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EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

Welcome to the eighteenth volume of the *Japan Studies Review* (JSR), an annual peer-reviewed journal sponsored by the joint efforts of the Asian Studies Program at Florida International University and the Southern Japan Seminar. *JSR* continues to be both an outlet for publications related to Southern Japan Seminar events and a journal that encourages submissions from a wide range of scholars in the field.

This year's journal features five original articles. Takehiko Kojima explores the correlation between Enlightenment ideals and Japanese folklore while offering an alternative analysis of Yanagita Kunio's ideals. Kimiko Akita and Rick Kenney discuss the misuse of metaphors in Japanese war propaganda in the history of Japanese State Shinto. Hideo Watanabe gives an account of the lives of James Curtis Hepburn and Guido Verbeck's contributions to the modernization of Meiji Japan. Gabriela Romeu sheds light on the heated debate over the Japanese history textbook controversy. Subramaniam Ananthram, Richard Grainger, and Hideo Tominaga together present the results of a study on Japanese business managers engaged in globalized business affairs.

This issue also includes two featured essays. Kinko Ito presents her research on ethnographic characteristics of the Ainu—the indigenous peoples of Northern Japan. Daniel Métraux discusses the possible threat of war over the Senkaku Island dispute between Japan and China.

Included in this issue are three book reviews. Martha Chaiklin reviews *Defining Engagement: Japan and Global Contexts, 1640-1868* by Robert Hellyer. Daniel Métraux discusses waves of new Japanese religions in his review of *Establishing the Revolutionary: An Introduction to New Religions in Japan* by Birgit Staemmler and Ulrich Dehn. Laura Sullivan highlights Alan Tansmann's idea of the power of aesthetics to transform a culture in her review of *The Aesthetics of Japanese Fascism*.

Additionally, a special section for translations is featured in this issue for the first time. S. Yumiko Hulvey translated a selection from Japanese to English of *Path of Dreams* written by Kurahashi Yumiko.

Submissions for *JSR* are accepted on an ongoing basis throughout the year. Articles, essays, or book reviews on topics dealing with Japan or comparative studies can be sent as email attachment to asian@fiu.edu.

Steven Heine

Re: Submissions, Subscriptions, and Comments

Submissions for publication, whether articles, essays, translations or book reviews, should be made in electronic formats, preferably Word for Windows via email attachment (please inquire about other formats). The editor and members of the editorial board will referee all submissions.

Annual subscriptions are \$35.00 (US). Please send a check or money order payable to *Florida International University* to:

c/o Steven Heine, Professor of Religious Studies and History
Director of the Asian Studies Program
Florida International University
Modesto A. Maidique Campus, SIPA 505
Miami, FL 33199

Professor Heine's office number is 305-348-1914. Faxes should be sent to 305-348-6586 and emails sent to asian@fiu.edu.

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All comments and feedback on the publications appearing in *Japan Studies Review* are welcome.

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Articles

**MISLEADING YANAGITA KUNIO:
A NEGLECTED INTELLECTUAL LINEAGE BETWEEN
ENLIGHTENMENT THOUGHT AND JAPANESE FOLKLORE¹**

Takehiko Kojima
Florida International University

The purpose of the article is twofold. The first aim is to offer an unconventional interpretation of the texts of Yanagita Kunio (1875–1962), an influential Japanese intellectual popularly known as the founder of the discipline of folklore (*minzokugaku*). I argue that, notwithstanding the popular conception of Yanagita as a chief advocate of Japanese exceptionalism, he can be characterized as an intellectual heir to the European—especially British and French—Enlightenment tradition. Such a suggestion certainly sounds either mistaken or banal. It is mistaken because Yanagita is often conceived as one of the conservative nationalists with Romantic inclination who emerged precisely in reaction to tendentious claims of Enlightenment universalism. It is banal because no serious modern Japanese thinker, regardless of his or her ideological orientation, is totally free from the sway of the Enlightenment tradition that profoundly transformed the global intellectual landscape. However, I believe that the influence of Enlightenment thought on his intellectual project is substantial and consequential to the extent that without taking the former into consideration, the nature of the latter cannot be fully grasped. Not only the

¹ This article was originally presented as “Misreading Yanagita Kunio: A Neglected Intellectual Lineage between Enlightenment Thought and Japanese Folklore” at the Southern Japan Seminar and Midwest Japan Seminar Joint Meeting, February 18, 2012. I changed the part of the title from “Misreading” to “Misleading” at the suggestion of Steven Heine to capture the double sense of the latter term—that is, Yanagita’s texts are misleading, which results in many misleading interpretations of his intellectual project. The revised manuscript was finalized in April of the same year, but my further research has revealed a less straightforward intellectual lineage from the Enlightenment idea of human sciences to Yanagita’s *minzokugaku*, mediated by the philosophies of science and history underlying Victorian anthropology and German cultural sciences that emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century.

methodology but also the substance of Yanagita's *minzokugaku* reveals an influence, direct or not, from the thoughts of such Enlightenment luminaries as Montesquieu, Rousseau, Adam Smith, Malthus, John Stuart Mill, and Marx. That is not to say that his thought is merely a reflection or refraction of European Enlightenment thought. Rather, it is remarkable of his thought that he critically and selectively appropriates those thinkers' ideas and weaves them into his own.²

The second aim is to consider, if the connection indeed exists between Yanagita and Enlightenment thought, the question as to why it has long been underemphasized, if not entirely missed, by his followers and critics alike. The lapse is even more perplexing, given the fact that probably few Japanese thinkers' texts are so meticulously, if somewhat uncritically, studied by their followers and are constantly subjected to critical scrutiny by critics, both Japanese and international. The second purpose, therefore, of this article is to give a plausible answer to the question. To anticipate the answer, it is because both his followers and critics often read his texts *partially* in both senses of the term. In other words, it may be the case that the vast body of his texts have been selectively read and interpreted to cram his equivocal voice into neatly demarcated but interconnected geocultural ("Japanese"), ideological ("conservative" or "nationalist"), and disciplinary ("folklore" or "ethnology") categories. As a result, a dialectical aspect of his thought tends to be underappreciated. In fact, one can plausibly argue that his *minzokugaku* is precisely a self-conscious attempt to relativize various boundaries that divide humanity, human life, and human science into discrete compartments. Many of his followers and critics alike misread his texts, partly in an attempt to suppress his equivocal voice. This is done for the sake of shielding their own privileged subjectivity from serious challenge that the equivocality of Yanagita's texts may pose.

I have used the word "misread," but probably that is too strong a word because it suggests that there is another correct way to read his texts

² Kazuko Tsurumi, "Sōzōsei wo dō yatte sodateruka," *Korekushon Tsurumi Kazuko Mandara IV, Tsuchi no maki Yanagita Kunio ron* (Tokyo: Fujiwara Shoten, 1998), p. 35. Yanagita's intellectual debt is not limited to the Enlightenment tradition. As Tsurumi points out, he weaves an assortment of thoughts, ranging from European literary works, folklore, and ethnography to Japanese classics such as Motoori Norinaga and Hirata Atsutane, into "a seamless patchwork" with "fuzzy boundaries."

and retrieve the authentic meaning of them. After all, any text is open to multiple interpretations, and each reader has to make sense out of it. My own interpretation is but another attempt to make sense of Yanagita's texts, and I do not claim it to be a more authentic one, however authenticity may be defined. My claim is that it has always been possible to read Yanagita in a different but equally plausible way, but both his followers and critics overlooked such a possibility for some reason that is not trivial to those of us who face the difficult task of navigating the Scylla of Western universalism and the Charybdis of cultural particularism. Such partial reading certainly reflects inevitable difficulty common to any interpretation of such a complex thinker as Yanagita, but it may also be related to the very problem he himself tackled almost one century ago—the division of the world into “progressive” and “stagnant” spaces and of humanity into the subject and object of knowledge/politics. In that sense, I hope, the misreading of Yanagita's texts, as much as the texts themselves, constitutes an interesting topic even for those who are not familiar with his works.

The remainder of the article is divided into three sections. The first section reviews competing interpretations of Yanagita's intellectual legacy. Although there is general acknowledgment about his academic contribution to Japanese folklore studies, the political or ideological aspect of his intellectual project has been a matter of substantial controversy. Especially, his complicity with Japanese nationalism and fascism has been the center of a recent literature on him and *minzokugaku*. The second section offers a broad picture of a possible intellectual lineage between Yanagita and Enlightenment thinkers such as Rousseau, Adam Smith, Malthus, and John Stuart Mill. The section is followed by a brief speculation on why such a lineage is consistently neglected by both his followers and critics.

Yanagita and Japanese Nationalism

To appreciate fully the significance of Yanagita's intellectual lineage from the Enlightenment, it is necessary to situate it in the context of long-standing debates on his legacy. Yanagita is a complex thinker and his ambivalent attitude toward modernity haunts both his career and writings, which verge precariously upon the boundaries between literature and science, Romanticism and rationalism, aesthetics and politics, conservatism and progressivism, obscurantism and enlightenment, and poetic imagination and scientific rigor. As a result, it is difficult to classify his thought into any preexisting category. Not surprisingly, the legacy of his intellectual project has been a subject of substantial controversy, and in Japan the interpretation

of his texts has become a sort of cottage industry. Furthermore, the past two and a half decades witnessed a renewed interest in his writings among Anglophone scholars. Unlike previous scholarship in Yanagita that largely focused on his achievement as the founder of Japanese folklore, the new scholarship turns a critical eye to the ideological dimension of his thought, especially its complicity with Japanese nationalism and fascism.

It seems to be Peter Dale's *The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness* (1986) that set the tone. In this penetrating but excessively dismissive study of the so-called *nihonjinron* (theory of the Japanese), Yanagita appears, along with Nishida Kitarō and his other contemporaries, as one of "[t]he next generation of thinkers [who] enters on centre stage in the years around 1910, which were a watershed for what might be called, by adapting a phrase from Thomas Mann, 'the intellectualization of Japanese conservatism.'"³ In an analysis that spans no more than one page and relies almost exclusively on a selective and dismissive reading of Tsurumi Kazuko's comments on Yanagita's concept of modernization, Dale characterizes Yanagita's *minzokugaku* as a "nostalgic return to the uncomplicated world of an earlier age."⁴ Yanagita, in his view, belongs to:

a significant wing of the intelligentsia [who], in relatively unconstrained autonomy, defected from the modern by a theoretical regression to archaic or feudal consciousness, and thus inadvertently supplied a sophisticated armoury of ideological ammunition to the very state from which they themselves often felt estranged.⁵

In H. D. Harootunian's *Things Seen and Unseen* (1988), in turn, Yanagita appears as an intellectual heir to the nativist thought (*kokugaku*) of the late Edo period, especially that of Hirata Atsutane. While recognizing a critical potential of nativist thought, Harootunian suggests that the twentieth-century *kokugaku* of Yanagita and his fellow and rival folklorist Orikuchi Shinobu is emptied of its critical potential vis-à-vis the modern state capitalist reality because:

³ Peter N. Dale, *The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), p. 206.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 211.

...in the formulation of *minzokugaku*, discourse itself became place—that is to say, the former discourse on place was inverted into the place of discourse. Hence, daily life as the lived experience of the folk, which nativists consistently centered indistinguishably from the content of discourse, existed in ethnology only as an effect of a constructed discourse called folklore. What apparently had authorized the constitution of a discourse comprising native knowledge became in the discussions of the twentieth century a discourse that constituted the ordinary folk as its object. If earlier the figure of the archaic was fulfilled in the renarrativization of the countryside, fulfillment was later realized simply in the *description* of the figure of the folk life.⁶

One consequence is that, “the critique Yanagita launched [at the Shrine Merger Act of 1908] was directed less toward political policy than toward conserving the true content of cultural form by defining it.”⁷

In her *Re-Inventing Japan* (1998), Tessa Morris-Suzuki engages more directly with Yanagita’s intellectual biography and original texts, but arrives at a similar conclusion. Along with Nishida and ethnologist Ishida Eiichirō, a former student of Yanagita, he is characterized as one of the key figures who contributed to the emergence of an organic concept of culture around the 1930s. She partly attributes the well-known midlife shift in his attention from the internal diversity of rural Japan to the mainstream culture of flat-land peasantry and from “rather eclectic research techniques [to] a more well-defined methodology [of *minzokugaku*]”⁸ to his status of “an eminent scholar whose comments were sought on a wide range of issues, including the ethnography of Japan’s expanding empire.”⁹ However, the main reason for the shift, she speculates more cogently, may be that “[t]he

⁶ H. D. Harootunian, *Things Seen and Unseen: Discourse and Ideology in Tokugawa Nativism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 414.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 416.

⁸ Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe), p. 71.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

organic image of culture is...appealing (as Yanagita's writings suggest) because it offers a way of counteracting fears of social disintegration and also because...it provides a coherent and respectably 'scientific' way of analyzing society."¹⁰ This is, however, a misplaced effort because "it imposes a particular utopian vision of integration and harmony on the protean and fluid forms of social existence."¹¹

On the surface, Yanagita's *minzokugaku* seems to share the same assumptions that Dale attributes to the *nihonjinron*—namely, the cultural homogeneity of Japan preserved intact from the immemorial past, the uniqueness and distinctiveness of anything Japanese, and its non-amenability to foreign concepts and modes of analysis.¹² As for the first assumption, one stated objective of his *minzokugaku* is to discover the national character of the Japanese. In his own words, the national character¹³ is "the binding force exercised by the environment from which we can never escape no matter how modernized/Westernized (*haikara*) the village youth may become, [and] natural fortuities much older than human history, [such as] the borders of a country or the size of its territory, [and hence] not a product of the so-called politics..."¹⁴ As for the second assumption, in order to justify the need for *minzokugaku*, he repeatedly emphasizes that Japanese experience is different from that of the West and knowledge of and from the West does not necessarily apply to the case of Japan. As for the third assumption, he rubs ethnologists and anthropologists the wrong way by suggesting that the inner meaning of visible social

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 78.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Dale, *The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness*, "Introduction," para. 2.

¹³ Yanagita characteristically avoids *kokuminsei*, the more popular Chinese-derived terms for national character and instead uses the more Japanese-sounding *kunigara*. The preference for Japanese words over Chinese-derived words is a characteristic of the *nihonjinron* as well. See Dale, *The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness*, Chapter 6.

¹⁴ *Teihon Yanagita Kunio shū* (TYKS hereafter) 16: 166–167. All the references to Yanagita's texts in this article are to this official anthology. 31 volumes and 5 supplementary volumes (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1962–1971). The number after the abbreviation stands for the volume number, followed by the page numbers. All the translations are mine.

institutions and practices is not accessible to foreigners.¹⁵ Then, perhaps it is not surprising that his *minzokugaku* is identified as the single most important source of ingredients for the *nihonjinron*.¹⁶

It is undeniable that Yanagita's texts can be, and have been, read in a way that contributes to the discourse of Japanese exceptionalism and cultural essentialism. I even think the renewed critiques of Yanagita are healthy reactions against the conversion of his texts into a national icon during the so-called "Yanagita boom" of the 1970s. At the same time, I do not believe that lumping him together with a variety of prewar thinkers under the broad label of nationalist or proto-fascist is the most interesting or productive way to engage with his texts. An issue here is the failure to pay due attention to the individuality of an original thinker, a privilege that tends to be denied to those from non-Western societies. Lumping, say, John Stuart Mill together with other mid-nineteenth century British thinkers under the broad label of liberalism is not necessarily the most interesting or productive way to read Mill's texts, though without any doubt such an approach yields some interesting insights into his thought. I myself initially approached Yanagita's writings in search of a representative or paradigmatic nationalist discourse, but I was surprised to find the long-casting shadow of the British and French Enlightenment and Marx's historical materialism,¹⁷ though Yanagita himself never acknowledges intellectual debt to any of Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment thinkers.

As I read through the secondary literature on Yanagita, I was again surprised that the existing scholarship on Yanagita has rarely paid systematic attention to the possible intellectual lineage. Of course, the fact that Yanagita is influenced by Enlightenment thinkers does not necessarily negate his characterization as a nationalist or cultural essentialist.¹⁸ However, the systematic presence of Enlightenment thought, at least, adds

¹⁵ For example, *TYKS* 25: 336–337.

¹⁶ Befu, Harumi, *Hegemony of Homogeneity: An Anthropological Analysis of "Nihonjinron"* (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2001), pp. 16–17.

¹⁷ It is worth emphasizing here that Marx's historical materialism is inspired by the British and French political economy as much as by Hegelian philosophy.

¹⁸ In *Myth of Japanese Uniqueness*, Dale points out that many *nihonjinron* writers often (mis)appropriate foreign concepts and theories and used them in their defense of the uniqueness and distinctiveness of Japanese culture.

an intriguing complexion to his thought that reveals a tortuous trajectory of the Enlightenment legacy in a non-Western society.

Yanagita and the Enlightenment Tradition

The connection between the Western intellectual tradition and Yanagita is not entirely missed in the previous literature. Yanagita is often characterized as a conservative in the vein of Edmund Burke, who viewed rapid social changes with skeptical eyes and favored gradual and moderate reform over radical and revolutionary paths to progress. This view also pays a tribute to the individuality of his thought to some degree by distinguishing him from a more common type of reactionary conservatives whose major tenet is a Romanticized version of nationalism.¹⁹ In this view, he is a rare example of “pure conservatism”²⁰ in Japan that is “always willing to converse with progressivism.”²¹ Yanagita himself sometimes characterizes his project as conservative in this sense.²² However, although this characterization is not totally off the mark, it does not capture the dialectical thrust and, hence, a progressive aspect of his intellectual project. It is more plausible to think that it is through a critical engagement with the Enlightenment tradition that he became appreciative of Burkean conservatism.²³

There is nothing extraordinary in the claim that the Enlightenment tradition forms an important part of Yanagita’s educational background. He

¹⁹ Bunzō Hashikawa, “Hoshushugi to tenkō—Yanagita Kunio-Shiratori Yoshichiyo no baai,” *Yanagita Kunio ron shūsei* (Tokyo: Sakuhinsha, 2002), pp. 160–171; and Hikaru Satō, *Yanagita Kunio no seijikeizaigaku, Nihon hoshushugi no genryū wo motomete* (Tokyo: Sekai shisōsha, 2004).

²⁰ Hashikawa, *Yanagita Kunio ron shūsei*, p. 158.

²¹ Shunsuke Tsurumi, “Yanagita Kunio no gakufū,” Jirō Kamishima, ed., *Yanagita Kunio kenkyū* (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1973), p. 154.

²² For example, *TYKS* 16: 167–168.

²³ As far as I know, there is no evidence, either textual or biographical, that shows the direct influence of Burke’s thought on Yanagita. Apparently, it is based on similarities between the ways the two understood history and political community. I do not deny that Burkean elements in Yanagita’s thought is substantial enough to warrant the possibility of either direct or indirect influence of Burke, but want to emphasize the equally plausible influence of progressive thinkers.

was a graduate of the Law Department of Tokyo Imperial University and belonged to the first generation of bureaucrat-intellectuals.²⁴ Although German Social Policy School and Young Historical School of Economics had become influential in Japanese universities and some ministries by the time he studied agricultural policy science at the Imperial University of Tokyo, British political economy was still part of curriculum.²⁵ Also, he spent a substantial portion of his youth exploring and devouring the Western literature, and it would be surprising if he had not been familiar with at least some texts of Montesquieu, Rousseau, and J. S. Mill that had been translated into Japanese in the early Meiji period and had become must-reads for the Japanese urban literati. Moreover, he could read English, French, and German and had access to texts in original languages.

²⁴ Victor J. Koschmann, "Folklore Studies and the Conservative Anti-Establishment in Modern Japan," *International Perspective on Yanagita Kunio and Japanese Folklore Studies*, eds., J. Victor Koschmann, Ōiwa Keibō, and Yamashita Shinji (Ithaca: East Asia Program and Cornell University Press, 1985), pp. 137–139. For the bureaucrat-intellectual, see Kenneth B. Pyle, "Advantages of Followership: German Economics and Japanese Bureaucrats, 1890–1925," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 1/1 (1974): 127–164.

²⁵ For the influence of the Social Policy School in Japan, see Kenneth B. Pyle, "The Technology of Japanese Nationalism: The Local Improvement Movement, 1900–1918," *Journal of Asian Studies* 33 (1973): 51–65. For the German Social Policy School and Young Historical School of Economics, see Erik Grimmer-Solem, *The Rise of Historical Economics and Social Reform in Germany, 1864–1894* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003). Although the labels of the Social Policy School and the Young Historical School of Economics are vaguely defined and are often used interchangeably, it seems appropriate to distinguish two rival camps within the German Social Policy Association: the state socialist camp represented by Adolf Wagner and the Young Historical School represented by Gustav Schmoller, Lujo Brentano, and others. The latter was directly influenced by British reformist movements and was opposed to Wagner's state socialism as well as *laissez faire*. The influence of the Social Policy School is discernible in Yanagita's early writings on political economy, but his position is closer to that of Schmoller and Brentano.

Therefore, it is surprising that one finds few references to Enlightenment thinkers in his texts, even when his discourses seem to draw on their ideas.²⁶ Mill's and Rousseau's names are mentioned several times in the early texts on agricultural policy science, but there is no substantial engagement with their political theory. We could think of various plausible reasons for Yanagita's reticence on his intellectual debt to Enlightenment thinkers, but given the lack of evidence, the exercise would remain purely speculative. Here I concentrate my efforts on assembling fragmented episodes of what seem to be Yanagita's engagement with Enlightenment thought, scattered throughout the vast sea of his texts, into more or less coherent clusters of theoretical problems. The list is by no means intended to be exhaustive or definitive, but it gives, I hope, a fair picture of the intellectual lineage at issue.

Transition from Agrarian to Commercial Society

The first and perhaps most visible cluster of problems is the transition from agrarian to commercial society and its moral and political implications. The key Enlightenment texts here seem to be Adam Smith's *The Theory of Moral Sentiment* and *The Wealth of Nations*. As Smith did one century and half before him, Yanagita embraced the commercialization and industrialization of society as something inevitable and overall beneficial, but potentially dangerous to social cohesion. Whereas commercialization brings about material and aesthetic benefits and makes social life more pleasant, comfortable, and beautiful,²⁷ it disintegrates traditional communities and social groups into egoistic individuals who meet and part just to satisfy their respective private desire. Therefore, instead of uniting a people into a nation, commercialization saps society of any source of horizontal solidarity, whose deficit must be compensated by the centralized bureaucratic state. To contain negative impacts of individualization, a new form of public morality must be developed in commercial society. Like Smith, Yanagita emphasizes the role of sympathy

²⁶ An example of the silence on the intellectual debt occurs in his very intriguing discussion of the divine vehicle (*mikoshi*) and the popular will in *Sairei to seken* (TYKS 10: 422–423). Yanagita seems to draw on Rousseau's distinction between the general will and the will of all, but did not mention his name.

²⁷ TYKS 16: 167–168.

(*dōjō*), a common feeling toward humankind cutting across the boundaries of particular groups, whether traditional communities, social classes, and... nations!²⁸ He explains *dōjō* as “an inclination to see old times imagining oneself to be in that particular time and place...One cannot understand, not only what one’s own ancestors’ life was like but also how contemporary *ethnos* [*minzoku*] other than one’s own are living today, without suspending the egocentric view [*onore wo munashiku suru*]...”²⁹ He made the empathetic understanding of the temporal and spatial others and the gradual expansion of the object of sympathy, from the local to the global level, both the methodological requirement and ultimate objective of *minzokugaku*.

In light of this interpretation, Yanagita’s *minzokugaku* may be accused of being apologist for capitalist development, but certainly not a “nostalgic return to the uncomplicated world of an earlier age.”³⁰ It is true that he tried to preserve or restore the traditional institutions and practices such as ancestor worship, the household, and Imperial House, but his defense of those institutions and practices is essentially utilitarian in the sense that he values them to the extent that they help generate sympathy that cuts across parochial groups and social classes dividing the nation. Arguably, the trinity of the household, ancestor worship, and Imperial House is “civil religion” in the Rousseauian sense,³¹ which fills the chronic deficit of communal bonds in commercial society.

Progress and Its Limits

The second cluster concerns the causes that drive the transition of society from one developmental stage to another. Here, the relevant texts seem, among others, Smith’s *The Wealth of Nations* and Malthus’ *An Essay on the Principle of Population*. What Ronald Meek denominates “four stages theory,” perfected by Adam Smith and Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot around 1750s, formulated social progress in terms of the succession of four modes of subsistence—hunting, pasturage, agriculture, and commerce—with

²⁸ Ibid., p. 168.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 168.

³⁰ Dale, *The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness*, p. 209.

³¹ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *On the Social Contract, with Geneva Manuscript and Political Economy*, ed. and trans. Roger D. Masters (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1978), pp. 124–132.

each stage having its corresponding institutions and ideas.³² The idea that the mode of subsistence is the base upon which a particular mode of politics and culture is built, laid the groundwork for the development of modern anthropology and sociology and became a direct precursor of Marx's historical materialism.³³ Smith and many others suggested that demographic pressure was the main driving force of the historical development of human society. However, he complained that in Europe the natural succession of developmental stages—which he calls “the natural progress of opulence”³⁴—had been distorted by perverse incentives created by artificial institutions. Especially, Smith, in the Book III of *The Wealth of Nations*, singled out primogeniture and the resulting concentration of land in the hand of the few as a hindrance to the full exploitation of land and gave impetus to the development of cities and foreign commerce even before the potential of agrarian economy was exhausted.³⁵

Yanagita seems to subscribe to the four stages theory and closely follows in Smith's footsteps when he gives industry and commerce a complimentary and somewhat subordinate position in the national economy, largely as an absorber of surplus labor in agriculture. His agrarianism, in other words, may be a curious relic of the eighteenth-century liberal political economy as much as reactionary backlash against rapid industrialization and urbanization under way in the early-twentieth century Japan.³⁶ According to this understanding, Japan's transition from

³² Ronald Meek, *Social Science and Ignoble Savage* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).

³³ Meek, *Social Science and Ignoble Savage*, p. 229.

³⁴ Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, ed. Edwin Cannan (New York: Modern Library, 2000), p. 407.

³⁵ Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, p. 413.

³⁶ I thank Clement Fatovic for pointing out the similarity between Smith's and Yanagita's agrarianism. It is worth mentioning interesting similarities and differences between Smith and Yanagita with respect to primogeniture. Smith traced back its origin to the period when property rights were insecure. The best way to defend properties from external threats was to concentrate them in one person, who, in turn, provided security to other members of the community. Yanagita's explanation of the origin of primogeniture in Japan in his early writings almost faithfully reproduces Smith's (*TYKS* 28: 227–228; 237). However, unlike Smith, he refused to

agrarian to commercial society is “a natural progress of opulence,”³⁷ given the demographic pressure found in rural Japan at the turn of the twentieth century.

Equally important is Malthus’ more pessimistic view of the limited possibility of progress because it introduces a certain kind of wariness toward modernity in Yanagita’s thought and tilts it toward political conservatism and ecological conservatism. According to Malthus, “the increase of population is necessarily limited by the means of subsistence,”³⁸ and the improvement of material conditions will at some point reach its limit. When that point is reached, the population growth is checked by famine, disease, and war. A famous passage from Malthus’ *An Essay on the Principle of Population* reads:

Famine seems to be the last, the most dreadful resource of nature. The power of population is so superior to the power in the earth to produce subsistence for man that, unless arrested by the preventive check, premature death must in some shape or other visit the human race. The vices of mankind are active and able ministers of depopulation. They are the precursors in the great army of destruction, and often finish the dreadful work themselves. But should they fail in this war of extermination, sickly seasons, epidemics, pestilence, and plague, advance in terrific array, and sweep off their thousands and ten thousands. Should success be still incomplete, gigantic inevitable famine stalks in the rear, and with one mighty blow, levels the population with the food of the world.³⁹

Yanagita’s diagnosis of persistent poverty, recurrent famines, and the practice of granny-dumping and infanticide in rural Japan is essentially

discard the institution of the household (*ie*), if not primogeniture itself, as institutional inertia rendered meaningless in the modern age.

³⁷ Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, p. 407.

³⁸ T. R. Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, ed. Donald Winch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 43.

³⁹ Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, pp. 42–43.

Malthusian. Moreover, he later extended the same logic to the global struggle among colonial powers over limited space and suggests that the phenomenon is not new but common to entire human history.⁴⁰ The Malthusian wariness remains a persistent and consequential theme throughout Yanagita's writings.

Nevertheless, Yanagita does not accept Malthus' diagnosis uncritically. In his own diagnosis, the scarcity of arable land and hence the means of subsistence, observed in some localities, is attributable to artificial spatial divisions hindering the movement of labor. In an essay titled "Japan's Population Problem" (1925), he criticizes Malthusian theory in the following terms:

A scholar by the name of Malthus who lived one hundred years ago was so aggrieved to witness this kind of scarcity before his eyes that he even tried to predict that people would eventually be forced to reduce their number by one means or another because of the limited means of subsistence. Given that the earth's surface is finite, it is mathematically correct to say that there is a limit to population growth. However, scarcity observed until today is not an outcome after a new way of production and distribution was attempted. Way before reaching that point, the anxiety of scarcity and competition emerged within one narrow class or region, and that produced enough misery among people. When nations only harbors animosity toward each other and cannot taste their own happiness but by comparison with the suffering of others, this misery torments us even more easily.⁴¹

Thus, in his diagnosis, the enclosure of global open space by sovereign states and colonial powers artificially hastens the advent of the Malthusian limit to human progress in some localities. In other words, the immediate barrier to further progress is not natural, as Malthusian theory suggests, but man-made. As such, it can be changed by human agency.

⁴⁰ For example, see Yanagita's historical narratives of Okinawa islands (*TYKS* 1: 283-284; *TYKS* 25: 151-156)

⁴¹ *TYKS* 29: 107.

Thus, Yanagita's progressivism is tempered by Malthusian wariness, and as a result, a cyclical motion is introduced into progressive time, as the linear accumulation of human time in a particular place, when having exhausted the limited gift of nature therein, results in a setback or even a complete reversal. Spatial limit means that today's prosperity may be purchased at the expense of future progress. Although he does not presuppose a complete trade-off between present and future gains, because some resources are renewable by human agency, he does fear that the prosperity in today's urban space is built upon the sacrifice of spatial and temporal others. Not only the current productive class in the rural area is footing the bill of the extravagance of the urban unproductive class, but also the future generation of entire humanity will end up paying back the debt accumulated by the preceding generation.

Human Agency and Culture

One of the basic tenets of the Enlightenment is its belief in human agency in determining our own fate. Especially, it is understood in terms of increasing control over nature. Progress or civilization is often defined as the gradual conquest of nature by human will. Yanagita's understanding of civilization conforms to this conception, as indicated in the passage below:

In the distant past, there was little difference in living conditions between animals and human beings, as natural agents constraining them were so powerful. However, as a result of cooperative life [*kyōdō seikatsu*], humans alone improved their life constantly and, as time progressed, were able to conquer nature gradually. From this point of view, the so-called civilization of a country means the conquest of nature by human agents—that is, the progressive victory of human agents over natural agents.⁴²

Two points are worth emphasizing in this passage. First, in spite of the popular association of him with the German notion of organic and spiritual *Kultur*, his conception of progress is much closer to the British and French

⁴² TYKS 28: 292.

notion of civilization (and Marx's).⁴³ Second, he explicitly associates human agency with social cooperation and, by implication, collective liberty with social progress. This emphasis is in sync with the overall intellectual trend in Western societies of moving from individualism and competition to collectivism and cooperation (e.g., Fabian socialism in UK, Progressivism in US). The passage above is taken from one of his earliest texts published in 1902 and there is no indication in his later texts that he fundamentally revised this conception of civilization and his commitment to it.

However, Yanagita's credential as an heir to the Enlightenment tradition would be seriously compromised if he considered culture to be immune to human agency, as if it were part of natural order. After all, the Enlightenment tradition prides itself in not considering inherited traditions to be something sacred and beyond contestation, but many critics claim that is exactly what he did. I do not think their claim is particularly convincing. At least, it is difficult to draw such a conclusion from the texts alone without relying on some extra sources of information. Quite tellingly, in one of the earliest texts titled *Nōseigaku*, Yanagita treated race (*jinshu*) and customs (*minzoku*) as natural agents along with climate and geographical topology on the ground that they are "permanent (*jōzai*)" conditions.⁴⁴ However, he silently dropped them as examples of natural agents in a subsequent text, *Nōgyō seisakugaku*.⁴⁵ Although he did not offer any explanation as to why he did so, it is consistent with his later conception of racial distinctions as a product of politics.⁴⁶ As for customs, one of the premises of his *minzokugaku* is precisely to recognize customs as the sedimentation of ancestors' practical attempts to control and tame natural agents.

Even Yanagita's criticism against the wholesale renunciation of customs would be unthinkable without the influence of the Enlightenment.

⁴³ For the history and meaning of the terms *culture* and *civilization*, see Raymond Williams, *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 48–50, 76–82; and Raymond Williams, *Marxism and Literature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 11–20.

⁴⁴ *TYKS* 28: 189.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 291.

⁴⁶ *TYKS* 25: 92.

Here, the important source of inspiration seems to be John Stuart Mill. In spite of his general antipathy toward customs, Mill readily admits that it is neither possible nor desirable for a new generation to renounce completely what is inherited from the preceding generations and to start from scratch.⁴⁷ “[E]ven in revolution of opinion,” he concedes, “one part of the truth usually sets while another rises. Even progress, which ought to superadd, for the most part only substitutes, one partial and incomplete truth for another; improvement consisting chiefly in this, that the new fragment of truth is more wanted, more adapted to the needs of the time, than that which it displaces.”⁴⁸ Therefore, both wholesale denunciation of the old and uncritical embracement of the new are equally dogmatic. What is important is to keep open the possibility for each generation to consciously choose which customs are to be kept and which are not on the basis of utility for their own purposes. A passage from Mill’s *On Liberty* reads:

It is the privilege and proper condition of a human being, arrived at the maturity of his faculties, to use and interpret experience in his own way. It is for him to find out what part of recorded experience is properly applicable to his own circumstances and character. The traditions and customs of other people are, to a certain extent, evidence of what their experience has taught *them*; presumptive evidence, and as such, have a claim to his deference: but, in the first place, their experience may be too narrow; or they may not have interpreted it rightly. Secondly, their interpretation of experience may be correct, but unsuitable to him. Customs are made for customary circumstances, and customary characters; and his circumstances or his character may be uncustomary. Thirdly, though the customs be both good as custom, and suitable to him, yet to conform to custom, merely *as* custom, does not educate or develop in him any of the qualities which are the distinctive endowment of a human being.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty and Other Essays*, ed. John Gray (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 64.

⁴⁸ Mill, *On Liberty*, p. 52.

⁴⁹ Mill, *On Liberty*, pp. 64–65.

Yanagita seems to have applied Mill's injunction to collectivities, and his critique of the uncritical acceptance of imported ideas and the wholesale renunciation of indigenous customs closely resonates with this passage. *Minzokugaku* is against both the dogmatic affirmation and the blind denunciation of customs. Its purpose is to encourage the current generation, first, to know the meaning of inherited traditions and customs, then, to critically examine their contemporary relevance and utility, and, finally, to consciously select what is to be preserved and what is to be abandoned.

Thus, for Yanagita, culture is not an organic entity that exists independent of human practice. He analogizes culture as a silk brocade in which innumerable threads of different colors are constantly being weaved into a whole. Morris-Suzuki⁵⁰ rightly points out the integrationist and assimilationist thrust of the analogy, but she underestimates Yanagita's emphasis on human agency in weaving such a brocade. It is the *political* construction of national culture in which not only a cultural elite but also the majority of the nation—i.e., laboring classes—participate in a self-reflective manner.

*Diversity and Theoretical Knowledge*⁵¹

The fourth cluster is the question of diversity and the production of theoretical knowledge. Diverse historical expressions of common humanity, in term of spatial and temporal variations, have long been a puzzle for modern theoretical knowledge, and theorizing activities in the Enlightenment period were, to a substantial degree, motivated by the explicit recognition of such diversity. Dugald Stewart, in his *Biographical Memoir of Adam Smith* (1811), succinctly put the theoretical question Smith grappled with in *the Wealth of Nations* as follows: "An historical view of the different forms under which human affairs have appeared in different ages and nations, naturally suggests the question, Whether the experience of

⁵⁰ Morris-Suzuki, *Re-Inventing Japan*, pp. 69–72.

⁵¹ The argument presented in this section is discussed in detail in my dissertation, "Diversity and Knowledge in the Age of Nation-Building: Space and Time in the Thought of Yanagita Kunio" (PhD diss., Florida International University, 2011).

former times may not now furnish some general principles to enlighten and direct the policy of future legislators?"⁵²

In the *Discourse on Inequality*, Rousseau suggests that the current mode of knowledge production is deficient in comparison, because what we know about non-European peoples is systematically skewed by ethnocentric prejudices against unfamiliar others. For example, a passage from the note X to the *Discourse* reads:

Although the inhabitants of Europe have for the past three or four hundred years overrun the other parts of the world and are constantly publishing new collections of travels and reports, I am convinced that the only men we know are the Europeans; what is more, it would seem that, judging by the ridiculous prejudices that have not died out even among Men of Letters, very nearly all anyone does under the pompous heading of the study of man is to study the men of his country. Regardless of how much individuals may come and go, it would seem that Philosophy does not travel, and indeed each People's Philosophy is ill-suited for another.⁵³

Specifically, knowledge about unfamiliar places and peoples mostly relies on observations by four classes of people—"Sailors, Merchants, Soldiers and Missionaries"⁵⁴—who are all ill-prepared for objective observation. In order to overcome the problem, Rousseau proposes that travel should be recognized, not as an appendix to other businesses, but as an intellectual activity in its own right:

Let us suppose a Montesquieu, a Buffon, a Diderot, a Duclos, a d'Alembert, a Condillac, or men of that stamp, traveling with a view to instruct their compatriots,

⁵² Dugald Stewart, *Biographical Memoirs, of Adam Smith, LL. D., of William Robertson, D. D. and of Thomas Reid, D. D.* (Edinburgh: George Ramsay and Company, 1811), p. 44.

⁵³ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 211.

⁵⁴ Rousseau, *The Discourses*, p. 209.

observing and describing as they do so well, Turkey, Egypt, Barbary, the Empire of Morocco, Guinea...and all the Wild regions, this being the most important voyage of all and the one that should be undertaken with the greatest care; let us suppose that on their return from these memorable travels, these new Hercules set down at leisure the natural, moral and political history of what they had seen, then we would ourselves see a new world issue from their pen, and would thus learn to know our own.⁵⁵

However, Rousseau's dream of a new philosophy—an empirical “science of man”—remains elusive until today. The way modern knowledge incorporates diversity into its fold can be called, at least with hindsight, imperialistic in a double sense of the term: It unilaterally incorporates the unfamiliar into preconceived spatial or temporal categories, and it has intimate connections with imperialistic practices exercised by coercive power. Instead of having existing theories bear the full weight of empirical diversity, it often resorts to the method called “conjectural or theoretical history.”

Dugald Stewart describes Smith's approach to history as “conjectural or theoretical history.”⁵⁶ It is conjectural because it supplements the lack of empirical evidence by the deductive application of certain principles to infer what human actor *would* behave under certain conditions.

In this want of direct evidence, we are under a necessity of supplying the place of fact by conjecture; and when we are unable to ascertain how men have actually conducted themselves upon particular occasions, of considering in what manner they are likely to have proceeded, from the principles of their nature, and the circumstances of their external situation. In such inquiries, the detached facts which travels and voyages afford us, may frequently serve as land-marks to our speculations; and sometimes our

⁵⁵ Rousseau, *The Discourses*, p. 211.

⁵⁶ Stewart, *Biographical Memoirs*, p. 49.

conclusions *a priori*, may tend to confirm the credibility of facts, which, on a superficial view, appeared to be doubtful or incredible.⁵⁷

However, those principles of human nature utilized by Smith and other Enlightenment thinkers are not entirely culturally neutral and national or civilizational prejudices were brought back in from the backdoor, so to speak, and vitiate the conjectural history of humanity.⁵⁸

In contrast, Yanagita insists in an inductive approach to historiography, and his insistence on inductive methods seems to derive, at least partially, from his dissatisfaction with conjectural grand historical narratives offered by Western thinkers and historians. For example, in reference to H. G. Wells popular *The Outline of History* (1920), he complains:

I suppose many people have read world history by Englishman Wells. The white people, since when they finally realized that the earth is round, have often wanted to write books of human history or world history. That is partly their habits dating back to ancient Greece—namely, they tend to think that it is okay to write as much as they know from their ethnocentric perspectives under such

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 48. Also see the discussion of the text in Meek, *Social Science*, pp. 231–234. Stewart here is referring to Smith's *The First Formation of Language*, but he points out that the same approach is used in all his other works. He suggests that "inquiries perfectly analogous to these may be applied to the modes of government, and to the municipal institutions which have obtained among different nations" and hints that that is exactly what Smith did in *The Wealth of Nations*. Stewart, *Biographical Memoir*, p. 50.

⁵⁸ Meek is somewhat skeptical of the view that the "four stages theory" is conjectural history and argues that it was intended as "a broad generalization of the historical facts as they saw them." Meek, *Social Science*, p. 238. However, he admits that Smith and other proponents of the four stages theory may have unwarrantedly presupposed that the life of contemporary "savage" peoples was comparable to that of ancient barbarians and may have unwarrantedly translated temporal order into cultural hierarchy (pp. 240–241).

grandiose titles. Yet, they have no excuse when someone objects that theirs is not true world history. Then, when they start afresh and attempt to write how entire humanity has lived and what changes they have undergone, the best thing they can get is something like the book by Wells.⁵⁹

In spite of his dissatisfaction with modern knowledge constructed through conjectural history, however, Yanagita remains committed to the idea of world history and the possibility of universal science of humanity. Like Rousseau before him, he interprets the historical and particular expressions of humanity, not as antithetical to universal knowledge, but as a rich reservoir of empirical evidence from which a universal history of humanity and science of man can be inductively reconstructed. He also firmly believes that only by the discovery of genuinely universal knowledge on the basis of particular historical experiences can humanity get rid of prejudices and parochialism and lift itself to a higher stage of human civilization.

In this sense, his *minzokugaku* can be said to be a legitimate heir and a necessary corrective to “conjectural history,” pioneered by eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinkers such as Rousseau and Adam Smith and elaborated by Mill and Marx. Yanagita would argue that, while conjectural history could fill a huge lacuna in human history, left by the lack of empirical evidence, *minzokugaku* offers a much more scientific method to fill the gap and write a more comprehensive and accurate history of human progress.

Partial Reading of Yanagita’s Texts

If Yanagita’s positions in the four clusters of theoretical problems described above are not entirely off the mark, we should seriously consider the seemingly impossible possibility that he is indeed a quite ingenuous heir to the Enlightenment tradition. Furthermore, if a non-Western, conservative, nationalist thinker like Yanagita can be counted as such, the Enlightenment tradition itself may be much richer in its internal contradiction and, hence, contains much wider potential yet to be redeemed. In a sense, Yanagita’s equivocal voice itself is a reflection of the equivocality of the Enlightenment tradition. Much more extensive and

⁵⁹ TYKS 25: 168.

complex cross-cultural exchanges than conventionally supposed seem to be involved in the intellectual lineage at issue. Then, why has such a possibility been so persistently overlooked both by his followers and critics? I conclude the article with some speculative comments on that question.

Without doubt, the problem is partly attributable to the nature of his writings. Throughout his long intellectual career, he has produced a body of texts that is too voluminous and diverse to be digested by a historian in a short period of time. Moreover, his style of writing is often circumlocutory and raises a substantial barrier for not only international, but also many contemporary Japanese readers. Inevitably, many scholars read only a portion of his texts and draw a conclusion from the partial reading. Although this problem is by no means unique to the studies of Yanagita, his texts, if only partially read, are especially vulnerable to misleading interpretations for various reasons. First, his intellectual career is punctuated by several ruptures marked by self-criticism and his thought kept evolving throughout his lifetime. As a result, it is difficult to single out one definitive work that represents the totality of his thought. None of his best-known works, such as *Tōno monogatari*, *Meiji Taishō shi: Sesō hen*, *Senzo no hanashi*, or *Kaijō no michi*, is his *magnum opus* in the conventional sense, and reading one or two of them is not likely to reveal the intellectual lineage at issue. Second, Yanagita is not a systematic writer and the bulk of his texts are not theoretical. His writings are often so saturated with the endless minutiae of particular facts that any casual perusal of his texts easily misleads the reader from broader theoretical concerns underpinning his intellectual project.

However, I suspect that partiality in the other sense of the term is also at work. As a matter of fact, not a small number of scholars have gone further than a casual perusal in an attempt to understand his texts, but the intellectual lineage at issue tends to be marginalized, if not totally missed, by them as well. For some reasons, the idea of a substantial and consequential influence of the Enlightenment on a Japanese folklorist does not fit well with the subjectivities of his followers and critics alike. One reason may be that intellectual history itself is not totally free from the problem Yanagita grappled with a century ago—that is, the division of the global space into progressive and stagnant spheres and of humanity into the subject and object of knowledge/politics. In the modern spatiotemporal imaginary, various labels used to characterize his intellectual project, such as “Japanese,” “folklore,” “ethnology,” “traditional,” or “rural,” connote its

attachment to the stagnant past, probably noble or aesthetically appealing but doomed to be swept away by the inexorable force of modernity. Such a project cannot be but “nostalgic,” “conservative,” or “reactionary.” Thus, on the one hand, his critics too quickly dismiss Yanagita’s thought as a mere reflection of Japan’s deficient modernity. His followers, on the other hand, tend to retreat into the fortress of cultural exceptionalism and unwarrantedly severe his thought from the global discursive field in which it was bred in the first place.

Admittedly, given his reticence on the intellectual debt to Western thinkers, Yanagita himself may be held partly responsible for this unfortunate polarization. However, quite ironically, his texts can also be used to diagnose the predicament and reimagine intellectual history in a way that remedies the prejudice inherent in the modern spatiotemporal imaginary. European Enlightenment thinkers’ engagement with the question of human diversity resulted in a rich and complex theoretical knowledge. Yet, such knowledge is still vitiated by ethnocentric historical narratives that privilege the subjectivity of the urban West, and it has been contested by many European and non-European thinkers, who, in direct confrontation with various counter-narratives of non-urban, non-Western experience of modernity, partially appropriated the language of the Enlightenment and turned it into a weapon to fight against it. Yanagita’s critical engagement with the Enlightenment tradition is an illustrative instance of such cross-cultural exchange. As such, reading his texts enriches our understanding of not only an interesting non-European thinker but also Western thought itself. Here is, I think, one reason the neglected intellectual lineage discussed in this article is not merely a historical curiosity but a subject of contemporary relevance.

**OF KAMIKAZE, SAKURA, AND GYOKUSAI:
MISAPPROPRIATION OF METAPHOR IN WAR PROPOGANDA**

Kimiko Akita
Aichi Prefectural University

Rick Kenney
Georgia Regents University¹

Introduction

When Japan's Meiji Emperor assumed the throne and replaced the Tokugawa shogun system in 1868, the new government and military began to radicalize Shintoism, the ancient Japanese pantheistic belief system. Leaders of the Meiji Restoration created and enforced a new "state" Shinto, one in which thousands-year-old myths, rituals, and aphorisms all became the tools of propaganda promoting patriotism, nationalism, and worship of the Emperor while encouraging the Japanese to go to war with China and Russia—and eventually with the United States of America. This co-optation of Shinto lasted until the postwar Occupation, when Allied rulers, insisting that the Japanese separate the sacred (Shinto) from the secular (government), dismantled the hybrid religion and many of its manifestations.

Japanologists have long since unraveled the fabric by which Shinto and the state had become "largely an invented tradition" (Hardacre 1989): the misappropriation of practice and place in the name of a new nationalism. Less attention has been paid, however, to the linguistic connections between Shinto and the state leading up to and during World War II, when Japan's leaders borrowed unabashedly from Shinto scripture and distorted sacred language to promote the nation's plans for regional and, eventually, global domination. Consequently, after the surrender of Japan in 1945 and during the Occupation that followed, the Shintoism that Allies found was unrecognizable from its original form. Breen and Teeuwen (2003: 268) traced the phrase State Shinto, "its popularization, and its application to the study of the whole prewar religious history" to the "so-

¹ This research was presented at an international conference: R. Kenney and K. Akita, "State and *Shinto*: Spanning the History of the Secularized Scripture," *ICA Annual Conference, Communication History Division*, 2nd place and \$250 prize, Phoenix, 2012.

called *Shinto shirei* [Shinto directive] issued by the American army of the Occupation.” The Occupation command required that the Japanese separate their government from the bastardized religion and eliminate State Shinto altogether. The land reform stripped shrines of their lands and assets. Amid the crackdown, worshippers and donors turned away from religion. Although some Shinto rites and festivals—weddings and shrine visits, for example—linger, very few Japanese today identify themselves with Shinto. Currently, although most Japanese seem to have little religious faith, they continue to live their lives in a culture that manifests a mixture of Buddhism, Confucianism, and Shintoism.

This article seeks to fill a gap in the scholarship of the history of Japanese State Shinto by identifying propagandistic slogans, songs, speeches, and symbols that composed a vocabulary of war and tracing them to sacred ideas. It illuminates and analyzes particularly how the language of Shinto was misappropriated and exploited by the Meiji government for secular, nationalistic purposes, with dire consequences for Shinto, its ancient shrines, and consecrated lands. In so doing, this study also reconnects State Shinto to the ongoing Yasukuni Shrine controversy and the rise in right-wing nationalism and militarism to contemporary Japan, which have implications for the nation’s tenuous relations with China and other Asian countries that have suffered historically from Japanese imperialism.

This article begins with a brief discussion of certain assumptions and definitions of both Shinto and propaganda that inform the study. Next, examples of Shinto scripture used in Meiji and 20th-Century war propaganda are provided and discussed. Finally, the notion of State Shinto’s legacy and lingering effects on right-wing Japanese nationalism is addressed.

Background

2.1. Assumptions/definitions

In examining the use of propagandistic slogans appropriated from Shinto writing by the Japanese government and military beginning in the Meiji Era, this study was informed by several assumptions and guided by certain definitions that deserve explanation here to clear the conceptual underbrush. Among these are the identification of Shinto as a religion and of its writings as sacred texts; and of Meiji proclamations about religion and religious education.

2.1.1. *Is Shinto a religion?* Frost (1943: 348) adamantly stated that Shinto “is in no sense a religion but is rather a patriotic cult.” Shinto gods—

depending on the scholarly source, they number between 80 and 800 (Frost 1943: 348)—were conceived as local communal gods to protect the people (Okada 2009: 4). Shinto mainly concerns ritual observances (Berthon 1991). It has “no creed, no dogma” (Herbert 1967: 33). It lacks a Jesus, a Buddha, or a Mohammed—a supernatural individual necessary to change Shinto into “a vital religion” (Ichiro and Yoshio 1956: 55). Yamakage (2006: 39–40) argued that, “without a founder, Shinto is also without any systematic doctrine connected to a founder’s teachings. Therefore, there are no dogmas, absolute codes, orders or laws applying to Shinto as a whole” and that Shinto does not require “standardization of belief and practice.” Still, religion experts have agreed with Herbert that “...when I linked everybody’s sayings together, I can see one philosophy...” (ctd. in Yamakage 2006: 41). Whether a religion or not, Shinto “has unquestionably made a significant contribution to the political theory and national stability of Japan” (Frost 1943: 347).

Defining Shinto as merely a system of rituals and beliefs permitted the Meiji state to establish itself as a “theocracy” (Koyasu 2004: 158). It is understood that by “becoming a non-religious entity, state-Shinto was able to rule over the population and to function as an organ of national ideology” (Inoue 2006: 27). Inoue (1998: 5) also argues that “religious systems are formed and transformed in close interaction with the society in which they partake;” and though *kami* worship “distinguishes Shinto from other religious traditions and gives it continuity through the ages,” its amalgamation with Buddhism radically transformed the substance of Shinto and caused it to lose its distinct character. In practical effect, Japan has no dominant orthodox religion like other nations (Noda 1995); their religion is practiced in their way of life.

The term State Shinto applies to the years 1868–1945—from the beginning of the Meiji Era to the end of the War in the Pacific—when, as Fridell (1976: 548) described it, “Shinto elements came under a great deal of overt state influence and control as the Japanese government systematically utilized shrine worship as a major force for mobilizing imperial loyalties on behalf of modern nation-building.” State Shinto was a component of a larger belief in what Woodward (1972: 11) termed the Kokutai Cult: “Japan’s emperor-state-centered cult of ultranationalism and militarism.” This was not Shinto itself or a form of Shinto, but rather, it “included elements of Shinto mythology and ideology and it utilized Shinto institutions and practices” (11). The Kokutai Cult became increasingly explicit over the prewar decades, reaching its culmination in the

ultranationalistic period from the early 1930's to 1945" (Fridell 1976: 553). Yet Kasulis (2004: 138) noted that State Shinto could hardly be considered irreligious. Although *kokutai* is commonly translated into English as "national polity," Kasulis argued that the word applied "to the purportedly unique form of Japan's political/spiritual/imperial structure" (139), with the Emperor as "chief priest of Shinto" (138).

2.1.2. *Scripture and sacred writings.* Shinto does have its own holy scriptures, including sacred writings that began with the Genesis-like *Kojiki* [Record of ancient matters], dating to 712 A.D., and *Nihongi* [Chronicles of Japan], dating to 720 A.D. The former tells of the gods before man was created and of the earliest emperors. Some passages, including the creation myth, were deemed so morally objectionable to Christians and other Westerners that translators refused to render them into English and turned to Latin instead (Frost 1943: 348). The latter comprises tales of the emperors, their genealogies, and their pronouncements. A third document also considered Shinto scripture is *Engishiki* [Procedures of the Engi Period], a tenth-century work that tells the story of the rise of the Shinto cult and includes two dozen ceremonial prayers (Breen and Teeuwen 2010: 189; Frost 1943: 348). Some intellectuals were inspired also to formulate and articulate Shinto thought during the Tokugawa era (Breen and Teeuwen 2003).

Herbert (1967: 34–35) maintained that Shinto had "no sacred book which in size, importance and authority can be compared to the Christian Bible or the Muslim Koran." A seventeenth-century Japanese wrote that "in truth, there is no original Shinto Scriptures of Nihon" (ctd. in Herbert: 35). A large body of Shinto literature exists, "although without any trace of that bibliolatriy which in some other religions attaches to Holy Scriptures" (35). Still, he claims that their "teachings and records need not be accepted blindly" (35), and that "even the high priests of the most important temples may put upon what little there are in the way of Holy Scriptures interpretations which amount to disbelief" (33). Antoni (2007) credited Motoori Norinaga's (1730–1801) commentary *Kojiki-den* [Commentaries on the *Kojiki*] with elevating the *Kojiki* to the status of a holy book under State Shinto in modern Japan. Konoshi (2000: 64) argued that *Kojiki* became famous and important as a holy scripture of Shinto in modernity only because of Norinaga and company declaring it as authentic and rendering it into an ancient and sacred Japanese narrative.

Yamakage (2006: 39) rebutted the idea that *Kojiki* and *Nihongi* were "sacred texts akin to the Bible or the Koran," averring that full of

myths, political twists, and literary embellishments, these texts must be read and interpreted carefully “because every word is not necessarily considered as sacred.” He also argued that “Japanese generally don’t believe in words very much” (40):

They understand that it is wrong to consider human language as absolute, recognizing that human existence is very small and limited when compared with the great nature. The Western mentality that treats human knowledge and language as absolutes is, from Shinto’s perspective, a form of human arrogance...words cannot contain either the world of great nature or the world of the spirit of Kami. In Shinto, it is important...not to use language to force others to believe in a certain way (Yamakage 2006: 41).

2.2. *Propaganda and Slogans*

2.2.1. *Propaganda*. Ellul (1965: 61) defined propaganda as “a set of methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring about the active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, psychologically unified through psychological manipulation and incorporated in an organization.” Propaganda, he argued, suppressed autonomy. Black (1977: 97) suggested that the manifest content of propaganda contained characteristics “associated with dogmatism.” Among its characteristics are:

- undue reliance on authority figures and spokesmen, rather than empirical validation;
- use of unverified abstract nouns, adjectives, and adverbs, rather than empirical validation;
- a fixed view of people, institutions, and situations;
- simplistic cause-effect relationships, ignoring multiple causality;
- under- or over-emphasis on the past, present, or future as disconnected periods.

2.2.2. *Slogans*. The term *slogan* represents an alteration of *slogorn*, itself derived from the Gaelic *slough-ghairn*, or “army cry” (Inouye 1997: 279). Slogans as “‘social symbols’ have united, divided, and even

converted. In so doing, slogans have become a direct link to social or individual action” (Denton 1980: 10). Inouye (1997: 274) asserted further that as a call for action, rather than a call for thought, a slogan erases or naturalizes the theory that created it and “denies the orderly connection of syntax and the precision of thought that follows from sustained dialogue.... Perhaps this is why, as is true of Japanese sentences generally, the subject is absent but aggressively implied.” The “elliptical nature” of a slogan “persuades by virtue of its incompleteness” (274–275).

Inouye asserted that the “most powerful of Meiji slogans” was the Emperor himself: *Meiji tenno* (277). Between 1872 and 1885, the Emperor appeared for the first time to the Japanese, touring the country, first meeting the troops and then his people. He became a literal and visual display of power: “Like a slogan, he was also a sign of synthesis, oriented toward action and inviting participation” (278). Soon thereafter, the Emperor became invisible again to his people—although his image was ubiquitous, like a religious icon—until after World War II “so their act of completing the slogan with their devotion could take place” (278).

Translated into words, his image became the ultimate utterance of the new phonocentric culture of the modern Japan: “*Tenno Heika, banzai!*” “Long Live the Emperor!” By way of this hooray he became logos... The statement “Long Live the Emperor” is central to the logocentrism of Meiji Japan and to its warlike spirit. Patterned after Western practice, the shouting of his name in public represents a new linguistic custom, a new mode of aggressive thought (279).

His subjects were compelled to action and not thought, as both Inouye and Ellul (1965: 61) suggested.

Findings

Kasulis (2004: 138) observed that State Shinto was “certainly ‘spiritual,’ not only in its praxes, but also in the use of terms like ‘*tama*,’ ‘*tamashii*,’ ‘*mitama*,’ and ‘*kami*.’” The Emperor was called *akitsu mi kami* [divine emperor] or *arahitogami* [*kami* in human form]. Beyond that basic glossary, the terminology associated with Shinto was appropriated by the State in more systemized fashion that bolstered ideas and authorized the military’s goals. To find examples, this study relied on original sources in

Japanese newspaper and magazine articles and columns, as well as print and broadcast advertisements that were reproduced in secondary texts. In this section, the use of Shinto language to advance Japanese militarism and nationalism is divided into the categories of slogans, songs/poems, speeches, and symbols/metaphors. Examples are provided in each category, and their connection to Shinto language is illuminated.

3.1. *Slogans*

Four particularly popular and potent Japanese wartime propaganda slogans may be traced to Shinto language. The slogans are listed and analyzed below:

- *Hakko Ichiu* [All the world under one roof];
- *Yamato Damashii* [Indomitable spirit of Japan];
- *Shichishou Houkoku* [Serving one's country for seven lives];
- *Kokumin Seishin Sou Douin* [Let all Japanese spirits work together].

3.1.1. *Hakko Ichiu*. Edwards (2003: 292), who analyzed the inscription of this slogan on a monument erected in 1940 in Miyazaki and researched its history, noted that its use “as a wartime slogan is well known.” Although the Shinto scriptural reference to the phrase designated “a philosophy of universal brotherhood, the notion of ‘all the world under one roof’ came to signify Japanese domination of Asia as part of a divine mission to unite the entire world under imperial leadership” (292). *Hakko Ichiu* was first decreed by Emperor Jinmu, who in Shinto cosmology was the first Emperor of Japan (which was then called Jomon), during the occasion of his ascension around 660 B.C. In a passage that appears in Book III, Section 3 of *Nihongi*, Jinmu, heir to the throne, is quoted, describing his intentions:

Now I have heard from the Ancient of the Sea that in the East there is a fair land encircled on all sides by blue mountains... I think this land will undoubtedly be suitable for the extension of the Heavenly task, so that its glory should fill the universe. It is, doubtless, the centre of the world (Aston 1972: 110–111).

In translating the work, Aston confirmed that “the heavenly task” was “further development of the Imperial power” (111). Jinmu would have been referring to the lands closest to Jomon (the name for Japan then), and Aston’s annotations to *Nihongi* describe the “world” as “the six quarters, N., S., E., W., Zenith, Nadir” (111).

Six years later, his expedition successfully completed, Jinmu announced that he would “reverently assume the Precious Dignity”—become Emperor:

Above, I should then respond to the kindness of the Heavenly Powers in granting me the Kingdom, and below, I should extend the line of the Imperial descendants and foster right mindedness. Thereafter the capital may be extended so as to embrace all the six cardinal points, and the eight cords may be covered so as to form a roof (Aston 1972: 131).

Aston noted that “the character for roof also means universe. The eight cords, or measuring tapes, simply mean ‘everywhere’” (131). Edwards (2003: 292) agreed that the original Chinese characters in *Nihongi* were “awkward to translate.”

Opportunists in Japan’s militaristic government used *Hakko Ichiu* as imperialist propaganda to their advantage beginning in the Meiji Era, and by the twentieth century, they interpreted Jinmu’s vague decree in creating the State Shinto belief that Japan should achieve its rightful destiny as center of the world, with its ruler a divine being descended from Amaterasu, the sun goddess and original *kami*.

Ishiwara Kanji, a mid-rank Army officer, used the concept of *Hakko Ichiu* to justify his disobedient plot to carry out the invasion of Manchuria in 1931—to the feigned dismay of the Japanese military and government (Edwards 2003: 305). Instead of being executed, Ishiwara was promoted and eventually served as general. The Japanese military was beset by sedition under the slogan *Hakko Ichiu*. Shillony (1970: 25) noted that “younger officers set their will against that of their seniors...high-ranking officers were assassinated; the officer corps seemed on the verge of breaking up into a number of factions; and the *Imperial Precepts to the Soldiers and Sailors* given by the Meiji Emperor were patently disregarded.”

Hakko Ichiu also became the justification for the Second Sino-Japanese War, beginning in 1937, and through the end of the War in the

Pacific in 1945. The slogan became popular among the Japanese people after the prime minister, Fumimaro Konoe, used it in a speech on January 8, 1940 (Beasley 1991: 226–227) and after it appeared in a white paper titled “Fundamental National Policy,” in which Konoe advocated “the establishment of world peace in conformity with the very spirit in which our nation was founded” (Edwards 2003: 309). *Hakko Ichiu* spread further that year, which was designated by government-directed historians as the 2,600th anniversary of Jinmu’s ascension to the throne, at a ceremony in the northern city of Miyazaki. The slogan, in the form of Prince Chichibu’s calligraphy, was carved into the front of a monument unveiled April 3, 1940 (Earhart 2008: 63).

3.1.2. *Yamato Damashii*. Hearn (1904: 177) noted the direct connection of *Yamato Damashii* [Indomitable spirit of Japan] to Shinto:

For this national type of moral character was invented the name *Yamato-damashi* (or *Yamato-gokoro*)—the Soul of Yamato (or Heart of Yamato)—the appellation of the old province of Yamato, seat of the early emperors, being figuratively used for the entire country. We might correctly, though less literally, interpret the expression *Yamato-damashi* as “The Soul of Old Japan.”

3.1.3. *Shichishou Houkoku*. This spiritually derived phrase, which translates as meaning “serving one’s country for seven lives” appeared in a 1936–1937 print advertisement meant to raise support for the war effort (Kashima 2000). A related slogan, *Nihon Seishin o Jissen no ue ni*, translates as “Let’s mobilize Japanese spirits practically.”

3.1.4. *Kokumin Seishin Sou Douin*. In the same years, 1936–37, state-run NHK Radio sponsored a magazine ad that included this slogan, which translates as “Let all Japanese spirits work together” (Kashima 2000: 53). In October 1937, Prime Minister Konoe also proclaimed via NHK: “Western people are materialistic, but Japanese people are spiritual, more sacred, sincere, and clean people who seek a spiritual culture.”

3.2. *Songs/poems*

3.2.1. *Kimigayo*. Upon the Meiji Restoration, the government sought a new national anthem to inspire the nation to become wealthier and stronger (Ohnuki-Tierney 1991: 205). John William Fenton, a British Army music leader, was asked to write the melody for the poem *Kimigayo*, which

had been composed during the Heian Era (794–1192). Fenton’s Western melody, however, did not appeal to the Japanese public, so Hayashi Hiromori composed a more Japanese melody. *Kimigayo* became the national anthem in 1880, though not formally so until the 1930s (Murakami 1977: 128–131):

*Kimigayo wa,
chiyoni yachiyo ni,
sazare ishino,
iwa o to narite,
koke no,
musu made*

Kimigayo means “Emperor” as well as “the entire Japanese people.” *Chiyoni yachiyoni* means the “desire for the continuation for thousands and thousands of years.” *Koke* means “moss.” *Musu* is a Shinto word meaning “procreation.” “*Kokeno musumade*” signifies the “desire for the moss to be created (taking many years to come)” on “the rock of Japan,” or *sazare ishi no iwa*.

British Japanologist Basil Hall Chamberlain (1982: 336) translated it as follows:

A thousand years of happy life be thine!
Live on, my Lord, till what are pebbles now,
By age united, to great rocks shall grow,
Whose venerable sides the moss doth line.

3.2.2. *Kokudo*. Meiji schoolchildren sang this song, which translates as “Homeland” (A Collection 2000), the lyrics of which refer to Shinto mythologies:

aogumo tooku, yoriaite
(Slightly blue gray colored crowd are gathering)
utsukushiki kana, yamakawa wa
(How beautiful the mountains and rivers are!)

kami no umaseru, ooyashima
(This is the *Yamato*, the land with many islands,
where *Shinto* Goddess was born)

tokowaka ni shite, yutaka naru
(It is a forever young, wealthy nation)

warera ga sei no, minamoto o

(That's where our life comes from)
ima atarashiku, kangeki su
 (We are reminded again of our appreciation for it)

3.3. *Symbols*

3.3.1 *Sakura*. The ancient anthropogenic myth propagated in the Japanese chronicles regarded as the earliest articulation of Shinto beliefs—the *Kojiki* (Philippi 1969) and the *Nihongi* (Aston 1956)—the progenitor deity Ninigi weds a beautiful tree that, though originally unspecified, has traditionally been identified by Shinto priests as a cherry blossom tree. According to folklorist Origuchi Shinobu (1928), ancient Japanese belief in Shinto's agrarian gods carefully observed *sakura* in the spring to help predict and calculate the amount and the timing of the fall rice harvest. Throughout Japanese civilization and in Shinto beliefs and rituals, *sakura* have been accorded a status in nature second only to rice.

Japanese militarist ideology seized upon the cherry blossom as not merely symbolic but actually transubstantive of the souls of the brave war dead; they would be literally reborn as cherry blossoms at the Yasukuni Shrine. “Cherry blossom propaganda” thus was spread in the planting of trees as well as in songs and poems and even military insignia. Foremost, it was embedded in the indoctrination of soldiers sent to sacrifice themselves for their Emperor. In a critique of the aesthetics of the Japanese military's secularism of Shinto, Ohnuki-Tierney (2002) explored the influence of such government propaganda on *tokko-tai*, or Japan *kamikaze* pilots, and concluded that unlike their widely perceived image as ultranationalist zealots, they were reluctant to die for their Emperor; rather, the compass, for most, was patriotism, a willingness to die for country. *Sakura* [cherry blossom] was used ubiquitously for the names of military ships, airplanes, bombs, and troops. Military units were given nicknames such as *ouka* [cherry blossom] and *yamato* [Japan]. *Shikishima* and *asahi* derived from a *haiku* by Motoori: “*Shikishima no yamato gokoro o hito towaba asahi ni niou yamazakura bana* [If someone inquires about the Japanese soul of these Blessed Isles, say mountain cherry blossoms, fragrant in the morning sun]” (Ohara 1975: 130–131).

A military-school anthem, *Douki no dakura* [Companion cherry blossoms], written in 1938 as a popular song with roots in Shinto reverence for *sakura*, was revised by the military in 1944 and played on the radio for the nation for the first time the next year. It promoted the idea that soldiers and sailors and pilots were petals from the same cherry blossom tree:

“You and I are cherry blossom petals,
 as we entered the army school in the same year.
 We bloomed together in the same army school garden,
 and we are ready to fall since we started to bloom.
 Let’s fall beautifully [successfully] for the sake of our country.”
 “We are the same cherry blossoms,
 bloomed in the same army garden.
 We do not share our physical body or blood,
 but somehow, we became bosom friends.
 It’s very hard to say goodbye.”

“We are the same cherry blossoms,
 bloomed in the same air force garden.
 The first [*kamikaze*] plane which left
 in the sunset of the southern sky has not returned.”

“We are the same cherry blossoms,
 bloomed in the same air force garden.
 Why did you die and fall without waiting for the day,
 which we promised that we would survive?”

“We are the same cherry blossoms.
 Even if we fall separately,
 let’s meet when we bloom in spring
 at the flowery heaven of Yasukuni Shrine.”

3.3.2. *Kamikaze*. Near the end of the Kamakura Period, Japan was attacked by Mongolians twice, in 1274 and 1281 (Imai 2003). Powerful typhoons sank the attacking ships both times, and Japan was spared Mongolian conquest. Many Japanese today still believe that Shinto gods protected Japan by sending these typhoons. The notion of these *kamikaze* [god’s winds] was revived in 1942 to describe the divine force that inspired, in the religious sense, certain pilots who sacrificed their lives by diving their planes into U.S. ships as weapons (Ohara 1975). This matter of expediency coincided with a diminishing Japanese arsenal. Military leader Tojo Hideki began, also in 1942, to emphasize spirituality over physical resources; beautiful words and phrases replaced the typical military nomenclature (Nagasawa 2004: 38). The suicidal attack, “*totsu geki*,”

became known as *seika* [spiritual flower]; bombs carried by *kamikaze* pilots were referred to as *sakura dan* [cherry blossom bombs].

3.3.3. *Other Nomenclature.* Shinto language abounds in the naming of Japanese ships, planes, bombs, and troops. World War II Warships were named after Shinto gods or shrines. The Katori-class cruiser *Kashima*, for example, was named after a shrine whose god was identified in *Kojiki* as “the protector of Japan against foreign violence” who “break[s] the spear points of heavenly demons and of Earthly demons” (Frost 1943: 351). The oracle of the god of Kashima warned in *Kojiki* that “when devout men are few, my powers dwindle, my heart is distressed and the demon powers gain vigour while the divine power is weakened” (351). Other ships and submarines also were named after Shinto shrines: *kashima*, *katori*, *gokoku*, and *yasukuni*, for example. Ancient Emperors’ names, such as *Jinmu* and *Shomu* appeared as ship names. Shinto ideologies were specified as *seishin* [true spirit] and *sekicho* [solid spirit], while fighting planes were often named after birds such as *washi* [eagle] and *hayabusa* [falcon].

3.3.4. *Gyokusai.* The word may be translated as “shattered jade,” “broken pearls,” or “scattered jewels.” *Gyoku* means “pearl”; *sai* means “crushed into pieces.” The military used *Gyokusai* as a euphemistic metaphor to glorify and prettify a suicidal attack in the face of imminent defeat. The concept was based on a passage from the *Book of Northern Qi*, the official history of a Seventh-Century Chinese dynasty: “A great man should die as a shattered jewel rather than live as an intact tile” (Hosaka 2005: 61). Thus, the slogan *Ichioku Gyokusai* (the shattering of the hundred million like a beautiful jewel) became popularized in the final year of the war when, as Kieman (2007: 484) noted, “The regime was prepared if necessary to send 100 million Japanese to their deaths.” *Gyoku* also was used to refer to the Emperor at the dawn of the Meiji Era; *gyoku* started to signify nobility. *Gyokusai* came to mean one’s sacrifice of his life for the sake of the Emperor.

3.4. *Speeches/polemics*

Language expressing other Shinto ideals were integrated into wartime propaganda. In their addresses to the nation, Tojo and other military officers unveiled a new vocabulary, beginning in November 1941, that included referring to Japan as *Kou Koku* [the Emperor’s country] (Hosaka 2005: 61). Soon, the word *kou* was prefixed to nouns to signify that everything belonged to the Emperor. For example, the army, which for thousands of years before the Meiji restoration had been under civilian rule,

was now called *kou gun* [We, the Emperors' army]. The structure of the very beginning of sentences changed to *Tenno no Ikou* [Thanks to the Emperor's glory, we...]. The Emperor himself was now referred to as *dai genshi heika* [Supreme Leader]. As the winds of war turned against the Japanese, journalist-polemicist Tokutomi Iichiro (1944: 1) borrowed from the ritual language of Shinto purification ceremonies to assert that while Americans "were fighting to preserve their own luxury...for the Japanese, the Greater East Asia War is a purifying exorcism, a cleaning ablution." Japanese leaders turned a religious ideal into fighting words: war propaganda. Their subjects were susceptible, believing that they possessed superior blood and soul because they were the children of the Shinto goddess.

Conclusion

Japan's nationalist and ultranationalist movements today, embodied in a half-dozen right-trending conservative political parties, may be traced to the growth of imperial militarism and patriotism fueled by the legacy of samurai and bushido culture and intertwined with the emergence of cult and State Shinto during the late Meiji Era. The turmoil of rival religions against the backdrop of one civilization's most dramatic political and cultural upheavals allowed for the misappropriation of Shinto and its original beliefs. Nationalists effectively used sacred scripture for propaganda, shortened and simplified into slogans.

4.1.1. *Yasukuni and Nationalism*. Yasukuni Shrine is rooted in Shintoism but was transformed into Japan's notorious national memorial to the war dead by the Meiji government. At Yasukuni, "religion, patriotism, and nationalism coalesce into one and the same attitude" (Masaaki 2005: 41). Yasukuni represents both religious and political ideals. At first, a little shrine was erected on a sacred mountain east of Kyoto as a memorial for worship by fallen loyalists at the end of the Tokugawa regime. According to Masaaki, the first private memorial service was held there for victims of the Ansei Purge: political leaders and samurai who had been opposed to the shogunate's policy to open the country to the West. To the victors go the spoils: the fallen troops of the imperial army that had launched a military campaign against Edo and which was instrumental in establishing the Meiji government were honored for their sacrifice in service of the Emperor. They became *saishin* [enshrined deities] to be perpetually commemorated.

A site for Yasukuni was secured in 1869 in central Tokyo, and the shrine was built in 1872. It was established as a national shrine with special

status in 1878; unlike the Grand Shrine of Ise, which is dedicated solely to the imperial dynasty, at Yasukuni, imperial lineage and troops who died in service to the Emperor are commemorated together. Tellingly, in prewar Japan, jurisdiction over Yasukuni belonged to the Ministry of the Military, whereas other shrines were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Emperor himself traditionally paid his respects there.

In 2009, Prime Minister Taro Aso sent an offering to a Tokyo war shrine seen by Asian neighbors as a symbol of the country's past militarism (AFP 2009). Aso had avoided visiting the controversial Yasukuni shrine, which honors 2.5 million Japanese war dead, including 14 top war criminals from World War II. Among Aso's immediate predecessors, Shinzo Abe had chosen to stay away from the shrine, and Yasuo Fukuda openly opposed visits to the shrine by political leaders, instead advocating reconciliation with other Asian countries. Right-wing politicians and their followers, however, along with many military veterans, have aggressively pursued an agenda promoting worship at the shrine.

Today, proponents and defenders of Yasukuni demand memorial worship for all military war dead and insist that the Emperor and prime minister attend. Yasukuni parties continually seek legislation establishing government sponsorship of Yasukuni as a religious organization and to change the Constitution accordingly, a stance Masaaki (2005) characterized as "political-religious conservatism"—"the same nature as Yasukuni's status in prewar Japan." Other religious conservatives, however, are among the antagonists of the Yasukuni stance.

Japan's prime ministers and its Emperor represent intermediate positions. Some, while basically supporting Yasukuni, have sought to downplay Shinto characteristics of war-dead worship and have suggested either decoupling the worship or excluding the so-called Class-A war criminals. Masaaki (2005) has suggested that "religious awareness of the Japanese people is thin and unfocused" and that "common people should develop a civil-religious consciousness and enhance their concern with respect to the war-dead memorials."

4.1.2. *Moral/intellectual Weakness.* Others have cited weakness among modern Japanese intellectuals and blamed them for a lack of moral authority in pointing out the logical impossibilities advocated in State Shinto. Tatsuo Arima (1969: 12–13) found it "difficult to believe that competent university scholars of this century could preach the idea that the 'prehistoric period' of Japan consciously formed...the sacred authority of the emperor." Maruyama (1996: 256) labeled Japanese intellectuals a

“community of contrition,” with a shared sense of remorse for failing to oppose the expanding militarism in prewar days. Toyota (1994: 184) observed that, after WWII, westernization and democracy ascended to god-like status, just as Shinto perpetuated its hundreds of gods.

Breen and Teeuwen (2003: 268) concluded that, “State Shinto is, indeed, a case of ‘in the beginning was the word; all creation came from the word; nothing came into being that was not of the word.’” Returning to Ellul’s (1965) and Black’s (1977) definitions of propaganda, the key for the Japanese, it would seem, is in how they decide, as a people, to create and receive messages. Japan’s tragic past of passive participation through psychological manipulation suppressed its autonomy due to unwarranted reliance on authority figures and spokesmen who used unverified and unverifiable abstractions of language rather than empirical validation. Japanese intellectuals and leaders should consider the current long-running controversy over textbook treatment of Japan’s war atrocities as symbolic.

The year 2011 marks the centennial of the Southern-Northern Courts controversy over the fact that school textbooks failed to say which court had been legitimate in the fourteenth century (Brownlee 1999). The controversy was significant for historians, who, since the 1892 Kume Kanitake incident—in which a historian was fired for questioning the validity of State Shinto—had conceded to the imperial government the right to decide what to discuss in textbooks (Hardacre 1989: 39). Should intellectuals again abdicate the moral authority of truth and knowledge in such matters, the Japanese are at risk of falling prey to a dangerously growing nationalism.

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WESTERN CONTRIBUTORS TO THE MODERNIZATION OF MEIJI JAPAN: HEPBURN AND VERBECK

Hideo Watanabe
William Paterson University

The modernization of Meiji Japan was aided by two different approaches in connection with other countries. One approach was that, in order to gain a better understanding of the West, Meiji delegates visited Western countries and learned about Western civilization first hand. One purpose of the Iwakura Mission was to observe and investigate the institutions and practices of advanced countries, which would help the modernization of Japan. Iwakura and high officials, such as Okubo Toshimichi and Ito Hirobumi, visited twelve countries including the U.S., Britain, and France. Upon their return home, they reported to the Meiji Emperor, “Power of nations, people, government, religions, military are deeply rooted and many branches are growing from the root.... Thus we need to quickly establish our constitutional government, accumulate wealth of our people, otherwise the growth of civilization cannot be done.”¹

The other approach for the establishment of a new nation was that many Westerners came to Japan and provided an incredible assistance to the country directly. The slogan of the Meiji government was “Enrich the country, strengthen the military,” and the government invited Western specialists to Japan with the goal of modernization on their minds. These specialists were called *oyatoi gaikokujin* (foreign advisors employed by the Japanese government). Many *oyatoi gaikokujin* came from Britain, America, and France, and numbered more than 3,000. Despite the risk to their lives, they came over to Japan and transferred their knowledge in the fields of military, law, agriculture and medical science, among others. One such example is that an American, William S. Clark, who established the Sapporo Agricultural College, was invited in 1876 by the Japanese government. Clark, who is well known for his famous words, “Boys, be ambitious!” had a significant impact on the scientific and economic development of the island of Hokkaido.

Verbeck, who originally came to Japan as a missionary of the Dutch Reformed Church, also became an *oyatoi gaikokujin* at one point in his life.

¹ Harry Sakamaki, “The Iwakura Mission in 1872” (Presentation, Japan Society of Fairfield Country, New York, February 25, 2012).

In his proposal “Brief Sketch,” he suggested a mission to travel to advanced countries in search of wisdom and to inspect various systems which could be used to civilize and modernize the nation.

Oyatoi gaikokujin certainly contributed to the modernization of Japan; however, not all foreigners who helped Japan at that time were *oyatoi gaikokujin*. Without invitation, some foreigners voluntarily came to Japan and dedicated their lives for the sake of the people and the nation. One such foreigner was Dr. James Curtis Hepburn. With his strong belief in foreign missions, Hepburn came to Japan just before the end of the two-century long closure. He stayed in Yokohama for 33 years (1859–1892) and addressed the people’s needs in terms of medical care, education, and Christian missionary work. This paper, focusing on Hepburn and Guido Verbeck, will explore how they aided in the modernization of Meiji Japan throughout the course of their lives in America and Japan.



Figure 1. James Curtis Hepburn

Milton, Pennsylvania Days

Hepburn was born in 1815 in Milton, a small town in Pennsylvania. His father was a highly esteemed citizen and lawyer, and his mother was a housewife: “My father and my mother were both humble Christians. . . . My mother was especially interested in Foreign Missions. She took the *Missionary Herald* and the *N. Y. Observer* as far back as I can remember. I always read those papers with interest.”²

² Cited in W. T. Linn Kieffer, *A History of the First Presbyterian Church of Milton* (Milton: The First Presbyterian Church of Milton, 1935).

Princeton College and University of Pennsylvania

After finishing Milton Academy, Hepburn enrolled in Princeton College as a junior at the age of sixteen in 1831. Hepburn's "first serious impressions about personal religion were in the winter of 1831–32 at Princeton during a revival in the College," in which he "awoke to a new life and was born again of the Spirit."³

After Princeton, he entered the Medical College of the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia: "A year earlier, on May 19, 1835 to be precise, he joined the First Presbyterian Church of Milton. The notion of becoming a medical missionary suddenly overtook him. His father strongly opposed it, and he wanted to wipe away this notion to appease his family. Yet his heart was not at rest until he definitely decided to go overseas. The sense of mission and calling was simply more overpowering."⁴

Meeting Clarissa

Hepburn received a medical doctor degree from the University of Pennsylvania and opened a medical practice office in Norristown, Pennsylvania, where he met Miss Clarissa M. Leete. She was also interested in missionary work abroad, and their fateful encounter made Hepburn decide on both marriage and missionary work abroad. The couple set sail in 1841 for Singapore, Macao, and then Amoy. Their first child, David Samuel, was born in Amoy in 1844.⁵

Life in New York (1846–1859)

After coming back from Amoy in 1846, the couple lived in New York. According to the New York City Directory of 1850, Hepburn's address was "42nd Street near 8th Avenue." The address indicates the center of present day Manhattan, but the area was still under development when Hepburn began to live there. At first he had a small family practice, but there was an epidemic of cholera of the Asian strain in the city. His experience in China helped Hepburn to diagnose and treat patients accurately. Although he hated New York, he soon became a well-known physician in the city. During their 13-year stay there, the Hepburn's had three additional children, who were

³ Kieffer, *A History of the First Presbyterian Church of Milton*.

⁴ According to David J. Lu, "James Curtis Hepburn, Missionary from Central Pennsylvania to the Pacific Rim" (Presentation, Synod of Northumberland, 1988).

⁵ Kieffer, *A History of the First Presbyterian Church of Milton*.

five, three, and two years of age, but they all died of illnesses. Hepburn wrote a letter to his brother, Slator, on August 1, 1855: “what a dreadful place is New York, Oh that I had wings that I might fly away to some desolate place. May God forgive me if these are wicked thoughts.”⁶

In the nineteenth century, America experienced significant industrialization and became interested in expanding her trading markets to the East. In 1853, Commodore Perry came to Uraga (near Yokohama) with four black ships, requesting Japan to open her doors to America. A treaty between the two nations was signed in 1854 and allowed foreign missionaries to enter Japan. It was then that Hepburn applied for a medical missionary position. As soon as The Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions in America made the offer, he readily accepted it.

Arrival in Japan

Hepburn and Clarissa left New York, leaving their only remaining child, Samuel, with a friend and landed in Nagasaki on October 12th, 1859. It was still before the reopening of Japan and most Japanese had never seen Westerners, especially women. When Mrs. Hepburn walked outside, local Japanese men followed her with much curiosity. She was the first American woman to walk on Japanese soil.⁷ The couple settled down at Jobutsuji, a Buddhist temple in Kanagawa, a town next to Yokohama, but Christianity was still under prohibition and the Edo (the old name of Tokyo) government had strict surveillance over suspicious foreigners.

Hepburn soon began studying Japanese and hired a Japanese tutor. The man was a brilliant teacher, but after about three weeks he told Hepburn that he would quit the job. He confessed to Hepburn that he was a spy from the government with the intention of assassinating the American; but he found Hepburn a person of ethics and too nice to be killed.⁸ Actually, thirteen foreigners were assassinated at that time,⁹ and Hepburn’s status was in great danger. This was in distinct contrast with the *oyatoi gaikokujin*, who were treated with high regard by the Japanese government.

⁶ Meiji Gakuin Rekishi Shiryōkan, *Hepburn’s letter addressed to Slator* (Tokyo: Meiji Gakuin, 2008), p. 13.

⁷ Ishikawa Kiyoshi, *Shirokyokai Kaihoo April 20th: Hebon koborebanashi* (Yokohama: Shiro Kyoukai, 2008).

⁸ Murakami Fumiaki, *Hebon Monogatari* (Tokyo: Meiji Gakuin, 2003).

⁹ Meiji Gakuin Rekishi Shiryōkan, *Meiji Gakuin Rekishi Shiryōkan Shiryōshū* (Tokyo: Meiji Gakuin, 2006), p. 88.

Medical Services

Being a medical missionary, Hepburn opened a clinic at Sokoji Buddhist Temple near his residence and provided Japanese citizens with free medical services. He treated patients as an eye doctor and physician, and his voluntary medical services soon earned him a good reputation; by this time 100 to 150 patients visited per day.¹⁰ In particular, his operation of amputating the leg of the top kabuki actor made Hepburn famous all over Japan. In addition, he trained Japanese medical students in Western medicine in his clinic. One of them was Miyake Hiizu, who became the first chairman of the Medical Science Department at Tokyo University, as well as the first person in Japan to hold a Ph.D. in medical science.

Waei Gorin Shusei (The First Comprehensive Japanese–English Dictionary)

Although Hepburn was engaged in medical services, his ultimate goal for his stay in Japan was to translate the Bible into Japanese. To accomplish this job, Hepburn needed a comprehensive Japanese dictionary, and so he decided to compile one himself. He was fortunate to have come across an eye patient, Kishida Ginko, who was a man of intelligence and skillful calligraphy. With his help, Hepburn successfully completed a dictionary in 1887. It was named *Waei gorin shusei* and was the first comprehensive Japanese–English and English–Japanese dictionary in Japan. The Japanese–English part contained 20,772 words in 558 pages and the English–Japanese part contained 10,030 words in 132 pages.¹¹ The indexes were basically written in *romaji* (romanized letters), with *katakana* (characters used for foreign words) and *kanji* (borrowed Chinese characters) equivalences added.

The dictionary was very useful to both Japanese and Westerners who studied English or Japanese. About 1,000 or 2,000 copies of the first edition sold out quickly, and the book was expanded until the most recent ninth edition. It is amazing that Hepburn took up this job, having little knowledge of the Japanese language when he began, and taking only seven years to complete it.

Eventually Hepburn sold his copyright of the third edition of *Waei gorin shusei* in order to raise funds to build the dormitory of Meiji Gakuin in

¹⁰ Okabe Kazuoki, ed., *Hebon Zainichi Shokan Zenshū* (Tokyo: Kyobunkan, 2009).

¹¹ Murakami Fumiaki, *Hebon Monogatari*, p. 132.

1886. The dormitory was named after him, “Hebon Hall,” and Hepburn was the first President of Meiji Gakuin (1890–1891).

Hebon’s Romanization

Hepburn used his own romanized description system in *Waei gorin shusei* in 1886. This system is based on English pronunciation and is called “Hebon-shiki” or “Hepburn-system.” In 1885, however, Tanakadate Aikitsu invented the system called “Nihon-shiki” based on Japanese pronunciation. According to the “Nihon-shiki system,” the Japanese equivalents of *bean curd* and *tea* are spelled *tohu* and *otya*, respectively. On the other hand, the “Hepburn-shiki system” writes *tofu* and *ocha*. Currently “Kunrei-shiki system,” which is a revision of “Nihon-shiki,” is the officially recognized romanized system. In reality, however, “Hebon-shiki” is used for Japanese passports and is more prevalent. The term “Hebon-shiki *romaji*” has been very popular in Japan, and thus the name “Hepburn” is well known among the Japanese people.

“Hepburn Juku” and Meiji Gakuin

In 1858, The Treaty of Amity and Commerce between the United States and Japan was concluded and stated that a settlement called *kyoryuchi*, in Japanese, should be built in the ports of Kanagawa, Kobe, Nagasaki, Hakodate, and Niigata. The *kyoryuchi* in Yokohama was located at the present Yamashita Park of Yokohama Port and was called “Yokohama Kyoryuchi.” Hepburn built a new residence at the Yokohama Kyoryuchi 39th in 1863 and used it as both a clinic and an academy. The academy was called “Hebon Juku” and was run by Dr. and Mrs. Hepburn. This is the origin of Meiji Gakuin, which was founded in 1887.

Prominent individuals who studied at “Hepburn Juku” included Hayashi, Tadasu (later Minister of Foreign Affairs as well as Minister of Communication). Hayashi wrote on his childhood memories of Dr. and Mrs. Hepburn: “I was brought up among the Doctor’s family from the time I was thirteen years old, and both the Doctor and Mrs. Hepburn treated me with parental love and kindness.”¹²

The Bible Translation

After the completion of the dictionary, Hepburn devoted himself to the translation of the Bible. In 1874, a Joint Committee on Translating the

¹² Cited in Takaya Michio, *Hebon* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1986).

Bible was formed. It is worth noting that “Hepburn advised the American Bible Society not to recognize translations rendered by individuals” as “he firmly believed that the translation must be a joint work, and the Society should accept only those versions recommended by a committee of missionaries representing all denominations in Japan.”¹³ The whole Bible was translated into Japanese, and more than 60% of the 27 volumes of the New Testament and nearly half of the 39 volumes of the Old Testament were translated by Hepburn himself.¹⁴ The translation of the New Testament was completed in 1880 and that of the Old Testament in 1887.

Shiro Church

In February, 1873 the prohibition of Christianity for Japanese citizens was lifted, and foreigners were allowed to do missionary work in Japan. The Yokohama First Presbyterian Church was established at the site of Hepburn’s residence in the Yamashita Settlement 39th in 1874. Still, Hepburn “strongly felt that the church for the Japanese people had to be within their reach and had to be built within the place they lived.”¹⁵ With this sentiment in mind, it was transferred to the Sumiyoshi-cho area of Yokohama with the name of Sumiyoshi-cho Church, which is presently known as Shiro Church in Onoe-cho.

By this time, Western medicine had become popular and Hepburn thought that some other Western doctors could help Japanese patients. He closed his clinic in the Yokohama Settlement 39th, entrusting “Hepburn Juku” to Mrs. Hepburn and J.C. Ballagh,¹⁶ and moved to the Yamate Settlement, which was up the hill nearby, to be soulfully engaged in the work of Bible translation.

¹³ Lu, “James Curtis Hepburn, Missionary from Central Pennsylvania to the Pacific Rim.”

¹⁴ Cited in Okabe Kazuoki, *Shiro Kyokai 125 nenshi* (Yokohama: Yokohama Shirokyokai, 2004).

¹⁵ Lu, “James Curtis Hepburn, Missionary from Central Pennsylvania to the Pacific Rim.”

¹⁶ On April of 1880, the Hebon Juku moved to the Tsukiji enclave and changed its name to the “Tsukiji Dai-Gakko,” with J.C. Ballagh is its principal. (*The Home Page of Meiji Gakuin University* (Tokyo: Meiji Gakuin University, 2010).

Hepburn's Return to America

When the Bible translation was completed, Hepburn thought that his mission was finished and that it was time to go back to America. His farewell party was held at Shiro Church and he made a speech: "I give my thanks to God that I have been in this country for 33 years and have devoted my energies to helping the Japanese people... Ah, I have completed my work and it is time for me to return to my home country, where I shall rest and then go on to meet my parents in Heaven."¹⁷ Hepburn was then 77 years old, and Clarissa was 74 years old.

Hepburn's Life in East Orange (1893–1911)

The couple left Yokohama in October, 1892 and settled in East Orange, New Jersey in May, 1893. They chose the place probably because their three children were buried at Rosedale Cemetery, Orange, near their house. They lived in a house on 71 Glenwood Avenue, with a small maple tree in the front yard. The house still exists at the same address and a widow now lives there. The house is nearly 150 years old and stands three stories high with a basement.¹⁸

Dr. and Mrs. Hepburn were members of Brick Presbyterian Church, which is a ten minute walk from their residence in East Orange. This building also exists, but the church is presently named "Temple of Unified Christians at Brick Church."

Hepburn called his 19 years of life in East Orange *inkyō*, whose Japanese word means "retired life." Mrs. Hepburn became mentally ill and Hepburn expressed his great sorrow about her in his letter to William Elliot Griffis, who wrote a book about Hepburn in 1913.¹⁹ The letter mentioned the following: "My heart is full sorrow, on account of my dear wife, whom I have

¹⁷ W. T. Linn Kieffer, *A History of the First Presbyterian Church of Milton*.

¹⁸ The maps of Hepburn's residence based on the present house owner's story are at the end of this article (Figure 3 and 4), drawn by Sato Takahiro and Watanabe Hideo. Author's note: When I interviewed the widow, she knew about Hepburn and told me that the big maple tree in the front yard is probably one of the oldest ones in America. It was my strong desire to draw the map of the entire house, and she generously accepted my request.

¹⁹ Cited in William Elliot Griffis, *Hepburn of Japan and His Wife and Helpmates: A Life Story of Toil for Christ* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1913).

been compelled to send to an asylum, on account of mental derangement...”²⁰

In the same letter, there is a sense of loneliness from the old man, whose only remaining child is no longer living at home: “I am alone in my house with a servant to care for me. I am waiting to hear from my son, who is at Nagasaki in business for the Standard Oil Co. —I have urged him to come home and occupy my house and to take care of me. I cannot hear from him before the middle of January, next, until then I am undecided what to do. I cannot now give a positive answer to your request about my papers, etc.”

In 1905, when Hepburn was ninety years old, he received a medal from the Japanese government in recognition of his great contributions to Japan. Hepburn expressed his gratitude for this honor in his letter: “Especially do I esteem the honor which His Majesty the Emperor of Japan has conferred upon me through Mr. R. Takahira the Japanese Minister at Washington. Let me also join with the Japanese people in crying Teikoku Banzai.”²¹

Takahashi Korekiyo, a former student of “Hebon Juku” when he was twelve years old (and later became the Prime Minister in 1921), visited the Hepburns in 1905 and missed seeing Mrs. Hepburn, who was hospitalized. The next year, Mrs. Hepburn passed away at the age of 88, having contributed many honorable achievements during her lifetime. She was responsible for girls’ education at “Hepburn Academy,” which was the precursor of the present Ferris Women’s College in Yokohama. She had been helping her husband with many activities for 65 years and Hepburn’s achievements would not have been possible without her strong support.

Dr. Hepburn’s Death

On September 21, 1911, in his residence, Hepburn fell into a quiet but everlasting sleep due to old age; he was 96 years old. His funeral was held at Brick Presbyterian Church, and he was buried in a modest tomb in Rosedale Cemetery, together with his beloved wife and three children. Afterwards, “Griffis wrote how, at the time of Dr. Hepburn’s death, he went into the study of the house in East Orange and found it stripped of almost all the books, for the doctor had been wont to keep nothing for himself but what

²⁰ Hepburn’s letter addressed to Griffis on Dec. 22, 1904. It is kept in Hepburn’s folder, which is preserved in the William Elliot Griffis Collection of Rutgers University.

²¹ Meiji Gakuin Rekishi Shiryōkan, *Meiji Gakuin Rekishi Shiryōkan Shiryōshū*, p. 106.

he was actually using and had given away everything that could be used elsewhere. In the same spirit he had given his all to Japan and Japan had taken him to her heart.”²² It was just by coincidence that on that same date, Hepburn Hall of Meiji Gakuin caught fire.

Both the Japanese and American press wrote sentinel headlines. The *New York Times* reported on September 24, 1911, “JAPANESE PRAISE HEPBURN. Regret Death of American Who First Taught Them Modern Medicine....The Hepburn Hall at Meiji Gakuin, the leading Presbyterian school in Tokio, was destroyed by fire at the hour of Mr. Hepburn’s death.”²³



Figure 2. Guido Verbeck

Guido Verbeck: Early Life (1830–1851)

Guido Verbeck was born into a middle class family in the province of Utrecht, Holland in 1830. His parents were good Christians and made him go to the Moravian School, which emphasized mission and spiritual training. He was a talented linguist and early in life learned to speak French and English almost as well as Dutch. His birth year, 1830, was signified by the construction of the first railway in Europe. Engineering was considered the “coming profession,” and thus he entered the Polytechnic Institute of Utrecht.

Life in America (1852–1858)

In 1852, when he was twenty-two, he immigrated to the United States, a country of opportunities, and was engaged in a foundry in Wisconsin. Two years later, in Arkansas, he suffered from cholera, which caused a

²² Cited in Elizabeth Gilliland, “James Curtis Hepburn, Missionary to Japan: A Biographical Sketch” (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Historical Society, 1938).

²³ “Japanese Praise Hepburn,” *New York Times*, September 24, 1911.

turning point in his career. He promised God that if restored to health, he would consecrate his life to service in the missionary field. After his recovery, he entered a seminary in Auburn, New York and was ordained in 1859. In the same year he met Maria Manion, and they soon married. Verbeck applied and was appointed to go out to Japan under the Missionary Board of the Reformed Dutch Church.

Life in Nagasaki (1859–1869)

Verbeck sailed from New York for Japan on May 7, 1859 and arrived at Nagasaki on November 7, 1859. He arrived in the same year the Hepburns arrived at Yokohama, less than one month later (the Hepburns left New York on April 24, 1859 and arrived at Yokohama on October 18, 1859). Nagasaki was for a long time the only port of Japan open to trade through Dejima, so Verbeck settled at Sofukuin Buddhist Temple in Nagasaki.

English had been replacing Dutch in Japan at that time, so he taught English at the Nagasaki Domain Academy, Seibikan. His pupils included Okuma Shigenobu, Ito Hirofumi, Okubo Toshimichi and Soyeshima Taneomi, who all became high government officials later on. Verbeck recalled that, “More than a year ago I had two very promising pupils, Soyeshima and Okuma, who studied through with me a large part of the New Testament and the whole of our national constitution.”²⁴ Teaching at Seibikan made Verbeck well known all over the nation, and many promising students even outside Nagasaki came to study under him.

Okuma and Soeshima established Chienkan, the Saga Domain Academy in Nagasaki in 1866 and learned from Verbeck the American Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. Verbeck’s letter dated on January 17, 1868 stated, “...and the meaning of the word ‘Liberty’ for which there is no exact equivalent in the languages is to become gradually appreciated and known.”²⁵ Western concepts such as liberty, independence, and equality at birth were introduced to the Meiji leaders of Japan in this manner.

The Tokugawa Shogunate government collapsed, and the Meiji Restoration began in 1868. The new government needed foreign advisors to learn new political systems from the West. Recommended by his former

²⁴ William Elliot Griffis, *Verbeck of Japan* (Chicago: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1900), p. 174.

²⁵ Ito Noriko, *Furubekki kokorozashi no shōgai: kyoshi soshite senkyōshi toshite* (Tokyo: Ayumu, 2010), p. 103.

student, Okubo, Verbeck received an appointment for a teaching position at the Kaisei Academy (later Tokyo Imperial University). In 1869, he left Nagasaki and students gathered for his farewell party. Students in Chienkan included famous samurai, such as Saigo Takamori and Sakamoto Ryoma in their younger days.

Tokyo: *Oyatoi Gaikokujin*

Entering the service of the Japanese government, the Dutch-American missionary became an *oyatoi gaikokujin*. The book entitled *Oyatoi Gaikokujin List* was published in 1872 and the term, *oyatoi gaikokujin* became prevalent soon thereafter.²⁶ *Oyatoi gaikokujin* were treated with a generous payment by the Meiji government. Verbeck was paid \$600 (Mexican dollars), which was the same amount received by Iwakura Tomomi, the second highest government official at that moment. The Ministry of Education was established in 1871, and Verbeck provided inspiration for the Education Order of 1872. The Conscription Ordinance of 1873 was also assisted by him. Verbeck had been a source of information about the West. He was such an important person to the government that he was heavily guarded wherever he went, especially because anti-foreigner feelings remained strong in Edo.

International Exchange

Verbeck imported foreign books to Japan and sent Japanese students to universities abroad. He had a connection with Dr. Ferris Isaac, chief of the Missionary Board of the Dutch Reformed Church in America, with whose aid Verbeck sent many Japanese students to Rutgers College, New Jersey. Those students included the Yokoi brothers, who were the first Japanese students to go to school at an American college. Iwakura's two sons were Verbeck's students and Verbeck wrote their recommendations for studies at Rutgers. About 500 Japanese students went abroad to the U.S. and Verbeck took care of half of them. Griffis Elliot was a professor at Rutgers College and Verbeck assisted in bringing him to Japan to teach at the Fukui Domain Academy, Meishinkan.

²⁶ Noriko, *Furubekki kokorozashi no shōgai*, p. 123.

“Brief Sketch” in 1871

On October 26, 1871, Iwakura requested that Verbeck call him to talk about a paper that Verbeck had shown to a high Japanese officer. The paper, the so-called “Brief Sketch,” was a proposal that Verbeck had sent to Okuma as a response to his request regarding the removal of the unequal treaties. The proposal read that a great embassy composed of the highest imperial officials should visit the United States and Europe in order for Japan to receive full recognition as a sovereign state. Okuma, however, kept the paper to himself for two years or more due to the intense anti-foreign feelings of 1869. Hearing Verbeck’s story, Iwakura believed that the program was exactly what the government needed, and the embassy was organized according to Verbeck’s paper. Their members went abroad for 632 days from December 1871 to September 1873.

Religious Toleration

Law, economics, and diplomacy were the important subjects of the mission for Iwakura, while for Verbeck, the survey of Christianity was crucial. He strongly felt that the great visitation of Japan’s leading diplomats to the Western countries would result in a definite and permanent commitment from its people to a vital union with the nations of Christendom.²⁷

Griffis cited Verbeck’s letter addressed to Dr. Ferris Issac. In this citation, Verbeck explains how the embassy is structured, with hopes that toleration of Christianity will be realized eventually:

The government is going to send a very superior embassy to America and Europe. I shall give some of the member’s letters (special) to you. The ambassadors expect to sail on the 22nd December for San Francisco. The chief of the embassy is the father of Tatsu and Asahi (of New Brunswick), the Prime Minister and most influential man in the Empire. It is my hope and prayer that the sending of this mission may do very much to bring about, or at least bring nearer, the long longed-for toleration of Christianity.²⁸

²⁷ Cited in Griffis, *Verbeck of Japan*.

²⁸ Sasaki Akira, “Oyatōi kyōshi senkyōshi furubekki 1869–1878,” *Kiyō* 36 (Tokyo: Meiji Gakuin University, 2004), p. 305.

The Iwakura Mission in 1872

The purposes of the mission was to a) visit all contracting parties of the Amity & Commerce Treaties in order to present its credentials to the sovereign of each country; b) gather information on the countries visited in order to effect the modernization of Japan; c) renegotiate the unequal treaties with the U.S., Great Britain, and other European countries.²⁹ Giving direct advice to Iwakura, the Prime Minister and Chief Ambassador, Verbeck was certainly the originator and organizer of the program.

Christians in Japan received bad treatment by the Edo government. Four thousand Catholics were exiled from Nagasaki in 1866 and were forced to work in mines. Many Christians were imprisoned in Kaga (the present Ishikawa Prefecture) and Kishu (the present Wakayama prefecture). Knowing this, Hepburn and other missionaries informed the American Foreign Mission Office of the horrible situation of Christians in Japan. This news spread not only in the U.S. but also in Europe. Since the U.S. and most European countries are Christian nations, the Iwakura Mission was severely criticized by those countries, for they understood that Japan oppressed Christians. The Japanese government, which wanted to renegotiate unequal treaties with those countries, came to realize the importance of lifting the anti-Christian edicts and removed them.³⁰

The grand outcome of the mission for Verbeck was the lifting of the anti-Christian edicts and the toleration of Christianity. He wrote these lines to Ferris: “The great and glorious event of the day is that, about a week ago, the edicts prohibiting the introduction of foreign religions have been removed by command of the government from the public law-boards throughout the country! It is equivalent to granting toleration! The Lord be praised.”³¹

The Order of the Rising Sun and Missionary Work

“Verbeck helped the government out of a great difficulty,” Iwakura repeatedly said of Verbeck. As an appropriate conclusion to his long service to the government, the emperor decorated Verbeck with the Order of the Rising Sun in 1877. Verbeck, however, had been criticized by other missionaries for his deep engagement with the government, and he had long been debating which role to take, stating the following:

²⁹ Cited in Sakamaki, “The Iwakura Mission in 1872.”

³⁰ Sugita Sachiko, *Hebon hakase no aishita Nihon* (Tokyo: Inochi foresuto bukkusu, 2006), pp. 99–101.

³¹ Griffis, *Verbeck of Japan*, p. 265.

My kingdom is not of this world, and though I know that missionaries ought to avoid getting mixed up in political affairs, yet, when these people come and sincerely inquire after the most likely measures that could conduce to the welfare of their country, I do not feel at liberty to refuse them a hearing and advice, in a place where honest advisers are few, if at all extant.³²

When Verbeck returned to Japan in 1874, conditions had changed. The Japanese were becoming self-reliant, and foreign advisers were being dismissed. He found that he had been deprived of his position of authority at the Nanko (later Tokyo Imperial University), and his influence soon began to wane. Although for a while Verbeck continued to work as a translator for the Genro-in (the Chamber of Elders), and teach at the newly-founded Nobles School, by the end of the decade his contacts with government had become more formal and ceremonious. From this time onward, Verbeck was increasingly drawn into church work, which absorbed his energies until his death in 1898.³³

Return to Missionary Work

Verbeck returned to missionary work, giving ten years to the work of translating the Bible. The translation of the Old Testament was completed in 1887. His translation of Psalms and Book of Isaiah were exceptionally good that those works had a future influence on Japanese literature. Meiji Gakuin opened in 1887 as the first Protestant institution in Japan, and Verbeck became Professor at the Department of Theology. Then, he was appointed the first trustee of Meiji Gakuin in 1886. Among missionary related activities, Verbeck enjoyed preaching the most, and in the end, he quit teaching and traveled widely in Japan as a preacher. His Japanese was superb, and his missionary tours were welcomed anywhere.

Verbeck's Death

Despite the glorious career as *oyatoi gaikokujin*, Verbeck's late life was poor, lonely, and sad. He had a wife and many children to support. The American government rejected Verbeck's request to obtain an American

³² Griffis, *Verbeck of Japan*, p. 173.

³³ Albert Altman, "Guido Verbeck and the Iwakura Embassy," *Japan Quarterly* 14 (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun, 1966), p. 58.

passport because he had already lost his Dutch citizenship, and the Japanese government granted him permanent residence. Verbeck lived in three countries, Holland, America, and Japan, but he did not hold the right of citizenship in any country. His true citizenship was in heaven. In 1898, Verbeck died in Tokyo of a heart attack, and his weary body was laid to rest in the foreign section of the Aoyama Cemetery in Tokyo.

Summary

Both Hepburn and Verbeck voluntarily came to Japan in 1859 with a common purpose of preaching Christianity. Both passed away with the common goal of living as servants of God. Although they shared the same translation job of the Old Testament and taught at the same university, their activities in Japan were quite different. Hepburn continued to be a servant of Christ until his return to America, while Verbeck became an *oyatoi gaikokujin* to serve the Japanese government in the middle of his life in Japan. Verbeck contributed to the government as an administrative advisor, while Hepburn helped individual Japanese people as a medical doctor and dedicated a significant time of his life to the translation of the Bible. Both of them were notable as great Western contributors to Meiji Japan.

Hepburn's Major Contributions:

- a) Provision of free medical services and introduction of Western medical science.
- b) Creation of the first comprehensive Japanese-English and English-Japanese dictionary and the Hepburn romanization system.
- c) First translation of the Bible and other missionary work, including the founding of Meiji Gakuin and Shiro Church.

Verbeck's Major Contributions:

- a) A great teacher of Meiji leaders such as Okuma, Ito, and Okubo. His influential lectures opened their eyes to the West, and eventually to the modernization of Japan.
- b) A very important consultant or advisor to the Meiji government, namely with his "Brief Sketch" and other advice on the Education Order, etc.
- c) A recruiter of many young students to American universities. The professors like Griffis whom Verbeck invited to Japan were also great contributors to the nation.




Figure 3. Hepburn's Residence in East Orange, NJ (1893-1911)




Figure 4. Hepburn's Residence in East Orange, NJ (1893-1911)

THE JAPANESE HISTORY TEXTBOOK CONTROVERSY AMID POST-WAR SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS

Gabriela Romeu

Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Program

The relations between China and Japan have been strained partly because of China's grievances concerning Japan's actions during World War II and the allegedly deceitful historiographical accounts found in Japanese history textbooks. These history textbooks, used in primary and secondary schools, which are approved by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT),¹ have caused a wave of protest within China and South Korea regarding the claimed glossed-over or whitewashed accounts of World War II atrocities. The most contested atrocity affecting the history textbook dispute is the highly controversial Nanjing Massacre (also known as the "Rape of Nanking," a title made famous by the late author Iris Chang),² where a debated number (ranging from an estimated 40,000 to 300,000) of Nanjing residents were killed on December 13, 1937 and up to six weeks after the city, located south of Beijing, fell to the Japanese Imperial Army. Other allegedly deceitful accounts of atrocities within history textbooks include the invasion of China, the military skirmish at the Marco Polo Bridge in Beijing on July 7, 1937, and the use of comfort women or non-Japanese Asian women in sex stations for Japanese Imperial troops.

Significance of Study

According to Ming, in the book *Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic and Transformation*, the issues found in Sino-Japanese relations are all related to history and status:

¹ In 2001, the Ministry of Education (MOE) and the Ministry for Science and Technology merged to form Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT).

² Iris Chang, *The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 1997); an editorial decision was made to use *pinyin* when referencing places in China, such as "Beijing" instead of "Peking" and "Nanjing" instead of "Nanking," except within an author's work. Chinese names will also be given in *pinyin* with the exception of Chiang Kai-Shek and the KMT.

Historical memory cannot escape politics; government and individuals often select or reimage history to advance their political interest. This book has also shown that how Japanese remember their history is a serious diplomatic issue for China. As such, history triggers intergovernmental exchanges and involves compromise by both sides.³

Therefore, my study is significant for several reasons. First, as previously stated, the issue of history is unresolved in Japan and China, causing political disputes, such as the claims to the Senkaku/Daiyou Islands, to continue, which could further harm current relations between these two important nations. Second, as MEXT is the agency that approves history textbooks, it is assumed that the Japanese government has a hand in not only selecting textbooks that whitewash World War II atrocities, but also in editing the textbooks themselves to fulfill a political or historical agenda. Lastly, the Chinese government looks to the Japanese government for a sense of urgency in righting these alleged historical inaccuracies; and, when this does not occur, the Chinese government is quick to publically condemn the Japanese government and attract international attention.

According to Caroline Rose, from *Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations* and *Sino-Japanese Relations: Facing the Past, Looking to the Future?*, the Ministry of Education has given authors and editors of history textbooks instructions to “water down” the descriptions of Japan’s prewar aggressive behavior, to convey the Meiji Constitution as democratic, and to change various words when regarding war-time events. For example, the words “‘invade’ (*shinryaku* 侵略) had been replaced by ‘attack/advance’ (*shinkō* 侵攻), ‘tyranny’ (*kasei* 苛政) by ‘oppression’ (*assei* 压制), ‘oppression’ (*danatsu* 弾圧) by ‘suppression’ ([sic] *chinatsu* 禁压), and ‘rob’ (*shūdatsu* 収奪) by ‘transfer’ ([sic] *jōtō* 譲与).”⁴ She also

³ Ming Wan, *Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic and Transformation* (Chicago: Stanford University Press, 2006), p. 152.

⁴ Caroline Rose, *Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations: A Case Study in Political Decision-Making* (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 518; and *Sino-Japanese Relations: Facing the Past, Looking to the Future?* (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), p. 18.

describes the foundation for China's involvement in the history textbook controversy and their reaction by stating:

Within Chinese lore, the Nanking Massacre has become one of the most powerful symbols of atrocities committed by the Japanese troops in China....Japan has been slow to acknowledge their role as a victimizer.⁵

Hence, specific World War II atrocities, such as the Nanjing Massacre, are not only seemingly absent in Japanese history textbooks, but they are also absent in Japan's collective memory, which is a stark contrast to China's collective memory.

Methodology

This research will utilize historical analysis, based on a general Western historiographical consensus, of the events leading up to the Nanjing Massacre in December of 1937, including the invasion into China, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident that occurred in July of the same year.⁶ My analysis will introduce and compare the historical account with the portrayal found in the Japanese history textbooks in order to confirm or challenge instances of whitewashing. Next, the research will explore several issues concerning the Japanese history textbook controversy, such as the process and the various theories about MEXT's involvement in the textbook selection, as well as the role of publishers and the involvement of political parties. This study will utilize quantitative data by comparing statistics regarding the adoption rates of past and current Japanese history textbooks within the primary and secondary academic system. Finally, this research will also enclose a syntactical analysis⁷ through my own original translations of key passages that are either included or left out of the 2001 *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho* as well as multiple Japanese history textbooks, which, as of 2012, are currently used in the Japanese school curriculum.

⁵ Rose, *Sino-Japanese Relations*, p. 19.

⁶ Although Western portrayals are not entirely neutral, they do not show a prejudice against Japan as opposed to Chinese portrayals of history.

⁷ A syntactical analysis refers to an analysis of the arrangement and usage of words and phrases within the Japanese history textbooks.

MEXT, Tsukurukai, and the 2001 *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho*

During the Cold War era, the differences between China and Japan's interpretation of World War II and the Second Sino-Japanese War surfaced as a bilateral political issue that progressed into the twenty-first century. In the 1990s, there was a focus on "the memory boom" through various media such as articles, testimonies, documentaries, museums dedications, and exhibitions that began to question the previous practices of collective memory, as people from both nations actively sought to uncover the truth. According to Vera Zolberg:

The problem of knowing what "really" happened becomes more complex the more we know, the more viewpoints expressed, the thicker the description. Indeed, a nation's "official history" conventionally highlights its glories. But this idea is increasingly being subjected to "readers" who wish to know what really happened.⁸

In order for a history textbook to be used in the Japanese national school curriculum, it must be either approved by MEXT or be published under its copyright.⁹ According to MEXT, the governmental control of the textbooks gives students equal opportunities to education while improving education standards throughout Japan.¹⁰ As a consequence of these high education standards, schools are permitted to select from only five to seven Ministry approved history textbooks for one academic year. Therefore, the approval of alleged whitewashed textbooks has called to question the authority of MEXT and the Japanese government. It is important to note that MEXT not only approves history textbooks for school use but also rectifies historical facts and typographical errors within the textbook, which, as of 1997,¹¹ the

⁸ Rose, *Sino-Japanese Relations*, p. 51.

⁹ The 2001 *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho* and the 2012 textbooks are not published under the MEXT's copyright. However, the dates of MEXT examination and authorization are found with the bibliographical information.

¹⁰ "Improving the Textbook Authorization System," Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, November 30, 2011 (accessed December 13, 2012, http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/hakusho/html/hpae199401/hpae199401_2_092.html).

¹¹ The courts deemed at the conclusion of Ienaga Saburō's trial in 1997 that

Japanese courts have held as constitutionally permissible. Therefore, it has been argued that MEXT could be influenced by nationalistic or right-wing organizations to spread nationalism within the Japanese educational system.

Asahi Shimbun reported that the following places within one textbook in particular, *Nihonshi* (*Japanese History* 日本史), were revised by the Ministry of Education:

1. A title, *Japan's Invasion of China* (*Nihon no chūgoku shinryaku* 日本の中国侵略), was changed to *The Manchurian and Shanghai Incidents* (*Manshu Jihen/Shanghai Jihen* 満州事変/上海事変).
2. The phrase 'The fifteen year war that started with the invasion of Manchuria' became simply 'The war....'
3. A caption under a map 'Japan's invasion of China' (*Nihon no chūgoku shinryaku* 日本の中国侵略) became 'Japan's encroachment into/invasion of China' (*Nihon no chūgoku shinnyū* 日本の中国侵入).
4. 'Mao Zedong...fought against Japan invasion' (*Mō Takutō wa...Nihon no shinryaku to tatakau* 毛沢は...日本の中国侵略と戦う) was changed to 'Mao Zedong...fought against Japan's attack/advance' (*Mō Takutō wa...Nihon no shinkō to tatakau* 毛沢は...日本の進行と戦う).¹²

In the example above, the Ministry of Education was criticized by left-wing media, such as the *Asahi Shimbun*, for creating a political agenda to eliminate any criticism towards the Japanese Imperial Army in China. Consequently, since the 1980s, it has become routine for *Asahi Shimbun* to report the results of the history textbook authorization, as Chinese media also relied on the press coverage to fuel its campaign.

In 1993, as a consequence of the admission of the use of comfort women during World War II by Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa and later

the textbook authorization system does not interfere with constitutional rights.

¹² Rose, *Interpreting History in Sino-Japanese Relations*, p. 82.

Chief Cabinet Secretary Kano Yohei, in addition to its inclusion in Japanese middle school history textbooks, a committee was formed from the heads of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), such as Hashimoto Ryūtarō, Mori Yoshirō, and Nakayama Tarō, called the Committee on History and Screening (*Rekishi kentō iinkai* 歴史検討委員会), which sought to investigate historical information. Their objective was to give a nationalistic summary of Japan's role during World War II. For example, they produced a summary of Japan's involvement in the war that expressed that Japan was acting in self-defense during the World War II as well as the Second Sino-Japanese War. Moreover, the alleged atrocities were purely fabrications to demean Japan.¹³

These findings by the Committee on History and Screening were published as a book, *Daitōa sensō no sōkatsu* (*Summary of the Greater East Asian War* 大東亜戦争の総括), on August 15, 1995, the 50th year anniversary of Japan's surrender. Within their summary, the Committee on History and Screening stated that a textbook debate was necessary as a result of the exaggerated emphasis on "damage" and "invasion" in recent textbooks and that a national movement was also needed to disseminate the correct historical view that was put forward within the book. The organization also expressed their dissatisfaction with Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi's apology for war atrocities in 1995.¹⁴

Along with the formation of the Committee on History and Screening was the launch of the *Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho wo Tsukurukai* (Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform 新しい歴史教科書をつくる会; furthermore known as "Tsukurukai"), by University of Tokyo Professor Fujioka Nobukatsu, whose goal was to give a "healthy," nationalistic account to schoolchildren while building their sense of dignity in Japanese history, which "plays an important role in the construction of contemporary Japanese national identity."¹⁵

¹³ Wan, *Sino-Japanese Relations* p. 152.

¹⁴ Rose, *Sino-Japanese Relations*, p. 58.

¹⁵ Alexander Bukh, "Japan's History Textbook Debate: National Identity in Narratives of Victimhood and Victimization," *Asian Survey* 47/5 (2001), p. 687.




Figure 1. Tsukurukai's first history textbook

As an organization, Tsukurukai created their own history textbook, *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho* (*New History Textbook* 新しい歴史教科書), and lobbied influential LDP members, utilized citizens movements and meet with local assemblies, who were concerned with education, to exert pressure on the Ministry of Education to approve their textbook (see Figure 1). In 2000, the manuscripts of several history textbooks, which were sent for approval by the Ministry of Education and assumed to be secret, were uncovered to the public. The uncovering of the manuscripts led to the dismissal of a member of the Textbook Authorization and Research Council as well as a number of “critical reports on the content of the Tsukurukai textbook.”¹⁶ As a result, before its official approval and adoption, *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho* gained a lot of attention. During the authorization process, the Committee for Truth and Freedom in Textbooks issued a highly signed petition that asked the Ministry of Education to reject *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho*'s manuscript because they claim that the textbook will “pave the way for the revival of chauvinistic history education of pre-war and war-time Japan.”¹⁷

The Ministry of Education required revisions on over 137 points of *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho*. The majority of these issues were classified as “simple factual errors,” but there were instances where the issues could be considered “politically motivated” according to the School Course

¹⁶ Mitani Hiroshi, “Japan’s History Textbook System and Its Controversies,” in Daqing Yang, ed., *Towards a History Beyond Borders* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), p. 254.

¹⁷ Rose, *Sino-Japanese Relations*, p. 63.

Guidelines (*Gakushū shidō yōryō* 学習指導要領) and the Regulations for Textbook Authorization (*Kyōkasho kentei kijun* 教科書検定基準).¹⁸ Tsukurukai implemented all of the requested changes and the Ministry of Education authorized *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho* to be used in the school system.

Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho, by the publishing company Fusōsha and the nationalist group Tsukurukai, became the most recent controversial history textbook because of a seemingly ambiguous account of the atrocities committed by the Japanese Imperial Army. For example, the passage translated from page 295 of the 2001 edition of *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho* states, “Furthermore, doubts have been raised concerning the circumstances of this incident (the Nanjing Incident), and there are various contested opinions so that even today this debate continues.”¹⁹ Although it is true that there are various opinions concerning the events of the Nanjing Massacre, such as the estimated number of casualties, the words, “doubt has been raised concerning the circumstances of this incident,” gives legitimacy to those who believe that the Nanjing Massacre was either greatly exaggerated or altogether false. Others view this attitude as being similar to the denial of the Holocaust.

Within the seven history books that were sent for approval to the Ministry of Education, only one contained a satisfyingly detailed account of war atrocities by the Japanese army. According to critics, the term “invade (*shinryaku* 侵略者 or *shin'nyū* 侵入)” was replaced by “advance (*shinkō* 進行 or *susume* 進め),” the mentioning of comfort women was omitted and the “Nanjing Massacre (*Nankin daigyakusatu* 南京大虐殺)” was toned down by renaming the event as the “Nanjing Incident (*Nankin jiken* 南京事件).” Nevertheless, with the leaked information, Tsukurukai, in an attempt to appeal to the general public and make their textbook official, made the final version of their approved textbook on sale for the masses.

The 2001 edition of *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho* gained a lot of media attention in China and South. Japanese officials expressed that the views of Fusōsha and the *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho* textbook were not the opinions of the Japanese government or people and stated, “It could not satisfy China’s demand for making further revisions of the history textbook

¹⁸ Hiroshi, “Japan’s History Textbook System and Its Controversies,” p. 257.

¹⁹ *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho* (Tokyo: Fusōsha, 2001), p. 295.

because there is no obvious deviation from historical facts in the book.”²⁰ As for this statement and the lack of initiative by the Japanese government, important visits by Chinese officials to Japan and Japanese officials to China were canceled.

In 2005, Fusōsha submitted a newly revised version of *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho*, which was also approved by MEXT. The textbook caused another round of public demonstrations in China (and South Korea) against the MEXT and the Japanese government for not revising the previously stated errors within its 2001 version and only correcting typographical errors. However, these historical facts, like the number of citizens and soldiers killed at the Nanjing Massacre have been debated and therefore excluded from textbooks based on the guidelines that prohibits the disclosure of a definitive conclusion to matters that are unresolved.

To counter the lobbying of Tsukurukai, progressive citizens groups networked with liberal organizations, such as Japan’s Teachers’ Union and Children and Textbooks Japan Network 21,²¹ to persuade school boards to reject the selection of *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho*.²² A survey of the 583 school districts, conducted by Children and Textbook Japan Network 21, found that the 2001 *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho* had a .039 percent adoption rate (around 11 schools throughout Japan) that later increased, minimally, to .046 percent (see Table 1). Administered prefectural schools in Ehime and also a few private schools in Tokyo adopted the textbook, and thus, no public school in cities, towns, or villages adopted the textbook. The adoption rate of the 2005 *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho* increased to 0.5 percent, and middle schools in Tokyo’s Sugunami ward became first public middle school ward to adopt *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho*.

These adoptions percentages fell short of Tsukurukai’s goal, but their direct cause for the textbook’s unsuccessfulness was the undesired media coverage as well as Fusōsha’s lack of experience in producing a textbook that could compete with those of well-known and accredited publishers. Although there were education officials who supported the

²⁰ Rose, *Sino-Japanese Relations*, p. 25.

²¹ Children and Textbooks Japan Network 21 is an NGO formed in 1998 that protests historical revisionism and fights the removal of material from textbooks that pertain to Japan’s war record.

²² Claudia Schneider, “The Japanese History Textbook Controversy in East Asian Perspective,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 617 (2008), p. 111.

ideals of Tsukurukai and its *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho*, these officials had “little reason to risk being the target of so much mass-media coverage by choosing their textbook,”²³ as there were other authorized textbooks and less controversial textbooks that “deleted references to the comfort women and eliminated Marxist-derived narratives.”²⁴

<i>PUBLISHER</i>	<i># OF BOOKS</i>	<i>% OF TOTAL</i>
TOKYO SHOSEKI	676,434	51.241
OSAKA SHOSEKI	185,397	14.044
KYOIKU SHUPPAN	171,533	12.994
TEIKOKU SHOIN	144,215	10.925
NIHON SHOSEKI	77,598	5.878
SHIMIZU SHOIN	33,346	2.526
NIHON BUNKYO	30,968	2.346
FUSŌSHA	601	0.046
TOTAL	1,320,092	100.000

**Table 1. Adoption rates for textbook in 2001
including *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho***

As a response to ease international tension, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made various sections of eight 2005 MEXT-approved textbooks available to the public. These sections included the original Japanese text as well as translations into English, Chinese, and Korean. Prior to this act, foreigners and neighboring countries had suspicions about the depiction of history within the Japanese middle school textbooks but had no direct access to the textbooks' content.

By providing the original text and translation to all of the eight approved textbooks, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took the focus away from the Tsukurukai's *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho* and gave foreign and neighboring nations the opportunity to judge the content and middle school history textbooks for themselves. The translation of the textbooks had great meaning in the long run for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.²⁵ In addition, many educators came together in order to developed supplementary

²³ Hiroshi, “Japan’s History Textbook System and Its Controversies,” p. 259.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 262.

teaching materials that were translated into Chinese and Korean, which were later sold in each country simultaneously. Through the process, despite critical opinions, these nations became familiar with the teaching and education practices within each nation. Although *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho* remains within the selection of textbooks authorized by MEXT, “it will most likely remain a marginal presence on the textbook market.”²⁶ Therefore, it can be argued that it is right-wing organizations’ and not necessarily the Ministry of Education’s agenda to promote nationalism within the Japanese education system.

Controversial 2012 Japanese History Textbooks

The latest Japanese history textbook controversy occurred in 2006, and even though this issue is fairly recent, I found that acquiring the newest MEXT-approved Japanese middle school history textbooks was vital to gain a first-hand knowledge of the controversy. If we look at the 2012 history textbooks, it is argued that there is a dominant narrative and a consistent disparity between the events that isolates knowledge from Japan and its students. According to Christopher Barnard:

In modern Japan, two of the main arguments used by those who deny the occurrence, or at least the scale, of the Rape of Nanking, are: first, it could never have happened, since Japanese people only found out about it after the war; and second it is a fabrication by the Allies, which was part of their administrations of “victors’ justice’ to the Japanese.²⁷

Currently, two textbooks in particular, *Chugaku shakai: Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho* (*Middle School Social: New History Textbook* 中学社会: 新しい歴史教科書) by Jiyūsha (Freedom, Inc. 自由社) and *Atarashii Nihon no rekishi* (*New Japanese History* 新しい日本の歴史) by Ikuhōsha (Peng Education Company 育鵬社) are supported by Tsukurukai or former

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Christopher Barnard, “Isolating Knowledge of the Unpleasant: the Rape of Nanking in Japanese high-school textbooks,” *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 22/4 (2001), p. 527.

members of Tsukurukai (see Figure 2) and bear a striking resemblance to the controversial 2001 *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho*.




Figure 2. “This is [our] new textbook” from Tsukurukai’s website

Three of the six Japanese middle school history textbooks commence with the invasion of China by mentioning Manchuria. The portion within the history textbooks that portrays the invasion of China and the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, which started the Second Sino-Japanese War, usually leads to text referring to the Nanjing Massacre:

In order to secure Manchuria and maintain resources, the Japanese army formed a pro-Japanese administration adjacent to northern China that led to the heightening of tensions with China. Japan stationed 5,000 troops around the vicinity of Beijing due to the treaty Japan and other Great Powers had with China after the Boxer Rebellion.²⁸

A careful reading of the text will show the justification to Japan’s military presence in Manchuria as well as Beijing with the words “in order to secure Manchuria and maintain resources.”²⁹ *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho* and *Atarashii Nihon no rekishi* omit the incident at the Southern Manchurian Railway that led to Japan’s invasion into Manchuria and specifically states that, as a consequence of the treaty after the Boxer Rebellion in 1901, Japan had a legal right to station troops within China, which at the time was not unified with Manchuria. Moreover, the statement referring to the Boxer Rebellion found in the *Atarashii Nihon no rekishi* textbook also entirely

²⁸ *Chūgaku shakai: Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho* (Tokyo: Jiyūsha, 2012), p. 225.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

omits the invasion into Manchuria by stating, “After the Boxer Rebellion Treaty, Japan stationed 5,000 troops around the outskirts of Beijing.”³⁰ The passage may cause an impression that Japan had already established a legal military presence in China, specifically Beijing, through the Boxer Rebellion Treaty, prior to the Second Sino-Japanese War. However, since China was not a unified nation at the time, as it was engaged in a civil war prior to World War II and the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Boxer Rebellion Treaty might have no longer been recognized.

One issue, which requires a detailed reading of the text, is the lack of perpetrators in the events that led up to the Nanjing Massacre. For example, when referring to the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, both *Chugaku shakai: Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho* by Jiyūsha and *Atarashii Nihon no rekishi* by Ikuhōsha describe it as “an incident [that] occurred when someone fired shots at the Japanese army while they were engaged in maneuvers at the Marco Polo Bridge near the outskirts of Beijing.”³¹ The question of concern is: Who is this “someone?” These two textbooks mention that the Japanese Imperial Army was near Beijing; and since Japan had “advance” into China, one can assume, since this “someone” was shooting at the Japanese Imperial Army in Beijing, that this “someone” was a Chinese military personnel. Nevertheless, the wording causes Japan to be viewed as a victim, who was defending against a military assault, instead of a victimizer who invaded a nation. The victim/victimizer portrayal can also be seen in the same two textbooks, which reference the killing of two Japanese officials in Shanghai: “...in Shanghai, an incident occurred where two Japanese officials were shot to death by Chinese troops....Thus, the [Second] Sino-Japanese began and expanded.”³²

On December 13, 1937, after three days of intense battle, the capital city of Nanjing fell to the Japanese Imperial Forces. The weeks following the capture were met with countless atrocities towards prisoners of wars and civilians not limited to women and children. Although the Nanjing Massacre is mentioned within all six Japanese middle school history textbooks, there are various instances of glossed over information or tricky wordplay that seems to downplay the atrocities committed by the Japanese Imperial Army:

³⁰ *Atarashii Nihon no rekishi* (Tokyo: Ikuhōsha, 2012), p. 209; and *Chūgaku shakai: Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho*, p. 225.

³¹ *Atarashii Nihon no rekishi*, p. 209.

³² *Chūgaku shakai: Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho*, p. 225.

Thinking that Chang Kai-shek would surrender with the fall of the Kuomintang government's capital city, the Japanese army occupied Nanjing in December. However, Chang Kai-shek moved the capital to inner Chongqing and the hostilities continued.³³

[Note] During capture of Nanjing, the Japanese army killed or wounded many Chinese soldiers and civilians (the Nanjing Incident).³⁴

The example above, found in *Chūgaku shakai: Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho*, gives the illusion that the atrocities committed at Nanjing were justifiable as a consequence of war because the Japanese Imperial Army killed many Chinese soldiers and citizens during the attempt to capture Nanjing and not up to six weeks after its surrender. The justification of the attack on Nanjing is stated as a military strategy to force Chiang Kai-shek to surrender. Within the six Japanese middle school history textbooks, the information regarding the Nanjing Massacre is limited to approximately three to four ambiguous and vague sentences with further explanation reserved in footnotes (located on the sides of the page) that also vary in length. The *Chūgaku shakai: Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho* textbook also contained the minimum amount of information regarding the Nanjing Massacre.

Although the 2012 *Chūgaku shakai: Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho* and *Atarashii Nihon no rekishi* textbook are the most closely related to the 2001 and 2005 *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho*, the publishing company Fusōsha disassociated with Tsukurukai in 2006 but continued to work with former members, such as Yagi Hidetsugu, to publish another textbook edited by Kaizenokai. Fujioka Nobukatsu, who remained with Tsukurukai, found another publisher, Jiyūsha, and declared that they would also be preparing a new textbook. Although both textbooks were approved by MEXT in 2009, a lawsuit erupted due to the similarities in the textbooks' content. The adoption of the textbooks did not spark an international controversy due to the improvements "from the 2001 and 2005 versions [by] making its wording more harmonious with the thinking of other countries."³⁵

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Gilbert Rozman, *U.S. Leadership, History, and Bilateral Relations in Northeast Asia* (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 111.

The statement, “Furthermore, doubts have been raised concerning the circumstances of this incident (the Nanjing Incident), and there are various contested opinions so that even today this debate continues”³⁶ no longer appears in the textbook or in any of the six textbooks acquired. The deletion of this statement is a stark contrast from the earlier version of this textbook, and it could also be a factor as to why the history textbook controversy is no longer in the forefront of Sino-Japanese relations. In 2011, Fusōsha sold the rights to the earlier history textbooks (the 2001 and 2005 *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho*) to its subsidiary company, Ikushōsha, as Fusōsha no longer publishes textbooks under its name.

Other 2012 Japanese History Textbooks

Although *Chugaku shakai: Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho* by Jiyūsha and *Atarashii Nihon no rekishi* by Ikushōsha are supported by nationalist or right-wing groups, the other textbooks do, to some degree, use wording that can be criticized as whitewashing. The main criticism towards Japanese middle school history textbooks is the wording regarding wartime events. For example, the term “invade (*shinryaku* 侵略者 or *shin'nyū* 侵入)” has been replaced by “advance (*shinkō* 進行 or *susume* 進め)” to give a defensive response for the action held accountable by the Japanese Imperial Army. The term “invade” implies that the offending country is the aggressor, while “advance” implies more a neutral military term or a military maneuver. The mentioning of “advance” can be seen in the following example in *Shakaika chūgakusei no rekishi: Nihon no ayumi to sekai no ugoki* (*Social Studies Middle School: History of Japan and the Movement of the World* 社会科中学生の歴史：日本の歩みと世界の動き) by Teikokushoin (Empire Publishing 帝国書院):

Japan was internationally isolated and became close with Germany who similarly withdrew from the League of Nations. This furthered the antagonism with the United States and Great Britain. Additionally, Japan advanced its army into not only “Manchukuo,” but also northern China.³⁷

³⁶ *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho*, p. 295.

³⁷ *Shakaika chūgakusai no rekishi: Nihon no ayumi to sekai no ugoki* (Tokyo: Teikokushoin, 2012), p. 209.

Not only does the passage above state that Japan “advance” into Manchuria and Northern China, but the tone of the text can be seen as self-justifying as it claims that Japan was “internationally isolated.” The passage also mentions Japan’s antagonism towards the United States, who was not involved in World War II until 1941; four years after Japan’s invasion of China and two years after Great Britain’s declaration of war on Germany. Nevertheless, two of the six Japanese middle school history textbooks, *Chūgaku shakai rekishi* (*Middle School Social History* 中学社会歴史) by Nihonbun Kyōshuppan (Japan Education Publishing 日本文教出版) and *Chūgaku shakai rekishi: Mirai no hiraku* (*Middle School Social History: Opening the Future* 中学社会歴史：未来のひらく) by Kyōikushuppan (Education Publishing 教育出版) do not mention the invasion of Manchuria, but refer to the political state of China prior to and during Japan’s invasion:

In China, at the time, the Kuomintang government was in the middle of a civil war against the Communist Party, led by Mao Zedong. The Communist Party, which moved its base to Yan’an, sought cooperation with the Kuomintang government in order to resist the Japanese, and in 1936, the civil war came to a standstill.³⁸

The passage gives an accurate portrayal of the situation in China during the 1930s, and also points out that the CCP and the KMT had to temporarily halt the civil war in order to resist the invasion of the Japanese Imperial Forces into China.

There is also a dispute on how criticism of the Nanjing Massacre is portrayed in the Japanese middle school history textbook. Although the textbook refers to the Japanese Imperial Army as having captured Nanjing, the translations of the 2012 Japanese middle school history textbook also portrays the presence of the army at the organization level instead of at an individual or human level. Moreover, the Japanese Imperial Army, as a whole, is not directly criticized; instead, the actions that constitute the event (“acts of brutality”) are criticized in the following example: “In Nanjing, many Chinese including soldiers, women, and children were killed causing

³⁸ *Chūgaku shakai rekishi: Mirai no hiraku*, (Tokyo: Kyōikushuppan 2012), p. 213.

foreign countries to accuse the Japanese Imperial Army for ‘acts of brutality’ (The Nanjing Massacre).”³⁹ The passage, found in the *Shakaika chūgakusei no rekishi: Nihon no ayumi to sekai no ugoki* textbook, seemingly shows no introspection from Japan by stating that only foreign countries accused Japan, and therefore suggests that Japan has no guilt or atonement for these actions. As a counterargument, this can also suggest that the event was such a concern that it caused the international community to criticize Japan. The words “acts of brutality” are used in quotes in the original Japanese text. However, the use of the quotation marks remains unclear, as there is no note to suggest that the phrase was said by a specific person.

The event is also indirectly given a name, such as the Nanjing Incident or Nanjing Massacre:

[Note] The incident, the Nanjing Massacre, gained international criticism and was unknown to the Japanese populace until they were informed after the war at the Tokyo Trials. Various investigations and studies were conducted in regards to the number of victims, but the decision has not yet been settled.⁴⁰

Although it is common to give an important historical event a specific name, it has been criticized that calling the Nanjing Massacre the “Nanjing Incident” downplays the scale and significance of the atrocity. Another point, from the previous passage, is that the events of the atrocity was seemingly kept from the Japanese populace, and suggests that the knowledge of the Nanjing Massacre was kept isolated from Japan. The previous example also indicates that the “whole world could know about something, but not Japan—as if Japan was in some way not part of the world.”⁴¹ Similarly, by whom was “this incident” not made know to the Japanese people? A closer reading of the text insinuates that this is in reference to the military and governmental authorities that hid the atrocities that occurred in Nanjing from the Japanese people. However, the text and textbooks change the wording to avoid any direct suggestions or accusation that the information and knowledge of the Nanjing Massacre might have

³⁹ *Shakaika chūgakusai no rekishi*, p. 209.

⁴⁰ *Atarashii shakai rekishi* (Tokyo: Tokyo Shoseki, 2012), p. 194.

⁴¹ Barnard, “Isolating Knowledge of the Unpleasant,” p. 256.

been covered up by military and government authorities, while “making conscience efforts to isolate the knowledge of Nanking.”⁴²

Although Japanese middle school history textbooks have been criticized for its glossed over or “whitewashed” portrayal of the Nanjing Massacre, within my research I have found that the most glossed over textbooks are associated with right-wing organizations, such as the textbooks supported by Tsukurukai, while other textbooks give a more detailed account of the World War II atrocities. For example, within the *Chūgaku shakai rekishi* textbook:

Nanjing was the capital city [of China] in December where many prisoners of war, women, and children were detained and many citizens were killed (Nanjing Incident).⁴³

[Note] At the time, the Japanese citizens were not informed of this incident. Investigative documents were presented at the Tokyo Trials. Then, it was revealed, in a later study that examples of various killings were written down in the diaries of military units and officers. However, the extent of the killing is unknown and further research is necessary.⁴⁴

Within this passage, there are several examples of consistency with Western portrayals concerning the Nanjing Massacre. First, the text does not mention the words “during that time” when discussing the Nanjing Massacre, which suggest that the atrocity happened up after its surrender and not during the capture. Second, the text mentions prisoners of war who were killed in Nanjing. The mentioning of prisoners of war solidifies not only the previous statement regarding the timeframe of the Nanjing Massacre, but also shows that the Chinese soldiers had surrendered or were captured and defenseless but were killed nonetheless. The passage also goes into more detail concerning the victims, as it mentions women and children.

Finally, the text mentions the diaries of military personnel, which seemingly erases any notion that the Nanjing Massacre could have been

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ *Chūgaku shakai rekishi: Nihonbun Kyōshuppan*, p. 226.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

fabricated because of the statement that entries were found in the diaries of Japanese military personnel, as opposed to the diaries of Westerners who have been criticized for exaggerating the events of Nanjing as a result of a predisposition of prejudice toward the Japanese. Although an approximate number of those killed in Nanjing is not mentioned, the text highlights that more research on the Nanjing Massacre is necessary. According to the Standards for Authorization of School Textbooks for Use in Compulsory Education, as of 2005 it states:

1. No present definitive conclusion on unsettled current issues.
2. In dealing with events in the modern and contemporary history of relations with neighboring countries of Asia, giving appropriate consideration to viewing them from the standpoint of international understanding and international cooperation.
3. In giving dates for important events in Japanese history, giving the year according to both the Western calendar and the Japanese imperial era system.

Thus, the approximation or estimation of those killed in the Nanjing Massacre cannot be present in any of the Japanese middle school history textbook due to the lack a definitive or official number.

Categorizing the History Textbooks

Through the analysis of the content of the history textbooks, the textbooks were categorized and separated between textbooks that are associated with right-wing organizations, such as Tsukurukai, and those that are not associated with right-wing organizations. The portrayals of Japan's involvement in the Second Sino-Japanese War can vary with the textbooks that are not associated with right-wing organizations, from consistent with Western portrayals to somewhat neutral or divergent with Western portrayals. Figure 10 shows a scale of the six 2012 textbooks and their relationship with the portrayals that are consistent with Western historical consensus.




Figure 10. Six 2012 Textbooks in relation to a Western historical consensus

The textbooks that are the most consistent are published by Tokyo Shoseki and Nihonbun and give a detailed account of Japan’s involvement in the war. The textbooks mention the state of China prior to the invasion, use the term “invade” instead of “advance,” specify women, children and prisoners of war, and do not include the words “during this time” when referring to the Nanjing Massacre.

The textbooks issued from Kyōikushuppan and Teikokushoin give a portrayal of Japan’s involvement in the war that diverges somewhat from Western accounts. The textbooks are less detailed than the textbooks by Tokyo Shoseki and Nihonbun and show some instances of ambiguity (such as using the term “advance” or stating that Japan was internationally isolated), but they mention the political state of China before the Second Sino-Japanese War, as well as women, children and prisoners of war, and do not use the words “during this time” when referring to the Nanjing Massacre.

Jiyusha and Ikuhōsha are the textbooks that provide the least amount of information. Neither of the textbooks mention the state of China prior to the war, and both rationalize the invasion into China via Manchuria. Both textbooks state that the military skirmish at the Marco Polo Bridge was due to “someone” who fired shots, refer to the Nanjing Massacre as solely the “Nanjing Incident,” and use the words “during this time” when referring to the timeframe of those who were killed in the Nanjing Massacre. Through the analysis of the content of the history textbooks, there can be a comparison between six 2012 textbooks (and their consistency with Western historical consensus) to the adoption rates within the Japanese educational system.

Adoption Rates

Although there are no official reports of the adoption rates for the new 2012 Japanese middle school history textbooks, the textbook store,

Daiichi kyōkasho (First Textbook 第一教科書), where I purchased the textbooks, posted a list of each schools' (within its district) textbook adoption for elementary, middle, and high school. *Daiichi kyōkasho*, located near the Okubo station in Shinjuku, Tokyo, is responsible for providing textbooks to the fourth district schools in Shinjuku, Shibuya, Nakano, and Suginami. These textbooks are also available for individual purchase, as this is how I acquired the textbooks without any affiliation to a school. Through a PDF provided in *Daiichi kyōkasho*'s website, I was able to obtain some statistics concerning the textbooks that are used for the 2012 academic year. This is shown in Tables 2 and 3.

<i>PUBLISHER</i>	<i>CATEGORY</i>	<i># OF BOOKS</i>	<i>% OF TOTAL</i>
TOKYO SHOSEKI	CONSISTENT	8	28.571
KYOIKU SHUPPAN	NEUTRAL	3	10.714
TEIKOKU SHOIN	NEUTRAL	9	32.142
IKUHŌSHA	DIVERGENT	2	7.142
SHIMIZU SHOIN	NO DATA	3	10.714
NIHON BUNKYO	CONSISTENT	3	10.714
JIYUSHA	DIVERGENT	0	0
	TOTAL	28	100.000

Table 2. Adoption rate for private schools in Shinjuku, Shibuya, Nakano, and Suginamis

<i>TOKYO WARD</i>	<i>TEXTBOOK</i>
SHINJUKU	TOKYO SHOSEKI
SHIBUYA	TOKYO SHOSEKI
NAKANO	TEIKOKUSHOIN
SUGINAMI	KYŌIKUSHUPPAN

Table 3. Textbook adoption for public schools in four of Tokyo's Wards

As seen in the Table 2, both *Atarashii shakai rekishi* by Tokyo Shoseki and *Shakaika chūgakusai no rekishi: Nihon no ayumi to sekai no ugoki* by Teikokushoin have a strong representation within the district (28.5% and 32.1% adoption rate, respectively), while the textbooks

associated with the controversial Tsukurui have a low adoption rate, such as *Atarashii Nihon no rekishi* by Ikuhōsha (7.1% adoption rate), or have not been adopted, such as *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho* by Jiyūsha.⁴⁵

Two of the four public middle school wards adopted *Atarashii shakai rekishi* by Tokyo Shoseki, while the other two adopted by *Shakaika chūgakusai no rekishi: Nihon no ayumi to sekai no ugoki* by Teikokushoin and *Chūgaku shakai rekishi: Mirai no hiraku* by Kyōikushuppan (see Table 3). An interesting observation from Table 3 shows that textbook adoptions for these public schools is compatible with the previous information concerning the process of adoptions in towns, cities, prefectures and municipalities. Although the number of the public schools within each ward is not available, it shows that public middle schools adopted the same textbook given that they are within the same ward.

Based on the information provided from *Daiichi kyōkasho*, it can be deduced that the textbook with the least nationalistic portrayal concerning the Second Sino-Japanese War, *Atarashii shakai rekishi* by Tokyo Shoseki, has a strong adoption rate within the fourth district, with a majority of the adoption in private middle schools as well as within two of the four wards. The adoption rate of *Atarashii shakai rekishi*, within the fourth district of Tokyo, is consistent with the 2001 statistic (see Table 1) that shows that the history textbook by Tokyo Shoseki had a 51 percent adoption rate within Japan. Also based on the information provided by *Daiichi kyōkasho*, we can see that a neutral or somewhat nationalistic textbook, *Shakaika chūgakusai no rekishi: Nihon no ayumi to sekai no ugoki* by Teikokushoin, also has a high percent of adoption with nine textbook adoptions within private middle schools and adoptions within one of the four wards. Although, *Shakaika chūgakusai no rekishi* can be criticized for having some whitewashed portrayals, the information provided within the textbook is more harmonious (less whitewashed) and detailed than the textbooks that are associated with right-wing organizations.

Atarashii Nihon no rekishi by Ikuhōsha and *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho* by Jiyūsha are textbooks that are associated with right-wing

⁴⁵ “Tokyo First Textbook Supply Co., Ltd.,” Daiichi Kyōkasho 第一教科書 (accessed December 13, 2012, <http://daiichikyokasho.co.jp/price/index.html>); It should be noted that I was not able to acquire the Shimizu textbooks for unknown reasons – this textbook was not available at the store in Tokyo or Kobe.

organizations and have a low to non-existent adoption rate within the fourth district Tokyo schools. The adoption rates for *Atarashii Nihon no rekishi* and *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho* are consistent with the low adoption rate of for the 2001 *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho*, whose textbook content is associated with both 2012 textbooks. Given these adoption rates in comparison to the statistics for 2001, the middle school history education consists of a liberal (least nationalistic) to neutral portrayal of Japan's involvement in the Second Sino-Japanese War, as the controversial textbooks continue to show low adoption rates. However, it is possible that the adoption of more controversial textbooks is growing, although assuming marginally, because of the change in their portrayal since 2005, which contains less whitewashing than their earlier 2001 version. Nevertheless, further research is required to deduce the adoption process and rates in a large municipality such as Tokyo, as well as the current adoption rates for history textbooks within Japan as a whole.

Conclusion: The Future of Sino-Japanese Relations and History Textbooks

Within the translations, I have given examples showing that the portrayal of World War II-related atrocities can vary between different publishing companies. However, the majority of the textbooks adjust the wording to defend the actions of the Japanese Imperial Army during the Second Sino-Japanese War. Conversely, some history textbooks portray a satisfyingly detailed (based on the size of the textbooks) and accurate account of the atrocities, by mentioning the situation in China prior to Japan's invasion and stating that more research is needed to have a definitive answer for the number of civilians that were killed during the Nanjing Massacre. The implication of the Japanese middle school history textbook is that the nationalist textbooks whitewash information, and other textbooks that are not supported by right-wing groups provide more detail and give a neutral portrayal of the atrocities.

However, in light of the controversy, even content within the right-wing supported textbooks have changed, as the 2001 *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho* differed from the 2012 *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho*. Furthermore, the publishing company Fusōsha, which published the 2001 and 2005 *Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho*, has dropped out of the textbook publishing industry all together. Therefore, although MEXT has an important role in the textbook screening process and have also been criticized for association

with right-wing groups, the portrayals within the textbooks, in general, were not as divergent as what has been lead to believe.

While there have been frequent talks about the need to settle the past and come to a mutual understanding, a series of diplomatic incidents, such as the prime ministerial visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, disagreements over the wording of apologies and the claims to uninhabited islands in the East China Sea, have continued to disrupt the relationship and highlight how far both sides still have to go to achieve reconciliation. The future stability of East Asia lies in the hands of China, Japan and South Korea. However, recent territorial disputes and statements by Japanese officials continue to strain relations between these neighboring nations and have pushed the Japanese middle school history textbook controversy into the background.

CONSTITUENTS OF A GLOBAL MINDSET: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY WITH JAPANESE MANAGERS

Subramaniam Ananthram
Curtin University

Richard Grainger
Curtin University

Hideo Tominaga
University of Hyogo

Overview

Based on government-inspired economic development in the Meiji Era and again in the aftermath of the Pacific War, Japan had quickly established itself as a major contributor to global business. In the case of the Meiji Era expansion, the dramatic advances have commonly been interpreted as resulting from the herculean efforts of a special group, namely ex-samurai leaders acting as agents of the administration, and in the post-war reconstruction period, a larger societal sub-group, Japanese “salary men.” Each of these groups has been associated with special qualities, in particular a single-minded dedication to hard work for nation and company. With this historical background in mind, and coming after a period of some two decades of economic decline, the current empirical research study was conducted in order to map out an appropriate global mindset “profile” for Japanese business managers engaged in contemporary global business.

After establishing the constructs by which “global mindset intensity” could be assessed, a questionnaire survey (n=71) and subsequent in-depth interviews (n=11) were undertaken with Japanese international managers in western Japan. Based on the findings from this pluralist methodology, the researchers have suggested that the ideal corporate role model of Japan’s post-war reconstruction and growth period, the “salary man,” was now effectively redundant, and that the currently accepted ideal profile for Japanese international businessmen was more worldly and individualistic, with expertise and “global mindset intensity” drawn from personalized international business experience, reminiscent of established Western business ideals.

Introduction

Modern Japanese industry is renowned for the speed and scale of the recovery made in the decades after the end of the Pacific War, as well as the way in which it was pivotal to the reconstruction, even the rehabilitation, of the Japanese economy and, as a by-product, Japanese civil society. Another way of interpreting this is to acknowledge that Japanese national pride was slowly but surely reinstated by the cumulative international successes of its flagship companies, such as Sony Corporation, National Panasonic, Seiko, Canon, Mitsubishi Motors, Nissan, and Toyota, to cite a few.

In many cases, very large Japanese companies such as these, as part of vertically or horizontally integrated industrial conglomerations, imported raw materials from around the world and manufactured a wide range of consumer products for domestic and global markets. With their unique approaches to the conduct of government relations, industry structure, corporate management, and inventory and production processes, they were highly successful. They excited protectionist sentiment around the world, and sometimes opposition in foreign markets, despite that, their approaches were also the subject of widespread admiration and emulation by Western managers, and their management techniques were often taught in universities and executive-level training courses by Western academics.

Indeed, the analysis of the Japanese approach to business, often broadly characterized as the “Japanese Management System,” was at the heart of a quite polarized debate in academic literature, especially as Japan seemed poised to take over world economic leadership from the United States in the late 1980s. McCormick has done an excellent job, not so much in taking up the argument from one perspective or another, but in setting out a detailed discussion, which showed that the Japanese “model” had been constructed and debated at factory, company, and national levels depending upon the perspectives of the creators of this model.¹

As with other fairly recent commentators, such as Pudelko and Mendenhall,² in light of the failure of the Japanese economy in the 1990s,

¹ Kevin McCormick, “Whatever Happened to ‘the Japanese Model’?” *Asian Business & Management* 3 (2004): 371–393.

² Markus Pudelko and Mark E. Mendenhall, “The Japanese Metamorphosis: What Western Executives Need to Know About Current Japanese Management Practices,” *Organizational Dynamics* 36/3 (2007): 274–287.

and slow economic growth beyond that, McCormick also turned his attention to the evolution of the Japanese management system and its influence on it apparently more successful Western approaches. In McCormick's case, he forecast that there might be less homogeneity in future management systems of Japanese organizations, while Pudelko and Mendenhall suggested that the well-established Japanese tradition of adapting foreign ideas and technologies might in the future come to the fore once again, likely resulting in unforeseen and effective innovations.

The Japanese struggle to adapt and shape their formerly ascendant management approaches to new global realities was cast into particular relief by a recent article about world management systems in *The Economist*.³ In the article, a comparison was made between the multinationals of the emerging economy primarily based in China and India, which were utilizing so-called "disruptive" innovative technologies, and approaches to management. The article also detailed the dramatic ascension to world leadership of the Japanese motor vehicle industry some three decades earlier that had been based on revolutionary, innovative, contingency driven processes associated with what became known as "lean manufacturing" or "lean production."⁴ As is now well known, Toyota Motor Corporation achieved iconic status in this respect.

Ironically, in this emerging global context, the current trials and tribulations of Toyota Motor Corporation with respect to quality control issues and mass vehicle recalls represent a spectacular fall from grace that must have been a heavy blow to Japanese national self-confidence. Recent media discussions suggested that Toyota's difficulties were related to a competitive thrust to become the world's largest automaker (achieved in 2008), in which the legendary focus on quality was compromised, resulting in the recall of hundreds of thousands of motor vehicles around the world and financial losses running into billions of dollars. It has also been recently asserted that compounding this situation was a result of management and governance failures that restricted the detection and correction of such

³ "Accelerating into Trouble," *The Economist* Print Edition, February 11, 2010 (accessed September 24, 2010, <http://www.economist.com/node/15498249>).

⁴ "The New Masters of Management," *The Economist* Print Edition, April 15, 2010 (accessed September 22, 2010, <http://www.economist.com/node/15908408>).

problems at an earlier stage, creating obstacles in dealing with authorities in countries outside Japan in relation to the legal and regulatory consequences of the alleged omissions.

These particular issues, in combination with the relative stagnation of the Japanese economy since the economic collapse of the late 1980s, inevitably lead to the following questions:

1. Did the so-called Japanese Management System cease to adapt to contemporary circumstances after the end of the 1980s?
2. Are Japanese multinational corporations in a position to effectively cope with contemporary global challenges?

Essentially, this study most directly addresses the second of these questions, in terms of the mental preparedness of Japanese international managers based in the Kobe region to effectively engage with the contemporary dynamic global business environment, with all its demands in terms of attitudes and values, skills and competencies. In short, the current study focuses on the “global mindset” of Japanese international managers. The general concept of “global mindset” is briefly introduced and examined, before the current empirical study is explained.

The Concept of “Global Mindset”

Globalization is the process whereby the political, economic, socio-cultural and technological structures and systems of nations around the globe are integrated into the world economy. National- and industry-level initiatives, such as the deregulation of industries, development of foreign direct investment policies, and applications to join trading blocs, provide organizations with the necessary impetus and institutional architecture to embrace globalization.⁵

These national and industry-level initiatives create a globalized business environment that compels organizations to foster global ambitions to reshape their structures, systems, policies, and processes in order to leverage the opportunities associated with globalization. In this context, Gupta and Govindarajan contend that the heightened business intensity, facilitated by initiatives linked to globalization, necessitates continuous

⁵ Jean-Pierre Jeanett, *Managing with a Global Mindset* (UK: Pearson Education Limited, 2000).

organizational level reform.⁶ They also explain that the number of researchers that have reported as organizations have been required to deal with a rapidly changing and dynamic complex global economic landscape, and thus a new breed and caliber of a multinational manager is required.⁷ It is clearly important for this new breed of manager to develop skills, values, and competencies that foster smooth functioning in the dynamic marketplace and contribute to the creation of efficient and effective global organizations.⁸

Within this context, a growing body of international management literature has emphasized the importance of the cultivation and development of a “global mindset” (see Table 1 below) as one of the critical elements in providing the human resource platform required to develop and nurture an intelligent global organization.⁹

Research	Conceptualization of a Global Mindset
Perlmutter (1969); ¹⁰ Heenan & Perlmutter (1979) ¹¹	Geocentrism is a global systems approach to decision-making or state of mind where “...HQ and subsidiaries see themselves as part of an organic worldwide entity...good ideas come from any country and go to any country within the firm.” (1979: 21)

⁶ Anil K. Gupta and Vijay Govindarajan, “Cultivating a Global Mindset,” *Academy of Management Executive* 16/1 (2002): 116–126.

⁷ Schon Beechler, Sully Taylor, Nakiye A. Boyacigiller, and Orly Levy, “Building Global Mindset for Competitive Advantage: A Conceptual Integration of Global Mindset, International Human Resource Management, and Organizational Performance in Multinational Corporation,” Reading, Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, Chicago, August 1999.

⁸ Stephen H. Rhinesmith, “Open the Door to a Global Mindset,” *Training and Development* 49/5 (1995): 35–43.

⁹ Thomas P. Murtha, Stephanie A. Lenway, and Richard P. Bagozzi, “Global Mind-sets and Cognitive Shift in a Complex Multinational Corporation,” *Strategic Management Journal* 19 (1998): 97–114.

¹⁰ Howard V. Perlmutter, “The Tortuous Evolution of the Multinational Corporation,” *Columbia Journal of World Business* (1969): 9–18.

¹¹ David A. Heenan and Howard V. Perlmutter, *Multinational Organizational Development: A Social Architecture Perspective* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

Fayerweather (1969); ¹² Prahalad & Doz (1987); ¹³ Bartlett & Ghoshal (1998) ¹⁴	A transnational mentality is the capacity to deliver global integration, national responsiveness, and worldwide learning simultaneously (“a matrix in the minds of managers”).
Calof & Beamish (1994) ¹⁵	Centricity is defined as a person’s attitude towards foreign cultures. Geocentrism can be characterized by the following factors: “...all major decisions are made centrally...substantial co-ordination exists between offices...and focus is on global systems.”
Calori, Johnson, & Sarnin (1994) ¹⁶	“Global mindset” is viewed as a cognitive structure or mental map that allows a CEO to comprehend the complexity of a firm’s worldwide environment.
Sambharya (1996) ¹⁷	Study taps into the “cognitive state” or “belief and values” of a top team.
Murtha, Lenway & Bagozzi (1998) ¹⁸	“Global mindset” defined using Fayerweather (1969) and Prahalad and Doz (1987).
Rhinesmith (1993); ¹⁹ Jeanett (2000) ²⁰	“Global mindset” is a state of mind able to understand a business, an industry, or a particular market on a global basis.
Govindarajan &	“Global mindset” is defined as a “...knowledge

¹² John Fayerweather, *International Business Management—A Conceptual Framework* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969).

¹³ C. K. Prahalad and Yves L. Doz, *The Multinational Mission: Balancing Local Demands and Global Vision* (New York: The Free Press, 1987).

¹⁴ Christopher A. Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal, *Managing Across Borders*, 2nd Ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1998).

¹⁵ Johnathan L. Calof and Paul W. Beamish, “The Right Attitude for International Success,” *Business Quarterly* 59/1 (194): 105–110.

¹⁶ Roland Calori, Gerry Johnson, and Philippe Sarnin, “CEO’s Cognitive Maps and the Scope of the Organization,” *Strategic Management Journal* 15 (1994): 437–457.

¹⁷ Rakesh B. Sambharya, “Foreign Experience of Top Management Teams and International Diversification Strategies of U.S. Multinational Corporations,” *Strategic Management Journal* 17 (1996): 739–746.

¹⁸ Murtha, Lenway, and Bagozzi, “Global Mind-sets and Cognitive Shift in a Complex Multinational Corporation,” pp. 97–114.

¹⁹ Stephen H. Rhinesmith, *A Manager’s Guide to Globalization: Six Keys to Success in a Changing World* (New York: Irwin, 1993).

²⁰ Jeanett, *Managing with a Global Mindset*.

Gupta (2001) ²¹	structure...that combines an openness to an awareness of diversity across cultures and markets with a propensity and ability to synthesize across this diversity.”
Bouquet (2005) ²²	A behavioral approach to measure “global mindset” focusing on the actual (and more readily observable) time and effort that top team members devote to making sense of international issues, both for themselves and for the benefit of the multinational enterprise (MNE) overall.

Table 1. Different Conceptualizations of a Global Mindset

While many scholars agree that a global mindset is essentially a cognitive structure, and that human beings are highly dependent on cognitive filters to sort otherwise overwhelming complexity in the information environment, there is still considerable argument about the essential constituents of a global mindset and how it might be cultivated and nurtured.²³ Building on the existing theory in the international management literature, global mindset intensity is defined by the current study as: the ability and willingness of managers to think, act, and transcend boundaries of goals, values, and competencies on a global scale. The primary aim of this study is to identify and test some of the skill sets that are believed to be associated with the development and cultivation of a global mindset in a Japanese setting. The next section identifies these skill sets from the international management literature and develops hypotheses for empirical testing.

Literature Review and Hypotheses Development

Global managers need attitude and skill sets that facilitate their efficient and effective functioning in the complex and dynamic global business environment. In this context, a number of studies have recommended managerial level reform, with particular reference to the cultivation of a global mindset.²⁴ Harveston²⁵ contends that a critical

²¹ Anoop K. Gupta and Vijay Govindarajan, “Building an Effective Global Team,” *MIT Sloan Management Review* (2001): 63–71.

²² Cyril Bouquet, *Building Global Mindsets: An Attention-Based Perspective* (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Cited in Jeanett, *Managing with a Global Mindset*.

success factor for any organization is the level of global mindset orientation amongst its managers.

A number of studies have linked managerial global mindset with certain individual level and organizational level characteristics.²⁶ Individual level characteristics are certain innate traits and competencies, which are, to a certain extent, inherently developed by the managers and contribute towards the cultivation of a global mindset.²⁷ Managers are expected to possess these individual level characteristics, which they bring to the organization, and are later nurtured within the organization. These attributes develop as a by-product of upbringing, social interaction, psychological state, economic environment and technological interest and prowess. In addition, the internal and external environment to which an individual is exposed tends to have a strong correlation with the expansion and nurturing of these attributes.²⁸

Research has identified a number of individual-level characteristics, three of which include: knowledge and information (encompassing the three constructs of knowledge of socio-political differences across countries and regions; knowledge of organizational and societal culture and cross-cultural issues that impact management; and knowledge of information systems networks facilitated by the information and technological revolution);²⁹ personal, cultural and professional skills and abilities (which includes the three constructs of professional and managerial skills; personal and social skills; and cross-cultural and international skills) to work in multicultural environments;³⁰ and level of

²⁵ Paula Harveston, "Synoptic Versus Incremental Internationalization: An Examination of 'Born Global' and 'Gradual Globalizing' Firms" (Ph.D. diss., University of Memphis, 2000).

²⁶ Beechler, Taylor, Boyacigiller, and Levy, "Building Global Mindset for Competitive Advantage."

²⁷ B. L. Kedia and A. Mukherji, "Global Managers: Developing a Mindset for Global Competitiveness," *Journal of World Business* 34/3 (1999): 230–251.

²⁸ Cited in Bouquet, *Building Global Mindsets*.

²⁹ Kedia and Mukherji, "Global Managers: Developing a Mindset for Global Competitiveness," pp. 230–251.

³⁰ A. Ali, and D. Horne, "Problems and Skills in International Business," *Management Memo* 1 (1986): 34–38.

risk tolerance, which is defined as the extent to which managers are willing to make risky decisions about international activities.³¹ These traits enable managers to think, act, and transcend global boundaries, foster global thought and develop a global mindset.

These individual-level characteristics, when supplemented by certain organizational-level characteristics, enable the reshaping of managerial outlook such that globalization is embraced. Organizational-level attributes are skill sets that are instilled in managers with the help of certain actions and plans developed by organizations often resulting in formal and informal training programs and mechanisms for managers.³² This training, in turn, enables managers to develop skill sets that are essential for operating successfully in the global marketplace. These organizational-level skill sets are categorized as global identity, boundary spanning activities, and level of international experience.

By being privy to numerous global activities, managers derive a psychological advantage, and essentially adopt a global identity.³³ Boundary spanning activities can be classified as internal activities (global responsibility designations, global team participation, ad hoc project groups, networks, and shared tasks or jobs across national boundaries) and external activities (international strategic alliances, joint ventures, international mergers, and international supplier agreements and joint marketing plans), which provide managers the necessary connections and channels to expand the business globally.³⁴ Lastly, the level of international experience is defined as the amount of experience that a manager has accumulated in an international context which includes foreign assignments, education, and vacations.³⁵ These organizational-level traits also enable reshaping of global thought and the cultivation of a global

³¹ Jeffrey Covin and Dennis Slevin, "Strategic Management of Small Firms in Hostile and Benign Environments," *Strategic Management Journal* 10 (1987): 75–87.

³² Beechler, Sully Taylor, Boyacigiller, and Orly Levy, "Building Global Mindset for Competitive Advantage."

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Cited in Bartlett and Ghoshal, *Managing Across Borders*.

³⁵ Rosalie L. Tung and Edwin W. Miller, "Managing in the Twenty-First Century: The Need for Global Orientation," *Management International Review* 30/1 (1990): 5–18.

mindset. The above linkages provide underpinning for the following hypotheses:

- H1a. Knowledge of socio-political differences across countries and regions will positively influence global mindset intensity.*
- H1b. Knowledge of organizational and societal culture and cross-cultural issues that impact management will positively influence global mindset intensity.*
- H1c. Knowledge of information systems networks facilitated by the information and technological revolution will positively influence global mindset intensity.*
- H2a. Professional and managerial skills will positively influence global mindset intensity.*
- H2b. Personal and social skills will positively influence global mindset intensity.*
- H2c. Cross-cultural and international skills will positively influence global mindset intensity.*
- H3. Risk tolerance will positively influence global mindset intensity.*
- H4. Global identity will positively influence global mindset intensity.*
- H5a. Boundary spanning activities (importance) will positively influence global mindset intensity.*
- H5b. Boundary spanning activities (involvement) will positively influence global mindset intensity.*
- H6. Level of international experience will positively influence global mindset intensity.*

Empirical Research Methodology

Research Design

Scholars are applying both quantitative and qualitative, or pluralist, approaches to their investigations.³⁶ The main reason for this is the recognition of the need to complement quantitative studies with qualitative research, in order to provide researchers with a deeper understanding of the

³⁶ Mary B. Teagarden, et al., "Toward a Theory of Comparative Management Research: An Idiographic Case Study of the Best International Human Resources Management Project," *Academy of Management Journal* 38/5 (1995): 1261–1287.

pattern of statistical results.³⁷Consequently, a pluralist research design was adopted for the current study.

The study was conducted in three major phases. In the first phase, a survey questionnaire developed by Ananthram was translated into Japanese and translated back into English with the collaboration of a professional bilingual translator.³⁸ In the meantime, professors at a prominent prefectural university in western Japan had accepted an invitation to collaborate in the research project, and part of their role was to mobilize industry networks for the purposes of survey data collection.

In the second phase, 200 hard-copy questionnaires were mailed by the Japanese research collaborators to potential respondent managers employed in globally-oriented Japanese organizations in the Hyogo area of western Japan. By the end of a three month period, 82 questionnaires had been returned (the identity of the managers and organizations were kept anonymous), of which eleven were incomplete and assessed as invalid.

The final usable sample was 71, which provided a response rate of 35.5 percent. A brief description of the demographic profile of the respondents is presented in Table 2. The data was analyzed with various statistical tests with SPSS software.

	%		%
Managerial Level		Gender	
Executive	36.6	Female	2.8
Senior	26.8	Male	97.2
Middle	23.9		
Supervisory	12.7		
		Industrial Sector	
Age (in years)		Manufacturing	59.2
Less than 30	2.8	Services	40.8
30 – 39	8.5		

³⁷ Cecil Pearson and Lanny Entrekin, “Structural Properties, Work Practices, and Control in Asian Businesses: Some Evidence from Singapore and Malaysia,” *Human Relations* 51/10 (1998): 1285–1306.

³⁸ Subramaniam Ananthram, *The Logic of Globalization and Global Mindset Development: Insights from the Indian and Chinese Services Industry* (Germany: VDM Verlag, 2008).

40 – 49	32.4	Educational Background	
50 and above	56.3	Senior High School	7.0
		University	93.0
Tenure (in years)		International Dimension	
Less than 10	16.9	in Education	63.4
10 – 19	19.7		
20 and above	63.4		

Table 2. Demographic Profile of Questionnaire Survey Respondents (N=71)

The demographic information above indicates that the great majority of survey respondents (and therefore focus group participants) were males above forty years of age who held managerial level posts, evenly divided between manufacturing and service sector industries. Most respondents held university degrees, and the great majority had more than ten years of experience in their respective organizations.

In the third and final phase, these empirical results were then presented to eleven Japanese managers at face-to-face and one-on-one interviews at on-site sessions in Japan. The managers at these qualitative sessions, who had participated in the quantitative phase of the study, were invited to provide further explanation to the survey data. One of the research collaborators from the Japanese university who was proficient in both Japanese and English was present at all the interviews and interpreted when necessary. Moreover, one of the Australian researchers was a Japanese language speaker who had considerable experience living and working in Japan. The interviewers made extensive notes at the qualitative sessions.

Measures, Factor and Reliability Analysis

Knowledge and Information

A scale developed by Ananthram³⁹ was utilized in the survey as a means of assessing the three dimensions of “Knowledge and Information;” namely, knowledge of information systems networks facilitated by the information and technological revolution (Knowledge 1), knowledge of

³⁹ Cited in Ananthram, *The Logic of Globalization and Global Mindset Development*.

socio-political differences across countries and regions (Knowledge 2), and organizational and societal culture and cross cultural issues that impact management (Knowledge 3). Three items were developed for each of the three constructs. Responses were given on a seven-point Likert scale (1=extremely unimportant to 7=extremely important).

Factor analysis (used to uncover the underlying structure of a set of variables) revealed three constructs. However, the three items measuring Knowledge 2 and one item measuring Knowledge 1 were skewed and were deleted. Knowledge 1 was subsequently using two items with a Cronbach alpha (measure of internal consistency and reliability where a score of 0.70 or higher is considered acceptable) of 0.83. Knowledge 3 was measured using three items with a reliability alpha of 0.81.

Skills and Abilities, and Risk Tolerance

“Skills and Abilities” was measured using an adapted version of a scale initially developed by Adler,⁴⁰ shortened from 27 to 16 statements by Ali and Horne,⁴¹ and later adapted by Ananthram⁴² as a 14-item scale. The scale is linked to three sub-dimensions of the necessary attributes, namely, *professional and managerial skills*, *personal and social skills*, and *cross cultural and international skills*. The three dimensions were assessed by asking four, seven, and three questions, respectively. Respondents reported their perceptions on a seven point Likert scale (1=extremely unimportant to 7=extremely important).

“Risk Tolerance” was measured using a scale developed by Covin and Slevin,⁴³ later adapted by Roth⁴⁴ and then by Harveston, Kedia and

⁴⁰ N. J. Adler, “Cross-Cultural Management Issues To Be Faced,” *International Studies of Management and Organization* 13/1-2 (1983): 7–45.

⁴¹ A. Ali and D. Horne, “Problems and Skills in International Business,” *Management Memo* 1 (1986): 34–38.

⁴² Cited in Ananthram, *The Logic of Globalization and Global Mindset Development*.

⁴³ Covin and Slevin, “Strategic Management of Small Firms in Hostile and Benign Environments,” pp. 75–87.

⁴⁴ K. Roth, “Implementing International Strategy at the Business Unit Level: The Role of Managerial Decision-Making Characteristics,” *Journal of Management* 18/4 (1992): 769–789.

Davis.⁴⁵ This measure was then adapted by Ananthram.⁴⁶ Managerial risk tolerance was assessed through five questions. Respondents were asked to respond on a seven point Likert scale (1=extremely unimportant to 7=extremely important).

The above items were factor analyzed with four factors expected and four obtained. One item measuring skills and abilities and one item measuring risk tolerance were deleted owing to leakage. Some of the items comprising the three constructs for skills and abilities loaded onto different constructs. This was attributed to the change in context given that the instrument was developed in the West and the current study was being conducted with Japanese managers in the East. The Cronbach alpha scores for cross cultural and international skills, personal and social skills, and professional and managerial skills were 0.86, 0.74, and 0.71, respectively. The Cronbach alpha for risk tolerance was 0.82.

Global Identity, Level of International Experience, and Global Mindset Intensity

An eight-item scale developed by Ananthram⁴⁷ was employed to measure “Global Identity.” Respondents were asked to report on a seven point Likert scale to indicate the level of importance that each action had in working in the global marketplace. “Level of International Experience” was measured using an instrument developed by Harveston⁴⁸ that had been adapted from Harveston, et al.⁴⁹ The adapted instrument was later employed by Ananthram.⁵⁰ Level of international experience was assessed through four questions. Respondents were asked to respond on a seven point Likert

⁴⁵ P. D. Harveston, B. L. Kedia, and P. S. Davis, “Internationalization of Born Global and Gradual Globalizing Firms: The Impact of the Manager,” *Journal of Global Competitiveness* 7/1 (1999): 278–286.

⁴⁶ Cited in Ananthram, *The Logic of Globalization and Global Mindset Development*.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Harveston, “Synoptic Versus Incremental Internationalization.”

⁴⁹ Harveston, Kedia, and Davis, “Internationalization of Born Global and Gradual Globalizing Firms,” pp. 278–286.

⁵⁰ Cited in Ananthram, *The Logic of Globalization and Global Mindset Development*.

scale (1=very rarely to 7=very extensively) to indicate their level of involvement with each activity.

Following the work of researchers, global mindset intensity was assessed by asking managers a series of questions about their attitude towards globalization.⁵¹ Questions were adapted from William J. Burpitt and Dennis A. Rondinelli⁵² that were later employed by Ananthram.⁵³ Respondents were asked to report on a seven point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree) to indicate their level of agreement with each statement. The 16 items were subject to factor analysis. Three factors were expected and three obtained. One item measuring global identity was deleted owing to its leaking across constructs and hence measured using a seven item scale. The Cronbach alpha scores were 0.84, 0.84, and 0.85 for global identity, level of international experience, and global mindset intensity, respectively.

Boundary-Spanning Activities

The study employed a ten-item scale developed by Ananthram⁵⁴ that asked respondents to indicate the importance and frequency of involvement with the “Boundary-Spanning Activities” identified from the literature. Respondents were asked to respond on a seven-point Likert scale (1=extremely unimportant to 7=extremely important) to indicate the level of importance each activity had, in working in the global marketplace. Respondents were also asked to report on a seven-point Likert scale (1=very rarely to 7=very extensively) separately, to indicate their level of involvement with each activity.

Factor analysis was not conducted for this variable owing to the fact that boundary-spanning activities are reported in the literature to be comprised of independent, mutually exclusive activities enabling

⁵¹Kevin Barham, “The Internationalisation of Business and the International Manager,” *Industrial and Commercial Training* 19/4 (1987): 6–11.

⁵²William J. Burpitt and Dennis A Rondinelli, “Export Decision-Making in Small Firms,” *The Role of Organizational Learning* 33/1 (1998): 51–68.

⁵³ Cited in Ananthram, *The Logic of Globalization and Global Mindset Development*.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

convergence of cross border informational boundaries.⁵⁵ The reliability assessment reported Cronbach alpha scores of 0.81 for the importance of boundary spanning activities and 0.91 for the involvement with boundary spanning activities.

Results

Multiple Regression Analysis

Table 3 presents the multiple regression analysis for the assessed skillsets with global mindset intensity. Multiple regression analysis was performed separately for the individual level and the organizational level skillsets. The results indicated that four of the ten assessed constructs were positively related to global mindset intensity; namely, personal and social skills, risk tolerance, global identity, and level of international experience. Therefore, hypotheses H2b, H3, H4 and H6 were supported.

Constructs	Global Mindset Intensity	
	B	T
Individual Level		
H1a – Knowledge of Information Systems Networks Facilitated by the Information and Technological Revolution	.031	.360
H1c – Knowledge of Organizational and Societal Culture and Cross-Cultural Issues that Impact Management	.049	.525
H2a – Cross-Cultural and International Skills	.018	.171
H2b – Personal and Social Skills	.328	3.208**
H2c – Professional and Managerial Skills	-.011	-.127
H3 – Risk Tolerance	.670	8.024***
Adjusted R ²	.569	
F	16.415***	
Organizational Level		
H4 – Global Identity	.296	2.739**

⁵⁵ Murtha, Lenway, and Bagozzi, “Global Mind-sets and Cognitive Shift in a Complex Multinational Corporation,” pp. 97–114.

H5a – Boundary Spanning Activities (Importance)	.124	1.007
H5b – Boundary Spanning Activities (Involvement)	.009	.084
H6 – Level of International Experience	.340	2.802**
Adjusted R ²	.213	
F	5.738**	
Notes: a. H1b – “Knowledge of organizational and societal culture and cross-cultural issues that impact management will positively influence global mindset intensity” was not included in the multiple regression model as the items were deleted during the factor analysis stage; b. b = beta, t = t value, F = F statistic; c. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, and ***p < 0.001.		

Table 3. Results of Multiple Regression Analysis

Quantitative Findings

The quantitative results were presented to eleven managers who had previously participated in the questionnaire survey at face-to-face interviews and focus group sessions. These eleven managers represented four different industry sectors, namely manufacturing (four managers), industrial gases (three managers), industry and commerce (three managers), and engineering (one manager). The managers were asked to explain the patterns recorded in the quantitative phase of the study based on their practical understanding and experience. They were also asked to identify all important skillsets that constituted a global mindset, which were outside of the six skillsets used in the quantitative phase of the study. The interviews were transcribed and analyzed manually using the content analysis methodology. The findings are presented in the following paragraphs.

Skills and Abilities

According to the interviewees, “personal and social skills” was the only construct that was significantly related to global mindset intensity. These soft-skills and values were somewhat unique to the Japanese context as explained by the managers, because the traditional Japanese management style encouraged managers to utilize *personal soft-skills* and values such as honesty, sincerity, loyalty, and sensitivity. The vice president and general manager of a leading Japanese manufacturing organization engaged in global business explained that the “affection and warmth of the heart for a Japanese manager was vital.” The manager went on to explain that it was important for Japanese managers engaged in global business organizations

to understand the core values of the organization and the history of the organization. That is, the importance of organizational culture. It was also important “to be honest and have a sense of integrity at all times.”

Managers also explained that certain additional personal soft-skills and values that were essential for Japanese managers to develop a global mindset included *family values*. The general manager of a leading Japanese oil and gas exploration company that had a global presence also explained that, “...in the end the human being is very important. Not just his/her ability or knowledge but the man/woman itself...to know how he/she was brought up, what value sets they bring in to the organization based on their up-bringing.” The manager explained the importance of these family value sets even when recruiting from overseas. He gave an example of a Vietnamese employee who was recruited to run the Vietnamese operations of their organization where: “...Our human resources officer visited the [potential] Vietnamese employee’s house in Ho Chi Minh City and met his family, talked with them, got introduced to the father and mother after personal exchanges and introductions. This [was] to assess the family background, values, etc. [instilled] in the potential employee as we want him to be part of our organization’s family.”

Risk Tolerance

Risk tolerance was positively related to global mindset intensity. The qualitative sessions provided support to this finding. The Vice President and General Manager of a leading Japanese manufacturing organization engaged in global business explained that, “...it is important to allow managers some kind of allowance that they make mistake [abroad]; learning from mistakes is very important. Maximum risk tolerance, freedom and discipline [comes together] and is very important.” This comment provided support to the fact that it was imperative for Japanese managers engaged in global business to possess a higher threshold for handling risk in business.

Global Identity

Global identity was reported as significantly related to global mindset intensity in the quantitative phase of the study. The view that global identity gave managers a psychological advantage because it enabled a perception of globalization as beneficial to the organization was confirmed during the qualitative feedback sessions.

A manager from the planning department of a leading Japanese organization in the industrial gases sector suggested the following: “Understanding [globalization] is very important. Doing business – understanding where you are, why you are doing this [globalization], business background, and understanding the global market is very important.” The manager further ventured that unless they fully understood the merits of globalization and its impact on the organization and themselves, it would be very difficult to appreciate the associated benefits; and, in order to appreciate this, it was imperative that managers possessed a global mindset. Another general manager from the engineering division of the same organization explained that “global identity is a human feeling, a sense that globalization is important [for the organization].”

Level of International Experience

The quantitative results reported that the level of international experience was related to global mindset intensity. The vice president and general manager of a leading Japanese manufacturing organization engaged in global business confirmed these findings. He stated that, “experience/opportunity to work outside Japan is extremely important.” A senior manager from the same organization added, “...experience in overseas [postings] when they [managers] are young is vital. [We encourage] them [managers] to go overseas to subsidiaries, work with foreign managers and employees.”

A senior manager of a leading Japanese organization in the industrial gases sector stated, “In one division – subsidiary company in Singapore – we have a Japanese general manager. He encourages managers from Japan to [live and work] in Singapore, experience the business [culture].” The manager further explained that this overseas experience helps managers understand and appreciate the similarities and differences in business cultures across different countries and that this was vital towards the development of a global mindset.

Discussion

The current empirical research study, which was conducted in the Hyogo area of Japan, tested eleven hypotheses that were developed from an examination of the literature in relation to the concept of “global mindset intensity.” Out of eleven hypotheses tested, four were supported as being related to the existence of a “global mindset” in Japanese managers following a pluralist methodology. These were “H2b - personal and social

skills,” “H3 - risk tolerance,” “H4 - global identity” and the “H6 - level of international experience.” Interestingly, as opposed to various forms of knowledge, the supported hypotheses all essentially related to skillsets or other personal or individual characteristics of the managers under study. Each of these skillsets, “personal and social skills,” “risk tolerance,” “global identity” and the “level of international experience” could only have been realistically acquired through individual experience and personal development.

It is true that within the above hypotheses list that H2a (professional and managerial skills) and H2c (cross-cultural and international skills) were not seen as related to the existence of a global mindset, but these might well have been interpreted by respondents as being professionally, as opposed to experientially, acquired. This potential limitation on the interpretation of the results could really only be clarified with further interviews with the managers concerned, and logistical and financial constraints of the researchers have prevented this from happening, at least in the short term.

Given, then, that these results are pointing to personal characteristics and skillsets acquired through individual experience and related personal development as the determinants of a global mindset (which is really the antithesis of the common understanding of the collectivist, even regimented, Japanese managerial psyche) it seems that change may have taken place. Or, there might be a change in progress in Japan, as desirable managerial development is accomplished, at least in relation to the development of a global mindset. Then, if it can be assumed that such a paradigm shift has occurred, it is interesting to contemplate the timeline of such change and to consider these results in a temporal or historical context.

In his seminal article in which he outlined in great detail the formulation of a model for the understanding of “societal systems of capitalism,” Gordon Redding explained very clearly and convincingly that business and management systems should be understood in terms of their historical and relevant socio-cultural contexts.⁵⁶ The current situation, in which various constructs have been linked to the contemporary “global

⁵⁶ Gordon Redding, “The Thick Description and Comparison of Societal Systems of Capitalism,” *Journal of International Business Studies* 36/2 (2005): 123–155.

mindset intensity” of contemporary Japanese global managers, is no exception, and the following paragraphs will outline some important aspects of the relevant historical and contemporary contexts.

The Japanese have struggled with globalization for centuries, and their society has fluctuated between periods of dogmatic isolation and receptiveness to the outside world.⁵⁷ A classic example of this is the closed nature of some two and a half centuries of Tokugawa society, in which a new Meiji period administration oversaw the rapid transfer and assimilation of knowledge and technologies from the industrialized Western nations. The Meiji rulers dispatched former members of the samurai class – an educated but previously very inwardly focused group – to Europe and the United States to study foreign industrial and military technologies and to be the vehicles for the transfer of knowledge, skills and technologies to the fledgling Japanese industrial economy.⁵⁸

These newly-coined international businessmen were also commonly charged with the development of new industries in Japan, and they would have needed all their acquired diplomatic, risk management and international skills to be a central part of Japan’s transformation from an inward-looking agrarian economy, to a first-world industrial power in less than fifty years (1868–1912).

Following the period of extreme nationalism, which saw Japan engaged in a catastrophic conflict with the Western powers (1942–1945). While firmly closed to the world in many ways, Japan entered a highly significant period in its social and economic history in which it was, in many ways, open to the outside world, but in some important ways remained closed. That is, in economic terms at least, after successful economic reconstruction efforts, flagship Japanese global corporations began looking outward and conquering world markets, but at the same time, the domestic economy was largely the exclusive province of Japanese companies. Foreign companies were largely locked out of the Japanese domestic economy because of legislative and bureaucratic restrictions, as well as cultural obstacles.

⁵⁷ “No Country is an Island,” *The Economist* Print Edition, November 29, 2007 (accessed October 6, 2010, <http://www.economist.com/node/10169924>).

⁵⁸ Mikiso Hane, *Modern Japan: A Historical Survey* (Boulder: West View Press, 1986).

The foot soldiers of Japanese postwar reconstruction became idealized employees: the Japanese “salary men” who staffed the Japanese corporations engaged in both international and domestic businesses as the nation battled its way from post-war chaos to first-world industrial leadership and international respectability. These hard-working employees were, in many cases, willing to work long hours each week for decades, often commuting long distances on a daily basis and taking relatively few annual holidays, in the name of their country, their companies and their families.

At the corporate level, they sublimated their personal desires and ambitions, and focused on the success of their companies and organizations for the greater good of the nation. As Chiavacci noted, “...a general middle-class model led to a solidification of the social basis of developmental capitalism by implying an ideal-life course and defining a successful life.”⁵⁹ For males, this success was based around studying hard to enter a highly-regarded university, and following graduation, entering a large corporation or government service at the beginning of a long and stable career with a single employer. For women, success meant marrying such a male, and rearing children to follow in the model of their parents, thus ensuring the continuity of the system.

It seems very likely that such mass dedication to work was a significant contributor to the situation where Japan became a contender for world economic leadership by the end of the 1980s: “The Japanese way of life was a formidable basis for developmental capitalism. It resulted in intense competition in education that provided the Japanese economy with workers and employees with excellent academic abilities and high labor productivity.”⁶⁰ As Chiavacci observed, in the case of the U.S. liberal capitalist system, the ideal person was the self-made entrepreneur, but for post-war Japanese society the ideal became the employee who toiled selflessly with big companies and government agencies.⁶¹

In stark contrast to the painstakingly constructed economic successes of the first three post-war decades, the spectacular collapse of the

⁵⁹ David Chiavacci, “The Social Basis of Developmental Capitalism in Japan: From Post-war Mobilization to Current Stress Symptoms and Future Disintegration,” *Asian Business and Management* 6 (2007): 35–55.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

Japanese economy in the early 1990s, the lost decade which followed this, the Asian financial crisis of 1997, the resurgence of the U.S. economy in the late 1990s and first years of the twenty-first century, the emergence of China and India as global economic powerhouses, and the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 all created a great deal of disruption to the previous social and economic order, leaving the Japanese unsure of their role in a rapidly globalizing world and looking for a way forward. At the end of all this – price deflation, relatively high unemployment, government indebtedness, negative or stagnant economic conditions – it must have seemed a bitter harvest in return for the decades of sacrifice of many Japanese salary or company men. Within a relatively short space of time, a central and established way of life had lost a significant proportion of its relevance and essential value.

Enter the global Japanese businessman of the contemporary era. According to the respondents in the current survey and interviews, a Japanese manager with the appropriate global mindset to tackle international business challenges in the contemporary, complex global arena, would have “personal and social skills,” “risk tolerance,” a “global identity,” and “international experience.” This twenty-first-century global businessman would be, by implication, an individualist bringing an array of personal, not culturally or collectively determined, attributes to bear in the battle for global business supremacy. This profile is the antithesis of the stereotypical Japanese salary man of the post-war era. Indeed, this new profile is reminiscent of the Japanese comic strip (*manga*) business man, Shima Kosaku, who attracted millions of avid readers in Japan, not because of his identity with a groupist instinct and unrelenting dedication to company and duty, but because of his worldliness, clever negotiation skills, and a propensity to take risks.⁶² In line with the results emerging from the limited survey and interviews conducted in the current, albeit modest study, it might be that the luster associated with the archetypal “salary man” of the post-war years has dulled, and a more worldly, risk-taking global businessman is perceived by many as an ideal role model.

Conclusion

⁶² “A Question of Character,” *The Economist* Print Edition, August 7, 2008 (accessed October 9, 2010, <http://www.economist.com/node/17673947>).

This paper began by very briefly reflecting on the human efforts that made possible the historic transformation that began in Japan after the middle of the nineteenth century when a domestically focused, essentially agrarian nation became a world industrial power within some fifty years, and again in the second half of the twentieth century, when Japan emerged from the chaos and trauma of defeat in the Pacific War to challenge for world economic leadership by the late 1980s. The champions of these herculean efforts were the ex-samurai chosen by the Meiji Administration to lead the initial economic transformation, and the more prosaic Japanese “salary men,” whose collective commitment and relentless energy dragged a dispirited Japan into the economic sunlight in the postwar period.

The current research study surveyed Japanese international managers in the contemporary age of globalism, which comes, of course, some two decades after the start of Japan’s relative economic decline. After establishing the constructs by which the so-called “global mindset intensity” could be measured, a questionnaire survey and follow-up interviews were conducted for the purpose of establishing how Japanese international managers conceptualized an appropriate mindset for the global business era. Out of eleven constructs offered to them, only four were supported, and these were “personal and social skills,” “risk tolerance,” a “global identity,” and “international experience.”

By placing this response in its temporal context, the researchers are tentatively suggesting that the most recent ideal business role model, the collectivist “salary man,” is now more or less redundant, and that the ideal is now a more worldly, individualistic, global business person, whose expertise and “global mindset intensity” is very much based on personalized international business experience, reminiscent of Western business ideals. For Japan, this is a radically different model, and one that might be quite challenging for many middle-aged and older Japanese. In making these tentative observations, the authors are very mindful of major limitations of the study—for example, the exploratory nature of the research, the fact that the data is really a perceptual “snapshot,” its regional focus, and the very limited size of the sample. Clearly repeated, larger scale and more broadly cast data collection would provide a stronger basis for asserting fundamental change in the nature of perceptions of global mindset intensity in Japanese international managers, but the current study at least provides some signposts for future research efforts.

Featured Essays

AN ELDERLY AINU MAN'S STORY: ETHNOGRAPHY

Kinko Ito

University of Arkansas at Little Rock

Introduction – Who are the Ainu?

In July 1962, my father and grandparents went to Hokkaido to visit their friends and do some sightseeing. They brought me back a small wooden jewelry box with a carved picture of two *kokeshi* dolls on the cover, as well as famous butter candies and three bears made from carved wood. My father used to read children's stories at night, and the bear family reminded me of a fairy tale. I later learned that these wood-carved bears were made by the Ainu,¹ the indigenous people of northern Japan.

Shigeru Kayano notes that tourism to Hokkaido was becoming very popular and a thriving economic driver in the region in the 1960s. The Ainu received much national attention as part of this new interest in tourism. The Japanese traditionally have a custom of bringing home local foods and goods as souvenirs (*omiyage*) for their family, relatives, and friends, while tourists purchase many Ainu artifacts such as woodcarvings, accessories, and traditional textile goods.²

Kayano also indicates in his book that, generally, the Japanese are ignorant of or indifferent to the existence of the Ainu people, their customs, manners, religion, and history of subjugation.³ I myself barely knew about them throughout my primary and secondary education in Japan. The word *Ainu* originally meant “human as opposed to God,” and it also referred to “humans in general” until the Ainu came into contact with the Japanese and Russians.⁴ Between that period and now, the meaning of the word has

¹ Hokkaido Ainu Association states that the Ainu population in Hokkaido was 23,782 in 2006 (accessed July 23, 2012, www.ainu-assn.or.jp), but the actual number “remains a mystery” (Poisson 5); Barbara Aoki Poisson, *The Ainu of Japan* (Minneapolis: Lerner Publications Company, 2002), p. 5.

² Shigeru Kayano, *Ainu no Ishibumi* (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun Publications, 2009), pp.156–158.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 135–136, 155.

⁴ Ainu Minzoku Hakubutsukan, *Ainu Bunka no Kisoichishiki* (Urayasu: Sofukan, 2009), pp. 12–13; and Hideaki Uemura, *Ainu Minzoku Ichimon Itto* (Osaka: Kaiho Shuppansha, 2008), pp. 11–12.

narrowed to refer to the Ainu themselves, yet the word is also used to refer to “a man” and “a father” in the Ainu language.

The Ainu are the indigenous people of the northern Tohoku region, Hokkaido,⁵ Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands.⁶ Thus, they are not a monolithic group, and there are geographical and cultural diversities. The Ainu form an ethnic group, but they also exhibit certain racial traits. Hilger states that a full-blooded Ainu has fair skin, a long nose, “round, dark-brown eyes, curling lashes, prominent eyebrows, rather long earlobes, and an abundant head of hair, often with a slight wave,” as well as body hair.⁷ The Ainu I have met or seen in pictures in Hokkaido appeared to have descended from a variety of regions, some resembling Italians, Russians, Native Americans, Filipinos, Micronesians, among others. According to Hiroshi Ushiro, the ancestors of the Ainu could be a mixture of the proto-types of all the major races: Caucasian, Mongoloid, and Negroid.⁸ However, the Ainu have been actively promoted exogamy to Japanese to reduce the amount of discrimination that their descendants will experience. Hilger observes that, “Now the Ainu, who stood apart for millenniums, face complete absorption by the Japanese.”⁹

The Ainu language is characterized as an isolated language that does not have an alphabet. Instead, the Ainu have a very strong oral tradition of *yukar* (long epics in lyric form about heroes) and *uwepekere* (traditional folk ballads). Oration is highly praised among their culture and is used to settle arguments and disputes.¹⁰ *Ukocharanke* is a debate in which the Ainu

⁵ Hokkaido is about the size of South Carolina. Hokkaido and parts of Tohoku still have many locations that have Ainu names meaning tall mountains, big rivers, small brooks, small pond, or other words that derive from the Ainu language. Kayano, *Ainu no Ishibumi*, p. 78, insists that this is a proof that Hokkaido was indeed *Ainu Moshir* (Quiet Human Land), the territory that belonged to the Ainu.

⁶ These islands have been occupied by Russia since the end of WWII.

⁷ Inez M. Hilger, “Japan’s ‘Sky People,’ The Vanishing Ainu,” *National Geographic* 131/2 (1967), p. 272.

⁸ Ushiro Hiroshi, The Historical Museum of Hokkaido (Personal communication, June 9, 2012).

⁹ Hilger, “Japan’s ‘Sky People,’” p. 268.

¹⁰ Ainu Minzoku Hakubutsukan, *Ainu Bunka no Kisoichishiki*, pp. 22–24; Kayano, *Ainu no Ishibumi*, p. 33; and Uemura, *Ainu Minzoku Ichimon Itto*, pp. 62–64.

opponents argue for hours and days until one gives up and another keeps debating. Oratorical abilities allot considerable social power to an individual in the Ainu culture.

The Meiji Government established the Hokkaido Colonization Board in 1869, and all of Hokkaido became government land. Japanese people were encouraged to immigrate¹¹ to *Ainu Moshir* in great numbers, where land and natural resources were abundant. The government supported the immigrants by granting them travel money, housing, food, agricultural devices, etc. The Ainu were classified as former aborigines, an insult, and their homeland was taken over by the Japanese from 1899. The Ainu, who used to be a hunting, fishing, and gathering people, were forced to become farmers. Fishing salmon, an Ainu staple, was prohibited in 1870, and deer hunting was also banned in 1889. The 1880s saw many periods of famine; it was a dire time for the Ainu, who had difficulty surviving since they were not allowed to obtain their traditional staple foods from natural surroundings.¹²

As part of the assimilation policies, government officials were sent to *kotan* (Ainu communities) and gave the Ainu family names, which were based on geographic characteristics such as mountains, rivers, and brooks. Today, the Ainu can still be identified by their last names, some of which include Hirame, Hiranuma, Kaizawa, Kawakami, Kawanano, Kayano, Kurokawa, Nabesawa, and Yoshikawa.¹³ What's more, the government prohibited traditional tattooing on women's mouths, the piercing of men's ears, and the performing of their sacred *Iomante*, the ceremony in which the Ainu "send off the sacred bear's spirit."¹⁴The Ainu were forced to speak

¹¹ Many Japanese also immigrated to Hawaii and North America between 1868 and 1907, to Brazil and Latin America between 1908 and 1934, and to Manchuria in the 1930s. Araragi, Shinzo, "*Manshu Imin*" *no Rekishi Shakaigaku* (Kyoto: Korosha, 1994), pp. 49, 55.

¹² Uemura, *Ainu Minzoku Ichimon Itto*, pp. 43–46.

¹³ As for the meanings of the Ainu surnames, Hirame means "flounder" because of many flounders caught near the ocean, Kaizawa means "a swampland where shellfish grow," Kawakami means "up the river," and Kurokawa means "a black river." Shiro Kayano (Personal communication, 2011).

¹⁴ Ainu Minzoku Hakubutsukan, *Ainu Bunka no Kisochishiki*, p. 159.

Japanese and wear Japanese hair styles and clothes.¹⁵ Thus, the assimilation policies affected not only their way of life, but also Ainu spirituality and identity. It was an ethnic cleansing that continued through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Almost half a century had passed since I first received my wooden bears that were carved by the Ainu, and I was on my sabbatical during the spring semester of 2011. The purpose of my project was to learn about the Ainu by reading books and articles, visit several Ainu museums to get a first-hand glimpse of their art and folk artifacts, and, of course, meet people. Before I left, I sent an e-mail to Three Rivers Town (a pseudonym) in the southwestern part of Hokkaido, a bucolic town known for agricultural products and its Ainu population.¹⁶ I inquired whether I would be welcomed to visit their museums and meet some Ainu people. I soon received an e-mail telling me that Mr. E at one of the museums could give me a tour of the place and also introduce me to a few Ainu. I was more than happy to hear this and was even more surprised that a certain Ainu gentleman suggested that I stay with his family while I was in town. His name was Mr. K.

My Trip to Three Rivers Town

My first trip to Three Rivers Town took place at the beginning of May 2011, which was still early spring in Hokkaido. From the airport, I enjoyed the scenic train ride that wound through industrial parks, small towns, and pastures. The houses along the railway looked different from those in Honshu because many have chimneys but no air-conditioners, and their steep roofs are designed to prevent snow accumulation during winter. I especially loved the view of the ocean from my window. The train was not crowded, and the local passengers were middle-aged, elderly men and women, as well as high school students who talked in groups, played video games, or sent

¹⁵ Ainu Minzoku Hakubutsukan, *Ainu Bunka no Kisochishiki*, pp. 159–162; Kayano, *Ainu no Ishibumi*, p. 128, Hokkaido Ainu Association (accessed July 23, 2012, www.ainu-assn.or.jp); Kenji Namikawa, *Ainu Minzoku no Kiseki* (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 2010), pp. 80–81; and Uemura, *Ainu Minzoku Ichimon Itto*, pp. 45–46.

¹⁶ According to the statistics provided by the Hokkaido Ainu Association (accessed July 23rd, 2012, www.ainu-assn.or.jp), 28.6% of today's working Ainu are engaged in primary industries of agriculture and fishery.

text messages. I looked for some Ainu faces because I was very curious how they might appear today, but all of the passengers looked Japanese.

I arrived at my station and was one of the very few passengers who got off the train. An old Ainu man was waiting in his van in front of the small station. This was Mr. K. He took me to various places, talking about the Ainu and himself as he drove. We went to a plaza where there were several traditional Ainu buildings, including houses, storehouses, a bear cage, and boats with information boards for tourists and educational purposes. We went into a showcase *cise* (traditional thatched Ainu house), talked with the Ainu women who staffed it, and had tea and cake by the fire pit.¹⁷ In all, my short stay with Mr. K and his wife Mayumi in 2011 was filled with Ainu culture: visits to museums where the staff explained archaeological history, Ainu art, and folk artifacts.

Mr. K and his friend Reiko sang Ainu ballads and songs, and I ate traditional Ainu food such as *ohau* (soup with salmon and vegetables in a slightly salted broth) and *inakibi* rice (rice with barnyard millet). Mr. K and his wife, Mayumi, showed me several traditional Ainu clothing, a ceremonial crown, bandanas with embroidery, and hand-woven *saranip* handbags. They wore these items themselves, and then let me wear them and take pictures as well. The next day, Mayumi showed me how to make and embroider a traditional wardrobe with *Attush* cloth.¹⁸ The K's invited me to come back to Three Rivers; soon after, I got a scholarship from my university in the summer of 2012, and went there for two weeks to do field research and conduct interviews.

A Story of an Old Ainu Man

Mr. K is an Ainu who was born in 1934 in Three Rivers Town. His grandmother was widowed when Mr. K was very young and came to live with his family until he finished elementary school. She spoke the Ainu language with her Ainu friends in the community, with whom she would get

¹⁷ One of my informants, an Ainu woman, told me that fire is considered sacred by the Ainu, and that they give prayers and offerings to *Apefuchi Kamui*, the Goddess of Fire.

¹⁸ The cloth is made of fibers from barks of *ohyo* (Japanese elm) tree. According to Mr. K, *ohyo*'s fibers from the barks are strong, and they make long threads easily. Mayumi sewed pieces of cloths onto *Attush* and embroidered various Ainu designs.

together occasionally and enjoy story-telling all night. That is how Mr. K came to understand some Ainu language. However, his parents, just like many other Ainu parents in those days, encouraged him to speak only Japanese. All Ainu were encouraged to learn Japanese by the government starting in 1871, which was part of the forced assimilation policy.¹⁹

Many Ainu parents themselves thought that speaking Japanese would promote assimilation and prevent prejudice, discrimination, and bullying at school. Mr. K said: “The Ainu had been looked down upon and discriminated against in society throughout the Meiji and Taisho Periods,²⁰ and the Ainu elders thought that their children should study Japanese. Thus, they spoke the Ainu language among themselves, but they only spoke Japanese to us children. I am sorry that I am not a native speaker of Ainu. I have been going to the local Ainu language school for the last 10 years or so, and actually I am the Chair of the steering committee of the school. The man who started the language school asked me to become the Chair about a year before he passed away. I felt uncomfortable about the job because I was not really a ‘native’ speaker. So, I declined the offer, saying that I would not like to cause an unnecessary trouble. He then said that the Ainu Language School needed to exist, and someone had to become the Chair. He told me that I could learn the language myself at the school with the students and serve the Ainu community as well.”

Mr. K has been adamant about learning and practicing Ainu in his later years. He has particularly focused on learning the epics and ballads for the last ten years. He said, “Recently I won an award for singing an Ainu folk ballad in one of the contests in Sapporo,” and showed me the certificate. In 2011, he was also awarded a certificate of gratitude for his contribution to the preservation, transmission, and promotion of Ainu culture by Three River Town’s mayor.

His father, Saburo, excelled in reading and writing in his elementary school. Upon graduation, he started to work as an apprentice at O Store, a major liquor store in town, which also served as a small post office. He worked as a store clerk and mailman. He had to deliver mail on foot or by bicycle to places which were 15 to 20 kilometers (approximately 9.4 to 12.5 miles) away, and the roads had many hills. In time, he became a young man and married Natsu. She was from the same town and was the last of five

¹⁹ Uemura, *Ainu Minzoku Ichimon Itto*, pp. 45–46.

²⁰ The Meiji and Taisho Periods extends from 1868 to 1926.

children in her family. Saburo and Natsu had two sons, Mr. K and his younger brother.

The owner of O Store said to his father one day: "You have been working very diligently, and I will give you land. Go there, clear it, cultivate the land, and engage in agriculture. You can be independent." Mr. K was about two years of age when his family left town for the given land, which was further inland, where big trees and weeds were lush. He said: "My father cut the large trees, dug roots, and did his best to cultivate the land, but we suffered a lot financially because he was no longer receiving wages from the liquor store. We had nothing; no money, food. Nothing! We would go to a nearby brook, fill two buckets with water, and bring them back to the house on the opposite ends of a wooden bar over the shoulders, and stored it in a *miso*²¹ barrel. We used the water for drinking and cooking, but by today's sanitation standard, it would be considered harmful to your health.

"When I was four years old, my father caught Tuberculosis (TB),²² which was rather common in those days among the Ainu and the Japanese. There was not much mechanization in agriculture then, and people had to keep working very hard without proper nutrition. Many suffered from pneumonia and TB. My father could not afford to go see a doctor. My grandmother, being an old-fashioned Ainu woman, knew a lot about folk medicine.²³ She gave him herbs and barks in hot water, yet my father died in April when I was six years old.

"Our old house looked worse than stables or huts where cows, horses, or dogs lived. Looking back at those days, I really wonder how we survived in that house and maintained our health. We did not have indoor plumbing like many other traditional Ainu houses, and in the summertime we would go to the river. We did not bathe in the winter. I did not have any shoes and went barefoot to school, to play, or to the mountains to pick grapes. Sometimes pieces of broken glass bottles were on the road, so I often injured my feet. In the wintertime, snow and ice would come through the holes in the

²¹ Fermented soybean paste used for sauce, soup, and pickling in Japanese cooking.

²² Many of the Ainu died of diseases that were brought by the Japanese immigrants due to the lack of immunity, just like the original inhabitants in the United States as well as in Latin America.

²³ The Ainu folk remedies include various herbs and trees that utilize their seeds, leaves, roots, fruits, and sap.

walls of our house, and it was very cold. I wore shoes made of horse leather to school in wintertime. Those shoes were called *keri* and were made of either horse or pig skin. I would put old rags around my feet, and then wore *keri* shoes. By the time I arrived at school, my shoes were frozen. When I returned home, I would warm up my shoes near the stove; once you wear them they became soft and no longer hard. We made those shoes at home. There used to be quite a few horses in those days—rich families had a handful or dozens of horses to help them with farming and pulling down lumber from the mountains.²⁴ When a horse died, we made *keri* shoes with the skin and ate the meat. Now there are regulations for butchering meat, but in those days, we just ate it. We did not have good food, my father was overworked, and he ended up dying young with TB. I can remember my father only very vaguely because I was not even in elementary school when he passed.

“My mother, Natsu, had to work after she became a widow in her 20s, maybe she was like 27. I think my grandmother was in her 50s then, and she went to work with my mother as *dementori*, day laborers on farms. My younger brother and I were on our own while they were gone, and I followed their instructions in regard to what to eat for lunch since I was 7 or 8. I cooked and did other things, so I can still do them.

“I was the first-born and had to take care of my younger brother, and I took him to school with me, too. I, just like many other Ainu children in those days, and even today to a certain extent, was bullied²⁵ and discriminated against by the *wajin*²⁶ (Japanese) at school on many days by

²⁴ Lumber and charcoal production used to be two of the major industries of Three River Town, and several Ainu men told me that they used to deplore the naked mountains after all the trees were cut and sold. There has been a social and political movement to restore the mountains to the original state, and they have been successful.

²⁵ A *wajin* friend of mine who is a principal at an elementary school in Sapporo said, “In today’s schools in Sapporo or anywhere else in Japan, nobody can engage in bullying or discrimination, whether they are Ainu or *wajin*. Bullying and discrimination are subject to negative sanctions, and when reported, the Board of Education gets involved, does an investigation, and solves the problem. It is more a human rights issue, and not an Ainu vs. *wajin* issue as much as it used to be.” (Personal communication, 2012).

²⁶ The Ainu refers to those non-Ainu Japanese as *wajin* (和人). I heard this word very often in their daily conversations among both the Ainu and the

my teacher and classmates. I was looked down upon just because I was an Ainu. I went to an elementary school in the R District in town where there were a lot of Ainu families. There were also many children whose fathers engaged in charcoal production in the mountains. These *wajin* families would stay in the region for five, or maybe six years, and they moved around like nomads. The local people, both the Ainu and *wajin*, did not discriminate against us, but these *wajin* children of charcoal makers would ridicule us as being dirty, hairy, and smelling like urine even though they were not better off than us. I was very strong when it came to fighting, and the *wajin* school teacher, who carried a cane-looking bar, which was about 1 yard and 4 inches in length, would always say that I was in the wrong in a fight or an argument just because I was an Ainu.

“Of course, I was not the only one who was bullied and scolded. The *wajin* children used to call us ‘You, Ainu!’ in a derogatory manner and say things like ‘*A inu ga kita*’ (‘Ah, a “dog” is coming’) when we approached them.²⁷ In Japanese *inu* means ‘dog’ and the word Ainu is divided into two words: *a* + *inu* (‘Ah’ and ‘dog’). This idea that the Ainu are inferior beings, and bad ones, truly let me down, and I had no motivation to learn the Ainu language when I was young. I did not even try to learn it, even though my grandmother spoke Ainu with her friends all the time. My mother did not speak Ainu in front of me. However, their voices speaking Ainu still sound in my ears since I heard them speaking Ainu to one another.

“When we moved to K District in town it was not the students but the *wajin* teachers who bullied us Ainu kids more. They would not even come near us because they thought we were filthy, and it was always us, the Ainu kids, who were beaten up. I experienced it, but I saw many other Ainu children who were bullied more than I.

“I envied those Ainu children who were half-Ainu and half-*wajin*, because looking like *wajin* reduced the amount of ridicule and bullying. The bullies would not really think that these kids were Ainu, either. They think that they were *wajin* and never called them ‘Ainu! Ainu!’ like they did to us. Unfortunately, the word Ainu, which means human in the Ainu language,

non-Ainu while I was in Three Rivers in 2011 and 2012. It seems that the Ainu/Wajin dichotomy characterizes one of the elements of one’s identity in Three Rivers.

²⁷ Several informants of mine told me that this kind of verbal insult is still exchanged today.

was used by the *wajin* as a word of contempt, a derogatory term. Actually, the Ainu Association of Hokkaido changed its name to the Utari (compatriot) Association in 1961 because of this negative association and then changed its name back to the Ainu Association in 2009.

“So many Japanese from different parts of Honshu moved to Hokkaido looking for a better life in those days. Japan was still a very poor nation, and people had very difficult times. However, many immigrants did not fare well; they were not at all prepared for the hush winter here. They suffered from hunger and cold temperatures, lived in primitive huts, and when they decided to leave Hokkaido and go back to Honshu, they left their infants with Ainu families just like those Japanese parents who left their infants and children to the Chinese at the end of World War II and barely came back to Japan themselves. This abandoning of their children and entrusting them in the hands of the strangers was one of the ways to save their young lives. Those *wajin* babies who were brought up by their Ainu foster parents spoke the Ainu language, followed the Ainu traditions, and believed their myths, and they became the Ainu of the Ainus even though they appeared to be *wajin*.

“My Ainu friend T looks like a *wajin*. His mother was an infant left by her Japanese parents. An Ainu couple from my town, who had lost their baby ten days earlier, heard about this baby, so the husband went to Wakkanai to pick her up, and brought her to their house on horseback. In those days there was no baby formula, and the Ainu parent had to look for a wet nurse on the way back home as he traveled. Luckily, the wife of the inn owner had a baby and could serve as a wet nurse. The suckling, after drinking milk, would feel full, stop crying, and be content. She was brought up by her Ainu parents and married an Ainu. Last year my friend T was in charge of a particular traditional Ainu ceremony and many people there asked me whether he was really an Ainu or not because of the looks he inherited from his *wajin* mother. His grandmother spoke only the Ainu language, and T stayed with her all the time until he was 17 years old. Thus, T can speak Ainu very fluently. I think he is just about the only one who is a native speaker among the Ainu men around here.

“In our district, there were a lot of Japanese immigrants from places like Sendai or Niigata, and they engaged in agriculture. As a good friend of mine used to say, they came to Hokkaido like an avalanche, occupied the land, and took all the fertile land away from the Ainu, and started farming and developing. The Ainu did not have their own nation, and our language does not have an alphabet, but my ancestors lived in harmony with nature.

The Japanese ‘gave’ the native Ainu barren and very poor land, told them to cultivate it themselves, and forced them to live there as farmers. The Ainu were not given much land anyway, and our ancestors were hunters, fishermen, and gatherers, but not really farmers. They became poorer and poorer, especially during bad harvests.

“Many Ainu men loved to drink, and some were in debt due to their heavy drinking. In those days, there was a credit system in which customers would purchase goods, the store owner would record the amount of the purchases, and the customers would pay the total amount of the bill on a specific date sometime later. Some Ainu men, who were totally drunk, would walk around in town smelling like alcohol²⁸ and come to this liquor store. The store owner, knowing that the drunkards would not remember anything, would write in their credit records that these unsuspecting Ainu ‘purchased’ some liquor on that day. Later, he would demand payment in full. The drunkards could not remember anything or defend themselves. The *wajin* store owner made plenty of money this way, and when the Ainu said that he could not pay the bill, the owner would demand that he pay in land. If the Ainu did not have land, a mountain would do. It was a totally corrupt system in which the Ainu lost a lot due to their notorious drunkenness.

“Among the immigrant Japanese farming families, there were the U and A families who were excellent and very rich farmers. I had a few classmates who were about the same age in my neighborhood; they were a son or a daughter of these very rich families. They were wonderful people and treated me (and often my brother, too) to delicious food. I am still friends with one of them like my brother. I also had a friend whose parents came from Sendai, and his family grew rice, the only one who did so in the community. One day, I was invited to this classmate’s house, which was huge and I was very hesitant to enter. Even though I was a small child, I knew I was dirty and stinky. I was told by Mr. U to go to the back door, take off my shoes, and enter the house. They knew that my family was very poor so they

²⁸ One of the Ainu elderly women told me that when she was young she was bullied and ridiculed. When she went home from school, the *wajin* children would often call her “*Kotan biiru* (Kotan beer)!” because there were many Ainu drunkards walking around smelling like alcohol. Her father worked, made money, and spent it all on drinking. An elderly man said and laughed, “When a tiger dies, it leaves its leather. When an Ainu dies, he leaves a whole bunch of liquor bottles behind.”

offered me food, saying ‘You must be hungry. Eat as much as you want. Eat until you get full and then go home.’ I ate a bowl of white rice for the first time in my life that day. I still remember how delicious it was.

“Our family lived on potatoes, *kabocha* (pumpkins), barnyard millet, and the like. I had millet for lunch at school. It does not have stickiness, so when it is warm, it is pretty good. But once it gets cold, it becomes very dry like rice bran. In those days, typical lunch boxes were oval-shaped and made of metal. All the students warmed the boxes on the stove in the classroom. When I tried to get my lunch box with my bare hands one day, it got so hot that I dropped it on the floor. The millet would spread all over the floor, and I could not eat it. I had to throw it away.

“When I was in the 4th grade, I was able to help my mother and grandmother by weeding in our very small vegetable garden in front of the humble house and gathering firewood in the mountains. I was also asked to work on a farm and earn money. I had to weed in the soybean or *adzuki* fields that were 100 or 200 meters (approximately 109-219 yards) long. Since I was only a child, I could not keep up with the adult workers, and many women helped me catch up with them. The wages were 2 *sho* (approximately 3.6 liters) of dried corn. We were living from hand to mouth, and we did not have much to eat. In wintertime, we ate preserved *kabocha* that we harvested in the autumn and dried in the sun. As soon as I arrived home from my farm work, I would ground the dried corn in a mortar called *iyuta*. Two people can pound the grain in the mortar easily, but three can pound at the same time, too. It is a bit more difficult that way, and I am the only one who can still do it. Anyway, when my mother would come home to find the gruel made with ground grains (corn, millet, etc.) she used to commend me and say, ‘You are great!’ and it made me feel very happy.

“My mother remarried Mr. W, a Japanese man from Niigata who came to Hokkaido to work, when I was 11 years old. Mr. W and my mother had two sons. Mr. W said that he would take care of me and my brother, but he would let us keep our last name in due respect to our late father. Mr. W was a great stepfather. He was very gentle and loved me and my brother genuinely. He did not have any prejudice toward the Ainu people. We were still poor, but our life with Mother and a new father began. Mr. W did several things for me, so my household labors, like going to mountains and making firewood, were lightened.

“My stepfather had relatives in Sapporo and Otaru, and he used to go there to visit them several times a year. When I was in the 6th grade, he went to Sapporo and brought me back a new set of skis. In those days, skis

were very rare, and even children from rich families did not have them. All my friends were envious of me, and many people asked where I got them and begged me to touch or use them. I felt very lucky to have Mr. W as my stepfather.

“In the fall of 1945 or so, my maternal grandfather gave my mother some land, and we moved to a small rural community. Mr. W built a hut with the logs that he had cut and brought from the mountain. He also used the cheap wood boards that did not meet the industry standard, which he purchased from a saw mill. Snow and wind came in from the holes in the walls and under the eaves during winter. We needed to put up wood boards to cover the holes. My mother and stepfather worked very hard every day, but our life was not easy. I tried to help them out and went to a farm and made some money. I went to junior high school for two years, but in my third year I went to work in the mountains, cutting grass, trees, and such. Because of this, I could not attend enough days at junior high school, so I did not receive a diploma. Many Ainu were in the same position. However, when the junior high school celebrated its 100th year anniversary, my name was entered into the registration of graduates.

“Mr. W concluded that his family could not keep living in poverty and decided to apply for a new land and engage in agriculture. He bought land thanks to an order that allowed people without land to purchase some cheaply. If they were successful in cultivation and could pass an inspection within five years, the land became theirs to keep. Our plot was about 30 km (approximately 19 miles) from our abode. My stepbrothers were still very young, and my parents took the youngest son with them to work since he was not healthy. I took care of my brother and stepbrother, while my parents were away. They would take two to three hours every day to commute in a horse buggy on the mountain roads. They needed to cut trees without machinery, and it was very hard labor to cultivate the land. I would ride my bicycle with my brother and helped my parents there, too.

“The work in the lush land was excruciatingly difficult. It is beyond a normal person's imagination. There were huge trees and weeds everywhere. My stepfather also engaged in charcoal production in the mountain. He built a kiln, burned wood, sold the charcoal to special charcoal sellers, and earned a living. After several years, when the land had finally been cultivated, my stepfather was diagnosed with cancer and died a year later, in 1972. He was 60-some years old. He loved his children and grandchildren. My youngest brother inherited the land and business, and, today, he has 23 green houses and his business is doing very well.

“In my teenage years, the only jobs available were related to the lumber business; cutting trees, transporting logs on the river, making lumber, etc. I stayed and did various kinds of work in the mountains for months and months. We loaded logs into trucks that delivered them to paper mills or woodworking plants. In the winter, my hands often froze, and they turned white. However, I kept working because it was my boss’s order. In those days, orders from an adult, your senior, must be carried out by all means. I worked very hard not to be scolded. Later, I purchased a horse and worked in the mountains, because I could make more money with my own horse.

“I got married to Mayumi when I was 24, which was in 1959. Mayumi and I have known each other for a long time, since our childhood. During that time, dating was not common here. You may not be able to believe it, but things like dating did not exist. Both of us had only mothers, and we were poor.”

I asked Mayumi how she liked Mr. K, and she said, “I fell in love with my husband because I thought that his family grew rice, and this meant I would probably not go hungry again.”

Mayumi’s father was an Ainu who died young. Her mother was a *wajin* from Sapporo who was adopted by an Ainu couple when she was four. Her adoptive parents had always spoken in the Ainu language, but Mayumi’s mother only spoke Japanese in front of her children, which was typical of parents in those days. Mayumi’s mother did speak Ainu with her friends, though. Her mother had many siblings, one of whom found where she lived, and they later introduced themselves and kept in touch as a family.

Mr. K. continued, “Mayumi and I had six children; four boys and two girls. It did not make sense for me to always stay in the mountains leaving my family behind. I decided to get a truck driver’s license so that I could commute to work and stay with my family every day. I told my wife, ‘It could be tough while I am going to a driver’s school, but when I become a truck driver I can stay with you.’

“I purchased a big truck and worked as a driver for a very long time. I loaded gravel and sand onto my truck and drove to Sapporo just about every day. I would get up at two or three o’clock in the morning and go back and forth to Sapporo²⁹ a few times a day. It was a time of a very high economic

²⁹ The city of Sapporo hosted the 11th Olympic Winter Games in 1972, the first Winter Games held in Japan and Asia.

growth in Japan,³⁰ and construction companies needed sand and gravel to build buildings and roads.

“In winter, this truck driving job got scarce due to snow, and I went to Kisarazu or Kimitsu in Chiba Prefecture in Honshu to work and make money. I went there every year from January to the “Golden Week” in May. I drove my truck there and worked at Tokyo Bay to fill the land. There were so many jobs available, and I did that for 20 years until 2007. Even though I lived there in the winter time, 20 years is a long time, and I know Kisarazu and Kimitsu very well. Without that job, I do not think we could have built this house. We do not have any mortgage payment, we only have *Kokumin Nenkin* (Social Security), and from now on it will be difficult since the amount of money has been reduced. The politicians are trying to increase the tax rates now, too. Japan will sink in the future, you know! It will.”

Mr. K has been very active in many Ainu activities since the 1970s. He said, “In 1970, I became the director of the Hokkaido Ainu Association’s local branch and served more than 40 years. I am also the Vice President of our Ainu Culture Preservation Association and the Chair of the steering committee of the Ainu Language School. I have been active in a project called ‘Restoring *Iwor*.’ *Iwor* is a traditional and ecological living space, and it entails biological resources in the area. The Ainu traditionally do not have a notion of private land ownership. Land belongs to their community.”

Mr. K told me that he is very happy that he is an Ainu, and I asked him why. He said, “I had to endure many hardships, but I also benefitted a lot from my membership in the Ainu Association, and I can really say that I am glad I am an Ainu now. We built this house more than 30 years ago. You can borrow up to 7.2 million yen to build your house, and start paying a mere 2 percent mortgage rate in the following year. This is significantly lower than other mortgages. If you need to get a driver’s license, you will get 50,000 yen since a driver’s license is considered a necessity to earn money for living. If you are a fisherman and need a boating license, it is the same. My children benefitted from scholarships, too. For example, when a student enters a senior high school, scholarships are given three times a year, and the same for

³⁰ According to Henshall, Japanese annual GNP grew around 9% in the 1950s, 10% in the early 1960s, and more than 13% in the late 1960s and early 1970s; Kenneth Henshall, *A History of Japan: From Stone Age to Superpower* (Houndsmille, U.K.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 157–158.

college students.³¹ You need to return the money you are awarded if you drop out, though.

“The Japanese government helps with building sewage disposal system facilities and pays about 70 to 90 percent of the cost. This program is part of improving the living conditions of the Ainu residents, and of course the *wajin* residents benefit from it, too, since they live in the same neighborhood. Paving the roads was also supported by money that the Ainu Association received from the Japanese government. In order to preserve Ainu culture, money is available for those who teach and learn Ainu crafts. As for me, when I go to elementary schools and teach how to grow products, I am paid 5,400 yen per hour. They do direct deposit. My brother who owns greenhouses also gets money, and the *wajin* farms equally benefit from this help. Thanks to the money given to the Ainu, both the Ainu and *wajin* residents in the whole community can thrive.

“I think the prefecture of Hokkaido has the attitude that they want to cherish Ainu culture, which I think is good. Hokkaido used to be an Ainu land, yet the history of the Ainu is full of exploitation and oppression. I came to be friends with a very influential Ainu man, and he invited me to come along with him to different places in Honshu such as Tokyo, Osaka, Matsuzaka, Akita, as well as abroad, to Canada, South Korea, and New Zealand, to promote mutual awareness among the ethnic minorities of the world. I feel very lucky to have travelled to these countries as a representative of the Ainu.”

On March 11th, 2011, huge earthquakes and many tsunamis hit the northeast Tohoku Region of Japan, and the Fukushima nuclear disaster also took place. Mr. K commented on what was going on at that time. He said, “The Japanese are now discriminating against these people from Fukushima. I would say that the radioactivity will not be contagious. We are not contaminated by the individuals from Fukushima who are visiting us here in Hokkaido. Some people misunderstand this, and certain gas stations have signs saying ‘No Cars from Fukushima Served.’ This is horrible. It was reported in yesterday’s paper. That is awful.”

When I left his house in 2011, Mr. K said to me, “Like many other Ainu elders, I am not young anymore, and my years are limited. I am very

³¹ One of my informants in her 20s told me that this scholarship might be causing jealousy among the *wajin* students, which leads to their bullying the Ainu students.

happy that you are studying the Ainu, and since you know English and Spanish, you can reach out to more people and let them know about us. I really appreciate that. Please come back next year. I will introduce you to more Ainu. This is your home, and you are welcome any time. I will be waiting for you.” I did go back in May 2012, and interviewed some 30 people, both Ainu and *wajin*, in Three Rivers.

THE ESCALATING JAPAN–CHINA ISLAND DISPUTE AND THE POTENTIAL FOR WAR IN EAST ASIA

Daniel A. Métraux
Mary Baldwin College

Shouting at the top of their lungs, a large joint contingent of Japanese soldiers and American Marines jumped from their landing craft and surged on to a barren stretch of beach. Their mission was to invade and seize control of a Pacific island that had been captured by hostile forces. Guns drawn, the allied troops quickly captured an abandoned seaside dwelling and later swept inland as their rearguard secured the beachhead. There was air support, from Huey and Cobra Navy helicopters hovering above.

Then larger Navy hovercrafts roared in just in time to secure the whole island.¹ This whole scenario was not real. The site was Camp Pendleton in California in February 2014. American and Japanese forces were undergoing joint training, learning how to seize small islands very much like those islets in the East China Sea that today are claimed by both Japan and China. Japan now says that it is prepared to use force to maintain control of these islands and the United States is bound to help Japan should China try to grab one or more of them from the Japanese. The practice invasion at Camp Pendleton could very well become reality if the current crisis between Japan and China continues to heat up.

The years 2013 and 2014 saw an escalation of the crisis between Japan and China over which nation has sovereignty of a small group of islands in the East China Sea. While the islands themselves are the focus of the dispute, there are other very complex issues at work between Japan and China that have led to a dramatic deterioration of relations between the two Asian powers and the possibility of armed conflict. One factor is the deep antagonism between Japan and China that developed before and during World War II, which has never been truly resolved. Both nations are experiencing strong surges of nationalism and both are involved in a scramble for the rich energy resources that supposedly lie inside the disputed waters. China's demand in late 2013 that intends to force foreign

¹ Helene Cooper, "In Japanese Drill with the US, A Message for Beijing," *New York Times*, February 22, 2014.

aircraft to seek permission to fly over the island region is the latest irritant in the deepening crisis. While it is clear that neither nation really wants war and the chances of armed conflict are today quite remote, there is always the possibility of an accident that could lead to shooting.

The Heart of the Matter

The dispute centers on eight uninhabited islands in the East China Sea known as the Senkaku islands in Japan and the Daiyou islands in China. These tiny islands have a total area of about 7 square kilometers and lie northeast of Taiwan, east of China, and southwest of Japan's southernmost prefecture, Okinawa. The islands are currently controlled by Japan.

The islands are important because they are close to key shipping lanes, are known as rich fishing grounds, and lie near potentially very rich oil and gas reserves. They are also located in a strategically significant position for both China and the United States and matters to both nations, as well as for Japan in the search for military supremacy in the hotly contested Asia-Pacific region. Unfortunately, neither China nor Japan agreed to fixed territorial boundaries after World War II in the East China Sea region. During the immediate postwar period the area was primarily important for fishing and trawlers from both countries and Taiwan largely left each other alone.

Japan's claim stems from its assertion that it surveyed the islands for several years in the late nineteenth century and determined that they were uninhabited. On January 14, 1895, Japan erected a sovereignty marker on one of the islands and formally incorporated the islands into Japanese territory as part of the Nansei Shotō island chain. Japan states that international law supports their claim noting that when no one occupies or controls a piece of territory, it is deemed *terra nullus* (land belonging to no one).² After World War II, Japan renounced its claims to a number of islands and territories including Taiwan, but the Shotō came under U.S. trusteeship until they, along with Okinawa, were returned to Japan in 1971. Japan asserts that China made no claims to the islands when they were

² Eric Posner, "Why Are China and Japan Inching Toward War Over Five Tiny Islands? Japan Has the Law in Its Side, But China Does Not Care," *Slate Magazine*, February 25, 2014, pp. 1–4.

returned to Japan and only began making claims in the 1970s when a UN report suggested that the area might be rich in gas and oil.³

China argues that historical precedent favors their claim.⁴ The Chinese say that ancient texts and maps demonstrate Chinese control and that the islands are geographically part of Taiwan. Thus, when Japan took Taiwan in 1895 as a result of the first Sino-Japanese War, the islands also went to Japan. Therefore, when Taiwan was returned to China after World War II, the islands returned to Chinese control.

Today, the Japanese government owns the islands and its coast guard vessels patrol the nearby waters. Japan even erected a lighthouse on one of the islands, but even now they remain uninhabited. Nationalist activists from both China and Japan have repeatedly journeyed to the islands to plant their nation's flag and to publicize their cause. Since 2008 Chinese fishing trawlers have aggressively traveled through the region, in some cases even colliding with Japanese coast guard vessels. China upped the ante in 2012 when it sent several formidable military vessels, and again in late 2013, when it said that foreign aircraft would be required to notify the Chinese government when they fly through the airspace above the contested islands.⁵

The Chinese government feels that the United States is complicit with Japan in depriving the Chinese of their “rightful ownership” of the islands. The Chinese news agency Xinhua recently published a dispatch noting that:

Diaoyu and its affiliated islands have been considered part of China since ancient times. Chinese people were the first to discover, name and administer these islands. In

³ Sheila A. Smith, “Japan and the East China Sea Dispute,” *Orbis* 56/3 (2012), p. 387.

⁴ I have an old European-made map from 1740, which shows the islands belonging to China, and I have seen copies of old Chinese maps that include the islands as part of their frontier. The Chinese acknowledge that their defeat in the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895 and the subsequent Treaty of Shimonoseki ceded the islands to Japan. They further state that the treaties that ended World War II clearly state that all territories seized from China before World War II would be returned to China.

⁵ Posner, “Why Are China and Japan Inching Toward War,” pp. 2–3.

June 1971, the U.S. signed the Okinawa Reversion agreement with Japan to “return” Diaoyu” and other [adjacent] Islands to Japan, privately taking China’s territory in a backroom deal between Japan and the U.S. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on Dec. 30, 1971, pointing out that this act is completely illegal and reiterating that Diaoyu and its affiliated islands are an inseparable part of Chinese territory.⁶

China’s claims are quite ambitious. The width of the East China Sea is only 360 nautical miles which creates a problem for both China and Japan since the UN suggests that nations can claim an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) that extends 200 miles off shore. Thus, whoever controls the Senkaku islands could claim economic and political sovereignty over a huge area of the East China Sea. China, however, argues that the natural extension of its continental shelf, which runs right up to the Okinawa trough, should be used to determine each state’s EEZ. This proposal is clearly unacceptable to Japan because it would bring Chinese territorial waters in propinquity with Okinawa.⁷

The situation grew in intensity in 2013 over disputes concerning which nation controlled the airspace over the islands. Japan has complained that China is flying unmanned drones over the area and has sent in its own jets to counter the Chinese aircraft. In October 2013 Japan said that it had the right to shoot down the drones, an act that drew a very sharp reaction from China.

The United States is also deeply interested in the disposition of this matter and is genuinely alarmed over the growing power and sophistication of China’s navy. It still recognizes the security alliance that it signed with Japan in the wake of World War II. According to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the United States is permitted to maintain military bases in Japan (most of them are in Okinawa) and in return promises to defend Japan if any third power attacks Japan.

Therefore, if war were to break out between Japan and China, theoretically the United States would be obliged to enter the conflict on the

⁶ “Contradiction in US position on Diaoyu Dispute,” *The Current Digest of the Chinese Press* 1/34–35 (2012), pp. 20–21.

⁷ Smith, “Japan and the East China Sea Dispute,” pp. 380–381.

side of Japan. So far, as the crisis has grown, the United States has continued to stress its support for its alliance with Japan and to support Tokyo's claims to the islands. At the same time, the State Department has urged for cooler heads to prevail and for the dispute to be settled diplomatically.

A Historical Precedent

The dispute between Japan and China over the islands is highly reminiscent of a crisis that developed in the late 1870s when both Japan and China laid claim to the nearby Ryukyu Islands and seemed on the verge of war. A rapidly modernizing Japan laid claim to the Ryukyu Islands (now Okinawa Prefecture) in the late 1870s. These islands were of strategic importance to both Japan and China. Throughout recorded history the Ryukyus had been an independent kingdom that paid tribute to both Japan and China. Japan decided that it wanted to control the Ryukyus and said that it was willing to go to war with a rapidly declining Chinese empire to get them. When former American President and Civil War hero Ulysses S. Grant passed through China on his way to Japan in 1879 on the final leg of his famous worldwide tour, both Japan and China asked Grant to negotiate with the other party on their behalf.⁸

Grant played the role of “honest broker.” Although his three-month stay in Japan was much longer than his sojourn through China, he refused to take sides. He successfully urged both sides to negotiate the issue, reminding them that a full-scale Sino-Japanese War at that point would only serve to weaken both countries to the extent that the Western powers could take advantage of their weakness. Sadly for both Japan and the Ryukyus, the negotiations failed and shortly thereafter Japan simply walked in and seized the islands. One can only hope that a modern version of General Grant will emerge to get both sides to a neutral site to hammer out a peaceful settlement.

⁸ For a detailed analysis of General Grant's visit to both Japan and China, see my article, “The Mikado, Guranto Shogun and the Rhapsody of US-Japanese Relations in Early Meiji,” *Education About Asia* 11/3 (2006): 39–43.

A Dangerous Rise of Nationalist Passions

The current dispute has unfortunately ignited strong nationalist passions in both China and Japan. Nationalism, a long history of hatred and bloody warfare, and a rapidly changing balance of power in East Asia between a greatly diminished Japan and a rapidly rising China are all factors that have made the dispute over sovereignty over the islands a major issue for both countries.

This nationalist fervor has put pressure on politicians in both countries to appear tough, which ultimately makes the crisis much harder to resolve. Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzō and his Liberal Democratic Party won the 2012 general election partly on their platform to defend Japan's sovereignty over the Senkaku islands. There have been many anti-Japanese riots in China, angry demonstrations in Tokyo, and major boycotts of Japanese goods, particularly cars, in China that have badly hurt the Japanese economy.

When I visited Japan in May and again in November 2012, there was constant nervous talk about the Senkaku territorial dispute between Japan and China. One day I stumbled on a nationalist rally in Tokyo. It was a cold clammy day in front of Odakyu Department Store in Shinjuku in central Tokyo. A few sound trucks were parked in the street with a group of older men together with a plethora of Japanese flags. A small crowd made up mainly of older men stood on the sidewalk to listen to the speakers rant on and on oblivious to the light rain and cold wind. Hundreds of pedestrians passed by every minute, most of them totally ignoring the demonstration and the few men who were handing out leaflets to passing pedestrians asking them to consider their cause.

I was curious and had no better plans that afternoon, so I stopped to watch the spectacle for a while. The leaflet written entirely in Japanese focused on the Senkaku islands. The pamphlet, which was adorned with the Rising Sun Flag of Japan, stated in no uncertain terms that the Senkaku islands are sovereign Japanese territory. It accused China of coveting the islands and castigated the "weak" Japanese government for not showing any backbone in confronting the Chinese over the problem.

The Islands and National Security

Both China and Japan see control of the islands as vital to their national security. Since the 1980s China has greatly expanded its naval fleet and is becoming a major maritime power in East Asia. Outgoing President Hu Jintao told the 18th Communist Party Congress on November 8, 2012

that “We [China] should enhance our capacity for exploiting maritime resources, resolutely safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests, and build China into a maritime power” and added that it is essential for China to, “build a strong national defense and powerful armed forces that are commensurate with China’s international standing.”⁹

China’s naval build-up and its supposed goal of building a submarine base in the Senkaku region greatly concerns Tokyo. Frequent Chinese surveying activities over the East China Sea, in areas in or near what Japan claims to be its territorial waters, and in what Japan calls its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), further rattle the Japanese. Furthermore, the Japanese are concerned that the Chinese recently have expanded their defenses and defense perimeter farther from the coast while approaching areas that are sensitive to Japanese national security. The United States shares Japan’s concerns about the challenges posed by the growing reach of Chinese maritime and air capabilities extending into the East and South China Seas.¹⁰

Japan, however, in recent years has also significantly strengthened its navy. According to naval expert James Holmes, “Under the division of labor worked out between the two navies, the U.S. Navy supplied the offensive firepower, manifest in aircraft carriers and other high-end implements of war. The defensive-minded JMSDF [Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force] acted as a gap filler, making itself proficient at niche missions like minesweeping, anti-submarine warfare, and offensive submarine warfare.”¹¹ However, in more recent days Japanese Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano indicates that Japan is going well beyond this to expand its own naval capacity. He highlighted “Japan’s role in recent international minesweeping drills and new procurements such as a 5,000-ton anti-submarine warfare (ASW) destroyer; two Kawasaki P-1 maritime patrol aircraft (MPAs) to replace ageing P-3C Orions; and modernization of the

⁹ “China must be maritime power: Hu” *The Japan Times*, November 9, 2012, p. 1.

¹⁰ Smith, “Japan and the East China Sea Dispute,” p. 373.

¹¹ James Hardy, “Japan’s Navy, Sailing towards the Future,” *The Diplomat* (accessed January 21, 2013, <http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/21/japans-navy-steaming-towards-the-future/?all=true>).

service's Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems."¹²

The Senkaku crisis has forced Japan to seek to both strengthen and revise its security pact with the United States. In 2010, American Secretary of State Hilary Clinton reiterated that the disputed islands fell under the U.S.-Japan security alliance, thus requiring the U.S. military to come to Japan's aid during a possible clash there. However, some Japanese officials have questioned whether the United States would actually risk a war with China over what on the surface seems like little more than barren rocks surrounded by shark-infested waters. Japanese leaders want the United States to take a further step and openly support Japan's claim to the islands.¹³ It is unclear, however, whether the U.S. is willing to take this step at this time.

Japan's recently elected conservative Liberal Democratic government announced on January 8, 2013 that it would increase the nation's defense budget by more than 100 billion yen (\$1.15 billion) and that its defense ministry had begun to explore a series of five war scenarios, three of which involved its Self-Defense Forces squaring off against the People's Liberation Army. These three all involved a potential crisis in the East China Sea where an aggressive China might seize the Senkaku islands by force or where China might launch an invasion of Taiwan, which might involve simultaneous attacks on Japanese forces in Okinawa.¹⁴

Historical Memory of Japanese War Crimes in China and Conflicting Nationalisms

Relations between China and Japan remain tense today almost seven decades since the end of World War II. Japan's intense invasion of China that destroyed the land and killed many millions of Chinese has left deep resentment between the two nations. It is possible for former enemies to reconcile their differences and to construct new relationships if the guilty parties acknowledge their sins and take measures to right old wrongs. Germany, whose sense of sincere contrition and postwar posture of

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Martin Fackler, "Japan Aims To Revise Pact With U.S.," *The International Herald Tribune*, November 10–11, 2012.

¹⁴ J. Michael Cole, "Japan Explores War Scenarios with China," *The Diplomat*, January 9, 2013.

cooperation in building a new united Europe, has built strong ties with its former enemies. Japan, on the other hand, has never fully acknowledged its responsibility for the terrible destruction of life it caused in World War II. There have been some half-hearted apologies by the Emperor and several prime ministers, but they have never fully convinced their neighbors, especially China and Korea, of their sincerity.

Shared national memories and enmity remain deeply embedded in the psyche of many Japanese and Chinese. One can find ample evidence of this phenomenon in two of the major museums dedicated to World War II, one in Tokyo and the other by the remains of Marco Polo Bridge on the outskirts of Beijing.

When one visits Yasukuni Shrine in the Kudanshita area of downtown Tokyo, as I did most recently in May 2012, one gets a very slanted view of the War. The theme of the museum next to the shrine is that the Japanese were the “good guys” and that the Allied Powers were the “bad guys.” We are told that Japan’s unselfish goal was the liberation of Asia from the Western imperialists. Japanese soldiers fought hard for this liberation and Japan did lose the war and suffer horribly the agony of defeat. But, ultimately, Japan was the victor because its war goals were achieved—the Western powers made a futile attempt to recover their colonies and their influence in Asia—but the Japanese victories in the early stages of the war had unleashed the forces of nationalism in all these Asian countries that ultimately led to their liberation. There were no displays or mention of the Nanjing or any other massacres in China, and a prominently displayed book that I purchased in the museum bookstore went to great lengths to deny that the Nanjing massacre had ever occurred.¹⁵ Apparently, all of the pictures that Chiang used in her book *The Rape of Nanjing* and in other works by different authors were fakes, doctored as Allied propaganda to humiliate the Japanese. A colorful film running continuously in the museum’s theatre, “Lest We Forget,” is a tribute to Japan’s WWII heroes who died liberating Asia from the West.

By contrast, the Museum for the War of Resistance Against Japan, which I visited in mid-July 2006, located next to the bridge in Nanjing, is a very modern structure full of exhibits commemorating China’s historic

¹⁵ Honda Katsuichi, *The Nanjing Massacre: A Japanese Journalist Confronts Japan’s National Shame* (Tokyo: Studies of the Pacific Basin Institute, 1999).

resistance to the Japanese invaders. One sees many exhibits of Japanese forces cheering “Banzai” as they shoot Chinese civilians while other photos show piles and piles of corpses of Chinese soldiers and civilians murdered by the Japanese. The terrible destruction of the Nanjing massacre is shown graphically in a whole range of pictures that show heroic efforts of the Chinese people to fight against the Japanese aggressors. The real heroes, of course, are the Chinese Communists led by Mao, although there are pictures of Nationalist troops and Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek who also fought the Japanese. Interestingly, there are statues and memorials to certain other foreigners who fought the Japanese on behalf of the Chinese, including American general Claire Chenault, who greets you as you walk through the front door.

Conversations that I had with numerous Chinese intellectuals while on a summer Fulbright in 2006 convince me that many Chinese, few if any of whom actually experienced the Japanese invasion, continue to bear varying degrees of hostility towards Japan.¹⁶ These feelings were especially evident in 2005 when there was a wave of demonstrations across China fueled by the Senkaku dispute, the visits of then Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to Yasukuni Shrine, and a Japanese-government sanctioned textbook which barely mentioned Japanese war atrocities in China. Prime Minister Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine in January 2014 drew a strong rebuke from China.

Chinese antipathy towards Japan is mirrored by growing hard feelings by many Japanese concerning China. A 2005 poll reported by Reuters showed that just over seventy percent of Japanese have negative feelings about and are distrustful of China and polls in early 2014 showed this number growing. Furthermore, there is a perceptible rise of nationalism among many Japanese concerned about their country’s increasingly weak economy and fading global status. There is growing anxiety in Japan over China’s potent assertiveness in East Asian affairs and its gradual but very real evolution as the leading power in the region, a position long held by

¹⁶ Several of my current Chinese students in Virginia express similar feelings. They enjoy good individual friendships with our Japanese students on campus, but have very negative feelings for the Japanese government. My Korean students express very similar feelings about their Japanese classmates here and the Japanese establishment; Odd Arne Westad, “In Asia, Ill Will Runs Deep,” *New York Times*, January 6, 2013.

Japan. The recent election victory of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party and its leader Abe Shinzō is a possible indication of voters' increased sense of nationalism.

The Senkaku islands have become a flashpoint where both nations are attempting to vent their nationalist frustrations. Despite strong economic ties between Beijing and Tokyo, political relations have become even tenser since 2010 when Japan detained the captain of a Chinese trawler that had collided with two Japanese boats that were patrolling the islands. This incident intensified when Ishihara Shintarō, the conservative and rigidly nationalistic former governor of Tokyo, suggested that Tokyo should buy the islands from their current Japanese proprietor. This suggestion prompted strong protests from China and the occupation of the islands by a group of Hong Kong Chinese activists that were quickly arrested by Japanese who returned them quickly to China. The Japanese government bought the islands before Ishihara could do so.

Nationalist groups such as the ones I encountered in Shinjuku are taking advantage of the current weakness of the Japanese government to compel Japanese leaders to take a more assertive stance towards China. Most Japanese seem to be very reluctant to rearm (or to even contemplate) a military confrontation with China, but at the same time there is this rising sense of nationalism and frustration in Japan. As noted at the start of this paper, when I suggested to a group of East Asian students at my college that Japanese claims to the Senkaku islands were rather bogus, the Japanese, all women, shouted that the "Senkakus are Japanese" and that they were not willing to compromise their feelings on this point.

Conservative Japanese nationalists, such as Ishihara Shintarō, have improved their public standing in recent years. They have decried what they call the weak-kneed policies of Japan's mainstream parties towards China and have been advocating a stronger Japanese position in defending its position in the Senkakus. Not long ago these conservatives have been small vocal minorities, but Japan's economic decline has caused growing unrest among many Japanese and the question of Japanese sovereignty over the Senkakus is increasingly drawing more mainstream attention and support in Japan.

The rising sense of nationalism coupled with Japan's continued economic stagnation has resulted in a shift of Japanese political opinion to the right. When Ishihara resigned as Tokyo governor in October 2012, and soon thereafter merged his small Sunrise Party with Osaka governor Toru Hashimoto's Japan Restoration Party, he vowed to change the war-

renouncing clause (Article 9) of the constitution and to take a far tougher stand against China. He has suggested that Japan should develop its own nuclear weapons, and he goes so far as to deny that the Nanjing Incident ever occurred—words that are sure to inflame Chinese protest.

While it is unclear whether many Japanese will accept Ishihara's harsh rhetoric, it is clear that the defense of the islands is indeed spurring greater Japanese nationalist sentiment. During my recent visit to Japan, I asked over twenty-five Japanese acquaintances, most of them middle-aged well-educated men and women, who had sovereign rights over the Senkakus. They all appeared slightly agitated when I broached the topic and they all asserted Japan's claims to the islands. One of them, a moderate 60-year-old businessman, stated: "The Senkakus are Japanese. The Chinese have never been to the islands and we took them by treaty in 1895. Even though we lost World War II, both the U.S. and Japan asserted Japanese sovereignty over these and neighboring islands. The islands are vital to Japan's economic and political security." Interestingly, all my interviewees were reluctant for Japan to go to war with China over the islands, but they felt that a diplomatic settlement would come out in Japan's favor if the United States stood by its commitment to defend Japan.

Despite this apparent reluctance, Japan is taking steps to upgrade its naval forces and to hold joint military exercises with other Pacific region countries. *New York Times* reporter Martin Fackler writes, "Taken together those steps, while modest, represent a significant shift for Japan, which had resisted repeated calls from the United States to become a true regional power for fear that doing so would move it too far from its postwar pacifism. The country's quiet resolve to edge past that reluctance and become more of a player comes as the United States and China are staking their own claims to power in Asia, and as jitters over China's ambitions appear to be softening bitterness toward Japan among some Southeast Asian countries trampled last century in its quest for colonial domination."¹⁷

It seems clear that Japan's apparent failure to deal with its past has put it at a distinct disadvantage in its relations not only with China, but also Korea. However, China continues to exploit Japan's invasion that started in the 1930s for its own propaganda gains. Much of the anti-Japanese ranting

¹⁷ Martin Fackler, "Cautiously, Japan Raises Military Profile as China Rises," *The New York Times*, November 26, 2012, p. 1.

in China is state-sponsored and not the spontaneous outbursts of impassioned citizens. Even Korea brings up embarrassing questions about World War II when it seeks to gain some diplomatic advantage over the Japanese.

Another interested party here, of course, is Taiwan. Over a year ago when a delegation of professors and officials from our sister university in Taiwan visited our college, I asked them about these islands. They all smiled quietly and said with confidence. “You know, we are Taiwanese. We are Chinese by ethnic origin, but our families have been here longer than there have been English in Virginia. Those islands, in fact, belong to Taiwan!”

Further Dimensions of this Dispute

The Senkaku Island dispute can and should be settled if both Japan and China agree to work together to exploit the fishing and natural resources in and around the islands. Calmer heads probably will prevail here, but a bigger question is whether a broader rapprochement between China and Japan can be found to calm these tensions.

The balance of the problem lies with the Japanese and the way that they have treated their neighbors since the early Meiji Era. Japan during Meiji had a fundamental choice—to join the West in the exploitation of Asia or to help other Asians counter Western imperialism. Tokyo chose the Western option which in turn led to its seizure of Korea, wars in China and its attempts to dominate Southeast Asia during World War II. Japan again focused its attention on the West after World War II while at the same time failing to make amends with its neighbors for its aggression.

Japan must come to terms with the new political and economic reality of a powerful China. Japan needs good relationships with its neighbors and to show greater contrition for its past actions if it is to stop its economic slide. This seemed a real possibility when Yukio Hatoyama became prime minister in 2009. Hatoyama made it clear that Japan needs to drastically improve its relationships with China, Korea and other Asian states even if that meant some distancing from the United States. Unfortunately, Hatoyama proved to be an inept leader and his premiership only lasted for about eight months. Hatoyama has been succeeded by a long list of equally weak and incompetent leaders whose governments have seemed unable (or unwilling) to counter the demands and appeals of the fervent nationalists who want to reclaim the Senkaku islands for Japan even at the expense of good relations with Beijing.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that China is, indeed, becoming the major power in the region. Chinese assertiveness may continue, which would mean Beijing's refusal to compromise on the Senkaku islands. Japan, on the other hand, needs to recognize its reduced status and adapt itself to the new reality. The present state of affairs has the potential of exploding in the faces of both nations. A reconciliation must come very quickly.

Both China and Japan have more to gain from cooperation rather than conflict. Harping on each other's past sins will do neither any good. If China and Japan wish to become predominant powers in the region, they must cooperate with each other. As General Grant noted well over a century ago, both China and Japan would be losers in a conflict over islands in the East China Sea.

Translation

**KEIKO'S ADVENTURES ON THE *PATH OF DREAMS*
BY KURAHASHI YUMIKO**

*Translated by S. Yumiko Hulvey
University of Florida*

Introduction

Path of Dreams is a collection of twenty-one short narratives, seventeen of which are connected by the appearance of the female protagonist, Keiko. Another unifier of this collection is communion with the “other” world, or the spirit world inhabited by people who have gone to Hades (or *Yomi* in Japanese). The title of the volume, *Path of Dreams*, which is placed last in the collection, hints at how visits to the other world occur.

In this series of narratives, Kurahashi Yumiko (1935–2005), reaches back into history, resuscitates people, such as emperors, poets, writers, and so on, to cavort with Keiko in racy adventures. Flowing throughout all the narratives are flagrant displays of sexuality and forays into taboo topics such as bestiality, incest, vampirism, and the like, to explore uncharted territories. It is writing in the fantastic mode at its best with escapades designed to keep the reader’s attention engaged.

The first three short narratives I translated from the *Path of Dreams* were published in *Mānoa* in 1994.¹ The first, “Beneath the Blossom,” centers on Satō Norikiyo better known as twelfth-century poet, Saigyō, whose claim to fame lies in a poem that predicted his death under a cherry tree in full bloom under a full moon in the second lunar month. The second, “Blossom Room,” focuses on the relationship between Lady Nijō, author of *Towazugatari* (*Confessions of Lady Nijō*), and the sovereign she served at court, Retired Emperor Go-Fukakusa (1246–1305). The third, “Castle in the Sea,” again features Lady Nijō, but this time the scene changes from Japan to England where the legend of Tristan and Isolde unfolds.

Included here are the fourth through seventh narratives from the *Path of Dreams*. The fourth, “Love Potion,” refers to the elixir imbibed by Tristan and Isolde transported to Japan and this time placed into the hands

¹ S. Yumiko Hulvey, trans., “Three Stories: Kurahashi Yumiko,” *Mānoa: Mercury Rising* 15/1 (1994): 119–129.

of Kamakura-period poets, Fujiwara Teika (also known as Fujiwara Sadaie, 1162–1241) and Princess Shokushi (also known as Shikishi Naishinnō, 1149/50–1201), to fulfill a dream of unrequited love. The fifth, “Dream of Jidō,” again features Fujiwara Teika, who returns this time to “play” with Keiko in the guise of the 2,800-year-old Chinese immortal known as the Chrysanthemum Youth (Kiku Jidō). The sixth, “Eternal Traveler,” focuses on a modern poet Nishiwaki Jun’zaburō (1894–1982), who wrote poetry in foreign languages and then translated them back to Japanese, playing with language as he does with Keiko. The final narrative, “Hell in Autumn,” continues with Nishiwaki’s missives from “hell,” but engages the topic of the Nō Theatre populated by ghosts, much like the inhabitants of the “other” world that is the dominant theme in this series.

These brief narratives by Kurahashi remind me of poetry collections like the *Shinkokinshū* (The New Collection of Ancient and Modern Japanese Poetry, 1205), which links short 31-syllable poems by association and progression and *honkadori* (allusions to poetry from earlier anthologies) into sequences that expand the limit of individual poems into something greater than the sum of its parts. In addition, these intertextual allusions to classical Japanese poetry, Nō plays, Western culture, and the like, expand the boundaries of these short narratives onto the world stage. Further fueled by scientific images of dark holes, dark matter, and celestial bodies floating in space, the venue expands into the universe. I recommend these stories be read by savoring the echoes of topics, themes, characters, and situations from the past that resonate in the present and prognosticate the future, defying both time and space.²

“Love Potion” (*Biyaku*, by Kurahashi Yumiko, 1989)

It was early afternoon at the height of summer when the air itself burns white, just like the *haiku*-topic called “blazing midday.” Since Keiko was to meet someone for lunch at a restaurant near her company, she walked a few minutes in the city’s “blazing midday.” Actually Keiko had

² The last three translations were originally translated in collaboration with Shigeki Nakanishi, but after many years of teaching these texts in JPW 4130 Readings in Japanese Literature at the University of Florida, they evolved into my own translations; Text, with permission: Kurahashi Yumiko, *Yume no kayoiji* [Path of Dreams] (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1989).

decided to share the love potion that sealed the fates of Tristan and Isolde that she had acquired during her recent trip to Cornwall. Though it was called a love potion, it looked exactly like red wine with the dark ruby color of a Medoc. Pouring portions of about two glasses into a small vial, she was going to give it to a certain couple intending to have them drink it. Keiko was to hear the detailed story later at leisure.

Differing from the appearance of blazing midday at fields or riverbanks, the blazing midday emitted by buildings, cars, and crowds in city centers have elements of madness that shimmer like burning hell. Affected by the heat, Keiko felt she was losing her mind and regretted not having had the car brought out even though her destination was close. When she thought that the line of cars climbing a sharp incline slowed for a moment, suddenly a deep-black mass gradually came uphill. She had never seen such a large truck. It gasped like an animal, emitting hot breath while approaching her, wrapped in wavering, shimmering heat waves. Oppressed by a feeling of heaviness and dizziness, Keiko felt that along with the dizziness she had entered the other world.

What was approaching was not a truck, but a black ox. It was an ox-drawn carriage like those seen in narrative scroll paintings of the Heian period (794–1185). When she realized what it was, she immediately recalled a poem by Fujiwara Teika (d. 1241):

<i>Yuki nayamu ushi no ayumi ni tatsu chiri no kaze sae atsuki natsu no oguruma</i>	Suffering as he goes, the walking ox causes dust to rise, even the wind is hot— small summer carriage. ³
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³ Poem by Fujiwara Teika (1162–1241) found in two collections: *Gyokuyō[waka]shū* 14.407, the fourteenth imperial poetry anthology, and *Fūboku wakashō* 16.15707, a private poetry collection compiled around 1310 by Fujiwara Nagakiyo, a follower of Kyōgoku Tamekane of the Kyōgoku-Reizei school of innovative poetry. *Fūboku[waka]shō* contained 36, rather than the usual 10 or 20 books, and also included *imayo* (popular songs). The headnote indicates that the poem was one of 120 poems written in the seventh year of Kenkyū (1197) on the topic of summer. Teika was one of the compilers of *Shinkokin[waka]shū*, the eighth imperially

Another poem immediately following it came to Keiko's mind, but by that time the ox had closed in right before her eyes:

<p><i>Tachinoboru</i> <i>minami no hate ni</i> <i>kumo wa are do</i> <i>teru hi kuma naki</i> <i>koro no ōzora</i></p>	<p>Rising up from the extreme south, even though there are clouds, the sun shines unblemished— great sky of the season.⁴</p>
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The black mass of flesh noiselessly thrust itself at her. Keiko was taken into the flesh like asphalt melted by the heat. When she came to, she was inside the ox.

Rather than being swallowed by the ox into its stomach, she felt as if she were trapped inside a cloud of flesh. The heat disappeared, replaced by comfortable warmth, and she could hear only the sound of the ox's heart and breathing; no sound from the outside world penetrated within. Keiko thought that perhaps this might have been how it felt inside the womb before birth. All around her was a wall of dark rose-colored flesh, but she could not touch the flesh even when she extended her hands. In any case, this was a strange vehicle. Keiko lost track of time as she was thus conveyed to the other world.

Suddenly it grew light before her eyes and when Keiko felt herself released from the body of the ox, she found herself standing in someplace like the precinct of a temple. Judging from the arrangement of the trees and rocks, it made her think this was some renowned temple in Kyoto. There was a pond, an Azumaya [small garden viewing pavilion]-like structure, and she could hear an outburst of crickets chirping from trees behind these. It seemed to be summer in the other world too. However, without the incandescent sun in the sky and being filled with a peaceful pearly light and

commissioned poetry anthology and was the sole compiler of the ninth royal anthology, *Shinchokusen[waka]shū*.

⁴ Another poem by Fujiwara Teika in *Fūboku[waka]shō* 16.8060. Although Kurahashi Yumiko writes that this poem “follows” the first poem, it is clear that the opposite is the case by referring to the numbers in the collection of *Fubokushō*. Perhaps another collection yet to be identified contains both poems in sequential order.

comfortable warm air, Keiko was made to think of these as proof that this was the other world.

Keiko decided to walk halfway around the lake and rest in the Azumaya. There was a guest inside. Without a trace of make-up, there was woman about thirty years old. For a moment Keiko thought she was to meet again Nijō of *Towazugatari* (*The Confessions of Lady Nijō*), but on closer inspection she realized it was not Nijō. Her kimono-clad figure resembled the robes of rustic women in Nō plays. Her long hair was parted in the middle, bound covering her ears, and hung down her back. Since it would have been rude to stare, Keiko bowed to her, and sat a little removed from where the woman was sitting and gazing at the pond.

“Excuse me, but where might you be from?” asked the woman in a genteel voice as she sat continuing to gaze at the pond. Neither her voice nor her manner belonged to that of a rustic. Keiko felt a peculiar air surrounding the woman that marked her clearly as a member of the nobility. However, it was not a quality that made people feel tense, but rather invited thoughts of strange nostalgia.

Keiko told her how she had encountered a strange ox-drawn carriage in the mid-summer heat of the city and how she had been brought to this place in a state between dream and reality and even included Teika’s poems that had come to mind.

“It seems after all to be the Kyōgoku middle counselor’s trick.” The woman somehow guessed Keiko’s situation and smiled.

“By Kyōgoku middle counselor, do you mean Fujiwara Teika?” Keiko asked.

“Yes. He must have discovered that article in your possession.” Keiko was surprised and checked to make sure the small bottle was still in her bag. “I brought this medicine is called a philter back from antiquity in the West,” explained Keiko, avoiding the use of “love potion.” “Did you perhaps hear about this philter from Lady Nijō?”

“In our world whatever happens is transmitted directly to us,” said the other looking at Keiko with an innocent smile. “It is what you call telepathy in your world.”

“You even know about such words. By the way, from what you said previously about the Kyōgoku middle counselor, I gather that you must be the royal Princess Shokushi.”⁵

“I have already forgotten about such great status. Only I am at my wit’s end about still being entangled in Teika’s strange fate,” said Princess Shokushi, her face darkening at the thought. Keiko thought that she had to be Princess Shokushi from what she had heard so far.

“Even I am familiar with the story from the Nō play entitled *Teika*.⁶ So its contents were true after all.”

According to the Nō play *Teika*, Teika brooded over royal Princess Shokushi, who ranked above him in both court status and age. After his death, it was said that his obsession grew into a vine and twisted around the deceased princess’ stone monument and would not go away.

After Keiko related the story, Princess Shokushi said with a smile, “Is it the ‘usual *Teika Kazura* (Teika’s Vine) story’? So I suppose that is how people in your world regard Teika’s shameful behavior.” Suddenly she became serious and fixed her eyes directly on Keiko. “Is this special medicine of harmony transmitted from the West splendidly efficacious?”

“Yes, it is touted as being so. But unfortunately, I’ve never had the opportunity to verify it.”

“I wonder if you might not share a little with me.”

⁵ 式子内親王: Princess Shokushi (or *Shikishi*), a daughter of Emperor Go-Shirakawa, served as *Itsuki no In* (or *Saiin*) at the Kamo Shrine in Kyoto, never marrying until her death in 1201. She was known as a poet with almost 400 extant poems.

⁶ The Nō play *Teika* is in *Nihon koten bungaku zenshū*, in *Yōkyoku*, vol. 33.1 (Tokyo: Shogakukan, 1973): 302–13. Princess Shokushi (also *Shikishi Naishinnō*), the unnamed *shite* of the first part of the play returns in the second part of the play to announce her name and to lead the priest to her own grave. Her gravestone depicts the vine known as Teika’s Vine tenaciously growing on her tomb. The name of Kurahashi Yumiko’s collection, *Yume no kayoiji* (Path of Dreams), is a variation of a line found in the play, *kumo no kayoiji* (Path of Clouds) on p. 308, line 12; see Hioraki Satō and Burton Watson’s, *From the Country of Eight Islands: An Anthology of Japanese Poetry*. New York: Anchor Books, 1981: 241–253 for an English translation.

Keiko was surprised by the unexpected course the conversation had taken. Princess Shokushi herself had proposed this surprising request because she had decided that she and Keiko would conspire to block Teika's plan, in other words, his plot to captivate the princess's mind by the power of the "love potion" since she would not yield to Teika.

"Yes, I would be honored to present it to you. Are the two of you planning to drink it?"

"Originally while I was alive, I disliked people like Teika. Rather, I hated him and he knew I did, so there was no deep association between us. But when it comes to our association after coming to the other world after death, I cannot continue saying such things. If we drink the "love potion," then even I would come to love Teika and if that happens, then I would not be forced to exchange pledges as I had up to now, and then at that time, I too might be able to taste pleasure. That is why I asked this favor of you."

Keiko admired Princess Shokushi's honest way of speaking. She thought even the way the princess called him "Teika" was filled with intimacy and kindness.

When Princess Shokushi received the small bottle of the "love potion" from Keiko, she was shy like a young girl, with a flushed face and a happy, excited voice, saying, "Then, I would like to try this immediately, so please wait here for a little while," and disappeared.

Princess Shokushi changed clothes and finally appeared wearing a small-sleeved robe in a resplendent Tang-style weave suitable for a noblewoman. Beyond her there stood a young nobleman with a slender face. Keiko kept an eye on the man wondering if he were Fujiwara Teika, but the two of them were wrapped in brilliant colors as they began to dance, so she could not distinguish detailed facial features. Furthermore, Teika placed himself behind the princess' shadow from beginning to end, manipulating her movements exactly as if she were a puppet. At first, Keiko thought that she was watching something like the dance of redemption shown by the main actor in the second part of the Nō play *Teika*, but Keiko realized that this was not the case since there was clear sexual meaning in their movements. Or rather, this dance was the very movement of the two thus engaged. As Teika moved the princess' body as if she were a doll, he guided her toward intoxication. The puppeteer's hands grasped the princess' body beneath her clothes as if his fingers had become innumerable tentacles connected to her nerves, playing the princess' senses like a musical instrument. Keiko perceived this from the color of ecstasy that floated in the princess' eyes and the enchanting music that escaped her lips.

There was incomparable eroticism in the lovers' naked embrace as the two floated in this fantasy that made Keiko feel as if she would melt away just watching them.

After Keiko barely managed to leave the place, she entered a stand of trees that spread out beyond the Azumaya and an outburst of crickets chirping fell and showered her body as she came upon the temple's cemetery. There was an old gravestone that appeared to have a history. Although Keiko saw a strange odd-shaped vine that couldn't be considered a plant wrapped around the gravestone, she wasn't surprised. However, was it waiting to astonish Keiko that Teika's Vine suddenly was made to bend back and forth, and burst into flames? The stone monument convulsed, was wrapped in flames, and melted away.

Keiko was convinced of the dramatic efficacy of the love potion. When Keiko came to herself after a momentary lapse, she was in front of the promised restaurant. She looked inside her bag, but the small bottle with the love potion she was going to hand over was no longer there. Keiko wondered how she was to explain its loss.

“Dream of Jidō” (*Jidō no yume*, by Kurahashi Yumiko, 1989)

That summer Keiko met Fujiwara Teika a number of times. Together they shared meals or went out to musical concerts. Whenever he appeared in this world, he looked like a music or art critic with long hair that was more than half gray and a sharp nose line, wearing clothes that seemed to have been cut from a men's fashion magazine. Since he called Keiko by her first name as if they were old friends, she also called him Teika, the Sino-Japanese reading of his first name, rather than by his last name, Fujiwara.

“Teika, it's surprising that you like Beethoven,” said Keiko. They were at dinner after hearing a piano recital by a young Polish pianist performing two late sonatas by Beethoven.

“You probably thought I only liked Debussy or some such, didn't you? Well, it isn't so,” said Teika. “I like to see powerfully constructed structures rather than a floating haze of sound in delicate colors.”

On another day when they went to the Nō Theatre, Teika didn't seem very pleased. He said that words in Nō librettos were vague and that when he saw a few plays, he grew tired of its monotonous style. “Then I'd like to say it's no different with the rock music you hate. Viewed from someone like me from the past, there is too much noise even in Nō and rock.”

“Are you saying that it isn’t considered art?”

“It seems I am a person who only has interest in the art of words.”

However, Keiko saw the probable relationship between Teika’s hostility toward Nō plays that emerged in later generations and the usual *Teika* play that took up his obsessive love for Princess Shokushi.

“No matter what, it’s unbearable,” said Teika resentfully. “It is a vulgar delusion at best, and further, quite absurd.”

“That’s what I also think. But after the two of you went to the other world, isn’t it all right to have an association based on poetic exchanges? Wouldn’t it be more enjoyable that way?”

“Well, that’s a different matter,” said Teika insistently. “Even living in the other world, there are such things as privacy. So I have no comment on that topic.”

Keiko thought that Teika was always thorny about his private affairs, looking like an animal in discomfort. His knowledge was profound, his conversations were witty and amusing, and his critiques of this world’s new customs were sharp. He even held opinions about sensitive pillow talk between men and women and even invaded the domain of dirty jokes without qualms. However, when the conversation actually turned into thorns that might strike him personally, he sensitively dodged it. While Keiko was trying to figure out what he wanted from her, she jumped to the conclusion that he did want something from her, and avoided rudely touching his thorns. He also avoided touching Keiko’s body, but he looked as if he were irritated while doing so.

So that is why Keiko and Teika talked about taxonomical variations of love like “secret love” and “lustful love” and discussed the technology of sexual pleasure as they spent long hours over dinner. One time when asked what she would like to experience once, she said she would like to cavort with an incredibly beautiful youth you can’t find in this world and taste ecstasy. Teika had been smiling while he listened, but suddenly he looked serious and said he would introduce her soon to someone suitable.

“Lord Genji as a young man would be good,” she said as a joke.

“He was not that incredibly beautiful. He doesn’t seem to be your type. Well, just leave it to me,” he said with a somewhat expectant attitude.

At the end of summer, Keiko took her children to the summerhouse in the highlands. By that time she had forgotten about the conversation with Teika, but the punctual Teika had been doing his utmost to fulfill his promise. One day, a letter arrived from Teika hinting at their

former conversation and suggesting tonight would be the time for the rendezvous. With that in mind she was waiting with her children asleep, when around midnight the moon emitted its characteristic, mysterious light, and she saw a hazy ball of light about the size of an armful approaching from the forest. Keiko thought it was clearly the movement of children the way the ball bounced and danced with a curious rhythm threading through the trees like “Golliwogg’s Cake-walk.” In the past, her children also had skipped and hopped in the snow in just that way.

When the ball of light drew near until it stuck to the window, it clearly assumed the shape of a human being. Certainly it was the face of a youth—and below the neck, his body and limbs. He moved his lips and seemed to say, “Good evening.” Then when Keiko smiled and opened the window, he jumped lightly and stood on the floor.

“Welcome. Are you Teika’s messenger?”

“Yes. I’m Jidō,” replied the high voice of a boy soprano.

“You mean *Kiku Jidō* (Chrysanthemum Boy) or *Makura Jidō* (Pillow Boy) of Nō Theatre . . .?”

“In the past, I served King Mu of Zhou (976–922 BC).”

“In the Han dynasty (206 BC–220 AD) you were said already to be eight hundred years old, so are you not a ghostly apparition that seems to be a beautiful youth?”

Keiko recalled the phrase in the *Taiheiki* (*The Great Peace*)⁷ that stated, “Until over the age of eight hundred, Jidō still retained the face of a youth and, moreover, his figure was without decay.” If two thousand years had passed since the Han dynasty, the boy must now be—she stopped calculating and looked at his face again.

He was a handsome youth who exceeded even the ideal of a handsome youth. His face was erased of approximate individuality, and he did not resemble in any way singers popular today. If Keiko had to compare his face to anything, she felt she might have seen his face among Nō masks. His face resembled most closely the mask called “Jūroku” (Sixteen) used in

⁷ In *Taiheiki* Book 13.1 (not included in Helen Craig McCullough’s translation) contains mention of Kiku Jidō. See Paul S. Atkins article (“*Chigo* in the Medieval Japanese Imagination,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 67/3 (2008): 947–979) which suggests the legend was the invention of Tendai monks in Japan without any reference to Chinese historical sources.

the play *Atsumori*⁸ but without the expression of sorrow, and there floated a coquettish pathos that looked like female masks. Legend has it that Jidō had been the beloved of King Mu. Keiko thought that if Jidō had captured the affection of a man, he might also have possessed some feminine elements.

At any rate, he was a purely cold, handsome youth, as if a beautiful Nō mask had acquired flesh. Keiko forgot the sordid jokes and such that she had exchanged with Teika and listened to Jidō's personal history as if she were listening to a distant relative who had dropped by for a surprise visit. Although he was exiled for the crime of stepping across the king's pillow,⁹ Keiko was moved when his face became colored with grief and tears glistened in his eyes while he was telling her such things as writing on a chrysanthemum leaf two sacred verses he had received from King Mu of Zhou, floating these verses on water that turned it immediately into an elixir of immortality, and by drinking this elixir, his face had remained that of a handsome youth for 2,800 years. The desire to make him her own child was borne, and in the next moment, she was captured by the so-called realization that Jidō was in fact her own son.

"I brought this for you," he said as he presented something like chrysanthemum elixir sloshing around in a gourd container. Keiko poured it into a glass and took a sip. It had no taste or smell. If a cold orb like the moon liquefied, it would taste like this.

"Perhaps I should have you drink this to thank you," she said as she poured the last drops of the love potion of Tristan and Isolde into a wine glass. Jidō innocently drank it with a face that told her it was sweet.

"Shall we go to bed," said Keiko flustered because she had almost added the next words, "with Mother." More surprising, however, was that Jidō called her "Mother" as if he had read her mind. "Mother, before going

⁸ Alludes to *Atsumori*, a Nō play by Zeami Motokiyo, in Royall Tyler, *Japanese Nō Dramas* (New York: Penguin, 1992): 37–48.

⁹ Royall Tyler interprets this phrase, to step across the king's pillow, as a euphemism to indicate that Jidō had slept with the queen, consort, or concubine, for which he could have been sentenced to death, but was exiled instead to a distant location. However, Paul S. Atkins in "Chigo in the Medieval Japanese Imagination," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 67/3 (2008): 957–961, suggests homosexual relations like that of *chigo* who served Buddhist monks as the core of the relationship between older and younger men.

to bed, I'll do you a favor by writing the sacred verses that I received from King Mu of Zhou on your back. If I were to do so, you would not need to drink the potion because you would be able to live forever young.”

When Keiko offered her back to the youth, he recited the sacred verses while beginning to write Chinese characters with his finger on her back:

具一切功德	Possessing all the merits,
慈眼視眾生	I watch all sentient beings with merciful eyes.
福壽海無量	Fortune and life-span are as boundless as the sea,
是故應頂禮	I should thus prostrate myself before the Buddha. ¹⁰

As Keiko tried to decode the movement of his fingers, she was overcome gradually by a comfortable drowsiness. For some reason, it seemed as if a young child were playing mischievously with the body of his naked mother. But it was not mere drowsiness. While her mind sank into a dream, parts of her body awakened here and there, and began vibrating and playing delicate, heavenly music. When she realized it, Jidō's hands that had been writing characters transformed into countless hands that extended over her entire body playing her like an instrument.

Keiko rolled over and tried to embrace face-to-face the person who had been at her back. At that instant, she suspected that it was all Teika's trick and that the person beside her was Teika wearing Jidō's mask. She put her hands on his face and peeled off the face as if it were the Nō mask of a handsome youth. Like a mask the face came off easily, but there was no face behind it. Rather than say there was nothing, she found only dark matter instead of a head. She also thought of a black hole. She regretted her insensitive act, but the face was nowhere to be found. And after that, fraternization continued between someone who appeared to be a handsome youth and a Keiko filled with maternal feelings. Keiko thought that a

¹⁰ I am indebted to my colleague, Richard Wang, for his guidance in identifying this Buddhist *gatha* in the form of a pentasyllabic poem, and for providing an accurate translation (Personal communication, August 27, 2011).

mother-son incest dream might be realized like this, but wondered if the cynical Teika granted her desire for a handsome youth with yet another strong dose of spice.

“Eternal Traveler” (*Eien no tabibito*, by Kurahashi Yumiko)

A letter from Nishiwaki arrived at Keiko's house just as she was thinking it was almost a year since he passed away. Because she was used to such things, she was not surprised especially. He always travels, so going to the other world was probably a continuation of his travels, and this time Keiko decided to think that he might have wanted to see her while he was on his journey. He wanted to walk near the lighthouse, send greetings to the late summer ocean, and eat some rare fruit together. According to the letter, it seemed he intended to visit her summerhouse at the beach. Or, he might already be there waiting for her. Immediately she got into the car alone and departed for the summerhouse with an ocean view.

It was a sunny day on the autumnal equinox.¹¹ A passage came to mind that she felt might have come from one of Nishiwaki's poems:

<i>Hisashiburi ni</i>	After a long time
<i>tōku no yama ga</i>	distant mountains
<i>hakkiri mieru</i>	clearly can be seen...

She thought this passage remarkably prosaic for him. He was a poet. His hair had become entirely silver and he looked like what one might imagine an immortal Greek god to look like if he had aged temporarily and become a tall, divine elderly man. Even so he never stopped creating poems that caused enjoyment in her brain and reading these poems gave birth to music in her head. If Keiko were made to say, there was no other poet like Nishiwaki, either before or after him. Other poets seemed merely to complain noisily with piercing words, rather than playing the complicated neurological wires in her brain as if they were strings on a harp.

This year the summerhouse had been used only once in July by Keiko's younger sister and her family, and unexpectedly a fresh sea breeze welcoming the end of summer was blowing inside when she felt the presence of a dear friend. While thinking, “Nishiwaki's here,” she gazed at

¹¹ Autumnal equinox occurs around September 22nd in the northern hemisphere.

the now empty beach through the window that was flung open. White lace-like waves moved with monotonous repetition where the bow-shaped sand met the sea. In the room, the refrigerator raised a faint growl like the flapping of insect wings. On the table, there was some tropical fruit she had never seen before emitting a sweet and sour fragrance. Thinking these might be the “rare fruit,” she felt the air move behind her at that time and turned around to find Nishiwaki standing there.

“I was sleeping on that bed over there and just woke up.”

She was about to give her condolences on his passing, but she managed to put a smile on her face. He looked more like an eternal traveler than the departed.

“Are these the rare fruit you mentioned in your letter?”

“These are fruit I brought from South America as a present. Unfortunately, it seems they have begun to spoil. Instead of these, I would like to treat you to some truly rare fruit. Would you like to go for a walk?”

The late summer afternoon ocean was shining like a blue jewel. On one occasion, Keiko had led Nishiwaki on a walk along the path to the lighthouse on the cape, but today Nishiwaki stepped ahead taking the lead as they climbed the sloping path filled with rocks. When she remembered the lightness of his body resulted from losing flesh of this world for one peculiar to the realm of Hades, sorrow spread over her heart like cold, clear water. But Nishiwaki advanced at a cheerful gait along the meandering path through the shrubbery. When suddenly he turned around, stuck his fiery red tongue out as if teasing her and laughed.

Through a gap in the shrubbery, she saw a purple-colored eggplant field. Beyond the field was a beach where pale Japanese horse mackerel were being dried. The ocean’s gentle breeze, shining noon, and crooked, collapsing lighthouse—all were reminiscent of scenes in Nishiwaki’s poem.

“O you hot-tempered traveler,” Keiko recited, remembering a poem he composed while he was young:

*Nanji no fun wa nagarete
hirubenia no umi
hokkai atoranchisu*

Your excrement flowed
through Hibernia¹² (Ireland),
North Sea, Atlantic, and

¹² According to recent editions of Iwanami Bunko and Kodansha Bunko, *Hirubenia* is a misspelling of *Hiberunia*, the Latin word for Ireland. A command to die by jumping from the cliff might be implied.

<i>chichukai o yogoshita</i>	Mediterranean Sea—polluting all.
<i>nanji wa nanji no mura e kaere</i>	You, return to your village.
<i>kyori no gake o shukufuku</i>	Bless the cliffs of your
<i>seyo</i>	village.
<i>sono hadaka no tsuchi wa</i>	That naked earth
<i>nanji no yoake da</i>	is your daybreak.
<i>akebi no mi wa nanji no</i>	The fruit of the <i>akebi</i>
<i>reikon no gotoku</i>	is like your soul,
<i>natsuju burasagatteiru</i>	hanging throughout summer.

(‘Traveler’ from *Ambarvalia* by Nishiwaki Junzaburō)¹³

“Seems like someone else’s poor poem,” he smiled grimly as he looked back.

“Speaking of which, there were many *akebi* hanging in the thicket at the top of that cliff in the past.”

“Ah, they’re the fruit of souls,” he said happily. “Let’s go over there to eat some.”

So saying he took both her hands. Somehow Keiko felt happy as if “recess” was about to begin in kindergarten of the past, but Nishiwaki kept on leading Keiko by the hand as before until they emerged above the sea. It was as if they had jumped over the sea and moved to a different world: the cliffs, olive trees, and the color of the sky made her think she was in ancient Greece or some such. But the scenery completely changed again and she came to a place like a tropical garden.

Lively rare fruit was hanging overhead. Various colored fruit that looked like *akebi* and tamarillos, or kiwis and mangos, was hanging with strange, funny shapes.

“They are cute and look like they’re playing.”

“They are the fruit of souls,” he said and easily plucked one, split it in two and gave her half.

¹³ Nishiwaki Junzaburō (1894–1982), modern poet who compiled a 1947 anthology, *Tabibito kaerazu* (Travelers Do Not Return), that Kurahashi twists ironically into ‘Eternal Traveler’ as the title of this narrative. He also played with the concept of translation.

At the center of the cream-colored flesh was a vivid red color, around which spread blurred vermilion flower shapes encircled by a golden ring around the edge. “It looks like a cross-section of the sun. Is this the soul of a human being?”

“Based on its flavor, I wonder if might be that of a Cretan.”

“What an indescribable taste.”

“It is the taste of eternity. Besides, there are swine souls, shark souls, and the like. As you can see, varieties abound with different flavors, colors, and shapes. There was once a time when my soul was hanging like this one summer. Though it was eaten by a bird long ago,” he said, smiling like a boy.

“But what would happen if you were to eat a soul?”

“Nothing would happen. In the first place, no matter how much you eat you would never get full. Although it will not prolong your life, it will not poison you with evil spirits and cause you to die. If you squeezed its juice into a nectar, it’s the stuff the gang on Mount Olympus often drank.”

Keiko, feeling that she had become a nymph, got naked, and bathed in the spring. Nishiwaki, pretending to be a centaur or something, went chasing after the nymph Keiko. The spring, surprisingly vast as she was escaping and diving in the water, kept expanding to who knows where and seemed to continue to the sea. As she was swimming in the water, she saw several things that looked like cities that had sunk to the seabed. When she came to, she was standing on a familiar looking beach. Wearing clothes she wore for the walk, she was not wet anywhere. Only Nishiwaki was holding three or four of the aforementioned fruit of souls in his hands.

That night Keiko and Nishiwaki lit an old lamp in a room with an ocean view, put some fruit of souls into each long-stemmed glass, and poured wine into them. They drank as they talked about people in the other world. He talked about many things including Andromeda, the female apprentice of Epicurus, *Liezi*, and dream of the prehistoric shark *Cladoselache*, while Keiko talked about Satō or Saigyō, Nijō, and so on; each time their eyes met, they smiled and raised their glasses as if toasting.

Eventually however, her back started to itch. Sometimes she rubbed it against the back of the chair. When Nishiwaki saw her doing this, he asked, “What is it? Let me look at it.”

Keiko stripped to the waist and had him examine her back.

“Something that looks like an incantation is written here:

具一切功德	Possessing all the merits,
慈眼視眾生	I watch all the sentient beings with merciful eyes.
福壽海無量	Fortune and life-span are as boundless as the sea,
是故應頂禮	I should thus prostrate myself before the Buddha.

It seems like a passage from a sutra. Is this the magic formula for perpetual youth and longevity?"

The Buddhist verses that Jidō had written with his finger the other day still remained. The words rose red to the surface. She told him in detail about Jidō's visit.

"Even if this spell helps me live forever, this so-called eternity is an itchy business," Keiko laughed.

"'Eternity' is sad. I want to pour tears on the 'eternity' on this goddess' back."

So saying, he dripped something cold on her back.

"Ah, that feels good. What was that?"

"Just water. A water spirit that oozed from rocks."

So while saying this, he rubbed her back with his warm hands. Unbelievably the itch disappeared completely.

"Now you have regained the goddess' marble back."

Keiko thanked him and continued talking while revealing her naked breast and back like a Greek goddess in the glow of the lamp. When the night grew late, they drank green tea he had brought as a present. Nishiwaki picked the tea "Chashuwang" (*pu-erh*) that Zhuge (Liang) Kongming planted when he went south on an expedition to Yunnan province.

The next morning, after completing preparations for his journey, he came to say goodbye to her.

"Where are you going?" Keiko asked.

"I may take a peek at hell," he answered.

As she watched him with a look of concern, he stamped his foot hard on the floor like a Nō actor. The floor split easily and she saw from there a space that could not be distinguished as either the blue ocean or sky. In the blue far beyond, a heavenly body that looked like the Earth was sinking. As Keiko controlled the spontaneous dizziness she felt coming on, she heard Nishiwaki's final words, "See you later," and saw him disappear into hell. Hurriedly, she tried to peek inside, but all she saw was the normal floor.

“Hell in Autumn” (*Aki no jigoku*, by Kurahashi Yumiko)

While Keiko was still feeling the heat of late summer badly in the daytime, she received tidings from Nishiwaki. Written in bold characters on a postcard of handmade Japanese paper washed with what looked like thin blood, she assumed it was “from hell” since he had written it at the end. She read the legitimate postmark, “Central,” that indicated it was sent from some central post office two days ago, so she didn’t expect to find postmarks like “Hell of Black Thread” or “Hell of Avici.”

Here there is no summer, no late summer heat, nor city noise; what is here is only the voice of the wind. Speaking generally of hell, there are such words as “scorching hell” with heat that tortures people as the selling point, but there aren’t such things. There are no ogres or demons. Those that live here blown by the wind as if floating are only the spirits that have moved here from over there. I met Rokujō,¹⁴ Saigyō, Nijō, and Teika with whom you are familiar. There are some other spirits that would like to meet you. I think they will visit you before long. Commonly, these are those who cannot go to nirvana. In fact, I am one of these, and I am going to peek into the Realms of Animals and Asuras to consider a place to settle down.

From Hell

Because she had read the letter, she began feeling hesitant about attending this month’s regular meeting of the Nō Theatre Association. In any case, gods, ghosts, and mad women frequently appear in Nō. If residents of hell that Nishiwaki mentioned were to come in succession to this world borrowing the Nō stage, she would become exhausted keeping them company. In itself, it required preparations to associate with people from the other world. Thus she felt a bit depressed.

¹⁴ Kurahashi published “Hana no shita,” “Hana no heya,” and “Momijigari” in 1987, the latter in which Rokujō is introduced, but when the collection, *Yume no kayoiiji*, was published in 1989, “Momijigari” was placed last (or seventeenth), making readers miss Rokujō’s introduction had it remained in the sequential order of publication.

The month's program was *Kayoi Komachi* (Visiting Komachi).¹⁵ The eldest son of the head of the Nō School was to play the principal role of Lesser Captain Fukakusa and the second son, the supporting role of Komachi. The brothers were good looking. Keiko's late father had been a friend of the head of the school. She had known the brothers since they were children and had been a fan of theirs. Though both were good looking, if the eldest had features that begged being called "bewitching" even though he was a man, it was as if he were Prince Niou in *The Tale of Genji*, then the serious and handsome features of the younger was as if he were Middle Captain Kaoru. Keiko concluded this because Mrs. Hanada and other members of the club had told her about a rumor that the brothers were rivals over a certain woman.

"The other day I saw Masao walking with a woman wearing a shocking vermilion mini-dress," said Mrs. Hanada.

"Was that the woman in question?"

"Without a doubt. I went around front to make sure I saw her."

Mrs. Hanada, again brought up the usual story of Masao, the older son, on the verge of being disowned by the head of the school if he continued seeing the woman who was originally the fiancé of Sadao, the younger brother. Keiko only had a nodding acquaintance in the dressing room with the brothers and their father, the head of the school, so she wasn't about to get to the bottom of the scandal that so excited Mrs. Hanada's curiosity. Actually, when Keiko had exchanged greetings that day with all three of them, father and brothers, she had not sensed any hostile atmosphere between them. The three had smiled warmly at her.

That day when she had seen three plays and gone out, it was still a little too early for dinner. Keiko parted from Mrs. Hanada and the others in front of the Nō theatre and climbed uphill away from the train station. Though the declining afternoon sun still burned flaming red, a dry wind blew through the city in the heat of late summer. She wanted to be alone at that bright and lonely time she liked best, when the dry wind blew along with time. Further, she had a hunch that something was about to happen as a sensation flickered in her head, just like an epileptic might feel before the

¹⁵ *Kayoi Komachi* (Komachi and the Hundred Nights) by Kanze Kiyotsugu Kan'ami is translated by Eileen Kato in *Twenty Plays of the Nō Theatre*. Ed. by Donald Keene (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970): 51–63.

onset of an attack. She was right. In the autumn light and wind strangely she sensed the presence of someone not of this world approach from behind and catch up to walk beside her.

The person was still wearing the costume of Lesser Captain Fukakusa from a while ago. If so, was this the actor Masao, playing the main character? However, the person wore the mask “Magojiro,” so it seemed as if the young Komachi appeared before her.

“Are you Komachi or perhaps the Lesser Captain?” Keiko asked, although she meant to ask whether it was Sadao playing Komachi or Masao playing the Lesser Captain. The person didn’t answer but said, “I would like to speak to you.” She could not tell whose voice was coming from behind the mask. She could not tell if the voice was male or female.

Keiko was about to say that being on such a street and still being in those clothes...but it came out strangely. A character from the Nō stage walking in the street dressed in costume was a strange spectacle from any perspective, but for some reason nobody passing by found it surprising. When she recovered her senses, she and the others had come to a world that was different from this one without realizing it.

“Where are we? Who are you?” Keiko said, although she knew there was no use asking. She thought that if she had come to a different world, she had to be somewhere in “hell.” There was nothing in the surroundings that looked frightening; it looked terribly neat like the Nō stage. Or it might be like a bedroom nobody comes to in a different world. Keiko wondered if the greeting a while ago, “I would like to speak to you,” implied “what I would like to do in this bedroom.” If that were the case, it would have been good to be prepared.

“Did you meet Nishiwaki?” The person tilted the mask and nodded. The gesture was like that of the Nō stage.

“Why don’t you remove that mask?” Keiko said, but he shook his head and refused. She felt a sense of foreboding. Keiko extended her hands and grasped the chin of the mask, but the flesh seemed connected to the mask and would not detach easily. That being the case, Keiko concluded that it was probably unreasonable for clothes to be removed. If one were to say something, she thought that denizens of hell were not bound by the ridiculous protocol like ordinary human beings in this world of getting naked and putting on clothes one had taken off. They didn’t even need language for fraternization...

Certainly, when she refrained from speaking, no obstacles stood in the way. When they embraced just as they were—he wearing a bulky Nō

costume and even a mask, and Keiko wearing a firm bodysuit, dress, and high heels—in fact, she felt more naked and free than when she was actually naked. Was making love like this when wrapped in twelve-layered robes (*junihitoe*)? Or, was this close to making love shut inside a cocoon? In any case, the atmosphere was enveloped in an ecstasy more dense than golden honey, and Keiko felt like she was swimming in a dream while she was united with the body of this mysterious man.

Then there appeared a change in the face of the Nō mask Komachi. The mask of “Magojirō,” with an expression that was neither crying nor laughing, convulsed and seemed to change into the face of a madwoman. Keiko was fascinated by this eerie transformation. Actually, it changed into the face of a dying woman. It was a rare experience during which she observed in detail how the climax of ecstasy during intercourse was shifting to death.

At the climax, the mask “Magojirō” closed its eyes. Then it reverted to a regular Nō mask and fell off like a leaf. What appeared was the face of an ogre. It was nothing other than the grotesque face of an ogre with burning golden eyes in a lump of red blood and flesh. Strangely, she felt neither fear nor disgust. Rather, she felt something akin to relief at finding what she had anticipated.

“You are Lesser Captain Fukakusa after all,” she said. The ogre’s face instantly turned pale and reverted to the face of a young man. She could not discern the face as Masao or Sadao, but if that were the case, she would think of this person as Lesser Captain Fukakusa.

“It’s just as you might have guessed,” the person said.

“Finally you seem to be free of the possessive spirit.”

“Oh, this,” the captain said and picked up the dropped “Magojirō” mask. “Somehow I couldn’t take this mask off my face. Probably due to this delusion, I mean I was obsessed with Komachi and behaved eccentrically, visiting her house for almost a hundred nights. But why did I come here?”

“From hell you emerged on stage, and just as you were, chased after me, wearing that mask and exaggerated costume.”

“So it seems. Then, I’ll take off these things,” the Lesser Captain said and tried to remove the red hunting robe (*kariginu*) and lavender corded trousers (*sashinuki*), but the clothes would not leave the body.

“Keiko,” the person called her name with the tone of an ordinary young man. “Please help me. Please take me away from here.”

Book Reviews

Robert I. Hellyer, *Defining Engagement: Japan and Global Contexts, 1640-1868*. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009. 314 pp. ISBN 978-0674035775, \$39.95.

Reviewed by Martha Chaiklin

Once upon a time, there was a land far, far away, all the way at the end of the world. It was so far away only a few intrepid souls ventured there but the rulers did not tolerate strangers and even the bravest were turned back at the gates. Occasionally an especially persistent adventurer managed to breach the barriers to this kingdom, but even these men were expelled shortly thereafter. The people gave up their guns inside this isolated realm and peace reigned throughout the domain. One day a warrior named Matthew C. Perry broke through the wall and this magical land was opened to the world...

Some version of this fairytale, buttressed by the wide dispersion of Engelbert Kaempfer's *History of Japan* with its essay "Should Japan Remain Shut-up" after its release in 1727, has dominated the Western perception of early modern Japan for hundreds of years. It has persisted even though for over forty years, at least since Donald Keene's *The Japanese Discovery of Europe* (Stanford University Press, 1969), scholars have shot arrows at this myth. Yet none has managed to slay it completely; the isolation myth rises from the ashes of the onslaught like a phoenix.

Robert Hellyer's *Defining Engagement* is the latest volley in this war of recurring ideas. Rather than a frontal attack on the nature of isolation the book is an oblique turning maneuver that feints to diplomatic engagement, claiming to argue "the Edo-period system of foreign relations...allowed Japanese leaders...to remain flexible and pursue nuanced approaches to intercourse with the outside world" (4), which turns out to be a Trojan Horse for economic determinism. Hellyer does note that foreign trade and diplomacy are interdependent. Nevertheless, it is clear that economic forces, rather than bureaucratic, diplomatic or intellectual ones, are the lenses of this book. Its central assumption is that economic forces are always rational and thus it is economics that form the basis of "rational systems of engagement" (4). Hellyer uses this structure to create a two-headed dragon of isolation and centralized authority to slay.

The first head, which is that of isolation, is easily dispatched because the persistence of this myth exists only among non-specialists. There are few surprises in this discussion but the details of some categories of imports that are often ignored such as Chinese medicines and a better incorporation of Chinese trade into the economic historical discourse based on the work of Japanese scholars adds new refinement to English language literature on this topic. The second head of centralized authority is where the real contribution of this book lies. This is achieved through the incorporation of two important domains into the larger picture of foreign trade, each located on the periphery.

Specifically, the histories of foreign trade in two *tozama han* (domains that fought against the founder of the Tokugawa shogunate in 1600 and excluded from shogunal office), Satsuma and Tsushima are highlighted. Hellyer shows how investigation of their trade policies and relations with the *bakufu* can produce a more nuanced understanding of the Japanese 'engagement' with the rest of the world. While conversely the *bakufu* is portrayed rather monochromatically, the added discussion of Satsuma, which funneled Chinese trade through the Ryukyus and through Chinese smuggling to its own shores, and Tsushima which conducted trade with Korea, are a much needed synthesis of scholarship on Japan's foreign trade. Nevertheless, the bold claim that "Satsuma and Tsushima...together conducted Japan's foreign relations" (250) seems more for effect than accuracy.

After the introduction, which outlines "the entrenched ideology of seclusion" (6), and some ideas about globalization in relation to Japan, the seven chapters of the book proceed chronologically. The first three chapters are primarily synthetic, and give a quick look at the first two hundred years of the early modern era. The incorporation of the *tozama han* with foreign trade, Satsuma and Tsushima, into a single economic narrative effectively complements Ronald Toby's *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan* (Stanford, 1991) by fleshing out some of the underlying motivations for political actions. The fourth chapter is a bridge chapter, almost an introduction to the real book. It surveys the international economic changes of the nineteenth century. The final three chapters focus on the nineteenth and are clearly, as Hellyer himself states, the "heart" of the book (22). With the exception of certain highlights, scholarship on the first half of nineteenth century Japan has been almost entirely absent until now.

As such these chapters would be of interest regardless of content, but the incorporation of the domains of Tsushima and Satsuma into the larger narrative is a perspective that has been almost entirely lacking. They are a

significant contribution to our understanding of a pivotal period in Japanese history. The fifth chapter bears the fruit of the synthesis of the previous chapters through the examination of various encounters on the fringes of the Japanese state. The increasing number of encounters caused by Western imperialism have not been unrecognized but the emphasis on a local perspective is an element that has been lacking in previous discussion. By tying various encounters with foreigners, which until now had usually been presented as a laundry list, into a tapestry of encounter and reaction, Hellyer gives these events new relevance. Chapter 6 then progresses to trade after the opening of the ports, and the politics behind government decisions. Much of the chapter focuses on Satsuma's economic policy and commerce, which give greater context to both subsequent economic and political events. The last chapter focuses on the efforts of Tsushima to obtain assistance in the final years of shogunal authority through both these channels and those of the imperial court. The Conclusion is really a mini-chapter that analyzes the events of early Meiji to support the conclusions drawn in the earlier parts of the book.

However, for a book that contains “global contexts” in the title, these contexts are limited, focusing on Japanese responses to other East Asian powers. This is problematic for a number of reasons, and especially obvious in the almost total omission of the Dutch in this interaction. While the Dutch were not involved directly in trade with Satsuma or Tsushima, and in that sense do not necessarily require a central focus in this book, the best documentation of Chinese imports are contained in Dutch sources, which were never directly examined. Secondly, the decision to excise the Dutch leads to some misunderstandings of how Dutch trade worked, its importance what was imported and the reasons for Dutch actions. This also points to a related problem—the use of translations for specialized vocabulary—the “special order system” refers to *eis* (Dutch) or *atsuraimono* (Japanese), but to use it without explanation will mystify those without background. Similarly, clearing house, while perhaps the closest English equivalent to *geldkamer* (Dutch) or *kaisho* (Japanese) does not adequately explain this office, which had a greater range of responsibility.

Hellyer's book does not quite “define engagement” as its ambitious title claims, but it does provide another sharp weapon to the arsenal of the next anti-sakoku champion through its emphasis on the complex political interplay between *tozama* domains and *bakufu*. Although the argument may be too subtle to kill the monster for non-specialists, it will be useful for those historians who seek to better define the nature of “*sakoku*” in Japan.

Birgit Staemmler and Ulrich Dehn, eds., *Establishing the Revolutionary: An Introduction to New Religions in Japan*. Berlin and Zurich: LIT Verlag, 2011. 408 pp. ISBN: 978-3643901521, \$44.95.

Reviewed by Daniel A. Métraux

One of the most fascinating phenomena in modern Japanese history is the rise of several waves of New Religions. Researchers can trace three waves of religious revival, beginning first in the late Tokugawa period and stretching to the 1930s, a second wave in the immediate postwar era and a final third wave which came to fruition in the 1980s. Today these religions claim tens of millions of followers not only in Japan, but also increasing numbers of non-ethnic Japanese abroad. These religions play important roles in Japanese society and political and cultural life and represent an interesting facet of the globalization of Japanese culture.

Birgit Staemmler, a researcher at the Japanese Department of Tübingen University in Germany, and Ulrich Dehn, a professor of the Study of Religions, Missiology, and Ecumenical Theology at the University of Hamburg, have produced a comprehensive and well-written volume, *Establishing the Revolutionary: An Introduction to New Religions in Japan*. This work begins with four long introductory chapters that analyze the historical development as well as the doctrinal, sociological and economical aspects of Japan's new religions. The body of the book consists of chapters on ten of these religions which analyze each of their history, doctrines, membership, present situation and activities. While Staemmler and Dehn have written some of the chapters themselves, they have solicited significant contributions from such highly respected scholars in the field as Susumu Shimazono, Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Tokyo, and Masako Watanabe, Professor of Sociology at Meiji Gakuin in Tokyo. The result is a fascinating handbook about these new religions.

The body of the book consists of studies of ten of the larger or most controversial of Japan's New Religions including Ōmoto, Seichō no ie, Risshō Kōsei-kai, Kōfuku no Kagaku and Chino Shōhō and the Pana-Wave Laboratory. I paid special attention to Ulrich Dehn's eighteen-page analysis of the Sōka Gakkai, my major focus of scholarship. Ulrich presents a very clear and well-developed study of Sōka Gakkai with an excellent overview of its history, doctrines, former relationship with Nichiren Shōshū, and its social and political activities. The commentary on the split between the Gakkai and Nichiren Shōshū is especially compelling. Ulrich presents a

credible history of the foundation and growth of the Gakkai's unique political party, the Kōmeitō, including its controversial decision to join the Liberal Democratic Party's ruling coalition between 1999 and 2009. There are, however, a couple of factual errors here. Ulrich states that between 1955 and 1964 when Kōmeitō was founded Sōka Gakkai candidates had been elected to both houses of parliament when in fact they only entered the upper House of Councillors. Ulrich also fails to note the defeat of this coalition in the 2009 national elections.

The introductory chapters provide an in-depth study of the defining characteristics of Japan's New Religions. Birgit Staemmler provides a useful analysis of the historical development of these religions from their origins in the mid-nineteenth century to the present. Yoshihide Sakurai, professor of Sociology at the graduate school of Hokkaido University, has produced a very original chapter on how the New Religions have devised very successful methods of collecting money and financing their operations while the dwindling flow of contributions to traditional temples means that many of the older temples may be forced to shut down in years to come.

Masako Watanabe focuses on a sociological approach to the New Religions noting that a prime motivation for joining a new religion "is said to be a serious shortage in the fulfillment of fundamental needs, as in poverty, illness and strife. This kind of deprivation is felt to be the result of individual failure, but if looked at from a larger perspective, it is often the product of social conditions" (70). Many of these religions experienced their greatest growth during the chaotic period right after World War II when huge social change threatened and dramatically altered the lives of most ordinary Japanese. Watanabe notes that these religions have been successful because they can "provide an emotional place of belonging and bring about psychological and spiritual stability" as they also "can give meaning to people's lives, make their lives worth living again, and lead to rediscoveries of human solidarity" (87). These religions' emphasis on small group activities promote a sense of inclusiveness so essential to Japanese culture and their relief activities after major disasters have won them a favorable image in the public eye.

The best chapter in the book is Susumu Shimazono's study of "The Concept of Salvation" among the New Religions. Shimazono stresses that their focus on the concept of finding true happiness here and now is crucial to their success. He notes that the New Religions differ from those of traditional Buddhist schools in that they deal with everyday problems facing people in their present lives: "In new religions, even when their teachings

refer to a world after death, salvation is not thought to be achieved in a world beyond or a different dimension, but to be realized as a happy life in this world.... [S]alvation means a calm life in which poverty, sickness, and discord have been resolved and one's days are spent in peaceful and harmonious relations with family and friends.... Health, wealth and peace are the embodiment of salvation" (45).

The only real fault of Ulrich's study of Soka Gakkai is his almost complete failure to address the organization's international activities. Sōka Gakkai International has chapters in over 200 countries and territories with perhaps two million or more members. Sōka University has established an affiliated college in California that is growing rapidly. While membership growth of Sōka Gakkai has stagnated in Japan, its international membership, especially among Koreans and ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia, has grown rapidly in Japan. While other authors do address the international activities of several of the New Religions, a separate chapter on the international expansion of these religions would have been a welcome addition to this work.

Erica Baffelli and Birgit Staemmler's chapter on Aum Shinrikyō is an excellent overview of the group's controversial past. The main value of the chapter, however, is its study of the transformation Aum into two separate small groups, Aleph and Hikari no Wa, and the political and social consequences of Aum's controversial and murderous activities in the mid-1990s.

Staemmler and Dehn's *Establishing the Revolutionary* is the best general introduction to Japan's New Religions available today. The chapters are well-written and meticulously researched using excellent and up-to-date source material. This work belongs in the Asia section of every major personal and institutional library.

Alan Tansman, *The Aesthetics of Japanese Fascism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009. 355 pp. ISBN 978-0520245051, \$55.00.

Reviewed by Laura Specker Sullivan

As Alan Tansman writes in the conclusion to *The Aesthetics of Japanese Fascism*, aesthetics has a striking power in the formation of a culture of fascism (280). In other words, aesthetic experience, when considered in opposition to logical thought, has the power to upend critical

judgment for the sake of momentary pleasure. In this book, Tansman traces how a certain style of aesthetic production in 1920s and 30s Japan bled into fascism, and may have helped fascist ideas gain traction in Japanese society. The specific aesthetic moments that Tansman traces are not *necessarily* fascist; his interest lies in the effect that aesthetic sensibilities can have on politics and culture. Thus, this work investigates the significance that an aesthetic sensibility can have in a time of increasing fascism, rather than the inherent fascist tendencies of such a sensibility. This entails recognizing, as Tansman writes, that fascist aesthetics is a *style* of thought and representation, without requiring any specific content (278).

In the introduction Tansman lays out his premise that “culture is where fascism forms its ideological power, and...Japanese fascism was fueled by a literary sensibility” (1). Throughout the book, Tansman explains this sensibility and how it may have contributed to fascism. What is crucial to understanding Tansman’s point is that he does not think that the writers he considers necessarily intended to create fascist works (although some may have). On the contrary, he writes that, “writers can aesthetically sow the seeds of a fascist atmosphere without intending to do so” (2). Tansman argues that certain writers, including Yasuda Yojūrō, Kawabata Yasunari, and Kobayashi Hideo, were responding to the sense of loss of legitimate culture that was commonly experienced as a result of the conditions of modernity. As Tansman writes, the “atmosphere of crisis” that such an experience engendered led to the exploration of narrative forms that could creatively respond to crisis by providing a sense of safety in beauty that could calm the Japanese public. To be sure, the sense of beauty that was developed by these writers reflected native Japanese aesthetics, but in the context of the rise of fascism in Japan this native aesthetics became ripe for political use. Thus, Tansman argues that these aesthetic works allowed for a “slip from art to politics” (23) that may have made the Japanese public vulnerable to fascist ideology.

Chapter 1 describes the beginning of this creative response to modernism through the works of Akutagawa Ryūnosuke and Kobayashi Hideo. According to Tansman, these writers played with language in order to disorient their reader from set ideas about the meanings of words, ideas that they believed were dominant in the “direct, positivistic prose” that was then common in Japanese writing (35). That is, they wanted to free language from the world of logical, political assertion in order to convey the sense of loss, and ultimately of vertigo, that accompanied their experience of modernity. For them, “language has lost its poetry” (40), and so the only

solution to the situation was to revive the Japanese linguistic tradition through the poetic novel. By treating language more as music than as logical statements, the poetic novel enables a free play of words in which rhythm allows for the blending of words and meanings. Such a tactic disorients readers, lulling them into acceptance of the beautiful form of the written word while at the same time disengaging their critical faculties. This makes the poetic novel ideal ground for the growth of fascism, if Tansman is correct in claiming that the fascist aesthetic is an experience to which one “submits oneself while feeling oneself to be free” (227).

This point gets to the heart of Tansman’s idea of the fascist aesthetic and the specific way in which he thinks that such an aesthetic functioned in Japanese society. Essentially, Tansman’s contention is that writers in 1930s Japan, beginning with Akutagawa, were so dissatisfied with the political, positivistic language of the time that they attempted to unhinge language, so to speak, to allow for a more free-flowing, natural, and universal linguistic culture. However, such an aesthetic sensibility could not rest idle in this free, universal linguistic space, but rather retied language to the concrete condition of the Japanese people. This secondary move was a direct response to the threat perceived in Western cultural hegemony, and the Japanese writers who employed it were trying to recreate native Japanese space, thus restoring its power. While Akutagawa does not necessarily take this secondary step, it is developed by the writers that Tansman considers in the latter portion of the book, most notably Yasuda Yojūrō (Chapters 2 and 3) and Kobayashi Hideo (Chapter 6).

Yasuda and Kobayashi stand out because of the clear way in which their particular aesthetic sensibilities lead to moments of violence. Tansman reads Yasuda as using the image of the Japanese bridge to convey the sense of a connection, both of the present with the past and of nature with human artifice. This “harmonized linking” (83) essentially provides the sense of binding that serves as a successful antidote to the splintering of modernity. Yasuda takes this one step further and connects the human aspect of bridges with self-sacrifice, in that bridges were also used as burial grounds. However, given the collapsing of human artifice into nature, this makes human death part of the natural, beautiful, aesthetic moment represented by Yasuda’s bridges. In this way, violence and death are aestheticized, and included within the eternity of the aesthetic moment, which then becomes the fascist moment.

Kobayashi also allows the lure of the aesthetic moment to supersede recognition of the realities of violence. In Chapter 6, we see how Kobayashi’s ability to see the devastation in Manchuria was blocked by his enjoyment of

the sublime music of Mozart. Inspired by Mozart, Kobayashi's attentiveness to the natural, formal beauty of everyday life made him blind to the concrete human suffering before him. This led Kobayashi to go as far as "endorsing state restrictions of expression in the name of beauty" (246) and even writing a semi-laudatory account of Hitler's thought (241). Therefore, Tansman argues that Kobayashi's ignorance of the political, ethical dimension of his experience allowed his aesthetic moments to become fascist moments.

While the other aesthetic sensibilities that Tansman considers are not as blatantly tied to violence as those of Yasuda and Kobayashi, Tansman sees them as contributing equally to the rise of fascist culture in 1930's Japan. In the novels of Kawabata Yasunari and Shiga Naoya (Chapter 3), as well as the successful film *Mother Under the Eyelids* (Chapter 5) and the government publication *The Essence of the National Polity* (Chapter 4), Tansman traces similar responses to modernity through repetitive, musical language and images that upended the Japanese masses' critical judgment and made them susceptible to the slip into violence that is so clear in Yasuda and Kobayashi. In these other works, Tansman remarkably presents how the fascist aesthetic arose as a cure for modernity in 1930s Japan (254), despite the fact that fascism is never explicitly present in these works. Indeed, he himself acknowledges that his goal in this work was not to consider obvious proponents of the fascist aesthetic, such as Mishima Yukio, but "figures that... were slippery in the ways they connected beauty and politics" (257). Tansman's consideration of such figures in this manner is certainly groundbreaking.

However, it seems that the critical conclusion of this work is that the "fascist aesthetic is always available for cultural use" (255). While Tansman specifically studies the interaction of a certain aesthetic sensibility with a given place and historical time, the takeaway is that we should always be attentive to (and wary of) the power aesthetics has to interact with and change a given national culture. Tansman has succeeded at making the case for this conclusion, and the hope is that it will lead to a greater understanding of and respect for the power of aesthetics.

CONTRIBUTORS/EDITORS

SUBRAMANIAM ANANTHRAM is Senior Lecturer in International Business at Curtin Business School, Curtin University. His research interests include strategic management, international human resource development and global mindset development in Asian multinationals.

KIMIKO AKITA is Associate Professor in the Department of International and Cultural Studies at Aichi Prefectural University in Japan. She has co-authored “A ‘Vexing Implication’: Siamese Cats and Orientalist Mischief-Making,” in *Diversity in Disney Film*.

MARTHA CHAIKLIN is author of *Ivory and the Aesthetics of Modernity in Meiji Japan* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), *Cultural Commerce and Dutch Commercial Culture* (CNWS, 2003), as well as translator and annotator of *A Pioneer in Yokohama* (Hackett, 2012) and numerous shorter works.

RICHARD GRAINGER is a former Associate Professor in International Business at Curtin Business School, Curtin University. His research primarily focuses on management in Asian multinationals.

STEVEN HEINE is Professor and Director of Asian Studies at Florida International University and a specialist in East Asian religions and social history. Author/editor of two dozen books, he recently published *Like Dogs and Cats: Contesting the Mu Kōan in Zen Buddhism*.

S. YUMIKO HULVEY is Associate Professor of Japanese Literature at the University of Florida since 1990. Her research includes Japanese literature, written by aristocratic women from the tenth to the fourteenth centuries, as well as the works of Enchi Fumiko and Kurahashi Yumiko.

KINKO ITO is Professor of Sociology at University of Arkansas at Little Rock. Her current research interests include ethnography of the Ainu people, and she is an internationally known scholar of Japanese comics

RICK KENNEY is Chair and Professor in the Department of Communications at Georgia Regents University in Augusta. Dr. Kenney has co-authored several articles and book reviews dealing with Japan.

TAKEHIKO KOJIMA is Coordinator of Academic Support Services at the Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy and Citizenship Studies at Florida International University.

DANIEL A. MÉTRAUX is Professor of Asian Studies at Mary Baldwin College. Former editor of the *Southeast Review of Asian Studies*, he has written extensively on Japanese and East Asian history, religion and politics.

GABRIELA ROMEU is currently an Assistant Language Teacher (ALT) with the Japan Exchange and Teaching (JET) Program in Okinawa, Japan. She continues to study Japanese language, history, and culture.

LAURA SPECKER SULLIVAN is a PhD candidate in Philosophy at the University of Hawaii at Manoa and a visiting researcher at Kyoto University. Her research includes Japanese philosophy, cross-cultural bioethics, metaethics, and aesthetics. She has recently published work on Nishida Kitarō, Dōgen, and Wittgenstein.

HIDEO TOMINAGA is Professor in the Department of English Language and Literature in the Graduate School of Letters at Mukogawa Women's University in Hyogo, Japan. His research interests are in linguistics, literature and international economics.

JOHN A. TUCKER is Professor of History and Director of the Asian Studies program at East Carolina University. Tucker is a specialist in Japanese and East Asian Confucianism and has translated Ito Jinsai's *Gomo jigi* and Ogyū Sorai's *Bendō* and *Benmei*.

HIDEO WATANABE is Associate Professor at William Paterson University in New Jersey. He specializes in cultural anthropology of Japan, and his research focuses on foreign settlements in Japan in the second half of the nineteenth century.