

Greek and Roman Scholarly Traditions: Ancient Interpretations of Classical Texts

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## PREFACE

Our source material is abundant and fruitful for ancient scholastic activity surrounding many of the literary productions that have come down to us from Greece and Rome—and indeed even for some which have not. The textual remains of this scholarship give us a sense of the breadth and depth of thinking that ancient academics applied to the literary heritage that in part defined them and was defined by them. Deprived as we are of so much of the ancient tradition of literary exegesis, this source material is critical for our understanding of how ancient Greek and Roman scholars went about their practice.

Though some independent treatises exist, the bulk of this scholarship has been transmitted to us through the scholia, a term exposed to varying definitions by scholars in different branches of Classics, as explained by Eleanor Dickey.<sup>1</sup> Employed most broadly, a “scholion” is any scholarly comment applied to a text (what I will call the “original text” to distinguish it from the commentary) and often but not always initiated by a lemma to mark the corresponding location in that text.<sup>2</sup> “Scholia” as it is used today is an exceptionally broad term, encompassing glosses, historical notes, snippets of grammatical theory, textual emendations, observations on cultural practice, aesthetic/ poetic evaluations, philosophical musings, nuggets of zoological lore, bouts of fisticuffs between rival scholars, and so forth. The scholia vary widely in form, clarity, intended audience, and insightfulness, but it cannot be denied that they are an invaluable source of information, not only for the fragments of otherwise lost works they frequently preserve for us, but also for the revelation of ancient scholarly practice that comes through them.

The problem is that, while the study of this source material is full of promise, our understanding of scholia on the whole is crippled by a lack of systematic investigation.<sup>3</sup> Scholia are frequently accessed

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<sup>1</sup> 2007, 3ff., 11 n. 25

<sup>2</sup> Most editions mark these with < >, as I will do here.

<sup>3</sup> Historically, much of the attention that the scholia have received has focused on aspects of individual corpora as opposed to the commentary tradition as a whole. This approach has led to a number of faulty assumptions that unfortunately still color modern understanding of the scholia. A good example is the hasty assumption by Rand

by modern scholars for individual points of reference when dealing with original texts, but without sufficient understanding of the scholia in general, and even when they are studied in their own right, the projects mostly have a narrow focus.<sup>4</sup> In this dissertation I aim to perform such a systematic analysis of various scholiastic corpora in order to say something about the general strategies and methodologies employed in the interpretation and explanation of the original texts, an analysis that will provide a basis for comparison for future investigations of the ancient scholarship on other authors as well, both Greek and Roman. I have selected four case studies not only because of the relatively good state of their texts, but also because of the magnitude of the material and the breadth of topics and methodologies displayed therein. I must stress, however, that such analyses can and must be carried out for other authors if we are to understand the scholia broadly. This study is meant as a foretaste of the possible fruit of such endeavors, and it is hoped that my project will add to the rapidly increasing interest in ancient scholarly practices. A completely exhaustive analysis of the scholia to any one author would require a project all its own, and I do not presume to provide an explanation for every single one of the thousands upon thousands of scholia included in my study. What I do offer is a formal typology showing the general trends, concerns, and approaches found in the scholia, a typology derived from my case studies, but one which could also be applied easily to other types of commentary. What I thus aspire to achieve in this study is to instill in my reader a firm sense of the basic form and content of ancient literary scholia through the lens of a few select corpora, but at the same time to cultivate a gnawing sense that much more work remains to be done and that many more scholia must be read.

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(1916) that the Scholia Danielis from the Servian tradition represented the commentary of Aelius Donatus, a position challenged powerfully by Travis (1942) and Daintree (1990). As the latter specifies (72f.), there is noticeable in the modern scholarly tradition a patently unfair tendency to see an ancient source behind every quality scholion that we have and a medieval source behind every silly comment. This principle also surfaces in assumed quotations of Alexandrian scholarship in the Greek scholia.

<sup>4</sup> E.g., Budemann's study on metrical scholia to Pindar (2010). Dickey's systematic introduction covering a huge range of Greek scholia is altogether unique. Nünlist (2009) too provides a comprehensive look at all Greek scholia, but limits his focus to literary critical terms. Jakobi (1996) offers another paradigm by setting out a typology for a range of critical exegetical notes in Donatus' commentary to Terence, but does not cover the tradition in general.

The lack of attention given to scholia in the modern period (certainly not the case in the ancient world<sup>5</sup>) can perhaps be explained by certain aspects of the text that make treatment difficult. For instance, source attribution is in many cases completely impossible, for only occasionally is the provenance of an idea given.<sup>6</sup> While occasionally there are resonances of the scholiast himself (e.g., through the use of first-person speech or internal references to other portions of the commentary), we are not often able to say who the “scholiast” is or how he came about his material.<sup>7</sup> Accordingly, it becomes difficult to know the date of a given comment even in the most general terms. The textual history of the scholia, which I summarize in the first chapter, is also quite complicated; apart from a general division of “old” (*vetera*) scholia from antiquity and “new” (*recentiora*) scholia from the Byzantine world, our sense of the chronology of the notes is severely compromised.<sup>8</sup> Though in some cases it is possible to distinguish the old from the new, and though we can be confident that the scholia preserve much ancient information, the potential complexity of scholiastic transformations by the hands of many scholars over the space of hundreds of years is quite dizzying.

The scholia therefore need critical attention, and in spite of the problems inherent in their study, much can be gleaned from them besides the quotation of lost original texts, perhaps regarded as their primary contribution to modern scholarship. Indeed, rather than dismissing the problems in the scholia *tout court*, the problems themselves might be tackled more constructively by asking why they exist in the first place. For instance, while it is frustrating to have such limited awareness of the identity of the

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<sup>5</sup> For discussions of, e.g., Vergil’s implementation of and reaction against the Homeric scholia, see Schlunk (1974), Schmit-Neuerberg (1999), Hexter (2010).

<sup>6</sup> This does not apply in the case of citations and quotations of other original texts, which are very often labeled, sometimes with specific titles or book numbers. The origin of most scholia is obscure, however, and even when a scholar is named as the source of a particular note, it is not automatically clear whether that scholar was the originator of the thought or collected it from somewhere else.

<sup>7</sup> It is evident that many writers are represented in our extant text of the Greek scholia. Let it be noted that when I refer to “the scholiast,” it must not be assumed that there is only one, or that he is readily identifiable. As will be seen, some examples from the Roman commentary tradition can be associated more accurately with individuals.

<sup>8</sup> I will examine the *scholia vetera* only, since what I am aiming at is a holistic view of ancient approaches to Euripides, though see Dickey’s endorsement of the new scholia and their importance not only for an understanding of Byzantine scholarship, but for their preservation of ancient material not otherwise extant (2007, 15). In future research I will complete systematic comparisons between techniques in “old” and “new” scholarship.

scholiasts from the notes themselves, it is worth investigating what this lack of self-identification could mean for ancient scholarship. If names were originally attached to commentaries, what does it say about the scholarly tradition that these names have been largely erased through the transmission of the scholia? Are there types of information that are regarded as “common” and therefore warrant no mention of specific provenance? If scholars are cited so rarely, what motivates the citations when they do occur? Further, perhaps blatant repetitions in the scholia are a mark of carelessness or ineptitude, but we might do well to consider whether repetition is not rather at times a pedagogical technique designed to teach a certain principle via sequential iterations. Answers to these questions, however provisional they may be, can be formed by interrogating not just the material that we do possess, but also that which we do not.

In the course of this investigation a few central questions will arise. What are the major concerns of the scholiasts, and what types of questions did they ask when interpreting original texts of various kinds? Or the corollary—what are the topics in which they demonstrate no concern or perception? Are the notes meant as a reductive minimum for understanding the original text, or are there things one might call “extraneous”? What are the techniques of scholarship employed (e.g., allegory, analogical and etymological arguments, comparison with other literature), and do these change based on the genre of the original text? Are distinctions in genre even recognized? On a related note, what assumptions do the scholiasts make concerning the author of the original text and its composition or performance? What purpose do the scholia serve, and for whom are they intended? What other original texts are brought to bear on a discussion of the text at hand, and for what purposes? Though it is impossible to determine the chronology of most scholia, are there any provisional criteria that can be established as an initial foothold? Finally, what relation do the various scholiastic corpora have to each other, if any?

I will begin with an introduction to ancient scholarship and the development of the scholia, followed by four sequential case studies on the commentary traditions surrounding Euripides, Aeschines, Terence, and Vergil. I have selected these authors in part with the aim of investigating the variations between commentaries of different genres. Euripidean scholarship provides an opportunity to examine



the exegesis of a dual text that is approached both as written text and as performance. Aeschines too “performs” on a “stage,” though in a context that requires a vastly different set of knowledge and that is intimately tied to the tradition of rhetoric. I return again to the theater in my chapter on Terence, but again there are important changes, not only in genre, but in culture: here we will we begin comparing Greek and Roman scholarship, and for the first time we will also see commentaries attributed to known individuals, such that we will be able to investigate the exegetical tradition from a more personal perspective. The final chapter on Vergil will further develop our understanding of individual exegetical methodology with an investigation of the texts of Servius and will permit a more nuanced evaluation of the Roman appropriation of Greek scholarly methods and concerns. Each chapter will begin with a short summary of the text(s) available, followed by a systematic outlay of the major categorical concerns of the scholiasts with particular attention paid to literary issues (e.g., genre division and aesthetic evaluations), and concluding with an analysis of the exegetical methods employed by the scholiasts for interpreting the original text.

## CHAPTER 1

### Introduction to Ancient Scholarship

The title I have chosen for this chapter is perhaps an inauspicious one. Dickey begins her comprehensive *Ancient Greek Scholarship* (2007) with a chapter of the same name, but with a learned authority that comes from knowledge and experience that are far greater than my own. To start my own project under the same banner, insofar as it implicitly suggests that my introduction is to be compared with hers, makes me look a bit of a Marsyas, challenging my betters when I should be nodding respectfully to them. While I do indeed cover some of the same ground as she, however, I will take a slightly different tack, for instead of providing a comprehensive sweep of the entire field of ancient scholarship, I wish to examine some of the same historical movements more specifically with a mind to my *τέλος* of understanding the scholarly origins behind the principles and methods of the scholia I will be examining. This is not to say that Dickey is not interested in principles and methods, but only that the impressively broad scope of her project limits the amount of attention she can give to its subcategories. I will thus follow Dickey's lead up to a point, for while I aim to provide sufficient information on the textual history of scholarship that eventually resulted in our extant scholia, I also want to focus on the broader movements of scholarly thinking so that I can introduce some conceptual topics that will be crucial for my project. Lest I be flayed as a Marsyan imitator, therefore, let me state here at the beginning that I shall be piping a lesser tune in a different key, and any riffs on the archetype are to be taken merely as respectful nods: *silvestrem tenui Musam meditor avena, quaero modos levioire plectro*, etc., etc.

Thus, in this chapter I aim to summarize the tradition of scholarship from pre-Alexandrian times to the Roman and Byzantine periods that eventually produced the scholia as we have them now, specifically with a view toward the questions most commonly asked by ancient literary critics and the theoretical principles of exegesis they employed. Although most scholia are impossible to sort out

chronologically, at least to any significant degree of specificity, it is possible to identify in many notes an inheritance from the Classical and Hellenistic past. Sometimes that relationship is explicitly elucidated by the scholia themselves, as in the case of quotations and terminology with the name of a source attached, though there are also a number of general techniques or strategies of exegesis without any attribution that are nonetheless traceable to the work of earlier thinkers. After setting out what we know of the intellectual background to the commentaries in their later form, we will have a more comprehensive picture of the development of at least some strands of ancient exegesis. With the completion of this and similar studies in other scholiastic corpora, that picture will become even clearer.

### *Defining Scholarship*

A fundamental question presents itself: what do we mean by “scholarship”? At least two general approaches are available for formulating a definition: to evaluate the activities of Greeks and Romans on the basis of our modern sense of “scholarship” by mapping our own perspective onto theirs—a problematic if useful approach, as it assumes (incorrectly) that there is a single modern perspective to begin with—or to establish an ancient definition of “scholarship” from the ground up by assembling the evidence in an effort to determine whether antiquity even constructs a distinct category of “scholarship” and, if so, what constitutes it, all with the understanding that our categorical distinctions may misrepresent the ancient reality. Both approaches may be fruitful, but regardless of the choice it is important to be explicit about which has been selected.

Pfeiffer is rather forthcoming on his understanding of the term, as the opening statement of his *History of Classical Scholarship* makes clear: “Scholarship is the art of understanding, explaining, and restoring the literary tradition.”<sup>9</sup> There are several important aspects of this definition. First, scholarship is an art, and if we can take Pfeiffer to mean this in terms generally akin to those found in Plato’s *Ion*,

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<sup>9</sup> 1968, 3

then there will be associated with it a certain *ἐπιστήμη*, a systematized body of knowledge that pertains to the practice of that art—e.g., linguistic ability, methods of exegesis, and so forth. Secondly, scholarship is inherently responsive: it does not create, but rather reacts, and specifically it reacts to something called a “literary tradition.” In a sense Pfeiffer has shifted the burden of definition somewhat, as there is no specification of what “literature” means, but in any case the tradition of scholarship is said to have originated as a response from within—“literary” men developing a systematic set of practices for a self-conscious theoretical approach to their own “literary” work, whatever we mean by that term. Third, scholarship is for the “restoration” of that tradition, by which Pfeiffer seems to indicate textual criticism, and perhaps we may also assume under this heading such activities as “preservation” and even “propagation.” Dickey is a bit more pragmatic in her own definition of scholarship, stating that she uses the word as a cover term for the kinds of texts she discusses in her book, namely “any type of work concentrating on the words, rather than the ideas, of ancient pagan authors: textual criticism, interpretation, literary criticism of specific passages, grammar, syntax, lexicography, etc.”<sup>10</sup> The separation of words from ideas is a difficult one to accept, but Dickey has to find some way to differentiate literary commentaries from, e.g., philosophical or religious texts that engage with another text on the level of doctrine, and perhaps there is no good way to express this.<sup>11</sup> In any case, in the opening to her first chapter Dickey describes “scholarship” in a way that is analogous to Pfeiffer: “For almost four thousand years, the peoples living around the Mediterranean have been attempting to improve their ability to understand ancient texts by systematic study of their language, context, and textual tradition.”<sup>12</sup> The mention of systematic study recalls Pfeiffer’s description of scholarship as an art, and his “restoration” is paralleled by the reference to the study of the “textual tradition.” Both authors take a

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<sup>10</sup> 2007, vii

<sup>11</sup> One might use such distinctions as “didactic vs. literary,” which can help distinguish the pedagogical aims of a philosophical or rhetorical text from an appreciation of literature-as-art, but it is easy to see how this dichotomy quickly comes crashing down as well. Let it suffice to say that any system of categorization is slippery.

<sup>12</sup> 2007, 3

modern perspective on scholarship and evaluate antiquity in those terms, and both consider our modern notions of scholarship to have begun in the context of the Hellenistic library.<sup>13</sup>

In some sense I wish to steer clear of these formulations. While it seems reasonable to speak of Alexandrian scholarship as a definitive break from the handling of literature that came before—not least because of the important developments made possible through a comprehensive library collection and the powerful political forces that supported such academic endeavors—to say that “real scholarship” was unknown or partially unknown to the Greeks before the Library at Alexandria can be misleading. Indeed, there was momentous change in the third century, but it seems to have been a change more in sophistication of method and of medium (i.e., through an increase in the availability of written texts) than in essence. The concerns of Alexandrian scholars are not particularly different from the concerns of “scholars” (*pace* Pfeiffer) in the Classical period. Aristarchus and his textual critical methods in third-century Alexandria were antedated by the rhapsodes of the sixth century, who were also interested in establishing an authoritative “text” of Homer. Grammatical concerns were not comprehensively developed into full-fledged theory until later, but fifth-century sophists posed the same types of questions about the relationship of words to one another, and their treatises on various topics show at least some sort of systemized approach to the material. Explicit recognition of various modes of exegesis appears at least as early as the sixth century with the tradition of allegorical interpretations. Lexicography too seems to stretch back into the earliest period of Greek literature, for the interpretation of words is an inherent feature of Greek poetry itself from the very beginning.<sup>14</sup> The resources and rigor of scholarship may have been expanded significantly in the third century, but the essential questions and concerns of those who paid particular attention to literary texts are similar, if only in basic form.

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<sup>13</sup> Dickey is sure to nuance her position by acknowledging that, when she says that scholarship truly began with the founding of the Library and Museum at Alexandria in the early third century BC, it is with an understanding of scholarship “in our sense of the term.” Pfeiffer does not seem to allow alternative definitions to exist, or at least cares only for the modern definition against which he judges antiquity, the result being that only a few men such as Aristarchus and Aristophanes of Byzantium are allowed the name “scholar.”

<sup>14</sup> Pfeiffer (1968, 197f.)

Another cornerstone of Pfeiffer's approach is a prejudice against the academic work of the Roman period, an attitude made clear at the end of his volume, where he attributes the rise of epitomes to the demands of a "declining civilization that wished for short cuts to knowledge."<sup>15</sup> There are certainly other ways of explaining such "short cuts," however, and the selection of the best samples from a large body of material need hardly be an uncritical activity that is designed to cater to a reader's laziness or stupidity and that is devoid of any "love of letters," as Pfeiffer describes the "pure" impetus of Alexandrian scholars.<sup>16</sup> Indeed, such a process of academic winnowing by compilers and epitomizers would seem in essence to be much the same (or at least possibly the same) as the process of textual criticism going on at Alexandria, where an authoritative text was constructed by sifting through multiple versions to find the best available sources. Even the work of summarizing may be done systematically and self-consciously on the basis of carefully chosen principles, which would at least provisionally seem to fit within Pfeiffer's definition of scholarship.

Thus, where Pfeiffer stresses a firm break between "scholarship" and "not scholarship" in accordance with a modern notion of the term, I wish to stress a continuity—not in terms of academic rigor or refinements in critical methods, but in terms of the general approach to the explication of a text, including the basic types of questions that scholars asked and some of the tools they used while going about their work of interpretation. Certainly Pfeiffer's approach is a valuable one, and in many cases he will be right in discounting the abilities of, for example, Roman-era compilers vis-à-vis the primary intellects at Alexandria,<sup>17</sup> but the exclusivity inherent to his definition of scholarship can be counterproductive, especially in a discussion of the scholia. Indeed, Pfeiffer seems not to have written a *History of Classical Scholarship*, but a *Classical History of (Modern) Scholarship*, given his severe

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<sup>15</sup> 1968, 279

<sup>16</sup> E.g., 171; motive is one of his primary deciding factors in separating sheep from goats—real scholars love knowledge, whereas sophists or teachers acquire knowledge only in service of their professional goals.

<sup>17</sup> It is even still perhaps a little unfair to speak of intellectual failing without considering the goals and intended readership of scholarly works: if the target audience is school children or anyone else apart from advanced scholars, it would be silly to assume that the writer/ compiler was only as intelligent as the depth of his material and no more, an argument also made by Daintree (1990, 73). Errors are another thing, of course, but even these have been common to scholars and "scholars" of all eras.

curtailing of post-Alexandrian developments—“Classical” seems to mean “Hellenistic.” Broadening our perspective on the realm of scholarship and its several subcategories can help us to appreciate the continuity that exists between them and also frees us from the need to make value judgments about the motivations behind scholarly practice, whether it is for “pure” reasons or for pragmatic, professional ones—a judgment I am entirely unable and unwilling to make.<sup>18</sup>

For these reasons I find it more appropriate to evaluate the scholia not merely as a vehicle for the transmission of (“real”) ancient scholarship, but as part of the continuum of ancient scholarship itself that continued through the Byzantine period and continues to leave a strong impression today.<sup>19</sup> For the scholia, at least, such a model seems to be a more appropriate paradigm, for just as Hellenistic scholars collected, interpreted, and shaped their literary heritage, so too did the scholiasts mold that tradition by their additions, omissions, and reorganizations of older academic work. The processes that gave us our extant scholia may partake of a different type or quality of scholarship, but it is scholarship nonetheless, and we cannot truly understand the “history of scholarship” unless we take into account all of its incarnations. Thus, when I evaluate the scholia and remnants of ancient commentaries in the subsequent chapters, it is with the assumption that the later hands that excerpted and modified the scholarship from the past were also themselves partaking in that tradition, and that this tradition did not begin in Alexandria, but rather in the critical approaches of the Classical period and, in some respects, even with the very dawn of literary activity in Greece.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> What is more, I lean toward the view that ancient scholarship—like modern scholarship—is inextricably linked to the political realm and as such can never truly be proven to be “pure.” It would be hard to believe, at any rate, that the scholars at the Library and those who wished to be scholars at the Library were in no way motivated by the economic and political benefits of the post, and yet this does not mean that they did or did not love knowledge for its own sake.

<sup>19</sup> The impression is stronger than we may realize. I take as evidence for this assertion that in coming across ancient scholarly texts we are often surprised and/or tickled to find ancient critics addressing the same questions as we do, and often in the same terms, even if so many features of their work surprise us instead because of their oddity. In future work I intend to give more careful attention to the ways in which ancient and modern literary commentaries overlap.

<sup>20</sup> Let me stress that I do not want to gloss over the important developments in the critical scholarship of Alexandria and the fact that modern notions of scholarship find some of their closest parallels in the Hellenistic period. What I wish to emphasize is that we can use the same term “scholarship” to refer to pre- and post-Alexandrian academic work and still recognize the important distinctions of that period.

Ultimately, however, while my adoption of this definition of scholarship affects the terms in which I evaluate the scholia, it does not change the boundaries of my project. Like Dickey, I operate somewhat more pragmatically by researching a reasonably well-defined corpus of texts, namely the tradition of texts that systematically explain other texts—perhaps a reasonable starting-point for a definition of a “commentary”—and will set out the features of those explanatory texts whether they seem “scholarly” or not. On the other hand, I am still concerned with theoretical divisions pertaining to “scholarship” and “literature.” The four case studies I present here deal with original texts that may be called “literary,” but the future of my project necessarily includes commentaries that might be considered “less literary,” including exegetical work on religious, philosophical, or medical texts. After expanding the scope of my research I will be able to offer a more definitive characterization of ancient commentaries and the extent to which we might isolate a “literary” approach from within them. For the present investigation I will be content to analyze how these “literary” commentaries mark out their own subdivisions: e.g., prose vs. poetry, tragedy vs. comedy, and so forth.

Having defined scholarship in this way, or rather having hinted at a definition of scholarship and left it hanging for a later time, I will proceed to give a brief history of the ideas and techniques employed in the ancient engagement with literary works through the Roman period. This summary will provide some hint as to the type of phenomena we will see when I begin my analysis of the case studies.

### *Pre-Alexandrian Roots*

The roots of scholarship in its sense of the self-conscious interpretation of literature were present in early ancient Greek poetry itself.<sup>21</sup> Being able to produce quality work necessitated the ability to critique it as well, and passages in the earliest extant Greek literature demonstrate some form of poetic

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<sup>21</sup> Pfeiffer (1968, 1, 8, 12, 47), Ford (2002, 1ff.)



self-consciousness, which we may call a certain “interpretation” of what poets were doing.<sup>22</sup> A sort of exegesis was also present in the craft of the rhapsodes, who interpreted Homer with each re-performance and who would have been very interested in establishing the correct Homeric “text,” especially when rhapsodes in different locations, most notably Chios, sought to claim as Homer as their own and would accordingly wish to advertise their texts as the most “Homeric.” Thus, performing poetry necessitated an ability to approach it critically, and Plato’s Socrates even refers to them in exegetical terms as “interpreters of interpreters” in the *Ion*; that is, the poets decipher what comes from the Muses, and the rhapsodes in turn communicate what the poets share.<sup>23</sup> The reverse of the sentiment is also found in the same dialogue: if one can interpret poetry, one should also be able to produce it. While Plato was hardly a great advocate for poetry, it is interesting to note the observation that if there *were* an art of poetic composition or re-performance, it would have to include a twofold ability both to create and to critique that poetry—and not just one’s own literary output, but any poetic production at all.<sup>24</sup> On the understanding of Plato’s Socrates, at least, anyone affirming the existence of an art of poetry cannot divorce that poetry from an attempt to understand itself: practitioners necessarily double as interpreters, and *vice versa*. The idea of such self-reflexivity is at least moving in the direction of the work of the scholar poets at Alexandria, even if it was only in the third century BC that fields such as literary criticism began to be approached in a more rigorous way.

Poetry was not judged only through itself, however. As early as the sixth century some Greeks began to confront certain issues of interpretation more directly, and Homer was naturally the starting point for central questions of literary criticism, with some of the earliest debates focusing on the very function of poetry. The sixth-century Xenophanes objected famously that Homer and Hesiod attributed to

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<sup>22</sup> The self-referentiality in the Catalogue of Ships in *Iliad* 2, for example, demonstrates the poet’s awareness of his own role (and limits) as singer. The poet of the *Odyssey* introduces himself in his second word. Hesiod relates his inspiration emphatically in the *Theogony*. Archilochus demonstrates the ability of poetry to shift speaking personae in his animal fables. Even inanimate objects could be given a poetic voice: “I am the cup of Nestor,” a hexameter reads. These examples show a self-aware Greek poetics that engages with the limits and features of its own discipline—certainly not with the systematic critique of Alexandrian intellectual circles and not to the extent of the later epigrammatic tradition, but nonetheless with some similar concerns.

<sup>23</sup> 535a

<sup>24</sup> Compare also the end of Plato’s *Symposium* (223d), where Socrates argues in the presence of the strong-to-the-finish party guests that a writer of tragedy should also be able to compose comedy.

the gods all the defective characteristics of mankind<sup>25</sup> and questioned the anthropomorphizing of the divine in general.<sup>26</sup> It is implied in these accusations that the chief of Greek poets had failed to reveal truth. Defenders of Homer rose up against such criticism, most notably among them the sixth-century Theagenes, who did not justify moral defects or claim they did not exist on a literal level, but employed an allegorical form of interpretation that transcended them. It is unclear whether allegory arose specifically for the purpose of answering these challenges or was instituted independently and then used by Homer's defenders, but in either case it was specifically through a discussion of exegetical strategy that the debate was played out. Inherent in this debate is an argument about the exclusivity of knowledge, since only those who know what interpretive framework to use can arrive at the proper interpretation of Homer.<sup>27</sup> Thus, even if it was not until Alexandria that literary criticism blossomed, it is clear that already in the sixth century there was a self-conscious engagement with poetry and the question of literal vs. metaphorical interpretation.

The objections of Xenophanes reached their climax in Plato, who famously described poetry as mere imitation of true reality with a potentially debilitating effect on morality. Since poetry was harmful, certainly putting any effort into explicating it was questionable from the start, and no allegorical model could salvage the endeavor. Again, Homer was not without his supporters. Viewing Homer as the *telos* of epic poetry, Aristotle argued forcefully in his defense, but not by the same means as Theagenes. The language of Aristotle's engagement with Homer reveals something of the thinking behind his hermeneutic model: *προβλήματα* and *λύσεις*, "difficulties" and "solutions." Rather than viewing Homer as the source of metaphysical knowledge that required a special key to decode, Aristotle used his breadth of learning to resolve individual objections on a literal, factual level; instead of changing the terms of the debate, he met the accusers on their own terms and then refuted them one by one, solving the "knots" of Homeric poetry

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<sup>25</sup> πάντα θεοῖς ἀνέθηκαν Ὅμηρός θ' Ἡσιόδός τε / ὅσα παρ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὀνειδέα καὶ ψόγος ἐστίν, / κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν (fr. 10 Campbell 1982, *Greek Lyric Poetry*).

<sup>26</sup> Fr. 13 Campbell; this latter criticism stretches beyond literature itself, but it nonetheless has specific relevance for the Homeric and Hesiodic gods and their (at times) very human characteristics.

<sup>27</sup> For Plato's mention of such contests between poets and philosophers, see Russell (1981, 19f.). See also the Introduction in Ford (2002) for a discussion of how praise and blame were interwoven into the very fabric of Greek song performance and its social context.

that needed “untying.” Thus, Homer’s detractors were found guilty not of a foundationally inaccurate exegetical approach, but rather simple ignorance of the facts, in contrast to Aristotle’s own wide-ranging knowledge.<sup>28</sup> It was this method of answering critics that would later become such a central part of poetic criticism.

One of the early preoccupations of Homeric interpreters was textual criticism, or at least a form of it. Pfeiffer holds that true textual criticism, along with other “pure” forms of scholarship, emerged only in the Hellenistic period. Even so, he admits that the roots of such criticism can be found early on. Even if the famous Peisistratus recension has no earlier evidence than the first century BC,<sup>29</sup> and even if this episode is a retrojection of the model of the literary-minded Hellenistic monarch back onto a sixth-century tyrant, it stands to reason that the popularity of Homeric poetry in the sixth century would have necessitated at least some thinking about the accuracy and consistency of the “text” for each performance, and probably the rhapsodes would be first in line to hammer out such issues, as I suggested above. If nothing else, there is the notable example of Herodotus, who argues about the Homeric authorship of the *Cypria*.<sup>30</sup> The first full edition of Homer that we know of was completed by Antimachus (fl. 400 BC),<sup>31</sup> at which time there may also have been at least *ad hoc* textual criticism by a certain Hippias, said by Aristotle to have proposed two alternate readings in the *Iliad* in order to “untie” some problems.<sup>32</sup>

Another demonstrable feature of pre-Alexandrian scholarship was the organization of knowledge. Typically, scholarly systems of classification are thought of as an Alexandrian development, and to be sure the physical demands of a library collection made such systematization via a catalog indispensable, but let us observe a few ways in which this practice was already underway. Hippias of Elis, for example, compiled a list of Olympic victors and used it as a basis for chronology.<sup>33</sup> Given the fact that we are left

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<sup>28</sup> Pfeiffer (1968, 69f.) gives an illustrative example: Plato says that Achilles could not have dragged Hector’s body around the tomb of Patroclus (*Rep.* 319b), but Aristotle points to a contemporary Thessalian practice of dragging the bodies of murderers around the tombs of those they had murdered (cited in a scholion to *Il.* 24.15).

<sup>29</sup> Cic. *de Or.* 3.137 (possibly using Asclepiades of Myrlea as a source, according to Pfeiffer 1968, 6)

<sup>30</sup> 2.116

<sup>31</sup> Pfeiffer (1968, 72)

<sup>32</sup> *Poetics* 1461a

<sup>33</sup> This coheres with the Platonic image of Hippias as someone interested in antiquarian issues of all kinds, and indeed it is the character of Hippias who provides our first extant use of ἀρχαιολογία (“antiquarianism”) in the

mostly with mere titles of investigations of this kind, it is difficult to know exactly how such antiquarian works were organized, but we may point out that antiquarianism itself is often defined in contradistinction to history as a “thematic” or “topic-driven” organization of historical knowledge, whereas history proper moves along a more chronological trajectory.<sup>34</sup> However that may be, the description of antiquarian studies as the study of genealogies and ktisis stories<sup>35</sup> assumes some level of systematic organization in the setting out of available knowledge. The shape of these early documents foreshadowed Alexandria’s vast array of “περί literature,” or monographs on specific areas of expertise and knowledge.

Aristotle too was responsible for a similar list of Olympic victors, and also for the Pythian games at Delphi, a work which met with great success.<sup>36</sup> Aristotle went further than Hippias by also systematizing literary knowledge, perhaps most notably in the *Didascalía*, a catalog of information on the history of Attic theatrical productions that seems to come from the same general impetus as the athletic catalogs.<sup>37</sup> Further, one finds in his *Poetics* distinctions between tragedy, comedy, and epic, a topic of inquiry that will be a crucial component of my investigation of the scholia as I consider the effects of a change in the genre of an original text on the content and form of the commentaries devoted to it. Perhaps his system of understanding different types of poetry was not as thorough as the next generations of scholars would produce, but again we are witnessing steps in this direction.

Language too was the subject of much scholarly attention from at least the fifth century. Herodotus explored the origin of the Greek language and its alphabet,<sup>38</sup> as did earlier Milesian thinkers.<sup>39</sup> Such a historical appreciation of the Greek language also included the investigation of the sources of individual words, and the tradition of glosses may even have begun as early as the sixth century through informal collections of rare or obscure phrases common in epic poetry. However that may be, etymology

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*Hippias Maior* (285d). Similar attempts had been made by Hecataeus (~500 BC), who employed lists of Spartan kings for such purposes. For fifth-century efforts in establishing chronology, see Jacoby (1949, 59).

<sup>34</sup> For instance, Thucydides details the history of a war, whereas the antiquarian Varro outlines specific topics of culture such as language or customs—both concerned with the past, but in different ways (Momigliano 1950).

<sup>35</sup> *Hipp. Mai.* 285d

<sup>36</sup> Pfeiffer (1968, 80)

<sup>37</sup> Aristotle also collected proverbs as relics of ancient wisdom, and it would be surprising if he did not develop some sort of classification for these as well.

<sup>38</sup> 5.58

<sup>39</sup> Pfeiffer (1968, 21)

thrived in the fifth century, and later by the time of Plato's *Cratylus* we see a wide-ranging discussion on the origin of words. Of particular interest to us here is the notion that one should recognize differences in meaning for words over large stretches of time,<sup>40</sup> a type of distinction that Aristotle would use in addition to a similar approach to changes in words across dialects.<sup>41</sup> Such an approach is again crucial for the hermeneutic techniques we shall see in the scholia.

Though formal grammatical theorization was still to come, the foundations of grammatical studies also had obvious starting points in the Classical period. Pfeiffer is correct to observe that poetic tropes such as polyptoton in early archaic lyric<sup>42</sup> are not an attestation of any kind of grammatical scholarship, but rather a simple poetic leaning toward wordplay. By the time of the sophists, however, various aspects of language were being systematically explored. Gorgias became interested in linguistic figures and the incorporation of poetic style into prose, including the ability of literature to create an emotional connection with the audience.<sup>43</sup> Protagoras worked on the gender of nouns and the mood of verbs, including an *Orthoepia*, evidently a list of “proper” words differentiated from metaphorical language.<sup>44</sup> Studies on the definition and morphology of words were carried out by Prodicus and explored in Plato's *Cratylus*.<sup>45</sup> Aristotle too showed concern for such things, and Dio Chrysostom could look back at him as the start of “critical and grammatical studies”: Ἀριστοτέλης, ἀφ' οὗ φασι τὴν κριτικὴν τε καὶ γραμματικὴν ἀρχὴν λαβεῖν.<sup>46</sup> That such grammatical studies were being applied to specific instances of literary exegesis is clear from Aristotle's depiction of Protagoras in the *Poetics*, where the man is said to have subjected the opening verse of the *Iliad* to scrutiny for its propriety as a command vis-à-vis a wish.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>40</sup> I.e., what the *πάλαιοι* said vs. what is said “now” (407a).

<sup>41</sup> E.g., *γλώσσαι* and *κύρια* (Pfeiffer 1968, 78f.)

<sup>42</sup> E.g., the famous Cleobolus fragment of Anacreon (fr. 359 Campbell): Κλεοβούλου μὲν ἔργω' ἔρέω, / Κλεοβούλω δ' ἐπιμαίνομαι, / Κλεόβουλον δὲ διοςκέω.

<sup>43</sup> Russell (1981, 22ff.)

<sup>44</sup> The concern over proper/ improper and metaphorical speech is a ubiquitous concern in the scholia, as will quickly become evident.

<sup>45</sup> For all these, see Kennedy (1994, 26); for Prodicus specifically, see Mayhew (2011).

<sup>46</sup> 53.1.9

<sup>47</sup> 1456b

Finally, what we call literary criticism also had its roots in the Classical period. Certainly by Aristotle there is a sophisticated way of talking about various features of poetry and how it can be assessed, but such terminology also appears in less-expected places, most notably Aristophanes.<sup>48</sup> His parody of tragedians in particular gives evidence of how different aspects of poetic language could be evaluated and what the terms of that evaluation were. The most famous example of such literary criticism comes amidst the underground poetry slam in the *Frogs*, a contest between the deceased Euripides and Aeschylus for the rights to return to the world above. Aristophanes sets the debate predominantly over which words are “weighty” and which are “light,”<sup>49</sup> a distinction picked up later by Callimachus. There is also discussion over the importance of consistent characterization and propriety, two topics that will prove to be important later on.<sup>50</sup> So too does one find criticism on the grounds of pleonastic speech, showing the importance of concision and clarity, another ubiquitous principle in the scholia.<sup>51</sup>

Thus, even before Alexandria we find several important strands of scholarly investigation, including questions of hermeneutics (e.g. literal versus figurative), textual criticism, the organization of knowledge (including some form of genre classification), and language. The level of research was not as thorough or intense as it would become in the Alexandrian Library, but it is important not to ignore the fact that many types of inquiry did not emerge suddenly in the Hellenistic period. Even if Pfeiffer and others may wish to reserve the term “scholar” for the likes of Aristarchus or Aristophanes of Byzantium, there is no doubt that men were taking part in scholarly activities much earlier. In time we will see how later traditions of scholarship reach all the way back to these pre-Alexandrian roots.

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<sup>48</sup> A point made also by Russell (1981, 20f.). See especially Ford (2002) on this general topic.

<sup>49</sup> E.g., *Frogs* 939ff., where Euripides claims to have put the bombastic Aeschylean style on a strict diet; cf. *Frogs* 1380ff.

<sup>50</sup> *Frogs* 1058ff.

<sup>51</sup> *Frogs* 1155ff.

### *Hellenistic Scholarship*

In his account of the politico-academic crisis of the 140s, Andron of Alexandria<sup>52</sup> reported that Ptolemy VIII's tyranny caused a mass emigration of scholars from Alexandria that then "filled the islands and cities with grammarians, philosophers, geometers, musicians, painters, physical trainers, doctors, and many other *τεχνίται*, who out of their poverty taught their field of expertise and so made men educated." He had stated just previously that Alexandria was the educator of the entire world, a nod to and expansion of Pericles' claim that Athens was the education of Greece, and in light of the scholastic diaspora induced by Ptolemy VIII this statement is not entirely hyperbolic. Scholarship had indeed flourished in Alexandria, especially in the third century, and the Library allowed a depth and breadth of research that had not been possible before. The traditions of critical academic investigation birthed in this context later became the standard for Roman scholars, and insofar as our modern notions of scholarship have arisen from the same source, Alexandria may truly be considered an education for the world and deserving of the distinction Andron accorded it. Even so, it will become clear that the questions being asked and many of the topics being researched were not much changed from the Classical period, though the methods used to perform that research and the degree to which it was executed were more advanced.

First, a word is in order regarding the forms that such scholarship took, since this is highly relevant to the scholia. As in the Classical period, textual criticism was crucial, though now we find the first attempts (excepting Antimachus, perhaps) to establish critical editions, as opposed to individual corrections aimed at solving literary *προβλήματα*. Other Hellenistic monographs took the form of "πρός literature," or challenges to the work of other scholars. Academic contentions were by no means original to this era, but it is true that a new level of carping is found amongst these Alexandrian scholars.<sup>53</sup> Further, some scholarship took on the *περί* type, or monographs (possibly peripatetic in origin) that dealt with specific topics in isolation. Such topics could be a specific episode like the catalog of Trojan forces

<sup>52</sup> Athenaeus 4.83, Pfeiffer (1968, 252)

<sup>53</sup> Regarding the Library, Timon of Phlius famously remarked that scribblers on papyrus feuded without end in the "bird-cage of the Muses" (Frag. 12D).

in the second book of the *Iliad* (Demetrius of Scepsis), an individual author (Apollonius Rhodius on Archilochus), or a broader category of literature (e.g., on comedy or the lyric poets). A final group—and the one that will concern me most—is the *ὑπομνήματα*. Immediately we run into trouble, as the Greek term encompasses at least two types of document. In the first sense, *ὑπομνήματα* are merely “notes,” without any implication of a specific direction or goal. In the second sense, *ὑπομνήματα* are running commentaries to a literary work. Callimachus furnishes an example of this problem: we know that he collected “notes” on mythology, geography, and other topics in a loose collection, but according to Pfeiffer there is no evidence that he wrote any running commentaries like his successors did.<sup>54</sup> Elementary explanatory notes must have accompanied the Homeric text for a long time, and the Derveni papyrus (fourth century BC) offers interpretations of Orphic texts, but there seems to be no evidence of full running commentaries before the Hellenistic period. It is therefore with caution that we must approach ancient references to *ὑπομνήματα*.

In the realm of textual criticism, scholars continued to do some of the things they had done for centuries. The concern over the authenticity of literary works shows up, for example, in Apollonius Rhodius’ discernment as to which works did or did not belong in the Hesiodic corpus,<sup>55</sup> just as Herodotus, Aristotle, and others had discussed the authenticity of parts of the Homeric corpus. Full recensions of the classical texts, however, came only with Alexandria. Though Antimachus had produced a full text of Homer—and here we recall as well the instability of our “evidence” for a Peisistratid text—there is no hint that this was a critical recension, and it is not referred to in the scholia as a *διόρθωσις*. Rather Zenodotus, who was among the first generations of scholars at the Alexandrian Library, was considered by Suidas the first true *διορθωτής* of Homer. Known as a conservative critic, Zenodotus was followed by

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<sup>54</sup> 1968, 138. See also Lucian’s use of the term (*How to Write History* 47ff) and the uncertainty surrounding Plutarch’s “notes” (Pelling 2002, 66; Montana 2011). One might also think of the term in relation to the *commentarii* of Caesar, ostensibly executed in a plain and unadorned style (Cic. *Brutus* 262).

<sup>55</sup> Pfeiffer (1968, 144)



Aristophanes of Byzantium and Aristarchus, also conservative in their treatment of texts.<sup>56</sup> In addition to Homer there were also recensions of other authors, including Aristophanes' influential edition of the lyric poets.<sup>57</sup>

Specific aspects of textual criticism deserve mention here, since they will recur in the scholia. One special concern for editors of dramatic or lyric poetry is the division of lines and cola. Aristophanes of Byzantium (known as the originator of colometry) arranged his lyric texts by cola instead of continuous lines as in prose texts, a technique that is attested by Hephaestion in his metrical handbook. On the evidence of Hephaestion we can also say that Aristarchus followed suit, though there was not always perfect agreement about how to divide the text.<sup>58</sup> For dramatic poetry, we may assume that in this process of organization one also would need to designate the start and end of lines for different speakers, though for Aristophanes at least we do not have evidence for any one particular decision of this type.

A kindred issue is that of punctuation and critical *σημεῖα*. Punctuation was in fact as old as Greek writing, as a graffito in Ischia shows,<sup>59</sup> but in the Hellenistic period one finds a more systematized use of various marks to give information about the text. Zenodotus was the first to introduce the obelus to mark text he found suspect but was not willing to omit entirely (see above on his extreme caution).

Aristophanes too employed such *σημεῖα*, and in particular was famous for introducing a system for marking Greek accents, though whether he in fact originated this system must remain a guess, as the "evidence" for it has been shown to be a later forgery.<sup>60</sup> However that may be, it is clear that a basic system of punctuation was preserved from Aristophanes down to Dionysius Thrax. The only difference for Aristarchus was that in his running commentaries he could explain his reasons for the various stops, obeli, or other marks that he placed in the text itself.

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<sup>56</sup> Aristarchus was even supposedly criticized for his excessive caution by Didymus in his *Περὶ τῆς Ἀριστάρχου διορθώσεως*. See also the case of his rejection of *δαῖτα* at *Iliad* 1.5 because it lacked sufficient parallel for its apparent use as animal food, as described by Pfeiffer (1968, 227).

<sup>57</sup> Pfeiffer (1968, 183)

<sup>58</sup> Pfeiffer (1968, 185)

<sup>59</sup> Pfeiffer (1968, 179)

<sup>60</sup> Pfeiffer (1968, 179)

Remembering to differentiate carefully between the multiple meanings of ὑπομνήματα, we can now make some observations on Hellenistic commentaries. Though as already stated there was to some degree a tradition of commenting on a text in various forms—for instance by a monograph on a single topic (the περί type) or by engagement with individual προβλήματα selected from a larger text—it was not until Aristarchus that full running commentaries on whole literary works appeared. Among his subjects were the works of Archilochus and Herodotus, and he was perhaps the first to provide a full commentary on Thucydides as well. Like other Alexandrian scholars, Aristarchus also spent much effort on comedy and produced commentaries for at least eight Aristophanic plays in addition to his commentaries on tragedy and lyric poetry. It must not be suggested that Aristarchus suddenly hit upon brand new methods of scholarship that had never been used before, but it seems clear that the scope of his ὑπομνήματα went far beyond that of his predecessors. He could still write concentrated treatises on individual topics (e.g., Περὶ τοῦ ναυστάθμου, a work describing the arrangement of Greek ships on the shore at Troy), but it was in the vast output of notes to the classical literary canon that he stands out from the rest, an output that would have been impossible without the intense work done on editions of those texts in the previous generations at Alexandria.<sup>61</sup>

It is appropriate here to say a few things about certain aspects of these commentaries and other works of scholarship like them. In general we see the same concerns as in our pre-Alexandrian examples, though here executed with more vigor and thoroughness. Such is the situation for glosses, which had been a crucial part of poetic interpretation from early on, but which were treated comprehensively for the first time by Simias and Philitas, whom Lycophron followed with his glossological work on Old Comedy—and he also famously showed off his extreme lexical erudition in the highly esoteric *Alexandra*. Aristophanes of Byzantium then brought this research to a new level in his comprehensive

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<sup>61</sup> Other notable commentaries include a running metrical commentary on Aristophanes by Heliodorus, Hipparchus of Nicaea's astronomical explication of Aratus, and the Τρωικός διάκοσμος of Demetrius of Scepsis, a work supposedly 30 books in length treating a mere 62 verses of the second book of the *Iliad*. There were also non-literary commentaries on material objects, including the work of Polemo and Antigonus Carystus.

*Lexeis*, a model for later Greek and Roman antiquity.<sup>62</sup> Lexicography and other linguistic concerns continued on in later generations through men such as Philoxenus, who among other things dealt with dialects, and notably the “dialect” of the Romans.<sup>63</sup>

Grammar also continued to be a primary concern for scholars, though whether it truly became an independent theoretical field of study in this period is uncertain. The first work that could be classified as such is the *τέχνη* of Dionysius Thrax (first century BC), if in fact what we have is an accurate transmission of his original. Even if there is no strong evidence for a comprehensive and systematic theory of grammar, however, one does find instances of Hellenistic thinkers engaging with grammatical concepts. Aristophanes, for example, identified some rules for declensions and developed some principles of analogy, in contrast to the *Περὶ ἀνωμαλίας* of the Stoic Chrysippus. The Stoics in fact achieved notoriety even at Alexandria for their development of grammatical studies, especially through Crates, who was an expert in grammatical usage and irregularities in spoken language. Ultimately, however, the very definition of ἡ γραμματικὴ τέχνη was not agreed upon, as Asclepiades of Myrlea, Tyrannio, and Dionysius Thrax all had different perspectives on what constituted that field of study, and it was not until the Roman period that grammatical knowledge would be more precisely codified.

In the Hellenistic period there is also an increase in efforts toward classification and organization of knowledge, exemplified primarily by the exhaustive catalog of literature by Callimachus, the *Πίνακες*. The extensive nature of this collection—ranging from poetry to science to the culinary arts—demonstrates something of the attitude toward knowledge present in Alexandrian scholars, and it is this that drives Pfeiffer in particular to see a difference between this era and the past: if men like the sophists researched academic matters, they did so with a mind toward helping themselves along in their profession, but scholars of the Callimachean mold pursued knowledge for its own sake and thus went to extremes of erudition unmatched by earlier men. Hellenistic classification covered not just poetry, but also the tougher task of organizing prose works, accomplished most notably by Callimachus, but also by

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<sup>62</sup> Pfeiffer (1968, 198)

<sup>63</sup> Pfeiffer (1968, 271)

Aristophanes, who according to Diogenes Laertius was interested in the organization of the Platonic dialogues.<sup>64</sup> Ultimately, the fact that a man in this era could be called Apollonius the Classifier (*εἰδογράφος*) suggests something of the Hellenistic attitude toward the organization of learning. Such epistemological classification, which was displayed in physical form on the shelves of the Library, would be carried through to subsequent generations.<sup>65</sup>

Even so, while the extent of scholarship was different, I must stress again the continuity with the past. If Eratosthenes is considered the founder of critical chronology, his efforts cannot be fully dislodged from the context of previous endeavors by Hippias, Hecataeus, and Aristotle. If Aristarchus solidified generic distinctions among lyric poets and discerned that which was “Homeric” and “cyclic” in the Homeric corpus, Aristotle too had done substantial work in this area, though to be sure Aristarchus employed a much more systematic method of examining specific phrases and marking them as Homeric or cyclic on the basis of their diction. The same may be said for Aristarchus’ collection of proverbs into four books (two for metrical proverbs, two for unmetrical), again apparently a development of Aristotle’s research. The extent to which knowledge was organized surpassed that of previous generations, but the impulse to do so was by no means a new thing.

The classification of knowledge implied selection as well, and in the Hellenistic period the literary canon (*οἱ ἐγκριθέντες*) was more firmly established. As Pfeiffer points out,<sup>66</sup> the “selected” authors very naturally became the “treated” authors, so that classification was part of a larger interpretive process insofar as it outlined what was to be interpreted. Of particular interest to us is the set of methods used by Hellenistic scholars in that interpretive work, which I highlight briefly here.

One fundamental exegetical technique seen in various incarnations is the distinction of past and present. Though it may seem obvious that cultures, languages, and ideologies change over time, the appeal to “old vs. new” is a crucial and ubiquitous mode of reasoning for Hellenistic and later

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<sup>64</sup> 3.61f.

<sup>65</sup> For example, note that Aristophanes’ use of the term “lyric” to describe archaic poets took hold as the common term instead of “melic.” Didymus and Proclus, at least, seem to have followed through on Aristophanic systems of organization (Pfeiffer 1968, 183f.).

<sup>66</sup> 1968, 208

interpreters. We know now, for instance, that Aristophanes' magisterial *Lexeis* contained one section that distinguished between old and new words, and Aristophanes exhibited concern not just for dialectal forms in the literature of the past, but also in modern usage.<sup>67</sup> Aristarchus too paid attention to how words changed meaning over time,<sup>68</sup> and the same is true for other aspects of culture, such as religious or other cultural practices. In moments of uncertainty, interpreters often turned to distinctions between οἱ πάλαιοι and οἱ νεώτεροι, and in many cases this type of reasoning served as an effective λύσις to the προβλήματα, a procedure found throughout the scholia.

Another fundamental issue pertains to the decision between literal and allegorical interpretation. Encased in this dilemma is not only the nature of a text's "truth," but also its purpose: texts could be for instruction, pleasure, or both, a distinction observed by Neoptolemus and followed famously by Horace in the *Ars Poetica*. The Stoics did not invent allegorism (which as mentioned above seems to have come out of the sixth century), but they did make this interpretive technique more widespread, as opposed to the ongoing tradition of a carping literalist tradition summed up best in the figure of Zoilus, the so-called Homeromastix, "whipping" Homer for errors in historical fact, plausibility, or language use. Eratosthenes seems to have found a middle ground, being neither completely literal or completely allegorical, but rather viewed Homer as pleasure (not instruction) and granted a degree of poetic license for an author who was not necessarily trying to reproduce a narrative that was perfectly plausible—a principle of interpretation followed also by Aristarchus. On the other hand, Aristarchus also wrote a detailed treatise on the arrangement of the Greek forces, akin to Demetrius of Scepsis' work on the arrangement of the Trojan army, so the expectations of realism and narrative consistency are evident even in those who allowed the poet some extra leash. This would continue to be one of the fundamental issues in the scholarly battle between supporters and detractors of classical authors.

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<sup>67</sup> Pfeiffer (1968, 202); cf. Crates' interest in the same topic as mentioned above.

<sup>68</sup> Pfeiffer (1968, 228)

*The Roman Period*

Pfeiffer takes the lead in charging the Roman period with inferior, unoriginal scholarship that involved compiling academic writings from the past without creating any new knowledge. Accordingly, he devotes approximately 10% of his volume to a discussion of scholarship after Alexandria, most of it spent on Apollodorus and Didymus, with scarcely a page total for actual Romans.<sup>69</sup> Whether this is fair based on the testimony of the Latin scholia remains to be seen, but for now it is sufficient to give a brief overview of the context of scholarship in the Roman period so that it is not overlooked in its place within the history of scholarship. This contextualization will be especially important for my project, since one of my central concerns will be analyzing the extent to which Roman scholars adopted the techniques and strategies of their Hellenistic or Classical Greek counterparts.

The transference of Alexandrian scholarship to Rome—or at least a form of it, depending on one’s view—was made possible in part by the political crisis of the 140s that distributed scholars abroad and in part by the Roman tendency to conquer peoples and then bring the spoils back to the city. Included in these spoils were some influential Greek scholars-turned-slaves who were brought to Rome and kept in the intellectual circles of leading men. Tyrannio the Elder, a prisoner of Lucullus in the early first century BC, was known for his linguistic prowess, including his work on meter and the doctrine of Aeolism.<sup>70</sup> At about the same time the Mithridatic Wars brought to Rome Alexander Polyhistor, a man of legendary learning, as his name suggests, with particular renown in philosophy, literature, and especially geography (he would later teach Hyginus, a freedman of Augustus who also showed great range in scholarship and was employed in the Palatine Library). Parthenius too may be added to this number, also a prisoner from the Mithridatic Wars and recognized for his literary acumen (he may have taught Vergil Greek and seems

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<sup>69</sup> The “founder of classical scholarship in Rome,” L. Aelius Stilo, gets one sentence and a footnote; for more on him, see Rawson (1985).

<sup>70</sup> See Rawson (1985) and Stevens (2006); Tyrannio was also placed in charge of salvaging Aristotle’s library after Sulla brought it to Rome in a state of disrepair, and when Cicero needed help organizing his own library, it was Tyrannio (also the tutor of his nephew Quintus) to whom he turned.

to have been responsible for encouraging a number of Latin poets to study Greek literature).<sup>71</sup> The most significant and productive of all scholars of this era, however, was the Alexandrian Didymus (first century BC to first century AD). Didymus was a prolific compiler and scholar whose supposedly thousands of books earned him such names as *Χαλκέντερος* (“Bronze-guts”) and *Βιβλιολάθας* (because he forgot which books he had written). Didymus is of utmost importance to us, for it is largely through his composite commentaries that we have remnants of earlier scholarship on classical Greek texts, most notably Homer, but also Euripides and others. His work is not always of the highest quality—commentators ancient, medieval, and modern have pointed out his errors in judgment<sup>72</sup>—but the immense breadth of his learning is remarkable.

Other important scholarly work was also being carried out in this period. As Dickey describes,<sup>73</sup> the first century AD saw Heraclitus’ allegorical interpretations of Homer, the Homeric lexicon of Apollonius Sophista, and a range of “popularizing” works aimed at a more general audience, including the so-called “Tales of Euripides” and other prose summaries of classical literature and mythology. In the second century we find developments in grammar (Apollonius Dyscolus), accentuation (Herodian), and meter (Hephaestion), as well as additional lexica that would eventually be used in some of our larger extant works from late antiquity (e.g., Hesychius). Commentaries also appeared, most notably Galen’s extensive response to Hippocrates, Porphyry’s work on classical Greek authors, and the first extant commentaries on Aristotle. Late antiquity saw the continuation of these traditions, especially with lexica and commentaries on Plato, Aristotle, Galen, and scientific/ mathematical writers such as Ptolemy and Euclid.

Roman scholars were also active, such as L. Aelius Stilo, who is thought to have been the first true scholar of Rome and was the teacher of Varro and Cicero. Varro’s work on the Latin language and its ancient customs would continue to be hugely influential to later commentators and throughout the

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<sup>71</sup> Other important Greek scholars at Rome include Aristonicus and Seleucus, both of whom produced work on the critical signs of Aristarchus as well as many other topics.

<sup>72</sup> For modern examples, see West (1970) and Harris (1989).

<sup>73</sup> 2007, 8ff.

ancient and medieval periods. Other scholars include Nigidius Figulus, whose work covered a range of topics from astronomy to divination to grammar and antiquarianism. We also hear of men such as Pliny the Elder working on *commentarii*, which according to his nephew were notes and extracts taken down by a slave at the scholar's side.<sup>74</sup> Later antiquity preserves a strong tradition of Roman *grammatici*, such as Aemilius Asper and Probus, and it was through some of these later scholars—the predecessors of the commentaries by Donatus and Servius—that the tradition of running commentaries was continued. At least some of the thrust for such academic endeavors should be viewed as a direct descendant from the Alexandrian tradition, perhaps most notably in the late Republic, when Julius Caesar supposedly planned to have Varro set up the “greatest possible libraries in Latin and Greek” in order to surpass the Alexandrian Library—and to proclaim himself a new Alexander.<sup>75</sup> The extent to which Latin scholia show a similar influence from Greek scholia will be a focus of my approach in my later chapters.

### *The Formation of the Scholia*

In her discussion of late antiquity, Dickey also provides an extremely helpful introduction to the complex process of the formation of our extant Greek scholia as marginalia to ancient texts, a process I summarize here.<sup>76</sup> Based on papyrus finds, the tradition of ancient literary marginalia was rather thin, with most notes providing interlinear glosses or other elementary help. The scholia, however, were taken not from ancient marginal notes, but from free-standing commentaries that were often based on scholarship from Alexandria, as the scholia themselves testify, filtered through the composite commentaries of Didymus and his contemporaries. The scholia are not to be regarded as a transcript of

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<sup>74</sup> *Epist.* 3.5.15ff.

<sup>75</sup> *Div. Iul.* 44

<sup>76</sup> 2007, 11-14. The formation of Latin scholia is a different matter. Although we can never be totally certain, in some cases we can be reasonably sure that we possess the work of known scholars, or at least something like their work, even if not in its full form or exact language, which for my purposes is sufficient to say something about those scholars' methods and concerns. I will outline the situation for Terence and Vergil individually in their respective chapters, for as Zetzel asserts (1975, 354), “no single pattern of development is correct for all scholia.”



these commentaries, but rather a reworking and (often) an epitomizing of such work. As such, they cannot be taken wholesale as a faithful reproduction of Alexandrian or even Roman-era scholarship, though in many places they will have accurately conveyed older material of a high quality, sometimes through quotation with explicit mention of the source. The timeline for this process of scholia creation from free-standing commentaries<sup>77</sup> is extremely uncertain, with guesses ranging from the fourth to the tenth centuries—and as it was not all accomplished instantaneously or in equal measure across literary, philosophical, mathematical, and medical works, we should probably think of the transition as a long one. As Dickey points out, however, the process could be reversed, as in the case of the D Scholia to Homer, which were reassembled into a free-standing commentary in some of our manuscripts.

Thus, the Greek marginal scholia in our medieval manuscripts is in large part a transmission of ancient Alexandrian and Roman-era scholarship, but certainly not in its original form, and not without manipulation or in some cases even mutilation. As a collection of ideas, the scholia may generally be said to contain much ancient material, and they represent the full gamut of notes from within the varying traditions of ancient scholarship, ranging from highly professional academic commentaries at the peak of Alexandria to popularizing mythographic information and basic glosses and paraphrases that are probably intended for young (possibly Roman) readers of Greek in a school setting. Because of their composite nature and the limits on our knowledge about their chronology, it is extremely important to handle the scholia with care. Even so, it is possible to see in the scholia quite a few of the foundational principles of literary exegesis as we know it from Alexandria and beyond, such that the scholia should be viewed as another step in the continuum of ancient scholarly practice. We may now proceed to the examination of the scholiastic corpora themselves, beginning with Euripides.

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<sup>77</sup> And I do mean “scholia creation,” vis-à-vis “scholia transmission” or some other term. The process is not simply a cut-and-paste job from older commentaries, but an evaluative reworking of and response to that material.

## CHAPTER 2

### Scholia and the Stage: Interpretations of Euripides

The scholia to Euripides offer a fascinating vista into the world of commentaries on tragic drama, where the original text receives exegetical treatment that mirrors its complicated identity. While to the scholiast the text is truly a text that is examined under a reader's eye and that can be cross-referenced with other written texts and with itself, at the same time the "text" has a double life because of the performance context associated with it, and the commentators show by their methods that in their minds a correct understanding of tragic drama hinges necessarily on an engagement with the material on both levels. Notes on etymology and discussions of precise grammatical rules reveal a commentator and his reader (emphasis on "reader") closely dissecting the written word, while remarks on stage direction, pronunciation, and evidence for a live, interactive audience place the exegesis back in the theater, even going so far as to recreate certain aspects of what the experience would be like.<sup>78</sup> This chapter provides an analysis of the efforts of some ancient thinkers to reconcile this gap in interpretation and will serve as a launching point for understanding exegetical endeavors aimed at other kinds of literature.

This chapter is also crucial insofar as it is the initial exposition of my own interpretive method and the typology I have established for studying ancient commentaries. For this reason I am especially thorough in the provision of examples so that I can give as accurate a sense as possible of the range of facts, questions, opinions, and techniques found in the commentaries, whereas in subsequent chapters I

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<sup>78</sup> In this sense it may be particularly useful to consider the reader of the Euripidean scholia as an "audience" in its formal sense of "listener." At least to some extent it is the implicit aim of the scholiasts to recreate the scene so that it may be seen and heard (*audire*). Of course, this sort of duality is inherent to my other case studies as well, though it remains to be seen whether the commentaries to those authors treat the text as writing, as performance, or both. In very general terms it is also useful to contrast the phenomenon of running "director's commentaries" in modern film, where a knowledgeable source (*auctor ipse!*) gives audio "marginalia" via a separate overlaid audio track as the "drama" unfolds in real time; the scholia cannot do this, but there are nonetheless ways in which the reader is permitted a seat in the *θέατρον*.

focus my attention more selectively. After a short description of the text of the commentaries, I will outline exhaustively the topical categories found therein. I will then describe what I see as the principal methods of exegesis used by these ancient scholars to find meaning in the original texts and to explain problematic passages.

### *The Texts*

Of the 19 surviving plays of Euripides, *scholia vetera* exist in substantial form for nine.<sup>79</sup> The best edition for these, though occasionally misleading and lacking some important manuscripts,<sup>80</sup> is that of Schwartz, an approximately 800-page volume with thousands and thousands of scholia ranging from single-word glosses to page-length expositions of historical and mythological information or paraphrases for large sections of the original text.<sup>81</sup> The concentration of notes per page of original text is usually more or less the same, though there is a general tendency to offer fewer comments toward the end of a drama (a common enough phenomenon in ancient commentaries), and sometimes a dozen or so lines can go by without receiving any attention.

Source criticism is extremely important but notoriously difficult for most scholia. While some are attributed to specific scholars, the majority can be discerned only very generally—that is, a comment

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<sup>79</sup> I include the debated *Rhesus* in this count. Although there are compelling reasons to doubt its authenticity, what concerns me in this project is not the actual authorship so much as the thinking of ancient scholars, who themselves debated its authenticity. The others are the *Hecuba*, *Orestes*, *Phoenissae*, *Hippolytus*, *Medea*, *Alcestis*, *Andromache*, and *Troades* (for these I employ the standard LSJ abbreviations). I also include the Euripidean hypotheses, for which see Rossum-Steenbeek (1998).

<sup>80</sup> One notable omission is the Jerusalem Palimpsest, edited by Daitz (1979). This volume is important for understanding the manuscript stemmata, though I do not cite it in my discussion here, not only because it is fragmentary and difficult to use with confidence, but because I see no evidence in the fragments for types of notes that are not found in abundance in Schwartz.

<sup>81</sup> The scholia are gathered from numerous manuscripts, and many of the notes are essentially the same, though with different wording and frequent lacunae. The prevailing aim of modern editions of ancient scholia seems to be a collective, representative “unity” of the scholia from their varying constituent parts. This means that the “collective” text of a scholion may claim a certain reading for a manuscript that is not exact, so the critical apparatus is extremely important for an examination of individual manuscript characteristics—and some noticeable tendencies do appear.

might convey a certain philosophical stance that is in accord with a specific individual, or literary critical notes may be derived from Aristotelian or other types of scholarship. As Dickey states, we can trace the Euripidean scholia ultimately back to Aristophanes of Byzantium as filtered through Didymus,<sup>82</sup> but even if it is relatively easy to separate the old scholia from the Byzantine material, we have simply no known provenance for the vast majority of the notes and do not know the extent to which the Alexandrian material has been altered. Thus, to provide any kind of guidance whatsoever as to the origin of a given scholion, one must become familiar with ancient scholarship and scholia of all kinds so as to discern tendencies and correspondences across different commentaries.<sup>83</sup>

Like the scholia to other authors, the Euripidean comments have a number of formulae and patterns that, when mastered, greatly aid one's journey through this material that is, as a rule, abbreviated and idiosyncratic. For instance, unfamiliar vocabulary may have a simple one-word gloss attached for clarification, though there are often formulaic markers for this.<sup>84</sup> Restatements of various kinds may also bear no special marker, though frequently they are introduced by *τοῦτ' ἔστιν* or *θέλει λέγειν* ("s/he intends to say that . . ."). Other passages begin with such phrases as *ὁ λόγος ἐστίν* ("The sense [of the passage] is as follows") or *ἡ σύνταξις ἐστίν* ("The arrangement [of the passage] is as follows"), the latter particularly in cases of unconventional word order—not a rarity for tragic drama, especially in the choral odes.<sup>85</sup>

These scholia also frequently present competing claims on the meaning, explanation, or significance of a portion of the original text, mostly without any perceptible preference for one option or the other. Here we often see formulae such as *τινὲς μὲν . . . τινὲς (ἄλλοι) δὲ . . .* and *οἱ μὲν . . . οἱ δὲ . . .*, "Some say . . . but others . . ." When a solution is preferred, it can be marked by phrases such as *ὃ*

<sup>82</sup> 2007, 32; a note to *Medea* 1415 states that the material has come from the copies of Dionysius and Didymus (*πρὸς διάφορα ἀντίγραφα Διονυσίου ὀλοσχερὲς καὶ τινα τῶν Διδύμου*), but there is hardly any guarantee that this statement applies to all the scholia we possess.

<sup>83</sup> Schwartz is not so helpful in this regard, but more modern editions of scholia often include, in addition to the critical apparatus, a separate apparatus listing parallel passages for a phrase or thought found in a given scholion. This practice can give some context to an otherwise obscure note, and in particular it will be a chief concern of mine in the future to examine how the scholia depend on writers such as Pausanias, Plutarch, and others.

<sup>84</sup> E.g., the word *ἀντί* can signal a replacement, whether a gloss or a paraphrase. See *Hecuba* 165, where *ἐνεγκοῦσαι* is accompanied by the note *ἀντί τοῦ ἀπαγγέλλασαι*.

<sup>85</sup> E.g., *Or.* 439, *Ph.* 1498, *Andr.* 168, *Hec.* 37, et al.

ἀμεινόν ἐστιν, “which is better.” Another ubiquitous feature of the scholia is ἄλλως, a word used to introduce additional notes for the same lemma—be they complementary, repetitive, or contradictory.<sup>86</sup>

In addition, there is a wide range of technical terminology that is utilized throughout the Euripidean scholia in discussions of rhetorical figures, issues of literary criticism, grammatical theory, and more. These can be mastered only through painstaking reading of many scholia while cross-checking the use of a phrase or word with other examples. Dickey’s *Ancient Greek Scholarship* provides valuable assistance to beginning and advanced readers, though there is no substitute for great quantities of reading—a fact that Dickey understands as well as anyone.

Further, let me offer a very brief word on the “personality” of the Euripidean scholiasts. It is incredibly difficult to come up with any reasonable assessment of individual commentators given the anonymity of most notes, which are presented in a variorum style that heaps together opinions from different sources without much streamlining, but even so we can glean some information from the ways the commentators insert themselves into the text through first-person speech. Scholia in general have certain identifiable formulae in which first-person references normally occur, including such phrases as “it seems to me” or “other say this, but we say . . .” or internal cross-references via phrases such as “as we said above.” Statements of this kind are useful not only for the content of the notes themselves, but also for the implications of the first-person references for considering the didactic role of the scholia, that is, the way in which the teacher-student paradigm is evident in the formal structures of the commentaries. The Euripidean scholia have relatively little language of this type, though note several examples of the “as we say” formula to contrast out-dated Euripidean locutions with contemporary common usage.<sup>87</sup> As will become obvious in subsequent chapters, other scholiastic corpora have more first-person language of

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<sup>86</sup> It quickly becomes clear through the use of such language and the often contradictory or, more often, repetitive nature of adjacent notes that the Euripidean scholia in their current form are largely a cut-and-paste affair, with compilations of notes thrown together without much energy spent in creating a streamlined whole. On the one hand, this gives the scholia a sometimes sloppy, juvenile appearance. On the other hand, it is through such minimal tampering that we are more likely to have received well-preserved comments from earlier sources.

<sup>87</sup> E.g., *Hec.* 241, *Or.* 1617

the other types—e.g., the commonplace “as we saw before” of the Aeschinean scholia—culminating in the frequent use of first-person speech in Servius.

Finally, let me cover a few technical points pertaining to my approach. There is no adequate system for citing an individual scholion in Schwartz, or for that matter in most modern editions of scholia. All that can be done is to provide the citation for the verse of Euripides to which the scholion is appended and leave it to the reader to track down the specific portion of text amongst the other scholia to that verse.<sup>88</sup> Given the unavoidable vagueries of this method and the fact that not many readers will have a copy of Schwartz on hand, I have tried to include the Greek text wherever it is necessary. Because scholia can be difficult to translate with their idiosyncratic and often abbreviated language, I have provided translations or at least a basic paraphrase for most of the Greek text that I quote, while in other cases it is necessary only to observe a specific phenomenon and keep moving, and so a translation is not always given. As far as good methods for translating the scholia consistently, I know of none. A literal translation would in many cases be illegible or at minimum grotesque.<sup>89</sup> A looser translation escapes this problem, but if it goes too far afield it stirs up dangers of its own. I pray the reader’s pardon as I sail toward these Symplegades. Because the scholia are so abbreviated, I have supplemented many of my translations with appropriate additions in square brackets in an attempt to give the full sense of the note while still communicating the brevity of the scholia. Square brackets are also used to add the reference numbers (provided by Schwartz) to the citations found in the scholia: for example [2.17] would be used to designate the source of a quotation from Thucydides 2.17, where the scholiast may give only the author or perhaps a vague reference to the second book. Lemmata and other quotations from the original text are enclosed in diamond brackets.

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<sup>88</sup> As will be seen in the next chapter, Dilts’ edition of the Aeschinean scholia combines a system of reference to the section in the original text and a continuous numerical sequence for each scholion in each speech. This makes it very easy to identify a specific scholion, but only if the reader possesses a copy of Dilts. Until this method is commonplace across different editions, it is not a universally friendly method of citation, and so throughout I continue to cite scholia by the verse or section number of the original text to which they are appended. It is a regrettably unspecific system, and I am sympathetic to any disgruntled readers.

<sup>89</sup> McDonough et al. (2004) opt for this method of translating Servius’ notes to Book 4 of the *Aeneid*, but must resort to end notes to explain what some translations mean.

### *Topical Concerns*

Presented here is an analytical summary of the wide-ranging topics addressed by the Euripidean scholia. It must be said at the outset that such a categorical division of topics is artificial, and that I find no evidence in the scholia themselves that the commentators conceived of their project as a systematized process of examining these several categories distinctly. Rather, we should say that in explaining the original text a scholiast might find it appropriate to employ many branches of knowledge to make sense of an otherwise obscure passage, to resolve a problem in the text, to blame Euripides for a mistake, or conversely to defend him against detractors. A game of knowledge is thus played out in the scholia, the implicit assumption being that no one can understand Euripides without a wide-ranging general *ἐπιστήμη*. What topics are found or not found within this *ἐπιστήμη* may be seen from the following.

### *Textual Construction*

One key area of interest for the scholiasts is the establishment of the Euripidean text itself, a foundational practice for literary exegesis—after all, one cannot interpret something until one has decided *what* is to be interpreted. We might call this project “textual criticism,” though one must be careful not to import notions of modern textual criticism into an understanding of ancient scholarly practice, and what I mean by “textual construction” is really somewhat broader than “textual criticism” would imply. What I outline in this section is a process by which commentators “put the text together,” an endeavor that includes the presentation of alternate readings and varied orthography, discussions of accentuation in cases where the identity of the word itself is at stake, implementation of a simple system of punctuation, and various other syntactical markers that show how the reader is to distinguish between segments of the text.

Though specific details are often lacking, the scholia frequently provide alternate readings to the text, many of which are useful for modern textual critics. The ancient commentators have no sophisticated system of handling the manuscripts, though there are vague references to source material through such terminology as ἔνιοι ἀντιγραφοί or ὑπομνήματα,<sup>90</sup> and one also occasionally finds critical evaluations of those manuscripts.<sup>91</sup> Most alternatives come without provenance, introduced simply by a set phrase such as γράφεται or λέγεται, but a few have names attached, as at *Hecuba* 13 where Didymus is claimed as the source for an aberration from the manuscripts. For *Orestes* 314, Callistratus advocates the removal of a final sigma, resulting in a generalizing third-person verb (“if someone is sick”) instead of a second-person version referring specifically to Orestes: <κὰν μὴ νοσηῖς γάρ> Καλλίστρατος τὴν ἐκτὸς τοῦ σ γραφὴν διδάσκει· <κὰν μὴ νοσηῖ γάρ, ἀλλὰ δοξάζῃ νοσεῖν>, ἔν’ ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ὀρέστου εἰς κοινὸν μεταβεβηκὼς ὁ λόγος. Callistratus again appears at *Orestes* 1038, this time as a spokesperson for Aristophanes of Byzantium: γράφεται καὶ <δόμον>. οὕτως γοῦν καὶ Καλλίστρατός φησιν Ἀριστοφάνη γράφειν, “δόμον is also written; Callistratus in any case says that Aristophanes writes thus.”<sup>92</sup>

In many cases a variant or variants are given without any specification as to which is better, and even when a preference is stated, it is often without any explanation as to why it is preferred. Such is the question over whether to read a form of πίπτειν or παίειν at *Orestes* 1547, the uncertainty of whether to read a participle or an infinitive at *Phoenissae* 1547 (<ἔχων ἴσον> ἐὰν γράφηται <ἔχειν>, καὶ <ἀπονέμειν>· ἐὰν δὲ <ἔχων>, καὶ <ἀπονέμων>),<sup>93</sup> or a similar question at *Alcestis* 734 (τινὲς δὲ <ἔρρων> γράφουσι σὺν τῷ <ν>, ἵνα ἢ μετοχὴ ἀντὶ ῥήματος τοῦ ἔρρε). The same is true for discussions of dubious verses, where some are marked simply as missing in most or at least a few manuscripts, with no preference stated as to whether they truly belong.<sup>94</sup>

<sup>90</sup> *Hec.* 13, *Or.* 957, *Ph.* 642

<sup>91</sup> τὰ κατὰ τῶν ἀντιγράφων <δρᾶσον> ἔχει (*Hec.* 225).

<sup>92</sup> See also, among others, the note on Philochorus at *Hecuba* 1 and on Aristophanes at *Orestes* 713.

<sup>93</sup> Neither of these options seems to be the correct reading is irrelevant to the present inquiry. As shall be true throughout, I am concerned with the principles and methods of ancient scholarly practice even when it is shown to be faulty.

<sup>94</sup> *Or.* 1229, 1394; *Ph.* 375, 1075, 1225, 1282; *Hipp.* 1050; *Alc.* 820; *Andr.* 1254



This is not always the case, however. The scholiast will sometimes indicate a preferred option plainly with a “which is better” formula, as in the case of *Troades* 40: γράφεται <οἰκτρά>, ὃ καὶ ἄμεινον. He can also provide more substantial grounds for the variant, as in *Hecuba* 70f., where there is a debate over the verse ending νύξ or χθών: εἰ δὲ γράφεται <χθών>, οὕτως εἶπεν, ἐπεὶ ἐκ τῆς γῆς λέγονται ἀναπέμπεσθαι οἱ ὄνειροι, “But if χθών is written, [Euripides] spoke thus because dreams are said to be sent forth from the earth.” Similarly, consider the original text of *Andromache* 89f., where a servant girl unwillingly agrees to deliver a message to Peleus for Andromache, possibly at her own peril: ἀλλ’ εἰμι’, ἐπεὶ τοι κοῦ περίβλεπτος βίος / δούλης γυναικός, ἦν τι καὶ πάθω κακόν, “But I go, since the life of a servant woman is no precious thing, whether I also suffer some evil.” A scholion remarks that some manuscripts omit the οὐ in crasis, leaving only καὶ περίβλεπτος, in which case the handmaiden’s comment is ironic—that is, she claims sarcastically that, *of course*, her life as a slave is of *utmost* concern.

As before, there is a parallel with verses marked as dubious, for while a preference is unspecified in some cases, others come with a rationale. A key example is *Orestes* 957, where the chorus laments Electra’s sorrowful appearance: ἐν ἐνίοις δὲ οὐ φέρονται οἱ τρεῖς στίχοι οὗτοι. πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἔμελλε στυγνάζειν; “But in some [manuscripts] these three lines are not contained, for how was she not about to have a gloomy countenance?” Here it is revealed that some textual critics have excised the lines on the principle that needless, unnecessary, and gratuitous pleonasm are unworthy of the poet, a principle we shall address later when discussing the aesthetic/ literary critical approaches found in the scholia. Also of note is *Orestes* 641f., which is marked by some for deletion on account of its un-Euripidean flavor: ἐνίοι ἀθετοῦσι τοῦτον καὶ τὸν ἐξῆς στίχον· οὐκ ἔχουσι γὰρ τὸν Εὐριπίδειον χαρακτήρα. As for what is meant by “Euripidean,” let us save this matter for later. Suffice it for now to say that the scholiasts may give reasons, however limited, for textual variants and verses of doubted authenticity.<sup>95</sup>

Separate mention is owing to one of the more interesting instances of textual criticism found in the Euripidean scholia. *Phoenissae* 682-7 reads: σοὶ νιν ἔκγονοι κτίσαν, / καὶ διώνυμοι θεαί, / Περσέφασσα

<sup>95</sup> For other examples of the defense of certain textual readings: *Ph.* 378, 393, 566.

καὶ φίλα / Δαμάττηρ θεά, / πάντων ἄνασσα, πάντων δὲ Γᾶ τροφός, / κτήσαντο, “Your ancestors founded it [Thebes] for you, and the two-named goddesses, Persephone and her dear mother Demeter, queen of all, and Earth, nurse of all, founded it.” A scholion to the first line mentions a variant: <σῶ νιν ἐκγόνῳ κτίσαν>, ἔν’ ἧ τῶ ἐκγόνῳ σου, Ἐπαφε, τῶ Κάδμῳ, αἱ θεαὶ κατέκτισαν τὰς θήβας, “So that [the verse] is, ‘Eraphus, the goddesses founded Thebes for your ancestor Cadmus.’” The replacement of σοὶ νιν ἐκγονοὶ with σῶ νιν ἐκγόνῳ is unexceptional, but the reason behind it is one of the most elaborate textual notes found in the corpus:

γέγονε δὲ περὶ τὴν γραφὴν ἀμάρτημα. ἄρχοντος γὰρ Ἀθήνησιν Εὐκλείδου μήπω τῶν μακρῶν εὐρημένων τοῖς βραχέσιν ἀντὶ τῶν μακρῶν ἐχρῶντο, τῶ <ε> ἀντὶ τοῦ <η> καὶ τῶ <ο> ἀντὶ τοῦ <ω>. ἔγραφον οὖν τὸ δῆμῳ μετὰ τοῦ <ι>· δῆμοι. μὴ νοήσαντες δὲ ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν γραφὴν ἔστι καὶ δεῖ μεταθεῖναι τὸ <ο> εἰς τὸ <ω> ἐτάραξαν τὸ νοητόν.

And an error has occurred in the manuscript. For when Euclides was archon at Athens [403-402 BC], since long [vowels] had not yet been discovered, they were using short ones instead of long: epsilon instead of eta and omicron instead of omega. Therefore they used to write δῆμῳ with the iota as δῆμοι. And not knowing that [the text] is in accordance with the old style and that it is necessary to transpose the omicron into the omega [i.e., making the word a dative singular instead of nominative plural], they confused the sense.

The “they” is left unspecified, though it is worth nothing that additional scholia to this verse as recorded by Schwartz assume a nominative plural, so there do seem to have been some who favored the reading σοὶ νιν ἐκγονοὶ. It is impossible to know whether the source of the first note would have known of the others, but in any case the existence of variants is clear. There are a number of issues at stake here, not least the idea of scholiasts butting heads, but for now let it suffice to show that the textual criticism of the scholia occasionally goes beyond simple collation of different readings and preserves a sometimes fine-toothed standard of judgment.

These issues of orthography also include uncertainty in accentuation in those cases where a different diacritical marking changes the word entirely. Since that is so, choosing accents—like choosing word variants—is often a matter of interpretation. For some of these situations the scholiast is confident in his assertion, though at other times the door is left open for multiple readings. See *Medea* 365, which gives the example of ταῦτα vs. ταῦτά, which in some places gets a circumflex accent and in

others an acute with crasis: τὸ <ταῦτα> πῆ μὲν περισπᾶται. πῆ δὲ ὀξύνεται, ὃ ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ κατὰ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος, καθὸ πεισθεῖς Κρέων ἀπήλθε, οὐ ταῦτὰ τὰ πράγματά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ βελτίονα. At *Hecuba* 155, some give an alternate accent that shifts the tense of the verb from present to future: τινὲς δὲ περισπῶσι τὸ <ἀχῶ>, ἴν' ἧ ὅποιαν ἠχήσω βοήν. Changing accents can also affect the syntax of a clause, as in *Orestes* 757, where the eta is either an intensive particle or a relative pronoun standing in for an indirect interrogative pronoun: <ἧ κρινεῖ τί χρεῖμα λέξον> ὃ ἧ ἀντὶ τοῦ δή· ἀναστρεπτέον δὲ τὸν λόγον· τί δὴ κρινεῖ, λέξον· ἧ οὕτως· τί δὴ ἡ ψήφος κρινεῖ, εἰπέ, ὅτι φοβοῦμαι· ἧ οὕτως· τὸ ἧ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἧτις· <ἧτις>, αὐτὴ ἡ ψήφος, τί κρινεῖ, λέξον. See also an example of shifting technical vocabulary at *Phoenissae* 84: <ναίων πτυχάς> ἔαν μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ πτύξ, πτύχας, ἔαν δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ πτυχή, πτυχάς, “If it comes from πτύξ, then [the accents appears as] πτύχας, but if from πτυχή, then πτυχάς.”<sup>96</sup>

It should be mentioned too that other scholia give instructions about accents that go beyond the original text at hand and aim to teach general principles, a didactic tendency that I shall be highlighting at various points throughout my project, especially for the ramifications this practice has for determining the intended audience of the scholia. For instance, a number of notes explain that the accentuation of a particular form is parallel to that of other words. Note the corresponding example for the acute accent on the final syllable of *σαγή* at *Rhesus* 207: ὡς *σαγή*, ὀξύτόνως. So too with the acute accent on the penultimate syllable of *ἰέραι* at *Orestes* 261: τὸ <ἰέραι> προπαροξύνουσιν ὡς τὸ τιμώριαι καὶ αἵτιαι. The note at *Phoenissae* 468 does one better, citing analogous examples but also giving a more general principle that the reader can use for the correct accentuation of other nouns derived from verbs: <καὶ διαλλακτῆς κακῶν> διαλλακτῆς ὀξύτόνως· τὰ γὰρ παρὰ ῥῆμα ὀξύνονται ὡς τὸ κολυμβητῆς ποιητῆς, “διαλλακτῆς has an acute accent on the final syllable, for [nouns] from verbs get this accent, like the words κολυμβητῆς and ποιητῆς.”<sup>97</sup> These scholia go beyond the immediate necessity of explaining the

<sup>96</sup> Compare the distinction between the adverb and imperative with ἴδου at *Hecuba* 808 (<ἴδου>: βαρυτόνως τὸ ῥῆμα, ὀξύτόνως τὸ ἐπίρρημα); cf. *Ph.* 227, 697; *Andr.* 816.

<sup>97</sup> It is worth noting the scholiastic convention of the neuter singular article to indicate an entry of a word or phrase, where we would use quotation marks.

text by appealing to analogical examples that demonstrate the same phenomenon, all with the purpose (ostensibly) of equipping the reader to have a better handle on Greek grammar.

Especially for those reading texts that may not have word breaks and a consistent system of punctuation—or any at all—a commentary must also provide help in distinguishing syntactical units. That this is a concern for scholiasts is evident in the many passages in which commas or periods are mandated through language such as ὑποστικτέον (“a comma must be placed here”) and στικτέον (“a period/ colon must be placed here”). As with other kinds of notes, though, there is not always certainty as to where punctuation should go, for which see *Orestes* 933: τινὲς εἰς τὸ <πάλαι> στίζουσιν, “Some put a period/ colon after πάλαι.”<sup>98</sup> Further, punctuation is recognized not simply as a means of helping a reader comprehend a text, but rather as a means of *interpreting* that text. For example, take Euripides’ verses beginning at *Phoenissae* 1356 where the messenger relates the death of Polyneices and Eteocles: τὰ μὲν πρὸ πύργων εὐτυχήματα χθονὸς οἶσθ’· οὐ μακρὰν γὰρ τειχέων περιπτυχαί, “You know the good fortunes of our land that were before the walls, for the enclosing of the walls is not far away.” The scholion reads: <οἶσθ’· οὐ μακρὰν γὰρ τειχέων>· τινὲς εἰς τὸ οὐ στίζουσιν· οὐκ οἶσθα, φησὶ, τὰ πρὸ τῶν πύργων εὐτυχήματα· μακρὰν γὰρ εἰσιν, “Some punctuate after the οὐ, ‘You do not know,’ he says, ‘the fortunes in front of the walls, for they are far away.’” However strange it may be for scholiasts to accept this interpretation, note that different possibilities for punctuation result in completely different meanings.<sup>99</sup> Punctuation is thus recognized as an element that is just as central to the construction of the text as the selection of the words themselves.

Allied with the use of punctuation marks is the mention of various types of syntactical organization. Just as a scholiast might point to a comma or full stop to show the reader where to find the beginning of a new sense unit, so too could he point out hyperbaton, parenthesis, and other types of word grouping or separation that might require elucidation. There is often clarification, for example, when normal word order is disrupted. A scholion at *Orestes* 1378 offers help of this type with its instruction to

<sup>98</sup> Cf. *Ph.* 217, 234; *Hipp.* 573; *Alc.* 909; *Andr.* 480; *Rh.* 508

<sup>99</sup> Cf. *Hipp.* 1378, *Med.* 1124

read the original text (*παῖ φύγω, ξέναι, πολλὸν αἰθέρ' ἀμπτάμενος ἢ πόντον, Ὀκεανὸς ὄν ταυρόκρανος ἀγκάλαις ἐλίσσω κυκλοῖ χθόνα;*) as if the delayed relative pronoun were actually at the head of its clause according to normal word order (*ἀναστρεπτέον δὲ τὴν λέξιν, τουτέστιν ὄν Ὀκεανός;*).<sup>100</sup> The figure of *ὑπέρθεις* is also pointed out for *Hecuba* 391 (*ὑμεῖς δέ μ' ἀλλὰ θυγατρὶ συμφονεύσατε*), meaning that the delayed *ἀλλά* would normally be first in its clause. Also included is the figure of *τμησις* (though it is not always given its formal name), specifically with compound verbs separated into root and prefix.<sup>101</sup>

Identification of cola divisions is another common feature of the scholia, as at *Orestes* 168 (*ἀπὸ τοῦ <σὺ γάρ νιν> ἕως τοῦ <θούξασα> τὸ κῶλον*) and 1419 (*τὸ <μή τις εἶη δόλος> ἄλλο κῶλον*). This includes pointing out parenthetical phrases, which have “middleness” (*μεσότης*), meaning that they are inserted in the middle of a different syntactical construction. Other phrases marking this phenomenon include *ἐν μεσοσυλλαβίᾳ*, *ἐν μέσῳ*, or *διὰ μέσῳ*,<sup>102</sup> all indicating that the given group of words has interrupted a statement and that the reader must take together what comes before and after, despite the separation. Akin to this is the idea that certain phrases must be read “by themselves” (*κατ' ἰδίαν, ἀπολύτως, καθ' ἑαυτό*),<sup>103</sup> opposite in force but similar in concept to statements that certain sentence elements “must be joined together” (*συναπτέον*).<sup>104</sup> As with the other kinds of textual notes demonstrated so far, such comments may be assertive or noncommittal in case of a debated reading.

Thus far I have shown a range of different types of comments that relate to alternate readings, punctuation, and word order or cola identification. It would be misleading, however, to suggest that these are distinct patterns of thinking, for the various concerns frequently appear in conjunction with one another. Instructions to add a comma, for example, go naturally with instructions to take certain words together.<sup>105</sup> So too may a variation in spelling affect accentuation: *<δέρηγν> ἔαν μετὰ τοῦ <ι>, ὀξύτόνως*

<sup>100</sup> See the similar case of anastrophe at *Phoenissae* 1498 (*τὸ δὲ <τίνα πρὸς> ἀναστρεπτέον, τουτέστι πρὸς τίνα*); cf. *Rh.* 783.

<sup>101</sup> *Ph.* 325, *Andr.* 552

<sup>102</sup> Respectively: *Med.* 1085, *Or.* 340, *Ph.* 341; for further examples, see *Ph.* 341, 583.

<sup>103</sup> *Or.* 327, 446; *Andr.* 1042, 1273; *Tr.* 951

<sup>104</sup> *Med.* 1053, *Andr.* 807

<sup>105</sup> E.g., *Ph.* 101; *Hec.* 1029, 1035

δειρήν· εἰ δὲ χωρὶς τοῦ <ι>, βαρυτόνως δέρην.<sup>106</sup> Further, different forms of punctuation may lead to emendations in accentuation, as at *Phoenissae* 196: ἔνιοι δὲ στίζουσιν εἰς τὸ <πόλιν> καὶ τὸ <χώρει> παροξύνουσι καὶ οὕτως ἐξήγουνται . . . , “But some put a full stop at πόλιν and make an acute accent on the penultimate syllable of χώρει and interpret the passage as follows . . . .” My distillation of these variant subsets of textual construction is meant only to help us examine different aspects of a general approach to the text. In summary, we should say that the scholiasts were concerned with an accurate rendering of the original text, and in their work they made use of a variety of tools, all of which—as the scholiasts were well aware and as the last example shows especially—affected the interpretation (ἐξήγησις) of the original text.

### *Lexicography*

Lexicographical notes are some of the most pervasive and essential of all the scholia. I say “essential” because at the heart of the commentary is exegesis of the original text, and the definition of individual words is the most fundamental element of this endeavor. As described in the first chapter, the tradition of *lexeis* literature is huge, and although the “scholarly” treatment of the topic begins to appear more in the Hellenistic period, lexicography in practice is inherent to the composition (and digestion, and re-performance) of literature itself. In the Euripidean scholia this practice exhibits itself primarily in the form of the gloss, but also in etymologies, notes on lexical figures, and discussions of lexical propriety.

As discussed above, the scholiastic gloss can take several forms. The most fundamental is a one-for-one pairing of a common word with an unfamiliar word in the original text,<sup>107</sup> the central assumption of this ubiquitous technique being that words have more familiar correlates that are sufficiently synonymous to clarify what the poet is saying without compromising his meaning. Glosses are also

<sup>106</sup> *Med.* 29

<sup>107</sup> For just one of the multitudinous examples, see the gloss τὸ μαντικόν for μαντόσυνον, with no other explanation given (*Andr.* 1032).

needed for common words used in uncommon ways, that is, when those words function outside of their normal lexical or grammatical domain. For example, it is common to read that ἀλλά should be understood as meaning γάρ, or that πρό stands for ἀνά, or that ὡς is a replacement for ὅτι.<sup>108</sup> Such cases do not usually come with any explanation for why the substitution is made, but regardless it is clear that this practice implicitly acknowledges that the poet will from time to time utilize a word in a way that is not in accordance with the commentator's sense of standard usage.

Other types of glosses might seem to us more encyclopedic than lexicographical, though I find no reason draw too fine a distinction here. These notes provided extended definitions of specialist terminologies in various fields, such as military language pertaining to certain kinds of equipment or tactics.<sup>109</sup> Other examples include the terminology of sailing, family relations, sacrifice, drinking cups, and more.<sup>110</sup> Some of these glosses aim at drawing specific distinctions in usage between terms, as in the note explaining the phrase μορφῆι μὲν οὐκ εὐώπός, ἀνδρείος δ' ἀνὴρ (“He is not fair to look upon in form, but he is a courageous man”) at *Orestes* 918: ἀνδρείος τῆ ψυχῆ. ἀνδρεία γὰρ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς. ῥώμη δὲ ἐπὶ σώματος, “[He means] ἀνδρείος in soul, for ἀνδρεία pertains to the soul, and ῥώμη pertains to the body.” Likewise, note the distinction at *Phoenissae* 1010 that different words are used to label the bedroom of a mortal and a sacred room belonging to a god: διαφέρει σηκὸς καὶ ἄδυτον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ σηκὸς ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπου, τὸ δὲ ἄδυτον ἐπὶ θεοῦ.<sup>111</sup> Other glosses define idiomatic phrases, as at *Andromache* 1120: <χωρεῖ δὲ πρύμναν> ὅ ἐστιν· εἰς τοῦπίσω ἀνεπόδισεν μὴ δοῦς τὰ νῶτα, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους ὀρών, “The phrase χωρεῖ δὲ πρύμναν means to backpedal without showing [your enemy] your back.” And as we have seen in other types of notes, not every assertion made by the scholiast is rigidly dogmatic. At *Orestes* 21, for instance, it is remarked that the bed of Clytemnestra could be ἐπίσημον either on account of its σωφροσύνη

<sup>108</sup> Respectively: *Ph.* 529, 1519; *Or.* 93. For further examples: *Hec.* 94, *Or.* 439, *Ph.* 643, *Hipp.* 525, *Med.* 912, et al.

<sup>109</sup> *Hec.* 133, 1155f.; *Or.* 1302; *Ph.* 1095, 1240, 1386, 1400; *Alc.* 498; *Rh.* 2

<sup>110</sup> Respectively: *Or.* 57, 1233; *Ph.* 274; *Rh.* 419

<sup>111</sup> Cf. *Ph.* 1116, *Andr.* 282

before her adultery or in a bad sense (i.e., “infamous”) after the adultery.<sup>112</sup> The possibilities can also become more numerous, as for *φύσις* at *Orestes* 126: οἱ μὲν φασι συνωνυμεῖν τῇ μορφῇ καὶ τῇ δομῇ, οἱ δὲ τὴν εὐπρέπειαν τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὸ κάλλος, οἱ δὲ τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἐκάστου, “Some say it is synonymous with form and figure, and some say a decent physical appearance and good looks, and others say character and individual nature.”<sup>113</sup>

Such distinctions may also include general didactic information in addition to specific exegetical help for the passage at hand. For instance, to understand the meaning of *μελάνδετον* in *Orestes* 821, one does not need to know that other compounds that are *not* found in this passage behave similarly.<sup>114</sup> One can also grasp the idea that *παράμουσος* is a synonym for *ἄμουσος* without being instructed that *ἄνοιαν* and *παράνοιαν* are analogous.<sup>115</sup> Likewise, once a definition for *ἰσθμός* is given, one does not necessarily need to know how it differs from *πορθμός*, a word not found in this passage from the original text.<sup>116</sup>

Moreover, although the reader has already been told that *τέτρωρον* means *τέθριππον*, the scholiast goes further in linking the language of yoking horses to a word referring to a spouse: καὶ συνωρίς δὲ, ὅταν ἕτερος ἐτέρῳ συνεζευγμένος ᾖ. ἀπὸ τούτου καὶ συνάορος ἢ γυνὴ λέγεται, ἢ συνηρητημένη καὶ συνεζευγμένη, “And also a horse is called *συνωρίς* when one is joined to another. From this also a wife is called a *συνάορος*, one who is joined together and yoked [to her husband].”<sup>117</sup>

One may argue as well that notes containing a profusion of glosses for a single word also smack of a didactic approach, though less explicitly than in the aforementioned notes. It is true that in these instances of heavy glossing the scholiast may be aiming at establishing the full range of meanings so that

<sup>112</sup> Cf. *Hec.* 865

<sup>113</sup> The issue of ambiguity in the original text is crucial for the aesthetic judgments found in the scholia. Poets are generally expected to be precise in their diction, but not pleonastic. The concept of *μεσότης* that we encountered in our discussion of syntax also recurs a few times in lexicography for words that are “middle” (i.e. they are ambiguous, as if vocabulary is being charted via Venn diagram). This concept will be prevalent in other scholiastic corpora as well, especially in the commentaries of Servius.

<sup>114</sup> διὰ τὸ μέλαιναν λαβὴν ἔχειν, τουτέστι μελάγκωπον. ἢ μέλαν παρὰ τοῦ φόνου γενόμενον. πολλὰ δὲ εἰσι τὰ τοιαῦτα σύνθετα, οἷον ‘κελαινεφές αἶμα’ οἷον τὸ νέφος οὐκ ἔγκειται, οὕτως καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὸ δεδέσθαι οὐκ ἔγκειται.

<sup>115</sup> *Ph.* 785

<sup>116</sup> διαφέρει δὲ ἰσθμός πορθμοῦ. ἰσθμός μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ μεταξὺ δύο θαλασσῶν πορεύσιμος τόπος, πορθμός δὲ τὸ ἀνάπαλι (Hipp. 1210).

<sup>117</sup> *Alc.* 483



the reader can appreciate the original text on a variety of levels, but at a certain point it seems that the note becomes a thesaurus lesson more than an interpretation of the Euripidean text. *Andromache* 46 provides one such instance: <ἐρμῆνευμα> ὑπόμνησιν ἄγγελον σημείον μνημόσυνον τεκμήριον. ταῦτα σημαίνει τὸ ἐρμῆνευμα. Note especially that the second entry, ἄγγελον, would make no sense in a translation in the original text, an indication that we are being treated to extraneous knowledge to help us round out our understanding of a multivalent Greek word. So too there is an abundance of glossing at *Hippolytus* 935 (<ἔξεδροι> οἱ ἐξεδροποιοὶ τῶν φρενῶν μου ἦτοι μαινόμενοι, ἐξεστηκότες, ἄδικοι, παραλογιστικοὶ, μὴ καλῶς λεγόμενοι, ἀλλ' ἐξω τῆς διανοίας ὄντες) and *Orestes* 922 (<ἀνεπίπληκτον> ἀνεπίπληκτον, ἀναμάρτητον, ἀδιάφθορον, ἀβλαβῆ, οὐκ ἄξιον τοῦ ἐπιπλήττεσθαι, ἀνεπιτίμητον, ὃν οὐδεὶς διὰ τὸ σῶφρον ὕβρισεν). Surely one or two of these glosses would have been sufficient for understanding the Euripidean sentiment, and yet the scholiast provides much more than that, seemingly seizing the opportunity to provide the reader with a lexicographical lesson.

I proceed now to describe some aspects of semantic theory found in the scholia, that is, principles by which the definitions of words are constructed and interpreted. One of the foundational principles of this type of area of exegesis in the commentaries is that words have different meanings in different temporal, cultural, and lexical contexts. A number of times, for example, the word *νῦν* is included in an otherwise basic gloss to signal that the synonym is applicable “now” (i.e., in this passage), but with the implication that elsewhere this may not be so. Such is the case at *Orestes* 605: *συμφοράς δὲ νῦν τὰς συντυχίας*, “And here *συμφοράς* [means] *συντυχίας*.”<sup>118</sup> Though there is no help as to *how* this definition varies, nor any examples given as to what the other possibilities might be, the scholiast alerts the reader that the gloss is contextually determined. Scholiasts also identify flexibility in meaning across different cultures, as with the term *σκότιοι* at *Alcestis* 989: *σκότιοι λέγονται οἱ λαθραῖοι παῖδες καὶ ἐξ ἀδαδουχῆτων γάμων γενόμενοι*. “Ὀμηρος [Z 24]: ‘σκότιον δὲ ἐ γείνατο μήτηρ’. τούτους δὲ Ῥόδιοι ματροξένους καλοῦσιν. Κρήτες δὲ τοὺς ἀνήβους σκοτίους λέγουσιν,” “Children born in secret and through secret marriages are

<sup>118</sup> The same use of *νῦν* occurs at *Phoenissae* 963, 1025, and 1098, among others.

called *σκοτίου*. Homer [6.24]: ‘And his mother gave birth to a child in secret.’ And the Rhodians call them *ματροξένους*, and the Cretans call them *ἀνήβους σκοτίους*.” Other words change semantically over time. Much more attention will be given to this concept later in this chapter, but for now it suffices to note a single example, the word *νόμον* at *Hecuba* 685: *ἀντὶ τοῦ θρηνητικῆς ᾠδῆς· νόμους γὰρ λέγουσιν οἱ παλαιοὶ τὰς ᾠδὰς*, “This word means a threnetic song, for the men of old call songs *νόμοι*.”

The scholiastic approach to lexicography also involves the principle of analogy, where the meanings of two or more words are linked through some special relationship between them. I have already noted the argument implicit at *Phoenissae* 785 regarding the similar morphological formation of *παράμουσος* and *ἄμουσος*, which is parallel to the relationship between *παράνοϊαν* and *ἄνοϊαν*. The same principle is visible for semantics, as at *Hippolytus* 1352: *<σφάκελος> ὁ μετὰ ὀδύνης σπασμός, κατὰ συγγένειαν τοῦ <π> εἰς <φ>*, “*σφάκελος* [is] a *σπασμός* with pain, according to the kinship/ closeness of pi and phi.” Here a curious procedure emerges for establishing definitions: if a word contains phonological similarities to another word, it may indicate that their meanings are closely related. Consider also a double example at *Andromache* 167, where Hermione refers to sprinkling water with the phrase *σπείρουσαν Ἀχελώϊου δρόσον*, to which the scholiast adds: *ἀντὶ τοῦ ραίνουσαν· ὡς γὰρ οἱ σπείροντες ρίπτουσι τὰ σπέρματα ἐν τῇ γῆ, οὕτως καὶ οἱ ραίνοντες τὸ ὕδωρ. Ἀχελῶν δὲ πᾶν ποτάμιον ὕδωρ φασὶν ὡς δρῦν πᾶν δένδρον καὶ ἀκρόδρυα πάντας τοὺς καρπούς*. The first instance of analogy is that the phrase “sowing water” comes from the affinity of sowing seed and sprinkling water, so that the two phrases have become mixed because of the likeness of the actions that they represent. The second instance is that one may read “Achelous” as “water” in the same way as “oak” is used for all sorts of trees, while the specialized term *ἀκρόδρυα* (used especially for hard-shelled fruits) may refer by extension to fruit in general.

A further key aspect of scholiastic semantics is found in its use of etymology, the elucidation of meaning on the basis of a word's origin.<sup>119</sup> Many etymologies are simply stated without any specification of what that etymology has to do with the interpretation of the word at hand, but throughout there runs the assumption that knowing a word's origin will help a reader understand its meaning (though as before, some may be included for more general didactic purposes and not only for the exegesis of the passage itself). Some are stated plainly, as is the naming of Oedipus from his swollen feet<sup>120</sup> and the term *μέλαθρα* from the blackening (*μελαίνεσθαι*) of a roof by smoke from the hearth.<sup>121</sup> Words may also result from the combination of two near-synonyms: <πρευμένεια> *πρᾶος εὐμενής· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν δύο σύγκειται ἡ λέξις*.<sup>122</sup> In other cases there is disagreement about an etymology, and so multiple possibilities are given.<sup>123</sup> There are also examples of etymology *e contrario*, in which a word is said to derive from something that is its opposite. Thus it is suggested by some that, among other possibilities, the name of Atlas may come from the fact that he is *πολύτλας*,<sup>124</sup> that is, “unburdened” really means “much burdened.” In other cases, etymologies are claimed on the basis of another poet's work. The scholiast states, for example, that *ἑσπέρα* is so called possibly because evening is when we “pass over to ourselves” (*εἰς ἑαυτοὺς περῶμεν*), a derivation to which Sappho is said to nod in her verse *ἔσπερε πάντα φέρων ὅσα φαινολῖς ἐσκέδασ' αὖως*.<sup>125</sup> Also of particular note is the etymology of the name Aphrodite at *Troades* 990: one possibility is that given by Hesiod (sea foam), but the scholiast also looks to *ἀφόρητον* (“unbearable”), noting that Euripides himself puns at this etymology at *Hippolytus* 443, which reads: *Κύπρις γὰρ οὐ φορητὸς, ἦν πολλὴ ῥύη*.<sup>126</sup> These latter examples are critical, for they represent the sort of analogical reasoning from external citations that is a cornerstone of the exegetical methods employed by the scholiasts, a concept I will address in more detail below.

<sup>119</sup> It is widely known that ancient etymologies are highly creative, to put it gently. My concern for the moment is not the accuracy of the claims made, but rather what the claims tell us about the practices of these ancient scholars.

<sup>120</sup> *παρὰ τὸ οἰδεῖν τοὺς πόδας ἐκ τῶν περονῶν (Ph. 27).*

<sup>121</sup> *Andr.* 882; *Hecuba* 649 is a parallel, but it should be noted that Schwartz deemed this the work of a later hand.

<sup>122</sup> *Hec.* 538; cf. *Or.* 1323

<sup>123</sup> E.g., *Or.* 220 (*πέλανον*); cf. *Or.* 268 (*κερουλκά*)

<sup>124</sup> *Hipp.* 747

<sup>125</sup> *Or.* 1260

<sup>126</sup> It is perhaps interesting that the scholia to this verse from the *Hippolytus* say nothing of the etymology.

Also under the umbrella of our theory of semantics is the category of linguistic figures, or *σχήματα*. The assumption behind this type of note is that there is a collection of irregular manners of speaking in which meaning is constructed in a way that is not intuitive. The scholia do contain formal labels for certain types of this phenomenon (e.g., periphrasis,<sup>127</sup> hyperbole,<sup>128</sup> synecdoche,<sup>129</sup> etc.), but the thrust to establish a clear typology is inconsistent, so instead of presenting a full range of these terms, I wish to consider them as a whole. These figures constitute a recognized feature of poetry<sup>130</sup> in which a thing is denoted in language that varies slightly from what is expected. Euripides might, for example, use some variation of a part-for-the-whole construction (*ἀπὸ ἐνὸς τὰ πάντα ὅπλα δηλοῖ*<sup>131</sup>) or a type of metonymy that represents a thing that is made with the the thing that makes it, as at *Hecuba* 1153 where the chorus praises the “shuttle of the Thracian hand” (*κερκίδ’ Ἡδωνῆς χειρὸς*), the shuttle standing in for the garment: *<κερκίδα> φησὶ τὸ ἱμάτιον τὸ γενόμενον ἀπὸ Θρακικῆς χειρὸς, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ποιούντος τὸ ποιούμενον ὠνόμασεν.*<sup>132</sup> By a similar token, a place may be called from the thing that is found therein.<sup>133</sup> Other variations include a species-for-species switch, as in the herpetological terminology in *Orestes* 479: *εἶδος ἀντὶ εἶδους ἔλαβεν· γένος μὲν γὰρ ὁ ὄφεις, εἶδος δὲ ὁ δράκων καὶ ἔχλις καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ὀφειῶν· νῦν δὲ δράκων ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔχλις.*<sup>134</sup> Similarly, the poet may call a category of people or items by the name of its most distinguished subcategory, which we (applying same principle) might call a bucolicism on the basis of its

<sup>127</sup> *Hec.* 21, *Or.* 270, *Ph.* 699, *Med.* 425

<sup>128</sup> *Ph.* 111

<sup>129</sup> *Med.* 4, *Rh.* 360

<sup>130</sup> On the other hand, such figures appear very frequently in the scholia to Aeschines as well, and a general reliance on Thucydides and Demosthenes in scholia to Greek poetry (and for Roman scholarship, Cicero and Sallust) for linguistic purposes shows that the division between poetry and prose is not that great, at least in terms of *σχήματα*. The most significant distinction will be drawn by Servius, whose delineation of *poetica licentia* clearly marks out boundaries upon which prose style cannot and should not encroach.

<sup>131</sup> E.g., *Hec.* 920

<sup>132</sup> Cf. *Ph.* 1351

<sup>133</sup> *<πεσσούς> δὲ, ἐπεὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν τοῖς τόποις ὠνόμαζον τοὺς τόπους (Med. 67).*

<sup>134</sup> This note is particularly useful for highlighting the importance of using the scholia to help interpret other scholia. The note to *Phoenissae* 1138 contains the same argument, but in abbreviated form: *<δράκοντες ἔφερον>: αἱ ἐχιδνώδεις κεφαλαὶ τῆς ὕδρας. δράκοντας δὲ εἶπεν εἶδος ἀντὶ εἶδους παραλαβάν.* This scholion would be much more difficult to comprehend without the more explicit note in the *Orestes*, and so it is with many other kinds of notes.

most frequent application: <ἵπποβουκόλοι> ἵπποφορβοί· τὸ δὲ βουκόλοι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐπισήμου ζώου.<sup>135</sup> In all these cases, whether a specific term for the figure is employed or not, the scholiast calls attention to a manner of speaking that is not in accordance with normal expectation.

In a related category, the scholiasts will often mark a lexical anomaly as something written “improperly” or “contrary to common usage” (ἀκύρως, καταχρηστικῶς). While not quite an instance of figured speech, this type of anomaly operates on a similar principle: Euripides has used a word or phrase that is not exactly what one would expect, and thus clarification is required. In a note to *Medea* 1122, the scholiast explains that Euripides has improperly named the ship a “vehicle,” which is more fitting for land-conveyance.<sup>136</sup> At *Phoenissae* 851 it is pointed out that αἶπος ὁδοῦ can mean either the weariness that comes from the journey, or as some say, αἶπος means “height” and is here used improperly (καταχρηστικῶς) for “length.” Not all notes of this type, however, single out Euripides for anomalous usage. It is acknowledged at *Orestes* 382 that Euripides’ phrasing is “proper,” since he used πρωτόλεια in its true sense of “firstfruits” instead of a common improper use of the term to describe all things that are “first”: <πρωτόλεια> δὲ κυρίως ἢ τῆς λείας ἀπαρχή· νῦν δὲ πρωτόλειά φησι τῆς ἰκεσίας τὴν ἀπαρχήν. καταχρηστικῶς γὰρ πρωτόλεια πάντα τὰ πρῶτά φασιν.<sup>137</sup>

Of particular note is the tendency of the scholia to include citations to other poets (including other examples from Euripides himself) in cases of anomalous usage. It seems that these notes constitute an appeal to authority, implying that Euripides can get away with irregularities if they appear in similar form elsewhere in literature. A fuller discussion of this technique of cross-referencing is forthcoming later in the chapter, and citations of other authors are employed for much more than lexical reinforcement, but for

<sup>135</sup> I.e., those who care for horses are called horse-cowherds, since the most salient type of herdsman is a cowherd (*Ph.* 28); cf. *Alc.* 8, *Andr.* 281. This figure recurs under a different name in Servius (κατ’ ἐξοχήν).

<sup>136</sup> καταχρηστικῶς τὴν ναῦν ἀπήνην ὀνόμασεν· ἀπήνη γὰρ κυρίως ἢ ἄμαξα.

<sup>137</sup> Cf. *Ph.* 203; such comments on propriety complicate our understanding of the purpose behind this type of note. On the one hand, one suspects that in some cases it is a matter of understanding the passage: if an anomalous term is used, this might result in a misreading. On the other hand, it could also be that the scholiasts do not want their (possibly young and impressionable) readers to develop a bad habit, assuming that anything they read in a tragic drama will pass for proper, regular Greek. There is also the fact that sometimes the marker is not for improper language, but *proper* language (as shown just below), in which case there should be no need to clarify the original text. This latter phenomenon suggests more strongly that the commentators are interested in establishing good writing habits in the reader.

now a small selection will suffice to show the range of authorizations that appear. Unsurprisingly, Homer is the most frequently cited author and is called in to defend such things as the use of *λίμνη* to mean “sea,”<sup>138</sup> *πόνος* as a synonym for *ζργον*,<sup>139</sup> the use of special equine vocabulary,<sup>140</sup> the labeling of time as cyclical,<sup>141</sup> and the Euripidean phrase *στόματος ἐν πύλαις*.<sup>142</sup> Pindar too is brought in for comparison, as at *Phoenissae* 683: <ἐκτίσαντο> ἀντὶ τοῦ ᾧκησαν, ὡς τὸ ‘ὄρεικτίτου συός’ παρὰ Πινδάρῳ [frg. 313], ἀντὶ τοῦ ὄρειοίκου. That is, Euripides and Pindar both use a root common with *κτίζω* instead of the expected *οἰκέω*.<sup>143</sup> Other examples include references to Menander,<sup>144</sup> Apollonius Rhodius,<sup>145</sup> and a few passages from Aristophanes<sup>146</sup> and Aeschylus,<sup>147</sup> all to show parallel lexical phenomena.

Euripides himself is also used for lexical comparanda. The use of *ᾠγλος* in the sense of *ᾠγλησις* at *Hecuba* 605 is cited also from the *Medea*. Similarly, *θοάζων* at *Orestes* 335 is linked to similar passage in the *Andromeda*. See also a note on the terminology at *Medea* 216 that turns to the *Hippolytus* for a comparable use of *σεμνόν*: καὶ νῦν δὲ τὸ σεμνόν ἀντὶ τοῦ ὑπερήφανον ὡς καὶ ἐν Ἰππολύτῳ [92] ‘μισεῖ τὸ σεμνόν καὶ τὸ μὴ πᾶσιν φίλον.’ Finally, the term *οἰκείου* at *Andromache* 986 is paralleled by a similar use in the *Bacchae*. These passages show that the scholiasts were sensitive to similar locutions in other plays of Euripides and help the reader keep track of irregularities that Euripides uses multiple times.

Contrary to what one might expect in a commentary on poetry, there is also a selection of prose citations used for the same lexical purposes. Thucydides is cited for an analogous use of *ἀμύνω* and an

<sup>138</sup> *Hec.* 446

<sup>139</sup> *Or.* 343

<sup>140</sup> *Med.* 134, *Andr.* 729

<sup>141</sup> *Alc.* 449

<sup>142</sup> ὁμοίως τῷ Ὀμηρικῷ ‘ἔρκος ὀδόντων’, “This is like the Homeric phrase ‘boundary of the teeth’ (*Hipp.* 882). For other instances of Homeric text used to justify lexical phenomena in Euripides: *Or.* 24, 393, 408, 1137, 1197; *Ph.* 789; *Andr.* 107, 1120.

<sup>143</sup> The same passage from Pindar is evoked for the same reason at *Orestes* 1621. See also *Phoenissae* 1285, where Pindar is cited as an analogue for Euripides’ use of an adjective of “shuddering” to mean “causing shudders.” Pindar is again used at *Andromache* 107 as an example of the verb *αἰρέω* used in an *ἀπὸ κοίνου* construction in which the first means *πορθέω* and the second means *ἀναίρέω*. Interestingly, it is noted that this formulation has “Homeric force” (Ὀμηρικῶ ζήλω), and a line from *Iliad* 11 is also quoted.

<sup>144</sup> *νεώτερον* (*Hec.* 217)

<sup>145</sup> *πῖνος* (*Or.* 225)

<sup>146</sup> *Or.* 210, *Ph.* 1668

<sup>147</sup> *Ph.* 209, 1194

idiom for backpedaling or “backing water.”<sup>148</sup> Herodotus is cited for the use of ὀρίζω to mean “passing between two objects.”<sup>149</sup> Demosthenes too is included in a short note explaining Euripides’ use of δεινός at *Andromache* 985: ἀντὶ τοῦ αὐτάρκες καὶ ἰκανὸν εἰς ἐπικουρίαν ἐν ταῖς συμφοραῖς. τὸ δὲ δεινὸν καὶ ὁ ῥήτωρ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἰκανὸν τέταχεν [Olynth. 1, 3] δεινὸς πράγμασι χρῆσθαι.’ These passages raise interesting questions regarding the methodology for examining Euripidean lexicography, for the implicit assumption is that lexical irregularity is not a phenomenon confined to poetry, an important factor to consider in judging the extent to which the scholia represent the existence (or non-existence) of categorical differences in genre.

### *Grammar*

In addition to the task of determining and communicating the meaning of words is the exposition of how those words relate to one another—a concise, if over-simplified definition of the modern conception of grammar. In this category I isolate notes pertaining to the following: parts of speech, morphology, case systems, dialects, and various syntactical issues. Here, as in the lexical notes, there will be seen a didactic tendency, as some comments not only help a reader through the difficulties of the passage at hand, but also teach a broader grammatical lesson.

One feature of the scholia that modern readers will find charming is the implementation of a taxonomy of grammatical terms that is surprisingly similar to what we generally employ in teaching Greek nowadays. Comments about verb tense and the gender of nouns, for example, ring familiar in our ears and help us to see the extent to which ancient scholarly texts have shaped our modern understanding of the Greek language and the way in which it is taught. Not all such comments are clear to us, and indeed a few demonstrate a fundamentally different approach to certain aspects of the language, so the

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<sup>148</sup> *Ph.* 688, *Andr.* 1120

<sup>149</sup> *Med.* 433

correspondence with modern usage should be recognized, but not exaggerated. Even still, in general one finds the same basic impulse in the scholia to identify words and explain their form, often with similar terminology.

Let us begin our sequential look at the various parts of speech with verbs. As part of the explication of Euripidean texts, the scholiasts recognize various features of verbs that may be altered, so that one form should be read as another. Such is the case for several examples of tense inversion: a present form is interpreted as a future,<sup>150</sup> a present for an aorist,<sup>151</sup> and an imperfect for a present,<sup>152</sup> where the scholiast adds a sort of label for this phenomenon, “tense for tense.”<sup>153</sup> The same may be said for mood, as when an imperative is said to stand in for what we would call a hortatory subjunctive,<sup>154</sup> or for voice, when an active form is used instead of a passive.<sup>155</sup> Other notes offer a simple identification of verbal forms. A scholion to *Andromache* 37 labels ἐκλέλοιπα as a perfect middle form (μέσου παρακειμένου), where “middle” here means “intransitive”; that is, the meaning is “I remain [alone]” instead of “I have abandoned.”<sup>156</sup> A humorous note on mood also appears at *Orestes* 169, at which point the chorus attempts to calm Electra down so that she does not wake Orestes, saying εὔδειν μὲν οὖν ἔδοξα (“And so I think he is sleeping”). The scholiast adds: ἀντὶ τοῦ δοκῶ.<sup>157</sup> καθησυχάσουσα δὲ τὴν Ἡλέκτραν φησὶν ὅτι καθεύδειν αὐτὸν νομίζω. διὸ ἐπιφέρει τὸ <ὑπνώσει> ὀριστικόν, ἐπεὶ πρῶτην ἀμφίβολον εἰποῦσα οὐκ ἔπεισεν, “Instead of δοκῶ [i.e., the aorist stands for the present]. And in order to hush Electra they say ‘I think he is sleeping.’ For this reason they add ‘He’s sleeping!’ [vs. 174] in the indicative, since in speaking in noncommittal fashion [i.e., “I think that . . .”] they did not persuade her [to be quiet]”).

<sup>150</sup> <κατεγγυῶ> ἀντὶ τοῦ κατεγγυήσω (*Or.* 1675).

<sup>151</sup> <κείρομαι> ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐκειράμην (*Ph.* 322).

<sup>152</sup> <ῆν> ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐστί, χρόνος ἀντὶ χρόνου (*Med.* 703).

<sup>153</sup> Cf. *Hec.* 1, *Ph.* 207, *Ph.* 1212

<sup>154</sup> <βᾶθι πρὸς εὐνάς>: βᾶθι ἀντὶ τοῦ βῶμεν (*Rh.* 1).

<sup>155</sup> <ῥάων φυλάσσειν>: ἀντὶ τοῦ φυλαχθῆναι καὶ τηρηθῆναι, ἐνεργητικόν ἀντὶ παθητικοῦ (*Med.* 320).

<sup>156</sup> Note the analogous example provided by the scholiast: ὡς οὖν τήκω αὐτὸν καὶ τέτηκα ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ, οὕτως ἐκλέλοιπα ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ, ἀντὶ τοῦ κατελείφθην, (i.e. the perfect form means “I melt because of him/it”).

<sup>157</sup> Note the interpretation of the aorist as a present, where ἔδοξα must have a perfect sense, “I have judged” = “I think.”



Nouns too receive comment concerning their gender, number, and case. As with verbs, the note may simply state a characteristic of a certain form, such as “this is a dual”<sup>158</sup> or “this is nominative.”<sup>159</sup> In addition, there are a number of examples of inversion, such as a plural form being used in place of a singular.<sup>160</sup> Also abundant is case inversion, or as the scholiasts sometimes call it, ἀντίπτωσις.<sup>161</sup> A few examples will give a sense of the pattern: <ἀγάλματα> δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγάλμασι.<sup>162</sup> ὑμῶν, ἀντὶ τοῦ ὑμῶν γενικῆ ἀντὶ δοτικῆς.<sup>163</sup> τὸ δὲ <μοί> ἀντὶ τοῦ μοῦ.<sup>164</sup> <πολιτῶν> ἀντὶ δοτικῆς, τοῖς πολίταις.<sup>165</sup> ἢ γενικῆ ἐστὶν ἀντὶ αἰτιατικῆς.<sup>166</sup> Case inversion, like other types of notes examined so far, can be left open, with the scholiast providing multiple possibilities, perhaps without expressing a preference.<sup>167</sup> The scholia also contain information on the gender of nouns, mostly when it is thought that Euripides has done something unusual. Examples include using στίβος as a masculine and κάμαξ or αἰῶνα as feminine.<sup>168</sup> In another passage, when one might have expected a masculine form to agree with δόμοι, the scholiast remarks that the neuter φροῦδα refers to the understood neuter form οἰκήματα.<sup>169</sup> Compare also a note to *Orestes* 2 in which the gender of the relative pronoun matches the feminine instead of the neuter noun in the compound antecedent: διὰ τί εἰρηκῶς <ἔπος> καὶ <πάθος> πρὸς τὸ θηλυκὸν τὰ ἐξῆς συνέταξε φάσκων <ἧς οὐκ ἂν ἄραιτ’ ἄχθος>. φαιμὲν οὖν ὅτι προτιμᾶται τοῦ οὐδετέρου τὸ θηλυκὸν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐποίησε τὴν σύνταξιν. Issues of gender are not always clear-cut, as at *Phoenissae* 1149, where it is unknown from context whether Euripides used “heads” as a masculine or feminine noun,<sup>170</sup> and where corresponding passages from Archilochus, Homer, and Ion are brought to bear. These examples show that for gender, in

<sup>158</sup> *Hec.* 896, *Or.* 50

<sup>159</sup> *Ph.* 1722, *Med.* 638

<sup>160</sup> πληθυντικῶς εἶπεν [i.e., τοιαῦτα] ἀντὶ τοῦ τοιοῦτόν τί ἐστὶν, *Hec.* 776; cf. *Ph.* 943, *Med.* 449, *Andr.* 771, *Tr.* 372.

<sup>161</sup> E.g., *Ph.* 793; the formulation may vary somewhat, as at *Hecuba* 847 (μεταλλακτέον τὰς πτώσεις).

<sup>162</sup> *Or.* 1434

<sup>163</sup> *Ph.* 460

<sup>164</sup> *Hipp.* 1102

<sup>165</sup> *Med.* 11

<sup>166</sup> *Alc.* 117; cf. *Andr.* 53 (which gives a similar example with a relative pronoun, an explanation of the phenomenon we call “attraction”). For other examples of case inversion in general: *Ph.* 350, 1286, 1564.

<sup>167</sup> *Med.* 910, *Andr.* 1014

<sup>168</sup> *Or.* 1274; *Ph.* 1403, 1484; cf. *Ph.* 1488, *Hipp.* 852

<sup>169</sup> *Med.* 139

<sup>170</sup> ἀμφίβολον πότερον τὰς κρᾶτας εἶπεν ἢ τοὺς κρᾶτας.

any case, there is little in the way of general instruction apart from a loose remark now and again, with most mentions of the topic coming in only when there has been some deviation from the norm.

A few notes pertain to pronouns, though these are generally more difficult to understand. While no full taxonomy is evident from the Euripidean scholia, we do see a couple of technical terms, including Hecuba's use of an "anaphoric" deictic pronoun: τὸ <ταῖσδε> ἀναφορικὸν ἐστὶ καὶ δεικτικόν.<sup>171</sup> One also sees at *Orestes* 142 a mention of what we would call an "ethical dative": διαθέσεως δὲ ἐστὶν ἐμφαντικὸν τὸ <μοι>. It is unclear to me at this point exactly what "emphatic of condition/ disposition" means, but in any case it is recognized that the pronoun does not quite indicate a real first-person reference. Further, there are notes that show a certain degree of flexibility with pronouns. Again, it is not made clear on what basis the irregularity is possible, whether through dialect, poetic language, or some other variant, but only that one form should or at least can be understood as a replacement for a similar word. Such is the treatment of *Hecuba* 1059, where Polydorus laments his betrayal by the Trojan women: ποίαν ἢ ταύταν ἢ τάνδ' ἐξαλλάξω. The scholiast rephrases slightly, adding a pronoun to the series and giving us our familiar line-up of Greek demonstrative pronouns: ποίαν παρέλθω ὁδὸν· ἄρα ταύτην, ἄρα ἐκείνην, ἄρα τήνδε. In other examples, the scholia show how νιν may represent any of the three genders, or that it can be expressive of a singular or plural entity.<sup>172</sup> Compare too the substitution of a "definite" demonstrative pronoun for an indefinite,<sup>173</sup> or the use of ἐμοί in place of the reflexive ἐμαυτῶ.<sup>174</sup>

Adjectives and adverbs also get some limited treatment. For adjectives, one finds a transferred epithet,<sup>175</sup> a comparative used in place of a superlative,<sup>176</sup> and a masculine adjective in place of a feminine.<sup>177</sup> Adverbs are at times simply noted as such (ἐπίρρημα), for example at *Phoenissae* 1224, but

<sup>171</sup> *Hec.* 1014

<sup>172</sup> *Or.* 289, 1659

<sup>173</sup> τὸ <τόνδε> ὠρισμένον ἔλαβεν ἀντὶ ἀορίστου τοῦ τινά (*Or.* 508).

<sup>174</sup> *Ph.* 508; cf. *Hipp.* 978: <ἐαυτόν> δύο ἀντωνυμῖαι ἐπάλληλοι, κτείνειν ἔ' αὐτόν. <ἢ> σύνθετον ἀντὶ ἀπλοῦ, τῆς αὐτός. For the concept of "compound for simple," see *Orestes* 382.

<sup>175</sup> τὸ ἐπίθετον τῆς γῆς ἐπὶ τὰ σφάγια μετήγαγεν (*Ph.* 174).

<sup>176</sup> <μᾶλλον κατέχουσιν>: ἀντὶ τοῦ μάλιστα, συγκριτικὸν ἀντὶ τοῦ ὑπερθετικοῦ (*Hipp.* 1466)

<sup>177</sup> <ἢ στερρὸς οὐσα μόσχος>: ἀντὶ τοῦ στείρα (*Andr.* 711)

there is also some system for describing different types of adverbs. These may be “invocational,”<sup>178</sup> adverbs of groaning or denial,<sup>179</sup> “optative adverbs,”<sup>180</sup> or even “adverbs of inspired frenzy.”<sup>181</sup> Other, less common grammatical phenomena include “interrogative conjunctions,”<sup>182</sup> a so-called *μὲν solitarium* at *Orestes* 8,<sup>183</sup> various interjectory words (*ἐπιφθέγματα*) ranging from threnetic to invocational,<sup>184</sup> a discussion about causal vs. interrogative *ὅτι* at *Orestes* 439, and the delineation of the meaning of certain prefixes.<sup>185</sup>

In addition to a classification of the parts of speech, the scholia also provide a number of notes on morphology. Among other things, one finds dictionary headwords given for unfamiliar inflected forms, a feature common in modern beginning and intermediate commentaries to Greek texts. A gloss at *Rhesus* 74 explains that *λελημμένοι* comes from *λήζω*, for example, and other passages give similar help with nouns: *χέρνιβας* is labeled as *ἀπὸ τοῦ χέρνιψ*,<sup>186</sup> the nominative plural is given for *τερμόνων*,<sup>187</sup> and the form of *δόρη* is clarified with an analogous pattern for the noun *βέλος*.<sup>188</sup>

Other morphological notes point out variations in spelling and pronunciation that could confuse the reader. Such variations are recognized as a result of various processes, including the following: *συγκοπή*, the cutting out of syllables from the middle of a word;<sup>189</sup> *συναλοιφή*, the coalescing of two vowels into one;<sup>190</sup> *ἀφαίρεσις*, the removal of letters from the start of a word;<sup>191</sup> and *κρᾶσις*, the joining of

<sup>178</sup> *κλητικόν* (*Hec.* 501, *Ph.* 1067)

<sup>179</sup> *ἐπίρρημα στεναγμοῦ* (*Ph.* 1274), *ἐπίρρημα ἀρνήσεως* (*Hec.* 613)

<sup>180</sup> *ἐπίρρημα εὐκτικόν* (*Med.* 1, here describing *εἴθε* in an “optative of wish” construction).

<sup>181</sup> *ἐπίρρηματα θειασμοῦ* (*Tr.* 325, in reference to the cries of Bacchant revelry)

<sup>182</sup> *ἐρωτηματικὸς ὁ ἧ σύνδεσμος* (*Hec.* 765).

<sup>183</sup> *οὐκ ἀπέδωκε τῷ <μέν> τὸν δέ.*

<sup>184</sup> *ὄτοτοῖ* (*Or.* 1388), *ὡή* (*Ph.* 269)

<sup>185</sup> E.g., the use of *κατα-* to indicate abundance in the compound *καταβόστρυχος* (*τὸ γὰρ <κατά> πλήθους ἐμφαντικόν*, *Ph.* 146).

<sup>186</sup> *Ph.* 662

<sup>187</sup> *ἧ δὲ εὐθεῖα τούτου τὰ τέρμονα* (*Med.* 276).

<sup>188</sup> *ἀπὸ γενικῆς τῆς δόρεος καὶ δόρεα καὶ δόρη ὡς βέλεα βέλη* (*Rh.* 274).

<sup>189</sup> E.g., *πρεσβῦται* from *πρεσβύτεραι* (*Hec.* 323); cf. Latin *periculum* from *periculum*

<sup>190</sup> E.g., *φοιτάσι* for *φοιτήσιν* (*Ph.* 1027); cf. *Hec.* 419 and *Alc.* 710, the latter of which includes a note on pronunciation (<σοῦ δ᾿άν>: σοῦ δὴ ᾿άν, καὶ ἐν συναλοιφῇ <σοῦ δ᾿άν>. ἐκτατέον οὖν τὸν ᾿άν).

<sup>191</sup> E.g., *δύρη* for *ὀδύρη* (*Hec.* 740; cf. *Alc.* 1033)

two vowels.<sup>192</sup> Other passages describe similar phenomena without giving specific labels, as for the note on *Phoenissae* 451: <τόνδ' εἰσεδέξω> εἴσω ἐδέξω ὡς καὶ εἴσιθι, εἴσω ἴθι. τοῦτο δὲ ἐναντίον τῷ Ἰλιον εἴσω', ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰς τὴν Ἰλιον ἐκέλσε γὰρ ἀντὶ προθέσεως παραλαμβάνεται. Here the prefix is noted as having adverbial force, with an analogous example provided, and with a counterexample from the *Iliad* where εἴσω functions not as an adverb, but as a preposition. The scholia also demonstrate an awareness of flexibility in inflection. These can come from alternative word endings,<sup>193</sup> irregular declensions,<sup>194</sup> or other types of variations.<sup>195</sup> The flexibility, it should be noted, sometimes goes farther than we would like, as in the case of the note on *Phoenissae* 846, where the word ἐξόρμισαι is taken as an equivalent to ἐξώρμισαι—in reality a perfect form—due to a supposed fluidity with the omicron and omega.<sup>196</sup>

The morphological notes presented thus far have been aids designed specifically for the original text at hand, but others demonstrate an interest in teaching miniature lessons as part of a broader education in the Greek language.<sup>197</sup> At least a couple of notes discuss noun declensions, and one in particular provides a rather full explanation of how the word *κάρα* can represent any case: <ἐμῶ κάρα> οὕτως ἡ γραφή· οὐ γὰρ προσγραπτέον τὸ <ι>. ἔστι γὰρ ἐξ ἀποκοπῆς τοῦ κάρηνον, ὅπερ κατὰ πάσαν πτώσιν ἀποκόπεται, τὸ κάρηνον τὸ κάρα, τοῦ κάρηνου τοῦ κάρα, τῷ κάρηνω τῷ κάρα, τὸ κάρηνον τὸ κάρα, ᾧ κάρηνον ᾧ κάρα.<sup>198</sup> The scholiast really has nothing to say about *κάρα* in context except that it is a viable form—the suggestion that an iota should not be added implies that others had indeed added one—and the rest of the note exhaustively provides forms for which, one would think, a couple of examples would have been sufficient. Though they are not altogether common in the Euripidean scholia, such notes show at least some interest in teaching morphological lessons along the way that help the student (assuming that is the

<sup>192</sup> κατὰ κρᾶσιν δία ἐγένετο δία (*Rh.* 226).

<sup>193</sup> E.g., between φιλαίματος and φιλαίματοιο (*Ph.* 174); cf. *Hec.* 496

<sup>194</sup> E.g., the forms of Οἰδίπους (*Ph.* 379, 1533)

<sup>195</sup> E.g., ὄχυρῶς and ἐχυρῶς (*Med.* 124)

<sup>196</sup> See the aforementioned note on the history of vowel quantity and the Athenian alphabet (p. 33).

<sup>197</sup> I do not wish to suggest that these notes are totally unconnected with the original text, but rather that, in explaining the passage, they take liberties to expound upon general principles of morphology that are unnecessary for understanding the passage at hand.

<sup>198</sup> *Andr.* 1210

identity of the audience) become a better reader of Euripides and of Greek in general, not just of the verses at hand.

Perhaps not unexpectedly, the majority of such notes occur with reference to verbs. Some comments perform the regular function of identifying a feature of a verbal form, but go a bit further by providing other information. For instance, the scholiast shows that *κυροῖ* is optative at *Orestes* 514, but also gives part of the relevant paradigm so that the reader can think of this form in connection with related forms: *εὐκτικόν ἐστι· κυροῖμι κυροῖς κυροῖ*.<sup>199</sup> Note also how the commentator provides analogous examples for conjugational patterns at *Alcestis* 795: *πίομαι πίη, ὡς πλέομαι πλέη*. Compare too the treatment of alpha-contract verbs at *Andromache* 337: *<φόνον· τὸ συνδρῶν> ὡς γειτνιῶν, οὕτω συνδρῶν καὶ πάντα τὰ τῆς δευτέρας συζυγίας*.<sup>200</sup> A note at *Andromache* 260 provides an even fuller example regarding the word *ἡμάτουν*: *ἀντὶ τοῦ αἵμασσε· ὡς χρύσου· ὅτε δὲ περισπᾶται παθητικόν ἐστιν· <ἡμάτουν> ἡμάτους ἡμάτου αἰμάτου [δὲ] ὡς ἐχρύσουν ἐχρύσους ἐχρύσου χρύσου*.<sup>201</sup> Finally, observe the clarification given for the form *εἶ* at *Hippolytus* 1065: *τὸ εἶμι τὸ πορεύομαι, καὶ τὸ εἶμί τὸ ὑπάρχω, ἐν τῇ συνηθείᾳ κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον πρόσωπον ἀποβολὴν πάσχοισι τοῦ <σ> παραλόγως, “εἶμι meaning ‘I go’ and εἶμί meaning ‘I am’ similarly suffer the loss of the sigma in the second person contrary to expectation.”*<sup>202</sup> It would have been sufficient simply to gloss *εἶ* as *πορεύει* to clarify the verse, but the extra information again shows an interest in teaching the reader to read.

Also within the broader category of grammatical scholia are numerous notes specifying what we might call an “economy of speech,” namely that certain words must be understood for the Greek to make sense and that other, redundant words may be taken out. The latter category is marked by a limited technical vocabulary including forms of *περιττός*, *πλεονάζω*, and *παρέλκω*, all of which indicate that words

<sup>199</sup> Compare *Orestes* 753 with its three verbal forms, akin to a listing of principle parts familiar to modern students of Greek (*λαζύω λάζυμι λάζυμαι*).

<sup>200</sup> It is possible that by “second conjugation” the scholiast means what we call alpha-contract verbs. It is perhaps relevant that a note at *Medea* 60 gives the omicron-contract form *μεσοῖ* as a “third conjugation” verb. In any case, there is an attempt to establish a pattern for the reader so that new vocabulary can be associated with familiar words.

<sup>201</sup> See also *Phoenissae* 407: *<οὐδ’ ὀνομάσαι δύναμι’ ἄν>· εὐκτικόν ἐστι· τὸ θέμα δύνω ὡς φαίνω, ὁ ἀόριστος ἔδυνα ὡς ἔφηναι*.

<sup>202</sup> Cf. *Ph.* 614: *<ἔξιθι>· τὸ μὲν εἶμι διὰ τῆς <ει> διφθόγγου παραλόγως, ἢ δὲ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ πᾶσα κλίσις διὰ τοῦ <ι>*.

in the original text are unnecessary or excessive, with no careful distinctions between the use of each marker as far as I can tell. Some common examples of this phenomenon are the “pleonastic τε”<sup>203</sup> and multiple incarnations of the double negative.<sup>204</sup> Individual letters may also be marked as pleonastic, as at *Hecuba* 1103, where Ὠρίων is glossed as follows: Ὠρίων καὶ κατὰ πλεονασμὸν τοῦ <α> Ὠρίων, “[This word is written as] Ὠρίων and Ὠρίων with the pleonasm of the alpha.” Interestingly there is also a linking verb marked as unnecessary at *Orestes* 86: <σὺ δ’ εἶ μακαρία> πλεονάζει τὸ ὑπαρκτικὸν ῥῆμα.<sup>205</sup>

Similarly, many scholia clarify passages with words or letters that are left to be understood by the reader.<sup>206</sup> Relevant markers include λείπει (“there is missing”), προσληπτέον (“there must be added”), and (προσ-)ὑπακουστέον (“there must be understood”). At *Orestes* 240, for example, the scholiast notes that παρά and ἐμοῦ should be supplied, and at *Medea* 1316 there is a missing καί.<sup>207</sup> Most instances of this phenomenon deal with prepositional phrases, though some mention verbs,<sup>208</sup> and a few give individual letters, specifically where there has been an elision. For example, a scholion at *Phoenissae* 293 states that the elided σ’ is written fully as σοί (<σοί> τὸ ἐντελής). Compare *Phoenissae* 1495, where the scholiast mentions that the full form (τὸ τέλειον) of κρανθεῖσ’ is κρανθεῖσα. Other examples include a missing ἄν in what we would call a past potential construction at *Phoenissae* 1561 and a missing ὡς (“as/like”) with an appositive noun.<sup>209</sup>

It should be mentioned here that these numerous mentions of excessive or missing words and letters are rarely, if ever, attached to explicit value judgments. Later on we will investigate passages in

<sup>203</sup> E.g., *Hec.* 464, *Or.* 118, *Andr.* 1097

<sup>204</sup> E.g., *Or.* 1059, 1572; *Ph.* 814, 1176; *Andr.* 656; *Med.* 1151

<sup>205</sup> For other examples of marked pleonasm: *Ph.* 448, 497, 791, 986.

<sup>206</sup> It is to be noted that many of my examples come from the *Phoenissae*, and that λείπει in particular seems to be absent from *Alcestis* and mostly so from *Troades* and *Rhesus*. For now this is just an interesting observation; more work is necessary to determine if this and other such language is equally imbalanced.

<sup>207</sup> See also *Phoenissae* 1574, which marks a sentence as asyndetic (ὁ δὲ λόγος ἀσύνδετος).

<sup>208</sup> E.g., *Andr.* 292, 1032

<sup>209</sup> E.g., instead of saying, “The Titan Prometheus held a torch in his right hand in order to burn the city,” Euripides means that Tydeus came against the city *as* the Titan Prometheus (*Ph.* 1122; cf. *Ph.* 416). Such a scholion seems daft on the surface, but when one considers that Elizabeth Wyckoff (1978, *Euripides* V, Univ. of Chicago) translates the phrase in such a way as to make it appear that Prometheus is actually present, the note does not seem so unnecessary. The scholia are by no means obsolete and can handsomely repay investigation for modern commentaries, editions, and translations.

which the commentators praise or blame Euripides for matters of style, and my own assessment is that ancient commentators have a keen eye for the balance of concision and clarity, but for the passages discussed above and for many others like them there is no discussion of whether it is good or bad for extra words to be added or for others to be left out. Further, there is rarely mention of why this is done, whether for the sake of meter, as a feature of the poetic art, or something else.<sup>210</sup> In any case, it seems safe enough to say that at the very least the scholiasts point out these additions and omissions to prevent basic misreading of the text on a grammatical level, and these notes are probably also intended to promote good stylistic tendencies in the audience, lest the example of the poet induce any wandering from the narrow path of grammatical accuracy in a hapless reader who does not have the literary authority to do such things.

A few miscellaneous grammatical notes related to various issues of syntax should also be mentioned, and it is perhaps not accidental (as I shall discuss later) that all my examples here come from the *Phoenissae*. The notes to two passages show recognition of flexibility between verb and participle: in the first case, a finite verb stands in where a participle was to be expected;<sup>211</sup> in the second case, *vice versa*: μετοχή ἀντὶ ῥήματος.<sup>212</sup> Elsewhere at *Phoenissae* 658 there is an explanation for the particular force of the genitive case, what we would classify as a brand of subjective genitive: <Ἄρεος ἀμόφρων φύλαξ> ὡς τὸ βασιλέως ἄρχων, ἀντὶ τοῦ ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως κατασταθεὶς ἄρχων, “The phrase ‘the savage-minded guardian of Ares’ is similar to βασιλέως ἄρχων, that is, the archon appointed by the king.” These and similar examples demonstrate some of the breadth of coverage that is possible in the syntactical notes.

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<sup>210</sup> Servius is much more prone to attribute irregularity to metrical demands, as I will explain in my chapter on Vergilian scholarship.

<sup>211</sup> ἀντὶ τοῦ προσκεψάμενος ῥήμα ἀντὶ μετοχῆς (*Ph.* 473).

<sup>212</sup> *Ph.* 668

Comments on dialect constitute another substantial category under the umbrella of grammatical notes.<sup>213</sup> One scholion marks a pronominal adverb as a Doric form: <ἄλλως> τὸ ᾤ Δωρικόν ἐστὶν ἀντὶ τοῦ ᾤ, ὃ ἐστὶν ὄπου),<sup>214</sup> and another sees a potential Ionicism in the accusative plural (δύναται δὲ τὸ <τέρψις> πληθυντικὴ εἶναι αἰτιατικὴ Ἰωνικὴ),<sup>215</sup> but by far the most prevalent reference is to Atticism, which is pervasively cited as the reason for many grammatical phenomena. The inflection of verbs and nouns appears a few times, as in the Attic substitution of ᾤν for ᾤμην.<sup>216</sup> In another passage, the troubled word δᾶ is cited as a pleonastic syllable, akin to extra syllables found in some verb forms.<sup>217</sup> Further, Atticism may be the reason behind unexpected noun gender: οἱ Ἀττικοὶ κυναγὸν τὸν κυνηγὸν λέγουσι.<sup>218</sup> Other notes deal with accentuation, such as the circumflex accent given to τροπαῖα by Attic speakers.<sup>219</sup> Still others pertain to the aforementioned type of note on “extra” or “missing” words, such as at *Hecuba* 198: πάλιν Ἀττικῶς λείπει τὸ ἔνεκα· ὦ δυστυχεστάτη μῆτερ ἔνεκα τῆς ἀθλίας ζωῆς σου.<sup>220</sup> Elsewhere the periphrastic imperative ἀπολαβὼν ἔχε is noted as an Attic equivalent to ἀπόλαβε.<sup>221</sup> Some comments are rather surprising, as when it is explained that the use of comparative ᾤ (“than”) is an Attic expression equivalent to the comparative genitive: τιμῶντές με οὐδὲν ᾤττον ᾤ τοὺς Διοσκόρους. Ἀττικὴ δὲ ἡ σύνταξις, ἀντὶ τοῦ οὐκ ἔλαττον τῶν Διοσκόρων.<sup>222</sup> Still other examples include voice inversion (active for passive),<sup>223</sup> case inversion,<sup>224</sup> and a triple repetition of the particle ἄν.<sup>225</sup>

<sup>213</sup> It will be noted that various phenomena are noted as “Attic” when we would hardly have said so, though for the scholiasts this is a significant method for explaining grammar that seems irregular to them. I will address this phenomenon later in the context of other appeals made by the commentators as part of their exegetical methodology.

<sup>214</sup> *Ph.* 683

<sup>215</sup> *Andr.* 94

<sup>216</sup> *Hec.* 13; cf. *Ph.* 784 (<ὦ πολύμοχθος Ἄρης>: ἔδει· ὦ πολύμοχθε Ἄρες. Ἀττικὴ δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ κλίσις), 1716 (<γενόμεσθα>: Ἀττικῶς μετὰ τοῦ <σ>).

<sup>217</sup> <φεῦ δᾶ φεῦ δᾶ> ἀντὶ τοῦ φεῦ φεῦ. ᾤ <δα> συλλαβὴ Ἀττικῶς πλεονάζει ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ᾤσθα καὶ φᾤσθα (*Ph.* 1296).

<sup>218</sup> *Hipp.* 1397

<sup>219</sup> *Ph.* 572, *Andr.* 694; cf. *Or.* 425

<sup>220</sup> cf. *Or.* 599 (γράφεται <ῥύσεται τὸ μὴ θανεῖν>. περισσὸν δὲ τὸ ἐν <μῆ>. ἐστὶν Ἀττικόν)

<sup>221</sup> *Or.* 451

<sup>222</sup> *Or.* 465

<sup>223</sup> ἐνεργητικὸν ἀντὶ παθητικοῦ, τοῦτο δὲ ἔθος ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς (*Med.* 320).

<sup>224</sup> *Or.* 29, 46; *Ph.* 478

<sup>225</sup> τρὶς δὲ τὸ ἄν παρέλαβε δέον ἄπαξ. Ἀττικὸν δὲ τὸ ἔθος (*Tr.* 1244).



Finally, it would be misleading to let the reader presume that the grammatical scholia always deal with discrete topics in isolation, for many of them integrate multiple syntactical, morphological, or dialectical principles all at once. For an example, let us return to the scholia to *Phoenissae* 1296:

<φεῦ δᾶ φεῦ δᾶ> οἱ μὲν ὡς ἐν μέρος λόγου ἀνέγνωσαν τὸ φεῦδα ὡς ἐν παρολκῆ τοῦ <δα>· ἔνιοι δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ φεῦ δῆ· τινὲς δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ φεῦ γῆ, κατὰ πάθος μεταβληθέντος τοῦ <γ> εἰς <δ>, ὡς ἐν τῷ Δημήτηρ, πηγῆ πηδῆ, παρὰ τὸ τὸ ὕδωρ πηδᾶν ἄνω· <ἄλλως> ἀντὶ τοῦ φεῦ φεῦ. ἢ <δα> συλλαβὴ Ἀττικῶς πλεονάζει ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἦσθα καὶ φῆσθα

Some take these as one word, *φεῦδα*, with the *δα* being pleonastic. And some take it as a substitute for *φεῦ δῆ*, others for *φεῦ γῆ*, in accordance with the switching of gamma and delta, as in the *Demeter* with *πηγῆ* and *πηδῆ*, from water ‘springing up.’ Or else: It is a substitute for *φεῦ φεῦ*. The *δα* syllable is an Attic pleonasm, as with *ἦσθα* and *φῆσθα*.

Note the various possibilities of interpretation here. On the one hand, the matter could be a lexical one, with a pleonastic syllable not affecting the meaning. There is also an implicit phonetic argument involving a vocalic change in the equation of *φεῦ δᾶ* with *φεῦ δῆ*. There is also an etymological argument for taking *δᾶ* as “earth.” Finally, the pleonastic argument is mentioned again as if it were a new explanation—a reminder that we are working with a variorum commentary that has not been streamlined—and this time it is suggested that the phenomenon is a dialectical one. Here and in many other places we observe that the scholia are a composite affair, and that for any given note a scholiast may access a variety of concepts in order to explain grammatical irregularities or potential problems.

### *History and Mythology*

As can be expected in commentaries on Greek tragedy, there is a great deal of information pertaining to mythological subjects, with hundreds of notes containing identifications of characters and places, summaries of past events, aetiologies, and more. The notes themselves are wide-ranging and full of details that aim to clarify the original text, provide general educational material on mythic variants, or both, and I will offer a small selection of notes that will demonstrate some of the operative principles

behind these scholia. First, though, let me add a word on my classification of this material. It is perhaps uncomfortable for modern readers to see how our distinct categories of history and mythology are conflated so readily in the scholia. Some notes on the past do actually provide historical information (or at least claims that are “historical” in appearance, even if they are inaccurate). For instance, the scholiast remarks that the Argives used to hold their ἐκκλησία on the Πρωῶν (“Headland”)<sup>226</sup> and that Euripides chooses the wording of *Orestes* 1682 as a reflection of the real political situation between Sparta and Athens (more on this later). On the other hand, the treatment of the past also includes what we would consider mythological insertions, and often it is difficult to see where (if) the scholiast makes a distinction, so we will need to examine the use of the term “history.”

Scholiastic ἱστορία encompasses an array of “facts” we would situate more comfortably under the category of mythology, or perhaps legend. Take, for example, the genealogical information for legendary figures in a note to *Hippolytus* 35: ἡ δὲ ἱστορία οὕτως ἔχει· Νίσος καὶ Πάλλας καὶ Αἰγέως τρεῖς ἀδελφοὶ ἐκ Πανδίωνος γεγόνασιν, καὶ ὁ μὲν Νίσος τὰ Μέγαρα ᾔκει, Αἰγέως δὲ καὶ Πάλλας δῆμων τινῶν ἤρχον, τῆς Ἀττικῆς οὕτω συνωκισμένης εἰς ἓν. The term is also used to describe, among many other things, the story of Iphigenia’s sacrifice to Artemis,<sup>227</sup> and the “fact” that the Cyclopes fitted Zeus with the thunderbolt.<sup>228</sup>

In a number of cases ἱστορία is treated as a single, authoritative account of how things actually happened. When the character of Andromache states that it was in Phthia that Peleus lived with Thetis, the scholiast refers this to ἱστορία, regarded here as a “true account”: τοῦτο ἀπὸ ἱστορίας εἴληφεν. αὐτόθι γὰρ αὐτῇ συνώκησεν Πηλεὺς.<sup>229</sup> Indeed, at *Phoenissae* 584 it is noted that it was binding upon Euripides to make Polyneices and Eteocles kill each other so as not to violate history (ὅπως τὰ τῆς ἱστορίας μένη βέβαια). In other cases Euripides is demonstrated to have gone against ἱστορία, as at *Troades* 943, where Helen implies that Menelaus was present when Paris came to his house, but then left, whereas the scholiast claims that he was not home at the time of arrival: καὶ ταῦτα παρὰ τὴν ἱστορίαν φησὶν· οὐ γὰρ

<sup>226</sup> *Or.* 871

<sup>227</sup> τῆς κατὰ Ἰφιγένειαν ἱστορίας μέμνηται, ἣν ἐδόκει σφαγιάσαι τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι (*Andr.* 624).

<sup>228</sup> οὗς ἡ ἱστορία φησὶ τὸν κεραννὸν τῷ Διὶ κατασκευάσαι (*Or.* 965).

<sup>229</sup> *Andr.* 17

παρόντος αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ἀποδημοῦντος ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος παρεγένετο. Elsewhere, when Andromache states that her husband's corpse had been dragged around the city three times, the scholiast replies that the circuit around the city was actually the chase itself preceding Hector's death, after which time it was around the tomb of Patroclus that his body was thrice dragged: *παρὰ τὴν ἱστορίαν· τρὶς γὰρ περὶ τὸ τεῖχος ἐδιώχθη ὑπὸ Ἀχιλλέως ὁ Ἔκτωρ, νεκρὸς δὲ περὶ τὸ Πατρόκλου σῆμα τρὶς ἐσύρη.*<sup>230</sup> Thus, to state that Euripides has diverged from *ἱστορία* suggests that there is only one, and that it is the truth.

Other notes, however, demonstrate a more flexible view of history. While it is immediately evident that the scholia present various accounts of mythical and historical events, it is instructive to see explicit acknowledgement of this variation for our term *ἱστορία*. For instance, it is recognized that the reports concerning the events of Hecuba's life are not consistent: *τὰ περὶ τῆς Ἑκάβης διαφόρως ἱστοροῦνται.*<sup>231</sup> At *Rhesus* 185, Euripides is said to have taken his version of events from Homer (*παρ' Ὀμήρου ἔλαβε τὴν ἱστορίαν*), with the implication that there was a different *ἱστορία* that he could have chosen.<sup>232</sup> Further, according to a note in the *Andromache*, some say that Telamon accompanied Heracles in his assault on Troy, but Pindar says it was Peleus, and it is from him that Euripides seems to take his version.<sup>233</sup> What is more, even the poet himself can introduce new *ἱστορία*, as the scholiast suggests with regard to how Rhesus was conceived when a Muse walked through the river Strymon and was impregnated: *μήποτε δὲ ἔπλασε τὴν ἱστορίαν, "Perhaps he fabricated the story."*<sup>234</sup>

<sup>230</sup> *Andr.* 107; I have excised the Homeric line numbers given by Schwartz, on account of the fact that, while they are helpful as a crossreference, the scholiast makes no mention of Homer, but appeals only to history in general, even if it is highly probably that the commentator does have Homer in mind. In cases where the scholiast does mention an author explicitly or gives a direct quotation, I find the provision of a specific citation to be more appropriate.

<sup>231</sup> *Hec.* 3

<sup>232</sup> It is possible that this means that Euripides learned the true account from Homer, but the formulation seems rather to suggest that there were multiple versions he could have used. There is less point in suggesting that Euripides "found about these events by reading Homer."

<sup>233</sup> *παρ' οὗ ἔοικε τὴν ἱστορίαν Εὐριπίδης λαβεῖν* (*Andr.* 796).

<sup>234</sup> *Rh.* 351; a note at *Troades* 90 (*κοινὰ δὲ τὰ τῆς ἱστορίας*) may be relevant, but I am unable to determine the exact meaning of it at this time, and it does not seem to appear elsewhere in any extant scholia. Perhaps it indicates that this version of events is the one that is generally known.

This latter view of history is in fact much more in keeping with the manner in which the scholia normally discuss mythographic information.<sup>235</sup> Indeed, variability is the most salient feature of such notes, a fact that is due in part to the variorum nature of the scholia as we possess them, but one that is also recognized explicitly by the scholiasts themselves. Instead of being synthesized and structured, mythographic discussions of the same person or theme are often scattered unevenly in various locations, especially as we shall see in the case of the Sphinx, and are also occasionally contradictory. In what follows I provide a representative sample of this widely-divergent mythographical information, and along the way I will point out some of the purposes which those notes seem to serve.

First, though, a quick word on the use of citation and quotation is fitting, since these are so crucial to mythographic notes. Later I will discuss more fully the use of citation as an exegetical methodology, but for now let it suffice to give some glimpse of their general form. I have already presented some examples in which external sources are brought to bear on the original text, sometimes with a name attached—e.g. Homer on Rhesus, Pindar on Peleus—and sometimes not—e.g., through some incarnation of the οἱ μὲν . . . οἱ δὲ . . . formula. Very often authors such as Stesichorus, Ibycus, Homer, Hesiod, Sophocles, and others are cited as the source for a particular version of events or details about a character—as well as a mention of an anonymous “word of mouth” and “popular” report.<sup>236</sup> There are also citations of the works of scholars who have documented such things, including Crates and Aristarchus on genealogy,<sup>237</sup> Aristodemus on the death of Parthenopaeus,<sup>238</sup> Didymus on the Lemnian women,<sup>239</sup> Epimenides and Pherecydes on the family of Oedipus,<sup>240</sup> Callisthenes on the date of Troy’s fall,<sup>241</sup> and Parmeniscus on how Medea’s children might *actually* have died.<sup>242</sup> Sometimes the scholiast will include rather large quotations from these authors, as in the case of the note at *Orestes* 249, which

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<sup>235</sup> I use the term “mythographic” with some reluctance, since I do not wish to posit a strong distinction between myth and history in the scholia.

<sup>236</sup> ἡ διὰ στόματος καὶ δημῶδης ἱστορία (*Alc.* 1)

<sup>237</sup> *Or.* 1233, *Ph.* 126

<sup>238</sup> *Ph.* 1156

<sup>239</sup> *Hec.* 887

<sup>240</sup> *Ph.* 13, 53

<sup>241</sup> *Hec.* 910

<sup>242</sup> *Med.* 264

contains a seven-line fragment of Hesiod, and another at *Orestes* 1648, with a sizable quotation from the prose writings of Hellanicus on the judgment of Orestes on the Areopagus, or a full quotation of the Sphinx' riddle in the hypothesis to the *Phoenissae*. Such notes can become quite detailed, with numerous citations provided to document the source of variant versions, including one note that contains a series of different opinions from Parmeniscus, Hippius, Hellanicus, Eumelus, Simonides, and Musaeus.<sup>243</sup> This all-inclusiveness is for the most part indicative of the generally open nature of the scholiasts' method, as they are mostly content to list alternatives without being very assertive.<sup>244</sup> Not all mythographic notes are like this, though, for some scholia do contain an expressed opinion (whether defended or not), such as a critique of Pindar's claims about why Tantalus was punished by the gods: ἐπὶ ἀκολάστῳ τινὶ λόγῳ φασὶν αὐτὸν κολάζεσθαι. εἰ γὰρ μετέδωκε τῆς ἀμβροσίας κατὰ τὸν Πίνδαρον τοῖς βροτοῖς, μᾶλλον ἂν τῆς φιλανθρωπίας παρὰ θεῶν ἐθαυμάζετο, "They say he was punished for unbridled speech, for if as Pindar says he had shared ambrosia with mortals, he would instead have been marveled at by the gods for his philanthropy."<sup>245</sup> Whether or not one lends any credence to this interesting view of the suddenly philanthropic Greek pantheon, the disagreement with Pindar's version is clear.<sup>246</sup>

As for the content of these mythographical notes, a few subcategories can be loosely delineated. Among the foremost would be the identification of less familiar characters, a sort of extended gloss where the reader is expected to need help. Many of these notes are brief, giving location of origin, ancestors, social position, or other basic characteristics. A few others are rather more robust, going above and beyond the necessities of basic mythographic knowledge needed for understanding the essentials of the original text. At *Orestes* 430ff., for instance, a brief mention of Oeax as the opponent of Orestes launches the scholiast into dozens of explanatory lines detailing the death of Palamedes, the source of his brother

<sup>243</sup> *Med.* 9; cf. *Or.* 872, *Alc.* 1

<sup>244</sup> It still remains uncertain whether their sources were dogmatic. When a scholiast says that, e.g., Didymus feels a certain way about a myth, the original assertion may well have come with harsh critique of other options.

<sup>245</sup> *Or.* 10

<sup>246</sup> The passage at hand demonstrates how difficult it is to distinguish between the opinion of the scholiast and the opinions recorded by the scholiast. In whose mind does the γάρ introduce the cause for attributing Tantalus' punishment to a loose tongue? However we understand the thought, it is worth observing that, at the very least, a scholiast has thought it worthwhile to record in his notes an argument for one version of a myth over another.

Oeax' anger. The scholion itself is exhaustive, where a few simple lines could have explained why Oeax held a grudge against Orestes; I cite the whole passage simply to give a glimpse of its length:

<Οἷαξ τὸ Τροίας μῖσος> Ναυπλίου καὶ Κλυμένης τῆς Κατρέως ἐγένοντο Οἷαξ καὶ Παλαμῆδης. ὁ δὲ Παλαμῆδης ἀπελθὼν εἰς Τροίαν τὰ μέγιστα ὤνησε τὸν Ἑλληνικὸν λαόν. λιμωσσόντων γὰρ ἐν Αὐλίδι καὶ περὶ τὴν διανομὴν τοῦ σίτου δυσχεραίνοντων τε καὶ στασιαζόντων, πρῶτον μὲν τὰ Φοινίκια διδάξας γράμματα αὐτοὺς ἴσῃν τε καὶ ἀνεπίληπτον τὴν διανομὴν ἐν τούτοις ἐπραγματεύσατο. ἔπειτα καὶ περὶ κύβους ἔτρεψεν αὐτῶν τὴν ὀλιγωρίαν καὶ μέτρα ἐξεύρε καὶ ψῆφον ὥστε μέγα σκεῖν ὄνομα παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλησιν. ἐπὶ τούτῳ δὲ φθονήσαντες οἱ περὶ Ἀγαμέμνονα καὶ Ὀδυσσεά καὶ Διομήδην τοιόνδε τι σκευωροῦσι κατ' αὐτοῦ. λαβόντες γὰρ Φρύγα αἰχμάλωτον χρυσίον κομίζοντα Σαρπηδόνη ἠγάγκασαν γράφαι Φρυγίοις γράμμασι περὶ προδοσίας ὡς παρὰ Πριάμου πρὸς Παλαμῆδην. καὶ τούτον μὲν φονεύουσι, θεράποντα δὲ Παλαμῆδους πείθουσι χρήμασιν ἅμα τοῖς Τρωϊκοῖς χρήμασι καὶ τὸ γραφὲν πινάκιον ὑπὸ τὴν κλίνην θέσθαι Παλαμῆδους. αὐτοὶ δὲ παρελθόντες προδοσίαν κατήγγελλον τοῦ ἥρωος καὶ φωραθῆναι τὴν σκηνὴν ἐκέλευον. εὐρεθέντος δὲ τοῦ πινακίου καὶ τῶν χρημάτων ὑπὸ τὴν κλίνην λίθους φονεύεται Παλαμῆδης. Ναύπλιος δὲ ἀκούσας ἤκεν εἰς Ἴλιον δικάσαι τὸν φόνον τοῦ παιδός. τῶν δὲ Ἑλλήνων κατολιγορῶντων αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ κεχαρισμένον τοῖς βασιλευσιν ἀποπλεύσας εἰς τὴν πατρίδα καὶ πυθόμενος ἀποπλεῖν τοὺς Ἑλληνας ἤκεν εἰς Εὐβοίαν καὶ χειμῶνα φυλάξας φρυκτωρίας ἤψε περὶ τὰς ἄκρας τῆς Εὐβοίας. οἱ δὲ εὐεπίβατον νομίσαντες τὸν τόπον προσορμίζονται καὶ ἐν ταῖς πέτραις ἀπόλλυνται.

Following this mammoth scholion, a further note adds even more after an ἄλλως transition: <ἄλλως> τὸν Παλαμῆδους θάνατον οἱ μὲν ἐν Γεραιστῶ, οἱ δὲ ἐν Τενέδῳ, οἱ δὲ ἐν Κολωναῖς τῆς Τρωάδος ὑποτίθενται. φασὶ δὲ αὐτὸν εὐρεῖν φρυκτωρίας καὶ μέτρα καὶ σταθμοὺς καὶ πεττοὺς καὶ γράμματα καὶ φυλακὰς καὶ ἀστραγάλους.<sup>247</sup> Palamedes—whose connection to the original text is simply that his brother was angry at Orestes—is mentioned as a pioneer in beacon-signaling, measurements, the game of *pestoi*, letters of the alphabet, guards,<sup>248</sup> and dice. These tidbits constitute a rather detailed character sketch, certainly more than is required for the matter at hand.<sup>249</sup>

As has already been glimpsed in the aforementioned examples, another important aspect of mythographical notes is an emphasis on aetiology. Perhaps the most essential is the always-frequent delineation of genealogy, which is often embedded in general descriptions of characters like the ones I

<sup>247</sup> Cf. Hyginus, *Fabulae* 277; Pausanias 2.20

<sup>248</sup> To what exactly does *φυλακὰς* refer?

<sup>249</sup> See the depiction of Eumolpus in a note at *Phoenissae* 854: the scholiast explains the conflict between Eumolpus and Erechtheus, as warranted by its mention in the original text, but then gives details about how Eumolpus was reported to be the first foreigner to become an initiate in the Eleusinian Mysteries, with more information following about his death, burial, and possible parentage by Poseidon, who, angry over the Athenian choice of Athena's gift over his own, sent his son against that city. Compare also the note on Sarpedon at *Rhesus* 29, with much of the note dedicated to the identities of his mother Europa and of other "Europae" with whom the mother might be confused.

provided above, and examples are available throughout the commentaries.<sup>250</sup> Other types of origins also occur, however. A mention of Dorian dress at *Hecuba* 933 (λέχη δὲ φίλια μονόπεπλος / λιπούσα, Δωρὶς ὡς κόρα) initiates a note that explains the aition of this style, specifically that the women's dress pins were taken away as a result of a particularly unfortunate accident in which a crowd of grieving women used them to blind and murder a messenger who had reported the deaths of their husbands and sons. At *Hecuba* 1199, Hecuba claims that barbarians and Greeks can never be allies, and the scholiast chimes in with a reference to the woman-stealing reported by Herodotus in the opening of his *Histories*. Others include the founding and naming of Lacedaemon/ Sparta<sup>251</sup> and—perhaps the most expansive example—the aetiology of each of the seven gates of Thebes, with an explanation of how they got their names.<sup>252</sup>

The scholiasts also demonstrate a sort of *horror vacui* when Euripides does not give the name of a character he mentions in a drama, and they are quick to supply this information where possible. We are told that Oenomaus' horses were named Psylla and Harpinna;<sup>253</sup> the three Gorgons were Stheno, Euryale, and Medusa;<sup>254</sup> Tiresias' daughter is named Manto;<sup>255</sup> Medea's sons with Jason were Mermeros and Pheres;<sup>256</sup> Merope is Oedipus' wife,<sup>257</sup> and Admetus' children were called Eumelus and Perimelus.<sup>258</sup> And, lest the reader suffer under more namelessness, our commentator states that when he assaulted the gates of Thebes, Capaneus held two torches in his hands, one of which he called Κεραυνός and the other Ἀστραπή in an effort to compare himself to Zeus via appropriation of his powers over lightning.<sup>259</sup> Such notes are telling, for they seem to represent an interest in teaching the reader about mythological figures in general. On the other hand, not all the onomastic scholia are “factual.” Consider the note at *Troades*

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<sup>250</sup> E.g., *Hec.* 886, *Or.* 765, *Ph.* 133, *Tr.* 822; of particular note is a dizzying array of children that Hermione was rumored to have born, and the men by whom she may have conceived them (*Andr.* 32).

<sup>251</sup> *Or.* 626

<sup>252</sup> *Ph.* 1104ff.; cf. the aition for Theban bacchic practices (*Ph.* 655) and an extended discourse on the history of trumpets (*Ph.* 1377).

<sup>253</sup> *Or.* 990

<sup>254</sup> *Ph.* 454

<sup>255</sup> *Ph.* 834

<sup>256</sup> *Med.* 117

<sup>257</sup> *Ph.* 39

<sup>258</sup> *Alc.* 265

<sup>259</sup> *Ph.* 1173; this ended unfortunately for Capaneus, who according to myth was killed by the real stuff when Zeus got angry.

457: <τριῶν Ἐρινύων> τρεῖς γάρ εἰσιν Ἐρινύες, Ἀληκτὸ Τισιφόνη Μέγαιρα. πεποιήται δὲ τὰ ὀνόματα, “For the three Erinyes are Alecto, Tisiphone, and Megaira, but the names have been made up.”<sup>260</sup> Names, like *ἱστορία* in general, are evidently not always reliable, depending on the source.

Various other mythographical notes provide information regarding dates and places. These can refer to different accounts about the chronology of certain events, such as the note at *Orestes* 39 discussing the amount of time between Orestes’ murder of Clytemnestra and the onset of the Erinyes’ attack as recorded by Homer and Euripides. Other chronological questions include the dating of Troy’s capture, which, as the scholiast notes, was a topic tackled by Callisthenes, Lysimachus, and others.<sup>261</sup> Certain locations are also mentioned as having special relevance, particularly when the scholiast in Pausanian fashion provides some sight-seeing opportunities connected with his stories about the past. In giving a summary of aetiological accounts for Delphi’s status as the ὀμφαλός of the earth, including the one in which two of Zeus’ eagles were released at the ends of the earth and came together at that spot, the scholiast cites a rumor that there are golden statues set up there as memorials to these eagles.<sup>262</sup> Compare also the note at *Andromache* 1139 and its mention of the “Leap of Achilles,” the place rumored to be where Achilles jumped down from his ship with such incredible force that a well shot up from that spot: <τὸ Τρωικὸν πήδημα> ὁποῖον ἐν τῇ Τροίᾳ ἐπήδησεν ὁ Ἀχιλλεύς. οἱ γὰρ συντεταχότες τὰ Τρωικὰ λέγουσιν ὡς τόπος ἐστὶν ἐν Τροίᾳ καλούμενος Ἀχιλλέως πήδημα ὅπερ ἀπὸ τῆς νεῶς ἐπήδησεν. οὕτως δὲ, φησί, βία ἤλατο ὡς καὶ ὕδωρ ἀναδοθῆναι.<sup>263</sup> Other examples include the cave of the Python at Parnassus and the height from which Apollo spied it out,<sup>264</sup> as well as the bath at Rhodius where it is said the three goddesses got gussied up in preparation for the Judgment of Paris.<sup>265</sup>

<sup>260</sup> One reason for believing this may be that the Erinyes were said to have names that were intentionally not uttered (see a scholion to *Orestes* 37).

<sup>261</sup> *Hec.* 910

<sup>262</sup> ἀνακείσθαι τε χρυσοῦς ἀετούς φασὶ τῶν μυθευομένων ἀετῶν ὑπομνήματα (*Or.* 331).

<sup>263</sup> Borthwick (1967, 18); cf. the “Leap of Glaucus,” the place where the Glaucus of the magical grass leapt into the sea and became a marine divinity (Pausanias 9.27).

<sup>264</sup> *Ph.* 232f.

<sup>265</sup> *Andr.* 285



Although these are much more limited, there are also moments in which the scholiast calls up figures from the past as mythological *exempla* for the purpose of elucidating a character in the original text. What is important to distinguish here is that in these examples the scholiasts are not simply providing information on the suggestion of the original text, but are introducing the comparison on their own. When Aegeus calls Pittheus one of his dearest friends, for instance, the scholiast glosses *δορυξένων* as those who have a military alliance, just like Glaucus and Diomedes: <δορυξένων> οί κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλίαν πεποιηκότες, ὡς Γλαῦκος καὶ Διομήδης.<sup>266</sup> The reference to the Homeric pair in a discussion of *ξενία* gives us a certain pleasure—we too think first of them!—and it is all the scholiast’s doing, as the comparison is not suggested in the least by the original text. Rather, the scholiast brings in a parallel set of figures as a sort of mythographic gloss on the term in question, using the common didactic method of pairing a familiar item with a less familiar one. So too when Andromache states that she often nursed Hector’s children—even those from other women—so as not to give him any cause for complaint,<sup>267</sup> the scholiast states that she is just like Antenor’s wife Theano, with a Homeric quotation to prove the assertion: <καὶ μαστὸν ἤδη πολλάκις> ὁποῖα ἦν ἡ Θεανὸν ἢ Ἀντήνορος γυνή. Ὅμηρος· Ἰηδαῖον δ’ ἄρ’ ἔπεφνε Μέγης, Ἀντήνορος υἱὸν, ὅς ῥα νόθος μὲν ἔην, πύκα δ’ ἔτρεφε διὰ Θεανὸν ἴσα φίλοισι τέκεσσι χαριζομένη πόσει ᾤ.’ Again, the text of Euripides makes no hint as to this correlation, which is rather the scholiast’s own interjection with his own Homeric citation.<sup>268</sup> The same phenomenon occurs again at *Orestes* 126f., where Electra laments the beauty of Helen and the destruction it has caused her, to which the scholiast adds that beauty had in fact profited some, since Ganymede’s father got a team of horses as compensation for his son’s abduction by Zeus, and on account of intercourse with Poseidon Amynone was able to bring water to Argos: <σωτήριόν τε τοῖς καλῶς κεκτημένοις> πολλοὶ γὰρ τὸ κάλλος ἐπὶ σωτηρία ἐαυτῶν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἐκτήσαντο, ὧν ἔστιν εἷς ὁ Γανυμήδης παρὰ θεοῖς εἶναι ἀξιωθεὶς καὶ ἵππους

<sup>266</sup> *Med.* 687

<sup>267</sup> *Andr.* 224

<sup>268</sup> Or rather it may be the interjection of his source, but the point stands either way: this is an example of Euripidean exegesis in which a mythological *exemplum* has been introduced from outside of the original text.

ἀθανάτοις κοσμήσας τὴν θρειαμένην. καὶ Ἀμυμώνη δὲ διὰ τὸ ἴδιον κάλλος τὸ ἄνδρον Ἴαργος πολύδρον ἐποίησε διὰ τῆς ἐπιμιξίας τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος.<sup>269</sup>

Finally, a few examples will show how some mythographic information gets repeated throughout the scholia in various incarnations, with no apparent organization and little consistency. The first is a story—or rather, series of stories—about a figure known as Glaucus. When he is mentioned as an adviser to Menelaus at *Orestes* 364, the scholiast states: <Νηρέως προφήτης> οὗτος Ἀνθηδόσιος ἀλιεύς· ἑώρακὼς δὲ ἰχθὺν παρὰ τὴν ψάμμον βοτάνης γευσάμενον καὶ ἀναζήσαντα, φαγὼν καὶ αὐτὸς γέγονεν ἀθάνατος, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀγήραος, ἐφ’ ᾧ κατεπόντισεν ἑαυτόν. μαντεύεται δὲ ὡς ὁ παρ’ Ὀμήρῳ Πρωτεύς καὶ παρὰ Πινδάρῳ [Pyth. 4.20] Τρίτων τοῖς Ἀργοναύταις, “This man was an Anthedonian fisherman, and after seeing a fish that had eaten some grass along the shore and had been revived [evidently one he had caught?], he ate the grass and became immortal himself, but not ageless, for which reason he threw himself into the sea; and he is a prophet called Proteus in Homer and Triton by the Argonauts in Pindar.” A previous note, however, presents another story:

<Ποτνιαδες θεαί> μανιοποιοί. Πότνιαι γὰρ χωρίον ἐστὶ Βοιωτίας, ἔνθα φαγοῦσαι βοτάνην αἱ Γλαύκου ἵπποι καὶ μανεῖσαι διεσπάσαντο τὸν ἴδιον δεσπότην Γλαῦκον τὸν Βελλεροφόντου πατέρα ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ Πελίου. Πότνιαι δὲ πόλις Βοιωτίας, ὅθεν καὶ Γλαῦκος . . . γευσάμενον . . . ἐμμανῆς γέγονε καὶ ἤλατο εἰς θάλασσαν [ὁ Ἀνθηδόσιος]: ἀπὸ <τῶν> Ποτνιαδῶν ἵππων μετήνεγκεν, αἱ μανεῖσαι ἔφαγον τὸν Γλαῦκον.<sup>270</sup>

These goddesses are mania-inducing. For Potniae is a place in Boeotia where the mares of Glaucus ate some grass, went mad, and tore their own master, Glaucus father of Bellerophon, to pieces on the tomb of Pelias. And Potniae is a city of Boeotia, from which also Glaucus . . . having tasted . . . became mad and was driven into the sea: Euripides assigned this word [Ποτνιαδες to the goddesses] from the horses of Potniae, which became mad and devoured Glaucus.

This note, listed as one entry in Schwartz, is an odd composite. The double mention of Potniae as a place in Boeotia intimates that the latter half is a supplement, probably by another commentator. Was this extra, incorrect identification the result of someone reading the note to *Orestes* 364 and then backtracking

<sup>269</sup> A note to the previous line uses similar wording to express the sentiment: πολλοὶ γὰρ διὰ τὸ κάλλος εὐεργέτησαν τὰς πατρίδας.

<sup>270</sup> Or. 318

to fill in a previous note, marked possibly by the repetition of *γευσάμενον* in the legible portion of the text? Was the story simply confused because there were two Glaucuses who both had something to do with magic grasses that could either grant immortality or impart a carnivorous savagery to their consumer? An additional scholion at *Phoenissae* 1124 attempts to provide a corrective for the confusion. When the messenger reports that Polyneices advanced bearing a shield with an engraving of the Potnian horses, the scholiast clarifies:

<Ποτνιαδες δ' ἐπ' ἀσπίδι> μανικαί. τινές δέ φασι Γλαῦκον τὸν τῶν Ποτνιαδῶν ἵππων δεσπότην πατέρα εἶναι Βελλεροφόντου, ἐξ οὗ παῖς ἐγένετο Γλαῦκος. Ποτνιαδες δὲ ἐκαλοῦντο ἐπεὶ ἐν Ποτνίαις ἔτρεφεν αὐτὰς Γλαῦκος. Πότνιαι δὲ πόλις Βοιωτίας. Γλαῦκον δὲ οὐ τὸν ἀπὸ Σισύφου, ἀλλὰ τὸν Θρᾶκα τὸν ἄγριον. <ἄλλως> τὰς τοῦ Γλαύκου φησὶν, αἱ λυσσήσασαι κατέφαγον τὸν δεσπότην Γλαῦκον τὸν ἀπὸ Σισύφου ἐν Ποτνίαις τῆς Βοιωτίας. Thus, attempts to explain a few passages

The term means “manic.” And some say that Glaucus, master of the Potnian horses, was the father of Bellerophon, from whom a son Glaucus was born. And they were called Ποτνιαδες because Glaucus raised them in Potniae, and Potniae is a city of Boeotia. And [they say that] Glaucus is not the son of Sisyphus, but the Thracian rustic. Additional note: Euripides means the horses of Glaucus, who went crazy and devoured their master Glaucus, the son of Sisyphus, in Potniae of Boeotia.

The details here are getting somewhat confusing. A scholar has apparently tried to solve the dilemma about the two Glaucuses, but another has simply stirred the pot again by saying that it was indeed the son of Sisyphus. However that may be, these examples show how problematic some mythographic accounts could be.<sup>271</sup>

The Sphinx likewise is treated in several different notes throughout the *Phoenissae*, with a wide range of ideas about who she was and what she did. A note at *Phoenissae* 45 states that some thought her to have the face of a young woman, the breast and feet of a lion, and the wings of a bird; but a certain Socrates said she was local prophetess who issued hard-to-discern oracles, which the Thebans failed to understand, and so they died. Meanwhile, others said that Creon's son Haemon himself was snatched away by the Sphinx, and others said that she was one of the daughters of Cadmus who went crazy and turned into an animal. More description occurs at *Phoenissae* 806ff., and then later again she is

<sup>271</sup> For more on the son of Sisyphus, see Pausanias 6.20 (he was also the subject of a lost play by Aeschylus).

mentioned as the offspring of the Echidna and Typhaon.<sup>272</sup> Just a few verses later the scholiast adds that Dionysus sent the Sphinx against Thebes: *παρόσον τὴν Σφίγγα ὁ Διόνυσος ἔπεμψε τοῖς Θηβαίοις ὡς † ἐναντίον λέγειν*,<sup>273</sup> but shortly thereafter it is suggested that it was Ares who did this out of anger for the serpent slain by Cadmus.<sup>274</sup> Finally, at *Phoenissae* 1505 the scholiast reveals that after Oedipus solved the riddle, the Sphinx tore herself to shreds (*φασὶ γὰρ ὅτι λύσαντος τοῦ Οἰδίποδος τὸ αἴνιγμα διεσπάραξεν ἐαυτὴν ἢ Σφίγγι*), and an Erinys began to destroy his household. As in the case of Glaucus, then, the Sphinx is subject to a range of notes, some of them contradictory, and most of them scattered in a haphazard manner with the details accruing slowly as one proceeds through the commentaries.

### *Proverbs*

According to Pfeiffer, formal collections of proverbs (*γνώμαι, παροιμίαι*) appear as early as Aristotle and continue through the work of his pupil Clearchus of Soloi and then through the likes of Aristophanes of Byzantium, Zenobius, Didymus, Pausanias Atticus, and more.<sup>275</sup> That the scholiasts have some knowledge of these collections is suggested not only by the fact that they point out proverbial statements that Euripides incorporates from elsewhere, but also because they are attuned to Euripidean sentiments that sound like other proverbs. The interest in maxims is clearly exemplified in the hypothesis to the *Phoenissae*, where the scholiast states that the drama is chocked full of many excellent proverbs: *ἔστι δὲ τὸ δράμα καὶ πολυπρόσωπον καὶ γνωμῶν μεστὸν πολλῶν τε καὶ καλῶν*.<sup>276</sup> Comments on individual verses demonstrate how this interest plays in the course of the notes, the most basic of which simply claim a line as proverbial, as in the case of *Phoenissae* 438 (*πάλαι μὲν οὖν ὑμνηθέν, ἀλλ' ὄμως ἐρῶ*), which

<sup>272</sup> *Ph.* 1020

<sup>273</sup> *Ph.* 1031

<sup>274</sup> <ἄλλως> διὰ τὸν θάνατον τοῦ δράκοντος μνησίαντος τοῦ Ἄρεως καὶ ἐπιπέμφαντος τὴν Σφίγγα (*Ph.* 1064).

<sup>275</sup> 1968, 83f.; cf. Rupprecht (1949, 1735ff.)

<sup>276</sup> *Ph. hypoth.* 28f.

is described thus: *παροιμιώδης δὲ ὁ στίχος*. See also a lengthy note on *Θεσσαλὸν σόφισμα* at *Phoenissae* 1408 (here in reference to Polyneices' fencing maneuver), where the scholiast not only points out that the phrase is a proverb (*παροιμία*), but also gives an extended aetiology for it through the story of the Thessalian Diotimus' refusal to fulfill his vow to honor Apollo with a sacrifice—a tradition of deceit carried on year after year by the Thessalians; the scholion then contains a number of citations that also demonstrate this stereotypical view of the Thessalians. A proverb from Sophocles' *Ajax the Whip-Bearer* is noted at *Medea* 618, the sentiment that the gifts of an enemy are no true benefit: *παροιμία ἐστίν· <ἐχθρῶν ἄδωρα δῶρα κοῦκ ὀνήσιμα>*. μέμνηται Σοφοκλῆς ἐν Αἴαντι μαστιγοφόρῳ [665].<sup>277</sup> Further, a scholion to *Rhesus* 251 highlights the proverbial “last of the Mysians,” a reference to cowardice—though the scholion also gives an alternative explanation that makes the phrase indicate a journey of great difficulty.<sup>278</sup> Other examples that do not include the term *γνώμη* or *παροιμία* nonetheless point to a sentiment that is “general” (*καθόλου*), which may amount to the same thing.<sup>279</sup>

Other Euripidean phrases seem to be understood by the scholiasts to have been extracted and used as a proverb in later times. When Menelaus states that it is a Greek practice to help one's own,<sup>280</sup> the scholiast adds that the line has come to be used as a proverb: *εἰς παροιμίαν ὁ στίχος οὗτος ἐχώρησιν*. See also the sentiment that hopes feed exiles,<sup>281</sup> at which the scholiast notes: *ἐντεῦθεν ἡ παροιμία· αἱ δ' ἐλπίδες βόσκουσι τοὺς κενοὺς βροτῶν*.<sup>282</sup> Euripides also states that a temporary lover is no lover at all,<sup>283</sup> a verse evidently included in collections of proverbs: *ὁ στίχος οὗτος ἐν παροιμίαις φέρεται*. In these examples it is sometimes difficult to decide whether the scholiast is actually saying that Euripides

<sup>277</sup> The proverb is also cited amply in the compendia, including Zenobius and Diogenianus. The scholion to the Sophoclean line reads simply: *γνώμη*.

<sup>278</sup> This example is particularly interesting in that Cicero explicitly mentions the proverb (in its former sense of inferiority) in reference to how self-depracting the men of Asia Minor were (*Mysorum ultimus*, *Pro Flacco* 65).

<sup>279</sup> Cf. *Or.* 823 (the evil deeds perpetrated by the house of Atreus), *Alc.* 309 (inimical stepmothers); a further example of proverbial speech occurs in the vicinity of *Orestes* 1610 (*παροιμιώδης τὸ ἡμιστίχιον*), though it is not clear to me which half-line is meant.

<sup>280</sup> Ἑλληνικόν τοι τὸν ὀμόθεν τιμᾶν αἰεὶ (*Or.* 486).

<sup>281</sup> αἱ δ' ἐλπίδες βόσκουσι φυγάδας, ὡς λόγος (*Ph.* 396).

<sup>282</sup> This is a particularly curious example. The scholiast seems to claim that Euripides' line is slightly adapted and then turned into a proverb, but Euripides himself admits the proverbial nature of the thought (*ὡς λόγος*).

<sup>283</sup> οὐκ ἔστ' ἐραστής ὅστις οὐκ αἰεὶ φιλεῖ (*Tr.* 1051).

instigated these proverbs on his own or whether this is simply loose language for stating that the poet made use of a proverb already in existence. In any case, it is at least clear that the statements were proverbial after Euripides, if not before.

In other passages the scholiasts show themselves eager to mention not only those maxims that are directly referenced (or created?) by Euripides, but also proverbs that are thematically parallel to a Euripidean sentiment, a phenomenon that is like the introduction of external mythical *exempla* for which I provided passages above. So it is at *Phoenissae* 584, where the phrase μέθετον τὸ λίαν, μέθετον is glossed by the famous μηδὲν ἄγαν. When Phaedra describes the nurse's help as friendly but not good,<sup>284</sup> our scholiast tells us that this is like another proverb about untimely "help": καὶ ἔστιν ὁμοιον τῇ παροιμία 'εὐνοια ἄκαιρος οὐδὲν διαλλάσσει ἔχθρας.' The *mundus inversus* of *Medea* 410, where women are now honorable and men dishonorable, is cited as an example of the παροιμία—here perhaps meaning "commonplace"—of things changed to the opposite of what they should be: παροιμία ἐπὶ τῶν εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον καὶ παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον μεταβαλλομένων πραγμάτων. When Andromache says that one cannot call a person happy before they die, the scholiast quotes the famous proverb "Look to the end of a long life."<sup>285</sup> Lastly, when Orestes says that it is wise to hear both sides of an argument before ruling, the scholiast suggests that he might be hinting at a proverb: μηδὲ δίκην δικάσης πρὶν ἀμφοῖν μῦθον ἀκούσης, "Do not cast judgment before you hear both sides of the story."<sup>286</sup>

Even more telling (and more interesting) are examples in which the scholiasts introduce proverbs that have no direct connection to anything proverbial in the original text. In the course of a lengthy note on the historical development of the war trumpet, one scholiast remarks that before trumpets were used to initiate battles fire-bearers (οἱ πυρφόροι) would throw torches out into the center of the battle field and then be allowed to run back unharmed because they were sacred persons; thus, the proverb "Not even a fire-

<sup>284</sup> φίλως μὲν, καλῶς δ' οὐ (Hipp. 597).

<sup>285</sup> τούτῳ συνᾶδει τὸ 'τέλος ὄρα μακροῦ βίου' (Andr. 100ff.).

<sup>286</sup> Andr. 957; this maxim is quoted several times in other sources, and Plutarch says that Zeno argued against its validity, saying that the first speaker will either persuade or not persuade (*De Stoic. repug.* 1034e).

bearer was saved” was used to indicate total annihilation.<sup>287</sup> Similarly, when Medea says that she will carry the corpses of her children to the temple of Hera (Ἀκραιάς θεοῦ), the scholiast adds that the Corinthians had a festival here, and a further note following an ἄλλως states that the location was the site of the birth of a proverb: ἔνθα καὶ ἡ αἰξὶ εὔρε τὴν μάχαιραν, ἀφ’ ἧς ἡ παροιμία, “Here also the goat found the knife, from which the proverb arose.”<sup>288</sup> Note that no explanation of the proverb is provided, but by examining the paroemiographers, one is able to patch together a story in which those hired to sacrifice a goat at the altar could not find the sword, but that the goat itself kicked it up; thus, the proverb applies to people who do something to their own detriment.<sup>289</sup> An additional example is even farther removed from the original text. At *Rhesus* 509 Hector uses the phrase κακῶ δὲ μερμέρω (“with baneful trouble”) to describe his rangling with Odysseus. The scholiast wonders if there is a textual error: instead of μερμέρω, perhaps it should be τερμέρου, in which case the phrase would be in accordance with a known proverb (μήποτε πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον μετέστραπται ἀπὸ τοῦ τερμέρου, ἔν’ ἢ παρὰ τὴν παροιμίαν “Τερμέρια κακά”). The exact meaning of this proverb is up for debate. The note at hand takes it as a reference to a place of piracy, whereas Plutarch took it as indicative of poetic justice.<sup>290</sup> However that may be, what is clear is that the scholiast can be so eager to read a proverb into the text that he is willing to offer a correction of a phrase—which, by the way, was attested in Hesiod already—with a reading that *might* hint at a proverb.

### Religion

In the course of explaining Euripidean tragedy, there must also be periodic clarifications of a religious nature. These may include spelling out characteristics of certain divinities, identifying locations

<sup>287</sup> ὄθεν παροιμία ἐπὶ τῶν ἄρδην ἀπολομένων· οὐδὲ πυρφόρος ἐσώθη (*Ph.* 1377).

<sup>288</sup> *Med.* 1379

<sup>289</sup> Pausanias Atticus has a couple of passages that mention this episode, and in his Ἀττικῶν ὀνομάτων συναγωγή he cites a variation of it (αἰξὶ ποττὰν μάχαιραν) from Clearchus (*Frag.* 63) and Chrysippus (no such citation found).

<sup>290</sup> *Theseus* 11

of religious importance, or providing details on rituals such as haruspicy. Such notes seek to provide additional information for what might be an unknown feature of ancient (to the scholiast/ reader) Greek religious life, and this may be a necessary elucidation of the original text at hand or general instruction for the curious student.

Numerous scholia attempt to identify the nature or characteristics of divine beings. The note might describe divinities in general, for when Medea orders those who are unholy to depart before she performs her daring deed, the scholiast explains that she has said this because there are some gods who rather like killing people, such as the Erinyes, Ares, and others: τοῦτο δὲ εἶπεν ὡς ὄντων τινῶν θεῶν χαιρόντων ἀνδροφονίαις, οἷον Ἐρινύων, Ἄρεως καὶ τινων ἐτέρων;<sup>291</sup> a quotation of Homer is provided for confirmation that this is true for Ares, at least. More often the notes explain individual deities, as at *Orestes* 1454 when the Phrygian messenger begins his description of how Orestes and Pylades seized Helen in the house while invoking Rhea. In the course of elucidating this invocation, the scholiast asserts that Rhea is carted around by lions (λέουσιν ὀχέλται), can be invoked apotropaically (τῆν Ῥέαν ἐπικαλεῖται ὡς ἀλεξίκακον), dwells in the mountains (ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὄρεσι διατρίβειν φασὶ τὴν θεόν), is powerful and fearsome (<ὀβρίμαν> δὲ τὴν ἰσχυρὰν καὶ φοβερὰν), and is also called Antaea, because she is terrifying to the Phrygians who encounter her, a play on ὑπαντᾶν (καλεῖται δὲ καὶ Ἀνταία· τοῖς Φρυγῶσι γὰρ ὑπαντῶσι φοβερὰ ἐστίν). Other such notes help explain why a Euripidean character might invoke one deity over another. For example, Antigone calls out to Hecate when she sees the approaching Argive army either because she is a virgin calling upon a virgin, or because she is amazed by the gleam of bronze from the soldiers' equipment, since this goddess is reminiscent of light, being the same as Selene, the Moon.<sup>292</sup> Similarly, when Cassandra invokes Hecate as she laments her upcoming marriage with Agamemnon, the scholiast says that she mixed her into her song because she was about to die, since the goddess is a chthonic one, or she invokes her because Hecate is concerned with marriage.<sup>293</sup>

<sup>291</sup> *Med.* 1053

<sup>292</sup> ὡς παρθένος δὲ τὴν παρθένον καλεῖ. ἢ θαυμάζουσα τὸ φῶς τὴν Ἑκάτην καλεῖ· ἢ αὐτὴ γὰρ ἐστὶ τῆ Σελήνη (Ph. 109).

<sup>293</sup> τὴν Ἑκάτην παρέμιξε διὰ τὸ μετ' ὀλίγον ἀποθνήσκειν· χθονία γὰρ ἡ θεός. ἢ ὅτι γαμήλιος ἡ Ἑκάτη (Tr. 323).



Other notes give details about various locations of temples or other types of religious markers. In a note on the prophetic nature of Dionysus, the scholiast remarks that “some say that there is a Dionysiac oracle at Pangaion, and others at Haemus.”<sup>294</sup> To return to the passage about Rhea mentioned above, a further note specifies that Rhea is called “Idaeian Mother” because she is worshipped on Ida, a mountain of Troy, and that perhaps the Phrygian invokes her as a local deity.<sup>295</sup> A note to *Phoenissae* 101 contains a note with similar language for Ismean Apollo: <Ἰσμηνοῦ ῥοάς> Ἰσμηνὸς ποταμὸς Θηβῶν, ὅθεν Ἰσμήνιος Ἀπόλλων τιμᾶται. Further, when Euripides uses the phrase λειμῶν’ ἐς Ἥρας, the scholiast remarks that this is either because every field is sacred to Hera, or because of the temple of Hera that is there in Thebes: <λειμῶν’ ἐς Ἥρας> ἢ ὅτι πᾶς λειμῶν ἱερός ἐστι τῆς Ἥρας ἢ ὅτι Κιθαιρωνίας Ἥρας ἐστὶν ἐν Θήβαις ἱερόν.<sup>296</sup> Another scholion of interest tells us that after Athena helped Cadmus against the Sown Men he founded a temple for her, giving her the title Ὀγκᾶ from the “Phoenician dialect,” complete with mention of the inscription he included: δοκεῖ Ἀθηνᾶ συμπρᾶξαι τῷ Κάδμῳ κατὰ τῶν Σπαρτῶν. διὸ καὶ ἰδρύσατο ταύτην Ὀγκᾶν προσαγορεύσας τῇ τῶν Φοινίκων διαλέκτῳ. ἐπεγέγραπτο δὲ τῷ ἱερῷ τούτῳ· Ὀγκᾶς νηὸς ὅδ’ ἐστὶν Ἀθήνης ὃν ποτε Κάδμος εἶσατο βοῦν θ’ ἱέρευσεν ὅτ’ ἔκτισεν ἄστῃ τὸ Θήβης.<sup>297</sup>

In addition to cult locations, various rites and religious practices are also described. Upon mention of Cadmus at the beginning of the *Phoenissae*, a scholion reports that celebrants at the festivals of Samothrace still perform a ritual search for the missing Europa: καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἐν τῇ Σαμοθράκῃ ζητοῦσιν αὐτὴν ἐν ταῖς ἐορταῖς.<sup>298</sup> Later the chorus’ reference to the “Immortal’s dance” elicits an assertion that Euripides means Artemis, and that her mysteries are in common with Apollo.<sup>299</sup> Another note explains that Apollo is called Ἀγυιεύς because statues of him are placed in front of gateways as apotropaic symbols and guardians of roadways: ἐπεὶ πρὸ τῶν πυλῶν ἵστασαν ἀγάλματα τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ὡς ἀλεξικάκου καὶ

<sup>294</sup> οἱ μὲν περὶ τὸ Πάγγαιον εἶναι τὸ μαντεῖόν φασι τοῦ Διονύσου, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Αἶμον (*Hec.* 1267). The note also mentions Orphic inscriptions, for which see the discussion below (*Alc.* 968).

<sup>295</sup> <Ἰδαία μᾶτερ> Ἰδη ὄρος ἐστὶ Τροίας, ἐνθα τετίμηται ἡ Ῥέα. ἕως οὖν ὡς ἐγχωρίαν θεὸν ἐπικαλεῖται αὐτὴν ὁ εὐνοῦχος (*Or.* 1453).

<sup>296</sup> *Ph.* 24; cf. a mention of a Spartan temple of Athena Chalchioecus (*Tr.* 1113)

<sup>297</sup> *Ph.* 1062

<sup>298</sup> *Ph.* 7

<sup>299</sup> τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος. κοινὰ γὰρ αὐτῆς καὶ Ἀπόλλωνός ἐισι τὰ μυστήρια (*Ph.* 235).

φύλακος τῶν ὀδῶν. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο Ἄγνιεύς.<sup>300</sup> Other notes mention priestly prayers on behalf of those offering sacrifices and some examples of Bacchic cries.<sup>301</sup>

Some notes also pertain to technical matters of various priestly duties. We learn from a note to *Phoenissae* 839 that augurs like Tiresias record the flights of birds in writing so that they can remember them: οἱ γὰρ οἰωνοσκόποι ἐν δέλτῳ ἐσημειοῦντο τὰς πτήσεις, ἵνα διὰ μνήμης ἔχοιεν. A scholion to *Alcestis* 968 includes information about Orpheus in his capacity as poet and prophet, who not only first handed down to men the mysteries of the gods (πρῶτος Ὀρφεὺς μυστήρια θεῶν παραδέδωκεν), but also was reported to have written poetry of an ostensibly religious significance on wooden tablets that Heracleides claimed were kept in the temple of Dionysus on Mount Haemus. An extended note to *Phoenissae* 1256 adds an explanation for Euripides' mention of haruspicy, specifically the importance of looking at the ruptures of the gall-bladder when placed in the fire, or the direction in which various liquids spurt when sufficient heat is applied<sup>302</sup>—and indeed, that looking at the gall-bladder was especially appropriate for inquiries about one's enemies, because enemies and gall are both "bitter": οἱ γὰρ θύται εἰ περὶ τῶν ἐχθρῶν βουληθεῖεν μαντεύεσθαι, εἰς τὴν χολὴν ἀφορῶσι· πικροὶ γὰρ οἱ ἐχθροί.

As mentioned above, not all of these religious comments are necessary for understanding the original text, and some feel more like trivia than anything else. In a note already examined at *Phoenissae* 1062, a mention of Athena's help for Cadmus sparks a mention of the temple with its dedicatory inscription, constructed as a sign of thanks for divine aid, but the original text makes no mention of the temple at all. Earlier in this play, when Antigone cries out to Nemesis and Zeus to punish the braggart Capaneus, the scholiast states offhand concerning the former: ἔστι δὲ θυγάτηρ Νυκτός.<sup>303</sup> Is this meant simply to remind the reader of Nemesis' place in divine genealogy? It certainly appears to have no clarifying power for the original text, for there is no genealogical allusion or difficulty to be resolved. Compare also the response to Euripides' mention of Epidaurus at *Hippolytus* 1197: though the messenger

<sup>300</sup> *Ph.* 631

<sup>301</sup> *Andr.* 1105, *Tr.* 325

<sup>302</sup> τῆς κύστεως τὸ στόμα ἐρίψ δεσμοῦντες ἐπετίθεσαν τῷ πυρὶ καὶ παρετήρουν πῶς ῥαγήσεται καὶ ποῦ τὸ οὖρον ἀκοντίσει.

<sup>303</sup> *Ph.* 182

mentions the site only to express the location of Hippolytus' demise, the scholiast tells us that Asclepius is worshipped here (ἐνθα ἐτιμᾶτο ὁ Ἀσκληπιός). The phrasing is not surprising and is in fact the same as we saw in two examples above, but whereas in those passages the information helped explain the text, here the detail is extraneous.

### *Scientific Pursuits*

It is with hesitation that I append the label “scientific” to the following category of notes, since the term in its modern sense does not have an ancient Greek parallel.<sup>304</sup> It is a category that comprises a variety of specialities, such as natural philosophy, anatomy, astronomy, astrology, biology, geography, and ethnography, but it is suspect to impose strict limits on these categories, as if they were always perfectly demarcated in the mind of ancient scholars. Let it suffice here to present in tandem the various subcategories of scientific knowledge that the scholia employ in their exegesis of Euripides with the understanding that such categorization is to some extent an artificial construct.

A number of notes deal with anatomical considerations, and interestingly they tend to be grouped together, appearing almost exclusively in select passages from the *Hecuba*, *Orestes*, and *Phoenissae*.

When Parthenopaeus suffers a fractured cranium in his assault on the city, for instance, a scholion adds

that doctors claim that there are five seams in the skull: πέντε δὲ ραφᾶς εἶναί φασιν οἱ ἰατροὶ τῆς

κεφαλῆς.<sup>305</sup> For an explanation of the prophecy Aegeus received not to “loosen the wineskin” until

returning home, a note asserts four possibilities: ἐξέχοντα δὲ μάλιστα ἐν σώματι τέσσαρα, κεφαλὴ χεῖρες αἰδοῖον πόδες, “The four most protruding parts of the body are the head, hands, genitalia, and feet.”<sup>306</sup>

Further, when Pylades prays that his blood and life be received by neither the earth nor sky if he should

betray Orestes, a commentator explains: τουτέστι· μὴ ἐνωθείην τοῖς στοιχείοις τελευτήσας. ὅτε γὰρ

<sup>304</sup> Pfeiffer (1968, 152ff.), Shipley (2000, 326f.)

<sup>305</sup> *Ph.* 1159

<sup>306</sup> *Med.* 681

ἀποθνήσκουσιν, εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀναλύονται ἐξ ὧν εἰσίν, “That is, ‘May I not be united with the elements when I die,’ for when people die, they are are dissolved into the elements of which they consist.”<sup>307</sup>

Other notes of this type appear in larger clusters, of which one particular example is a group of scholia on blood and the soul in the first half of the *Hecuba*.<sup>308</sup> The first comment shows that Euripides indicates the loss of Hector’s blood/ life through the loss of his “soul” since many equated the two, including Homer: <ψυχῆ> τὸ αἷμα νῦν ψυχὴν φησι. πολλοὶ γὰρ οὕτως ἐδόξασαν, αἷμα εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, ὡς καὶ Ὅμηρος [Ξ 518]: ‘ψυχὴ δὲ κατ’ οὐταμένην ἀτειλήν ἔσσυτ’ ἐπειγομένη τὸν δὲ σκότος ὅσσ’ ἐκάλυψεν.’<sup>309</sup> The second concerns this same terminology, for when the sacrifice of Polyxena is described as a cutting of the “channels of her soul,”<sup>310</sup> a scholiast takes this phrase as a representation of the various types of blood vessels: τὰς ἀρτηρίας, τὰς φλέβας. An added distinction is made: διαφέρει δὲ ἀρτηρία φλεβὸς ταύτη, τῷ τὴν ἀρτηρίαν μὲν ὀλίγον ἔχειν αἷμα, πνεῦμα δὲ πολύ, τὴν δὲ φλέβα τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ μὲν αἷμα πολὺ, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ὀλίγον ὡς πρὸς σύγκρισιν τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἀρτηρίᾳ, “And an ἀρτηρία is different from a φλέψ in this, namely that the ἀρτηρία has a little blood and much πνεῦμα, whereas on the contrary the φλέψ has much blood and little πνεῦμα in comparison to that in the ἀρτηρία.” Though the terminology for “soul” is different (ψυχῆ, πνεῦμα) the perceived intimate relationship between soul and blood is common in this cluster of notes.

More patterns of anatomical notes emerge in the opening scenes of the *Orestes*, where the scholiasts see a number of elements in the Euripidean verses that have physical (φυσικόν) parallels. One pair of notes refers to the nature of sleep in sick people. When Electra calls upon Night to bring Orestes sleep, a scholion at *Orestes* 174 points out scientific reasons for this invocation:

ἐπικαλεῖται τὴν Νύκτα πρὸς τὸ κοιμίσει τὸν Ὀρέστην: <πότνια πότνια νύξ ὑπνοδότειρα> ὁ κατὰ φύσιν ὕπνος ἐξ ὑγρότητος γίνεται· ὑγρὰ δὲ ἡ νύξ ἀφισταμένου τοῦ ἡλίου τοῦ ξηραίνοντος καὶ θερμαίνοντος τὸν ἀέρα. ὁ τοίνυν Ὀρέστης ἐξηραμμένος ὑπὸ νόσου τε καὶ αἰτίας, ὑγρανθεὶς τῷ

<sup>307</sup> *Or.* 1086; cf. *Ph.* 18

<sup>308</sup> Schwartz has excised *Hecuba* 1 and 368, which are also pertinent to the theme, as later additions. On principle I have decided to omit his obelized passages in an effort to confine my study to the *scholia vetera*, even if such confinement can never be perfectly watertight.

<sup>309</sup> *Hec.* 21

<sup>310</sup> πνεύματος διαρροάς (*Hec.* 567)

*νυκτερινῷ καταστήματι μᾶλλον κοιμηθήσεται ἄλλως τε καὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἡρεμουσῶν ἐν σκότῳ. ἔπεται ὕπνος ἡσυχία αἰσθήσεων καὶ κινήσεων.*

She calls upon Night to bring sleep to Orestes. <πότνια πότνια νύξ ὑπνοδότειρα> Sleep naturally occurs from moisture, and night is moist, due to the setting of the sun, which scorches and heats up the air. Therefore Orestes, who is dehydrated from sickness and lack of nourishment, will sleep more if he is in a “nightly” state of hydration, especially with his sensory perceptions eased in the darkness. Sleep follows the silence of perceptions and motions.

Later, when Orestes calls upon Forgetfulness to give him sleep, the scholiast shows that Orestes is asking for the deepest possible sleep, since light sleep is disturbed by phantoms, which is not what he needs:

*<ὕπνου θέλγητρον> τὸ βαθύτατον τοῦ ὕπνου, τὸ μάλιστα θέλγειν δυνάμενον τοὺς ἀσθενοῦντας· ὁ γὰρ ἐλαφρὸς φαντασίαις ἀναμέμκται.<sup>311</sup>* It is then pointed out that Orestes makes this request because he knows

“scientifically” that sleep is a cure of evils: *φυσικῶς τὸν ὕπνον οἶδεν ἐπίκουρον τῶν κακῶν.* In both cases it is suggested that a full understanding of the original text requires that we evaluate Euripides’ words on a scientific level as well.

A triad of anatomical notes on the “sympathy” (i.e., simultaneous suffering) of body and soul immediately follows. When Orestes comes to his senses and states that he does not understand what has just happened to him, the scholiast explains that this is because the “perceptive organ” travails right alongside the body in sickness.<sup>312</sup> Compare the following lines in which Orestes complains that when the νόσος leaves him, his body becomes frail, which the scholiast explains by stating that, during the onset of such madness, the sinews of the ailing person are stretched out and filled with πνεῦμα, but when the madness slackens, so too is the sick person devoid of πνεῦμα.<sup>313</sup> Lastly, when Electra evaluates Orestes’ condition by looking at his eyes, the note explains: *φυσικῶς· καθόλου γὰρ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς παθῶν εἰκόνας οἱ ὀφθαλμοί,* “A scientific explanation, for in general the eyes are images for the sufferings of the soul.”<sup>314</sup>

In each case of this triad, as in the previous examples, the scholia point to a scientific explanation of the

<sup>311</sup> *Or.* 211

<sup>312</sup> *τὸ γὰρ ὄργανον, δι’ οὗ ἀναφέρομεν τὰ πραττόμενα, συννοσεῖ τῷ σώματι (Or.* 216).

<sup>313</sup> *<ὅταν μ’ ἀνῆ νόσος> περὶ γὰρ τὸν καιρὸν τῆς μανίας εὐτονοῦσιν οἱ μαινόμενοι ἐντεινομένων τῶν νεύρων καὶ πνεύματος πληρουμένων· χαλωμένης δὲ τῆς μανίας καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος ἐπιλείποντος παρίενται (Or.* 227).

<sup>314</sup> *Or.* 253

text, such that Euripides' verses are to be understood not simply as loose poetic language describing a general ailment, but rather factually correct responses to the problem of νόσος.<sup>315</sup>

Other notes give details about the natural environment, including plants, animals, and topographical/ geographical features. Some of these contain only the briefest of identifications of organisms, such as when the scholiast states that the ἐλάτινος is a kind of tree<sup>316</sup> and that the ζάρος is a sort of predatory bird.<sup>317</sup> The “mountain tortoise” of *Alcestis* 446 is shown to be metonymical for the lyre, and the “mountain” epithet added by Euripides is justified because there are also tortoises that live in water: <χέλυν> τὴν λύραν. ἀπὸ γὰρ χελώνης ὀρεινῆς ἡ λύρα ἐστίν. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἔνυδροι· διὸ ὀρείαν εἶπεν.<sup>318</sup> A few other notes describe various features of a physical landscape. Apollodorus is cited for his explanation of mystical sounds in the woods by the fact that mountains, valleys, and caves are echo-inducing (ἠχώδη), such that, when various animal sounds reverberate in that landscape, some people think that it is Pan and the Nymphs.<sup>319</sup> Elsewhere, the movement away from a harbor out to sea is termed ἀναγωγή, for the sea seems higher than the land.<sup>320</sup> Further, when Hecuba calls out to Zeus as the one who carries the earth and simultaneously sits upon it (ὦ γῆς ὄχημα κατὰ γῆς ἔχων ἔδραν / ὅστις ποτ' εἶ σύ, δυστόπαστος εἰδέναί, / Ζεὺς), the scholiast says that she refers to Zeus as ἀήρ, for there is both “upper” and “lower” ἀήρ, so that the earth is held aloft in the middle.<sup>321</sup> This interpretation of the figure of Zeus as metaphorical for an atmospherical reality, as in other examples, is taken as a poetic nod by Euripides to a physical reality.

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<sup>315</sup> The scholia do not look to Euripides to provide straightforward, literal depictions of madness in every case, though. At *Phoenissae* 792, for example, the scholiast states that the dappled pelts carried by the Bacchic revelers are symbolic of the self-mutilation that characterizes the truly insane, a reading that recognizes a “physical” allusion in the original text that is by no means meant to address it directly. This sort of phenomenon is ubiquitous in Servius' commentaries, as I will show in a subsequent chapter.

<sup>316</sup> εἶδος δένδρον (*Hec.* 632)

<sup>317</sup> ὄρνέον ἐστὶν ἀρπακτικόν (*Ph.* 45).

<sup>318</sup> *Alc.* 447

<sup>319</sup> *Rh.* 36

<sup>320</sup> ἀναγωγή λέγεται ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ λιμένους εἰς τὸ πέλαγος ἀναχώρησις· δοκεῖ γὰρ ὑψηλοτέρα εἶναι ἢ θάλασσα τῆς γῆς (*Rh.* 1126).

<sup>321</sup> λέγει δὲ τὴν ἀέρα [ὦ συνέχων τὴν γῆν]· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἐπάνωθεν ἀήρ καὶ κάτω ὡς τὴν γῆν εἶναι μετέωρον (*Tr.* 884).

Akin to these notes on the natural environment are geographical identifications of various place names. The most basic of these simply state that, for example, the Eurotas is a river in Lacedaemonia.<sup>322</sup> Other notes provide the same basic identification for mountains,<sup>323</sup> cities,<sup>324</sup> and other rivers and springs.<sup>325</sup> Some labels come with added explanations of various kinds: the mapping out of the Saronic gulf has an etymology appended to it,<sup>326</sup> the description of the Plain of Adrasteia comes with information about its namesake,<sup>327</sup> Thrace is described as a place of bad winters,<sup>328</sup> and Enete is identified as a city of Epirus with the added note that it is a place where lovely mules and colts are born.<sup>329</sup> Other examples of locations include the promontory of Myconos<sup>330</sup> and the “Seats” of Thebes where Tiresias prophesied.<sup>331</sup> Not every location is straightforwardly identifiable, however, and some names are used to describe different locations. Whether Parrasion is a city or region, for example, is left open: τὸ Παρράσιον οἱ μὲν πόλιν, οἱ δὲ χώραν εἶναί Φασιν.<sup>332</sup> The same is true of Dirce, which is said to be either a river or spring.<sup>333</sup> Similarly, a scholion remarks that the Cephissus from *Medea* 835 is the one in Attica, as opposed to the one of the same name in Boeotia, and that in fact there are even more, as stated by Polemo in his *Περὶ ποταμῶν*.<sup>334</sup> Compare further the observation at *Andromache* 1 that the Thebes mentioned in the first verse is the one in Asia, though in fact there are five in all: πέντε εἰσὶ Θῆβαι, Ὑποπλάκιοι, Βοιωτῖαι, Αἰγύπτια καὶ ἐν τῷ Φθιωτικῷ μέρει καὶ περὶ Μυκάλην. There is also disagreement at *Phoenissae* 1100, where one scholion claims that Teumesus is a mountain in Boeotia (ὄρος Βοιωτίας), whereas a subsequent note says that there is uncertainty about its referent: <ἄλλως> οἱ μὲν ὄρος Βοιωτίας, οἱ δὲ ὅτι ὄρος ἐν Ἄργει.

<sup>322</sup> Εὐρώτας ποταμὸς Λακεδαιμονίας (*Hec.* 650)

<sup>323</sup> *Or.* 362, 1453; *Rh.* 408

<sup>324</sup> *Or.* 658; *Ph.* 202, 1707

<sup>325</sup> *Or.* 809; *Ph.* 574, 659

<sup>326</sup> *Hipp.* 1200

<sup>327</sup> *Rh.* 342

<sup>328</sup> *Andr.* 215

<sup>329</sup> *Hipp.* 1132

<sup>330</sup> *Tr.* 89

<sup>331</sup> *Ph.* 840

<sup>332</sup> *Or.* 1645

<sup>333</sup> οἱ μὲν ποταμὸν, οἱ δὲ κρήνην τὴν Δίρκην (*Ph.* 102); a note to *Phoenissae* 703 confirms that the same name is given to both (Δίρκη δὲ ποταμὸς ὁμώνυμος τῇ κρήνῃ).

<sup>334</sup> ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ἕτερος ὁμώνυμος ἐν Βοιωτίᾳ. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἕτεροι.

Other onomastic issues include Euripides' use of "Dardania" as a synonym for Troy<sup>335</sup> and geographical anachronisms at *Orestes* 352 and *Phoenissae* 6: in the first example Euripides' use of the "new" name of Asia would not have been applicable in the context of the dramatic setting, and in the second he similarly employs the name Phoenicia, a name that was not in use in the dramatic time of the play: ἡ Φοινίκη προληπτικὸς δὲ ὁ λόγος· οὐδέπω γὰρ ἐκαλεῖτο Φοινίκη.

Continuing in the vein of scientific notes, let us examine a few passages of astronomical or astrological significance. Let me begin with a caveat: these passages are some of the most complicated and most difficult to understand, not only from the difficulty inherent in the topic, but also from my own limited knowledge about ancient astronomical theory. In fact, for me the most fruitful consideration of these passages has been not their specific statements on astronomical or astrological matters, but rather the way in which these matters are discussed—i.e., their significance for understanding the methodologies and practices of the scholiasts, which I address later. For now, a quick glance at the subject matter itself will give some sense of breadth.

Heavenly bodies of various kinds are described. A note at *Orestes* 982 mentions that Euripides calls the sun a *μύδρος* (ball of molten metal) after the manner of Anaxagoras, and that Tantalus is chained to it, such that Euripides mixes scientific knowledge with mythological claims: γινωσκέτωσαν ὅτι τὰ φυσικὰ τοῖς μυθικοῖς καταμίγνυσιν ὁ Εὐριπίδης. The moon also receives mention: when it is full, it shines throughout the whole night,<sup>336</sup> and Selene is called the sister of Helios by Hesiod, but she is called his daughter by Aeschylus and the "more scientific" of men, since the moon reflects the sun's light and is affected by its emanations: Αἰσχύλος [frg. 445] δὲ καὶ οἱ φυσικώτεροι θυγατέρα, παρόσον [ἐκ] τοῦ ἡλιακοῦ φωτὸς μεταλαμβάνει. ἀμέλει καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἡλιακὰς ἀποστάσεις μεταμορφοῦται ἡ σελήνη.<sup>337</sup> Other notes

<sup>335</sup> τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ φησι Τροίαν καὶ Δαρδανίαν (*Or.* 1391).

<sup>336</sup> *Alc.* 450

<sup>337</sup> *Ph.* 175



give information about various stars and constellations, such as Sirius, the stars representing the Dioscuri, the rounded shape of the Zodiac, and the movement of the Pleiades.<sup>338</sup>

Another subcategory of scientific pursuits that can be distilled from the Euripidean scholia is ethnography, by which I mean the identification of people groups and their respective customs, and by extension an “anthropography,” so to speak, of customs that are common to people in general. By far the most common formula for the presentation of this information is some version of the phrase ἔθος γὰρ ἦν (“For it was the custom . . .”), and mostly these snippets are included as reinforcement of a specific instantiation of that custom by some character in a drama.<sup>339</sup> Later in this chapter I will explore the ramifications of this type of exegetical method, but for now it is fitting to demonstrate the breadth of the ethnographical notes.

A large number of comments implicitly claim that certain behaviors are common to an unspecified “they,” meaning that the customs could be universal, or perhaps “Greek,” but in any case not explicitly unique to individual ethnicities. A significant percentage of these pertain to death and burial practice: the ritual sprinkling of those visiting the homes of the deceased,<sup>340</sup> the construction of coffins out of cedar,<sup>341</sup> the burial rites of kings,<sup>342</sup> dressing the wounds of the dead and crowning them to make them appear decent,<sup>343</sup> the honoring of the dead by their children,<sup>344</sup> and the inscription of heroic deeds upon the tombs of the dead.<sup>345</sup> Others pertain to marriage: the mother of the groom would lead the bride with torches, brides would sprinkle themselves in nearby rivers to encourage fertility, and so forth.<sup>346</sup> Also included are notes on imprecation and beseeching, specifically the grasping of the knees and holding olive

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<sup>338</sup> Respectively: *Hec.* 1104, *Or.* 1637, *Ph.* 1, *Rh.* 528

<sup>339</sup> For instance, at *Andromache* 1093 when the messenger reports that the men of Delphi muttered that Orestes was there to plunder the treasuries of the temple, the scholiast explains that he says this because it was customary to make bank deposits at the temple for safe keeping (see Bogaert 1968).

<sup>340</sup> *Alc.* 98

<sup>341</sup> *Or.* 1053

<sup>342</sup> *Ph.* 1319

<sup>343</sup> *Ph.* 1632, 1669; *Tr.* 1085

<sup>344</sup> *Tr.* 381

<sup>345</sup> *Tr.* 1189

<sup>346</sup> *Ph.* 344, 347; cf. *Tr.* 315, 321 (where it is suggested that not the mother-in-law, but rather the mother of the bride would lead her daughters in the ceremony with torches)

branches and wreaths in one's hand.<sup>347</sup> Other rituals and rules encompass the history of honoring victors at games through gifts and the bestrewing of leaves, regal sacrifice before going off to war, ritual avoidance of those under a curse, and the fact that women do not get dressed in front of men.<sup>348</sup>

In addition, many notes give information about customs that are specific to various people groups. The women at Sparta are accustomed to go around in public while exercising or performing festival duties, but are not allowed to do so at random: *ἔστιν οὖν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἐν Σπάρτῃ εἰώθασι γυμνάζεσθαι αἱ γυναῖκες καὶ παρθένοι, ὥστε δέδοται μὲν παρθένους εἰς ὄχλον ἔρπειν, οὐ μὴν καθόλου, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ὀρισμένοις πράγμασιν οἷον κανηφορούσαις ἢ γυμναζομέναις, οὐ μὴν ἄλλο τι πραγματευομέναις.*<sup>349</sup> Aetolian soldiers have strange armor and wear a shoe on the right foot, but not on the left, and the Aetolians in general share in Greek and barbarian culture because they live at the border between them.<sup>350</sup> Laconian men are terse speakers.<sup>351</sup> Phoenicians honor their king by bowing the knee.<sup>352</sup> The Athenians put great value on education.<sup>353</sup> Andromache cannot touch the beard of Peleus while beseeching him because it is customary for barbarians not to touch the beard of a ruler.<sup>354</sup> Barbarians also tend to have concubines.<sup>355</sup> Finally, as seen above, Thessalians are tricksters.<sup>356</sup>

Other notes simply identify a tribe or give some explanation of it. The Thesprotoi are a tribe of Thessaly, while the Paiones are a tribe of Thrace.<sup>357</sup> The Phoenicians and Thebans are related by blood.<sup>358</sup> The Chalybes are a tribe of Pontos, where there are iron metals.<sup>359</sup> These and other such

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<sup>347</sup> *Med.* 947, *Or.* 383, *Andr.* 894

<sup>348</sup> *Hec.* 573; *Or.* 1603, 481; *Med.* 1158

<sup>349</sup> *Or.* 108; cf. *Andr.* 599 (Spartan women exercising in order to produce hearty children)

<sup>350</sup> *Ph.* 138f.

<sup>351</sup> *Or.* 640

<sup>352</sup> *Ph.* 293

<sup>353</sup> *Med.* 826

<sup>354</sup> *Andr.* 573

<sup>355</sup> *Andr.* 216

<sup>356</sup> *Ph.* 1408; more such comments exist but will not be mentioned here, because they also have important references to Euripides and his technique, so that they are better treated when I discuss the scholiasts' impression of Euripides as a dramatist below.

<sup>357</sup> *Ph.* 982, *Rh.* 408

<sup>358</sup> *Ph.* 216

<sup>359</sup> *Alc.* 980

comments furnish a sort of ethnographic glossing to clarify what would otherwise be an unknown people group with unknown customs.

### *Technical Arts*

In the course of commenting on Euripides, the scholiasts find it appropriate at various points to introduce short discussions of various τέχναι. Rhetoric is one such concern, and although such notes are not nearly as common as we might think given the sophistical leanings of some Euripidean characters, a few of the scholia do offer some details about the oratorical content of various passages. When Hecuba beseeches Odysseus to spare Polyxena, addressing her as her city, her nurse, her walking staff, and the guide for her path (i.e., all that remains for her) the scholiast remarks: ἀπίθانا ταῦτα· οὐ γὰρ ἔμελλε γηροβοσκεῖν ἡ Πολυξένη τὴν Ἐκάβην μὴ οὐσα μετ’ αὐτῆς· ὁμῶς μέντοι πρὸς τὴν ἰκεσίαν χρήσιμα, “These things are unpersuasive, for Polyxena was not about to lead her around in old age, since they wouldn’t be together [i.e., because Polyxena would be kept apart from her as a slave even if kept alive?]. Nevertheless, these things are appropriate for supplication.”<sup>360</sup> An argument made by Menelaus against Orestes is said to be in syllogistic form: μετὰ συλλογισμοῦ τοῦτο εἴρηκεν.<sup>361</sup> A couple of technical rhetorical terms surface as well, as at *Phoenissae* 629, where Polyneices’ invocation of the city of Thebes to proclaim his innocence is called a “testimonial proof” (τοῦτο δὲ καλεῖται μαρτύριον). Elsewhere, when Jason tries to convince Medea that he has done her a service by bringing her into a land of civilization characterized by the rule of law and not brute force, the scholiast retorts: περιπετῆς ὁ λόγος κατὰ ῥήτορας· περιπίπτει γὰρ αὐτῷ ὁ λέγων, “According to orators this is a ‘stumbling argument,’ for the speaker trips

<sup>360</sup> *Hec.* 280

<sup>361</sup> *Or.* 417; the same occurs with a slight variation of phrase at *Orestes* 646 (κατὰ συλλογισμὸν φησιν).

over himself.”<sup>362</sup> It must be said, though: given the strong rhetorical influence on Euripidean speeches, these few examples seem quite paltry.

A good many notes also provide details on the musical art and its types of songs and instruments. Of the song types, some are specific to drama, such as the stasimon and parados (mentioned in a note to *Phoenissae* 202) and monody (defined as the song of a single lamenting actor at *Andromache* 103). Other references are more general: the ialemos is a song of groaning, an epode is a prophetic invocation, and a paeon is a song sung at the end of horrific things.<sup>363</sup> The instruments mentioned include the aulos, which is called “Libyan” by Euripides because of its area of origin.<sup>364</sup> The salpinx is like the aulos, but is used instead during war.<sup>365</sup> The barbitos is a musical instrument with deeper chords, as if it were a βαρύμιτος—i.e., the scholiast sees an etymological play on “heavy.”<sup>366</sup> The lyre also gets a couple of mentions, as in the passage cited above concerning its metaphorical name χέλυσ.<sup>367</sup>

Various other passages show details from other types of crafts. When the chorus of women laments where they may be taken as slaves at *Hecuba* 467, they mention Athens as a possibility, where they may be required to embroider images on the robe of Athena. The scholiast explains that this dedication, which was yellow and blue, was made every fourth year, and that older women as well as younger maidens did the weaving: <τᾶς καλλιδίφρου Ἀθαναίας> οὐ μόνον γὰρ παρθένοι ὕφαινον, ὡς φησιν Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τῷ περὶ θεῶν [FHG iv p. 649<sup>a</sup>], ἀλλὰ καὶ τέλειαι γυναῖκες, ὡς Φερεκράτης ἐν Δουλοδιδασκάλῳ [cf. frg. 46]. ὅτι δὲ κρόκινός ἐστι καὶ ὑακίνθινος καὶ τοὺς Γίγαντας ἐμπεποίκιλται, δηλοῖ Στράτις [frg. 69]. τοῦτον δὲ ἀνιέρουν διὰ πενταετηρίδος ἐν τοῖς Παναθηναίοις. Further, a large note to *Phoenissae* 114 gives a technical description of the construction of doors and gates, including the bolts, hinges, and plate metal placed over the wooden frame to make the door seem to be made of metal throughout, with further comment that during war time the entire door was bolted shut, but that for the

<sup>362</sup> *Med.* 538

<sup>363</sup> *Ph.* 1033, 1260, 1036; see also the mention of the customs of the threnos (*Ph.* 1337), and that fact that one of the Muses is devoted to threnody (*Tr.* 120).

<sup>364</sup> *Alc.* 346

<sup>365</sup> *Ph.* 791

<sup>366</sup> *Alc.* 345

<sup>367</sup> *Alc.* 447, *Med.* 425

sake of convenience during peacetime a smaller contraption was devised for protection at night. There is also present an awareness of the change of craftsmen's terminology over time, as what were formerly called *καθέται* are now called *πτερά*. Ultimately, though, these isolated instances demonstrate only a concern for elucidating a passage at hand. Their scarcity reveals that there is no desire to provide any kind of sustained discourse about these areas of expertise, and such detailed explanations are quite the exception.

### *Dramatic Concerns*

The next few categories pertain uniquely to the theater and show how the scholiasts treat the Euripidean texts as a “dual” entity, both written and performed. Such notes give details on the setting or manner of performance, assignment of speaking parts, stage directions, and matters of literary criticism including such topics as the definition of “tragic” and opinions on poetic style. Some of these concerns will remind the reader of some of the general patterns of thinking in Classical and Hellenistic scholarship, as described in Chapter 1.

A handful of scholia give information about the historical context in which a drama was produced or contemporary events to which the poet alludes, an inheritance from the tradition of didasalia that started from stone inscriptions by the archons and that were eventually treated critically by Aristotle.<sup>368</sup> I focus on a few examples of this type here. In one passage, a scholiast claims that when Euripides presents the hostile Menelaus in an unfavorable light he does so to slight the Spartans of his own time because of their breach of faith with the Athenians in the archonship of Theopompus, which was before that of Diocles, in whose time the *Orestes* was produced: *πρὸ γὰρ Διοκλέους, ἐφ' οὗ τὸν Ὀρέστην ἐδίδαξε, Λακεδαιμονίων πρεσβευσαμένων περὶ εἰρήνης ἀπιστήσαντες Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ προσήκαντο, ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος*

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<sup>368</sup> Pfeiffer (1968, 81)

Θεοπόμπου [ὃ ἔστι πρὸ Διοκλέους]. οὕτως ἱστορεῖ Φιλόχορος [frg. 117].<sup>369</sup> More historical references appear later when Orestes remarks that the people become a terrible thing when they are directed by malicious leaders. The scholiast sees here an allusion to Cleophon, who had stalled the peace process two years earlier (i.e., before the production of the drama): <δεινὸν οἱ πολλοὶ> εἰς Κλεοφῶντα ταῦτα αἰνίττεται πρὸ ἐτῶν δύο ἐμποδίσαντα ταῖς σπονδαῖς: <ἄλλως> ἴσως αἰνίττεται πρὸς τὰς καθ' αὐτὸν δημαγωγίας, μήποτε δὲ εἰς Κλεοφῶντα. πρὸ ἐτῶν γὰρ δύο τῆς διδασκαλίας τοῦ Ὀρέστου αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ κωλύσας σπονδὰς γενέσθαι Ἀθηναίους πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους, ὡς Φιλόχορος [frg. 118] ἱστορεῖ.<sup>370</sup> A later note at *Orestes* 903 has more to say on this matter when the messenger refers to a demagogic figure:

<ἀθυρόγλωσσος> ταῦτά φασιν ἐπὶ Κλέωνι τῷ δημαγωγῷ λέγεσθαι, σφαλλόμενοι. πρὸ γὰρ τῆς τοῦ Ὀρέστου διδασκαλίας πολλοῖς χρόνοις ὁ Κλέων ἐτελεύτα. τάχα οὖν εἰς Κλεοφῶντα τείνει, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἔναγχος οὗτος τὰς πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους συνθήκας οὐ προσήκατο. καὶ τῷ λέγειν δὲ <Ἀργεῖος οὐκ Ἀργεῖος ἠναγκασμένος> εἰς τοῦτον βλέπει. θέλει γὰρ εἰπεῖν Ἀθηναῖον οὐκ Ἀθηναῖον ὄντα αὐτὸν, ἀλλὰ νόθον πολίτην, παρόσον Θραξῆ ἦν ὁ Κλεοφῶν.

They say these things are said with regard to the demagogue Cleon, but erroneously. For Cleon died many years before the staging of the *Orestes*. Therefore it likely refers to Cleophon, since he also around that time did not allow treaties with the Spartans. And also by saying Ἀργεῖος οὐκ Ἀργεῖος ἠναγκασμένος, he casts an eye to that man. For he wants to say that he was “a non-Athenian Athenian,” but rather a bastard citizen, insofar as Cleophon was a Thracian.

As in the previous note, some debate is evident not only for the question of whether an allusion is being made, but also what the object of that allusion could be. It is interesting at the very least that this scholiast assumes that an allusion to a contemporary is more likely than someone who died “many years” ago,<sup>371</sup> and as with the previous note the basis for dating is rooted in the tradition of didascalia.

Two notes to the *Andromache* discuss similar matters, but are somewhat more difficult. The first is some hearty verbal abuse of the Spartans by Andromache herself. After a brief reply as to the trope of Spartan slander, the scholiast adds information regarding the production of the drama: εἰλικρινῶς δὲ τοὺς τοῦ δράματος χρόνους οὐκ ἔστι λαβεῖν· οὐ δεδίδακται γὰρ Ἀθήνησιν. ὁ δὲ Καλλίμαχος [frg. 100d, 26] ἐπιγραφῆναί φησι τῇ τραγωδίᾳ Δημοκράτην . . . φαίνεται δὲ γεγραμμένον τὸ δράμα ἐν ἀρχαῖς τοῦ

<sup>369</sup> Or. 371

<sup>370</sup> Or. 772

<sup>371</sup> In fact it was about 15; in any case, the dating of the play to the archonship of Diocles (409/8) is correct.

Πελοποννησιακοῦ πολέμου, “And it is not possible to give the exact time of the drama, for it had not been produced at Athens. And Callimachus says that Democrates claimed the tragedy as his own . . . and the drama seems to have been written at the outset of the Peloponnesian War.”<sup>372</sup> The note at hand itself is conflicted, stating first that ascertaining the date of production—and even its authorship—is difficult, but with an additional comment claiming that it seems to have been written in the first years of the Peloponnesian War. Later when Euripides mentions a town that was “once a friend but now an enemy,” the scholiast states that some people claim that the poet hints anachronistically at Peloponnesian affairs: ἔνιοί φασι τὸν ποιητὴν παρὰ τοὺς χρόνους αἰνίττεσθαι τὰ Πελοποννησιακά.<sup>373</sup> That the possibility is stated blandly without any sophisticated argument, just as in the previous example, is indicative of a general lack of scholiastic interest in pointing out contemporary allusions and issues of dating.<sup>374</sup>

Often the scholiast clarifies who is speaking at various points and to whom that speaking is addressed if there is the danger of ambiguity. Some speaking assignments are minimalist, as in the declaration concerning the opening line of the *Hecuba* (προλογίζει Πολύδωρος) or in one of the few lines spoken by Molossus, son of Andromache in the play of the same name: ταῦτα τὸ παιδισκάριόν φησιν.<sup>375</sup> Many of these notes deal with the chorus, especially since some choral speaking parts are limited to one half of the chorus or even a single, unspecified representative, as at *Hecuba* 1293 (πρὸς ἑαυτὰς ταῦτά φασιν αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ χοροῦ) and *Medea* 1273 (τοῦτο πρὸς ἀλλήλας αἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ χοροῦ φασι κατ’ ἐρώτησιν).<sup>376</sup> As these two examples show, scholia may also indicate the addressee, as is also the case when Hecuba is said to turn her speech toward Odysseus after a line addressed to her daughter: ἐπέστρεψε τὸν λόγον πρὸς Ὀδυσσεά,<sup>377</sup> and later her words are understood to be addressed to Agamemnon.<sup>378</sup> Another such note

<sup>372</sup> *Andr.* 445

<sup>373</sup> *Andr.* 734

<sup>374</sup> It would be of particular interest to see the relative concentration of contemporary references in other tragedians, and then to contrast that with the treatment of this question in Aristophanes.

<sup>375</sup> *Andr.* 508

<sup>376</sup> *Med.* 1273; cf. *Or.* 1559; *Med.* 1043, 1415

<sup>377</sup> *Hec.* 383; it is worth mentioning that the vocative Ὀδυσσεῦ follows at 385. It is unclear why the scholiast sees a need to include this “help,” unless he truly envisions a pupil combing over the text slowly one line at a time.

<sup>378</sup> πρὸς τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα ὁ λόγος (*Hec.* 1279).

specifies that the chorus shifts from speaking *about* Necessity to speaking directly *to* her, marked in Euripides by a sudden vocative.<sup>379</sup>

The inclusivist approach of the scholiasts in listing multiple possibilities is also visible for this category of comments when there is a dispute regarding the speaker or addressee. For a line evidently (in the text used by the scholiast) attributed to a servant with whom Hecuba is in dialogue, a scholion states:

τινὲς καὶ τοῦτο τῆς Ἑκάβης εἶναί φασιν.<sup>380</sup> A similar debate is framed with more specificity shortly thereafter for *Hecuba* 736, which reads: δύστην', ἐμαυτὴν γὰρ λέγω λέγουσα σέ, Ἑκάβη, τί δράσω. The scholion states: ὃ δύστηνε Πολύδωρε, τί δράσω ἐγὼ, ἢ Ἑκάβη: πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἀποστραφείσα λέγει . . . τὸ δὲ <δύστηνε> ὁ Δίδυμος φησι πρὸς τὸν Πολύδωρον λέγειν καὶ <πρὸς ἑαυτὴν> τὴν Ἑκάβην, “Hecuba says, ‘Oh wretched Polydorus, what am I to do?’ Then turning away she speaks to herself . . . but Didymus says that the δύστηνε refers both to Polydorus and to herself.” Other notes (though these are rarer) make a claim about speaking attribution based on an explicit reason. When Talthybius approaches with news at *Troades* 709, Hecuba calls him a servant: τίν' αὖ δέδορκα τόνδ' Ἀχαιικὸν λάτριν στείχοντα καινῶν ἄγγελον βουλευμάτων. The scholiast spots the anomaly and goes so far as to claim that this might even be someone other than Talthybius: μήποτε οὐχ ὁ Ταλθύβιος, ἀλλ' ἄλλος τις ταῦτα λέγει. καὶ γὰρ οὐ λάτριν, ἀλλ' ὀνομαστὶ Ταλθύβιον καλεῖν εἴωθεν, “Perhaps it is not Talthybius, but some other person saying these things, for indeed Hecuba is accustomed not to call him a servant, but to call him by name.” Finally, at the hinge point in a conversation between Andromache and her servant right before the start of a stichomythic series, a scholiast attributes a line to the servant on account of it being more harmonious with what is going on: μᾶλλον δὲ ἀρμόζει ὑπὸ τῆς θεραπαίνης τὰ δύο ταῦτα ἰαμβεῖα λέγεσθαι.<sup>381</sup> Though

<sup>379</sup> ἐκ τοῦ περὶ αὐτῆς εἰς τὸ πρὸς αὐτήν (*Alc.* 976); there are many other examples of such things: *Ph.* 1587, 1640ff.; *Med.* 401, 764, 819, 872, 899; *Andr.* 507; *Tr.* 98, 444, 578. See also the string of notes in the *Troades* that describes an extended series of quotations and movements of the chorus (*Tr.* 166, 176, 178). *Orestes* 526 is an interesting example because it comments on the “unusual” nature of the shift in addressee from Orestes to Menelaus, but I am yet to understand the full extent of its meaning.

<sup>380</sup> *Hec.* 700; other basic identifications of multiplicity include: *Or.* 1528; *Ph.* 1425, 1740; *Hipp.* 776; *Med.* 759, 995; *Tr.* 308, 341.

<sup>381</sup> *Andr.* 80



there is not much in the way of explanation for this claim, it is nonetheless interesting to see the scholiast taking a firmer than average stance.

A final subcategory of notes on speaker and addressee identification is a series of claims that the addressee is the audience in the theater. When Peleus advises that wooers pick a good mother-in-law,<sup>382</sup> the scholiast remarks that this is directed to the spectators: *διαλέγεται δὲ πρὸς τὸ θέατρον. ὅσοι οὖν μνηστεύεσθε, λογίζεσθε καλῆς γυναικὸς παῖδα λαβεῖν*. When Antigone comes out onto the stage in lament, the scholiast suggests that her behavior is unbecoming to a maiden in the way that she addresses the theater: *ἀπρεπῶς εἰσβέβηκε καὶ οὐ παρθενικῶς. τίνι γὰρ ἀπολογίζεται, εἰ μὴ τῷ θεάτρῳ;*<sup>383</sup> Further, when the nurse states that she will reveal her plans to her allies inside at *Medea* 523-4 (*τᾶλλα δ' οἷ' ἐγὼ φρονῶ / τοῖς ἔνδον ἡμῖν ἀρκέσει λέξαι φίλοις*), a scholion explains via paraphrase that she does not want these plans to be known by all the characters and the audience (*τὰ δὲ ἄλλα, ἃ φρονῶ, ἀρκέσει τοῖς ἔνδον διηγῆσασθαι φίλοις, ὅποιά ἐστι, καὶ μὴ ἐπὶ πάντων καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ θεάτρον ταῦτα ἐκφέρειν*), the implication being that the audience is considered a part of the drama. Elsewhere, Poseidon is said to address the audience at the beginning of the *Troades* (*τοὺς λόγους νῦν ὁ Ποσειδῶν ποιεῖ*), and when Electra utters an apostrophic “Look at how Helen cut only the tips of her hair so as to preserve her beauty [in fake mourning],” the scholiast remarks that some say she directs this at the servants, but some at the theater, “which is better”: *ἔνιοι δὲ φασὶ ταῦς δμῳσὶ ταῦτα λέγειν. οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὸ θέατρον, ὃ καὶ ἄμεινον.*<sup>384</sup>

An additional concern over dramatic production expressed by the scholia is the tone or manner in which various statements are to be pronounced. Quite a few of these examples refer to utterances that are interrogative and are marked by such phrases as *τοῦτο κατὰ ἐρώτησιν, ἐν ἐρωτήσῃ δὲ προεικτέον τὸν στίχον, τινὲς ἐρωτηματικῶς*, and *ἐρωτηματικὸς ὁ λόγος*.<sup>385</sup> More comments of this kind are found in the opening scenes of the *Orestes*, where the notes on manner of speech are particularly rich. In Electra’s

<sup>382</sup> *τοῦτο καὶ σκοπεῖτέ μοι, μνηστῆρες, ἐσθλῆς θυγατέρ' ἐκ μητρὸς λαβεῖν (Andr. 622).*

<sup>383</sup> *Ph.* 1485; compare the value judgment contingent upon an address to the spectators at *Troades* 36, discussed below.

<sup>384</sup> *Or.* 128

<sup>385</sup> Respectively: *Med.* 600; *Andr.* 79, 626; *Ph.* 724. For further examples: *Or.* 491; *Ph.* 621, 1704; *Rh.* 706.

admonition to the chorus to quiet down at *Orestes* 149 (κάταγε κάταγε, πρόσιθ' ἀτρέμας, ἀτρέμας ἴθι), the scholiast sees the two repetitions as an indicator that she is speaking softly and must repeat herself: τῇ ἐπαναλήψει μεμίμηται τὴν ἡρμαίαν προϊεμένη.<sup>386</sup> A little before the chorus had responded to Electra's plea for silence by claiming that they would acquiesce.<sup>387</sup> Since Electra responds with a further injunction to be quiet (ἄ ἄ σύριγγος ὅπως πνοὰ / λεπτοῦ δόνακος, ᾧ φίλα, φώνει μοι), the scholiast reasons that the chorus' initial response must have been stated in a very high-pitched tone, whence Electra's fear that they would wake Orestes: τοῦτο εἰκὸς ὀξύτερον εἰρηκέναι τὸν χορὸν, διὸ καὶ Ἡλέκτρα περιδεῆς γενομένη εἶπεν ἄ ἄ. Like these two passages, another pair also clarifies the nature of a character's delivery on the basis of internal evidence. Electra eventually states that the chorus has awoken Orestes by their shouting,<sup>388</sup> and the scholiast reveals not only that this means the chorus has uttered a loud lamentation, but also that some understand that the chorus employs sounds of lamentation that cannot be written down, and that Electra's comment at *Orestes* 168 is a demonstration of what is otherwise invisible in the text outside of performance:

τινὲς δέ φασιν ὅτι φωνῇ ἐχρήσατο θρηνώδει ὁ χορὸς γραφῆναι μὴ δυναμένη, ἰυγμῶ ἢ καὶ ἰυγμοῦ τραχυτέρῳ, ὅπερ εἰώθασι ποιεῖν αἱ γυναῖκες ἐπὶ τοῖς ὑπερβάλλουσι κακοῖς. ἄ γὰρ μὴ δύναται γράφεσθαι, ταῦτα δι' ἑτέρων προσώπων δηλοῦται, οἷόν τι καὶ παρὰ τῷ κωμικῷ οἰκέτου στενάξαντος ἕτερός φησιν· ἀκούεις, ὡς στένει;

And some say that the chorus employed a threnetic sound that cannot be communicated in writing, a iugmos or something harsher than that, which women are accustomed to make amidst overwhelming evils. For what cannot be written is made clear through other characters, as when in comedy, when a slave groans, someone else says, "Do you hear how he groans?"

The same rationale had been given before at *Orestes* 156, where the chorus is assumed to have uttered some awful sound such that Electra's comment at 168 would make sense.<sup>389</sup> Again the scholiast determines pronunciation on the basis of what would most cohere with the surrounding text. Of course,

<sup>386</sup> Doubling of this kind can also be used for other reasons; e.g., the repetition of λαβοῦ λαβοῦ δητ' at *Orestes* 219 is viewed as a product of the intensity with which the request is being made (σφόδρα δεομένου ἢ φωνῇ διὸ τῇ ἐπαναλήψει κέχρηται).

<sup>387</sup> ἰδοὺ πείθομαι (*Or.* 144).

<sup>388</sup> θωύξασ' ἔλασας ἐξ ὕπνου (*Or.* 168).

<sup>389</sup> δεῖ νοεῖν στεναγμόν τινα γεγενῆσθαι μετὰ τὸ ᾧ <τάλας> ὑπὸ τοῦ χοροῦ, ἵνα εὐλογον ᾗ τὸ παρὰ τῆς Ἡλέκτρας εἰρημένον [167] <σὺ γάρ νιν, ᾧ τάλαινα, θωύξασ' ἔβαλες ἐξ ὕπνου>.

the scholiast also recognizes that this method is not always foolproof, because the necessary interpretation of *Orestes* 176 actually conflicts somewhat with the context. The scholiast affirms here that what Electra says is in the mode of a high pitched song, but that it is unbelievable that she would do this after berating the chorus for similar sounds; the solution is in the necessity forced upon Electra, since that is simply the mode one uses for lament, even if it is incongruous with her desire to let Orestes sleep: *τοῦτο τὸ μέλος ἐπὶ ταῖς λεγομέναις νήταις ᾄδεται καὶ ἐστὶν ὀξύτατον. ἀπίθανον οὖν τὴν Ἥλέκτραν ὀξεῖα φωνῇ κεχρηθῆσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα ἐπιπλήσουσιν τῷ χορῷ. ἀλλὰ κέχρηται μὲν τῷ ὀξεῖ ἀναγκαίως, οἰκείον γὰρ τῶν θρηγνούντων, λεπτότατα δὲ ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα.*<sup>390</sup>

Akin to the scholia on pronunciation is a group of comments on stage directions, many of which are brief, straightforward, and able to be deduced from the original text alone. Electra, for instance, speaks to Orestes while sitting next to him and drawing him near: *παρακαθίσασα δὲ ἔξωθεν καὶ εἰς πλευρὸν δεξιμένη τὸν Ὀρέστην ταῦτα λέγει.*<sup>391</sup> As Polyneices approaches the chorus at Thebes and hides his sword,<sup>392</sup> a note suggests that he puts it away into a sheath or, better, under his cloak to conceal it but also to have it ready for defense: *<μεθῶ ξίφος> εἰς τὸν κουλεόν. ἢ ὑπὸ τὴν χλαῖναν, ὃ καὶ ἄμεινον, ἵνα κεκαλυμμένον τὸ ξίφος ἔχη καὶ πρὸς ἄμυναν ἔτοιμον.* When a messenger's face is called gloomy at *Phoenissae* 1333 (*σκυθρωπὸν ὄμμα*), it is remarked that his facial expression must be such that Creon can guess that his news is bad: *ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου τοῦ ἀγγέλου στοχάζεται τὰ λεχθησόμενα.*<sup>393</sup>

Other notes of this kind depict the positioning of characters in specific locations. Orestes is said to be speaking from the rooftop in a final showdown with Menelaus at *Orestes* 1567 (*ταῦτα ἄνωθεν Ὀρέστης ἐκ τοῦ δώματός φησιν*), and when Menelaus cries out that he sees torches, the scholiast explains that he is looking at the torches and the sword held up to the neck of Hermione by Orestes.<sup>394</sup> When Admetus implies that the chorus was with him offstage at the tomb of Alcestis, the scholiast replies to a

<sup>390</sup> *Or.* 176; *Orestes* 183 is also relevant here (*καὶ τοῦτο κατὰ ἀναφώνησιν λέγει ἡ Ἥλέκτρα*).

<sup>391</sup> *Or.* 225

<sup>392</sup> *φέρ' ἐς σκοτεινὰς περιβολὰς μεθῶ ξίφος καὶ τάσδ' ἔρωμαι, τίνες ἐφεισῶσιν δόμοις (Ph. 276).*

<sup>393</sup> Cf. *Hipp.* 1353, *Tr.* 1207

<sup>394</sup> *<ἔα τί χρῆμα> κάτωθεν ἀναβλέψας ὁ Μενέλαος ὄρα πῦρ ἀναπτόμενον καὶ ξίφος ἐπικείμενον τῷ τῆς Ἑρμιόνης αὐχένι (Or. 1573).*

potential objection that the chorus can in fact leave the σκηνή, for in fact this has been done in other dramatic productions: πρὸς τὸν χορὸν φησιν· ἦν γὰρ ὁ χορὸς μετ’ αὐτοῦ· δύναται γὰρ ὁ χορὸς ἐξίστασθαι τῆς σκηνῆς, ὡς καὶ ἐν Αἴαντι μαστιγοφόρω.<sup>395</sup> One of the more notable examples of this kind deals with a potential problem in the staging of the opening scene to the *Hecuba*. The ghost of Polydorus sees his mother coming out of Agamemnon’s tent,<sup>396</sup> but it is asked why she was not in the women’s tents, and also why she is asking where Cassandra is if she comes out of the very same tent where Cassandra would have been. A possible solution is offered: Hecuba was disturbed by a dream in her own tent, and went into Agamemnon’s to ask Cassandra for help interpreting it, but Cassandra was not there because she was perhaps washing herself after intercourse with Agamemnon, so that Hecuba now exits the tent of Agamemnon, unsure of Cassandra’s whereabouts:

*<περᾶ γὰρ ἦδ’ ὑπὸ σκηνῆς πόδα Ἀγαμέμνονος> εἰ κατὰ τὸν Εὐριπίδην ἴδιαι γυναικῶν αἰχμαλώτων στέγαι ἦσαν, πῶς ἐκ τῆς σκηνῆς Ἀγαμέμνονος ἐξῆι ἡ Ἑκάβη· πῶς δὲ καὶ ἐκείθεν ἐξιούσά φησι μετ’ ὀλίγον [87] ‘ποῦ ποτε Κασάνδραν εἶδω, Τρωάδες’ τῆς Κασάνδρας τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι συνοικουσίης. νοητέον τὴν Ἑκάβην τῷ φάσματι ταραχθεῖσαν προελθεῖν ἐκ τῆς σκηνῆς τῶν αἰχμαλωτίδων εἰσελθεῖν τε εἰς τὴν σκηνὴν Ἀγαμέμνονος εἰς ζήτησιν τῆς Κασάνδρας, ἵνα αὐτῇ κρίνη τοὺς ὀνείρους. καὶ μὴ εὐροῦσαν αὐτὴν διὰ τὸ ἴσως τὴν κόρην μετὰ τὴν κοίτην τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος καθαρμοῦ χάριν ἔωθεν εἰς τὴν θάλασσαν ἀπεληλυθέναι πάλιν ἐξελθεῖν τὴν Ἑκάβην τῆς βασιλικῆς σκηνῆς· ἦν ἰδὼν ὁ Πολύδωρος ἔφη <περᾶ γὰρ ἦδ’ ὑπὸ σκηνῆς πόδα Ἀγαμέμνονος>.*

Note that this comment, like many others pertaining to stage directions, is able to be determined entirely from the original text. The actions and positioning of characters are argued on the basis of necessity and likelihood, not (ostensibly) on any external information, such as an actual viewing of a dramatic performance.<sup>397</sup>

Finally, some stage directions come with a specific tag marking them as *κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον*, “done in silence.” Most of these refer to characters who have either come onto the stage or left it without an explicit signal in the original text, as when a scholion points out that Orestes sees Pylades approaching

<sup>395</sup> *Alc.* 897; cf. *Ph.* 690; *Andr.* 1007; *Tr.* 139, 176

<sup>396</sup> *περᾶ γὰρ ἦδ’ ὑπὸ σκηνῆς πόδα Ἀγαμέμνονος (Hec. 53).*

<sup>397</sup> Although we will see later some evidence that the scholia do show evidence that actual performances are being incorporated into the commentary, namely through examples of an “actors nowadays” formula.

in silence: *κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον εἶδε τὸν Πυλάδην ἐρχόμενον*.<sup>398</sup> Another example refers to things done offstage on the grounds of propriety when it is said that Polyxena is sacrificed out of the view of the audience.<sup>399</sup> Still another refers to the fact that Menelaus comes on stage after hearing “in silence” what has gone on within the house: *κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον δὲ εἰκὸς ἀπηγγέλλαι τῷ Μενελάῳ τὰ κατὰ τὸν οἶκον γειόμενα*.<sup>400</sup> A final example concerns the speech of the messenger reporting the death of Neoptolemus: in referring to Apollo, the messenger speaks of “some being,” which the scholiast takes as a reverentially “silent” denotation of the god: *κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον σεμνῶς τὸν θεὸν ἠνίξατο*.<sup>401</sup>

Thus, the scholia demonstrate a number of concerns pertaining to the performance of drama, be it stage directions, the manner in which various lines are to be delivered, or who speaks those lines to whom. Yet, it is important to observe that nearly all of these comments arise or at least may arise directly from an engagement with the original text itself and do not require an actual viewing of the play. Later we will see examples that point to the contrary, but for now it seems probably that for the most part the scholiasts would have been able to extrapolate stage directions from the Euripidean text itself. In any case, it is clear that the scholiasts are considering the text as a dramatic performance, since they are concerned with how the text would be played out on stage, a factor that is not to be overlooked in considering the approaches taken by ancient scholars to Euripidean drama.

### *Literary Criticism*

Some immediate qualification is needed for the title of this section, since the type of analysis indicated by the modern use of the term “literary criticism” overlaps partially with the territory covered

<sup>398</sup> *Or.* 725; the observation is a daft one, as the original text itself makes this perfectly clear. For further examples, see *Or.* 132, 850; *Ph.* 694; *Med.* 214.

<sup>399</sup> *κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον ἐσφάγη ἡ Πολυξένη (Hec.* 484).

<sup>400</sup> *Or.* 1554; again, the chorus itself makes this fact evident, such that the scholion appears unnecessary.

<sup>401</sup> *Andr.* 1147; the verb *ἀνίττομαι* is a standard signal for anything “hinted at” by the original text and will be treated more fully below.

by ancient literary studies, but only partially. As we will see, some elements in the modern conception are lacking in the ancient and *vice versa*, and even where the topics of interest are common to both, the ancient approach can be quite a bit different. Overall in this section I will discuss the scholia's response to the following questions: What is poetry? What is particular to the tragic genre? What characterizes good or bad poetry, and what are the standards by which poetry (and specifically dramatic poetry) should be judged?<sup>402</sup>

Remembering that the scholia are individual notes in different locations and not a systematic treatise on topics such as poetry or style, we can at least begin to identify some qualities or tendencies of poetry as outlined in the commentaries to Euripides, starting with its grammatical idiosyncrasies. In identifying the use of an accusative direct object with the verb *μέμνημαι*, for example, one scholion states that this is clearly evident throughout the poets: *καὶ πολλαχοῦ εὐρήσεις παρὰ ποιηταῖς συντασσόμενον αἰτιατικῇ τὸ μέμνημαι.*<sup>403</sup> Poets also tend to front *γάρ* clauses, giving the cause before the effect in contrast to the more normal order that places the *γάρ* clause after, and several poetic examples are adduced.<sup>404</sup> Further, poets also tend to speak of horses with feminine grammatical gender, even where it is more “proper” to give them masculine gender: *<θοαῖς ἵπποισιν> ἔδει ἐκ τοῦ ἐπικρατοῦντος ἀρσενικῶς αὐτοὺς ὀνομάσαι. τέσσαρες γάρ εἰσι, Χρόνος Αἰθοψ Ἀστραπή Βροντή. ἔθος δὲ τοῖς ποιηταῖς θηλυκῶς λέγειν τοὺς ἵππους. Σώφρων ‘τὰν ἵππον’ καὶ ἐν Ἰππολύτῳ [1223] ‘αἶ δ’ ἐνδακοῦσαι στόμια’ καὶ παρ’ Ὀμήρῳ [Ψ 376] ‘αἶ Φηρητιάδαο ποδώκεες ἔκφερον ἵπποι.’<sup>405</sup>*

Poets also demonstrate looseness with factual information, which we might be tempted to put under the umbrella of “poetic license,” though the Euripidean scholia do not employ such a

<sup>402</sup> Nünlist (2009) provides much fuller coverage of the literary critical terms in the scholia than I do here, though it is nonetheless important to see the extent to which literary criticism plays out specifically in the Euripidean scholia. Further, while Nünlist (2009, 94) deliberately leaves aside the question of genre on the grounds that it is covered more properly by a study of individual technical treatises on the subject from antiquity, e.g. Aristotle's *Poetics*, I have made this topic one of my central considerations.

<sup>403</sup> *Andr.* 1164

<sup>404</sup> ἔθος ποιητικὸν τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ γάρ ἄρχεσθαι. Ὀμηρος [κ 190]· ‘ὦ φίλοι, οὐ γάρ τ’ ἴδμεν ὅπη ζόφος’ καὶ [κ 226]· ‘ὦ φίλοι, ἔνδον γάρ τις ἐποιχομένη.’ καὶ Μένανδρος [frg. 232]· ‘ἐκ γειτόνων οἴκων γάρ, ὦ τοιχώρυχε’ (*Ph.* 886).

<sup>405</sup> *Ph.* 3; a further example at *Phoenissae* 8 shows that poets have a certain tendency in the naming of Polydorus, but the text is corrupt and incomprehensible to both Schwartz and myself (<Πολύδωρον>: τοῦτον οἱ ποιηταὶ † πίνακον καλοῦσι Πολύδωρον [δέ] διὰ τὸ πολλὰ δῶρα εἰληφέναι τὴν μητέρα αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τῇ γεννήσει αὐτοῦ).

comprehensive term to describe this phenomenon.<sup>406</sup> Specifically, this license is recognizable in the realm of geography in two passages from the *Hecuba*. In what is now regarded as a dubious line, Hecuba prays that her son be kept safe in his current location in Thrace.<sup>407</sup> The scholiast sees a potential problem here, since she speaks as if she were not in Thrace herself, when in fact the stage is set in the Chersonese: *τοῦτο ὡσπερ οὐκ ἐν Θράκῃ οὐδὰ φησι τῆς σκηνῆς ὑποκειμένης ἐν Χερρονήσῳ. ῥητέον δὲ ὅτι ποιητικὸν ἔθος ἐστὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον*. Note that the explanation for this dilemma is an appeal to poetic custom—Euripides breaks a “rule” simply because this is poetry, and he can. A similar “violation of truth” comes when the herald Talthibius reports that the whole Achaean entourage was present for the sacrifice of Polyxena at the tomb of Achilles, when in fact they are in the Chersonese, not at Troy where Achilles died: *<παρῆν μὲν ὄχλος> αἴτημα σκηνικόν. πῶς γὰρ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως ἐν τῇ Τροίᾳ θανόντος τοὺς Ἑλληνας φησι πρὸ τοῦ τύμβου αὐτοῦ θύειν ἐν Χερρονήσῳ ὄντας*.<sup>408</sup> Again, the problem is resolved by appealing to a “demand of the stage”; in other words, the dramatist must be allowed a bit of geographical leniency simply because this is drama.

This license is visible also in a passage from the *Orestes* concerning the customary practice of poets in their representations of the gods. Euripides refers to the Erinyes as bloodstained and snake-like,<sup>409</sup> to which the scholiast replies that poets attribute to the gods characteristics based on analogy, that is, the gods themselves are described in terms that have some relation to the effects they have on people (*τὰ συμβαίνοντα τοῖς πάσχουσι τι τοῖς προεστῶσι τοῦ πάθους θεοῖς ἀνατιθέασιν οἱ ποιηταί*). The scholiast proceeds to give examples: Homer says that the Litai are lame, shriveled, and blind, and that he has fashioned them thus because of the condition of those who make prayers (*οἷόν τι καὶ Ὅμηρος φησι περὶ τῶν Λιτῶν [I 503]: ‘χωλαί τε ῥυσαί τε παραβλῶπές τ’ ὀφθαλμῶ’ ἐκ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων παθῶν εἰδωλοποιήσας*). Likewise, Plutus is blind, because he gives wealth indiscriminately, and Opportunity is bald at the back,

<sup>406</sup> Servius does have such a term, and in the chapter on Vergil we will examine his explicit delineation of this concept. For the concept in general, see Russell (1981, 16).

<sup>407</sup> *Hec.* 74

<sup>408</sup> *Hec.* 521

<sup>409</sup> *τὰς αἵματωποὺς καὶ δρακοντώδεις κόρας (Or. 256)*

because once he is gone, you cannot make him return—and Demosthenes says that he is deaf, since you can call, but he will not heed you: καὶ τὸν Πλοῦτον τυφλὸν λέγουσιν, ὅτι ἀκρίτως ποιεῖ πλουσίους, καὶ τὸν Καιρὸν ὀπισθοφάλακρον, ὅτι τοῦ παραχρημένου ἀδύνατον ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι· καὶ κωφὸν δὲ αὐτὸν ὁ Δημοσθένης [frg. 12] φησὶν, ὅτι μετακαλούμενος οὐχ ὑπακούει.<sup>410</sup> Again, the basis for understanding what Euripides has done is the knowledge of a general poetic technique.<sup>411</sup>

Other notes give information that is associated specifically with the brand of poetry we call “tragedy.” Two of the most crucial notes provide a broad definition of tragedy vis-à-vis comedy, one of which states at *Orestes* 1691:

ἡ κατάληξις τῆς τραγωδίας ἢ εἰς θρῆνον ἢ εἰς πάθος καταλύει, ἢ δὲ τῆς κωμωδίας εἰς σπονδὰς καὶ διαλλαγὰς. ὅθεν ὀρᾶται τόδε τὸ δρᾶμα κωμικῆ καταλήξει χρῆσάμενον· διαλλαγαὶ γὰρ πρὸς Μενέλαον καὶ Ὀρέστην. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἀλκῆστιδι ἐκ συμφορῶν εἰς εὐφροσύνην καὶ ἀναβιοτήν. ὁμοίως καὶ ἐν Τυροῖ Σοφοκλέους ἀναγνωρισμὸς κατὰ τὸ τέλος γίνεται, καὶ ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν πολλὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν τῇ τραγωδίᾳ εὐρίσκεται.

The ending of a tragedy results either in lamentation or suffering, but that of comedy results in truces and reconciliations. For this reason the drama seems to employ a comic ending, for there are reconciliations for Menelaus and Orestes. But also in the *Alcestis* there is a movement from disasters to gladness and resurrection. Likewise also in the *Tyro* of Sophocles there is a recognition at the end, and simply put, many such things are found in tragedy.

What is particularly interesting about this statement is that one of the presumably foundational qualifications for something to be a tragedy is in fact not met by many tragedies. Compare a statement from the hypothesis to the *Alcestis*:

τὸ δὲ δρᾶμά ἐστι σατυρικώτερον ὅτι εἰς χαρὰν καὶ ἡδονὴν καταστρέφει [παρὰ τοῖς τραγικοῖς] <καὶ> ἐκβάλλεται ὡς ἀνοίκεια τῆς τραγικῆς ποιήσεως ὅ τε Ὀρέστης καὶ ἡ Ἀλκῆστις, ὡς ἐκ συμφορᾶς μὲν ἀρχόμενα, εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν <δὲ> καὶ χαρὰν λήξαντα, <ᾗ> ἐστι μᾶλλον κωμωδίας ἐχόμενα.<sup>412</sup>

<sup>410</sup> The mention of Demosthenes makes clear that, though the scholiast began his discussion from poetry, the technique is not exclusively a poetic one, or at least we might qualify the assertion by saying that it may arise in poetry, but can also be employed in prose.

<sup>411</sup> Poetic license is also visible in a couple of passages concerning numbers, though here there is no explicit mention of common poetic practice. These passages refer to the use of “fitted” or “prepared” numbers, meaning a count that is not exactly correct, but which is meant to demonstrate a certain magnitude, as we might say “I have a thousand reasons not to do this” (τῷ ἀπηρτισμένῳ ἀριθμῷ, *Or.* 353, *Andr.* 106; cf. *Ph.* 1135). Note at the same time, however, that poetic license has its limits: Euripides chooses not to name Jocasta/ Epicaste, for instance, because he wants to avoid the dilemma of which name to choose (ἀσφαλιζέται τὴν ὀνομασίαν τῆς ἡρώϊνης, *Ph.* 12).

<sup>412</sup> *Alc. hypoth.* 23ff.



The drama is more satyr-like because it turns toward joy and pleasure, and the *Orestes* and the *Alcestis* are discarded as incongruous with tragic poetry, since they begin from disaster and end in gladness and joy, which are things that pertain more to comedy.

This second observation comes with a bit more verve: instead of simply accepting that tragedies can be un-tragic, some have apparently decided that they will draw the line—tragedy must end badly for someone. Thus, while it seems that tragedy and comedy are categorized according to their endings, there is some disagreement about how far to take this criterion.

With this confusion about what constitutes a tragedy generally, we might not have much hope of piecing together more particular details, but a few characteristics of tragedy as a genre do appear at various points in the scholia. In response to the Phrygian’s epic description of a relatively minor skirmish in the halls of Menelaus, the scholiast remarks: ἴδιον δὲ τῆς τραγωδίας τὸ τὰ μικρὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐξαιρεῖν καὶ φοβερὰ ποιεῖν ὥσπερ νῦν ὁ Εὐριπίδης ὡς περὶ πολλῶν <περὶ> τῶν ὀλίγων θεραπόντων τὸν λόγον <ποιεῖται>, “It is peculiar to tragedy to inflate minor affairs and to make them fearsome, just as now Euripides makes much of the minor servants.”<sup>413</sup> This sentiment coheres with the passages just mentioned in that tragedy properly tells a story that ends badly, and the scholion at hand suggests that it will do so even if it must make a mountain of a molehill. We learn in a note to the opening line of the *Phoenissae* that it is also customary for tragic poets to lead in heroic characters who lament their misfortunes to the gods, as do Medea and Jocasta: <ἄλλως> ἔθος ἔχουσιν οἱ τραγικοὶ παράγειν τοὺς ἥρωας θεοῖς τὰς συμφορὰς ἀπολοφυρομένους. καὶ ἐν Μηδεΐᾳ [57]: ὥσθ’ ἕμερός μ’ ὑπῆλθε γῆ τε κούρανῶ’. We find also a clue that tragedians, like poets in general, are wont to be a little loose in their terminology, as when λόγχην is apparently used to mean a sword.<sup>414</sup> Finally, an additional note in the *Orestes* speaks of how chorus members are accustomed to exchange speaking parts at sense pauses to avoid monotony; no

<sup>413</sup> *Or.* 1484

<sup>414</sup> νῦν τὸ ξίφος. σύνηθες δὲ τοῦτο τοῖς τραγικοῖς (*Ph.* 1398); it is unclear to me whether this specific word substitution is meant, or substitution in general. In any case, it is worth mentioning that the weapon in the scene really does appear to be a spear.

mention of “tragedy” is made here per se, but it is implied that this is a common feature of tragic choral discourse.<sup>415</sup>

We have just seen that misfortune was regarded by the scholiasts as a central feature in tragic drama, and while the scholia nowhere explicitly state a formal connection between πάθος and the genre of Euripides’ works, a couple of passages suggest to us that this technical term should also be considered as a crucial aspect of the tragic genre. The first of these passages is a comment on repetition at *Hecuba* 689: τὸ ἐπαναλαμβάνειν τοὺς αὐτοὺς λόγους ἐν τῷ θρηνεῖν σφόδρα σχετλιαστικὸν καὶ πάθος ἐγγεῖρον ἐν τῇ τραγωδίᾳ. The fact that such repetition is appropriate for “raising πάθος in tragedy” is particularly suggestive. The second is a suggestion that Poseidon’s mention of the weeping Hecuba at the start of the *Troades* would have been better if Euripides had brought her onto the stage lamenting her situation, for then the tragedy would have had πάθος: <τὴν δ’ ἀθλίαν> ἄμεινον ἦν ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων παρεισάγεσθαι, ὀδυρομένην τὰ παρόντα. οὕτως γὰρ <ἂν> ἡ τραγωδία τὸ πάθος εἶχε, νῦν δὲ ψυχρῶς τῷ θεάτρῳ προσδιαλέγεται.<sup>416</sup> These passages hint that even if there is no formal statement about πάθος being a feature of tragedy, we should take the treatment of πάθος in the scholia as especially pertinent to type of poetry that Euripides has composed.

If that is correct, it is fitting to examine a bit further a few passages in which the scholia formulate what causes πάθος. Hecuba, for example, is said to be augmenting the πάθος of her situation when she claims that she had 50 children, since really she had only 19, as Homer said: αὔξουσα τὸ πάθος φησί· <ιθ> γὰρ μόνους παῖδας ἐγέννησεν. Ὅμηρος [Ω 496]: ‘ἐννεακαίδεκα μὲν μοι ἰῆς ἐκ νηδύος ἦσαν.’<sup>417</sup> Elsewhere, the change into dochmiac meter as Electra and the chorus go back and forth trying not to disturb Orestes is viewed as “conducive to πάθος.”<sup>418</sup> A later quotation of Electra is also said to make the drama “very pathetic” insofar as her assumption that Menelaus was there to help was merely a setup for

<sup>415</sup> ἐν τοῖς τέλεσιν εἰώθασιν οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ χοροῦ μεταλλάττειν φεύγοντες τὴν μονωδίαν τοῦ λόγου (*Or.* 348). This statement seems vague to me and requires more investigation.

<sup>416</sup> *Tr.* 36

<sup>417</sup> *Hec.* 421; cf. the “mountain-from-a-molehill” approach listed as a common aspect of the tragic genre above. Repetition too is said to “increase πάθος” at *Andromache* 839 (ἡ ἐπανάληψις τὸ πάθος αὔξει τοῦ πένθους).

<sup>418</sup> πρόσφορος τῷ πάθει ἢ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ ἀγωγή δοχμιάζουσα (*Or.* 140).

disappointment, as it became clear that he was not going to assist in any way: *περιπαθέστερον δὲ ποιεῖ τὸ δράμα καὶ πόρρωθεν διαβάλλουσα τὸν Μενέλαον, καθὸ ἐλπισθεῖς βοηθήσειν οὐκ ἐβοήθησε.*<sup>419</sup> Other such passages include the opening verses of the *Medea*, which are said to be praised on account of their great *πάθος* (διὰ τὸ παθητικῶς ἄγαν ἔχειν), with no additional explanation provided. Further, when Hecuba tells herself to lift up her head at *Troades* 98, the scholiast points out that a drooping head is “pathetic” and is fitting for the present circumstances: *ἡ δὲ πεδόθεν κεφαλὴ ἐμπαθεστέρα ἐστὶ καὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις οἰκείως ἔχουσα.* Finally, there is also mention of what might have made the drama *more* pathetic, if Euripides had done something different.<sup>420</sup> Such is the note at *Troades* 1129, in which the dead Astyanax is carried in on the shield of Hector, with Andromache having already departed with Neoptolemus. The fact that Andromache has been removed from the situation makes the scene less tragic: *κομψῶς δὲ ταῦτα πάντα πεποίηκε, παρήρηται δὲ τὸ τραγικὸν κατασκευάσμα. εἰ γὰρ παρῆν ἡ Ἀνδρομάχη, οἰκτρότερον ἂν ἐγένετο τὸ πάθος θρηνοῦσης αὐτῆς τὸν ἴδιον παῖδα,* “All these things Euripides constructed cleverly, but the tragic device has been removed. For if Andromache were present, the suffering would be even more pitiable, with her lamenting her own child.” Thus, we see how pity and suffering are wrapped up in discussions of tragedy as a genre at least on an implicit level.<sup>421</sup>

### *Aesthetic Judgments*

The Euripidean scholia also spend much time outlining things that are good or bad about the composition of the original text. At times these are complaints or praise for Euripides himself, though they can also be directed specifically to his characters, such that it is sometimes difficult to say whether Euripides or one of his characters is really being evaluated. There is also the ongoing problem of the

<sup>419</sup> *Or.* 241

<sup>420</sup> Cf. the previously mentioned scholion from *Troades* 36.

<sup>421</sup> For more examples of such discussions: *Hipp.* 566; *Ph.* 32, 618; *Tr.* 343.

ambiguity as to the source of that evaluation. At times the comment is stated by the scholiast seemingly *propria voce*, but other notes are attributed to specific scholars or “some/others” in general. Further, even when we do have examples of the scholiast’s voice, this does not mean that the evaluation is an original thought, for perhaps a comment is simply being copied from some other exegetical source. What we can say is that there are some consistently evident criteria by which the poetry is evaluated.

Though these scholia contain far less stylistic commentary than we might expect, a few principles of judgment emerge, one of which is concision. We have already seen how the scholia frequently highlight words that are either unnecessary or omitted in the text, and certain examples showed a particular distaste for pleonasm.<sup>422</sup> Those passages cited before seemed to have no value judgment associated with them—Euripides simply left out or added words as he wished, perhaps for metrical reasons—but there are a few other notes that suggest concision as a goal of good poetry. Such is the case at *Orestes* 45-6: Electra states that her brother weeps when he is released from his itinerant madness and is in his right mind (ὄταν μὲν σῶμα κουφισθῆι νόσου / ἔμφρων δακρύει), and the scholiast clarifies that there is an understood participle of being with the adjective, but that the participle is better left omitted (ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔμφρων γενόμενος. ἄμεινον δὲ ὑφ’ ἔν· ἔμφρων δακρύει). Thus, even though *γενόμενος* is necessary in the scholiast’s mind for the completion of the sense, it is better that Euripides leave it out for the sake of brevity.<sup>423</sup> Euripides himself also seems to nod to concision in various places with such stock phrases as “But why should I say more,” and the scholiast’s reasons for such aposiopesis can be quite interesting. For instance, when Eteocles says that he will not name the seven leaders in the assault against Thebes, a scholion claims that Didymus attributed this aposiopesis to the fact that the men had already been named in Aeschylus: πεφύλακται τὰς ὀνομασίας αὐτῶν εἰπεῖν, ὡς φησι Δίδυμος, διὰ τὸ ὑπὸ Αἰσχύλου εἰρησθαι ἐν τοῖς Ἑπτὰ ἐπὶ Θήβας.<sup>424</sup> Concision is also praised when the nurse says she will not describe to Phaedra the drugs she plans to use: ἄριστα δὲ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἡ διοίκησις· τὴν μὲν ὄλην φάρμαξιν οὐκ ἐπὶ σκηνῆς, ἀλλ’

<sup>422</sup> It is instructive to see how at *Phoenissae* 973 (λέξει γὰρ ἀρχαῖς καὶ στρατηλάταις τάδε / πύλας ἐφ’ ἑπτὰ καὶ λοχαγέτας μολῶν) the entire second line is regarded as excessive (*περιττός*). There does not seem to be much room offered for expansive poetic language.

<sup>423</sup> Recall also the pleonastic linking verb from *Orestes* 86.

<sup>424</sup> *Ph.* 751; this sort of strange intertextuality will be evident elsewhere in the scholia.

ἔνδον ποιῆσαι μέλλουσα, πιθανῶς ἤδη τὸ κεφάλαιον ὑπέθετο τῆς φαρμάξεως. ἔδοξε γὰρ ἂν ἐνοχλεῖν διηγουμένη φανερώς.<sup>425</sup> That is, a full description of the magic would have been otiose, so thankfully it is kept off the stage.

A few other comments add to our understanding of stylistic appreciation, even if the exact reasoning behind the judgment is obscure. When Polyxena states that now being called a slave makes her yearn to die,<sup>426</sup> a scholion adds that the consecutive infinitives have made the verse ill-composed:

κακοσύνθετον δὲ τὸν λόγον πεποιήκασιν τὰ δύο ἀπαρέμφατα.<sup>427</sup> Elsewhere, the remark that the wooden horse holds the hidden spear<sup>428</sup> is said to contain a flat pun on the phonetically similar words “wooden” and “spear”: ψυχρῶς ἠτυμολόγησε τὸν ἵππον ἀπὸ τῶν δοράτων· ἄμεινον γὰρ παρὰ τὰ δοῦρα πεποιῆσθαι ἤγουν τὰ ξύλα.<sup>429</sup> Lastly, in a passage already examined, when Poseidon points to the lamenting Hecuba at *Troades* 36, the scholiast himself laments that the scene could have had more πάθος if Euripides had brought Hecuba onto the stage in sorrow over her circumstances, but that instead the character of Poseidon speaks to the theater “flatly” about her (ψυχρῶς) and so misses an opportunity for a powerfully tragic scene: ἄμεινον ἦν ἀπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων παρεισάγεσθαι, ὀδυρομένην τὰ παρόντα. οὕτως γὰρ <ἂν> ἢ τραγωδία τὸ πάθος εἶχε, νῦν δὲ ψυχρῶς τῷ θεάτρῳ προσδιαλέγεται.

A larger literary concern in the scholia is what we might generally call “propriety,” a category including proper lexicography, as described above, but also the consistency and suitability of Euripides’ characters. For instance, the scholiast notes how Euripides preserves the heroic character of Polyxena in her bold, confident refutation of Odysseus right before her death: ἐνταῦθα ἐφύλαξεν ὁ Εὐριπίδης τὸ ἥρωικόν ἦθος· οὐ γὰρ ταπεινὸν αὐτὸ μεμίμηται, ἀλλὰ παρρησιαστικόν.<sup>430</sup> Likewise, the scholiast commends Euripides for making neither Laius nor Oedipus give way when they meet at the crossroads, for both

<sup>425</sup> *Hipp.* 514

<sup>426</sup> πρῶτα μὲν με τοῦνομα θανεῖν ἐρᾶν τίθησιν οὐκ εἰωθὸς ὄν (*Hec.* 357).

<sup>427</sup> Note that the scholiastic paraphrase on the line “fixes” the infinitive collision, though the paraphrase is not an attempt at an iambic line: τὸ τῆς δουλείας ὄνομα τοῦ θανεῖν με ἐρᾶν ποιεῖ.

<sup>428</sup> ὄθεν πρὸς ἀνδρῶν ὑστέρων κεκλήσεται δούρειος ἵππος, κρυπτὸν ἀμπισχῶν δόρυ (*Tr.* 14).

<sup>429</sup> Modern commentators agree: the line is bracketed in the edition of Kovacs (2002, Loeb Classical Library).

<sup>430</sup> *Hec.* 342; cf. the similar comment about the consistency of Electra (οὐδαμοῦ ἀνώμαλον τὸ τῆς Ἡλέκτρας ἦθος, *Or.* 99), and the general suitability of *Orestes* 223 to the words, characters, and stage setup of its context.

characters were such as not to yield to the other: *καλῶς ἐτέρῳ ἕτερον περικείται φρύαγμα, Λαίῳ μὲν διὰ <τὸ> τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀξίωμα, Οἰδίποδι δὲ ὅτι βασιλέως υἱὸς ἦν καὶ προπετῆς ὡς νέος καὶ ὁδοῦ τῆς πᾶσι κοινῆς εἴργετο.*<sup>431</sup> Further, when Medea's nurse says that she is forced to make her lament to heaven and earth at *Medea* 57, the scholiast praises Euripides' imitation of reality:

*καλῶς ὁ Εὐριπίδης μιμήσθαι τοὺς ἐν μεγάλαις δυστυχίαις ἐξεταζομένους καὶ μηδενὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων θαρροῦντας ἀπαγγεῖλαι τὰ δυστυχήματα ἢ διὰ φόβον δεσποτῶν ἢ διὰ τινα χρείαν συμφέρουσαν τοῖς πράγμασιν. οὗτοι γὰρ σιωπᾶν τὰς συμφορὰς μὴ δυνάμενοι καὶ λέγειν ἀνθρώποις φοβούμενοι, οὐρανῶ ἢ ἡλίῳ ἢ γῆ ἢ θεοῖς ἄλλοις διηγούνται.*

Euripides portrays well those being questioned amidst great misfortunes and not having the courage to speak their misfortunes to anyone, either on account of fear of their masters or some other necessity born of their circumstances. For these people, not being able to keep silent and fearing to speak to people, tell their story to heaven or the sun or the earth or other gods.

By the same token, Euripides is blamed for mischaracterization or other slips in propriety. Just as the preservation of heroic or kingly ethos is praised in other situations, so too is Agamemnon's lack of kingly authority criticized. When Hecuba asks for the favor of having her son and daughter burned on the same pyre, Agamemnon grants the request, but states further that if sailing from that place were possible, he could not have granted it. The scholiast is upset by this: *οὐ καλῶς φησι ταῦτα ὁ Ἀγαμέμνων. ἐχρῆν γὰρ αὐτὸν ἄπαξ δόντα τὴν χάριν σιωπῆσαι καὶ μὴ ἐλέγξει τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην· οὐ γὰρ ἀνάγκη τοιαύτη ὑπέκειτο βασιλεὺς ὢν,* "Agamemnon does not speak these things correctly, for it was necessary for him to grant the favor simply and then shut up and not to malign his own authority, for since he was king he was not subject to that necessity [i.e., 'If sailing is possible, we must sail immediately no matter what']."<sup>432</sup> Likewise, Polyneices' assertion at *Phoenissae* 395 that it is sometimes necessary to be slavish to get what one wants is marked as unheroic: *οὐκ ἀξιόχρεως ἦρωος ὁ λόγος.* Further, Medea's weeping is contrary to her savage nature:

*ἔδει δὲ αὐτὴν μηδὲ κλαίουσαν εἰσάγεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ οἰκεῖον τῷ προσώπῳ [τοῦτο]· ὠμὸν γὰρ εἰσῆκται τοῦτο. ἀλλ' ἐκφέρεται τῇ ὀχλικῇ φαντασίᾳ ποιήσας κλαίουσαν καὶ συμπάσχουσαν. ἀπιθάνως γὰρ τὴν*

<sup>431</sup> *Ph.* 40; cf. *Ph.* 446, 614

<sup>432</sup> *Hec.* 898

τοιαύτην διαχειριζομένην τὰ τέκνα εἰσάγει. ἄμεινον δὲ Ὅμηρος [τ 211]· ὀφθαλμοὶ δ' ὡσεὶ κέρα ἔστασαν.<sup>433</sup>

But it was necessary for her to be brought on stage not weeping, for it is not suitable to her character, for this character has been introduced as savage. But Euripides has brought her in weeping and suffering, having fashioned her according to popular imagination. For he unpersuasively introduces her, she who is such a woman as to kill her children. And Homer is better [i.e., it would have been better to describe her as Homer does Odysseus], “And his eyes stood still like horn.”

The reverse is also true, as Euripides is criticized for making characters seem lofty when in fact they are not. Heracles, for instance, should not be philosophizing when he is inebriated—he should be joking around and letting someone else do the deep thinking: οὐκ εὐλόγως τὸν Ἡρακλέα εἰσήγαγε φιλοσοφούντα ἐν μέθῃ ὃν ἔδει καὶ ἄλλου φιλοσοφούντος διαπαίξειν.<sup>434</sup> Didymus twice chimes in with more criticism in this vein. Andromache’s exposition on human nature meets with his displeasure, since she speaks things too lofty for a woman in mourning, and a barbarian woman at that: Δίδυμος μέμφεται τούτοις ὡς παρὰ τὰ καθεστῶτα· σεμνότεροι γὰρ οἱ λόγοι ἢ κατὰ βάρβαρον γυναικα καὶ δυστυχοῦσαν.<sup>435</sup> He has a similar opinion of her subsequent slander of Menelaus’ weakness, which is unfitting for the situation and for the characters.<sup>436</sup>

The last two quotations hint at further grounds on which Euripides is blamed or praised, namely the suitability of words or actions to their specific context within the drama or even to tragic drama itself. For instance, when Andromache remarks that her servant ought to have many crafty stratagems on account of her being a woman at *Andromache* 85 (πολλὰς ἂν εὖροις μηχανάς· γυνή γὰρ εἶ), a scholion replies that it is not fitting for her to be uttering such gnomic statements amidst such turmoil (presumably in reference to her generalization about female craftiness): ἐν οὐ δέοντι γνωμολογεῖ τοσούτων αὐτὴν περιεστώτων κακῶν. Similarly, it is called improper for Pylades and Orestes to talk about the former’s

<sup>433</sup> *Med.* 922

<sup>434</sup> *Alc.* 779; cf. a similar thought on propriety regarding Andromache at *Troades* 634.

<sup>435</sup> *Andr.* 330

<sup>436</sup> Δίδυμος μέμφεται πᾶσι τούτοις ὡς παρὰ τὸν καιρὸν καὶ τὰ πρόσωπα (*Andr.* 362); note the very similar language in the note to *Andromache* 229 (παρὰ τὰ πρόσωπα δὲ καὶ τοὺς καιροὺς ταῦτα). For further examples of issues of propriety in characterization: *Or.* 4, 71, 418; *Ph.* 1485; *Med.* 324.

planned marriage with Electra in the midst of their trouble: ἀνοίκεια δὲ ταῦτα τοῦ προκειμένου ἀγῶνος.<sup>437</sup>

Further, Orestes' interrogation of the Phrygian is unsuited to tragedy and to the misfortune of Orestes:

ἀνάξια καὶ τραγωδίας καὶ τῆς Ὀρέστου συμφορᾶς τὰ λεγόμενα.<sup>438</sup> Finally, the relevance of a choral

interlude is questioned at *Phoenissae* 1019-1053. The opening of this passage is marked plainly as

having nothing to do with Menoecus, who is about to die for his city: πρὸς οὐδὲν ταῦτα· ἔδει γὰρ τὸν χορὸν

οἰκτίσασθαι διὰ τὸν θάνατον Μεναικέως ἢ ἀποδέχεσθαι τὴν εὐψυχίαν τοῦ νεανίσκου. ἀλλὰ τὰ περὶ Οἰδίπουν

καὶ τὴν Σφίγγα διηγεῖται τὰ πολλάκις εἰρημένα.<sup>439</sup> Toward the end of this passage, a scholion states that

the chorus should have begun at this later point with the mention of the boy: ἀπὸ τούτων ἐχρῆν εὐθέως

ἄρξασθαι τὸν χορὸν. ἐκεῖνα γὰρ περιττά ἐστιν.<sup>440</sup> Comments to other passages point to things that are

unsuited to tragedy as a whole, for instance, the bringing in of Alcestis' corpse onto the stage: οὐκ εὖ·

κατὰ γὰρ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ὡς ἔσω πραττόμενα δεῖ ταῦτα θεωρεῖσθαι.<sup>441</sup>

Allied to this standard of judgment is a demand for internal consistency within the narrative. One such situation involves a slip regarding the exile of Polyneices and its relevance to the narrative of the *Phoenissae*. Early in the drama Jocasta states that the two brothers made an agreement that one would leave the city, but later Polyneices alleges that he has lived a harsh life in exile barely finding his daily needs.<sup>442</sup> The scholiast remarks that the first passage brings the drama into disorder (οὗτος ὁ τόπος εἰς ἀσυμφωνίαν ἄγει τὸ δράμα. ἔδει γὰρ ἐξέλασιν ὑποθέσθαι τοῦ Πολυνείκου), going on to say that, if there really had been an agreement, Polyneices would have had plenty of provision for the road (πάντως καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἐπεφέρετο <ἀν> ὁ Πολυνείκης).<sup>443</sup> Other objections include *Phoenissae* 748, where Eteocles

<sup>437</sup> *Or.* 1210

<sup>438</sup> *Or.* 1512; it is perhaps felt that the scene smacks of too much comedy, though the exact reason is not stated.

<sup>439</sup> *Ph.* 1019

<sup>440</sup> *Ph.* 1053

<sup>441</sup> *Alc.* 233; cf. *Hecuba* 484 on the slaughter of Polyxena. For further examples of this kind, see the inappropriate suggestions of Jocasta to her sons (*Ph.* 584), the laughable idea that Dolon would ask for kingship for a reward for his espionage (*Rh.* 165), and the absurdity of Dolon actually putting on a wolfskin and walking around like an animal (*Rh.* 210). Not all such comments are negative, however (cf. *Hec.* 1291).

<sup>442</sup> *Ph.* 71, 401

<sup>443</sup> The scholiast's conclusion is that Euripides has conflated two different *ἱστορίαι*, one from Pherecydes—in which there was actually an exile—and one from Hellanicus, where there was an agreement. (The scholiast himself also seems to slip at the end, referring to *Phoenissae* 71 as if it were in accord with Pherecydes, when he means



states that he will go “into the city” to defend it (ἔσται τὰδ’ ἐλθὼν ἐπτάπυργον ἐς τὴν πόλιν), which the scholiast reasonably asserts is laughable: γελοῖως τοῦτό φησιν ὡς μὴ ὦν νῦν ἐν πόλει.<sup>444</sup>

Further comments demonstrate a demand for realism in tragedy by pointing out various things that are true or false on the grounds of external fact, as opposed to consistency that is internal to the dramatic narrative itself. Antigone’s claim that the Argive army flashes like lightning in the sun meets with approval from the scholiast on account of the fact that bronze actually looks that way in sunlight: οἰκείως δὲ τὸ ἀστράπτειν· τοιαύτη γὰρ ἡ τοῦ χαλκοῦ φύσις εἴ τις ἐν ἡλίῳ κινήσειεν αὐτόν.<sup>445</sup> So too the description of Tydeus as half-barbarian (μιξοβάρβαρον) is fitting, since Aetolians had Greek armor, but used barbarian-styled javelins: καλῶς εἶπεν αὐτὸν μιξοβάρβαρον· οἱ γὰρ Αἰτωλοὶ πάντες . . . καὶ ὄπλοις ὀπλίζουσιν ὡς Ἕλληνες, ἀκοντίζουσι δὲ ὡς βάρβαροι.<sup>446</sup> By the same token, Euripides is criticized for things that are unrealistic, such as the claim that Orestes stopped in Phthia on his way from Argos to Dodona: ἐκβληθεὶς τοῦ Ἄργους Ὀρέστης ἀπήει εἰς τὸ ἱερόν τοῦ Διὸς τὸ ἐν τῇ Δωδώνῃ μαντευσόμενος ποίαν οἰκήσει πόλιν. ἀπιὼν οὖν ἔρχεται εἰς Φθίαν. Δίδυμος δὲ φησι ψευδῆ ταῦτα εἶναι καὶ ἄπιστα.<sup>447</sup> Didymus finds further fault with Peleus’ tragic claim that he is “dead and senseless,”<sup>448</sup> apparently because no one should be able to *say* that his voice is gone, or at least that is what is suggested by the following mention that in Homer such a sentiment is uttered by someone else: <οὐδὲν εἶμ’, ἀπωλόμην> ἐγκαλεῖ Δίδυμος καὶ

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Hellanicus.) See also *Phoenissae* 805 for a similar conclusion regarding the piercing of Oedipus’ ankles in his infancy. Here the scholiast’s reasoning is charming: 1) In this passage the chorus says that he was notable for his golden pins as an infant, but 2) earlier they were called iron pins. 3) This makes no sense unless the chorus refers to the gold pins used in his blinding. 4) But they talk about him as an infant, and he certainly wasn’t blind then. 5) Euripides must be conflating two versions.

<sup>444</sup> See also *Andromache* 216, where the verbal sparring between Andromache and Hermione does not proceed as the scholiast deems right.

<sup>445</sup> *Ph.* 111

<sup>446</sup> *Ph.* 139

<sup>447</sup> *Andr.* 885; it is unclear to me why this claim is objectionable, unless perhaps it is thought that Phthia is so far out of the way that a stopover is unbelievable. For another geographical objection, see the discussion of *Phoenissae* 159 below.

<sup>448</sup> οὐδὲν εἶμ’, ἀπωλόμην φρούδη μὲν αὐδῆ, φρούδα δ’ ἄρθρα μου κάτω (*Andr.* 1077).

εὐεπίληπτόν φησι τὸ αὐτὸν ἐν πάθει ὄντα λέγειν <οὐδέν εἶμι, φρούδη μὲν αὐδή> παρὰ τὸ Ὀμηρικόν [P 695 δ 704] ἄδην δέ μιν ἀμφασίη ἐπέων λάβεν'. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ οὐκ αὐτὸς ὁ πάσχων φησὶν, ἀλλ' ἕτερος περὶ αὐτοῦ.<sup>449</sup>

A caveat is in order regarding these types of judgment. While in the above cases it is clear that Euripides is the one being evaluated, in other passages it is difficult to tell whether the comment is directed at the poet or simply one of his characters. For example, Hecuba tells Menelaus to kill Helen at *Troades* 1030, but this is naïve to the scholiast: did she not learn from Euripides' *Andromache* that Menelaus discarded his sword when he had Helen in his clutches earlier, and did she not therefore know his true disposition toward Helen?<sup>450</sup> On the surface this is only an accusation of Hecuba as a character, but is there also some sense in which we are to view Euripides as inconsistent in the way he has portrayed her? Has the author “forgotten himself” as he does elsewhere?<sup>451</sup> It is also instructive to consider the scholion at *Phoenissae* 507, which suggests that Eteocles' famous endorsement of tyranny is senseless:

<τοῦτ' οὖν τὸ χρηστόν> ἀλόγιστος ὁ Ἐτεοκλῆς· ἐξὸν γὰρ αὐτῷ τῷ τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου χρήσασθαι δικαίωματι ᾧ μᾶλλον ἐπέβαλλεν ἢ ἀρχή, ἀδικεῖν ὁμολογεῖ αὐτὸν καὶ πλεονεκτεῖν φησι. πρὸς δὲ ῥητέον ὅτι μίμησιν ἀνδρὸς ἀδίκου ἐξεικονίζει ἡμῖν ὁ Εὐριπίδης μὴδὲ τῷ δοκεῖν εὐσεβεῖν βουλομένου.

Eteocles is irrational. For, it being possible for him to use the justification of his being the elder, to whom ruling power more [often] falls, he confesses that he has done wrong and says that he has greedy ambition. In response to this it must be said that Euripides is showing us a representation of an unjust man who does not even want to seem honorable.

We will return to this scholiastic question-and-answer formula in a moment, but let it suffice here to say that while one interpretation posits Eteocles as a fool, another perspective interprets that supposed foolishness as the poet's purposeful characterization of an evil man. Thus, we see that the scholia as a whole present the possibility of critiquing the actions or words of a character as naïve or illogical, while simultaneously realizing that this may not be a fault, but rather the poet's careful design. Logical

<sup>449</sup> One observes that Didymus may not have much poetry in his soul if he disallows such tragic exaggeration, which is in any case a common enough assertion in Greek literature.

<sup>450</sup> εὐήθης ἢ Ἐκάβη. ἀπὸ γὰρ τῆς ἐκβολῆς τοῦ ξίφους ἐχρῆν ἐπιγνώσαι τὴν διάθεσιν τοῦ ἀνδρὸς, ὡς ἐν τῇ Ἀνδρομάχῃ [628]. οὐκ ἔκτανες γυναῖκα [σὴν] χειρίαν λαβών'; cf. the sort of intertextuality seen above with Euripides' refusal to cover old ground that Aeschines had covered decades before.

<sup>451</sup> Cf. *Hec.* 1219

consistency remains a crucial aspect of the literary criticism evident in the scholia, but there is at least this one suggestion that purposeful inconsistency may be part of the poet's craft.

A final category of literary analysis that we can isolate is a series of comments on narrative organization (*οἰκονομία*).<sup>452</sup> This topic will have something in common with that of narrative consistency as mentioned above, but the change in terminology gives these passages a special emphasis in terms of how Euripides has structured his work. Often the mention of good or bad arrangement does not come with a full explanation of why it is good or bad, though in most cases we can be fairly certain what the scholiast has in mind. One of the clearer examples regards the introduction of Tyndareus to the stage in the *Orestes*. His claim to have come from making libations at his daughter's tomb is to the scholiast a good move on Euripides' part, such that Tyndareus has a reason for showing up when he does to converse with Menelaus and Orestes: *εὐοικονομήτως ἐποίησε τὸν Τυνδάρεων ἀπὸ τῆς Σπάρτης διὰ τὰς χοῶς τῆς θυγατρὸς ἐληλυθέναι, ἵνα εὐκαίρως τῷ Μενελάῳ καὶ τῷ Ὀρέστῃ διαλεχθῆ.*<sup>453</sup> Likewise, when Hippolytus leaves the stage in anger when he learns of Phaedra's love for him, the scholiast states that his departure is optimally arranged, since this allows Phaedra to write the incriminating letter and then hang herself, resulting in the credibility (to Theseus) of Hippolytus' wrongdoing: *ἄλλως τε καὶ ὁ ποιητῆς οἰκονομικώτατα ἐξεργάζεται, διὰ τῆς τοῦ Ἴππολύτου ἀπουσίας ἐξουσίαν διδοὺς τῇ Φαίδρα ἐργάσασθαι τὴν ἀγχόνην καὶ τὴν διαβολὴν αὐτοῦ τὴν διὰ τῶν γραμμμάτων, ἵνα ἡ δέλτος καὶ ἡ τοῦ Ἴππολύτου ἐρημία πιστώσῃται τὴν κατηγορίαν τῆς μοιχείας.* Later, when Theseus asks the chorus why Phaedra has hung herself, they reply falsely that they do not know—a fitting statement, for otherwise there could be no subsequent misunderstanding and therefore no tragic ending to the drama.<sup>454</sup> Further, though it is less clear, another passage is particularly noteworthy. At *Andromache* 630, a verse mentioned above, it is remarked that Menelaus originally planned to kill Helen and had grabbed hold of her, but let go of his sword because he was mastered by her beauty. Here the scholiast prefers the arrangement adopted by

<sup>452</sup> Richardson (1980) explores the function of this term in the Homeric scholia, and his findings correspond closely with my own on the attitude toward arrangement found in the Euripidean scholia.

<sup>453</sup> *Or.* 472

<sup>454</sup> *οἰκονομικῶς ψεύδεται τὰ λοιπὰ μὴ εἰδέναι ὁ χορός (Hipp. 804).*

Ibycus, who had Helen run into the temple of Aphrodite and converse with Menelaus there until he dropped his sword, overcome by desire: ἡττηθεὶς τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις. ἄμεινον ᾠκονόμηται τοῖς περὶ Ἴβυκον [frg. 35]: εἰς γὰρ Ἀφροδίτης ναὸν καταφεύγει ἢ Ἐλένη κἀκεῖθεν διαλέγεται τῷ Μενελάῳ, ὁ δ' ὑπ' ἔρωτος ἀφίησι τὸ ξίφος. Perhaps the Ibycean execution was more realistic or more “true to history,” but in any case it is interesting to see the scholiast evaluating different kinds of οἰκονομία for the same scene.<sup>455</sup>

Lastly, one particular passage in the *Phoenissae* happens to have several consecutive instances of this kind of comment, a demonstration of the phenomenon of “clustering” in which the commentator gets going on a certain track and includes several notes of a similar type in a confined space. The scene in question is the Homeric *τειχοσκοπία* of Antigone and the pedagogue looking out from the wall of Thebes toward the Argive ranks—and one note does indeed make this connection with Homer explicit, as we will see soon. Antigone’s departure from the house is well-arranged to the scholiast: εὖ διώκηται ἡ τῆς Ἀντιγόνης ἔξοδος,<sup>456</sup> perhaps simply because it is a mirror imitation of the scene from *Iliad* 3, or perhaps because, as the note goes on to explain, the poet has fittingly decided to have an old pedagogue attend the girl instead of a bunch of women, since it was proper for a wise old man to cast a wary eye down the street to avoid any danger of detection. It is also possible that the answer comes a few lines later, where the scholiast points out one possible reason for the pedagogue speaking several lines before Antigone comes out on stage, specifically that the actor playing Jocasta, who has just finished the prologue, needs a few extra seconds to switch masks: ταῦτα μηχανᾶσθαι φασι τὸν Εὐριπίδην ἵνα τὸν πρωταγωνιστὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ τῆς Ἰοκάστης προσώπου μετασκευάσῃ· διὸ οὐ συνεπιφαίνεται αὐτῷ Ἀντιγόνη, ἀλλ' ὕστερον.<sup>457</sup> Further credit is given to Euripides for making the pedagogue state that he was among the Argives for the attempt at a treaty, which explains why he is able to reveal so much information to Antigone and the audience: οἰκονομικῶς φησιν αὐτὸν ὁ ποιητὴς ἀπεστάλθαι εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον ὅπως εὐλογον ἔχη πρόφασιν τοῦ

<sup>455</sup> A further example, *Phoenissae* 617, is inscrutable to me (ἄφατος ἢ οἰκονομία).

<sup>456</sup> *Ph.* 88

<sup>457</sup> *Ph.* 93

ἐπιγινώσκειν ἅπαντας.<sup>458</sup> In this extended example of οἰκονομία, then, it seems that discussions of arrangement might take place over a range of verses, which can help us pin down the scholiast's thinking regarding the construction of the passage as a whole.

### *Euripides*

A number of notes contain information about the poet himself. The project of the scholia at large in interpreting the tragedies cannot truly be detached from questions about the author (“Who is Euripides?” “What does he do?”), and so as a general rule all of the notes tell us something about the man and his work, but what I mean to isolate here is the collection of notes that make explicit reference to Euripides either biographically or in terms of his literary predilections—and in some cases, the biographical and literary facets of his life will be shown to overlap.

While the biographical notes are few, they are worth mentioning. One note reports, as a way of explaining Euripides' celestial descriptions at *Orestes* 982, that Euripides was a student of Anaxagoras: Ἀναξαγόρου δὲ μαθητῆς γενόμενος ὁ Εὐριπίδης μύδρον λέγει τὸν ἥλιον. A note just below adds a similar statement: <ἄλλως> Ἀναξαγόρα δὲ πειθόμενος μύδρον αὐτὸν εἶναι λέγει. This is a claim that had also been made in Euripides' ancient biography,<sup>459</sup> and possibly also in a scholion to *Hippolytus* 601, where a (perhaps dubious) scholiastic reference is made to the passage in the *Orestes*. Further evidence of this claim comes at *Troades* 884: here Euripides' description of Zeus is interpreted as possibly metaphorical language for a description of human νοῦς as a divinity, and those who say so take their cue from the lessons of Anaxagoras: ὀρμῶνται δὲ ἐκ τῶν Ἀναξαγορείων λόγων. The implication seems to be that since Euripides was the student of Anaxagoras, it is reasonable to expect that Euripides will have made a nod to

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<sup>458</sup> *Ph.* 96

<sup>459</sup> *Vita* 2.5, 3.4. According to Lefkowitz (2012, 89, 182 n. 7), the assertion that Euripides studied under Anaxagoras seem to have arisen from the claim by Satyrus of Callatis that Euripides had channeled Anaxagorean teaching in at least one passage.

the philosopher's teachings from time to time. Elsewhere there is mention of an old rumor that Euripides was involved in a dispute with Sophocles in which the latter found fault with the former for the opening two verses of the *Phoenissae*, but Euripides countered with an indictment of the opening to the *Electra* in an episode reminiscent of the poetic contest in Aristophanes' *Frogs*: <ὡ τὴν ἐν ἄστροις> παλαιά τις

φέρεται δόξα ὡς Σοφοκλῆς μὲν ἐπιτιμήσειεν Εὐριπίδῃ ὅτι [μὴ] προέταξε τούτους τοὺς δύο στίχους, ὁ δὲ Εὐριπίδης ὅτι [μὴ] προέταξεν ἐν Ἡλέκτρᾳ [1] ὁ Σοφοκλῆς τὸ ὄ τοῦ στρατηγήσαντος ἐν Τροίᾳ ποτέ.<sup>460</sup>

Euripides was also said to have cultivated a relationship with certain towns on the basis of his poetry. For example, one story has it that after receiving a bribe from the Corinthians Euripides changed the plot of the *Medea* so that the city would not be implicated in the murder of the children:

πολυαῖκος τις λόγος φέρεται τῶν φιλοσόφων, ὃν καὶ Παρμενίσκος ἐκτίθησιν, ὡς ἄρα πέντε τάλαντα λαβὼν παρὰ Κορινθίων Εὐριπίδης μεταγάγοι τὴν σφαγὴν τῶν παιδῶν ἐπὶ τὴν Μήδειαν. ἀποσφαγῆναι γὰρ τοὺς παῖδας Μηδείας ὑπὸ Κορινθίων παροξυνθέντων ἐπὶ τῷ βασιλεύειν αὐτὴν θέλειν διὰ τὸ τὴν Κόρινθον πατρίαν αὐτῆς λῆξιν εἶναι.

Some account of an impetuous philosopher [?] is related, which Parmeniscus also relates, that having received five talents from the Corinthians Euripides reassigned the slaughter of the children to Medea. For [the story goes that] Medea's children had been killed by Corinthians who were outraged at her desire to rule on the basis of the fact that Corinth was her ancestral lot.

Currying favor is something that Euripides was said to have done with other cities as well, including Athens, to which he is said to give a subtle shout-out near the beginning of the *Troades* when he mentions how, after the sack of Troy, some captive women were taken by Arcadia, some by Thessaly, and some by the leaders of Athens; this is interpreted as a subtle nod to the fact that those on the side of Demophon were content to get back Aethra, for whose sake they went to Troy under the leadership of Menestheus:

ταῦτα ἔνιοι πρὸς χάριν Ἀθηναίων Εὐριπίδῃν λέγειν· ἀγαπητὸν γὰρ εἶναι τοῖς περὶ Δημοφῶντα Αἰθραν ἀναλαβεῖν, ἧς ἕνεκα αὐτοῦς φασιν εἰς Τροίαν ἐλθεῖν, Μενεσθέως ἀφηγουμένου τῶν Ἀθηναίων.<sup>461</sup> So too does

Euripides praise Athens as a repository for wisdom and knowledge in the choral passage at *Medea* 824, since he contrasts their lofty ideals with the baseness of Medea's plans, and so they will ask a few verses

<sup>460</sup> *Ph.* 1

<sup>461</sup> *Tr.* 31

later why someone like Medea could ever find a home in a place like Athens.<sup>462</sup> A final and perplexing note appears at *Medea* 1346 (ἔρρ', αἰσχροποιὲ καὶ τέκνων μαιφόνε), where the scholiast states that the line has been marked as special (κεχίασται) because it seems that Euripides was exiled after saying this, or perhaps said it while going off into exile: ὅτι δοκεῖ τὸν στίχον τοῦτον εἰπὼν Εὐριπίδης ἐκβεβλήσθαι.<sup>463</sup> I find no corresponding passage to confirm or refute this event, and there does not seem to be much of a *Nachleben* for this particular verse, so I remain uncertain about its full meaning.<sup>464</sup>

The literary notes on Euripides report that he has his own grammatical tendencies as well. To *Phoenissae* 52 is appended a note that explains how the word ἔπαθλα is found only in Euripides, and some even change the text because of this: <καὶ σκῆπτρ' ἔπαθλα> παρ' οὐδενὶ κείται τὸ <ἔπαθλα> ἢ μόνω τῷ Εὐριπίδῃ· ὅθεν μεταγράφοισι τινεσ <καὶ σκῆπτρα χώρας ἄθλα>. He also employs a meaning of τλήμων that is different from that of other tragedians: παρὰ μὲν τῷ ποιητῇ τλήμων ὁ ὑπομονητικός, παρὰ δὲ τοῖς τραγικοῖς τλήμων ὁ δυστυχής.<sup>465</sup> Similarly, Euripides is characterized as always using ἀεί to mean “up until now”: τὸ γὰρ ἀεί Εὐριπίδης τάσσει ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔως τοῦ νῦν.<sup>466</sup> Euripides also typically uses βλέπειν for ζῆν<sup>467</sup> and μῶρος to denote an incorrigible person.<sup>468</sup> Finally, he has a tendency to use σοφός meaninglessly, for he applies it to Pandion, to whom no noble act can be assigned, such that the modifier must be taken as an expletive: <σοφοῦ Πανδίωνος> εὐεπίφορός ἐστιν ὁ Εὐριπίδης εἰς τὸ λέγειν σοφός καὶ

<sup>462</sup> μακαρίζει νῦν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ὡς εὐδαίμονας καὶ σοφίας πάσης ἐπιστήμονας ἱεροῦ τε καὶ μύστας, ὅτι μέλλει τὰ κατὰ τὴν Μηδειαν ἐπάγειν μιάσματα. τῇ γὰρ παραθέσει βούλεται αὐτὴν ἀποτρέψαι τοῦ κατὰ τῶν παίδων φόνου. οὕτως γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἐξῆς ἐπάγει ὅτι οὐκ εἰκὸς τοὺς οὕτως ἱεροῦς καὶ σοφοῦς ἄνδρας σὲ μαιφόνον γενομένην ὑποδέξεσθαι.

<sup>463</sup> Marks such as χ were used to denote passages of interest, often the departure from some norm, be it grammatical or (as it seems here) historical.

<sup>464</sup> Machon apparently wrote that the Corinthian courtesan Lais challenged Euripides on the first half of this line, and when Euripides called the brazen girl αἰσχροποιός, she replied, “Evidently not, at least to my customers” (Frag. 18, quoted in Athenaeus 13.45). (Ps-?)Gregory of Nazianzus (*Christus Patiens* 334) recycles the same half-line, but with no clue to our problem.

<sup>465</sup> *Or.* 35

<sup>466</sup> *Med.* 670; this is born out by other notes that gloss ἀεί in the same way (*Or.* 1663, *Ph.* 1209).

<sup>467</sup> ἔθος ἐστὶ τῷ Εὐριπίδῃ τῷ βλέπειν χρῆσθαι ἀντὶ τοῦ ζῆν (*Tr.* 632).

<sup>468</sup> συνεχῶς ὁ Εὐριπίδης <μῶρα> λέγει τὰ ἀκόλαστα καὶ κατωφερῆ (*Tr.* 989); a gloss at *Troades* 1059 also suggests this definition.

σοφή πρὸς μηδὲν χρήσιμον παραλαμβάνων τὸ ὄνομα. κατὰ τί γὰρ σοφὸς ὁ Πανδίων λέγεται; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὠνόμασται τοιοῦτον.<sup>469</sup>

Euripidean idiosyncrasy extends also the realm of mythology and history. We have noted above how a multiplicity is often visible in the presentation of myth and history generally, but we learn at a couple of locations that Euripides has a particular penchant for creating his own versions of events. At *Hecuba* 3 a scholiast remarks that the poet often plays to the beat of his own drum when it comes to genealogies, even to the point of contradicting himself from time to time: *πολλάκις δὲ ὁ Εὐριπίδης αὐτοσχεδιάζει ἐν ταῖς γενεαλογίαις, ὡς καὶ ἑαυτῷ ἐνίοτε ἐναντία λέγειν.*<sup>470</sup> His rogue presentation of facts includes geographical details as well, for when he describes the tomb of the Niobids near Thebes, the scholiast affirms Aristodemus' claim that no such site exists near that city, and that Euripides is making things up, as is his custom: ὁ Ἀριστόδημος [frg. 3] οὐδαμοῦ φησιν ἐν ταῖς Θήβαις τῶν Νιοβιδῶν εἶναι τάφον, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀληθές, ὡς αὐτοσχεδιάζειν νῦν ἔοικεν ὁ Εὐριπίδης.<sup>471</sup> Other examples provide further evidence of the “innovative” Euripides at work, though without explicit statement that it is his custom to do such things.<sup>472</sup>

Euripides also has some particular tendencies in the way he unfolds his narratives and his characters. For instance, he frequently brings his heroic characters onstage in philosophizing mode (τοιοῦτος δὲ ἐστὶν ἀεὶ, τὰ ἡρωϊκὰ πρόσωπα εἰσάγων φιλοσοφοῦντα<sup>473</sup>) and often constructs beggar characters (ὄλως ἐν πάσιν Εὐριπίδης πτωχοποιός ἐστι<sup>474</sup>), in addition to his proclivity to find the cause for

<sup>469</sup> *Med.* 665

<sup>470</sup> For the recognition of such a contradiction, see *Phoenissae* 794, where Euripides is accused of saying first that Ares stirred the Thebans against the Argives, and then at the present passage that he incited the Argives against the Thebans. The scholiast is left with only one conclusion: *τοῦτο δὲ φησιν ὡς τοῦ Ἄρεως ἑκατέρους παρορμήσαντος κατ' ἀλλήλων.*

<sup>471</sup> *Ph.* 159; Euripides does not always create his own story, of course, and at times even seems to have sought out the “best versions” (e.g., *Andr.* 10).

<sup>472</sup> Examples include the aforementioned conception of Rhesus in the river Strymon (*Rh.* 351), the length of Orestes' sojourn (*Or.* 1645), and the relative disposition of the multitude of Argos' eyes, specifically in their combination of eastern and western trajectories (*Ph.* 1116). See also the inversion of *ἱστορία* at *Orestes* 1009.

<sup>473</sup> *Hipp.* 953; nowhere else do we see this exact statement, though we might apply the principle at *Alcestis* 779 and *Troades* 634.

<sup>474</sup> *Ph.* 1539; a scholiast even suggests here that perhaps everyone had come out (to the theater, presumably) to be witnesses of the present evils, for which reason Oedipus is brought out as a lonely beggar, evidently to emphasize



present disasters in the actions of one's ancestors, as when Jocasta assigns the start of her troubles to Cadmus: *εὐεπίφορος δὲ ὁ Εὐριπίδης πρὸς <τὸ εἰς> ἕτερα πρόσωπα πρεσβύτερα τὴν τῶν δυστυχημάτων αἰτίαν ἀναφέρειν.*<sup>475</sup> Elsewhere, when Jocasta speaks proverbially with Polyneices, the scholiast remarks that it is unfitting for her to speak thus amidst turmoil—an instance of the evaluation of character propriety as described above—and that Euripides does this all the time: *οὐκ ἐν δέοντι δὲ γνωμολογεῖ τοιούτων κακῶν περιεστώτων τὴν πόλιν. τοιοῦτος δὲ πολλαχοῦ ὁ Εὐριπίδης.*<sup>476</sup> Further, the messenger's initial reporting to Creon of Jocasta's death followed by a more thorough explanation is said to be a Euripidean commonplace: *συνήθως πάλιν Εὐριπίδης προειπὼν ἐν ἐνὶ στίχῳ τῆς συμφορᾶς τὸ κεφάλαιον καταστατικώτερον ὕστερον διηγεῖται τὸ πᾶν*, “Regularly again Euripides mentions the crux of the misfortune first and then later explains the whole thing more calmly.”<sup>477</sup> A similar note at *Medea* 40 states that Euripides is prone to foreshadow, as here where Medea is said to hate the sight of her children early in the play.<sup>478</sup> Finally, Euripides is accustomed to issue such statements as “Many things do the gods change” on account of paradoxical inversions in his dramas: *<πολλὰ μορφαὶ τῶν δαιμονίων> ταῦτα εἶωθεν ὁ ποιητὴς λέγειν διὰ τὰ ἐν τοῖς δράμασιν ἐκ παραδόξου συμβαίνοντα.*<sup>479</sup>

Part of Euripides' technique as recognized by commentators also includes the author speaking through his characters *propria voce*. This is a complex issue in the scholia, as I have shown already, particularly because the compressed diction of the commentaries will often be content with a plain third-person singular verb, leaving the reader to guess whether Euripides or one of his characters is the subject. In a few places, however, one finds explicit acknowledgment of Euripides using his choruses as a

the tragic *πάθος* of this scene: *τάχα δὲ τῶν παρόντων κακῶν πάντες ἐξῆλθον θεαταὶ γενέσθαι διὸ μεμονωμένον θεράποντος Οἰδίποδος τὸ πρόσωπον ἕξεισιν.* Compare how the Aristophanic character of Euripides interestingly criticizes Aeschylus for just this sort of trumped-up delay of a hyper-tragic entrance (*Frogs* 920).

<sup>475</sup> *Ph.* 4

<sup>476</sup> *Ph.* 388; evidently her proverb-speak (*γνωμολογεῖ*) is her musing on exile: *τί τὸ στέρεσθαι πατρίδος; ἢ κακὸν μέγα.*

<sup>477</sup> *Ph.* 1339

<sup>478</sup> The note is technically appended to *Medea* 40, though it looks back to 36 for the phrase *στυγεῖ δὲ παῖδας* (cf. *Med.* 791: *καὶ νῦν προλέγει ὡς εἶωθεν*).

<sup>479</sup> *Andr.* 1284; one further note seems to defy classification but is related to the idea of Euripidean characterization. At *Orestes* 1369, the Phrygian speaks in such a strange, panicked way that the scholiast notes the passage as incongruous with Euripides' customary style: *ἐντεῦθεν ἐξέστη τοῦ ἰδίου ἥθους ὁ Εὐριπίδης ἀνοίκεια ἑαυτῷ λέγων.* The note is interesting especially for its judging of Euripides against the standard of himself, though the comment is not at all specific as to what makes the passage odd.

mouthpiece. First, in what is now considered a dubious passage at the end of the *Orestes*, the chorus states: ὦ μέγα σεμνὴ Νίκη τὸν ἐμὸν / βίωτον κατέχοις / καὶ μὴ λήγοις στεφανοῦσα, “Holy Victory, preserve my life, and do not cease crowning me.”<sup>480</sup> The reference to crowning evidently encouraged the scholiast to read this as Euripides speaking through the chorus: τοῦτο παρὰ τοῦ χοροῦ ἐστὶ λεγόμενον ὡς ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ ποιητοῦ. A more complex and in some ways more interesting example involves a unique bit of interpretation on the part of the commentator. When Hippolytus departs from Theseus on the journey that will kill him, the chorus launches into a song about the vacillation of Fortune. Which chorus, though? At this point there has been a chorus of women attending Phaedra, but also a chorus of huntsmen attending Hippolytus. The scholiast assumes it is the first—perhaps judging that the huntsmen have left with Hippolytus—and this has interesting implications for the text of the choral passage, which contains masculine participles. A simple explanation (and I believe the one most modern readers would adopt) is that it is the chorus of huntsmen, speaking as normal in the first-person singular. Since the scholiast has decided upon their female status, however, the explanation becomes a metatheatrical one; the poet is speaking through the chorus, which explains why it is treated as masculine: γυναῖκες μὲν εἰσιν αἱ τοῦ χοροῦ. μεταφέρει δὲ τὸ πρόσωπον ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ὁ ποιητὴς καταλιπὼν τὰ χορικά πρόσωπα· μετοχαῖς γὰρ ἀρσενικαῖς κέχρηται.<sup>481</sup> Such an interpretation of this choral passage, even if it seems to us unnecessary and strange, is made possible by the basic assumption that Euripides characteristically does this kind of thing. Finally, in another curious passage, when the chorus composed of citizens of Pherae state that in all their intellectual inquiries and studies they have never found anything so strong as Necessity, the scholiast thinks that the poet is using the chorus to show off his erudition: ὁ ποιητὴς διὰ τοῦ προσώπου τοῦ χοροῦ βούλεται δεῖξαι ὅσον μετέσχε παιδεύσεως.<sup>482</sup>

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<sup>480</sup> *Or.* 1691-3

<sup>481</sup> *Hipp.* 1102

<sup>482</sup> The topic of the poet’s voice in drama is one that would profit especially from a full examination of ancient commentaries to Greek and Roman comedy, where metatheatricality is more the norm. I am interested to find out in my subsequent studies whether, e.g., the scholia to Aristophanes demonstrate a similar treatment of authorial interjection.

Anachronism too is recognized as a common Euripidean device. When Hecuba berates the throng of useless orators as a response to Odysseus' intractability, one note suggests that Euripides is speaking to the demagogues of his own time (*εἰς τοὺς κατ' αὐτὸν δημοκοποῦντας ῥήτορας λέγει*), and a subsequent note expands on this: *ταῦτα εἰς τὴν κατ' αὐτὸν πολιτείαν λέγει. καὶ ἔστι τοιοῦτος ὁ Εὐριπίδης, περιάπτων τὰ καθ' ἑαυτὸν τοῖς ἥρωσι καὶ τοὺς χρόνους συγχέων*, "He speaks these things in reference to the constitution of his own time. And such is Euripides, attaching contemporary events to his heroes and mixing up chronology."<sup>483</sup> Other passages bear out this observation in the mind of the scholiasts. Andromache's criticism of the deceptive Spartans is understood as Euripidean slander against contemporary Sparta for its breach of the treaty with Athens in the Peloponnesian War: *ταῦτα ἐπὶ τῷ Ἄνδρομάχης προσχήματι φησιν Εὐριπίδης λοιδορούμενος τοῖς Σπαρτιάταις διὰ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα πόλεμον. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ παρεσπονθήκεσαν πρὸς Ἀθηναίους.*<sup>484</sup> Further possibility for anachronism is seen by some a bit later in the play in reference to cities that were formerly allies but now are enemies: *ἔνιοί φασι <τὸν ποιητὴν> παρὰ τοὺς χρόνους αἰνίττεσθαι τὰ Πελοποννησιακά. οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δὲ κατασκευαστέον τὸν Εὐριπίδην, ἀλλὰ φάσκειν πλάσματι κεχρηῆσθαι.*<sup>485</sup> Another instance occurs in the aforementioned notes to *Hippolytus* 953, where the vegetarian tendencies of Hippolytus as stated by Theseus are taken as a nod to the contemporary fame of Pythagoras, which was exemplified by the fact that many were abstaining from the consumption of living things: *ἐπεὶ ἔνδοξος ἦν ὁ Πυθαγόρας, ἥδη καὶ πολλοὶ ἐμφύχων ἀπείχοντο. ἀνάγει δὲ τοὺς χρόνους. περὶ ἑαυτοῦ γὰρ αἰνίξασθαι βούλεται ὁ Εὐριπίδης.* Additionally, to return to *Phoenissae* 1377, the scholiast sees here the mention of the *σάλπιγξ* as anachronistic, since it was not used in heroic times, as the drama implies:

*<ἐπεὶ δ' ἀφείθη> πρὸ γὰρ τῆς εὐρέσεως τῆς σάλπιγγος ἐν ταῖς μάχαις καὶ τοῖς μονομαχείοις ἐν μέσῳ τις λαμπάδα καιομένην ἔρριπτε σημεῖον τοῦ κατάρξασθαι τῆς μάχης. τούτῳ οὖν τῷ σημείῳ ἀντὶ σάλπιγγος κὰν τοῖς περὶ Ἑτεοκλέα χρόνους ἐχρῶντο. ὕστερον δὲ μετὰ τὰ Τρωικὰ καὶ τὴν εἰς γῆν Ῥωμαίων Αἰνείου κατοίκησιν Τυρρηνοὶ τὴν σάλπιγγα ἐξεύρον ἐν τοῖς Ἰταλικοῖς πολέμοις, ὅθεν καὶ*

<sup>483</sup> *Hec.* 254

<sup>484</sup> *Andr.* 445; note also that here is another example of the scholiast explicitly identifying the voice of Euripides in one of his characters, though this time not the chorus specifically.

<sup>485</sup> *Andr.* 734; note also the suggestion at the end that it is not necessary to criticize Euripides for this, but just to say that he has made use of some fictionalization, the same principle I showed just above.

Τυρρηνὶς ἢ σάλπιγξ ἐκλήθη. τὸ οὖν τούτῳ αὐτοὺς χρῆσθαι ἀντὶ σάλπιγγος ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἐμφαίνων ὁ ποιητὴς φησιν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀγγέλου πρόσωπον τοῦτο ἀναφέρεσθαι πιθανὸν, εἴγε ὅλως οὐπω ᾔδεσαν τὴν σάλπιγγα.

For before the inception of the trumpet in battles and duels someone threw a burning torch into the middle as a sign for beginning the battle. This sign, then, they used instead of the trumpet also in the times of Eteocles. And later after the events of Troy and the settling of Aeneas in the land of the Romans, the Tyrrhenians first implemented the trumpet in the Italian wars, whence also the trumpet was called Tyrrhenian. Thus, the poet says this, informing us that they made use of this instead of the trumpet [sic]. For to be sure it is unbelievable that it could be attributed to the character of the messenger, if indeed they did not yet know the trumpet.

In my distillation of various types of stage direction, specifically in the identification of speaker and addressee for some problematic lines, I presented a few passages that were said by scholiasts to have been directed toward the audience. I now return to two of those passages here, for both allege that addressing the audience is not only something that the characters do, but something that is characteristic of Euripides himself. In the first, Poseidon delivers the prologue of the *Troades* while speaking to the audience, with the following note added: ὅλος ἐπὶ τοῦ θεάτρου ὁ Εὐριπίδης, πρὸς ὃ ἀφορῶν τοὺς λόγους νῦν ὁ Ποσειδὼν ποιεῖ παρὼν ἐν τῇ ὑποθέσει. πολλαχού δὲ τοιοῦτος, ὡς ἐν ταῖς Βάκχαις ὁ Διόνυσος, “Euripides is entirely [inclined] toward the audience, in view of which Poseidon now makes his speech being present in the prologue. And [Euripides] is like this everywhere, as [when] Dionysus [speaks the prologue] in the *Bacchae*.”<sup>486</sup> The second is more cryptic and more intriguing. When Electra mocks Hermione for failing to cut off more than the tips of her hair in “mourning” for the dead so that her beauty would not suffer, the addressee of Electra’s exclamation may be interpreted in two ways:

<εἶδετε παρ' ἄκρας> τὸ <εἶδετε> ἀντὶ τοῦ ἴδοι τις ἂν, ὡς τὸ [Γ 220] ‘φαίης κε ζάκοτον’ καὶ [Δ 223] ‘ἐνθ' οὐκ ἂν βρίζοντα ἴδοις’. ἔνιοι δὲ φασὶ ταῖς δμῶσι ταῦτα λέγειν. οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὸ θέατρον, ὃ καὶ ἄμεινον. ἐφελκυστικὸς γὰρ ἐστὶν αἰὲ μᾶλλον τῶν θεατῶν ὁ ποιητὴς, οὐ φροντίζων τῶν ἀκριβολογούντων.<sup>487</sup>

She says “Did you see . . .” instead of “Someone might see,” just as “You would have said he was bitter,” and “You would not have seen him slumbering.” And some say she speaks these things

<sup>486</sup> Tr. 1

<sup>487</sup> Observe that only the second interpretation, marked as better by the scholiast, gives the Homeric references any relevance here. As for the poet involving the spectators, it may be useful to compare the reputation of Euripides in Aristophanes’ *Frogs* 1129, where the tragedian claims that he has paid special attention to the audience in order to make them better equipped to judge poetry for themselves.

to the slavewomen, but others to the theater, which is better. For the poet always rather draws in the spectators and pays no heed to overzealous critics.

It is unclear to me what the nature of this “overzealous criticism” is, unless it is perhaps a general principle that tragic poets ought to maintain the dramatic illusion without, as we would say, breaking the fourth wall. In any case, Euripides’ practice of addressing his audience is recognized as something he “always” does, whatever slander he may receive for this.<sup>488</sup>

### *Scholarly Rivalries: Praise and Blame*

Thus far we have seen mostly one-sided notes that either commend or condemn Euripides. The scholia, though, are a locus of contention, and the praise and blame of Euripides is the stage upon which the full brunt of this scholarly ἀγών is felt. As I showed in Chapter 1, scholarly criticism has in many ways risen up around this very question of authorial quality, with it being possible even that an entire method of literary analysis (i.e., the allegorism of Theagenes) arose for the sole purpose of answering objections to factual inaccuracy in Homer. The present form of the Euripidean scholia, with their snowball-like accretions, is well suited to this kind of ongoing debate, captured over centuries as scholars edited, revised, and criticized the work of their predecessors and contemporaries. As we will see, the scholia themselves are a window into this scholarly tradition of posing problems, stating answers, and being lambasted for those answers, and Euripides is caught in the middle as the object of attack and defense.

The vituperation of other scholars appears at varying degrees of severity in the Euripidean scholia. Sometimes the correcting scholar is reasonably gentle, stating that certain people do not

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<sup>488</sup> Consider also the example of *Troades* 1057, where Menelaus’ critique of women’s intemperance is attributed directly to Euripides, who apparently hates women: τὸ κατὰ τῶν γυναικῶν μῖσος ἑαυτοῦ καὶ διὰ τούτων παρίστησιν ὁ Εὐριπίδης· οὐ γὰρ, φησὶ, ῥάδιόν ἐστὶ ποτε σωφρονίσαι γυναῖκα.

understand a passage very well,<sup>489</sup> or that what they suggest is because they are ignorant about a certain fact or poetic principle.<sup>490</sup> Others are dismissed summarily, as when a scholiast says that Parmeniscus' assertion that *προταινί* is a Boeotian word has no credence whatsoever.<sup>491</sup> Some seem fairly sarcastic, for example when the Homoloides are said to be the daughters of Homolois, daughter of Amphion—but those who wish to spread false stories say that they were the children of Homolois, the daughter of Niobe: *κατὰ δὲ τοὺς ψευδολογεῖν βουλομένους ἀπὸ μιᾶς τῶν Νιόβης θυγατέρων Ὅμολοίδος.*<sup>492</sup> Such accusations give some idea of the form that scholiastic criticism takes and can range over all sorts of topics, but now I proceed to what is by far the most common arena in which scholarly rivalries play out: the defense of Euripides against detractors.

A significant number of passages in the scholia acknowledge some criticism of Euripides' grammar, but then proceed to defend him through appeals to various kinds of knowledge. The chorus' lament concerning the plight of Jocasta and her children at *Phoenissae* 1288-9 is one such example. The original text reads *δίδυμα τέκεα πότερος ἄρα / πότερον αἰμάξει*, "The twin offspring—which will bloody the other?" The attached scholion reads: *<δίδυμα τέκεα> τοῦτο ἔνιοι σολοικισμόν ἠγήσαντο. ἔδει γὰρ εἰπεῖν διδύμων τεκέων πότερος ἄρα πότερον αἰμάξει. νῦν δὲ οὐ πρὸς τὸ ῥητὸν ἀπήντησεν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ νοητὸν, τὸν οἶκτον*, "Some judged this to be a solecism, for it was necessary to say 'Which of the twin offspring will kill the other?' But now [the poet] did not fix the [phrase] to the verb [i.e., syntactically to the clause], but to the thought, as a lamentation." It thus seems that the scholiast takes the initial nominative form as exclamatory, so that there is no need to criticize Euripides for a slip. Note that the "some" are not heavily abused, but are simply disregarded in favor of an interpretation that gives Euripides the benefit of the grammatical doubt.

Other notes defend Euripides against a charge of factual error or narrative inconsistency, which we saw above to be an important criterion by which his dramas are evaluated. The scholiast states that,

<sup>489</sup> οὐ καλῶς (e.g., *Alc.* 1071)

<sup>490</sup> ἀγνοοῦντες (e.g., *Or.* 2)

<sup>491</sup> Παρμενίσκος τὴν <προταινί> λέξιν Βοιωτικὴν φησι μετ' οὐδεμιᾶς πίστεως (*Rh.* 523).

<sup>492</sup> *Rh.* 1119

when Menelaus asks Orestes what the source of his suffering is at *Orestes* 396, some criticize Orestes' response that it is his own conscience: <ἡ σύνεσις ὅτι σύνοιδα> ἐγκαλοῦσί τινες· πῶς γὰρ, φασίν, αἰτιᾶται τὴν σύνεσιν, τὸ πᾶν αἴτιον τῶν Ἐρινύων ἐχουσῶν. ἀγνοοῦσι δὲ ὅτι ὑπὸ δισσῶν φησιν ἀπόλλυσθαι, περὶ μὲν τὸν καιρὸν τῆς ὑγείας ὑπὸ τῆς συνειδήσεως, ἐν δὲ τῇ λύσσει ὑπὸ τῶν Ἐρινύων· ὃ καὶ ἐπάγει· ‘μανίαι τε’ [400], “Some criticize this. For how, they say, does he blame his conscience [i.e. for his suffering], when the Erinyes are entirely responsible? But they do not know that he says he is perishing from two things: in the time of health, by his conscience, but in his madness, by the Erinyes, which he also states, ‘And madness . . .’ [vs. 400]. Turning to *Medea* 830ff., we find ambiguity in the original text: ἔνθα ποθ’ ἀγνάς / ἐννέα Πιερίδας Μούσας λέγουσι / ξανθὰν Ἀρμονίαν φυτεῦσαι, “Where they say at one time the nine holy Pierian Muses birthed Harmony.” Some readers, however, apparently took Euripides to say that Harmony was their *mother*, an idea that the scholiast rejects: ἔνιοι λέγουσι τὸν Εὐριπίδην τὰς Μούσας λέγειν Ἀρμονίας θυγατέρας, ἀγνοήσαντες. οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο λέγει, ἀλλ’ ὅτι αἱ Μοῦσαι πρῶτον ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐλθοῦσαι τὴν ἀρμονίαν ἦδον καὶ τὴν μελωδίαν. διὰ γὰρ τοῦ <φυτεῦσαι> τοῦτο παρίστησι νῦν, “Some ignorantly say that Euripides calls the Muses the daughters of Harmony. For he does not say this, but rather that the Muses, after coming to Attica, first sang harmony and melody.”<sup>493</sup> In another example, the scholiast reveals that Crates criticized astronomical details in the *Rhesus*, attributing the mistakes to the poet’s youth,<sup>494</sup> but again the scholiast states that the text that Crates accuses is not even what Euripides had said (τὸ δὲ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει). Lastly, when Euripides says that Rhesus’ horses are dappled,<sup>495</sup> objectors evidently complained that just before he had called them white, to which the scholiast replies: <βαλιαῖσιν> οὐ κυρίως νῦν τῇ λέξει κέχρηται· λευκὰς γὰρ εἶχεν, ὡς καὶ ἀνωτέρω [304] αὐτὸς ἔφη. δύναται δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ ταχείαις, “Not correctly does he use this language now, for Rhesus had white horses, as Euripides himself

<sup>493</sup> It is to be observed that Rex Warner’s translation (1955) preserved the reading of Harmony as the mother, though Page (1938) had called that interpretation “absurd and meaningless.” As often, in this passage a scholion brings up an issue that persists to the modern day.

<sup>494</sup> Κράτης ἀγνοεῖν φησι τὸν Εὐριπίδην τὴν περὶ τὰ μετέωρα θεωρίαν διὰ τὸ νέον ἔτι εἶναι ὅτε τὸν Ῥῆσον ἐδίδασκε (*Rh.* 528).

<sup>495</sup> βαλιαῖσι πάλαις (*Rh.* 356)

said above [vs. 304]. But it is possible that the word means ‘swift.’” Thus, while the objection remains on the table, there is an escape route for Euripides.<sup>496</sup>

Other scholia defend Euripides when he is attacked for having his characters do or say something that seems inappropriate.<sup>497</sup> I have already given some examples of such defense, including the passage in which Eteocles praises tyranny, where at least one scholiast thought the passage should be interpreted not as impropriety in characterization, but rather as an accurate presentation of an evil man.<sup>498</sup> Creon too is criticized for offering his sister in marriage to anyone who could help Thebes, as described at *Phoenissae* 47, but a scholiast responds that desperate times call for desperate measures—and besides, only a well-born man would even attempt such a feat, so the marriage could never be incongruous:

ἀνοήτως, φασὶν, ἐπὶ τὸν τῆς ἀδελφῆς γάμον τὸν τυχόντα καλεῖ. ἀγνοοῦσι δὲ ὅτι ἡ κατεπείγουσα συμφορὰ καὶ παρὰ τὸ πρέπον τι πράττειν προτρέπεται. ἔπειτα καὶ ἄριστόν τινα ᾤετο τὸν ἐγχειρήσοντα τῷ ἀγῶνι.

Similarly, when Oedipus curses Mount Cithaeron to hell, a note responds to detractors by saying that cursing a mountain is really not as out-of-place as they suggest, given Oedipus’ situation: εὐήθως δὲ, φασὶ, καταρᾶται τῷ Κιθαιρῶνι ὅτι οὐκ ἀπώλεσεν αὐτόν· δέον γὰρ τοῖς ἀνελομένοις καταράσασθαι ἢ τῇ Πολύβου γυναικί, τῷ ὄρει καταρᾶται. ἀλλὰ μεμίμηται ὁ Εὐριπίδης τοὺς δι’ ὑπερβολὴν συμφορᾶς καὶ τοῖς ἀναισθήτοις θυμουμένους, “And naively, they say, he curses Cithaeron because it killed him. For, it being necessary to curse those who tried to kill him or perhaps Polybus’ wife, he curses the mountain. But Euripides is imitating those who on account of extreme suffering become angry even with inanimate objects.”<sup>499</sup> An additional scholion to this verse offers yet another possible excuse for this apostrophe to Cithaeron, for

<sup>496</sup> Note the correlation with the related Greek word ἀργός, which means “shining” but also “swift.” For another example where the scholiast sees a possible solution to the objection without being very forceful, see *Phoenissae* 1606.

<sup>497</sup> I will point out that all these examples come from the *Phoenissae*. This has no special meaning other than as a reminder that certain types of notes do tend to congregate to some extent, though without a great degree of predictability. After all, it is not as if the *Phoenissae* alone has notes defending Euripides, but only that it seems to contain a cluster of responses to accusations regarding characterization. Such phenomena may have as much to do with what the scholiast had for breakfast that morning as with any deliberate choice to focus on particular aspects of particular dramas.

<sup>498</sup> *Ph.* 507; cf. *Ph.* 504, where a note says this about the text: οὐκ ἐπιτιμητέον δέ· ἀρμόδιοι γὰρ οἱ λόγοι ἀνδρὶ πλεονεξίαν διώκοντι, “This is not to be impugned, for the words are in keeping with a man who is in ambitious pursuit of glory.”

<sup>499</sup> *Ph.* 1605; cf. *Ph.* 267, 911



“we say” that the statement might have been designed for stirring the audience to pity: ἀλλά φαμεν ὅτι ἔνεκα τοῦ εἰς οἶκτον κινῆσαι τοὺς θεωμένους ταῦτα ὁ Εὐριπίδης ἐτεχνάσατο.

Other poetic principles are also at stake in certain notes. Timachidas had complained that Euripides’ introduction to the *Medea* has reversed the correct order of events, first giving a wish that the Argo had never sailed, and then that it had never been constructed. The note responds that it is from ignorance of poetry that Timachidas alleges this, for in Homeric fashion Euripides is using the trope of *ὑπέρθεσις*: Τιμαχίδας τὸν τρόπον [τῆς ποιήσεως] ἀγνοήσας ποιητικὸν ὄντα τῷ ὑστέρω πρώτῳ φησὶ κεχρηθῆναι, ὡς Ὅμηρος [ε 264]: ‘εἴματα δ’ ἀμφιέσασα θυώδεα καὶ λούσασα’. πρότερον γάρ φησι φῦναι τὰ δένδρα, εἴθ’ οὕτως κατασκευασθῆναι τὴν Ἄργω . . . ἔστι δὲ ὑπέρθεσις ὁ τρόπος. τὰ γὰρ δεύτερα τῇ τάξει, πρώτα ὑπέθετο.<sup>500</sup> Others had complained that Jocasta’s presentation of the background story in her prologue to the *Phoenissae* was lacking, since she failed to give an accurate genealogical picture. The scholiast’s response meets this evaluation on the grounds of the poetic principles I examined above:

ἔτι δέ τινες ἐγκαλοῦσι τῷ Εὐριπίδῃ ὡς οὐκ ἀκολούθως γενεαλογήσαντι· εἰ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐβούλετο τὰ πράγματα λέγεσθαι, ἐχρῆν τὴν ἐκ Φοινίκης ἀποικίαν τοῦ Κάδμου κατὰ λεπτόν μετὰ τῆς αἰτίας διηγῆσθαι· εἰ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ ὑπογυίου, ἔδει ἀπὸ τῶν Λαίου δυστυχημάτων ἄρξασθαι. πρὸς οὓς ῥητέον ὅτι, εἰ μὲν ἄνωθεν ἤρξατο, μακρὸς ἂν ἦν ὁ λόγος ἄλλως τε οὐκ ἔπρεπε Θηβαίαν γυναῖκα ἀκριβῶς τὰ ἐν Φοινίκῃ ἐπίστασθαι· εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν Λαίου δυστυχημάτων, πολλὰς ἂν τῶν περὶ τὰς Θήβας συμφορῶν παρέλιπεν.<sup>501</sup>

And still some blame Euripides for not giving the genealogy correctly. If he [or Jocasta?] wanted to start telling the story from the beginning, he should have told in detail the departure of Cadmus from Phoenicia in designating the cause, or if he wanted to begin more recently, he should have begun from the misfortunes of Laius. To these things it must be replied that, if he had taken it from the top, the story would have been long, and it would not have been fitting for a Theban woman to have exact knowledge of Theban history, and if he had started from the misfortunes of Laius, he would have passed up many of the sufferings pertaining to Thebes.

The scholiast then proceeds to give several examples of the stories of woe that would be missed (e.g., Semele and Actaeon). Two things are especially worth noting here: the first is that this passage exemplifies the claim shown above concerning the common practices of Euripides, namely that in tracing the origins of disaster he will often go back to the actions of ancestors. The second is that the defense of

<sup>500</sup> *Med.* 1

<sup>501</sup> *Ph.* 4

Euripides in this note is consistent with several aforementioned scholia on poetry: that Jocasta should not become too long-winded is in keeping with the scholiastic demand for concision, and to have her demonstrate such historical expertise would also have violated the principle of propriety in characterization, while passing over juicy tidbits about the horrendous experiences of Cadmus' line would be to miss out on the necessary augmentation of tragic πάθος. Thus, the criticism of these verses is empty: Euripides, it is implied, has found a happy middle ground.<sup>502</sup>

Finally, a note to *Andromache* 32 attacks commentators for claiming that this play is a comedy with tragic characters.

οἱ φαύλως ὑπομνηματισάμενοι ἐγκαλοῦσι τῷ Εὐριπίδῃ φάσκοντες ἐπὶ τραγικοῖς προσώποις κωμωδίαν αὐτὸν διατεθεῖσθαι. γυναικῶν τε γὰρ ὑπονοίας κατ' ἀλλήλων καὶ ζήλους καὶ λοιδορίας καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα εἰς κωμωδίαν συντελεῖ, ἐνταῦθα ἀπαξάπαντα τοῦτο τὸ δράμα περιειληφέναι. ἀγνοοῦσιν ὅσα γὰρ εἰς τραγωδίαν συντελεῖ, ταῦτα περιέχει ἐν τέλει, τὸν θάνατον τοῦ Νεοπτολέμου καὶ θρήνον Πηλέως, ἅπερ ἐστὶ τραγικά.

Inept commentators blame Euripides, saying that he forced a comic drama upon tragic actors. For, they say, this drama deals with women's suspicion against each other and their jealousy and bitterness and all the other things that come together in a comedy. They are ignorant, for all the things that pertain to the end of a tragedy are found in the end here: the death of Neoptolemus and the lamentation of Peleus, which very things are tragic.

Recall that in two passages mentioned above<sup>503</sup> the boundary between tragedy and comedy was disputed, for while it was agreed that sad endings were “tragic” and happy endings were “comic,” tragic drama was not always in accord with that generalization, particularly in the *Alcestis* with its final reconciliation scene. This note from the *Andromache* employs the same assumption about the overall thrust of a tragic drama in order to deflate critics who approach the question of genre on the basis not of the play's *denouement*, but of the comic tussles of the female characters. If these shoddy commentators had

<sup>502</sup> It is interesting to consider as well a scholion at *Phoenissae* 88, which suggests that Jocasta's prologue is a bit redundant and stretched out for the sake of the audience, evidently to give them a sufficient amount of background material: ἡ τοῦ δράματος διάθεσις ἐνταῦθα ἀγωνιστικωτέρα γίνεται. τὰ γὰρ τῆς Ἰοκάστης παρελκόμενά εἰσι καὶ ἔνεκα τοῦ θεάτρον ἐκτέταται. It is almost as if the scholiast perceives an objection that Jocasta has been on stage long enough and that it is time to get on with the show, but as normal Euripides makes sure not to leave his audience out of the loop.

<sup>503</sup> Or. 1691, *Alc. hypoth.* 23ff.

understood that a tragedy is defined by its end, the scholiast implies, they would never have squabbled over details like a little comic hair-pulling along the way.

Before leaving this topic of the defense of Euripides, I wish to bring into focus one more feature of this category of scholia that shows an important connection with Classical and Hellenistic scholarship, as outlined in the first chapter. There I pointed out that one key aspect of the history of literary scholarship was the phenomenon of *ζητήματα* or *ἀπορίαι*, a corpus of frequently-asked questions arising around certain works of literature. It is noteworthy that at least a couple dozen notes in the Euripidean scholia employ language that is at home in this tradition, and here I offer a few passages where questions are raised and answered regarding the topic at hand, namely the defense of Euripides against his detractors. We will see that certain formulae tend to be repeated in these passages, and that commentators seem to have their minds geared toward some recurring *ζητήματα*.

First, I provide a few passages demonstrating the principle. One of the lengthier examples concerns the division of night watches referenced at *Rhesus* 5. The chorus leader calls out to those who are keeping the fourth watch of the night (*οἱ τετράμοιρον νυκτὸς φυλακῆν*), which gets this remark from the scholiast:

*<οἱ τετράμοιρον> ὅτι οἱ ἀρχαῖοι εἰς τρεῖς φυλακὰς νέμουσι τὴν νύκτα. Ὅμηρος [δὲ] ‘ἀλλ’ ὅτε δὴ τρίχα νυκτὸς ἔην, μετὰ δ’ ἄστρα βεβήκει [ξ 483]. Στησίχορος [frg. 55] δὲ καὶ Σιμωνίδης [frg. 219a] πενταφύλακόν φασιν [ὑποτίθεσθαι τὴν νύκτα]. διαπορήσει δέ τις ὅπως ... <οἱ τετράμοιρον νυκτὸς φυλακῆν>. πρὸς ὃ ῥητέον ὅτι οὐκ ἐν τῷ καθόλου φησὶ τετραφύλακον, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ παρόντι φυλακῆν, ὡσανεὶ πρώτην ἢ δευτέραν.*

[This passage is marked]<sup>504</sup> because the ancients divided the night into three watches, as Homer says: “But when it was the third watch of the night and the stars had gone by.” But Stesichorus and Simonides say there were five watches. And someone will be uncertain how it is that Euripides says, “You who have the fourth watch of the night.” To this it must be said that he does not say it has four watches overall, but only refers to the guard at the time, as if he had said “first” or “second.”

<sup>504</sup> The most likely explanation for this note beginning with a *ὅτι* is that there was a critical sign in the margin of the manuscript used by the commentator and that the comment is meant to explain why the mark is there (i.e., what makes the passage special).

The scholion proceeds to explain the situation more fully, with added arguments from Crates that Euripides too has a five-watch night, based on a later assertion at *Rhesus* 538, and the tribe that was responsible for each watch is given. The fact that the passage was marked is telling, since there was a perceived difference in the way Euripides treated the custom of night watchmen vis-à-vis other poets (including Homer), and the introduction of views from other authors and scholars such as Crates suggests that the issue of the night watches was a thorny one, even if it seems incredibly daft to us to suggest that a plain reference to a “fourth watch” could ever be taken to mean that no more watches would occur after that. In any case, the scholiast frames the question in terms of the tradition of ἀπορίαι, providing a solution to the dilemma in case anyone should become stumped (διαπορήσει).

Another dilemma of this kind centers on Medea’s claim that she will kill Creon, his daughter, and Jason at *Medea* 375. Notice how the problem is again phrased as a question to be resolved, in this case an apparent incongruity between Medea’s promise and her actions: πῶς ἐπαγγελαμένη τὸν Ἰάσονα ἀνελεῖν οὐκ ἀνεῖλεν; ἢ τάχα ἐπεὶ ἐλθὼν ὁ ἄγγελος μετὰ θάνατον Γλαύκης καὶ Κρέοντος ἐθορύβησεν αὐτὴν λέγων χρῆναι τάχιστα φεύγειν ἔνθα [1122] καὶ φησι <Μήδεια, φεῦγε>, ὄθεν οὐκ ἔσχε σχολὴν τοῦτο ἐργάσασθαι. εὐθὺς οὖν καὶ ὁ Ἰάσων παραγίνεται πρὸς αὐτήν, “How did she not kill Jason after promising to kill him? Or perhaps it is because the messenger arriving after the death of Glauce and Creon scared her by saying that she had to flee immediately. And there [vs. 1122] the messenger says, “Flee, Medea,” which is why she was not at leisure to do this deed.” At *Orestes* 982 an additional instance of the πῶς formula can be seen: εἰ δ’ ἄρα τινὲς διαποροῦσι πῶς ἐξ ἀλύσεως παρηρητημένος περίεισιν ὁ ἥλιος, γινωσκέτωσαν ὅτι τὰ φυσικὰ τοῖς μυθικοῖς καταμίγνυσιν ὁ Εὐριπίδης, “But if some should be perplexed as to how the sun goes around while hanging on a chain, let them know that Euripides mixes physical science and myth.”<sup>505</sup>

Further, see the scholion to *Hippolytus* 1132 for the mention of the Enetoi: <πῶλων Ἐνετῶν>

Παφλαγονικῶν. Ἐνετοὶ γὰρ ἔθνος Παφλαγονίας. εἰ δέ τις εἴποι, ἐκ ποίας πόλεως ὠνομασμένοι, ἴστω ὅτι πολλοὶ βάρβαροι οὐκ ἐκ πόλεως οὐδὲ ἐκ χώρας, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἔθνους ὀνομάζονται, ὡς Νομάδες, Βλέμιες, “By πῶλων

<sup>505</sup> This poetic mixing is also claimed as a feature of Vergilian poetics by Servius, as I will explore at length in the final chapter.

Ἐνετᾶν he means Paphlagonians. For the Enetoi are a tribe of Paphlagonia. And if someone should ask from what city they have been named, let him know that many barbarians are named not from a city or land, but from their tribe, as the Nomads and Blemyes.” In each of these cases the explanation is given in question-and-answer format, suggesting that some readers had indeed asked such questions in the past.<sup>506</sup>

A few other notes of this type give us a special glimpse into the place of this and similar formulae in the scholarly tradition. At *Orestes* 434, for example, Orestes tells Menelaus that he is being persecuted by Oeax because his father Agamemnon had Palamedes, the brother of Oeax, put to death, even though Orestes himself had nothing to do with the murder. Orestes then states curiously that he is “perishing because of three” (διὰ τριῶν δ’ ἀπόλλυμαι). The scholiast offers some solutions to the question of who these three are:

πρῶτον τῶν πολιτῶν, δεύτερον Οἶακος. διὸ ἐπάγει <τίς ἄλλος>, ἵνα πληρώσῃ τοὺς τρεῖς. τινὲς δὲ <τριῶν> φασὶ τῶν Ἐρινύων. προεῖπε γὰρ [408] <ἔδοξ’ ἰδεῖν τρεῖς νυκτὶ προσφερεῖς κόρας>. τινὲς δὲ φασὶ τῆς συνέσεως, τῆς λύπης καὶ τῆς μανίας. ἐν δὲ τοῖς Καλλιστράτου γέγραπται· ἐπιζητήσκειν ἂν τις πῶς διὰ τριῶν εἴρηκεν, εἰ μὴ διὰ τὸ Ἀγαμέμνονα καὶ Διομήδην καὶ Ὀδυσσεῖα μετασχεῖν τοῦ φόνου Παλαμήδους.

First by the citizens, second by Oeax. For this reason he [Menelaus] adds “Who else?”, so that he [Orestes] will fill out the three. But some say the “three” are the Erinyes. For he said before, “I seem to see three night-visaged maidens.” And some say it is his conscience, his grief, and his madness. But in the [commentaries?] of Callistratus it is written: “Someone might ask how he said that it was through three, unless it was through the fact that Agamemnon, Diomedes, and Odysseus took part in the murder of Palamedes.”

I call attention not only to the breadth of possible solutions offered here, but also to the phrasing of the “one might ask” formula as attested for a known scholar of the second century BC, which helps us to see a bit more clearly (if the quotation is trustworthy) the presence of such formulations in Alexandrian scholarship.<sup>507</sup>

I close this section with one particularly noteworthy example of ζητήματα. At *Medea* 1342 Jason rails against Medea as being a lioness—not a woman—fiercer than Tyrrhenian Scylla (λέαιναν, οὐ

<sup>506</sup> For other basic examples with similar formulae, see the following: *Or.* 32, 796; *Ph.* 24ff., 44, 61, 402, 934f., 1100, 1130; *Tr.* 453.

<sup>507</sup> See also the explicit mention of “voiced questions” at *Medea* 169 (τῶν διαβεβοημένων ἐστὶ ζητημάτων καὶ τοῦτο), a further testimony to the impact of the ζητήματα tradition on the scholia.

γυναῖκα, τῆς Τυρσηνίδος / Σκύλλης ἔχουσαν ἀγριωτέραν φύσιν). The scholiast takes a very interesting turn in his commentary: <τῆς Τυρσηνίδος> τῆς Σικελικῆς· Τυρσηνὸν γὰρ πέλαγος Σικελίας. ἐκ τούτων φανερός ἐστὶν Εὐριπίδης τὴν τοῦ Ὀδυσσεύως πλάνην περὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ Σικελίαν ὑπειληφῶς γεγονέναι, “By ‘Tyrrhenian’ he means ‘Sicilian’; for the Tyrrhenian sea is that of Sicily. From these things it is clear that Euripides supposes that the wandering of Odysseus was around Italy and Sicily.” The mention of Odyssean wandering is perhaps believable given the mention of Scylla, but the way in which this scholar uses a single mention of a mythical beast as a springboard into a claim about Euripides’ view of epic geography is telling. This is the eye of a commentator trained in his “Important Questions” about Homer, including the geographical “truth” behind his poetry and the actual wanderings of his characters.<sup>508</sup> One imagines our commentator having previously dealt with some question such as “Where did Odysseus really wander,” so that when he sees the mention of Scylla as Tyrrhenian, he immediately applies this information to an established scholarly topos, even though this passage of Euripides has nothing to do with the geographical exactitude of Homer. The unpredictable nature of this comment might suggest to us just how much the tradition of “Important Questions” had permeated literary commentaries.<sup>509</sup>

### *Exegetical Methodology*

Having concluded a systematic outline of the topics and questions posed by ancient scholars, I now turn to an evaluation of their methodology.<sup>510</sup> As we have seen, Euripidean commentators made various kinds of appeals to knowledge of all sorts to explain the original text. They also invoked various

<sup>508</sup> Apollodorus was particularly important for Homeric geography, for whom see Pfeiffer (1968, 258ff.).

<sup>509</sup> For a lengthy debate over Sicily and some further geographical problems, see the scholia to *Phoenissae* 208.

<sup>510</sup> By using “methodology” in the singular I do not mean to imply that the scholia represent a unity—Servius and perhaps Donatus are the only commentators in this study who may be treated in this way—lest I fall into the trap described by Daintree (1990, 72). What I do mean is that the scholia to Euripides, and indeed to all the authors I have examined, demonstrate a common set of procedures that are widely evident. The scholia are not a literary unity, but they do have a roughly unified approach to the texts, a crucial factor when considering their place in the tradition of ancient (and modern) scholarship.

principles of exegesis that are used consistently throughout as a way of explaining things that would otherwise seem out of place, incorrect, or poorly constructed. These principles are founded upon basic assumptions about language, poetry, chronology, and truth itself, and understanding them will help us comprehend more the mind of the ancient Euripidean scholar.<sup>511</sup>

### *Analogy*

One such principle of exegesis is analogy, the use of parallel examples (external or internal to the original text) to explain something in that text or to teach a broader lesson. I have already shown how this method is central to the treatment of syntactical, semantic, and morphological principles. Analogical reasoning also surfaces when scholiasts bring in external mythological *exempla* to illustrate a Euripidean character, or even when Euripides is said to allude to natural phenomena in his poetry, part of his aforementioned tendency to mix truth and fiction. Specifically, though, I want to focus here on the aspect of analogical reasoning that emerges through the ubiquitous scholiastic practice of comparing Euripides with—or rather, to judge him against and interpret him by—other authors. The principle is not just one of literary analysis, but by far it is the appeal to poetry that most clearly defines this exegetical method.<sup>512</sup>

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<sup>511</sup> I am not suggesting that the scholia provide a comprehensive sweep of ancient scholarship that reveals “what the ancients thought about Euripides,” nor do I presume that there is a single methodology adopted by all the writers who contributed directly or indirectly to our extant scholia. What I present here is a critical analysis of the methods employed in the extant scholia, and I speak of a “scholiastic methodology” only in terms of a general synthesis. This approach is the same as that taken by modern editors of scholiastic texts in their synthesis of the manuscripts into a single text, even though it represents the work of multiple authors. As with any approach, there are advantages and drawbacks to this method, and I do not wish to suggest that explicating a “universal” methodology is the only way to approach ancient scholastic thought, but rather that it is a concession to our ignorance concerning how to differentiate various strands of scholarship. As methods develop to help us do this, other, more differentiated approaches will become increasingly fruitful.

<sup>512</sup> A few references to prose literature also appear, though these are relatively rare. Mostly such references are to Demosthenes (e.g., *Ph.* 439, 1408, in both of which he is called simply ὁ ῥήτωρ; cf. *Or.* 256) or Thucydides (e.g., *Ph.* 688, *Hipp.* 269, *Andr.* 1120, *Tr.* 9). For a separate attestation of an analogical approach to grammatical studies, see the opening statement of the τέχνη γραμματικῆ of Dionysius Thrax, where the grammatical art is defined not as a list of prescriptionist rules, but rather the empirical observation of common usage in poets and historians: γραμματικῆ ἐστὶν ἐμπειρία τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς τε καὶ συγγραφεῦσιν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λεγομένων.

Whether it truly originated with him or not, Aristarchus' supposed dictum of interpreting Homer by Homer ("Ὅμηρον ἐξ Ὁμήρου σαφηνίζειν) was a crucial one in ancient approaches to literary studies. It turns out that Homer is not the only one judged by Homer, however, for the Euripidean scholia contain dozens upon dozens of references to Homeric epic, including citations of parallel thoughts, similar grammatical usage, differences in mythology, and other bases for comparison. The motivation for these citations and quotations ranges widely, but I outline below a few basic reasons for bringing Homer to bear on Euripides.

Grammatical and lexicographical comparisons are not abundant, but are nonetheless present from time to time. Such notes include a differentiation between terms for hitting people with lightning:

<οὐτάσας πυρί> ἀντὶ τοῦ βαλὼν τῷ κεραυνῷ. οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι οὐκ ἴσασι τὴν διαφορὰν τοῦ οὐτάσαι καὶ βαλεῖν.

"Ὅμηρος δὲ οὐτάσαι μὲν τὸ ἐκ χειρὸς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ σύνεγγυς τρῶσαι, βαλεῖν δὲ τὸ πόρρωθεν, "He uses οὐτάσας instead of βαλὼν. And modern people do not know the difference between the terms, but Homer says that οὐτάσαι is wounding someone hand-to-hand and nearby, whereas he uses βαλεῖν for wounding from afar."<sup>513</sup> So too is Homer invoked for the problem of dowry language. Euripides' Hermione states that Menelaus has given her along with gifts in marriage,<sup>514</sup> but the scholiast points out that Homer does not use the term that way: ἔδνα νῦν ἐκάλεσε τὴν προῖκα καὶ τὰ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς κειμήλια. Ὅμηρος οὐχ οὕτως,

ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ τῶν παρὰ τοῦ νυμφίου προσφερομένων τάσσει τὴν λέξιν [β 53]: Ἰκαρίου ὃς καὶ τὸς ἐεδνώσαιτο θύγατρα', ἀντὶ τοῦ· ἔδνα λαβὼν ἐκδοίη, "Euripides here called the dowry and the goods from the father ἔδνα. Homer does not write thus, but rather he uses the term for the things offered by the groom: 'Who would provide the dowry for marrying the daughter of Icarus.'" In both cases Homer is brought in to highlight a distinction between usages.<sup>515</sup>

At other times a particular Euripidean phrase strikes the scholiast's ear as Homeric and is called out as such, often with no further statement beyond the simple fact of the recognized correspondence.

<sup>513</sup> *Hipp.* 684

<sup>514</sup> Μενέλαος ἡμῶν ταῦτα δωρεῖται πατὴρ πολλοῖς σὺν ἔδνοις (*Andr.* 153).

<sup>515</sup> Cf. *Or.* 103, 1238; the latter is especially interesting in that the title of "the poet" belongs to Homer, whereas most of the time it refers to Euripides. Only context can indicate which the scholiast means.



The opening of the *Orestes* (οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν δεινὸν ᾧδ' εἰπεῖν ἔπος / οὐδὲ πάθος οὐδὲ ξυμφορὰ θεήλατος, / ἧς οὐκ ἂν ἄραιτ' ἄχθος ἀνθρώπου φύσις) is said to be reminiscent of Homer's *τλητὸν γὰρ Μοῖραι θυμὸν θέσαν ἀνθρώποισι*. Also Homeric is the Euripidean mention of torrents of tears at *Orestes* 335: <ᾧ δάκρυα δάκρυσι> *συνάγει καὶ συμμίσγει ἐπάλληλα δάκρυα*. "Ὁμηρος [Δ 453]: 'συμβάλλετον ὄμβριμον ὕδωρ. The same is true for certain images, characterizations, or scenes. In particular let us note that the claim attributed to Capaneus that he will enslave the captive women of Thebes reminds the scholiast of Hector's words to Andromache in *Iliad* 6, namely that she will be forced to draw water as a slave of some Greek: τὸν Ὀμηρικὸν δὲ Ἔκτορα ἐμιμήσατο φάσκοντα πρὸς Ἀνδρομάχην [Z 457]: 'καὶ κεν ὕδωρ φορέοις Μεσσηίδος ἢ Ὑπερείης.<sup>516</sup> To return to the previously mentioned passage of Antigone and the pedagogue observing the Argive forces, the scholiast finds here an allusion to the *τειχοσκοπία* of Helen in *Iliad* 3: ἡ δὲ ἔξοδος τοῦ παρθένου εἰκὼν ἐστὶ τῆς Ὀμηρικῆς *τειχοσκοπίας* τῆς Ἑλένης ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου· ἐκεῖ γὰρ γυνὴ τῷ γέροντι δείκνυσιν, "And the coming out of the maiden is the likeness of the Homeric *τειχοσκοπία* of Helen in reverse; for there the woman points out [the warriors] to the old man."<sup>517</sup>

Euripides is also said to agree with Homer in certain proverbial expressions or general truths. According to one scholion, both agree that virtue is something that can be learned.<sup>518</sup> In addition, the Euripidean sentiment that things are in the control of the gods (ἀλλ' ἐς θεοὺς χρὴ ταῦτ' ἀναρτήσαντ' ἔχειν) is like that of Homer (ἀλλ' ἧτοι μὲν ταῦτα θεῶν ἐν γούνασι κέϊται).<sup>519</sup> The scholiast also finds Creon's claim that nothing is better than defending one's fatherland (ἐς γὰρ τί μᾶλλον δεῖ προθυμίαν ἔχειν;) to be analogous to Hector's assertion that only one bird sign is best—the defense of one's own: εἶς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος.<sup>520</sup> So too when the messenger reports that the assault on Neoptolemus at Delphi was perpetrated

<sup>516</sup> *Ph.* 185; this is perhaps somewhat of a stretch as far as verbal correspondences go, especially given how frequently the idea of women captured in war appears in Greek literature—why *Iliad* 6 specifically?—but in any case this scholion reminds us that ancient scholars could go pretty far to make a literary connection—which is certainly no different than in our modern age.

<sup>517</sup> *Ph.* 88; cf. *Andr.* 1039; *Ph.* 576, 889, 1178, 1226; *Or.* 585; *Tr.* 432. As for characterization, note two other places in which Menelaus is said to be depicted in the same way by both poets (*Ph.* 170, *Or.* 356).

<sup>518</sup> *Or.* 251

<sup>519</sup> *Ph.* 705

<sup>520</sup> *Ph.* 902; this line of Homer is also quoted at *Phoenissae* 781 just before.

by all who were around,<sup>521</sup> Homer's phrase to describe the assault on Hector's corpse by the Greeks at *Iliad* 22.371 is mentioned (οὐδ' ἄρα οἶ τις ἀνουτητί γε παρέστη).<sup>522</sup>

In many places, including some mentioned above, Homeric comparanda seem to be used as a defense for Euripides, for if Homer can get away with something, then Euripides certainly can too, even if the defense of Euripides is often only implicit in these scholia. For instance, two scholia early in the *Medea* state that Euripides has used a particular poetic figure that Homer had used as well.<sup>523</sup> While the scholiast does not say outright that Euripides is justified on the grounds that Homer did something similar, the extra citation does appear to serve this purpose. Consider also the following examples, where possible improprieties are excused by an appeal to the greatest of poets: Euripides regards Ocean as a river just like Homer does;<sup>524</sup> Euripides personifies Piety just like Homer personifies Terror and Fear;<sup>525</sup> according to Euripides and Homer, Thessaly is divided into the same four parts.<sup>526</sup> In other places the use of Homer for the defense of Euripides is more explicit, perhaps most notably at *Orestes* 12, where Eris is said to weave war: οὐ παράλογον δὲ καὶ ἄλλον θεὸν ἐπικλώθειν ἢ τὰς Μοίρας. Ὅμηρος γοῦν φησι [a 17]: τῶ οἱ ἐπεκλώσαντο θεοὶ οἰκόνδε νέεσθαι, 'And it is not illogical to say that some other god than the Fates does the weaving. Even Homer says, 'The gods wove it out for him to come home.''' Here Euripides has been subjected to criticism, and the citation of Homer is added not only as an interesting side note, but as ammunition against Euripides' detractors. The basis for the argument is a clear one: Homer has poetic authority, and other poets may safely follow his lead.<sup>527</sup>

But if Homer is a means of justification, he is also available for establishing a basis of critique.

We have already glimpsed this phenomenon in the scholiast's objection to the Euripidean *Medea* in

<sup>521</sup> τίς οὐ σίδηρον προσφέρει, τίς οὐ πέτρον, βάλλων ἀράσσω; (*Andr.* 1153).

<sup>522</sup> Cf. *Or.* 517, 1552; *Andr.* 471

<sup>523</sup> *Med.* 1, 40

<sup>524</sup> καὶ οὗτος δὲ ποταμὸν ὑπέιληφε τὸν Ὀκεανὸν ὡς Ὅμηρος (*Or.* 1378).

<sup>525</sup> τῇ δ' Εὐλαβείᾳ > σωματοποιεῖ τὴν Εὐλάβειαν. Ὅμηρος [Λ 37]: 'Δεῖμός τε Φόβος τε' (*Ph.* 782).

<sup>526</sup> *Alc.* 1154; cf. *Med.* 1053, *Andr.* 1011

<sup>527</sup> Compare a similar move at *Phoenissae* 4, this time with a citation from Hesiod: "They say Euripides is irreverent in calling the ray of the Sun 'wretched.' But how can he be irreverent, when Hesiod also makes clear that some days are evil?" (<ὡς δυστυχή Θήβαισι>: ἀσεβεῖ, φασὶ, τὴν ἀκτίνα τοῦ Ἥλιου δυστυχή καλῶν. πῶς δὲ ἀσεβεῖ, ὅποτε καὶ Ἡσίοδος [opp. 769ff.] ἀποφαίνειν τινὰς τῶν ἡμερῶν πονηράς).

tears,<sup>528</sup> but in returning let me now emphasize the contrast with Homer: ἄμεινον δὲ Ὀμηρος [τ 211]· ὀφθαλμοὶ δ' ὡσεὶ κέρα ἔστασαν,' "Homer is better, [for he says] 'And his eyes stood still like horn.'" Of course, Homer is describing a disguised Odysseus trying not to give away his identity to his wife, not Medea hiding her plans from her children, so the suggestion that Homer is better must be taken somewhat loosely, but the overall principle is clear: Homer's characterization of Odysseus as able to restrain tears is suitable to Odysseus' nature as a trickster, but Euripides falls short of that standard in his inconsistent portrayal of Medea, who is not the weeping type. We have also already examined the scholion to *Troades* 14, where Euripides is criticized for a tasteless pun on the "wooden" horse filled with "spears" (<δούρειος ἵππος> ψυχρῶς ἠτυμολόγησε τὸν ἵππον ἀπὸ τῶν δοράτων). Again, the end of the note is telling: ἄμεινον γὰρ παρὰ τὰ δοῦρα πεποιῆσθαι ἤγουν τὰ ξύλα. Ὀμηρος [θ 512] 'δουράτεον', ὃ ἐστὶ ξύλινον. The judgment that the pun is in poor taste stands on its own, but the scholiast drives his point home by giving the Homeric counterpart, which is judged to be better than Euripides'. Further, according to a scholiast, Euripides is unpersuasive in his invention that Hecuba knew Odysseus' identity when he was spying inside of Troy during the war, since she—unlike Helen!—would not have stood by silently while such a thing happened: ἀπίθανον τὸ πλάσμα καὶ οὐχ Ὀμηρικόν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐσίγησεν Ἐκάβη πολέμιον θεασαμένη κατοπτεύοντα τὰ κατὰ τοὺς Τρῶας πράγματα. ἢ δὲ Ἑλένη εἰκότως ἄτην γὰρ μετέστενεν Ἀφροδίτης.<sup>529</sup> Here Euripides' departure from Homer is regarded as a poor choice that does not fulfill the scholiast's demand for logical coherence in the dramatic narrative. Compare also the similar language at *Rhesus* 210 in regard to Dolon's plan to wear a wolf skin so that he will actually appear as an animal going on all fours: <βάσιν τε χερσί> ἀπίθανον τετραποδίξειν αὐτὸν ὡς τοὺς λύκους· οὐδὲ γὰρ Ὀμηρος [Κ 334] διὰ τοῦτο τὴν λυκῆν αὐτῷ περιτίθουσιν, "It is unpersuasive that he would go on all fours like wolves do; for Homer does not give him the wolf skin for this purpose." It is impossible to say whether this image would be thought so silly if there were no corresponding scene in Homer against which it could be compared, but regardless Euripides is again weighed in the Homeric scales and found wanting.

<sup>528</sup> *Med.* 922

<sup>529</sup> *Hec.* 241

Similar reasons lie behind citations and quotations of Hesiod, though they are far less in number than those of Homer. For instance, a scholion to *Andromache* 476 quotes a Hesiodic line (“Poor vies with poor, singer with singer”) as a corresponding sentiment, and again at *Medea* 296, where Euripides is said to agree with Hesiod in stating that virtue requires the greatest effort and zeal, and still again at *Hecuba* 1192, where Euripides states in accordance with Hesiod that Justice always comes around in the end. There is also evidence of Hesiod being used to defend Euripides—recall the scholion regarding the mention of the “ill-omened rays of the sun”—as well as to criticize him. Euripides, after all, should have followed Hesiod in saying that Night was born from Chaos, among other things.<sup>530</sup>

Numerous references to other poets also appear (e.g., Alcman, Apollonius, Aesop), especially other dramatists (Sophocles, Aeschylus, Aristophanes, Menander), and often for the same reasons as citations of Homer, namely a reinforcement of something Euripides has done or as proof that he has gone his own way, for better or worse. Most of all, however, the scholiasts record a tradition of scholarship like unto that supposedly coined by Aristarchus for Homer, namely the use of Euripides to interpret Euripides. The breadth of references and purposes for which those references are used demonstrate that the scholiasts are considering Euripides broadly and attempt to use his other dramas to give comparanda for notable statements or dramatic techniques. Among the dozens of Euripidean citations and quotations, we find a number of internal cross-references to verses in the same play, as when Polyneices says “for the second time” at *Phoenissae* 601 that he is claiming a share of the kingship, to which a quotation of verse 484 is attached to show the first time he states this. Further, when the messenger tells Jocasta that Eteocles positioned seven generals at the seven gates but left himself out of this count so that he could roam about freely bringing help wherever it was needed, the scholiast states that the messenger’s statement is preparation for a later passage, when he will say that Eteocles saw that one gate was well-defended and so passed on to another: *διὰ τοῦτο ἐπτά ἔταξε στρατηγούς πρὸς ταῖς ἐπτά πύλαις ἑαυτὸν οὐ συγκατατάξας ὅπως αὐτὸς περιέρχοιτο τὰς πύλας τῷ νοσοῦντι μέρει συμμαχῶν· ἐπάγει γὰρ [1163] <ἐπειδὴ*

<sup>530</sup> (<Ἐρεβόθεν ἴθι> ἔδει ἐκ Χάους εἰπεῖν, ὡς Ἡσίοδος [Theog. 123]: ‘ἐκ Χάεος Ἐρεβός τε μέλαινά τε Νύξ ἐγένοντο,’ (Or. 176). It is also pointed out that Euripides does not distinguish between ἐπιτολή and ἀνατολή like Hesiod and Aratus do (*Ph.* 1116).

τάσδ' εἰσεῖδεν εὐτυχεῖς πύλας, ἄλλας ἐπήει παῖς σός>.<sup>531</sup> Some scholia address other Euripidean plays, showing a broad interest and knowledge in Euripidean drama. Topics for which the scholiasts include these references include the behavior of the insane,<sup>532</sup> a style of lamentation,<sup>533</sup> and identical verses that appear in multiple locations.<sup>534</sup> It is worth noting also that when the scholia cross-reference Euripidean verses for which we have scholia, we do not always find a corresponding cross-reference at the other location. Much more work needs to be done in diligently tracking down these cross-references and coming up with conclusions as to the extent to which such correspondences are recognized at both ends of the link. Such an investigation is of course also very important for understanding the relationship between commentaries to different authors, and this constitutes a promising area of research in scholiastic studies.

### *Intertextuality*

If there is one area in which the scholia are lacking in terms of modern standards for a literary commentary, it is in the realm of intertextuality.<sup>535</sup> It may surprise one, however to find that there is some understanding of intertextuality in the scholia, even if it is an idiosyncratic one. The very fact that scholiasts think Euripides ought to be compared to other authors from different genres of poetry and even prose is in itself a hint at their inclination to view Euripidean drama in a larger literary context, but a few notes help us understand just how far they are willing to push a connection.

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<sup>531</sup> *Ph.* 1095; cf. *Hec.* 687, *Or.* 321, *Ph.* 202, *Alc.* 693, *Andr.* 211. The present passage smacks somewhat of *οἰκονομία*, as described above. There is no explicit praise for Euripides here, but he is nonetheless said to be consistent in this small respect.

<sup>532</sup> *Or.* 73, 268

<sup>533</sup> *Or.* 982

<sup>534</sup> *Med.* 54

<sup>535</sup> See Russell (1981, 113), who holds a relatively low opinion of ancient recognition of intertextuality, with the exception of 'Longinus.'

We have already seen at *Phoenissae* 88 that Euripides is said to have created a *τειχοσκοπία* scene that is akin to—though a reversal of—the corresponding Homeric scene with Helen in *Iliad* 3. A scholion a bit later makes an even stronger assertion about the Euripidean text when the pedagogue tells Antigone that Polyneices is about to approach the city under truce to parlay with Eteocles: <ἴξει δόμους τούσδ’> τὸν Ὀμηρικὸν Μενέλαον μιμείται ὁ Εὐριπίδης ὑπόσπονδον Πολυνεΐκην ἄγων εἰς τὰς Θήβας, ὡς ἐκεῖνος εἰς τὴν Ἴλιον εἰσῆλθε καταθησόμενος τὸν πόλεμον, “Euripides imitates the Homeric Menelaus in leading Polyneices into Thebes under truce, since Menelaus came into Ilion to create war.”<sup>536</sup> This goes beyond a simple comparison between characters in different stories; it is an explicit statement that Euripides is pointing to Homer in his own characterization, and the scholiast thinks that his readers ought to see this connection. At times the intertextual reading of the scholia can become highly specific, as we saw above in the claim that Euripides does not name the seven generals attacking Thebes because Aeschylus had already done so, such that restating them would apparently be onerous—a sign that the scholiast envisions an original production in which inter-“textual” knowledge is assumed, namely that Euripides’ audience would have already watched Aeschylus’ *Seven against Thebes* and would not need to hear the names again. Compare the treatment of Hecuba at *Troades* 1030, where Hecuba joins the chorus in begging Menelaus to seek vengeance against Helen with the sword. The scholiast’s critique is intriguing: ἐυήθης ἢ Ἐκάβη. ἀπὸ γὰρ τῆς ἐκβολῆς τοῦ ξίφους ἐχρῆν ἐπιγνώσει τὴν διάθεσιν τοῦ ἀνδρός, ὡς ἐν τῇ Ἀνδρομάχῃ [628]: οὐκ ἔκτανες γυναῖκα [σὴν] χειρίαν λαβών,’ “Hecuba is naïve, for she should have known from his throwing away of the sword what the disposition of her husband was, as in the *Andromache* [vs. 628], ‘You did not kill your wife after getting her in your hands.’” The scholiast refers to one version of the story in which Menelaus prepares to kill his adulterous wife, but drops the sword at the critical moment because he was overwhelmed by her beauty, though the story is not immediately evoked by the text of the *Troades*. It is almost as if Hecuba were expected to have read up on her other Euripidean plays, and if she had, she would not have such silly expectations.

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<sup>536</sup> Ph. 170

Another significant area in which intertextual concerns play out is with the quotation of passages from Old Comedy that satirize various Euripidean lines or their performance. Perhaps the most famous is the assault of the unfortunate actor Hegelochus, who upon delivering *Orestes* 279 (ἐκ κυμάτων γὰρ αὐθις αὖ γαλήν' ὀρω) accidentally mispronounced the penultimate word, giving the line quite a different meaning: *κεκωμώδηται ὁ στίχος διὰ Ἡγέλοχον τὸν ὑποκριτὴν· οὐ γὰρ φθάσαντα διελεῖν τὴν συναλοιφήν ἐπιλείψαντος τοῦ πνεύματος τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις τὴν γαλήν δόξαι λέγειν τὸ ζῶον, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τὰ γαληνά. πολλοὶ μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ διέπαιξαν τῶν κωμικῶν*, “The line is parodied on account of Hegelochus the actor. For in not anticipating the separation of the elision, with his breath overflowing [out of breath?], he seemed to the listeners to say *γαλήν* the animal instead of *γαληνά* [the calm].” Others include the statement of Electra to Orestes that in all things change is pleasant—where of course the implication is “change in all evils”—to which the scholiast notes the comic response: <μεταβολὴ πάντων γλυκὺ> *κεκωμώδηται δὲ ὁ στίχος. τὸ γὰρ ἐξ ὑγείας εἰς νόσον μεταβάλλειν οὐκ ἔστιν ἡδύ*, “And the line is parodied, for the change from health into sickness is not pleasant,”<sup>537</sup> followed by two anonymous quotations poking fun at this slip. Two other passages are mocked for phonetic reasons. *Orestes* 742 (οὐκ ἐκείνος ἀλλ' ἐκείνη κείνον ἐνθάδ' ἤγαγεν) is ridiculed for its monotony: *κωμωδεῖται δὲ ὁ στίχος διὰ τὴν ταυτότητα. Medea* 476 (ἔσωσά σ', ὡς ἴσασιν Ἑλλήνων ὄσοι) is similarly slandered for its excessive sigmatism by the comic writers Plato and Eubulus: *πλεονάζει ὁ στίχος τῷ <σ>. ὅθεν καὶ Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς Ἑορταῖς φησιν [frg. 30]· ἔσωσας ἐκ τῶν σίγμα τῶν Εὐριπίδου'. καὶ Εὐβουλος ἐν Διονυσίῳ [frg. 26]· Ἑὐριπίδου δ' “ἔσωσά σ', ὡς ἴσασι<ν Ἑλλήνων ὄ>σοι” καὶ “παρθένε εἰς<ώσαιμι σ'> ἔξεις μοι χάριν” καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖσιν ἐγγελῶσι πῆμασι τὰ σίγμα συλλέξαντες, ὡς αὐτοὶ σοφοί.’*

These scholia demonstrate awareness, if only on a superficial level, that Euripides not only looked specifically to other works of literature for his own productions, but also was in turn used by other literary men as fodder for comedies. Such examples remind us that, if the scholiasts are not as attuned to literary allusion as we would like, there is nonetheless some emphasis in the ancient commentaries on the fact that tragic drama (and comedy, for that matter) could not be fully understood outside the context of literature

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<sup>537</sup> *Or.* 234

on the whole, and that ancient authors consciously developed these intertextual relationships with other authors. Thus we may say that while an understanding of intertextuality is relatively undeveloped in the scholia, it nonetheless constitutes an available method for the ancient interpretation of Euripidean texts, and the examples that do exist often demonstrate an incredibly close reading of the text.

### *General Truths*

Scholiasts also typically interpret Euripidean statements by appealing to general principles or truths about reality; that is, Euripides says what he says because that is how things are, an exegetical technique that recalls the previous discussion concerning the demand for realism as a primary aspect of literary criticism in the scholia. What I wish to say here is not simply that the scholia are concerned with “universal” concepts and truths—I have established this already through my discussion of, among other things, an emphasis on proverbial statements. What I will demonstrate here is that the scholia introduce general truths *as an argument* for understanding and validating specific events or statements in Euripides, with the implication that, since Euripides aims at realism, his poetry can be interpreted by appealing to reality.

In many of these examples the scholion seems to field an unstated question, “Why would the character do that?” The scholiast replies to this anticipated dilemma with an appeal to a general truth, which is usually stated plainly with no support on the assumption that the premise will be self-evident. Take for example the fact that, when Electra tells Orestes amidst his troubles she has more news to share, Orestes assumes it is going to be bad. The scholiast explains Orestes’ thought process: *οἱ ἐν περιστάσει ὄντες ἀεὶ τὸ ἐπάγγελμα τοῦ μέλλοντος λέγεσθαι δεδοίκασιν*, “Those in a crisis always fear the announcement that news will be given.”<sup>538</sup> Similarly, Didymus says that when Oedipus asks Antigone to go amongst her friends at the end of the *Phoenissae*, the reason is so that they could supply her with

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<sup>538</sup> *Or.* 239



goods, since those going into exile take nothing with them for the road.<sup>539</sup> Likewise, when Medea calls Jason “unmanly,” the scholiast pardons this clearly unfactual statement with an appeal to the way people speak in certain situations: *ἤτοι ὡς θυμουμένη ἄνδρον αὐτὸν ἀποκαλεῖ· τῶν γὰρ λοιδορουμένων οἰκείον καὶ τὰ μὴ προσόντα πολλάκις προφέρειν*, “She calls him unmanly because she is angry; for it is characteristic of those slandering someone often to add on even those things that are technically not accurate.”<sup>540</sup> In other cases a scholion might contain such an appeal in order to explain some implicit stage direction found in the original text. When Orestes asks Menelaus why he has “circled his foot” in the middle of their conversation at *Orestes* 632, the commentator states that this action is what people do when they are in a quandary: *ὡς τῷ ποδὶ τὸ ἔδαφος περιγράφοντος αὐτοῦ καὶ διστακτικῶς ἀναλογιζομένου εἰ δέοι βοηθεῖν, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ ἀμηχανοῦντες ἐν πράγματι*. Likewise, Orestes’ announcement that he has brought into light the sword he used to kill his mother brings on the following comment: *εἰώθασι γὰρ οἱ ἀνελόντες τινὰ δικαίως, ὡς οἴονται, τῷ ἡλίῳ τὸ ξίφος δεικνύναι σύμβολον τοῦ δικαίως πεφονευκέναι*, “For those who have killed someone justly, as they think, are accustomed to show to the sun the sword as a symbol of their having killed the person justly.”<sup>541</sup>

It is in this kind of note that we also find a bit of a more personal touch than we are accustomed to see in the scholia. Note the unique use of the first-person verb at *Orestes* 213, where Orestes addresses Lethe as “Revered One” (*ὦ πότνια Λήθη τῶν κακῶν*): *πότνιαν εἶπεν αὐτήν, ἐπεὶ πάντας τιμῶμεν τοὺς παραμυθουμένους*, “He called her *πότνιαν* because we honor all those who comfort us.” So too when Orestes calls himself the murderer of his “wretched mother,”<sup>542</sup> this supposed change of heart is explained according to a general principle: *ἤτοι ὅτι μετανοεῖ ἀνελὼν αὐτήν, ταλαίπωρόν φησιν· οὐ γὰρ πρὸ πράξεως καὶ μετὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν οἱ αὐτοὶ τυγχάνομεν*, “He says that she is wretched because he repents of having

<sup>539</sup> Δίδυμός φησι συμβουλεύειν αὐτῇ τοῦτο ποιῆσαι, ἵνα ἐρανίσωσιν αὐτήν. οὐδὲν γὰρ λαμβάνουσιν ἐξιόντες ἐφόδιον (*Ph.* 1747).

<sup>540</sup> *Med.* 466; recall the similar argument made in regard to Oedipus’ cursing of Mount Cithaeron—in stressful situations, people do irregular things.

<sup>541</sup> *Or.* 819

<sup>542</sup> ὄδ’ εἰμί, μητρὸς τῆς ταλαιπώρου φονεύς (*Or.* 392).

killed her; for we are not the same before the deed and after the deed.” In these passages therefore Euripides’ claims are interpreted (and implicitly defended) in light of “the way things are.”

### *Chronology*

It would be incorrect, however, to assume that the scholiasts blithely carry on about universal truth with no regard for the ways in which customs, behaviors, and language vary over time. In fact, many notes explicate the original text precisely on the grounds that things change with time, most often with such terms as ἀρχαῖοι (people long ago/ the ancients) and νεώτεροι (contemporaries and nearer-contemporaries). Incidentally we have come across such assertions before,<sup>543</sup> but let me now return to this phenomenon with a fresh focus on how such statements illuminate the overall exegetical methodology in the scholia.

Several of these examples are lexical in nature. For instance, the labeling of Hades as “underground” at *Phoenissae* 810 is explained by the fact that the men of old called all frightful things “chthonic” (πάντα γὰρ τὰ δεινὰ χθόνια ἔλεγον οἱ ἀρχαῖοι). Didymus also makes an etymological argument for the phrase ἀρμάτειον μέλος based on the customs of old: τὸ ἀρμάτειον μέλος ὃ Δίδυμός φησιν ὠνομάσθαι, ὅτι αἱ ἀρχαῖαι παρθένου εἰς τοὺς θαλάμους διὰ τῶν ἀρμάτων ἤγοντο· ὅθεν ἔτι καὶ νῦν πάροχοι λέγονται ἀπὸ τοῦ [τοῖς ὄχεσι] παροχεῖσθαι . . . ὑμέναιον ἄδειν, “Didymus says it is called a ἀρμάτειον μέλος because in olden days maidens were brought to their bedchambers via chariots, on the basis of which even now the ones singing the marriage song are still called πάροχοι on account of their riding alongside in chariots.”<sup>544</sup> In both cases the scholion gives not only the meaning of the original text, but also provides some indication for why the original text might be confusing, namely that the change of language over

<sup>543</sup> E.g., regarding the construction of doors (*Ph.* 114), the number of watches in the night (*Rh.* 5), and the history of the war trumpet (*Ph.* 1377).

<sup>544</sup> *Or.* 1384

time necessitates a knowledgeable guide for the “modern” reader who is unaware of such linguistic developments.

Other examples refer to a change in various customs as a solution to problematic passages. One such issue is the problem of victors being crowned with leaves, which seems to be an anachronism to the scholiast,<sup>545</sup> but which can be explained nonetheless by a detailed and lengthy note about the history of prizes given to victors, and at what times that prize happened to be heaps of leaves. One also hears a tacit objection at *Hippolytus* 1157, where a servant calls Theseus by his name. The scholiast attributes this apparent irreverence to the times: <Θησεῦ, μερίμνης ἄξιον φέρω> οἱ ἀρχαῖοι καὶ ἐξ ὀνόματος τοὺς δεσπότης ἐκάλουν. The same is true for a Euripidean reference to singing to the aulos<sup>546</sup> and the description of plains as “bordered by grass.”<sup>547</sup>

Two further examples demonstrate how arguments of chronology can be employed in disputed passages where no solution is clear. When Medea states that Jason’s ability to look directly at his own family while treating them unjustly is not courage (*θράσος*) but cowardice (*ἀναίδεια*), a scholiast discusses a contention over the text:

τινὲς δὲ ἐπιλαμβάνονται Εὐριπίδου, ὡς κακῶς εἰρηκότος· τὸ γὰρ θράσος ἔδει μᾶλλον εἰπεῖν θάρσος. διαφέρει γὰρ ὡς ἀρετὴ κακίας· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ κακοῦ καὶ ῥιψοκινδύνου τάσσεται, τὸ δὲ ἐπὶ ἀγαθοῦ. ὅθεν οἱ παλαιοὶ αὐτὸ διώρισαν οὕτως, ὅτι θάρσος μὲν τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς παράστημα μετὰ λογισμοῦ, θράσος δὲ ἢ ἀλόγιστος ὀρμῆ.<sup>548</sup>

And some criticize Euripides for speaking badly. For instead of *θράσος* he should have said *θάροςος*. For there is a difference between the terms, just as between virtue and vice. For the one is attributed to a bad and reckless man, and the other to a good man. From this the ancients divided the term thus, that *θάροςος* was the firmness of soul with reason, but *θράσος* was an irrational impulse.

The close distinction between the two terms is interesting in itself, but note too the way in which chronological distinctions are used to outline the dilemma. For this particular passage, unlike those given

<sup>545</sup> ταῦτα οὖν παρὰ τοὺς χρόνους Εὐριπίδης (*Hec.* 573).

<sup>546</sup> οἱ γὰρ ἀρχαῖοι καὶ πρὸς αὐλὸν ᾗδον (*Alc.* 346).

<sup>547</sup> (<σύγχορτα ναίω πεδί> τὰ ὄμορα ὅτι χόρτω διέγραφον τὰς πόλεις οἱ ἀρχαῖοι· Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ ἢ ὄσπριους ἢ ἀλεύρους (*Andr.* 17).

<sup>548</sup> *Med.* 469

above, knowledge of chronological variation in language is used not to defend Euripides' choice of word, but to confirm the objections of his critics, that Euripides has not paid attention to a lexical distinction that he ought to have minded. Another vexed statement also necessitates a chronological argument at *Andromache* 616, where Peleus accuses Menelaus of never receiving a wound in battle, a sign of his cowardice. A scholion shows that there is a dispute over this passage, and in fact the assertion is said to be *παρὰ τὴν ἱστορίαν*, because Menelaus was indeed wounded by Pandarus. An escape for Euripides is found, however, since one may argue that arrow wounds were not considered actual wounds by the men of old, so Peleus didn't recall that particular one: *πρῶτος γὰρ ὑπὸ Πανδάρου τέτρωται. εἰ μὴ ἄρα ὅτι ἠϋτέλιζον τὰ τοξεύματα οἱ παλαιοί [διὸ οὐ λαμπρά γε ταῦτα ἐχόντων], οὐδὲ ἐμνήσθη*. There is room, at least, to say that Euripides is treating his characters realistically according to their own ways of thinking and not simply forgetting a mythical episode in which Menelaus took one for the team.

### *Modes of Speaking*

The following section attempts to delineate what we might call a scholiastic theory of dramatic speech. What I mean by this is a set of assumptions about the ways characters and even Euripides himself talk in different situations, specifically ways of communicating that might otherwise be considered perplexingly irregular or improper. To amass such types of communication under a heading of “theory of dramatic speech” is, as much of my classification has been, rather artificial. By looking at the following selective sampling, however, we can approach some broad sense of the various modes of speaking recognized by the scholiasts and how they appeal to those modes to interpret and explain the original text.<sup>549</sup>

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<sup>549</sup> It will be noted as we proceed that many of these modes of speaking are not inherently “dramatic,” though they are certainly recognized as having a place on the stage. The investigation of the Aeschinean scholia in the following chapter will shed more light on the distinction—where there is one—between modes of speaking in prose and poetry.

One important and very common instance of this type of reasoning is the frequent warning that certain phrases are to be taken as a metaphor, lest the reader accidentally understand them literally and so think that Euripides is guilty of some impropriety. For example, Jocasta reports at *Phoenissae* 18 that Laius had been told not to “sow the furrows of childbirth,” to which the scholiast responds:

«μη σπεῖρε τέκνων ἄλοκα»: Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ὁ φυσικὸς ἀλληγορῶν φησι σχιστοὺς λιμένας Ἀφροδίτης [vs. 261] ἐν οἷς ἡ τῶν παιδῶν γένεσις ἐστίν. Εὐριπίδης δὲ ταῦτόν τούτῳ φάσκων τὴν τε ἔννοιαν τὴν αἰσχρὰν ἀπέφυγε καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν οἰκείοις ἐχρήσατο καὶ τεχνικαῖς ταῖς μεταφοραῖς, σπόρον καὶ ἄλοκα λέγων.

Empedocles the natural philosopher speaks allegorically of the “cloven harbors of Aphrodite” [vs. 261] in which is the procreation of children. And Euripides, saying the same thing as he does, avoided a shameful sentiment and used fitting terms and technical metaphors, saying “seed” and “furrow.”

Other common Euripidean metaphors include dice-playing, as when the chorus states at *Orestes* 603 that marriage is a boon when it goes well, but when things fall out poorly (μη πίπτουσιν εὖ), it is hell on earth; the commentator calls this phrase a metaphor from bad luck at dice, a phrase used also by Sophocles, as the appended quotation shows.<sup>550</sup> Similarly, when the chorus prays that they may find a middle road between total sincerity and being “counterfeit” (παράσημος), it is explained that this is a numismatic metaphor for fraudulence. Many other scholia point out nautical metaphors of various kinds from phrases indicating retreat, suffering in solitude, or the avoidance of hasty and angry reactions.<sup>551</sup> Such metaphorical language is used so commonly that it seems daft for it to be pointed out so frequently, especially in the blatantly obvious cases, but regardless the phenomenon demonstrates one way in which the scholiasts appeal to a certain mode of speaking to explain what is otherwise irregular speech.

Other non-literal modes of speaking include irony, for which there are many examples. When Hecuba refers to Polymestor, the murderer of her son, as a “noble friend” at *Hecuba* 710, it is of course to be read ironically, a “so-called friend”: κατ’ εἰρωνείαν εἴρηται. ἢ ὀνομαζόμενος φίλος. When Helen asks Electra for a favor while she is trying to tend to her brother at *Orestes* 93, some find irony in Electra’s

<sup>550</sup> For more on dice metaphors, see *Rhesus* 155, 446.

<sup>551</sup> Respectively: *Hec.* 403, *Alc.* 407, *Ph.* 454; for the latter example, compare the modern English metaphor ἐκ τῆς ἰατρικῆς τέχνης (“to take a chill pill”). Note also the opposite phenomenon at *Troades* 1175, where Eratosthenes is said to have argued that Euripides was *not* in fact using metaphorical language in his reference to a certain hairstyle.

response that, of course, she has *plenty* of time! Further, though the sentiment may also be taken as a question and not a sarcastic statement, the scholiast offers another instance of irony at *Andromache* 203, where Andromache points out the absurdity of Hermione’s assumption that she poses a threat to her as a rival, a statement that is “completely ironic” (ὁ πᾶς λόγος ἐν εἰρωνείᾳ ἐστίν): φιλοῦσι γάρ μ’ Ἕλληνες Ἐκτορός γ’ ὕπερ, “For surely the Greeks *love* me for Hector’s sake!” For these passages it is easy to see how a literal interpretation could cause considerable distress in the reader, much like a literal reading of metaphorical language, and so the scholiast ensures that the text is understood in the proper way, not least because in reading the text the “audience” is deprived of an actor’s intonation, which would presumably help convey the meaning.

Another significant way in which scholiasts explain irregularities in speech is by appealing to dramatic context or the demands of characterization. Such irregularities may include a violation of standard lexical usage or some stylistic infelicity. The former can be seen in the treatment of the term *χαιμαιπετεῖ* at *Orestes* 1491, where the messenger speaks of Helen as having fallen dead to the ground, when in fact Helen did not die. His language therefore is criticized, and to excuse this gaffe a scholiast states that perhaps he meant “about to fall,” or simply that in his distress he does not speak precisely: οὖν ἢ τῷ μέλλοντι πεσεῖν ἢ τεθορυβημένος οὐκ ἀκριβολογέεται. Misspeaking as a result of mental distress is more clearly demonstrated by a note to *Hecuba* 506: Hecuba’s apparently empty restatement (σπεύδωμεν, ἐγκονῶμεν, “Let’s hurry, let’s be quick”) is excused on the grounds of her eagerness: ἡ δὲ ταυτολογία τῆς Ἐκάβης τὴν προθυμίαν ὑπέφηγεν. Likewise, when Helen calls her husband “Menelaus” instead of *πόσιν*—supposedly the preferred form of address—a scholiast gives a rationale: διὰ τί τολμηρῶς αὐτὸν Μενέλαον καὶ οὐ πόσιν προσαγορεύει; διὰ τὸ μετὰ φόβου ἐξάγεσθαι ἀρχὴν φησι τοῦ λόγου ταύτην ἀξίαν φόβου, τὸ Μενέλαον αὐτὸν καὶ οὐ πόσιν προσαγορεύειν, “Why did she rashly call him ‘Menelaus’ instead

of ‘husband’? Because she is introduced as fearful, she makes a beginning of speech that is in accordance with her fear, namely calling him ‘Menelaus’ instead of ‘husband.’”<sup>552</sup>

Other phrases that need to be excused or explained contain logical problems, and we have seen just this sort of argument at *Phoenissae* 507, where Eteocles’ illogical statement about tyranny is provisionally justified as the poet’s purposeful imitation of an evil man. Other examples of this kind include the aforementioned dilemma of the type of metal used to pierce the ankles of the infant Oedipus. Jocasta’s claim that they are iron is taken as fact, whereas the chorus’ contradictory claim can be dismissed, as they do not actually know the truth, seeing as how they are barbarians: ἡ μὲν Ἰοκάστη ὡς ἀκριβῶς εἰδυῖα εἶπε [26] σιδηρᾶς τὰς περόνας· αὐταὶ δὲ ὡς βάρβαροι οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ἴσασιν;<sup>553</sup> thus, it is not a Euripidean mistake, but rather an intense devotion to realism that makes for the inconsistency. Further, when Medea impugns sophisticated learning as a curse, the scholiast quickly defends wisdom by saying that this sentiment is not to be taken as a dogmatic utterance by the poet himself, but rather as fitting to the character of Medea, who is being accused on account of her craftiness: τοῦτο δὲ οὐ δογματίζων ὁ ποιητῆς λέγει, ἀλλ’ ἀρμοζόμενος πρὸς τὸ ὑφ’εστηκὸς ἦθος, ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ ἡ Μήδεια σοφίας ἔχουσα δόξαν βλάπτεσθαι.<sup>554</sup> Finally, Theseus’ injunction to his dead wife to “take courage” is marked as absurd, but the scholiast can muster some sympathy for him: γελοῖον πρὸς νεκρὸν τὸ <θάρσει>. συγγνωστόειον δὲ διὰ τὴν περικειμένην συμφορὰν, “It is laughable to say ‘take courage’ to a corpse, but it must be pardoned on account of the present misfortune.”<sup>555</sup> Thus we see that in many cases the scholiasts appeal to the demands of context or characterization to explain why Euripides would write in ways that would otherwise seem misguided.<sup>556</sup>

<sup>552</sup> See *Orestes* 640, where Menelaus’ brachyology is attributed to Laconian brevity, and *Orestes* 14, where Euripides is said to break off Electra’s speech early to keep her from saying something unfitting for a young girl.

<sup>553</sup> *Ph.* 805

<sup>554</sup> *Med.* 296

<sup>555</sup> *Hipp.* 860

<sup>556</sup> It should be pointed out that this is not a purely independent line of thinking. Euripidean dramas themselves give clues that speech can be altered for such reasons, and for this it is helpful to observe the scholion to *Hippolytus* 924, where a paraphrase states plainly the force of the original text: sorrow can make language go awoul.

As mentioned just above, the modes of speaking thus far examined are not confined to dramatic speech, or at least they could conceivably be used to describe language in other genres, but there are also passages that refer specifically to variations in speech that *are* unique to the stage. Among these are explanations of Euripidean text that is not Euripidean, that is, passages altered by actors. The references to the production of these plays in fact constitute one of the more fascinating types of Euripidean scholia, not only because stage directions are essentially lost to us, but also because of what they *might* suggest for the dating of the scholia and the treatment of Euripides as both written text and performance.<sup>557</sup> Some of these are simple assertions about what actors tend to do at certain points in the drama. For instance, people playing the part of Orestes in his madness “nowadays” ask for a bow and do not get one, but they pretend to fire it anyway, evidently as a confirmation of insanity: ἔδει οὖν τὸν ὑποκριτὴν τόξα λαβόντα τοξεύειν. οἱ δὲ νῦν ὑποκρινόμενοι τὸν ἥρωα αἰτοῦσι μὲν τὰ τόξα, μὴ δεχόμενοι δὲ σχηματίζονται τοξεύειν.<sup>558</sup>

Other passages, though, approach the problem of performance as a methodological dilemma, for actors are suspected in several places of corrupting the text through ignorance or changing the words to make their lines easier to say.<sup>559</sup> One of the more entertaining is the notion that the text of *Orestes* 1366-8 was added by actors who did not want to be forced to jump from the roof: τούτους δὲ τοὺς τρεῖς στίχους οὐκ ἂν τις ἐξ ἐτοίμου συγχωρήσειεν Εὐριπίδου εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μάλλον τῶν ὑποκριτῶν, οὔτινες, ἵνα μὴ κακοπαθῶσιν ἀπὸ τῶν βασιλείων δόμων καθαλλόμενοι, παρανοιάζαντες ἐκπορεύονται τὸ τοῦ Φρυγῶς ἔχοντες σχῆμα καὶ πρόσωπον.<sup>560</sup> Actors might also change lines to avoid a problematic tongue-twister, as at

<sup>557</sup> I would emphasize again that scholia are transmitted many times over many years. A reference to actual production in a note dated to, e.g., the sixth century AD is not a guarantee that the play was in production then, but simply that a sixth-century scholiast included a comment on production, which may have originated in the Alexandrian period discussing Alexandrian-era performance. A scholion alone cannot be used to determine the temporal limits of stage production, nor can independent information about stage production alone confirm the date of a scholion. They must be used in tandem to arrive at reasonable guesses. At its very best, careful analysis of the scholia can give us information about the progression of ideas, together with a general sense of chronology. It is important not to overtax the data.

<sup>558</sup> *Or.* 268

<sup>559</sup> For a comprehensive look at the phenomenon of actors’ interpolations in Greek tragedy, see Page (1934), whose index provides a list of actors’ modifications of Euripidean drama, though in most cases there is no discussion of particular details. It may also be worth consulting Page’s general suggestions on the dating possibilities for non-Byzantine interpolations (211), though he himself is cautious with such assertions.

<sup>560</sup> The text itself does not necessitate this, and the claim is based on a specific reading—by no means a necessary one—of the following lines; see Mastronarde (1990, Appendix I.2).



*Phoenissae* 264. Other lines are corrupted because actors are unaware of a figure of speech and so “emend” the text, as at *Medea* 288 and 910, and other lines are put out of order for similar reasons, as at *Medea* 356.<sup>561</sup> Thus we see the scholiasts preserving the traces of a critical method involving the search for passages that are not authentic—one of the oldest and most central motivations of ancient scholarship—and the enumeration of reasons for why those passages could have been altered. By appealing to basic assumptions about the tragic genre and the interrelationship between written text and performance, the scholiasts more clearly define what is “Euripidean.”

Finally, we saw earlier how, though an umbrella term of “poetic license” is not used by the scholiasts, there are perceptible ways in which poets are allowed or even expected to use language irregularly, and that the simple fact that they are writing poetry excuses them from what would otherwise be called stylistic or grammatical infelicities—and probably even were so called by critics who were unwilling to grant the poets their literary freedom. This was true not only for figures of speech, but also for anachronism and other oddities. I return now to this principle for its importance in the literary exegesis practiced by the scholiasts, namely its role in explaining irregularities by an appeal to the nature of poetry itself. For example, though observations on meter by no means dominate the scholia, there are a few key passages in which prosody is invoked as a reason for the text’s appearance. These notes can be as simple as identifying a change in meter from iambics to something else.<sup>562</sup> Other comments suggest that various parts of the text were added to fill out a verse, as when a tautology at *Andromache* 50 is attributed to the necessity of meter: ἡ δὲ ἀνάγκη τοῦ μέτρου τῆς ταυτολογίας αἰτία—and recall that the scholiasts’ general disapproval of pleonasm would seem to necessitate some sort of justification for such an empty statement, much like a character’s mental distress can also excuse superfluous language. Another curious case is *Orestes* 1378, where the Phrygian’s description of “bull-horned Ocean” is regarded as metrical filler by the poet, since it is not fitting for an unlearned Phrygian to talk like this:

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<sup>561</sup> Cf. *Or.* 57; *Med.* 84, 148 (the latter mentions a dispute between Didymus and Apollodorus and, with further investigation, might help us understand something more about the methodology of these scholars, but more evidence is needed).

<sup>562</sup> E.g., trochaic tetrameter catalectic (*Or.* 1378) and elegiacs (*Andr.* 103)

τοῦτο ἔξωθεν ὁ ποιητῆς πρὸς ἀναπλήρωσιν τοῦ ἰαμβείου προσέθηκεν· οὐ γὰρ ἀρμόττει ἀμαθεῖ γε ὄντι τῷ Φρυγὶ τοῦτο λέγειν.<sup>563</sup> Again we see how poetic license is not just a topic of interest in the scholia—it is a central assumption that informs the very method whereby the scholiasts go about their exegetical work.

### *Allegory*

Finally, the scholia also demonstrate allegorical or other “deeper” methods of interpretation.<sup>564</sup> One of the more salient examples is found amidst the debate of Orestes and Menelaus over whether the gods help mortals who suffer. Orestes claims that Apollo told him to kill his mother, but Menelaus doubts this: if that is so, why does he allow you to suffer like this? Orestes responds that the divine is slow to react, after which Menelaus remarks that the Erinyes were speedy enough in their response.<sup>565</sup> A scholiast praises the skill of Euripides in his representation of the two prevailing views on this topic:

ὄρα τὸ εὐφνές τοῦ ποιητοῦ, πῶς δι’ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν προσώπων τούτων, τοῦ Ὀρέστου καὶ τοῦ Μενελάου, τὰς ἐναντίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων δόξας ὑποδηλοῖ. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγουσι τιμωρεῖν τὸ θεῖον τοῖς πάσχουσιν, οἱ δ’ ἀδιαφοροῦσι, διὰ μὲν τοῦ Ὀρέστου τὸ βοηθεῖσθαι παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ τοὺς κάμνοντας συνίστησι, διὰ δὲ τοῦ Μενελάου σοφιστικῶς ἀπαγορεύει.

Note the cleverness of the poet, how he subtly expresses through both these characters, Orestes and Menelaus, the opposite opinions of men. For since some people say that the gods avenge the suffering but others disagree, on the one hand through Orestes he presents the idea that the hard-pressed are helped by the divine, but through Menelaus he sophistically rebuts this.

That is, the scholiast sees in the text a meaning deeper than the surface portrayal of a disagreement—rather, the debate is a symbol for conflicting philosophical positions in real life. In a different sort of example, when Tyndareus calls Orestes a snake that drips pestilential lightning bolts in front of the house, the scholiast has an imaginative and highly subtle explication of the word *δράκων*:

<sup>563</sup> Cf. *Hec.* 533, *Ph.* 922

<sup>564</sup> The scholia use the term “allegorical,” but it indicates nothing more than regular metaphorical language (e.g., *Ph.* 113).

<sup>565</sup> *Or.* 412ff.

<πρὸ δωμάτων δράκων> εἶδος ἀντὶ εἰδους ἔλαβεν· γένος μὲν γὰρ ὁ ὄφης, εἶδος δὲ ὁ δράκων καὶ ἔχης καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ὄφρων· νῦν δὲ δράκων ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔχης. οὗτοι γὰρ οὐκ ἐξ ὠῶν γεννῶνται, ἀλλὰ ζωοτοκοῦνται καὶ τικτόμενοι διαρρηγνύουσι τὰς τῶν μητέρων γαστέρας, ὡς φησι Νικάνδρος [*Ther.* 134]: ‘γαστέρ’ ἀναβρώσαντες ἀμήτορες ἐξεγένοντο’. διὸ ἔχιν αὐτὸν ὡς μητροκτόνον φησίν.

<πρὸ δωμάτων δράκων> [Substitution of] species for species. For ὄφης is the genus, and δράκων and ἔχης and the other types of snakes are species. And now he says δράκων instead of ἔχης, for these [i.e., the ἔχης] are not born from eggs, but are born live and in being born tear asunder the stomachs of their mothers, as Nicander says [*Ther.* 134]: “Bursting through the stomach, they are born without a mother. For this reason he calls him an ἔχης, since he is a mother-killer.

More information is provided in a note to *Orestes* 524:

<τὸ θηριῶδες τοῦτο> τοῦτο διὰ τὸ λεγόμενον περὶ τῶν ἐχιδνῶν ὅτι μετὰ τὴν συνουσίαν φονεύει τὸν ἄρρενα ἢ ἔχιδνα, οἱ δὲ γεννώμενοι ὥσπερ τιμωρούμενοι τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς φόνον διατήρησαντες τὴν κοιλίαν τῆς μητρὸς καὶ φονεύσαντες αὐτὴν γεννῶνται ὡς Νικάνδρος ἐν τοῖς Θηριακοῖς [130ff.]. οἷς ὁμοίον ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ κατ’ Ὀρέστην καὶ Κλυταιμνήστραν γενόμενον.

<τὸ θηριῶδες τοῦτο> [He says] this because of what has been said about echidnae, that after copulation the female echidna kills the male, and the children, as if avenging the death of their father, bore through the womb of the mother and, having killed her, are born, just like Nicander says in his *Wild Beasts* [130ff.]. The situation concerning Orestes and Clytemnestra is like these.

The amount of thought the scholiast demonstrates here is shown not only by his awareness of a zoological allusion, but also by the fact that this reading necessitates the recognition of a “species for species” substitution before the zoological note can even be made. Again, the text goes much deeper than a surface-level clarification or simple paraphrase, and the scholiasts will at least occasionally enter this level of reading to explain Euripides.

### *Conclusions and Inconclusions*

The scholia to Euripides give some sense of the breadth and depth of ancient literary interpretations and the purposes for which they were employed. To be sure, the core purpose of a literary commentary—ancient or modern—is to explain a text, and the scholia demonstrate that this explanation requires a range of exegetical methods and a grasp on many spheres of knowledge. Yet, as shown above,

many notes go beyond this by using the original text as a springboard for the inculcation of some larger principle—grammatical, mythological, etc.<sup>566</sup> These “didactic” notes might suggest that we are looking at remnants of school texts, and this would seem particularly appropriate for the *Phoenissae*, which has been recognized as a popular choice as an educational text in antiquity,<sup>567</sup> though some notes are of a sufficient intellectual depth as to suggest more advanced academic treatises and so seem odd right alongside paraphrases that are intended for readers who will otherwise struggle even to comprehend Euripides’ language. No doubt what we possess in the margins of our medieval texts is a conglomerate of different types of commentaries, though how we are to differentiate these strands is a mystery and will require much further study, both in the scholia to other authors and in the academic commentaries we possess that are in a less dissected form.

As to the usefulness and quality of the scholia, a few things may be said here. First of all, note that the method employed by Schwartz and others in presenting the scholia in a modern edition can tend to make the scholiasts seem more daft than they are, since achieving a “collective” text of the scholia means putting similar notes side-by-side that inevitably produce bald repetitions and contradictions, a product of the modern editor’s technique. Furthermore, though there are also frequent repetitions within the same manuscript,<sup>568</sup> it is nonetheless uncharitable to say that the restatements serve no purpose. The same is true with contradictions, since in many places the scholiast has simply listed variant opinions without stating a preference, or even without mentioning that there is a problem.<sup>569</sup> The scholia to Euripides are a variorum affair, and given how little we know about their construction, the material from which they were drawn, and their intended audience, we are not well situated to evaluate thoroughly the effectiveness of their assemblage.

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<sup>566</sup> One may recall the aforementioned examples of *παράμυθος* (*Ph.* 785) and *ἰσθμός* (*Hipp.* 1210; cf. *Alc.* 483), as well as extended glosses that feel more like a thesaurus lesson than a straightforward cue for understanding the original text.

<sup>567</sup> Criatore (2011)

<sup>568</sup> The examples are very many (e.g., *Hec.* 3; *Or.* 982, 1373; *Ph.* 65; *Andr.* 929).

<sup>569</sup> One salient example is the aforementioned *Orestes* 318 with its confusion over the identity of Glaucus.

That being said, one does still find factual mistakes and bogus interpretations in the scholia. A mythological error puts Sinis where Procrustes belongs.<sup>570</sup> Elsewhere, when Hippolytus makes his famous and clearly exaggerated wish that men could buy children from the temple instead of through sex with women, a scholiast surprisingly seems to take his suggestion as a serious one, replying that this absurd idea would keep poor people from having children.<sup>571</sup> Add to this that when Hermione says she will bring fire to the temple where Andromache is hiding—obviously to smoke Andromache out so she can not remain a suppliant there—a scholiast claims that this is because it was a custom to bring fire to those who have fled to an altar, as if it were possible to read Hermione’s threat as a promise of benefaction: <πῦρ σοι προσοίσω> ὅτι ἔθος ἦν πῦρ προσφέρειν τοῖς εἰς βωμὸν καταφεύγουσιν. τὸ σὸν συμφέρον προνοήσω.<sup>572</sup> Furthermore, the scholiasts miss things for which we might expect a comment, particularly in the realm of tragic irony. While this phenomenon is mentioned in other passages, the scholia show no recognition of the clear double entendre when Hecuba calls herself childless in her lament over the death of Polyxena<sup>573</sup>—Polydorus has also died, unbeknownst to her, so that her exaggeration is more true than she can know—or when Jason’s new bride sees her “lifeless” reflection in the mirror, a clear foreshadowing of her death.<sup>574</sup>

Even so, the scholia provide a great deal of useful information, and so it is crucial to understand them as a whole.<sup>575</sup> Even in the slippery terrain of the scholia, where disclaimers of uncertainty must necessarily be repeated *ad nauseam*, we have seen how it is possible to distill a number of consistent methods, principles of aesthetic judgment, and trends in the exposition of different types of knowledge, all for the purpose of helping Euripides’ readers better understand his dramas and—through them—to

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<sup>570</sup> *Hipp.* 977

<sup>571</sup> ἀτόπως δὲ ταῦτα. οἱ γὰρ πένητες οὐκ ἂν ἐκτήσαντο παῖδας (*Hipp.* 620).

<sup>572</sup> *Andr.* 257. Note that the response from Andromache in the following line makes this interpretation impossible (σὺ δ’ οὖν κάταιθε· θεοὶ γὰρ εἴσονται τάδε).

<sup>573</sup> *Hec.* 514

<sup>574</sup> *Med.* 1162; cf. *Ph.* 1566

<sup>575</sup> I would actually suggest that we go further than this “baby and the bathwater” proposition: let us keep the bathwater as well so that we can have a closer look at it. We have seen already that odd statements from ancient scholars actually cohere quite well with some of their general operating principles, so that their “blunders” should be seen as an opportunity to consider the reason behind the oddity.

become better readers and critics of Greek texts. As we understand the scholia more broadly through systematic analyses, we will be better equipped to make use of the wealth of information contained therein, so that we will in turn better understand the nature of ancient scholarship, which fails to meet our expectations in certain areas but also shows a careful reading of the text with a concern for how it relates to other ancient literary texts. The task is a formidable one because of the mass and difficulty of the material, but the fruits are promising. And if the journey through the scholia becomes arduous, there are frequent oases at which the reader is refreshed with a charming note—a sarcastic scholiast rips the “noble” Helen for her selfishness,<sup>576</sup> the syrinx is hyperbolically said to be loud enough to wake Endymion,<sup>577</sup> and the portrayal of rivers as bull-headed is lauded because of the bovine-like echoes emanating from their rushing waters.<sup>578</sup> Such notes remind us that, while the scholia demonstrate a number of scholarly approaches and concerns familiar to us from the modern commentary tradition, they depict a much different academic world, and accordingly they challenge us to think more carefully about the intellectual environments in which ancient literature was produced, digested, and evaluated.

The analysis I have offered to the *scholia vetera* to Euripides is comprehensive, but also in great need of further expansion. I have suggested along the way a few instances in which the Euripidean scholia must be considered in the light of scholia to other authors, and the question of scholiastic overlap is a central one, but it is just this sort of study that one will not find in my bibliography except for the very general treatment given by Dickey. What is the relationship, for example, between the Euripidean scholia and the tradition of Homeric scholarship, or the notes to the Athenian orators—which, by the way, contain a number of intriguing parallels and counterpoints to the Euripidean material? To what extent do the same topics and methodologies resurface later in Roman exegetical contexts, such as the Donatian commentaries to Terence or in the massive Servian commentaries to Vergil? (And they do resurface.) Do Roman scholars completely appropriate Greek methods or operate under new principles, and is this

<sup>576</sup> ἐνταῦθα ἡ βελτίστη οὐδὲ τὴν θυγατέρα ἑαυτῆς προέκρινε· τοῦ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς μικροῦ δεῖν καὶ ἐπελάθετο (*Or.* 120).

<sup>577</sup> οὐ γὰρ τὸ ὄργανον τῆς σύριγγός φησι· τοῦτο γὰρ πολύφωνον ὄν καὶ Ἐνδυμίωνα ἐγείρει δύναιτ’ ἄν (*Or.* 144).

<sup>578</sup> ἐπεικῶς δὲ τοὺς ποταμοὺς ταυροκράνους ἐξηγράφουν τε καὶ ἔλεγον ἴσως ὅτι παραπλησία τῷ μυκῆματι τῶν ταύρων ἢ ἀπήχησις τοῦ ὕδατος ἐν τοῖς σφοδρῶς ῥέουσι ποταμοῖς (*Or.* 1378). This strikes us as strange indeed, though it is worth mentioning that the sentiment has no mean provenance (Homer himself, *Il.* 21.237).

done self-consciously? I will begin to approach such questions in the (increasingly comparative) remaining chapters of this project, and I begin with a transition to a different sort of “theatrical” performance, the orations of Aeschines.

## CHAPTER 3

### Political Theaters: The Scholia to Aeschines

The scholia to the extant speeches of Aeschines—*Against Timarchus*, *On the False Embassy*, and *Against Ctesiphon*<sup>579</sup>—provide what is on the surface a similar approach to that taken by the Euripidean commentators. The familiar categories of lexicographical and grammatical notes, information about important figures or historical events, and arguments about what has been poorly or well done all appear again, often with the same formulae as before.<sup>580</sup> On the other hand, a number of changes are evident in the focus of the scholiasts, and the switch to oratory—still performance and still agonistic, though not “poetic”—comes with a shift in the frequency of certain types of comments. Even so, we will see some intriguing evidence that this generic distinction is not as dramatic as we might expect. In general the organization of this chapter will follow that of the previous one, though there will be some changes in the way I partition my analysis. Let this be taken as a sign that while the scholia to Aeschines and Euripides have much in common, they are far from homogenous.

The best edition of the Aeschinean scholia is that of Dilts, who takes largely the same approach as Schwartz—that is, a “collective” scholiastic text that synthesizes where possible notes of more or less the same content, leaving the critical apparatus to spell out small changes in wording in different manuscripts—and so faces the same methodological questions, most notably how to present the manuscripts in such a way that one may quickly and accurately discern important differences from one

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<sup>579</sup> For the references to the speeches in this chapter, I use the common numerical abbreviations (e.g., *On the False Embassy*, Section 32 = 2.32). Dilts helpfully numbers the scholia individually in addition to indicating the section, but I will mark only the latter. The individual enumeration is more specific, but I fear that it would be unhelpful to anyone using a different edition of the scholia or wishing simply to consult the original text at any point.

<sup>580</sup> E.g., glosses with *ἀντί*, alternatives given under the head word *ἄλλως*, paraphrases marked by “he means to say” (*θέλει εἰπεῖν*, 2.147, 2.149, 3.139), preferences marked by “which is better” (*ὅπερ ἀμεινον*, 2.95).



manuscript to the next.<sup>581</sup> There is also the recurring problem of the reader's impression: when scholia from different sources are brought together, reading the resultant collective text can give the sense that the scholiasts are bumbling fools writing blatant contradictions into their work. We must remember that the modern edition is bringing together pieces from different sources and will naturally contain additional discrepancies and repetitions as a result.

That being said, the collective text of the scholia to Aeschines generally appears more streamlined than the scholia to Euripides as found in Schwartz. The Euripidean scholia are highly inclusive, meaning that different interpretations and comments are placed side by side, often without comment as to which is considered better. The scholia to Aeschines do contain alternative viewpoints, but this is more of a rarity. Repetitions and contradictions within the several manuscripts occur, but in general it seems that these scholia had been homogenized to a greater extent, such that the end result in our manuscripts appears to be the work of fewer minds.

As in the case of the Euripidean scholia, the problem of origin is a vexed one in the commentaries to Aeschines. Again there are periodic citations for certain notes, as will be discussed below, but otherwise one is in the dark. It is useful, however, to have notes from Dilts that point to correspondences between the scholia and other sources. One finds, for example, that information on the court of the Palladium—used for cases of unintentional manslaughter, conspiracy to manslaughter, or the murder of a slave, metic, or foreigner—is found in Aristotle<sup>582</sup> in somewhat the same form as in the scholion to *On the False Embassy* 87. The issue of origin is essentially the “Scholiastic Question,” and only through painstaking effort and a lot of help can we start to see the connections between our scholia and other extant texts.

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<sup>581</sup> As with Schwartz' edition, this is a difficult task, though a few differences emerge. Manuscript f, for example, is more likely to contain simple glosses that are not found in the other manuscripts (1.57, 1.119, 3.89, 3.148). Manuscript g, the latest in Dilts' analysis, also somewhat frequently gives information that the other manuscripts do not (1.67, 1.89). Also interesting is the presence of notes that respond not to the original text, but to other scholia in our manuscripts. For example, the note ἀστὸς ἐξ ἀστῆς is too obscure for the οὐδ' ἐγγενῆς that Aeschines uses to describe Demosthenes; it is far more likely to be responding to the previous note about the rumor that Demosthenes came from a Scythian mother (2.22). Note also that the scholia to *Against Ctesiphon* are generally contained in fewer manuscripts than the other speeches (or at least are so presented by Dilts), such that it is more common to have a string of notes that come from only one or two sources.

<sup>582</sup> *Const. Ath.* 57.3

A few remarks may be made here on the chronology of the scholia. Though as always the problem is significant, and though most references to time, such as “as we now say” are woefully unspecific, a few hints appear from time to time that give a *terminus post quem* for a particular note. Citations of known authors are generally not that helpful, as they are mostly from the fifth or fourth centuries, though at times some examples can help push a comment beyond a certain boundary, such as a quotation of Plutarch or the school of Marcellinus.<sup>583</sup> References to historical figures such as “Nero, emperor of the Romans” also help periodically.<sup>584</sup> Finally, evidence of Latin terminology may also suggest a later date.<sup>585</sup> Ultimately the picture will remain a blurry one, but we are not entirely without clues.

The shape of this chapter will be much the same as the previous one—analysis of topical considerations, explication of exegetical methodologies, and summary of some problems and benefits of scholiastic research. Our treatment of many features will be strongly curtailed in cases where the scholia to Aeschines align more or less with what we have seen already, which will allow for more focused treatment on those areas that help make this corpus of scholia unique.

### *Textual Construction*

The scholiasts have very little to say on matters of textual criticism for Aeschines—far less, in fact, than the Euripidean scholia. This is to some extent understandable, as an Athenian judicial speech is less likely to contain odd forms or adventurous syntactical arrangements than a tragic drama, especially in the choral odes, and so one supposes that it is on the whole less likely that a given portion of the text

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<sup>583</sup> 2.99, 3.161, 3.258, 2.6.

<sup>584</sup> 3.116

<sup>585</sup> E.g., 2.130: οὔτινες διὰ τοῦ δρόμου καὶ τοῦ τάχους δύνανται τινα ἀγγεῖλαι, ὡς νῦν καλοῦμεν τοὺς βερεδαρίους. For the most part in this study I am concerned with the influence of Greek scholarship on commentaries to Latin texts, but it is also important to remember that certain Greek notes will have had their origin in the Roman era and will have been influenced accordingly—in historical terms, if not scholastic ones.

would be corrupted. When issues of textual criticism do appear, they take the same form as in the Euripidean scholia.<sup>586</sup> One particular note at *On the False Embassy* 10 deserves special mention:

περὶ τὴν γραφὴν ἡμάρτηται· δεῖ γὰρ γεγράφθαι Ἱμεραίας. Τίμαιος γὰρ ἐν τῇ ἕκτῃ ἱστορεῖ γυναικὰ τινα τὸ γένος Ἱμεραίαν ἰδεῖν ὄναρ ἀνιοῦσαν αὐτὴν εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ πρὸς τινος ἄγεσθαι θεασομένην τὰς τῶν θεῶν οἰκῆσεις. ἔνθα ἰδεῖν καὶ τὸν Δία καθεζόμενον ἐπὶ θρόνου, ἐφ' ᾧ ἐδέδετο πυρρός τις ἄνθρωπος καὶ μέγας ἀλύσει καὶ κλοιῶ· ἐρέσθαι οὖν τὸν περιάγοντα ὅστις ἔστιν, αὐτὸν δὲ εἰπεῖν, ἀλάστωρ ἐστὶ τῆς Σικελίας καὶ Ἰταλίας, καὶ ἐάνπερ ἀφεθῆ, τὰς χώρας διαφθερεῖ. περιναστᾶσαν δὲ χρόνῳ ὕστερον ὑπαντῆσαι Διονυσίῳ τῷ τυράννῳ μετὰ τῶν δορυφόρων, ἰδοῦσαν δὲ ἀνακραγεῖν ὡς οὗτος εἴη ὁ τότε ἀλάστωρ δειχθεῖς, καὶ ἅμα ταῦτα λέγουσαν περιπεσεῖν εἰς τὸ ἔδαφος ἐκλυθεῖσαν· μετὰ δὲ τρίμηνον οὐκέτι ὀφθῆναι τὴν γυναικὰ, ὑπὸ Διονυσίου διαφθαρεῖσαν λάθρα. οὗτος ἰέρειάν φησιν εἶναι τὴν γυναικὰ, μηδενὸς τοῦτο ἱστορήσαντος.

A textual error has been made, for he should have written *Ἱμεραίας*. For Timaeus reports in his eighth [book?] that a certain woman of the Himeraeian family saw a dream that she went up to heaven and was brought by someone to view the homes of the gods. There she also saw Zeus sitting on his throne, at which a certain large man of red hair was bound by a chain and collar. She thus asked the person escorting her who he was, and he said, “He is the avenger of Sicily and Italy, and if he is released, he will despoil the lands.” And having descended she later met Dionysius the Tyrant with his spear-bearers, and seeing him she cried out that he was the one who had been pointed out as the avenger, and right when she said this she fell to the ground in a faint. And after three months she was no longer seen, being murdered secretly by Dionysius. This man [i.e., the scribe] says that she is a priestess [*ἰέρεια*], though no one gives this version of the story.

Besides the fact that the story itself is intriguing, let us note that the explanation for this alternate reading is among the longest thus far presented.

I have found no discussion of punctuation in the scholia to Aeschines, though note that, as mentioned in the previous chapter, various other scholiastic phrases do much the same work as notes on punctuation insofar as they show which words should be joined together. These passages include mentions of the *ἀπὸ κοινοῦ* construction,<sup>587</sup> as well as the common key words *σύνταξις* and *συντακτέον*.<sup>588</sup> The omission of notes on punctuation is also attended by a relative lack of references to *σημεῖα*, which are more common for Euripides. There are but a few examples where I detect that a scholion *may* indicate a critical sign in the original text used by the commentator. These take the form of notes beginning with

<sup>586</sup> 2.15, 3.9

<sup>587</sup> 1.86, 1.172, 3.65

<sup>588</sup> 1.33, 1.195, 2.16, 2.158, 3.228; cf. terms such as epanalepsis and hyperbaton (3.45, 148).

ὄτι,<sup>589</sup> that is, “[There is a critical sign here] because . . . ,” a common formula for passages that are marked with a chi. There is, however, no mention of the chi in the Aeschinean scholia, and presumably there are other ways to interpret the ὄτι in these comments. The one explicit reference to *σημεῖα* is a mention of ὀβελισμούς at *On the False Embassy* 177, but here also there are problems. First, the plural is odd, and evidently one manuscript treated this as a gloss on ἐπιπλήξεις, since it appended the word ἡγουν, “That is to say.” Secondly, if actual obelisks are referred to, there is no hint as to why they are there. Could they carry their traditional force of denoting spurious or misplaced lines? Thus, these scholia will not answer the question of whether the texts of Aeschines contained critical *σημεῖα*.

### *Grammar*

The notes on grammatical theory, though fewer in number, cover much the same types of concepts as we saw in the previous chapter. It becomes clear in these examples that some of the comments that seemed “poetic” are in fact common in prose explication as well. For example, many words are left understood by Aeschines that the reader must supply in order for the sentence to be sensible.<sup>590</sup> In contrast there are a few mentions of pleonastic sentence elements (περιττός).<sup>591</sup> One also finds familiar comments on tense inversion, where for instance the present βοᾶτε is glossed with an aorist ἐβόησατε.<sup>592</sup> So too with nouns one sees notes on gender,<sup>593</sup> number,<sup>594</sup> and case.<sup>595</sup> There are also identifications of potentially tricky forms, such as the labeling of παράσχη as second-person

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<sup>589</sup> *Against Timarchus* 125 has what the scholiast calls “epilogues,” since he tells the jury what Demosthenes will say: ὄτι ἐπίλογοί εἰσιν ἐντεῦθεν· ἐξαγώνια γὰρ ἔστιν ἃ μέλλει λέγειν. *Against Ctesiphon* 1 is evidently marked because Aeschines was not supposed to use “metaphorical names” in introductions (μεταφορικοῖς ὀνόμασι)—a principle I do not find elsewhere and do not completely understand at the moment.

<sup>590</sup> 1.2, 2.73, 2.181, 3.53

<sup>591</sup> 1.112, 3.20

<sup>592</sup> 1.85; cf. 1.89, 1.148, 1.163. The same is true for inversion in voice (e.g., active for middle, 2.22).

<sup>593</sup> 1.95, 2.112

<sup>594</sup> E.g., the use of the plural when the singular was expected (1.141, 3.41)

<sup>595</sup> E.g., for verbs taking the genitive case (1.188, 2.49)

subjunctive,<sup>596</sup> or the gloss of ἦν as ἀντὶ τοῦ ἡμην.<sup>597</sup> There is also the identification of the root form ἀναετροφότης: ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνατρέπω.<sup>598</sup> Other notes include mentions of σχήματα such as the “part for the whole” construction and periphrasis.<sup>599</sup> Lastly, accents feature when there is some potential trap, as when differing accents are given for ἀγχονή, one for the act of hanging and one for the noose: ἐπὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πάθους ὀξύνεται, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ βρόχου παροξύνεται.<sup>600</sup>

As with Euripidean scholia, frequent mention is made of seemingly irregular forms or grammatical constructions that are attributed to dialect, mostly Attic.<sup>601</sup> For instance, Attic speakers use the word ἕτερον not just for the second element in a group of two, but even for a third item.<sup>602</sup> They also commonly use the perfect infinitive for a present one: ἀντὶ τοῦ σπουδάζειν. οἱ γὰρ παρακείμενοι οἰκείως ἔχουσιν ἀντὶ ἐνεστώτων λαμβάνεσθαι. πολλή δὲ ἡ τοιαύτη χρῆσις παρὰ τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς.<sup>603</sup> Further, they prefer to employ “passive” (here middle) forms as much as possible: <ὑποκηρυξάμενοι> ἀττικῶς ἀντὶ τοῦ κηρύξαντες. χαίρουσι γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον τοῖς παθητικοῖς.<sup>604</sup> Other examples include pleonastic negatives<sup>605</sup> and changes in preposition usage.<sup>606</sup> There is even mention of “Atticists” who have studied the usage of certain words.<sup>607</sup>

<sup>596</sup> δευτέρου προσώπου ὑποτακτικοῦ (2.59)

<sup>597</sup> 2.169; note the same substitution at *Hecuba* 13 and *Alcestis* 655 in the Euripidean scholia.

<sup>598</sup> 1.190

<sup>599</sup> 1.148, 2.87

<sup>600</sup> 2.38; cf. the Euripidean scholion at *Andromache* 861: ἀγχόνῃ τὸ σχοινίον, ἀγχονή δὲ ὀξυτόνως αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα.

For other accent examples in Aeschines: 1.18, 1.126, and 3.21.

<sup>601</sup> There is one mention of the Ionic dialect (1.144).

<sup>602</sup> 2.110

<sup>603</sup> 1.89

<sup>604</sup> 3.41

<sup>605</sup> 1.112, 3.48; cf. a pleonastic prefix at 1.122.

<sup>606</sup> 1.101

<sup>607</sup> At *Against Timarchus* 89 they are cited for the claim that the noun ἐκκλήτου was used by the ancients, but that the verbal form is no longer used.

### *Lexicography*

As may be expected, the lexicographical landscape of the comments to Aeschines changes somewhat drastically compared with those seen in the last chapter. The essential formulae for glosses and paraphrases remain the same,<sup>608</sup> and we see familiar types of comments on etymology and proper usage, but the shift in technical terminology shifts dramatically to cover the mass of legal and political terms that must be defined for a reader outside the original context of fourth-century Athenian courtroom oratory.

First, let us examine some familiar aspects of the lexicographical notes. The essential principle of word-for-word substitution remains the same—either with no formulaic phrase or with the likes of *ἀντί*—both for specialized technical vocabulary, for ambiguous terms, and for everyday conjunctions and prepositions that are sometimes interchangeable.<sup>609</sup> Some words have their definitions repeated in various locations.<sup>610</sup> Other words and phrases have a multiplicity of potential glosses, not in the sense of a continuous string of synonyms, but a list of alternative ways to understand those expressions. Such is *ὑπερόριον λαλιάν* in the context of Demosthenes’ speech before the Assembly after the Second Embassy; this term may indicate either talk that was irrelevant to the present issues, or that it was literally “foreign,” dealing with Macedonia and not matters at Athens.<sup>611</sup> Likewise, at *On the False Embassy* 121 some scholia provide multiple glosses for the phrase *διαιρούμενος τὸν λόγον*, used by Aeschines to describe the way in which Demosthenes argued that Aeschines and Philocrates had kept him from telling the truth. Chris Carey (2000) translates the phrase as “One slanderous claim *on which he laid great emphasis . . .*” To my mind it must mean “compromising his argument” in the sense of making a breach in a wall, since Aeschines goes on to refute the claim immediately. To the scholiast, though, it indicates either that

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<sup>608</sup> I must stress again the looseness of the terms “gloss” and “paraphrase.” At times a word is offered with a similar definition. At others, the scholiast gives a specific referent for a pronoun that might be ambiguous (2.153, 2.167). Elsewhere a gloss may be more “interpretive,” meaning that the scholiast is reading into the text a certain reference or tone (e.g., reading into the term “speech writer” the stereotype of a litigious scoundrel that is not inherent to the word itself, but rather a connotation the scholiast assigns to the word in the context of Athenian oratory, 2.180).

<sup>609</sup> For the latter: 1.157, 1.173, 2.45, 2.162.

<sup>610</sup> See the clustered entries for *πὸρρωθεν* at 2.150, 2.154, 2.171.

<sup>611</sup> 2.49; cf. 2.121, 2.140, 2.167.

Demosthenes spoke clearly and with well-defined divisions, or that it refers to the double task of accusing Aeschines and defending himself.<sup>612</sup> The chief among these examples of alternatives, however, is the entry for the phrase τὰς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων πληγὰς, when Aeschines explains how Timarchus and his gang physically assaulted Pittalacus.<sup>613</sup> The array of interpretations is impressively large: ἢ τὰς ἀπολλύουσι δυναμένας καὶ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ποιούσας ἢ ἃς οὐ γινώσκουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἢ ἃς εἰκὸς ἀνθρώπους παρασχέειν ἢ ὅσαι εἰσὶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἢ ὅσας ἄνθρωποι πλήττουσιν, “Either the beatings that can kill and ‘beat the humanity’ out of people, or the kinds that are unknown to [=outside the ken of?] people, or the kind that people can produce, or however many there are among people, or however many beatings people deliver.” One wonders if there are any additional interpretations left over that could have been added here.


The lexicographical examples in the scholia to Aeschines also show a familiar differentiation between similar or partially-overlapping terms. This phenomenon occurs several times in *Against Timarchus*, where the scholiast clarifies a terminological differentiation that is crucial for Aeschines’ argument, namely between those who commit a single act of prostitution and those who specialize in it: <πεπορνευμένος> ἐστὶν ὁ πολλάκις ἁμαρτῶν εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σώμα, ἡταιρικῶς δὲ ὁ προσάπαξ.<sup>614</sup> There is also a concern on the part of the scholiast at *Against Timarchus* 126 that the similarity between a particular cluster of words could lead to confusion about what Aeschines is saying. A gloss on τίτθης reads as follows: τίτθη ἡ τροφός, τήθη ἡ μάμμη, τηθίς ἡ θεία, τίτθη means a nurse, τήθη a breast, and τηθίς an aunt. Finally, the Aeschinean scholia also contain a note on the differentiation of vocabulary in diagram form. Dilts does not provide facsimiles of the manuscripts, but I reproduce his rendering of the diagram below for *On the False Embassy* 145, where Aeschines says that there is a big difference between φήμη

<sup>612</sup> This example is also interesting for the reasoning given for the latter choice: τοιοῦτος γὰρ ὁ Δημοσθένης ἐν τῷ κατ’ Αἰσχίνου μάλιστα, “For Demosthenes is like this [attacking and defending] most of all in his speech against Aeschines.” That is, the method for arguing this phrase’s meaning involves an understanding of what kind of speaker Demosthenes is. Later we will see other examples that show other ways in which the scholiast shows the importance of treating Demosthenes and Aeschines together.

<sup>613</sup> 1.59; Carey translates “the worst whipping imaginable,” i.e., evidently the worst ones that could be mustered “out of people.”

<sup>614</sup> 1.29; the differentiation recurs in a couple of notes at 1.52 and is implied in 1.40.

(“common rumor) and *συκοφαντία* (“malicious accusation”), and that while the former has no connection with *διαβολή*, the latter is its brother.



Not everything about this diagram is clear to me, but it captures in general the relation between the three nouns at the vertices of the triangle: *φήμη* has no connection with *συκοφαντία* or *διαβολή*, both of which do share a link.<sup>615</sup>

There are also several etymologies in the scholia to Aeschines, of which a few representative and straightforward examples may be given here. The noun *λήξεις* comes from the verb *λαγχάνειν*.<sup>616</sup> A specific word for a pirate ship comes from a compound of two other types of ship: *κέλης καὶ ἑπακτρὶς εἴδη πλοίων εἰσίν. καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν σύνθετον ἑπακτροκέλης, ληστρικὸν πλοῖον*.<sup>617</sup> *βδελυρία* indicates a shamelessness that is connected to the word for “leech,” which is most shameless and hard to tear away: *ἀναισχυντίας εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ ἀσελγαίνειν. εἴρηται δὲ ὡς παρὰ τὴν βδέλλαν τὸ ζῴφιον, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀναιδέστατον καὶ δυσάποσπαστον*.<sup>618</sup> An especially peculiar example of scholiastic etymology appears at *On the False Embassy* 11, where the commentator glosses *τερατείαν* as *ψευδολογίαν*, but then seems to justify the gloss etymologically: *<τερατείαν> οἶονεὶ ψευδολογίαν, καθὸ καὶ τὰ τέρατα γινόμενα ψεύδεται τὴν φύσιν*, “Equivalent to *ψευδολογίαν*, insofar as even the marvels that occur cheat nature (*ψεύδεται*).”

<sup>615</sup> Why the terms *πᾶς*, *οὐδείς*, and *οὐδέν* differ in gender, I do not know. Why is there “nothing” connecting *συκοφαντία* and *φήμη*, while the others are masculine?

<sup>616</sup> 1.63

<sup>617</sup> 1.191

<sup>618</sup> 1.70



Many notes also speak of the proper usage of words, often to highlight that Aeschines has used a term outside of its normal function. Such notes can take a form like the following: <προθεσμία> καταχρηστικῶς ἀντὶ τοῦ χρόνος, “Contrary to common usage, instead of [the proper word] χρόνος.”<sup>619</sup> See also Aeschines’ use of κυβείω at *Against Timarchus* 53: ἰδίως δὲ εἶπεν κυβεῖον· οὐ γὰρ οὕτως ἐκάλουν, ἀλλὰ σκιραφέιον, “He said κυβεῖον irregularly, for they didn’t name it that, but rather the σκιραφέιον.” So too does Aeschines use ἀφορμώντων in an unexpected way: ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀναχωρούντων. παρατήρησαι δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς κατὰ γῆν ὁδοῦ εἴρηται ἡ λέξις, “This word means ἀναχωρούντων. And note that the term is used also for a journey on land.”<sup>620</sup> Lastly, an interesting example of this phenomenon catches Demosthenes doing the same thing: <προκατεσκευασάμεθα> καταχρηστικῶς, ὡς καὶ ἐν τοῖς Φιλιππικοῖς [1.20] στρατιώτας κατασκευασθῆναί φησιν ὁ Δημοσθένης.<sup>621</sup>

Other notes point out that Aeschines has in fact used correct terminology—a sign that the scholiast is interested not only in solving thorny problems in the text, but in teaching a lesson along the way and using Aeschines as a springboard for that project. When Aeschines says that the term *παρουσία* was used to describe an assault on Pittalacus, the scholiast notes that the word is correctly employed, since the allegation was that the assailants were drunk: κυρίως ἐχρήσατο τῇ λέξει, εἶπε γὰρ ὅτι μεθυσθέντες.<sup>622</sup> It is technically possible that the scholiast has answered some objection against Aeschines’ use of the word—that is, “Others say he misuses it, but actually he is correct”—but such notes seem instead to be hints as to how the reader might use the term him- or herself, or how the reader should expect to find the term used in other passages. The impulse for such comments may be found in other lexicographical notes as well, such as the explanation that compounds of τίθημι can refer to putting something aside as well as putting something on: τὸ τίθεσθαι λέγεται καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀποτίθεσθαι τὰ ὄπλα καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ περιτίθεσθαι καὶ ἐνδύεσθαι, ὡς ἔγνωμεν ἐν τοῖς Θουκυδιδεῖοις ἐν τῇ β’ (c. 2). ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἐπὶ τοῦ

<sup>619</sup> 1.39

<sup>620</sup> 2.40; cf. the treatment of *παιπάλημα* in the same section.

<sup>621</sup> 2.173; for a few other examples of such comments: 2.145, 156, 157.

<sup>622</sup> 1.61

περιτίθεσθαι λέγει.<sup>623</sup> We have seen this “extraneous,” didactic style of commenting before and will return to the matter later in this chapter.

Notes on usage are also special in that they contain a relatively large concentration of first-person verbs that attest to what “we say.” Implicit in some of these notes is an understanding that words maintain their basic function across different times and circumstances. For instance, Aeschines uses *σοσταθείς* in a way similar to what “we say” in common usage, “I introduced so-and-so to so-and-so.”<sup>624</sup> At the same time, these comments may also point out a change in usage: for example, the term *ποικιλτήν* is what “we” call *πλουμάριον*.<sup>625</sup> So too does Aeschines use the phrase “beyond the Bear” to refer to the far north, which “we” call “among the Hyperboreans.”<sup>626</sup>

As for the focus of the lexicographical notes, one finds a distinct and expected shift toward legal terminology. For a reader not intimately aware of Athenian judicial and legislative proceedings, there is an obvious need for help, and the scholiasts spend much time clarifying the legal context of Aeschines’ disputes with Demosthenes. Since these notes are part of a very general impulse to describe the legal and political setting of Aeschines’ speeches, however, I wish to deal with them not individually as lexicographical notes, but as a cog in this system of explaining the Athenian context.

### *Laws, Procedures, and Politics*

Understanding the arguments made by Aeschines, and those of Demosthenes which Aeschines cites, necessitates specific knowledge of the Athenian political and legal systems, and a presentation of this information is the prevailing distinguishing characteristic between the Aeschinean scholia and the

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<sup>623</sup> 1.29

<sup>624</sup> οἰονεὶ φίλος γενόμενος. ὅθεν ἔτι καὶ νῦν λέγομεν ἐν τῇ συνηθείᾳ, συνέστησα τόνδε τῷδε, ἀντὶ τοῦ γνώριμον ἐποίησα (2.154; cf. 3.10).

<sup>625</sup> 1.97

<sup>626</sup> <ἔξω τῆς ἄρκτου> ἐν ὑπερβολῇ λέγει, ὃ λέγομεν αὐτοὶ ἐν Ὑπερβορέοις (3.165).

notes to Euripides. A survey of this information, arranged topically, will give some sense of what knowledge the Aeschinean scholia offer.

At several junctures the scholiasts provide help on the Athenian *πολιτεία*. The division of citizens into phyles, for instance, is a recurring feature, as in two adjacent notes at *Against Ctesiphon* 4:

ἔγνωμεν καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τοῖς Δημοσθενικοῖς, ὅτι ἐκάστη τῶν δέκα φυλῶν τριάκοντα ἕξ ἡμέρας διώκει τὴν πόλιν, καὶ αὐτὴ εἶχε τὴν προεδρίαν τῶν ἄλλων. πάλιν δὲ καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς προεδρευούσης φυλῆς ἦσαν τινες τιμιώτεροι, οἱ πρόεδροι, οἵτινες δι' ἑαυτῶν διώκουν ἐν αὐταῖς ταῖς ἡμέραις πάντα τὰ καθήκοντα τῇ αὐτῶν φυλῇ.<sup>627</sup>

We saw this also in the works of Demosthenes, namely that each of the ten phyles manages the city for 36 days, and the phyle itself has authority over the others. And again, during the management period of each phyle there were certain honored men, the *πρόεδροι*, who managed on their own in those days all the business belonging to their phyle.

δέκα γὰρ ἦσαν φυλαὶ καθεσταμέναι Ἀθήνησιν ἀπὸ τῆς Κλεισθένους πολιτείας, εἰς ἃς ἅπαντες ἦσαν Ἀθηναίων διανενημένοι.

For there were ten phyles established at Athens from the Cleisthenic constitution, into which all the Athenians were divided.

An early note in *Against Timarchus* 10 also mentions the phyles as the basis for the selection of choruses in dramatic productions: ἐξ ἔθους Ἀθηναῖοι κατὰ φυλὰς ἵστασαν ν' παιδων χορὸν ἢ ἀνδρῶν, ὥστε γενέσθαι δέκα χορούς, ἐπειδὴ καὶ δέκα φυλαί, “By custom the Athenians put forth according to phyle a chorus of 50 youths or men, so that there were ten choruses.” See also the additional information at *Against Timarchus* 104:

ἐπειδὴ δέκα ἦσαν πρυτανεῖαι, ἐκάστης δὲ τούτων πενήκοντα βουλευταί, ἄνδρες πεντακόσιοι πρυτανεύουσιν, ἕκαστος μῆνα καὶ ἡμέρας ἕξ, ἕως τὸ ἔτος περιέλθοι εἰς τὰς δέκα φυλάς. ὁ δὲ χρόνος, ὃν ἄρχει ἡ μία φυλὴ, πρυτανεῖα καλεῖται. καὶ μετροῦσι κοινότερον οὐ πρὸς μῆνας ἀλλὰ πρὸς πρυτανείας τοὺς τε μισθοὺς καὶ τόκους καὶ ἐνοίκια.<sup>628</sup>

Because there were ten prytanies, and 50 *βουλευταί* in each of them, there were 500 men serving as *πρυτάνεις*, each one serving for a month and six days, until the year came around to all ten phyles. The time which each single phyle was in charge is called a “prytany.” And frequently they measure wages, interest, and rent not according to month, but rather according to prytany.

<sup>627</sup> Cf. 3.39 on the Eponymous Founders and 1.23 on the *πρόεδροι*.

<sup>628</sup> For more on the work of the *πρυτάνεις*, see 2.61. See also 2.82, where the scholiast may be referencing one of these earlier notes (ὡς ἔγνωμεν, “as we observed”).

Other comments mention polities in general, such as the idea that some people refer to oligarchy as “aristocracy,”<sup>629</sup> or that Aeschines was incorrect to list tyranny as a *πολιτεία* in his opening to *Against Timarchus*, since a polity is on the basis of law, not lawlessness—and from this it is clear that Aeschines was no student of Plato, for Aeschines claims there are three, but Plato said that there were either two or five: οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὁ Αἰσχίνης τὴν τυραννίδα πολιτείαν ἐκάλεσεν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ πολιτεία ἐκ νόμων συνέστηκεν, ἐν δὲ τυραννίδι οὐκ εἰσὶ νόμοι, ἀλλὰ παρανομίαι. καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ ἤκουσε Πλάτωνος. οὗτος μὲν γὰρ φησι τρεῖς εἶναι πολιτείας, Πλάτων δὲ καὶ δύο καὶ πέντε καὶ ἑπτὰ.<sup>630</sup>

One also finds specific information about Athenian assemblies and councils.<sup>631</sup> For instance, three “proper” assemblies fixed by law must meet every month, but in an emergency a “summoned” assembly may be called: γίνονται δὲ ἐκκλησίαι τρεῖς τοῦ μηνὸς αἱ λεγόμεναι κύριαι, ἃς ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἔχουσιν ἀναγκαίως τελεῖν. ἐπὰν δὲ αἰφνιδιὸν τι προσπέσῃ, ἐκκλησιάζουσι μὲν, καλεῖται δὲ σύγκλητος.<sup>632</sup> Among other notes one learns about the ritual of the sacrificed pig that cleansed the Assembly,<sup>633</sup> that the Council is crowned when it rules well,<sup>634</sup> and that equal representation in the Council across the phyles makes it in a sense a “little city.”<sup>635</sup>

Other notes offer details about Athenian officials. The scholiast remarks on, for instance, the composition of the nine archons and their status on the Areopagite Council after their term: οἱ γὰρ ἐννέα ἄρχοντες στέφανον ἐφόρου μυρρίνης. ἦσαν δὲ ἄρχων, βασιλεύς, πολέμαρχος καὶ θεσμοθέται ἕξ. οὗτοι δὲ οἱ ἐννέα ἄρχοντες μετὰ τὸ ἐξελθεῖν ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς Ἀρεοπαγῖται γίνονται.<sup>636</sup> Each archon also had a *πάρεδρος* to

<sup>629</sup> 3.6

<sup>630</sup> 1.4; for the Platonic passages, see *Laws* 3.693d (two) and *Republic* 4.445c (five).

<sup>631</sup> There is also some limited coverage of non-Athenian assemblies, such as the Spartan *γερονσία* (1.180).

<sup>632</sup> 1.60; cf. 2.72, 3.24

<sup>633</sup> 1.23

<sup>634</sup> 1.111

<sup>635</sup> ἔοικε δὲ ἡ βουλή πόλις εἶναι μικρά (3.4).

<sup>636</sup> 1.19; for more on the *θεσμοθέται*, see 3.13.

assist in his affairs,<sup>637</sup> in addition to “vice-archons” to replace those who died in office.<sup>638</sup> Further notes include information on the presidents of the law courts<sup>639</sup> and the *λογισταί* with their scribes.<sup>640</sup>

Dozens of other comments concern particular technical terms from the Athenian court room. In fact, the notes to *Against Timarchus* begin along these very lines, with a technical distinction between three important types of judicial proceeding:

γραφὴ καὶ δίκη καὶ εὐθυναὶ διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων. δίκη μὲν γὰρ ἰδιωτικὸν πρᾶγμα ἐστὶ, γραφὴ δὲ δημόσιον. καὶ τῇ μὲν ὅλοις τοῖς νόμοις ὄρισται ἢ καταδίκη, τῇ δὲ γραφῇ τιμᾶται τὸ δικαστήριον ὅποσον τι βούλοιτο. δηλοῖ δὲ Δημοσθένης ἐν τῷ κατὰ Μειδίου τὴν διαφορὰν. ἤδη μέντοι συγχέουσιν ὥστε ἐπιμίσειν. εὐθυναὶ δέ, ὅταν πρεσβευτὴν ἢ ἄρχοντά τις κρίνη.<sup>641</sup>

*γραφὴ*, *δίκη*, and *εὐθυναὶ* differ from each other. For *δίκη* is a private suit, but *γραφὴ* is a public one. And the one has its punishment decreed in the laws, whereas for a *γραφὴ* the court assesses however much it wants. And Demosthenes makes clear the difference in his *Against Medias*. But now they confuse [the terms] so as to mix them up. And *εὐθυναὶ* take place when someone answers for his work as ambassador or official.

Similarly, *ἐπαγγελία* is a type of suit brought against those who have prostituted themselves and who therefore sacrifice their citizen rights,<sup>642</sup> and *προβολή* refers normally to a suit against someone who has violated some law in connection with the Dionysia.<sup>643</sup> Two notes refer to the *κλεψύδρα* and explain how the length of a day in the month Poseideon was measured at 11 amphorae, from which adjustments were made for the other months when there was to be a day-long procedure.<sup>644</sup> Still other notes provide quite a few details about the process of producing witnesses and verifying their accounts.<sup>645</sup>

Aeschines also makes reference to a variety of other Athenian laws and procedures that warrant clarification. These include the procedure for making a proposal in the Assembly,<sup>646</sup> the specified days

<sup>637</sup> 1.158

<sup>638</sup> 3.62

<sup>639</sup> 3.14

<sup>640</sup> 3.15

<sup>641</sup> For more on punishment assessed by the court, see 1.15. For more on *εὐθυναὶ*, see 1.107, 3.9.

<sup>642</sup> 1.32

<sup>643</sup> 2.145

<sup>644</sup> 2.126

<sup>645</sup> E.g., subpoena (1.45f., 1.163, 2.68), absentee testimony (2.19), oaths of denial (2.94), suspicion of testimony given by friends (1.47).

<sup>646</sup> 2.84; cf. 1.86. For voting procedure, see 1.79, 1.111. For distinctions on election by lot, see 3.62.

on which archons were elected,<sup>647</sup> the laws on inheritance and wards,<sup>648</sup> the age of expected military service,<sup>649</sup> and a number of comments on the Athenian monetary system.<sup>650</sup> What emerges from these examples is that the scholiasts access a variety of principles and procedures from Athenian law, some of which are implicit in the speeches of Aeschines, while others require external sources.

### *Rhetoric*

The scholiasts also concern themselves with the theory and practice of rhetoric. (“Theory” here includes a range of technical terms for the various elements of a speech, rhetorical figures, etc. “Practice” means a clarification of Aeschines’ technique in other, less taxonomized ways.) As will be seen, the theoretical comments largely assume some knowledge of rhetorical terminology, and although it is always difficult to identify an intended audience in our scholia, the rhetorical notes would seem in general to anticipate a more “advanced” reader.

Though there is no place where all the parts of an oration are spelled out in a single lesson, notes in various locations give a limited picture of a speech’s broader structural movements. Importantly, a few pieces of evidence suggest that these notes—or at least some of them—may be traceable to the Roman period or later, but first I will give overview of the topic. It is expected that a speech will begin with an introduction (*προοίμιον*), though in each speech there are actually several *προοίμια*. At the beginning of Section 2 in *Against Timarchus* a scholion states that some call this a second introduction (*τοῦτό τινες δεύτερον προοίμιον*), and an additional note affirms that the start of our Section 3 is another (*ἕτερον προοίμιον*). Such is the case in the other speeches, with a second *προοίμιον* at *On the False Embassy* 4, and again at *Against Ctesiphon* 2. The close of an introduction is called a *συμπέρασμα*, and these are

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<sup>647</sup> 3.13

<sup>648</sup> 1.95, 2.99

<sup>649</sup> 2.167f.

<sup>650</sup> 1.107, 1.113, 1.115, 3.104

marked at *Against Timarchus* 3, *On the False Embassy* 3 and 5, and *Against Ctesiphon* 3.<sup>651</sup> Likewise, there are labels for the conclusion of an entire speech (ἐπίλογος), and while there is only one conclusion pointed out at *Against Timarchus* 177, there can again be several. In a note to *On the False Embassy* 143 the scholiast remarks that the ἐπίλογοι begin here, with the same sort of statement made at *Against Ctesiphon* 230, except that there one finds a more technical breakdown of ten τόποι in which the epilogues consist.<sup>652</sup>

Other examples of theoretical terminology pertaining to the division of a speech include the κατάστασις,<sup>653</sup> διήγησις,<sup>654</sup> and the δίκαιον and νόμιμον κεφάλαιον.<sup>655</sup> There is also a “refutation of indictments,” which in *Against Timarchus* is said to begin at our Section 71: ἐντεῦθεν ἐλέγχων ἀπαίτησις. ἔλειψε δὲ τὸ παραγραφικόν, ὅτι ὁ λόγος ὅλος παραγραφὴ ἐστίν.<sup>656</sup> Finally, another series of comments deal with the so-called “start-to-finish” phenomenon (τὸ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους), which is defined by Hermogenes as a set of questions in a legal case: who, what, where, how, when, and why.<sup>657</sup> This type of approach is exemplified in five separate notes spanning *Against Timarchus* 40-55 that answer “who,” “what,” and “when.”<sup>658</sup>

<sup>651</sup> Interestingly, all of these “conclusion” notes have just one manuscript attestation each, but the manuscript is different in each case.

<sup>652</sup> E.g., the first is a reminder of the essentials of the case (3.230), the second is for alarming the jurors (3.233), the third is a demand for a reasonable cause for giving Demosthenes the crown (3.236), etc., all the way to the tenth, in which Demosthenes concludes with a διαμαρτυρία that he has spoken “as best he could” (3.260).

<sup>653</sup> Presumably meaning “arrangement” (2.7, 2.20, 2.56, 3.9); in each case there is only a mention of the term without any clarification as to what it indicates.

<sup>654</sup> Narration, statement of the case (2.12)

<sup>655</sup> Meaning something like “a section of the speech dealing with what is just” and “a section of the speech pertaining to the law” (3.11, 33, 49, 50, 54). While the exact nature of this oratorical partition is obscure to me, it is clear that a categorical distinction is made, especially at 3.54: μετέρχεται ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον κεφάλαιον ἐντεῦθεν, πληρώσας τὸ νόμιμον.

<sup>656</sup> Note here that Aeschines is said to have skipped τὸ παραγραφικόν—which is permissible, because the whole speech is a παραγραφὴ (“counterplea, defense against an indictment”).

<sup>657</sup> τὰ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς ἄχρι τέλους ἐστὶ μὲν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον τοῦ κατηγοροῦ, γίνεται δὲ καὶ αὐξεται, ἀφ’ ὧν περ καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐλέγχων ἀπαίτησις· ἐστὶ δὲ τὰδε· τίς, τί, ποῦ, πῶς, πότε, διὰ τί (Περὶ τῶν στάσεων 3.80). The term is found mostly in Hermogenes and in commentaries on his work, though also in some other late rhetoricians. As we will find, the Aeschinean scholia have a few interesting points of overlap with the way rhetoric is treated by Hermogenes, and investigating the exact nature of this overlap would be a fruitful direction for future research.

<sup>658</sup> 1.40, 1.43, 1.53 (bis), 1.55. This technique is at least tangentially related to status theory, for which examples are rare in the Aeschinean scholia, though see 3.1: ἡ στάσις τοῦ λόγου ἐστὶ πραγματικὴ ἔγγραφος, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὑπὲρ τοῦ στεφάνου.

There are also places in which the division of the speech is disputed. For example, a scholiast says at *On the False Embassy* 5 that some people label the section beginning ὑμᾶς μὲν οὖν as a third introduction, but that it is really just the conclusion to the second: τοῦτο τινὲς τρίτον προοίμιον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου συμπέρασμα. Another example, and one that is important for the dating of these notes, comes shortly thereafter at our Section 6: τοῦτο οἱ περὶ Μαρξελλίνον προκατασκευὴν φασιν· ἔστι δὲ τρίτον προοίμιον, “Those of the school of Marcellinus say that this is the προκατασκευή,<sup>659</sup> but it is a third introduction.” If this Marcellinus is the same as the commentator whose work on Hermogenes’ rhetorical treatise on status theory Περὶ τῶν στάσεων is combined with that of Syranus and Sopater, then our scholion is probably later than the fifth century AD. The similarity of language in the other notes of this kind that we have seen just above would then suggest that they too are from this time. There is still almost nothing to go on here, but the prospect of a fifth century date for these notes on the theory of rhetoric is intriguing, especially given the proclivity toward rhetorical commentaries that one finds for Latin literature, as I will point out for both Terence and Vergil. At the very least, we have at *On the False Embassy* 6 an indication that at least some of the rhetorical theory in the scholia to Aeschines is fairly late.

In addition to the material on divisions of speeches, there is a ubiquitous concern for rhetorical figures (σχήματα) and individual methods of argument. Most of these are stated very simply without any elaboration, but there are a couple of instances in which some explanation is given. Among these is the rhetorical technique ἐπερώτησις, which the scholiast explains as asking oneself a question and then answering it, and there are two types: either the speaker states “someone says” before moving on to the actual quotation (διηγηματικόν) or simply gives the quotation himself without any marker of another

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<sup>659</sup> Hermogenes (Περὶ εὐρέσεως 3.1) uses this term to mean a sort of summary: ἔργον δὲ αὐτῆς τὸ προεκτίθεσθαι τὰ κεφάλαια καὶ τὰ ζητήματα, οἷς περιπλακεῖς ὁ λόγος συμπληρώσει τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, “Its job is to lay out the main points and questions which the speech will include as it fulfills its purpose.” For more examples in the scholia to Aeschines, see 2.7, 3.6, 3.9. For the related terms παρασκευή (“preparation,” = the same as προκατασκευή) and κατασκευή (“logical argument”), see 1.3, 1.4, 2.1, 2.4, 2.20, 3.1, 3.2 (there are also very many instances in the scholia to Demosthenes). It will be noted that all of these seem to occur at or near the beginning of a speech.



speaker (μιμητικόν).<sup>660</sup> Also requiring some further explanation is a technique called *διόρθωσις*, a “setting right” of information that an orator knows will be displeasing to the audience. The scholiast clarifies what is meant by two compounds of this word at *Against Timarchus* 37: τὸ σχῆμα προδιόρθωσις. εἰώθασι δὲ χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ, ὅταν μέλλωσιν ἀναγγέλλειν τι, πρὸς ὃ δυσκόλως διάκεινται οἱ ἀκούοντες. τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ καὶ μετὰ τὰ πράγματα λεχθὲν ἐπιδιόρθωσις καλεῖται, “This is the figure of *προδιόρθωσις*, and they [i.e., orators] are accustomed to use it whenever they are going to announce something to which the audience is ill disposed. And the same technique done after the fact is called *ἐπιδιόρθωσις*.” Further instances of both terms may be found in the scholia: Aeschines uses *ἐπιδιόρθωσις* when he fears repercussions from saying that the Athenians should model themselves on the Spartans regarding certain political practices,<sup>661</sup> and *προδιόρθωσις* comes when he must fight the presupposition on the part of some jurors that Demosthenes acted out of goodwill for the city.<sup>662</sup>

The many other instances of rhetorical figures include methods of amplification, such as *αὔξησις* and *δείνωσις*. Both of these terms are in fact used to describe Aeschines’ opening remark that he has brought litigation against Timarchus for the protection of the whole city, the laws, the jury, and himself.<sup>663</sup> The label *αὔξησις* recurs when Aeschines heaps the accusations high against Timarchus’ wanton manner of living: πάντα ταῦτα μετὰ αὔξησεως ὁ ῥήτωρ.<sup>664</sup> Still other passages describe additional types of argumentation employed by Aeschines. Three times in Dilt’s edition there is mention of the *παραγραφικὸν ἀπὸ χρόνου*, an appeal to chronology in answer to an accusation.<sup>665</sup> At *On the False Embassy* 123, Aeschines calls Demosthenes out for inconsistency by using his own claims against him: if Demosthenes knew Aeschines was in the wrong during the Second Embassy, why did he not make the accusation then instead of waiting until later? A similar argument appears a little later at Section 161,

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<sup>660</sup> 3.20

<sup>661</sup> 1.180

<sup>662</sup> 3.59

<sup>663</sup> 1.2

<sup>664</sup> 1.42

<sup>665</sup> Interestingly the exact phrase occurs almost nowhere else in all of Greek literature that is searchable on the TLG database (besides those in the Aeschinean scholia, there is one reference in the aforementioned commentary of Marcellinus on Hermogenes and one in the scholia to Demosthenes).

where Aeschines asks why his accusers put off the trial so long if they did not like his endorsement of peace with Philip. In another example at *Against Ctesiphon* 219, Demosthenes had apparently claimed that Aeschines had acted out of a desire to flatter Alexander, to which Aeschines retorts that the action to which Demosthenes referred was while Philip was still alive and Alexander was not clearly about to take over: why then would he have tried to flatter him? In each of these cases Aeschines argues on the basis of chronology, stating that his opponent's claims do not line up with the order of events.<sup>666</sup>

Two other notes on rhetorical *σχήματα* in *Against Ctesiphon* are important because they give the source of their taxonomy. While normally such terminology does not have any stated provenance, Apsines is twice cited for labeling a certain passage of Aeschines as a certain rhetorical figure. In the first example, when Aeschines says that the decree that just read is a disgrace to the city, a powerful indictment against Demosthenes' political actions, and a clear accusation of Ctesiphon, Apsines uses the term *ἐπίζευξις* ("yoking," "binding") to describe the appositional noun series: *τοῦτό φησιν Ἀψίνης ἐπίζευξιν εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ ἐνικῶ ὀνόματι πολλὰ ἐπιφέρει ὀνόματα. εἰπὼν γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ ψήφισμα ἐπήγαγεν αἰσχύνη, ἔλεγχος, κατηγορία.*<sup>667</sup> In the second example, Aeschines tells the jurors near the end of the speech to consider that the dead Aristides, an esteemed Athenian figure, is expressing his dismay at the fact that a villain like Demosthenes is being given a crown. In his work *Περὶ σχημάτων* Apsines called this the *σχῆμα* of *προσωποποιία*, or the fashioning of a character (i.e., the dead Aristides, who is otherwise unable to make an appearance), and the scholiast differentiates this from *ἠθοποιία*, which is for made-up characters.<sup>668</sup>

Another part of the rhetorical exegesis for Aeschines is highlighting the specific purposes behind his various forms of argumentation—the “practical” side of the rhetorical notes. Two of the most

<sup>666</sup> For examples of the many other rhetorical figures, see 1.138 (amphibole), 1.75 (apostrophe; cf. 1.121, 3.53), 1.94 (antithesis; cf. 2.4, 3.22, 3.28), 1.79 (epimone, “elaboration”).

<sup>667</sup> Τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ ψήφισμα, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, αἰσχύνη μὲν τῆς πόλεως, ἔλεγχος δὲ οὐ μικρὸς τῶν Δημοσθένους πολιτευμάτων, φανερά δὲ κατηγορία Κτησιφώντος (3.105).

<sup>668</sup> 3.258; compare Hermogenes (*Progyrnasmata* 9), who has the reverse definition for these terms: *ἠθοποιία* is when we fashion speeches of people who actually exist, whereas *προσωποποιία* is for when we make up a speaking entity that does not exist. Technically Apsines' use of *προσωποποιία* to describe Aristides is correct by this definition (he is not able to speak in his deceased state), but the appended definition of *ἠθοποιία* may be a mistake on the part of the scholiast.

important incarnations of this phenomenon are when Aeschines sets up an argument to defend against potential objections and when he wishes to win the jury over to his side. For instance, when Aeschines says that Timarchus prostituted himself while already having plenty to live on, the scholiast states that Aeschines does not want anyone to think that Timarchus did this simply to earn a living, which would be pardonable: <οὐδενὸς – μετρίων> ἵνα μὴ τις οἴησεται δι’ ἔνδειαν αὐτὸν πεπορνεῦσθαι, ὅπερ συγγνώμης ἦν.<sup>669</sup> Further, Aeschines speaks of problems that went on in Athens while he himself was away on an embassy, and a scholion suggests that Aeschines’ reason for this side comment was to protect himself from those who would accuse him of not speaking out against proposals that eventually proved damaging to the city: <πρεσβεύοντος ἐμοῦ> λύει τὸ ἀντιπίπτον· ἐχρῆν γὰρ ἀντελεπεῖν, ἀπεδήμουν, φησὶν.<sup>670</sup> In a final example, at *Against Ctesiphon* 25 Aeschines reports that starting with Eubulus, the commissioner of the Theoric Fund enjoyed increased responsibilities in different areas of Athenian government. The scholiast notes here that Aeschines brings up Eubulus for a specific reason:

τοῦτο ὡς ἀντιπίπτον βούλεται λύσαι. ἵνα γὰρ μὴ εἴπῃ ὁ Δημοσθένης ὅτι οὕτως εὖνους ἦμην τῇ πόλει, πολλὰς μοι ἀρχὰς ἐπίστευσε, λύει λέγων ὅτι οὐ διὰ τὴν εὖνοιαν τὴν σὴν, ἀλλ’ ἐπειδὴ ἔθος τοῦτο ἐγένετο ἀπὸ Εὐβούλου. οὗτος γὰρ πολιτευόμενος ἦρχε τῶν θεωρικῶν, καὶ διὰ τὴν εὖνοιαν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄλλας διοικήσεις αὐτῷ ἐπίστευσεν οἶον καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀντιγραφέως ἀρχήν. ἐκ τούτου λοιπὸν καὶ εἰς τοὺς ἀναξίους ἔδραμε τὸ ἔθος.

[Aeschines says this] since he wants to disarm a [potential] response. For in order that Demosthenes would not be able to say, “It was because I was benevolent to the city that she entrusted me with many offices,” Aeschines disarmingly says, “It was not on account of your benevolence for the city, but because this was the custom starting with Eubulus.” For this man served as an official over the Theoric Fund, and through his benevolence the city entrusted him with other responsibilities, such as the office of the accountant (*ἀντιγραφεύς*). After his term the custom continued, even to those unworthy of it.

Aeschines’ main point in this section, as he himself says, is to show that Demosthenes had many responsibilities while commissioner of the Theoric Fund, which is all the more reason to require him to be subject to *εὐθυνα* before being crowned. The scholiast wants to read a bit deeper, though. He sees Aeschines’ apparently harmless mention of Eubulus not simply as a basic recapitulation of how the

<sup>669</sup> 1.42

<sup>670</sup> 2.139; cf. 1.180

Theoric Fund commission was augmented, but as a subtle defense against Demosthenes' expected claim that his added responsibilities were a result of his own performance. Though the scholia frequently do nothing more than paraphrase what is already evident in the text, examples such as this demonstrate critical thinking about the text and its less obvious meanings.<sup>671</sup>

Other scholia show that Aeschines is sensitive to his need to win the audience over to his side. For instance, at *Against Ctesiphon* 15 a scholion points to Aeschines' avoidance of topics that are painful for the jurors. When Aeschines refers to the city's current political troubles, he says vaguely "these sorts of problems—and you know what they are." The reason cited for this language is given thus: <τοιούτων, ὁποίους> τὸ ἐπαχθὲς ἔφυγεν, ἵνα μὴ λυπήσῃ, "He avoided what was distasteful, so that [they jury] might not experience pain."<sup>672</sup> Another interesting example goes a bit further by stating explicitly that Aeschines' plan is to link himself with his audience, specifically where he rails on Demosthenes for treating the jury as if they were entirely uneducated about the Homeric poems. The scholiast appends a lemma with the opening words to this section and comments thus: <ἐπειδὴ δὲ> ἐνταῦθα συγκρούει αὐτὸν τοῖς δικασταῖς, "Here he joins himself to the jurors."<sup>673</sup> The subsequent notes are extremely interesting in that Aeschines' first-person plural verb λέξομεν is treated not as a true plural (i.e., Aeschines and the jury), but as what we call a "royal plural" referring only to himself.<sup>674</sup> The language of the scholion shows not a rhetorical ploy, as one might expect given the previous note, but simple grammatical variation, akin to the many similar variations found frequently in the scholia to Euripides and Aeschines. Nonetheless, the overall purpose of the section is summarized immediately below: κοινοποιεῖ ἑαυτὸν τοῖς δικασταῖς εἰς πλείω καταφορὰν ἐκείνου, "He associates himself with the jurors for a greater attack against that man [i.e., Demosthenes]."

<sup>671</sup> For more basic examples of Aeschines' defense against counterpoints, see 1.49, 2.104, 2.121.

<sup>672</sup> 3.5

<sup>673</sup> 1.141; one will notice that, as in numerous other places, Carey's modern commentary to his translation contains much the same assertion.

<sup>674</sup> πλῆθυντικῶς εἶπε, δέον ἐνικῶς. ἀδιάφορον κατὰ παλαιὰν συνήθειαν.

*Varia*

Because of the coverage of the following types of notes in the previous chapter, I do not wish to spend a great deal of time discussing the miscellaneous other topical categories covered by the scholia to Aeschines, but rather to proceed onward to what the scholia say about Aeschines and the art of oratory. It will suffice to mention a few examples here for a general understanding of what is available in these comments.

In terms of “scientific” notes, the scholia to Aeschines are sharply reduced. There is no need, for instance, to explain constellation imagery in courtroom speeches as there frequently is in a choral ode. There are, however, a number of notes on geography and topography, including the locations of certain cult sites. Among other things, the Attic demes must be clarified, as when the scholiast differentiates between two places called Colonus and explains which one the orator means.<sup>675</sup> A number of passages include the identification of cities, such as those surrounding Mount Oeta,<sup>676</sup> and a list of Locrian cities, among which Nicaea is a city by the sea, 40 stades from Thermopylae.<sup>677</sup> In addition to other notes on rivers and islands,<sup>678</sup> topographical information covers cult sites such as the altar of Rumor at Athens and its founding,<sup>679</sup> the Propylaea as a monument of valor,<sup>680</sup> the Theseum as a place of refuge and the potential confusion resulting from multiple places to which this name was given,<sup>681</sup> a holy place of Apollo at Tamuna that was also mentioned in the *Against Medias*,<sup>682</sup> an altar of Zeus in the Assembly,<sup>683</sup> and a description of the Phaedriadan rocks as a launching point for the execution of those sinning against the temple at Delphi.<sup>684</sup> Likewise, the plow of Epimenides (nicknamed Buzyges) was placed on the Athenian acropolis to commemorate him as the first person to yoke a team of oxen together: ὄθεν καὶ τὸ ἄροτρον

<sup>675</sup> 1.125; see also 1.97, 1.101, 2.83, et al.

<sup>676</sup> 2.142

<sup>677</sup> 2.132; see also 1.113, 2.27, et al.

<sup>678</sup> 1.107, 2.72f., 2.124, 2.143

<sup>679</sup> 1.128

<sup>680</sup> 2.74

<sup>681</sup> 3.13

<sup>682</sup> 2.169

<sup>683</sup> 2.45

<sup>684</sup> 2.142

αὐτοῦ ἀνέκειτο ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει πρὸς μνήμην.<sup>685</sup> Other types of “scientific” notes are sparse, though one does find a hint of botanical and zoological information.<sup>686</sup>

A handful of places also elucidate the text of Aeschines with other pieces of cultural information like that seen in the scholia to Euripides. For instance, the scholiast might clarify burial customs<sup>687</sup> or offer some definition for festivals such as the Eleusinian Mysteries, the Dionysia, or the Lenaea.<sup>688</sup> A series of interconnected notes also lays out genealogical information for the Eumolpidae and Ceryces, including a summary of the types of “heralds” used in the city and the identification of various priestly classes.<sup>689</sup> Ethnographic comments are infrequent, though they are not entirely absent.<sup>690</sup> Finally, though there is not the prevalence of the “For it was customary . . .” notes that appeared so often in the Euripidean scholia, there are a few references to contemporary practices that have the same basic flavor. These include a short discussion of the practice of branding fugitive slaves, a custom that is curiously suggested to have originated with Xerxes’ branding of his Theban prisoners: ἡ ἐπειδὴ Ξέρξης Θηβαίους αὐτομολήσαντας ἔστιζεν.<sup>691</sup>

It is to be observed that, while the Aeschinean scholia cover much of the same categorical territory as the Euripidean scholia, there is in general less information provided by the former. Proverbs, for instance, receive only brief mention,<sup>692</sup> in contrast to the heavy emphasis laid on their appearance in the *Phoenissae* and other Euripidean plays. So too there is much less need for the identification of various peoples and customs, including religious practices<sup>693</sup> and the definition of musical terms. This will have much to do simply with the size of the corpus of notes, but is also a product of a change in the genre of the original text.

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<sup>685</sup> 2.78

<sup>686</sup> 2.21, 2.99

<sup>687</sup> 1.13

<sup>688</sup> 2.133, 1.43

<sup>689</sup> 1.19f., 2.147, 3.18

<sup>690</sup> See the identification of nomadic Scythian tribes at *On the False Embassy* 78.

<sup>691</sup> 2.79 (apparently the only mention of Xerxes in the Aeschinean scholia)

<sup>692</sup> A couple of examples appear at *On the False Embassy* 215, 261 and *Against Ctesiphon* 90.

<sup>693</sup> Though see 1.114, where Deinarchus the Rhetor is quoted by the scholiast to show by which gods Timarchus issued his false oath (Apollo, Demeter, and Zeus).

### *Histories and Contexts*

For the speeches of Aeschines, explanation of history has a more central purpose than the historical-mythological notes to Euripides. In the latter, information is generally presented to explain a terse reference to the past that is otherwise not comprehensible, or to help the reader expand his or her general mythological knowledge, but these details are rarely crucial for understanding the play as a whole. For Aeschines, on the other hand, the historical notes are as a rule necessary for understanding his and Demosthenes' arguments, such that the elucidation of events and circumstances will influence one's comprehension of the entire speech. As we will see later, the demand for realism and consistency found in the Euripidean scholia persist, but now the debate is not simply one of aesthetic quality, but of legality. Notes on history, therefore, take on a different flavor, not only because they consist more often of what we call "history" as opposed to mythological legend, but also because they are so important for judging the overall effectiveness of Aeschines' speeches.<sup>694</sup>

Many important historical figures are identified, if only briefly. A number of these are Athenian military commanders or orators and are listed with their father, hometown, or perhaps a brief summary of successes and failures.<sup>695</sup> Some of the explanations become somewhat lengthier, as in the case of Hippomenes:


*Ἴππομένης γὰρ τὸ μὲν γένος τῶν Κοδριδῶν, βασιλεὺς δὲ Ἀθηναίων, λαβὼν ἐπὶ τῇ θυγατρὶ μοιχὸν τοῦτον μὲν αἰκισάμενος ἀπέκτεινε, τὴν δὲ θυγατέρα καθείρξεν ἐν οἰκῆματι μεθ' ἵππου. ὁ δὲ λιμώττων κατέφαγε τὴν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὕστερον καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπὸ λιμοῦ ἀπώλετο. καλεῖται δ' ἔτι καὶ νῦν ὁ τόπος ἐν ᾧ καθείρθησαν Παρ' ἵππον καὶ κόραν.*

For Hippomenes, of the family of the Codridae, king of the Athenians, having caught a man committing adultery with his daughter, killed him with the spear, and he locked up his daughter in a house with a horse, and the horse, being famished, devoured the woman, and later also the horse itself died from starvation. And the place in which they were locked up is called even now the "Place of the Horse and the Girl."

<sup>694</sup> At the same time, we must be careful not to create a firm division between "myth" and "history" for the scholia. The narrative on the history of the Palladium shows as much (2.87).

<sup>695</sup> E.g., Timomachus (1.56), Laodamas (1.69), Eubulus (2.8), Tolmides (2.75), Callistratus (2.124), Thrasylbulus (3.138). The succession of notes at *Against Ctesiphon* 139 is interesting for its brevity; perhaps the scholiast, awash in names, began to lose patience: "A famous orator. This man is an orator too. This man is too" (ῥήτωρ διάσημος. ῥήτωρ καὶ οὗτος. ῥήτωρ καὶ οὗτος).

Also in this category are a few notes on the family history of Philip, for instance how the Athenians helped Amyntas, Philip's father, regain his power.<sup>696</sup> This cluster of scholia is particularly remarkable for the fact that it contains a short genealogical tree sketched out in a few of the manuscripts, not unlike the lexicographical diagram seen above:



The speeches of Aeschines also frequently call up specific moments in Athenian history that need clarification, often with some relation to the Peloponnesian War (specifically the Thirty Tyrants, the history of the Deceleia, and the rule of the 400).<sup>697</sup> In other places the scholiasts elucidate developments in Athenian law, such as the reforms of Solon and Draco, or Eucleides' law requiring citizens to have two Athenians as parents.<sup>698</sup> There are other, more recent events as well, such as the razing of Thespia and Plataea by the Thebans,<sup>699</sup> or the collection of Athenian goods from the countryside within the city walls upon Philip's entrance into central Greece.<sup>700</sup> These naturally include events that pertain directly to the main characters in the legal disputes at hand, such as the issue of house construction on the Pnyx, for which Timarchus proposed legislation,<sup>701</sup> and Demosthenes' corruption and exploitation of Aristarchus, whom he apparently coaxed to kill Nicodemus, and from whom he later embezzled money that he had promised to send to the exiled Aristarchus.<sup>702</sup> Finally, other notes give a general picture of the times

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<sup>696</sup> 2.26ff.

<sup>697</sup> 2.76, 2.77, 2.176

<sup>698</sup> 1.6, 1.39

<sup>699</sup> 2.104

<sup>700</sup> 2.139

<sup>701</sup> 1.81

<sup>702</sup> 1.171, 2.166



without referring to specific events. For example, when Aeschines uses the term *λογόγραφος* perjoratively, a scholion states that this activity was disreputable: οὐκ ἦν δὲ ἀστεῖον τὸ λογογραφεῖν οὐδὲ τὸ συνηγορεῖν μισθοῦ.<sup>703</sup> Compare also a note to *On the False Embassy* 76, which states that orators would be exalted among the people for accusing the rich in a court of law, securing their condemnation, and distributing the financial penalty to the crowd.

A few further scholia must be mentioned here for their use of what we have called “extraneous” details—that is, information that is not necessary for understanding the text at hand, but seems aimed at a more general education about a certain topic. A brief mention by Aeschines, for example, of the “amnesty” he will have for the sins of Timarchus’ youth—which he likens to the amnesty following the dissolution of the Thirty Tyrants—inspires one of the longest notes in the corpus, a huge summary of the rise of the Thirty, their ruthless actions while in power, the number of casualties they caused, a funerary epitaph on the grave of Critias, the fact that the Athenians hated them so much that they despised even the number thirty, and finally that in the wake of their rule an amnesty was enacted.<sup>704</sup> Other examples are less drastic, but demonstrate a similar approach. Consider also the extensive note to the location known as the Nine Roads, for the name of which the scholiast provides an etymology: a girl named Phyllis fell in love with Demophon but was stood up by him nine times at the place in question. She thus cursed the Athenians to have bad luck there nine times.<sup>705</sup> The scholiast could have ended with this, but instead proceeds to recount all nine military losses they faced there. Lastly, a brief mention by Aeschines of the cult of the Erinyes sparks a digression that is by no means necessary for grasping Aeschines’ meaning.<sup>706</sup> Here the scholiast reports that Scopas made two of the three statues of the Erinyes from Parian marble, and that Calamis made the one in the middle. There follows more information: the Areopagite Council oversees homicide trials for three days a month, one day for each of the Erinyes, and the offerings given to them are cakes and milk in urns. Finally, some say their parents are Gaia and Scotus, but others say

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<sup>703</sup> 1.94  
<sup>704</sup> 1.39  
<sup>705</sup> 2.31  
<sup>706</sup> 1.118

Scotus and Euonyme (who is also called Gaia), and that they were euphemistically called “Eumenides” in the *Orestes*, being first called Erinyes. Such a note seems not to be a quick guide to the reader, but rather an encyclopedia entry for all the scholiast can think of regarding the Erinyes. At the very least we can say that the scholiast is not simply trying to get the reader through the original text, but wants to give a much broader understanding of certain topics.

### *Aeschines*

In the previous chapter we saw numerous pieces of outside information about the author that were introduced by the scholiast (with no particular prompt from the original text) to offer some glance at the man behind the curtain, as it were—that he was a student of Anaxagoras, that he received benefits from cities he flattered in his dramas, that he had a quarrel with Sophocles, etc. For Aeschines, and Athenian forensic oratory in general, the relationship between the author and text is much different. Rather than looking for clues to a hidden Euripides within his tragedies, the reader is faced with a sort of (pseudo)autobiographical account. The question thus shifts from “Where is the author?” to “How will the author present himself?” There is in fact a great deal of information about Aeschines, but for the most part it is an elaboration of what is already in the original text, and for that reason is generally less valuable and interesting than the Euripidean notes that introduce material from an outside source—and perhaps things which we would not otherwise know.

I find no significant biographical information about Aeschines that is not at least partially revealed by the speeches themselves.<sup>707</sup> The mentions of Aeschines that do occur are generally to explain what his strategy is, as discussed above in the section on rhetorical theory and practice. Actually, one finds more interesting details about Demosthenes in these scholia than about Aeschines, though again

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<sup>707</sup> An example is Aeschines’ claim to be from the phratry that shares with the Eteobutadae the priestly duties of the cult of Athena Polias; the scholion does little more than rephrase what Aeschines himself has said (2.147).

these are just elaborations on what is already suggested by the original text. Besides remarks about Demosthenes' previous (dishonest and underhanded) litigations and other disreputable activities,<sup>708</sup> two important themes recur: the ethnicity of his mother and his nickname "Batalus." The former appears at least three times in *On the False Embassy*, the first two stating explicitly that she was said to be Scythian, and the third explaining why Aeschines calls him a bastard: οὐ διὰ τὸ ἐκ παλλακίδος εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκ διαφόρου γένους, ὥσπερ τὸν ἡμίονον λέγομεν νόθον εἶναι, "Not because he was born from a mistress, but because of his mixed birth, just as we say that a mule is a bastard."<sup>709</sup> Two clusters of notes also explain what is meant by the nickname "Batalus." The first is from *Against Timarchus* 126:

Βάταλος δὲ ὁ κίμαιδος λέγεται. Βάταλος δὲ τις γέγονεν ἀνὴρ ἀλλητῆς ἡταιρικῶς. ἢ οὖν ἐκ τούτου Βάταλος ὁ Δημοσθένης ἐκαλεῖτο, καθότι μεγάλα καθίσματα εἶχεν, ἢ ἐκ τοῦ βαταλίζεσθαι, οἷον ἐὶ τύπτεσθαι. <Βάταλον> καταπύγωνα καὶ μαλακόν. ὠνομάσθαι δὲ φασιν οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ Βατάλου ἀλλητοῦ μαλακοῦ, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ ποιητοῦ κατεαγότα κρούματα γράφοντος. διόπερ καὶ Δημοσθένη διὰ μαλακίαν οὕτως ὀνομασθῆναι. λελοιδόρηται γὰρ αὐτῷ πάντες εἰς μαλακίαν. εἰσὶ δ' οἱ βάταλον προσηγόρευον τὸν πρωκτόν· καὶ Δημοσθένην ἐκ μεταφορᾶς διὰ μαλακίαν βάταλον ἐκάλεσαν. αὐτὸς μέντοι ὁ Αἰσχίνης φησὶν ὡς Δημοσθένης ἔλεγεν ὡς ὑποκοριζομένη παιδίον αὐτὸν ὄντα ἢ τιτθῆ οὕτως ἐκάλεσαν. καὶ νῦν δὲ οἱ ἀλληταὶ ὑποπόδιον διπλοῦν ὑπὸ τὸν δεξιὸν πόδα ἔχοντες, ὅταν αὐλῶσι, κατακρούουσιν ἅμα τῷ ποδὶ τὸ ὑποπόδιον, τὸν ῥυθμὸν τὸν αὐτὸν συναποδιδόντες, ὃ καλοῦσι βάταλον. δοκεῖ δὲ μοι<sup>710</sup> λελέχθαι Βάταλος παρὰ τὸ Εὐπόλιδος σκῶμμα· ἐκεῖνος γὰρ τὸ τῶν Βατάλων ὄνομα κείσθαι τοῖς αἰσχροῖς καὶ τὸν πρωκτόν βάταλον ὑπ' αὐτῶν καλεῖσθαι.

And a pathic is called "Batalus." And there was a certain man named Batalus, a flute player who prostituted himself. Thus, either Demosthenes was called Batalus from this man, insofar as he had large buttocks, or from the [verb] βαταλίζεσθαι, meaning "to get drummed." <Βάταλον> sexually deviant and effeminate. And some say he was so called from Batalus the effeminate flute player, and others from a poet who wrote weak musical pieces, and that for this reason Demosthenes was so called on account of his effeminacy. For they all slandered him for effeminacy. And there are some who call the anus "Batalus, and they called Demosthenes Batalus metaphorically on account of his effeminacy. But Aeschines himself says that Demosthenes said that his nurse gave him that nickname when he was a child. And now too flute players, having a double footstool under the right foot, when they play, beat the footstool in time with their foot, rendering the same rhythm, which they call "Batalus." And it seems to me that "Batalus" was spoken as a joke by Eupolis. For that man wrote that the name of "Batalus" belonged to shameful men and that the anus was called "Batalus" by them [because of them?].

<sup>708</sup> 2.93, 2.149, 3.51

<sup>709</sup> 2.22, 2.87, 2.93

<sup>710</sup> In the scholia to Aeschines one finds plenty of instances of plural first-person verbs in formulae such as "like we observed above," but this use of the singular is not at all common.

The second passage, at *On the False Embassy* 99, repeats some of this information in reduced form:

<Βάταλος> ἔκλυτος καὶ ἄνανδρος, ἀπὸ ἀύλητοῦ τινὸς ὀνόματι Βατάλου. Ἄλλως· οἱ μὲν ἀύλητὴν Βάταλον ὠνομάσθαι οὕτως, οἱ δὲ ποιητὴν μελῶν κατεαγότων. ἔκ δὲ τούτου σκώπτει αὐτὸν εἰς μαλακίαν. It is

interesting to note how varied the potential explanations are. Normally the scholia to Aeschines are in agreement about such things, but when there is no cue in the original text as to how this name was interpreted by Demosthenes' contemporaries, there is more room to hypothesize. This example marks one of the few in which biographical details of any kind are introduced almost entirely from an outside source, and the disagreement between commentators would seem to be a product of this.

### *Praise and Blame*

As in the scholia to Euripides, commentators express approval and disapproval regarding the content and style of Aeschines. The same basic principles of judgment recur in that the notes speak of narrative consistency, factual accuracy, proper use of language, and so on. The ramifications of those judgments, however, are much different, particularly in the realm of factual accuracy. While a poet may be excused for toying with the details of a particular myth, Aeschines is held to the truth, and many of the criticisms of his speech are accusations of misinformation, whether through ignorance or malice.

Aeschines is caught, for example, appealing to a statue of Solon to show that the orators of old were much more reserved in their mode of dress than the scantily clad Timarchus, but the scholiast (and

Demosthenes) see through this: <Σόλωνος εἰκόνα> ἀνετέθη ἢ Σόλωνος εἰκὼν οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ ἐν κόσμῳ λέγειν, ὡς φησιν Αἰσχίνης, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ οὕτω τὰ ἐλεγεία ἀπήγγειλε. Δημοσθένης μέντοι [19.251] νεωστὶ φησι πρὸ πεντήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀνατεθεῖσθαι ταύτην τὴν εἰκόνα, “The statue of Solon was not put there for his well-

ordered speaking, as Aeschines suggests, but since he presented his elegies in that way. And

Demosthenes says that this statue was set up recently, just 50 years prior [i.e., that it was not even

contemporary with Solon].”<sup>711</sup> Other accusations of this time are more concise, some with the simple tag “false,” as when Aeschines asserts that Socrates was executed because he taught Critias, one of the Thirty Tyrants.<sup>712</sup> In a previously mentioned passage on the Nine Roads, Aeschines is faulted for a historical inaccuracy—it was not Acamas who received this place as a dowry, as Aeschines claims, but rather Demophon.<sup>713</sup> Elsewhere Aeschines pulls material from Andocides in his summary of Athenian history at *On the False Embassy* 175, but the scholiast points to several of these “historical” details as incorrect.<sup>714</sup> On the other hand, not all of the fact checking in the scholia is negative: at *Against Timarchus* 195, a scholion cites Lycurgus in order to defend Aeschines’ statement that the law on *δοκιμασία* is for the scrutiny of public, not private men.<sup>715</sup>

Aeschines is also faulted for the misuse of vocabulary or some other problem in expression. In a note to *Against Timarchus* 49, the scholiast alleges, with a reinforcing citation from Plato, that the term *προφερέης* means a person who is actually young but appears old. It is thus “not well” (*οὐ καλῶς*) that Aeschines states: *ἔνιοι μὲν γὰρ νέοι ὄντες, προφερεῖς καὶ πρεσβύτεροι φαίνονται*, “For some are young, but seem *προφερεῖς* and older.” The problem is that Aeschines has been too wordy, since *προφερεῖς* itself explains all: *ἤρκει γὰρ μόνον τὸ προφερεῖς πάντα δηλῶσαι*. Conversely, Aeschines is too terse when states: “On the one hand, those who are well-measured by nature . . . but Ctesiphon . . . .” Here the scholiast prefers a more balanced antithesis: *εἰπὼν ‘οἱ μὲν μέτριοι εἰσιν,’ ἔδει ἐπενεγκεῖν ‘οἱ δὲ ἀναιδεῖς, ὧν ἐστὶ Κτησιφῶν,’* “Having said “On the one hand, those who are moderate,” he should have said “But others who are shameful, of whom Ctesiphon is one . . . .”<sup>716</sup> A little later Aeschines refers to “another” argument that the opposition will set forth, but the scholiast complains that this is not consistent with

<sup>711</sup> 1.25

<sup>712</sup> *ψεῦδος* (1.173; cf. 1.117, 2.61). Note that these are generally, though not exclusively, confined to Manuscript f.

<sup>713</sup> *οὗτος δὲ παρὰ τὴν ἱστορίαν Ἀκάμαντί φησι δοθῆναι, οὐ Δημοφῶντι* (2.31).

<sup>714</sup> *<καὶ πάλιν> μετῆκται τὰ πλεῖστα ἐκ τῶν Ἀνδοκίδου [3.8], ἔστι δὲ ψευδῆ.*

<sup>715</sup> For further examples of fact checking, see 1.3, 1.33, 3.68, 3.86, 3.210.

<sup>716</sup> 3.11

what has come before: οὐδένα προείπε τῶν ἀδικούντων λόγον. πῶς οὖν φησι καὶ ἕτερον; “He gives no initial argument that the unjust men [will make], so how does he mention also a ‘second one’?”<sup>717</sup>

In the scholia to Euripides we saw a number of instances in which the author’s οἰκονομία was judged: that is, how well has the poet arranged his narrative so that it coheres with logic and the literary critical demand for realism? Surprisingly, there is practically nothing on this topic in the scholia to Aeschines, though I provide what I have found here. A minor example at *On the False Embassy* 22 does not pertain to Aeschines’ speech, but rather an internal reference to a speech that Demosthenes had given previously, but I add it here as a signal for the kind of way that the scholiast thinks about οἰκονομία in an oratorical context. In this passage Aeschines reports that Demosthenes claimed at the beginning of his speech to have been the youngest of the speakers there so that he would speak last, to which the scholiast adds Demosthenes’ supposed train of thought: προοικονομούμενος, ὡς οἶμαι, τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων νοήματα ἀπανθίσειν, “[He said this] making arrangements in advance, as I judge, so that he might cherry-pick the arguments made by all the other speakers.” The other example is more relevant to Aeschines’ own pattern of argumentation. At *Against Timarchus* 53, Aeschines says that Misgolas sent Timarchus out of his house when he became weary of the high cost.<sup>718</sup> The scholiast praises this seemingly minor comment about the lavish expense as a brilliant set-up for his later arguments: ἐπειδὴ βούλεται αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ πατρῶα κατεδηδοκῶτα ἐπιδείξει, θαυμαστῶς πάνυ τοῦτο προοικονομεῖ λέγων αὐτὸν πολυτελεῆ εἶναι, “Since he wants to show that he devoured even his inheritance [1.95ff.], he marvelously sets up this argument, saying that he was an expensive chap.”

Other comments show that the scholiasts have an eye for statements and arguments that are particularly persuasive. In arguing that Demosthenes had been a corruptor of men’s wives, Aeschines says that he will not put any of these men forward as witnesses, since they would want to conceal the

<sup>717</sup> 3.13; see also accusations of solecism at 3.127 and 3.180—though note in the former that by grouping the words in the sentence differently, the scholiast finds it possible to harmonize the construction.

<sup>718</sup> Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ὁ Μισγόλας τῇ τε δαπάνῃ ἀπέειπε . . . .

matter.<sup>719</sup> A scholiast calls this a powerful argument—δεινὸν τὸ ἐνθύμημα—evidently because he skillfully turned a lack of witnesses into proof of his point.<sup>720</sup> Elsewhere Aeschines’ association of Timarchus with notorious criminals such as Diophantus, Cephisodorus, and Mnesitheus is called “acerbic and piercing,” *πικρὸν καὶ δριμύ.*<sup>721</sup> Aeschines is also praised for his trick at *Against Ctesiphon* 54:

χαριέντως ὁ Αἰσχίνης, ὅτι διαιρῶν τὴν κατηγορίαν εἰς τοὺς τέσσαρας καιροὺς οὐχ ὡς αὐτὸς ταύτην ποιούμενος τὴν διαίρεσιν τῆς κατηγορίας ποιεῖται τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ’ ὡς τοῦ Δημοσθένους χρωμένου ταύτη τῇ τῶν καιρῶν διαιρέσει, ἵνα ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ ἀνεπίφθονος γένηται.

Aeschines [says this] skillfully, since in dividing the accusation into four time periods he delivers the speech as if he himself did not make the accusation’s division, but as if Demosthenes used this division of time periods, so that the speech would not make [the jury] bitter toward him.

Other passages are less well-received, such as Aeschines’ joke that Ctesiphon’s orifices, including the one that speaks, has been corrupted: οὐκ ἔστιν ἔμφυχον τουτὶ τὸ χωρίον οὐδ’ ἀληθινόν, “This passage is neither lively [?] nor true.”<sup>722</sup> Elsewhere, Aeschines is said to have gone out of his way to use the term

*ἀνδραγαθία* maliciously instead of *εὐνοία* simply so that he could play up the effeminacy of Demosthenes:

κακοήθως τοῦτο· δέον γὰρ εὐνοίας εἰπεῖν ἀνδραγαθίας εἶπεν ὡς τοῦ Δημοσθένους ἀνάδρου ὄντος.<sup>723</sup>

Aeschines is thus said to employ a cheap *ad hominem* attack instead of using the most accurate terminology. The same term *κακοήθως* occurs also at *Against Timarchus* 79 in a very interesting reading of Aeschines’ statement that if he were to take a vote in the jury as to whether Timarchus was a prostitute, the result would be a clear majority. The interesting feature of this note is that, when Aeschines mentions the solid bar (*πλήρης*) and hollow bar (*τετρυπημένη*) used for indicating a “yes” or “no” vote, the scholiast sees a subversive joke: τοῦτο κακοήθως εἶπεν ἐπὶ τοῦ Τιμάρχου, καὶ ἔστι κακέμφατον, “He said this maliciously toward Timarchus, and it is a vulgarity.” The implication here, which adjacent notes clarify,

<sup>719</sup> 1.107

<sup>720</sup> Note that Manuscript x has a curious first-person assertion: *δεινὸν τοῦτο ᾄμην*. See also Aeschines’ dodging of the problem of no witnesses at 1.176, which he does “altogether powerfully,” *πάνυ δεινῶς* (so too with his *a fortiori* argument at 1.88).

<sup>721</sup> 1.158

<sup>722</sup> 2.88

<sup>723</sup> 3.42

is that the “bored through” voting disc is used to condemn a “bored through” man, and this is accordingly marked as foul play.

Interestingly, some notes also discuss the effectiveness of Demosthenes’ speeches, giving further clues as to how orations are judged by the scholiasts. When Aeschines says sarcastically that Demosthenes is an exceptional speaker, one potential interpretation of this phrase is that Demosthenes can discover ways to get around thorny problems, including in the Eighth Philippic when the topic was the salvation of Diopieithes and he instead shifted the focus to fear for the Chersonese.<sup>724</sup> Other notes defend Demosthenes, as when Aeschines refers to a bogus claim by the defense that Timarchus could not possibly have been prostituting himself and squandering his inheritance at the same time. The scholiast actually seems to express approval of the argument that Aeschines denies: *ἐνταῦθα ἡ πιθανὴ ἀπολογία*.<sup>725</sup> Demosthenes is also criticized, though, as when he is said to have called Cottyphus of Pharsalus an Arcadian, when it was the Thessalians who were in charge there.<sup>726</sup> Demosthenes and Aeschines are both criticized at *Against Ctesiphon* 108, for both had made the same geographical error:

Ἀθηνᾶ Προνοία] καὶ Αἰσχίνης καὶ Δημοσθένης ἐν τῷ κατ’ Ἀριστογείτονος ἡμαρτήκασι γράψαντες τὴν ἐν Δελφοῖς Ἀθηνᾶν Πρόνοιαν. τὸ δὲ ἀμάρτημα διὰ περιήχησιν ἐντόπιον ἱστορίας. τῆς γὰρ Ἀττικῆς ἐν δήμῳ τινὶ πεποιήται ἱερὸν Ἀθηνᾶς Προνοίας, Πυθοῖ δὲ Προναίας ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸ τοῦ νεῶ ἰδρῦσθαι . . . ταύτης μέμνηται Ἡρόδοτος ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ· τὸ δὲ Προνοίας Ὑπερίδης ἐν Δηλιακῷ συνιστᾷ ὅτι ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ ἐστίν.

Both Aeschines and Demosthenes in the *Against Aristogeiton* have erred in writing “Athena Pronoia at Delphi.” And the mistake is because of a local echoing [= retelling?] of history. For in a certain deme of Attica there has been made a shrine of Athena Pronoia. But at Pytho, [the shrine is] of Athena Pronaias, from the phrase “founded before the temple.” Herodotus records this in his first book, and Hyperides confirms in his *Deliacus* that it is in Attica.

As with Euripides, there are also moments in which a scholiast comes to the aid of Aeschines against detractors. Aeschines’ anadiplosis of “Thebes, Thebes” at *Against Ctesiphon* 133 had evidently been called by some a solecism, but a scholion states that it is simply a linguistic figure: τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον

<sup>724</sup> 1.119

<sup>725</sup> 1.94

<sup>726</sup> 3.128



οὐκ ἔστι σολοικισμός, ἀλλὰ σχῆμα.<sup>727</sup> Another potential accusation had appeared just earlier, when Aeschines blames Demosthenes for pushing a subversive proposal through the Assembly. To the question, “Why did he not speak against it?” the scholiast shows that Aeschines defended himself by saying that the Assembly was adjourning, and that most people (including Aeschines) had already left: ἀντέπιπτε· καὶ διὰ τί ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ παρὼν οὐκ ἀντέλεγε; ὁ δὲ φησιν, ὅτι ἔμελλον ἢ ἐκκλησία ἀνίστασθαι. Later in this speech Aeschines guesses that Demosthenes will be angry at being compared to Athenian ancestors and will say, “Do not compare me with them. Consider how Olympians compete only against their contemporaries.”<sup>728</sup> Where Aeschines retorts that it is not against other people, but against a standard of virtue that men compete for civic crowns, Dionysius apparently criticized the passage: οὐ γάρ, φησί, νικῆσαι βουλόμεθα τὴν ἀρετὴν ὡς τοὺς ἀνταγωνιστάς, “For, he says, we do not want to defeat virtue as we do our competitors.” A scholiast replies: ἡγνόηκε δὲ ὅτι ὁ ἀγὼν πρὸς τὸ ἐπαγόμενον νοεῖται. ἄνω μὲν οὖν περὶ τῆς νίκης λέγομεν αὐτοὺς ἀγωνίζεσθαι, νῦν δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἐφικέσθαι, “But Dionysius did not recognize that the contest is thought of as against a standard of excellence. Therefore we speak above about them competing for victory, but now about attaining [a standard].” That is, Dionysius was too tendentious regarding Aeschines’ statement regarding the competition of virtue, and the scholiast sees through this.<sup>729</sup> Lastly, Aeschines faces criticism as to the lack of κατασκευὴ and συμπέρασμα in the introduction to *Against Ctesiphon*, but the scholiast shows how there is indeed both and gives short quotations to prove his point.<sup>730</sup>

<sup>727</sup> There is a similar situation at *Against Ctesiphon* 116, where a scholion defends Aeschines against a possible charge of stating that there are two temples at Delphi, when in fact he says only that it was at the incomplete restoration of the temple.

<sup>728</sup> 3.189

<sup>729</sup> See also the defense of Aeschines at *Against Timarchus* 69, where “the critics” say that Aeschines’ language belongs in an epilogue. The response is firm: ἀλλ’ εὐήθες πάσχουσι· μερικὰς γὰρ πανταχοῦ ποιεῖν ἔξεστιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐφ’ ἐκάστου κεφαλαίου ἐπιλογιζόμεθα.

<sup>730</sup> 3.1

## Oratory

In addition to the aforementioned passages on rhetoric, the scholiasts also provide a glimpse into their understanding of oratory as a genre, specifically how speeches were written and performed. The first note of this kind offers little more than a restatement of what Aeschines himself says about Demosthenes' need to use written aids when speaking in front of Philip: <τῶν γεγραμμένων> οἱ γὰρ μὴ δυνάμενοι ἀπὸ μνήμης εἰπεῖν γράφουσι πολλάκις ἃ μέλλουσι λέγειν. ἢ οὖν ὡς σκηπτόμενον αὐτὸν λέγει, ἢ ἐπειδὴ ἔγραφεν ἐν ὑπομνηστικῶ περιὶ τίνος καὶ τί δεήσει λέγειν, “For those not able to speak from memory often write what they will say. Thus, either he says this because he was propping himself up, or since he wrote what he needed to say in a notebook.”<sup>731</sup> The commentator thus picks up on the suggestion of Aeschines that leaning on written aids was a sign of oratorical weakness.

Three other notes from *On the False Embassy* are more significant for their revelation of certain assumptions about oratory without any specific prompting from the text. All three passages pertain to material that Aeschines wrongly states is in Demosthenes' speeches, and in each case the reason for the discontinuity is found in the nature of Athenian oratory. In the first, Demosthenes is claimed to have asked the jury in an *a fortiori* argument why Aeschines should be acquitted when Philocrates had been condemned. The scholiast replies: <ἐπηρώτα> ταῦτά φησιν εἰρηκέναι Δημοσθένην, ἃ οὐκ ἀπαιτητέον ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ Δημοσθενικοῦ· πολλὰ γὰρ εἰκὸς εἰπεῖν αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι καὶ παραλιπεῖν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, δοκιμάσαντα ὡς περιττά, “He says that Demosthenes said these things, which are not to be found in Demosthenes' speech. For it seems likely that he said many things in arbitration and omitted them in the speech, having judged them superfluous.”<sup>732</sup> This scholion not only reminds us of an important criterion by which tragedy and oratory were judged, namely concision, but also points to a potential for alterations between the actual speech as it was given and a pretrial version.<sup>733</sup> Shortly thereafter Aeschines

<sup>731</sup> 2.35

<sup>732</sup> 2.6; or perhaps we should read ἀγῶνι as the trial itself and λόγῳ as the published form?

<sup>733</sup> See also Carey's note to 2.6.

complains that Demosthenes tried to compare him to the tyrant Dionysius, but the actual text does not bear this out. An explanatory scholion states:

*<ἐνεχείρησε δ'> ὅτι ἐπὶ τῶν διαιτητῶν εἶπε τοῦτο ὁ Δημοσθένης, οὐκέτι μέντοι καὶ ἐν τῇ δικαστηρίῳ διὰ τὸ ἀπίθανον. ἔξῃ γάρ τινα παραιτήσασθαι ῥήματα ῥηθέντα παρὰ τοῖς διαιτηταῖς, πλὴν τῶν ἐγγράφων καὶ ἐμβληθέντων ἐν τοῖς ἐχίνοις.<sup>734</sup>*

*<ἐνεχείρησε δ'>* Because Demosthenes said this in front of the [pretrial] arbiters, but not also in the court room on account of its unpersuasiveness. For it was possible for certain statements that were said in the presence of the arbiters to be omitted, except for the written documents that were deposited in the jars [where the evidence was kept sealed].

Here again Demosthenes has deemed it better to leave something out of his speech, and Aeschines has persisted as if it made the final cut. In both cases the scholiast assumes that the very nature of Athenian oratory allowed for multiple versions of a speech. In a final example, two versions are given for an episode concerning Satyrus, who according to Aeschines asked for the freedom of some of his guest-friends who were working as slaves under Philip, whereas Demosthenes says it was for the daughters of a dead friend.<sup>735</sup> A comment explains the discrepancy:

*<ὅτι ξένους> οὐ τοῦτο εἶπε Δημοσθένης (19.192) ἐν τῇ κατηγορίᾳ, ἀλλ' ὅτι τὰς Ἀπολλοφάνους τοῦ Πυδναίου θυγατέρας ἐξηγήσατο. ἐκ δὲ τούτου δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἐλέχθησαν οἱ λόγοι. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἄλλ' ἀκούσας ὁ Αἰσχίνης ἄλλα ἔλεγεν. ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι ἂ ὑπενόησεν ἐρεῖν αὐτὸν πρὸ τοῦ ἀγώνος, ταῦτα ἐνέγραψεν.*

*<ὅτι ξένους>* Demosthenes did not make this claim in the accusation, but said rather that he asked for the daughters of Apollophanes of Pydna. From this it is clear that the speeches were not spoken [i.e., in advance of the actual trial], for having heard other things, Aeschines would have spoken in a different way. But it is clear that he wrote down before the trial the things which he suspected he would say.

Once more a discrepancy in the report of Aeschines is explained by the basic assumption that orators assumed beforehand what their opponents would say—either through informants, evidence submitted to the arbiters, or reasonable hypothesis—but that for various reasons this material might not make it into the actual speech.

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<sup>734</sup> 2.10  
<sup>735</sup> 2.156

It may be mentioned here that the scholiasts also, though rarely, offer some clue as to how the speeches themselves give evidence for piecing together the chronology of the period. Herein one finds another difference with the Euripidean scholia, for while the tradition of the didascalía aims to give some sense of chronology, the dating of the plays cannot be determined on the basis of internal criteria. For Aeschines, on the other hand, and by extension for oratory in general, certain comments are used to establish at least a basic chronology. Each of these come from *Against Timarchus*, beginning with the opening lines, where Aeschines claims never to have brought a public suit against someone or indicted him as part of a scrutiny of his duty as public official—that is, he had made neither *γραφή* nor *εὔθυνα*. As naïve as it may sound, the scholiast chimes in with a comment to this opening section: *ἐκ τούτου δὲ δῆλον, ὅτι πρῶτον ἔγραψε τὸν κατὰ Τιμάρχου λόγον.*<sup>736</sup> Further specification comes later when a scholion states that some say Timarchus was at odds with Aeschines because the latter owned land at Pydna and was thought to be a Philip-sympathizer, but more likely it is as others say, namely that it was because Timarchus had joined Demosthenes in filing a suit against Aeschines for his behavior on the [second] embassy: *φασὶν ὅτι διήχθρευσεν Αἰσχίνῃ ὁ Τιμάρχος, ἐπεὶ ἔδοκει ὁ Αἰσχίνης τὰ Φιλίππου φρονεῖν. καὶ γὰρ εἶχεν ἀγρὸν ὁ Αἰσχίνης ἐν Πύδνῃ τῆς Μακεδονίας. οἱ δὲ διὰ τὴν γραφὴν τὴν τῆς παραπροσβείας, ἣν ἀπέθετο μετὰ Δημοσθένους κατ' αὐτοῦ, ὃ καὶ μᾶλλον.*<sup>737</sup> A later note confirms this outlook: when Aeschines says that Timarchus should not be allowed to bring a suit against someone for his work as an ambassador, this shows again that Timarchus had already joined Demosthenes in making the indictment: *<προσβέυσαντας κρινέτω> ἐπειδὴ ἀπέθετο μετὰ Δημοσθένους Τιμάρχος τὴν κατ' Αἰσχίνου τῆς παραπροσβείας γραφὴν.*<sup>738</sup> Likewise, when Aeschines expresses his approval of Philip's promises to do good to Athens, the scholiast notes that this speech, which was delivered immediately after the second embassy, must have therefore been before the third embassy and the destruction of the Phocians: *<τὴν τῶν λόγων εὐφημίαν> ἐπειδὴ ὑπισχνέεται ἡμῖν ἀγαθὰ ποιῆσειν πολλά, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τούτου, ὅτι οὐπω ἦν γεγενημένη ἡ τρίτη προσβεία οὐδὲ*

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<sup>736</sup> 1.1

<sup>737</sup> 1.3

<sup>738</sup> 1.20; cf. the same assertion at 1.119.

κατασκαφέντες οἱ Φωκεῖς. μετὰ γὰρ τὴν δευτέραν πρεσβείαν εὐθὺς ἐγένετο ἡ κατηγορία ὑπὸ Τιμάρχου καὶ Δημοσθένους κατ' Αἰσχίνου ὡς παραπρεσβεύσαντος. While these statements may be regarded as fairly simplistic, it is nonetheless important to see how the scholiasts employ internal evidence as a basis for establishing even a general chronology.

One further example demonstrates both phenomena mentioned above, giving information about the genre of oratory as well as some chronological details. Aeschines claims at *Against Ctesiphon* 58 that Athens had sent out embassies to the other Greeks around the time of the Peace of Philocrates to get broad-ranging consensus about the reaction to Philip, but that Demosthenes prevented this. A scholiast adds:

<τὰς πρεσβείας> Αἰσχίνου πείσαντος πρέσβεις ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις Ἀθηναῖοι πεπόμφασι παρακαλοῦντας ἐπὶ Φίλιππον. τοῦτο Δημοσθένης ἐν μὲν τῷ περὶ παραπρεσβείας, ὁμολογεῖ καὶ παρῆναι πρέσβεις τινὰς φησιν, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ στεφάνου ἀρνεῖται ὡς τῶν δικαστῶν οὐ μεμνημένων τῷ πλέον ἢ δέκα ἔτη εἶναι τὰ ἐν μέσῳ.

<τὰς πρεσβείας> On the persuasion of Aeschines<sup>739</sup> the Athenians sent ambassadors to the cities to rally them in response to Philip. Demosthenes admits this in his speech *On the False Embassy* and says that certain ambassadors were present, but in his *On the Crown* he denies it, since the jurors did not remember on account of the more than ten-year period intervening.

First, note that the scholiast has tracked the basic chronology of these two speeches, with the correct assertion that more than ten years passed between them. Secondly, observe that the scholion highlights a feature of oratorical performance that affects the form of the speeches themselves, namely that Demosthenes is able to change his story when enough time has passed to ensure that his first version would be forgotten. This assertion by the scholiast reveals a basic assumption about oratory in general: speakers can get away with lies if they are careful enough about how they lie. Of course, this does not mean that an orator can escape the watchful eye of the scholiast.

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<sup>739</sup> A detail not mentioned by Aeschines himself.

*Oratory and Drama*

Thus far I have highlighted some features of oratory that recur in the scholia to Aeschines. It must be stressed, though, that nowhere do the scholia give any sort of comprehensive definition to oratory as a genre, only examples of how the original texts are shaped as a result of performance context and other demands. In fact, there are a number of intriguing ways in which Aeschines' speeches are treated very much like tragic performance. One might naturally expect this to be the case to some extent, given the potential overlap between occupations (Aeschines was an actor) and some obvious correlations in performance context, namely a few select individuals performing a prepared script in front of a crowd of fellow-citizens. Yet, the similarity with which oratory and tragedy are treated in the scholia is at times surprising.

Normally, for instance, identification of speaker and addressee could not be simpler: the orator speaks to the jurors. At times, however, a scholiast adds clarification for statements that might be directed to a specific group of people in the jury, to an opponent, or some other individual.<sup>740</sup> These have much the same flavor as the notes regarding line attribution in the scholia to Euripides and serve the same purpose. A marker at *Against Timarchus* 22 tells the reader that when Aeschines speaks of documents being read it is the *γραμματεὺς* who has done the reading. A more subtle example comes later in this speech when Aeschines speaks of the venerable old men at Sparta who are part of the Gerousia, a position they earned through a lifetime of virtuous action.<sup>741</sup> Here the scholiast sees a snide remark aimed at Timarchus: *τοῦτο πρὸς τὸν Τίμαρχον εἶπεν. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ εἶπε γέροντας, ἦν δὲ καὶ ὁ Τίμαρχος γέρων, διὰ τοῦτο φησι· καθιστᾶσι δὲ αὐτούς*, "He directs this toward Timarchus, for since he said "old men," and since Timarchus was an old man, for this reason he says, 'And they appoint them [on the basis of their lifetime of virtue].'"<sup>742</sup>

<sup>740</sup> Carey's edition demonstrates that this need still exists, as at the footnote to 2.164.

<sup>741</sup> 1.180

<sup>742</sup> Note that not all examples of statements pointed to individuals are marked. The personal gibe at the effeminacy of Timarchus' clothing includes a direct address to Timarchus himself, but with no scholion to this effect (1.131).

In other places the discussion of the original text suggests that it should be imagined as being acted out in a certain way, and here we find some of the same terminology as used in the scholia to Euripides. Phrases such as *κατ' ἐρώτησιν* mark a question,<sup>743</sup> whereas other passages point to a sarcastic tone. At *On the False Embassy* 139 Aeschines is said to speak as a man joking, since he speaks to Timarchus as if he were a good man: *χλευάζοντος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος. ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ ἀγαθοῦ τοῦτο εἶπεν*. When he mentions Demosthenes' so-called “irrefutable argument” at *Against Ctesiphon* 17, a note calls his tone “sarcastic” and even “Demosthenic”: *Δημοσθενικῶς προδιαβάλλει τὴν ἀντίθεσιν, μετὰ ἥθους δέ*. Such is also the case at *On the False Embassy* 124, where the tag *ἥθικῶς ἀναγνωστέον*, at times a difficult phrase to define, is clarified by *ἔστι γὰρ κατ' εἰρωνείαν ὁ λόγος*.<sup>744</sup> There are also some reading cues that specifically invoke tragedy. When Aeschines accuses Demosthenes of embezzling public funds, his language is said by a scholiast to be as if on stage, since he directs his words toward Demosthenes as a thief: *τοῦτο καθ' ὑπόκρισιν προσενεκτέον. ἀποτείνεται γὰρ πρὸς τὸν Δημοσθένην ὡς αὐτὸν κεκλοφῶτα ἐκ τῶν δημοσίων καὶ ἰκανῶς σεμνυνόμενον ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀναλωκένας ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων*.<sup>745</sup> Another intriguing, if mystifying, note suggests that the beginning of Aeschines' speech *Against Ctesiphon* was done rather tragically, while Demosthenes' rendering of the same idea at the start of *On the Crown* was done more “politically,” evidently meaning more in keeping with a court room: *δοκεῖ δὲ τραγικώτερον κεχρησθαι εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ τῇ μεταφορᾷ, πολιτικώτερον δὲ ὑπὸ Δημοσθένους εἰρησθαι τὸ αὐτὸ νόημα ἐν τῷ τῆς παραπροσεβείας, εὐθὺς ἐν ἀρχῇ*.<sup>746</sup> Finally, a scholion at *Against Ctesiphon* 152 states that Aeschines' mockery of Demosthenes' pseudo-concern for dead Athenian soldiers needs a stage delivery and a high pitched voice: *ταῦτα δέεται ὑποκρίσεως καὶ φωνῆς ἐπιτεταμένης*.<sup>747</sup>

<sup>743</sup> 2.23, 2.158, 3.182, 3.223; cf. *καθ' ὑπόθεσιν* at 1.195.

<sup>744</sup> For the similarity of *ἥθικῶς* and *κατ' εἰρωνείαν*, see also 3.41: *εἰρωνείας καὶ ἥθους μεστὸς ὁ λόγος* (cf. 3.31).

<sup>745</sup> 3.19

<sup>746</sup> 3.1; recall also Aeschines' pathetic anadiplosis “Thebes, Thebes” at 3.133.

<sup>747</sup> Two notes on meter also deserve mention here. The first is the recognition that one of Aeschines' phrases has the rhythm of a verse of iambic trimeter: *Ἵμεῖς δ' ἡμῖν ἔσεσθε τῶν λόγων κριταί* (3.50). Conversely, though, there is also a place at which Aeschines is said to have delivered the contents of an oracle, but to have purposely broken up its original meter. Thus, while this particular element of poetry may be inserted into an oration, it is also at times consciously avoided.

There is one more key area in which oratory and drama overlap in the scholia, and that is the way in which the commentators take for granted that the audience has a dialogic role, if only an intermittent one, in the actual performance of a speech or drama. At *Against Timarchus* 83 Aeschines claims that at a previous public oration by Timarchus, the crowd burst out with laughter when Autolycus unintentionally used language with a double meaning—Timarchus had in mind the relatively low cost of a renovation project on the Pnyx, and the listeners who considered Timarchus a prostitute enjoyed an apparent pun on the low cost of his sexual favors. That the scholiast acknowledges and clarifies this situation shows his awareness of the possibility of such an outburst: <πάλιν> οἱ ὑποπτεύοντες πόρνον τὸν Τίμαρχον ἐθορύβησαν. τὰ γὰρ ὀνόματα κακόσχολα πρὸς τὸν ἐπὶ τούτοις διαβαλλόμενον.<sup>748</sup> A similar situation occurs at *On the False Embassy* 35, where Philip is said to have told Demosthenes to calm down and deliver his speech, not fearing an audible response from the crowd as in the theater. A note explains what he meant: <τι πεπονθέναι> οἶονεὶ συρίττειν ἢ τοιοῦτό τι πάσχειν. λεληθότως δὲ διασύρει τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ὡς ἐν αὐτῇ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολιτεύεται, “That is, [he told him not to fear] experiencing hissing or some such thing. And [Philip] imperceptibly ridicules democracy, since such things are a part of that form of government.” It is taken for granted that the signs of disapproval in the theater were also employed in other public contexts, and in such ways the stage and the court room offered a comparable performance context that was treated as such by ancient commentators.

### *Exegetical Methodology*

As in the previous chapter, a central question for the Aeschinean scholia is the methodology employed by the commentators in their exegetical work. Investigation reveals that many similar

<sup>748</sup> Elsewhere Aeschines appears to have asked the jury a question and actually received a response: <οὐκοῦν μὴ> ὡς τῶν δικαστῶν ἀποκριναμένων· εἰς τοὺς πεπορευμένους, οὕτως ἀπήντησεν (1.159). A humorous parallel in the Demosthenic scholia must also be mentioned here. “They” say that Demosthenes asked the jury if Aeschines was a friend or a hireling to Philip, except that he purposefully used the incorrect accent (μίσθωτος) so that in correcting him (μισθωτός), the jury would unwittingly supply the answer he was looking for (18.104).



techniques are used to solve various problems or obscurities in the original text. Included among these is an appeal to some general truth about “the way things are” in order to substantiate a claim by Aeschines as valid and real-to-life. When Aeschines says that a certain general might stand up to attempt a refutation of his claim with an easy arrogance (ὕπτιαζων καὶ κατασκοπούμενος ἑαυτόν), a scholiast explains the arrogant body language simply as something prideful people are prone to have: ὅπερ αὐτὴν τὴν ὄλην ὑπόθεσιν καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ λόγου.<sup>749</sup> Appeals to general truths are of course also a fundamental part of ancient Greek judicial oratory, particularly in cases such as *Against Timarchus*, where Aeschines hangs more on arguments from probability than on actual evidence. See, for example, Aeschines’ general statement at *On the False Embassy* 2 that Demosthenes could not have made certain accusations out of anger, because someone who lies is not angry at the victims of his falsified slander. A scholiast modifies this somewhat: τότε γὰρ τις ὀργίζεται, ὅταν αἰσθάνηται τὴν ἀληθῆ ἀδικίαν, “For then is someone [truly] angry, whenever he perceives true injustice.” Lastly, at the close of *On the False Embassy* Aeschines asks the jury not to hand over his family to his enemies, including the “unmanly, effeminate” Demosthenes.<sup>750</sup> Interestingly, the scholiast glosses these terms as “savage and merciless,” and for a fascinating reason: ἐπειδὴ δοκοῦσιν αἱ γυναῖκες πικραὶ σφόδρα εἶναι περὶ τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι. διὸ καὶ ὁ Μέγανδρος φησι “φιλόνηκος δ’ ἐστὶ καὶ νέα γυνὴ εἰς μῆνιν.” The original text in no way sets up this sort of characterization, but the commentator can nonetheless justify a specific interpretation on the basis of “the way things are.”<sup>751</sup>

Conversely, there is a recognition that not all things fall under this category of universal truths, for many things change over time, so that problematic passages in an original text might be best solved through appeals to chronological change. At times the awareness of such change is signaled implicitly through phrases such as “as we now say,”<sup>752</sup> though other passages refer explicitly to what the men of old (οἱ παλαιοί) would do or say. Two notes signal this sort of change specifically with regard to

<sup>749</sup> 1.132

<sup>750</sup> ἀνάνδρω καὶ γυναικείῳ (2.179)

<sup>751</sup> For two more examples, see 1.160 (the beloved is normally younger than the lover) and 2.175 (colonization is a sign of a powerful community of people).

<sup>752</sup> See 1.41, with several other examples at 1.97ff.

lexicography, for the men of old would call kingship “tyranny.”<sup>753</sup> So too did the ancients typically refer to youth with the term *ἡλικία*.<sup>754</sup> What might otherwise be confusing to a contemporary reader is disentangled by the scholar, who has a sense of how language changes over time.<sup>755</sup>

There are also numerous examples of the traditional *ζητήματα/ἀπορίαι* methodology we found so prevalent in the previous chapter—that is, a pattern of exegesis involving a question-and-answer format for typically problematic passages.<sup>756</sup> For example, as Aeschines explains to the jury a system of laws designed to protect young boys from sexually voracious older men, he states that a choregos was to be older than 40. Unprompted, a scholiast chimes in: *καὶ πῶς ὁ Δημοσθένης τριάκοντα ἔτη ἔχων ἐγένετο χορηγός; ἀπορία δηλονότι χορηγοῦ*, “And how did Demosthenes become choregos at the age of 30? Clearly because of the pressing need for a choregos.”<sup>757</sup> Some questions do not get even provisional answers,<sup>758</sup> while others give a hint of large questions floating in the back of the scholiasts’ minds, to which the original text at hand may provide some answers. Such is a note to *On the False Embassy* 165, where a commentator jumps at the chance to offer an opinion on the authenticity of a certain speech. Aeschines says that Demosthenes composed a speech for Apollodorus indicting Phormion on a capital charge, and the appended note states: *ἐκ τούτου δῆλον ὅτι καὶ οἱ περὶ τὴν οἰκίαν Ἀπολλοδώρου λόγοι οὐκ Ἀπολλοδώρου, ἀλλὰ Δημοσθένους*, “From this it is clear that the speeches about the house of Apollodorus were not by Apollodorus, but Demosthenes.” This statement suggests that the scholiast knew of the problem already and found some convincing evidence for the Demosthenic origin of these speeches.<sup>759</sup>

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<sup>753</sup> 1.4, 3.6

<sup>754</sup> 1.63, 1.182

<sup>755</sup> For other examples, see 1.64, 1.65, 1.89, 1.97, 2.78.

<sup>756</sup> I say “traditional” not only because the methodology itself has a long academic history, but also because the problems themselves seem to be “classic” ones, with different generations of scholars proposing solutions to well-known *προβλήματα*.

<sup>757</sup> 1.11

<sup>758</sup> 2.49

<sup>759</sup> Recall as well the Euripidean scholion at *Medea* 1342, where the scholiast takes a simple mention of “Tyrrhenian Scylla” and remarks that Euripides must have thought Odysseus’ wanderings took him to Italy and Sicily, though the original text makes no mention of this. For the many other examples of *ζητήματα* notes in Aeschines, see 1.14, 1.45, 1.90, 1.139, 3.69, 3.127.

The scholia to Aeschines do not show the same allegorical methodology as do the scholia to Euripides, but even so there is some clue that the scholiasts are open to deeper meaning than the original text appears to indicate on the surface, of the kind we have already seen regarding Philip's subtle disparagement of Athenian democracy as a theater-like enterprise.<sup>760</sup> The term used in this corpus to designate "hidden" information is again *αἰνίττεται*, "he alludes to." This is a term that can be used for very simple implicit references, such as a subtle nod to Demosthenes at *Against Timarchus* 117 and to Cersobleptes at *On the False Embassy* 84. In *Against Ctesiphon* there are also a couple of gibes at Demosthenes' apparent embezzlement of public funds, and in one of these notes we find another *αἰνίττεται* to describe this phenomenon.<sup>761</sup> A final example, albeit without *αἰνίττεται*, comes at *On the False Embassy* 164, where Aeschines says that states and individuals must adjust their strategies to suit their circumstances after giving several examples of how the Athenians had changed their policies often with other Greeks. A commentator notes a possibility for double interpretation here:

<τὸν ἄνδρα> τινὲς κοινῶς αὐτὸ λαμβάνουσι καὶ ἀφελῶς, τινὲς δὲ πικρῶς, ἄνδρα μὲν τὸν τύραννον, πόλιν δὲ τὴν δημοκρατίαν, ὡς ἔχομεν τὸ ὅμοιον ἡμῖν ἐν τοῖς Φιλιππικοῖς (9.72), ἐν οἷς λέγει· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐστὶν πρὸς ἄνδρα καὶ οὐχὶ συνεστῶσης πόλεως ἰσχυρὸν ὁ πόλεμος.

<τὸν ἄνδρα> Some take this commonly and straightforwardly [i.e., literally], but others take it as piercingly [critical], taking "man" as "tyrant" and "city" as "democracy," since we have the same thing in the *Philippics*, in which he says, "For since the war is against a man and not the strength of an organized city."

It is difficult to be sure about the exact meaning of this note, as the scholiast's description is abbreviated, but in any case one can see that some readers detected a subtle undercurrent in the original text that was evidently intended as a biting critique.

Further methodological techniques include, as before, a strong reliance on internal and external citations. As we saw above, internal references are important as a means of fact checking what both Aeschines and Demosthenes say, for periodically they are caught giving conflicting information in different locations, and even just in passing we have seen a number of citations and quotations from both

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<sup>760</sup> 2.35

<sup>761</sup> 3.19, 3.23

orators, including cross-references from all three speeches of Aeschines and three others by Demosthenes: the *Philippics*, *Against Medias*, and *On the Crown*. These references serve a unique purpose for the Aeschinean scholia insofar as they help clarify the actual historical events of the time period. Citations are used much more broadly than that, however. As is the case with the Euripidean commentaries, external references are frequently used to reach solutions to all sorts of issues, whether lexicographical, historical, cultural, etc. Homer is not used so often as for the exegesis of Euripides, but he too has a role, especially in the middle portions of *Against Ctesiphon* (a further example of the phenomenon of “clustering”). Other cited authors, all of which are easily traceable in Dilts’ *Index Auctorum*, include Plato, Timaeus, Lycurgus, Thucydides, Sophocles, Euripides, Isocrates, Aristophanes,<sup>762</sup> Eumelus, Apollonius, Menander, Callimachus, Deinarchus, and Apsines.

It is in these citations that we most often encounter our first-person references by the scholiasts themselves. We have already seen examples of this within the tradition of *ζητήματα* notes, when a question or objection is answered by “But we say . . . .” There are also a handful of “it seems to me” comments.<sup>763</sup> For the citations, this generally takes the form of *ὡς ἔγνωμεν*, “As we observed [in some other location].”<sup>764</sup> These hold particular interest for us insofar as they point to a continuous commentary form with its own internal self-references, and it is especially gratifying to find some instances of continuity despite the fact that the scholia we have are the product of so much editing and repackaging. Such is the case, for example, at *Against Ctesiphon* 122, where a comment about the age at which young Athenian men were eligible for certain types of military service includes an acknowledgement that this has been a theme throughout: *πολλάκις ἔγνωμεν ὅτι ἀπὸ ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἐτῶν ἐνεγράφοντο εἰς τὸ ληξιαρχικὸν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐφύλαττον δύο ἔτη τὰ πλησίον τῆς πόλεως, καὶ ἀπὸ εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν ἐξήρχοντο εἰς τοὺς*

<sup>762</sup> I.e., the comic poet. There are a couple of instances of the verb *κωμωδέω*, showing that someone has been the subject of treatment in a comedy (1.64, 1.157), which is the same type of note that we saw several times in the Euripidean scholia. See also 2.157, where a scholiast refers to comedic stock characters by name.

<sup>763</sup> Note that these generally, though not always, have a smaller number of manuscript attestations. See 1.107, 1.126, 1.143, 2.22.

<sup>764</sup> 1.29, 1.79, 2.82, 2.177, 3.35, 3.54, 3.124. This marks a distinct difference in the formulae of the scholia to Aeschines and Euripides, for I find no such example in the latter.

ὑπερορίους πολέμους.<sup>765</sup> It is not always clear to what these types of comments refer,<sup>766</sup> but it nonetheless gives us some sense of continuity running through the scholia.

The first-person references may actually be seen as part of a larger didactic methodology. Personal references to the commentator, or to other places at which the commentator has given information, invites the reader to view the commentary as one-on-one instruction. The *ζητήματα* passages even make this somewhat of a dialogic relationship: “Someone may ask . . . but we say . . .” Yet, it is not just the formulation of specific comments that hints at a didactic relationship between scholar and audience, but also the content of particular notes, where it becomes clear that the scholiast is interested not only in clarifying a passage of the original text, but in teaching a broader lesson. These include differentiations in terminology for polyvalent words, such as *σοφιστής*,<sup>767</sup> or clarification for words that appear similar but are not, where a simple gloss could have sufficed for the present moment.<sup>768</sup> There are also some grammatical aids, as for the declension of Ὀποῦς,<sup>769</sup> the principal parts of *παραδύω*,<sup>770</sup> and other help with verb forms.<sup>771</sup> Other notes present a surprisingly extensive description of names or events mentioned in the original text, as we have already seen with the description of the Nine Roads and the Erinyes.<sup>772</sup> Arguments by analogy are also used sometimes with this kind of note, so that the example of a particular phenomenon within the original text leads to a short lesson on how, for example, language works in general. For instance, a *στρατηγίον* is a place where *στρατηγοί* assemble, just as *ἀρχεῖα* refers to

<sup>765</sup> E.g., 2.167f.; note too the possible connection between 2.82 and 2.61 (or even 1.104?).

<sup>766</sup> E.g., the “as we said above” (*ὡς ἀνωτέρω εἴπομεν*) at *On the False Embassy* 82 concerning the selection of the Council chairmen has no clear referent, and the word *πρόεδρος* does not occur in the scholia to this speech before this note. It is conceivable that the commentary went “backwards” starting with *Against Ctesiphon*, where there is discussion of the relevant terms, but it seems more likely that a previous comment was simply lost.

<sup>767</sup> *πολλὰ γὰρ σημαίνει τοῦνομα* (1.125); cf. 3.50.

<sup>768</sup> *τιτθὴ ἢ τροφὸς, τήθη ἢ μάμμη, τηθῖς ἢ θεία* (1.126).

<sup>769</sup> *κλίνεται δὲ ἢ Ὀποῦς, τῆς Ὀποῦντος* (1.144).

<sup>770</sup> 3.37

<sup>771</sup> 2.86, 2.87. Note that these come only from Manuscript a and that the previous two come only from Manuscript g. It is perhaps a sign of how the scholia to Aeschines were used that these notes seem to have been phased out, or perhaps that they were later additions and were not a part of the commentary tradition from the beginning. Much more analysis of scholia from many authors would be needed to say more on this.

<sup>772</sup> 2.31, 1.118; cf. the treatment of choruses and dithyrambs at 1.10.

a place where ἄρχοντες meet.<sup>773</sup> So too an accepted analogy between two nouns (παραπομπήν, συστρατείαν) is used as the basis for a replacement of one verb for another (οὐ λέγει προπέμπων, ἀλλὰ συστρατεύων).<sup>774</sup>

### *Conclusions and Inconclusions*

It is easy to point out flaws in the Aeschinean scholia. At times the glosses are incredibly obvious or simply miss the point.<sup>775</sup> At other times there is information presented that is more or less exactly what is stated in the original text, such that the notes seem entirely superfluous.<sup>776</sup> Other comments offer interpretations that are very strange at best, and some factual statements do not accord with what we know from other sources.<sup>777</sup> Add to this the countless instances in which information is reduplicated needlessly, even within the same manuscripts, such that the scholia often appear haphazardly thrown together.

Nonetheless, the scholia to Aeschines provide us with some information that we would not otherwise possess, and in many places the questions that the commentators address are the same questions that still face us today. For this reason it is instructive to read the scholia alongside a modern edition like Carey's, for one finds a surprising amount of overlap in how certain notes are phrased. Whether Carey is simply channeling the scholia in these passages or not, it is clear that some appreciation is owed to how our own expectations for a scholarly commentary are a reflection of those from the ancient world.

And to be sure, the errors and other oddities in the scholia make them even more intriguing. If there is a grammatical mistake, why is this so? If the interpretation of a passage seems completely

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<sup>773</sup> 2.85

<sup>774</sup> 2.168; note that we have already seen this sort of argument with the word for "bastard" at 2.93.

<sup>775</sup> 1.122, 1.160

<sup>776</sup> 1.172, 1.173

<sup>777</sup> For passages that differ from the information provided by Carey's edition, see 1.56 and 1.103. Note also the odd treatment of the Olympic truces at 2.12, or mistakes such as the story about "Philippides" (i.e., Pheidippides, 2.130).

illogical to us, what are the foundational assumptions that made such an observation sensible to an ancient scholar? And where there are factual inaccuracies, what can that tell us about the source material available to the scholiasts? There is also some comic value along the way from various bizarre notes. We learn that Crobylus was completely obsessed about his hair, and that he was mocked for having an ugly face.<sup>778</sup> We hear that the *κέρκωπες* were wild and savage animals that were metamorphized into monkeys, or that they they were two ruffian pirate brothers whom Heracles punished for the theft of the cattle of Geryon—though others just say they are a kind of evil monkey.<sup>779</sup> We are also told that one day when initiates of the Eleusinian Mysteries came to the sea to be purified, a sea beast snatched one of them up—or others say that two people were taken.<sup>780</sup> And finally, when Aeschines tells the jury to come down hard on Timarchus (*ἀποσκήψατε*), the scholiast imaginatively says he means “Fall upon him like lightning.”<sup>781</sup>

There is also the question of audience. We have noted how the scholiasts tend to include information that is for general education, but this alone is not enough to say that the intended audience is schoolchildren, for even in the case of grammatical aids we could be dealing with adult readers, especially Romans, who know Greek only as a second or even third language. As mentioned earlier, there are also notes to rhetorical terms (figures, parts of an oration, etc.) that are generally unexplained and were therefore presumably inaccessible for those who had not had at least some theoretical instruction in the subject. Though we are still largely uncertain about the competence of the anticipated reader—and though the variorum nature of the scholia means that we are likely dealing with the remains of commentaries that were intended for different audiences—such evidence does suggest that at least one

<sup>778</sup> αὐτὸς ἤλειψε τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ ἐφιλοκάλει τὰς τρίχας (1.64). ἐκωμωδήθη ὡς αἰσχρὸς τὴν ὄψιν (1.71).

<sup>779</sup> ζῶα ἦσαν ὡμὰ καὶ πανούργα οἱ κέρκωπες, οὓς δὴ φασι μεταβεβληκέναι εἰς πιθήκους. οἱ κέρκωπες γένος τι ὑπῆρχον ληστῶν καὶ πανούργων περὶ τὴν Λιγύην, οὓς ἐτιμωρήσατο Ἡρακλῆς διὰ τὴν κλοπὴν τῶν βοῶν τοῦ Γηρύονος. ἦσαν δὲ ἀδελφοὶ δύο. τινὲς δὲ ἐξηγοῦνται τοὺς κέρκωπας εἶδος πιθήκων πανούργων (2.40).

<sup>780</sup> κατελθόντων τῶν μυστῶν ἐπὶ τὴν θάλασσαν ἐπὶ τὸ καθαρθῆναι, ἤρπασαν ἕνα αὐτῶν τὸ κῆτος . . . οἱ δὲ λέγουσιν ὅτι δύο κατέφαγεν (3.130). See Carey’s note here; the scholiasts may whale be misapplying information from Plutarch’s *Phocion* 28.6.

<sup>781</sup> δίκην κεραυνοῦ ἐνεπέσετε (1.193).

strand of our scholia were intended for readers of a more mature age, or at least ones that had undergone some sort of oratorical training.

In terms of comparison with the Euripidean scholia, the Aeschinean scholia in large part represent the same methodological approach to the original text as we saw before, and much of the terminology and many of the formulae employed for explaining the text are very similar, if not exactly the same. Some of the same central questions are asked, and the breadth of knowledge employed to understand different facets of the original texts is again large. In fact, the overlap is striking enough at some points to cause us to question the extent to which the scholiasts even think in terms of generic classifications. Certainly in practice the notes to Aeschines will necessarily look different from those to Euripides (e.g., in the emphasis on legal terminology), but we have seen how in certain categories of literary composition and aesthetics the two types of discourse are treated quite similarly. More analysis is necessary from other types of scholia to determine whether these similarities occur across other boundaries as well (e.g., epic and history). In any case, the scholia to Aeschines and Euripides help us to question our own generic distinctions. Did the Greeks think of oratory and tragedy as differently as we do? The scholia may suggest that they did not.



## CHAPTER 4

*Barbare Vortendum: The Commentaries to Terence*

*adhuc nulla reprehensio, siquidem licet transferre de Graeco in Latinum.*

Donatus, *Commentum in Eunuchum Terentii* 23

The importance of Greek literature for Roman authors has by now been so fully confirmed that it cannot be doubted, even for those who wish to emphasize the presence of originality in Latin literature. The Romans themselves made it clear that, while they were carving out new territory in the landscape of their own literary culture, they owed a debt of influence to their Greek predecessors for the content and form of their own work. The Augustan Library on the Palatine represents this interrelationship with its shelves of Greek volumes on one side and Roman on the other, of which the latter still had some (literally and metaphorically) empty spaces that awaited literary creations by the Romans to match their Greek counterparts.<sup>782</sup> Thus, Roman literature was viewed as a distinct accomplishment, but could never be considered apart from the Greek shelves across the way. At the same time, the presence of Greek volumes in a Roman building on the hill representing the power of the empire itself declares that Greek culture must also be viewed within its Roman context.

It is interesting that, while so much literature has been devoted to the Roman response to Greek literature, so little concern has been given to the Roman response to Greek scholarship on that same literature. Did Roman scholars adopt Greek scholarship wholesale? Did they, like the Roman authors whose work they elucidated, take general principles and formulae from the Greeks while nonetheless considering their work a distinctly Roman practice? Did they have any regard at all for their Romanness,

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<sup>782</sup> Horsfall (1993)

or did they simply consider themselves to be a continuation of the Greek scholarly tradition, identifying with an academic heritage that transcended ethnic difference (“We are not Roman scholars—we are simply scholars”)? These questions mark out some of the empty shelves in our knowledge of ancient scholarship, and in the next two chapters we will set about filling that largely empty space with substantive observations on the relationship between Greek and Roman scholarship.

A shift to commentaries on Terence raises important questions in addition to the general topic of how Roman scholars appropriated or rejected the Greek academic tradition. That we are dealing again with a dramatic performance context calls us to reconsider the approaches used by scholars to the texts of Euripides—and to a lesser extent Aeschines, whose oratorical performances were treated in much the same way, as I have shown. Specifically, we must ask how (whether) the commentators deal with the concept of genre, the identity and role of the author, and the identity and role of the audience. Do commentators on Terence have the same concern for staging? Does their work demonstrate an awareness (or attempt at awareness) of the original performance context, or do they consider the texts only as written and not (re-)performed? What is the breadth of knowledge called upon to explain Terence, and do the exegetical methodologies employed closely follow those of Greek scholars? Do Terentian commentators show any interests or techniques that are not evident in the other corpora of scholia we have examined?<sup>783</sup>

### *The Texts*

The textual situation for the commentaries on Terence is curious indeed. For Euripides and Aeschines, we possess as marginalia the remnants from (and some later additions to) a patchwork of

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<sup>783</sup> It must be noted that one cannot prove that individual Latin scholia are later than the extant Greek scholia, since we cannot say when the latter were included in the stream of scholarship that eventually resulted in our extant texts (the inclusion of Latin words transcribed in a few of the Greek notes, at least, suggests that some of this Greek scholarship was carried out during or after the Roman period; cf. the aforementioned references to the school of Marcellinus). Even so, in general terms we may speak of Roman scholarship as a later development, and as I will show there are specific evidences of this in the commentaries to Terence.

ancient scholarship that is only sporadically attributed to a named individual. For Terence, on the other hand, we have in addition to some anonymous marginal scholia two free-standing commentaries to which the names of known individuals are attached. Though the purpose of my investigation is to trace larger ideas that constitute “ancient scholarship,” and though full consideration of manuscripts goes beyond the scope of this project, I will offer some clarification on these forms in which the ancient scholarly information reaches us.

Purportedly the oldest source we possess is the commentary attributed to the fourth-century scholar Aelius Donatus.<sup>784</sup> That what we possess comes ultimately from Donatus is agreed upon, but there is also near certainty that we do not have the commentary as he wrote it in its full form, but rather some sort of extract (and perhaps a re-combination of two partially-garbled excerpts of the original) with notes to the six extant plays of Terence: *Andria*, *Heauton Timorumenos*, *Eunuchus*, *Phormio*, *Hecyra*, and *Adelphoe*.<sup>785</sup> Mountford is optimistic that the extant Donatus is rather close to the original, but Zetzel shows that the most likely scenario is that the commentary of Donatus existed in several abridgements in antiquity and was not transmitted as a single authoritative text, so that while our extant text does seem to be Donatian, it by no means represents the entirety of his work.<sup>786</sup>

The other free-standing commentary that we possess for these six plays is that of Eugraphius, who may have lived in the sixth century. His work, which is included in Wessner’s edition of Donatus, is unique in that he tends to focus primarily on rhetorical themes and the structure of speeches, with extensive lemmata and heavy amounts of paraphrasing. As we will see, there is not a great deal of overlap between Eugraphius and Donatus,<sup>787</sup> though it is plausible that Eugraphius drew his material from the original version of Donatus, which was then cut down and later reassembled into the version we

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<sup>784</sup> The fourth-century teacher of Jerome and author of commentaries on Terence and Vergil whose grammatical treatises (*Ars Maior*, *Ars Minor*) were heavily influential for centuries. The classic edition of his commentary on Terence is Wessner (1902-8), which I use here.

<sup>785</sup> Mountford (1934, 119ff.); Wessner (1902-8, xliv-xlvi); cf. Reeve (1979), Zetzel (1975)

<sup>786</sup> 1975, esp. 353f.

<sup>787</sup> I will continue to use the name “Donatus” without any qualification to describe the commentary we possess under his name, though it is to be remembered that we probably do not have the commentary as he originally composed it. I take as a working assumption that, despite some potential transformations in shape, the notes we possess give an essentially accurate (if perhaps curtailed) picture of his scholarly approach.

possess—a hypothesis that could account for the information in Eugraphius that cannot be found in the Donatian commentaries. Ultimately, though, Eugraphius could conceivably have had access to multiple other commentaries, so he may not have used Donatus in any serious way, and perhaps not at all.

Further, there are about 1500 marginal scholia found in the Bembine manuscript of Terence, which was written at the end of the fourth century or beginning of the fifth, edited by Ioviales in the sixth, and annotated to reach its current form in the subsequent century or two. These notes are most abundant for the *Eunuchus*, with substantial amounts for the *Heauton* and *Adelphoe*, but with very little for the *Phormio*, almost nothing for the *Andria*, and nothing at all for the *Hecyra*. A very useful edition is that of Mountford (1934), who keeps a careful eye to the correspondence between the Bembine scholia and the free-standing commentaries mentioned above. The history of the scholia is quite complicated, but Mountford's hypothesis can be summarized as follows: the bulk of the extant Bembine scholia come ultimately from a pre-Donatian commentary, possibly that of Aemilius Asper.<sup>788</sup> The scholia show a clear correspondence with Donatus at *Phormio* 1-59, but otherwise there is not enough overlap to suggest that the notes we have were derived in large part from Donatus—either the current version or the original—and the correspondences that do exist can reasonably be explained by positing a common source for both. Complicating our understanding of the Bembine scholia is the unique kinship of *Phormio* 1-59 with Donatus, the absence of any scholia to the *Hecyra* and the end of the *Heauton*, and the intermingling of two scholiastic scripts, which Mountford calls Hand 1 and Hand 2, the latter of which is demonstrably later.<sup>789</sup> In any case, all of the Scholia Bembina are generally dated to around the seventh century, and not earlier than the sixth.<sup>790</sup>

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<sup>788</sup> That the scholiasts are using older commentaries and not simply coming up with their own interpretations is supported by the fact that they refer to what “others” say and the fact that some notes (e.g., the information given on Luscius at *Eunuchus* 11) are too specific to be created simply from a reading of Terence, as Mountford points out, and must be relying on other sources.

<sup>789</sup> For a demonstration of chronology, see for example the note and explanation at *Eunuchus* 126, where an alternative to Hand 1's note is clearly added by Hand 2. This same type of phenomenon in other places shows that neither of the scholiasts is Ioviales himself.

<sup>790</sup> While I have not differentiated strongly between the types of notes for each play, it is worth noting that the *Heauton* seems to have a concentration of grammatical notes, and that the *Adelphoe* seems to have a good supply of comments on rhetoric. These are simply blanket observations and need to be treated more rigorously, but it is

I offer a quick word here on the possible sources of these three strands of commentary. As stated above, the sources for Eugraphius and the Scholia Bembina are obscure, though perhaps we can say with Mountford that they derive ultimately from a pre-Donatian commentary such as Asper's. What then of the sources for Donatus? The text itself provides some hint through direct citation of scholarship. It is clear that Varro was an important source for lexicographical and cultural information,<sup>791</sup> though I find only general citations and no evidence that Donatus (or any of Donatus' sources) found in his work any direct commentary on Terence. The situation is different for Nigidius (first century BC), Probus (first century AD), and Asper (late first/ early second century AD), all of whom are cited for critical work on Terence's plays. Nigidius is said to have provided a note at *Phormio* 233 (*hic Nigidius annotavit*) and to have asked a question about the use of *celari* at *Phormio* 182. Donatus cites Probus for his punctuation of *Eunuchus* 46 and *Andria* 720, with a further note of his (*annotavit*) at *Phormio* 49. The opinions of both Probus and Asper appear at *Adelphoe* 323 in a discussion of which character is speaking to whom in that verse. One wants more exact analysis to say how heavily Donatus leans on Asper, but suffice it to say that the door is left open for those who wish to explain the *Phormio* overlap in Donatus and the Scholia Bembina with an appeal to Asper as a common source.

A few other Roman sources may help us broaden our perspective on what was available in terms of scholarship on Terence and his work. Quintilian avails himself from time to time of a quotation from Terence, but without any exegetical or evaluative discussion of the text itself, and his only judgment on Terence's merit is very general: his writings are *elegantissima*, but could have been more so if they had been kept to trimeter verses.<sup>792</sup> Suetonius' *Vita Terentii* is more helpful for us, since therein we find the names of a number of men who, if they did not write commentaries on Terence's work, at least made some general remarks about him. In addition to some Terence trivia, we find in Suetonius a mention of

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important to question the types of notes that appear in different sections of the Scholia Bembina, especially since we know that they are coming from different hands and (potentially) different sources.

<sup>791</sup> *Eun.* 256; *Ad.* 583, 952; *Ph.* 49

<sup>792</sup> 10.1, where he adds that Terence's writings were said to have been the work of Scipio Africanus, a rumor that Suetonius also discusses (*non obscura fama est adiutum Terentium in scriptis a Laelio et Scipione, Vita Terentii* 3). Terence himself addresses this in the prologue to the *Adelphoe*, so we are left again with the important question of source: did scholars extrapolate from the prologue that Terence had help, or was that known from elsewhere?

information contained in the didascalia for the *Eunuchus* (specifically that it was so successful that it was performed twice in one day and that it earned 8,000 sesterces, more than any comedy up to that point), as well as Varro's comment that the beginning of Terence's *Adelphoe* was even better than that of Menander's play: *nam Adelphorum principium Varro etiam praefert principio Menandri*.<sup>793</sup> We also have a fragment of Varro's *Menippean Satires* that praises Caecilius for his plots, Terence for his ethics, and Plautus for his speeches/ style: *poetice est ars earum rerum / in quibus partibus in argumentis Caecilius poscit palmam, / in ethesin Terentius, in sermonibus Plautus*.<sup>794</sup> Varro also has some references to Terence in his *De Lingua Latina*, but only for providing an example of a particular linguistic phenomenon. It must be stressed that these sources provide some background, but do not help us greatly in understanding the sources for the commentaries themselves, except where mentioned explicitly by Donatus, Eugraphius, or the Bembine scholiasts. One fruitful avenue for further research here would be an analysis of literary terminology used by Quintilian and its relation to the commentaries, for which I will point out a few correspondences later on.

The appearance of Donatus in Wessner's edition is like that of the scholia we have seen already—multiple manuscripts exist, so the editor aims at the single “correct” version on the basis of collation and recension of manuscripts. For Mountford, the situation is much different, since he is working from only one manuscript, and where there are illegible or missing pieces, supplements must be made by careful guesswork, a strong familiarity with scholiastic formulae, and at times a comparison with other commentaries that have similar notes. Thus, the systems of notation used by Wessner and Mountford in their citation of the commentaries are quite a bit different. As stated above, since my project aims at a holistic understanding of Terentian scholarship, I am not overly encumbered by the illegibility of a few notes, though there are a few lost portions that must have been quite juicy—*SIT TIBI TERRA LEVIS*. Thus, for the purpose of readability, I will adopt the text of Mountford without using his careful system of parentheses and brackets to denote portions of words that have been abbreviated or individual letters that

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<sup>793</sup> *Vita* 2

<sup>794</sup> Frag. 399

have been supplemented—both of which are frequent occurrences; the curious reader is invited to examine Mountford’s text itself. The symbols < > will continue to be used to mark lemmata, though Mountford’s system is different.<sup>795</sup> In those cases where my argument does hinge on uncertain portions of the scholia, I will bring special attention to the problems of the text. I am also not going to differentiate between Hand 1 and Hand 2, since 1) I am again looking for larger patterns in exegesis, and 2) the second scholiast seems partially if not completely to have used the same source material as the first scholiast. I will add also that the commentaries occasionally include Greek script, but in some cases Greek terms are transliterated into Latin; in my quotations I use the script found in the commentaries and do not transliterate everything back into Greek.

The qualities of each commentator will emerge as we see more and more examples in the course of this study, but a few preliminary remarks may be made here. It is to be emphasized that we are dealing again with the variorum style of commentary. Thus, the precautions needed for the previous chapters still apply: that is, when a scholar like Didymus or Donatus states an opinion or gives information, we cannot say with any certainty whether the idea is an original one, and we may also expect to see some incarnation of the typical variorum formula “Some say . . . but others say . . .” This is especially the case with Donatus, for whom we have attestation in the programmatic epistle to Munatius that his commentary to Vergil incorporated a technique of selection that aimed at a fair and faithful presentation of the best commentaries he could access, free from excessive tampering on Donatus’ part.<sup>796</sup> The commentary to Terence seems to maintain this basic approach, especially in its frequent use of *et* and *aliter* transitions that behave like ἄλλως—that is, they indicate a new entry only and can mean anything from “Here is a

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<sup>795</sup> Mountford also describes a number of instances where the scholiast has included markers and reference signs in the text, but since he does not give facsimiles of the manuscript, it is impossible to say much on the basis of his edition alone. Suffice it to say that there is no hint of the Greek scholiastic formula “This gets a chi because . . .”

<sup>796</sup> See *Epist.* 1-9: *inspectis fere omnibus ante me qui in Virgilio opere calluerunt, brevitati admodum studens quam te amare cognoveram, adeo de multis pauca decerpsi, ut magis iustam offensionem lectoris expectem, quod veterum sciens multa transierim, quam quod paginam compleverim supervacuis. agnosce igitur saepe in hoc munere collatio sinceram vocem priscae auctoritatis. cum enim liceret usquequaque nostra interponere, maluimus optima fide, quorum res fuerant eorum etiam verba servare.* Note also that Jerome, the student of Donatus, followed a similar technique of setting various interpretations side-by-side and letting the discerning reader judge between them (McDonough 2004, xv).

supporting note,” to “And now for something completely different.”<sup>797</sup> The Bembine scholia do not have this formula as frequently, though there are still some passages that point to compiling.<sup>798</sup>

In spite of this variorum style, however, there remain a few instances of the commentator’s own voice in the notes, much as there was to some extent with Euripides and especially with the frequent “as we observed” formula in the scholia to Aeschines. For instance, Donatus exclaims that those who find Terence’s use of comic stock characters blameworthy are being ridiculously critical: *quid stultius aut calumiosius dici potest?*<sup>799</sup> The Bembine scholia have a few examples of a commentator’s exclamations that also carry a personal touch. When Geta explains that Aeschinus has openly taken a new girlfriend instead of fulfilling his obligations with another woman, the scholiast shouts: *o inpudentiam singularem ut non abscondat quod mali committit!*<sup>800</sup> Later, when Demea greets his son in a loving and gentle manner—much altered from his previous sternness—the scholiast exclaims: *quam cito censuram lenitate mutavit! quam optimum subito patrem naturalis affectio effecit!* Further, a fantastic note on different kinds of lips at *Eunuchus* 336 leads to an outburst:

*labellum pueri habent, ut Vergilius [Ecl. 2.34], ‘calamo trivisse labellum’; labrum iuvenes [Ecl. 3.47] ‘necum illis labra admovi’; labia mulieres sive senes. sed quantum Donatus commentator Vergilii refert! labeae dicuntur inferiores.*

Boys have a *labellum*, as Vergil says, “*calamo trivisse labellum*”; young men have a *labrum*, “*necum illis labra admovi*”; women or old men have *labia*. But how greatly Donatus the commentator of Vergil differs!<sup>801</sup> [Rather] the lips “down there” are called *labeae*.

Eugraphius will also make a few signposting comments from time to time with first-person verbs; for instance, after a summary of the nature of the *Eunuchus* prologue, he states: *nunc iam singula, ut proposuimus, explicemus*, and as he passes to the first act, he adds: *hic iam comoediae ipsius res*

<sup>797</sup> An especially salient example is the relatively lengthy discussion of the phrase *plus satis* at *Eunuchus* 85. At the third and final entry for this phrase, Donatus gives his own opinion: *hoc quidam putant, at mihi videtur . . .* See also his numerous explanations of *falsum*, *vanum*, and *fictum* at *Eunuchus* 104.

<sup>798</sup> *Eun.* 56, 130; *Haut.* 205. The first of these contains a variant of the familiar “which is better” formula (*sed melius est . . .*). The second is the traditional “some . . . others . . .” arrangement (*alii . . . alii . . .*). The third offers three possible grammatical interpretations, with explanations of each.

<sup>799</sup> *Eun.* 5

<sup>800</sup> *Ad.* 328. Though this might simply have been a sentiment of Sostrata given by the scholiast mimetically, I find it unlikely, since she does not say anything quite to this effect.

<sup>801</sup> This is because Donatus’ note to this verse suggests that *labia* refers to the *pudenda muliebricia*.



*potestatemque noscamus*, another echo of the commentator's voice.<sup>802</sup> Finally, note that the commentators occasionally introduce second-person addressees into their work, as we saw for Euripides and Aeschines. Such is the case when the scholiast says that "you" should understand *moror* as if it were *nolo*, a usage that Vergil also has.<sup>803</sup>

Lastly, before I set out the topical categories and exegetical methodology of the Terentian commentaries, it is important to issue a caveat. As for the Euripidean and Aeschinean material, presentation in the modern edition is a crucial one when it comes to evaluating the quality of the commentators. This is especially true for the Scholia Bembina, Donatus, and Eugraphius. Mountford's technique is to maintain the state of the original as closely as possible by not regularizing the orthography, including the Greek words that seem to have an appearance that is (to us) very odd. Wessner chooses to regularize the Latin and Greek for Donatus and Eugraphius, and the result is that the latter seem more professional than the Bembine scholiasts. This judgment is to be avoided, for the critical apparatus for Donatus and Eugraphius shows that the same imprecisions exist in their manuscripts.<sup>804</sup> In fact, Mountford points out a few passages for which a Bembine note is superior to the corresponding note of Donatus: at *Eunuchus* 54 the scholiast's identification of the legal metaphors used by Terence is more exact than Donatus'; at *Eunuchus* 50 the Bembine scholion cites Sallust more accurately than Donatus does; and at *Phormio* 13 the scholiast's solution to a grammatical dilemma is not correct, but it is not as absurd as Donatus' suggestion. Thus, it will be especially important to remove any preconceived notions about the inferiority of marginal scholia to free-standing commentaries, or of later material to earlier.

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<sup>802</sup> *Eun. prol.* 1; *Eun.* 44

<sup>803</sup> *Eun.* 184 (Bem.)

<sup>804</sup> I have decided to regularize the Greek. Though this decision has its drawbacks, any careful analysis of medieval Greek script should be done directly via the manuscripts anyway, and what concerns me most is not the orthography of the commentators' Greek quotations and terms, but the fact that they are using Greek at all.

### Lexicography

Let me begin the systematic outlay of topical concerns again with lexicography, since as always the definition of words is the foundation of literary interpretation.<sup>805</sup> Here one finds nothing surprising: rare, ambiguous, or otherwise difficult words are glossed with simpler words. I provide a few very basic examples from the Bembine scholia: *hospite* is glossed with *peregrino*,<sup>806</sup> *propter* with *iuxta*,<sup>807</sup> *putabit* with *aestimabit* and *cogitabit*,<sup>808</sup> *garri* with *res ineptas loquere*,<sup>809</sup> and *bono* with *seculo* and *utili*.<sup>810</sup> Remember too that glossing for individual words is carried out for whole sentences as well, and some notes reproduce the standard Greek formulae  $\acute{o}$   $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$   $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\nu$  /  $\acute{\eta}$   $\acute{\sigma}\acute{\upsilon}\nu\tau\alpha\xi\acute{\iota}\varsigma$   $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\nu$ , such as with the phrase *sensus est* at *Phormio* 12 and *Adelphoe* 313, and in the frequent paraphrasing found throughout Eugraphius.

It will be noted that the exceptionally long strings of glosses from the Euripidean and Aeschinean scholia are not to be found for Terence. Many reasons could explain this reduction in “heavy” glossing, including a generally richer *copia* of Greek vocabulary, but one principle at work may be the particular attention paid by the commentators of Terence to technical differentiation between words of similar meaning, such that extended glossing could actually be misleading insofar as words are treated as synonyms when there are in fact precise differences in their usage. For instance, Donatus states explicitly at *Eunuchus* 27 that the *imprudencia* described by Terence in his prologue is *ignorantia*, but not *stultitia*. Later he differentiates between *prudens* (being able to perceive something by one’s own intelligence) and *sciens* (knowing something that is revealed by another person).<sup>811</sup> Compare a Bembine scholion at *Eunuchus* 117 that defines *educatio* as moral instruction, whereas *doctrina* pertains to skill, e.g. in a

<sup>805</sup> The appearance of this and other such categories in Donatus are also isolated by Jakobi (1996), who covers grammar, rhetorical theory, stylistic analysis, characterization, and more. My study is less comprehensive for these categories, but it is also broader insofar as I also incorporate Eugraphius and the Bembine scholia, in addition to covering other topics such as the poet himself, genre, exegetical methods, etc.

<sup>806</sup> *An.* 803

<sup>807</sup> *Eun.* 368

<sup>808</sup> *Haut.* 485

<sup>809</sup> *Phorm.* 496

<sup>810</sup> *Ad.* 543

<sup>811</sup> *Eun.* 72

musical instrument. Another scholion discusses words for “finding”: *inter repperire et invenire hoc interest: repperimus quod obvium se oculis praebet . . . invenimus quaerentes*.<sup>812</sup> More Bembine examples from the *Heauton* provide short lists explaining how alteration of a verb’s prefix can change its sense: *ferre dicimus leviora, sufferre quae nos onerant*;<sup>813</sup> *reticemus dolentia, obticemus pudenda, tacemus secreta*;<sup>814</sup> *sedemus desidia . . . residemus otio . . . praesidemus rei commissae . . . adsidemus aegris, iudicantibus*.<sup>815</sup> More help is given to those who confuse smooches, kisses, and pecks:

*inter savium, osculum, et basium hoc interest quod savium meretricibus tantum quod causa suavitatis datur, basium autem circa pudica matrimonia, osculum circa liberos vel parentes; nam et Vergilius ‘oscula libavit natae’.*<sup>816</sup>

There is this difference between *savium*, *osculum*, and *basium*: a *savium* is that which is given only to courtesans, on account of its sweetness (*suavitas*), and the *basium* pertains to chaste marriage, and the *osculum* pertains to children or parents; for Vergil says, “He bathed his daughter in kisses.”

Note, however, that such differentiations sometimes collapse. Merely two hundred verses after the explication of *repperire* and *invenire* in the Bembine scholia, for example, the former is glossed as the latter without apology.<sup>817</sup> So too Donatus, in response to a verse reading *bonam magnamque partem ad te attulit*, states two opinions on the adjectives: *haec dicuntur ἰσοδυναμοῦντα, ut [Haut. 5.1.53] ‘abs te petere et poscere.’ an potius ‘bonam’ specie, ‘magnam’ quantitate? Et: nunc discretive dictum est, nam alias ‘bona’ pro magna accipimus.* “These are called synonymous, as in ‘to seek and ask from you.’ Or rather does *bonam* refer to kind and *magnam* to quantity? Also: now it has been spoken with differentiation, for elsewhere we take *bona* as meaning *magna*.” This fascinating example not only gives

<sup>812</sup> *Eun.* 308; compare also *Eunuchus* 673 and *Heauton* 285, where the same point is made, but with *offendere* replacing *repperire*.

<sup>813</sup> *Haut.* 453

<sup>814</sup> *Haut.* 85

<sup>815</sup> *Haut.* 124

<sup>816</sup> *Eun.* 456; cf. Servius (*Aen.* 1.260). Though the terms may be used synonymously, the distinction is generally workable in at least some cases (e.g., the *ius osculi*, Suet. *Claud.* 26; the *basia* of Catullus 5; and the *suavium* as an amatory kiss at Plaut. *Truc.* 2.4.5).

<sup>817</sup> *Eun.* 512

a sense of the *variorum* style found throughout Donatus, but also shows that at least some lexicographical distinctions should not be regarded as ironclad.<sup>818</sup>

Not only are differentiations made between similar words, but at times a single word does not contain enough specificity by itself and requires an epithet of some kind. This is the category of words that are τῶν μέσων, that is, vocabulary that resides in the “middle” between two possible significations and that can be pushed one way or another with attending modifiers.<sup>819</sup> Such is *facinus*, which is steered in the direction of “wrongdoing” by the adjective *audax* at *Eunuchus* 644, to which the Bembine scholiast responds: τῶν μέσων est *facinus*; nam potest et bonum esse, potest et malum; ideo semper cum epitheto debet poni. The same is true for *nobilis*: τῶν μέσων: *nobilis Africanus, nobilis gladiator*.<sup>820</sup> Other passages do not use the phrase τῶν μέσων explicitly, though the principle is easily discernible. For this reason *natalis* cannot be used by itself, because it can refer to the hour or the day.<sup>821</sup> Donatus uses similar language to describe *nuper*: *ex illis verbis est, quae veteres propter ambiguitatem cum adiectione proferebant; nam nisi adderet ‘nunc,’ hoc ‘nuper’ olim, pridem etiam significasset*, “This belongs to those words with which the ancients preferred to have an adjective on account of their ambiguity; for if he had not added *nunc*, this *nuper* could also have meant ‘once upon a time,’ ‘long ago.’”<sup>822</sup>

Coupled with these notes on semantic distinctions is a series of comments that mark the diction of Terence and his characters as proper or improper, a feature that will be familiar from such Greek terms as ἀκύρως and καταχρηστικῶς in previous chapters. When Phormio states that Chremes’ wife will have something to complain about (*ogganniat*) to her husband for the rest of his life, the Bembine scholiast glosses the verb as follows: *cum querella murmuret; gannire enim canes proprie dicuntur*.<sup>823</sup> The phrase *dedit existimandi copiam* is also pointed out as an “unusual expression” (*nova locutio*) requiring at least an acknowledgement of its irregularity, even if the meaning itself must have been considered clear

<sup>818</sup> For more on differentiation in terminology, see the Scholia Bembina at *Heauton* 102, 231 and *Adelphoe* 785.

<sup>819</sup> Compare the ἐν μέσῳ formula from the Euripidean scholia.

<sup>820</sup> *Haut.* 227 (Bem.); cf. Don. *Hec.* 797 (*et meretrix et gladiator nobilis dici solet*)

<sup>821</sup> *Phorm.* 48 (Bem; cf. Don.)

<sup>822</sup> *Eun.* 9; cf. *Haut.* 53 (Bem.)

<sup>823</sup> *Phorm.* 1030; cf. *Phorm.* 38

enough to let by without glossing.<sup>824</sup> At the same time, we should not assume automatically that irregularity is a sign of a mistake, for the Bembine scholiast states explicitly that, when Phaedria says that he is frozen at the sight of Thais (*tremo horreoque*) and Parmeno responds that Phaedria is now exceedingly hot (i.e., with love), the conjunction of hot and cold terminology is something that “we” also express—and Vergil had as well: *sicuti de frigoribus usurpamus ‘ignem,’ possumus et ex igne ‘frigus’ usurpare; nam et Vergilius ‘hos penetrabile frigus adurit.’*<sup>825</sup> Donatus confirms this tendency to “misuse” words pertaining to temperature extremes in his own note to the passage, though with an expansion that we will examine later under a different category. Such examples show again that lexicographical matters are not always completely inflexible, and the implicit defense of Terence’s locutions is a sign that some slack should be given in at least some instances for linguistic expression. How this flexibility exhibits itself in poetry specifically will become clear later in this chapter.

Another familiar category of lexicographical note is a series of etymologies, some of which are rather creative. The adverb *venuste* means *pulchre* and is derived from Venus,<sup>826</sup> while *sollers* is someone who is totally devoted to his or her art (*solus in arte*).<sup>827</sup> Orcus is called Dis because he is rich in souls (*dives animarum*).<sup>828</sup> The use of *calamitas* to refer to the ruination of a family estate, as we learn from Donatus at *Eunuchus* 79, is appropriate because it is used to describe the agriculturally deleterious effects of hail: *proprie. ‘calamitatem’ rustici grandinem dicunt, quod comminuat calamum, id est culmum ac segetem*. Eugraphius states that amatory “rivals” are so called because they share, as it were, one river of love: *rivales dicuntur, qui unam amant vel meretricem vel amicam, quod quasi uno rivo amoris utantur*.<sup>829</sup> Another passage from the Bembine scholia gives alternate etymologies for *cuppedenarius* (confectioner), one from each scholiast: *cuppedenarii: [Hand 1] dicuntur qui poma distrahunt aut ideo*

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<sup>824</sup> *Haut.* 282 (Bem.)

<sup>825</sup> *Eun.* 84; note that the quotation of Vergil (*G.* 1.93) is not exact, though close enough to validate the point being made. It is worth noting that Demetrius (*On Style* 135) used similar terminology to describe the graceful effect of literature to express something through its opposite, but there is no hint of such a literary aesthetic in the scholion here.

<sup>826</sup> *Eun.* 457 (Bem.)

<sup>827</sup> *Eun.* 478 (Bem.)

<sup>828</sup> *Ad.* 770 (Bem.)

<sup>829</sup> *Eun.* 268

*eos sic appellavit quasi quod nummorum cupiditate teneantur.* [Hand 2] *aliter cupidinarii cupiditatibus populi servientes.*<sup>830</sup> That is, Hand 1 posits an etymology based on the greed of the seller, whereas Hand 2 attributes the *cupido* to the buyer. Donatus' etymology may be taken in either way, and Eugraphius is parallel to Hand 2 (*cupedinarii sunt qui cupiditatibus populi serviunt*).

Other etymologies are noteworthy for their invocation of Greek. Piraeus is so called because it was frequently attacked by pirates (*temptatum sit*), and the Greek word for *temptare* is *πειρᾶν*.<sup>831</sup> Understanding the name Gnatho also requires knowledge of Greek: *nomen fictum ex gula; nam γνάθους dicimus malas quibus mandamus, hoc est dentibus molimus quod digerendum transmittimus sthomacho*, “The name was created from a reference to the throat. For *γνάθους* is the term we use for the jaws with which we chew, that is, we grind with the teeth what we transmit to the stomach for digestion.”<sup>832</sup> A similar example concerns the name Phormio, which is derived from the Greek *φορμίον* and not from *formula*, as the quantity of the first “o” makes clear.<sup>833</sup>

### Grammar

The elucidation of difficult syntax, morphology, or other grammatical phenomena is again a primary concern of the commentators, with many of the notes mimicking the Greek formulae with which we are already familiar. And as before, some notes provide specific help for the passage at hand, while others offer in addition a broader lesson for the reader to take away.

The commentators of Terence, for example, show sensitivity to irregular or confusing word order and syntax (recall the *συντακτέον* of previous chapters). For *Eunuchus* 202 (*et quidquid huius feci causa*

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<sup>830</sup> *Eun.* 256

<sup>831</sup> *Eun.* 290 (Bem.)

<sup>832</sup> *Eun.* 228 (Bem.)

<sup>833</sup> *Phorm.* 26 (Bem.); cf. Donatus' note to this line, as well as his comment in the preface (1.1). For other examples of etymology, see the Bembine notes to *Heauton* 68 (*fundus*), 420 (*egregii*), 479 (*prodere*); *Adelphoe* 285 (*triclinium*), 358 (*nequam*), 587 (*silicernium*).

*virginis*) the Bembine scholiast clarifies as follows: *ordo: et quidquid feci huius causa virginis feci.*<sup>834</sup> At *Heauton* 317, the scholiast uses the same tag *ordo* to mark a sort of hyperbaton that is common in Terence, namely where one character's statement is broken up by the interjections of another. Our commentator simply takes the separated parts and puts them together: *ordo est: at enim si sinas dicam.* Another problem with word order emerges for *Adelphoe* 491, which reads: *haec primum ut fiant deos quaeso ut vobis decet*, "I pray the gods that these things happen as is proper for you." Donatus gives what seems to be the correct interpretation, taking *vobis* as a dative with *decet*, akin to the Greek phrase ὑμῶν πρέπει.<sup>835</sup> The Bembine scholiast, however, thinks that since *decet* requires an accusative, *vobis* must belong with what comes before:

*aliter composuit metri causa quam dicendi ordo deposcit. nam ita conponi oportet 'primum deos quaero ut fiant haec vobis ut decet,' ut 'vobis' sit 'a vobis.' 'vobis' autem 'decet' non est Latinum quippe cum alibi [Ad. 506] dixerit 'decet te facere.'*

For the sake of meter he composed the verse other than what the order of speech demands. For it should be thus arranged: *primum deos quaero ut fiant haec vobis ut decet*, so that *vobis* stands for *a vobis*. And *vobis decet* is not Latin, since elsewhere he says *decet te facere*.

So too at *Eunuchus* 76 Donatus states that the phrase *si sapis* has to be taken with what follows, or it does not make sense: *ad inferiora iungendum est, nam aliter non intellegitur.*<sup>836</sup>

Also of grammatical concern is the use of superfluous words or the omission of words that need to be understood to complete the sense, an extremely common observation in the Greek scholia, especially for Euripides (e.g., *λείπει, παρέλκει*). For Terence, omitted words can be marked with phrases such as *deest*<sup>837</sup> or *subaudiendum est.*<sup>838</sup> Extra words are marked most often with some form of *abundare*

<sup>834</sup> Donatus sees the possibility of taking the *huius* with an understood *rei*, in what we would call a partitive expression with *quidquid*. The Bembine scholiast would seem to take it with *virginis*, "for the sake of this girl."

<sup>835</sup> See *TLL*, s.v. *deceo* II.B.2.

<sup>836</sup> The Bembine scholiast makes no remark on this issue, but instead mentions the connection of this phrase to Stoic doctrine—a thought not given at all by Donatus at this verse, and one which we will return to. See also the statement at *Eunuchus* 401 (Bem.) that *quod* is to be taken absolutely, or the result is a solecism. For more on syntax/ *ordo*, see *Heauton* 470 and *Adelphoe* 313.

<sup>837</sup> *Haut.* 67, 366 (Bem.)

<sup>838</sup> *Eun.* 202 (Don.), *Eun.* 65, 88 (Bem.)

or *abunde*, though also with the Greek transliteration *parhelcon*.<sup>839</sup> Other instances of “extra” words include an anaphoric tricolon (*vis amare, vis potiri, vis quod des illi effici*),<sup>840</sup> where the Bembine scholiast remarks that this triple use of *vis* is surprising.<sup>841</sup>

Though the actual phrase *τῶν μέσων* is not used with regard to grammatical phenomena, the same principle extends to matters of linguistic taxonomy, where certain words can be used as different parts of speech or fulfill other changing functions based on context. For example, *ubi* can be an adverb of place and time.<sup>842</sup> *Mane* (“in the morning”) can be an adverb, but at other times it seems like a noun: *modo adverbium est, alibi nomen videtur ut* [Verg. *G.* 3.325] ‘*mane novum*.’<sup>843</sup> Further, *heus* at *Heauton* 313 is said to be not an adverb, but an interjection. Another occurrence of this word soon thereafter is called an “admonishing” *heus*.<sup>844</sup> Like the *τῶν μέσων* vocabulary seen above, the syntactical role of these words is dependent on their context, and otherwise the words themselves are ambiguous.

Morphology is another recurring category in our commentaries. Notes on nouns include identification of the “seventh case”<sup>845</sup> and the archaic genitive ending *-i* in the singular of what we call the fourth declension, where the normal ending is *-us*.<sup>846</sup> Also, the comparative adverb *inclementius* is glossed in its positive form *inclementer*.<sup>847</sup> Most notes of this kind, however, are reserved for verbs. Some are simple substitutions of verbal forms like those seen in the Greek scholia: *agere* is glossed with *agebat*,<sup>848</sup> *amabunt* with *ament*,<sup>849</sup> and the indicative *est* with its subjunctive version.<sup>850</sup> Others give

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<sup>839</sup> *Haut.* 249, 257, 385, 538

<sup>840</sup> *Haut.* 322

<sup>841</sup> It is clear why omitted words would need to be supplied, but pleonastic words are generally not too encumbering. Perhaps the commentator wishes to keep his readers from picking up bad habits in usage, or simply wishes to demonstrate his own awareness of irregularities, even when they pose little or no threat to a reader’s understanding of the original text.

<sup>842</sup> *Eun.* 460 (Bem.); cf. *Eun.* 406, 1080; *An.* 848 (Don.).

<sup>843</sup> *Haut.* 67 (Bem.); cf. *An.* 83 (Don.)

<sup>844</sup> *Haut.* 369

<sup>845</sup> *Eun.* 195 (Don.); see Serbat (1994, 159ff.). This grammatical concept is found in Servius as well.

<sup>846</sup> *Eun.* 237, *Ad.* 870 (Bem.); *An.* 365 (Don.)

<sup>847</sup> *Eun.* 4 (Don.)

<sup>848</sup> *Eun.* 391 (Bem.); cf. *Haut.* 125

<sup>849</sup> *Haut.* 463 (Bem.)

<sup>850</sup> *Haut.* 53 (Bem.)



simple dictionary identifications: *pultat* is the frequentative of *pulsat*,<sup>851</sup> *commetare* is the frequentative of *commearare*,<sup>852</sup> and *intuitur* comes from *intueor, intuor*.<sup>853</sup> Elsewhere, it is stated by the Bembine scholiast that verbs of the third conjugation have a “double declension” according to tense, with the examples *servimus serviemus, scimus sciemus, nutrimus nutriemus*.<sup>854</sup> In addition, Donatus states that inchoate trisyllables like *labascit* are generally pronounced with a lengthened middle syllable,<sup>855</sup> and that in Terence’s tricolon *amare odisse suspicari* at *Eunuchus* 40 the second element is not *odere*, since that is not a Latin infinitive form.<sup>856</sup> Finally, in a wonderful note to *Phormio* 36, the Bembine scholiast and Donatus both gloss *pauillulum* as a fourth-degree diminutive: *quartus gradus diminutionis: paulum paululum pauillum pauillulum*.

Other notes cover the topics of accent, rhythm, and meter. I gave an example above in which Terence was supposed to have altered his word order for the sake of meter,<sup>857</sup> and while the argument that meter influences the text is not at all common, there are a few pieces of information about syllable length and other germane topics. Donatus points out that *emerunt* at *Eunuchus* 20 has a short middle syllable, just like *tulerunt* can be found in Vergil with a short “e.” The Bembine scholiast states at *Heauton* 9 that the rhythm of the sentence receives the mora on *id*: *in hac syllaba moram rhythmus accipit*. Later he says that the form *congruere* at *Heauton* 511 has a lengthened first “e”, with a short final syllable.<sup>858</sup> Other examples include a lengthened final syllable in *referre* and a largely illegible note on *qui* that says it must be pronounced acutely.<sup>859</sup> Lastly, though there is hardly much discussion of Terence’s choice of metrical arrangements, when Syrus opens the fifth act of the *Adelphoe* the scholiast remarks: *Syrus servus egreditur iambico metro luxoriose adludens. mollius enim metrum temporibus anapesticis sonat neque*

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<sup>851</sup> *Haut.* 275 (Bem.)

<sup>852</sup> *Haut.* 444 (Bem.)

<sup>853</sup> *Haut.* 403 (Bem.)

<sup>854</sup> *Haut.* 309; this note seems based on the potential reading *scibam* for *sciebam*, but is not entirely clear.

<sup>855</sup> *Eun.* 178

<sup>856</sup> For other examples of verb morphology in the Scholia Bembina: *Eun.* 432; *Haut.* 410; *Ad.* 482, 910.

<sup>857</sup> See also *Adelphoe* 793 (Bem.): *metrum poetae exigit accusativum singularem pro genetivo plurali; liberum pro liberarum, nostrum pro nostrorum, miserum pro miserorum, u test apud Vergilium [Aen. 6.21f.] ‘miserum septena quotannis corpora natorum.’*

<sup>858</sup> See *TLL*, s.v. *congruo*: *traditur infin. congruere TER. Haut.* 511 *neque aliter, ut videtur*.

<sup>859</sup> *Haut.* 467, 7 (Bem.)

*ultima claudicat syllaba*, “Syrus the slave comes out sporting extravagantly in iambic meter, for this meter sounds more luxuriant with its anapestic rhythm, and the last syllable does not limp.”<sup>860</sup>

There is also a series of remarks on the tone that certain phrases have, which I include here because of the taxonomic approach taken toward them. The phrase *quid ais* at *Heauton* 182 (Bem.) is not interrogative, but an indication of rejoicing: *non est interrogantis sed laetantis*. A similar interjectional phrase, *quid fit*, is not a rebuke, but an exclamation of surprised joy: *haec interrogatio non est censoria sed favorabilis*.<sup>861</sup> Likewise, *o* is an *interiectio admirantis* at *Heauton* 406 (Bem.). Lastly, *actum siet* at *Heauton* 456 is said to be a verb of one in despair: *verbum disperationis*.

As is common in the commentaries to Euripides and Aeschines, many grammatical notes demonstrate an interest in analogical reasoning when it comes to explaining various phenomena. Several examples appear in the Bembine scholia: *etiamdum* is constructed in the same way as *nondum*,<sup>862</sup> *istic* stands in for *iste* much as *hic* for *illic*,<sup>863</sup> and the prefixes *inter-* and *de-* both show intensification in *intertrimento* (*ad augmentum ostendendum*), in the same way as *inter-* does in the form *interfectus*.<sup>864</sup> We also learn that the men of old formed the imperative of *ducere* on analogy with *legere*, meaning that *abduce* was proper Latin.<sup>865</sup> Further, the term *greges* is used analogically for humans: *ut minorum pecorum greges et maiorum armenta dicuntur, ita et humillimae condicionis hominum greges appellantur*, “As herds of lesser beasts are called *greges* and herds of larger animals are called *armenta*, so also groups of people of lower status are called *greges*.”<sup>866</sup>

Very many notes (and especially those of Donatus) pick out linguistic figures, many of which are Greek or Greek transliterations. These include basic identifications of asyndeton, ἀπὸ κοινοῦ

<sup>860</sup> *Ad.* 763 (Bem.). The OLD confirms the use of *claudicare* with reference to limping verse, with one citation to support the claim (*claudicat hic versus*, Claud. *Epigr.* 79.3), to which the present passage may be added.

<sup>861</sup> *Ad.* 885 (Bem.); cf. *Haut.* 103 (Bem.)

<sup>862</sup> *Haut.* 229

<sup>863</sup> *Haut.* 380

<sup>864</sup> *Haut.* 448

<sup>865</sup> *Ad.* 482; cf. *Ad.* 781

<sup>866</sup> *Haut.* 245

constructions, pleonasm, hysteron proteron, ellipsis, and others.<sup>867</sup> Archaism is also particularly common and will be of concern for us later when we examine the degree to which the Terentian commentators use chronological arguments as a method of exegesis. For now, let it suffice to say that archaism is invoked for the genitive of *ornatus* and *senatus* in *-i*,<sup>868</sup> the use of an accusative object with *utor*,<sup>869</sup> the presence of the pleonastic *diei* with *tempus*,<sup>870</sup> and many more perceived oddities in the original text. These and other figures are with a few exceptions stated plainly without any technical definition, such that the reader would have to be expected to know them already. This also means that determining a commentator's meaning for a given passage can be difficult when the identification of the figure is not obvious to us.<sup>871</sup>

Finally, there are a few grammatical notes that do not fit easily into the categories mentioned. Donatus notes at *Eunuchus* 189 that a compound subject of mixed gender (masculine and feminine) has its plural form in the masculine. Gender also comes to the foreground in a short discussion on the qualities of *satur*, which is both masculine and neuter, though Terence uses it in the feminine as well.<sup>872</sup> There is also information about locative forms of *rus* at *Adelphoe* 401 (Bem.). The term *neutrum verbum* is used at *Heauton* 423 (Bem.), apparently to describe *augescit* as intransitive. There is also a short discussion of negation at *Heauton* 175 (Bem.), but one for which I have found no parallel, nor have I been able to determine its full meaning.<sup>873</sup>

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<sup>867</sup> For a sampling, see the following Bembine scholia: *Eun.* 65, 227, 677; *Haut.* 426, 430, 519; *Ad.* 610. Donatus has these figures and more, including zeugma (*Eun.* 12), παρασκευή (*Eun.* 103), ἐπιμονή (*Eun.* 127), and anastrophe (*Eun.* 139).

<sup>868</sup> *Eun.* 237 (Bem.)

<sup>869</sup> *Ad.* 815 (Bem.)

<sup>870</sup> *Haut.* 168 (Bem.)

<sup>871</sup> I am still considering the Bembine scholia at *Haut.* 343 and *Ad.* 419, for example.

<sup>872</sup> *Ad.* 765 (Bem.)

<sup>873</sup> <haudquaquam> vel 'non' vel 'non nimis.' nam negatio est mixta cum quadam aestimatione, et est una pars orationis.

*History, Geography, and Culture*

In the scholia to Euripides, mythological information was superabundant. For Aeschines, a large portion of the notes were devoted to matters of history and especially the political environment before and during the speeches. For Terence, however, there is no clearly evident category that corresponds to these extremely prevalent background descriptions in the Greek scholia. In Terence's plays there is usually little need for the exposition of mythology, and only a few historical markers need to be given from time to time. I provide here in collective form some of the comparatively sparse historical, geographical, and cultural comments that do emerge.

A handful of notes pertain to what we would classify as "history," and they are all the more interesting for their rareness. When Thraso boasts that he had always been pleasing to the king in whatever he did, the Bembine scholiast adds:

*legimus et alibi sub regibus militasse Athinienses [sic], habebant enim urbis commercia cum regibus, teste Demosthene. nam et ipse Terentius alibi [Haut. 117] 'in Asiam ad regem militatum abiit, Chreme.'*<sup>874</sup>

We have read elsewhere too that the Athenians served as soldiers under kings, for the cities had trading relations with kings, as Demosthenes testifies. For Terence himself also says elsewhere: 'He went off to Asia to be a soldier for the king, Chremes.'

At *Adelphoe* 686, Micio tells Aeschinus that he has violated a maiden whom it was not right for him to touch: *virginem vitiasti quam te non ius fuerat tangere*. The Bembine scholiast explains that this rule came from Solon: *quod conditum fuerat a Solone cuius filosofi legibus Attica regibatur*. More Greek history recurs just a bit later in a bizarre and fascinating note. Aeschinus rejoices to himself that Micio will help him arrange his marriage, stating finally: *sed cesso ire intro, ne morae meis nuptiis egomet siem?* "But do I delay to go in and so cause delay for my very own marriage?" Out of the blue the Bembine scholiast draws the following comparison: *sensus hic de Alexandro venit qui cum esset interrogatus orbem qua ratione vicisset respondisse fertur 'nihil in crastinum differens'* talis sensus est

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<sup>874</sup> *Eun.* 397; note that there is no corresponding scholion at *Heauton* 117.

in Lucano [1.281] *'semper nocuit differre paratis,'* “This idea comes from Alexander. When he asked the oracle how he should conquer, it is said to have replied, ‘Putting off nothing for tomorrow.’<sup>875</sup> Such a notion is in Lucan, ‘Delay always harms one’s plans.’”<sup>876</sup> Another note specifies that slaves from Ethiopia were of great value because they were brought in rarely, for it was difficult to bring them from India to Greece, because in the times of Terence India had not fallen under Roman authority, and that it was Augustus (on the testimony of Vergil) who first conquered it: *nondum enim temporibus Terentii in dicionem Romanae potestatis accesserat. Indiam primus vicit Augustus, teste Vergilio, 'super et Garamantas et Indos proferet imperium.'*<sup>877</sup> Lastly, a rather lengthy note to *Adelphoe* 439 (Bem.) gives information about the calendar:

*apud Athenienses populus decem tribubus censebatur; et haec popularis erat res publica; singulae tribus singulis mensibus urbem regebant. singuli autem menses apud veteres tricenis non plus diebus supputabantur. Alexandrini primi, post Macedones, deinde Romani binos menses addiderunt ut annus XII mensibus censeretur. addiderunt autem Romani Ianuarium et Februarium; nam December mensis indicio est primum Martium fuisse.*

Among the Athenians the people were divided into ten tribes, and this was a popular republic. The individual tribes reigned for one month each. And among the ancients each month was reckoned at not more than thirty days. First the Alexandrians, afterwards the Macedonians, and then the Romans added two months apiece so that the year would be divided into twelve months. And the Romans added January and February; for [the name of] December [i.e., “Tenth”] is an indication that March had been the first.

Geographical notes are also quite rare compared to those in the Greek scholia we have examined, but there are a few exceptionally basic ones. A short gloss on *Rhodi* at *Eunuchus* 107 (Bem.) reads: *insulae nomen.* Just a few lines later, *Sunio* is explained by: *locus est unde piratae puellam rapuerunt* [Hand 1]; *regio Atheniensium maritima* [Hand 2]. For this verse Donatus gives: *promontorium est Atheniensium.* A previously mentioned note also gives some information about the Piraeus. In the original text Parmeno shows surprise that Chaerea is approaching, since he has been assigned as a guard at that port, and the Bembine scholiast adds: *Pyraeum dicitur promuntorium Athenarum quod frequenter*

<sup>875</sup> Compare a note from the *Gnomologium Vaticanum* (74): ‘Ο αὐτὸς ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ τίνος τίνι τρόπῳ τὰς τηλικαύτας πράξεις ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ κατεργάσατο εἶπεν· “μηδὲν ἀναβαλλόμενος.”

<sup>876</sup> *Ad.* 712 (Bem.)

<sup>877</sup> *Eun.* 417 (Bem.); has India been conflated with Ethiopia here?

*temptatum sit a piratis. [<custos>] quia non perpetuo muro Athenae cinguntur sed maxima ex parte alluuntur mari, publicis illic costodiis merebatur.* Donatus adds a comment along these lines: *adversus praedonum incursus illic excubabat iuventus Attica.* Eugraphius' addition is comical (in a couple of senses): *<ex Piraeo> locus est mari vicinus iuxta Athenas aptus ad voluptatem.* Perhaps the situation at Piraeus is the same as at Baiae or the Jersey Shore.

Other comments pertain to different aspects of culture. These include the fact that a mina is equal to 50 denarii,<sup>878</sup> that the Roman plebs consists of slaves and freedmen,<sup>879</sup> and that the cognomen Milesius is a fabricated one.<sup>880</sup> An extended note also gives details about military defense fortifications on the basis of a metaphorical use of *circumvallant*:

*metaforice. vallata enim dicimus terrae aggerem intra quem latentes figimus vallos, hoc est acutas sudes hisque fossatis civitates vel castra tutamur contra obsidiones hostium qui si proprius [propius] accesserint inmerguntur vallo tam pedites quam equites et cum vel inserti sint sudibus vel pedes inmerserint aggeri neque liberari possunt et obruuntur desuper saxis ab his qui obpugnantur.*<sup>881</sup>

He says this metaphorically. For we call *vallata* the mound of earth hiding within which we fix palisades (i.e., sharp stakes), and by digging these we protect cities and camps against the sieges of enemies who, if they come too close, become sunk in the fortification—both foot soldiers and cavalry—and when they are either stuck on the stakes or their feet sink into the mound, they are not able to get free and are rained down upon from above with rocks by the besieged.

Further, one learns about the goddess Salus at *Adelphoe* 761 (Bem.): *dea est Salus quae cum Aescolapio pingitur, Hygia dea quaedam praebendae salutis,* “Salus is a goddess who is depicted with Aesclepius; Hygia (Health) is a certain goddess in charge of granting health.” And lastly, at *Eunuchus* 79 the Bembine scholiast glosses *si sapis* with *si non furis*. The statement immediately following that gloss, and done in the same hand, is a fascinating expansion: *Stoicorum enim dogma est omnem stultum insanire; sic graece πᾶς ἄφρων μαίνεται,* “For it is the teaching of the Stoics that every stupid person is insane; thus in Greek, ‘Every fool is mad.’” At *Eunuchus* 254 (*hic homines prorsum ex stultis insanos facit*), the scholiast again states: *decenter a Graecis sumit iocum; nam paradoxon unum dicit πᾶς ἄφρων μαίνεται, id*

<sup>878</sup> *Eun.* 169 (Bem.)

<sup>879</sup> *Ad.* 898 (Bem.)

<sup>880</sup> *Ad.* 702 (Bem.)

<sup>881</sup> *Ad.* 302 (Bem.); cf. the description by Polybius (17.14)

*est omnis stultus insanit.* The invocation of the Greek saying makes far more sense here, and so it may be assumed that the commentator has read another reference back into a previous gloss that reminded him of stupidity and madness.<sup>882</sup>

### *Rhetoric*

It is with the Roman scholars that we find the detailed rhetorical treatment that we might have expected to find in the Euripidean scholia. By far the prime representative of this kind of approach is Eugraphius, whose notes to Terence are usually concerned with paraphrasing<sup>883</sup> and identifying the motives, execution, and persuasiveness of speeches. This type of rhetorical analysis is particularly heavy at the start of a new section of the play, where Eugraphius sets out the type of argument being made in the theoretical terminology of rhetoric and law. He thus speaks of the *captatio benevolentiae* at the start of the prologue to the *Eunuchus* and discusses how this prologue contains two *controversiae*, one in which Terence prosecutes Lanuvinus for his error in the *Thesaurus*, and another in which Terence must defend himself against the accusation that he “broke the law” in taking material from Latin plays and not just Greek ones, as the prologue itself describes.<sup>884</sup> His concern for rhetoric continues on into the play too, as when he lauds Chaerea’s request to Parmeno for help in his new love affair, specifically because he begins his sales pitch with a recollection of past benefits (filched food from his father’s storehouse): *apte beneficium se ante praestitisse, quod conveniret personae, dixit, cum servalis in cellulam patris omnem penum sit solitus transferre.*<sup>885</sup>

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<sup>882</sup> Compared to the scholia to Euripides, there are remarkably few mentions of proverbial statements, but in addition to this Greek proverb, two more may be found at *Phormio* 21 and *Adelphoe* 804, both in the Scholia Bembina and Donatus (the latter adds that the proverb derived from the Pythagoreans). See also the proverb of the greedy rustic who ruined the bean, a story meaning that he who does evil will have that evil return to him (*Eun.* 381, Eogr.).

<sup>883</sup> Eugraphius also has typical formulae such as *sensus est hic* and *hoc est* (*Eun.* 59, 285).

<sup>884</sup> Also involved here is mention of status theory. Both *controversiae* have a status of *qualitas*—that is, the debate is over what kind of action was committed, not whether it was committed.

<sup>885</sup> *Eun.* 310

Eugraphius is not alone in providing rhetorical guidance, however. The Bembine scholiast uses the term *auxesis* (familiar to us from the Aeschinean scholia) to describe hyperbolic amplification, as when Demea laments his situation while calling upon the sky, the earth, and the seas of Neptune.<sup>886</sup> Elsewhere, when Hegio tries to persuade Demea to do the right thing by appealing to his responsibility as a man of “great power, wealth, fortune, and nobility,” the scholiast exclaims: *o argumentum rhetoris Areopagitae! laude onerat eum quem scit animo iustiore esse ut ista laudatio causae videatur esse praescriptio*, “Oh argument of an Areopagite orator! He heaps praise upon him, whom he knows to be of juster soul, so that that praise of the cause [i.e., for his responsibility to do good] would seem to be a pretext [for right action].”<sup>887</sup> Lastly, when Sostrata says that the only hope of proving legally that Aeschinus has wronged his fiancée is the ring he had given her as a promise, the scholiast refers to this would-be court case as having conjectural status, where the defendant must be convicted either by witnesses or arguments.<sup>888</sup>

Donatus includes rhetorical observations as well, including a note to the above argument of Hegio: *vide quam oratorie laudes sumpserit argumenta suadendi*. The appearance of *oratorie* is standard with Donatus, who uses this term also to describe Parmeno’s sarcastic gibe at Thais: “Oh, you *poor thing*, having to exclude Phaedria because of your love for him.”<sup>889</sup> Thais is also said to be speaking rhetorically when she describes (the as-of-yet-unnamed) Pamphilia as a sister so that her preoccupation with the girl, to the detriment of Phaedria’s feelings, would limit the injury he thinks he has received from her: *oratorie cumulate dignitatem et amorem puellae, ut eius comparatione leniatur iniuria facta Phaedriae*.<sup>890</sup>

<sup>886</sup> *o caelum, o terra, o maria Neptuni!* (*Ad.* 790; cf. *Eun.* 61). “By the hammer of Thor!” “Great Odin’s raven!” and “By the beard of Zeus!” (*Anchorman*, 2004) are a reminder that the tradition of *αὐξήσις* through flamboyant divine invocation is alive and well in comedy today.

<sup>887</sup> *Ad.* 502

<sup>888</sup> *Ad.* 347

<sup>889</sup> *credo ut fit misera prae amore excludi hunc foras* (*Eun.* 98). See the division made by Seneca (*Epist.* 100.10): *sit aliud oratorie acre, tragice grande, comice exile*.

<sup>890</sup> *Eun.* 117



Donatus also provides some comments on technical rhetorical theory at *Eunuchus* 144, though it is clear that he is getting this from other scholars:<sup>891</sup>

*non indiligenter consideraverunt hanc meretricis orationem, qui illam instar controversiae rettulerunt. nam et principium est [v. 1] . . . et narratio [v. 27] et partitio cum confirmatione [v. 64] et reprehensio [v. 82] . . . et conclusio per conquestionem [v. 99-102].*

Not heedlessly have those estimated this speech of the courtesan who have reported on it as if it were a *controversia*. For it has a beginning . . . and a narration . . . and a division with the adducing of proofs . . . and refutation . . . and a conclusion with an appeal for sympathy.

These types of remarks are a clear demonstration that our commentators have analyzed the plays specifically from a rhetorical perspective (or are at least using sources that have done so) and have brought to bear knowledge that goes beyond what one could garner from the plays themselves.

### *The Genre of Comedy and the Comic Writer*

The commentaries to Terence have a good deal of information and opinions about the creation, production, and criticism of Roman comedy. First, though, a disclaimer should be issued. In the scholia to Euripides, comments on the nature of tragedy and on Euripides himself were intriguing not only for the information itself, but also for the fact that the commentators were not frequently prompted by the original text to say something about Euripides and his art. That is, there is not a heavy amount of obvious meta-theatricality in Euripides, and when claims were made about something Euripides was up to (e.g., addressing the audience or making a statement about tragedy as a genre), this required a subtle reading that went beneath the surface of the drama's mythological narrative. Terence, on the other hand, is more like Aeschines in that his meta-performative perspective appears often. Just as Aeschines makes frequent remarks about rhetorical technique and the judicial/ political context of his speeches (especially when he wishes to point out some scam technique on the part of Demosthenes), so too does Terence, in a tradition

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<sup>891</sup> This could of course be true with any kind of note in a variorum commentary, but here he is explicit in attributing the thought to others.

going back to Old Comedy, point openly to the fact that we are witnessing a stage production—and never more clearly than in the prologues, where he takes issue with critics and gives preliminary information about the upcoming play. Thus, we will need to be careful when we assess scholia that make comments about the genre of comedy or other poetic matters: does a given observation serve as evidence that the commentator is making a conscious effort to consider performance context and poetic expectations, or is he simply channeling the ideas of Terence through paraphrase?<sup>892</sup> It is only the former that proves the extent to which our scholars actively employed literary criticism in their exegesis, and so I will be concerned here with the degree to which the commentators initiate their various exegetical methods as opposed simply to recapitulating what they find in the original text.

At several places the commentators slip in information about the production of Roman comedy, both in general and for the plays of Terence specifically. This includes the didascalia and the prefatory comments in the text of Donatus. The Bembine scholia have no introductory remarks for any of the plays except for the *Phormio*, a fact that is due to the aforementioned close correspondence that the scholia have to Donatus for the first 59 verses of that play. These introductions give information such as the curule aediles under whom the games were held, the names of the actors, the names of the accompanying musicians, and the play's level of success. There are also Bembine scholia to the prologues that further explain dramatic production. Terence claims that his rival, Luscius Lanuvinus, tried to ruin his reputation as a poet and therefore to force him to go hungry, which the scholiast clarifies by saying that poets were accustomed to sell what they had written.<sup>893</sup> Another note to *Heauton* 10 summarizes the process of production as follows: *docet poeta, discit actor, edunt magistri*.<sup>894</sup> Who these *magistri* are is explained further by a comment to *Eunuchus* 22: *<magistros> aediles; ad ipsos enim ludi pertinebant teatrales; sic Cicero deicit aedilitatem dicendo [in Verr. 1.1.13] 'aedilis, hoc est paulo amplius quam privatus.'* It

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<sup>892</sup> A good example is the deduction at *Phormio* 32 (Bem.) that the *Hecyra* was produced before the *Phormio*, since Terence refers to the incident in which his audience was lost to a tightrope-walker and some boxers. If one knows this bit of information about the interruption of the *Hecyra*, then the chronology of the two plays is simply confirmed as it is found in Terence.

<sup>893</sup> *Phorm.* 18

<sup>894</sup> Stylistically this note is the same as the lexicographical strings seen at *Heauton* 85, 124, 453.

will be noted that the quotation from Cicero has little or no bearing on the original text at this point, but the scholiast found it suitable to give extra information concerning this political office. Other minor notes do little more than clarify what Terence has already said in the prologue, such as the statement that *primae partes* refers to the lead acting role, or that the labeling of the *Heauton* as “new” means that it was being produced for the first time in Latin, not that it had a brand new plot or characters.<sup>895</sup>

As in the Euripidean scholia, the commentaries to Terence contain limited amounts of stage direction, sometimes regarding the intonation of lines, but more often the actions that should attend them.<sup>896</sup> When Thais speaks of her uncle’s greed, for instance, it should be pronounced in a manner showing disdain: *vultu accommodato ad reprehensionem pronuntiandum est*.<sup>897</sup> Further, when Phaedria asks Thais, “Am I despised by you on account of these actions of mine?” (*ob haec facta abs te spenor?*), Donatus states that the verse can be taken as a question or a bitter attack, with an additional note giving preference to the latter: *vel per interrogationem vel per invidiosam exprobrationem. Et: melius velut indicativo modo quam interrogativo profertur; hoc enim est multo gravius quam illud*.<sup>898</sup> A bit later, when Phaedria says that he will go into the countryside and stay away from Thais for two days, Donatus remarks that the actor should pronounce *biduom* as if he were saying *biennio*—that is, in an agonized and frustrated way, as if two days away from his beloved would feel like two whole years.<sup>899</sup> In another example, Chremes describes a horrendous dinner at which his guests cost him a considerable sum with their exorbitant tastes, and the Bembine scholiast says that his exclamation *sensi* is to be done with a groan.<sup>900</sup>

Gestures and other actions are also assumed when there would otherwise be ambiguity—and the discussion of lexicography above should make it clear that the commentators recognized a persistent and sometimes problematic fuzziness in the way words could be interpreted, such that these instances may

<sup>895</sup> *Phorm.* 27 (cf. *Haut.* 1); *Haut.* 7

<sup>896</sup> It will be noted that these directions are able to be deduced entirely from the original text, but that does not mean that they are *obviously* derived from that text, and in fact some of them require a fair bit of imagination.

<sup>897</sup> *Eun.* 131 (Don.)

<sup>898</sup> *Eun.* 171

<sup>899</sup> *Eun.* 187

<sup>900</sup> *cum gemitu pronuntia* (*Haut.* 455, Bem.).

even be considered part of the τῶν μέσων category, requiring either additional words or some sort of gesture to clarify. This sort of ambiguity is addressed specifically by Donatus in a note to *Eunuchus* 89f., where the previously excluded Phaedria responds sarcastically to Thais after she asks him why he did not come right in: *sane quia vero haec mihi patent semper fores aut quia sum apud te primu*’, “Sure, since these doors are *always* open to me, and since I’ve got first place in your heart!” Donatus remarks: *tolle ‘sane’ et ‘vero’ et pronuntiandi adiumenta vultumque dicentis et in verbis non negatio sed confessio esse credetur*, “Take away the *sane* and the *vero* and the aids of pronunciation and the countenance of the one speaking and it will be believed that in these words is not denial [i.e. sarcasm], but a confession.” Thus, the actor’s intonation and facial expression<sup>901</sup> go hand in hand with other words to steer the otherwise ambiguous phrase in the right direction.

Several examples show this sort of dependence on nonverbal communication. When Thais tells Phaedria and Parmeno to listen up (*hoc agite, amabo*), Donatus says that this is an address to the audience akin to what Plautus (*Asin. prol.* 1) says, *hoc agite si vultis, spectatores*.<sup>902</sup> Accordingly, after an *Et* transition he adds that it is appropriate to help this line out with a nod and gesture towards the audience: *convenit veluti nutu audientiam significantis et gestu hoc ipsum adiuvari*. In the prologue to the *Heauton*, written to be delivered by Terence’s lead actor, the speaker wonders if “this actor” will be able to communicate accurately enough the speech given to him by Terence. The Bembine scholiast states that when he says *hic actor*, he points to himself with his finger (*se digito ostendit*).<sup>903</sup> Similarly, near the beginning of the *Phormio* Davos is said to have uttered *accipe* with a gesture of someone making an offer: *hoc cum gestu offerentis dicitur*.<sup>904</sup>

<sup>901</sup> Did Donatus assume that Terence’s actors did not wear masks?

<sup>902</sup> *Eun.* 130; a scholiast adds at *Phormio* 30 (Bem.) that *silentium* is a way of expressing favor for a comedy (since silence shows the audience’s attention—evidently a disinterested spectator will start chatting with a neighbor, or perhaps even leave to see a circus act, a problem with which Terence was familiar).

<sup>903</sup> *Haut.* 13; Eugraphius says simply: *hoc est ego*.

<sup>904</sup> *Phorm.* 52 (identical in the Scholia Bembina and Donatus). See also the claim that Demea’s *iam scibo* at *Adelphoe* 780 (Bem.) is the wording of someone about to break down the door, i.e., to discover what is going on inside.

A few other instances demonstrate how the commentators extrapolate actions of the characters on the basis of the demands of the script. Such is *Eunuchus* 190ff., where Thais and Phaedria are bidding each other farewell:

*PH. in hoc biduom, Thais, vale. TH. mi Phaedria, et tu. numquid vis aliud? PH. egone quid velim? cum milite istoc praesens absens ut sies; dies noctesque me ames, me desideres, me somnies, me exspectes, de me cogites, me speres, me te oblectes, mecum tota sis.*

PH. [I go] for this two-day period. Good-bye, Thais. TH. My Phaedria, Farewell to you too. You don't want anything else do you? PH. What could I want? That when you are present with that soldier, you seem absent; love me day and night, desire me, dream about me, await me, think about me, hope for me, delight yourself in me, be totally mine.

It seems clear from the *ut* construction in Phaedria's response that the one thing he wants before departing is to make his request for Thais' all-consuming obsession while he is away. Donatus has a different interpretation: *subintellegendum post osculum dici 'numquid vis aliud?' quasi recte factum*, "You must understand that 'You don't want anything else, do you?' was said after a kiss, as if it was a good and proper one." The Bembine scholiast assumes the same thing: *nisi osculum praecessisse animadvertas non potest aliter intellegitur*, "Unless you understand that a kiss has come before, it is not possible to understand otherwise." Other examples include Thais' plea for Phaedria to stop tormenting himself, for which Donatus assumes a loving embrace:

*haec rursum nisi amplectens adolescentem mulier dixerit, videbitur 'ne crucia te' sine affectu dicere. sed sic dicit 'ne crucia te' et eo gestu, quasi in eo et ipsa crucietur; nam ideo subicit 'anime mi' hoc est animus meus.*<sup>905</sup>

Unless the woman embraces the young man while saying these things, she will seem to say "Do not torment yourself" without affection. But she says "Do not torment yourself" in such a way and with such a gesture as if she herself was being tormented vicariously; for it is for this reason that she adds *anime mi*, that is, *animus meus*.

<sup>905</sup> *Eun.* 95; the final statement is simply a repetition of a preceding note stating that *mi* is the vocative of *meus*.

Similarly, Demea's *mitte me* at *Adelphoe* 780 is an indication to both the Bembine scholiast and Donatus that the servant must have grabbed hold of him. Here again the stage direction is mentioned as a necessity to make sense of the script, and there is no way to know the source of such comments. These are in any case different from the Euripidean stage directions, which periodically reveal that they come ultimately from scholars who had viewed these dramas on stage. I have found no such clue from the commentaries to Terence that such autopsy is the origin of any stage directions.<sup>906</sup>

The commentators also periodically provide distinctions between comedy and tragedy, and several key notes to the prologue of the *Phormio* (where again Donatus and the Bembine scholiast essentially overlap) deal with this topic of genre. The debate itself starts with the text of the prologue, where Terence meets the accusation of Luscius Lanuvinus, who says over and over that Terence's comedies are weak since they never have scenes of a damsel in distress begging a lovesick youth to save her:

*postquam poeta vetu' poetam non potest  
retrahere a studio et transdere hominem in otium,  
maledictis deterrere ne scribat parat;  
qui ita dictitat, quas ante hic fecit faculas  
tenui esse oratio et scriptura levi:  
quia nusquam insanum scripsit adulescentulum  
cervam videre fugere et sectari canes  
et eam plorare, orare ut subveniat sibi.*

The commentators support Terence here. A note to *Phormio* 5 (*tenui esse oratio*) suggests: *imperitus accusator hoc obicit quod in comoedia maxime pollet; nam cothurnus tragoediae aptus est*, "An unskilled critic makes this objection against something that prevails in comedy in the greatest way; for the cothurnus is suited to tragedy."<sup>907</sup> Another note several verses later at *Phormio* 8 confirms this: *haec omnis peristasys tragica est et ideo in comoedia vitiosa dicitur*, "All this subject matter [i.e., what Lanuvinus suggests] is tragic and for this reason is said to be faulty in a comedy."

<sup>906</sup> For more stage direction see *Eunuchus* 197 (Bem.), where Thais is said to remain on stage alone; Donatus has a different interpretation, but difficult to understand fully.

<sup>907</sup> If I understand this correctly, the commentator means that Lanuvinus' suggestion for subject matter is actually more tragic and would not belong on the comic stage—what he blames in Terence is *supposed* to be that way.

Other specifications for the genre of comedy have to do with the presentation of characters. These *personae* can be *statariae* (“quiet, tranquil”) or *motoriae* (“bustling, noisy”).<sup>908</sup> The latter can include cunning slaves like Parmeno who end up giving advice to their masters, as Donatus remarks: *concessum est in palliata poetis comicis servos dominis sapientiores fingere, quod idem in togata non fere licet*, “It is allowed in a *palliata* comedy for the comic poets to create slave characters who are wiser than their masters, a thing which is not generally permitted in a *togata* play.”<sup>909</sup> There is also careful attention at times to the way that diction is kept consistent with a character. Such is the case with Thraso’s boast that his rejoinder to a rival Rhodian left everyone in the dining room nearly dying from laughter (*emoriri*).<sup>910</sup> The Bembine scholiast says that *emoriri* is just another way to say *emori*, but instead of stopping there, he goes on to explain that this results from the characterization of Thraso, an example of a common comic trope:

*pro persona militis locutus. nam apud comicos personae pro qualitate sua inducuntur. nam talis est regula: omnia verba infinito modo RI terminantur per omnes coniugationes absque tertiam productam. nam quando volumus personam callidam exprimere ‘emori’ dicimus, quando stolidiorem ‘emoriri.’*<sup>911</sup>

[Thraso] spoke in the character of the soldier. For with comic writers, characters are introduced in accordance with their own nature. For such is the rule: all verbs in the infinitive mood [i.e., passive/ deponent] end in *-ri* for all conjugations except the lengthened third [i.e., third conjugation i-stem, of which *mori* is one]. For when we want to express a cunning character, we say *emori*; when we want to express a denser character, *emoriri*.

This is also an interesting place to examine the difference between Hand 1 and Hand 2 in the Bembine scholia, since the latter seems to ignore the character-based interpretation of the former, stating simply that *emoriri* occurs because poets love adding extra syllables.<sup>912</sup> In any case, whether the form is to be attributed to poetic commonplace or a subtle indication of Thraso’s bumbling idiocy, the irregular form is interpreted not as a mistake by Terence, but something that exemplifies a tendency of the genre.

<sup>908</sup> *Haut.* 36 (Bem.), *Eun. praef.* 2 (Don.).

<sup>909</sup> *Eun.* 57

<sup>910</sup> *Eun.* 432

<sup>911</sup> Eugraphius has a similar thought, though not as clearly expressed: *emoriri comice tantum dicitur, nam emori facit.*

<sup>912</sup> *amant poetae addere syllabam ut ‘duellum,’ ‘induperatorem.’*

There are in fact more examples of this kind in which linguistic oddities are attributed to comic tendency. Like the added syllable *-ri*, the syllable *-er* on a passive infinitive is said to be poetic: *poetice 'er' abundat*.<sup>913</sup> Similarly, for the phrase *perdoctast probe*, either the *per-* or the *probe* is said to be poetically pleonastic.<sup>914</sup> In addition, the notion of being rationally mad (*cum ratione insanias*) is said to be an oxymoron, but one that is fitting for a comic writer: *ὀξύμωρον est, sed convenit comyco; nam nemo sanus insanit*.<sup>915</sup> Like Euripides, Terence is given a certain amount of leash for linguistic expression, whether it is just something that poets do or whether it expresses something more subtle about the character who says it.<sup>916</sup>

Before proceeding to notes about Terence himself, let us examine a few more passages in which the commentators discuss things that poets in general tend to do. Davos laments to himself (and to the audience) in the first act of the *Phormio* that his friend Geta has assembled a small amount of money but will probably be forced to use it as a gift for the new bride of his master's son, and in making this lament he provides the background information for the story. The Bembine scholiast (and Donatus, in almost the same words) states that this is a feature of comedy:

*quod in omnibus fere comoediis in quibus perplexa argumenta sunt teneri solet, id in hac quoque Terentius servat ut personam extra argumentum inducat; cui dum ob ipsum quod veluti aliena a tota fabula est, res gesta narratur, discat populus continentiam rerum sitque institutus ad cetera. persona inducitur ad narrandum argumentum, quae cum servilis intellegatur, adhuc nesciatur cuius sit domini.*<sup>917</sup>

What usually happens in almost all comedies that have complex arguments Terence also keeps here, namely that he brings in a character outside of the argument, and while the action of the play is narrated by him on account of the fact that he appears to be separate from the whole story, the audience learns the contents of the matter and is prepared for the rest. A character [Davos] is brought onstage to narrate the argument, and while it is clear that he is a slave, it is unclear whose slave he is.

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<sup>913</sup> *Eun.* 164 (Bem.)

<sup>914</sup> *aut 'per' poeta (=poetice) abundant aut 'probe' (Haut. 361, Bem.).*

<sup>915</sup> *Eun.* 63 (Bem.)

<sup>916</sup> The topic of poetic license will recur with Servius, who discusses this concept explicitly. Quintilian (1.8) describes the principle, but with some sourness, pointing out that irregularities, which were really compelled by the meter and not by design, are given special names and treated as if they came from poetic virtue and not necessity: *metaplasmus enim et schematismus et schemata, ut dixi, vocamus et laudem virtutis necessitati damus.*

<sup>917</sup> My sense of this last statement is that the lack of identification of his master helps him remain farther removed from the argument that he is narrating (*extra argumentum*).



So far we are told that it is a comic practice to use a character from within the story to tell the audience about that story, but the next note goes a bit further in describing what Terence has done:

*in hac scaena quae docendi spectatoris causa inducitur, miri extrinsecus lepores facetiaeque cernuntur et talis [=sales] comoeci. id enim est artis poeticae<sup>918</sup> ut dum narratio argumenti detur opera idem tamen res agi et comoedia spectari videatur.*

In this scene, which is introduced for the sake of instructing the spectator, one finds wonderful jokes and clever phrases on the side, as well as the wit of the comic poet. For this belongs to the art of poetry, namely that while the narration of the argument is given, even so at the same time the action seems to be played out and the comedy seems to be underway.

That is, the comic art is to conceal art by coming up with a creative means whereby the audience can be simultaneously made aware of the argument while being caught up in it. So it is not only the use of a character to provide background information that is “comic,” but rather the artful way in which the comic poet plays with the audience—has the drama started, or hasn’t it?

### *Terence*

So much for comic technique in general. What do the commentators have to say about Terence specifically? Not much, sadly. There is almost nothing that could be called “biographical,” and most comments about the man himself are (often vague) generalizations about his poetic practice, of which I provide some examples here. Donatus, for instance, tells us that for Terence the three main divisions of a drama—*πρότασις*, *ἐπίτασις*, *καταστροφή*—are so balanced that “you would nowhere say that Terence fell asleep exhausted from the length of his work”: *haec et πρότασις et ἐπίτασις et καταστροφή ita aequales habet, ut nusquam dicas longitudine operis Terentium delassatum dormitasse.*<sup>919</sup> In an additional example, the Bembine scholiast states that “you would not know if Terence was a comic writer or a

<sup>918</sup> For more on the *ars poetica*, see *Haut.* 23 (Bem.), where it is the gloss for Terence’s phrase *studium musicum*.

<sup>919</sup> *Eun. praef.* 5.

grammarians”: *nescias utrum comicus Terentius an grammaticus*.<sup>920</sup> This note is perplexingly unspecific, and it may have something to do with the fact that *angiportum* is used as a neuter noun, as the scholiast and Eugraphius point out, and Mountford even conjectures in his aporia that the *erravi* of Syrus in the next line may even have been taken as a joking apology for the usage. Whatever the solution, the commentator does make some remark on the linguistic concerns of our poet. See too the additional assertion that Terence is an avid rhetorician: *Terentius cupidus artis oratoriae* [ca. 25 letters missing] *emitationem* [imitationem?] *Tullius; argumentatur secundum dicendi genus: amator quid faciat abiectus cum revocatur ab ea a qua fuerat ante contemptus*, “Terence, being passionate about the art of oratory . . . Cicero . . . . The argument is made according to the *genus dicendi*: what is a lover to do when he is rejected and then recalled by the same girl by whom he had previously been despised?” The lacuna here is disappointing, for we would very much like to know what the scholiast has to say about Cicero, but in any case we can see that Terence is said to have modeled the speech of Phaedria on a common rhetorical topic of a lover’s dilemma, and that this technique is a result of his oratorical bent.

At least two other notes speak of things Terence does according to his own custom (*more suo*),<sup>921</sup> and both examples are linguistic in nature. At *Heauton* 290, where Syrus describes an old woman weaving at the loom with her hair not fixed up (*capillu’ pexu’ prolixus circum caput / reiectu’ neglegenter*), the Bembine scholiast says that Terence customarily uses *capillum* to describe hair that is not styled (*crinem incultum*).<sup>922</sup> Elsewhere the scholiast says that, since *quis* and *cuius* are indefinite with respect to number when they refer to a multitude, Terence added *hi se adplicant*, not *hic se adplicat*.<sup>923</sup> That is, he showed that the relative pronoun *quoniam* (= *cuius*) referred to a plurality. These examples are opaque and disappointingly few.

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<sup>920</sup> *Ad.* 578ff.

<sup>921</sup> This has a clear correspondence with the scholia to Euripides and will again be very important in Servius, where the phrase appears dozens of times

<sup>922</sup> I find no corresponding claim in the commentaries. Terence uses a form of *capillum* three other times in our extant plays: *Eun.* 646, 860; *Phorm.* 106.

<sup>923</sup> *Haut.* 393 (Bem.); Donatus expresses the same grammatical principle at this line and also at *Eunuchus* 3, but without any comment about it being characteristic of Terence to make the specification.

### *Aesthetic Judgments*

As was the case for the Greek scholia, much of the commentary to Terence is concerned with the evaluation of his work. The principles on which Euripides and Aeschines were judged were predominantly the maintenance of plausibility and realism, consistency of characterization, linguistic propriety, and narrative arrangement. The evaluation of Terence is conducted on much the same lines, and as before the poet is more often defended against detractors than criticized. In fact, the depiction of Terence is even rosier than that of the Greek authors we have examined, with there being only a few points at which Terence is blamed outright for something.

As with other kinds of notes, remarks of praise or blame have a few recognizable formulae, with most examples beginning with an adverb that marks the comment as an endorsement or rejection of Terence's technique. Thus, when Terence does well, the note may begin with *bene*, *venuste*, *proprie*, *ornate*, and so forth. Disapproving—or at least less approving—notes may begin with *nove* (“irregularly”) or *mire* (“surprisingly, inexplicably”). With the latter we must be especially careful, since some examples seem to use *mire* as a marker of cleverness, or at least surprise without negative criticism.<sup>924</sup>

Realism is a primary criterion of aesthetic judgment, both in characterization and other areas. This is manifested in the Terentian commentaries especially at points in which characters are said to do or say something in a way that is particularly suited to their state of mind or situation, even if those words and behaviors would normally be deemed inappropriate for them. Donatus has a cluster of such notes near the beginning of the *Eunuchus* that we shall examine here. As a light threat to Thais, Parmeno says that he is able to keep true things a secret, but when someone tells him lies, he is full of cracks and leaks all over the place: *plenus rimarum sum, hac atque illac perfluo*.<sup>925</sup> Donatus calls this metaphor of a clay pot “vile and abject,” but instead of criticizing it, he explains it as the perfect way to talk in the presence

<sup>924</sup> The Greek equivalent *θαυμαστικῶς* functions in a similar way, with some instances pointing out exceptional cleverness, and others expressing surprise at a slip.

<sup>925</sup> *Eun.* 104

of the courtesan: *vilis et abiecta translatio est, apta apud meretricem loquenti*. Also, homoeoteleuton is normally avoided,<sup>926</sup> but Phaedria is so angry when he recounts what he sees as Thais' excuses that he did not even avoid this type of sound pattern: *vide μίμησιν cum odio inductam et depravatam pronuntiatione ita, ut et ὁμοιοτέλευτα non vitarentur de industria: 'abrepta' 'pro sua' 'soror est dicta*.<sup>927</sup> The effect is similar to what Terence does at *Eunuchus* 65, where Parmeno is pretending to express some of the thoughts in Phaedria's distraught mind: *egon illam, quae illum, quae me, quae non*, "I . . . her, who . . . him . . . who . . . me . . . who didn't . . . !" Donatus describes this disjointed pattern as a product of Phaedria's mental state, or at least what Parmeno imagines it to be:

*familiaris ἔλλειψις irascentibus; nam singula sic explentur: 'egone illam' non ulciscar, 'quae illum' recepit, 'quae me' exclusit, 'quae non' admisit. etenim nec necesse habet nec potest complere orationem, qui et secum loquitur et dolore vexatur. nam amat ἀποσιωπήσεις nimia indignatio, ut Vergilius [Aen. 1.135], 'quos ego—! sed motos praestat componere fluctus*.<sup>928</sup>

Ellipsis is common for angry people; for the individual items are filled out like so: "Will I not punish her, who took him back and who excluded me, who did not admit me?" For he does not need to complete his speech, nor can he, who even speaks with himself and is troubled by grief. For great anger customarily has sudden breaks, as Vergil says, "You whom I—! But first I must calm the troubled waves."

The Bembine scholiast also makes remarks about realism, including when Thais speaks of her faint memories of her childhood. That she can remember her parents' names and little more speaks of Terence's attention to detail: *vide quemadmodum proprietatem infantis descripsit; nam scimus infantes mox †oriuntur† non alia prius discere quam nomina parentum suorum*, "See how he depicted the quality of an infant; for as infants we know no other things before we learn the names of our parents."<sup>929</sup> Finally,

<sup>926</sup> *Ad.* 397 (Bem., Don.); see below.

<sup>927</sup> "*parvola / hinc abrepta; eduxit mater pro sua; / soror dictast; cupio abducere, ut reddam suis*" (*Eun.* 156, Don.); note that the scholiast's text (*soror est dicta*) differs from Kauer and Lindsay's 1961 OCT (*soror dictast*), making the homoeoteleuton worse. It is interesting besides that a character within the drama is considered to have the same linguistic sensitivity as the poet. See also Quintilian (9.2), who quotes this passage as an example of *imitatio* or *μίμησις* (i.e., Phaedria putting words into Thais' mouth), but without comment on homoeoteleuton or Phaedria's state of mind. Donatus includes the part about *μίμησις* but goes no further.

<sup>928</sup> Compare the Bembine note to this verse: *subaudimus 'videbo' aut 'repeto'; haec tamen defectiva sunt quae amorem decent*.

<sup>929</sup> *Eun.* 112; the text of the scholion is corrupt in some way, though the meaning seems clear. A similar comment is made at *Adelphoe* 757ff., where Demea's hysterical shouting is explained by the fact that crotchety old men convey all their complaints through invective. For other situations where consistency is pointed out, see *Eun.* 116, 190 (Don.), *Ad.* 812, *Phorm.* 20 (Bem.).

we return briefly to *Eunuchus* 84, where it was stated that Terence had used mixed language of hot and cold to describe Phaedria's condition, namely that excess in one extreme can induce perceptions of its opposite. Donatus goes further than the Bembine scholiast here by citing a scientific reason: *nimius ignis effectum frigoris reddit, ut ex frigore nimio effectus ignis existit, secundum illud quod physici aiunt ἀκρότητες ἰσότητες*, "Too much fire gives the effect of chill, just like the effect of fire comes from too much chill, according to what the *physici* call 'extremity equivalence.'" While there is no explicit praise here, there is a hint of the sort of natural explanations we saw in the Euripidean scholia, where it was pointed out that poetry imitated what actually happens in real life.

Both the Bembine scholiast and Donatus also use the term *οἰκονομία* (poetic arrangement, narrative consistency) for a few passages in the *Eunuchus*.<sup>930</sup> An assessment of this kind requires careful reading, as the scholar aims to see whether the poet's narrative elements are in harmony with each other. Such a harmony may be subtle, as the Bembine scholiast shows in his note to *Eunuchus* 88. Here Parmeno angrily confronts Thais on her welcoming of Phaedria with no word of apology about his exclusion from her house, and the scholiast zooms in on his mention of exclusion: *oeconomice autem dixit exclusionem; nam supra [Eun. 49] sic ait 'exclusit revocat.'* The reference to Phaedria's initial mention of the exclusion is precise, and apparently there was a danger that if Parmeno did not say something about it a reader might accuse Terence of forgetting the nature of the situation himself. Donatus too refers to narrative arrangement when he describes Parmeno's recognition of Pamphilia's beauty, for if he thinks her beautiful, Chaerea will too, and that is crucially important for the remainder of the plot: *οἰκονομία, qua ostenditur amaturus Chaerea, si quidem hanc Parmeno ipse miratur*.<sup>931</sup>

Donatus points out examples of *οἰκονομία* without invoking the term itself in two other examples, both of them pertaining to Chaerea's future marriage with the slave-girl-in-disguise, Pamphilia. At

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<sup>930</sup> The commentaries seem to use this term in the same way as the Greek scholia, and not in the specifically rhetorical way that Quintilian describes the word (1.8). Quintilian also interestingly mentions in this passage that no Latin term exists to convey the rhetorical meaning: *oeconomiae, quae Graece appellata ex cura rerum domesticarum et hic per abusionem posita nomine Latino caret* (3.3). We shall soon discuss more fully the ramifications for the Greek terms in Roman scholarship.

<sup>931</sup> *Eun.* 230

*Eunuchus* 144, Thais says that Thraso has taken a fancy to Pamphilia, but that his interests have as of yet gone no further (i.e., to the point of sexual contact). Donatus remarks on the intelligence of this move: *optime purgavit Terentius, quod mox liberalibus nuptiis fuerat obfuturum, si vitiatam virginem duceret Chaerea. necessario ergo defenditur, tamquam quae honeste nuptura est*, “Terence cleared up the situation excellently, which would have obstructed the noble marriage later, if Chaerea were to marry a violated girl. Thus she is necessarily defended, as if she was going to be married in the proper way.” After Phaedria and Parmeno exit the stage, Thais has a short monologue in which she reveals more knowledge to the audience about the noble birth of this “slave girl.” Donatus again approves: *recte Thais nunc partem argumenti exsequitur tacitam apud Phaedriam propter praesentiam servi, quem poeta vult ita nescire, ut audeat ad vitiandam virginem subornare Chaeream*, “Correctly Thais now fills out part of the argument that she didn’t say in the company of Phaedria on account of the presence of the slave [Parmeno], whom the poet wants to be ignorant of this matter [i.e., Pamphilia’s nobility] so that he can dare to suggest that Chaerea violate the girl.” If this marriage is to be a socially acceptable one, then the knowledge of certain characters must be restricted so that they can act in (to the Roman spectator) good conscience, and Terence has carefully arranged the beginning of the play to ensure that this can happen.

In terms of his language and style, Terence meets with both praise and blame. Here Donatus has a mostly positive opinion of his work, which manifests both in general statements and in specific comments to individual words and phrases. His view of the prologues, for example, includes praise for Terence’s rich supply of language, for while his introductions say more or less the same thing, the variety of their presentation is impressive: *attendenda poetae copia, quod in tot prologis de eadem causa isdem fere sententiis variis verbis utitur*.<sup>932</sup> Donatus also sees great skill in Terence’s placement of *sententiae* alongside certain words from everyday speech. It is not clear exactly how we are to understand his perspective here, but his note to *Eunuchus* 91 shows clearly that Terence is being praised: *magna virtus poetae est non sententias solum de consuetudine ac de medio tollere et ponere in comoedia, verum etiam verba quaedam ex communi sermone, unde est quod ait nunc ‘quid missa?’* Other passages point to

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<sup>932</sup> *Eun.* 1

individual phrases that are of interest. Terence's ellipsis with *fidibu' scire* (i.e., *fidibus canere scire*) is *vetusta*.<sup>933</sup> Parmeno's use of *intercepit* to describe Thais' absorption of all Phaedria's resources is said to be appropriate, because *inter-* gives a sense of completion: *proprie 'intercipit' quasi totum capit*.<sup>934</sup> Finally, the Bembine scholiast adds at *Adelphoe* 397 that Terence's use of the form *coeperit* instead of *coepisset* was an apt formulation (*vetusta conpositio*), since he avoided homoeoteleuton with the nearby *olficissem*.<sup>935</sup>

It is also on linguistic terms that Terence is most frequently criticized, even if not very harshly. In a previous section I introduced the note to *Heauton* 322, where Terence's triple use of *vis* in an anaphoric tricolon was said to be "surprising" (*mire*). This adverb also introduces other linguistic oddities, and it is clear in some of these that the commentator finds fault. Donatus uses *mire* to tag a certain word order that he felt would have been better in a different arrangement: *mire, cum ordo melior videretur, si sic diceret 'postquam aediles emerunt quam nunc acturi sumus, perfecit ut inspiciundi esset copia*.<sup>936</sup> The same is true for what Donatus sees as pleonastic language: *<cur non recta introibas> quasi parum fuerit 'introibas,' satis mire additum 'recta*.<sup>937</sup> Compare the statement that *Eunuchus* 200 (*neque me finxisse falsi quicquam*) should either have no *dixisse*, or that the *falsi* is superfluous.<sup>938</sup> The Bembine scholiast also adds some light criticism in this vein: it was irregular (*nove*) for Terence to write an *etsi* without also adding *tamen*<sup>939</sup> and also to use the phrase *cepi labores* to describe a task that was not burdensome.<sup>940</sup>

Below I will discuss a number of passages in which criticism of Terence is presented and then overturned by the commentator, but there are at least three further instances in which Terence is

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<sup>933</sup> *Eun.* 133 (Don.)

<sup>934</sup> *Eun.* 80 (Don.). Donatus seems to make a similar statement about the powerful arrangement of the words at *Eunuchus* 49, though there is no explicit praise given.

<sup>935</sup> For other, less clear examples that still need more analysis, see *Haut.* 2, 148, *Ad.* 387 (Bem.).

<sup>936</sup> *Eun.* 20

<sup>937</sup> *Eun.* 87

<sup>938</sup> *aut 'dixisse' debuit dicere aut abundat 'falsi.'* Observe that an additional note finds a potential escape for Terence: *aut ideo, quia et vanum aliquid fingi potuit, ut supra [v. 24] 'si vanum aut falsum aut fictum est.'* The latter quotation is not a real parallel for this phenomenon, but is meant only to recollect the use of *vanum* in connection with *falsum*.

<sup>939</sup> *Haut.* 412

<sup>940</sup> *Haut.* 399; for other general examples, see *Eun.* 21 (Don.), *Eun.* 697 (Bem.).

genuinely maligned without qualification. One comes at *Eunuchus* 290, where Chaerea approaches after having left his post as guard at the Piraeus. The Bembine scholiast says that Terence was criticized for introducing this young man, but the text is sadly illegible where the explanation would be: *et in hoc Terentius vituperatur quod aduliscentem induxit . . .* Why this is a problem is unknown, though one guesses that it was some matter of propriety in characterization or realism. A much clearer example comes at *Phormio* 25, where the scholiast calls Terence out for a clear error in his citation of earlier Greek work, for which the original text has *Epidicazomenon: manifeste hic errat Terentius; nam haec fabula Epidicazomine dicta est a puella, de qua iudicium est, cum sit alia fabula eiusdem Apollodori quae Epidicazominos scribitur. debuit ergo dicere Epidicazonomenen*. The similarity in the names has apparently confused Terence, and the commentator takes him to task for it. Finally, Terence is criticized by many for using a past tense verb in place of a present one, but there is no further explanation of the foible, and it is not even clear from the note what verb is referred to.<sup>941</sup>

Other notes defy any clear categorization but may be said to praise Terence's general cleverness. When Terence lists the different kinds of stock characters available to him, Donatus states: *artificiose ostendit omnem materiam comicorum*.<sup>942</sup> In that same prologue Terence points out Lanuvinus' recent screw-up in his production of the *Thesaurus*, first describing him as the one who recently put on a performance of Menander's *Phasma* (*idem Menandri Phasma nunc nuper dedit*).<sup>943</sup> Terence in fact makes no criticism of this reproduction of the *Phasma*, but Donatus sees a subtle attack: *bene 'nunc nuper,' ut ex vicinitate facti ostendat nihil esse dicendum, quam displicuerit haec comoedia Lusicii Lanuvini, propterea quod res recens sit et omnes meminerint*, "He did well to say *nunc nuper*, so that he may show from the nearness of that play that nothing had to be said as to how that comedy of Luscius Lanuvinus was a disappointment, because the matter was still fresh, and everyone could remember it." Other praise comes from the Bembine scholiast and Donatus at *Adelphoe* 427, where Syrus in his role of head cook says that he orders the other slaves around in the kitchen as smartly as he knows how (*moneo*

<sup>941</sup> *hic notatur a multis Terentius quia tempus praeteritum pro praesenti posuit (Eun. 697?, Bem.).*

<sup>942</sup> *Eun. 37*

<sup>943</sup> *Eun. 9*



*quae possum pro mea sapientia*). The commentators see an etymological pun at work here between *sapientia* and *sapor*: *bene adlusit ad saporem; sapor enim curae est coquo*.<sup>944</sup> Finally, note a couple examples in which *mire* seems to have a positive meaning, namely that Terence has been especially keen or creative in his script-writing. When Parmeno tells Thais that he can keep a secret only if the secret is true, Donatus says that the line is written “marvelously,” since he employs the basic stereotypes that a slave cannot keep a secret and that a courtesan cannot tell the truth.<sup>945</sup> We have in fact already seen a stronger example of this usage of *mire* at *Phormio* 39, where Terence was praised for the way that he reveals the narrative of the play by having it presented by someone within the plot, for it is “remarkable” how Davos inserts himself into the argument: *mire se adplicat ad argumentum*.<sup>946</sup>

So far the examples have shown unchallenged aesthetic judgments, but quite a few others demonstrate the sort of scholarly rivalry we have seen in the Greek scholia, with arguments made for and against the author. Especially in a variorum style of commentary, it is regular to see generic *quidam dicunt* statements and alternate opinions that conflict with one another, and frequently these opposing thoughts sit side-by-side without doing battle, as it were.<sup>947</sup> There are also signs of the ζήτηματα tradition that goes back to early Homeric criticism, providing a simple, generally non-confrontational model of question-and-answer format that tackles difficulties in the original text.<sup>948</sup> And even when the commentator shows a preference for one option over another, the assertion can be fairly reserved, as in the generic formula *sed melius est*, or for example when Eugraphius humbly states that *penum* at *Eunuchus* 310 refers to food in general, not just a certain type: *‘penum’ tamen intelligimus omne quicquid ad victum est: quidam enim tantummodo pulmentaria hoc sermone significata voluerunt*. There are still fireworks, however, as scholars sometimes take strong positions against those who disagree. Traces of

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<sup>944</sup> A clever turn of phrase.

<sup>945</sup> *Eun.* 103; I take this to mean that Parmeno’s comment is a keen combination of self-criticism and joking at Thais’ expense.

<sup>946</sup> For more examples, recall the “fitting Greek joke” at *Eunuchus* 254 (Bem.), and observe the praise of Terence’s careful specificity at *Eunuchus* 73 (Don.). *Phormio* 15 is another potential example of *mire* used positively. Another instance of *bene* occurs at *Heauton* 278, but the text is largely illegible.

<sup>947</sup> E.g., *Haut.* 185 (Bem., Eugr.), 318, 353, 507 (Bem.); *Phorm.* 1 (Bem.)

<sup>948</sup> *Eun.* 143 (Don.); *Ad.* 360 (Bem.)

this may be seen when the otherwise tame *quidam dicunt* formula is modified, which may mean that the “some people” are correct, as in Donatus’ aforementioned discussion of rhetoric at *Eunuchus* 86 (*non imperite intellegunt*), but more often that they are wrong. These tussles begin to form a distinction between the learned and the unlearned, and of course the commentator positions himself as part of the former. Such is Donatus in his preface to the *Eunuchus* as he distinguishes the abilities of those who read Terence’s plays:

*actus sane implicatiores sunt in ea et qui non facile a parum doctis distingui possint, ideo quia tenendi spectatoris causa vult poeta noster omnes quinque actus velut unum fieri, ne respiret quodammodo atque, distincta alicubi continuatione succedentium rerum, ante aulaea sublata fastidiosus spectator exsurgat.*

In this comedy the acts are rather well tied together, and are such as not to be easily distinguished by the insufficiently learned, for the reason that our poet wants all five acts to become as one for the purpose of holding the spectator’s attention, lest he take a breath in some measure and, with the continuation of succeeding events broken up at some point, the scornful spectator should leave before the curtain is raised.

Examples of such scholarly conflict have been seen in part, particularly in the discussion of the etymology of “Phormio,” where the Bembine scholiast disagreed with those who derived the word from *formula*.<sup>949</sup> Note also two examples from the Scholia Bembina to the *Heauton*. In a quick interplay between Clinia, Clitipho, and Syrus starting at verse 343, the syntax becomes difficult as the speakers interrupt each other:

*CLIT. quid ago nunc? CLIN. tunc? quod boni . . . CLIT. Syre! dic modo verum. SY. age modo: hodie sero ac neququam voles. CLIN. datur, fruare dum licet; nam nescias . . . CLIT. Syre inquam! SY. perge porro, tamen istuc ago. CLIN. eius sit potestas posthac an numquam tibi.*

The scholiast says that some take *quod boni* as *quod fortes*, but that this is incorrect: *sed male siquidem diacope sit. nam hic ordo: quod boni datur, fruare dum licet, nam nescias eius sit potestas posthac an numquam tibi*. That is, the scholiast reads the lines of Clinia as an instance of tmesis and thinks they should be taken together syntactically. A similar type of note appears shortly thereafter in regard to the

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<sup>949</sup> *Phorm.* 26

phrase *haec arte tractabat virum*. The scholiast states: *quidam 'arte' producta η legunt, sed melius correpta, id est 'arte,' dolo*, “Some people read *arte* with a lengthened eta, but it is better to take as correction [i.e., with a short “e”], that is, “by art, by a trick.”<sup>950</sup>

The rejection of other scholars’ claims is also important for those who wish to defend Terence against detractors, or even against potential accusations for which there is no explicit criticism.<sup>951</sup> At *Eunuchus* 454, the Bembine scholiast remarks that the expression *audire vocem visa sum* is strange, since we *know* when we have heard something (i.e., we do not “seem” to hear), but a defense is found in the example of Vergil—and if Vergil can use a particular expression, then certainly Terence can get away with it.<sup>952</sup> Again the scholiast sees an issue at *Heauton* 285, where the phrase *textentem telam* seems pleonastic, since *textentem* would have sufficed; our scholar thus takes *telam* as another word for *vestem* so that the phrase will not fall under the accusation of having excessive verbiage. Observe also how the scholiast reacts to Phaedria’s plea to Thais to dream about him and desire him: *stultum est imperare ut siquis te somniet vel desideret. sed legimus apud . . . nasci plerumque somnia ex continuatione praeceptorum*, “It is stupid to command someone to dream about you or desire you, but we have read in [illegible] that dreams frequently come about from a continual stream of perceptions.”<sup>953</sup> Neither Mountford nor I can supplement the missing source for this idea about dreams, but in any case an escape for Terence (and his characters) has been made.

Finally, some examples from Donatus will help us see how a commentator comes to the defense of Terence concerning his method of characterization. In the prologue Terence suggests that he has come under fire for stealing characters from the comedies of Naevius and Plautus, though he responds that his only sin is to take character *types*. Donatus backs him up in a prefatory comment: *πρωτατικὸν* [sic] *πρόσωπον nusquam habet, sed suis tantum personis utitur*, “In no place does he use a prefabricated [?]

<sup>950</sup> I confess that I do not understand what “some people” mean by the eta argument, and there could be a problem with the text of the scholion, but the note still stands as an example of scholarly conflict.

<sup>951</sup> I have not found an example going the other way (i.e., “Some say that Terence is correct to do this, but I say he is wrong”).

<sup>952</sup> *nove dixit 'vocem visa' cum sciamus vocem audiri; sed tale est et illud in Virgilio [A. 6.257], 'visaeque canes ululare.'*

<sup>953</sup> *Eun.* 194

character, but uses only his own characters.” Stronger emotions emerge a little later when he comments upon the prologue itself where Terence speaks of the “stolen” character of the parasite: *et hoc mire: non versus obicit sed personam esse translatam. quid stultius aut calumniosius dici potest*, “And this is remarkable—he [i.e., Lanuvinus] objects not to stolen verses, but a stolen character. What stupider or more false accusation could be uttered?” Finally, recall the passage where Thais fears that Phaedria will judge her character stereotypically based on the character of other women (*atque ex aliarum ingeniis nunc me iudicet*), to which Donatus says: *hic Terentius ostendit virtutis suae hoc esse, ut pervulgatas personas nove inducat et tamen a consuetudine non recedat, ut puta meretricem bonam cum facit, capiat tamen et delectet animum spectatoris*, “Here Terence shows that it is of his own virtue that he brings in very common characters in a new way, nevertheless without falling away from traditional practice; for example, when he makes a prostitute with a heart of gold, even so he captures and delights the mind of the spectator.”<sup>954</sup> Thus, for Donatus, if someone would follow a Lanuvian stream of thought and criticize Terence for the way he writes his characters, it could only be a result of scholarly incompetence.

### *Exegetical Methodology*

Having surveyed the breadth of topics and questions employed in the commentaries to Terence, I now proceed to a distillation of their exegetical principles and methodologies. It will be noticed that all of these methods find a counterpart in the Greek scholia, and in fact the one significant area in which they can be said to differ is that they must deal with a bilingual literary history, and this question of intertextuality in Roman comedy is called to the forefront by the original texts themselves, so we will have an opportunity to see the extent to which the commentators springboard from this foundation into discussing the nature of Terence’s reliance on Greek literature. Otherwise, we will see a familiar array of exegetical techniques and principles: recognition of metaphorical language, appeals to specialized (e.g.,

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<sup>954</sup> *Eun.* 198

dramatic) speech, appeals to general truth, recognition of chronological differences, and analogical arguments.

The recognition of metaphorical language is a crucial component in the way Terence's language is received and is essentially the same as the attention to metaphor shown in Euripidean scholarship, except that for Terence it is not as prevalent (a product due partially to the fact that the corpus of notes examined is smaller). We have encountered such comments already, namely in the "vile and abject" metaphor of a leaky pot used by Parmeno to talk about his own (in)ability to keep secrets.<sup>955</sup> Metaphorical language is also pointed out at *Eunuchus* 54, where Parmeno's phrase *actumst, ilicet, peristi* is shown to be legal in nature by the Bembine scholiast: *omnia ista verba de iudicio sunt; 'actum' quod dixit definitionem negotii significat, 'ilicet' solutionem, 'peristi' quasi 'sententiam quoniam suscipisti,'* "All these words are from the courtroom; what he called *actum* means the definition of the business, *ilicet* means the resolution/ decision, and *peristi* means as it were 'since you received the judgment.'" <sup>956</sup> At *Eunuchus* 74 (Don.), Parmeno is said to use language borrowed from warfare to describe Phaedria's situation: *perseveravit in translatione, quam iam dudum sumpsit a bello.*<sup>957</sup> Later, Chaerea questions where he should seek and track down (*ubi quaeram, ubi investigem*) the beautiful woman of whom he has just lost sight, to which the scholiast replies: *vestigem translatio venandi; nam vestigatur omne quod latet,* "'Track down' is a hunting metaphor; for one tracks down everything that is hiding."<sup>958</sup> Recall also the extended note on circumvallation from *Adelphoe* 302 (Bem.), which began with the recognition that the verb *circumvallare* was used metaphorically by Geta.

Given the overlap between the ancient critical terms "metaphorical" and "allegorical," it may be permissible here to ask whether the commentaries to Terence show any of the deeper, allegorical interpretations that we saw occasionally in the Euripidean scholia, and to a lesser extent in the

<sup>955</sup> *Eun.* 105 (Bem.); *Eun.* 103f. (Don.)

<sup>956</sup> Mountford calls Donatus' note to this phrase inferior, though he communicates the same general thought on the metaphor (*de iure translatum*). For a similar tricolon, compare the English phrases "game, set, match," or perhaps "signed, sealed, delivered." The point is that once Phaedria gives an inch to Thais, she will run all over him.

<sup>957</sup> Wessner identifies this previous passage as verses 15-16, though it is difficult to see how he arrives at this conclusion, seeing that there is no such comment by Donatus about a military metaphor for those verses.

<sup>958</sup> *Eun.* 294 (Bem.)

commentaries to Aeschines. As might be expected for Roman comedy, there is very little that is subjected to allegorical interpretation, though we have seen in some places how the commentators derive subtle meaning from the original text that is by no means obvious on the surface, such that even if there is nothing “allegorical” per se, there is at least an emphasis on hidden meanings of other kinds. Such is the case with the previously mentioned passage from the prologue to the *Eunuchus*, where Terence describes Lanuvinus as the one who just recently put on a showing of the *Phasma* of Menander and then going on to ridicule his legal blunder in the *Thesaurus*.<sup>959</sup> The mention of the *Phasma* in this way, though it is without any explicit criticism, is viewed by Donatus as crippling: *hanc fabulam [Phasma] totam damnat, ut apparet, silentio; Thesaurum vero non totum, sed ex uno loco*, “The silence (on the *Phasma*) damns the entire play, it seems; for he criticized the *Thesaurus* not in whole, but only in one part.” Consider also the prologue to the *Phormio*, where Lanuvinus is said to have complained about Terence’s lack of a specific kind of scene in his plays: *quia nusquam insanum scripsit adolescentulum / cervam videre fugere et sectari canes / et eam plorare, orare ut subveniat sibi*, “Since he nowhere wrote that a love-sick young man saw a hind fleeing and dogs chasing her, and that she begged and asked him to help her.”<sup>960</sup> The watchful scholiast, whose note is the same as Donatus’ here, sees something deeper: *ambiguitas per accusativum casum perseverans usque ad ultimum de industria ut etiam ipsa perplexitas odiosa sit*, “The ambiguity intentionally continues via the accusative case all the way to the end, so that even the confusion itself [i.e., of the suggestions] would be detestable [to the audience].” This seems to mean that the indirect statement allows for a reverse reading, that the girl would in fact chase the dogs, and even though the intended meaning is completely clear in the light of common sense, the scholiast sees this as a subversive gibe at Lanuvinus.<sup>961</sup> Thus, while these ancient scholars apparently do not try to find hidden

<sup>959</sup> *Eun.* 7ff. Interestingly, the criticism Terence gives of the *Thesaurus* is on the principle of realism: Lanuvinus had presented a legal battle in which the defendant spoke first, which was not the way things actually worked in a courtroom.

<sup>960</sup> *Phorm.* 6-8

<sup>961</sup> Galen (*De Sophismatis* 14.583) discusses this type of ambiguity in a sample about a someone chasing a pig, or *vice versa*: *παρ’ ἀμφιβολίαν δέ, ὅταν παρ’ αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ διττὸν ᾗ, καθάπερ ἔχει τὸ ‘γένειτο καταλαβεῖν τὸν ὕν ἐμέ’ ἐνταῦθα τῶν μὲν ὀνομάτων οὐδὲν διττόν, αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ λόγος ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ σημαίνει τὸ ἐλεῖν τε καὶ ἀναιρεθῆναι.* Cf. Ennius (6.167): *aio te, Aeacida Romanos vincere posse.*

principles of philosophical or scientific truth in Terence, they do look for subtle strands of meaning that require careful examination.

Another key aspect of the ancient literary approach to Terence is the allowance and even expectation of different modes of speaking. We have already seen a few examples of this phenomenon in the section on characterization and realism as categories of literary analysis, for instance how Phaedria's thoughts were appropriately disjointed given his frazzled state.<sup>962</sup> The same occurs at *Heauton* 430, where Chremes' illogical word order (*valet atque vivit*), an instance of *hysteron proteron*, is said to be the result either of his haste or of a slight joke: *hysteronproteron; nam prius est vivere postea valere, sed quod maius est intulit. aut ordinem prae festinatione non servat, aut ioculariter sollicito patri hoc primum dicere voluit quod usitatum est de absentibus nuntiari*. Other examples of this interpretive methodology include the frequent references to irony, a technique in which words mean the opposite of what they would normally indicate.<sup>963</sup> Also included here is the term ἡθικῶς (used to refer to harsh or critical speech), which to my knowledge appears only in Donatus' commentary, for example in his description of Terence's statement that Lanuvinus should not fancy that Terence will take verbal abuse lying down.<sup>964</sup> See also the synonymous phrase ἐν ἡθελί at *Eunuchus* 48 (Don.), where Phaedria complains about the scornful behavior of all courtesans because he is suffering pretty badly at the hands of one in particular.

As in the previous case studies, appeals to general truth make up a significant category among ways in which ancient scholars make sense of Terence's plays, an approach that goes hand-in-hand with the demand for realism that is evident in the commentaries: the comedies must be in keeping with real life, and it should be pointed out when Terence has adhered to this principle. So it is with *Eunuchus* 187, where Phaedria agrees to stay away from Thais for two days and says that he will go off into the countryside to waste away there (*rus ibo: ibi hoc me macerabo biduom*). Donatus explains his idea to

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<sup>962</sup> *Eun.* 65, 156

<sup>963</sup> Some of the numerous examples include the following: *Eun.* 89 (Bem., Don.), 224 (Don.), 468 (Bem.); *Haut.* 323, 358 (Bem.); *An.* 185, 436 (Don.); *Ad.* 476, 722 (Bem.).

<sup>964</sup> *Eun.* 14

leave town by appealing to the general principle that lovers hate the city when they cannot be with their girlfriend: *et hoc amatorium est, odisse urbem sine amica*. At *Phormio* 12, the Bembine scholiast supports Terence's phrase *qui hoc dicat aut sic cogitet* by saying that whatever comes into our mind we either think or say: *omne quod in mentem venit aut cogitamus aut dicimus*.<sup>965</sup> In another example, Aeschinus doubts the good news Micio has shared with him: *pater, obsecro, nunc ludi' tu me?*<sup>966</sup> The scholiast explains this by citing another general truth: *neglegenti homini nova semper est insperata felicitas*. In these examples, the implicit argument being made is that the behavior of Terence's characters is explained by the simple fact that people normally act that way in such circumstances, so Terence has met the demands of realistic mimesis.<sup>967</sup>

One also finds in the commentaries to Terence the same appeal to chronological distinctions that were employed for Euripides and Aeschines to explain irregularities in the original text. Just like the *παλαιοί* of the Greek scholia, the *maiores/ antiqui/ veteres/ prisca* are invoked as an authority for what used to be acceptable, the difference being that whereas the *παλαιοί* were frequently used to validate cultural practices in Euripides, based on my investigation the "men of old" arguments deal exclusively with issues of language in Terence. We have in fact already seen some examples of this type under the discussion of the figure of archaism, where the oddity of certain expressions was chalked up to the standard language of the past.<sup>968</sup> Further evidence for this type of thinking may be found at a Bembine note to *Eunuchus* 678: *ideo dixit quia maiores nostri 'quis' et 'vir' dicebant et 'mulier'; ideo dixit 'quisquam.' debuerat enim dicere quaequam*, "He said this [i.e., *quisquam*] since our ancestors said *quis* for both a man and a woman; for this reason he said *quisquam*, for he should have said *quaequam*."<sup>969</sup>

<sup>965</sup> Compare Donatus' note as well, which like the rest of the notes to the opening of the *Phormio* have a special correspondence with their counterparts in the Scholia Bembina.

<sup>966</sup> *Ad.* 696f.

<sup>967</sup> Further examples: *Eun.* 69 (Bem.), 148, 163 (Don.); *Haut.* 479 (Bem.); *Ad.* 820, 857 (Bem.).

<sup>968</sup> The commentators do not seem to make a distinction in the term "archaism," namely whether it describes language that is already old to the poet as he writes it or just to the scholar who comes along later. Thus, when Terence is said to be using archaism, it should not be assumed that the commentator thinks he is using language that was old to him, but may in fact be the regular language of the poet's day.

<sup>969</sup> Observe how this appeal to chronology is used for the defense of Terence, for which we saw multiple other examples above. This note is also interesting because it offers a clear addition by Hand 2, a supporting quotation from *Adelphoe* 321. Still more interesting is that we possess a corresponding scholion at that cross-reference.



Donatus grants Terence license to change from *factitarunt* to *faciunt* in the same breath, since there is ample defense for this in ancient custom: *et varie dixit 'factitarunt' et 'faciunt' et cum magna defensione Terentii semel facientis id, quod saepe veteres.*<sup>970</sup> And if the alliteration in the phrase *consilia consequi consimilia* seems undesirable, one should know that the men of old had an appetite for such things (*appetebant prisci verba ab isdem litteris incipientia*), including Vergil himself (*Aen.* 3.183, *casus Cassandra canebat*).<sup>971</sup> In another note, Terence's use of the form *transdere* is explained as a more resonant (read: "fuller") ancient version of the contemporary *tradere*—though the process also worked backwards, as the ancient *tralatum* was equivalent to the contemporary *translatum*.<sup>972</sup> Interestingly, the scholiast does not seem to be bothered by the fact that the second example suggests that his reasoning may be flawed or at the very least not sufficiently detailed.

Finally, let us examine the role of analogical argumentation in these commentaries, specifically with a focus on the use of cross-referencing and the influence of Greek literature and scholarship on these commentators of Terence.<sup>973</sup> As is the case with the other scholia, one of the hallmarks of the Terence commentaries is a reliance on the work of other authors (and of Terence himself) as comparanda for diction, historical claims, and other types of information that might need to be validated in some way, or which simply strike the annotator as an interesting parallel. Internal cross-references to Terence are common, as in two notes presented above: a scholion to *Eunuchus* 397 points to *Heauton* 117 for confirmation of the fact that Athenian men served as mercenaries to kings, and the gender of *satur* at *Adelphoe* 765 is compared to a usage at *Hecyra* 769. Consider too the comment at *Eunuchus* 132 (the ancient use of *honestus* as *pulcher*) where the scholiast points to a comparable passage later in the same play (*nam paulo post dicturus est . . .*)—which shows that not all notes look backward to a part of the original text that has already been covered.

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<sup>970</sup> *Eun.* 43

<sup>971</sup> *Haut.* 209 (Bem.); cf. a note from Servius on *Aeneid* 3.183.

<sup>972</sup> *Phorm.* 2 (Bem; cf. Don.). For other examples: *Eun.* 97 (Don.), 132 (Bem.); *Haut.* 8, 271 (Bem; cf. *Eun.* 1004, Don.); *Phorm.* 1, 34 (Bem., Don.); *Ad.* 482, 906 (Bem.).

<sup>973</sup> See my section on grammar for analogical reasoning as a means of inculcating rules about syntax and morphology in the Terentian commentaries.

As Mountford points out, the Bembine scholia quote from Terence 40 times, but Vergil 140 times. Like Homer, Vergil stands as the touchstone by which irregularities or other supposed errors may be justified—and the fact that Vergil comes later evidently shows that his poetic authority is not chronologically restricted to his successors.<sup>974</sup> A salient example is found in the scholiast's note to *Eunuchus* 381 (Bem.): < *cludetur* > *frangetur. excudere autem dicimus polire, teste Virgilio [Aen. 6.847] 'excudent alii spirantia mollius aera.'* Here it is suggested that both Terence and “we” (ostensibly the commentator and his contemporary readership) follow Vergil as an authoritative standard.<sup>975</sup> Other Roman authors cited by the Bembine scholiast include Ennius, Plautus, Lucretius, Sallust, Cicero, Horace, Lucan, Persius, Juvenal, and Statius. Given that we are dealing with Roman comedy, though, the references to Plautus are surprisingly sparse, and while we might guess that a figure of Cicero's stature might have plenty of citations regardless of the genre of the original text, it seems odd to have so many more references to him and to other prose writers such as Sallust when there is so little from other Roman comic writers. Donatus has a similar spread of Roman authors, again with a heavy emphasis on the works of Vergil and with a few additions as well, such as a number of citations from Lucilius and some from Catullus.<sup>976</sup> For Donatus, at least, one's anticipation of citations from other Roman dramatists is fulfilled: Plautus is cited frequently,<sup>977</sup> and some attention is given to Accius and Caecilius as well.<sup>978</sup>

By far the majority of the citations of Greek literature belong to Menander. Of course, given the fact that in his prologues Terence himself is open about how his own comedies are translated (in a loose sense) from Menander's work, it is unsurprising that we should see an interest in citing him. After all, when Donatus states in his prologue to the *Eunuchus* what Greek sources Terence has used, this is nothing more than a restatement of claims that can be found in the prologue itself. On the other hand, at

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<sup>974</sup> Homer, however, was used not just to defend Euripides, but also to critique his failings. For the Scholia Bembina and Donatus, Vergil does not ever seem to serve this purpose.

<sup>975</sup> I find only one other example of the *teste* formula in the Bembine scholia, which comes almost immediately after the Vergil reference (*teste Demosthene, Eun. 397*). For the formula in Donatus, see *Adelphoe* 952, where Varro is the authority cited.

<sup>976</sup> E.g., *An.* 183, 718

<sup>977</sup> E.g., *An.* 70, 96

<sup>978</sup> *Ad.* 668, 871

*Eunuchus* 9 he offers a relatively lengthy plot summary of Menander's *Phasma*, which as we have mentioned already is given no more than brief citation by Terence himself, such that Donatus must be accessing information outside of the original text (at least a summary of the play, if not the play itself). The Bembine scholiast also points to allusions by Terence to Menander in several of the plays, including an amazing instance at *Eunuchus* 61. When Parmeno gives his list of what one experiences in love (*iniuriae, suspiciones, inimicitiae, indutiae, bellum, pax rursus*), the scholiast zooms in on *bellum*: *auxesis est inimiciarum; et videtur Periceiromenen Menandri quaerere in qua fabula milis suspicione percussus adolterii gladio amatae amputat crines; nam quidquid ferro agitur bellicum sane est*, “[The use of *bellum*] is an augmentation of hostilities. And he seems to allude to the *Periceiromene* of Menander, in which drama a soldier, struck by the suspicion of adultery, cuts off the hair of his beloved with a sword. For whatever is done with a sword is certainly warlike.”<sup>979</sup> See also the quotation of a verse from Menander's *Heauton* (*ἀνδρὸς χαρακτήρ ἐκ λόγου γνωρίζεται*) that matches one from Terence (*nam mihi quale ingenium haberes fuit indicio oratio*).<sup>980</sup> A verse of Menander is also mentioned at *Adelphoe* 693, but the condition of the manuscript makes it difficult to understand the nature of the connection.

Other Greek authors are cited as well, but these are almost entirely from Donatus, and even the Scholia Bembina's mention of Apollodorus comes at *Phormio* 49, where the scholia more or less match the text of Donatus anyway.<sup>981</sup> Those cited by the latter include a small but not insignificant range of authors. At *Eunuchus* 167 Donatus assigns to Hellanicus the idea that eunuchs were originally a Babylonian idea. Apollodorus is again introduced at *Hecyra* 58, with an additional mention of Demosthenes at *Phormio* 68 for his analogous use of hyperbole. In an explanation of the proverbial *lupus in fabula* (meaning, “Be quiet”) at *Adelphoe* 537, a verse of Theocritus appears as a confirmation of the theory that the phrase comes from the fact that people are dumbstruck when they first see a wolf. Homer

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<sup>979</sup> This example reminds one of the sort of intertextuality that was assumed between Euripides and Aeschylus, when the former refused to name all the generals in the *Phoenissae* because they had already been given in the *Seven Against Thebes*. Such statements infer a keen interest in searching out even faint intertextual connections.

<sup>980</sup> *Haut.* 384; cf. *Haut.* 285, 293

<sup>981</sup> The Bembine scholion at *Eunuchus* 397 is exceptional for its appeal to Demosthenes as a source for the history of Greek mercenaries in the East, as this note is not mirrored in Donatus.

also receives treatment in several places, mostly to show that Terence has used a Homeric phrase or sentiment.<sup>982</sup>

The purpose of cross-references in general in these commentaries is predominantly linguistic, as corresponding usages are presented from prose and poetry in order to lend credence to what might otherwise be blameworthy in Terence. On the other hand, we saw just above in the (apparent) *bellum* allusion how Terence could nod to Menander thematically and not just linguistically. It is also important to consider the Bembine scholion to *Eunuchus* 56, where Phaedria<sup>983</sup> tells himself to cool down and think in the midst of his confused state regarding Thais:

*correctio sui. amor enim non habet perpetuum furorem in viro; unde Virgilius [Ecl. 2.73] 'invenies alium si te hic fastidit Alexis.' e contrario in feminis amor pudoris damno fit tristior; unde Dido ad exitium usque perducitur [Aen. 5.5-6] 'duri magno sed amore dolores polluto notumque furens quid femina possit'; Iuvenalis [10.329] 'cum stimulus odio pudor ammovet.'*

This is self-correction. For love does not keep an eternal madness in a man. From this is Vergil's "You will find another if this Alexis despises you." On the other hand, love in women becomes worse with the loss of *pudor*, from which principle Dido proceeds all the way to death, "But harsh pains from the pollution of a great love, and knowledge of what a raging woman was capable of . . ." Juvenal says, "[Never is a woman so savage] than when she is moved by a *pudor* spurred on by hatred."

These references are not made on the basis of any verbal parallels, but on a thematic one. The same is true for a Bembine scholion to *Adelphoe* 701, where learned poets are said to have the opinion that the fear of hatred creates a faithful love: *est apud doctos poetas hic sensus: ut amoris fidem metus faciat odiorum, et odiorum [odium?] testimonium habeat ex amore contrario.*<sup>984</sup> Thus, while cross-references may be predominantly linguistic in nature, ancient Terentian scholars show evidence that they were thinking about the relationship between texts in other ways as well.<sup>985</sup>

<sup>982</sup> *An.* 400, 718; *Ad.* 460; *Hec.* 361, 380

<sup>983</sup> It is actually Parmeno's line, but I treat it here as Phaedria's, since that is what the scholiast thought.

<sup>984</sup> It is unclear to me exactly how this sentiment relates to the original text, but in any case it makes clear that the cross-references given afterwards are to be taken as thematic parallels (cf. *Ad.* 610, Bem.). In another obscure example, when Syrus tries to give Demea directions at *Adelphoe* 577, a mention of a large fig tree (*caprificus*) is seen to be an imitation of Homer, who spoke of a similar tree at the gates of Troy.

<sup>985</sup> There are also a few examples that provide citations as if there were a direct allusion being made from the other author to Terence. For example, when Demea exclaims *o Iuppiter, hancin vitam! hoscin mores! hanc dementia!* (*Ad.* 757f.), the Bembine scholiast states: *inde est illa Ciceronis ecfonesis, 'o tempora, o mores.'* How are we to read this *inde*? Is it that Cicero actually thought about Terence when composing that phrase? Or is it simply to

*The Commentaries and Greek*

The previous discussion of Greek sources opens up a much larger question at this juncture: how do the commentators use and respond to Greek language and literature, not only in their understanding of the original texts, but in their approach to their own academic discipline? Terence is open about the Greek origins of his work, and the scholiasts recognize this. Are the scholiasts as open about their own use of Greek scholarship? And what exactly characterizes their use of it?<sup>986</sup>

In my analysis of other types of notes it has been evident that Greek terms are used for linguistic and rhetorical figures, as well as in etymologies, philosophical maxims, and the like.<sup>987</sup> Other examples demonstrate an ongoing concern for the translation of Greek into Latin for passages in which Terence will use a Greek form or syntactical arrangement that is pointed out as such. Some notes simply identify these words as Greek, as in the case of *technam* and *apage*.<sup>988</sup> Donatus also states that the Romans spelled *thesaurus* without the “n” that the Greeks had in their version.<sup>989</sup> So too at *Adelphoe* 405 and 759, where the Bembine scholiast explains that the Greek *psaltria* is the Latin *fidicina*, and that while the Greeks gave this lyre player her name from the sound of her voice (*cantare = psallin*), “we” do so from the playing of the chords (*fides*) by the hand.<sup>990</sup> The same principle applies for grammar as well, as we have already seen in Donatus’ note to *Adelphoe* 491, where the dative *vobis* is read in conjunction with *decet* on analogy with the Greek phrase  $\acute{\upsilon}\mu\acute{\iota}\nu \pi\rho\acute{\epsilon}\pi\epsilon\iota$ , a passage for which Terence is said to have spoken in a

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mark that Cicero’s phrase partakes of the same spirit? This type of formula is sadly unspecific, for we would like to know what exactly the scholiast has in mind.

<sup>986</sup> I remind the reader here that Greek quotations in the manuscripts are often garbled and scarcely legible, both for the Scholia Bembina and Donatus. While this can tell us something about the level of Greek proficiency attained by the Bembine scholiasts, it is impossible to say what Donatus’ Greek was like, since there is no telling what transformations his text could have suffered between its initial recording and our extant manuscripts. I will continue to regularize the Greek with the caveat that I am covering over the oddity of its form. In some cases the “Greek” is truly bizarre (see *Phorm.* 16, *Ad.* 469, Bem.), though one cannot say at what point it got this way.

<sup>987</sup> *Phorm.* 26 (Bem.); *Eun.* 76, 254 (Bem.); *Eun.* 14, 48 (Don.)

<sup>988</sup> *Eun.* 718, 756 (Bem.)

<sup>989</sup> *Eun.* 10

<sup>990</sup> See also the Scholia Bembina to *Eunuchus* 777 (*spongia, peniculon*), *Adelphoe* 715 (*reptare, serpens*), and *Adelphoe* 781 (*mastigia, verbero*).

Greek manner.<sup>991</sup> For the phrase *quid sibi eunuchus velit*, Donatus again turns to Greek for an explanation: τῷ ἀττικισμῷ ‘sibi,’ ut alibi [*Haut.* 61f.] ‘nam pro deum atque hominum fidem, quid vis tibi aut quid quaeris.’<sup>992</sup>

In other places the scholiast is *not* prompted by a Greek word in Terence, but rather demonstrates that there has been a general Greek influence on his scholarly way of thinking. Such are two notes to *Adelphoe* 827f., where Micio tells Demea that his sons demonstrate a fair amount of intelligence and show respect when they need to, that they have love for each other, and that it is possible to recognize a noble character and spirit in them: *video sapere intellegere, in loco / vereri, inter se amare: scire est liberum / ingenium atque animum*. There is nothing particularly Greek about these lines, but the scholiast points out for *in loco* that things that are fitting can be so in two senses, either in time or in place: *quod opportunum aut temporis est aut loci*. The rest of this note contains Greek vocabulary: *temporis aceron* [ἄκαιρον] *dicimus Graece inportunum, loco atopon*, “We say in Greek that what is not fitting in time is ἄκαιρον, and in place ἄτοπον.” That is, much like with the figures mentioned before, Greek terminology has shaped the Latin system of semantic categorization at least in part. The second note to these same lines has the lemma *scire* and explains that *scientia* is a skill in knowing (*noscendi peritia*), just like the Greek ἐπιστήμη means *disciplina scientiae*. Bringing in the Greek term does nothing for an understanding of *scire* in the original text (which can be glossed easily enough in Latin), so the reference to Greek terminology is telling.

In other passages one finds a general consciousness of Greek ideas, much like the aforementioned allusion to the Stoic doctrine of fools and madness. For instance, the Bembine scholiast states that the *lacrimae* and *gaudium* are emotions of the mind (*mentis affectus*) that are labeled in Greek *pathos*, where again the introduction of the Greek conception of emotion is in no way necessitated by the original text.<sup>993</sup>

<sup>991</sup> *Graece dixit*; cf. *Ad.* 928 (Don.).

<sup>992</sup> *Eun.* 45; note that the specific label of ἀττικισμός may have stylistic connotations as well, though this note does not say this explicitly and would need to be supported by other examples. For a general praise of Attic style, see Quintilian 1.8, 10.1 (the former links Atticism specifically with comedy: *in comoediis elegantia et quidam uelut atticismos inueniri potest*).

<sup>993</sup> *Ad.* 409.

Likewise, at *Heauton* 440ff. Chremes tells Menedemus that he is always going to extremes in the use of his money, while never finding a moderate middle ground. The scholiast chimes in unexpectedly with the Greek saying *πᾶς πατήρ μωρός*, “Every father is a fool,” and nothing more. A fascinating note to *Adelphoe* 493 brings in more outside Greek knowledge. When Hegio threatens to come to the defense of the pregnant girl “with the greatest force” (*summa vi*) if Demea cannot get his son to accept his responsibility as the father, the scholiast notes: *videtur hic senex Areopagitarum sustinere censuram quos legimus apud Graecos [Stoicae?] severitatis fuisse in iudiciis; qui Oresten matricidii crimine damnavissent nisi Minervae arbitrio vincirentur*, “This old man seems to keep up the strictness of the Areopagite Council, whom in Greek authors we read to have been of [Stoic?] severity in their judgments, they who would have condemned Orestes on the charge of matricide if they had not been compelled by the vote of Minerva.” The reference to the Areopagite Council has no real parallel in the original text, as Hegio is threatening to defend (not prosecute) the girl with the dead father, such that this Greek analogue seems to be a bit forced. If so, this is all the more reason to appreciate the desire of the scholiast to incorporate Greek thinking, language, and culture into his commentary.<sup>994</sup>

Three more notes from Donatus can be mentioned here as further support for this notion that Roman scholars felt a need to introduce Greek material on their own instead of simply reacting to Greek language and references they found in the original text. The first is a simple gloss at *Eunuchus* 12—simple, except that when *qui petit* is defined as *petitor*, that gloss is introduced by the familiar phrase *ἀντὶ τοῦ*.<sup>995</sup> There is clearly no need to use this phrase, as there are countless other glosses in Donatus’ notes without it. Instead, Donatus (or whomever he was excerpting) appears to be including a Greek scholarly formula simply for its own sake. The same is true at *Eunuchus* 175, where Donatus says rightly that Phaedria’s *istuc verbum* really refers to the entire phrase *potius quam te inimicum habeam*, so that *verbum*

<sup>994</sup> A couple of notes later the scholiast utters the aforementioned exclamation about Hegio’s “Areopagite argument,” and then gives further information: *Areopagitae dicti sunt qui cummorabantur in Martio pago* (*Ad.* 502). Why the scholiast was thinking about the Areopagus on the particular day in which he wrote those comments, I cannot say.

<sup>995</sup> There is a textual issue here (as often with Greek script). I consider Wessner’s *ἀντὶ τοῦ* to be the best emendation given the incomprehensibility of *anterior* or the other manuscript offerings (the seemingly random Greek phrase does seem to be the *lectio difficilior*).

really means something closer to *sententia* than merely “a word.” But Donatus goes a bit further in a second note: <verbum> *pro dicto, sed proprie ἀξίωμα, id est sententia vel enuntiatio, quae uno stringitur et ligatur verbo, verbum a veteribus dicebatur*, “*Verbum* stands in for *dictum* here, though properly speaking it is an ἀξίωμα, that is, a saying or pronouncement that is summed up and tied together in a single word, and it was called a *verbum* by the men of old.” In other words, Donatus has just said that a Greek word was the preferred technical term for the type of statement given by Phaedria. Finally, note that Donatus’ final comment to *Eunuchus* 167 is entirely in Greek: εὐνοῦχος εἴρηται ὡς εὐνήν ἔχων, τοῦτ’ ἔστιν φυλάττων, ὡς ἡνίοχος ῥαβδοῦχος σκηπτουῦχος· εὐνήν οὖν γυναικὸς κἀνδρός, “A eunuch is so called from ‘having a bed,’ that is, guarding it. This is just like a ἡνίοχος, ῥαβδοῦχος, and σκηπτουῦχος. Thus, it is the bed (εὐνή) of a man and woman.” Was Donatus using commentaries in Greek for his variorum composition? Did Donatus or one of his sources provide a single note in Greek to show off his erudition? Is there a corresponding note in a Greek scholiastic corpus from which this was taken? Whatever the answer, it is clear that Donatus and his Bembine counterparts did not merely deal with Greek topics and language out of necessity, but freely chose to incorporate elements of Greek scholarship into their work.

### *Mistakes and Oddities*

I will make a few comments here about the quality of the commentaries I have been examining. These commentaries, like the scholia from previous chapters, contain some errors, slips, and inexplicable perspectives, and the overall effect of these passages is to remind us how different the approaches of ancient scholars were from our own perspective. In general, as before, there are notes that make bald restatements of what has come before, more so in the variorum style of Donatus, though also from time to time in the Scholia Bembina.<sup>996</sup> It has also been shown that Greek script and Roman names can be

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<sup>996</sup> See the repeated notes at *Adelphoe* 405 and 759.



butchered so much that we cannot have full confidence that all the scholars who provided Greek scholarly information to us had a professional grasp on the language.<sup>997</sup> A few individual mistakes and oddities also creep in to the Scholia Bembina and are noted by Mountford: *melior* is written instead of *melius*,<sup>998</sup> *in hominem* is taken as *contra hominem* when it cannot have that meaning,<sup>999</sup> *minime gentium* is inexplicably glossed as *per omnes gentes*,<sup>1000</sup> *satago* (“satisfy,” *satis* + *ago*) and *sagio* (“perceive keenly”) are conflated,<sup>1001</sup> the syntax of a larger passage is misunderstood,<sup>1002</sup> and the phrase *primo luci* is oddly identified as some sort of hybrid dative-genitive combination.<sup>1003</sup> In addition, I have pointed out some instances in which a citation or quotation is introduced with no apparent logic.<sup>1004</sup>

It is not to be assumed that the Bembine scholiast is the only one nodding, however. At the beginning of this chapter I highlighted the notes of Donatus to *Eunuchus* 50 and *Phormio* 13, both of which contain readings of the text that are demonstrably worse than those found in the Scholia Bembina for these verses. Donatus is also not immune from notes that seem a bit daft, such as the alert at *Eunuchus* 59 that the perfectly regular phrase *in amore haec omnia insunt* has two prepositions (*in, insunt*). Etymologies can be quirky and unrealistic, as at *Eunuchus* 406: *expuere est cum fastidio aliquid reicere et expellere; nam expuere est ἔξω pus mittere*. Another gem<sup>1005</sup> occurs at *Eunuchus* 179 with a far-fetched interpretation of *ego*: *vide quanta significet: convenit hoc pronomem multa blande exprobandi, ut [Verg. Aen. 4.314] ‘mene fugis?’* “Note how much weight the *ego* carries here: this pronoun is suited to someone making a lot of accusations in a fawning manner.” Perhaps, but is not *ego* also useful for nearly every other kind of emphatic sentence?

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<sup>997</sup> *Phorm.* 1 (Bem.)

<sup>998</sup> *Eun.* 50

<sup>999</sup> *Eun.* 588

<sup>1000</sup> *Eun.* 625

<sup>1001</sup> *Haut.* 236

<sup>1002</sup> *Haut.* 3; cf. EUGRAPHIUS, who gets this correct.

<sup>1003</sup> *Ad.* 481

<sup>1004</sup> Such is the citation of Vergil at *Eunuchus* 322 (Bem.), though here there may have been some explanation in the illegible portion of this folium. See also the Bembine note to *Adelphoe* 306, which offers a “quotation” of *Adelphoe* 471ff.—one that is evidently given from memory and is far from exact.

<sup>1005</sup> ἐῖρωνικῶς dixit dissertator.

Lastly, some notes are particularly entertaining for their oddity or silliness, at least from a modern perspective. It seems to us fairly obsessive, for example, that a scholar would think that Phaedria's farewell to Thais (*in hoc biduom, Thais, vale*) might be interpreted as "Be well, Thais, but only for two days and no longer!"<sup>1006</sup> We are also a bit shocked to see *vel* glossed as *aut*<sup>1007</sup>—who needs help with that?—or when the Bembine scholiast and Donatus want to make sure that we know that the evidently elusive word *sed* is a particle meaning a transition from one thing to another: *particula transitum significat ad mentionem alterius rei*.<sup>1008</sup> When Syrus describes an old woman with her hair pulled back in an unadorned way (*capillu' pexu' prolixus circum caput reiectu' neglegenter*), the scholiast cannot decide whether her hair is pulled backward (*retro iactus*) or tossed again (*iterum iactus*), evidently in some sort of mildly sexy manner (*ut appareat pulchritudo crinis*).<sup>1009</sup> It is also charming to come across the occasional personal testimonial<sup>1010</sup> like that found at *Adelphoe* 507, where Demea says: *non me indicente haec fiunt*, "It was not by my advice that these things are happening." The scholiast reads *indicente* as *non dicente*, an interpretation that causes him some unease: *tacente. nove. immo potius cata archahaismon; nam nusquam legimus nisi in hoc loco*, "It means "keeping quiet," which is strange; nay, rather, it is an archaism. For nowhere have we read [this usage] except for in this passage."

### *Conclusions and Inconclusions*

At a glance, there is much in the commentaries to Terence that reminds us of scholarly work done on Euripides and Aeschines. The staging of Roman comedy and its divergence from tragedy, for example, occupy the attention of Terentian scholars just like it did for their Euripidean counterparts, and I

<sup>1006</sup> *nunc 'vale' abscessum significat, non salutationem. nam si mera salutatio est, biduo solum amicam valere optat; sed praescribere conatur, quanto tempore abfuturus sit (Eun. 190, Don.).*

<sup>1007</sup> *Haut. 78 (Bem.)*

<sup>1008</sup> *Phorm. 57*

<sup>1009</sup> *Haut. 293 (Bem.)*

<sup>1010</sup> *vituperatur a multis dissertator, quia homoeoteleuton non vitavit.*

have pointed out a number of ways in which Donatus, Eugraphius, and the Bembine scholiasts demonstrate a consistent interest in rhetoric that employs some of the same approaches as the Aeschinean scholiasts, including the manifold assortment of figures. While there is not so much on history or mythology in the comments to Terence, and while discussion of variant textual readings is remarkably absent given the frequency of this type of note in the Greek scholia, one can recognize a general similarity in the way information of various kinds is introduced in an effort to explicate the original text—not only to make it readable, but to offer insightful parallels that demonstrate an interest in literature as literature and that point to a careful reading of the text.

At the same time, the commentaries to Terence are not “just more scholia,” for in some ways they are quite a bit different from what we have seen on the Greek side. Yes, rhetoric is important for the explication of both Aeschines and Terence, but the amount of rhetorical and legal theory in the latter is perhaps even greater in some ways than in the commentaries to the Greek orator and politician. The analysis of larger argumentative structures, for example, is much more developed for Terence than for Aeschines, where one often finds nothing more than a brief label for a particular section of the speech, whether it be an introduction, refutation, peroration, or something else. And in any case, when comparing drama to drama, the rhetorical information contained in the Terentian commentaries far outweighs that in the Euripidean scholia, despite the fact that Euripides lacks no amount of passages that would welcome sophisticated analysis. In a fair assessment, there is simply a greater interest in rhetoric among the Roman scholars—and recall also that, notably, some of the rhetorical notes to Aeschines appear to have come from the Roman era.

The exegetical methodologies are also largely the same for all parties concerned, though note that the *ζητήματα* tradition is not abundant in Terence, whereas it was ubiquitous among the Greek scholars.<sup>1011</sup> As for expectations of realism, appeals to general truth, standards of characterization, and

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<sup>1011</sup> The reason could be as simple as the suggestion that Terence’s plays do not present as many thorny problems as Euripides and Aeschines, though we have seen how exceptionally picky scholiasts can turn even the most harmless phraseology into a problem. If the Roman scholars had wished to incorporate this tradition of question-and-answer

other such topics, the notes to Terence seem to partake of the same types of thinking as mentioned in previous chapters. All the scholia examined thus far put high value on analogical reasoning—demonstrated especially through external and internal citations—and they also contain the basic assumption that the time in between the literature and the scholars themselves is great enough to allow for substantial changes in the standard for what is “normal,” either linguistically or culturally.

Further, all the scholia have demonstrated a tendency to include notes that are “extraneous,” that is, not absolutely critical for a basic understanding of the original text. Nowhere does this appear more evident than in the grammatical and lexicographical notes, where specific information for a specific passage is often expanded into a general lesson that differentiates between confusingly similar vocabulary, explains morphological phenomena, or provides other helpful information. The glosses in Terence do not seem as expansive as some of the extended entries seen in previous chapters, and perhaps this indicates a more mature intended audience who does not need as much help, though as always it is difficult to assert the skill level of the target reader, especially when we are dealing with variorum commentaries that could have been pieced together from scholarly works with different aims.<sup>1012</sup>

In terms of generic distinctions, it is again true that the scholia to a specific author demonstrate some understanding of the particular demands and expectations that are associated with the performance of that sort of literature, be it on stage at a festival or on the “stage” of the Athenian courtroom. What Terence does, after all, is for the sake of the spectators, and both Euripides and Aeschines were also said to have aimed at winning over their audiences—and apparently none of our authors were above a little flattery. Yet, this difference in performance context and the various expectations assigned to different

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format into their work, they could have drummed up enough material for it easily. We shall examine the topic further in the next chapter.

<sup>1012</sup> It is perhaps worth noting that I find no obscenity in the scholia to Terence, the closest example perhaps being the aforementioned note on *labeae inferiores*. There is also precious little that could be called “moral education” in the scholia, whereas we did see some examples for Euripides. Perhaps one could say that the Bembinian scholiast’s disdain for Aeschines’ brazen behavior at *Adelphoe* 328 qualifies, or also his assertion at *Adelphoe* 307 that it is characteristic of dutiful husbands to love their wives more when there is a certain hope for the birth of sons: *religiosorum est maritorum plus amare mulieres cum spes certa est puerorum*. In any case, there is not much of an argument to be made that the scholia have what we might call a “moral” impetus.

genres (e.g., tragedy vs. comedy, drama vs. oratory) do not mean that the same questions and techniques cannot be used to explicate each type of literature.

As for the Roman response to the Greek tradition, it has to be said that the scholars of Terence are consciously aware of their debt to their Greek counterparts, as is clear by their own treatment of Greek language, history, and culture. Some of this treatment will have resulted simply from the commentators' need to explicate Terence's own acknowledgement of the Greeks, especially Menander, but a number of other passages show that these Roman scholars did not aim at a bare minimum when it came to employing Greek scholarly techniques. Not only do they seem to have picked up the same basic approach to a literary text from their forebears, but in several places they seem to be pursuing those techniques actively, whether through the quotation of Greek sources or the use of individual Greek scholastic formulae. As we move forward, we will see whether Servius' approach to Vergil can be understood in the same way, and whether this shift in genre brings with it any perceptible change in methodology.

## CHAPTER 5

### Servius and the *Quidam*: Scholarship on Vergil

The scope of this project expands greatly as I proceed to the literary tradition surrounding Vergil, not only in the sense of magnitude with the great increase in scholarly remnants compared to those of my other case studies, but also in the realm of genre, as we move beyond oratory and drama into epic, pastoral, and agricultural literature. And, for the first time, we will see the same scholar(s) commenting on works from different genres by the same author, so that we will be afforded a rare opportunity to see the effects of a change in genre as the other variables remain the same. In addition to genre, another central concern of this chapter, as in the previous, will be the question of influence—not only how Vergil is said to incorporate and respond to his literary predecessors, but also how much Roman scholars leaned upon the commentaries of their Greek counterparts.

In my approach to these questions I will follow the same general procedure as in the other case studies: a short description of the texts, a critical summary of the topical categories contained in those texts with a focus on poetry and poetic genre, and analysis of the exegetical methods used throughout. Because of the great quantity of primary material available, I will not presume to offer a detailed presentation of the entire corpus. Some portions of Vergil's output will receive more intensive treatment here than others, and it is not to be assumed that my discussion is everywhere in perfect balance. Let it be observed at the outset that most phenomena from Vergilian scholarship that I present here will have a multitude of other examples that will not even be cited in a footnote, much less discussed in full.<sup>1013</sup> I will select passages that I find most interesting, often to the exclusion of large portions of the commentaries.

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<sup>1013</sup> This represents a significant shift from my approach to the scholia to Aeschines, where Dilts' slim volume could be summarized much more comprehensively. The problem of equal representation is present for Euripides and Terence as well, though not to the same extent as it is for Vergil. If someone wishes to know more specifically what are the relative concentrations of different kinds of notes on different topics in these scholiastic corpora, what is

*The Texts*

We have ample testimonia that the ancient commentators of Vergil were many and that the response to his *Aeneid* was immediate.<sup>1014</sup> His *Georgics* and *Eclogues* were also the subject of lectures by Caecilius Epirota soon after their publication. And, as if to prove that Vergil had indeed entered the ring to compete with Homer, the *obtrectatores* (accusing critics) appeared immediately to carp at the poet's work,<sup>1015</sup> a revival of the tradition of Homeric vituperation that was so entrenched from the early stages of Greek literary criticism. Among these snarling chaps was Carvilius Pictor, who wrote an excoriating *Aeneidomastix* ("Whipper of the *Aeneid*") to match the famous *Homeromastix* of Zoilus of Amphipolis.<sup>1016</sup> Vergil, of course, was not without a long line of scholarly *clientelae*. Among these were poets such as Silius Italicus and Valerius Flaccus, whose allusive programs showed the primacy of Vergil's work. Quintilian too sang his praises and even stated that his own teacher, Domitius Afer, had given Vergil second place to Homer—but that he was closer to first place than to third.<sup>1017</sup> In later antiquity Vergil's impact was solidified further not only as a literary giant in the secular world, but also among Christians, and the permanence of his verses shines clear within the tradition of the *centones*, poems that shuffled Vergilian lines to create new poetry from the building blocks of Vergil's own work—and that they were "building blocks" in a different sense is also confirmed by Vergil's continued status as a vital school text. It is in this context that later *grammatici* and other scholars continued the commentary tradition on what was already at that time "ancient" poetry: Aelius Donatus and then Servius produced their own *variorum* commentaries, while Fulgentius approached Vergil from a philosophical perspective

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needed is a comprehensive mathematical analysis. What I have aimed at instead is a representative sampling of the different types of knowledge and techniques of interpretation that appear in a given corpus.

<sup>1014</sup> Actually, if one includes the oft-cited premonition of Propertius (2.34.66) that something greater than the *Iliad* was on the way, then the comparative analysis with Homer may be said to have begun even before the poem's publication.

<sup>1015</sup> Donatus (*Vita* 43, perhaps an echo of Suetonius) states that Vergil was never without these detractors.

<sup>1016</sup> For the *obtrectatores*, see Farrell (2010, 445f.), Tarrant (1997, 59), Nettleship (1881). Farrell points out how useful these critics are to us, even though we have information on so few, since it was their critiques that launched the defenders of Vergil (e.g., Donatus and Servius) into exegetical action to explain Vergil's relationship to poetic works that are now lost.

<sup>1017</sup> 10.1.86

(for which compare Macrobius on the *Somnium Scipionis*), and Tiberius Claudius Donatus (not to be confused with Aelius Donatus) wrote a rhetorical commentary that emphasized the whole *Aeneid* as a carefully-planned *laudatio* of Augustus and Rome.<sup>1018</sup>

For the purposes of this study I focus exclusively on the Servian tradition, the definition of which I will clarify shortly. My future study of Vergilian scholarship will take many other works into account, and this project will provide a foundational methodology for such research, in addition to giving a broad-sweeping analysis of the most popular and important commentator of Vergil in the ancient world.<sup>1019</sup> To be sure, the commentaries I treat are focalized through the lens of merely a couple of individuals, but at the same time they are illustrative of many strands of Vergilian scholarship through their frequent citation of the way “many” or “some” approached Vergil’s poetry. Thus, while the text of Servius by no means tells us “what the ancients thought about Vergil,” as Fowler points out,<sup>1020</sup> there is present in this case study the flavor of a centuries-old tradition on Vergil that itself looked back to the millennium-old tradition of Greek thinking about Homer and other literature.

The text of Servius, the fourth-century commentator and possibly a student of Donatus, comes to us in the manuscripts in two forms: the standard text of Servius and a commentary known as Servius Danielis or Servius Auctus (hereafter referred to as DS). The first is a large collection of notes on the *Aeneid*, *Eclogues*, and *Georgics* in that order. The second, first published by Pierre Daniel (1600), contains the whole text of Servius (with some modifications) and a vast assemblage of additional notes, the provenance of which is unknown. It has been suggested that Servius’ own commentary is based on the work of Donatus and that DS, which was probably compiled in the seventh or eighth century, contains pieces of the Donatian commentary that Servius did not include.<sup>1021</sup> However that may be, it has long

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<sup>1018</sup> McDonough (2004, xvii)

<sup>1019</sup> I intend the subtitle of this chapter as a reference to Servius’ frequent mention of other unnamed commentators. Whether he intended this or not, however, this anonymizing *quidam* formula is almost performative in that Servius’ work largely put other ancient Vergilian commentaries out of business.

<sup>1020</sup> 1997, 77

<sup>1021</sup> See Rand (1916), but note that this view, which was based on mere assumption, has been largely discredited (e.g., Travis 1942, Daintree 1990).



been clear that DS is a fundamentally different commentary with recognizable features of its own.<sup>1022</sup> In this investigation I will be treating both texts together without drawing fine distinctions between them except where they are obvious, nor will I make any special effort to ensure that I have given examples from both equally in my various sections, since my goal is not to solve the problems of the Servian manuscript tradition, but to analyze the commentaries according to the methodology I have developed in previous chapters. In some sense it will be helpful to have the balance of two different commentaries side-by-side in order to give a bit more breadth to my study, but future endeavors will have to go much further into other Vergilian exegesis as well, including the likes of Tiberius Claudius Donatus and Macrobius, whose extensive *Saturnalia* contains details of ancient scholarly practices that will prove helpful in broadening the scope of my project.

The textual history of the Servian tradition (Servius + DS) makes it extremely difficult to produce an efficient and accurate edition. Part of the dilemma is that DS is not simply the text of Servius with additions, but is an *emended* text of Servius. Thus, any modern edition must choose which text to privilege, with the two basic approaches being represented by Thilo (1881) and the ongoing Harvard edition. The first privileges Servius by reproducing a critical edition of his text with the additions of DS in italics, relegating any emendations of the original Servius in DS to the critical apparatus. The second privileges DS, and the somewhat complicated presentation of the text obfuscates those places in which the original Servius text was modified by our anonymous seventh- or eighth-century compiler.<sup>1023</sup> Both systems have flaws, and the only truly accurate way to express both texts together in a way that respects their original form is to print them in their entirety side-by-side, which would mean a tremendous expenditure of paper, but which one day could be an extremely useful format for electronic versions of the text. For the current project I use Thilo's 1881 edition, and my citations are from the original Servius unless otherwise marked by the initials DS. Finally, let it be noted that in a number of places the citation

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<sup>1022</sup> See Murgia (1975, 3ff.). The use of DS (Danielis Scholia) is to be preferred to Servius Danielis or Servius Auctus for the simple reasons that the expansion of the commentary is demonstrably not Servian. It is better to divorce ourselves from speaking of it in those terms.

<sup>1023</sup> Fraenkel (1948) issued a withering review of this project and addressed such obfuscation.

or quotation of a verse in Servius or DS will not match a modern edition such as Mynors' OCT (1985); should the reader wish to track down any citations in the original text, it is advised that he or she remain flexible, as a wished-for verse could be several spots removed from its expected location.

The form of the text itself is very much like what I have described in previous chapters, though with a much stronger unity, the additions of DS notwithstanding. Even the “single” commentary on Terence by Donatus contains many disjointed, redundant, or contradictory collections of varying opinions, but Servius and DS are far more streamlined—again, excepting those places where the DS compiler has not smoothed over a join in the composite text or has added redundant material (though for the most part I do not find this to be the case).<sup>1024</sup> The commentaries have the same lemma-based structure as before, and continuations of notes are linked most often by *autem*, in contrast to the *et* in Donatus' commentary on Terence, with alternative positions marked with *vel* or *aut*. The amount of self-reference in Servius and DS is extremely high, with “as we said above” formulae appearing hundreds of times, though with other first-person markers appearing only rarely.<sup>1025</sup> It will be observed that the scholiastic formulae from other corpora are used frequently by Servius as well, with a few unique additions.

### *Servii Praefationes*

Another important difference between Servius and the scholia we have seen thus far is that, while we were left mostly to our own devices in determining the method of our commentators, now we are given substantial introductory material that explains at least in part what Servius is doing and how he

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<sup>1024</sup> For some good examples that demonstrate the sort of additions or corrections that are made by DS to the original text of Servius, see *Aeneid* 1.514, 3.248, 3.701.

<sup>1025</sup> E.g., *in opinione mea* (*Aen.* 8.471). Note that, in comparing DS with the Terence commentary of Donatus, Travis (1942) finds no consistency between styles, which leads him to conclude that DS may contain the substance of Donatus' commentary on Vergil, but decidedly not the very words themselves or anything close to it. Part of his reasoning includes the relative frequency of “personal exclamations” in the Terence commentary (some examples of which I showed in the last chapter) vis-à-vis the “pedestrian and impersonal language” of DS.

views his task as commentator. Before I begin my own assessment of what Servius is up to, it is fitting to give him some space to speak for himself.

Servius launches his entire commentary project with an overview of the tasks that are common to any expositor of an author: *in exponendis auctoribus haec consideranda sunt: poetae vita, titulus operis, qualitas carminis, scribentis intentio, numerus librorum, ordo librorum, explanatio*. These terms are largely self-explanatory, though some specification is needed. The *qualitas* of a work may refer to meter, stylistic register, and genre, though we will have to examine later how we are to understand this last term. The *intentio* is the author's purpose in writing: for example, the *intentio* of the *Aeneid* is to imitate Homer and praise Augustus from his ancestors,<sup>1026</sup> while that of the *Eclogues* is to imitate Theocritus and to give thanks to Augustus and other nobles for returning his confiscated land in Mantua.<sup>1027</sup> There is no formal statement of the *intentio* in the *Georgics*, though one learns that Vergil has imitated Hesiod and that the poem is didactic, having a goal of instructing the reader in agricultural practices.<sup>1028</sup> The last element, *explanatio*, encompasses the rest of the entire work, namely the line-by-line commentary itself.

Each of the prefaces are quite unique, and only the *Aeneid* fully exhibits all the features Servius lists for the requirements of a literary commentary, and by the time he gets to the introduction to the *Georgics*, the systematized approach with which he has begun is not clearly recognizable, though more or less the same types of information are communicated. The prefaces also contain more than the list given above would suggest, as the commentator takes liberty to talk about whatever seems important for a given work. For the *Aeneid*, this includes the fact that the poem was never emended or published by Vergil and that it survived only because Augustus ordered Tucca and Varius to correct it by removing everything that was superfluous and adding nothing, which is the reason for the presence of unfinished verses and the absence of Vergil's initial four-verse introduction to the first book.<sup>1029</sup> The preface to the *Eclogues*

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<sup>1026</sup> *Aen. praef.* 70ff.

<sup>1027</sup> *Ecl. praef.* 14ff.; Servius then explains what he means with a biographical section that gives details for how Vergil's land was handed over to veterans from the civil war and how he successfully petitioned Augustus for his fields to be returned.

<sup>1028</sup> *G. praef.* 1ff., 26ff.

<sup>1029</sup> *Aen. praef.* 23ff.

contains extra information on the history of the genre, and the (noticeably shorter) introduction to the *Georgics* deals with, among other things, a dispute about the applicability of the title to the contents of each book. Though these prefaces seem to be somewhat random in what they discuss, and while taken together they do not seem to follow the same structure, they are an invaluable source of information for how Servius viewed his task as commentator and what starting assumptions were operable in his interpretation of Vergil.

### *Topical Concerns*

It will be clear from the previous chapters what are the essential epistemological components of an ancient commentary. In order to explain literary works, scholars called upon all kinds of knowledge—history, mythology, geography, ethnography, rhetorical theory, linguistics, literature in general, and others—a practice with a potent implication: anyone who thinks he or she can bring light to Vergil’s work without an extremely broad education is doomed to failure, and as I will emphasize below, it is exactly in those terms that Servius distances himself from other Vergilian “scholars.” Since the topics covered in the other scholiastic corpora are already familiar to my reader, in what follows I will present an unjustly brief assemblage of notes from each category to show that the tradition of Vergilian scholarship partakes of a similarly wide-ranging knowledge, an abridgement that is necessary to make room for my more crucial considerations, but one that nonetheless seems like a criminal activity given the profoundly rich and diverse Servian corpus. In most cases I am not even able—like the Vergilian commentator at *Eclogues* 4.34 (DS), who explains that anyone wishing to learn more about Jason and his mates aboard the *Argo* should consult the works of those who write fables—to direct the avid reader to more detailed explanations in other sources. Let it be understood simply that most of the examples that follow will have dozens (perhaps even hundreds) of siblings that demonstrate the same or similar phenomena and that only

a few will get explicit recognition. In the meantime, there is need for more detailed studies on the epistemological categories that Servius and his sources access.

Let me start this brief summary with a look at lexicography. Like the commentaries to Terence, Servius and DS make use of basic glosses, but not with the continuous string of five, six, or even seven synonymous entries that we saw in the Greek scholia.<sup>1030</sup> Rather, as with Terence, the places in which multiple glosses are given generally come with differentiation between the terms instead of stacking them all together in an extended gloss. This phenomenon is evident from the very first verse of the *Aeneid*, where the multivalence of *cano* is explained: *<cano> polysemus sermo est. tria enim significat: aliquando laudo, ut “regemque canebant” [Aen. 7.698]; aliquando divino, ut “ipsa canas oro” [Aen. 6.76]; aliquando canto, ut in hoc loco, “The word is multi-valent, for it means three things: sometimes ‘praise,’ as in ‘and they were praising the king’; sometimes ‘prophecy,’ as in ‘I ask that you yourself prophecy’; and sometimes ‘sing,’ as in this passage.”*<sup>1031</sup> And as with Terence, there are a series of words that are categorized as *τῶν μέσων*, that is, inherently ambiguous and in need of clarifying epithets.<sup>1032</sup> There are also very many places in which Vergil’s language is said to be executed “properly” (*proprie*) or “improperly” (*improprie, abusive, usurpative, καταχρηστικῶς*), that is, adhering to a standard of common usage or diverging from it. For example, it was appropriate for Vergil to describe shipwrecked sailors as *nautis deprensus*, since *deprendere* is a nautical verb.<sup>1033</sup> Likewise, when a spear rips through Herminius’ shoulders at *Aeneid* 11.644 (*per armos*), Servius mentions that the anatomical phrase is employed contrary to common usage (*abusive*), since it properly refers to quadrupeds.<sup>1034</sup> See also Vergil’s use of the singular *carcere* to refer to the starting gates for the ship race in the funeral games for Anchises at

<sup>1030</sup> Some of them are still charming, though: e.g., *<mitia> matura, quae non remordent cum mordentur*, “This word means ‘ripe,’ fruits that do not bite back when bitten into” (*Ecl.* 1.80).

<sup>1031</sup> Cf. *Ecl.* 1.13 (*aeger* can indicate sickness of body or of mind), *Ecl.* 4.38 (*vector* can mean either *nauta* or *Mercator*—i.e., either the person transporting the goods, or the person selling them), *Ecl.* 1.56 (the three types of *frondator*), *Ecl.* 2.34 (accusing some scholars of trying to make a most inane distinction between *labra* and *labia*, namely that the former is for men and the latter for women; cf. Donatus’ note to *Eunuchus* 336).

<sup>1032</sup> These include *ars* (*Aen.* 1.657, 2.106, 2.152 [DS]), *coniuratio* (*Aen.* 8.5), *inops* (*G.* 1.186), and *tempestas* (*Aen.* 9.19).

<sup>1033</sup> *G.* 4.420 (DS); cf. *Aen.* 6.160, 8.230 (DS), and the interesting 7.7, where the phrase *tendit iter velis* is said by many to be composed improperly (*improprie*), but according to many others it was done with excessive propriety (*nimum proprie*).

<sup>1034</sup> Cf. *Aen.* 4.543; *G.* 2.469; *Ecl.* 7.7 (*acyrologia*; cf. Quintilian 8.2.3)

*Aeneid* 5.145: <carcere> usurpavit: nam ‘carcer’ est numero tantum singulari custodia noxiorum; ‘carceres’ vero numero tantum plurali ostia, quibus equi arcentur: unde et ‘carceres’ quasi ‘arceres’ secundum Varronem, “He used this term irregularly, for *carcer* in the singular indicates only the place where criminals are guarded, but *carceres* in the plural means only the gates in which horses are enclosed; from this we get *carceres* as if from *arceres*, according to Varro.”<sup>1035</sup>

There is nothing particularly unique about the etymologies in the Vergilian commentaries—they are not infrequent and are often quite imaginative—though here it is worth pointing out a few examples of etymologizing from Greek, of which there are a fantastic amount, a fact Servius himself acknowledges at *Aeneid* 1.184.<sup>1036</sup> The final section of the preface to the *Eclogues*, for instance, states that the names of the characters involved are in large part fabricated based on their rustic context: Meliboeus is so-called because he is in charge of the cows (ὄτι μέλει αὐτῷ τῶν βοῶν), and Tityrus is a Laconian name for the bellwether. The same principle, Servius continues, is evident in comedy as well: *sicut etiam in comoediis invenimus; nam Pamphilus est totum amans, Glycerium quasi dulcis mulier, Philumena amabilis*. The *Eclogues* continue this recognition of Greek etymology in the opening line of the first poem (*fagus dicta est ἀπὸ τοῦ φαγεῖν*), and *Eclogues* 4.34 has an example of the etymologizing of a Greek name through Latin: *sane quidam Argo a celeritate dictam volunt, unde verso in latinum verbo, argutos celeres dici*, “Indeed some want the Argo to be so called for its swiftness, from which, with the verse changed into Latin, *argutos* is said to be *celer*es.” Varro is also cited at *Aeneid* 1.22 for an etymology of *Libya* from

<sup>1035</sup> Cf. the similar note at *Aen.* 1.54; for other examples of such irregular language: *Aen.* 4.610, *G.* 3.64 (DS). Vergil is not the only one whose language is pointed out to be irregular (e.g., Horace at *Aen.* 3.576, Lucan at *Aen.* 3.22). Note also the *obiter dictum* at *Aeneid* 1.410 that Terence is as far above the other comic writers in verbal propriety as he is beneath them in everything else: *sciendum tamen est Terentium propter solam proprietatem omnibus comicis esse praepositum, quibus est quantum ad cetera spectat inferior*.

<sup>1036</sup> Sadly many gems will be passed over here, like the fact that *latex* refers properly to water that is “hidden” (*latere*) within the earth and comes up through a spring, but also of wine, which is hidden inside a grape (*Aen.* 1.686), and that Caesar got his name either because he was “cut” from his mother’s womb or because his uncle killed an elephant in Africa with his own bare hands, *caesa* being the Phoenician word for “elephant” (*Aen.* 1.286), which apparently is taken as a sort of honorific sobriquet along the lines of Scipio “Africanus.” I must sadly also pass over another fantastic story regarding Caesar’s name: when he was captured by Gauls one of the enemy came up to him and taunted him with bantering calls of “Caesar, Caesar!” To the general’s pleasant surprise (and no doubt the offending Gaul’s as well), Caesar was released, since in the language of the Gauls, *caesar* means *dimitte*, “Let him go!” (*Aen.* 11.743). Let this episode find its place among the great historical gaffes: if true, then it is akin to the Schabowski-induced Berlin Wall fiasco of 1989; if false, then to the rumors concerning the premature retirement of NFL great Barry Sanders.

λιπυία, *id est egens pluviae*. Further, Zeus' name is connected with life, and the year (*annus*) is so called because of the way it is renewed.<sup>1037</sup> One of the more interesting examples is the (still accepted) etymology of *animus* from the Greek ἀνεμος (“wind”), which Servius provides for a passage in which Vergil actually describes how Aeolus calms the winds.<sup>1038</sup> Here Vergil puns on the correlation between the terms—*animos* can mean “tempers,” but sounds rather like ἀνέμους, or the “winds”—but Servius has nothing to say on the lightheartedness of this wordplay, only the plain fact of the etymology. Finally, at *Eclogues* 2.31 the etymology of the name Pan appears in a marvelous note that is, as they say, worth the price of admission:

*nam Pan deus est rusticus in naturae similitudinem formatus, unde et Pan dictus est, id est omne: habet enim cornua in radiorum solis et cornuum lunae similitudinem; rubet eius facies ad aetheris imitationem; in pectore nebridem habet stellatam ad stellarum imaginem; pars eius inferior hispida est propter arbores, virgulta, feras; caprinos pedes habet, ut ostendat terrae soliditatem; fistulam septem calamorum habet propter harmoniam caeli, in qua septem soni sunt, ut diximus in Aeneide “septem discrimina vocum”; καλαύροπα habet, id est pedum, propter annum, qui in se recurrit. hic quia totius naturae deus est, a poetis fingitur cum Amore luctatus et ab eo victus, quia, ut legimus, “omnia vincit Amor.”*

For Pan is a rustic god assembled in the likeness of nature, from which he is called Pan, that is, Everything (πᾶν). For he has horns like the rays of the sun and the horns of the moon. His face is ruddy in imitation of the ether. He has a starry fawnskin over his chest in the likeness of the stars. His lower part is hairy because of the trees, brambles, and wild beasts. He has the feet of a goat in order to show the solidity of the earth. He has a pipe of seven reeds because of the harmony of heaven, in which there are seven tones, as we said in the *Aeneid*, “seven kinds of voices.” He has a καλαύροπα (that is, a shepherd’s crook) because of the year, which comes back to itself. Since he is the god of all nature, he is portrayed by the poets as having contended with Amor and having been beaten by him, since, as we say, “Love conquers all [= ‘All,’ πᾶν].”

There is also a profound amount of grammatical notes in the commentaries. Suffice it to say that these pertain to the same concepts that we have seen already: noun and verb morphology,<sup>1039</sup> words that are either pleonastic or omitted,<sup>1040</sup> various syntactical rules,<sup>1041</sup> and much more. While there is no need to spend much time on the details of these notes for the purpose of this investigation, let two things be

<sup>1037</sup> ζῳή (*Aen.* 1.388), ἀνανεοῦσθαι (*Aen.* 1.269)

<sup>1038</sup> *mollitque animos et temperat iras* (*Aen.* 1.57).

<sup>1039</sup> *Aen.* 1.108, 1.635, 2.41, 2.272, 5.694; *Ecl.* 1.32 (cf. 4.5), 1.49, 5.69

<sup>1040</sup> *deest*: *Aen.* 2.96 (DS), 3.163, 9.683. *subaudire*: *Aen.* 9.260, 11.4, 12.316 (DS); *G.* 2.488 (DS), 4.107. *abundare*: *Aen.* 4.116, 8.45; *G.* 1.162. Other terminology in this category includes *superfluus/ superfluere*, *pleonasmos*, and *vacare*.

<sup>1041</sup> *Ecl.* 2.28, 30, 71; *G.* 1.3, 3.53

noted. First, very many of them show analogical reasoning as a basis for grammatical study: that is, principles of morphology, orthography, and syntax are regularly transferable from one word or phrase to another. Such is the language of speaking at *Eclogues* 1.15: just as *da* can be used for *dic*, so *accipe* can be used for *audi*. In another example at *Aeneid* 1.203, verbs of remembering and forgetting take both genitive- and the accusative- case objects.<sup>1042</sup> Secondly, note that many are also “didactic” in the sense of using a passage of Vergil as a springboard for teaching a broader grammatical lesson. A few examples from the *Eclogues* will suffice to show this principle. *Amarylli* is said to be a Greek vocative, and other Greek names ending in *-is* are like this word in that the final syllable is short.<sup>1043</sup> Vergil’s use of *serpyllus* sparks a reference to the Greek *herpyllon*, with an analogical explanation: *in multis enim nominibus, quae in Graeco aspirationem habent, nos pro aspiratione ‘s’ ponimus*, “For in many nouns that have aspiration in Greek we put an ‘s’ in place of the aspiration.”<sup>1044</sup> At *Eclogues* 2.34 Servius also explains that using a perfect infinitive instead of a present one as Vergil does here (*trivisse*) is permissible when the verb is defective, like *meminisse*.<sup>1045</sup> It will again be noted how often these examples contain discussion of the Greek language.

As with Terence, problems in the organization of sentences are addressed throughout the Vergilian corpus. Where word order is confusing, the commentator simplifies the original text by providing a more regular arrangement of the words under the familiar *ordo est* formula.<sup>1046</sup> Other difficulties are resolved through a specification of the correct placement for punctuation, commonly

<sup>1042</sup> Servius calls attention to this very principle in his commentary to the *Ars* of Donatus (435.15): *analogia dicitur ratio declinationis nominum inter se omni parte similia*. See also his note to *Aeneid* 546, where he states that Pliny’s rule that verbal expressions are formed from other similar ones is to be taken only as a general truth—a fact Pliny himself affirms: *nec nos decipiat quod dicit Plinius, ut elocutiones ex similibus formemus; nam ecce ‘comedo illam rem’ dicimus, nec tamen ‘vescor illam rem.’ et ipse dicit non usquequaque hoc esse servandum*.

<sup>1043</sup> *Ecl.* 1.36; cf. *Ecl.* 3.74 (lemma = *Amynta*), which gives much the same type of lesson for Greek names ending in *-as*.

<sup>1044</sup> *Ecl.* 2.11; for another example of Greek grammatical analogy, see the discussion of Greek monosyllables that come into Latin and the manner in which they are accented (*Ecl.* 2.31).

<sup>1045</sup> That *tero* is not defective in the same way is not the point, though it is worth considering why Servius thinks *trivi* and *memini* behave similarly.

<sup>1046</sup> *Aen.* 2.535 (DS), 7.250; *Ecl.* 5.71, 9.27; *G.* 1.260, 4.99, 4.150; not all of these are necessarily difficult passages—e.g., DS says that *inque vicem* (*G.* 4.166) should really be taken in this order: *in vicemque*. Thus, *ordo est* is used to point out irregularities even when one’s understanding of the text is not compromised. This type of stylistic note is quite common and lends itself to the theory that Servius and DS are interested in establishing correct Latinity in their readers, a theory for which I find a great deal of evidence.



expressed by *distinguere* or *subdistinguere*, analogous to the *στικτέον* and *ὑποστικτέον* of the Greek scholia.<sup>1047</sup> There are also variant readings of the original text, marked sometimes by *legitur* (=γράφεται): DS says that *aptare* at *Aeneid* 1.552 is also read as *optare*, and Servius uses the same formula to show that *acies* is also given as *acie* at *Aeneid* 2.30.<sup>1048</sup> See also Servius' notes at *Eclogues* 3.85 (*Polio* vs. *Pollio*) and 2.12, where the debate is whether the first word of the line is *ad* or *at*: '*ad*' *si per* '*d*' fuerit, erit hyperbaton . . . sed melius est, ut '*at*' coniunctio sit. The latter example shows both that textual critical notes were not always decisive, but that a preference could be given where appropriate, and the same principle is seen in the multiple examples in which "others" are said to give this or that punctuation or word order as a solution for an uncertainty. Finally, the *a priori* assumption that the *Aeneid* was unfinished is also cause for notes containing textual criticism, as at *Aeneid* 6.289, where DS explains that some people said that a four-verse passage on the Gorgons had been removed by the editors *Tucca* and *Varius*.

Very many notes on ethnography and cultural practices appear. Some are simple identifications of obscure peoples, such as the *Picti* and *Agathyrsi*: <*Pictique Agathyrsi*> *populi sunt Scythiae, colentes Apollinem hyperboreum*.<sup>1049</sup> The mention of the worship of *Apollo* is itself indicative of a recurring emphasis on divinities and their rites in different lands: *Apollo* is also worshiped in *Patrae*, a city of *Achaea*,<sup>1050</sup> and *Liber* has a cult at *Nysa*.<sup>1051</sup> More information on the divine comes at *Aeneid* 2.632, where Servius explains that the masculine form of *deus* may be used to refer to gods and goddesses: <*ducente deo*> *secundum eos qui dicunt, utriusque sexus participationem habere numina. nam ait Calvus "pollentemque deum Venerem". item Vergilius "nec dextrae erranti deus afuit", cum aut Iuno fuerit, aut Allecto. est etiam in Cypro simulacrum barbatae Veneris*, "This phrase is in accordance with those who say that divinities participate in both genders. For Calvus says 'the powerful god Venus.' Likewise

<sup>1047</sup> *Aen.* 4.323 (DS), 8.381, 10.485; *Ecl.* 3.7, 3.29, 8.50; *G.* 3.46 (DS), 4.424

<sup>1048</sup> Cf. *Aen.* 11.524, 12.290; *Ecl.* 3.38; *G.* 3.310 (DS)

<sup>1049</sup> *Aen.* 4.146; cf. the identification of *Scythia* as a "northern region" (*Ecl.* 1.65). For more ethnographic notes: *Aen.* 1.113 (*Lycii*) and *Aen.* 8.724ff. (the throng of peoples subject to Augustus).

<sup>1050</sup> *Aen.* 3.332

<sup>1051</sup> *Aen.* 6.805

Vergil: ‘nor was the god absent to his wandering right hand [i.e., of Ascanius when he shoots the stag],’ when it was either Juno or Allecto. There is even in Cyprus a statue of a bearded Venus.” DS adds a bit more to this note: *corpore et veste muliebri, cum sceptro et natura virili, quod Ἀφρόδιτον vocant, cui viri in veste muliebri, mulieres in virili veste sacrificant*, “[The bearded statue has] a woman’s body and garment, with a scepter and a manly nature, which they call ‘Aphroditus,’ to whom men sacrifice while wearing women’s clothing, and women in men’s.”<sup>1052</sup>

Scientific notes are also a regular part of the commentaries, including astronomy, zoology, botany, and more. As expected, one finds a great deal on such topics especially in the *Georgics*, for instance Servius’ identification of the Pleiades, the Hyades, and the Bear with the etymological and mythological additions by DS.<sup>1053</sup> The beginning of *Eclogues* 4 also describes the cycle of the cosmos and the return to the golden age, and the commentator states that some called a *saeculum* 100 years, but some 110.<sup>1054</sup> Botanical notes occur throughout the *Eclogues* and *Georgics*.<sup>1055</sup> A range of interesting zoological notes include a reference to bees: Pliny the Elder (11.70) says that there are many kinds, and these include *fuci*, *crabrones*, and *vespae*.<sup>1056</sup> A little before this, Servius comments on a mention of the “bird of Jupiter”: *<Iovis ales> aquila, quae in tutela Iovis est, quia dicitur dimicanti ei contra Gigantas fulmina ministrasse; quod ideo fingitur, quia per naturam nimii est caloris, adeo ut etiam ova quibus supersidet possit coquere, nisi admoveat gagen, lapidem frigidissimum, ut testatur Lucanus*, “Jupiter’s bird is the eagle, which is in his care, since it is said to have supplied his lightning bolts in his battle against the Giants. This myth is so created because the eagle is naturally so hot that it would cook the

<sup>1052</sup> For other kinds of sacrifices: *Aen.* 1.8; *Ecl.* 3.77. For the gender-bending of the gods: *Aen.* 6.64 (*cum supra dixerimus ἀρσενοθήλεις esse omnes deos*).

<sup>1053</sup> *G.* 1.138; cf. *Aen.* 6.64 (where this verse is quoted). The Hyades and their rainy etymology (ὕαδες) appear also at *Aeneid* 1.744 (though note the introduction by *alii* of a porcine etymology from ὕς). On a slightly unrelated note, I have just learned that the phrase “go the whole hog” started with or at least has a close correlation among the ancient Greeks (λύσω τὴν ἑμμαντῆς ὄν, “I will let loose my pig [= anger],” *Ar. Lys.* 684).

<sup>1054</sup> *Ecl.* 4.5 (DS); there is not adequate time to discuss more astronomical details here, but let it be noted that, as will be shown below, such features of the natural world are used to interpret Vergilian poetry, such as the use of astronomical facts to support his depiction of Venus as a *virgo* in the woods (*Aen.* 1.314); cf. the treatment of Jupiter and Juno as realms of the sky at *Aeneid* 1.47. And on a side note, let it be known that the sun takes an indirect route around the earth, lest it fall upon the center of the earth and frequently suffer eclipse (*Aen.* 1.742)—I do not know what this means, but it can be enjoyed nonetheless.

<sup>1055</sup> *Cytisus* (*Ecl.* 1.78, *G.* 3.394 [DS]), *serpyllus* (*Ecl.* 2.11), *amomus* (*Ecl.* 3.89, 4.25), *myrice* (*Ecl.* 4.2, 8.54), et al.

<sup>1056</sup> *Aen.* 1.435

eggs its sits on if it did not bring in a *γαγάτης*, a very cold rock, as Lucan reports.” We also learn that when Vergil says that *cytissus* is bitter, what he means of course is that it is bitter to us—but goats love it.<sup>1057</sup> Further, there are geographical notes, including the statement that Britain used to be attached to the *orbis terrarum*,<sup>1058</sup> and even some geometry, such as when Menalcas cannot remember which geometrician is portrayed on the cup he offers as a prize for the competition: Servius states here that the *radius* is a philosopher’s rod that is used to measure straight lines, and that this art of geometry was invented when the flooding Nile discombobulated property lines which then needed to be redrawn, hence the calling in of professional philosophers<sup>1059</sup>—and he adds that the mystical man on the cup is either Aratus, Ptolemy, or Eudoxus.<sup>1060</sup>

A few references to notes on natural philosophy are due here, since establishing a connection between poetry and actual scientific knowledge is a primary aim of Servius, much as it was for some Euripidean commentators. When Vergil states that Aeneas stands strong against the pleas of Anna like a tree whose roots extend as deep as its top is tall, Servius remarks that this is in accordance with what the *physici* say about root depth.<sup>1061</sup> It is also according to the doctrine of the *physici* that Vergil makes Mercury fast, since his constellation is quick in rising.<sup>1062</sup> So too Corydon’s assertion of his own good looks as he sees his reflection in the sea is given with a disclaimer (*si numquam fallit imago*) that is based on a physical truth: *nulla enim res ita decipit, quemadmodum imago: nam et in speculo contraria ostendit universa, et in aqua remum integrum quasi fractum videmus: quod etiam Cicero in Tusculanis plenius docet*, “For nothing so deceives as an image; for even in a mirror everything appears in reverse, and in the water we see an intact oar as if it were broken [i.e., through refraction], which Cicero also discusses more fully in his *Tusculan Disputations*.”<sup>1063</sup> Finally, when Vergil says that Neptune is riled up (*commotum*) at

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<sup>1057</sup> *Ecl.* 1.78

<sup>1058</sup> *olim iuncta fuit orbi terrarum Britannia: est enim insula reposita in Oceano septentrionali, et a poetis alter orbis terrarum dicitur* (*Ecl.* 1.66).

<sup>1059</sup> Cf. Strabo 17.1.3

<sup>1060</sup> *Ecl.* 3.41

<sup>1061</sup> *Aen.* 4.446

<sup>1062</sup> *Aen.* 1.301, 8.139

<sup>1063</sup> *Ecl.* 2.27

the disobedience of the winds and that he calms the swelling waves (*tumida aequora placat*), Servius remarks at both places that this is poetic, but also pertains to the physical realm, since the disturbance and calming of the sea are shown in the character of Neptune, who is connected with the sea.<sup>1064</sup>

Further, as we proceed through the Vergilian commentaries, we find a range of mythological notes that remind us of the landscape of the scholia to Euripides. As for Euripides, an accurate understanding of Vergil's texts requires a wide-ranging knowledge of the past, be it fact or fiction, and the result is page after page of mythological exposition. Accordingly, there is hardly space for me to provide details on how, for example, Atlas was a natural philosopher who first described the nature of heavenly bodies and their orbits and was thus mythologized to have held up the sky, and how he then taught his grandson Hercules what he knew, such that Hercules (a philosopher) was then mythologized as having taken the earth from him as one of his twelve labors—a symbol for the celestial science handed down to him.<sup>1065</sup> Nor is there time to share the story of how Vulcan could not determine who his true parents were and thus constructed a chair that would trap anyone who sat in it, so that when Juno became enmeshed therein, Vulcan refused to let her out until she revealed the truth to him.<sup>1066</sup> Instead, let me focus on a key difference in terminology that Servius employs for *historia* and *fabula*, which is the first such formal distinction between the two concepts of “history” and “mythology” that I have found in scholia thus far. The decisive text is this:

*et sciendum est, inter fabulam et argumentum, hoc est historiam, hoc interesse, quod fabula est dicta res contra naturam, sive facta sive non facta, ut de Pasiphae, historia est quicquid secundum naturam dicitur, sive factum sive non factum, ut de Phaedra.*<sup>1067</sup>

And it must be known that between “fable” and “argument” (i.e., “history”) the difference is this: a “fable” is a thing that is contrary to nature, whether it happened or not, as with the story of Pasiphae. “History” is what is said according to nature, whether it happened or not, as with the story of Phaedra.

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<sup>1064</sup> *Aen.* 1.142

<sup>1065</sup> *Aen.* 1.741 (DS)

<sup>1066</sup> *Ecl.* 4.62 (DS); note that the original text at this passage and the previous one have absolutely no hint of Hercules or Vulcan—the scholiast chose freely, and fortuitously, to pass these nuggets on to us.

<sup>1067</sup> *Aen.* 1.235

This remarkable pair of definitions is hardly what we would expect—another reminder that ancient scholars are working in a much different context from our own. “History” has nothing to do with fact, but rather plausibility, while it is strongly implied that “myth” (or perhaps “legend”) can actually be real.<sup>1068</sup> In any case, Servius puts himself in an interesting position regarding what is regarded as “history”: whether his historical sources are correct or not, he justifies his use of the term for the entire batch.

The more (to us) normal division between history and myth is enacted by Servius through a comparison of *fabula* and *veritas*. Contrary to the well-known myth, for example, the truth of the Atreus/Thyestes conflict was that the former was the first to discover the principle of the eclipsing of the sun, and when it actually happened as he predicted latter got angry and left town.<sup>1069</sup> Similarly, *fabula* says that Cacus was a fire-breathing son of Vulcan who destroyed everything nearby, but *veritas* says, according to the *philologi* and *historici*, that he was a wicked slave of Evander and a thief.<sup>1070</sup> The truth is not always available, though, as Vergil’s mention of Mercury sparks the following from Servius: *Cicero in libris de deorum natura plures dicit esse Mercurios; sed in deorum ratione fabulae sequendae sunt, nam veritas ignoratur*, “Cicero says in his books on the nature of the gods that there are many gods named Mercury, but in an account of the gods one has to follow *fabulae*, since the truth is not known.” In other situations there is disagreement about what the truth is, as with the origin of mankind in a note at *Aeneid* 1.743: *si fabulam respicis, a Prometheo intellege, vel a Deucalione et Pyrrha; si autem veritatem requiris, igni, alii de atomis, alii de quattuor elementis*, “If you seek the *fabula*, understand that [people came from] Prometheus, or from Deucalion and Pyrrha. But if you seek the truth, [they came from] fire, and others say from atoms, and others from the four elements.”<sup>1071</sup> Thus, Servius has at least a provisional system of classification for things from the past (whether they happened or not), and any treatment of his historical/mythological outlook must take this into account.

<sup>1068</sup> A *fabula* can certainly contain hints of *historia* without being *historia* itself (e.g., *Aen.* 10.91).

<sup>1069</sup> *Aen.* 1.568

<sup>1070</sup> *Aen.* 8.190; cf. *Aen.* 1.619 (DS), 6.16

<sup>1071</sup> As will be evident below, *veritas* is also repeatedly contrasted with praise (*Aen.* 1.380; *Ecl.* 1.70; *G.* 1.24). The division is nicely summed up at *Aeneid* 12.25: *aspera sunt quae cum veritate dicuntur; falsa enim plena solent esse blanditiis*, “Things that are said in truth are harsh, for false things are usually full of flattery.”

*Rhetoric*

Having briefly summarized the categorical divisions of knowledge that are less important to the central questions of my investigation—as unfair as it is to leave behind such a wealth of information—I will proceed to highlight in more detail the following topics: rhetoric, poetic genres, the criteria for aesthetic assessment, literary/ biographical information about Vergil himself, and the evidence for scholarly rivalry in Servius and DS.

The treatment of rhetoric in Servius and DS is impressively broad in both theory and practice, as I have used the terms to denote discussions of conceptual rhetorical terminology and how rhetorical principles play out in actual speeches. This is demonstrated perhaps most clearly in the vast array of rhetorical figures that are listed, some of which would be familiar to my readers and some of which would not. I will not attempt a systematic summary of all of these, but let me make two important observations. The first is that almost all of these are Greek terms, another factor for us to consider later when we discuss the role of Greek language and scholarly tradition on the Vergilian commentaries. The second is that there is a definite push in some places for an education in rhetorical terminology. While often a note in Donatus or the Bembine scholia to Terence would include a rhetorical figure without much explanation, Servius and DS both offer more help for the beginner, and especially at the first instance of a term. Take the use of *syncope*, for example, at *Aeneid* 1.26: <repostum> *autem syncope est; unam enim de medio syllabam tulit*, “*repostum* is syncope, for he removed one syllable from the middle [i.e., of *repositum*].” While the term is not formally defined, there is enough help to understand what must be meant from the example. The same is true for *aphaeresis*, which DS describes as the loss of the first syllable of a word.<sup>1072</sup> The best example I know, however, is Servius’ treatment of *hypallage*. The term is first mentioned at *Aeneid* 1.9, where a definition is given: *est figura hypallage, quae fit quotienscumque per contrarium verba intelleguntur. sic alibi [Aen. 3.61] ‘dare classibus austros,’ cum ventis naves*

<sup>1072</sup> <temnitis> *pro contempnitis* [sic] *per aphaeresin dictum, quae est cum prima verbi syllaba detrahitur* (*Aen.* 1.542); cf. the treatment of *antiptosis* (*Aen.* 1.120) and *hysterologia* (*Aen.* 1.307).

*demus, non navibus ventos*, “This is the figure of *hypallage*, which happens whenever words are understood in an opposite way [to how they are presented]. So elsewhere with *dare classibus austros*, since we give ships to the winds, not winds to the ships.” What is especially intriguing is that there are similar notes at *Aeneid* 1.392 and then again at *Aeneid* 2.361, both with a notice of *hypallage* in the original text and with a further citation of *Aeneid* 3.61 as an additional example. When we finally get to that passage, Servius confirms again that *dare classibus austros* is indeed *hypallage*. Thus, not only have Servius’ readers been given a definition of the term up front, but they have been groomed multiple times to read *dare classibus austros* comfortably when it appears. Has Servius done this on purpose, or did he provide the example in multiple passages simply because he forgot that he had already provided it? A confident answer would need to take into account his treatment of other such terms and his general patterns of cross-referencing, but whatever it is, Servius shows a clear sympathy toward readers who might not have a clear picture of the entire system of rhetorical figures.

As in the Terentian commentaries, here again the scholia discuss the taxonomy of various types and arrangements of speeches. One of the most prominent is the tripartite division of *genera dicendi*, or registers of speaking, from the prefaces to the *Aeneid* and *Eclogues*: *humilis, medius, grandiloquus*. Servius and DS also include various technical forms of argumentation: Venus’ injunction to Amor to take on the appearance of Ascanius is accompanied by an *argumentum a facili* where she says *tu faciem illius noctem non amplius unam / falle dolo et notos pueri puer indue vultus*, “Take on his [Ascanius’] appearance by a trick for no more than a night, and you, a boy, put on the familiar visage of a boy.” The “argument on the basis of ease” is encapsulated in *pueri puer*—that is, you are a boy yourself, so it should be easy for you to do this.<sup>1073</sup> Elsewhere Alpheisiboeus states that songs are able to bring down the moon from the sky and that Circe used songs to transform Ulysses’ men and that a chilly serpent is ruptured in the meadows by singing.<sup>1074</sup> Servius calls this an *argumentum a maiore ad minus* (what we would call an

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<sup>1073</sup> *Aen.* 1.684

<sup>1074</sup> *carmina vel caelo possunt deducere lunam, / carminibus Circe socios mutavit Ulixi, / frigidus in pratis cantando rumpitur anguis* (*Ecl.* 8.69ff.).

*a fortiori* argument) and adds: *si haec possunt facere carmina, cur non etiam facilia impleant?* “If songs can do these things, why can they not achieve easy things too?”

Other types of taxonomy include the divisions and protocols of various types of speeches. A *petitio*, for example, should observe the following in accordance with the art of rhetoric: that the person being petitioned be permitted to have precedence, that the request be a feasible one, that the thing asked for be on the side of justice, that the petition be within the bounds of moderation, and that payment follow a granted request.<sup>1075</sup> Vergil is also said to have appended an *epilogos* to each of the first six books of the *Aeneid* in the manner of *controversiae*, with each one ending in some event that inspires *pathos*.<sup>1076</sup> An example from *Aeneid* 9 also shows an interest in oratorical taxonomy, and this in particular is an illuminating one for modern scholars to consider. It would seem that the Nisus and Euryalus episode, commonly regarded as one of the most moving parts of the *Aeneid*, is appreciated mostly for its pathetic appeal, and the plea of Euryalus’ mother to be allowed to die adds significantly to the force of Vergil’s depiction. Perhaps Servius’ note catches us off guard, then, when he states that her speech is finely crafted: *et est conquestio matris Euryali plena artis rhetoricae: nam paene omnes partes habet de misericordia commovenda a Cicerone in rhetoricis positas*, “And the lamentation of Euryalus’ mother is full of the art of rhetoric, for it has almost all the parts contained by Cicero in his rhetorical writings on the moving of pity.”<sup>1077</sup> Does the emotional appeal of this poor mother’s wailing lose any of its effect because of its technical proficiency? However that may be, let this stand as an important reminder that our own interpretive emphases may be much different from that of our ancient counterparts.

I conclude this section on rhetoric with a glance at some effective uses of speech as judged by the commentators, passages that treat the subject of rhetoric without engaging in official taxonomy. Venus’ approach in requesting help from Jupiter in the first book of the *Aeneid*, for example, is properly done.

When she asks Jupiter what has changed his mind (*quae te, genitor, sentential vertit*), she modestly

<sup>1075</sup> *Aen.* 1.65 (Juno’s request to Aeolus); cf. the short description of an encomiastic speech at *Aeneid* 2.136.

<sup>1076</sup> *Aen.* 3.718

<sup>1077</sup> *Aen.* 9.479; see also *Aeneid* 4.284, where Servius states that an *exordium* has two parts, one at the beginning of a speech, and one at the end, “as we have read in rhetorical works” (*sicut in rhetoricis legimus*). What these rhetorical works are remains uncertain, though perhaps the note to *Aeneid* 9.479 sheds some light on this.



avoids bringing up Juno directly in the presence of her husband: *verecunde agit Venus; nec enim conveniebat ut aperte contra uxorem ageret apud maritum.*<sup>1078</sup> A few lines later, when she mentions that Antenor was allowed to settle safely while Aeneas is still denied a home, Servius has this to say: *<et genti nomen dedit> hoc est quod ne victori quidem concedetur Aeneae; quod scimus a Iunone esse perfectum, contra quam oblique loquitur propter considerationem mariti*, “That is, a thing not even granted to Aeneas the victor, which we know was accomplished by Juno, against whom Venus speaks obliquely out of consideration for her husband.”<sup>1079</sup> Venus is at it again when Juno comes to her with the proposal for joining the Carthaginians and Trojans, saying that she could never refuse such an offer, but at the same time adding that the fate of the situation is still uncertain (*sed fatis incerta feror*). DS remarks: *sane oratorie et blanditur et pugnat, sed non palam, dicendo incertam se esse de voluntate fatorum*, “Clearly in rhetorical fashion she both flatters and opposes, but not openly, by saying that she is uncertain about the will of the fates.”<sup>1080</sup> Vergil himself receives such a comment at *Eclogues* 4.18, where his praise of Varus’ son Saloninus is done “rhetorically.” Here Vergil is careful not to use overly lavish praise for an infant, instead suggesting that his glory grows steadily with his age: *rhetorice digesta laudatio: non enim improvide in principio universa consumpsit, sed paulatim fecit laudem cum aetate procedure.*<sup>1081</sup>

Other passages show rhetorical techniques that are deemed especially effective. When Aeneas famously ends his speech to Dido with the half-line *Italiam non sponte sequor*, DS reports that he stopped there in oratorical fashion, in the place where the force of his argument consists: *et oratorie ibi finivit, ubi vis argumenti constitit.*<sup>1082</sup> Aeneas is also credited with a fair piece of speechmaking as he addresses his men at the start of *Aeneid* 11, particularly in the way he tells his men to honor the fallen: *ite, ait, egregias animas quae sanguine nobis / hanc patriam peperere suo, decorate supremis / muneribus*, “Go, he says,

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<sup>1078</sup> *Aen.* 1.237

<sup>1079</sup> *Aen.* 1.248

<sup>1080</sup> *Aen.* 4.110 (DS)

<sup>1081</sup> Cf. the similar treatment of *nascentem poetam* (*Ecl.* 7.25)

<sup>1082</sup> *Aen.* 4.361 (DS); this is a particularly intriguing example for what it might suggest for the scholiastic interpretation of half-lines in general. Has the commentator, like some modern scholars, attempted to find purpose behind the unfinished (complete?) verse? Further study on this is due.

adorn with the highest honors the noble souls who have acquired this fatherland for us by their blood.”<sup>1083</sup>

DS likes this approach: *eleganter hoc et oratorie ad exhortationem audientium sumptum est: nam laus defunctorum viventium exhortatio est*, “This was addressed elegantly and in oratorical fashion for the encouragement of his audience, for the praise of the dead is the exhortation of the living.”<sup>1084</sup> Finally, Vergil again gets a favorable nod, this time from Servius, for his sleight of hand at the start of *Georgics* 4: *rhetorice dicturus de minoribus rebus magna promittit, ut et levem materiam sublevet et attentum faciat auditorem*, “About to speak of smaller matters, he rhetorically promises great things, so that he might elevate his trivial material and make his audience attentive.”<sup>1085</sup> Vergil’s characters, then, are not the only ones who will dip into the bag of rhetorical tricks to get what they want.

### *Ars Poetica*

Servius and DS address the topic of poetry more thoroughly than we have seen thus far in any of the other scholiastic corpora. There were suggestions in the Euripidean commentaries that poets were given some leeway in style and content simply on the grounds that they were producing poetry, and Terence too received such treatment, but the Vergilian commentaries are significantly richer in this respect. One immediately obvious difference is that Servius and DS have and frequently use a term for what they are describing: the *ars poetica*.<sup>1086</sup> This poetic art is defined in large part by flexibility in grammar, mythology, history, and other areas, but it also encompasses certain stylistic and structural tendencies, which are both exemplified by individual passages and also stated as general principles.

A starting point for the discussion of the poetic art in Servius is its most pervasive feature, *poetica licentia*. Poets are allowed to say things that are irregular and even blatantly wrong, a flexibility that is

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<sup>1083</sup> *Aen.* 11.24ff.

<sup>1084</sup> Note the similar comment at *Aeneid* 11.24.

<sup>1085</sup> Cf. *G.* 3.305

<sup>1086</sup> The scholia to Terence contain this term a few times, but not with the treatment that it receives for Vergil.

taken for granted, but which cannot be pressed too far, as we shall see. This license manifests itself in a variety of categories throughout Servius and DS—in fact, in all the categories I specified above as central to an understanding of Vergil. One of the most obvious examples of *licentia* surfaces in issues of grammar. “Poets often use antiptosis” (the exchange of grammatical case), Servius says, as in *urbem quam statuo vestra est*, where we would expect *urbs* as the nominative subject of *est*.<sup>1087</sup> It is also permitted for poets to use a noun where one would normally need an adverb or participle, as Vergil has done with the phrase *manibus aequis*.<sup>1088</sup> There are also Graecisms that are allowed for poets, such as the use of an infinitive with the verb *dare*, as at *Aeneid* 5.248 (*vinaque et argenti magnum dat ferre talentum*): *Graecum est duo verba coniungere, ut Paulo post ‘donat habere viro.’ sed hoc datur poetis*. The same is true for the inversion of tenses: *<excussisse deum> pro ‘excutere,’ tempus pro tempore. est autem Attica figura, qua nos uti non convenit, quia hac licenter utuntur poetae*, “He uses *excussisse* for *excutere*, tense for tense; and it is an Attic figure, which it is not fitting for us to use, since poets use this by license.”<sup>1089</sup> Lastly, the sort of conjunction- and preposition-switching that is so frequent in the Greek scholia for both Euripides and Aeschines (e.g., δέ for γάρ, πρό for ἀνά) is said by Servius to be a feature of poetry: *poetarum est partem pro parte ponere, ut torvum pro torve, volventibus pro volubilibus: coniunctionem ergo pro coniunctione posuit, ut ‘saxum ingens volvunt alii radiisque rotarum,’ ‘que’ pro ‘ve’ posuit; nam sonantius visum est*.<sup>1090</sup>

Poets are also given extra leash when it comes to lexical propriety. Such an allowance may be guessed from the commentator’s lack of explicit criticism in all the many passages in which Vergil is said to bend the lexical rules, for which we saw examples above, but in any case there is also explicit pardon granted. It is not exactly with chains and a prison (*vinclis et carcere*) that Aeolus restrains the winds, for

<sup>1087</sup> *Aen.* 1.120; for the tendency of poets to vary declensional endings, see *Aeneid* 1.191.

<sup>1088</sup> *Aen.* 11.861 (DS); it is not entirely clear what the commentator means, but presumably *aequis* would normally be either *aequaliter* or *aequantibus* (cf. *Aen.* 1.415 [DS], 10.740).

<sup>1089</sup> *Aen.* 6.79

<sup>1090</sup> *Aen.* 2.37; the stylistic comment at the end makes this statement even more interesting, since it suggests that there are or at least can be reasons behind *licentia* that go further than “because he can.”

example, but the metaphor gets a pass: *translatio est per poeticam licentiam facta*.<sup>1091</sup> Further, it is by poetic custom that Vergil uses *regina* as if it were *filia regis* to describe Ilia at *Aeneid* 1.273, with an additional quotation of *Aeneid* 6.28 to show the same treatment of Pasiphae. Servius also says that poets conflate *totus* and *omnis*,<sup>1092</sup> as well as a cluster of similar-sounding nouns: *iuventus est multitudo iuvenum, Iuventas dea ipsa, sicut Libertas, iuventa vero aetas; sed haec a poetis confunduntur plerumque*.<sup>1093</sup>

Factual information from geography and other scientific pursuits is also muddled at times. Poets are particularly known for mixing up the names of cities and regions, as when the name Troy, technically a region in Asia, is used to describe the city that is more properly known as Ilium.<sup>1094</sup> Vergil is also said to be making up his own location when he speaks of the cove where Aeneas goes ashore onto Libya: *topothesia est, id est fictus secundum poeticam licentiam locus*.<sup>1095</sup> Other areas of scientific fact-bending include botany—some take Vergil’s *alnos* as *populos*, in accordance with poetic practice<sup>1096</sup>—and astronomy—Sirius is used in place of the sun by the poets.<sup>1097</sup> Let it be remembered, however, that *poetica licentia* and scientific accuracy may go hand in hand, as in the previously mentioned note at *Aeneid* 1.142, where the mythological depiction of Neptune calming the waves is done according to poetic license, but also touches on physical truth, since Neptune himself was equated with the sea.

This sort of flexibility also applies to the concepts of *historia* and *fabula*—both of which are defined not on the basis of actual occurrence, but on plausibility. It is stated outright by Servius that poets frequently change *fabulae*, as in the case of Vergil’s and Horace’s accounts of Hippolytus, specifically whether he was freed from the infernal realms.<sup>1098</sup> Later in *Eclogues* 6, Servius is confused about

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<sup>1091</sup> *Aen.* 1.54; Servius also gives forewarning here that, as we saw above, Vergil will technically misuse the singular *carcere* at *Aeneid* 5.145.

<sup>1092</sup> *Aen.* 1.185; for an example, see *Aeneid* 11.834.

<sup>1093</sup> *Aen.* 1.590; see also *Aeneid* 7.47, where Vergil is said to exchange words that sound alike.

<sup>1094</sup> *Aen.* 1.1; cf. *Aen.* 1.273. Two more notes at *Aeneid* 1.235 and 1.292 make it clear that this fuzziness with names applies to other proper nouns too, not just geographical features.

<sup>1095</sup> *Aen.* 1.159; that the poetic invention is actually assigned a technical name encourages the reader to view this as an established poetic feature.

<sup>1096</sup> *Aen.* 6.62

<sup>1097</sup> *Aen.* 4.424

<sup>1098</sup> *Aen.* 6.617

Vergil's reference to "Scylla, daughter of Nisus" instead of the daughter of Phorcus.<sup>1099</sup> There are several possible solutions to this dilemma in his mind, but one concerns mythological *licentia*:

*modo ergo Vergilius aut poetarum more miscuit fabulas et nomen posuit pro nomine, ut diceret Scyllam Nisi' pro 'Phorci'—sicut alibi 'domitus Pollucis habenis Cyllarus,' cum Castor equorum domitor fuerit; item 'et manibus Procne pectus signata cruentis,' cum Philomelae, non Procnes, abscisa sit lingua.*<sup>1100</sup>

Now therefore one possibility is that Vergil mixed the stories according to the custom of the poets and substituted a name for a name, so that he should say "Scylla, daughter of Nisus," instead of "daughter of Phocis," just as elsewhere he says, "Cyllarus, mastered by the reins of Pollux," when Castor was the master of the horses. Likewise he says, "And Procne, her breast marked by her bloody hands," when it was Philomela's tongue, not Procne's, that was cut out.

Furthermore, like Neptune's calming of the sea, in which Servius detected a touch of scientific truth along with poetic invention, we have seen examples of how *fabula* can be combined with *historia* in Vergil, such as the transformation of Cacus from thieving slave to fire-breathing monster. I will point out here that this phenomenon is also referred to at *Aeneid* 1.52 as a tendency of poets: *unde et Vergilius ait 'Aeoliam Liparen.' poetae quidem fingunt hunc regem esse ventorum, sed ut Varro dicit, rex fuit insularum, ex quarum nebulis et fumo Vulcaniae insulae praedicens futura flabra ventorum inperitis visus est ventos sua potestate retinere*, "This is why Vergil says 'Aeolian Lipare.' Indeed, poets portray this man as king of the winds, but as Varro says, he was king of some islands from which, predicting the future gusts of the winds from the clouds and smoke of Vulcan's island, he seemed to the unlearned to hold the winds in his power." It must also be attributed to the poetic art that Evander praises Hercules for his successful labors, including his victory over Centaurs and his courage in the face of Typhoeus and other terrifying evils during his stint in the underworld, because the chronology does not fit: *et hoc poetice; nam si interemit Centauros, quemadmodum etiam Gigantum interfuit proelio, qui ante innumeros annos fuisse dicuntur?*<sup>1101</sup> Finally, a note to *Aeneid* 1.382 contains an interesting assertion regarding the poet's use of *historia*: not only is it part of *poetica licentia* to manipulate historical details,

<sup>1099</sup> *Ecl.* 6.74

<sup>1100</sup> It will be observed that Servius is perhaps a little demanding in his assumption that Pollux could not steer horses too. In any case, note that these examples are given at *Aeneid* 1.235 for another *nomen pro nomine* substitution.

<sup>1101</sup> *Aen.* 8.298; cf. *Aen.* 10.526

but an author is even prohibited by the *ars poetica* from presenting *historia* openly: *quod autem diximus eum poetica arte prohiberi, ne aperte ponat historiam, certum est*. I will revisit this principle when I discuss the aesthetic principles evident in the Vergilian commentaries, but suffice it to say for now that it is both expected and required for poets to alter the past.

As in the scholia to other authors, metrical concerns in the Vergilian commentaries are limited to a technical discussion of a few principles without any appreciable treatment of a poet's metrical arrangement as a conscious form of art, even for such lovely examples as *Aeneid* 5.136-41, with its spondaic tension immediately before the ship race followed by quick dactylic lines as the oars leap into motion, or the rhythmic galloping of *Aeneid* 8.596 (*quadripedante putrem sonitu quatit ungula campum*).<sup>1102</sup> Even so, we learn in a number of passages that the demand of meter is partly the reason for *poetica licentia*. Servius draws a distinction between *apparere* ("appear") and *parere* ("obey"), for example, stating that the difference is to be observed carefully, but that authors are off the hook: *et haec observatio diligenter custodiri debet, licet eam auctores metri causa plerumque corrumpant*.<sup>1103</sup> It is also for the sake of meter that poets change the long final syllable of *honor*, *arbor*, and *lepor* into a short one (*honos*, *arbos*, *lepos*).<sup>1104</sup> In the same way *conticuere* is used in place of *conticuerunt* for metrical reasons,<sup>1105</sup> and the *ille* of *Aeneid* 4.457 is said to be superfluous in meaning, but is included anyway *metri causa*. As in other examples just above, Servius also comes out with a general rule from time to time in addition to his isolation of individual instances of *licentia*, and so it is at *Aeneid* 1.587, where he states that irregularity (*usurpatio*) is something that poets use for the sake of meter, and throughout the commentaries it is clear that this phenomenon is part of the *poetica consuetudo*.<sup>1106</sup>

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<sup>1102</sup> But note the comparison between Theocritean and Vergilian metrical tendencies in the preface to the *Eclogues* (28ff.). This brief discussion takes at least some perspective on broader metrical features of a work, as opposed to remarks on individual verses only.

<sup>1103</sup> *Aen.* 1.118; note the importance of this comment and others like it for understanding Servius' role as a teacher of good grammar.

<sup>1104</sup> *Aen.* 1.253

<sup>1105</sup> *Aen.* 2.1

<sup>1106</sup> For other examples: *Aen.* 3.418, 8.155, 10.394, 10.677.

I mention here a few other passages that show *poetica licentia* in action for other types of statements. Vergil is allowed a bit of leeway, for instance, when he says at *Aeneid* 10.815f.: *validum namque exigit ensem / per medium Aeneas iuvenem totumque recondit*, “For Aeneas forced the stout sword through the young man’s middle and buried it completely therein.” Servius explains: *poetica descriptio est: nam re vera fieri non potuit, ut gladius et transiret per corpus iuvenis, et in corpore iuvenis absconderetur*. A poet is also given freedom to play around with different philosophical standpoints. For this subcategory the principal comment comes at *Aeneid* 10.467, where Servius responds to the statement that every man has his destined day (*stat sua cuique dies*):

*sectis philosophorum poetae pro qualitate negotiorum semper utuntur, nec se umquam ad unam alligant nisi quorum hoc propositum est, ut fecit Lucretius, qui Epicureos tantum secutus est. scimus autem inter se sectas esse contrarias: unde fit ut in uno poeta aliqua contraria inveniamus, non ex ipsius vitio, sed ex varietate sectarum.*

Poets always use philosophical schools in accordance with the quality of the material at hand, and they never bind themselves to one school unless this is part of their proposed task, as Lucretius does, who followed only Epicurean philosophers. And we know that the schools differ amongst themselves, from which it results that in one poet we find certain contradictions, not by the fault of the poet himself, but from the variety of schools.

A specific instance of this phenomenon had appeared early in the *Aeneid*, where Servius makes it clear that philosophical back-and-forths are one of the allowances made under the umbrella of poetic license: Venus comes to Jupiter as he looks down with a troubled heart at the affairs of mortals at *Aeneid* 1.227. Servius remarks that this is a Stoic outlook, but that Vergil elsewhere adopts an Epicurean stance: *<iactantem pectore curas> nunc secundum Stoicos loquitur, qui deos dicunt humana curare, interdum secundum Epicureos, poetica utens licentia*. DS takes a similar stand at *Georgics* 4.219, where it is affirmed that Vergil is offering general philosophical sentiments and should not be pinned down to one particular school of thought.

As an epilogue to my investigation of *licentia*, let me point out that the poetic flexibility shown in the notes above is explicitly contrasted with prose style in a number of passages—the first instances of such a formal comparison in the scholia that I have presented thus far. Take, for example, the poetic tendency to use the *nomen pro adverbio* substitution, as in the use of *infandum* for *infande* at *Aeneid*

1.251 (where Servius also cites the aforementioned *torvum-torve* example), which is said to be a poetic figure that is rarely or never used in prose: *magis autem poetica est, in prosa aut rara aut numquam*. Vergil can also use *relliquias* for the purpose of meter where in prose “we” use one “l”: *<relliquias> ut stet versus geminavit ‘l,’ nam in prosa reliquias dicimus*. In addition, Vergil uses *hordea* for the sake of meter where in prose “we” are able to use the singular *hordeum* only, a principle that also applies to *triticum*, *vinum*, and *mel*.<sup>1107</sup> Let it be noted, however, that Servius also mentions exceptions. Indeed, despite the prosaic exclusion just mentioned, one can use *vina* in the plural by the example of Cicero, who is also cited to show that the use of *mage* for *magis*, originally a substitution for the sake of meter, had become so common in normal usage that it was permitted also in prose.<sup>1108</sup> The same is true for *virum* as a contraction of *virorum*, though Pliny is said to dislike the contraction altogether unless the necessity of meter demands it.<sup>1109</sup> We should understand Servius’ concept of *poetica licentia*, therefore, to have a dynamic relationship with common usage: poetry has special allowance for flexibility in many areas, but where an authority like Cicero adopts such license in prose, we ourselves have permission to imitate him, a principle I will return to later.

So much for *poetica licentia*. What then are the other characteristics of the *ars poetica* in the Vergilian commentaries? A few comments speak of tendencies to use certain structures or arrangements that are “poetic.” Such is the discussion in Servius’ preface to the *Aeneid*, where the order of the books comes under criticism. In response to those who would say that the second and third books are actually the first and second, since they deal with events that are chronologically antecedent to those of the first book, Servius remarks that such assertions demonstrate an ignorance of the *ars poetica*:

. . . *nescientes hanc esse artem poeticam, ut a mediis incipientes per narrationem prima reddamus et non numquam futura praeoccupemus, ut per vaticinationem: quod etiam Horatius sic praecepit in arte poetica ‘ut iam nunc dicat iam nunc debentia dici, pleraque differat et praesens in tempus omittat’; unde constat perite fecisse Vergilium.*<sup>1110</sup>

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<sup>1107</sup> *Ecl.* 5.36; note also that, although I have not spent any time discussing Servius’ commentary on the *Ars* of Donatus, there is a corresponding formulation of the poetry-prose distinction for *metaplasmus* (444.8): *praeterea si in prosa oratione fiat, tunc barbarismus dicitur; si autem in poemate, metaplasmus vocatur*.

<sup>1108</sup> *Aen.* 10.481

<sup>1109</sup> *Aen.* 2.18

<sup>1110</sup> *Aen. praef.* 80



[They do this] not knowing that this is the art of poetry, namely that beginning in the middle we recount the first events through [internal] narration and sometimes foreshadow future events, as through prophecy. Horace also teaches this in his *Ars Poetica*: “[It is characteristic of good *ordo*] that one now say and now put off many things that ought to be said, omitting them for the present time.” From this it is agreed that Vergil has made [this arrangement] skillfully.

It is therefore a special characteristic of poetry to portray at least some events in a way that differs from their normal chronological order. It is also “poetic” to have three parts to an introduction, as the opening of the *Aeneid* does: *et est poeticum principium professivum ‘arma virumque cano,’ invocativum ‘Musa mihi causas memora,’ narrativum ‘urbs antiqua fuit,’* “And there is a poetic introduction: a profession (“I sing of arms and the man”), an invocation (“Muse, recount to me the causes”), and a narration (“There was an ancient city”).<sup>1111</sup> Servius communicates the same idea in different language a little later at *Aeneid* 1.8: *in tres partes dividunt poetae carmen suum: proponunt, invocant, narrant.* Poets then have a freedom to do many things that prose writers cannot, but even so there is a set pattern that they are expected to follow for certain things, especially at the outset of a poem.

A few other specific poetic patterns are observable throughout the commentaries to Vergil. Poets have a tendency to mention lightning almost every time they speak the name of Jupiter (*poetarum autem consuetudo est prope semper cum Iovem nominaverint et fulmen adiungere*),<sup>1112</sup> and lightning itself is portrayed as winged, just like the winds.<sup>1113</sup> They also tend to attribute to divinities the characteristics of the physical elements over which they preside, as in the case of Neptune and the sea.<sup>1114</sup> In similar fashion it is *phantasia poetica* to give sense/ emotion to inanimate things, as the marveling Gargara at *Georgics* 1.103. It is also a poetic custom to talk about the sky as “closed” at night and “open” during the day.<sup>1115</sup> Poetic description like this can be a little loose at times, as when Vergil compares Dido and company to Diana and her retinue, two groups that are not exactly alike: *hoc non ad conparationem pertinet, sed est poeticae descriptionis evagatio.* DS adds an explanation to the note: *quia chori nec*

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<sup>1111</sup> *Aen.* 1.1

<sup>1112</sup> *Aen.* 1.230 (DS)

<sup>1113</sup> *Aen.* 5.319

<sup>1114</sup> *Aen.* 1.254

<sup>1115</sup> *Aen.* 1.374; cf. *Aen.* 10.1

*personis hic nec locis congruunt; saltantium enim et cantantium dicuntur*, “ [This is] because since the two choruses are not similar in their characters or locations, for they [i.e., those of Diana] are said to be leaping and singing.”<sup>1116</sup> Further, poets love circumlocution, as in phrases such as *urbem Troianam* and *arcem Buthroti*.<sup>1117</sup>

A similar technique appears under the name *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, which signifies the naming of a category of things or people by the chief representative of that category, as when Eridanus is taken by some to refer to rivers in general as their “king.”<sup>1118</sup> At this passage Servius states that poets love this sort of “naming by the greater” figure: *et amant poetae pro appellatione ponere magnae rei proprietatem* (with a citation of *poculaque inventis Acheloia miscuit uvis* from *Georgics* 1.9, where a note from DS identifies the same principle). This phenomenon is visible again at *Aeneid* 11.3, where Aeneas’ mind is said to be *turbata funere*, where the singular referring to the funeral of Pallas is pulled out for emphasis and used as a representative for all those who died fighting for Aeneas.<sup>1119</sup> Moreover, poets often employ morphology from the ancients for the sake of euphony, as in the use of *fluvius* at *Aeneid* 8.77, where Servius says that *fluvie* (otherwise not attested) would be expected for a vocative. And finally, poets often have purpose behind the types of wounds they describe in battle scenes: *<perque caput Remuli venit> figmenta haec vulnerum plerumque non sine ratione ponunt poetae: nam modo hunc ideo in capite dicit esse percussum, quia eum supra vaniloquum introduxerat et superbum: quod vitio capitis evenit*, “It is often not without reason that poets fashion these types of wounds, for now he says that he was struck on the head because he had previously brought him into the scene vainglorious and arrogant, which occurs by a defect in the head.”<sup>1120</sup>

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<sup>1116</sup> *Aen.* 1.499

<sup>1117</sup> *Aen.* 1.244; cf. *Aen.* 1.252, where Servius says that it is a custom of all poets to say things a bit fuzzily at first and then to clarify what is meant.

<sup>1118</sup> *Aen.* 6.659; this can work both ways, as *urbs* can be used to refer to *Roma* (*Aen.* 3.159), i.e., a general noun standing for a specific one. The same principle applies for authors: *poeta* means Vergil unless otherwise stated (*Aen.* 2.556), and by default *orator* means Cicero (*Aen.* 1.258); cf. Quintilian (10.1.112).

<sup>1119</sup> Note that here also Servius says that it is a practice among poets to separate leaders from their peoples, as in the phrase *reliquias Danaum atque inmitis Achilli*, a quotation from *Aeneid* 1.30.

<sup>1120</sup> *Aen.* 9.630

### *Genre Rules*

The commentaries from Servius and DS treat three genres of poetry from a single author in what is clearly meant to be a continuous commentary. This affords us a unique opportunity to examine the question of genre in a controlled setting, where the other variables (e.g., the identity of the commentator) are consistent. What are the expectations for each genre, and how carefully demarcated are those genres? Do any central exegetical principles change with a transition from one genre to the next? We have spent some time working on the definition of poetry as outlined by Servius and DS; are there further specifications to be made? Here also I will mention an evident distinction between Servius and DS, namely that the latter demonstrates more reliance on sources that are picky when it comes to whether Vergil sticks to the demands of the genre—but more on that later.

In terms of a theory of genre, one of the most important terms contained in the commentaries is *character*, but, as Servius might say, *polysemus sermo est*. There are at least three ways in which this crucial term is used, each with a varying level of importance for the question of genre as I will lay it out. The first is the most straightforward and of least concern for differentiating between genres, since it in fact varies freely across genres. This is first described in full at the opening to *Eclogues* 3:

*novimus autem tres characteres hos esse dicendi: unum, in quo tantum poeta loquitur [i.e., διηγητικόν], ut est in tribus libris georgicorum; alium dramaticum, in quo nusquam poeta loquitur [i.e., μιμητικόν], ut est in comoediis et tragoediis; tertium, mixtum, ut est in Aeneide: nam et poeta illic et introductae personae loquuntur. hos autem omnes characteres in bucolico esse convenit carmine, sicut liber etiam iste demonstrat.*

And we know that there are these three styles of speaking: one, in which only the poet speaks, as in three [of the four] books of the *Georgics*. The second is dramatic, in which the poet does not speak anywhere, as in comedies and tragedies. The third is mixed, as in the *Aeneid*, for both the poet and the characters he introduces speak there. And it is fitting for all these styles to be present in bucolic song, just as that book itself also shows.

Servius goes on to give examples of how the various *Eclogues* exemplify these styles. This tripartite distinction is important for how the ancients classified poetry, but one can see from Servius' description that it aligns only loosely with different genres in some cases and so is not a useful criterion for

distinguishing between them. It is also true that this topic is treated very little in the commentaries elsewhere, and I include only the example from *Aeneid* 11.715 (DS): *subito, ut solet, ad characterem dramaticum transit: neque enim ostendit Camillam loqui coepisse*, “Suddenly, as he is accustomed to do, he passes into the dramatic style, for he did not show that Camilla had begun to speak.” The affirmation that these are indeed Camilla’s words comes only after her speech a few verses later (*haec fatur virgo*). As for our discussion of genre, this proves only that what Servius says about the mixed nature of the *Aeneid* was true.

The second kind of *character* seems to refer to the distinction between poetry and history, but there is very little evidence whereby we can assess this usage properly. DS states at *Aeneid* 11.597 that Vergil’s entire description of the battle scene mixes a historical style with a poetic one: *in tota hac descriptione historicum characterem poetico miscet*. There is no further discussion of what this means—perhaps we have been robbed through the selection process of whatever explanation existed for this topic in a previous note from the source of DS, or perhaps there was no such explanation. Other passages do not offer much substantive help. Servius says at *Aeneid* 1.382 that Lucan is more historian than poet: *Lucanus namque ideo in numero poetarum esse non meruit, quia videtur historiam composuisse, non poema*. This is a remarkably vague and subjective assessment, though it does tell us that Servius views the distinction between poet and historian as negotiable and that meter alone is not enough to say whether one is or is not a poet or historian. The final piece of evidence is more tantalizing than it is rewarding. Servius says that *confugere* at *Aeneid* 8.493 (*confugere et Turni defendier hospitis armis*) is equivalent to *confugiebat* and that the style here is historical: *<confugere> confugiebat: et ut diximus, historicus stilus*. What he means to point out, presumably, is that the “historical infinitives” *confugere* and the syntactically parallel *defendier* are considered a feature of historical writing, but the exact way in which *character* pertains to genre here is obscure.<sup>1121</sup>

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<sup>1121</sup> It does not help, then, to look for an answer to this question in Servius and DS, though perhaps the problem could be solved by understanding the principles of *historia* from other scholastic writing. The question remains open.

The last division of *characteres*, which is the most fully discussed and the most critical for the question of poetic genres, is found in the preface to the *Eclogues*:

*qualitas autem haec est, scilicet humilis character. tres enim sunt characteres, humilis, medius, grandiloquus: quos omnes in hoc invenimus poeta. nam in Aeneide grandiloquum habet, in Georgicis medium, in Bucolicis humilem pro qualitate negotiorum et personarum: nam personae hic rusticae sunt, simplicitate gaudentes, a quibus nihil altum debet requiri.*<sup>1122</sup>

The quality [of the *Eclogues*] is this, to be sure a low style. For there are three styles: low, middle, and grand, all of which we find in this poet. For in the *Aeneid* he has the grand style, in the *Georgics* the middle, and in the *Eclogues* the low in accordance with the quality of the affairs and characters. For here the characters are rustic, rejoicing in simplicity, from whom nothing lofty should be required.

The term *character* here seems to indicate style, as suggested by a parallel categorization that Servius had introduced in his preface to the *Aeneid*, where he uses the term *stilus* instead:

*qualitas carminis patet; nam est metrum heroicum et actus mixtus, ubi et poeta loquitur et alios inducit loquentes. est autem heroicum quod constat ex divinis humanisque personis, continens vera cum fictis; nam Aeneam ad Italiam venisse manifestum est, Venerem vero locutam cum Iove missumve Mercurium constat esse compositum. est autem stilus grandiloquus, qui constat alto sermone magnisque sententiis. scimus enim tria esse genera dicendi, humile medium grandiloquum.*<sup>1123</sup>

The quality of the song is evident, for it is in the heroic meter and has mixed action, where the poet both speaks and brings in other speaking characters. And that which is “heroic” consists of divine and human characters, mixing true things with made-up things. For it is clear that Aeneas went to Italy, but it is agreed that the stories of Venus speaking with Jupiter or Mercury being sent are made up. And the style is grand, which consists of lofty speech and great *sententiae*; for we know that there are three types of speaking: low, middle, and grand.”

The “middle” style gets no special attention, but it may be assumed that it will find itself somewhere between the elevated discourse and powerful ideas of the *Aeneid* and the plain style of the *Eclogues*. In what follows I wish to test the extent to which Servius and DS demand consistency in this matter, and on what terms that consistency is judged, for this will help us give some definition to this important technical distinction in the theory of poetic genre and will provide a transition to other aspects of the aesthetic appreciation of Vergil available in the scholia.

<sup>1122</sup> *Ecl. praef.* 16-21

<sup>1123</sup> *Aen. praef.* 63-70

I begin with the *Aeneid*: does Vergil maintain a proper gravity throughout with weighty speech and thoughts? The notes on this topic—which mostly concerning poetic language<sup>1124</sup>—detail ways in which Vergil has fallen into the *humilis* style or techniques he has used to avoid it. DS has far more of such comments than Servius, and in fact all of the criticisms are found in DS only, who must have been using sources (ignored by or unavailable to Servius) where critics persistently found fault with this aspect of Vergil’s poetry. The majority of these have no explanation to go with the stylistic assessment. For example, *avunculus* is not fitting to some: *quidam ‘avunculus’ humiliter in heroico carmine dictum accipiunt.*<sup>1125</sup> The speech transition *ea verba locutus* receives the same judgment,<sup>1126</sup> as does the use of *deicit* to describe how Jupiter hurls his lightning bolts to earth.<sup>1127</sup> So too with the following phrases: *pellis* at *Aeneid* 10.483, *prendere* at *Aeneid* 12.775, and *tinguat* at *Aeneid* 11.914. Two other notes state that *ligno* is inappropriately low,<sup>1128</sup> though the second makes a concession: *‘lignum’ humiliter dictum accipiunt, ornavit tamen ‘venerabile’ dicendo*—hence, there remains the possibility of using adjectives to maintain the necessary register, a phenomenon that will be seen again below. Finally, in several places Vergil is said to have written “neoterically,” and one of these contains a reference to stylistic register: *<attollens umero famamque et facta nepotum> hunc versum notant critici quasi superfluo et humiliter additum nec convenientem gravitati eius: namque est magis neotericus*, “Critics find fault in this verse as if it were added superfluously and in the low style and not fitting to his *gravitas*, for it is instead neoteric.”<sup>1129</sup> One wishes there were more explanation here as to why this is an unworthy verse,<sup>1130</sup> particularly as this final statement at the end of a long and glorious shield description would be taken by

<sup>1124</sup> There is an exception: at *Aeneid* 5.27 Servius says that Vergil’s depiction of Aeneas as a skilled ship captain is not only heroic, but also a mark of poetic consistency, since he will say later that Aeneas sailed the ship by himself at night: *non tantum heroicum est quod dat Aeneae gubernandi scientiam, sed etiam ad prooeconomiam pertinent: dicturus enim est ‘et ipse ratem nocturnis rexit in undis.’* Vergil has thus maintained the loftiness of his character, which contributes at least in a sense to the grandeur of the poem’s tone.

<sup>1125</sup> *et pater Aeneas et avunculus excitat Hector* (*Aen.* 3.343 [DS]).

<sup>1126</sup> *Aen.* 8.404 (DS)

<sup>1127</sup> *Aen.* 8.428 (DS)

<sup>1128</sup> *Aen.* 9.411 (DS), *Aen.* 12.767 (DS); cf. *Aen.* 2.46 (DS), where the commentator points to *ligno* as a purposeful use of *tapinosis*, which I describe below.

<sup>1129</sup> *Aen.* 8.731 (DS)

<sup>1130</sup> Surely it is not the zeugma of *attollens fama et facta*?

most modern readers, I think, as an effective and sufficiently “weighty” finale, in a literal and literary sense. Perhaps we are all hopeless neoterics.

In other places the commentators highlight ways in which Vergil has aimed to avoid the low style. As in the example of *venerabile lignum* above, this can be achieved through the addition of an *epitheton maiestatis*, if I may be permitted the term. Servius calls the phrase *gurgite vasto* in the storm at the beginning of the *Aeneid* an example of *tapinosis* (ταπεινωσις), *id est rei magnae humilis expositio*. He continues: *prudenter tamen Vergilius humilitatem sermonis epitheto sublevat, ut hoc loco ‘vasto’ addidit. item cum de equo loqueretur ait ‘cavernas ingentes,’* “Nevertheless, Vergil judiciously raises the lowliness of the word [*gurgite*] with an adjective, as he added *vasto* in this passage. Likewise when he speaks of the horse he says *cavernas ingentes*.”<sup>1131</sup> DS also realizes that nothing kills poetic grandeur faster than a chicken reference,<sup>1132</sup> and so when Vergil states that Evander is awoken by the sound of birds in the morning (*Evandrum ex humili [!] tecto lux suscitatur alma / et matutini volucrum sub culmine cantus*) and Servius states that this phrase can refer to birds in general and also specifically to swallows, DS adds: *potest et gallorum: quae omnia propter sermonis humilitatem vitavit*, “It can also refer to roosters, all of which [the poet] avoided because of the lowliness of the word.”<sup>1133</sup> Vergil can also maintain poetic grandeur by making careful selections from among similar-sounding words, as when Lavinia pulls at her *floros crines* when she hears of Amata’s suicide.<sup>1134</sup> DS gives an interesting note here: *Probus sic adnotavit: ‘neotericum erat flavos, ergo bene floras: nam sequitur et roseas laniata genas,* “Probus gives the following note: *flavos* would be neoteric, so he does well to say *floros*, for the phrase ‘having torn her rosy cheeks’ follows,” that is, Vergil would presumably be staying consistent with

<sup>1131</sup> *Aen.* 1.118; the citation of *cavernas ingentes* is from *Aeneid* 2.19-20, where Servius gives a brief reminder of this statement, but nothing more: *<ingentes> ut diximus, epitheto levavit tapinosin*. This is perhaps a more confusing example for us because of our grand sense of the English “cavern,” but when one observes that *caverna* could refer to, among other things, the excrementary canal of animals (e.g., Plin. *NH* 8.55.81, 28.8.27), one sees the commentator’s point.

<sup>1132</sup> *dissertator ipse notatur quia audax humilitatem non vitavit*.

<sup>1133</sup> *Aen.* 8.456 (DS); I take this to mean that Vergil did not specify *volucrum* because that specificity would have seemed too cute. This kind of comment is particularly interesting to me, since specificity is often one thing that the commentators demand of Vergil, as I will show later. There is evidently room for a little ambiguity when poetic register is at stake.

<sup>1134</sup> *Aen.* 12.605; Mynors’ text (1985) gives *flavos*, which is the lemma provided by Servius, who states nonetheless that *floros* is the *antiqua lectio* and a *sermo Ennianus*.

his flower imagery. If it is correct to read *neotericum* in connection with *humilitas* as in the aforementioned scholion to the final verse of *Aeneid* 8, then Vergil has made a careful selection to avoid the low style. So too does Vergil dodge baseness when he is careful to use the dative phrase *huic monstro* to describe Cacus, since the dative of the proper name would be crude: *<huic monstro> bene vitavit casum, in quo inerat turpis significatio*.<sup>1135</sup>

Vergil also uses periphrasis to maintain a proper register.<sup>1136</sup> It was to avoid *humilitas*, for instance, that he refers to a pig as *saetigeri fetum suis* during a sacrifice at the truce between Trojans and Italians.<sup>1137</sup> For the same reason Rhamnetes is said to be “heaving sleep with his whole chest” when Nisus and Euryalus prepare to make their attack at the enemy camp: *<toto proflabat pectore somnum> periphrasis est, ne verbo humili stertentem diceret*, “This is periphrasis, lest he say with lowly speech that he was snoring.”<sup>1138</sup> Vergil can also omit details entirely when it would be superfluous or base to include them, as is the case just a few verses after the mention of Rhamnetes, where Euryalus is said to be cutting madly through the mass of sleeping Italian soldiers (*nec minor Euryali caedes; incensus et ipse / perfurit ac multam in medio sine nomine plebem / Fadumque Herbesumque subit Rhoetumque Abarimque*).<sup>1139</sup> Vergil omits the names of most of the victims because they do not deserve mention on account of their *humilitas*: *‘sine nomine’ autem dixit sine gloria, quorum per humilitatem non sunt omnibus nota nomina*.<sup>1140</sup> Finally, I provide one additional example that shows the commentators’ preoccupation with the stylistic register of the *Aeneid*. In the final moments before his death, Turnus asks Juturna in desperation if she has come to watch her poor brother die: *sed quis Olympo / demissam tantos voluit te ferre labores? / an fratris miseri letum ut crudele videres?*<sup>1141</sup> DS remarks that if we read *miseri* from the

<sup>1135</sup> *Aen.* 8.198; DS, perhaps afraid that the reader would not understand what is meant, spells out the illicit phrase. For more examples of the importance of diction in maintaining a certain literary style, see the discussion of the base *lucerna vis-à-vis* a grander Greek alternative *lychnus* (*Aen.* 1.177, 1.726).

<sup>1136</sup> Recall that this is a linguistic figure that “poets love” (*Aen.* 1.244, 6.659).

<sup>1137</sup> *non nulli autem porcum, non porcum in foederibus adserunt solere mactari, sed poetam periphrasis usum propter nominis humilitatem* (*Aen.* 12.170 [DS]).

<sup>1138</sup> *Aen.* 9.324 (DS)

<sup>1139</sup> *Aen.* 9.342-4

<sup>1140</sup> 9.341 (DS); cf. the aforementioned figure of *κατ’ ἐξοχήν*, which poets use to differentiate preeminent members of a group from those who are not worthy of specific mention.

<sup>1141</sup> *Aen.* 12.635f.



perspective of Turnus, it is too lowly, as if Turnus is taking away from his own heroism: *humile est si ex persona Turni accipias: ergo 'miseri' ad animum sororis referendum est*. That is, Turnus' self-description is really to be read as focalized through the viewpoint of Juturna. The reasoning for this interpretation is illuminating: given the option between accepting Turnus' "low" estimation of himself and a slight transposition of the adjective to his sister's mind, the commentator chooses the latter. The expectation that Vergil's poetry will be "grand" influences the way his poetry is interpreted.<sup>1142</sup>

Before proceeding to the *Eclogues*, I will add a few comments here concerning the mention of the comic genre in the scholia to Book 4 of the *Aeneid*. Compared to a modern reading of the Dido-Aeneas episode, the scholion to the first verse of this book is odd to say the least:

*Apollonius Argonautica scripsit et in tertio inducit amantem Medeam: inde totus hic liber translatus est. est autem paene totus in affectione, licet in fine pathos habeat, ubi abscessus Aeneae gignit dolorem. sane totus in consiliis et subtilitatibus est; nam paene comicus stilus est: nec mirum, ubi de amore tractatur.*

Apollonius wrote the *Argonautica* and in the third book he introduced Medea in love. This whole book [i.e., *Aeneid* 4] is transferred from that. And it is almost totally with good will, although it has pathos at the end, when the departure of Aeneas produces grief. Indeed the whole book consists in plans and subtleties, for it is almost comic in style, and no wonder, when it deals with love.

This is not the only mention of comedy in this book. See also the note to *Aeneid* 4.534: *<en quid ago?> est comicum principium, nec incongrue amatrici datum. sic Terentius 'quid igitur faciam?'* Dido's speech is here equated to the comic formula found in Phaedria's opening lines at *Eunuchus* 46. A little later Dido continues her monologue of lamentation, referring to herself with the pronoun *memet*.<sup>1143</sup> Servius says her statements are in keeping with her role as lover (*satis amatorie*), but DS adds another interesting layer. Faced with a few interpretations of *memet*, he eventually settles on the term as a sort of residue from comic pleasantries: *alii autem, quod magis sequendum est, excrementa [!] comici leporis existimant: nam Terentius dicit 'tutemet mirabere,' id est tu*. Many unanswered questions arise from these bizarre and intriguing notes, and there seems to be no clear piece of evidence elsewhere that would

<sup>1142</sup> For other examples of modifications for the sake of maintaining a high register: *Aen.* 1.474, 4.254, 10.104.

<sup>1143</sup> *Aen.* 4.606

bring these interpretations into the light. What remains, in any case, is that Servius and DS take it for granted that Book 4 is subject to some genre-bending both in general principle and at a linguistic level.

I pass on now to the *Eclogues*, the genre of which receives quite a bit more attention than the genre of epic for the *Aeneid*—and it will be noticed that there is no Servian term for “epic” apart from the periphrastic *heroicum carmen*. The preface to the *Eclogues* begins with the origin of bucolic poetry: *Bucolica, ut ferunt, dicta sunt a custodibus boum, id est ἀπὸ τῶν βουκόλων: praecipua enim sunt animalia apud rusticos boves. huius autem carminis origo varia est*, “Bucolic poems, as they say, were named from the caretakers of cattle, that is from *βουκόλων*: for cattle are the preeminent animals among country folk. And the origin of this [type of] song is varied.” Servius proceeds to explain the different versions, including the one in which bucolic songs originated in the time of Xerxes’ invasion of Greece, when the Greeks were forced to stay penned up in the city and could not celebrate the rites of Diana out in the field, and so the country folk headed off to the mountains of Laconia and sang their songs there, after which a subsequent era refined these songs. Another account states that Orestes stole a statue of Diana from Scythia and, driven to Sicily by a storm, assembled the rustics there and celebrated a festival for Diana, and the ritual of the songs persisted amongst the Sicilians. Meanwhile, others assert that they come from the worship of Apollo Nomius, or that they are for Pan, fauns, nymphs, and satyrs. However that may be, Servius is clear on the *qualitas* of the poems, which I provided above: bucolic poems are of the *humilis* register, with simple, rustic characters who do not do great deeds. There is also the aforementioned etymology of the names of these rustic characters (Meliboeus, caretaker of herds, and Tityrus, meaning “bellweather”). Finally, at the end of the preface Servius repeats that the characters are to be rustic, and that all their affairs and their basis for comparisons are to be countrified accordingly: *personae, sicut supra dixi, rusticate sunt et simplicitate gaudentes: unde nihil in his urbanum, nihil declamatorium invenitur; sed ex re rustica sunt omnia negotia, comparationes et si qua sunt alia*.

The starting assumption for the bucolic poems, then, is that they will adhere to *humilitas* just as the *Aeneid* adhered (or at least aimed to adhere) to elevated speech and grand *sententiae*, and indeed the notes to the individual poems demonstrate this expectation. In fact, from the very opening verses of the

first poem it is asserted that Vergil himself has commented allusively on his own lowly style: *dicendo autem 'tenui avena,' stili genus humilis latenter ostendit, quo, ut supra dictum est, in bucolicis utitur,* “And by saying ‘with slender reed,’ he allusively demonstrates a type of lowly style, which as was said above he employs in his bucolic poems.”<sup>1144</sup> Note that the subject of this sentence must be Vergil and not the internal speaker Meliboeus, a fact made clear by the cross-reference to the assessment of Vergil in the preface and the knowledge that, according to the parameters established above, a rustic man such as Meliboeus would not do anything *latenter*. Vergil’s phrase *calamo agresti* a few lines later has a similar tag: *rustic stilo, sic supra 'tenui avena,'* “In the rustic style, as above with the phrase ‘with slender reed.’”<sup>1145</sup> This is spoken by Tityrus, but as before it seems to be taken as a nod by Vergil to his own art.

Servius thus shows that his characterization of the bucolic genre is in keeping with Vergil’s own description of the pastoral style, and the notes that follow call attention to specific instantiations of these principles. Some examples pertain directly to the aforementioned statement in the preface that bucolic characters are thoroughly rustic in all their affairs, whether they are making comparisons or any other such thing (*ex re rustica sunt omnia negotia, comparationes et si qua sunt alia*). When Tityrus describes how freedom came to him late in life at a time when his beard fell white to the barber’s blade, Servius praises his rustic indication of his own age: *et bene tempora, quasi rusticus, computat a barbae sectione*.<sup>1146</sup> The same phenomenon occurs later in this poem when Meliboeus refers to a succession of harvests to denote a succession of years: *et quasi rusticus per aristas numerat annos: nam physica rusticanorum est in paleis et in messibus*.<sup>1147</sup> This is in accordance with the normal experiences of herdsmen and is not dependent upon complicated calendrical systems that would be beyond such simple folk. The preface’s delineation of rusticity in the use of bucolic comparisons also appears, as in *Eclogues* 5 as Menalcas tells Mopsus, “As much as the soft willow yields to the pale olive, as much as lowly wild nard yields to red rose gardens, so much does Amyntas yield to you in my judgment.” Servius points out

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<sup>1144</sup> *Ecl.* 1.2

<sup>1145</sup> *Ecl.* 1.10

<sup>1146</sup> *Ecl.* 1.29

<sup>1147</sup> *Ecl.* 1.69

simply: *rusticis utitur comparationibus*.<sup>1148</sup> Another example of such a bucolic mindset appears in *Eclogues* 2, where an interesting note explains that Vergil comes back to the safety of pastoral comparisons after nearly reaching too high a stylistic register. Here Corydon imagines that he sings to Alexis, telling him that just as Pallas maintains the citadels she has founded (*Pallas quas condidit arces / ipsa colat*), so too does he enjoy the woods above all else (*nobis placeant ante omnia silvae*).<sup>1149</sup> When he immediately compares his own chase of Alexis to a lioness pursuing a wolf, a wolf pursuing a goat, and a goat hunting down clover, Servius approves his shift back to the rural world after speaking a little too loftily about the founding of citadels: *et bene se revocat ad rusticas comparationes, paene enim fuerat lapsus dicendo 'Pallas quas condidit arces'*.<sup>1150</sup> As with the opening verse to *Eclogues* 4, where Vergil says he will raise his register a little (*paulo maiora canamus*), Servius notes that the break from the expected *humilitas* is minor.

In addition to rustic approaches to the passing of time and the use of comparisons, Vergil also maintains the *humilis stilus* in other ways. When Menalcas describes the beechwood cups that he has offered up for his wager in the contest with Damoetas, he states that there are two figures, Conon and some other man whose name he cannot remember: *in medio duo signa, Conon et—quis fuit alter, / descripsit radio totum qui gentibus orbem, / tempora quae messor, quae curvus arator haberet?*<sup>1151</sup> That he can remember the name of the famous Conon but not that of the second figure speaks of his rusticity: *<Conon> dux fuit,*<sup>1152</sup> *cuius nomen dicit, quia in omnium ore versatur: nam philosophi tacet, quod non facile potest ad rusticum pervenire. et bene ea dicit philosophi, quae ad rusticum pertinent, ut 'tempora quae messor, quae curvus arator haberet,'* “Conon was a leader whose name he says because it was uttered in the mouths of all, for he is silent [on the name of] the philosopher, because it is not easy for it to be able to arrive at [the ears of] a rustic man. And well does he say those things of the philosopher that

<sup>1148</sup> *Ecl.* 5.16; cf. *Ecl.* 2.18 (*et rustice et amatorie ex floribus facit comparationem*)

<sup>1149</sup> *Ecl.* 2.61f.

<sup>1150</sup> *Ecl.* 2.63; I say that “Vergil” has come back from the cliff, though as often in scholia it is difficult to say for sure whether the commentator means the internal speaker or the poet himself. In a sense the point is moot: Vergil is ultimately to blame if his character is not within the expected bounds of the genre.

<sup>1151</sup> *Ecl.* 3.40f.

<sup>1152</sup> It is possible that Servius has confused Conon of Samos with the Athenian; otherwise *dux fuit* is an odd choice.

pertain to a rustic man, as ‘the times which the reaper and the curved ploughman have.’” A fascinating comment at the end of *Eclogues* 7 similarly assumes that the rustic characters are a few apples short of a bushel.<sup>1153</sup> Having heard an amoebic competition between Corydon and Thyrsis, Meliboeus declares at the end that Corydon has won: *haec memini, et victum frustra contendere Thyrsin. / ex illo Corydon Corydon est tempore nobis*. Servius completes the thought with a phrase that must be understood from Meliboeus’ ellipsis (*victor, nobilis supra omnes*). Very interestingly, though, the reason for the ellipsis is not the *ars poetica* or a literary device, but a simple inability on the part of this rustic man to complete his thought: *quam rem quasi rusticus implere non potuit*.<sup>1154</sup> One more example is instructive from the opposite angle, for at *Eclogues* 2.65 Vergil is accused by critics of having gone beyond the bounds of the bucolic genre: *<trahit sua quemque voluptas> notatur a criticis, quod hanc sententiam dederit rustico supra bucolici carminis legem aut possibilitatem*, “Vergil is blamed by critics because he gave this *sententia* to a rustic man beyond the law or possibility of bucolic song.” Recall that weighty *sententiae* were rather the domain of the *grandiloquus* register found in the *Aeneid*, not in pastoral poems. A glance back at a similar type of utterance from *Aeneid* 10.467 (*stat sua cuique dies*) may also help us understand the reasoning behind this comment, for there Servius treated the proverbial statement as a philosophical borrowing by Vergil, and one can see above that philosophical sentiments are out of bounds for bucolic characters.

Two more passages will demonstrate again that general assumptions about genre shape the commentator’s judgment about individual verses. A geographical problem arises at *Eclogues* 2.24 with the phrase *in Actaeo Aracyntho*. Servius explains that Aracynthus is a Theban mountain, and that Actis was in the territory of the Athenians, and so he prefers to read *Actaeo* not as a proper adjective, but a common one meaning *litorali*. What other scholars offer, however, demonstrates just how far they expect Vergil to take the rusticity of his characters: *quamquam plerique ‘Actaeo Aracyntho’ Atheniensi accipiant, non quod Aracynthus apud Athenas est, sed ut ostendatur rustici imperitia*, “Although most

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<sup>1153</sup> *male utitur iste dissertator rusticis comparationibus, quasi poeta bucolicus.*

<sup>1154</sup> *Ecl.* 7.70

take *Actaeo Aracyntho* as ‘Athenian,’ not because Aracynthus is at Athens, but so that the ignorance of the rustic man may be shown.” Servius then alerts his reader to a similar geographical problem already seen earlier with the Oeax River at *Eclogues* 1.65. There it was simply stated that *Cretae* could not be a proper noun, but meant rather “of chalk, chalky,” since this river was in Scythia. In the context of the Aracynthus dilemma, however, Servius now reveals that it is possible to take *Cretae* as a proper noun for the same reason as *Actaeo*, namely that the geographical error that results, while certainly inappropriate to an educated poet, might be fitting for a herdsman who could not know better. For an additional example I return to *Eclogues* 3, where a pair of riddles near the end of the poem sparks a relatively lengthy set of possible explanations from Servius. The initial riddle by Damoetas asks in what lands the space of the sky extends no more than a few feet: *dic quibus in terris (et eris mihi magnus Apollo) / tris pateat caeli spatium non amplius ulnas*. One possibility is a punning reference to the tomb of a man named Caelius (= *caelum*), and another is the “philosopher’s well” in Egypt, which was constructed so that someone at the bottom could observe the direct rays of the sun on a particular day of the year. Servius does not like either of these interpretations, though, since they would seem to violate the demands of the bucolic genre: *sed neutrum horum convenit rustico: unde simpliciter intellegendus est cuiuslibet loci puteus, in quem cum quis descenderit, tantum caeli conspicit spatium, quantum putei latitudo permiserit*, “But neither of these fits a rustic man, from which we must understand simply a well in any location, in which when anyone has descended, he sees only so much space of sky as the width of the well allows.” Assumptions about genre have again determined Servius’ preference from among multiple interpretations of a problematic passage.

The *Georgics* get very little treatment regarding their generic characteristics and will thus occupy only a brief space here, but a few remarks are possible. It is stated in the prefaces to the *Aeneid* and *Eclogues* (interestingly not in the preface to the *Georgics*) that this poetry is marked by the “middle” style, though this gets hardly any treatment in the course of the commentaries. For one example, at *Georgics* 1.391 Vergil has used the phrase *testa cum ardente* out of fear that his other options would be too low or too high in stylistic register: *<testa cum ardente> propter vilitatem lucernam noluit dicere, nec*

*iterum lychnum, sicut in heroo carmine, ut 'dependent lynchni': medius enim in his libris est stilus, sicut diximus supra.*<sup>1155</sup> Otherwise, the most salient characteristic of the genre of the *Georgics* is its didactic nature, and this has a role to play in the formal qualities of the poetry, as was the case for the *Aeneid* and *Eclogues*. Servius writes in the preface: *et hi libri didascalici sunt, unde necesse est, ut ad aliquem scribantur; nam praeceptum et doctoris et discipuli personam requirit: unde ad Maecenatem scribit sicut Hesiodus ad Persen, Lucretius ad Memmium,* “And these books are didactic, from which it is necessary that they be written to someone; for instruction requires the character both of the teacher and the student. For this reason he writes to Maecenas, just as Hesiod wrote to Perses and Lucretius to Memmius.” There is implicit in this comment a reference to the aforementioned division of *characteres*, not in the sense of stylistic register, but as regards the nature of the poet’s voice, whether he speaks the entire poem, part of the poem, or none of the poem. Even so, there is no explicit mention of this categorization, and in the course of the *explanatio* one finds little evidence that the didactic nature of the genre has significantly shaped the form of the poetry.<sup>1156</sup>

### *Aesthetic Judgments*

Having completed the survey of the role of genre in the commentaries, I proceed to an analytical summary of the aesthetic principles by which Vergil is assessed. As is the case in other scholiastic corpora, passages that relate to this theme are most often marked with an initial qualitative evaluation that either praises (*bene, perite, recte*) or criticizes (*male, vituperabiliter*) the poetry. This type of

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<sup>1155</sup> See above on the difference between *lucerna* and *lychnus* (*Aen.* 1.177, 1.726). For other examples of this phenomenon in the *Georgics*, see 1.274 (DS), 3.135.

<sup>1156</sup> I point out here only two passages in which Servius notes that Vergil has shifted from one *praeceptum* to another (*G.* 1.79, 1.94). These remarks are quite bare and offer no critical insight into the way Servius is approaching the *Georgics*, and the discrepancy with the relatively expansive implementation of generic principles for the other works is surprising. Perhaps this is simply the result of the “middle” style, which almost by its very nature is unexceptional, though my first example showed that it was at least possible for Servius to point out lexical choices that were neither base nor elevated.

phenomenon has been readily observable in the preceding section, as commentators judged Vergil's ability to adhere to the demands of various poetic genres, but now I expand that discussion into other areas of consideration, namely the principles of specificity, propriety, consistency, arrangement, and (in a few cases) poetic style. Let me emphasize that, as was seen in the other scholiastic corpora, the commentaries to Vergil are not a treatise on poetic style, and they should not be read as such. Rather, by piecing together different comments to different passages, I will attempt to illuminate the aesthetic principles of Servius and DS with the understanding that this picture will be incomplete and that the artificial taxonomy I use for understanding those principles is just that—artificial. The boundaries of my categorization will overlap, and not every comment fits neatly into my system, but overall the exercise will be an effective way to examine the general approach to the praise and blame of Vergil's poetry.

The frequent mention of words that are extraneous (*vacans*, *superfluus*, etc.), omitted (*subaudiendus*), or ambiguous (*τῶν μέσων*) shows that Servius and DS have a close eye on the level of specificity in Vergil's language. Even though there is some flexibility given within the context of the poetic art, one sees throughout that Vergil is praised or blamed for adhering or not adhering to a desirable level of lexical exactitude, and the following examples will give some idea of what this looks like. Venus' grand address to Jupiter in the first book of the *Aeneid* includes mention of his lightning: *o qui res hominumque deumque / aeternis regis imperiis et fulmine terres*, "You who rule the affairs of men and gods with your eternal commands and you who terrify with the thunderbolt."<sup>1157</sup> Servius, who tends to look for meaning and purpose in every word possible, says that the mention of terror is intentional:

*et 'fulmine terres' non sine causa adiecit 'terres.' est enim fulmen quod terreat; est quod adflet, ut 'fulminis adflavit ventis'; est quod puniat, ut 'vel pater omnipotens adigat me fulmine ad umbras'; peremptorii autem fulminis late patet significatio: est quod praesaget, ut 'de caelo tactas memini praedicere quercus.'*

And it is not without reason that he added *terres* to *fulmine terres*. For there is a thunderbolt that terrifies, one that blasts with wind (as in *fulminis adflavit ventis*), one that punishes (as in *vel pater omnipotens adigat me fulmine ad umbras*—and the meaning of the destructive bolt is patently obvious), and one that presages (as in *de caelo tactas memini praedicere quercus*).

<sup>1157</sup> *Aen.* 1.229f.; cf. Vergil's proper specification of nut at *Eclogues* 2.52.



In other locations Vergil is explicitly praised for such specifications. It is “skillful” (*perite*) of Vergil, for instance, to say that bronze sickles were used by Dido to reap grasses for her chthonic ritual in *Aeneid* 4, because some types of grasses are cut, but others are plucked.<sup>1158</sup> Likewise in Book 8 when Aeneas sacrifices the white sow and her offspring to *maxima Iuno* Servius explains: *quaesitum est quae sit ‘Iuno maxima’: nam, ut diximus, variae sunt eius potestates, ut Curitis, Lucina, Matrona, Regina. et dicunt theologi ipsam esse matrem deum, quae terra dicitur; unde etiam porca ei sacrificatur. ergo perite elegit epitheton, ut maximam diceret*, “It has been asked which Juno is the ‘greatest,’ for as we said she has various powers under the names Curitis, Lucina, Matrona, and Regina. And scholars of the divine say that she is the mother of the gods, who is called ‘Earth.’ For this reason even a pig is sacrificed to her. Thus, Vergil skillfully selected the adjective, so that he might call her ‘greatest.’” That is, Servius takes the adjective not as vaguely aggrandizing, but as highly specific: Aeneas is sacrificing to a particular instantiation of Juno, since that is the version to which pigs are sacrificed.<sup>1159</sup> In another passage Servius praises Vergil for his system of naming the Trojans, which is specific to their behavior at the time of each mention; thus, he calls them Phrygians when they are afraid, Dardanidae when they are noble, Laomedontiadae when they are treacherous, Trojans when they are brave, and also men of Hector when they are brave.<sup>1160</sup>

Not all things should be given in exact detail, however. Indeed, I have already given an example in which Vergil is said to suppress the names of the mass of soldiers whom Euryalus kills because of their relative insignificance. This sort of restraint is praised again at *Aeneid* 11.243-5, where Venulus describes the Italian embassy to Diomedes: *vidimus, o cives, Diomedem Argivaque castra, / atque iter emensi casus superavimus omnis, / contigimusque manum qua concidit Ilia tellus*. Servius applauds the phrase *casus superavimus omnes*, which is fittingly unspecific: *et bene vilitatem singularum rerum generalitate vitavit*,

<sup>1158</sup> *nec omnes eodem modo: unde perite et ‘aenis falcibus’ dixit, quia aliae velluntur, aliae inciduntur* (*Aen.* 4.513).

<sup>1159</sup> *Aen.* 8.84; it is worth mentioning that the commentators seem to hold that Aeneas is extremely knowledgeable about the divine, so this specificity is in accordance with his own knowledge of rituals (cf. *Aen.* 3.359 [DS]: *sciendum tamen, sicut veteres auctores adfirmant, peritissimos auguriorum et Aeneam et plurimos fuisse Troianos*).

<sup>1160</sup> *Aen.* 1.468; all the examples I have provided here are positive for Vergil, though rarely there is a criticism of his level of specificity (*Aen.* 1.409).

*ne diceret flumina, latrones, et cetera*, “And he did well to avoid the banality of the individual obstacles, lest he should talk about streams, bandits, and so forth.” Such praise also comes for Vergil’s apt use of ambiguous terminology in the speech of Diomedes that Venulus reports. When Diomedes says that Mount Caphereus and the Euboean cliffs know the grim star of Minerva (*triste Minervae sidus*), Servius explains that *fabula* has it that some returning Greeks were destroyed because of the sexual assault on Cassandra during the sack of Troy, while fact has it that the Greeks suffered under the stormy vernal equinox, during which time they were assaulted by lightning, the *manubiae Minervales*. Thus, Vergil’s use of *sidus* is perfect, since it can mean “star” and “storm,” thus capturing allusively both the meteorological and the mythological damage sustained by the Greek fleet.<sup>1161</sup> These examples demonstrate how, although specificity is a crucial feature of good poetry, ambiguity can be productive through an allusive withholding of information.<sup>1162</sup> What is more, even when critical information is left out, Servius and DS can resort to a term from the Greek scholia to describe what has happened “silently”: *κατὰ τὸ σιωπώμενον*. As often in the Euripidean scholia, this phrase denotes something that must have happened “offstage,” as it were, in order for the text to be coherent.<sup>1163</sup>

In addition to these specific instances of omitted information, the commentaries stress that poets are not to provide all the details of a narrative in general, an idea that seems to relate to the examples given above regarding the danger of a poet (e.g., Lucan) falling into *historia* by recording facts in an unpoetic way. At *Aeneid* 1.223, Servius states that Vergil’s *finis* could refer to the end of storytelling or the end of the day, for at a later point (1.305) he remarks that it is night. But Vergil, it is said, does not tell his reader every time the sun rises or sets and instead leaves chronological changes to be understood or indicates the shift in time through indirect means: *et sciendum est Vergilium non semper dicere ortum vel occasum diei, sed aut intellectui relinquere, ut hoc loco, aut negotiis tempora significare*. Thus far

<sup>1161</sup> *unde perite dicendo ‘sidus’ utrumque complexus est: nam sidus et tempestatem significat et re vera sidus* (*Aen.* 11.259); cf. *Aen.* 3.24.

<sup>1162</sup> See also the “useful” ambiguity in the encomium throughout *Eclogues* 4: is Vergil praising Augustus? Pollio? Pollio’s son Saloninus? By not specifying which one, as Servius points out explicitly at *Eclogues* 4.15, he seems to be praising them all.

<sup>1163</sup> *Aen.* 3.82 (Anchises being called the friend of Anius without any background story), *Aen.* 6.456 (the death of Dido being announced to Aeneas), *Aen.* 9.200 (DS, the age of Euryalus)

there is no true praise or blame, but the note continues: *est autem poetica callopietia non omnia exprimere . . . . Homerus sane ista contemnens tempora universa describit*, “And it is poetic embellishment (καλλωπιστία) not to express everything . . . . Indeed Homer describes everything without any regard for those [distinctions in] time.” The term καλλωπιστία itself puts a positive spin on these omissions, and the appeal to Homer also reinforces the technique. Later Servius reveals that this practice is in fact part of the *ars poetica*,<sup>1164</sup> and in Book 2 he responds to critics of Vergil according to the same principle. When Aeneas tells his Trojan companions to arm themselves against the Greek invaders, the *critici* complain that Vergil is always saying that people are being armed without ever showing that they are unarmed in the first place, to which Servius responds that they are simply ignorant of the poetic principle in question: *<arma, viri, ferte arma> notant hoc critici, quia saepius armari aliquos dicit, cum exarmatos nusquam ostendat: qui nesciunt, non omnia a poeta ut supra diximus dici debere*.<sup>1165</sup> Whatever reasons Servius has for favoring καλλωπιστία in different situations, it is clear that specificity has a limit in poetry.

The next principle of assessment in the commentaries may be labeled “propriety,” though this term is τῶν μέσων, so to speak, and needs specification. By “propriety” I mean that the commentators expect Vergilian characters to act and be treated in a manner that is consistent with their identity, specifically with respect to their position in a hierarchy of importance and authority. That is, lofty characters should remain lofty, and base characters should remain base. Putting the definition of propriety in this way makes it clear that the principle is much the same as that evident in the presentation of the generic parameters above—heroic poems should be heroic, and lowly poems lowly. Servius and DS do not have a highly taxonomized way of talking about this principle as pertains to characters, but they both employ the term τὸ πρέπον in a few places to signal that Vergil has maintained propriety. In other cases this type of evaluation is attended by more general markers such as *bene* or *perite*, so the nature of Servius’ praise must be judged at each occasion to see which aesthetic principles are at work.

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<sup>1164</sup> *Aen.* 1.683

<sup>1165</sup> *Aen.* 2.668

Having defined my use of propriety as pertains to characterization, I offer some examples here of the principle in action. At the beginning of *Aeneid* 3, Vergil has Aeneas say that Anchises was in command of the expedition to find a new home: *et pater Anchises dare fatis vela iubebat*.<sup>1166</sup> Servius remarks (and DS confirms) that Vergil has kept propriety by letting the father do the ordering.<sup>1167</sup> Later in this book DS is more explicit in his praise, again when Anchises gives the commands: *<velis aptare iubebat> et bene servat τὸ πρέπον, ut ubique Anchisen inducat iubentem navigationem, ut 'et pater Anchises dare fatis vela iubebat.'*<sup>1168</sup> That is, not only is this hierarchy of authority “appropriate,” but it is also “well done.” Propriety also entails the sort of distinction that was encountered above under the term *κατ' ἐξοχήν*. When the storm rises against Aeneas' fleet in Book 1, for instance, Vergil first emphasizes the shouting of the men and the imminent death before their eyes before a sudden chill seizes Aeneas (*extemplo Aeneae solvuntur frigore membra*).<sup>1169</sup> Servius likes this, stating that it was appropriate to make Aeneas the last to be afraid: *servavit τὸ πρέπον, ut Aeneam ultimum territum dicat*. Similarly, Aeneas' men set about the mundane tasks of setting up camp when they land on the Libyan shore, but he himself goes exploring to find signs of his lost comrades. Servius adds:

*merita personarum vilibus officiis interesse non debent: quod bene servat ubique Vergilius, ut hoc loco, item in sexto cum diversis officiis Troianos diceret occupatos, ait 'at pius Aeneas arces quibus altus Apollo praesidet': nisi cum causa pietatis intervenit, ut ad sepeliendum socium Misenum de Aenea dixit 'paribusque accingitur armis.'*<sup>1170</sup>

Well-deserving characters should have nothing to do with base duties, which Vergil does well to maintain everywhere, as in this place, and likewise in the sixth book when he says that the Trojans are busy with various duties, “But *pius* Aeneas [seeks] the citadels where lofty Apollo presides.” The exception is when he [Aeneas] intervenes for the sake of *pietas*, as when he said that Aeneas “girds himself with equal implements [i.e., axes and saws for the pyre]” for the burial of his comrade Misenus.

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<sup>1166</sup> *Aen.* 3.9

<sup>1167</sup> *ut diximus servat τὸ πρέπον, ut pater iubebat*. Or less likely: Aeneas has kept propriety. It is again impossible to say for sure whom Servius means, though the distinction is not absolutely critical to our understanding of the note, and indeed it is probable that Servius wants us to think of both author and character acting appropriately.

<sup>1168</sup> *Aen.* 3.472 (DS)

<sup>1169</sup> *Aen.* 1.92; cf. *Aen.* 1.30

<sup>1170</sup> *Aen.* 1.180

The same principle of propriety applies also for other prominent men, as when Vergil says that Mnestheus and Serestus hear the slaughter of their men by Turnus and come running. Servius explains that this inclusion is appropriately added so that it will not seem as if Turnus is allowed to wreck so much havoc with Trojan leaders nearby.<sup>1171</sup> A final example shows the opposite, namely that base actions and sentiments belong to base people. At *Aeneid* 11.351, the Italian Drances says that the Trojan army “terrifies the sky with their weapons” (*caelum territat armis*). Servius finds such a phrase incongruous with the *gravitas* of Vergil, but he interestingly says that the words are to be taken rather as skillfully attributed to the “swollen” oration of Drances: *<caelum territat armis> dictum quidem Vergilii gravitati non congruit, sed perite Dranci haec data sunt verba, qui tumida uti oratione inducitur.*<sup>1172</sup> We can conclude, then, that Servius and DS expect Vergil to maintain the nature of his characters much in the same way as he is to stick to the stylistic parameters assigned to each of the genres in which he composes.

The next important principle of assessment to which Vergil is subjected is that of “consistency,” another broad term that requires some clarification here. Vergil is expected to be what I call internally and externally consistent, meaning that his work should cohere on all points with itself and that his poetry should agree with factual knowledge outside the realm of the poem itself (with some allowances made for *poetica licentia*). The former includes the avoidance of self-contradiction and the assurance that characters’ words and actions are plausible in their given contexts. The latter concern deals with the poem’s coherence with history, natural philosophy, cultural practice, etc.—in essence that Vergil alludes subtly to knowledge from the “real world” through his poetry in an artistic weaving of fact and fiction.

That Servius favors internal consistency is visible at *Aeneid* 9.603, a passage in which the Italian Numanus—about to be the inaugural victim of Ascanius—reminds his fellow soldiers that they have been trained in demanding environmental conditions from their early youth and should therefore be able to defeat the weakling Phrygian “women.” Servius points out that Vergil has been consistent here with his

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<sup>1171</sup> *Aen.* 9.775; cf. *Aen.* 12.443

<sup>1172</sup> I am still working on the full meaning of the note on propriety at *Aeneid* 1.738, but it may have the same basic thrust as the Drances comment. I also find confusing an additional “propriety” note at *Aeneid* 8.127 (DS), though it clearly belongs in this discussion.

previous comment that the Italians are trained in martial activities from an early age: *sane poeta meminit sui, nam ait superius* [Aen. 7.162] ‘*ante urbem pueri et primaevo flore iuventus exercentur equis.*’

Similar statements occur also at *Aeneid* 4.322 (Dido speaking with great indignation of her lost *pudor*, since she had previously promised not to violate it) and 7.551 (where *spargam arma* is a recollection of *sere crimina belli* at 7.339). Within this category I also include comments pertaining to logical consistency (and, rarely, inconsistency) in Vergil’s characters. Servius makes it clear at *Aeneid* 1.145 that Vergil is characteristically good, for instance, at tailoring the speeches of his characters to their contexts: *et scire debemus prudenter poetam pro causis vel tendere vel corripere orationem*, “And we should know that the poet judiciously either lengthens or shortens a speech for [good] reasons.” In the present passage this manifests as Neptune cutting short his speech because of Aeneas’ urgent need for help in the storm, and Servius cites as well a one-verse statement in which Aeneas quickly asks Panthus for information while Troy is being invaded—no time for pleasantries here.<sup>1173</sup> The same note from Book 1 also gives a contrary example from Book 5, where Neptune’s calming of the sea is done with greater leisure, since there is no immediate danger: *contra in quinto libro ubi nullum periculum est latius describit placantem maria Neptunum*. Vergil is also skillfully showing his attention to detail when his disjointed presentation of Aeneas’ thoughts after the death of Pallas (*Pallas, Evander, in ipsis / omnia sunt oculis, mensae quas advena primas / tunc adiit, dextraeque datae*) are an indication of Aeneas’ distraught condition: *sed perite scissa est narratio, per quam animus Aeneae perturbatus exprimitur*.<sup>1174</sup>

External consistency is a somewhat trickier issue, since as I described above the poet has a significant amount of freedom in altering details from history, natural philosophy, or other areas, and in fact he *must* alter some details lest he turn out to be writing *historia* and not poetry.<sup>1175</sup> Even so, there are limits to *poetica licentia*, for just as a poet cannot be too straightforward with the truth, so too he must not

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<sup>1173</sup> *Aen.* 2.322

<sup>1174</sup> *Aen.* 10.515; for other examples: *Aen.* 10.92, 12.747.

<sup>1175</sup> Further, recall that even the genre of epic (*heroicum carmen*) demands a mixture of true and made-up things, as stated in the *Aeneid* preface.

stray too far from it: *vituperabile enim est, poetam aliquid fingere, quod penitus a veritate discedat.*<sup>1176</sup>

Even so, Servius praises Vergil numerous times for his allusion to some external fact, a marker of the overall realism and consistency of his poetry. There is a balance, though, and these nods to *veritas* come subtly, noticeable only through a very close reading. The first such example mentioned by Servius is a historical reference in the phrase *urbs antiqua fuit*, the beginning of the narration about Carthage at *Aeneid* 1.12. The phrase seems neutral enough, but Servius lauds Vergil's careful thinking here: *et 'antiqua' autem et 'fuit' bene dixit, namque et ante septuaginta annos urbis Romae condita erat, et eam deleverat Scipio Aemilianus. quae autem nunc est postea a Romanis est condita: unde antiquam accipe et ad comparationem istius quae nunc est, et Roma antiquiorem,* "And he did well to say both *antiqua* and *fuit*, because it had been founded 70 years before Rome, and Scipio Aemilianus had destroyed it. And this city has now been settled after the fact by the Romans, from which you are to understand that *antiquam* means both 'in comparison to the city that now stands,' and 'older than Rome.'"<sup>1177</sup> Further, see *Aeneid* 4.166, where Tellus and Juno are said to preside over the wedding ceremony of Aeneas and Dido—too bad, since according to the *Etrusca disciplina* there is scarcely anything less well-suited to a marriage than Tellus, and Vergil thereby skillfully shows that things will end badly. Other examples of external consistency consist of nods to astronomy,<sup>1178</sup> religious rites,<sup>1179</sup> natural philosophy,<sup>1180</sup> and even a reference to the size of a legion in the Roman army,<sup>1181</sup> all passages in which Vergil slips in nuggets of factual knowledge about the world in the framework of the *ars poetica*, to the sound of praise from his commentators.

The scholia also put a significant focus on the arrangement of poetry. The term *prooeconomia* is defined by Servius himself as *dispositio carminis* and is used (along with the more general term

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<sup>1176</sup> *Aen.* 3.46

<sup>1177</sup> The praise for *fuit* is harder to understand—probably that the city *was* old, but is now new, if one takes into account the resettlement as a new founding. For another allusion to actual historical events, see *Aeneid* 7.682.

<sup>1178</sup> *Aen.* 1.336, 2.801 (DS), 4.482, 6.795

<sup>1179</sup> *Aen.* 1.329 (DS), 4.510, 6.191

<sup>1180</sup> *Aen.* 11.186

<sup>1181</sup> *Aen.* 7.274

*oeconomia*<sup>1182</sup>) to refer to the way the poet includes details in his work that pave the way for a later event. In fact, in several cases the explicit purpose of *prooeconomia* is to give that future event verisimilitude,<sup>1183</sup> such that *oeconomia* may be said to pertain to the principles of realism and consistency discussed above, but from a larger perspective that takes into account the entire movement of the poem. We have already seen an example of this phenomenon from Book 5, where some navigationally sound advice from Aeneas at the beginning of the book is taken as *prooeconomia* for when he will guide the boat himself at its end (i.e., he shows that he is competent to do so). Other examples include a statement at *Aeneid* 1.170 that only some of his fleet made it onto the Libyan shore with Aeneas, for if Aeneas had arrived with everyone, the *oeconomia* of the book would have been ruined. Vergil is also praised (*bene transiit*) for the way in which he uses the earthgazing of Jupiter as a transition between the Trojan shipwreck victims on the Libyan shore and the intervention of Venus, where an abrupt transition would have been culpable (*vituperabile enim fuerat, si ex abrupto transitum faceret*).<sup>1184</sup> Elsewhere, Vergil is praised for having *bona oeconomia* when he has Venus tell Aeneas that she will never be absent from him in his trouble (*nusquam abero*)—and good thing, since we have already learned that the Greeks occupy every place where there is not fire, and so escape will necessitate divine involvement.<sup>1185</sup> In another example, it is *bona prooeconomia* that the Trojans and Italians come together for their truce dressed fully for battle, since battle is what they will soon experience after the ceremonies are divinely thwarted: *<instructi ferro> bona prooeconomia et rei futurae praeparatio: ruptis enim foederibus in bella descendent*.<sup>1186</sup> The examples so far have been fairly “local,” meaning that Vergil’s provisions for the fitting arrangement of his narrative span no longer than a book, but note the instance of *prooeconomia* at *Aeneid* 3.491. Here Andromache tells Ascanius that Astyanax would be a young man of the same age as he if he were still alive: *et nunc aequali tecum pubesceret aevo*. Servius zooms in on *pubesceret*, stating

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<sup>1182</sup> *oeconomia* refers to the entire process of making two separate narrative points align, while *prooeconomia* refers specifically to the “foreground” half only. For its definition as *dispositio carminis*, see *Aeneid* 1.226.

<sup>1183</sup> *Aen.* 9.715, 9.761 (DS)

<sup>1184</sup> *Aen.* 1.226; cf. the mention of the inferiority of abrupt transitions at *Aeneid* 4.1.

<sup>1185</sup> *Aen.* 2.620; for the preceding passage about Greeks and fire, see *Aeneid* 2.505.

<sup>1186</sup> *Aen.* 12.124



that this word makes Ascanius' participation in war six books later seem plausible: *<pubesceret> ut etiam in secundo diximus, proeconomia est, ut verisimile sit Ascanium in nono potuisse iam bella tractare.*

One of the other chief areas in which the theme of arrangement emerges is in the way Vergil is said to make coherent, seamless transitions between the various books of the *Aeneid*—or not, depending on which scholar one asks. The introduction to Book 4, for example, comes under fire from other scholars for not being sufficiently joined to the third book, but Servius has a much different opinion:

*stulte quidam dicant hunc tertio non esse coniunctum—in illo enim navigium, in hoc amores exsequitur—non videntes optimam coniunctionem. cum enim tertium sic clausurit 'factoque hic fine quievit,' intulit 'at regina gravi iamdudum saucia cura,' item paulo post 'nec placidam membris dat cura quietem': nam cum Aeneam dormire dixerit, satis congrue subiunxit, ut somno amans careret.*

Some people stupidly proclaim that this book is not joined to the third—for in the latter Vergil deals with a voyage, but in this one he deals with a love affair—not seeing that the join is of the highest quality. For though the third book ends with “And with this end made, he rested,” he introduces [in the fourth], “But the queen was now wounded with great worry.” Likewise a little later: “Nor does worry give quiet rest to her limbs.” For although he said that Aeneas was sleeping, he tacked on rather fittingly that the lover lacked sleep.

Book 9 faces similarly harsh scrutiny by those who deny that there is a suitable transition, but again they are said to make this accusation out of ignorance: *nescientes Vergilium prudenter iunxisse superioribus negotiis sequentia per illam particulam 'atque ea diversa penitus dum parte geruntur,'* “Not knowing that Vergil judiciously joined what follows to the preceding affairs by that clause, ‘And while those things were being carried out in a different area.’”<sup>1187</sup> These examples show clearly that seamless transitions are an important part of how a poet is to arrange his work, and Vergil again comes through this test with flying colors, despite the carping of certain uneducated fools.

I will close my discussion of the aesthetic judgments in the commentaries with a look at some particular stylistic standards that can be gleaned from the notes. At *Aeneid* 2.418 Servius identifies a

<sup>1187</sup> *Aen.* 9.1; observe that Servius' defense of the Book 9 transition is quite a bit more hesitant when it is first mentioned at *Aen.* 1.226 (*vituperabile . . . si ex abrupto transitum faceret, quod in nono fecit: quae res tamen excusatur uno sermone, 'atque ea diversa penitus dum parte geruntur'*). For more on book transitions, see the opening statements to Book 6.

short *excursus poeticus* (*strident silvae saevitque tridenti / spumeus atque imo Nereus ciet aequora fundo*) and states that such things should not be more than three verses long (*qui ultra tres versus fieri non debet*)—thankfully Vergil’s is just under two. The avoidance of homoeoteleuton is another common stylistic feature in Vergil, a tendency that Servius seems to take for granted as a proper decision, for example at *Aeneid* 11.464 (*tu, Voluse, armari Volscorum edice maniplis, / duc, ait, et Rutulos. equitem Messapus in armis . . .*): *Messapus autem ut diceret, vitavit ὁμοιοτέλευτον: nam vitiosum erat ‘Voluse’ ‘edice’ ‘Messape.’* That is, the name “Messapus” might have been in the vocative had it not then created a repetitive string of words ending in “e”—a worry that perhaps seems a bit odd to us, since the words would not have been adjacent anyway.<sup>1188</sup> Servius also isolates the famously disparaged *Dorica castra* phenomenon—that is, a syllable at the end of a word repeated at the start of the next—though he does not call it that. At<sup>1189</sup> *Aeneid* 5.467 Vergil opts for a pleonastic *–que* in the phrase *dixitque et* to avoid the similarity in consecutive syllables, which Servius says is censurable when it is frequent.<sup>1190</sup>

Other remarks indicate praise for *ornatus* (stylistic embellishment), though without any general guiding principles as to how this is achieved. This category includes repetition with polyptoton: *et bonum ornatum a sermonis fecit similitudine ‘magnis magna para’ dicendo.*<sup>1191</sup> Servius also likes the embellishment that comes from certain kinds of variation, as when Vergil gives the names Imbrasides and Hicetaonius in the same line with different patronymic endings: *et bene ex varietate syllabarum quaesivit ornatum: nam patronymica aut in ‘des’ aut in ‘ius’ exeunt.*<sup>1192</sup> Additionally, the verse *Alcandrumque Haliumque Noemonaque Prytanimque* is identified as a verse of Homer with only the conjunction changed, so that it seems not to be historical, but rather to be there for embellishment.<sup>1193</sup> Of course, other passages also refer to embellishment without using exactly the same terminology, as when Vergil is

<sup>1188</sup> cf. 12.781; for examples from DS, see *Aeneid* 1.220, 8.545, 11.112.

<sup>1189</sup> *maxime vituperabilis est iste quasi iocus.*

<sup>1190</sup> This makes little sense to me given that the elision would seem to produce about the same effect. Note also that for the phrase *Dorica castra* itself Vergil has not avoided the harsh sound of the line, and Servius has no excuse ready for him: it is simply poor composition (*Aen.* 2.27).

<sup>1191</sup> *Aen.* 3.159

<sup>1192</sup> *Aen.* 10.123; this variation likely has some opposite relation to homoeoteleuton. Note also the ornate diversity of colors in the floral description at *Eclogues* 2.50.

<sup>1193</sup> *Aen.* 9.764

said to have skillfully expanded his material in Book 4 of the *Georgics* by introducing extended metaphors, since he knew that the task of writing about bees was a short one that could be dealt with in a few verses, hence the need for extending his material: *sane perite, quoniam scit breve esse opus hoc de apibus et intra paucos versus posse consumi, usus est translationibus ad dilatandam materiam, dicens apes habere reges, praetoria, urbes et populos.*<sup>1194</sup> A few other passages also smack of *ornatus* without using the term itself. Here the commentator mentions that Vergil's diction is more powerful than it could have been otherwise, such as when Meliboeus states *nos patriam fugimus* instead of a more bland *relinquimus*,<sup>1195</sup> or when Vergil uses the word *amici* instead of a less moving *Hectoris*.<sup>1196</sup> In the same manner, when Corydon says that his love for Alexis has caused him to be slack in his chores so that his vines are *semiputata*, Servius points out that this is stronger than if he had said *inputata*, since it is worse to start something and not finish it than never to start at all.<sup>1197</sup>

### Vergil

The discussion of various categories above have provided a fair amount of indirect information already concerning Vergil as a poet, but I wish to fill that out here with some additional evidence for how Servius and DS view the author. The (pseudo-)biographical information on Vergil is neither extensive nor entirely reliable, but it is extremely important for understanding the commentators' approach to his poetry. First, as was shown near the beginning of this chapter, one of Vergil's primary intentions for his work is encomium—of Augustus primarily, but also of Pollio, Varus, and others. The prefaces also related how Vergil was deprived of his land in Mantua before receiving it back from Augustus, a feature that recurs especially in the *Eclogues*, particularly in the idea that Tityrus is a stand-in for Vergil when he

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<sup>1194</sup> *G.* 1.4

<sup>1195</sup> *Ecl.* 1.4

<sup>1196</sup> *Aen.* 1.486

<sup>1197</sup> *Ecl.* 2.70; recall Donatus' note to *Eunuchus* 49, where the formula employed is similar to what is used in most of the Vergilian examples.

talks about getting his property back.<sup>1198</sup> More references to the lost fields appear in *Eclogues* 3.93, where the “snake hiding in the grass” is taken as Roman soldiers occupying the countryside, since like snakes they can produce death. The following verse adds a supposed allegorical reference to the near-death experience of Vergil at the hands of the centurion Arrius, when he jumped into a river to save his life—hence, Servius says, the “ram” (*aries*) still drying its fleece from its dip in the stream. Other factoids include Vergil’s desire to go to Actium with Octavian in his campaign against Antony: *dicitur enim Vergilius sequi voluisse Augustum contra Antonium ad Actiaca bella properantem*.<sup>1199</sup> *Eclogues* 2 adds that Vergil had a thing for boys, and that the homosexual love found in this poem is taken as representative of one of these relationships.<sup>1200</sup> Thus, the *vita* of Vergil plays a significant role in the interpretation of the poems—and *vice versa*.

Various other comments about Vergil state explicitly what has been communicated indirectly through some of the aforementioned notes. For one, he is a lover of antiquarianism (*amator antiquitatis*<sup>1201</sup>) and exceedingly skilled (*peritissimus*) in this field.<sup>1202</sup> A Servian note at *Aeneid* 1.246 also adds that he loves to weave a bit of *historia* into his poetry, a characteristic clearly demonstrated in the above section on external consistency. Compare too the statement that no matter what he does he always makes some nod to *veritas*: *apparet divinum poetam aliud agentem verum semper attingere*.<sup>1203</sup> Just a few verses later DS again states that this “divine poet” always shows off his skillful knowledge whenever an opportunity is afforded: *poeta divinus peritiam suam inventa occasione semper ostendit*, followed by an explanation of how Vergil has deliberately used the language of augury when he could have expressed himself more as a layman would.<sup>1204</sup> On the other hand, when Vergil is not certain about a claim, he is careful to attribute it to common report to take the burden of responsibility from himself (*et*

<sup>1198</sup> E.g., *Ecl.* 1.1, 1.12, 1.27, et al.

<sup>1199</sup> *Ecl.* 3.74 (where Menalcas complains that he is forced to tend the nets while Amyntas goes boar hunting)

<sup>1200</sup> *Ecl.* 2.1, 2.15

<sup>1201</sup> *Aen.* 1.632 (DS)

<sup>1202</sup> *Aen.* 11.532 (DS); *Ecl.* 8.68 (DS)

<sup>1203</sup> *Aen.* 3.349 (DS); cf. 1.243

<sup>1204</sup> *Aen.* 3.463 (DS); cf. 8.552 (DS)

*haec consuetudo poetae est, ut ubi de incertis dubitat, famam faciat auctorem*<sup>1205</sup>), a claim that is evinced in part by the statement at *Aeneid* 1.15 that Vergil cites public opinion (*fertur*) when discussing Juno, so that he does not seem to be flaunting his *poetica licentia* in far-fetched stories: *et ingenti arte Vergilius, ne in rebus fabulosis aperte utatur poetarum licentia, quasi opinionem sequitur et per transitum poetico utitur more*. As often with Servius' Vergil, there is allowance taken for bending some rules, but it is always done with a sense of moderation, with any small "violation" inserted subtly and not brazenly.

As for Vergil's other poetic tendencies, we may form a short list here. He uses words very artfully, as when he pays special attention to verb tense when describing the panels on the temple at Carthage, a transfer of medium from portrait to poetry that requires particular care when trying to communicate the chronological aspects of the depiction.<sup>1206</sup> He always uses flood and fire imagery to describe war.<sup>1207</sup> When he comes across names that are rough or do not fit the meter, he either changes or altogether hacks up the word for his own purposes.<sup>1208</sup> He employs the *ars poetica* to ensure that in all his transitions there is some hinge to connect one book to the next.<sup>1209</sup> He also loves to take what he reads and present it in a different form in his own work: *sane adamat poeta ea quae legit diverso modo proferre* (with some examples from Naevius).<sup>1210</sup> He mostly treats *divum* and *deorum* as equivalent terms, though there is a difference between them.<sup>1211</sup> Finally, whenever new enemies are introduced against the Trojans, Vergil loves to cite the conquered Trojan *penates* as the cause—that is, they rise against the Trojans because they feel that a defeated people should stay defeated, as if marching around with subdued *penates* were a sign of arrogance that needed to be quashed.<sup>1212</sup>

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<sup>1205</sup> *Aen.* 3.551 (DS)

<sup>1206</sup> *Aen.* 1.484

<sup>1207</sup> *Aen.* 1.566

<sup>1208</sup> *Aen.* 1.343; cf. *Aen.* 7.47

<sup>1209</sup> *Aen.* 1.748; cf. *Aen.* 3.717, but note that *Aen.* 11.532 states that his abrupt transitions are censurable in several places.

<sup>1210</sup> *Aen.* 2.797 (DS); cf. *Aen.* 3.10 (DS).

<sup>1211</sup> *Aen.* 5.45

<sup>1212</sup> *Aen.* 8.12 (DS)

*Idiots and Idonei*

By this point it has become clear that Vergil is not the only one who is subject to the critique of Servius and, to a lesser extent, DS. The Vergilian commentaries have the same generic formulae for expressing variant opinions (“some . . . others . . .”) and can do so without taking a firm position, but a few examples have shown how vitriolic the notes. It is not just that certain scholars are wrong in making various assertions, but that they are stupid, ignorant, or uneducated. This technique of accusation makes up one of the unique features in the Servian commentaries, since with Servius the vituperation is of greater frequency and magnitude than that of the others (including DS).

For those who think differently from Servius, the language of stupidity recurs. The passage from the opening to *Aeneid* 4 cited above provided one example, as certain would-be scholars stupidly suggested that the fourth book was not sufficiently linked to the third. In other instances, as Troy is sacked and the women start shrieking, the noise strikes the *aurea sidera*, which some take as a reference to ceiling tiles, “which is stupid.”<sup>1213</sup> An etymology from Donatus is also in danger of falling from the plane of intelligence, for if *Parrhasio* comes from *parra avi* as Donatus says, and if *parra* is a Latin word, Donatus was being a dolt, for a Greek word does not admit a Latin etymology.<sup>1214</sup> When Vergil is giving the days of the month that are good for flight and bad for thieves, he is not (as it seems to the intellectually disadvantaged) suggesting that slaves should try to run away on a certain day or that thieves should wait for a more auspicious day to get what they want.<sup>1215</sup> As the new ship-become-nymph Cymodocea speaks to Aeneas, it is wondered why she is called *doctissima*. Servius states flatly that this is poetic, just like the metamorphosis itself; that some refer this adjective to the fact that she was the ship of Ilioneus is superlatively moronic: *nam stultissimum est, quod ait quidam: ideo ‘doctissima,’ quia Ilionei navis fuit.*<sup>1216</sup> And it is not only literary critics who get lambasted, for Epicurean philosophers

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<sup>1213</sup> *Aen.* 2.488

<sup>1214</sup> *Aen.* 11.31

<sup>1215</sup> *G.* 1.286

<sup>1216</sup> *Aen.* 10.225; cf. *Aen.* 1.458

stupidly say that the sun consists of atoms, and that it is born with the day and dies with the night.<sup>1217</sup> On the other hand, Servius shows a more moderate side as well when he speaks of the great uncertainty surrounding the original foundation of Italian cities, including Rome itself, such that commentators and writers of histories should not be condemned for their varying stories, since it is the great antiquity of the topic that makes it difficult to ascertain.<sup>1218</sup> Yet, perhaps this cool-headed note makes the vituperation of dullards even more powerful, since we know that Servius is perfectly capable of civilized rebuttal, provided his opponents in the debate show some decent sense.

These incompetents are contrasted with the authority of the *idonei*, the “suitable” authors and commentators.<sup>1219</sup> Nowhere does Servius formally specify who the *idonei* are, though we can tell from several passages that they are regarded as authoritative sources for lexical, mythological, and other types of knowledge, and they are singled out from “most” or “other” writers. The *idonei* can be *auctores*,<sup>1220</sup> but also *commentatores*, such as the ones who disagree with the commonly accepted report that according to history Turnus died in the first battle, but that Vergil kept him alive for the sake of *oeconomia* to keep the glory for Aeneas, a proposition which Servius rejects (*quod falsum est*) and then supplants with a correct account from Livy and the *Origines* of Cato.<sup>1221</sup> Other reliable sources include Euripides, Ennius, Cicero, Sallust, and of course Homer.<sup>1222</sup> Nowhere does Servius or DS call them *idonei* specifically, but it is clear that they have poetic and historical authority, just as Vergil himself does. And to be sure, that Servius and DS can identify who the *idonei* are puts the commentators themselves in the correct camp. It is a strategy that Servius uses in a most salient fashion with his vituperation of rival “scholars,” and it is one to which I will return later as I address the topic of didacticism in the Vergilian commentaries.

It is further to be observed, and no doubt has been already by my *idonei lectores*, that the majority of these scholarly tussles are not over neutral issues, but rather concern the reputation of Vergil himself: is

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<sup>1217</sup> *Aen.* 4.584

<sup>1218</sup> *Aen.* 7.678

<sup>1219</sup> Kaster (1978, 184ff.)

<sup>1220</sup> *Aen.* 6.154; cf. *Aen.* 10.164 (DS)

<sup>1221</sup> *Aen.* 9.742

<sup>1222</sup> Respectively: *Aen.* 3.46, *G.* 2.449, *Ecl.* 5.36, *Aen.* 10.539, *G.* 3.306

he or is he not a good poet? Servius in any case is clear: Vergil is to be defended from academic assailants at every turn, with very rare acknowledgment of a mistake that Vergil has let by. This defense of the poet happens ubiquitously and for all sorts of accusation—philosophical, historical, religious, grammatical, lexicographical, or literary. Certain scholars think, for instance, that only Books 1 and 2 of the *Georgics* really belong in a work pertaining to γῆς ἔργον, but Servius calls out their ignorance:

*nescientes tertium et quartum, licet georgiam non habeant, tamen ad utilitatem rusticam pertinere; nam et pecora et apes habere studii est rustici. licet possimus agriculturam etiam in his duobus sequentibus invenire: nam et farrago sine cultura non nascitur, et in hortis colendis non minorem circa terras constat inpendi laborem.*<sup>1223</sup>

[They say this] not knowing that the third and fourth books, although they do not have the working of the land, nevertheless pertain to what is useful for the rustic man, for keeping both herds and bees is a rustic concern—though we are also able to discover [the topic of] agriculture in these two subsequent books, for fodder does not come about without cultivation [of the land], and in tending gardens it is agreed that no lesser effort is expended concerning plots of land.

Another assault on Vergil fully deserves the criticism Servius returns upon the carping commentator. At *Ecloques* 2.23 the Vergiliomastix (“Whipper of Vergil”) attacks Vergil’s *lac mihi non aestate novum, non frigore deficit* (“New milk is not wanting either in summer or winter for me”) by a subversive punctuation suggestion: *sane hunc versus male distinguens Vergiliomastix vituperat ‘lac mihi non aestate novum, non frigore: deficit,’ id est semper mihi deest*, “Indeed, it is by badly punctuating this verse that the Vergiliomastix carps at it, ‘I have no new milk either in summer or winter; it’s gone,’ that is, I never have any.” Elsewhere Servius makes clear that a departure from *historia* at *Aeneid* 1.267 is not from the poet’s ignorance, but is due to the *ars poetica*. Finally, two examples will show the extent to which Servius minimizes Vergil’s (extremely rare) faults. When he addresses meteors at *Georgics* 1.366, Vergil is said to have followed public opinion, that is, instead of his normal precision in the area of external factual consistency. Well, Servius says, the poet does not have to say *everything* judiciously: *<praecipites caelo labi> sequitur vulgi opinionem: non enim omnia prudenter a poeta dicenda sunt*. Later in this same book Servius says that it is a little hasty for Dido to be calling her visitors Aeneadae, despite the fact that Ilioneus told her that Aeneas was their king—but after all, we should not marvel that such things show up

<sup>1223</sup> *G. praef.* 21-6



in an unedited work: *satis propere dixit Aeneadas, quamquam ab Ilioneo audierit 'rex erat Aeneas nobis,' nec haec in opera inemendato miranda sunt.*<sup>1224</sup> This remarkable justification returns us to the preface of the *Aeneid* commentary, where Servius had explained that the text was not completely finished, and here he calls upon that fact as a last-ditch effort to save Vergil from criticism.

Before passing on to exegetical methodology, I want to confirm briefly that the ubiquitous evidence for the ζήτηματα tradition from the other scholiastic corpora is also prevalent in the Vergilian commentaries, usually in some sort of justification for Vergil. Given that Zephyrus had been helping the Trojans get to Italy, for example, why does Neptune castigate that wind along with the others during the storm in *Aeneid* 1? Because Neptunes' anger was so great that he upbraids even a wind that was not present: *ira in hoc Neptuni exprimitur, si etiam eum obiurgat, qui non adfuerit.*<sup>1225</sup> Later in this book Servius says that Vergil himself answers the πρόβλημα, "Why are the deeds of Trojans and Greeks portrayed on the temple of Juno and not the deeds of the Phoenicians?" The reason is that they *did* have a pictorial record of their own ancestors, but in more valuable materials on the inside of the palace.<sup>1226</sup> See also the note by DS at *Aeneid* 9.74: *quaeritur, quid ibi faciant foci. sed in carminibus quaedam nec ad subtilitatem nec ad veritatem exigenda sunt*, "It is asked what the hearths are doing there. But in poems certain things should not be expected to partake in subtlety or truth." Finally, it is asked how Corydon complains of Alexis' departure at *Eclogues* 2.58 when it is clear from the beginning of the poem that he was already alone in the woods. There is a solution, though:

*ratione non caret. Epicurei enim dicunt, quod etiam Cicero tractat, geminam esse voluptatem, unam quae percipitur, et alteram imaginariam, scilicet eam quae nascitur ex cogitatione. unde ita debemus accipere, hunc usum per cogitationem illa imaginaria voluptate, qua et cernere et adloqui videbatur absentem. sed postquam obiurgatione sua in naturalem prudentiam est reversus, caruit utique illa imaginaria voluptate.*

[The issue] does not lack a rationale, for the Epicureans say (a thing Cicero also treats) that pleasure has two parts, one which is perceived [by the senses] and another that is imaginary, the one that is born from the cognitive faculty. On the basis of this fact we should understand the passage thus, that Corydon accessed this imaginary pleasure in his mind, which he seemed to

<sup>1224</sup> *Aen.* 1.565

<sup>1225</sup> *Aen.* 1.131 (DS)

<sup>1226</sup> *Aen.* 1.641; note that the formula Servius uses (*hic resolvit poeta illud quod reprehenditur*) bears some resemblance to the formula in the scholia to Aeschines, λύει τὸ ἀντιπίπτον.

perceive and address though it was absent, but after he returned to his natural state of mind by reprimanding himself, he certainly lost his imaginary pleasure.

### *Exegetical Methodology*

In essence the Vergilian commentators employ the same methodological approaches to the text as the other scholiasts were shown to have used—e.g., analogical reasoning, appeals to chronological differences, the assumption of alternate modes of speaking, appeals to general truth, or allegorical interpretation—and in most cases I will simply demonstrate with a few examples that Servius and DS partake of the same techniques. On the other hand, there are a couple of crucial differences in the way the commentators approach Vergil in terms of allegory and his relationship with other authors, Greek and Roman, and these have to do with some of the foundational assumptions about what Vergil is doing in and through his poetry.

First of all, there is evident a realization that words are not always to be taken in a literal sense, but are often metaphorical, ironic, adapted to the traits of a specific character, and so on. That is, there are different modes of speaking that are appropriate at different times and that must be interpreted in different ways. The word Servius uses to track metaphors is *translatio*, though his formula for such statements is structurally the same as in the Greek scholia, namely “This is a metaphor from . . . .” The mention of “perked up ears” (*arrectis auribus*) is metaphorical language when it is applied to humans, since it is taken from animals that have moveable ears.<sup>1227</sup> Other *translationes* are “reciprocal,” meaning that the first image can be used metaphorically for the second, and *vice versa*. Such are the pairs *timor* and *frigus*, *navis* and *avis*, *magister* and *pastor*, and *homines* and *herbae*.<sup>1228</sup> Semantic transference of other kinds occurs through changes in the mode of speaking, as we saw so frequently in the other scholiastic corpora. Characters may speak ironically, as when Deiphobus refers to the traitorous actions

<sup>1227</sup> *Aen.* 1.149, 1.152 (DS)

<sup>1228</sup> Respectively: *Aen.* 1.92, 1.224, 12.717, 4.513 (cf. 12.413); for the latter example, men are said to be in the “flower of youth,” while grass is said to “mature” (*pubescere*).

of Helen, his *egregia coniunx*.<sup>1229</sup> There is even a definition of this term when it first appears: *<egregiam vero laudem> ironia est, inter quam et confessionem sola interest pronuntiatio: et ironia est cum aliud verba, aliud continet sensus*.<sup>1230</sup>

This categorization of speaking modes also includes speech that is tailored specifically to individual characters. As in the case of metaphor, the reader must be aware of the degree of literalness he or she is bringing to a specific passage, and often the commentator signals that some sort of adjustment should be made to ensure the correct interpretation. Such is the case for the rumor at *Aeneid* 11.898 that the Volsci are completely destroyed; this is false, says Servius, because they had fled but had not been annihilated, but instead of blaming Vergil for inconsistency, he instead tells his reader to understand the discrepancy as a marker of a message's tendency to include more than just the truth that lies at its core: *sed vim exprimit nuntii, cuius mos est plus quam habet veritas nuntiare*.<sup>1231</sup> There are also numerous comments that refer to speeches as coming *ex persona*, that is, from the viewpoint of a specific character in the poem or of the poet himself, and understanding this focalization is crucial for a proper grasp of the text. Vergil even takes steps to safeguard himself as the poet in this respect. At *Aeneid* 1.8 Servius states that invocations in general are used to explain why a poet might have knowledge about things that he could not otherwise know as a human being, adding that Vergil correctly invokes the Muse to tell him why Juno was angry, there is no way he could know otherwise:

*sane observandum est, ut non in omnibus carminibus numen aliquod invocetur, nisi cum aliquid ultra humanam possibilitatem requirimus . . . bene ergo invocatur Vergilius, non enim poterat per se iram numinis nosse. item in nono libro nisi adderet 'Iuno vires animumque ministrat,' quis crederet Turnum evasisse de castris?*<sup>1232</sup>

<sup>1229</sup> *Aen.* 6.520; note that irony is quite sparse in these commentaries, which is quite surprising given the amount of material that is covered in them. This absence is perhaps indicative of Vergil's style, though it must also be said that Servius and DS do not put much emphasis on this term, which mostly appears only for the ironic use of *egregius* (cf. *Aen.* 4.93, 7.556).

<sup>1230</sup> *Aen.* 4.93; observe also how close this note is to the discussion of pronunciation by Donatus at *Eunuchus* 89.

<sup>1231</sup> Compare the similar language in the description of Neptune's slip in accusing Zephyr along with the other winds.

<sup>1232</sup> Cf. *Aen.* 1.535; it will be noted that invocations have nothing to do with genre in Servius' mind, but rather the plausibility of the poet's knowledge. It will also be noted that the example from Book 9 does not demonstrate the same epistemological query, but rather the necessity of a general reliance on the divine for explaining events that are otherwise impossible (cf. *Aen.* 2.620, pertaining to Venus' help of Aeneas when the whole city is covered by either Greeks or fire).

Indeed it must be observed that it is not in every poem that some divinity must be invoked, unless when we need something impossible for humans . . . Correctly therefore does Vergil make an invocation, for he could not have known on his own the anger of a divinity. Likewise in the ninth book: if he had not added “Juno administers strength and spirit [to Turnus amidst the Trojan army],” who would believe that Turnus would have escaped from the camp?

Other examples of focalization include a reference to Evander’s parting words to Pallas at their final farewell, where *digressu supremo* is said to be *ex persona poetae*, since only he knew that Pallas was about to die.<sup>1233</sup> Likewise at *Aeneid* 4.412 an exclamation of *improbe Amor* is said to be the poet’s own. Finally, not all such *ex persona* claims are without dispute, as when Vergil describes the sad fate of Nisus and Euryalus: *quin ipsa arrectis (visu miserabile) in hastis / praefigunt capita et multo clamore sequuntur / Euryali et Nisi*, “But [the Rutulians] fix on raised spears (a terrible sight) the very heads of Euryalus and Nisus and follow with great shouting.” Interestingly, a number of commentators had understood the proper names not as possessive genitives for the *ipsa capita*, but rather as the *clamor* of the Rutulians—that is, they followed the spears while shouting the names of their vanquished enemies—and Servius makes the necessary correction:

*<Euryali et Nisi> volunt non nulli clamorem esse militum; sed melius hoc a poeta dictum accipimus—nam Rutuli eorum non noverant nomina—ut sit ‘quin etiam capita Euryali et Nisi praefigunt in arrectis hastis et cum magno clamore comitantur’.*

Not a few want *Euryali et Nisi* to be the shout of the soldiers, but it is better for us to read it as said by the poet, for the Rutulians did not know their names, so that [the sense] is “But they also fix the heads of Euryalus and Nisus on uplifted spears and accompany them with a great shouting.”

As here, a reader must carefully distinguish which words are to be attributed to whom, lest an incorrect assumption lead one to think that Vergil has made an error in consistency. For those passages in which this distinction is difficult, the commentator is an ever-present help.<sup>1234</sup>

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<sup>1233</sup> *Aen.* 8.583

<sup>1234</sup> Further, there is a sort of focalization present in the depiction of the temple friezes in Carthage, where action normally depicted easily via language is suddenly limited through a more tactile artistic medium (e.g., repetitive action is easy for a poet with access to imperfect tense verbs, but difficult for a sculptor). Servius acknowledges this limitation in medium at *Aeneid* 1.483 (and see the expansion by DS here); cf. Russell (1981, 25).

Much has been said already concerning the role of general truth in the interpretation of Vergil's work. That his poems bear some relation to "the way things really are" is clear already from my discussion of Vergil's external consistency, but let me here introduce a few more examples that show a formula common in the Greek scholia. In order to interpret some of Vergil's comments, Servius makes an appeal to what "customarily" happens in real life through the phrase *solent enim* and other closely related formulations. One recalls the ἔθος γάρ statements that were so popular in other scholiastic corpora, particularly that of Euripides. When Cassandra is captured by the Greeks and lifts her burning eyes to heaven—eyes, because her hands are bound—DS clarifies that this is because people are accustomed to stretch out their hands to heaven in great turmoil: *solent enim homines in magnis motibus manus ad caelum tendere*.<sup>1235</sup> Dido's dream in which she is left all alone and seeks her lost countrymen in a deserted land is also said to be based on what is customary: *bonus adfectus: solent enim qui deficiunt suos desiderare, ut Alcestis moriens*, "This is a good show of emotion, for those who do not have their loved ones by their side are accustomed to pine after them, as the dying Alcestis does."<sup>1236</sup> In other places Servius appeals to the fact that herdsmen regularly lay claim to certain places for a defense against the cold<sup>1237</sup> and that statues are frequently made of the head and torso only.<sup>1238</sup>

Chronology is again taken to be a highly significant factor in the way language and cultural practices are interpreted within a poetic context. As in the scholia to Terence, frequent mention of the *maiores/prisci/veteres/antiqui* appears for an explanation of why many of Vergil's passages do not cohere with contemporary (to Servius) expectation. Glossing *confidentissime* as *audacissime*, for example, is justified by the fact that the *veteres* understood *confidentia* to be *audacia*.<sup>1239</sup> Servius remarks that Vergil's verb form *populat* is explained by the fact that the men of old used both *populo* and *populor*, though only the latter was still allowed in Servius' day, since the other had fallen from common usage.<sup>1240</sup>

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<sup>1235</sup> *Aen.* 2.405 (DS)

<sup>1236</sup> *Aen.* 4.468 (DS)

<sup>1237</sup> *Ecl.* 7.6

<sup>1238</sup> *Ecl.* 7.31

<sup>1239</sup> *G.* 4.444 (DS)

<sup>1240</sup> *Aen.* 12.263

Chronological appeals do not have to be lexical or grammatical in nature, though, as the tendency to give the title of a poetic work in the first line was also a feature of ancient authors.<sup>1241</sup> So too it is stated that the “our forebears” pranced about in their religious rites so that no part of their body would not be involved—song for the mind, and prancing about for the body: *sane ut in religionibus saltaretur, haec raito est, quod nullam maiores nostri partem corporis esse voluerunt, quae non sentiret religionem: nam cantus ad animum, saltatio ad mobilitatem pertinet corporis.*<sup>1242</sup> Understanding such differences between time periods becomes quite important for Servius and DS, and this chronological technique shows its fruit in how it can be used to solve problematic passages, as when the reference to *saeva Iuno* at *Aeneid* 1.4 is questioned: why is she *saeva* if the etymology of her name is from *iuuare*, “to help”? The issue is resolved once we realize that the ancients used *saevus* to mean *magnus*.<sup>1243</sup>

### *Allusion and Allegory*

I come now to the exegetical methods of Servius and DS that deserve special attention: allegorical interpretation and analogical reasoning (including the crucial topic of Vergil’s use of Greek literature). The first is not entirely new, as the scholarship on each of the other three authors has been shown to discuss matters “beneath the surface,” where a narrative, character, or statement in the original text is taken to have far greater meaning than it appears to have. With Vergil, however, the assumption that the poet is operating on different levels of meaning is greatly expanded. Not only are the commentators demonstrably more interested in hidden meaning of various kinds, but Servius’ starting assumption as stated in his prefaces is that one of the two pillars of Vergil’s *intentio* is the praise of Augustus, and for the *Aeneid* and *Eclogues*, at least, this praise is communicated allusively.

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<sup>1241</sup> *Aen. praef.* 89

<sup>1242</sup> *Aen.* 5.73

<sup>1243</sup> The other commentators are actually the correct ones here: *saeva* indicates that Juno is cruel to the Trojans.

There are very many notes that speak of what Vergil (or one of his characters) has done subtly (*subtiliter*), in secret (*latenter*), or through allusion (*adludere*). Such allusive language can be manifested in several areas, including in the rhetorical refinements in the speeches of the characters, the poet's occasional hinting at his own poetic style,<sup>1244</sup> and the category of "external consistency" that I isolated above, where Vergil slips in references to historical, scientific, or cultural knowledge through his poetic narrative. As Aeneas sees a raving Penthesilea depicted on the temple of Juno at Carthage, for instance, Vergil makes a special nod to a background myth: *<Penthesilea furens> furentem ideo dixit, quia sororem suam in venatione confixit simulans se cervam ferire. sed hoc per transitum tangit, nam furor bellicus intelligitur*, "He said that she was raving mad because she shot her sister while hunting, pretending that she was striking a deer. But Vergil touches on this through transference, for the madness is understood to be the warlike kind."<sup>1245</sup> For a geographical example, see *Aeneid* 3.104:

*<medio ponto> potest quidem intellegi secundum Sallustium, longe a continenti. sed altior est hoc loco poetae intuitus: nam apud chorographos legimus, quae insula in quo sit mari, ut Sardinia in Africo, Delos in Aegeo, et de aliis. de Creta omnes dubitant in quo sit mari; nam parte Libycum, parte Aegyptium, parte Achaicum, parte Ionium respicit. ergo 'medio ponto', ac si dici possit 'medio pontorum', quod Latinitas non recipit.*

"In the middle of the sea" can indeed be understood, in accordance with Sallust, as "far from the mainland." But in this passage the poet's viewpoint is deeper, for in the works of the geographers we read which island is in which sea, as Sardinia in the African Sea, Delos in the Aegean, and others. Concerning Crete everyone is in doubt about which sea it is in, for in one direction it looks to the Libyan, in another to the Egyptian, in another to the Achaean, in another to the Ionian. Thus, *medio ponto* is as if he could say *medio pontorum*, which Latinity does not allow.

Servius also sees subtle historical allusions in the ship race in *Aeneid* 5 during the funeral games of Anchises, where these *prima certamina* are an allusion to the tradition of Roman naval contests among the different *gentes* that began after the Romans first made use of a navy in the Punic War: *Punico bello primum naumachiam ad exercitium instituere Romani coeperunt, postquam probarunt gentes etiam navali certamine plurimum posse: ad quam rem in hoc certamine plurimum adludit poeta.*<sup>1246</sup>

<sup>1244</sup> Recall the case of *tenui avena* from *Eclogues* 1.2, which "secretly" (*latenter*) denotes the *genus humilis*.

<sup>1245</sup> *Aen.* 1.491

<sup>1246</sup> *Aen.* 5.114

Other Vergilian subtleties are astronomical, for which see the poet's care in selecting the name Saturnia for Juno when she is about to do harm, since he knows that the star of Saturn is associated with damage.<sup>1247</sup> Vergil also nods to physical phenomena when Aeolus says that Juno has given him his authority over the winds (*tu mihi quodcumque hoc regni, tu sceptrā Iovemque / concilias, tu das epulis accumbere divum / nimborumque facis tempestatumque potentem*), for the motion of the air—equated with Juno much as Neptune was equated with the sea—creates winds, over which Aeolus presides.<sup>1248</sup> It is also possible that Vergil has slipped in a subtle joke here: *dicendo autem 'quodcumque' aut verecunde ait, ne videatur adrogans, aut latenter paene iocatur poeta; quis enim potest ventos, id est rem inanem tenere?* “By saying ‘whatever [of a kingdom this is]’ either he speaks with reverence so as not to seem arrogant, or the poet secretly makes somewhat of a joke, for who is able to keep control over winds, that is, an empty thing?” It is also “secretly” that Vergil alludes to other fields of knowledge, such as philosophy<sup>1249</sup> and religious rite.<sup>1250</sup> Again, as I have shown, this sort of deeper meaning is a characteristic of Vergil, who is always pointing to something while dealing with something else, as the commentators put it.<sup>1251</sup>

Vergil's subtle nods are therefore quite broad in scope, but for the scholiasts the cornerstone of his allusive program is clearly the second part of his poetic *intentio* as stated in the preface: the praise of Augustus. The treatment of Augustus in the commentaries to the *Aeneid* is expansive and deserves special treatment, which I will not provide here, but what is clear is that many aspects of Vergil's poem are to be read as the glorification of the *imperator*. Some of the laudatory allusions are somewhat direct, as when a prophecy of Rome's future greatness involves the praise of Julius Caesar, a passage where Servius reminds his reader that Vergil's entire aim with this poem is to praise Augustus, just as he does in the catalog in the sixth book and again with the shield of Aeneas: *et omnis poetae intentio, ut in qualitate*

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<sup>1247</sup> *Aen.* 4.92; recall here Vergil's subtle use of names for the Trojans to describe their nature (cowardly, noble, etc.) in different situations.

<sup>1248</sup> *Aen.* 1.78

<sup>1249</sup> *Aen.* 4.210 (DS)

<sup>1250</sup> *Aen.* 3.607 (DS)

<sup>1251</sup> E.g., *Aen.* 10.419 (DS); *G.* 1.269



*carminis diximus, ad laudem tendit Augusti, sicut et in sexti catalogo et in clipei descriptione.*<sup>1252</sup>

Vergil's allusions can also be more secretive, such as when he elevates Augustus by praising Aeneas, since as the preface states the poet aims to laud Augustus *a patribus*—a principle that is validated by Servius explicitly at *Aeneid* 4.234, where he states that Aeneas' concern for Ascanius' *imperium* is put there for the praise of Julius Caesar. Thus, for example, the double agenda of the second book is indirectly in favor of the *princeps*: *in hoc libro duplex intentio est: ne vel Troiae quod victa est, vel Aeneae turpe videatur esse quod fugit*, "In this book the goal is twofold: that it not seem disgraceful that Troy was conquered, and that it not seem disgraceful for Aeneas to flee."<sup>1253</sup> And that Vergil aims to praise Aeneas is clear even at the end of the poem: *omnis intentio ad Aeneae pertinet gloriam: nam et ex eo quod hosti cogitat parcere, pius ostenditur, et ex eo quod eum interimit, pietatis gestat insigne: nam Evandri intuitu Pallantis ulciscitur mortem*, "[Vergil's] entire aim is for the glory of Aeneas, for he is shown *pius* by the fact that he considers sparing his enemy, and the fact that he kills him also bears a mark of *pietas*, for it is out of regard for Evander that he avenges the death of Pallas."<sup>1254</sup> That such praise of Augustus is "hidden" is confirmed elsewhere through comments that show glory being given secretly or through allusion.<sup>1255</sup>

The *Eclogues* too are said to be composed with the goal of encomium, but the discussion of these passages in the commentaries is executed in different terms. In his preface, Servius states that the *intentio* of the *Eclogues* is not only to imitate Theocritus—a topic I shall address below—but also to praise Augustus (or other noble men in certain places) through allegory in return for his previously lost property: *intentio poetae haec est, ut . . . aliquibus locis per allegoriam agat gratias Augusto vel nobilibus, quorum favore amissum agrum recepit.*<sup>1256</sup> The term *allegoria* is not found in the notes to the *Aeneid*, but it is a

<sup>1252</sup> *Aen.* 1.286; cf. the reinforcement of Vergil's aim in the shield description at *Aen.* 8.672 (DS), followed shortly by Servius' assertion that Vergil took great pains to make Actium seem like less of a civil war (which was considered shameful) since Augustus brought the gods of the fatherland with him, while Antony had the monstrous divinities of Egypt.

<sup>1253</sup> *Aen.* 2.13

<sup>1254</sup> *Aen.* 12.940

<sup>1255</sup> *Aen.* 1.4, 3.105, 11.169.

<sup>1256</sup> *Ecl. praef.* 33-5; note that allegory is not confined to encomium, and that as in the *Aeneid* Vergil does many things through allusive means (see *Ecl.* 1.1).

widespread indicator of allusive praise in the *Eclogues*.<sup>1257</sup> This is especially true in the first poem, in which Tityrus is read as Vergil, who had his land returned by Augustus.<sup>1258</sup> Corydon is likewise taken as a figure for Vergil in the second poem, for Vergil was said to be in love with a young boy (or three) as well. Here too there is an allegorical interpretation regarding Augustus, because when Corydon calls the unresponsive Alexis *crudelis*, the reader is allowed the possibility of reading Vergil speaking to Augustus in these verses: *crudelis Caesar, qui non flecteris meis scriptis et non das ereptos agros*.<sup>1259</sup> This “lovers’ quarrel” surfaces again at the end of the poem: when Corydon consoles himself with the hope of finding another Alexis who will be more cooperative, Servius says that many—and he does not discount this interpretation—wish to read this allegorically, as if Vergil should say: *invenies alium imperatorem, si te Augustus contemnit pro agris rogantem*, “You will find another emperor if Augustus despises you as you ask for your fields.”<sup>1260</sup>

Not every passage that could conceivably hold hidden meaning should be taken allegorically, though, as Servius makes clear from the very first verse of the bucolic poems: *et hoc loco Tityri sub persona Vergilium debemus accipere; non tamen ubique, sed tantum ubi exigit ratio*. What he means by *ratio* is partly revealed in the third poem, where he fights off two incorrect allegorical readings from other commentators. In the first passage, Menalcas accuses Damoetas of stealing a goat from Damon, and Servius says that some readers take this as an allegory for a biographical tale that he himself had never read elsewhere: Vergil had been in the practice of indulging in an occasional extra-marital rendezvous with the wife of Varus, the writer of tragedies, and one day Vergil gave this woman a tragedy he had written. This woman was herself very well educated and gave the play to Varus, saying she had written it herself. Varus then recited the piece as if it were his own work, and since a goat was the prize for a contest in tragedy, Damoetas’ goat-theft was taken as an allegory for Varus’ theft of the tragic prize.

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<sup>1257</sup> Humorously, the fourth poem is only one of two in the corpus to receive no mention of allegory in either Servius or DS, despite the strong tradition of allegorical reading (i.e., the “Savior” theme). For a brief summary of the Christian interpretation, see Tarrant (1997, 70).

<sup>1258</sup> *Ecl.* 1.29; cf. 1.1, 1.17, 1.27, 1.38

<sup>1259</sup> *Ecl.* 2.6

<sup>1260</sup> *Ecl.* 2.73

Servius responds that this is superfluous and that it is better not to make allegorical connections in the *Eclogues* unless they pertain to the lost fields: *sed melius simpliciter accipimus: refutandae enim sunt allegoriae in bucolico carmine, nisi cum, ut supra diximus, ex aliqua agrorum perditorum necessitate descendunt*.<sup>1261</sup> Servius comes against another allegorical reading later in the poem, where the ten apples that Menalcas says he has sent “his boy” are supposed to be the ten bucolic poems; again Servius finds fault with this interpretation on the grounds that there is no necessity (i.e., no reference to the lost fields).<sup>1262</sup>

The notes on the *Georgics* stand apart for their relative lack of allegorical interpretation, and the key words for signaling that Vergil has done something “secretly” or “subtly” are very few. In fact, Servius states explicitly that this poem does not have the same obscure problems as the *Aeneid* does except for just a few places, and that the only difficulty is understanding the (agricultural) contents: *illud quoque sciendum est, in his libris non esse obscuritatem in quaestionibus sicut in Aeneide, nisi in paucis admodum locis; sed in hoc tantum esse difficultatem, ut res positas intellegamus, id est τὸ κείμενον*.<sup>1263</sup> It must be said even so that the commentators do recognize encomium in the *Georgics*, as when Servius acknowledges that Vergil lauds Augustus, whom he invokes as a god to whom he gives praise early in the poem.<sup>1264</sup> Servius also reveals that Vergil altered the end of the fourth book, previously about Gallus, after Augustus ordered his execution: *sane sciendum ut supra diximus, ultimam partem huius libri esse mutatam: nam laudes Galli habuit locus ille, qui nunc Orphei continent fabulam, quae inserta est, postquam irato Augusto Gallus occisus est*.<sup>1265</sup> Clearly the *Georgics*, like the other works of Vergil, are considered in light of Augustus, but here there is no such system for discussing allusion and allegory.

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<sup>1261</sup> *Ecl.* 3.20

<sup>1262</sup> *Ecl.* 3.71

<sup>1263</sup> *G.* 1.43; this stance is not an irrational one given the fact that Servius takes the poem *a priori* as didactic, for if the purpose is to teach, then it could be considered counterproductive to introduce subtle truths that could be gleaned only with great difficulty—and the help of a Servius-like figure.

<sup>1264</sup> *G.* 1.24; cf. *G.* 3.29

<sup>1265</sup> *G.* 4.1

*Analogical Reasoning and the Greeks*

On the surface, the Vergilian commentators employ analogical reasoning in much the same ways as scholiasts to other authors. Analogy is an important aspect of grammatical theory throughout ancient scholia as we have seen all along, and the method has also been seen to include the pervasive incorporation of internal and external citations from other authors for the purpose of buttressing or discrediting grammatical, lexicographical, historical, philosophical, and literary phenomena found in the original text. In the same way Servius and DS appeal to grammatical analogy often, and the citation and quotation of other passages is ubiquitous, particularly in DS, who seems to have accessed a wider range of material than Servius. The way that the commentators view Vergil's appropriation of other authors, however, substantially influences the way in which they develop a theory of Vergilian intertextuality.

For the previously discussed authors, intertextuality is a recognized feature—and if not a predominant one, then at least a clear one. Euripides is said to have responded in particular to Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes* and to have modeled several characters and scenes on Homeric precedents, and his own dramas were an important part of the intertextuality of Athenian Old Comedy, as the scholiasts show. Aeschines is not proven to have engaged in any sort of “literary” or artistic allusion, though it is emphasized even so that his speeches cannot be understood properly apart from a close examination of other orations, historical documents, and even poetry—and of course the most important of these would be the speeches of Demosthenes, to which Aeschines' own statements are frequently compared, not least because such “intertextuality” is a necessary feature of the genre, as each orator has to advance his own claims while attacking those of his opponent. Terence too, it is assumed, can be understood only in light of other authors, and this is especially true for Menander, from whom both individual verses and larger narrative sequences are borrowed. Terence, after all, is forthcoming regarding the dependence of his own work on previous dramas and nods to the general *translatio* of the Greek theater to the Roman stage, a process into which he explicitly inserts himself.

The commentators to Vergil show that he too can be understood only in light of other literature, and an especially broad range of literature at that. Between Servius and DS together, nearly every Latin author that one can think of has been cited multiple times, and very many Greek authors as well from poets to philosophers and scholars, not to mention occasional references to sources on Phoenician history and the religious rites of Etruscans, Egyptians, and others. There are also plenty of passages for which Vergil himself is said to have done something intertextual, be it a borrowing of a verse, a divergence from the standard version of a myth, a general allusion, or the like. One example is reminiscent of the claim seen in Chapter 2 that Euripides had omitted the names of generals so as to avoid tedium, since Aeschylus had named them already in his *Seven Against Thebes*, or that Hecuba was to be blamed for thinking Menelaus would punish Helen, as if she should have read up on Euripides' other dramas to figure it out. Vergil writes of Juno's worry early in the *Aeneid*: *progeniem sed enim Troiano a sanguine duci / audierat Tyrias olim quae verteret arces*, "For she had heard that a progeny was come from Trojan blood that would overturn Tyrian citadels."<sup>1266</sup> Servius likes the pluperfect verb in the last verse: *et perite 'audierat'*; in *Ennio enim inducitur Iuppiter promittens Romanis excidium Carthaginiis*, "And skillfully he said 'she had heard,' for in Ennius Jupiter is introduced promising the Romans the destruction of Carthage." Without taking Ennius into account, the reader might assume that Vergil had used the pluperfect simply because it fit the meter or that he was being too unspecific as to how Juno acquired this information, and it is only by searching for intertextual relationships that one could, in Servius' mind, completely understand Vergil's art here. The same is true for other examples in which Vergil is said to have tailored his poetry to what he read in Greek authors. Just as Terence brought Menander onto the Roman stage, so too does Vergil take phrases, episodes, or sentiments from authors such as Homer,<sup>1267</sup> Apollonius,<sup>1268</sup> Theocritus,<sup>1269</sup> Hesiod,<sup>1270</sup> and others. After all, the prefaces to each Vergilian work state

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<sup>1266</sup> *Aen.* 1.20

<sup>1267</sup> *Aen.* 5.1, 5.85, 6.1, 6.532, 6.893, 8.274, 9.1, 11.483ff., 11.860, and scores upon scores of others. Note in particular the example at *Aen.* 8.183, where Servius is clear about the need for analogical argumentation: *secundum Homerum intellegendum*, "This must be understood according to Homer."

<sup>1268</sup> E.g., *Aen.* 2.81, 4.1, 5.426, 12.754

<sup>1269</sup> E.g., *Ecl.* 1.27, 2.24, 2.63, 5.32, 6.1, 7.1, 8.1, 9.23

that one of Vergil's chief aims is to imitate certain other authors, so it would surely be silly to assume that one could interpret Vergil without methodically investigating his relationship to his sources.

There is also an added element to Vergil's intertextuality, however, namely an emphasis on the poet's critical treatment of the sources that he has used. The other authors we have examined are said to bring in external material just the same as Vergil, but the way commentators talk about Vergil's adoption and adaption stresses a sophistication in the poet's method that is not seen in the other scholiastic corpora. This very principle (that Vergil is a sophisticated and careful handler of other literary works) is evident in a comment of DS mentioned above that Vergil likes to manipulate what he gets from other authors: *sane adamat poeta ea quae legit diverso modo proferre*, "To be sure, the poet loves to set forth in a different manner those things which he has read."<sup>1271</sup> This is also emphasized in the prefaces, particularly that of the *Georgics*, where the *ingens ars* of Vergil is on full display in his reworking of Hesiod, for while imitating Homer and Theocritus meant selection and narrowing, in the *Georgics* Vergil has turned a single book of Hesiod into four of his own by compacting broad things and expanding upon narrow things: *ingenti autem egit arte, ut potentiam nobis sui indicaret ingenii coartando lata et angustiora dilatando, nam cum Homeri et Theocriti in brevitatem scripta collegerit, unum Hesiodi librum divisit in quattuor*.<sup>1272</sup>

A few examples will demonstrate the point that Servius and DS are making. The first set concerns passages in which Vergil has improved upon his sources in the sense that he has elevated their dignity. Recalling that it is one of the commentators' primary demands that Vergil remain faithful to the *heroicus stilus*, let us examine a note at *Aeneid* 9.801. When Jupiter sends Iris down from the sky with weighty threats to keep Juno from helping Turnus while he fights within the Trojan camp, the threats themselves are omitted by Vergil where they were not by Homer: *<haud mollia iussa ferentem> melius*

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<sup>1270</sup> E.g., *G.* 1.175, 1.245, 3.280; it will be noted that the sum total of references to Hesiod in the *Georgics* commentaries is surprisingly small given that in the preface Vergil is said to have followed his lead.

<sup>1271</sup> *Aen.* 2.797 (DS); of course, Vergil also loves to keep some of those things unchanged (*Aen.* 3.10 [DS]), so the point cannot be taken too far, as if Vergil modified everything he received from other authors.

<sup>1272</sup> *G. praef.* 11-14; cf. the opening comments to *Eclogues* 7 and 9, where Vergil is said to have stitched together various bucolic poems from Theocritus into single pieces.

*quam Homerus hunc locum exsecutus est: salvo enim sensu vitavit et fabulosa et vilia; nam ille ipsas minas exsequitur*, “Vergil executed this passage better than Homer did. For, since the meaning [of the passage] was secure, he [Vergil] avoided things that would have been base and too full of *fabula*, for he [Homer] expresses the threats themselves.”<sup>1273</sup> It is also in the interest of elevation that Vergil carefully adjusts the arrangement of the spy mission in Book 9, a recollection of the *Doloneia* from Homer. Both Nisus and Dolon go out with the promise of a prize: the chariot of Turnus for the former, the chariot of Achilles for the latter. In a crucial change, however, Vergil has Nisus volunteer for the mission for honor’s sake, and it is only after this that Ascanius joyfully offers prizes as a payment for, not an inducement of, his courage; Dolon, on the other hand, had agreed only because of the promise of compensation: *<vidisti quo Turnus equo> melior oeconomia: Nisum noluit inducere postulantem equum Turni praemii loco, sed honestius facit ultro offeri, cum Homerus fecerit Dolonem Achillis currus inprobe postulantem.*<sup>1274</sup> Whatever Homer’s goal is in the characterization of Dolon as a greedy and reluctant warrior, the Vergilian commentator makes his point clearly: Vergil has carefully guarded the heroic quality of his poem by weeding out a minor detail that would have compromised it.<sup>1275</sup>

The second set of passage demonstrates Vergil’s ability to put a Roman spin on material he gets from Greek authors. A simple example appears at *Aeneid* 8.670, where Vergil has “superseded” Homer’s arrangement of offices in the Underworld: if Homer can place Minos, Rhadamanthys, and Aeacus as the judges of the evil dead, well, Vergil will inaugurate a Roman leader to give laws to the innocent: *et supergressus est hoc loco Homeri dispositionem, siquidem ille Minoem, Rhadamanthyn, Aeacum de impiis iudicare dicit, hic Romanum ducem innocentibus dare iura commemorat.* The other passage, crucial for understanding Servius’ notion of Vergilian allegory, appears in the preface to the *Eclogues*

<sup>1273</sup> *Aen.* 9.801; cf. *G.* 3.135, where material drawn from Lucretius is similarly purged of its baseness through metaphorical language.

<sup>1274</sup> *Aen.* 9.267 (DS); cf. Servius’ similar mention of altered *oeconomia* at *Aeneid* 12.266.

<sup>1275</sup> Compare two passages in the *Eclogues* where Servius says that Vergil has avoided the open mention of something dishonorable in order to maintain modesty (*verecunde*). One is an omission of sexually explicit language at *Eclogues* 3.8. The other is a very oblique allusion that would have been improper in more direct form. Corydon says that he will go collect apples for Amaryllis if Alexis does not want them, and Servius says that by *mala* he really means quinces, *Cydonea mala* (*Ecl.* 2.51). The allusion? Cydonian *mala* come from Crete, where it is disgraceful for boys to be without a lover. Thus, direct mention of this fruit would be a dishonorable jab at Alexis (not to mention a rhetorically disadvantageous one).

immediately after the exposition of Vergil's *intentio* regarding the allusive praise of Augustus and other noble men: *in qua re tantum dissentit a Theocrito: ille enim ubique simplex est, hic necessitate compulsus aliquibus locis miscet figuras, quas perite plerumque etiam ex Theocriti versibus facit, quos ab illo dictos constat esse simpliciter*, "In this matter only Vergil differs from Theocritus: for the latter never uses allegory, but in various places Vergil, compelled by necessity [i.e., of the lost fields], mixes in *figurae* [e.g., allegorical readings, metaphors] that he very often creates skillfully even from verses of Theocritus which are agreed to have been written by him in unallegorical fashion."<sup>1276</sup> Thus, Vergil has taken a piece of bucolic poetry with no hidden meaning and endowed it with a deeper signification, and a very Roman one at that. Servius continues in his preface by saying that this type of manipulation comes about through *poetica urbanitas*, and he provides an example of Juvenal's reworking of Vergil's *Actoris Aurunci spoliium*.<sup>1277</sup> It is this *urbanitas* that the Vergilian commentators see throughout his works.

### *Conclusions and Inconclusions*

I will make a few closing comments about the Vergilian commentaries before concluding with a panoptic summary of my findings for this entire investigation. First, let it be said that the commentaries of Servius afford ample opportunity for exploring the exegetical program of a single scholar across multiple genres, for which there were a number of formal distinctions, ranging from stylistic register to the level of allusivity and poetic *intentio*. Many principles of genre remain untouched, such as the question of meter and its role in different types of poetry, nor do we get any sense that Servius has any consideration for how Vergil's poetics may have changed over time, since his three works spanning

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<sup>1276</sup> *Ecl. praef.* 35-8; for this principle in action, see the allusion to Arrius made through Theocritean language at *Eclogues* 9.23.

<sup>1277</sup> *Satires* 2.100, *Aen.* 12.94



decades of his life are treated in some ways as if they were part of a single program,<sup>1278</sup> but even so the Vergilian commentaries provide a much more expansive discussion of genre than in previous scholiastic corpora.

What then of the use of Greek scholarship in the Vergilian commentaries? It should be clear from even a cursory reading that the influence is strong, not only in terminology for linguistic and rhetorical figures, but also in quotations of Greek passages, detailed comments on the overlap of Greek and Latin lexicography, and inclusion of some formulae that serve as the sinews and tendons for an ancient Greek literary commentary. It is instructive to see, for example, that Vergil's *raucae* at *Eclogues* 1.57 is glossed not bilingually, but with a Greek word only (*βραγχώδεις*). It is clear from such examples that Servius and DS not only "think in Greek," but also expect their readers to be able to follow along.

What of his readership? Here it is perhaps possible to speak with more authority than in the case of other scholiastic corpora, since with Servius we have a body of notes that are at least to some extent shaped and designed by a single scholar, whereas for other authors our commentaries are more of a (at times) haphazard collection of several sources, where we must admit the possibility that these sources could easily have had different target audiences. In any case, Servius' work is fairly homogenous and is tailored to the student, probably an intermediate one given the occurrence but not superabundance of simple grammatical aids, the relative absence of plain paraphrasing compared to other scholia, and the occasionally complex presentations of literary, historical, or philosophical concepts, along with a basic assumption that most rhetorical terms will already be familiar to the reader—indeed, Servius was famous as a *grammaticus*, a teacher for intermediate students. If nothing else, the sheer size of the commentaries would seem daunting for a beginning student, and it should probably be assumed that Servius has collected his notes for serious pupils, though perhaps even as an aid to other teachers, as Donatus had done. Whatever the age and ability of his target readership, it remains clear that Servius fashions himself as a teacher in his commentaries and takes his own advice in the preface to the *Georgics*, where it is

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<sup>1278</sup> Contrast with the fact that Euripides was pardoned for at least one of his supposed slips in the *Rhesus* on the grounds that he wrote it in his youth, an implication that he became a better, more knowledgeable poet in his later years.

stated that didactic works need first- and second-person participants, both of which are explicitly recognized in the commentaries. The *idonei auctores*, as the name suggests, possess the *auctoritas* to define what is correct and incorrect, and Servius is there as a mediator of their authority—and therefore a partaker in it—whether it is to teach a grammar lesson, elucidate the theory of the *ars poetica*, or uncover hidden meaning that Vergil has encoded for the careful reader.<sup>1279</sup> As the careful reader *par excellence*—sophisticated poets need sophisticated expositors—Servius sides with Vergil by defending him against bad critics and by truly understanding his poetry, and Servius’ readers are implicitly encouraged to do the same, to the exclusion of straw-men and *stulti*.

Lest all this seem too germane to the work of modern commentators, I close with a few passages that remind us just how different Servius’ mindset is from ours and just how much information has been lost to us regarding ancient scholarship. At times the ancient commentator can become obsessed with what to us is a trivial matter, say, the position of the *non* at *Eclogues* 3.108. There are also times at which the ancient hatred for extraneous words goes out of bounds, as when the vocative phrase *perverse Menalca* is thought to be given in order to differentiate the character in this poem from some other “noble Menalcas.”<sup>1280</sup> Our understanding of even the most commonly known dates from antiquity is shaken to the core when we learn that Julius Caesar was assassinated on May 17th (!).<sup>1281</sup> In other passages we are amazed at the obviousness of the note: when Corydon invites Alexis over with an appeal to *cervos*, it is stated that this polyvalent term must here refer to actual deer and not the props to a house—the lover would invite the beloved over for the pleasure of hunting, not household chores!<sup>1282</sup> We also learn that Vergil allegorizes Augustus as a young man (*iuvenem*) because the senate passed a decree forbidding anyone from calling him a boy, lest his *maiestas* be impugned.<sup>1283</sup> There is also a healthy dose of odd mythology, as in the suggestion that the reason Gorgons were said to turn their spectators into stone is that, as Serenus the poet says, they were originally very beautiful girls whose appearance caused young

<sup>1279</sup> For Servius’ own *auctoritas*, see Kaster (1988).

<sup>1280</sup> *Ecl.* 3.13

<sup>1281</sup> *Ecl. praef.* 41f.

<sup>1282</sup> *Ecl.* 2.29

<sup>1283</sup> *Ecl.* 1.42

men to gawk.<sup>1284</sup> DS apparently felt this way about some mythological variants as well: when he tells Nicander’s version of Pan dressing up in white fleeces so he could appear beautiful to the Moon and crawl into bed with her, he adds snidely that only a Greek could have come up with this (*huius opinionis auctor est Nicander: nec poterat esse nisi Graecus*).<sup>1285</sup> And yet, despite many examples of what we would call silly or inaccurate scholarship, the attention to detail is remarkable and allows for interpretations that most of us modern readers would probably never consider, as in *Eclogues* 2.47 when Corydon’s enumeration of flowers, meant as an enticement for Alexis to join him, comes with a bite: the specimens he mentions used to be beautiful young boys who suffered floral metamorphosis because of a misadventure in love—so watch out, Alexis! One also does not expect the sort of drama coaching that appears in this same poem for Corydon’s *o formose puer*, which Donatus says must be pronounced with a suspended “Oh” and a delayed *formose*, since Corydon was about to say something harsh and then thought better of it, something to the effect of, “Ooooooh . . . you . . . you . . . [sigh of resignation] beautiful boy . . . .” However odd they may be, such perspectives not only provide an important window into the mind of the ancient scholar, but they also help us question our own perspectives by providing a different exegetical paradigm for us to consider.

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<sup>1284</sup> *Aen.* 6.289

<sup>1285</sup> *G.* 3.391 (DS)

## CONCLUSION

### An Introduction to the Road Ahead

A few things may be said in summary on the basis of my investigation. First, the extant scholia to Euripides, Aeschines, Terence, and Vergil are multitudinous and variegated. All of the scholiastic corpora partake of the variorum style to some extent, but the degree to which the corpus is streamlined differs considerably for each author. The Euripidean scholia in their extant form constitute the best example of a disheveled conglomeration of facts and opinions, replete with repetitions and contradictions, especially when a modern editor like Schwartz attempts to bring numerous manuscripts into one “collective text.” The scholia to Aeschines are somewhat more streamlined, with less repetition and more internal markers (“as we said/ as we have observed”) that show a more unified whole—especially for those passages for which we actually do find corresponding notes to answer the internal cross-references. The Bembine scholia to Terence provide an exercise in deciphering notes for which there is not a large corpus of manuscripts from which one can assemble readings and choose the best “collective text.” The work of Eugraphius, in contrast to the open epistemological approach of the variorum commentary of Donatus, shows what is possible when a scholar adopts a particular focus (in this case rhetorical) and pursues that end to the exclusion of other types of exegesis. Servius represents the other end of the spectrum opposite Euripides: a single, authoritative commentator whose work is clearly a unity with copious internal references and continuous threads of discussion that are woven throughout the work.

The intended readership of the scholia also seems quite varied. With Servius one may be more certain that the text reflects a distinct teacher-pupil relationship in a school setting, though the depth of some of his comments might suggest a more mature audience as well, perhaps junior *grammatici* in training under the master. The other corpora do not betray such leanings with anywhere near the same

degree of clarity. Euripidean scholarship is again the most difficult to define, as one finds a juxtaposition of sophisticated notes on literary criticism with basic glosses and mythographic information that seem to be for the uninitiated, a combination that seems to reflect what Dickey sees as the varying traditions of ancient exegesis ranging from the high-quality scholarship of Alexandria to the popularizing texts of the following centuries. Rhetoric is another interesting window through which to view the supposed readership of scholiastic corpora, most notably with Terence and Vergil, for here one can see the extent to which technical aspects of the art are defined or assumed to be understood, and though at times there are definitions of rhetorical figures and terminology pertaining to methods of argumentation, often the beginner would be lost (or would at least need a teacher nearby to offer explanations). However that may be, what is clear is that the scholia are hardly all the same, but consist of a variety of comments that suit a variety of purposes for a variety of readers.

One of the more promising areas of research in the scholia would seem to be for ancient conceptions of genre. In most cases the scholia do not provide anywhere near a comprehensive definition for the type of literature under which the original text should be classified, but in each case there are hints as to how the reader is to understand the peculiarities of the work at hand. This was less the case with Aeschines, though even there we find evidence of ancient scholars making arguments on the basis of certain assumptions about Athenian oratory—including some of its more intriguing points of overlap with dramatic productions from the theater. For Terence and Euripides there is a continued concern for what is “comic” or “tragic,” and though definitions are not always clear or consistently upheld, again the commentators show a basic sensitivity to the different modes in which literature can partake. For Servius, the definition of various genres reaches its most refined point with his tripartite association of Vergil’s three *genera dicendi*, to which many individual scholia correspond in the course of the commentaries.<sup>1286</sup>

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<sup>1286</sup> For Greek literature, Nünlist (2009, 94) suggests that one should read individual ancient literary treatises rather than the scholia to get a complete picture of ancient generic categorization. No doubt this is true, especially as regards theoretical conceptions of genre, but it is nonetheless crucial to see how genre theory is played out in the trenches, so to speak, of running commentaries.

In terms of literary criticism (insofar as can be judged on the basis of these case studies), at least some ancient scholars seem to have put a premium on realism and believability. For Aeschines the standard seems clear: “This is true, this is false.” And, if an orator is going to lie as Aeschines and Demosthenes are both said to do, then at bare minimum he needs to cover his tracks skillfully, or his house of cards will come falling down. For the poets, however, realism was no less important as a consideration, if a less rigorously demanded one. True, poetry is assigned a license to manipulate facts and language, but there are certain limits within which the poet must stay. For some scholiasts, at least, this seems to have been part of a larger poetic program of “art concealing art,” in which the poet can get away with more or less anything provided he do so with a sufficient amount of allusion—and indeed, such concealment was considered an aspect of the poet’s skillful achievement. Other aesthetic judgments included the reasonable use of language and a proper level of specificity—not so terse as to be obscure, but not so precise that the audience becomes bored and runs off to watch the tight-rope walkers next door. In this area specifically one sees the delicate balance that had to be maintained by the poet—*qua* tight-rope walker—with carping *obtrectatores* ready to accuse even a slight misstep. Finally, the stylistic register of a poetic work was also crucial, an aspect of literary criticism tied inextricably in some cases to the idea of genre. Grand literature needs to remain grand, and lowly works should not stick their head out too high. And if there is a violation of such principles, the poet will need to have some excuse, such as an extremely distressing situation that might cause a character to speak in irregular (and otherwise blameworthy) ways. It is this fascinating dissociation of the author and his character that enables the former to maintain propriety, even if the latter cannot.

Finally, we witnessed how all four corpora embraced the same essential range of methods for going about the work of interpretation. The most dominant of these is analogy, a principle that is evoked on every page with numerous citations to other literary passages that are assumed to have some relationship to the original text—and in some cases that relationship constituted a type of intertextuality that was extremely particular, requiring a keen eye and a bear-trap of a memory. In their exegesis, all the scholia also shared in various other appeals: to differences in chronology, to changes in language and

culture, etc. If something odd appeared in the original text, then it was possible that calling upon a range of knowledge and experience could provide a solution that would allow the author to escape undue criticism. These methods, largely consistent across the four case studies, also remind us of the exegetical techniques we witnessed from Classical and Hellenistic sources.

In view of the vast amount of scholiastic material available, what I have done is by no means conclusive in terms of establishing a rubric for how ancient literary commentaries work. I still have not addressed the behemoth of Homeric scholarship, nor have I exhaustively accessed the scholia to Demosthenes as a litmus test for the Aeschinean scholia, nor indeed the scholia to Cicero to test the overlap of Greek and Roman commentaries on oratory. There remain also the scholia to Hesiod and Theocritus for a comparison with Servius' *Georgics* and *Eclogues*, and I have not yet explored the overlap in technique between the rhetorical commentaries of Eugraphius on Terence and Tiberius Claudius Donatus on Vergil. Further, there could be fruitful investigations of "non-literary" commentaries on religious, medical, philosophical, and other texts (e.g., Galen on Hippocrates, the tradition of Biblical exegesis, and others). Thus, the work is hardly done. What I have accomplished is the construction of a prototype model for understanding the content and form of ancient commentaries, and I have found that over four relatively diverse case studies my typology is able to account for most of the notes, even if I am not able to treat them all in such a space as this.<sup>1287</sup> And so this is hardly a "conclusion," but rather a transition into other types of commentaries to see if the principles of interpretation and the concerns for various subsets of knowledge are consistent in other scholiastic corpora. For now, let me hypothesize that my project has hit upon some crucial elements of ancient scholarship that contribute to our understanding of the original texts and the environments in which they evolved.

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<sup>1287</sup> And let me stress again that I have not aimed at making chronological claims (largely impossible) or assertions that all of the scholia are somehow indicative of "ancient thought," or that they should be read as a unified "commentary," except perhaps in a few cases. I have pointed out simply some features that can be observed in the scholia, with some consideration for how those features change or do not change from commentary to commentary across different genres and different cultures.

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