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**Analogous Response Redux: Vladimir
Putin's Aspirations for Altering the
Maritime Balance**

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1. Introduction¹

Nukes; it is always about nukes. Beginning with their espionage efforts against the Manhattan Project during World War II, the Soviets clearly understood the importance of nuclear weapons—their use in conflict as well as the existential danger nuclear weapons posed to Russia and the Soviet leadership. That focus continues to this day.

The early 1980s marked a major shift in the military competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, including the following benchmark events:

- The U.S. “Second Offset Strategy” and the U.S. Army and Air Force’s Air-Land Battle specifically targeted newly developed U.S. precision weapons on Soviet wartime concepts of operation. The Soviets determined that these new systems would alter to their disfavor the “correlation of forces” in the center region of Europe.
- As a result, the development and deployment of “intermediate range” nuclear weapons systems by both the Soviet Union and the U.S. was significantly accelerated.
- The newly inaugurated administration of U.S. President Ronald Reagan began with a major emphasis on national security, with a substantial increase in defense spending, strategic defense, and a much more assertive and aggressive strategic focus.
- The Soviets demonstrated their willingness to use force in Afghanistan and national power in Poland to achieve their foreign policy objectives. Despite several abrupt changes in long-term leadership after the death of Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviets continued their confrontation with the West and Cold War national security policies. Beginning in 1981, apprehensive about the Reagan administration’s intent, the Soviet KGB initiated a major intelligence collection effort (Operation RYaN) to discern “enemy preparation for nuclear war” especially a surprise first strike using nuclear weapons.²

¹ Author’s note: Information current as of July 20, 2020, was used in the development of this paper.

² KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov to KGB Members, “The Results of the 26th Congress of the CPSU and Tasks for the Party Organization of the KGB,” March 25, 1981 (TOP SECRET). Source: Ukrainian KGB Archive, f.13, o.687, pp 9–27. Contained in “The Soviet Side of the 1983 War Scare” (Washington, D.C.: National Security Archive, 2018), accessed March 27, 2020, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/aa83/2018-11-05/soviet-side-1983-war-scare>.

Maritime strategy had a major emphasis from the very beginning of the Reagan Administration. Indeed, starting in its early years, “Maritime Superiority over the Soviets” was a cornerstone of a revised and overtly more aggressive national security strategy and maritime policy.³ Throughout the 1980s, U.S. naval exercises focused on bringing any conflict with the Soviet Union to its exposed maritime approaches in the northwest Pacific and the Soviet northwest using sea-based conventional and nuclear weapons systems launched from aircraft carriers, surface ships and submarines. Another key component of this concept of maritime superiority was the strategy of holding Soviet ballistic missile submarines at risk. The maritime competition persisted through the end of the Cold War, and seemingly ended only with the collapse of the Soviet Union and with it the Soviet Navy.

During the last 20 years of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in an apparent “tit-for-tat” competition in the development and deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons and their comparable maritime nuclear components—especially submarine-launched cruise missiles systems, which by range and warhead were included in the classification of “Tactical Land Attack Cruise Missiles.” As tactical weapons with either a nuclear or conventional warhead, these naval missile systems, especially those launched by submarines, became the focus of intense strategic and operational competition between the U.S. and Soviet navies. This continued throughout the 1980s despite the introduction of a theater nuclear arms control agreement, since these systems were excluded from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) of 1987. Termed “Analogous Response,” this competition played out well below the public eye until it reportedly faded away with the demise of the Soviet Union.

“Analogous Response” was analytical shorthand developed by U.S. strategists and intelligence analysts in late 1983 and early 1984⁴ “Analogous Response” characterized in two words a Soviet maritime strategy to deploy off the U.S. coast submarines armed with nuclear submarine launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). By doing so the Soviet leadership could establish an endoatmospheric nuclear threat to CONUS that was, in the words of Marshall Nikolay Ogarkov, the Chief of the General Staff of the USSR: “The Soviet systems to be deployed in the oceans and seas and relevant to the territory of the United States itself will be no less effective than American systems that are being deployed in

³ See, for example, Caspar W. Weinberger “Annual Report to the Congress Fiscal Year 1983,” II.13.

⁴ Author was unable to identify any explicit definition of “Analogous Response” in Soviet-era literature. The strategy was first described by the CIA in 1983 (“Memorandum for Holders of SNIE 11/20-3-82: INF: The Prospects of West European Deployment and USSR’s Reactions,” August 9, 1983, 6, approved for release 2009/03/09 CIA-RDP86T00300R000701060012-8). CNA’s James McConnell used the term “analogous” to described this Soviet maritime strategy in 1985 (James M. McConnell “Analyzing the Soviet Press Spot Report No 1: The Irrelevance of Sokolovskiy’s Book: Military Strategy,” Center for Naval Analysis Research Memorandum CRM85-35, May 1985, 6).

Europe, in range, yield, accuracy and what is especially important, in time of flight to their targets.”⁵

By doing so, Soviet submarines so equipped could: “.pose an especially significant threat to the United States’ C3 systems and bomber bases. The closer the submarine can get to a land target, the less warning time there would be for a cruise-missile attack.”⁶

The Soviets operationalized their “Analogous Response” strategy with the actual deployment of threat submarines beginning in 1984 and extended until the conclusion of the INF Treaty in 1986. Significantly, naval cruise missile systems were not included in the treaty.

However, in 1991 President George H.W. Bush and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev agreed on a reciprocal basis to eliminate much of their tactical nuclear weapons inventories—without the agreement’s codification in an arms control regime.

Maritime nuclear competition has reemerged in the 21st century in an apparent reprise of the “Analogous Response” strategy of the 1980s. Under the direction of Russian President Vladimir Putin, the Russian Federation Navy is again deploying cruise missiles—updated with state-of-the-art technology—aboard a new class of Russian submarine specifically designed for this purpose. This new cruise missile has already been tested in combat in Syria, having been launched from surface ships in the Caspian Sea and submarines in the Mediterranean. A more ominous hypersonic missile and a nuclear-armed unmanned underwater vehicle are under development as well. Putin and his senior defense officials have stated that these new weapons are designed to carry a nuclear warhead. They stress that these weapons systems are under development to counter U.S. actions—in effect Analogous Response Redux.

Part I of this paper examines the mid-1980s and the first “Analogous Response” challenge. Part II will examine a series of events beginning in the intervening years from the demise of the Soviet Union that collectively helped shape the attitudes, perceptions and decisions of President Vladimir Putin and the current Russian leadership. Part III will then examine current Russian military doctrine, public statements by Russian senior leaders, and ongoing naval programs that characterize the current Russian maritime nuclear challenge. Taken together, they lead to the conclusion that, while the Soviet “Analogous Response” submarine deployments of the 1980s ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the succeeding Russian leadership continued to embrace the concept and the strategic advantages they feel such a strategy provides. The submarines and weapons systems that are just now becoming operational were designed in the later 1980s, and their

⁵ Marshall Ogarkov, press conference, December 4, 1983.

⁶ Robbin F. Laird and Dale R. Hespering “The Soviet Union and the Arms Race,” *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 35, no. 3 (1984), 190, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1174127>. U984.

keels were laid in the early 1990s. This consistency should not come as a surprise since all these new Russian military leaders were Soviet junior and mid-level officers steeped in Soviet training and doctrine. They are bending steel at considerable expense to make it so. Part IV will draw some preliminary implications and conclusions for the United States and the U.S. Navy.

This analysis focuses on Russian decision-making. It will use a very simple rubric—Russian public statements and official documents (“what they say”), an assessment of the weapons systems characteristics and performance acquired to support articulated Russian strategies (“what they buy”), and finally how the Russians operate and exercise these forces (“what they do”). Of special importance is the timeline of Soviet and Russian acquisition of these weapons and platforms. This methodology was proven to be exceptionally useful in understanding Soviet strategy and can be just as useful in understanding Russian strategy, as there will emerge a clear and important coherence in current Russian competitors.

History can provide an important lens through which to view the present and perhaps get a glimpse into the future. This paper benefited significantly from the very recent declassification and release of actual discussions between U.S. and Soviet leaders, assessments of the strategic nuclear balance at the highest levels of the Soviet government during this period, as well as the operational taskings of its security service, the Комитет Государственной Безопасности, or KGB. These documents provide unique historical insights into the broader Soviet perspectives as they were manifest in the first “Analogous Response.”⁷

⁷ “The Soviet Side of the 1983 War Scare.” See note 1.

2. Part I. “Analogous Response I” (1979–1989)—Putin’s Inheritance

A. The Strategic Context of the 1980s

In 1976, the Soviets deployed the SS-20/Saber road-mobile intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) to their Western and Far East Military Districts, thereby enhancing the immediate—if only by time of flight—nuclear threat to all of Western Europe and Asia. The Soviets also had the SS-N-21/SAMSON submarine-launched cruise missile under development. These Soviet nuclear enhancements raised a number of concerns about the credibility of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent in Washington and European NATO capitals. The chief concern was that many U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe were short-range tactical weapons designed for use on the battlefield to disrupt a conventional attack by Warsaw Pact ground forces. The new Soviet IRBMs had much greater range and thereby held European as well as Asian capitals at risk. If tactical nuclear weapons were used on the soil of European NATO allies, these same countries privately questioned whether the United States would retaliate against Soviet territory. Such a U.S. response could easily lead to a broader intercontinental nuclear exchange, resulting in potential devastation of the U.S. homeland. While the United States continued to voice its commitment to provide a nuclear umbrella, there was significant tension between the Americans and their European allies. These new Soviet “theater” nuclear systems threatened to “decouple” the United States from its NATO allies—a longstanding Soviet strategic objective.⁸

In 1979 NATO adopted a “dual-track” approach to respond to this gap in intermediate-range nuclear forces. In the first track, NATO agreed to execute a decision to deploy enhanced nuclear forces to Europe in the form of 108 Pershing II (P-II) intermediate-range missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles between 1983 and 1986. The second track required the U.S. to enter into serious negotiations with the Soviets to limit these intermediate-range nuclear systems.⁹

The nuclear-capable naval forces of both the USSR and the United States also played a major role in this theater nuclear balance. In the maritime domain, the Soviets initiated a number of political and military actions that, in aggregate, were termed “Analogous Response.” This section addresses the maritime dimensions of Soviet actions observed in

⁸ “Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress” (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, updated June 27, 2019), 11.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 2.

the 1980s. It first examines a series of events in 1983 that clearly shaped Soviet perceptions and decisions. These events included the following: President Reagan’s announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI); continuation of a series of U.S. Navy exercises involving aggressive multi-carrier operations in the seaward approaches of the Soviet Union; a false alarm in the Soviet missile warning system of a U.S. ICBM attack; NATO’s exercise ABLE ARCHER ’83; and culminating in NATO’s decision to deploy corresponding ground-based missiles—the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missile. Unconnected, initiated by both the Soviet Union and the United States, these events occurred across the Soviet Western Military and Far Eastern Military Districts; and, unbeknownst at the time, almost led to war. Individually and collectively they shaped the perceptions of the Soviet leadership regarding the strategic and theater nuclear balance, as evidenced by Soviet public statements and, from the maritime perspective of this paper, the Soviet maritime response.

B. 1983—The “War Scare”

1. President Reagan and the Strategic Defense Initiative

The advent of the intercontinental ballistic missile armed with a nuclear warhead fundamentally changed post–World War II national security policies of both the United States and the USSR. The emergence of such strategic concepts as “Mutual Assured Destruction” resulted in corresponding interest and investment in strategic defense—the ability to intercept and destroy incoming ballistic missiles before they reached their targets. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the United States and USSR invested in the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems. The Soviets recognized the importance of strategic missile defense as early as the 1960s. On March 4, 1961, the Soviets conducted an important test, when a Soviet guided missile intercepted and destroyed an SS-4 intermediate-range ballistic missile. The Soviets made an enormous investment in ballistic missile defense in the years that followed.¹⁰

Because of the direct impacts on the strategic nuclear balance of a potentially unconstrained, effective strategic defense system on either side, the United States and USSR entered into the ABM Treaty in 1972, which limited each side to two operational systems. The Soviets chose to deploy 32 GALOSH BM-1 to eight sites in four complexes

¹⁰ For an excellent history of Soviet perspectives on and investments in strategic missile defense see Mike Gruntman, *Intercept 1961: The Birth of Soviet Missile Defense* (Reston, Virginia: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Incorporated, 2015).

around Moscow.¹¹ At the direction of Congress in 1975, the United States shut down its only SAFEGUARD ABM site.¹²

On March 23, 1983, President Reagan, elected in 1980 on platform to rebuild the U.S. military to challenge the Soviet Union, addressed the nation from the Oval Office. He first outlined the Soviet Union's accumulation of enormous military might for 20 years, which he characterized as "exceeding all requirements of a legitimate defensive capability." He made special mention of Soviet strategic offensive intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the USSR having built five new classes since 1969. "They have continued to build far more intercontinental ballistic missiles than they could possibly need only to deter attack." Following a review of the underlying rationale for and the goals of his defense program, underway for now 2 years, the president then introduced "a vision for the future...It is that we embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive." He closed by announcing that he was "directing a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic missiles."¹³

President Reagan's "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) brought an immediate and visceral response from the Soviets, who saw it as an effort to enhance the U.S. strategic nuclear threat to the Soviet Union by neutralizing a major component of Soviet military strategy. The Soviets, who also saw SDI as an opportunity to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its European allies, developed a sophisticated messaging campaign to suggest that "Star Wars" would in effect decouple European NATO from the U.S. nuclear guarantee. In the assessment of one prominent U.S. strategic analyst at the time: "Although much of its commentary has been patently propagandistic, the Kremlin's pronouncements have also reflected deeper concerns about what SDI may portend for Soviet prospects in the long-term competition."¹⁴ In essence, the Soviets feared that SDI would make nuclear war more likely by deprecating their strategic ballistic missiles' ability to hold the U.S. "at risk" and thereby undermine their deterrent effect.

There was also an unstated, albeit important, relationship between SDI and the maritime balance. Quietly supported at the highest civilian and military levels of the U.S. Navy, Navy strategists in the Pentagon and the Naval War College at that time had begun

¹¹ *The Military Balance 1983 – 1984* (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983), 15.

¹² John W. Finney, "Safeguard ABM System to Shut Down," *New York Times*, November 25, 1975.

¹³ President Ronald W. Reagan, "Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security," March 23, 1983, accessed March 23, 2020, <http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/Missile/Starwars.shtml>.

¹⁴ Benjamin S. Lambeth and Kevin Lewis, "The Kremlin and SDI," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1988, accessed March 26, 2020, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1988-03-01/kremlin-and-sdi>.

an effort to examine the strategic impacts of a deliberate offensive submarine campaign targeted, in the event of hostilities, at the Soviet Navy's strategic ballistic missile submarine force. There were many other strategic components to what became the Navy's "Maritime Strategy." But as became apparent to Soviet naval operators and planners, this emergent U.S. Navy operational concept became the maritime component of SDI by seeking in the early stages of conflict to reduce by attrition what the Soviets relied on as their secure retaliatory, or "second strike," SLBMs.¹⁵ When coupled with an effective U.S. strategic missile defense system, which the Soviets were well aware was within U.S. technical capabilities, confidence in their strategic first-strike ICBMs as well as their second-strike SLBMs was severely undermined.

2. U.S. Naval Exercises in the Northwest Pacific and Barents Seas—1983

As part of the Reagan Administration's expressed national security policy to achieve "maritime superiority,"¹⁶ the Navy regularized annual exercises to project airpower, surface ships, and attack submarines into the seaward approaches of the Soviet Union. In the Atlantic, carrier battle groups operated far into the Norwegian and Barents Seas. In the Pacific, multi-carrier battle groups operated in the northwest Pacific, off the Kurile Islands as well as in the Sea of Japan.

As articulated by then-Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, the purpose of these exercises was to demonstrate the Navy's ability, in the event of conflict, to project U.S. maritime power directly into the Soviet Union. Because the principal focus of NATO war planning was on the center region of European NATO, the Navy's strategic initiative was to bring combat to the Soviet Union itself and thereby reduce pressure in the center.¹⁷

It was left unstated whether or not these naval exercises focused on conventional or nuclear operations. However, Soviet planners need only have examined widely available unclassified analyses, coupled with the U.S. classified information regularly provided them by the John Walker spy ring, to conclude that the A-6/Intruder and A-7/Corsair aircraft in

¹⁵ For much more thorough historical accounts and post-facto analyses, see: John D. Hattendorf, *The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986*, Naval War College Papers 19 (Newport: U.S. Naval War College, 2004); John D. Hattendorf and Peter M. Swartz, eds., *U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s. Selected Documents*, Naval War College Papers 33 (Newport: U.S. Naval War College, 2008); Christopher Ford and David Rosenberg, *The Admirals' Advantage: U.S. Naval Operational Intelligence in World War II and the Cold War* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005); and John Lehman, *Oceans Ventured: Winning the Cold War at Sea* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2018).

¹⁶ In the experience of this author, "Maritime Superiority" was at times a contentious issue within the Defense Department. For a clear policy expression of the concept, see Secretary Weinberger's "Annual Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1983," pp II-12 and 13. For insights into the at times fierce bureaucratic infighting over the issue, see former Secretary Lehman's book, *Oceans Ventured: Winning the Cold War at Sea*, pp. 108 and 109.

¹⁷ Ibid.

the aircraft carrier's air wing were nuclear capable. They were therefore unlikely to view the flight profiles of these aircraft in proximity to the Soviet homeland as anything other than nuclear. At the time the Navy also had under development the Tomahawk Land Attack Cruise Missile. In its FY1983 Military Posture report, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported that deployment of the nuclear version of this 1000 nm submarine-launched missile would begin in FY 1984.¹⁸

It has now become clear that the three-carrier exercise in the Pacific in April and May 1983 elicited significant Soviet reactions. During the exercise, U.S. carrier-based aircraft evidently violated Soviet territory by conducting simulated bombing runs over what the Soviets claimed was a military site on Zeleny Island (Figure 1), located in the very southernmost Kurile Islands. These Japanese islands had been occupied and claimed as national territory by the Soviets since the end of World War II.



Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/be/Kurily_Malaya_Gryada.svg.

Figure 1. Zeleny Island (Shown in Red) in the Southernmost Kurile Islands. Occupied by Russia since the end of World War II.

On April 3, 1983, the Soviets officially protested the violation of Soviet territory, which the State Department rejected, asserting that the United States did not view the island

¹⁸ Organization of the Joint Chiefs Staff, "United States Military Posture for FY 1983," Washington, DC; The US Navy Fact File, "Tomahawk Cruise Missile," last updated April 26, 2018, accessed March 30, 2020, <https://www.navy.mil/navydatafact>.

as Soviet territory. Post facto, the incident appears to have had a number of consequences. First, Yuri Andropov, then the Chairman of the CPSU, personally ordered “shoot-to-kill” for any aircraft crossing onto Soviet territory. Then, on September 1, the Soviets did indeed shoot down Korean Airlines 747 Flight KAL-007 over the Sea of Okhotsk.¹⁹ Second, the incident also likely reinforced Soviet perceptions that the United States was planning and exercising a carrier-based nuclear strike capability on the Soviet homeland in both the Northern and Far Eastern Military Districts.

3. COL Petrov and the Averted Nuclear War

Yuri Andropov’s Operation RYaN had been underway for more than 2 years in September 1983, focusing the Soviet Union’s intelligence resources on what Andropov and the KGB perceived as Reagan Administration preparations for nuclear war. On September 26, just 3 weeks after the shootdown of KAL-007, Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov of the Soviet Air Defense Force was manning the watch in an early-warning command post south of Moscow, when the warning system detected an incoming missile attack from the U.S. In a post-event interview 30 years later, Petrov recalled “I had all the data [to suggest there was an ongoing missile attack]. If I had sent my report back up the chain-of-command, nobody would have said a word against it,” thereby possibly initiating a real, massive Soviet “Launch-on-Warning” ICBM attack on the United States. “There was no rule about how long we were allowed to think before we reported a strike. But we knew that every second of procrastination took away valuable time; that the Soviet Union’s military and political leadership needed to be informed without delay ... All I had to do is reach for the phone; to raise the direct line to our top commanders—but I couldn’t move...”²⁰ Petrov had his doubts, as did a group of satellite radar operators who told him they had observed no missiles. But the decision rested on Petrov. Petrov called the duty officer in Moscow and informed him of a malfunction. Nuclear war based on a false report was averted. Petrov was initially informed by his superiors that he was to be given an award—but of course was reprimanded—not for what happened that night but because of mistakes in his logbook. Many experts consider this event to be the one that came closest to causing a nuclear exchange during the Cold War due to accident. War was averted by the decision of a single Soviet lieutenant colonel from a military not known for taking initiative. After the fall of the Soviet Union his story came to light and he received a number of international awards. Petrov died at age 77 on May 19, 2017.²¹

¹⁹ State Department Cable from Secretary of State to American Embassy Moscow, “Soviet Protests on Overflight Rejected,” and related cables, May 6, 1983 (SECRET), contained in “The Soviet Side of the 1983 War Scare” (see note 1).

²⁰ Pavel Akensov, “Stanislav Petrov: The Man Who May Have Saved the World” BBC, September 26, 2013, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24280831>.

²¹ Ibid.

4. Able Archer 83

In recent years the historical record has been enhanced significantly with the public release of previously highly classified Soviet and Western documents related to NATO Exercise “Able Archer 83,” and Soviet reactions to it. Able Archer was the codename for a November 1983 NATO command-post exercise that simulated the escalation of a conventional conflict in Europe, culminating in the U.S. military implementing a simulated DEFCON 1 and executing a coordinated nuclear attack. The exercise was exceptionally realistic. In the context of the paranoia of the Soviet leadership described, some Soviet leaders actually believed that the exercise was a pretext for U.S./NATO nuclear first strike undertaken under the guise of an exercise—which would have been a “mirror-image” of actual Soviet concepts of operations. The Soviet response was unprecedented: its nuclear forces and air units were placed on high alert in East Germany and Poland. The crisis, which some U.S. national security analysts argue was one of the times when the world has come closest to nuclear war since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, was defused when the exercise ended on November 11, 1983.²² But the consequences were substantial.

5. NATO’S Nuclear Decision

Finally, in late 1983, NATO executed its 1979 decision to deploy to Europe modern, ground-based nuclear systems—the Pershing II IRBM and the ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)—which are termed Intermediate Range Theater Nuclear Forces (IRTNF). This decision and its execution were undertaken by NATO for two principal reasons.

First, modernized, ground-based theater nuclear weapons were considered necessary to offset what the United States assessed was the eroded credibility of the “extended deterrent” of U.S. strategic intercontinental nuclear forces, which had been the main pillar of the alliance’s security consensus for more than two decades. This erosion of credibility was due mainly to the negotiated parity in strategic nuclear forces achieved by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (SALT I). Before SALT I, U.S. nuclear superiority had been the foundation of extended deterrence; many Europeans feared that the loss of this superiority might ultimately mean the decoupling of America from Europe. There was thus a need to offset this loss of nuclear superiority with weapons in the theater that could tie America’s nuclear forces more closely to Europe’s defense.

Second, the decision was undertaken to offset the ongoing expansion of already massive Soviet conventional forces in Europe and the rapid modernization of their arsenal

²² Nate Jones, ed., *Able Archer 83: The Secret History of the NATO Exercise That Almost Triggered Nuclear War* (New York: The New Press, 2016).

of theater nuclear weapons.²³ Lawrence Freedman, the British nuclear strategist analyzed the strategic context for this decision:

The substance of the [December 1979 NATO] decision was to establish a distinctive regional response to the modernization of Soviet missiles designed solely for European use, without denying the essential link between the defence of Europe and American strategic forces. Thus, though American-owned and manned, the forces were to be ground based so as to make their activation in the face of a Soviet advance credible. There were to be sufficient missiles to make a difference, but not so many as to suggest that they could fully satisfy NATO's nuclear needs without involving the rest of the American nuclear arsenal.²⁴

6. The Soviet Response

Given Soviet perceptions of the U.S.–Soviet relationship since 1981, especially shaped by the events of 1983, the Soviets, represented by their most senior military and political leaders, reacted vigorously to this deployment of modernized NATO IRTNF. Vocal Soviet opposition began with the 1979 decision and became much more pointed as the actual deployment of the new nuclear weapons reached fruition in November 1983. Thus, on November 19, Marshall Dimitri Ustinov, the Soviet Defense Minister, stated in a lengthy article:

[T]he deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles will be countered by our own nuclear systems corresponding to them in terms of combat effectiveness. ... By an agreement with our allies, additional systems will be deployed to create the necessary counterweight to the increasing grouping of NATO nuclear weapons in Europe. *Necessary retaliatory measures affecting the territory of the United States itself will be taken so that Americans will inevitably feel the difference between the situation that existed before the deployment of their missiles in western Europe and after it* [emphasis added].²⁵

Six days later, on November 25, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Yuri Andropov, made Soviet threats even more explicit by stating that the Soviet leadership had made the following decisions:

First: Since the United States by its actions has wrecked the possibility of achieving a mutually acceptable accord at the talks on questions of limiting

²³ Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Introduction," in *The Nuclear "Balance" in Europe: Status, Trends, and Implications* by Donald R. Cotter, James H. Hansen, and Kirk McConnell (Washington: United States Strategic Institute, 1983), vii–ix.

²⁴ Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), 386.

²⁵ Marshall Ustinov, *Pravda*, November 19, 1983.

nuclear arms in Europe ... the Soviet Union considers it impossible to participate further in these talks.

Second: The moratorium on the deployment of Soviet medium-range nuclear systems in the European part of the USSR is thereby abrogated.

Third: By agreement with the governments of the GDR and CSSR ... the siting of enhanced-range operational-tactical missiles on the territory of those countries will be accelerated.

Fourth: Since by siting its missiles in Europe the United States is increasing the nuclear threat to the Soviet Union, *corresponding Soviet means will be deployed to the ocean regions and seas taking this circumstance into account*. In terms of characteristics, these means of ours will be equal ((adekvatnyy)) to the threat created for us and our allies by the American missiles being sited in Europe. [emphasis added]²⁶

On December 1, General Yuri Lebedev of the Soviet General Staff stated, "*Soviet missile submarines would move closer to the United States, but there would be no new types of weapons on board*." [emphasis added]²⁷

On December 4, Marshall Nikolay Ograkov, the Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, held a news conference at the USSR Foreign Ministry, during which he explained the effectiveness of these measures:

Considering the increased nuclear menace, the Soviet leadership, as you know, had to take certain measures in reply. They are set forth in the statement I referred to [General Secretary Andropov's statement of November 25, quoted above] and I would merely like to take this opportunity to stress their adequacy. *The Soviet systems to be deployed in the oceans and seas and relevant to the territory of the United States itself will be no less effective than American systems that are being deployed in Europe, in range, yield, accuracy and what is especially important, in time of flight to their targets*. These {response} measures are of a forced nature. With the deployment of the American Pershing and cruise missiles there will be a change in the military balance in Europe and globally in favor of the United States. This is something we naturally cannot allow. Considering this, we will also take other steps to assure security of [the] Soviet Union and the other countries of the Socialist community. The United States will not have superiority. [emphasis added]²⁸

These explicit statements show that the Soviets were highly agitated and disconcerted over the execution of this NATO decision from both a political and a military perspective. Politically, the actual deployment of Pershing II and GLCMs to Europe represented to the

²⁶ General Secretary Yuri Andropov, *Pravda*, November 24, 1983.

²⁷ General Yuri Lebedev, Reuters, December 1, 1983.

²⁸ Marshall Ogarkov, press conference, December 4, 1983.

Soviets a failure of their nearly 4-year effort to manipulate European NATO decision-making processes to, in effect, exercise a “veto” over NATO’s IRTNF decision. The Soviets were clearly frustrated over their failure to exercise such a veto. Had the Soviets been successful, they would have contributed to the political decoupling of Europe and America. Moreover, the *fact* of their success would have been seen as a manifestation that this political decoupling—a major Soviet goal—had already been well underway. Thus, Soviet public utterances and their resultant actions were best interpreted in this political context, as well as in strictly military terms.

Yet with the NATO political decision on track and apparently holding, it was the military dimension of the problem that appeared at the time to be drawing the greatest Soviet concern. And it is the military dimension of the Soviet response that, likewise, elicited serious NATO concern.

Table 1 summarizes the specific characteristics of the new NATO systems, to which the Soviet have made specific reference. From a military perspective, it is apparent that these new systems represent a qualitatively new and different kind of threat to the Soviet homeland.

Table 1. Characteristics of NATO Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces, 1983

Parameter	Pershing II	GLCM
Range	1800 km ^a	2500 km ^a
Speed	MACH 8 ^b	High subsonic ^b
Time of flight	5–6 mins ^c	Not available

Sources:

- ^a Donald R. Cotter, James H. Hansen, and Kirk McConnell, *The Nuclear “Balance” in Europe: Status, Trends and Implications* (Washington: United States Strategic Institute, 1983), Table B-1, p. 41.
- ^b Ronald T. Petty, *Jane’s Weapon Systems, 1981–1982*, 12th ed. (New York: Jane’s Publishing Incorporated, 1981), 45–48.
- ^c Raymond Gartoff, “Soviet Perspectives” in *Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy, Politics*, ed. Richard K. Betts, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1981), 354.

These improved characteristics of NATO IRTNF still did not match those of the 5,000 km Soviet SS-20. Figure 2 shows a comparison of target coverages of the Soviet SS-20 force and those of Pershing II and GLCM. The broad band around Eurasia and northern Africa describes the overall reach of the SS-20s deployed in the western and eastern parts of the Soviet Union. The thin lines through the western USSR define the maximum range of Pershing IIs and GLCMs.²⁹

²⁹ Donald R. Cotter, James H. Hansen, and Kirk McConnell, *The Nuclear “Balance” in Europe: Status, Trends and Implications* (Washington: United States Strategic Institute, 1983), 17–18.



Source: Donald R. Cotter, James H. Hansen, and Kirk McConnell, *The Nuclear "Balance" in Europe: Status, Trends and Implications* (Washington: United States Strategic Institute, 1983), 17 – 18.

Figure 2. Target Coverage of Soviet SS-20 and Target Coverage of NATO Pershing II and GLCM

The Soviet perception of these IRTNF characteristics mandated the development of a new Soviet maritime nuclear threat to hold the U.S. homeland at equivalent nuclear risk.

7. Underpinnings in Soviet Theory

On the most basic level, if one accepts the proposition that a people's language reflects their political culture, historical experience, and the way they view themselves and the world, then the Russian word for security, *bezopasnost* (literally "without danger") has profound implications for understanding the depth of Soviet reactions to NATO IRTNF. *Bezopasnost* connotes a state of *absolute* security, one in which any enhanced military capability—however remote or immediate—is viewed as a direct threat to the security of the Soviet state.³⁰ Thus, regardless of the enhanced characteristics of NATO IRTNF, the

³⁰ Mark E. Miller, *Soviet Strategic Power and Doctrine: the Quest for Superiority* (Coral Gables: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1982), 205.

very deployment of these weapons, or any weapons for that matter, was (and remains) something the Soviets would resist in the strongest terms.

In addition to visceral feelings about threats to their security, the Soviets were (and are) concerned about the war-fighting capability of these weapons. But to address this issue, it is necessary to first discuss some aspects of Soviet military doctrine.

The Soviets and their Russian successors write extensively about the nature of modern warfare. Their military writers stated that Soviet military strategy “*is guided by the advanced scientific theory of Marxism-Leninism, which allows the knowing and correct use of objective laws which determine victory in modern war.*”³¹ This statement was not mere rhetoric; rather, it reflected a culture that had always placed a heavy emphasis on science—witness Russian prowess in mathematics, chess, and scientific theory as well as the high regard Russian society gives to its theoreticians, scientists, and educators. In such a society, Marxism-Leninism, with its scientific pretensions, not only found fertile ground but also reinforced basic tendencies. Thus, when Soviet military writers and theoreticians made reference to the scientific laws of war, they were expressing deeply held personal beliefs and societal traditions.

Rooted in their cultural experience, the objective laws of war were very real to the Soviets, particularly during the Cold War because of the absence of practical experience in waging war using nuclear weapons. The *first law of war*, according to one view, was that “*the course and outcome of war waged with unlimited employment of all means of conflict depend primarily on the correlation of available strictly military forces of the combatants at the beginning of the war, especially in nuclear weapons and means of delivery.*”³²

Essentially, the quantity and quality of troops and types of weapons available at the very start of war are the key factors; in this nuclear era, “*there is nothing that can compensate for the absence of nuclear weapons.*”³³

Thus, in the context of the first objective law of war, the Soviets likely viewed the deployment of enhanced NATO IRTNF as an attempt to change the “correlation of forces and means” that would obtain at the beginning of conflict; therefore, they must *de facto* be resisted or countered.

³¹ P. I. Skubeda, ed., *Tolovyy Slovar' Voyennykh Terminov* [Explanatory Dictionary of Military Terms] (Moscow: Voenizadat, 1966), quoted in Harriet Fast and William F. Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR*, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), 85–86.

³² V. Ye Savkin, *Osnovnyye Printsipy Operativnoya Iskusstva I Taktiki* [Fundamental Principles of the Art of Strategy] (Moscow: Voenizadat, 1972), quoted in Fast and Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR*, 86.

³³ *Ibid.*, 91.

Given these concerns over nuclear weapons, the key question then became one of how the Soviets might view the use of NATO nuclear weapons in conflict. In light of the overriding geopolitical importance of Europe to both sides, Soviet military writings consistently professed the staunch view that neither NATO nor the Warsaw Pact could afford to accept the destruction of its armed forces in the combat zone or the loss of vital territories without employing all the forces at its disposal. Consequently, faced with defeat by conventional means, one side or the other would be compelled to resort to the nuclear option. Thus, under this very strictly defined circumstance, the only real question in the Soviet view was not whether, but *when* nuclear weapons will be used.³⁴

In fighting a nuclear war, Soviet military doctrine and strategy stressed the importance of the initial strike and the necessity of “frustrating” the nuclear strike of the opponent. As one Soviet author noted: “*Central place is now occupied by the destruction of means of nuclear attack and weakening of the nuclear power of the opponent. This is achieved by forestalling the enemy in carry out nuclear and firepower strikes*”³⁵ (emphasis added).

Another essential element of Soviet military doctrine was to induce major attrition to NATO’s nuclear potential during the conventional phase of conflict. Targets included delivery systems, command-and-control facilities, and the nuclear weapons themselves. Because both the Pershing II and the GLCM were mobile systems, the likelihood of their being absent from known deployment areas during the conventional phase of conflict foreclosed accurate targeting information to the Soviets, and thereby reduced their confidence in being able to attrit these systems during either the conventional or, indeed, the nuclear phase of hostilities.

Aside from the problem of attacking these systems, the Soviets were forced to deal with their offensive potential. Here, the Soviets were presented with a significant problem of penetrability. It was estimated that a Pershing II could reach the USSR from the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in 5 to 8 minutes—a time of flight that would severely stress Soviet decision-makers were they to adopt a Launch Under Attack (LUA)/Launch on Warning (LOW) policy for the release of their nuclear weapons. While the GLCM is a subsonic system, its capability to fly “under” the Soviet air defense system would also stress Soviet decision-makers as Marshall Orgakov noted: “*Although their speed is slow ... the time in apprehending [low-altitude GLCMs] is very short indeed.*”³⁶

Furthermore, the Soviets likely found these weapons particularly worrisome because they operationalized a significant shift in U.S. nuclear weapon employment policy, directed

³⁴ Miller, *Soviet Strategic Power and Doctrine: the Quest for Superiority*, 218.

³⁵ V.G. Reznichenko, “Battle Today,” *Krasnaya Zvezda*, June 28, 1967, quoted in Fast and Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR*, 140.

³⁶ Marshall Ogarkov, press conference, December 4, 1983.

by Presidential Directive 59 during the Carter Administration. Here, it is noted that PD-59 altered U.S. strategy for a large-scale nuclear war in two ways. First, it mandated a shift in targeting emphasis from the economic recovery targets mandated by National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) – 242 of 1974 to the targeting of Soviet political and military assets, strategic military targets, leadership targets, and Other Military Targets (OMT).

Second, PD-59 required that the United States develop the capability to fight a protracted nuclear conflict, one that might last months instead of days. The ability to conduct such a conflict required strategic weapons and command, control, and communications (C3) systems that had the characteristics of endurance and flexible response—that is, such forces must be able not only to survive a Soviet first strike and be used in an immediate retaliatory strike but also be able to operate for a significant period of time afterward. Such enduring forces could then be used selectively as the situation required.³⁷

A final consideration was the linkage of nuclear conflict in Europe to nuclear attack on the homelands of both the United States and the USSR. There had developed, at least in Western strategic thinking at that time, clear, definable “steps” in the escalation ladder, with conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact first involving conventional conflict, then nuclear conflict confined to the European theater, after which the conflict could or would escalate to intercontinental strategic nuclear exchange involving the territories of the United States and USSR. The United States was able to theorize and plan for theater nuclear war because it enjoyed the putative advantage of being able to strike Soviet territory using theater-based systems, an advantage enhanced by the deployment of Pershing II and GLCM, while enjoying relative immunity from similar attack on the U.S. homeland. The Soviet nuclear strike potential was vested solely in intercontinental strategic systems—ICBMs, SLBMs, and antiquated strategic bombers. This is the strategic rationale that was played out so realistically in Able Archer 83 to the disconcert of the Soviets.

In contrast to Western theory, the Soviets viewed the principal escalatory boundary as primarily a function of the location of the targets that came under nuclear attack, not the arbitrary designation of the system used in the attack. Any nuclear system capable of striking Soviet territory was, in the Soviet view, clearly a weapon of “strategic significance,” which, if used, would provoke the appropriate response.³⁸ Presumably, this

³⁷ Jeffrey Richelson, “PD-59, NSDD-13 and the Reagan Strategic Modernization Program,” *Journal of Strategic Studies* 6, no. 2 (June 1983): 129–30.

³⁸ On January, 24 1984, the Soviets restated this position. LTGEN Viktor P. Starodubov, a member of the Soviet General Staff and for the past 10 years a member of the Soviet team negotiating strategic arms, stated from the Soviet viewpoint that Pershing II and cruise missiles deployed to Europe “are considered to be strategic weapons.” He also charged that their main purpose was to attack military and political command posts of the Soviet Union, including command posts of strategic nuclear missile

would have resulted in a nuclear strike not only against the country from which the strike was launched, but also against targets in the United States. Thus, to permit the United States to wage nuclear war against the USSR using “theater nuclear weapons,” while CONUS was allowed to remain a sanctuary, would have been untenable for the Soviets. The Soviet problem was that, howsoever untenable the situation, the only way they could strike U.S. territory was with a central strategic system, the effectiveness of which could be substantially degraded by the U.S. SDI and the emerging U.S. Maritime Strategy.³⁹

Understanding this Soviet position during the Cold War is most important when analyzing the maritime dimensions of “Analogous Response” in the 1980s and today. Indeed, it formed the basis of the aforementioned Soviet public utterances and their resultant actions. By deploying “corresponding systems” in the maritime environment to threaten CONUS, it appears that the Soviets attempted to accrue to themselves advantages only the United States had heretofore enjoyed—being able to threaten or strike CONUS *without* using intercontinental strategic systems.

C. “Analogous Response” 1984–1986—The Short Term

In line with their public statements, the Soviets did indeed make good on their threats to “deploy corresponding systems.” In line with General Secretary Andropov’s public statement of November 25, 1983 (noted above), the Soviets deployed additional SS-20 IRBMs in the western USSR and SS-22/SCALEBOARD missiles to East Germany.⁴⁰

However, it was the maritime dimension of the Soviet “Analogous Response” that should have drawn serious concern, particularly because it affected the linkages between nuclear war in Europe and nuclear attack on the United States. Beginning in late November/early December 1983, Soviet submarines executed a directive to impose over the short term a qualitatively different maritime nuclear threat to the United States. Over the longer term, it was reported at the time that the Soviets had under development submarine-launched cruise missiles, which could operationalize this threat. In retrospect, this was the SS-N-21/SAMPSON submarine-launched cruise missile.

In January, 1984, it was reported that a Soviet ECHO-II SSGN (nuclear-powered anti-ship cruise missile submarine) was detected operating off the U.S. east coast in the western Atlantic.⁴¹ The ECHO-II SSGN was equipped with either the SS-N-3/SHADDOCK land-

forces. Don Oberdorfer, “Soviet Says U.S. Missiles Violate SALT II,” *Washington Post*, January 25, 1984, 18.

³⁹ Miller, *Soviet Strategic Power and Doctrine: the Quest for Superiority*, 220–21.

⁴⁰ “New Soviet Missile Shift is Reported,” *Baltimore Sun*, January 26, 1984, 1; “Soviets Plan Missiles for Western U.S.S.R.,” *Washington Times*, February 21, 1984, 5.

⁴¹ “More, Newer Soviet Subs Seen Off U.S.,” *Washington Post*, January 27, 1984, A23.

attack or the SS-N-12 anti-ship missile system.⁴² In its nuclear land-attack version, the SS-N-3/SHADDOCK had a reported range of 835 km. Under development since 1951, the SS-N-3 SHADDOCK did not appear to be deployed in great numbers as a land-attack weapon, because the Soviet Navy chose to invest in ballistic missile submarines.⁴³ Because of its very antiquated (early 1950s vintage) and very limited land-attack capability, the deployment of the ECHO-II SSGN did not appear to conform to Marshal Ogarkov's threat to deploy to the oceans and seas adjacent to the U.S. systems that are "*adequate in range, in yield, in accuracy, and what is especially important, in flight time to their targets.*"⁴⁴

The deployment of the ECHO-II did appear to have satisfied stated short-term Soviet political objectives—but only in the crudest sort of way. Over the short term, this antiquated platform and missile system platform was one of only a handful of submarines that the Soviets could call upon—quickly—to impose a qualitatively different (not necessarily better) nuclear threat on CONUS. Based on the capabilities of its missile system, as well as the command-and-control and targeting issues likely to be associated with nuclear conflict, the ECHO-II SSGN clearly had little if any meaningful land-attack warfighting capability.

The equation of deterrence is based on the sum of: (1) the military capabilities of a particular weapon system; (2) its visibility to an adversary; and (3) the willingness to use it. Thus, as any of these elements approaches zero, the deterrent value of the weapon is seriously degraded. Because the ECHO-II had little capability to threaten CONUS seriously, its deterrent value was close to zero. Thus, from both war-fighting and deterrent perspectives, the ECHO-II SSGN deployment was less than satisfactory. In this case, the United States at the time was dealing more directly with a political vice military issue. The Soviets may well have intended that this submarine deployment, when (not if) it was made public, would reinforce in the mind of the U.S. public that the world had been made more dangerous by the deployment of U.S. nuclear systems and Soviet counter-deployments. Yet the issue received only the minimal factual coverage in the U.S. press noted above.⁴⁵ The Soviets may have counted on U.S. public opinion to pressure the U.S. government to return to the INF negotiations under conditions more favorable to the Soviets, but that did not happen. In any case, this first Soviet escalatory step appear to fail in both military and political terms.

The Soviet's second escalatory step evidently began in January 1984, with the alteration in the deployment patterns of some Soviet DELTA SSBNs. Secretary of the

⁴² Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, *Understanding Soviet Naval Developments*, 4th ed. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, NAVSO P-3560, 1981), 90 and 131–32.

⁴³ Joel Wit, "Soviet Cruise Missiles," *Survival*, November/December 1983: 249–60.

⁴⁴ Marshal Ogarkov, press conference, December 4, 1983.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*; "More, Newer Soviet Subs Seen Off U.S."

Navy Lehman reported at the time that as many as three of these, the most modern nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines in the Soviet Navy, were operating in the western Atlantic—far beyond their normal patrol areas in the Arctic.⁴⁶ Although the United States had traditionally viewed these submarines as a “central strategic system,” the Soviets may have hoped that by forward-deploying them, the United States would consider them a “theater” system, not unlike a U.S. ballistic missile submarine assigned to the U.S. European Command that could threaten Soviet territory.

In directing this course of action, it appeared that the Soviets derived certain peacetime political as well as wartime military advantages:

- The deployment of DELTA SSBNs to the western Atlantic represented a timely response to U.S. IRTNF deployments.
- The deployment of DELTA SSBNs to the western Atlantic reduced time-of-flight/warning time for Soviet SS-N-8 ballistic missile systems. Furthermore, additional targets in CONUS, most notably SAC bases in the central United States, were placed under a more immediate, time-sensitive threat.

Despite these advantages, sufficient military disadvantages resulting from the deployments severely limited any true warfighting capability. The most important disadvantage concerned the wartime vulnerability of these submarines. This problem of vulnerability presented by the deployment of DELTA SSBNs to the western Atlantic could not have been sitting very well with the “bastion concept” planners in Moscow. If judged only by the increasing ranges of their submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the Soviets had labored for more than two decades to withdraw their SSBNs into the sanctuary provided by the Northern Fleet’s three-dimensional anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability in those waters close to the Soviet homeland. These are the bastions that were the focus of the Navy’s aforementioned Maritime Strategy. The 1984 Delta patrols in WESTLANT presented the Soviets with numerous operational and security-related problems. These altered deployment areas in the western Atlantic afforded U.S. ASW an opportunity to localize DELTA SSBNs. They also negatively affected the security these SSBNs derived by operating in northern latitudes—operating areas much closer to Soviet defensive ASW and AAW resources.⁴⁷

In sum, the DELTA patrols in the western Atlantic appear to have had a peacetime political rationale as their basis. Yet, as with the ECHO-II SSGN, the DELTAs had not made their political impact. These very valuable wartime strategic assets were, at a minimum, more vulnerable to U.S. Navy ASW assets immediately off the East Coast than

⁴⁶ “Advanced Soviet A-Subs Move to North Atlantic, Navy Secretary Asserts,” *Los Angeles Times*, February 15, 1984, 13.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

they are when operating in their “normal” patrol areas. Thus, we observed at the time a Soviet short-term response to a long-term problem. How the Soviets intended to deal with the qualitatively new nuclear threat to them, imposed by NATO IRTNF, was observed in a new naval land-attack weapon system then under development.

D. “Analogous Response”—The Longer Term Threat and Its Demise

At that time, Soviet engineers were developing a new naval weapons system that, when operationalized, would provide the capability to deploy at sea land-attack cruise missile systems that were roughly equivalent in range, yield, accuracy, and time of flight to the U.S. GLCM being deployed to Europe. This system was the SS-N-21/SAMPSON land-attack cruise missile.

The SS-N-21 submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM) had been under development since at least the late 1970s and appeared to incorporate many of the technological features of the U.S. Tomahawk SLCM. With a range capability estimated to exceed 2500 km, this subsonic nuclear SLCM reached initial operational capability (IOC) in mid-1984.⁴⁸ Among the key issues that emerged concerning the SS-N-21, two were most important.

The first issue concerned the impact of the SS-N-21 on Soviet wartime concepts of operation. Although it might be argued that Soviet naval planners had found some military utilities for the SS-N-21—or they would not have developed the weapon in the first place—it would appear that the SS-N-21 presented them with some strategic and doctrinal problems. It was uncertain how the nuclear land-attack SLCM would be integrated into Soviet theater and strategic strike plans. As enhanced by the SS-20 IRBM, the Soviets had developed a robust theater and intercontinental land-attack nuclear strike capability, the maritime components of which were ballistic missile-firing submarines (SSBN). They had presumably developed over two decades a fairly precise targeting plan for these SLBMs. They now had to incorporate into their nuclear strike plans a subsonic weapons system having entirely different launch, flight, and attack parameters for which they did not have at that time effective targeting packages and guidance systems—a difficult operational planning problem at best.

On a more fundamental level, although the SS-N-21 would have given the Soviets the option of escalating the conflict to include limited nuclear attacks against CONUS with a

⁴⁸ *Jane's Defense Review*, November 1984, 9. Other references to the SS-N-21 include: Joel Wit, “Soviet Cruise Missiles,” *Survival*, November/December 1983, 249–60; “Now Russia Has It, Too,” *The Fairfax (Virginia) Journal*, November 17, 1984, 2; Walter Andrews, “Soviets Gain U.S. Cruise Missile Technology,” *Washington Times*, November 17, 1983, 6; “New Soviet Missiles Causing Concern,” *USA Today*, November 17, 1983, 8; Charles W. Corddry, “Soviet Cruise Missiles Expected Offshore,” *Baltimore Sun*, November 26, 1983, 1; and Ted Agres, “Soviet Subs off U.S. Bear Cruise Missiles,” *Washington Times*, January 27, 1984, 1.

“theater-based” system, such an option ran against traditional Soviet doctrine of massive nuclear strikes, designed to achieve quick, decisive results. At the level of deterrence, as opposed to strictly warfighting, the SS-N-21 did, however, fill the gap for the Soviets in the aforementioned escalatory ladder (i.e., by affording them the capability to threaten or execute a limited nuclear attack on CONUS in response to the clearly specified U.S. threat from theater-based systems).

The second, related issue concerned deployment platforms. Because the SS-N-21 is launched from a torpedo tube, it could be employed from either a strategic submarine or a general-purpose submarine. It was reported at the time that the VICTOR-III nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) was being configured with the SS-N-21.⁴⁹

The VICTOR III was described by *Jane’s Fighting Ships* as an improvement on the VICTOR II, the first of this new class being completed in 1978. Fast (30 knots when dived), equipped with advanced ASW weapons (SS-N-15 and torpedoes) and command-and-control systems (VLF buoy and ELF), the 16 submarines in this class epitomized at the time the Soviet general-purpose, nuclear-powered attack submarine.⁵⁰ It was also reported that VICTOR III SSNs had been equipped with the Soviets’ first towed-array anti-submarine warfare sensor.⁵¹ Based on these ASW-related characteristics, it would appear that the Soviet Navy had a lot of missions for this class of submarine, the most important of which likely included defensive ASW in support of their SSBN force and offensive action against hostile submarines and surface action groups. Were the Soviets to have added to these existing missions yet another mission of land attack, they would have faced the classic mission-versus-force-level mismatch. Thus, for these reasons, it was uncertain whether the operationalized SS-N-21 would have been deployed aboard *every* Soviet submarine thought capable of firing it. Perhaps a new generation of submarine specifically designed for the land-attack cruise missile was necessary.

Beginning in June 1985, however, the CIA reported that five VICTOR-class SSNs and an intelligence collection ship (AGI) operated in an area northeast of Bermuda. They were augmented by four TU-142/BEAR-F ASW aircraft operating out of Cuba. CIA analysts concluded that these Soviet naval platforms were focused on finding and targeting U.S. Navy ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), which the Soviets apparently presumed to be patrolling in these areas—their own response to the Navy’s Maritime Strategy.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Captain John Moore, ed., *Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1983 – 1984* (London: Jane’s Publishing Company Limited, 1983), 497.

⁵¹ Benjamin F. Schemmer, “Navy’s ‘Silent Service’ Concerned Over Complacency about U.S. Submarine Superiority, Concludes It’s Time to Make Some Noise,” *Armed Forces Journal International* 121, no. 7 (February 1984): 78.

Accordingly, a direct association with “Analogous Response” cannot be drawn, and, in any case, these patrols did not resume.⁵²

In 1986, the U.S. Navy published its “Maritime Strategy,” which articulated how the senior Navy leadership envisioned employing the Navy during a conflict with the Soviet Union. In addition to its traditional roles of projecting power ashore, something the Navy had been very visibly exercising as noted above, and protecting the sea lines of communication, a prominent new feature of the strategy was to target and attrit the Soviet SSBN force in the early stages of conflict. In Soviet eyes, this anti-SSBN strategy took direct aim at their secure second strike vested in the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). When coupled with what they saw was an emerging first-strike capability from ground-, air- and sea-based theater and tactical systems, and a Strategic Defense Initiative targeted to reduce Soviet ballistic missile effectiveness, the Soviets and newly installed Chairman Mikael Gorbachev were faced with a severe strategic challenge.⁵³

One Soviet strategist, Colonel General V. Lobov, did offer, in the context of the ongoing INF Treaty negotiations, a number of naval arms control initiatives in 1987 to limit what the Soviets evidently saw as an emerging and expensive naval arms race and deteriorating nuclear balance. These Soviet offerings included calling for a nuclear-free zone in the Mediterranean and demilitarization of the Indian Ocean, as well as negotiations to limit the deployment of nuclear weapons in the South Atlantic and to limit nuclear-armed ships in the Pacific. Lobov also indicated the Soviets were prepared to engage in serious negotiations limiting the size of U.S. and Soviet naval forces, including “restrictions on submarine forces and means and limitations on overseas naval bases.” The United States, he observed, had so far ignored, rejected, or impeded every one of these initiatives.⁵⁴

After a series of fits and starts, the “dual-track” strategy adopted by NATO back in 1979 finally reached fruition with the signing of the Treaty on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) on December 8, 1987. Under the treaty, the United States and Soviet Union agreed to destroy all intermediate-range and shorter-range ground-launched ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles, as well as their launchers. Significantly, the treaty did not ban the possession, testing, or production of sea-based or air-delivered

⁵² *Soviet Naval Activities Outside Home Waters in 1985 – A Research Paper – SOV 86-10047C October, 1986*, CIA Historical Review Program Release as Sanitized, 1999, 1–2.

⁵³ Admiral James D. Watkins, USN “The Maritime Strategy,” supplement to the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, January 1986, 2–17.

⁵⁴ Colonel General V. Lobov, “Peace and Stability for the Worlds’ Oceans,” *Krasnaya zvezda*, June 28, 1987, as cited in David A. Rosenberg, “It is Hardly Possible to Imagine Anything Worse: Soviet Thoughts on the Maritime Strategy,” *Naval War College Review* 41, no 3 (1988), Article 8, p. 80.

intermediate-range ballistic or cruise missiles.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, former Secretary Lehman reported that “Analogous Response” patrols ended entirely in 1986, coincident with the conclusion of the INF Treaty.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ “Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress” (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, updated June 27, 2019), 14–15.

⁵⁶ John Lehman, *Oceans Ventured: Winning the Cold War at Sea* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2018), 141.

3. Part II. The Intervening Years (1989–2014)—Putin’s Gripes

*“You Americans need to listen more....You can’t have everything your way anymore. We can have effective relations, but not just on your terms.”*⁵⁷

President Vladimir Putin to Ambassador William J. Burns, 2005,
as quoted in *The Atlantic*, April 2019.

Following increasingly virulent, massed dissent within Russia and the Soviet Republics, in 1990 Mikhail Gorbachev found himself besieged. That fall he traveled to Paris to participate in the formal ceremonies reunifying the two Germanies. The Baltic Republics had declared their independence. A new democratic party in Russia had elected Boris Yeltsin their leader. The Soviet Union dissolved. Following a failed coup attempt, Gorbachev resigned on Christmas Day 1991, and the following day Boris Yeltsin became President of the Russian Federation.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact ended the Cold War. It began an era, albeit seemingly short-lived, that offered a glimmer of hope that the fierce adversaries of the Cold War could embark on a new path to a genuine partnership. Observing was an obscure Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, who in 1991 at the fall of the USSR, resigned from the KGB and his posting in Dresden, East Germany, to return to his native Leningrad to begin his meteoric rise in Russian politics.

As will be exemplified by a few events of the period, what began with hope and expectation ended with disillusionment and distrust. With the Russian annexation of the Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine in 2014, this brief period ended with the relationship between the United States and Russia characterized as being at its lowest point since the depths of the Cold War. It is not the purpose of this section to offer a brief diplomatic history of the period. Rather these events—individually and collectively among many others—helped frame, if not reinforce, Russian, and especially Vladimir Putin’s, perceptions and assessments of the threat posed by the United States and, for the purposes of this paper, its naval forces.

⁵⁷ William J. Burns, “How the U.S.-Russian Relationship Went Bad,” *The Atlantic*, April 2019, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/04/william-j-burns-putin-russia/583255/>.

A. Desert Storm—January 1991

Following Saddam Hussein's invasion, seizure, and reign of terror of Kuwait in August 1990, the United States initiated a number of political and military actions. The Soviet Union was included in some of these actions, most notably as a member of the United Nations Security Council. Hussein had been for many years, and was at the time, a client of the Soviets, having concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow in 1972. Much of the Iraqi army, air defense, and air forces were outfitted with modern Soviet military equipment. Although the Soviets did not accept an invitation to join the coalition, President Gorbachev, himself under considerable political pressure at that time, went against their Iraqi client. The Soviet Union voted repeatedly to support a series of United Nations Security Council resolutions. The most notable of these was UNSC Resolution 678, which stipulated that if Saddam did not withdraw his military forces from Kuwait by January 15, 1991, a U.S.-led coalition would drive them out.⁵⁸

During the early morning hours of January 17, 1991, after Saddam had made no attempt to comply with the U.N. mandate, the "Coalition" under the leadership of the U.S. Central Command initiated the "air operation." As reported by USCENTCOM in its After-Action Report, this campaign had four phases:

- Phase I - to destroy Iraq's ability to command and control, eliminate Iraq's chemical and biological capability and neutralize other strategic targets that would contribute to Iraq's overall ability to wage war...
- Phase II would establish air supremacy over Kuwait and isolate the battlefield by cutting the supply lines and blocking escape routes.
- In Phase III, the battlefield would be prepared by air and artillery attacks focused on reducing Iraqi defenses in the KTO [Kuwaiti Theater of Operations].
- Phase IV was the final multi-axis air, ground and naval assault.⁵⁹

After the 38-day air campaign, which USCENTCOM characterized as "the most lethal and intensive air attack in the history of warfare," the "Phase IV ground campaign began. In February 28, only 100 hours after the ground campaign began, the NCA [National Command Authority] and USCINCCENT determined Operation Desert Storm objectives had been met and ordered a temporary cessation of hostilities."⁶⁰

⁵⁸ William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, eds. *Operation Desert Storm: Ten Years Later*, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 39 (Washington, DC: The National Security Archive, George Washington University, January 17, 2001), accessed April 4, 2020, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB39/>.

⁵⁹ Ibid., Document 6, United States Central Command, "Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm: Executive Summary," July 11, 1991.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 11.

USCENTCOM noted the advantages of technology in the After-Action Report:

Our technology gave us a decisive edge. Standout performances of the F-117 Stealth fighter, precision guided munitions, Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM), Patriot missile system, M-1 Abrams tank, AH-64 Apache helicopter, RPV, vertical take-off AV-8B, and JSTARS highlighted for the American public that US defense dollars have been well invested and our fighting men and women were superbly trained in peacetime to prepare them for war.⁶¹

The Soviets, most especially the Soviet General Staff, evidently took away the same message. Senior Soviet military officers wrote lengthy and detailed analyses during and immediately after the Gulf War. Many were concerned about the performance of Soviet military equipment as it unsuccessfully confronted the onslaught of the massive application of the most modern U.S. military weapons systems, information technologies, tactics, and training. Yet perhaps the greatest General Staff concern was the alteration to the military balance posed by the effective employment high-precision weapons to achieve superiority quickly on and over the battlefield. Thus, shortly after the cessation of combat operations, on February 22, 1991, the Soviet Minister of Defense reportedly told the Supreme Soviet that the allied victory in the Persian Gulf had prompted the MoD to reexamine its air-defense capability. He warned that the Soviet Union was currently capable of repelling attacks, although this might not be true in 2 or 3 years.⁶²

Conjecturally, might not the General Staff have been considering two questions: What if the target was Moscow and not Kuwait or Baghdad? What if the precision weapons carried nuclear as opposed to conventional warheads? President Bush went a long way to perhaps mollify some of these likely General Staff concerns just a few months later.⁶³

B. Reciprocal Nuclear Weapons Reductions—September/October 1991

1991 was a tumultuous year for Mikhail Gorbachev, as he was at the time under enormous political pressure—internally from the democratic movement led by Boris Yeltsin—and externally, Germany had reunited the previous year, and the Soviets had agreed to withdraw their military forces from East Germany by 1994. The Warsaw Pact was dissolving. Led by the Baltic Republics, all the other states that were once part of the

⁶¹ Ibid., 29.

⁶² Gilberto Villahermosa, “Desert Storm: The Soviet View” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Foreign Military Studies Office, May 25, 2005).

⁶³ For an extremely thorough and insightful analysis of Desert Storm and its consequences, see William J. Perry, “Desert Storm and Deterrence,” *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 4 (Fall 1991), New York: Council on Foreign Relations.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, save Romania, were clamoring for political independence.

In the midst of this tumult, on September 27, 1991, U.S. President George H. W. Bush called Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev to inform him that he had decided to initiate a series of unilateral initiatives to limit and reduce U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. The call was a follow-up to a memo President Bush had sent to President Gorbachev the day before in which he outlined the following:

- U.S. would withdraw to the United States all ground-launched short-range weapons deployed overseas and destroy them along with existing U.S. stockpiles of the same weapons; and
- Cease deployment of tactical nuclear weapons on surface ships, attack submarines and land-based naval aircraft during “normal circumstances.”⁶⁴

In the telephone call, Gorbachev greeted President Bush’s proposals enthusiastically, and on October 5, he called back to offer his own: “We want to fully destroy tactical nuclear weapons on sea forces, on a mutual basis to withdraw tactical armaments of sea forces, including bombs. The weapons withdrawn should be stored at bases in nuclear stockpiles.”⁶⁵

On September 28, 1991, Secretary of Defense Cheney directed pervasive reductions in the inventories and alert postures of the U.S. nuclear arsenal (see Figure 3). As concerns sea-based tactical nuclear weapons, the SECDEF ordered the withdrawal of:


- Nuclear Tomahawk cruise missiles from surface ships and submarines.
- Nuclear bombs from aircraft carriers.
- Nuclear depth bombs for land-based naval aircraft.

It was also envisioned that older nuclear warheads for ship-based weapons would be destroyed and the remainder stored on U.S. territory. All nuclear weapons associated with land-based naval air would be destroyed. A Fact Sheet accompanying the SECDEF memo pointed to the growing trust between both nations:

⁶⁴ White House, “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush,” National Security Archive Briefing Book 561, September 27, 1991 (Washington, DC: National Security Archive/George Washington University), accessed April 3, 2020, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault-russia-programs/2016-09-30/unilateral-us-nuclear-pullback-1991-matched>.

⁶⁵ Ibid., White House, “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush,” Secret, Document 05, October 5, 1991; National Security Archive, accessed April 3, 2020, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=3117098-Document-05-White-House-Memorandum-of-Telephone>.

With regard to the SNF [Strategic Nuclear Forces] and naval systems, we do not envision any formal verification regime, although we are willing to discuss possible confidence building measures with the Soviets. It will also be very important to use the increased openness that currently exists between the U.S. and the new Soviet leadership to further enhance the transparency of both sides' actions.⁶⁶



Source: Document 03, Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, "Reducing the United States Nuclear Arsenal," Secret/Formerly Restricted Data, September 28, 1991; National Security Archive, accessed April 3 2020, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=3117096-Document-03-Department-of-Defense-Secretary-of>.

Figure 3. SECDEF–Directed Reductions in Navy Nuclear Weapons, 1991

What multiple Soviet outreaches for "naval arms control" talks had not been able to achieve, the Presidents of the United States and the Soviet Union accomplished in two phone calls within a week of each other. From the perspective of the United States, the President and his National Security Council were well aware of the ongoing turmoil within the Soviet Union. This effort to reduce and destroy Soviet tactical nuclear weapons would enable securing at least some nuclear warheads from theft and proliferation. Besides, as had been unambiguously demonstrated by U.S. precision weapons just a few months before during Desert Storm, the United States no longer needed to rely on tactical nuclear weapons

⁶⁶ Ibid., Document 03, Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, "Reducing the United States Nuclear Arsenal," Secret/Formerly Restricted Data, September 28, 1991; National Security Archive, accessed April 3 2020, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/dc.html?doc=3117096-Document-03-Department-of-Defense-Secretary-of>.

to offset deficiencies in defending against overwhelming offensive Warsaw Pact ground forces.

The Soviet military establishment at the time was itself in turmoil due to the ongoing political crisis. From at least the likely perspective of the Main Naval Staff, however, U.S. naval operations within weapons range of the Soviet homeland—on the order of those described in by Secretary Lehman in Part 1—would no longer pose a nuclear threat. Given the erosion of Soviet naval capabilities that was beginning to manifest itself during this period, an “Analogous Response” would no longer have been necessary to counter the U.S. naval tactical nuclear threat. Nor were the remnants of Admiral Gorshkov’s “Blue Water Navy” even capable of doing so.⁶⁷ Or so we thought at the time.

C. NATO Expansion—The Threat Moves East and the Relationship Begins to Sour

From the very beginning of the Bush Administration in 1989 (or even before) the overarching foreign policy and national security concern of the United States as well as NATO was on the consequences of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Widespread societal unrest in Soviet Russia and throughout the constituent states of the Warsaw Pact as well as Russian economic dislocations (due at least part to the failed attempt to match ruble for dollar the Reagan defense buildup) led the leadership of the West to conclude that the end of the Soviet Union was a question of “when” and “how,” not “whether” or “if.”

National security and political issues were at the forefront of the many issues to be confronted with this eventuality. First, from a national security perspective, it was unknown whether the massive, nuclear Soviet military establishment, led by senior officers who had in large measure remained loyal to the communist regime, would quietly accept whatever political outcomes eventuated or spasmodically unleash some kind of military event. Related was the issue of “loose nukes.” How would any resultant Russian political and security structure quickly and securely control the nuclear warheads deployed throughout the Soviet Union. President Bush’s outreach to President Gorbachev on tactical nuclear weapons, described above, was part of a U.S. initiative to come to grips with this vexing challenge. Other efforts are beyond the scope of this paper.

The second issue was political. The United States and its NATO allies wrestled with what the post-Soviet security environment of Europe—all of Europe—would look like. Therein lay the conundrum. On the one hand, for more than four decades democratic

⁶⁷ After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December, 1991, just months after the Bush–Gorbachev agreement on tactical nuclear weapons, the Soviet Navy, then the Commonwealth of Independent States Navy, and finally the Russian Federation Navy fell into organizational disarray, financial neglect, and materiel decline. Fully three-quarters to five-sixths of the Soviet-era inventory was written off. See “The Russian Navy: A Historic Transition” (Washington: D.C. Office of Naval Intelligence, January 7, 2016), accessed April 3, 2020, <https://www.oni.navy.mil/News/Naval-Capabilities/Russia/>.

NATO had provided peace, stability, and economic prosperity to all the members of the alliance. Surely the European states that had been the coerced members of the Warsaw Pact would look west to NATO for integration into the democratic alliance that would ensure their freedom, security, national integrity, and prosperity. On the other hand, it was unambiguously clear from the beginning that Russia was adamantly opposed to any eastward expansion of NATO.

In recent years, the National Security Archive of George Washington University has analyzed and made available to the public a series of previously classified documents from the United States, Russia, and certain NATO allies. These documents reveal, first, that:

U.S. Secretary of State James Baker's famous "not one inch eastward" assurance about NATO expansion in his meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev on February 9, 1990, was part of a cascade of assurances about Soviet security given by Western leaders to Gorbachev and other Soviet officials throughout the process of German unification in 1990 and into 1991.⁶⁸

These reassurances came with a criticism by then CIA Director Robert Gates. As reported by the Archive's Savranskaya and Blanton, Gates warned of the consequences of "pressing ahead with the expansion of NATO eastward [in the 1990s], when Gorbachev and others were led to believe that wouldn't happen."⁶⁹

So Gorbachev presided over the dissolution of the Soviet Union, assured that the West would not threaten Russian security and that NATO would not expand eastward. It would be up to his successor, Boris Yeltsin, and the newly formed Russian Federation to deal with what turned out to be the inevitable expansion of NATO.

Here, Savranskaya and Blanton have again analyzed and made public a series of previously classified documents from the United States, Russia, and certain NATO allies. These documents reveal that senior officials of the newly elected Clinton administration led Russian President Boris Yeltsin to believe in 1993 that the "Partnership for Peace" was the alternative to NATO expansion, rather than a precursor to it, while simultaneously planning for just that—NATO expansion after Yeltsin's reelection bid in 1996. Yeltsin was led to believe that the future of European security would include, not exclude, Russia.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Sveltana Savranskaya and Tom Blanton, "NATO Expansion: What Gorbachev Heard" National Security Archive Briefing Book #613 (Washington: National Security Archive/George Washington University), December 12, 2017, accessed April 6, 2020, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev-heard-western-leaders-early>.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁷⁰ Sveltana Savranskaya and Tom Blanton, "NATO Expansion: What Yeltsin Heard," National Security Archive Briefing Book #621 (Washington: National Security Archive/George Washington University, March 16, 2017), accessed April 6, 2020, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2018-03-16/nato-expansion-what-yeltsin-heard>.

Yet the Russian leadership was increasingly concerned with NATO expansion during the Yeltsin era. In one of the most explicit statements now available, during a July 15, 1996, Moscow meeting with Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgenny Primakov stated: “I have to tell you, there is one thing that will not change here—*one thing that constitutes a real redline for us: if the infrastructure of NATO moves toward Russia, that will be unacceptable—it will not be accepted.* Therefore, we need to find a way out of this issue.”⁷¹

Nevertheless, NATO expansion proceeded apace. In 1999, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joined NATO, amid much debate within the organization and Russian opposition. Another expansion came in 2004 with the accession of seven Central and Eastern European countries: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Albania and Croatia joined on April 1, 2009. Macedonia (2017) and North Macedonia (March 27, 2020) are the most recent member states. The aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia, which are tied culturally and ethnically to Russia, continued to be a cause of tension between NATO and Russia.

D. NATO Goes to War in the Balkans

Russian apprehensions were accelerated when NATO, as NATO, went to war against a Russian ally. Yugoslavia had always been a loose aggregation of diverse ethnic and religious groups, held together after world War II as the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia by the strong arm of Marshall Josp Broz Tito. Following Tito’s death in 1980, historical, political, and ethnic tensions were unleashed, resulting in increasingly violent and vicious civil wars in Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia, which ultimately declared their independence. Yet “ethnic cleansing” continued, leading NATO—as NATO—to initiate major combat operations against a former Soviet and now Russian ally. In 1995, NATO initiated a bombing campaign in Bosnia and Herzegovina. NATO again initiated a combined military (primarily air) operation in March 1999 against the Serbia. The NATO campaign lasted until June, when the Serbian government under Slobodan Milosevic agreed to withdraw its military forces from the ethnic enclave of Kosovo.

These were the first major military operations undertaken by NATO as an alliance, and they were targeted against a former Soviet and Russian ally having a linguistic and cultural identity with Russia. NATO did so in both cases without the sanction of the United

⁷¹ Department of State Memorandum of Conversation Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Russian Foreign Minister Yevgenny Primakov, July 15, 1996, U.S. Department of State Case No. M-2017-11926., Doc No. C06570196, Date: 05/30/2018, accessed April 6, 2020, <https://foia.state.gov/Search/results.aspx?searchText=strobe+talbott+and+primakov&beginDate=&endDate=&publishedBeginDate=&publishedEndDate=&caseNumber=M-2017-11926>.

Nations Security Council—in which both China and Russia vetoed any UN endorsement.⁷² The Russians saw firsthand the potential consequences on Russian security of NATO expansion.

E. The Rise of Vladimir Putin and the Final Demise of the Partnership

Watching all these events was a once obscure lieutenant colonel in the KGB—Vladimir Putin. Rising through the ranks of the Kremlin bureaucracy, Putin became Prime Minister in 1999 and replaced Boris Yeltsin as President in 2000. Initially, Putin appeared inclined to support the warming of relations with the West. But NATO expansion, the growing clamor for independence from states that were actually part of the USSR, the NATO air campaign against Serbia, the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and the onset of “color revolutions”—the popular uprising leading to the overthrow of Pro-Russian or authoritarian leaders who in Putin’s eyes were his allies and the foundation of the Russian state, most notably in Georgia (Rose, 2003) and Ukraine (Orange, 2004)—were, individually and in aggregate, considered a debacle in the Kremlin. Once having demanded by its military might alone a position coequal with the West, Russia, the great “Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” had collapsed. The West had imposed on Russia a position of strategic inferiority. The geographical buffer of the Warsaw Pact gone, Russia lost a source of military manpower, economic partnerships, a major part of its industrial base. An isolated, inferior, vulnerable Russia retreated from Europe. Putin and his coterie set about restoring Russia to what they ardently believed to be its rightful position as a world power.

Putin abandoned the notion of any kind of partnership with the West and began his own Moscow-centered foreign and national security policy. Here, Putin appears to have been heavily influenced by the policy perspectives of his former KGB boss Yevgeny Primakov (Figure 4), who was a pivotal figure in Russian foreign policy as an adviser to Mikhail Gorbachev (1990–1991), head of the KGB/SVR (1991–1996), Soviet Foreign Minister (1996–1998), and Prime Minister (1999–2000). Primakov articulated what has come to be known as the “Primakov Doctrine.” Having observed firsthand the evolution of the U.S.–Russian relationship from the very beginnings of Gorbachev’s *perestroik* through the events described above, Primakov felt strongly that a post-Soviet, unipolar world dominated by the United States was unacceptable to Russia. He believed that Russia

⁷² *Balkan Battlegrounds: A Military History of the Yugoslav Conflict, 1990–1995*, Volume I (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Russian and European Analysis, May 2002), accessed April 10, 2020, https://www.google.com/books/edition/Balkan_Battlegrounds/xUS8--YFr1YC?hl=en&gbpv=1&dq=Balkan+battlegrounds:++A+Military+history+of+the+Yugoslav+Conflict,+1990++1995&printsec=frontcover.

should strive to establish a multi-polar world to counterbalance the United States, and in this multi-polar world Russia should insist on its primacy in the post-Soviet space.⁷³



Source: Robert D. Ward, DoD, March 16, 1997,
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:E_Primakov_03.jpg.

**Figure 4. Evgenii Maksimovich Primakov (Евгений Максимович Примаков),
Russian Foreign Minister**

Clearly, Putin was not going accept an imposed status of “junior-partner” in company with Brazil, China and India. Because of its history, Russia would rightfully assert itself as a major world power. To do so, Putin initiated or increased a major modernization of Russia’s military forces. He executed a national security policy to reinsert Russia into the wavering states of what he termed the “near abroad.” And he carefully and calculatingly planned to take on the United States.

⁷³ Eugene Rumer, “The Primakov (Not Gerasimov) Doctrine in Action” (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 5, 2019), accessed April 15, 2020,
<https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/06/05/primakov-not-gerasimov-doctrine-in-action-pub-79254>.

1. Chafing under the INF Treaty

President Putin and his national security advisers had never been satisfied with the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty because the treaty codified Russian strategic inequities and vulnerabilities. Recall from Part 1 that the INF Treaty banned all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched nuclear and conventional missiles and launchers with a range of between 500 and 5,500 km worldwide. The treaty prohibited producing or flight testing any new INF-capable system or separate stage and was to have been in force in perpetuity. Significantly, the treaty did not ban air-launched cruise missiles and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM). By June 1, 1991, a total of 2,692 missiles defined by the treaty and their launchers had been destroyed. But while the Soviets destroyed 1,846 missiles, the United States destroyed only 846.⁷⁴ Recall as well that President George H. W. Bush and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev had in 1991 reached a “gentlemen’s agreement” to mutually eliminate all their nation’s air, ground and maritime non-strategic nuclear weapons. The agreement was just that—an agreement never codified by treaty or treaty-induced inspection.

For two decades post-Soviet Russia had chafed under what Putin and his national security establishment, certainly under the ideological guidance of Sergei Primakov, considered to be a position of inferiority that demanded reversal. The Russian Ministry of Defense had a number of missile programs underway, notably the 9M729 cruise missile, that would circumvent the range restrictions of the treaty. By 2007 the Russian leadership under Vladimir Putin had also begun to take issue with what they saw as a U.S. program to circumvent the treaty—“Aegis Ashore.”

In October, 2007, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates met in Moscow with their counterparts, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, as well as President Vladimir Putin. The purpose of the meeting was to (1) apprise the Russian leadership of U.S. plans to deploy a missile defense shield, based on the Navy’s Aegis missile system, to European NATO, and (2) attempt to assuage their concerns over a threat the system could pose to Russia. U.S. strategic missile defense had been a major issue for Russia since President Ronald Reagan’s “Star Wars” initiative, and especially so since the U.S. withdrawal from the Missile Defense Treaty in 2002. The U.S. delegation was in Moscow in an attempt to mollify Russian concerns by proposing a “Joint Regional Missile Defense Architecture.”

⁷⁴ Ulrich Kuhn and Anna Peczeli, “Russia, NATO, and the INF Treaty,” *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Spring 2017: 69–71, accessed April 18, 2020, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-11_Issue-1/Peczeli.pdf.

In cooperation with the Russians, this European-based missile defense system would focus exclusively on the emerging Iranian ballistic missile threat.⁷⁵

At least in public, the Russians would have none of it. Public statements following the meeting expressed their dissatisfaction not only with the U.S. ballistic missile defense proposal, in which the United States had clear technological advantages, but their perceived vulnerabilities imposed on them by the INF Treaty. Putin himself reportedly argued in favor of abandoning the agreement several times, stating directly to the U.S. delegation:

The only thing I would like to point out is that we hope in our complicated talks that you will not forge ahead with your previous agreements with eastern European countries ... If we fail to achieve these goals, I think, it will be difficult for us to remain in this agreement, when other countries are actively developing these systems of weapons, including states in the immediate vicinity of our borders.⁷⁶

Putin was clearly signaling that the INF Treaty no longer served Russia's interests.

At issue for the Russian leadership was the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) missile defense system. After years of negotiation, including the 2007 meeting in Moscow, the EPAA was announced in 2009. The United States negotiated a hosting agreement with Romania and broke ground for what has been termed "Aegis Ashore" in 2013. The system reached initial operating capability (IOC) in 2016. The groundbreaking for a second site occurred in 2016 in northeastern Poland, a location the Russians evidently considered far more threatening. This site remains under construction at this time. The stated purpose for these sites was defense against an Iranian ballistic missile attack on Europe. But the Russians did not see it that way.⁷⁷

Back in 2007 if not before, Putin and his senior advisors were clearly aware of—likely as not from open-source materials readily available to them—the capabilities of the

⁷⁵ Thom Shanker and Steven Lee Myers, "Putin Criticizes U.S. Officials on Missile Defense," *New York Times*, October 13, 2007, <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/13/world/Europe/13russia.html>.

⁷⁶ "Putin hopes U.S. Will Not Forge Ahead with Eastern Europe on NMD..." Russia and CIA Presidential Bulletin, Interfax, October 12, 2007.

⁷⁷ Ian Williams, "Aegis Ashore," Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 14, 2016, last modified June 15, 2018, <https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsyst/aegis-ashore/>. As described by the Navy and the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, Aegis Ashore is a land-based version of the Navy's Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System based on the same MK41 vertical-launch system currently deployed on 84 U.S. Navy ships. Each site includes the Navy's SPY radar and the VLS launch tubes with eight cells each, for a total of 24 missiles. As configured for missile defense, the tubes contain the SM-3 anti-ballistic missile. However, with no modification, the tubes can also fire the SM-2/SM-6 Standard surface-to-air-missile as well as the Tomahawk cruise missile. Source: "Aegis Ashore" Missile Defense Agency Fact Sheet, 14-MDA-7921, July 23, 2014, <https://photos.state.gov/libraries/romania/231771/PDFs/Aegis-Ashore-Fact-Sheet-May102016.pdf>; U.S. Navy Fact File: "Aegis Weapon System," https://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid+2100&tid=200&ct=2.

Aegis system, which had been operational in the U.S. Navy for three decades. But it is this Aegis Ashore system, in both its ballistic missile defense and, in their eyes, potentially land-attack configurations that was causing the Russians so much concern. While the U.S. Navy had divested itself of the nuclear warheads for the Tomahawk cruise missile in 1991, this is the same submarine- or surface-launched cruise missile system that has proven itself so effectively in combat since the Desert Storm.

At the time there were a number of apparent political, logistics, and operational impediments to deploying the Tomahawk missile system to the Aegis site in Poland. Politically, the United States would have had to provide advanced notice to the Congress, the Polish government, and NATO of a planned change to the mission and configuration of the site. Logistically, the existing site would have to be modified for missile storage and handling—engineering and construction efforts that could not be concealed. Operationally, there were available to NATO and U.S. planners a number of other cruise missile delivery platforms, for example, the USAF Global Strike capability. So, it did not appear to make the case for military necessity to deploy the Tomahawk ashore in Poland.

What was going on at the time was another series of moves and countermoves in the international security chess match between the Russians, world chess masters, and the United States. In this case, the scenario, moves, and outcomes were similar to that of the late 1970s, when, as previously described, the Soviets deployed SS-20s and the United States and NATO deployed countering Pershing II and GLCMs. Now the United States was deploying to Europe a defensive system to counter another emerging Russian offensive threat.

The Maritime Balance and “Analogous Response” had a major role in the INF debate as well. As noted earlier, the INF Treaty codified, in Russian eyes, a significant Russian vulnerability. In event of conflict, the United States and NATO could execute a decapitating strike on Moscow using air-launched cruise missiles or ship- or submarine-launched cruise missiles. The vexing problem for Russia, as it had always been, was how to hold Washington, D.C., and other U.S. “decision centers” at equivalent risk using non-strategic weapons. From a maritime perspective, the Russians turned to the strategy of “Analogous Response” from the 1980s, which, it turns out, never really “just went away.”

2. 2014–2015: The Inflection Point

The year 2014 marked a turning point in the Russian competition and overall relationship with the West, and the United States specifically, primarily because of three events: the Russian annexation of Crimea, the civil war in eastern Ukraine, and the reinsertion of Russia in Syria:

- As part of the USSR, Ukraine had been Russia’s breadbasket and major center for Russia’s military-industrial production. Crimea occupied a strategic position

on the Black Sea as the homeport for the Black Sea Fleet and for its substantial shipbuilding capacity. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine underwent decades of political turmoil—notably the “Orange Revolution” (2004–2005), culminating in the “Euromaidan” demonstrations and civil unrest in late 2013. The forced departure of the pro-Moscow Yanukovich government on February 21, 2014, during the Orange Revolution, gave Vladimir Putin an opening to “annex” Ukraine’s strategic peninsula of Crimea. On February 28, in the midst of widespread social unrest, Russian troops occupied airports and other strategic locations. A national referendum held in March installed a pro-Moscow government. The Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol were quickly established and petitioned Moscow to join Russia. Within the space of a few weeks, Putin had reacquired enormous oil and gas fields in the Black Sea, shipbuilding, and other industrial infrastructure and reestablished the Russian Federation Navy not as a tenant but a sole occupant of its base complex and shipyards at Sevastopol. Putin had gotten away with it at the price of a series of UN resolutions and the imposition of sanctions.

- Shortly after the annexation of Crimea, unrest quickly followed in the eastern Ukrainian region of the Donbas. Escalating violence between supporters of the ousted President Viktor Yanukovich and the government in Kiev, as well as the imposition of Russia troops with no Russian military insignia (also termed “little green men”), led to a civil war that continues to this date. The conflict has reached no resolution. It is considered by some to be a “cease and desist order” signal from Putin to the pro-Western government in Kiev to give up any pretensions for joining NATO.
- Little more than a year later, in September 2015, at the invitation of the Assad government, Russia deployed what became a substantial military force to northwest Syria. Russian special forces and military advisers are stationed there, top-of-the-line air defense units are deployed in the vicinity of air bases at which are deployed high-end Russian fighter bombers, and the Russian Federation Navy has reestablished its naval presence at its long-abandoned base at Tartus. Within a month, Syria became a test bed for Russia’s most advanced weapons. In October, ships in the Caspian Sea launched Kalibr cruise missiles more than 1200 km to targets in Syria. This was followed by submarine launches of the same missile in December, as well as launches from TU-22m/BACKFIRE bombers.

Yet Russia’s establishment in Syria after more than three decades’ absence is more than just a weapons and combat-arms proving ground. A permanent Russian presence in Syria collapses the eastern extension of NATO’s southern flank. When coupled with

Putin's overtures to a wavering Erdogan of Turkey, Russia's southern flank is more secure and the U.S. position in the Middle East and Mediterranean less so.

At some economic cost in the form of sanctions, Putin, in the space of a few years, now has sizable, well-equipped, and well-trained ground, naval, and air forces all along Europe's eastern border, arrayed in a crescent extending from the Arctic through the Baltic and Black Seas, extending into the Middle East, as well as into the North Atlantic and Mediterranean. Putin has demonstrated a willingness and capability to apply multiple military and paramilitary instruments to invade and intimidate, thereby undermining the confidence of NATO's newest members in the NATO Article V guaranty of their sovereignty.

4. Part III. “Analogous Response” Redux— Putin’s Aspirations

Using medium-range target missiles and deploying launchers in Romania and Poland that are for launching Tomahawk cruise missiles, the US has openly violated these clauses in the [INF] Treaty ... If they really are built and delivered to the European continent ... it will dramatically exacerbate the international security situation, and create a serious threat to Russia, because some of these missiles can reach Moscow in just 10 – 12 minutes. This is a very serious threat to us. In this case, we will be forced, I would like to emphasize this, *we will be forced to respond with mirror or asymmetric actions* [emphasis added]. What does this mean? ... Russia will be forced to create and deploy weapons that can be used not only in the areas we are directly threatened from but also in areas that contain decision-making centres for the missile systems threatening us.

Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly on February 20, 2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin⁷⁸

“Analogous Response” of the 1980s just “didn’t go away.” Submarines were withdrawn—likely due to the erosion in combat readiness that the entire Soviet Navy was sustaining in the 1980s. But the Soviets, then the Russians, likely under the ideological guidance of Sergei Primakov, as a legacy of the Cuban missile crisis and “Analogous Response” of the 1980s, never gave up the idea of being able to hold the U.S. homeland at risk with non-strategic conventional or nuclear weapons. Essentially, the Russians never gave up wanting to threaten the United States with what they felt the United States was threatening to do to them. So, as far back as the late 1980s, just as the first “Analogous Response” patrols were going away, they set about designing and building the next generation of nuclear-powered submarines and missiles systems to do so.

As evidenced by current Russian military and maritime doctrine and very public statements by Putin himself, the unusually explicit public descriptions of the characteristics of at least two new classes of Russian submarines and their weapon systems, and the public revelation of some of their operations, Putin aspires to position the Russian Federation Navy to reprise the “Analogous Response” of the late Soviet era.

⁷⁸ President of Russia Vladimir Putin Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, February 20, 2019, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59863>.

A. Putin—Channeling His Inner Gorshkov

Soviet Admiral of the Fleet Sergei Gorshkov commanded the Soviet Navy from 1956 to 1985. He is universally acknowledged as having built the Soviet Navy into a nuclear-equipped, “blue water” Navy, which many analysts estimated could have capably challenged the maritime superiority of the U.S. Navy during the Cold War.⁷⁹ Vladimir Putin has recently taken a page from Admiral Gorshkov’s Cold War playbook. As President of Russia, he has taken a greater, more direct personal interest in the Russian Federation Navy (RFN) than any of his predecessors—certainly since the advent of the Communist era. Since 2015 he has personally signed into law a number of state documents that together articulate an ambitious, expansive, and expensive vision for the Russian Navy. His priority areas for the RFN include preventing the exclusive superiority of the U.S. Navy and developing and maintaining the naval capability to strike ground targets of a potential enemy with conventional as well as nuclear weapons.⁸⁰ These are captured in national-level documents that were approved by Putin or his Prime Minister:

- “The Maritime Doctrine of Russia 2015,” signed by President Putin during Russian Navy Day ceremonies July 27, 2015.⁸¹
- “Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the Period Until 2030,” signed by President Putin 20 July 2017.⁸²

⁷⁹ Norman Polmar, Thomas Brooks, and George Fedoroff, *Admiral Gorshkov: The Man Who Challenged the U.S. Navy* (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2019).

⁸⁰ “Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the Period Until 2030,” 2017, translated by Anna Davis, U.S. Naval War College, Russian Maritime Studies Institute, [https://dnnlgwick.blob.core.windows.net/portals/0/NWCDepartments/Russia%20Maritime%20Studies%20Institute/RMSI_RusNavyFundamentalsENG_FINAL%20\(1\).pdf?sr=b&si=DNNFileManagerPolicy&sig=fjFDEgWhpd1ING%2FnmGQXqaH5%2FDEujDU76EnksAB%2B1A0%3D](https://dnnlgwick.blob.core.windows.net/portals/0/NWCDepartments/Russia%20Maritime%20Studies%20Institute/RMSI_RusNavyFundamentalsENG_FINAL%20(1).pdf?sr=b&si=DNNFileManagerPolicy&sig=fjFDEgWhpd1ING%2FnmGQXqaH5%2FDEujDU76EnksAB%2B1A0%3D).

⁸¹ “Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2015,” translated by Anna Davis, U.S. Naval War College, Russian Maritime Studies Institute, https://dnnlgwick.blob.core.windows.net/portals/0/NWCDepartments/Russia%20Maritime%20Studies%20Institute/Maritime%20Doctrine%20TransENGrus_FINAL.pdf?sr=b&si=DNNFileManagerPolicy&sig=fqZgUUVVRVRkKmSFNMoj%2FNaRNawUoRdhdpFJj7%2FpAkM%3D.

⁸² “Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the Period Until 2030,” 2017, translated by Anna Davis, U.S. Naval War College, Russian Maritime Studies Institute, [https://dnnlgwick.blob.core.windows.net/portals/0/NWCDepartments/Russia%20Maritime%20Studies%20Institute/RMSI_RusNavyFundamentalsENG_FINAL%20\(1\).pdf?sr=b&si=DNNFileManagerPolicy&sig=fjFDEgWhpd1ING%2FnmGQXqaH5%2FDEujDU76EnksAB%2B1A0%3D](https://dnnlgwick.blob.core.windows.net/portals/0/NWCDepartments/Russia%20Maritime%20Studies%20Institute/RMSI_RusNavyFundamentalsENG_FINAL%20(1).pdf?sr=b&si=DNNFileManagerPolicy&sig=fjFDEgWhpd1ING%2FnmGQXqaH5%2FDEujDU76EnksAB%2B1A0%3D).

- “Russia’s Strategy for the Development of Maritime Activities to 2030,” signed by Prime Minister Medvedev 30 August 2019.”⁸³

Three elements of Putin’s maritime doctrine, policy, and strategy stand out from these documents as the reprise of “Analogous Response:”

- The role of the RFN in deterrence.
- The pivotal importance of nuclear-armed and conventionally armed cruise missiles in the furtherance of deterrence.
- The application of all instruments of Russian state power—“a set of interrelated political, diplomatic, legal, military, economic information and other measures...” to prevent and reduce the level of threat.

Conceptually, “deterrence” as developed and refined in U.S. strategic thinking and applied since World War II has no real equivalent in Russian strategic thinking. A close approximation may be found in the Russian Ministry of Defense Dictionary’s definition of *strategicheskoe sderzhivanie*, or “strategic containment.” “Strategic containment” is based on the principle of “preventing victory” by the opponent. The dictionary makes an explicit distinction between “the military-political deterrence measures taken to prevent aggression” and “strategic containment,” which are “measures that are undertaken constantly, both in peacetime and in wartime, and not only to prevent any power actions that cause or could cause damage to the strategic scale of the nation, but also to keep the object [adversary] within a certain framework [containment], as well as to de-escalate the military conflict.”⁸⁴

The dictionary defines a series of nonviolent measures that are an essential part of strategic containment: “political, diplomatic, legal, economic, ideological, scientific and technical and others.” These measures are “carried out constantly by the federal executive bodies of the Russian Federation in close cooperation with international organizations ... in order to achieve success in conducting negotiations ... strengthen interstate ties ... or withdrawing from international obligations.”

In addition to the traditional set of capabilities like military presence, demonstrations of military strength, and offensive and defense actions, strategic containment calls for inflicting or threat of delivering single strikes (including nuclear ones). These forceful measures are undertaken in peacetime in order to prevent threats and prevent aggression

⁸³ Richard Connolly, “Russia’s Strategy for the Development of Marine Activities to 2030,” Russian Studies Series 7/19, NATO Defense College, November 27, 2019, <http://www.ndc.nato.int/research/research.php?icode=618>.

⁸⁴ *Military Encyclopedic Dictionary*, s.v. “Voennyi Entsikopedicheski Slovar’,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, accessed April 17, 2020, <http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/details.htm?id=14206@morfDictionary>.

and in conflict “to prevent escalation, or de-escalation, or an early end to the military conflict on conditions favorable to Russia, up to the massive use of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction in a large-scale war.”

In sum, while the Western concept of deterrence is based on doing things that will cause the adversary *not* to do things the West does not want them to do, the Russian concept of deterrence, or strategic containment, is carried out continuously by all elements of state power to shape, that is, contain, an adversary’s decision-making to *do* the things the Russians want the adversary to do.

These concepts of strategic containment are reflected directly in Putin’s naval pronouncements and policies, in the naval forces he is acquiring to execute strategic containment, and the means by which they are being articulated to the West, specifically the United States.

The Naval Policy Document contains an entire section on “The Navy as an Effective Instrument of Strategic Deterrence.” This defines one of the most immediate threats to Russia as the “deployment (build-up) of strategic high-precision sea-based non-nuclear weapons systems, as well as sea-based ballistic missile defense systems by foreign states in waters adjacent to the territory of the Russian Federation...”⁸⁵ It goes on to characterize the Russian Federation Navy to be “one of the most effective instruments of strategic (nuclear and non-nuclear) deterrence, including preventing ‘global strike.’”⁸⁶ One of the primary objectives of naval operations to deter military conflicts and implement strategic deterrence is the ability to destroy the enemy’s military and economic potential (i.e., inflict unacceptable damage) by striking its vital facilities from the sea using long-range, high-precision nuclear and non-nuclear weapons.

The policy also outlines the primary objectives in the modernization and development of the RFN as

building the combat potential of the RFN by construction and modernization of multi-purpose nuclear and non-nuclear submarines and multi-purpose surface combatants designed to perform tasks in the near and far zones and oceans ... The primary armament of the undersea, surface and coastal forces of the Navy through 2025 will be long-range high precision

⁸⁵ “Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the Period Until 2030,” 2017, translated by Anna Davis, U.S. Naval War College, Russian Maritime Studies Institute, paragraph 25.b.

⁸⁶ “Global Strike” is a U.S. Air Force warfighting concept operationalized by the USAF Global Strike Command. Its mission is to provide “combat-ready forces to conduct strategic nuclear deterrence and global strike operations in support of combatant commanders” (<https://www.afgsc.af.mil/units/>). While a USAF command, the Russians consider, at least in their naval policy, “global strike” to include naval forces. See “Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the Period Until 2030,” 2017, translated by Anna Davis, U.S. Naval War College, Russian Maritime Studies Institute, paragraph 31, and <http://www.afgsc.af.mil/index.asp>

cruise missiles. After 2025, hypersonic missiles and various unmanned autonomous systems, including unmanned underwater vehicles, will be supplied to equip undersea, surface, and coastal forces of the Navy.⁸⁷

B. “Analogous Response Redux”—The Weapons

As noted above, Putin’s maritime policy asserts: “The pivotal importance of nuclear and conventionally-armed cruise missiles in the furtherance of deterrence...”⁸⁸ One operational and one developmental Russian missile systems realize Putin’s policy of holding land targets at risk. In addition, a planned underwater unmanned vehicle will present, when operational, an unprecedented threat.

1. 3-M-14/*Kalibr* (SS-N-30A)

Kalibr land-attack cruise missile provides General Staff planners and RFN operators a combat-proven endoatmospheric missile to threaten CONUS as well as overseas locations now. The RFN reportedly plans to deploy *Kalibr*, which is comparable to the U.S. Navy’s Tomahawk, on all-new design nuclear and non-nuclear submarines and surface combatants of all displacements, as well as to retrofit the missile system to existing platforms. Fitted with either a nuclear or conventional warhead, the missile has a range of 1,500 to 2,500 km (930 to 1550 nm).⁸⁹ As reported by TASS, an extended-range 4,500 km *Kalibr-M* is reportedly under development.⁹⁰

Kalibr has seen combat in Syria. On October 7, 2015, Russian Defense Minister Shoigu announced that four warships fired 26 sea-based cruise missiles, destroying 11 Islamic State group targets in Syria. The missiles were launched from warships in the Caspian Sea, about 1,500 km (930 miles) away.⁹¹ Two months later Russian news agencies reported that Defense Minister Shoigu had informed President Putin, “We used *Kalibr* cruise missiles from the Rostov-on-Don submarine from the Mediterranean Sea.” A

⁸⁷ “Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the Period Until 2030,” 2017, translated by Anna Davis, U.S. Naval War College, Russian Maritime Studies Institute, paragraphs 41–44.

⁸⁸ “Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the Period Until 2030,” 2017, translated by Anna Davis, U.S. Naval War College, Russian Maritime Studies Institute, paragraph 30.

⁸⁹ Missile Defense Project, “SS-N-30A (3M-14 Kalibr),” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 11, 2016, last modified June 15, 2018, <https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ss-n-30a/>.

⁹⁰ Ankit Panda, “Report: Russia Developing 4,500 kilometer Kalibr-M Range Land-Attack Cruise Missile” *The Diplomat*, January 10, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/report-russia-developing-4500-kilometer-kalibr-m-range-land-attack-cruise-missile/>.

⁹¹ “Russian Missiles ‘Hit IS in Syria from Caspian Sea,’” BBC, October 7, 2015, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34465425>

Russian statement on Facebook amplified: “For the first time from an underwater position, a combined launch [of four] *Kalibr* sea-based cruise missiles was carried out by the submarine Rostov-on-Don.”⁹² *Kalibr* has since been used multiple times in combat in Syria, launched from RFN surface ships and submarines operating in the Mediterranean.

On balance, *Kalibr* has proved to be a very successful and useful weapon for the RFN. *Kalibr* provides Russia with a standoff system that can be used from the Caspian Sea, Black Sea, and Mediterranean into much of Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. It can influence the perceptions of how the countries around the Black Sea, especially those that are not NATO allies with a NATO article-five commitment, must view Russian capabilities. As a nuclear weapon it can hold all NATO capitals at risk.

2. *Poseidon* (NATO *Kanyon*)—Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV)

Putin and the Russian military establishment have revealed that they have under development a nuclear-powered underwater drone that is planned to deliver a conventional or nuclear warhead from unlimited range. This UUV is termed *Poseidon*, a name chosen by vote of the Russian citizenry in March 2018 (Figure 5). As described by multiple sources, including press releases from the Russian Ministry of Defense, *Poseidon* has been under development since 2000. It is a substantial weapon—more than 2 meters (6.5 ft) in diameter and an estimated 24 meters (79 feet) long, with an estimated speed in excess of 70 kts and an operating depth greater than 1000 meters (3,280 feet). Its nuclear power plant gives the weapon unlimited range. There are reports that the Russians are also developing a seabed launch option, in which mode it may be designated as *Skif*.⁹³


Putin is especially enamored with this weapon. In a 2-hour speech before both houses of the Russian Parliament on March 1, 2018, Putin presented, with accompanying videos, a new arsenal of Russian nuclear weapons. He described *Poseidon* as having low noise and high maneuverability and being practically invulnerable to the enemy. “The means to resist them today simply do not exist in the world.” Being equipped with either a 2-megaton nuclear or conventional warhead, it can hit a wide variety of targets, including aircraft carrier groups, coastal fortifications, and infrastructure.⁹⁴ The Russian press recently reported that the submarine *Belgorod* will test launch a *Poseidon* in the fall of 2020. In the

⁹² Christopher Cavas, “Russian Submarine Hits Targets in Syria,” *Defense News*, December 8, 2015, <https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2015/12/08/russian-submarine-hits-targets-in-syria/>.

⁹³ H. I. Sutton, “Poseidon Torpedo,” *Covert Shores*, February 22, 2019, http://www.hisutton.com/Poseidon_Torpedo.html.

⁹⁴ President of Russia Vladimir Putin, Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, March 1, 2018, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957>.

view of Russian strategists and engineers, *Poseidon* is immune to missile defense systems and thereby ensures a secure second-strike capability.⁹⁵



Source: H. I. Sutton, “Poseidon Torpedo,” Covert Shores, February 22, 2019, http://www.hisutton.com/Poseidon_Torpedo.html.

Figure 5. Kanyon/Poseidon Nuclear-Powered Nuclear-Armed Autonomous Underwater Vehicle

3. 3M22/Tsirkon (NATO SS-N-33)

The 3M22/*Tsirkon*, or the SS-N-33, is a maneuvering anti-ship hypersonic missile. On February 20, 2019, Putin stated the missile is capable of accelerating up to Mach 9 and destroying both sea and land targets within 1,000 km (540 nm) distance. He said it can be launched from surface vessels and from submarines, including those that were built for carrying *Kalibr* high-precision missiles.⁹⁶ On May 10, 2020, the Russian News Agency TASS reported that Deputy Minister of Defense Alexei Krivoruchko had announced that the *Tsirkon* would enter service at the turn of 2020–2021.⁹⁷

In addition to being a potent land-attack weapon, albeit at shorter ranges than *Kalibr*, *Tsirkon* poses an immediate threat as an *anti*-antisubmarine warfare weapon. Traditionally,

⁹⁵ Thomas Nilsen, “Russia’s ‘Doomsday Drone’ Prepares for Testing,” *The Barents Observer*, May 26, 2020, <https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2020/05/russia-prepares-testing-doomsday-drone>.

⁹⁶ President of Russia Vladimir Putin Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, February 20, 2019, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59863>.

⁹⁷ “Cruise Missiles Ministry of Defense, Army of the Russian Federation (RF Armed Forces),” TASS, May 10, 2020, <https://iz.ru/1008815/2020-05-08/v-minoborony-soobshchili-sroki-postupleniia-tirkona-na-vooruzhenie>.

submarines engaged in combat have relied on their stealth and quietness to defend themselves from surface and air forces prosecuting them. If evasion failed, the submarine would rely on torpedoes and, in decades past, topside mounted guns for offensive action against its surface protagonists. *Tsirkon* gives a RFN submarine the ability to engage a surface threat with a powerful weapon at considerable distance from what might truly be the last known position of the submarine.

C. “Analogous Response Redux”—The Submarines

1. Design Project 885/885M—*Yazen* and *Kazan* SSGNs

Despite building a large “blue water” surface fleet during the Gorshkov era, the Soviets traditionally favored the submarine for maritime warfare. As the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union collapsed, the Soviet fleet, including its substantial submarine force, fell into disrepair due to nonexistent military budgets and deferred maintenance. However, the plans for the next generation of nuclear-powered submarines were actively pursued in the Malakit Design Bureau of St. Petersburg. Given the perceived strategic advantages afforded the Soviets by the “Analogous Response” patrols and SS-N-21/LACM deployed off the U.S. east coast in the 1980s, Malakit evidently was given a high priority during that time for designing and building the Project 885/*Yazen* nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine (SSGN).


The *Yazen*-class is a formidable offensive platform. Approximately 393 feet long, displacing 11,800 tons submerged, the submarine is equipped with 10 torpedo tubes and 8 multipurpose vertical-launch tubes behind the sail. These tubes can accommodate the P-800 *Onyx* (NATO designator SS-N-26/*Strobile*) Mach 2.5 anti-ship missile. It is also reported that *Yazen* will be equipped with the *Tsirkon* hypersonic (Mach 9) anti-ship missile, which would make it an even more formidable offensive platform. The submarine is also armed with as many as 40 3M14/*Kalibr* (NATO designator SS-N-30) LACMs.⁹⁸ One analyst concludes that the Type 855 submarine armed with *Kalibrs*, with an estimated range of 1,600 nm, “could target East Coast U.S. cities from the mid-Atlantic.”⁹⁹

The lead unit of this class, *K-560 Severodvinsk* (Figure 6), was laid down at the Sevmas Shipyard on December 21, 1993, and launched on June 15, 2010—some 17 years

⁹⁸ Kyle Mizokami, “Russia’s Newest Yasen-Class Attack Submarines Are the Equal of America’s Subs,” *Foxtrot Alpha*, October 10, 2018, <https://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/russia-s-newest-yasen-class-attack-submarines-are-the-e-1829644713>.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, H. I. Sutton as quoted by Mizokami.

after construction had begun. *Severodvinsk* was commissioned for trial service on January 17, 2014.¹⁰⁰



Source: David Majumdar, "U.S. Navy Impressed with New Russian Attack Boat," USNI News, October 28, 2014, <https://news.usni.org/2014/10/28/u-s-navy-impressed-new-russian-attack-boat>.

Figure 6: Project 885 SSGN Severodvinsk

The Project 885-M/*Kazan* is a somewhat smaller (reportedly 10–12 meters shorter) than the lead unit of the class and has the same weapons configuration, albeit a smaller load (32 *Kalibr* vice 40). K-561 *Kazan* was launched at the Sevmash yard on March 31, 2017.¹⁰¹ The second unit of the Project 885-M, and third overall, K-573 *Novosibirsk*, was launched on December 25, 2019.¹⁰² According to Aleksandr Khrumchikin, deputy director of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, five additional *Kazan* submarines are under

¹⁰⁰ "The Russian Navy: A Historic Transition" (Washington: D.C. Office of Naval Intelligence, January 7, 2016), accessed April 3, 2020, <https://www.oni.navy.mil/News/Naval-Capabilities/Russia/>.

¹⁰¹ H. I. Sutton, "Yazen Class: Russia's Most Potent Submarines," *Covert Shores*, April 13, 2019, http://www.hisutton.com/Pr885_Severodvinsk_class.html.

¹⁰² Franz-Stefan Gady, "Russia Launches New *Yszen-M* Nuclear Attack Submarine," *The Diplomat*, January 6, 2020, <https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/russia-launches-new-yasen-m>.

various stages of construction.¹⁰³ TASS subsequently reported that contracts had been concluded to build two additional *Yasen-M* submarines to be laid down at Sevmash in 2020 and 2021, which would raise the total number of submarines to nine (see Table 2).¹⁰⁴ It was subsequently announced that the keels for *Yazen-M* units eight and nine were laid down at Sevmash on July 20, 2020.¹⁰⁵

Table 2. Project 885 and 885-M Submarines

Pennant Number	Name	Laid Down	Launched
K-560	Severodvinsk	21 December, 1993	15 June 2010
K-561	Kazan		31 March 2017
K-573	Novosibirsk	26 July 2013	25 December 2019
K-571	Krasnoyarsk	27 July 2014	
K-564	Arkhangelsk	19 March 2015	
	Perm	29 July 2016	
	Ulyanovsk	28 July 2017	
Unit #8	Voronezh	20 July 2020	
Unit #9	Vladivostok	20 July 2021	

Source: “The Russian *Yasen-M* Class Submarines Examined,” *FMSO OE Watch*, 08, issue 05, May 2018 (Mobile Edition), <https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/w/o-e-watch-mobile-edition-v1/22869/the-russian-yasen-m-class-submarines-examined/>.

On January 18, 2018, TASS announced that *Severodvinsk* had completed a full cycle of tests of the *Kalibr* and provided a very thorough description of its capabilities and performance:

Project 885 and 885-M U-boats for the first time in the history of the Russian Navy engage in non-nuclear deterrence due to universal vertical launchers which fire seaborne cruise missile and anti-ship missiles. Nuclear-powered cruise missile fourth generation submarines of projects

¹⁰³ “The Russian *Yasen-M* Class Submarines Examined,” *FMSO OE Watch*, 08, issue 05, May 2018 (Mobile Edition), <https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/w/o-e-watch-mobile-edition-v1/22869/the-russian-yasen-m-class-submarines-examined/>.

¹⁰⁴ Thomas Nilsen, “Russian Navy Orders Additional Two *Yasen-M* Submarines” *The Barents Observer*, May 18, 2020, <https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2019/07/russian-navy-orders-additional-two-yasen-m-submarines>.

¹⁰⁵ Atle Staalesen, “Russia Starts Construction of Two More Nuclear-Powered Super Subs” *The Barents Observer*, July 21, 2020, <https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2020/07/russia-starts-construction-of-two-more-nuclear-powered-super-subs>.

885 and 885-M are designed to destroy surface and underwater targets, as well as ground objects of the adversary.¹⁰⁶

Some analysts offer the conjecture that a *Kazan*-class submarine costs between \$1 and \$2 billion in equivalent U.S. dollars (an always dangerous comparison). Even at the lower end of an admittedly imprecise costing estimate, nine submarines would price out at \$9 billion, which is a substantial investment decision and indicates the priority Putin and the Russian leadership give to the program and its intended missions. It is expected that the *Yazen*-class submarines will be evenly assigned to the Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleets of the Russian Federation Navy. When all units are fully operational by the mid to late 2020s, the RFN would likely be able to keep at least one submarine in a deployed status at all times.

2. Project 09852/KC-139 *Belgorod*

The lead unit of this new class of Russian submarine, *Belgorod*, was also laid down in 1992, thereby providing another indicator of the Soviet and then Russian commitment to the “Analogous Response” mission. *Belgorod* is a one-of-a-kind “special projects” submarine that can launch a variety of unmanned underwater vehicles (Figure 7).¹⁰⁷ *Belogord* was finally launched from the Sevmash shipyard on April 23, 2019, in the midst of substantial Russian media coverage. President Putin had predicted the launch in his February 20 Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly and reportedly watched the proceedings via video link from a shipyard in St. Petersburg. At 184 meters in length, it is the longest submarine ever built and will be capable of carrying as many as six Kanyon/*Poseidon* Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV).

¹⁰⁶ “Project 885 Yasen-class SSGN Severodvinsk K-560 Completes Kalibr Tests,” Navy Recognition, January 15, 2018, <https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/news/defence-news/2018/january-2018-navy-naval-defense-news/5855-project-885-yasen-class-ssgn-severodvinsk-k-560-completes-kalibr-tests.html>

¹⁰⁷ Joseph Trevithick and Tyler Rogoway, “Analyzing the First Images of Russia’s Huge Doomsday Torpedo Carrying Special Mission Submarine,” The War Zone, April 24, 2019, <https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/27629/analyzing-the-first-images-of-russias-huge-doomsday-torpedo-carrying-special-missions-sub>.



Source: Joseph Trevithick and Tyler Rogoway, “Analyzing the First Images of Russia’s Huge Domsday Torpedo Carrying Special Mission Submarine,” *The War Zone*, April 24, 2019, <https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/27629/analyzing-the-first-images-of-russias-huge-doomsday-torpedo-carrying-special-missions-sub>.


Figure 7. Launch of Project 09852/KC-139 Belgorod Sevmasch Shipyard April 23, 2019

3. Project 09851/*Khabarovsk*

The RFN has reportedly ordered four *Kharbarovsk*-class nuclear-powered submarine drone-torpedo carriers, or SSDNs, which will be the operational platform for six to eight *Poseidon* UUVs (Figure 8). The four *Khabarovsk*s are to be assigned to the RFNs Northern and Pacific Fleets.¹⁰⁸ *Khabarovsk* is expected to be launched in the spring of 2020 and handed over to the RFN in 2022. The RFN is slated to receive as many as 30 *Poseidon* UUVs, the first production units arriving in 2027.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ Sebastien Roblin, “Russia Plans to Build Four Submarines Armed with Nuclear Drone Torpedoes,” *National Interest*, June 29, 2019, <https://nationalinterest.org/print/blog/buzz/russia-plans-build-four-submarines-armed-nuceat-drone-torpedoes>.

¹⁰⁹ Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia’s Second *Poseidon* Underwater Drone-Carrying Submarine to Be Launched in 2020,” *The Diplomat*, May 15, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/russias-second-poseidon-underwater-drone-carrying-submarine-to-be-launched-in-2020/>.



Source: H. I. Sutton, "Analysis - Russian Status-6 aka KANYON Nuclear Deterrence and Pr 09851 Submarine," Covert Shores, December 19, 2016, <http://www.hisutton.com/Analysis%20-%20Russian%20Status-6%20aka%20KANYON%20nuclear%20deterrence%20and%20Pr%2009851%20submarine.html>.

Figure 8. Artist's Conception of Project 09851/*Khabarovsk* and *Kanyon/Poseidon* UUV, leaked on Russian Television, November 9, 2015

D. "Analogous Response" Redux

As described above, Vladimir Putin has put in place a national and maritime policy and is acquiring the naval forces and weapons systems to reprise "Analogous Response" of the 1980s. The events in 2018–2019 related to the INF Treaty provide Putin, post facto, an overt reason for doing so. But the fact that these new submarines are now reaching operational status suggests that funding was approved and construction started around the time of Putin's Munich speech of 2007, in which he articulated a much more assertive Russian foreign policy.¹¹⁰

Long-standing Russian dissatisfaction with the INF Treaty has been noted. Although the United States had expended considerable diplomatic efforts to induce Russian compliance with the INF Treaty, on October 20, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from the INF Treaty, citing both Russia's violation and China's nonparticipation. He noted that both nations were expanding their forces of intermediate-range missiles, which would require the United States to develop these

¹¹⁰ Vladimir Putin Speech and Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 10, 2017, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034>.

weapons. The National Security Advisor, John Bolton, conveyed the U.S. intentions to Moscow on October 23, 2018.¹¹¹

President Vladimir Putin, in a Presidential Address to the Russian Federal Assembly on February 20, 2019, gave his response to the U.S. decision:

Using medium-range target missiles and deploying launchers in Romania and Poland that are for launching Tomahawk cruise missiles, the US has openly violated these clauses in the [INF] Treaty ... If they really are built and delivered to the European continent ... it will dramatically exacerbate the international security situation, and create a serious threat to Russia, because some of these missiles can reach Moscow in just 10 – 12 minutes. This is a very serious threat to us. In this case, we will be forced, I would like to emphasize this, we will be forced to respond with mirror or asymmetric actions. What does this mean? ... Russia will be forced to create and deploy weapons that can be used not only in the areas we are directly threatened from but also in areas that contain decision-making centres for the missile systems threatening us.¹¹²

As he had the previous year, Putin went on to describe a series of new Russian hypersonic, ballistic, cruise, and underwater missile systems and to introduce new ships to the Russian Navy—each posing a significantly enhanced nuclear threat, especially in the maritime domain.¹¹³

On August 2, 2019, Secretary of State Pompeo announced that the United States had formally withdrawn from the treaty, noting that “dating back to at least the mid-2000s, Russia developed, produced, flight tested and has now fielded multiple battalions of its non-compliant [SSC-8 or 9M729 ground-launched cruise] missile.”¹¹⁴ On August 18, the U.S. tested a ground-launched variant of the Tomahawk to a distance of more than 310 nm (or beyond the INF limit of 500 km).¹¹⁵

The Russians reacted pre-emptively, predictably, vocally, and immediately. In an interview with Interfax on August 1, the day before Secretary Pompeo’s announcement,

¹¹¹ Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia’s Second Poseidon Underwater Drone-Carrying Submarine to Be Launched in 2020,” *The Diplomat*, May 15, 2019, <https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/russias-second-poseidon-underwater-drone-carrying-submarine-to-be-launched-in-2020/>.

¹¹² President of Russia Vladimir Putin Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, February 20, 2019, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59863>.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴ Michael R. Pompeo, “U.S. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty on August 2, 2019,” U.S. Department of State Press Statement, August 2, 2019, <https://www.state.gov/u-s-withdrawal-from-the-inf-treaty-on-august-2-2019/>.

¹¹⁵ “DOD Conducts Ground Launch Cruise Missile Test,” U.S. Department of Defense Press Release, August 19, 2019, <https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/1937624/dod-conducts-ground-launch-cruise-missile-test/>.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, referencing President Putin’s February 20 Address to the Federal Assembly, raised a number of Russian concerns, including the following:

Question: You’ve said that the dismantlement of the INF Treaty is fraught with a crisis that may be similar to the Cuban Missile Crisis. What do you mean? Does this mean of U.S. ground-based nuclear missiles that are banned by the treaty are deployment [sic] in Europe, we may consider an option of a symmetric response and the deployment of similar missiles closer to the U.S., with the same time of flight?

Answer: Yes, every option will be on the table. Of course, flight time is the key issue. ... Launches of such delivery vehicles don’t allow early warning systems to establish what kind of missile has been launched—conventional or nuclear ... This scenario will force us to take measures, I’d rather not dwell on their nature, considering that they remain strictly abstract and hypothetical, to create a similar level of threat to our potential adversaries.¹¹⁶

After the Tomahawk test, during a press conference with Finnish President Sauli Niinistö in Helsinki on August 21 President Putin reiterated the threat this test represented: “Launches of this missile can be carried out from systems already in Romania and Poland. All you have to do is change the software ... this entails the emergence of new threats for us *that we must react to accordingly* [emphasis added].”¹¹⁷

E. Putin’s Messaging—The Third Element of his Maritime Policy

These public statements are but the most recent evidence of an ongoing Russian campaign that is tied directly to the third element of Putin’s maritime policy. To wit:

- The application of all instruments of Russian state power—“a set of interrelated political, diplomatic, legal, military, economic, information and other measures...” to prevent and reduce the level of threat.¹¹⁸

Submarines by their nature are a very difficult strategic, operational, and tactical adversary. Nations and their navies wishing to employ them pursue every possible engineering innovation—nuclear power being the most prominent example—and pursue

¹¹⁶ Sergei Ryabkov, “Every Option Will Be on the Table as Regards Deployment of U.S. Missiles,” interview with Interfax August 1, 2019, www.interfax.com/interview.asp?id=918555.

¹¹⁷ “Putin Slams U.S. Missile Test, Downplays Moscow Protests, Bids to Reassure on Radiation,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, August 21, 2019, <https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-to-hold-talks-in-helsinki-with-finnish-president/30120768.html>.

¹¹⁸ See “Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the Period Until 2030,” 2017, translated by Anna Davis, U.S. Naval War College, Russian Maritime Studies Institute, paragraphs 39–41.

every possible technical and tactical advantage and try their very best to keep anything related to submarines a closely guarded secret. During the Cold War the United States spent billions of dollars in highly classified intelligence programs trying to discern such facts about Soviet submarines.

The Russians and their Soviet predecessors are often characterized as being excessively focused on security and secrecy. With the possible exception of the later days of Mikhail Gorbachev and the chaos of Boris Yeltsin, “openness” has not been a readily identifiable characteristic of governance by the Kremlin. What is most unusual, then, about Putin’s reprise of “Analogous Response” is that he and his military establishment have been so open in displaying new construction submarines and describing in detail new weapons systems, even to a point of providing photography and YouTube videos. Figures 4–6 above were released or leaked to the public by Russian sources. Putin has over many years refined a Soviet maritime strategy from the eighties; developed and deployed modern, capable submarines equipped with cruise missiles and nuclear underwater drones; and openly revealed them to place the United States itself under a new and different threat.

Putin and his senior military and foreign policy officials have used (1) diplomacy (e.g., arms control); (2) messaging in official and unofficial forums; (3) the public exposure of the naval forces and the characteristics and missions of their weapons, all of which were designed and built to execute the policy; and (4) very visible and aggressive naval operations in the Northern and Pacific Fleets as well as the Mediterranean to warn the United States coherently and explicitly that CONUS itself is now facing a new and qualitatively different strategic threat. These are the nonviolent measures of “strategic containment” that are “carried out constantly by the federal executive bodies of the Russian Federation in close cooperation with international organizations ... in order to achieve success in conducting negotiations...strengthen interstate ties ... or withdrawing from international obligations....”¹¹⁹

F. Limits to Putin’s Aspirations

There are, however, at least several competing factors that may limit Putin’s aspirations for doing so:

- The short- and long-term effects of the coronavirus pandemic on Russian society, its military establishment, and the Russian military-industrial complex;
- The macroeconomic impacts in Russia of Putin’s induced price war on oil;

¹¹⁹ *Military Encyclopedic Dictionary*, s.v. “Voennyi Entsikopedicheski Slovar’,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, accessed April 17, 2020, <http://encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/details.htm?id=14206@morfDictionary>.

- The political ramifications of Putin’s strategic overreach in Ukraine and Syria; and
- The resultant 5-year-long recession in Russia, which has reduced the buying power of the average Russian by 20%.

As of this writing, the coronavirus pandemic is having a significant impact on Russia. In responding to the coronavirus pandemic in Russia, the Ministry of Defense has concentrated its efforts on medical force protection and disinfectant units. There is at present very limited reporting on the actual numbers of the coronavirus cases in the Russian military, which is unsurprising because readiness of a nation’s military is closely held information in any country. The Ministry of Defense, however, has placed greater restrictions than normal on access to military installations countrywide. Nevertheless, it may be inferred from the relatively larger number of reported cases in some of the oblasts and cities with large troop concentrations—Moscow, Moscow Oblast, St Petersburg, Murmansk, Tula, and Riyazan—that the Russian military and the defense industrial infrastructure are not immune from the virus.

Disinfection units of the Russian Armed Forces have provided a lot of support to major Russian aerospace and defense production factories, including the navy. Because they do not appear to be doing this at other civilian plants, it demonstrates a serious effort to keep all these plants up and running at as high a level as they can in the COVID-19 environment.

The Sevmash Shipyard has been mentioned prominently as the single construction site for Putin’s “Analogous Response” submarines, and the nearby White Sea contains some of the test ranges for naval weapons, like those examined above. Shipbuilding and weapons test and evaluation are not the kinds of activities that might adjust easily to “social distancing” or whatever viral prophylactic measures the Russians might put in place. Accordingly, the pandemic may be one factor that slows the scheduled completion and operationalization of RFN “Analogous Response” submarines and weapons. In a message to the employees of the shipyard April 24, the Director General, M. A. Budnichenko, prioritized the yard’s focus during the pandemic as saving lives, ensuring the maintenance of the welfare of each employee, and “as far as possible in this situation, fulfill the state defense order.” All mass events at the yard have been canceled, and Budnichenko reported that “a little more than half the enterprise’s staff in now working in production.”¹²⁰ Northern Fleet Chem Bio Forces disinfected SEVMASH on the May 8.

A second factor affecting Putin’s aspirations is his spectacularly ill-timed price war over crude oil, which came precisely at the time of the global pandemic; the glut of Russian,

¹²⁰ “Message from the Director General M. A. Budnichenko,” April 24, 2020, www.sevmash.ru/rus/-cpvod-19.html.

Saudi, and U.S. crude oil on the world market; and the emerging global recession. Reduced demand depressed prices well below those necessary for Russia to realize any kind of profit on its major source of foreign exchange. Because exports of oil and natural gas comprise the largest single component of Russia's economy, any prolonged depression of crude oil prices will have a significantly negative effect on Russia.

Third, the average Russian citizen is having a hard time of it. In addition to having to deal with the coronavirus, the average citizen's purchasing power has declined by 20% over the past 5 years due to inflation. The *Moscow Times* recently reported that in an independent poll taken by the Levada Center in late April, Putin's approval rating hit a historic low of 59%, with 33% of respondents disapproving his work. The latest results mark Putin's lowest approval rating recorded by the Levada Center since September 1999, when he had a 53% approval rating shortly after being appointed prime minister. Putin has been criticized in recent months over his decentralized response to the coronavirus pandemic and for what critics say is a lack of adequate measures to prevent economic collapse as the country remains under lockdown. In April, Levada said that more Russian respondents approved of local officials' coronavirus response efforts than they did of Putin's. A recent state poll has also found that Russians' trust in Putin has hit a 14-year low of 28%, the same figure as in Levada's latest results.¹²¹

The pervasive economic dislocations of the late 1980s that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union are not about to be recreated in today's Russia. But as these current economic and social impacts percolate through Russian society, Putin's national and international standing could be tarnished, and Russia may necessarily recede from the aspirational position in the world Putin has long sought. Alternatively and more dangerously, Putin may seek to precipitate a crisis to galvanize the Russian citizenry and mobilize popular support for him and his leadership.

G. “Analogous Response”—Then and Now

Disinformation and deception are major elements of Russian strategy, policy, and doctrine. It might be argued that Putin's openness in revealing the submarines and weapons, their characteristics and missions, is part of his sophisticated strategy to induce, seduce, or coerce the United States and its Navy to divert its attention away from power projection into the Russian homeland—recall Putin's concern in his Maritime Policy over “Global Strike”—and refocus and redeploy at least some naval forces for homeland defense and anti-submarine warfare. But while his intent is clear, Putin and the Russian Federation Navy will never fully operationalize this threat.

¹²¹ “Putin's Approval Rating Drops to Historic Low: Poll,” May 6, 2020, *Moscow Times*, <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/05/06/putins-approval-rating-drops-to-historic-low-poll-a70199>.

This deprecatory argument is belied by the simple rubric used throughout this paper; that is, examine Russian intent by what they say, what they buy, and what they do. Since the 2007 Munich speech Putin has been very open and very assertive. Recall Putin's missive to Ambassador Burns in 2005: "You Americans need to listen more ... You can't have everything your way anymore. We can have effective relations, but not just on your terms."¹²² "Analogous Response" submarines are in commission, and more are on the building ways at Sevmash. Missiles have been tested, and some, like the *Kalibr*, used in combat. Putin is clearly committed to "Analogous Response" in 2020. It is real and, unlike its predecessor from the 1980s, it is not just going to fade away.

A core element of Soviet and now Russian military doctrine is holding the U.S. under a nuclear threat equal to the threat posed by the United States and NATO. "Analogous Response" in the 1980s and reprised in the 2020s provides the military capability to do so. Certainly, at the end of Gorbachev era and through Yeltsin's governance, there was a strategic pause as submarines were laid up, construction was halted, and the economy faltered. Yet the Russians have invested (at one time fitfully) in new classes of submarines and weapons for more than three decades to reestablish and operationalize this threat. "Analogous Response" in the 21st century articulates with, and executes the Russian concept of, "strategic containment" in peacetime and provides Putin and his military commanders a potent warfighting capability to coerce U.S. and NATO decisions.


¹²² William J. Burns, "How the U.S.-Russian Relationship Went Bad," *The Atlantic*, April 2019, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/04/william-j-burns-putin-russia/583255/>.

5. Part IV. Implications—Putin’s Endgame

“.....building at the Continental expense a fleet of sufficient force, for the protection of these colonies, and for employing them in such a manner and places as will most effectively annoy our enemies....”

Resolution of the Rhode Island State Assembly, August 26, 1775

Figure 9 describes the endgame Vladimir Putin aspires to realize—hold the CONUS at risk with submarine-launched cruise missiles and autonomous weapons as an “Analogous Response” to his perceived threat of the return of U.S. intermediate-range ballistic missiles or cruise missiles IRBMs to Europe. This final section comprises what he might hope to accomplish and how best the United States might respond.



Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies Missile Threat Project, <https://missilethreat.csis.org/>.

Figure 9. Russian Cruise Missile Threat to the East Coast

A. Putin’s Endgame

By deploying conventional and nuclear *Kalibr* cruise missile and the *Poseidon* underwater unmanned vehicle to the maritime theater, Putin aspires to alter the existing military balance in Europe and the maritime balance at sea. When deployed to the Atlantic and Pacific maritime approaches to the United States, these new missiles will more directly, more immediately, and more symmetrically respond to any deployment of U.S. intermediate-range nuclear systems within range of the Russian homeland. Putin’s response directly links conventional or nuclear strikes on the U.S. homeland with the

initiation of nuclear or conventional warfare with Russia. As a result, Putin is espousing a concept that the United States and the U.S. Navy have argued all along—the naval forces of both NATO and Russia will have an even greater impact on the military balance in Europe than once might have been the case.

That Putin is a self-described judo master is often used as a metaphor for how he has gone about shaping the competition with the United States. Judo enables a practitioner to employ moves and countermoves that take advantage of an opponent's superior strengths, keep the opponent off balance, and strike decisive blows. By seeking in his Naval Policy to establish the Russian Federation Navy as the world's *second most powerful Navy*, Putin is acknowledging that the U.S. Navy is a superior opponent. Putin's "Analogous Response Redux" represents the capability for a series of moves and countermoves in peacetime and, in the event of conflict, to keep the U.S. Navy off balance. His goal is for the U.S. Navy to redirect assets and resources to the defense of the U.S. homeland and away from, in Putin's assessment, the much more threatening offensive maritime posture directed at Russia.

The paradigm for U.S. participation in global conflict has been one in which the United States classically takes the war to its enemies' territories. Two abroad oceans have largely insulated the continental United States from attack. That is not to suggest that our wartime enemies did not try. The Royal Navy successfully reached America's shores in our two wars with Great Britain—hence the resolution of the Rhode Island legislature quoted above. The Japanese famously attacked Pearl Harbor and may have been able to attack the West Coast had it not been for the Battle of Midway. German submarines caused considerable damage to shipping off the East Coast during the early stages of World War II.

Defense of the U.S. homeland has not been ignored. During the years between World Wars I and II, the United States spent considerable resources on coastal defense artillery sites. The North American Air Defense Command was established for the specific purpose of defending against air attack. In the early decades of the Cold War, surface-to-air missile sites ringed major American ports and cities. Air defense interceptor squadrons remain on alert to defend against penetrating bombers to this day.

Defense of the homeland comes at considerable expense and often competes for resources with the U.S. military and its paradigm for taking the war to the enemy. Thus, forward deployment remains the preferred and essential element of U.S. strategy since World War II.

Figure 10 shows a portion of a video of recent U.S. and NATO naval operations displayed during President Putin's annual meeting with the Russian Defense Ministry Board on December 18, 2018. A U.S. Navy EF-18G/Prowler is being launched from the USS *Harry S. Truman* during NATO Exercise "Trident Juncture," which was held a few months earlier in the fall of 2018 and involved operations north of the Arctic Circle. The

display of this video clip at the meeting of the Russian Federation’s senior military leadership emphasizes the threats that are identified in Putin’s 2017 maritime strategy and naval policy:

There are existing and emerging new risks and threats to the national security of the Russian Federation on the World Ocean, the main of which are: a) the aspiration of a range of states, primarily the United States of America (USA) and its allies, to dominate on the World Ocean, including the Arctic, and to achieve overwhelming superiority of their naval forces.¹²³



Source: RG.RU, “Russian Gazette,” December 18, 2018.

Figure 10. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chief of The General Staff Valery Gerasimov at the Extended Meeting of the Russian Ministry of Defense, December 18, 2018

In the event of crisis or conflict in Europe, Putin and his General Staff planners fully expect the United States to redeploy substantial CONUS-based ground and air military units to Europe. The U.S. Navy plans to surge major elements of its fleet to forward operating areas. To counter what they observe to be expected U.S. reinforcement to Europe and forward surge of naval forces, Putin appears intent on superimposing a credible, immediate conventional or nuclear threat to CONUS. His countermove would place this threat behind U.S. forward lines of defense. The *Kalibr/Tsirkon* combination would effectively extend the Russian anti-access/area-denial envelope to the U.S. east and west

¹²³ “Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Naval Operations for the Period Until 2030,” 2017, translated by Anna Davis, U.S. Naval War College, Russian Maritime Studies Institute, 24.

coasts. By doing so, Putin evidently hopes to “freeze” significant U.S. naval and air defense resources to take the pressure off the Russians.

A conventional version of the SS-N-30/*Kalibr* SLCM gives Putin and his General Staff planners more options in the event of conflict. Conventional cruise missile attacks against the departure ports, naval and air bases, and military infrastructure could disrupt European reinforcement and forward defense. Such attacks on CONUS may have only a nuisance value. However, both the United States and Russia absorbed much from the political, economic, social, and political impacts from the precise targeting of hijacked airliners of New York and Washington, D.C., on September 11, 2001.

Furthermore, Russian cruise missiles pose an omnidirectional threat. Putin’s “Analogous Response” submarines, *Severomorsk* and the *Kazens*, can target their SS-N-30/*Kalibr* SLCMs on European targets, as can the combat-proven Kilo diesel-powered submarines assigned to the RFN’s European Fleets as well as to the eastern Mediterranean. In another manifestation of “strategic containment,” all the European and North American capitals of NATO members can be at risk, as had been the case with the Soviet SS-20 IRBM in the 1980s.

We have heretofore attributed to Soviet and Russian military decision-making a warfighting mindset (i.e., what the Soviets and now the Russians do and buy in peacetime always has a clear warfighting cast). What we observed in 1983 and reprised much more forcefully in the Putin era represents a reinforcement of that mindset. Putin’s senior Russian political and military leadership had as its exclusive experience intense political and military competition with the United States during the Cold War. Consistent with its concept of “strategic containment,” Putin’s maritime doctrine policy and strategy, and the deployment of very capable, modern, quiet nuclear submarines armed with threatening weapons into the Atlantic and Pacific, may portend the greatest purpose of these weapons—influencing and manipulating the peacetime decision-making processes of the United States and NATO.

This discussion leads to a final implication, one touched upon briefly in earlier sections of this paper. It has been noted that Soviet military doctrine was not sympathetic to notions of limited nuclear war. Based upon their experiences in the two world wars, taking a cue from their Soviet predecessors, Putin and his strategic advisers appear to have concluded that war among modern industrialized states will be total war. No longer able to mass enormous numbers of forces on their own, Russia instead seeks to use a “strategic containment” strategy in peacetime and conflict to shape outcomes and control the escalation ladder.

On June 2, 2020 President Putin published for the first time in an unclassified venue “A Decree of the Russian Federation on the Tenets of Russian Federation National Policy in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence.” Paragraph 17 of the policy states:

The Russian Federation reserves the right to employ nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, and in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation using conventional weapons, when the nation's very existence is threatened.¹²⁴

This policy is entirely consistent with Putin's strategy, policies, and doctrines since 2015 and appears to have at its origins General Staff observations and assessments from as long ago as Desert Storm (Part 2), amplified by Putin's concerns expressed over the years. Putin's "launch-on-warning" policy requires a zero-defect indications-and-warning system to detect a ballistic missile launch and thereby enable a Russian nuclear response. As documented in Part 1, the Soviet warning system deployed for this purpose proved to be unreliable in at least one case.

Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed at sea for immediate use against the United States and its European allies convey an immediate readiness to use these weapons to coerce or intimidate before or during any phase of conflict in the execution of Putin's nuclear policy. As described in his nuclear policy and developed in his maritime and military doctrine, Putin is developing and deploying these weapons to intimidate Russia's adversaries and coerce them to act the way the Russians want them to act in peacetime, as well as in any level of conflict.

B. The U.S. Response

The U.S. has a number of options for dealing with Putin's "Analogous Response Redux," including the following:

1. Ignore the Archer: Hope the threat goes away as it did in 1989, as Putin's political support erodes and his economic difficulties become more pervasive.
2. Observe the Archer: Use the moribund arms control framework to negotiate the problem away or establish mutually acceptable boundaries.
3. Shoot the Arrow: Focus on air defense of the cruise missile threat.
4. Kill the Archer: Re-emphasize the Navy's most traditional and arguably first mission of "sea control" to defend the seaward approaches to the United States.

Option 1 is entirely unrealistic, as Putin certainly is not going to eliminate the capability he and his defense establishment have committed such substantial resources to develop. Nor is any possible successor likely to cede Putin's perceived strategic advantages. Option 2, a resuscitation of the INF Treaty, does not appear to be a high priority

¹²⁴ "Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on the Tenets of Russian Federation National Policy in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence," Number 355, June 2, 2020, Kremlin, Moscow (English translation from original Russian).

for either Putin or the U.S. administration. Regarding Option 3, General Terrence O’Shaughnessy, Commander U.S. Northern Command and the North American Air Defense Command, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 13, 2020, about his command’s focus on the cruise missile threat:

In order to effectively defend the homeland, USNORTHCOM and NORAD have developed a Homeland Defense Design (HDD) consisting of three major elements: a layered sensing grid for domain awareness, an adaptive architecture for joint all-domain command and control (JADC2), and new defeat mechanisms for advanced threats, including cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons, and small unmanned aerial systems. These three elements are vital to deterring and defeating advanced threats to the homeland, and USNORTHCOM and NORAD are moving with sense of profound urgency to bring these capabilities to the fight.¹²⁵

As regards Option 4, the United States and U.S. Navy have dealt successfully with the vexing problem of enemy submarines operating off the East Coast for more than 100 years. Wartime ASW operations in World War I and World War II were not an immediate success, as the U.S. Navy was not well prepared when the war began. In January 1942, shortly after Pearl Harbor, the German Navy initiated Operation Drumbeat, which targeted shipping in the western Atlantic. From January to August, Axis submarines, some of which famously operated within visual range of the U.S. east coast, sank 609 ships totaling 3.1 million tons and resulting in the loss of thousands of lives, mainly those of merchant mariners, against a loss of only 22 U-boats. It was not until mid-1943 that the U.S. Navy and Merchant Marines turned the tide with:

- An institutional focus and prioritization of ASW directed by the highest level of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations (Tenth Fleet).
- Construction of low-cost, mass-produced destroyer escorts with a principal ASW mission.
- Application of convoy tactics to derive strength from numbers.
- Commitment of long-range aircraft to fill the air gap between CONUS and Europe.
- Rapid application of technology, specifically radar that rendered the snorkeling submarine vulnerable.
- Successful exploitation of German naval codes to locate submarine wolf packs.

¹²⁵ Statement of General Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, Commander U.S. Northern Command and the North American Air Defense Command, before the Senate Armed Service Committee, February 13 2020, 9.

- Simply producing more merchant ships than German submarines were able to sink.

Final victory in the Battle of the Atlantic was achieved at great cost. Between 1939 and 1945, 3,500 Allied merchant ships (totaling 14.5 million gross tons) and 175 Allied warships were sunk, and some 72,200 Allied naval and merchant seamen lost their lives.¹²⁶

The United States and the U.S. Navy did not lose its focus on anti-submarine warfare during the Cold War, as the strategic requirement for ASW was reinforced by the deployment of Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines to both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. ASW-focused surface ships, dedicated marine patrol aircraft (P-2 and P-3), shipborne aircraft (S-3 and ASW helicopters), nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), broad-area acoustic surveillance systems, and an integrating Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS) gave Navy commanders a high degree of confidence in being able to detect and track Soviet submarines, especially those posing a strategic nuclear threat to CONUS. The threat envelope posed by *Kalibr*-configured submarines is not unlike the deployment areas of Soviet *Yankee* SSBNs in the 1970s and early 1980s.

As the threat posed by the Soviet Union eroded in the late 1980s, the U.S. Navy sustained a significant reduction in its overall force levels, especially ASW-capable surface ships (e.g., Spruance-class destroyers). In the intervening years, the Navy has also been called on to forward deploy carrier battle groups, submarines, and surface combatants, which are now Tomahawk equipped, for the power-projection/forward-presence mission set. The geographic Combatant Commanders have a seemingly insatiable appetite for naval forces deployed to their theaters. Although the Navy has developed major shipbuilding and aircraft procurement plans, there do not appear to be sufficient ships to execute its traditional “Forward Presence” mission and simultaneously maintain continuity on Russian submarines operating within cruise missile range of CONUS. Shore-based broad area search systems (e.g., SOSUS) have been dismantled, as have the fleet-based integrating ocean-surveillance nodes.

Herein the metaphor of Putin the judo master is reinforced—using an erroneously perceived weakness against strength as a countermove. With the deployment of one RFN submarine armed with the advanced weaponry openly revealed to the West, Putin hopes to reverse engineer the underlying strategy of the Reagan defense buildup of the 1980s. In the case of “Analogous Response Redux,” this causes the United States to redirect substantial amounts of R&D time and intellectual energy, as well as redeploy operational resources, to defend against this threat.

¹²⁶ David White, *Bitter Ocean: The Battle of the Atlantic, 1939–1945* (New York, Simon & Schuster 2008), 2.

Analogous Response Redux is intimately tied to Putin’s overarching strategy of reasserting Russia as a world power. Putin’s demands for a rightful place of prominence on the world stage is reinforced by Putin’s rhetoric, the nuclear weapons he is acquiring, and their deployment to the approaches of its greatest adversary, the United States.

Dealing with Analogous Response Redux is well within the capabilities of the United States and the U.S. Navy. As has been noted by a number of serious naval analysts,¹²⁷ the U.S. Navy must recommit its technical skills, operational talent, and resources to recapture the anti-submarine warfare competencies proven—at great cost—during two world wars and, most recently, the Cold War. Vladimir Putin aspires to alter the maritime balance. If the U.S. Navy is to continue to execute its founding mandate as resolved by the Rhode Island State Assembly in 1775, it has a strategic imperative to do so.

¹²⁷ Owen Cote, “The Third Battle: Innovation in the U.S. Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle with Soviet Submarines,” *Naval War College Newport Papers* 16 (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2003). Robert C. Manke, “Overview of U.S. Navy Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) Organization during the Cold War Era,” Technical Report 11,890 (Newport, RI: Naval Undersea Warfare Center Division, August 12, 2008). Bryan Clark, “The Emerging Era in Undersea Warfare” (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2015). James R. Fitzgerald and Richard F. Pittenger, “ASW: Will We Ever Learn?” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 145, no. 4 (April 2019). Joel Holwitt, “Sub vs Sub: ASW Lessons from the Cold War,” *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* 145, no. 10 (October 2019).

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