

Inventing Germanness:

Class, Ethnicity, and Colonial Fantasy at the Margins of the Habsburg Monarchy

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I. Introduction

For some time now, scholars in the Americas have written about the category of race as a socially constructed, historical phenomenon. In doing so, they deny race an objective or transhistorical existence, while attempting to unmask its complex and very real social effects. This scholarship presents an important challenge to the historian of European nationalisms, namely, to convey the historical contingency of ideas about national identity rather than normativizing them and thus to reject the essentialist stamp placed on such categories by their contemporary and past proponents.⁽¹⁾

This challenge is particularly important today, as current analyses of the civil conflicts in the former Yugoslav republics have repeatedly demonstrated. Both media analysts and academic observers frequently rely on "ancient ethnic hatreds" as an important category for explaining these tragic events. Historians too are tempted to treat contemporary political conflict in eastern Europe as simply the latest manifestation of apparently transhistoric ethnic conflicts which have divided the region for centuries. Despite several

historical studies which have offered rigorous critiques of the normative category "nationality" in its European context, historians continue to treat nationalist politics as if they reflected an innate, essentialist truth shared by individuals who make up the national group.⁽²⁾

This working paper draws on theories generated by analysts of racial categories in the Americas to examine a particular form of German nationalism popularized in the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy during the 1880s. The paper assumes that 19th-century German-speaking Austrians did not share a transhistoric German identity, and that among those who identified themselves as Germans there was little agreement about what it was that made them German. Thus, rather than ascribe local conflict in Bohemia and Moravia to innate national differences, the paper points instead to the interaction of multiple and contingent social factors which together produced a distinctive German nationalism in late nineteenth century Austria.

II. The "Problem" as Understood by German Nationalists

Writing in 1882 for the German Society for the Spread of Generally Useful Knowledge, Julius Lippert outlined a challenge which faced German nationalists in Bohemia. He illustrated this challenge using a story taken from a popular account of David Livingstone's travels in Africa.⁽³⁾

The local natives, "somewhere on the Zambesi river," are "curious to learn the racial stock and national origins of this stranger" Livingstone. The Africans who accompany him, however, have no terms to distinguish the various nationalities of white men who trade there, such as Arabs, Portuguese or English.

[The Africans in Livingstone's party] explain that this white man is one of those 'who do not lie,' and on that basis alone, the others recognize immediately that he is English. A nation can certainly be proud of an appraisal like this, especially since it is made by sharply perceptive primitive peoples. What advantages are to be gained when individuals...as well as a whole nation, are so unified, that the reputation of the people is immediately applied to the individual, and that on the basis of an individual's behavior, a whole people can be recognized!⁽⁴⁾

Lippert suggested that this fundamental identification of the individual with qualities shared by the whole had enabled a small nation like England to conquer for itself a world-wide Empire. "It is not so much the coincidental reputation for truthfulness which explains this British success," he claimed, "but rather the manifest national unity of character, which other peoples immediately recognize and respect in them." This point echoed an increasingly common complaint voiced in bourgeois nationalist circles of the 1880s: that Germans in Austria remained stubbornly unaware of their own transhistorical national character. Historically the victims of too many conflicting interests in Central

Europe, it was claimed, Austrian Germans had never created a unified, self-conscious, nationalist education for themselves. They lacked the enviable sense, apparent in the British example, that "behind the individual stands the authority of a [united] *Volk*, an authority which impresses [people] even on the remotest of islands."⁽⁵⁾

Bourgeois political activists like Lippert worked hard in the 1880s to redefine local political identities and social conflicts in German nationalist terms. Their new German nationalist politics which emerged in the 1880s challenged Germans to embrace a unique identity, and to take up the "Kiplingesque" burdens of their special role in Central Europe. This new nationalism developed primarily among activists located in ethnically-mixed provinces at the geographic and cultural periphery of the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy.⁽⁶⁾ Here, nationalist activists framed a mission for themselves, a mission they sometimes modeled after that of European colonizers outside Europe.⁽⁷⁾ European colonizers had organized social relations with colonized peoples largely around racialist concepts of difference. Doing so had enabled the former to define themselves more clearly as Europeans, in fact, to invent the notion of the "European." In a similar fashion, Germans now worked to reimagine non-German speakers as fundamentally different from themselves in order to give Germanness a clearer definition.⁽⁸⁾

This was a far more essentialized understanding of identity than previous forms of German nationalism. Activists pointed to local linguistic habit as an external mark of irreconcilable social, cultural and perhaps racial differences. Where national identity had been previously understood as something contingent and changeable, by the 1880s national identity was increasingly imagined as something, fixed, inborn and transhistorical.

The redefinition of local linguistic habit as constituting a nationalist identity required activists to invent specific forms and histories for a previously undefined German identity. They also had to cut those local ties which had linked German and Czech speakers in parts of Bohemia and Moravia, emphasizing instead the imagined yet insurmountable boundaries separating the two groups. Lippert's invocation of colonialist imagery suggested how to accomplish these ends. The "natives" in distant Africa had recognized the uniqueness and superiority of the British in the latter's display of a "manifest national unity of character." In a geographically peripheral region of Austria, where German speakers constituted a numerical minority, nationalists like Lippert wanted local German speakers consciously to reflect on the differences which supposedly separated them from their Czech-speaking neighbors. In time, German speakers would come to see these incidental differences as fundamental to their identity, and would gain a clearer sense of their own Germanness.

This new nationalism was foremost a political response to the significant changes in the Monarchy wrought by economic transformation and political mass mobilization. In Austria (as elsewhere in Europe), the 1880s marked a critical turning away from the elite-dominated politics of the liberal period (1861-1879) to an emerging mass politics involving more broadly-based interest groups. Historians typically include nationalism as one among several powerful new mass ideologies whose deployment helped to defeat

bourgeois liberals in local and national elections.⁽⁹⁾ Since both nationalism and artisanal radicalism succeeded in mobilizing masses of people for diverse political causes in the 1880s, it is not surprising that historians have tended to view these two related but different movements as a single phenomenon. Yet nationalism's character differed significantly from the forms of mass politics organized around specific social and economic interests.

Artisanal radicalism and interest politics, for example, stressed inter- and intra- class conflict, repudiating the traditional liberal assumption that the bourgeoisie had the interests of all classes at heart. The men who led this new politics were alienated from the liberal movement. They sought access to power and resources for their "outsider" social groups by creating a powerful populist backlash against the domination of local politics by the more affluent Liberals.

The nationalism of the 1880s, however, resolutely denied that social differences among Germans should assume any political significance. In this it differed substantially from economic interest politics. Nationalist ideology sought to bind together highly diverse elements of a German national community under bourgeois leadership, directing the community's political energies outward against competing national groups. In terms of personnel, nationalism also presented leaders in the declining Liberal movement with some new opportunities to revive their waning political fortunes. Several Liberals held influential positions in the movement at both the local and Imperial levels well into the 1890s.

III. Nationalist Rhetoric and Bourgeois Interest

If this new nationalism represented a bourgeois liberal attempt to parry the blows dealt it by the new interest politics, we must still ask why at this particular moment, and why more often at the periphery of the Monarchy than at the center?

According to traditional liberal political rhetoric in Austria, German identity corresponded to the cultivation of liberal bourgeois cultural values like education, freedom and enlightenment. By this standard, German identity was available to anyone who chose to adopt those higher cultural values.⁽¹⁰⁾ In theory at least, individuals from any background, from Jews to Slavs, could attain a German identity through education and acculturation. The special structural position of the German language in the governing institutions of the Empire (after 1867, the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy) further enhanced the desirability of a German identity. Proficiency in German was a crucial prerequisite for any upwardly-mobile bourgeois seeking higher social status by entering government service. As the language of much interregional commerce, German was also closely associated with financial and social achievement in parts of Bohemia and Moravia. Many German liberals in fact presumed that as upwardly-mobile Czech or Slovene *Bürger* became more financially successful and better educated, they would naturally identify themselves as Germans, (a process which frequently did occur).⁽¹¹⁾

The special relationship between state institutions which employed the German language and the German-speaking bourgeoisie shaped the latter's approach to reform and to politics in general. Despite their frequent opposition to state policies the German Liberals never questioned the legitimacy of the centralized state structure. They viewed the central state as a powerful instrument which might someday help them to transform Austrian society from one of feudal privilege into a new liberal order. During the period 1848-1867 the Liberals worked hard, not to weaken the state so much as to gain control over it for themselves.

Since the central state guaranteed the German language a functionally privileged status, German Liberals interpreted any kind of nationalist attack against that status as a particularist threat to the state.⁽¹²⁾ Until 1879, the survival of the Germans' special status depended on their complete identification with the supra-national state. For this reason, sporadic attempts by German activists before 1880 to develop a politics organized around German nationalism typically met with embarrassed silence or outright opposition from Liberal leaders.⁽¹³⁾

German Liberal attitudes changed dramatically in 1879, when for the first time in the history of participatory politics in Austria, the Liberal parties were actually defeated at the polls. The so-called "Iron Ring" government, a coalition cabinet of Clerical, Conservative and pro-Slav parties under Count Eduard Taaffe, replaced the Liberal-dominated Vienna Government. This defeat created a devastating aura of vulnerability among self-styled German *Bürger*. No longer could bourgeois Germans refer to themselves confidently as a *Staatsvolk* and assume a correspondence between their interests and those of the Austrian state. In fact, the new government swiftly passed legislation designed to weaken the privileged position of the German language, and to gain support for itself particularly among lower-middle class groups whose interests the Liberal parties had famously ignored.⁽¹⁴⁾

The Iron Ring policies had a far different affect on politics at the center of the Empire (Vienna) than they had on politics in the ethnically mixed provinces at the Empire's periphery. In German-speaking Vienna, anti-Semitic, Catholic social and artisanal activists united to challenge the long-standing dominance of bourgeois political Liberalism. While many Viennese opposed the government's new anti-German tilt, they did not accord nationalism much priority in municipal politics. Instead, social and economic issues galvanized the masses in the capital city, eventually bringing Lueger's radical movement into power.

Lueger combined appeals based on anti-Socialist fears with a kind of populism which aimed to restore the power of a broad based, urban petty-bourgeois coalition, purposely reminiscent of the coalition which had supposedly led the revolution of 1848. Lueger's twin attacks focused on both the Viennese "Jewish" upper bourgeoisie and on an increasingly well organized socialist movement. Lueger's alliance with Catholic social activists, themselves sponsors of slav national movements elsewhere, caused him to avoid taking a strong German nationalist position, as did the traditional anti-clericalism

of the Liberal nationalists. Instead, Lueger relied on the common language of anti-Semitism to hold together the diverse constituencies which formed his movement.⁽¹⁵⁾

In ethnically-mixed Bohemia and Moravia, however, the new government's policies had a much different affect on local politics. German-speakers may have dominated specific regions or cities, but in terms of provincial populations, they made up a distinct minority of 37% in Bohemia and 29% in Moravia. German speakers in these provinces who were conscious of their minority status had always relied on the central government to guarantee their language's privileged status. With the new central government in the hands of their enemies, however, many of these German speakers turned to new forms of nationalism as their best hope for political survival. They did so partly for defensive reasons since their newly-empowered Czech opponents had organized their own political attacks around issues of language and nationality. Yet bourgeois leaders also turned to nationalism because they saw in it a powerful instrument to unite their economically divided community.

In the 1880s the Iron Ring gave German Liberal parties a lot more to worry about than simply the attacks on the traditional privileges enjoyed by the German language. The new government sought to exploit social and economic differences within the German middle classes by enfranchising a significant portions of the lower middle class and by setting these new voters against the traditional Liberal parties. Rapid industrialization had created social dislocation and discontent in parts of Bohemia and Moravia, and many social groups already held "Liberal financiers" responsible for the severe depression of the 1870s. Small wonder then that growing artisanal radicalism, fed by Iron Ring policy, posed a life threat to political liberalism in the 1880s.

This rise of a politics based on social and economic interests helps to explain why bourgeois Liberal activists in the ethnically-mixed provinces found nationalism so attractive. These activists portrayed national identity as more significant than class position, arguing that occupational, corporate or party political identities had to take a back seat to the very survival of the nation. Nationalists worked hard to prevent workers, artisans, small retailers and peasants from adopting divisive political identities organized around class interest.

When bourgeois Liberal parties began to reformulate their political appeals around a populist form of German nationalism, they called upon all those who shared a German identity -of whatever class- to mobilize politically in support of an endangered German community.⁽¹⁶⁾ In doing so, German Liberal activists developed a rhetoric which projected a specific, unified German identity, available only to those who had inherited a common ethnic-linguistic heritage, (and which had to be kept pure of outside influences). Gone were those days when German identity had functioned as an earned virtue, gaining its bearer entrance into a relatively tiny, politically active bourgeois elite. In a time of increasing social and political mobilization, Germanness became less a mark of cultural achievement -theoretically available to all- and more an essentialized form of identity which bound its holder to certain codes of social and political behavior.

The multi-lingual character of the Austrian periphery was critical to the success of this new bourgeois German nationalism in Austria. As nationalist rhetoric came to dominate local politics in the periphery, Germanness became a crucial component of one's political identity, precisely because of the apparent ambiguities of social identity in linguistically heterogeneous regions. For example, bourgeois German speakers at the periphery could point to real differences in local language use, an empirically observable element in social life, to stress the importance of inter-class German unity. They could also "prove" through statistical analyses the number of Germans "lost" annually to the Czechs, or that the German birthrate had fallen behind that of the Czechs.

The adoption of a more populist political rhetoric represented a considerable gamble on the part of the leaders of the Liberal parties. By inciting people of all classes to join their political movement on the basis of national identity alone, the bourgeois strata risked losing its control over local politics. Local and national Liberal leaders recognized from the start that mass mobilization should occur only under safe conditions which guaranteed the survival of their own power within the local community.⁽¹⁷⁾ This concern to maintain control largely determined the specific content of local nationalist rhetoric and ideology.

The importance of defining to the whole community just what constituted Germanness shaped the bourgeois nationalist strategy from the start. By defining Germanness primarily in terms of bourgeois norms and behaviors, Liberals tried to impose a powerful if invisible hierarchy of class on the newly mobilized German national community. As long as all groups within the community accepted a particularly bourgeois construction of Germanness, the strategy worked. The danger always remained, however, that other lower class groups might offer alternative, more egalitarian constructions of Germanness.⁽¹⁸⁾ To avoid any competing attempts to define Germanness, bourgeois leaders continually stressed that an effective nationalism required complete, unquestioned political unity.

Most of the work of creating and spreading the new nationalism was accomplished in nationalist associations, many of which were organized in the early 1880s to protect the social interests of local German communities. These groups were offshoots of the existing local networks of bourgeois associations, generally sharing with the latter the same local leadership and membership base. Yet unlike those already in existence, the nationalist associations consciously directed their appeals to a socially broader audience. They were joined in this effort by local nationalist newspapers and almanacs, all of which founded their new rhetoric on three linked components of the new nationalism: 1) The preservation of German inter-class unity in the face of a hostile "other," 2) education to prevent internal disunity or mixing with ethnic "others;" and 3) the creation of political and economic self-help institutions designed to relieve class tensions within the German community and to encourage the spread of bourgeois values and customs.

IV. Inter-Class Unity under Fire: Inventing the Enemy

A crucial part of nationalism's attractiveness as a community ideology for bourgeois liberals lay in their claim that it superseded all "artificial" social qualifications of rank or status. In 1882, for example, the highly successful German School Association [*Deutscher Schulverein*], dedicated to bringing German language education to children living in ethnically mixed regions, closed a typical appeal for membership with the words,

we will never accomplish our mission until all social strata of the people take an active part, until those who inhabit the German palaces as much as those who inhabit German peasant huts, make a claim to their Germanness."⁽¹⁹⁾

The notion of making a claim on one's Germanness suggests the essentialized dimension of this quality. The concept of national community conveyed by this appeal reflected its author's concern to represent Germanness as a quality shared equally by German-speakers of all classes, from prince to peasant. To reinforce the claim of universality, an article appearing in the School Association journal the following year listed the diverse occupations of its local officers, presenting this survey as "convincing proof that the School Association can count active members in every class [*Schicht*] of society."⁽²⁰⁾

Constructing the Czech as fundamentally different from Germans of every class enabled local nationalists to weaken those common bonds of local culture which frequently linked German speakers to their Czech-speaking neighbors. This was a difficult project in rural areas where the isolation of peasants from provincial or national politics gave the nationalists few issues on which to build arguments about national unity and difference. As one German-speaking peasant explained to a Bohemian agrarian convention in 1879, "We know nothing of national hatred...of what importance is nationality to the peasant?"⁽²¹⁾ Yet even in more urbanized areas with significant German-speaking populations, nationalists frequently contended with regional attitudes which attached little political significance to local differences in language use. One mid-nineteenth-century account of Iglau, a city in central Moravia, noted for example that, "the inhabitants of Iglau are mostly of German origin. The language in Iglau is predominantly German, the domestic servants however speak mostly Bohemian or Moravian."⁽²²⁾ Here the non-German languages are referred to simply as "Bohemian" and "Moravian," not as a single Czech national language. Moreover, both languages are associated with class position, and are not representative of essential qualities separating two distinct nations.

Many writers used scare tactics to define the German community in terms of its national enemies. In particular, they warned against the anti-constitutional political goals and unjust tactics of their Czech nationalist opponents. In fact, they demonized the Czechs, pointing to the suspicious feudal aristocratic and clerical elements which supposedly dominated Slav movements, and condemning the strategies devised by Czech self-help organizations as unfair and even immoral. In particular, German nationalists accused these organizations not simply of working to protect legitimate Czech interests, but of engaging in guerilla tactics in order to gain new territorial footholds and to divide the populace in parts of Bohemia which rightly "belonged" to Germans.

"We ask nothing of the Czechs but that they behave themselves in German districts in the same way they would expect those Germans who live in Czech districts to behave," proclaimed one Moravian almanac.⁽²³⁾ Yet apparently, this was exactly the kind of honorable behavior which the nationalists claimed could not be expected of such people. Numerous pamphlets and articles pointed in "shocking" detail to the aggressive tactics developed by the Czechs. Unlike the Germans who claimed only a desire to protect themselves and their property, the Czechs dreamed of converting all Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia into a Czech-speaking state.⁽²⁴⁾ German nationalists worried that to accomplish this aim, the Czechs might try to lure German-speaking workers or artisans into so-called politically neutral interest groups, organizations which inevitably became vehicles for Czech infiltration into the community. One article describing the activities of the Czech School Association, a group dedicated to founding Czech language schools in ethnically-mixed areas, noted that:

First they try to win over the *Sprachinseln*, then they try to shift the border areas in their favor, and then, they try to permeate the purely German areas with Slavic elements, starting with the major cities.⁽²⁵⁾

Defining the Czechs as "others" involved elaborating the deadly long-term consequences which their national movement might unleash on the German-speaking communities of Bohemia and Moravia. In the introduction to his 1892 statistical survey of Austro-Germans in the Monarchy, Michael Hainisch cited a story by Alexander von Humboldt whose not-so-subtle moral suggested the dire consequences of German passivity in the face of Czech nationalism:

In his observations on nature, A. von Humboldt relates the impression made on him by an old parrot who could recite words from the vocabulary of an extinct Indian tribe. The people for whom this language had served as a medium for intellectual exchange were dead; some few words survived for just a few more decades in the throat of the bird. Just as with Humboldt, so do proofs of the decline of a people awaken in the individual thoughts about mortality, mortality which can apply to a nation as much as to an individual.⁽²⁶⁾

Nationalists who wanted to raise concerns about apparent German demographic decline could also cite the publication in 1881 of the first decennial census to classify Austrians on the basis of their "language of use" [*Umgangssprache*].⁽²⁷⁾ As a government document designed to help determine the language of instruction for local schools, this and all subsequent censuses became objects of substantial political controversy.⁽²⁸⁾ Political activists on all sides questioned their accuracy. Czechs suspected, for example, that the notion of *Umgangssprache* would favor German interests, since many Czech speakers used the German language in their commercial dealings. Many on both sides demanded that people be asked to report their nationality instead of their language of use, but this concept was probably a foreign one to most citizens of the monarchy.⁽²⁹⁾

The 1881 census shocked the bourgeois German political community, particularly since its publication closely followed the German Liberal party's fall from government power in Vienna. The appearance of the census at this moment reinforced fears about possible German demographic decline in ethnically-mixed regions of Austria. Earlier censuses had only guessed at the ethnic composition of various regions, and due to the almost universal usage of German in commerce and government, they had typically overestimated the numbers of German speakers in ethnically-mixed cities and regions.⁽³⁰⁾ It therefore seemed to many Germans that their "nation" had suffered a demographic defeat.

The use of the census to depict the size and the geography of the German nation in Austria changed the ways in which activists spoke about the so-called "national community." The census transformed a complex reality, in which individuals frequently used more than one language, into an apparently simple fact of national identity. Despite all evidence to the contrary, every individual was now imagined to speak one true defining language; knowledge of a second or third language had no bearing on this innate national identity.

Nationalist activists increasingly understood the census as an elaborate form of national accounting. Mapping the census statistics according to the geography of each nation also conveyed a notion of group territory and ownership. "Not another square foot!" was the visually suggestive slogan adopted by the Union of Germans in North Moravia [*Bund der Deutschen Nordmährens*]. The image of territorial loss also equated nationalist conflict with threats to the private property of the community of Germans. Conjuring up images of abandoned cities, lost lands and property, many writers reinforced a palpable sense of decline among Germans, while giving those Germans a legitimate and historically-grounded claim to Bohemia and Moravia.⁽³¹⁾

The image of territorial loss to a community suggested that nationalist conflict was really about threats to the private property of the community of Germans. In fact, the use of the term *Nationalbesitzstand*, which came to refer both to specific geographic places and to the wealth, power and knowledge produced by Germans in those places, reflected a rhetorical attempt to create a common sense of national property among Germans of all classes. Nationalist writers encouraged German speakers to develop a feeling of national ownership by imagining their commonalities with each other in tangible geographic terms, not simply in cultural or linguistic ones.

Some nationalist writers admitted that it was the successful industrialization of formerly German cities which had brought Czech-speaking workers into formerly German-speaking communities, and not some Czech nationalist plot. However, these nationalists still blamed the Czechs for their unwillingness to become Germans. Hainisch reminded his readers that, "until now, numerous Czech immigrants, almost all members of the lowest classes, willingly renounced their nationality and attached themselves to the Germans." Now however, the aggressive presence of Czech nationalist voluntary organizations lodged in German communities encouraged those workers who might have learned German, to adopt a Czech nationalist identity instead.⁽³²⁾

In an era characterized both by lingering economic depression in some industries and increased social mobility due to growth in others, nationalist organizations sought through symbols and overt statements to link local economic and social fears directly to the issue of nationalism. Their ability to make this connection allowed them to insist that maintaining a united nationalist community outweighed any possible class differences within that community.

V. Education against Disunity or "Creolization"

Consciousness-raising and education became the primary means for overcoming any apparent disunity among the Germans. Most Germans, according to Julius Lippert in the quotation cited earlier, were simply unaware of their national identity and did not understand the dire consequences for their community of this lack of awareness. In order to raise popular concern, activists educated their followers about endangered ethnic purity. They warned against the hidden threat which "creolization" (to borrow a term from another continent) posed to the formation of individual and community identity. The need to strengthen a specific, multi-class German identity, once pure, long since creolized by "ethnic intermingling" on the border lands, increasingly pervaded the nationalist literature published by bourgeois voluntary associations and newspapers after 1880.

Calls for purification typically insisted on (re)-establishing a kind of original endogamous national identity by ridding language and culture of so-called foreign elements. These concerns ranged from establishing proper German place names to appropriating common Central European customs and traditions by calling them German and giving them specifically German histories. A General German Language Association was founded in 1885 to fight the "spreading plague of foreign words, to cleanse the German language of foreign influences, and to strengthen the general national consciousness of the German people." The Association urged its members never to "use a foreign word for anything which can be expressed in good German!"⁽³³⁾

Since it depended so heavily on formal and informal sites of education for its success, the nationalist movement made special appeals to bourgeois and lower middle class women to join its associations. Their responsibilities for the early years of child rearing in that imagined sphere of (re)production, the home, made women (or more accurately, women defined as mothers) the first teachers of future Germans. In addition, their increasing role in public charitable organizations made bourgeois women a trusted point of contact with the working class.

Women of all classes who joined nationalist associations were subjected to a barrage of prescriptive literature which related Germanness to specific forms of domestic economy and child rearing. This barrage conveyed a tangible conception of what it meant to live as a German, enforcing specifically urban *Bürger* norms of behavior among the marginal classes of Germans who now belonged to the community.⁽³⁴⁾

Pamphlets, almanacs and particularly newsletters offered a variety of useful hints on how German parents should instill in their children German virtues. Number five of the "Ten Commandments of the German Peasant," which appeared in various popular almanacs, commanded peasants to marry their daughters to German-speaking husbands.⁽³⁵⁾ Writings such as the following poem by Adolf Pichler encouraged both parents and daughters to accept only true German men as suitors:

**And should a cowardly boy approach you,
who fears openly to call himself a German,
you shake your curls with contempt
and show how angrily your eyes can burn.**⁽³⁶⁾

Such prescriptions encouraged individual families to join in that community process of purification to restore their dangerously creolized national identity, and to give specific meanings to a hazy universal German identity.

Yet it was to the mother that most articles gave the responsibility of instilling in children the appropriate German behavioral virtues.⁽³⁷⁾ From the day of her child's birth it became the German mother's primary responsibility to raise that child as a German. Mothers should be certain to hire German-speaking domestic servants, and never Czech-speakers. This prevented the German mother from inadvertently encouraging her children to learn a second language before the age of 14, a serious danger associated with hiring Czech-speaking domestic help.⁽³⁸⁾ According to these writers, exposure to a second language could only confuse a child, and therefore should be avoided before the child reached the age where he or she had already internalized a solid national identity. Lippert even warned in an article on national education that, "along with the milk of a Czech nurse, the child imbibes her language."

Yet even if Germans refrained from using a Czech-speaking wet nurse, they unwittingly retained a "speech wet nurse" in the person of any Slavic servant in the house. "What good is the most glittering speech of a German parliamentarian against our territorial losses, when German manufacturers willingly give their children to the care of Czech maids...?" asked Hainisch.⁽³⁹⁾ German nationalists frequently justified their fear of ethnic mixing by referring to the apparently clear differences in cultural sophistication attained by the Czech and German cultures. According to one writer, of all the languages spoken in the Monarchy, only German (and possibly Italian) had an "absolute cultural value." The rest had only a relative, local value. While it would always be to Czech advantage to learn German, a German individual's learning Czech or forgetting German made little sense, and in fact, constituted a cultural tragedy.⁽⁴⁰⁾

Nationalists relied on the figure of the German mother to convey key information to her children in other ways as well. She had to adorn her walls with artwork depicting German heroes, German rulers, and most important, (perhaps because of their conspicuously small number), historical "examples of German community unity." A mother must also avoid unnatural French fashions in dressing herself and her children, resorting rather to

the trusted German traditional costume [*Tracht*], accenting the child's individuality by dressing boys and girls in different colors.⁽⁴¹⁾

The last examples point to an important irony in the construction and dissemination of Germanness. Even as urban-based *Bürger* activists held up their own forms of sociability and behavior as examples of Germanness, and as they attempted to reinforce patterns of deference among lower-middle-class, working-class and peasant Germans, they often gave these behaviors a rural genealogy. This helps to explain urban writers' fascination for the peasant *Tracht* and its social significance. These activists often exhorted their rural or lower class fellow Germans to "honor your *Tracht*." Since the early 19th century the rediscovered *Tracht* had become a symbol for the simple, quiet rural virtues which the local bourgeois hoped their politically unenfranchised and economically dissatisfied neighbors would adopt. Now, however, those virtues were extolled not simply for their rural genealogy, but rather for their national authenticity, for which that rural genealogy offered a kind of proof. One writer referred to the peasant's re-adoption of the *Tracht* as "a sign of pride in his German qualities as opposed to [those of] his (Czech) speaking neighbor," cautioning the peasant who lived on the linguistic border against "gradually laying aside his *Tracht* in order to fit in better with his Czech neighbor or even his own Czech servant!"⁽⁴²⁾

VI. Nationalist Self-Help and Capitalist Virtue

As mentioned above, even as they castigated Czech nationalists for their unfair tactics, most bourgeois German activists betrayed at least a rudimentary understanding of the impersonal economic and social forces which had actually created the very demographic crisis they warned against. They encouraged the efforts of German economic self-help organizations both to stem the demographic tide of German emigration, and to diffuse economic tensions which constantly threatened to splinter the German community.

The Union of the Bohemian Woods embodied the kind of approach adopted by a most bourgeois German nationalists. This organization in southern Bohemia focused its attentions both on the high rate of German emigration from the *Böhmerwald* to neighboring areas like Lower Austria or Vienna, and the growing Czech population there and in the city of Budweis. The region suffered from low agricultural productivity, overcrowded farms and a generally stagnant economy as well as from the fact that Czech workers apparently accepted lower wages and worse working conditions than their German counterparts.

The Union directed its attentions specifically to raising agricultural productivity, founding credit institutions, aiding local manufacture and encouraging tourism in the region. It sponsored training programs for farmers and handworkers, encouraging local German manufacturers to hire German-speaking journeymen and apprentices, and bourgeois women to hire only German-speaking servants. The Union organized craft exhibitions in commercial centers like Budweis, Gablonz, Prague and Vienna to advertise products made in the *Böhmerwald*. Following the model of popular alpine resorts in

neighboring Austria and Bavaria, the Union started a tourist bureau, built mountain climbing huts and advertised a *Guide through the Bohemian Woods* by a Prague educator. In the 1890s it even called for organized boycotts directed against Czech-owned businesses.⁽⁴³⁾

All of these very measures, apparently designed to combat the Czech demographic infiltration of the German *Nationalbesitzstand*, also addressed some less apparent class-based fears shared by local and regional bourgeois nationalists. Publications of organizations like the Union of the Bohemian Woods or the Union of North Moravian Germans constantly stressed that economic self-help required new forms of self-discipline in which the readers, as Germans, were uniquely positioned to engage. Individual Germans had to learn certain moral lessons in order to take full advantage of the opportunities offered by economic self-help measures. Repeatedly, consumers of nationalist publications read that peasant or working-class Germans could survive only by adopting German bourgeois values, otherwise the instruments of self-help would not work.

These discussions should remind us of the implicit tension in Julius Lippert's hope, cited at the outset, that Germans would learn more about their own transhistorical identity as Germans. Nationalist writers made several claims to a kind of moral superiority, based largely on empirical evidence of German economic prosperity in Bohemia and Moravia. At the same time, however, those very qualities which they claimed as the hallmark of Germanness had to be taught to Germans who were as yet unfamiliar with them. Just as with education, where lower-middle-class, working class and peasant German speakers had to learn what it meant to be part of a German nation, so they also had to learn how to behave in a rationally capitalist fashion. Yet these behaviors, it was suggested, were already part of an unconscious ethnic identity, implicitly shared by members of the nation.

Images which linked capitalist virtue to Germanness were to be found in two new types of propaganda. In one form, authors contrasted neat German farms, carefully laid out, regular cities and the general economic prosperity of German regions to their supposedly sloppy, less prosperous Slav counterparts. One description lavishly praised a Moravian German textile factory, likening it to a vacation resort, and connecting both its attractive external appearance and its internal productivity to its German identity:

The factory buildings themselves are positioned splendidly near a forest, and are surrounded by beautiful gardens. The internal management is admirable, the treatment of the workers is humane, inspired by a well-meaning solicitude. For these reasons, we wish [this factory], created and run by German energy, all the best in the future.⁽⁴⁴⁾

The second form of propaganda addressed the German farmer or small business owner more directly. Almanac advice columns like one entitled "Useful Hints for the Home," frequently concluded with a general exhortation linking Germanness to rational capitalist behavior.

Which farmer today is capable of fulfilling his task? The one who attains a personal and technical proficiency. In the fight for [national] survival, [only] increased technical knowledge and ability can ensure the land will endure.⁽⁴⁵⁾

"Golden Rules for Businesspeople," from the Union of North Moravian Germans, taught capitalist virtue and provided valuable information on techniques for conducting a business, as the following advice suggests:⁽⁴⁶⁾

One should behave in all business situations with careful deliberation, one should always be respectable, punctual and indefatigable...Everyone should try in an upright and permissible fashion, to earn as much money as he can...One should insure all purchases immediately...The best business partner for a middling-sized business will always be a thrifty wife.

The frequently-published "Ten Commandments of the German Farmer" connected a bourgeois view of appropriate behavior explicitly with German virtue:

1) Thou shalt honor thy mothertongue and believe that all Germans are thy brothers. 2) Thou shalt read only newspapers sympathetic to the German cause. 3) Thou shalt honor Emperor Joseph as your liberator and hang his picture in your living room. 4) Thou shalt sign no promissory note. 5) Thou shalt marry thy daughter only to a German. 6) Thou shalt not go to court over every small issue. 7) Thou shalt make certain that thy children diligently attend school. 8) Thou shalt not complain about bad times but shall bravely persevere... 9) Thou shalt be a good Christian, but never fall into excessive piety. 10) Thou shalt join the German School Association, since the [cost of a] few weekly Kreuzer will do you no harm.

There is another important way to read this choice of economic self-help as a social policy strategy for maintaining or increasing German bourgeois influence at the local level. The increase in voluntary associations designed to address the apparent demographic decline of the Germans on the periphery reflected a growing understanding that no help could be expected from the central state. For some thirty years the bourgeois German elite had sought to ally itself with the state, in fact to use the state as an instrument to transform a feudal, ignorant and superstitious society into a liberal and capitalist one. Now that state lay in the hands of Conservatives, Clerics and Slavs who used its power to weaken liberal reforms and to make greater concessions to ethnic minorities.

As a result, German bourgeois Austrians in provinces like Bohemia and Moravia gradually muted their traditional insistence on maintaining the centralist system. Instead, they returned to a strategy for achieving change at the local level which they had developed early in the *Vormärz*, during the years of censorship and repression which had

preceded the revolutions of 1848. German nationalist activism came to be organized primarily as a local and regional phenomenon, and was gradually detached from its original identification with the central state. In the eyes of many bourgeois Germans, the central state had lost its former potential for bringing modernity to Austria. Instead, the German nation itself was increasingly imagined as the vehicle for modern cultural values and economic development. For these reasons, Austrian politics in the 1880s and 1890s saw the decline of the old supra-regional German liberal party in parliament and its replacement instead with a number of regionally-based, bourgeois German nationalist parties.⁽⁴⁷⁾

VII. Conclusion

In their very designations of and social interactions with colonial "others" all over the world, Europeans developed nationalist identities for themselves. Increasingly, these identities relied for their survival on the importance of imagined notions of national or racial difference. Something of the same process seems to have taken place among those bourgeois German speakers in the Austrian Empire who, after 1880, concerned themselves with defining a nationalist identity for their communities, and then with maintaining its purity in a period of rapidly changing economic and social conditions.

After 1879, the traditional liberal claim that education and property would eventually provide all social groups with access to political power no longer served to hold the political community together. Bourgeois activists in some regions of the monarchy turned instead to a rhetoric organized around ideas of national identity. In part, the turn to nationalism in Bohemia and Moravia was defensive in nature. In those provinces especially, bourgeois Czech nationalists had employed a similar rhetoric to organize their political community with growing success since the 1860s. Yet German nationalism's ability to parry the blows aimed by the Czechs at the German-identified state constituted only part of its important attraction. It was German nationalism's claim to apply equally to all Germans that constituted its most valuable attribute. At a time when previously unenfranchised groups were mobilizing politically around class interests, this kind of nationalism offered the German-speaking bourgeoisie a powerful ideology of inter-class solidarity.

By the late 1880s, the need to preserve local class relations had helped produce this compelling new community identity among bourgeois Germans in the ethnically-mixed provinces at the Monarchy's periphery. Yet, as with liberalism and its discredited promises of social advancement and progress, appearances in the case of this nationalism were often deceiving. Bourgeois nationalists might claim to be mobilizing a socially heterogeneous group of people politically in the 1880s on the basis of a shared ethnic identity, yet rarely did they willingly distribute access to political power on that same basis. In fact, asserting the primacy of a common German identity enabled bourgeois Austrians to co-opt competing classes and social groups at least for a time, in the name of national unity. Particularly in its earlier phases, the new nationalist rhetoric often served to reinforce traditional, if less visible, power relations at the local and provincial level.

This rhetoric carefully defined the essential differences which separated national groups from each other, in order to enforce new forms of inter-class unity. To reinforce both the inherent and historic superiority of a unitary German culture, German nationalists often depicted the relations between Germans and Czechs in Bohemia and Moravia as the local equivalent to the colonial relationships which linked "culturally superior" Europeans to non-Europeans in Africa, Latin America and Asia.

The nationalist ideology of the 1880s achieved a tenuous community unity, endowing the newly important social categories of "German" and "non-German," with apparent stability. That they succeeded to such a great extent in linking local understanding of social problems to a larger nationality conflict points to the nationalists' success at reinterpreting social conflict in terms of nationalist conflict for their followers. Yet this quick success in no way solved the problem or ended the social struggles it was meant to mask. As with the concept to race in the Americas, the explosive contradictions between universal presumptions of community and the individual's own experience of real power relations within the community meant that what was presented as transhistorical and natural, was in fact constantly contested, questioned and redefined. For a clear example of this ongoing process, one has only to trace the uses to which newly-mobilized community members put this essentialized German identity. Eager to exert power within the community, yet still forced to defer to bourgeois leadership, many frustrated lower-middle-class activists turned to the more radically essentialist community ideology of anti-Semitism as a way of challenging the hegemony of the bourgeois elite.⁽⁴⁸⁾

By redefining Germanness on their own, more egalitarian terms, the next generation of activists would undercut that elusive inter-class unity which nationalist ideology had promised to guarantee.

Endnotes

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Wherever possible I have tried to use common English terms for place names in the ethnically-mixed regions of the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy. In cases where there are no common English terms, I have used the nineteenth-century German place names as they appeared in the newspapers, almanacs and records of voluntary association which I examined for this article. This choice should in no way imply an ideological preference for the German names on my own part. The following are Czech names for some of the

German and English place names cited: Brno for Brünn; České Budejovice for Budweis; Jablonec for Gablonz; Jihlava for Iglau; Praha for Prague.

1. See, for example, Virginia Dominguez, *White by Definition* (Rutgers: 1986), Barbara Fields, "Ideology and Race in American History," in J. Kousser and J. McPherson, eds., *Religion, Race and Reconstruction* (Oxford: 1982), Daniel Segal, "'The European': Allegories of Racial Purity," in *Anthropology Today*, nr. 7, 1991, pp. 7-9, Ann Stoler, "Rethinking Colonial Categories: European Communities and the Boundaries of Rule," in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, nr. 31, 1989, pp. 134-161, Verena Martinez-Alier, *Marriage, Class and Color in Nineteenth-Century Cuba*, (University of Michigan Ann Arbor: 1989).

2. Some excellent critical studies of European nationalisms include, Gary B. Cohen, *The Politics of Ethnic Survival: Germans in Prague, 1861-1914* (Princeton: 1981), Daniel Segal, "Nationalism, Comparatively Speaking," in *Journal of Historical Sociology* vol. 1, no. 3, 1988, pp. 301-321, Segal and Richard Handler, "How European is Nationalism?" in *Social Analysis*, (forthcoming), Katherine Verdery, *Transylvanian Villagers: Three Centuries of Political, Economic and Ethnic Change* (Berkeley: 1983). Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* (London: 1991) seeks to displace traditionally Eurocentric and teleological discussions of nationalism, but see the critique of Anderson's discussion of race and nationalism by Handler and Segal, and by Paul Gilroy, *There Ain't no Black in the Union Jack': The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation* (Chicago: 1987), pp. 44-45.

3. Julius Lippert, "Die Erziehung auf nationaler Grundlage," in *Sammlung Gemeinnütziger Vorträge*, (Prague: 1882). The series, published in Prague, included several pamphlets by Lippert meant to acquaint the populace with subjects like world geography, economics or the Austrian constitution. See also Robert R. Luft, "Der 'Deutsche Verein zur Verbreitung gemeinnütziger Kenntnisse' in Prag 1869-1938. Ein Beitrag zur Volksbildung in Böhmen," in Ferdinand Seibt, ed., *Vereinswesen und Geschichtspflege in den böhmischen Ländern*, (Munich: 1986), pp. 139-178.

4. Lippert, "Die Erziehung auf nationaler Grundlage," p. 1.

5. Lippert, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-3.

6. I am not arguing that the actual relationship which linked Bohemia and Moravia with Vienna was comparable to the relationships of European powers to their colonies. Rather, it was the German nationalists themselves who tended to imagine their position in those provinces as culturally comparable to the European colonists overseas. On the question of center and periphery in the Habsburg Monarchy, see Jiri Mallir, "Bürgertum in Mähren zwischen Prag und Wien," in Hannes Stekl et. al, eds., *"Durch Arbeit, Besitz, Wissen und Gerechtigkeit" Bürgertum in der Habsburgermonarchie*, II, (Vienna: 1992), pp. 94-111. Mallir argues that despite Moravia's relatively central role in the Habsburg economy, the province should be viewed as forming a culturally and politically peripheral entity in the Monarchy.

7. Many nationalists in the 1880s defined Austrian German culture as Europe's cultural bulwark against an historically less civilized slavic "East." They justified the presence of a German-speaking population in East-Central Europe in colonial terms, seeing their ancestors as settlers who had brought with them elements of civilization which had literally increased the value of the land. Recalling the history of the German peoples who had settled in Bohemia and Moravia, the Moravian parliamentary deputy Armand von

Dumreicher noted, for example, that, "Older city neighborhoods in present-day Slavic towns still show their German imprint. All of this culture in the East was actually introduced by German Colonists..." Armand, Freiherr von Dumreicher, *Südostdeutsche Betrachtungen*, (Leipzig: 1893), p. 38.

8. The literature on the invention of race, for example, points overwhelmingly to the frontier, the colony, the borderland, the margin as the contexts where broad categories of human difference are invented, tried out and deployed for a variety of purposes. Thus, historians studying the origins of French, German or English nationalism need to consider the extent to which those categories may have been decisively shaped at various moments by developments outside the continent of Europe in places like Haiti, Namibia, Ireland or India. See, for example, Segal, "The European" and Stoler, "Rethinking Colonial Categories."

9. See, for example, Carl Schorske's equation of nationalism with petty bourgeois radicalism in his *Fin de Siecle Vienna: Politics and Culture*, (New York: 1980), pp. 5-6.

10. See, for example, *Das Deutschtum in Krain. Ein Wort zur Aufklärung*, (Graz: 1862). Also Judson, "Whether Race or Conviction," pp. 81-84. Writings from the pages of *Schwarz-Roth-Gold*, organ of the Association of Germans in Austria during the revolution of 1848, reflect this equation of German identity with the adoption of politically liberal positions.

11. See for example Peter Vodopivec's discussion of Slovene academic and writer Dragotin Dezman in "Die sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Ansichten des deutschen Bürgertums in Krain vom Ende der sechziger bis zum Beginn der achtziger Jahre des 19. Jahrhunderts," in Helmut Rumpler and Arnold Suppan, eds., *Geschichte der Deutschen im Bereich des heutigen Slowenien 1848-1941*, (Munich: 1988), especially, pp. 87-93. For an excellent discussion of issues surrounding German identity in mid-19th-century Prague, see Gary B. Cohen, *The Politics of Ethnic Survival: Germans in Prague, 1861-1914*, (Princeton: 1981), pp. 19-51, especially pp. 45-47.

12. German liberals bitterly opposed the Slav political nationalism which emerged in 1848. In that revolutionary year, bourgeois Czechs in Bohemia defined their political identity in opposition to the central state and its German-speaking bureaucracy, arguing for a decentralized political system organized around ethnic considerations and historical provincial boundaries. These Czech arguments suggested an alternative form of upward mobility to the traditional model of becoming German. Later, when the Czech nationalist movement formed a tactical alliance with the federalist wing of the Bohemian nobility in 1861, this choice gave German liberals the additional complaint that Slav nationalism harbored a socially reactionary political agenda. See Bruce Garver, *The Young Czech Party 1874-1901 and the Emergence of a Multi-Party System*, (New Haven: 1978), pp. 13-15; 31.

13. One brief exception to this attitude toward nationalism was the 1871 "Hohenwart crisis" which saw some German liberals in Bohemia couch their political appeals in terms of nationality. Yet even in this case, as soon as the crisis had ended, mainstream liberals disavowed the more radical nationalist rhetoric. See Judson, "'Whether Race or Conviction'," pp. 85-6.

14. On the question of Liberal party social policy toward the lower-middle and working classes following the *Krach* of 1873, see Wilhelm Wadl, *Liberalismus und soziale Frage in Österreich* (Vienna: 1987), particularly pp.158-234.

15. For an elaboration of this interpretation of Lueger and his politics, see John W. Boyer, *Political Radicalism Imperial Vienna. Origins of the Christian Social Movement 1848-1897*, (Chicago: 1981).
16. The essays and speeches in Philip Knoll, *Beiträge zur heimischen Zeitgeschichte* (Prague: 1900) constitute excellent examples of this ideological transformation. See also Cohen's illuminating general discussion of this process in his *Politics of Ethnic Survival*, pp. 52-85; 140-183.
17. Cohen, *op. cit.*, pp. 184-232, and Judson, "'Whether Race or Conviction'," pp. 87-94.
18. Anti-Semitism offered to many a more egalitarian construction of nationalist ideology, since it stressed a racial definition of a German community, rather than a cultural one. For this reason, liberal nationalists fought hard to prevent anti-Semites from gaining influence within their associations. See Judson, "Whether Race or Conviction," pp. 92-94.
19. *Mittheilungen des deutschen Schulvereins (MDS)*, #5, November 1882, p. 1.
20. *MDS* # 6, February 1883, p. 10. Readers of this survey might note the obvious absence of factory workers, journeymen and agricultural laborers from the list, all occupations which employed considerable numbers of people in Austrian society.
21. Peter Heumos, "Interessensolidarität gegen Nationalgemeinschaft. Deutsche und Tschechische Bauern in Böhmen 1848-1918," in Ferdinand Seibt ed., *Die Chance der Verständigung: Absichten und Ansätze zu übernationaler Zusammenarbeit in den böhmischen Ländern 1848-1918*, (Munich: 1987) pp. 87-100, particularly p. 91.
22. Christian Ritter d'Elvert, *Geschichte und Beschreibung der (königlichen Kreis-) und Bergstadt Iglau in Mähren*, (Brünn: 1850), p. 459.
23. *Deutscher Volkskalender für die Iglauer Sprachinsel [DVIS]*, 1887, p. 97.
24. Michael Hainisch, *Die Zukunft der Deutsch-Österreicher. Eine statistisch-volkswirtschaftliche Studie*, (Vienna: 1892), (Vienna: 1892), p. 9; Rainer von Reinöhl, "Die Bedrohung des Böhmerwaldes" and "Der Tschechische Schulverein," in *Deutsche Worte*, (Vienna: 1885), pp. 123-134; 159-179. See also, von Reinöhl, *Die Hut der Sudetenländer durch den Deutschen Schulverein* (Vienna: 1886), particularly p. 40, where the author claims: "The German School Association has never tried to found schools in purely Czech communities, while the (Czech School Association) wanted to force Czech schools on the pure German communities of Wallisgrün, Neuwallisdorf, Krschekowitz and Wetzlau."
25. Reinöhl, "Schulverein," p. 159.
26. Hainisch, *Die Zukunft der Deutsch-Österreicher*, p. v.
27. The term *Umgangssprache* means language of common or daily usage.
28. Surprisingly, little has been written about the role of the census in constructing nationalist categories in Austria. See Emil Brix, "Die Erhebungen der Umgangssprache im zisleithanischen Österreich (1880-1910). Nationale und sozio-ökonomische Ursachen der Sprachenkonflikte" in *Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichte*, #87, 1979. Also, Gerald Stourzh, "Die Gleichberechtigung der Volksstämme als Verfassungsprinzip 1848-1918," in *Die Habsburger Monarchie*, vol. III/2, (Vienna:1980), pp. 975-1206.
29. In any case, in subsequent censuses political parties urged their followers to treat *Umgangssprache* as nationality in order not to undercount their co-nationals. The occasion of the decennial censuses were treated increasingly like political campaigns, with groups

exhorting (particularly rural) inhabitants to categorize themselves according to national loyalty, and watchdog groups springing up to make certain (particularly in some cities) that no undue pressure was put on individuals to declare themselves as speakers of the wrong *Umgangssprache*. See Brix, "Die Erhebungen der Umgangssprache."

30. See Cohen, *Politics*, p. 20, for a critique of the reliability of earlier census estimates. For the results of the censuses taken in 1851, 1880, 1890, 1900 and 1910, see Peter Urbanitsch, "Die Deutschen in Österreich. Statistisch-deskriptiver Überblick," in *Die Habsburger Monarchie*, vol. III/1, tabel 1.

31. The German Liberal deputy Armand von Dumreicher noted, for example, that in many Eastern regions, "German creations remain, but the German people are gone. Yet even here the stones speak; they speak for those who were and are no more." See Dumreicher, *Südostdeutsche Betrachtungen*, p. 38.

32. Hainisch, *Die Zukunft der Deutsch-Österreicher*, p. 6.

33. See the article "Plöckenstein oder Blöckenstein," a typical example of this genre, in *Mittheilungen des deutschen Böhmerwaldbundes [MDB]*, #2, July 1885, pp. 26-27. On the General German Language Association, see *MDS*, #17, December, 1885, p. 3; *DVIS*, 1885, p. 166.

34. On women's activism in the nationalist associations, see Judson, "Die unpolitische Bürgerin im politisierenden Verein: Zu einigen Paradoxa des bürgerlichen Weltbildes im 19. Jahrhundert," in Stekl et. al, *Bürgertum* vol. II, pp. 337-345; also Judson, "The Gendered Politics of German Nationalism in Austria, 1880-1900," in David Good, et al, eds., *Women in Austria*, (forthcoming, 1994).

35. *DVIS*, 1887, p. 156.

36. "Grüss Gott du deutscher Mann" in *Nationales Erbauungs-Buch für das deutsche Volk in Österreich*, (Brünn: 1882), p. 129. This book was published by the German Club of Brünn.

37. *MDB*, #17, 1889, pp. 188-190. See also Judson, "Gendered Politics" in Good, et. al.

38. This advice aimed to slow the migrations of German working-class or peasant men and women from Bohemia in search of better jobs, by offering their women employment as servants. The organization sought to find other forms of employment for women of the lower middle and working classes, as well as to prevent the spread of alcoholism and illegitimacy. See below, p. 28.

39. Hainisch, *Die Zukunft der Deutsch-Österreicher*, p. 9.

40. *Die Deutschen im Nationalitätenstaat Österreich*, (Meran: 1887), pp. 11-23.

41. *MDB*, #17, 1889, pp. 189-190.

42. "Haltet Eure Tracht in Ehren!" in *DVIS*, 1893, pp. 95-6.

43. See Reinöhl, "Böhmerwald," pp. 132-134. The league also supported local German-speaking schools, town libraries and it contributed funds for the erection of local monuments to Emperor Joseph II.

44. *BDM*, 1889, p. 54.

45. *BDM*, 1889, p. 100.

46. *BDM*, 1889, p. 98.

47. Voting patterns in those provinces in the 1890s confirm this reorientation away from a single central party toward regional politics. From the late 1880s until 1918, the electoral map of the Austrian half of the Monarchy portrays a fundamental split between

the central provinces which moved into the camp of the Catholic Social movement, and the ethnically mixed provinces of the north and south where various German nationalist parties generally prevailed. See for example, Lothar Höbelt, "Die Linke und die Wahlen von 1891," in *Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs*, no. 40, 1987, pp. 270-301.

48. Judson, "Whether Race or Conviction," pp. 92-94.