Japan's reconceptualization of national security: the impact of globalization[†]

Bhubhindar Singh[1*] and Philip Shetler-Jones[2]

[1]*S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 639798 Singapore, Singapore; and* [2]*Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, New York, NY, USA*
*Corresponding author. E-mail: isbhubhindar@ntu.edu.sg

Abstract

Japan has steadily extended its military reach from a domestic zone of defense against territorial invasion in the late 1950s, through regional security policy in the late 1970s to what has now become a globally scaled military role. This re-expansion is perceived by some as evidence of revived militaristic ambitions, and by others as subservience to the US global strategy. However, taking the cue from Japan's 2004 National Defence Programme Guideline (New Taikō), this paper assesses the role globalization has played in this territorial expansion. The impact of globalization is evident in the double expansion of Japan's national security conception in geographical terms and self-defense forces roles in global security. These

[†]   This paper was published as a working paper at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Singapore, under the title 'Japan's New Security Imperative: The Function of Globalization' (No. 209, 11 October 2010).

'expansions' are studied through two key elements of globalization – the deterritorialization of complex relations of interdependence between states (security globality) and the inter-penetrating nature of these relations blur the boundary between foreign and domestic spaces (intermestic space).

1 Introduction

It is widely recognized that the role Japan's self-defense forces (SDF) has come to play in Japan's national security policy since the end of the Cold War has expanded in terms of mission tasks, geographical reach, and its importance relative to other parts of Japan's national security apparatus (Hughes, 2004; Hughes and Krauss, 2007; Pyle, 2007; Samuels, 2007). This expansion has been crowned with an overt change of emphasis represented by the abandonment of the minimum territorial defense concept in favor of a concept of global security expressed in the 2004 National Defence Programme Guideline (NDPG or Bōei Keikaku Taikō, hereafter Taikō).

Since the same post-Cold War period saw a quickening in the pace of globalization, it would seem that the de-territorialization of Japan's national security concept just happened to coincide with this latest surge of globalization. But not if you track the logic presented in the 2004 Taikō, which references globalization and deepening interdependence as the background against which 'new threats and diverse situations' are emerging to menace Japan. In the narrative of the 2004 Taikō as well as its precursor report by the Council on Security and Defence Capabilities entitled 'Japan's visions for Future Security and Defense Capabilities' (also known after its chairman as the Araki report)', the 9/11 attacks are cast as symbolizing the way globalization enables threats emerging far away to speedily cross distances and borders and arrive in Japan. It includes a reminder of Japan's reliance on far-flung supply lines for food-stuffs, energy and foreign markets, underlining globalization's role in shaping the security environment. These ideas continue to be used (not only in Japan) to argue that old territorially bounded concepts of national defense should give way to a more ambitious, proactive (even preventive) global security concept; opening opportunities for the military to claim a larger role in national security policy.

Academic accounts of this re-inflation of Japan's security concept and military capacity overwhelmingly fall back on the three narratives that dominated explanations of Japan's international relations and defense policies over the post-war period. The first is external pressure or *gaiatsu*, specifically encouragement from the United States to be a more active ally in regional and international security affairs (Inoguchi and Jain, 2000). The second is pressure from a domestic lobby of what has been termed 'normal nation-alists' who have sought to overturn restrictions on Japan's military-strategic freedom of movement, which they see as the legacy of defeat and occupation (Samuels, 2007). The third variable is the changing East-Asian security environment since the mid 1990s – specifically a series of belligerent gestures by North Korea and rising Chinese military capability (Green, 2003; Pyle, 2007). What is neglected by these conventional narratives is the possibility that an over-arching structural factor, represented by the rise of interdependence from the 1970s and the post-Cold War surge of globalization, also influenced the shift to a new national security concept. This factor is not only because it is mentioned in the 2004 Taikō, but has also entered the security discourse all over the world.

This paper explores theoretical and empirical connections between the globalization surge and the geographical and military expansion in Japan's national security concept. This is approached in three stages: first, a general investigation of the relationship of globalization and national security from a theoretical perspective. The second section describes how Japan contained the role of its military with a narrow conception of national security focused on territorial defense, and how this concept started to dilate, both qualitatively and geographically in the late Cold War period. The third section looks at how the double expansion took place, and evaluates the extent of globalization's role. This section concentrates on two aspects of globalization's effect: the emergence of a globalized concept of national security in Japanese national security discourse and Japan's adaptation to 'intermestic' security challenges.

2 Globalization and national security

For the purposes of this paper, globalization is defined as the increasingly free flow of materials, images, ideas, people, and human interactions on a planetary scale enabled by the gradual elimination of

obstacles (distance, borders), through technology in the service of economic or political interests. Movement towards these conditions is neither new nor complete, but the present rate and stage of progress has made relations of interdependence more widespread as well as deeper, and fostered the growth of a complex system of contingencies (Dillon, 2005). The effects of globalization were already studied within the study of International Relations from the 1970s focusing on the theme of interdependence (Nye and Keohane, 1977), and were realized in the oil shocks and currency crises of that decade. The elimination of East-West divisions with the end of the Cold War made the economic interdependence of the late 1970s and 1980s a near universal condition – catalyzing the process that came to be called globalization. The process accelerated with the end of the Cold War causing confusion between these two processes (Cha, 2000; Bilgin and Morten 2007, p. 13).

However, this changed towards the end of the 1990s. The influence of globalization was increasingly seen as distinct from that of the 'post-Cold War'. As a result, a number of phenomena initially attributed to the end of the Cold War such as fourth generation war, the transformation of war (Lind *et al.*, 1989; Van Creveld, 1991), the rise of non-state actors, and 'new wars' (Kaldor, 1999) were being identified and evaluated in the context of globalization (Guéhenno, 1999; Cha, 2000; Tanaka, 2000). A clear turning point arrived when the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack was interpreted mainly in the context of globalization (Rasmussen, 2002; Tanaka, 2003). The subsequent upholding of 9/11 as the dominant icon of globalization's effects on security demonstrated that the latter had achieved ascendancy over the 'post-Cold War' security paradigm (Campbell, 2002; Keohane, 2002; Rasmussen, 2002, p. 331). Japan's 2004 revision of its Taikō reflects the same shift from post-Cold War reference points to those of 'global terror', as will be discussed below.

According to the present body of literature, globalization has affected security in the following areas: concepts, system, actors, practice, and procurement.

Concepts: globalization has affected the realist and constructivist schools that dominate IR and security studies. Globalization poses a challenge to 'realist caution' by making the concepts of barriers and distance obsolete in the calculation of the national interest and

security (Keohane, 2002, pp. 32–3). Globalization's effects on cultural flows and migration create social effects in the constitution of identity – a core constructivist concern. The effects of globalization have also contributed to the broadening of the concept of security since the 1980s as globalization has facilitated the spread of international terrorism, transnational crime, WMD proliferation, illegal immigration, pandemics, and pollution, strengthening the argument that non-state transnational threats deserve as much, if not more, attention than conventional inter-state military threats.

System: globalization has altered the international system within which states pursue national security. The belief that the largest national economies are more interdependent through a network of trade, commerce, finance, and global supply chaining is not limited to a few 'hyper globalizers' (Wolf, 2004; Friedman, 2006). The implication that any threat to this network itself represents a threat to national interests can be seen as an extension of the democratic peace theory – the idea that economies are so interdependent that they cannot afford to go to war with one-another. But while this interdependent system may represent a plus for a peaceful inter-state security (Waltz, 1979, p. 143), it also offers non-state actors ('asymmetrically' unencumbered by such a vulnerable flank) a clear advantage (see Robb, 2007).

Actors: globalization's effects on actors can be seen in two related areas: the weakening of the state's capacity to exercise sovereignty, and the proliferation and empowerment of trans- or inter- national non-state actors. Politically or commercially motivated trans-border movements can realize logistical and operational benefits of globalized money transfer networks and porous borders. Japan's attempts to control remittances and other links between its Korean population and the Pyongyang regime shows how even in relatively isolated countries, the infrastructures of globalization enable diasporas to become more involved in international disputes (Lind, 1997). The capacity of globalization to challenge the state was the central focus for Hughes' studies of what he termed the 'globalization-security nexus' (2001) – specifically its ability to exploit potential divisibility between the security interests of sovereign states and their citizens. The weakening of borders (Rosenau, 2003, pp. 251-252; Cha, 2000, p. 392) and the shifting of power 'up' to inter-state institutions and

'sideways' to NGOs also features in this category of 'state weakening' that have led some to predict the end of the nation state (Guéhenno, 1995; Ohmae, 1996).

Practice: the transnational nature of newly perceived threats such as organized crime, proliferation and terrorism raises the demand for collective security operations, as seen in the rise of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping as well as multinational coalition operations (Smith, 2006). Threats especially from transnational actors raise the requirement for more coordination between security actors hitherto constituted according to categories of 'domestic' (police) and 'international' (military). They may also in part account for increased reliance on paramilitary or Special Forces (SF) whose training, equipment, and legal framework (including disguise by 'unmarked' vehicles or civilian clothing for clandestine or covert operations) make them more effective at engaging threats in intermestic space.

Procurement: national champions in defense production are largely a thing of the past. Big defense companies have dispersed in terms of ownership through privatization and their production facilities have been physically relocated, making the nationalizations seen in the 1930s impossible. Even the largest corporations rely to a significant extent on a de-territorialized supply chain, cross-licensing and R&D partnerships to maintain their position at the cutting edge of new weapons development (Brooks, 2005). The pressures of competing in this environment have been keenly felt in Japan, where national participation in joint R&D and international marketing is restricted by principles on arms exports (Kimura and Matsuoka, 1999).

This section concludes by investigating the implications of the two main concepts that do – the effects on security arising from de-territorialization and complex relations of trans-national interdependence (security globality), and second, challenges from the blurring of foreign and domestic spaces (intermestic space).

2.1 Security globality

The globality in 'security globality' is borrowed from Ulrich Beck's definition of the global social structure. It is distinct from globalization, which Beck defined as the process that transcends previous – national – structures in favor of new global structures (Beck, 2003, p. 87, 88).

The idea of security globality goes beyond the notion that our national security is merely more interdependent – even beyond the idea that globalization means borders and distance have diminished significance as a check on the movement of threats. It is an assertion that globalization has fused national securities into a globally scaled indivisible whole. This is not a new idea as Immanuel Kant's 'Perpetual Peace' presents a version of it as far back as 1795 (section I, para 5). However, it has become a recurring theme in the rhetoric of political leaders, not to mention many journalistic and some scholarly works.

This contemporary view of security globality has evolved through three stages. First, the oil shocks of the 1970s reminded economies closely tied to the emerging boom in world trade of the fragility of their economic interdependence. The economic lens of global security gave way after the Cold War to a moral version as the 'West' understood its 'victory' over the Soviet bloc in terms of the realization of a ideological globality of values, marking 'the end of history' (Fukuyama, 1992). UN-mandated operations boomed and Japan joined in, sending the SDF overseas for the first time. The famines, slaughter and despotism that cast doubt on the new world order were met with 'humanitarian interventions'. The progress of this moral globality took institutional forms such as the International Criminal Court and the 'responsibility to protect' (R2P). Toward the end of the 1990s, the side effects of 'failed states' – organized crime, refugees, drugs – were presented as a pragmatic supplement to the moral imperative (Kaldor, 1999). The logic ran that 'We have to help these poor people or something nasty will seep out'. Before taking the helm at Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the UN, Guéhenno described these situations as 'black holes' (1999, p. 10). This amalgam of moral and pragmatic concerns pre-figured the present stage, which is characterized by the framing of 9/11 as a symbol of globalization's 'dark side'. State failure, weak governance and 'ungoverned spaces' were implicated in the generation of a different problem: underdevelopment, backwardness and frustration were the 'recruiting sergeant' of the terrorist. 'Ungoverned spaces' provided 'safe havens' for their training and organization or a base from which to launch attacks on the network of the world economy. The architectures of globalization provided the medium by which these threats would be transmitted across borders and distances from the black holes to our streets. What was first (in the 1970s) an economic interdependence became (in the West's

misplaced post-Cold War triumphalism) a moral globality, and finally (after the affront of 9/11) was 'securitized' to create the 'security globality'.

This view of the security globality may be exaggerated, but it comes with certain advantages. For one thing, it allows states to present their security policy outside of a political context that is often of a murkier ethical coloring and may obscure the clarity of the moral mission; transnational terrorist groups do not strike out in every direction at random. The countries Al-Qaeda has not attacked to date are unlikely to suffer their own 9/11 for the simple reason that they have little or no political interest in or influence over the things that Bin Laden and his affiliates care about. But the security globality enables governments to evade the difficulties of addressing the specific grievances that mobilize and draw support to Al-Qaeda, and instead to target rhetorical, open-ended abstractions 'the war on terror' or 'disconnectedness' (Barnett, 2004, p. 94). To put it another way, the notion of 'security globality' camouflages efforts to extend power and values. Before 9/11, Duffield pointed out how the 'merging of development and security' was taking place on the logic that 'the modalities of underdevelopment have become dangerous and destabilising' (Duffield, 2001, p. 16). Later, he suggested that the idea of human security has functioned as 'a moral technology through which effective states are able to project and strategize power' (2005, p. 4). Former UK Prime Minister Blair expressed the global logic linking morality and security thus: 'Globalization begets interdependence. Interdependence begets the necessity of a common value system to make it work. Idealism becomes realpolitik' (Blair, 2006, p. 34). Just as fears of territorial incontinence (WMD proliferation) were used to link 9/11 to the invasion of Iraq, thus the bogey man of 'global terror' moved ideas about transnational insecurity and international intervention from the optional realm of humanitarian obligation (expressed in the 'R2P'), to the realist realm of necessity and even self-defense. At its furthest extent, the logic of the security globality ends in what Blair called 'progressive pre-emption':

'A few decades ago, we could act when we knew. Now, we have to act on the basis of precaution. We have to act, not react. We have to do so on the basis of prediction, not certainty. Circumstances will often require intervention, usually far beyond our own borders . . . We must

be prepared to think sooner and act quicker in defence of our values'
(Blair, 2006, p. 31, 34).

If the security globality unbinds 'defense' from the restrictions of space,
this notion of 'progressive pre-emption' removes even the restraint of
sequence and time.

2.2 Intermestic space

Globalization is as much or even more about inter-penetration of foreign
and domestic spaces as it is about the extension of links between states
or nations (Guéhenno, 1999, p. 7, 8; Cha, 2000, p. 392). Since the 1980s,
many governments liberalized economic policies, opening up their
markets and societies to the world. This exposed them to global econ-
omic and social forces, the impact of which was felt more directly by
groups and individuals within nations; a process Guéhenno (1999) calls
'disintermediation'. In the same period, transnational migration has
increased due to economic demand, political liberalization, and cheaper
transport and communications allowing the growth of ethnic diaspora as
people move but maintain economic and identity connections to their
places of origin.

Globalization has stimulated the growth of transnational networks
through technology and migration, but also because disintermediation
increases demand for material and cultural insulation to cushion the
impact of global market forces and cosmopolitan culture. As the post-
modern liberal market state system cut back its activity in these areas
(patriotic education, social insurance), reliance on 'transnational solida-
rities' (Guéhenno, 1999, p. 7, 8) grew, and individual loyalties re-aligned.
By the mid-1990s, where state capacity compared poorly with that of
enterprising (often formerly state-employed) individuals, the latter took
steps to meet people's needs – legal or otherwise. Transnational orga-
nized crime boomed on the basis of its ability to get drugs, people and
weapons *inter alia* to market across borders (Glenny, 2008). While Mary
Kaldor (1999) revealed the symbiotic relation between such activities
and war, globalization gave organized crime not only the opportunity,
but also the profit incentive to connect areas of war and peace (Naím,
2005; Saviono, 2007).

State security institutions that are constituted, trained, equipped, and
legally empowered according to territorial divisions between 'foreign'

and 'domestic' (such as, police/army, internal/external intelligence agencies), found themselves wrong footed by these groups. This started to change with more police in peacekeeping, and more paramilitary tactics and equipment in the police, as well as efforts to integrate intelligence in cross-border security functions. Intermestic space is also the home of other, non-human threats like transnational pollution and epidemics. The difficulty of adapting state institutions to manage these inside-out menaces has led some to signal 'the end of foreign policy' (Hain, 2001).

3 Territorial conception of Japan's National Security

The rest of the paper examines the impact of globalization on Japan's changing national security concept. It begins with an account of Japan's territorial conception of security formed in the Cold War period that prevailed in the face of repeated challenges.

3.1 Establishment

Based on Yoshida Shigeru's vision of making Japan, a merchant nation (shōnin kokka), Japan's Cold War security policy concentrated all efforts on economic resuscitation and development. The goal was the revival of its economy from the devastation of war. Japan expanded its economic interests globally to access resources and markets, and in the process became increasingly interdependent with the international environment in economic and financial matters (Edström, 1999, p. 162). However, a similar pattern in Japan's security policy did not follow, as it pursued a minimalist security policy that was based on a narrow conception of national security. The security policy-making elite separated Japan's national security (in military terms) from the larger regional and international security environment. Due to this narrow conception, Japan's interaction with the international environment mainly occurred through economic means pursuing a strategy that, according to Hellman (1977), did not form a linkage between its economic interests and national military capabilities (p. 326). Their focus was on mitigating the impact of the 'threat-based' international environment at the national level, namely through strengthening its national defense capabilities and relying on the US for a security guarantee against external threats (Hellman, 1977, p. 329). Whilst the 'maintenance of international peace and security in

the Far East' was stated in the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security signed in 1960, this responsibility was excluded in the way Japan's security policy was exercised, including the SDF's mandate.

This territorial conception of national security was institutionalized in the official documents that outlined Japan's postwar defense policy. The 1957 'Basic Policy on National Defense' was Japan's first clear post-war statement of a military role in a national security and defense policy. Based on a territorially circumscribed notion of home defense, according to this document, the objective of Japan's defense policy was to resist an invasion pending the arrival of assistance of the US and/or UN forces (http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_policy/dp02.html, accessed 13 November 2007).[1] Such an approach was further reinforced in the National Defense Programme Outline (NDPO) or Taikō, issued on 29 October 1976 – the first policy document to describe Japan's defense doctrine in detail and to present it as the basis for the determination of the SDF force structure. The 1976 Taikō argued for a focus on self-defense, hence the narrow definition of national security, and a continued reliance on the US for wider security guarantees (Nishihara, 1983/84, p. 180, 181; Kawasaki, 2001; p. 72, 73).

This narrow conception of national security was also embedded in legislation that created the SDF in 1954. Both the pacifists and conservatives politicians interpreted Article 9 in such a way that the SDF was permitted to use the minimum level of force necessary for individual self-defense, but no more. This interpretation determined that collective self-defense efforts and overseas troop deployment would be forbidden on the ground that they exceeded this minimum (Samuels, 2007, pp. 45–49; Oros, 2008, p. 46). Such an interpretation overshadowed the legal provisions accrued to Japan's membership in the UN Charter, namely Article 51 that permits all member states to carry out both individual and collective self-defense activities.

The Japanese government defined the purpose of the SDF as to repel a 'limited and small-scale aggression' against Japan's national territorial integrity. The Upper House passed a resolution banning overseas despatch of Japanese troops and participation in collective security

---

1   Also see the first four defence build-up plans during the period of 1957–1976 divided into the following four five-year defence plans: (1) 1958–60; (2) 1962–66; (3) 1967–71; and (4) 1972–76.

initiatives. As a result, the Japanese military focused on the limited function of defending Japan's borders, relying on the US military to safeguard Japan's overseas interests. Japan's post-war security policy determined the scope of the SDF's role according to the territorial principle, as well as using this same spatial principle for delineating the SDF role from that of its US ally, with the latter taking responsibility for the maintenance of peace and stability of the regional and international security environment. This strategy came to be known critically as 'one-country pacifism', which placed constrains on the use of the military as a legitimate instrument of state policy (Hook, 1996). This relationship of Japan with the international promoted by Yoshida strategy became entrenched in Japanese security policy discourse during the course of the Cold War (Edström, 1999, p. 19).

3.2 Challenges

This strategy of a narrow security conception and Japan's aversion to even part ownership of the military affairs in the regional and international security environment faced successive waves of challenges over the course of the Cold War period starting from the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine on July 1969,[2] which urged America's allies to expand their responsibility in the contribution to defend the 'free world' against communism. This, along with enhanced trade frictions with the United States from the 1950s triggered relentless American pressure on Japan to balance its one-sided economic policy by strengthening its national defense and expanding its responsibility in terms of regional security (Hellman, 1977, p. 327). This was the context for the November 1969 Nixon-Sato communiqué that extended Japan's narrow security definition by incorporating South Korea and Taiwan as essential factors to Japan's security. Tōgō (2005) wrote that this represented 'a clear convergence of views [between Japan and the US] ... needed ... so that any possible mobilization of forces from Okinawa would be conducted based

---

2　When the Cold War emerged in 1950, the US considered building a regional defence alliance comprising the US, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and perhaps even Indonesia. Japan's participation would have involved rearmament efforts and joint responsibility to protect the interests of the regional defence alliance, namely to stop the spread of communism, based on the concept of collective security. Yoshida rejected this proposal and the American demands of rearmament. He pursued to define Japan's national purpose in narrow terms based on the narrow definition of national security (Pyle, 2004, 40).

on common recognition of the developing situation' (p. 67, parenthesis added).

The foundation of Japan's security policy was also challenged by the 1973 oil crisis that quadrupled world oil prices. For the first time, Japan had to incorporate the political dimension into its economic policies towards the oil-producing states (Hellman, 1977, p. 327). Both pressures from the US and events in the international environment, such as the oil crisis, resulted in a debate within Japan to reorient its security policy. The resultant effect was that the Japanese leadership began to appreciate how security issues such as events in the Middle East had a direct impact on Japan's security vulnerability. In terms of security policy, the debate led to the introduction of the Comprehensive Security concept as a core feature of Japan's external security policy (Chapman, Drifte, and Gow, 1983), a marked increase in Japan's defense expenditures, the use of an economics-based foreign policy defined by aid diplomacy, and the strengthening of an UN-centred diplomacy.

From the late 1970s the security debate within Japan began to hint at integrating the SDF into the US East Asian strategy. The main development was the signing and adoption between Japan and the US of the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation in November 1978, the declared purpose of which was to expand Japan's military participation in the alliance from operations confined to the home islands to operations designed for the provision of 'peace and stability throughout East Asia'. This laid the foundation for greater cooperation between the US and Japanese militaries and greater interoperability and set the stage for more far-reaching commitments from Japan, such as Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō's announcement in 1981 that Japan would accept responsibility for patrolling sea-lines of communication up to 1000 nautical miles from the Japanese coasts (Lind, 2004, p. 113, 114).

Of all the Cold War Japanese prime ministers, it was Nakasone who made probably the boldest attempts to widen Japan's concept of national security and implement a more active security policy. He believed Japan's security was 'indivisible' from the regional and international security environment (Pyle, 2007, p. 273). In the preparation of the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan (for fiscal 1972–6) during his time as chief of the JDA, Nakasone attempted to fundamentally review Japan's BPND. Not only did he intend to make Japan more self-reliant in

deterring a foreign invasion alongside the United States, Nakasone proposed that Japan take control of the air and sea command in an event of an invasion to exercise the right of self-defense and engaging the enemy in international air space and on the high seas (Murakami, 2004, p. 97). Although the immense opposition from within and outside of Japan and the changing strategic situation around Japan meant this policy proposal was abandoned (see ibid, p. 97, 98), this was an early indication of the expansion of Japan's national security concept beyond its national borders.

Nakasone resurrected his proposal to expand Japan's national security during his time as Japan's prime minister in the 1980s (Maeda, 2004, p. 114, 115). This time he succeeded in incorporating his proposals in the fifth five-year defense plan that was approved by the National Defence Council and the Cabinet (also known as the Mid-Term Defense Program Estimate for 1986–90). Unlike the first four plans, the fifth one did not refer to the BPND and it made clear the pronouncement of the Soviet threat in the Pacific, even suggesting that Japan's military power should extend over the northwest Pacific region (Maeda, 2004, p. 114, 116). According to Maeda (2004), 'The plan represents the first official document sanctioning a shift from a policy oriented to defense of the Japanese archipelago to an outward-looking policy oriented to deterrence of the Soviet threat' (Maeda, 2004, p. 113). Working on the principle that Japan's 'security was indivisible' from the United States, Nakasone constructed not only a closer but a more global bilateral relationship between the two countries (Nishihara, 1983/84, p. 184; Tōgō, 2005, p. 75). On this basis he declared support for US's efforts under the Reagan administration to confront the Soviets head-on (Tōgō, 2005, p. 74). During a G-7 meeting in Williamsburg in May 1983, Nakasone announced that the Soviet installation of Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces SS-20 in Europe and Asia posed a serious threat and declared support for US action for their removal. This declaration had three implications: it resulted in Japan's clear alignment with the West (Pyle, 2007, p. 273); it was an indication of where Japan stood in relation to a security issue of global magnitude (Tōgō, 2005, p. 75) and raised the possibility that Japan could take part in future collective arrangements (Nishihara, 1983/84, p. 184).

3.3 Resistance

These attempts hinting at the functional and geographical expansion of Japan's security role only led to cosmetic changes to Japanese security policy and had little impact in military terms on Japan's narrow conception of national security and taking active responsibility for regional and international security affairs. Nor did the developments described above lead to a revision of Japan's security policy principles. Japan's main contribution to international affairs remained centred on economics, and not in the area of military-strategic affairs where the SDF continued to play a subsidiary role to the US military. This security policy stance remained unchanged even when Japanese prime ministers, especially from Ikeda onwards, repeatedly voiced in public and policy statements that Japan had to adapt to the international security environment and promote a strategy that would effect the international environment (Edström, 1999, pp. 49–50). The 'convergence of views' as represented by the Nixon-Sato communiqué described above did not expand Japan's national security conception. According to Hellman (1977), the strategic attachment of the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan to Japan's national security was not a carefully calculated strategic policy, and instead, was in response to US pressure and in exchange for the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty (fn 16, 329).

Article 6 of the 1978 Japan–US defense guidelines and Prime Minister Suzuki's proposal, as discussed above, did not expand either the role of Japan's military or its concept of national security. The signing of the 1978 guidelines came during the period of détente in the Cold War (Berger, 1996), and reflected the softening of the bipolar rivalry triggered by the declaration of intent of a US troop withdrawal from Vietnam in May 1969, the signing of the US-Soviet agreements on SALT 1 and ABM Treaty in May 1972, the establishment of diplomatic relations by the United States (and Japan) with China in 1972; and the improvement of Japan–Soviet relations, which led to Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei's visit to Moscow in October 1973. As détente reduced Japanese fears of entanglement in the US Cold War struggle, Japan officially supported the new security roles within the US–Japan security relationship but not in the form of actual policy changes (Berger, 1996, p. 339).

The signing of the 1978 defense guidelines was also promoted by Japan's domestic considerations. According to Green and Murata (1998),

the bilateral defense guidelines were passed to preclude a breakdown of the consensus within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) on defense issues, which was threatened by the United States withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975 and keeping a credible US defense commitment to Japan (p. 2). The Article 6 contingencies were included in the 1978 defense guidelines as a consequence of US pressure; namely the United States pushing Japan on two points (related to Article 6 contingencies) that would have expanded Japan's national security. The first was that the United States wanted Japan to adopt a larger operational role to assist the United States outside of the main purpose to defend Japan, and the second point was to include a reference to the Korean Peninsula, a precedent set by the Nixon-Sato communiqué signed in 1969. Japan resisted on both points (Green and Murata, 1998, p. 4) suggesting the continued application of the narrow conception of national security and aversion to assuming a larger security role in regional and international security.

Similarly, Japan's definition of national security did not expand with Prime Minister Suzuki's proposal to accept responsibility for patrolling sea-lines of communication up to 1000 nautical miles from the Japanese coasts. Berger (1996) argued that Japan's SDF had long planned to patrol Japan's sea-lines of communication in order to assure the continued flow of oil and other vital raw materials and his announcement was more related to domestic political intrigues than to geo-strategic exigencies (pp. 350–351). As Arase (2007) points out, Prime Minister Suzuki failed to provide a clear commitment 'to assist US forces in anything but the defense of Japan' (p. 565). Bold though they may have been, Nakasone's attempts in the 1980s were futile in the sense that they remained at the rhetorical level without altering the course of Japanese security policy. He faced adverse pressure from the Yoshida followers and the bureaucracy – advocates of the narrow conception of national security for Japan.

Japan's Cold War strategy emphasized activity in economic over military-strategic spheres in the international environment during the post-war years. All governments in the Cold War period defined Japan's security policy based on this narrow conception of national security and shunned military-strategic responsibilities that came with being an economic power. Japan did expand its concept of national security, but only in economic terms through its contribution of non-military international public goods like aid and debt relief in support of the Cold War struggle (Pharr, 1993). The various efforts to expand the operational range of the

SDF were resisted by budgetary and politically principled objections. In spite of rising expenditure and capacity through the 1970s and 1980s, the mission of Japan's military was held behind the line that divided 'defense' from 'security' according to a spatial and territorial logic that was to prove surprisingly durable.

4 Globalization of japan's national security

Japan's security policy was transformed in the post-Cold War period by two expansionary trends – first, the SDF mission was expanded from territorial defense to a wider role within a new concept of national security; second, that new concept of security itself represented an expansion in spatial and functional terms. The rest of the section examines this transformation in terms of globalization's effects on security noted above: the advent of the security globality and the imperative of securing intermestic space.

4.1 Security globality

The manifestation of the security globality in Japan's security policy is described in the following sequence: (i) emergence: from Japan's adjustment to economic interdependence in the late 1970s until the flowering of the 'international contribution' era around 1994; (ii) exchange: from the mid-1990s until around 2004, when Japan expanded its support to the US global strategic project in exchange for contributions to overcoming local security problems; (iii) *institutionalization*: after 2001 the indivisibility of national and international security is embedded as a fundamental principle of Japan's security policy.

Emergence. Japan shared in the revival of interest in themes of common security and 'interdependence' that surfaced in the wake of American decline in the late 1970s. Even before Europe produced the Brandt, Palme and Brundtland reports,[3] Japan's Prime Minister Ōhira unveiled the concept of 'comprehensive security' in 1979. Then in the 1980s, Prime

---

3   The Brandt (1980), Palme (1982) and Brundtland (1987) reports 'all call for a reconceptualization of security in the light of interdependence between states in the international system and between the rich North and the developing countries'. Brandt looked at North/ South wealth disparity and impact of world economic system on this inequality; Palme nuclear arms race and its ramifications on the poor South; and Brundtland focused on the environmental and development sustainability models (McSweeney, 1999, p. 51).

Minister Nakasone began to question the line dividing Japan's national security from wider issues in the realm of 'international security'. Some Japanese officials and scholars now insist that Japan's defense build-up in the 1980s was only presented as a territorial defense effort in order to disguise its key role in the (global) strategy of containing Communism (Interviews, Tokyo, April/May 2009). The geographical accident that placed Japan in an ideal position to block the USSR's far eastern 'Bastion' strategy allowed it to present such operations (mindful of anti-militarist audiences) as defense against the threat of Soviet invasion (Michishita, 2002, p. 92). This points to two conclusions: first, that Japan's global security role pre-dated the end of the Cold War; and second, that the distinction between simple territorial defense and a global security role had meaning in the context of Japanese politics. However, in the early 1990s several events started the process that was first to blur this distinction.

The first of these events was the 1990 Persian Gulf Crisis. Rare is the account of Japan's recent diplomatic history that does not mention the 'shock', 'trauma', or 'humiliation' felt in Japan when Kuwait and the world failed to register much appreciation for Japan's cash contribution to the 1991 Gulf War. This shock prompted the Japanese security policy-making elite to think beyond the defense of its own territory (Mochizuki, 1997, p. 57), and provided momentum for the 1992 'International Peace Cooperation Law' that gave the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) its first international mission – participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs). It is notable that, with the possible exception of the Golan Heights operation (due to potential for Arab-Israeli conflict to impact Japanese oil supplies), none of the PKOs in which the GSDF took part could be seen as addressing a threat to Japan's security. A more important feature of PKO was its effect on Japan's security culture in that it overturned the post-war assumption that overseas military despatch necessarily implies aggression and/or a threat to 'civilian control'. Looking back over opinion polls in the 1990s, the expectation that PKO participation would improve the standing of the SDF in the eyes of public opinion seems to have been broadly satisfied.[4]

---

4   Two government (Prime Minister's Office) surveys conducted in 1991 and 1994 show the increase in public's support for SDF's participation in UNPKOs. Between 1991 and 1994, the percentage for those who supported SDF's participation in UNPKOs increased from 46 to 48.8%, while the figure for opposition decreased from 37.9 to 30.9% (Washio, 1994, 1995).

Japan's PKO participation came in the context of a wider renewal of optimism in the early 1990s regarding the effectiveness of international organizations within the 'new world order' that would replace the collapsing Cold War framework, reflected by Boutros Ghali's 1992 'Agenda for Peace' and the boom in UNPKO. The 'Higuchi report' (known formally as 'The modality of the security and defense capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century', known after the name of its chair, Higuchi Hirotaro) commissioned in 1994 by Prime Minister Hosokawa 'with a view to reviewing the National Defense Programme Outline' was animated by this same spirit, listing failed states and arms proliferation as dangers likely to appear in the new security environment:

> '...with nations of the world becoming increasingly interdependent because of the economic and technological conditions of the modern society, even localized conflicts are likely to affect the entire international community. In particular, the Japanese economy is built on close relations with various parts of the world, including heavy dependence on Middle East oil. Therefore, the nation's security concerns are truly worldwide, ...' (Higuchi Report, 1994)

The Higuchi report even listed 'promotion of multilateral security cooperation on a global and regional scale' first in the list of three elements of a 'comprehensive and coherent security policy', before 'enhancement of the functions of the Japan–US security relationship' and (third) 'possession of a highly reliable and efficient defense capability based on a strengthened information capability and a prompt crisis-management capability'. In retrospect, this looks like the highpoint of Japan's enthusiasm for PKO and other forms of 'international contribution'. It was not to last. The perceived 'drift'[5] in the US–Japan security relationship was soon to be arrested in light of events closer to home.

In sum, while the notion of the 'security globality' was instrumental in dispensing with the SDF's territorial restriction, Japan's contribution to 'international peace and security' was presented less in the context of

---

5   In February 1995 the US Department of Defence published 'United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region', sometimes referred to as the Nye Report Department of Defense, United States (1995). This report stressed the importance of Japan as America's key ally in East Asia and the continued long-term presence of US forces in East Asia.

national security than in terms of its value for Japan's reputation. The Higuchi report speculated that:

> 'giving the SDF opportunities to participate in UN peacekeeping operations and other international activities will greatly help, internationally, to broaden the international perspective of the SDF and defence authorities and enhance the public understanding of the SDF and, externally, to increase transparency in the real image of the SDF and eventually build confidence in Japan.' (See Higuchi Report 1994).

Exchange. For the decade between the North Korean Nuclear Crisis in 1993/4 up to the 2004 Taikō, the globalization of Japan's security policy can be understood in the form of an exchange. Japan determined deeper alliance cooperation as the best way to face the resurgence of local threats to the extent that it was prepared to pay the price of contributing more substantial support to US global strategic projects. What began with a series of crises in Northeast Asia would end (post-9/11) with the SDF in the Indian Ocean and Iraq.

The 1993/4 North Korean Nuclear Crisis drew attention away from Higuchi's international contributions toward more proximate and directly threatening features of the post-Cold War security landscape. For the first time since the collapse of the USSR, Japan was reminded of the continued value of the US nuclear umbrella. Thus, North Korea's behavior, particularly during the Taepodong Missile Crisis, forced the Japanese security policy-making elite to incorporate a concept of expanded national defense into Japan's national security policy. It convinced the Japanese leadership that it would have to perform national defense duties away from its national borders, either individually or in cooperation with the United States, based on an expanded understanding of national security to include the regional and international security environment.[6]

---

6   To strengthen national defence, the Japanese government implemented the following measures: the re-introduction of the pre-emptive strikes option against potential foreign enemy targets as a form of deterrence; Japan's declaration to commit itself to the US-led Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) project to install a defence shield in East Asia against ballistic missiles from enemy states; and the strengthening of Japan's air defence capabilities, providing the ASDF with the capability to target perceived threats before they reach Japan's mainland (Singh, 2006, chapter 7).

Another military crisis that raised the threat level for Japan during this period was the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. Although Japan's response was limited to monitoring the exercises and voicing protests through diplomatic channels, it highlighted the impact a regional security crisis could have on its national security, and Japan's inability to act on its own to mitigate it (Funabashi, 1999, p. 422, 423; Singh, 2006, p. 194, 195). This crisis made Taiwan a core feature in Japanese security debates that continues to present itself as a destabilizing factor to date. In a joint security declaration signed in February 2005, the foreign and defense ministers of Japan and the United States declared the peaceful resolution of Taiwan as a shared strategic objective. Related to the Taiwan issue is Japan's concern about China's economic and military rise during this period. The Sino-Japanese relationship is plagued by the territorial disputes in the East China Sea and Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands, maritime incursions (such as the 2004 passage of a Chinese submarine through Japan's waters and the fishing boat dispute in 2010), and rising nationalism in both countries. China's economic rise presents a new factor in calculations of intent and capability. Double-digit growth in military budgets has driven a form of military modernization that compounds fears regarding possible power-projection intentions.

Japan's response to rising perceptions of regional threats can be read in its 1995 revision of the 1976 Taikō, which discussed the role of Japan's defense capabilities in three areas: national defense, response to large-scale disasters (and various other situations), and in situations in areas surrounding Japan 'which have an important influence on national peace and stability' (see NDPO 1995). Contrary to Higuchi's prioritization of international cooperation over the alliance, the 1995 Taikō identified the latter as the core of Japan's security strategy and signaled Japan's willingness to respond to regional situations that have serious implications for Japan's national security (Ueda *et al.*, 1996).

This re-evaluation of the alliance took shape in a joint declaration during the 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto summit, which started the process for revising the 1978 defense guidelines for close defense cooperation between the US and Japanese militaries in 1997. These vivified the SDF's long-standing but operationally dormant mandate to provide military assistance to the US military, and expanded the scope of such cooperation from the 'Far East' to the 'Asia-Pacific'. Both parties pledged to undertake studies to study bilateral cooperation in dealing

with 'situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the peace and stability of Japan' (Japan–US Joint Declaration on Security, 1996).

This expansion of Japan's national security concept took legal form in the May 1999 'Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan'. The term 'surrounding situations' (shuuten jitai) raised controversy, *inter alia*, from China, as to how far the geographical coverage extended (namely whether the Taiwan Straits was covered in the ambiguous 'areas surrounding Japan' phrase). Japan and the United States responded to calls for clarification of this phrase by stating that the law had a situational rather than a geographical interpretation.[7] The controversy over 'surrounding situations' suggests the continued salience of geographical scope of SDF mission areas. Japanese policy-makers understood that it 'strictly limited the area to Japan's territory and the high seas (and its airspace) surrounding Japan' (Shinoda, 2002) and not envisaging the Indian Ocean to be part of the revised guidelines (Hughes, 2004, p. 127). This issue of 'surrounding areas' would re-appear in the context of support to the US-led global war on terror.

Long after Japan's enthusiasm for 'international contributions' was diverted towards 'situations in areas surrounding Japan', the notion of the 'security globality' resurfaced in the wake of 9/11. As 'global terror' became the symbol for a new era of security, the idea that globalization permitted threats to cross borders and distance to arrive in Japan was used to mobilize support for SDF's despatch to aid US-led global counter terrorist operations in 2002. In fact several aspects of the 'security globality' were used to justify SDF deployments to Iraq and the Indian Ocean. First, in distinction to the 1991 Gulf Crisis, the 9/11 attacks were presented as a direct hit on Japan's national security in terms of the human (more than 20 Japanese were killed in the attacks) and material damage on Japanese banks, life insurance companies, and

---

7   In August 1997, at a delicate time just prior to then Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro's visit to China, Chief Cabinet Secretary Seiroku Kajiyama expressed the view that the US-Japan defence cooperation guidelines cover the Taiwan Strait (Nikkei Weekly, 1 September 1997). In May 1998, Director-General of the North American Affairs Bureau at MOFA Takano Toshiyuki admitted that the agreement would cover Taiwan (*Daily Yomiuri*, 27 May 1998). Even former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro said, "It would be wrong to say that Taiwan is not included in the interpretation of the US-Japan Security Treaty" (Funabashi 1999, 399).

brokerages that had offices in the twin towers. JDA's Director-General, Nakatani Gen, said 'Many Japanese victims were involved in the attacks, so we can hardly look on unconcernedly like last time [referring to Japan's contribution to the 1991 Persian Gulf War]. We are under threat' (Hasegawa, 2001). During a ceremony dedicated to all victims of terrorist attacks in the United States, Prime Minister Koizumi said 'Many people fell victim to these attacks. The damage was inflicted, of course, on Americans, but also on people throughout the world, including Japanese' (MOFA, 2001). In this way, the Japanese government framed the attacks against the United States as attacks on Japan's national security, and the fight against terrorism as Japan's own challenge. This represented an 'imagined' equivalence between US national security and Japan's own national security. During the Prime Minister's New Year Reflections speech in January 2002, he raised 9/11 as one of the two core issues that had major implications for Japan's national security. (The other issue being the intrusion of the unidentified vessels in Japanese waters in December 2001; MOFA, 2002). The link was articulated in the following abstract terms in the 2003 Diplomatic Bluebook: 'Japan considers terrorism as a threat to its own national security'; MOFA, 2003.)

Second, the government stressed the vulnerability of Japan to similar terrorist attacks. At a press conference, the JDA chief announced that terrorist incidents could also occur in Japan (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 12 September 2001). The National Police Agency (NPA) Security Bureau chief, Uruma Iwao, repeated this concern when he revealed information from foreign intelligence sources that members of a radical fundamentalist Islamic group had entered Japan before the terrorist attacks in the United States. Although the possibility of Japan being a terrorist hideout remained low, Uruma told the House of Representatives' Foreign Affairs Committee that a launch of a terror campaign in Japan could not be dismissed: 'If members of such groups are already in Japan, it is possible that they will carry out terrorist attacks here' (Mainichi Daily News, 18 September 2001). NPA's white paper released in September 2001 repeated similar vulnerabilities of the Japanese state, warning that Japan's status as an economic power had attracted terrorist organizations to use Japan as a financial base to support their operations (Daily Yomiuri, 22 September 2001). The rise of terrorist bombings in

Asia prompted the then Japanese Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko to warn that:

'Recent bombings on Bali in Indonesia and in the Philippines show that the terrorists are stepping up their activities in Southeast Asia, and we cannot discount the possibility that the wave of violence will come to Japan, which has deep human and economic ties with the region' (Kawaguchi, 2003, p. 27).

Based on the widened concept of national security, the Japanese security policy-making elite joined the international community in condemning the 9/11 attacks and in the same breath announced measures that laid the foundation of major changes in Japanese security policy. Japan passed the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML), which extended the geographical limit of US–Japan defense cooperation. The Basic Plan (the document that outlines the measures and the geographical scope of SDF's activities during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)) disclosed a greater sense of flexibility in SDF's activities in a wider geographical area (and not only in the US military's operational area around Afghanistan) (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 6 October 2001). It stated that Japan's SDF was legitimized to undertake supply and transportation activities in: the territory of Japan and the Indian Ocean, which includes Diego Garcia, Australia, and the territories of countries located on the coast of the Indian Ocean as well as the territories of countries along the routes from the territory of Japan to the coast of the Indian Ocean which contain points of passage or points where fuel and others will be loaded and/or unloaded (MOFA, 2001). Nevertheless, to show the relationship between the Middle East and Japan's national security, Admiral Kōjō Kōichi told his commanders 'This mission [OEF] doesn't mean just the support for US–UK military action. What you have done is for Japan. I want you to keep telling the crew this' (parenthesis added). According to an Asahi Shimbun report, this statement was in recognition of the fact that the sea-lanes the MSDF fleet uses between Japan and the Indian Ocean are the same as that used by oil tankers linking Japan with the Middle East (Asahi Shimbun, 2005). In as far as the ATSML legitimized the SDF to actively support the US and other militaries outside of the 'areas surrounding Japan', it contributed to the globalization of Japan's of national security concept.

A similar widening of Japan's national security concept occurred during debates that led to SDF's deployment to Iraq. Japan's participation was based on its responsible fulfillment of an international role, but the security policy-making elite also discussed the impact of the Iraq issue on Japan's national security. The Diplomatic Bluebook 2004 stated, 'Japan is vigorously tackling the Iraq issue, understanding that it is a critical issue directly related to Japan's national interests' (MOFA, 2004). The impact on Japan's national *security* was framed with regard to the threat of WMD falling into the hands of international terrorists. Prime Minister Koizumi mused on this as follows: 'What would be the consequences were dangerous weapons of mass destruction to fall into the hands of a dangerous dictator? Any consequences would certainly not be limited to the people of the United States. This is not a matter without implications for Japan' (MOFA, 2003). Further, the Japanese government stressed that instability in Iraq will have a direct impact on Japan due to its extensive reliance on the Middle East for 90% of its crude oil and energy. The Diplomatic Bluebook recognized this relationship when it wrote, 'Based on such recognition, Japan has been actively making efforts toward ensuring the peace and stability of this region [Middle East]' (MOFA, 2004, parenthesis added).

This geographical expansion of Japan's concept of national security was also reinforced by the restructuring of the US military presence in Japan designed to enhance the interoperability of the two militaries in the context of the US-led war on terror. On 29 October 2005, the US–Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) published its report: 'US–Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future', the product of a review launched in December 2002. This report re-iterated the theme of 'regional and global common strategic objectives', identified in their 19 February 2005 Joint Statement. In a joint statement in 2006, Prime Minister Koizumi and US President George Bush 'heralded a new US–Japan Alliance of Global Cooperation for the 21st Century' (Japan–US Summit Meeting, 26 June 2006). In May 2006, Japan and the United States agreed to undertake a defense Policy Review Initiative to institutionalize bilateral interoperability (including command and control functions) to address both regional and global military contingencies (Hughes and Krauss, 2007, p. 158). As Hughes and Krauss (2007) identified, this realignment meant that 'Japan would serve as a frontline command post for US global power projection to as

far away as the Middle East' (p. 331).[8] These changes culminated in a joint statement between Prime Minister Koizumi and President Bush, on 29 June 2006 entitled 'The Japan–US Alliance of the New Century', which highlighted 'universal values' as the basis for the US–Japan Alliance:

> 'The United States and Japan stand together not only against mutual threats but also for the advancement of core universal values such as freedom, human dignity and human rights, democracy, market economy, and rule of law. These values are deeply rooted in the long historic traditions of both countries....Asia's historic transformation is underway, creating a region that increasingly embraces the universal values of democracy, freedom, human rights, market economy, and rule of law' (Japan–US Summit Meeting, 29 June 2006).

However, the suggestion that these policies implemented by the Japanese leadership during both the OEF and OIF missions reflected a global security policy is flimsy to say the least. Despite the agreement on common and universal values, the decision to support the US-led war on terror was based on the desire to maintain the integrity of the alliance, but more for locally than globally conceived security aims. Koizumi mobilized support for his Iraq policy on the basis that Japan could not refuse to assist America's war on terror efforts if it expected to continue to receive United States help to deal with the threat from North Korea (Shinoda, 2006, p. 77). This suggests his agreement on a global alliance was based less on recognition that Japan's security had become global, and more on acceptance of the price to be paid for help in the immediate neighborhood.

In sum, the period between 1994 and 2004 saw how threats from North Korea and China stimulated Japan to dilate the mission of the SDF and the geographical dimension of its national security concept through expanded participation in the US–Japan security agreement. Although the effects of globalization are more apparent as a justification than as the cause or outcome of these changes, they did lay the groundwork for later developments by shifting the basis for the SDF's international role from

---

8 As the GSDF rapid-reaction force is stationed alongside the US I Army Corps at Camp Zama, it will operationally tie it to the global deployments of the US military (Hughes 2007, 335).

improving Japan's image by keeping peace to facing direct or indirect 'threats', and moving Japan's alliance from a local to a 'global' scale.

Institutionalization. The institutionalization in Japan's security policy of the 'security globality' that emerged in the 1980s and was applied after 9/11 has two elements: the inseparability of Japan's national security from international security and the end to geographical limits on the deployment of the SDF.

Following the ground-breaking SDF deployments to the Indian Ocean and Iraq, work began on revising the 1996 Taikō to bring security policy up to date with these developments and prepare the ground for the next phase of the legislative programme. The foreword to the 2004 Araki Report began with the following assessment:

> 'We are living in an era of great transition . . . In the era of globaliza-tion, dangers and threats can easily travel across borders and arrive in our land without any warning. Under such context, the Cold War, in hindsight, seems to have been an era of relative stability.'

This was the logical basis for Araki's recommendation that 'international peace cooperation activities' (including UNPKO, but also support to the GWOT), be promoted to the SDF's 'primary mission' (alongside national defense). Previously, such secondary missions could only be undertaken so long as they did not impair the ability of the SDF to exercise its 'primary mission' of national defense. This change implies international duties should be evaluated in roughly equal importance with territorial defense. The third Taikō published in 2004 followed faithfully this security globality logic, noting for the first time the impact of globalization on security, casting it alongside 'interdependence' as the background against which 'new threats and diverse situations' are emerging to menace Japan. Giving primacy to the threats of 'international terrorist organizations' and prolifer-ation of WMD, the 2004 Taikō extrapolates from these themes a logic for questioning conventional forms of defense and deterrence. Global pro-blems, it implies, call for global solutions. This logic makes sense of the need to deploy the SDF not only in support of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but to wherever failed states might foster potential transnational threats. The new Taikō's shift in moral tone is striking – where in 1996 con-tributions to PKO were an expression of Japan's 'international contribution' – a kind of noblesse oblige owed by big economies – the impact of

globalization and interdependence on security casts participation in counter-terrorist operations as a security necessity.

The 2004 Taikō prepared the ground for a set of legislative amendments consolidating the post-9/11 initiatives, including the 2006 amendment of the SDF law adding 'activities for the preservation of the peace and security of the international community, including Japan' to its primary duties, framing into law the notion that Japan's security was indivisible from that of the international community.[9] The significance of this change lies in its utility for overcoming restrictions on SDF deployments, which reflect a lingering trace of concerns over 'civilian control'. Even after a decade of PKO participation, a sunset clause was placed in the legislation on SDF despatch to Afghanistan and Iraq, meaning continued operations were subject to their periodical review and potentially veto. The LDP aimed to bypass the difficulties of gaining support for renewal of the legislation for Indian Ocean operations with the argument that since various forms of overseas despatch (including disaster relief, PKO, humanitarian and anti-terrorism operations) had become a routine part of the SDF's mission, it would be more practical to draft a permanent law covering all such operations.

One of the most far-reaching applications of the 'security globality' to Japan's security concept is as the basis for an extension of defense not just in space, but in time via a notion of preventive or pre-emptive security action. Just as former UK Prime Minister Blair used the logic of the 'security globality' to justify what he called 'progressive pre-emption', the idea that globalization permits threats to travel rapidly across borders from far away combined with the theory that non-state actors are not susceptible to deterrence, was the basis for the Japanese version of a pre-emptive doctrine. Where the Bush doctrine described the intention of the United States to act, using force where necessary, to prevent states obtaining WMD and possibly passing them on to terrorist organizations (National Security Strategy of the United States 2002, chapter V), the 2004 Taikō described Japan's pre-emptive doctrine in terms of the second objective of Japan's security policy, which is 'to improve the international security environment so as to reduce the chances that any threat

---

9   The phrase increasingly taken up in debates (see especially Diet discussions on counter-piracy operations in 2009), is 'Nihon wo fukumu kokusai shakai', or 'international society, which includes Japan'.

will reach Japan in the first place' (2004 Taikō, III, 1). This has expanded the legal scope governing Japan's use of the military.

There are two other cases where Japan's security policy reform has followed the logic of de-territorialized space. Outer space can be seen as another non-territorial dimension, and here too Japan has relaxed restrictions on the role of its military (Oros, 2008, p. 79, 129). Though there have been calls to relax the restrictions on arms exports (LDP Defence Policy Studies Subcommittee Report, 2004, p. 15, 16), this territorial limitation is still largely in place. The exception made for the BMD programme has been widely noted. However, a more significant example from the perspective of this paper is the exception granted for the use of ODA to supply arms (armoured patrol boats) to Indonesia. The logic for this was Japan's reliance on clear SLOCs would be ensured in part by boosting the military capacity of friendly countries in critical points such as the straits of Malacca. This signifies a new area of de-territorialized security policy for Japan, as pre-figured in the 2004 Taikō.

4.2 Intermestic space

This section looks at how Japan's security policy and capacity is adapting to improve its ability to meet the challenges of securing intermestic space. We specifically focus on reforms in crisis response and intelligence.

Crisis response. If the history of the Imperial Japanese Army's unchecked aggression and Japan's loss of civilian control explained the taboo on overseas despatch of the SDF, lessons learned from the same period also restricted the scope of SDF operational powers at home. From the mid-1990s however, local crises involving North Korea (abductions of Japanese citizens by North Korea and intrusions of North Korean 'spy ships' into Japanese waters), inspired a set of security policy changes that eroded this restriction and saw the SDF engage in a range of new security tasks across intermestic space.

The 'Crisis laws' (Yūji hōsei) passed in the early 2000s have been defined as: 'The set of laws that determine what action will be taken as a nation in the event of an armed attack on Japan – 'teamwork rules' set in advance to determine how national, local government, individuals, also the police, fire service, coastguard, and SDF will work together in peace-time, war-time and large-scale terrorism events, etc.' (Tamura and

Suginō, 2004, p. 160). By adding a series of special provisions on relevant laws such as Road Traffic Law, Medical Service Law, Building Standards Law, and others, these laws provide the basis for the SDF to function in the same space as the police and local government, and to requisition the use of civilian infrastructure such as air and sea ports, roads, and radiofrequencies (JDA, 2002, pp. 146–159). One of the measures that attracted criticism was the role of the SDF in coordinating voluntary neighborhood groups to organize the civil response to crises (Yamauchi, 2002, p. 108).

The 2004 Taikō foregrounded intermestic threats such as clandestine operations, guerrilla, and SF activities by a hostile power/organization (section IV, 1 (1)b). The response to this can be seen in the transformation of structures and rules affecting the SDF's ability to respond and cooperate with other domestic actors. The basic agreement concluded in 1954 between the (then) JDA and National Public Safety Commission, to provide cooperation procedures in case of public security operations to suppress mass violence was revised in 2000 to enable its application to illegal activities by armed agents. Local agreements were concluded in 2002 regarding public security operations between GSDF divisions/brigades and prefectural police forces. The government still feels that '[f]or the SDF to deal with armed agents it is important to cooperate with the police agency' (MOD, 2008, p. 178).

Also notable among such reforms is the 2007 creation of the Central Readiness Force (CRF), which houses the GSDF's SF capability within a structure tasked with preparing and directing the GSDF's response to domestic and overseas crises. The intermestic range of the CRF mission is illustrated by its organizational structure, which consists of two deputies under the commander – one for overseas another for domestic operations. The CRF conducts an annual exercise with the police force[10] and members of its SF units take steps to preserve their anonymity,

---

10 Although it is outside the scope of this paper, it is noteworthy that Japan's Police has extended its operational reach across intermestic space too. 'Japan's National Policy Agency (NPA) has begun systematic cultivation of contacts with law enforcement agencies in other Asian-Pacific countries in an effort to increase trust among police professionals throughout the region. In so doing, the NPA hopes to create a climate in which Japan's police will be able to cooperate more easily with foreign police forces on an *ad hoc* basis' (Katzenstein and Okawara, 2001, 160).

presumably to enable them to pass among the civilian population in covert (or clandestine) operations at home or overseas.[11]

In summary, the institutionalization of the SDF's intermestic role is reflected all the way down the line from doctrine (2004 Taikō), through law (Yūji hōsei) and procedures (basic agreement, etc.) to capacity and practice (CRF, joint exercises).

Intelligence. One of the implications of globalization for security policy noted in the first section of this paper is the increased importance of intelligence for coping with complex contingencies and problems approaching Japan from afar, at speed and without warning. However, there is also evidence that post-Cold War changes increasing Japan's intelligence capacity could be seen as a response to some of the 'intermestic' consequences of globalization on security.

The expansion and re-orientation of Japan's intelligence capacity can be traced back to the early post-Cold War period. The 1994 Higuchi Commission report detailed the third element of a 'comprehensive and coherent Security Policy' as 'possession of a highly reliable and efficient defense capability based on a strengthened information capability and a prompt crisis-management capability'. 1996 Taikō followed through on the Higuchi recommendations, expressing the need for stronger intelligence capability. Since then, substantial material and political resources have been invested to re-orientate, re-organize, and expand Japan's intelligence capacity.

Three cases show how Japan's new intelligence capacity reflects an adaptation to the challenges of securing intermestic space. First, in May 1996 the traditional orientation of the Public Security Intelligence Agency (or PSIA, which had a task similar to that of the UK's MI5 or the American FBI) to monitoring left-wing subversives was re-directed towards the Korean community resident in Japan (Oros, 2002, p. 8; Sung-jae, 2004, p. 376). Following the 1998 Taepodong-1 shock and Pyongyang's 2001 admissions of kidnapping, the PSIA and the Japanese police attention on Korean organizations in Japan intensified. This began with raids in November 2001 on the Chongryon organization and

---

11 Photograph at the CRF website showing masked members of the tokushu sakusen gun, available at http://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/crf/pa/crforganization/sfg/SOGindex.html (13 January 2010, date last accessed).

Chongryon-affiliated financial enterprises suspected to be responsible for funding the North. Similar actions were conducted in 2003 against the ship Mangyongbong-92, which was suspected of being used to transfer materials and currency (Sung-jae, 2004, p. 380, 381).

Second, when the Japanese government established the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH) in 1996, and attached it to the Joint Staff Office in 1997, this raised the capacity of military intelligence and streamlined its function in supporting executive crisis management. The DIH website describes the reasons for bringing defense intelligence under direct control (chokkatsuka) as follows:

> 'In order for defence capability to function properly in its various phases and situations in a more unpredictable, complex and varied security environment, it is essential to attain and make adequate use of high level information capacity. Also in the intelligence department of the JDA (now MoD), in order to collect and deal with information from a wider field from all points of view and respond to the needs of a wider range of government agencies and the cabinet, it is necessary to have the capability to provide directly to the Minister of Defence more rapidly a higher level of analysis and more precise information'. (http://www.mod.go.jp/dih/gaiyou.html#gaiyo3, Author's translation, italics added).

Third, Japan has also initiated its indigenous satellite program to strengthen its information-gathering capability, deploying reconnaissance satellites to inculcate a greater sense of independence for intelligence information that would be crucial for Japan's national security. The information gathered from these satellites is collected and analysed by the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Centre, which is housed in the Cabinet Secretariat. This is a significant move by Japan as it integrates the intelligence agencies into a centralized structure allowing Japan to devise crisis response measures more effectively.

In sum, Japan's intelligence capacity has been re-directed at a transnational threat and embedded in a system of crisis management designed around the theme of integrating the functions of government. Both moves reflect the need to manage fast-developing threats in a way that is not impeded by institutional or conceptual barriers between 'foreign' and 'domestic' portfolios.

5 Conclusion

This paper aims to develop our understanding of the ways globalization has affected security, taking as its case study the military element of Japan's security policy, which has moved from a territorial to a global scale. Two aspects of globalization's effect on security – the 'security globality' and 'intermestic space' – are identified to study the role they played in breaking through historically robust resistance against a globally scaled post-war security role for Japan's military.

Although ideas such as 'interdependence' had appeared in Japan's security discourse much earlier, and Japan began 'overseas dispatch' of the SDF in the early 1990s, the events of 9/11 provided the spur to finally lift Japan's policy over the obstacles to reform. While the US–Japan alliance facilitated this change by providing a series of intermediate stepping stones, the logic of the 'security globality' has enabled a global military role to be locked into place in the form of legislation, policy, doctrine, and procurements. Also, crises in the region (Taiwan and North Korea) provided the impetus for reforms that make Japan more able to cope with the challenges of securing intermestic space. In the first decade of this century, both ideas have been firmly embedded in Japan's new global security policy and operations, as well as changes in organization, procedure, and practices.

This paper makes an argument for looking outside the areas usual cited as drivers of security policy change (US gaiatsu, changes in the East Asian balance of power unfavorable to Japanese interests, and changes within the Japanese political system, namely the shift of power in favor of the conservative politicians), to consider broader and more long-term trends affecting the security field beyond Japan. This paper presents evidence to suggest that the motivations and justifications for a shift to a global security policy should also be sought in evolutionary responses to adapt to broader change rooted in technological and ideological developments affecting the global security climate.

Recent changes in Japanese domestic politics offer a chance to test the validity of this argument. In the 2009 Katsumata Report prepared for the abortive 2010 Taikō, the logic of the 'security globality' was expressed once again in the following statement: 'Since it is not possible to build walls between people, making the whole world peaceful is essential for the security of one country', (Katsumata Report, 2009, p. 6).

Japan's August 2009 election replacing the LDP-led government with a Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)-led government might be expected to disrupt this steady evolution of Japanese security policy. However, despite the decisions of the DPJ government to allow the SDF mission in the Indian Ocean to lapse and to discard the Katsumata report, there are also signs of continuity in the trends noted above. The DPJ is committed to military participation in global collective security action, as seen by its launch of a review of PKO policy, intended to boost Japan's contributions. While 'globalization' does not have such a crucial function in the analytical and policy justification sections of DPJ's first Taikō (published December 2010), indeed it does not appear even once, the term 'global peace and security environment' appears no less than seven times in the 20 page document, and is used to support similar themes of 'security globality' presented in its 2004 counterpart, suggesting the effects of globalization on Japan's security concept may be here to stay.

Personal interviews

Professor Michishita Narushige, 27 March 2009, Tokyo.
Major General (Rtd.) (anonymous), 24 April 2009, Tokyo.

References

'About-face on defense', *Daily Yomiuri*, 27 May 1998, p. 6 (accessed from Nikkei Telecom 21 database).

Arase, A. (2007) 'Japan, the active state?: Security Policy after 9/11', *Asian Survey*, 47(4), 560–583.

Barnett, T.P.M. (2004) *The Pentagon's New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century*. New York: Berkley.

Beck, U. (2003) *What is Globalization?* Blackwell: Cambridge.

Berger, T.U. (1996) 'Norms, identity and national security in Germany and Japan', in P.J. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, pp. 317–356. New York: Columbia University Press.

Bilgin, P. and Morten, A. (2007) 'Rethinking state failure: the political economy of security*', in D. Lambach and T. Debiel (eds), *State Failure Revisited I: Globalization of Security and Neighborhood Effects*. INEF report 87/2007. http://inef.uni-due.de/page/documents/Report87.pdf (18 March 2008, date last accessed).

Blair, T. (2006) *A Global Alliance for Global Values*. London: Foreign Policy Centre.

Brandt, W. (1980) *North-South: A Programme for Survival*. London: Pan Books.

Boutros Ghali, B. (1992) *Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping*. http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html (7 December 2009, date last accessed).

Brooks, S.G. (2005) *Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the Changing Calculus of Conflict*. New Jersey: Princeton UP.

Bruntland, G.H. (1987) *Our Common Future, The United Nations' World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED)*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Campbell, K.M. (2002) 'Globalization's first war?', *Washington Quarterly*, 25(1), 7–14.

'Central Readiness Force' pamphlet produced by the CRF information office. http://www.mod.go.jp/gsdf/crf/pa/ (3 December 2009, date last accessed).

Cha, V.D. (2000) 'Globalization and the study of international security', *Journal of Peace Research*, 37(3), 391–403.

Chapman, J.W.M., Drifte, R. and Gow, I.T.M. (1983) *Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security: Defence, Diplomacy, and Dependence*. Pinter: London.

'Chief Cabinet Secretary Seiroku Kajiyama's statement', *Nikkei Weekly*, 1 September 1997, p. 1 (accessed from Nikkei Telecom 21 database).

Commission on Security and Defence Capabilities (1994) 'The modality of the security and defence capability of Japan: the Outlook for the 21st Century'.

Council on Security and Defence Capabilities. (2004) The council on security and defence capabilities report: Japan's visions for future security and defence capabilities. Araki Commission.

Department of Defense, United States. (1995) United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (also known as the *Nye Report*). Washington, DC: Office of International Security Affairs.

Dillon, M. (2005) 'The globalization of security', ESRC Briefing Paper, Chatham House. http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/research/security/papers/view/-/id/311/ (2 December 2009, date last accessed).

Duffield, M. (2001) *Global Governance and the New Wars*. London: Zed Books.

Duffield, M. (2005) Human security: development, containment and re-territorialization, in *Chatham House/ESRC*. The Globalization of Security. http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/research/security/papers/view/-/id/311/.

Edström, B. (1999) *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine: From Yoshida to Miyazawa*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Friedman, T.L. (2006) *The World is Flat: The Globalized World in the 21st Century.* London: Penguin.

Fukuyama, F. (1992) *The End of History and the Last Man.* London: Penguin.

Funabashi, Y. (1999) *Alliance Adrift.* New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press.

Glenny, M. (2008) *McMafia: A Journey Through the Global Criminal Underworld.* Alfred A. Knopf.

Green, M.J. (2003) *Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power.* New York: Palgrave and Council on Foreign Relations.

Green, M.J. and Murata, K. (1998) 'The 1978 guidelines for the US-Japan defence cooperation process and the historical impact', George Washington University Working Paper No. 17. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/japan/GreenMurataWP.htm (25 November 2009, date last accessed).

Guéhenno, J-M. (1995) *The End of the Nation State.* Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press.

Guéhenno, J-M. (1999) 'The impact of globalization on strategy', *Survival*, 40(4), 5–19.

Hain, P. (2001) *The End of Foreign Policy? Britain's Interests, Global Linkages and Natural Limits.* http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/foreign-articles/the-end-of-foreign-policy/ (20 August 2007, date last accessed).

Hasegawa, M. 'Japan girds for anti-terrorist action: Koizumi builds consensus on support for retaliation, including mobilizing SDF', *Nikkei Weekly*, 24 September 2001, p. 1 (accessed from Nikkei Telecom 21 database).

Hellman, D.C. (1977) 'Japanese security and postwar Japanese foreign policy', in R.A. Scalapino (ed.) with a foreword by Edwin O. Reischauer, *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*, pp. 321–340. Berkeley and London: University of California Press.

Hickey, D.V. (2001) *The Armies of East Asia: China, Taiwan, Japan, the Koreas.* Boulder, Colo. and London: Lynne Rienner.

Hook, G.D. (1996) *Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan.* London: Routledge.

Hughes, C.W. (2001) 'Conceptualizing the globalization-security Nexus in the Asia-Pacific', *Security Dialogue*, 32(4), 407–421.

Hughes, C.W. (2004) *Japan Re-emergence as a 'Normal' Military Power.* Oxford: Oxford University Press for International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS).

Hughes, C.W. and Krauss, E.S. (2007) 'Japan's new security agenda', *Survival*, 49(2), 157–176.

Inoguchi, T. and Jain, P. (eds.) (2000) *Japanese Foreign Policy Today: A Reader.* New York: Palgrave.

JDA (2002) *Defence of Japan.* Tokyo: Japan Times.

Japan-US joint declaration on security: alliance for the 21st century, Tokyo, 17 April 1996. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security. html (5 June 2006, date last accessed).

Japan-US Summit Meeting (2006). The Japan-US Alliance of the New Century. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/summit0606.html (3 December 2009, date last accessed).

Kaldor, M. (1999) *New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity.

Katsumata, H. (Chair) (2009) Committee on security and defence capability report 2009 (also known as *Katsumata Commission report*). http://www. kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ampobouei2/200908houkoku.pdf.

Katzenstein, P.J. and Okawara, N. (2001) 'Japan, Asian-Pacific security, and the case for analytical eclecticism', *International Security*, 26(3), 153–185.

Kawaguchi, Y. (2003) 'A foreign policy to consolidate peace', *Japan Echo*, 30(2), 24–29.

Kawasaki, T. (2001) 'Japan and two theories of military doctrine formation: civilian policymakers, policy preference, and the 1976 National Defense Program Outline', *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 1, 67–93.

Keohane, R.O. (2002) 'The globalization of informal violence, theories of world politics, and the 'liberalism of fear', *Dialog-IO*, 1(1), 29–43.

Kimura, S. and Matsuoka, H. (1999) 'Prospect and dilemma of the defense industry in Japan in the Post Cold-War Era – accommodation to globalization of economy.' NIDS Review, December 1999, 59–88 (also published in English in NIDS Security reports, March 2001). http://www. nids.go.jp/english/dissemination/kiyo/e2000.html (19 March 2009, date last accessed).

'Koizumi Supports Possible U.S. Retaliatory Attacks', *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 12 September 2001 (accessed from Nikkei Telecom 21 database).

LDP Defence Policy Studies Subcommittee Report (Policy Research Council) (2004) *Recommendations on Japan's New Defence Police: Toward a Safer and More Secure Japan and the World*. http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/seisaku/2004/ pdf/seisaku-006E.pdf (on 23 February 2009, date last accessed).

Lind, J.M. (1997) 'Gambling with globalism: Japanese financial flows to North Korea and the sanctions policy option', *The Pacific Review*, 10(3), 391–406.

Lind, J.M. (2004) 'Pacifism or passing the buck?: Testing theories of Japanese security policy', *International Security*, 29(1), 92–121.

Lind, W.S., Nightengale, K., Schmitt, J.F., Sutton, J.W. and Wilson, G.I. (1989) *The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation*. Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989, pp. 22–26.

Maeda, T. (2004) 'A Dangerous shift in defence policy', in E. Krauss and B. Nyblade (eds), *Japan and North America: The Postwar (Volume II)*, pp. 112–118. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon.

McSweeney, B. (1999) *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Michishita, N. (2002) 'Changing faces of Japanese defence policy: past and future', *Global Economic Review*, 31(4), 91–100.

Mochizuki, M.M. (ed.) (1997) 'American and Japanese strategic debates', *Towards a True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations*, pp. 43–82. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.

MOD, Japan (2008) *Defense of Japan*. Tokyo: Japan Times.

MOFA (2001) 'Remarks by Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro at the ceremony for all victims of terrorist attacks in US'(Provisional Translation). http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/terro0109/010923_e.html (28 March 2005, date last accessed).

MOFA (2002) 'New year's reflections by Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro', (Provisional Translation). http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/koizumi/new0201.html (28 March 2005, date last accessed).

MOFA (2003) *Diplomatic Bluebook*. Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2003/chap1.pdf (accessed at various times).

MOFA (2004) *Diplomatic Bluebook*. Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://www/mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2004/chap1.pdf (accessed at various times).

Murakami, K. (2004) 'The postwar defence debate in review', in E. Krauss and B. Nyblade (eds), *Japan and North America: The Postwar (Volume II)*, pp. 88–102. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon.

Naím, M. (2005) *Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats Are Hijacking the Global Economy*. New York: Doubleday.

'National Programme Defence Outline in an after FY1996' (Tentative Official Translation). http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/6a.html (5 June 2006, date last accessed).

National Defence Programme Guidelines FY 2005 (NDPG) (2004). http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2004/1210taikou_e.html.

Nishihara, M. (1983, 1984) 'Expanding Japan's credible defence role', *International Security*, 8(3), 180–205.

'No Geographical Limits On SDF Dispatch: Koizumi', *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 6 October 2001 (accessed from Nikkei Telecom 21 database).

'NPA says Islamic terrorists active in Asia', *Daily Yomiuri*, 22 September 2001, p. 2 (accessed from Nikkei Telecom 21 database).

Nye, J. and Keohane, R. (1977) *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*. Little: Brown and Company.

Ohmae, K. (1996) *The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies*. London: Harper Collins.

Oros, A.L. (2002) 'Japan's growing intelligence capability', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence*, 15(1), 1–25.

Oros, A.L. (2008) *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Palme, O. (1982) *Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament*. London: Pan Books.

Pharr, S.J. (1993) 'Japan's defensive foreign policy and the politics of burden sharing', in G.L. Curtis (ed.), *Japan's Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Coping with Change*, pp. 235–262. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.

Pyle, K.E. (2004) 'Japan's Postwar National Purpose', in E. Krauss and B. Nyblade (eds), *Japan and North America: The Postwar (Volume II)*, pp. 37–57. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon.

Pyle, K.E. (2007) *Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose*. New York: Public Affairs.

Rasmussen, M.V. (2002) 'A parallel globalization of terror': 9–11, security and globalization', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 37(3), 323–349.

Robb, J. (2007) *Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism at the End of Globalization*. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons Inc.

Rosenau, J.N. (2003) *Distant Proximities: Dynamics beyond Globalization*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Samuels, R.J. (2007) *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*. Cornell, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Saviono, R. (2007) *Gomorra: Italy's Other Mafia*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Security Consultative Committee. (2005) *US-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Relignment for the Future*. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html (3 December 2009, date last accessed).

Shimbun, A. (2005), '*Japan's New Blue Water Navy: A Four-year Indian Ocean Mission Recasts the Constitution and the US-Japan Alliance*', Japan Focus (translated by E. Osaki and M. Penn). http://www.japanfocus.org/products/details/1812 (24 July 2006, date last accessed).

Shinoda, T. (2002) Japan's response to terrorism and the implications for the Taiwan Strait issue. Japan-Taiwan Research Forum. http://taiwansecurity.org/TS/2002/JTRF-Shinoda-0102.htm (27 June 2005, date last accessed).

Shinoda, T. (2006) 'Japan's top-down policy process to dispatch the SDF to Iraq', *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 7(1), 71–91.

Singh, B. (2006) 'Japanese post-cold war security policy: crises and security identity transformation', unpublished PhD Dissertation. University of Sheffield.

Smith, R. (2006) *The Utility of Force*. London: Penguin.

Sung-jae, C. (2004) 'The North Korean factor in the improvement of Japanese intelligence capability', *The Pacific Review*, 17(4), 369–397.

Tamura, S. and Suginō, Y. (eds.) (2004) *Textbook: Japan's Security*. Fuyōshobō: Tokyo.

Tanaka, A. (2000) *Wa-do poritiksu: gurobaruzeishon no naka no nihon gaikō (Word Politics: Japanese diplomacy under globalisation)*. Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo.

Tanaka, A. (2003) *Fukuzassei no sekai: 'Tero no seiki' to nihon (The World of Complexity: Japan and the Century of Terrorism)*. Tokyo: Keiso Shobo.

Tōgō, K. (2005) *Japan's Foreign Policy, 1945–2003: The Quest for a Proactive Policy.* Leiden, Boston: Brill.

'Top Cop Warns on Terrorism Threat,' *Mainichi Daily News*, 18 September 2001.

Ueda, T., Washio, A. and Koseki, M. (1996) 'Tokyo makes major defence policy shift', *Japan Times*, 18 April, p. 1.

USG (2002) National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/index.html.

Van Creveld, M. (1991) *The Transformation of War*. New York: Free Press.

Waltz, K.N. (1979) *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley.

Washio, A. (1994) 'Peacekeeping debate falls by the wayside', *Japan Times*, 24 May, p. 3.

Washio, A. (1995) 'Japan dragging its heels on UN peacekeeping', *Japan Times*, 3 January, p. 1.

Wolf, M. (2004) *Why Globalization Works*. London: Yale Nota Bene, Yale University Press.

Yamauchi, Toshihiro (ed.) (2002) *Investigation of the Crisis Laws: Re-inquiring into the 'Post-9/11' from the Standpoint of the Peace Constitution (Yūji Hōsei wo kentō suru: '9.11 ikō' wo heiwa kenpō no shiza kara toinaosu)*. Tokyo: Hōritsu bunka sha.