

SOME PROBLEMS OF THE FEUDAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE INFEUDATION IN THE KAMAKURA PERIOD, 1185—1333

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In the following papers, I shall discuss some of the problems of the feudal institutions and the infeudation in the *Kamakura* period (1185—1333) in view of the growth of feudalism in Japan. The discussion will be theoretical to a great extent, because the main attempt will be concerned with establishing a consistent scheme of the history of the early feudal period by using the latest results of research by such Japanese historians as Ishimoda Tadashi and Nagahara Keiji.

It is generally known that "the ultimate origin of feudalism must be sought in the maladjustment between the Chinese regime, which was introduced in the seventh and early eighth centuries, and the primitive social habits of the nation, which reacted upon the alien institutions."¹ Past studies seem to have been focussed on the growth of private land-ownership by the nobles and religious institutions. However, private land-ownership—the *Shōen* (manor) system—itself, in reality, was quite different from the private land-ownership—the manor system—which existed in the West. Unlike its European counterpart, the *Shōen* system was based entirely upon the ancient aristocracy. Even after the establishment of the military government by Minamoto Yoritomo in 1192, at the beginning of the *Kamakura* period, one of the main problems of the infeudation was the political dualism between the military power and the non-military powers.

The feudal institutions, which we can see in the *Bakufu* system

in the *Kamakura* period, brought tremendous confusion into the understanding of the growth of feudalism in Japan. The operation of the *Gokenin* system (retainer system), for instance, which aimed at setting the relationship between the *Shogun* and his vassals, seems to have been influenced by the complicated land-ownership derived from the ancient period. The feudal laws set up by the *Bakufu* certainly stressed a kind of vassalage which was rather like the *hominum ligium* between the chiefs and warriors of European feudalism. However although there was a similarity in the feudal institutions of the Japanese and the European systems, the degree of infeudation in the Japanese system was less. In this sense, the feudalism of the *Kamakura* period was immature feudalism.

Regarding these problems, the latest works by Japanese historians are remarkable for their definitions of the real factors in the early feudalism. However, it is regrettable that these works do not reveal a sufficient perspective in evaluating the whole historical process from the late *Heian* period to the *Ashikaga* period. However, one must concede their deep insight and detailed analyses of such component topics as the studies of the individual *Shō*. For the further advancement of the study of the early feudalism, this paper aims to define the real transition of the social structure in the *Kamakura* period by analysing the relationship between the feudal institutions and infeudation.

I

Obviously, the *Gokenin* system in the *Kamakura* period advocated a certain relationship between the *Shōgun* and his immediate retainers. Its hierarchal nature led to the subordination of the retainers to the *Shōgun* and constituted a major element in the power structure of the *Bakufu*. This system, however,

was not the one which was originated by the *Kamakura Bakufu*. The idea underlying this system seems to have been related to the earlier *Ienoko-Kenin* (retainers) system of the *Heian* period. The *Ienoko-Kenin* system, in turn, grew out of, and developed alongside the so-called *Sōryō* (primogeniture) system. The householder (*Sōryō*), who was concerned with the management of *Myōden* (credited field in the *Shō*), shared his responsibility with his *Ienoko-Kenin*. And the relationship between the *Sōryō* and his house-men called “*Sōryō* system”.

Originally the *Sōryō* system was based on the degree of consanguinity or kinship and confined the hereditary suzerainty of the house or family to the *Sōryō*. This system later developed into the feudal vassalage and became a standard to determine the hierarchal position of each member in a house unit which was developed from a clan or family system.

It is noteworthy that even through the *Taika* Reform in 645 the domestic servants who belonged to the nobles were allowed to be private servants of the clans rather than free-people. These private servants were called ‘*Kenin*’ by the *Taihō* Laws which was promulgated in 702. This type of ‘*Kenin*’ apparently was of a higher status than the ancient domestic slaves. However, insofar as they were regarded as little more than properties of the estates, their position had no significant change²⁾.

In general the *Kenin* were under the patronage of the masters, but the patronage itself did not include any wage or salary payments. Therefore the relationship between domanial chiefs and ‘*Kenin*’ seems to have been similar to a slave-system subordination rather than a feudal-system subordination.

The *Kenin* in the *Shōen* had been native cultivators and domestic servants. Gradually their status was changed by the growth of the *Shōen*-style private land-ownership by the nobility

or religious institutions out of the public lands which were previously under the direct administration of the government during the *Heian* period (9—12c.). That is to say, some of them became military guards and lower officials of the local administrations in the private domains. In exchange for their services, they were given grants of land. However, since the land grants were sufficient only for sustenance and no more, and since the new positions could not be refused, the change in status was not significant. And in fact, there remained an all too-great resemblance to the slave system.

II

There are some doubts as to the relationship of the *Gokenin* system set up by the *Kamakura Bakufu*, to the *Kenin* system of the late *Heian* period. These problems seem to offer certain points for investigating the rise of the power of the military class (*samurai*). For this reason the ultimate origin of the *Kenin* system must be sought in the change of the social structure in the *Heian* period, rather than in the ancient institutions.

It is noted that in the late *Heian* period the growth of the *Sōryō* system seemed to be inversely proportional to the decline of large-scale private domains which dominated the middle of the *Heian* period. In the domains the holders of the certain *Myōden* gradually increased their power out of the slight progress of agricultural techniques and productivity, which forced them to clear new land (*shingai*). Any new land could be held by the one who had cleared it. These land-holders (*myōshu* or *tato*) were going to be house-chiefs when they could accumulate enough land.

Actually the economic basis of these rising land-holders was guaranteed by the family system, the character of which was a smaller image of the old clan system. However the basis of the

ancient institutional land-lordship held by the state was shaken by the growth of the private land-lordship among the central nobles. In this situation the local land-holders at that time were ruled by both institutional land-lordship of the state and private land-lordship of the nobles and temples. Therefore finally the state tried to keep its institutional land-lordship through the liberation of the private domestic servants. However the private land-lords, like the nobles, could react against this policy by means of the exemption of corvee (*fuyaku*) for their own domestic servants. The local wealthier land-holders were inclined to depend on the private land-lords because of their lack of political means to protest against the policy of the state. Thus the alliance between the nobles and the local wealthier land-holders resulted from their common interest in maintaining the slave system on the lands. However this situation also brought the conflict between the two classes to its next step by the growing power of the private land-lords. Since the official position of the wealthier land-holders was nullified by the decline of the authority of the state, they could not stand against the pressure of the private land-lords without arming themselves. The armament enabled the wealthier holders to become independent against the private land-lords. This situation was supposed to have constituted the ultimate origin of the military class.³⁹

However the lands which were directly managed by the wealthier holders as house-chiefs were cultivated by their domestic servants of their followers (*Kenin*) for the sake of sustenance. The rest of the lands held were given over to relatives or immediate followers with agricultural instruments supplied by their house-chiefs. Thus the house-chiefs retained the land and its concomitant economic and social power. However the basic structure of their power and relationship with their followers depended

fundamentally on the bond of kinship as well as the semi-slave system⁴⁾.

The kinship bondage in the *Myōshu* or *Tato* units certainly did not allow their relatives' independence. The bondage itself was strictly within the framework of the consanguinous unity of the relatives as local communities. Therefore the growth of the *Myōshu* class could not be a main factor of the decline of the ancient institutional land system. However the historical significance of the growth of the *Myōshu* class at that time is that the *Myōshu* promoted the rise of the local domanical land-lords who were more powerful than the *Myōshu* itself. That is, the powerful *Myōshu* enhanced its power sufficiently to allow rule over several *Myōshu* villages as its own domain, and even communal lands and forests (*iriai*) were included in the domain. The growth of the local domanical lordship was only possible because of the continuously unstable management of the lands under the rule of the state. The local domanical lordship followed the rise of landholders of a new type, who were substantially different from the original *Myōshu*. This meant that the *Myōshu* was going to reorganize its kinship-type party for the political purpose of combating the local domanical lordship. This change reinforced the unity of the *Myōshu* party and also its *Sōryō* system. Of course, even the local domanical lords were excepted from this tendency and the powerful *Myōshu* were going to be more political and military units⁵⁾.

Through the *Hogen-Heiji* Wars (1156, 1159) and the *Juei* War (1182-85) the *Sōryō* system seems to have developed to a great extent. The powerful local parties divided into two military camps, the *Heike* or the *Genji*, and some of them expanded their powers by obtaining the beneficiary lands (sometimes called "fiefs"). But the beneficiary lands were not only the lands which

belonged to the warriors but also those which were officially owned by the state, nobles or religious institutions. In addition, the *Sōryō* made his previously owned land 'home domain' (domesne) and his beneficiary lands 'follower-holding domains'. The former was directly managed by the *Sōryō* and the latter was managed by his relatives or his immediate followers as bailiffs. The relatives were called '*Ienoko*' and the followers were called '*Kenin*'. Each '*Ienoko*' and each '*Kenin*' in his turn also had his own '*Ienoko*' and '*Kenin*'.

III

The *Gokenin* system in the *Kamakura* period seemed to reflect the *Ienoko-Kenin* (retainers) system developing among the powerful *Myōshu* in the late *Heian* period. Yoritomo was called '*Tōryō*' (chief) and this means he was '*Sōryō*' of all '*Ienoko*' (relatives) and the suzerain of all his '*Kenin*' (followers). The structure of the *Bakufu*, especially its authority, depended on this '*Ienoko-Kenin*' system. In addition to this, however, there were some of the traditional elements of the general *Kenin* system existing in the ancient style landownership. Therefore the *Gokenin* system seems to have combined the elements of the '*Ienoko-Kenin*' system and those of the old '*Kenin*' system.

As a background of the *Bakufu* there was a strong affiliation between the *Genji* clan and the local families existing in eastern Japan. Here the important factor is that eastern Japan was an underdeveloped part of the country. And the local military powers were more or less related to the ancestors of the *Genji* clan by their traditional loyalty. The traditional loyalty was maintained by the local families and passed on within the circle of their blood-relations. In addition, their relationship with the *Genji* clan was to a great extent a sort of slave-type subordination which

was based on the patriarchal management of agriculture in eastern Japan. Therefore the tie between the *Shōgun* and the *Gokenin* was a sort of compulsory loyalty which coincided with the slave-type relationship existing in the underdeveloped agrarian societies in eastern Japan. At the same time some of the *Gokenin* were not traditional followers of the *Genji* clan. Many of these non-traditional followers were appointed to the *Gokenin*, especially those who were from western Japan, so that the *Bakufu* could strengthen its hold over that section of the country.⁶⁾ However, since the *Gokenin* system was dominated by the eastern warriors at the starting point of the *Bakufu*, the system seems to have reflected the elements of the underdeveloped areas like eastern Japan. This factor was especially dominant in the structure of the military units.

Since the premise of the *Sōryō* system in reality was the kinship bondage, the national unification under the *Bakufu* gave a chance to add the elements of the area unity to the *Sōryō* system. Then the *Gokenin* system faced the necessity of reinforcing its system in the new situation and a complicated series of feudal duties and codes were issued by the *Bakufu*. Finally these duties and codes were compiled in an unified form under the *Hōjō* clan as the *Jōei Shikimoku* (1232). This law seems to have put emphasis on the *Sōryō* system on the basis of the *Gokenin* system around the *Bakufu* and stressed the unity of the *Gokenin* for the purpose of strengthening the central military power against the gradual rise of un-classified new powerful local groups from below. In this point, it is important that the establishment of the *Bakufu* was fundamentally achieved on the recognition of the already existing land-ownership. This was typified in the fact that the official administrative power of Yoritomo covered only eastern Japan (*Kantō Goryō*—eastern imperial domain), despite his official position as *Shōgun* (“the supreme head of the military class”).

IV

As we can see in its contents, the *Jōei Shikimoku* itself obviously reflected the political dualism of the military power of the *Bakufu* and the non-military power centering around the imperial court. At the same time, it seems that the historical role of the *Shugo* (constables) and *Jitō* (stewards) was chiefly concerned with the control of the imperial court power.

Actually the purpose in the establishing of the *Shugo-Jitō* system in 1185 was to enhance the power of the local domanial land-lords who constituted the main portion of the *Gokenin*, against the owners of the *Shōen* and the state lands. Therefore the main functions of the *Shugo-Jitō* system were two: to limit the imperial power; and to prevent the growth of the power of the lower followers of the military class or attached cultivators. It was felt that installing the *Shugo-Jitō* system in the areas not directly under the control of the *Bakufu*, i.e., the areas outside the domains of the *Gokenin*, was the only way to keep the *Shōen* under control. It was also obvious that the *Shugo-Jitō* system was used as the 'spring board' to secure the power of those local domanial land-lords of the military class that were already in existence.⁷⁾

Under the *Shugo* who controlled the military-police power, the *Jitō* was chiefly concerned with the control of the state and private lands owned by the imperial power, nobles, and religious institutions. However, the growth of the *Jitō*'s power soon enabled him to confiscate the lands from the owners or to impose very heavy taxes on the manor-owners, perhaps a too-zealous interpretation of his duties. The land which was owned by the *Jitō* was assessed a heavier produce-tax than the lands in the *Shōen*. Furthermore, the *Jitō* sometimes levied his private tax on the cultivators in the *Shōen*. Through this process the power of the *Jitō* was enhanced to a great extent, much greater than that of

the local land-holder (*Myōshu* class) who had originally been in the same social stratum as the *Jitō*. Thus the growth of the *Jitō*'s power resulted in *Jitō* landlordship. At the same time, however, the growth of the *Jitō*'s power led to a radical internecine struggle among three powers; the *Jitō*, the *Shōen*-owners, and the general *Myōshu*.⁸⁾

The growth of the *Jitō*'s power as the local domanial landlords seems to have been fundamentally promoted by the development of the *Shugo* power through such wars as the *Jōkyū no Hen* (1221) and the *Bunei-Kōan no Eki* (the Mongol Invasions in 1274 and 1281). In fact, the *Jitō*'s power to a great extent infringed on the suzerainty of the lands owned by the imperial court or nobles under the protection of the *Shugo*.

V

Another main factor which worked towards increasing the *Jitō*'s power resulted from the change of the *Sōryō* system. In the early *Kamakura* period, the *Jitō* appointed by the *Bakufu* were usually chosen from among the traditional followers of the *Genji* clan. They were mostly from eastern Japan and each has assistants, who, as bailiffs or wardens in the *Jitō* system, helped to achieve complete control of the assessed districts. The *Sōryō* system, however, defined the absolute supremacy of the *Sōryō*, and the relatives or branch families, who were assistants of the *Sōryō*, had almost no share in the estates and privileges of the *Sōryō*. However, the principle of divided rule under the *Sōryō* certainly promoted the independence of branch families from the *Sōryō*'s power as well as their rights as the officials for several generations. This tendency was parallel to the growth of the area unity which followed the progress of the *Shugo* system. The *Jitō* who was assigned to the remote areas by the *Sōryō* was to have close contact with the local

Shugo. This change seems to have been based on the fact that the *Sōryō* system, which had emphasized the kinship unity before, was about to decline and the *Shugo* system, which stood on the principle of area unity, was about to be strengthened.

The local rebellions which occurred in the middle of the *Kamakura* period against the Hōjō power, were indications of the transition from the kinship unity to the area unity. The rebellion under Miura Yasumura in 1247 was a traditional family-party uprising like previous rebellions of the early *Kamakura* period. But the rebellion under Akita Jōsuke in 1285 was a fight between the *Gokenin* party of the *Shugo* and the Hōjō government. The latter obviously showed a certain degree of the development of the *Shugo*'s power and seems to have been a leading example of the growth of the *Shugo*-feudalism which came into existence in the *Ashikaga* period.⁹³ However the most important thing revealed by the Akita rebellion was the appearance of the area unity of the military class.

The *Bunei-Kōan no Eki* (the Mongol Invasions in 1274 and 1261) offered the *Bakufu* a precious opportunity to reinforce its authority over the lands which were owned by the non-military powers. This was accompanied by the mobilization of the military landholders in those areas. Thus the dictatorial power of the Hōjō *Bakufu* in the late *Kamakura* period overwhelmed the non-military power. On the other hand, the growth of the area unity of the military class was supposed to be the basis for the political alliance of the *Shugo* who became *Daimyō* (feudal lords) in the *Ashikaga* period. To combat this new danger, the Hōjō leaders appointed Hōjō relatives as *Shugo*, thus attempting to strengthen the regime against the growth of the area unity of the military class. The result was to heighten the confusion between kinship unity and area unity, thus inviting the ruin of the Hōjō regime.

VI

In the course of the growth of the *Shugo Daimyo* in the *Ashikaga*, period, we should pay attention to the change of the social structure of the agrarian society in the late *Kamakura* period. In the middle of the *Kamakura* period, there was the tremendous growth of the *Jitō's* power in local areas. But later the *Jitō* became politically impotent. This problem seems to be related to the elimination of the political dualism by the *Shugo-Jito* system as well as the growth of infeudation in the society.

In general the *Jitō* as well as the *Myōshu* divided his own land into the *Jitō's* home-land (*tsukuda*) and the peasant-holding lands. His home-land was cultivated by 'predial service' supplied by his land-holders as well as by his followers. In so far as the home-land and the peasant-holding lands were distinguished, and in so far as the cultivation of the home-land depended on the predial service from the land-holders, this system seems to have been similar to the 'classical manor' system in European feudal society. However the important thing is that the cultivation of the home-land was done not only by predial service from the land-holders but also by the lower followers. It is noted that these followers were as much a part of the *Jitō's* estates as was the land. Even the land-holder class (*myōshu*) in general might own some of these followers. And these lower cultivators were supplied for the predial service for the cultivation of the home-land by the land-holders. This tendency apparently was a holdover from the ancient family system¹⁰⁾.

On the other hand, the *Jitō* land-lordship was closely related to the land-holders (*myōshu*). One of the reasons was the similar natures of the *Jitō* and the *Myōshu* in their social structure. That is, both the *Jitō* and the *Myōshu* in general could pass their burdens on to their followers. In addition to this, the *Myōshu*

more or less had to compromise with the *Jitō*, because both wanted to increase their own independence in the hierarchical structure of the society. On the other hand, the *Myōshu* could be a decisive aid in the conflicts between the *Jitō* and the *Shōen*-owners. The resistance of the *Myōshu* against the *Jitō* resulted in the alliance of the *Myōshu* and the *Shōen*-owners. Again, the resistance against the *Shōen*-owners resulted in the alliance between the *Myōshu* and the *Jitō*. However the tie between the *Myōshu* and the *Jitō* prevailed over the tie between the *Myōshu* and the *Shōen*-owners, because the *Jitō* compromised or yielded to the *Myōshu* more than the *Shōen*-owners did.¹¹⁾

The reason for this may stem from the necessity of the *Jitō* to obtain their independence from the bondage of the *Sōryō* system to control the power of the *Shōen*. The alliance between the *Myōshu* and the *Shōen*-owners, indeed, brought the decline of the *Sōryō* system and an increase in the *Jitō*'s power. At the same time, this alliance also seems to have caused a disruption within the *Myōshu* class.

The *Myōshu* class was used to holding the land and the lower cultivators. Some of the *Myōshu* became bailiffs in the *Jitō* system and governed the other *Myōshu* and their lower cultivators. It is one of the characteristics of the late *Kamakura* period that in general the *Myōshu* and lower cultivators cooperated closely with each other. Although the *Myōshu*, who became officials of the *Shōen* or the *Jitō* system, was used to controlling the general cultivators, the interest of the *Myōshu* depended on the cultivators to a great extent. At the same time, the *Myōshu*, merchants, and usurers had almost the same character at that time. Those people sometimes confiscated the property of the lower cultivators as a sort of political resistance against the upper rulers. The development of domestic commerce raised the socio-economic power of the

Myōshu class and enabled the *Myōshu* to continue political action against the upper rulers. In other words, the *Myōshu* were aiming to free themselves from their domanical rulers. However the *Myōshu* were still regarded as necessary to the domanical system by the domanical lords. In so far as the *Myōshu* tried to fight against the upper rulers, they had to depend on the cooperation of the lower cultivators who had a grievance under the dual lordship of the military and non-military classes. The growth of infeudation increased their grievances, and their demands became increasingly anti-feudal in tone. Then the poorer cultivators were organized and armed under the leadership of the *Myōshu* class. The unity between the *Myōshu* and lower cultivators was enough to eliminate the dual lordship of the agrarian society. This substantial change of the agrarian society was also the basis of the coming pure-feudalization of the agrarian society. These cultivators were under the dual system of the community (*mura*) and the *Shōen* on one hand, and above that dual system there was the dual rule by the *Shugo* and the *Shōen*-owners. Then the power of the *Shōen*-owners was assumed by the *Shugo* when the development of the communities had overcome the *Shōen* system. Therefore the *Shugo* intended to govern the units of the agrarian communities.¹²⁾

Through these circumstances, it seems that the *Jitō* who were originally from the *Myōshu* class, were lost their position in the complicated disruption of the *Myōshu* class. Out of the tie between the *Jitō* and the *Myōshu*, the *Jitō* was entirely disingrated into the *Myōshu*. The strong revolutionary energy among the poorer cultivators under the dual lordship not only enhanced the power of the *Myōshu*, but also forced some of the *Myōshu* down into the lower-cultivator class in the incessant agrarian uprisings (*Do ikki*) of the *Aashikaga* period. These circumstances prepared the basis for the emergence of pure feudalism in Japan.

CONCLUSION

On the whole, the main question of the formation of feudalism in the *Kamakura* period is chiefly concerned with the evaluation of the real feature of the *Myōshu-samurai*-landholders at that time. The latest studies of Japanese historians reveal the fact that the relationship between the *Gokenin* and the peasants was more semi-slavery than semi-feudal. This problem is also related to the understanding of the *Soryo* system in the *Kamakura* period.

Actually the *Sōryō* system which endorsed the *Gokenin* system in the *Kamakura* period was influenced by the inconsistency between the land-ownership and land-holdership. The growth of the power of the land-holders created the conditions for the growth of infeudation. The increased number of serfs resulted from the overcoming of the ancient power structure by the land-holders. At the same time, the land-holders were faced by the necessity of reinforcing their own power against any kind of land-lord. Their efforts crystalized in the setting of the *Sōryō system*. The *Sōryō* system, therefore, was a sort of serfdom under the strict kinship bondage, because the interests of land-holders still coincided with those of domestic servants and lower followers within a patriarchal relationship.

The social structure of the *Kamakura Bakufu* seems to have been based on these circumstances. However this kind of system—the *Sōryō* system—could hardly be homogeneous throughout the country. In this very structure lay one fundamental reason for the decline of the *Bakufu*, although at the beginning of the *Kamakura* period it had been strong enough to control the entire country. The split within the *Myōshu* weakened the *Sōryō* system which in turn weakened the *Bakufu* itself. The gradual growth of the non-*Gokenin* and the substantial change of the *Shugo* power on the basis of the area unity which was entirely different from

the basis of the *Gokenin* system of the *Bakufu*, accommodated the decline of the *Bakufu* power as well as the growth of the infudation.

In this sense the *Bakufu* in the *Kamakura* period which once ruled over the country was based on the immature infeudation which was typified in eastern Japan in the early *Kamakura* period. Therefore the *Bakufu* institutions could hardly apply to the growth of the non-*Gokenin* and the area unity. Under these circumstances the *Shugo* in the underdeveloped areas strengthened their power, organizing the new powerful land-holders, the non-*Gokenin*, in a local scale under his rule. This tendency promoted the establishment of area feudalism and a feudal hierarchy through a series of civil wars from the end of the *Kamakura* period to the end of the *Ashikaga* period.

However the fundamental problems of the early feudalism still provoke a number of questions in view of the studies of feudalism in Japan, inspite of the remarkable works of the experts of the *Shōen* system. The questions are still concerned with the relationship between the substantial structure of the society and the power of the *Bakufu*. The focus of these questions has been on the evaluation of the relationship between the feudal institutions and the infeudation. Although the individual studies bring to us the general picture of feudalism in the *Kamakura* period, an integrated understanding has not been achieved yet. In this sense, further analyses of the productivity of the society around the *Kamakura* period would have indicated the fundamental conditions of the power structure and the conflicts among nobles, the military class, and the peasantry. Such analyses are desperately needed. Thus the problems of the institutions and the infeudation seem to go back to the minor problems existing within the *Shōen* system.

Footnote

- 1) K. Asakawa, "Feudalism (Japanese)". *Encyclopedia of the Social Science*, (ed. by E.R.A. Seligman and A. Johnson), 1931, Vol. VI, p. 214.
- 2) Okuda Masahiro, "Bushii kaikyū no seiritsu (The rise of the military class)", in *Shin Nihonshi Kōza* (New series on Japanese history), Tōkyo, 1948, p. 18.
- 3) Tōma Seita, *Nihon Shōenshi* (History of the Japanese manor), Tōkyo, 1947, pp. 363—373.
- 4) Takeuchi Rizō, *Jiryō Shōen no Kenkyū* (Studies of ecclesiastic manors) Tōkyō, 1942, p. 164.
- 5) Ishimoda Tadashi, *Chūseiteki Sekai no Keisei* (Formation of the medieval world), Tōkyō, 1950, pp. 122—138.
- 6) Satō Shinichi, "Bakufuron (Treatise on the Bakufu)", in *Shin Nihonshi Kōza* (New series on Japanese history), Tōkyō, 1949, pp. 15—18.
- 7) Nagahara Keiji, "Hōkenjidai zenki no minshū seikatsu (The life of the common people in the early feudal period)", in *Shin Nihonshi Kōza* (New series on Japanese history), Tokyo, 1950. pp. 6—7.
- 8) Nagahara Keiji, *op. cit.*, pp. 9—11.
- 9) Satō Shinichi, *op. cit.*, pp. 20—21.
- 10) Nagahara Keiji, *op. cit.*, p. 12.
- 11) *ibid.*, p. 11.
- 12) Suzuki Ryōichi, "Do Ikki Ron (Treatise on the peasants uprisings of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries)," in *Shin Nihonshi Kōza* (New series on Japanese history), Tōkyō), Tokyo, 1948, pp. 3—6.