

Tactical Vignette 97-1

“The Battle of Durango Valley”

The tactical vignette is a training tool for tactical decision-making during mission execution. The Marines have long used similar vignettes, which they call Tactical Decision Games (TDG), in the *Marine Corps Gazette* as an efficient and inexpensive exercise for leaders at all levels. An article detailing the uses of the TDG can be found in the May-June 1997 issue of *ARMOR*.

The following tactical vignette serves as the first in a series of scenarios developed by the Doctrine Division of the U.S. Army Armor Center. Readers are encouraged to send their solutions for the tactical vignette to *ARMOR* as a means of discussion and instruction. The author's solution, along with several of the best solutions from the field, will be published in a subsequent issue of the magazine.

Situation:

You are the commander of A Team (tank heavy), TF 2-8. You are the advance guard company (AGC) of the TF as it conducts a movement to contact. The brigade commander wants the task force to find, fix, and destroy the advance guard of an MRR that is moving east. This will allow the rest of the brigade to maneuver and destroy the regimental main body, with enough combat power left to block the second-echelon MRR. The task force commander directs the AGC to find, fix, and destroy the FSE allowing the task force main body to maneuver into the flank of the AGMB.

Your team consists of two M1A1 tank platoons and one mechanized infantry, (BFV) platoon. An engineer platoon and the mortar platoon follow in support; you have priority of mortars. Your team is moving on an axis south of the task force based on an erroneous report that the FSE was at CP 8. The terrain is mostly open desert flanked by mountains, with some high terrain in the center of the zone. As you approach the intersection at CP 6, your 1st Platoon reports seeing approximately 20 vehicles moving east and starting to deploy vicinity CP 2. A moment later, task force




scouts report they have identified the AGMB north of Hill 560 moving east toward CP 4.

You suddenly realize that the element identified by 1st Platoon must be the FSE and that it is probably deploying to engage the task force from Hill 110. You attempt to contact the task force commander but receive no response. The last transmission with the task force had them approximately 15 minutes out from CP 2. Based on the scout's last report, the AGMB is 20 minutes from CP 4. It will take you 9-10 minutes to move northeast to engage the FSE or 11-12 minutes to move northwest to intercept the AGMB. You must act now! What do you do?

Requirement:

In 2 minutes or less, make your decision and issue your FRAGO and any other reports you would submit. Readers wanting to submit their solutions to the scenario should provide the following: Fragmentary order to the company team, the rationale behind your decision, and a sketch of your plan of action. Mail your solution to ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-TDM, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210 or send your solution by e-mail to: washburj@ftknox-dtdd-emh5.army.mil




THE PROBLEM:

"The Battle of Durango Valley" - from the September-October issue of ARMOR

Situation:

You are the commander of A Team (tank heavy), TF 2-8. You are the advance guard company (AGC) of the TF as it conducts a movement to contact. The brigade commander wants the task force to find, fix, and destroy the advance guard of an MRR that is moving east. This will allow the rest of the brigade to maneuver and destroy the regimental main body, with enough combat power left to block the second-echelon MRR. The task force commander directs the AGC to find, fix, and destroy the FSE allowing the task force main body to maneuver into the flank of the AGMB.

Your team consists of two M1A1 tank platoons and one mechanized infantry, (BFV) platoon. An engineer platoon and the mortar platoon follow in support; you have priority of mortars. Your team is moving on an axis south of the task force based on an erroneous report that the FSE was at CP 8. The terrain is mostly open desert flanked by mountains, with some high terrain in the center of the zone. As you approach the intersection at CP 6, your 1st Platoon reports seeing approximately 20 vehicles moving east and starting to deploy vicinity CP 2. A moment later, task force scouts report they have identified the AGMB north of Hill 560 moving east toward CP 4.



You suddenly realize that the element identified by 1st Platoon must be the FSE and that it is probably deploying to engage the task force from Hill 110. You attempt to contact the task force commander but receive no response. The last transmission with the task force had them approximately 15 minutes out from CP 2. Based on the scout's last report, the AGMB is 20 minutes from CP 4. It will take you 9-10 minutes to move northeast to engage the FSE or 11-12 minutes to move northwest to intercept the AGMB. You must act now! What do you do?

THE SOLUTIONS:

The following solutions pertain to the tactical vignette, "The Battle of Durango Valley," published in the September-October issue of ARMOR. They include the author's solution, provided by the Doc-

trine Division, and two solutions submitted by our readers.

We would like to thank those other readers who also submitted their solutions to the tactical vignette.


Author's Solution

FRAGO:

"GUIDONS, this is BLACK 6, FRAGO follows. **Situation:** The enemy FSE is deploying at CP2 to engage the main body of the task force, and the AGMB is moving east toward CP4. BREAK.

"**Mission:** We will attack by fire to fix the AGMB vicinity CP4 to allow the task force to move to a position of advantage to destroy the AGMB.

"**Intent:** (Purpose) The purpose of our mission is to fix the AGMB to allow the task force time to move to a position of advantage and destroy the AGMB. We will accomplish this by attacking by fire from a blocking position west of CP3 oriented north and west of CP4, in effect luring the AGMB into an 'L'-shaped ambush. (End state) The company team arrayed in attack by fire positions vicinity Hill 210, oriented to the west; the AGMB fixed vicinity CP4; and the task force maneuvering to destroy the AGMB. BREAK.



Tasks to subordinate units:

“RED (MECH), move to the intervisibility line vicinity grid 135454, oriented north. **Task:** Attack by fire from a blocking position, orienting fires from TRP1 to CP4. **Purpose:** To protect the company team’s flank, denying enemy movement toward the south. Be prepared to shift fires to the west, oriented on CP8. Move dismounts to vicinity grid 130451 (Hill 560) to block enemy dismounted avenues of approach. BREAK.

“WHITE, move to grid 140456 west of CP3, oriented north. **Task:** Attack by fire from a blocking position, orienting fires on CP4. **Purpose:** To prevent the enemy from maneuvering to the north. BREAK.

“BLUE, move to grid 145473 north of CP3, oriented west. **Task:** Attack by fire from a blocking position, orienting fires from CP4 to TRP1. **Purpose:** To prevent the enemy from maneuvering north. BREAK.

“MORTARS, move to grid 145442. **Task:** Disrupt the AGMB with HE/smoke. **Purpose:** Disrupt the enemy’s formations, giving us a direct fire advantage by forcing him to button up and disperse. BREAK.

“FIST, move to a position vicinity CP3 to regain communications with the task force and call for fires against the AGMB. You have priority of fires.


“BLACK 5, provide protection for the FIST. Assist in calling for and adjusting fires. Observe location and movement of FSE. Regain contact with higher and report. BREAK.

“SAPPER (ENG), move to vicinity grid 132424. **Task:** Provide flank security, oriented on CP8. **Purpose:** Provide early warning of enemy forces moving on southern avenue of approach. BREAK.

“BLACK 7, move trains to a hide position near Hill 230, west of CP6; be prepared to execute MEDEVAC. ACKNOWLEDGE, OVER.”

RATIONALE:

Our mission was to find, fix, and destroy the FSE, but it has bypassed us and



may fix the task force, allowing the AGMB to maneuver on it. Our dilemma is whether we should attempt to destroy the FSE or move to fix the AGMB. We do not have the time or the combat power to accomplish both. I decided to establish a blocking position and attrit the AGMB before it has time to develop the situation and maneuver against the task force.

I moved the mechanized infantry to high ground, oriented northwest, to provide greater range for their TOWs as they establish their blocking position. Red’s dismounts will block enemy dismounted avenues of approach. I positioned the tank platoons along Hill 210, fixing the enemy from the east and denying him movement north or south. We should be able to accomplish the mission of fixing the AGMB with accurate direct fires. I had the XO provide security for the FIST to regain communications with higher and keep an eye on the actions of the FSE.

Both the company FIST and the mortars are in a position to support the company fight. The engineers are positioned to reinforce the blocking position and observe the southern avenue of approach.

Even though my mission to find, fix, and destroy the FSE has essentially failed, the brigade commander’s intent for the task force was to find, fix, and destroy the AGMB. By fixing the AGMB, we are disrupting the enemy’s plan, providing time for the task force to destroy the FSE and still gain a position of advantage to destroy the AGMB. Although we have not achieved our original task, the task force still has a shot at winning.

SOLUTION B

(Submitted by MAJ John Allen and CPT(P) Donald Barnett, Doctrine Writers, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas)

FRAGO:

“RED and WHITE (MECH) will occupy attack by fire positions west of CP1, on Hill 230 oriented on CP2. Fix and/or destroy the FSE vicinity CP2. BREAK.

“BLUE, along with BLACK 5, will occupy Hill 210 vicinity CP3, oriented on CP4. Observe approach of the AGMB, and cover hasty minefield emplacement vicinity CP6. Engage the lead company of the AGMB between CPs 4 and 6. Delay the lead company of the AGMB for 10 minutes or withdraw under direct pressure. Move now. BREAK.

“DIGGER (ENG) will emplace a hasty minefield at CP6; intent is to delay the lead company of AGMB from moving eastward from CP6 to CP5, allowing BLUE more engagement time. BREAK.

“FIST, use mortars to suppress the FSE vicinity CP2; plan to suppress the lead company of the AGMB using targets vicinity CP4 and CP6. Plan for a smoke target between CP3 and CP6 to screen BLUE’s withdrawal. DIGGER will inform BLACK 5 and FIST of minefield grids. BREAK.

“MORTARS will emplace vicinity grid 123456 southwest of Hill 230 and return fire within 10 minutes. BREAK.

“FIST, DIGGER, and BLACK 7 will immediately contact higher to report our intent. BLACK 7, attempt to regain con-

tact with battalion by either FM or face to face. ACKNOWLEDGE, OVER.”

Rationale:

The company will maneuver north to fix and, preferably, destroy the FSE. This is in keeping with the commander's intent: preventing the FSE from fixing or turning the battalion prior to CP2 while exercising the initiative to destroy the enemy force. The commander feels he can destroy the FSE because he is on its southern flank. The BLUE platoon is pushed forward to Hill 210 to gain observation of the AGMB and to delay the AGMB if it continues straight or south at CP4. If the AGMB goes northeast, the battalion can then attack its flank from CP2 to CP10.

If the AGMB continues straight, the battalion can flank it by attacking from CP9 south, or it can attack from CP5 to CP3 or CP6, then turn north. If the AGMB goes south (most likely because of the expected demise of the FSE), the enemy will be delayed trying to negotiate the minefield and defeat the BLUE platoon on Hill 210. This delay gives the battalion commander the option to bypass remnants of the FSE at CP2 and attack the flank of the AGMB from CP3 and/or CP4. Of course, to make any of this work, the AGC must regain contact with the battalion!

SOLUTION C

(Submitted by 1LT Daniel T. Head, XO, HHC, 2nd BDE, Fort Stewart, Georgia)


FRAGO:

“GUIDONS, this is BLACK 6. Probable enemy AGMB spotted vicinity grid 123445. Will arrive at CP4 in approximately 20 minutes.

“WHITE (MECH), set vicinity grid 124678; orient from CP4 left. Engage enemy vehicles with TOWs when they reach CP4. Do not dismount.

“RED, set to the right of WHITE; orient on CP4. Engage enemy once three vehicles are past CP4.

“BLUE, set to the right of RED; orient from CP4 right. Engage once enemy is 1,000 meters past CP4. Watch CP2 for possible enemy or friendly activity. Ensure positive ID before firing. Prepare to



bound to the left of WHITE. Prepare to cover the company's displacement.

“MORTARS and FIST, CP4 is target AB1001. Tanks and BMPs in the open. Fire as the first enemy vehicles pass CP4. FIST is the primary shooter. RED is the alternate.

“ENGINEERS, begin digging hasty, hull-down fighting positions vic grid 122455, oriented west.

“GUIDONS, on order, the company will shift south, with left-most platoon vicinity CP6. We will orient on CP4. BLUE will cover the company's move. ACKNOWLEDGE, OVER.”

RATIONALE:

The commander's intent was for the company to find, fix, and destroy the FSE, but with the enemy AGMB coming toward me and the FSE behind me, this is no longer practical. The task force should be able to deal with the FSE, especially if I can reestablish communications. A hasty attack on the FSE leaves me open to attack from the rear by the AGMB as well as to friendly fire from my own task force as they engage the FSE.

I would set my company on the northwest side of Hill 210 (on the reverse slope in turret-down positions) in a hasty defense oriented on CP4. A tank company in the defense is a match for an AGMB in a direct fire fight. If I can successfully fix, delay, and destroy most or all of the AGMB, the task force will be able to destroy the FSE and then move on to destroy the AGMB piecemeal.

This plan allows the company to engage the AGMB from a hasty defense if

the enemy chooses to follow the road (an obvious axis of approach). Should he turn south, the company will reposition before the enemy is close enough to bring accurate and deadly direct fires.

One probable reason for the loss of ammo is that we have gone too far and are now outside the TF's primary SINCGARS range. Switching to the retrans frequency will probably restore ammo. If I can restore ammo, I will send a spot report and SITREP to the TF commander or TOC (whomever I can contact).

Budget Cut Eliminates Knox Doctrine Home Page ...and "Issues in ARMOR"

Fort Knox's Directorate of Training and Doctrine Development (DTDD) has declined to renew the Entelechy, Inc. contract that originally created the Doctrine Home Page, opting to use the resources elsewhere.

The cutback also impacts the ARMOR Magazine Internet presentation, "Issues in ARMOR," which was part of that home page.

Tactical Vignette 97-2

“Ambush at Dogwood Crossing”

Situation

Terrain (see Fig. 2, Battalion graphics)

Obstacles - Dogwood Creek is a natural obstacle which will restrict tactical movement because it offers only three fording sites within the area of operation.

Avenues of Approach - Axis California is a high speed avenue of approach that will allow maneuver to be masked by the high ground nearby and the wood line to the east of CP 5. Route Kayla is a dismounted avenue of approach that provides outstanding cover and concealment up to CP 6. Occupation of CP 6 will allow dismounts to engage suspected enemy armored vehicles to their flank, causing disruption to the enemy COA.

Key Terrain - Dogwood Creek is key terrain since the creek can restrict or impede friendly maneuver. The ridge line on PL Yorktown is key terrain because it affords outstanding observation to the north, which will provide an advantage to friendly or enemy forces.

Observation and Fields of Fire - The ridge line along PL Yorktown provides great observation and fields of fire because it is the high ground that dominates the terrain within the area of operation.

Cover and Concealment - The high ground near CP 5 and the wood line to the east of CP 5 provide great cover and concealment as friendly forces maneuver along Axis California.

Enemy. The enemy is conducting a defense out of contact. The 13th MRD has deployed a forward detachment (MRB) ahead of the division to secure a key logistical site five kilometers north of PL Yorktown (airfield). The forward detachment has been establishing hasty fighting positions and protective obstacles for the last 24 hours in preparation for the arrival of the main body within the next 12 hours. Our task force (TF 1) will attack against an MRC (along PL Enterprise) that the forward detachment has deployed forward to provide early warning and to disrupt and attrit enemy forces that enter their engagement area. The MRC is currently at 70% strength. The MRC has been identified by a UAV that flew over their positions two hours ago. The defending MRC deployed a CSOP



2-3 kilometers forward of its main defensive belt (along PL Yorktown) to provide early warning and call for indirect fire to harass enemy maneuver. The CSOP is an MRP which is reinforced with a tank.

Friendly.

Brigade

Mission: 1st Brigade attacks in zone 230630SEP97 to destroy enemy forces vicinity OBJ Amanda in order to allow




Figure 1. Brigade Graphics.

2nd Brigade (the division's main effort) to maintain freedom of maneuver as they attack north to seize key logistical site vicinity OBJ Brittany.

Intent: (Purpose) The purpose of this attack is to allow 2nd Brigade to attack north maintaining freedom of maneuver to seize the airport vicinity of OBJ Brittany. The airport allows the division to provide more responsive logistical support within the area of operation. We will accomplish this mission by conducting an attack with three TFs attacking abreast, enveloping enemy forces from the east and west. This will prevent the enemy from massing fires, forcing him to fight in three directions.

(End state). At end state, enemy destroyed in zone vicinity OBJ Amanda allowing 2nd Brigade to maintain freedom of maneuver as they attack north to seize OBJ Brittany (see Figure 1. Brigade Graphics).

Tasks to Maneuver Units:

TF 1 - Task: Seize OBJ Kara

Purpose: allow 1st Brigade to maintain freedom of maneuver to destroy enemy forces vicinity OBJ Amanda.

On order, continue the attack north to destroy enemy in zone to LOA New York

Responsible for triggering brigade artillery target AB1002. Priority of artillery up to PL Enterprise

TF 2 - Task: (Brigade main effort) Seize OBJ (Amanda #1)

Purpose: To protect 1st Brigade's western flank

Responsible for triggering brigade artillery target AB1000. Priority of artillery at PL Enterprise

TF3 - Task: (brigade supporting effort) Seize OBJ (Amanda #3)

Purpose: To protect 1st Brigade's eastern flank

Responsible for triggering brigade artillery target AB1001

Task Force 1

Mission: TF 1 attacks in zone along Axis California 230630SEP97 to destroy enemy forces vicinity OBJ Kara in order to allow 1st Brigade to maintain freedom of maneuver and maximize its combat power as it attacks to destroy enemy forces vicinity OBJ Amanda. On order, continue to attack north to LOA New York, destroying enemy forces in zone.

Intent: (Purpose) The purpose of our attack is to destroy enemy forces in zone. This will allow 1st Brigade to maintain freedom of maneuver and maximize its combat power as it attacks to destroy enemy forces vicinity OBJ Amanda. We will accomplish this mission by conducting an attack enveloping




Figure 2. Battalion Graphics.

enemy MRC 1 from the west. (End state) At end state, OBJ Kara has been seized, and TF conducting consolidation and reorganization operations in preparation to continue the attack north to LOA New York.

Tasks to Maneuver Units:

TM A - Task: (TF main effort) Seize OBJ Kara.

Purpose: Prevent MRC 1 from attacking into the flank of TF 2 or TF 3

Assault force during TF breaching operations

Responsible for firing one green start cluster at PL Enterprise to signal TM B to lift fires

Responsible for triggering artillery targets AB1002 and AB002

Priority of fires at PL Yorktown

Accept one tank platoon from TM C to maximize combat power to seize OBJ Kara, effective immediately

TM B - Task: Support by fire

Purpose: To suppress enemy forces on OBJ Kara in support of TM A's attack

Occupy terrain vicinity SBF 01, which will provide effective suppressive fires on eastern MRP

Lift your fires as TM A fires one green start cluster as they pass PL Enterprise Support force during TF breaching operations

Responsible for triggering mortar targets AB001 and AB003

Initial priority of fires up to PL Yorktown

TM C - Task: Breach

Purpose: To clear a lane for TM A's attack to seize OBJ Kara

Attached assault and obstacle platoon effective immediately

Responsible for identifying point of breach

Detach one tank platoon to TM A effective immediately

Company Situation

You are the commander of TM B (tank heavy). Your team is attacking in zone as part of a three-team task force attack. TM B is the support force. You are responsible for establishing a support by fire position (SBF 01) to suppress the enemy MRP on the eastern side of OBJ Kara. You have priority of mortar sup-




Figure 3. Commander's view from his turret (Area visible from turret is shaded in Figure 2).

port throughout this operation and are responsible for triggering AB001 and AB003. Your team has just deployed along PL Lexington in anticipation of contact with the enemy CSOP (see Figure 2. Battalion Graphics).

You direct that 2nd platoon (tank) and 3rd platoon (tank) establish an overwatch while 1st platoon (mech) bounds forward towards CP 2. You direct 1st platoon to focus its observation from CP 5 to CP 3, 2nd platoon from CP 6 to CP 7, and 3rd platoon from CP 7 to CP 8. During 1st platoon's bound, they receive fire, and 2nd platoon reports seeing a signature from a firing BMP east of CP 5. As the team continues to develop the situation, it conducts the following actions and gains the following information:

3rd platoon conducts a reconnaissance by fire and reports a vehicle moving vicinity of CP 8.

2nd platoon initially identified a tank turret west of CP 7; the tank has since backed down into a defilade position, leaving only its antennae visible. The platoon additionally identified and destroyed a BMP vicinity NX065550 (see Figure 3. Commander's View from Turret).

Requirements

In five minutes or less, choose a course of action and issue a FRAGO. The end

state of the COA must have the remaining enemy to your front destroyed and have the company team arrayed to conduct its support-by-fire position task. Readers wanting to submit their solutions to the scenario should provide the following: fragmentary order to the company team, the rationale behind the decision, and a sketch of your COA. Mail your solution to ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-TDM, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210, or send your solution by e-mail to:

ThompsonM@ftknox-dtdd-emh5.army.mil

In the next issue of *ARMOR*...

In the January-February issue, we will include some of the solutions sent in by readers to the September-October issue tactical vignette, "The Battle of Durango Valley," along with the author's proposed solution. Suggested solutions for this vignette will appear in the March-April issue. - Ed.

THE PROBLEM:

"Ambush at Dogwood Crossing" from the November-December 1997 issue of ARMOR

Situation:

Terrain (see Fig. 2, Battalion graphics)

Obstacles - Dogwood Creek is a natural obstacle which will restrict tactical movement because it offers only three fording sites within the area of operation.

Avenues of Approach - Axis California is a high speed avenue of approach that will allow maneuver to be masked by the high ground nearby and the wood line to the east of CP 5. Route Kayla is a dismounted avenue of approach that provides outstanding cover and concealment up to CP 6. Occupation of CP 6 will allow dismounts to engage suspected enemy armored vehicles to their flank, causing disruption to the enemy COA.

Key Terrain - Dogwood Creek is key terrain since the creek can restrict or impede friendly maneuver. The ridge line on PL Yorktown is key terrain because it affords outstanding observation to the north, which will provide an advantage to friendly or enemy forces.

Observation and Fields of Fire - The ridge line along PL Yorktown provides great observation and fields of fire because it is the high ground that dominates the terrain within the area of operation.

Cover and Concealment - The high ground near CP 5 and the wood line to the east of CP 5 provide great cover and concealment as friendly forces maneuver along Axis California.

Enemy. The enemy is conducting a defense out of contact. The 13th MRD has deployed a forward detachment (MRB) ahead of the division to secure a key logistical site five kilometers north of PL Yorktown (airfield). The forward detachment has been establishing hasty fighting positions and protective obstacles for the last 24 hours in preparation for the arrival of the main body within the next 12 hours. Our task force (TF 1) will attack against an MRC (along PL Enterprise) that the forward detachment has deployed forward to provide early warning and to disrupt and attrit enemy forces that enter their engagement area. The MRC is currently at 70% strength. The MRC has been identified by a UAV that flew over their positions two hours ago. The defending MRC deployed a CSOP 2-3 kilometers forward of its main defensive belt (along PL Yorktown) to provide early warning and call for indirect fire to harass enemy maneuver. The CSOP is an MRP which is reinforced with a tank.

Friendly.

Brigade

Mission: 1st Brigade attacks in zone 230630SEP97 to destroy enemy forces vicinity OBJ Amanda in order to allow 2nd Brigade (the division's main effort) to maintain freedom of maneuver as they attack north to seize the airport vicinity of OBJ Brittany.

Intent: (Purpose) The purpose of this attack is to allow 2nd Brigade to attack north maintaining freedom of maneuver to seize the airport vicinity of OBJ Brittany. The airport allows the division to provide more responsive logistical support within the area of operation. We will accomplish this mission by conducting an attack with three TFs attacking abreast, enveloping enemy forces from the east and west. This will prevent the enemy from massing fires, forcing him




Figure 1. Brigade Graphics

to fight in three directions.

(End state). At end state, enemy destroyed in zone vicinity OBJ Amanda allowing 2nd Brigade to maintain freedom of maneuver as they attack north to seize OBJ Brittany (see Figure 1. Brigade Graphics).

Tasks to Maneuver Units:

TF 1 - Task: Seize OBJ Kara

Purpose: Allow 1st Brigade to maintain freedom of maneuver to destroy enemy forces vicinity OBJ Amanda.

On order, continue the attack north to destroy enemy in zone to LOA New York

Responsible for triggering brigade artillery target AB1002. Priority of artillery up to PL Enterprise

TF 2 - Task: (Brigade main effort) Seize OBJ (Amanda #1)

Purpose: To protect 1st Brigade's western flank

Responsible for triggering brigade artillery target AB1000. Priority of artillery at PL Enterprise

TF3 - Task: (brigade supporting effort) Seize OBJ (Amanda #3)

Purpose: To protect 1st Brigade's eastern flank

Responsible for triggering brigade artillery target AB1001

Task Force 1

Mission: TF 1 attacks in zone along Axis California 230630SEP97 to destroy enemy forces vicinity OBJ Kara in order to allow 1st Brigade to maintain freedom of maneuver




Figure 2. Battalion Graphics

ver and maximize its combat power as it attacks to destroy enemy forces vicinity OBJ Amanda. On order, continue to attack north to LOA New York, destroying enemy forces in zone.

Intent: (Purpose) The purpose of our attack is to destroy enemy forces in zone. This will allow 1st Brigade to maintain freedom of maneuver and maximize its combat power as it attacks to destroy enemy forces vicinity OBJ Amanda. We will accomplish this mission by conducting an attack enveloping enemy MRC 1 from the west. (End state) At end state, OBJ Kara has been seized, and TF conducting consolidation and reorganization operations in preparation to continue the attack north to LOA New York.

Tasks to Maneuver Units:

TM A - Task: (TF main effort) Seize OBJ Kara.

Purpose: Prevent MRC 1 from attacking into the flank of TF 2 or TF 3

Assault force during TF breaching operations

Responsible for firing one green start cluster at PL Enterprise to signal TM B to lift fires

Responsible for triggering artillery targets AB1002 and AB002

Priority of fires at PL Yorktown

Accept one tank platoon from TM C to maximize combat power to seize OBJ Kara, effective immediately

TM B - Task: Support by fire

Purpose: To suppress enemy forces on OBJ Kara in support of TM A's attack

Occupy terrain vicinity SBF 01, which will provide effective suppressive fires on eastern MRP

Lift your fires as TM A fires one green star cluster as they pass PL Enterprise

Support force during TF breaching operations

Responsible for triggering mortar targets AB001 and AB003

Initial priority of fires up to PL Yorktown

TM C - Task: Breach

Purpose: To clear a lane for TM A's attack to seize OBJ Kara

Attached assault and obstacle platoon effective immediately

Responsible for identifying point of breach

Detach one tank platoon to TM A effective immediately

Company Situation

You are the commander of TM B (tank heavy). Your team is attacking in zone as

part of a three-team task force attack. TM B is the support force. You are responsible for establishing a support by fire position (SBF 01) to suppress the enemy MRP on the eastern side of OBJ Kara. You have priority of mortar support throughout this operation and are responsible for triggering AB001 and AB003. Your team has just deployed along PL Lexington in anticipation of contact with the enemy CSOP (see Figure 2. Battalion Graphics).

You direct that 2nd platoon (tank) and 3rd platoon (tank) establish an overwatch while 1st platoon (mech) bounds forward towards CP 2. You direct 1st platoon to focus its observation from CP 5 to CP 3, 2nd platoon from CP 6 to CP 7, and 3rd platoon from CP 7 to CP 8. During 1st platoon's bound, they receive fire, and 2nd platoon reports seeing a signature from a firing BMP east of CP 5. As the team continues to develop the situation, it conducts the following actions and gains the following information:

3rd platoon conducts a reconnaissance by fire and reports a vehicle moving vicinity of CP 8.

2nd platoon initially identified a tank turret west of CP 7; the tank has since backed down into a defilade position, leaving only its antennae visible. The platoon additionally identified and destroyed a BMP vicinity NX065550.

THE SOLUTIONS:

Author's Solution

FRAGO:

"GUIDONS, this is BLACK 6, FRAGO follows. **Situation:** The enemy is overwatching the ford site and occupying SBF01. We have a possible BMP at grid 062556, a stationary tank at 074557, and possible BMP moving west near grid 081557. BREAK.

"**Mission:** Team B conducts a hasty attack to destroy enemy forces along PL YORKTOWN to establish SBF 01 in order to support the task force's attack on OBJ KARA. BREAK.

"**Intent:** We will destroy the CSOP in order to establish our support by fire position and suppress enemy forces as the TF attacks to seize OBJ KARA. BREAK.

"Tasks to subordinate units:

"**RED (MECH),** Seize the crossing site and establish near side security. On order, establish the left flank of SBF 01 vicinity CP6. Report when set. BREAK.

"**DISMOUNTS,** Clear enemy dismounts along Route Kayla and anchor the left flank at CP6 oriented towards CP5. BREAK.

"**WHITE,** Support by Fire BLUE's assault to seize SBF 01. Orient fires from CP6 to CP8. BREAK.

"**BLUE,** Seize SBF 01. Move through the ford site. Establish the right flank of SBF 01 vicinity CP8. BREAK.

"**FIST,** Suppress the enemy positions at CP5 and CP7 with artillery fires. Trigger AB001 to mask our movement to the ford site. BREAK.

"**BLACK 5,** Move with BLUE. Report movement of enemy or friendly forces maneuvering from the east. You are second in priority of calling fires. BREAK.

"**BLACK 7,** move the trains to a hide position vicinity PL LEXINGTON. BREAK.

"I'm moving with BLUE. Once we're set on SBF 01, RED orients from TRP1 to TRP3, WHITE from TRP2 to TRP3, BLUE from TRP2 to TRP4. ACKNOWLEDGE, OVER."

RATIONALE:

Since the enemy is currently occupying my SBF position, and I am in a time crunch to establish it, I must conduct a hasty attack to destroy him or force him to withdraw in order to establish my SBF position. First, I get the company team to attack known enemy positions with direct fire, while the FIST suppresses them with HE and uses smoke to cover RED's seizing of the crossing site. WHITE supports by fire from his position since he has visual contact with the enemy, and will support BLUE's assault. BLUE then assaults through to destroy or force the withdrawal of any enemy along PL YORKTOWN, and establishes the center of the SBF01.

I'm counting on our firepower and movement to quickly gain a position of advantage over what enemy remains along PL YORKTOWN before we establish SBF 01 and turn our attention on KARA. I make sure we crosstalk with the teams and let the TF know what's going on.

AUTHOR'S NOTE: We purposely reduced unnecessary verbiage staying away from the perfect school house solution that would be unrealistic in the heat of battle. We want to provide to the readers a quick realistic FM fragmentary order from the company commander to his subordinates.

A Reader's Solution

(Submitted by 1LT Dan Head, HHC, 2nd BDE, 3ID, Fort Stewart, Ga.)

Frago:

Guidons, Black 6, Frago follows:

Situation: Probable enemy CSOP with tanks and BMPs in hasty defense from 060555 to 082557.

Mission: No change

Execution:

Redleg: Call for mortars. Fire for effect, grid 062555, one BMP on a hilltop. Repeat twice.

Red: Move to CP 2 and dismount. Clear Route Kayla up to CP 6 and report whether or not the enemy is in position on the reverse slope of the ridge. Bradleys support dismounted move up Route Kayla and cover company sector from CP 6 to the edge of the battalion sector. Watch ATGM position vic 062555. Use impact of mortar rounds as the trigger to start your move.

White and Blue: Overwatch Red's move and destroy any enemy vehicles

spotted. DO NOT fire into Route Kayla once dismounts are on the ground. White, you have from CP 6 to CP 4. Blue, destroy any remaining enemy on the ridge. White moves first, covered by Blue. White occupies CP 7. Blue occupies CP 8. Once White and Blue are set, Red moves to CP 6 and remounts.

Black 5: Move up behind Red to cover their move forward to the dismount point. Stay on the ridge. Battlecarry Heat.

RATIONALE:

Now I am in good shape. I have destroyed one enemy vehicle, and have good ground and have taken no losses. What I do not want to do is charge up to the defile at Dogwood Creek while in direct fire contact. In order for the battalion mission to succeed, my company must reach SBF 1 without taking serious losses. I must first clear the woodland along Kayla to avoid enemy dismounted ATGM fire to my flanks and rear as I advance and set my SBF position. The best way to do this is with my dismounts supported by their Bradleys. The problem is that the infantry platoon must

cross over 1000 meters of open ground before they reach the relative safety of the woodland. I will use my tanks and indirect fire support to suppress and destroy the enemy while Red gets into position and dismounts. I know that the enemy is well within range of my tanks, so in many ways I actually hope that they try to shoot Red, so that my tanks can engage and destroy them with superior firepower.

Once Red has cleared up to CP 6 and has eyes on suspected enemy locations, I can bound my platoons forward, execute platoon defile drills, and seize our SBF position. While White moves to seize SBF 1, Blue can destroy any enemy that has remained in position. Once Blue and White are set in the SBF, I can safely bring up Red's Bradleys and remount the infantry.

The XO moves to cover Red in case any enemy tanks are hidden in the woodland or in the vicinity of CP 5. I can trust him to determine when and if it is safe to fire over Red's head and to cross talk with the Red platoon leader and platoon sergeant before he fires. He battle-carries HEAT so that he will not cause fratricide with SABOT petals.

TACTICAL VIGNETTE 98-1

“Screen at Croley Lake”

WHAT'S
YOUR
NEXT
MOVE??




Situation.


Terrain. The area around Croley Lake favors the defense. It is a mixture of wooded and open areas with undulating hills. The open areas contain farmland with several one-kilometer-square towns. There are numerous two-lane roads and intermittent streams in the area. Maximum visibility is no more than eight kilometers for ground vehicles, but can be limited to 500 meters due to the undulating terrain. The squadron's sector contains three north-to-south, regimental-sized avenues of approach (AA): AA 1, which runs west of Croley Lake in B Troop's sector; AA 2, which runs east of Croley Lake in A Troop's sector; and AA 3, which runs east of Redwood Forest in C Troop's sector. The weather is expected to be sunny and clear with a low temperature of 45 degrees and a high of 78. Winds will be out of the east at 5 mph. Sunrise is at 0530 and sunset is at 2030.

Enemy. The sovereign nation of Greenpieceland had its international border with Kevorkia violated by first echelon divisions of the Kevorkian Combined Arms Army. The 5th Kevorkian Division is expected to continue the attack to the south into the 52nd Armored Division's (AD) sector. The Kevorkians will attack in standard Soviet-style regimental organization/formations to secure a long-sought-after seaport in southern Greenpieceland. The most likely course of action is that the 5th Kevorkian Division will conduct a deliberate attack in the 52nd AD's sector down AA 1 and 2 with two motorized rifle regiments (MRR) forward and one MRR and the tank regiment in the division's second echelon. The lead regiments will utilize an advance guard main body (AGMB) formation for security. The second echelon will reinforce the most successful lead regiment.

Friendly. The 52nd AD was deployed to Greenpieceland to defeat the Kevorkian advance and to provide time for the deployment of more Coalition forces. 1-23 Cavalry conducts a guard along Phase Line (PL) DOLPHINS to destroy enemy reconnaissance forces and to fix



Commander's view from his turret



or repel the enemy main body before it can engage the division with direct fire weapons. The division commander's intent is to destroy the 5th Kevorkian Division's reconnaissance assets and force its main body to deploy at PL DOLPHINS. He expects to accomplish this with direct fires from 1-23 Cavalry, combined with close air support (CAS) and indirect fires. The 1-23 Squadron commander intends to deploy three cavalry troops abreast in sector, screening along PL DOLPHINS with the two air cavalry troops (ACT) conducting a screen along PL BENGALS. He expects to use Hellfire missiles from the ACTs and TOW missiles from the ground scout platoons to destroy enemy reconnaissance forces out of enemy direct-fire range in Engagement Areas (EA) PETER, PAUL, and MARY. He also expects to use the ACTs to trigger a CAS strike on the AGMB in EAs PETER and PAUL. The squadron commander's end state is all enemy reconnaissance assets destroyed north of PL DOLPHINS and all AGMBs fixed in specified engagement areas north of PL DOLPHINS.

Troop Situation. You are the commander of A Troop, 1-23 Cavalry. Your troop is conducting a screen along PL DOLPHINS. It is 0545, and your troop had successfully destroyed division and regimental reconnaissance elements that entered your sector at 1800 yesterday. A Troop's task is to destroy the enemy's reconnaissance assets, and the forward security element (FSE) in EA PETER, then conduct a rearward passage of lines through elements of the 52nd AD (FSE destruction is trigger for RPOL). D

Troop, screening along PL BENGALS, will identify the follow-on AGMB and trigger a CAS mission to strike them in EA PETER. Your purpose is to provide the 52nd AD with three hours of advanced early warning of an MRR attack through your sector. At 0600, D Troop reports a platoon-sized element consisting of three BMPs and an SA-9 moving south vic CP 2. D Troop reports that the platoon went to ground from CP 2, South 0.5, West 0.3. Your Blue Platoon reports they are taking direct fire from an enemy element in the vic of D Troop's last spot report. D Troop continues to report that one of their OH-58Ds was shot down from CP 2, South 0.4, West 0.7. The pilots are wounded and immobile and the squadron commander orders your troop to conduct downed aircrew recovery and extraction (DARE) operations, and destroy the SA-9 vic CP 2. At 0635, the remaining D Troop OH-58s operating in the western part of your sector reports that a company-sized element is entering your sector vic of NAI 3 (Grid 119589), heading southwest in march formation at 15 kilometers per hour. Your Blue Platoon reports that one of his Bradleys has been destroyed by the enemy platoon in the vic of CP 2. You have the normal complement of support assets for a heavy division cavalry troop. D Troop has priority of indirect fires.

Requirement: In 5 minutes or less, choose a course of action (COA) and is-


sue a FRAGO. The end state of the COA must have the SA-9 near CP 2 destroyed, DARE operations successfully completed, and your platoons arrayed to destroy the company-sized element that is entering your sector. When you submit your solution to the scenario, provide the following: Fragmentary order to the troop, the rationale behind the decision, and a sketch of your course of action. Mail your solution to ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-TDM, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210, or e-mail your solution to:

Harrisv@ftknox-dtdd-emh5.army.mil

In the May-June issue of ARMOR, we'll include some of the solutions sent in by readers, along with the author's proposed solution.

On page 47, we recap the September-October issue vignette, "The Battle of Durango Valley," and follow this recap with the author's solution and several others suggested by readers.

-Ed.



Solutions to Tactical Vignette 98-1: "Screen at Croley Lake"

Author's solution:

FRAGO

Guidons this is Black 6, Frago follows:

Situation: D troop reports 3 BMPs and one SA 9 gone to ground vicinity grid 073556 and a company-sized element (FSE) moving southwest in march formation vicinity 119589, and reports a downed aircraft located vicinity 067556. FSE should enter EA Peter in 15-20 minutes.

BLUE: Maintain contact and fix the enemy by conducting SBF, orient from Hill-top 22 to TRP 03. As White begins their assault, shift fires east orienting on TRP 03 to 02. Adjust mortar fires to provide good obscuration for White's assault on the CRP. BPT assist the destruction of the FSE in EA Peter.

WHITE: Conduct hasty attack to destroy CRP. Assault through CP 1 and secure crash site for Band-Aid. When site is secure, signal Band-Aid to begin evac, then continue the attack to destroy the CRP. LOAs: north is PL Bengals and east is CP 2. When the enemy is destroyed, conduct hasty defense west of TRP 03. Orient east into EA Peter between TRP 01-02. BPT assist the destruction of the FSE in EA Peter.

BAND-AID: Follow White. Once White 1 reports crash site secure, evac pilots to AXP.

RED: Maintain position. Orient from TRP 02 to 03. BPT assist the destruction of the FSE in EA Peter.

GREEN: Maintain position. Orient from TRP 01 to 02. BPT maneuver to my location in order to reinforce Blue, orienting from TRP 01 to 03. BPT assist the destruction of the FSE in EA Peter. BPT destroy dismounted CATKs east, vicinity Redwood forest.

FIST: Fire immediate smoke-mortars vicinity grid TRP 3 (074552). BPT fire immediate suppression TRP 03. When D troop reports FSE vicinity CP 7, fire immediate suppression TRP 02.

Rationale: Speed is essential in this operation due to the arrival of the FSE within 30 minutes. With Blue in contact, they have the ability to place effective direct fires on the CRP to fix them, allowing White to assault. Blue is also in the best location to adjust mortar fires, providing good obscuration from the enemy as White conducts their attack. White assaults through CP 1 using the terrain to mask movement and

assist them in locating and securing the crash site. Band-Aid follows behind White and when the area is reported secure, conducts evacuation. White continues the attack east and destroys the CRP using fire and maneuver. Upon destruction of the enemy, establishes hasty defense and prepares to destroy FSE in EA Peter.

Red maintains its position and orientation into the EA and prepares to assist destruction of the FSE. Green also maintains its position but has a BPT mission to maneuver to reinforce Blue's support by fire onto the CRP. Without knowing the exact location of the downed aircraft and personnel, the risk of fratricide is great. The use of indirect fires to neutralize or suppress the CRP may increase that risk. By firing smoke east of TRP 03 to provide obscuration, the risk of endangering the downed air crew is lessened. At the same time, it provides White with some concealment as they conduct the assault.

The swift execution of this plan allows for the successful completion of the DARE mission, destruction of the CRP, and the array of forces to destroy the FSE in EA Peter.

SOLUTION A

(From 1-10 Cavalry, 4th ID, Fort Hood, Texas)

FRAGO

SITUATION

a. Enemy - Outlaw 15 has just reported the FSE at NAI3; that's 3.5 km out of direct fire range (12-15 minutes). They are still in march formation. There are three BMPs and one SA-9 remaining (vic 072551) from the CRP that Blue was engaging. This CRP has shot down Outlaw 11 and Outlaw 24 (in the same helicopter). The FSE consists of 8 BMPs, 3 T-80s, 2 engineer vehicles, and a chem recon BRDM. They are travelling at 15 kph. They are heading south and will pass to the east of Croley Lake and of Hill 22 and are expected to try to shoot the gap at 0755.

b. Friendly - B Troop on the left is still screening along DOLPHIN as is C Troop on our right. They have reported similar contact with CRPs in their sectors.

MISSION - A/1-23 CAV conducts DARE operations vic 070552 to rescue Outlaw 11 and 24.

EXECUTION

a. Commander's Intent - **Purpose:** rescue Outlaw 11/24 while still executing original mission in OPORD. **Critical tasks:** Use massed tank fires to destroy the CRP and SA-9 vic CP2. Outlaw 15 will provide intel and o/o call fires on FSE. One scout platoon will rescue the downed crew while the other scout platoon provides supporting fires and observation across PETER. **End-state:** 11/24 rescued and transferred to 1SG for medevac, CRP and SA-9 destroyed, nine tanks alive and positioned in hide, three M3s screening to the NW behind Hill 22, and five M3s providing supporting fires from the south.

b. Concept of the Operation - Three major events must happen simultaneously and quickly: 1) White and Green w/A66 will move rapidly west to the 07 N-S and then violently assault the SA-9 and three BMPs, destroying all enemy to allow Blue to complete the rescue; 2) Blue will move immediately behind the tanks to rescue 11/24; 3) Red will provide overwatch and supporting fires to allow the tanks to destroy the CRP and SA-9. Outlaw 15 will maintain observation of the FSE and o/o call fires to allow White and Green to destroy the CRP and SA-9. Once the CRP and SA-9 have been destroyed, the tanks will move rapidly around the north side of Hill 22 to a hide position vic CP1. Once Blue has picked up 11/24, one section will screen to the NW, providing early warning to the tanks; the other section will prepare to assist in the assault on the FSE from the west. o/o, Red will initiate direct fire against the FSE from the south, NET 555 E-W, diverting attention away from the west. o/o, White and Green will assault from the west in to the FSE, destroying all enemy. Blue will SBF. Red will SBF. o/o, Outlaw 15 will call indirect on the FSE.

c. Tasks to Maneuver Units:

Red

Overwatch tanks
Assist in directing White and Green to CRP, SA-9
Deceive as to the location of the defense
Maintain comms with Outlaw 15
B/P to call arty fires
Call Mortar fires
B/P to call mortar smoke vic CP7
Initiate direct fires
Kill far right (east) tank with TOW

Blue

Conduct rescue
Transfer 11/24 to 1SG for medevac
Screen to NW
B/P to guide tanks into hide position

Coordinate with B Troop for screen to NW
Secure helicopter; be prepared to destroy (need CG approval)

White

Kill two BMPs in CRP
Kill SA-9
Kill left (east) tank in FSE
Kill east four BMPs in FSE

Green

Kill one BMP in CRP
Kill two middle tanks in FSE
Kill four middle BMPs in FSE

Outlaw

o/o call arty fires on FSE
B/P to kill select targets w/HELLFIRE

d. Coordinating Instructions:

Speed is essential!!
All vehicles transfer ammo from semi-ready to ready racks whenever time permits
Accepting risk in NW
Short depth engagement area - violence and speed is essential in assault
Medics travel with Blue

SERVICE SUPPORT - n/c

COMMAND AND SIGNAL - CDR with tanks

Assumptions made:

- 1) Initial OPORD has been given and issued.
- 2) Initial Mission Statement: A/1-23 CAV will screen along DOLPHIN NLT XX1600JAN98, destroying all division and regimental recon and the FSE in order to provide three hours of advanced warning to 52nd AD.
- 3) Enemy situation has not changed significantly from initial OPORD.
- 4) The terrain will allow tank movement forward of PL DOLPHIN.

Rationale for Plan - The main effort is to Blue Platoon (rescue). Secondary effort is to the tanks because they will kill the CRP which is preventing the rescue effort. Red will provide supporting fires to allow tanks to kill CRP and SA-9. Time is critically short because the real threat is the FSE that is at NAI3 (about 12-15 minutes out of [the FSE's] direct fire range. There is not enough time to execute a complex plan. Given the armor protection of an M1A1, especially against a BMP, there is little reason not to conduct a frontal assault with all nine tanks to kill the CRP, especially when we consider how little time we have before the FSE is within direct fire range. Green Platoon will have to travel a maximum of 3.5 km to kill the CRP; White only 2 km.

This entire movement should take not more than 10 minutes. Red will have to call mortar or artillery smoke in order to conceal the movement of the tanks behind Hill 22 to ensure surprise for the remainder of the mission. Whereas effective artillery fires by Outlaw north of PL COWBOYS would slow down the FSE, it would also cause them to deploy into battle formation, which I do not want; I want mass enemy confusion once Red opens the direct fire fight. Red will initiate direct fires to draw attention to the direct south. It is important that Red kill the far right (in battle formation) or the front tank (in march) with TOW. The tanks will assault directly into the flank of the FSE. Given the superior armor protection, fire control, surprise, numerical superiority (9 to 3), and armament of the M1 to the T-80, added to the shock effect of nine M1A1s rolling at you at 25 mph, the odds are heavily stacked in favor of A Troop. Add to that supporting fires from Red, Blue, and Outlaw 15, the fight will be quick.

SOLUTION B

(From Task Force Eagle Heavy Reserve, A/1-37th AR, TF 1-36th Infantry, Bosnia)

FRAGO

"GUIDONS, this is BLACK 6, FRAGO follows. **Situation:** 3 BMPs with SA-9 support located vicinity 072552. Downed OH-58D air crew vicinity 069554. Suspected FSE vicinity 119588, moving into sector. ETA to EA PETER is 20 minutes."

"BLUE, maintain contact with enemy. Fix the MRP by conducting support by fire, oriented from Hill Top 22 to TRP 03. Adjust mortar fire on MRP. Adjust smoke to vicinity 086560 when WHITE begins its attack. Lift or shift fires on my order. Once MRP is destroyed, orient fires from TRP 03 to TRP 02. Prepare to destroy FSE in EA PETER."

"WHITE, Conduct hasty attack on MRP. Move north-west through CP1. Locate and secure crash site of OH-58D on Hill 22. Once site is secure, continue to attack east in order to destroy MRP vicinity 086560. Priority is destroying air defense assets. Do not cross PL BENGALS. LOA is tree line on Hill 22. Initiate smoke mission vicinity 086560 in order to obscure your attack. Trigger is continuing your attack east from crash site. Once MRP is destroyed, conduct hasty defense vicinity tree line west of TRP 03. Orient from TRP 02 to CP2 and prepare to destroy FSE in EA PETER. Move now."

"BAND-AID, move behind WHITE. Once site is secure, treat and evacuate

downed air crew to ambulance exchange point. Move now."

"RED, hold in place. Orient from TRP 03 to TRP 02. Do not engage targets on Hill 22. RED 1, personally verify all targets due to WHITE's attack. Prepare to destroy FSE in EA PETER."

"GREEN, hold in place. Orient from TRP 02 to TRP 01. Prepare to destroy FSE in EA PETER. BPT to reposition to my location in order to reinforce BLUE, orienting from TRP 03 to TRP 01. BPT orient east towards Redwood Forest to counter a dismounted attack."

"FIST/THUNDER, Immediate suppression 072552, BMPs/SA-9 in the open. BPT fire WP smoke at 086560 during WHITE's attack in order to obscure observation from the north-east."

"End State: NLT 0655, air crew evacuated to AXP. SA-9 and MRP destroyed. All elements prepared to destroy the FSE in EA PETER."

RATIONALE


With the impending arrival of the FSE in under one half an hour, speed is imperative. BLUE is in contact, and can place effective direct and indirect fire on the MRP, fixing it. The nearest unit out of contact is WHITE. The tanks are the best choice due to the speed and firepower necessary to make the hasty attack as quick and devastating as possible. With BLUE fixing the MRP, the mortar section pounding them with HE, and WHITE conducting a flanking maneuver, we should be able to destroy it within ten to fifteen minutes, giving WHITE time to set up its hasty defense. There will be a five-minute delay between the tanks and the medics due to their position. That five-minute buffer allows the tank platoon to react to contingencies, such as a crash site occupied by the enemy, without exposing the medics to danger. We accept risk in that once WHITE 1 decides the area is clear, he will continue with his attack, leaving the medics with no security. WHITE's objective is not far away, however, and could react to any contact on the crash site within minutes.

We will keep RED and GREEN in their prepared positions in order to provide cover over EA PETER while the other two platoons destroy the MRP, and to keep the enemy confused as to what is in front of him. There is no doubt that the MRP has spotted BLUE and has called their position to the FSE. The longer we can keep the enemy thinking that they are facing one scout platoon in this sector the better. By the time they realize they are taking fire from a tank platoon on their flank, they

will be dead with no time to inform the FSE. If BLUE continues to take casualties we will reinforce them with GREEN to help finish off the MRP, and help with the destruction of the FSE.

The most complex part of the operation will be coordinating the indirect fire. In order to confuse and fix the MRP, we will hit it with HE from the beginning. BLUE has the best position to adjust the fire, and will do so until WHITE continues from securing the crash site. WHITE must cancel the HE mission and begin the WP smoke in order to obscure their actions from the FSE. Only they will know when they continue their move east. They will not be able to observe the smoke however, and BLUE must adjust the smoke accordingly until WHITE has completed the attack.

This plan allows for the securing and evacuation of the downed air crew, the destruction of the SA-9 and MRP, and the destruction of the follow-on company-sized element in EA PETER.



TACTICAL VIGNETTE 98-2

“The Defense of Kozda”

WHAT'S
YOUR
NEXT
MOVE???



Situation

Enemy. The S2 reports that within the brigade's area of operations, the 13th MRD is conducting an attack to seize Kodza Airport a key logistical site, that will allow enemy forces easy access into the theater of operations. Within the battalion's area of operations, the 3rd MRR is conducting an attack to seize the city of Kodza. This will allow the regiment to seize additional logistical sites (hospital, stores, and water) that will support the division.

The most probable course of action is for the 3rd MRR to attack along Avenue of Approach 1, enveloping the TF from the west maximizing their combat power. The most dangerous course of action is for the 3rd MRR to attack with two MRBs abreast, forcing us to fight in two directions and deny us the ability to concentrate our combat power.

Friendly. TF 3-37 defends BP 22 at 260630SEP98 to destroy enemy forces in EA Crush in order to protect the western flank of the brigade's main defense vicinity of the Kodza Airport.

Company Situation. You are the commander of Charlie Team (tank heavy), TF 3-37. You are the main effort of TF 3-37 that is defending in sector. The brigade commander wants the task force to protect the west flank of the BDE main effort TF 2-10 AR, which is defending a key logistical site (Kodza Airport) east of the city of Kodza. Delta Company has been attached to TF 2-10. TF 3-37 is arrayed with two companies forward and one back. Bravo Team is occupying BP 1, oriented on TRPs 2 and 3. Alpha Team (mech) is occupying BP 3, oriented on TRPs 2 and 4. The TF commander's intent is to destroy the enemy in EA CRUSH by establishing a deliberate defense on BP 22, reinforced by extensive obstacles in the engagement area; this will deny the enemy from seizing the city of Kodza (See Figure 1).

Your team consists of two M1A1 tank platoons and one infantry (BFV) platoon and a MANPACK Team. You have priority of mortars and are responsible for triggering artillery targets AB001




Figure 1. Mapboard for the defense of Kozda.

through AB003. Currently, the company is occupying BP 2, oriented on TRPs 1 and 2 and is backed down in turret down positions, having withstood an initial artillery bombardment. However, you have taken some losses.

1st Platoon (mech) is down to 3 BFVs, while 2nd Platoon reports that one tank has received heavy track damage and another suffered severe gun tube damage.

3rd Platoon reports no damage to any of their tanks.

Bravo Team has just made contact and destroyed three BMPs, and the TF scouts in the west report that the MRB will be in their sector within the next 15-20 minutes. As you are monitoring these reports, you hear Terminator 6 (TF commander) trying to raise the Alpha Team commander or his XO. He has lost all


radio communications with Alpha Team, and the last transmission the A Team commander sent was that he was engaging three armored vehicles and was down to 9 vehicles. The TF commander now believes that the MRR is attacking with two MRBs abreast along Avenues of Approach 1 and 2. The TF scouts in the east confirm this by reporting that an MRB is moving fast along Avenue of Approach 2 and will be in Alpha Team's sector within the next five minutes. The TF commander believes that the enemy will successfully penetrate Alpha Team's position, leaving his flank exposed. He orders you to block penetration of Alpha Team's sector (See Figure 2). You must act now! What do you do?

Requirement. In 5 minutes or less make your decision and issue your FRAGO and any other reports you would submit. Readers who submit their solutions to the scenario should provide the following: fragmentary order to the company team, the rationale behind your decision, and a sketch of your plan of action. E-mail your solution to: ThompsonM@ftknox-dtdd-emh5.army.mil, or mail your solution to ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-TDM, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210.

In the July-August issue of ARMOR, we'll include some of the solutions sent in by readers, along with the author's proposed solution.

On page 45, we recap the November-December issue vignette, "Ambush at Dogwood Crossing," and follow this recap with the author's solution.

-Ed.



THE SOLUTIONS: Tactical Vignette 98-2 "Defense of Kozda"

Author's Solution

FRAGO

GUIDONS, this is BLACK 6, FRAGO follows.

Situation: The TF scouts have reported a second MRB moving in the east and closing on TM A's position. The TF commander has lost all radio communications with TM A; the last transmission the TM A commander sent was that he was engaging three armored vehicles and was down to nine vehicles. The TF commander is concerned that the enemy will successfully penetrate TM A's position, leaving the TF eastern flank exposed. BREAK.

Mission: TM C establishes a hasty defense vicinity 083537 to destroy enemy forces in EA SMASH to prevent penetration of the TF's eastern flank. BREAK.

Intent: We will accomplish this mission by splitting our team in two and fighting on two fronts. BREAK.

Tasks to subordinate units:

RED (MECH), maintain your current position and be prepared to reinforce BLUE in the east. BREAK.

WHITE, have Alpha section maintain their current position (damaged vehicles) and have Bravo section follow BLUE to the east. Once BLUE establishes a hasty defense, have Bravo section establish a position to BLUE's left flank. BREAK.

BLUE, move your platoon to 083537 and establish a hasty defense oriented on EA SMASH. You are the main effort. BREAK.

BLACK 5, maintain your current position and take control of the fight in the west. I will move with BLUE. BREAK.

FIST, follow me and establish a position where you can call for effective fires. BREAK.

BLACK 7, maintain your current position. Be prepared to conduct logistical support across two fronts. BREAK.

RATIONALE

The TF commander has ordered me to block the penetration of TM A's position. However, leaving my current position

entirely leaves the center of the TF's defense vulnerable to penetration.

Splitting my company team in two will allow the TF to maintain greater lethality on two fronts. Furthermore, leaving my XO, a section from RED, and the two damaged tanks from WHITE at BP 2 gives me organic assets to protect my western flank as I reposition the rest of my forces to BP 3. To maintain command and control of the company team, the XO will control the fight from BP 2. I will move with Blue and a section from RED. As the most experienced officer, it is logical for me to take charge of the fight in the east (BP 3). My first priority once I get to BP 3 will be to establish a hasty defense anchored on the left flank of TM A. Second, I will attempt to regain communication with TM A. Third, I will determine what TM A's combat strength is and take control of those assets if the leadership of TM A has been killed. Fourth, I will contact the TF commander and update him on the situation and provide him with any recommendations, if applicable.

AUTHOR'S NOTE: We purposely reduced the unnecessary verbiage staying away from the perfect school house solution that would be unrealistic in the heat of battle. We want to provide to the readers a quick realistic FM fragmentary order from the company commander to his subordinates.

SOLUTION A

(Submitted by SFC Gregory Burbo, doctrine writer, assigned to B CO, USAARMC, Fort Knox)

COMANCHES, this is COMANCHE 6, FRAGO follows. The enemy is attacking along both northern axes of approach. Terminator 6 has lost comms with the Apaches, their last message stated that the Apaches had taken some losses at BP 3. We must assist the Apaches in stopping the enemy in engagement area SMASH to protect the battalions flank. (BREAK)

COMANCHE 5: Move yourself and the remainder of RED with WHITE'S 2 FMC tanks to a position vic grid 079634 orient on EA CRUSH between AB 001

and TRP 2. Control all indirect fires from your position. Be prepared to reinforce myself and BLUE vic grid 094553. Report when set. (BREAK)

WHITE: Move your 3 and 4 tanks to a position vic grid 076534 have them report to COMANCHE 5 when set. Move yourself to a position near your 2 tank and attempt to get his track repaired. Be prepared to resupply Comanche 5 and your 3 and 4 tanks as needed. Report when you are set. (BREAK)

RED: Move your remaining elements to a position vic grid 076534 and report to COMANCHE 5 when set. (BREAK)

BLUE: Move your platoon with me to a position southeast of BP3 vic grid 094533 to block the enemy penetration. We will orient from TRP 2 to TRP 4. (BREAK)

STINGER: Move your team to a position vic grid 075533 and provide the team with Stinger support. Report when set. (BREAK)

FIST: Move to a position vic grid 075533 and prepare to provide fires to the company team. Report when set. (BREAK)

COMANCHE 7: Move the company trains to a position vic grid 085523 and execute our CASEVAC plan. On order conduct emergency resupply of BP2 and/or my location vic grid 094533. Report when set. (BREAK)

COMANCHE 6 will be located with BLUE vic grid 094533 send all calls for fire through COMANCHE 5. (OUT)

ONE MINUTE LATER THE FOLLOWING RADIO TRAFFIC IS SENT:

TERMINATOR 6 this is COMANCHE 6, I am moving myself and BLUE to a position vic grid 094533 time now. I will attempt to regain contact with you once set. (OUT)

FIST this is COMANCHE 5, Fire AB 002 and AB 003 time now. (OUT)

FIVE MINUTES LATER THE FOLLOWING RADIO TRAFFIC IS SENT:

TERMINATOR 6, this is COMANCHE 6, set vic grid 094533. I have comms with the Apaches 6; he is down to 6 operational victors and engaging 4 enemy

vehicles vic grid 087545. I am engaging 7 enemy vehicles vic grid 093548 heading south along the hardball. (OUT)

COMANCHE 5, this is WHITE 1, I am with White 2 set vic grid 071534. (OVER)

COMANCHE 5, this is RED 1, all Red elements are set vic grid 077534. (OVER)

COMANCHE 5, this is WHITE 4, White 3 and myself are set vic grid 079533. (OVER)

COMANCHE 5, this is FIST. I am set vic grid 075533. (OVER)

COMANCHE 5, this is STINGER. We are set vic grid 075533. (OVER)

FIST, this is COMANCHE 5 fire AB 001 time now. (OUT)

COMANCHE 5, this is COMANCHE 7 set vic grid 085523. (OVER)

RATIONALE

We have been ordered to block the enemy penetration of Apache's sector. However we have not been totally relieved of our original mission of defending BP 2. By taking BLUE with me to a position southeast of BP3, I can reinforce the Apaches and should have enough firepower to force the attacking MRR to ground in or near EA SMASH.

I should also be able to regain commo with Terminator 6. This also puts me in a position to be able to take charge of the Apaches should I find their command elements dead. By leaving COMANCHE 5 with White's 2 FMC tanks and the remaining RED elements and moving them to the east side of BP 2, I am able to still engage the enemy in EA CRUSH. This also places them in a position from where they can quickly reinforce the Apaches on BP 3, or my element vic grid 094533, if needed.

By moving WHITE 1 to a position near his down tank he may be able to get it up and give us that additional firepower. If not, he is in a position to resupply COMANCHE 5 and his two FMC tanks as needed. The Stinger team and FIST is now in a more secure position, which will still allow them to give the company protection from air attack. Comanche 7 is now in a more secure position from where he can execute our CASEVAC plan and resupply either BP 2 or BP 3 as well as my element vic grid 094533 as needed.

SOLUTION B

(Submitted by CPT Ukeiley, USMC)

FRAGO

Guidons, this is Charlie 6 FRAGO follows.

Situation: MRB advancing south AA2. FSE at 55 Northing in 5 mikes. Bravo in good position to cover AA1. Alpha needs help.

Mission: Team Charlie establishes hasty battle position overlooking EA Smash in order to destroy enemy advancing along AA2.

Tasks to subordinate units:

FSO: Immediate obscuration fires to screen company movement.

1st Plt (Mech): Establish hasty BP vic grid 083536 oriented northeast on EA SMASH in order to destroy MRB. Conduct physical link-up with Alpha's left flank.

2nd Plt: Company reserve. Maintain current position and mission. Get damage fixed ASAP. Be prepared to reinforce.

3rd Plt: Main effort! Establish hasty BP vic grid 081539 oriented northeast on EA SMASH in order to destroy MRB.

XO: Get maintenance contact team to 2nd now!

RATIONALE

No plan survives contact with the enemy; the plan is nothing more than a common basis for change. With a confirmed MRB on AA2 and no answer from Alpha, I must act decisively in order to accomplish the brigade CO's intent. His intent is to destroy the enemy in order to retain possession of key terrain, Kodza. Whether Charlie destroys the enemy in EA CRUSH or EA SMASH makes no difference so long as the enemy is destroyed and we retain Kodza. This is why I must understand not just my TF commander's intent, but my brigade commander's as well.

In order to accomplish this, the MRB advancing into EA SMASH must be destroyed. With only nine of fourteen vehicles remaining, Alpha is in trouble and must be reinforced. This is the decisive action that will accomplish the intent. Bravo is in good shape and position to defeat the MRB advancing into EA CRUSH. Additionally, by changing battle positions, I am introducing doubt into the enemy commander's perception of the battlefield.

With heavy incoming artillery and the chaos and confusion of my troops in combat for the first time, I must keep things simple and direct. I must leave my subordinate leaders maximum room for initiative by providing clear mission and intent. Each platoon has been given a very specific task and purpose over the tac net.

With less than five minutes before MRB is expected in EA SMASH, speed is critical. Concise and direct orders facilitate this. Team Charlie must be in its new hasty BP before the bulk of the MRB combat power is in direct fire range. As the move from our current BP to our new BPs is less than 500 meters, time and space factors must be considered. Even with such a short move, it will be close.

First, the accurate enemy targeting of my BP and Alpha's confirms that I am under observation of enemy FO teams. I must blind them in order to regain freedom of maneuver and retain tactical surprise. I am dropping smoke to blind enemy FO teams. I doubt they have thermal sights within their FO teams. Even if the smoke alerts the enemy as to movement, he will not know what I am doing or why.

I sent 1st Plt to actually link up with Alpha for numerous reasons. First, I want to gain situational awareness as to what is happening at their position. Second, the mech infantry platoon with dismounts provides flexibility in coordination, linkup, and assistance to Alpha that an armor platoon will not.

With 2nd Plt degraded, I leave them in position as company reserve and task my XO with getting them mission capable. In addition, this leaves the XO as my directed telescope with eyes on the original EA to deal with unexpected contingencies. If the situation requires, there is still a platoon of shooters overlooking EA CRUSH to destroy any enemy forces that bypass Team Bravo. If not, I can mass the company at EA SMASH.

3rd Plt is now my main effort as they are still at 100% effectiveness and their four tanks (plus mine) will provide the mass of company combat power. 3rd Plt is my decisive bid for victory at EA SMASH. As the terrain dictates that enemy mechanized forces will be naturally channelized to the east along AA2, this will present 3rd Plt with flank shots as the enemy closes.

The mission has changed, yet the intent remains the same. Destroy the enemy MRB and prevent enemy seizure of Kodza.

TACTICAL VIGNETTE 98-3

“Attack in Brandenburg”

WHAT'S
YOUR
NEXT
MOVE??



Situation

Enemy.

Remnants of an enemy force are defending the town of Brandenburg to prevent the seizure of the ferry site. Enemy forces have been cleared from PL Dismount to PL Sniper and are making a final stand along the south bank of the Ohio River north of PL Sniper. The level of enemy resistance indicates that the enemy remnants have created effective antiarmor kill zones, armed with SAGER missiles, RPGs, antitank grenades, Molotov cocktails, and sniper fire. The enemy force in OBJ White is reported to have a T-80 and 2 BMPs in support of the dismounted effort.

The most probable and most dangerous course of action is for the enemy remnants to courageously attempt to hold their defensive positions. They will attempt to destroy friendly units piecemeal as they move down the bottleneck streets of Brandenburg.

Friendly.

TF 3-37 AR attacks OBJ Bridge (Red, White, and Blue), 071300__98, to seize crossing sites on the south bank of the Ohio River to enable follow-on forces to establish a bridge site at ET729065.

Scenario.


You are the commander of Delta Team (2 tank platoons and 1 mech platoon with 15 dismounts), TF 3-37. The TF consists of 2 tank-heavy teams and 2 mech-heavy teams. You are the TF reserve. The brigade commander wants the TF to seize OBJ Bridge in order to support an assault crossing of the Ohio River. TF 2-66 IN has already seized the southern half of Brandenburg (south of PL Sniper). Alpha Team, TF 3-37, has successfully seized OBJ Red and Charlie Team, TF 3-37, has successfully seized OBJ Blue. Both are currently set up in SBF positions oriented north.

In its haste to set up a SBF position, Bravo Team, TF 3-37, attacked its objective in column. A tank platoon was assigned to lead, and the attached infantry platoon was clearing buildings at the southern end of the team's column. While the infantry was clearing the first few buildings on Main Street (1, 2, 20, 21, 22), the team's column of vehicles continued down the street without the support of the infantry platoon. The column proceeded without incident until reaching the northern-most end of the town, where the vehicles were ambushed by antitank fire from the surrounding buildings. The attack destroyed the first two vehicles of the lead tank platoon and the second vehicle of the following mech platoon. Three other vehicles were trapped and eventually destroyed before any dismounted support could assist. Bravo Team recovered the majority of its wounded from Main Street. Bravo 6 reported sighting the following enemy positions: building 13, RPG team; buildings 10 and 16, SAPPER teams with small arms fire; building 4, a suspected sniper; a tank to the east of building 12; a BMP north of building 13. Bravo 6 believes there are other buildings that are occupied by enemy remnants armed with antitank and small arms weapons, but he cannot confirm this.



Looking north on Main Street from Broadway.

The TF commander has ordered Bravo Team to retain control of buildings it currently holds and to withdraw all remaining vehicles to CP 7 for consolidation. In addition, he has ordered you to assume the Bravo team mission (seize OBJ White) and has given you priority of artillery and mortar fires as soon as






The ambush site near the ferry landing.

you cross PL Sniper. The TF commander has attached an engineer squad to your company team; the 1SG is moving to make linkup at CP 4 in the next five minutes. You also receive reports that some soldiers from Bravo Team are pinned down within the kill zone. Division follow-on forces are rapidly approaching and are expected to reach Brandenburg in one hour. In order for the division to maintain tempo and successfully continue the attack, Brandenburg must be seized and a bridge site established. Your team is currently at CP 5. You must act now! What do you do!


Requirement:



In 10 minutes or less, make your decision and issue your FRAGO and any other reports you would submit. Readers who submit their solutions to the scenario should provide the following: fragmentary order to the company team, the rationale behind your decision, and a sketch of your plan of action. E-mail your solution to ThompsonM@ftknox-dtdd-emh5.army.mil, or mail your solution to ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-TDM, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210.



LEGEND:

1. Liquor store (1)	13. Apartment building, brick, with balcony (2)
2. VFW hall (1)	14. Three-car garage
3. Wordsmith (1)	15. Large building (2)
4. Building (2, not high)	16. Apartment building (2)
5. House, Victorian (2)	17. Drifter Cove Gallery, window front with front overhang (2)
6. Moose lodge (2)	18. House (2)
7. Building (2)	19. House (2)
8. Meade County Messenger (1)	20. House (2)
9. Building (2)	21. Large house (3)
10. Little Dave's restaurant (1)	22. Building (1)
11. Building (1)	
12. House, brick (2)	

 Depression

Note: The number of stories is shown in parentheses.



SOLUTIONS

The author's solution, along with interesting alternative solutions, will appear in the September-October issue of ARMOR.

Several solutions to Tactical Vignette 98-1, "Screen at Croley Lake," which appeared in the January-February issue, are published in this issue on page 49.

THE SOLUTIONS

TV 98-3, "Attack in Brandenburg"

Author's Solution

FRAGO:

GUIDONS, this is Black 6, FRAGO follows.

Situation: Remnants of an enemy force are defending the town of Brandenburg. Enemy forces have been cleared from PL DISMOUNT to PL SNIPER, and OBJ RED and OBJ BLUE have been seized. The enemy has created an effective antiarmor kill zone in OBJ WHITE and has employed SAGGER missiles, RPGs, anti-tank grenades, Molotov cocktails, and sniper fire. A T-80 and 2 BMPs have been reported on OBJ WHITE. The enemy will attempt to piecemeal friendly units as they move down the bottleneck streets of Brandenburg. Bravo 6 has reported enemy positions in the following buildings: building 13, RPG team; buildings 10 and 16, Sapper teams with small arms; and building 4, a suspected sniper. Other buildings are believed to be occupied by enemy remnants.

Mission: Team D attacks immediately to seize OBJ WHITE to enable follow-on forces to establish a bridge site vic. grid ET729066.

Intent: (Purpose) To seize OBJ WHITE to allow follow-on forces to establish a bridge site vic grid ET729066. (Endstate) OBJ WHITE has been seized and conditions set for follow-on forces to establish the bridge site.

Tasks to subordinate units:

RED: Isolate OBJ WHITE by establishing an SBF position vic grid ET732063 oriented west. Destroy all enemy dismounted forces and armored vehicles (including the T-80) that could bring effective fires into Brandenburg, preventing Blue (mech) from clearing the town. On order, establish a trafficable passage lane from ET730063 to ET730065 (between Decatur Street and "River" Road) for follow-on forces from the division. The engineer squad is attached to assist you in establishing the lane.

BLUE (MECH): The tank platoons will overwatch your initial movement into Brandenburg. Dismount your infantry at the intersection of Broadway and Main Streets. Immediately begin clearing the town. Split your platoon into sections and use your dismounts, overwatched by your vehicles, to clear both sides of Main Street simultaneously. Eliminate the sniper in the building on the southeast corner of the

intersection of Decatur Street and Main Street. Continue to move north along Main Street, eliminating all other enemy resistance. Recover Bravo's wounded. I am attaching a medic vehicle to your platoon, and Black 5 will move with you for added firepower.

WHITE: Provide overwatch of OBJ WHITE by establishing an SBF position vic grid ET727059 oriented northeast into the town. After Blue (mech) has cleared up to Decatur Street, attack north behind the buildings on the west side of Main Street. Destroy the BMP vic grid ET731064 and attempt to find and destroy the other reported BMP.

BLACK 5: Move with Blue (mech), providing them with additional firepower as they clear the buildings along Main Street and as they clear the route. Coordinate with Black 7 for the CASEVAC of Bravo's wounded. Determine if Main Street is a trafficable route for follow-on forces.

FIST: Follow Red and set vic grid ET732063 oriented northwest to observe and adjust artillery and mortar fires to obscure enemy observation of Red's movement.

BLACK 7: On order, lead the M88 forward to recover Bravo's disabled vehicles on Main Street. Request additional M88 support from the Task Force. Supervise the CASEVAC of wounded Bravo soldiers. Request additional medic support from the Task Force as necessary.

SAPPERS: Move with Red and assist in clearing the lane for the follow-on forces.

I will move with Red and maintain command and control of all the moving pieces. I will coordinate with Alpha and Charlie and have them scan for the BMPs and T-80 that were reported close to their positions. It is essential that we maintain situational awareness during the execution of this mission. All guidons, keep me informed of your progress. Communication is our success.

RATIONALE:

The purpose of the company team's mission is to allow follow-on forces to establish a bridge site. The passage of follow-on forces within the allocated 1-hour time constraint hinges on our ability to establish a trafficable lane for the division to pass through. To conserve time, the company team can begin to pass follow-on forces without entirely clearing the town of Brandenburg as long as the main route is clear for the main body of the division. Initially, we must establish a temporary lane to allow passage of the division's lead elements. This provides the company team

with enough time to remove the disabled vehicles from the main avenue of approach (Main Street), which will serve as the passage lane for the division's main body.

To accomplish this mission, the company team should conduct the operation in five phases IAW *FM 90-10-1 (An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built-Up Areas)*. After reconnoitering and moving to the objective, the company team isolates the objective, secures a foothold, and clears the built-up area prior to establishing the lane. Isolating the objective involves seizing terrain that dominates the area so that the enemy cannot supply or reinforce its defenders. This step must be accomplished concurrently with securing a foothold, which involves seizing an intermediate objective that provides cover from enemy fire and a place for attacking troops to enter the built-up area. A foothold is normally one or two city blocks. As the company team attacks to secure the foothold, it should be supported by suppressive fires and smoke.

To isolate the objective, I will employ my tank platoons in overwatch roles because of their firepower and their ability to acquire targets with their thermal sights. If my tank platoons are successful, the mechanized platoon's ability to clear the built-up area will be enhanced significantly.

I will use the mechanized platoon to clear the built-up area because of its greater maneuverability in restrictive terrain and its organic relationship with the platoon's dismounted infantry. Task organizing the mechanized assets within the tank platoons would prove to be too time-consuming; it is also doubtful that the tank platoon leader can employ dismounted soldiers with maximum efficiency. Therefore, I decided to keep my platoons pure.

The company team will have to clear the main avenue of approach to pass the majority of the division's assets. Due to the XO's support of Blue, the 1SG will be required to coordinate at the task force level for additional recovery and medic assets, which will assist in expediting the route clearance. Once Brandenburg is cleared and all disabled vehicles have been removed from Main Street, the company team will have created a passage lane capable of handling two-way traffic.

AUTHOR'S NOTE: We purposely reduced the unnecessary verbiage, staying away from a "perfect" schoolhouse solution that would be unrealistic in the heat of battle. Rather, we are providing the readers with a quick, realistic FM fragmentary order from the company team commander to his subordinates.

Reader Solution

(From First Lieutenant Rob Weber, B Co/USAARMC, Fort Knox, Ky.)

FRAGO:

"GUIDONS, this is Black 6, FRAGO follows.

Friendly Situation: Alpha has seized OBJ RED to our immediate West and Charlie has seized OBJ BLUE to our immediate East. Bravo attacked OBJ WHITE to our direct front. At the north end of town, six of their vehicles were destroyed by sniper and RPG fires that came from inside and around the buildings in that vicinity. Bravo has evacuated most of its casualties to CP 7; however, there are still a few dismounts pinned down in the area. Bravo has cleared and still occupies Buildings 1, 2, 20, 21, and 22.

Enemy Situation: Bravo 6 confirms the following enemy locations: RPG team Bldg. 13, SAPPER teams with small arms Bldgs. 10 and 16, suspected sniper Bldg. 4, a T-80 east of Bldg. 12, vicinity grid 732064, and a BMP north of Bldg. 13, vicinity grid 728064. Also expect another BMP somewhere in the town and other enemy occupied buildings, but cannot confirm exact locations. The enemy is armed with SAGGER missiles, antitank grenades, Molotov cocktails, and sniper rifle fire. They will attempt to destroy friendly units piecemeal as they move down the bottleneck streets of Brandenburg.

Mission: Team Delta attacks to seize OBJ WHITE in order to secure the crossing site on the south bank of the Ohio River vicinity grid 728066 and establish a SBF position to enable follow-on forces to establish a bridge site.

Intent: We will clear all buildings on OBJ WHITE and destroy all remaining enemy remnants. The endstate is the seizure of OBJ WHITE and the establishment of a SBF position oriented north across the Ohio River.

Tasks to subordinate units:

BLUE (mech): Detach Bravo section (minus dismounts) to Red (tank) and take Red's Bravo section. Move along Main Street and use your dismounts overwatched by your vehicles to clear Bldgs. 4, 16, 10, and 13 of reported enemy. Be advised, other enemy locations are possible as you move along the street. Collect any of Bravo's casualties that you encounter. Consolidate on the west side of the parking lot oriented NW. Assess whether or not we will be able to clear the vehicles off Main Street and use it as a trafficable route for follow-on forces. BREAK.

RED (tank): Detach Bravo section to Blue (mech) and take Blue's Bravo section. Move along Gay Street and turn west on Decatur Street to pass along the east side of Bldg. 7. Also take the engineer squad and clear a route behind the buildings on the east side of Main Street that can serve as a trafficable passage lane for follow-on forces in case we are unable to clear Main Street for through traffic. Consolidate on the east side of parking lot and orient NE. BREAK

WHITE (tank): Conduct a Passage of Lines with Charlie and quickly move along Gay Street until it intersects "River Road." Attack west along "River Road" and destroy the T-80 vicinity Bldg. 12. Continue your attack west to destroy the BMP vicinity Bldg. 13. You need to execute a timely move, destroy those two vehicles, and set on the south side of the parking lot oriented south. BREAK

Black 5: Follow in support of White and coordinate the passage of lines with Charlie. Keep me informed of your situation and give me warning prior to White's crossing of Main Street so I can lift fires. BREAK

Black 7: Take the trains to CP 9. Send the medic track with Blue to assist in the CASEVAC along Main Street. Coordinate with Charlie 7 for CSS support of White if necessary. On order conduct consolidation and reorganization activities in parking lot vicinity grid 731064. BREAK

FIST: Follow Red and locate in a position of good observation. Trigger artillery and mortar fires to provide smoke to obscure enemy observation of Red's and White's movement. BREAK

I will move with Red and maintain command and control. I will coordinate with Charlie and Alpha and have them scan for the T-80 and BMPs as their reported locations are close to their respective positions. It is essential that we maintain situational awareness, so keep me informed of progress. When White assaults west across the north side of the OBJ, I will instruct Red and Blue to lift and shift fires to prevent fratricide.

Alpha 6, be advised there is a reported BMP north of Bldg. 13 to your NE. You should be able to observe and engage him at this time. BREAK

Charlie 6, be advised there is a reported T-80 east of Bldg. 12 to your NW. You should be able to observe and engage him at this time. OVER.

RATIONALE:

My primary mission is to ensure that the division's follow-on forces can establish the bridge site and continue the attack. Therefore, I must create a trafficable lane

for their passage. In addition, I must also clear OBJ WHITE and CASEVAC Bravo's wounded soldiers. I have task organized my platoons in the following manner:

(Red and Blue, two tanks and two BFVs; White, 4 tanks). I did this in order to provide the element clearing the town with the added firepower of the tanks. In addition, I left the dismounts of the Bradley section that went to Red behind with Blue (mech) for use in clearing the buildings of Brandenburg. White remained tank pure in order to maximize its firepower as it is my primary killing element.

I have used Red to clear a lane behind the buildings on the east side of Main Street to be used in case the disabled vehicles on Main Street cannot be removed prior to the arrival of the division's forces. I have provided Red with the engineer squad to assist them in establishing a lane. I am using the infantry dismounts to clear the buildings in the town of Brandenburg. They are supported with a tank section to provide overwatch and additional firepower and the medic track to assist in the CASEVAC of Bravo's wounded. I have also tasked Blue (mech) with determining whether Main Street can be used as a trafficable route. I have sent White, along with the XO, to conduct a passage of lines with Charlie in the east in order to conduct an attack at the north end of Brandenburg. By attacking east to west, I hope to achieve advantage by hitting the enemy (T-80 and BMPs) from their flanks or rear. I anticipate that these enemy vehicles will be primarily orienting south into the town of Brandenburg. Also, I have attempted to crosstalk with other elements in the task force by informing Alpha and Charlie of the enemy vehicles reported near their locations. If Alpha and Charlie would be able to engage these vehicles, I would have more assets available to accomplish my mission of establishing a lane and clearing Brandenburg. I have used the FIST to provide smoke in order to obscure enemy observation of Red's and White's movement.

I have incorporated a redundancy by providing two alternatives for the passage lane for the division's assets. First, I will attempt to use Main Street as the primary route. However, if Main Street cannot be cleared of enemy resistance or disabled Bravo vehicles cannot be removed, I have provided an alternative route on the eastern side of town. Due to the difficult task organization and the independent maneuver of each platoon, my plan requires a well-trained unit. However, good communication will lead to the commander's ability to maintain command and control and a successful mission.

TACTICAL VIGNETTE 98-4

Stability and Support Operations in Athia

“Showdown at Bruechville”

Scenario:

You are deployed in theater as part of a United Nations force where you have been assigned stability and support type operations (SASO), primarily peace enforcement and support of the humanitarian assistance efforts of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The threat in the area is from the Athian faction, which is not satisfied with the United Nations' resolution of border disputes or redistribution of international aid. Athian equipment includes BRDM-1s and OT-64s, which they have been flaunting in violation of the U.N. accord by using their armored vehicles to escort other vehicles and equipment around in your area of operations. Additionally, Athian activity has thus far been limited to mild anti-United Nations demonstrations and graffiti. Recent intelligence indicates insurgent forces are suffering food shortages brought on by harsh winter months. Current rules of engagement now allow the use of deadly force when necessary to protect lives, critical equipment, and all U.N./host nation facilities.

General Situation:

You are the commander for Blackhorse Troop 1-23 Cavalry, an armored division cavalry squadron. Your assets include two scout platoons (1st and 3rd Plt) of M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicles, two tank

platoons (2nd and 4th Plt) of M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tanks, a mortar section, one up-armored fire truck and one tank and pump unit, carrying high-pressure water cannons. Additionally, there is a team of OH-58D(I) Kiowa Warriors (KWs) on station from Delta Troop that are under squadron control. The KWs are each carrying 300 rounds of .50 caliber and two Hellfire missiles.

Mission:

B/1-23rd Cavalry conducts area security operations centered on the village of Bruechville to protect food distribution points and other critical facilities against Athian insurgent threats.

You have been issued non-lethal weapons for crowd control, to include water cannons, pepper spray, and CS grenades. You are conducting an area security mission to protect and control the distribution of food and medical supplies at a recently resupplied food distribution center. Your 1st platoon is assigned Check Points 7 and 9, the terrain west of the river, with its sister platoon (2nd) established in Hide Position Horse. Your 3rd Platoon is responsible for the river and the terrain east of the river, with its sister platoon in Hide Position Saddle. Your mortars are in Mortar Firing Position Rope.

WHAT'S
YOUR
NEXT
MOVE??



The Action Begins:


Ten minutes ago, the squadron S2 informed you that JSTARS reports two convoys approaching your position from the west on each of the major roads. Both convoys have approximately 20 vehicles, of which about half appear to be armored. The **squadron commander FRAGOed** the KWs to reconnoiter the convoys to determine their exact location and disposition. You plot their location to be approximately twelve kilometers west of CPs 7 and 9.

You receive the following **SPOTREP** from your 3rd platoon: “*Black 6, this is Blue 1. We have a crowd of approximately 200 pro-Athian sympathizers on foot, moving on the road toward the resupply area, current location is two kilometers west of CP 11. We have identified known Athian black list personnel among the demonstrators. Also, a roving patrol has found five empty dump trucks hidden in the wooded area north of HP Saddle. The truck drivers state they are taking a lunch break from their road construction project.*” Although you have been briefed on all construction projects in your area, you are unaware of any projects in your immediate AO.

The **KWs report** that both convoys are approximately ten kilometers west of CPs 7 and 9 respectively. The northern convoy consists of 3 BRDMs, 5 OT-64s, and 12 GAZ cargo trucks. The southern convoy consists of 5 BRDMs, 6 OT-64s, and 9 GAZ cargo trucks. Every armored vehicle has women and children riding on top. The OT-64s are equipped with 14.5mm heavy MGs, and BRDMs equipped with 12.7mm heavy MGs. The paramilitary soldiers have RPGs and SA-7s. They further report that the road is bordered on both sides by restricted and severely restricted terrain.

Requirement:

Take five minutes to assess the situation and formulate a FRAGO. Issue your FRAGO as if talking on the radio. Submit your solution to the Cavalry Branch by e-mail at: HoskinsonT@ftknox-dtdd-emh5.army.mil, or mail your solution to ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-TDM, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210.



THE SOLUTIONS Tactical Vignette 98-4, "Showdown at Bruechville"

Author's Solution

FRAGO

Guidons, this is Black 6, FRAGO follows, acknowledge, over.

Situation: There is a 20-vehicle convoy consisting of 3 BRDMs, 5 OT-64s, and 12 GAZ cargo trucks 10km west of CP 9 moving east. There is an additional 20-vehicle convoy with 5 BRDMs, 6 OT-64s, and 9 GAZ cargo trucks 10 km west of CP 7 moving east. All armored vehicles in both convoys have women and children riding on top. Blue has approximately 200 pro-Athian sympathizers on foot, 2 km west of CP 11 moving west. Blue has also discovered 5 empty dump trucks in the wooded area north of HP SADDLE.

There is an Air Weapons Team (AWT) from D Troop operating in our area. It is my assessment that this is a coordinated effort by pro-Athian sympathizers to raid the distribution site in Bruechville.

Mission: No change.

Intent: (Purpose) Prevent Athian aggressors from capturing or destroying supplies. (Endstate) Athian convoys and demonstrations dispersed and returned to their point of origin.

Tasks to subordinate units:

RED: - Establish blocking positions at CPs 7 and 9 to allow no penetration east of the checkpoints.

- On order, destroy convoys using sections from White.

- Use the fire truck at CP 7 and the tank and pump unit at CP 9 to remove women and children from the armored vehicles, or use mortar fire.

- Use mortars first, then escalate force with direct fire as necessary to stop the convoys.

- B/P coordinate with AWT to prevent penetration of CPs.

- You have priority of mortar fire.

WHITE: - Send one section to CP 7 and one section to CP 9 to reinforce Red.

- On order, destroy convoys.

BLUE: - Establish a blocking position from CP 11, west 4.5 oriented east.

- Use water cannons, CS, and pepper spray as necessary to disperse the crowd.

- Identify and detain crowd leaders and blacklist personnel.

- Detain the dump truck drivers.

- Disable the dump trucks.

GREEN: - Send one section to reinforce Blue and one section to defend the supply distribution point.

- Be prepared to reinforce Red or White.

MORTARS: - Lay one tube on a target from CP 9, west 1.0.

- Lay the other tube on a target from CP 7, west 1.0.

- Be prepared to reorient your direction of fire to support Blue.

TOC: - Keep Squadron informed.

- Request that the AWT be OPCON to us.

- Request FA priority of fires.

FIST: - Move to CP 9 and adjust fire for the mortars.

- FA POF: KWs, 1st Plt.

- Mort POF: 1st Plt, KWs.

KWs: - Maintain contact with the convoys.

- O/O use FA and organic fire to attrit the convoys.

- Be prepared to conduct BHO with 1st Platoon and fight a coordinated close fight.

TRAINS: - Move to the supply point with the 1SG's M113, maintenance M113 and the M-88.

- Link-up with Green and establish a perimeter around the supply point.

Service Support: No change.

Command and Signal: I will be with Red and White at CP 7. Acknowledge, over.

RATIONALE:

I sent 1st and 2nd Platoons to CPs 7 and 9 as a show of force and have overwhelming firepower if destruction of the BRDMs and OT-64s is necessary and/or authorized. I split 2nd Platoon because a section is sufficient firepower to destroy either of the convoys and the restrictive terrain will not allow for anything larger than a section to be effectively employed against the convoys.

I sent a section of 4th Platoon to reinforce 3rd as a show of force. 3rd Platoon has the ability to detain crowd leaders and delay the crowd so they should be dispersed before they reach the distribution point.

I detained the dump truck drivers for later questioning and possible turnover to the host nation police for their involvement in the raid. I disabled the dump trucks to prevent their usage by other personnel. I considered tasking 3rd Platoon to use them to block the road into Bruechville, but I felt time was short and they would need all they could get to plan and prepare for the crowd.

4th Platoon is my be-prepared reserve. They should not be needed in 3rd Platoon's fight or at the distribution point.

The Kiowa Warriors will provide additional firepower and eyes for 1st Platoon. They also can record the event on video.

Reader Solution

(Submitted by CPT Ray M. Ceralde)

Note: "Demon" Troop is one of the Air Cavalry Troops in the squadron.

Alert

Guidons, this is Black 6, FRAGO follows.

Situation: 20-vehicle convoy, ten kilometers west of CP 9, consisting of 3 BRDMs, 5 OT-64s, and 12 cargo trucks, moving east, break.

Another 20-vehicle convoy, ten kilometers west of CP 7, consisting of 5 BRDMs, 6 OT-64s, and 9 cargo trucks, also moving east, break.

Demon troop reports terrain on both sides of north and south road past checkpoints 7 and 9 is severely restricted for vehicle movement, break.

All armored vehicles have women and children riding on top, break.

200 pro-Athian sympathizers with identified black-listed personnel, two kilometers east of CP 9 moving west along east road, break.

5 dump trucks, stationary in woodline, 1 kilometer north of hide position SADDLE, break.

Most probable course of action is that the Athians are attempting to overwhelm the supply and food point by numbers and force to take more than their allotted share of food and supplies, break.

Mission: We will establish hasty checkpoints at CP 7, CP 9, and CP 11 to prevent armored vehicles from entering Breuchville and to prevent large numbers of civilians from massing at the food distribution point, break.

Intent: I want to prevent the armored vehicles from entering our AO, break.

I want the checkpoints to delay the passage of non-combatants so that they will not overwhelm the supply and food point, break.

I want to detain blacklisted personnel that attempt to pass through our checkpoints, but I do not want you to aggressively pursue them if they flee, break.

I want to maintain observation on dump trucks to ensure that they do not support insurgent operations, break.

All other personnel are free to continue to Breuchville within guidelines of UN Accord, break.

Tasks to Subordinate Units

RED 1, Go with your Alpha section past checkpoint 7 along south road, break.

Send your Bravo section past checkpoint 9 along north road, break. Establish hasty checkpoints and use your vehicles to physically block the road where there is restricted terrain on both sides to prevent the convoy from bypassing you, break. Upon inspection, cargo trucks and personnel can continue, but send them in intervals of two vehicles every five minutes, break. Order all armored vehicles to turn around or remain at checkpoints, break.

WHITE 1, Send your Alpha section to vicinity checkpoint 7 along south road with Red's Alpha section and physically block the road to support Red's hasty checkpoint, break.

Send your Bravo section to vicinity checkpoint 9 with Red's Bravo section along north road and physically block the road to support Red's hasty checkpoint, break.

GREEN 1, Move your platoon to the Breuchville river bridge, 3.0 west and 1.0 north from your hide position, break. Put your sections on both sides of the bridge to prevent any armored vehicles that have slipped through from reaching the supply and food point, break

BLUE 1, Send a two-vehicle section to continue to observe and report on the 5 stationary dump trucks, break. Send the rest of your platoon and all available dismounts to establish a hasty checkpoint at CP 11 to prevent the crowd from massing at the food point. Upon inspection, send groups of 20 people every five minutes, break.

BLACK 5, Move to CP 11 and supervise the situation there, break.

BLACK 7, Move company trains to food point to provide security to enable orderly distribution, break. Send fire truck and pump unit to food point to support in the event of a hostile crowd, break. I will send the mortars to provide you additional manpower, break.

BLACK 2, Move to the food point and provide dismounts to support security at food point. Obtain further instructions from Black 7, break.

Coordinating Instructions

Detain any blacklisted personnel attempting to pass through checkpoints, break.

Use deadly force only in self-defense and to protect lives and critical equipment, break.

CSS

Company trains move to supply and food distribution site, break.

Command & Signal

I will be with Red's Bravo section at CP 9, break.

Blackhorse X-ray will remain in same place.

Acknowledge, over.

RATIONALE

I sent one scout platoon and one tank platoon to areas along the roads where the terrain is severely restricted on both sides so that the convoys cannot bypass them.

In the event that an armored vehicle does bypass the checkpoints west of the river, another tank platoon is at the bridge blocking both sides to prevent passage to the food point. I decided to put the tank platoon at the bridge instead of supporting 3rd Platoon because they really do not need combat vehicles, but rather dismounts. Sending four BFVs and their dismounts to establish a hasty checkpoint should be able to control the situation.

The dump trucks may not have work in the area of operations and are suspicious, but unless they actually participate in

insurgent operations, there is nothing I can do but continue to observe and report. If they do something in violation of the UN accord, then I can have the BFV section block their movement and detain the drivers.

The hasty checkpoint at CP 11 is intended to slow down the movement of the crowd. The blacklisted personnel will probably not attempt to pass through the checkpoint for fear of being detained and will probably turn around. This separates some of the known instigators and will lessen the potential of the crowd from becoming hostile.

Sending personnel and trucks in intervals of 20 people and/or 2 trucks every five minutes should keep the demonstrators from initially overwhelming the food point and allows the security personnel there to establish order.

I sent the 1SG to move the company trains to the food point to provide security to the relief personnel there. The company trains personnel and equipment are capable of providing security with their M113s and M88.

I attached the mortar platoon to the 1SG to provide additional manpower for security of the food point. Based from experience in Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia, the rules of engagement extremely limit the use of indirect fires. I do not foresee the need for mortars to support with indirect fires.

I sent the fire truck and pump unit to the food point to support in case the crowd becomes hostile.

I sent the XO to the east at CP 11 because I feel that the situation there is the second most important point and I want him to control the situation there.

I will go to CP 9 in the north because I have RED 1 to control the situation in the south.

READER SOLUTION

(Submitted by Student, Cavalry Leaders Course 98-03)

Guidons, this is Blackhawk 6. FRAGO follows, acknowledge, over.

Situation: Two convoys of Athian insurgents with BRDMs, OT-64s, and trucks are currently 10 kilometers to the west, moving down the roads leading to Checkpoints 9 and 7, break. Athian use of APCs is in violation of UN accord, break. A crowd of approximately 200 pro-

Athian sympathizers is approaching Bruechville from the east, current location from CP 11 west 2.0, break. There are also 5 empty dump trucks located in the woods vicinity CP 10, break. My read is that this is a coordinated effort to raid the NGO supply and food distribution (SFD) point, break. The two armed convoys are a diversion to focus our attention away from the crowd, who will then use the dump trucks to raid the NGO SFD, break. Athian insurgents are known to be suffering food shortages, break. Athians have not used violence up to this point, break. Athian force approaching CP 9 consists of 3 BRDMs, 5 OT-64s, 12 GAZ trucks, and paramilitary forces armed with RPGs and SA-7s, break. Athian force approaching CP 7 consists of 5 BRDMs, 6 OT-64s, 9 GAZ trucks, and paramilitary force armed with RPGs and SA-7s, break. Both convoys have women and children riding on the APCs, break. Pro-Athian crowd west of CP 11 consists of 200 dismounts with known Athian blacklist personnel among the crowd, break. Dump trucks vic CP 10 consists of 5 civilian dump trucks with drivers, break. Be advised we also have a group of refugees of unknown affiliation from CP F east 2.0. Acknowledge situation, over.

Task Organization: No change within troop. Be advised we have one SWT on station, break.

Mission: No change, break.

Execution, Intent: My intent is to protect the NGO SFD point by preventing the Athians from entering Bruechville with their convoys or the crowd, break. Success occurs when we fix the armed convoys west of the river and control the crowd east of Bruechville with only use of minimum force, break. I intend to have squadron block the APCs from the west after we have fixed them, break.

Concept: We will establish roadblocks at CPs 7 and 9 to prevent Athian APC penetration of those CPs. We will establish a roadblock vic HP SADDLE to prevent the crowd from entering Bruechville en masse. We will also secure the NGO SFD point, break. We will then negotiate with the Athians to defuse the situation and allow squadron time to assist us with additional assets, Acknowledge, over.

RED, move one three vehicle scout section to CP 7 and one to CP 9. Establish roadblocks tied into severely restrictive and restrictive terrain to prevent insurgent APCs from passing through CPs, break. Halt Athian columns at roadblocks and

inform them they cannot enter Bruechville, break. Inform them that unarmed trucks and civilians can proceed to Bruechville, but in no case will we allow their APCs past our CPs, break. Negotiate as necessary to separate the trucks and women and children from the APCs, break. If the APCs refuse to stop, you are authorized to fire warning shots, then engage to immobilize, then engage to destroy, break. Use minimum weapons systems to fire warning shots, starting with small arms, break. Use pepper spray, then smoke, then CS, if I authorize, to separate civilians from APCs if you must engage APCs, break. I say again, use only minimum force in accordance with ROE. Acknowledge, over.

BLUE, move two vehicle scout sections, the fire truck, and the TPU to the road vic HP SADDLE, break. Establish a roadblock and civilian holding area (CHA) to prevent the crowd from entering Bruechville and raiding the NGO SFD, break. Move a two vehicle scout section to identify and secure in place the refugees from CP F east 2.0 to prevent possible factional violence and protect them from harm, break. Have your dismounted patrol commandeer the five dump trucks and use them to reinforce your roadblock, break. Search and detain the dump truck drivers in the CHA, break. Halt crowd vic HP SADDLE and inform them that they cannot enter Bruechville in an unorganized manner, break. Use vehicle sights and LP/OPs to identify crowd leaders and blacklist personnel, then dismount teams to snatch and detain them in the CHA, break. Negotiate with crowd to defuse situation, break. You are authorized to offer them food that we will bring to them, break. If crowd gets out of control, you are authorized to use the KWs rotorwash, water cannons, smoke grenades, pepper spray, and, if I authorize, CS, to control disperse the crowd as necessary, break. Break contact if the crowd gets out of control and you have used nonlethal weapons, then reestablish subsequent roadblocks to delay the crowd, break. I say again, use only minimum force in accordance with ROE, break. Acknowledge, over.

WHITE, Set in overwatch vic CP 9 to assist RED, break. Make your tanks a visible show of force, break. Take all commands from RED 1, break. On my order, you are to attack by fire to immobilize, then destroy, if necessary, Athian APCs if they ignore the roadblock and RED's warning shots, break. I say again, use only minimum force in accordance with ROE. Acknowledge, over.

GREEN, Set in overwatch vic CP 7 to assist RED, break. Make your tanks a visible show of force, break. You are in command of CP 7 roadblock, break. On my order you are to attack by fire to immobilize, then destroy if necessary, Athian APCs if they try to ignore the roadblock and RED's warning shots, break. I say again, use only minimum force in accordance with ROE. Acknowledge, over.

DELTA TROOP KWs, Request you assist BLUE in crowd control operations vic HP SADDLE, break. Be prepared to assist RED in destruction of Athian APCs vic CPs 7 and 9. Acknowledge, over.

MORTARS, Move to bridge in Bruechville and block it to prevent all non-troop vehicular traffic, break. Allow civilian dismounts to pass after searching for arms and blacklist personnel, break. Be prepared to fire smoke in support of line platoons, Acknowledge, over.

TOC, Blackhawk 5, inform squadron of situation and my intent, break. Request OPCON of Delta Troop SWT, additional SWTs, release of CS authority, release of mortar firing authority, CA teams, and SCO's intent, break. Recommended COA to squadron is to move a blocking force west of the armed convoys while we fix them at the roadblock to allow the squadron to confiscate or destroy the unauthorized APCs, break. Coordinate with civilian police, militia, and local leaders to keep civilians off the streets and to assist in crowd control or negotiations, break. Coordinate with NGO running SFD for emergency release of food to crowd, break. Collocate with the trains vic NGO SFD for additional security, break. Acknowledge, over.

BLACKHAWK 7, move the trains to the NGO SFD point to provide security, break. Establish a CHA vic the NGO SFD to process any civilians that approach for food, break. Assist the NGO in the issue of food and/or medical supplies to authorized civilians by providing security and crowd control, break. Search all civilians who attempt to enter the NGO SFD site for arms and blacklist personnel, break. Be prepared to move food to BLUE to defuse situation with crowd. Acknowledge, over.

I will collocate with BLUE vic HP SADDLE, break.

COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS: Use only minimum force in accordance with ROE, break. Use of CS is not authorized without my permission. Acknowledge, over.

Zone Recon To LOA Steelers



Situation:

You are "Wolfpack 6," the commander of Delta Team, TF 3-37, with two tank platoons and a mech platoon. Sunrise is at 0600, sunset at 1800.

Enemy:

The 52d MRB has seized Bensonville to our north. It is set up in a deliberate defense on the south side of the town in OBJ GREEN (encompassing OBJ YELLOW and OBJ BLUE, which is east of YELLOW) oriented south. In OBJ YELLOW, we expect an MRC(+). The TF S2 templates that the enemy is established in a well-prepared defense out of contact, with three MRPs in a horseshoe formation tied into the terrain and a dismantled infantry strongpoint on the west side of his defensive position. This strongpoint is templated to have an AT firing line composed of 2A45Ms and AT-5s. The enemy also has an extensive obstacle belt, three dismantled reconnaissance teams (DRT), and two CSOPs forward in the security zone (see map board with original enemy SITEMP and R&S graphics).

The most probable and most dangerous course of action is for the enemy to courageously hold his defensive positions and die in place. He will attempt to piecemeal friendly units with obstacles and indirect fire and destroy them in his kill sack as they move through the restrictive NTC-like terrain north toward Bensonville.


Friendly:

TF Mission: As the main effort of the brigade's attack on OBJ GREEN, TF 3-37 attacks 310600AUG98 to seize OBJ YELLOW, vic 085595, to facilitate passage of follow-on forces that will gain control of Bensonville vic 130700.

Last night the TF scout platoon, which had only six operational HMMWVs, infiltrated through the zone to attempt to reconnoiter enemy positions and obstacles. As of first light this morning, the TF TOC has lost communications with the scouts. Before the TOC lost communications with the scouts (VIPERS), it had received the following information:

- **A section** (VIPER 2 and 3).
 - One vehicle requires recovery vic 044580; the other vehicle is FMC and a patrol is conducting dismounted reconnaissance vic 045594.
 - Reported complex obstacle (triple-strand concertina with AT and AP mines) running NE-SW with difficult bypass at SW end vic 059568; dismantled enemy activity vic 055591.
 - Last SITREP at 0445.
- **B section** (VIPER 4 and 6).
 - Reported point obstacle (wire and mines) with difficult bypass on north side grid 119580.
 - Last reported grid 112606. Last transmission at 0300: "CONTACT NORTH, OUT!" No further contact.
- **C section** (VIPER 1 and 5).
 - Reported two BMPs stationary vic 076556 oriented S-SE at 0030; wire/mine obstacle oriented NE-SW vic 074587 at 0200.
 - VIPER 1 destroyed vic 078588 at 0230; all KIAs.

Continued on Page 54



Steelers (Continued from Page 40)

- VIPER 5 conducted dismounted reconnaissance and reported tracked vehicle activity vic 100600 at 0300; three T-80s (stationary in a hide position) vic 079609 at 0400.
- Last reported grid 062608, relayed through VIPER 2 at 0445.

Without a clearer picture of the enemy, the TF commander believes that tomorrow's attack will be unsuccessful. He wants you to assume the mission of the scout platoon. At 1630, just as your 1SG arrives at your assembly area with the LOGPAC, the TF commander issues a FRAGO directing you to conduct a force-oriented zone reconnaissance to LOA STEELERS to confirm or deny the S2's template. He wants you to reconnoiter all NAIs; to identify the composition, disposition, and array of enemy forces in OBJ YELLOW and the obstacles in the security zone; and to destroy CSOPs and any other reconnaissance assets in zone. He

attaches an engineer squad and an extra FIST to your company team to assist you in your mission, and he orders you to position both FIST-Vs in OPs where they will be able to observe preparatory fires on the objective. He reminds you that all friendly elements, including scouts, must be at least 2 kilometers from any pre-planned targets because the brigade commander has given him MLRS support for the attack. You have priority of artillery fires until 0600, and you are primary shooter for AB0001 and AB0002 prior to the attack. After completing your reconnaissance mission and positioning your FIST-Vs in OPs, you will consolidate your remaining forces at CP 7 and fall in as the trail company team of the TF diamond during the attack. You may leave FIST-Vs and dismounted OPs north of PL COWBOYS, but you must have the rest of your company team positioned at CP 7 prepared to attack when the TF comes through.

The time is now 1700, and the sun will set in an hour. Your assembly area is 3km south of the LD, and the LD is 10km south of PL COWBOYS. The attack is planned to begin with preparatory fires at 0600. You must act now! What do you do?

Requirement:

In 15 minutes or less, develop your COA, and issue your FRAGO and any other reports you would submit. Readers who submit their solutions to the scenario should provide the following: fragmentary order to the company team, the rationale behind your decision, and a sketch of your plan of action. E-mail your solution to: HastyD@ftknox-dtdd-emh5.army.mil, or mail your solution to Platoon and Company Team Doctrine Branch, ATTN: ATZK-TDD-P, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210.

SOLUTIONS — TACTICAL VIGNETTE 98-5

“Zone Recon To LOA Steelers” from the September-October 1998 issue of *ARMOR*

THE PROBLEM

Situation:

You are “Wolfpack 6,” the commander of Delta Team, TF 3-37, with two tank platoons and a mech platoon. Sunrise is at 0600, sunset at 1800.

Enemy:

The 52d MRB has seized Bensonville to our north. It is set up in a deliberate defense on the south side of the town in OBJ GREEN (encompassing OBJ YELLOW and OBJ BLUE, which is east of YELLOW) oriented south. In OBJ YELLOW, we expect an MRC(+). The TF S2 templates that the enemy is established in a well-prepared defense out of contact, with three MRPs in a horseshoe formation tied into the terrain and a dismantled infantry strongpoint on the west side of his defensive position. This strongpoint is templated to have an AT firing line composed of 2A45Ms and AT-5s. The enemy also has an extensive obstacle belt, three dismantled reconnaissance teams (DRT), and two CSOPs forward in the security zone (see map board with original enemy SITEMP and R&S graphics).

The most probable and most dangerous course of action is for the enemy to courageously hold his defensive positions and die in place. He will attempt to piecemeal friendly units with obstacles and indirect fire and destroy them in his kill sack as they move through the restrictive NTC-like terrain north toward Bensonville.

Friendly:

TF Mission: As the main effort of the brigade’s attack on OBJ GREEN, TF 3-37 attacks 310600AUG98 to seize OBJ YELLOW, vic 085595, to facilitate passage of follow-on forces that will gain control of Bensonville vic 130700.

Last night the TF scout platoon, which had only six operational HMMWVs, infiltrated through the zone to attempt to reconnoiter enemy positions and obstacles. As of first light this morning, the TF TOC has lost communications with the scouts. Before the TOC lost communications with the scouts (VIPERS), it had received the following information:

• A section (VIPER 2 and 3).

- One vehicle requires recovery vic 044580; the other vehicle is FMC and a patrol is conducting dismantled reconnaissance vic 045594.

- Reported complex obstacle (triple-strand concertina with AT and AP mines) running NE-SW with difficult bypass at SW end vic 059568; dismantled enemy activity vic 055591.

- Last SITREP at 0445.

• B section (VIPER 4 and 6).

- Reported point obstacle (wire and mines) with difficult bypass on north side grid 119580.

- Last reported grid 112606. Last transmission at 0300: “CONTACT NORTH, OUT!” No further contact.

• C section (VIPER 1 and 5).

- Reported two BMPs stationary vic 076556 oriented S-SE at 0030; wire/mine obstacle oriented NE-SW vic 074587 at 0200.

- VIPER 1 destroyed vic 078588 at 0230; all KIAs.


- VIPER 5 conducted dismantled reconnaissance and reported tracked vehicle activity vic 100600 at 0300; three T-80s (stationary in a hide position) vic 079609 at 0400.

- Last reported grid 062608, relayed through VIPER 2 at 0445.

Without a clearer picture of the enemy, the TF commander believes that tomorrow’s attack will be unsuccessful. He wants you to assume the mission of the scout platoon. At 1630, just as your ISG arrives at your assembly area with the LOG-PAC, the TF commander issues a FRAGO directing you to conduct a force-oriented zone reconnaissance to LOA STEELERS to confirm or deny the S2’s template. He wants you to reconnoiter all NAIs; to identify the composition, disposition, and array of enemy forces in OBJ YELLOW and the obstacles in the security zone; and to destroy CSOPs and any other reconnaissance assets in zone. He at-

taches an engineer squad and an extra FIST to your company team to assist you in your mission, and he orders you to position both FIST-Vs in OPs where they will be able to observe preparatory fires on the objective. He reminds you that all friendly elements, including scouts, must be at least 2 kilometers from any pre-planned targets because the brigade commander has given him MLRS support for the attack. You have priority of artillery fires until 0600, and you are primary shooter for AB0001 and AB0002 prior to the attack. After completing your reconnaissance mission and positioning your FIST-Vs in OPs, you will consolidate your remaining forces at CP 7 and fall in as the trail company team of the TF diamond during the attack. You may leave FIST-Vs and dismantled OPs north of PL COWBOYS, but you must have the rest of your company team positioned at CP 7 prepared to attack when the TF comes through.

The time is now 1700, and the sun will set in an hour. Your assembly area is 3km south of the LD, and the LD is 10km south of PL COWBOYS. The attack is planned to begin with preparatory fires at 0600. You must act now! What do you do?



THE SOLUTIONS

Author's Solution

(NOTE: This solution is in the form of a FRAGO from WOLFPACK 6, the commander of Delta Team, TF 3-37. The team comprises two tank platoons and a mech platoon.)

SITUATION

General:

Last night, the TF scout platoon (VIPERS), with six operational HMMWVs, infiltrated through the zone to conduct reconnaissance of enemy positions and obstacles. As of first light, the TF TOC has lost communications with the scouts. The attack is planned for tomorrow morning at 0600. Without confirmation of his IPB, the TF commander has serious reservations about the enemy situation and scheme of maneuver for tomorrow's attack. To ensure the operation's success, he has directed us to complete the mission of the scout platoon.

Enemy:

Intel update follows. Before contact was lost, the TF scouts reported the following enemy situation:

- Complex obstacle (triple-strand concertina with AT and AP mines) running NE-SW with difficult bypass at SW end vic 059568.
- Dismounted enemy activity vic 055591 at 0445.
- Point obstacle (wire and mines) with difficult bypass on north side vic 119580.
- Two stationary BMPs oriented S-SE vic 076556 at 0030.
- Wire/mine obstacle oriented NE-SW vic 074587 at 0200.
- Tracked vehicle activity vic 100600 at 0300.
- Three T-80s stationary in hide position vic 079609 at 0400.

An obstacle in the west, although not templated, has been confirmed by the scouts. The enemy's countermobility capabilities are not unlimited. If, as the scouts report, there is a large complex obstacle in the west, the enemy must be weak somewhere else. Additionally, VIPER's B section was able to maneuver to

112606 without reporting any contact; this tends to deny the presence of the templated CSOP in NAI C112 and an obstacle and MRP in NAIs C107 and C106 respectively. Based on this information, I think he is probably weaker in the east than in the west.

Friendly:

Before contact was lost, scout locations were reported as follows:

- **A section** (VIPER 2 and 3): one vehicle needs recovery vic 044580; the other vehicle is FMC and is collocated with the bent vehicle; patrol is conducting dismounted reconnaissance vic NAI C103 (grid 045594).
- **B section** (VIPER 4 and 6): last reported at grid 112606; assumed to be zapped.
- **C section** (VIPER 1 and 5): VIPER 1 zapped vic 078588 at 0230 (all KIAs); VIPER 5 is conducting dismounted reconnaissance, last reported grid 062608 at 0445 (relayed by VIPER 2).

Additional graphic control measures:

Add the following graphic control measures:

- Platoon boundary along N-S grid line 09.
- PL OILERS along E-W grid line 53.
- CP 8 at 121572.

MISSION

Wolfpack conducts a zone reconnaissance NLT 301730AUG98 to LOA STEELERS to destroy enemy reconnaissance forces, confirm or deny the presence of other enemy forces and obstacles in zone, and establish OPs to observe enemy defensive positions. Consolidate at CP 7 NLT 0600.

Intent:

Our main reconnaissance effort will be in the east, because I believe that is where the enemy is weakest. I want to destroy DRTs and confirmed CSOP, observe NAIs C103, C104, C105, C108 to confirm or deny templated enemy MRPs and obstacles. I want to clear NAIs C106 and C107 to confirm or deny a templated

MRP and obstacle in those NAIs. Do not become decisively engaged with the enemy's main defense and consolidate at CP 7 NLT 0600.

Concept of the operation:

We will move quickly in a company wedge, assuming risk to PL COWBOYS. We must make contact with VIPER ASAP and use him to assist us throughout the mission. We will set vic PL COWBOYS, BLUE will move quickly and begin to locate and destroy the DRT teams in zone. RED will move forward and destroy the CSOP in NAI C109. WHITE will move up and clear NAI C112. With the CSOP and DRTs destroyed, the enemy will not have eyes on our reconnaissance efforts tonight or our attack tomorrow. Then we will continue our reconnaissance and set FIST-Vs in OPs to observe AB0001 and AB0002. On order the engineers will breach the obstacle vic CP 8. NLT 0600, we will consolidate at CP 7 and conduct rearm and refuel operations. Then we will fall in as the trail element of the TF diamond when the TF passes our location at 0700 on the attack to seize OBJ YELLOW tomorrow morning.

Maneuver:

BLUE: You are initially the main effort. Lead company wedge to PL COWBOYS. Move quickly to CP 7, dismount, and conduct a hasty DRT sweep to clear NAI C110. Once this is complete, remount, and send one section and a FIST-V to NAI C113 and send one section to NAI C111. You must move quickly to take out the enemy's eyes. RED and WHITE will overwatch your mounted movement. Dismount your squads 1km south of each NAI and clear NAI C113 and C111. Use your dismounts to guide the FIST-V into a position vic 054555 oriented on NAI 109 to call fires on the CSOP. Once DRT sweeps are complete, establish a dismounted OP (OP1) vic 053563 to observe NAIs C103 and C104 and a dismounted OP (OP2) vic 122552 to observe NAIs C107 and C108. Use your vehicles to overwatch your dismounts as much as possible. Your vehicles are the company reserve. Keep them at REDCON 1 and be prepared to react quickly to FRAGOs from me. Leaving your OPs in place, start your move back to CP 7 NLT 0500. Consolidate at CP 7 NLT 0600.

THUNDER 14: Move with BLUE. Set vic 054555 oriented on NAI C109. On

order, adjust fires on the CSOP in C109. After destroying the CSOP, move to a position vic 046567 to serve as primary shooter for AB0001 and AB0002.

RED: Move on the left of the company wedge. Set COWBOYS. Follow and overwatch BLUE's move to NAI C113. Set vic PL OILERS. Once the FIST is set in a position to observe fires on NAI C109, move forward and destroy reported CSOP at NAI C109. Make contact with VIPER 2 on his net, and send a section to recover his vehicle. Have him guide you in, if necessary. If recovery is not possible, ensure that all friendly elements, including VIPER 5 (last reported to be near AB0002), are at least 2 km from targets. Send your other section with the XO to set PL RAIDERS and observe the obstacle reported by VIPER vic 074587. Determine if there is a bypass on the NE end. If there is no bypass, determine the point of penetration. Move as stealthily as possible, and do not become decisively engaged. Start your move back to CP 7 NLT 0500. Consolidate your platoon at CP 7 NLT 0600.

WHITE: Move on the right of the company wedge. Set PL COWBOYS. Follow and overwatch BLUE's move to NAI C111. Set vic PL OILERS. Once BLUE reports NAI C111 clear, you become the main effort. Move forward and clear NAI C112. Send one section and SAPPER 2 (engineer squad) to reconnoiter the point obstacle vic CP 8. Do not risk being compromised. Assess the trafficability of that avenue of approach for the attack. Bypass the obstacle and clear NAIs C107 and C106. Attempt to make contact with VIPER's B section and find out what happened to that element. Evacuate WIAs if necessary. Return to CP 8. On order breach the obstacle. Be prepared to leave that tank section and engineer vehicle on site to secure the area and keep that lane open. Have your other section set RAIDERS and observe NAIs C108 and C105 to confirm or deny presence of obstacles and vehicles. Position THUNDER 24 (FIST) in an OP vic 090573 to be the alternate shooter for AB0001 and AB0002. Start your move back to CP 7 NLT 0500. Consolidate your platoon at CP 7 NLT 0600.

SAPPER 2: Move with WHITE. On order, breach the obstacle vic CP 8. Be prepared to remain on site, secure the area, and direct traffic through the lane.

THUNDER 24: Move with WHITE. Set vic 090573 and orient on NAI C103 and C104. You will be the alternate shooter for AB0001 and AB0002.

WOLFPACK 5: Move with RED and supervise the effort in the west. Call the TF main and get retrans for our net.

WOLFPACK 9: Request that the TF immediately attach to us an additional engineer squad, two additional medic PCs, a fueler, and an ammo truck for this mission. They must move with us when we leave this location. Follow the company team's move and set the trains at CP 7. Conduct CSS operations from there. Conduct rearm and refuel operations at CP 7 NLT 0600.

WOLFPACK MG: You are the company team relay and battle captain. Move in my HMMWV with the trains. Ensure that you maintain communications with me and with the TF main. Keep accurate track of the battle and move to high ground as necessary.

I will move with WHITE. I need clarification on the enemy situation in the east. Keep me informed. What are your questions?

RATIONALE

The three keys to the success of this mission are:

1. Recognize that you can't do everything. You must clarify the TF commander's PIR. Time is of the essence, and your resources are limited. Seek guidance from higher and focus your reconnaissance efforts.
2. Fight the enemy, not the plan. You must quickly conduct a thorough IPB. Use reports from the scouts to update your sitemp. Plan off of your updated sitemp, not the original from the S2. Continue to update your running estimate of the enemy situation throughout the night and think from the enemy's perspective. Recommend a COA to the commander based on the information you gather.
3. Use all assets available. Continue to use available scouts to conduct reconnaissance and provide you with information on the enemy in OBJ YELLOW. Evacuate wounded scouts as necessary. Share information with reconnaissance assets from your adjacent units, brigade reconnaissance assets, etc.

After LOGPAC activities are completed, start your movement ASAP. Request clearer focus from the TF commander. You must request additional assets (engineer, medics, fueler, and ammo truck) in order to accomplish your mission and sustain your team. Once you

complete your IPB, inform the TF commander that you believe that the enemy is weakest in the east and recommend that he begins developing a COA to attack in the east, to be executed pending the results of your reconnaissance. The reconnaissance information you gather and your recommended COA should provide him with sufficient information to make his final decision.

Sacrifice security for speed and assume risk in your movement to PL COWBOYS. Make contact with VIPER ASAP and use them to help you. If any scouts are still alive, you should be in communications range with them by the time you reach PL COWBOYS. If any scouts are alive, they have presumably been conducting continuous reconnaissance and surveillance since they lost communications with the TF main. They should have at least some new information that will help you. It is implied in your mission that you assume operational control of the scouts. Issue them a FRAGO to conduct detailed area reconnaissance of any unconfirmed NAIs in OBJ YELLOW and help you confirm your IPB. Ensure all scouts are at least 2km from preplanned targets and abandon disabled vehicles if necessary. Extract wounded scouts as necessary.

Clear DRTs to prevent them from observing your every move. Only dismounts will be able to clear the DRTs. Your mechanized infantry platoon is your primary means of dismounted reconnaissance. Use it to conduct DRT sweeps to quickly take out the enemy's eyes. If DRTs are not cleared, they will call fires to impede and harass your reconnaissance efforts throughout the night. Once it completes its DRT sweeps, BLUE sets in two short-term OPs (VISITS) to observe NAIs, provide redundancy for preplanned targets, and provide "reconnaissance pull" for the TF during tomorrow's attack. Use BLUE's vehicles to act as the company team reserve or quick reaction force. FRAGO them as necessary. Use BLUE's dismounts to guide in and set one of the FIST-Vs in a position to overwatch NAI C109 and adjust fires on the CSOP and other targets of opportunity to facilitate your reconnaissance. BLUE must move quickly because you must clear DRTs before moving any other elements north of PL OILERS. Otherwise you risk compromising your entire unit.

Destroy the CSOP confirmed by the scouts in NAI C109 with a tank platoon and indirect fire called by the FIST-V emplaced by BLUE. Clear C112 to ensure that there is not a CSOP there. This will leave the enemy completely blind

and allow you to continue your zone reconnaissance toward OBJ Yellow.

You must get eyes on the obstacle in the western corridor. This is where the TF commander currently plans to attack. If you cannot convince him to attack in the east, he will attack in the west as planned and expect you to provide him with the grid to the point of penetration where the obstacle is weakest.

Physically clear NAIs C106 and C107. If you can deny the presence of an MRP and obstacle there, you may convince the TF commander to attack there. With some further reduction by the engineers, the bypass on the north side of the point obstacle may be a viable avenue of approach for the attack tomorrow. Use of this avenue, if successful, would also serve to isolate OBJ YELLOW and prevent the enemy from repositioning forces from OBJ BLUE (east of OBJ YELLOW) into OBJ YELLOW.

Reconnoiter the obstacle at CP 8. Beware of enemy overwatching the obstacle. The enemy should have eyes on the obstacle. Be careful and do not risk compromising your forces and your plan. If possible, bypass the obstacle initially and clear C106 and C107. If the NAIs are clear, prepare to breach the obstacle at CP 8. Do not breach too early, because you may compromise your intentions and allow him time to replace the obstacle.

The scouts confirmed tracked vehicle noises at NAI C105, but they neither confirmed nor denied the presence of the templated obstacle in NAI C108. Use a tank section from WHITE and your vehicle to conduct mounted reconnaissance along the eastern mobility corridor. Use the standoff distance of your thermal sights to observe NAIs C108 and C105 to confirm or deny presence of the templated obstacle and MRP. Then set the second FIST-V in a position where it can observe the preplanned targets and provide redundancy as the alternate shooter. If you visually clear NAI C108 and deny the presence of an obstacle there, you will have further support for recommending that the TF attack in the east rather than the west.

Do not allow mounted movement north of PL RAIDERS in the central mobility corridors without your authorization, because, based on your IPB, PL RAIDERS is most likely the southern edge of the enemy's kill sack. Using this control measure will prevent friendly vehicles from driving into the enemy's kill sack and becoming decisively engaged by his main defense.

Reader's Solution

(Submitted by CPT Ray M. Ceralde, Korea)

TASK ORGANIZATION:

RED – 1st Platoon (Tank)

WHITE – 2d Platoon (Tank)

BLUE – 3d Platoon (Mech)

FRAGO: Delivered face to face with 1s, 4s, and attachments while CO/TM conducts LOGPAC activities, and briefing off a 1:50,000 map and a dry erase board.

Situation. Scouts conducted zone reconnaissance up to PL STEELERS last night. The task force has lost commo with them. However, these are the reports they sent back before we lost contact.

The scouts reported the following enemy activities:

- Two BMPs, stationary, oriented SSE at 076556, NAI C109.
- Three T-80s, stationary, in a hide position vicinity 079609, NAI C104.
- Tracked vehicle activity vicinity 100600, NAI C105.
- Enemy dismount activity vicinity 055591, templated strongpoint, NAI C103.

The scouts reported the following obstacles:

- Wire and mine obstacle consisting of triple-strand concertina, AT and AP mines. Oriented SW to NE starting from a difficult bypass at 059568 going NE for an unknown length.
- Wire and mine obstacle 074587 oriented NE to SW. This obstacle most likely ties in with the previous obstacle and both of them combined are probably an extensive turning obstacle.
- Point obstacle consisting of wire and mines with difficult bypass on north side at 119580. This obstacle is most probably blocking the gap at 120573.

I think that the enemy is defending the western avenue of approach (AA) as his main effort. His AT weapons are covering an extensive turning obstacle that will try to force us to go north and straight into the kill sack of an MRP or tank platoon vicinity 104. The AT fires will have flank shots on us as we go north to avoid the obstacle. The strongpoint is there to protect the AT firing line and force us to stay off the western ridge and keep us in

the east to go into the MRP kill sack. The CSOP in 109 is intended to give early warning and to attrit us.

In the eastern AA, the scouts haven't seen anything in 112 so we can assume that the two BMPs in 109 are the CSOP for the MRC defense. The scouts probably haven't cleared 108, where there is a templated obstacle, but their report of tracked vehicle activity vicinity of 105 indicates that there is an MRP defending this AA. I'm pretty sure that 108 is the location of this MRP's kill sack. Since the MRC has put a great deal of effort into the turning obstacle in the west, I do not think that there is an extensive obstacle here.

The gap in the far east is blocked by a point obstacle. The scouts found a difficult bypass around it but I'm sure that somebody is overwatching this obstacle. It may be an MRP (-) or a single vehicle and they may have let the scouts through to prevent their detection and/or deceive us that this obstacle is not covered. This MRP(-) may be defending this obstacle vicinity the 1257 grid square oriented west or defending in 106.

The scouts haven't found any DRT teams, especially in NAIs 110, 111, and 113. I still think that there is one DRT team out there, however.

As far as the friendly situation goes, Viper 1 has been zapped and Vipers 4 and 6 made direct fire contact, and we haven't heard from them since. As of the last report, four scout vehicles are still alive with one requiring recovery at 044580. All of the scout vehicles are north of PL RAIDERS.

Our attachments are an extra FIST-V and an engineer squad. BLACK 1, take one of your FIST-Vs to go with RED and the other one to go with WHITE. BLUE 1, take SAPPER 12 (engineer squad) with you.

Our mission is to conduct a force-oriented zone reconnaissance to destroy enemy security forces and to recon point obstacles from PL COWBOYS to PL RAIDERS starting at 1800 in order to support the task force's reconnaissance effort.

My intent is that we are completing the scout's zone recon, not redoing it. There are plenty of tasks that we have to do, but I have prioritized the most important ones. If we can re-establish commo with the remaining scouts, our mission becomes much easier because the scouts can continue their recon up to PL STEELERS and provide us updated reports. The end state is that we have destroyed the CSOP, reconned the point

obstacle in the gap, identified the DRTs, cleared designated NAIs, and positioned the FIST-Vs ready to observe AB0001 and AB0002. Also, we are ready to fall in as the trail CO/TM for the TF.

At 1800, be at REDCON 1 ready to move out of here. We'll cross the LD in a wedge formation using the traveling overwatch method, with BLUE leading and RED trailing in the west and WHITE trailing in the east. CO trains will trail in the center behind RED and WHITE. I'll assume risk and sacrifice security for speed while moving up to PL COWBOYS. After crossing PL COWBOYS, be deliberate and cautious in your movement.

BLUE 1, set vicinity CP7 and send your dismounts to clear NAI 110 in order to deny DRTs the use of this key terrain. Also, I want you to try to re-establish commo with the scouts on their net. They may be simply out of range, and we should be close enough to contact them from here.

When 110 is clear, BLUE 1, split one section to go west with RED and one to go east with WHITE.

BLUE section and RED 1, you will conduct a raid on the CSOP at 109 to destroy it in order to deny the enemy from using his security elements. Here's my guidance. BLUE, have your section move toward CP D4. I want you to fix the CSOP from the support by fire position vicinity CP D4 to allow RED to destroy it. RED 1, talk to BLUE's section so they can guide you in to assault the CSOP. I will be with RED to control the action here.

RED 1, after you destroy all enemy in 109, move back to CP D1 to overwatch BLUE's section. BLUE 1, at CP D4, send your dismounts to clear 113 to deny DRTs use of this terrain. Once 113 is clear, keep your dismounts there. Their mission is to observe 103 and 104 to provide early warning if the enemy situation changes. BLACK 1, send one of your FIST-Vs to position vicinity 113 to observe AB0002. BLUE, keep your section in the vicinity of CP D4 and continue to overwatch 109 to ensure that it remains clear.

BLUE, send your eastern section to CP D3 and send your dismounts to clear 111 in order to deny DRTs use of this terrain. WHITE 1, overwatch BLUE's section in order to protect them. Once clear, take your dismounts back and move your section to CP D5 and clear 112. Next go to CP D8. SAPPER 12, recon the point obstacle to determine if mechanized forces can move through a breach if the TF

commander decides to attack through here for tomorrow's attack. BLUE, your section will provide overwatch for SAPPER to protect them during their recon. Additionally, observe for any enemy forces guarding this obstacle.

WHITE 1, work and talk with BLUE's section and use bounding overwatch to cover their moves as they clear 111, 112 and the obstacle at CP D8. When 112 is clear, go to CP D6 and send the FIST-V to position on the ridge about 1 km west of CP D6 to observe fires on AB0001. Additionally, observe NAI 108 from CP D6 to see if there are any enemy or obstacles there.

BLUE and SAPPER, once you've reconned the obstacle, move back to CP D3 using a series of bounds to overwatch each other. WHITE, work with BLUE to cover their moves back. When BLUE is set at CP D3, move back to CP D2. BLUE and WHITE, from your positions, continue to overwatch NAI 112 to report any new enemy activity.

Here's the coordinating instruction for everybody. The TF commander wants us to consolidate at CP 7 once we've completed our recon. I think it's because he wants all available combat power in the AA the TF attacks. On order, move to CP 7 where we will consolidate. From there, we will fall in as the trail CO/TM in the TF attack.

BLACK 7, move the CO trains to CP 7 once 110 is clear. Request the FAS to move closer to CP 7 and request for an additional M113 attached to us for casevac. Request an additional fueler and ammo HEMMT to be attached to us for tomorrow's attack, and be prepared to conduct a hot refuel and rearm during tomorrow's attack.

BLACK 5, go in the east with WHITE to control the maneuver there. Keep attempting to make contact with the scouts. I assume that they already know, but remind them to be at least 2 km away from the pre-planned MLRS targets by 0600. For the scout vehicle requiring recovery, order them to destroy it if it can't move out before 0600.

I'll be in the west with RED. What are your questions?

RATIONALE:

Since the TF commander has issued vague guidance, and assuming that I cannot contact him for clarification, I would have to prioritize tasks and execute the most important ones. This is not disobeying orders but maintaining a purpose orientation. It is probably unrealistic to

perform all the tasks, but some are important enough to support the TF commander's purpose, which is to enable the S2 to determine the enemy template.

My plan is based on the assumption that there are scouts still remaining and who can continue to perform reconnaissance. If I can re-establish contact with the remaining scouts, and they can continue their zone recon to PL STEELERS, they can execute the other half of the mission that the TF commander wants me to accomplish. Additionally, they can provide additional reports since the past day about what they have discovered that we do not know yet. If I can't contact the scouts or if they are all destroyed, I will continue the mission only to recon the areas that I don't have a good read on, such as NAIs 106 and 108.

Based on the scout's reports and making some deductions, such as about the turning obstacle in the west, the intel picture is over halfway complete. With that, I prioritized which NAIs we need to clear, what enemy to destroy, and what obstacles to recon to enable the S2 to confirm or deny the enemy template.

In order to gain a foothold, I need to clear NAI 110 first. From there, I have RED and BLUE conduct a raid to destroy the CSOP in the west. I have the BFs guide the tanks in because they can locate and fix the CSOP, making it easier for the tanks to locate and destroy it. I use a raid for this operation because I do not intend to hold that ground; the enemy probably has a pre-planned artillery target there. Destroying the CSOP here will allow the TF to attack unimpeded.

In the east, I sent BLUE's other section to clear NAI 111 to ensure that there are no DRTs. I then have them recon the point obstacle because we need to determine if a breach through here will support the TF's attack. I did not send them past PL RAIDERS to clear NAIs 105 and 108 because I believe that this would put them in a suspected MRP kill sack.

When RED, WHITE, and BLUE had completed their missions, I positioned them just north of PL COWBOYS conducting a screen mission to allow them to continue observation but close enough to CP 7 to consolidate for tomorrow's attack.

The instructions I gave to the platoons were not extremely specific but I gave them enough guidance so they can execute using their own initiative. In situations where time is critical and there is minimal preparation time, initiative and clearly defined tasks and purposes are important to success.

TACTICAL VIGNETTE 98-6

Cobra's Counterreconnaissance Fight

WHAT'S
YOUR
NEXT
MOVE??



Situation: You are the company team commander of Cobra Team (tank heavy), TF 3-37. Your team consists of two M1A1 tank platoons (1st and 3rd Platoons), both at full strength, and one mechanized infantry (BFV) platoon (2nd Platoon), which has three operational BFVs. Your TF is comprised of two armor company teams (Apache and Cobra) and one mechanized infantry company team (Battle Masters). Your TF is defending in sector, and the brigade commander wants your TF to protect the western flank of TF 2-10, the brigade main effort. Prior to 1500 yesterday, you prepared your battle position for the main defensive battle. You assumed the counter-recon mission from Apache Team at 1500 yesterday. During the night, Apache Team destroyed three vehicles from the enemy's division reconnaissance. The TF scout platoon (with six HMMWVs) was already established in three long-term OPs in depth forward of PL TENNESSEE.


Currently, you have 1st and 2nd Platoons (at 50% security) arrayed along PL CAROLINA, ready to react to spot reports from the scouts. 3rd Platoon's Alpha section is manning passage point CHARLIE on the north end of the passage lane and controlling all traffic into and out of the security area. The remainder of your company team is in a hide position co-located with your command post. You have priority of fires. The TF scout platoon is attached to your company team until you withdraw from your counter-reconnaissance mission. Upon your withdrawal, scouts remain in place and revert to TF control.

Your company team has had no contact with the enemy until around 0330, when scouts report one BMP-1 vic WT095813 moving south on AA1. The 1st Platoon's Alpha section reacts, and at 0400 you get the following report from RED 4: "RED slant 2, Alpha section engaged but did not destroy 1 BMP, last seen moving south vic grid WT086793. Alpha section has one vehicle with severe track damage, one fully mission capable vehicle stuck in a wadi, and a total of four wounded soldiers vic WT097786. Bravo section set PL CAROLINA." Just as RED 4 finishes his transmission, you receive a report

from the scouts that two BRDMs are moving south on AA2 vic WT132809 and scouts are observing four unidentified hotspots moving south vic WT095862.

The TF commander stated in the OPOD that you are to withdraw your company team NLT 0500, signal the engineers to close the lane behind your last vehicle, rearm and refuel, and occupy your BP ready to defend with all 14 vehicles NLT 0600.

Time is now 0403. You must act now! What do you do?



REQUIREMENT

Develop your COA and issue your FRAGO and any other reports you would submit. Readers who submit their solutions to the scenario should provide the following: fragmentary order to the company team, the rationale behind your decision, and a sketch of your plan of action. E-mail your solution to: HastyD@ftknox-dtdd-emh5.army.mil, or mail your solution to Platoon and Company Team Doctrine Branch, ATTN: ATZK-TDD-P, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210.

SOLUTIONS — Tactical Vignette 98-6

“Cobra’s Counterreconnaissance Fight,” from the November-December 1998 issue of ARMOR

Author’s Solution

“Guidons, guidons, this is COBRA Six. FRAGO follows, break...”

1. SITUATION

Friendly:

RED’s Alpha section engaged but did not destroy 1 BMP, last seen moving south vicinity grid WT086793. Alpha section has one vehicle with severe track damage, one vehicle stuck in a wadi, and a total of four wounded soldiers vicinity WT097786.

Enemy:

Scouts report:

- Two BRDMs are moving south on AA2 vicinity WT132809 at 0400.
- Four unidentified hot spots moving south vicinity WT095862 at 0400.

2. MISSION

No change.

3. EXECUTION

Commander’s intent:

No change.

a. Concept of the operation:

(1) **Scheme of maneuver.** Evacuate RED’s casualties, recover his vehicles, and destroy any known enemy vehicles in our AO, all in less than 1 hour. NLT 0500, start movement to PP CHARLIE. NLT 0530, have all elements passed through PP CHARLIE, signal engineers to close the lane, rearm and, refuel behind our BP, and be established in our BP ready to defend NLT 0600.

(2) **Fires.** Scouts have priority of fires to delay and disrupt enemy reconnaissance assets entering our security area. Send all calls for fire through me.

b. Tasks to subordinate units:

RED 4: Move your section as quickly as possible to recover your Alpha section vicinity CP 1 and evacuate wounded soldiers. Since you will be towing the disabled tank, you will be the last vehicle through the passage lane.

WHITE: Move toward CP 2. Find and destroy the two BRDMs identified by the scouts on AA2. Cross-talk with the scouts. Do not cross PL TENNESSEE without my permission.

BLUE: Send your Alpha section immediately and set vicinity CP 3. Orient N-NW. The BMP that engaged RED will probably continue to move south along the western wall. I will move with this section. Send your Bravo section to set vicinity CP 4. This section will serve as the safety net for the two BRDMs if they slip through WHITE. Cross-talk with WHITE to prevent fratricide.

SCOUT 6: Stay on my net and update reports on any enemy activity that your element identifies. You have priority of fires. Be prepared to call for indirect fires on all enemy elements you identify. You are my overwatch element. Cross-talk with WHITE and RED on their internal nets to conduct a video handoff of the BMP and two BRDMs. Update me frequently on those four hotspots, a possible CRP.

COBRA BAND AID: Move with me to vicinity CP 3. From there you will assist as needed in treatment and evacuation of casualties.

COBRA 5: Move to PP CHARLIE and control traffic flow there. Begin movement of the trains to the BP. Keep me informed of status. Ensure sappers are prepared to close the lane immediately upon our withdrawal. Get a status on WHITE’s fourth vehicle. We need to have it in the BP by 0600.

COBRA 9: Move the trains to our BP and conduct CSS operations from there. Coordinate for a hasty rearm and refuel there immediately upon our arrival at the BP.

c. Coordinating instructions:

Add the following additional graphic control measures to the current overlay, which remains in effect:

CP 1 – WT097786

CP 2 – WT130790

CP 3 – WT083763

CP 4 – WT130760

We must initiate our withdrawal NLT 0500, move all elements through PP CHARLIE NLT 0530, signal the engineers to close the lane behind our last vehicle, rearm and refuel behind the BP, occupy our BP, and be ready to defend with all vehicles NLT 0600.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

No change.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

a. Command: I will move with BLUE’s Bravo section and the medic PC to set vicinity CP 3. Keep me informed. We must cross-talk to prevent fratricide.

b. Signal: Far recognition signal is FM voice. Near recognition signal is two infrared flashes returned by three infrared flashes.

“ACKNOWLEDGE”

RATIONALE

To meet the TF commander’s intent, you have one hour to successfully accomplish the following:

1. Destroy all enemy reconnaissance elements in your security area.
2. Recover your vehicles and evacuate wounded soldiers.
3. Withdraw your company team, and be prepared to defend from your BP with all of your vehicles.

The BMP and two BRDMs are most likely elements of the enemy’s regimental reconnaissance. The four unidentified hot spots are probably one of the combat reconnaissance patrols leading the enemy attack.

Scouts will maintain contact with the BMP and BRDMs as long as they can. You must get your killers in position to conduct a “video” handoff from the scouts before they lose contact with the BMP and BRDMs. The current “gap” between the hunters and the killers is too large. If scouts lose contact with the enemy before they can hand him off to the killers, the enemy may slip through unharmed. Depending on the terrain, you may not regain contact with the enemy until it is too late.

NOTE: The counterreconnaissance mission requires extensive IPB. It should be fought primarily as a defensive mission from positions of advantage along likely enemy avenues of approach; there should be sufficient depth and redundancy of observation and fields of fire within the security area. Therefore, the commander should position his elements to maximize coverage of likely avenues of approach and minimize the requirement for friendly movement. By minimizing friendly movement, the commander also reduces the risk of fratricide. Optimally, the hunters provide the killers with early warning (on their platoon in-

ternal net) and continuously track the enemy, providing real-time updates of enemy activity as he enters and passes through the security area. The hunters maintain contact with the enemy and conduct a “video” handoff to the killers, who destroy the enemy with a simple, gunnery-style defensive engagement. In this scenario, if the killers had been positioned vicinity PL TENNESSEE to engage targets on AA1 and AA2, and there was depth within the security area from the beginning of the operation, we would probably not be in this situation now.

Delegating specific tasks to each section allows you to conduct many tasks simultaneously.

1. You have the TF scout platoon attached to your company team. It has the capability of providing overwatch for your entire company team; use it to provide overwatch as you conduct your tasks and withdraw your company team. Since you have priority of fires, the scouts can also impede, harass, suppress, and possibly destroy enemy reconnaissance elements. Also, the activity and composition

for the four unidentified hot spots will most likely be designated as PIR for the TF commander.

2. Send RED’s Bravo section to recover its Alpha section and evacuate the wounded soldiers because it is closest and can be there quickest. If Bravo section encounters the BMP, it is capable of destroying the enemy vehicle, although this is not Bravo’s primary mission. The M88 is in the hide position and is too slow to move up, conduct recovery, and get back in time.

3. Send WHITE to destroy the BRDMs on AA2 because it is closest and can be there quickest. You need to conduct a “video” handoff of the BRDMs from the scouts to WHITE. If scouts lose contact with the BRDMs before they can hand them off to WHITE, the enemy may slip through. You may not regain contact with them until it is too late.

4. Send BLUE’s sections up to PL CAROLINA to add depth to your coverage of the security zone and to serve as a safety net in case the enemy slips through

RED and WHITE. The BMP will probably attempt to infiltrate south along the western wall to conduct reconnaissance of our defensive positions and obstacles. Therefore, position BLUE’s Alpha section against the western wall to block potential enemy penetration.

5. Bring the medic PC up with you and position it on PL CAROLINA. If RED has any urgent casualties, the senior aidman can transfer them to the medic PC and begin treatment while en route to the FAS. You are assuming risk by sending your 1SG and trains to the BP. If you take additional casualties or require additional recovery, you will have to conduct it without assistance from the 1SG or company trains assets if you are to meet your timeline.

6. Throughout this operation, especially upon withdrawal, cross-talk is a key factor in preventing fratricide. Position your XO at the passage point to control traffic, keep you informed, maintain communications with the TF, and coordinate with the engineers to close the lane after you have withdrawn.

TACTICAL VIGNETTE 99-1

**FORGING STEEL —
Exploiting a Brigade's Success**

**WHAT'S
YOUR
NEXT
MOVE??**



Situation:

You are "Hammer 6," the Task Force commander of TF 1-40, (BDE Reserve), with two tank teams (M1A2) and one mech team.


The brigade just conducted a deliberate attack against a stationary enemy mechanized infantry battalion (MIBN) on Objective Anvil. Objective Anvil is located three kilometers to the west of PL Red. The brigade's attack was a success. However, it encountered less resistance than expected and the reserve, TF 1-40, was not committed.

The other two task forces of the brigade are currently consolidating and reorganizing along PL Red. Your task force is postured in Tactical Assembly Area Pittsburg 2 km west of PL Red.

Enemy:

Division intelligence reports indicate there is a key bridge site along the river Quasimodo that must be secured. The bridge site is currently undefended and is the only way across the river. An enemy MIBN (6 T-80s and 15 BMPs) is moving west toward the bridge with an ETA of 40 minutes. In the south, your scout #3 reports enemy vehicles, 2 T-80 tanks and 5 BMPs, moving northeastward. These vehicles are suspected remnants from the MIBN defeated on Objective Anvil and are most likely moving towards the bridge and defend it until the MIBN from the east can reinforce them. In the north, scout #1 reported 2 tanks vicinity grid 040205 and a small dust cloud behind them moving southwest out of the town of Dirk-

Task Organization




heim. Before scout #1 could pass any further information, radio contact was lost.

TF Mission:

The brigade commander wants to capitalize on the success of his attack and he wants your TF to exploit that success! The commander issues a FRAGO to your TF. Your mission, Hammer 6, is to attack to secure the bridge site on Objective Steel. You have priority of FA fires (1 DS Bn with DPICM/HE/Smoke). You will also have 2 sorties of A-10s loaded with Mavericks on station in 15 minutes. You must act now! What do you do!

Requirement:

You have ten minutes to assess the situation and formulate a FRAGO. Issue your FRAGO as if talking on the radio to your company commanders. Submit your solutions to the Bn/Bde Branch by e-mail at: BilaferJ@ftknox-dtdd-emh5.army.mil, or mail your solution to ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-TDM, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210.



SOLUTION — Tactical Vignette 99-1

“FORGING STEEL — Exploiting a Brigade’s Success” from the January-February 1999 issue of *ARMOR*

(**Note:** There was a mistake in this tactical vignette when it ran in the Jan-Feb 99 issue. The second paragraph, second sentence should have read, “OBJ ANVIL is located three kilometers to the east of PL Red,” instead of west.)

Author's Solution

SITUATION.

Enemy. The enemy defense along OBJ ANVIL has collapsed. It appears that remnants of the enemy mechanized infantry battalion are falling back and trying to secure the bridge over the Quasimodo River while another battalion is approaching from the west to reestablish a defense. Scout #3 reports two T-80s and five BMPs moving northeastward in the vicinity grid 028152. Scout #1 reported two T-80s vicinity grid 040205 moving southwest out of the town of Dirkheim, followed by small dust clouds. We have lost contact with Scout #1. An enemy battalion consisting of six T-80s and 15 BMPs is moving west toward OBJ STEEL, estimated arrival time is 40 minutes. I believe the enemy company in the south is attempting to secure the bridge on OBJ STEEL. The enemy battalion in the west will likely attempt to secure the bridge and reestablish a coherent defense along the river. The unidentified force from Dirkheim will most likely defend the gap between Scout #1 and Scout #2 or move to secure the bridge.

Friendly. The brigade is reorganizing along PL RED. The brigade commander intends to continue the attack by securing OBJ STEEL for future operations.

MISSION. TF 1-40 attacks to secure the bridge on OBJ STEEL to allow the brigade to continue the attack.

EXECUTION.

Intent. Our purpose is to secure the bridge over the Quasimodo River. This provides the brigade a significant tactical advantage for future operations. We must delay the attacking enemy battalion in order to gain time to secure the bridgehead. We must defeat the retreating enemy company in the south. Then, we must secure the far side of the bridge to provide sufficient maneuver space for

follow-on forces to cross the bridge to continue the attack. The endstate is the bridge and OBJ STEEL secured with two companies securing the far side and one company in depth securing the near side and the task force prepared to repel the enemy battalion’s attack.

Concept of Operations. We will cross PL RED in a vee formation with TM C in the north, TM B in the south, and TM A followed by the Engineer Company in the rear. CAS will delay the attacking enemy battalion and artillery will focus on the enemy company in the south. TM C will seize the near side of OBJ STEEL and the bridge while protecting the task force northern flank. TM B will destroy the southern enemy company and then support-by-fire to assist in securing the near side of OBJ STEEL. TM A will cross the bridge after it is secured by TM C, then defend the far side against the attacking enemy battalion. On order, TM B will cross the bridge to assist defending the far side of the bridge in the south.

Concept of Fires. We have priority of artillery fires and two sorties of A-10s loaded with Mavericks on station in 15 minutes. Priority of artillery fires is to Scout #3 to delay the enemy company in the south. On order, artillery priority of fires shift to TM B. Once TM B has destroyed the enemy company, priority of artillery fires is to TM A to assist in delaying enemy battalion and defending the bridgehead. Mortar priority of fires is to TM C, on order TM A. CAS will engage the enemy battalion to provide us the time needed to secure the far side of OBJ STEEL.

Tasks to Subordinate Units.

TM C (initial main effort). Seize the near side of OBJ STEEL and secure the bridge to protect the forward passage of TM A. Support-by-fire vicinity grid 061194, orient east, to protect the crossing and deployment of TM A. Clear the bridge to support the crossing of TM A. Block the mobility corridor vicinity grid 045192 to protect the northeastern flank of the task force. Primary observer for fires against the enemy battalion until TM A is deployed.

TM B. Destroy the enemy company in the south to protect TM Cs southern

flank. Then support-by-fire vicinity center-of-mass grid 042172, orient northeast, to assist securing the near side of OBJ STEEL. On order, follow TM A and defend the southern half of OBJ STEEL, south of the 18-grid line, to assist in protecting the bridgehead.

TM A (on-order main effort). On order, seize and defend the far side of OBJ STEEL to allow the brigade to continue the attack. Be prepared to defend the entire far side of the bridgehead if TM B is unable to cross the bridge in time. Be prepared to reinforce TM Cs blocking of the mobility corridor in the vicinity of grid 061194.

B Company Engineers. Follow TM A, secure the bridge after TM A has crossed. Coordinate emplacement of VOLCANO minefields in support of TM A, execution is on-order.

Mortars. Follow TM C. Occupy position vicinity grid 035186. Initial priority of fires is TM C in order to suppress and obscure enemy forces approaching from the north or at the bridge. As the main effort shifts from TM C to TM A, priority of mortar fires shifts to TM A in order to suppress and obscure enemy forces on the far side of the bridge.

Scout. Attempt to reestablish contact with Scout #1 now. Reposition Scout #2 to the north to observe the unidentified enemy force reported by Scout 1.

SERVICE SUPPORT. Task force trains remain in AA PITTSBURG. Re-supply IAW with SOP.

COMMAND AND SIGNAL. I will move with TM C, then with TM A. TF S3 moves TM B. Task force TOC remains in AA PITTSBURG. Signal is no change.

We move in 15 minutes. Acknowledge over.

RATIONALE.

Success of the task force mission rests on securing the bridge to support the brigade’s future operations. Securing the bridge means the task force must secure

Continued on next page

Solution (Continued from previous page)

the far side of OBJ STEEL to provide the required maneuver space for follow-on brigade forces to move out of the bridgehead. The task force must send maneuver forces to seize the far side. Further maneuver forces on the far side of the bridge must be strong enough to defend against the attacking enemy battalion.

There are three threats the task force must overcome to secure the bridge. The first is the retreating enemy company in the south. The enemy company poses a serious threat to the mission if it gets to the bridge before the task force. At only four kilometers away from the bridge, the enemy company will arrive at the bridge before the task force. We used artillery, adjusted by Scout #3, to delay this enemy company until it can be engaged. This enemy company must be destroyed to prevent it from interfering with the continuing attack. We tasked TM B to destroy this enemy company. With two tank platoons and one mechanized infantry platoon, TM B has the combat power to quickly destroy the enemy company and then be available for other tasks like assisting TM A with defending the far side of the bridge.

The second threat is the enemy battalion approaching from the west. The enemy battalion is expected to arrive in about 40 minutes. This means the enemy battalion is likely to arrive at the bridge

just before or just as the task force gets there. The enemy battalion has to be delayed. We used the two A-10s to delay the enemy battalion. These two aircraft should delay the enemy as well as inflict some damage. This delay provides the task force the time needed to deploy TM A, the most lethal company in the task force, to the far side of the objective. Any additional delay of the enemy battalion should provide enough time for the deployment of TM B to the far side. But if TM B does not have time to get to the far side, TM A has the combat power to defend against the enemy battalion.

The final threat is from the unknown enemy force approaching from the north out of the town of Dirkheim. Because the task force has lost communications with Scout #1 the enemy force's exact composition and actions are not known. We assumed some risk against this threat. It is likely TM C can handle this enemy threat. If the enemy force moves toward the bridge, then TM C will have to destroy it prior to securing the bridge. If the enemy force turns east towards PL RED, the other two task forces can eliminate it. TM C with two mechanized infantry platoons, a tank platoon, and a combat engineer platoon has the combat power and support to block the mobility corridor north of OBJ STEEL, clear the bridge, and overwatch the far side of the bridge.

TACTICAL VIGNETTE 99-2

The Passage at Wilcox

WHAT'S
YOUR
NEXT
MOVE??




SITUATION

You are the company team commander of Barbarians Team (mech-heavy), TF 3-68 AR. The task force, which is conducting a movement to contact, is composed of two armor company teams (Apache and Comanche) and one mechanized infantry company team (Barbarians). Your team consists of two mechanized infantry (BFV) platoons (1st and 3d Platoons), both at full strength, and one M1A1 tank platoon (2d Platoon), also at full strength. You also have an attached combat engineer platoon, consisting of four squads, two ACEs, and one AVLM. Your team has priority of TF mortars and FA.

The brigade commander's intent is for the task force to secure a passage lane to the east of the town of Wilcox, to vic 548886, for the follow-on unit (TF 2-72 AR). In turn, the TF commander's intent is for your team, the TF main effort, to clear a passage lane to PL TENNESSEE (the LOA) to allow the secure passage of TF 2-72 AR. Once battle handover has occurred at the passage point and TF 2-72 AR has assumed the brigade main effort, TF 3-68 AR will become the brigade reserve and prepare for future operations.

Prior to the mission, the brigade S2 provided the task force with a recent aerial photo of Wilcox (see attached aerial photo). Approximately three hours ago, the brigade's cavalry troop identified an enemy column moving into the town from the north; the column consisted of one T-72, two BMPs, and one ZSU-23-4.

As the operation begins, Apache Team is on your left flank and must seize OBJ 1 to prevent enemy reinforcements from reaching



- (A) RESIDENCE
- (B) GAS STATION
- (C) CHURCH
- (D) TOWNHOUSE
- (E) 7-11 STORE
- (F) OFFICE BUILDING
- (G) BUSINESS
- (H) 2-STORY HOTEL
- (I) BANK
- (J) OPEN AIR MARKET
- (K) EMBASSY
- (L) SCHOOL
- (M) FIRE STATION
- (N) WATER TOWER
- (O) BUSINESS
- (P) UNDER GROUND SEWER SYSTEM
- (Q) POWER PLANT
- (R) SUBWAY ENTRANCE
- (S) UNDERGROUND STORM SHELTER
- (T) WAREHOUSE
- (U) INDUSTRIAL PARK

Continued on Page 54

Passage at Wilcox (Continued from Page 52)

Wilcox from the west and interfering with the forward passage of lines for TF 2-72 AR. Comanche Team has cleared the enemy forces up to the 49-grid line and is in hasty defensive positions. On your right flank is TF 4-7 AR, whose mission is to secure an alternate passage point in its sector. The TF scout platoon, with six HMMWVs, is established south of Wilcox in three section positions, two of which are located in your zone vic 508778 and 504797. The other section is located within Apache's zone.

Currently, the TF scouts report the situation in the town as two-dismounted infantry positions, each manned by approximately a squad-size element. One squad is located vic 518785, near an opening that is probably an underground storm shelter (S) and residences (A); the other is located vic 522792, in the school (L). The TF scouts have spotted two enemy vehicles: a ZSU-23-4 located vic 545784 and a BMP located vic 516799. The location of the other BMP is unknown. The TF scouts also report hearing a vehicle they believe to be the T-72; its current location is unknown. A road crater reinforced with wire and mines is reported vic 524803. The TF scouts report that most civilian residents have left the town, but that some seem to be hiding in their homes and in the town church.

REQUIREMENT

Develop your COA and issue your FRAGO and any other reports you would submit. Readers who submit their solutions to the scenario should provide the following: FRAGO to the company team, the rationale behind your decision, and a sketch of your plan of action. E-mail your solution to this address: *armordctrine@fknnox-dtdd-emh5.army.mil*. Send your solution by regular mail to Platoon and Company Team Doctrine Branch, ATTN: ATZK-TDD-P, Ft. Knox, KY 40121-5210.

Solutions to this vignette will appear in the July-August issue of *ARMOR*.



SOLUTIONS — Tactical Vignette 99-2

“The Passage at Wilcox” from the March-April 1999 issue of *ARMOR*

Author's Solution

FRAGO:

Guidons, this is Black 6, FRAGO follows:

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy. A T-72, two BMPs w/squads and a ZSU-23-4 have been reported within the town of Wilcox. The tank location is unknown but the TF scouts have heard it moving throughout the town. One BMP is located vic 782514 and the ZSU-23-4 is located vic 783543. Two squad-size elements have been identified at vic 784518 and 793524. An obstacle is located vic 802523 and is reinforced with wire and mines. I believe the enemy is defending with 2 BMPs forward and the tank in depth. The unidentified BMP is likely located near the infantry squad in building L overwatching the obstacle. The tank is likely to be located within the town ready to reposition to support either BMP.

b. Friendly. Comanche Team has cleared the enemy forces up to the 49-grid line and has established a hasty defense. Apache Team is on our left flank and attacks to seize Obj 1 in order to protect our left flank. TF 4-7 AR is on our right flank and is attacking to secure an alternate passage lane within their sector. TF 2-72 AR is located to our rear as the brigade reserve and is preparing to continue the brigade attack to the north.

2. MISSION.

Team B attacks to secure a passage lane (RED-SKIN) from PL KENTUCKY to the LOA (PL TENNESSEE) in order to support the forward passage of TF 2-72 AR.

3. EXECUTION.

Intent: Our purpose is to secure a passage lane to allow TF 2-72 AR (on order, the brigade main effort) to continue the attack to the north. We must suppress the enemy to gain a foothold and seize our OBJs. We must clear the lane of all obstacles allowing the use of the passage lane by the follow-on task force. Then we must prevent the enemy from placing fires on TF 2-72 AR during their forward passage. Our endstate is platoons occupying OBJ L, OBJ T, and OBJ U oriented north to northwest and all remaining enemy forces contained within the town, allowing no direct fires on the lane.

a. Concept of Operations.

1) The team will move through C team in a company wedge, platoons in wedge formation with 1st platoon (mech) as the lead element, 2nd platoon (tank) on the left flank, 3rd platoon (mech) on the right flank, and the Sapper Platoon following 3rd Platoon. Traveling technique of movement. Once the team passes through C Team vic PL Kentucky, we will execute traveling overwatch technique of movement oriented north/northwest of the passage lane. 1st Platoon will occupy SBF1 and destroy the BMP vic 782514 and suppress the enemy to protect 2nd

Platoon. 2nd Platoon will occupy SBF 2 and suppress enemy forces to support 3rd Platoon's attack. 3rd Platoon will attack along AXIS MUSTANG to seize OBJ L. Once 3rd platoon seizes OBJ L one section of 3rd Platoon will occupy SBF 3 to protect the Sapper Platoon. The Sapper Platoon will follow 3rd Platoon, once OBJ L is seized and SBF 3 is occupied, it will breach the obstacle vic 802524 and continue to clear the passage lane as we attack to the LOA. 1st Platoon will attack to seize OBJ T. 2nd Platoon O/O will attack to seize OBJ U. Once the OBJs have been seized infantry elements will dismount and clear them of all remaining enemy forces. Once OBJs are occupied, platoons will orient north by northwest to prevent enemy direct fires on the follow-on task force's passage. 1st

Platoon will overwatch the RP. On order, the XO will move to the SP to establish link up with TF 2-72 AR and lead the task force to the RP.

2) Fires: Priority of FA fires is with 1st Platoon. Priority of mortar fires is with 3rd Platoon. 1st Platoon, destroy BMP vic 782514 in order to allow B team the freedom of movement once we pass the 49-grid line. 3rd Platoon obscure enemy in order to support your attack to seize OBJ L. 3rd Platoon, continue to fire vic. 802524 to provide obscuration for the breach element.

3) R & S: The task force scouts will move behind our company as we attack to establish a screen along the LOA (PL TENNESSEE). XO coordinate with the scouts and keep us informed




Fig. 1

of their plans and locations to prevent any fratricide.

4) Intel: We must be able to locate the tank.

b. Task to subordinate units:

1st Platoon (Red): Lead element in formation. Suppress enemy from SBF 1 to protect 2nd platoon's occupation of SBF 2. On order, attack to seize OBJ T to protect follow-on forces during their movement through the passage lane and overwatch the RP.

2nd Platoon (White): Initially move on left flank of the company wedge. Suppresses enemy forces from SBF 2 to protect 3rd platoon's attack on OBJ L. On order, seize OBJ U to protect follow-on forces during their movement through the passage lane.

3rd Platoon (Blue): Initially move on the right flank of the company wedge. Attack along AXIS MUSTANG to seize OBJ L. Then move one section to SBF 3 and suppress enemy forces to protect the Sapper Platoon as they breach the obstacle.

Sapper Platoon: Follows 3rd Platoon. On order, breach obstacle at grid 802523 and continue to clear the lane behind our attack in order to provide a trafficable lane for TF 2-72 AR.

Black 5: Move with Blue to assist them with additional firepower to protect the Sapper Platoon. On order, move to the SP. Link up with and lead TF 2-72 AR along the lane to the RP.

Fist: Follow Red set SBF 1. Adjust artillery and mortar fire. Call artillery fires on BMP in open vic 782514 and then smoke and suppression to protect the breach vic 802527. Fire smoke and suppression for 3rd Platoon's attack on OBJ L with mortars.

Black 7: Initially set vic PL KENTUCKY behind SBF 2. On order, move along AXIS MUSTANG set vic 802513 and support reconstitution and recovery.

c. Coordinating Instructions:

New operations overlay (Fig. 1) is being sent over IVIS.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT: No change.

5. COMMAND & SIGNAL:

a. Command: I will move with 1st Platoon.

b. Signal: No changes.

Rationale

To accomplish the mission B Team must secure a lane for the follow-on task force. The goal is to avoid costly, time consuming fighting in the town and secure a lane as quickly as possible. The plan is to seize key positions that control the lane and only engage those enemy forces required to secure the lane. OBJs L, U, and T are key to controlling the lane. From these positions the company can prevent the enemy from interfering with the passage of TF 2-72 AR. Initially a mechanized infantry platoon and tank platoon supported by artillery destroy the known enemy BMP and suppress remaining enemy forces to support an attack to seize OBJ L. With massed suppressive fires from the two platoons in SBF 1 and SBF2, a mechanized infantry platoon sup-

ported by mortars can rapidly seize OBJ L. OBJ L provides a position of advantage for the platoon to protect our breach of the obstacle and provides a commanding position overwatching all the southern approaches into the passage lane. Once the obstacle is breached, the tank and mechanized infantry platoon move from their SBF positions to seize the remaining two objectives, being protected by the suppressive fires of the platoon on OBJ L. With OBJ L, OBJ U, and OBJ T secured the company can effectively overwatch the lane and suppress or destroy any enemy forces attempting to interfere with the passage.

Reader's Solution

(From the officers of Co. B, 2d Tank Battalion, 2d Marine Division, 2d MEF)

"Guidons, guidons, this is Black Six, FRAGO follows, break..."

1. SITUATION

Task Organization

Effective immediately an engineer platoon is attached to Team Barbarians.

Friendly:

Team Apache is on our left flank. Team Comanche has cleared all enemy forces up to the 49-grid line. They are currently in a hasty defensive position. TF 4-7 AR is on our right flank and is tasked with securing an alternate route. Two scout sections are located to our front at grids 508778 and 504797.

Enemy:

TRP Zulu, office building, located at grid 534789. Alpha 1, one ZSU 23-4; Bravo 1, one BMP with dismounted infantry squad positioned near an underground storm shelter. Bravo 2, one dismounted infantry squad located in a school. A road crater at 524803 is reinforced with wire and mines. The location of another BMP are unknown. Scouts report hearing track vehicle noises they believe to be a T-72. Some civilians are believed to be hiding in their homes.

2. MISSION

O/O Team Barbarians secures a passage lane from PL Kentucky to PL Tennessee IOT allow the passage of TF 2-72 AR through our lines.

3. EXECUTION

Commander's Intent

Higher's intent is for Team Barbarians to facilitate the passage of follow-on forces. The final result desired is for all enemy hard targets to be destroyed. One tank platoon will set on PL Tennessee with two mechanized platoons securing the passage lane.

a. Concept of the operation

(1) Scheme of maneuver. Team Barbarians will conduct a deliberate breach with one platoon establishing a support by fire position. The tank platoon will conduct a breach at the road crater to allow follow-on forces to reach PL Tennessee. The remaining platoon will secure the passage lane. Once the breach has been affected, both

mechanized platoons will provide security for the passage lane.

(2) Fires. The purpose of indirect fires is to support our breaching operation. First platoon has priority of fires from mortars to suppress enemy positions. Second platoon has priority of fires from artillery for obscuration and suppression. The first unit to gain eyes on the ZSU 23-4 gains priority of fires from artillery.

a. Tasks to subordinate units

1st Platoon: Establish a support by fire position vicinity of grid 508788. Suppress all enemy positions within Bravo 1 and immediately report the position of the T-72 and the second BMP. Your left lateral limit is the church. Your right lateral limit is the school. Once the breach is complete, defend the passage lane oriented to the west from checkpoint 1 to checkpoint 2. You have priority of fires from TF mortars.

2d Platoon: Breach the obstacle located at grid 524803. You have a platoon of engineers attached to you initially. Upon completion of the breach, detach the engineers to 3d platoon. Proceed to PL Tennessee and screen to the North. BPT facilitate the forward passage of TF 2-72 AR through our lines. You have priority of artillery throughout the mission.

3d Platoon: You are designated the assault force. Follow in trace of 2d platoon during the breach. You are responsible for adjusting artillery fire for 2d platoon. Upon completion of the breach, defend the passage lane from checkpoint 2 to PL Tennessee.

Engineers: You are attached to 2d platoon and will provide engineer support during the breach. Upon completion of the breach, continue to improve the passage lane for follow-on forces.

b. Coordinating Instructions:

The following checkpoints have been added:

CP ET- 515796

CP 2 ET- 530804

4. SERVICE SUPPORT

No change

5. COMMAND & SIGNAL

a. I will be with the support force and the XO will move with the assault force.

b. All vehicles will display a green flag to indicate an open passage lane through the obstacle. The alternate signal is green star cluster.

Rationale

The mission is best accomplished by avoiding the potential MOUT situation. The decisive point during the mission will be the breach. The locations of the T-72 and one BMP remain unknown, therefore the tank platoon should be the breach force. Second platoon provides more armor protection and precision firepower to the engineers. The Bradleys will be able to provide adequate suppression on the enemy dismounted infantry squads and the known BMP. It is important to protect the passage lane until TF 2-72 AF passes through our lines. This can be accomplished by positioning second platoon along PL Tennessee and both mechanized platoons along the route.

TACTICAL VIGNETTE 99-3

Screen in a Snowstorm

WHAT'S
YOUR
NEXT
MOVE??



You are the commander of A Troop (Wolfpack), 1-201 Cavalry, the ground troop of the light division cavalry squadron of the 32nd Infantry Division (Light). Your division is deployed to the Republic of Urbuti (RU) in support of OPERATION BIG EASY. The RU recently seceded from the United States of Leinad (USL). Special Operations Forces (SOF) and other intelligence sources indicate that the USL will attempt an insurgency to overthrow the RU government and regain the province. On RU's western border is the country of Eus, an ally of USL, but not aggressive towards RU. The rules of engagement (ROE) allow for destruction of armed USL forces crossing the border into RU.

Squadron Mission: 1-201 Cav screens along PL SILVER from PL GOLD to PL LEAD and along PL GOLD between PL BRONZE and PL SILVER NLT 010900JUN1999 to identify and track insurgents entering the RU.

Squadron Commander's Intent: Purpose – I want to identify and track insurgents from the USL entering the RU and prevent them from harming civilians. Endstate – The squadron will continue to screen until relieved, and will have destroyed insurgents with Hellfires and rockets if possible, or have handed targets off to 1st Brigade.

Troop Mission: A, 1-201 Cav screens along PL SILVER from PL GOLD to PL LEAD NLT 010900NOV-1999 to identify and track insurgents entering the RU.

You task organized your troop in a scout/anti-tank (SCAT) configuration. You have four platoons with three scout HMMWVs and two AT HMMWVs each, for a total of 20 HMMWVs with six MK-19 platforms, six cal .50 platforms, and eight TOW platforms. You do not have a FIST, mortars, or a troop executive officer. You are re-

sponsible for maintaining continuous surveillance of Named Areas of Interest (NAIs) 1-8. Each observation post (OP) has either two or three vehicles, with a mix of scout and AT platforms. Your squadron commander (SCO) has accepted risk on the west flank of the squadron and assigned B and C Troops (8xOH-58D each) to screen along PL GOLD (NAIs 12-15) until the brigade cavalry troop from 1st Brigade can relieve the air troops. The air troops are also responsible for NAIs 9-11 along PL SILVER.

It is now 051000NOV1999; your troop has been screening for four days. There has been light civilian traffic across both borders. Satellite photos and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) indicate that, two days ago, two battalions of the USL Army moved out of their motor pools and barracks and began moving south. Yesterday, Eus issued a statement that the United States could no longer fly in its airspace. A situation is developing and you monitor the following radio traffic:


- At 051005, you hear the following radio transmission on your squadron command net from B Troop commander to the SCO: "Saber 6, this is Bulldog 6, I have lost contact with Bulldog 26, break. At last contact, he had nothing to report at NAIs 12-14 and was returning from the FARP enroute to NAI 15, break. The ceiling has dropped to 50 feet with 100 meters visibility, so I cannot get another team to Bulldog 26's location, break. Request assistance from Wolfpack to reestablish contact with Bulldog 26, over."

- The squadron S2 reports that there is a snowstorm moving in that will probably last for two days.

- C Troop commander reports that his troop is closed on AA Saber and that flying is extremely dangerous.

- You receive the following spot report from your 2nd platoon, observing NAIs 3 and 4: "Wolfpack 6, this is White 1, contact, three T-34s moving south, vi-

Continued on Page 51



TV 99-3 (Cont. from Page 49)

cinity NAI 3, break. I will lose visual contact in approximately five mikes, break. Recommend that Red reposition to continue to track the vehicles, over.”

- The weather has gotten worse and you can no longer talk to the squadron TOC.

- You hear a weak radio transmission: “Any Wolfpack element, this is Bulldog 26, I am on the ground at GV305120, break. I had an engine failure and had to land. There is a group of about five personnel observing me 500 meters to the north, they appear unarmed, break. We spotted one T-55 moving east last seen approximately 1.5 kilometers NNW of NAI 16, request assistance, over.”

What do you do?

Requirement: You have five minutes to decide what to do and issue your FRAGO as you would if speaking on the radio. Submit your solutions by e-mail to: taylorde@ftknox-dtdd-emh5.army.mil or by regular mail to Cavalry Branch, Doctrine Division, ATTN: ATZK-TDD-C, Ft. Knox, KY 40121-5210.

Solutions to this vignette will appear in the September-October 1999 issue of ARMOR.

Solution — Tactical Vignette 99-3

“Screen in a Snowstorm,” from the May-June 1999 issue of *ARMOR*

Author's Solution

Guidons, this is WOLFPACK 6. FRAGO follows, acknowledge over.

SITUATION: There are three T-34s moving south vicinity NAI 3. WHITE has eyes on but will lose them quickly. Bulldog reports one T-55 moving east, last seen grid 1.5 kilometers NNW of NAI 16. BULLDOG has one downed aircraft at GV299123, currently being observed by five apparently unarmed personnel 500 meters to their north. Additionally, S2 reports that weather conditions are worsening, and the snowstorm moving in will probably last for two days. The air troops are currently grounded and are likely to remain that way for at least 48 hours.

MISSION: A Troop, 1-201 CAV screens along PL SILVER from PL GOLD to PL LEAD and along PL GOLD between PL BRONZE and PL SILVER NLT 051030JUN1999 to identify and track insurgents entering PRU.

EXECUTION.

Tasks to Subordinate Units:

RED: Move two vehicles from OP 1a to establish OP b1a VIC GV299123, to provide security for the downed aircraft and crew. Be prepared to accept a three-vehicle section from GREEN VIC GV352104. Move one HMMWV from GREEN to reinforce 1a, and the other two to establish b2a VIC GV 305102 oriented on NAIs 12-13.

WHITE: Continue to track the three T-34s moving in your sector. Reposition a two-vehicle section within your sector to pass the tanks off to 1st BDE south of PL BRONZE.

BLUE: Continue mission.


GREEN: Collapse OP 4a and move a three-vehicle section into first platoon's sector VIC GV352104. This section is attached to RED upon link-up.

Coordinating Instructions:

Report when moving and set.

RED report when you have secured the downed aviators. Your sector now extends east to and along PL GOLD.

GREEN move to WHITE's FREQ while moving through their sector. Avoid contact with the T-34s. Move to RED's FREQ at the link up point.



WOLFPACK 7 move to the squadron TOC to advise SABER 6 of our situation. Ensure the squadron TOC notifies F Troop to launch the Downed Aircraft Rescue Team (DART) and informs 1st BDE they have three T-34s moving to them. I will remain at my current position and continue to try and raise SABER TOC.

What are your questions?

RATIONALE

The squadron commander has ordered me to screen along PL SILVER from PL PLATINUM to PL LEAD. The situation has changed, however, with the weathering in of the two flight troops on my flank. Also, two contacts force me to make one quick move with RED, to secure the downed aviators, and one more deliberate move with GREEN, to establish a new OP in B/C sector. The shifting of force gives the number of OPs I want in sector with enough soldiers at those OPs to establish them for long duration operations. The decision to shut down OP 4a is based on the belief that GREEN can cover both NAIs 7 and 8 from OP 4b. I am not overly concerned with the T-55 moving around in EUS, with the establishment of the two new OPs in the old B/C sector, he should be identified if he crosses into PRU. Having contact with the three T-34s center sector only adds to the problem, but WHITE should be able

to track them with their displaced section. I decided to send WOLFPACK 7 to approve my plan because I did not want to be out of contact with my platoon leaders should problems arise during this reposition, with tank moving in sector. If GREEN can avoid bumping into the T-34s and the SCO approves of my plan, we are in business until the storm subsides.

Reader's Solution

(Submitted by 1LT Nathan A. Cox, ACCC 99-03, Section 1B, Ft. Knox, Ky.)

“White 1, this is 6. Roger. Continue to monitor until you lose visual. NAI 3 is still in your sector. Attempt to move to a position that better suits visual on the T-34s. Break. Red 1, this is 6. White 1 reports seeing three T-34s vic NAI 3. He may lose visual. I need you to see if you can get a visual on NAI 3, just in case White loses contact. Red 1, also be prepared to send a section with MK-19 and .50 cal. vic GV305120. Bulldog has a bird down with engine trouble. Leave your AT assets to monitor enemy tanks. I'm going to call Bulldog 6 and let him know I've got contact with his guy, then I'll let you know. Break. Guidons, this is 6. S2 reports a big snowstorm coming. It's supposed to last for two days. Continue to monitor your NAIs, and let me know when you lose visual contact. Red 1, stand by. Over.”

Trouble for the Redball Express - Rear Area Security



WHAT'S YOUR NEXT MOVE??

Situation:

Friendly Situation:

You are "Rubicon 6," the brigade commander of 3 Bde, 4th AD. Your brigade is preparing a defense in sector. A mechanized infantry division is expected to attack NLT 110530AUG99. TF 1-23 and TF 1-78 are defending forward in sector while TF 2-78 is the brigade reserve. C/1-23(-) is attached to 1-1 FA protecting an MLRS platoon and Q37 radar located in the brigade sector. The brigade is currently at 90% strength. Your task organization is in Figure 1 and the current graphics are in Figure 2.

Enemy Situation:

The brigade cavalry troop has had sporadic contact with enemy reconnaissance elements for the last 12 hours. The forward task forces have reported no contact in the main battle area. The division S2's assessment indicates that the enemy 66th MID will LD its main body early in the morning on 11AUG99. Based on experience over the last few weeks, division believes that the enemy will increase its activity in our rear area using partisans,




Figure 2: Operational Graphics

SOF, and air-inserted forces. These attacks will likely target logistics, command and control, and artillery assets to desynchronize our operations while the enemy division attacks into the main battle area.

Event #1: At 100643AUG99, TF 1-23 reports that its LOGPAC, en route to LRP1, ran into a point minefield roadblock over-watched by a sniper. The convoy reacted to the ambush, forcing the sniper to withdraw. The LOGPAC lost of one HEMTT fueler and three soldiers were wounded. The convoy is continuing to the LRP1.

Event #2: At 102032AUG99, the FSB commander reports that the BSA is under attack by a squad-size element equipped with small arms, machine guns, and mortars. The enemy position is vicinity grid 047193. The FSB security forces have prevented any penetration of the BSA perimeter, but are unable to destroy the enemy position. The FSB

security forces are continuing to man their perimeter. Most logistics functions are on hold.

Event #3: At 110217AUG99, 2 MI-24s (HIND-D) and 5 MI-8s (HIPs) penetrate the brigade's air space and land vicinity grid 070225. Each Hip has the potential to carry 28 troops. Reports indicate that 1 MI-24 and 1 MI-8 were destroyed by ADA fires, but the rest of the element successfully exited the brigade sector.

Requirements:

Assess the situation presented by each event and formulate a course of action. Issue instructions to your staff or a FRAGO to your commanders to deal with the threats to your rear area. Issue your FRAGO as if talking on the radio to your commanders. Submit your solutions to the BN/BDE Branch by email at: armordctrine@ftknox5-emh3.army.mil, or mail your solution to ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-TDM, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210.

Solutions to this vignette will appear in the January-February 2000 issue.




Figure 1: Task Organization

Solution — Tactical Vignette 99-04

Trouble for the Redball Express - Rear Area Security
 (From the September-October 1999 issue of *ARMOR*)

Author's Solution

EVENT #1

The sniper attack on TF 1-23 is clearly an example of a level I rear area threat. The local commander was able to deal with the threat with the forces available and the situation requires no immediate response from the brigade commander. He should however, direct the staff to:

- 1) Update the IPB with a special emphasis on likely ambush sites along the BDEs MSR. Include an assessment of the degree of support for partisan and SOF forces in each of the urban centers in the BDE AO.
- 2) Vary the use of MSRs, LRPs, and the timing of LOGPACs to avoid setting predictable patterns.
- 3) Direct MP platoon to proof MSR prior to major convoy movements.

EVENT #2

The enemy contact vicinity of the BSA is more than the FSB can effectively deal with. They can prevent penetration of their perimeter but are unable to mount an attack that will destroy the enemy mortar location. While the situation does not warrant the commitment of a combined arms formation, this level II threat does require action by the brigade.

"Guidons, this is Rubicon Six, Frago follows, acknowledge over.

Situation: The BSA is in contact with a dismounted infantry squad and light mortars located in the hills to their south (grid 047193). Friendly forces continue to defend the BSA perimeter and have no forces south of the 195 east-west gridline.

Mission: No change.

Execution:

Tasks to subordinate units:

- 1) MP platoon OPCON to FSB. Neutralize enemy squad vic grid 047193.
- 2) FSB maintain contact with enemy squad. Provide sup-

pressive fires on enemy squad in support of MP platoon's maneuver.

- 3) FA switch priority of fires to FSB.

Coordinating instructions:

- 1) Report when link-up with MP and FSB is complete.

Service Support:

- 1) FSB provides medevac support to MPs.

Command and Signal

- 1) Signal to lift fires is green star cluster.

ACKNOWLEDGE over.

EVENT #3


The insertion of an infantry force, which is potentially as large as 120 soldiers, in the BDE rear presents the commander with a Level III threat. The MP platoon certainly does not have the capability to defeat the threat and probably couldn't fix them with much success. So where does the BDE CDR get a combined arms

formation capable of dealing with the situation? Commitment of the BDE reserve is certainly an option, but could leave them out of place or without sufficient combat power to be decisive in the close fight. The enemy appears to have committed to a course of action that supports his maneuver in the center of the brigade sector. A more logical choice to deal with the threat is the mech team providing security to the high value FA assets.

"Guidons, this is Rubicon Six, Frago Follows, acknowledge over.

Situation: At 110217AUG99 conducted an air insertion of a company-sized unit with 2 MI-24s and 5 MI-8 Hips vic grid 070225. 1 MI-24 and 1 MI-8 were destroyed. I believe the enemy infantry company will defend vic 078223 to block our MSR and hold key terrain in support of the enemy MID attack. His most dangerous course of action is a dismounted attack on the BSA.

Mission: No change to the brigade mission.



Solution (continued)

Execution:

Tasks to subordinate units:

- 1) 1-1FA, detach Team Mech and place them under brigade control. TM Mech consolidates his platoons at attack position Dog (vic 100205) and attacks to fix enemy infantry company vicinity grid 078223 in order to protect the brigade support area.
- 2) MP Platoon screens from grid 035240 to 085245 to protect MLRS platoon.
- 3) TF 2-78 provides mortar fires to Team Mech.

Coordinating instructions:

- 1) All units between PL Red to PL blue go to REDCON 1.
- 2) PIR; composition, location, direction of movement of suspected infantry company.
- 3) Establish a CFZ on BSA until contact with enemy company is established.

Service Support:

- 1) All logistics traffic uses southern MSR.

ACKNOWLEDGE, over.

DEFINITIONS

Some readers unfamiliar with current Army abbreviations, such as those used in the accompanying tactical vignettes, have asked us to define them. —Ed

AO	Area of Operation	LRP	Logistics Release Point
BP	Battle Position	MLRS	Multiple Launch Rocket System
BSA	Brigade Support Area	MSR	Main Supply Route
CFZ	Critical Friendly Zone	OPCON	Operational Control
EA	Engagement Area	O/O	On order
EN	Engineer	PIR	Priority Information Requirements
FA	Field Artillery	PL	Phase Line
FIST	Fire Support Team	REDCON	Readiness Condition
FRAGO	Fragmentary Order	SBF	Support by Fire
FSB	Forward Support Battalion	SOF	Special Operations Forces
FSE	Forward Security Element	TGT	Target
IPB	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield	TRP	Target Reference Point
LOGPAC	Logistics Package		

TACTICAL VIGNETTE 00-01

Ragin' Cajun Time — Platoon Leader's Decision

WHAT'S
YOUR
NEXT
MOVE??



Overall Situation

Enemy Situation:

A battalion (-) size element of the Chafenburg Army is moving south along the border of the nation of Dansu. Heavy fighting has attrited them to 70% strength. They are looking for a favorable location near the capital or a surrounding town from which to conduct an insurgency. They are equipped with 6 - 9 x T-72s, 22 - 25 x BMP-2s with infantry, and 2 x 2S3s. They have the ability to employ non-persistent agents, although none have been used as yet. Their most probable course of action is to invade the southern portion of the border somewhere between grid 2310 and grid 2301. Their doctrine dictates that they first send their reconnaissance across to find a suitable avenue of advance (this element may be split into two sections). Expect to see at least two tanks and five BMPs along with a minimum of one EN vehicle in their reconnaissance element.

Friendly Situation:

As part of Operation Steel Fist, the 1 BDE has deployed to the desert nation of Dansu and successfully repelled a border insurgency by the Chafenburg Army. TF 6-46 is currently consolidating and reorganizing west of the capital. As the most southerly deployed unit of the 1 BDE, they have been alerted. The TF commander orders a company-size force to conduct security operations in the vicinity of the border.

Company Situation:

You are the platoon leader of 2nd Platoon, Alpha Team (task organization: Company HQ, 1st Platoon, 2nd Platoon, 3rd Platoon, and FIST). Your company has priority of fires. Alpha Team is at 100% strength and has just finished

conducting a relief in place of Charlie Team. After Bravo Company finishes refueling, the TF will continue to march to the border for further operations. One section of scouts (2 x HMMWV) is forward of your position screening at vicinity MR250060 and MR256060. Charlie team is held in reserve to be the spearhead of the TF counterattack.

Company Mission:

Team A/6-46 AR defends vicinity BP 1 NLT 230900MAR00 in order to prevent enemy forces from penetrating the task force rear boundary (PL Apache). O/O, establish an SBF vicinity SBF 2A to secure the flank of the task force while it conducts a counterattack.

Platoon Situation:

Your platoon is moving toward BP 1 when you receive the following transmission: "Guidons, this is Black Six, frago

follows." All elements acknowledge. Six then sends "Scouts report three BMPs followed by one T-72 vicinity AA 2 moving east vicinity MR235047."


Red: Occupy BP 1B and orient on EA HOUSTON from TRP 1 to TRP 4. On order, shift fire to EA SEATTLE orienting from TRP 5 to TRP 6.

White: Occupy BP 1A and orient on EA HOUSTON from TRP 1 to TRP 3. On order, displace and reposition to BP 1D and orient from TRP 7 to TRP 8.

Blue: Occupy BP 1C and orient on EA HOUSTON from TRP 2 to TRP 4 and EA SEATTLE from TRP 5 to TRP 8.

Trigger is three tanks or four BMPs (the FSE) in either EA.

Continued on Page 45



Tactical Vignette 00-01

(From Page 43)

The trigger for any platoon to reorient its fires into an alternate EA is:

- Negative contact in primary EA.
- Confirmed enemy company (+) identified in the alternate EA.

Engagement priority is tanks, EN vehicles, BMPs, all other vehicles.

Displacement criteria for White: Three tanks vicinity EA SEATTLE.

I will move with Red. XO, you stay with Blue.

All other OPORD information has remained unchanged.”

Task 1:

Send the pertinent FRAGO to your platoon and occupy your position in BP 1.

Situation 2:

Your platoon sergeant sends you the following SPOT report: “White One, this is White Four. Observing one tank and one BMP moving northeast vicinity TRP 1, over.” As you attempt to send the information higher, you hear “Black Six, this is Blue One. Observing one tank and one BMP slowly moving northeast vicinity

TRP 1, over.” After thirty minutes, you hear, “Black Six, this is Red One. Contact, three tanks and two BMPs vicinity EA Seattle, out.” Red sends “Black One, this is Red. Fire TGT Group A2B, tanks and BMPs in the open.” Main gun fire to the north is audible from your position. Your attempts to contact Black Six and Black Five yield no results as they are sending information higher.

Task 2:

What actions, if any, do you take?

Requirements:

Readers wishing to submit solutions to the scenario should provide the following: 1) a sound FRAGO for your platoon and 2) the appropriate procedures and supporting rationale for the second situation. Send your solution by e-mail to BerkowitzA@ftknox5-emh3.army.mil or by mail to: Platoon Gunnery Doctrine Branch, ATTN: ATZK-TDD-PG, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210.

Solutions to this vignette will appear in the May-June 2000 issue of ARMOR.

Solution — Tactical Vignette 00-01 *Ragin' Cajun Time*

(Author's Solution to the January-February 2000 Vignette)

TASK 1 – Issue 2nd Platoon FRAGO – “All White elements, this is White one, FRAGO follows.”

SITUATION: Scout report three BMPs followed by one T-72 vic MR235047.

MISSION: No Change.

EXECUTION:

-Occupy BP 1A and orient on **EA Houston** between TRPs 1 and 3.

-Alpha section orient from TRP 1 north to TRP 3; work far to near. Bravo section orient on TRP 3 south to TRP 1; work inside out.

-On order, displace and reposition to BP 1D, orient into **EA Seattle**. Alpha section orient from TRP 7 north to TRP 8; work far to near. Bravo section orient on TRP 8 south to TRP 7; work inside out.

-Engagement trigger is three tanks or four BMPs (what we believe is the FSE) in either **EA Houston** or **EA Seattle**.

-Trigger to reorient fires into **EA Seattle** is negative contact in **EA Houston** or

confirmed enemy company (+) size element in **EA Seattle**.

-White displacement criterion is three tanks vicinity **EA Seattle**.

-Engagement priority is tanks, EN vehicles, BMPs, then all others.

SERVICE AND SUPPORT:

No change.

COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

CO will be with Red (1st) platoon; XO will be with blue (3rd) platoon.

“Acknowledge, over.”

TASK 2 – White's response to SPOT reports over company net –

EVENT 1 – Report of one tank and one BMP vic TRP 1 in EA Houston.

Your response should be to continue to observe and monitor the situation. Both you and the Blue platoon see these enemy vehicles.

The size and activity of this enemy element does not meet any of the criteria set

by your company commander for engagement, reorientation into your alternate engagement area (EA Seattle), or displacement to your alternate BP (BP 1D).

EVENT 2 – Report of three tanks and two BMPs vic EA Seattle.

Your response, because you cannot get contact with your commander or XO, should be to displace and occupy BP 1D.

This SPOT report meets the criteria set by your commander for your platoon to displace to BP 1D and begin engaging the enemy.

While this SPOT report also meets one of the criteria for you to reorient your platoon fires into your alternate engagement area (EA Seattle), it would do no good.

You are set in BP 1A. Your fires from there would be ineffective into EA Seattle because you are too far away (3km to the southern portion of EA Seattle). You must displace to BP 1D, reorient your platoon's fires to the appropriate TRPs, and begin engaging the enemy.

TACTICAL DECISION EXERCISE

Tactical Vignette 14-01: "Battle at Narrow Bridge"

ARMOR publishes tactical vignettes, or tactical decision exercises, to generate professional dialogue. Scenarios may seem vague and lack pertinent information to mimic the confusion of battle. There are no "right" or "wrong" answers. Use your doctrinal knowledge and educated assumptions to determine "What's Your Next Move?"

Situation

You are the mechanized platoon leader of 1st Platoon, Company A, 2-81 Armor (a combined-arms battalion). You are task-organized with two infantry

squads in M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs) and two M1A2s.

The 1-502 Infantry Battalion (Air Assault) is attacking north to destroy enemy forces vicinity Objective Chapultec and has already air-assaulted a rifle company in the plain south of Objective Chapultec. Reports indicate that a superior force has decisively engaged the rifle company.


Your battalion's mission: 2-81 Armor follow and support to assist 1-502 Infantry attack to destroy enemy forces

WHAT'S
YOUR
NEXT
MOVE?



vicinity Objective Chapultec. On order, attack to destroy enemy forces vicinity Objective Chapultec to prevent their southward advance.

Your battalion commander's intent is to force passage onto the plain. The terrain south of Missionary Ridge is generally rugged and undeveloped with thick vegetation and severe relief. The enemy you are fighting is



primarily infantry with point obstacle and anti-tank capabilities augmented with small numbers of armored vehicles – a mix of T-72, BRDMs and BMPs. It is 2315 hours; there is a full moon. Your platoon advances along the battalion's left flank with the following task and purpose:

Task: Screen the battalion's western flank.

Purpose: Enable the battalion to follow and support 1-502 Infantry.

Your platoon moves parallel to a trail – but not on it – and you cross a dry, rocky gully about three to four feet deep and 20 meters wide without making contact. As you approach Checkpoint 67, your lead M2 BFV makes visual contact with what appears to be a listening/observation post that immediately flees northwest toward the Western Narrow Pass.

Your battalion is in contact to your east. Your best guess from listening to

radio transmissions and monitoring Blue Force Tracker (BFT) is that the engagement is taking place near Narrow Bridge. You cannot tell whether your battalion has negotiated the bridge, but you can hear explosions and assume that vehicles are taking casualties. From your position, you can see an enemy machinegun and anti-tank fire on the ridge to your northeast.

On the battalion command net, you hear the battalion S-3 directing supporting fires onto enemy positions near the bridge. Looking at your BFT, the overall tactical situation is unclear, but it appears the battalion is attempting a right flanking movement against the enemy position. Except for the listening post that fled, there is no sign of enemy activity in your area.

What's your next move?

Decide what to do and issue your fragmentary order as if you were speaking

on the radio or via BFT message. Following your initial FRAGO, take time and clearly define the problem(s) as you see them. Submit both your initial FRAGO and discussion of the problem, assumptions and rationale for your solution to **ARMOR**. The author's solution will be published in the July-September edition of **ARMOR**; select solutions and a more thorough discussion will follow in the October-December edition. Submit solutions to us-army.benning.tradoc.mbx.armor-magazine@mail.mil no later than 30 days after this edition (March-June) is posted on-line.

Acronym Quick-Scan

BFT – Blue Force Tracker
BFV – Bradley Fighting Vehicle
FRAGO – fragmentary order

TACTICAL DECISION EXERCISE

Author's Solution to Tactical Vignette 14-01: "Battle at Narrow Bridge"

by LTC Scott O'Neal

"Solutions to tactical problems are a collective effort. Success results from the commander's plan and the ability of subordinates to execute it. Commanders must have full confidence in their subordinates' mastery of the art and science of tactics and in their ability to execute the chosen solution." – Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-90

At its core, "Battle at Narrow Bridge" creates a simple dilemma for the platoon leader: continue the directed

scheme of maneuver or develop a new course of action (CoA). Using an unclear commander's intent, vague battalion mission statement and an increasingly confusing, and perhaps deteriorating tactical situation, the scenario places the platoon leader in a position where he must make a decision without guidance or direction from the battalion. Or does he? Hence, the tactical debate ensues.

This article offers a methodology for determining our platoon leader's


WHAT'S YOUR NEXT MOVE?



options, along with a proposed solution. To do this, we will review the specified and implied guidance, the enemy situation, and outline the pros and cons of potential CoAs. Ideally, this affords readers a technique for solving this and other tactical problems.

Our specified guidance

"Tactical proficiency is not defined by



mastery of written doctrine, but by the ability to employ available means to win battles and engagements. A solution may not match any previous doctrinal example; however, the language used to communicate that concept must be technically precise and doctrinally consistent, using commonly understood and accepted doctrinal terms and concepts.” –ADRP 3-90

In our scenario, the battalion commander states that he wants to “force passage onto the plain,” but what does this really mean and how does it apply to us? Does he want to bypass enemy in zone and move to the plain as quickly as possible, or does he want to clear enemy and secure lines of communication before moving to the plain?^{1, 2, 3}

Key guidance

Battalion commander’s intent: “Force passage onto the plain.”

Battalion mission: 2-81 Armored follows and supports 1-502 Infantry Battalion’s (Air Assault) attack to destroy enemy forces vicinity Objective Chapultepec.

Platoon task: Screen the battalion’s western flank.

Platoon purpose: Enable the battalion to follow and support 1-502.

Each option has merits and requires different actions on our part. Ideally, we would like to know more about what the battalion commander really wants – the expanded purpose of the operation – before we make a decision. At minimum, understanding his definition of “force” is critical. Of course, at this point we do not know, so we must assume what the battalion commander really wants the battalion, and our platoon, to do. Therefore, let us assume by “force” he means to “fix the enemy in place with fires and then conduct a bypass” rather than alternate techniques of either avoiding the enemy completely or maneuvering to destroy.^{4, 5, 6}

This allows the battalion to continue to support 1-502’s attack – at least, that is our assumption. The critical issue here is that the battalion commander’s intent is vague. Rather than using “technically precise, doctrinally consistent and commonly understood

doctrinal terms and concepts,” he uses vague and potentially misleading verbiage that evokes confusion.⁷ Further, comparing his intent to the battalion’s mission creates an even more puzzling dynamic.

Battalion mission

“A commander assigns a unit the task of follow and support to keep the supported force from having to commit its combat power to tasks other than the decisive operation, which would slow the offensive operation’s momentum and tempo. The follow-and-support force accomplishes its tasks to prevent the enemy, obstacles and other factors from interfering with offensive actions, especially along the lines of communications.” –Field Manual (FM) 3-90

The battalion has the essential task to follow and support 1-502’s attack on Objective Chapultepec.⁸ From doctrine, we know the battalion therefore has the responsibility – meaning it is committed and not a reserve – to trail and support the lead force conducting an offensive task (in our case, an attack). Moreover, we should understand that in a follow-and-support operation, the battalion’s doctrinally prescribed tasks are as follows:

- Destroy bypassed enemy units;
- Block movement of enemy reinforcements;
- Relieve in place any direct pressure on encircling force halted to contain the enemy;
- Secure lines of communication;
- Clear obstacles;
- Guard prisoners, key areas and installations;
- Recover friendly battle losses;
- Secure key terrain; and
- Control dislocated civilians.

The challenge here is how much effort the battalion places on destroying the bypassed enemy units and securing the lines of communication vs. moving to relieve and/or re-enforce 1-502 – which changes their mission from *support* to *assume*. During a follow-and-assume tactical mission task, a second committed force follows a force conducting an offensive task and is prepared to continue the mission if the lead force is fixed, attrited or unable

to continue.⁹ In follow-and-support, the committed force is an enabling element to the lead force’s offensive operation. The difference is obviously in the “assume” vs. “support” role. The brigade and battalion commander are probably struggling with this fact now, given that both lead elements of 1-502 and the main body of 2-81 Armor are in contact.

Therefore, based on our doctrinal understanding of the assigned mission, we can anticipate that the battalion commander – unless otherwise directed – will maneuver to defeat those units controlling the key line of communication leading into Objective Chapultepec rather than seek to find a bypass and move to reinforce 1-502 as his intent implies. However, there easily could be a point at which 2-81 Armor works to bypass to assume 1-502’s mission. This is a brigade decision point associated with a commander’s critical information requirement, and you would understand the information requirements leading to that decision. What we do know is, at this point, our understanding of the battalion commander’s intent and battalion mission somewhat contradict, and as a result, we cannot be completely sure how our platoon can best assist.

Our task and purpose

With that in mind, our task is to screen the battalion’s western flank. We know from FM 3-90.2 that “screen” is a security task that requires us to observe, identify and report enemy actions. We provide reaction time and early warning to the battalion so the commander can preserve his combat power to commit at the decisive place and time. Further, a screen requires several critical tasks – performed within our capability. For this operation, we should:

- Allow no enemy ground element to pass through the screen undetected and unreported;
- Maintain continuous surveillance of all avenues of approach larger than a designated size into the area under all visibility conditions;
- Destroy or repel all enemy reconnaissance patrols within our capabilities;

- Locate the lead elements of each enemy advance guard and determine their direction of movement in a defensive screen;
- Maintain contact with enemy forces and report any activity in the area of operations;
- Maintain contact with the main body and any security forces operating on its flanks; and
- Impede and harass the enemy within our capabilities while displacing.

Given those requirements, it is appropriate that we maneuver to destroy security elements (the fleeing observation post (OP), in our case) while remaining oriented on the battalion main body. However, does that CoA agree or counter our purpose as the tactical situation around us evolves?

We have to remember that the purpose of our screen is to “enable the battalion to follow and support 1-502.” The key question then is, how does our screen assist the battalion mission? Alternatively, does our purpose within the overall operation at some point outweigh the specified task and drive us to alter from our stated task and purpose? If our purpose is to enable the battalion to follow and support, we should consistently think about how the battalion is working to enable 1-502 and how we can assist the battalion’s execution of its CoA. We are an enabler. Essentially, this is our platoon’s contribution to the fight, albeit a little harder to determine with conflicting guidance and no immediate direction. Before we act hastily, let us take a moment – since we are in contact – to develop the situation.

What we know

“With regard to narrow passes, if you can occupy them first, let them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy.” –Sun Tzu

“Undeniably, in a mountainous area, a small post in a favorable position acquires exceptional strength.” –Carl von Clausewitz

Terrain and weather are the common denominators in engagements, meaning that regardless of the composition and disposition of forces, the “playing

field” is the same for both actors. The actor on the most favorable, or key, terrain possesses an initial advantage. In this case, we understand that we have an enemy occupying high ground and overwatching canalizing and compartmentalizing terrain – both of which give him a potential significant advantage.

The enemy “is primarily infantry with point obstacle and anti-tank capabilities augmented with small numbers of armored vehicles – a mix of T-72, BRD-Ms and BMPs.” This composition arrayed in the restrictive terrain along Missionary Ridge also mitigates the maneuver and firepower advantages our mechanized vehicles provide. Attacking into this type of terrain against this type of enemy diminishes many of our strengths and requires more time and resources to effectively clear.

What we think we know

Even a rudimentary terrain analysis leads to several assumptions on the disposition of the enemy. Knowing that Narrow Bridge and the line of communication leading to Objective Chapultepec are critical to both friendly and enemy success leads to assuming that the focus for the enemy defense centers on that area. If we assume that the main engagement area focuses on Narrow Bridge, our platoon’s particular concern is how the enemy has worked to secure his flanks, the location of his reserve and indications of where is he accepting risk. Identifying weakness in his defense provides something the battalion commander could use to his advantage if his attack stalls at Narrow Bridge.

We also can assume that the fact the enemy purposely engaged in and around its own dismounted elements indicates they are fighting from prepared positions with planned engagement areas with alternate and subsequent fighting positions – maybe validating the assumption on his disposition and also identifying obvious areas of strength. Further, the lack of reporting on his armor could mean that he is holding it in reserve to reinforce or counterattack.

What we need to know

Although obvious, what we really need to know is where the enemy is and in what strength. We owe that to the battalion commander so he can develop options, but we have to do it without becoming so decisively engaged that he has to commit forces from the main body to reconstitute his flank security – or bail us out. However, knowing the battalion is in contact vicinity of Narrow Bridge starts to illustrate the basic enemy disposition.

We also need to know if there is an alternate route for the battalion to use should the attack stall on Narrow Bridge. At the same time, we need to know more about the success or lack of success of the battalion’s attack. Quite simply, if the battalion is having success along Narrow Bridge, that action could create a different set of considerations for the platoon.

Seizing, retaining and exploiting the initiative

“The most consistently successful commanders, when faced by an enemy in a position that was strong naturally or materially, have hardly ever tackled it in a direct way. And when, under pressure of circumstances, they have risked a direct attack, the result has commonly been to blot their record with a failure.” –Sir Basil H. Liddell-Hart

Our lieutenant’s dilemma is how to handle the conflicting scenario unfolding in front of him. Although there are many possibilities, they generally group into three basic options:

- **Stay the course.** Our lieutenant abides by stated orders and his perception of the battalion commander’s intent and continues to screen the battalion’s flank. Nothing in the battalion commander’s guidance indicates that he would allow for excessive initiative from a platoon leader. For that reason, while the battalion situation seems to be deteriorating on the plain, the battalion commander believes his left flank is secure or at least has the ability to react based on the early warning the platoon provides. If the platoon was to give up

the flank and move to assist the battalion, there is no guarantee that either that action would help or that leaving the flank exposed is what the battalion commander would see as “responsible initiative.” Consequently, staying where we are and continuing to screen makes sense.

- **Attack the enemy’s flank.** Our lieutenant makes the assessment that since the battalion is in contact and all good lieutenants in the absence of further orders attack, he should do so. In this case, the lieutenant knows that the battalion is involved in a heavy firefight and assumes that the best way to alleviate pressure is to move toward contact, thereby forcing the enemy to deal with two problems simultaneously. The advantage here is that it potentially exposes the enemy flank, which is a proven tactic when attacking fortified positions; however, in reality, dealing with limited visibility and a dynamic situation limits the effectiveness and potentially adds confusion to the battalion’s attack. Given the terrain and the prepared defensive positions, perhaps the only way the battalion controls Narrow Pass is by attacking the enemy’s flank (a tactic, it seems, is unfolding to the west). Unless the battalion commander directs or gives approval, a platoon moving on its flank “unsolicited” could have significant consequences both by exposing the battalion’s flank and by presenting the opportunity for fratricide. Bottom line is, it mandates coordination of fires and synchronization of effort. Finally, should the battalion’s attack begin to succeed, the now-exposed left flank is a likely avenue for the armor reserve to counterattack, and there is no one securing the battalion’s flank.
- **Take the high ground.** At this point, the lieutenant makes several assumptions. First is that the battalion will be challenged to make it through Narrow Pass without significant losses, which will cause the battalion to look for other options. Second, if he abandons

the battalion flank, he throws what certainty the battalion commander has about the situation out his hatch. Finally, if you were the battalion commander or S-3, you would want someone to provide some decent options and begin setting conditions for them. Setting conditions for any battalion movement would require understanding the terrain around Missionary Ridge and the Western Narrow Pass. You can bet that the OP you had visual contact with had the task to provide early warning about activity on the enemy’s right flank. If we wait too long to act, the enemy could easily reposition his reserve to block the gap along the Western Narrow Pass (if he has not done so already), or the pass might already contain a significant blocking effort (which we do not know). Further, if the battalion stalls at Narrow Bridge, one of the battalion’s next-best options is to move west through the Western Narrow Pass, but unless we act, the commander would (or should) have to generate a reconnaissance force to develop the situation – taking valuable time and combat power away from his main body.

Author’s solution

“Blue, this is Blue 1. WARNO follows.

“I am posting graphic control measures on our Blue Force Tracker, acknowledgment receipt.”

“Battalion is engaged vicinity Narrow Bridge, lead elements of 1-502 are in contact to the north, and we had visual contact vicinity CP 67 with two to three dismounts, which I believe to be an OP overwatching Western Narrow Pass.”

“We are going to continue to screen the battalion’s western flank while developing other options. Namely, once the net clears, I am going to engage the battalion S-3 on a revised CoA for us. Upon approval, I want to move quickly to secure the Western Narrow Pass to both provide early warning for the battalion and secure it as a potential avenue for the battalion to use should their attack on Narrow Bridge fail. If I can’t get through on the net, then I’ll make the decision to execute.”

“White 3 and 4 [mech]. On order, I want you to move to the spur on the east side of the Western Narrow Pass (CP 96 on your graphics) and establish an OP observing both the Western Narrow Pass and north of Missionary Ridge to figure out the enemy composition and disposition and if they are moving in our direction. Expect contact. Clear dismounts, take extra precautions for point obstacles and let me know if you have any contact with mechanized or anti-tank elements. What we can’t afford is to become decisively engaged.”

“The trigger for you to move is when Blue 1 and 2 are set in the support by fire.”

“Blue 2 [tank]. On order, move with me to establish a support-by-fire vicinity CP 23 to cover White’s move to CP 96. Once you are able to observe the Western Narrow Pass, White will bound to establish a hasty defense along PL Spur oriented on the plain north of Missionary Ridge. Standard lift and shift fire procedures apply.”

“Acknowledge.”

Rationale

The key element to this CoA is requesting a decision out of the battalion leadership before acting. At this point, we should consider that the battalion is acting based on the assumption that our platoon is maintaining a flank screen. Any actions that detract from that deserve (if not mandate) going back to the headquarters who issued the order and requesting to deviate from the directed CoA.

Nevertheless, there is a point where the loss of communication or urgency of action mandates initiative within intent. In this case, our lieutenant makes the decision that control of the Western Narrow Pass is growing in importance and provides a warning order to his platoon so they can start planning while he attempts to get approval from the battalion. Second, battalion needs to hear his perspective on the problem, and by bringing a solution, he helps the battalion S-3 and commander formulate branches and

sequels. If he fails to reach the battalion, then he will have to make a decision within what he believes is the battalion commander's intent.

The tactic of using the tank section (led by the platoon leader) to establish a support-by-fire while the mech section (led by the platoon sergeant) dismounts and attempts to flank what most likely will be a defended position is fundamentally sound. The trick in this scenario is not to become decisively engaged and thereby compound the battalion's problem. The interesting discussion would be at what point does the lieutenant act without guidance?

Closing

"The commander should train to be able to cut to the heart of a situation, recognize its important elements and base decisions on those important elements as a part of mastering the Army profession. Commanders develop this capability after years of education in military schools, self-study and practical training experiences, which eventually develop the intuitive faculties required to solve tactical problems." – ADRP 3-90

This is a lot to expect a lieutenant to do, and the scenario could easily expand to address the battalion problem set. With that, audacity and initiative are values we nurture and seek to grow within our command cultures; however, understanding when audacity and initiative become irresponsible derives from experience and good judgment. In this case – as in many cases – we are asking the lieutenant to interpret, anticipate, assume and take responsible initiative within his commander's intent. This is normal in combat. How then do we grow audacity and initiative within our commands with limited access to training and combat experience? Perhaps, as ADRP 3-90 states, an element to that solution is in studying and solving tactical problems such as "Battle at Narrow Bridge."

As we do these, it is good to remember there are three elements to solving tactical problems. First is the ability to identify the problem and determine

plausible solutions. This is perhaps the easiest of the three – especially when given the relative comfort of an office or classroom. Second is the ability to communicate a solution. Brevity and clarity combine with simplicity to ensure the orders are received correctly and often only over a radio. Can the leader help his subordinates visualize the problem and CoA? Finally is the ability to lead the execution of a solution. This is not necessarily "out front" but often from a position where you as the leader can make the decisions only you as a leader can make while providing the appropriate presence to feel the outcome.

As we explore solutions to this and other tactical problems, it is important to keep these three considerations in mind. Remember: while it might be a doctrinally correct answer, can the leader communicate it simply and quickly is almost as important as a correct answer.

These exercises allow us to get "mental reps" at dealing with tactical problems. Engaging in problem-solving sessions helps build experience in facing these types of tactical issues and provides mental references for future scenarios. Finally, when done in an open session with leaders and subordinates, the associated dialogue – and often debate – creates an opportunity to understand how leaders approach solving these types of tactical problems. Consequently, we as leaders are better able to anticipate and assume on the battlefield even with the lack of clear guidance and perhaps comprehend what it means to "force passage onto the plain."

(Editor's note: If you wish to present an alternative solution, please submit it to usarmy.benning.tradoc.mbx.armor-magazine@mail.mil within 30-45 days after this edition is posted on-line but no later than Jan. 14, 2015. The material to be submitted is a fragmentary order as if you were speaking on the radio or via Blue Force Tracker message. Then, following your initial FRAGO, clearly define the problem(s) as you see it/them. Please submit both your initial FRAGO and discussion of the problem, assumptions and rationale for your solution to **ARMOR for possible publication.)**

LTC Scott O'Neal is a lifelong student of the profession who believes in the detailed practice and study of tactics. He has had the privilege of leading Soldiers from platoon through battalion level and served on a variety of operational staffs throughout his career; his duty assignments have included squadron commander, 2/3 Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood, Texas; regimental operations officer, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood; operations officer, 1/3 Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood; commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1-1 Cavalry, Budingen, Germany; and commander, Troop A, 1-1 Cavalry, Budingen. LTC O'Neal holds a bachelor's of science degree in international and strategic history from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, and a master's of arts degree in military arts and science from Air University.

Notes

¹ *Secure* is a tactical mission task that involves preventing a unit, facility or geographical location from being damaged or destroyed due to enemy action.

² *Clear* is a tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance within an assigned area.

³ *Bypass* is a tactical mission task in which the commander directs the unit to maneuver around an obstacle, position or enemy force to maintain the momentum of the operation while deliberately avoiding combat with an enemy force.

⁴ For a more complete discussion of bypass maneuver, see FM 3-90-1, Page B4.

⁵ *Defeat* is a tactical mission task that occurs when an enemy force has temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight.

⁶ *Destroy* is a tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted.

⁷ The vagueness invoked by the simplistic guidance "to force passage onto the plan" is purposeful and meant to evoke conversation and highlight the importance of well-thought-out and clearly communicated commander's intent.

⁸ *Follow and support* is a tactical mission task in which a committed force follows and supports a lead force conducting an offensive task.

⁹ *Follow and assume* is a tactical mission task in which a second committed force follows a force conducting an offensive

task and is prepared to continue the mission if the lead force is fixed, attrited or unable to continue.

Acronym Quick-Scan

ADRP – Army doctrinal reference publication
CP – checkpoint
CoA – course of action
FM – field manual
FRAGO – fragmentary order
OP – observation post
PL – phase line
WARNO – warning order

TACTICAL DECISION EXERCISE

Tactical Vignette 14-02: Showdown in the Central Corridor

WHAT'S
YOUR
NEXT
MOVE?



Situation

You are the commander of Company A, 1-8 Cavalry. Your infantry company team consists of one tank and two mechanized platoons; you have an attached engineer platoon and mortar section following in support. Your company has priority of fires. The terrain is mostly open desert flanked by mountains, with some high terrain in

the center of the zone. We are attempting to deny enemy advancement into the country's capital.

You are first in the order of march for the battalion as it conducts a movement-to-contact. The battalion's purpose is to find, fix and destroy the advance guard of a brigade tactical group (BTG) moving east, allowing your


brigade to destroy the main body with enough combat power left to block a second-echelon detachment.

Task and purpose

2/1 Cavalry:

Task: Destroy the BTG.

Purpose: Prevent the motorized rifle



division from crossing east of the international border.

1-8 Cavalry:

Task: Destroy the BTG's advance guard.

Purpose: Enable 2/1 Cav to destroy the main body.

Company A, 1-8 Cav:

Task: Fix and destroy the forward reconnaissance detachments.

Purpose: Enable 1-8 Cav to destroy the advance guard.

Scenario

As you reach Checkpoint (CP) 2, based on his decision support criteria, your battalion commander decides to move your company south toward CP 8 to gain contact with the reconnaissance detachment, suspected to be at CP 8. As you approach the intersection at CP 6, your trail platoon reports about 20 vehicles in formation, moving east and starting to deploy north of CP 3. A moment later, you notice a Blue Force Tracker (BFT) icon appear from brigade

reconnaissance assets reporting some 35 vehicles north of Hill 560 moving east toward CP 4. You assume that the element identified by 1st Platoon must be the reconnaissance detachment and that it is probably deploying to engage the battalion from Hill 110 (vicinity CP 9), and you are unsure of the element identified on BFT.

You attempt to contact the battalion commander or S-3 on the command net but receive no response. BFT has the battalion frontline trace about 15 minutes out from CP 2. Based on the brigade spot report, you estimate that the BTG is at least 20 minutes from CP 4. It will take you about the same amount of time to move northeast to engage the reconnaissance detachment or northwest to intercept the unidentified element on BFT.

In two minutes or less, make your decision and issue your fragmentary order and any other reports you would submit.

Acronym Quick-Scan

BTG – brigade tactical group
BFT – Blue Force Tracker
CP – command post

TACTICAL DECISION EXERCISE

Tactical Vignette 14-02: Author's Solution to 'Showdown in the Central Corridor'

WHAT'S
YOUR
NEXT
MOVE?




When you take some time to think about it, every operation is in some form a movement-to-contact. Whether moving to position for a deliberate attack, conducting counter-reconnaissance during a defense or executing movement in stability operations, each possesses key elements of a

movement-to-contact. Units conduct a movement-to-contact when the enemy situation is vague or not specific enough to conduct a deliberate attack, and even then, the approach to a deliberate attack should be organized around a movement-to-contact's guiding concepts. Consequently, it should

be a standard operation for leaders to master.

Further, our responsibility as leaders at all levels is to manage transitions and, at its core, a movement-to-contact is simply a temporary state before a formation transitions to another



type of operation. When conditions are properly set, formations possess the capacity to quickly transition to the attack or defense, and leaders can identify opportunity to seize the initiative, a movement-to-contact facilitates accomplishing subsequent more-decisive operations.

Doctrinal analysis and interpretation

Field Manual (FM) 3-90-1 states “a movement-to-contact employs purposeful and aggressive movement, decentralized control and the hasty deployment of combined-arms formations from the march to conduct offensive, defensive or stability tasks.”¹ Based on that definition, doctrine describes the fundamentals of a movement-to-contact as:

- Focus all efforts on finding the enemy.
- Make initial contact with the smallest force possible, consistent with protecting the force.
- Make initial contact with small, mobile, self-contained forces to avoid decisive engagement of the main body on ground chosen by the enemy. (This allows the commander maximum flexibility to develop the situation.)
- Task-organize the force and use movement formations to deploy and attack rapidly in any direction.
- Keep subordinate forces within supporting distances to facilitate a flexible response.
- Once in contact, maintain contact regardless of the course of action adopted.

While a thorough definition and account of fundamentals, perhaps we can restate them in simpler terms for our use. Restated, they could read:

- Find the enemy.
- Gain and maintain contact with the smallest force possible.
- Retain freedom of maneuver.
- Rapidly transition to attack, defense or retrograde operations.
- Finish decisively.

Tactical vignette task and purpose

2/1 Cavalry:

Task: Destroy the brigade tactical group (BTG).

Purpose: Prevent the motorized rifle division from crossing east of the international border.

1-8 Cavalry:

Task: Destroy the BTG’s advance guard.

Purpose: Enable 2/1 Cav to destroy the main body.

Company A, 1-8 Cav:

Task: Fix and destroy the forward reconnaissance detachments.

Purpose: Enable 1-8 Cav to destroy the advance guard.

Basic organization and critical tasks

The ultimate purpose of a movement-to-contact is to gain contact with the enemy. As our fundamentals dictate, ideally, we make contact with the smallest force possible to allow us to preserve main-body combat power so it can deploy in a position of advantage. This allows us to seize and retain the initiative. The basic formation for a movement-to-contact consists of an advance guard, main body and flank-and-rear-security elements. However, based on the formation’s size, it is often problematic to generate forces to accomplish these associated tasks and purposes without substantially degrading the main body. Therefore, at a minimum, a movement-to-contact has an advance guard and main body, and the commander looks for other methods to gain flank and rear situational awareness. Before we get to a solution for the tactical vignette, let us look at the key components of a movement-to-contact.

ADVANCE GUARD. The advance guard ensures the uninterrupted advance of the main body. To do this, the advance guard moves ahead of the main body and works to 1) find the enemy, 2) develop the situation for the commander, but most importantly, 3) facilitate the main body’s deployment at a time

and place of the commander’s choosing. As a result, the designated formation should possess a degree of mobility, firepower and survivability that enables these tasks. Ideally, the advance guard operates within supporting range of the main body’s weapon systems, is often the initial priority of fires and possesses a mixture of combined-arms capabilities appropriate to the mission. It should be both lethal and mobile. Normally, the advance guard conducts the following critical tasks:

- **Gain and maintain contact.** Reconnaissance assets typically conduct zone or area reconnaissance focused on finding the enemy, obstacle identification and pulling the advance guard into a position of advantage to assist in developing the situation for the main body. Following reconnaissance hand-off, the advance guard maneuvers to determine enemy weaknesses for further exploitation by the main body.
- **Disrupt the enemy.** Once the advance guard begins to maneuver on the enemy, it focuses effort on identifying enemy gaps and key terrain, along with destroying command-and-control (C2) elements that serve to disrupt the enemy effort. The intent is to set conditions for the main body to exploit the enemy’s weaknesses.
- **Fix the enemy.** The advance guard then, within its capability, maneuvers to fix the enemy main body to prevent it from achieving a position of advantage over the friendly main body.

MAIN BODY. The main body is the element designated to conduct the decisive operation resulting from gaining contact. As such, its organization varies based on the amount of combat power the commander task-organizes to the various security elements supporting the main body. However, the main body typically transitions from an approach march to either a hasty attack or a defense ideally positioned to take advantage of an enemy’s weakness through maneuver.² As such, its task-organization should reflect the ability to maneuver to conduct

decisive operations. The typical critical tasks the main body conducts are:

- Maneuver.** Tempo is the key to successful maneuver and transition from the approach march into another type of operation. Ideally, the main body is capable of deploying faster than the enemy deploys and thereby forces the enemy to react to friendly maneuver. Critical to this concept is the successful battle handoff and passage of lines between the security forces (usually the advance guard) and the main body. The object is to place the main body's strength against the enemy's weaknesses as swiftly as possible, and the advance guard and reconnaissance elements serve to facilitate the commander's knowledge of those weaknesses. Effectively, this is what developing the situation means.
- Follow-on actions.** This task accomplishes the overall task and purpose of the operation and typically serves as the decisive task. The subordinate formation's task and purpose nest within the higher headquarters to ensure complementary efforts. The result of the maneuver is ordinarily a transition to an attack, or depending on the terrain and enemy, transition to a defense.

Analysis of tactical problem

What we know. As we said earlier, we know we are in visual contact with 20 vehicles moving east and starting to deploy north of Checkpoint (CP) 3. (We suspect this is the reconnaissance detachment.) We also know that there are 35 vehicles moving rapidly toward CP 4. (We suspect this is the advance guard.) Our hasty time-distance analysis puts the suspected reconnaissance detachment in position to affect our main body before it reaches CP 2. With that, the most important fact we know is that we are in contact (visual only at this point). We are unable to receive battalion guidance. We also know that our task is to destroy the reconnaissance detachment so that our battalion can destroy the advance guard.³ However, the developing situation




Figure 1. Force organized for a movement-to-contact. (From FM 3-90-1, Page 2-2)

causes some concern of whether that is still relevant.

What we think we know. We will assume that the enemy's organization consists of one to three combat reconnaissance patrols, a reconnaissance detachment, an advanced guard, a main body and a reserve. Further, we will also assume that the enemy will flow to success, meaning that where he finds the least resistance, he will move his follow-on echelons, rather than reinforcing failure. We can also assume that our separation from the main body is allowing the enemy unhindered deployment against our main body.

Given this information, we have several options. First: we are in contact and must begin developing the situation for the main body; however, our decision is complicated. Do we assume that the contact to our north is the reconnaissance detachment and "action right" to address it in accordance with our stated task and purpose? Alternatively, do we assume that we should ignore contact with the reconnaissance detachment, pass it off to our

main body and attempt to gain contact with the expected enemy main body moving from our east? Are there other options?

Option 1: Engage reconnaissance detachment

Our task clearly states to destroy the reconnaissance detachment. However, how do we know if the contact to our north is the reconnaissance detachment? Normally, intelligence sections (S-2s) are best at classifying echelons in that they have a better situational understanding of often-conflicting spot reports.⁴ In this case, based in some part on our inability to talk to battalion, we are unsure of our contact. Nevertheless, what we do have is a spot report of an element that meets the basic outline of what we expect of a reconnaissance detachment's composition (20 vehicles deploying to our north).

We have several other considerations. First, to stay true to our fundamentals, we must work to maintain contact (ideally with the smallest force

possible), and that dictates a transition from the march to maneuver against the suspected reconnaissance detachment. This action could disrupt or fix the reconnaissance detachment and, depending on how we capitalize on the terrain, we could destroy it. However, if we wait too long, the main body will pass through CP 2 and begin receiving direct fires – violating our overall purpose. Further, and perhaps most importantly, as we maneuver against the reconnaissance detachment, we expose our own flank to the oncoming advanced guard.

Option 2: Bypass reconnaissance detachment, engage advanced guard

Option 2 is to continue movement toward CP 6 and find suitable ground to establish a hasty defense between Hills 560 and 210 oriented on CP 4. The intent of this option is to turn the advanced guard toward CP 2, thereby forcing them toward our main body. The assumption is if we can effectively turn the advanced guard, then the main body would be in position to both destroy the reconnaissance detachment and disrupt the advanced guard. Many assumptions roll into this decision; however, we do address the battalion's overall task to destroy the advanced guard, but we also fail to meet our specified task to destroy the reconnaissance detachment.

That said, there are many permutations of dealing with the reconnaissance detachment (should we choose this course of action), but mostly they fall into either "maintain contact" or "report the reconnaissance detachment and continue mission."

Author's solution

"Apache, this is Apache 6. FRAGO follows.

"Blue has visual contact with approximately 20 vehicles moving north of CP 3. I don't know if that is the reconnaissance detachment or not, but we can't let something that large affect our main body; therefore, we are going to attack to destroy that formation before they reach CP 2 and are able to fix the battalion.

"My intent is to gain contact, develop the situation and then either attack or find good ground to defend. I expect that once we gain contact, they will try to fix us and bypass us to the east between CP 2 and Hill 110; we cannot let that happen. Bottom line, that formation cannot put direct fire on the main body.

"Tasks to subordinate units:

- Blue (tank). Reverse march and maintain visual contact on the lead enemy elements. Find good cover and wait for White to move on-line.
- White (tank). Move to Blue's left flank and establish a support-by-fire position overwatching Blue's movement. Once on-line, begin bounding overwatch with Blue to gain contact. If you do not get contact, press toward CP 2 as quickly as you can so we can establish a hasty defense protecting the main body's move south of CP 2.
- Red (mech). You are our reserve. Stay with me and be prepared to transition to hasty attack or defense.
- Apache Redleg. Priority of fires is Blue. I want to use fires to disrupt and assist in breaking contact.

"Coordinating instructions:

- Stay mobile; we cannot get fixed. The idea is to stay between our main body and their main effort.
- Engagement criteria. Engage C2 vehicles, armor and anti-tank systems.
- Bypass criteria. Bypass one to three vehicles. Focus efforts on greater than three vehicle formations."

Rationale and conclusion

Generally, this solution lines up with the first option based on the rationale that we must gain and maintain contact above almost all other considerations. Given this, there are still some concerns based on this decision.

First, the lack of comms, combined with the separation from the main body, presents the very real

consideration that we have to deal with the gap in both guidance and supporting fires. This gap really drives our ultimate decision and outweighs the perceived benefits of moving toward the advance guard. Since the spot report came across Blue Force Tracker, you can assume the battalion and brigade commanders are working on how to deal with the advance guard, but you cannot assume that they know about the reconnaissance detachment moving into their flank; therefore, that has to be your priority.

Finally, what this scenario provides is reinforcement of units having well-practiced standing operating procedures, detailed engagement criteria and well-understood bypass criteria. In the lack of guidance, units and leaders make many decisions within the left and right limit of these types of coordinating instructions.

As units discuss this and other tactical scenarios, it is useful to take some time and discuss how current operating procedures would or could be used within the scenario. As always, the more we talk about these and other tactical problems, the better we are at solving the ones to come.

LTC Scott O'Neal is a lifelong student of the profession who believes in the detailed practice and study of tactics. He has had the privilege of leading Soldiers from platoon through battalion level and served on a variety of operational staffs throughout his career; his duty assignments have included squadron commander, 2/3 Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood, Texas; regimental operations officer, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood; operations officer, 1/3 Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood; commander, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 1-1 Cavalry, Budinggen, Germany; and commander, Troop A, 1-1 Cavalry, Budinggen. LTC O'Neal holds a bachelor's of science degree in international and strategic history from the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, and a master's of arts degree in military arts and science from Air University.

Notes

¹ FM 3-90-1, Page 2-3.

² An *approach march* is the advance of a combat unit when direct contact with

the enemy is intended (Army Doctrinal Reference Publication 3-90).

³ *Destroy* is a tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted (FM 3-90-1, C1).

⁴ The contemporary threat depicted in the combat training centers constantly adjusts based on the desired training objectives. However, there was a time that the timing of the various opposing-force

elements moving through the National Training Center's Central Corridor was widely known. Combat-arms officers knew the composition and disposition of the threat better than intelligence officers did, and while that time has passed, mechanized or mobile movements still require the same basic echeloning of forces and should be discussed within the overall enemy order of battle.

Acronym Quick-Scan

C2 – command and control
CP – checkpoint
FM – field manual
FRAGO – fragmentary order

Index of 2014 Articles and Authors

Articles by Title

"1st Armored Division Leads Army in Re-examining Mission Command 'Initiatives'"; Harrington, BG Joseph P., Riererson, Dr. William M., Jones, promotable LTC Marcus and Dvorak, MAJ John; November-December 2014.

"All-Bradley Scout Platoon at National Training Center Rotation 14-04, The"; Bove, CPT Robert, Kaness, CPT Michael and Page, CPT Jonathan; July-September 2014.

"Armored Brigade Combat Team 2014-2024: Improving Abrams Lethality, The"; Brown, MAJ Robert; January-February 2014.

"Ask the Right Questions, and You'll Get a Better Answer: How Training in the Philosophy of Mission Command Will Enable Our Commanders to Get Staffs to Get It Right the First Time"; Formica, CPT Anthony M.; March-June 2014.

"Bastogne Fusion Process: a Commander-Centric Approach to Planning and Decision-Making, The"; Kiniery, LTC Philip and Sentell, LTC Scott; July-September 2014.

"Cavalry Branch: a Redesignation for the 21st Century"; Jennings, CPT Nathan A.; January-February 2014.

"Cavalry: the Mounted Arm of Maneuver"; Rossow, CPT Andrew J.; March-June 2014.

"Cluster Munitions No More: What This Means for the U.S. Military"; Jacobson, LTC Mike; November-December 2014.

"Confessions of Mediocrity";

Brannan, 1LT Paul A.; January-February 2014.

"Developing Mission Focus to Ensure Military Expertise and Esprit de Corps in Army of 2020"; Klein, CPT Gary M. and Harrell, 1LT Christopher P.; March-June 2014.

"Doing More with Less"; Krasznitzer, LTC Franz; November-December 2014.

"Driver, How Much Fuel Do We Have?"; Kepley, LTC William; November-December 2014.

"Elite Mechanized Formations in an Age of Expeditionary Operations"; Elmonari, 1LT Kier; March-June 2014.

"Fostering a Culture of Mission Command"; Blanton, CPT David E.; March-June 2014.

"Global Positioning System and the Maneuver Soldier"; Drew, CPT Jerry V. II; March-June 2014.

"How Garryowen and the Standard Scout Platoon Equal Effective Recon"; Miseli, LTC Jason A., McLean, MAJ Gregory W. and Van Ingen, CPT Dirk K.; July-September 2014.

"How We Got Here and Where We are Going: a Doctrinal Approach to the Health of the Force"; Eisenberger, CPT Keith, Knepp, CPT Nick and Steadman, CPT J.P.; January-February 2014.

"Integrating Armored Warfare and What That Could Mean for the Infantry Brigade Combat Team"; Taylor, MAJ Joshua A.; November-December 2014.

"Integrating Live, Virtual, Constructive Enablers: U.S. Army in Europe's Ability to Create a Blended Training

Environment"; Green, LTC Andrew L., Joy, Bradley and Rykard, Edward; January-February 2014.

"Intelligence Support to a Cavalry Squadron"; Miseli, LTC Jason A., McLean, MAJ Gregory W. and Bovan, CPT Jeremy; July-September 2014.

"Knowledge Management at the Brigade"; Laybourn, MAJ Thomas E.; January-February 2014.

"Lessons from Exportable Combat Training Center Rotation 14-02"; Kuester, LTC Sean Hunt and Guthrie, MAJ Nathan; November-December 2014.

"Lost Sabers: Why We Need Operational Cavalry and How to Get It Back"; Nance, MAJ William S.; November-December 2014.

"Measures of Effectiveness in Army Doctrine"; Guffey, CPT Jason and Westphal, CPT Tom; November-December 2014.

"Next Combat Vehicle, The"; Lamont, retired USMC LTC Robert W.; July-September 2014.

"Not Just Infantry with Tanks: Who We Should Be and Why the Army Needs Us to Be It"; Spolizino, CPT Thomas; July-September 2014.

"Observations from the Opposing Force"; Fox, CPT Amos C. and Rossow, CPT Andrew J.; January-February 2014.

"Observations from the Opposing Force, Part II: Movement-to-Contact Lessons-Learned from National Training Center Rotation 12-05"; Fox, CPT Amos C.; July-September 2014.

"Partnership at Troop Level is Essential

Element in Joint Distributed Operations During Drawdown Transition from Counterinsurgency to Foreign International Defense”; Kelly, MAJ Michael J.; March-June 2014.

“Planning Assumptions: Are They Really Necessary and Valid?”; Hodge, retired LTC George; March-June 2014.

“Platform Immaterial: Reconnaissance Challenges in a Decisive-Action Training Environment”; Desai, CPT Jaison D.; July-September 2014.

“Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leader’s Course”; Randall, Nicole; January-February 2014.

“Stability Corps: Organizational Change for Full-Spectrum Capability, The”; Feret, CPT Eli; July-September 2014.

“Strike Now: Why the Armored Gun System Must Be Purchased in This Fiscal Climate”; Suthoff, CPT Josh T.; March-June 2014.

“Sustaining the Squadron: Sustainment Lessons-Learned at National Training Center”; Randi, CPT Matthew M. II; March-June 2014.

“Sustaining the Standard Scout Platoon”; Underwood, MAJ Bob and Turner, CPT William; July-September 2014.

“Sustainment Portal Provides Relevant Tool to Improve Readiness”; Snell, Dr. Reginald L.; November-December 2014.

“Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Employing Brigade and Task-Force Engineers”; Smallfield, COL Jason L.; November-December 2014.

“Tagging, Tracking and Locating: Intelligence Gathering in Support of Army 2020”; Lowry, LTC Eric; March-June 2014.

“Too Light to Fight: the Infantry Brigade Combat Team Cavalry Troop in Combined-Arms Maneuver”; Bies, MAJ Charles G.; July-September 2014.

“Transforming Tanks to Boots”; Rinaldi, CPT Nicholas A., Strickland, 1LT Chad J. and Winczewski, SFC David J.; November-December 2014.

“What Our Army Needs is a True Aero Scout”; Nuckols, COL William T. Jr. and Rose, Peter W. II; July-September 2014.

Authors

Bies, MAJ Charles G.; “Too Light to Fight: the Infantry Brigade Combat Team Cavalry Troop in Combined-Arms Maneuver”; July-September 2014.

Blanton, CPT David E.; “Fostering a Culture of Mission Command”; March-June 2014.

Bovan, CPT Jeremy; “Intelligence Support to a Cavalry Squadron”; July-September 2014.

Bove, CPT Robert; “The All-Bradley Scout Platoon at National Training Center Rotation 14-04”; July-September 2014.

Brannan, 1LT Paul A.; “Confessions of Mediocrity”; January-February 2014.

Brown, MAJ Robert; “The Armored Brigade Combat Team 2014-2024: Improving Abrams Lethality”; January-February 2014.

Desai, CPT Jaison D.; “Platform Immaterial: Reconnaissance Challenges in a Decisive-Action Training Environment”; July-September 2014.

Drew, CPT Jerry V. II; “Global Positioning System and the Maneuver Soldier”; March-June 2014.

Dvorak, MAJ John; “1st Armored Division Leads Army in Re-examining Mission Command ‘Initiatives’”; November-December 2014.

Elmoniary, 1LT Kier; “Elite Mechanized Formations in an Age of Expeditionary Operations”; March-June 2014.

Eisenberger, CPT Keith; “How We Got Here and Where We are Going: a Doctrinal Approach to the Health of the Force”; January-February 2014.

Feret, CPT Eli; “The Stability Corps: Organizational Change for Full-Spectrum Capability”; July-September 2014.

Formica, CPT Anthony M.; “Ask the Right Questions, and You’ll Get a Better Answer: How Training in the Philosophy of Mission Command Will Enable Our Commanders to Get Staffs to Get It Right the First Time”; March-June 2014.

Fox, CPT Amos C.; “Observations from the Opposing Force”; January-February 2014.

Fox, CPT Amos C.; “Observations from

the Opposing Force, Part II: Movement-to-Contact Lessons-Learned from National Training Center Rotation 12-05”; July-September 2014.

Green, LTC Andrew L.; “Integrating Live, Virtual, Constructive Enablers: U.S. Army in Europe’s Ability to Create a Blended Training Environment”; January-February 2014.

Guffey, CPT Jason; “Measures of Effectiveness in Army Doctrine”; November-December 2014.

Guthrie, MAJ Nathan; “Lessons from Exportable Combat Training Center Rotation 14-02”; November-December 2014.

Harrell, 1LT Christopher P.; “Developing Mission Focus to Ensure Military Expertise and Esprit de Corps in Army of 2020”; March-June 2014.

Harrington, BG Joseph P.; “1st Armored Division Leads Army in Re-examining Mission Command ‘Initiatives’”; November-December 2014.

Hodge, retired LTC George; “Planning Assumptions: Are They Really Necessary and Valid?”; March-June 2014.

Jacobson, LTC Mike; “Cluster Munitions No More: What This Means for the U.S. Military”; November-December 2014.

Jennings, CPT Nathan A.; “Cavalry Branch: a Redesignation for the 21st Century”; January-February 2014.

Jones, promotable LTC Marcus; “1st Armored Division Leads Army in Re-examining Mission Command ‘Initiatives’”; November-December 2014.

Joy, Bradley; “Integrating Live, Virtual, Constructive Enablers: U.S. Army in Europe’s Ability to Create a Blended Training Environment”; January-February 2014.

Kaness, CPT Michael; “The All-Bradley Scout Platoon at National Training Center Rotation 14-04”; July-September 2014.

Kelly, MAJ Michael J.; “Partnership at Troop Level is Essential Element in Joint Distributed Operations During Drawdown Transition from Counterinsurgency to Foreign International Defense”; March-June 2014.

Kepley, LTC William; “Driver, How

Much Fuel Do We Have?"; November-December 2014.

Kiniery, LTC Philip; "The Bastogne Fusion Process: a Commander-Centric Approach to Planning and Decision-Making"; July-September 2014.

Klein, CPT Gary M.; "Developing Mission Focus to Ensure Military Expertise and Esprit de Corps in Army of 2020"; March-June 2014.

Knepp, CPT Nick; "How We Got Here and Where We are Going: a Doctrinal Approach to the Health of the Force"; January-February 2014.

Krasznitzer, LTC Franz; "Doing More with Less"; November-December 2014.

Kuester, LTC Sean Hunt; "Lessons from Exportable Combat Training Center Rotation 14-02"; November-December 2014.

Lamont, retired USMC LTC Robert W.; "The Next Combat Vehicle"; July-September 2014.

Laybourn, MAJ Thomas E.; "Knowledge Management at the Brigade"; January-February 2014.

Lowry, LTC Eric; "Tagging, Tracking and Locating: Intelligence Gathering in Support of Army 2020"; March-June 2014.

McLean, MAJ Gregory W.; "How Garryowen and the Standard Scout Platoon Equal Effective Recon"; July-September 2014.

McLean, MAJ Gregory W.; "Intelligence Support to a Cavalry Squadron"; July-September 2014.

Miseli, LTC Jason A.; "How Garryowen and the Standard Scout Platoon Equal Effective Recon"; July-September 2014.

Miseli, LTC Jason A.; "Intelligence Support to a Cavalry Squadron"; July-September 2014.

Nance, MAJ William S.; "Lost Sabers: Why We Need Operational Cavalry and How to Get It Back"; November-December 2014.

Nuckols, COL William T. Jr.; "What Our Army Needs is a True Aero Scout"; July-September 2014.

Page, CPT Jonathan; "The All-Bradley Scout Platoon at National Training Center Rotation 14-04"; July-September 2014.

Randall, Nicole; "Reconnaissance and Surveillance Leader's Course"; January-February 2014.

Randi, CPT Matthew M. II; "Sustaining the Squadron: Sustainment Lessons-Learned at National Training Center"; March-June 2014.

Rierson, Dr. William M.; "1st Armored Division Leads Army in Re-examining Mission Command 'Initiatives'"; November-December 2014.

Rinaldi, CPT Nicholas A.; "Transforming Tanks to Boots"; November-December 2014.

Rose, Peter W. II.; "What Our Army Needs is a True Aero Scout"; July-September 2014.

Rossow, CPT Andrew J.; "Cavalry: the Mounted Arm of Maneuver"; March-June 2014.

Rossow, CPT Andrew J.; "Observations from the Opposing Force"; January-February 2014.

Rykard, Edward; "Integrating Live, Virtual, Constructive Enablers: U.S. Army in Europe's Ability to Create a Blended Training Environment"; January-February 2014.

Sentell, LTC Scott; "The Bastogne Fusion Process: a Commander-Centric Approach to Planning and Decision-Making"; July-September 2014.

Smallfield, COL Jason L.; "Tactics,

Techniques and Procedures for Employing Brigade and Task-Force Engineers"; November-December 2014.

Snell, Dr. Reginald L.; "Sustainment Portal Provides Relevant Tool to Improve Readiness"; November-December 2014.

Spolizino, CPT Thomas; "Not Just Infantry with Tanks: Who We Should Be and Why the Army Needs Us to Be It"; July-September 2014.

Steadman, CPT J.P.; "How We Got Here and Where We are Going: a Doctrinal Approach to the Health of the Force"; January-February 2014.

Strickland, 1LT Chad J.; "Transforming Tanks to Boots"; November-December 2014.

Suthoff, CPT Josh T.; "Strike Now: Why the Armored Gun System Must Be Purchased in This Fiscal Climate"; March-June 2014.

Taylor, MAJ Joshua A.; "Integrating Armored Warfare and What That Could Mean for the Infantry Brigade Combat Team"; November-December 2014.

Turner, CPT William; "Sustaining the Standard Scout Platoon"; July-September 2014.

Underwood, MAJ Bob; "Sustaining the Standard Scout Platoon"; July-September 2014.

Van Ingen, CPT Dirk K.; "How Garryowen and the Standard Scout Platoon Equal Effective Recon"; July-September 2014.

Westphal, CPT Tom; "Measures of Effectiveness in Army Doctrine"; November-December 2014.

Winczewski, SFC David J.; "Transforming Tanks to Boots"; November-December 2014.