Analysis of the Sunken Russian Cruiser Moskva and Implications for Russia and the World Navies

Green or Brown Future for the World: Geopolitical Dimensions of the EU Green Deal

The integration challenges of Ukrainian refugees in the Netherlands: What's next?

Book Review: The Legitimation of Power

Beyond the Horizon International Strategic Studies Group (BtH) is an independent next-generation think & do tank in Belgium. BtH aims to promote glocal (global & local) peace and security by its strong in-house capacity and extensive network of partners throughout the world.

Disclaimer and Other Legal Information

Photo Credits : @salajean / Envato Elements

Contents

Foreword

Dear Reader,

We are happy to be with you in this second issue of 2022. We again had to make hard choices in selecting the articles to make it to the journal. Most notably, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and its repercussions on the global geopolitical landscape are hard to escape. Yet, we brought three articles on three different topics to your attention.

The first article is a policy brief that investigates sinking of Russian Cruiser Moskva and implications for Russia and the world navies. Putting onto the spotlight the importance of A2AD systems in modern navies, the article delves deeper to answer the questions of "how" and "what now" with the limited information available open to public. The author concludes with three policy recommendations.

The second article brings to your attention the importance of implementation of the EU Green Deal's regulations while Europe has to compensate for the consequences of the war in Ukraine. Accordingly, the authors posit new environmental legal regulations under the deal will initiate a wave of green regulations in other regions to increase the compatibility of the regional companies to the emergence of new sustainable markets in the world. The authors also highlight importance of maintaining the pace of enacting the EU Green Deal regulations to preserve the competitiveness of the clean tech industries.

The third and the last article analyses the rapid reaction of the Dutch government regarding the influx of refugees from Ukraine. It focuses on integration policy measures taken in housing, language learning and health alongside the challenges experienced in the process. The policy brief ends with several policy recommendations which primarily highlight importance of structural orientation programs at the local level for overcoming the challenges the new comers face.

Finally, we have a book review on David Beetham's book *« The Legitimation of Power »*. The author offers an alternative reading of legitimacy, straying from widely accepted definition proposed by Max Weber. Accordingly, there are three underlying factors of legitimacy; legality, the justifiability of the rules in terms of beliefs and values present in each society, and actions of consent to legitimacy. He contends that people's reasoning of authority also matters for legitimacy. In a stark contrast to Weber, people must find it logical to give their consent to the authority, thus legitimise their power.

Sincerely yours,

Beyond the Horizon ISSG

Analysis of the Sunken Russian Cruiser Moskva and Implications for Russia and the World Navies

Policy Brief

by Furkan Akar[1]

1. BACKGROUND

- On 13 April, the Ukrainian governor for the Odesa region, Maksym Marchenko, said on his Telegram channel that the Ukrainians had hit the Russian flagship of the Black Sea Fleet Moskva with two Neptune missiles.[2] There have been three previous reports about other warships (Ropucha class Saratov, Patrol boat Vasily Bykov, and frigate Admiral Essen), and only the hit of Saratov was confirmed.[3] Thus, the news about Moskva was received with a grain of salt.

- On 14 April, Pentagon confirmed a blast on Moskva without specifying any reason.[4] Russian MoD rejected Ukrainian claims, asserting the explosion occurred due to a fire reaching to the ship's arsenals.[5] According to Russian official statement, the crew had put out the fire and evacuated Moskva. Russian media agency TASS reported that the ship sank while the cruiser was being towed towards Odessa.[6]

- On 15 April, a US senior defence official confirmed that Moskva was hit by two R-360 Neptune anti-ship cruise missiles.[7]

- On 18 April, photos and videos of the cruiser showing the extent of the damage started to circulate on social media.[8]

- On 24 April, more than 10 days after the incident, Russia acknowledged that one person was killed and 27 sailors were missing, contradicting the previous statement that the crew was safely rescued.[9]

2. ANALYSIS OF THE INCIDENT

There are still unknowns about what/how exactly happened, and there is not sufficient concrete evidence yet to make a final verdict. Therefore, the analysis at your hand was made based on the available information and through benchmarking with the standard operating procedures within the context of the Western navies.

2.1. How can you attack Moskva?

Before scrutinising what happened, it is worth briefly explaining how an anti-ship missile works and how a warship defends herself against air threats (anti-air warfare).

Targeting

To be able to hit a warship, you need its location. Without proper targeting, you cannot fire a missile. The million-dollar question is how the Ukrainians pinpointed Moskva. There are two possibilities. The first is the official story that they flew a TB2 to locate and distract the ship. It is not very convincing to buy this argument for the reasons that will be explained in the coming sections. The second possibility is receipt of intel from the West.

Itamilradar reported on 12 April that they tracked a USN Boeing P-8A "Poseidon" mission over the Black Sea for the first time since the start of Russia's invasion.[10] The aircraft is equipped with AN/APY-10 radar, which has a range of 200 nautical miles. [11] Moreover, it approached 20 km the Snake Island, the closest encounter observed by Itamilradar. According to The Times, the P-8A patrolling the Black Sea on 13 April closed its transponder for three hours. This increases the plausibility of the second scenario.


Figure-1: The Flight of P-8A Poseidon, Source: The Times[i]

A Brief Description of How Anti-Ship Missiles Hit

After launching an anti-ship missile, it proceeds to the target ship in low altitudes to avoid detection, known as sea-skimming. The more it gets closer to the ship, the lower the altitude becomes at which the missile flies. In the terminal phase, the last stage of a missile's flight pattern, the anti-ship missiles with active homing (other types also exist) activate their own radar to seek the ship, and some missiles have the capability to do pop-up and dive manoeuvre to evade ClWS (Close in Defence Systems).

There is little available information about the Neptune missile. According to open-source data, RK-360MC Neptune[12] is a subsonic missile with active radar homing and travels 0.75 mach (900 km per hour), similar to the famous "Harpoon".[13] Neptune also has a skimming feature and flies 10-15 metres above the water, and it lowers its altitude up to 5-10 [metres] in the terminal phase.[14] The missile carries 150 kg of explosives. These figures mean that it does not travel fast, which makes its detection easier than supersonic or hypersonic missiles, and it includes a light payload than its counterparts. A high-ranking Russian naval officer confirmed this perception in an interview published four months ago and stated that Russian warships in the Black Sea Fleet have appropriate defensive systems.[15] Therefore, Russia does not have to worry about Neptune missiles.

In naval warfare, you are required to launch several successive missiles (salvos) to sink a ship. The number of missiles needed depends on the ship's size, her air defence capabilities and the amount of the payload it carries. Of course, it is also related to where the missile hit on the ship. Chance is always a factor. For instance, the missile misses the Moskva's Sandbox launchers so close. However, according to Cowden's calculation, the Ukrainians should have launched at least 11 missiles to sink Moskva.[16] It is also an important question why the Ukrainians shot just two missiles. Maybe, they had just two or wanted to keep for the future.

2.2. What capabilities did Moskva have against the incoming missile?

Moskva has the following capabilities[17];

- Two 3D search radars; Voskhod MR-800 (Top Pair) and Fregat MR-710 (Top Steer)
- Eight Fire Control Radars; 1x Argon 1164 (Front Door), 1x 3R41 Volna (Top Dome), 2x 4R33 (Pop Group), 3x MR-123 (Bas Tilt), 1x MR-184 Lev (Kite Screech)
- 64 S-300F Fort (SA-N-6 Grumble) long-range SAMs
- 40 OSA-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) short-range SAM
- 1x AK-130
- 6x AK-630 CIWS (Close-in-weapons systems)
- Chaff
- Electronic Warfare Systems (Rum Tub and Side Globe EW antennas)

Figure-2: Moskva's sensors and weapons, Source: Naval Graphics[ii]

Warships are designed with a layered defence approach. Multiple radars and weapons are used to protect against threats at different ranges. Search radars scan for contacts in their range, and most modern radars automatically track them, meaning that the radar tracks the path of one or multiple targets. Then, the tracks are identified into categories such as enemy, friend, neutral, warships, merchant vessel, aircraft, or incoming missile. If it is recognised as hostile and the crew decides to engage, the target is tracked by a fire control radar. Then, a warship can engage the enemy unit with multiple weapons depending on its type and range.

If one weapon fails, the next one can take care of the threat. That is why warships have several search and fire control radars with many channels which can be connected to different weapons within those fire control radars enabling the crew to use various weapons, e.g. long-range SAMs (Surface-to-Air-Missiles), short-range SAMs, naval guns.

Figure-3: Air Defence by a Warship, Source: CIMSEC[iii]

Electronic countermeasures (ECM) can be used in passive mode to identify targets (a missile, helicopter, or fighter jet) according to their specifications (altitude, speed, or electromagnetic spectrum in which a missile's radar works) or in active mode to conduct jamming. ECM systems have multiple antennas separate from radars providing 360-degree coverage.

EW becomes very important if a warship fails to detect or intercept an incoming missile with search radars. For instance, if a rocket is fired against you, an EW operator can detect it and even designate which missile is coming by comparing the missile's specifications with ECM's database. Then, the ship attempts to thwart the missile by employing jamming with ECM and firing CIWS. As a last resort, a warship will launch chaffs to deceive a missile and make a manoeuvre to evade the incoming missile. The drawback of ECM is their shorter ranges than radars, giving the crew a limited time.

If the ship had detected the incoming missiles (there is also an unconfirmed video showing her firing against the missile[18]), she is supposed to engage them with S-300F, OSA-M, AK-130, AK-630s and make an evading manoeuvre by firing chaffs, respectively. Given that, the ship has many alternatives to defend itself and that is why she was assigned to provide air defence to other military assets and ports within her coverage.

This is a highly technical issue concerning anti-Air Warfare. So, suffice it what has been said on this. In the following part, only relevant information to grasp the attack against the Russian cruiser will be given.

3. WHAT COULD HAVE GONE WRONG WITH MOSKVA?

3.1. Technical Reasons

The Neptune is a subsonic missile with a speed of 900km per hour and allegedly launched from 65 nautical miles (120 km) away from the ship.[19] So, the ship had almost 8 minutes to respond to it, and it is not a short period if you are operating under war conditions. If the ship did not fire any missiles and employ countermeasures, we could understand that the crew failed to detect the missiles.

After the sinking of the cruiser, some experts pointed out that the cruiser and systems onboard were almost 40 years old and could be too old to detect Neptune missiles. Of course, having a modern radar will be more helpful to counter threats, yet the Harpoon missile, equivalent to Neptune and used as the main anti-ship missile used in NATO countries, was also developed in the 1970s. [20]

Therefore, Moskva is expected to detect the Neptun considering its specifications, although detecting a sea-skimming anti-ship missile is challenging for navies. It is also necessary to consider the radar signature of the Neptun, but no information exists in the open sources at the time of writing. Even if her search radars failed, ECM operators should have detected the missiles, which would give a chance to Moskva to counter the missiles.

The caveat here is the assumption that the sensors, radars, and weapons are in order and functioning as expected.

3.2. Atmospheric Conditions

Precipitation and waves could have played a role in the failure of detecting the missile as they may have created clutters on the radar scope that complicated distinguishing real tracks from the errors.[21] CNN reported that they could not verify the ship was hit because of the storms over the Black obscuring satellite imagery and sensory satellite data.[22] Clouds do not necessarily obscure radars, but they may indicate a high wind speed increasing wave height (a problem in detecting a sea-skimming missile) and probability of precipitation.

When checking the historical weather data, the weather fluctuated on 13 April. The exact time the Ukrainians attacked the Russian ship is not yet precise. However, "rumours" started to circulate on social media, hinting at 21:19 LT in Ukraine.[23] We can surmise that the attack took place before 21:00 LT.

There are different data about wind on 13 April (Windguru (3 kts)[24], Windy (10 kts)[25], World Weather Online (15 kts)[26]), and all of them show almost no rain but a massive cloud coverage in the evening. Visual crosser data shows a wind of 20 kts and drizzle (0.3) in the evening, coinciding with the probable hours of the strike against Moskva.[27] The distance between the warship and the coast where the stations are based is a caveat in this data.

If we put the maximum wind speed into the Beaufort Scale, the wave height should be 2.5 meters at maximum.[28] This will affect radar, but it is hard to accept that Moskva failed to detect the missile due to this weather.

3.3. What is the Impact of Crew on the Incident?

Having a skilled crew and efficient organisation among them are crucial in warfighting. There are reports claiming Russian forces assigned conscripts to the Russian warships.[29] Yet, it is implausible that they are tasked with a critical technical role since radar/weapon operators are generally skilled and experienced senior staff. The extended deployment period and low morale could also make the crew exhausted, and their training level is also another issue we cannot know.

Can these issues have an impact on the performance of the warship? It does but is not substantial for the detection and interception of the missile. However, its effects on Damage Control efforts can be profound, as explained in the next section.

3.4. The Role of TB-2 in the Attack

Ukrainians claim that they distracted the cruiser with a TB2 drone and hit Moskva with two cruise missiles. This story does not seem plausible.

You cannot distract a warship with a drone since many eyes follow the tracks on different radars and consoles. Besides, there are supervisors who follow the big picture and communicate with the operators. For the ship to be distracted by only one drone, the entire CIC (Combat Information Centre, seen as the brain of a warship) should be sleeping. Therefore, from a naval warfare perspective, distracting a warship with a drone is nearly impossible.

TB2 has a small radar signature complicating its detection by radars on the warship. We also know that it successfully penetrated Russian defence systems on other battlefields. However, if TB2 played a role in such a distraction, Moskva should have been aware of it. In this case, the question should be why the ship did not engage it. Did not they care about an armed drone operating in their vicinity? Highly unlikely.

Another possibility is that the warship detected the drone but failed to hit it. In this case, the Ukrainians would publish camera/radar records from the drone. As a result, TB2 could have helped them find the ship at best.

4. THE SINKING OF MOSKVA: FAILURE ON DAMAGE CONTROL

According to the statement of the Russian MoD, the crew abandoned the ship, which is a rare and extreme situation and possibly means that the damage control efforts failed, unlike Russia claimed. In general, warships have two or three damage control parties (forward, amidship, aft), and each of them has firefighting and repair teams so that the crew can handle multiple fires and damages concurrently.

Arsenals are generally kept in highly protected compartments on warships, and it is challenging for a fire to spread to a magazine onboard. According to the experts, fire detection and extinguishing systems are outdated in the old ships designed in the 1980s.[30] Hence, Russians were already afraid of a possible fire. Moreover, Russian warships have also poor compartmentalisation making it challenging to contain leakages after damage.[31]

Figure-4: The damage on Moskva, Source: MazMorris on Twitter [iv]

Otherwise, why did the crew abandon Moskva if the fire was under control, damages were repaired, and the ship could float? Even if a missile hits the bridge, warships have several emergency systems to sail them in critical times. For instance, when the bridge is damaged, the ship can be sailed by using alternative systems, e.g., electronic, hydraulic, or manual, to command the rudder and engines from different places. Engines are also put into various parts of the ships to avoid being out of operation. Hence, she must have suffered substantial damage, or the crew was unskilful to abandon the ship and her being towed by another vessel.

Russian MoD blames the "stormy seas" for her sinking en route to Sevastopol, but the weather tells a different story.[32] The wind was four miles per hour, and the sea state was very calm at the mentioned time.[33] It can be a balance problem if the ship is flooded from fractures, but it stems from the crew's inability to recover the ship.

5. IMPLICATIONS OF MOSKVA'S LOSS FOR RUSSIA

Moskva's loss is a severe psychological and operational blow for Russia since she became the first destroyed warship of its size in 40 years, costing Russia $750 million.[34] Warships are seen as a source of national pride. Losing the flagship is a huge humiliation for a great power like Russia. Moreover, its intelligence failed to learn that Ukraine had developed an anti-ship missile capability. Moskva sailed closely to the shore within the range of a possible attack even though she had no role close to the coast. These issues depict that the Russian Navy has serious flaws in warship design, modernisation, crew training, and operation planning.

There is no warship with the same air defence capabilities in the Black Sea concerning the naval operations. Flagships are floating headquarters. Therefore, the Russian Navy lost a flagship with command-and-control capabilities at sea. Considering the closure of the Turkish Straits, Russia cannot reinforce its task force in the Black Sea from the Mediterranean Sea.

Third, the Russian Navy carried out amphibious demonstrations in the Black Sea, which aimed to distract Ukraine's energy and forces even though a landing was a remote possibility.[35] Russia already lost a landing ship in Berdyansk, and the loss of Moskva makes an amphibious operation almost impossible.[36] The Black Sea Fleet will probably operate in a defensive posture to avoid another strike.

6. LESSONS TO ALL NAVIES

The sinking of Moskva has several lessons for World Navies. First, a fire onboard is still a nightmare for ships. Navies put a lot of effort into avoiding fire and minimising its impact. What is more important is to have a well-trained crew to carry out successful damage control and keep the ship afloat.

Second, A2AD is a real threat to warships. Comparing the Russian Navy with the American Navy, which has long been thinking about addressing A2AD, is not appropriate.[37] Yet, the Western navies should be adequately prepared against Russia's build-up in the Eastern Mediterranean and Chinese capabilities in the South China Sea.

Third, the regional security in the Black Sea is fiercely discussed in the heat of the Russian invasion. Montreux Convention imposes restraints on the naval operations in the region. NATO can help its littoral members and allies in the region by deploying robust and deterrent A2AD capabilities to address security concerns.

Endnotes

1   Furkan Akar is a Research Fellow at Beyond the Horizon ISSG.

2   Manash Pratim Boruah, Prathamesh Karle, and Shaurav Gairola, "Fire puts Russian Navy's Black Sea Fleet flagship out of action," *Janes*, April 14, 2022, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/fire-puts-russian-navys-black-sea-fleet-flagship-out-of-action.

3   H I Sutton, "Satellite Images Confirm Russian Navy Landing Ship Was Sunk at Berdyansk," *USNI News,* March 25, 2022, news.usni.org/2022/03/25/satellite-images-confirm-russian-navy-landing-ship-was-sunk-at-berdyansk.

4   Luke Harding et al, "Russian warship Moskva on fire but afloat, Pentagon says," *The Guardian*, April 14, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/14/russia-moskva-ship-ukraine-black-sea.

5   David Ljunggren, "Russia says ammunition blast damages flagship of Black Sea fleet – Interfax," *Reuters*, April 13, 2022, https://archive.ph/fxiqi.

6   TASS, "Крейсер "Москва" затонул при буксировке (Cruiser "Moscow" sank when towed)," *TASS,* April 14, 2022, https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/14383383.

7   Dan Lamothe, "Russian warship was hit by two Ukrainian missiles before sinking, Pentagon says," *The Washington Post*, April 15, 2022, https://archive.ph/AZYMS#link-ONMKXSD7QZAQRHWVWEGVK55IJE

8   Andrew Roth, "Film and photos show Russian cruiser Moskva probably hit by missiles," *The Guardian*, April 18, 2022, https://archive.ph/nPZkG.

9   Jennifer Hauser, "1 dead and 27 missing after Russian flagship Moskva sunk in Black Sea, Russia says," *CNN,* April 22, 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/2022/04/22/europe/moskva-russia-casualties-intl.

10   Itamilradar, "Poseidon Black sea mission," April 12, 2022, www.itamilradar.com/2022/04/12/poseidon-black-sea-mission.

11   Raytheon, "AN/APY-10 Maritime, Littoral and Overland Surveillance Radar," *Raytheon Intelligence and Space*, https://www.raytheonintelligenceandspace.com/what-we-do/decision-superiority/reconnaissance-systems/apy10.

12   Military Today, "Neptun," https://www.military-today.com/missiles/neptun.htm.

13   Missile speed is measured with mach. 1 mach is equals to 1200 km per hour. For a comparison, RGM-84 Harpoon travels with 0,85 mach and has a payload of 224 kg. For more information about Harpoon, see CSIS Missile Threat, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/harpoon/.

14   Global Security, "ZhK-360MTS Neptun," April 14, 2022, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ukraine/neptune.htm.

15   Maksim Karpenko, "Russian Naval Captain: Ukrainian "Neptune" Is Easy to Detect and Shoot Down," *Stalkerzone*, January 2022, https://archive.ph/fxrui.

16   Anthony Cowden, "Neptunes, the MOSKVA, and How Not to Sink a Cruiser, *RealClear Defense*, April 19, 2022, https://archive.ph/AUK5y.

17   To provide a simpler picture, only relevant sensors and weapons are listed here.

18   Twitter User 'arestovych,' April 14, 2022, https://twitter.com/arestovych/status/1514485385207988226.

19   Heather Mongilio, "UPDATED: Russia Says Damaged Cruiser Moskva Sank Under Tow Headed to Black Sea Homeport," *USNI News*, April 13, 2022 https://news.usni.org/2022/04/13/russian-navy-confirms-severe-damage-to-black-sea-cruiser-moskva-crew-abandoned-ship.

20   Boeing, "AGM/RGM/UGM-84 HARPOON MISSILE," *Boeing*, www.boeing.com/history/products/agm-84d-harpoon-missile.page.

21   Britannica, "Factors affecting radar performance," https://www.britannica.com/technology/radar/Factors-affecting-radar-performance.

22   Paul P. Murphy et al, "Ukraine claims it hit a Russian warship with a missile strike. Russia says otherwise," *CNN*, April 13, 2022 https://archive.ph/4kYTV.

23   Michael MacKay, *Twitter*, April 13, 2022, https://twitter.com/mhmck/status/1514307282431057922.

24   Windguru, "Weather Data about Odessa between March 12-15, 2022," https://www.windguru.cz/archive.php?id_spot=9425&id_model=3&date_from=2022-03-12&date_to=2022-04-15.

25   Windy, "Weather Data at Station: wmo-33837," https://www.windy.com/station/wmo-33837?46.433,30.767,8.

26   Worldweatheronline, "Odesa Historical Weather," https://www.worldweatheronline.com/odesa-weather-history/odeska-oblast/ua.aspx.

27   Visaulcrossing, "Weather Data about Odessa," www.visualcrossing.com/weather/weather-data-services.

28   NOAA, "The Beaufort Wind Scale," *NOAA*, https://www.wpc.ncep.noaa.gov/html/beaufort.shtml.

29   James Hockaday, "'Tell us the truth': Parents of conscripts on sunken ship left in dark by Moscow," *Metro*, April 20, 2022, https://metro.co.uk/2022/04/20/tell-us-the-truth-parents-of-conscripts-on-sunken-ship-left-in-dark-by-moscow-16498994/.

30   Dmitry Zhavoronkov, "Experts: Russian cruisers are afraid of fire due to outdated fire systems," *Flot*, November 29, 2018, https://archive.ph/kTIAm.

31   Justin Katz, "What should the US Navy learn from Moskva's demise?" *Breaking Defense*, April 15,2022, https://breakingdefense.com/2022/04/what-should-the-us-navy-learn-from-moskvas-demise/.

32   Leo Sands, "Sunken Russian warship Moskva: What do we know?" *BBC*, April 18, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61103927.

33   Luke Harding et al, "Russia's Moskva cruiser sinks following Ukrainian claim of missile strike," *The Guardian*, April 14, 2022, theguardian.com/world/2022/apr/14/russia-moskva-cruiser-sunk-stormy-seas-defense-ministry.

34   Xander Landen, "Moskva Warship's Sinking a $750 Million Loss for Russian Military: Report," April 14,2022, *Newsweek*, newsweek.com/moskva-warships-sinking-750-million-loss-russian-military-report-1698163.

35   H I Sutton, "Russia's Most Powerful Warship In The Black Sea Is Operating In A Pattern," *Naval News*, April 07, 2022, www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/04/russias-most-powerful-warship-in-the-black-sea-is-operating-in-a-pattern/.

36   H I Sutton, "Burning Russian Landing Ship at Berdiansk visible in satellite imagery from earlier today," *Twitter*, March 24, 2022 "https://twitter.com/CovertShores/status/1506996489205297158.

37   DOD, "Air- Sea Battle," *DOD*, May 2013, https://archive.ph/LHyu4.

Figures

[i] Elizia Volkmann and George Grylls, "Ukraine war: US spy plane on patrol in Black Sea before sinking of Russian flagship Moskva," *The Times,* April 20, 2022, https://archive.ph/bdNaz.

[ii] Twitter User 'Naval_Graphics,' "The weapon and sensor systems of a Slava class cruiser," June 14, 2015, www.twitter.com/Naval_Graphics/status/610121625116274688.

[iii] Bryan Clark, "Peeling Back the Layers: A New Concept for Air Defense," *CIMSEC,* February 25, 2015, www.cimsec.org/peeling-back-the-layers-a-new-concept-for-air-defense/.

[iv] Twitter User MazMorris, April 18, 2022, www.twitter.com/MazMorris/status/1516138371084845056.

Green or Brown Future for the World: Geopolitical Dimensions of the EU Green Deal

Policy Brief

by Ilyas Gulenc* and Onur Sultan**

Introduction

Rising energy prices, ongoing negative impacts of the pandemic (Guindos, 2022), and dependence on Russian natural gas (Halm, 2022) have created a harsh political conjuncture for the European Union (EU) to implement the EU Green Deal's regulations including the strengthened Emission Trading System proposal which was rejected by the EU Parliament on June 8 (European Parliament, 2022). While CEOs of the carbon-intensive industries demanded (EUROMETAL, 2022) the adaptation of a slow approach in phasing out the free carbon allowances by waiting for the establishment of an effective Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), some members of the EU Parliament including Muhammed Chahim, the reporter of CBAM proposal, argues that watering down the proposed ETS and CBAM regimes would not be compatible with the overall emission targets of the EU Green Deal. The internal debates about the Fit for 55 Package, however, make it difficult to understand the geopolitical dimensions of the EU Green Deal on the global scale. At the dawn of the climate change-related disasters, the EU Green Deal has a great potential in the transition to a more democratic and clean international order by changing the competitive nature of international relations and spreading a collaborative economic model.

Figure 1. Heatwave in India
(Source: World Meteorological Organization)

The Urgency of Tackling Climate Change

The recent hot waves in India (World Meteorological Organization, 2022) and record-breaking temperatures in Spain are the recent clear indicators that show that climate change has become a conspicuous global problem rather than an anticipated future phenomenon. There were debates in India as the second-largest wheat exporter about restricting the amount of wheat exported. Scientific research demonstrate that only shorter than 9 years remain to (Gray, 2021) exceed the 1.5 degree global warming threshold (IPCC, 2022). During the voting process of the eight regulations related to the Fit for 55 package, Frans Timmermans, the Executive Vice-President of the EU Green Deal, warned (Timmermans, 2022) the members of the EU Parliament that *the climate change is going to intensify* and inaction of the EU will exacerbate its consequences. In this context, the EU Green Deal is the only viable and strong international project to use the last chance (Carrington, 2018) of the current generation to save the welfare of the future generations.

Figure 2. Remaining Carbon Budget (Source: Carbon Tracker)

Changes in global surface temperature relative to 1850-1900

a) Change in global surface temperature (decadal average)
as reconstructed (1-2000) and observed (1850-2020)

b) Change in global surface temperature (annual average) as observed and
simulated using human & natural and only natural factors (both 1850-2020)

Figure 3. Global surface temprature change (Source: IPCC)

The EU Green Deal and Its Impacts on Other Countries within the Context of Carbon Regimes

The EU policymakers are well-aware that only minimizing the carbon emissions of the EU, which only account for 8% of the global emissions (Evans, 2021), is not enough to prevent the ongoing harmful effects of climate change. That is why the CBAM proposal (European Commission, 2021)is designed to force trade partners of the EU (Eurostat, 2022) to reduce their emissions for escaping from the financial burdens of carbon prices on certain exported products to the EU including cement, steel, electricity, aluminum, and steel-iron. Most of the EU's trade partners are also among the countries that are the top greenhouse gas emitters. The EU Green Deal has accelerated the efforts of other countries to establish their own Emission Trading Systems to allow the payment of carbon prices domestically. The current CBAM proposal excludes the exporters to buy CBAM certificates, if there are efficient ETS mechanisms in their countries. Emergence of new carbon markets around the world will enforce the representatives of the industries to reduce their carbon footprints.

On the other hand, CBAM is regarded as a kind of trade barrier (Römer, 2021) for some countries. Some experts allege that it may trigger retaliatory attempts that can hinder the competitiveness of the EU Companies and harm the harmony in the international trade. The economic burden of the strengthened ETS and new requirements in the context of sustainable product initiative may also harm the competitive advantages of the EU companies by increasing their production costs. According to the World Bank's annual report related to the carbon pricing trend around the world, policymakers in different countries have difficulty in the establishment of new carbon regimes due to the volatility in the energy market and high inflation rate. Creation of new carbon clubs necessitates coordination among the countries to harmonize the rules and prices of new emission trading systems.

Extra-EU trade in goods by main trading partners, EU, 2011 and 2021
(€ billion)

Note: partners are sorted according to the sum of imports and exports in 2021.
(*) Excluding Hong Kong.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: ext_lt_maineu)

eurostat

Figure 4. EU's Major Trade Partners (Source: Eurostat)

Figure 5. The Cumulative Emissions of the Countries 1850-2021 (Source: CarbonBrief)

Exiting from Fossil Fuels and Implications for Other Countries in the Wake of the Ukraine War

Terminating the use of fossil fuels as a source of power will have also fundamental impacts (Pisani-Ferry, Wolff, Tagliapietra, Shapiro, & Leonard, 2021) on the EU's relations with oil and gas exporters. After the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, the EU has accelerated its exit strategy from the fossil fuels by declaring REPowerEU plan (European Commission, 2022), which aims to increase the share of the renewable energy from 40% to %45. Frans Timmermans paid some visits to countries in the Mediterranean Seas such as Turkey and Egypt to seek the possibilities of new partnerships on green hydrogen.

The relationship between Russia and the EU is very complicated in terms of energy dependency (Peeters, 2022) and international trade. On the one side, the EU has few alternatives to replace the Russian natural gas in the short-term due to the rising gas demands of other countries and difficulty in transferring the gas in the LNG form. On the other hand, the EU's exit from fossil fuels will definitely have detrimental effects on the Russian economy (Broom, 2022) in the long term. Although Russia can easily find alternative markets for exporting oil and gas in the short-term, the success of the EU Green Deal in encouraging other countries (which is known as "Brussel effect") to decarbonize their economies may shake the Russian economic strength.

Figure 6. Russian Export Products (Source: World Economic Forum)

New Raw Material Dependencies Mean New Relationships

The EU Green Deal seems to create new kind of raw material dependencies that are widely used in the renewable energy systems. The EU predominantly imports (DW, 2022) 19 critical metals from China. The growing critical metal demands for the development of the clean technologies can become a new achilles' heel for the EU. It is estimated that the lithium demand of the EU will increase 18 times by 2030. The EU's new kind of critical metal dependency to China may create another vulnerability for foreign and security policies of the EU

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

New environmental legal regulations under the EU Green Deal will initiate a wave of green regulations in other regions to increase the compatibility of the regional companies to the emergence of new sustainable markets in the world. From this point of view, the EU Green Deal can be regarded as an effective international policy instrument to build a world order, which is compatible with the sustainable development goals of the United Nations. In this context;

- EU should concentrate on establishing a new kind of economic partnership with its Western allies to accelerate the green transition and find effective solutions to exit from fossil fuels

- EU should also build a cooperative and collaborative relationship with countries in the Middle East and Africa to help them to make their economic system greener. Unlike its colonial past, this type of relationship will both increase the effectiveness of the actions related to the fighting against climate change and restrict the authoritarian countries such as China and Russia to enhance their power in the international relations.

- The pace of enacting the EU Green Deal regulations is critical to preserve the competitiveness of the clean tech industries in the EU and prevent the disasters related to the climate change. Therefore, the institutional mechanism of the EU should find the ideal balance between the need to react faster and obeying the democratic institutional standards.

* Sustainable Management /EU Green Deal/European Climate Pact Ambassador
** Onur Sultan is Research Fellow at Beyond the Horizon ISSG.

References

Broom, D. (2022, May 18). WEF. Shaping the Future of Trade and Investment: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/03/russia-gas-oil-exports-sanctions/.

Carrington, D. (2018, December 3). Guardian. 'We are last generation that can stop climate change' – UN summit: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/dec/03/we-are-last-generation-that-can-stop-climate-change-un-summit.

DW. (2022, April 04). Can the EU do without metals from China?: https://www.dw.com/en/the-eus-risky-dependency-on-critical-chinese-metals/a-61462687#:~:text=Of%20the%2030%20raw%20materials,even%20increase%20in%20the%20future.

EUROMETAL. (2022, June 01). EU steelmaker executives warn of 'premature' CBAM transition: https://eurometal.net/eu-steelmaker-executives-warn-of-premature-cbam-transition/.

European Commission. (2021, July 14). https://ec.europa.eu/info/index_en: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_21_3661.

European Commission. (2022). REPowerEU: affordable, secure and sustainable energy for Europe: https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/repowereu-affordable-secure-and-sustainable-energy-europe_en.

European Parliament. (2022, June 09). Fit for 55: Environment Committee to work on way forward on carbon-pricing laws: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/de/press-room/20220603IPR32130/fit-for-55-environment-committee-to-work-on-way-forward-on-carbon-pricing-laws.

eurostat. (2022, October 1). https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Main_Page: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=File:Extra_EU_trade_in_goods_by_main_trading_partners,_EU,_2011_and_2021.png.

Evans, S. (2021, October 05). CarbonBrief. Analysis: Which countries are historically responsible for climate change?: https://www.carbonbrief.org/analysis-which-countries-are-historically-responsible-for-climate-change/.

Gray, H. (2021, August 24). Carbon Tracker. The IPCC's Red Alert: https://carbontracker.org/the-ipccs-red-alert/.

Guindos, L. d. (2022, February 10). Managing Europe's economic recovery after the pandemic. European Central Bank: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2022/html/ecb.sp220210~2923b1c6d4.en.html.

Halm, I. v. (2022, May 12). ENERGY MONITOR. How can the EU end its dependence on Russian gas?: https://www.energymonitor.ai/policy/how-can-the-eu-end-its-dependence-on-russian-gas#:~:text=The%20EU%20imported%20approximately%20155,rising%20to%2065%25%20in%20Germany.

IPCC. (2022, February 27). Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: https://www.ipcc.ch/report/sixth-assessment-report-working-group-ii/.

Peeters, T. (2022, May 17). BEYONDTHEHORIZON. Does the EU move away from EU Green Deal in the wake of the Ukraine war?: https://behorizon.org/does-the-eu-move-away-from-eu-green-deal-in-the-wake-of-the-ukraine-war/.

Pisani-Ferry, J., Wolff, G., Tagliapietra, S., Shapiro, J., & Leonard, M. (2021, February 02). brugel. The geopolitics of the European Green Deal: https://www.bruegel.org/policy-brief/geopolitics-european-green-deal.

Römer, D. (2021, September 15). The EU's carbon border adjustment: A trade barrier or an opportunity for global climate action. KFW: https://www.kfw.de/PDF/Download-Center/Konzernthemen/Research/PDF-Dokumente-Fokus-Volkswirtschaft/Fokus-englische-Dateien/Fokus-2021-EN/Focus-No.-345-September-2021-CBAM.pdf.

Timmermans, F. (2022, June 7). European Commission . Opening and Closing Remarks EVP Timmermans at European Parliament Debate on ETS and Fit for 55: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_22_3526.

World Meteorological Organization. (2022, May 24). Climate change made heatwaves in India and Pakistan "30 times more likely": https://public.wmo.int/en/media/news/climate-change-made-heatwaves-india-and-pakistan-30-times-more-likely.

The integration challenges of Ukrainian refugees in the Netherlands: What's next?

by Kubra Tasbas, Research Intern at Beyond the Horizon ISSG

This policy brief analyses the rapid reaction of the Dutch government regarding the influx of refugees from Ukraine. It focuses on integration policy measures taken in housing, language learning and health and also on the challenges that have been experienced in this process. A qualitative research method has been used to collect data. The policy brief also proposes several policy recommendations for overcoming these challenges.

1. Background

After the Russian illegal invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, there has been an unprecedented massive exodus from Ukraine to other countries in search of safety. The Council of the European Union has activated the Temporary Protection Directive with the Council Implementing Decision on 4 March 2022, to assist quickly and effectively with the massive influx of people who fled Ukraine because of war. Under the Temporary Protection Directive, people who fled Ukraine, as beneficiaries, have been granted certain social, social, legal, and economic rights, such as:

- A residence permit that allows the beneficiaries to stay in the country of arrival for the entire duration of protection (EU Home affairs state that the duration period can last from one year to three years)

- Access to the asylum procedures,

- Access to suitable accommodation or housing,

- Access to medical care,

- Access to education for persons under 18 years old,

- Free movement in EU countries for 90 days within 180 day-period after a residence permit in the host- EU country is issued[1].

The Directive and the Commission implementing decisions are being enforced with operational guidelines which are issued by the EU Commission[2].

"For stronger European coordination on welcoming people fleeing the war from Ukraine", the EU member states agreed to implement 'the 10-point Plan' in order to exchange information, to help people who fled Ukraine with transport and information, to ensure health care, accommodation, and security, to meet their needs, and help them unite[3].

According to UNHCR data, a total of 11,536,470 Ukrainians have fled to neighbouring countries, while a total of 3,933,695 Ukrainians have been registered under the 'Temporary Protection' as agreed by the Member States of the European Union or national protection programmes (data as of 23 August 2022)[4].

2. Dutch government's response to Ukrainian refugees

Persons who fled Ukraine can obtain temporary protection in the Netherlands through the European Union's Temporary Protection Directive. To apply for temporary protection, there are several essential requirements, such as holding Ukrainian nationality, having a residence permit or being under international, or temporary national protection in Ukraine on 23 February 2022[5].

As of 15 August 2022, the number of people fleeing Ukraine who have registered with the municipalities in the Netherlands is 73.930. However, there are also people with no identification documents, and these people cannot register in any municipality[6].

Refugees from Ukraine who are not Ukrainian nationals and had temporary residence permits will no longer be covered by the Temporary Protection Directive unless these refugees fall under the EU Qualification Directive. These people will not be eligible to receive help for accommodation, allowances, education, and medical care. Nonetheless, those who were legal residents in Ukraine and registered on The Dutch Personal Records Database before 19 July 2022 will continue to be covered by the Temporary Protection Directive[7].

The approach of the Dutch government in the reception of people who fled Ukraine is to work together with municipalities, security regions, and involved partners such as the Netherlands Red Cross, Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG) and Central Organisation for Reception of Asylum Seekers (COA), and in order to provide the coordination and the information exchange, The Ukraine Information Coordination Point (KCIO) has been established[8]. KCIO is a part of the National Coordination Centre for Refugee Dispersal (LCVS) which helps refugees find places to live and work. This collection point summarises the available municipal reception locations on a supra-regional/national scale and has a coordination role among them.

Ministry of Justice and Security (JenV), working with the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport (VWS), Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (OCW), Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (SZW), Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (BZK), Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG) and the other partners outside the central government, has drawn up 'The Municipal Reception of Ukrainians (GOO) Guide' for every municipality, and the organisations work with the municipalities to describe the elements and aspects of the reception of displaced persons from Ukraine and how to organise and deployment of the GOO[9]. GOO is being updated regularly according to the course of the situation.

3. Challenges of early integration in the Netherlands

The Dutch government cooperated with NGOs for the reception of Ukrainian refugees. As uncertainty about the volume of the refugee influx from Ukraine existed, the Dutch government has asked its partners and volunteers to organise and provide accommodation, language courses (in case of need), and health care for refugees who fled Ukraine. This part focuses on major issues such as housing, language and communication, and health measures and analyses the challenges concerning these measures.

Housing

From the beginning of the reception of people who fled Ukraine, the Dutch government has been prepared for a large-scale reception. The safety regions, municipalities, and involved organisations that would be responsible for providing basic accommodation and shelter have made available as of 30 June, around 52,000 beds[10]. Refugees from Ukraine are supposed to be registered in the municipalities to receive accommodation. Accommodation is provided for 6 months but can be extended. Besides, there are also NGOs, such as 'Takecarebnb', providing temporary accommodation and volunteers who open their homes to people who fled Ukraine for up to three months and help them[11].

The Dutch government provides refugees who stay at reception centres with a full board 55 euros for personal expenses. Refugees who stay at reception centres are entitled to without a full board of 205 euros for food and drinks during their stay in the Netherlands. Ukrainian refugees who stay with private individuals receive 475 euros for food, personal and living expenses[12]. However, these allowances are stopped if Ukrainian individuals get a paid job[13].

Challenges:

- Registration in the municipalities can take longer than refugees expected due to red-tape and the lack of officials working in the municipalities.

- Takecarebnb matches refugees with suitable volunteer families to stay at in order to ensure continuity of accommodation and facilitates an agreement between refugees and host families which might take longer than expected.

- Hosting by private individuals is for up to three months and after three months, Ukrainian refugees have to apply for a new host for their stay. However, a new host match may take longer or may not be found.

- Staying in the reception centres is up to six months and after six months, some Ukrainian refugees may want to rent a house from social housing. Renting a social house is a slow and laborious process. There are also available houses in the private sector and no need for queueing. However, rents are really high which people from Ukraine may not be able to afford.

Language and communication

The initial step of the Dutch government to overcome the language barrier for Ukrainian refugees arriving in the Netherlands who speak neither English nor Dutch is to introduce online translators. Municipalities work with face-to-face translators and interpreters together with organisations such as GlobalTalk or volunteers who know Ukrainian and Dutch[14]. Many municipalities and reception centres in the Netherlands organised language classes in cooperation with voluntary organisations and subsidised them financially. In other municipalities, there are

voluntary organisations which are independent of the municipalities to provide language courses[15]. Refugees from Ukraine do not get an allowance for paid language courses. If Ukrainian refugees prefer paid language courses, they have to pay for them themselves[16]. Yet, some organisations (such as universities) provide exemptions.

Challenges:

Language difference is one of the major challenges that Ukrainian refugees face for communicating with the locals. Although the translation technology is advanced, there are still problems with online translator or interpreter systems. Therefore, face-to-face interpreters or translators are preferred, but there are only about 20 interpreters registered at the government to help Ukrainian refugees. Lack of staff at the municipalities worsens the problem. Lack of motivation to learn local language(s) due to the uncertainty of the current situation in Ukraine is also another challenging factor for their integration. Although some organisations support refugees' language learning voluntarily, lack of structural government support makes it difficult to facilitate good quality courses.

Health

Individuals who have legal residency in the Netherlands are required to take out standard health insurance to cover the cost of, for example, consulting a general practitioner, hospital treatment and prescription medication. Those individuals are insured under the Healthcare Insurance Act (ZVW) and Long Term Act (WlZ)[17]. Refugees who fled Ukraine to the Netherlands and did not apply for asylum are not able to take out any health insurance and they fall under the Subsidy Scheme for Medically Necessary Healthcare for Uninsured Persons (SOV)[18]. Therefore, the healthcare costs can be claimed by healthcare providers from the Central Administrative Office (CAK) which is an independent administrative body that works with the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport (VWS) to reimburse the healthcare payments.

From 1st of July 2022, those who fled Ukraine or people who are subject to Temporary Protection Directive, and have a citizen service number (BSN) fall under a scheme called Ukrainian Displaced Persons Medical Care Scheme (RMO) which is more extensive and they are entitled to incur medical care from 1st of August 2022 until at least March 2023[19]. People who fled Ukraine without a BSN number do not fall under RMO and their healthcare costs will be reimbursed by CAK[20].

It is possible that there are traumatised ones among the people arriving from Ukraine. Therefore, they need to get emotional and psychological support. The support for people who fled Ukraine is offered by voluntary organisations for free, such as Slachtoffer hulp Nederland (Victim Support Netherlands). Moreover, municipalities offer psychosocial care in cooperation with NGOs such as Dutch Council for Refugees.

Challenges:

Medical system in the Netherlands is a challenge for people who have fled Ukraine. The health system in the Netherlands differs from the system in Ukraine. In Ukraine, people have direct access to the hospitals to get treated. However, in the Netherlands, there is no direct access to the hospitals. People go to the general practitioner first to be treated, then the general practitioners refer them to the hospitals if they deem necessary. This may lead to misunderstandings by Ukrainian refugees that doctors do not want to treat them. Better communication is necessary.

4. Policy Recommendations

In the aftermath of the influx, the Dutch government urgently adopted some policy measures regarding the reception of Ukrainian refugees and implemented these measures in collaboration with its partners. As in every country, challenges arose from implementing policies in the Netherlands.

Based on our research and interviews with the target group and practitioners, several policy measures are recommended to the national and local authorities and voluntary organisations to overcome these challenges that people who fled Ukraine face. Those are:

- Structural orientation programs can be organised at the local level for better informing and orienting refugees on issues related to administration, health, education, housing, language learning and local culture. These programs can include social mentoring (buddying) that matches them with volunteer locals (See Orient8 project as an example)[21].

- Digital platforms and applications with necessary information at the local level in Ukrainian language can be also helpful and ease communication problems (See welcome application as an example)[22].

- As the situation remains uncertain for a longer period, structural government support for language learning becomes a bigger necessity for a better integration of refugees in the host society in terms of communication, education and working. The number of Ukrainian-Dutch/English translators and interpreters should be increased. The low number of translators and interpreters may cause delays in

the processing of refugees who do not speak English or Dutch.

- Better communication and information on the current health system and housing procedures is a big necessity to overcome misunderstandings among the refugees. Info sessions, info sheets and digital platforms in Ukrainian language would be helpful as part of orientation programs.

- Housing is the greatest challenge at the moment and needs sustainable solutions such as opening new locations and facilitating rental accommodations.

Acknowledgements

Kubra Tasbas

References

1. European Commission Migration and Home Affairs (2022). Temporary protection. Retrieved on 22 July 2022, from https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/common-european-asylum-system/temporary-protection_en

2. The intention of these operational guidelines were made to assist and manage the migration from Ukraine to EU borders.

3. European Commission Migration and Home Affairs (2022). The 10-Point Plan: For stronger European coordination on welcoming people fleeing the war from Ukraine. Retrieved on 21 July 2022, from https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/10-point-plan-stronger-european-coordination-welcoming-people-fleeing-war-ukraine_en

4. UNHCR (2022). Ukraine Refugee Situation. UNHCR Operational Data Portal. Retrieved on 25 July 2022, from https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine

5. Rijksoverheid (2022, August 3). Temporary Protection Directive Ukraine. Retrieved on 19 July 2022 from https://ind.nl/en/ukraine/temporary-protection-directive-ukraine

6. Rijksoverheid (2022). Cijfers opvang vluchtelingen uit Oekraïne in Nederland. Retrieved on 19 July 2022, from https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/opvang-vluchtelingen-uit-oekraine/cijfers-opvang-vluchtelingen-uit-oekraine-in-nederland

7. Rijksoverheid (2022, August 3).Temporary Protection Directive Ukraine.

8. Rijksoverheid (2022). Aanpak opvang vluchtelingen uit Oekraïne. Retrieved on 19 July 2022, from https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/opvang-vluchtelingen-uit-oekraine/informatie-voor-overheden

9. Rijksoverheid (2022, May 20). Handreiking Gemeentelijke Opvang Oekraïners (GOO). Retrieved on https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/opvang-vluchtelingen-uit-oekraine/documenten/publicaties/2022/03/13/handreiking-gemeentelijke-opvang-oekrainers

10. Rijksoverheid (2022). Cijfers opvang vluchtelingen uit Oekraïne in Nederland.

11. Takecarebnb (2022). Takecarebnb matcht vluchtelingen en gastgezinnen (n.d.) Retrieved on 11 July 2022, from https://takecarebnb.org/over/

12. Gemeente Rotterdam (2022). Rotterdam vangt Oekraïense vluchtelingen op. (2022). Retrieved on 11 July 2022, from https://www.rotterdam.nl/wonen-leven/vluchtelingen-oekraine/

13. Rijksoverheid (2022). Werk en inkomen voor vluchtelingen uit Oekraïne. Retrieved on 11 July 2022, from https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/opvang-vluchtelingen-uit-oekraine/ondersteuning-in-nederland/werk-en-inkomen

14. Information has been received from the interview with Iryne Wiede.

15. Information has been received from the interview with Marcel van Geel.

16. Rijksoverheid (2022). Aankomst, registratie en verblijf van vluchtelingen uit Oekraïne.

17. Rijksoverheid (2022). Health Insurance and residence permit (n.d.). Retrieved on 20 July 2022, from https://www.government.nl/topics/health-insurance/health-insurance-and-residence-permit

18. Zorgverzekeringslijn (2022). Coming from abroad. (n.d.). Retrieved on 20 July 2022 from https://www.zorgverzekeringslijn.nl/english/#31

19. Rijksoverheid (2022, June 29). Informatie voor zorgverleners over Regeling Medische zorg Ontheemden uit Oekraïne (RMO). Retrieved on 20 July 2022 from https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/publicaties/2022/06/29/regeling-medische-zorg-voor-ontheemden-uit-oekraine-rmo-informatie-voor-zorgverleners

20. CAK (2022). Vergoeding zorg vluchtelingen uit Oekraïne verandert vanaf 1 juli. Retrieved on 20 July 2022. https://www.hetcak.nl/zakelijk/nieuws/2022/vergoeding-vluchtelingen-oekraine-verandert

21. Orientate Newcomers by Smart Social Mentoring (ORIENT8) is a project funded by the European Union under Asylum, Migration and Integration Funding program. https://orient8.eu/

22. Welcome Application is developed by the ORIENT8 project as a project deliverable and is tested in 3 European cities. https://orient8.eu/WelcomeApplication.html

Book Review: The Legitimation of Power

Ibrahim Genc[1]

The Legitimation of Power by David Beetham (1991) delves into the question of what legitimation means? What makes power legitimate? He posits that many experts from the fields of law or philosophy have been interested in settling legal or moral issues and dilemmas about power. Political scientists, on the other hand, have long attempted to comprehend "the empirical consequences that legitimacy has for the character of power relations, for the different ways in which they are organised, and for the extent to which the powerful can actually count on the obedience or support of those subordinate to them" (p. 5). There are two main parts to this book. The first part explains the concept of legitimacy, and the second part looks at the relationship between states and legitimacy.

Beetham starts the first chapter by criticizing Weber's definition of legitimacy as the 'belief in legitimacy' because it appears to have been adopted by almost all social scientists (Beetham 1991). He asserts, *"the whole Weberian Legitimacy has to be left behind as one of the blindest of blind alleys in the history of social science, notable only of the impressiveness of the name that it bears, not for the direction on which it leads."* For Beetham, associating legitimacy with only belief exaggerates the role that belief plays in the legitimation of power. *"What is important for legitimation,"* writes Beetham, *"is evidence of consent expressed through actions which are understood as demonstrating consent within the conventions of society, such as

- *concluding an agreement or entering into a contract with a superior party;*
- *swearing an oath of allegiance;*
- *joining in acclamation;*
- *voting in an election or plebiscite, and so on"* (p.12).

For Weber's typology does not go beyond associating legitimacy with belief. In this seminal work, Beetham posits that there are three underlying factors of legitimacy; legality, the justifiability of the rules in terms of beliefs and values present in each society, and actions of consent to legitimacy. He contends that people's reasoning of authority also matters for legitimacy. In a stark contrast to Weber, people must find it logical to give their consent to the authority, thus legitimise their power.

In the second chapter of the book, the author outlines what he means by power. He describes power briefly as *"the ability to achieve our purposes"* and adds, *"it is unequally distributed"* (p.43). *"To speak of having power over someone usually implies a continuous relationship, in which a substantial sanction is always present."* This account of having greater power and its implication on us is problematic. It implies that there has to be a superiority if one is more potent than the other. From the perspective of democracy, power is granted to the rulers by the will of the people. Those elected representatives are therefore obliged to rule the very people who choose them. In this relationship, power is a regulation rather than subordination. He uses the parent-child relationship metaphor to justify his arguments that subordination is beneficial and temporary.

He then posits that "the expanded powers of the dominant are dependent upon the limitation of powers of the subordinate and are achieved primarily at their expense." These claims appear to neglect the fact that subordinates have the power to change the distribution of power. The author also seems to think that these differences concerning power -he terms them inequalities- are intrinsic to societies. He then goes on to argue that such inequalities are the result of the difference in competence.

In the second part of the book, the author attempts to address 'Why should political legitimacy be so difficult to attain in the contemporary world?' (p.117). For the author, "the contemporary state is a form of power-structure that requires legitimation" (p.117). He then gives examples from countries like Greece in

---

[1] Ibrahim Genc is a PhD candidate in the school of government and international relations at Griffith University. He is also a research editor at Democratic Decay and Renewal (Dem-Dec).

1974 and Iran in 1979, where regimes appeared healthy, yet due to loss of legitimacy, they collapsed swiftly. Another possible outcome of the loss of legitimacy is civil war (Beetham 1991). For that, it would be accurate to add here that states survive and thrive on legitimacy. Without it, states are doomed to collapse. From the examples and explanations he provides in the book, such claims ring true. Even today, where many states -the most obvious example would be Syria- fail to control their citizens appear to have legitimacy issues.

As mentioned above, legality is one of the three fundamental prerequisites of legitimation. In achieving legal authority, states benefit from *"the set of institutional arrangements and practices to protect the rule of law"* (p.126). He then says that such arrangements must also mesh with the nominal and normative rules present in each society. *"Constitutional order,"* Beetham writes, *"must facilitate rather than hinder the pursuit of a general interest"* (p.127). Though there is no doubt on the part that rules and laws must conform to the norm of societies, it is not clear, however, what he means by general interests. Who creates such interests, or how they are created? Does he mean finding common ground for the subordinate and dominant? Addressing these questions would have increased the clarity of the arguments.

Under the sub-section called *'Crisis Tendencies of Political Systems,'* Beetham argues that crisis occurs when there is a problem with agencies through which legitimacy is procured. For that, crisis *"in a liberal democracy,"* he argues, *"means a threat to the electoral rules and their associated freedoms or an erosion of commitment to the idea of popular sovereignty underpinning them."* He then discusses Islam and legitimation and argues that Islam's rise has proved the idea that *"political legitimacy can only be securely grounded on a secular basis."* Upon closer examination, if one looks at the role that religion plays in the Western World and values of religion embedded in countries like the US, that presumption was already wrong. The problem here stems from the idea that when a western country seemingly adopts a religion's values, they do so in a secular manner. When a so-called Islamic country adopts Islam's values, however, it does so in an unsecular manner.

In the book's last two sub-sections, the author looks at de-legitimation, political breakdown, and re-legitimation. De-legitimation for Beetham stems from a legitimacy deficit which he describes as follows: *"A legitimacy can occur either because of a divergence between constitutional rules and given beliefs about the source of political authority, or because of their inadequacy to resolve problems of government performance; or indeed both simultaneously"* (p.208). To summarise, a legitimacy deficit leads to delegitimation, which means the withdrawal of consent. It seems of great importance to comprehend how the public withdraws its consensus from the ruling power. This question was not addressed in detail by the author. Therefore, this area of inquiry is a fruitful topic to advance for future researchers.

References

Beetham, D. 1991. The Legitimation of Power. Palgrave New York