until no longer needed. The title transfer eliminated a great deal of work when the US elements began to stand down.

(U) After 28 January operational efforts were directed primarily toward monitoring and reporting tactical data to maintain a steady flow of information to keep the command abreast of the tactical situation and to report on the personnel redeployment. On X-Day all US support of the RVNAF stopped. Only a limited number of advisory personnel remained with division units and at the province capitals. Their sole function was to maintain a steady flow of information. Personnel were scheduled for redeployment as their jobs were eliminated. The last RAC personnel to depart Vietnam were the RAC commanders and their immediate staffs. In early January, RAC personnel were selected to form the US Delegation, FPJMC field elements in each military region. They worked for the US Delegation through March. CORDS personnel departed generally prior to 27 February, reflecting the 1 March disestablishment date of CORDS. ROKFV units in the Second Regional Assistance Command (SRAC) began departing on 30 January and completed their redeployment on 16 March.

(U) Equipment retrograde was accomplished through the collection, classification, and storage activities in each RAC. Units adopted a free turn-in policy which avoided large scale abandonment of equipment. The SRAC CCS also processed ROKFV units. In the early stages of the standdown the CCS experienced tremendous congestion as ROKFV units flooded the facilities with equipment. Incorrect preparation of turn-in documents, attempts at unauthorized substitution, and attempts to turn-in equipment which was short vital components further complicated the ROKFV retrograde.

(U) Equipment transfers to RVNAF proceeded swiftly. Prior property book title transfers enabled units to adopt simplified turnover procedures; usually an RVNAF representative conducted a brief, joint property inventory and took possession. Post, camp, and station property turnover proceeded in a similar fashion. Usually transferred with the

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facility to which it belonged, the post, camp, and station property was vulnerable to theft and destruction after turnover. As US personnel redeployed, some previously trustworthy employees became prone to vandalism and illegal expropriation. Civilian guards, as well as National Police, proved totally ineffective in providing security and were frequently involved in theft themselves. The only effective measure against theft proved to be the designation of a responsible Vietnamese organization with an interest in preserving the integrity of the facility equipment. The prompt appearance of guards supervised by the receiving organization insured adequate security.

(U) Real properties and facilities were physically transferred to the Vietnamese and the Consulates General as US need ended. Facility transfers were generally completed by 27 February with the exception of the RAC headquarters facilities, which were maintained under US control until the end of the withdrawal period.

(U) An orderly transfer or termination of functions occurred. The Consulates General acquired intelligence and operations responsibilities, basically monitoring the RVNAF corps headquarters. They also assumed CORDS duties in the military regions. A transition period allowed the departing military personnel to orient members of the consulates general to these tasks. The gradual curtailment of US activities had created the impetus for the Vietnamese to operate many programs. During Operation COUNTDOWN final transfer took place as intelligence gathering, operations, most CORDS

missions, and logistics activities became Vietnamese functions. The consulates' personnel were to monitor and provide minimal advice and assistance after 28 March.

(C) RAC support to the FPJMC and ICCS began as those bodies were formed. Initially the RVNAF was responsible for the site selection and logistic support. Since rapid fielding of FPJMC and ICCS teams was imperative and the RVNAF displayed a pronounced reluctance to provide the required support, the RACs moved aggressively to designate FPJMC and ICCS team locations, supervise facility construction and provide vehicles, communications, and air transport. As the ICCS became self-sufficient, RAC support was withdrawn; FPJMC support continued under contract with Pacific Architects and Engineers until US forces assets were redeployed.

(U) The First and Third Regional Assistance Commands experienced difficulties in reaching accord with the FPJMC members on the team site locations. In FRAC South Vietnamese delegates declared the Hue facility unsuitable, and a new site was selected which required considerable renovation. In TRAC the South Vietnamese objected to sharing compounds with the Communist delegations for security reasons. Further difficulties initially were encountered in trying to meet Communist desires during construction; efforts were directed toward meeting these wishes, and the experience gained subsequently proved useful in avoiding similar problems at other sites.

USARV/MACV SUPPORT COMMAND

PERSONNEL REDEPLOYMENT

(U) In early November 1972 USARV/MACV Support Command (USARV/MACV SUPCOM) completed planning for the final 60-day withdrawal of personnel and the Army support system from Vietnam. The baseline strength of US Army personnel in South Vietnam at the beginning of Operation COUNTDOWN was 13,244, including 352 personnel who were in CONUS at the time of the cease-fire but did not return, personnel assigned to the US Delegation, Four Party Joint Military Commission (815 Army personnel), and the Defense Attache Office (28 Army personnel). Thus, the number of US Army personnel to be redeployed under Operation COUNTDOWN was 12,049.³⁹ Personnel were redeployed in four increments between X-Day and X+61.

Increment 1	2,785	23 percent
Increment 2	3,329	28 percent
Increment 3	2,887	24 percent
Increment 4	3,042	25 percent

(U) The principle ingredient in the successful redeployment of US Army personnel during each incremental force reduction and Operation COUNTDOWN was the direct contact with, and responsiveness of, the Office of Personnel Operation (OPO), Headquarters, Department of the Army. Following a prearranged schedule on an almost nightly basis, thousands of names of individuals needing assignments were passed to OPO. Usually, on the following day appropriate instructions were received. Without this capability, many individuals would have departed Vietnam uncertain of their next assignment and an inordinate number of reassignment orders would have required amending by other commands. Personal desires were addressed on an individual basis.

(U) The 90th Replacement Battalion, operating in Camp Alpha, Tan Son Nhut AB, and Da Nang AB outprocessed departing Army personnel. On 1 November 1972, a joint military operation was established. The USAF 8th Aerial Port passenger

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service crew and the Tri-Service ATCO flight booking agency opened offices in Robinson Hall, the main processing center at Camp Alpha. Duties formerly handled exclusively by the Army, including processing Army DEROS flights, transporting baggage to and from the flight lines, and transporting passengers to and from the aircraft were assumed by the Air Force personnel. Although the consolidation of operations with the USAF eased the burden on the replacement battalion in terms of flight processing, it initially created organizing and operating problems. Within two weeks these difficulties were resolved; flight processing procedures were standardized, an efficient system for channeling baggage through customs was devised, and ground transportation for passengers and baggage was arranged. While the Navy and Air Force used a "booking system"—scheduling individuals on specific flights several days in advance—the USARV MACV SUPCOM continued to use the "free flow" system, which had proven successful during the withdrawals over the preceding years. Under the latter system, except for colonels and general officers, personnel were scheduled aboard aircraft only after their arrival at the outprocessing facility (e.g., Camp Alpha at Tan Son Nhut AB). This system again proved effective, although the various holds imposed throughout the withdrawal caused the airheads' facilities to become crowded with personnel awaiting redeployment aircraft.

(U) When the cease-fire agreement was signed on 27 January, the Replacement Battalion immediately discontinued two of its primary missions: receiving and billeting Army replacement personnel and supervising the assignment and shipping of replacements to field elements. Changes were made to realign the resources with the COUNTDOWN mission. On 28 January personnel began converging on Camp Alpha. During the first two weeks of the withdrawal a daily average of 190 Army personnel were processed for redeployment.⁴⁰

(U) The task of moving Army personnel out of Vietnam in itself posed no unusual problems. In other areas, however, the demands of the final withdrawal severely taxed the personnel assets of the battalion. With the deactivation of units and the closure of civilian agencies, the 90th Replacement Battalion found it necessary to assume additional missions. One such mission was the processing of AWOL and deserter cases that surfaced in the final stages of the withdrawal. To centrally locate their administrative processing, the 90th Replacement Battalion was selected as their unit of assignment for administrative processing and shipment to CONUS. Initially, more than 1,600 individuals were listed on various rosters as being AWOL or a deserter. A major effort was initiated with the US Army

Deserter Information Point at Fort Benjamin Harrison to review the status of every individual and to purify the rosters. This effort reduced the list by approximately 50 percent. A detailed plan was developed to handle the anticipated large number of deserters surfacing after the cease-fire. However, the plan was not implemented, since only four deserters turned themselves in and five were apprehended.⁴¹

(U) While the withdrawal operation was allowed to operate without restrictions, the free-flow system of the Army and the booking system of the Air Force complemented each other well. With these combined systems, DEROS personnel normally remained at Camp Alpha not longer than four days. Under this joint system 350 men were processed routinely each day.

OPERATIONS

(U) The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOP) was tasked with organizing and scheduling a Redeployment Base Closure Assistance Team (RBCAT). This team consisted of representatives from the Offices of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Logistics, Personnel and Administration, and Operations; the Adjutant General, the Inspector General, and the USARV Engineer. The teams advised and assisted USARV unit and installation commanders in the redeployment of personnel and the turnover of specified US assets to the RVNAF. On 28 January the teams immediately deployed to the field to assist with the personnel redeployment and the installation closures. Immediately thereafter USARV PM began to identify key installations that would remain operational in South Vietnam after X-Day.

(U) During the period 20 January to 12 March the teams twice visited 97 units and installations throughout Vietnam. Assistance visits were scheduled in two phases. The first phase, during the period 30 January through 21 February, was primarily to identify any possible problem areas and act as liaison directly to USARV Headquarters. The second phase from 22 February to 12 March, was the final inspection phase to follow up on any problem areas initially encountered and to ensure that the first phase problems had been solved. Check lists were prepared by each staff section concerned and were used by the RBCAT members to evaluate the progress of the unit being inspected. Any problems which could not be corrected, or for which a solution between the RBCAT member and his counterpart could not be reached, were referred to the responsible USARV staff office. Thus, problems and potential problems were identified early and units were able to obtain rapid, responsive, and timely assistance from the USARV staff personnel

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for many problem areas which, if left unattended, would have developed into major problems.

(U) On 24 January, in coordination with the RBCAT effort, lists of installations that would remain operational under US control after 28 March were provided to the USARV Provost Marshal (PMO) who then conducted physical security surveys. The surveys required contractors to meet a minimum level of security prior to 27 February when the contract and security responsibility was transferred from USARV/MACV SUPCOM to the Defense Attache Office.

COMMAND ACTIVITIES

(U) On X-Day 20,763 Vietnamese civilian employees being serviced by the USARV Civilian Personnel Offices throughout Vietnam had to be placed, reassigned, or separated. An orderly drawdown of the civilian workforce was instituted. Coordination with the Defense Attache Office, South Vietnamese officials, and US contractors assisted in placing an estimated one-third of the Vietnamese workforce.

(U) As Operation COUNTDOWN progressed, the various services and facilities provided US troops in Vietnam closed. The six education centers still in existence were prepared for final closure by forwarding excess nonappropriated fund property (NAF) and materials to other education programs throughout the Pacific area, other NAF accounts, or to property disposal. On 24 January the in-country R&R program at the Vung Tau facility began closing. The Army welfare fund was designated "successor-in-kind" to the USARV Central Welfare Fund. Property excess to the needs of the Army and other armed services in the Pacific area was transferred to USAID and the RVNAF. On 28 January the USARV Safety and Education Programs were terminated. A representative of the USARV Safety Office visited each of the seven field safety offices prior to their closures. This procedure proved helpful in insuring that field facilities and programs were properly terminated. Of the 16 retail and 11 snack bar facilities operating on X-Day, 14 retail and 10 snack bar facilities were closed by 24 March. The remaining two retail facilities were at Camp Alpha, which operated until the camp closed and at the MACV Headquarters building, which remained open for the DAO. The one remaining snack bar, also located in the headquarters building, similarly remained open.

(U) The Commander, US Army, Vietnam, was the COMUSMACV executive agent for US postal matters in-country. Final redeployment planning was premised on the assumption that the successor postal system was to be Army-operated. How-

ever, just prior to the cease-fire agreement, a Navy-operated successor system was announced from Washington. No knowledgeable Naval postal personnel were in-country at that time. Consequently, most planning and arrangements for postal matters were accomplished on a tentative basis, subject to later confirmation that the arrangements were congruent with applicable Navy postal directives and procedures. The US Army Postal Group geared its personnel redeployment on the overall drawdown of troops in Vietnam, but was unable to make severe cuts in strength because of the necessity to retain a basic structure throughout Vietnam.

(U) The Special Services Agency was able to effect an early close-out of all but minimum support in the military regions and rapidly draw down its strength. Library collections and crafts supplies were shipped to CONUS and various USARPAC commands. Facilities throughout the country were transferred to the Vietnamese, except in the Saigon area, where those facilities of the MACV Headquarters became a part of the Defense Attache Office. As the withdrawal period began, it became necessary to revise the planning to permit the operation of 16mm film accounts beyond X-Day in greater numbers than had been planned initially. Other revisions were made to permit the operation of craft shops and service clubs for longer than had been originally planned. All functions were closed out or transferred and the agency was discontinued on 3 March 1973.⁴²

(U) Comptroller activities during the final sixty days closely followed the planning tasks and milestones. The major significant activities included:

- Closure of military banking facilities.
- Terminal audits of nonappropriated funds.
- Closure of the Assistance in Kind (AIK) disbursing network.
- Transfer of disbursing functions.
- Military Payment Certificate (MPC) recall; conversion to US currency.
- Phasedown and closure of finance network.
- Relocation of selected personnel to USARPAC Headquarters for temporary duty to conclude residual functions related to budget, accounting, internal review, and finance activities.

ARMY AVIATION

(U) In late October planning began for the retrograde or transfer of all US Army aviation assets in South Vietnam. Under Project ENHANCE PLUS inventories of aviation assets were verified, UH-1H helicopters and aviation related materiel were title transferred to the RVNAF and then hand receipted to US forces for their continued utilization. Aircraft retrograde schedules were established for the OH-6A, AH-1G, CH-47C, U-8, and U-21 air-

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US Army helicopters especially marked with vertical international orange stripes served the FPJMC.

craft. These plans and schedules were coordinated through higher headquarters and among the units themselves to insure that required missions would be continued for limited periods past the cease-fire date. The retrograde from South Vietnam of CH-54, OH-58, and OV-1 aircraft and parts in November enabled the aviation retrograde plans and procedures to be tested and refined.

(U) When the cease-fire became effective on 28 January, many aviation missions in the field were curtailed and others began a gradual phasedown. Retrograde operations began at all three selected ports within the first three days. Civilian contract personnel handled the bulk of the aircraft retrograde duties at Newport, Nha Trang, and Da Nang, plus the retrograde of repair parts and supplies in Saigon. The previously identified special aviation detachments in support of the FPJMC and ICCS

were deployed and began operations for those agencies.

(U) US Army aviation assisted in the recovery of 27 US prisoners released on 12 February by the Viet Cong at Loc Ninh. Thirteen Army helicopters participated in Operation HOMECOMING, with the aviation staff developing an aviation plan and participating in key roles throughout the operation.

(U) When the Air Force transferred its base of operations for C-130 aircraft from Saigon to Thailand, many maintenance and weather delays prevented scheduled shipments of Army aviation parts from Saigon to units in the field. Backlogs of supplies developed. The situation was only alleviated by special efforts of the aviation staff in conjunction with RVNAF, surface transportation, and special airlift requests from the Air Force. On

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X-Day nearly all Air Force support ceased, and thereafter Army aviation elements used their organic assets for resupply and retrograde activities.

(U) Retrograde activities progressed smoothly as over 200 US Army aircraft and 2,000 tons of aviation repair parts and supplies were prepared for surface shipment to CONUS and other areas. The operational readiness of all Army aircraft was maintained above the USARV/MACV SUPCOM goals. The efforts and availability of the contract civilian personnel served to effect a smooth withdrawal of Army aviation for South Vietnam.

COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

(U) The major operations of US Army Strategic Communications, Southeast Asia (STRATCOM-SEA) during COUNTDOWN were: the establishment of communications to support the ICCS and FPJMC; the release of the MACV Telecommunications Facility and FTC-31 switch to DAO; the Vietnamization of the Single Integrated Military System; the transfer of the responsibility for the Contingency Communications Unit; and communications in Operation HOMECOMING. On 9 March the major portion of STRATCOM-SEA's operational functions was transferred to the DAO. Circuit reporting continued through RVNAF channels, but other military reports were terminated with the standdown of STRATCOM-SEA on 15 March.

(U) Equipment not already transferred to the Vietnamese was programmed for eventual retrograde. Common items of organizational property were turned in to outprocessing facilities. COMSEC items were retrograded through the Armed Forces Courier Service and other selected items were prepared, preserved, and packed for shipment by the Communications Assets Recovery Division of Federal Electric Corporation. Some equipment remained in South Vietnam at the end of March, which was scheduled for recovery by civilian contractors. These included the CRB-VTU REL 2600B system, the MACV EAC, the Digital Subscriber Terminal Equipment and teletype equipment at the DAO Telecommunications Facility (TCF), the AN/FTC-31, SEVAC Switch, AUTOSEVOCOM terminals in the Saigon area, key telephone systems, and the NCR computer at the AMSF-V.⁴³ In addition, selected items of communications center equipment located in regional assistance command communications centers were transferred to Pacific Architects and Engineers for FPJMC use. The equipment in the MACV TCF and AN/FTC-31 Switch was transferred to the US Embassy.

(U) Signal support for the regional assistance commands was provided by four signal companies. The 14th Signal Company at Da Nang was in direct support of FRAC. The 148th Signal Com-

pany was in direct support of SRAC, with installations at Pleiku, Nha Trang, and Qui Nhon. The 536th Signal Company at Plantation was in direct support of TRAC. The 560th Signal Company, at Can Tho, was in direct support of DRAC. The last signal company stood down on 14 March.

LOGISTICS

(U) Upon the announcement that a cease-fire had been signed and that the withdrawal was to be accomplished within 60 days, the Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics (DCSLOG), identified all subsistence requisitions for which the shipping status had not been received and immediately submitted requests for cancellation. Over 700 requisitions were canceled with the saving of approximately 6.5 million dollars.⁴⁴ Approximately 125 additional requisitions had already been released from depot stocks under direct vendor delivery procedures. To effect cancellation of those requisitions the Subsistence Stock Control Officer was sent to the Defense Personnel Support Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania to coordinate directly with the commodity managers. This action resulted in a further 33 percent cancellation rate, with 54 percent frustrated at the port and only 13 percent for which no firm cancellation or frustration action could be initiated. As a further step to preclude the onward movement of unnecessary and unneeded subsistence, "stop/see" procedures were initiated at all West Coast ports from which subsistence moved to Vietnam. The onward movement of subsistence only proceeded following the approval of USARV/MACV SUPCOM. To dispose of excess subsistence supplies in-country, close coordination was accomplished with the Newport commissary (the residual subsistence support base for the theater), the Long Binh Class I point (which became a storage location for the Newport commissary), GSA, USAID, and other Pacific commands. The expedited disposition instructions resulted in the savings of many additional thousands of dollars, as well as improving the US image through the turnover to excess subsistence supplies to support humanitarian efforts in South Vietnam.

(U) As early as July 1972, planning had been accomplished on the disposal of existing contracts should all US troops be withdrawn from Vietnam. The plans were further refined between October 1972 and January 1973. When the cease-fire was announced, the actions to be taken were well-defined, and the principal problem was in determining the date a particular contract would be terminated or responsibility for the contract transferred to DAO. In close coordination with the Contract Administration Office, Vietnam, logistical commanders in the military regions, and DAO personnel, termination

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and transfer dates were determined and DCSLOG initiated letters to accomplish the actions. In some instances changes in plans or operations necessitated changing some dates, but these were handled with little or no difficulty. Of the 56 USARV contracts in being at the time the cease-fire was signed, 35 were completely terminated and 16 were transferred to DAO. There were five contracts where certain functions were terminated and the remaining functions continued in support of DAO.

(U) Retrograde of assets not required or anticipated not to be required in various activities continued, but the retrograde effort was affected by the diversion of manpower to process support to the

FPJMC and ICCS. Even with this diversion of effort, 12,900 short tons were shipped between 28 January and 28 February, with the remaining 6,400 short tons being moved prior to 28 March. The retrograde and recovery of materiel assets from South Vietnam represent one of the most significant logistical operations of the US Army in Vietnam. Between 1969 and the final closeout of USARV in 1973, more than 1,849,500 short tons of materiel were retrograded with an acquisition value of more than five billion dollars.

DISESTABLISHMENT

(U) USARV/MACV SUPCOM was disestablished at 1808 hours, 29 March 1973.



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COUNTDOWN — ANNEX H

1. OPLAN (U), COMUSMACV, 9 Nov 72, Subj: J215 - THUNDERBOLT, p iii-iv.
2. Msg (S), JCS to COMUSMACV et al, 260029Z Jan 73, Subj: Redeployment from RVN (U), GDS-81.
3. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 211320Z Feb 73, Subj: COMUSMACV Status Report of Selected SEASIA Activities (U), p 8, GDS-81; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 231351Z Feb 73, Subj: COMUSMACV Status Report of Selected SEASIA Activities (U), p 8, GDS-81; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 251238Z Feb 73, Subj: COMUSMACV Status Report of SEASIA Activities (U), p 4, GDS-81; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 261335Z Feb 73, Subj: COMUSMACV Status Report of Selected SEASIA Activities (U), p 4, GDS-81; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 271210Z Feb 73, Subj: COMUSMACV Status Report of Selected SEASIA Activities (U), p 4, GDS-81; Msg (S), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 281305Z Feb 73, Subj: COMUSMACV Status Report of Selected SEASIA Activities (U), p 4, GDS-81.
4. Msg (S), COMUSSAG to JCS et al, 011050Z Apr 73, Subj: Commander USSAG Status Report of Selected SEASIA Activities (U), GDS-81.
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6. Msg (U), DAO to CINCPAC, 290620Z Mar 73, Subj: Project COUNTDOWN Reporting 2400H 28 Mar.
7. Msg (S), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, DTG illegible, Mar 73, Subj: COMUSMACV Status Report of Selected SEASIA Activities (U), GDS-81.
8. Rpt (U), MACDP, 8 Mar 73, Subj: After Action Report, p 6.
9. Ibid., p 12.
10. Rpt (C), MACCE, 7 May 73, Subj: After Action Report - OPLAN J215 COUNTDOWN (U), p 1, GDS-Not Stated.
11. Rpt (U), MACEA, undtd, Subj: After Action Report, p 1.
12. Rpt (S), MACCORDS, 9 Mar 73, Subj: After Action Report (U), p 2, GDS-Not Stated.
13. Ibid., p 6.
14. Rpt (C), MACDMA, undtd, Subj: After Action Report (U), p 1, GDS-78.
15. Ibid., p 3.
16. Ibid., p 4.
17. Rpt (U), USAHSVCGPV, 16 Mar 73, Subj: After Action Report, p 1.
18. Ibid., p 6.
19. Ibid., p 2.
20. Rpt (U), MACOI, 29 Mar 73, Subj: After Action Report, p 1.
21. Ibid., p A-2.
22. Rpt (C), MACIG, 21 Mar 73, Subj: After Action Report (U), p 5, GDS-79.
23. Ibid., p 21.
24. Ibid., pp 19, 22.
25. Ibid., pp 13, 17.
26. Ibid., p 3.
27. Ibid., p 23.
28. Rpt (U), MACST, 22 Mar 73, Subj: After Action Report, p 2.
29. Ibid., p 2.
30. Ibid.
31. Draft history (C), MACPM, 5 Apr 73, Subj: Outline History of the Release/Repatriation of Enemy Prisoners of War (U), p III-4, GDS-Not Stated.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid., p III-10.
34. Ibid.
35. Rpt (U), Army Advisory Group, 26 Mar 73, Subj: After Action Report, p 5.
36. Ibid.
37. Rpt (C), NAVFORV/NAVADVGRP, 15 Mar 73, Subj: After Action Report (U), GDS-Not Stated.
38. Rpt (S), Air Force Advisory Group, 22 Mar 73, Subj: After Action Report (U), p II-E-7, GDS-Not Stated.
39. Rpt (U), USARV/MACV SUPCOM, undtd, Subj: Draft After Action Report, p 36.
40. Ibid., p 17.
41. Ibid., p 71.
42. Ibid., p 14.
43. Ibid., p 76.
44. Ibid., p 53.

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ANNEX I

STRATEGIC TECHNICAL DIRECTORATE ASSISTANCE

TEAM-158

INTRODUCTION

(U) The US Strategic Technical Directorate Assistance Team - 158 (STDAT) was formed on 1 May 1972 to advise and assist the Vietnamese Strategic Technical Directorate (STD). The history of STDAT is intrinsically tied to STD; the origin and evolution of STD is crucial to an understanding of the ideas guiding both organizations' operations.

(TS) Because of increased Communist activities in the Republic of Vietnam after the 1954 Geneva Accords, a Vietnamese secret special service was established in 1958 under the control of the President, Republic of Vietnam.¹ The mission of this agency was to obtain intelligence on Communist activities north of the Demilitarized Zone, and to locate strategic targets for destruction in the event of open hostilities with the North Vietnamese. In 1963 the secret service was redesignated the Vietnamese Special Forces Command.

The forerunner of the present Strategic Technical Directorate (STD) was organized within the Special Forces Command under the name Special Branch. The Special Branch consisted of two sections, one responsible for in-country support sites and one responsible for out-of-country support sites. The out-of-country support section recruited potential agents for training in clandestine intelligence and interdiction operations. Because of funding problems, however, the out-of-country program was eventually eliminated.

(TS) By 1964 the situation in South Vietnam had become so critical that the Special Branch was unable to handle the escalating special operations requirements. Therefore, the Special Branch was reorganized as an independent unit, separate from the Special Forces Command. In April 1964 the Special Branch officially became the Special Exploitation Service (SES) and was placed under the command control of the Joint General Staff (JGS). Concurrent with the formation of SES, its counterpart US organization, the MACV Special Operations Group (MACSOG), later renamed the Studies and Observations Group, was created. MACSOG assumed from the Controlled Agent Source the responsibility for supporting SES special and unconventional warfare (UW) operations.² SES was

organized with a headquarters element in Saigon, the Coastal Security Service in Da Nang, the Airborne Training Camp at Long Thanh, and attached VNAF elements at other sites. The VNAF elements included several special aircrews operating in close coordination with the MACSOG First Flight Detachment in Nha Trang.

(S) During the latter part of 1964 the NVA increased its infiltration of troops and supplies into South Vietnam via the Ho Chi Minh trail complex. In response SES was enlarged in early 1965. Activated in April 1964 under the aegis of JGS to conduct reconnaissance in Laos and Cambodia, the previously autonomous Liaison Service was assigned to SES in January 1965. SES was subsequently redesignated the Strategic Technical Service. For the first time one agency was responsible to the Joint General Staff for all special and unconventional warfare operations supporting the Vietnamese counterinsurgency program.

(S) By September 1967 the Strategic Technical Service had grown considerably. To accommodate its new status, it was redesignated the Strategic Technical Directorate (STD). The STD Director reported directly to the Chief, Joint General Staff. At that time, the major subordinate units were the Liaison Service, the Coastal Security Service, the Special Task Force, the Airborne Training Center, and the Coordination and Liaison Detachment. Also, the STD PSYWAR Division was greatly enlarged to meet the growing needs of unconventional warfare (UW) and special operations (SO).

(S) In mid-1970, because of the deactivation of the US 5th Special Forces Group, STD absorbed the Vietnamese Special Forces Command, which was redesignated the Special Mission Service (SMS). The resulting organization, shown in Figure I-1, remained essentially unchanged through March 1973.

(S) STD was organized into two major field units, the Liaison Service (LS) and the Special Mission Service (SMS). LS was given the mission of conducting operations in the Khmer Republic and the Republic of Vietnam south of the triborder area; SMS, of conducting operations in Laos and in South Vietnam north of the triborder area. In addition to general intelligence collection, LS and SMS

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
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teams were trained to conduct wiretaps, prisoner snatch operations, and road and trail mining, and to direct TACAIR and artillery on lucrative targets. The capabilities of LS were somewhat reduced after May 1972 as a result of the deactivation of its Special Commando Unit exploitation and security companies.

(S) The Special Mission Service was authorized five operations groups; however, only four were assigned. The organization of the SMS operational units was similar to a Special Forces A detachment and was developed to facilitate the conduct of unconventional warfare operations in North Vietnam and Laos.

STRATEGIC TECHNICAL DIRECTORATE (STD) ORGANIZATION



-----TASKED BY STD HQ.

- * SEA COMMANDO TEAM
- ** PATROL CRAFT FAST

Figure: 1-1

Source: STDAT-158

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(TS) Until early 1972 STD was tasked with cross-border operations only; however, the NVA offensive in April 1972 caused STD operations to be reoriented on in-country tactical reconnaissance operations in support of the hard pressed RVNAF. This change in STD employment was also due in part to the loss of US air assets and the detachment on 5 May 1972 of the VNAF 219th Helicopter Squadron. These events considerably reduced STD's capability to respond independently to cross-border reconnaissance missions developed at the MACV

and JGS levels. Although the strategic role of STD atrophied to a marked degree, tactical reconnaissance operations (in excess of 200 separate reconnaissance team missions) in support of the military region headquarters were instrumental in producing intelligence vital to RVNAF efforts to counter the NVA invasion. This kept the Liaison Service and the Special Mission Service reconnaissance teams in a high state of preparedness for their primary mission of intelligence collection operations in North Vietnam, Laos, and the Khmer Republic.⁴


STRATEGIC TECHNICAL DIRECTORATE ASSISTANCE TEAM-158 (STDAT)

(TS) On 30 April 1972 upon the deactivation of MACSOG (see the 1971 MACV Command History, Annex B, p. B-1), which had carefully nurtured STD through the improvement and modernization programs of the previous two years, a jointly staffed advisory agency was formed from residual MAC-

SOG personnel and designated the Strategic Technical Directorate Assistance Team-158 (STDAT). Consisting of a total of 152 USA, six USN, and two USAF personnel, STDAT was organized as shown in Figure 1-2. STDAT was activated on 1 May 1972, chartered under a classified MACV missions and

STDAT -158 ORGANIZATION

(1 MAY-30 NOVEMBER 1972)



Total personnel 160

Source: STDAT-158

Figure: 1-2

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
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GENERAL DISPOSITIONS 1 MAY - 31 DECEMBER 1972



Source: STDAT-158

Figure: I-3

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
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STDAT-158 ORGANIZATION

(1-31 DECEMBER 1972)



Total personnel - 44

Source: STDAT-158

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Figure: I-4

functions letter directive dated 30 April 1972. STDAT was charged with providing advice, assistance, and limited financial and materiel support to STD; developing combined plans for special operations and unconventional warfare; and maintaining liaison between STD and MACV agencies concerned with intelligence collection and related operational matters. STDAT was also directed to keep the MACV J2 and J3 (later MACDI and MACDO) informed as to STD activities, to exert all possible efforts to insure that STD operations best served the objectives of the US and MACV, and to encourage STD to consider intelligence collection requirements specified by MACDI. As a parallel to the direct command relationship existing between STD and JGS, the STDAT Commander and Senior Advisor reported directly to the Chief of Staff, MACV. As a cover, STDAT was shown on the MACV organizational chart as a subordinate element of the Army Advisory Group. Finally,

STDAT was charged by the Chief of Staff, MACV, with serving as the MACV point of contact

STDAT was later directed, in addition to its advisory mission, to organize, equip, train, and employ a Special Mission Force (SMF) and a Coastal Recovery Force (CRF), whose organizational details and operational activities are described more fully below. Until mid-November 1972 STDAT maintained field advisory elements at each of the STD element locations depicted in Figure I-3. Increment XIV of the MACV drawdown required a reorganization of STDAT and a reduction in personnel to 42 USA, one USN, and one USAF. The resulting organization is shown in Figure I-4. Effective 1 December 1972 STDAT continued its advisory and assistance role; however, its capabilities were greatly reduced. Owing directly to the impact

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of the NVA offensive in April and the continued reduction of US forces in Vietnam, STDAT directed the majority of its energies and talents to the following:

—Planning and coordinating its own reorganization.

—Fulfilling its responsibility to place STD in a sound operational and logistical posture.

—Developing as rapidly as possible the SMF and CRF into units operationally ready to perform their assigned missions.

—Forming and deploying to Military Region 2 a Special Training Team (STT) designed to upgrade the II Corps ranger and reconnaissance companies' capability to conduct deep penetration, ambush, raid, and reconnaissance operations in enemy rear areas. The STT was organized and supported from STDAT resources.

(S) Meeting the first of these four general tasks complicated efforts to realize the other three. Careful planning, in particular, was required to support the STT right up to the time the Increment XIV drawdown necessitated its deactivation, turnover of equipment, reassignment of personnel, and the turnover of training responsibility to ARVN cadre.

(TS) The most serious advisory problem encountered during 1972 concerned STDAT's endeavors to influence the employment of STD forces following the stabilization of the tactical situation in the aftermath of the NVA invasion in April. This problem had its focus in efforts to reverse the JGS concept for employing STD forces. The invasion caused a shift in emphasis in the prevailing JGS concept from strategic to tactical intelligence collection, as previously mentioned. In April, I, II, and III Corps, and the Capital Military District were given operational control of the STD forces and began to employ them in their respective areas of responsibility. In May the detachment of the 219th Helicopter Squadron made STD completely dependent on the corps air assets for operations, which

firmly lodged STD in a tactical, as opposed to a strategic, intelligence collection role. Although STD played an important part in the overall RVNAF effort to counter the NVA offensive, the tactical situation had stabilized enough by October to justify STDAT efforts to influence, by direct liaison with STD and through the MACV command chain, a redirection of STD's operational emphasis from a tactical to a strategic role. Even though no formal change in STD's commitment to support the corps was announced or directed, a de facto change resulted from STDAT's liaison and advisory activities. The corps commanders seemed to have become aware of the dangerous inertia which had developed concerning strategic reconnaissance. In mid-November they began to make the corps air assets available and encouraged operations in the Laos and Khmer Republic base areas. By early 1973 ten cross-border operations had been conducted following this renewal of strategic interest.

(TS) Another major advisory undertaking concerning the planning, training, and coordinating of STD supported special, national, and psychological warfare operations developed in connection with CINCPAC CONPLAN 1608 (CINCPAC message 060:33Z June 72), the sensitivity of which exceeds the security classification of this document. The professional manner in which STD elements responded to the requirements of this plan gave direct evidence of the viable counterpart relationships existing between STD and STDAT.

(TS) In response to the President's order to halt all US military activities against North Vietnam in anticipation of the cease-fire, JCS canceled all STDAT authorities for special operations against North Vietnam on 15 January 1973. With the signing of the cease-fire on 28 January, STDAT prepared to stand down and transferred House 50 (logistics support facility located at #50 Plantation Road in Saigon) supplies to STD. On 12 March 1973, STDAT was deactivated.

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY DIVISION

(S) From 1 May 1972 until deactivation on 1 December 1972, the Intelligence Advisory Division (IAD) consisted of three branches: Current Indications Branch, Photo Interpretation Branch, and Intelligence Data Handling System Branch.

(S) The Current Indications Advisor, the principal IAD combat intelligence officer, was responsible for maintaining the current Southeast Asia intelligence situation. In addition, he assisted STD with interpreting information and developing targets, and provided advice on intelligence requirements, collection methodology, and intelligence processing. The

Photo Interpretation Branch assisted STD with photographic intelligence and photographic laboratory techniques. The Intelligence Data Handling System Advisor supervised an integrated US/RVNAF section which developed and maintained computerized intelligence data base files for STD operations.

(S) The intelligence collection activities of STD and STDAT were drastically altered by the enemy's April 1972 invasion of the Republic of Vietnam. Virtually every available resource was committed against this threat. As a result, STD strategic out-

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of-country reconnaissance operations were reoriented toward tactical in-country reconnaissance operations in support of the military regions. This occurred at a time when strategic intelligence was at a premium. Throughout the summer and fall of 1972, STD's field elements were under military region and Capital Military District operational control. This arrangement left the STD G2 with a limited operational planning and support role and required reorientation of the G2 intelligence operations. In addition to maintaining intelligence coverage for the Thot Not and Phu Dung areas of operation, STD quickly developed an in-country intelligence base.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

(TS) On 21 May 1972 JCS and CINCPAC tasked STDAT to develop and initiate a comprehensive program of special operations.⁶ Intelligence support for these operations was provided by the IAD. Having few resources to accomplish the targeting mission, the IAD was compelled to seek outside assistance, particularly in imagery interpretation and current intelligence. This assistance was formally requested from MACDI on 1 June 1972 and marked the beginning of a successful and profitable working relationship with the Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (CICV). With IAD guidance CICV developed nine basic target package folders. IAD further refined these data folders, using its own targeting expertise and other UW intelligence assets. With CICV preparing the basic study, IAD was able to concentrate its energies on tailoring each package for a specific operation. With a view to meeting the short suspense dates initially assigned to the project, the cooperation with CICV permitted the completion of the nine target folders in the same time span the IAD would have taken to complete two or three working alone. Ultimately, CICV developed 21 target folders for STD/STDAT use. With these original folders as a base, IAD prepared 11 additional folders to support two more special operations. All folders were updated by the IAD on a daily, all source basis; CICV provided major photo update every 90 days. Concurrently, additional packages were developed as new target areas became known.

MILITARY REGION 1 OPERATIONS

(S) In May 1972, Special Mission Service (SMS) was placed under the operational control of I Corps. To better accommodate this new status, SMS proposed that a forward headquarters and operations base be established at Hue. Owing to the relative inexperience of SMS intelligence personnel, the STD commander assigned a control element from his own headquarters to support the operation and requested STDAT assistance. On 25 May 1972 a two man team

from the division was sent to Hue with the STD intelligence element. The combined team coordinated with all major units and intelligence agencies in the area and tied the SMS and its advisory detachment into the corps intelligence network. I Corps and the First Regional Assistance Command were informed of SMS's capabilities and limitations, and liaison visits provided these agencies information with which to employ SMS reconnaissance units. When the SMS S2 and his advisor arrived in Hue they were able to begin intelligence operations almost immediately. The liaison visits had provided the groundwork for a coordinated effort by the local intelligence community in support of SMS.

THOT NOT OPERATIONS

(TS) Targeting for operations in the Thot Not area of operations was accomplished by the IAD on a case-by-case basis. In late August STD renewed planning for operations in the Khmer Republic.⁷ In response the IAD developed four target packages for Base Area 354 (north of the Parrot's Beak area of the Khmer Republic). These packages included drop zone photography, recommended exfiltration routes, coverage of the enemy's major lines of communication, and suspected storage site locations. It was envisioned that four teams operating concurrently at widely separated locations would provide immediate intelligence within the base area. Ultimately, STD elected to employ three teams, with one team covering the fourth target area during its exfiltration. The teams were dropped by USAF and VNAF aircraft on the night of 2 September 1972. They reported significant enemy movement and logistics activity throughout the base area, and confirmed the use of major lines of communication and transshipment points by the NVA. After the teams were exfiltrated on 12 September, the area was subjected to intense aerial bombardment by 35 B-52 strikes. Sixteen of the strikes were based upon information reported by the teams. Reports as late as November 1972 indicated that in addition to extremely heavy personnel casualties, two NVA sapper training schools were destroyed by the strikes.

(S) Encouraged by the Base Area 354 success, the IAD developed another concept and target package for the Khmer Republic in late September. The package contained three separated target areas in the vicinity of Stung Treng and Siem Pang. It was envisioned that a team would be employed in each area for a period of 30 to 60 days. Inserted by parachute, the team was to execute its mission and exfiltrate the operational area on foot to an extraction site in Laos. On 4 October 1972 the plan was approved and forwarded to the

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US Embassy in Vientiane for the Ambassador's approval. The concept was approved on 31 December 1972, but an initial lack of air assets and then the cease-fire forced the cancellation of the operation.

(TS) A third Khmer operation was planned by the IAD in response to a MACDI request. This mission involved a reported NVA communications cable near Kratie that allegedly linked COSVN directly to Hanoi. In conjunction with CICV a comprehensive target package was developed. Planning was delayed temporarily, however, while attempts were made to pinpoint the cable location. In the interim the planned target area was struck by B-52 raids targeted against COSVN. As a result of these strikes the original mission was changed to bomb damage assessment. The mission was postponed in December 1972, pending allocation of necessary airlift support, and then canceled altogether when the cease-fire was signed.

JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY CENTER (JPRC) SUPPORT

(S) Although the Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) received its intelligence support from MACDI, IAD was responsible for developing operational intelligence for use by the STDAT's Special Mission Force in support of JPRC missions. The Special Mission Force was responsible for all in-country prisoner of war rescue missions, pilot

search and rescue missions, and crash site inspections. During the period covered by this history only one prisoner of war rescue mission was planned by the IAD and CICV. The mission was deferred, however, because subsequent reports indicated that the prisoners had been moved to an unknown location.

INTELLIGENCE DATA HANDLING SYSTEM (IDHS)

(S) The initial Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS) program used by STDAT was developed to provide an intelligence base for operations. Target printouts from this program were incorporated into all target packages. The initial program, however, was designed to provide printouts in English. Consequently, its utility for most STD personnel was limited. In June 1972 an English and Vietnamese printout capability was developed. The STDAT IDHS advisor, working with MACV IDHS specialists and factory consultants, developed a program which eliminated the problem of encoding the Vietnamese diacritical marks. By the substitution of Standard Telegraphic Code terminology for the diacritical marks, the program was modified so that it could handle Vietnamese input. All subsequent coding was accomplished by STD personnel attached to the IAD. Printouts were requested on a mission basis, and monthly printouts in both English and Vietnamese were prepared. With this capability, STD became virtually self-sufficient in its intelligence functions.

LOGISTICS DIVISION AND COMPTROLLER DIVISION

LOGISTICS DIVISION

(S) The organization of the Logistics Division during the cited period is shown in Figures I-5 and I-6. The Logistics Division consisted of the Supply Branch and the Support Branch. In November 1972 the two branches were consolidated into one activity. The entire period was characterized by a steady reduction of support personnel and support capabilities. Throughout December 1972 and until deactivation in March, the Logistics Division and its agencies continued limited support of STD, prepared and stocked crash site inspection equipment for JPRC post cease-fire operations, supported Special Mission Force crash site operations, and prepared and implemented deactivation plans which culminated in the transfer of House 50 to STD on 6 March 1973. The Logistics Division was deactivated on 12 March 1973.

Supply Branch

(S) The Supply Branch supported all STDAT accounts, including storage, receipt, issue, research, and requisitioning. Additionally, the Supply Branch,

located at House 50, was responsible for repair and maintenance of electronic equipment, weapons, and all major end items, and provided civilian personnel office services for Saigon area Vietnamese employees. During 1 May through 15 October 1972 nearly \$800,000 worth of materiel was shipped to supply accounts.⁹ Over 202 tons of supplies were shipped to supply accounts during May through October 1972, and 613 tons of supplies were turned in to supply sources.⁹ The Supply Branch received 338.2 tons of supplies during the period 1 May through 15 October 1972.¹⁰ Approximately 83 tons were received during the remainder of the reporting period.

Support Branch

(U) During the period 1 May 1972 thru 30 June 1972, the Support Branch was primarily concerned with headquarters and House 10 (located at number 10 Nguyen Minh Chieu in Saigon) support activities. On 1 July 1972 the Support Branch was relieved of the Liaison Service Advisory Detachment support mission. At that time, the Liaison Service Advisor,


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LOGISTICS DIVISION ORGANIZATION

(1 MAY-15 NOVEMBER 1972)



Source: STDAT-158

Figure: 1-5

Detachment initiated its own formal supply account, and all property in its possession was laterally transferred to its own account.

(U) In late August 1972 the Support Branch received notification that all of its functions would be transferred to and consolidated with the Supply Branch on 1 September 1972. Relocation plans were completed; warehouse and generator and refrigeration shop construction plans were drawn up. By 10 September 1972, the construction was completed, and the generator/refrigeration shop was relocated from House 10 to House 50.

(U) By the first week in October 1972 all elements of the Support Branch had been transferred to the Supply Branch at House 50, with the exception of the transient billets, the club, and the orderly room.

COMPTROLLER DIVISION

(C) The comptroller, as the principal economic and financial advisor to the Commander and Senior Advisor of STDAT, was directly responsible for financial management of all STDAT funds. In addition to accounting, auditing, and disbursing responsibilities, the Comptroller Division formulated and implemented policy, regulations, and internal bud-

etary management controls.

(TS) While encouraging STD to assume more of the financial responsibility for the execution of its mission, STDAT continued to finance three high priority programs: Short Term Reconnaissance and Target Acquisition (STRATA).

STDAT also funded STD in-country per diem expenses. Beginning in June 1972 STDAT funded special incentive pay for the Sea Commando teams in support of special operations. This program was discontinued on 12 December 1972. On 30 September 1972 the per diem allowance for STD and special incentive pays for STRATA were terminated in consonance with the phasedown of STDAT operations. In November 1972 a representative from the Chief of Naval Operations visited STDAT to discuss future plans. Subjects discussed included STDAT deactivation and budgetary management matters related to the deactivation of STDAT-158. During January 1973, the Comptroller Division prepared plans to close out STDAT funds and after the cease-fire on 29 January implemented the formal auditing and closeout procedures. The division was deactivated on 12 March 1972.

(C) Five open messes were closed between May

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
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LOGISTICS DIVISION ORGANIZATION (16 NOVEMBER - 16 MARCH 1973)



Source: STDAT-158

Figure: I-6

and November 1972. Several discrepancies revealed by a May closing pointed out the need for close supervision of the remaining open messes. The Camp Long Thanh Open Mess Fund was dissolved and consolidated into a nonappropriated fund mess association, and a nonappropriated fund mess as-

sociation was established for the Special Mission Force at Pleiku.

(TS) The STDAT budget for FY 72 was \$12,664,000. Total obligations for FY 72 were \$12,444,532.95.¹¹ Figure I-7 shows the FY 72 budget in comparison to previous fiscal years.

MACSOG/STDAT BUDGETS FOR FY 68 - FY 72 (Millions of US\$)

YEAR	ORIGINAL APT*	ADJUSTMENTS	FINAL APT*	TOTAL OBLIGATIONS
1972.....	20.6	8.0	12.6	12.4
1971.....	22.0	1.0	21.0	21.0
1970.....	25.8	7.6	18.6	17.4
1969.....	26.0	4.8	21.7	19.3
1968.....	25.6	8.6	22.0	17.6

*Annual Funding Table

Source: STDAT-158

Figure: I-7

ADVISORY DETACHMENTS AND ELEMENTS

LIAISON SERVICE ADVISORY DETACHMENT

(TS) The Liaison Service Advisory Detachment (LSAD) and its subordinate task force advisory elements (TFAE) assumed the mission of advising and supporting the Strategic Technical Directorate Liaison Service (LS) and its subordinate task forces on 1 May 1972. With the deactivation of the MACSOG Ground Studies Group, LSAD was tasked with supporting LS operations in the Thot Not area of operations. Close coordination with LS continued with the objective of total Vietnamization of the

various intelligence collection programs as rapidly as possible. On 1 August 1972 the LSAD and the TFAEs were reduced in strength. In mid-October the TFAEs were deactivated. LSAD was deactivated on 3 November 1972.

(TS) LSAD was collocated with the LS at Camp Nguyen Coa Vi, Saigon. LSAD exercised command over the three TFAEs and, during the period 1 May to 1 August 1972, LSAD exercised operational control over

and the Golf 5 Security Company.

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From the operational control of LSAD and assigned to SMS Advisory Detachment to improve command and control and to parallel the LS and SMS organizations.

(S) In mid-May, when enemy pressure forced the evacuation of Kontum, the Golf 5 Security Company moved to Ban Me Thuot. The company was relieved of its Golf 5 radio relay site security mission and moved to the Team 36 compound in Pleiku on 18 July where it was redesignated the Special Mission Force (SMF). Under appropriate JCS and CINCPAC authorities, the SMF was tasked with in-country crash site inspections and personnel recovery. SMF immediately began intensified mission training on its arrival at Pleiku. On 1 August 1972 SMF was removed from LSAD operational control and designated a separate command within STDAT.

(TS) The main advisory effort was directed at the task force level with emphasis on upgrading communications, medical, operations, intelligence, and supply functions. A concerted effort was made to improve the task forces' capabilities in these fields to enhance their self-sufficiency as a hedge against the possible complete disbanding of LSAD and the TFAEs. Liaison Service operations during this period were severely restricted by the withdrawal of dedicated air assets, the continuing enemy offensive, and reductions in task force strengths. The majority of the missions assigned were in support of the Capital Military District (TF1) and II Corps (TF2 and TF3). Only two cross-border operations were executed by LS elements during the period 1 May to 3 November 1972. Plans to intensify operations in the Khmer Republic were studied in anticipation that these operations could begin late in 1972.

(TS) The loss of the VNAF 219th Helicopter Squadron, which supported TF2 and TF3 in the Thot Not area of operations, greatly restricted operations of both elements. Air assets in support of missions had to be obtained on a day-to-day basis from II Corps. This situation proved to be quite unsatisfactory, since the allocated air assets were subject to withdrawal by II Corps at any time. Even when air assets were available, command relationships were ill-defined and resulted in numerous misunderstandings. Air support for TF1 operations in support of the Capital Military District was more consistent. An air package of VNAF assets supporting TF1 missions usually consisted of two gunships and one troop lift helicopter and was normally dedicated for the entire mission. VNAF C-47s were also used to support several parachute insertions.

Thot Not Area of Operations

(TS) In mid-August TFL was tasked by II Corps

to insert reconnaissance teams into the 701 and 702 Base Areas in the Khmer Republic to locate the 320th NVA Division. The Liaison Service directed TF3 to attach two reconnaissance teams and a light command post to TF2 for the operation. Poor weather in the area of operation and the lack of dedicated air assets delayed the operation until late August. One team, launched from the Plei Djereng Border Ranger Camp, was inserted into the 702 Base Area on 25 August.¹² No enemy activity was reported by the team. The series of operations was canceled when the Plei Djereng forward launch site was overrun by elements of the 320th NVA Division on 4 September. Subsequently, the attached reconnaissance teams from TF3 returned to Ban Me Thuot.

(TS) On 2 September 1972, TF1 conducted an airborne insertion of one reconnaissance team into the 354 Base Area (Parrot's Beak area of the Khmer Republic).¹³ The team reported heavy enemy combat service support activity throughout the area of operations.

EM-2 Crash

(S) The 5 June air crash of EM-2 (C-46 contract flight) near Pleiku took the lives of the LSAD senior advisor, assistant operations advisor, and two intelligence and communications men. Other casualties included:

the intelligence/operations officer of the Golf 5 Security Company, and two communications personnel from Advisory Element Two. A special task force was created from LSAD assets to coordinate and conduct the crash site investigation. This task force, consisting of sixteen US personnel from LSAD Headquarters and subordinate elements and 55 Special Commando Unit personnel from the Golf 5 Security Company, was organized into a ground team and a mobile command post. During the conduct of the investigation from 9 to 16 June, extremely poor weather hampered the operation; however, all bodies were recovered. While the crash site investigation was still in progress, LSAD was requested to provide recovery operations assistance in the crash of a Cathay Pacific Airlines jetliner in Military Region 2. A recovery team, composed of three US and 25 Special Commando Unit personnel, was inserted at the crash site on 16 June. The team recovered 65 bodies from the wreckage. On 18 June the team was extracted because of increasing enemy activity in the area.

SPECIAL MISSION SERVICE ADVISORY DETACHMENT

(TS) The mission of the Special Mission Service Advisory Detachment (SMSAD) was to train and advise the Vietnamese Special Mission Service

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(SMS) in the conduct of unconventional warfare and strategic reconnaissance, to assist in developing within SMS the capability to maintain this program, and to assure a continuing input of trained personnel.

(S) As of 1 May 1972 SMS was organized as shown in Figure 1-8. Initially, only three of the SMS's five authorized operational groups were assigned.


ters, minus a small rear detachment which remained with Group 72 in Da Nang, moved with Group 71 to a forward base in Hue. Group 75 (Kontum) engaged in mission training, camp defense, and local security operations. Group 72 (Da Nang), in addition to being responsible for two outposts on top of Marble Mountain, conducted mission training, local security operations, and camp defense. Group 71 (Hue) conducted an area reconnaissance mission under SMS for I Corps; already at Hue along with four action reconnaissance teams, also conducted area reconnaissance missions under SMS I Corps. SMS headquarters remained at Hue where it coordinated and controlled operational missions. SMSAD supported SMS operation from Da Nang.

The SMSAD organization is depicted in Figure 1-9. On 25 October 1972 all of SMS's advisory elements were deactivated. The SMSAD was deactivated on 15 November 1972.

(S) On 19 May 1972 SMS was tasked to support I Corps operations. On 22 May the SMS headquar-

(S) On 11 July Group 75 (Kontum) assumed the responsibility for securing the GOLF 5 radio relay site. On 19 July Group 71, composed of three action teams, most of the headquarters, and Advisory Element 71, moved to Chu Lai to conduct area reconnaissance missions to the west of the 2d ARVN

STD SPECIAL MISSION SERVICE



Source: STDAT-158

Figure: 1-8

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
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SPECIAL MISSION SERVICE ADVISORY DETACHMENT

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Source: STDAT-158

Figure: 1-9

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Division. The remainder of Group 71 and elements of the Support and Service Company continued to secure Camp Hung Vuong and to support the two Marble Mountain outposts at Da Nang.

(S) On 2 August 1972 SMS was tasked to establish a series of observation posts and execute interdiction missions in support of I Corps. SMS immediately initiated an intensive refresher training program for [redacted] and Group 72. This instruction emphasized artillery adjustment procedures and communications techniques. The first mission was initiated by SMS elements in August. Subsequent operations, however, pointed up the limitations of reconnaissance units engaged in prolonged combat operations. Because of these limitations and because of inadequate air and artillery support, SMS requested that I Corps change the assigned observation post and interdiction mission to one of area reconnaissance. This request was approved, and on 2 September SMS began to conduct area reconnaissance missions in support of I Corps and the 1st ARVN Division.

(S) On 9 September, when Group 75 (Kontum) was relieved of its tactical area of responsibility south of Kontum City, Group 75 and Advisory Element 75 began intensified mission training. In mid-September the SMSAD senior advisor and three non-commissioned officers were sent to Pleiku to conduct a special training mission. A special training team was activated with selected STDAT and STD personnel, which established and conducted a reconnaissance training program for selected II Corps reconnaissance and ranger companies. STDAT's participation in the program ended after the graduation of the second training cycle on 15 November. In response to severe flooding caused by Typhoon Flossie on 16 September, Group 75 provided shelter and food for several groups of refugees. During the period 16 to 27 September, Group 75 provided forty men per day in support of flood relief operations and civic action programs throughout the Kontum City area.¹⁴

On 9 October SMSAD received formal notification of its phasedown and termination, while SMS assumed responsibility for the 81st Airborne Battalion tactical area of responsibility. By 25 October all SMSAD field advisory elements were deactivated.

TRAINING CENTER ADVISORY DETACHMENT

(U) Throughout the period 1 May to 10 November, the Training Center Advisory Detachment (TCAD) advised and assisted the Airborne Operations Training Center in conducting training

courses. Additionally, TCAD was charged with conducting limited field evaluation of concepts, equipment, and techniques. TCAD was deactivated on 10 November 1972.

(S) The training center was located east of Saigon at Camp Yen The. During 1972, the training center conducted courses in basic combat, basic and advanced airborne techniques, reconnaissance team operations, communications, and demolitions training for STD.

(S) The training center conducted a total of seven courses and graduated 179 Vietnamese and other personnel. Cadre training became more intensive in anticipation of complete Vietnamization of the program. Cadre members were given refresher training in basic combat skills, demolitions, and methods of instruction. The courses are described below:

—Reconnaissance Team Course: The purpose of this four week course was to prepare selected Vietnamese personnel as reconnaissance team leaders. The course included physical training, communications, land navigation, patrol tactics, intelligence techniques, forward observer techniques, first aid, demolitions, weapons, and air operations.

Basic Airborne Course: The purpose of this three week course was to train Vietnamese personnel in basic airborne techniques. The course covered physical training, use and wearing of parachutes and airborne equipment, parachute landing falls, aircraft procedures, suspended harness, the 34 foot tower, and recovery from drag. It concluded with three nonequipment jumps and two equipment jumps.

—Communications Course: The purpose of this eighteen week course was to train Vietnamese personnel to be radio communicators. The course covered such subject areas as voice procedures, equipment, SOIs, brevity codes, receiving and sending Morse code, CW (continuous wave) procedures, cryptographic techniques, and reduced distance nets.

—Basic Combat Training Course: The purpose of this two week course was to instruct Vietnamese personnel in basic military training. The course covered such subject areas as weapons, mines and demolitions, tactics, military discipline, drill and ceremonies, intelligence, communications, first aid, psychological operations, and map reading.

(S) Mobile Training Team: The training center dispatched one mobile training team (MTT) and participated in another. The first MTT operated from 10 to 15 July 1972, during which time XM-202 flame rocket instruction was presented to STD personnel at Camp Yen The, Ban Me Thuot, Kontum, and Da Nang. The second MTT was conducted by the Special Training Team (STT), consisting of

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selected STDAT personnel and training center cadre. The training was conducted at Pleiku from 11 September to 16 November 1972.

COASTAL RECOVERY FORCE AND SECURITY SERVICE

(S) During the period 1 May to 31 October 1972 STDAT advised and assisted the STD Coastal Security Service (CSS) and provided the cadre for the Coastal Recovery Force (CRF). The Coastal Security Service, a Vietnamese Navy unit under the operational control of STD, consisted of 15 to 18 man commando teams, swift craft and fast patrol boat crews, and maintenance and headquarters personnel. The Coastal Security Service was located in Da Nang. After the fast patrol boats were returned to the US Navy in April 1972, the commando teams and two fast patrol boats on loan to STD from the Vietnamese Navy were the only active Coastal Security Service elements. The US Naval Advisory Element consisted of four USN Sea Air Land (SEAL) team members at Da Nang and one naval operations/liaison advisor at STDAT headquarters. Because of manpower ceiling reduction, Coastal Recovery Force operations and STDAT Coastal Security Service support ceased, and its advisory element was deactivated on 31 October 1972.

Coastal Recovery Force Support

(S) The Coastal Recovery Force (CRF) was formed on 22 April 1972 to provide ground and maritime support to search and rescue forces in support of tactical air operations against North Vietnam. Impetus for the creation of the force had been provided by the successful recovery of two downed US aviators from the Dong Ha River by a US SEAL and a small force of sea commandos in early April 1972. Initially, the CRF had two operational teams. Each was led by two US SEALs on temporary duty from the MACV Naval Advisory Group. Both teams had ten Vietnamese sea commandos. The CRF responded to assistance requests initiated by the

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37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron in Da Nang. Trained to assist downed aviators to evade capture and reach friendly lines, the teams normally deployed by SAR helicopter or by fast patrol boat.

(S) During April and May 1972 the SEALs conducted an intensive refresher course for all personnel in aquatic skills, small unit patrol tactics, and SAR procedures. The ten best trainees were then formed into two recovery units and given additional special training. This training period was followed by a field exercise under combat conditions. Throughout this period the CRF was on alert status for search and rescue assists.

(S) In June 1972 CRF authorizations were extended for an additional 45 days and STDAT was tasked to develop plans to establish a permanent force to perform crash site inspections and conduct personnel recovery missions in addition to its search and rescue mission. To support the mission a new group of sea commandos was trained during June 1972. On 30 June the force participated in an underwater crash site inspection for an OV-10 lost off the coast near Hue. COMUSMACV approved a permanent joint table of distribution (JTD) for the CRF on 25 July. Four permanent SEAL cadre were assigned on 1 August. The cadre also assisted the Coastal Security Service on all seaborne operational matters. Under its guidance, training and local operations continued throughout August.

(S) From August through October, the CRF continued to conduct local operations and was prepared for search and rescue missions. In September CRF launched an intelligence collection effort targeted against suspected collaborator activity in Quang Ngai Province. No operations were mounted against these suspected collaborators because of the enemy situation and an inability to collect timely intelligence on their movements. On 31 October 1972 the CRF was deactivated.

Coastal Security Service (CSS) Operations

(TS) In May 1972 CINCPAC recommended that RVNAF develop a capability to conduct seaborne clandestine operations against North Vietnam. Missions suggested included cross-beach demolition raids against coastal defense sites, and harbors and shipping sabotage. CINCPAC planners envisioned these missions would be supported by helicopters, small craft, or the amphibious transport submarine, the USS GRAYBACK. Accordingly, 31 Vietnamese sea commandos received nine weeks of intensive training at Subic Bay, Republic of the Philippines, from 10 June to 13 August. The course included diving, advanced demolitions, and SEAL tactics and operations. The final week was devoted to mission rehearsals. Training was conducted by the Underwater Demolition Team, WESTPAC Detachment. All 31 trainees completed the course. The Naval Inshore Warfare Command, WESTPAC Detachment, with the advice and assistance of STD and STDAT, prepared plans for sea commando employment against selected targets. The sea commandos returned to Da Nang on 14 August and STD assumed primary planning responsibility for seaborne clandestine operations. While preparing additional plans and awaiting mission approval, the Coastal Security Service conducted local security operations in the Da Nang area. On 2 September 1972 the Subic-trained sea commandos were detached from the Coastal Security Service to support RVNAF operations in Military Region 1. During September and October a series of night cross-beach reconnaissance operations were conducted behind enemy lines along the coast between Quang Tri and the Demilitarized Zone.¹⁹ These operations collected intelligence on enemy dispositions and located targets for naval gunfire. US support of the Coastal Security Service ceased with the deactivation of the Coastal Recovery Force on 31 October 1972.

SPECIAL MISSION FORCE

(C) On 19 July 1972 the Golf 5 Security Company moved from Ba Me Thuot to the Advisory Team 36 compound north of Pleiku City. Upon relocation of its 150 indigenous troops and 14 US personnel, it was officially redesignated the Special Mission Force (SMF).

(S) Comprised of indigenous mercenaries led by a 21 man US contingent, the Special Mission Force was tasked to conduct recovery operations, crash site inspections, and search and rescue assistance in South Vietnam and on a case-by-case basis in other Southeast Asia countries and to conduct limited intelligence collection missions in South Vietnam in support of prisoner recovery operations.

(C) Special Mission Force indigenous soldiers were primarily ethnic Montagnards from three main tribes: Rhade, Sedang, and Jarai. In addition to the Montagnard tribesmen, there were a few Nungs and some Vietnamese. Most of the indigenous members of SMF had fought with US-commanded Special Forces elements for five or six years. Prior to their assignment to SMF most of the soldiers were members of highly trained reconnaissance teams with Command and Control Central. These special mission teams operated as subordinate elements advised by the Liaison Service Advisory Detachment. Using six or seven men each, the reconnaissance teams trained for and executed small

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
unit operations. They also participated in various specialized training programs which included basic airborne training, high altitude low opening (HALO) airborne training, long range patrolling, night movement, helicopter rappelling, airmobile operations, and the use of the STABO personnel harness for inserting and extracting individuals from inaccessible areas by helicopters.

(C) SMF's US contingent was not an advisory element, but actually commanded and led the indigenous soldiers.¹⁷ SMF was organized into three platoons under a force headquarters element and an administrative section (Fig. I-10). Each US platoon leader had a counterpart indigenous platoon leader. All command decisions, however, both in the rear area and in the field, were the responsibility of the US platoon leader. A US major commanded SMF, supported by a Montagnard counterpart, a highly respected former tribal chieftain. SMF did not experience the attrition among indigenous troops one would expect to find in a similar US

unit. Personnel retainability was unique in that there was no specific termination of service for the indigenous soldier. A Montagnard's assignment with SMF normally terminated only if he absented himself without leave or if he elected to terminate his service.

(C) The initial emphasis, following the reorganization of the Golf 5 Security Company was to train SMF personnel to perform the missions they had been tasked to execute on a contingency basis. One of these missions was to perform crash site inspections. Prior to the SMF activation the Golf 5 Security Company had been tasked with crash site inspection and remains recovery missions on two separate occasions, following the crashes of a China Air Lines flight carrying 32 personnel and a Cathay Pacific flight carrying 82 personnel. There were no survivors in either crash. Many of the techniques and procedures of SMF's crash site SOPs were derived from the methods used by Golf 5 during these missions. Most of the personnel assigned to

SPECIAL MISSION FORCE



Total: US personnel 18
VN personnel 129

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the Golf 5 Security Company subsequently formed the nucleus of SMF.

(C) In order to insure that the level of combat training and special operations techniques were consistent throughout the force, SMF began an intensive, two week training program as soon as the Pleiku compound was occupied and the personnel organized under the new Joint Table of Distribution. This was followed by a second two week block of field training and, on 23 August 1972, actual operations. This rapid transition from formation to combat operations did not impair SMF's

responsiveness to a variety of missions. Reconnaissance missions were conducted in Military Region 1 and 2 with single squads, platoons, and the entire force. Two additional crash site inspections further clarified techniques which would prove useful to post cease-fire crash site search operations.¹⁸ The quality of the Special Mission Force showed best in combat, where the indigenous soldier proved his excellence as a jungle fighter.¹⁹

(U) The Special Mission Force was deactivated and disbanded on 5 March 1973; indigenous troops returned to their villages.

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STRATEGIC TECHNICAL DIRECTORATE ASSISTANCE TEAM-158

ANNEX-I -

1. Rpt (TS), STDAT-168, 7 Feb 73, Subj: Command History 1 May 1972-March 1973 (U), p 1, GDS-Exempt.
2. Ibid., p 2.
3. Ibid., p 4.
4. Ibid., p 5.
5. Ibid., p 8.
6. Ibid., p 27.
7. Ibid., p 29.
8. Ibid., p 43.
9. Ibid., p 44.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid., p 60.
12. Ibid., p 66.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p 78.
15. Ibid., p 90.
16. Ibid., p 95.
17. Ibid., p 98.
18. Ibid., pp 105, 119.
19. Ibid., p 112.

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ANNEX J

AN LOC

(C) The NGUYEN HUE Offensive of 1972 began on 30 March with the invasion of northern Military Region 1, Republic of Vietnam. Within a week, the component of the offensive in Military Region 3, which included Saigon, began to unfold. The enemy campaign caught the friendly forces in the area by surprise. Intelligence reports during March indicated that there was little likelihood of an enemy offensive on the scale of that in Military Region 1. While there was the possibility of increased activity near Tay Ninh City, the reports placed great reliance in the ability of allied cross-border operations in Cambodia to keep the enemy divisions busy defending their lines of communication. Critically, there was a lack of mention about the presence of enemy armored forces in the area of Military Region 3. There was no indication that an attack might be mounted on the towns along Route 13, the main route of approach to Saigon from the north. The overall evaluation of the situation was that enemy forces in the Republic retained the ability to conduct battalion size attacks and guerilla, terrorist, propaganda, and sapper activities. Although multibattalion attacks were considered to be possible in the B-3 Front (Kontum, Pleiku, and Darlac Provinces), they were not expected in Military Region 3. This misreading of enemy capabilities as well as intentions seriously affected the level of readiness of friendly forces in the Region (Fig. J-1).

(C) Not until the offensive had been blunted in Military Region 3 were intelligence agencies able to determine what had happened. During the allied operations in Cambodia around the Chup-Dambe areas in November and December 1971, the 5th VC Division had been located between Krek and Snoul. The mission of this enemy force was to prevent the 5th ARVN Division from moving into this area and to resist other ARVN elements attempting to sweep east of the Dambe area. In late December the 5th VC Division had established its base area near Snoul, Cambodia, which is the first significant Cambodian town along Route 13 as it crosses the border. From January through March 1972 this division was refitted and retrained.

(C) In February and March 1972 the 7th NVA Division and the 9th VC Division were refitting and retraining in the Cambodian areas of Dambe and Chup respectively. In late March, documents captured in Tay Ninh Province revealed that ele-

ments of the 9th VC Division were planning to move to Base Area 708 in the vicinity of the Fishhook on or about 24 March. Part of the division was to assemble in a staging area in the southwest portion of the base area. To the east of that location in western Binh Long Province elements of the 272d VC Regiment would assemble where part of the 95C NVA Regiment had already moved. Another unidentified unit was in position north of Camp Tonle Cham and Route 246. The captured documents also indicated that coordination between the 7th NVA Division and the 9th VC Division was possible and that all elements of the 9th VC Division had been trained in urban warfare. The three battalions of the 272d VC Regiment were listed as having received additional training against selected targets.¹


(C) The objectives of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong NGUYEN HUE Offensive were to destroy ARVN forces through military victories, to disrupt the Vietnamization and pacification programs, thus "liberating" the countryside, and finally, to take over the government of South Vietnam. To accomplish these objectives in Military Region 3 the enemy developed a complicated tactical plan. The 24th and 271st Independent NVA Regiments were ordered to conduct diversionary attacks against elements of the 25th ARVN Division in northern Tay Ninh Province. This diversion masked the movement of the 7th NVA and 9th VC Divisions through Base Area 708 and into Binh Long Province (Fig. J-2). The 9th VC Division, considered to be the elite division of the enemy force, was assigned the mission to attack and capture An Loc, preferably within five days but not more than ten. A command headquarters for South Vietnam was to be established at the new Communist capital at An Loc on 20 April 1972.

(C) While the 9th VC Division was moving to accomplish this mission, the 7th NVA Division was given the responsibility to block Route 13 between An Loc and Lai Khe to the south and to stop all traffic from reaching or leaving An Loc by road. The 5th VC Division was assigned the mission to move into northern Binh Long Province and attack and capture Loc Ninh. When Loc Ninh had fallen, the 5th VC Division was to coordinate an attack with the 24th and 271st Independent NVA Regiments to isolate the 25th ARVN Division by 1 May. Subsequently, these forces were charged with isolat-


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MILITARY REGION 3



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ing the remainder of Tay Ninh Province. The general concept for this maneuver was for the 5th VC Division to redeploy from the Loc Ninh area and attack Tri Tam. Simultaneously, the two independent NVA regiments would attack into Hau Nghia and Tay Ninh Provinces from the Parrot's Beak to cut Route 1.

(C) After the common government had been established by mid-May, the 7th NVA Division, 9th VC Division, 69th Artillery Command, 202d Tank Regiment, and the 203d Tank Regiment were to attack down Route 13 and the Saigon River Corridor and capture Saigon. Finally, the Thu Bien Subsector and 429th Sapper Group were to attack Bien Hoa. These enemy plans were completely disrupted by the costly attack at Loc Ninh and the failure to capture An Loc, but in the meantime, the enemy set the initial phases of his plan in motion.²

(C) The first significant enemy contact in Military Region 3 occurred early on the morning of 2 April. The enemy attacked the ARVN Fire Support Base Lac Long along Route 20, 35 kilometers northwest of Tay Ninh City, in the Dog's Head area of the Cambodian-Vietnamese border. Formerly called Fire Support Base Pace, the base was overrun within several hours by a regimental size enemy assault. Contributing to the surprise of the defenders was the employment of tanks in support of the enemy attack. Previous intelligence reports had given no warning that the enemy had a tank capability in the area. The fire support base, defended by the 1st Battalion, 49th ARVN Regiment, suffered ten killed, 44 wounded, and 22 missing, in addition to significant losses in weapons and equipment. Although the enemy force was not identified in the confusion of the battle, it was probably either the 24th or the 271st NVA Independent Regiment.³

(U) After the capture of Lac Long the enemy forces continued their move and forced the evacuation of the ARVN fire support base at Thien Ngon on Route 22, leading into Tay Ninh City from the northeast. The enemy ambushed the withdrawing ARVN elements but did not follow these successes with a thrust against the province capital. The loss of Thien Ngon was more critical than the loss of Lac Long because it guarded the approaches to Tay Ninh City. There was a clear path into the capital had the enemy wished to continue his advance. The failure to press this advantage in Tay Ninh Province was an early indication that this move was a feint, although it was not recognized clearly at the time.⁴

(C) Although the ARVN forces in Military Region 3 had been surprised by the enemy attacks at Lac Long and Thien Ngon, and particularly by the

presence of enemy armor, they reacted against what appeared to be a threat against Tay Ninh which was thirty kilometers to the south of the abandoned fire support base. The 25th ARVN Division organized a relief force composed of the 2d Battalion, 49th Regiment, and the 32d, 43d, and 44th Ranger Battalions. In the confusion of the opening days of the campaign, the mission of this force was not clear. MG James F. Hollingsworth, Commanding General, Third Regional Assistance Command (TRAC), advised GEN Creighton Abrams, COMUSMACV, that he did not know whether this force was to link up with the remnants of the ARVN troops that had been driven from Lac Long or to reoccupy the fire base.⁵

(C) In any case, the actions of the 25th ARVN Division relief force were irrelevant to the enemy offensive in Military Region 3. The attack against the fire base was a diversionary attack, intended to draw allied attention from the area of Route 13. There appears to have been little purpose in that operation on the part of the enemy unless that was his goal. There was no serious attempt on the part of the enemy to continue toward Tay Ninh City, nor was there any effort to maintain continuous occupation of the captured fire support base.

(C) For several days after this initial move against friendly forces in Military Region 3, there was a general lull in the level of enemy activity. However, there were indications of increased enemy activity in the 5th ARVN Division area of operations, particularly around Loc Ninh and An Loc, the northernmost towns on Route 13. The 5th Division advisors received reports of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese operating in squad, platoon, and company formations during the period 1 to 3 April. TRAC Headquarters, however, continued to place its emphasis on the situation in Tay Ninh Province, in which Fire Support Base Lac Long was located. Attempts to recover the fire base met with some resistance, and a captured North Vietnamese soldier revealed that the main force enemy element in the Tay Ninh area was the 7th NVA Division.⁶

(U) The enemy operations around Loc Ninh and An Loc in these first days of April were apparently reconnaissance efforts. In addition, some enemy attempts had been made to turn the workers in the Terres Rouges Plantation area against the South Vietnamese government representatives in Binh Long Province where both towns were located. On 4 April there began a lull in this type of enemy activity throughout Military Region 3. Probably the enemy was moving into his final positions around Loc Ninh, just before the assault on that district town (Fig. J-3).

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
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BINH LONG

DISPOSITIONS
EARLY APRIL 1972

CAMBODIA



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THE ATTACK ON LOC NINH

(U) The attack on Loc Ninh was the prelude to the siege of An Loc. What happened at Loc Ninh is difficult to determine; there were few survivors and most of the American advisory detachment was killed or captured. Although the enemy's 7th NVA Division had been identified coming through Tay Ninh Province, the enemy forces in Binh Long Province remained unidentified for several days after the beginning of the attack on Loc Ninh. Not until the siege of An Loc were friendly forces able to discover the size and unit designation of the hostile force besieging them.

(U) To meet the enemy attack on Loc Ninh, the 5th ARVN Division had the 9th Regiment together with an attached armored cavalry squadron (minus one APC troop) and an attached ranger battalion. At the beginning of the attack, these forces were dispersed. Since there had been no warning that Loc Ninh was an enemy objective, the commander of the 9th Regiment had assigned search missions to the bulk of his force. The attack on the morning of 5 April defeated in detail these forces around Loc Ninh.⁷

(C) The battle of Loc Ninh began in the early morning hours of 5 April. At 0400 hours TRAC Headquarters received a report from the 5th ARVN Division that enemy armor had been heard southwest of Loc Ninh moving east toward Route 13. This was the first warning that the 5th ARVN Division faced a force of significant strength and size. At 0650 hours the enemy began shelling the headquarters of the 9th Regiment and the Loc Ninh Subsector Headquarters compound. Soon thereafter, Loc Ninh was subjected to heavy ground attack from the west. Several times the enemy was in the wire before being forced back. The next day MG Hollingsworth reported to GEN Abrams that he estimated the force to have been the size of a reinforced regiment. There were confirmed reports of 60mm and 82mm mortar fires and 107mm rocket fires. There were also reports that 105mm howitzers were being used by the enemy, but these were unconfirmed. Some confusion existed as to whether tanks had been used in the first day's fighting, but it appears that at least one tank was knocked out by direct fire from the ARVN artillery with the 9th Regiment.⁸

(U) The fighting at Loc Ninh was fierce. American advisors on the ground made extensive use of tactical air strikes. MG Hollingsworth singled out CPT "Zippo" Smith in particular for praise as a result of his effective and brilliant fire direction. In another attempt to break the developing enemy stronghold, the 1st Cavalry task force with two companies of the 2d Battalion, 9th Regiment, attached, was ordered to attack toward the city from its positions north of Loc Ninh. The lead elements of the task force made contact with the encircling enemy just to the north of the beleaguered village. Early in the afternoon, radio contact with the cavalry was lost. It faded from the remainder of the conflict at Loc Ninh, having no influence on the outcome of the battle.⁹

(C) Heavy enemy pressure against Loc Ninh continued through the fifth of April. To the southeast of the town, the enemy had reinforced his attacking elements by noon and launched major ground attacks. During one of the afternoon assaults, enemy elements attempted a westward crossing of the Loc Ninh runway, which was stopped by well-placed air strikes using CBU's. As the fighting raged, another enemy assault which had succeeded in getting into the wire on the east side of the 9th Regiment's command post was cut down by helicopter gunships. By nightfall the situation had stabilized, and MG Hollingsworth felt that most of the attacking enemy regiment had been killed.

(C) Early on the morning of 6 April, however, the enemy brought up his armor. The defenders of Loc Ninh heard the tanks at the southern end of the runway. Shortly thereafter, an enemy infantry assault succeeded in getting into the wire, and tanks joined the attack from the northwest and southeast at about 0630 hours. The battle continued for another two hours, seesawing back and forth. MG Hollingsworth observed tanks in groups of seven and eight being beaten back on five occasions. The enemy forces were too strong for the defenders, however, and at 0745 hours the camp was overrun. "Those on the ground at Loc Ninh fought gallantly against insurmountable odds to include 25 to 30 tanks," Hollingsworth later reported to GEN Abrams. "Dauntless and remarkable courage kept them going."¹⁰


THE SIEGE — PHASE I

(C) During the last day of the battle at Loc Ninh, MG Hollingsworth became increasingly concerned about the state of readiness throughout the remainder of Military Region 3. In a message to

all American elements in the region he warned, "Situation in Binh Long Province has taken a turn for worse." He reported that Loc Ninh had probably fallen and observed that the likelihood was

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that the enemy would continue his momentum south astride Route 13. Noting that there were unconfirmed ARVN reports that the enemy planned to take Tay Ninh Province and make a major move on Saigon, the general wrote, "Considering enemy successes at Loc Ninh we must be prepared." He then gave directions based upon his observations of the enemy attack on Loc Ninh. "All US elements and personnel in Military Region 3 will immediately check and improve defensive positions to insure that they are in best possible condition to withstand heavy attacks-by-fire and possible direct fire from 76mm tank guns." With foresight that proved critical at An Loc, Hollingsworth continued, "Commanders will secure all possible anti-tank weapons, insure that people are assigned to employ them and that those assigned know how to fire them properly." He then placed the entire region on yellow alert status.¹¹

(C) As the battle at Loc Ninh unfolded, LTG Minh, commanding III Corps, realized that the main enemy effort was not to be in Tay Ninh, but rather in Binh Long Province. Loc Ninh was the northernmost town of significance in the province. In addition to its political importance as a district town, Loc Ninh also guarded the northern portion of Route 13, a major approach to Saigon. The next town to the south was An Loc, province capital of Binh Long and a major center of latex rubber production for the Republic of Vietnam. Minh also realized that the enemy wished to seize Binh Long to effect a direct approach to Saigon. Unable to save Loc Ninh, he decided to reinforce An Loc and attempt to stop the enemy advance to the national capital. A successful defense of An Loc would also deprive the enemy of the psychological advantage of capturing a provincial capital close to Saigon.¹²

(C) LTG Minh's decision to hold at An Loc was a wise one. Later intelligence evaluation confirmed that during the first week of April, while the 5th VC Division was surrounding and attacking Loc Ninh, the 9th VC Division was moving into position around An Loc. Minh hurried to Saigon on 7 April and demanded more troops to make up the losses suffered in the initial engagements. He informed the Vietnamese National Security Council that the enemy offensives in Military Regions 1 and 2 were diversionary and that Saigon was the real target. He reported to the council that there was the equivalent of four enemy divisions in the III Corps area. Initially his arguments seemed to go unheeded, and he was dismissed while the other corps commanders remained within the Council. Later in the day, however, he was recalled and told that the 21st ARVN Division from Military Region 4 was

assigned to him, as well as the 1st Airborne Brigade, a part of the general reserve force.

(C) The next day MG Hollingsworth reported that he had urged LTG Minh to move the airborne brigade to An Loc immediately. Minh did not do this in time to meet the first major assault. Instead the airborne battalions were used to drive up Route 13 from Lai Khe through Chon Thanh toward the roadblock. They were followed by the 21st Division. When Minh did not reinforce An Loc with the airborne brigade, Hollingsworth warned GEN Abrams that "An Loc will fall and it will be clear sailing into Lai Khe."¹³

(U) LTG Minh probably did not move the airborne brigade into An Loc at this point because he had inserted the 3d Ranger Group of two battalions the day before. He may also have been worried not only about the threat to An Loc but also the threat to Saigon if An Loc fell and no forces were to the south along Route 13 to block their way. In addition, the roadblock between Lai Khe and An Loc needed to be cleared so that reinforcement and resupply of the town would not remain dependent upon air power.

(U) The enemy also realized the critical position of An Loc as the key to a successful move on Saigon. While the battle at Loc Ninh was in progress, enemy forces conducted attacks on Quan Loi, a large helicopter rearming and refueling point six kilometers to the east of An Loc. The ARVN forces defending the airfield were able to hold out for a time. Between An Loc and Loc Ninh, the two battalion Task Force 52 was also brought under enemy attack. Most critical of all the enemy actions, however, was the establishment on 6 April of a roadblock south of An Loc between the city and Chon Thanh. This cut off surface transportation into An Loc from the south. For many months thereafter the provincial capital was dependent upon aerial resupply.¹⁴

TASK FORCE 52

(C) Task Force 52 was composed of two battalions from the 18th ARVN Division which normally operated in Long Khanh Province in eastern Military Region 3. This organization had been under the operational control of the 5th ARVN Division since 21 March. Formed around the 2d Battalion, 52d Regiment, and the 1st Battalion, 48th Regiment, this force had as attachments the 52d Regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Company, C Battery, 182d Artillery (105mm howitzer), a platoon of 155mm howitzers, and B Company, 18th Engineer Battalion.

(C) On 28 March the task force moved north along Route 13 and began to operate in an area on both sides of Route 17, a little over a kilometer

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west of Route 13 and some 15 kilometers north of An Loc where the 155mm howitzer platoon remained. Upon moving into the area, the task force commander, LTC Thinh, had directed that the organization occupy two abandoned fire support bases astride Route 17 in the center of his area of responsibility. The infantry battalions alternated in securing the bases and conducting operations from them. The reconnaissance company conducted local security operations along Route 17. In performing these missions, the task force was part of the border screen for the 5th ARVN Division. The other main element in this screen was the force at Loc Ninh.

(C) During the first three days of April, the task force had only light contacts. On the morning of the fourth of April, the 2d Battalion, 52d Regiment, began the routine mission of clearing Route 17 from the two fire bases which it secured. As the battalion reached the intersection of Routes 17 and 13, it became engaged in a fierce contact. Some of the advisors began to suspect that the task force might be cut off from the remainder of the 5th ARVN Division forces at An Loc.

(C) Activity increased on the following day, 5 April, while the battle of Loc Ninh was unfolding to the north. There were several disturbing indications of growing enemy presence. Whenever an ARVN force attempted to move outside the fire support bases, they came under indirect fire from 82mm mortars and 122mm rockets. As the day passed, these began to fall upon the bases themselves. To the west the 1st Battalion, 48th Regiment, had ambushed an enemy force, killing fifteen and capturing five pounds of documents. Later that day, the task force received an intelligence report that an enemy regiment was within seven kilometers of the twin fire bases. In response to this warning, the task force commander moved the 1st Battalion, 48th Regiment, four kilometers closer to the bases. This put them within range of the task force 81mm mortars in addition to the fires of the composite artillery element.

(C) The next day, 6 April, 5th ARVN Division headquarters directed Task Force 52 to reinforce Loc Ninh with one battalion. The 2d Battalion, 52d Regiment, was chosen for this mission and began to move along Route 17. The battalion made contact with a stubborn enemy force in the vicinity of the junction of Routes 13 and 17, the same area where it had had a sharp engagement two days earlier. In an attempt to dislodge the enemy the battalion called for indirect fires. Some six hundred rounds were fired to no avail; the enemy held his position. Since the available tactical air support was committed to the defense of Loc Ninh, the battalion returned to its fire base. Throughout the

day the twin fire bases came under heavy enemy indirect fire, including 105mm howitzer shelling. Although casualties had been light until 6 April, the resupply situation was becoming critical. There had been no surface resupply for four days, and now airdrop was the only method open. To insure a water supply, the 52d Reconnaissance Company secured a portion of the small stream to the west of the fire base.

(C) During the morning of 7 April, the task force was subjected to intense shelling. Enemy ground probes from the west, southwest, and north followed. The mortar and howitzer ammunition remaining at the base rapidly approached depletion as a result of the heavy counterbattery fires. In the midst of the shelling, the 5th ARVN Division ordered the task force to move to An Loc by road. The lead elements of the convoy were stopped short of Route 13 by the same enemy force that had blocked the 2d Battalion, 52d Regiment, earlier in the week. The American advisors observed that one reason for the effectiveness of the enemy effort was that the task force did not have enough infantry out in front of them to push through the road block. The difficulty was that the convoy had departed from the fire support base with the artillery and trucks leading. In addition, the advisors on the ground were unable to obtain tactical air support, even with the help of MG Hollingsworth. The remnants of the convoy returned to the fire base area after suffering heavy casualties. Three of the 105mm howitzers in the lead element were captured. The entire action, from departure to return, had taken just over one hour.

(C) Task Force 52 was ordered to destroy all its equipment and move on foot. The battered organization was unable to destroy its three remaining 105mm howitzers, and these were destroyed twenty minutes later by tactical air strikes on order of MG Hollingsworth. As the task force moved eastward along Route 17 toward the junction with Route 13 with the 2d Battalion, 52d Regiment, leading, it was ambushed in the same area where the three previous heavy contacts had occurred. This time, however, the column was hit almost immediately from three directions. One ambush was sprung at the original site, another several hundred meters farther south along Route 13 where the advance elements had reached, and the third back at the fire support base where elements of the 1st Battalion, 48th Regiment, remained.¹⁵

(C) After bitter fighting the ambush was broken sufficiently to permit the column to continue. The order was passed to move south through the jungle toward An Loc. The three American advisors, wounded during the fighting, remained at the ambush site along Route 13 with fifteen wounded

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South Vietnamese soldiers. Above them in his command and control helicopter was BG John R. McGiffert, Deputy Commanding General, TRAC. LTC Walter D. Ginger, the wounded senior advisor, asked BG McGiffert for permission to bring LTC Thinh, his ARVN counterpart, along with him if he were extracted by medical evacuation helicopter. When McGiffert learned that the ARVN task force commander was not wounded, he refused permission. This was a sound decision, for Thinh was able to reach An Loc safely with most of his command which, though scattered and disorganized, contributed to the strengthening of the defense.

(U) BG McGiffert remained above the wounded for the rest of the day, overseeing the attempts to evacuate them. The first two helicopters to make the try were damaged by fire and aborted the mission. The third aircraft was also hit, and the pilot was killed. McGiffert returned to his headquarters at nightfall and planned a major operation for the next day to extract the advisors and as many of the wounded Vietnamese soldiers as possible. During the night an Air Force AC-130 Spectre gunship remained on station over them.

(U) At about 0500 hours the next morning, 8 April, the group of wounded Americans and ARVN soldiers saw a group of about 25 uniformed enemy headed toward their hiding place. The ARVN soldiers took them under fire while helicopter gunships attacked and killed them from above. Several hours later, the operation planned during the night began. Waves of tactical fighters struck the area around the wounded soldiers. At about 1100 hours three light observation helicopters skimmed toward the area at tree top level and landed on Route 13 to the front of the advisors, despite the fact that they were receiving enemy fire. The three Americans and nine of the surviving South Vietnamese scrambled aboard. As they flew out to the south, the ships were hit by automatic weapons fire, wounding again one of the rescued advisors. The aircraft reached safety shortly afterward, and the wounded were taken to medical facilities.¹⁶

(C) Meanwhile, the situation became critical at Quan Loi airfield, where the helicopter refueling and rearming area was defended by two rifle companies of the 7th Regiment. Within their perimeter was a section of two 105mm howitzers. On 7 April at 1925 hours this force was subjected to heavy enemy ground attack, with the assaulting forces using gas. During the fighting, the enemy placed B-40 gunners in the upper floors of the French homes at the rubber plantation. Although the ARVN troops managed to repulse this attack, their situation was untenable. That night they were ordered to destroy their equipment and escape and evade to the An Loc perimeter. After a day and

a half of infiltration toward friendly lines, these units reached An Loc on 9 April. The fall of Quan Loi was significant because it left the enemy in possession of dominating high ground to the northeast of An Loc. From this position, they were able to shell the city freely.¹⁷

THE FIRST ATTACKS

(U) The days of 8 to 12 April were relatively quiet. Combat activity varied from light to moderate, as both friendly and enemy forces prepared for the battle at An Loc. The forces at An Loc continued to strengthen their positions. The entire 21st ARVN Division had arrived in Lai Khe by 11 April, and the airborne brigade was moving north of Chon Thanh toward contact with the 7th NVA Division which had established the road block south of An Loc. As intelligence efforts and captured prisoners indicated an increasingly heavy buildup of enemy forces in the An Loc area, B-52 and tactical air strikes were placed on the suspected locations. Observation aircraft noted enemy troop and vehicle movement, which was also attacked by friendly aircraft, despite intense enemy antiaircraft fires.

(U) Reinforcements were airlifted into An Loc during the last two days of this period. The 1st and 2d Battalions, 8th ARVN Regiment, and the regimental reconnaissance company were flown to the city by helicopters of the 1st Brigade, 1st US Air Cavalry Division. These additional troops closed within the perimeter on 11 and 12 April. The American brigade also provided CH-47 helicopters to transport supplies and evacuate wounded and civilians. With Cobra gunships, they flew reconnaissance and troop support missions around the city.


(U) Contact with the enemy continued to increase in the An Loc area during the five days before the first major battle. Friendly units patrolling outward from the An Loc perimeter encountered stiffening resistance from enemy forces toward the northeast and southwest of the city. Reports from ARVN and civilian observers indicated that the enemy was driving cattle and civilian refugees ahead of his advance to activate the mines and automatic ambushes placed by the defenders of An Loc. Civilians also reported that there were numerous tanks in the area. Enemy artillery attacks began.

(U) ARVN soldiers who had escaped capture in the fall of Loc Ninh continued to straggle in. At one time on 11 April, 50 men of the 2d Battalion, 9th Regiment, arrived. At another time, the district chief of Loc Ninh returned, and later his senior advisor, MAJ Davidson, reached the An Loc perimeter safely. Civilian refugees from Loc Ninh and

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Southwestern edge of An Loc on 10 April 1972 before the first attack.

the villages in the An Loc area continued to seek the safety of the friendly defenses.¹⁸

(C) MG Hollingsworth had been over the An Loc area every day. On 10 April he had observed the bodies of approximately 200 enemy soldiers who had been killed by air strikes. Also he noticed the increase in ground probes beginning on the ninth and increasing in intensity during the follow-

ing days. Enemy artillery bombardment became heavy on 12 April, and it was evident to him that the enemy would try their first major attack on the morning of the thirteenth. He radioed BG McGiffert, who was also in the air overseeing operations, to meet him at the 5th ARVN Division base camp at Lai Khe. Upon arrival, they went into conference among the rubber trees in the area.


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ARVN TROOP
DISPOSITIONS
AN LOC DEFENSES
12 APRIL 72

Source: MACDI

Figure: J-4

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from the enemy. The aircraft hit tanks, destroyed supply vehicles, and slowed ground assaults. There were 369 enemy verified as killed on the 13th of April; 200 of these were killed by air strikes. One enemy attack from the northwest was passing through the preplanned target area of the big bombers when the strike occurred. Three or four tanks were destroyed and an estimated 100 attacking soldiers were killed. MG Hollingsworth told GEN Abrams the air support had been decisive. "The massive air support of all types," he reported, "tipped the scales in our favor yesterday."²³

(U) BG McGiffert was particularly impressed with the effectiveness of the B-52 strikes. He noted that the target boxes he and MG Hollingsworth had planned at Lai Khe late in the afternoon of the twelfth were very close to the defenders. "I really believe that without those the city would have fallen," he said later, "because I think the infantry would have gotten in with the tanks."²⁴

(C) The attacking enemy forces, by now identified as the 271st and 272d Regiments of the 9th VC Division, shifted their forces during the fourteenth. To pin ARVN forces in place and permit regrouping for future assaults, the enemy hit An Loc with heavy rocket and mortar attacks beginning at 0550 hours on the morning of 14 April and continuing throughout the day. Shortly after the attacks began, the 36th ARVN Ranger Battalion detected heavy movement to the east of An Loc near the road between the besieged province capital and Quan Loi. COL William Miller, Senior Advisor to the 5th ARVN Division, reported that vehicles were moving four kilometers to the north of An Loc at 0630 hours. In addition, tanks were observed to the east, but there was no significant ground attack made against the perimeter during the day. In reaction to the events of the preceding two days, however, four B-52 strikes were directed against known or suspected enemy positions.²⁵

(C) The situation remained stabilized on the evening of the thirteenth. At 0435 hours the next morning, however, the enemy renewed his attacks. He prefaced a ground assault with attacks-by-fire from 155mm howitzers and 122mm rockets. Shortly after the indirect fires began to fall upon the defenders, enemy infantry were reported in the defensive barbed wire on the southern and southeastern sides of the ARVN perimeter. The South Vietnamese defenders also reported that armored vehicles were once again within the city, but by 0745 hours the initial pressure against the defenses had momentarily slackened. Several hours later, however, An Loc was again under heavy pressure from the enemy, with North Vietnamese armor reported to be within 500 meters of the 5th ARVN Division command post. The situation was later

restored by driving off the ground attack and neutralizing or destroying the armor.²⁶

(U) The ARVN III Corps and the American Third Regional Assistance Command had been active meanwhile in rushing reinforcements to the battle area. While the 21st ARVN Division continued to push north along Route 13 from Chon Thanh, the 1st Airborne Brigade was ordered to positions on the group of hills to the southeast of An Loc. On 13 April five companies of the brigade were carried in by American helicopters and conducted an air assault southeast of Hill 169. The following day, the remainder of the brigade was also airlifted by American helicopters into a nearby position. This placed three airborne battalions just to the southeast of the An Loc perimeter.²⁷

(C) Enemy pressure against the besieged province capital increased on the fifteenth. "There was a great battle at An Loc yesterday," MG Hollingsworth reported to GEN Abrams on the morning after, "perhaps the greatest of this campaign." Enemy indirect fires were heavy throughout the day. Particularly troublesome to the sorely pressed defenders was the accurate tank and 75mm recoilless rifle fire. One tank was able to advance within 200 meters of the 5th ARVN Division command post and fire directly into it and the division's tactical operations center. Three division staff officers, including the division G3, were killed. The recoilless rifles concentrated on the tactical operations center of the provincial forces.

(C) Once more, faulty employment of enemy armor assisted the South Vietnamese soldiers on the ground. Early in the morning, eleven tanks joined in the attack on An Loc but were destroyed or neutralized by ARVN tank killer teams and tactical air support. Later, about 1400 hours, the enemy sent ten more tanks against the An Loc defenses from the north and west supported by heavy mortar, rocket, and artillery fires. Again the ground tank killer teams and tactical air engaged the attacking tanks and destroyed nine of them. Although the defenders knew that there were more tanks, they no longer stood in fear of them. All available tactical air was over An Loc during the day; the massive air effort continued through the night. By late afternoon the antiaircraft fires began to subside as tactical aircraft located and destroyed some of their positions.

(C) "I am most pleased with the outcome of the battle yesterday," MG Hollingsworth noted on the morning of the sixteenth. "The enemy hit us hard all day long with everything he could muster — and we threw it right back at him. The forces in An Loc realized that they had to fight and they fought well." He further reported to GEN Abrams that although enemy indirect fires were still falling

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on the city, the garrison was able to cope with it.²⁸

(U) When the dust of battle cleared on the morning of 16 April, the major attacks of the first phase had ended, although this was unknown to the defenders. The South Vietnamese had yielded the northern half of the province capital in the face of the ground, armor, and artillery attacks. The next line of defense was quickly adjusted in preparation for the expected future attacks. The most significant result of the fighting from 13 to 16 April was that the ARVN forces had held. This thwarted the enemy objectives to take An Loc, establish a command headquarters and provisional government, and then move against Saigon. The enemy had lost 23 armored vehicles, most of which were T-54 tanks. However, the ammunition dump and the northern half of the city were lost and An Loc lay under heavy siege.²⁹

(C) When the fighting had begun at An Loc, two tasks faced LTG Minh, the III Corps Commander. The first was to prevent enemy forces from advancing south to Saigon. The second was to lift the siege at An Loc by having a relief column move from the south up Route 13. To accomplish the first objective, the 1st Airborne Brigade had initially been positioned at Chon Thanh, followed shortly by the 21st ARVN Division brought in from the Delta. For several weeks after the arrival of the 21st ARVN Division in the III Corps area, it was assigned the mission of stopping the enemy drive in the Route 13 area of Binh Long and Binh Duong Provinces. This remained the division mission until after the first major enemy attacks upon the An Loc garrison had ended. Once the situation had stabilized, the senior ARVN commanders realized that there would not be an enemy drive on Saigon until An Loc had been taken, and the Division was ordered to push north, clearing the highway from Chon Thanh to An Loc and thereby raise the siege. For the remainder of the campaign, ARVN forces were occupied along Route 13 to the south of An Loc in an attempt to eliminate the blocking force. They were not successful; the 7th NVA Division proved to be a dogged and skillful defender. Moreover, the enemy was more familiar with the area than was the 21st ARVN Division from the Delta. The 7th NVA Division had operated in the Binh Long area over a period of several years. The 165th Regiment of the Division had interdicted Route 13 during the enemy Tet Offensive of 1968.³⁰

(U) On 17 April COL Miller, the American senior advisor to the 5th ARVN Division, reported to MG Hollingsworth that the 5th ARVN Division was unable to retake the lost northern half of the city. During the night of the sixteenth, the invading enemy had reinforced its defenses in northern

An Loc and was firmly entrenched with mortars and antiaircraft weapons in support. Miller suspected that the enemy would grow stronger in those positions and warned Hollingsworth that the city was ringed on three sides with heavy concentrations of antiaircraft weapons. He alerted the general to his belief that "the enemy will use strangulation and starvation tactics and then attack in force," and noted that the enemy appeared to have no ammunition resupply problem for his artillery and mortars. His assessment of the capabilities of the badly mauled 5th ARVN Division was blunt and unencouraging. "The division is tired and worn out; supplies minimal, casualties continue to mount, medical supplies coverage low," he reported. "Wounded a major problem, mass burials for military and civilian, morale at a low ebb. In spite of incurring heavy losses from US air strikes, the enemy continues to persist."³¹

(U) Intelligence reports indicated that there were at least five enemy regiments in the An Loc area. Friendly casualties mounted under the continuing enemy indirect fires, and resupply began to be a problem, for only token recoveries were made from airdrops. Friendly artillery had been all but destroyed and counterbattery efforts could be made only through the use of tactical air strikes. Evacuation of wounded troops was next to impossible because South Vietnamese Air Force helicopters refused to touch down; in fact, they often sustained heavy losses when they approached An Loc.³²

(C) To force the ARVN troops into a smaller perimeter, the 9th VC Division was reinforced by two other regiments. The remaining tanks were assigned to accompany the 275th Regiment from the 5th VC Division and the 141st Regiment from the 7th NVA Division. These two regiments were ordered to attack the 6th Airborne Battalion and its 105mm howitzer battery of six artillery pieces on Windy Hill three and one-half kilometers to the east of the An Loc perimeter. The three regiments of the 9th VC Division, the 271st, 272d, and 95C, would attack the town itself. In anticipation of the success of this move, Radio Hanoi announced on 18 April that An Loc had been taken and that the headquarters for the Communist government of South Vietnam would be established there on the twentieth. In confirmation of these enemy plans, a significant intelligence find was made also on the eighteenth, about three kilometers northeast of Tonle Cham, where the 92d Ranger Border Defense Battalion was stationed. A company from the battalion was patrolling the road from Tonle Cham toward An Loc when they killed an individual who was identified and confirmed as a highly placed political officer from the enemy Central Office for

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South Vietnam (COSVN). He had been carrying a six page handwritten letter from the political commissar of the 9th VC Division to COSVN Headquarters. This letter divulged plans for another assault on An Loc that was to begin on 19 April. In addition the letter explained to COSVN the serious problems encountered during the initial attack on the provincial capital when the 9th VC Division failed to take its objective. The political commissar reported that the tactical air and B-52 strikes had been unbelievably devastating. He also noted that the 9th VC Division had had problems with the tanks. In some instances the tanks had left the infantry, while in others the infantry would not go with the tanks. The commissar noted that word had reached the tank crews that An Loc had already been taken by the 9th VC Division so that all they had to do was drive into the town, and finally, he was critical of the 9th VC Division commander.

(C) To meet his 20 April deadline the enemy attacked in the early morning hours of the nineteenth. The attack opened with heavy bombardment by rockets and artillery on An Loc and on the ARVN units at Windy Hill and Hill 169. The enemy proceeded initially according to plan. Six tanks assaulted with the 141st and 275th Regiments in the attack upon the 6th Airborne Battalion's fire support base on Windy Hill. The airborne brigade headquarters and its protecting ranger company on Hill 139 were overwhelmed. During the battle, tactical air and B-52 strikes inflicted heavy casualties on the attacking enemy forces and knocked out the accompanying tanks, but the ARVN units were forced to abandon their position with heavy casualties, leaving the destroyed artillery battery behind. Two companies of the 6th Airborne Battalion, the airborne brigade headquarters, and the ranger company succeeded in reaching the An Loc perimeter. The remaining two companies of the airborne battalion were cut off from An Loc and forced to move south, where they were later picked up by VNAF helicopters. The enemy now held the high ground above An Loc.

(C) In the meantime, the elite 9th VC Division was making no progress in its attack on An Loc. Heavy losses in personnel and equipment prevented any further progress by the three assaulting enemy regiments. An enemy plan to disengage, move southwest to Route 13, and attack An Loc from the south never materialized. On 21 April the 5th and 8th Airborne Battalions had lost on An Loc and occupied positions among the rubber trees just south of the town. The presence of this relatively fresh and elite fighting force in the southern perimeter was critical in preventing the enemy's execution of this plan. Steady enemy ground pressure and con-

tinuous rocket and artillery fire into An Loc continued through 22 April. After the twenty-second ground pressure lessened and the shelling phase of the battle began in earnest. Antiaircraft fires continued to remain intense. These made helicopter operations into An Loc almost nonexistent except for necessary American advisory resupply and medical evacuation of American personnel.TM

(U) When the attack ended on the twenty-second of April, COL Miller reported to MG Hollingsworth that the enemy had increased his indirect fires "almost to the point of bombardment." There was no change in the situation in the northern part of the city. The northeastern corner remained heavily fortified and strongly defended by the enemy, and the ARVN troops were unable to breach these positions. The 81st Ranger Group was able to move in the northwestern corner and to score gains against the enemy by using the AC-130 Spectre aircraft equipped with the 105mm howitzer. The enemy held the dominant terrain around An Loc as a result of having driven the 6th Airborne Battalion and the airborne brigade headquarters from Windy Hill and Hill 169. Antiaircraft fire continued around the city. "Enemy enjoys observing no resupply; enemy enjoys lack of helicopters landing at this location," the senior advisor continued. "Come hell or high water, both should be accomplished."

(U) Intelligence reports indicated that the enemy forces surrounding the city were dispersing into dispositions that sought to overcome or reduce the effects of B-52 strikes. South Vietnamese units conducting short patrols after 22 April confirmed that enemy troops were being killed by air strikes. The tactical situation remained essentially unchanged until 10 May. Neither side made significant gains or sustained sufficient losses to necessitate yielding. South Vietnamese helicopters flew some successful troop replacement missions into the airborne positions south of the city, but they continued to sustain heavy losses in men and equipment. The South Vietnamese defenders were able to evacuate some of their wounded, but only the most able-bodied were able to board the VNAF helicopters which, in most cases, refused to do more than hover momentarily. By consistently probing on the west side of the perimeter, the enemy managed to occupy a small portion of a city block near the intersection of Route 246 with the perimeter road. By persistent efforts the enemy eventually secured the full block.

(U) Enemy indirect fires continued to strike the city at the rate of about 1,000 rounds a day. All available calibers of mortars, rockets, and artillery, in addition to 100mm tank gunfire, were employed. On three occasions, CS or tear gas projectiles were

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fired in the vicinity of the 5th ARVN Division command post. The projectiles were armed by quick, delay, and time fuzes. Late in the shelling period on 8 May the senior advisor to the 5th Division noted that the amount of artillery fired appeared to be lessening while the mortar fires were increasing. Both fired freely during aerial resupply drops. He noted that the mortars seemed to fire on ARVN troops positions and concentrations while the artillery was directed against the division command post. With the continued shelling and the lack of aerial resupply, the conditions in An Loc deteriorated rapidly.³⁴

RESUPPLY BY AIR

(U) From 7 April to 25 June An Loc was resupplied entirely by air. The enemy had completely cut all roads leading into the area and no other lines of communication were available to the defenders and their support organizations. During the first week of the fighting around the city, US Air Force resources had not been used nor considered necessary. Only gradually did ground commanders realize that the danger from enemy ground fire was prohibitively costly to slow-moving helicopters and C-123 aircraft. From 7 to 19 April aerial resupply was primarily a US Army and Vietnamese Air Force operation; American and Vietnamese helicopters and Vietnamese C-123s flew 93 sorties, delivering 301 tons of supplies. The helicopter effort was terminated after 12 April when three American CH-47s sustained minor damage from antiaircraft fire and one Vietnamese CH-47 was destroyed. The Vietnamese Air Force continued for another week with C-123 sorties using the low level paradrop method. This worked well for 39 sorties, but on the 40th, the aircraft was hit by ground fire and crashed three kilometers southwest of An Loc. Further low level resupply by C-123s was cancelled immediately. From this time on, the defenders of the city were entirely dependent upon US Air Force C-130s for aerial resupply.³⁵

(C) During the last five days of the Vietnamese C-123 effort, while the first major attack was raging, American and Vietnamese commanders realized that additional help was needed. Accordingly, on 15 April MACV requested that the US Air Force begin dropping supplies into An Loc. Five missions were planned for 16 to 18 April using the low altitude container delivery system in daylight drops with C-130 aircraft. The loads contained ammunition, rations, and medical supplies. Aiming for a 200 meter square over a soccer field in the southern portion of the town, these missions were successful in delivering the supplies. The first four aircraft, however, suffered moderate to severe damage from enemy ground fire, and the fifth

crashed after being hit. The Air Force understandably terminated aerial resupply using this method.³⁶

(C) The high altitude low opening (HALO) method was tried next. In this technique, the supply bundles are dropped in free fall from a relatively safe altitude of 8,000 to 9,000 feet at a release point to which the aircraft is vectored by a ground radar station. The chutes are designed to open and fully deploy 500-800 feet above the drop zone. In the eight missions flown from 19 to 23 April, this system failed primarily because of parachute malfunctions. Advisors to the 5th ARVN Division reported that most of the material fell outside the perimeter and that a considerable portion doubtless fell into enemy hands. Intelligence reports received by the advisors confirmed that the enemy was recovering supplies which missed the drop zone and were within their reach. Although tactical air strikes were called upon to destroy the unrecoverable bundles, this was often impossible because the bundles were hidden by the foliage in the area where they had landed. The malfunctions were traced directly to Vietnamese packers who lacked the technical background and experience necessary for the more complex packing techniques required for the high altitude low opening method. Until these problems could be solved, the Air Force returned to the low altitude container delivery system.³⁷

(C) For four days, 23 to 28 April, the Air Force flew missions using this system in daylight. Even though different air routes were used, the enemy was able to plot the course of the aircraft from reports sent by numerous observers scattered throughout the plantation area surrounding An Loc. The enemy placed his antiaircraft weaponry on every possible air approach to the city where he could easily bring the C-130s under fire. The use of tactical aircraft in suppression roles did not ease the situation beyond a brief reduction in the volume of fire. The C-130s were particularly vulnerable over the drop zone where they slowed to speeds of about 130 knots; every aircraft making an aerial delivery received battle damage. Although the Air Force succeeded in getting the supplies to the defenders on the ground with a good recovery rate, this system was again cancelled on 26 April when an aircraft was hit by enemy ground fire, exploded, and crashed. Low level deliveries at night became the order of business until the high altitude delivery problems could be solved.³⁸

(C) The night resupply missions were not as dangerous for the air crews, but the delivery rate to the Vietnamese forces and their American advisors in An Loc declined. The basic problem was the difficulty in identifying the drop zones at night; the small area within the defensive perimeter made

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the drop zones smaller than those recommended in standard USAF guidelines, so even a near miss often resulted in loss of the supplies to the enemy. These problems were magnified at night because even using drop zone marker lights, pilots found it hard to distinguish the markers from the many fires and lights of An Loc. An attempt at establishing a spotter system on the ground to recover lost bundles failed because the forward air controllers were reluctant to give advance warning of the resupply runs, even by using codewords. As a result, warnings came either too early so that spotters tired of their watch, or came at the last minute, allowing no time for them to reach their positions. Use of the AC-130 spotlight to illuminate the drop zone was tried, but was discontinued because of the danger to the gunships from enemy fire. Neither did attaching lights to the dropped bundles help. High intensity flashing lights were mistaken for small arms fire, and constant beam flashlights could not be seen because of their low intensity. After a third C-130 crashed on the night of 3 May, COL Miller recommended to MG Hollingsworth that all low altitude aerial resupply attempts be discontinued until a workable method could be developed. On 4 May, all planned resupply drops were cancelled.³⁹

(C) In the meantime, the US Army and Air Force had been working together to solve the problems related to high altitude drops. Seventy-six packers arrived from the Army's 649th Quartermaster Aerial Resupply Company on Okinawa, and together with Air Force quality control personnel they worked on troubleshooting procedures to isolate the causes of parachute malfunctions. These two teams produced immediate improvement in the delivery of resupply by air drop.

(U) Two methods of high altitude drop were used successfully beginning on 4 May. The first was the initially abortive HALO system; the other was the high velocity drop. Experimentation while dropping supplies into An Loc determined what items were best used with each method. HALO was improved to the point where 91 percent of all bundles dropped landed in the drop zone. High altitude high velocity drops proved to be even more accurate, with 98 percent of the bundles hitting the drop zone.⁴⁰

(U) Advisors on the ground in An Loc agreed that aerial resupply was sufficient, although there were some problems. "I never went hungry," said CPT Moffett, the Deputy Senior Advisor to the 3d Ranger Group. "I always had plenty of rice and tuna and there were always plenty of bullets lying around, and I don't think the resupply problem, strictly an opinion, was nearly as bad as they made it to be because they liked to exaggerate

quite a bit." COL Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., the Senior Advisor to the 5th ARVN Division, agreed. "Although there were some extended periods when certain items were in short supply," he reported after the battle had been won, "logistical support for the battle of An Loc was satisfactory."⁴¹

(U) Once the aerial delivery problem had been solved, distribution of the supplies on the ground remained the major difficulty. "It was almost a murder scene," BG McGiffert reported later. "The guys who got there first got the goods." Not until late in the battle did an effective organization for distribution of supplies exist. There were reports of firefights between groups of ARVN soldiers over dropped food supplies; even the American advisors were threatened. The dog-eat-dog attitude persisted until late May when sufficient supplies were arriving. The problem was finally solved when BG Hung placed the commander of the airborne brigade in charge of recovery and distribution of the airdrops. Hung also sent the Division G4 and an ARVN colonel to the drop zone to keep lists of what had been recovered and who had received it. Instead of soldiers or units feeding for themselves, teams were sent to the recovery area where airborne soldiers issued the supplies in rationed amounts.

(U) Until 24 May the artillery fires of the encircling enemy forces complicated the recovery and distribution problem. As soon as a supply drop was made, enemy indirect fires began to hit the drop zone; consequently there were no volunteers to go to the area and supervise the distribution process. Later, enemy fire diminished to the point where effective recovery could be made.⁴²

(U) In addition to disrupting the recovery and distribution of supplies, incoming fire prevented the use of Vietnamese Air Force helicopters for medical support. This severely affected the morale of the soldiers in the An Loc perimeter, for they knew that if they were severely wounded, evacuation to proper medical care was unlikely, and medical supplies at An Loc were critically low. The deteriorating medical situation was obvious to all; the hospital facilities had been destroyed in the first days of the battle, and until early June aerial resupply efforts were not successful in getting needed medical supplies to the besieged forces. Many of the wounded died from lack of proper attention, and the authorities on the scene were forced to resort to mass burials in relatively shallow graves.⁴³

(U) The difficulty in helicopter support was attributed to both a lack of leadership and faulty organization. American advisors agreed that it was difficult to get the Vietnamese helicopter pilots to fly near An Loc. Not only were they wary of the

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dangers of ground fire as they flew toward and into the perimeter, but they were concerned about the immediate enemy artillery fire that followed their landings. Strong and imaginative leadership was needed to prevent the VNAF pilots from following the same flight paths into and out of An Loc. The VNAF air mission commander was rarely with the group of ships flying into the firing pattern of the antiaircraft and artillery fire. As a result, inexperienced officers were in charge of the critical lead ship. These were the people who made the decision whether to abort the mission as the aircraft came under fire. Usually the decision was made to abort, and the air mission commander could do nothing about it. When an aggressive pilot was in the lead ship, the aircraft came through despite the firing. But that was not the only problem. American advisors reported that on two oc-

casions, only the first one or two helicopters landed; the rest hovered out of reach of the wounded who needed to get aboard.

(U) There was a measure of logic in remaining above those attempting to reach safety aboard the aircraft. On many occasions helicopters within reach of the soldiers were nearly swamped and overturned with the rush to climb aboard. This lack of control on the ground was an army problem; it paralleled the lack of control and organization on the aerial resupply drop zone in the An Loc perimeter. The combined circumstances in the air and on the ground compounded the difficulties.

(U) In late May, after American helicopters successfully resupplied the American advisors in An Loc, LTG Minh, the Corps Commander, asked MG Hollingsworth and BG McGiffert to permit American helicopters to lead the Vietnamese aircraft into



South Vietnamese soldiers on the perimeter of An Loc. The enemy threat, erratic resupply, and lack of medical evacuation served to lower ARVN morale.

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the city to show them how it was done. At first, Hollingsworth was adamant in his refusal, but he finally agreed to one operation if the VNAF helicopter unit would meet certain strict conditions. Americans would be in command of the entire effort from start to finish. A VNAF colonel would have to fly with the American mission commander to help control the Vietnamese pilots, and he would be required to participate in the reconnaissance flight. The pilots themselves were required to agree in advance that they would obey the orders given by the American mission commander, and discipline themselves against breaking formation or aborting during the mission. Finally, Minh was required to talk personally to BG Hung over the radio and insure that the 5th Division Commander would have a senior ARVN officer on the landing zone to control the wounded South Vietnamese soldiers. Minh agreed to all of these conditions.

(U) The operation took place on 3 May. COL John Richardson, commander of the American 12th Combat Aviation Group, planned the movement and was in charge of the execution of the operation. He piloted the lead ship, with four VNAF helicopters to follow him in. Moving into the city at treetop level, the aircraft encountered insignificant small arms fire. At the landing zone, however, not all went as had been planned and as LTG Minh had promised. The trail helicopter came down low enough only to kick off supplies and then hovered out of reach of the soldiers on the ground. The lead American ship was able to take on a full load of stretcher cases, but only because the strong-arm tactics of the door gunners held the walking wounded at bay. The other VNAF helicopters were overwhelmed by walking wounded and almost swamped; in the end these craft did not take out any of the more seriously wounded. Although the operation was not wholly successful, the helicopters had landed in An Loc and shown it could be done. For the next several weeks, the Vietnamese Air Force succeeded in getting three or four ships a day into and out of An Loc.⁴⁴

(U) Part of the problem throughout had been that the helicopters belonged to the Vietnamese Air Force, while their primary user was the Vietnamese Army. There was no single commander jointly responsible for both the helicopter pilots and the ground troops below the level of the Chief of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff. Earlier in the war the decision had been made that helicopters would be given to the Air Force, but at An Loc this system was wholly unsuccessful. Senior American officers thought that the best system was that adopted by the US Army. If the Vietnamese Army commanders were given direct control over the helicopter units, these units in turn would become more responsive to the needs of the troops on the ground.

At An Loc the system was too complicated. The defenders of An Loc were faced with a situation where an ARVN lieutenant general had no control over a VNAF colonel. Although the VNAF colonel was quite cooperative most of the time, the general could not obtain the flexibility and response that he needed to sustain his operation successfully. He had been forced to beg for American leadership to step in where the VNAF commanders would not.⁴⁵

RELATIONS WITH CIVILIANS

(U) A major factor complicating the defense of An Loc during the long weeks of the siege was the presence of large numbers of civilians. The normal city population had been swollen with refugees fleeing from Loc Ninh and the villages surrounding An Loc during the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong advance.

(FOUO) When it became apparent that the fighting would spread to An Loc, many of the inhabitants wanted to flee the town. The Province Chief refused to permit them to leave as they pleased, and his actions disgruntled much of the local citizenry. They later changed their opinion of this policy, however, when others were killed or captured by the enemy while trying to leave An Loc. Refugees reported hundreds of executions in Loc Ninh and reinforced this change of attitude. For the most part the government troops received the cooperation of the townspeople. Most of the civilians did not panic and did not complain about their hardships and losses. Significantly, those who did leave the area went south toward areas held by the South Vietnamese. The people feared that the North Vietnamese would kill them or expose them to danger in involuntary support roles if they were captured. These fears were supported by the harsh experiences of those who attempted to flee to the south but were stopped by the enemy. As a result the people of the town voluntarily supported the government soldiers and were grateful to them for defending what remained of An Loc.

(FOUO) In the early days of the fighting around An Loc the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong had encouraged civilians to leave the An Loc area; but later, realizing that the presence of large numbers of civilians in the An Loc perimeter would create considerable logistical problems for the government forces, they indiscriminately killed anyone who attempted to leave the town. Early in the battle a large group of civilians led by a French Catholic priest and a Buddhist monk tried to escape An Loc to the south. They were able to move several kilometers on their way before they were stopped by the enemy. The able-bodied men and women were kidnapped, as well as the older women who might be useful in support roles, and sent toward Loc

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Rangers and civilians in An Loc developed a close relationship.

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Ninh. Only the old men and children were left. Subsequent attempts by civilians to break out were also unsuccessful. Every group leaving the perimeter was brought under heavy enemy mortar fire. Observers estimated that between four and five hundred of the several thousand who tried to escape were killed as a result of this treatment. After several such experiences with their liberators, most people from the An Loc area cast their lot with the government forces.⁴⁴

(U) The presence of the civilians in the An Loc perimeter strained the already overburdened aerial resupply system. Until the delivery of supplies by air became effective in late May, the civilians were a drain on food stocks and medical supplies. In many cases, the civilians would compete with soldiers for recovery of food and medical supplies from the drop zone. This was not only because of the lack of such items in the besieged city but also because of the failure to organize an effective system for recovery and distribution of supplies.⁴⁵

(FOUO) Relations between the civilians trapped in An Loc and the government forces defending the city varied from unit to unit. The townspeople had high praise for the performance of the Regional and Popular Forces, the airborne brigade, the ranger battalions, and later, the troops of the 18th Division who replaced the 5th Division at An Loc, although they were considered to be ineffectual militarily. For the officers and men of the 5th Division, however, the townspeople had nothing but scorn. The soldiers of the 5th Division engaged in considerable looting and in some cases even fired into the houses to force the occupants out. Although the officers of the 5th Division did not encourage looting, they apparently lacked sufficient control and discipline to prevent it.

(FOUO) A surprisingly large number of 5th Division soldiers were taking drugs. Observers within the city estimated that perhaps an average

of twenty men in each company were using narcotics. Much of the looting apparently stemmed from the need of the young soldiers to acquire goods to trade for the drugs. The addicts among the troops left their units, did not carry weapons, lived in and around the town, and preyed on the townspeople.

(FOUO) In addition, the troops of the 5th Division were observed selling the airdropped food and medical supplies. On at least one occasion troops of the division fired on ranger and airborne troops who were attempting to retrieve some rations. Much of this trouble arose from a lack of supervision and leadership within the 5th Division. Observers remarked upon the noticeable absence of senior officers actively engaged in directing the perimeter defense. Two government civilian cadre never saw the division commander throughout the siege. The troops of the 5th Division seemed to be commanded solely by company grade officers. The only visible field grade officers were those with the ranger and airborne battalions.⁴⁶

(U) In the ranger sector of the perimeter the relationship between the trapped civilians and the rangers was quite different. There were about 2,000 civilians in that area, with whom they shared their food freely. In return, the people cooked for the rangers and sought out edible vegetation and small animals to add to the meals of both. The inhabitants also took care of the rangers' clothes. If one of the civilians became wounded, the rangers saw that the wound was dressed and bandaged; unit corpsmen were used to assist. It was a working relationship of great benefit to both parties. In addition, civilians would occasionally enter that portion of the city held by the enemy; upon their return, they would report to the rangers what had been observed, thus making much useful information available to the friendly forces.⁴⁷

THE SIEGE — PHASE II

THE SECOND ATTACK

(C) On the first of May, the enemy forces began to set the stage for what became a second desperate attempt to capture An Loc. On that day the 5th VC Division moved its headquarters to the vicinity of Hill 169 three kilometers southeast of An Loc. On the following day the E6 and 174th Regiments of the division moved to positions three kilometers east of An Loc in the vicinity of Windy Hill, and north of their division headquarters. The 165th NVA Regiment left its roadblocking positions on Route 13 to the south and moved southwest of the An Loc perimeter. The 141st NVA Regiment moved north to a position within three kilometers

south of the An Loc defensive lines. The 275th VC Regiment remained in place on Windy Hill from which it had driven the airborne artillery battery on 19 April. By 7 May the 5th VC Division with its three regiments was positioned east and southeast of An Loc, the 141st and 165th Regiments of the 7th NVA Division were located south and southwest of the city, and the 272d and 95C Regiments of the 9th VC Division were northeast of the perimeter. These enemy regiments surrounding the city were within two to three thousand meters of the defensive lines.

(C) Facing these seven enemy regiments were less than 4,000 South Vietnamese soldiers inside

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the An Loc perimeter, territorial and regular forces combined. At least a thousand were wounded, although most were able to man their defensive positions in a limited way. Morale was low at this stage of the siege; the 5th Division Commander, the Binh Long Province Chief, and their American advisors were convinced that the defense could not hold against another attack. They stressed to MG Hollingsworth the effects of the continuous artillery bombardment and the failure of the Vietnamese Air Force to evacuate the wounded. Their troops were reluctant to move, shoot, or otherwise expose themselves; they understood that there was no chance for them to be evacuated if they were wounded. "I spent many hours during the course of the next few days encouraging the Province Chief, the Division Commander, and their advisors to hold their positions," Hollingsworth reported. "My attempts to belittle the capability of the enemy and to strengthen friendly forces' morale seemed almost hopeless. Enemy positions and movements, intensity of antiaircraft fire, and the increase in enemy artillery and rockets against An Loc pointed to an imminent all out attack."¹⁰

(C) MG Hollingsworth's concern over a renewal of the battle was confirmed when a rallier from the Headquarters, 5th VC Division, turned himself over to regional forces on patrol a short distance from the An Loc perimeter on 5 May. The captive was immediately interrogated by the Binh Long Province Chief, LTC Thinh. The rallier, a Viet Cong lieutenant, told his questioners that the commander of the 9th VC Division had been severely reprimanded by the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) for the division's failure to capture An Loc in mid-April. The commander of the 5th VC Division, whose forces now encircled the city, had told COSVN that he could take An Loc in two days as he had taken Loc Ninh. The rallier understood that the Communist high command had then placed the 5th VC Division in charge of the next assault on the city. The 9th VC Division had been relegated to a supporting role in the attack. The prisoner indicated that a determined enemy effort against An Loc could be expected in the near future.¹¹

(C) Strong enemy ground probes and increasing indirect artillery fire beginning at 0530 hours on 9 May alerted MG Hollingsworth to the probable timing of the next major attack. Within two hours the ground pressure subsided, but the heavy bombardment by enemy artillery, mortars, and rockets continued. From his experience with the pattern of enemy attacks in Vietnam, and armed with the knowledge of enemy dispositions and intentions provided by the rallier, Hollingsworth began to plan the defense. He believed that the enemy would

make the major attack on the morning of 11 May, following another day of ground probes against the South Vietnamese defenses. On 9 May the general selected 18 target boxes for B-52 bombers, supplemented by almost 200 tactical air strikes. Hollingsworth flew to Saigon to confer with GEN Abrams. While there he advised Abrams that the An Loc defense would require maximum tactical air support and, as a minimum, the 18 B-52 strikes he had planned. Abrams agreed with Hollingsworth's assessment and promised to send him everything that he requested.

(C) At the same time, GEN Abrams proposed a new plan for the employment of B-52 strikes. His scheme was to give the total strike capability for a 24 hour period to each military region in turn, excepting Military Region 4, which was not included because of the relatively low level of enemy activity there. After three days, strikes would be allocated on the basis of the situation, each region normally receiving eight B-52 strikes each day. MG Hollingsworth was concerned that Military Region 3 would not receive any allocation for two days following the day set aside for him. Because he believed that a major battle was imminent, however, he agreed with the plan under the condition that Military Region 3 have the first day of the full strikes. Abrams approved and wanted to know only when to start. Hollingsworth advised the general that he would provide an answer on the next day.¹²

(C) The 5th VC Division commander followed the pattern suspected by MG Hollingsworth. On 10 May the enemy repeated their pattern of strong ground probes before daylight, withdrawing within two hours. Hollingsworth readjusted the 18 target boxes planned the day before and added seven more, based upon his analysis of the ground probes. During the afternoon of 10 May, the TRAC commander advised GEN Abrams that the enemy would begin his main attack and ground assaults on 11 May. He asked that Abrams allocate him one B-52 strike every 55 minutes for the next 25 hours beginning at 0550, 11 May. Abrams agreed.

(C) On the morning of 11 May at 0035 hours the encircling enemy intensified his indirect fire bombardment of the An Loc perimeter, now measuring 1,000 by 1,500 meters. At 0530 hours the ground assault began from all sides. SA-7 missiles were used against Cobra gunships, tactical aircraft, and forward air controllers. During the day, An Loc was hit by 8,300 rounds of indirect fire. In addition to the unprecedented use of the SAM missiles and the longer and more intensive artillery bombardment, the attack differed in other respects from the first major enemy effort in April. The enemy launched coordinated attacks with tanks and infantry, although his handling of these forces remained

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
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amateurish. On the friendly side most ARVN soldiers, profiting by their earlier experiences, stood their ground against the enemy armor and destroyed the tanks with the M-72 Light Antitank Weapon.

(U) The enemy main attacks came from the west and northeast. The attacking forces were able to establish two penetrations in these areas (Fig. J-5). Their tactic was to continue to push tanks and infantry into the penetrated defenses in order to expand the salients and link up in the center of the town, thereby splitting the remaining defenders into enclaves that could be defeated in detail. This threat was countered when BG Hung, the 5th ARVN Division Commander, moved the 5th Airborne Battalion from the south of the city. He assigned the battalion the mission of blocking the penetrations in both the west and northeast. This

tactic stopped the enemy in place. The western salient was then methodically attacked by VNAF A-1E Skyraiders and AC-130 Spectre gunships. Because of the narrowness of the northeastern salient, the VNAF fighters were unable to drop their bombs; friendly troops were too close. The Spectre gunships were highly effective, however, and helped to contain this northeastern penetration. At the same time, they inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy troops in their bunkered positions. Spectre also forced the enemy soldiers into the open where they were hit by small arms fire or triggered mechanical ambushes.

(C) In countering the assault on An Loc, MG Hollingsworth employed 297 sorties of tactical air support on 11 May, and approximately 260 sorties on each of the following four days. He had borrowed



LTC Gordon Weed, commander of the USAF 8th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) selects a target over An Loc. Operating out of Bien Hoa AB, the 8th SOS provided a major portion of TACAIR support for ARVN defenders.


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five additional B-52 strikes from Military Region 2 to bring the total to 30 strikes within a 24 hour period. This overwhelming use of firepower was effective in supplementing the efforts of the ARVN troops within the perimeter. One example occurred on 11 May, when approximately 40 tanks and armored vehicles attempted to enter An Loc. By noon on 13 May they had been destroyed. During the fighting several crews had abandoned their tanks and had rallied to the ARVN forces in the city.²⁸

(U) The rapid succession of B-52 strikes was heartwarming to the defenders on the ground in An Loc. Not aware of the discussions between GEN Abrams and MG Hollingsworth, one advisor was incredulous. "The surprisingly fast B-52 strikes that we received on the eleventh of May were just unbelievable," remembered CPT Moffett with the rangers. "I couldn't believe that we got so many

B-52 strikes so fast." The bombs landed within 600 meters of the ARVN forces on the perimeter with only a few soldiers wounded as they were getting into their bunkers. The effectiveness of the big bombers was apparent to all observers inside An Loc, who called for them to be dropped closer to the defensive lines.

(U) The B-52s used in close ground support proved to be a flexible system as well. BG McGiffert estimated that over 90 percent of the strikes were diverted from their original targets on 11 and 12 May. As the ground targets appeared, close cooperation between MG Hollingsworth's staff, MACV J-3, and the Strategic Air Command Advanced Echelon at MACV Headquarters permitted a change of target within an hour before the bombers were due to release their ordnance. In one case the 81st Airborne Ranger Group was subjected to intensive pressure from an enemy regi-



Jubilant ARVN soldiers with a T-54 tank captured during the enemy attack on 11 May.

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ment, and a B-52 strike was diverted to hit this troop concentration. The regiment was eliminated as an effective fighting force.³¹

(C) By noon of the eleventh the employment of firepower from the air, combined with a steady resistance on the ground, had broken the enemy attack. MG Hollingsworth reported to GEN Abrams that the attack had been thwarted by noon, with many enemy soldiers fleeing in a state of disorganization from the areas that had been struck by the B-52s. These panicked troops were attacked by the tactical aircraft and ground fire as they ran. During the afternoon no moving enemy tanks were reported and attacks by indirect fire fell off considerably. Several NVA tanks were found abandoned after receiving friendly fire.³²

(C) By 2000 hours on 12 May there were indications that the enemy was preparing to launch another attack in his abortive attempt to capture the province capital. Tank fire from standoff positions hit the city, and there was a continuous exchange of small arms fire around the perimeter. Worsening weather complicated the support available to the defenders, but AC-130 Spectre gunships were able to remain on station and keep the enemy off-balance. The B-52 strikes continued to come at regular intervals, and MG Hollingsworth reported to GEN Abrams that the heavy bombers "spoiled another apparent enemy effort to seize An Loc." Although the TRAC commander felt that the situation remained serious, he was confident that the city would hold out.³³

(C) On 13 May enemy attacks by indirect fire were moderate, and standoff tank fire was reported from the south, west, and north. At 0145 hours on 14 May enemy troop movement was noticed to the west and southwest of the city, together with more tank fire from the west. MG Hollingsworth thought that the enemy was going to try another assault. "If so," he wired GEN Abrams the next day, "he was dissuaded by the timely delivery of three ARC LIGHTS." Once again, the B-52 strikes had been decisive. By midmorning, the two salients had been reduced in size and most of the occupied territory returned to ARVN control. The tide of the battle had turned.³⁴

(C) Enemy indirect fire continued to decrease on 15 May. There were no significant engagements that day. The situation had stabilized. By nightfall the enemy had withdrawn except for the company size forces in the two smaller salients. "The enemy had lost his capability for further offensive actions in Binh Long Province," concluded MG Hollingsworth.³⁵

(U) For the next ten days the situation at An Loc remained stalemated. Contacts with enemy forces were significantly reduced, although artillery

and aircraft fire remained heavy. The 3th ARVN Division advisors estimated that the enemy was turning his attention toward the South Vietnamese forces attempting to advance along Route 13 toward An Loc from the south. Although enemy activity within the two small salients dwindled, ARVN forces were unable to reduce them easily. The enemy fought stubbornly from bunkered positions. Finally the western salient was successfully flanked by the 8th ARVN Regiment, and the task there became one of cleaning out the remaining pockets of resistance.³⁶

RELIEF FROM THE SOUTH

(U) The operation to clear Route 13 had been bogged down by enemy resistance from the beginning. The 21st ARVN Division had closed on Lai Khe on 12 April after disengaging from heavy fighting in the Delta's U Minh Forest. Initially the division had been assigned the mission to secure the highway north from Lai Khe to Chon Thanh. The first major engagement occurred during 24 to 29 April thirteen kilometers north of Lai Khe as the 21st Division sought to fight its way toward Chon Thanh. The 101st Independent NVA Regiment had blocked the road on 22 April, eleven days after the 32d ARVN Regiment had moved the vehicle to Chon Thanh. The 32d Regiment attacked from the north in combination with the 33d ARVN Regiment from the south to destroy the enemy force. On 27 April the 101st NVA Regiment withdrew to the west, leaving the K-6 Battalion of the 165th NVA Regiment in contact to cover the disengagement. The remnants of this battalion were driven from their heavily fortified positions two days later.

(U) With the road now clear to Chon Thanh, the 21st Division began offensive operations north of the base where the 31st ARVN Regiment, airlifted there during the fighting to the south, had encountered increasing enemy resistance. Six kilometers north of Chon Thanh the other two battalions of the 165th NVA Regiment had occupied strong defensive positions. The fighting raged for the first 13 days of May, supported by military tactical air, and B-52 strikes. At some point late in the battle the enemy reinforced with the 209th NVA Regiment. During the fighting the commander of the 31st Regiment was seriously wounded and control over the operation passed to the 32d Regiment. On 13 May the enemy position was finally overrun. The South Vietnamese now had control over the highway to a point eight kilometers north of Chon Thanh.

(U) Fresh from this latest victory in the advance up Route 13, the 32d ARVN Regiment was given the mission of clearing the enemy to the Tau O Bridge, five kilometers to the north. The opposing force was the strongly reinforced 209th NVA Regi-

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The center of An Loc on 17 May after the last major enemy attempt to take the city.

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ment, which had fallen back to heavily fortified positions in depth. This network was centered on the deep swamps of the Tau O stream. For 38

days the 32d ARVN Regiment fought to push the enemy out of the area. Despite extensive use of B-52s, tactical air support, and artillery, the ARVN



Principal Vietnamese commanders with President Thieu after the battle for An Loc: far left, LTG Nguyen Van Minh, III Corps Commander; third from left, GEN Cao Van Vien, Chief of the Joint General Staff; fourth from left, BG Le Van Hung, 5th ARVN Division Commander.

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forces were unsuccessful. On 21 June the 32d ARVN Regiment was relieved of the mission. However, the drive of the regiment north had pulled enemy forces away from the An Loc perimeter in late May, easing the situation in the besieged province capital.

(U) The last major battle at An Loc was fought concurrently with the fighting at the Tau O Bridge. Enemy pressure on the city made relief by outside ground forces essential. An urgent requirement was the deployment of artillery support to a position capable of supporting both the 32d ARVN Regiment in its attempt to drive north and the defenders within the An Loc perimeter. Accordingly, on 15 May the 15th Regiment, which had arrived from the 9th ARVN Division in the Delta three days earlier, was given the mission to secure and establish this fire base. On that day the 1st Battalion of the regiment and the 9th Armored Cavalry Regiment began their attack. The task force bypassed enemy resistance to the east of Route 13 and moved in the direction of Tan Khai hamlet, ten kilometers south of An Loc and four kilometers north of the Tau O Bridge. Simultaneously, the 2d Battalion, 15th Regiment, and the regimental command group made an air assault into the Tan Khai area. On 16 May they secured the hamlet. Later in the day, VNAF Chinooks and an American Sky Crane brought in three 105mm howitzers and a platoon of 155mm howitzers. The following day, the 3d Battalion, the regimental light command post, and the 33d Regiment (-) reached the new fire support base. On 18 May, the armor and infantry column, delayed by the difficult terrain to the southeast, closed on the hamlet.

(U) For a few days enemy activity in the vicinity of the fire base was negligible. By 20 May the enemy had turned his attention away from An Loc and reacted to the threat from the south. That day the 141st NVA Regiment, which had just moved from An Loc, launched an attack against the base. This initial battle lasted for three days. The defenders of Tan Khai held out against this and all subsequent attacks through June. The existence of this base brought the needed relief from enemy pressure to the defenders of An Loc.^(U)

(U) The weary ARVN forces within the An Loc perimeter took advantage of the respite afforded by the move of enemy troops to the south. Patrolling outward from the defenses increased, and the bodies of many enemy dead were discovered. As the South Vietnamese troops regained an aggressive spirit, clearing operations were begun against the northern salient. On 8 June the 1st Battalion, 48th ARVN Regiment, eliminated the last enemy resistance in the northern salient. By 12 June the remaining pockets of resistance in the former

western salient were reduced by the 7th ARVN Regiment. The situation continued to improve on 13 and 14 June when 1,500 fresh troops, mostly from the 18th ARVN Division, were lifted into the city by American helicopters.

(U) By 15 June, with enemy indirect fire continuing to decrease, the 5th ARVN Division began offensive operations, pushing out in all directions from the perimeter. The 48th Regiment seized Hill 169 on 17 June. From this regained vantage point, they observed several concentrations of enemy troops. Tactical air support was called, and the enemy formations were dispersed after suffering heavy casualties. Small contacts continued all around the city as enemy bunkers were systematically reduced. Large amounts of enemy equipment were captured. On 18 June control of the 1st Airborne Brigade reverted directly to III Corps, and the brigade moved the next day by foot to Tan Khai for airlift out of the An Loc area. Rallyers and prisoners of war reported at both An Loc and Tan Khai that the enemy had taken large losses and that many more enemy troops were ready to rally.^(U)

(U) Although Route 13 had not been reopened and fighting continued as ARVN forces attacked to regain territory around An Loc, the enemy offensive in Binh Long Province had ended. By 18 June the situation around An Loc had improved to the point that LTG Minh, the III Corps Commander, declared that the siege was over.^(U)

(C) The remainder of the year was spent in pushing the enemy back from An Loc and in exchanging fresh troops for those who had participated in the defense of the province capital. On 11 July the 18th ARVN Division completed its relief of the 5th ARVN Division at An Loc. The 25th ARVN Division began the relief of the 21st ARVN Division on Route 13 north of Chon Thanh. Given the mission of reducing the enemy blocking force at the Tau O Bridge, the 25th ARVN Division enveloped the strong point and neutralized it on 20 July. The road was still subject to harassing and interdiction fire, however, and considerable mine-sweeping and roadwork were necessary before the highway could be opened for traffic.

(C) During August the 18th Division began operations to recapture the Quan Loi airfield and base camp. The first step was to gain control of the high ground to the east of Quan Loi. As the operation went into its next phase, the advance slowed as the 18th Division neared the well-prepared defensive positions of the base camp. The tough going made replacement of the lead battalions necessary on 23 August; the attack continued on the following day. By 4 September the

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18th Division had breached the Quan Loi perimeter and established a lodgement that included the southwestern end of the airstrip. The attempt to secure the rest of Quan Loi stalled when the 52d Regiment, 18th ARVN Division, failed to secure the dominating high ground north of Quan Loi.

(C) In late September, as III Corps prepared for an enemy high point in October, attention shifted from the An Loc-Quan Loi area of operations. Divisional elements were moved to the south to cover the northern approaches to Saigon. Although the 18th ARVN Division remained in the An Loc area, the Quan Loi base camp was not recaptured. When there appeared the possibility of a cease-fire in late October, III Corps stabilized in a defensive posture. By 29 November the 18th Division had been relieved by the 3d, 5th, and 8th Ranger Groups, a total of nine battalions. Through the rest of the

year and into the cease-fire period, the rangers secured the approaches to An Loc.

(U) The successful defense of An Loc saved Saigon from a direct threat. By denying the Viet Cong a province capital close to Saigon in which to set up a "liberation" government, the South Vietnamese dealt their opponents not only a military defeat but also a severe psychological and propaganda defeat as well. More tangible benefits were also realized. Regular and territorial forces had cooperated well in coordinating the defense, and the heroism of the local soldiers was noteworthy. South Vietnamese troops overcame panic when first faced with an attack by armor and defeated Soviet-made medium tanks with relative ease. The battle of An Loc stands as a classic case of a besieged city holding out against overwhelming odds, aided both by their own tenacity and by airpower.

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AN LOC — ANNEX J

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ANNEX K

KONTUM

THE NVA BUILDUP

(U) Military Region 2, the largest tactical zone in The Republic of Vietnam, contained 47 percent of the country's total land area (See Fig. K-1). However, it contained only three million people or about one-fifth of the population. For this reason, in the rolling, sparsely populated Central Highlands, neither side tried very hard to win. Both North Vietnamese Army/Viet Cong (NVA/VC) forces and Army of Vietnam (ARVN) troops were used in economy of force roles. Each year during the dry season the Annamite Mountains in Kontum Province became an area of increasing enemy activity; 1972 was no exception.¹ The drawdown of US maneuver battalions and the relegation of the remaining 60,000 US military personnel in Vietnam to advisory roles resulted in Vietnamese responsibility for the war in the region. Failure of the American Vietnamization program would be a disastrous blow to US foreign policy and give the enemy a decided advantage at the negotiating table.

(C) As early as the middle of December 1971, allied forces in the Central Highlands of Military Region 2 began to receive reports of preparations being made by the enemy for a major offensive in the winter/spring of 1972. ARVN intelligence reports and interrogation of PWs and Hoi Chanh revealed large scale enemy troop movements from base areas in Cambodia and Laos into northern Kontum Province. These sources also reported that the campaign would be a 3-phase offensive with Phase I from 27 January until 7 February; Phase II from 7 February to 14 February; Phase III from 14 February to 29 February. The high point of the offensive was to be characterized by attacks on Tan Canh/Dak To II, the fire support bases on Rocket Ridge, and the main population centers of Kontum City and Pleiku City.² In addition, VC local force activity in the southern portion of Military Region 2 and in the coastal provinces would increase in an attempt to scatter widely the ARVN forces and thus make the highlands vulnerable to a multi-divisional attack in Kontum Province. With the supporting attacks of VC units in traditionally VC-dominated Binh Dinh Province, a success on the Kontum battlefield would enable the NVA to cut the Republic of Vietnam in two and thus discredit the Vietnamization Program. Intelligence sources identified the controlling headquarters for the impending NVA offensive in the Central Highlands

as the B-3 Front. Its major combat units were the 320th NVA Division, the 2d NVA Division, and the organic combat units of the B-3 Front which equalled another division. These NVA units were supplemented by VC main force and local force units and the 203d Armor Regiment from Hanoi High Command.³

(C) Due to increasing indications of an impending offensive, the US advisors in Military Region 2 worked closely with their counterparts to utilize the remaining US assets in Vietnam. These assets were the air cavalry, tactical air support (TACAIR), and B-52 strikes. The air cavalry was used to reconnoiter known enemy base areas along the tri-border region of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam and also to the northwest of Kontum City in the Plei Trap Valley. The air cavalry and the USAF forward air controllers were able to detect enemy training areas containing mock-up tanks, mortar positions, and large bunker complexes.⁴

(C) During the last week of January the first sightings were made of enemy armor activity east of Base Area 609 (See Fig. K-2). On 25 January two Cobra gunship pilots from the 361st Aerial Weapons Company reported engaging two tanks in the Plei Trap Valley (not indicated on map) just west of Rocket Ridge. The pilots also saw four other tanks under trees in the area. In this same area another Cobra team reported sighting six sets of tracks made by armored vehicles. Subsequent visual reconnaissance did not locate the tanks, but the tracks indicated that the enemy had at least one armor company in the area. Further tank sightings by US gunships occurred on 30 January and sporadically thereafter. Because these reports could not be substantiated by ground reconnaissance, little credence was given to them by the SRAG advisory staff.

(C) Through the results of these reconnaissance efforts and the patrolling of the Border Rangers from fire support bases at Dak Pek, Dak Seang, and Ben Het, the US advisors were able to conduct over 60 B-52 strikes during the month of January. Friendly territorial forces, the Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF), increased their activity during January by conducting several ground and airmobile operations in battalion strengths, while ARVN regular forces concentrated on strengthening their defenses in Kontum and Binh Dinh Provinces.⁵


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
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Figure: K-2

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(U) Upon evaluation of all available intelligence, the ARVN II Corps staff, led by LTG Ngo Dzu, planned the defense of the Central Highlands. While the US advisors were kept informed of all developments, the Vietnamese themselves formulated the defense plan. The key US figure in this process was Mr. John Paul Vann, the only civilian ever selected to head the advisory effort in one of South Vietnam's military regions. Vann had spent over 11 years in Vietnam, first as an army officer and then as a civilian, and was highly respected among the Vietnamese people.⁶

(U) During the first week of February the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) and US air cavalry continued to report sightings of enemy armor, as tensions began to build. Documents captured during the week of 4 to 10 February confirmed the presence of the 320th NVA Division in the B-3 Front. One document also stated that the 320th was composed of the 48th, 52d, and 64th Infantry Regiments and the 54th Artillery Regiment. The total strength of the division and its special battalions was listed at 10,400 men. An accompanying document revealed that both 122mm and 130mm Soviet field guns with ranges up to 17 miles were being infiltrated to the triborder area.⁷

(U) As a result of this information LTG Dzu ordered COL Le Duc Dat, the new commander of the ARVN 22d Division, to move the division forward CP, the 47th Regiment, and logistical support to the Tan Canh/Dak To II area, which was already occupied by the 22d Division's 42d Regiment. The movement of the logistical and division main elements from the division base camp in Ba Gi, Binh Dinh, was accomplished on the 7th and 8th of February.⁸ In addition, elements of the 19th Cavalry Regiment were ordered to the Tan Canh area to reinforce the division's organic 14th Cavalry Regiment. COL Dat placed this new armor support at Ben Het because he felt that any NVA armor assault must come from that direction. LTC Tuong, the II Corps senior armor officer, argued against this deployment since it tied the armor to static positions. He felt that these units should be kept free for a mobile defense.⁹ The 2d Airborne Brigade from the Government of Vietnam's strategic reserve was also committed to the fire support bases on Rocket Ridge. LTG Dzu then defined his command structure. COL Dat was placed in command of the Dak To area to include the border ranger camps at Ben Het, Dak Mot, Dak Pek, Dak Seang, and Fire Support Bases 5 and 6. COL Long, Kontum Province Chief, was responsible for Kontum City and COL Tuong, the Corps Deputy for Operations, was given command in Pleiku.¹⁰

(C) Tet passed however, and there was no offensive. Nevertheless, the evidence of enemy battlefield

preparation continued to increase. In an effort to disrupt the enemy's timetable the USAF flew more than 80 B-52 missions in the Tan Chanh area during the first three weeks of February.¹¹

(C) President Nixon's visit to Communist China from 21 to 28 February led many to believe that the enemy would attempt widespread activity to discredit this important meeting between the two powers. Once again the enemy acted contrary to intelligence estimates. He continued to avoid direct engagements but increased his interdicting attacks on the lines of communication and minor installations. The number of prisoners and Hoi Chanh decreased to a trickle. In previous years, this had signaled impending attack. Surveillance continued to detect an eastward movement of enemy supplies into Kontum Province in greater amounts than ever before. Still, the offensive was delayed because the NVA/VC units had difficulty in moving their supplies forward into attack positions due to heavy US B-52 and TACAIR strikes on the base areas in response to air cavalry surveillance and ARVN intelligence reports. Therefore, the Tet period was peaceful. Nevertheless, enemy preparation of the battlefield included bunker and road construction, reconnaissance operations, and movement into attack positions, all of which portended a massive enemy offensive. The attack awaited only an adequate enemy personnel and logistical situation and favorable weather conditions.¹²

(C) To further bolster the defense of the highlands, the Airborne Division Headquarters and another brigade moved to Kontum in the first week of March and took over responsibility for defense of Kontum City and the southern portion of Kontum Province. After the middle of March contacts with larger enemy units began to increase significantly. One major incident was initiated by the actions of the 2d Airborne Brigade along Rocket Ridge, which resulted in the capture of several PWs and one Hoi Chanh. The contacts were with NVA battalion size forces and marked the end of the period of enemy reluctance to engage in major combat. The rallier and PWs reported that the 320th NVA Division would support the B-3 Front and participate in an offensive during the period April to September. These sources also reported seeing many tanks in the base areas through which they had moved and hearing that NVA armor units would accompany B-3 Front ground forces during the coming offensive. They also told of massive casualties and materiel destruction inflicted on units in their area by B-52 strikes.¹³

(U) There were three other significant enemy contacts. One of these occurred 30 kilometers north of Kontum City where the 23d Ranger Battalion was surrounded while assessing a B-52 strike.

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Heavy tactical airstrikes, artillery, and supporting B-52 strikes were required to assist the rangers' breakout. A lesser engagement occurred between the 95th Border Ranger Battalion and the 141st Regiment, 2d NVA Division, north of Ben Het. At the end of the month elements of the 47th Regiment and the 2d Airborne Brigade again made heavy contact along Rocket Ridge. The friendly forces took a heavy toll of the attacking NVA forces with the support of B-52s and US and VNAF tactical air.

(C) These successful ARVN offensive actions and the enemy failure to launch his announced offensive on schedule unduly affected the II Corps staff; they began to doubt whether the enemy possessed the capability to attack his stated objectives. They felt that the continued pressure on the enemy through increased patrolling, the aggressiveness of the 2d Airborne Brigade, and the relentless use of available air resources had harassed the enemy sufficiently to delay his preparation of the battlefield. Therefore, continued ARVN aggressive ground activity and massive air support would deny the enemy the initiative and reduce the size, duration, and effectiveness of the planned offensive.¹⁴

(C) In the first week of April this estimate appeared to be accurate as the 320th NVA Division's 48th and 52nd Regiments sustained heavy losses in assaults on the fire bases on Rocket Ridge. B-52s and tactical aircraft continued to pound at the massed enemy forces in this area until four to five enemy battalions were rendered combat ineffective. A prisoner taken in one of these attacks confirmed this information. He reported that reinforcements were infiltrating daily, however, and the units were regaining their original strength. At the same time the 42d and 47th ARVN Regiments were in heavy contact north and east of Dak To with elements of the 2d NVA Division and the 66th Regiment of the enemy B-3 Front. Prisoners captured in these contacts indicated that the mission of the 2d Division was to seize Dak To II airfield and the headquarters of the 42d ARVN Regiment at Tan Canh, as well as to destroy friendly artillery units along Provincial Route 512. The 66th Regiment had reconnoitered the Tan Canh compound and was in

the final planning stages for the attack. The prisoners did not know the time for the attack but were certain that it was imminent.¹⁵

(C) Hearing these reports, LTG Dzu felt that he had insufficient forces in the Dak To area to counter a multi-divisional NVA attack. He wanted to bolster the Dak To forces with nine ARVN battalions from Binh Dinh and thus leave that province stripped of ARVN regular forces and defended only by territorial forces. Mr. Vann, however, convinced LTG Dzu that such a move might prove disastrous. Vann proposed that the area of operations of the 23d Division be adjusted to give it some responsibility in Kontum and thus eliminate the need to move the battalions from Binh Dinh. With this plan the friendly order of battle showed the 22d Division with a total of 13 battalions consisting of three border ranger battalions, eight ARVN infantry battalions and scout companies, cavalry, sector forces, and 50 tubes of artillery; the Airborne Division with six airborne battalions, one border ranger battalion, and 16 tubes of artillery; Kontum sector with a ranger group of two battalions and territorial forces; and 50 tanks belonging to the 19th and 14th Cavalry Regiments spread between Pleiku and Ben Het.

(C) This realignment strained the logistical support of ARVN forces north of Vo Dinh due to the limited capability of the single road into the area. In this posture the ARVN forces were extremely vulnerable to an envelopment which would isolate all forces north of Vo Dinh. However, LTG Dzu ignored these logistical problems, perhaps because he was under orders from President Thieu to hold territory at all costs. The pressure continued to increase, however, as the enemy buildup continued.

(C) His problems were compounded by the ineffective leadership of COL Dat, the 22d Division Commander, whose inept handling of a combat assault by the 9th Airborne Battalion resulted in the loss of two helicopters, a failure to exploit two B-52 strikes, and divisiveness between the 22d Division and the Airborne Division.¹⁶

THE ATTACK ON TAN CANH

(U) On 14 April Fire Support Base Charlie (See Fig. K-2) on the northern end of Rocket Ridge received over 300 mixed 105mm howitzer and 75mm recoilless rifle rounds followed by a ground attack from the 48th NVA Regiment. Although US Cobras and tactical aircraft were able to slow the initial advance, at 2230 hours the 11th Airborne Battalion was forced to withdraw. MAJ John Duffy, the Senior Advisor to the battalion, was the last to

leave the position. He noted that five of the nine enemy anti-aircraft guns that had ringed the fire base had been destroyed and that as many as 1,000 bodies from the attacking enemy forces were lying on the perimeter wire.¹⁷

(C) The 42d and 47th ARVN Regiments continued their attempts to control the ridgelines around Tan Canh and Dak To II, but slowly fell back to the main compound. On the 19th the 1st Battalion of

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the 42d was isolated by an estimated two enemy battalions, making resupply impossible. COL Dat made only feeble attempts to relieve this force. On the 21st, after running out of ammunition, 63 of the 360 men in the battalion filtered back to the regimental compound.¹⁸

(U) On 20 April, the Vietnamese Joint General Staff required the release of one airborne brigade of three battalions and the division light command post from Military Region II. To fill the gap, the 6th Ranger Group was brought in from Hue, and the 23d Division assumed the old Airborne Division area of operations with its 53d Regiment.

(U) At 1930 hours on 21 April, after several days of heavy artillery attacks, the ARVN forces at Fire Support Base Delta on Rocket Ridge were overrun. The defenders, composed of one airborne company and one company of the 2d Ranger Group, had held until an NVA attack supported by three tanks forced them to withdraw. On 22 April in order to offset the setbacks on Rocket Ridge and give depth to the battlefield, LTG Dzu moved some of his artillery to Dien Binh in Dak To District. Vann had urged this move for several weeks but had been previously unable to convince Dzu of its value.¹⁹

(U) By 23 April the defenses in the Tan Canh area appeared adequate. The airborne brigade and rangers at the fire support bases on Rocket Ridge were well supplied. Their American advisors considered them to be excellent combat units. The 47th ARVN Regiment at Dak To II had a company of tanks and one airborne battalion in support. They also had two 106mm recoilless rifles and numerous M-72 light antitank weapons (LAW). The 22d Division at Tan Canh had the 42d Regiment and one battalion of the 41st Regiment near the compound. The garrison comprised 1,200 troops, which included 900 from the support elements not organized into the defensive plan of the compound. For antitank defense the compound had two 106mm recoilless rifles, over one hundred M-72s, and a company of M-41 tanks. More than 50 tubes of 105mm and 155mm artillery were in support. The area appeared to be prepared for the multi-division attack which threatened.²⁰

(U) By 23 April, although signs of an imminent enemy offensive had been present since early January, the long awaited campaign had not yet begun. Contacts with large units of regular NVA forces had increased significantly in the previous two weeks as the Tan Canh/Dak To II area had become encircled by hostile forces. The artillery fire had increased from 20 to 50 rounds per day in late March and early April to approximately 1,000 rounds a day in the previous two weeks. The enemy had already secured key terrain to the north and

east of the Tan Canh compound and were able to place accurate observed fire onto the forces inside.

(U) Lying on top of a bunker on the northeast side of the Tan Canh perimeter on 23 April, CPT Raymond H. Dobbins, acting Senior Advisor to the 42d ARVN Regiment, paid little attention to the constant volleys of artillery and rocket fire which fell like rain on the beleaguered 22d Division forward compound. Although he was completely exposed to this deadly and accurate fire, he calmly and methodically directed US airstrikes onto targets given him by his Vietnamese counterpart. He knew that one battalion of the 42d, supported by four M-41 tanks, in a nearby operation was also taking a fierce pounding from the mixed 122mm rocket, 130mm artillery, and 82mm mortar fire and needed the US airpower he was coordinating if they were to clear the area which was dangerously close to their perimeter. His attention was momentarily diverted to the area of the main gate where one of the M-41 tanks had gone to unload a crewman who had been wounded by small arms fire. At that moment a brilliant flash and accompanying roar signified that the tank had been hit by an enemy antitank weapon and destroyed. Due to the frequency with which the enemy had been utilizing the B-40 rocket, the Vietnamese immediately reported this as the cause of the explosion to CPT Dobbins. Dobbins quickly radioed a spot report to the division tactical operations center (DTCO) where the call was taken by MAJ Jon Wise, the G3 advisor who brought it to the attention of COL Philip Kaplan, the Senior Advisor to the 22d Division and LTC Terrence McClain, the Deputy Senior Advisor at the 22d DTCO. After a brief discussion the three agreed that the terrain was not suitable for a B-40 rocket since its effective range is only 200 meters and the enemy was over 500 meters from where the tank was hit. COL Kaplan, LTC McClain and MAJ George Carter, the Senior Advisor to the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment, proceeded to the destroyed tank. At that moment a wire guided missile whisked over their heads and struck another tank some 150 meters to the north of their position at the main gate. LTC McClain ran to the vehicle gathering up some 30 to 40 meters of thin copper wire. He noticed a small hole about the size of a silver dollar in the frontal armor. Underneath the tank was the tail assembly of a rocket. Examination revealed this assembly to be about three inches in diameter with two bobbins of wire and two jet nozzles attached to the body. The three advisors quickly returned to the division TOC as Dobbins continued to direct air strikes. Before Kaplan, McClain, and Carter could return to the DTCO, two more guided missiles were fired from the high ground to the northeast in the vicinity of a Buddhist

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pagoda. All agreed that the introduction of this sophisticated equipment might signal the beginning of the long-awaited offensive. The time was 1031 hours. At that moment a large explosion rocked the DTOC sending people and equipment crashing about; then all was quiet except for the unceasing artillery fire which continued to shake the earth above.

(U) The division TOC was a 45 by 30 foot reinforced bunker constructed of beams and pierced steel planking with a double layer of sandbags and was buried about eight feet underground. The impact of the blast had tossed everyone about like matchsticks and blown out several walls. The DTOC communications room and equipment and the sleeping area of the division TOC officers had been destroyed. As LTC McClain pulled himself to his feet, a ringing sensation caused by the blast continued. He soon realized that COL Kaplan and MAJ Wise had serious head wounds. No other Americans appeared injured, but there were about 20 ARVN dead and seriously wounded on the debris-strewn floor of the damaged DTOC. 1LT John Jones, an operations officer, and CPT David Stewart, division signal advisor, began to bandage Wise and Kaplan, while McClain treated the wounded ARVN. While the wounded were being cared for, COL Kaplan noticed that smoke had begun to fill the DTOC. The creosoted timbers which reinforced the bunker in the communications room had been ignited by the blast and had started to burn furiously. There were no fire extinguishers present, and after several futile attempts to douse the flames with water, the bunker was evacuated. COL Kaplan and LTC McClain insured that everyone was removed from the bunker before they departed.²¹

(C) Meanwhile, Stewart and MAJ Julius Warmath started to set up a new division TOC in the 42d Regiment TOC using US signal equipment. The division slowly regained a part of its composure, but a seed of doubt had been planted in the mind of their leader, COL Dat. The wire guided missile had devastated more than the command bunker; it had shattered the 22d Division's confidence in itself. A feeling that the NVA were better soldiers and must win had seemed to take hold on nearly every responsible individual. By noon the enemy had taken a heavy toll of the ARVN forces through the use of the wire guided missile. The five M-41 tanks within the compound were all destroyed by the missiles. Several bunkers were hit in addition to the division TOC. But the most important destruction had been psychological. At 1100 hours Vann, despite heavy enemy artillery fire, landed at Tan Canh to inquire about the decaying situation. He noticed that there was no ARVN counterbattery fire and that the MEDEVAC of wounded ARVN soldiers was entirely an American effort. After dis-

cussing the situation with the advisors, Vann directed them to implement their plan for escape and evasion. He then departed, taking with him several Vietnamese civilians who were employed by the advisors.²²

(U) LTC McClain and MAJ Warmath worked constantly during the afternoon to insure that all of the wounded were evacuated. In addition to directing the helicopters through increasing artillery fire, the advisory team also carried the litter patients to the aircraft. The remainder of the advisors were engaged in the direction of TACAIR onto enemy targets near the compound. With the exception of the increased artillery fire and small ground probes the remainder of the afternoon and early evening passed without significant incidents. The enemy did not move until 1900 hours when they lined up ten B-40 and B-41 rocket launchers on the high ground near the L-19 airstrip. Aided by the heavy barrage of artillery which kept the ARVN forces under cover, they were able to lob rounds of B-40 into the ammunition dump. One of several direct hits ignited a large fire which set off a chain of explosions and destroyed the stored ammunition. At 2100 hours CPT Richard Cassidy, the District Advisor of Dak To District, received word from his counterpart that tanks were moving through the hamlet of Dak Brung toward Dak To District Headquarters. Cassidy relayed this report to the 22d Division TOC and requested that a Spectre C-130 gunship be made available to counter this threat.²³

(C) At 2300 hours Spectre arrived in the Tan Canh area and immediately began to scan the Dak Brung hamlet area with its infrared and television tracking mechanisms. After 15 minutes the gunship located a column of 18 tanks moving from west to east toward Dak To District Headquarters. The Spectre reported this discovery to the 22d Division advisors and began to engage the tanks with the airborne 105mm cannon. Within Tan Canh this discovery caused a flurry of activity. LTC Thong, commander of the 42d Regiment, sent his deputy to the water tower on the northwest side of the perimeter to direct airstrikes onto the approaching enemy. CPT Ken Yonan, Deputy Senior Advisor, 42d Regiment, accompanied him to the tower and prepared to direct Spectre onto the tanks if they turned toward Tan Canh. Because a major attack appeared to be developing and ARVN was not attempting any countermeasures, COL Kaplan called his advisory team together and insured that they knew the escape and evasion plan. He then placed the advisors in bunkers to await the outcome of the initial engagements.²⁴

(U) Meanwhile, the Spectre had reported three tank kills around Dak Brung hamlet. Local terri-

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torial forces captured one of these tanks and found no visible damage. When a group of NVA sappers came down the road, the territorials fled, and the enemy drove the tank away. Evidently, Spectre's 105mm cannon was having little success in destroying the enemy tanks. Since the vehicles were T-54s (or Chinese Communist T-57s), the only vulnerable points to attack from high altitude with high explosive ammunition were the rear fuel tanks and rear engine compartment. A hit anywhere else caused casualties among the crew but did not usually disable the vehicle.²⁵

(U) About midnight the enemy armor column turned south toward Tan Canh and the 22d Division. COL Kaplan advised the ARVN artillery commander to get his people to fire on the tanks before they were overrun. His pleas were answered with a four gun volley which Spectre observed to hit one POL vehicle and land within five feet of one of the advancing T-54s. Kaplan applauded the Vietnamese for their efforts, but an intense counterbarrage of enemy artillery sent the ARVN artillerymen scrambling for their bunkers and ended the attempt to hit the oncoming enemy with indirect fire.²⁶

To reach the 22d Division compound, the enemy column had to cross two bridges. Both bridges were defended by a platoon of territorial forces. Because they had no antitank capability, these local troops evacuated their bridge positions when faced with the advancing armor. This incident demonstrated a lack of coordination between the regular and territorial forces. Both bridges were along likely avenues of approach and spanned unfordable streams. The 22d ARVN Division Headquarters, however, believed that the sector forces had prepared the bridges for destruction; this was not the case, and the failure was not realized until it was too late. The tanks continued into the outskirts of Tan Canh Village. Some of them stopped there while others drove back towards Dak To. Spectre requested permission to fire on the tanks which had entered Tan Canh, but was refused because of the ARVN dependents in the village.

(U) Dobbins persuaded LTC Thong to deploy one company of the 42d in tank hunter/killer teams to seek out the enemy armor. Their efforts were rewarded with reports of two kills by these teams on the western edge of town. At 0328 hours on 24 April Spectre reported ten of the tanks had split off from Tan Canh and traveled to the high ground north of the compound near the L-19 strip. The remaining vehicles were proceeding south of Tan Canh Village and then west toward the compound. Spectre returned to Pleiku to refuel and rearm and was replaced by another Spectre gunship armed with two 20mm cannons and two 40mm cannons incapable of destroying a T-54. However,

from his vantage point in the water tower CPT Yonan was able to place Spectre's fire onto troop concentrations which were moving closer to the compound.

(U) Dobbins had been on the east side of the perimeter near the main gate with LTC Thong since the first reports of the enemy armor were received. Shortly before 0600 hours the tanks began their attack through the early morning haze. As they assaulted they raked the front line bunkers of the perimeter near the main gate with machine gun fire. Simultaneously, the tanks which had moved to the high ground near the L-19 airstrip supported by fire an infantry assault on the northern perimeter, while a second infantry assault hit the southern perimeter which was defended by the reconnaissance company of the 42d Regiment. Dobbins informed the TOC of the advance of the armor and of a mass exodus of ARVN soldiers through the perimeter. The sight and sound of the advancing enemy armor had proved too much for the 900 undisciplined and unorganized support troops within the compound, and they fled in fear. The tanks crossed the bridge and moved on line toward the main gate. Dobbins and LTC Thong remained in positions near the gate in an attempt to build up the confidence of the combat troops there who had seen the support troops break and flee in terror.

(U) After he received the report that the support troops had fled, COL Kaplan diagnosed the situation as critical. He alerted the division advisors to prepare for extraction if the ARVN did not hold. Five minutes later Dobbins reported that the advancing tanks were at the main gate and that the ARVN was unable to stop them. His transmission was cut out by three 105mm shells which struck the TOC and knocked down the antennas. At this report the division advisors recognized that they were in no position to continue to influence the action by their presence. They left the TOC, secured their weapons, radio, and two LAWs and went into the compound, proceeding to the water tower. CPT Yonan was still perched there in the hope of thwarting the attack if TACAIR arrived. Unfortunately, the morning haze rendered high performance aircraft ineffective and helicopter gunships were still 30 minutes away. CPT Stewart, who was carrying a PRC-25, radioed Yonan and told him to come down out of the tower and move with them to the west where they would be extracted. Yonan said he could not move at that time, but would join them later. His reply was silenced by the sound of two rounds of T-54 main gun shells as they exploded on the water tower. Another quick call by Stewart to Yonan to evacuate the tower received the reply that he was uninjured but could not leave at that time.²⁷

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(C) Dodging artillery, the advisors ran to the western perimeter. There they saw a burning T-54 tank barreling down the road from the north just outside the wire. The tank was past their position before they could engage with their LAWs. However, as a second tank came into view LTC McClain and LT Jones prepared their weapons for engagement but were frustrated by two malfunctions as the second T-54 moved quickly past. Fortunately there was no infantry in support of the two tanks. Seizing this opportunity to escape entrapment, the advisors moved quickly across the road. Ahead of them lay 200 meters of friendly minefield. A wounded ARVN soldier lay nearby. While being given first aid, the soldier told the advisors he knew the way through the minefield. He led them across the field to the other side of the clearing. Here they took up positions and pondered their next move.²⁸

(C) Mr. Vann had been awake most of the previous night as reports filtered into the II Corps headquarters in Pleiku. At first light on 24 April he and his pilot, CPT Richard Todd, were in the air heading for Tan Canh. He had had no communication with the advisors since the enemy armor had assaulted the compound. Arriving over Tan Canh, Vann was able to establish communication with Stewart on the ground. Vann viewed the situa-

tion and asked how best he could pick up the advisors. COL Kaplan replied that they would move 200 more meters to the west, away from small arms fire. While six men moved, the remaining three covered them. These three then joined the first group. Finally it was decided that Vann could come in in his OH-68 helicopter and extract the first group of advisors. In this group were MAJ Carter, MAJ Warmath, CPT Kellar, LT Jones, SGT Ward, and SP Zollenkopher. As Vann left with the first group several frightened ARVN soldiers hung onto the skids of the helicopter. Fearing that the dangling Vietnamese would fall before he could reach Ben Het, Vann set down at Dak To II, where LTC Robert Brownlee and CPT Charles Carden, advisors to the 47th Regiment, awaited them. Vann then headed back for Tan Canh and the remaining advisors. As he landed, the aircraft was swamped by 15 to 20 panic-stricken ARVN soldiers. While attempting to lift off, the helicopter crashed, but Vann and CPT Todd escaped. They were picked up shortly by another aircraft which then located the three remaining advisors, Kaplan, McClain and Stewart. Panicky ARVN troops again tried unsuccessfully to crowd aboard, but the aircraft lifted off without them. Thirty minutes later the party landed at Pleiku.

THE ATTACK ON DAK TO II

(U) Meanwhile, Dak To II came under increasing fire and some ground probes less than an hour after the attack on Tan Canh had begun. The helicopter originally scheduled to be used for the command and control helicopter of the 22d Division was diverted to Dak To II where it was to evacuate the six 22d Division advisors. CPT Carden had noted the NVA antiaircraft weapons on his map and he briefed the aircraft pilot over the radio. The aircraft made its approach from the southwest and weaved its way to the compound helipad where the six passengers awaited. The helicopter took some small arms fire from the dense undergrowth around the perimeter but landed and then lifted off without damage. However, contrary to instructions, the pilot exited to the northwest and flew into a crossfire of two antiaircraft guns. The helicopter burst into flames and crashed on the southern side of the perimeter. Carden concluded that there were no survivors.²⁹

(U) Back in the 42d Regiment's compound Dobbins had chosen to remain until the bitter end. He and LTC Thong were feverishly working to reconstitute the defenses of the shattered troops of the 42d. By 0630 hours the enemy had pierced the northeast perimeter with their armor, closely followed by the infantry. After initially repelling

an enemy infantry battalion on the southern perimeter, the outnumbered reconnaissance company had been overrun by weight of numbers, although more than 100 enemy had been killed. The northwestern perimeter was penetrated by a battalion infantry assault and then exploited by a platoon of T-54s.

(U) The enemy artillery continued to fire throughout the attack. When the weather finally cleared enough for high performance aircraft, Dobbins relayed targets to the forward air controllers who then marked them with smoke. The tanks stopped and did not attempt evasive action; they served as decoys for the antiaircraft gunners. When the NVA 37mm antiaircraft guns fired, however, they were targeted by the forward air controllers. Dobbins and Thong continually moved from bunker to bunker, hiding in culverts and whatever else would lend them cover. At 1000 hours LTC Thong lost all contact with his elements, and both men decided there was nothing else they could do to influence the situation. Dobbins' recent attempts to contact Yonan had been fruitless. It appeared unlikely that Yonan was still alive in view of the pounding that side of the compound had taken. (Editor's Note: CPT Yonan's name was included on the POW list released by Hanoi in late January 1973.) LTC Thong directed Dobbins to follow him

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as he led the way to his quarters within the inner perimeter. They were followed by about 19 ARVN soldiers. Arriving at the hut, Thong opened a trap door revealing a hidden bunker. Climbing inside they closed the door and settled into the darkness as the fighting overhead slowly dwindled to a few isolated pockets of resistance.³⁰

(U) After reporting the crash of the UH-1 at Dak To II, CPT Carden and LTC Brownlee tried vainly to find their counterparts and the 47th command group. The regimental TOC was deserted, and it appeared that the command group had already decided it was time to exit the danger area. While looking for someone in command, Carden viewed the arrival of two T-54 tanks on the airstrip. One T-54 proceeded to the west end of the airfield along the north road to cover the highway leading into Dak To II from Ben Het where COL Dat had erroneously positioned the bulk of his armor. The other T-54 wheeled into the center of the airfield from the north and systematically attacked the bunker defenses of the 47th Regiment's command post. The two remaining operational M-41 tanks maneuvered to the west flank of the T-54 and took it under fire with three rounds each. Carden was only 100 meters from the NVA tank and observed direct hits and smoke, but the enemy tank was not knocked out. The T-54 recovered quickly and destroyed one M-41 with a second round hit, and immediately thereafter the enemy tank destroyed the other M-41 with one round. The wounded crew members abandoned their burning tanks.

(U) At this time a relief column of two platoons of M-41s plus a platoon of infantry left Ben Het to counterattack the NVA forces around Dak To II. They crossed the Dak Mot bridge and were ambushed by a large NVA force holding the high ground just east of the bridge. Enemy B-40 and recoilless rifle fire destroyed all of the M-41s and scattered the infantry.³¹

(U) This was the last ARVN counterattack on the 24th. After the tank battle, Carden located LTC Brownlee. Both men decided the compound was in imminent danger of being overrun in the absence of control of the 47th Regiment and the 9th Airborne Battalion, also located in the compound. At about 1000 hours Carden witnessed friendly forces moving toward the south. The departure of the airborne troops, extraction of the US advisors, and the desertion of their command group were the final blows in shattering the confidence of the 47th Regiment. With no one to control them they began to leave their positions and head out of the compound. Brownlee and Carden realized that they could no longer influence the situation and that no further fighting was going to occur that day. They gathered together their radios and supplies,

burned some documents, and moved out of the base camp toward the southeast. The two advisors and their Vietnamese interpreter and driver attempted to cross a small footbridge over the Dak Poko River which flows along the southern boundary of the compound. However, the airborne battalion and elements of the 47th Regiment who had followed them were pinned down by a large volume of fire. The river was clogged with the bodies of the dead and wounded who had been chopped down while attempting to cross the footbridge. Realizing it was impossible to cross the river at that location, Brownlee and Carden moved westward along the riverbank until they reached a likely fording spot about 700 meters up the river from the bridge. As they attempted to ford the river they came under an intense volume of both direct and indirect fire. When the group finally crossed the river and were climbing up the steep bank on the other side, Carden noticed LTC Brownlee having trouble climbing the bank. At that moment the volume of fire increased again. Carden was forced to abandon his position on top of the river bank and hurry into the dense underbrush about 100 meters away. When the firing slackened off several minutes later, Carden moved cautiously back to the riverbank in an attempt to locate LTC Brownlee. He moved several hundred meters up and down the stream in his search but was unable to locate Brownlee. LTC Brownlee was not heard from again. Carden and the two Vietnamese began to head south toward Fire Support Base Vida where they were picked up two days later.

(C) Day long US TACAIR strikes on the enemy around Tan Canh had shaken the bunker where Dobbins and the 20 ARVN had hidden. At 2000 hours, Dobbins divided the South Vietnamese up into three-man groups and prepared to escape. The moon was full and they were detected as they neared the southwest side of the perimeter. Four men were killed before the group finally found concealment in a pigpen on the eastern bunker line. At midnight the group again attempted to escape. This time they were caught in the illumination of a flare by Spectre which was firing on targets in the area. Once again they were detected, losing several more men to small arms fire. They returned to the pigpen and waited until about 0430 hours when the moon finally set for the night. A low ground fog also covered their moves as they successfully passed through the perimeter on this try. They proceeded south several kilometers and were spotted and picked up the next day.³²

(C) The attacking enemy units at Tan Canh and Dak To II were part of the 2d NVA Division. Battalions of the 1st and 141st NVA Regiment formed the infantry assault along with the D-10

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Two Communist tanks were destroyed in the middle of the runway at Dak To Airfield April 24 by fighter-bombers of the Republic of Vietnam Air Force. The airfield is adjacent to Route 512, three miles south of Dak To.

Sapper Battalion. The T-54 tanks which supported the assaults were from one battalion of the enemy 203d Tank Regiment. The attack was well-coordinated in spite of several miscues in timing, and the use of conventional tactics by the enemy was not new in the Indochina War. What was significant, however, was the heavy commitment of front line NVA troops in an all-out effort. During prior offensives such as Tet of 1968, VC units had led the attacks, but the attack on Tan Canh was primarily an NVA effort. During the 24th and 25th of

April the North Vietnamese consolidated their gains and extended their control west of the Dak To II airstrip and south to Dien Binh. Captured ARVN equipment included twenty-three 105mm howitzers, seven 155mm howitzers, 14,000 rounds of artillery ammunition, and other materiel. Among the missing were COL Dat and his entire staff.³³

(C) The 320th NVA Division continued to pressure the remaining fire support bases on Rocket Ridge during the attacks on Tan Canh and Dak To II (See Fig. K-2). On 25 April the decision

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was made by LTG Dzu to abandon the precarious positions at Fire Support Bases 5 and 6, affording the NVA covered movement down Route 14 to Kontum City. In addition, the enemy could now force ARVN to abandon its defensive positions along the route by bringing a heavy volume of fire to bear on them. At the same time as the enemy thrust in Kontum Province, the 3d NVA Division and VC main force units attacked the three northernmost districts in Binh Dinh Province. Although the 40th and 41st Regiments of the 22d ARVN Division had been quite successful in recent combat with VC units, the NVA regulars forced them

to break and run from Landing Zone (LZ) English and other fire bases in the area. This focused allied attention on the threat to Kontum City, as the NVA came within reach of their goal of cutting South Vietnam in two. The Vietnamese Joint General Staff and the US Command began to give more credence to John Paul Vann's contention that the enemy campaigns at Quang Tri and An Loc were limited in scope and that the NVA's real goal was to take Kontum, Pleiku, and Binh Dinh Provinces by multidivision attacks across the highlands.

THE ENEMY APPROACH ON KONTUM

(U) To combat the successes of the NVA offensive the II Corps staff activated the following plan. COL Ba, 23d Division commander, would command all forces in Kontum Province. Four battalions of rangers would occupy blocking positions at Vo Dinh and south along the Dak Poko River. The 53d ARVN Regiment was given the responsibility for Kontum City. The 22d Ranger Battalion moved to Ploi Kleng to reinforce the battalion of border rangers there. In addition, Vann placed B-52 strikes along Rocket Ridge and over the evacuated fire support bases. Thousands of refugees, remnants of the 22d Division, and missing US advisors in enemy held areas limited the number of airstrikes. To alleviate this problem TACAIR was utilized with over 180 sorties flown during the period 24 to 26 April.

(C) By 28 April much of the 23d Division staff was enroute to Kontum City. COL Ba was faced with the difficult task of molding a conglomeration of units into a cohesive defense. The only 23d Division unit remaining under his command was the 53d Regiment. The 2d and 6th Ranger Groups, an airborne brigade, and sector forces under COL Long comprised the remaining forces under COL Ba's command (each of these unit commanders reported through nine different chains of command). Several of these full colonels resented taking orders from another colonel, and as a result COL Ba had an increasingly difficult time attempting to get them to respond to his orders. Many times they would not show up for coordination meetings, making it impossible to adequately plan for the defense. To solve the problem Vann suggested to LTG Dzu that his deputy, MG Phong, and Vann's deputy, BG John Hill, fly to Kontum each morning at 0800 hours to preside over the staff meetings. Their presence insured the attendance of the unit commanders and permitted the defense to be planned. COL John Truby, the acting Senior Advisor to the 23d Division, was given the monu-

mental task of advising the division staff on the concepts of a conventional defense within a limited time. The 23d Division advisors also had to explain details such as limiting points, coordination of units on the perimeter, reduction of penetrations, and so forth.

(C) To insure the division maximum time to train and prepare for the defense, COL Ba assigned the 2d and 6th Ranger Groups to the critical mission of delaying along Route 14 between Tan Canh and Kontum. The defensive plan established an outer defensive line seven kilometers from the center of the city with a delaying position four kilometers in front of the final defensive positions on the edge of the city. Four 155mm howitzers and forty-four 105mm howitzers were available for fire support. The northern and western approaches were defended by rangers, while the 53d Regiment defended the east and south.

(C) On 26 April LTG Dzu was ordered to Saigon to see President Thieu. When he returned to Pleiku, he brought word that he had a heart ailment which would cause him to be committed to a hospital in Saigon. Dzu appeared to be shaken by his visit to Saigon and did not wish to discuss it with anyone. Dzu eventually left for the hospital in Saigon on 10 May and was replaced by MG Toan.³⁴

(U) The 6th Ranger Group arrived in Military Region 2 on 24 April from the Hue battlefield where it had been heavily engaged. MAJ James Givens, Senior Advisor to the 6th Ranger Group, had listened to the fall of Tan Canh on the radio as the group moved into position at Fire Support Base Bravo. This base was just north of Vo Dinh where the group was collocated with the 2d Airborne Brigade Command Post (See Fig. K-2). The next day the airborne brigade was ordered to Kontum to board transportation for Saigon and the 6th Group moved nearer Kontum to Fire Support Base November. From Lam Son, a long, high piece of key terrain with a commanding view of

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Highway 14 north of Vo Dinh and south toward Kontum, Givens and his assistant, CPT Vannie, observed the remnants of the 22d Division struggle past their position in groups of from 5 to 15 people with very few small arms and no crew-served weapons; many of the troops had no steel helmets or web gear. They had discarded these items in their haste to flee the attacking NVA forces. Although unorganized, there was no panic among the stragglers, who gave the appearance of Sunday strollers.

(U) Throughout the 25th and 26th increasing attacks-by-fire hit the group command post. The group had not received heavy casualties, but at 1500 hours on the 27th Givens and Vannie, along with the ranger group command post, were airlifted to Fire Support Base November over the objections of Givens that the command post should remain with the major elements of the group at Lam Son. The remaining ranger battalions, the 34th and 35th, continued to receive ground probes and attacks-by-fire. At 0500 hours on 1 May the

crews of four M-41 tanks at Lam Son abandoned their vehicles in the face of an NVA attack. The NVA then occupied the tanks, which VNAF TAC-AIR and a USAF Stinger gunship successfully destroyed, and the attack was repulsed.

(U) At 1800 hours the 23d Division Combat Advisory Team contacted Givens and informed him that the airborne artillery battery had departed Lam Son. Givens hurried to confirm this with the group commander, LTC De, but was told that the group headquarters had no contact with its two battalions at Lam Son. At 1930 hours contact was reestablished with the withdrawing ranger units. They were moving well to the south of Lam Son, carrying 50 wounded and their crew-served weapons with them. Asking why the artillery had abandoned the fire support base, Givens discovered that LTC De had ordered his two infantry battalions to withdraw; thus, the artillery was left without local security and forced to leave. On 4 May LTG Dzu relieved LTC De for failing to hold Fire Support Base November.³³



Ranger groups leaving Kontum after being replaced by the 44th and 45th ARVN Regiments.

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(C) This matter convinced Mr. Vann to persuade LTG Dzu that the remaining organic units of the 23d Division, the 44th and 45th Regiments, should be brought to Kontum to replace the two ranger groups and the airborne brigade with no resultant loss in manpower. Dzu accepted this proposal. On 6 May the 46th Regiment moved up Route 14 from Pleiku and was exchanged for the 8th Ranger Group.³⁶

(C) From 24 April to 5 May attacks-by-fire on the ranger camps which were astride the NVA supply routes increased. Ben Het and Polei Kleng bore the brunt of these sporadic attacks because they hindered the enemy's movement of supplies into his assembly areas for the attack on Kontum City. On 6 May at 1200 hours Polei Kleng received heavy artillery fire. Over 50 rounds fell in an hour and a half before US air strikes temporarily stopped the enemy fire. When the forward air controllers left station at 1515 hours, however, the volume of fire once again increased until 500 rounds had fallen by 1900 hours that day. The systematic destruction of each bunker within the compound indicated that the fire was being adjusted. The command bunker, where advisors CPT Geddes MacLaren and LT Paul McKenna were directing US air support, was struck by several direct hits. At 1730 hours a round collapsed the walls and blew out an oak door. The two advisors dug their way out of the rubble and moved to open foxholes nearer the perimeter. The enemy forward observers then systematically destroyed all the buildings above ground, all of the bunkers, and knocked down the antennas. The repeated accurate shelling demoralized the ARVN ranger defenders. When McKenna attempted to find the battalion commander at 1800 hours, he found that the commander had fled from the compound. On his return to the limited cover of his foxhole, he observed the enemy using flashing red beacons to signal their infantry who were poised for the

attack. At 1900 hours, despite the heavy anti-aircraft fire an OH-6 landed to extract the advisors. The camp continued to hold on for three more days through continuous indirect fire and ground attacks by the 64th NVA Regiment. The enemy's massing of forces to seize Polei Kleng provided lucrative targets for the sixteen US B-52 strikes employed in the area during the three days of extended attack. A Hoi Chanh later attested to the effectiveness of B-52 strikes against the forces attacking Polei Kleng. He reported that his company of 100 men had sustained 40 killed and many more wounded. At 0500 hours on 9 May, however, the ARVN forces were wedged out of Polei Kleng by an assault of NVA tanks and infantry. LTG Dzu then directed anything within the evacuated perimeter to be taken under fire.

(C) During this period Ben Het Ranger Camp received a total of 400 to 500 rounds of mixed caliber indirect fire. On 7 May the 71st Ranger Battalion mutinied and gave the battalion commander an ultimatum to extract the unit within 48 hours. Before the extraction was completed the camp was ringed by anti-aircraft weapons.³⁷

(U) At dawn on the 9th of May the North Vietnamese sent dogs into the perimeter wire to detonate mechanical mines. This tactic was followed at 0630 hours by a heavy ground attack supported by six PT-76 tanks. Two of the tanks, supported by infantry, assaulted the main gate but were knocked out by rangers using LAWs. At 0730 hours five PT-76 tanks attacked the eastern perimeter; two were knocked out by LAWs. The remainder retired after NVA infantry had seized the eastern perimeter. The rangers spent the rest of the day ejecting the enemy. By 1700 hours the perimeter was restored. The attacking NVA forces lost 11 tanks and over 100 dead in their attempt to overrun Ben Het. Although the forces there continued to be harassed, no more major assaults were made.

THE FIRST ATTACK ON KONTUM

(U) The air cavalry had not been idle during the period since Tan Canh. Daily missions over the battle area detected new trails, caches, and bunker complexes. The regional advisory group began using a regional command and control helicopter in which senior officers flew as observers and went where they could best influence the action. On 10 May BG John Hill stopped in Kontum to confer with COL John Truby about a sighting he had made just north of Vo Dinh. Hill was convinced that the area was a main assembly area for the attacking forces. A prisoner captured that same day confirmed that the 320th NVA Division had closed on its assembly area. Subsequently, B-52 strikes

were placed on the suspected positions.

(U) The 23d Division had continued its preparation for the defense of Kontum. COL Ba personally walked the entire perimeter. He criticized poor positions and talked encouragingly to his troops. Several tank hulls were pulled into open areas for targets and as many soldiers as possible were given the opportunity to fire the LAW in conjunction with a companion program which showed victorious ARVN soldiers beside T-54 tanks they had destroyed at An Loc and Quang Tri. The purpose was to instill in ARVN soldiers the confidence that they could destroy an attacking tank.

(U) Commanders coordinated at their limiting

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points and supervised the improvement of camouflage. Reserve forces practiced counterattacking possible penetrations. The division artillery planned fires around the perimeter. Sector forces were trained in calling for fire to show them that the division was going to give them all possible fire support. COL Ba ordered limited offensive operations which fixed the enemy and developed targets for the B-52 missions allocated to Military Region 2.

(U) On 12 May the 44th Regiment completed its replacement of the 2d Ranger Group astride Route 14, the probable main avenue of approach. The 44th Regiment's positions were approximately four kilometers northwest of Kontum. The ARVN soldiers were confident and believed that they could knock out NVA tanks with their organic weapons. COL Ba was more confident now that the 23d's own units were organized into the defense. At 0700 hours on 13 May, radio intercepts confirmed that the 320th NVA Division was in its final stage of preparation in its assembly area, confirming air cavalry reports of a large buildup of armor and troops just south of Vo Dinh.³⁹

(C) The enemy planned to attack as early as possible because they felt that US B-52s would hurt them if they remained long in their attack positions. Vann was skeptical about an imminent attack since no concentrated artillery preparations were falling on the 23d's defensive positions. Although there were scattered attacks-by-fire, the pattern of heavy bombardment before the attacks on Tan Canh and the fire support bases was absent. At 2230 hours a battalion of the 44th Regiment at Fire Support Base November reported many lights moving south on Highway 14 toward their positions. This report did not cause alarm until it was realized that NVA inexperience with night movement of armor vehicles had caused them to use their lights when moving into attack positions at Tan Canh. Shortly afterward COL Ba entered with a captured document which had been sent from the 320th Division artillery commander to one of his units. The message stated that all supporting artillery would support an attack by the 320th at 0400 hours on 14 May. COL Truby again talked to Vann and the Corps G-3. Although both still considered this contention hasty, Vann believed it was better to be prepared and told Truby he would get air assets to them at first light. At 0400 hours nothing happened. The 23d Division G-2, LTC Tieu, then brought in another captured document which delayed the attack one-half hour. The G-2 believed that since these orders were coming from B-3 Front Headquarters the times were probably Hanoi time — one hour later than Saigon time. At 0430 hours Fire Support Base November began to receive an increasing volume of indirect fire which continued

until 0630 hours, when the attack began.³⁹


(C) The NVA had been surprised at the ease with which they had taken Tan Canh. As a result they decided to attack Kontum City without a time-consuming artillery preparation. The attack had three major axes of advance (See Fig. K-3) oriented along Highway 14 from the north and northwest. The 48th NVA Regiment and one company of the 203d Tank Regiment attacked from the northwest along the west side of Route 14. The 64th NVA Regiment attacked south along the east side of the highway also with one company of supporting armor from the 203d Tank Regiment. The 28th NVA Regiment of the enemy B-3 Front advanced from the north against the 53d ARVN Regiment. The 141st Regiment of the 2d NVA Division probed the sector forces who defended the southern positions along the river.⁴⁰

(U) The air support was not yet on station when the call came into the DTOC that two columns of infantry with tanks were coming down Route 14. A quick call by COL Truby to the corps operations center launched US Cobras and the new weapon in the corps arsenal, the helicopter mounted TOW missile. The ARVN artillery commander quickly massed his artillery on the high speed avenue of approach, Route 14, and the 44th dispatched several tank killer teams armed with the LAW. The massed artillery made the T-54s easy prey for the tank killer teams by separating the attacking infantry from the tanks. LTC Thomas McKenna, Senior Advisor to the 44th Regiment, reported that ARVN soldiers, while admitting they were initially scared by the iron monsters, crawled out of their bunkers and engaged the tanks with their LAWs at point blank range. Two quick kills were made by the teams. Meanwhile, the helicopters with TOW missiles had arrived over Kontum. Before two of the tanks could reach the cover of the thick undergrowth along the highway, the TOW missiles stopped them dead in their tracks. The heavy artillery concentration and sudden destruction of the leading armor broke up the initial attack by 0900 hours, although indirect fire and small probes continued. In addition, the sky was filled with both US and VNAF aircraft attacking enemy targets vigorously.

(U) All of Kontum City received incoming artillery and rocket fire, but the air support was successful in spotting its origin and silencing the guns and launchers. Some areas, however, such as the airfield and the division CP received light attacks-by-fire, indicating that the enemy forward observers were adjusting their rounds for future fires. By nightfall on the 14th the front lines had been restored by the 23d Division through fierce, hand-to-hand fighting.

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(U) At 2000 hours the enemy again launched attacks against the 44th and 53d Regiments. The renewed attacks were more intense than the previous ones. In the confusion of fighting at night the two ARVN regiments failed to coordinate and interlock their fires. This situation spelled disaster when a battalion of the NVA penetrated the gap between the ARVN regiments.

(U) MAJ Wade Lovings, Deputy Senior Advisor, 44th ARVN Regiment, reported to the division advisors that the ARVN regimental commander was requesting timed, preplanned artillery fires on their locations. Lovings also requested that when the Spectre came on station he be allowed to work him on the perimeter of the 44th. By this time Lovings and LTC McKenna felt they were faced with three battalions of attacking NVA who were situated in their front, eastern flank, and rear. The Spectre arrived and Lovings immediately put his fires all around the perimeter as targets were relayed from the front line units through the regimental commander.⁴¹

(C) At that same moment in the DTOC COL

Truby and the other members of the advisory team were developing some last-ditch defensive measures in order to stop the enemy penetrations. They wanted to place on the attacking enemy the two B-52 strikes scheduled for 0300 hours. The situation was turning more desperate by the minute. If the penetrations were not stopped Kontum would fall by dawn. Because it was impossible to request the B-52 strikes any nearer to friendly positions, COL Truby proposed that COL Ba withdraw his forces one hour before the strikes. An increase in artillery was planned to compensate for the withdrawn force. When the B-52s arrived, they would catch the NVA in the open with little cover. Ba was deeply concerned about the deteriorating situation and anxious to do whatever possible to improve it. Truby told Vann of the plan and requested his approval. Vann was hesitant due to the complex coordination involved. Finally, he acquiesced after thorough discussion with both Truby and Ba. During the three or four hours until the strikes all attention was focused on holding in place. The 53d Regiment committed their reserve to block the penetration



A T-54 tank destroyed 14 May

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in their sector. With the aid of Spectre, the 44th was holding its own against the attack on three sides.

(C) Then the critical time arrived, and Ba ordered the withdrawal and directed his artillery to fire continuously for the next hour. The nearness of the two strikes shook the teeth of the ARVN defenders but as the rumbling stopped, so did the ferocity of the attacks. At first light elements of both ARVN regiments moving into the areas which had been struck discovered several hundred bodies and parts of bodies dressed in green uniforms and sandals. The majority of the attackers who had penetrated the defense were sappers armed only with AK-47s and explosive charges. In the front line area numerous crew-served weapons were found with the crumpled bodies of their operators nearby. Over 200 enemy killed were confirmed by McKenna and Lovings in front of their positions with another 189 reported by MAJ Perry from the 53d. Seven tanks were destroyed by the TOW missiles, LAWs, and tactical aircraft during the attacks on 14 May. The South Vietnamese claimed 11 tank kills and both the 23d Division staff and the American advisors felt that the battle had convinced the South Vietnamese line troops that tanks were not invincible. Vann and his staff at II Corps headquarters thought that the North Vietnamese were trying to save time by attacking with tanks before their usual artillery preparations. The enemy apparently hoped that the defenders would be frightened into retreat as at Tan Canh some three weeks before. Although fewer than 3,000 NVA troops had taken part in these initial attacks, Vann's staff knew a full division of 10,000 men was within striking distance. A major thrust was anticipated within the next two or three days.

(C) While searching a B-52 strike area the 2d Battalion, 53d Regiment found 23 enemy killed and one wounded in a close group. The wounded prisoner stated that his company had had only 25 men. They had just begun their attack when the bombs started to fall. COL Ba ordered limited offensive maneuvers in the areas of the previous night's B-52 strikes in an attempt to fix the enemy's new positions and develop new air and artillery targets. During these operations elements of the 44th and 53d Regiments received intermittent fire from heavy mortars and automatic weapons. The airborne TOW missiles continued to seek the enemy, destroying an ammunition truck, an ammunition cache, and a large bunker in the area northeast of the city. The air cavalry reported a large increase in activity to the northeast, southeast, and west of Kontum. Similar activity was detected further west of Kontum City near the Dak Poko River.

(U) This buildup in the southern defensive area of operations particularly worried the division advisors. Their concern was caused by the habit of the territorial forces manning the southern defenses leaving their positions at night and going into town to be with their families. This absence created gaps in the defense which, if detected by the enemy, would allow them to enter the city virtually unopposed and undetected.

(C) An increased airlift was begun on the 15th to evacuate the families of Montagnard refugees. Some 2,500 Montagnard men were given arms and detailed to militia units defending the city. The refugees were flown to relatively safe Pleiku. Some 30,000 civilians had also fled from the provincial capital to the coastal regions and southern provinces immediately following the Tan Canh disaster.⁴²

(C) The relative quiet of the 15th was interrupted at 0200 hours on 16 May by an increase in enemy shelling. Some of this fire was 100mm fire from the main guns of six T-54 tanks. A US ground TOW team that had been deployed to Kontum City on the 14th took one under fire and destroyed it. A ground attack had just started in front of the 53d Regiment's positions when a B-52 strike fell on the attackers at 2240 hours. The attacks-by-fire continued along the entire division front until approximately 2300 hours when the contact again decreased, and the firing ceased. The remainder of the evening passed without any further significant enemy activity until about 0615 hours when the tanks once again began to fire upon the positions of the 44th. There were no ground probes at this time.⁴³

(U) COL Ba examined the results of these first few probes. He had seen his defensive line penetrated and disaster narrowly avoided. His fear of this happening again led him to decide to tighten his defensive perimeter. Ba had discussed this with MG Toan, the new II Corps commander, and Mr. Vann during their visit to Kontum City on the 16th. They had agreed to let him move the 44th Regiment back into a reserve position in the hospital compound and move the 45th Regiment into its place.

(U) The Kontum airfield came under increased observed indirect fire during the afternoon of the 16th. Each time a helicopter came in to refuel it was greeted by 9 to 12 rounds of mortar and artillery fire. Three helicopters were damaged in this manner during the afternoon hours. Two VNAF C-123s which were on the parking ramp were systematically brought under fire and destroyed. In addition to damaging aircraft the airfield runway was damaged by over 50 rounds which fell on it after 1700 hours. The airfield remained closed until 0645 hours on the morning of the 17th.

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(U) At 1430 hours on the 17th a US C-130 was unloading its cargo of ammunition on the western end of the airfield when rocket fire again fell on the airfield. The USAF pilot attempted to take off with his aircraft only partially unloaded and the ramp still down. A shower of sparks was thrown out as the ramp dragged on the runway and prevented the aircraft from obtaining flight speed. The C-130 scraped the roof of a Vietnamese brick factory off the east end of the runway. After the pilot lost control of the aircraft, its right wing struck the ground and the plane flipped onto its back. A US helicopter extracted two of the five crewmembers. Because of this incident and the increasing volume of observed artillery and mortar fire Vann decided to limit fixed wing traffic to night flights only.

(C) On 17 May COL Rhotenberry replaced COL Truby as the senior advisor to the 23d ARVN Division. His first day as the senior American within the 23d Division was quiet with the exception of continued indirect fire on the airfield. Intelligence information gathered during the lull in the fighting indicated that a major registration of artillery fire would be made on the 18th when the North Vietnamese Army celebrated Ho Chi Minh's birthday. The night of the 17th and morning and early afternoon of the 18th produced no significant activity.⁴⁴ From 1740 to 1940 hours over 200 rounds of mixed artillery and mortar fire peppered the Kontum City defenders. Forward elements of the 44th reported to LTC McKenna that seven T-54s were to their front. A forward air controller spotted the tanks and was able to destroy one with US tactical air support. The location of the tanks about two miles out from the defenders indicated the NVA reluctance to expose their armor to accurate ARVN antitank fire. The same controller spotted two 130mm guns firing from the vicinity of Polei Kleng on Kontum City. Further observation revealed two 23mm antiaircraft guns. Even after they realized they were detected, the guns continued to fire until they were destroyed by tactical aircraft.⁴⁵

(C) At 2345 hours on 18 May an increased barrage of heavy artillery fire heralded the beginning of a ground assault by the 48th NVA Regiment against the forward defenders from the 44th ARVN Regiment. Antipersonnel claymore mines sowed on the perimeter created gaping holes in the wall of attackers. ARVN artillery, the tenacity of the ARVN frontline soldiers, and the devastation wrought by the claymores thwarted the first attack. A B-52 strike at 0015 hours on 19 May ended the first assault.

(C) The only significant activity on the 19th occurred at 2115 hours when the NVA troops fired

canisters of CS gas onto the front line ARVN bunkers, followed by an assault on the defenders. The attack was quickly dispersed by ARVN artillery and ground fire. Before dawn, at 0345 hours on the 20th, the 53d ARVN Regiment received the first of three successive assaults on their positions. During the final assault they allowed themselves to be pushed off the positions during the early daylight hours. This lack of resistance may have been caused by weariness from the past weeks of heavy fighting.

(U) Throughout the day ARVN forces unsuccessfully attempted to regain the lost position. ARVN unit commanders falsely reported its recapture several times during the action. By 1645 hours the enemy had tunneled to within twenty meters of the positions of the 53d, too close for the use of tactical air support. COL Rhotenberry, who had sent a member of the advisory team up in the command and control helicopter after each false report of success by the unit commanders, convinced COL Ba that his personal presence was necessary to control the action. Ba himself had been reluctant throughout the day to commit his armor or attempt to verify the false reports coming in. Finally Vann's arrival and conference with Ba persuaded him to commit his division reserve. Success was achieved by linking up nine M-41 tanks firing direct fire at the enemy with the support of gunships. This decisive action resulted in the eviction of the enemy forces. Meanwhile, air cavalry reported intensive activity in the area to the north and east of Kontum City. The NVA movement in the area was down the valley along Route 5B pushing closer to the defenses in that area.

(C) The night of 20 May passed quietly until 0500 hours on the 21st. The 44th ARVN Regiment, which had been scheduled to be replaced by the 45th, received heavy indirect fire. Under the cover of this barrage the enemy 406th Sapper Battalion moved behind the 3/44th and cut Route 14 three kilometers northwest of Kontum City. At the same time another enemy battalion penetrated between the 4/45th and 2/53d creating a wedge in the ARVN front lines. Quickly and efficiently the 3/44th counterattacked south on Highway 14 while the 4/44th and 1/45th moved north along the highway. Supported by US gunships and tactical aircraft, the two forces linked up and cleared the road of the enemy sappers after fierce fighting. The wedge which formed between the 44th and 53d Regiments deeply concerned COL Ba. He quickly requested TACAIR and artillery preparations on the entrenched enemy. He then went to the site of the battle. The personal presence of Ba inspired his men in their counterattack and was a key factor in

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the ejection of the NVA and restoration of the front line.⁴¹

(C) From Pleiku, the South Vietnamese Air Force sent an AC-47 Spooky gunship armed with three 7.62mm miniguns. Thirty minutes later it was spraying the enemy positions with its fire. Its arrival corresponded with another unsuccessful assault on the forward defenses. Meanwhile, US C-130 aircraft began to land at Kontum airfield to resupply the Kontum defenders. They were the first fixed wing aircraft to land in 48 hours.

(C) Two more assaults within the next two hours coincided with scheduled B-52 strikes on enemy attack positions, silencing the attackers. The fifth and final assault began at a little past 0400 hours on 21 May. The fight was characterized by fierce hand-to-hand combat during which hand grenades were lobbed between the opposing forces. ARVN

coordination, which had been excellent throughout the evening between units on the defensive line, broke down toward dawn. The attackers made a small penetration as a result. Lovings requested the Cobra gunships to help seal this penetration before it could be enlarged. The gunships raked the enemy company which had penetrated the defenses and chased them back to the north where two more B-52 strikes hit them. The gunships reported bodies blown several feet into the air. Altogether, five assaults were beaten off by a combination of ground and air fire, and the use of B-52 strikes in the vicinity of the front lines every hour.⁴²

(U) During the night twelve C-130 sorties carrying ammunition and cargo flew into Kontum airfield. The two 10,000 gallon fuel bladders destroyed on the 17th were replaced and the refueling point was fully operational by dawn.

THE ARVN COUNTEROFFENSIVE

(C) The successes of the previous night inspired COL Ba and the 23d Division to make their first extensive offensive efforts. The 23d Division Reconnaissance Company was airlifted eight kilometers to the northwest. Once on the ground it worked its way south to link up with the 1st Battalion, 45th ARVN Regiment, which was moving north by ground. They discovered 30 bodies in a B-52 strike area and evidence of many more casualties which had been evacuated. The remainder of the 44th and

53d ARVN Regiments were sent out to examine the area bombed on the previous evening. After some initial progress they were halted by light enemy contacts. The air cavalry confirmed the extensive damage of the B-52 strikes when reconnaissance of the area revealed the enemy attempting to pull bodies from bunkers.

(C) On the 21st a task force composed of the 2d and 6th Ranger Groups and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment began an operation to clear High-



Reconnaissance northwest of Kontum.

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ARVN counteroffensive north of Kontum.

May 14. Convoys were needed to carry supplies from Pleiku to the forces defending Kontum City. Several B-52 and tactical air strikes of CBU-55s were placed on the enemy 95B Regiment which was entrenched in the Chu Pao mountain pass. Initially the attack was successful, but as ARVN forces came within B-40 range the fighting became more intense. When several armored personnel carriers and M-41 tanks were destroyed by the B-40s, the armor spearhead halted against the entrenched forces.⁴²

(C) The 44th Regiment became the division reserve on the night of the 21st after the front lines were restored. The transfer of positions took most of the next two days. This period was punctuated by light attacks of indirect fire and small ground probes. A minor sapper attack occurred at 0630 hours on the 23d and continued with intermittent breaks until 1900 hours that evening. Bomb damage assessments during this period revealed at least 20 to 30 bodies and equipment. Sector forces received one Ho Chi Cham from the 48th NVA Regiment. He gave the position of the 46th NVA Regiment's command post and revealed that nearly all companies in his battalion were down to 10 men as

a result of B-52 strikes. Because many of their supplies had been destroyed en route to the front lines, food as well as medicine for malaria was in critically short supply. His knowledge of the plan of attack was limited but he knew it would include a heavy artillery barrage followed by tank/infantry assaults. The ferocity of this barrage would depend on resupply, since artillery ammunition was in short supply.⁴³

(C) After a day's rest for his forces, COL Ba ordered new offensive operations conducted on the 24th. The operations began at 1045 hours when the 1st Battalion, 44th ARVN Regiment, was lifted into a landing zone four kilometers north of Kontum City near Route 14. From here they attacked south. The 2d Battalion was inserted one kilometer to their east with orders to attack south. A blocking force was positioned just south of the intended objectives. In another operation the 53d ARVN Regiment attacked north to seize a small village which the enemy had taken on the 22d. By 1245 hours the combat assaults were completed and all units were engaged in small arms fire fights. Resistance remained light throughout the afternoon and each unit achieved its objectives by 1800 hours.⁴⁴

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THE SECOND ATTACK ON KONTUM

(U) Following a generally quiet period from 2200 hours to 0200 hours on the 25th, attacks by indirect fire began on units of the 23d Division in Kontum City and the southern defensive area (See Fig. K-3). The firing concentrated on the vicinity of the airfield and southeastern portion of the city. At 0300 hours the enemy 406th and 10th Sapper Battalions began to infiltrate the positions of the sector forces in the southeast portion of Kontum City. Reconnaissance had revealed to them what the US advisors had known; the territorial forces left gaps in their defenses each night when they went back into the city to stay with their families. Moving in small squad size groups, some of the enemy were dressed in captured ARVN 22d Division uniforms. The sappers successfully moved into the built-up area near the airfield, a school, a Catholic seminary, and the home of the French Bishop of Kontum. Some of the regional force units reacted well and made contact with the enemy elements. At 0925 hours near the airfield one of these units killed 20 sappers who had placed 60mm mortar fire on the airfield. Throughout the remainder of the morning and into the early afternoon the 23d Division command post and division artillery positions received continuous incoming artillery and mortar fire. At the insistence of LTC Gannon, now Senior Advisor to the 53d Regiment, the artillery moved to secondary positions after two of their 105mm howitzers were destroyed by the incoming artillery. The continued excellence of the NVA artillery was demonstrated soon after the move was completed, for the next round landed five meters from the new positions, followed by a six round barrage that destroyed another 105mm howitzer.³¹

(U) At 1300 hours BG Hill declared a tactical emergency for Kontum City, diverting all available air and gunship support to the area. By 1615 hours the 23d Division artillery was completely neutralized. Their guns and ammunition were either destroyed or the crews were pinned in their bunkers by the enemy's volume of fire, now at a rate of one round every 30 seconds. A crater analysis by MAJ Lovings, an artilleryman, indicated 155mm ammunition was being used. By 1900 hours that evening only fourteen 105mm and two 155mm howitzers were operational to support the 23d's operations. The C-130 resupply airlift was cancelled the night of 25-26 May due to the tactical situation; this meant that the division went without resupply for 24 hours. Year estimated that at least one battalion of sappers remained in the area around the airfield. At 0100 hours on the 26th the attacks by indirect fire increased to several rounds per

minute. Three or four tank/infantry teams attacked from the north under this heavy barrage. The principal attacks occurred against the 53d Regiment but pressure also increased on the sector forces around Kontum City. At first light helicopter mounted TOW missiles began firing and by midafternoon had destroyed two T-54 tanks and numerous trucks. COL Ba ordered one battalion of the 44th Regiment, reinforced by eight tanks, to counterattack. It was successful in helping to contain the penetration between the 44th and 53rd Regiments, and as on the 22d ARVN forces were able to limit enemy gains but unable to push him out of his newly captured positions. The situation remained fairly stable for the remainder of the day within the city. However, the air cavalry sighted major enemy movements toward the penetrations, possibly reinforcements moving into the battle. Since the airfield was closed to fixed wing aircraft, CH-47 Chinook helicopters hauled in emergency resupply to the soccer field and evacuated the seriously wounded. Lightly wounded ARVN soldiers trying to escape the beleaguered city led to the use of American armed security guards on the resupply aircraft.³²

(U) After dark, indirect fire on the command posts of the 45th and 53d Regiments increased. The 45th was faced with the heaviest attacks by three battalions of the 64th NVA Regiment. The attackers penetrated between the 45th and 53d and enveloped the forces of the 45th. All tactical air support was diverted to the embattled regiment. LTC Grant, the Senior Advisor, conferred with COL Rhotenberry who agreed to divert two scheduled B-52 strikes on the forces attacking the 45th. The bombers struck at 0230 hours and decreased the ferocity of the attack. In addition, LTC Grant relayed targets from the front lines to a USAF gunship overhead throughout the night.³³

(U) When the 44th Regiment completed the move into its reserve position on the 22d, they failed to place any security to their front. They mistakenly believed that the 45th and 53d were to their front. This error nearly proved disastrous. The main NVA armor and infantry thrust came in this area with attacks by the 1st Regiment, 2d NVA Division, and the 66th Regiment, B-3 Front, supported by one company of armor. A coordinated attack was made by the 52d NVA Regiment of the 320th NVA Division, with the assistance of the 64th Regiment which had enveloped the 45th ARVN Regiment the previous night.

(U) Inside the 44th Regiment tactical operations center MAJ Lovings and LTC McKenna were attempting to sleep as the incoming enemy artillery

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exploded overhead. Their concern during the evening hours was the large enemy force which had been steadily creeping in toward the northeastern part of the city. Their sleep was interrupted by the cry of "Tanks and infantry in our wire!" It seemed impossible for Lovings to believe that this was true so he ran to the entrance and attempted to verify it himself. He arrived in time to see the lead T-54 tank moving within 50 meters of the bunkers around the TOC. A battle streamer flew from the turret in the early morning breeze. The blast of an M-72 LAW fired by an ARVN officer from the front line bunkers momentarily blurred his vision of the assaulting tank. The impact of metal against metal was distinctly heard above the roar of the battle. When the smoke cleared there was a hole the size of a silver dollar in the front slope and the tank engine was silent. A second T-54 tank on another street in the crowded hospital complex saw this tank destroyed. Apparently deciding the NVA infantry had not secured the area, this second tank attempted to turn back toward cover. The enemy vehicle presented a broadside target to an ARVN soldier who scored a direct hit on it. Lovings hurried inside to contact the division command post to obtain air support.

(U) BG Hill had risen early to fly to the battle area with a team of gunships. Contacting Lovings as he hovered overhead, he reported six tanks approaching across the open area north of the hospital compound. He also saw infantry moving through the buildings of the compound. Lovings radioed that his bunker line was the 90 grid line on the map; anything north of that line was free fire. The gunships swooped out of the sky on the attackers. Separating the infantry from the tanks, they forced two other T-54s which had entered the compound to drive into some deserted buildings for concealment. This made them ineffective for the time being.³⁴

(U) Helicopters with TOW missiles had been scrambled from Pleiku at the first report of enemy tanks. At 0600 hours they were over the northern battle front. The open terrain north of the city provided no cover or concealment for the attacking tanks, making them easy prey for the helicopters which scored two TOW missile hits on tanks that were moving to join the attack on the northeastern defenses. Tactical aircraft, the gunships, and the efforts of the front line soldiers stemmed the enemy advance by 1000 hours. By 0615 hours on the 27th, friendly forces were again in heavy contact with enemy tanks and infantry. At 0715 hours the main ammunition dump north of the Kontum airfield was struck by an enemy mortar round and exploded. A stray round from the exploding ammunition dump struck a nearby petroleum

pump, and the resulting fire and smoke obscured visibility.³⁵

(C) As the morning of the 27th progressed the NVA infantry held their gains in the northernmost compounds. They also continued to harass the airfield and to exert pressure on the regional forces in the eastern part of the city. By midday the enemy had formed pockets of resistance all across the northern front. USAF and VNAF air strikes and the air cavalry supported the ARVN forces. During the afternoon a VNAF lieutenant spotted a large enemy troop concentration and requested VNAF tactical air strikes. Since none was available, he contacted the ground commander and coordinated a US strike in which 60 North Vietnamese were killed. Near the embattled 53d ARVN Regiment north of the airfield, several .51 caliber machine guns were firing constantly at the fighter bombers. Two VNAF pilots in A-1Es made pass after pass at the machine gun positions exposing their aircraft to deadly crossfire. Their efforts silenced several of the machine guns as well as a 23mm AA gun which revealed its position.³⁶

(U) At 1800 hours VNAF helicopters began shuttling much needed supplies from the soccer field to the regimental command posts. LTC Gannon had organized the ARVN into teams to evacuate the supplies from the drop zone. The enemy artillery was firing constantly on the teams as they worked. As he attempted to move back to his bunker after directing the resupply, Gannon was wounded in the upper leg.

(U) COL Ba then decided to tighten the city's defenses again. He ordered the 45th to withdraw from Fire Support Base November and move into a tighter ring around the city. His purpose was to prevent further penetration of the defensive perimeter and to allow for better utilization of



A VNAF A-1E attacking an NVA position.

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B-52 strikes. That evening Toan also agreed to strengthen the defenses by pulling in the 53d Regiment to maintain greater integrity.

(U) The NVA infantry was now firmly entrenched in the hospital compound only 40 meters away from the ARVN defensive positions. With the exception of some small arms fire and a few mortar rounds the evening passed without incident. During the evening Spooky, Spectre and Stinger aircraft all provided support for the defensive forces. At 0345 hours on the 27th the indirect fire increased throughout the northern defensive perimeter; between 300 and 400 rounds fell by dawn. At 0500 hours elements of the 53d Regiment defending the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment compound were attacked by sappers. This was followed shortly by an attack against the 44th Regiment positions to the west. Because bad weather made tactical air support impossible, Sky Spot strikes were employed every 20 minutes between 0350 hours and 1230 hours on preplanned targets along the battle front. Elements of the 44th and 53d Regiments, supported by tanks from the 8th Armored Cavalry Regiment, attempted to dislodge the enemy from the northern compounds. At the same time the territorial forces engaged in bitter house-to-house fighting in the southern portion of the city where the North Vietnamese were still dug in inside a school and some houses at the edge of the airfield.

(U) An NVA machine gun crew on a water tower overlooking the area halted the ARVN counter-attack in the hospital compound by stopping the government infantry. Two M-41 tanks were unable to destroy the reinforced concrete of the water tower by direct fire. Finally the TOW helicopter, which had just neutralized a 23mm AA position, placed one of its missiles into the NVA position and silenced the .51 caliber gun. The 53d advanced through the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment compound and advanced to within 500 yards of the airstrip in hand-to-hand fighting throughout the day. VNAF A-37 Skyraiders and US Cobra gunships devastated the armor compound, reducing it to rubble.

(U) Enemy artillery shifted from military targets such as the various compounds and the airfields to an indiscriminate pattern which caused over 100 civilian casualties. Kontum was reinforced during the afternoon by the 3d Battalion, 47th Regiment, from Pleiku. The 45th, pulling back into a tighter ring around the city, encountered heavy resistance by an entrenched NVA battalion and was unable to enter the city's defensive ring until the 29th of May. By the night of the 28th the situation remained critical; the NVA still held the same area that he had held at the beginning of the day. The 23d

Division's only accomplishment was in containing the two penetrations in the northern compounds and southern area. The North Vietnamese found it difficult to resupply their troops in the penetrations because the hourly B-52 strikes forced them to store their supplies great distances from the city. Originally each soldier had been provided three belts filled with cooked rice. Transportation elements were to carry food and ammunition to the front lines. However, heavy air strikes disrupted the telephone lines and the transportation elements trying to reach the front lines. In short, the NVA had to achieve success swiftly or withdraw to the sanctuary of the mountains in order to resupply and refit.¹⁷

(C) The 23d ARVN Division was also beginning to feel the pinch from lack of resupply. To counter this, American C-130 aircraft airdropped a total of 64 tons of ammunition, of which three-quarters was recovered. May 29th was a day of light activity consisting mostly of sniper fire and sporadic attacks-by-fire, with only 30 artillery rounds hitting the city by mid-afternoon. The ARVN counter-attackers were pinned down by sniper fire from strengthened enemy bunker defenses. Although sixty sorties of assorted tactical aircraft destroyed 39 of these heavily fortified bunkers, the stalemate continued through the evening, despite heavy fighting. Just after midnight the 44th and 53d Regimental Command Posts received heavy mortar fire. Two Spectre gunships and one Stinger were on station and fired on the suspected mortar locations. However, 50 to 100 rounds fell in the next half hour, followed by NVA ground attacks against the northeastern perimeter. The attack was joined by renewed activity just south of the airfield, when the enemy made a last attempt to link his penetrations. One of the enemy mortar rounds strayed into the remains of the ammunition dump between the ARVN defenders and the attacking enemy. The resulting explosion and fire caught the enemy in the middle of his assault, causing many casualties and breaking up the assault.¹⁸

(U) Soon after daylight the 23d Division forces once more counterattacked the northern compounds occupied by the enemy. Bunker-to-bunker fighting, hand grenades, and individual efforts were required because the bunkers were too well fortified and hidden to be damaged by artillery or air support.¹⁹

(U) At 1430 hours on 30 May President Nguyen Van Thieu flew into Kontum City amid sporadic rocket and mortar fire in a personal effort to inspire the counterattack. Thieu promoted COL Ba to Brigadier General while the guns rumbled outside. Thieu later chatted with many of the soldiers, voicing encouragement. Slowly but surely the bunkers were won back. Two T-64 tanks were

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President Thieu visits Kontum.

destroyed by LAWs amid the rubble of the hospital. Snipers were routed from their positions. When the 44th Regiment moved forward, the troops saw large groups of the enemy withdrawing to the northeast. This was the only avenue of escape left as the counterattacking forces were on the other three sides. The air cavalry and forward air controllers also reported the enemy leaving the battle front. By day's end some NVA soldiers still remained in Kontum, but their positions rapidly

weakened under ARVN pressure.

(U) By midday on the 31st Vann commented that the main battle was over, although pockets of resistance in the city would remain for a time. Needing resupply and replacements for their battered forces, the NVA retreated. Nearly 4,000 NVA dead littered the battlefield. The South Vietnamese Army, too, had suffered heavily, but they held the field. Effective enemy resistance in Kontum City ceased by 10 June 1972.⁴⁰

ARVN CLEARING OPERATIONS

(C) After enemy resistance was eliminated within Kontum City, combat activity for the remainder of the year in Kontum Province dropped to a low level. The activities of government forces focused on opening Highway 14 between Kontum and Pleiku and in clearing the enemy out of the

areas to the north of the city that had fallen in the first days of the offensive.

(C) The road opening operation was first conducted in June and required fourteen maneuver battalions to accomplish the task. The enemy fought fiercely in the initial phases. By 26 June, however,

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after suffering heavy casualties, the enemy lessened his resistance when the advancing ARVN forces secured the high ground east and west of the highway. On 30 June the highway was open and a military convoy of 36 vehicles traveled from Pleiku to Kontum City without incident. On 6 July the road was opened to civilian traffic.

(C) Although the road had been opened, the enemy continued to harass traffic with minor attacks-by-fire south of Kontum Pass in Pleiku Province. In August, ARVN units began to make contacts with small enemy elements along the highway north of Pleiku. By September the enemy had recovered sufficiently to interdict the road sporadically. Enemy activity increased in October and effectively closed the road by destroying a culvert 12 kilometers south of Kontum City on 19 October. Enemy activity prevented repair work. Three days later, a bridge in the pass area was destroyed. Although the 23d ARVN Division moved additional troops into the area to secure the engineers performing repairs, enemy activity prevented early restoration of the bridge despite heavy enemy casualties. By 8 November the highway was declared open again but travel remained hazardous.

(C) Clearing operations out from Kontum City were also varied in their results. To establish the ability of government forces to reenter lost territory, to gain a psychological advantage, and to destroy enemy personnel and materiel, an airmobile

raid was conducted into the Tan Canh area on 17 June. A 23d ARVN Division reconnaissance company was used to seize limited terrain objectives. The company was withdrawn after three hours. Several months later, two more companies from the 23d ARVN Division air assaulted into the Tan Canh and Dak To areas. Several days later, when one of the companies was dispersed by enemy action, another company was landed as reinforcement. For the most part contact with the enemy was light and sporadic, however, and the ARVN troops were withdrawn on 12 November.

(C) Government forces attacked by foot to the north and northwest during the last half of the year. The 23d ARVN Division was directed by the II Corps Commander to destroy enemy forces between Kontum City and Vo Dinh. Several sharp engagements were fought, particularly in October during a general increase in enemy activity and resistance throughout South Vietnam. In one three day battle beginning on 5 October, ARVN troops accounted for 250 enemy killed. On 6 December a reinforced battalion of the 53d ARVN Regiment air assaulted into the Vo Dinh area. Three days later elements of the battalion had gained temporary lodgements in the village before being withdrawn to Kontum for rest and resupply. The operation continued until the cease-fire was declared on 28 January.¹¹

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KONTUM — ANNEX K

1. Intel Rpt (C), PSA, Kontum Province, 18 Jan 72, GDS-Not Stated.
2. Rpt (U), CPT John Schandl, G-3, SRAG, 15 Feb 72, Subj: Battle for Kontum. (SRAG refers to the Second Regional Assistance Group which was under Mr. John Paul Vann. On 10 Jun 72 when BG Michael Healy succeeded Mr. Vann who had been killed in a helicopter crash, SRAG was redesignated SRAC: the Second Regional Assistance Command.)
3. Rpt (C), G-2, SRAG, 13 Jan 72, Subj: SRAG WIEU 7-13 Jan 72 (U), GDS-Not Stated.
4. Interview (C), CPT Jack Heslin, S-3, 17th CAG, by 1LT Gary R. Swingle, G-3, SRAC, 22 Jun 72, Pleiku, RVN.
5. Rpt (C), CORDS, MR 2, Jan 72, Subj: SRAG Military Region Overview, January 1972 (U), GDS-Not Stated.
6. Vincent Davis, "If there is a Hero, it will be John Vann," reprint from The Denver Post, Sunday, June 28, 1972.
7. Rpt (C), G-2, SRAG, 10 Feb 72, Subj: SRAG WIEU, 4-10 Feb 72 (U), GDS-Not Stated.
8. Interview (U), CPT David Stewart, Signal Advisor, 22d ARVN Div, by 1LT Gary R. Swingle, G-3, SRAC, 6 Jul 72, Ba Gi, RVN.
9. Rpt (U), LTC Ralph C. Waara, SA, 2d ARVN Armored Bde, 5 June 72, Subj: Lessons Learned (U).
10. Same as #2.
11. Interview (C), MAJ Stanley Kweciak, G-3 Air, SRAC, by 1LT Gary R. Swingle, G-3, SRAC, 21 Jun 72, Pleiku, RVN; Rpt (C), G-2, SRAG, 17 Feb 72, Subj: SRAG WIEU, 11-17 Feb 72 (U), GDS-Not Stated.
12. Rpt (C), G-2, SRAG, 9 Mar 72, Subj: SRAG WIEU, 3-9 Mar 72 (U), GDS-Not Stated.
13. Rpt (C), CORDS, MR 2, Subj: SRAG Military Region Overview, March 1972 (U), GDS-Not Stated.
14. Rpt (C), G-2, SRAG, 6 Apr 72, Subj: SRAG WIEU, 31 March-6 April 1972 (U), GDS-Not Stated.
15. Msg (C), SA, SRAG to COMUSMACV, 9 Apr 72, Subj: Daily Commander's Evaluation (U), GDS-Not Stated.
16. Stars and Stripes (Pacific edition), April 9, 1972.
17. Interview (U), LTC Terrence McClain, DSA, 22d ARVN Div, by 1LT Gary R. Swingle, G-3, SRAC, 27 Jul 72, Phu Cat, RVN.
18. Msg (C), SA, SRAG to COMUSMACV, 21 Apr 72, Subj: Daily Commander's Evaluation (U), GDS-Not Stated.
19. Interview (U), CPT Raymond Dobbins, Acting SA, 42d ARVN Regt, by 1LT Gary R. Swingle, G-3, SRAC, 6 Jul 72, Ba Gi, RVN.
20. Same as #17.
21. Same as #19; Same as #17; Interview (U), MAJ John Wise, G-3 Advisor, 22d ARVN Div, by 1LT Gary R. Swingle, G-3, SRAC, 22 Jun 72, Pleiku, RVN.
22. Same as #19; Msg (C), SA, SRAG to COMUSMACV, 23 Apr 72, Subj: Daily Commander's Evaluation (U), GDS-Not Stated.
23. Interview (U), CPT Richard Cassidy, Asst District Advisor, Dak To District, by 1LT Gary R. Swingle, G-3, SRAC, 27 Jul 72, Pleiku, RVN.
24. Same as #8; Journal (C), G-2/G-3, SRAG, 24 Apr 72. Note: Tan Canh was the home base of the 42d ARVN Regiment and Regimental Advisory Team. Dobbins and Yonan knew the area well. They drew up a plan for E&E based on their experience in the area. This was the plan that was distributed.
25. Same as #8.
26. Same as #19.
27. Same as #19; Same as #17.
28. Same as #17; Msg (C), SA, SRAG to COMUSMACV, 24 Apr 72, Subj: Daily Commander's Evaluation (U), GDS-Not Stated.
29. Interview (U), CPT Charles Carden, DSA, 47th Regt, by 1LT Gary R. Swingle, G-3, SRAC, 7 Jul 72, LZ English, RVN.
30. Same as #19.
31. Same as #29; Same as #9.
32. Interview (U), CPT Raymond Dobbins, Acting SA, 42d Regt, by 1LT Gary R. Swingle, G-3, SRAC, 7 Jul 72, LZ Uplift; Msg (C), SA, SRAG to COMUSMACV, 25 Apr 72, Subj: Daily Commander's Evaluation (U), GDS-Not Stated.
33. Msg (C), SA, SRAG to COMUSMACV, 28 Apr 72, Subj: Daily Commander's Evaluation (U), GDS-Not Stated.
34. Interview (C), COL John O. Truby, Acting SA, 23d ARVN Div, by 1LT Gary R. Swingle, G-3, SRAC, 17 Aug 72, Pleiku, RVN; Stars and Stripes (Pacific edition), August 12, 1972.
35. Interview (U), MAJ James Givens, SA, 6th Rgt Gp, by 1LT Gary R. Swingle, G-3, SRAC, 29 Jun 72, Pleiku, RVN.
36. Same as #34; Journal (C), G-2/G-3, SRAG, 6 May 72.
37. Journals (C), G-2/G-3, SRAG, 6, 7 and 9 May 72.
38. Same as #34.
39. Same as #34; Journal (C), G-2/G-3, SRAG, 13 May 72; Rpt (C), G-2, ARVN II Corps, n.d., Subj: II Corps Scenario (U), GDS-Not Stated.

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40. Journal (C), G-2/G-3, 23d ARVN Div, 14 May 72.
41. Same as #34; Interview (U), MAJ Wade Lovings, DSA, 44th Regt, by 1LT Gary R. Swingle, G-3, SRAC, 22 Jun 72, Kontum, RVN.
42. Ibid.; Same as #34; Journal (C), G-2/G-3, SRAG, 15 May 72; Journal (C), G-2/G-3, 23d ARVN Div, 15 May 72.
43. Journal (C), G-2/G-3, SRAC, 17 May 72.
44. Ibid.
45. Journal (C), G-2/G-3, SRAG, 19 May 72.
46. Interview (C), LTC James W. Bricker, G-3 Advisor, 23d ARVN Div, by 1LT Gary R. Swingle, G-3, SRAC, 22 Jun 72, Kontum, RVN; Msg (C), SA, SRAG to COMUSMACV, 21 May 72, Subj: Daily Commander's Evaluation (U), GDS-Not Stated.
47. Msg (C), Ibid.
48. Journal (C), G-2/G-3, SRAG, 23 May 72.
49. Journal (C), G-2/G-3, SRAG, 24 May 72.
50. Interview (U), same as #46; Same as #23.
51. Interview (U), LTC Norbert C. Gannon, SA, 53d ARVN Regt, by 1LT Gary R. Swingle, 22 Jun 72, Kontum, RVN.
52. Same as #41; Journals (C), G-2/G-3, SRAG, 25-26 May 72; Msg (C), SA, SRAG to COMUSMACV, 26 May 72, Subj: Daily Commander's Evaluation (U), GDS-Not Stated.
53. Journal (C), G-2/G-3, 23d ARVN Div, 26 May 72.
54. Same as #41.
55. Same as #51.
56. Msg (C), same as #52.
57. Journals (C), G-2/G-3 23d ARVN Div, 26-28 May 72.
58. Rpt (C), MACDI, 4 Jun 72, Subj: PW Interrogation (U), GDS-Not Stated.
59. Same as #41.
60. Same as #41; Rpt (TS), MACDO-43, 18 Jul 72, Subj: DO Historical Summary for June 1972 (U), p 26, GDS-Not Stated.
61. See Annex B.

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ANNEX L

QUANG TRI AND HUE

(U) South Vietnam's Military Region 1 was the smallest both in land area and in population of the country's four military regions. This lack of size did not prevent the enemy from devoting a large amount of attention to the region over the years. Many factors favored the enemy throughout the region: the indigenous central Vietnamese population was not receptive to the Saigon government; the terrain was mostly mountainous, allowing the enemy sanctuary and hidden supply areas; the enemy controlled borders on the north, west, and most of the south of the region; the enemy's supply lines from North Vietnam were the shortest into Military Region 1; and the population concentrations along the coast offered the enemy well-defined targets and restricted friendly maneuver. Despite the many advantages accruing to the enemy,

the Republic of Vietnam managed to control Military Region 1 and such important cities as Hue, the old capital of Central Vietnam (Annam), important psychologically to both sides. With the withdrawal of the American forces and the favorable progress of the Vietnamization and pacification programs nationwide, the North Vietnamese apparently decided that in early 1972 the time was at hand to move from the guerrilla phase of counterinsurgency warfare to conventional warfare to gain their victory. However, the North underestimated the tenacity of the RVNAF, especially the lightly regarded Territorial Forces and the overwhelming US and VNAF air response. In addition, regular troops were positioned throughout Military Region 1 to counter the anticipated enemy threat (Fig. L-1).

SITUATION PRIOR TO THE OFFENSIVE

(U) March 1972 saw major RVNAF units disposed in their Military Region 1 areas of operation to counter enemy threats from the north and west. Three divisions under I Corps bore primary responsibility for Military Region 1: the 1st Division, the 2d Division, and the recently activated 3d Division. I Corps Headquarters, located in Da Nang, was the overall control element for Military Region 1; I Corps in turn answered directly to the RVNAF Joint General Staff in Saigon.

(C) I Corps Headquarters was commanded by LTG Lam. His span of control was small in number of units, with the three divisions, the 1st Special Brigade, and the 10th Engineer Group, but it was complex in terms of the variety of army, marine, ranger, Territorial Force, and armor units. In spite of being under the operational control of I Corps, many units were less responsive than they should have been. Before complying with an I Corps order, they usually would informally clear it with their parent headquarters. One example of this problem was mentioned by LTC Louis Wagner, Senior Advisor of the 1st Armor Brigade, who stated:

On occasion armor and infantry units would work on a cooperative arrangement between commander rather than attaching one unit to another. In addition to receiving orders from the 3d Division Commander (1st Armored Brigade was placed under the operational control of the 3d Division effective 1 April), the Armor Brigade Com-

mander also received orders directly from the Corps Commander and the Deputy Corps Commander for Operations. These relationships often prevented a strong unified command required for successful combat operations.

Similar occurrences frequently took place in both the VNMC and the Ranger Command units as well, according to other advisors.

(C) As of 31 March the 1st Division was headquartered at Camp Eagle, just south of Hue in Thua Thien Province. Its mission was to control the area west and north of Hue. Regimental headquarters were at Camp Evans (1st Regiment), Fire Support Base T-Bone (3d Regiment), and Fire Support Base Bastogne (54th Regiment). Headquarters of the 7th Armored Cavalry Regiment, organic to the 1st Division, was also at Camp Evans (Fig. L-2).

(C) 2d Division elements were scattered over the southern three provinces of Military Region 1. The division headquarters was at Chu Lai in Quang Tin Province. The 4th Regiment had its headquarters at Fire Support Base Bronco in Quang Ngai Province, the 5th Regiment operated near Hoi An, and the 6th Regiment was at Fire Support Base Artillery Hill in Quang Tin Province. The Division's 4th Armored Cavalry Regiment at Chu Lai, and six ranger border defense battalions assisted the division in controlling the three southern provinces.

(C) The 3d Division, activated in October of 1971, was required to secure the northernmost frontiers of

L-1

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
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MILITARY REGION 1



Source: MACDO

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South Vietnam. The headquarters was at Quang Tri Combat Base. The 2d Regiment was situated at Camp Carroll, with two battalions at Fire Support Base C-2. The 56th Regiment was headquartered at nearby Fire Support Base Carroll, while the 57th Regiment was located at Fire Support Base C-1. The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, organic to the division, was located near Landing Zone Sharon. In addition, the 147th VNMC Brigade at Mai Loc was under operational control of the 3d Division.

(C) Among the other important units in Military Region 1 were the various division artillery units, and headquartered at Da Nang and responsible to I Corps was the 1st Special Brigade, with an armored brigade in Quang Tin, the 51st Infantry Regiment operating in Quang Nam Province, the 1st Ranger Group (3 battalions), and two ranger border defense battalions. Highly important to the overall operational picture were six Regional Force battalions, two in Quang Nam Sector, and one each in Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Ngai, and Quang Tin Sectors.¹

(C) While the 1st and 2d Divisions were long established, the 3d Division had been activated on 1 October 1971, hastily formed from a variety of sources. For example, the 1st Division Forward Command Post was the nucleus of 3d Division Headquarters. The division's 2d Regiment was transferred intact from the 2d Division, while the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment came from the 1st Armor Brigade. New activations included the 56th and 57th Regiments, with the last battalions joining the regiments at the end of January 1972, barely two months before bearing the brunt of the enemy offensive. As with most newly activated units, the 3d Division suffered from the ills of having received cadre who were substandard performers in their previous units, too little time for individual and unit training, and insufficient experience to develop a dependable chain of command. Because it was anticipated that the enemy would attack from the west and not across the Demilitarized Zone, the 3d Division was given what was considered to be the least critical area in Military Region 1.²


(C) The American advisors to the 3d Division recognized the many problems associated with the formation of a new unit. The Deputy Senior Advisor, LTC William Lozier, noted that among the assets used to form the division were Regional and Provincial Forces and that on numerous occasions large increments of replacements, perhaps as many as 200 at a time, overburdened the division's capacity to assimilate them. The Senior Advisor, COL Donald J. Metcalf, estimated that there were some 1,000 deserters assigned to the 3d Division when it was formed. In addition to personnel problems were those associated with training. Little

formal training was conducted, as the troops were on the move most of the time. Squad and platoon tactics for the attack and defense were ignored. The division lacked small unit leaders who understood tactics and even the basic responsibilities of the non-commissioned officer. LTC Lozier referred to the 3d Division as being formed from a melting pot.³


(S) The NVA had been quite active in Military Region 1 during the months preceding the push. There were definite indications that an attack was imminent. During the first three weeks of March, for example, there were many tangible examples of enemy support activity. On 1 March, a new surface-to-air missile (SAM) site was located in the central Demilitarized Zone, some 23 kilometers northwest of Dong Ha; this meant that enemy SAMs could range up to 29 kilometers south of the Demilitarized Zone. On 29 March another SAM site was confirmed in a location 7 kilometers north of the central Demilitarized Zone, extending the SAM threat over northern Military Region 1 to the western Route 9 area, some 19 kilometers south of the Demilitarized Zone. There were then believed to be 83 prepared sites capable of intercepting aircraft in the vicinity of the Laotian and North Vietnamese borders, an increase of one-third over the preceding two months. Noted, too, were shipments of 130mm artillery ammunition and 130mm field guns. By 4 March there were eight 130mm field guns in the Demilitarized Zone area; on 21 March two were spotted 21 kilometers north of Fire Support Base Fuller, while two more were located west of the Laotian border some six kilometers southwest of the Demilitarized Zone; and on 25 March six more were sighted 28 kilometers north of Fire Support Base Fuller. Enemy armor was also seen in the area. Airfields and airstrips in North Vietnam were constructed and improved; a new airfield was located near Ha Tinh in North Vietnam on 18 March, and both it and others were improved by grading, gravel surfacing, and runway extension. Lines of communication were considerably improved, especially in northwestern Quang Tri Province, where traffic greatly increased. In this area the lines of communication were protected by 57mm antiaircraft guns, indicating the great importance the NVA placed on these logistical corridors and staging areas. New roads were constructed in the Demilitarized Zone, one going south from the Ben Hai River to a point 7 kilometers north of Fire Support Base Fuller.⁴

(S) Enemy troop movements also indicated impending action. During the first three weeks in March the enemy was relocating units. On 11 March major elements of the 324B NVA Division were deploying eastward from positions southeast of

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MILITARY REGION 1 FRIENDLY DISPOSITIONS AS OF MARCH 1972



Source: MACDO

Figure: L-2

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Khe Sanh to an area west of Hue. In the Fire Support Base Veghel area around mid-March both the 6th NVA Regiment and 324B Division were on the offensive. The activity on the part of the 6th NVA Regiment was the most significant for that unit in over a year, indicating that it had received equipment and personnel replacements. By 20 March, all major elements of the 324B Division had either deployed or were en route to Military Region 1, and the enemy appeared to be screening the division's activities in the A Shau Valley. Indications were that the 86th Regiment of the 304th NVA Division was in the Ba Long Valley near Fire Support Base Sarge. This unit, as well as the 9th Regiment, had operated in western Quang Tri Province in 1968 and 1971. By 23 March it was believed that the 803d and 29th Regiments of the 324B Division were operating in the Veghel and Bastogne areas, and by the 24th the 38th NVA Artillery Regiment was deploying to Military Region 1. On 25 March the presence of the 29th Regiment, 324B Division, was confirmed.⁵

(S) In Military Region 1 enemy activity during the month of March was characterized by attacks-by-fire and ground probes. The railway between Hue and Da Nang was cut several times at the Hai Van Pass. A relatively high level of attacks-by-fire was the enemy pattern of operation below the Demilitarized Zone, primarily against friendly elements at the northern Fire Support Bases A4 and C2. During the first half of the month the enemy was avoiding physical contact but devoting significant efforts to prepare for large scale offensive operations. In countering a 1st Division effort which began on 5 March in the vicinity of Fire Support Base Veghel, the enemy reinforced and put up stiff resistance. From about 18 to 22 March activity increased greatly as the ARVN threat to enemy logistical activity in the A Shau Valley increased, threatening enemy activity along Route 547. Beginning around 23 March enemy activity was lower, but increased again on 26 March in the Veghel area. On 27 March 1st Division elements were ambushed five kilometers northeast of Fire Support Base Veghel; one M-41 tank and two APCs were destroyed. Another ARVN force nearby received an attack-by-fire and a ground probe, while a third 1st Division force engaged an unknown size enemy element. Attacks-by-fire continued on the 29th, and it was felt that the enemy might also take advantage of the commitment of the 1st Division in the Veghel area by increasing his activities in the lowlands north of Hue. Further, there was a significant increase in indirect fire attacks in the Demilitarized Zone area during the three days preceding 30 March. Since 27 March friendly Demilitarized Zone fire support bases had received 27 mortar and rocket

attacks; 11 of these attacks occurred on 29 March. And at midday on the 30th of March, the enemy's NGUYEN HUE Offensive began.⁶

(S) Over the month prior to the NGUYEN HUE Offensive, both the 2d and 3d Divisions were engaged in major offensive operations. In the 2d Division area of operations only minor enemy contacts were reported. Meanwhile, the 3d Division was conducting clearing operations in its area of operations and conducting probes into the Demilitarized Zone. One of the patrols north of Fire Support Base A3 near the Demilitarized Zone on 29 March was met with rocket and mortar attacks, a precursor of the next day's full scale offensive.⁷

(C/NF) The most aggressive Military Region 1 unit during the month preceding the offensive was the ARVN 1st Division, responsible for Thua Thien Province. The 1st Division launched Operation LAM SON 46 on 5 March to clear areas south of Fire Support Base Rakkasan and west and south of Fire Support Base Bastogne, all in preparation for future division operations towards the A Shau Valley. A combat assault was planned in the Dang Cu Mong area, south of Fire Support Base Veghel, but despite a B-52 strike heavy ground fire caused its cancellation. MG Phu, the 1st Division Commanding General, had developed a ground maneuver plan to attack towards Dong Cu Mong with two battalions of the 3d Regiment. As the situation developed, it became evident that a major enemy buildup was in progress, but was preempted by 1st Division forces, preventing coordinated attacks against division units around Fire Support Base Bastogne. Enemy elements positively identified were the MRTTH 6th Regiment and both the 803d and 29th Regiments of the 324B NVA Division. Enemy resistance was strong with numerous ground contacts and mortar attacks in the entire area of operations. Dong Cu Mong was captured by the 1st Division and then lost again, as the enemy was determined to control the area. From 19 to 30 March action was moderate as MG Phu moved the 54th Regiment to Fire Support Base Birmingham to relieve the 3d Regiment.

(C) According to COL Hillman Dickinson, the Senior Advisor to the division, and LTC Alexander Einseln, Deputy Senior Advisor, the March operations of the division preempted a scheduled 1 April enemy push against Hue from the west and southwest and was the key to the enemy's ultimate failure to take Hue and Thua Thien Province. The enemy was denied an opportunity to prepare his staging area in the Fire Support Base Bastogne area, a prerequisite for the attack on Hue. Although Bastogne ultimately fell, it was retaken, saving Hue.⁸

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
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QUANG TRI

PRINCIPAL LOCATIONS AND ENEMY THRUSTS



Source: MACDO

Figure: L-3

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(S) Combat activity in southern Military Region 1 was light when compared to the two northern-most provinces. Enemy small unit attacks and at-

tacks-by-fire were countered with increased patrolling and mobile operations by the 2d Division, ranger border defense units, and the Territorial Forces.⁹

ATTACK ON QUANG TRI

(S) Beginning about 27 March, indirect fire attacks began to be heavier against ARVN 3d Division units near the Demilitarized Zone, and by midday on 30 March the division was reporting heavy attacks-by-fire on fire support bases along the Demilitarized Zone and at Camp Carroll (Fig. L-3). Ground attacks were occurring at the same time against Fire Support Bases Sarge, Nui Ba Ho, and Holcomb. The pressure increased against the fire support bases with each attack-by-fire averaging 200 to 300 rounds.

(C) As the pressure increased, the training weaknesses of the 3d Division became more apparent. Reflecting on the situation, the division advisors felt that the 3d Division troops had developed a "fire base syndrome" and were unwilling to move beyond the range of the indirect fire weapons at the fire bases. The use of fire bases for artillery emplacement and as staging areas for short operations resulted in the division failing to develop adequate offensive capabilities. Further, the only defensive tactics practiced were those associated with defending the fire bases. When the 3d Division was forced to fight a delaying action, it was untrained to do so.¹⁰

(C) To the 3d Division the heavy artillery and rocket fire seemed extremely accurate and well planned. Attacks on Fire Support Bases Sarge and Nui Ba Ho against the marines, as well as against the northern fire support bases, began with artillery fire, progressed from mortar fire to recoilless rifle fire, and culminated in a ground attack. The artillery support of the infantry was well coordinated and against the northern fire support bases such as A-2, A-4, and C-1, where the enemy had tanks, armor's shock action was used with good effect. Whether these outposts should have been defended longer by the 3d Division was debatable; the Deputy Senior Advisor, LTC Lozier, doubted that it would have been practical. The decision was to fall back behind successive defensive positions where there was more mobility and flexibility and where the enemy did not know the exact location of each outpost. The 3d Division did quite well after the initial fallback into a defensive posture from Dong Ha down toward Fire Support Base Pedro, paralleling Route 1. There the lines were fluid and ARVN had armor and mobile infantry in forward positions.¹¹

(S) As the initial hours passed, enemy activity intensified under a cloud cover which prevented

aerial reconnaissance and support by TACAIR. Bad weather during the first seven days limited allied TACAIR activities to COMBAT SKYSPOT missions. The 3d Division Air Liaison Officer Advisor, MAJ David A. Brookbank, later commented:

Within 24 hours the entire battle area was completely unworkable for FACs and close air support. The adverse weather was a major factor in the initial success of the NVA offensive. The only usable air power was B-52 strikes, COMBAT SKYSPOTS, and LORAN bombing. Fixed wing gunships, USAF Spectres, and USAF and VNAF AC-119's could not be used even when there was a break in the weather because of the air defense.¹²

(S) On 31 March attacks-by-fire against A-2, A-4, C-1, C-2, Fuller, Sarge, Holcomb, Dong Ha, Quang Tri Combat Base, and Camp Carroll and



In the face of the NVA invasion refugees evacuated combat areas.

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Nui Ba Ho, accounted for the enemy expenditure of some 4,000 rounds of mixed 82mm mortar, 122mm rocket, and 122mm, 130mm, and 162mm artillery, the first enemy use of tube artillery in Military Region 1 for 1972. In addition to the indirect fires, Fire Support Bases A-2, C-1, Fuller, Sarge, and Holcomb also received ground attacks. Fire Support Base Khe Gio was lost at 0545 hours and Fuller was abandoned around noon, followed by the evacuation of Holcomb. Late afternoon saw Camp Carroll under heavy attack, while NVA forces finally penetrated Nui Ba Ho at 2000 hours, forcing evacuation by the advisor, his counterpart, and some 30 to 40 remaining Vietnamese marines. Of the 300 total marines who began the withdrawal, some 170 reached Mai Loc and safety. Fire Support Base Sarge, also manned by marines, was penetrated and evacuated a few hours later. The northernmost outposts occupied by 3d Division units had to be abandoned too; Fire Support Bases A-4, A-2, C-1, and C-2 were evacuated on 1 April. Cam Lo District Headquarters came under indirect fire, followed by a ground attack. As a result of the onslaught, local civilians were fleeing south in large numbers.

(C) One bright spot in this dark picture was the performance of the 3d Territorial Forces Group, which was tasked to defend along the eastern four kilometers of the Demilitarized Zone as an economy of force measure. While the decision to use Territorials as front line troops was unpopular with the CORDS advisors, the Group held against the initial NVA onslaught, unlike the 3d Division troops which abandoned Fire Support Base A-2 and their American advisors. Subsequently, the Territorials counterattacked to A-2 and rescued the six surviving Americans. Three days later, under increased enemy pressure, the Group was forced to withdraw. Even in the withdrawal they fought well, using delaying tactics. By that time they had killed 196 of the enemy.¹³

(S) The situation in Quang Tri Province worsened as the hours passed. ARVN units were fighting against coordinated attacks with a minimum of air support and largely ineffective artillery support. Because both the weather and the missile threat had blocked almost all air support, the enemy offensive was gaining momentum. On 1 April it appeared that unless the weather cleared within the next two days, it was certain the enemy would control all of Quang Tri Province outside a line encompassing Dong Ha and Quang Tri City.¹⁴

(S) By 2 April the Quang Tri situation was described as fluid. The garrison at Camp Carroll was in great danger as the 56th Regiment had undergone heavy shelling and ground attacks. During the daylight hours of 2 April Camp Carroll underwent another intensive ground attack. Artillery fire from Mai Loc supported the friendly forces

and priority for air support went to the beleaguered camp. But adverse weather continued to hamper air operations. Carroll surrendered to the enemy about 1500 hours, a distinct blow to the 3d Division, the ferocity of the attack notwithstanding. And the fall of Camp Carroll had a chain effect. The 147th VNBC Brigade at Mai Loc was put in a serious position, for Carroll had been the only base which could provide Mai Loc with artillery support, and at about 1700 hours the Mai Loc forces fired their last 105mm round. Air resupply had been precluded by bad weather. At 1815 hours, the brigade commander evacuated Mai Loc under extremely heavy enemy artillery fire. The withdrawal was extremely arduous and the marines finally reached Route 1 some twenty-four hours later.¹⁵

(S) The enemy continued to mass his forces. Although not identified in combat, the 304th NVA Division was believed to be committed in central Quang Tri Province. The 324B Division was believed ready to increase its activity in southern Quang Tri and in Thua Thien Provinces. Elements of the 308th NVA Division were nearing the Demilitarized Zone. Major enemy forces were situated on the northern banks of the Nieu Giang and Cua Viet Rivers to the east and west of Dong Ha. Cam Lo District Headquarters was evacuated on 2 April. This withdrawal, together with the exodus from Mai Loc, left Fire Support Base Pedro as the only strong point southwest of Quang Tri City. Enemy attacks in Quang Tri Province were further reinforced with tanks which had moved across the Ben Hai River and deployed north of the Cua Viet River. Tanks were also located west of Fire Support Base Sarge moving north along the road. The main attack, across the Ben Hai River, had been slowed by the Cua Viet River and ARVN forces. All major elements of the enemy B-5 Front and the 304th Division were reported to have been committed to battle, and it was probable that the 308th NVA Division was also in the Demilitarized Zone.¹⁶

(S) Meanwhile, other friendly units were on the move. A fresh VNBC brigade was scheduled to leave for Military Region 1 on 3 April. The 258th VNBC Brigade, originally stationed at Fire Support Base Nancy in southern Quang Tri Province, and moved at the beginning of the onslaught to Dong Ha, was again moved, this time to Quang Tri Combat Base to assume overall security for the 3d Division Command Post and for the base itself. The 3d Battalion of the 258th remained in defense at Dong Ha under the operational control of the 20th Tank Regiment until 8 April. On the evening of 1 April the 3d Division Command Post was moved to a location within Quang Tri City.¹⁷

(C) The 1st Armor Brigade, another major element under 3d Division control, established defen-

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sive positions south of the Mieu Giang River in the vicinity of Dong Ha beginning on 2 April. In order to provide unified control for friendly forces in the Dong Ha area, the commander of the 1st Armor Brigade was ordered to take control of the newly formed 20th Tank Regiment, the 3d Battalion of the 258th VNMC Brigade, and the 57th Infantry Regiment. The 1st Armor Brigade command group arrived in Dong Ha from La Vang at 1430 hours on 2 April and took charge of the units. Although enemy tanks and troops had been reported north of the river at Dong Ha, when the command group arrived enemy activity was light. The Dong Ha bridge had been prepared for demolition, but the 1st Armor Brigade commander refused to allow its destruction until he obtained a clearer picture of the situation. However, a previously requested COMBAT SKYSPOT air strike and sympathetic detonation of the demolitions dropped one span of the bridge. In the meantime, the brigade set up defensive positions south of the river using the newly formed mixture of armor, marine, and infantry troops. On the morning of 3 April the 1st Armor Brigade was given operational control of the 17th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Beginning on 4 April in the Dong Ha area the enemy conducted ground probes and indirect fire attacks of varying intensities. Marine and ranger battalions from the JGS reserve were moved north and deployed in Military Region 1.¹⁸

(S) By 4 April the enemy offensive had abated somewhat as he paused to make preparations to continue the attack. Enemy forces, supported by tanks, were known to have crossed the Cua Viet River. Some of the tanks previously reported as having deployed north of the Cua Viet had AA guns in place of the regular turrets. Ten tanks were located north of the Cua Viet River and engaged by TACAIR and naval gunfire. Aerial photography confirmed the southernmost SAM site to that date, extending the threat to within three miles of Quang Tri City. Artillery was located in Quang Tri between the Demilitarized Zone and Cua Viet River. The 304th NVA Division was still maintaining pressure against Fire Support Base Sarge southwest of Quang Tri City and, for the first time, Fire Support Base Anne was attacked. Field commanders believed the enemy was trying to conduct a double envelopment of the Dong Ha and Quang Tri City. Artillery was located in Quang weighted in the north. Late on 4 April Fire Support Base Anne was finally evacuated by ARVN troops.¹⁹

(S) On 5 and 6 April the enemy continued to reconstitute and reposition his units. Large numbers of enemy vehicles, men, and supplies were being

transported down Route 1 from the Demilitarized Zone. Friendly forces were similarly reinforcing. With the arrival of the 369th VNMC Brigade from Saigon and nine ranger battalions from the JGS reserve, a refined defensive posture could be established. By 6 April RVNAF forces were disposed north to south as follows:

- Territorial Forces occupied defensive positions which paralleled the south bank of the Cua Viet River from Dong Ha to the sea.
- The 3d Division (in reality the 1st Armor Brigade) with the 57th Regiment, the 3d Battalion, 258th VNMC Regiment, and the 20th Armor Regiment (equivalent to a US tank battalion) defended west of Dong Ha.
- The 258th VNMC Brigade (—), under operational control of the 3d Division, defended west-northwest of Quang Tri City.
- Newly arrived, the 147th and 369th Brigades, VNMC Division, defended the area west and southwest of Quang Tri City to include Fire Support Base Nancy.
- Three ranger battalions and two armored cavalry regiments of the 1st Armor Brigade provided defense in depth in the Quang Tri area.
- The 4th, 5th, and 6th Ranger Groups were established in the vicinity of Camp Evans.
- In the Hue area, the 1st Division had the 1st Regiment at Fire Support Base Rakkasan, the 54th Regiment at Birmingham, while 3d Regiment added depth to the defense.
- One Regional Force battalion and a Regional Force group were enroute to Thua Thien Province from Quang Tin and Quang Ngai Provinces respectively.


(S) On 7 April the weather was also improving as the lull in combat continued into its fourth day. But the enemy was expected to resume activity as soon as his artillery and armor were ready.²⁰

(C) In Thua Thien Province, as a result of the offensive, 1st Division forces were withdrawn from the Veghel area northeast to the area including Fire Support Bases Bastogne, Checkmate, and Birmingham (Fig. L-4). One significant enemy attack occurred on 5 April when armored elements were ambushed at a roadblock on Route 547 about 7 kilometers east of Bastogne. Despite concerted efforts by two battalions to dislodge enemy forces, only one tank and two armored personnel carriers were able to break through. Friendly forces lost one tank and 11 armored personnel carriers. Enemy pressure was increasing in the Bastogne area, thus threatening Hue. However, as of 6 April no enemy armor had been confirmed in this area of operations.²¹


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**THUA THIEN
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HUE MUNICIPALITY**



Source: MACDO

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
(S) As the first week in April came to an end, the enemy thrust abated. Although the NVA continued to apply pressure, especially in the provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien, the advancement of enemy forces ceased. Prior to 27 April there were days when the enemy was very active, conducting ground probes of allied lines and staging indirect fire attacks of great intensity. There were also days when such attacks were very sporadic and during which there were no ground probes. Both Marble Mountain (Da Nang) and Da Nang Air Base were subject to periodic rocket and mortar attacks. The area around Fire Support Bases Bastogne and Checkmate was under intense pressure, and by the second week in April the two were cut off from surface transportation. Enemy forces also exerted pressure in southern Military Region 1, causing Fire Support Bases West and O'Connor to be evacuated by ARVN on 9 April (Fig. L-1).²²

ALLIED ACTIVITY

(S) During the lull, RVNAF forces had the opportunity to conduct badly needed reorganization and resupply and shore up their defensive posture. LTG Lam, the I Corps Commander, began planning an offensive to regain the initiative. For the most part, until the limited offensive began on 14 April, RVNAF forces continued to dig in. Later during the month, in conjunction with increased TACAIR activity, most contacts with the enemy, were RVNAF initiated.²³

(S) By 8 April, then, the situation in northern Military Region 1 had stabilized. SAM firings in southern Quang Tri and in Thua Thien Province confirmed the existence of SAM sites within South Vietnam. Both Dong Ha and Quang Tri Cities were subject to sporadic 130mm artillery fire. There was an 8 April coordinated attack against both Fire Support Bases Birmingham and Bastogne as the NVA kept up its effort to control the Route 547 area, an avenue of approach to the walled city of Hue.

(S) RVNAF forces operating on and around Fire Support Base Pedro were attacked shortly after midnight on 9 April. In this coordinated tank-infantry thrust, enemy success would have exposed the southern flank of the Dong Ha defense to the enemy; however, NVA armor lost between 13 and 16 tanks in this abortive attack. The next two days saw the addition of another marine battalion to reinforce sweep operations, which accounted for 400 NVA killed. According to VNMC advisors these actions defeated a major drive to bisect the vital Quang Tri Combat Base complex



ARVN soldiers driving into Quang Tri in a T-54 tank captured on 10 April.

and destroy the effectiveness of the 3d Division.²⁴

(S) During a period following the tank-infantry attack in the Pedro area, RVNAF forces met the enemy in three other attacks involving enemy armor and destroyed 24 enemy tanks. In one skirmish elements of the 5th Ranger Group, under 3d Division operational control, along with the 1st and 4th Ranger groups, destroyed 12 enemy tanks, nine of them by direct 105mm howitzer fire. According to the Senior Advisor to the Ranger Command, LTC Craig H. Spence,

The most spectacular incident occurred on 10 April when members of the 30th Ranger Battalion, 5th Ranger Group, operating with the 20th Armor (20th Tank Regiment), captured a Soviet T-54 tank evacuated by its crew, reportedly with the engine running and a round in the gun.

The RVNAF Ranger Command elements had been rushed to Military Region 1 only a few days earlier, having been constituted as South Vietnam's reserve for Military Regions 1 and 2. The 1st Ranger Group was already in Military Region 1. Arriving at Phu Bai on 4 and 5 April, COL Tran Cong Lieu's Ranger Command consisted of the 4th, 5th, and 6th Ranger Groups; 4,048 men and 130 vehicles had been airlifted from Saigon to Military Region 1 in 27 hours using both USAF and VNAF resources. I Corps had decided that the Ranger Command would be I Corps Reserve with two ranger groups near Camp Evans and one providing security for Hue. The Ranger Command set up headquarters at Phu Bai, and on the night of 5 April the 5th Ranger Group moved to Camp Evans; the 4th went to Hue and the 6th remained at Phu Bai. But on the morning of 6 April the 5th Ranger

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Group was dispatched to Quang Tri Province under 3d Division operational control, and later in the day the 4th was placed under operational control of Thua Thien Province. Ranger Command Headquarters and the 6th Ranger Group were relocated to Camp Evans. The basic mission of the Ranger Command remained as I Corps Reserve until the next enemy push. There was little additional guidance from I Corps Headquarters, but boundaries of the areas of operation did change on occasion. On 9 April the 4th Ranger Group was placed under operation control of the 3d Division, which now had control of the 1st, 4th, and 5th Ranger Groups. In spite of the high frequency of command and control changes, ranger operations were generally effective during the period of initial stabilization. Ranger Command units were credited with killing 434 enemy soldiers and destroying 15 enemy tanks while capturing another.²⁵

(S) Throughout the initial stabilization period the enemy continued with strong efforts to control Route 547 and Fire Support Bases Bastogne, Checkmate, and Birmingham. The pressure was especially heavy on the high ground to the northwest of Bastogne and to the east where Route 547 had been interdicted. On 11 April one battalion of the 54th Regiment was on the high ground around Bastogne, while another had just reinforced Checkmate. The battalion on the high ground was soon forced to withdraw to Fire Support Base Birmingham, having received heavy ground and indirect fire attacks. Meanwhile, both Bastogne and Checkmate had been cut off. The 1st Regiment was dispatched to attempt to clear Route 547 and relieve the two battalions at Bastogne and Checkmate, but to no avail, as strong and determined 29th NVA Regiment forces blocked forward movement. In spite of subsequent heavy artillery concentrations and B-52 strikes, the enemy held fast. Several attempts were made to resupply both fire support bases by both VNAF Helicopters and US and VNAF parachute drops, but they were only partially successful. Most air drops missed the drop zones. On two occasions, foot parties made successful resupply trips from Birmingham on a route north of 547 to Checkmate. Although these efforts sustained the defenders, MEDEVAC of wounded from the daily mortar and rocket attacks became an increasingly serious problem. According to the 1st Division's Senior Advisor, during the latter half of April the division situation was critical. Attacks-by-fire and ground attacks had increased, and five defending battalions were at 50 percent strength or less. Fortunately, weather was now in favor of the allies, permitting extensive VNAF and US tactical air support near friendly positions.²⁶

(S) Fire Support Bases West and O'Connor in Quang Tri Province were abandoned to the enemy

by 2d Division forces on 9 April, and several unsuccessful attempts were made to retake them during the ensuing weeks. Six 105mm howitzers were lost, adding to the many which had been lost by RVNAF in Quang Tri Province. Prior to 9 April the situation in the southern three provinces had become more critical with the departure of some 27,000 troops of the Americal Division, for RVNAF forces could not provide the same extensive control of the land. Coupled with the enlarged area of operations that the 2d Division was given was the recent loss to the newly formed 3d Division of an entire artillery battalion of one 155mm and two 105mm howitzer batteries, but nothing of significance had happened until the 9 April loss of two fire support bases. Then on 11 April 5th Regiment forces, operating out of Fire Support Base Ross, received a ground probe from elements of the 38th NVA Regiment, which normally operated farther north. This presented a problem to MG Heip, the 2d Division Commander. The town of Hiep Duc and a battalion of the 5th Regiment were now sandwiched between the 38th NVA Regiment on the north and the 31st NVA Regiment on the south. Should he move the battalion to Ross with the rest of the 5th Regiment, which would mean probable loss of Hiep Duc and the Territorials guarding it, or should he leave the battalion there? To move the battalion to Ross would reinforce the Que Son Valley gateway, insuring that this vital supply route remained intact. MG Heip chose to move the battalion, and 400 men were airlifted by only two HU-1Ds in one day. MG Heip believed the Territorials in Hiep Duc might hold, and that in the long run Que Son was strategically more important than Hiep Duc. Enemy pressure continued to mount in the Hiep Duc area against the Regional Force/Popular Force garrison, with resupply becoming a problem. The 711th NVA Division was also believed to be advancing towards the lowlands of Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces, posing an additional threat to Hiep Duc and Route 534. Elements of this division attacked Fire Support Base Center on 20 April. Meanwhile, in the Que Son area of operations, the 2d Division was holding the vital entrance to Que Son Valley, assisted by vast amounts of air support, especially Spectre and Stinger. The Deputy Senior Advisor of the 2d Division, LTC Vincent Reinstein, stated that the enemy forces around Que Son had been decimated by B-52 strikes beginning about mid-April and that the 2d Division could not have held Fire Support Base Ross and Que Son without this support. Enemy plans for Que Son were thus temporarily aborted, but not so for Hiep Duc; on 25 April the town was overrun by the enemy after heavy indirect fire attacks.

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(S) The enemy was also active in Quang Ngai Province during the initial stabilization. In a successful 19 April attempt to undermine the Vietnamization and pacification programs, the NVA burned nine return-to-village sites in the eastern portions of the province. Route 1 south of Quang Ngai City was also cut in a related incident, thus adding to already serious problems.²⁷

(S) GEN Abrams visited all of the ARVN Military Region Commanders on 11 April in order to get a first hand look at the situation. LTG Lam of I Corps informed GEN Abrams that the enemy's main effort after the initial thrust had been on the 8th, 9th, and 10th of April and that NVA forces had been beaten. Despite the loss of many armored vehicles, enemy forces were expected to continue pressure for the next two or three weeks. According to LTG Lam, RVNAF morale was high, and counterattacks were scheduled to begin on 14 April. Plans were to use three VNMC battalions, two ranger battalions, and two armored cavalry regiments to extend the allied perimeter to the higher ground around Cam Lo, Mai Loc, and Fire Support Base Carroll, allowing Fire Support Base Holcomb, overlooking the Ba Long Valley, to be reestablished. If the operation was initially successful, LTG Lam planned to go further west to Fire Support Bases Fuller, Sarge, and Khe Gio, then move north of the Cua Viet and return in an easterly direction to the sea. The westward RVNAF movement was planned to be slow and methodical. On 16 April there were three contacts with the enemy, with moderate to heavy resistance. By about 18 April I Corps units were contacting enemy forces four to five times per day, mostly elements of the 304th NVA Division, the 308th NVA Division, and the 204th NVA Tank Regiment. A 21 April message reported that a captured battalion executive officer of the 102d Regiment, 308th NVA Division, stated that his division was to have attacked Dong Ha between 15 and 17 April with tanks and infantry, while another PW revealed that his division, the 304th, was to have attacked Quang Tri Combat Base on the same date. The attacks did not materialize, probably because elements of the 304th and

308th NVA Divisions suffered high casualties as a result of ground, air, and artillery attacks. Late April aerial photography revealed the presence of 122mm field guns in the vicinity of Route 547, and Fire Support Base King was believed to have been hit with 130mm rounds, both of these occurrences giving notice of the increased threat to Hue. Quang Tri City was already vulnerable, and allied units operating in the vicinity were often subjected to shellings by enemy long range artillery. On 26 April the ARVN counteroffensive was still pushing slowly westward against moderate resistance from a still refitting enemy. The general perimeter of the battle area was as shown in Figure L-5.²⁸

RVNAF RESUPPLY AND TRAINING

(S) As of 25 April RVNAF had lost considerable numbers of major items of equipment, creating serious resupply problems countrywide. For example, 18 155mm and 47 105mm howitzers had been lost. Twenty-one light tanks, 16 medium tanks, and 89 APCs had been destroyed or captured. Over 240 wheeled vehicles had been lost. Most of these losses took place in Military Region 1. In order to compensate for these losses rapid resupply was a must. After a delay in reporting shortages, the RVNAF resupply operation began to improve. On 15 April nine M-48A3 tanks were received from Japan where they had been rebuilt. Seventy M-113 APCs and three M-41A3 tanks were shipped by sea, scheduled to arrive in late May. Positive action was taken to accelerate delivery of main gun ammunition for the M-41A3. The concurrent recovery of repairable armored vehicles was slow during April. Artillery units were reconstituted with equipment from other ARVN assets and by airlift from offshore stocks.²⁹

(C) Training acceleration began in April, too. JGS approval was sought for extra tank training course increases, four of which were programmed to start in May. Artillery units were reconstituted by reassigning experienced personnel from other units and by drawing officers and non-commissioned officers from a pool of ARVN Artillery School graduates.

THE FALL OF QUANG TRI PROVINCE

(C) By the time NVA forces began the second phase of their advance, the command and control situation in I Corps was weakened, especially in the 3d Division. The newly formed and badly battered 3d Division and its commander, BG Giai, had a span of control that encompassed at times as many as 13 major units from several different services including the Division's three organic regiments. Not only was the span of control too great,

but units were attached and detached with alarming frequency.³⁰

(S) The weather was bad on 27 April, and NVA forces capitalized on the situation. In Quang Tri Province the 3d Division began reporting heavy fire and ground attacks involving company size units. Some of the attacks were accompanied by tanks across the Cua Viet River. The heaviest ground attack was in the vicinity of Fire Support


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MILITARY REGION 1

BATTLEFIELD PERIMETER AND AREAS
OF
OPERATION
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Base Pedro in the 2d Regiment area of operation and a troop of the 18th Armored Cavalry Regiment, part of I Corps Reserve, had to be sent in as reinforcements. Territorial forces were reported as being heavily engaged northwest of Quang Tri City. Fire Support Bases Nancy and Barbara, as well as Dong Ha City, received heavy 122mm rocket and 130mm artillery attacks. Other units belonging to the 3d Division also reported attacks: 1st Armor Brigade and its 4th and 5th Ranger Groups, the 147th VNMC Brigade, and the 1st Ranger Group. At 1315 hours LTG Lam declared a tactical emergency in Quang Tri Province. At about the same time, however, activity was relatively low in both the Bastogne and Birmingham areas of Thua Thien Province and in southern Military Region 1, a situation which soon changed.

(C/NF) The battlefield situation on 27 April was one of confusion, especially among units assigned to the 3d Division. By 0900 hours on 27 April a troop of the 20th Tank Regiment operating with the 5th Ranger Group had all its officers killed. Leaderless, the remaining six operational tanks broke and fled but were rallied by the regimental executive officer. The 4th and 5th Ranger Groups were in constant contact throughout the day. Remaining tanks from the troop of the 20th Tank Regiment succeeded in destroying several enemy T-54s. By the end of the afternoon the front lines of both ranger groups had been pushed back 2 to 4 km. Reports vary as to what happened next, but in any event elements of either the 20th Tank Regiment or the 43d Ranger Battalion broke and fled to the east, creating a situation wherein nearly all units who were operationally controlled by the 1st Armor Brigade broke ranks.³¹

(S) The 2d Regiment and the 1st Armor Brigade were not the only 3d Division units facing a worsening situation; all 3d Division units were being pushed back. By nightfall elements of the enemy 304th and 308th Divisions had pushed RVNAF to within 2 to 3 km of Quang Tri City. Fire Support Base Pedro had to be evacuated. On 27 April it was estimated that some 7,000 accurately directed artillery and rocket rounds had been fired by the enemy in Military Region 1. All day long, Quang Tri City, Quang Tri Combat Base, La Vang, and Quang Tri Bridge were attacked by fire. To add to the problems a direct hit on the main ammunition dump at Quang Tri Combat Base destroyed 2,000 rounds of mixed artillery ammunition.³²

(S) Early on 28 April the status of units of the 1st Armor Brigade gave ample proof of the intensity of the enemy effort: 20th Tank Regiment had only 18 M-48A3 tanks remaining; 57th Regiment had 1,400 men; the 4th Ranger Group had 800 men with one battalion ineffective, while the

5th had 600 men with two battalions ineffective; and the 17th and 18th Armored Cavalry Regiments had only two-thirds of their combat vehicles operational. The enemy renewed his efforts at 0630 hours, with heavy incoming artillery being directed at all friendly elements. An initial thrust pushed from the north to about 3 km south of Dong Ha. After a fierce battle for a strongpoint about 3.5 km south of Dong Ha, successive southward defensive lines were established as the enemy kept up his pressure. At one point a Route 1 bridge about 5 km south of Dong Ha, defended by elements of the 5th Ranger Group, was threatened by the enemy. Had the enemy captured the bridge, elements of the 20th Tank Regiment, the 17th Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the Armor Brigade command group would have been cut off. As ARVN armor elements were moving south on Route 1, approximately half of them had crossed the bridge when it was hit by two 130mm rounds, rendering it impassable for tracked vehicles. Six APCs and one M-48A3 tank were abandoned by their crews and had to be destroyed by US TACAIR. About this same time the Armor Brigade commander was wounded, and a little later the brigade CP, attached artillery, and the 4th Ranger Group again began withdrawing south on Route 1. As one ranger advisor, MAJ Kenneth Teel, stated: "Enemy artillery chased all units heading along Route 1 south to the Quang Tri Combat Base, which was occupied by the 147th Marine Brigade." Route 1 soon became clogged with vehicles moving south. Later that day the 4th and 5th Ranger Groups and 20th Tank Regiment were detached from the 1st Armor Brigade. BG Gial decided to establish defensive positions at Quang Tri Combat Base, and remaining 1st Armor Regiment elements were ordered to defend an area southeast of Quang Tri City. The 5th Ranger Group was south of the Quang Tri Combat Base to the east of the Quang Tri Bridge and the 4th Ranger Group was in the Quang Tri Combat Base air strip. Elements of the 2d Regiment were securing the north end of the Quang Tri Bridge. However, two battalions of the 52d Regiment which were exfiltrating from Dong Ha were never heard from after 1000 hours that morning, leaving the brigade weakened. Night defensive positions were set up, as the 3d Division began girding itself for the next day.³³

(S) Meanwhile, the relative calm which had existed in Thua Thien Province came to a halt. Late in the afternoon the NVA attacked 1st Division elements some 5 km north of Fire Support Base Bastogne. At exactly 2015 hours the 2d Battalion, 54th Regiment, at Bastogne began receiving mortar fire and an hour later was attacked by an estimated enemy battalion. It was believed these were elements of the 29th and 803d Regiments of the 324B

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Division. Communications with the 54th Regiment headquarters were lost when the battalion TOC took a direct hit, forcing communications to be routed through Checkmate. By 2330 hours the perimeter of Bastogne had been penetrated and the 2d Battalion began withdrawing to the east to Fire Support Base Birmingham. Cover was provided by US Stinger aircraft and TACAIR. Because Checkmate was now uncovered, it was ordered evacuated too, with the troops also moving towards Birmingham. TACAIR and B-52 strikes were directed against the two bases to destroy the remaining supplies, ammunition, and artillery pieces. The loss of Bastogne and Checkmate was a severe blow to the South Vietnamese, but more reverses were encountered before the NVA was turned back.¹⁴

(S) In Quang Tri Province enemy forces continued the attack on 29 April but at somewhat less intensity than the day before. The 308th NVA Division was advancing from the northwest, the 304th NVA Division from the south and southwest, and the 812th Regiment of the 324B Division was operating in the vicinity of Fire Support Base Nancy.

(S) The situation remained serious for friendly forces. On 29 April the enemy apparently relaxed efforts to conceal 130mm gun sites so they could sustain their fires. Fire Support Base Nancy, Quang Tri Combat Base, and La Vang were among the major enemy artillery targets. La Vang, in one 15 hour period, received about 1,000 rounds of artillery. Ground forces penetrated marine defenses on the north and west of Quang Tri Combat Base and advanced to about 1 km south of the Quang Tri Bridge in another location. This strategic bridge had been the subject of repeated attacks throughout the day. In one action shortly after midnight elements of the 2d Division and the 18th Armored Cavalry Regiment were forced to fall back across the bridge while holding the enemy at bay. Then, TACAIR, guided by a FAC with flares, put air strike after air strike on the enemy at the north end of the bridge, beating off the attack. Still later a Regional Force company, assisting in guarding the bridge, succeeded in destroying three enemy tanks. Communications, command, and control were such that the question of who was defending the bridge was often in doubt. The bridge had been heavily damaged but was still passable, an important factor since there were yet some 11 allied battalions of infantry and supporting arms to the north of it. Later in the afternoon of 29 April ammunition at the Quang Tri Combat Base was again struck by incoming artillery, and what remained burned throughout the night.

(C) There was some reshuffling of control during the 29th. The 18th Armored Cavalry Regiment, minus two troops in Quang Tri City, was attached

to the 1st Armor Brigade with the mission of keeping often interdicted Route 1 open south of Quang Tri City. The 79th Ranger Battalion was also controlled by the brigade. Late in the day the 3d Division commander ordered a withdrawal from Quang Tri to a general defensive line near My Chanh near the Quang Tri - Thua Thien Province boundary, but this order was soon rescinded by the I Corps Commander.¹⁵

(C) RVNAF vehicles and refugees fleeing south from Quang Tri City were caught in murderous NVA artillery barrages. According to the Province Senior Advisor of Quang Tri Province, the majority of the vehicles were military, mostly 2½ ton trucks. But there were many jeeps, smaller trucks, APCs, and hundreds of bicycles and motorcycles all mingled with pedestrians. Three-quarters of the people in the convoy were civilian, most of them members of military families. The Senior Advisor to the 18th Armored Cavalry Regiment, MAJ Thomas S. MacKenzie, accompanying his regiment on their mission to open Route 1 to the south, was a witness to one of the incidents. The 3d Troop of the 18th Armored Cavalry Regiment had successfully cleared the highway (new Route 1 which parallels the railway) to a small bridge about 4 km south of the Quang Tri Bridge. As soon as the bridge was cleared, streams of refugees on every conceivable type of vehicle poured down the highway, some reaching the next blockage about 2.5 km further south. At that time the convoy was hit with intense fire which decimated the refugees, killing hundreds. The artillery fire caused the stream of refugees to reverse its course, and as they did so they were hit again. As of 1 August there was no accurate accounting of how many people perished; estimates varied between 1,000 and 2,000.¹⁶

(S) By 30 April there had been a serious deterioration of command and control within the 3d Division and attached units. Of the units in the Quang Tri area only the 147th VNMC Brigade appeared to have maintained reliable combat effectiveness. In short, the ARVN defenses were tenuous and vulnerable.

(S) As the NVA forces increased their efforts to interdict the southern approaches to Quang Tri City, both air and road travel became extremely limited. All units were low on ammunition, particularly the artillery. On the previous day the last convoy had been left unattended in the La Vang area and was destroyed by the enemy. An attempt at aerial resupply on 30 April also met with disaster with only one pallet recovered. The Armor Brigade senior advisor reported that the shortage of fuses for 105mm rounds was critical. Although one battalion had 4,000 105mm rounds, it had only 400 fuses. The Armor Brigade had no reserve petroleum or ammunition supplies, and food would be

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Refugees flee Quang Tri as NVA forces advance on the city.

exhausted after 30 April. The 147th VNMC Brigade had only about 1,000 rounds of high explosives and 60 rounds of illumination left on the morning of the 30th.³⁷

(C) Midmorning gave rise to information that another large attack was to be launched against Quang Tri Combat Base. Previous attacks had been stopped by the 147th VNMC Brigade, but with the shortage of artillery ammunition the required artillery support was no longer available. At noon, BG Giai decided to withdraw the marines and assign them the mission to defend Quang Tri City. The withdrawal to Quang Tri was accomplished smoothly except for the removal of the artillery. Just before the artillery pieces reached it, the Quang Tri Bridge was destroyed, and the marines had to disable the artillery by removing the firing mechanisms. The troops had no trouble in fording the river, and defensive positions were set up around the city.

(C) The Armor Brigade had been operating south of Quang Tri City during the day, a day filled with enemy contacts and conflicting orders. For example,

at 1700 hours an order was received to execute a night withdrawal south along Route 1 and to destroy all equipment without an amphibious capability. Before the order could be clarified or stopped 12 M-41 tanks from the 17th Armored Cavalry Regiment and 18 105mm howitzers of the 33d Artillery Battalion were destroyed. Later came another order to counterattack north, this time to the Armor Brigade directly from I Corps. However, informed that the logistical situation precluded a counterattack, I Corps ordered several air drops, but only one bundle was recovered. By that time, the brigade had set up a night defensive perimeter some 5 km south of the Quang Tri Bridge. Plans called for an attack south along Route 1 at first night 1 May. The 1st, 4th, and 5th Ranger Groups were also situated south of Quang Tri City along Route 1, and by late in the evening of 30 April the outer edge of Quang Tri City was the battle line.³⁸

(S) On 1 May the RVNAF defenses around Quang Tri City collapsed, and the exodus south reached its peak. Evacuation plans had been made earlier by

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the 3d Division Commander, BG Giai. The 3d Division plan was based on successfully opening Route 1, permitting vehicular withdrawal of some 3,000 troops and 120 Americans remaining in the city. If Route 1 were not opened, then the withdrawal would be carried out on foot to the southeast. The plan called for the 1st Armor Brigade; the 1st, 4th, and 5th Ranger Groups; and the 57th Infantry Regiment, all of which were south of Quang Tri City, to push south along Route 1. The 147th VNMC Brigade was to escort the 3d Division south to link up with the 369th VNMC Brigade which was in the My Chanh area.

(C) Although the night of 30 April had been relatively quiet, the respite was short-lived. By about noon all effective resistance to the NVA north, east, and west of the Citadel had disappeared. Only the VNMC Brigade (1,200 meters south), the 3d Division staff, and the US advisors remained. BG Giai declared the situation hopeless and with his command group attempted to break out of the Citadel in armored personnel carriers and join the marines for the withdrawal. But he and his group were forced back into the Citadel by the enemy, returning about 1400 hours. Their extraction by helicopter began at 1615 hours. As MAJ Brookbank described it:

The aircover commenced at 1530 hours as F-4s started delivering every type of ordnance. The tactical situation dictated that normal safe distances for much of the ordnance be waived so we could do nothing but watch, wait, and thank God for the US Air Force. Enemy artillery continued to hit the Citadel. One 105mm artillery round impacted 5 feet beneath an American guarding the south wall. There were no casualties as the dirt absorbed the full impact. About 1600 hours, I received word from a FAC that the Jolly Greens were on their way in. At 1615 hours the first Jolly Green was seen coming in at a low altitude with American Sandys doing clover leaf fire suppression pattern around him. I was extracted along with 26 ARVN and 14 US advisors on the third and final Jolly Green at 1635 hours. I can state without reservation that I have never witnessed such an impressive display of aerial cover and fire control as the Sandys provided for the Jolly Green helicopter during the evacuation.³⁹

(S) What had caused most of the RVNAF to begin their flight south was not known. A catalyst may have been a report that a large enemy force, supported by tanks, was headed towards Quang Tri City from the southwest. Command and con-

trol was nonexistent. Many divisional units had begun destroying their equipment, which included tanks and artillery, prior to noon. About the same time as BG Giai declared the situation hopeless, units began withdrawing south in confusion. Only the withdrawal of the marines, the 20th Tank Regiment, and the 18th Armored Cavalry Regiment was made with any order; they fought their way back to the My Chanh together with their advisors. By about 1900 hours the 147th VNMC Brigade had halted in the vicinity of Hai Lang to await further southward movement on 2 May. The 5th Ranger Group moved south to clear an enemy unit blocking Route 1. It was followed by the 1st and 4th Ranger Groups, but it is not clear how or under what order. The 1st Armor Brigade units fought and fled southward, taking up night positions about 4 km southwest of Hai Lang. Indicative of the situation is LTC Louis C. Wagner's account of the afternoon:

By this time (1730 hours) in excess of 1,000 infantrymen from many units had begun to move into the Armor Brigade area. These infantry regimental commanders and a number of battalion commanders without troops were riding APCs, but would make no attempt to organize the stragglers into march units despite insistence by advisors that this be done.⁴⁰

(S) By late evening BG Giai was at Camp Evans where he was attempting to reestablish the 3d Division Headquarters and begin reorganizing. I Corps was faced with the immediate task of defending Hue. This included establishing a defense in depth across the northern approaches to Hue, movement of the two battalions of the 4th Regiment, 1st Division, to Hue, and strengthening command and control.

(C) In the meantime, on the afternoon of 1 May, remnants of the 3d Division, specifically 1st and 4th Ranger Group personnel, began arriving in the vicinity of Camp Evans. The 5th Ranger Group, still intact, was hit on three sides during the night of 1 May. Its units were fragmented and its advisors were separated from the group command post. The command group lost contact with its units and did not return to friendly territory until 4 May. The advisors were eventually extracted by a US air cavalry unit on the afternoon 2 May.


(C) Armor brigade units (17th and 18th Armored Cavalry Regiments, the last Armor Brigade Headquarters element, the 20th Tank Regiment, and elements of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment) in their night defensive positions southwest of Hai Lang were awakened on 2 May by the sound of enemy armor passing by, and by 0630 hours they had begun their move southward. But as they

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approached Route 1 they were taken under heavy artillery fire. Except for the 18th Armored Cavalry Regiment, there was mass confusion as dozens of vehicles ran into each other before control was finally regained. About 0900 hours Armor Brigade elements attempted to break through the heavily defended Hai Lang area after it had been hit with suppressive TACAIR strikes. Again there was confusion, and control was lost by some commanders. Some elements of the 11th, 17th, and 18th Armored Cavalry Regiments passed through Hai Lang successfully. To add to an already confused situation, six or seven PT-76s came from behind Hai Lang firing at the Armor Brigade. The 18th Armored Cavalry Regiment destroyed at least four, and possibly all of them. At this point, the commander of the 1st Armor Brigade moved to the head of the remaining elements to find an opening through Hai Lang to the east. In spite of heavy antitank fire, the remaining Armor Brigade forces broke through

around 1100 hours. From then on the going was relatively easy, with closure on Camp Evans about 1400 hours. But the cost had been heavy, as many vehicles either became stuck in rice paddies or ran out of fuel. And as LTC Wagner observed, leadership was very poor on 2 May. Another major problem was the infantry stragglers who tried to climb on the tracked vehicles, making it impossible to fight the vehicles properly, and many were killed because they fell off and were run over by other vehicles. All in all for the period 1 April to 2 May, Armor Brigade elements lost 43 M-48A3s, 66 M-41s, and 103 M-113s, while suffering 1,171 casualties.

(C) The 147th VNBC Brigade was in night positions southwest of Hai Lang on 1 May. The positions were integrated with tracked vehicles of both the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and 20th Tank Regiment. Some 1,200 ARVN stragglers were also inside the perimeter. Planning to attack south and east to link up with the 369th VNBC Brigade



NVA PT-76's disabled in the advance on Quang Tri.

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around the My Chanh, the brigade moved out at dawn, subject to the same attack from Hai Lang as the Armor Brigade. One VNMC battalion counterattacked, and with TACAIR and assistance from some of the tanks, the attack was broken. By about 1430 hours most of the 147th Brigade forces had passed through the 369th Brigade defensive positions and were regrouping in the vicinity of the Hue Citadel.⁴¹

(S) By 3 May the situation was grave. Fire Support Base Nancy, the last remaining fire support base in Quang Tri, came under fire on 2 and 3 May and was evacuated. In Thua Thien Province Fire Support Base King was subjected to increased pressure. As for RVNAF forces the 1st Division was effective and reliable but overtaxed and in need of replacements. The VNMC Division was intact except for the 147th Regiment, which needed replacements to relieve a critical shortage of officers and non-commissioned officers. The ranger groups were ineffective, unassembled, and uncontrolled, while the 1st Armor Brigade was almost nonexistent. The condition of the 3d Division was unknown, but it was ineffective as a unit and could not be rebuilt by simply furnishing personnel and

equipment. By 4 May, there was a pronounced lull in enemy activities. And as an interim measure, I Corps formed mobile reaction forces at Camp Evans from elements of the 4th Regiment (2d Division); 56th Regiment; 20th Tank Regiment; and the 11th, 17th, and 18th Armor Cavalry Regiments.⁴²

(S) While the NVA was occupied with the task of capturing Quang Tri Province, activity in Thua Thien Province and southern Military Region 1 was relatively light after the fall of Hiep Duc. The 1st Division forces restricted their activity to primarily a defensive role. Pressure did continue somewhat against Fire Support Base Birmingham. Aerial photographs revealed enemy personnel and vehicle movement in the Route 547 area, probably reinforcements for the 324B NVA Division in preparation for future attacks in the Fire Support Base Birmingham area. Aerial photography also revealed a buildup of enemy personnel and supplies in the A Chau Valley, while the 66th Regiment, 304th NVA Division, was reported moving to the Fire Support Base Anne area, probably enroute to Thua Thien Province.⁴³

THE DEFENSE OF HUE

(S) With the fall of Quang Tri Province, emphasis shifted to the defense of Hue. Enemy pressure had been light in Thua Thien Province as he was occupied with the battle for Quang Tri, but on 1 May 1st Division elements at Fire Support Base King had to repulse a heavy ground attack. Camp Eagle, south of Hue, was rocketed the same day but with no significant damage. By early evening of 2 May, Fire Support Base Nancy, the last friendly base in Quang Tri Province, was evacuated under the pressure of a day long enemy artillery and ground attack. VNMC elements withdrew to positions south of the My Chanh River, making this withdrawal the last by RVNAF in Military Region 1. It left the forward edge of the battle area as shown in Fig. L-5, with the marines in the north and the 1st Division in its normal area of operation west of Hue.

(S) Within two days after the fall back along the northern border of Thua Thien Province, LTC Lam, summoned to Saigon by President Thieu, was replaced as CG I Corps and Military Region 1 by LTC Ngo Quang Truong, who had been commanding Military Region 4. BG Giai was also replaced; he had accepted full responsibility for the loss of Quang Tri Province. Concurrently, a forward I Corps command post was established in the Hue Citadel by both the CG I Corps and CG. First Regional Assistance Command (FRAC). Straggler

control points were set up at Hue and Da Nang to assist in the reconstitution of units which had fled from the north. The 3d Division began the long task of completely rebuilding its units, while armor and cavalry elements began to receive high priority replacement of both equipment and personnel. Territorial Force commanders were placed under control of regular military commanders and integrated into the defensive structure. For the first four days in May the enemy maintained a low level of activity. The city of Hue did not come under attack, but enemy ground probes and shellings along the northern front continued.⁴⁴

(S) For the 1st Division operations were essentially defensive and characterized by moderate movement with limited battalion clearing actions aimed at restoring manageable areas of operation. On 5 May the 1st Division began an operation designed to relieve pressure against Fire Support Bases King and Birmingham and to ultimately retake bases to the west and south. US and VNAF TACAIR coupled with B-52 strikes helped 1st Division elements make steady progress and inflict heavy casualties on the enemy. The Senior Advisor to the division counted approximately 50 ground contacts, primarily in the 1st and 3d Regiment areas of operation, during the period 29 April to 12 May. Enemy units involved during this time span were probably elements of the 29th Regiment.

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LTG Ngo Quang Truong, Commanding General, I Corps and, Military Region I, meets with GEN Vian, Chairman, Joint General Staff, and President Thieu.

324B Division, and the 711th NVA Division. The enemy suffered 748 KIA at the hands of the 1st Division, which showed a more aggressive and bold spirit. In further reorganization efforts, the new CG of I Corps decided to disband the remainder of the 58th Regiment, 3d Division, using the personnel as replacements for the 1st Division.⁴⁵

(S) On 5 May LTG Truong directed a redesignation (which was completed on 7 May) of areas of operation. The northern sector of Thua Thien Province, covering the northern and northwestern approaches to Hue, was assigned to the Marine Division. The 1st Division was assigned the southern area of operation, and charged with the responsibility for defending the southwestern and southern approaches. What was important was that the concept provided for a defense in depth, a realistic chain of command, strong reserves, and the integration of ARVN and Territorial Forces. Three

days later, the Marine Division was reinforced by the 2d Brigade of the Airborne Division, deployed north from Military Region 3. At about the same time there began an intensive firepower program of B-52 strikes, TACAIR, naval gunfire, and conventional artillery, all in an attempt to disrupt enemy movement of men and materiel towards Hue. This around the clock effort saw TACAIR operating against virtually all major arteries leading south. The program significantly reduced mortar attacks, but light 130mm shelling continued. Significant amounts of enemy equipment were destroyed, including tanks, 130mm guns, trucks, and petroleum.⁴⁶

(S) With the additional brigade the Marine Division was able to begin its first offensive operation on 13 May. The 369th VNMC Brigade was able to conduct a limited objective operation some 12 km into southeastern Quang Tri Province. USMC heli-


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
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QUANG TRI

(SITUATION 24 MAY)



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copters air assaulted two battalions, while a third battalion crossed the My Chanh River. The plan was for a link-up, but immediate contact with the enemy prevented it. The two battalions swept south successfully, reaching the defensive line by nightfall. Supported by tactical air and naval gunfire, 243 enemy were killed while VNMV casualties were 9 killed and 38 wounded.⁴⁷

(S) Meanwhile, in the 1st Division area of responsibility, the increased aggressiveness of 1st Division personnel resulted in patrolling operations and contact with enemy forces along Route 547 and the outlying fire support bases. On 14 May two regiments began operations to clear the high ground south of Fire Support Bases Birmingham and Bastogne, and on 15 May ARVN volunteers were airlifted into Bastogne. A ground linkup with other 1st Division elements was made the next day, and 10 days later Fire Support Base Checkmate was retaken. A significant morale boost to ARVN and to the Government of Vietnam, this example of determined offensive operations and successful exploitation of B-52 strikes, tactical air, and artillery resulted in the withdrawal of the 29th NVA Regiment and a considerable reduction in pressure in the area of responsibility.⁴⁸

(S) In the Marine Division area of responsibility enemy activity remained at a low level for about a week following the division's first offensive action. But on 21 May the enemy initiated a three-pronged attack south. The attacks, spearheaded by both infantry and armor, but not preceded by preparatory fires, were successful in penetrating 3 to 5 km into the marine positions. The ensuing battle lasted all day, with the VNMV succeeding in cutting off a sizeable enemy force behind friendly lines. On the next day the enemy renewed the attack, this time penetrating 3 to 4 km. Again he was thwarted, and by 1900 hours on 22 May friendly lines had been restored. During the two days, the enemy suffered 542 killed while the marines reported light casualties.

(S) The increase in enemy activity caused the JGS to commit the 3d Brigade of the Airborne Division, which arrived in Military Region 1 on 22 May. Another reorganization was then possible. The Airborne Division (-) was assigned an area of responsibility northwest of Hue, between the 1st Division and the Marine Division. Airborne Division headquarters was located in Landing Zone Salley, along with the 3d Brigade which replaced the 2d Brigade, and the 2d Brigade moved to Camp Evans. Meanwhile, the Marine Division assumed control of the 1st Ranger Group, which had just been reorganized and refitted at Da Nang.

(S) Further indications of RVNAF readiness to begin offensive operations were embodied in a 24

May Marine Division action. One battalion of marines, using USMC landing craft, assaulted across Wunder Beach, north of the My Chanh defense line (Fig. L-8). About two hours later another battalion was airlifted by USMC helicopters into an area of Quang Tri, and the third was airlifted, using VNAF helicopters, into an area along the northeast end of the Thua Thien border. It immediately crossed the My Chanh River in a northerly direction. Supported by tactical air and naval gunfire, the two battalions in the north completed a sweep and joined the third battalion, completing the operation on 25 May. There were 515 enemy killed, with the marines losing 12 killed and the US 4. With the exception of the enemy repulsing a ranger element attack, activity in the Marine Division, Airborne Division (now at full strength with the 29 May arrival of the 3d Brigade), and 1st Division areas of responsibility was light for the remainder of the month.⁴⁹

(C) During the first three weeks in June enemy activity in the VNMV area of responsibility was relatively light, but indirect fire attacks increased in number and intensity. The Marine Division conducted limited offensive operations into Quang Tri Province on two occasions, 8 and 18 June. On 18 June, enemy forces countered with heavy artillery and mortar attacks, with 600 rounds reported on that day. Two days later heavy fighting erupted in the marine area of responsibility as the enemy attacked with tanks, infantry, and indirect fire along the My Chanh defense line. Supported once again by US tactical air, B-52 strikes and naval gunfire, as well as RVNAF artillery, the marines held their ground for five days. Heavy losses were inflicted on the enemy, who suffered 601 killed and 23 tanks and three 130mm guns destroyed. Friendly losses were put at 71 killed and 179 wounded.

(C) In the meantime, activity in the Airborne Division area centered southwest of Fire Support Base Nancy as the enemy increased pressure. Besides expanding the area of responsibility, divisional units protected the avenues of approach to Hue. Daily 130mm gun and 82mm mortar attacks-by-fire caused light ARVN casualties and damaged some equipment. One significant enemy ground attack occurred southwest of Nancy on 6 June, while another occurred on the 21st. During the latter, and for a four day period, NVA forces succeeded in penetrating the My Chanh defense line. But by nightfall on 24 June the Airborne Division units had driven the enemy back across the river. Heavy enemy shellings continued, but ground contact was light through 26 June.

(C) Still responsible for defending the western and southwestern approaches to Hue, the 1st Division conducted limited offensive operations during


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June to expand the area of responsibility and provide depth to the defense. Activity was focused along the line of Fire Support Bases Birmingham, Checkmate, and Bastogne. Two heavy contacts, responsible for 25 enemy killed, were reported on 10 and 11 June, and for the next week the pattern of activity was characterized by sharp, brief ground engagements. Activity was reduced until 26 June when Fire Support Base Checkmate was struck by indirect fire and ground attacks. Enemy pressure increased in the area and on the night of 27 June Checkmate reported 180 rounds of 122mm artillery while Bastogne reported 142. A heavy ground attack and continued mortaring caused ARVN forces to again withdraw from Checkmate on 29 June.³⁰

(S) In the three southern provinces during May and June enemy activity was relatively light. The 2d Division advisory personnel attributed this reduced level of activity to effective B-52 strikes and to successfully targeting the enemy forces. As a rule enemy activity was limited to sporadic as-

saults-by-fire, sapper attacks, and ground contacts.

(C) Da Nang and Marble Mountain were often the subject of light rocket attacks. For example, on 13 May eight 122mm rockets impacted within the perimeter of Da Nang Air Base causing some damage. Route 1 was often cut, usually through the destruction of key bridges. In Quang Tri Province, especially during May, enemy pressure against Fire Support Base Ross continued in the form of assaults-by-fire and ground attacks against Regional Force outposts. Territorial forces and 2d Division elements countered with increased mobile patrolling operations coupled with air support of all varieties. On 22 May Que Son City, the target of the 711th NVA Division, received a heavy assault-by-fire followed by a ground attack which was repulsed by Regional Forces with helicopter and fixed wing gunship support. Two Regional Force outposts were overrun on 27 May but were quickly retaken, and for the rest of the month and through June, activity was insignificant.



Enemy tanks destroyed near Quang Tri.

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(S) The only other action of importance occurred during the period 13 to 24 May in Quang Ngai Province. Ranger camps at Ba To and Gia Vuc began being subjected to increased enemy pressure. By 19 May the NVA had overrun two ranger outposts at Gia Vuc and had interdicted Route 516 between the two camps. With the support of ARVN artillery located at Fire Support Base Bronco, the rangers retook the outposts on 22 May, as well as taking the high ground around them. For the rest of May and most of June, activity in this area was slight.⁵¹

THE HUE POPULACE

(C) Even before the fall of Quang Tri, Hue had been crowded with some 85,000 refugees in some 75 different locations. In spite of the obstacles, Government agencies in Hue had met this refugee challenge. Few citizens had left Hue, and an anti-Communist front had even been established from local political parties and groupings. The formation of a paramilitary force of Hue People's Self Defense Force and retired military men, the "Thoan Hoa Division," was announced on 25 April. This optimism evaporated rapidly, however, when Bastogne and Quang Tri fell and some 100,000 refugees began descending on Hue.

(C) By the night of 3 May there were only about 70,000 people left in Hue, and it was clear that because of lack of direction something had to be done quickly. The next twenty-four hours, the critical period for the old Imperial Capital, witnessed a dramatic change. The chief catalysts were local heroes, LTG Truong and ex-Province Chief Le Van Thin. Both were well known, and with leadership which had an electric effect they began to guide

Hue back to order. Both civil and military discipline improved, as deserters were arrested and looting was stopped, all concurrent with a decrease in the refugee flow. An Emergency Committee was formed of citizens from the former anticommunist front. The committee's leader did much to bring order back to Hue. At first refusing to believe that leadership in the city had broken down, the Thua Thien Province Chief was finally forced into chairing a 4 May meeting to restore both. He had correctly sensed a challenge to his authority, and from then on reorganization and emergency procedures were swiftly established. At one critical point in the meeting the CORDS Province Senior Advisor was directly challenged by the Province Chief to reaffirm US support to Hue in this time of crisis. Hearing the affirmation directly from the senior American present brought applause from the assembly. According to Mr. John A. Graham, the affirmation had important positive effects. The reorganization of a stripped down government and the meeting were the last examples of real drama in this phase of the battle for Hue. The hard work began as civil servants returned, but organization was still lacking. With CORDS intervention the refugee program was restarted. But the low level of emergency activity contributed to a false sense of security, and for a few days there was a period of lethargy and indifference. On 6 May the "Thoan Hoa Division" was formally presented to the public, and by 8 May evidence of a return to normalcy was beginning to be seen. On 9 May CORDS personnel estimated that there were some 60,000 citizens and 30,000 refugees who had not gone to Da Nang.⁵²

RVNAF REFITTING AND RETRAINING

(S) By 31 May Military Region 1 RVNAF equipment losses had been heavy, considerably impairing combat effectiveness. After the fall of Quang Tri the shortage of tracked vehicles and artillery pieces was extremely critical. In response to MACV requests, the US logistic system moved into high gear, taking expedited action to replace heavy equipment losses of 149 tanks, 116 APCs, and 140 artillery pieces.

(C) Concurrently, ARVN ammunition expenditure rates had risen dramatically, creating critical shortages of some items. Of primary concern were 106mm HE, 160mm HE, point detonating fuses, claymore mines, and small arms ammunition. Sufficient resupply items were both air and sea lifted to meet ARVN demands, and as a result friendly forces did not run out of any type of ammunition.⁵³

(C) As a result of the offensive there was a countrywide shift in training emphasis, no less so

in Military Region 1. The loss of RVNAF personnel caused a swift realignment of training priorities in that noncritical programs were suspended and critical ones were shortened to increase the trainee output. For the RVNAF the number of recruits trained or retrained through 30 June 1972 was greater than the number programmed, because of an increase in the number of recruits entering training. Mobile training teams were developed to present critical instruction on new equipment, such as the XM-202 Flame Rocket and the highly successful TOW Missile System.

(C) In Military Region 1 specifically, complete refitting and retraining of some units was necessary and was accomplished quickly and efficiently. The 3d Division, reconstituted at Phu Bai shortly after the fall of Quang Tri, required complete retraining as a unit. To alleviate the pressure on the division, it later moved to the Da Nang area where training continued. Also needing complete

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refitting and retraining were the 1st Ranger Group, the 20th Tank Regiment, and several thousand RF/PF soldiers from Quang Tri Province. Such training was accomplished in the Phu Bai area south of Hue. In addition, new artillery units were activated and dispatched to Military Region 1, while in an effort to improve artillery counter-battery fire, targeting assistance teams were dis-

patched from Fort Sill. From 21 May to 30 June divisional artillery units received counterbattery and crater analysis training. No new armor units were activated for Military Region 1, but a mobile training team concept was put into effect to increase armor combat effectiveness. Likewise, no new ranger elements were activated, but the mobile training teams retrained ranger units.³⁴

THE US AIR AND NAVAL EFFORTS

AIR OPERATIONS

(S) When the enemy began the NGUYEN HUE Offensive, he was counting on surprise, bad weather, and an apparent shrinkage in US air assets to enable him to overcome the disadvantage of lack of air support. He clearly underestimated the ability of worldwide US TACAIR units to react to the sudden attack.

(S) Insofar as Military Region 1 was concerned the TACAIR and B-52 sortie rates reflected a decline during each of the first three months of 1972. To establish perspective, however, this had to be considered in terms of the air war in the whole area of Southeast Asia. The first quarter saw a continuation of the Commando Hunt VII dry season campaign directed at the infiltration routes and logistical lines of communication. This was heightened by continuing intelligence indications of a massive enemy offensive although the area of attack was still unknown. The drop in sortie rate in Military Region 1 reflected a diversion of resources to higher priority targets rather than a lack of capability to deliver the strikes. After a drop in January, the Southeast Asia total sortie rate showed an increase in both February and March as efforts to preclude an enemy offensive by a heightened interdiction campaign were implemented. Special emphasis was placed on strikes along the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos and both the number of attack sorties and the intensity of enemy antiaircraft reaction increased sharply along the Trail.

(S) During this temporary diminution of attacks in Military Region 1 the enemy was able to amass supplies to an unprecedented degree in preparation for the offensive. Thus, on the opening day of the attack he was well supplied, and his weapons were in place for the onslaught. Bad weather during the initial days hampered but did not stop the utilization of TACAIR and B-52 support by the defenders.

(S) Although bad weather hampered visual reconnaissance and TACAIR operations, air strikes were made using electronic guidance systems. When the weather finally improved, over 4,500 TACAIR sorties were flown in Military Region 1, complemented by nearly 600 B-52 sorties or more than double the rate of the previous month. Time

after time enemy buildups were decimated by air attacks. During the first days of the offensive air strikes were hampered by the disorganized retreat of friendly forces whose locations could not be accurately ascertained. Therefore, large no-fire areas were established. As the weather cleared and the battle lines stabilized, air strikes were used effectively against enemy troop concentrations, tanks, and artillery and along the lines of communication. The NVA antiaircraft effort was substantially increased as SAM sites, heavy antiaircraft artillery, and SA-2 missiles were located closer and closer to Quang Tri City.

(S) May saw a continued increase in the use of air power against the NVA as over 6,000 air sorties struck the enemy in Military Region 1. During the retreat from Quang Tri Province early in the month the enemy was rarely fixed long enough for effective use of air power, and the shambles of the control of many units made coordinated use of air difficult. As the lines stabilized during May, the RVNAF regained control and made effective use of air strikes. Enemy troop positions and 130mm gun emplacements were hammered from the air.

(S) In June the enemy attempted to build up supplies and mass troops for a push toward Hue, but was thwarted by TACAIR and B-52 strikes which resulted in the VNA consolidating two decimated divisions into one.

(U) At the end of June, supported by air, the RVNAF began an offensive to recapture Quang Tri City, finally accomplished on 16 September. Throughout the remainder of the year, air power supported RVNAF attacks to recapture lost territory.³⁵

US AIR EFFORT—MILITARY REGION 1 SORTIES

	TACAIR	Gunships	B-52 Strikes	Total
31 Mar - 30 Apr..	4,551	75	575	5,201
1-31 May.....	5,187	240	827	6,254
1-30 Jun.....	4,695	186	1,563	6,444
1-31 Jul.....	5,461	201	2,054	7,716
1-31 Aug.....	5,493	197	1,756	7,446
1-30 Sep.....	4,404	151	1,923	6,478
1-31 Oct.....	2,727	127	1,924	4,778

Source: MACDO

Figure: L-7

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NAVAL GUNFIRE

(S) During late March there were only two destroyers, USS Straus (DDG-16) and USS Buchanan (DDG-14), on the naval gunline off Military Region 1. When the offensive broke, all additional naval gunfire ships in the vicinity were dispatched to the area on an emergency basis. Within hours of their arrival they began the mission of supporting the beleaguered ARVN and VNMC defenders. During the month of June thirty-eight destroyers and three cruisers served in the gun line for varying periods of time. The number of rounds fired by naval guns in Military Region 1 increased from 3,000 in March to well over 80,000 in June. The number of ship days on station for March was 92 and for June was 533.

(U) During May the arrival of the heavy cruiser USS Newport News with her eight inch guns greatly increased the range and weight of metal per salvo of the gunline. Spotting for the naval gunfire was provided by the First Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (1st ANGLICO), a joint Navy-Marine organization utilizing trained personnel to provide spotting, both from the ground and through the use of airborne spotters.

(U) Enemy counterbattery fire resulted in several US ships sustaining minor damage and personnel casualties. A number of 1st ANGLICO personnel were also killed, wounded, or reported missing as a result of enemy action.

(S) A summary of Naval Gunfire Support statistics for Military Region 1 is depicted in Figure L-8.³⁶

US NAVY EFFORT — MILITARY REGION 1

	Missions	Struc Dam	Struc Doe	Seed Explo	1" Rounds	6" Rounds	8" Rounds	Total
1-31 Mar.....	720	25	6	12	3,095	0	0	3,095
1-30 Apr.....	650	191	171	72	34,141	2,241	0	36,382
1-31 May.....	832	236	448	222	42,076	7,400	3,438	52,914
1-30 Jun.....	1,173	224	367	387	77,509	3,881	2,596	83,986
1-31 Jul.....	1,285	406	449	245	53,247	6,799	5,219	65,274
1-31 Aug.....	922	555	613	461	50,137	4,264	3,985	58,386
1-30 Sep.....	830	183	278	158	46,354	2,259	3,574	52,467

Source: 1st ANGLICO

Figure: L-8

THE RVNAF COUNTEROFFENSIVE

(C) The RVNAF counteroffensive, which began on 28 June, was the first corps size operation ever planned by RVNAF. Quang Tri City was the primary objective and was to be reached within nine days, but it was not until 1700 hours on 16 September that the Citadel was retaken. The battle for Quang Tri proved to be the longest of the war, but the need for success on the part of the RVNAF was paramount. Testimony to the need was provided by President Thieu. After the recapture of the city he journeyed to Quang Tri and Hue where he hailed the success and stated that this victory, as well as others, was a "deadly blow to the Communist aggressors".³⁷

(S) The task organization for the offensive was comprised of the Airborne Division, which had three brigades, additional armor and artillery as well as Territorial Forces; the Marine Division with the same kind of reinforcement; and the 1st Division with its 3d Regiment, the 57th Regiment of the 3d Division, the 1st Ranger Group, and the 7th Armored Cavalry Regiment. Corps reserve consisted of the 4th Regiment of the 2d Division, the 51st Independent Regiment (Infantry), and the 17th Armored Cavalry Regiment (-). The mission was to destroy


enemy forces and restore major portions of Quang Tri Province to government control.

(S) While still securing Hue and Thua Thien Province, I Corps planned to conduct the operation in three phases. Phase I (D-2 to D-Day) was to be an extensive bombardment of enemy positions, roads, gun emplacements, and assembly areas by B-52 strikes, TACAIR, naval gunfire, and artillery. Phase II (D-DAY to D+3/4) was to be the actual I Corps attack with two divisions abreast. The Airborne Division was to press the main attack to the west of Route 1, with an on call airmobile assault into the area west of Hai Lang. The secondary effort, to be conducted by the marines east of Route 1, called for an on call combined airmobile and amphibious assault in the vicinity of the Hai Lang-Trieu Phong district boundary. Both divisions were to move to secure Phase Line GOLD along the Hai Lang-Trieu Phong border, which included Quang Tri City and the southern banks of the Tach Han River. Phase III (D+3/4 to D+9) called for I Corps to continue the attack north after securing Phase Line GOLD, this time with the marines making the major effort. Various maneuvers were planned, with screening forces to be posi-

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
The Quang Tri Citadel, 24 May 72.

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
The Quang Tri Citadel, 31 July 72.

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The Quong Tri Citadel, 13 September 1972.

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tioned as far forward as the Cua Viet River. Fire Support Base Barbara was also targeted for recapture.⁵⁸

(S) The offensive began on schedule with the Airborne and Marine Divisions attacking north as planned. In the marine area of operation both the land and air assault elements met moderate to heavy resistance, and by the third day 368 enemy had been killed. Airborne troops accounted for some 250 enemy on the first day, and by the third day, with battalion air assaults, penetrations up to 10 kilometers had been made into Quang Tri Province.⁵⁹

(C) The recapture of Quang Tri City was not accomplished until September because of a determined enemy defense. The Airborne Division, responsible for retaking the city, breached the northwest wall of the Citadel on 25 July, but withdrew two days later. Up to that time the Marine Division had been conducting operations in its area, including air assaults northeast of the city on 11 and 22 July. When the Airborne Division failed to take the Citadel, the marines were assigned the task. The 2d Brigade of the Airborne Division, which had been involved in some of the heaviest fighting, became I Corps reserve, moving to Fire Support Base Sally for refitting. The rest of the Airborne Division was oriented to the west and northwest toward enemy base areas. By 30 July, the marines were beginning to deny the enemy communications and resupply routes north of Quang Tri City.

(S) On 3 August, after 48 hours of preparatory fires, the marines attempted to assault the Citadel. The assault failed to break the enemy defenses in spite of 2,000 rounds of mortar and artillery being directed into the Citadel on the day of the assault. Until Quang Tri was finally recaptured, attacks-by-fire against the marine elements were extremely high, reaching a peak of 3,000 rounds on 22 August. Due probably to an increased air effort, enemy artillery fire was reduced in intensity, averaging around 1,500 rounds per day during the last week in August. Ground fighting was also heavy around the city, with several sharp contacts being made. Even though the level of activity in the Quang Tri City area remained high, the marines continued to fight well, helped by a system of rotating units for rest and refitting.

(S) The major effort for the Airborne Division through the end of August was in an area of operation bordered on the northeast by the Cua Viet River and extending southwest from Route 1, the division rear boundary. The division protected the left flank of the Marine Division and controlled Route 1, a vital resupply route. Operations were conducted against the enemy in the Hai Lang area and, with the attached 1st Ranger Group, as far

south as Fire Support Base Rakkasan. Heaviest enemy pressure centered about 10 km south of Quang Tri City as the enemy attempted to interdict Route 1. On 27 August enemy activity increased markedly as airborne elements were attacked by both infantry and armor. This day long battle resulted in 60 enemy killed and six tanks destroyed. After the 27th, only light activity occurred for the balance of August.⁶⁰

(S) During July in the 1st Division area of operation, the enemy continued intensified offensive action in the Fire Support Base King, Bastogne, and Checkmate environs. Toward the end of the month 1st Division forces abandoned Checkmate, retook it, then evacuated it again due to poor cover and concealment. On the 26th Fire Support Base Bastogne was once again taken by the enemy. But LTG Troung was determined that control would be regained. Consequently, the 1st Division was reinforced with the 51st Regiment, and as the month drew to a close plans were made to restore the Bastogne area to friendly control. As August began enemy pressure was maintained, with daily attacks-by-fire in the areas around Fire Support Base Bastogne and Checkmate. On 2 August Bastogne was reoccupied and Checkmate was retaken on 1 August. Enemy pressure continued, however, consisting of daily 500 round attacks-by-fire and numerous ground contacts. By mid-August, however, most contacts were friendly initiated. The 24th of August was particularly productive, with 115 enemy killed and some 20 tons of ammunition destroyed. As August ended, the 1st Division was in the process of occupying high ground as far as 3 km from Bastogne and Checkmate.⁶¹

(S) During July and August there was generally very little enemy activity in most of the southern three provinces, but as the second half of August began, activity picked up in the Fire Support Base Ross and Que Son areas. Intelligence reports had begun to indicate that the enemy would employ armor and heavy artillery in the Que Son area as the 711th NVA Division attempted to "liberate" the Quang Nam lowlands. Limited contact occurred until 18 August at Fire Support Base Ross, when heavy fighting erupted. Enemy forces attacked nearly all friendly positions and interdicted Route 535 in several places. Small units assaults and hugging tactics were employed by enemy forces. Late on 18 August Fire Support Base Ross and Que Son District Headquarters were evacuated, and the 2d Division elements formed a defensive line to the east. By 21 August, with a stabilized situation, the 2d Division had positioned its forces and counter-attacked to retake Ross and Que Son. As August ended Que Son had been recaptured, but not Fire Support Base Ross.⁶²

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SUMMARY

(S) The initial enemy assault in Quang Tri Province pushed friendly forces off their fire support bases south to a line from Dong Ha to Quang Tri Combat Base (Fig. L-4). The enemy advance then paused, giving the RVNAF time to regroup and reinforce. By 14 April the 3d Division, which bore the brunt of the attack, was able to begin a limited counterattack to the west to expand the defense to the high ground dominating Cam Lo, Fire Support Base Carroll, Mai Loc Combat Base, and reestablish Fire Support Base Holcomb which overlooked the Ba Long Valley.

(S) Until 27 April the level of combat activity remained at a relatively low level. The NVA then renewed their forward thrust and seized the town of Dong Ha, forcing RVNAF back to Quang Tri Combat Base. The situation deteriorated rapidly, and on 30 April friendly forces evacuated south to defend Quang Tri City. As night fell, friendly units had moved south of the Thach Han River. But the threat of a major attack continued, and the next day, 1 May, the forces in the city began an uncontrolled withdrawal south. New defensive positions were ultimately established along the southern bank of the My Chanh River which served as the boundary between Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces. Here the RVNAF held the line until they began a June counteroffensive.

(S) The other primary thrust in Military Region 1 came southwest of Hue from the A Shau Valley, following a path parallel to Route 547. The 1st Division resisted with great determination but evacuated Fire Support Base Bastogne on 29 April and established defenses at Fire Support Base Birmingham, which was key to the defense of Hue.

(S) The defense of Hue continued into May. Around the city major units of the 1st Division established positions west and south, defending critical terrain. A defense guarded the four main armor approaches: Route 1 to the northwest, the Ba Long Valley to the west, Route 547 to the southwest, and the Ruong-Ruong Valley to the south. Straggler control points were established, efforts were made to reform the tactical units, and areas of operation were modified to meet the changing situation. In general, the northern and northwestern approaches were defended by the reinforced Marine Division, and the 1st Division guarded the western and southern approaches, while a strong reserve was maintained to reinforce where necessary. Command and control was improved by placing Territorial Forces under the operational control of the ARVN sector commander.

(S) By 9 May the 2d Airborne Brigade arrived from Kontum and was subsequently placed under the operational control of the Marine Division. Four

days later the Marine Division went on the offensive with a limited brigade operation across the My Chanh River. Other limited offensives were undertaken, and on 24 May the marines began an amphibious assault to the rear of enemy lines. Meanwhile, in the 1st Division area of operations, Fire Support Base Bastogne was recaptured on 16 May, and on 26 May Fire Support Base Checkmate was again in ARVN hands.

(S) The RVNAF began a counteroffensive on 28 June. Stiff enemy resistance resulted in a bitter, two month battle for Quang Tri City. Quang Tri was successfully retaken on 16 September, and



Vietnamese marines recapture the Citadel, Quang Tri.

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after that time friendly forces continued to regain territory to the north and west.

(U) In Quang Tri Province by the end of the year the RVNAF had pushed north to the Thach Han River and west to Fire Support Base Anne. In Thua Thien Province the 1st Division remained deployed along a line extending from Fire Support Base Bastogne to the Hai Van Pass. Friendly

activity in other provinces of Military Region 1 concentrated on defense of district capitals and protection of the population in the lowlands. The bad weather of the monsoon season kept activity at a relatively low level. Activity was at a reduced level in November and December as both sides, exhausted by arduous months of battle, anticipated a cease-fire.

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QUANG TRI AND HUE — ANNEX L

1. Rpt (C) MACJ3-082, 17 Apr 72, Subj: Order of Battle, US, RVNAF, and FWMAF Combat and Combat Support Units (U), pp 2-8, Gp-4; Interview (C), COL Donald J. Metcalf, SA, 3d Inf Div (ARVN), 22 May 72, Gp-Not Stated.
2. Memo (S), RVNAF, I Corps and MR 1, 13 Oct 71, Subj: Activation of 3d Infantry Division (U), Gp-1.
3. Interview (C), same as #1; Interview (C), LTC William Lozier, DSA, 3d Inf Div (ARVN), undtd, Gp-Not Stated. Note: Unless otherwise specified, interviews cited in this annex were conducted by LTC William L. Allen, MACV MHB, between late May and mid-September 1972 at unspecified locations in Military Region 1: Interview (U), COL Raymond R. Battreal, C/S. AAG, by MAJ Walter S. Dillard, MACV-SJS, History, Tan Son Nhut, RVN, 14 Jan 73.
4. Msgs (S/SPECAT), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 011005Z Mar 72, 021021Z Mar 72, 040920 Z Mar 72, 130915Z Mar 72, 161015Z Mar 72, 170955Z Mar 72, 180935Z Mar 72, 211035Z Mar 72, 240950Z Mar 72, 250910Z Mar 72, 280915Z Mar 72, 291000Z Mar 72, Subj: COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal of the Enemy/Friendly Situation (C), Gp-4.
5. Msgs (S/SPECAT), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 111055Z Mar 72, 161015Z Mar 72, 190840Z Mar 72, 220930Z Mar 72, 230940Z Mar 72, Subj: COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal of the Enemy/Friendly Situation (C), Gp-4.
6. Msgs (S/SPECAT), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 120905Z Mar 72, 140915Z Mar 72, 151015Z Mar 72, 161015Z Mar 72, 180935Z Mar 72, 190840Z Mar 72, 200935Z Mar 72, 220930Z Mar 72, 230940Z Mar 72, 240950Z Mar 72, 260915Z Mar 72, 270945Z Mar 72, 280915Z Mar 72, 291000Z Mar 72, 301015Z Mar 72, Subj: COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal of the Enemy/Friendly Situation (C), Gp-4.
7. Msgs (S/SPECAT), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 130915Z Mar 72, 151015Z Mar 72, 280915Z Mar 72, 291000Z Mar 72, Subj: COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal of the Enemy/Friendly Situation (C), Gp-4; Rpt (TS), MACDO-43, 12 Apr 72, Subj: J3 Historical Summary for March 1972 (U), Gp-4.
8. Rpt (C/NF), SA, 1st Inf Div (ARVN), undtd, Subj: Debriefing Rpt, 21-23 May 72 (U), Gp-4; Interview (C/NF), LTC Alexander Einsein, DSA, 1st Inf Div (ARVN), 14 Jun 72, GDS-Not Stated.
9. Rpt (TS), MACDO-43, 17 May 72, Subj: J3 Historical Summary for Apr 72 (U), Gp-4.
10. Msg (S/SPECAT), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 301015Z Mar 72, Subj: COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal of the Enemy/Friendly Situation (C), Gp-4; Interview (C), same as #1; Interview (C), LTC Lozier, same as #3.
11. Interview (C), same as #1; Interview (C), LTC Lozier, same as #3.
12. Msgs (S/SPECAT), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 301425Z Mar 72, 311120Z Mar 72, 061040Z Apr 72, Subj: COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal of the Enemy/Friendly Situation (C), Gp-4; Rpt (S), AFAG, 31 Jul 72, Subj: VNAF TACS and the Fall of Quang Tri (U), GDS-Not Stated.
13. Msgs (S/SPECAT), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 301425Z Mar 72, 311120Z Mar 72, Subj: COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal of the Enemy/Friendly situation (C), Gp-4; Rpt (C), Office of Senior Marine Advisor, NAG, 5 May 72, Subj: Monthly Historical Summary for April 1972 (U), Gp-4; Msgs (C), COMUSMACV to AIG, 7870, 312200Z Mar 72, 012000Z Apr 72, Subj: USMACV OPREP 4, Gp-4.
14. Msg (S/SPECAT), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 011400Z Apr 72, Subj: COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal of the Enemy/Friendly Situation (C), Gp-4.
15. Msg (S/SPECAT), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 021300Z Apr 72, Subj: COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal of the Enemy/Friendly Situation (C), Gp-4; Rpt (C), same as #13.
16. Msgs (TS/SPECAT), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 021300Z Apr 72, 031000Z Apr 72, Subj: COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal of the Enemy/Friendly Situation (C), Gp-4.
17. Rpt (C), same as #13; Msg (S/SPECAT), same as #15.
18. Interview (C), LTC Louis C. Wagner, Jr., SA, 1st Armor Bde, undtd, Gp-Not Stated; Rpt (C), SA, MACV Adv Tm 156, undtd, Subj: Combat After Action Report (Draft) (U), Gp-Not Stated.
19. Msgs (TS/SPECAT), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 031000Z Apr 72, 041110Z Apr 72, 051120Z Apr 72, Subj: COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal of the Enemy/Friendly Situation (C), Gp-4.
20. Msgs (S/SPECAT), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 061040Z Apr 72, 071045Z Apr 72, Subj: COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal of the Enemy/Friendly Situation (C), Gp-4; Rpt (C), same as #18.
21. Msg (S/SPECAT), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 061040Z Apr 72, Subj: COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal of the Enemy/Friendly Situation (C), Gp-4; Rpt (C), HQ FRAC, 10 Jun 72, Subj: Significant Activities Report (U), Gp-Not Stated.
22. Msgs (S/SPECAT), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 080935Z Apr 72, 090915Z Apr 72, 161015Z Apr

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- 72, 160905Z Apr 72, 230947Z Apr 72, 250950Z Apr 72, Subj: COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal of the Enemy/Friendly Situation (C), Gp-4; Rpt (C), same as #21; Rpt (TS), MACDO-43, 17 May 72, Subj: J3 Historical Summary for April 1972 (U), Gp-4.
23. Msgs (S/SPECAT), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 090015Z Apr 72, 120935Z Apr 72, 151015Z Apr 72, 180915Z Apr 72, Subj: COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal of the Enemy/Friendly Situation (C), Gp-4.
24. Msgs (S/SPECAT), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 080935Z Apr 72, 090915Z Apr 72, Subj: COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal of the Enemy/Friendly Situation (C), Gp-4; Rpt (C), same as #13; Rpt (C), MAJ Michael J. Hatcher, SA, 20th Tank Regt, 8 Apr-2 May (U), Gp-Not Stated.
25. Msg (S/SPECAT), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, (DTG not avail), Subj: COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal of the Enemy/Friendly Situation (C), Gp-4; Interview (U), CPT Michael A. Hood, DSA, 1st Rgr Gp, 11 Jun 72; Memo (C), Rgr Cmd Adv Det, 12 Apr 72, Subj: Employment of Ranger Command in Military Region 1 (U), Gp-4; DI (C), Director of Training and Special Assistant to COMUSMACV, 17 Apr 72, Subj: RVNAF Ranger Command (U), Gp-4; Rpt (C), Rgr Cmd Adv Det, 11 May 72, Subj: Activities Report of Ranger Units Operating in Northern Military Region 1 from 27 April to 9 May 72 (U), Gp-4.
26. Msgs (S/SPECAT), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 080935Z Apr 72, 120935Z Apr 72, 151015Z Apr 72, 160905Z Apr 72, 170915Z Apr 72, 190914Z Apr 72, 200905Z Apr 72, 220910Z Apr 72, 240915Z Apr 72, 250950Z Apr 72, Subj: COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal of the Enemy/Friendly Situation (C), Gp-4; same as #21.
27. Msgs (S/SPECAT), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 190930Z Apr 72, 140930Z Apr 72, 151015Z Apr 72, 160905Z Apr 72, 170915Z Apr 72, 190914Z Apr 72, 200905Z Apr 72, 261000Z Apr 72, Subj: COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal of the Enemy/Friendly Situation (C), Gp-4; Interview (C), LTC Vincent Reinstein, DSA, 2d Inf Div (ARVN), 10 Jun 72, Gp-Not Stated; Interview (C), MAJ William J. Windham, Advisor, 2d Inf Div (ARVN), 10 Jun 72, Gp-Not Stated.
28. Msgs (S/SPECAT), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 120935Z Apr 72, 140930Z Apr 72, 151015Z Apr 72, 160905Z Apr 72, 170915Z Apr 72, 180915Z Apr 72, 190914Z Apr 72, 211020Z Apr 72, 250950Z Apr 72, Subj: COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal of the Enemy/Friendly Situation (C), Gp-4.
29. Rpt (S), DA, 26 Apr 72, Subj: Army Activities Report: SE Asia (U), p 35, Gp-4; Rpt (C), Chief AAG, 18 May 72, Subj: Monthly Historical Summary (U), Gp-4.
30. Rpt (C), MACDO-32, 5 Jun 72, Subj: US, RVNAF, and FWMAF Order of Battle (as of 30 Apr 72) (U), GDS-Not Stated; Rpt (C), same as #13; Rpt (C), Rgr Cmd Adv Det, 11 May 72, Subj: Activities Report of Ranger Units Operating in Northern MR 1 from 27 April to 9 May 72 (U), Gp-Not Stated; Rpt (C), Office of the Senior Marine Advisor, NAG, undtd, Subj: Monthly Historical Summary for May 72 (U), Gp-4; Rpt (C), SA, 1st Armor Bde, undtd, Subj: Combat Operations After Action Report (draft) (U), Gp-Not Stated.
31. Rpt (C), Rgr Cmd Adv Det, same as #25; Interview (C), LTC Louis C. Wagner, Jr., SA, 1st Armor Bde, 23 May 72, Gp-Not Stated; Interview (C), MAJ Edward F. McGushin, Advisor, Rgr Cmd, 24 Jul 72, GDS-Not Stated.
32. Msgs (S/SPECAT), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 270930Z Apr 72, 280910Z Apr 72, Subj: COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal of the Enemy/Friendly Situation (C), Gp-4.
33. Msg (S/SPECAT), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 280910Z Apr 72, Subj: COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal of the Enemy/Friendly Situation (C), Gp-4; Rpt (C), Rgr Cmd Adv Det, same as #25; Rpt (C), SA, 1st Armor Bde, same as #30; Rpt (C), Office of the Senior Marine Advisor, same as #30; Interviews (C), same as #31.
34. Msg (S/SPECAT), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 290915Z Apr 72, Subj: COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal of the Enemy/Friendly Situation (C), Gp-4; Rpt (C), FRAC, 10 Jun 72, Subj: Significant Activities Report, Gp-Not Stated.
35. Msg (S/SPECAT), same as #34; Rpt (C), Rgr Cmd Adv Det, same as #25; Rpt (C), SA, 1st Armor Bde, same as #30; Interview (C), same as #31; Rpt (S), 3d ARVN Div ALO Advisor, 31 Jul 72, Subj: VNAF TACS and the Fall of Quang Tri (U), GDS-Not Stated.
36. Msg (C), AMCONSUL, DANANG TO AMEMBASSY, SAIGON, 94, 010750Z Aug 72, Subj: Convoy of Death, Quang Tri Province (U), Gp-Not Stated; Interview (C), MAJ Thomas S. Mackenzie, SA, 18th Armored Cav Regt, 25 May 72, Gp-Not Stated.
37. Msg (S/SPECAT), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 300915Z Apr 72, Subj: COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal of Enemy/Friendly Situation (C), Gp-4; Rpt (C), Rgr Cmd Adv Det, same as #25; Rpt (C), SA, 1st Armor Bde, same as #30; Interviews (C), same as #31; Rpt (S), 3d ARVN Div ALO Advisor, same as #35.
38. Msg (S/SPECAT), same as #37; Rpt (C), Rgr Cmd Adv Det, same as #25; Rpt (C), SA, 1st Armor Bde, same as #30; Interviews (C), same

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- as #31; Rpt (S), 3d ARVN Div ALO, Advisor, same as #35.
39. Msg (S/SPECAT), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 020345Z May 72, Subj: COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal of the Enemy/Friendly Situation (C), Gp-4; Rpt (C), Rgr Cmd Adv Det, same as #25; Rpt (C), 1st Armor Bde, same as #30; Interviews (C), same as #31; Rpt (S) 3d ARVN Div ALO Advisor, same as #35.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.; Interview (C), same as #36.
42. Msgs (TS/SPECAT), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 030845Z May 72, 040900Z May 72, Subj: COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal of the Enemy/Friendly Situation (C), Gp-4.
43. Msgs (TS/SPECAT), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 300915Z Apr 72, 020945Z May 72 040900Z May 72, Subj: COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal of the Enemy/Friendly Situation (C), Gp-4; Rpt (C), FRAC, same as #34; Rpt (TS), MACDO-43, 20 Jun 72, Subj: DO Historical Summary for May 1972 (U), Gp-Not Stated.
44. Rpt (TS), same as #43; Stars and Stripes (Pacific Edition), May 5, 1972; Interview (C), LTC William Lozier, DSA, 3d Inf Div (ARVN), 22 May 72; Msg (TS/SPEC. T), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 040900Z May 72, Subj: COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal of the Enemy/Friendly Situation (C), Gp-4.
45. Rpt (TS), same as #43; Rpt (C), FRAC, same as #34; Msg (S/SPECAT), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 050630Z May 72, Subj: COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal of the Enemy/Friendly Situation (C), Gp-4.
46. Rpt (TS), same as #43; Msgs (S/SPECAT), COMUSMACV to JCS et al, 060935Z May 72, 070915Z May 72, Subj: COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal of the Enemy/Friendly Situation (C), Gp-4; Interview (C), MAJ Galen Yanagihara, G-3 Advisor, ARVN Abn Div, 13 Jun 72, GDS-Not Stated.
47. Rpt (TS), same as #43.
48. Ibid.; Rpt (C), FRAC, same as #34.
49. Ibid.
50. Rpt (TS), MACDO, 18 Jul 72, Subj: DO Historical Summary for June 1972 (U), GDS-Not Stated.
51. Rpts (TS), same as #43 and #50; Interview (C), LTC Vincent Reinstein, DSA, 2d Inf Div (ARVN), undtd, GDS-Not Stated; Interview (C), MAJ Patrick Passarella, G-2 Advisor, 2d Inf Div (ARVN), undtd, GDS-Not Stated.
52. Interview (C), Mr. John A. Graham, CORDS Deputy Senior Advisor, Thua Thien Province, 22 May 72, Gp-Not Stated; Rpt (C), MACMR-ITT, 11 May 72, Subj: Anatomy of a Crisis-Hue City (Phase One-April 30-May 10 1972) (U), Gp-3; Rpt (C), MACMR-ITT-HC, 20 May 72, Subj: Anatomy of a Crisis-Hue City (Phase Two-May 11-19, 1972) (U), Gp-3.
53. DF (C), MACSJSJH to MACDL, 5 Sep 72, Subj: Requests for Information (U), GDS-Not Stated.
54. Rpt (S), MACDL, 26 Aug 72, Subj: RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program Progress Report (U), GDS-Not Stated; Interview (C), LTC William Lozier, DSA, 3d Inf Div (ARVN), 22 May 72, GDS-Not Stated; Interview (U), MAJ Thomas V. Borlund, Jr. DSA, Quang Tri Province, Adv Tm 19, undtd.
55. Rpt (S/NF), JCS, 26 Jul 72, Subj: Action Officer's Data Book on Vietnamizing the War (U), GDS-Not Stated; Rpt (TS/NF), CHECO, Dec 1972, Subj: The NVA 1972 Invasion of Military Region I; Fall of Quang Tri and Defense of Hue (U), GDS-81; Rpts (TS), MACDO-43, Subj: J-3 Historical Summary (U), Feb-Apr 72, Gp-4; Rpts (TS), MACDO, Subj: DO Historical Summary (U), May-Oct 72, GDS-82.
56. Rpts (S), Unit One, 1st ANGLICO, FMF, Subj: Command Chronology for 1-31 Mar (U), 1-30 Apr (U), 1-31 May (U), 1-30 Jun (U), 1-31 Jul (U), and 1-31 Aug (U), Gp-4.
57. Interview (U), LTC George H. Jarrett, Staff Officer, MACDO, 28 Sep 72; Star and Stripes (Pacific Edition), 12 Sep 1972; Embtel (C), SECSTATE, 138899, 211115Z Sep 72, Subj: President Thieu Hails Quang Tri Victory in Tough Hue Speech, Lashed Out at "Colonialists" and "Political Profiteers in Exile" (U), Gp-Not Stated.
58. Msg (TS), COMUSMACV to CINCPAC, 281121Z Jun 72, Subj: RVNAF Counteroffensive (U), GDS-Not Stated.
59. Rpt (TS), MACDO-43, 18 Jul 72, Subj: DO Historical Summary for June 1972 (U), GDS-Not Stated.
60. Rpt (TS), MACDO-43, Subj: DO Historical Summaries for June, July and August 72 (U), GDS-Not Stated; Rpt (C), FRAC, 4 Aug 72, Subj: Significant Activities Report (U), GDS-Not Stated.
61. Same as #58.
62. Ibid.

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1 COMMANDERS AND PRINCIPAL STAFF OFFICERS

HEADQUARTERS, USMACV

COMMAND GROUP	RANK	SERVICE	DATE OF SUCCESSION
² COMUSMACV			
C. W. Abrams	GEN	USA	
F. C. Weyand	GEN	USA	Oct 72
DEPCOMUSMACV			
F. C. Weyand	GEN	USA	
J. W. Vogt	GEN	USAF	Jun 72
³ DEPCOMUSMACV FOR AIR OPERATIONS			
J. D. Lavelle	GEN	USAF	
J. W. Vogt	GEN	USAF	Apr 72
DEPCOMSUMACV FOR CORDS			
G. D. Jacobson	MR	CIV	
COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR			
M. J. Bowser	CSM	USA	
C. Theriac	CSM	USA	Apr 72
⁴ GENERAL STAFF			
CHIEF OF STAFF			
D. H. Cowles	MG	USA	
G. H. Woodward	MG	USA	May 72
H. H. Cooksey (Actg)	MG	USA	Jan 73
DEP C OF S FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS			
J. A. Wickham	BG	USA	
DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL (ASST C OF S FOR PERSONNEL)			
J. B. Adamson	MG	USA	
A. J. Bowley	MG	USAF	Jul 72
R. J. Magione	BG	USAF	Sep 72
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE (ASST C OF S FOR INTELLIGENCE)			
W. E. Potts	MG	USA	
G. A. Godding	MG	USA	Aug 72
⁵ O. W. Dillard	BG	USA	Feb 73
DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS (ASST C OF S FOR OPERATIONS)			
J. T. Carley, Jr	MG	USA	
A. D. Slay	MG	USAF	Jun 72
C. M. Talbot	MG	USAF	Aug 72
J. R. McGiffert	BG	USA	Feb 73
DIRECTOR OF LOGISTICS (ASST C OF S FOR LOGISTICS)			
H. N. Maples	MG	USA	
J. C. Fuson	MG	USA	Jan 72
J. E. Murray	MG	USA	Dec 72
⁶ (ASST CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PLANS)			
R. B. Perez	CPT	USN	

Note:

¹ Due to frequent changes prior to and during Operation COUNTDOWN some positions had short-term incumbents who are not indicated.

² GEN Abrams departed Vietnam on 29 June to become the Army Chief of Staff. GEN Weyand was then acting COMUSMACV until 12 October, when the Senate confirmed GEN Abrams' appointment.

³ Position was consolidated with DEPCOMUSMACV in June.

⁴ MACV was reorganised in May 72. Titles in parentheses indicate title prior to reorganisation.

⁵ BG Dillard succeeded MG E. L. Hudson, USAF, who served 7-14 Feb 73.

⁶ Position consolidated with Operations Directorate in May 72.

⁷ Position consolidated with Logistics Directorate in Jun 72.

⁸ Unit deactivated/redeployed during 1972.

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DIRECTOR OF COMM-ELEC (ASST C OF S FOR COMM-ELEC)

F. H. Trogden BG USAF

DIRECTOR OF CORDS (ASST C OF S FOR CIVIL OPERATIONS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT)

G. D. Jacobson MR CIV

N. L. Sweet MR CIV Jul 72

COMPTROLLER

J. W. Currier COL USA

G. E. Emrick LTC USA Mar 72

F. A. Couch III COL USA Jul 72

J. E. King COL USA Dec 72

SPECIAL STAFF

CHIEF OF ADMIN SVCS (ADJUTANT GENERAL)

W. A. Rutledge COL USA

J. C. Griffith COL USA Jul 72

CHAPLAIN

W. V. O'Connor COL USA

E. F. Kapusta COL USA Sep 72

PROVOST MARSHAL

B. H. Russell Jr COL USA

FREE WORLD MILITARY ASST OFFICE

W. W. Hawke COL USA

H. G. Keebaugh COL USA Sep 72

DATA MANAGEMENT AGENCY

G. A. Brumme COL USA

W. C. Wood COL USA Jul 72

W. D. Anderson LTC USAF Jan 73

COMMAND SURGEON

R. Bernstein BG USA

M. D. Thomas COL USA Jul 72

⁷DIRECTOR OF CONSTRUCTION

R. P. Young MG USA

J. A. Johnson BG USA Mar 72

PERSONAL STAFF

CHIEF OF INFORMATION

P. H. Stevens COL USA

R. L. Burke COL USA Jul 72

INSPECTOR GENERAL

R. M. Cooke COL USA

H. J. Fleck COL USA Jul 72

STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE

J. F. Senechal COL USA

J. N. Tenhet COL USA Dec 72

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE COORDINATOR (SCIENCE ADVISOR)

G. Duval MR CIV

W. Marroletti MR CIV Jun 72

ADVISORY ELEMENTS

MILITARY REGION I/I CORPS

W. G. Dolvin LTC USA

H. H. Cooksey MG USA May 72

H. H. Hiestand BG USA Jan 73

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MILITARY REGION II/II CORPS			
J. P. Vann	MR	CIV	
M. D. Healy	BG	USA	Jun 72
MILITARY REGION III/III CORPS			
J. F. Hollingsworth	MG	USA	
M. B. Garth	MG	USA	Oct 72
MILITARY REGION IV/IV CORPS			
J. H. Cushman	MG	USA	
T. M. Tarpley	MG	USA	Feb 72
F. E. Blazey	BG	USA	Jan 73
AIR FORCE ADVISORY GROUP			
J. H. Watkins	MG	USAF	
J. J. Jumper	MG	USAF	May 72
MILITARY EQUIPMENT DELIVERY TEAM, CAMBODIA			
T. C. Mataxis	BG	USA	
J. R. D. Cleland	BG	USA	Feb 72
NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP			
R. S. Salzer	RADM	USN	
A. W. Price	RADM	USN	Jun 72
J. B. Wilson	RADM	USN	Aug 72
ARMY ADVISORY GROUP (DIRECTOR OF TRAINING)			
S. L. McClellan	BG	USA	Feb 72
W. S. Coleman	MG	USA	Jun 72
SENIOR ADVISOR, STRATEGIC TECHNICAL DIRECTORATE/ ADVISORY TEAM 158 (CHIEF, STUDIES AND OBSERVATIONS GROUP)			
J. F. Sadler	COL	USA	
D. R. Presson	COL	USA	May 72
R. W. Hill	COL	USA	Dec 72
 COMMANDERS OF SELECTED U.S. UNITS			
SEVENTH AIR FORCE			
J. D. Lavelle	GEN	USAF	
J. W. Vogt	GEN	USAF	Apr 72
USARV/MACV SUPCOM (DEP CG, USARV)			
W. J. McCaffrey	LTG	USA	
M. G. Roseborough	MG	USA	Aug 72
MACV SPECIAL TROOPS (US ARMY HEADQUARTERS AREA COMMAND)			
W. W. Scott Jr	BG	USA	
W. K. G. Smith	EG	USA	Jul 72
8XXIV CORPS			
W. G. Dolvin	LTG	USA	
8101ST ABN DIV (AMBL)			
T. M. Tarpley	MG	USA	
83D BDE, 1ST CAV DIV (AMBL)			
J. F. Hamlet	BG	USA	
8196TH INF BDE (SEP) (PROV)			
J. P. McDonough	BG	USA	
1ST AVN BDE			
R. N. Mackinnon	BG	USA	
J. V. Mackmull	CG	USA	Jul 72
8USA ENGR CMD			
R. P. Young	MG	USA	
J. A. Johnson	BG	USA	Mar 72

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1ST SIG BDE			
W. C. Weaver	MG	USA	
C. R. Myer	BG	USA	Oct 72
18TH MP BDE			
P. M. Timmerberg	BG	USA	
H. I. Pitchford	COL	USA	May 72
H. H. Gerecke	COL	USA	Aug 72

COMMANDERS OF MAJOR FREE WORLD MILITARY ASSISTANCE FORCES

AUSTRALIA (TERMINATED ASSISTANCE DEC 72)			
D. B. Dunstan	MG		
B. A. McDonald	BRIG		Mar 72
I. A. Geddes	BRIG		Apr 72
NEW ZEALAND (TERMINATED ASSISTANCE DEC 72)			
V. B. Brown	LTC		
KOREA			
Sae-ho Lee	LTG		
THAILAND			
Tawit Bunyawat	MG		
Chouvidh Ch. Sorapong	COL		Oct 72
PHILIPPINES			
P. S. Dizon	COL		
CHINA			
Chiang Hsien Siang	LTG		



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CHRONOLOGY

JANUARY

- 2—In an interview on CBS President Nixon said that the US withdrawal from Vietnam was contingent only on PW releases in Southeast Asia.
- 6—The Naval Communication Station, Cam Ranh Bay was turned over to the VNN.
- 7—The German Malteser Union Hospital began operating in Da Nang. This facility replaced the West German hospital ship *HELGOLAND*, which returned to Germany after a distinguished 5 years in Vietnam. Some 160,000 persons received medical treatment on the *HELGOLAND*.
- 8—A terrorist's hand grenade tossed into a bonfire at a youth rally in Qui Nhon Province killed 15 and wounded 212 students. It was one of the worst terrorist attacks in Vietnamese history.
- 9—The Honorable Robert Froehke, Secretary of the Army, arrived in Saigon for a six-day visit.
- 10—Communist terrorists damaged three multi-million dollar US B-52 aircraft in a predawn raid at U-Tapao Air Base, Thailand.
- 10—India's decision to establish an embassy in Hanoi threatened the usefulness of the International Control Commission.
- 13—President Nixon announced 70,000 troops were to leave Vietnam during Increment XI, reducing US strength by 1 May to 69,000, the lowest in seven years.
- 14—The US Navy turned over the Hon Duc Island coastal surveillance radar station to the VNN. Designed to detect Communist sea infiltration, the station was one of 16 being built or modernized for the VNN.
- 16—The Honorable John H. Chaffee, Secretary of the Navy, arrived in Vietnam for an assessment.
- 18—Camp Eagle, 10 kilometers southwest of Hue, was turned over to the ARVN. MG Pham Vein Phu, commander of the 1st ARVN Division, accepted the base from BG John Hill Jr., DCG, 101st Airborne Division.
- 21—The largest convoy in two years began arriving in Phnom Penh before dawn, bringing an end to the fuel shortage in the Khmer capital.
- 22—President Thieu offered the NLF political representation in the South Vietnamese government if they would renounce violence.
- 25—A US helicopter gunship reported firing on two enemy PT-76 amphibious tanks in Military Region 3. This was the first report of enemy tanks in the Republic of Vietnam since May 1971.
- 26—GEN William C. Westmoreland, Army Chief of Staff, arrived in Saigon to inspect Army troops and operations.
- 26—President Thieu announced that he had agreed to the secret allied peace proposal that would require his resignation and Communist participation in an internationally supervised election.
- 29—Defense Secretary Melvin Laird announced that US troops would not be reintroduced into Vietnam in case of an emergency.
- 31—The North Vietnamese revealed a secret peace initiative presented to Dr. Henry Kissinger in Paris.
- 31—The US troop strength was reduced to 136,505, as Increment X withdrawals were completed.

FEBRUARY

- 4—The last Thai combat troops left South Vietnam as the final elements of the Black Leopard Division departed.
- 9—Communist gunners slammed 24 rockets into Da Nang Air Base, wounding ten Americans.
- 13—US forces were placed on alert for the Tet holidays. The Viet Cong announced a four-day cease-fire beginning at 0100 hours. The allies said they would observe a 24-hour cease-fire effective at 1800 hours.
- 23—ADM Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., CNO, visited 7th Fleet units at sea and shore installations in South Vietnam.
- 24—The 5th ROK Marine Battalion and the 2d ROK Marine Brigade Headquarters redeployed to Korea.
- 25—BG Phon Dinh Saon, DCG, Military Region 1; four Americans, including COL Albert W. Smart Jr., FRAC DCG; and two Vietnamese were killed in a helicopter crash. The helicopter was returning to Da Nang from the destroyer USS *CRAIG* when it crashed in Da Nang Harbor.
- 28—Phan Rang Air Base in Military Region 2 was turned over to the South Vietnamese.
- 29—The US troop strength was reduced to 119,606.

MARCH

- 1—The US and the Government of Vietnam signed an agreement establishing a \$35 million national economic development fund.
- 2—The Tet holidays alert ended at noon.
- 5—A powerful explosion near Saigon sank three barges loaded with 300 tons of ammunition.
- 7—The 1st Australian Task Force stood down, ending the combat role of Australia in Vietnam.
- 9—The Republic of Korea announced plans to withdraw its civilian medical teams of 72 doctors and nurses from South Vietnam because of reduced US financial support. The medical teams had provided medical care to Vietnamese civilians since 1966.

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- 10—President Nixon proclaimed March 26 - April 1 a National Week of Concern for Prisoners of War or Missing in Action personnel.
- 26—The US broke off the Paris peace talks because the Communists refused to negotiate seriously.
- 30—The NVA offensive was launched across the Demilitarized Zone in Quang Tri Province.
- 31—The US troop strength was reduced to 95,500.

APRIL

- 1—The Republic of Korea's 2d Marine Brigade and 100th Logistics Command redeployed.
- 1—The US Navy withdrew its last combat forces from Vietnam. The remaining 5,000 land-based American sailors in South Vietnam were advisors or members of the US command staff.
- 1—South Vietnam's northern quarter erupted, and the Republic of Vietnam commander said more than 30,000 North Vietnamese troops had invaded Quang Tri Province in Military Region 1. Enemy attacks also began in Tay Ninh Province in Military Region 3.
- 3—MACV announced that American troop withdrawals were continuing despite the enemy offensive.
- 3—A powerful US air and naval strike force of 200 warplanes and five Navy destroyers spearheaded an allied counterassault to drive troops of three North Vietnamese divisions back from South Vietnam's northern cities and towns.
- 4—In Paris North Vietnamese and Viet Cong delegates demanded the US return to the peace talks that were suspended by the US on 26 March.
- 4—North Vietnamese forces, including tanks, opened a third major attack, in Binh Long Province, 60 miles from Saigon, around Loc Ninh and An Loc.
- 5—US Seventh Fleet destroyers hit military targets in North Vietnam for the first time since 1968 with naval gunfire.
- 6—The 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), officially returned home from Vietnam when the division colors arrived at Fort Campbell, Ky., after more than four years of combat in Vietnam.
- 7—In Saigon, new curfew hours were set from 2300 to 0600 hours daily.
- 8—In Binh Long Province, the district capital of Loc Ninh fell, as the enemy continued to press his attack on An Loc.
- 10—B-52s hit targets 145 miles north of the Demilitarized Zone near Vinh, the deepest penetration of North Vietnam in over four years and the first use of B-52s above the Demilitarized Zone.
- 10—GEN John W. Vogt Jr. assumed command of the 7th Air Force and became DEPCOMUSMACV for Air Operations.
- 11—The US Navy Base at Binh Thuy, 85 miles southwest of Saigon, was turned over to the VNN.
- 11—NVA forces surrounded the town of Kompong Trabek in the Khmer Republic. Route 17 to the south was closed by the enemy.
- 12—The enemy surrounded the city of An Loc with armor and heavy artillery support.
- 13—The Communists announced that An Loc would become the Viet Cong's "capital" in one week.
- 14—South Vietnam reported 18 Soviet-built tanks destroyed in An Loc.
- 15—B-52s hit targets near Hanoi and Haiphong ending a four-year suspension of air strikes in the area.
- 15—The US Navy Base at Da Nang was turned over to the VNN, completing the base turnover phase of Vietnamization that began in mid-1969.
- 16—A US Navy surface force struck targets on the Din Son Peninsula. This was the first strike of the war by surface forces in the Haiphong area.
- 16—Three MIG-21s were shot down in dogfights over Hanoi.
- 16—The USS *WORDEN* and the USS *BUCHANAN* were hit by enemy fire, killing two US Navy men and wounding several others.
- 17—Secretary of State William P. Rogers announced the Nixon administration would commit everything short of ground troops and nuclear weapons to repel the NVA invasion of the south.
- 19—Communist troops entered An Loc as the 4th week of the offensive began. The attack was preceded by an estimated 2,000 rounds of artillery, mortar, and rockets.
- 19—The USS *HIGBEE* was damaged by a North Vietnamese MIG attack off the coast of North Vietnam.
- 22—Route 14 between Kontum and Pleiku City was blocked by the enemy at Kontum Pass.
- 23—Enemy armor attacks forced the evacuation of Dak To and Tan Canh in Military Region 2.
- 24—A North Vietnamese infiltration trawler carrying munitions was sunk by the VNN near Phu Quoc Island in the Gulf of Thailand.
- 26—Bong Son Pass fell to the enemy, closing Route 1 and isolating the northeast corner of Binh Dinh Province.
- 26—President Nixon announced a further withdrawal of another 20,000 US troops, reducing US strength to 49,000 by 1 July.
- 27—Dong Ha fell, as the NVA offensive was resumed in Quang Tri Province.
- 28—ARVN forces were forced to abandon Fire Support Bases Bastogne and Checkmate, jeopardizing the defense of Hue.

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- 30-All ARVN forces north of the Thach Han River were withdrawn in order to defend Quang Tri City from more tenable positions south of the river line.
- 30-The US troop strength was reduced to 68,100 personnel as Increment XI withdrawals were completed.

MAY

- 1-Quang Tri was abandoned, the only provincial capital to fall to the enemy. Sections of Highway 1 between Quang Tri and Da Nang were cut by the enemy.
- 3-Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird announced that Assistant Secretary Barry J. Shillito would bring a team to South Vietnam to review equipment requirements to counter the new enemy weapons, including 130mm artillery and T-54 tanks.
- 4-M-48 tanks began arriving aboard C-5A transports to replace tanks lost during the Quang Tri fighting.
- 4-Pentagon spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim announced that 72 F-4s would be sent from CONUS to Southeast Asia.
- 4-In Paris, the US and North Vietnam postponed the peace negotiations for an indefinite period.
- 5-ARVN forces began the first counterattack since the invasion to open Highway 14 to Kontum.
- 5-US announced plans to reopen Takli Air Base, Thailand, for use by the F-4s from Holloman AFB, New Mexico.
- 8-Rear Admiral Rembrandt C. Robinson, Commander of Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla Eleven, was killed in a helicopter crash in the Tonkin Gulf. He was the first admiral to be killed in the war.
- 9-President Nixon, in a radio and television address to the nation, announced the mining of North Vietnamese ports, to include Haiphong. Other lines of supply would be cut by air strikes. The two criteria for ending the blockade were: (1) the return of all US PWs and (2) an internationally supervised cease-fire.
- 10-Navy and Air Force pilots shot down a total of ten MIGs, the largest single day total of the war.
- 10-Lt Randal Cunningham and Lt (jg) William Driscoll became the first Americans during the Vietnam war to down five enemy aircraft and earn the status of "ace".
- 10-President Thieu declared martial law throughout South Vietnam, and the Saigon curfew was extended from 2200 hours to 0600 hours daily.
- 10-The Army Advisory Group was activated with a strength of 254 officers, 9 warrant officers, 529 enlisted men, and 1 DOD civilian.
- 10-The first mission in the LINEBACKER operation against North Vietnam was flown against the Paul Doumer Bridge and the Yen Vien Railroad yards, both targets near Hanoi.
- 11-Navy troops destroyed the provincial capital of An Loc and were met by 70 B-52s dropping 1,700 tons of bombs in the war's heaviest bombing concentration.
- 13-Seventh AF announced the destruction of the Thanh Hoa "Dragon's Jaw" bridge, 80 miles south of Hanoi, by an F-4 aircraft. The bridge stood for seven years despite repeated attacks to destroy it. In addition, several spans of the Paul Doumer bridge on the northern edge of Hanoi were collapsed. The ordnance used was 2,000 and 3,000 pound laser-guided bombs.
- 13-RVN marines opened the first counteroffensive in Military Region 1 since the beginning of the NGUYEN HUE Offensive.
- 15-USAF turned over Cam Ranh Bay Air Base, the largest USAF installation in South Vietnam, to the South Vietnamese. Built at a cost of \$72 million and located 304 kilometers north of Saigon, the base was formerly the home of the 483d Tactical Airlift Wing, which was redeployed.
- 17-Vice President Spiro T. Agnew, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, and GEN Creighton W. Abrams conferred with President Thieu. After the conference Mr. Agnew departed for Bangkok.
- 18-The aircraft carrier USS SARATOGA joined the 7th Fleet, bringing to six the number of carriers operating off the shores of Vietnam for the first time in the war. The total number of Navy personnel offshore rose to approximately 46,000 in some 60 ships.
- 18-USAF aircraft using "smart" bombs destroyed over 5.5 million gallons of fuel 3 1/2 miles northeast of Hanoi.
- 23-Vice Admiral James L. Holloway III replaced Vice Admiral William P. Mack as Commander, 7th Fleet.
- 24-The Defense Department announced that more B-52s were en route to SEASIA and added to the target list all facilities used to support the enemy war effort.
- 25-US F-4 Phantoms, using 2,000 pound "smart" bombs, destroyed the Lang Chia railroad bridge, 65 miles northeast of Hanoi, linking North Vietnam with China.
- 27-An American Embassy, Bangkok, spokesman announced the US and Thai governments had agreed to reopen Nam Phong Air Base for US air operations over SEASIA.
- 30-President Thieu visited Pleiku and Kontum, ordering Kontum held "at all costs."
- 30-The Associated Press reported elements of the NVA 7th and 9th Divisions had pulled back into Cambodia from the An Loc area.
- 30-The heaviest air raids since 1968 struck Vinh, the second largest port in North Vietnam.
- 30-MACV estimated the South Vietnamese refugees resulting from the enemy offensive to be 768,000.
- 30-MG G. H. Woodward became the Chief of Staff, MACV.
- 31-The US troop strength was reduced to 63,000.

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JUNE

- 5--The NVA withdrew from Phu My district capital, Binh Dinh Province.
- 6--A South Vietnamese Government spokesman announced the Kontum was cleared of enemy forces.
- 6--North Vietnamese special representative Le Duc Tho stated he would agree to further secret talks with Dr. Henry Kissinger on two conditions: The US must present a new proposal to end the war, and the Paris Peace Talks must resume simultaneously.
- 6--Refugees generated since start of offensive were estimated at 823,000.
- 7--Radio Hanoi reported China and the Soviet Union pledged continued aid to North Vietnam and the Viet Cong on the occasion of the third anniversary of the founding of the PRG.
- 8--Enemy troops cut Route 1 near Trang Banh, 30 miles northwest of Saigon.
- 8--MACV reported 95 Americans killed and 266 wounded in air and ground action since the offensive began on March 30.
- 9--Mr. J. Paul Vann, the senior US advisor in Military Region 2, was killed in a helicopter crash. Vann, his pilot, and a US military passenger died when their light observation helicopter crashed in flames on a night flight from Pleiku to Kontum.
- 9--President Thieu said the next four-month period would be the decisive phase--the Communists' targets might become Hue and Saigon.
- 9--The ASW carrier *TICONDEROGA* joined the 7th Fleet off North Vietnam, raising the number to seven carriers.
- 10--BG Michael D. Healy was named senior US advisor in Military Region 2; Second Regional Assistance Group (SRAG) was redesignated Second Regional Assistance Command (SRAC).
- 11--US aircraft destroyed the Lang Chi hydroelectric power plant, 63 miles northwest of Hanoi (capable of producing 75 percent of the North's power requirements), using "smart" bombs to avoid damaging the adjacent dam.
- 13--The North Vietnamese and VC demanded the US end its five-week boycott of the Paris peace talks.
- 16--The US suspended air strikes in northern North Vietnam during the visit of USSR President Podgorny.
- 17--MACV announced the standdown of major elements of the last two US infantry brigades in South Vietnam, the 196th at Da Nang/Phu Bai and the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) at Bien Hoa.
- 18--The Commander of III Corps/Military Region 3 declared the siege of An Loc had ended. The attacks began on 12 April 1972.
- 18--South Vietnamese Marines launched their second spoiling attack north of the My Chanh River, Quang Tri Province.
- 19--In an Armed Forces Day address, President Thieu said the Communist offensive had failed and pledged a three-month South Vietnamese military drive to push the Communists out of South Vietnam.
- 19--The US resumed airstrikes north of the 20th parallel in North Vietnam, following a four-day suspension during the visit of Soviet President Podgorny.
- 20--In a brief ceremony, the 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), stood down. GEN Creighton W. Abrams and LTG Nguyen Van Minh, Military Region 3 Commander, joined BG James F. Hamlet, the Brigade Commander, for the ceremony.
- 21--GEN Creighton W. Abrams was named by President Nixon to replace GEN William C. Westmoreland as Army Chief of Staff.
- 23--B-52s flew a record 33 missions in Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces in the 24-hour period ending at noon.
- 23--MACV announced the deployment of the 366th Tactical Fighter Wing from Da Nang AB, the last F-4 squadron in South Vietnam. Three squadrons of the 366th moved to Takhli AB, Thailand, to join another F-4 squadron from the US.
- 23--South Vietnamese Foreign Minister Tran Van Lam rejected any in place cease-fire agreement and said that the North Vietnamese must withdraw their forces from South Vietnam as prelude to a cease-fire.
- 24--North Vietnam claimed that the US was bombing dikes in the Red River Valley.
- 26--US Treasury Secretary John B. Connally arrived in Saigon for an overnight visit and a meeting with President Thieu.
- 27--The South Vietnamese Senate passed a bill granting President Thieu power to rule by decree for 6 months.
- 28--The RVNAF offensive to retake Quang Tri Province began as the Marine and Airborne Divisions attacked north across the My Chanh River.
- 28--President Nixon announced the withdrawal of 10,000 additional US troops by 1 September. He also announced that draftees no longer would be sent to Vietnam unless they volunteered.
- 29--GEN Fred C. Weyand assumed the duties of Commander, US Forces, Vietnam. GEN John W. Vogt assumed the duties of Deputy COMUSMACV.
- 29--GEN Creighton W. Abrams departed Vietnam.
- 30--Route 14 was opened by friendly forces, as a convoy of 36 vehicles proceeded from Pleiku to Kontum City without incident.
- 30--RADM Arthur W. Price Jr. relieved RADM Robert S. Salzer as Commander Naval Forces/Chief, Naval Advisory Group, Vietnam.
- 30--US troop strength was reduced to 48,000 as Increment XII withdrawals were completed.

JULY

- 1--MG Alexander M. Haig, USA, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, arrived for a three-day visit.

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- 3-A South Vietnamese marine reconnaissance team entered Quang Tri City. They raised the South Vietnamese flag for the first time since the city fell on 1 May.
- 8-For the first time, President Thieu utilized the new special powers given him on 27 June to amend the draft of males between the ages of 18 and 38.
- 9-BG Richard J. Tallman, USA, was killed by artillery while on an inspection tour of An Loc. He was the first general officer killed in two years and brought the total of general/flag officers killed in Vietnam to 9.
- 9-The USS AMERICA replaced the USS CORAL SEA in the 7th Fleet off Vietnam.
- 10-The Republic of Korea Defense Minister Ye Jae-Hung announced that ROK forces would be withdrawn from Vietnam as soon as possible after the current offensive.
- 10-North Vietnamese negotiator Xuan Thuy arrived in Paris to resume the peace talks.
- 15-MACV revealed that Communist forces were using a new antiaircraft weapon, the SA-7 Strela heat-seeking missile.
- 18-At least five Communist Chinese freighters were detected unloading onto lighters off the southern coast of North Vietnam.
- 19-22d ARVN Division units and rangers began a campaign to re-take the northern part of Binh Dinh Province.
- 25-MACV announced that the phase-out of the previous week included the last 3,000 US combat forces in the Saigon region. Only one US ground combat unit remained in South Vietnam.
- 25-ARVN Airborne Division elements breached the wall of the Quang Tri Citadel and were able to enter briefly before being driven back.
- 26-1st ARVN Division units withdrew from Fire Support Bases Bastogne and Checkmate, west of Hue.
- 27-NVA 711th Division elements captured Fire Support Base Ross in the Que Son Valley, Quang Nam Province.
- 28-Mr. Rudolph Kaiser, PSA, Go Cong Province, was killed during a ground attack on the border of Go Cong and Dinh Tuong Provinces.
- 28-RVNAF soldiers re-captured the third district town in Binh Dinh Province, Hoai An, without a fight.
- 31-US troop strength was reduced to 46,000 with one ground combat battalion remaining in Vietnam.

AUGUST

- 1-President Thieu predicted a new enemy offensive around Quang Tri and Hue before the US election. He also indirectly called on the US to continue bombing the North.
- 1-MACV announced the presence of up to seven enemy regiments in the Delta province of Dinh Tuong.
- 1-MACV announced that USAF fighter-bombers attacked the Haiphong shipyard for the first time in the war.
- 4-President Thieu promulgated a decree law which greatly restricted newspaper and magazine publishing.
- 4-1st ARVN Division troops reoccupied Fire Support Base Checkmate.
- 6-The number of refugees generated since the beginning of the offensive topped 900,000.
- 6-South Vietnamese officials estimated that about 1,800 civil servants and soldiers captured in Binh Dinh Province were forced to join the Communist ranks.
- 9-Seventh Air Force announced that laser-guided bombs destroyed the newly repaired Thanh Hoa bridge in North Vietnam for the second time in three months.
- 11-The last US ground combat unit in South Vietnam, the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry, stood down.
- 16-Presidential advisor Dr. Henry Kissinger arrived in Saigon for three days of talks with President Thieu.
- 16-US aircraft flew 400 sorties against North Vietnam, in the heaviest raids since the April resumption of the bombing.
- 16-MACV announced that MIG fighters were being shot down at a record rate. US pilots had destroyed 48 MIGs during 1972, for an average of one every four days.
- 18-MACV announced a new, accelerated Vietnamization plan involving more heavy weapons and aircraft.
- 21-MACV announced that Long Binh base would be turned over to the South Vietnamese in October.
- 22-The South Vietnamese announced an amnesty for convicts and offered to release 600 sick and wounded NVA PWs for repatriation to North Vietnam.
- 24-Communist negotiators in Paris rejected the South Vietnamese offer of 22 August to repatriate 600 sick and wounded NVA PWs.
- 27-A Chinese mine sweeper was detected in Haiphong Harbor.
- 28-President Nixon announced that he would end the draft by July 1973.
- 28-USAF CPT Steve Ritchie downed his fifth MIG over North Vietnam and became the third US ace and the first USAF ace of the war.
- 29-President Nixon announced a 12,000 man cut in US troop strength by December 1.
- 30-The South Vietnamese endorsed the US troop withdrawal announcement, saying it demonstrated ARVN readiness.
- 31-US troop strength was reduced to 36,800 as Increment XIII withdrawals were completed.

SEPTEMBER

- 1-MACV announced five Americans were killed and three wounded for the previous week, the lowest weekly casualty toll since 1965.

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- 2-North Vietnam announced the release of three US PWs in celebration of National Day. They were Lt (jg) Markham L. Gardley, USN, captured August 17, 1968; Lt (jg) Norris A. Charles, USN, captured December 30, 1971; and Major Edward K. Elias, USAF, captured April 20, 1972.
- 10-Admiral Noel Gayler, CINCPAC, arrived in Saigon for a ten-day familiarization visit throughout Vietnam.
- 11-USAF jets again destroyed the Paul Doumer bridge in Hanoi, just as repairs were nearing completion.
- 15-Units of the Vietnamese Marine Division retook the Quang Tri Citadel, the only provincial capital captured during the offensive.
- 17-The number of refugees generated since the enemy offensive began topped one million.
- 18-North Vietnam released the three American pilots to a US peace group in a Hanoi ceremony.
- 20-President Thieu announced that he would not seek an extension of his emergency powers when they expired in December.
- 25-The three American PWs, whose release had been previously announced, left Hanoi for the US.
- 26-Vietnamese military sources announced fighting within South Vietnam was at the lowest level since the Communist offensive began.
- 28-The released US PWs arrived in New York, having traveled via Peking, Moscow, and Copenhagen.
- 29-The last Indian ICC members left Saigon as their visas expired. ICC headquarters was officially moved to Hanoi; however, the Canadian and Polish delegations remained in Saigon.
- 30-US troop strength was reduced to 35,500.

OCTOBER

- 1-MACV reported 100 Communist attacks in South Vietnam, the largest surge of enemy activity in two months.
- 8-B-52s struck a supply buildup near Vinh in the deepest B-52 raids into North Vietnam in six months.
- 12-The Ben Het Ranger Camp in northwestern Kontum Province fell to a heavy enemy attack.
- 12-GEN Fred C. Weyand, USA, assumed command of MACV.
- 12-MG M. G. Roseborough, USA, assumed command of the USARV/MACV Support Command.
- 14-ARVN troops evacuated the Minh Thanh base camp in Binh Long Province, which had been under siege since April.
- 18-Presidential advisor Dr. Henry Kissinger arrived in Saigon for further talks with President Thieu.
- 19-President Thieu told legislators that President Nixon turned down a Communist cease-fire proposal after President Thieu rejected a proposed coalition government.
- 23-For the first time in 18 days B-52s did not bomb North Vietnam: tactical air strikes were at their lowest level in three weeks.
- 26-North Vietnam said that the US had backed down on a cease-fire agreement and set a 31 October deadline for the US to agree to a cease-fire.
- 27-Defense Secretary Melvin Laird announced a halt to US bombing above the 20th parallel in North Vietnam.
- 27-Dr. Henry Kissinger announced that "peace is at hand".
- 27-President Thieu declared that he would accept no settlement which did not provide for withdrawal of NVA troops from South Vietnam.
- 31-Hanoi's proclaimed deadline for the US to sign the cease-fire agreement passed without signing.
- 31-B-52s staged the heaviest raids in three months over North Vietnam, south of the 20th parallel.
- 31-Vietnamese airborne troops recaptured Fire Support Base Barbara in Quang Tri Province.
- 31-US troop strength was reduced to 32,200.

NOVEMBER

- 1-Hanoi announced there would be no further talks in Paris until the US signed the draft cease-fire agreement.
- 2-The US began delivery of 32 C-130 aircraft to South Vietnam as part of an accelerated build-up of military equipment prior to a cease-fire.
- 3-The US announced that Iran, South Korea, and the Republic of China had agreed to provide F-5 aircraft as part of the United States effort to build up the VNAF.
- 4-The North Vietnam panhandle was subjected to heavy B-52 raids in an effort to disrupt the increased movement of troops and equipment south.
- 5-ARVN forces reoccupied Fire Support Base Ross in the Que Son Valley of Quang Nam Province.
- 14-ARVN forces recaptured Fire Support Base Anne in Quang Tri Province.
- 15-The State Department announced that Canada, Hungary, Indonesia, and Poland had agreed in principle to serve as members of an International Control and Supervision Commission to oversee a cease-fire in South Vietnam.
- 20-Dr. Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho resumed their talks in Paris.
- 22-The first B-52 combat loss of the war occurred when one of the giant bombers was hit by a SAM missile near Vinh. The aircraft limped back to Thailand, where the crew parachuted to safety and was rescued.
- 25-Dr. Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho broke off their talks without agreement.
- 30-US troop strength in the Republic of Vietnam fell to 25,500 men; the troop ceiling remained at 27,000 as Increment XIV was completed.

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DECEMBER

- 6-Dr. Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho resumed their talks in Paris.
- 6-Tan Son Nhut Air Base was hit by 43 122mm rockets, killing nine (1 US), wounding 54 (2 US) and destroying one helicopter and a quantity of POL.
- 13-The Paris peace talks were broken off without agreement.
- 14-The New Zealand government withdrew its last element from South Vietnam.
- 18-The Australian government withdrew its last advisory element from South Vietnam.
- 18-President Nixon ordered a resumption of the bombing north of the 20th parallel, suspended on 27 October.
- 21-The National Liberation Front announced that its forces would observe a 24-hour truce at Christmas and New Year's.
- 23-The Republic of South Vietnam announced a 24-hour Christmas truce commencing on December 24 at 1800 hours.
- 26-The US resumed heavy bombing of North Vietnam after a 36-hour Christmas pause.
- 27-MACV announced that from December 18 to 25, the US flew 147 B-52 missions and more than 1,000 tactical fighter strikes against 68 specific targets in North Vietnam north of the 20th parallel. Twelve B-52 bombers were lost, primarily to SAMs—over 600 of which were launched against the aircraft.
- 27-The special powers law, which gave President Thieu the authority to rule by decree, expired at midnight. Thieu did not seek renewal.
- 30-President Nixon announced a halt to the bombing above the 20th parallel.
- 30-The Republic of South Vietnam announced a 24-hour New Year's truce commencing on December 31 at 1800 hours.
- 31-A total of 15 B-52s and 13 other aircraft were reported shot down during Operation LINEBACKER II (a 12-day period from 18 through 29 December).
- 31-US troop strength in South Vietnam was reduced to 24,000.

JANUARY

- 2-Meetings between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States technical experts resumed in Paris.
- 4-Two Government of Vietnam envoys, former Foreign Minister Tran Van Do and former Ambassador to the US Bui Diem, departed Saigon for the US.
- 8-US planes on a tactical strike inadvertently bombed Da Nang Air Base, setting fire to a POL storage area and wounding several people.
- 8-Serious private negotiations resumed between Dr. Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho in Paris.
- 15-Dr. Kissinger flew to the US from Paris for consultations with the President.
- 15-President Nixon directed that the bombing, shelling, and mining be suspended above the 17th parallel.
- 16-GEN Alexander M. Haig visited South Vietnam's President Thieu to explain secret steps taken toward peace in Vietnam.
- 22-Dr. Kissinger returned to Paris to resume private negotiations with Le Duc Tho.
- 23-President Nixon announced that the cease-fire agreement had been initiated by Dr. Kissinger on behalf of the United States and Le Duc Tho on behalf of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
- 26-The US Delegation to the Four Party Joint Military Commission was activated with MG Gilbert H. Woodward, USA, the Chief US Delegate.
- 27-Formal signing of the cease-fire agreement and protocols took place in Paris.
- 28-The Defense Attache Office (DAO), Saigon, was activated; MG John E. Murray was appointed the Defense Attache.
- 28-The Vietnam cease-fire officially began at 0800 hours (2400 hours, 27 January, GMT).
- 28-The implementation of the cease-fire was marred by widespread fighting in South Vietnam.
- 28-Members of the ICCS delegation began arriving in Saigon.
- 28-Letters from President Thieu were sent to President Nixon and Korean President Park Chung Lee expressing appreciation for US and Korean aid. Letters were also sent to the Philippine, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand heads of government.
- 29-The first meeting of the Four Party Joint Military Commission was held in Saigon.
- 30-Vice-President Spiro Agnew began a brief visit to Saigon during which he held consultations with President Thieu on post-war relations.
- 30-VNMC units on the south bank of the Thach Han River were forced to give up land taken before the cease-fire.
- 31-Nearly 11,000 enemy PWs rallied in a special *Chieu Hoi* program.
- 31-US troop strength in South Vietnam was reduced to 21,821.

FEBRUARY

- 2-President Nixon stated that he would send Dr. Henry Kissinger to Hanoi during 10-13 February to initiate negotiations on Indochina-wide reconstruction.
- 5-FPJMC and ICCS delegations began deployment to the field.

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- 5-GEN John W. Vogt, USAF, DEPCOMUSMACV and Commander, 7th Air Force, arrived at Phnom Penh from Saigon for talks with President Lon Nol and other officials.
- 6-US military strength in South Vietnam was reduced to less than 20,000.
- 8-Four US Navy minesweepers began clearing an anchorage 35 miles off Haiphong Harbor to serve as a base of operations for the sweeping of mines from North Vietnamese ports.
- 8-Dr. Henry Kissinger began his trip to Peking and Hanoi.
- 12-The first exchange of PWs involving eight American civilian and 19 military personnel was made at Loc Ninh. 116 more Americans were released in Hanoi.
- 12-MACV announced that it had withdrawn about one-fourth of its troops from Vietnam since the cease-fire began.
- 13-North Vietnam agreed to allow the International Red Cross to help search for the 1,328 missing US servicemen in Indochina.
- 14-The US and North Vietnam announced plans to create a joint economic commission to oversee the rebuilding of North Vietnam.
- 16-ARVN recaptured the coastal town of Sa Huynh, denying the NVA a port of entry for war materiel.
- 17-US military strength in South Vietnam was reduced to less than 15,000.
- 17-The four elements of the FPJMC issued a joint appeal to the "High Command" of the parties in South Vietnam to implement the provisions of the cease-fire agreement.
- 18-In the wake of Henry Kissinger's visit, Hanoi released 20 American military PWs as an expression of "good will".
- 20-Dr. Kissinger returned to Washington to brief President Nixon on his talks with the leaders of China, North Vietnam, and Japan.
- 21-Route 1 was opened from the Military Region 2 border to Quang Tri as ARVN elements cleared the road in Quang Ngai Province.
- 24-The Navy ordered two aircraft carriers, the USS MIDWAY and the USS AMERICA, from Asian waters, the first significant cutback in US seapower since the Vietnam cease-fire.
- 26-The international conference on Vietnam opened in Paris.
- 28-The US placed a hold on US troop withdrawals in response to Communist delays in releasing American PWs.

MARCH

- 1-In Paris the foreign ministers of 12 governments, including all the world's superpowers, initialed a nine-point declaration endorsing the Vietnam peace agreement and establishing a procedure for examining violations.
- 1-US Consulates General were officially established at Da Nang, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa, and Can Tho.
- 1-The office of the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) was terminated.
- 2-The last Thai element in South Vietnam departed.
- 2-The last Philippine element in Vietnam redeployed.
- 4-Withdrawal of US troops was resumed.
- 4-106 prisoners of war, the first group of increment two, were released in Hanoi and flown to Clark Air Base in the Philippines.
- 5-US troop strength in South Vietnam was reduced to less than 10,000.
- 5-Twenty-seven military, three US civilian, and four third country civilian prisoners, the second group of increment two, arrived at Clark Air Base after being released in Hanoi.
- 10-Withdrawal of US troops was again halted.
- 14-107 military and one civilian prisoners of war, the first group of the third increment, were released at Hanoi's Gia Lam airport.
- 14-US troop withdrawal resumed.
- 14-The US Army Hospital, Saigon (formerly the 3d Field Hospital) became the Saigon Seventh Day Adventist Hospital.
- 15-Military payment certificates were discontinued and converted to US dollars.
- 16-Twenty-seven military and five civilian US prisoners of war, the second group of the third increment, arrived at Clark Air Base after being released at Hanoi.
- 16-The US again halted the troop withdrawal pending the release of PWs held by the Pathet Lao.
- 23-The final group of Korean forces departed, ending eight and one-half years of military assistance to South Vietnam.
- 26-The last advisors from the Republic of China departed.
- 27-US troop strength in South Vietnam was less than 5,000.
- 27-Twenty-seven military and five civilian US prisoners of war, the first group of the fourth increment, held by the Viet Cong, were released in Hanoi.
- 27-US troop withdrawals resumed concurrently with the prisoner release in Hanoi.
- 28-Seven US military, two US civilian, and one Canadian prisoners were released by the Pathet Lao in Hanoi.
- 28-Forty prisoners of war arrived at Clark Air Base from their captivity in North Vietnam.
- 28-The last US ships departed Vietnam with retrograde cargo. Over 150,000 MT of cargo were retrograded.
- 29-The final group of 67 American prisoners departed Hanoi.
- 29-US Army, Vietnam was disestablished effective 1808 hours.

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
29-The Military Assistance Command Vietnam, (MACV) was disestablished effective 1900 hours.

29-The US troop withdrawal was completed.

31-The US Delegation, FPJMC was disestablished at 1900 hours.

APRIL

1-CPT Robert T. White, USA, the last known US prisoner held by the Viet Cong, was released at Xom Tien, Vinh Binh Province.



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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

AA	Antiaircraft
AAA	Antiaircraft Artillery
AAE	Army Aviation Element
AAF	Army Airfield
AAEOI	Associated American Engineers Overseas, Incorporated
AAG	Army Advisory Group
AB	Air Base
ABF	Attack-by-Fire
Abn	Airborne
ABT	Alaska Barge & Transport
ACofS	Assistant Chief of Staff
ACTOV	Accelerated Turnover to Vietnamese
ACTOVRAD	Accelerated Turnover to Vietnamese Radar
ADA	Air Defense Artillery
ADB	Agriculture Development Bank
ADP	Automatic Data Processing
ADVON	Advanced Echelon
AE	Advisory Element
AF	Air Force
AFAT	Air Force Advisory Team
AFGP	Air Force Advisory Group
AFGP/DO	Air Force Advisory Group Directorate of Operations
AFP	Annual Funding Program
AFRTS	American Forces Radio and Television Service
AFVN	American Forces Vietnam Network
AG	Adjutant General
AGE	Aerospace Ground Equipment
AGM	Air to Ground Missile
AGP	Motor Torpedo Boat Tender (Auxiliary General Purpose)
AID	Agency for International Development
AIK	Assistance-in-Kind
AKL	Auxiliary Cargo Lighter
ALO	Air Liaison Officer
ALC	Area Logistics Command
AM	Air Medal
AMC	Army Material Command
Ambi	Airmobile
Amemb	American Embassy
AMM	Airman's Medal
ANGLICO	Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company
AO	Area of Operations
APC	Armored Personnel Carrier
APL	Auxiliary Personnel Lighter
APT	Armed Propaganda Team
AQM	Drone Aircraft
ARA	Aerial Rocket Artillery
ARCLIGHT	B-52 Strategic Bomber Strike
ARCOM	Army Commendation Medal
ARDF	Airborne Radio Detection Finding
ARRGP	Aerospace Rescue Recovery Group
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
AS	Aviation Support
ASC	Automatic Switching Center
ASL	Authorized Stockage List
ASP	Ammunition Supply Point
ASPB	Assault Support Patrol Boat

UNCLASSIFIED

ASR Ammunition Supply Rate
ASTD Army Strategic Technical Detachment
ASRT Air Support Radar Team
ATC Armored Troop Carrier; Air Training Command
ATF Australian Task Force
ATP Army Training Program
AUTODIN Automatic Digital Data Network
AUTOSEVOCOM Automatic Secure Voice Communications
AUTOVON Automatic Voice Network
Avn Aviation
AWOL Absent Without Leave
BA Base Area
BARCAP Barrier Combat Air Patrol
BCAT Battalion Combat Assistance Team
BDA Bomb Damage Assessment
Bde Brigade
BER Budget Executive Review
BG Brigadier General
Bn Battalion
BNDD Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
BNR Body Not Recovered
BOC Bureau of Customs
BPO Budget Project Officer
BR Body Recovery
BSA Base Support Area
BSB Budget Screening Board
BSM Bronze Star Medal
BT *Binh Trám* (Enemy Logistical Command and Control Agency)
Btry Battery
Bufe Vietnamese Ceramic Elephant
C Confidential
CA Heavy Cruiser
CAB Combat Aviation Battalion
CABOTS Currency and Black Market Control System
CAC Current Affairs Committee
CAG Civic Action Group; Combat Aviation Group
C&GSC Command and General Staff College, RVNAF
C&C Command and Control
CAP Combat Air Patrol
CAPT Captain (Navy O-6)
CARS CEIMP Automated Reporting System
CAS Controlled American Source; Controlled Agent Source
Cav Cavalry
CB Construction Battalion
CBMU Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit
Cbt Combat
CBU Cluster Bomb Unit
CCB Command Communication Boat
CCP Combined Campaign Plan
CCRSFF Commander Central Region SEATO Field Forces
CCTS Combat Crew Training School
CD Combat Development
CDLD Community Defense and Local Development
CDIC Committee for the Development of the Industry of Construction
Cdr, 7AF Commander, Seventh US Air Force
CDS Container Delivery System
C - E Communications - Electronics
CEI Communications - Electronics Instructions
CEIMP Communications - Electronics Improvement and Modernization Plan

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CEMIS Communications - Electronics Management Information System
CG Commanding General
CHECO Contemporary Historical Evaluations of Combat Operations
CHICOM Chinese Communist
Chieu Hoi Open Arms Program
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CICC Combined Interdiction Coordinating Committee
CICV Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam
CID Command Information Division; Criminal Investigation Division
CIDG Civilian Irregular Defense Group
CINCPAC Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCPACAF Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces
CINCPACFLT Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet
CINCUSARPAC Commander in Chief, US Army, Pacific
CIP Commercial Imports Program
Civ Civilian
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJGS Chief of the Joint General Staff
CLA Central Logistics Agency
CLC Central Logistics Command
CMA/DCA-RVN Communications Management Agency/Defense Communications Agency - Republic of Vietnam
CMAC Capital Military Assistance Command
CMAT Capital Military Assistance Team
CMD Capital Military District
CMU COMSEC Management Unit
CNC *Cuc Nghien Cuu* (North Vietnamese Central Research Agency)
C/NP Confidential/No Foreign Dissemination
Co Chief of Naval Operations
Co Company
CO Commanding Officer
COA Confirmed Operating Area
CofS Chief of Staff
COL Colonel
COMMANDO VAULT Operational Name for 15,000 Pound Space Clearing USAF Conventional Bomb
COMNAVFORV Commander, Naval Forces, Vietnam
COMNAVSUPPACT Commander, Naval Support Activity
COMSEC Communications Security
COMUSMACV Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
COMUSSAG Commander, US Support Activities Group
COMUSSEASIA Commander, US Forces, Southeast Asia
CONEX Container Express
CONUS Continental United States
CORDS Civil Operations and Rural Development Support
COSVN Central Office for South Vietnam
CP Command Post
CPDC Central Pacification and Development Council
CPT Captain (Army, Air Force, Marine Corps 0-3)
CPWC Central Prisoner of War Camp
CRC Control and Reporting Center
CRS Coastal Recovery Service
CRIMP Consolidated RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Plan
CROC Combat Required Operational Capability
CSA Chief of Staff, Army
CSAF Chief of Staff, Air Force
CSAS Common Service Airfield System
CSC Computer Sciences Airfield System
CSFF Commander, SEATO Field Force
CSI Crash Site Inspection
CSOP Combined Strategic Objectives Plan

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CSW Crew-served Weapon
CTC Central Training Command
CTEA Combined Telecommunications Engineering Agency
CTF Commander, Task Force; Carrier Task Force
CTG Commander Task Group
CTZ Corps Tactical Zone
CWC Civilian War Casualty
CWCP Civilian War Casualty Program
CVA Attack Aircraft Carrier
CY Calendar Year
DA Department of the Army
DAO Defense Attache Office
DART Deployable Automatic Relay Terminal
DASC Direct Air Support Center
DASD Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
DCA Defense Communications Agency
DCA-SAM Defense Communications Agency-Southeast Asia Mainland
DCAT Division Combat Assistance Team
DCG Deputy Commanding General
DCS Defense Communications System
DCSCOMPT Deputy Chief of Staff, Comptroller
DD Destroyer
DEFT Drug Education Field Team
DEPCG Deputy Commanding General
DEPCOMTHD Deputy Commander. TRAN HUNG DAO
DEPCOMUSMACV Deputy Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Viet Nam
DEPCORDS Deputy for Civil Operations and Rural Development Support
DEPSECDEF Deputy Secretary of Defense
DER Radar Picket Escort Ship
DFC Distinguished Flying Cross
DGBFA Director General for Budget and Foreign Aid
DGFA Director General for Finance and Audit
DGOH Directorate General of Highways
DGOV Director General of Youth
DIOCC District Intelligence and Operations Coordination Center
Div Division
DLG Guided Missile Frigate
DMA Data Management Agency
DMAC Delta Military Assistance Command
DMZ Demilitarized Zone
DOD Department of Defense
DOT Department of Defense, Transportation
Dong Kboi Saturation Operation
DRAC Delta Regional Assistance Command
DRSTO Defense Resources Surveillance and Termination Office
DRV Democratic Republic of Vietnam
DS Direct Support
DSA Deputy Senior Advisor; District Senior Advisor
DSC Distinguished Service Cross
DSM Distinguished Service Medal
DSPG Dependent Shelter Program Group
DSPO Data System Project Officer
DST Bomb Fitted With Magnetic Detonation Circuits
DSTE Digital Subscriber Terminal Equipment
DTE Dial Telephone Exchange
DTOC Division Tactical Operations Center
DTP Delta Transportation Plan
DUFFLE BAG Electronic Sensing Devices; the US Sensor Program

UNCLASSIFIED

DUSTOFF	US Army Aeromedical Evacuation Helicopter Units; an Aeromedical Helicopter Evacuation
EAD	Engineering Advisory Division
ECAP	Engineering Civic Action Program
ELC	English Language Comprehension
ECM	Electronic Countermeasures
EDC	Export Development Center
Embtel	Embassy Telegram
En	Enemy
Engr	Engineer
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EOGB	Electro-Optically Guided Bomb
EPW	Enemy Prisoner of War
ESSG	Engineer Strategic Study Group
FA	Field Artillery
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FAE	Field Advisory Elements
FAMF	Floating Aircraft Maintenance Facility
FANK	<i>Forces Armees Nationales Khmeres</i> (Khmer Army Forces)
FANSONG	Enemy Ground Radar Used to Guide SAMs to Their Target
FASU	Fleet Air Support Unit
FDC	Fire Direction Center
FLIP	Flight Information Publication
FLIR	Forward-Looking Infrared Radar
FMF	Fleet Marine Force
FMFPAC	Fleet Marine Force Pacific
FMR	Financial Market Rate
FPJMC	Four Party Joint Military Commission
FPJMT	Four Party Joint Military Team
FOUO	For Official Use Only
FPO	Fleet Post Office
Fr	Friendly
FRAC	First Regional Assistance Command
FSA	Forward Support Area
FSB	Fire Support Base
FSCC	Fire Support Coordination Center
FSCL	Fire Support Coordination Line
FSE	Fire Support Element
FSI	Force Structure Increases
FSL	Force Structure List
FTC	Fank Training Command
PWF	Free World Forces
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces
FWMAO	Free World Military Assistance Office
FWMAPC	Free World Military Assistance Policy Council
FY	Fiscal Year
GAO	General Accounting Office
GCA	Ground Controlled Approach
GCI	Ground Controlled Intercept
GDA	Gun Damage Assessment
GDRS	General Directorate of Rear Services
GEN	General
GFCs	Gunfire Control System
GFE	Government Furnished Equipment
GIS	Government Information Service
GKR	Government of Khmer Republic
GNP	Gross National Product
Gp	Group
GPWC	Geneva Prisoners of War Convention

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GPWD	General Political and Warfare Department
GSG	General Support Group
GVN	Government of South Vietnam
HA	Helicopter Ambulance
HAC	Headquarters Area Command
HAL	Helicopter Attack Squadron
HALO	High Altitude Low Opening
HDU	Harbor Defense Unit
H&I	Harassing and Interdiction Fire
HEAT	High Explosive Antitank
HF	High Frequency
Hel	Helicopter
HES	Hamlet Evaluation System
<i>Hoi Cbamb</i>	VC/NVA Rallier
House 50	Logistical Support Center located at Number 50 Plantation Road, Saigon
How Bn	Howitzer Battalion
HQ	Headquarters
HSSC	Heavy Salvage Craft
HTA	High Threat Area
IAACONS	Improved ARVN Ammunition Control System
IAAD	Information Advisory and Accreditation Division
I&M	Improvement and Modernization
ICCS	International Commission of Control and Supervision
ICP	In-Country Procurement
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICS	Integrated Communications System
ICS-SEA	Integrated Communications System - Southeast Asia
IESS	Inter-service Egress Screening System
IFR	Instrument Flight Rules
IG	Inspector General
Intel	Intelligence
IO	Information Office/Officer
IR	Infrared
IRHA	Injuries Resulting from Hostile Action
ISB	Intermediate Support Base
ISD	Instructional System Development
IW	Individual Weapon
JCC	Joint Coordination Group
JCGRO	Joint Central Graves Registration Office
JCRC	Joint Casualty Resolution Center
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JGS/RVNAF	Joint General Staff/Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
JGSIG	Joint General Staff Inspector General
JIB	Joint Information Bureau
JIC	Joint Information Center
JOSS	Joint Overseas Switchboard
JPRC	Joint Personnel Recovery Center
JSCM	Joint Service Commendation Medal
JTD	Joint Table of Distribution
JUMPS	Joint Uniform Military Pay System
JUSPAO	Joint US Public Affairs Office
JVREC	Joint Vietnam Regional Exchange Council
JWTC	Jungle Warfare Training Center
KC	Khmer Communist
KCI	Khmer Communist Infrastructure
KCS	Kit Carson Scout
KG	<i>Kompong</i> (Cambodian for Province)
KIA	Killed in Action

UNCLASSIFIED

KLF	Khmer Liberation Front
KR	Khmer Republic (Cambodia); Khmer Rouge (Insurgent Group)
KSB	Boston Whaler
LAW	Light Antitank Weapon
LCM	Landing Craft Mechanized
LCMMS	Landing Craft Mechanized, Minesweeper
LCPL	Landing Craft Personnel, Large
LCU	Landing Craft Utility
LCVP	Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel
LD	<i>Lao Dong Dang</i> (Lao Workers' Party)
LDHB	Land Development and Hamlet Building
LDNN	<i>Lien Doi Nhoui Nhai</i> (Frogman Group VNN)
LDPC	Logistical Data Processing Center
LGB	Laser Guided Bomb
<i>Lien Doi</i>	Regional Force Company Group
LIMDIS	Limited Distribution
LM	Legion of Merit
LN	Local National
LnO	Liaison Officer
LOC	Lines of Communication
Log	Logistics; Logistical
LOH	Light Observation Helicopter
LORAN	Long Range Airborne Navigation
LPD	Landing Platform, Dock
LPH	Landing Platform, Helicopter
LRRP	Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol
LS	Liaison Service
LSAD	Liaison Service Advisory Detachment
LSB	Logistical Support Base
LSIL	Landing Ship Infantry, Light
LSM	Landing Ship, Medium
LSM-H	Landing Ship, Medium - Hospital
LSSL	Landing Ship, Support, Large
LST	Landing Ship, Tank
LT	Lieutenant
LTC	Lieutenant Colonel
LTG	Lieutenant General
LZ	Landing Zone
MA	Military Assistance
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAB	Marine Amphibious Brigade
MAC	Military Affairs Committee; Military Airlift Command; Military Assistance Command
MAC	Military Assistance Command Staff Designations (parentheses represent designation before May 1972 reorganization)
MACDP	Directorate of Personnel
(MACJ1)	(AC of S for Personnel)
MACDI	Directorate of Intelligence
(MACJ2)	(AC of S for Intelligence)
MACDO	Directorate of Operations
(MACJ3)	(AC of S for Operations)
MACDL	Directorate of Logistics
(MACJ4)	(AC of S for Logistics)
(MACJ5)	(AC of S for Plans)
MACCE	Directorate of Communications-Electronics
(MACJ6)	(AC of S for Communications-Electronics)
MACCORDS	Directorate of Civil Operations and Rural Development Support
(MACCORDS)	(AC of S for Civil Operations and Rural Development Support)
MACCO	Comptroller

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MACAG Directorate of Administrative Services
(MACAG) (Adjutant General)
MACPM Provost Marshal
MACCH Chaplain
MACST Special Troops
MACMD Command Surgeon
(MACDC) (Construction Directorate)
MACFWMAO Free World Military Assistance Office
MACDMA Data Management Agency
MACIG Inspector General
MACOI Office of Information
MACJA Staff Judge Advocate
MACEA AC of S for Economic Affairs
(MACT) (Training Directorate)
MACTC Technical Assistance Coordinator
(MACSA) (Science Advisor)
MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAF Marine Amphibious Force
MAG Marine Air Group
MAGROCV Military Advisory Group, Republic of China, Vietnam
MAGV Military Assistance Group, Vietnam
Maint Maintenance
MAP Military Assistance Program
MARKET TIME USN anti-infiltration blockade of SVN Coast
MASF Military Assistance Service Funded
MASH Mobile Army Surgical Hospital
MAT Military Advisory Team; Mobile Advisory Team
MATT Mobile Advisory Training Team
MAU Marine Amphibious Unit
MCA Military Construction, Army
MCAP Military Construction, Air Force
MCAS Marine Corps Air Station
MCN Military Construction, Navy
MDD Municipal Development Directorate
MDEM Ministry for the Development of Ethnic Minorities
MEDCAP Medical Civic Action Program
MEDCOMV Medical Commander, Vietnam
Medevac Medical Evacuation
MEDTC Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia
MEIP Miscellaneous Environmental Improvement Program
MFYP MOND Four Year Plan
MG Major General
Mgt Management
MHB Military History Branch
MHE Materials Handling Equipment
MI Military Intelligence
MIA Missing in Action
MIG Russian Fighter Aircraft
MILCON Military Construction
MILSTRIP Military Standard Requisition and Issue Procedures
MK Mark
MLMS Motor Launched Minesweeper
MMASP Military Mutual Aid and Savings Fund
MMIP Marine Modernization and Improvement Plan
MND Ministry of National Defense
MNK *Marine Nationale Khmer* (Khmer Navy)
MOE Ministry of Education
MOP Ministry of Finance

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MOH	Ministry of Health
MOI	Ministry of Information
MOL	Ministry of Labor
MOND	Ministry of National Defense
MORD	Ministry of Rural Development
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
MP	Military Police
MPC	Military Payment Certificate
MPCC	Medical Policy Coordinating Committee
MPW	Ministry of Public Works
MR	Military Region
MRTTH	Military Region Tri Thien Hue
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MSM	Meritorious Service Medal
MSO	Military Security Office (COSVN)
MSR	Minesweeper, River
MSS	Military Security Service
MSW	Ministry of Social Welfare
MTD	Mobile Training Detachment
MTS	Military Telecommunications System
MTT	Mobile Training Team
MWV	Ministry of War Veterans
NAG	Naval Advisory Group
NAS	National Academy of Sciences
NAVADVGRP	Naval Advisory Group
NAVFORV	Naval Forces, Vietnam
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
NDC	National Defense Council
NDPS	National Defense Planning System
NEDF	National Economic Development Fund
NFLSVN	National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam
NGFS	Naval Gunfire Support
NILO	Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer
NLHX	Neo Lao Hak Xat (Lao Patriotic Front)
NM	Nautical Mile
NMMA	National Materiel Management Agency
NOFORN	No Foreign
NORS	Nonoperational Repair and Supply
NP	National Police
NPC	National Police Command
NPFF	National Police Field Force
NSA	National Security Agency; Naval Support Activity
NSAM	National Security Action Memorandum
NSDM	National Security Draft Memorandum
NTC	National Training Center; Naval Training Center
NTDS	Naval Tactical Data System
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
NVAF	North Vietnam Air Force; North Vietnamese Armed Forces
NVN	North Vietnam; North Vietnamese
NZ	New Zealand
NZATTV	New Zealand Army Training Team, Vietnam
OASD	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
OB	Order of Battle
OCO	Office of Civil Operations
OCR	Optical Character Reader
OCS	Officer Candidate School
OIC	Officer in Charge
OICC	Officer in Charge of Construction

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OIR Other Intelligence Requirements
OJT On the Job Training
OMA Operations and Maintenance, Army
OMAF Operations and Maintenance, Air Force
OMN Operations and Maintenance, Navy
OP Observation Post
OPCON Operational Control
OPLAN Operations Plan
OPM Office of the Prime Minister
OPORD Operations Order
OPTAR Operating Target
ORE Operational Readiness Exercise
OSA Office of the Special Assistant to the Ambassador
OSA (PA) Office of the Secretary of the Army (Public Affairs)
OSD (DIO) Office of the Secretary of Defense (Director of Information Operations)
OSD (I&L) Office of the Secretary of Defense (Installation and Logistics)
OSD (ISA) Office of the Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
OSD (PA) Office of the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
OSS Overseas switchboards
PACAF Pacific Air Force
PACEX Pacific Exchange System
PACFLT Pacific Fleet
PACOM Pacific Command
Pathet Lao Lao Group under Communist/NVA Direction
PAVN People's Army of Vietnam
Pax Passengers
PB Patrol Boat
PBR Patrol Boat River
PC Patrol Craft
PCD Purchasing and Contracting Department
PCE Patrol Craft Escort
PCF Patrol Craft, Inshore
PDF Provisional Defense Force
PDHA Property Disposal Holding Area
PDO Property Disposal Operation/Office
PF Popular Force
PG Patrol Gunboat
PGM Patrol Gunboat Medium
PHILCAGV Philippines Civic Action Group, Vietnam
PHILCONV Philippines Contingent, Vietnam
Phung Hoang Anti-VCI Campaign
PIOCC Province Intelligence and Operations Coordination Center
PIRAZ Positive Identification Radar Advisory Zone
PID Public Information Division
PL Pathet Lao; Public Law
PL 480 Food-for-Peace Program
PM Preventive Medicine; Provost Marshal
PMAT Province Mobile Assistance Team
PMS Planned Maintenance System
POC Police Operations Center
POL Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
POLWAR Political Warfare
POPAT Protection of the People against Terrorism
PPBS Planning, Programming, Budgeting System
PPD Plans and Policy Division
PPDC Provincial Pacification and Development Council
PPL *Phak Pason Lao* (Lao People's Party)
PPP Philippines to People Program

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PR Personnel Recovery
PRC People's Republic of China
PRG Provisional Revolutionary Government
PRP People's Revolutionary Party
PRU Province Reconnaissance Unit
PSA Province Senior Advisor
PSD Public Safety Directorate
PSDF People's Self Defense Force
PSYOP Psychological Operations
PSYWAR Psychological Warfare
PURA PACOM Utilization and Redistribution Agency
PW Prisoner of War
PX Post Exchange
QRF Quick Reaction Force
QC *Quan Camb* (ARVN Military Police)
QM Quartermaster
RAC Regional Assistance Command; River Assault Craft
RAD Research and Analysis Directorate, CORDS
RADM Rear Admiral
RAG River Assault Group
RAID River Assault and Interdiction Division
RAM Rapid Area Maintenance
RAMMS RVNAF Automated Materiel Management System
R&R Rest and Recuperation
RAR Royal Australian Regiment
RBCAT Redeployment Base Closure Assistance Team
RBDB Ranger Border Defense Battalion
RCAT Regimental Combat Assistance Team
RCC Rescue Coordination Center
RD Rural Development
RDC Rural Development Cadre
RDT&E Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
RECCE Reconnaissance
Recon Reconnaissance
Regt Regiment
RESCAP Rescue Combat Air Patrol
RF Regional Force
RF/PF Regional Force/Popular Force
Rgr Ranger
RHAW Radar Homing and Warning
RID River Interdiction Division
RLA Royal Laotian Army
RLAF Royal Laotian Air Force
RLG Royal Lao Government
RMK/BRJ Raymond-Morrison-Knudsen/Brown-Root-Jones Construction Firm
ROC Republic of China
ROCMAGV Republic of China Military Assistance Group, Vietnam
ROE Rules of Engagement
ROI Report of Investigation
ROK Republic of Korea
ROKFB Republic of Korea Forces, Vietnam
ROKMAGV Republic of Korea Military Assistance Group, Vietnam
ROKMC Republic of Korea Marine Corps
ROP Republic of the Philippines
RPC River Patrol Craft
RPD River Patrol Division
RPDC Regional Pacification and Development Council
RPG River Patrol Group

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RSG Rear Service Group
RSSZ Rung Sat Special Zone
RT Route
RTA Royal Thai Army
RTAF Royal Thai Air Force
RTAFB Royal Thai Air Force Base
RTAFV Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force
RTFV Royal Thai Forces, Vietnam
RTG Royal Thai Government
RTN Royal Thai Navy
RTV Return to Village
RVN Republic of Vietnam
RVN-CCU Republic of Vietnam-Contingency Communications Unit
RVNAF Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces
S Secret
SA Senior Advisor
SA-7 Soviet manufactured Surface to Air Missile
SAB Scrap Ammunition Brass
SAC Strategic Air Command
SACADVON Strategic Air Command Advanced Echelon
SAM Surface to Air Missile; Space Available Mail
SAMOB Surface to Air Missile Order of Battle
SAR Search and Rescue
SATP Security Assistance Training Program
SB Special Branch
SC Signal Corps
SCT Special Commando Team
SCU Special Commando Unit
SEA Southeast Asia
SEA-ATS Southeast Asia Automatic Telephone System
SEAC Southeast Asia Command
SEAL Sea, Air, and Land
SEA LORDS Southeast Asia Lake-Ocean-River-Delta Strategy
SEASIA Southeast Asia
SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SECDEF Secretary of Defense
SEACORDS Secure Voice Cordboards
SECSTATE Secretary of State
Sep Separate
SES Special Exploitation Service
SF Special Forces
SIGINT Signal Intelligence
SIMS Single Integrated Military Telecommunications System
SIO Strategic Intelligence Office
SITS Single Integrated Telecommunications System
SJA Staff Judge Advocate
SLAR Side-Looking Airborne Radar
SM Soldier's Medal
SM&DSLCL Sector Management and Direct Support Logistics Center
SMF Special Mission Force
SMO Systems Maintenance Office
SMS Special Mission Service
SMSAD Special Mission Service Advisory Division
SMO Systems Maintenance Office
S/NF Secret/No Foreign Dissemination
SOG Studies and Observations Group
SOP Standing Operating Procedures; Strategic Objectives Plan
SPECAT Special Category

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
Sqdn	Squadron
SR	Subregion
SRAC	Second Regional Assistance Command
SRAG	Second Regional Assistance Group
SSG	Special Support Group
SSMP	Self-sufficiency Master Plan
STCAN	River Patrol Craft
STCP	Sector Tactical Command Post
STD	Strategic Technical Directorate
STDAT-158	Strategic Technical Directorate Assistance Team - 158
STOL	Short Takeoff and Landing
S/T	Short Ton (2,000 pounds)
STRDC	<i>Son Tbon</i> Rural Development Cadre (for Montagnards)
STS	Special Technical Service
STT	Special Training Team
STZ	Special Tactical Zone
SUPCOM	Support Command
TAC	Tactical Air Command
TACAIR	Tactical Air
TACAN	Tactical Air Navigation
TACP	Tactical Air Control Party
TACS	Tactical Air Control System
TAOR	Tactical Area of Responsibility
TAR	Tactical Air Request
TASD	Tactical Air Support Division
TASE	Tactical Air Support Element
TASS	Tactical Air Support Squadron
TC	Training Center; Transportation Corps
TCAD	Training Center Advisory Detachment
TCF	Telecommunications Facility
TCN	Third Country National
TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowances
TDY	Temporary Duty
TE	Table of Equipment
TEA BALL	US Air Weapons Control System
TET	VN Lunar New Year Holiday
TF	Task Force
TFES	Territorial Forces Evaluation System
TFG	Tactical Fighter Group
TFPS	Tactical Fighter Squadron
TFW	Tactical Fighter Wing
TG	Task Group; Transportation Group
THD	<i>Tran Hung Dao</i> (Riverine Operations)
Tm	Team
TMA	Traffic Management Agency
TMO	Telephone Management Office
TMS	Training Management System
TND	Training Directorate
TOC	Tactical Operations Center
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TOW	Tube launched, optically tracked, wire-guided
TPJMC	Two Party Joint Military Commission
TPJMT	Two Party Joint Military Team
TRAC	Third Regional Assistance Command
TRU	Technical Reconnaissance Unit
TS	Top Secret
TS/NF	Top Secret/No Foreign Dissemination
U	Unclassified

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UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice
UDT Underwater Demolition Team
USA United States Army
USAAG US Army Advisory Group
USAF US Air Force
USAHAC US Army Headquarters Area Command
USAHSVCGPV US Army Health Services Group, Vietnam
USAID US Agency for International Development
USAMEDCOMV US Army Medical Command, Vietnam
USAPAV US Army Procurement Agency, Vietnam
USAPDAV US Army Property Disposal Agency, Vietnam
USARPAC US Army, Pacific
USARV US Army, Vietnam
USARV/MACV SUPCOM US Army Vietnam/Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Support Command
USASPAC US Army Security Agency, Pacific
USC US Code
USCG US Coast Guard
USG US Government
USIA US Information Agency
USMC US Marine Corps
USN US Navy
USNS US Navy Ship
USO United Services Organization
USSAG US Support Activities Group
USS US Ship
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UTB Utility Boat
UTG Underway Training Group
UW Unconventional Warfare
VADM Vice Admiral
VAL Light Attack Squadron
VARS Visual Air Reconnaissance and Surveillance
VC Viet Cong
VCI Viet Cong Infrastructure
VC/NVA Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army
VD Venereal Disease
VECCO Vietnam Engineering and Construction Company
Vedette Interceptor, Cutter, Surveillance
VERT REP Vertical Replenishment
VES Vietnamese Economic Study
VFR Visual Flight Rules
VIKYN Technical Services Institute, Vietnam
VIP Voluntary Informant Program
VIS Vietnamese Information Service
VMAT Vietnamese Mobile Advisory Team
VN Vietnam; Vietnamese
VNAD Vietnamese Advisory Division, Office of the Comptroller
VNAF Vietnamese Air Force
SVN Vietnamese Piaster
VNMC Vietnamese Marine Corps
VNN Vietnamese Navy
VNNSC Vietnamese Naval Supply Center
VNNSY Vietnamese Naval Shipyard
VR Visual Reconnaissance
VRE Vietnam Regional Exchange
VSD Village Self-Development
WAFPC Women's Armed Forces Corps
WBLC Waterborne Logistics Craft

UNCLASSIFIED

WHEC US Coast Guard High Endurance Cutter
WIA Wounded in Action
WLV Coast Guard Light Ship
WPB US Coast Guard Patrol Craft
WWMCCS Worldwide Military Command and Control System for US Forces
Yankee Station Carrier Force Area off Coast of Vietnam



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BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

(U) Throughout the final months in Vietnam, and during the Military History Branch (MHB) stay in Hawaii, the question was periodically raised as to what historical documents were available in the branch library and what happened to this material when MACV was disestablished. Thus it appeared appropriate that a bibliographical note be included with the final Command History which would provide some guidance for future historians. Unfortunately, at the time this is written, no one remaining with the branch knows the extent of the original library, for much had been retired prior to October 1972—the limit of the personal experience available. Nonetheless, the reader should not be dismayed, for an active retirement program began in early 1972 in cooperation with the Director, US Army Military History Research Collection Center, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 17013 (hereafter referred to as Carlisle), an agency of the Chief of Military History, US Army. Information concerning MACV historical documentation is available from the director. All documents held by the Military History Branch were sent to Carlisle either directly from Vietnam prior to the end of March 1973 or from Hawaii in May and June 1972. Unless otherwise stated in the following narrative, Carlisle received the documents listed.

(U) At the outset, it should be understood that this bibliographical note is intended to provide the reader with a general idea of the material contained in the MACV Military History Branch library. It is not a detailed bibliography of source materials used in the preparation of this history.

(U) The MACV historical program (MACV Directive 870-1, dated 29 August 1972) required submission of periodic monthly or quarterly historical summaries by MACV headquarters staff agencies and advisory groups. Monthly input was required from the Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, and Communications-Electronics Directorates, from CORDS and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Economic Affairs. The three advisory groups—Army, Air Force, and Navy—and the Comptroller, Inspector General, and Information staff agencies submitted quarterly summaries. How valuable each submission is varies directly with the historical interest of those who prepared the input; thus, one agency's input varies throughout the 14 months (January 72-February 73) as the draw-downs, reorganizations, and normal rotations caused personnel changes within each agency. Nonetheless, the historical summaries contain detailed and valuable information, although often it is difficult (and in some cases impossible) to trace functions or programs throughout the periodic reports over the

14 month period. In addition, many of the MACV special staff agencies prepared and provided to the Military History Branch historical summaries of their 1972 activities. When the COUNTDOWN after-action reports are added to these, a relatively complete picture of the 1972-1973 period usually is available.

(U) The periodic summaries terminated with the input covering January 1973. However, the Operation COUNTDOWN plan (MACV OPLAN J-215) required an after-action report from the agencies which provided historical summaries, and from the Regional Assistance Commands and the USARV/MACV Support Command (SUPCOM) as well. Generally, these reports covered the entire COUNTDOWN period—November 1972 through March 1973—although a few agencies limited their coverage to the 28 January to 29 March period. As with the monthly historical summaries, the COUNTDOWN after-action reports vary widely in quality; however, most are excellent.

(U) The summaries from each of the advisory groups (Army, Air Force and Navy) contain considerably more detail than could be accommodated in this history. It should be noted that the Army Advisory Group's (AAG) initial summary on advisory activities and the Vietnamese Army is for the third quarter, 1972; its predecessor organization, the Training Directorate, provided monthly summaries through June. The Air Force Advisory Group (AFGP) summaries contain both summary and primary source material, such as end of tour reports and special studies, for the group's activities and the Vietnamese Air Force. Copies of these reports were sent to the Air University at Maxwell AFB, Alabama as well as to Carlisle. Special studies on the AFGP roles in Project ENHANCE PLUS and COUNTDOWN are also available, as are monthly issues of the *VNAF Status Review* and the *Staff Digest*. AFGP personnel also wrote short histories of the AFGP and VNAF. The Navy Advisory Group (NAG) activities were well documented and a relatively large collection of quarterly chronologies, briefings, and special reports were sent to Carlisle, in addition to the quarterly summaries. The MACDO monthly *Measurement of Progress* reports contain summary data from each advisory group. VNMC activity and the US Marine advisory effort information appears in reports and chronologies from the Marine Advisory Unit.

(U) The yearly combined JGS/MACV RVNAF Force Structure Reviews comprise comprehensive packages of the then current status of RVNAF (Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine) force structure, with recommended changes and the rationale

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for future force structure actions. The reviews contain invaluable information for any investigation of the RVNAF force structure changes that took place over the period of this history. Additionally, the monthly MACDO summaries contained a section on RVNAF force structure changes. Letters and messages between COMUSMACV, CINCPAC, and JCS provide more firsthand background information on the Long Range Force Structure Plan and other force structure matters.

(U) Varied historical documentation on the ground, air, and naval warfare was held by the Military History Branch. For those interested in the ground war the best sources are the MACDO monthly summaries, and the regional assistance command commander's and ARVN division senior advisor's end of tour reports. The *FRAC 1972-1975 Command History* also is an excellent summary of the war in Military Region 1. The 1st Aviation Brigade prepared several historical summaries of Army aviation activities. For information on the enemy the monthly MACDI *Periodic Intelligence Report* (PERINTREP) covers the gamut of enemy order of battle, situation by military region, operations and capabilities, and other activity, such as sabotage and terrorism. This report was discontinued with the September 1972 issue. MACDI also prepared a study of the successes and failures of the enemy 1972 offensive, *The NGUYEN HUE Offensive*, plus several special summaries used in the preparation of this history.

(U) The best single source for the air war statistics and trends is the PACAF monthly publication, *Southeast Asia Air Summary*, which contains statistics derived from the SEASIA data base computer, special studies, and reports on air operations. Methods of sortie counting and definitions vary widely between the services. Thus, while reports such as the MACDO monthly summaries, the JCS *Action Officers Handbook for Vietnamizing the War*, and Navy sources contain valuable, similar data, no two publications provide the same statistics. Inter-service efforts to resolve this problem resulted in some improvement, but not a complete solution, beginning in September. For detailed studies of specialized areas, the USAF Project CHECO (Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Current Operations) has produced a wealth of excellent monographs on various aspects of the air war. Additional CHECO tasks were the preservation on microfilm of key air war documents and taped interviews with senior Air Force officers, many of which have been transcribed. While the CHECO personnel worked closely with the MACV historians, the branch possessed an incomplete inventory of their reports and only a few interviews (some CHECO interviews are restricted access-Air Force eyes only). The best sources for CHECO

items are the Chief of Air Force History and the Air University. Material on the US Navy air effort available to the MACV historians was very limited. There were some special studies by the Navy's Operations Evaluation Group, however these are limited access. The USMC air effort was documented by input from the 1st Marine Air Wing and the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.

(U) Similarly, little documentation on the naval war was available. Some taped interviews were obtained aboard 7th Fleet ships in September and a Fleet Coordinating Group chronology based on news releases was sent to the Carlisle. The information concerning the fleet operations was procured after the Military History Branch moved to Hawaii; however, most of the source documents were not retained. Historians seeking information on the fleet activities are advised to contact Navy sources.

(U) Early in 1972 the precaution was taken to preclude the destruction of MACV computer programs. Procedures were established to ensure the retirement of computer programs and data to the Combat Data Information Center, Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio or to a location designated by the user. The Military History Branch maintained a retired ADP program file which was sent to Carlisle. The MACV Data Management Agency COUNTDOWN after-action report lists the disposition of those programs remaining on the computer when Operation COUNTDOWN began.

(U) Reliable information on the 1972 Vietnamese economy is contained in a series of messages periodically sent from USAID to SECSTATE: *Economic Outlook*, *Economic Recession*, and *Economic Impact of the Offensive*. MACEA prepared several reports such as the *Vietnam Economic Study* and the *MACV Report on the Economic Aspects of Vietnamization* which dealt primarily with the economic impact of US and RVNAF programs and plans. MACEA also prepared a detailed quarterly assessment of the Vietnamese economy.

(U) In addition to the CORDS monthly historical summary, from August 1972 through January 1973 a copy of the monthly *Progress of Pacification* report was received. An important source for the status of pacification was the monthly *Hamlet Evaluation System (HES)* report, which rated the security, government, and development of political units from hamlet to the national level. Another important series was the *Terrorist Incident Reporting System (TIRS)* which recorded terrorist incidents. The *Pacification Attitude Analysis System (PAAS)* was a monthly nationwide public opinion poll designed to evaluate the citizens' views and awareness of the pacification programs. Finally, the end of tour reports prepared by Province Senior Advisors are excellent sources, which often contain

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candid comments by officers with many years experience in Vietnam.

(U) Also part of the branch library were two periodic Embassy, Saigon reports: *Vietnam Highlights* and *Embassy Saigon Mission Weekly*; as well as numerous embassy routine messages and special reports. Copies of the MACV prepared Mission Council meetings minutes also were filed. These items contain a wealth of information on the Vietnamese political, economic, and military situations. Beginning during the COUNTDOWN period, the newly established Consuls General prepared daily situation reports and *Military Region Weekly Cease-fire Overview* reports, plus special reports. The Military History Branch did not possess a complete file of these reports.

(U) COMUSMACV provided to JCS a daily appraisal of the military situation and special interest items in the *COMUSMACV Personal Appraisal* message-renamed *COMUSMACV Status Report of Selected SEASIA Activities* from 30 January 1973 through its discontinuance with the 28 March message. Thereafter, the Defense Attache Office provided input to the COMUSSAG daily message report, *COMUSSAG Status Report of Selected SEASIA Activities*, copies of which were sent to Carlisle through the end of May 1973. These messages are classified TOP SECRET or SECRET, SPECAT (except for the period 25 February 1973 to 31 March 1973, which are not SPECAT), and are retained at Carlisle under limited access.

(U) Several special historical studies were undertaken by MACV agencies in late 1972 or 1973. The USARV/MACV SUPCOM prepared a detailed after-action report covering the entire COUNTDOWN period - annexes include input from each subordinate unit and staff agency. Similarly, the Communications-Electronics (C-E) Directorate prepared a historical narrative of the C-E Vietnamization effort which was to be completed in the United States after MACV's disestablishment. The reference documents were designated for shipment to Carlisle directly from the C-E Directorate. The US Delegation, FPJMC employed a full-time historian from early February on. A detailed historical final report was completed in Washington in the early summer, 1973. Similarly, the MACV Provost Marshal, the Strategic Technical Directorate Advisory Team 158 (STDAT - 158), and MACEA

prepared histories of their activities. A First Regional Assistance Command (FRAC) history for 1972-1973 was completed in late March. Copies of the STDAT, MACEA, and FRAC histories were provided to the Military History Branch and Carlisle was to receive copies of the others when published.

(U) A MACV estimate of the RVNAF capabilities was prepared in February 1973. This can be found in two separate documents: a COMUSMACV to CJCS message (TOP SECRET), DTG 210307Z Feb 73, Subject: Assessment of the RVNAF (U); and a COMUSMACV to CJCS letter (SECRET), dated 7 Mar 73, Subject: Assessment of the RVNAF (U).

(U) The branch library also contained voluminous files of messages (both incoming and outgoing), memoranda, routine and special reports, and fact sheets prepared by the MACV staff and field elements. This material varied from daily routine message traffic to periodic reports like the Department of the Army, *Army Activities Report*, *SEASIA*, to several sets of special fact books prepared for COMUSMACV. The history branch was not privy to the SPECAT message traffic (with the exception of the COMUSMACV daily appraisal messages mentioned earlier) which contains much of the rationale for decisions, recommendations, and programs. From the historian's point of view, one can only hope that this message traffic has been retained at higher headquarters and eventually will be made available to historians.

(U) When Carlisle was designated as the repository for the MACV historical documentation, it was decided that all available documents would be sent there; where the sorting, cataloguing, and destruction of insignificant material would take place. This policy was dutifully followed within the history branch. In addition, when the MACV agencies began reducing their files in October 1972, the branch provided guidance for retiring historical documents directly to Carlisle, because the volume was beyond the branch's capability to handle. Thus, at this point in time, only the people at Carlisle can provide any reasonable idea of what significant MACV historical documentation was preserved.

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
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